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Identity and Empire: the Making of the Bolshevik Elite, 1880-1917

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August 2000

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This study concerns the sources of the revolutionary Bolshevik elite's social and ethnic origins in Late Imperial Russia. The key finding is that the Bolshevik leadership of the revolutionary years 1917-1924 was highly ethnically diverse in origin with non-Russians -- Jews, Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians -- constituting nearly two-thirds of the elite. The 'Russian' Revolution was led primarily by elites of the empire's non-Russian national minorities. This thesis therefore considers the sources of their radicalism in the peripheries of the multinational empire.

Although the 'class' language of socialism has dominated accounts not only of the causes of the Revolution but also of the sources of Bolshevik socialism, in my view the Bolsheviks were more a response to a variety of cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic social identities than they were a response to class conflict. The appeal of a theory about class conflict does not necessarily mean that it was class conflict to which the Bolsheviks were responding; they were much more a product of the tensions of a multi-ethnic imperial state than of the alienating 'class' effects of an industrializing Russian state.

How 'peripherals' of the imperial borderlands came to espouse an ideology of the imperial 'center' is the empirical focus. Five substantive chapters on Jews, Poles and Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Transcaucasians, and Latvians, consider the sources of their radicalism by contextualizing their biographies in regional ethnopolitics and in relationships to the Tsarist state. A great attraction of Russian (Bolshevik) socialism was in what it meant for ethnopolitics in the multi-ethnic borderlands: much of the appeal lay in its secularism, its 'ecumenical' political vision, its universalism, its anti-nationalism, and in its implied commitment to "the good imperial ideal". The 'elective affinities' between individuals of different ethnic strata and Russian socialism varied across ethnic groups, and often within them. One of the key themes, therefore, is how a social and political identity is worked out within the context of a multinational empire, invoking social processes such as nationalism, assimilation, Russification, social mobility, access to provincial and imperial 'civil societies', linguistic and cultural choices, and ethnopolitical relationships.

Résumé

Cette thèse ce concentre sur les sources sociales et ethniques de l'élite révolutionnaire bolchevique à la fin de l'Empire russe. L'argument central est que l'élite bolchevique des années révolutionnaires 1917-1924 était d'origines ethniques très variées; les non-Russes–les Juifs, Lettons, Géorgiens, Arméniens, Polonais, Lituaniens, et Ukrainiens--représentaient a peux près deux tiers de l'élite. La Révolution russe était dirigée principalement par les élites des minorités non-russes de l'Empire. La thèse souligne les sources du radicalisme dans les périphéries de l'empire multinational.

Bien que le langage de classe du socialisme ait dominé l'étude non seulement des causes de la Révolution, mais aussi des sources du socialisme bolchevique, à mon avis les Bolcheviques étaient davantage une réponse a une variété d'identités sociales, culturelles, linguistiques, religieuses, et ethniques plutôt qu'à des conflits de classes. L'attrait d'une théorie sur les conflits de classes ne signifie pas que c'était à ce dernier que les bolcheviques réagissaient; ils étaient plutôt le résultat des tensions existant dans un état impérial pluriethnique que des effets aliénant du conflit de classes dans une Russie industrielle.

La voie par laquelle les 'périphéraux' des frontières impériales ont embrassé l'idéologie de la métropole impériale est le sujet principal de recherche. Les cinq chapitres substantifs sur les Juifs, les Polonais et les Lituaniens, les Ukrainiens, les Transcaucasiens, et les Lettons, traitent des sources de leur radicalisme en contextualisant leurs biographies dans les ethnopolitiques régionales et en leur relation avec l'État tsariste.

Un des attraits principaux du socialisme russe était ce qu'il signifiait pour les ethnopolitiques des frontières pluriethniques: une grande partie de l'attraction se base sur son engagement avec son laïcisme, son œcuménisme, son universalisme, son contre-nationalisme, et son idée d'un empire bienveillant. Les "affinités electives" entre les individus de divers niveaux ethniques, et le socialisme Russe variaient à travers les groupes ethniques, et souvent à l'intérieur de ceux-ci. Un des thèmes principaux traite de la manière dans laquelle une identité sociale et politique se forme dans le contexte d'un empire multinational, en invoquant des proces sus sociaux comme le nationalisme, l'assimilation, la Russification, la mobilité sociale, l'accès aux sociétés civiles provinciales et impériales, les choix linguistiques et culturels, et les relations ethnopolitiques.

Acknowledgments

For financial support which permitted research for this thesis, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of a McGill University Social Science and Humanities Research Grant. The McGill Department of Sociology also provided generous support in the way of Teaching Assistantships and several Lectureships in political sociology. I am also grateful for the kind assistance of the staff and archivists at Stanford University's Hoover Institution Archives during the Summer and Fall of 1997. And finally I would like to thank Kevin Hagen and Richard Bachand of the McGill Geography Department for their expert and creative work constructing the map, based only on the barely intelligible Russian and German sources I provided.

That I was able to do this project owes absolutely everything to Professor John A. Hall, whose confidence in me and in this work in political and historical sociology has been more unwavering than my own. But as importantly, my thinking here has been influenced by John Hall's body of work in subtle and not so subtle ways. And his early advice to make my work 'about something', since in 'doing history' ideas will suggest themselves, has been *the* organizing intellectual force behind this thesis.

I am very grateful to my parents, Giorgio and Carla, and to my sister Roberta, for love, encouragement, and support through years of graduate study and thesis work. My father saved the day with last minute computer assistance, and my mother graciously helped with the French translation of the abstract. Thanks are also due to Devrim Yavuz Julie Michaud for assistance in translating the abstract.

Most especially, I owe a great personal debt to my husband, James Kennedy, for his gentle constancy, for his immovable love and faith, and for his intellectual advice in moments when these qualities were most needed.

Auronzo di Cadore, Italy
July 2000


Atlantic Ocean
Arctic Ocean
SWEDEN
FINLAND
NORTH RUSSIA
SIBERIA
ST. PETERSBURG
Baltic Sea
GERMANY
CENTRAL RUSSIA
MIDDLE VOLGA
LOWER VOLGA
BELORUSSIA
CENTRAL BLACK EARTH
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
STEPPE
ROMANIA
Black Sea
CAUCASUS
Caspian Sea
CENTRAL ASIA
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Origins of the Bolshevik Elite (▲) 1917-1924
Major Ethnic Groups
Great Russian
Ukranian
Belorussian
Polish
Bulgarian
German
Swedish
Jews
Romanian
Greek
Latvian (Letts and Letgals), Lithuanian
Armenian
Tatish, Kurd, Ossetian, Tajik
Cherkess, Kagatchiag, Abkhazian, Chechens
Lesghiens
Georgians: Georgian Mingrel, Suanetes, etc.
Finnish, Karelian, Estonian, Livonian
Lapp
Samoyed
Eastern Finns: Mordvidian, Cheremise, Votiak, Permiak, Vogol, Zyrian, Magyar (sparsely populated)
Tatar, Kirghiz
Bashkir
Chuvash
Kalmuk
more than 15% of population
10-15% of population
eastern boundary of Pale of Settlement
0 100 200 400km

Chapter 1
Introduction

This study concerns the sources of the revolutionary Bolshevik elite's social and ethnic origins in Late Imperial Russia. The key finding is that the Bolshevik leadership of the revolutionary years 1917-1924 was highly ethnically diverse in origin with non-Russians -- Jews, Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians -- constituting nearly two-thirds of the elite. The 'Russian' Revolution was led primarily by elites of the empire's non-Russian national minorities.

Historical and political sociology has traditionally conceived of Russia's Revolution either as a 'social revolution' understood in class terms, or as 'political revolution' (or political collapse) understood in statist terms. On both views Russia is conceived as a modernizing 'backward state', the Revolution as 'Russo-centric', and the Bolsheviks as something between modernizing elites or messianic, ideologically-inspired political revolutionaries whose 'Russian soul' found affinity with Marxism. Yet a better understanding of the ethnic origins of the revolutionary Bolshevik elite suggests the possibility of a rather different interpretation. This was not merely a Russian Revolution within an industrializing autocratic state, but a Revolution within a multinational empire, led by a multi-ethnic revolutionary elite. The seismic shift that augured the revolutionary period in Russia was as much the product of highly complex and differentiated ethnic relations and statuses in imperial society as it was the product of a socioeconomically differentiated industrializing state. The central question then is this: how did 'peripherals' of the imperial borderlands come to espouse an ideology of the imperial 'center'?

This turns attention to sources of radicalism in the 'alien' peripheries of the multinational empire. I offer an account of the Bolsheviks of the revolutionary years as products of the late Russian empire and in understanding their politicizations, I consider the relationships between the empire's constituent nationalities and the Tsarist state, as well as the nationalities' regional ethnopolitical contexts.

In politically consequential respects the Russian empire remained traditionally dynastic and status-based in its social stratification, despite its industrializing drive. While social change caused estate categories to be fluid and boundaries between status groups to

become increasingly blurred, the persistence of estates continued through the late imperial period, assisted both by pressures from insecure and threatened elites and by the Russian state's commitment to maintaining social barriers. Indeed imperial Russian society remained so status-particularistic that it was easier for the state to design policies of 'divide and rule' *within* ethnicities than *between* them -- so pronounced were the cultural-linguistic differences between Ukrainian or Polish peasants and elites, and so persistent the cultural-linguistic similarities which brought both Ukrainian and Polish elites inside imperial Russian culture. So status-related linguistic and cultural markers were shifting both because of social changes and in response to Tsarist nationality policies. Russification for instance challenged, among other things, ethnic classifications and cultural possibilities. And the 'alien' peripheries produced not only most of the Bolsheviks, but most other radical ideological groups as well, including Russian nationalists.

Broadly then, the objectives of this thesis are three. Most narrowly and most immediately it is an attempt to understand the sources of the social and national composition of the Bolshevik revolutionary elite. Their early radicalizations and how they came to Russian Social Democracy and Bolshevism comprise the substantive focus of the five area chapters, each devoted to Bolsheviks of different nationalities: Jews, Poles and Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Transcaucasians, and Latvians. By working through their biographies and autobiographies, I situate them within the ethnopolitical contexts of the imperial borderlands and in connection with Tsarist nationality policies.

Secondly and as suggested above, the ethnic diversity of the Bolshevik elite underscores the political importance of ethnicity or nationality and demands that this be considered in the social stratification of Late Imperial Russia and in its political radicalism. This study, therefore, attempts both a better appreciation of the role of linguistic and cultural identities in the social radicalism of the Russian empire, and a clearer and more precise role for nationality, 'status', and 'social class'. 'Class', 'status', and 'nation' were related in a variety of complex ways in the empire's different regions, giving rise not only to variations in local ethnopolitics but also to differential appeals of 'empire'. The 'elective affinities' between individuals and Russian socialism varied across ethnic groups, and often within them. So in terms of social origin, for instance, the Georgians tended to

be impoverished rural gentry, the Jews educated professionals, the Latvians sons of propertied rural elites, the Armenians and the Azerbaijani Turk cultural-literary elites, and Ukrainians Russified workers and Russified 'middling classes'. Yet they all became Bolsheviks. These differences, considered together with various ethnopolitical contexts (the Polish-Lithuanian borderlands, the industrializing southern Ukraine, the Right-bank, the Muslim-Christian Caucasus, the Baltics) and with various Tsarist policies, suggest patterns of 'elective affinities' as differentiated systems of social mobility, statuses, and cultural and linguistic markers.

The third objective of this study is more analytical. One of the key themes is how a social and political identity is worked out within the context of a multi-ethnic empire. This invokes a variety of social processes including nationalism, assimilation, acculturation, Russification, social mobility, access to 'provincial civil society' vs. access to 'imperial civil society', socioethnic stratification, political inclusion-exclusion, language and culture, and ethnopolitical conflict. In transition to modern industrial society, intertwined social markers -- status, rank, class, *sosloviie*, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture -- shifted to define new positions and social strata and new relationships between ethnicities and between ethnic groups and the state. Some resulted in political and cultural national identities, others resulted in purely assimilationist identities, and many more either embodied more dualistic and complex combinations somewhere in between or oscillated between the two.

Ethnopolitics in the imperial borderlands therefore produced not only nationalists, nationalist socialists, and internationalists, but 'Russian centralists' as well -- among the non-Russians often in vicious defense of their 'new' identities. Some ferociously reasserted their 'new' Russified identities against previous ethnic origins. Here I include Dzierzynski, Kapsukas, Manuil'sky, and Ordzhonikidze. Yet others, Narimanov and Skrypnyk, maintained 'national' identities -- ultimately to their very great cost. And the Jews in this elite, though most were Russified and only Jewish by origin not 'affiliation', never escaped their ethnic origins; some had already internalized surrounding anti-Semitism, and though they joined 'Jewish' radical groupings (i.e. the Bund), renounced a Jewish 'ethnic' identity.

Imperial ethnopolitics were also such that different social strata of different ethnicities found political affinities. So, for instance, the son of an impoverished Polish *szlachta* of the *kresy* (Dzierzynski) had more in common with Vilna Jews than with ethnic Poles in Russian Poland. The Russian educated sons of rural impoverished Georgian gentry felt more 'at home' in non-Georgian multi-ethnic Baku and among Azerbaijani peasants and workers than in the Georgian capital Tiflis among European-educated Georgian Mensheviks. And while Polish Jews confronted a strain of Polish anti-Semitism which by the turn of the century viewed Jews as the avant garde of European urban bourgeois decadence and materialism (and nihilism and socialism), Ukrainian Jewish Bolsheviks were confronted with the more rural-inspired, communalistic anti-Semitism of 'Jews on the land'. For some Bolsheviks early political radicalism went from involvement in 'provincial', 'patriotic', or 'national' groupings to more 'internationalist' and 'socialist' ones. As testament of the initial 'ethnic openness' of the socialist (and nationalist) groups which were often multi-ethnic and 'imperial' in character, the same group had within it Russified Jews, impoverished Polish Catholic gentry, Russified Ukrainian elites, and Polonized *quasi*-aristocratic Lithuanian intellectuals.

In terms of the organization of the thesis, Part I comprises two chapters: a general contextual chapter on the Russian empire which highlights a few key relevant features of late imperial Russia, and Chapter 5 which presents my findings on the social and national composition of the Bolshevik elite. Part II contains five chapters, each corresponding to a numerically relevant national grouping: Poles and Lithuanians, Jews, Ukrainians, Transcaucasians (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijani Turks), and Latvians. The most numerically important national minority contingent were the Jews (17), followed by the Ukrainians (8), Latvians (6), Georgians (4), and Armenians (4). Chapter 7 on the Jews includes a brief section on the absence of Polish Jews from Russian Poland, just as Chapter 10 on the Latvians required a brief account of the absence of Estonians from the revolutionary Bolshevik elite.

However certain groupings have been omitted, namely the Russians, the Central Asians, and 'others' (Bulgarian, Moldavian, Old Sectarian, Belorussian, etc.). A chapter on the Russian Bolsheviks would essentially consist of materials already presented in

other works on the Bolsheviks since most have focused on the Russians anyway -- Lenin, Bukharin, Molotov, Rykov, Tomskii, Preobrazhenskii, etc. There were only 3 Central Asians for whom relatively little material was available to me. The 'other' Bolsheviks (e.g.Rakovskii, Frunze, Shliapnikov, Tuntul) were of such disparate national backgrounds that they could not easily be grouped together and would have required separate treatment, too extensive for thesis purposes. Yet a more complete analysis of this elite would necessarily include each of the ethnicities omitted from this thesis.

The five area chapters are organized around individuals with varying degrees of detail, depending on the quality and quantity of source materials available. So the chapter on the Poles and Lithuanians involves greater detail on three individuals (Dzierzynski, Kapsukas, and Radek) than the chapters on the Ukrainians or Jews. In each case, however, an attempt is made to situate the individuals within their specific social context, including discussion of the relationship between the particular nationality and the state, and between the nationality and other nationalities. This is most clear in the chapter on the Jews in which the relationship of Jews to the Russian state is highlighted, as well as the relationships between Jews and Ukrainians, Jews and Lithuanians, Jews and Russians, and Jews and Poles.

Chapter 2
Literature Review

In this review I address three literature: specific studies on the composition of the Bolsheviks, key historical sociological works on the Russian Revolution, and key ideas on the political sociology of the Tsarist empire.

I. The Bolshevik elite

Synthetic works on the social or national composition of the Bolsheviks are relatively few, though of high quality. Rigby's 'class analysis' of the Communist Party in 1917, based on nearly 24,000 party members in 1917, found 60.2% members of the working class, 7.5% peasant, and 32.2% white collar or 'other'[1] But this referred to "*occupation on the eve of the Revolution*", and not to social origin. He found that despite the increase in the number of "proletarian workers" and the "withdrawal of the intelligentsia", those drawn from the white collar and educated strata continued to be overrepresented vis-a-vis their numbers in the population as a whole. My own research based on only the Bolshevik elite over a seven year period reveals a much higher 'white collar and other' *occupational* and *class* base, however I am in broad agreement with Rigby that the educated strata had far higher representation than would be assumed given their numbers in the wider population.

A different general finding resulted from Lane's very similar analysis of Russian Social Democracy of an earlier period (1898-1907). Lane's cluster sampling technique of 986 SDs was based on 'class' as an economic position. He concluded that the RSDLP was primarily a working class party and not a party of middle class intellectuals.[2] Based on regional studies of the RSDLP in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanono-Voznesensk, Tver, Ekaterinoslav, Baku, and Omsk, Lane found that while the Bolsheviks remained tightly connected to the working class and tended to be more 'downwardly mobile' than the Mensheviks, their strength lay in the Russian speaking areas of the empire (Central Russia

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[1] T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, pp.85-87.

[2] David Lane, The Roots of Russian Communism: A Social and Historical Study of Russian Social Democracy 1898-1907, London: Martin Robertson, 1975, pp.17-27.

and the Urals) while the Mensheviks received greater support in the south and in the Caucasus among national minorities. Accordingly, Lane found that Bolshevism was more "nationally homogeneous" (e.g. Russian) and Menshevism had greater "national divisions". And finally, Lane interestingly found that while Menshevism had more "townsmen" (*meshchane*) Bolshevism had far more men and women of gentry origin.[3] My own work makes no attempt at comparison, but I will challenge Lane's finding on the ethnic homogeneity of Bolshevism and on their geographical origin: they were mostly peripherals, based on my study of the composition on the arguably more consequential revolutionary period (and not in the years 1898-1907). However, I concur with Lane's conclusion that a distinctive feature of Russian Social Democracy (and particularly its Bolshevik contingent) was the disproportionate number of men of gentry origin.

Shapiro's landmark 1960 The Communist Party of the Soviet Union had remarkably little discussion of the nationalities composition of the party, though his more general Origins of the Communist Autocracy and his essay on Jews in the revolutionary movement did address this.[4] In his analysis of the composition of the party as a whole (not just the Bolshevik elite) between 1917 and 1922 (a period very similar to mine), Shapiro focused on the youth of the party (in 1919 1/2 of the party were under 30), the fact that they had little political experience, and that based on a Soviet study in 1920, only 8% had secondary school education and 5% had received higher education.[5] Shapiro found, and other scholars have generally concurred, that Jews abounded in the lower levels of the party machinery, especially in the Cheka and the GPU, OGPU, and NKVD of 1937 in which more than 11% of the 407 officials were of Jewish origin.[6] And finally Shapiro found that in 1923 45% of the party membership (not just the leadership) were workers, 26% peasants, and 29% 'others', which if taken together with the party census of 1922

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[3] Ibid., pp.21-28, 49-50, 95-118 & 132 (Moscow), 145-148 (Ivanovo-Voznesensk & Tver), 160-162 (Ekaterinoslav), 183-191 (Caucasus), 209-215.

[4] Leonard Shapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Random House, New York, 1960, and Shapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase 1917-1922, Harvard, 1977; and Shapiro's "Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement", Ellen Dahrendorf (Ed.), Russian Studies, Collins Harvill, London, 1986, pp.266-288.

[5] Shapiro, Communist Party, pp.233.

[6] Shapiro, "Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement", p.286.

defined 2/3 of the party as 'proletarian' (e.g. those with only elementary education). In terms of nationalities composition, and based on the same 1922 party census, Shapiro quoted Pipes' figures: 72% of the party was Russian, 5.88% Ukrainian, and 5.20% Jewish. He saw, then, a predominance of Russians and assimilated non-Russians due primarily to the party's centralization and its urban population base.[7]

The differing figures on national composition in the various studies, my own included, initially reflect different data sets. So, for instance, while acknowledging that the "information provided in Granat is in some cases deficient", of his sample of 246 revolutionaries Mosse found 45% of the revolutionaries (drawn from 34.5% of the population) to be of non-Russian extraction.[8] More recently Mawdsely found the 1917-1923 CC elite (78 including candidate members) were only one-half (38 of 78) Great Russian.[9] Mann's revolutionary group however, based on the leadership of the Military Revolutionary Council, the 1917 Central Committee, and the Petrograd Soviet, is by my count, at least 55% or 37 of 65 non-Russian, most of which are Jewish.[10]

The few studies making specific mention of the national or ethnic origin of Russia's revolutionaries pose difficulties of comparison because of the use of different data sets. Mawdsely and Mosse's studies are concerned with differences between old vs. new Bolsheviks (though both treat the revolutionary period as a whole); Rigby's study of CPSU elites covered the period from the Revolution to 1967; Lane's work concerns early Bolshevism and Social Democracy more generally in the years 1898-1907; and most recently Mann's work-in-progress is concerned with the revolutionary seizure of power.[11]

Part of the reason for the quite significant discrepancies in class or social origins, nationalities composition, occupational structures, and other measures of social stratification across studies (this thesis included) lies in the different data sets. But an

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[7] Shapiro, Communist Party, pp.223-227. Pipes based his study on the party's own 1922 census.

[8] Werner Mosse, "Makers of the Soviet Union", Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.46, 1968, pp.147-148. Because of the uneven data for all 246, Mosse's samples vary between 8 and 246.

[9] Mawdsely, "Makers of the Soviet Union Revisited: The Bolshevik CC Elite in the Revolutionary Period", Revolutionary Russia, Vol.8, No.2, December 1995, p.204.

[10] Calculations based on data from work in progress.

[11] David Lane, Roots of Russian Communism; Rigby, Communist Party Membership; Mosse, "Makers of the Soviet Union"; Evan Mawdsely, "Makers of the Soviet Union Revisited".

equally important difficulty in finding commensurate measures across studies derives from variations in measures of 'social' or 'status' stratifications. For instance, Shapiro observed that a crucial problem in accurately determining social origin was the Bolsheviks' deliberate concealment of non-proletarian origin.[12] Also problematic has been the use of occupation as an indicator of class origin (as Mawdsely uses it) or the use of 'class' as an economic position, with 'estate' membership marking off both social origin and occupation (as Lane uses it). Much of our use of classical social stratification categories not only complicate analysis of the underlying data, but based on recent historiographical studies of the use of 'class' and 'estate' and 'profession', we now know that the traditional 'estates' persisted through 1917, making application of western 'class' analysis anachronistic and potentially distorting, and that 'estate', 'professions', and ethnic classifications cross-cut in ways more complex.[13]

Moreover, Mosse's figure of 34.5% for non-Russians followed Tsarist 'ethnic counting' rules, which included Ukrainians and Belorussians as 'Russians'. Mosse assumed that "unless otherwise stated, a person is of Russian (including Ukrainian and White Russian) extraction". So any name of slavic derivation is designated as 'Russian'. I, too, problematically 'default' as *ethnic* Russian those for whom little or no reliable data is available, but count Ukrainians and Belorussians as ethnically distinct, and Jews as a group -- though they were Ukrainian Jews, Lithuanian Jews, Russian Jews, etc.

II. Historical sociology on the Russian Revolution

Western historiography on 1917 and the Bolsheviks has undergone at least two distinct phases. The works of Shapiro, Pipes, Seton-Watson, and Carrere-D'Encausse, largely in response to the historiography of the revolutionaries themselves, were of the 'political' school seeing political action as responsible for the October Revolution and for

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12 Shapiro, Communist Party, p.234.

13 Gregory Freeze, "The *Sostovie* (Estate) Paradigm in Russian Social History", American Historical Review, Vol.91, 1986, pp.11-36; Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, "Problematics of Status Definition in Imperial Russia: The *Raznocincy*", Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 40, 1992, pp.319-339; William Pomeranz, "'Profession' or 'Estate'? The Case of the Russian Pre-Revolutionary *Advokatura*", The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.77, No.2, April 1999, pp.240-268; John W. Slocum, "Who, and When, Were the *Inorodtsy*? The Evolution of the Category of 'Aliens' in Imperial Russia", Russian Review, 57, April 1998, pp.137-190.

the course of politics.[14] The emphasis was on the policies of the Tsarist state and its political collapse, and on the Bolsheviks as disciplined, ideologically motivated political actors who seized power at a crucial moment of social unrest and manipulated disaffected social groups. The moral outcome of 1917 was clear and unambiguous. The (usually Russian, but sometimes Jewish) Bolsheviks were alienated intellectuals drawn to radical ideologies, and particularly to the eschatological aspects of socialism. They were alienated by an exclusionary state and by the absence of a civil society.[15] Interestingly there was attention paid to the geopolitical pressures on the Tsarist state, not as a unitary actor, but as an imperialist power, including analyses of the Bolshevik willingness to dismantle the territorial multinational empire at Brest-Litovsk in order to preserve the revolution.[16] Although these works were sensitive to the national, ethnic, and religious dimensions of the Russian context, there was still a 'Russo-centric' bias in the accounts.

Largely in response to the 'political' accounts of Russianists of the 1950's and 1960's, accounts of 'social' historians such as Bonnell, Koeneker, Mandel, and Suny, retrieved earlier works of Haimson, and even Lukacs and Trotsky, in arguing that the Russian working class on its own efforts would only have displayed 'trade union consciousness'. The pivotal role of the Bolsheviks was in leading revolutionary action and in creating and articulating its discourse.[17] The Bolsheviks provided the guiding ideological orientation for more general social unrest. Earlier emphasis on political factors

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[14] John Eric Marot, ""A 'Post-modern' Approach to the Russian Revolution? Comments on Suny", The Russian Review, Vol.54, No.2, 1995, pp.260-264.

[15] See Marc Raeff, Understanding Imperial Russia: State and Society in the Old Regime (Trans. Arthur Goldhammer), New York, 1984, on educated society's more general search for a civic life and the intelligentsia's political and civic exclusion.

[16] Helene Carrere-D'Encausse, Lenin: Revolution and Power, Longman (1979), 1982, especially parts of Chapter 2, pp.76-97, and Chapter 3; Shapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, pp.89-109; and Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.

[17] Victoria Bonnell, The Roots of Rebellion: Worker's Politics and Organization in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914, Berkeley, UCB Press, 1983; Diane Koenker, Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution, Princeton University Press, 1981; David Mandel, The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime, London, Macmillan, 1983; Ronald Grigor Suny, "Toward a Social History of the October Revolution", American Historical Review, 88, no.1 (1983), pp.31-52, and "Revision and Retreat in the Historiography of 1917: Social History and its Critics", The Russian Review, Vol.53, April 1994, pp.165-182; Leopold Haimson, The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism, Beacon: Boston, 1955; Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, [1919], Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971.

ceded to a view of the Revolution as the culmination of 'social' forces, socioeconomic tensions, and class conflict. These views navigated between "material" conditions and "discursive" ones, as in Suny's work, which highlights the "construction" of identities and meanings.[18] Unlike the 'political' historians, however, the causes and outcomes of the Revolution were far more ambiguous, and earlier attention to national or ethnic factors, if considered, was seen as a function of 'class' analyses.

Moreover, the Bolsheviks have been seen as 'ideologists', often to the neglect their 'interests'. Richard Pipes' important and influential accounts, for instance, consistently conceive of the Bolsheviks as reckless and power-hungry political actors. Setting aside whether this is an accurate characterization, it does not carry sociological (or historical) understanding very far. A more suggestive approach -- and one that I have been influenced by -- has conceived of Bolshevism in Weberian terms as a charismatic-heroic or charismatic-salvationaist emergence, and communism more generally as a chiliastic-salvationist movement, whose revolutionary dialectic 'routinized neo-traditionally' in the face of the mundane needs and pressures of the members of the revolutionary community.[19] Yet on both views much attention has been paid to their ideas, to Leninist doctrine, and to Bolshevik ideology, and far less attention to how and why Bolshevism had the social and national composition that it did. In other words, we need a better sociological connection between their 'ideas' and their 'interests'.

While there is great merit in the accounts of the 'social historians', this thesis seeks to retrieve some of the earlier emphasis on the Tsarist state, particularly its imperial dimension. But in so doing I seek to rectify some of the Russo-centrism of the political approaches by situating the analysis within the context of the late 19th century multinational empire. And in retrieving the earlier 'political' accounts, I add to the more recent literature on Russification, nationalities, and the (geo)politics of empire in situating Russian events as part of European history. Although there are excellent regional studies of revolutionary

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[18] Marot, "A 'Post-Modern' Approach to the Russian Revolution", pp.260-264; Suny, "Nationalism and Class in the Russian Revolution: A Comparative Discussion", in E.R. Frankel, J. Frankel, B. Knei-Paz, Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.219-246.

[19] I am thinking here of the work of Ken Jowitt. For a more detailed discussion, see Andrew Janos' important "Social Science, Communism, and the Dynamics of Political Change", World Politics, 44, October 1991, pp.81-112.

events, they have not generally challenged one of the key assumptions of 1917: that it was not simply a social revolution in a state, but a revolution in a multi-ethnic empire. Class and national loyalties were in tension, but they were not as incompatible as scholars have seen them.[20] Both internationalism and socialism, I think, may have had underneath them commitments to ethnic, national, or imperial identities expressed in the language of class.

In addition to general historiographical trends, historical sociology on the Russian Revolution and the Bolsheviks has produced several key approaches. The influential socio-structural approaches of the 1960's and 1970's viewed revolutionary elites, the Bolsheviks included, as modernizers, or functional elites who emerged for modernization or developmental purposes. This was part of a general view of communism (and its Leninist-Marxist variant) as an ideology of development and modernization, used by elites in 'backward' states to organize the processes of 'catching up'. But more recent thinking has correctly suggested that these 'functional elites' were more a *product* of modernization than they were its functional response.[21] Their roles were as much political as socioeconomic.

With her influential States and Social Revolutions Theda Skocpol revisited these socio-structural approaches, but argued that the Revolution was best understood by analyzing the interests of the Tsarist state -- an autonomous, coercive, and bureaucratic organization. Along with the French and Chinese Revolutions, geopolitically induced fiscal crises and agrarian relations were important components to an explanation of the causes and outcomes of the revolutions. Her comparative socio-structural approach necessarily reduced the role of revolutionary ideologies and political elites by viewing them as limited by structural conditions.[22] So not only their autonomous political role, but now even their ideological role was diminished. That this was fundamentally problematic has been noted.

My disagreement with Skocpol's analysis lies elsewhere. Though she consistently referred to the Russian state as an "Imperial state" and "Imperial Russia", the consequences

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[20] Suny makes this argument, "Nationalism and Class", pp.219-223.

[21] See especially Janos, "Social Science, Communism, and the Dymanics of Political Change".

[22] Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp.168-171.

of its 'imperial' qualities were omitted from the argument that was then joined.[23] Skocpol's geopolitical account overlooked the fact that Russia was a multi-national empire and not merely an autocratic, modernizing state swimming in geopolitical waters. Our understanding of the empire's geopolitical concerns should take into consideration not only geopolitically-induced fiscal crises and their effects on state finances and agrarian reform -- as Skocpol does -- but also on St. Petersburg's considerable "frontier anxiety" about the fragility of its western and southern borderlands and the loyalty of its most 'troublesome' subjects in such close proximity to the Austrian, German, and Ottoman empires. It was upon these latter geopolitical worries that some of the most socially consequential domestic policies and reforms (and Russification) were predicated: intensified state repression, language restrictions and educational policies, 'ethnic and religious' and passport controls, 'emergency legislation', religious (Catholic and Muslim) suppression, curtailment of local elite autonomy, the withholding of zemstvo institutions and other local and municipal government, military draft legislation, Jewish restrictions, land reform, and emancipation settlements of national peasantries (not just the Russian).

The geopolitical threat was conceived by state elites as laying in internal sedition, irredentism, and separatism, in relations between disloyal subjects inside imperial borders and co-ethnics on the other side. Indeed the social fact of the incongruence of ethnic and political borders was a constitutive feature of the imperium. State elites viewed their greatest geopolitical threats as residing in 'international' Polish organizations seen as either separatist or irredentist, but in either case thriving in Austrian Galicia. "Little Russian" separatism was similarly troublesome. Particularly after 1871 worries of pan-Germanism and growing German identity turned attention to Jews and Ukrainians near German borders and to questions of Baltic German loyalty. Tsarist rapproachment with the Ottoman state (triggered by the need to turn attention to the Balkans) meant that securing Armenian loyalty was less urgent and Armenian radicalism more bothersome. And 'Jewish cosmopolitanism' began to look increasingly destabilizing and disloyal. Conceived as

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[23] See, for instance, Skocpol's discussion of the landed nobility, State and Social Revolutions, pp.85-90. It is unclear whether the references are to Russian nobles or those of other nationalities, or both. Similarly see her discussion of the 1905 revolution as a peasant revolt, to the great omission of one of its most significant dimensions, the nationalities rebellions.

threats to the integrity of the empire, sedition had to be rooted out, so the response was Russificatory and repressive toward disloyal national elites.[24] In addition to a better theory of the geopolitics of the state, we may also need is a better theory of the geopolitics of the empire.

As Starr wrote, there was hardly a distinction in the minds of imperial elites between foreign policies and imperial (nationalities) policies.[25] Indeed even analyses of Tsarist state budgets reveal anxieties and insecurities over internal and external security: the Tsarist government had, much like Imperial Germany, a highly centralized budget, and very little was given to provincial authorities, with most resources devoted to central administration and defense. But within the centralized administrative budget, the largest portion was devoted to 'internal surveillance' (1/4 of the budget in 1900).[26]

Moreover, in addition to fiscal crisis which 'split elites', nationalist separatist groupings were profoundly implicated in Russia's conduct of WWI and the geopolitics of the state's collapse. This is vastly understudied but we know, for instance, that the degree to which the integrity of the empire was threatened by minority nationalisms before WWI has been overstated, while the effects of the war both on nationalist separatism and socialist internationalism have been underestimated. The more than 3.5 million displaced civilians and refugees created by the war's moving eastern front on the imperial borderlands not only challenged traditional social categories, but provided important social bases for nationalist and socialist groupings.[27] The German occupation of the Ukrainian territories, for example, was absolutely determinative. On Geoff Eley's view, for instance, the

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[24] Quoted in Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.314. So in 1849 when Kossuth was elected Ruler of Hungary, Nicholas was less concerned about the disorders in Galicia or Russian Poland than he was fearful of the presence of Polish revolutionaries among the commanders of Hungarian armies "as evidence of an international conspiracy against Russia". He wrote of Russia's "duty to defend the security of the boundaries of the Russia...for in the Hungarian rebellion are clearly visible the effects of a general plot against all that is sacred, and especially against Russia, for at the head of the rebellion, and acting as the main instruments of it, are our eternal enemies, the Poles".

[25] S. Frederick Starr, "The Tsarist Government: the Imperial Dimension", in Jeremy Azrael, (ed.), Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, New York, Praeger, 1978, pp.3-38.

[26] Peter Gatrell, "Economic Culture, Economic Policy, and Economic Growth in Russia 1961-1914", Cahiers du Monde Russe, 36 (1-2), janvier-juin, 1995, pp.37-52.

[27] Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia During World War I, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Skoropadsky coup was stage-managed by Germans and the Hetmanate was practically a front for German requirements: "German imperialism decisively structured options in Ukrainian politics for most of 1918", as German sponsorship trapped Ukrainian democratic nationalists.[28] The German occupation of Latvia also had a mobilizing effect on ethnic Latvian refugees, or 1/2 the Latvian population which was forced to evacuate in the two years prior to the Revolution because of German invasions. These refugees became important sources of socialist and nationalist radicalism, and created an important divergence in the developments of Estonian and Latvian radicalism.[29]

The war and the 1915 Armenian genocide in Anatolia at the hands of the Turks profoundly changed the Armenian movement in the Russian Caucasus as thousands of refugees fled to Baku and Tiflis: the Armenian revolutionary Dashnaks overwhelming won Armenian support, as war and genocide mobilized the population in a way that 25 years of revolutionary activism could not. More generally, in the (Trans) Caucasus and Central Asia the war years saw the intervention of no less than 14 states. Indeed Pipes considered that no other territory of the empire had suffered greater losses during the war than the Armenian -- and none was as threatened by imperial integration.[30] The Armenian genocide makes this assessment largely true.

But Jews, too, and especially Polish Jews, were threatened both by invading armies and by the Stavka's intensely anti-Semitic policies, though no genocide occurred.[31]

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[28] Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval, and State Formation in eastern Europe, 1914-1923", in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Alster (eds), Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective, Edmonton, 1988, p.239.

[29] James White, "National Communism and World Revolution: The Political Consequences of German Military Withdrawal from the Baltic Area in 1918-1919", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.46, No.8, 1994, pp.1349-1369; Stanley W. Page, The Formation of the Baltic States: A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics Upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, Harvard University Press, 1959.

[30] Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, Harvard University Press, 1964, p.208.

[31] In late 1914 the Russians lost Lodz and with it 100,000 Jewish and Polish refugees, with entire Jewish villages removed; 190,000 Jews were deported from Courland, Kovno, and Grodno gubernia. And in July 1915 Warsaw, then Kaunas (with 88,000) Jews, and then Vilna fell. As more than 600,000 Jews were evacuated from the front lines into the Russian interior, 250,000 would die in the Civil War and in the Soviet-Polish War. With the de facto dissolution of the Pale, Jews entered the Russian interior in large numbers for the first time -- and triggered worries of possible assimilation. Figures in Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, pp.145-150 and John Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, (eds) Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.291.

As the plethora of armies moved through Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Polish territories, Jews were clientalistically caught between them. In the Ukraine Jews were politicized and mobilized in great numbers to join the Bolsheviks because of the progromism of the Ukrainian nationalist and the White armies. But at various times both the Austrian and German armies and occupying forces were quite preferential toward Jews in these border zones since their Yiddish was familiar and they were viewed as sources of support in hostile slavic environments.[32] While Tsarism's survival would ensure that Jews remain " a considerable minority of 6 million in a big empire rather than a series of small minorities in many little countries", Jewish security could conceivably also be sought by the imposition of a German *Ostimperium* embracing the same borderlands.[33] Levene writes,

> "The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 seemed to provide for the latter scenario. Germany's defeat in the west ...however, determined that the Jews had only one real alternative: The Bolsheviks. It was no coincidence that only the armies of these two powers maintained a rigorous 'no pogrom' policy".[34]

Ten years after Skocpol's classic McDaniel's Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia studied the relationship between autocratic capitalism, labor policies, and the Russian labor movement.[35] Regarding the specific role of the revolutionary intelligentsia, McDaniel was concerned to understand the effects of autocracy and capitalism on the relationship between workers and the revolutionary intelligentsia.[36] However the latter was assumed to be Russian, the alienated product of a Russian autocratic state, and no distinction was made to account for the fact that there were several *national* intelligentsias and an equal number of *national* working classes at play.

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32 See the discussion in Jonathan Frankel, "The Paradoxical Politics of Marginality: Thoughts on the Jewish Situation During the Years 1914-1921", Studies in Contemporary Jewry, Vol.4, 1988, p.5.

33 Quoted in Mark Levene, "Frontiers of Genocide: Jews in the Eastern War Zones 1914-1920 and 1941", in Panikos Panayi (ed), Minorities in Wartime, Berg (Oxford), Providence, 1993, p.99.

34 Ibid.

35 Tim McDaniel, Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia, Berkeley, UCB Press, 1988.

36 Ibid., Chapter 9.

McDaniel's study focused on the relationship between the 'vertical' demands of autocracy and the 'horizontal' needs of capitalism. But the "autocratic" nature of Russian state in its capitalist development may need to be somewhat attenuated. We know that *non-Russian* commerce, capitalism, and industrialism actually flourished and thrived under Russian protection. Tatar, Greek, Armenian, Baltic German, and certain Jewish capital, for instance, were at various times protected and assisted by Russian laws and arms. And economic and trade policies in the 'colonial' Transcaucasus were qualitatively distinct from those applied elsewhere. We know, too, that while merchants and industrialists displayed different 'economic cultures', within the 'merchant *soslovnie*', for example, different ethnic affiliations were often reinforced, not attenuated.[37]

The state's industrial-labor policies were often intimately related to its nationality policies, particularly since Jews and capitalists were seen by the Tsarist state as proponents of liberalism.[38] Though this, too, is understudied, we may take one example. Much of the ancient regime state's anti-capitalism derived from its anti-Semitism and Jews historic association in commercial professions, with 'capitalist exploitation' of Russian peasants and Russian merchants, and the urban *meshchane*. This is important because Jews figured prominently in nearly all radical groups. So important was the "Jewish Question" in the mind of the state, that the Minister of Interior Pleve believed that the Russian state's greatest problem *was* the "Jewish Question" -- above the "worker's question", the "peasant question", and the "school's question".[39] Indeed, McDaniel's research on the autocratic character of the paternalist Zubatov societies neglects its profound anti-Semitism: Jewish workers were pointedly excluded from the state-run societies, to important effect.

How the "Jewish Question" affected the battles between the Pleve's Ministry of Interior and Witte's Ministry of Finance -- battles at the heart of the autocratic capitalist state's industrial and labor policies during the years covered by McDaniel's account are ignored. Witte as Finance Minister pressed Russian industrialization, and because of his classic liberal views on capitalist development he opposed most anti-Jewish legislation as

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[37] Gatrell, "Economic Culture, Economic Policy, Economic Growth in Russia".

[38] Heinz-Dietrich Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews: Reform, Reaction, and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia, 1772-1917, Harwood Academic Press, Switzerland, 1993, p.111.

[39] Ibid., p.139.

both unjust and harmful to the interests of the empire. Witte's was a "liberal capitalism versus an old regime anti-Semitism".[40] The Interior Minister Pleve's views on social and economic reform were defensive of aristocratic privilege, anti-capitalist, and repressive towards (even acculturated) Jews and bourgeoisie alike: even the Jewish 'great bourgeoisie' was targeted.

Moreover, 'Jewish capital' also tended to have Russificatory effects in local ethnopolitics. In Kiev, for instance, Tsarist officials viewed the city as a "Russian outpost" amid Jewish traders and Polish landlords in a kind of siege mentality, as Russian merchants complained of Jewish competition. In 1884 there were only 4 Christian first-merchants guilds as against 117 Jewish guilds; the numbers rose proportionally until the turn of the century when in 1894 there were 90 Christian guilds and 301 Jewish guilds. The pattern was reversed however, in the less lucrative second merchants guilds where 288 were Christian and only 39 Jewish.[41] The prominent Jewish capitalist elite in Kiev, like the magnate Brodsky who controlled 1/4 of the empire's sugar production, and the fact that only 1 in 10 substantial property owners in Kiev were Polish, while 1 in 5 were Jewish, also fueled perceptions that 'capital was Jewish'.[42]

Though the majority of Kiev's Jews were too poor to appear on the tax rolls, and perhaps a 'class' of Jewish property owners did not exist in Kiev,[43] the very Jewish dominance of commercial Kiev guaranteed that it would be 'Russian'. The pattern for language and culture of commercial business was set: because the most influential were Jewish, imperial Russian became the language of transactions. Indeed Hamm concludes that the "prominence of Jewish merchants contributed to the Russification of Kiev's commercial culture".[44] Kiev's ethnic Russian migrant labor force, its Polish cultural influences, and Jewish commerce, contributed to the 'Russification of Kiev' and set the social base for radical politics in the late 1890's and again in 1905.

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[40] Ibid., pp.112-122.

[41] Figures cited in Michael Hamm, Kiev, A Portrait 1800-1917, Princeton, 1993, pp.93-94.

[42] Ibid., p.131.

[43] Ibid., pp.50. Here defined as more than 10,000 roubles of income.

[44] Ibid., p.94. In 1897 Ukrainians were 1% of merchants and 6% of nobles and civil servants.

So for different reasons and with different consequences, Skocpol's and McDaniel's, important studies ignored the nationalities and the imperial dimensions of the Russian Revolution. The traditional idiom of the 'Russian' Revolution, and of the revolutionaries themselves was of course a socialist or 'class-based' one, seeing Russia as an essentially agrarian state which in its drive for industrialized modernity was generating the traditional classes of a new industrial social order: the working class, the bourgeoisie, the Russian intelligentsia as the revolutionary element of the 'bourgeois' class, the peasantry, the capitalist autocratic state. But the idiom of the revolutionaries themselves has been taken up almost wholesale and has set the parameters of most scholarly inquiry. My critique here is not to deny the important role played by Russia's industrialization or its new 'classes', and I certainly do not want to minimize the controlling role of socialist ideology. But perhaps 'empire' should figure more prominently in our analyses of 1917 and of the Bolsheviks.

Specifically, we should not take unreservedly the Revolution's class idiom. The attractiveness of a theory about classes and a classless society should not be taken to mean that class conflict produced it. It is one claim of this thesis that what is most interesting about the Bolsheviks was not their class base or social composition as 'bourgeois intellectuals' or intelligentsia, but their ethnic and national composition and that many had been active in nationalist and cultural groupings. This suggests that it may not have been class conflict to which they were responding, but regional-nationalist, ethnic conflicts, interests, and ideas.

Historical and sociological work has accorded nationalism and ethnicity an important role in European state formation in France, Germany, and the Habsburg successors, but this dimension of Russia's transition from empire to nation-state has been all but neglected in its most important state-building moment, 1917 (although post-1989/91 scholarship is now somewhat problematically reading recent events back into 1917). The appeal of socialism, I will suggest, was was not so much in its 'scientific','historical', or developmental-functional value, or in the 'meaning' and eschatology it gave to the alienated Russian intellectual as a messianic ideology. Neither was it a 'developmental' ideology used by elites in 'backward' Russia to modernize. Rather, a good part of socialism's

appeal, for the Bolsheviks at least, lay in its *secularist* and universalist theory of an implied *imperial* state, in its *statism*, and in its seeming indifference to ethnicity, its *anti-nationalist value*. Socialism may have been an antidote to the disintegrating effects of an multinational empire more than to the alienating effects of an industrializing state.

While some of the Russian revolutionary parties addressed the empire's nationality question, the Bolsheviks above all made it an issue of central concern. As Seton-Watson observed, "Lenin's [nationalities] formulation [of self-determination] was certainly more attractive to non-Russian nationalists than those of the SR's or the Menshevik's", and the Bolsheviks' opposition to Russian nationalists, led many national minorities to support them -- particularly during the Civil War.[45]

III. Empire, Russification and the state

If the Bolsheviks are re-conceived as part of a revolt of the empire's ethnic peripheries to Romanov rule, attention should turn to several important properties of the Tsarist empire which produced the Bolsheviks. I address three relevant literatures on (a) the relationship between the 'Russian nation' and its empire, (b) the nature of imperial of rule over the ethnically diverse parts of the empire, and (c) Russification or the homogenizing, "nationalizing" state.

The Russian nation and the Russian empire

A key argument in Hosking's excellent synthetic Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917 is that Russian nationhood was imperfectly or incompletely constructed because it was an empire, "the building of an empire impeded the formation of a nation".[46] Hosking views the historic Russian empire as a multi-ethnic service state which imperfectly emerged as a 'Russian nation' despite fitful attempts at creating a nation-state. Taking seriously the

[45] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.675-676; Roman Szporluk, "The Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the USSR: The Russian Question and Imperial Overextension", in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot eds., The End of Empire, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p.77.

[46] Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire: 1552-1917, Fontana Press, 1998, pp.478-481. A similar idea was held by Russian ethnographers: that the multinational empire hindered its social and economic development. Catherine Clay, "Russian Ethnographers in the Service of Empire, 1856-1862", Slavic Review, Vol.54, No.1, Spring 1995, pp.45-46. This is perhaps a competing explanation for Russian 'backwardness'.

"Russian obsession with the national problem" and its national identity, Hosking argues that neither "civic" nor "ethnic" forms of Russian nationalism developed because "nationhood had to be generated partly in opposition to the empire bearing its name":

> "The effort required to mobilize revenues and raise armies for the needs of the empire entailed the subjection of virtually the whole population, but especially the Russians, to the demands of state service, and thus enfeebled the creation of the community associations which commonly provide the basis for the civic sense of nationhood."[47]

In other words, empire-building impeded the emergence of a civil society, which would in turn have been necessary for the creation of a civic Russian nationalism. Hosking concludes: "autocracy [and backwardness were] generated by the needs of empire, and had to be reinforced as that empire came increasingly into conflict with nation-building"; "autocracy and backwardness were symptoms and not causes: both were generated by the way in which the building and maintaining of empire obstructed the formation of a nation". So prescriptively he writes "if Russia can find a new identity for herself as a nation-state among other nation-states, autocracy and backwardness will fade out".[48]

Suny too has argued that it was not that "Russia did not succeed in building a state, but that she succeeded too well in building an empire and failed to create a 'Russian nation' within that empire."[49] Roman Szporluk has come to a similar conclusion: the 'Russian nation' contributed to the fall of the empire because it had no identity distinct from empire and so failed to solve the 'Russian question'...Russia's experience has been one of incomplete nation-making".[50] In this context, Hosking's most important claim is that the Russian Orthodox Church's failure to integrate the Russian nation was "perhaps most damaging of all",

> "Russia's church was compelled to renounce its function as

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[47] Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, Introduction, especially pp.xx-xxvi, quote pp.xxiv.

[48] Ibid, pp.xxvi-xxvii

[49] Ronald Grigor Suny, "Ambiguous Categories: States, Empires and Nations", Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.11, No.2, 1995, p.191.

[50] Szporluk, "The Fall of the Tsarist Empire", pp.65-66.

> guarantor of the national myth to become the marginalized prop of an activist secular state. A messianic national myth which had demonstrated its viability in the crises of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was spurned in favor of a cosmopolitan Enlightenment project which required all the refinements of a 'well-ordered police state'.[51]

Conceding the undesirability of the 'well-ordered police state', the sociology here may be weak: it is extremely difficult to imagine that in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic polity, a "messianic national [Russian] myth" socially carried by the Church would have been preferable to the semi-repressive, semi-tolerant 'muddling through' that actually existed. Indeed the Catherinian relegation of the role of the church to 'demoted' status may actually have been one of the empire's few beneficial features, as much past and present sociology would tell us, because it crucially permitted religious toleration and incorporation of non-Orthodox elites.[52] But more generally, that autocracy or imperial backwardness would have been lessened had Russia found its national identity seems, by itself, equally implausible: recent history is full of autocratic states with national identities fully intact.

Scholars' post-1898/91 concern with Russian national identity is clearly prompting a re-interpretation of Tsarism and its imperial collapse, one that moves away from traditional explanations of 'autocracy' and 'backwardness'. The idea that the construction of Russian nationhood was fractured and imperfect because of its colonial or imperial ambitions seems now to be widely accepted. These recent views draw from Carlyle's famous conception (as Hosking acknowledges) of Russia as a "mighty empire of brutal force" devoid of a national or cultural identity. That empire-building impeded nation-building, which in turn contributed to imperial collapse, however, adds an important new causal and historical analysis deserving of attention.

My sense is that the sociology may be mis-specified. I would offer a different empirical analysis, and a different antidote. My disagreement with these scholars is that

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[51] Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.478.

[52] In addition to Gibbon's classic account on religious tolerance in early Rome, see recent social theory, e.g. Victor Perez-Diaz, The Return of Civil Society, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Tsarist Russia's principle weakness was not that it had an incomplete national identity because it was an empire; its principle weaknesses were that it was fundamentally autocratic and rigidly prohibited societal organization (Russian and non-Russian) and that it was an administratively under-governed and under-institutionalized weak state, ultimately collapsing because of geopolitically-induced nationalist separatism. As good sociology tells us, had Carlyle been more precise, by "mighty empire of brutal force" he may have said "despotically mighty" and not "infrastructurally mighty".[53] With significant exceptions (British and American) empires are typically weak, not mighty, states. What makes them weak is their inability to organize, coordinate, or mobilize their domains, unless under threat of force; part of what made the British and the American comparatively stronger was that they had civil societies. I return to the weakness of the Tsarist state below.

More immediately, however, at least since Gibbon we know that despotism is not a constitutive feature of empire, but a contingent one. The needs of empire-building cited by Hosking, Szporluk, and others were also needs of state-building (demands for state service, linguistic rationalization, administrative centralization, etc.). And it was in its state-building, not nation-building, that the Russian empire failed most consequentially. So the fact that the Tsarist imperial state 'politically crystallized' in particular ways should tell us not that it was an empire, but more precisely that its empire-building was refracted through a weak and autocratic state.[54] The sociology may be that autocracy destroyed civil society,[55] thereby preventing the formation of a coherent nationalism. Studies by Kappeler, Weeks, and Rogger show that Tsarist elites' persistent fear of any form of societal initiative (even of the conservative and reactionary *Russian* kind) made it

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[53] Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol.I, Cambridge University Press, 1986, Chapter 1, and Michael Mann "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanics, and Results", in States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988.

[54] Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

[55] John A. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society", in John A. Hall (ed), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, Polity Press, 1995, Chapter 1, especially pp.7-15 on Tocqueville and Montesquieu.

impossible to create strong civil institutions for *either* a civic *or* an ethnic nationalism.[56] The Russian state was even hesitant and conflicted toward Russian political and ethnic nationalism. Despite recent interest in 'Russian nationalism', I think canonical scholarship had this part right: autocracy, illiberalism, and the state's infrastructural weakness -- not the absence of a coherent Russian national identity -- kept the empire weak and backward and set the conditions for social and political breakdown under pressure of war.

In fact, the absence of civil society may not be a constitutive feature of empire, but it is an important feature of autocracy. The explanation for weak towns, commerce and the "missing bourgeoisie" (Hosking's excellent chapter), or the absence of an imperial middle class lies more in the political conditions between society and state than it does on the imperatives of empire; the British, the Dutch, the American were liberal empires with functioning civil societies, at least at home. But the Russian was no more liberal or tolerant in the 'Russian interior' than it was in its imperial borderland conquests -- and indeed in certain moments it may even have been less so.

Gibbon's well-known concern about the corruption of Rome's "civic spirit" due to "pernicious luxury" caused him to believe that it was not commerce or affluence which had created the Romans' love of 'luxury' and 'polish' above commercial and civic pursuits, but despotism: "indolent despair [caused by arbitrary, corrupt rule] says to enjoy the present hour and not think of future".[57] The uncertain political conditions of the pursuit of property, wealth, commerce, or other forms of 'civility' had discouraged the Romans from activities which required long term planning.[58] Besides a weak legal framework and political infrastructure, Russian industrialists complained of state restrictions on their freedom of maneuver, the arbitrary behavior of government, and its lack of

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56 Hans Rogger, "Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.4, N.3, April 1962, pp.253-264, and Hans Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right Wing Politics in Imperial Russia, Berkeley, 1986; Andreas Kappeler, Russland Als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall, Munchen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992.

57 Edward Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Penguin Classics (abridged version), 1981; J.A. Pocock, "Between Machiavelli and Hume: Gibbon as Civic Humanist and Philosophical Historian", in G.W. Bowersock, John Clive, Stephen R. Graubard (eds), Edward Gibbon and the Decline and Fall, Cambridge MA/London, Harvard University Press, 1977, pp.103-119.

58 Pocock, "Between Machiavelli and Hume", pp.109-115, especially p.113. Corruption of civic virtue was not due to luxury, polish, or refinement, but to despotism. In his defense of "polite society" Gibbon follows the Scots: the purpose of commercial society is to permit a leisured and civilized ruling class.

accountability.[59] Despotic rule was first the cause, then the effect, of the weakness of 'civility'.

In short, what the empire required was not more nationalism but more liberalism and better state institutions. This is not to argue that liberalism would have 'saved' the empire -- indeed by 1918 almost *any* multi-national empire of its scope was geopolitically inviable. But it may have been that given that most of the empire's constituent nationalities found sufficient 'interests' in the empire (judged by patterns of self-Russification, access to positions, bi- and multi-lingualism etc.), and 'national' identities were so weak and vaguely articulated, that greater toleration and institutional rationalization may have softened the geopolitical blows. (The exceptions were, of course, the Poles and the Finns, but neither of these nationalities were themselves causes of imperial weakness or collapse).

The antidote was (and arguably continues to be) not a stronger Russian national identity, a more coherent nationalizing project, or nationalist ideological glue for social mobilization or cohesion, but a political and social unity predicated on some form of constitutional settlement, precisely because it was (and continues to be) ethnically pluralist. In addition to the recent social theory cited above, Gibbon's prescription that empires be based on "tolerant enlightened institutions" as the foundation of social and political imperial unity still resonates.[60]

This is not to minimize the functional requirement of the 18th and 19th centuries: 'the nation-state' was the geopolitical winner over 'the empire' in part because of the socially and politically integrative functions of 'nation-state' building. And while Lieven is right, in my view, to argue that at the heart of the loss of Russian legitimacy was the state's geopolitical weakness in the international environment,[61] geopolitical failure may have

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59 "There was no assurance that the government would not suddenly impose fresh restrictions on corporate activity, still less that the regime would remove existing restrictions on company formation and organization". Gatrell, "Economic Culture, Economic Policy and Economic Growth", p.49.

60 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; see Giarrizzo's classic discussion of Gibbon's requirement that laws provide the basis for the cohesion of diverse 'nations', and that political unity requires enlightened institutions, Giuseppe Giarrizzo, Edward Gibbon e la cultura europea del Settecento, Napoli: Sede dell'Istituto, 1954, pp.203-204, and on Gibbon's argument on toleration's ability to get cohesiveness, Patricia Craddock, Edward Gibbon: Luminous Historian 1772-1794, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, 1989, p.17.

61 Dominic Lieven, "Dilemmas of Empire, 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.32, No.2, 1999, pp.163-200.

been in the first instance the result, not the cause, of the state's domestic weakness. Were Russia a nation-state it would likely have been a stronger state, though perhaps no less autocratic. But there were several features of Russian nation-building that made it quite distinctive. First, the development of the Russian 'nation' (in a modern sense) was quite late.[62] Russia was an essentially peasant 'nation' in the 'fourth time zone' and Russian nationalism dates its 'political phase' to the last decades of the 19th century.

Second, Russian 'nation-building' occurred in an established political and geopolitical context of nearly 400 years of building -- and being -- an empire. As Rogger argued, imperial territorial consolidation had been completed before nationalism became a major fact in Russian life.[63] So at the very core of the creation of the Russian 'nation' was its imperial identity. The Russian imperial mission or imperial purpose was conceived, as with so many empires since Rome, as an historical echo of Rome itself, "Moscow Third Rome". So, for instance, we see the Russian nationalist Mikhail Katkov's influential view of the role of the Russian language:

> "Under favorable conditions, the Russian language is destined for a great future in the Slavic world; it could become the indisputable center for the unity of diverse tribes. And it is obvious that history has prepared us for that mission...."[64]

But this Roman archetype as 'imperial purpose' is generally vague enough that it can be infused with virtually any imperial content, and by itself does not constitute a 'theory of the imperial state'.[65] This was not really a failure of a compound identity, as in "Britons". The mission of the Russian nation was to "lead" other nations. Its national identity was fused into its longstanding imperial identity.

Thirdly and relatedly, the timing of this 'fourth time zone' nationalism coincided

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62 Suny, "Ambiguous Categories: States, Empires and Nations", p.191. Suny sees Russia's nation-building process as incomplete in the way Ukraine's was. I disagree: they may both be 'incomplete', but if so it was due to a very different social and political processes.

63 Rogger, ""Nationalism and the State", p.255.

64 Martin Katz, Mikhail Katkov: A Political Biography, 1818-1887, The Hague, Mouton, 1966, pp.62-63.

65 So, for instance, the same Roman imperial archetype: on the British 'imperial purpose' in comparison to Rome, Linda Colley, Britons, Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, Pimlico, 1992, Chapter 4, or Tom Nairn's discussion of Scotland's role as "the junior partner in the New Rome", The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, London, New Left Books, 1977, p.129; on the Spanish, Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the Worlds, New haven, CT., 1995.

with the European 'age of empire'. Russian nationalism's imperial mission borrowed the fullness of European racialist and geopolitical militarism (e.g. witness the justifications for Russia's expansion in Central Asia). Szporluk writes that Russia's was an 'empire in the age of nationalism'. Yet Russia had been an empire for 400 years; rather it was the 'imagining' of its nation in 'the age of empire'. Russian nation-building was imagined in a geopolitical context in which other European powers were articulating their imperial ambitions, and Russian nationalism developed late in the 19th century in the service of a 400 year empire. Indeed Russian policy makers' very motivation for transforming the empire into a 'nation-state' was that this would strengthen both its geopolitical power in the international arena *and* that it would strengthen autocracy. They considered this to be the lesson of the age.

The fourth feature of the development of the Russian 'nation' was that it was not, to borrow Gellner's model, a 'High Culture' which was then diffused. Suny is correct to disagree with Beissinger's claim that the Tsarist regime did what the French and English did in creating loyal subjects by transforming their cultural identities: Russia's integration of elites was very differentiated across nationalities, and minority peasant populations were hardly integrated into the Russian 'nation', retaining for the most part their tribal, ethnic, and religious identities.[66] There was, as Suny points out, "no ethnic nation-making project or even consistent and effective Russification program" to 'nationalize' subjects as there was in France around the idea of the 'nation'.[67] But neither was there such a 'nation-making' program in Russia itself designed to make 'Russian' peasants into 'Russians'. In part this was because, as Hosking emphasizes, 'Russian' High Culture was itself hardly Russian but European, cosmopolitan, and borrowed.

Fifth, if the creation of the Russian nation did not involve the diffusion of a High Culture, neither did it involve the universalization of 'low' or peasant culture, as in most of Central Europe's nation-building movements. And this despite its being an essentially peasant nation. Neither Populists, nor Tsars, nor Church effectively served as spokesmen

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66 Suny, "Ambiguous Categories: States, Empires, and Nations", p.191. We can also add the most important-- linguistic identities.

67 Ibid.

for the Russian *narod*.

Sixth and relatedly, as Reshetar said of the Ukraine: 'no middle class, no nationalism'. None of the Russian middle social strata -- the First Element (bureaucracy), the Second Element (zemstvo deputies), 'educated political society' (*obshchestvennost*), and the Third Element (*raznochintsy*) -- were able to articulate a national identity or 'speak for the nation', as did the French Third Estate (as Rogger argues) or the "towns and missing bourgeoisie" (as Hosking argues).[68] There was no 'middle class nation' (Mann's term for Britain).

In short, neither a state directed 'nationalism from above' on the Prussian model, nor a social movement 'nationalism from below' (High Culture, Low Culture, or 'middle class') could develop in state which feared any societal association.[69] As Rogger wrote, 19th century Russian nationalism could only with difficulty view the Tsarist state as the embodiment of the "national purpose", "while the state, for its part, looked upon every autonomous expression of nationalism with fear and suspicion".[70] Russian nationalism, he argued, remained essentially a problem of cultural identity for elites, and not a political reality, since imperial "territorial consolidation brought with it no extension of political rights, no interpenetration of state and society, no lasting accommodation between them": no form of nationalism -- radical, liberal, or conservative -- was acceptable to the Russian state, not even under pressure of WWI.[71] So in the Russian case at least, we can amend Reshetar slightly: no civil society, no nationalism.

And finally, the most overlooked feature of the those who did embody and advocate an 'official nationality' and/or an ethnic Russian nationalism were either *Russian administrators or settlers in the imperial peripheries* or *non-Russians*. I discuss possible reasons for this -- lack of confidence, weak ethnic Russian presence in the peripheries, the rise of regional-national identities, and the fact that the Russian was a 'geopolitical state' --

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68 Rogger, "Nationalism and the State", pp.263-264; Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, pp.319, 479 and *passim* and Chapter on the "Towns and Missing Bourgeoisie".

69 This is derived from John A. Hall's typology, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained", Daedalus, Vol.122, No.3, Summer 1993, pp.1-28.

70 Hans Rogger, "Nationalism and the State", p.253.

71 Ibid., pp.256, 262.

in the next chapter. But this was as true of "Official Nationality" as it was of anti-Semitism, Nationalist Rightism, and ultimately Bolshevism.

Reiber and Starr argued that, apparently in contrast to other empires, Russian settlers and colonizers in the peripheries (in part because they included Cossacks and Old Sectarians) did not really develop a "settler mentality" or a "distinctive cultural identity".[72] I disagree. Russian settlers and imperial administrators (many of whom were non-Russian) living in the 'shatter zones' in a kind of permanent 'ruling insecurity' and anxiety were the initial bearers of an *ethnic Russian nationalism:* anti-Semitism, 'innovations' in Judeophobia and 'Polonophobia', conservative rightism, Russificatory policies, illiberal economic practices and policies, and Great Russian nationalism itself, all originated *among Russians in the imperial peripheries*, not in the Russian center. We know that most of the empire's greatest rightists and Russian nationalists were not from Petersburg, Moscow or the Central Russian provinces, but from the western borderlands (Vilna, Bessarabia, Volynia, and Kiev). Particularly after 1905 the western borderlands were strongholds of nationalist and rightist parties, anti-Semitism, and polonophobia.[73] The Russian landlords in the southwest were the core of the Russian Nationalist Party and the rightists in the 3rd and 4th Dumas. 'Innovations' in Judeophobia (initially 'borrowed' from Polish rule) came from Governor-Generals and other officials in the western provinces not from Petersburg elites.[74] Demands for restrictions on non-Russian commerce and trade (especially toward Jews, Germans, and Armenians) came from Russian merchants and financiers. In 1905 progromism was primarily a 'southern Russian' or Ukrainian phenomenon socially carried by Russian and Ukrainian workers and peasants responding to calls from groups like the Black Hundreds, who following the announcements of Jewish liberalizations contained in the October Manifesto set out in reactionary defense of Fatherland and Tsar.[75] And the most influential proponents of "Official Nationality" of the first half of the 19th century

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72 Reiber, "Struggle over the Borderlands", p.85; Starr, "The Tsarist Government", pp.3-38.

73 Don Rawson, Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905, Cambridge University Press, 1995; Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914, DeKalb, 1996.

74 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia.

75 Klier and Lambroza (eds), Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History.

were largely *non-Russians*, and in composition bore strong resemblance to the Bolsheviks. Reiber argues that reform, revolution, and Russification "rippled out from the metropole core to the periphery",[76] but the sociology of these processes suggests the opposite dynamic: they originated in the peripheries and moved into the center.

Lieven writes that "twice in this century empire in Russia has been brought down above all by a revolt among ethnic Russians against the burdens of empire and the ideology that sustains them".[77] I am not sure that this is true: ethnic Russians both times began to 'liberalize', 'reform', or 'modernize', and both times did so in *defense* of empire or to save the empire and the ideology that sustained it, while the true revolt against the burdens of empire (and the ideology that sustained it) actually came from the non-Russian ethnic peripheries. In short, *both* an ethnic Russian national identity, *and* an imperial, geopolitical Russian identity were products not of the imperial 'center' but of 'peripherals', Russian and non-Russian. The negative argument is that there was no Russian nationalism because autocratic Russia had no civil society; the positive argument is that the social carriers of much of the Russian or imperial 'national' identity that did exist bring us to the very core of the cultural dimensions of empire, to the relationship between metropole and peripheries, and to Bolshevism and how 'peripherals' come to espouse an ideology of the 'metropole'.

The imperial state and imperial rule

I begin with Gibbon on imperial rule. Momigliano's classic work argued that Gibbon's history of Rome represented the crucial dilemma between "enlightenment" and "Christianity"; and Gibbon's hostility to Rome as an "empire"[78] was firmly 18th century: he saw it as the "extended despotism" of a "universal monarchy",[79] quite distinct from the principles of the British empire. More specifically, for Gibbon the social intricacies of imperial society are what crucially distinguished the accumulation of Roman despotism

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76 Rieber , "Struggle over the Borderlands".

77 Lieven, "Dilemmas of Empire", p.164.

78 Arnaldo Momigliano, "Gibbon's Contribution to Historical Method", in Momigliano, Studies in Historiography, London, 1966, pp.40-55.

79 John Robertson, "Gibbon's Roman Empire as a universal monarchy: *Decline and Fall* and the imperial idea in early modern Europe", in McKitterick and Quinault, (eds), Edward Gibbon and Empire, p.265.

from other run-of-the-mill despotisms.

Gibbon was not deeply interested in Rome's size, extension, or 'overextension'. Rather he wanted to understand the sources of cohesion of the empire on the premise that extended societies are held together by 'artifice'.[80] "Small societies", he believed, have a certain cohesion which "extended societies" do not, but which they create 'artificially'. The differences between small, 'organic' units and gigantic, diverse empires he borrowed from Montesquieu, further believing that in small societies the slippage between culture and manageable institutions is relatively slight, while in empires it is far greater.[81] The "artifice" and intolerance of Rome, not the size of Rome, was at fault in its decline.[82]

Giarrizzo insightfully argued that Gibbon's moral history calling for an "enlightenment tolerance" was an essentially pre-modern *relativismo tradizionalistico* in which the social stratifier was religion, and in which language (let alone 'nation') had not yet been elevated to 'identity'.[83] Through the lens of 18th century pluralist Europe Gibbon had no suspicion that nationalism, not religion, would be the new basis of 'intolerance' and political disintegration.

Yet Giarrizzo's framing of the central empirical question is still pertinent: "by what means and with what success were local groupings and particular vested interests within the empire induced for many centuries to lend their support to the 'stupendous fabric'?"[84] Recent work has picked up variations on this theme. Lieven's most recent contribution on the Tsarist empire usefully frames it this way: "the key dilemma of empire was how, on the one hand to hold together polities of great territory, population and therefore power, and, on the other, to square this priority with satisfying the demands of nationalism, democracy and economic dynamism".[85]

In other words, the dilemma resided in surviving as an empire in the age of nation-

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80 Peter Brown, "Gibbon on Culture and Society", in Bowersock et al (eds) Edward Gibbon and the Decline and Fall, p.49.

81 Ibid., pp.45-46.

82 Craddock, Edward Gibbon: Luminous Historian, p.31.

83 Giarrizzo, Edward Gibbon e la cultura Europea dell'Settecento, p.140 and *passim*.

84 Ibid., pp.251, 440-441.

85 Lieven, "Dilemmas of Empire", p.165.

states -- which in the end not even the most geopolitically successful liberal British empire managed to do. But Lieven's comparison of the Russian with other empires is suggestive and important. He situates the Russian (together with the Austro-Hungarian) as a 'hybrid' of the pre-modern, 'moribund' absolutist bureaucratic monarchical empires such as the Ottoman, and of the modern and vibrant European-power empires like the British. Lieven further situates these within the pressures and incentives of an international geopolitical and military context. My own sense, however, is that the Russian was less a 'hybrid' than it was resolutely 'pre-modern' in its workings, but that it was thrust onto a 'modern' European Great power geopolitical stage from which it inherited 'European' territories with 'European' institutions and sensibilities. The geopolitical insecurities consequently felt by Tsarist elites -- particularly in light of its 'pre-modern', weak under-government -- caused them to respond conservatively and traditionally to preserve privileges, statuses, *soslovniie*, property rights, and citizenship access.

This is why Reiber writes, in my view correctly, that the Romanovs had neither a 'theory of empire' nor a 'theory of state', and that "unlimited Russian expansionism" has really been a myth.[86] The Russian empire has been distinguished by being a 'landlocked' territorial empire, so what is usually termed 'militarist' or imperial expansionist has actually been the rather more traditional 'balance of power' geopolitics of a landlocked state (thus the perennial Russian fear of 'encirclement'). The Steppes, the Baltics, Poland and the western borderlands were obtained not by expansionism or 'imperial conquest', but by "Great Power" geopolitics with neighboring empires, e.g wars with Poland-Lithuania and Sweden, and the collapse of the East European dynastic states from which Prussia and Austria equally benefited.[87]

McNeill's early work on the Steppe, for instance, documents Turkish expansionism into Danubian Europe, the Habsburg response culminating in the "Time of Troubles" in the Ottoman, Austrian, Polish, and Russian states, the resulting frontier defense systems and communities set up by the Muscovite and Polish monarchies. All of this produced in the

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86 Reiber, "Struggle over the Borderlands", pp.82-83.

87 Ibid., pp.65-66, 85; Seton-Watson's classic study of the Russian empire treats the imperial state's geopolitics in terms of its "Great Power" foreign policy, Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, especially pp.41-68, 280-331.

Muscovite state (and the others) a "monarchical bureaucratism".[88] "War makes states" social theory has merit: Russia's geopolitical competition forced a modernization and bureaucratization of the army, professional infantry, and a navy -- all with their associated domestic infrastructures. As in the West, taxes replaced plunder, and armed-forces backed tax-collection which in turn became bureaucratically sustained.[89] Colonization and agricultural advance became economically self-sustaining with bureaucratic and tax collection infrastructures. And in part because it was a territorial empire, the 'center' was profoundly changed by rule of the peripheries: crucial links in the domestic-imperial economy were forged, for instance, since the landlocked center needed sea trade routes.[90] As McNeill showed, when the Turkish, Austrian, and Russian frontiers were stabilized c.1800 the "supremacy of the bureaucratic empire over any more local form of political organization had been definitively demonstrated in Danubian and Pontic Europe".[91]

But geopolitical competition was also important to the empire culturally. Russian imperial elites were resolutely Europeanized, in part as a function of this geopolitical socialization. Gibbon believed that geopolitical competition had an important "civilizing" cultural legacy in 18th century Russia because "military imitation served to soften manners": Catherine's Russian "enlightenment" and "Europeanization" were comforting to the liberal Gibbon.[92] So until c.1800 Russia's 'political crystallization' as a bureaucratic monarchy was essentially geopolitically-selected, and Russian empire-building was firmly connected to European geopolitics as Russia integrated into a European geopolitical sociability.

As an empire however, the Russian differed from its contemporaries, the Habsburg and the Prussian, in its greater ethnic heterogeneity, in the greater socioeconomic disparity

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88 William McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800, University of Chicago Press, 1964, Chapters 2 and 3.

89 Ibid, pp.128-131.

90 Starr, "The Tsarist Government", p.7.

91 McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier, p.182.

92 Jeremy Black, "Gibbon and International Relations", in Rosamond McKitterick and Roland Quinault (eds.), Edward Gibbon and Empire, Cambridge, 1997, p.234. Gibbon shared the prevailing view of 'progress-via-competition', and Robertson's view that "imitation or cultural transmission holds the key to growing European homogeneity". (pp.224-225)

of its constituted parts, and in the absence a 'Russian' ruling 'High Culture'. It differed from the Asian bureaucratic empires which were characterized by an 'advanced' despotic center and political weakness and backwardness in the peripheries; and it politically differed from the early Roman empire with the latter's culturally and politically advanced 'liberal' center and its 'barbaric' borderlands.

In some respects, the Russian was more similar to the Spanish European and South American territories in terms of the nature of its constituted parts. The empire's Muscovite 'metropole' was essentially agricultural, patrimonially legitimized and stratified, but its dominions were *both* more 'advanced' *and* more 'backward'. The western borderlands were more "advanced", some with histories of 'western-style' legitimacy and social stratifications (Poland-Lithuania, the Baltics); its southern territories bordering the Ottoman empire (Transcaucasus, the Steppes), were predicated on the social and political legitimation of a steppe-agricultural 'frontier' society and its social stratifications; and its eastern territories bordered the sparsely populated Asian agricultural bureaucratic empires, premised on still other social organizations and manners of historically legitimate rule. So an important feature of the Russian empire in its 'state building' from the 1500's onwards was its difficulty in reconciling very disparate social stratifications and cultural 'legitimacies' into a coherent polity.

Lenin had stressed the feudal, military, and bureaucratic character of Russian imperialism (in unfavorable contrast to western capitalist imperialism), and clearly the Romanov armies played a crucial role in the settlement process as the civil and military bureaucracies became closely entwined.[93] But the degree to which the army and military continued as the "chief agents of imperial policy" may be overstated.[94] The state's domestic militarism was more a property of its rule of the eastern and southeastern empire than of the western empire, and it was more true of early periods of imperial consolidation than of the later empire. Education replaced militarism as the chief agent of imperial policy.

By the early reform period (c.1801-1812) state elites viewed language, education, and the bureaucracy, not its military, as the main agents of imperial rule and influence over

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93 Starr, "The Tsarist Government", pp.12-13; McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier, pp.186-187.

94 Starr for instance argues that the state's main agent was its army, "The Tsarist Government", p.13.

its domains. Geopolitically, the Russian state's purely imperialist militarism was limited to its conquest of Central Asia beginning in the late 1860's, but its small gains rapidly gave way to restrained, conventional, and cautious *Realpolitik* in the Balkans between 1875-1878 (despite the bombast of the pan-slavists, pan-slavism was never the basis of foreign policy).[95] With the mid-century Polish rebellions and with Bismarck's cultural policies in the east and perceptions of pan-Germanism the Tsarist response, though geopolitically-induced, involved Russification and 'social' reforms, that is, cultural domestic responses not militarist ones.

Therefore in terms of imperial rule and consolidation, at least three features of the Russian multi-ethnic territorial empire seem to me most important. First, attempts at political unity tended to fluctuate somewhere between unity based on 'divide and rule' and unity based on 'integration' or 'homogenization' (interestingly Russification was 'divide and rule' not homogenization). This oscillation was reinforced by the ethno-social geography of the realm which made uniform rule more difficult to implement, and *ancien regime* particularistic rule comparatively more straightforward. In the long century between the Catherinian state (a cooperation and cooptation based on an Enlightenment 'artifice') and the Soviet state (unity imposed on the constituent parts) the Romanovs struggled through the long 19th century with elements of both. I detail the different conceptions of imperial unity and their respective policies as they affected elites in the peripheries in Chapter 4.

Secondly, the problem of political unity was as much political as cultural. Empires require a greater linguistic and cultural cosmopolitanism than nation-states. The ability to have flexible local rule is important, especially in the persons of loyal bilingual national elites. But empires, like autocratic states, tend to associate pluralism, decentralization, and local (including linguistic) autonomy with weakness since it is seen as perpetuating the diversity of the realm. This may be for two reasons. First because they tend to lack confidence in their ability to rule in far flung regions: Tsarist elites' insecurity was inevitably heightened by the fact that there were extremely few ethnic Russians in the peripheries. It was for this reason that the state withheld local self-government, a decision

[95] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.438-461.

which resulted in more bureaucratic rule.[96] At base the fear may have been that local (particularly rural) national elites would offer a 'counter-culture' to the ruling imperial culture: the central worry was not Poland or ethnic Poles generally, but that in the multi-ethnic western provinces the Polish gentry was an upper class cultural, propertied minority inside the Russian 'nation'; in the Baltics the concern was not Baltic German's non-Russianness, but the anachronistic nature of their social, political, and administrative culture in their provinces as it differed from those prevailing elsewhere in the empire;[97] and the state's changed view of Armenians (once a privileged Christian minority) in the late imperial period was not because they were not 'Russian', but because by the 1890's the state viewed Armenian elites as posing a threat to its relations with the Ottoman state.[98]

Thirdly and relatedly, the very ethnic, religious, national, and linguistic diversity of the territorial empire made it difficult for imperial elites to distinguish between geopolitical and domestic political concerns. On the one hand the Romanovs' raison *d'etre* was fundamentally geopolitical, much as Sked said of the Habsburgs. As Sked wrote of the Austrian, the Russian state, too, was "a natural geographical unit", complete with a geographical role, an historical role, a cultural role, and a European balance of power role.[99] On the other hand, because the ethno-geographical patchwork and socio-ethnic niches of the 'fourth time zone' were so intricate,[100] and because ethnic and political boundaries did not coincide, imperial elites saw very little distinction between imperial and foreign policies.[101] I discuss the consequences of this in Chapter 4 in terms of minority elites and radical groups.

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96 This was the experience in the Polish-dominated provinces. On the connection between local self-government and bureaucratic rule, I follow Max Weber's observations on Russia, "Zur Lage der burgerlichen Demokratie in Russland" and "Russlands Ubergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus", in Max Weber, Zur Russischen Revolution von 1905: Schriften und Reden, 1905-1912, (Ed.) Wolfgang J. Mommsen, JCB Mohr: Tubingen, 1989, especially pp.129-152, and 320-400.

97 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, UC Berkeley Press, 1961,p.227.

98 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.499-500.

99 Alan Sked, "Historians, the nationality question, and the downfall of the Habsburg Empire", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 31 (1981), p.190. Lieven's study corrects the lack of attention paid to this latter.

100 Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1994, on the ethnic intricacy of the 'third and fourth time zones'.

101 Starr makes this last point, "The Tsarist Government", p.6.

Early Tsarist empire-builders were typically pragmatic colonizers -- local elites were co-opted regardless of color, race, creed, ethnicity, etc. and local social hierarchies were initially minimally altered. Tolerance was the child of necessity as traditional leaders were transformed into loyal imperial service elites while retaining local privileges. (Though this is typically overstated: co-optation of elites still required arbitrary demarcations to limit the number of 'nobles' to enter the Russian ranks as the state -- and Russian nobles -- feared the 'overproduction' of nobles, and state policies themselves caused great status insecurities.)

But elite cooptation does not stand still, and what worked at one historical moment could no longer work in another. The early 19th century rebellions of 'disloyal Georgian nobles' and particularly the two rebellions of the 'disloyal Poles' not only intensified "frontier anxiety", but they crucially challenged early empire-builders' toleration and cooptation of minority elites. The more 'advanced' peripheries began to challenge the political legitimacy of imperial rule in a manner not unsimilar to the Dutch revolts in the Spanish Empire. Though these were less 'nationally conscious' rebellions than they were elite revolts to political arbitrariness and autocracy, they had a profound affect on how imperial elites thought about the peripheries: the state abandoned its traditional policies of co-opting minority elites. The Tsarist state experimented with as many forms of local rule as there were localities, and no consistent -- much less homogenizing -- nationality or peripheral policy was adopted. Various 'divide and rule' and 'integration' policies were attempted, but 'incorporation' still had a traditional, dynastic-monarchical basis in privileges, not rights.[102] Both insecure elites of various statuses and ranks, and the Tsarist state, continued to maintain traditional *sosloviie* boundaries and privileges.[103] And because of the persistent cultural-linguistic differences marking off elites and peasants of any given ethnicity, 'divide and rule' was more readily applied within ethnicities than between them. So these were 18th century, not 19th century, 'incorporations', and this at

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[102] Raymond Pearson, "Privileges, Rights, and Russification" in Olga Crisp and Linda Edmondson, (eds), Civil Rights in Imperial Russia, Oxford, Clarendom Press, 1989, pp.85-102.

[103] Freeze, "The *Soslovnie* Paradigm in Russian Social History"; Wirtschafter, "The Probelmatics of Status Definition in Imperial Russia"; Gatrell, "Economic Culture, Economic Policy and Economic Growth".

a time when 'fourth time zone' educated elites were borrowing European socialism and nationalism.

In this connection the two most cited features of late imperial Russia were its bureaucratic-centralization and its Russification or 'homogenization'. In the next chapter I endeavor to show that both find very little empirical support. Actually the state could neither centralize nor homogenize because it was fundamentally institutionally weak and fearful, semi-feudal, *ancien regime* dynastic state unable to transcend particularistic rule. Additionally, the imperial state was itself ruled by 'peripherals' far more than is usually assumed. We know, for instance, that the ethnic peripheries were governed largely by ethnic non-Russians who had 'imperial', not Russian experiences,[104] and that educated bilingual national minorities held most of the provincial middle and lower level imperial civil service posts.[105]

The Tsarist state failed not in its nation-building process, which it did not really begin until the mid-1880's in any sustained way, but it failed in its state-building. I noted above that a key source of the failure of the empire was its weakness, its administrative under-government. The institutions of a modern state were hardly in place. Administrative needs were so acute that in the Ukrainian territories, for instance, there were not even enough educated elites to staff positions.[106] Even in the gubernia with zemstvo and some form of local government, the Tsarist state had difficulty finding local men of sufficient education and experience to staff the offices; the number of personnel in the gubernia chancelleries were minute: usually 9 people (i.e. in Vilna and Kiev) in 1917, the same as there were in 1865.[107] The Russian government needed more, not fewer, officials to staff bureaucracies and the institutional infrastructures, and given its alliance commitments and

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[104] Stephen Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?", Russian Review, No.2, 1995, pp.188-208; W.E. Mosse, "Provincial Governors at the End of the Nineteenth Century", Historical Journal, No.1, 1984; Dominic Lieven, "Russian Senior Officialdom under Nicholas II: Careers and Mentalities", Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 32, 1984, pp.203-204.

[105] Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia"; Manfred Hagen, "Russification via 'Democratization'? Civil Service in the Baltic after 1906", Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol.9, no.1, 1978, pp.56-65.

[106] Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia".

[107] Richard G. Robbins, Jr., The Tsar's Viceroys, Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of the Empire, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, pp.95-97, 103-104.

"imperial pretensions" should have spent more, not less, on military defense outlays.[108]

There was 'undergovernment' in other spheres as well. The 1881 anti-Jewish pogroms also lay bare the imperial state's infrastructural weakness: in 1900 there were less than 48,000 police for an imperial population of 127,000,000 (the average Russian province had only 8-12 gendarmes in 1900) as social order broke down.[109] Local self-government was introduced only in Russian-noble dominated provinces and not in the peripheries until after 1890. No language standardization had been adopted empire-wide and, partly related to the failure to introduce zemstvo, no uniform educational system had been adopted, notably primary education -- much less in Russian language. Illiteracy levels were notoriously high. In short, the Tsarist state was an under-governed, under-administered, and generally weakly institutionalized and infrastructurally fragile 18th century state.

Russification or homogenizing state?

Russification and 19th century Tsarist nationality policies have generally received comparatively thin scholarly attention. No consensus among historians and sociologists exists on the dynamics and intention of Russification. This "historical neglect", as one scholar puts it, has resulted in a view of the empire as a "prison of nations", an unqualified nationalities disaster:

> "the term Russification has been used carelessly, most commonly as an ironic euphemism for brutal physical subjugation. Even in academic circles, Russification has often been projected as a centrally planned, demonic imperial strategy, a Tsarist blueprint for the ... persecution of minorities, with little attempt to understand its purpose,

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108 Gatrell makes this point in "Economic Culture, Economic Policy, Economic Growth", pp.41-42. Examples cited are the fact that Russian troops before the Russo-Japanese War had to furnish their own uniforms, food, and boots -- and had to produce these finished goods given cloths, leather, and flour. With the result that in 1907 2/5 of all men in uniform were engaged in non-military activities such as tailoring, cobbling, and baking.

109 Michael Aronson, "The Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia in 1881", Pogroms, Table 1, pp.51-52, 54-57, and John Klier, "The Pogrom Paradigm in Russian History", Klier and Lambroza (eds), Pogroms, pp.23-24, 28, 33. Elizavetgrad, one of the most pogrom-ridden cities in the empire in 1881, had a population to police ratio of more than 73,000:87; and Kherson had almost 50,000:138.

dynamic, and scope."[110]

As Pearson observes, this was primarily due to a focus on a few highly visible minorities -- Poles, Jews, Finns -- whose historiographies view the Russian state as backward and reactionary, and which have generalized to the more than 100 nationalities in the empire the experiences of these three unrepresentative nationalities. In other words, the focus on the Jews and Poles has caused a distortion of our understandings of Russification's intentions, designs, and policies, and their consequences for the empire. As with many historians of the Habsburg empire, so too high levels of Polish and especially Jewish emigration, "what one may simplistically label the 'Jewish refugee view' of the Russians and the Tsarist empire, quickly established itself, retaining much of its authority in the West right up to the present".[111]

Pearson is surely correct. As we will see in subsequent chapters, the Jewish experience in the Russian empire was almost entirely *sui generis* and should not by itself serve as the centerpiece for understanding Tsarist nationality policies. Tsarist nationality policies not only varied in intent and design over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but they tended to be less far-sighted, planned, centralizing, homogenizing, or deliberate than is usually thought. And though in certain moments arguably the intention was there, institutional and administrative weakness and de-centralization undermined any coherent implementation. A more nuanced and empirical view is needed. Tsarist nationality policies, and Russification among them, were far more pragmatic, ad hoc, and discriminate depending nationality, class and estate within nationality, and by region. Rather than being, as is usually asserted, homogenizing and assimilative, Russification was actually more 'divide and rule' and 'dissimilative' (Brubaker's term), in attempts to maintain social control more than 'make non-Russians into Russians'. And understanding at least part of this will provide the context for better understanding Bolshevism, or how 'peripherals' come to join and create a 'Russianized' movement -- and a state -- of the imperial Russian 'metropole'.

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[110] Pearson, "Privileges, Rights, and Russification", p.88.

[111] On the Russian empire, ibid, p.87. On Habsburg historians, Sked, "Historians, the nationality question, and the downfall of the Habsburg Empire", pp.184-185.

If the term 'Russification' is itself complex, it is also used both empirically and analytically with varying degrees of precision. Richard Pipes employs the term in its malevolent connotations to describe the predatory behavior of a Great Russian chauvinist or nationalist state; while Carrere-D'Encausse emphasizes Russification's more benign bureaucratic imperatives, the empire's (and later the state's) requirement for administrative centralization. On these views, Russification was part of a wider socio-historical pattern across Europe of state centralization, a transition from empire to nation-state and the need for (at least) linguistic uniformity in administration, education, civil service, etc.. In its Russian variant it was simply more autocratic and illiberal. Viewed this way Russification had certain resemblance to Magyarization and Prussianization.[112]

For Suny, Russification has been used in three distinct ways, temporally very similar to Thaden's usage. Suny distibguishes as *obrusyet'* (or *obrusyevaniye*) policies under Catherine and Nicholas I as administrative unification; as a "spontaneous process of self-adaptation of people to the norms of life and language in the Russian empire"; and in the more conventional sense of *obrusit'* or "to make Russian in a cultural sense", as a reaction to the nationalism of non-Russians under Alexander III and Nicholas II.[113] Suny usefully distinguishes between a process of voluntary 'self-Russification' and Russification as explicit state policy. However, as I show in the following chapter, 'administrative Russification' and 'cultural Russification' empirically mis-specify the content of the actual policies across nationalities. Thaden's seminal edited volume, too, distinguished between the intransitive *obruset* as the earlier usage and the latter use of the active *obrusit* , noting that until the end of the 19th century officials were cautions in their use of the term.[114]

Suny writes that Muscovy and Imperial Russia successfully integrated the "core regions of their empire" into a single nationality, but failed to integrate the Russian core and the non-Russian peripheries. This, he observes, finds parallels between England's integration of Britain, but failure in Ireland, or France's nationalizing of the "hexagon", but

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112 Pearson, "Privileges, Rights, and Russification", pp.92-93; Seton-Watson saw both Magyarization and Russification as products of the crisis of the gentry. Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.486.

113 Ronald Grigor Suny, "Ambiguous Categories: States, Empires and Nations", p.191.

114 Edward Thaden, (ed), Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914, Princeton, 1981, pp.7-8.

failure in Algeria.[115] (Though I think the French and British empires were very different from the Russian in this respect, not least because of the timing of their 'nationalizing' drives.)

The parallel between Russification and Prussianization is a far better one, though these views tend to assume an inherent homogenizing or centralizing intent and design in Russification that finds scant empirical support, save perhaps with qualification in the narrow post-1905 period. I agree with Starr that "mass Russification" was only a very brief phase in the history of the Russian empire, but I locate it later than he does.[116] It is also hard to sustain the claim that Russification had a consistently centralizing administrative thrust or as Hosking claims, that it was consistently applied in the 1880's.[117] Systematically sorting through nationality policies, Weeks, Keep, Starr, and Klier argue that the Russian state never had consistent or articulated 'homogenizing' policies, much less the administrative ability to centralize or 'homogenize'. Russification as "administrative unification" *never* occurred, and neither was it explicit policy. Indeed there was never a top level official in Russia in charge of the nationalities -- Stalin was the first, neither was there a central ministry or agency responsible for nationality policy.[118] Unfortunately Pipes' early -- and misleading -- characterization has persisted. He wrote *both* that "at no point in its history did Tsarist Russia formulate a consistent policy towards the nationalities", *and* that "the Russian government perhaps for the first time in its entire history adopted a systematic policy of Russification and minority repression".[119] Pipes' judgment is now corrected by the emerging historical consensus.

Other discussions of Russification focus on specific regions or nationalities of the empire and draw from them models of Russification or nationalities' incorporation. So, for instance, Thaden's collection distinguishes between "administrative Russification" (laws,

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115 Suny, "States, Empires and Nations", p.192.

116 Starr, "The Tsarist Government", p.22 locates "mass Russification" in the last decades of the century. My own research locates it at least after 1894 and in a sustained way after 1905.

117 Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.367.

118 Ibid., pp.5-7.

119 Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, p.6, also quoted in Pearson, "Privileges, Rights, and Russification", p.90.

institutions, schools), "unplanned Russification" (voluntarily 'becoming Russian'), and "cultural Russification" (more aggressive in language, religion, culture).[120] But "unplanned Russification" is more precisely "acculturation" or "assimilation". Similarly, David Laitin's recent work employs three 'models' of peripheral incorporation and their effects on linguistic Russification and assimilation: 'most favored lord pattern' (Ukraine), 'colonial model' (Kazakhstan), and 'integrationist model' (Baltics). Laitin's account is inspired by Besancon's 'three faces of the Empire', as he himself notes: the US in Siberia, the British in Central Asia, and Austria-Hungary in the Ukraine.[121] This is also reminiscent of Seton-Watson's earlier distinction between the 'European' imperial territories, in which Russification was a secular ideology of state firmly predicated on the sovereignty of the Russian nation, and the 'Asiatic' imperial territories in which the governing principle was colonial or 'civilizatrice'.[122]

Although each account has merit, they either have limited regional relevance and therefore make intra-imperial national comparisons difficult, or they deny an independent role to the interests and intentions of the Russian state in formulating nationality and Russification policy, particularly problematic in view of the fact that Russification policies changed over time, motivated by different *raison d'etat*. So, for instance, Laitin's 'most favored lord' pattern to describe the imperial incorporation or assimilation of the Ukraine (in the pre-1917 period) insufficiently distinguishes between differences in regional incorporation (right bank Ukraine and Kiev vs. southern Ukraine and Odessa), and misspecifies not only the changing content of Russificatory policies over time, but also the sociology of Russification, e.g. the vastly different treatment of Ukrainian intellectuals, Ukrainian peasants, and Ukrainian civil servants and officials by the Russian state.

These typologies tend generally to be 'unsociological' in neglecting that Russification and nationality policies varied not only by region and specific nationality, but also by key social classes and status or social groups within and across nationalities. Indeed more often than not Russification policies were differently implemented depending

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120 Thaden, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, pp.8-9.

121 David Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998, Chapter 3, pp.59-83.

122 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.737.

on ethnic group. I discuss this in my own typology in Chapter 4.

Moreover, Russification is generally intended to refer to the post-1881 period, while the term 'official nationalism' typically serves the same analytical purpose for early and mid-century nationality policies.[123] This both confuses and clarifies. It confuses because the term 'Russification' itself was in relatively widespread official use 20 years before 1881, but with a very different policy denotation behind it (Thaden's use of the term in the years between 1855 and 1863 is likewise anachronistic). But it clarifies an important definitional problem -- Russification in its ethnic Russian or 'russkie' connotation was indeed a late arrival in official thinking and discourse, and the policies that flowed from this shift were in marked contrast to those that preceded it. The term 'Russification' dates to the 1863 Polish uprising, and was initially used specifically -- and singularly -- in connection with the Poles, though shortly afterwards it was adopted in discussions of the 'Jewish Question'. Russification in the 1863-1881 period then, entailed something qualitatively different than its post-1881 usage in terms of how the state was thinking.

The term is further complicated by the fact that depending on ethno-political context, national minorities themselves (often Jews) were considered "social carriers" of Russification: Lithuanian Jews migrating into Russian Poland were fearfully considered both by Poles and by Polish Jews as 'forces of Russification'. And while in the early part of the 19th century Jewish Russification or assimilation was considered a beneficent trend and desired aim of policy, during the war when Jews were evacuated into the Russian interior ethnic Russians feared their presence precisely because they were so thoroughly Russified and assimilated and so could not be easily 'detected'.

These distinctions are captured in independent studies of the empire's constituent nationalities together with more general works on the Russian imperial state and its wider imperatives. In this endeavor, the most empirically successful account is the work of Kappeler. Kappeler's excellent Russland als Vielvolkerreich distinguishes, thematically and regionally, differences in Tsarist nationality policies between 1831 and 1904: the repressive policies of Nicholas I in suppression of the Polish uprisings, the forced

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123 Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia; Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, pp.367-397; Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.485-505.

integration of Poles and others after the second Polish rebellions in 1863, the very different russificatory and assimilatory policies in the East and the South, and Jewish assimilation and exclusion.[124] This turns attention to complexities across the empire's nationalities, and to variations in the thinking of state elites at different historical junctures. I adopt some of Kappeler's thematic organization of Russification in my own periodicization and typology in Chapter 4.

And finally Reiber argues that "Russification engendered nationalism" and fostered revolutionary agitation in the imperial borderlands (minority elites educated in the center), as had Seton-Watson who devoted considerable attention to Russification and maintained that it resulted in the formation of nationalist intelligentsias. However as the next chapter will show, Russification was itself a *response* to Polish separatism and Bismarck's cultural policies. Separatist, political nationalisms were really a product of WWI and Civil War and occupation, not Russification, which produced only cultural autonomists. Tsarist Russia was not Habsburg Austria and her 'fourth time zone' nationalisms were rather more regionally based and in their early stages in 1914. Suny is correct to say that nationalist identities were far weaker, especially among the 'peasant nations' such as Ukraine, where Russophilia was strong among peasants, workers, and middle classes, than has been usually assumed.[125] Even census data on nationality typically reflect 'nationality' inconsistently across measures such as 'mother tongue', ethnicity, and religion, but showed rather strong local or regional identities. Indeed what is neglected is that much Russification policy actually *worked*. Levels of multi-lingualism and bilingualism were rising. And the willing assimilationism of the empire's minorities needs quite as much to be understood and explained.

In this fact, Suny rightly concludes that Lenin's "estimation that *national separatism would [have been] reduced by central Russian tolerance* and a willingness to allow self-determination to the point of independence" was an indicator of his astute political realism.[126] Lenin understood that since the empire's minority nationalisms were relatively

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[124] Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich, pp.204-224.

[125] Suny cites Reshetar's classic work.

[126] Suny, "Nationalism and Class", p.240. Emphasis is mine.

'backward' (the more advanced were limited to autonomist elites), "central Russian tolerance" may have served to reign them in. This may have been an important difference between the Habsburg and Romanov third and fourth 'time zone' nationalisms and the limits and possibilities of empire. Lenin, too, saw the principle problem of Tsarist Russia to be illiberalism, not separatist nationalisms. Geopolitics and war politicized the empire's nationalities to the point of separatism where Russification had not.

Chapter 3
Methods and Sources

After a brief discussion of the data set, this chapter details the historical sociological methods adopted in this thesis, the kind and quality of the sources used, the rationale for the choice of data set, and a discussion on some of the analytical and empirical issues surrounding definitions of 'nationality' and ethnicity.

I. Data set

As noted in Chapter 2, some scholars have focused on the Bolsheviks of an earlier period (prior to the Revolution) in order to get at the differences between Bolshevism and Menshevism, while others have taken a longer view, analyzing Communist Party members from the Revolution through five or six decades to better understand what we may term 'charisma's routinization'. There is also the question of the handful of revolutionaries (Bolsheviks and others) who seized power in 1917 as a way to understand the revolutionary events in a more focused fashion. And finally, the period between 1917 and 1923/4 is itself somewhat arbitrary, as it could be easily extended through the late 1920's and 1930's with Stalinist consolidation, the beginning of the purges, and the concomitant change in the character of the Soviet leadership.

In short, the choices of 'data set' are several and each has a useful organizing rationale. So clearly one's choice will depend on the kinds of questions one wishes to ask. I am less interested in the mechanics of the Revolution itself, or the actual revolutionary seizure of power and who was at the barricades, than I am in getting a better understanding of those Bolsheviks who had a vision and contribution in the creation of a new political and social order. And I am less interested in macro-theoretical generalization about the wider comparative, socio-structural causes of revolution, than I am in a more careful, albeit empirically narrow, consideration of the imperial social and political order that produced these revolutionaries. In other words, who were the Bolsheviks who constructed a new order and what do they tell us about the society that they came from. I seek therefore not only a better sociological understanding of the Bolsheviks of the early revolutionary years, but through them, a better sociological understanding of the multinational Tsarist empire.

In am interested in the carriers of a 'charismatic heroic' movement.

Accordingly, I have chosen to include in this study the 93 members and candidate members of the constituted Central Committees between 1917 and 1923, inclusive. The primary rationale is that this was the first generation of revolutionary communists, the 'charismatic' elite before 'routinization' set in. These years mark off the period in which Lenin was in control of the revolutionary effort of the early state building years, making this "old guard" both destroyer of the *ancien regime* and the first creators of a new social and political order. To borrow Geertz's famous distinction between "holding a belief" and "being held by one" -- I am resolutely interested in the latter.

Arguably qualitative and quantitative changes took place in 1924 with Lenin's death, as both the character of the Bolshevik leadership began to change with Stalin's gradual consolidation of power, and as the CC was significantly expanded after 1923/1924. Therefore the inclusion of those Bolsheviks through the 1923 CC has both a logical and practical rationale -- expanding the data set beyond that would perhaps have been too large to do detailed biographical work.

And finally, I have chosen not to do any formal quantitative analysis. My interest has been to understand in some empirical detail the biographical experiences of as many members of a particular group, and the social context which produced them, as possible. I have neither formally looked for patterns or changes over time, e.g. from 1917 to 1923, nor have I attempted to compare this cohort with any other. In part, this derives from the unevenness of the data available. For instance, in most cases the most consistently accurate and available data have been dates of birth, geographical origins, dates of party membership, and sometimes type of schooling. Far more uneven have been most of the most interesting pieces of biographical information: activism in nationalist groups, national or ethnic origins, and even social or class origins. In short, it would be very difficult to conduct any statistical or formal quantitative analysis that would have any real meaning or interpretive usefulness.

II. Methods and Sources

This thesis therefore adopts a historical sociological approach to the study of the

Bolshevik elite, with particular attention paid to C. Wright Mills' use of 'biography in history' and Weber's concept of 'elective affinity'. In his classic The Sociological Imagination Mills famously argued for the connection between biography and society: the 'sociological imagination' enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. The study of the intersection between 'biography' and 'history' is what allows us to connect 'private troubles' with 'public issues', as we shift from the relations between private features of individual lives to the character and ethos of an historical period.[1]

Using biographies to conceive of features of men's inner lives as features of specific historical contexts is particularly appropriate in understanding identities and choices -- political, cultural, and linguistic. How social and national contexts are implicated in these identity choices lie at the heart of this thesis. I have endeavored, therefore, to understand personal choices not in individual psychology but in their 'breeding ground' in wider society.

This thesis is influenced by Michael Mann's use of memoires and biographical materials in his chapter on the Jacobins, and more recently in his work on the social background of revolutionary Bolshevik elite.[2] (Auto)biographies can be rich sources of historical data. For instance, through his use of published biographies on a set of Russian revolutionaries, Mann found that they were radicalized very young, at approximately 17 years of age, so their careers were "substantially contaminated by their adolescent activities and by police harassment", concluding that we should look at "high schools, at apprenticeships, and at other juvenalia for a better understanding of Bolshevism".[3] My own research on a different Bolshevik 'data set' finds support for Mann's findings, but I am more interested in another aspect of revolutionary Bolshevism, namely their national-ethnic composition and activism in nationalist-cultural politics.

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[1] C.Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp.4-12, 134-143, 158-163, 225.

[2] Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol.II, Cambridge University Press, 1993, Chapter 6; Michael Mann, "In praise of macro-sociology: a reply to Goldthorpe", British Journal of Sociology, Vol.45, No.1, March 1994, p.43.

[3] Mann, "In praise of macro-sociology", pp.44-45.

Weber's concept of 'elective affinity' is equally central to the methodological questions organizing this thesis. Weber believed that "there is no pre-established correspondence between the content of an idea and the interests of those who follow from the first hour".[4] This is the product of the connection between an idea and (receptive) interests of a particular social strata, or an "elective affinity". Broadly interpreted this is the controlling idea organizing the empirical material of this thesis. Since different social strata or social groups display different motives and attractions to a particular 'idea', in the area chapters I seek to understand how and why an educated middle-class Jew, a rural Ukrainian civil servant, a *declasse* Polish gentry-intellectual, a Latvian factory worker, and an urbane Azerbaijani Turkish dramatist and writer all became Bolsheviks leading a Russianized movement, and what that says both about Bolshevism and about late Imperial Russia. Therefore I am interested in the interplay between 'interests' and 'ideas'.

More generally however, this thesis interprets *both* primary and secondary historical studies.[5] I have tried to organize the empirical historical data around certain sociological ideas:[6] the sociology of the Tsarist empire, acculturation-assimilation, linguistic-cultural choices, cultural-political choices, social identities, ethno-politics, nationalism.

This thesis relies primarily on biographies and autobiographies of the Bolsheviks, supplemented by relevant secondary works. Certainly diaries and memoires written for publication had a different intent than those intended for personal use and should be assessed with this in mind. Additionally, those individuals who write autobiographies and memoires are themselves something of a self-selected group. But with these considerations in mind, (auto)biographies can nevertheless provide a great deal of information when social background, intentions, personal traits, and social and political contexts are considered.

The best and most consistently reliable source for biographic information on revolutionary elites of the 1920's is the Entsiklopediia Granat. Most entries are

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[4] Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Trans. and eds., H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.63-65.

[5] J.H. Goldthorpe, "The uses of history in sociology: reflections on some recent tendencies", British Journal of Sociology, Vol.42, No.2, 1991, pp.211-230.

[6] See Mann's reply to Goldthorpe, "In praise of macro-sociology", pp.37-54.

autobiographical, with some authorized biographies. The Entsiklopediia Granat was prepared between 1921 and 1926 to coincide with the tenth anniversary of the revolution. Its entries are of varied length and detail on 246 revolutionaries, also of variable importance in the Revolution, and not all Bolsheviks. For most of the revolutionaries of 1917, contributions in the Entsiklopediia Granat were their only efforts at autobiographical account of their revolutionary careers and therefore retain a singular importance. Written and compiled before the "heroes of October" archetype became standard, they contain numerous details of the revolutionaries' pre-1917 lives which were then buried in subsequent historiography. But it should be kept in mind that the period in which these autobiographies were written was during the 'Left Communist' debates, and therefore tend to be better on Bolsheviks earlier politics than they are on events and circumstances surrounding and immediately following the Revolution. Typically scholars have consulted Granat biographies for information on class composition, for details of the revolutionaries roles and positions within the party, and for party membership dates.

I have read them also for national background and for their early radical activities and sources of politicization. Although there is an unevenness among the accounts of the most contentious protagonists (Stalin, Lenin, Zinoviev, Rykov, and Trotsky's which was compiled by the Old Bolshevik Nevskii), there still remains much detail about their ethnic origins which has been relatively un-mined, and their non-Bolshevik early politics. Taken as a whole, the Granat biographies contain, as Haupt observed, great variety in terms of the revolutionaries' abilities to draw on relevant facts, on the sophistication of their 'self-analysis', and on levels of humility and candor, among other things.[7] This is particularly true of their willingness to include information on religious affiliation, ethnicity or nationality, and membership in non-Bolshevik radical groups, particularly nationalist groups. This said, the Granat autobiographies combined with Okhrana (Tsarist political police) documentation have contained the most valuable information.

Much relevant primary source information on the Bolsheviks' early radicalism was also found in the Hoover Institution Archives of the Paris Okhrana (hereafter HIAPO). The Paris Okhrana was the most important Tsarist police headquarters outside Tsarist

[7] Georges Haupt and Jean-Jacques Marie, Les Bolcheviks par eux-memes, Paris, 1969, p.15.

Petersburg and Moscow from 1881 through 1917. During the Revolution and in its immediate aftermath Okhrana headquarters in Russia were sacked and unknown numbers of documents were destroyed, primarily those which were deemed to have had 'sensitive' value regarding particular revolutionaries. The Paris Ohkrana headquarters were left comparatively unscathed and nearly all of its contents is now collected at the Hoover Institution. Consequently, the Paris materials contain, in certain cases, more useful documentation for purposes of reconstructing the Bolsheviks' early politics, often traceable through arrest and surveillance records. Okhrana records for Uritskii or Skrypnyk reveal nationalist or national-socialist involvements before joining the Bolsheviks, for instance.

I have relied only in a limited way on 'official' biographies for obvious reasons of bias, the inevitable 'sovietization' of retrospective accounts, and their typically sketchy and incomplete assessments of both pre-revolutionary politics and ethnic origins. 'Official' biographies and autobiographies have been useful in gathering the most basic data (dates and places of birth, dates of joining the party, etc.). Most post-1920's biographies tend to begin describing political life on the date of joining the Communist Party. Unfortunately, in more than a few cases these official sources are the only ones available.

The greatest limitation to the use of biographies in this thesis has been the fact that I have been unable to consult non-Russian language accounts (although written Ukrainian is intelligible to me). A number of (auto)biographies do exist in Lithuanian, Armenian, Georgian, Yiddish, etc. which, unfortunately, are not available in translation. Moreover, I have been limited to sources available in the West, though this has had only marginal significance at best: most 'sensitive' materials, particularly regarding national and social origins, perished with the Revolution and in the years subsequent so it is unlikely that Russian archive biographical materials would cause substantial revision of the main claims in this thesis. For instance, recent Russian works on Trotsky by Russian historians and based on the new archival sources still seem as much interested in Trotsky's ideas on permanent revolution, theoretical disagreements with Lenin as a Bolshevik, and debates around Brest-Litovsk and the NEP, and far less new information seems to have emerged

regarding the social, political, and ethnic contexts of his early radicalism.[8]

More generally, the recently released 'personal funds' (*lichnye fondy*) and *opisi* on the early Soviet leadership contain correspondence, reports, documents on activities, personal papers, photographs, etc. Graziosi points out several biases however. Most immediately, the documents have themselves been 'selected out' and "constructed over time by archivists...according to a variety of evolving criteria",[9] and so what was omitted may have been more illuminating than what is included. But more importantly, the memoir and (auto)biographical material available for Soviet leaders of the pre-1941 period remains substantially unaffected by recently released materials: Graziosi describes the "scarcity of good quality literature on the leadership's inner life and ideologies", and concludes that this is generally "disappointing material" on this count.[10] In short, while there may be something with respect to the inner workings of the Soviet state in the 1930's and 1940's, there is little relevant to the early radicalism of the Soviet leadership.

Finally, and apart from the new sources, there is very uneven (auto)biographical data for the 93 Bolsheviks in this elite. Materials on the most well-known -- Lenin, Stalin, Bukharin, Trotsky -- abound, while information on some of the lesser-known figures is scant and fragmentary at best. I have tried to balance my accounts in the area chapters by including data on early politics and ethnicity on the lesser-known Bolsheviks, while presenting only minimal relevant data on men such as Stalin or Trotsky. Usually Lenin has been the embodiment of Bolshevism and others were 'deviations'. But when the revolutionary elite is taken as a totality, Lenin appears far less 'typical' of the Bolsheviks, who in turn are far more heterogeneous and less 'Russian'. But it is inevitable that the reconstruction of certain individual's choices are relatively easier and more detailed than others.

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8 Dmitri Volkogonov, Trotskii. Politicheskii portret, 2 Vols., Moscow: Novosti, 1992, and N.A. Vesetsky, Trotskii. Opyt politicheskoi biografii, Moscow: Respublica, 1992. See the review by Ian D. Thatcher, "First Russian Biographies of Trotsky: A Review Article", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.46, No.8, 1994, pp.1417-1429.

9 Andrea Graziosi, "The new Soviet archival sources. Hypotheses for a critical assessment", Cahiers du Monde Russe, 40/1-2, janvier-juin, 1999, p.23. Graziosi's contribution is part of an entire issue devoted to "Assessing the New Soviet Archival Sources".

10 Graziosi, "The new Soviet archival sources", p.26 and *passim*.

Other important source materials used throughout the thesis included the data of the most important imperial census in the Pervaia vseoshchaia perepis naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897g, (multivolumes) from which Bauer, Kappeler, and Roth usefully extracted and compiled nationalities information in their excellent two volume Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkzahlung von 1897.[11] The 1897 census data on nationalities is one of the few primary sources which provide comparative demographic information on the nearly 100 nationalities or ethnicities of the empire. In fact, no imperial census taken between 1811 and 1897 listed nationality, both because of the costs involved and because nationality was irrelevant for tax purposes.[12] The 1897 census includes data collected on religion, language, literacy levels, occupation, and 'estate' memberships, much of it compiled not only in aggregate across the empire, but also by *guberniia* and by major city.

Though extremely useful in providing comparative data on the socio-ethnic structure of the empire's constituent nationalities, the census data should be used carefully. Several cautions are warranted: not all of the material collected in the census was published, the language of some of the questions was poorly conceived, the categories used were often problematic, and there were problems in terms of the manner in which data was collected. So, for instance, the raw census data showed there to be 5,885,548 Belorussians, 22,380,551 Ukrainians, and 55,667,469 Great Russians in the empire in 1897.[13] Respectively these nationalities constituted 4.68%, 17.81%, and 44.31% of the imperial population. By this counting, "Great Russian" would be a minority (44%) of their own empire. But when this method of 'ethnic counting' is compared to some of the official compilations of Census date in which "Russian" as a slavic language group becomes Ukrainian plus Great Russian plus Belorussian, then this explains why the "official" source has Russians 66.33%, with Ukrainians 26.0% of "Russians", and Belorussians 7.01% of

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11 Two other Russian sources also usefully compile much of the relevant nationalities information in the census and I have relied on these as well: "Rossiia", Bol'shaia entsiklopediia, Vol.16, St. Petersburg, 1904, pp.436-530, and "Rossiia", Entsiklopedicheskii slovar', Vol.2, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp.1-22.

12 Stephen Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?", Russian Review, No.2, 1995, p.191.

13 Henning Bauer, Andrea Kappeler, Brigitte Roth, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszahlung von 1897, Vols. I&II, Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1991, Tabelle 003, p.74.

"Russians".[14] Indeed Census figures generally between 1870 and 1897 did not differentiate between Ukrainians and Russians.

In addition to the tendency to count "Little Russians" as Russians, classification by nationality was further compounded by the tendency of official ethnic counting to exaggerate the number of Russians in the border areas.[15] As I discuss in subsequent chapters, the demographic fact that there were comparatively few ethnic Russians -- particularly Russian landed elites -- in the empire's borderlands was a source of particular insecurity on the part of state elites. This may have prompted official sources to 'count' more Russians, or count as 'Russian' non-Russians, in a variety of imperial and provincial level sources.

III. Nationality, ethnicity, and language in the Census data

These are not unimportant issues since at the core of this thesis must lay an understanding of ethnic or cultural identity in the imperial context. Broadly, there are three analytical concerns with census and other data on 'nationality' or ethnicity, religion and language. The most general is in definition itself: what constitutes 'nationality' or 'language use'. Second is the analytical problem of measuring levels of assimilation or acculturation from this kind of data. And third is the less obvious but not less consequential issue of bilingualism and multi-lingualism, as distinct from 'linguistic assimilation'. I briefly address each as they relate to the chapters that follow.

The most complicated analytical issue is that of defining 'nationality' or ethnicity. In 1897 in Right-bank Kiev, many 'ethnic' Poles identified themselves as Russians; in Petersburg many Orthodox 'ethnic' Belorussians also called themselves Russians, while Catholic 'ethnic' Belorussians identified themselves -- to the great dismay of the Russian state -- as Poles.[16] As late as 1917 when Ukrainian peasants were asked "what is your nationality", not a few famously responded, "I am from here". And in the complex identity

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[14] For "official" counting, Entsiklopediia Slovar', , pp.13-14.

[15] Stephen Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands", Russian Review, No.2, 1995, p.191; Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914, Dekalb, 1996, p.83.

[16] Michael Hamm, Kiev: A Portrait, 1800-1917, Princeton, 1993, pp.79-80.

between a religious community (a kind of millet) and 'nationality', most Muslim (Azerbaijani) peasants in Transcaucasia responded to "what is your nationality?" with "I am a Muslim".[17] Matters were hardly clarified by the secular Azerbaijani nationalists' slogan "a Muslim and also a Turk, but not an Ottoman".[18]

More specifically, for instance, if the problem of Ukrainian identity in official Tsarist counting is difficult to untangle, it rests on the equally complex question of locating a sociological basis for 'Ukrainian' in late imperial Russia. In addition to the usual cautions in using the 1897 Census data, Ukrainian 'nationality' and Ukrainian 'mother tongue' revealed rather large disparities: 73.07% of those of Ukrainian 'nationality' considered themselves 'peasant' by occupation, while the figure for those of Ukrainian 'mother tongue' who considered themselves 'peasant' by occupation was 90.93%.[19] So when asked one's mother tongue, the peasant responded 'Ukrainian', but when asked their ethnicity, a substantial proportion responded *Ruskie*. Clearly 'nationality' and 'mother tongue' were not coterminous, rendering an ethnolinguistic basis for Ukrainian identity problematic: the number of respondents who considered themselves 'Ukrainian' was greater than the number of those classified under "Little Russian language".[20] As noted in Chapter 4, Reshetar and others have concluded that with the exception of a very small cultural elite (mostly in exile) most "Ukrainians" had only the thinnest of a 'national' social identity, as late as 1917 describing themselves as *Ruskie* despite retaining Ukrainian 'dialect'.[21]

Moreover, among a certain segment of Ukrainians, religion may have been a more stable marker of 'identity' than language. Ukrainian linguistic assimilation to Russian appeared easier than religious assimilation of non-Orthodox Ukrainians. With the 1875

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17 On Azerbaijanis, Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, Columbia University Press, 1995, p.34.

18 Audrey Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1992, p.70.

19 Bauer et al eds, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 023 on 'nationality' and Tabelle 043 on 'mother tongue', pp.156, 227.

20 Andreas Kappeler, "Ukrainians and Germans in Southern Ukraine, 1870's to 1914", in Hans-Joachim Torke, John Paul Himka (eds), German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Toronto, 1994, p.46.

21 John Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism, Princeton, 1952, p.142

administrative 'reunification' of the Uniate to the Orthodox Church -- an attempt to prevent Uniates from becoming (Polonized) Catholics with the closure of the Uniate Church -- thousands of Uniates refused and the problem of "the persisters" was born: "the persisters" continued to worship in secret, even going into the Austrian empire to solemnify their marriages by Jesuit missionaries, and after the 1905 Decree on Toleration made up the majority of converts to Catholicism. So with the Decree of Toleration, figures differ, but approximately 1/3 of the region's "Orthodox" (or 2/3 of the "Orthodox" Ukrainians) converted "back" to "Catholicism", causing a confusion in the 'nationality' statistics because the religious conversion meant an ethnic conversion by official counting: "Orthodox Ukrainians" by converting "back" to Catholicism now became "Polish" Catholics.[22] In short, because the Uniate Church was completely dismantled in the empire, most former Ukrainian Uniates embraced Polish Catholicism not Russian Orthodoxy, suggesting that here perhaps regional-religious identity was more firmly rooted than common slavic origin. This supports the more general idea that ethnic boundaries based on religious identity tend to be stronger than those based on language.

Also consequential was the Tsarist use of "Tatar", "Turko-Tataric", "Turkic", and "Turkish". Mid-century imperial surveys referred to the Transcaucasian *rural* populations as "Turkic tribes" and "Iranian tribes" (in reality Tats and Talysh), and "Tatar" to refer to settled *urban* Turkish speakers. Tsarist officials used the term "Turkic" (*tiurk, tiurkskii*) to refer to groups of (rural or mountain) tribes or dialects, in contrast to their use of the term "Turkish" (*turok, turetskii*) to designate Ottoman Turks only. Although no such distinction occurs in Turks' language -- so their own self-designations would inevitably not correspond to official categories -- in the 1897 Census 'mother tongue', religion, and nationality were often conflated. Linguistic distinctions using 'mother tongue' appear variously as "Tatar", "Turkmen", "Ottoman Turkish", and "Turkish unspecified", or "Tats", "Talysh", and "Persian"; while 'nationality' was typically clustered as "Tatar" or "Caucasian mountain peoples". Scholars using these sources have attempted to render the original census categories into more meaningful ethnolinguistic sets, such as "Tatar and

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22 See the discussion in Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914, DeKalb, Illinois, pp.174-185.

Azerbaijani" or "Caucasian mountaineers" with some success.[23] Another way to make the classifications more meaningful in terms of the empire's "Muslim", "Tatar" or "Turkici" populations is to ignore empire-wide categories and focus on data from the regional breakdowns in the Census which disaggregate "Tatars", *viz.* Crimean Tatars, Volga Tatars, Siberian Tatars, Transcaucasian Tatars (Azerbaijanis), as I do in Chapter 9.

In the Transcaucasus particularly religious and linguistic distinctions often cross-cut 'nationality'. For example, Georgians ethnically belonged to a wider group, cross-cut by geographic, linguistic, and religious distinctions. Some of these distinctions appear in the Census under 'mother tongue' (Mingrelian, Imeretian) or under religious breakdowns of 'Georgian nationality' (Muslim, Orthodox) as people of "Georgian language" but of Muslim faith. Other categories simply group "Georgians" as a 'nationality' without more precise differentiation. Of the "Caucasian language groups" only the Armenians and southern Georgians were religiously Christian Orthodox; the remainder were linguistically related but religiously Sunni Muslim (Abkhazians, Chechens, Cherkassians, Ingush, and Dagestanis). And some were more linguistically related than others, such as the passive bilingualism that existed between the Chechens and Ingush. Tadjiks and Ossetians were of the "Iranian language group", but the former were Sunni Muslim and the latter were Orthodox. The "Turko-Tataric linguistic group" comprised mostly Sunni Muslims (Uzbeks, Bashkirs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz), but the ethno-linguistically related Chuvash were religiously Orthodox.[24] And while the "Caucasian Tatars" (Azerbaijanis) were ethno-linguistically "Turko-Tataric" and most were Shi'ite, a substantial segment of Azerbaijanis were Sunni. But in 'nationality' categorizations many of these distinctions are obfuscated in catch-all categories of "Tataren" and "Caucasian mountaineers'.

If defining nationality and ethnicity is difficult, then so too are analytically related processes of assimilation and acculturation. The 1897 census data of 'nationality' based on

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23 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.28 on the mid-century distinctions. Bauer et al eds., Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, compare 'mother tongue' Tabelle 001, p.71 with 'nationality' Tabelle 002, p.73; Andrea Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall, Munchen: Verlag C.H., Beck, 1992, Tabelle 6, p.328 for a re-categorization.

24 Some of this is captured elsewhere in the Census as 'nationality' is compared with 'religion', Bauer et al eds., Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 037, p.210 where 4.95% of "Tatars" were Orthodox.

language, for example, would certainly underestimate the the number of 'ethnic' Latvians and Jews: since many were linguistically Russified they would have listed themselves as 'German'.[25] Or alternatively, an ethnic Latvian who customarily used German might answer Latvian to 'native tongue'.[26] So linguistic Germanization did not necessarily result in their changed ethnic or 'national' affiliation. This was even more true of Riga's Poles -- interestingly the group in Riga most inclined to adopt Russian: between 1881 and 1913 up to 1 in 4 declared Russian as their family language, but Polish as their 'ethnicity'.[27]

Jews as religious group, as Yiddish-speakers, as ethnicity, or as nationality are another example of the difficulty in measuring acculturation. For instance, those respondents of "Jewish nationality" and those whose "mother tongue" was Yiddish was the same, but we know that there were thousands of Jews who could not speak Yiddish.[28] And the question of 'customary or family language' vs. 'native tongue' creates complex elisions between Jews as language-based ethnicity, assimilation-acculturation, and bilingual dual identities. There may have been an element of fear of declaring Yiddish. The percentage of those Jews who did declare Yiddish as their mother tongue (circa 97%) obviously conceals the degree of assimilation or acculturation unless it is used in conjunction with the figures for schooling and reading Russian ability.[29] This is particularly significant in this thesis since I am concerned with levels of acculturation and Russification. But it also suggests the usefulness of using several 'indicators' for a particular idea, e.g. 'mother tongue' and 'education and literacy', or 'occupation' and 'estate'.

Indeed the complex patterns of language and ethnicity, religion and nationality may actually reflect traditional 'imperial' patterns of bilingualism and multi-lingualism more than

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25 Michael F. Hamm, "Riga's 1913 City Election: A Study in Baltic Urban Politics", Russian Review, p.444, ftnt.10.

26 Stephen Corrsin, "The Changing Composition of the City of Riga, 1867-1913", Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol.13, No.1, 1982, p.21.

27 Ibid., p.25.

28 Bauer et al eds., Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, compare data in Tabelle 001, p.72 and 003, p.74.

29 Heinz-Dietrich Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews: Reform, Reaction, and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia, 1772-1917, Harwood Academic: Switzerland, 1993, p.95.

ethnic or linguistic assimilation.[30] Multi-lingualism and bilingualism have been both understudied and underestimated, and they are rarely captured in the census data. For instance, besides Jews and the well-known example of Ukrainian (and Polish) elites of the borderlands, there is ample evidence that by 1897 most of Riga's population spoke and read two or three languages, including Russian. Most (educated and uneducated) urban Latvians were almost by necessity at least bilingual. Despite being a quintessentially German city culturally, administratively, and economically-commercially, Riga was linguistically Russified in part because of Russification and in part because of its very ethnic and linguistic diversity. Fully 50% of Riga's population could read Russian -- more than all other major non-Russian cities including Tiflis, Baku, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Kiev, Kishenev, and Odessa. And surprisingly for a German-Latvian city, this was also higher than the level of Russian-reading of such major *Russian* cities as Saratov, Kazan, Petersburg and Moscow.

And finally, these analytical problems are not mitigated by the fact that the statistical measures for nationality or ethnicity or even language are not stable over time, and by the more general reality that even estate, occupational and sector categories have as their base unstable and changing criteria. So, for instance, data from Riga's various censuses (among the most reliable in the empire) measured 'nationality' by different criteria: in 1867 it was 'everyday language', in 1881 it was both 'everyday language' and 'nationality', in 1897 it was 'native language', and in 1913 it was 'language of daily use of the family'.[31]

And more generally, the development of the thinking on data collection and categories changed so substantially over time that comparisons must be highly qualified. The traditional estates (hereditary nobles, personal and service nobles, clergy, town dwellers, and peasants) ceded to a broader set by 1877 in order to better account for changes in urban estates, zemstvo, and effects of emancipation: honorary and distinguished citizens was added, but "rural" still comprised landed peasants, state serfs, and more substantial landed elites, and 'the counting for the first time of 'families' based on

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[30] Corrsin suggests this may have been true in Riga, "The Changing Composition of the City of Riga", pp.21, 25.

[31] Ibid., pp.20-26, 31, 36 ftnt.3.

zemstvo statistics.[32] The category of *inorodtsy* likewise changed in terms of the empirical reality that it was trying to explain as the empire expanded (and as 'Russian' changed meaning) and new 'alien' groups were placed under this rubric, Jews most notably.[33] Moreover, census data regarding sectors and occupation often do not distinguish between wealthy owners of industrial plants, for example, and the factory worker, categorizing both as 'manufacturing'. Additionally, census data typically track only primary occupation, a particular problem for many in this elite who were teachers or doctors *and* published literary works, or even changed careers (as did the Azerbaijani Narimanov).[34]

Clearly these provide challenges in determining nationality and ethnicity with precision. However, if rather than problematically squeezing out of the Census data categories that fit uneasily, we interpret it using different questions, then there is a certain richness of information. For instance, the very fact that so many 'indicators' of ethnicity, nationality, language, religion, estate, social status, is itself highly suggestive of social stratification and social identity in the late Russian empire. Mother tongue, religion, literacy-levels, the discrepancies between 'occupation', 'estate', 'nationality' -- all indicate that this was hardly a society which had moved from traditional status to modern class, but was still traditionally status and estate-based, and that regional-religious, or national-linguistic identities were far more pronounced than has been recognized, though they were far short of modern 'national' identification.[35] In short, there is a richness in 'imperfect' Census data that should be mined. Concerns with the quality of the Census nationalities and other demographic information warrant caution in interpretation, but because it is the only comprehensive compilation of this kind it still constitutes the richest primary source.

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32 Alessandro Stanziani, "Les sources demographiques entre controle policier at utopies technocratiques, le cas russe, 1870-1926", Cahiers di Monde Russe, 38 (4) octobre-decembre 1997, pp.457-488.

33 John W. Slocum, "Who, and When, Were the *Inorodtsy*? The Evolution of the Category of "Aliens" in Imperial Russia", The Russian Review, 57, April 1998, pp.173-190.

34 On the Riga census, Corrsin, "Changing Composition of the City of Riga", p.38, ftnt.30.

35 There is ample evidence for this. Besides the question of *inorodtsy* discussed above, see Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, "Problematics of Status Definition in Imperial Russia: The *Raznocincy*", Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 40 (1992), pp.319-339; William Pomeranz, "'Profession or Estate'? The Case of the Russian Pre-Revolutionary *Advokatura*", Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.77, No.2, April 1999, pp.240-268; Gregory Freeze, "The *Sosloviie* (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History", American Historical Review, Vol.91, 1986, pp.11-36.

Chapter 4
Nationality and Class in Late Imperial Russia, 1880-1917

The first part of this chapter situates nationality within imperial state and society along three dimensions: nationality, class, and estate (or social stratification); within the distinction between provincial (or regional) 'civil society' and imperial 'civil society'; and on the 'language question', education and local government. The second part of the chapter focuses on Russification and nationality policies in terms of 'geopolitical and cultural worries', 'the politics of Russification', 'the sociology of Russification', and Russification and radicalization in the 'fourth time zone'.

I. Nationality in imperial state and society

Nationality, class, and estate

Far more than in the 18th century, with the newly acquired territories of the Polish Partitions, and with the subsequent additions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia entered the 19th century a multi-ethnic empire. However no official census taken between 1811 and 1897 categorized nationality or ethnicity both because of the costs involved and because nationality was not used in tax collection. While preindustrial Russia's social and national structure was conceived in terms of the four traditional estates (nobility, clergy, townspeople, and peasants), by the first half of the 19th century these no longer captured the diversity and differentiation of imperial society. During the late 19th century new *klass-soslovie* and *Berufsstande* categories were evolving, and the 1897 Imperial Census for the first time included more than 100 'nationalities' of the empire.

By themselves neither 'class' nor the traditional 'estate' categories reflected the empire's social stratification, even as the nine 'Stande' categories in the 1897 imperial census testify: hereditary nobility, personal nobility, clergy, distinguished citizens, merchants, townspeople, peasants, Cossacks, *inorodtsy*, and foreigners. Social hierarchies embodied a number of categories -- ethnic, occupational, class, European-type Stande, Central European-type *Berufsstande*, and Russian sui generis *sosloviie*. In the following I combine class, estate, ethnic, *Berufsstande*, and occupational categories to situate the empire's nationalities' within the general social structure. In the next chapter I

situate the Bolsheviks within this stratification.

(a) *"hereditary" and "personal" noble estates*: Both the "hereditary nobility" and the "personal nobility" included urban and rural gentry, nobles, and aristocrats. These political and social categories in practice comprised a variety of occupations: landowning and non-landowning nobility, higher bureaucratic officials in the armed forces and in the imperial civil bureaucracy, a considerable portion of the free professions (later to become part of the *intelligentsia* or *raznochintsy*), and other persons in higher government service. Between 1880-1914 the number of persons in higher government service doubled with the expansion of the imperial civil service, with important consequences for educated minority elites, and increasing numbers (as measured by number of officials per inhabitant) of educated careerists entered state service,[1] including Lenin's and Bukharin's fathers.

Additionally, because the Table of Ranks (1772) criterion for promotion were education, achievement, and experience, this permitted the ennoblement of commoners, and a century later its effect was considerable: by 1850, 540 of 1408 civil service officials above Grade 8 were non-noble.[2] The penetration of *gimnazia* and university education into the middle social orders however, actually did less to 'democratize' officialdom than is usually assumed: non-nobles with higher education, *viz.* educated middle strata with non-noble rank, did nearly as well as nobles.[3] In fact most in higher imperial civil service were not independently wealthy and had to serve to supplement incomes and social status. Though educational criteria remained important for entry in the civil service throughout the 19th century, particularly for those with higher or middle-level education,[4] at least one exception was in the Baltic civil service after 1905 where Russians

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[1] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, p.534; W.R. Pinter, D.K. Rowney (eds), Russian Officialdom: the Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the 17th Century to the 20th Century, Chapel Hill, UNC Press, 1980, p.5.

[2] Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917, London, Fontana Press, pp.154-155. In part this expansion was due to administrative reorganizations of 1889-1893: 42% of officials in the Russian and Ukrainian provincial governors' lists were civil officials, 40% were military/naval officers, and 18% were noblemen without official posts. Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.468.

[3] Pinter and Rowney, Russian Officialdom, pp.376-378.

[4] Dominic Lieven, "Russian Senior Officialdom under Nicholas II, Careers and Mentalities", Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, Vol.32, 1984, pp.202-204.

from the lower social strata were sought for provincial posts.[5]

The expansion of officialdom and Tsarist civil service not only increased levels of bureaucratization but it also provided new administrative roles for sons of landed nobilities.[6] As estates were sold, young *dvorianstvo* went to towns, finding employment either in the expanding bureaucracy or in the 'new professions' and attaining moderate incomes. Economically they became urban, 'upper middle class' (though not a 'bourgeoisie'), but in functional terms they became the empire's bureaucrats. As both Seton-Watson and Max Weber observed (and *pace* Skocpol), in important ways landed elites were far less of a social force in Russia than were the new bureaucrats.[7]

It is frequently noted that *declasse* nobilities became 'new middle classes', and in so doing their view of 'the nation' changed. Seton-Watson, for example, argued that much like the *declasse* Magyar gentrys' Magyarization policies, *declasse* Russian nobles similarly became carriers of a bureaucratic Russian nationalism. And there has been much debate as to whether the Russian nobility was 'Russian', 'cosmopolitan-European', or 'imperial Russian'.[8] However the degree to which Russian landed nobles in the civil service carried 'nationalist' ideas may have been minimal. Under Nicholas II, for instance, most higher government officials' "mentality", as Lieven's study showed, actually reflected their 'interests': most were by birth members of the noble landowning classes and therefore showed a certain openness to local government through zemstvo, consultative institutions, and even limited constitutionalism.[9] This was also true of governor generals in the guberniia with zemstvo. Most were hereditary nobles with strong ties to the land and their estates: 2/3 held estates, giving the gubernatorial corps a degree of economic independence most state officials lacked (the landed gentry element

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5 Manfred Hagen, "Russification via 'Democratization'?" Civil Service in the Baltic after 1906", Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol.9, No.1, Spring 1978, pp.56-65.

6 Pinter and Rowney, Russian Officialdom, p.5.

7 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire; Max Weber, Max Weber, "Russland Ubergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus", in Mommsen (ed), Max Weber, Zur Russischen Revolution von 1905: Schriften und Reden, 1905-1912, (Ed.) Wolfgang J. Mommsen, JCB Mohr: Tubingen, 1989

8 Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.159.

9 Lieven, "Russian Senior Officialdom under Nicholas II", pp.219-220.

only declined in 1914).[10] And as I show below, noble dominated zemstvo were hardly carriers of nationalist politics.

Often overlooked, however, are the non-Russian nobilities of the empire. Non-Russians comprised a significant contingent of the imperial noble estate. The impoverished Polish landed elites of the *kresy*, *declasse* Georgian landed nobles, and the Lithuanian landed aristocracy, were among the leaders nationalist, socialist, and other radical and conservative movements. While only 0.87% of Russians were classified as hereditary nobles in 1897, 5.29% of Georgians and 4.41% of Poles were considered "hereditary nobility", followed by Lithuanians, Tatars and Azerbaijani-Turks, and Germans.[11] So in proportional terms far more Georgians and Poles were "hereditary nobles" than Russians. Georgians, Germans and Russians had the highest proportion of "personal nobles" in the empire, and most Polish, Georgian, and German nobles were more likely to reside in cities than on rural estates.[12] Even inside the Bolshevik elite, *declasse* Georgian nobles constituted the most important noble contingent.

There was a great deal of differentiation within these non-Russian nobilities both in terms of their privileges vis-a-vis the state and in their integration-acculturation into the Russian estates. As noted in Chapter 2, each newly incorporated nationality required the incorporation of its nobility, with the result that a great many nobles were fully incorporated becoming, in effect, 'upper class' minorities in the Russian 'nation'. After mid-century when the state embarked on 'divide and rule' policies, this ethnic social status would become problematic, particularly for the rural nobilities. The idiosyncratic nature of Tsarist privileges was nowhere more evident than in the contrast in the differential treatment of Polish nobles and the Tataric nobility in Lithuanian provinces. Lithuanian Tatars, known as "Muslim nobles", lived in Grodno and Vilna, owned land, spoke Polish or Russian, and while Polish elites were severely repressed after 1863, Lithuanian-Tatars,

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10 Richard Robbins, The Tsar's Viceroys: Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of the Empire, Ithaca, 1987, pp.31, 85-86.

11 Andreas Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall, Munchen, Beck, 1992, Tabelle 6, p.328.

12 H. Bauer, A. Kappeler, B. Roth eds, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkzahlung von 1897, Vols.A & B, Stuttgart, 1991, Tabelle 033, pp.202-203.

regarded as loyalist, remained untaxed with full privileges.[13]

Polish nobles' claims to 'noble estate' status were treated more harshly than Georgians'; and Ukrainian nobles' claims were also quite harsh as a result of the general insecurity of the state after the 1831 Polish revolts because their systems were based on Polish law or Cossack practice.[14] Like Ukrainian nobles, Georgian nobles too were fully incorporated, though the degree of Russification, cultural and linguistic, remained far more circumscribed among Georgians. And unlike Polish *szlachta* which were harshly repressed after the 1830 and 1863 rebellions, in land confiscations, language prohibitions, severe curtailments of church properties and rights, and the imposition of peasant emancipation settlements highly skewed against Polish landed interests. The Georgian nobility, after their rebellions of the first third of the 19th century, were re-incorporated, not repressed -- a testament to their perceived compatibility with the imperial state's ideals and interests, as well as evidence of their importance to the state's need for loyal local elites in order to rule effectively. Georgian nobles' failure to resist the state's emancipation settlements beyond initial petitions illustrated the degree to which they had been successfully integrated into the Tsarist hierarchy".[15] These differences partly explain why Polish civil and military elites were sent elsewhere in the empire, while Georgian civil and military service elites were assigned to Transcaucasia (patterns I discuss further in the chapters that follow).

Besides threats of economic impoverishment and socioeconomic displacement by rising educated elites, state policies also contributed to noble or elite status insecurities. Status insecurities among ordinary nobles and elites statuses (based on wealth, birth, or service) among Russians and non-Russians were considerable and often due to imperial civil and military service integration and emancipations settlements. For example, the Tsarist state's acute need of service or 'personal' nobles to staff civil service positions meant that as education replaced birth as criteria for promotion, the influx of commoners (often ethnic Russians in places where the state wanted local ministries "Russified") into

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[13] Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914, Dekalb, Illinois, 1996, p.90.

[14] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.239-240.

[15] Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, Indiana University Press, 1994, p.110.

the noble estates became quite worrisome to local native nobilities.

As with the Polonized or Russified Lithuanian Tatar nobles, linguistic, cultural, and even religious acculturation was common within the noble estates. Russian noble families were full of Turko-Tataric names, landed Ukrainian nobles intermarried with Russians and became highly Russified -- often losing any local or regional identity -- Russian nobles in the borderlands found a certain 'status affinity' with the Polish gentry, Polonized, and even converted to Catholicism, and Lithuanian landed aristocratic gentry were culturally Polonized.[16] Indeed the near complete cooptation and integration of Ukrainian gentry into the Russian *dvorianstvo* was one of the defining features of Tsarist rule in Ukraine. The cultural-linguistic differences between nobles and the lower social strata were most often greater than those between nobles of different nationalities.

(b) *clerical estate*: Catherine II's Toleration Edict had "limited the role of the Tsar's church for the sake of the Tsar's empire".[17] As a consequence most clergy and sons of clergy remained outside the imperial civil service, and rarely held secular posts in government and bureaucracy. This clerical estate was primarily Russian Orthodox, but significant numbers of Georgians (2.18%) and Armenians (1.30%) were also members. Clerical estate membership analyzed by nationality is revealing. The discrepancy between those national minorities occupationally in the clergy, and those permitted entrance into the official, and privileged, "clerical estate" reveals the limits of the state's religious tolerance *at the level of elites*. In 1897 "occupationally" 4.11% of Kalmyuks (Buddhists) were in the 'clerical' profession, 1.32% of Jews, 1.13% of Georgians, 0.95% of Armenians, 0.77% of Greeks, 0.52% of Ukrainians, and 0.35% of Poles. Yet in terms of official membership in the "clerical estate" with all the privileges it comported, 2.18% of Georgian clergy, or almost double those occupationally in the clergy, were admitted, 1.30% of Armenians (again more than occupation), 0.83% of Greeks (nearly all), and 0.26% of Ukrainians (about 1/2). Pointedly *excluded* were Kalymuks, Jews, and Poles whose

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16 Stephen Velychenko, ""Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism in Great Britain and Imperial Russia, 1707 to 1914: Institutions, Law, and Nationality in Scotland and Ukraine", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.39, No.3, 1997, p.415; Rieber, "Struggle Over the Borderlands", pp.61-64, 70; Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.104.

17 Starr, "The Tsarist Government", pp.6, 17.

estate membership was reduced to 0.04%.[18] In other words, excluded were non-Christian or non-Orthodox Buddhist, Jewish, and Catholic clerical elites. This shows not only the slippage between occupation and estate as social stratifiers, but also how ethno-religious identity cross-cut these social categories.

(c) "*merchant*" and "*distinguished citizens*" estates: Primarily urban (though not exclusively) non-noble, non-official urban upper and middle classes comprised the "*distinguished citizen*" and "*merchant*" estates. "*Distinguished*" or "*honored citizens*" were essentially the educated bourgeoisie (*Bildungsburgertum*), and occupationally included a large portion of professional peoples (including rentiers) and lower-level administrators and bureaucrats. Because of their desire to enter the noble ranks due to 'status insecurity' (fear that their attainment of wealth or distinction would be lost if their children fell back into the *meshchanstvo* estate) and because of the state's equally strong opposing desire to limit further expansion of the noble estates, in 1832 influential and favored "urban middle classes" were offered a new "*distinguished*" or "*honorary citizens*" estate to secure their status, hereditary or personal.

"Honorary citizens" were exempted from conscription, payment of the capitation, and corporal punishment. They included children of personal nobles and church employees, first-guild merchants, low-ranking civil servants, and a few scholars.[19] In practice, this urban, educated upper middle class included the following: (i) some government officials -- administrators, judicial officials, gendarmerie and police, some officers in the imperial army, (ii) professionals -- teachers and some professors (state, private, and university), journalists, writers, intellectuals, doctors (hospital, civil, vets, military), and barristers/attorneys, and (iii) zemstvo officials and clerks, often poorly paid, and some provincial bureaucrats and civil servants. These low-level bureaucrats, provincial civil servants, and clerks had rather good possibilities for social mobility,

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[18] And 1.26% of Russians. I list here only the most numerically significant. "Rossiia", Bolsh'aia Entsiklopediia, 'Naseleniia Imperii', Vol.16, St. Petersburg, 1904, pp.456-457; Bauer, et al, eds, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 025, pp.167-174 on occupation, and Tabelle 033, pp.203-204 on estates. Ukrainian clergy were also some Uniate and some Catholic. Moldavians were 1.05% in the clerical profession, their numbers were reduced but not excluded.

[19] Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, "Problematics of Status Definition in Imperial Russia: The *Raznochintsy*, Jarhbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 40, 1992, pp.319-339, p.329, ftnt.45.

particularly if they were willing to serve in the non-Russian borderlands where there were few eligible local ethnic Russians.[20] Together with petty nobles in the noble estate, these groups comprised an 'imperial service gentry" whose traditional ethos was based on state service.

Three related features of the social composition of the zemstvo are important. First, because of property restrictions, most zemstvo deputies were themselves (Russian) landowners -- zemstvo were only introduced in imperial provinces where Russian landholding was strong. This tended to make them, in contrast to imperial bureaucrats, 'de-centralizers', often pressing for more local autonomy and fairly liberal in outlook. Secondly, the zemstvo did not carry a Russian 'national' identity because their mandate involved such things as rural education, roads, irrigation, etc. So in practice they tended to be pragmatic in furtherance of local or regional concerns. And thirdly, zemstvo middling and low-level employees and zemstvo experts of the 1880's and 1890's -- officials, bureaucrats, petty civil servants, statisticians, agronomists, and teachers which were nearly 50% of the zemstvo "Third Element" -- tended to be politically-minded reformers and gravitated toward socialist or radical movements, not liberal or nationalist ones.[21]

The other important favored urban estate, "merchant" estate, comprised essentially the commercial bourgeoisie (*Besitzbugertum*) which included both the "great bourgeoisie" or wealthy merchants and capitalists, and middling-level business, banking, commercial or capitalist class. Traditionally entrance into the merchant estate involved commercial *gildii* (guilds) membership, artisan or family business with corporative status, particular rules for apprentices (*tsekhi*), and in practice also included elements of the *meshchane* estate (see below). The commercial bourgeoisie included propertied commercial elites and capitalists accustomed to servility to the state and the privileges it could confer.

The presence of non-Russians entering these estates was important. According to the 1897 Census 1.12% of the empire's Moldavians were "distinguished citizens", 0.83%

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[20] This was Manfred Hagen's conclusion. Hagen cited cases where a 51 year old son of a peasant reached the position of Senior Revenue Surveyor in the Baltic civil service (once it became Russified), that is, a position eligible for hereditary noble status, and the likelihood that he had been born a serf was great. Hagen, "Russification via 'Democratization'?", p.6

[21] On this last point see Seton-Watson's discussion, The Russian Empire, pp.471-472.

of Germans, 0.82% of Armenians, and only 0.44% of Russians. Of the empire's Jews, 1.42% were members of the "merchant estate", 0.86% of Armenians, 0.66% of Germans, and only 0.29% of Russians. Combined these two social categories, or the upper middle educated and commercial classes were 1.68% of Armenians, 1.54% of Jews, 1.49% of Germans, and only 0.73% of Russians.[22] Proportionally then, more national minorities were in the more recently created urban estates of "distinguished citizens" and "merchants" than were Russians. And interestingly, while Georgians were were represented in the 'hereditary' and 'noble' estates, Armenians were equally well-represented in the urban 'honorary citizens' and 'merchants' estates, suggestive of the ethnopolitical dynamics in Transcaucasia.

The distinguished citizens and merchant estates comprised elements of both the educated middle classes (who often required state licensing) and capitalist middle classes. Four points are important. First, there was a blurring between those professionals and government service bureaucrats who entered the 'personal nobility' estate and those who remained 'distinguished citizens' since these categories were in flux. Second, zemstvo officials, the landowners (often of noble estate), and the small agricultural entrepreneurs and active local farmers together comprised the foundations of provincial public life or provincial 'civil society', and exclusion from this provincial 'civil society' characterized many minority elites as the chapters on the Bolsheviks will show. Third, the nucleus of the intelligentsia were the free professions, both from within the noble estates and from the 'distinguished citizens' of the upper educated middle classes. And fourth, a significant imperial commercial society was non-Russian, mainly Jewish, but also Armenian, Tatar, and German. Non-Russian capitalists (Jewish great bourgeoisie, Armenian merchants, and German bourgeoisie) remained relatively privileged as the Tsarist state viewed them as useful. The Russian state was typically supportive on non-Russian commerce -- Greek, Armenian, Central Asian, Baltic German.[23]

(d) "*meshchane estate*" or 'small burghers' and 'townsmen': The '*meshchane*'

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[22] Bauer, et al. eds, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 031, p.198; Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich, Tabelle 6, p.328; "Rossiia", Entsiklopedicheskii slovar', II, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp.XIX-XXI.

[23] Starr, "The Tsarist Government", p.25.

estate often blurred into the lower ranks of the "merchant estate". Essentially an omnibus social category, the '*meshchanstvo*' included urban, lower middle and lower class, non-capitalist, non-estate registered artisans and other lower class urbanites. Included here would have been both the petty bourgeoisie and portions of the urban working classes. Occupationally this social category comprised: non-guild registered artisans (usually Jews), small shopkeepers, white collar employees, artisans generally, most urban skilled and many unskilled workers, owners of small family businesses, some non-manual laborers with moderate wealth who worked in conjunction with capitalists, and various floating populations in the cities, usually poor and earning a precarious living.

Jews were the ethnic group particularly prominent in the *meshchanstvo*. Just over 94% of the Tsarist empire's Jews were classified as 'townsmen' in the *meshchane* estate. They were followed by Germans (18.12%), Poles (15.28%), and Armenians (15%). But because all three of the latter national groups were predominantly peasant, Jews stood out as the predominant urban and rural petty capitalists. Residency restrictions designed to prevent "Jewish exploitation of slavic peasants" in the rural areas gave Jews a disproportionate urban presence, with consequences both in terms of access to radical political groupings (essentially urban phenomena) and in terms of municipal or city government reforms after the 1870's.

Jews' presence in what were essentially lower urban classes and the petty bourgeoisie intimately connected them with petty capitalism. As we will see below urban lower orders and petty capital were two of the social categories most notably marked off as unprivileged and excluded by the Tsarist state. Jews were traditionally prominent in trade and commerce,[24] but their association with modern capitalism masked the fact that more than 90% of Jews in Russia and East Central Europe were actually poor, impoverished and itinerant *Luftmenschen*, not prosperous bourgeoisie. The same was true of the empire's Jews. And as the century progressed (as we will see of the Jewish Bolsheviks) Jewish commercial pursuits were rapidly replaced by their entrance in the

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[24] Heinz-Dietrich Lowe. The Tsars and the Jews: Reform, Reaction, and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia, 1772-1917, Harwood Academic Press, Switzerland, 1993, pp.87-88.

liberal professions.[25] Moreover, as Weinberg notes specifically regarding Odessa, perceptions of Jewish domination and wealth to the contrary, most of the city's wealth and power remained in the hands of non-Jews because Jews could not translate wealth into leisure or political power.[26] This, I think, is what crucially distinguished the often compared Jewish urban commercial bourgeoisie from the Armenian. So just as Russia was entering its 'modern capitalist' phase, most Jews were not prosperous commercial bourgeoisie.

(e) *peasant estate*: This estate comprised both urban and rural peasants and the largest segment of the new urban working classes. Included in this somewhat residual category were peasants without property or land, a small minority of 'rural bourgeoisies', farmers or prosperous peasants, much of the peasant-cum-worker urban manual and seasonal labour, and a large unskilled floating population. The lower strata of the '*meshchane*' estate, together with large portions of this 'peasant' estate, covered the whole of the working classes, especially including those employed in urban factories, mining, transport, the large unskilled working population, and the unemployed urban poor. Significantly, as late as 1895 the state did not regard workers as a 'class' but only as a subgroup of the peasantry.[27] And it is possible that the social consequences of the differentiation of the peasantry have been generally exaggerated: the rural bourgeoisie remained notably small and insufficient to constitute a new 'class', as rural class conflict continued to be between peasants and landowners, not peasants and well-off peasants.[28]

The peasantries of the empire's constituent nationalities were emancipated at different historical junctures, under different social conditions, and received different emancipation settlements depending on the state's assessments of provincial ethnopolitics. And the degree to which peasant versus landed elite bore the cost of the settlement also varied considerably across nationalities, particularly in European Russia. This is usually

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25 See W.O. McCagg's discussion in connection with the Austrian empire, A History of the Habsburg Jews, 1670-1918, Bloomington, 1989, pp.2-4.

26 Robert Weinberg, The Revolution of 1905 in Odessa, Indiana, 1995, pp. 251-254.

27 Gregory Freeze, "The *Sostoviie* (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History", American Historical Review, Vol.91, 1986, p.28 and fint.55, p.28.

28 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.544-546. Lithuania and the Baltics could be exceptions.

omitted from discussion of the 'peasant question'.[29] For instance, on emancipation the Lithuanian peasantry received generous settlements which directly contributed to the emergence of a landed, privileged, quasi-aristocratic Lithuanian rural elite which in turn became the backbone of the nationalist movement; the Latvian peasantry's emancipation settlements in the early 19th century similarly set the course for rural socioeconomic differentiation among Latvians by the 1870's; Polish peasants famously received comparatively generous emancipation terms at the expense of the Polish *szlachta*, in part explaining the Polish peasants' relative social quiescence in moments of social unrest (and the *szlachta*'s presence in radical groups); Georgian middling and petty landed nobles were harshly treated in land reforms in the Caucasus (while Georgian greater magnates and peasants were not), sending many into radical nationalist-socialist movements. In short, the 'peasant question' in Tsarist Russia was also important in understanding how and why certain groups within nationalities were radicalized -- including the Bolsheviks as subsequent chapters show.

(f) *the inorodtsy*: Another important social classification particularly relevant to the empire's national minorities was the *inorodtsy*, a distinct legal category in force between 1822-1917 and used to designate a set of (constantly changing) ethnic minorities. As of 1835 this also famously came to include Jews. Originally designed to refer to non-Christian peoples of the Russian east, and based on religious distinction, *inorodtsy* then came to include "way of life" (sedentary, nomadic, wandering, such as Tatar agriculturalists and merchant traders of Bukhara and Tashkent). Then it included groups with distinctive social structures which were incorporated with imperial expansion (Caucasian highlanders, Kirghiz hordes, and settled populations of Kokand, Khiva, and Bukhara). Then for educational purposes it was extended to the Volga region so Tatars, Bashkirs, Mordvidians, Chuvash, Urdmurts, and Cheremis were included. And eventually it came to be used pejoratively to refer to all non-Russian minorities or "non-assimilable" peoples of the borderlands outside the 'metropolitan core', now crucially

[29] Most notably Skocpol's discussion of the agrarian question in late imperial Russia.

distinguished linguistically, not religiously.[30] While in *sosloviie* terms most were considered state peasants or Cossacks, Slocum's data shows that the shifting meanings of the term *inorodtsy* were really driven by shifting referents as the empire expanded and as what it was to be "Russian" came to be redefined.[31]

Slocum's most general claim, however, is that the development of the term *inorodtsy* accompanied broader trends in nationality policies. Specifically, he shows that the most basic shift was from a social classification predicated on an 'ethnic identity' defined religiously to one which defined 'ethnicity' linguistically.[32] This was bound up with changing conceptions of "Russianness", the "Russian nation", nationality, and "otherness". Indeed "otherness" and "alien", according to Slocum, were key features of this social classification: as "Russian" ethnicized, then "alien" shifted and it became harder for "aliens" to assimilate and become "Russians".[33] Therefore the term was latterly used derogatorily by rightist Russian nationalists to mark off, based on language, the unassimilable *inorodtsy*: Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Tatars, Finnic tribes, Baltic Germans, Armenians, etc. But they pointedly *excluded* Ukrainians and Belorussians, also on linguistic criteria, so that the opposition was between the Eastern Slavs (*russkie*) and everyone else (unassimilable, politically restive non-Russians).[34]

There is much merit in this general view of the *inorodtsy*, particularly considering that 'ethnic identity' was indeed latterly conceived linguistically (though I think the degree to which 'ethnicity' was earlier defined religiously may be overdrawn). I add three observations relevant to this thesis. First, "alien", "otherness", or *inorodtsy* were not only defined in opposition to evolving conceptions of "Russianness", as Slocum shows, but the very evolution of "Russianness" was itself prompted by the entry of"others" into the empire. Secondly, while the basis of the classification may have variously invoked "way of life" (sedentary, nomadic), religious, or linguistic criteria, it is possible that in all

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30 See the excellent tracing of the ethnic referents of *inorodtsy* of John C. Slocum, "Who, and When were the *Inorodtsy*? The Evolution of the Category of 'Aliens' in Imperial Russia", Russian Review, 57, April 1998, pp.137-190.

31 Ibid., pp.174-175.

32 Ibid., p.176 and *passim*.

33 Ibid., p.181.

34 Ibid.,pp.186-187, 190.

cases what was being marked off was not a generalized "otherness" or "alienness", but more precisely cultural incompatibilities with the evolving conception of empire. Cultural 'unrecognizability' seemed to be the common denominator. And thirdly, while the shifting meanings and referents of *inorodtsy* as a legal social category were important, this legal classification usually did not translate into actual nationality policies. That is, in terms of substantive policies, the effects of this legal-social classification were uneven and often irrelevant. For some it meant exemption from conscription, for others it did not, and for others still (e.g.Jews) it meant both at various times. So, for example, Slocum writes:

> "the classification of Jews as inorodtsy points to a fundamental ambiguity in the underlying logic of the category: was it more an indicator of a given people's purported level of civilized development, or a legal marker of racial difference?"[35]

And yet rather than reflecting the confusing definitions or ambiguities of the legal term, I think perhaps more importantly and more substantively, the classification of Jews as *inorodtsy* reflected an ambiguity of *Jewish* policies and socio-ethnic identities.

In summary then, the social consequences of Russia's social stratification for the empire's nationalities were several. Firstly, canonical historiography has held that between c.1861 and 1917, or from the Great Reforms to the Revolution, Russian society was evolving from *sosloviie* to classes, from a traditional status society to a modern, class society. Recent excellent historical scholarship has shown that this is empirically incorrect: although urbanization and migration patterns began shifting traditional socioeconomic niches and *sosloviie* or corporative identities, these traditional frames of reference persisted longer than is usually believed, and rather than being rigid they were actually more flexible with increasingly blurred and fluid boundaries, distinctions often blurred by occupation and ethnicity.[36] As Gellner noted, in preindustrial societies 'estates' were often social strata "who knew their place" (as good a definition as I have found),[37] and with increasing status and occupational differentiation such rigidity ceded.

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[35] Ibid., p.174.

[36] Wirtschafter,"The Problematics of Status Definition"; William Pomeranz, "'Profession' or 'Estate': The Case of the Russian Pre-Revolutionary *Advokatura*", The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.77, No.2, April 1999, pp.240-268.

[37] Ernest Gellner, "The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class", in Gopal Balakrishnan, Mapping the Nation, London, Verso, 1998, p.141.

But far from dissolving the estate system was actually maturing and reconstituting such that most elements of the *sosloviie* categories endured until the Revolution.[38] Moreover, until 1917 nationality policies in particular continued to be predicated on hierarchies of privilege and loyalty for select groups either on a national-class, occupational, status group, estate, corporative, or territorial basis.[39] This was not yet a class society, officially or in practice.

As late as 1897 most of the subjects of the empire viewed their primary social identities in *sosloviie*, regional-ethnic, regional-religious, occupational, and 'property' terms (or some combination of *Stande* and *Berufsstande*) -- not in class terms.[40] This was particularly true of the empire's educated national elites whose new 'professional' categories were not reflected in official, corporative social categories. For instance, increasingly diversified after the 1860's, and with the exception of barristers and advocates which I discuss below, most of the liberal 'professions' had no recognized legal status and they were precluded from autonomous organization and meeting to discuss professional interests. Most notably among these were the newer professions -- teachers of various categories, statisticians, agronomists, etc. -- all of which fell outside the official estate system. Similarly, the working class, as a *klass-soslovie* social group also fit uneasily into existing social and political categories. These two newest non-estate social groups, workers and (semi) professionals (including *declasse* gentry), were the most receptive to socialism's class-based view of the social order. Social hierarchies were based then, on a number of categories, of which 'class' was not the most significant. For some the appeal of socialism may not have been an expression of class divisions, but an elite reaction to an estate or status privileges and to and ethnically particularistic society.

Included in this educated, semi-professional group outside the estate system were,

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38 Freeze, "The *Sosloviie* (Estate) Paradigm ", pp.13, 20, 35 and *passim*.

39 Raymond Pearson, "Privileges, Rights, and Russification", in Olga Crisp and Linda Edmondson, eds., Civil Rights in Imperial Russia, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, pp.85-102.

40 Freeze, "The *Sosloviie* (Estate) Paradigm", p.30; Pomeranz,"'Profession' or 'Estate'?", p.244; see Leopold Haimson's classic statement on imprecise social identities and categories, "The Problem of Social Identities in Early Twentieth Century Russia", Slavic Review, 47, Spring 1988, pp.1-20; and a recent treatment which argues that social structures were fluid, not rigid, Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, Social Identity in Imperial Russia, Northern Illinois University Press, 1997. Though her discussion unfortunately does not consider ethnicities of national minorities for separate treatment.

of course, the 'intelligentsia', or *raznochintsy* -- 'people of various ranks' or professionals employed by the state, provincial municipalities, zemstvo, courts, and universities -- all excluded from recognized professional associations. Though difficult to define with precision, the *raznochintsy* -- most often termed 'revolutionary *raznochintsy*' or revolutionary intelligentsia -- should properly neither be equated with oppositional political views nor with 'civil society'.[41] As a social category, the *raznochintsy* were typically defined negatively or defined by exclusion: always regarded as a free class group with limited economic privileges, they were usually non-peasant, non-registered taxed urbanites, non-noble, and non-merchant. The noble/non-noble distinction seemed to be crucial in determining social positions. with the *raznochintsy* always lacking noble rights. Another feature of the *raznochintsy* was that they were subject to *both* upward and downward mobility, e.g. retired, low-ranking service personnel and their children could move in either direction.

Besides the *raznochintsy*, state service, zemstvo and cities (municipal) employment witnessed increasing numbers of trained, educated experts: doctors, statisticians, agronomists, teachers, engineers (the Ukrainian Bolshevik Tsiurupa was one). Teachers comprised fully one-half of this group. These zemstvo experts of the 1880's and 1890's formed a "hard core of politically minded reformers, usually of radical or socialist rather than liberal views".[42] And these zemstvo produced in the latter century Russia's "educated or politically-aware society" (*obshchestvennost'*). While a complete discussion of whether the Russian intelligentsia was a social class and/or status group is beyond my scope,[43] it is important to emphasize that this social group was not only the source of leftist radicalism, but also of liberal and nationalist groupings. This was also a blurred zone in distinguishing between professional and official occupational status. So, for instance, though almost 2/3 of medical doctors in the empire worked for the government, armed services, or the state in some capacity, they did not consider themselves government officials or educated civil servants, but rather members of the

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[41] Here I draw from Wirtschafter, "Problematics of Status Definition", pp.319-320, 322-325, 337-339.

[42] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.471.

[43] See Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, Chapter 6 for a discussion.

intelligentsia.[44] Yet *gimnaziia* and *realschulen* teachers were not considered a professional class, but "petty officials" of the state bureaucracy well through the 1880's.[45] Or in the case of the *advokatura* which was referred to as both an estate and as a profession and reflected elements of both (itself a factor in transforming the concept of 'estate') indeed as a social category it had "largely overtaken the estate system".[46]

As social mobility became increasingly predicated in education, and as most imperial educational institutions were becoming important social locations for Russification and assimilation, access was possible not only for lower social orders, as most scholars acknowledge, but also for national minorities. This has received comparatively less attention. Social mobility, education, assimilation, and state policies no where intersected more clearly than in the civil service and in the professions, especially one of the most important for understanding the revolutionary intelligentsia, the *advokatura*. Although Pomeranz's study of the Russian *advokatura* does not present full data on its nationality composition, his discussion on its relationship to Jews is interesting and suggestive. As a unique social group in Imperial Russia governed by an ethos of public service (defense of the poor and oppressed) rather than by state service, the *advokatura* was not a hereditary profession-estate, but membership was based on knowledge and open to qualified applicants regardless of social, religious, or ethnic origin.[47] This meant that it became an ethnically-open venue for social mobility and, unlike the state civil service, had no direct links to the state. This also distinguished it from the medical profession which was governed by traditional estate principles and remained state controlled.

However socio-ethnic openness gave way to a 'Russianization' of the *advokatura* in the last third of the 19th century. Three bar associations had existed -- in St.Petersburg, Moscow, and Kharkov -- but between 1874 and 1904 the state prohibited the formation of state-licensed bar associations in other imperial cities because of fear that

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[44] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.472.

[45] Alston, Education and the State, pp.99-100.

[46] Pomeranz, "'Profession' or 'Estate'?", especially, pp.251, 265 for the clearest statement.

[47] Ibid., p.246.

non-Russians in non-Russian regions would come to control them.[48] At the heart of this fear lay anti-Semitism. As Pomeranz notes, by the 1880's Jews had turned to the *advokatura* in large numbers since it was the only institution which admitted them to practice law -- indeed so much so that by 1889 fully 22% of all St. Petersburg sworn attorneys and 42% of all attorneys-in-training were Jewish.[49] And between 1890 and 1895 fully 89% of all applicants to the *pomoshchniki* (assistants or attorneys-in-training) were Jewish, challenging the very 'Russianness' of the *advokatura* estate. This fact alone contributed in greatest measure to the decision to block the introduction of a bar association in Odessa.

In 1889, therefore, the state legislated that all non-Christian applicants to the sworn profession be curtailed -- curbing the dominance of Jews, an ethnic minority, in a Russian *sosloviie*. But the potential for a Polish-dominated Warsaw bar was as threatening as a Jewish-dominated Odessa bar, with the result that that sworn attorneys in the ethnic peripheries had their professional development severely restricted, prompting a rise in the number of private attorneys -- the largest portion of which were, unsurprisingly, Jewish.[50] The considerable social mobility that the *advokatura* had represented in allowing educated national minorities opportunity to move into positions of influence (especially Jews), was therefore seriously undermined in the multi-ethnic imperial peripheries.

More generally, the most significant 'intelligentsias' were the Russian, the Jewish, the Polish, and the Armenian, and radicalism across the empire reflected this. Together these four intelligentsias constituted the core of the early organizers of both socialist and nationalist movements. In fact there was a strong relationship between membership in the middle classes and political activism. But there was still a 'nationality policy' component to this. It is worth noting here that each national intelligentsia responded to different ethnopolitics. For instance, the Jewish and Armenian intelligentsias are frequently

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[48] Ibid., pp.253, 256. This had the effect of opening the way for private attorneys, especially among national minorities, in addition to the existing state-sworn attorneys.

[49] Ibid., pp.251-252.

[50] Ibid., pp.253-255, 262 fint.86, 265. Bar councils were introduced in 1904 in Novocherkassk, Odessa, Saratov, and Kazan -- but never in Vilna, Tiflis, Tashkent, and Warsaw, and only in 1916 in Kiev.

compared. Both were diasporic, highly urbanized, highly educated, and both produced well-organized radical political groups of considerable sophistication. But because the empire's Jews were far more geographically dispersed, because of the differential strengths of religious Jewish religious identities (Hasidism in the northeast vs. the southwest), and because of debates concerning Yiddish vs. Hebrew vs. Russian, Jewish politics on the whole invoked greater regional ethnopolitical complexities than did Armenian politics. Moreover, unlike *inorodtsy* Jews who were historically ambivalent in their relationship to the Tsarist state, Armenians were Christians in a Christian empire and historically completely loyalist until very late in the 19th century. In short, religiously, geographically, linguistically, and in their relationship to the Tsarist state, the Jewish intelligentsia was less homogeneous than the Armenian, and consequently Armenian political radicalism did not have the fractures or the variety of Jewish political radicalism.

Secondly, socio-ethnic niche ranking continued to characterize relations between nationalities in the 'fourth time zone' until 1917: who one was ethnically or nationally largely determined where one would be in the social structure. In the Polish-Lithuanian borderlands the landowning nobility tended to be Polish, and to a lesser extent Russian, officials and bureaucrats were Russian, 'townspeople' were Jewish and Polish, and peasants Lithuanian and Belorussian. Similarly, Ukraine's ethnic niche ranking had a Polish and Russian landowning and administrative elite, although many imperial officials in Polish-Ukrainian areas were Baltic German, Georgian, or Tatar, 'townsmen' Jewish, and peasants Ukrainian, Polish, or Russian. This had important consequences for 'acculturation' patterns, the attractiveness of Russification, and political radicalization. Together with imperial society's fluid and changing boundaries between traditional estates and modern classes, socio-ethnic rankings, too, persisted in various fashions.

Specifically this socio-ethnic niche ranking meant that the 'elective affinity' between social position and/or ethnic status and ideology differed across nationalities. Socialism, nationalism, or liberalism had different appeals to Lithuanian landowning aristocracy (liberal nationalists until c.1900) than to the Polish landed elites in Lithuania and Ukraine (socialists in Lithuania and nationalists in Ukraine), than to the Georgian rural nobility (national socialists), or to Armenians (liberals and nationalists). Vilna Jewish

workers could organize *qua* Jewish workers in ways that Kievian Jewry could not, due to the ethnic structure and composition of the two cities and fears of anti-Semitism. Latterly Polish borderland elites were attracted to socialism over nationalism, while Polish elites inside Poland were more often attracted to socialist or non-socialist variants of Polish nationalism. Peasants of the European Russian borderlands, whether Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian or Belorussian, were notably absent in radical movements until after the turn of the century because their socio-ethnic niches placed them under the potential influence of Polish *szlachta* radicalism and Jewish capitalist 'exploitation' in the view of the Russian state; they were courted by the state and benefited far more from emancipation settlements than had Russian peasants in the interior.

One finding of this thesis is that the 'elective affinity' between Russian Social Democracy, especially Bolshevism, did not hold for the same social group across nationalities for a variety of context-specific reasons: a Jewish artisan in Vilna, an Armenian intellectual in Tiflis, an impoverished Polish gentry in the Lithuanian-Belorussian borderlands, a *declasse* Georgian noble, and a rural, uneducated Ukrainian Jew all had a certain 'elective affinity' with something inside Russian socialism, but the sociology in each case should be specified.

Thirdly, Tsarist policies certainly continued to reflect a commitment to maintaining social barriers, *sosloviie* boundaries, and other particularistic traditional status distinctions and categories, thereby contributing to both upward and downward social mobility. But although the Russian state was not particularly concerned to abolish corporative frameworks and privileges, they were neither as entirely state-created nor entirely state-maintained as we have traditionally assumed. To be sure, the state did continue 'divide and rule' policies in its attempts to control civil society's growing politicization, but consistent and coherent policy was beyond the abilities of the weak *ancien regime*. Significantly, those social groups within civil society that did have legal or economic privilege (landowning nobles, higher level imperial bureaucrats, Cossacks, Russian merchants, the Orthodox clergy) themselves "sought to reinforce their social separateness as distinct social categories" and maintain their particularistic privileges and social

positions.[51] And these social groups had greater collective identity and organization than is usually accorded.

State policies were at best ambivalent: on the one hand the ennoblement of commoners through the Table of Ranks, the recognition of peasant commercial rights, and the gradual undermining the the Orthodox clergy's corporative structure, all served to reduce differences between *sosloviie*; on the other hand, after the 1870s the state's commitment to the *soslovie* system became increasingly ideological, hardening social categories and rigidly refusing to recognize new ones, e.g. the urban workers, doctors and advocates and other professionals.[52] In short, corporative and traditional 'estates' were sustained as much by 'civil society' as by the state itself. The state was not abolishing corporative or particularistic privileges but reorganizing them along new lines.

Fourthly, urbanization and migration patterns altered traditional socio-ethnic niches and *sosloviie* or occupational-corporative identities. So for instance, Georgians migrating to Tiflis in significant numbers after mid-century challenged Armenian demographic and political dominance.[53] Substantial influxes of Georgian peasants and Russian officials, army officers, and craftsmen into the southern peripheries changed ethnic and social structures. Similarly, Estonians and Latvians from the countryside migrated to the cities in the Baltics and became workers or small shopkeepers; the more prosperous middle classes remained German and officials and state employees, Russian. But unlike some cities in Central Europe where newly arrived ethnics were more receptive to nationalist movements, in certain ethnically mixed regions of the empire the nationalist appeal was diluted. Part of the reason for the success of Georgian Social Democracy, for instance, was that it combined national and social claims: the newly mobile urbanizing Georgian peasants tended to be extremely suspicious of Georgian "national rebirth" because of fears

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51 Freeze, "The *Sosloviie* (Estate) Paradigm", p.24.

52 Ibid, pp.26-27.

53 Suny, Making of the Georgian Nation, p.116. In 1801 3/4 of Tiflis inhabitants were Armenian and less than 1/4 were Georgian; but by the end of the century Russians were almost 1/4 and Georgians just over 1/4 of the city's population, with the rate of growth highest for Russians, not Georgians. By another estimate in 1897 Armenians were 35% of the city's population, down from 42.4% in 1865. Oliver Reisner, "Die Entstehung-- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien bis 1921", in Uwe Halbach and Andreas Kappeler, (Hrsg.), Krisenherd Kaukasus, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1995, p.69.

that at the back of this would be a restoration of earlier Georgian feudalism since the nationalist leaders were *declasse* landed elites and petty nobles.[54] Any non-socialist nationalism stood very little chance of succeeding. Likewise, part of the social strength of Latvian socialism derived from the socioeconomic divisions among among Latvians themselves, both rural and urban, and by the late 1880's most urbanizing Latvians became socialists, not nationalists.

In another setting, different classes of nationalities across the Pale and western borderlands increasingly perceived Jews as challenging their status, livelihood, and power.[55] This was due to both industrialization processes and to state policies. Despite the restrictive laws of 1882, through a series of openings for Jewish residency and occupational mobility under Alexander II, Jewish migrations from the Pale to the Russian interior and from Lithuania and Belorussia to Congress Kingdom ("Litvaks") and to Novorossia and the south, other nationalities reacted to increasing Jewish preferments and competition. As Rogger notes, Russian migrants from the interior to Novorossia "must have been especially affronted by the sense of fitness of things" as they were now competing with new, 'alien' rivals in employment, trade, and livelihood: "the discontents which had made them walk or ride great distances for a better livelihood were worsened rather than assuaged in raw industrial settlements or urban slums and their awareness of being Russian or Ukrainian was heightened in a multi-ethnic environment".[56]

State policies also contributed to changes in socio-ethnic niches. Apart from Jewish residency restrictions, the Russian state's preoccupation with Polish landholding in the western *gubernii* resulted in highly restrictive policies on rural Polish property ownership, which had the unintended effect of increasing the numbers of sons of Polish gentry migrating to the cities at the same time that Jewish rural capital was also being restricted (due to concerns that Jews might buy newly available lands) forcing a faster urbanization on Jews as well. Despite rather concerted state efforts to colonize vacated

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[54] Reisner, ""Die Entstehung-- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgian bis 1921", Krisenherd Kaukasus, pp.76-78.

[55] Rogger, "Conclusions and Overview", John Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History, Cambridge, 1992, p.334.

[56] Ibid., pp.336-337.

(and confiscated) Polish estates with Russian landed elites, most of these properties actually came into the possession of German colonists. This state-engineering resulted in significant socio-ethnic changes in the rural regions of the western provinces.

Additionally, when zemstvo were introduced in six western provinces property qualifications for suffrage were lowered in order to favor the small ethnic Russian population, which in the regions tended to belong to the middle and lower social strata (the upper was mostly Polish). This social engineering elevated the relatively weak social position of ethnic Russians in the peripheries. State policies with respect to civil and military service likewise had important nationality dimensions which increasingly tended to privilege ethnic Russians: in the Baltic civil service, for example, the state lowered entrance and educational qualifications for posts in the Ministries in order to allow more ethnic Russians.[57] So not only national minorities but lower class Russians also found social advancement, in the imperial peripheries especially, through state civil service policies.

Fifth, and finally, the persistence of linguistic-religious (Yiddish or Belorussian), linguistic-regional (Ukrainian, Polish), ethnic-regional (Estonian, Latvian), ethnolinguistic (Turkic), and regional-religious (Catholic, Protestant-Lutheran, Muslim) identities deserves emphasis. Most of the empire's inhabitants did not consider themselves in national terms, particularly the nationalities' peasantries. Regional, religious, and local-linguistic identities were far more significant social forces than 'nationality'. The 1897 Census, as I noted in previous chapters, is most interesting precisely because the responses reflect important inconsistencies on what are considered traditional 'indicators' of nationality or ethnicity: mother tongue, religion, language of literacy, etc. Reshetar's classic study showed that even as late as 1917 peasants in the Ukraine had distinctly 'parochial' identities, and referred to themselves in regional terms, e.g. Rusins (sons of Rus), Galicians, Bukovinians, Uhro-rusins, Lemki, and Hutsuli.[58] Or Weeks' study of the creation of the Kholm province between Poland and Ukraine in 1912, showed the difficulties in separating religion from nationality: with the 1905 "Decree on Toleration",

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[57] Hagen, "Russification via 'Democratization'?, pp.59-60.

[58] John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution,1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism, Princeton, 1952, pp.321-322.

1/3 of the "Orthodox" meaning "Russian" (though they were mostly linguistically Ukrainian) region had converted (back) to "Catholicism", which by the state's nationality categories meant "Polish", thereby effectively "changing" their nationality in the eyes of the state.[59]

Provincial 'civil society' vs. imperial 'civil society'

Clearly relations between the state and non-Russians in the empire were not direct domination and subordination. Rather, different classes and status groups within nationalities represented a variety of relations toward the imperial state. It is important to stress that policies were usually targeted at local, municipal, or provincial levels and rarely at the level of the central state; reforms were 18th century dynastic-style, ad hoc and discretionary, aimed at specific privileges for specific groups. These were not 19th century "rights". This not only meant that there was less centralization or homogenization than is usually assumed, but also that there was great variation in electoral, municipal, zemstvo, agrarian, and social policies, depending on local ethnic compositions. As with most imperial state elites, reforms and policies were typically conceived as incremental and responsive to specific circumstances, rather than major overhauls involving more general theories of imperial rule in the peripheries.

Nationality policies were not clearly articulated or centralizing for several reasons. First, as noted in Chapter 2 specific nationality policies tended to originate in specific regions in the peripheries and not in the Petersburg 'metropole'. Innovations and pressures for nationalities' policies derived from imperial elites in the peripheries who had contact with Jews, Ukrainians, Poles, Kazakhs, and others, not from elites in Petersburg whose contacts were with 'court Jews' or Polish service nobles. This crucially included 'innovations' in Judeophobia which often moved from periphery to center.[60] The result was pressures for specific, particularistic -- and often inconsistent -- policies.

Second, directives from Petersburg were routinely disregarded or altered by provincial governors and officials in the borderlands to such an extent that the putatively 'centralized' nature of the empire was rarely an accurate picture of actual rule. Provincial

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[59] Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.180-185.

[60] On Russian Judeophobia, Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855-1881, Cambridge, 1995, p.153 and *passim*.

Governors had extensive powers, especially after the Temporary Laws of 1881/2, and though on paper subordinated to the Ministry of Interior, both distance from Petersburg and the fact that many were military men meant that they ruled the non-Russian provinces with considerable autonomy and discretion.[61] Broad discretionary powers in the provinces meant that bureaucratic uniformity or homogeneity was rarely achieved.[62] In fact, during the 18th and 19th centuries the independent authority of provincial governors and governor generals actually *increased* under the Ministerial system, hardly consistent with what centralization might presume.[63]

Thirdly, fragmentation and interministerial rivalry meant that far from centralizing, the imperial bureaucracy "reflected and perpetuated the diversity of the empire"; a diversity which did "not express itself as bureaucratic nationalism, but graft, corruption, bribery, venality, nepotism, and red tape riddled the bureaucracy, and ignoring directives was so widespread that, in practice, self-rule was the rule".[64] Even in education there was no uniformity of language of instruction, particularly among the eastern nationalities for whom there was no standardized Russian alphabet.[65]

Fourth and finally, we know that the ethnic regions of the empire were not uniformly or centrally administered by the rate and number of changes in personnel at all levels of the imperial bureaucracy: there was never a consistent personnel selection policy for the non-Russian borderlands.[66]

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61 W.E. Mosse, "Russian Provincial Governors at the End of the Nineteenth Century", The Historical Journal, Vol.27, No.2, 1984.

62 On discretionary powers of Governor-Generals in the Western Borderlands see Weeks, Nation and State, p.76. Minister Pleve, for instance, recalled that the provincial Governor Prince Shcherbatov, "after governing a province for 3 years, won the reputation of a splendid administrative officer"; when poor health forced him to resign, however, his successor "found in the Governor's office all his ministerial packets, each bearing the inscription 'Secret -- to be handed to the Governor' -- unopened". Recounted and quoted in W.E. Mosse, "Russian Provincial Governors", p.225.

63 Starr, "The Tsarist Government", pp.14-16.

64 Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?", Russian Review, No.2, 1995, p.190.

65 Isabelle Kreindler, "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities", pp.85-87; Patrick Alston, Education and the State in Tsarist Russia, pp.138-140. There were, for instance, several different alphabets in the Kazan region, while the Arabic alphabet prevailed in Turkestan.

66 Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia", p.205; Mosse, "Russian Provincial Governors, pp.233-235.

This leads to the more mundane empirical question of *how* the regions of the empire were ruled. Here we can make several relevant observations. Mosse's early and meticulous study showed that overall patterns of 'instability' in Governor-General service and selection in the latter part of the century reflected shake-ups in the northeast (Viatka, Novgorod) and in the southwest (Volhynia, Podolia, Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav), while service was relatively stable in the central agricultural provinces. He found a significant increase in the number of military men as Governor-Generals as the century closed: in the 1850's and 1860's (under Alexander II) Governor-Generals were essentially bureaucrats, in the 1870's they were primarily landowning men, and by the 1880's under Nicholas II there was an increasing militarization of the Governor-Generalships.[67] This will parallel my own periodicization of Russification and nationality policies below: in the 1850's and 1860's 'bureaucratic' governors presided over a period of 'official nationality' or imperial unity achieved through administrative reforms; in the 1870's agrarian reforms and local government which affected landed non-Russian elites and peasants were presided over by 'landed' governors, and the 1880's 'integral nationalism' witnessed the rise of military men keen on maintaining growing social disorder of cultural elites, and socialist and nationalist intellectuals.

Moreover, Lieven showed that the majority of Nicholas II's (1894-1917) ministers and senior officials were career civil servants.[68] Lieven did not address their ethnic composition, but we know from other studies that educated minority elites made careers in the imperial civil service in large numbers. Though social status had only a marginal influence on promotion in imperial service (most were of *dvorianstvo* ranks), social status did have a significant influence on *where* one was assigned, as Mosse argued. Though Mosse was not specifically looking at national elites in imperial service, his findings are suggestive. For instance, he found that in 1897 titled men of the hereditary nobility governed the Central Russian provinces ('Black Earth', 'feudal belt') and the 'secondary feudal belt' (Courland, Kovno, Vitebsk, Minsk). Governors recruited from the *uezd*, usually prominent landowners, were assigned to the central agricultural provinces.

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[67] Mosse, "Russian Provincial Governors", p.237.

[68] Lieven, "Russian Senior Officialdom under Nicholas II", p.200.

Governors recruited from Petersburg's central administrative posts -- educated, trained lawyers, or hereditary nobles with court titles -- were usually assigned to the northern provinces (Archangelsk, Novgorod, Livland, Courland, Petersburg). So titled, educated, and landed *Russians* governed the Russian provinces.

Again using Mosse's data, the ethnic peripheries seemed to reveal a different pattern. Those recruited from the imperial army or military men (irrespective of social status within the army) were typically assigned to the marches of the empire in the south and west where there were substantial non-Russian populations (Stavropol, Astrakhan, Podolia, Mogilev, Chernigov). And significantly, most of the non-Russian Governors and Governor Generals were recruited from provincial administrative posts and bureaucracies. They were often graduates of prestigious Russian universities who had made local careers in the western and Polish provinces and in the Caucasus as provincial administrators or provincial vice-governors.[69]

In other words, the non-Russian provinces were typically governed either by ethnic non-Russians with considerable local administrative experience or by military men in the south and the Steppes. The empire's peripheries were governed by peripherals with 'imperial', not Russian experiences and training, cultivated through local administrative posts. This meant that they brought to bear ideas and beliefs developed in the provinces not in the Petersburg central bureaucracy, making them somewhat more insulated from patronage, cliques, and other personal intrigues of Petersburg society.[70] It also implies that the requisite criteria was not a local knowledge: a single Governor could in his career be assigned to posts in Poland, the Baltics and the Caucasus, requiring not knowledge of the region but simply a commitment to 'the empire'. This is consistent with Velychenko's excellent study which found Poles governing the Caucasus, Baltic German and Georgian nobles governing the Ukrainian provinces, and Tatars governing the Lithuanian provinces.[71]

We can be even more precise about the sociology of the cooptation of minority

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69 Mosse, "Russian Provincial Governors", pp.229-232.

70 For a discussion of "official society" in Petersburg see Lieven, "Russian Senior Officialdom under Nicholas II", pp.215-218.

71 Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service".

elites into imperial civil service. From specific area studies we know that in the southwest, for example, Poles were precluded from imperial administrative posts, and Baltic Germans and Caucasians were assigned to Polish-Ukrainian provinces because sending Russian officials from the interior was deemed too expensive.[72] Imperial political cohesion in the Ukrainian regions seemed to predicated on the belief the Baltic German, Tatar, and Georgian nobles could integrate Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles into the Russian imperial fabric! This was testament to the degree to which national elites had acculturated into an 'imperial political society'. As further proof that imperial social integration was not predicated on 'ethnic Russian' basis, and counter to the much asserted Ukrainian repression under Tsarism, the total number of Ukrainians ("Little Russians" in the statistics) serving in their native provinces was actually *rising* through 1900. Ukrainians were not excluded because of their "Little Russian" ethnic identity explaining, in part, the high level of Russification among segments of the Ukrainian elites not calling into question imperial unity, but desiring only 'cultural autonomy', and as I will show with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks in Chapter 8, evidence of how the state 'split' Ukrainian elites.

This pattern was also broadly true of Latvians and Estonians. In the Estonian *gubernia* in 1908, even after Stolypin's Russification of the Baltic civil service, considerable numbers of Estonians continued to be present in the middle and lower ranks of the civil service (6 of 12 were Russian, 5 were Estonian, and 1 was Polish), and in Courland *gubernia* (Latvia) in the same year, 88 of the state servitors were Russian and German and nearly as many (83) were Latvian.[73] Moreover the Germans who served in public service in the Baltic region tended to remain in the existing German self-administration, not in imperial or central Russian state service.[74]

So like the Poles, high level civil service Germans served the imperial state in large numbers -- but not in their native provinces; while petty and middling-level minority elites were employed in regional posts of the imperial civil bureaucracy. Educated Estonians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles, all made careers in middling and lower level civil

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[72] Ibid., p.205.

[73] Hagen, "Russification via 'Democratization'?", p.58. Though there was a decreasing trend in the number of Latvians from 1906: 110 to 83.

[74] Ibid., p.58.

service, while Polish, Tatar, and German elites, for various reasons excluded from their native provinces, made careers in high level posts in their non-native provinces. 'Democratization' of Russians in civil service meant that lower order Russians made imperial service careers in the less desirable regions of the empire, not in their own Central Russian provinces, so for these Russians "social climbing" was less attractive in imperial service than it was for non-Russians of the lower and middling orders. Therefore, for many educated minority elites state service provided access to careers that local civil and political society did not, particularly for Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, as subsequent chapters show.

There were several reasons for this. Here I address what I consider the most important reason in connection with the politicization of the Bolsheviks: educated peripheral elites' access provincial and local elected assemblies or zemstvo, as the foundation of provincial 'civil society' was restricted, in contrast to their relatively easy access to the central administrative-bureaucracy of the empire or 'imperial civil society'. In 1864 when local provincial assemblies were granted to the Russian provinces, zemstvo were not introduced in provinces of European Russia including the Baltic, Polish, and western provinces (the 6 Lithuanian provinces and the Belorussian provinces, and the 3 provinces of southwestern Ukraine, Archangelsk, Siberia, the Don region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia) primarily because these regions lacked strong Russian landed nobilities. Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Poltava were all considered sufficiently "Russian", but in the 9 western provinces property-owning (the backbone of the zemstvo mandate) in 1864 was overwhelmingly Polish and therefore could not be entrusted with local self-government.[75] Fifty years later, when the Tsarist state revisited zemstvo laws in 1903, 1905, and 1910/11, zemstvo were granted to six Belorussian and Ukrainian provinces with an eye to "safeguarding" the local Russian population, but they were still not granted to the three Lithuanian provinces (Vilna, Grodno, Kovno) for fears of local Polish influence. In short, no zemstvo had been set up in the same ethnic imperial peripheries where most of the Bolsheviks were radicalized (see map in Chapter 5).

If zemstvo were withheld in Polish-dominated provinces for fear of flaming Polish

[75] Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.131-137.

separatism and influence, in the Baltic provinces they were withheld to avoid unduly undermining the socially conservative Baltic German *Ritterschaften*, while in the eastern empire the considerations were religious: Tsarist elites feared Muslim aristocratic and intelligentsia participation in zemstvo and school boards, prompting an 1888 edict which barred all non-Christians (Muslims and Jews) from participating. Here the religious basis of the zemstvo exclusion was clear, though the fear was not conservative Islam but reformist, progressive Islamic movements.[76] The 'Jewish question' played out more ambiguously. Jews were barred from participating in zemstvo elections as of 1890 because zemstvo were now considered "matters of state" and therefore no concern of Jews.[77] Yet after 1905 when municipal government reforms were considered which would have given 'townsmen' (e.g. mostly Jews) representation in Russian Poland, it was not Tsarist intransigence, but Polish anti-Semitism which prevented Jewish municipal government participation: that is, Polish fears of increasing Jewish urban influence in city government because of their overwhelmingly 'townsmen' status and the fact that they were perceived as a Russifying social force.[78]

The failure to introduce zemstvo or some form of local government in the ethnic peripheries, I think, had several consequences on minority elites. Most immediately, the development of a local civil and political society, capable of integration into the imperial one, was stunted. As noted above the bulwark of provincial 'civil society' in the Russian regions came from within the non-commercial elements of the '*meshchane*' estate, which included lower level government officials, professionals, and zemstvo officials and clerks. Those most active in zemstvo were landowners, small agricultural entrepreneurs, and active local farmers. In the face of the increasing importance of education and ability with the professionalization of the civil and military service, the 'crisis' of the landowning gentry had caused many to turn from state and local service as they became increasingly involved in provincial public life, agriculture, zemstvo and noble assemblies. But because the zemstvo were not introduced in many of the borderland western provinces, in

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[76] Kreindler, "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities", pp.106-110.

[77] Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.72.

[78] Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.151-153, 166-169.

Congress Poland and in the Pale, peripheral nationalities were not permitted this venue into provincial 'civil society'.

Here we see an emerging contrast between what might be considered provincial 'civil society' and imperial 'civil society'. In the chapters that follow, an important argument is that 'Russification' or acculturation, linguistic and social, meant membership in imperial society, usually because of exclusion, marginalization, or escape, for one reason or another, from provincial civil and political society. This was absolutely determinative in the case of the empire's Jews, for example.

Interestingly, while the imperial civil bureaucracy expanded to make education more important than wealth or noble status by slowly eliminating landed interests,[79] in the 34 provincial zemstvo and in some municipal government reforms, landowning, wealth, and property were becoming increasingly more important. Although zemstvo had been established in rural areas as "self-governing corporations" on certain landowning principles, by 1890 they were almost entirely predicated on "estates" as the franchise was extended to increase the number of noble landowners. And by 1905 electoral laws privileged (a) landowning as a criteria in certain areas, (b) urban landowners, and (c) peasants on tax lists, pointedly excluding 'workers', lower urban middle classes (craftsmen and lower level civil servants), and intelligentsia.[80] This pattern held even regionally. So for instance, after the Tiflis uprising in 1865, St. Petersburg restructured municipal government, shifting power away from the Armenian merchant guilds to the Georgian nobility. But between 1870-1874 municipal reforms began to distinguish the population by wealth and property, not estates, establishing a property qualification for political participation, and the Armenian bourgeoisie re-emerged as the leading political force in Tiflis, to the new exclusion of the Georgian nobility.[81]

So we see certain counter-pressures: as the civil service was 'professionalizing' and opening to educated minority elites (with the significant exception of advocates as discussed above), thereby slowly shifting 'estate' as the determinative social stratifier, the

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79 Pinter and Rowney, Russian Officialdom, pp.377-378.

80 See Weber's classic on this, "Russland Ubergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus", pp.109-128, in Mommsen (ed), Max Weber, Zur Russischen Revolution von 1905: Schriften und Reden, 1905-1912.

81 Suny, Making of the Georgian Nation , pp.120-121.

state was also privileging wealth and property, or economic status, in its provincial and municipal local government. I think that this differentially affected certain nationalities and certain status groups within nationalities: Tatar merchants remained tied total concerns, while the Tataric intelligentsia was provincially excluded, Armenian merchants remained tied to local concerns while Armenian cultural elites (some Russified) radicalized, and similarly with wealthy Georgian magnates as against *declasse* Georgian petty nobles seeking careers in the educated 'middle classes', and by the late 19th century nearly all Jews regardless of wealth or status (as the expulsion of even Moscow's wealthy Jewish merchants show). Upon Russification or on the attainment of dual-identity linguistically, educated Tatar elites, educated petty Georgian nobles, and educated Armenian elites could make their way into imperial state service.

Secondly, the provinces where zemstvo or local self-government were not introduced tended to be more more bureaucratically controlled than those Russian provinces with zemstvo. At base, this is because the Tsarist state lacked confidence in its ability to rule locally without a Russian presence. Though the state needed local administration, it determined that the local population did not have the requisite ethnic make-up. Geopolitical fear of minority separatism and fears of local 'counter-cultural' influences' meant that local government assemblies had to be subordinated to the "Russian state idea". So "Poles could be Poles within the Polish Kingdom" and granted certain institutions,[82] and they could be co-opted into the imperial bureaucracy, but their influence *regionally* had to be limited in the western and southwestern provinces where they were the most locally economically and culturally influential landed elites. Bureaucratism prevailed locally where there were more non-Russian ethnicities and fewer Russians, and thereby hindered the development of a local political and institutional civic society.

Thirdly, rural education -- a key zemstvo mandate -- was slowed in the European provinces because of the failure to introduce zemstvo. In the 34 provinces where zemstvo were introduced zemstvo schools (under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education) were the most important educational institutions in the rural areas. In the Ukrainian

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[82] This was of course in relative terms: as Weeks notes the state also limited civic and social organization within Russia itself, undermining *some* of the 'ethnic' distinction. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.73.

provinces, for instance, by the 1890's 47% of all primary schools and 78% of all pupils in Poltava, Chernigov, and Kharkov Ukrainian provinces were under zemstvo jurisdiction.[83] So the withholding of zemstvo in Russian Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian and Belorussian territories, and in the Caucasus, had not only effects on the development of provincial political and civic society, but on rural education among non-Russian peasantries as well. In fact, by 1894, the Governors of Vilna, Kiev and Grodno began pressuring Petersburg for zemstvo in their provinces in order to get education in place locally.[84] The significant exception were the Protestant Lutheran Church schools in the Baltics which boasted the highest literacy levels in the empire, indeed levels far higher than those which were zemstvo-run.

As noted earlier, in the end the zemstvo were not bastions of strong Russian or imperial identity. Because zemstvo mandates were building and repair of roads, local trade and industry, public education, medical provisions, assessment of local taxes, etc, they not only represented practical regional issues and interests rather than any ideological commitment to Russian nationalism or the empire, but they generally employed the 'new professions' (statisticians, agronomists, engineers, teachers etc) which tended to be radical or socialist in orientation, not liberal or nationalist. In regions where there were zemstvo, local educated minority elites in the professions did have certain access to careers, as we will see with the Bolsheviks.

Fourth and finally, local and provincial government and administration necessarily implicated the 'language question'. The Tsarist state's concern over the local language of *urban* self-government was so pronounced that it even overshadowed its concern over 'the Jewish question'. As Weeks noted, in "allowing the use of Polish...the government would not only encourage the centrifugal tendencies of the worst elements of Polish society but would also antagonize the Jews and Lithuanians in Congress Kingdom, who would then demand that their language be given proper recognition in these bodies".[85] The need for local administration or decentralization with a language of state, while

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83 Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service", ftnt.4, p.190.

84 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.136.

85 Ibid., p.161.

carefully circumventing the inevitable regional-national question, was an issue that even caught Max Weber's attention after 1905. Max Weber noted the importance in Russia (as in Austria) of an official language for central offices and the army, and the need for multi-lingualism at regional levels. For Weber the tension between the requirements of an official language of empire and a multi-lingual civil society and local administration and its effects on the 'nationalities question' was manifested in the Russian state's failure to *either* fully centralize or to fully decentralize.[86] This seems a fair assessment.

'The Language question' and education

Intimately related to local government and provincial rule was 'the language question' and the integration of national minorities via state education. The need for a 'language of state' became a significant issue in the early 19th century partly because of the use of French in Russian educated society and partly because of the clearly multi-lingual nature of the imperial state.[87] Spreading Russian in non-Russian regions, particularly in education, took on singular importance since, apart from its administrative functionality, to state elites it represented a unifying force across an otherwise heterogeneous realm. And the most likely social and institutional location for language policies -- and for Russification and assimilation -- were the empire's state secondary schools and universities.

Educational policies toward the empire's nationalities were part of more general educational reforms in the late 1870's and 1880's under D.A. Tolstoy (Minister of Education 1866-1880). Despite being somewhat reactionary Tolstoy's policies increased educational opportunity for lower classes and minority groups.[88] In addition to the zemstvo rural schools of the late 1860's, the Realschule Statute of 1872 bifurcated secondary education between *Realschulen* (where local districts were responsible for administration) and *gimnaziia* (central state-run). *Gimnaziia* prepared students for university and *Realschulen* prepared them for higher technical institutions.

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86 Weber, "Russland Ubergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus", pp.109-128, and in "Zur Lage der burgerlichen Demokratie in Russland", p.152 and *passim*.

87 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationalism in Russia, UCB Press, 1961 [1959], pp.130-131.

88 Alston, Education and the State, p.115.

After a significant mid-century expansion of the secondary and university school system, in the late 1880's the state instituted restrictions. The most significant were the 1887 'contraction' policy restricting the lower 'classes' or 'townspeople' (*meshchane*) and the *numerous clausus*. The contraction policy had the effect of shrinking the academic population in *gimnaziia* 17% between 1887-1889, while the *numerous clausus* placed quotas on Jewish enrollment in *gimnaziia* and universities. The state's intent was to decrease specific categories of people, namely urban non-privileged 'commoners'. This had the effect of raising the proportion of privileged in the empire's schools.[89] Significantly, most the Bolsheviks in this elite attended *gimnaziia* precisely in these years, a testament to their socially privileged status.

But by 1894 the policy was everywhere abandoned. In fact Alston argued that on their own initiative local officials eliminated the social bias in the policy.[90] However except for Jews, these restrictions did not have an ethnic or national basis but status-estate bias restricting children from social strata beneath the Second Merchants Guild from *gimnaziia*. An ethnic norm was placed, though not in primary schools, not just for Jews of the lower orders.[91] Though Jews in the Pale had greater restrictions than those in the Russian interior, this had the effect of slowing Jewish acculturation in its most important social location, the *gimnaziia*.

State elites believed that Russian language education was a way of absorbing minorities toward a 'unity of state and society'.[92] We may usefully distinguish state educational and language policies at three levels: the elite institutions such as the non-Russian universities, the empire's secondary schools or *gimnaziia* and *realschulen*, and state primary education in the ethnic peripheries. Over the course of the 19th century the universities (and many of the seminaries) in the ethnic peripheries were gradually closed down or Russianized. Yet in these elite non-Russian universities -- Vilna, Warsaw, Kiev, Dorpat, Armenian seminaries -- linguistic Russification was more for *raisons d'etat* in preventing the influence of national minority revolutionary intelligentsias than in

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89 Ibid, pp.130-138.

90 Ibid, p.139.

91 Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp.74-75, 95.

92 Alston, Education and the State, pp.119-120; Katz, Mikhail Katkov, p.150.

'assimilating' them. From the Polish to the Ukrainian to the Armenian state elites considered them hotbeds of social unrest, not far different from the Russian universities in Petersburg and Moscow. But state university policies were less important in radicalizing youth (Russian and non-Russian) than is usually assumed because most students were anyway politicized before they attended university -- as in the case of the Bolshevik elite.

If the universities were 'Russified' in order to curb the cultural influence of revolutionaries and to maintain social order, the empire's *gimnaziia* were used as the most important instruments and social location for Russification and assimilation, linguistic and cultural. For instance, for political reasons the Tsarist state located most of its schools at state expense in the ethnic peripheries. In 1908, of the 68 *gimnaziia* and *realschulen* supported only with state funds, 27 were located in Poland alone as instruments of Russification.[93]

As institutional settings for acculturation to imperial state culture and language, *gimnaziia* educational experiences were in important respects cultural experiences. The materials studied in *gimnaziia* reflected the 'high culture' of the imperial state and classical humanism. In mid-century it was believed that training in the natural sciences would radicalize young minds, so with classical education the state had a conservative weapon against a rising radical intelligentsia. A product of the 'Establishment', the classical humanism of the *gimnaziia* was intended as a conservative break on nihilist and socialist ideas, and as a place for training public figures, professors, administrators, and bureaucrats.[94] But classical humanism either opened the doors to European ideas, liberal and secular, or it prompted an embrace of the sciences, thus strengthening, not undermining "revolutionary utilitarianism".[95] For the Bolsheviks it was the former.

So the intended aims of education of national minorities were twofold: classical education would counter social radicalism and bring minorities closer to the state, and in classic European colonial fashion, Russian language education would effect a 'merging' of minorities into Russian imperial culture. In actuality however, the consequences were

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[93] Alston, Education and the State, p.205.

[94] Most influentially this was Katkov's view, Katz, Mikhail Katkov, pp.144-154.

[95] On the idea that it prompted a rebellion, Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.380-382.

otherwise. In some cases educational Russification prompted (cultural) nationalist responses, and in other cases, as we will see below, Russified minorities adopted anti-state, if 'imperialist', politics.

Nevertheless in most of the ethnic peripheries the attraction of national minorities to the Russified *gimnaziia* was powerful. Parents sent their children to the empire's elite *gimnaziia* in large numbers, and often at a substantial financial sacrifice.[96] Mid-century was a crucial period for the empire's Jews, for instance, as they started to enter Russian state schools in large numbers: between 1864-1881 Jewish enrollment in *realschulen* and *gimnaziia* increased by two and one half times.[97] As we will see in the next chapter, the non-Russians in the Bolshevik elite were overwhelmingly a product of these Russified elite institutions.

And finally, Russian-language Tsarist primary schools were virtually non-existent in the ethnic peripheries. This is unsurprising given the absence of mandatory, state sponsored primary education on the Prussian model in the Russian territories. The Russian provinces had parish schools for peasants and the lower urban strata, while the ethnic peripheries continued with their regional and local schools. Denied zemstvo, the borderlands had no state assistance in primary rural education, and neither was the Russification of primary education ever attempted -- not even for Jews. The exception was Polish primary schools after 1885, though this had ambiguous success if measured by levels of Russian reading ability in the 1897 census. To be sure, the state recognized the need for provincial level multi-lingualism for local administration and bureaucracy, and therefore instituted Russian as the object of instruction in secondary schools, but native languages were retained as the language of instruction in primary schools.

Because primary education was ignored, the lower orders of the national minorities, both urban and rural, tended to be less linguistically Russified. I show in subsequent chapters that this made them available for nationalist mobilizations; socialist leaderships had to adapt national appeals because of language restrictions (Ukrainians,

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96 So urgent was the desire to send sons to *gimnaziia* that Marc Chagall's mother famously bribed a *gimnazia* headmaster in Vitebsk with 50 rubles so that her son could attend the *quasi*-military Russified *gimnazia* -- which he then did.

97 Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.94. Part of this was due to the fact that universities and other institutions provided financial support to Jews and non-Jews alike.

Lithuanians, Belorussians, Azerbaijani Turks, and significantly, Jews) causing a certain schizophrenia within the national socialist groupings. In the end, I think the most important practical consequence for the failure of the Russian state to promote a centralized, Russian *primary* education was that by the 1880's and 1890's most national peasantries were not linguistically Russified and therefore available for nationalist mobilizations. This was ironic since the state had made concerted efforts to maintain non-Russian peasant loyalty to the Tsar.

More generally, as the debates surrounding the Il'minskii system in the eastern empire nicely illustrate, there was much ambiguity about *how* language and schooling could 'merge' or 'assimilate'. Il'minskii, a professor of Turkish languages at Kazan, was a missionary whose aim was to strengthen the Orthodoxy among baptized Tatars and thereby strengthen the Russian Church in the eastern empire. Applied mostly to small minorities of converts among non-Russians, he devised alphabets, grammars, and dictionaries in native languages to translate Orthodox texts for use in native Orthodox parish schools.[98] By 1906 most Muslims viewed this as patently Russificatory, but his concern had been religious not nationalist: he wanted to preserve national characteristics which were not a threat to the Church, but believed that only through the use of native language could Christian ideals penetrate the native masses. Hence the use of the Tatar vernacular in Cyrillic, not Arabic, for the latter would dangerously open into Islam.[99]

To this end Il'minskii had designed his alphabets to isolate Turkish-speaking people from each other through dialect cultivation, thereby breaking ties between Orthodox and Muslim Tatars. But this linguistic 'divide and rule' system was strongly opposed by Russian nationalists who wanted a standard Russian state language. In the end a variety of Russian-native language schools were set up, dividing Muslim Tatars from baptized natives[100] and no uniform or standard linguistic curriculum was

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98 The system was established between 1863-1870 in the Kazan Baptized Tatar School relying exclusively on the Tatar language. Kriendler, "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities", pp.6-7.

99 Alston, Education and the State in Tsarist Russia, Stanford, 1969, pp.128-137.

100 Baptized natives had three categories: the least Russified (given mostly native language instruction), the semi-Russified (given schools with Russians in Russian), and the sufficiently Russified (entirely Russian schools with no use of mother tongue permitted). "Muslim-Tatar" schools emphasized Russian language and education as a subject of instruction, but was not the language of instruction. Kreindler, "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities", pp.85-87.

instituted.[101] The Il'minskii system was adopted in the eastern provinces despite Russian nationalist opposition. At the core of this debate was whether adapting 'mother tongues' was the most effective way of instilling Christianity (Il'minskii's position) or whether the use of Russian was preferable because assimilation of language assimilates also 'nationality' (the position of Russian nationalists).[102]

Russification in the educational institutions in the more 'backward' regions of the empire then had the effect not of preventing but of stimulating the emergence of national intelligentsias. While among the more 'advanced' Poles educational Russification backfired within already developed intelligentsias, and among the 'moderately advanced' Ukrainians Russification's effects were mixed, among the more 'backward', and curiously among Jews (though for a different reason), linguistic-Russification educational policies had educated a Tatar intelligentsia among people with only weakly articulated literary cultures. A Russianized education provided the basic cultural tools, and educated national intelligentsias capable of using them, toward progressive and oppositional politics by the 1880's and 1890's.[103] In fact, the radicalization of these Russified intellectuals may have been one of the immediate causes of the reform movement and the revival of Islam in late 19th century Russia. At the center of these movements were teachers, especially in the Volga region, among the Tatars, Kalmyks, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Udmurts, Mordvidians, Cheremis (Mari), and Buriats. The state first educated Kazakh Tatar elites, and then barred Kazakh religious leaders and teachers from working in the Russian-Kazakh schools, with the consequence that they could work only as a distinct intelligentsia promoting, in this case, a progressivist Islam.[104]

As we will see in subsequent chapters in connection with the Bolshevik elite, it was not Jewish or Turkic traditional religious elites -- or those hardest hit by oppressive cultural and religious policies -- that flocked to revolutionary socialist or nationalist

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101 Alston, Education and the State, pp.156-161. All of this resulted in the growth of native publications: Tatar-Russian dictionary, a Chuvash prayer book and primer, the Saints' lives in Altai language, a Iakut prayer book and Easter service, and the Gospel of St. Matthew in Mordvidian.

102 Kreindler, "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities", p.80.

103 Ibid., pp.10, 206-210; Alston, Education and the State, p.112.

104 Kreindler, "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities", pp.176-202.

parties. Rather it was educationally and linguistically *Russified* Jews and Muslim or Turkic elites. These Russified intelligentsias did not create religious movements in response to cultural Russification, but reformist and progressive groupings, which in the Tsarist context would necessarily be oppositional. Jewish Zionists, Bundists, *maskilim* and socialists, and Tataric *jadidists* and pan-Turkic groupings of the Russified literary and urbane Tataric and Azerbaijani intelligentsias were the most powerful oppositional groupings. For its part the Russian state viewed this in almost the same way: imperial elites feared pan-Turkism as a threat to the political unity of the empire far more than it worried about Islamic religious 'fanaticism', and it feared the "rationalist, venal, faceless" Jewish "*kosmopolit*" far more that the religious 'fanaticism' of the Hasidim.[105]

In sum, through educational and linguistic Russification the state tried to create educated, Russified national elites loyal to imperial service, but it practice it (a) politicized certain educated elites (particularly Poles and Germans) both in universities and in *gimnaziia*, (b) actually created educated -- and Russified -- national intelligentsias who by virtue of their new education and Russified 'middle class' status found themselves in (generally progressive) opposition to an illiberal state, and (c) left the vast majority of national rural peasantries without primary education -- not linguistically Russified -- and so available to nationalist mobilizations. As we will see, the non-Russian Bolsheviks were radicalized in each of these scenarios, most especially the second, in which acculturation or Russification (linguistic and cultural) occurred against a backdrop of civic and political rightlessness, radicalizing 'imperialist' non-Russians.

II. Russification and Nationality

Geopolitical concerns consistently influenced nationality policies: because of the multi-ethnic nature of the empire, the imperial state was both a geopolitical state and a cultural state, and nationality policies embodied the two together. Kappeler argues that Russification was motivated by geopolitical or state preservation imperatives:

> "The first priority [of nationality policy] was always the preservation of the Empire's power and security, both

[105] On the Russian state's view of the Tataric intelligentsia, Kreindler, ""Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities", pp.110-111; on the Russian state's view of the Jewish *kosmopolit*, Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp.75-76.

> domestically (loyalty of all subjects, the most conflict-free rule over an ethnically heterogeneous population) and on the international stage (great power politics, strategic considerations)."[106]

Based on his study of the western provinces Weeks agrees, arguing that the primary goal of nationality policy between 1863 and 1917 was not Russification but state preservation, noting that the curtailment of local privilege for reasons of state actually looks like Russification in the ethnic borderlands.[107] Hosking too argues that "at all times the survival of the Empire and the maintenance of its territorial integrity were the paramount priorities for Russia's rulers, before which national, religious, economic and other priorities invariably yielded".[108] And the most important claim in Starr's seminal article is that the preservation of the empire and imperial order was *the* key concern of state elites causing the subordination of domestic affairs to foreign and imperial policy.[109]

Geopolitical worries were paramount in the Russification of the Baltics and Poland -- designed to counter Bismarck's cultural policies in the west. And the imperial state's dismanteling of the universities of Vilna and Warsaw following, respectively, the 1830 and 1863 anti-imperial Polish insurrections, can be explained as sound *raison d'etat*, not Russification, since the Polish 'conspiracies' threatened the integrity of the imperial state.[110] Similarly, the problem with the Armenian seminaries in 1896 was not that they were Armenian, but that they produced revolutionaries -- not altogether different from the problems of Russian universities. On this view the primary goal of the imperial state's non-Russian policies was not Russification derived from Russian nationalism, homogenization, assimilation, or 'nationalization', but state preservation. Arguably, "Pole", "Jew", "Armenian", or "Muslim" were conceived by state elites in political-status

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106 Andreas Kappeler, "Historische Voraussetzungen des Nationalitatenproblems im russisches Vielvolkerreich", Geschichte and Gesellschaft, Vol.8, No.2, 1982, pp.59-83.

107 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.45, 194 and *passim*.

108 Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.41.

109 Starr, "The Tsarist Government".

110 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia.

ancien regime terms, not modern national-ethnic categories.[111]

Connected to Pan-slavist politics, from the 1870's the previously liberal Mikhail Katkov who had supported emancipation, and zemstvo and judicial reform, became a nationalist keen on rescinding Polish liberties, particularly after the 1863 rebellions. He viewed Polish sedition as a threat to Russia's Great Power status and believed that political unity (though not ethnic homogenization) and a 'statist-cultural' nationalism were required if Russia was to be a European Great Power. Katkov believed that an autocratic ruling principle had allowed 'a multitude of tribes', a 'Moscow the Third Rome', to cohere as an empire. But because there were, as Hosking points out, advanced nationalities -- Germans, Finns, Jews, Poles -- Katkov held that,

> "in the Russian state there are forces at work which are hostile to the Russian people, parasites which have insinuated themselves into its lifeblood, various privileged political nationalities, and so the Russian government has taken on a non-Russian character in its policies".[112]

By the 1880's this meant exclusion, not assimilation. The Russian empire had allowed itself to be ruled by non-Russians and geopolitical necessity, imperial integrity and *raison d'etat* required a re-assertion of Russian identity and leadership inside the empire. This was a national identity and politics constructed in service of the empire.

19th century nationalities policies and Russification

The preliminary typology presented below periodicizes the empire's nationality policies during the 19th century in terms of their content or direction, and in terms of the underlying theory of rule, or how the geopolitical and cultural imperial state conceived of political unity. I suggest six distinct periods: (a) pre-1825 or a '*state service empire*' of Catherine II, (b) 1825-1855 or '*official nationality bureaucratic empire*' under Nicholas I, (c) 1856-1862 or the '*liberalizing empire*' of the "Tsar Liberator" Alexander II, (d) 1863-

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[111] In this way Tsarist Russification prior to 1905 differed from Brubaker's descriptions of other statist 'nationalizations', Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1996; See also Weeks's discussion, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.13, 45, 56. Thaden also notes that after 1831 the Polish question was seen as a threat to the Russian state, but does not draw the same implication as Weeks, Kappeler, or Hosking for nationalities policies. Thaden, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland pp.121-122, 137.

[112] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.378-379; quotes from Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.375, and Martin Katz, Mikhail Katkov, p.127.

1880, the '*imperial Russian empire*' (geopolitical), (e) 1881-1904 was a period of '*integral Russian empire* (cultural), (f) 1905-1914 or the '*ethnic Russian empire*', under Alexander III and Nicholas II.

This periodicization may be useful because it situates the non-Russian Bolsheviks within the context of nationality policies and Russification, and allows distinctions to be made across generations. The last three phases are particularly important in subsequent chapters: 1863-1880 in understanding the context in which the families' of the Bolshevik elite sent their sons to Russified *gimnaziia* and *Realschulen*, or the Bolsheviks' social origins; 1881-1904 provides the context for the Bolsheviks' radicalization and politicization, often in nationalist or national socialist groupings; and 1905-1917 contextualizes the period in which most became active Bolsheviks, including the 1905 revolutions and WWI.

(a) pre-1825 or "*state service empire*": After the Polish partitions and the establishment of the Pale, imperial elites contended with the effects of 1789, the Napoleonic influences, the War of 1812, the birth of the distinctive and increasingly influential Russian literary-political culture of of Pushkin and Gogol, and the challenges of nationalism -- both European and Russian.[113] Governed by universalist principles of state service, the Russian empire was a secular state organized around the social 'estates', and its cosmopolitan elites conceived of imperial unity as deriving from the cooptation of the empire's nobilities into its secular, cosmopolitan service. In educational policies, private schools across the empire taught in literary Russian, though official sanction was granted for the use of local, native languages in parish schools. Catherinian toleration between 1773-1784 had banned forced conversion to Orthodoxy, and in the eastern empire, for instance, Muslim-Tataric culture had flourished with Muslim parochial schools and mosques.[114] This was a 'service empire' governed by Europeanized elites and predicated on a relatively liberal religious and cultural tolerance toward the empire's constituent nationalities' elites.

(b) 1825-1855 or '*official nationality bureaucratic empire*': The period of 'Official

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[113] Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.149 on European effects; Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich, pp.199-200 on effects of early Russian 'nationalism'.

[114] Kreindler, "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities", pp.33-35.

Nationality' under the reign of Nicholas I witnessed the Decembrist uprising (1825), the first Polish rebellion (1830-31), the Georgian uprising (1832), and the 1848 Revolutions in Europe and the Russian suppression of the 1849 Revolution in Hungary. The nationalist and republican forces unleashed by Europe's revolutions, the Decembrists, and Polish *szlachta* and clergy irredentism and separatism, had reduced Nicholas I to a state of panic and "catatonic fear" of any form of independent 'civil society'.[115] Censorship and military-style bureaucratic standardization followed.[116] Nicholas I's suppression of the 1830-31 Polish rebellions eliminated the constitutional arrangements established under the Catherinian state. Entrance to universities was restricted, the teaching of law and philosophy in Russian universities was banned to limit the spread of Enlightenment ideas, and students were "assigned immediately to state service to prevent them from entering the 'slippery career of journalism'".[117]

Accordingly, within Nicholas I's "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality" , "Official Nationality" was a Restoration doctrine of state, a Russian version of the more general European *ancien regime* reaction. Its most influential proponents, the cosmopolitan and Europeanized Russian educated and aristocratic classes, adapted to the Russian context an ideology of state designed to suppress social revolution, nationalism (including Russian), constitutionalism, and liberalism.[118] In short, any form of societal organization, Russian or otherwise, was to be curtailed.

In practice "Official Nationality" was ambiguous and highly malleable, expediently including any group acceptable to the regime. For instance "nationality" was construed to include not just *a certain class* of Russians, but Ukrainian, Belorussian, and even Polish *peasants* on the grounds that they were 'essentially Russian' -- and this despite the fact that most Polish peasants and Belorussians were not Orthodox but Catholic.[119] And despite Nicholas' efforts at greater bureaucratic inclusion of the ethnic peripheries,

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115 Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich, pp.204-205.

116 Riasanosky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality, pp.43-44, 50 and *passim*,on Nicholas' penchant for military organization and the assignment of military men over civilians in administrative posts.

117 Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.149.

118 Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality, pp.41, 137, 168-176 and his chapter on "The Ideas" more generally.

119 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.67-68.

similarly pragmatic policies toward the nationalities prevailed. For example, with no consistent policy toward the Caucasus, Nicholas' concerns about local peasant disorders prompted him to centralize the region by bring it into Russian administration and introducing Russian law and language into local government. Yet this eliminated Georgian as the local language of state bureaucracy at a time when most in the area could not even understand Russian. In the end pragmatism prevailed over bureaucratic uniformity: the system collapsed and the new Viceroy Vorontsov re-incorporated Georgian nobles into state service.[120] Even Jewish policies were 'integrationist', including the extension of rights of residence and the inclusion of Jewish merchants of the first guild, university graduates, and incorporated artisans -- all designed to bring a 'fusion' between Jewish and Gentile populations.[121]

Similarly in education, "Official Nationality", though ostensibly Russian was in practice actually more "European". In the 1840's there was a "Europeanization of culture" in the Caucasus, directly promoted in Tsarist schools which enrolled over 3,000 by the end of the decade.[122] Jewish education reflected a similar pragmatic Europeanization. Under Uvarov, 'enlightened' measures were adopted in order to attract Jewish children to the Russian language.[123] The state permitted the use of Polish, German or Russian, and restricted Yiddish and Hebrew in schools. In 1847 in Vilna rabbinical seminaries were opened under the supervision of the Russian state to train local educators, teachers, and community leaders, attracting *maskilim* interested in careers in Jewish education. Like Georgian educated elites, state-educated Jews were "Europeanizing", and this meant 'integration'.

Other nationality policies included Polish *szlachta* land confiscations, the establishment of a strong military presence in Warsaw, Catholic educational and church repression (including Uniate incorporation into the Orthodox Church in 1839), the

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120 Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, pp.72-73; Reisner, "Die Entstehungs --und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien bis 1921", in Uwe Halbach and Andreas Kappeler (Hrsg), Krisenherd Kaukasus, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1995, p.67.

121 Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, Vol.II, pp.157-161.

122 Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, p.93; Reisner, "Die Entstehungs --und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien bis 1921", pp.66-67.

123 Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, Vol.I, p.51.

beginning of suppression of Polish language and culture, the closing of the Polish University of Wilna (1832), the opening of a Russian university in Kiev (1834), the Lithuanian Statute in the western provinces in 1840, and the conversion of Latvians and Estonians to Orthodoxy (1845-1847).[124]

Riasanovsky argued that "Official Nationality" had two distinct strains: those who viewed it in "dynastic" pragmatic terms as a geopolitically sensible ideology of state, and those who adhered to its romantic "nationalistic" and messianic content, finding affinity with Pan-slavism.[125] But my sense is that part of the tension in "Official Nationality" had to do with the social composition of its most influential practitioners. Individual backgrounds of the proponents of "Official Nationality" are presented, but overlooked, in Riasanovsky's own study. The extent to which it was an ideology of the gentry class is debatable,[126] but from my reading of Riasanovsky's biographies the key proponents were disproportionately non-Russian:s.[127] The national composition of the proponents of Nicholas I's "Official Nationality" in the early 19th century bore a strong resemblance to the Bolsheviks in the late 19th century.

Nicholas was a standardizer and centralizer, always seeking greater subordination to the center along military principles to root out sedition and rebellion, political and social stability were the main concerns.[128] Fear of social revolution was driving the policies, not specific anti-ethnic sentiments. It has been argued, for instance, that Nicholas' anti-Semitism was not inspired by an ethnic intolerance, but by a desire for bureaucratic

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[124] Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.149; Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.275-276; Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich, pp.146-147, 204-207 on centralization and integration in the Caucasus and Nicholas' nationality policies generally.

[125] Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality, pp.162-163, 137-138.

[126] Ibid, pp.180-181.

[127] Karl Nesselrode was German educated and of "strikingly cosmopolitan background" (born Anglican in Portugal, to Protestant and Catholic-Jewish parents); F. Bulgarin, the noted journalist and writer from the *kresy* was the child of a "fanatically patriotic Polish family of gentry" whose father had joined Kosciuszko; the journalist Senkovskii, a Polish gentry also from the borderlands who had studied at Wilno University (before it became Russified Vilna); and of course the Ukrainian writer Gogol. Indeed, even the architect of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality" Uvarov was himself a committed atheist who had never read a single Russian language book in his life, writing only in German and French. ibid., pp.44-47, 60-61, 65-67, 70-71, 87-89. This is by no means exhaustive; I have not found a detailed study on the social and national composition of the principle adherents and followers of "Official Nationality".

[128] Ibid., pp.192-193; Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich, p.207.

uniformity and greater social control.[129] An even with Polish repressions, high levels of Polish gentry cooptation continued of practical grounds. Despite "Official Nationality" and increased bureaucratic uniformity, the thrust of Nicholas' nationality policies were *rossisskii*, pragmatic, and essentially cosmopolitan. Because the threats to imperial political and social unity were thought to reside in liberal, constitutional, and national social unrest, a combination of elite cooptation and administrative standardization along *ancien regime* autocratic principles was sought.

(c) 1856-1861/2: '*liberalizing empire*'. Crimean geopolitical defeat signaled a Great Power in decline, and prompted a brief period of political liberalization. Attempts to strengthen the social unity of the empire were sought through *quasi*--liberal social reforms and an easing of 'official nationality'. Yet the content of the Great Reforms merely underscored the autocratic basis of imperial rule, and made manifest the social distance between an essentially cosmopolitan imperial elite society and the wider peasant masses.

Similarly, nationality policies reflected the ethos of a '*rossisskii*' state elite struggling with both social initiative and the ethnic-religious diversity of the empire. Russian imperial ethnographers, for example, "investigated obstacles to forging a diverse, multinational population into a common empire". They tried to recast imperial identity and unity in rethinking the 'official nationality' formula and stressing the need for liberal recognition of "legitimate diversity" with regional and local authority.[130] But this brief period of state attempts at liberalizing social reforms and 'revolution from above' both in Russia and under Wielopolski in Russian Poland (1861-1862) was halted in the reaction following the 1863-1864 Polish insurrections.

(c) 1863-1881: '*imperial Russian empire*'. The reign of Alexander II between the second Polish rebellions (1863-1864) and the assassination of Alexander in 1881 witnessed the most extensive imperial expansion since the Polish partitions: the conquests of Central Asia (Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara) between 1865-1876, and the territorial gains from the 1877-78 Ottoman Wars. In addition to the incorporation of new nationalities, the creation in 1871 of the German state and the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich

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[129] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.274.

[130] Catherine Clay, "Russian Ethnographers in the Service of Empire, 1856-1862", Slavic Review, 54, No.1, Spring 1995, pp.45-61.

in 1867 only intensified Petersburg geopolitical worries about the stability and loyalty of its borderland nationalities, particularly on the part of Pan-slavists.

Nationalities' policies and the introduction of 'Russification', were viewed as inextricably connected to the empire's geopolitical stability. In no other period were nationality policies more directly driven by geopolitical considerations. Imperial unity was sought (a) through social reforms which began to target social groups and classes within the nationalities, (b) through the abandonment of policies of co-opting national minority elites, and (c) through 'integrative' policies designed to 'fuse' or 'merge' the empire's minorities.

The significance of the Polish insurrections of 1863-1864 in the minds of imperial elites cannot be underestimated since the repression begun in 1864 constituted a dramatic shift in nationality policies. Nationalists like Katkov viewed Polish events through Germanophilic fears.[131] State elites considered Polish gentry separatism and irredentism a threat to the integrity of the geopolitical state, and for the first time abandoned traditional imperial policy of cooperating with national -- especially Polish -- elites. *Ancien regime*-style policies of maintaining social and political unity through combinations of elite cooptation and bureaucratic uniformity ceded to more explicit 'divide and rule' policies. The loyalty of the empire's nationalities was both enticed and coerced through a series of social reforms, generally punitive towards gentries and conciliatory towards peasantries. And there was a shift away from administrative-bureaucratic policies and reforms to social policies and reforms. In short, there were now in the minds of state elites important distinctions to be made between particular social groups *within* nationalities, and these could be achieved more directly through social policies than through bureaucratic changes. So, for instance, in Katkov's view what was needed was both a 'class' (meaning 'estate') and a 'national' (ethno-religious or ethnolinguistic) war against the Polish *szlachta* by Belorussian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Russian peasants.[132]

Because this was still a traditional, particularistic dynastic state, its divide and rule policies were generally not between ethnic groups, but between strata within ethnic

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131 Katz, Mikhail Katkov, pp.115-116.

132 Ibid., p.128.

groups. This was so for possibly three related reasons. First, the state was concerned with maintaining the loyalty of slavic peasantries and 'vertical' alliances between, for example, Ukrainian peasants and Ukrainian elites could strengthen separatist movements. Second, as in most traditional societies, there were greater status-particularistic cultural and linguistic differences within ethnic groups which were not yet culturally homogeneous (e.g. Polish peasants and Polish *szlachta*) than between elites of different groups, so these linguistic markers were easier to manipulate. And third, the Tsarist state was above all concerned with maintaining social order (and social barriers); fears of losing social control in the borderlands by inciting ethnic conflicts made 'divide and rule' risky.

In the western borderlands then, nationality policies were aimed at local elites who posed the greatest threat to separation: the Polish *szlachta*, clergy, and educated classes.[133] Among other things, these comprised suppressive measures against the Catholic church, against Polish *szlachta* in the western borderlands, and severe restrictions on the use of Polish in administration and schools in Russian Poland in addition to the *kresy*. The 'Polish question' affected the substance of agrarian reforms in Poland in 1864 and it figured prominently in the withholding of zemstvo in the same year both in Russian Poland and in the *kresy*.

Other policies included agrarian or land reforms, zemstvo or provincial elected assemblies, and municipal government reforms. Agrarian reform in Poland in 1864, unlike the 1861 Emancipation Edict in Russia, was designed to benefit peasantries and the expense of the *szlachta in* the hope of keeping the former loyal to the Tsar and the latter in submission. Similarly, Georgian nobles, until now highly loyal to the state, were displaced by land reforms between 1864-1870 in Transcaucasia. Unsurprisingly, gentry-intellectual sons of borderland Polish *szlachta* and urbanized sons of rural small and middle Georgian nobles (those most impoverished) turn up in radical movements in great numbers, Bolshevism included. Some conciliatory policies toward Jews were attempted in the borderlands in efforts to integrate Jews as counter-weight against the Poles in the region. And the state's fear of Ukrainianizing or Polonizing Ukrainian peasants in the borderlands resulted in policies harsh toward Ukrainian intellectuals and ambiguous

133 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp. 103-104.

toward the peasants. The Ukrainian peasantry was not only viewed as more advanced than other peasantries, but because they were in close proximity to Germany, their potential politicization was deemed geopolitically sensitive. On the other hand, because Ukrainian peasants were not seen as 'nationally conscious', they were viewed as potential allies in the southwest against Poles and Jews. In this connection the state also feared Ukrainian intellectual and Polish gentry alliances (though these never materialized). And finally, as noted earlier, zemstvo were introduced only in the Russian provinces and carefully avoided where Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians resided, guaranteeing that provincial public life remained out of the hands of potentially disloyal elites.

Begun under Alexander II in the previous period, the general principle of 'equal rights for Russification' continued. This was particularly true in two related areas: language laws and education. Polish language laws in religious texts and in the 'Latin script' directly affected Lithuanians, Belorussians, and some Ukrainians, either because they too were Catholic or because they used the now prohibited "Latin script". The effect on Ukrainian nationalism of the 1863 ban on publications in Ukrainian books other than *belles lettres* and folklore, and the further Ukrainian language restrictions of 1876 are well-known. And in 1870 Russian was made the language in offices of the higher provincial administration in the Baltic provinces. But Russification in this period meant 'integration' or 'rapproachment',*sliianie* or *sblizhenie*, not assimilation in the modern sense.[134] Russificatory policies were not uniform in intent or in application, but a series of discriminate ad hoc measures most often conceived by elites in the borderlands (local administrators, governors, governor-generals, viceroys etc) not in Petersburg, as reactions to a variety of specific, local concerns.

This period had several distinctive features then. First elite cooptation policies were largely abandoned in favor of more 'divide and rule' policies between groups within nationalities. Second, these policies moved beyond simply bureaucratic reforms, but took the form of more substantive social reforms. Third, 'integration' policies were also attempted in language laws and education in efforts to create national minority elites loyal to the 'state idea' and to bring a certain unity between 'state and society'. This was

[134] Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, pp.72-73, for a discussion of the empire's Jews.

crucially important in terms of the Bolshevik elite under study: most of the families of the Bolsheviks were socialized in these years and either responded 'nationally' to state exclusions or took advantage of increasing educational and civil service opportunities for minorities willing to 'Russianize'. And fourth, ("disloyal") minority elites tended to be viewed as threatening the geopolitical integrity of the empire and imperial unity.

(d) 1881-1904: *'integral Russian empire"*. This was a period of "integral imperial nationalism" in which state intolerance of diversity was characterized not by homogenization but by exclusion of particular social groups within nationalities. Typically -- though incorrectly -- referred to as "systematic Russification", or "imperial homogenization", this period opened with the assassination of Alexander II and the massive and violent anti-Jewish pogroms in southern European Russia. The state responded with the Security Law of 1881 and the Temporary May Laws of 1882. This period was particularly critical since most of the Bolsheviks were radicalized in these years in the empire's elite *gimnaziia*.

Faced with more variegated territories, increased social unrest, pogroms, and growing revolutionary movements, and other social activism, security measures vis-a-vis the nationalities were not intended to 'Russify', but to increase the power of local and provincial officials to deal with social unrest.[135] I discuss this in its most important manifestation, the state's response to pogroms in 1881, in Chapter 6. The primary concern once again was the maintenance of social order in the face of cultural and national elites which posed not only geopolitical challenges to the state, but also a 'counter-culture' to the imperial culture. Accordingly, imperial unity was sought not in homogenization, further integration, or centralization, but through full-on exclusion, abandoning earlier efforts at 'integration' or rapproachment.

In 1894 under Alexander III Russification became, for the first time, official policy, or as Seton-Watson viewed it, "an ideology of state". According to Seton-Watson the Great Russian nationalism that emerged with force in these years was the product of bureaucrats and civil servants from noble landowning families, better educated than their parents and no longer on rural estates. Forming a "disciplined hierarchy based on the

[135] On the intention of these measures, J.W. Daly, "On the Significance of Emergency Legislation in Late Imperial Russia", Slavic Review, Vol.53, No.3, Fall 1995, p.611.

more illiberal features of Prussian government, they aimed at order and uniformity", intolerant of diversity and regional variety.[136] But Alexander III, though known as "Tsar Nationalist" was, by most accounts, working in 'state interests' by restricting local privilege in the peripheries -- Baltic, Finland, Jews.[137] So it is important not to exaggerate the "Russianness" of his policies, which were still *ancien regime* particularistic and not yet modern ethnic Russian: Alexander continued to despise the Polish landed gentry as an upper class 'nation', but had no animosity toward the slavic Polish peasantry.

We can be more precise about nationality policies in these crucial years: cultural elites, intellectuals, and those in the professions were specifically targeted since they were seen as threatening 'imperial cultural unity' (not necessarily Russian culture) with their own 'counter-cultural' claims, nationalist and socialist. Educational policies most clearly typified this reaction: what appeared to be cultural 'Russificatory' policies were more precisely intended to root out the anti-state radicalism of cultural elites in all its forms, the Russian included. The famous 'Cook's Letter' educational contraction policy had not an ethnic or national basis (except with qualification for Jews) but a 'social status' basis, that is, one intended to restrict the lower orders from higher education because of the growing fear of rebellion in these institutions, again the Russian included. Armenian seminaries were closed down not because they were not Russian, but because the state believed (correctly in this case) that they were producing too many revolutionaries.

The same is true of a number of other nationality policies. After the Finns had been made liable for military service, in 1899 under Bobrikov Finnish legislative autonomy was curtailed, and Russian language was to be used in administrative offices; the Baltic's administrative integration of the 1870's continued in the 1880's as Russian courts were introduced and Russian language was required in administration and law; in 1886 German secondary schools in the Baltics were made Russian-speaking; in 1893 Dorpat University was closed, reopened as Russian Yurev University, and caused student enrollment to drop from 1000 in 1890 to 268 in 1900[138]); converted Estonians and

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136 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.485-486.

137 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.105.

138 Alston, Education and the State, p.120.

Latvians could not return to Lutheranism; and most noticeably Jews, categorized as *inorodtsy* were systematically excluded after 1881, thereby abandoning earlier efforts at 'integration'. As noted above, the 1887 *numerous clausus* limited Jewish enrollment in secondary and higher education institutions. Jews were no longer permitted to enter the *advokatura*, were barred from military-medical professions, their votes in municipal and zemstvo elections were rescinded, and in 1891 the expulsion of Moscow's Jews rid the city of more than 2/3 of its Jewish population.

Significantly, this was not a 'Russifying' or assimilationist state, if by this we take to mean a state that tried to 'make Russians' of non-Russians. Nor was this a 'nationalizing' state in the sense in which Brubaker refers to interwar Poland for instance, or in the sense in which Pearson defines Russification, as "state-sponsored transfer of privilege from the nationalities to the Russians", first by revoking formal privileges and then by revoking informal privileges in the military, religious, and educational spheres.[139] There is no evidence that Russians were gaining any more privileges or rights, indeed the contrary seemed more true: Russian intellectuals, professions, and cultural elites were quite as 'excluded' as those of the minority nationalities. This was not yet a 'nationalizing' state.

Tsarist nationality policies did however resemble -- with significant qualifications -- what Brubaker refers to as 'disassimilationist' policies ('assimilation by exclusion' as towards Germans and Jews in interwar Poland) despite its not yet being a 'nationalizing' state. That is, exclusionary policies were aimed not at ethnicities wholesale, ie. Germans in nationalizing Poland, but rather quite discriminately at particular social groups within ethnicities. Yet unlike the 'dissimilationist' policies described by Brubaker, these were not intended to 'nationalize' or 'homogenize' but simply to control social rebellion and influence of specific elites via 'divide and rule'. All attempts at integration or 'assimilation' of the earlier period were entirely abandoned. Earlier the fear had been in the geopolitical effects of national elites' rebellions, now the fear was in the cultural influence and effects of national intellectuals and professionals -- social revolutionaries

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139 Rogers Brubaker, "Nationalizing states in the old 'New Europe' -- and the new", in his Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.84-103 particularly; Pearson, "Privileges, Rights, and Russification", pp.93-94.

were threatening imperial unity.

(e) 1905-1917: '*ethnic Russian empire*' : Following the 1905 revolutions the Russian state made certain linguistic, religious, and administrative concessions to the nationalities, not in the form of "rights" but as "expedient privileges".[140] Accordingly they were rescinded once the revolutionary threat had passed, and Stolypin's illiberal policies prevailed until WWI. By this time, however, Russian nationalism itself became ethnicized. It was only after the socialist and nationalist revolutions of 1905, the October Manifesto's liberalizations, and the beginning of electoral and parliamentary Duma politics that Russian nationalism itself came to find its ethnic basis. Much like Polish nationalism, it was largely reactive to the development of other nationalisms. In fact Weeks argues that both Russian and Polish nationalism changed as a result of new minority nationalismsafter 1905 -- Jewish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Belorussian.[141]

So despite initial liberal gestures following events of 1905, Russificatory and nationality policies became increasingly ethnically-based and reactionary. Largely originating among Russians in the European borderlands, both Russian nationalism and Russian liberalism developed in coincidence with the 'political' phases of non-Russian nationalities within the context of Duma politics. State elites after 1905 clearly and explicitly feared the empire's developing national movements and organizations, triggering 'ethnic' Russian responses. In turn, the government reaction had strengthened the nationalities' national-cultural autonomist claims, and gave increasing impetus to nationalist movements, particularly regarding language and schooling.[142] After 1905 even the *Kaisertrue* Baltic German elite responded by re-aligning along ethnic lines.

The state's worries were captured in Stolypin's 1910 circular arguing that the empire's nationalities' cultural and educational institutions strengthened their national

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[140] Ibid., pp.98-99.

[141] Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.110. Though Weeks plausibly argues that even after 1905 the state continued to balance Russian nationalism and dynastic cosmopolitanism (p.108).

[142] Zalevskii, "National'niia dvizheniia", pp.219-221 on Jews, for instance, flowering of Yiddishist literature, theater, and culture; on Muslim and Armenian cultural revival triggered by 1905, Tadeusz Swietochowski, "Hummit Party: Socialism and the national Question in Russian Azerbaijan, 1904-1920", Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique, Vol.19, Nos.1-2, and Claire Mouradian "Die armenische Nationalbewegung im Osmanischen and Russischen Reich bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg", Halbach and Kappeler, Krisenherd Kaukasus, pp.80-93.

consciousness and separatism. The Stolypin response was (a) to uproot the cultural institutions of "alien" races in Russia like Jews and Finns which were producing these cultural revolutionaries, and (b) to 'ethnicize' both social and administrative policies, in this case by increasing the presence and privileges of ethnic Russians. Once Russian nationalism itself became ethnicized after 1905, the Tsarist empire finally became, in effect, a 'nationalizing state'.

While the 'Russification' of the 1880's-1890's had affected culture and education among minority elites most profoundly, it now resumed in other sectors politicizing the lower classes as well. After 1905 the basis of integration and political unity was viewed by Stolypin in a manner different from Katkov's earlier 'integral imperial nationalism'. In the Baltics, for example, Stolypin wanted the state to "persistently and with all means...[increase] the number of Russian men in the districts of the Baltic region (in the ranks of the civil service as well as among the population tilling the soil) *in the interest of bringing these regions nearer to the rest of the empire*".[143] In other words, imperial unity was sought, as Hagen observed, in policies such as Stolypin's Russianization of the Baltics which combined both national and social elements to displace Estonians, Latvians, German officials because they were not members of the "elect race of reliable citizens".[144]

This principle was also in evidence when zemstvo were introduced into six of the western provinces and property qualifications for zemstvo suffrage were lowered substantially in order to boost local Russians who tended to occupy middle and lower social strata, and in the growing in the number of culturally protective measures for Russians as the new 'Russian' state opened up to 'Russian' society.[145]

Stolypin was a nationalist who envisioned Russia a modern, centralized European state. He wanted the empire's subjects to have a modern national loyalty because he grasped the geopolitical advantages of centralized nation-states. Russification was designed to serve this geopolitical -- and autocratic -- purpose. Crucially, Stolypin

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[143] Quoted in Hagen,"Russification via 'Democratization'?", p.56. Emphasis is mine. In this instance this involved "systematic displacement (of non-Russians) and corresponding substitution by Russians" in the Baltic civil service, and as Hagen argues, this required increasing recruitment of personnel from the lower social strata, in contrast to recruitment in the Central provinces. (pp.59-60)

[144] Ibid., p.62.

[145] On culturally protective measures, Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.194.

believed that nationalism was the only modern ideology whose appeal could compete with socialism.[146] And he saw no reason why Russian should not be the reigning language of the empire, following Katkov in the belief that imperial Russian culture had a powerful assimilatory ability. Stolypin's view was captured thusly: "first of all come over to our point of view, admit that the greatest blessing is to be a Russian citizen, bear this name with the same pride with which the Romans bore their citizenship and then you will call yourselves first-class citizens and you will receive all your rights". As Seton-Watson succinctly wrote: his "lack of understanding could hardly have been more complete".[147]

Russification and ethnic groups

The extent to which nationality remained an important stratifier in terms of incorporation into the state was evident in the fact that administration, education, rights of residence, the ability to work and buy land, other property ownership, zemstvo participation, etc., were all determined in some way by nationality.[148] But there were significant differences in the way in which different groups *within* nationalities were treated. The state incorporated, *viz.* granted privileges to the wealthier urban estates, urban merchants and well-off capitalists, licensed professions, imperial civil servants, and peasants. Tatar, Armenian, German, and Greek merchants and capitalists, and some Jewish capital was 'in', while most 'labor' was 'out'. After 1863 the Russian state 'split' the Polish elite: petty szlachta , clergy, and intellectuals were repressed, magnates left alone, and peasants conciliated. Yet many Poles made their careers in government service outside Congress Poland. Similarly, Georgian nobles were not viewed uniformly by the state. Like Polish magnates, Georgian magnates were relatively well-treated while Georgian small and middling landed nobles were far more harshly treated in peasant and land reform settlements. Tataric nobles (usually Russified), and particularly those of the Lithuanian provinces, seemed to be exempt from oppressive policies against rural landed elites, and Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belorussian peasants were similarly conciliated as potential allies against Poles and Jews.[149] Ukrainian elites were similarly 'split':

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146 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.663.

147 Ibid., p.665. Stolypin quote same page.

148 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.70.

149 Ibid., p.90, 125.

intellectuals and cultural elites repressed, educated middle and lower middle classes and nobles were incorporated into state service, and peasants were alternately conciliated (when deemed to have anti-Polish value) and repressed (when deemed dangerously close to the German and Austrian cultural or geopolitical borders).

So was there a sociology to Russification? I argue that at least seven general patterns prevailed, particularly in the second half of the century most directly relevant to the Bolsheviks. The chart below is intended to lay out general patterns and policies. There will be exceptions in some cases, and I exclude Russians. First, because 'incorporation' and 'exclusion' consistently involved the granting or withholding of corporative or status 18th century-type 'privileges', not 19th century-type citizenship 'rights', the persistence of this status particularism meant that *neither* classes *nor* nationalities were incorporated or excluded wholesale (with few significant exceptions after 1905). So to speak of Ukrainians as repressed, Baltic Germans as privileged, and Central Asians as 'colonized' -- as does Laitin for instance -- is highly misleading because actually different groups within these nationalities were incorporated or excluded -- there was indeed a sociology to Russification.

Secondly and relatedly, Tsarist nationality policies combined both 'divide and rule' and 'integrationist' policies, with late 19th century Russification paradoxically an example of the former. Both 'integration' and 'divide and rule' were therefore conceived as creating imperial political and social unity.

Thirdly, because the imperial state was constituted as both a 'geopolitical state' and as a 'cultural state', the ethnic peripheries alternately threatened both dimensions of imperial integrity. In consequential ways "Polish" was defined in either 'status' sense or in a political sense, e.g. the upper class or gentry of the Polish 'nation', much as Bismarck did in Prussia; while in other moments "Polish" was defined as "Catholic", thereby affecting also Belorussians and Lithuanians. Elite rhetoric to the contrary, most policies did not conceive of Poles in strictly ethnic terms, but as an upper class status minority, alternately geopolitically threatening (sedition) and culturally threatening (local influence over slavic peasantries). Similar descriptions would also apply to Armenians, Jews, Turko-Tataric populations, Ukrainians, and Germans.

Fourthly, there was an 'urban-rural' component to Tsarist nationality policies. The rural non-Russian areas were of particular concern because of the potential cultural, political, and economic influence of certain elites (notably Polish *szlachta*, Ukrainian intellectuals, and Jewish rural capital) in the context of a very weak Russian presence.

Social groups and nationality policies, 1861-1914

	exclusionary oppressive	**integrationist conciliatory**
	A	**B**
urban groups	(a) intellectuals: all, esp. Jews, Armenians, Poles, Turks (Azer), Ukrainians (b) liberal professions: Jews, Poles, Armenians, Ukrainians, Turks (Azer) Georgians (c) urban lower classes: Jews, 'peasant-workers' all ethnicities	(a) urban estates; (b) licensed urban professions; (c) imperial civil service nobles; (d) nationalities in civil service: Baltic Germans, Armenians, Tatars, wealthy Georgian & Polish magnates and service nobles, 'court' Jews, lower and middle-level Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian civil service (e) urban large capital: Jewish haute bourgeoisie, Armenian and Tatar merchants, Baltic German German capital, Greeks
	C	**D**
rural groups	(a) landed nobles: elites: Polish, some Lithuanian, Georgian small/middle, Jewish landholding (b) rural clerics: Polish and Lithuanian (c) rural non-Russian capital: Polish and Jewish	(a) peasants: Polish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Belorussian, Estonian, Latvian (b) German colonists (despite their being Lutheran or Protestant)

Accordingly, in order to control the *szlachta* Polish peasant 'liberation' granted generous allotments of land and the Polish peasantry did not have the burdensome redemption payments that the Russian peasants had in 1861. Similarly in order to protect Polish (and other peasantries) the 1882 May Laws were designed to restrict Jewish rural "exploitation", and subsequently the influence of Ukrainian intellectuals and Polish *szlachta* cultural influence.[150] And one of the cornerstones of Tsarist nationality policies

[150] Ibid., pp.60-61, 100.

was its concessions to Jews in the urban professions but not to Jews in the countryside, especially in landholding.[151]

More generally, we may say that rural landed national elites were harshly treated while the local peasant populations fared far better, at least until the turn of the century. The Tsarist state historically coopted peripheral elites and cared very little about the peasant masses of any nationality.[152] Of primary concern was a loyal nobility desperately required to administer the peripheries. But mid-century this shifted. Rural elites and landed nobles were excluded and peasantries co-opted, though not Russified (or educated), thereby leaving them available for nationalist mobilizations. In the urban areas, the state was rather more conciliatory toward those national elites in the higher urban estates while generally repressing the urban 'lower classes', most of whom were peasants-turned-workers and the Jewish '*meshchane*'. I discuss the urban middling classes below.

Fifthly, as the century progressed, repressive policies tended to be 'top-down', first affecting nobilities, landed gentries, and clergy, then emergent educated middle class elites, and finally the 'lower orders', peasants and peasant-workers. Until the 1890's nationality policies generally targeted only: national minority middle classes, educated elites, and certain nobilities among the national minorities. In the case of the former there were obviously a question of mobility, but more significantly, the fact of binding them closer to the language and culture of the state in various privileged and corporative arrangements. Russificatory policies did not affect working classes, peasantries, and those with only primary education until much later, c.1895-1900, significantly leaving most open to nationalist mobilization in native languages.

Sixthly and relatedly, the state seemed to 'split' the emergent 'middle strata'. Although membership in educated middle class was very important in radicalization across the empire (Russians included), it is not surprising that among the peripheral minorities' educated elites had higher rates of radicalization. This is particularly true of cultural elites and those in the liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, teachers, journalists, writers) -- the

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151 Dubnow, A History of the Jews, pp.44-45.

152 Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich, pp.94-95.

targets of oppressive nationality policies. By contrast, non-Russian well-to-do commercial and capitalist elites seemed to fare quite well under Tsarist privileges (particularly Crimean Tatars and Armenian merchants), and until quite late this even included Jewish capital.

Because Jews constituted a significant proportion of these educated minority elites, this pattern was perfectly typified in Jewish policies. As noted earlier this chapter, from 1874 the legal profession and the Russian Bar were quite anti-Semitic, but in 1889 the Bar Council (whose future members would include Lenin and Kerenski) closed its doors to Jewish membership, thereby excluding Jews from one of the most influential corporate professions in Russian society. These restrictions were not limited to (potential) Jewish advocates, but to Jewish participation in the liberal professions more generally -- Jewish intellectual and free professions were barred from state service, Jews could not get university positions, those serving in the army could not become officers, Jews were barred from participating in zemstvo elections as of 1890, and Jewish physicians and lawyers were now barred from the civil service and limited to private practice.[153]

Seventh and lastly, nationality policies tended to be far more repressive and bureaucratic where the local ethnic Russian presence was weak or non-existent. I discuss the consequences of this for acculturation and the attractiveness of Russification below, but here I stress that this created both provincial 'civil' and political society and an imperial 'civil' and political society as alternate venues for national minorities. A significant proportion of educated minority elites of the middling classes were co-opted into the imperial state via civil service and the imperial bureaucracy where they would otherwise have been excluded from provincial institutions, notably Ukrainians, Georgians, Latvians, Estonians, and surprisingly, Jews.

In sum, the sociology of nationalities policies was intimately connected to the sociology of the empire itself. Namely, policies were typically repressive or exclusionary either for fear of cultural influence or for fear of local, non-Russian rule in the provincial

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[153] Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp.72-73; Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, pp.336-337; Dubnow, A History of the Jews, Vol.II, pp.348-357, 385-386, Vol.III, pp.26-31; Cristoph Gassenshmidt, Jewish Liberal Politics in Tsarist Russia, 1900-1914: The Modernization of Russian Jewry, New York University Press, 1995, pp.6-7.

and local levels where local elites were disloyal or 'exploitative' (respectively Poles, Ukrainians and Jews), but the state tread lighter where local elites and nobles were firmly ensconced 'inside' the imperial state (Baltic Germans, Georgian nobles in Kutais and Tiflis, Tataric nobles in the Caucasus and Crimea). Policies were more conciliatory and integrationist toward those social groups which were 'inside' the imperial state by virtue of licensing or estate membership or civil service and therefore had a stake in the imperial state itself, or to non-Russian peasants more generally who were viewed as traditionally loyal to the person of the Tsar.

Russification and acculturation

Kautsky famously believed that nationalities without a bourgeoisie (or with very weak and small bourgeoisie) were doomed to assimilation. On the historical evidence of course, he was wrong as the histories of 'fourth time zone' nations like the essentially peasant Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians positively demonstrate, and as the highly 'assimilatory' nature of the nationality with the largest bourgeoisie, the Jews, negatively demonstrates. Chlebowczyk argued that among "ethnic island communities" the relationship between levels of development (industrialization, urbanization, literacy, etc) and assimilation processes was such that ethnicities with lower levels of development placed a ceiling on acculturation because their "assimilatory ability" to draw newcomers was negligible.[154] Tsarist elites' belief in the ability of the imperial Russian language and culture to attract or assimilate the empire's nationalities was impressive and abiding, and from this, as we saw, a number of repressive and conciliatory policies flowed. Because on the evidence acculturated and Russified national elites were politically influential in *both* nationalist and socialist groups, as the Bolsheviks themselves testify, the relationship between Russification and radicalization is a crucial one.

Typically, acculturation is to the native middle class culture, a process assisted both the state policies and by urbanization, industrialization, increasing literacy, and secularization. But given the 'ethnic niche ranking' of the 'fourth time zone', the Tsarist peripheries were constituted in such a manner that often the 'native middle class culture' was not the Russian imperial culture. Which was chosen by the emergent lower and

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[154] Josef Chlebowczyk, On Small and Young Nations in Europe: Nation-forming Processes in Ethnic Borderlands in East Central Europe, Wroclaw, 1980, pp.49-51.

middle classes -- Russian or Polish in Congress Poland or Poland-Lithuania, Russian or German in the Baltics, Russian, Ukrainian or Polish in Kiev, etc? I argue in subsequent chapters in connection with the Bolsheviks that these linguistic and cultural choices were affected by, and in turn affected political choices and patterns of radicalization.

Specifically, I suggest that the choices involved one or both of two considerations: (a) the extent to which the minority elite found itself excluded from provincial civic and political society, and therefore the turn to 'imperial society' or to the state's language and culture both for inclusion (social opportunity) and for protection (corporative/status rights and privileges), and (b) the inherent attractiveness of the linguistic and cultural options on offer in terms of what they could do for creating personal and social self-esteem. Mikhail Katkov, the 'imperial nationalist', believed that it was not economic opportunity that motivated, but that the empire's non-Russian subjects were only willing to learn and teach their children a language as long as it raised their self-esteem. Parents did not want their children to learn the language or adopt a culture of a defeated people,[155] or, one might add, of a 'backward' people.

Katkov's own motivations aside, his analysis was not wrong. Vilna Jews typically chose Russian over Polish because the latter was 'politically' defeated, and they chose Russian over Lithuanian because of its perceived 'cultural backwardness' -- learning Lithuanian was neither attractive nor necessary. Ukrainian Jews chose Russian for both reasons: in an anti-Semitic Ukraine they turned to the state for protection *and* Ukrainian language and culture held no inherent attractiveness as a 'peasant' language, only with Russian could greater vistas open into European culture and ideas. To the extent that Lithuanians and Belorussians who migrated to cities adopted another language or culture, it was the state's Russian, not the Polish of the 'defeated nation' (the historical exception was the culturally Polonized Lithuanian aristocracy).

Given that the Bolsheviks were Russified minority elites within this context, I offer five factors which I believe were crucial to the shaping of cultural, linguistic, national, and political identities and in their politicization or radicalization: (i) the national-ethnic composition of the region or locality itself, e.g. Vilna Jews vs. Odessa Jews vs.

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[155] Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855-1881, p.154.

Kievian Jews, (ii) the particular socio-ethnic niche ranking, or the nationality's relationship to the socioeconomic structure and its position vis-a-vis other nationalities, (iii) the nationality's and/or its particular groups (Armenian merchants, Georgian nobles, Polish *szlachta*, Ukrainian peasants) relationship to both the imperial state and to provincial political authority, especially in terms of local restrictions, privileges, educational access, zemstvo, and the relationship between imperial civil society and provincial civil society, (iv) the language and culture of provincial civic and political society, including political, cultural, and literary associations and periodical press, (v) secondary schooling and language of instruction. Each of these factors, as subsequent chapters will show, varied in their relative weight depending on context, and were crucial in getting at 'elective affinities".

Russification policies may usefully be distinguished from voluntary Russification or acculturation, the latter involving the attractiveness or 'assimilatory power' of Russian language and culture as a matter of choice. Russification policies tended to backfire (e.g. Lithuanians, Poles in the borderlands, Il'minskii system in Central Asia etc.). Yet national minorities across the empire chose to send their children to Russian *gimnazii*a, often at a considerable financial sacrifice. That most families *wanted* their children to be 'Russified' must be taken into consideration. Conditions under which forcible Russification backfired and triggered nationalist responses (e.g.Dzierzynski, Kapsukas), and those under which Russification was an attractive option (e.g. Uritskii, Sokol'nikov) should be specified.

Secondly, linguistic acculturation or Russification may be distinguished from a deeper social and cultural acculturation, or quasi-assimilation. The pervasiveness of bilingualism and multi-lingualism should also be considered. So whether Jews' stated 'mother tongue' as Yiddish or Russian reflected not only linguistic acculturation, but also a certain level of social acculturation if Russian was declared as the second language. The development of a Jewish press in Russian language (Odessa), and of a distinctive Jewish literary and periodical genre in Polish language after mid-century in Russian Poland may have reflected a deeper social acculturation. Similarly Russification patterns among Poles in Russian Poland, the Polish-Lithuania *kresy*, and the southwest Ukrainian provinces

differed, with consequences for their politics.

Thirdly and relatedly, I emphasize that neither linguistic nor social Russification-acculturation removed social distance between ethnicities. Georgian and Armenian elites in the Caucasus were similarly linguistically Russified, but social and ethnic animosities persisted; German colonists and Ukrainian peasants living in south Russia were among the most highly linguistically Russified ethnicities in the region, yet despite their parallel adoption of Russian, they continued to inhabit different social spheres; anti-Semitic pogroms were most common among ethnic Russians and (often Russianized) Ukrainians where Jews were the most socially and linguistically acculturated, not where they were the most traditionally 'Jewish'. To the extent that a number of the empire's greatest cities were 'ethnically balkanized' (Tiflis, Odessa, Warsaw, Vilna, Baku), they remained so even after the constituent surrounding ethnicities had urbanized and 'Russified'. Social or linguistic Russification actually tended to contribute little to imperial social and political cohesion in the peripheries.

Fourthly, often the degree to which linguistic Russification predominated in a given region was in part shaped by whether 'Russian' had a social-cultural presence in addition to an institutional presence. Russian Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian borderlands, and parts of Ukraine, had a relatively small number of ethnic Russians: here the Russian state's presence was in the persons of officials, administrators, Governor-Generals, bureaucrats and imperial civil servants of various ranks and other nationalities (Georgians, Baltic Germans, Tatars). In contrast, ethnic Russians were present in significant numbers as workers, commercial merchants, shop owners, industrialists, educators, as well as officials and administrators in southern Russia, parts of Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Latvia (though less in Estonia).

The regions with a considerable Russian socioeconomic presence generally tended to be less bureaucratically-ruled for reasons discussed above. In effect, then, where Russians had a weak social presence, bureaucratic state control prevailed; where Russians were more strongly present, provincial political and civil society had more latitude. One important consequence was that where bureaucratic control was stronger and Russian only institutionally present, linguistic acculturation tended to result (Russian Poland,

Transcaucasia, Polish-Lithuania); where provincial political and 'civil society' existed, cultural or social acculturation/Russification was more likely (Left-bank Ukraine, Latvia).

Fifth, in regions in which no single nationality was dominant -- culturally, socially, or economically -- national minority elites tended to have more political and cultural space within which to develop (Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian borderlands, Odessa). And to the extent that linguistic acculturation occurred it was usually to Russian as the language of the empire. By contrast, where one nationality was dominant (Volga area, Russian Poland, Latvia, Estonia), minority elites tended to find very little autonomous cultural and political space, and therefore acculturated more thoroughly. For example the autonomous (Russified) Jewish cultural life in Vilna and Odessa in contrast to its stifled weakness in Kiev.

Sixth, and most crucially, acculturation was generally into the native middle class culture, mores, values, and language -- made easier with urbanization. Indeed urbanization seemed to be a more important factor in acculturation-Russification than state policies. Unsurprisingly this has been most fully explored in studies of Russian Jews. Consequently, the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the native middle class (both commercial and educated) had an important effect on minority elites' ability and desire to acculturate, integrate, or Russify.

Chapter 5
Bolshevik Origins and the Russian Empire

This chapter presents findings on the social and national composition of the revolutionary Bolshevik elite and highlights areas of inquiry for subsequent chapters.

I. National Origins

The nationalities composition of the 1917-1924 elite and their corresponding representation in the empire are shown in Table 1 below.[1] Of the 93 Bolsheviks studied, only 38 were Russian Orthodox with the remaining 55 (or 60%) of other minority nationalities and ethnicities. It is important to state at the outset that this is a conservative figure with the true numbers undoubtedly higher, likely in the range of 66-70%. This is so for two reasons. First, those Bolsheviks for whom I was not able to obtain reliable national background, I have 'defaulted' as Russian. Yet in all likelihood many were either Jewish, Belorussian, German, or Ukrainian -- the 'invisible' nationalities, if often even by self-designation. The second source of skepticism derives from the fact that sources often reflect Russified name changes, masking true ethnic or religious origins.

The non-Russian nationalities were slightly overrepresented within the Bolshevik leadership as against their 56% representation in the empire. When each group is taken independently, three nationalities were considerably overrepresented within the Bolshevik elite as against their numbers in the wider population: Latvians, Caucasians, and Jews. Jews were overepresented by a ratio of 4:1, Caucasians (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijani Turks) together by 6:1, with Georgians and Armenians each 4:1, and Latvians overrepresented in the order of 7:1. The Jewish figures are consistent with findings in other studies notwithstanding the different 'data sets': Mosse, for instance, found Jews to

[1] Nationalities figures are drawn from Henning Bauer, Andreas Kappeler, Brigitte Roth, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszahlung von 1897, Vols. I&II, Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1991, Tabelle 004, p.74, which compiles nationalities data from the Tsentralnyi statisticheskii Komitet, Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis naselaiia Rossiiskoi imperii, 1897 g., St. Petersburg, 1899-1905, multivolumes, and from "Rossii", Bol'shaia Entsiklopediia, Vol.16, St. Petersburg, 1904, pp.436-530.

comprise 16.6% of the revolutionaries in entire Granat sample.[2] And though Mawdsely's more recent study on a much smaller group underestimates, I believe, the other national minority contingents, his count of the Jewish cohort is in the same range at 17%.[3] By my count the most striking is Mann's cohort, 20 of his 65 revolutionaries were Jewish, or just under 1/3, although this may be because his list also includes Mensheviks, SRs, and others.[4]

Table 1
National/Ethnic Composition[5]

	Nationality representation in CC Bolshevik elite	Nationality representation in the Tsarist Empire
Russian	38 (40%)	44%
Jewish	16 (17%)	4%
Caucasian		
Georgian	4 (4%)	1%
Armenian	4 (4%)	1%
Azerbaijani	1 ----	—
Ukrainian	8 (9%)	19%
Latvian	6 (7%)	1%
Polish	3 (3%)	6%
Lithuanian	1 (1%)	1%
Belorussian	1 (1%)	1%
German	2 (2%)	1%
'others'	8 ----	—

Underrepresented, by contrast, were Poles, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. And conspicuously absent were Estonians, Poles from Congress Poland, and Polish Jews. As the largest non-Russian minority in the Tsarist empire Ukrainians comprised nearly 19% of the imperial population, yet they were only 9% of the Bolshevik elite.[6] Low proportions held for the Belorussians as well. This is partly because these were essentially peasant populations with small intelligentsias and would not be expected to

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2 W.E. Mosse, "Makers of the Soviet Union", Slavonic and East European Review, Vo.46, 1968, p. 148. But I depart from Mosse's finding regarding a large numbers of Germans: he finds 6% to be of Germanic origin with "clearly Germanic" (and perhaps) Jewish names. But this may be flawed and potentially misleading.

3 Evan Mawdsely, "Makers of the Soviet Union Revisited: the Bolshevik CC Elite in the Revolutionary Period", Revolutionary Russia, Vol.8, No.2, Dec, 1995, p.204.

4 Work in progress.

5 Sources are cited in the Appendix.

6 Bauer et al., (eds) Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, p.74, Tabelle 004. This figure is rounded from 18.81%.

make strong showings in radical movements generally. However, the relatively weak presence of Poles in the Bolshevik elite is somewhat surprising given their comparatively high levels of socio-economic development, the vigorousness of Polish working class radicalism, and the substantial Polish intelligentsia. These underrepresentations are considered in the following chapters.

When each CC and its leadership organs are considered individually several important trends regarding its national composition are suggested. (Tables 2 & 3) Most immediately, non-Russians comprised between 53-74% of each CC in the years 1917-1923, averaging 3/5 non-Russian presence in each constituted CC. Indeed, they formed the majority in all the Congresses except 1921 where Russians comprised just over half or 51% of the CC. Although the proportions decrease (from 74% in 1918 to 53% in 1923) this strong non-Russian presence is maintained despite a steady *increase* in the size of the CC's (from 29 members in 1917 to 57 in 1923) and despite the concomitant entry of more ethnic Russians. As the CC's expanded in the late 1920's and 1930's, more Russians entered positions of leadership, and the 'proletarianization' or 'russianization' of the Soviet leadership would be complete. But in the revolutionary and state-building years, national minority elites predominated in nearly every CC Congress.

Tables 2 & 3
Ethnic composition of CCs and leadership, 1917-1923[7]

	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Russian	11(38%)	6(26%)	11(41%)	13(42%)	18(51%)	19(41%)	27(47%)
Non-Russian	18(62%)	17(74%)	16(59%)	18(58%)	17(49%)	27(59%)	30(53%)

		1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
POLITBIURO	Russian	3	3	4	6	
	Non-Russian	5	5	4	4	5
ORGBIURO	Russian	4	3	11	5	
	Non-Russian	7	2	5	5	6
SECRETARIAT	Russian	1	2	2	1	
	Non-Russian	1	1	1	2	2

Even more significantly, the leading organs of each CC (Politbiuro, Orgbiuro, and

[7] Congresses: July/Aug 1917, March 1918, March 1919, March 1921, March/April 1922, April 1923.

Secretariat established in 1919) reveal a strong and consistent presence of non-Russians in the highest positions.[8] In other words, national minorities (particularly Jews, Caucasians and 'others') continued to occupy the most important leadership and decision-making positions throughout the crucial revolutionary and state-building years -- and this despite the increasing number of Russians entering both the CCs and the Bolshevik rank and file.

II. Geographical origins

The political geography of the Bolsheviks underscores both their ethnic heterogeneity, and the complexity of ethnic/religious, urban-rural, and political-administrative patterns in the late Tsarist empire.[9] The origins or birthplaces of the 93 CC members were primarily in the imperial peripheries. Most of this Bolshevik elite was concentrated in some of the most ethnically mixed areas of the Empire: "New Russia", Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Caucasus and Lower Volga and Central Russia. Only 1 in 4 (or 24) came from Central Russia or the heartland of the empire, while 3/4 (or 69) were from the empire's peripheries, both east and west. Of the latter, 2/3 or 46, (or 1/2 the total) come from the western and southern imperial borderlands, in the most geopolitically sensitive peripheries of the empire.

Six Bolsheviks came from Ekaterinoslav gubernia, Kherson, Lifland, and Saratov each produced 5 Bolsheviks, and Tver, St. Petersburg had 4 each. With the exception of Tiflis, which was formed into an imperial province in 1849, all the others were incorporated into the empire of longstanding dates, between 1783-1803 (St. Petersburg in 1708). So a number of Bolsheviks came from the oldest and more established provinces of the empire and not those newly incorporated. This is true of the Bolshevik elite as a whole -- only 14 of 92 came from newer imperial acquisitions, e.g. 1846-1870, the rest were from the older and more established provinces incorporated between 1793-1803. Most Bolsheviks (including non-Jews) were from European Russia and the Pale.

In considering Jewish geographic distribution within the Pale established under Catherine II, it is noteworthy that they were not politicized in areas of densest and oldest

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[8] The exception is the 1921 CC, consistent with the CC national composition as a whole.

[9] Sources for the map at the beginning of the thesis are in the Appendix.

Jewish settlement (where Jews constituted more than 15% of the population) or in cities with the highest proportion of Jewish settlement (Warsaw, Kaunas, Vilna). These areas had the *lowest* incidence of pogrom and anti-Jewish violence in the most important episodes, 1881-2 and 1905. Instead most Jewish Bolsheviks came from the southern Ukraine and from areas of most recent Jewish migration in the last years of the empire. Here anti-Semitism and nationalism were the most violent, and intertestingly, Jews tended to be the most acculturated.

Their political geography also typified two related social dynamics: the village-to-city migrant (in the case of minorities, its young, educated strata, and in the case of the Russians, workers and peasants), and their movement from ethnically homogeneous countrysides, to ethnically diverse cities, to the empire's capitals. Of the 93 Bolsheviks, 53 (or 57%) were raised and politicized in villages or towns, while 39 (or 43%) came from major cities in the empire. In terms of the nationalities composition, 1/2 (23) of those from towns or villages were Russian, while 36% (14) of those from major cities were Russian and 30% (11) were Jews. A preponderance of Jews (11 of 16) were from cities. This is consistent with their co-nationals in the empire as a whole: Jews were the most urbanized minority in the empire at 49.42%.[10] Also highly urbanized were the Armenians. Most rural or semi-rural were the Latvians, Poles, and Lithuanians, while Russians drew almost equally from both towns and cities. When considered in connection with social origin then, while most were socialized and politicized in the smaller towns and villages of the imperial peripheries, the urbanites inside this elite were essentially middle class, not working class (who were of rural origin). That is, Bolshevism was mostly constituted by an urban middle class (non-Russian), a rural working class element (essentially Russian), and a (often *declasse*) rural nobility/bourgeiosie (mostly non-Russian).

This was an essentially Russified or acculturated elite. Russification was part of their creation of a social identity. In the imperial context, some peripheral non-Russian elites found attraction in the language, culture, and politics of the imperial metropole. Bolshevism was not a Russian project because there were lots of ethnic Russians in its

[10] Bauer, et al, eds. Die Nationalitaten des Russiches Reiches, Tabelle 002, p.3. So 50.58% of Jews were rural.

leadership but becase there were lots of Russified peripheral elites who had a stake in maintaining the empire. It seemed that those that struggled the most with their 'russianness' were those who felt their identity the most threatened. Russification, then, had more to do with provincial ethnic tensions, attraction and access to imperial or European culture and ideas, and the need to build self-esteem into one's social identity.

Some of this may be usefully conceived by comparing minority elites' acculturation and Russification patterns across European Russia and the Transcaucasus -- the imperial peripheries which produced most of the non-Russian Bolsheviks. The Table below is not intended as rigid, but only preliminary. In the category of 'strong Russian social/cultural presence', I refer to those regions in the empire where, in addition to Russian administrators, civil servants, and officials, that is, an 'institutional Russian presence', there was also a considerable ethnic Russian socio-economic presence or a 'Russian civil society' in the persons of working classes, educated and commercial middle classes, industrialists, landowning elites, or cultural elites. This was particularly the case in the Transcaucasus, the Ukraine, and in Latvian cities. In contrast, the (North) Caucasus, the Lithuanian-Belorussian borderlands, Congress Poland, and Estonia, had comparatively weaker 'Russian social/cultural presence', limited essentially to officials, military and civilian, and bureaucrats in state capacity. In fact, in Poland and the western provinces only in Vitebsk did Russians comprise more than 6% of the population, and this was due primarily to inflated figures.

It is one claim of this thesis that national minority elite acculturation was qualitatively different in, for instance, Vilna and Kiev -- Vilna was "une ville polonaise ou l'on voyait beaucoup de Russes", but Kiev was "une ville Russe ou l'on voyait beaucoup de Polonais".[11] The Russification or acculturation of the Bolsheviks shows this in the chapters that follow. The most Russified in this elite were the Jews, Latvians, and

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11 Daniel Beauvois, La Bataille de la Terre en Ukraine 1863-1914: Les Polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques, Presses Universitaries de Lille, 1993, pp.286-287. Compare, for example, the Russian Orthodox population of Vilna and Kiev gubernia: Vilna 26.10% Orthodox, 58.81% Catholic, 12.90% Jewish, while Kiev was 83.96% Orthodox, 3.07% Catholic, 12.03% Jewish. "Rossiia", Bolsh'aia Entsiklopediia, Vol.16, St Petersburg, 1904, pp.456-457. But by 'official' counting, 'Russians' (inlcuding Belorussians and Ukrainians) comprised 61.1% of Vilna guberniia and 85.3% of Kiev guberniia. "Rossiia", Entsiklopedicheskii slovar', II tom., St. Petersburg, 1906, p.13. The general pattern remains however: Russians were 6.72% in Lithuania-Belorussia, 33.96% in Caucasus, 80.91% in Siberia, and 8.91% in Central Asia.

Georgians -- though the forms and quality of Russification differed considerably. This is fairly consistent with levels of Russification among their nationalities generally, as measured by ability to read Russian.[12]

A second important consideration is the socio-ethnic composition of the region. In Latvia, Estonia and Congress Poland a single non-Russian ethnicity had a cultural-social predominance in the region, respectively Baltic Germans and Poles. For non-dominant minorities such as Jews, Ukrainians, Latvians, and Estonians, then, linguistic and cultural choices for middle class educated elites were either German or Polish in these cases, or, alternatively the imperial state-language, Russian. Either because local ethnic tensions excluded them from local, provincial civil society, or because, as Katkov understood, the 'self-esteem' involved in creating a social identity, Russian was the preferred choice. Baku, Tiflis, Odesso, and Kiev had two or more competing 'civil societies' where no single ethnicity fully prevailed. In contrast, in Riga, Warsaw, Lodz, Revel, Congress Poland, and Estonia influential 'civil society' was clearly dominated by Germans or Poles. While they similarly shared German dominance, Russian civil and social presence crucially distinguished Riga from Revel.

Significantly, most of the non-Russian (and a number of the Russian) Bolsheviks were socialized and politicized in A or B, and to the lesser extent C, none came from Box D. In Chapter 8 on the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, illustrative of the dynamics of Boxes A and B, we will see that Russification was quite thoroughgoing in both social and linguistic terms, and that political radicalization reflected this, much more so than in Right-bank Ukraine. Those Ukrainian Bolsheviks with nationalist radicalism struggled later inside Bolshevism because of the virulent anti-Ukrainian position of the Russified Ukrainians. In Chapter 8 I show that part of the reason for this was that Russification and acculturation were a consequence of Tsarist nationality policies which split Ukrainian elites.

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[12] In 1897, between 23.68-29.30% of Jews, Latvians, and Estonians could read Russian, between 13.21-13.51% of Poles, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, between 4.28-6.36% of Lithuanians, Armenians, and Georgians, and 2.16% of Tatars could read Russian. Bauer, et al, Die Nationalitaten des Russichen Reiches, Tabelle 012, pp.93-95. The significant exceptions were Georgians and Armenians, something I discuss in Chapter 10.

Table 10

	comparatively strong social/cultural Russian 'civil society'	comparatively weak social/cultural Russian 'civil society'
no single ethnicity socially/culturally dominant	**A** Transcaucasus Ukraine (Kiev, Kharkov) Southern Ukraine (Odessa, Ekaterinoslav)	**B** North Cuacasus Poland-Lithuania-Belorussia
a non-Russian ethnicity socially/culturally dominant	**C** Latvia	**D** Congress Poland Estonia
Russian social/cultural dominance	**E** Central Russia (including Black Earth) Northern Russia Volga and Urals Steppe Central Asia	**X**

The 9 Transcaucasian Bolsheviks (Box A) were radicalized in multi-ethnic contexts where wide cultural spaces and 'cultural balkanization' were typical. So with very few exceptions, most were involved in national-cultural political groupings (Shaumian, Narimanov). Pan-ethnic organizations were essentially Russian-language based, and the underlying national-cultural groupings not really anti-Russian because of the local ethno-politics, e.g. Christian Armenians under Turkish rule, and Azerbaijani-Armenian class tensions.

Chapter 7 on the Poles and Lithuanians similarly (Boxes C and D) reflected the pan-Russian socialist organizations in the borderlands. As in Transcaucasia, and as Dzierzynski's and Kapsukas' radicalism show, because of a weak Russian presence Russification tended to be more linguistic than social or cultural. But in Congress Poland, the absence of Russians and the overwhelming predominance of Polish language and culture amost insured that radicalism (socialist and nationalist) would be essentially Polish

in content. All Polish and Lithuanian Bolsheviks came from the borderlands, and none from Congress Poland.

The Baltics should be likewise divided, Boxes C and D. Latvia had a sizable ethnic Russian presence in industrial and working classes, and together with its increasing institutional (largely educational) presence in the late imperial years, Russian-tied socialist groupings served as battering rams against German socio- economic and cultural domiance, as the radicalism of the Latvians Berzins and Stuchka show. Estonia, in contrast, was far more homogenous in ethnic composition, and had a weaker ethnic Russian presence (most Russians were there in a military capacity in the Baltic Fleets), with comparatively fewer radical group links to Russian radical groupings. As we will see in Chapter 10, Estonian acculturation as reflected in nationalist and radicalist groupings shared more with Finland than with Latvia. Like Ukrainian socialists, Latvian socialists eventually faced strong anti-Russian nationalist movements, and they became some of the most virulent Bolshevik Russifiers.

And finally, most complex because of geographical dispersion, Boxes A and B, were the Jewish Bolsheviks. Jews, and Jewish Bolsheviks, were in the Ukraine, southern Russia, Lithuania-Belorussia, and in Russia proper (Petersburg and Moscow). Though none were from Congress Poland despite its considerable Jewish population -- one was Austrian Galician. Jews of Odessa and Vilna had far greater cultural autonomous space than Jews of Kiev or Warsaw, and their movements (e.g. the Bund, Zionism) reflected this, though these movements were also linguistically Russified. Rarely did they acculturate to 'peasant' cultures (Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian), but usually to imperial state culture, Russian, and in some cases to Polish (e.g. Uritskii). The important pattern of Ukrainian Jewish acculturation, including in Odessa, was affected by Russian, Polish, and especially Ukrainan anti-Semitism.

In sum, the non-Russian Bolshevik elites came primarily from multi-ethnic regions in which no single ethnicity pre-dominated. Those Bolsheviks from the Transcausasus, Lithuania-Belorussia-Polish borderlands, and parts of Ukraine tended to be rather more linguistically than culturally Russified/acculturated, and their early radicalism involving national-cultural groupings; while those Bolsheviks from Transaucasia, Right-bank

Ukraine, and parts of southern Ukraine (Poltava or Ekaterinoslav), where Russian's 'assimilatory power' was greatest, tended to be both linguistically and culturally Russified. Socialism, in its Bolshevik formation, was a basis for ethnic cooperation in multi-ethnic areas and in areas where middle class elites and the aspiring petty bourgoisie were somehow excluded from provincial civil society, especially the native middle classes or when they had weak native middle classes (Ukraine and Lithuania-Belorussia), Russian-based Bolshevism had appeal of access to imperial society and the protection of the imperial state.

III. Social Origins

Data on social background (based on father's occupation) are notoriously complicated and even contradictory. Table's 4 and 5 present my findings on both 'class' and 'status' stratification. At the most general level, 43% of the elite were of peasant or worker origin, 44% were middle class broadly conceived, and 13% were of noble or military origin. This is generally consistent with Mosse's findings on the entire Granat sample, though substantially departs from Mawdsely's 60% workers figure.[13] As Haupt concluded of the Granat sample, intelligentsia and liberal professions were well-represented, yet there were more workers (by social origin and occupation) than other socialist parties in Europe.[14] There was also a proportionally larger noble or gentry element, as Lane noted.

Putative 'estate' membership or 'status stratification' confirms the class/social classification: 25 Bolsheviks had their social origins in the most privileged and exclusive estates -- the noble, distinguished citizens', clergy, and merchants estates -- placing 1/3 of this elite in the most privileged 2.43% of imperial society. If those in the *meshchane* estate are also considered, 2/3 of the Bolshevik elite derived from the top 13% of the

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[13] Mosse's Granat sample of 178 revolutionaries found 58% of "middle class", 32% of "petty bourgeois extraction". "Makers of the Soviet Union", ibid, p.150. Mawdsely's findings: 60% workers and 33% "white collar workers and others" in the Bolshevik leadership in 1917. "Makers of the Soviet Union Revisited", ibid, p.205. However Mawdsely's figure is based on *occupation* in 1917, not social origin. Mann's elite contain 22 of 61 as "petty bourgeois, officials, professional, small farmer", and 7 each from "impoverished middle class" and "substantial farmer, merchant", or at least 36 of 61 comparable to Mosse's broad "middle class". Mann, work in progress.

[14] Georges Haupt & Jean-Jacques Marie, Les Bolcheviks par eux memes, Paris, 1969, p.19.

imperial population.[15]

In comparing social/class origin with occupation, at least two important differences distinguish the Bolsheviks from their father's generation. Those whose father's were occupationally within the middle classes were nearly evenly divided between the commercial classes (*Besitzburgurtum*)and the educated, or professional classes (*Bildungsburgertum*). By contrast, of the roughly equal number of middle class Bolsheviks (again, broadly conceived), *none* were occupationally in commercial or capitalist pursuits. This was an important occupational shift between the two generations. In fact, the urban liberal professions were, in contrast to the general imperial population, substanially overrepresented within this elite. And as we will see below, this held true across nationalities. Also overrepresented within this elite were a number of sons of impoverished or *declasse* rural nobles and landed elites. Therefore, consistent with the discussion in the previous chapter on the sociology of nationalities policies, of the minority nationality Bolsheviks, the two most significant social groups were the non-corporative, urban liberal professions and sons of rural *declasse* noble-gentry. Moreover, for what is traditionally considered a 'militarized elite', not a single Bolshevik was occupationally in military service establishment, though several were army doctors during the war.

A second important generational difference when (putative) estate membership is considered is that while approximately 1/3 of the Bolsheviks' fathers would have been in the higher or more privileged estates, the same proportion of Bolsheviks would not have found any of the estate categories as reflective of their social identities. As the discussion in Chapter 4 noted, they constituted a new, educated, professional and semi-professional group, intelligentsia or *raznochintsy* outside the estate system. And with the exception of lawyers, they were excluded from any recognized professional associations or guilds. This too constituted a decisive break in terms of social identity from their fathers whose social identities tended to have a better 'fit' in traditional categories and social hierarchies. So they were the first generation to slip out of traditional estate and occupational categories, despite the fact that the latter continued to be more significant social categories

[15] Bauer, et al., Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 033, p.202.

Table 4
Social class & estate (*sosloviie*) membership

	Russian	Jews	Ukrain.	Pol/Lith.	Lat.	Cauc.	Other*	TOTAL
peasant	14	2	1	-	2	-	-	19
worker: skilled(a)	4	-	-	-	-	1(h)	1	6
unskilled	4	-	1	2	2	-	1	10
artisan/ small manu.	1	3	1	-	-	-	-	5
prof/educ. bourg:(b)								
low level	4	1(f)	2	-	-	-	1	8
professions	2	2	1	-	-	-	-	5
commercial bourg:(c)								
petty merch.	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	4
middling merch	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	4
haute bourg.(d)	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	3
military	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	4
clergy	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	3
noble/gentry:(e)								
landed noble	-	-	-	1	1	3(g)	-	5
service/personal	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	5
"no recognized"	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	3
hereditary noble	3	-	-	1	-	3	-	7
personal noble	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	3
clergy	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	3
disting. citizen	1	2	2(j)	-	-	-	2	7
merchant	-	3	1	-	-	2	-	6
'meshchane'	13	5	0	2	2	2	1	24
peasant	14	2	1	1(i)	4(k)	2(l)	2	26
Cossack	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
'inorodtsy'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(a) workers in middling to large manufacture or factories

(b) *Bildungsburgertum*: lower level--petty bureaucrats/civil servants, elementary teachers, clerks, etc; professionals--doctors, barristers, engineers, agronomists, university/*gimnaziia* professors. A number of these positions were in the employ of local or imperial government.

(c) Includes middling commerciants/merchants and capitalists, as well as landowners and commercial property elites, and small property owners of non-noble status.

(d) Includes wealthy merchants and capitalists, well-off landowners of non-noble status only.

(e) These may overlap. Each can include hereditary nobles.

(f) Iaroslavskii's father was a furrier, but his mother, a schoolteacher, is not counted here; Kuibyshev's (Russian) schoolteacher mother is also not counted. Radek is included here.

(g) Dzhaparidzhe's family were landowners, but their noble status is unclear; Ordzhonikidze's family were nobles, but their landowning status is uncertain.

(h) Unclear as to Mikoyan's father's 'skill level'

(i) Kapsukas' family were prosperous landowners, but still considered in the small Lithuanian 'rural bourgeoisie' in the peasant estate because they held no noble titles.

(j) Skrypnik's and Tsiurupa's fathers, a petty railroad official and a municipal civil servant, both at the lower end of the 'distinguished citizens' estate.

(k) Smilga and Stuchka's families were prosperous non-noble landowners, and like Kapsukas', at the higher end of the 'peasant estate'.

(l) Dhzaparidze's family were wealthy landowners at the higher end; Ryskulov's father was a nomadic stock raiser whose wealth is unclear.

than 'class' at least until 1917. This slippage in social identity was particularly acute for the national minority elites because of their high numbers in the liberal professions *and* because of their non-Russian status.

Of the Bolsheviks in the liberal professions, there was a considerable occupational diversity: doctors, teachers, agronomists, chemists, pharmacists, technical draftsmen, economists, etc. Specifically, 6 Bolsheviks were lawyers, 5 doctors, 5 teachers, 5 economists, and 4 (non-radical) journalists. Somewhat surprisingly, then, there were more doctors, teachers, and economists than lawyers, distinguishing this elite from other political (revolutionary) elites which have tended to have an overrepresentation of the legal profession. And when occupation is considered in connection with nationality, economists and lawyers tended to be Russian and Ukrainian, while most of the doctors and teachers were from Transcaucasia. Subsequent chapters show how these differences affected their political radicalization.

The most interesting findings concern class, occupation, and estate as a function of nationality or ethnicity. Of the 35 Bolsheviks whose fathers were peasants and/or workers, 20 were Russian, followed by 4 Latvians. And of the 39 of the middle classes (lower, middle, and upper) only 11 were Russian, most were Jewish, Transcaucasian, and Ukrainian. Very similar figures hold for Bolshevik occupation (Table 5). Of the 9 Bolshevik noble-gentry families, 4 were Russian, 4 were Georgian, and 1 was Polish.

Therefore both class and occupational distributions reflect national composition. The variations in social origin and occupation were more the product of national composition than previous studies, which focused almost exclusively on class analysis, have fully appreciated. Had the Bolshevik leadership of the revolutionary years been almost exclusively Russian, it is most likely that it would have had quite a different class basis, mostly working class or 'proletarian' (e.g. with elementary education only). Certainly the substantial petty bourgeois, middle class, or noble/gentry components, due essentially to Jewish and Transcaucasian presences (and to a lesser extent Ukrainian and "others"), would have been much diminished. No single class *across* the empire's numerous nationalities was predominant inside this political elite.

In short, class or social representation within the Bolshevik elite was

homogeneous within nationalities, but heterogeneous across nationality. This suggests that the 'elective affinity' between social class and/or status group and the attraction to Russian Social Democracy varied across nationalities, and turns attention to socio-economic niche ranking and state nationality policies. How and why this should be so will be developed in subsequent chapters.

Yet even within occupation or class/estate, national differences mattered. For example, of the 11 noble/gentry families, Georgians were highly overrepresented. The comparatively high number of gentry/nobility among the Transcaucasians -- essentially a *declasse* group in Transcaucasian society -- is a subject for Chapter10. The *declasse* Georgian nobility, however, should be properly distinguished from the noble estate rank of the Latvian Smilga's father, the Russian Osinskii's (Obolenskii), and to a lesser extent Lenin's and Bukharin's fathers -- all of whom had comparatively secure noble status as compared to that of the Georgians' families of Dzhaparidze, Orakhelashvili, and Ordzhonikidze, or the Pole Dzierzynski's impoverished gentry. Therefore the personal, service or landed gentry families of the Russian Bolsheviks had very different social and political experiences than the Georgian or Polish landed gentry, and this was reflected in the different attractions of the sons to Russian Social Democracy.

The new and ascendant service gentry-nobility of Lenin and Bukharin's fathers represented a challenge to the old hereditary landed nobility of the Georgian and Polish gentry (and even Osinskii's father who, despite his hereditary aristocratic position, sought a career as a veterinarian). And secondly, the impoverishment of the Polish and Georgian landed gentries were the product of specific nationality policies which targeted non-Russian, rural elites.

With the exception of the Russian Bolsheviks, the social and occupational composition of this elite suggests that they were drawn from the most privileged social strata of the empire's national minorities. For instance, in 1897 64.91% of the empire's Jews were engaged in manufacturing, trade, industry, and commerce, in contrast to the only 3.21% in the 'free professions'.[16] Yet occupationally fully one half of the Jewish Bolsheviks would have fallen within the top 3% of Jewish society. Stated in terms of

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16 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 023, pp.156-157.

estate membership, 7 of the 12 Jewish Bolsheviks (for which I have reliable data) came from 'merchant' and 'distinguished citizen' estates, which together constituted only 1.54% of Jewish society.[17]

Table 5
Bolshevik occupation & estate (*sosloviie*) membership

	Russian	Jew	Ukrain.	Pol/Lith.	Lat.	Cauc.	Other*	TOTAL
peasant	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
worker: skilled	5	1	-	3	1	-	2	11
unskilled	16	1	3	-	1	-	-	21
artisan/ small manu.	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	3
prof/educ. bourg:								
low level	3	2	2	-	1	3	1	12
professional	6	5	3	0	1	4	1	20
commercial bourg:								
petty merch.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
middling merch	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
haute bourg.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
military	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
clergy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
noble/gentry:								
landed noble	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
service/personal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
"prof. revolutionary"(a)	6	4	-	1	2	1	2	16
"no recognized"(b)	7	7(c)	4	-	1	7	-	26
hereditary noble	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
personal noble	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
clergy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
disting. citizen	2	-	1	-	1	-	1	5
merchant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
'meshchane'	7(d)	4	3	3	-	-	3	20
peasant	15(d)	-	-	-	2	-	-	17
Cossack	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
'inorodtsy'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(a) "Professional revolutionary"as only 'occupation', no other practicing occupation or occupational qualification.

(b) This included humanist/writers, lawyers, economists, teachers, draftsmen, doctors, pharmacists, (non-radical) journalists, agronomists, statisticians and chemists.

(c) Sokolnikov was both a trained economist and a lawyer.

(d) These categories blend into one another.

Even more stark in terms of their elitist social status were the Georgian Bolsheviks. Of the four Georgians in this elite, 3 were of noble/gentry families, placing them within the 6.34% of Georgians in the noble estates. Occupationally they were within

[17] Ibid, Tabelle 033, p.203. In fact, 94.16% were in the 'meshchane' estate.

the 0.58% of Georgians in the 'free professions'.[18] The Ukrainian Bolsheviks reveal similar social status. In 1897 90.94% of the Ukrainian population was in the 'peasant' estate, occupationally 73.07% categorized as agricultural workers, 9% domestic servants, and 7.31% in manufacturing/industry, with only 0.46% in the 'free professions' and 0.45% in the 'clerical', 'distinguished citizens', and 'merchant' estates combined. Yet 5 of the 8 Bolsheviks fell within the 0.46% of Ukrainians in the 'free professions', and one-half came from families in the three elite estates.

In contrast, the social composition of the Russian Bolsheviks more closely matched the social structure of Russians in the empire generally. That is, 2/3 of the Russian Bolsheviks came from fathers of peasant or worker background, consistent with the 65.57% of the empire's Russians who were so employed. While there were comparatively few 'middle class' Russian Bolsheviks, there were disproportionately more of the noble estates (7%) compared to the Russian noble population (1.71%).

In comparing Bolshevik occupations with those of their fathers (social background with occupation), several observations are worth making (Table 6). Each Bolshevik's station in life seemed to improve as compared to that of their fathers'. Two specific trends are worth identifying. There were no peasants *by occupation* within this political elite -- most who came from the land eventually became manual laborers (skilled or not). Most notably among them, the Latvian Rudzutak and the Russian Sapronov began as farm workers and sheepherders but eventually obtained employment as manual laborers in small and large industries, thereby effectively joining the working class. So the increase in the number of workers represents those Bolsheviks whose fathers were peasants, a total of 16.[19]

Secondly, 9 of the 11 sons of noble-gentry and clergy families found liberal, middle class professions (Dzierzynski and Preobrazhenskii were the exceptions), 3 of the 4 sons or daughters of military fathers did as well. Most of the 'professional revolutionaries' were of petty bourgeois origin, and none whose 'occupation' was

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[18] Ibid, Tabelle 023, pp.156-157; Tabelle 033, p.203.

[19] This included Chubar', Muranov, Badaev, Chudov, Kalinin, Kolotilov, Komarov, Kutuzov, Lobov, Sapronov, Sergeev, I Smirnov, A Smirnov, Uglanov, Krivov -- all Russian except the Ukrainian Jew Chubar', the Chuvash Krivov, and the Ukrainian Muranov.

'professional revolutionary' *only* were of working class origin.

Table 6
Bolshevik & Father Occupation compared

	Father Occupation	Bolshevik Occupation
peasant	19	0
worker	16	32
petty bourgeois(a)	19	15
bourg-- m/c(b)	14	20
military	3	0
clergy	3	0
noble/gentry	8	0
prof. revolutionary	0	18

(a) Includes artisans, lower level educated bourgeoisie, and petty merchants.
(b) Includes educated professionals, middling merchants, and haute bourgeosie.

Thirdly and more generally, this was a generation of young men, many of whose parents had been the first post-serfdom generation of free peasants and manual laborers. Their life chances were characterized by an opening of possibilities and opportunities. Blocked social mobility in a strict sense was not operating -- even for the Jewish Bolsheviks.

IV. Education, early radicalism, and exile

The table below suggests findings consistent with those of occupation and class background: they reflect a fairly broad opportunity for social advancement via education. This was true even for the Jewish Bolsheviks despite entrance quotas and other restrictions. While 23 (34%) Bolsheviks received only a primary or elementary level education, 32 (48%) attended universities, either inside the empire or in Europe, and another 13 (18%) attended post-secondary vocational schools, technical or teacher's institutes.[20] This revolutionary and state-building cohort was highly educated, especially as compared to the levels of education extant in the empire: 2/3 of Bolsheviks had greater than elementary school education while only 1.52% of the empire's population was similarly educated.[21]

[20] Of course in many cases education was not completed because of radical activity of because of financial difficulties.

[21] Bauer et al., Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 041, pp.231.

Considered against national composition, patterns emerge consistent with other indicators of social profile. The overwhelming majority of those Bolsheviks who received only elementary education were Russian (15 of 23). Of the 32 with university/institutes level education (within the empire or abroad), only 1/3 were Russian, the remaining 2/3 were Jewish (6), Ukrainian (5) and Transcaucasian (5), Latvian (3), and Polish or Lithuanian (2). In descending order Transcaucasians, Ukrainians, and Jews generally had the highest levels of education.

The overwhelming majority of Bolsheviks attended the Tsarist empire's elite *ginnaziia*,whose Russian language curricula and classical content also successfully 'Russianized' many of its pupils. This is also where most began their earliest radical activity. This is significant because it holds *across* nationalities, although there was some diversity within groups. Of those Bolsheviks who attended secondary schools, no less than 25 went to *gimnazia*, 9 each to parish schools and *realschule*, 2 to zemstvo, and 1 to a Protestant school. Jews had a majority in *gimnazia* with 8 of 10. A slightly more differentiated analysis shows, *gimnazia* and parish schools most common among the Caucasians, and *gimnazia* and *realschule* among the Ukrainians. Interestingly, those Bolsheviks that had stronger national identities--Shaumian (Armenian), Skrypnyk (Ukrainian), and Narimanov (Azerbaijani Turkish) did not attend *gimnazia* but *realschulen* or parish school, where Russian language instruction was not mandated.

Related to the Bolsheviks' secondary school or *gimnazia* experiences, was their initiation into radical political activity and the character of the first groups which they frequented. Table 7 shows the age of the Bolsheviks first political activity and membership in radical groups prior to Russian Bolshevism. Many Bolsheviks began political activity in their adolescent years, usually while in *gimnazia*, or for the Russians, while working in factories and ateliers in their teen years, further underscoring the need to focus attention on the classical *gimnazia* and away from the traditional view which has seen Tsarist universities as a source of youth and student radicalism. In fact, of the 26 Bolsheviks within this elite who attended universities or advanced institutes, 21 or 80% had already been politically active before age 17, or prior to attending university.

Many Bolsheviks had actively participated in one or more radical movements prior

to joining Russian Social Democracy, and 1 in 9 became Bolsheviks only with the Revolution, further problematizing the designation "Old Guard".[22] On the whole the most active of the national minorities were the Jews and Transcaucasians.

While subsequent chapters will devote more sustained discussions to this important, if neglected dimension of revolutionary Bolshevism, a few reasons for this can be suggested. In part this may be a function of age or generation: Russians tended to be the youngest (though not by much) and often politicized after 1898, while Jews, Ukrainians, and Transcaucasians (Georgian, Armenian and Azeri-Turks) were sufficiently older that there was more opportunity for political activism before Russian Social Democracy crystallized as a coherent organization. The practical availability of radical groupings from which to choose may also have been of importance in their level of activism -- far greater variety or

Table 8
Politics before Bolshevism

entry into radical politics		active involvement in groups before Bolshevism	
less than 13	13	nationalist	12
14-17 years	39	national SD	16
18-23 years	12	Bund/Jewish	3
24+ years	2	cultural/religious	4
		SR	5
		other groups**	15

*These figures are not 1:1 as there is some double counting, i.e.Narimanov
**Includes feminist organizations, Kadets, Truds, Narodaia Volia, Menshevism, Anarchism

choice for a Jew in the Pale than a Russian in Central Russia. It is worth noting, too, that the two most active groups -- Jews and Transcaucasians -- were also the most petty bourgeois or bourgeois in origin. There seemed, then, to be an important affinity between class and involvement in more than one radical group, an idea further explored in connection with nationality policies in subsequent chapters.

In fact, political activism in groups other than Russian Social Democracy was particularly common among the non-Russians. Only 7 of 38 Russians had been active in other radical groupings, *Narodnaia Volia* or Socialist Revolutionary groups. In contrast,

[22] Haupt also found this in the Granat sample, Les Bolcheviks par Eux-memes, p.16.

31 of the non-Russians were similarly active, and among the most active in European movements were the 'others' and the Jews. All three women had been involved, to varying degrees of commitment, in feminist or socialist femininst and humanitarian causes and organizations, Kollontai having established her writing career almost exclusively on these issues.[23] This was classic feminist humanist activism of educated, well-off middle class women.[24]

Most involved in nationalist groups were the Transcaucasians and the Poles. The Transcaucasians were also very active in cultural and religious groupings. Those most involved in national social democratic groupings were Jews, Transcaucasians once again, and Latvians (4 each). Three Jews were involved in the Socialist Revolutionaries, 4 in Narodnaia Volia and only 2 in the Bund or other Jewish organizations; Jews were least likely to be involved in specifically 'Jewish' national or socialist organizations, something I explore in Chapter 6. Only Ukrainians were involved in anarchist groups. In sum, Haupt's observation that of the 246 revolutionaries in Granat fully 1/2 were not Bolsheviks before 1917 has merit:[25] there was a marked ideological and political heterogeneity in the radical politics of the Bolsheviks.

As noted in Chapter 4, the 'fourth time zone' witnessed competing socialist and nationalist political projects. One way to understand the Bolsheviks' early radicalism is to note that they were elites of a couple of generations (1870's-1880's, 1880's-1890's). The timing of their radicalizations coincided (a) with the cultural-political phases of nationalist movements, particularly in the later years, and (b) with the arrival (borrowing) of Marxist socialism in the late 1880's and early 1890's. This will be elaborated in detail in the area chapters, but a few general patterns can be presented.

In the 'fourth time zone', Russification (1880's) pre-dated the arrival of European socialism (late 1890's) in any diffuse form. Political radicalization in the fourth time zone typically occurred during a period of cultural-autonomist nationalism from mid-1880's (and later political nationalism), and from the mid-1890's with European socialism.

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23 Isabel de Palencia, Alexandra Kollontay: Ambassadress from Russia, Longmans, London, 1947.

24 Barbara Alpern Engel, Mothers and Daughters of the Intelligentsia in 19th Century Russia, Cambridge, 1983; Barbara Evans Clements, Bolshevik Women, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

25 Haupt, Les Bolcheviks par Eux-memes, p.16.

Therefore most young radicals went from cultural nationalist groupings with vague socialist orientation, to predominantly socialist groupings with cultural-national dimensions, and to Bolshevism. Those fully radicalized in the 1880's (the Pole Dzierzynski), took nationalism with the latter addition of socialism; for those politicized in late 1880's and early 1890's, found a nationalist-socialist mix (the Lithuanian Kapsukas); and for those politicized in the 1890's socialism was predominant and cultural-national activity had a mixed form (the Lithuanian Jew Piatnitskii). Those *intelligent* middle class elites who were products of the Russified *ginmaziia* after the mid-1880's (the Latvian Berzins), had greater access to Russian language socialist groupings and literatures than to native language nationalist groupings and literatures (as had the earlier generational cohort of the Latvian Stuchka). This too is explored in subsequent chapters.

Most of the Bolsheviks' first encounters with Tsarist authorities occurred very shortly after their first political activities. Before age 19, these revolutionaries were already objects of state persecution. Yet as we will see in subsequent chapters, their political radicalization almost always occurred*before* their encounters with the Tsarist state. Radicalization seemed to be less the result of specific repressions or exclusion than of educational and social influences, or inter-ethnic relations.

It is difficult to estimate how much time each Bolshevik spent in exile or prison. However at a minimum most Bolsheviks spent between 4-8 years under some form of state supervision or custody before 1917 (prison, exile, administrative exile, or labor camp). This generally holds across nationalities but, unsurprisingly, Jews tended to have slightly lengthier terms of prison or exile (and noticably more meticulous Okhrana records) followed, again unsurprisingly, by Poles, the two most 'threatening' nationalities by Tsarist calculations. In rough proportions, Ukrainians, Latvians, and Transcaucasians were similarly arrested and exiled, though with a lesser intensity and frequency than Jews and Poles.

These figures can be compared with those of time spent in political emigration and exile. The overwhelming majority of Bolsheviks did spend time in Europe and the United States and many spent more than several years. Although one half of those who never left imperial borders were Russian, 15 of 39 Russians did spend time abroad --usually to

attend conferences in Stockholm, London, Zurich, etc. Most striking however, was that 11 of the 12 Jews for whom there is reliable information spent time in emigration outside Tsarist Russia, and 8 of those spent more than six years -- a figure which far surpassed that of any other nationality. Combined with the figures on prison and exile terms noted above, it becomes quickly apparent that the Jewish Bolsheviks spent more time than any other national contingent either in prison, exile, or emigration. This is a fact of considerable importance, and contributes to an understanding of both their attraction-repulsion to the state and to their internationalism, which after 1917/18 would decline in intensity. The Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians, too, did party work outside Tsarist borders, while generally the Latvians and Transcaucasians, as with most of the Russians, did not.

The fact that many Bolsheviks, particularly Russians, Poles, and Jews, spent so much time in exile or emigration will be considered in detail in the relevant chapters. But here, following Kolakowski's essay "In Praise of Exile", we may distinguish between the 'intellectual in exile' (those who escape political persecution, prison, censorship, pogroms and anti-Semitism, etc) and those who suffered the "Russian specialty" of 'internal exile'. The former produced Trotsky and Lenin, while the latter produced Stalin and Dzierzynski. These experiences of exile affected views of their 'Russian home', and ultimately their views of the desired new social order.

For Kolakowski, 'intellectuals in exile' lived in constant "discomfort": they "warmed their souls with the memory of their -- spiritual, ethnic, divine, or geographical, real or imaginary -- homes". Creativity "arose from insecurity, from an exile of a sort, from the experience of homelessness" in which "it was probably their uncertain status, the lack of well-defined identity, which enabled them to see more. In short, exile offered the "cognitive privilege" of an outsider.[26] And exile could produce nearly any system of ideas: Popper's liberal 'cosmopolitanism' (as Hacohen showed), Marx's socialist internationalism as Kolakowski noted, and as Reshetar found, Ukrainian nationalism --

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26 Leszek Kolakowski, Modernity of Endless Trial, Chicago, 1990, pp.56-59. A recent article takes up several of Kolakowski's ideas and applies them to Popper, see Malachi Hacohen, "Popper in Exile: the Viennese Progressive Imagination and the Making of *The Open Society*, Philosophy of Social Sciences, Vol.26, No.4, December 1996, pp.452-492.

Reshetar cites Lord Acton's 1862 obervation that "exile is a nursery of nationality", since "severance of ties with the homeland not only caused nostalgia but also stimulated an awareness of group particularities", e.g. Ukrainians in Western Europe and those who studied in Russian universities.[27]

Yet for those Bolsheviks who experienced the Russian 'internal exile' (Siberia, prison, labor camps, censorship etc) engagement with 'home' remained firmly implicated in daily reminders of persecution and social marginality. While the 'cultural products' (usually systems of ideas, cosmopolitan and internationalist) of the 'intellectuals in exile' served to justify their self-imposed exile or 'homelessness', for those who experienced 'internal exile', it was only by 'aestheticizing' the suffering of prison and labor camp that they found meaning. In letters to his family, for instance, Dzierzynski wrote that while 'life in freedom had no meaning, life in prison gave his existence meaning and purpose'.[28]

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27 Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920, p.11.

28 Feliks Dzerzhinskii, Dnevnik zakliuchennogo pis'ma, "Pis'ma k rodnym, ianvar', 1898 - mai 1902", Moskva, "Molodaia gvardiia", 1984, pp.7-8. Similar sentiments are also found in the Bolshevik Adolf Ioffe's letters from an Odessa prison, contained in Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 186, Series 119, Folder 9, and Box 41 Accession No.63013 8.41/44, Series 16, Folder 30.

Chapter 6
The Jewish Bolsheviks

This chapter situates the Jewish Bolsheviks within their social and national contexts in the Tsarist empire. The first half of the chapter discusses the relationship between Jews and the state through the 19th century, their social origins, and their early radicalization. I then turn to their radicalization within specific 'national' contexts: the Lithuanian Jew Piatnitskii, the Russian-Polish Jew Uritskii, the Ukrainian Jews Chubar', Zinoviev, Kaganovich, and Trotsky, and the Russian Jews.

I. Jews and the Tsarist Empire

Russian Jewry dates quite late in the history of the empire as nearly all of her Jews were incorporated only with the Polish Partitions. Of the new 5.5 million new subjects under Russian rule 10% were Jews from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[1] As in other European feudal states, Polish-Lithuanian Jewry had been welcomed by Polish nobles and ruling elites as traders and merchants, managers and bailiffs in the employ of Polish noblemen and magnates. Most engaged in moneylending, small-scale trade, land tenure, and small manufacture; others became financial agents of kings, leased crown estates, engaged in liquor traffic, salt mines, and export. In their desire to benefit from Jews' commercial activities, Polish rulers protected them with certain charters and privileges. Ecclesiastical authorities, however, sought to exclude Jews from civic life, and Polish merchants, burghers, artisans and tradesmen viewed Jews as unwanted competition to their Christian guilds and trade.

In southeastern Poland (provinces of Ukraine, Kiev, Chernigov, Podolia and Volhynia) the ethnic composition was more complicated and so too the relationships. The largely Ukrainian peasant population was dominated by Polish landed nobles who, residing far from their possessions, left the stewardship of their lands to the Jews. In administering the Polish estates Jews sought to extract as much profit as possible from the Ukrainian peasantry. This explosive ethnic ranking often resulted in anti-Jewish pogroms, led by

[1] John Klier, Russia Gathers her Jews: the Origins of the 'Jewish Question' in Russia, 1772-1825, Dekalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, p.56.

Cossack and Ukrainian peasants. Ukrainian Cossacks repeatedly rose in revolt of the Jewish role in Polish feudalism, establishing the historiography of the 'Cossack tradition' of Ukrainian pogromism, in contrast to relatively peaceful Jewish-Gentile coexistence in the Polish-Lithuanian borderlands.[2] This pattern would persist through the turn of the century. Typically order was restored by the Polish state, the ultimate guarantor of Jewish rights. However, despite progressive tendencies among Polish elites, Poland was in economic decline and political disintegration, and measures designed to reform and rationalize Jewish life had been weak and consistently opposed both by the Church and by the Polish middle class. In effect, Jewish rights were historically dependent on whether political power resided with nobles, burghers, the Church, or the state, in periods of liberalism and reaction.

When Polish Jewry came under Tsarist rule, Jews' main pursuits remained artisanry, the liquor trade, moneylending, and inn and tavern keeping in rural villages and towns. As members of a 'mercantile estate' they continued to fit uneasily between the nobility, usually Polish or Russian, and the peasantry (Ukrainian, Polish, Lithuanian, Belorussian). Crucially, Jews also continued to be opposed by Polish commercial classes and tradesmen. As Jewish artisans and tradesmen migrated from the provinces to Warsaw and other cities, their pursuits challenged the native Polish middle class. These privileged Polish burghers, whose rights vis-a-vis the *szlachta* were on the ascendancy, regarded Jews as a source of intolerable competition requiring state intervention.

However anti-Jewish sentiment among the Polish bourgeoisie in Congress Kingdom under Russian rule differed from that of feudal Poland in at least two significant respects. First, while the Jewish bourgeoisie was generally acculturationist, socially mobile, and had a comparatively weak national identity, the Polish bourgeoisie under Tsarist rule felt 'blocked', hit hard by the Russian state and increasingly developed a strong anti-Russian national identity. This gave Polish middle class anti-Semitism an ethnic-nationalist component absent in feudal Poland. Secondly, Tsarist rule suffered locally from the absence of a sizable Russian presence, particularly a weakly present Russian nobility.

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[2] John Klier, "The Pogrom paradigm in Russian history", in John Klier and Shlomo Lambroza (eds.), Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.13-14.

This would have important consequences as 'Russificatory' policies were adopted in the last decades of the 19th century, but its most immediate effect was that Polish Jewry was now acculturating into a non-state, non-ruling language and culture, e.g. Polish. Both of these factors had important implications for Jewish politicization in late imperial Russia.

Official Russia's attitude toward her Jews was in the first instance largely borrowed from Polish rule: Muscovite, Tataric, and Byzantine cultures had been superstitious and fearful of Jewish presence, but it was the tone and policy of Polish rule which guided Tsarist thinking both at the time of the Partitions and in the decades immediately following.[3] Distrust of Jews had permeated the local peasantries, both Polish and Ukrainian; the nationalist reaction of the Polish commercial middle class towards the Jews was soon replicated by the native Russian merchant estate and eventually suspicion of Jewish presence developed on the part of Tsarist administrators.[4]

Consequently, the establishment of the Jewish Pale under Catherine II was designed very specifically (a) to allow the Russian state to benefit from Jewish commerce and industriousness, while (b) keeping Jews out of the interior of Holy Russia and thereby protecting Russian merchant and commercial interests. As with earlier Polish rule, the impetus for the state's "policy of exceptional laws and restrictions" did not originate inside the state itself, but from pressure from 'civil society': fearing Jewish economic competition, the Orthodox Christian (Russian) middle class, merchants and merchant guilds demanded state protection from Jewish merchants of Vitebsk and Mogiliev who had begun to carry their business and trade to Moscow and Smolensk, challenging commerce in the Russian interior.[5] The complaints were familiar: Jewish merchants harmed both native Russian merchants and exploited the Russian consumer and peasant. The state responded with the 23 June 1794 *ukaz* sanctioning the Pale into law and permitting Jews to engage in

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3 Simon Dubnow, The History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, Vol.I I. (3 Vols.) Friedlander, trans., Philadelphia, 1916-1920, pp.36-37, Vol.II, 242-251; Heinz-Dietrich Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews: Reform, Reaction, and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia, 1772-1917, Harwood Academic, Switzerland, 1993, pp.28-34.

4 Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914, Dekalb, 1996, p.59.

5 Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.28 on the role of the Russian merchant guilds of Moscow that caused the Senate to restrict Jews' rights to residence.

commerce as merchants and burghers only in specified, *non-Russian* provinces.[6]

The Polish "models" for the 'Jewish question' ceded in the early reform era to Prussian and Austrian models. The state attempted policies similar to those which had tolerated Jewish merchants in Vienna and Lower Austria, and in education it imitated German models. With general imperial reform of the central government between 1803-1807, the enlightened absolutism of Alexander I presided over a new social agency, "The Committee for the Amelioration of the Jews", designed to find ways to integrate Jews into Russian society.[7] One result was the Jewish Statute of 1804. Although it allowed for the expansion of Jewish agricultural settlement in an attempt to force Jews into 'productive' (non-capitalist) pursuits, the Statute restricted Jewish rural occupations of land-tenure, inn keeping, tavern-owning, and liquor trade. The 1804 Statute also dramatically restructured Jewish education granting access to state education (public schools, *gimnaziia*, and universities) though in practice very few Jews actually enrolled.[8] Jews were granted the right to establish their own schools for secular culture, using the obligatory Russian, Polish, or German. Educational and linguistic policies were not yet 'Russificatory' but 'cosmopolitan', remaining open also to Polish and German.[9] In effect, the 1804 Statute represented the spirit of enlightened Prussian absolutism with its continuation of certain Jewish disabilities, not French emancipation.[10]

A series of important legislative initiatives under Nicholas I's centralization changed Jews' civic and socioeconomic status. Reversing the policies of Catherine II, the Conscription Edict of 1827 made Jewish boys older than 12 draftable to serve a 25 year period in the Tsarist army, so that by 1841 'non-useful' Jews were conscripted at five

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6 These were Volhynia, Minsk, Podolia, (now) Vitebsk, Mogiliev, Kiev, Chernigov, Novgorod-Seversk, Ekaterinoslav, and the Taurida region -- effectively enlarging the Pale into the new southern provinces. Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, pp.315-317.

7 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917, Oxford, Clarendon, 1967, pp.96-112; Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917, Fontana 1998, pp.128-133.

8 Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia, Mouton, The Hague, 1971, Vol.13, pp.615-616; Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.34. But government stress on secular education in state schools was to remain completely voluntary, unlike Joseph II's policies. Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.32.

9 Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.32.

10 Dubnow, History of the Jews, pp.342-362. Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, p.34; Hans Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia, Berkeley, 1986, pp.8-9.

times the rate of other nationalities.[11] With a 1835 Statute, the Pale boundaries were redefined. Only Jewish merchants of the first and second guilds were allowed into the markets and fairs of the capitals in the Russian interior. Forbidden from using the "Hebrew language", they were required to use Russian, German or Polish in public business. An *ukaz* of 19 December 1844 abolished the *Kahal* (Jewish communal self-government surviving from medieval Poland) and placed Jews under the same system of city government as other citizens, rural and urban, for taxation purposes especially.[12]

Under the influence of the European (Berlin) Haskalah and under pressure from the maskilim themselves, emphasis on Jewish educational reform was embodied in an another important *ukaz* in 1844. A new progressive state Jewish school was set up in the style of the parish and *uezd* schools for Russians with the intention of competing with the *hadarim* and combating Jewish "fanaticism". Accordingly, Russian Jewish schools were given a German character, German teachers were recruited, German were texts adopted, and "Jewish" subjects were taught in German.[13] With these important educational reforms state elites sought to bring a merger between the Jewish and Christian populations, like the 'assimilated' Germanized Jews of Prussia and Austria, by weakening the role of the Talmud as the basis for Jewish nationality. Imperial reformers' focus on 'rapproachment' implied that Jews could remain Jews religiously, but that they would be culturally and linguistically integrated into Russian society, and their status on par with certain of the estates. At least until mid-century, then, nationality policy vis-a-vis the Jews still reflected Europeanized, cosmopolitan elite thinking, and German was considered a sufficient linguistic vehicle, not the "Official Russian": the state's intention with educational and linguistic policies was to make the 'Jewish Jew' more European and cosmopolitan, while tolerating an acceptable level of 'Jewishness'. Jewish 'enlightenment' was now the condition for 'assimilation'.

By mid-century, however, Russian officials acknowledged the general failure of

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11 Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia, p.617.

12 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.274; Hosking, Russia:People and Empire, p.34, notes that "in practice [the *kahal*] continued to exist, since the authorities were unable to replace it with anything effective. Henceforth, however, it had no acknowledgement or protection at law."

13 Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, pp.7, 74.

integrative policies. Though some Jews had been educated in the state system, for instance, their exclusion from state service remained. To be clear, "integration" into Russian society did not mean Russification or assimilation in the modern sense. The term 'Russification' was not in use (especially regarding Jews) until after 1863, nor was there any understanding of the concept as it would be constructed in the latter half of the century. The terms most frequently used during this early reform era were *sblizhenie* and *sliianie* -- respectively rapproachment and assimilation, although as Klier points out, the latter in its modern connotations would also be misleading.[14]

Jewish 'emancipation' and 'assimilation' were, according to Klier, borrowed from the European context, and accordingly defined as 'civil and political equality with the rest of the population'. Yet given Russia's semi-feudal 'estate' structure, this was necessarily problematic: "Jews might be equalized to one or another social group, or disabilities specific to Jews might be removed, but no one legal act could emancipate all Russian Jewry".[15] In effect it was not 'emancipation' but 'liberation' (*osvobozhdenie*), or the liberating of a social group from disabilities. Thus *sliianie* was not Russification, but a 'rapproachment' of Christians and Jews within imperial society.[16] This was key because the belief was that such a 'rapproachment' would decrease the social distance between Christians and Jews, and thereby increase social cohesion, forming a particular understanding of imperial unity. It also underscored the status particularism of the *ancien regime* state based on privileges, not rights.

Accordingly, in the reform period following the Crimean War, Russian officials considered just such a Jewish 'liberation' along with the liberation of the serfs.[17] The Pale's restrictive effects were now painfully evident: population growth, migrations assisted by railway expansions, and industrialization had created abnormal socioeconomic conditions in provinces of the Pale. Governor-Generals from key provinces -- 'Novorossiia', Bessarabia, Kiev, Podolia, Vohlynia -- reported that the high concentrations

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[14] Ibid, pp.72-73.

[15] Ibid., p.72. This was the term used for the serfs, for example.

[16] Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp. 40-44.

[17] In 1862 Jews in Congress Kingdom received quasi-legal rights, and were not subject to the restrictive policies of the western provinces and Pale. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.117

of Jews in towns and cities had produced an overabundance of craftsmen, artisans and skilled workmen, most of whom remained unemployed due to overcrowding and competition. At the same time, the Russian interior suffered from shortages of precisely these skilled master craftsmen. Arguments were made that the Pale should be abolished, and Jewish artisans and craftsmen be allowed to compete in the interior of the empire, thereby also decreasing the monopolistic practices of Russian merchants.[18] Moreover, if Jews were allowed to live among non-Jews in the empire's interior they might integrate more fully. The most vocal and consistent group in opposition to the abolition of the Pale came once again from within 'civil society': Russian merchants and merchant guilds.[19]

In the end, full Jewish emancipation across the empire failed to materialize for a number of related reasons. First, the pressures on official Russia by Russian merchants and relevant estates were consistent and influential. Second, the emancipation of the Russian peasantry in 1861 triggered worries that the ignorant and 'dark' Russian peasant might easily fall prey to Jewish 'exploitation', and that Jews, having relatively abundant liquid capital, might purchase the newly available lands. And thirdly, the Polish insurrection in 1863 turned elites' attention to the imperial borderlands with worries about Polish *dvorianstvo* separatism and irredentism, and borderland nationalities' (dis)loyalty.

But certain openings were in evidence mid-century. In 1851, the "Temporary Rules Concerning the Assortment of the Jews" had divided Jews into five categories: merchants, artisans, agriculturalists, settled burghers and unsettled burghers. The first three were permitted enrollment in the available corresponding guilds and estates, settled burghers could obtain state licenses, and the remaining 'unsettled burghers' (e.g. masses of workers), remained subject to restrictive measures, including conscription.[20] Gradually the road was paved for Jewish capital to enter the cities of the Russian interior. In legislation between 1856-1879 rights of residence were extended to Jewish merchants who were members of the first guild, university graduates, incorporated artisans, apprentices, and distillers. Jewish capital began to enter the Russian interior in increasing numbers, and

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[18] Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, pp.16-17.

[19] Ibid., p.19.

[20] Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, p.142.

graduates of higher secondary institutions (*gimnaziia*, realschulen, universities) also moved to Russian cities. Members of the first guild with university education could even enter state service.[21] Significantly several Jewish Bolsheviks' fathers were the beneficiaries of these new leniencies. They could, additionally, pass on their rights, becoming a kind of hereditary nobility.[22] From 1864 Jews could become state licensed lawyers and judges, and they did so in large numbers in the St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kharkov bar associations of the *advocatura*. From 1879 all Jewish graduates of higher educational institutions, pharmacists, dentists etc. could elect, or be elected to, zemstvo assemblies (with certain limitations), and they were granted universal residence regardless of the nature of the diploma. Among the artisans and craftsmen who were permitted to leave the Pale were the fathers of other Bolsheviks.

This is consistent with the sociology of Russification layed out in Chapter 4: great bourgeois capital and its estates were 'inside' the state, while urban poor and lower classes were 'outside' the state, though liberalizations initially also allowed university educated Jews and the legal profession 'in'. Some of these liberalizations were consequent upon the new political atmosphere after 1863. The Polish rebellions marked a very important change in the thinking of state elites toward the nationalities of the imperial peripheries. Jews were now viewed as possible 'loyal' allies of the Russian state in its attempts to counter Polish radicalism and separatism. So, for instance, Governors of the southern and western provinces suggested that if Jews were granted more rights, they could be loyal agents of Russification in the Polish regions -- and indeed they were seen as such by many Poles as well.[23] Consequently, 'the "Jewish Question" invoked not 'Russian' and 'Orthodox' distinctions, but 'Slavic' and 'Christian' ones. This had mixed effects. On one hand Jewish disabilities and restrictions were slowly eased as Jewish rights expanded through the 1860's and 1870's, and these quasi-emancipatory leniencies continued.[24]

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21 Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol.13, p.622; Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.94.

22 Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, p.29.

23 On the Governors, Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp.44-45; on the view of the Poles, Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.117.

24 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.103. This should not be exaggerated however: Poles and Jews were forbidden from acquiring estates in the nine Kiev and Vilna provinces. Dubnow, History of the Jews, Vol.II, p.173

On the other hand, the Russification of the region prompted evaluation of other factors as well, and the few 'enlightened' moves by the state were soon accompanied by new exclusions and restrictions.[25] The "Temporary May Laws of 1882" following pogrom violence forbidding Jews from residing in villages and rural areas, and the 1887 circulars of the Minister of Education including the *numerus clausus* limiting Jewish enrollment in *gimnaziia* and universities, both had impressive effect.[26] And after 1889 Jews were excluded from membership in the *advokatura*'s bar associations. This marked a new phase of exclusion, not integration. In important respects 'Russification' is a misnomer. Tsarist policies vis-a-vis Jews after 1881 were not 'Russificatory' in the sense of being integrationist, assimilationist, or homogenizing. Rather, Russification and other policies were 'dissimilative' and clearly designed to exclude Jews from Russian society, unlike in the earlier part of the century. Now Jews were increasingly seen as 'too cosmopolitan', threatening imperial 'Russianness'. As we will see below the Jewish Bolsheviks' parents' generation of mid-century were the beneficiaries of earlier easing of restrictions allowing for more social mobility, but the Jewish Bolsheviks of the 1880's and 1890's suffered a reversal. While the Bolsheviks' parents acculturated in a context of gradual political-civic inclusion, the Bolsheviks, themselves already largely acculturated, did so against political-civic exclusions.

Five trends in the relationship between Jews and the imperial state deserve highlight. First, while in the first part of the century the state sought integration and 'assimilation', by the turn of the century it was full-on exclusion.[27] Second, Jews' position relative to other nationalities, inside and outside the Pale become increasingly problematic. The Pale's socioeconomic restrictions had resulted in unnatural and distorted overcrowding, as the absence of political rights and legal discriminations had had not only class bases, but ethnic and religious ones as well. Inter-ethnic and class tensions

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[25] K. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", L. Martov, et at, eds.. Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka, tom 4, St. Petersburg, 1912, p.210.

[26] Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, Dubnow, The History of the Jews, vol.II, pp.348-353; In the Pale Jews were admitted at 10% of the Christian population, outside the Pale at 5%, in Petersburg and Moscow at 3% -- and all were applied to *gimnaziia*, *realschulen*, and universities.

[27] Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich, pp.220-224.

intensified and Jewish identity underwent important changes. Paradoxically, the state's easing of restrictions only seemed to compound the distinction between Jews and others: rather than abolishing corporative frameworks, old categories were shifted and newer ones put in place -- all of this with the result that new socio-ethnic hierarchies challenged old ones. New vulnerabilities were created and ethnopolitics came to the fore. So Jews' distinct legal and socioeconomic position, a consequence of *both* reformist and reactionary policies, made them seem to other national social groups *and to themselves*, both *different and unprotected*. This alone accounts for much of the social force behind the pogroms of 1881-1882, 1903, and 1905. It also contributed to the *maskilim*'s early attempts to channel Jews into non-commercial "productive" pursuits (policies the state also variously attempted), to Zionists' emphasis on 'return to agricultural work', to the anti-capitalism of the Jewish socialists.

The selective easing of Jewish restrictions and the adoption of new ones significantly contributed to social differentiation within Jewish society itself. Each successive opening and restriction affected only a small number of 'elite' Jews, leaving the wider Jewish population generally untouched.[28] But while emancipatory moves affected the Jewish elite, the expansion of education affected Jewish middling and lower classes. As more 'middle class' Jews were able to take advantage of residential and educational opportunities and entered state culture and society, greater social distance was forged between them and the Jewish masses. Universities and financial institutions provided financial support to Jewish and non-Jewish students; this combined with the opening of careers inevitably encouraged Jews into the Russian school system. While university students increased two-fold between 1864-1880, the number of Jewish students increased four-fold in the same years.[29] In 1886, 14.5% of university students and 10.2% in *gimnaziia* were Jews, in part due to their high levels of urbanization.

However unlike other nationalities incorporated into the empire, Jewish society had no natural allies for the Tsarist state; unlike the Baltic Germans, the Georgian nobility, Tataric and Turkish nobles, and even elements of the Polish nobility, Jews had no such

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[28] Dubnow, The History of the Jews, Vol.II, p.168.

[29] Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.94.

easily marked-off noble class or elite status group for the state to incorporate. In this absence, such a status group was created: wealthier, financially and commercially successful, educated and 'enlightened' (read 'Russifiable') Jews were 'incorporated'. This acceptable Jewish status group, similar to the traditional nobilities of other nationalities, and capable of imperial integration, pointedly excluded the traditional, religious Jewish rabbinical or religious elite. This meant that unlike the Georgian, Polish or Baltic German nobility, whose historically recognized status within their regions was a 'natural' demarcation for alliance with the imperial state -- and recognized as such by their populations -- wealth, education, and 'Russianization' would be the markers for status inside Jewish society, placing an important emphasis on education-cum-acculturation.

Fourth, with respect to the 'Jewish Question' the pressures on the Tsarist state from within 'civil society' were influential. In 1875, W. Roscher wrote that in the Middle Ages anti-Semitism in Europe increased significantly with the rise of indigenous bourgeoisies.[30] While his analysis was based on the effects of the transition from feudal to commercial Europe, the social processes at work would be quite similar to those of later periods in Central Europe and the western lands of the Russian imperium. The indigenous middle classes, particularly the commercial or *Besitzburgertum*, consistently pressured ruling elites for protection in the form of Jewish restrictions and disabilities. The Polish middle urban classes/bourgeoisie and Russian merchants became the most vocal and consistent sources of anti-Jewish pressures on state elites and provincial administrators. Indeed, the fact that the provinces of the northern Pale (Lithuania, Belorussia) had weak native middle classes explains, in part, the comparatively milder anti-Semitism of the region as compared to the southern Pale's Ukrainian and Polish provinces.

That rising bourgeoisies became important carriers of national identity is central to an understanding of the sources of anti-Semitism and Jewish identity and politics in the late imperial Russia. This was complicated by the rise of not one but *several* national bourgeoisies as capitalism -- and nationalism -- moved eastward into the "fourth time zone". The Polish bourgeoisie, the Russian commercial and merchant class, and the

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30 W. Roscher, "The status of the Jews in the Middle Ages considered from the standpoint of commercial policy", S. Grayzel, trans., Historica Judaica, 6:1944 (1875), pp.13-26.

nascent Ukrainian middling classes developed simultaneously nationalist and anti-Semitic identities as they came into competition with Jews both as social class, as an estate, as a religious group, and as a privileged (and non-privileged) ethnic group. But as national or ethnic identities increasingly solidified by the last decades of the century the perception of Jews as an ethnic group prevailed. We know, for instance, that zemstvo were withheld in some of the Polish provinces not because of Russian state intransigence, but because of local Polish anti-Semitism, and perceived 'Russificatory' effects of Jewish migration.[31]

The connections between rising nationalisms and anti-Semitism were important. Seton-Watson offered one kind of explanation. Like German nationalism (militant pan-Germanism, and later National Socialism in the Bohemian borderlands and Styria) Russian nationalism was most marked in the borderlands. In the southwest, where Ukrainian nationalism was strongest, one also found the strongest anti-Semitic Russian nationalism. According to Seton-Watson, semi-revolutionary, anti-Semitic fascist movements which flourished in eastern Poland, Romania, and Hungary had proto-types in the "Union of Russian People" and the "League of Archangel Michael". "It may be argued", he wrote, "that this type of nationalist movement is a phenomenon of the area of dense Jewish population, stretching from northern Hungary and Moldavia as far as the Russian Ukraine and Lithuania, that its essence is anti-Semitism, and that it is not indigeneous to the Great Russian lands".[32] But "demagogic organizations" were also appearing in Great Russian regions. So, he added, just as Austrian anti-Semitic nationalism was accepted in northern Germany, where it had no historical roots but where circumstances in the 1920's and 1930's made it seem useful to some politicians, so too the southwestern type of Russian Black Hundreds demagogery was winning a clientele in Moscow and Petersburg.

Part of the way in which these nationalisms rose was during war, particularly in the Ukrainian territories. Eley argues that the wartime encounters prompted by population movements, conscript armies, refugees etc., and in wartime alliances (Jews with the occupying German administration in Poland in 1915 or Ukrainian-German cooperation in 1918) brought together previously remote peoples; in these encounters, "as the German

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[31] Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.131-151.

[32] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.674.

officers, soldiers, and civilian personnel recorded their reactions to the ways and appearance of the peoples of the East (Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and above all the reviled*Ostjuden*) that the radical-right racism of the interwar period had many of its origins....In [this] sense the German nationalist (and German Jewish) image of the *Ostjude* was the particular form of a general ideological syndrome, with its counterpart in many other ethno-cultural contradictions (e.g. the Polish and Polish Jewish image of the [Russian Jewish] Litvak, or German attitudes toward Polish immigrant labourers before 1914)."[33] Recent work by Gatrell found something similar as Jewish refugees were evacuated into the Russian interior.[34]

This is not to say that anti-Semitism was not 'inside' the state itself. And this leads to a final and related point. As noted in chapter 2, studies on the relationship between Russian autocracy and capitalism have ignored the connection between old regime anti-Semitism and old regime anti-capitalism. Southern industry was especially vulnerable to the strain of anti-Semitism emanating from Nicholas II's government: although the Tsar's ministers had been keen to limit Jewish participation in corporate ownership in southern Russia's coal industry and its supporting railroad infrastructure, by 1914 state officials had began to equate corporate enterprise with Jewish (and foreign) influence, and implemented restrictions accordingly.[35] And the anti-capitalist turn in official anti-Semitism and the policies of Alexander III to reduce Jewish economic 'exploitation', among other things, resulted in the 1890-1892 expulsion of thousands of Jews (mostly artisans) from Moscow to end their "rapacious activities".[36]

II. Social and 'national' origins of the Jewish Bolsheviks

The social and 'national' composition of the fifteen Jewish Bolsheviks reflect key aspects of imperial Jewry of the late 19th century discussed above. Most impressive about

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33 Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation", p.221.

34 Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia During World War I, Indiana University Press, 1999.

35 Susan MacCaffray, The Politics of Industrialization in Tsarist Russia: The Association of Southern Steel and Coal Producers, 1874-1914, Dekalb, Illinois, 1996, p.210.

36 Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp.62-72.

this Jewish cohort is that in important respects they represented an 'elite' inside Jewish society, a status reflected in their education, class origin or 'estate', level of acculturation, language preferences, loyalty to Russian and European cultures, and ultimately in their attraction to statist (e.g. Marxist-socialist) solutions to (Jewish) social problems.

Reflective of the diversity of the empire's borderlands, the fifteen Jewish Bolsheviks were of varied 'national' origins: 7 of 15 were raised in the provinces of the Ukraine; 4 were raised outside the Pale in the Russian interior; 2 were raised in Lithuania; and one each in Galicia and in a penal colony in Chita. The number of Jewish Bolsheviks legally residing outside the Pale was further evidence of their relatively privileged status.[37] There were no Polish Jews from Congress Kingdom -- an notable absence given the sizable Jewish population in the region. They derived from some of the most ethnically mixed provinces and cities of the Empire, in socioeconomic and political relationships with Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Russians. In this respect the regional diversity of the Jewish experience was unique among the empire's nationalities, and implicates relations between ethnicities as much as state policies toward any single national group.

By the turn of the century Jews were the most urbanized nationality in the Empire. While only 13.4% of imperial citizens were urbanites, 49.42% of Jews were city-dwellers -- far surpassing the next most urbanized Tajiks (29.50%), Germans (23.38%), Armenians (23.06%), Sarts (21.06%), and Poles (18.35%).[38] This unnatural concentration was in largest measure due to enforcement of the Pale's residential and occupational restrictions. In the eyes of Russian officials and other nationalities among whom they lived, Jews' level of urbanization had the effect of giving them a prominence and conspicuousness somewhat out of proportion to their actual numbers.[39] Moreover, 'political society' -- nationalist, socialist, and liberal -- was essentially an urban phenomenon. So the high level of Jewish urbanization (and education) facilitated radicalization simply by virtue of access. In part,

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[37] Dubnow, The History of the Jews, Vol.II, pp.342-343. This included those with education, first merchants guilds, and handicraftsmen.

[38] Andreas Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall, Tabelle 4, "Urbanisierungsgrad einzelner Ethnien des Russischen Reiches, 1897", p.326.

[39] Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.96.

this accounts for their disproportionate numbers in radical movements. In some of the larger cities Jews constituted a substantial minority: Odessa where Trotsky was politicized was nearly 31% Jewish in 1897, with Russians comprising just over 49%; Piatnitskii's Vilna was 40% Jewish, 31% Polish, and only 20% Russian; outside the Empire, Radek's Lvov was 27.7% Jewish in 1900.[40] Yet some Bolsheviks were politicized where the Jewish population was in the minority: Saratov (Gusev and Zelenskii), Moscow (Sokol'nikov), and Nizhny-Novgorod (Sverdlov). These differences had important consequences for acculturation and radicalization, as we will see below.

Jewish ethno-politics and identity had important regional variations. Since Jews constituted a substantial minority in Ukrainian provinces (28.27%), in Lithuania-Belorussia (27.93%), in Russian Poland (25.3%), and in "New Russia" (14.23%), their presence affected administration and local politics for Ukrainians, Poles, and Lithuanians. So state policies targeting Poles and Ukrainians regarding zemstvo, municipal government, property owning laws and land reforms all implicated Jews. In contrast, the "Jewish Question" had almost no resonance among Georgians, Estonians, Central Asians, or most significantly, among Russians themselves.[41] So state policies toward Jews were (a) inconsistent across the empire, (b) largely made by Russian administrators and Governor-Generals in the western borderlands, not in Petersburg, and (c) limited to official Russian circles, with input from Russian merchants, but essentially outside the scope of 'civil', educated Russian society.

In the Jewish Bolsheviks' early radicalism geographical effects were still evident. Working class and petty bourgeois Jews in the northwest tended to be well-established artisans and craftsmen ateliers and workshops whose skills were challenged by industrialization (such was the experience of the Lithuanian Jew Piatnitskii). Working class urban and rural Jews of the Ukraine and 'South Russia', such as Chubar' and

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[40] Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich, Tabelle 5, p.327; Paul Robert Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, University of Toronto Press, 1993, table p.109.

[41] Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 005, p.76. Their presence in the North Caucasus, Transcaucasus, and Baltics were, respectively, 0.35%, 0.45%, and 1.24%. Jews comprised 57.7% of the population in Grodno, 58.8% in Minsk, 52.1% in Vitebsk, and 50.8% in Volhynia; in contrast, only 2.4% in the Caucasus, 3.5% in Siberia, and 0.8% in Central Asia. "Rossiia", Bol'shaia Entsiklopediia, p.15.

Kaganovich, tended to work in newer factories as members of the new industrial proletariat and joined SRs and SDs, while educated urban middle class Jews of Kiev and Odessa in the Ukraine either joined Polish radical groups (Uritskii) or emigrated to Europe (Trotsky and Zinoviev). Educated well-off Jews in the Russian interior, such as Sokol'nikov, joined 'Russian' movements (and often emigrated) while Jews of petty bourgeois origin or those less educated in the Russian interior like Sverdlov or Zelenskii, remained almost exclusively in 'Russian' radical groups such as *Narodnaia volia* or the SRs.

In terms of class or estate origin, this Jewish Bolshevik cohort was broadly bourgeois and petty bourgeois, with a significant number of fathers members of the "distinguished citizens" *soslovie*. If official 'estate' categories alone are considered, of the 11 for whom there is reliable information (and excluding Radek because he was Galician and Iaroslavskii who was on a Jewish penal settlement) almost half (5 of 11) would have been in the "personal nobility", "distinguished citizens" or "merchant estate" -- the most exclusive urban, middle class and upper middle class estates in which just over 1.5% of the Jewish population could count themselves members. This is significant considering that in 1897, according to official categories, 94.16% of the domains' Jews were *meshchane*, or small burgher, and lower urban classes, including a vast floating population in the cities of poor workers and 'non-registered' artisans.[42] Of the remaining six Bolsheviks, five were of classic petty bourgeois origin whose fathers were skilled artisans (Piatnitskii, Sverdlov, Zelenskii) and shopkeepers (Zinoviev, and again Sverdlov). Although they would have been considered members of the *meshchane* estate, the fact that Sverdlov and Zelenskii's families lived in Nizhny-Novogorod and Saratov respectively, suggests that their families were able to take advantage of the easing restrictions which allowed skilled Jewish artisans to reside in the Russian interior. These persons were few, however, and certainly not the norm. Only two, the Ukrainian Jews Chubar' and Kaganovich, may be said to have been among the 'rural poor', and although there is incomplete information, Chubar' at least was able to attend technical school on a zemstvo bursary, a privilege for a rural Ukrainian Jew.

As noted in Chapter 4, 'estate' categories did not completely reflect socioeconomic realities. Accordingly, if specific occupations are considered the picture becomes even

[42] Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabellen 031 & 033, pp.198, 203.

more revealing. These families were classic middle and upper middle class in the conditions of the Tsarist empire: educated and commercial bourgeoisie, including both free professions and those employed by the state which required state licensing or registration, and members of the merchant or business class. Of the six who were in the privileged 'estates', three were of the educated bourgeoisie (*Bildungsburgertum*) and two were of the commercial bourgeoisie (*Besitzburgertum*), which would have corresponded roughly to the "distinguished citizens" and "merchant" estates in official Tsarist categories. Trotsky's and Uritskii's families were well-off, middling property owners and merchants respectively, would have fallen in the second category;[43] Iaroskavskii's, Kamenev's, and Sokol'nikov's families were in the former category, respectively as a teacher, an educated railway engineer employed by the state, and a medical doctor, also in the employ of the state.[44]

The latters' occupations reflected the blurring of distinctions between professionals and higher government service officials, considered "personal nobility", and the large number of professionals considered "distinguished citizens" in government categories, e.g. educated professionals in direct employment of the state. This is of particular interest because employment in higher government service *doubled* between 1880 and 1914.[45] The state's civil and service bureaucracy was expanding, and it seemed to be the only avenue for educated, Russifying Jews outside of the free professions.

This is evident when Jewish employment in imperial state service is compared to that in local government, zemstvo, provincial administration, and petty (non-imperial) civil service combined: in the empire as a whole 5.01% of Jews of the educated middle classes were employed as (imperial) government officials, and 3.21% licensed by the state as free professions. This is in marked contrast to those Jews employed in local, zemstvo, or provincial civil service: the third most important venue for the empire's educated elites, only 0.17% of Jews were so employed. The employment pattern remains consistent when

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[43] On Uritskii, "Biografiia", Deiateli SSSR i revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia Rossiia: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Granat, (hereafter Granat), p.734; Trotsky's family was very well-off.

[44] Iaroslavskii's mother was a teacher and his father a furrier. Settlers in a Jewish penal colony in Chita, they have been omitted here. Radek is discussed in Chapter 7 in connection with the Habsburg Empire.

[45] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.534. That is, non-zemstvo, non-local administrative, non-police, non-gendarmerie, and non-military.

broken down by rural/urban Jews: 5.83% of rural Jews and 7.15% of urban Jews were employed by the imperial state as government officials and 2.90% (rural) and 3.62% (urban) were in the state licensed free professions. In contrast, only 0.22% of rural Jews and 0.22% of urban Jews were employed by local, provincial, zemstvo, etc. civil service.[46] The pattern remains the same by region as well: of those for whom Yiddish was their mother tongue, in the Lithuania-Belorussian provinces, 6.25% were employed by the central state, while only 0.16% were employed in local, provincial civil service; in the Ukrainian provinces, 4.49% were in imperial employ as against 0.18% in provincial service; in "New Russia" 4.83% and 0.15% respectively; and in the Baltics, 2.86% as compared to 0.18%.[47]

The conclusion is this: educated, professional, middle class Jews in the empire were highly dependent on the imperial state for direct employment and licensing because they were excluded from local, or provincial service and employ. Two possible (non-exclusive) explanations suggest themselves. First, as noted above, between 1880-1914 the number of persons employed by the imperial state in positions as higher government officials doubled, and Jews, being highly educated, would likely have benefited after mid-century when they were permitted into state service. Secondly, Jews may have sought imperial service because local, provincial opportunities, were restricted because national identities were increasingly anti-Semitic. To be sure, the Tsarist state was the first to insure that Jews remained outside provincial government and provincial 'civil society' for fears of 'exploitation' and sedition. But the imperial state offered possibilities that local society and and provincial government did not.

Additionally, of the educated Jewish middle class, those most likely to be employed by the state were educated urban Jews rather than educated village or rural Jews. This is not to minimize educated Jews' general rightlessness, however it is true to say that

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[46] Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 027, p.179; Tabelle 029, pp.189-192.

[47] Ibid., Tabelle 045, pp.329-338. Their appears to be no difference between use of "mother tongue. This last figure for the Baltics is somewhat lower that the other regions, and this may have been due to the fact that a very high number of Baltic Jews were employed by the imperial government in military service -- 6.41% as against between 1.95-3.48% for the empire as a whole and regionally. Those Jews here in the free professions were fewer than in other regions of the empire, perhaps in part because military positions were siphoning them off.

educated urban estate Jews and civil service Jews were comparatively better-off than their rural counterparts. This is consistent with what we know of the fathers of the Jewish Bolsheviks inside this elite. It is also consistent with the more general claim of this thesis that the sociology of Tsarist nationality policies tended to be rather more conciliatory toward urban estates and imperial civil service elites -- two 'status groups' already 'inside' the state -- regardless of national/ethic origin, and harsher towards rural elites of all nationalities (see Chapter 4).

We should be as specific as possible about the social context and the available reference group in understanding Jewish acculturation or Russification.[48] Clearly high levels of urbanization enabled the rapid acquisition of a secular culture, but for this Bolshevik elite secularization had *preceded* urbanization. Though there was a difference between rural and urban contexts, even the rural Jewish Bolsheviks' families found some social mobility. Relative upward social mobility normally implies an acculturation into the norms and culture of the higher status group. This was complex: village Jews like Kaganovich remained essentially alienated from the Gentile, non-Russian peasantries and often suffered from pogrom violence, while others, like Chubar', found a certain belonging in socialist movements among Ukrainian peasants. For the new urban Jews however, and for those in the Russian interior, acculturation into the higher status (bourgeois) group proved difficult as they were in crucial ways 'blocked' from entry into the local, 'native' bourgeois culture and provincial civil and political society because of anti-Semitism. In these cases, much of the attraction of "Russian" imperial culture was its possibility to escape provincialism, localism, and regional national cultures. In either case, their secularization had occurred prior to their urbanization, and to the extent that 'blocked mobility' was present, it was cultural and linguistic, not socioeconomic.

The exclusion of the families of Sokol'nikov, Kamenev, Iaroslavskii, and in some senses Gusev, from provincial or local venues of mobility meant that in significant respects they were excluded also from the foundations of provincial public life in the empire, as this rested almost entirely among local landowners, zemstvo leaders, small agricultural

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[48] Paula Hyman, "The social contexts of assimilation: village Jews and city Jews in Alsace", in Jonathan Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstein (eds..), Assimilation and Community: Jews in Nineteenth Century Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.115, 124-125.

entrepreneurs and active local farmers. These were the core of 'provincial civil society' and political life, and Jews were seen, both locally and by the state, as alien and dangerous potential participants. The same was also true of the Polish *szlachta* but for a different rationale. Both could be integrated and incorporated into imperial state service in some fashion, but participation in local and provincial affairs would only pander to *szlachta* 'disloyalism' and Jewish 'exploitation'.

For those Jews in the commercial middling classes, either as skilled artisans and shopkeepers or as wealthier merchants, dependence on the state took a different form. The combined socioeconomic effects of industrialization and anti-Semitic effects of inter-ethnic commercial competition meant that Jewish preferments and protections were necessarily in the hands of the central state. The Jewish Bolsheviks whose families were involved in small capitalist enterprises or larger scale merchants were clearly in a struggle with capitalism as it was developing in the empire. For Piatnitskii's father, as well as for Iaroslavskii's, Sverdlov's, Zelenskii's, and Zinoviev's, the struggle was classic one: skilled artisans and small shopkeepers facing economic competition from larger works and small industries, dependent on state assistance and protection. The fact that so many Jews were artisans and shopkeepers only made it seem a 'Jewish problem'.

For the Jewish Bolsheviks (Uritskii, Trotsky, Ioffe) whose families were engaged in more lucrative and successful commercial pursuits, their struggle with capitalism was not due to its displacement effects, but to the anti-Semitism of other national capitalist classes, such as the aspiring Polish, Ukrainian commercial middle classes, the descending Polish and Lithuanian nobility, the already successful Armenian merchant class, and the new upwardly mobile Russian settlers. Jewish capitalism meant (often violent) inter-ethnic tensions and old regime official anti-Semitism.

So Jewish dependency on the Russian state for preferments, privileges, and protections was pronounced. Since with *ginmnazia* and university education, Jews could attain some civic rights, many merchant families particularly, sent their sons to the empire's middle and higher educational institutions rather than traditional Jewish schools.[49] Therefore the Bolsheviks' parents were a particular generation of Jews in imperial Russia

[49] Dubnow, The History of the Jews, Vol.II, p.216.

for whom 'Russification' held very specific attractions. And consequently there is a marked shift in Bolshevik occupations as compared to their fathers': no Jewish Bolshevik was engaged in capitalist or commercial pursuits, nearly all entered the liberal professions. The rising Jewish commercial bourgeoisie (many of the Bolsheviks parents) were sending their children to secular elite state schools, often at a considerable financial sacrifice. They had taken advantage of social openings granted by the state and had internalized the urban manners, standards, and decorum of the imperial bourgeoisie, an acculturation which became predicated on its loyalty to the tutelary state.[50] Sons of Jewish merchants and capitalists were now acquiring secular, urban liberal education.

For the generation of Jewish youth (the Bolsheviks) born in the 1880's and politicized in the last decades of the 19th century experience, circumstances, and possibilities had changed. By virtue of their education and class origin, they were already 'Russified' or acculturated to greater (Sokol'nikov) or lesser (Gusev) extents. As with Bohemian Jews of an earlier generation in Habsburg lands, these Russian Jews were the first generation of Jews to have obtained gimnazia and university education, and pursue careers in the liberal professions as acculturated Jews.[51] But the decades in which they were politicized coincided with important shifts in state policies with respect to its national minorities. Now acculturation was taking place in the context of political exclusion. European socialism was the dominant political discourse of dissent among much of imperial educated society -- of which they were increasingly members. And the empire's nationalities (Jews included) started to 'imagine' themselves as 'nations' and cultural entities. In short, socialization and politicization in late imperial Russia involved a very different set of socioeconomic and political pressures and incentives than those of their father's generation with the liberalizations just after mid-century. Now acculturated, urbanization, modernization, and increased social/occupational differentiation within Jewish society crucially invoked an ethnic or national 'Jewish identity' as against their fathers' more traditional 'estate' designations.

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[50] Michael Greatz, "Jewry in the modern period: the role of the 'rising class; in the politicization of Jews in Europe", in Frankel and Zipperstein (eds.), Assimilation and Community, p.169.

[51] Hillel J. Kieval, "The social vision of Bohemian Jews: intellectuals and community in the 1840's", Frankel and Zipperstein, eds., Assimilation and Community, pp.247-248.

This was among the best educated of the nationalities represented in the Bolshevik elite. Of 14 for whom there is good data, 12 attended some secondary school or its equivalent, and 8 attended post-secondary institutes or university. These figures are well above the imperial average since a mere 0.88% of the empire's population had received anything beyond elementary schooling.[52] Even when compared to the empire's Jews generally, this cohort was a highly educated group, 12.61% of Yiddish language speaker had more than elementary education.[53]

Although two attended *realschule*, most had received *gimnazia* education, and for those like Sverdlov, Lashevich, Uritskii, and perhaps even Ioffe, whose families were involved in commerce, trade, or artisanry, the classical *gimnazia* represented a distinct world of classics, humanities, and high culture. For those whose fathers were already acculturated in some fashion themselves and had received professional education, such as Sokol'nikov's, Kamenev's and perhaps Gusev's parents, integration into imperial 'high culture' was already a reality in the home.

Far from disenchantment with humanist scholasticism, based on their (auto)biographical accounts, the humanist, classical, 'high culture' of Russian literature and European ideas in the *gimnaziia* seemed to captivate. Gusev wrote of his passion for French novels and literature and cultivated a love of classical music. Sokol'nikov enjoyed the classics, Latin and Greek. Uritskii developed a passion for Russian literature, while attending a *gimnazia* in the Ukraine. And Trotsky, who attended *realschulen* in Odessa and Nicolaev, was famously quite captivated by not only by painting, for which he felt he had no vocation, but by by writing, as he wrote verses and translated the fables of Krylov in Ukrainian. Only Sverdlov seemed to have felt stifled by the dry scholasticism of his *gimnazia* studies.[54] Theirs was not a rebellion against classical training in favor of 'scientific socialism', and as we will see classical humanism (especially secularist) was a stepping-stone to socialism, not its antithesis.

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[52] Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 012, pp.93-94.

[53] Ibid, Tabelle 051, pp.411-412. Calculated for cities with more than 100, 000 inhabitants.

[54] Sverdlov, "Biografiia", Granat, p.651; Gusev, "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.399; Sokol'nikov, "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.681-688; Uritskii, "Biografiia", Granat, p.734, BSE, p.78.

Russian language, literature and culture seemed more appealing and prestigious than the alternatives. For Ukrainian Jews, Ukrainian appeared a vulgarized Russian, and Ukrainian culture and literature 'backward'. It did not provide access to political or civic opportunities, but more importantly it did not provide access to imperial or European culture and ideas. Acculturating into Ukrainian society was no measure of an educated Jews' advancement, so Ukrainian did not serve as a break to Russification. Europeanization and cosmopolitanism necessarily meant Russification. Lithuanian literature and language seemed similarly 'backward' and relatively inaccessible. And although Polish language, literature, and revolutionary history held an attractive power, as with Radek and Uritskii, they were now those of a defeated nation and the political future lay elsewhere. The mid-century prestige of the revolutionary nationalism of heroic Poland was being eclipsed by the excitement of European Marxist socialism.

This cultural experimentation was more true of the Jews of the rising educated middle strata, most of these Bolsheviks, than it was for rural or lower class Jews. As Kieval wrote of Bohemian Jews of the 1840's, in the absence of a clear vision of integration or political emancipation, "undelineated boundaries of ethnic affiliation created extensive opportunities for testing the cultural possibilities", a kind of "cultural restlessness".[55] Moreover, living on the boundaries of various cultures, it seemed natural that several political and social allegiances could be embraced simultaneously without seeing them as competing or contradictory.

In the 19th century German Jews acculturated developing a sociability in keeping with German citizenship by creating social institutions of the new German Jewish bourgeoisie which paralleled those of the German bourgeoisie.[56] Hence even with emancipation, Jews did not assimilate in the sense that they disappeared or became 'Germans', rather they created a new identity, the "German Jew". Russian Jews had no similar official 'citizenship' on offer, but those educated, 'Russified' Jews, as were most of these Bolsheviks, did acculturate initially into a particular kind of middle class political

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55 Kieval, "The social vision of Bohemian Jews", in Frankel and Zipperstein, eds., Assimilation and Community, p.247, 256.

56 David Sorkin, "The impact of emancipation on German Jewry: a reconsideration", in Frankel and Zipperstein, eds., Assimilation and Community, pp.191-192.

sociability in keeping with the imperial middle class cultural elite: a political life of dissent, radicalism, literature, writers, publicists, political 'salons' and circles. This was an acculturation without political and civic integration or incorporation; national minority elites acculturated into a society in the face of civic exclusion. Consequently, they absorbed an imperial culture and its accoutrements against a backdrop of dissent.

In these cultural experimentations one senses that the worlds of European and Russian literature, art, music, and classics seemed to be an 'escape' from the traditional, 'backward', pogrom-ridden, anti-Semitic world of Judaism; an attempt to define a new identity in the modern and 'airy' world of European and elite Russian imperial culture. This was most certainly the case for Gusev and Uritskii who had both been required, before *gimnaziia*, to study the Bible and the Talmud respectively, and who had either experienced or witnessed anti-Semitism and pogrom violence. The world of 'Jewishness' and its associated experiences seemed too constricting and narrow. They wrote of the sense of 'emancipation' and 'escape' that European culture and ideas could provide. This 'transcendence' of Judaism was captured by Isaac Deutscher, who at age 11 had lived through pogrom violence himself at the time of Polish independence. Deeply immersed in the Talmud as a child in preparation for the rabbinate, he described the *kheder* as dirty and disgusting. Deutscher seemed to have transgressed and escaped from traditional Hasidic Judaism and what he perceived to be its stunted visual arts through the paintings of Chagall: for Deutscher, and indeed for Chagall himself, for a "Jew to paint was to rise in revolt...an act of emancipation".[57] Deutscher's subsequent passion for both Polish literature and German culture followed the same development as Karl Radek. Academically nearly all pursued careers in the liberal professions, and indeed many were in the humanist professions. In fact in 1897 11.7% of all people in the Tsarist empire working in art, literature and science were Jews -- almost 3 times what should have been their proportion in the population.[58]

In the 1870's Russian and Jewish Crown schools were an arena of Jewish cultural

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[57] Essay by Tamara Deutscher, "The Education of a Jewish Child", in Isaac Deutscher, The Non-Jewish Jews and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, London, 1968; on Chagall, Jacob Baal-Teshuva, Marc Chagall, 1884-1985, Koln, London: Taschen, 1998.

[58] Figure from Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.96.

regeneration. As Dubnow observed, "many [Jewish] children rapidly enlisted under the banner of Russian youth, and became intoxicated with the luxuriant growth of Russian literature which carried to them the intellectual gifts of the contemporary European writer". It was an escape from the "stuffy Talmud" and entry into positivism, evolution, rationalism, socialism: the two ways to escape the 'darkness' of the Pale were through cosmopolitanism and through rationalism, into universal humanism or "right into the heart of the Russian nation", where Jewish enlightenment was "through the Russian language and the Russian spirit". The national tongue of the Jews must then be Russian.[59] All of this initially lead to an *entente cordial* between Jewish youth and the Tsarist state.

Interestingly, this crucial dimension of the assimilative power of Russian language and culture was perfectly understood by the Governor of Minsk in 1894: "I am happy to report the progress that the Jewish population makes in Russian. Knowledge of Russian is regarded in Jewish society as a sign of education".[60] This is a restatement of Katkov's dictum that national elites in imperial peripheries only choose a language and culture as long as it raises their self-esteem. Unlike their father's generation, Russification was no longer solely a matter of access for socioeconomic advancement, it was now a matter of prestige, self-esteem, and "identity". And as we will see below, this also involved a response to growing local nationalisms.

The Jewish Bolsheviks studied at universities in Europe, some because of restrictive quotas in the empire but others simply because of expulsion because of radicalism. For instance, Kamenev left secondary school with admonitions from school authorities and consequently had a difficult time gaining admittance to university. In the end it was his record of radicalism, and not his Jewish origin, which caused difficulties. Kamenev continually petitioned the Minister of Public Education for the right to enter university, and was finally admitted to Moscow University Law Faculty in pursuit of a career in politics. His political activism continued and he was eventually expelled.[61]

Witte famously contended that it was Jewish oppression which was the cause for

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[59] Dubnow, The History of the Jews, Vol. II, pp.209-210, 214-215.

[60] Cited in Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.79.

[61] Granat, p.427.

their high numbers in the revolutionary movements, and much social theory would tell us something similar. But Leonard Shapiro was right to note that Witte's analysis was not the whole story: most young Jews who joined *Narodnaia volia*, for instance, were not inspired by their 'Jewishness' since they were anyway 'assimilated'.[62] Shapiro's observation finds some support in the Russian Jewish Bolsheviks in this elite.

But while it is true that they were not radicalized because they were Jewish, Shapiro may have been wrong to say that their Jewishness did not have anything to do with their political choices. Although we may speak of them as 'Russified Jews', they did confront their own 'Jewishness' in some fashion. National and cultural identity was a factor. Their cultural and political choices reveal the complexity of the identity of the 'non-Jewish Jew' late imperial society and politics: they were radicalized in years of reaction, anti-Semitism, quotas, exclusions, pogroms, and increasing ethnic nationalism. And for some this was indeed internalized.

Their early radicalism was, as Shapiro intimates, not primarily a function of their Jewishness as it confronted state exclusion, but had, I think, two components. First, much of what was happening had to do with their membership in the educated middle strata, socialized into a particular kind of elite society and 'sociability'. There was a very strong link -- across nationalities in the various radical movements -- between membership in radical movements, socialist and nationalist, and their membership into the educated middle strata who were involved in greater numbers and in a greater variety of radical groupings. These Jews did experience state oppression and exclusion, and even specific anti-Semitism, but this exclusion seemed to have occurred *after* they had already been radicalized.

The second component of their early radicalism had to do with their Jewishness, not as invoked by state oppression, but by the desire to 'escape' a Jewish identity. This had to do with ethnic, national, or religious tensions in their relations with other nationalities and how their new place in educated society caused identity dilemmas, cultural experimentations and possibilities. So we should look not only to Jews' relationship with

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[62] Leonard Shapiro, "Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement", in Russian Studies, ed. Ellen Dahrendorf, London, Collins Harvill, 1986, pp.266, 269-270, 272, 274.

the Tsarist state in the 1880's-1910's, but also to how nationality policies affected relations *between* ethnicities, to their changing position in the social structure, and to their place in regional or provincial civic life, as all of these factors impacted on their radicalism and Jewish identity.

III. Piatnitskii: Lithuanian Jewish radicalism in Vilna

Piatnitskii, a Vilna Jewish artisan, became a Bolshevik, but not before substantial activism in the Jewish Bund and Polish and German Social Democracy. He was born Osip Aronovich in 1882 in Vilkmerge, Lithuania, the son of a skilled Jewish carpenter. According to Piatnitskii, Vilkmerge had a population of 14,000 with numerous artisan and craft shops, a few small factories and a large machine shop. By 1897 he was one of 27.93% of Jews in the Belorussian and Lithuanian provinces; by 1900 the most important Lithuanian and Belorussian cities had considerable Jewish populations: Vilna had the 7th largest Jewish population in East Central Europe with Jews comprising 41% of the city's population and in 1897 up to 40% of Lithuania's urban population was Jewish.[63] Though the comparatively small number of Poles and Russians in these gubernii were the most urbanized ethnicities, there were almost three times as many urbanized Jews, far outweighing the urban social presence of the Lithuanians and Belorussians.[64]

What was distinctive about the socio-ethnic structure of the *kresy* was the fact that the 'native' middle classes -- Lithuanian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and even Polish -- were particularly small and weak. Vilna's industry was also distinctive in that Jewish capital dominated almost every field of production, and Vilna crafts industries were more prosperous than elsewhere. Also distinctive, and no doubt related to this, was the relatively mild anti-Semitism in the northern Pale as compared with the southern Ukrainian Pale provinces. So Piatnitskii's socialization was within the context of historically strong

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63 "Rossiia", 'Naseleniia Imperii', chart p.456a and b; Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 005, p.76; Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, p.109; Yves Plassarand and Henri Minczeles, Lituanie Juive, 1918-1940: Message d'un Monde Englouti, Editions Autrement, Collection Memoires, No.44, 1996, pp.59-61. Vilna had 64,000 Jews, Minsk 48,000, Vitebsk 34,000, Kaunas 28,000, and Grodno 23,000; Minsk was 52.3% Jewish, Vitebsk was 52.4% Jewish, Kaunas 37.1% Jewish, and Grodno 46%.

64 There were c.564,000 Poles, c.560,000 Russians, c.5,400,000 Belorussians, c.1,400,00 Jews, and c.870,000 Lithuanians. Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 040, pp.215-216.

Jewish communities in the *kresy* of the northwest empire, with relatively mild anti-Semitism.

Piatnitskii spoke Yiddish, Russian, and German with varying levels of proficiency. Less linguistically Russified than 'New Russian' (31.8%), Ukrainian Jews (41.27%), Lithuanian-Belorussian Yiddish-speaking Jews were more linguistically Russified than Yiddish-speaking Jews in Russian Poland (22.49%), although they were generally more literate.[65] About 1/2 of Ukrainian Yiddish-speaking Jews of Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Odessa, and Kharkov were able to read Russian, while in Vilna and Lodz it was only 36% and 30% respectively.[66] Therefore, Jewish acculturation to Polish or Lithuanian language and culture was neither attractive nor necessary, and in this respect it was similar to Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian provinces.

Jewish and Lithuanian communities in Vilna remained religiously, culturally, and linguistically distinct. Vilna's Jewish neighborhoods were Yiddish-speaking pockets whose Russified, educated, cosmopolitan Jewish *intelligentsia* spoke Russian or German, or both.[67] Occupationally most of Vilna's Yiddish-speaking Jews (44.6%) were in artisanry and manufacturing, 24.85% were employed in banking and commerce, and only 3.75% in the free professions This latter category had notably more Jews than Poles in absolute numbers: 2,312 Yiddish and only 1,461 Poles.[68] Although commerce was largely in Jewish hands, the majority of Vilna's Jewish population lived in the poor and dirty quarters of the city.[69] The Vilna socialist intelligentsia -- Polish and Jewish -- endeavored to connect the two ethnic worlds. And despite the city's predominantly Polish and Jewish composition, it became the center of Lithuanian socialist and nationalist

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65 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 041, pp.234, 236, 238. However, 45.08% of Yiddish speakers (mother tongue) were illiterate, 31.81% could read Russian, and 22.51% were literate in other languages (usually German); only 0.59% had more than primary school education -- as compared, for instance, to 2.68% in some Ukrainian provinces, including Odessa, Kherson, and Kishenev.

66 Ibid, Tabelle 051, pp.412-413, 415, 417, 419, 428.

67 Lituanie Juive, pp.67-79; Leonas Sabaliunas, Lithuanian Social Democracy in Perspective, 1893-1914, Durham N.C., Duke University Press, 1990, p.3.

68 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 053, p.450, Tabelle 052, p.439.

69 Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, p.91; Plassarand and Minczeles, Lituanie Juive, pp.74-75.

radicalism.[70]

To situate Piatnitskii then, he was among the preponderance of Vilna's urban Jewish artisans working quite apart from the Lithuanians, but linguistically and culturally he was among the minority who could read Russian and German. It was this fact that placed him at the borderlines of the nationalities of Vilna and made non-Bundist groupings both attractive and possible. How he acquired those linguistic skills is unclear, at least in my research, but it predestined his involvement in Polish, German, and Russian Social Democracy. In 1896 at age 14 Piatnitskii was working as an apprentice at a tailor's shop, when his two brothers involved in the labor movement brought home political exiles, socialists deported to Vilkmerge. This initiated Piatnitskii's radicalism.[71]

Piatnitskii made his way to Kaunas where he joined Bundist circles and associated not with his own tailor's trade, but with the more numerous and better organized carpenters.[72] Kaunas was historically an industrial city and in the late imperial period, Kaunas joined Vilna as a Jewish literary and cultural center where major Hebrew and Yiddish periodicals were published and where in 1898, the year Piatnitskii arrived, the Bund held its Second Congress.[73] Founded in 1897 the Bund was active not only among workers in small manufacture, but also in the larger industrial factories of Lodz and Warsaw.[74] In addition to the Bund, the Lithuanian parties, the Polish parties, and the small Russian parties all recruited among Jewish artisans. Piatnitskii was involved in the legal trade unions, but soon went to Vilna and joined the illegal Ladies Tailor Trade Union becoming its secretary and treasurer.

By 1900 both socialist internationalism and Jewish nationalism thrived in the northern Pale, and the Bund was the most important of the 'synthetic' movements, at once in Russian, Jewish, and Polish worlds.[75] Piatnitskii erroneously believed that the Bund

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70 Sabaliunas, Lithuanian Social Democracy, pp.3-5; Plassarand and Minczeles, Lithuanie Juive, p.66.

71 Piatnitskii, Memoires of a Bolshevik, p.15; BSE, p.293.

72 Piatnitskii, Memoires of a Bolshevik, pp.16-17.

73 Plassarand and Minczeles, Lituanie Juive, pp.77-79.

74 K. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", p.211.

75 Others were the Poalei Zionists, the Zionist Socialist Worker's Party, and the Jewish Socialist Worker's Party. ibid., pp.215-216.

remained "aloof" to non-Jewish workers and that this hampered their efforts to organize a single trade across nationalities.[76] But one of the most significant imperatives of Bundist politics was the need for inter-ethnic cooperation.[77] Bundist party tactics required that agitation also be conducted among non-Jewish social democratic workers, Poles and Lithuanians. In part, this derived from the fact that in cities of mixed ethnic working classes, general political strikes were more effective in unison with Lithuanian, Latvian, Russian, or Polish workers because Jews were not employed in the railways or post and telegraph offices and because they were poorly represented in the large factories.

But it also derived from the fear that political revolutionary action by Jews *qua* Jews might trigger pogroms and anti-Semitism. That Jewish workers were employed in small shops and ateliers may have made them easier to organize, but the antecedent reason for Bundist and Jewish success in cities like Vilna and Kaunas was that where Jews were either a very large minority or a minority among other minorities; "Jewish" radical politics could work either alone or in alliance with others without provoking anti-Semitism. However where Jews were only a relatively small minority, and therefore more conspicuous, or where other workers were not active, then Jewish workers would not organize for fear of anti-Semitism. This fear was lessened in Warsaw or Lodz where Jews constituted substantial minorities; but ethnic cooperation with Latvians and Russians was a necessity in Riga where Jews were a very small minority.[78] In cities such as Brest-Litovsk where Russian and Polish workers were themselves relatively inactive, Jewish workers, as a small minority, were also inactive for fear of anti-Semitic pogroms.

In sum, the largest "Jewish" actions took place in large cities (Vilna, Odessa, Kaunas, Minsk) with ethnically mixed working classes, and only if all the ethnic groups

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[76] Piatnitskii, Memoires of a Bolshevik, p.26.

[77] Jonathan Frankel, Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862-1917, Cambridge, 1981, pp.144-148; HIAPO, Box 206, Index Nos.XVIIIa-XVIIIc, Index XVIIIa, Folder 3, Circular No.17393, '18' November 1902, on Fifth Congress discussions on the need for inter-ethnic organizational strategies; K. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", pp. 211-213.

[78] Warsaw had 162,150 Poles and 64,481 Jews; Lodz had 86,353 Poles, 48,863 Germans, and 34,042 Yiddish (Jews); Odessa had 53,811 Russians, and 43,263 Yiddish; Riga had 54,836 Latvians, 14,304 Russians, and only 8,143 Jews. Vilna was 27,635 Yiddish-speaking, 12,793 Polish-speaking, 931 Belorussian-speaking, and only 600 Lithuanian-speaking of a 45,900 total. Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 052, pp.432, 434-435, 439.

were radicalized. In these cities Christian and Jewish workers did display a certain solidarity, and especially after 1905 this prompted increasing confidence in the viability of multi-national working class socialist organizations.[79] Significantly, then, the lesson of 1905 for many was a confirmation of 'internationalism', as socialist elites, and Jews foremost among them, began to see pogroms as "final outbursts of a dying political order".[80] Both Piatnitskii's pattern of activism and his autobiographical account reflect this sense of urgency about ethnic cooperation.

After 1905 Bundism became more significant than Zionism, assisted by the fact that the language of Zionism was Hebrew and the Jewish working classes were Yiddish-speaking.[81] When the Bund began to recruit among the wider Jewish working class, this shifted from Russian to Yiddish as the linguistic and cultural basis of the party's literature.[82] This had three related consequences. First, the Bundist leadership of Russian-speaking ex-*gimnazia* graduates ceded to an elite comprised of ex-*yeshiva* Jews with a better command of Yiddish than Russian. Secondly, this language and leadership shift resulted in the adoption of a more 'national' policy. The Bund therefore became at once more 'international' because its Yiddish-speaking rank and file lived in 'islands' amongst different 'nations' in the region, and more 'national' since the switch to Yiddish entailed a general switch in cultural orientation from Russian-centered to Jewish-centered.[83] And thirdly, since most Jews were employed by other Jews in small shops and ateliers, recruiting primarily among Yiddish-speaking workers meant both the reinforcing of the 'balkanization' of the labor force and the restricting of activism to small-scale manufacturing, to the exclusion of industrial or factory labor.

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79 K. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", pp.212-213, 218-219

80 Frankel, Prophecy and Politics, p.147.

81 Ibid, pp.132-133, 158-160.

82 K. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", p.220.

83 Ibid, pp.173-186, 190-250. This should be qualified as Frankel suggests. The Bund's ideological orientation was ultimately determined by political relations among national socialists: where an established socialist party allowed an autonomous Yiddish-speaking section (Galicia) the internationalist tendency prevailed, but where Jewish socialists were excluded from the dominant party (Rumania) the reverse process was set in motion. As the Bund moved in a nationalist direction, it forced confrontation with the RSDLP, leaving in 1903 and returning with Bolshevik support in 1906. It was on the Bund's insistence that the RSDLP adopted *rossisskaia* with its imperial connotation and not the ethnically-loaded *russkaia* .

Though not an intelligent, Piatnitskii was affected by these linguistic and cultural changes in Bundist policies and organization. Socialized and politicized before these linguistic changes, Piatnitskii continued to equate 'internationalism' with the Russian social democratic movement, not the Yiddishist Bund. Though a typical Jewish skilled artisan, Piatnitskii's linguistic skills were untypical and accorded him different status and potentials. Moreover, since most Lithuanian Jews felt distanced from Polish language and culture (which had prompted Pilsudski to replace Yiddish with Russian as the lesser of two evils), internationalism via the Polish socialists was unattractive. Perhaps for this reason Piatnitskii's memoires are laced with a certain trepidation of 'going it alone' as a Jewish organization and with continual references to the need for inter-ethnic cooperative alliances.

After the Revolution in the second edition of his autobiography, Piatnitskii retrospectively wrote that he was not "officially" a Bundist during this period. Piatnitskii had no clear political affiliation, he wrote "if I were asked to what organization I then belonged I could not answer as definitively as I could [now]".[84] However this may be an understatement judging from his activities: transporting literature for the Bund, assisting striking Bundists, carrying materials for *Iskra* through Bund connections, distributing leaflets for Pilsudski's nationalist PPS (Polish Socialist Party), and attending Bundist meetings and celebrations.[85] According to official accounts, Piatnitskii joined the RSDLP in 1898 at age 16.[86] This was likely only nominally through Bundism since the RSDLP did not really penetrate the area until 1905, and his own account details numerous contacts with Bund sections and Bundists in Vilkmerge and Kaunas at least until 1903.[87] At best it would be true to say that he was active in several national groupings at more or less the same time. Piatnitskii had contacts with the PPS between 1899-1900, while remaining active in the Bund and despite the fact that the Bund and the PPS were in direct competition for workers. And even as a member of the Iskra group after 1901, Piatnitskii continued to attend Bundist celebrations, rely on Bundist contacts and activists in the PPS -- even while

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[84] Piatnitskii, Memoires of a Bolshevik, p.20.

[85] Ibid, pp.24-27.

[86] BSE, p.293; Branko Lazitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, ("New Revised Expanded Edition), Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, [1973], 1986, p.362.

[87] Piatnitskii, Memoires of a Bolshevik, pp.24-28, 34, 49-50.

in Paris and after joining Lenin's Russian "Emancipation of Labor Group".

Piatnitskii's politics were not limited to Bundism or to Lithuania. While in prison in Kiev in 1902, Piatnitskii came into contact and organization with Iskra prisoners from other parts of the empire, and especially with Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries. On his escape from the Kiev prison, in 1903 Piatnitskii became active in the German Social Democratic Party under the name "Freitag", smuggling literature across the border from Tilsit and working in illegal printing offices. While in Tilsit and working for the German Socialists he also assisted the nationalist Lithuanian Social Democrats (LSDP) in smuggling religious literature and pamphlets across the border, and he strengthened his Menshevik sympathies after 1903.[88]

For some years then, Piatnitskii easily moved in and out of 'national' socialist groupings with relative ease, and though he never severed connections with the Bund, his urgency regarding cross-ethnic alliances only intensified in 1905. As we will see below in connection with Gusev, Piatnitskii's involvement with the Bund in Odessa in 1905 during revolutionary events, and especially in Jewish self-defense units, continued to strengthen his commitment to inter-ethnic alliances as he worked with Bolsheviks, Bundists, Armenian Dashnaks, and SRs. Piatnitskii had himself witnessed pogrom violence and assisted in the Jewish defense effort with Gusev.

But his involvement in inter-ethnic cooperation against pogromists did not evoke in Piatnitskii a 'Jewish' identity. Piatnitskii's activism in the Bund was a matter of pragmatic circumstance, not of Jewish identity. Lithuanian Jews were accustomed to the absence of anti-Semitism, and once confronted with it, he identified not as a Jew but as a revolutionary -- validating Shapiro's claim against Witte's notion that it was Jewish oppression which sent Jews into radical movements.[89] In recounting 1905 events, in descriptions of his activism in Kaunas, in Kiev prisons, and of his work in Leipzig, Piatnitskii seemed at pains to emphasize the multi-ethnic nature of his political involvements.[90]

Piatnitskii returned to Germany and spent four years between 1909 and 1912 in

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[88] Ibid., pp.40-50, 52-56, 60-61; HIAPO, Index No.XIIIb(1), Box 123, Folder 1E, Outgoing Dispatch No.1080, 3/16 July 1913.

[89] Frankel, Prophecy and Politics, p.50 on Lithuanian Jews.

[90] Piatnitskii, Memoires of a Bolshevik, pp.80-88, 129, 144.

Leipzig, active in 'colonies' of Poles, Lithuanians, and Jews. His involvement with German socialism continued, even working in Austria and Berlin.[91] In 1912 Piatnitskii went to Paris just as the city became an important Bolshevik center. He was arrested for his activities, exiled to Einisei in Siberia, and released only with the 1917 revolution. At outbreak of hostilities in 1914 Piatnitskii had been in exile among Bundists, Latvians Socialists, and Polish Socialists -- none of whom, according to Piatnitskii, had clear ideas or opinions on the war.[92] Piatnitskii subsequently became a committed internationalist, an active member of the Comintern, holding posts of Treasurer and Chief of the OMS in 1921, in 1923 one of four members of its secretariat, and in 1924 one of its secretaries. He remained an active and high ranking member of the Comintern through the 1920's.[93]

IV. Uritskii: Polish-Jewish radicalism in Kiev

Piatnitskii's radicalism in Vilna took place in a context of relatively wide Jewish cultural and political space. His and Kamenev's Bundist activism typified linguistic acculturation, while retaining social space for Jewish organizational and associational life. In this respect Vilna was broadly similar to Trotsky's Odessa. But in Kiev, by contrast, Jewish acculturation and radicalization took place in a very different ethno-political context. Despite stronger Polish social, cultural, and political presence in the northwest than in the southwest Pale, Piatnitskii was not attracted to it, but Uritskii was as part of a highly educated, culturally Russified Polish-Jewish radical elite.

This was typified by the Bolshevik Uritskii's early politics. Uritskii (Boretskii), a Kievian Jew, came to Bolshevism via Menshevism and alliance with Trotsky. Yet while in Kiev prior to his joining the Mensheviks in 1903 he had been active in Polish socialism and in the Ukrainian Spilka. A one time imperial army volunteer, war-time emigre, and confirmed internationalist along with most Jewish Bolsheviks, Uritskii opposed the dismemberment of the empire at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. He had been Chairman of the Petrograd Vecheka ordering executions of counter-revolutionaries just before he was

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91 Ibid, pp.164-172.

92 HIAPO, Index XIIIb(1), Box 123, Folder 1E, Outgoing Dispatch No.1080, 3/16 July, 1913; BSE, p.293; Piatnitskii, Memoires of a Bolshevik, pp.173-176, 208.

93 Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp.362-363.

himself assassinated by an SR in August 1918.[94]

Moisei Solomonovich Uritskii was born in 1873 into a Jewish merchant family in Cherkassak, Kiev guberniia.[95] His father died young and Uritskii was raised religiously on the Talmud.[96] Uritskii's intellectual horizons were broadened when, under his sister's influence, he became "captivated" by Russian literature.[97] He attended the Cherkassak pro-*ginmazia* and *gimnazia*, and gave lessons in order to support himself financially. He then attended Kiev University's Law Faculty, graduating with a law degree in 1897.[98]

Before addressing Uritskii's early radicalism it may be useful to lay out the social and political context of his radicalization in Cherkassak and Kiev. In 1897 Jews of the five Ukrainian guberniia (Volhynia, Kiev, Podolia, Kharkov, Chernigov) comprised only 8.35% of the population, similar in proportion to ethnic Russians (8.31%), but far outnumbered by Ukrainians (78.65%). Yet because of high levels of urbanization Jewish presence in these Ukrainian cities was considerable: c.705,000 Ukrainians, c.510,000 Jews, c.450,000 Russians, and c.60,000 Poles (mostly in Kiev).[99] The high level of Jewish urbanization was also reflected in occupational and *soslovie* standings: 76.61% of Ukrainian Jews were occupationally in urban manufacturing or commerce, and 94.16% were considered members of the *meshchane* estate.[100] Although the Uritskii's financial status is unclear (at least in my research), the use of "merchant" in official biographies (and in Okhrana pre-revolutionary records), and the fact that they could afford the elite *gimnazia* for their son, at least suggest they were members of the privileged 'merchant estate'. This would have placed Uritskii's family among the 1.42% of the empire's better-off Jews.[101] Uritskii's father's death, as with the early death of several of the Bolsheviks in this elite, no

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94 "Biografiia", Granat, p.734.

95 "Biografiia", Granat, p.734; BSE, p.78.

96 "Biografiia", Granat, p.734.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 040, pp.216-217.

100 Ibid, Tabelle 033, p.203, and Tabelle 043, p.284.

101 On the Uritskii's "merchant estate" status, BE, p.78; HIAPO, Index Cards, reference to Outgoing Dispatch No.242 dated 1916, notes that Uritskii was the "son of a merchant".

doubt changed the family's circumstances; Uritskii had to give lessons in order to make payments for the *gimnazia* in Cherkassak.

The fact that Uritskii attended classical *gimnazia*, and especially his 'captivation' by Russian literature, suggest the relatively high level of acculturation of this Jewish family, despite his having studied the Talmud (and not the Bible). It also further suggests that Uritskii was among the fairly small Jewish elite with high levels of education. Across the empire, 23.68% of Jews could read Russian (a rate of linguistic acculturation superceded only in the Baltics by Latvians, Estonians and Germans), but in the five Ukrainian provinces this figure was higher at 30.52%; empire-wide 0.88% of Jews had more than elementary education (superceded only by Germans, Poles, Russians, and Armenians), and it was slightly lower 0.78% in the five Ukrainian provinces.[102] In short, Uritskii was among the 1/4-1/3 of linguistically Russified Jews of the empire, and among the less than 1% of Jews with advanced education.

Uritskii's attraction to Russian literature and *gimnazia* education may have been connected to his and his family's desire to escape the anti-Semitic perceptions of merchant-capitalist Jews in Kievian Ukraine. Coming from a 'merchant Jewish family' in these years comported clear social difficulties, not the least of which were both societal (especially Ukrainian) and official anti-Semitism in Ukrainian Kiev -- one of the most anti-Semitic cities in the empire. The late 1880's and early 1890's were especially difficult for Kievian Jewry as compared to Piatnitskii's Vilna Jews, and the more so for those Jews involved in 'capitalist' or 'commercial' pursuits.[103] Pogromism and the *Kievlian*, the most Judeophobic periodical in the empire,[104] pressed for Jewish acculturation and insured that Jewish cultural, social, and political life would have much less space than in Vilna. Autonomous 'Jewish cultural' space was limited in Kiev, unlike Piatnitskii's Vilna or Trotsky's Odessa.

But like Odessa, Kiev's 1881-1884 pogroms were among the most violent in the

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102 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 012, pp.93-94; Tabelle 041, p.237.

103 Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp.103-112.

104 The slogan of the widely read Kievlian, an adversary of both Ukrainian separatism and Jews, was "Kiev was, is and shall be Russian". Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, pp.182, 206; Dubnow, History of the Jews, Vol.III, pp.19-20.

empire.[105] Jewish Russification and acculturation was associated with educated Jews in the urbanized professions. Though there seems to be some debate on this, by some accounts pogroms tended to occur precisely where Jews were the most acculturated (or at least the most skilled and qualified), not the most 'Jewish', culturally or linguistically.[106] So for the Talmudic Jew the classical *gimnaziia* and the literary and cultural and entrance into imperial society that they comported represented not only the intellectual, expansive literary world of Russian elite society, and a lift out of the traditional, closed, Jewish Hasidic world of anti-Semitism but, ironically, made them more vulnerable to pogromist anti-Semitism. *Gimnazia*, Russian language, and literature were simultaneously an escape from the Jewish 'capitalist-commercial-exploiter' social identity, and an entry into a wider imperial and European elite society and a new Jewish identity. So while in *gimnaziia* in the 1880's Uritskii began his involvement in Russian socialist circles in Cherkassak.[107]

Uritskii's ability to receive an advanced education in Kiev, and especially at the Law Faculty, was itself remarkable. As noted in Chapter 4, by 1892 educational restrictions on Jews, particularly in the form of percentage quotas had considerably reduced Jewish enrollment in *gimnaziia* and university from their 1860-1880's levels. Uritskii was not himself affected by entrance quotas, but his law degree, obtained in 1897, would have had very little value since in 1889 Jews had been almost entirely excluded from becoming sworn advocates in the Russian *advocatura*. This was a major blow to an acculturated Jewish lawyer like Uritskii. Unlike nationality restrictions in earlier years, now educated, acculturated Jews of the liberal professions were also excluded.

Yet when Uritskii was in the Law Faculty at Kiev University in the 1890's, he had been active in both Polish socialist groupings and in the Ukrainian socialist 'Spilka' group, activism not mentioned in official or unofficial biographies.[108] Kiev was a center of both Polish and Ukrainian radicalism, and Uritskii was attracted to both. Russian (and even Polish) cultural and social presence was strong in these Ukrainian provinces, especially as

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105 Klier and Lambroza, eds.., Pogroms, p.43 and passim.

106 Lowe believes this, for example, The Tsars and the Jews, pp.61-62.

107 "Biografiia", Granat, p.734.

108 This information is in HIAPO, Index Cards, reference to Outgoing Dispatch no.242 dated 1916 which notes that Uritskii was a member of Spilka while a student at Kiev.

compared to the weaker Russian presence in the Lithuanian-Belorussian provinces. In Kiev itself, high levels of linguistic Russification characterized Ukrainian, Polish, German, Yiddish speakers alike, 42.91%, 53.93%, 48.84%, and 47.36% respectively. Yet those Kievians with advanced education were ethnic Russians (14.74%), Polish (22.33%), and Germans (25.73%), with Jews (5.67%) and Ukrainians (3.80%) far behind. And this despite the fact that there were more Yiddish speakers in Kiev than Poles or Germans.[109]

In effect, a Yiddish speaking, educated Jewish lawyer in Kiev, such as Uritskii, would have found himself a very small minority, surrounded by an elite culture dominated alternatively by Polish and Russian. Acculturation and Russification would be different within this context than it was for the artisan Piatnitskii in Vilna or Sokol'nikov in Moscow. Linguistically, Polish socialism retained German for much of its literature, and Uritskii was proficient in German.[110] The attractiveness of Polish socialism, especially in the mid-1890's when it was still 'open' and 'cosmopolitan' enough to include acculturated Jews would have enabled *both* an escape from specifically Jewish identity and an anti-Russian state radicalism (see Chapter 7 for Polish socialism's early 'openness' to Jews). This was the embodiment of acculturation without political and civic integration.

There had historically been some affinity between Kiev's Ukrainian and Polish radicals. Though 90% of the 1863 revolutionaries in Kiev and Volynia were ethnic Poles, they were joined by politically disatisfied Russians and Ukrainians. In turn, many Poles were active in the Kiev Societies of Ukrainians, supporting Ukrainian cultural rights, something which only "fueled the paranoia of Kiev's small but active Russian Nationalist Club".[111] Polish Kievians had a social presence but political impotence.[112] Ukrainian-Jewish relations were equally contentious. Despite high levels of Russification among

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109 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 051, p.415. Kiev's Ukrainian population was 36,990, Polish 11,821, Yiddish-speakers 15,889, and German only 3,280. These census figures may mask the actually far higher numbers of Poles, see Daniel Beauvois, La Bataille de la Terre en Ukraine: Les Polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques, Presses Universitaires de Lille, pp.285-286.

110 As evidence see his later correspondence with Trotsky in German: letter from Uritskii while in Denmark to Trotsky in Switzerland of 12/11/1914, Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Box 185, Accession No.63013 8.41/44, Series No.119, Folder 17.

111 Hamm, Kiev, A Portrait, p.80. They demanded that the state tax Polish and Jewish property at twice the rate of Russian property for instance.

112 Beauvois, La Bataille de la Terre en Ukraine, pp.275-276.

educated Jews, and despite the fact that Jews were largely indifferent to Jewish culture, Kiev Jewry was perceived by both Ukrainians and Russians as "proches des Polonais", something which gave Ukrainian radicalism a distinctive dimension.[113]

Uritskii's early activism in the Ukrainian Spilka in Kiev while a law student is less well-documented. Ukrainian socialism had never developed a central leadership, and its position on Ukrainian Jewry was ambivalent. The leftist Ukrainian SD Party (Spilka was its youth wing) combined socialism and nationalism in the manner of the Polish PPS, but when it became more nationalist (as did the PPS) Jews were marginalized.[114] My sense is that Uritskii's Ukrainian activism was part of a deeper 'imperial' commitment. Ukrainian Jewish alliance with (Kievian) Poles and Polish culture was common, and it prompted a deep-rooted distrust of Jewish intellectuals on the part of the small Ukrainian (essentially nationalist) intelligentsia. On the one hand Ukrainians held that Jewish loyalty was to the Russian state, understandable given the primarily rural Ukrainian culture and the fact that most Jews lived, in effect, in culturally distinct spheres from Ukrainians, and where they did co-exist, the problem was perceived as Jewish exploitation of the Ukrainian peasant, often with ethnic undertones as 'lackeys' of the Polish *szlachta* or the Russian state. So less than Jewish apathy toward the Ukrainian intelligentsia's nationalist aspirations, there was perceived Jewish treachery and disloyalty in its alliance with the imperial government.[115] Ukrainian Jewish intellectuals, and my sense is that this is what was motivating Uritskii, were a minority increasingly caught between two anti-Semitic nationalisms, attempting to convince all nationalities around them that they were 'cosmopolitan', working in the interests of all peoples of universal values, speaking a vague language of 'patriotism', but this manifested in political alliance with the culturally dominant Poles or with the statist Russian.

This was hardly accepted by the leading Ukrainian nationalist Professor Kostomarov who viewed Jewish alliance with the Poles, and their professed 'cosmopolitanism' with suspicion, seeing in this a thin layer of cosmopolitanism but a

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113 Beauvois, La Bataille de la Terre en Ukraine, pp.311-315. On the Jewish community in Kiev, Hamm, Kiev, A Portrait, pp.120-121.

114 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.608.

115 Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, pp.110-111.

deeper layer of Talmudic belief, no doubt reinforced by Jews' traditional role in rural Ukrainian countryside as agents of Polish landed nobility.[116] For their part, Jews failed to participate in the Ukrainian national movement (despite a few Ukrainian liberal nationalist intellectuals' gestures) essentially because tangible benefits from the Ukrainians were no better than those on offer by the Russian state,[117] and because both Polish and Russian literature, history, and culture had greater appeal or 'assimilative power'. Ukrainian Jewry's imperial commitment, which I believe Uritskii's radicalism embodied, had at its base a principle of 'cooperation between peoples' rather than a 'unity imposed' on its constituent parts. But on the basis of 'cosmopolitanism', 'universalism, and 'humanism', ethnic Ukrainian nationalism was often accused of disrupting 'liberal' imperial principles.[118] While the Ukrainian nationalist Dragomanov argued that Russified Jews in radical parties only strengthened their centralist tendencies showing indifference to local differences.[119] Polish socialism and Ukrainian socialism (an RSDLP-allied Ukrainian-youth Spilka) offered Uritskii an organizational, radical form of this 'imperial', multi-ethnic cooperative vision, a vision which was excluded by Ukrainian nationalism. Note that ethnic cooperation was also important for Piatnitskii, but for different reasons because of the ethnopolitics in Vilna.

On completion of his law degree, and perhaps because of restrictions on Jewish admittance into the Russian Bar and Jewish lawyers into the imperial civil service, Uritskii joined the imperial army as a "volunteer" (*bol'noopredeliaiushchiitsia*)[120] -- persons with secondary education serving terms in the Tsarist Army under certain privileged conditions. Yet Uritskii's stay may have been quite brief -- as little as 8 days --ending, according to his biography, when he was accused of membership in the Social Democratic movement, and

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116 Ibid, pp.112-113.

117 Ibid, p.111.

118 Ibid, p.114.

119 Frankel, Prophecy and Politics, pp.218-219.

120 "Biografiia", Granat, p.734. This is omitted from official biographies.

thereby triggering a series of arrests and exiles.[121] It is also likely that anti-Semitism may have prompted his expulsion, although this is undocumented. Nevertheless Uritskii's volunteering in the Imperial Army in 1897-1898 may have reflected a certain commitment to some imperial patriotism, just as it may have seemed one of the best options available to an unemployable Jewish lawyer in the now exclusionist Imperial civil service, and one unlikely to successfully practice law privately in anti-Semitic Kiev.

At the outbreak of the war Uritskii emigrated to Europe and did not return to Russia until March 1917 -- Russian Jews were the only *inorodtsy* group liable for war service. In 1915 censors banned all Yiddish and Hebrew publications, depriving most of the Jewish population of information, and as early as August 1914 the first Jews were expelled from the areas immediately behind the front lines -- altogether 600,000 Jews were expelled from those provinces in the theater of war, creating a de facto dissolution of the Pale of Settlement.[122] All of this could have prompted Uritskii's emigration.

As a war-time emigre and now Menshevik, Uritskii was involved in Trotsky's *Nache Slovo* and held its internationalist, anti-war position. On returning during the Revolution, he joined Trotsky's Mezhraionka group before they joined the Bolsheviks in July-August 1917. Uritskii sided with Piatnitskii and the Left Communists on Brest-Litovsk, in opposing the Treaty terms for dismemberment of the empire.

V. Zinoviev, Chubar' and Kaganovich: Ukrainian-Jewish radicalism

In contrast to Piatnitskii's Vilna and Uritskii's Kiev, the economic dynamism and relatively open policies in Left-bank Ukraine and 'New' or 'south' Russia led to a more thoroughgoing Russification in the context of growing Ukrainian nationalism. A brief discussion of Zinoviev's, Chubar's, and Kaganovich's early radicalization leads to a

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121 Uritskii subsequently spent considerable time in prison and internal exile in Siberia. Exiled to Iakutsk province in 1899, and after participation in events in 1905 in Petersburg and Krasnoiarsk, he was arrested in 1906 and again exiled. He spent several years before 1914 in emigration abroad, though only briefly mentioned in his biography. This is documented in Uritskii's extensive Okhrana file: at least 19 dispatches between 1909 and 1913, and intercepted correspondence from 1913. HIAPO, Index Card File referencing a series of dispatches: 1226, 1222, 1363, 594, 757. 979, 994, 6100, 22, 157, 940, 1134, 118, 1451, 1680, 1128, 913; Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution, Box 185, Accession No.63013 8.41/44, Series 119, Folder 17, Letters dated 14/11/1913 and 13/8/1913; "Biografiia", Granat, p.734; BSE, p.78.

122 Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp.323-334.

discussion of Jews' relationship to the Tsarist state within the context of anti-Semitism and progromism in the Ukraine, the most violent region in the empire.

Zinoviev was born Radomil'skii, in 1883 in Elizavetgrad, Kherson gubernia to a small (milk firm) shopkeepers. His family was not well-off and Zinoviev worked at a young age to contribute to the family's keep.[123] His first political involvement was in the late 1890's radical circles. He was 'self-educated' passing the *gimnazia* maturity certificate, which enabled him to study in university. First arrested in 1901, by 1902 Zinoviev was in emigration in Berlin, Paris, and Berne where he participated in the German and Swiss Social Democratic parties.[124] In Berne he entered the University's Chemistry Faculty, and briefly the Law Faculty, while remaining active in Lenin's *Vpered* group, as he would continue a close association with Lenin throughout he career as a Bolshevik.

Unlike the urbanized, educated, and more cosmopolitan Zinoviev, Vlas Chubar' had a strong Ukrainian identity. So much so that Kaganovich, also a Ukrainian Jew from Kiev gubernia and also from a poor, uneducated rural family, frequently clashed with Chubar' because of the latter's 'bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism".[125] Stalin, too, thought Chubar' and the Ukrainian Pole, Kosior, guilty of Ukrainian nationalism.

Born in 1891 in a Ukrainian village, Chubar's parents were small-scale Ukrainian-Jewish farmers.[126] Chubar's radicalism began at age 13 as he proclaimed himself an athiest under Darwin's influence.[127] With support from a zemstvo stipend, private lessons, and work at a local railroad shop, between 1904 and 1911 he attended the Aleksandrovosk Mechanical and Technical School. Under a teacher's influence Chubar' became involved in populist and SR groups and worked to organize Ukrainian peasants, conducting propaganda for the SRs among the illiterate. But life in Aleksandrovsk and in the railroad workshops exposed him to Social Democratic workers groups, and he

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123 "Biografiia", Granat, p.418.

124 "Biografiia", Granat, pp.418-419; He was in Petersburg in 1980 when he was arrested, followed by a period of police surveillance in Elizavetgrad, and by August 1908 he was at the RSDLP plenum in Geneva, and in Paris in 1909, HIAPO, Box 198, Index Nos. XVIId-XVIIh, Index No. XVIIc, Folder 5, 'Spravka', No.36; Box 198, Index Nos.XVIId-XVIIh, Index XVIIe, Folder 4, No.1000, Paris 20 June/3 July 1913

125 Recounted in Medvedev, All Stalin's Men, p.117.

126 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.759; BSE., p239.

127 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.759.

eventually became a Bolshevik in 1907.

Chubar's activism before Social Democracy is suggestive. He experienced pogrom violence at first hand in 1905 in Aleksandrovosk, when his student apartment was destroyed by pogromists. His response was to leave the city immediately and return to the village to work with the SRs among the Ukrainian peasantry.[128] This is interesting because by most accounts, it was the Ukrainian village peasantry that were among the worst perpetrators of anti-Jewish violence in the pogroms of 1905 following the October Manifesto. And yet, as we will see with Gusev, Chubar' too sought refuge from his "Jewishness" in the SR movement. Although a convinced atheist, his Jewish identity persisted -- if only to deny it -- and amongst SRs he was able to escape it.

It is important and interesting that, unlike Uritskii, in 1905 Chubar' did not join Ukrainian national groups, Jewish groups, or Polish groups. Instead he turned to the SRs and SDs. It is worth pointing out that these were not singularly 'Russian' groupings in the Ukraine, and that in their ranks were many acculturated Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles. Chubar' would have felt himself 'at home' amongst other acculturated Jews in radical groupings that were essentially 'imperial' in their social composition. Chubar's strong Ukrainian identity derived in part from the fact that he had worked so extensively with the SRs among the Ukrainian peasantry. As noted earlier, rural Jews like Chubar' acculturated in a manner different from urban Jews since they had no higher social status group into which to move as did educated urban Jews like Zinoviev.

Before completing the discussion of Chubar' I briefly turn to Kaganovich. Kaganovich represented a third 'type' of Ukrainian Jewish Bolshevik, unlike Zinoviev he was uneducated and non-Europeanized, born in 1893 to a poor Jewish farming family in a village in Kiev guberniia, on the border with Belorussia (Minsk guberniia). He was particularly concerned with the impoverishment of the peasantry, no doubt because of his own Jewish family's circumstances in a Ukrainian village.[129] He wrote of the struggles between the state peasants and the kulaks, as peasant exploitation was intensified by the

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[128] Ibid., p.759.

[129] Lazar' Moiseevich Kaganovich: Pamiatnee zapiski, Rabochego Kommunista bol'shevika, profsoiuznogo partinogo i sovetsko-gosudarstvennogo rabotnika, Vagris, Moskva, 1996, pp.20-23, 30-31.

increasing social differentiation of the peasantry. But within this social context, as a Jewish family the Kaganovich's were quite "singular", rural Jews outside the colonies were few. The family's already difficult material circumstances, like many other Bolsheviks in this elite, suffered a reversal with the early death of his father -- no doubt making Kaganovich himself more receptive to perceptions of 'kulak exploitation'.[130] However there were nearby Jewish colonies, and Kaganovich wrote also of the internal social struggles of Jews within the colony as his family had contacts with some of the poorest.[131] Unlike most other Jewish Bolsheviks in this elite, Kaganovich's early life was one of severe socioeconomic hardship among the Ukrainian peasantry. In retrospective autobiography Kaganovich seemed to have been profoundly impressed by the class differences *within* Jewish society: poor colonists (he himself had difficulties entering village school) and the lack of rights for small Jewish farmers were juxtaposed against the wealth of the Kievian Jewish millionaires Brodskii and Gintsburg: though not a practicing Jew, Kaganovich seemed sensitive to Jews as both exploited and exploiters.[132]

In 1903 Kaganovich's brother migrated to the city and by 1905 became a Bolshevik.[133] Through him Kaganovich was exposed to the 'literatures of Kiev' -- Gogol, Nekrasov, Tolstoy -- in addition to radical newspapers, leaflets, and other publications. The protests of 1904 in connection with the war also made a strong impression on the 11 year old Kaganovich.[134] His intellectual exit from poor rural Ukraine was in the literature of imperial Russian culture. Kaganovich attended a village state school and was taken by Ukrainian literature and culture, the writings of Shevchenko and Russian classical and progressive literature, Belinskii, Chernyshevskii. He read Ukrainian and Russian translations of revolutionary-democratic literature and, by his own account, all of this planted in him the seeds of internationalism.[135]

Kaganovich must also have experienced severe and violent anti-Semitism,

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130 Ibid, pp.24-25.
131 Ibid, p.26.
132 Ibid, pp.26, 41, 61.
133 Ibid, p.26, 34-35, 38.
134 Ibid, pp.27-28, 30-31.
135 Ibid, pp.43-44.

especially in 1905-1906. While by this time Polish anti-Semitism had an urban bias, Ukrainian anti-Semitism was perhaps based more on fears of 'kulaks' and 'Jews on the land'. In the heart of the Pale, Kiev gubernia witnessed the most violent pogroms during 1881-1884 waves, and was among the most violent in the 1903-1906 period.[136] Though not a "fanatically religious" family, it was still a Yiddish-speaking family, with Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking children.[137] Therefore his Jewishness was experienced in the context of the deep societal anti-Semitism around him and may likely have been internalized. But his experience of anti-Semitism differed from Chubar's who was acculturating with other acculturated Jews in radical groupings among Ukrainian peasants.

Kaganovich also lived amongst Belorussian, Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish growing nationalisms -- all in delicate but shifting socio-ethnic balances. He wrote of the "nationalism of backward nations" and of the tensions between Ukrainians and Russians experienced by Jews as pogroms.[138] The experiential associations entwined nationalism ('chauvinism') with pogroms. But Kaganovich viewed the greater Russian revolutionary movement and workers' struggle as spearheading the struggle of all oppressed nationalisms under Tsarism, e.g. Ukrainians, Poles, Jews.[139] Socialist internationalism was the antidote to excesses of nationalist-ethnic conflict. Interestingly, the 'rightness' of the empire is never called into question. Kaganovich's hatred of Ukrainian nationalism and his battles with Petrovskii and Chubar' have their sources here in his early associations.

The sociology of Chubar's and Kaganovich's early radicalism was intimately connected to rising nationalism and anti-Semitism. The SR's and SD's in the Ukrainian industrial regions had many Russian workers in their ranks, but they also had a proportionally large number of Jews. These groups may have been seen by many Jews as the best defenses against Ukrainian nationalism and violent anti-Semitism. Kaganovich was notoriously ruthless, once in power, toward Ukrainian nationalism on the grounds that

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136 Lambroza and Klier, eds., Pogroms, pp.43,194. In 1881-1884, Kiev, Kherson, and Ekaterinoslav gubernia had the worst pogroms in the Empire, between 31-70. In 1903-1906 wave Kiev gubernia witnessed between 35-55 pogroms, behind Kherson, Bessarabia, and Chernigov.

137 Ibid, pp.37-39.

138 Ibid, pp.46-47.

139 Ibid, pp.46-47, 83-87.

it was "bourgeois". But this was the language of socialism, not Kaganovich's experience. Radicalized as a village Jew in rural Ukraine, Ukrainian peasant culture and 'nation' were violently anti-Semitic, ethnic, and for Jews, ultimately exclusionary. Therefore 'Russian' movements like the SRs or the SDs had a distinctive appeal. The 'elective affinity' was different for Uritskii who joined Polish Socialists while a student at Kiev University: educated Ukrainian Jews found no resonance inside Ukrainian culture and often turned to Polish movements, while poorly educated or uneducated rural Ukrainian Jews (Kaganovich) with no exposure to educated Polish society may have turned to Russian movements to escape violent Ukrainian anti-Semitism.

Moreover the Tsarist state's response, and the response of the revolutionary movements themselves, to pogroms and anti-Semitism may also have played a role. Pogroms were primarily a product of the southern Ukrainian provinces: Chernigov, Kherson, Poltava, Bessarabia, Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, and Podolia. Unlike the 1881-1882 pogroms, by 1905 many thought of the Jews as responsible for the revolutionary movements gaining strength throughout the empire. Anti-Jewish violence appeared less religiously inspired and more reactionary. Government analyses of the 1903 Kishenev pogroms had placed responsibility on the Jews themselves, and though not the cause of the pogroms, the state's failure to condemn the violence had unintentionally encouraged future pogroms.[140] The key trigger for the worst violence to date was the October Manifesto: at least 650 pogroms occurred between October 1905 and September 1906, most in the 3 months following the Manifesto. Although -- or perhaps because -- the liberalizations of the Manifesto were greeted with general celebration, particularly among Jews as a step toward their eventual emancipation, reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries acting in defense of Fatherland and Tsar were the most numerous pogromists. Right-wing political organizations (such as the Black Hundreds) tried to convince Russian and Ukrainian peasants that extension of rights to Jews would diminish their claims to (land) reform.

Though mentioned only in passing in his autobiography, and not at all in official sources, Gusev (discussed in detail in the next section) was deeply involved, *as a Bolshevik*, in the protection of Jews in Odessa during the 1905-1906 pogroms. The

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[140] Shlomo Lambroza, "The pogroms of 1903-1906", in Klier and Lambroza, eds., Pogroms, p.207.

sketchy accounts are contained in Piatnitskii's memoires, as they worked together for the Odessa SDs.[141] Gusev was involved with student Bolshevik organizations in Odessa and was active in the "technical apparatus" of the Odessa committee.[142] Odessa's enterprises were mostly small-scale: tailoring, shoemaking, small shops, printing offices, with committees representing Mensheviks, Bund, SRs, Dashnaks and Bolsheviks. According to Piatnitskii, the Bund and the Bolsheviks often worked together on tactical issues. Bundists, SRs, Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, Poale-Zionists, and Dashnaks organized federated joint resistance and set up defensive armed detachments. They seemed to have been impeded, in Piatniskii's account, by the fact that the pogromists were defended by police, Cossacks, and cavalry. They were sufficiently hindered in their efforts that on the second day of the pogroms, Gusev himself decided to terminate Bolshevik involvement because they were "losing too many comrades".[143]

Gusev's decisions and activities during the Odessa pogroms seemed entirely consistent with those of the Bolsheviks and the other socialist and national socialist parties. Jews figured prominently among all these socialist and national-socialist groupings, and Gusev and Piatnitskii, as Jewish Bolsheviks, could easily work closely with the Bundist self-defense organizations without invoking any specifically Jewish identity. The motivating rationale behind these socialist parties' concerted actions was not a specifically ethnic-religious or national one, but rather they viewed ethnic and religious tensions as cross-cutting and undermining worker identities. As Weinberg noted in his study of the Odessa pogroms, the essential element in the confrontations in 1905 Odessa was between the forces of reaction (e.g. Black Hundreds) and the forces of revolution (e.g. the socialist parties).[144] Yet it was precisely because Jews were prominent in the latter revolutionary and leftist parties that they also became obvious targets to both reactionary social forces and to a state fearing social revolution.

The immediate tensions in 1905 were among dockworkers of different nationalities

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141 Piatnitskii, Memoires of a Bolshevik, see especially Chapter 4.

142 Ibid, pp.76-77.

143 Ibid., pp.86-88.

144 Robert Weinberg, "The Pogrom of 1905 in Odessa: A Case Study", in Klier and Lambroza eds. Pogroms, p.259.

-- Russians, Jews, Georgians, and Turks. Historically a non-Russian city, Odessa pogroms -- in 1821, 1859, 1871, 1881, 1900 -- had involved Greek-Jewish antagonisms over control of the grain trade as Jews entered as middlemen and displaced the Greek presence in Odessa. In 1881, 1900, and 1905 Russian dockworkers were increasingly prominent as pogromists, evidence that Russian workers and migrants were replacing Greeks in the port city. But it was the underlying Greek-Jewish antagonisms, often during Holy Weeks and religious festivals, which because of abnormal socioeconomic relations latterly drew in the new Russian population.[145] Indeed in 1905 the pogromists were primarily unskilled day laborers with precarious social existence, taking part in patriotic processions.[146] Thousands of unskilled dockworkers and longshoremen vied for employment in the city during periods of peak activity (nearly 16,000 in 1897), competition which was ensconced in Jewish-Gentile relations. These tended to be the shock troops of reaction, day laborers often following conservative government lines.

State responses to pogroms were important. At the mid-level of imperial government, e.g. provincial governors and Governor-Generals of the various provinces and regions, official attitudes to anti-Jewish violence were mixed depending on both the proclivities of individual governors and the socio-ethnic composition of the particular region, with some governors quite anti-Semitic while others wanted a liberalization of Jewish restrictions.[147] But there seemed to have been much more leniency towards anti-Semitic violence and more official anti-Semitism generally at lower, local and municipal levels of government. It was here that official response tended to be much more inconsistent, often inciting violence, and generally tolerant of pogromists.[148]

Therefore the higher up governmental and official Russia, the more tolerant and integrationist it appeared to be; the more provincial, regional, or local official Russia, the

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145 Klier, "The Pogrom Paradigm in Russian History", ibid, pp.21-23.

146 Weinberg, "The pogrom of 1905 in Odessa: a Case Study", in Lambroza and Klier, eds.. Pogroms, pp.272-273.

147 Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.63 and *passim*.

148 Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right Wing Politics, p.30, 32 and *passim;* Weinberg, "The pogrom of 1905 in Odessa: A Case Study", p.265; Shlomo Lambroza, "The Pogrom of 1903-1906", ibid., p.218-225, 239, although he believes that general government attitude and actions did contribute by subtly manipulating events and by placing blame on Jews, p.241-242.

more anti-Semitic, intolerant, and exclusionary. This is consistent with what we know of nationalities staffing in the provincial civil services generally: higher posts were non-native (and in the borderlands often non-Russian), while middle-level and lower level posts were generally held by bilingual natives. Interestingly this was matched by the radical parties themselves: the more 'imperial' or geographically broad in scope (SRs and SDs), the more tolerant toward Jews, while the more regional or local, the more exclusionary (PPS, Ukrainian RUP). This is also consistent with the more general claim of the sociology of the empire: local educated minority elites were excluded from local positions, rights, and power in the provinces, but were incorporated within the imperial service and bureaucracy.

While the thrust behind anti-Jewish violence had, for instance, been retributive in the destruction of property, to official Russia it was unclear whether it was religious-national antipathies reinforced by exploitation, or exploitation triggered by religious-national tensions.[149] These were at the core of the explanations variously used by government officials, right-wing political organizations, and much of the periodical press: ethnic tensions and Jewish exploitation were the sources of disorder. Yet Hans Rogger has shown that the state, rather than conspire to instigate, indulge or condone pogrom violence as had long been argued, was frightened and unnerved by the loss of social control.[150]

Both socialists and state elites focused, respectively, on class-revolutionary potential and social order, to the exclusion of the distinctive feature of the violence -- ethno-religiously motivated enmities whose underlying causes were much more complicated. So while the state responded with increased repression, the Leftist non-national radical parties, particularly the SDs and SRs, offered 'social engineering' solutions: because the sources of the social unrest were attributable to capitalists exploitation and to the autocratic state, the solution required a radical restructuring of socioeconomic relations along socialist lines, removing both the causes of ethnic tensions and the source of Jewish 'exploitation'. Pogroms only strengthened national identity and in so doing diverted workers from their true interests; attention had to be turned away from national, ethnic-religious identifications

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149 Klier, ibid, p.17, 29. Klier writes that the "Kievlianin", one of the most judeophobic papers in the empire, had accepted "Jewish exploitation" not socioeconomic or political forces, as the cause of pogroms.
150 Rogger's "Conclusion and Overview", in Klier and Lambroza, eds., Pogroms, pp.316-617.

and toward more 'universalist' values.

The effect of this reasoning on the Jewish socialists, and they were in no small measure contributors to it, was profound. Socialist radicalism was predicated on a certain kind of 'absolution' from Jewishness, as Gusev, Chubar', Kaganovich, Piatnitskii and others could be members of these radical groups, but not necessarily labeled as Jews. The multi-national (and national) socialist parties to which they belonged mirrored the empire itself and organizationally provided political escape from ethnic tensions endemic to localism.

For Ukrainian Jews in particular, Russian Bolshevism continued to appeal after the Revolution. During the Russian Civil War in the Ukraine, the most widespread pogroms to date occurred between 1919-1920: 250,000 Jews were killed in the Civil and Polish wars at the hands of nationalist forces, the White Armies, Ukrainians, Cossack, and Anarchist (typically Ukrainian) forces. Ukrainians appeared to have been the worst perpetrators, especially in the villages, since Ukrainians believed Jews to be pro-Russian, while conservative Ukrainian forces viewed them as radical Leftists.[151]

Crucially, the anti-Jewish violence on the part of the Red Armies is known to have been the most minimal. The Red Army was apparently highly disciplined and well-controlled by the Bolshevik leadership, as there were concerted efforts in the form of penalties and propaganda among Red Army troops to convince them *not* to hunt Jews. The Council of Commissars decreed in 1918 that "it is herewith ordered that pogromists and persons inciting to pogroms be outlawed".[152] (Occupying German armies also had anti-pogromist policies). Although there is no good study on this, the significant Jewish representation in the Bolshevik leadership elite may have been an important factor in the policy. Nevertheless the 'statist' solution to Jewish victimization was apparent. In the face of nationalist, conservative, Cossack, and Ukrainian peasant violence, Ukrainian Jews "ultimately realized that Soviet rule offered them the best chance of survival", and many young Jews enlisted in the Red Army as Soviet leaders.[153]

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151 Peter Kenez, "Pogroms and White Ideology in the Russian Civil War", in Klier and Lambroza, eds., Pogroms, pp.293-294.

152 Quoted in Rogger, "Conclusion and Overview", p.351.

153 Kenez, "Pogroms and White Ideology", ibid, p.301.

VI. Trotsky and Odessa Jewry

Odessa, like Vilna, had wide cultural and political space for Jewish development. Vilna had been the traditional Jewish intellectual center since the mid-1700's, with the Haskalah *maskilim* of the Vilna region based on a new secular, Hebrew literature. Odessa was a different haskalah center: a modern, secular and commercial city founded at the end of the 18th century, it was not the center of learning and education that Vilna had been. Because Odessa itself was a boom town with all the freedom of frontier conditions, its Jewish community had very little local tradition and few religious restrictions. The first modern Jewish community in the Russian empire emerged as Odessa Jews stood at the vanguard of almost every modernist Jewish movement in the empire.[154]

Odessa was both the administrative capital of 'new Russia' and an important Black Sea grain exporting city with duty free port of entry status. Extremely multinational -- Greeks, Armenians, Russians, Jews, Rumanians, Turks, and others -- it was also an extremely cosmopolitan city. Odessa's Jews did not predate Russian presence, but had migrated from the northwest Pale (Belorussia-Lithuania) in search of opportunity. By the turn of the century, Odessa was not only the fourth largest city in the empire (behind Moscow, Petersburg, and Warsaw), but it was also 1/3 Jewish. In contrast to Kievian Jews, Odessa Jews had suffered comparatively fewer restrictions. Residence limitations, unlike in Kiev, were never imposed, and as one observer noted, "if a Jew from the Pale doesn't dream about America or Palestine, then you know he'll be in Odessa".[155]

The lucrative Odessa grain trade and its accompanying infrastructure gave rise to ethnic tensions -- Odessa Jews experienced pogroms repeatedly as noted in the section above. Significantly, an important segment of the Jews arriving in Odessa in the early 19th century were reformers of the Galician Haskalah with their educational emphasis: Bible (not Talmud), German, French, science and geography; teachers were from Austria or the German states, with German cultural orientations. So through the early 1860's the Odessa

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154 Alexander Orbach, New Voices of Russian Jewry: A Study of the Russian Jewish Press of Odessa in the Era of the Great Reforms, 1860-1871, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1980, p.14.

155 Quoted in Robert Weinberg, The Revolution of 1905 in Odessa: Blood on the Steps, Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies, Indiana University Press, 1993, p.9.

Jewish community was modernist, secular, and Germananophilic.[156]

By the late 1850's and early 1860's however, commercial and political contacts with imperial officials increasingly required Russian, and the Jewish elite began sending their children to the Russified Richelieu Lyceum. By the beginning of the Great Reforms, Odessa witnessed the emergence of a russophile, secularist and modernist intelligentsia, which produced important newspaper and periodical press for the Jewish community. Jewish periodicals like "Rassvet" addressed their readers in Russian, an indication that "the Jewish community in Russia had produced in less that one century under Tsarist rule a group of serious writers and thinkers that had come to identify themselves, at least culturally, with the Russian literary tradition...[and]...shows the degree to which western liberal tradition had penetrated deeply into Jewish society in the Russian Empire".[157]

Trotsky was radicalized in this context. Trotsky's life and career are so well-known and so well-documented that I will only highlight a few aspects of his pre-1917 activism. Much like Radek and Dzierzynski, Trotsky's (Bronstein's) early years were spent on the borderlines of several cultures, and his cultural and linguistic choices reflected this. In 1879 Trotsky's father had bought and leased land in German-Jewish farming colony in Elizavetgrad, Kherson province.[158] The state had promoted Jewish colonization of the southern Steppe, and prior to 1881 generally offered favorable conditions for it; Jews found it attractive if only because it permitted them to leave the Pale. According to Trotsky, Kherson's Jewish agricultural colony had about 40,000 people. Jewish colonists, however, tended to be something of a self-selected group -- from the lower orders of the Pale's population, and as Deutscher observed with respect to Trotsky's family, "illiterate, indifferent to religion...[appearing] almost completely un-Jewish".[159] The few agricultural Jews in the Steppe were semi-Russified, and the family spoke a combination of Ukrainian and Russian, not Yiddish.[160]

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156 Orbach, New Voices of Russian Jewry, pp.18-20.

157 Ibid, pp.196-197, 201. "Rassvet", "Sion", "Den'" (all in Russian), "Hameliz" (in Hebrew), and "Kol mevaser" (in Yiddish).

158 "Biografiia", Granat, p.720; Leon Trotsky, My Life, Grosset and Dunlop, New York, 1930, pp.5-7.

159 Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879-1921, Oxford University Press, 1954, pp.5-6.

160 Trotsky, My Life, p.18; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, p.7.

Though hit hard by the agricultural crises of the 1880's, the Bronstein's became rather wealthy landowner farmers. Like Kaganovich in Kiev gubernia, Trotsky was in proximity to German and Jewish colonists. But unlike Kaganovich who focused on the impoverishment of the peasants in his autobiography, Trotsky's autobiography stresses his witnessing the rural aristocratic class in decay and decadence.[161] Here we find an important distinction between the poor, rural Jew Kaganovich, and the wealthier, more urbane and educated Trotsky in terms of the "elective affinity" between their 'interests' and the ideas within socialism. Because they were Ukrainian Jews of different social strata, their 'interests' made them receptive to different elements of the social critique: Kaganovich was receptive to peasant exploitation, while a key theme in Trotsky's work and career was his preoccupation with (and identification with) the aristocratic classes -- Russian while in Ukraine, Austrian while in Vienna, and German while in Berlin. Significantly, both would become strongly anti-nationalist, though one would be a Russian centralist and the other an internationalist.

At age 10 Trotsky was sent to a Yiddish-speaking *kheder* in a local German-Jewish colony, but could not speak Yiddish. Trotsky was immediately repelled by the dirty darkness of the Jewish community but was strongly attracted to the bright, clean cottages of the Gentile German colonists.[162] He had, however, learned to read and write Russian. Under the influence of a liberal Odessa relative, Trotsky polished his manners and Russian accent, and his entry into Russian educated society began reading Pushkin, Lermontov, and Nekrasov, Tolstoy, Faust, and Dickens. While Trotsky failed entrance into an Odessa *gimnazia* in 1887 -- the year of the Jewish percentage quotas -- he was admitted in 1888 into the Odessa *realschule*, a Russified German-Luthern school with German, Russian, Polish, and Swiss teachers, and where Germans comprised just under 1/2 the student body.[163]

Odessa schools, like the city itself, were particularly liberal and multi-national and no single nationality predominated. There appeared to be no open discrimination (except

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161 Trotsky, My Life, pp.30, 32-33, 37, 78-86.

162 Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, p.11.

163 Trotsky, My Life, pp.45-46.

against Germans in the face of Russification) and more academic openness than was normal for the empire.[164] It was here that Trotsky became "highly bourgeois" in manners, dress, and thought.[165] He developed a deep passion for Russian literature, Shakespeare, and Italian opera.[166] Rural life and its battles became more distant, coarse, and brutal. Until 1896 however, Trotsky remained politically indifferent and had joined no socialist circles. But in Odessa, a place of cultural and linguistic experimentation, his Europeanization and Germanophilia had cemented his hatred for the decadence of the rural gentry and coarse rural life.

In 1896 when he continued secondary studies in Nicolaev he stayed with a family whose sons were already socialists, though socialist groupings were non-existent in Nicolaev at the time. Like much of Odessa's liberal Jewish secular intelligentsia, Trotsky's affinity was anyway with the liberal ideas of Mill and Bentham, not Marx.[167] Trotsky was not, however, concerned with nationality. He wrote: "in my mental equipment, nationality never occupied an independent place, as it was felt but little in everyday life...as a son of a prosperous landowner, I belonged to the privileged class rather than to the oppressed. The language of my family and household was Russian-Ukrainian...[and] I was not personally affected by the [Jewish percentage] restrictions."[168]

To a certain extent Trotsky's politicization, as Shapiro said of many Jewish Bolsheviks, was not specifically related to a Jewish identity. And as Deutscher notes, "rationalistic rejection of religion was... characteristic of the educated Russian of his time", liberal or socialist, Orthodox or Jewish.[169] In fact Trotsky would later come down hard on Bundist demands for "cultural autonomy", always maintaining that Jewish cultural life should not be closed in on itself.[170] Trotsky wrote that although there were occasionally "instances of suppressed chauvinism", there was no real discrimination because so many

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164 Trotsky, My Life, pp.59-60; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, pp.13-14.
165 Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, p.115.
166 Trotsky, My Life, pp.64-65.
167 Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, p.25.
168 Trotsky, My Life, pp.86-87.
169 Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, p.38.
170 Ibid., pp.73-74.

nationalities were present: "national inequality probably was one of the underlying causes of my dissatisfaction with the existing order, but it was lost among other phases of social injustice. It never played a leading part -- not even a recognized one -- in the list of my grievances."[171] But "spirit of opposition" was all around, "along with a suppressed hostility to the political order in Russia, I began to create, in my imagination, an idealized picture of the foreign world -- of western Europe and America...I began to visualize a culture which was high in itself and included everybody without exception". This ideal democracy was absorbed from his "environment of liberal smug citizenship".[172]

And yet his dismissal of the relevance of any Jewish identity may be misguided. Odessa's Jews were liberal, Germanized and Russified, and highly cosmopolitan or Europeanized. It may have been less the 'scientific', 'messianic' of 'spiritual transfiguration' within socialism,[173] but its European Enlightenment secularism. Trotsky wrote that multi-national Odessa was "far beyond other centers in a political sense", but while true in terms of socialist groupings, Odessa did have a number of Jewish and liberal circles. Trotsky was finding theories of exploitation to match and explain his earlier experiences of peasant floggings and gentry decadence. His politicization involved finding explanation of his experiences. Nicoleav in 1896 was a turning point, as he met Marxist students and read the Russian liberal paper *Russkiia Vedomosti* where he formed a picture of life in Europe.[174]

Then after the SD splits, Trotsky spent time in Viennese emigration with the Adlers, whom he had met in 1902. He returned to Russia in 1905, and by 1907 he was back in Vienna, though he "watched German life more attentively than [he] did Austrian, which reminded [him] too much of a squirrel in a cage".[175] In intellectual community, and in cafes with Hilferding, Adler, Kautsky, with Austro-Marxists Bauer and Renner, Trotsky

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171 Trotsky, My Life, p.87.

172 Ibid, pp.91-92.

173 Eric Haberer makes this last apoint, arguing that socialism was a 'transfiguration' of Judaic belief. I find this unconvincing. Haberer, Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth Century Russia, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

174 Trotsky, My Life, pp.96-100.

175 Ibid, p.205.

regarded Austrian Marxists as philistines and academics in "old imperial, hierarchic, vain and futile Vienna". The German-Czech battles inside Austrian Marxism fell on deaf ears on Trotsky, who blamed the Vienna leaders of the party for Czech trade union secession.[176] Although Trotsky wrote disdainfully on this, saying he felt no affinity with the "Herr Doktors", he nevertheless frequented the cafes and took active part in all activities as a member of the Austrian party.

It is worth noting that though a 'non-Jewish Jew', Trotsky was socializing and in political activity essentially in the company of other 'non-Jewish Jews'. In his years in exile Trotsky developed close friendships with other Russian Jews in exile, notably Ioffe and Uritskii who both became contributors to his *Pravda*, formerly published by the Ukrainian Menshevik *Spilka* group, and he crossed paths with Radek, another acculturated Jew whose multi-lingualism and Europeanization bore striking resemblance with that of Trotsky. He made his most lasting friendship with the future Bolshevik the Bulgarian-Rumanian Rakovskii who was as "Europeanized" as Trotsky.[177]

Another of Trotsky's closest relationships was with the future Jewish Bolshevik Adolf Ioffe. Ioffe became one of the most talented and "European" Bolsheviks, a key diplomat for the Bolshevik regime in 1918 at Brest-Litovsk, and the first ambassador to Germany. Plagued by nervous disorders and crises all his life, in 1927 Ioffe committed suicide.[178] Ioffe's family were wealthy merchants from Simferopol (Crimea). Owners of the transport and postal services in the Crimea, they owned a home in Moscow and carried the title "hereditary distinguished citizen". Ioffe's father was considered a 'favorite Jew' of Witte's.[179] Ioffe's family were Karaites, a Jewish sect of Lutsk (Volhynia), Troki (Lithuania), and the Crimea. Compared to other Jews Karaites had privileged legal positions because they had convinced the state that they had rejected the Talmud.[180]

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176 Ibid, pp.207-209, 217-218; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, p.185.

177 Trotsky, My Life, p.227; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, pp.207-209.

178 Nadezhda A. Joffe, Back in Time, My Life, My Fate, My Epoch: The Memoirs of Nadezhda A. Joffe (trans. Frederick S. Choate), Labor Publications, Oak Park, MI, 1995, p.10; Trotsky, My Life, p.221; Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 127, Accession No.63013 8.41/44, Series 276, Folder 4.

179 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.422; BSE, p.390; Joffe, Memoirs of Nadezhda Joffe, p.3.

180 Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855-1881, p.10.

Ioffe was born in 1883 and his political radicalism began while in *gimnazia* in the late 1890's as the labor movements were taking off.[181] Ioffe joined the RSDLP, was labeled 'politically unreliable' and was barred from entering any Russian university.[182] This began his many years in emigration: in 1903 he went to Berlin to study medicine and joined the German Social Democratic Party (he was eventually deported by Bulow for his activities). Ioffe then went to Zurich to study law at the university and joined the Swiss Socialist Party.[183] In 1908 he went to Vienna where he worked on *Prawda* with Trotsky, becoming a classic acculturated Jewish intellectual in exile.

Ioffe's Vienna years were closely entwined with Trotsky's, as he associated in the community of acculturated Russian and Viennese Jews. Ioffe suffered nervous breakdowns and violent crises for which he sought treatment from Alfred Adler, though Trotsky famously wrote that the Russian Revolution "healed Ioffe better than psychoanalysis of all his complexes".[184] Between 1912 and 1917 Ioffe was in prison in Odessa and in internal exile in Krasnoyarsk where he worked, for the first time, in a village as a physician, and from which he wrote a series of letters testifying to his fragile nervous state.[185]

Therefore, as with the Jews of Habsburg Vienna, educated Russian Jews were acculturated in the sense that they had adopted outward cultural forms and ideas of Imperial Russian and European societies, but they did not disappear as Jews. And although they were acculturating, in *gymnasia* and universities and socialist parties, they were often doing so in the company of other acculturating Jews.[186]

Additionally, during his Vienna exile Trotsky seemed to achieve a certain 'cognitive' clarity (to borrow Malia's term) on his Russian home. He wrote of the

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181 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.422; BSE, p.390.

182 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.422.

183 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.422-423; Joffe, Memoirs of Nadezhda Joffe, p.4.

184 Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, p.193.

185 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.423; Joffe, Memoirs of Nadezhda Joffe, p.6; HIAPO, Index XIIIb(1), Box 122, Folder 1A; his prison letters from Odessa are in Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 186, Series 119, Folder 9 and Box 41 Accession No.63013 8.41/44, Series 16, Folder 30.

186 On Vienna Jews, Marsha L. Rozenblit, "Jewish assimilation in Habsburg Vienna", in Frankel, and Zipperstein, eds., Assimilation and Community, pp.225, 235-237.

"poverty and crudity" of Russian culture, seeing socialism as a way of transforming it into a "good European" state. In a 1912 essay in the liberal *Kiev Mysl* on the Russian intelligentsia he wrote: "we are poor with the accumulated poverty of over a thousand years...How miserable was our gentry! Where were its castles? Where were its tournaments?...Its chivalrous love? The Russian gentry was coarse, barbarian, vulgar." The European medieval towns, guilds, municipalities, universities, and self-government, were all unlike the backward Russian gentry. Russia needed educated, Europeanized men in its intelligentsia to bring the light of European civilization to the darkness of the Russian log-cabin.[187] For Trotsky, and other Jews, I think socialism was something of a call for *cultural* -- perhaps even more than socioeconomic -- Europeanization of 18th century universalist states.

For Trotsky nationalism had corroded Viennese Austrian Social democracy, but Berlin was different. Here there was less nationalism, and German Social Democracy was the model and the teacher. But Trotsky did not fully fall under its "spell", even at the 'Russian empire's headquarters -- Liebknecht's house'. He wrote that the Austrian Social Democract's attitude toward the war was really "nationalists barely disguised under the veneer of a socialist culture". He was, accordingly, more attracted to the internationalism of the Swiss Socialist Party, both as an intellectual and literal refugee during the war years. When he was in the Balkans as a foreign correspondent for *Kievskaia Mysl*, the most important radical paper in southern Russia, he spent the war years with Serbian, Bulgarian and Rumanian nationalists and socialists.[188] His Balkan correspondence decried slavophilism and nationalist 'chauvinism', at one time or another taking all sides -- Serbian, Bulgarian, Turkish, Rumanian -- but he consistently opposed pan-slavism and the nationalism of great power European politics. As we will see with the Galician Polish Jew Radek (Chapter 7) it is questionable that Trotsky (and other Jews) were anti-nationalists because of their commitment to socialism as most have contended, but rather that their commitment to internationalist socialism was, at least in part, a function of experiences with emerging nationalisms and 'national identities' within socialist parties.

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187 Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, pp.187-189, 191.

188 Trotsky, My Life, pp.226-229; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, pp.202-207.

VII. The Russian Jewish Bolsheviks' early radicalism

The Russian Jews clearly show that *how* Jewish identity was made relevant may have been important. Isaac Deutscher's experiences famously took the form of pogrom violence, yet while in Catholic school anti-Semitism was far more subtle: disturbing glances and minor exclusions. The latter seems more likely to have been the case for Sokol'nikov. Sokol'nikov, *nee* Brilliant, confronted his "Jewishness" in the context of the more subtle and nuanced anti-Semitism of the Russian *gimnaziia.*[189] His ability to attend a Moscow *gimnazia* reflected his family's rather privileged social status and general integration. Sokol'nikov's father was a medical doctor among the railroad workers, and in the employ of the state. Sokol'nikov was born in 1888 in Poltava (Ukraine) but his father's employment with the state allowed the family move to the Russian interior.

Sokol'nikov's initial response to whatever anti-Semitism he felt was manifested in an attraction to study of the classics as he began to attend these study circles. These circles then gradually evolved into politically oriented ones, organized around populist and Marxist literature, and involving the activities of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the followers of Tolstoy. Sokol'nikov wrote that besides the classics, he was also fond of reading foreign press. It was only in 1905 that he joined the Social Democrats, but his polemics with the Socialist Revolutionaries continued even while in exile in Enisei.[190] In other words, Sokol'nikov's early passions reflected neither a re-assertion of his Jewish identity, nor an anti-state radicalism, but rather an immersion into non-Jewish European and classical culture.

By contrast Gusev's Jewish 'consciousness' was awakened early and violently. The son of a schoolteacher, at age 4 Gusev was beaten in the street as a "Zyd", and at age 10 in a Saratov village the "spirit of fanaticism" pervaded several of the village taverns, as he witnessed what he believed may have been a pogrom.[191] Gusev believed that the anti-Jewish violence he witnessed and experienced was organized by the Tsar and state. He "saw a merger of blood and vodka" -- clearly a reference to one of the most prevalent

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182 Granat, p.681.

183 Granat, p.682.

191 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.399.

occupations of village Jews, inn and tavern-keeping and the liquor trade. It is significant that he was, at the same time, required each day to read the Jewish prayer books and the Bible (in Hebrew) under the direction of special teachers, writing of his hatred and aversion to Hebrew and the "old women teachers" and of his disgust with God and religion.[192]

Gusev's early religious training and identity as a Jew was intimately associated with the (often violent) anti-semitism surrounding him. His Jewish identity was invoked in a manner and context far different from Sokol'nikov's. He entered different circles in *realschule*, and was captivated by French literature and by Darwinism with the consequence that in 1891 he was temporarily expelled from *realschule* not for openly political activity, but for preaching atheism.[193] He later found socialism and was clearly attracted to its secularism. The attraction of these ideas, given Gusev's sociopolitical context, is clear. The connection between his Jewishness and the violence he was experiencing was reinforcing itself. His early radicalism was not a response state repression, but rather an 'escape' into a secular Europeanism because of the associations of a Jewish identity.

Gusev had witnessed the 1881-1882 pogroms in the Russian interior, and among the Jewish Bolsheviks seems to have been unique in this respect. Outside the Pale the Jewish population was very small and isolated, especially in the villages. The violent anti-Semitism that existed seemed to have been largely derivative and imitative of events and social forces inside the Pale, most especially in the Ukrainian provinces as noted above, and therefore rather limited in comparison. [194] Gusev's parents were teachers in the employ of the state and managed to send their son to *realschule*, so he likely would have perceived himself -- as a reflection of his social identity in local society -- as Jewish in a religious sense rather than in a 'capitalist class' sense.

Gusev was deeply affected by the assassination of Alexander II, a trigger to the

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192 Ibid.

193 Ibid., p.399.

194 The 1881 pogroms were mostly an urban phenomenon, eventually moving into villages, agricultural colonies, and towns such as Gusev's which had markets and fairs. They likely moved in waves to the Russian interior, from large towns to villages along railway lines and rivers. In the countryside pogroms were spread largely by itinerant workers, unemployed ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, railroad workers, and contract laborers. Michael Aronson, "Anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia in 1881", Klier and Lambroza, eds., Pogroms, pp.46-47.

1881 pogroms. He followed the process of the Narodnaia *volia*, and came into contact with students from the state schools in Rostov-on-Don. In 1892 he managed to complete *realschule*, but was initially denied admission to the St. Petersburg Technological Institute because of increased competition among Jews.[195] Though Gusev's Jewish identity was strongly reinforced at an early age, his experiences were clearly not limited to societal anti-Semitism. He had already been radicalized before his run in with the state. It was noted above that he had (erroneously) attributed pogroms to the Tsarist government, now his Jewish identity was again negatively reinforced. During a period of unemployment and a brief 8 month position in a bank, Gusev came into contact with member of *Narodnaia volia*, first read *Capital*, and joined radical circles. In 1896 he was finally admitted into the St. Petersburg Technological Institute, immediately joined *Osvobozhdenie Truda* (Emancipation of Labor), and by 1897 was active in demonstrations.[196] After several years' activities with the Socialist Revolutionaries, in 1896 he joined the RSDLP, and in 1903 as a Bolshevik.

In this respect, his activism with the SRs was significant and resembled the Ukrainian Jew's Chubar's. In the Russian interior he had extremely limited access to specifically 'Jewish' radical groups (e.g. the Bund) and the SRs were the most powerful radical socialist grouping in the region.[197] Gusev's entry into Russian radical movements may have partly been because non-Russian movements were few in the interior of the empire, so access has to be given causal importance, but it cannot be the whole story because the pattern held also for Ukrainian Jews who *did* have access to non-Russian movements, as with Chubar'. Nevertheless it is important to note that Jewish radicalism in essentially "Russian populist" movements has been historically underestimated. Haberer's excellent study found that the number of 'Jewish Jews' in Russian Populist and SR movements of the 1870's and 1880's was significant.[198]

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195 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.399-400. Other sources say that he did enter the Institute immediately, see BSE, pp.460-461 and Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.160. The latter may have used the official BSE account. I use Gusev's account here.

196 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.400; BSE, p.460-461; Geroi oktiabria, p.311.

197 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.400.

198 Haberer, Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth Century Russia, especially Part III, Chapter 10.

Gusev had found refuge from Jewishness in the radical movements. At the time of his early radicalism with *Narodnaia volia*, the general position of these socialist populist movements was that pogrom violence was a product of the character of the regime, and not in the "Jewish character" or something within Judaism itself. Gusev joined these groups as they were undergoing important transformations. *Zemlia i Volia* (Land and Liberty) had suffered an internal split which resulted in the *Narodnaia volia* (People's Will) and *Chernyi Peredel* (Black Repartition). While the former focused on the absolutist state and organized along centralist lines, the latter advanced 1870's populism and agrarian revolution. Gusev joined the former. Black Repartition leaders (Plekhanov, Zasulich, Axelrod etc.) became pioneers of Russian populism but eventually worked primarily in emigration. With the founding of the *Osvobozhdenie Truda* in 1883, by the time Gusev became active in this movement as well there was, as his activity itself shows, a great deal of overlap in personnel among the various radical groupings. Although *Narodnaia volia* had failed in 1881-1882 to adequately respond to the pogroms because of latent slavophilic and judeophobic tendencies, the general position of *Zemlia i Volia* of St. Petersburg was (a) the rejection of Jews as a minority, (b) a condemnation of the pogroms, essentially on the grounds that pogrom violence tended to foster national antagonisms and as such posed threats to the possibility of a 'peoples' revolution', and (c) a reiteration of the need for solidarity among workers across religions, nationalities and ethnicities.[199] Gusev's early radicalism, then, drew him to radical movements which not only themselves repudiated, by and large, anti-Semitism but also, and even more significantly, allowed him to cultivate a non-Jewish identity inside essentially Russian movements in the Russian interior.

In contrast to Gusev, Sverdlov's career was entirely in the Russian interior and in Siberia and he was far more 'assimilated'. Sverdlov was born Iakov Morshevich Solomon in relatively cosmopolitan and progressive Nizhny-Novgorod -- an important trading-post between the Volga and Oka Rivers where 23% of its inhabitants were engaged in trade, industry, railroad, and transport -- which offered Sverdlov's father, a skilled engraver and owner of a printing shop, a petty bourgeois existence. He sent his son to the classical

[199] Moshe Mishkinsky, "'Black Repartition' and the pogroms of 1881-1882", in Klier and Lambroza, eds.. Pogroms, p.62-75.

gimnazia, but after four years could no longer afford to pay the fees. Yet Sverdlov was already well-acculturated, so much so that his bother Eshya was famously adopted and Christianized by Gorky.

Sverdlov began his political activities at age 15 in Nizhny-Novgorod, where he was involved with the Socialist Revolutionaries through the activities of his brothers. Later political activism eventually brought him to the Urals and long periods of administrative exile sent him to Tomsk province in Northern Siberia, and finally between 1913 and the Revolution in Turukhansk. Sverdlov's contact with non-Russians, then, was essentially limited to native peoples and exiled non-Russian revolutionaries. The minorities in Nizhny-Novgorod province, the Mordvins and Tatars, were almost entirely Russified, and Sverdlov himself contributed to the 'Russification' of the native Tungus and Ostiaks while in Siberian exile by giving Russian grammar lessons to native children. Sverdlov's biographer discusses his friendly relationship with the Siberian native peoples, and is careful to note that Sverdlov listened to complaints about unfair treatment by Russian merchants. But it is clear that Sverdlov was not worried about their Russification by the Tsarist state.

Sverdlov's years in exile in Tomsk after the events of 1905 were spent among other exiled revolutionaries -- mostly Jews, Armenians, Georgians, Latvians, and Poles. In fact the Polish Socialist Party had its own exile organization in Siberia and held 'annual Congresses of exiles'. Yet despite these contacts with political exiles of various nationalities and political affiliations, Sverdlov continued to identify himself as Russian. Indeed he was so thoroughly Russified and assimilated to Russian culture that in explaining why he never joined the Bund he could write, "I never felt a nationalist yoke or was persecuted as a Jew. In fact during the first days of Kishinev pogrom I felt nothing which separated me from the attitude of the non-Jewish population".[200] And that attitude would have been indifference. Sverdlov had apparently never faced anti-Semitism or persecution as a Jew either in Nizhny-Novgorod or while engaged in party work in the Urals. This seems consistent with the scholarship on this: anti-Semitism was generally a non-Russian phenomenon endemic in the western provinces, Poland and the Pale, but far less among

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200 Quoted in Duval, The Forgotten Bolshevik.

most ethnic Russians of the interior who had only the most minimal contact with Jews.

Kamenev worked summers in a factory as a joiner and locksmith in Vilna and attended the classical *gymnasia* until age 13 when his father moved the family to Tiflis because of his employment in the state railroad as an engineer. Kamenev completed secondary school in Tiflis and continued his activities in Marxist circles, particularly influenced by LaSalle. Vilna had a significant Jewish population as Kamenev was likely involved before 1896 with the Jewish Bund. But Tiflis, though multi-ethnic, was a Transcaucasian city and in 1896 the political options for young radicals were SRs and SDs -- Kamenev chose the latter working with cobblers and railroad workers in Nakhalova.[201] Kamenev's early radicalism was shaped, then, largely through political exposure to groupings while in *gimnaziia* in Vilna and Tiflis, and perhaps affected by his parents own early radicalism as university students. His choice of groupings was more the product of setting and circumstance than identity. Yet his early radicalism with SDs in Tiflis, and later Kutais and Bhatoum, would profoundly affect later battles with the Georgian Mensheviks.

Iaroslavskii, on the other hand, is striking because of the extremes embodied in his experiences. *Nee* Gubelman, Iaroslavskii was raised on a penal colony in Chita. This penal settlement comprised essentially deportees, convicts, and political prisoners obliged by the courts to settle in remote areas after completing prison sentences. Iaroslavskii was born in 1878 and was surrounded by former political prisoners of the 1860's, 1870's, 1880's. The Chita colony was primarily of petty bourgeois composition since it was the administrative center of Transbaikalia. Iaroslaviskii's father was a skilled furrier and then became a teacher, and his mother had only elementary education.[202] Profoundly and inescapably influenced by his surroundings, his first political involvement was with the *Narodnaia volia*, the first radical groups in the area before the Social Democrats. After attending the state elementary schools Iaroskavskii attended *gimnaziia*.[203] At age 9 he worked as a bookbinder and then for a chemist/pharmacist.[204] And 1898, the year he

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201 Granat, p.427.

202 Granat, p.785; BSE, p.558.

203 Granat, p.785.

204 Granat, p.785; Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.190.

joined the SDs at age 20, he sat an exam to become a chemist/pharmacist assistant but was unable to pursue this work because of troubles with the authorities. He therefore began organizing SD circles of workers on the Transbaikal Railroad.

It does not appear that it was his families' Jewish origin, but their radicalism which placed them there: his mother's family had a member of the Decembrists.[205] And Iaroslavskii's radicalism was not provoked by any specifically 'Jewish' motive. He seemed to have been thoroughly acculturated to Russian language and culture. Iaroslavskii was arrested numerous times with periods of exile in Siberia. In the late 1920's Iaroslavskii became the President of the "League of Militant Atheists".[206]

VIII. Nationalisms, anti-Semitisms, and international socialism

In their most essentialist form the main tenets of Jewish assimilation and separatism have been that assimilation results from emancipation and separatism from 'reaction', that assimilation either de-nationalizes or de-religicizes, and that oppression produces either a re-assertion of Jewish identity as nationalism or a reassertion of assimilation.[207] Moreover, it is argued that the Russian Jewish intelligentsia turned 'inward' to strategies of nationalism, exodus, "organic work", and "auto-emancipation", sometimes synthesizing nationalism and socialism, but in all cases a tension between loyalty to a Jewish cause and loyalty to the more general (Russian) revolutionary cause prompted ideological realignments.[208] Many in the Jewish intelligentsia, it is also argued, either renounced their Russian-centered revolutionary faith or strengthened it anew in 'cosmopolitan-assimilationist' fashion, maintaining the distinction between the 'cosmopolitan assimilated non-Jewish Jew' and the 'non-assimilated Jewish Jew'.[209] These arguments derived from Dubnow's classic formulation -- that assimilation and national consciousness

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205 Granat, p.785.

206 Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.190.

207 Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol.111, pp.333-337; Eric Haberer, "Cosmopolitanism, anti-Semitism and Populism: a reappraisal of Russian and Jewish response to the pogroms of 1881-1882", in Klier and Lambroza, Pogroms, pp.98-134, especially pp.98-99.

208 Frankel, Prophecy and Politics.

209 Haberer, "Cosmopolitanism, anti-Semitism and Populism".

(separatism) were tied to state policies of emancipation and reaction. Indeed similar social theories of 'exit, voice, loyalty', are only minimally useful here since 'exit' is so vague and versatile that it can mean nearly anything -- nationalist separatism, re-assimilation, emigration, socialism, Zionism, or any anti-state politics.

Yet recent historiography has challenged some of the empirical claims sustaining this reasoning. We know from a number of studies that urbanization, industrialization, secularization, and modernization more generally, were far more important contributors to 'assimilation' or acculturation than political emancipation itself.[210] Political exclusion radicalized, but it did not hinder acculturation: even the leadership of the Jewish radical political elite, Bundist and Zionist leaders, were Russified, acculturated Jews. Moreover, the turn inward into Jewish culture (the new 'Jewish Jew') predated both the 1881 pogroms and the state's subsequent reaction and Russification. In fact on the empirical evidence it is most likely that, as with the Turko-Tataric intelligentsia of the 1880's and 1890's, the turn to Jewish nationalism and culture was not a product of state 'reaction' or repression, but of earlier liberalizations and openings, particularly in increased educational and career openings: the state produced, in its elite educational institutions, articulate, educated, politically modern, *Russified*, national elites, who by virtue of their modern education were oppositional to an illiberal, *ancien regime* state.

More generally, overwhelmingly the Jewish response to exclusion and societal or official anti-Semitism was not increased politicization or radicalization. It was *neither* nationalism (separatism) *nor* increased assimilation, but mass emigration. And the post-1881/2 emigrations, like those of the preceding decades, though due to imperial Jewry's socioeconomic and political distress and pogromism, had little ideological commitment behind them, *viz.* Zionism: the fact that only 1,000 Jews emigrated to Palestine in the same years that hundreds of thousands emigrated to America, Western and Central Europe suggests that a non-ideological motivator was at work.[211]

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210 French and German Jews, for instance, seemed to have 'acculturated' at least 3 generations *after* emancipation; the timing had to do with urbanization, secularization, education and increasing literacy, etc.

211 Figures in Magosci, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, p.107. Earlier Jewish migrations in the century between 1750-1850, from the Pale and Galicia into Moldavia, Bukovina, and northeastern Hungary, on to Budapest and Vienna. In 1910, 52% of the Russian empire's immigrants to the US were Jews, in Frankel, Prophecy and Politics, p.50. In the 1870's more than 50,00 Jews emigrated to the US.

So the acculturated Jewish intelligentsia of the late 19th century, and the Jewish Bolsheviks as a part of this, sought to solve Jewish disabilities, and social problems more generally, not in reform of Jewish society as had the earlier *maskilim*, but in reform of Russian society. Since social, economic, and political disabilities of Russian society kept her Jews isolated and non-integrated, with social justice and democracy, Jewish disabilities with disappear on their own accord. The Jewish socialist and liberal intelligentsias provided two variations on this key idea. Social emancipation consequent on social (Jewish) 'enlightenment', reform and integration as had been the case through most of the 19th century; rather, the generation of Jewish elite who were now fully acculturated sought 'enlightenment' and integration of Jews (and other oppressed classes or nations) only as a consequence of wider social emancipation. This marked an important shift from the Jewish Bolshevik's mid-century parents' generation.

Beyond this however, Shapiro had argued that though Jews were represented in high numbers in the socialist parties, they were 'assimilated non-Jewish Jews' and therefore did not become revolutionaries because they were Jewish.[212] Similarly, Lowe held that the Narodniki Jews of the 1870's were Russified, assimilated Jews who became revolutionaries not because they were Jews but because they were 'Russians'.[213] Robert Brym's early study, by contrast, found that radicalized socialist Jews had had a Jewish identity and had been traditionally 'embedded' within the Jewish community. They then became alienated from the Jewish community (through a process of 'de-embedding') and re-integrated into Russian society.[214] And Haberer's more recent study of Jews in the Russian movements adopts Brym's general model finding that, *pace* Lowe and Shapiro, Narodniki Jews of the 1870's were in fact 'Jewish Jews' and they were present in 'Russian' radical groupings in greater numbers than usually assumed. So at the back of their radicalization as Russified Jews they *had been* 'Jewish Jews', alienated from their traditional Jewish community.

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212 Leonard Shapiro, "Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement", in Ellen Darendorf (ed.), Russian Studies, Collins Harvill, London, 1968.

213 Lowe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp.167-168.

214 Robert Brym, The Jewish Intelligentsia and Russian Marxism: A Sociological Study of Intellectual Radicalism and Ideological Divergence, MacMillan, 1978.

Some of the differences in assessments derive from different 'data sets' or individuals under study. But as Haberer notes, some of these disagreements also derive from the persistence of (usually Jewish) scholarship's dichotomized view of Jewish revolutionaries as either 'non-Jewish Jews' (religiously de-Judaicized) or as fully assimilated "Russian Jews", "Ukrainian Jews", etc.[215] I agree. On the empirical evidence, Jews were not only very highly overrepresented in Populist Narodniki as Haberer found, but they also constituted, apart from the ethnic Russians, the single largest and -- judging from their positions in the Party -- most influential national contingent in the revolutionary Bolshevik elite. This is not to reduce the analysis to the classic anti-Semitic claim that 'communism was Jewish', not least because there were other very significant national groupings inside Bolshevism, several of which were also disproportionately overrepresented. But the high degree of Jewish radicalization in the empire (there were at least 9 Jewish radical parties by the turn of the century) needs explanation.

For Shapiro and Lowe, and most traditional scholarship, the explanation had been to argue that they were not radicalized *qua* Jews because they were anyway assimilated. For Brym and Haberer (following Brym's sociological analysis) the explanation lies in the degree of social 'embeddedness' or 'de-embeddedness' in Jewish or Russian society, ultimately invoking a Jewish identity in some fashion. And for Haberer particularly, this 'Jewish identity' involved a 'socialist promise of salvation': their cosmopolitan socialism was *not* devoid of Jewish content, and neither was it 'frantic assimilation' in socialist guise, rather they sought to enter a 'universal church', a cosmopolitan "transfiguration of their Jewishness' described as "an abstract and futuristic idealism of assimilation *qua* emancipation in a denationalized and secularized democratic society, ideally of universal scope"; their responses to pogromism, their radical political activism, and their adoption of cosmopolitan socialism were "solutions to existential problems", as "their cosmopolitanism was really the obverse side of Jewishness -- a search for an identity that was predicated on their estrangement from the community...which had shaped their spiritual being. Hence the religious-existential nature of their identification with socialism and its Russian 'church'

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[215] Haberer, Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth Century Russia, p.xi.

-- the revolutionary movement."[216]

In terms of the Jewish Bolsheviks I agree only in part. Theirs was an idealization of a kind of 18th century universalist state -- and particularly *a multi-ethnic imperial state* -- - and their radicalization did invoke a certain 'Jewish' identity, though not because of the 'embedding' process that Haberer and Brym before him suggested. The explanation I offer is more politically sociological: their radicalization was less due to the psycho-spiritualism that Haberer found than to the more mundane 'elective affinity' of the sociology of ethno-politics. Nearly all were escaping local growing nationalisms (even within socialist parties) or some kind of local, provincial level exclusions. For these Jews the appeal of socialism was not in its 'messianic' content, but in its *secularism*, its *anti-nationalism*, in its '*bureaucratic statism*', and in its implicit '*imperialist*' political form.

The Ukrainian nationalist Dragomanov polemicized that the Russified Jewish *intelligenty* in the Russian parties had strengthened their centralist tendencies and displayed an aversion to local differences.[217] Despite Dragomanov's own anti-Semitism, there was something to this. The European models of social democracy, the German, the Swiss, the Austrian, and the Polish, had great influence on Radek, Piatnitskii, Uritskii, Trotsky, Ioffe, and Zinoviev and others.[218] But Kautsky, not Bauer, the German, and not the Austrian socialist model resonated. Kautsky had believed that even if Austria-Hungary were divided along nationalities, the fate of oppressed minorities such as the Jews and Ruthenians would remain, since an empire based on linguistic or 'national' cantons institutionalized the distinction between territorial and non-territorial nations.[219] Only a multinational state, in which it would be in the interests of the dominant nation to encourage pluralism, could territorial nationality be rendered irrelevant -- non-territorial nations thrived best in multinational empires.

Though often problematically and inconsistently the case, the final arbiter, and therefore the ultimate depository of one's loyalty, was the bureaucratic, and preferably

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216 Ibid., pp.259-261.

217 See Frankel, Prophecy and Politics, p.190.

218 Trotsky, "Biografiia", Granat, p.722; Ioffe, "Biografiia", Granat, p.422; Radek, "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.597-600; Zinoviev, "Biografiia", Granat, pp.419-420.

219 Frankel, Prophecy and Politics, pp.218-219.

imperial, state. As a German-Jewish intellectual wrote in 1854:

> "All in all, we Jews recognize...that among all elements of the modern age it is the state, and above all and in particular the bureaucratic state, that has been and still is most open-minded towards us, since in every period of storm and stress the people rose up against us, and in every period of reaction it was the nobility and the upper bourgeoisie who did the same."[220]

Moreover, Jews were perceived as being -- and most indeed were -- loyal to the very imperial state that seemed to be oppressing the Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians. So part of the social dynamic here was reinforcing: Jews felt themselves excluded (and often victimized) from 'local' national society, and turned to the imperial state for protection and alliance; the local nationalities perceived this as disloyal and even treasonous, associating Jews with Tsarist Russification and oppression (as would happen later with Bolshevik Sovietization). Jewish prominence in the non-nationalist radical socialist movements only compounded the perceptions. And yet Jews' very prominence in socialist movements was itself intimately tied to the same inter-ethnic dynamics that prompted their fathers to turn to the state for employment, protection, and cultural integration.

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220 Quote from W.E. Mosse, Arnold Paucker, and Reinhold Rurup, eds., Revolution and Evolution: 1848 in German-Jewish History, Tubingen, 1981, p.41, as cited in Rogger, "Conclusion and Overview", p.322.

Chapter 7
Polish and Lithuanian Bolsheviks

After a brief discussion of Poles and Lithuanians in 19th century Tsarist Russia this chapter addresses, in some detail, the political radicalism of only three Bolsheviks: the Lithuanian Kapsukas, the Pole Dzierzynski, and the Galician Polish Jew Radek. It concludes with a brief discussion on the absence of Polish Jews from Russian Poland in this elite.

I. Russian Poland and the western gubernii under Tsarism

In the First Partition of 1772 Russia gained a strip of Polish Livonia, a large portion of Belorussia, and 1.3 million mostly Orthodox inhabitants. With the Second Partition Russia acquired the provinces of Vilna and Minsk, the eastern half of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the palatinates of Kiev, Podolia, and Braclaw, with 3 million Belorussians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Jews. The Third Partition, completed in 1795, brought an additional 1.3 million inhabitants under Russian rule with the Duchy of Courland, the remainder of the Duchy of Lithuania, and Volhynia.[1] Following the Vienna settlements in 1815 a Polish state was restored, Congress Poland, with its own government and administration but unified with the Russian Empire through the Tsar, now hereditary King of Poland.

The lands of the Partitions and the 1815 settlement were 40% Ruthenian (Ukrainian and Belorussian), 26% Polish, 20% Lithuanian, 10% Jewish, and only 4% Russian. Religiously, they were 38% Catholic, 40% Uniate, 10% Jewish, and only 6.2% Orthodox.[2] The immediate effects on the empire's national composition were mixed. Substantial non-Russian populations, notably Jews and Poles, did alter the empire's ethnic and religious composition considerably. Yet official categories considered Ukrainians and Belorussians 'Russian', so their addition to the imperial population meant that 'Russians'

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[1] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, pp.45, 49-50; Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, pp.70, 107; Simon Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, 3 Vols. (trans. I. Friedlander), Philadelphia), 1916-1920, pp.262-304. Estimates differ as to the number of Jews incorporated, from 2 million (Seton-Watson), to 1.3 million (Magocsi), to 900,000 (Dubnow) in the First Partition. I use Magocsi's figures here.

[2] Figures in Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917, London, Fontana Press, p.29.

could still retain majority status in their empire.[3]

This chapter distinguishes three Polish regions in the Tsarist empire and one region in Austrian Galicia, each corresponding to the location of the Polish and Lithuanian Bolsheviks. First, the ten ethnically Polish provinces of Congress Poland remained distinct entities within the empire and were not divided into guberniia, although each province had a Governor with a Governor-General in Warsaw. The only significant non-Polish ethnicity was Jewish, and to a lesser extent German; ethnic Russians were conspicuous by their absence. There were no Bolsheviks from Congress Poland, and this itself requires explanation.

Next were the ethnically mixed Polish-Lithuanian borderlands, or the *kresy* between uni-national Poland and uni-national Russia where no single nationality was predominant. Lithuanians, Belorussians, Poles, and Jews were present in large numbers, and there was a relatively small ethnic Russian presence. With imperial administrative reforms in 1802 these borderlands were divided into guberniia and though the Belorussian guberniia were not subordinated to the Governor-Generalships, the Lithuanian provinces were centralized under the Governor-General of Vilna. Crucially, these multi-ethnic borderlands produced four Bolsheviks: Dzierzynski, Mickevicius-Kapsukas, Kiselev (Belorussian), and Piatnitskii (discussed in Chapter 6).

The third Polish region in the empire was southwest or right-bank Ukraine (Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia), administratively subordinated to the Governor-General of Kiev. No single nationality predominated, but unlike Congress Poland and the *kresy*, these guberniia did have a significant ethnic Russian social presence. The non-Russians in these provinces, particularly Poles and Ukrainians, were among the most Russified of the borderlands. Two Bolsheviks, Kosior and Uritskii (also discussed in Chapter 6), came from this region.[4]

The final Polish region was not under Romanov rule but in Habsburg Austria. Karl Radek was a Polish Jew from Austrian Galicia. In ethnic composition western Galicia was

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[3] Excluding Ukrainians and Belorussians, Great Russians would have been only 44% of the empire's population. "Rossiia", Entsiklopediicheskii slovar', tom. 2/d, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp.13-14; Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 003, p.74.

[4] I do not discuss the Ukrainian Pole Kosior here because of insufficiently detailed biographical data.

similar to Congress Poland with a majority of Poles, and Jews the only significant minority; in contrast, eastern Galicia had not only Poles and Jews, but a significant Ukrainian minority as well. While Polish language and culture were repressed in Russian Poland, particularly in the nine western guberniia, Poles were on the political ascendancy in relatively open Austrian Galicia.

Differences in regional ethnic composition contributed to differences in political rule, administration, and Russification. This was reflected most clearly in the Tsarist state's response to the Polish insurrections of 1830-31 and 1863-64. The 1830-31 insurrections caused official Russia to view the Polish gentry or *dvorianstvo* of Congress Poland, the northwest borderlands, and Right-bank Ukraine as disloyal and irredentist subjects. The state's anti-Polish policies varied by region. In Congress Poland, the response was tighter administrative control and the beginnings of Russification, quickly making Congress Poland the most bureaucratically administered region of the empire. The state also began dismantling Polish educational institutions: schools run by the clergy were closed, Russian was introduced as the language of instruction, and by 1839 the Polish educational system was placed under the Curator of the Warsaw Education Region, itself administratively dependent on St. Petersburg. In 1833 the center of cultural Russification was Right-bank Ukraine -- the Russian St. Vladimir University in Kiev was to attenuate 'national' Polish traits in Polish youth and to instill in them the spirit of the Russian people.[5] In the Lithuanian northwest region, Vilna (Wilno) University was closed in 1832, Russian was made the language of administration, courts, and schools in 1834. In 1836 Russian *gimnaziia* were opened in Grodno and Vilna as Russian teachers replaced Polish teachers in the *gimnaziia* of the Kiev and Belorussian districts and the teaching of Polish ceased. By 1838 Uvarov could report that the "establishment of Russian education in the Lithuanian provinces may be considered definitely completed".[6] It is worth reiterating a point made in Chapter 4: these measures were intended to undermine the sons of the Polish *szlachta* targeting elite secondary institutions and universities, leaving the vast majority of lower class Poles unaffected.

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[5] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.269-270.

[6] Quoted in ibid, p.269.

Non-educational institutions were also targeted. In 1832 the Sejm was dissolved and the Polish army suppressed. Most affected were the 'disloyal' petty *szlachta* of the rural Lithuanian and Belorussian borderlands. Estates were confiscated forcing Polish landowners to settle elsewhere in the empire. By 1857 land confiscation had reduced much of the petty *szlachta* to the ranks of peasant and townsmen, impoverishing the Polish nobility in the western gubernii such that 40% fell into the 'burgher' estate. The Polish nobility in the Ukrainian provinces was hit hard after the 1831 revolt: in 1852 Polish nobles from these provinces were forced to serve in "Great Russian" provinces, and by 1853 340,547 of the 410,547 Polish gentry were reduced to the peasant estate.[7] Although limited rights were still extended, 'security precautions' were strengthened to limit Polish *dvorianstvo* separatism and irredentism.[8] And yet despite 25 years of subsequent anti-*szlachta* policies the Polish landowning classes continued as the most important political and cultural force in the borderlands: in 1858 most of the empire's non-service nobles still resided in the western gubernii and the great majority were Polish.[9]

Possible respite from harsh anti-*dvorianstvo* policies came in the 1861-1862 attempts at 'reform from above' under Wielopolski in Congress Poland. While accepting the de facto reality of Russian rule, Wielopolski, head of the civil government in Warsaw, sought cooperation with the Russian state to push through moderate reforms (e.g. conversion to money rents from corvee, city and rural self-government, and increased Jewish rights). He was impeded, for different reasons, by both Polish radicals and by the Catholic Church.

Whether the slide into the January 1963 insurrection was due to the 'rising expectations' brought by Wielopolski's efforts as some contend is unclear,[10] but the 1863

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7 Stephen Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?, Slavic Review, Vo.54, April 1995, p.205.

8 Robert Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland, 1856-1865, London, Althone Press, 1963, pp.99-100, 110-111, 140.

9 Ibid, p.49; Edward Thaden, Russia's Western Borderlands, 1710-1870, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp.123-124, 133-135. In fact 95% of the landowning nobility in Vilna province, 94% in Minsk and 82% in Kiev provinces were Polish

10 Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914, Dekalb, Illinois, 1996, pp.94-95.

rebellion did set Tsarist nationalities policies on a different course and changed the political character of the Polish territories as reform efforts were reversed and reaction ensued. Congress Poland, the most bureaucratically-ruled region of the empire, was also the first in which imperial policy of cooperating with local elites was abandoned.[11]

Specifically, Petersburg's response to the Polish rebellions was punitive and Russificatory toward the Polish landed elite and relatively generous toward the borderlands' non-Russian peasantries. The most consequential social reforms involved agrarian relations between Polish landowner and Belorussian or Lithuanian peasant -- the former affected Dzierzynski, while the latter affected Kapsukas. The solution to the land question was the most radical -- virtually impoverishing Polish elites -- where the insurrections were the most intense in the Lithuanian borders and in Congress Poland, but because the Kiev region had been relatively quiescent, the state's agrarian reform was milder. According to contemporary accounts, Polish gentry land confiscations and a series of restrictive regulations on property rights, including limitations on acquiring and selling lands, were especially harshly felt in the western gubernii.[12] The interdiction of 10 December 1865 provoked particular gentry resentment by precluding anyone of Polish descent (either by birth or by education) from purchasing land -- land which was now sold to Russian landowners.[13] Polish landed elites were also undermined by peasant emancipation as Polish, Lithuanian, and Belorussian peasants received emancipation settlements more generous than those granted the Russian peasantry in 1861.

Because of the Tsarist state's worries about Polish cultural and economic power over the local peasantries, Russificatory policies were more harshly applied in the borderlands than in Congress Poland.[14] Yet Russification was also extended to Congress Poland, when a number of linguistic measures were enacted between 1864 and 1869 designed to limit Polish and introduce Russian in administration, *gimnaziia*, and other public domains, even limiting Polish conversation in public places. With the Russification

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11 Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland, pp.224-226.

12 Count Anton Tyszkiewicz (pseud. Graf' Leliva), Russko-Pol'skiia otnosheniia, Leipzig, E.L. Kaspovich', 1895, pp.14-38.

13 This Polish gentry perspective is discussed in ibid, pp.14-20, 26-28.

14 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.99-100.

of Warsaw University in 1869, Polish was relegated to minority linguistic status as educational institutions were placed under Russian local control.[15]

The Catholic clergy and the Jews were also affected by shifts in imperial policy. Viewed as highly seditious, Church lands and monasteries were confiscated, clergy control over education was limited with the removal of Polish language, and Church administration was placed under the Russian Ministry of the Interior.[16] The State was concerned to protect the "Slavic" and "rooted 'Russian'" peasantries not only from the Polonizing cultural influence of the Polish *szlachta*, but also from the economic "exploitation" of the Jewish bourgeoisie.

In sum, the imperial state sought (a) to court Polish peasants as "Slavs" generally viewed as loyal to the Tsar, (b) to prevent alliances between Polish *szlachta* and Ukrainian intellectuals, (c) to protect Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian peasants from Polonization, and (d) to court Jews as counterweight to the Poles on the view that if granted civic rights, they would be less disloyal than Poles.[17] To the extent that these policies were 'divide and rule', they were meant largely to divide Polish *szlachta* from peasants and lower orders culturally and linguistically.

Three conclusions may be drawn from Tsarist policies in the 19th century of particular relevance to the late imperial period. Most immediately, peasant emancipation and agrarian reform in Congress Poland after the 1863 insurrections reversed years of Tsarist policy: rather than seek accommodation with the propertied and noble classes, as has been the usual policy with national minorities across the empire, now the aim was to court non-Russian (including Polish) peasantries and Jews in the western borderlands at the expense of the propertied classes, and to counter Polonization with Russification.[18] To this end Russification intensified between 1883 and 1897, particularly in a series of changes in the educational system. However, it was not until 1885 that Russian was made

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15 Count Anton Tyszkiewicz, Russko-Pol'skiia otnosheniia, pp.52-3, 58-60, 158 and *passim*; Weeks Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.98-100.

16 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.409; Count Anton Tyszkiewicz, Russko-Pol'skiia otnosheniia.

17 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.58, 60, 63-64, 71-72, 123.

18 Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland, pp.236-237; Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917, pp.376-378.

the language of instruction in primary schools, significant because until this time educational Russification had only affected Polish and other national middle classes and elites. One consequence was that by 1897, 2/3 of the population of the "Vistula" lands was illiterate. This was further exacerbated by the unwillingness to introduce *zemstvo* in the mid-1860's -- the core of the *zemstvo* mandate across the empire being rural and primary education.[19]

Secondly, "Pole" became as much a political category as a national or ethnic one. Russian policy in the Polish lands was driven both by increasing sensitivity to its 'state' interests and, as Seton-Watson noted, more specifically by Austrian policies in neighboring Galicia where from 1867 onwards Poles enjoyed home-rule.[20] Moreover, imperial nationalists and pan-slavists like Katkov, worried about pan-Germanism and events of 1871 and saw the need for a more unified and coherent national Russian response.[21] The Polish rebellions also sensitized official Russia to the state-threatening potential of Ukrainian separatism.[22] Tsarist policy in Congress Poland was driven primarily by geopolitical worries of Polish separatism, which gave it both a russificatory component to insure 'loyalty' and an excessively bureaucratic component to maintain close control. In contrast, Tsarist policy in the nine western guberniia, especially in the Lithuanian provinces, though broadly also geopolitically motivated, was more centrally concerned with Polish *dvorianstvo cultural* and political influence and irredentism, and consequently privileged Russificatory policies and land confiscation over administrative centralization.

Thirdly, Tsarist borderland policy created not only widespread Polish (and eventually Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian) resentment, but it also undermined the Russian state's own ability to govern by its failure to allow provincial or local political institutions to thrive. Official Russia's fear of seditious Polish *szlachta* and nobility had caused them (not without dissension) to withhold local government or *zemstvo* to prevent

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[19] On the effects of Russian as the language of instruction in primary schools, Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.488 and Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.101; on the effects of withholding *zemstvo*, Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland, and Thaden, Russia's Western Borderlands, pp.226-227.

[20] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.410-411.

[21] Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, pp.367-368, 374-376.

[22] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.410-412.

any provincial Polish civil and political society. But this rendered imperial rule, and especially Russification, tremendously difficult (a) without the cooperation of local *szlachta* and (b) without a sizable ethnic Russian social presence. This also effectively undermined the Polish educated political class, just as the Polish *szlachta* had been undermined by Russification and land confiscation. Educated middle class Poles were constrained to seek bureaucratic and political careers in the imperial bureaucracy, leaving a very thin local gentry and educated segment of Polish society to respond to rising Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian national movements. In the decades between the insurrections bilingual Polish noble officials were 'circulated' in the empire (while Russians were brought in) and radicalized in contacts with Russian revolutionaries, they played a major role in the 1863 insurrection.[23] Because the only ethnic Russian presence was in the persons of administrators, officials, clergy, and teachers, there was no Russian 'society' around them. Relatively wide cultural autonomy remained for 'Polish' or 'Jewish' society. In fact, as late as the last decades of the 19th century Poles retained a discernible economic and cultural strength in the Lithuanian and Belorussian provinces, though the bulk of officials were Russians from the interior, with Poles only in the lowliest local positions.[24] This was in contrast to the experience of Russification in Kiev, Podolia, and "South Russia", for instance, where there was a local Russian 'society', leaving less autonomous cultural space.

By the 1890's the combined effects of Tsarist policies, industrialization, and urbanization, had changed socio-ethnic niches and political relationships in the western empire. Though the Polish gentry continued to own considerable amounts of land, by the 1880's the borderland *szlachta* were yielding their social predominance to commercial and industrial elites. Peasantries were given expanded rights and in theory, *szlachta*, peasants, commercial and middle classes were equally under Russian law -- but it was still *Russian*

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23 Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service". Yet the extent to which this was successful is unclear. At the end of Nicholas' reign, 723 of the 866 senior officials in Grodno and Wilno gubernii were Catholic. Thaden, Russia's Western Borderlands p.124-129.

24 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.74-81.

law.[25]

Nationality policies and the presence or absence of a Russian 'society' had changed Lithuanian-Jewish, Polish-Lithuanian, and Polish-Jewish relations as well. Jewish, Lithuanian, and Polish elites in the borderlands typically had multiple linguistic and cultural affiliations, as did Dzierzynski, Piatnitskii, and Kapsukas, in a way that Polish elites in Congress Poland, for instance, did not. To the extent that linguistic acculturation did occur it was to the Russian state language, not to Polish, Lithuanian or Belorussian. In the (Polish) Ukrainian provinces Uritskii (a Polonized Jew) and Kosior (a Russified Pole) were politicized around both Russian and Polish political and cultural-nationalist groupings.

Dzierzynski's, Kapsukas' (and Kosior's and Kiselev's) early radicalism reflected changes in the cultural and political identities of the declining Polish szlachta in the rural Polish-Lithuanian borderlands, of the Catholic Lithuanian landed elite, and acculturated-Russified Polish and Belorussian workers in Polish Ukraine and Belorussia. Their radicalism was marked by shifts in cultural and linguistic identities, and activism in supra-ethnic groupings like early Lithuanian socialists (LSDP), the Polish-Lithuanian SDKPiL, alliances with the Polish socialists (PPS) and the RSDLP.

II. Mickevicius-Kapsukas: Lithuanian nationalist to Bolshevik

Kapsukas, a Lithuanian 'aristocrat', traveled the nationalist and leftist spectrum, from an anti-clerical Lithuanian nationalism, to Polish-Lithuanian socialist union, to Lithuanian socialism, to Lithuanian-Russian socialist union, and finally to a form of Russified Bolshevism which repudiated any form of Lithuanian political identity. Kapsukas was born Vincas Mickevicius-Kapsukas in 1880 in Budvieciai, Vilkaviskis county, in the predominantly ethnically Lithuanian Suvalkija (Uznemune) region of rural Lithuania to a prosperous, quasi-aristocratic landowning family. Most well-to-do Lithuanians were present in Samogitia near the Prussian border and in Uznemune. After

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[25] Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland, pp.239-240, 249; Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.99.

the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 the Uznemune region became part of the newly created Duchy of Warsaw, and with the Napoleonic Code serfdom was abolished early. After the 1815 settlements the Code remained in force in Uznemune and set the conditions for the development of the region on a course different from that of the rest of Lithuania, ruled differently by the Russian state.[26]

The Russian state generally viewed Lithuanians as hardworking and potentially patriotic agriculturalists whose anti-Polish feelings were to be encouraged.[27] After the 1863 Polish insurrections, two decrees permitted Lithuanian peasants to purchase the lands they used, without further obligations to the Polish *szlachta*, and each was provided with 3.54 hectares of land. Over time this kind of progressive legislation (at Polish gentry expense) created a relatively well-off and socially differentiated Lithuanian peasantry as compared to the Russian peasantry, particularly in Uznemune, Kapsukas' region, creating both a class of landless peasants who migrated to the cities and a small, quasi-aristocratic, prosperous Lithuanian landowning rural elite.[28] Kapsukas' social origins derived from the latter.

Kapsukas' family, like most prosperous quasi-aristocrats, were able to educate their sons, and typically sent at least one -- Kapsukas -- to seminary in preparation for the priesthood. The most important Lithuanian educational centers were the Marijampole Gymnasium and the Catholic Theological Seminary in Seinai (Sejny).[29] Kapsukas attended the Gymnasium between 1890 and 1897 before enrolling in the Catholic Seminary.[30] While in *gimnazia* and at the Seminary Kapsukas' first politics involved an anti-clerical, liberal Lithuanian nationalism.

The Lithuanian intelligentsia and the religious-cultural phase of early Lithuanian nationalism was born in Marijampole and the Seinai Seminary. For decades the language

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[26] A.S. Strazas, "Lithuania 1863-1893: Tsarist Russification and the Beginnings of the Modern Lithuanian National Movement", Lituanus, Vol.42, No.3, 1996, pp.43-45.

[27] Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.67, 121.

[28] Strazas, "Lithuania 1863-1893", pp.47, 56-58; Sabaliunas, Lithuanian Social Democracy in Perspective, 1893-1914, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990, p.5. While 93% of farms were small peasant holdings, 4% were large estates accounting for more than 1/3 of the total land.

[29] Strazas, "Lithuania 1863-1893", p.47.

[30] Encyclopedia Lituanica, Boston: J. Kapocius, 1970-78, vols.1-6, p.39.

of instruction had been Polish, with the result that most of these priests-in-training, sons of prosperous Lithuanian landowners, became moderate to radical secular and religious Lithuanian nationalists, rebelling against the pervasive religious use of Polish. Though designed to undermine Polish cultural influence, Tsarist measures against the Catholic Church and the Polish *szlachta* had directly but unintentionally politicized the emerging Catholic (and secular) Lithuanian intelligentsia.

After 1863 non-state parish schools were closed; in state schools Russian was made the language of instruction.[31] By 1897 the 366 state schools were instruments of Russification, Lithuanian was banned in both instruction and informal conversation, and only graduates of Orthodox seminaries were employed as teachers.[32] Muraviev's well-known 'press ban' (extended to include all religious books and anything in the "Polish-Latin script") of Lithuanian language books, requiring that they be published in Cyrillic, affected all educational institutions and most of the Lithuanian press. One important result was that Lithuanian resentment was now directed not only at Polish 'imperialism', but at Russian imperialism as well. Another consequence was the famous 'book smugglers' movement which drew together students, intellectuals, radicals, and various professions united against linguistic Russification: religious and other books were printed in East Prussia, where there was a sizable historic (albeit Lutheran) Lithuanian community, and smuggled across Tsarist borders.[33] Kapsukas was active in this 'book smugglers' movement in East Prussia.

However Kapsukas did not attend the Russified state school system, but the Catholic system. The heart of the Lithuanian nationalist intelligentsia was not the Russified state system, but the Polonized elite Catholic system where autonomous cultural space still existed. Moreover, Kapsukas was not radicalized in Lithuanian's multi-ethnic cities where there were fewer Lithuanians, but in the ethnically homogeneous but Polonized Lithuanian religious schools away from the capitals. Significantly the Lithuanian intelligentsia was in

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31 Strazas, "Lithuania 1863-1893", pp.65-66.

32 One result was that parents withheld their children from schools. Though educational levels dropped, literacy rates among Lithuanians remained relatively high because of 'secret teaching' systems.

33 K. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", Martov et al, Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka, tom 4, St. Petersburg, 1912, pp.180-181.

largest part also the Uznemune intelligentsia -- by the end of the century 114 of the 235 leading nationalists came from Kapsukas' region, far less populated than Vilna or Kaunas.[34] By the time Kapsukas joined the Lithuanian nationalist movement between 1890 and 1897 while in *gimnazia* and as a clerical student at the Seminary, the church dominated phase of Lithuanian nationalism had already ceded to a nationalist-socialist mix with the arrival of Marxist socialism. So Kapsukas was politicized during the last years of the cultural, anti-clerical phase of the Lithuanian nationalist movement.

In 1898 Kapsukas was expelled from the Catholic Seminary because of his activities.[35] He was denied permission to enroll in any Russian university, so in 1902 he emigrated to Switzerland to audit courses in economics and sociology at Bern University. By 1904-05 he was very active in the LSDP (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party), serving on its CC between 1905 and 1907, and emerging from 1905 onwards as a Leftist.[36] An avowed nationalist Kapsukas, literally "Little Kapsas", considered himself a follower of the great Kapsas, Vincas Kudirka, who wrote on Lithuanian patriotism and democracy.[37] In 1902 Kapsukas co-edited *Varpas*, founded and edited by Kudirka and in 1901-02 Kapsukas wrote for *Ukininkas*.[38] *Varpas*, together with *Auszra* and *Ukininkas* were the most important underground Lithuanian papers between 1883 and 1905, published in East Prussia and smuggled into Lithuania. Essentially secular in approach, these cultural, literary, and historical publications also positioned themselves on political currents in attempts to move out of clerical control.[39]

Yet the nationalists' problem was that in most of Lithuania's guberniia, ethnic

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34 Strazas, "Lithuania 1863-1983", p.52.

35 Encyclopedia Lituanica, p.39.

36 Sabaliunas, Lithuanian Social Democracy, pp.33, 48-56,113; Encyclopedia Lituanica, p.39. In October 1905 40,000 demonstrators took part in general strikes in Kaunas, Vilna, and other Lithuanian cities in sympathy with Russian workers. Organized jointly by the Bund and the LSDP, with leaflets in Polish, Lithuanian, Yiddish, and Russian, though urban Lithuanian workers were far less radicalized than Polish or Jewish workers. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", p.185.

37 Encyclopedia Lituanica, p.39.

38 A.S. Strazas, "From *Auszra* to the Great War: the emergence of the Lithuanian nation", Lituanus, Vol.42:4, 1996, pp.42-44. *Ukininkas* addressed rural economic problems.

39 Strazas, "From *Auszra* to the Great War", part 2, pp.34-36; Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", p.181.

Lithuanians were a minority.[40] Jews, Poles, and Russians dominated Lithuanian cities, leaving Lithuanian society a "pyramid without a top", since most of the Lithuanian aristocracy was itself Polonized.[41] The small cultural Lithuanian nationalist intelligentsia tried to create an urban or social Lithuanian presence through its nationalist press, and Kapsukas was at the center of this liberal nationalist movement.[42] During Kapsukas' nationalist activism in the early 1890's, social democracy was a significant political force in Lithuania, particularly the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP, Lietvuvos socialdemokratu partija). Kapsukas, a liberal nationalist, became one of the most influential figures in the LSDP. The lineage of the LSDP owed much to Jewish socialists and particularly to the Bund and its forerunners, but it was also influenced by German, Austrian, and Polish socialism.[43]

At its founding the LSDP was created by students who espoused socialist ideas and who relied on Polish as the language of communication and publication. The founders of the LSDP were descendants of Lithuania's nobility, students in Kiev who did not speak Lithuanian. In 1896 at the LSDP's creation congress, Feliks Dzierzynski attended as its youth representative. As a Pole, he eventually left the party because of its separatist program, but at the time the LSDP was quite mixed in its ethnic composition (it also had an Austrian Serb social democrat, Perazich, among its leadership). The LSDP's publications were in Lithuanian, Polish, Yiddish, and German, reflecting its multi-ethnic leadership elite

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[40] In 1897 Grodno guberniia was only 2.1% Lithuanian, Vilna guberniia only 17.48% Lithuanian, and Kaunas where Lithuanians wer a majority it was still only 66.02%, the remainder were Jews, Poles, Belorussians, and Russians. But compare with figures in Zalevskii, 66.2% in Kaunas, 50% in Suwalki, 20% in Vilna, 0.1% in Courland. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", p.180.

[41] Strazas, "From *Auszra* to the Great War", part 2, p.38. Unlike most Lithuanian peasants, semi-aristocratic Lithuanians like Kapsukas had no firmly held antagonism to Polish cultural dominance. While the Lithuanian peasantry generally suffered from Polonization in the form of widespread use of Polish in both official and customary discourse in church and schools, the small Lithuanian landed aristocracy was itself culturally Polonized, though there periodically remained calls for political home-rule and a restoration of the historic two states.

[42] Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", p.181.

[43] Sabaliunas, Lithuanian Social Democracy, pp.15-18; Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", pp.182-183. The PPS had a chapter in Vilna as of 1892, but it refused to accept Lithuanian workers because of their possible separatist tendencies. The LSDP had organizational ties with both the SPD and the SPO, and its program resembled Erfurt.

and western influences.[44] Its membership was urban workers, students, and professionals, but no effort was made in the Lithuanian countryside where most of the Lithuanian population resided until after 1902. In the early 1890's the LSDP was an eclectic and mixed grouping based largely on recruits from Vilna, and because of its ethnic composition it espoused a largely liberal nationalism within its socialist platform. Yet because the party's founders were liberally oriented seeking increased political autonomy and the eventual creation of an independent Lithuanian state, their politics necessarily de-emphasized class radicalism.[45]

By 1905 inter-group ties were created beyond the usual tactical collaborations: the PPS branch in Lithuania (PPS na Litwie) eventually merged several of its city chapters with those of the LSDP, but not in border cities like Bialystok where there were too many Polish workers who strongly identified with the Polish-PPS, or in Brest which had Jewish and Polish followings, and where the LSDP did not want merger because of fear of diluting Lithuanian influence. The LSDP tried to attract Jewish workers and established relations with the Bund until 1914 with some success: in 1907 of the LSDP's 2,310 members, 380 were Jewish, most from Grodno and Vilna. Jewish workers in the Lithuanian party were granted autonomous status and Yiddish literature. Alliances with LSDP and the Latvians were also relatively easy with chapters in Riga, Jelgava, and Liepaja, and 500 active members.[46] So where tactical alliances occurred it was for organizational reasons and nationalities questions were set aside.

Yet there was little accord between the LSDP and the RSDLP because of differences over the national question, and this in the years when Kapsukas was in the LSDP's CC. Although the middle level leadership of the LSDP wanted merger with the Russian party, the elite, including Kapsukas in 1906, did not.[47] Kapsukas was adamantly nationalist in his position and was unwilling to cede any ground to the RSDLP. In the event, there was no merger. In these years of the LSDP, the leadership was comprised of

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[44] Ibid., pp.28-29.
[45] Ibid., p.10.
[46] Ibid., pp.99-105.
[47] Ibid, pp.108-110.

52% middle class and 32% working class, while active support derived from students, intellectuals, educated professionals, and leaders of various labor unions. But more general support, evidenced by the 1906 Duma elections, came from the Lithuanian countryside where thousands of Lithuanian peasants elected 5 Lithuanian Social Democrats to the 1907 Duma.[48]

Revolutionary events of 1905, the subsequent Stolypin reaction, and the subsequent Duma elections, had changed the landscape and shifted the center of gravity within the LSDP elite itself. Since 1896 the LSDP had wanted an autonomous Republic of Lithuania in federal arrangement with its neighbors; the Bund wanted Jewish cultural autonomy; the national question was still almost non-existent in Latvia; the SDKPiL was increasingly Luxemburgist in its position; and the PPS increasingly nationalist. In other words, the ethnic/nationalist groupings of the Polish-Lithuanian territories had become irrevocably 'balkanized'.

Against this the LSDP revived a position that had been submerged in Lithuanian socialism from the beginning: Lithuania and Lithuanian workers were more advanced than backward Russia and its workers and the latter were not deemed ready for socialism. The Russian socialist leadership, too, was deemed "backward" and in turning to a more west European orientation, the LSDP elite, and Kapsukas foremost among them, prioritized the 'national' over the 'social'.[49] Kapsukas believed that Lithuania was more advanced than Russia, arguing that only in an ethnically distinct Lithuania could its workers follow their class interests.[50]

The multi-ethnic LSDP leadership had ceded to a certain ethnic unity. Moreover, arrests and repression in the cities had forced the LSDP into the ethnically homogeneous countryside, away from multi-ethnic urban Vilna. With this, rural Lithuanian support caused the elite to replace the party's Polish with Lithuanian. This pattern resembled the Bundist leadership, with similar immediate effect: those Polish speaking LSDP elites were

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[48] Ibid, pp.115-116.

[49] This was no doubt reinforced by the nationalism of the PPS, as Polish socialists generally refused to recognize Lithuanian distinctiveness. The LSDP was not admitted into the Second International until 1923 because of its separatist platform, which had also alienated Dzierzynski after 1905.

[50] Ibid, pp.122-123.

de facto excluded while Lithuanian speaking elites ascended, Dzierzynski left and Kapsukas rose to the CC. After 1900 then, the LSDP focused less on multi-ethnic urban workers and more on Lithuanian farm labor and small landholders, deriving essentially rural support, privileging 'nation' to 'class', and 'ethnicizing' the Lithuanian territories.

In recruiting in rural areas where most ethnic Lithuanians resided, from its original urban base, the LSDP now drew support in 1905 from the village farmer, his student offspring, and artisans. Then it gradually began to penetrate the two largest rural strata, agricultural workers and urban peasants. This was an elite that was part of the rural community, as had been Kapsukas' family, though with advanced education. This form of rural coalition-building created a certain alliance between farmers and socialists, but it was a political union not an ideological one. The issue of land ownership caused rifts and when farmers with landed estates broke away, the LSDP's class strategy shifted to the poorest, largest agricultural sector, the 'true village proletariat'.[51] There was however, in reality very little 'revolution' among these rural strata, and language problems with the Polish and Belorussian peasantries surfaced. The LSDP intelligentsia's 'social affinity' was with rural landowners not agricultural workers, and therefore its socialist basis was undermined. Kapsukas was at the heart of this linguistic and cultural shift.

Because of his involvement in events of 1905-6, from 1907 to 1913 Kapsukas was imprisoned and exiled.[52] Between 1906 and 1914 arrests, exiles, and resettlement thinned the LSDP leadership, Kapsukas included. He spent time in Lithuanian, Polish, and Russian prisons; in 1910-11, while in a Warsaw prison, he came into contact with members of the SDKPiL, Dzierzynski's new party, and seemed to have been influenced by its Polish members.[53] But when Kapsukas was sent to Vladimir and Krasnoiarsk in Russia, Polish influences waned, and under the Russian Jewish Bolshevik Sverdlov's influence, Kapsukas gravitated toward Russian socialism.

Now older elites stayed with their positions while the younger students and newcomers, deeply impressed by Russian revolutionary events in 1905-7, viewed the

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[51] Ibid, pp.129-131.

[52] Ibid, p.52.

[53] Ibid., pp.33, 93-94.

national question as an obstacle to closer LSDP and RSDLP ties.[54] The 'federalist' and 'autonomist' wings of the LSDP solidified, and Kapsukas embraced the more radical, federalist option. Indeed a number of Lithuanian Social Democrats moved closer to the Bolsheviks and the RSDLP. It was increasingly obvious that the LSDP elite had too many Lithuanian and Polish intellectuals, and its appeal was too segmented to effectively broaden its social base. Significantly, most of the LSDP intellectual elite also pursued cultural, literary and foreign interests as members of literary societies, Lithuanian library groups, museums, etc. This set the cultural elite inside Lithuanian social democracy apart from the 'professional' elite of revolutionaries, and Kapsukas' skills marginalized him from the former. Not having the 'cultural capabilities' to remain a 'Lithuanian' socialist, Kapsukas found himself excluded from its ethnopolitics.

As early as 1901 Kapsukas had published a few second-rate articles combining literary criticism with Marxist analysis. His official biography says that his "Marxist aesthetic views were definitively formed between 1913 and 1916" on the 'bourgeois nature' of art and Lithuanian fiction. But his 'Marxist aesthetic views' were 'formed' by necessity of exclusion from Lithuanian (socialist) cultural and literary society. It was not that his embrace of Bolshevism "made him an outcast in Lithuania",[55] rather he embraced Bolshevism precisely because he was something of a 'cultural' outcast, ill-equipped to associate with Lithuanian socialist-nationalist intellectuals.

Not all Lithuanian nationalists became political nationalists. After the Stolypin reaction and through the war years Lithuanian intellectual-cultural elites, both socialist and nationalist, turned inwards and focused on Lithuanian national-cultural pursuits, a number of the remaining LSDP organizations were nestled amongst the Lithuanian diaspora in Latvia, Britain, and the US. On his return from exile in 1913 Kapsukas found himself marginalized from Lithuanian politics and he gravitated to the Lithuanian diasporas among which could be found small groups of Lithuanian intellectual emigres.[56] In 1913

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[54] Ibid., pp.118-119.

[55] Ibid, p.145.

[56] Riga had 35,000 Lithuanian emigrants, Petersburg 30,000. Between 1869 and 1914 more than 300,000 left for the US, with sizable communities in New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago. Strazas, "From *Auszra* to the Great War", pp.67-68.

Kapsukas edited Lithuanian socialist papers in Philadelphia during his six months in the US, and on his return began editing papers in Latvia.[57]

Lithuanian colonies, concentrated in Scotland's industrial belt in the mines, factories, and iron foundries, became important cultural and intellectual centers for activist intellectual emigres who published *Rankpelnis* (The Laborer) weekly in Glasgow between 1907 and 1923.[58] The leading organ of the LSDP during the War, Kapsukas took over its editorship between 1915-1916, while also editing *Socialdemokratas*, the journal of the Foreign Bureau of the LSDP. He moved to Glasgow from Kracow in 1915, and "for at least part of the war years Bellshill [Glasgow]became the main center of Lithuanian socialism".[59]

Kapsukas played a crucial part. *Rankpelnis* and *Socialdemokratas*, under Kapsukas' editorship took hard internationalist and anti-war positions, both during Kapsukas' time in Scotland and after 1916 while in the US. During the war Kapsukas also penned several articles for the British socialist press in attempts to raise awareness of the oppressive conditions under Tsarist rule, and this in cooperation with the Russian Jewish Literary Society in London.[60] It was also during the war that Kapsukas joined the Bolshevik party.

After the Revolution he became an ardent anti-nationalist and took active part in the Bolshevik effort to Russify and centralize Lithuania and Belorussia as head of the government of the 'Lithuanian Soviet Republic' designed to unite Lithuania and Belorussia until it was ousted by the Polish Army in April 1919. After the Revolution, Kapsukas edited the first Bolshevik paper in Lithuania, and became active in the Comintern until 1928.[61] Kapsukas returned in 1920 with the Russian forces until activities were forced underground. As a member of the Lithuanian Communist Party and director of its

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57 Encyclopedia Lituanica, p.40; Branko Lazitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, ("New Revised Expanded Edition"), [1975], 1986, p.320.

58 James White, "Scottish Lithuanians and the Russian Revolution", Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol.6, No.1, 1975, p.2.

59 Ibid, pp.4-5.

60 Ibid, pp.5-6.

61 Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.320.

underground activity in Lithuania, Kapsukas' followers in 1921 were between 700-900, but 2/3 of them were not ethnic Lithuanian.[62]

But the 'anti-nationalist' impulse now had another source. As White notes, those Lithuanian socialists who had been nationalists earlier were eager to dissociate themselves from any manifestation of nationalism: "the same impulse caused him to write the history of the Lithuanian Social Democrats as though the latter existed in a vacuum, with no relation other groups or currents in society".[63] It was only in the 1920's and 1930's that the Bolshevik Kapsukas received recognition -- of the 'Soviet' type -- for his writings on Lithuanian literature, its aesthetic role and national character, writing reviews, essays, and short stories. Kapsukas, frustrated and marginalized inside Lithuanian cultural nationalism, found a 'literary' place critiquing the same Lithuanian culture from within Russian Bolshevism.

If Kapsukas' social origins from a prosperous Lithuanian peasant landowning family reflected the privileged status historically accorded by the Russian state to Lithuanian peasants and the creation of a rural (clerical) bourgeoisie, this status was gained at the expense of the rural Polish landed gentry -- Dzierzynski's national and social origins, to which I now turn.

III. Feliks Dzierzynski and Polish gentry radicalism in the *kresy*

Karl Radek wrote that Dzierzynski had rejected Polish nationalism for internationalism because social proximity to the Lithuanian peasantry and agitation among Polish and Jewish workers in a predominantly Lithuanian region had estranged him from the ideals of the Polish nobility.[64] Though Radek wrote this in 1935, Dzierzynski's origins as an impoverished Catholic Polish gentry on the Polish frontier were important both to his early nationalism and to his later internationalism.

From the 1870's through the turn of the century the most important source of urban growth in Russian Poland was from the Polish-Lithuanian countryside. Two rural groups

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62 Encylopedia Lituanica, p.40.

63 White, "Latvian and Lithuanian Sections of the Bolshevik Party", p.95.

64 Karl Radek, Portraits and Pamphlets, London, Wishart Books Ltd., 1935, pp.100, 110.

migrated to the cities, the impoverished rural gentry whose small estates in the post-emancipation period could not adjust without cheap serf labor, and landless peasants who could not be absorbed by the rural economy. Both groups migrated to the cities by the 1890's as Russian Poland's urbanites increasingly consisted of ethnically non-Polish groups -- Jews, Russian officials, Lithuanian peasants-turned-workers, and Germans. A new industrial proletariat in Vilna, Kaunas, Grodno, and other cities comprised landless Lithuanians and Belorussians, Jewish artisans and small craftsmen, descendants of the old urban manufacturing class, displaced small producers, and a few impoverished Polish *szlachta*.[65]

The displaced Polish *szlachta* and children of the Polish landowning classes arrived in the cities to seek alternative professions. With difficulty, they found positions in urban society as civil servants in lower level state administration, especially in the postal and rail bureaucracies, few went into the imperial bureaucracy (though not in Poland and not at the highest levels), and few went into private business, schools, or the free professions earning subsistence wages in literary work and journalism. But the most ambitious of the gentlemen-intellectuals found themselves lost.[66] Because most of the sons of the impoverished Polish gentry sought intellectual professions, they constituted a disproportionately large intelligentsia. In 1897 the sons of the displaced rural Polish gentry of the borderlands comprised 2/3 of those urbanites with proof of *szlachta* lineage, with the result that much of Russian Poland's urban intelligentsia, largely Polish and Jewish, embodied the cultural attitudes and radicalism of the Polish gentry of the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian borderlands, or the *kresy*.

Dzierzynski's social origins in the class of rural Polish gentry-intellectuals were rooted in this period of political and social change. His family had been affected by the state's punitive policies towards the Polish gentry of the borderlands -- agrarian reform, confiscation of Polish lands, and sustained Russification. As noted above, Tsarist policies had been retaliatory in intent: persons of gentry origin were sent to the gallows, thousands were sent to Siberia and labor camps, and in Lithuania hundreds of Polish estates were

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65 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.78.

66 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.488.

confiscated, with severe levies placed on those that remained -- Dzierzynski's family among them. Though this was not yet the more systematic 'Russification' of Alexander III (1881-1894) which Dzierzynski himself experienced, several decades of undermining Polish cultural control of the region had important effects on educational and administrative elites, Church elites, and on the landowning gentry itself. Consequently, the first generation of rural Polish *intelligenty* of the borderlands, sons of impoverished Polish *szlachta*, were the most oppressed and persecuted social group in the western borderlands, and among them emerged most of the leaders of the Polish labor and national movements: Dzierzynski, Pilsudski, Marchlewski, and Warynski. Unlike the liberal and positivist Polish intelligentsia of an earlier generation, Dzierzynski's generation radicalized in the 'Russificatory' 1880-1890's, turning away from liberalism and positivism to socialism and nationalism.

Dzierzynski's father felt the diminishment of their Polish middle-rank gentry status on their Lithuanian estate *Dzierynowo*: in 1863 he had graduated from St. Petersburg University with a degree in math and physics, and was constrained to find employment as an instructor in the more remote Taganrog's male *gimnazia* after he was denied employment in Vilna province. He held the post until a forced retirement in 1875 when he received a decent state pension. Though not wealthy, the Dzierzynski's were not impoverished either: the father's pension combined with the leasing of the property to Belorussian peasants rendered a comfortable existence.[67]

Dzierzynski's father was a 'village intellectual', an educated landowner who advised the peasantry on agricultural techniques. Dzierzynski's mother was from a wealthy intelligentsia family related to the dramatist and poet Tadeusz Kosciuszko, her father a professor in St. Petersburg and herself privately educated.[68] Dzierzynski's mother raised him a Polish patriot, insisting on the importance of the Catholic Church in saving Poland

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[67] In his autobiography written in 1921, Dzierzynski wrote that he was from a "petty *szlachta*" family, "Avtobiografiia", Deiateli SSSR i revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia Rossiia: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Granat, Moskva: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia,1989, (hereafter Granat), p.407. This was deleted from 'official' reprints, see his "Avtobiografiia", in Feliks Dzerzhinskii: Dnevnik zakliuchennogo Pis'ma, Moskva, "Molodaia gvardiia", 1984, pp.3-6. On the father's pension, Robert Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL: A Study of the Origins of Polish Communism, Boulder, Co.: East European Monographs, 1984, p.20.

[68] Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski, pp.22-24.

from Tsarist Russification. Dzierzynski later told Kapsukas that after his father's premature death in 1882 the home became so nationalistic that as a young boy Dzierzynski himself dreamed of killing Muscovites. Raised and tutored on a rural Lithuanian estate on the Polish national romanticism of Mickiewicz, his biographer says this produced in him a "permanent intellectual and cultural bias",[69] a bias sustained on the belief that a future Polish order would necessarily rest on Catholic foundations.

In 1887 at age 10 Dzierzynski was sent to boarding school and the Vilna Gimnazia where his first political activism took form.[70] The empire's *gimnaziia* were the most important venues for Russification of the sons of Polish *szlachta*, gentry, and intelligentsia. Entrance exams required a knowledge of Russian, and signs abounded advising that the use of Polish was prohibited even outside the classroom, as was the study or discussion of Polish literature and history. In 1832, after the first Polish insurrections, the Polish university in Vilna had been closed and converted into the First Male Gimnazia, and two years later Russian replaced the Polish-language curriculum. So by the late 1880's both the city of Vilna and its *gimnaziia* had been recipients of decades of Russification, humiliatingly reducing the status of Polish language and culture.

Dzierzynski's pre-Bolshevik radicalism had roughly four phases: Polish nationalism, Lithuanian Social Democracy, Polish Social Democracy, and Polish-Lithuanian Social Democracy. His 'Polish nationalist' phase began in 1887. When Dzierzynski entered *gimnazia* the romantic-nationalist reaction against positivism was already underway. His earliest activity was in the Catholic, nationalist-patriotic circles of "Young Poland", a response to the oppressive Russificatory atmosphere both inside and outside the *gimnazia*, and part of his desire to please his mother by entering the Roman Catholic Seminary.[71] Dzierzynski's nationalist activism invoked two pillars of his Polish identity, his language and his religion, and initially found expression in Catholic Polish student circles designed to "train future Polish citizens" through discussions of Polish literature and history. Yet Dzierzynski's nationalist radicalism in Vilna's *gimnazia* reflected

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69 Ibid.

70 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.407.

71 Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, pp.18, 24-25, 32.

not his rural upbringing, but an urban political bias that would continue throughout his life, never showing interest in the rural peasantry. [72]

Though he otherwise received excellent marks in *gimnazia*, Dzierzynski's Russian skills were evidently very poor, becoming a constant problem and leaving with him a bitter experience of Russification. Whether this may have been a form of passive resistance to Russification as Blobaum speculates is unclear, but Blobaum's suggestion that Dzierzynski's later radicalism was a product of the contradiction between the indulgence and coddling he received as a child at *Dzierzynowo* and subsequent state oppression may be a mischaracterization of his radicalization. Dzierzynski was radicalized before coming into direct contact with Tsarist oppression: 'nurtured and coddled' on Polish nationalism and anti-Tsarist sentiment, he had been socialized and radicalized to the resentment of a declining Polish gentry under Russian rule before *gimnazia*. Vilna's multi-ethnic urban setting and political atmosphere, and the *gimnazia* setting, may have rendered the humiliation more apparent, and provided the organizational opportunities absent in rural *Dzierzynowo* with which to express it.[73]

The second phase of Dzierzynski's radicalism, from about 1894 involved both Polish socialism and Lithuanian social democracy. In his seventh year of *gimnazia* Dzierzynski entered socialist political circles loosely tied to the Polish Socialist Party (PPS, Polska Partia Socjalistycsna), marking his shift from Polish patriotic nationalism to a vague Polish nationalist socialism. Between 1890 and 1919 Polish Marxism was something of a conduitor arena of exchange between Europe and Russia. In 1892 at the founding of the PPS, the party leadership called for Polish independence with a program modeled on that of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), and soon joined the International. But Polish socialism was warring between its nationalist and internationalist wings. Although most Polish exiles were attracted to the PPS and Pilsudski's leadership, Rosa Luxemburg and Leo Jogiches denounced Polish nationalist demands as non-Marxist and founded the

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[72] Ibid, p.49.

[73] Dzierzynski's brothers, raised but not educated in the same setting, never became radicals: Stanislaw attended St. Petersburg University, Casimir a Veterinary Institute, Ignatii was a student at Moscow University, and Vladislaw enrolled in St. Petersburg *gimnazia*. HIAPO, Box 162, Index No. XIIId(2), Processing Intelligence, Folder 2A, Headquarters Circular No.4317, 26 June 1902.

rival social democratic party, Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP), careful not to recruit in Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. Luxemburg's SDKP eventually disbanded due to arrests, leaving only the PPS.

PPS circles entered the Vilna *gimnazia* in 1893; an essentially Polish party with a chapter in Vilna, the PPS was premised on the belief that Lithuania was a Polish province and therefore had no legitimate separatist claim to autonomy.[74] But the PPS had very little support among Polish workers in Vilna and was slowly eclipsed by the secular, socialist reformism of Lithuanian social democracy. As noted above, Lithuanian socialism was soon constituted as the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), its founders linguistically and culturally Polonized descendants of Lithuania's nobility. Therefore Lithuanian socialism in 1894 was still open to educated polonized Lithuanians and Polish gentry radicals, respectively Kapsukas and Dzierzynski.

By early 1895 Dzierzynski began to organize artisans, craftsmen, and factory apprentices in Lithuanian social democratic circles.[75] He was given his own student circles to direct, and in 1896 attended the Congress of the LSDP as a representative of Vilna socialist youth. Following his mother's death, Dzierzynski experienced a severe depression. Throughout his life frenetic political activism consistently served to save him from debilitating depressions and nervous breakdowns. He fell into more frequent conflicts with *gimnazia* authorities, and although he claimed to have withdrawn from *gimnazia* in 1896 two months before graduation to dedicate himself to political activism, the best evidence suggests that he was actually expelled.

Until this point Dzierzynski's political activity had been limited to student circles and a few Polish workers, but in leaving the student environment of the *gimnazia*, he entered Vilna's political life. Dzierzynski agitated among workers in small factories, in taverns, and in night schools for the Vilna LSDP, organizing strikes in conjunction with the

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74 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.407; Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, p.32; Sabaliunas, Lithuanian Social Democracy, p.18.

75 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.407; Sabaliunas, Lithuanian Social Democracy, p.25; but Strazas dates Dzierzynski's involvement in Lithuanian social democracy much earlier to 1887, "From *Auszra* to the Great War", Lituanus, Vol.42, No.4, 1996, p.43.

Jewish socialists.[76] As noted in Chapter 6 with Piatnitskii, Vilna's labor force was multi-ethnic in essentially small workshops and handicraft enterprises, and organizing effective strikes in Vilna required inter-ethnic cooperation. The best organized were the Jewish socialists and they were keen to involve Polish or Lithuanian workers in city-wide strikes. Jewish socialists' aspiration to empire-wide socialist organizations so persuaded Dzierzynski that he began to study Yiddish in order to more effectively work among Vilna's Jewish workers. Very few among the Jewish socialist intelligentsia in Vilna themselves spoke Yiddish, as Radek wrote, "it was a great joke to us that [in] the headquarters of Polish Social Democracy, which contained quite a number of Jews, only Dzierzynski, former gentleman of Poland, and Catholic, could read Yiddish!".[77] Russian had been difficult, but Yiddish came much easier.

In 1897 Dzierzynski was sent to work in Kaunas to form a chapter of the LSDP, the PPS chapter in Kaunas having collapsed because of repression. Dzierzynski set up an illegal printing press and began publishing the Polish language underground paper "Kowienski robotnik" ('The Kaunas Worker'), which stressed both economic demands and inter-ethnic labor alliances.[78] On arrival in Kaunas Dzierzynski had turned to his Jewish friends and contacts for assistance. As with Vilna, Kaunas also had a multi-ethnic labor force with predominantly small craftsmen and shopkeepers.

It is interesting to note the parallel in Piatnitskii's and Dzierzynski's writings on the need for inter-ethnic cooperation.[79] As with Piatnitskii from a Jewish artisan perspective, Dzierzynski, as a Polish gentry intellectual, stressed inter-ethnic working class alliances as important. In 1894 Dzierzynski had renounced his Catholicism, but not his Polish nationalist commitments.[80] He also remained opposed to any form of Lithuanian autonomy from Poland. Official biographies state that on joining Lithuanian circles

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76 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.407; Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, p.40.

77 Radek, Portraits and Pamphlets, p.100.

78 BSE, p.482; F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, tom.1, Moskva, Izd.Polit.Lit., 1977, four articles from April 1897, pp.16-26.

79 Piatnitskii, Memoires of a Bolshevik, Chapter 6; F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, "Iz pis'ma sochuvstryviushchei revoliutsionnomu dvizheniio v Pol'she", pp.49-52.

80 Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, p.33.

Dzierzynski adhered to their left or non-nationalist wing, while he himself wrote that in these years he began studying Marxist literature in Siberian exile and presumably adopted its anti-nationalist position.[81] But Dzierzynski opposed Lithuanian national aspirations quite apart from his Marxist orientation. He had had very little contact with Lithuanian peasants or Lithuanian factory workers -- those ethnic Lithuanians most implicated in Polish-Lithuanian social-economic relations. In fact Dzierzynski had been consistently indifferent to Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Polish peasants alike.

His opposition to Lithuanian nationalism, it seems to me, did not invoke his socioeconomic identity as an impoverished Polish gentry-landowner, but it did invoke his gentry-intellectual experiences as a Pole in Russifying Vilna. Lithuanian socialism had initially been a political alliance between Polonized Lithuanian nobles, intellectuals and aristocrats, and similarly oppressed descendants of the Polish *szlachta*. Both social groups had been radicalized by Russification. But as the Lithuanian intelligentsia found and asserted its cultural identity vis-a-vis the cultural dominance of the Polish rural gentry, it eventually privileged Lithuanian cultural autonomy from Polish influence over common socialist and anti-Russian aspirations.

As the Lithuanian LSDP elite demanded to be treated as a distinct entity free of 'Polish imperialism', the 'right' or national wing of the party came to the fore as we saw with Kapsukas. At the same time, Polish socialism found *its* national identity, and its leadership elite came to be constituted around opposition to Lithuanian 'separatism' from 'Historic Poland'. In short, both Polish socialism in its 'patriotic' form and Lithuanian socialism in its 'patriotic' form became mutually exclusive: the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian borderlands were becoming culturally and linguistically 'balkanized'. And Dzierzynski, a Polish gentry-intellectual from rural Lithuania found himself on the borderlines of the constituent nationalities of the region. Ironically this ethnopolitical 'elective affinity' meant that he had more in common with Russified Vilna Jews than with ethnic Poles from Congress Poland.

Dzierzynski's radicalism now gravitated away from the 'provincial' and 'patriotic' and towards more 'socialist' and 'internationalist' political groupings. In addition to

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81 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.407; BSE, p.482.

descendants of the rural Polish *szlachta*, Russified Jews were the other social group finding themselves squeezed between these 'national' socialisms. And Jewish socialism was a significant cultural and intellectual influence on Dzierzynski. It is very important to emphasize that throughout this period Dzierzynski was intimately involved with Jewish socialists in Vilna (especially in his student circles), many of whom would later become Bundists (his affairs and marriage with Jewish women were well-known).[82] These Jewish associations would continue throughout his pre-1917 political career, and they no doubt had significant influence on Dzierzynski's ideological orientations.

Blobaum argues that Dzierzynski's close relations with Jewish socialists caused him to adopt their internationalist views.[83] I agree, with qualifications. First, as noted above, Dzierzynski's social origins militated against his ability to embrace either Polish or Lithuanian 'national' socialisms, anyway forcing him into 'internationalism'. Second, the PPS, the LSDP, and the Jewish socialists (after 1897 the Bund) came into conflict over claims to recruiting the same workers -- Jews, Poles, and Lithuanians in Vilna, Kaunas, Grodno, and other *kresy* cities. Of course the multi-national character of the working classes in these cities was distinctive because there were no large industrial factories with highly concentrated and multi-ethnic labor bases (as in southern Ukraine and parts of Russia, for instance); urban labor of the borderlands was small-scale, often family-owned handicraft shops or enterprises which tended to employ their 'own' nationality. Unlike Baku in the Caucasus, there was very little ethnic competition or consciousness among the urban working classes in these cities. For the socialist and nationalist intelligentsias however, the narrower the linguistic and cultural affiliation of the working classes, the more 'provincial', local, or limited their political influence. The converse was also true: 'internationalist' or cross-cultural affiliations could horizontally broaden the scope and social base of the organization.

Dzierzynski's moves from Polish patriotism to the PPS to Polish-Lithuanian alliance in the early LSDP to the founding of the SDKPiL were indeed profoundly affected by his intimate associations and friendships with Jewish socialists, but they were also due

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[82] Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, p.34.

[83] Ibid.

to political limitations that singular cultural allegiance entailed. Therefore the elective affinity was such that (i) Russified Jewish socialists (Piatnitskii), (ii) impoverished Polish gentry-intellectuals (Dzierzynski), and (iii) (Polonized) Lithuanian quasi-aristocratic intellectuals (Kapsukas) could, because of the borderlands ethnic social-niche ranking and Tsarist Russification, find common cultural-political interests in 'imperialist', multi-ethnic socialist groupings. Therefore only the borderlands could have produced Bolsheviks, not the ethnically homogeneous -- and thus vertically organized -- provinces of Congress Poland.

In 1898 in Kaunas, Dzierzynski was arrested and exiled to Viatka gubernii where he worked in a printing cloth factory, and from which he escaped in 1899.[84] Dzierzynski's period in exile took a severe toll on him, as he suffered from chronic emphysema, bronchitis, and anemia, and was told that his life would be a short one: Dzierzynski was exempted from military service in the Imperial Army due to poor health.[85] But his emotional state was more debilitating. Like Ioffe and Gusev, he suffered from severe depressions and near nervous breakdowns, and at one point even wrote that he "felt a discrepancy between the real and the apparent".[86] In letters from prison during this period he wrote that life in freedom had no meaning, while life in prison gave his existence meaning and purpose.[87] This was the clearest statement of this commitment to political radicalism.

The third phase of Dzierzynski's radicalism began in 1899 on his return from exile to Vilna. In 1899 he found Lithuanian 'national' socialism was on the ascendancy and he deserted the party in order to help Rosa Luxemburg to found a new party. In 1897, the same year as the founding of the Bund in Vilna, the Polish National Democratic Party had been founded under Dmowski's leadership, with a clear nationalist agenda. Pilsudski's distrust of Russian socialists and internationalism and his influence inside the PPS had also

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[84] On his 1898 arrest and exile HIAPO, Box 126, Index No.XIIId(2), Processing Intelligence, Folder 2A, Headquarters Circular, Warning Lists, Circular No.4317, 26 July 1902.

[85] BSE, p.482.

[86] Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, p.50.

[87] Feliks Dzerzhinskii, Dnevnik zakliuchennogo pis'ma, "Pis'ma k rodnym, ianvar' 1898-mai 1902", pp.7-8. In all Dzierzynski would spend more than 11 years in Tsarist prisons and labor camps in Siberia, Warsaw, and Moscow, freed only in 1917.

ensured that the national struggle would have priority over the socialist one. The PPS was de facto, then, the only socialist organization active among the Polish working class.

In response to Pilsudski's politics Dzierzynski and Luxemburg founded the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), initially calling for Polish and Lithuanian autonomy within a Russian federation. That is, Dzierzynski's SDKPiL de facto recognized the legitimacy of 'imperial' boundaries. Dzierzynski went to Warsaw to re-establish contacts with Polish social democrats and with friends in the Vilna Bundist organization.[88] With his Bundist contacts in Warsaw Dzierzynski worked among factory workers to counter the rightist-PPS, whose patriotism he believed divided not only Polish society, but Polish workers from Russian and Jewish workers as well.[89]

Dzierzynski then returned to Vilna to merge Warsaw and Vilna groups on the basis of Polish and Lithuanian unity in an all-Russian, *rossiiskaia* federation. Along with other 'national' socialist parties, the SDKPiL formed a loose federation with the RSDLP. The merger caused considerable controversy, and Dzierzynski was insistent on a centralized organization, opposing his Bundist friends' demands for recognition of their "Jewishness" and requests for special status within the RSDLP.[90] Although intimately involved with Jewish socialists, and although deeply affected by Jewish internationalism, Dzierzynski was clearly at odds with Bundist autonomism or 'nationalism'. He could make common cause with Jewish socialists as long as they were socialists first and Jewish second; but as they found their 'national' identity, he could not easily follow. Similarly, as Polish socialists under Pilsudski began to give precedence to national demands over workers' demands, Dzierzynski's social and organizational base in the multi-ethnic borderlands could only problematically be incorporated. In other words, Dzierzynski's internationalism was something of a response to isolation from 'national' socialisms.

Dzierzynski's position on Polish nationalism was Luxemburgist embracing 'organic incorporation', and he agreed with her that the problem was not the SDKPiL's position on the 'national question', but rather the RSDLP's Leninist concessions to self-

88 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.408; Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, p.56.

89 HIAPO, Box 162, Index No. XIIId(2), Processing Intelligence, Folder 2A, Headquarters Circular No.4317, 26 June 1902; Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, pp.61-64.

90 Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, pp.90-91.

determination.[91] Any concessions to national autonomism or separatism, including certain federalist arrangements, were seen by Dzierzynski, and much of the Polish emigre Left, as undermining their position and strengthening that of Dmowski's National Social Democrats and Pilsudski's PPS.

Not a theoretician by nature, Dzierzynski came at the issue pragmatically: Polish and Lithuanian nationalism would only weaken radicalism in areas which were ethnically mixed because workers of different nationalities would not see their mutual interests, thereby making strike organization more difficult.[92] Dzierzynski's position makes more sense when two considerations are taken into account. Most immediately, his close personal and professional relationships with internationalist Jews in Vilna and Warsaw influenced his thinking, though he disagreed with the Bundist position on cultural autonomy, just as he had earlier with Lithuanian national socialists.

Secondly, Dzierzynski was never 'at home' inside Congress Poland. His cultural sensibilities and personal associations were those of the Polish gentry-intellectual of the borderlands: the embodiment of the cultural and political dominance of the Polish *szlachta* over non-Polish peasantries. Though he and Pilsudski derived from the same socio-ethnic milieu as Polish gentry families in rural Lithuania, attended the same *gimnazia*, and early on became Polish patriots, Pilsudski was 8 years older and radicalized in patriotic circles before Jewish socialist circles' arrival in Vilna. Therefore Dzierzynski's *declasse kresy* status found certain social affinity with that of the Jewish intelligenty in the western borderlands in a way that Pilsudski's earlier cohort did not.

Dzierzynski was arrested in Warsaw, and after a period in the Warsaw Citadel was exiled to Iakutsk in Eastern Siberia.[93] He escaped by swimming across the Lena River -- despite his pneumonia and a case of TB -- and it would be one of his most famous escapes.[94] He described his existence in these years as difficult, painful, and miserable,

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91 Ibid., p.94.

92 Ibid., p.69.

93 F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Dnevnik zakliuchennogo pis'ma, "Pis'ma k rodnym ianvar' 1898- mai 1902", letter from Alexsandrovskaia prison in Iakutsk, pp.35-38.

94 Well-documented in original sources by the Okhrana in the Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Box 88 Accession No. 63013, 8.41/44, Series 54, Folder 28.

and only political activism could prevent him from sinking into yet another deep depression.

By the time Dzierzynski went to Berlin in 1903, the SDKPiL and the PPS were rival parties, with nearly equal membership bases. But the two parties' social composition differed: the nationalist-PPS attracted Polish intelligentsia from the Kingdom and from Galicia and other emigre centers, while the SDKPiL had relatively few Polish intelligentsia and was mostly Jewish in leadership. The SDKPiL found rank and file support among shoemakers, bricklayers, carpenters, weavers, and bakers; in contrast, the PPS drew support from Polish industrial workers in metallurgy and machine building. The SDKPiL had far fewer factory workers, though this was the growing sector and the sector most affected by the War.[95] But the PPS was conflicted in its attitude towards the War, while the SDKPiL, without Polish independence on its agenda, was able to focus on the War's effects on the working classes.

In 1905 Dzierzynski edited the SDKPiL's organ *Czerwony sztandar* ('The Red Banner') in Kracow under Austria's more lenient rule.[96] Revolutionary events were more advanced in Poland than in Russia, in part because in Congress Poland the revolution had both social and national dimensions, with political demands placing a distinctive gloss on labor strikes.[97] And although the SDKPiL had amiable relations with the Bund in 1905, the Lodz textile workers became a recruiting battleground between the two parties, eventually forcing the Bund, the SDKPiL, and the PPS into temporary cooperation as strike activity in Lodz escalated in 1905 ahead of its leadership.[98] By Dzierzynski's account

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[95] Indicative of the growing strength of the PPS was also the fact that 15,000-20,000 copies of literature reached 25 towns in the Kingdom, while the SDKPiL's 5,000 pieces of literature reached only 10 towns; in part this was because the PPS had their own local presses, while the SDKPiL had to publish abroad until 1904. The SDKPiL had a narrower organizational base than did the PPS, with the former comprising 125-150 members in Warsaw and the latter about 400.

[96] On its publications, HIAPO, Index XIIIb(1), Box 121, Folder 1G, Outgoing Dispatches; F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Izbrannei proizvedeniia, pp.40-44.

[97] Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", Martov et al, Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii, pp.157-158, 162. This included demands such as language laws, Russian students boycotting schools etc.

[98] F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Izbrannei proizvedeniia, "Otchet glavnogo pravleniia na c'ezde SDKPiL", 18 June 1906, pp.40-44, 97-106. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", pp.159-166, for a discussion of the role of the various parties and the may strikes in Warsaw and Lodz. They also cooperated closely with the German Social Democrats, who had been organizing Lodz's considerable German working class (60,000). Blobaum, Rewolucja, pp.134-137.

its Lodz organization had 13 circles, 400 members, and only 3 active *intelligent*.[99]

Dzierzynski was again imprisoned in the Warsaw Citadel, and released with the October Manifesto.[100] The SDKPiL's factory organization was by now no longer a political sect, but a mass party with a Central Committee, a foreign bureau, separate Lithuanian and Polish committees, a Warsaw committee and workers' circles below each.[101] But in becoming a 'mass party' some concessions had to be made to the 'national question', as the SDKPiL, and Dzierzynski, conceded to certain guarantees of cultural development, e.g. national schools and freedom to use native tongues in Poland (though no explicit mention was made of Lithuania).[102] Socialists became much clearer about their affinities: the PPS-Left aligned with the Mensheviks and the Bund, while the SDKPiL internationalists moved closer to the Bolsheviks.

By focusing strictly on ethnically Polish workers in 1905, Pilsudski's PPS had cut itself off from the revolutionary potential in Russia, while the SDKPiL had flourished and increased its membership.[103] Crucially, Dzierzynski and other Polish socialists saw in 1905 a vindication of internationalism and labor radicalism, believing that the strength of Polish social democracy lay in its connection to an all-empire labor radicalism; only in conjunction with the Russian working class could both capitalism and autocracy be dismantled. This belief was reinforced by the fact that 1905 student radicalism and strike activity in Warsaw, for instance, involved not only Polish students, but Jewish and Russian students in common struggle over Polish rights in education.[104] Inter-ethnic cooperation in 1905 had vindicated internationalism.

Dzierzynski's assessment proved tactically correct in the short run: the years of

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99 F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Izbrannei proizvedeniia, "V zagranichnei (ii) komitet SDKPiL", February 1905, pp.55-56.

100 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.408; Dzierzynski wrote his sister from the Tenth Pavilion of he Warsaw Citadel on October 1905, just before his release, that his life had become unbearably painful and arduous, "Pisma k rodnym: avgust 1902-mai 1907", Feliks Dzerzhinskii: Dnevnik zkliuchennogo Pisma, pp.69-70.

101 Its organizational structure as seen by the Tsarist authorities, HIAPO, Box 208, Index XIX, Folder 12B, dated 1909.

102 Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", pp.172-173 on Luxemburg and the SDKPiL's program during this period.

103 Robert Blobaum, Rewolucja: Russian Poland, 1904-1907, New York, 1995, p.145.

104 Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", pp.163, 176-179.

Tsarist reaction between 1905 and 1911 were the years of peak SDKPiL influence among Polish, German, and even Jewish workers, including a large influx of factory proletariat.[105] The SDKPiL's influence in 1906-1907 as a mass party just smaller than the PPS was truly multi-ethnic: the national composition of its leadership was almost entirely Polonized Jewish intellectuals (Dzierzynski was the notable exception), while its rank and file were 70% Polish workers, 25% German workers, and 5% Jewish workers.[106] In the longer term, however, Duma elections and Stolypin reaction had galvanized national over labor radicalism. And Dmowski's National Democrats, whose autonomist-separatist platform included demands for a variety of religious, political and linguistic rights, and who were now active among the Polish peasantry, eclipsed the socialist parties with their cultural organizations.[107]

Dzierzynski's prolonged absence due to arrest and exile during this time of contested elections and increased Russification removed him from events in Congress Poland.[108] In 1908-1909 Dzierzynski was in prison and exile during the years of Stolypin reaction; stripped of his privileges deriving from noble birth, he was permanently exiled to Siberia.

Dzierzynski had wanted affiliation with the RSDLP while retaining organizational autonomy and sole organizational privileges over multi-ethnic regions of Poland and Lithuania. His politics were still those of the Polish gentry of the multi-ethnic borderlands, with an implicit commitment to the integrity of the imperial territories. And although Dzierzynski was in close alliance with Lenin in this period, he maintained even closer relations with Rosa Luxemburg, particularly on the national question.

In 1911 the SDKPiL split between the minority loyal to the Berlin leadership (as did

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105 Ibid, p.168. In 1906 its membership may have been, by one source, 35,000, while the PPS was 40,000 in 1907.

106 Blobaum, Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, p.87.

107 Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", pp.164-166, 169-171 on matices, language circles, etc.

108 Ibid, pp.168, 174. The SDKPiL, the Bolsheviks, the PPS, and the Bund boycotted the first Duma elections, so Dmowski's National Democrats were the only party to contest the elections, foreshadowing the ascendancy of conservatism in Poland. The Second Duma was contested by the Bolsheviks and the SDKPiL, but not by Pilsudski's PPS. The national socialist parties (SDKPiL, Latvian Social Democrats, Bund) found greater affinity with the Bolsheviks than with the Mensheviks because of the latter's desired alliance with the Russian Kadets.

Dzierzynski and Luxemburg), while the majority remained in the Warsaw Committee (as did Radek, Hanecki, and the future Bolshevik Unszlicht). The PPS came to dominate the Polish labor movement, the SDKPiL's strident internationalism had slowly marginalized not only much of its leadership, but its following as well. Its multi-national membership began to find their respective 'national' identities. SDKPiL membership dropped and its leadership elite emigrated to Germany where they found a more suitable 'leftist' home in the German dominated International.

In 1912 Dzierzynski was again exiled and spent most of the War years in chains in a labor camp in Orel. He was moved to a Moscow prison but remained hospitalized because the chains had caused sever cramping in his legs, and he now faced the prospect of amputation.[109] When the Provisional Government proclaimed an amnesty for all political prisoners, Dzierzynski was released but by this time was unable to stand. There is no doubt that his extensive period of personal and physical struggle fostered in Dzierzynski a particular attitude towards suffering, as his writings reflect an almost aesthetic resignation and a certain fatalism, writing that his life of torment and monotony in prison was a destiny to be not only accepted, but embraced.[110]

With events of 1917 the SDKPiL, already thinned because of mobilization and conscription of younger members into the Imperial Army, shifted its base from Poland to Russia. The Polish Communist Party was constructed on Russian, not Polish, soil with the merger of Dzierzynski's SDKPiL and the small but influential PPS-Left -- both with their anti-nationalist positions in tact. Though Dzierzynski had planned to return to Poland, his close ties to Lenin assisted his position in the Bolshevik ranks. The early revolutionary years fired the belief that Russian events should be nurtured so that they might spill over into Poland, hence Dzierzynski's active involvement in the Russian Revolution.

Dzierzynski became a Bolshevik. Blobaum writes that Dzierzynski's "former identity was submerged by the Russian Revolution...his transfer of loyalty from Polish Social Democracy to Bolshevism flowed automatically from his internationalist proletarian

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109 On his correspondence during this period, F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Dnevnik zakliuchennogo pis'ma, "Pis'ma k rodnym, mart 1910 - mai 1926", pp.219-259.

110 Ibid, "Pis'ma k rodnym, ianvar 1898-1902", pp.17-18, and "Pis'ma k rodnym, mart 1910 - mai 1926", letter to his brother dated 2 September 1916, pp.249-250.

principles...becoming first and foremost a Russian Communist".[111] There is something to this: Dzierzynski's activism as a Bolshevik only briefly implicated him in Polish affairs in the Polish-Soviet War, on Brest-Litovsk he opposed Lenin both on the crucial national question and the terms of the German treaty, and his defense of the socialist revolution during the Civil War was unmatched. But it may not be necessary to invoke his "internationalist principles" to understand his identity 'shift' from Polish socialist to Russian socialist. It may have been that internationalist principles followed his transfer of loyalty rather than produced it.

As Blobaum himself notes, early and continued influence of the Jewish socialist movement on Dzierzynski was profound: "his love affairs with Jewish women were more than just circumstantial -- they were the logical outcome of a man which had been possessed of a certain way of seeing the world".[112] From his early embrace of Polish radicalism, Dzierzynski had come to reject Lithuanian national socialism, Polish national socialism, and Bundist cultural autonomism. He was attracted to Lithuanian socialism before it found its 'national' identity; he was attracted to Polish socialism in its cosmopolitan, not nationalist variant; and his efforts toward alliances between Polish, Lithuanian, Jewish, and Russian labor groupings consistently privileged internationalism over national labor radicalism. Though he opposed the dismemberment of the empire in the terms of Brest-Litovsk, he eventually abstained from the final vote, not committing himself to the internationalism of the Left Communists (as did Radek). In the revolutionary years Dzierzynski embraced a Russianized or 'national' version of Bolshevism. Dzierzynski's position on Brest-Litovsk demonstrated, above all, his allegiance to the territorial integrity of the empire.

Though consistently rejecting 'nationalisms' in favor of multi-ethnic internationalism, in the end he embraced and fought to defend the "Russian" Bolshevik variant of 'nationalism' until his death in 1926. This could not have been consistent with his internationalist principles. My sense is that it was not his internationalist principles which were motivating Dzierzynski's positions, this was merely the language and not the

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[111] Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, p.223.

[112] Ibid, p.225.

experience. Rather, his 'internationalism' reflected an implict commitment to an imperial form of territorial political organization characteristic of *kresy* gentry.

Each of Dzierzynski's political alignments throughout his early career were not a "rejection of his social, national, and religious background",[113] but their embodiment: an impoverished Polish gentry-intellectual of the multi-ethnic borderlands, it was nationalist separatism (Lithuanian, Jewish, and even Polish) which was the threat to his interests and identity. Though initially a Polish nationalist in response to Tsarist Russification, Dzierzynski made alliance with Russian socialists, and became a 'Russifier' himself. But this was only understood by him in *rossiskii*, not *russkii* terms, as official imperial nationalism, not as an ethnic Russian nationalism. His radicalism reflected less an a priori commitment to 'internationalism', than to a conception of a multi-ethnic empire, a political expression consistent with the cultural-political status of the Polish borderland gentry.

The Lithuanian Catholic Kapsukas and the Polish Catholic Dzierzynski were both nationalists in response to Polonization and Russification respectively, before local ethno-politics made them Bolshevik internationalists. Once Bolsheviks, their anti-nationalism was resolute and strident in defense of their new identities in the 'new empire'. Dzierzynski's early radicalism, his Polish nationalism and subsequent internationalism bore a resemblance to Karl Radek's, though the latter was a Galician Jew. Yet the differences in their radicalizations are highly suggestive of the different "elective affinities" of both Polish nationalism and Bolshevism.

IV. Karl Radek and Polish-Jewish radicalism in Galicia

An Austrian citizen, Karl Radek was a Polish-Galician Jew who became a (near Catholic) Polish nationalist, a Bolshevik in 1917 and a Spartacist in 1918 in Germany. An Austrian deserter of the Russian delegation at Brest-Litovsk, and an internationalist persecuted by Stalin as a 'cosmopolitan Jew', A.J. Cummings wrote that Radek was at heart a Polish Jew, "when he wished to speak words of endearment to women, they would be Polish words...but for revolutionary matters he thought in German".[114] Radek could

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[113] Ibid.

[114] A.J. Cummings, "Introduction", Karl Radek, Portraits and Pamphlets, pp.xi-xii.

work in several languages, but he was a Jew who could not speak Yiddish, and a Bolshevik who could barely speak Russian. Rosa Luxemburg thought him brash and irresponsible, and eventually her SDKPiL expelled him; too 'Bohemian' for the German Socialists, Radek was also expelled from the SPD; and after pragmatic collaboration with Lenin, the latter broke off relations with Radek over differences over the 'national question'.

To his biographer Radek was the embodiment of the *vaterlandslos* cosmopolitan: never identifying himself as a Jew, he had no national or ethnic affiliation other than his Jewishness and no consistent values other than his commitment to internationalism; a Jewish cosmopolitan whose lack of national identity permitted him to move in and out of socialist groupings and embrace socialist internationalism where *vaterland* could be transcended.[115] There is certainly something to this. But as with Dzierzynski perhaps the anti-nationalist language of internationalism should not be taken for the experience of *vaterlandslos*. Radek's considerable polemical writings on the virtues of internationalism to the contrary, my sense is that Radek actually *desired* a non-Jewish *vaterland*. Judging from his political activities, internationalism may not have been a first choice, but either a second best alternative or a necessity. Far from rejecting national cultures, Radek embraced them, wanting to belong. Radek's leftist internationalism did not simply flow from his being Jewish. It was the product of exclusion from what were increasingly 'national' radical groupings and social identities; as each found its 'national' identity, Radek became, in equal measure, a more radical 'Leftist' seeking refuge in another more 'open' grouping.

Much of Radek's early radicalism embodied the cultural and political orientations of a rising, secular, Galician Jewish middle class in the last decades of the century. Radek was born 'Sobelsohn' in 1885 in Lwow.[116] Together with Hungary and Vienna, Galicia was one of the three most significant Jewish regions in Habsburg Austria; its largest city,

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115 Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist, pp.viii, 174-175.

116 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.593.

Lwow, was the 13 largest "Jewish" city in Central Europe in 1900.[117] A Polish provincial capital for over 400 years, after the First Partition in 1772 under Austrian rule Lwow became Lemberg, but after 1867 Polish political and cultural dominance of the city was restored. It remained a multi-ethnic city with Polish, Ukrainian, and German, and although Yiddish was not an officially recognized language, it was the city's second major language.

Galicia was politically more moderate than Congress Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian borderlands, in part because of milder Austrian rule. But socioeconomically Galicia was relatively backward and more closely resembled Russia to the east than the rest of the Austrian lands. As in other places, Galician Jews were typical middlemen between Polish landowners and Polish or Ukrainian peasants, but because this semi-feudal arrangement did not break down until quite late, most Galician Jews were engaged in occupations in the rural economy and small craft works, more so than in any other Habsburg Crownland.[118]

Mendelsohn argued that because of Galician socioeconomic backwardness, and because of Lwow's cultural diversity, the secularized Jewish intelligentsia's cultural 'assimilation' was rendered more difficult. Acculturating Jews had to chose between competing cultural and political orientations. Adherents of the Jewish Galician Enlightenment (Haskalah) in the first part of the century formed an alliance with the Austro-German Habsburgs, as secular Jews identifed secular culture with German culture; in their struggle against the Jewish traditionalists, the Galician *maskilim* looked to Vienna for assistance and support, though they did so as Jews with a tie to the Hebrew language. The next generation of progressive Jews, however, retrieved a European (and primarily German) culture, not a Hebrew one. In turn, the Habsburgs supported the Galician Enlighteners as allies in their efforts to Germanize Galicia, thereby making the secular Jewish reformers a persecuted elite, despised by Poles and traditional Jews alike. Their successors, the Galician Jewish professional and commercial elite -- Radek's family --

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117 Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, p.109; Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918, Band III Die Volker des Reiches, 2 Teilband, Verlag: der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wein, 1980, p.885. In 1857 44,000 Jews, or 27.7% of the city's population, though this was a decline from 40.58%.

118 Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918, pp.913-915.

struggled in mid-century as proud Austrian citizens for Jewish rights based on German cultural orientation and anti-Polish loyalty to the empire.[119]

The Sobelsohns had arrived in Lwow in 1880 and aspired to posts in the Austrian civil service: in 1860 restrictions on Jewish occupations in Galicia had been removed, allowing Jews into various public works positions, and after 1867 the Austrian civil service had been opened to all nationalities, Jews included.[120] They settled among the 'emancipated' Jews of the city, and Radek's father assumed a modest position in the post office, while his uncles held positions in the Austrian civil service and in the Austrian Army (one uncle gave Radek German military history books).[121]

But as with most secular Jews classic German literature, philosophy, universalist and humanitarian ideals were preferable to the Catholicism, anti-Semitism, and clericalism of Polish culture.[122] In Franz-Joseph's Austria the Sobelsohn's aspired to an acculturated and loyal Jews' middle class existence, free from the Jewish *shtetl* as fully integrated Austrian citizens. They were in many respects similar to many acculturated Jews in that they continued to send their children to German *gymnasia* in preparation for German universities.[123] As beneficiaries and civil servants of the Austrian state, their Austrophilism persisted. In this respect Radek's family was in the German-speaking Jewish minority in the latter years of the century.

The German-oriented Austrophilism of Radek's family, and of much of the secularized Jewish middle classes, continued through the end of the empire (and arguably beyond), despite the fact that after the Ausgleich Polonization was rapid and thorough. As loyal citizens of the Austrian state, Jewish loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty and devotion to German culture after 1867 especially, provoked criticism from both the Polish Galician

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119 Mendelsohn, "Jewish Assimilation in Lvov", pp.577-579; Mendelsohn, "From Assimilation to Zionism in Lvov", pp.521-522.

120 Wandruszha and Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918, p.893.

121 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.593.

122 Ibid.

123 Jews in the Austrian lands comprised about 13.4% of all gymnasia students. Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, p.924. According to Mendelsohn, in 1896 18.3% of all *gymnasia* students in Lwow were Jews, but they were also 50% of the remaining Germanized *gymnasia* students in the city. "Jewish Assimilation in Lvov", p.579, footnote 8.

population and from the growing Jewish Zionist intelligentsia. As the Polish majority in Galicia was granted self-rule, German Lemberg became Polish Lwow, causing a rupture in the provinces ruling culture, and forcing secular Jews to deal with Polish nationalists rather than German-speaking Austrian officials. Peace had to be made with Polish rule, as political necessity required. For those like Dr. Nossig, the father of the future leader of Galician Socialism Alfred Nossig, insufficient knowledge of Polish had cost him his position in the Jewish community since he could no longer represent them to political authorities.[124] For those like his son, Alfred Nossig, Wilhelm Feldman, and Karl Radek, born after the 1860's, accommodation was rather painlessly achieved by attending schools and coming of age in a Polish Lwow rather than German Lemberg. So Radek's cultural capabilities had a certain duality. Though his family was thoroughly culturally Germanized, he was the first to become linguistically Polonized.

Four important trends are worth considering in connection with Radek's early radicalism in Galicia. Over the last decades of the Habsburg empire, Jewish migration within the empire was *away* from Galicia, in contrast to Radek's family. Galician-born Viennese Jews were 18% of the city's population in 1880 and 23% in 1910.[125] The vast preponderance of Galician Jews chose neither Viennese emigration nor acculturation nor Jewish nationalism -- most Galician Jews emigrated abroad: 85% of the 302,000 Jews emigrating to the US from Austria-Hungary were from Galicia.[126] Between 1880 and 1910, Jewish emigration inside the empire flowed from Galicia and the Carpathian region to Bukowina, Vienna, and the end of the Bohemian Crown. This was particularly true of Jews who preferred to retain a German cultural orientation.

Secondly, the Polonization of Galicia in the last decades of the century triggered

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[124] Mendelsohn, "From Assimilation to Zionism in Lvov", pp.521-522.

[125] Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Band III, Tabelle 88, p.882, also see p.887. By 1900 Galician Jews had declined from the 11.52% of the population in 1880 to 11.09%, and by 1910 they were only 10.89%; while Bukowinan Jews rose from the 11.79% in 1880 to 12.86% in 1910, the highest concentration in Habsburg lands. The other significant increase was in Vienna and the Imperial center itself, as Niederosterreichen Jews constituted 5.23% in the city's population in 1910, up from 4.08% in 1880.

[126] McCagg, History of the Habsburg Jews, pp.183-184.

important cultural and political changes among Galicia's nationalities, Radek included.[127] As Lwow became an important cultural center of Ukrainian nationalism (largely due to Tsarist oppression on the other side of the border), Polish cultural dominance was threatened and Eastern Galician Jews were caught between the conflicting Polish and Ukrainian national movements. One important consequence was that Polonized (or Germanized) Galician Jewry, and Radek among them, tended to align culturally with the anti-nationalist socialist Left, first in Polish groupings, and then in German or Austrian groupings, and much less so with specifically Jewish groups. With important exceptions, Galician Jewry was historically more acculturated to German-Austrian or Polish culture than Congress Poland's Jews had been to Polish culture, making European or socialist movements more attractive than Jewish movements.

So as a conspicuous ethnic/religious minority caught between violent Ukrainian anti-Semitic nationalism and clerical Polish nationalism, Jewish cultural and political orientations tended to privilege (a) state-imperial language and culture, and (b) socialist leftism of the Polish Left (SDKPiL) and German Socialism (SPD) over Austrian Socialism (SPO). And in fact Radek was never attracted to the SPO. By the 1880's both Polish cultural-political and Jewish (Hebrew and Yiddish) associations made their appearance.[128] This was no doubt assisted by the fact that Galicia was particularly fertile soil for Polish-oriented nationalist and socialist associational life, more so because of Russian Poland's oppressive political atmosphere. In 1892 Polish Social Democracy, in 1895 the Polish Peasant Party, and in 1895-1904 Polish National Democracy were all active recruiters in Austrian Galicia.[129]

Although the Sobelsohns continued to hold all things Polish in contempt as alien and unworthy of study, Radek's radicalization rejected his family's German-Austrian

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[127] Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, p.905. Across the Cisleithanian empire, by 1910 61.70% of Jews were linguistically Polonized, 25.88% were Germanized, and 3.86% spoke Czech as the vernacular. Galician Jews in particular became highly linguistically Polonized: 871,804 Galician Jews spoke Polish as their vernacular (often in addition to Yiddish), with the remainder almost evenly split between German and 'Ruthenian'.

[128] Ibid., pp.933-940, which included auto-emancipation, Zionism, and associations such as the Osterreichisch-Israelitische Union of 1886 in Vienna, in 1893 the Judisch-Nazional Partie in Galicia, and various other Jewish associations with Austrian Social Democracy.

[129] McCagg, History of the Habsburg Jews, p.182.

cultural orientation, turning to the culture that he had been taught to hate: the romanticism of Polish nationalism. Radek chose to adopt Polish culture as his own despite, and even in part because of, its Catholicism. In fact, Radek was so taken with the romanticism of Polish nationalism that he considered converting to Catholicism in order to be more fully involved in the Polish nationalist cause.[130] So in *gymnasium* Radek was, as had been Dzierzynski, a true Polish patriot, attracted to the work of Mickiewicz, the writings of the patriots of the 1831 rebellion, and his heroes were Polish patriots who had fought with Napoleon for liberty.[131]

Radek was a petty bourgeois, educated Galician Jew and Dzierzynski a Catholic Polish gentry-intellectual in rural Lithuania, yet both turned to Polish nationalism. In 1869, the year that Polish was banned in secondary schools in Russian Poland, Polish became the official language for administration and courts in Austrian Galicia, with its school system becoming quickly Polonized.[132] While Polish nationalism for Dzierzynski had been prompted by the Russificatory Tsarist state, for Radek Polish nationalism represented an historical and romantic irredentist struggle against the Austrian government. Dzierzynski's earliest radicalism followed his mother's Polish nationalism of the *declasse* Polish gentry, while Radek's earliest radicalism constituted a rebellion against his acculturated Austrianophile civil servant family. In both cases however, by the 1890's Polish nationalism was increasingly tied to Polish socialism.

Before discussing this connection, three aspects of the Radek's initial switch in cultural orientation and his family's persistent Austrophilism are worth emphasizing. First, despite the shift in political power and Galicia's Polonization, and even after 20-25 years of Polish rule, a significant portion of middle class Jews who had aligned themselves with the dynasty persisted in their rejection of Polish culture and insisted that their children be raised Germanized Austrians and not Polonized Galician Jews. This suggests that perhaps

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130 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.593.

131 Ibid.

132 Count Anton Tykiewicz, Russko-Polskiis Otnocheniia, pp.158-159; Russian curriculum was introduced in limited fashion in 1866, and within ten years the entire educational system was Russified, Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.100-102; Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1989, Band III , p.531. Polish became the language of the universities in Cracow and Lwow in 1870 and 1871 respectively.

something other than either access to occupational or social mobility ('assimilation') was operating. Part of the dynamic may lie in the cultural choices and orientations on offer: German-Austrian, Polish, Jewish, and increasingly, Ukrainian. Polish culture, history, and language, though now the center of political gravity in Galicia, were seen as an historically and politically defeated nation-state whose temporary ascendance in Galicia was seen as the result of a benevolent and liberal dynasty. More importantly, Polish culture was enveloped in the anti-Semitic Catholic Church, and the possibility of a uni-national, Catholic Polish Galicia could only be feared by even acculturationist Jews. In other words, for a number of middle class Galician Jews, fears of a Catholic anti-Semitic Polish province proved more important than the possibilities for social mobility that Polonization could bring -- hence the Sobelsohn's persistent German Austrophilism in the face of Polonization.

Secondly, the relative ease with which cultural switches could occur within the same Jewish family in two generations testifies to the 'cultural modularity' or flexibility of Jewish acculturationism, and it underscores the fact that while under some sociopolitical circumstances cultural choices may have been more the result of political and social necessity (interest), in other historical moments they seemed rather more the result of social identity and self-esteem. In other words, the attractive power of a particular language and culture (and the political orientation they entailed) appeared neither singular nor constant.[133]

Thirdly, although Ukrainian culture, language, and social presence was on the ascendancy, and increasingly challenging Polish dominance, Ukrainians were historically even more violently anti-Semitic than Catholic Poles. Moreover, if Polish was unworthy of study Ukrainian, a "peasant language", was perceived even less worthy. Ukrainian national culture could do nothing for an educated, rising Jewish social esteem and possibilities. In fact, the Ukrainian *gymnasium* in Lwow did not have a single Jewish student at the turn of the century.[134] So the Ukrainian cultural orientation held virtually no

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[133] This did not preclude, for instance, the shift back to Jewish cultural identity: the Polonized Nossig subsequently became a Zionist.

[134] Mendelsohn, "Jewish Assimilation in Lvov", p.597, ftnt.8.

appeal, despite the demographic reality that Ukrainians constituted 42% of the population of Galicia by 1910.

Ukrainian-Polish antagonisms in Galicia had become very tense by 1900, indeed St. Petersburg's earlier worries about a potential alliance between Ukrainian intellectuals and Polish *szlachta* had proven unfounded.[135] But for acculturating Jews, who in one scholar's estimation "remained the whipping boy of the competing Christian nations" in Galicia,[136] holding out a hope of remaining citizens of a multi-ethnic empire via allegiance to the Habsburg monarchy seemed the most prudent political-cultural option, and this despite the obviously reduced opportunities for social mobility. Like Lithuanian in the northwest Tsarist empire, Galician Ukrainian was neither attractive nor necessary to acculturating secular Jews.

Radek's Polish nationalist radicalism had an intoxicating youthful appeal however, eventually drawing him closer to socialism as it developed an antipathy to the Austrian bureaucracy.[137] Polish nationalism, for *gymnasia* students in the 1880's like Radek and Nossig held out a different identity than their parents: "far from being exclusive and anti-Semitic, [it] appeared to offer an honorable place within its ranks for Polish Jews".[138] A vision of Jews, 'Poles of the Mosiac persuasion', and Poles fighting oppression together represented the essence of Polish nationalism, as Mickiewicz' romanticization of the two persecuted peoples gave acculturationist Jews a sense of self-esteem. Polish nationalism led to Polish socialism, but not before its inclusivist essence gave way to a more ethnically strident form. Radek's writings reflect a period in which he viewed Polish socialism and Polish nationalism as complimentary inside Polish patriotic circles; the separate but united struggles of Polish workers in Austria, Prussia, and Russia, all under the banner of "Patriotism, Democracy, Socialism".[139]

After his father's death, the Sobelsohns moved to Tarnow because it was regarded

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135 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.123-124.

136 McCagg, History of the Habsburg Jews, p.183.

137 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.593-594.

138 Mendelsohn, "From Assimilation to Zionism in Lvov", Ibid., p.524.

139 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.594.

by Radek's mother as 'less East European' and more Austrian than Lwow. Unlike Lwow however, Tarnow had no significant Ukrainian population, and though there were fewer Jews (only 12,000), they comprised a larger proportion of the city's population (41.2%). Tarnow had no cosmopolitan or international press so Radek read the Kracow paper *Naprzod* ("Forward"), the organ of the PPSD (Polish Social Democratic Party), which combined both Polish nationalism and Polish socialism. The PPSD was Austrian Poland's version of Pilsudski's PPS in Russian Poland. While in *gymnasium* in Tarnow, and under *Naprzod*'s influence, Radek joined the PPSD led by the Galician socialist Ignacy Daszynski and he was introduced to Marxist literature.[140]

Radek became active in Galician socialist circles advocating both socialism and Polish independence and developing concerns about the Galician peasantry. At age 14 Radek met his first workers. He circulated literature in German and organized meetings in the home of a Jewish baker.[141] Radek read Kautsky, Bebel, and Lasalle, the Polish press of Austria, Germany, and Russian Poland and the German Social Democratic press and combined membership in patriotic circles with membership in neo-socialist circles. Radek also read novels about Polish students' struggles to preserve their national identity under the Russification of Tsarist *gimnaziia*. Notable was the novel *Syzyfowe Prace* ("The Labor of Sisyphus") which was published in 1898 and revolved around a boy of humble origin named Andrzej Radek who talked of Polish nationalism and workers' revolution.[142] Radek began to construct his political identity, taking the name of this nationalist Polish youth and dropping his own German-Jewish Sobelsohn.

In reading Polish patriotic and democratic tracts Radek attributed the social problems and divisions within Poland to the power of its nobility. He read of the Polish peasant revolt of 1846 where serfs had turned on the landowning nobility, and where the Austrian response was one of neutrality because of fears of Polish *dvorianstvo* irredentism. Radek viewed Polish independence as tied to the nation's freedom from the Polish landowning classes, who were in turn favored by the Austrian bureaucracy in Galicia to the

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140 Ibid, p.595.

141 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.594.

142 Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist, p.5.

detriment of the Polish peasantry.[143]

Two observations are worth making about Radek's and Dzierzynski's 'elective affinities' to Polish nationalism. Firstly, Polish nationalism, as Radek and other middle class Polish urbanites understood it, was now intimately connected to socialist doctrine, and tied to the problems of the Polish peasantry, in the face of perceived collusion between the Austrian state and the Polish landowning nobility. This seems far different from Polish nationalism as it was conceived by Dzierzynski and other *declasse* Polish gentry in the Lithuanian-Belorussian borderlands, whose concerns had little to do with peasant exploitation (Polish, Lithuanian or otherwise), but had much to do with Tsarist Russification and civic oppression. In other words, Radek's early Polish nationalism was the product of acculturation -- a Polonized Jewish youth swept up by the romanticism and belonging and possibilities of Polish freedom. In contrast, Dzierzynski's early Polish nationalism was the product of the exclusion of a Polish gentry-intellectual forced to submit to the humiliation of Russian rule.

Secondly and relatedly, just as Dzierzynski's identification with Polish patriotism was intimately related to his social experience as a Polish *szlachta* in the *kresy*, so too might Radek's have been related to his social experience in Galicia. Typical of a number of Bolsheviks in this elite who lost their fathers at an early age, after Radek's father's death the family's middle class existence was threatened; his mother, a kindergarten teacher, struggled to support them in Tarnow.[144] From the Austrian rising middle class civil servant family that the Sobelsohns were in Lwow, in Tarnow they had become a financially struggling family in the social milieu of the city's artisanry and lower classes. Though the city was more Germanized than had been Lwow in keeping with the family's cultural orientation, and though Tarnow's Jewish population was more modern, the Sobelsohn's social existence suffered a reversal, and the struggles of their now petty bourgeois experience may have made Radek more receptive to the class conflicts inside Polish nationalism. Both Radek and Dzierzynski, I believe, brought a particular *declasse* social experience to their radicalism, the former in the petty bourgeois Galician milieu and the

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143 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.593-594.

144 Ibid., p.593.

latter in the social setting of the Polish *szlachta* in the Lithuanian borderlands.

Like Dzierzynski, Radek was also expelled from *gymnasium* for his political radicalism, and he devoted himself to full-time political activity. Radek was permitted to enroll in the *gymnasium* in Kracow, Austrian Poland's largest city, where he continued both his studies and his activism with socialist youth groups of the PPSD. In 1897 the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPO) had reorganized on a federative basis and its Galician 'section' had become officially Polish, insisting that its members be 'international' in the Polish language. The Jewish members did not split out until 1905 (prompting Bauer's famous tract on the national question) and indeed Jewish socialism in Galicia did not fully take off until after 1905. This meant that Polonized Jewish socialists of Galicia generally joined Polish parties, often in their 'left' wings. Even Austrian socialism in Galicia was 'Polish'. Clearly Radek was not attracted to Austrian groupings, only Polish ones. Nor was he attracted to specifically 'Jewish' groupings, socialist or nationalist, and indeed very few were, particularly in light of the brutal Galician pogroms in 1898. What is important to note about Radek's radicalism thus far was that it was neither 'Jewish' nor fully socialist, and far from internationalist. Significantly, Polish socialism *and* Polish nationalism, whether PPS, PPSD, or SDKP, were still 'open' enough to attract acculturated Polonized Jews.

Though Kracow was a far less multi-ethnic city than Lwow or Tarnow (Jews comprised 28.1% of the city's population) Radek's vistas opened beyond Austrian Galicia. In 1903 he met, and liked, the by now legendary Dzierzynski who was in Kracow setting up a new SDKPiL section.[145] Radek's biographer writes that Radek was moved by Dzierzynski's renunciation of his social background -- bourgeois, privileged, Catholic, Polish gentry -- rejecting Polish independence in order to join the socialist cause (with the Russian movement no less). Radek began to question the PPSD's possibilities, and according to Lerner, through his contacts with Dzierzynski and the Polish socialist Adolf Warszawski Radek began to see Polish socialism as an international force in itself and not just a tactic for achieving Polish independence.[146]

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145 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.596.

146 Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist, pp.7-9.

Yet this may be conflating the causes of his radicalization with the content of the ideology he espoused. As we have seen, Dzierzynski's radicalism was not a renunciation of his social origins or experience, but an expression of it. Perhaps the same should be said of Radek. In the same year that he met Dzierzynski, Radek went to Zurich and found work as a librarian.[147] He then joined Dzierzynski's and Luxemburg's SDKPiL as an emigre member and was immediately introduced into the Second International, which was at the time fighting the 'revisionist vs. revolutionary' battles of Bernstein and Luxemburg, the latter not only a member of the Polish SDKPiL but also working within the SPD.

Though Radek was no doubt attracted to the idea of socialist internationalism as a value which necessitated an abandonment of Polish nationalism,[148] this may have been consequent to the dynamics within the political groupings themselves. Specifically, while the PPSD as a Galician party was attractive to Radek while in Tarnow, and even initially in Kracow, once in Zurich, its political scope appeared limiting. Galician politics was rather provincial, indeed localism was Galician radical politics' defining feature.[149] Moreover, the rivalry between the nationalist PPS and the internationalist SDKPiL had intensified in the years between 1901 and 1903. And the nationalist strain in the PPS was becoming increasingly more exclusionary -- despite Pilsudski's strong socialist credentials, the PPS sat to the right of most European socialist parties. This sent most Polish Jewish socialists, already more attracted to Polish movements of the left than they were to "Jewish" groupings, into even more 'leftist' Polish groupings, such as Dzierzynski's and Luxemburg's SDKPiL. In short, the 'federated' and internationalist SDKPiL (in federation with the RSDLP) offered (a) greater political vistas than Galician politics for Radek's considerable talents,[150] and (b) an escape from an increasingly 'nationalizing' Polish socialism. In effect Radek was for a period simultaneously a member of the RSDLP federated SDKPiL and Galician Social Democracy; that is, his linguistic and cultural 'modularity' permitted him to belong to a leftist internationalist Polish grouping in Russian

147 Ibid., p.8.

148 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.595.

149 McCagg, History of the Habsburg Jews, pp.185-186.

150 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.596 for his own statement on this.

Poland and a nationally-minded Polish grouping in Austrian Poland at the same time.

Radek had also been writing for Warsaw's "Golos" on the plight of the Galician peasantry, but slowly came to the realization that revolutionary potential lay with the working class in Russian Poland.[151] With the outbreak of the 1905 Revolutions both Luxemburg and Radek made their way to Warsaw and the SDKPiL headquarters.[152] The following year he was arrested, started studying Russian, and became a regular contributor to the German leftist press.[153] In 1906 he had a major article on the SDKPIL's position on Polish labor published in "Die Neue Zeit", a crucial journal at the time because it was both the official organ of the SPD and the unofficial journal of the Second International. As his relations with German socialism deepened, Radek's writings became increasingly critical of calls for Polish independence, arguing that Polish trade unions should not follow the nationalist PPS, but instead limit their focus to socialist agitation.[154]

Radek also remained active in the SDKPiL as editor of the "*Czerwony sztandar*" during 1907 and 1908. Radek was sufficiently linguistically and culturally capable to work equally in Polish and German socialist groupings. As the SDKPiL's constituent nationalities 'balkanized', its leadership, Radek included, drifted into the German dominated International which in these years was full of leftist Polish (and Polish-Jewish) emigres who felt increasingly marginalized by the growing 'national' identity of Polish socialism. The center of gravity for leftist Polish socialists was now Germany. Radek reverted and increasingly came to rely on his "Germanized" Jewish background; his linguistic and cultural fluency in German opened more vistas.

During the first Balkan Crisis, Radek began writing on colonial and imperial questions.[155] Equally at home in Polish and German socialism, Radek edited the SDKPiL's theoretical journal in 1908 in Berlin and became a regular contributor to the "Leipsiger Volkszeitung" and "Die Neue Zeit", eventually moving to Leipzig. The

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151 Ibid.

152 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.597.

153 Ibid, pp.597-598.

154 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.597; Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist, p.12.

155 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.597-598.

"Leipziger Volkszeitung", under the direction of Luxemburg, was the single most important organ of the German Left. The SDKPiL was in disarray and decline. In the early 1900's and especially after 1905, the SPD began to lose its stridency as Bernstein's revisionism prevailed and participation in parliamentary elections dominated its agenda: German Social Democracy, too, was finding its 'national' home. In response, the German Social Democratic Left, which now included nearly all the Jewish leftist emigre members of the Russian-Polish-Lithuanian SDKPiL (Luxemburg, Jogiches, Radek) formed a loose knit group; the nucleus of the German-based internationalist Left was increasingly dominated by Polish-Jewish intellectuals with affiliations to both the SPD Left and the leftist SDKPiL. These Polish-Jewish emigres, like Radek and Luxemburg, were now increasingly marginalized by both Polish and German socialism.

Immediately preceding the war, Radek's multi-party activism reflected an uneasiness with the nationalist tendencies of the socialist parties and an ambivalent membership status. Shortly after the SDKPiL split into the Berlin and Warsaw factions in 1911, Radek was expelled from the Berlin group. German socialists regarded Radek as 'too Bohemian', sloppy and irresponsible; his telling dirty jokes about his mother was too much for them.[156] Radek had slowly been gravitating toward a new group, the Bremen Left radicals, the *enfant terrible* of German socialism. He began writing for the "Bremer Burgerzeitung", the most radical and anti-revisionist paper in Germany. Radek's personal credentials and integrity came under attack when he was accused of embezzling monies from the SDKPiL. The 'Radek Case' was investigated by a commission set up by Dzierzynski. He was found guilty, and Dzierzynski himself believed that Radek should not be allowed membership in *any* socialist party.[157]

Radek's expulsion from the SDKPiL was followed by expulsion from the SPD. "Die Neue Zeit", now under Kautsky's editorship, whose positions on imperialism's pacifist tendencies Radek was openly challenging in the "Bremen Burgerzeitung".[158] The SPD expelled him on the grounds that he had tenuous membership credentials and because

156 Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist, p.19.

157 Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzynski and the SDKPiL, pp.207-208; Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist, pp.28-29.

158 Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist, pp.26-30.

he had already been repudiated by the SDKPiL. Now the only party which welcomed Radek were the Bremen Left Radicals.

In Berlin at the declaration of war, Radek was shocked that German Social Democracy became 'imperialist'.[159] He deeply suffered the fact that German socialism, as with other socialisms, seemed more concerned with 'fatherland' than with revolutionary socialism. In 1914 Radek was an Austrian citizen and liable for military service, so he went to Switzerland and began writing for the largest socialist paper there, the "Berner Tagwacht" which opposed the war and sympathized with the Second Internationalist Left.[160] Switzerland was the only 'internationalist' place left.

Disillusioned, and in response to growing 'national' identities of the socialist groupings, Radek again gravitated to the nucleus of 'internationalism', which during the war was with the Russian emigre-dominated Left. After 50 years of international socialism, it was still possible to seat all the internationalists for the Zimmerwald anti-war conference in four train coaches.[161] He wrote for them in the Second International press and for the Bern and Bremen papers as he came into contact with SRs, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks.[162] Though Radek held to Luxemburg's position on the national question, not Lenin's, and though he had no real interest in Russian socialism (he could not write or speak Russian), he cultivated a relationship with Lenin on an anti-war leftist basis -- the Bolsheviks would support his membership in the International since no other party would.

Because Radek was not in Russia but in Sweden during revolutionary events, he did not experience the 'nationalist' aspects of the Revolution as did other Bolsheviks.[163] He continued to regard 'Russian' events with dispassion, singularly focusing on the relevance of Russian events to the world revolution. In this his interpretation of events differed markedly from that of those Bolsheviks who began to see the revolution in purely 'Russian' terms.

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159 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.601-602.

160 Ibid, p.603.

161 Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist, p.41

162 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.604.

163 Ibid, pp.605-606.

Once again his leftist internationalism was a product of political and organizational isolation. As the Revolution slowly found its 'Russian' national character, Radek reconfirmed his commitment to internationalism. However Lenin and Trotsky understood the realities in Russia in 1918 better than did Radek: revolutionary Russia was in no condition to continue waging war with Germany, the Bolshevik hold on power was extremely tenuous, and the harsh German terms had to be accepted. But Radek clung to his leftist internationalism, not simply because of an intrinsic belief in world revolution as his biographer suggests, but because as a Polish-Austrian Jew who could barely speak Russian he now found himself increasingly marginalized from a 'nationalizing' Bolshevik revolution.

Radek turned away from Russian events toward German politics in 1918. Social events in Russia now led Radek to believe in the inverse ratio of capitalist development to revolutionary prospects, and therefore he lay his hopes in an impending German revolution.[164] Immediately after the collapse of the German government, Radek became involved with the Spartacists and re-established contacts with the Bremen Left. The Bolsheviks Radek, Ioffe, Rakovskii, and Bukharin were sent as a special delegation in December 1918 to the Reich Congress, but only Radek who was able to impersonate an Austrian prisoner of war was permitted across the German border. Radek's return to the German Left was now as a Bolshevik, the only country to have had a successful socialist revolution.

Though not present when Luxemburg and Leibknecht were killed, Radek was caught in February 1919 and placed in solitary confinement. To guarantee his safety the Bolsheviks named him Ukrainian ambassador to Germany and seized several German hostages; Radek remained one of the most famous German prisoners for almost a year, as an emissary of the Bolshevik government in custody. He was allowed a rather privileged custody: he could work on his political writings and he could entertain guests, his Berlin prison cell becoming a 'political salon' which not only permitted him contact with socialist

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164 Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist, pp.75-76. Although as Lerner points out, even by this formulation the revolutionary potential should have resided in Austria or Italy, not Germany.

activity outside Russia, but also kept him isolated from the Bolshevik's foreign policies.[165]

Radek's isolation from domestic Russian and Bolshevik politics at this crucial time only served to reinforce his internationalism now 'at home' in the Comintern. The Jewish dominated Comintern in the 1920's became something of a mecca for displaced and isolated radicals. Until 1924 the language of the Comintern was still German, which Trotsky, Lenin, and Radek knew with various degrees of proficiency. But with Zinoviev's ascendancy inside the Comintern, much to Radek's dismay since the two despised each other, and with Stalin's ascension inside Russia, a shift from German socialist internationalism to Russian 'internationalism' was clear, and Radek, among others, would once again find himself excluded from a now 'Russian' socialist international. The Comintern, too, was failing as a refuge from nationalisms.

Radek's biographer argues that Radek's position on the national question derived from his belief that support of one's fatherland was at the expense of another's, and since national oppression is class oppression, only socialism could abolish both.[166] I disagree as to the basis of his internationalism. By this time Radek's commitment to socialist internationalism had more than 17 years of experience invested in it, the product of repeated 'escapes' from nationalisms and 'nationalizing' socialists. As Lerner himself observes, Radek held that the ethnic or national boundaries of Europe could not be redrawn as political territorial entities because mixed Austro-Hungarian populations could prosper more together than they could apart.

Imperial ethnic heterogeneity was at the very essence of Radek's socialist radicalism, first Habsburg in Polish nationalism and Galician Socialism, then Tsarist in the SDKPiL, and finally the potential to straddle both in German Socialism. These empires had provided educated, acculturated Jews like Radek with cultural and national identities. As one scholar wrote in a different context: "so long as greater Austria existed, Jews could after all get out of Galicia! They could go abroad, they could go to the cities! There was

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165 E.H. Carr, "Radek's Political Salon in Berlin in 1919", Soviet Studies, Vol.III, No.4, April 1951, pp.411-430. His 'salon guests' included Karl Moor, a leader in the Swiss labor movement who supported both the Bolsheviks and the Spartacists, and Enver Pasha, the War Minister of the Young Turk government who was living semi-legally in Berlin after the fall of the Turkish regime and seeking support for the resistance.

166 Lerner, Karl Radek: the Last Internationalist, pp.45-46.

no frontier!", as thousands of one-time Galician Jews had taken advantage of these opportunities in their 150 years of association with Austria.[167] In other words, perhaps underlaying Radek's ideological commitment to 'internationalism' was an experiential need for a multi-ethnic political configuration involving not a modern 'Austrian' liberal toleration of nationality, but the traditional relativism of the 18th century universal monarchies before the age of nationalism.

As a member of the secular Galician Jewish intelligentsia, Radek was acculturated into a non-Jewish middle class culture, and held multiple national-cultural identities, in practice not renouncing national cultures, but embracing them. Far from having 'no national identity', in the context of late 19th century Central Europe and in late imperial Russia even an acculturated Jew could not help *but* be reminded of his 'national' or ethnic identity. Moving in and out of different national-cultural orientations was not the result of a lack of national identity, but because the identity he *did* have allowed and often required him to inhabit others'.

Acculturated Jews survived on their ability for shifting and multiple national-cultural affiliations. What was desired was a transcendence of national or cultural identities, but in practice what was required was an assurance of their multiplicity. Jewish liberal, socialist, or Zionist political groups, involved acculturated Jews who were well able to integrate into the dominant or chosen national middle class culture. Educated Jews who remained tied to traditional Jewish communities did not appear in radical groupings. The multi-cultural possibilities of pluralist state and societies, Habsburg and Tsarist, were preferred to the cultural fixity of uni-national states, which risked permanent "Jewishness" and inevitable anti-Semitism. Jewish socialist internationalism had been a response to Austria's anti-imperialist, nationalist middle classes, and the product of isolation from increasingly 'national' socialisms.

Why no Polish Jews?

Aside from Karl Radek who was a Galician Polish Jew and Uritskii, a Kievan Polish Jew, there were no Jews from Russian Poland in this Bolshevik elite. This is

[167] McCagg, History of the Habsburg Jews, p.187.

noteworthy given the fact that at the turn of the century most of the world's Jews lived in the territories of the late Polish *Rzeczpospolita*, and most of that was now within the Russian empire. Indeed besides Warsaw and Lodz, of the 116 'cities' of Russian Poland in 1909, 73 had populations which were more than 1/2 Jewish.[168] Anti-Semitism was amply present in Russian Poland, as were Tsarist restrictive policies, and in the latter years a more defined and articulated anti-Semitic Polish nationalism which would culminate after the war. The most important reasons for the absence of Polish Jews in the Bolshevik elite, I think, are essentially three. First, very few *Poles* was present because Polish socialist parties were perfectly viable on their own and most Jews were attracted to these since most acculturated Jews were anyway Polonized, not Russified; second, there was a weak ethnic Russian presence in Congress Kingdom and therefore 'Russian' socialist parties were weak or non-existent -- Bolshevism included; and finally, most Polish Jews were hardly assimilated even into Polish culture, and even among those who were Polish nationalism made Jewish groups attractive as well. I briefly elaborate below.

From 1862 Jews of Russian Poland had received quasi-legal rights and were not subject to the extreme arbitrariness of the Pale. Yet they were still caught between the judeophobic Polish peasantry and distrustful Russian officials.[169] Russian public opinion was generally apathetic to the position of Jews in its Polish territories,[170] and far more concerned with the borderlands as the 1863 insurrections brought the Jewish question and Russification to the fore. Although there had been a potential, if ultimately unsustainable, 'brotherhood' between Poles and Jews as allies in a common struggle against the Russian state in the early 1860's,[171] because of Jewish insecurity in their legal status, and because Poles considered themselves an incomplete nation whose 'rightful' middle class seemed to be not Polish but Jewish, as well as their own insecurity with Russification and Russian

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168 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.83.

169 Ibid., p.117.

170 John Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855-1881, Cambridge, 1995, p.146.

171 Magdalena Opalski and Israel Bartal, Poles and Jews: A Failed Brotherhood, Hanover and London, Brandeis University Press, 1992.

rule, Poles and Jews remained politically isolated from each other.[172] Moreover, with the Warsaw Christmas pogroms in 1881, the old positivist idea of Jewish assimilation into the Polish nation was laid to rest as both Poles and Jews began questioning both the desirability and the inevitability of full Jewish Polonization. And the pogroms in Russia also had their effects: from the 1880's harsh anti-Jewish policies in the Pale sent many into Congress Poland. The influx of the so-called 'Litvaks' or Lithuanian Jews, Ukrainian Jews, Belorussian Jews and Russian Jews added a new dimension to Polish-Jewish tensions: Poles viewed them as 'Russifiers' since most were Russian-speaking, and Polish Jews distrusted their presence, culturally, linguistically, and economically. Besides state policies and Polish-Jewish tensions, it is important to note that unlike Galician Jews or even Lithuanian or *kresy* Jews, Jews in Russian Poland were only minimally assimilated. Religious distinctiveness and ethnic boundaries persisted regardless of social contact, socioeconomic change, and social mobility.[173] Galician Jewry was the most Polonized of the 'three Jewries' (Congress Poland, the borderlands or *kresy*, and Galicia). The Jews of Russian Poland remained -- as late as the 1920's -- traditionalist, devout, unassimilated and unacculturated.[174]

Ethnic boundaries between Poles and Jews were very strong, characterized by high levels of assimilation of an urbanized and commercial few 'Poles of the Mosiac faith' than by any more general acculturation. Indeed most of the Polish Jewish activists of the socialist left were drawn from the merchant, industrial, and educated middle classes -- the acculturated element of the Jewish community who viewed themselves as Polish in almost every was but who sought a European-cum-German education and emancipation on the then German model. Therefore those Jews attracted to political groups tended to join

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[172] The discriminatory May Laws of 1882 were not introduced in Congress Poland. Zemstvo were never introduced, nor were the imperial municipal statutes of 1870 and 1892. Bureaucratically administered, Warsaw was administered with an appointive council tightly circumscribed by the MVD in Petersburg. Russian distrust of Polish-Jewish alliances meant that Polish was forbidden in synagogues (though this was routinely ignored). Weeks, Nation and State in late Imperial Russia, p.117.

[173] Stephen Corrsin, Warsaw Before the First World War: Poles and Jews in the Third City of the Russian Empire, 1880-1914, Boulder, East European Monographs, 1989, p.24.

[174] Ezra Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland: The Formative Years,1915-1926, Yale University Press, 1981. As late as 1931 only 12% of Polish Jews regarded Polish as their mother tongue, most were Yiddish-speaking and religious, and fully 70% said they belonged to the "Jewish nationality" -- indicators of their historical lack of integration into Polish society. (p.10).

Polish groups, typically on the left. As Mendelsohn observed, Congress Poland was characterized by political extremism, even within the Jewish community itself. In other words, one feature of Polish Jewry in 'Congress Poland' was the extreme assimilation of a small polonized Jewish elite (typically urbanized) and the extreme Orthodox religiosity of the majority of the masses (this latter made Congress Poland the bastion of Hasidism and accounted for the weakness of the Haskalah as compared to Lithuania or Galicia): faith was the crucial marker of ethnic boundaries in Congress Poland.[175]

Jewish linguistic assimilation, particularly in Warsaw, invoked five languages: Yiddish, Polish, Russian, German, and Hebrew. In 1897 5/6 of Warsaw's Jews were considered native speakers of Yiddish and Yiddish would continue to the the main language of Jewish Warsaw until WWI.[176] One in seven were Polish speakers. But the linguistic use of Polish may have had less to do with ethnic and political allegiance and more to do with simply existing in a Polish city. Many Polonized Jews were joining specifically Jewish political groups by 1900, including Zionism and the Bund. As noted earlier in this thesis, the line between linguistic 'assimilation' and 'bilingualism' or 'multi-lingualism' is not at all distinct, and it is exceedingly difficult to tell whether Jewish adoption of other languages were simply 'languages of daily use' (*Umgangssprache*, a term from the Austrian census) and not reflective of deeper identity shifts.[177] Corrsin's study of Warsaw Jews suggests that while linguistically acculturation was indeed slowly taking place, "identificational assimilation" was not.[178]

Significantly though, only 2.2% of Warsaw's Jews claimed Russian as their native tongue in 1897, and this was almost entirely due to the 'Litvaks' not to Polish Jews themselves.[179] But these eastern Jews played an important role in Warsaw's socialist and nationalist groups and in the Yiddish press after 1905, bringing with them Russian language and culture. If anything, a more significant cultural influence was German,

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175 Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland, p.20; Corrsin, Warsaw Before the First World War, p.24.

176 Corrsin, Warsaw Before the First World War, p.33.

177 Corrsin makes this point, Warsaw Before the First World War, pp.34-36.

178 Ibid, p.108 and *passim*.

179 Ibid.

particularly among 'enlightened' Warsaw Jews. Russian culture was really socially carried by the 'Litvaks' or eastern Jews and found no social roots among Warsaw's native Polish Jews. Actually Russification was making few inroads among Polish Jews.

Polish anti-Semitism also had effects on Jewish radicalism. Given their substantial urban presence, in the minds of many Poles, Jews at once weakened Polish social structure and contributed to Poland's de-Polonization, Russification, and even Germanization. Though one strain of anti-Semitism viewed Jews as 'money-lenders' and 'Jews on the land' as a hangover from feudal times', there was another strain of Polish anti-Semitism which viewed the Jews as "the avant garde of European decadence", associated with 'bourgeois decadence and materialism', atheism, "negativism", socialism, and in general everything wrong with 'modernity'.[180] It is possible that *fin de siecle* Polish nationalism indeed had mostly this latter strain of anti-Semitism. But most importantly this caused Jewish radicalism to seek 'internationalist' solutions with a vengeance. This was initially found in Polish Leftism. The Polish left had adopted a position of assimilation and Polonization, and in principle opposed anti-Semitism, while for the parties of the right Jews were fundamentally unassimilable. But this did not last. The SDKPiL founded by Luxemburg, and other multi-ethnic groupings, found greater social strength among Jews in the *kresy* than among non-Russified -- and really non-Polonized -- Polish Jews. As the socialist parties 'found' their 'national' identities, most especially Polish socialists, most of their Jewish membership gravitated to German socialism which was still more suitably 'internationalist' -- until it became 'imperialist' -- than Russian socialism for which they had no particular interest.

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180 Theodore Weeks, "The 'International Jewish Conspiracy' and T. Jeske-Choinski", East European Quarterly, Vol.31, No.1, March 1997, pp.24-25. Choinski fell within the latter tradition, and after 1905 was influential in anti-Semitic political circles. "Anyone interested in the roots of modern Polish anti-Semitism", Weeks writes, "must examine carefully Choinski's writings, his portrayal of Jewish past and present, and the metaphors he uses to describe both Jews' and Poles' relations...throughout the ages".

Chapter 8
The Ukrainian Bolsheviks

Two common assumptions about Ukrainian politicization under Tsarist rule have been that Ukrainians were excluded, repressed, or otherwise relegated to minority status under the Romanovs, and consequently that the response has been a re-assertion of Ukrainian national identity. Both seem only partially accurate. Tsarist elites never conceived of 'Ukrainians' or 'Little Russians' in wholesale ethnic or national terms. Both conciliatory and repressive policies targeted specific groups: peasants, the *starshyna* or Ukrainian nobility, cultural elites, the Ukrainian liberal professions, high-ranking service or military elites, or petty civil servants. Policies were both integrative and exclusionary. One result was that the great majority of educated Ukrainians were co-opted in some fashion into the imperial state, either in *Russkii* or in *Rossisskii* terms, really limiting Ukrainian nationalist radicalism to cultural elites in exile, first in 'Muscovy' then in Galicia and Europe. Ukrainian nationalism had virtually no social roots in Tsarist Ukraine. Indeed Russified Ukrainians were so common that Max Weber could write of 1905 events that because of their careers in the Tsarist civil service, the Ukrainian intelligentsia hardly questioned imperial unity or Russian hegemony, and at most asserted only autonomy.[1]

But if Ukrainian nationalism had few social roots in Tsarist Ukraine before 1917, Ukrainian socialism did not. Because of the scholarly bias towards understanding nationalism, the social strength of Ukrainian socialism in the 19th century, Populist and Marxist, SR and SD, has been underestimated. One of the key themes of this chapter is that the political battles among Ukrainian Bolsheviks in Tsarist Ukraine were between the internationalists who conceived of an unconditional unity within the imperial state (Krestinskii and Manuil'sky) and those who conceived of cultural autonomy within the empire (Skrypnyk). Political battles were not primarily between nationalists and socialists.

Another feature of radicalism in the Ukrainian territories was its extreme social-national polarization, producing not only some of the most virulent nationalist groups (Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish), but also some of the most internationalist (Russian,

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[1] Max Weber, "Zur Lage der burgerlichen Demokratie in Russland", and "Russlands Ubergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus", in Max Weber, Zur Russischen Revolution von 1905: Schriften and Reden, 1905-1912, (Ed.), Wolfgang J. Mommsen, JCB Mohr: Tubingen, 1989, pp.129-152.

Ukrainian, Jewish). These were clearly related in one of the most ethnically mixed regions of the empire also comprising the Jewish Pale. Internationalism had greater appeal because of the ethnopolitics of local nationalisms. Russified or dual identity Ukrainians faced not only several 'nationalisms' (Jewish, Russian, Polish, and the Ukrainian itself) but also (Russian) imperialist centralism. The Left-bank and southern provinces particularly were squarely within the Jewish Pale, and after 1905 these regions became strongholds of nationalist and rightist parties, of anti-Semitism, and of polonphobia (though pogromism was less intense in Volhynia and Podolia in 1881-1884 than in Kiev or Ekaterinoslav, and more intense in Chernigov and Kherson in 1905 than in Kiev and Podolia).[2] The complexity of Ukrainian radical politics, therefore, was perhaps only matched by that of the empire's Jews.

There were eight Ukrainians in this elite, a significant underrepresentation as compared to their proportion of the empire's population.[3] Bolshevism had little support in the Ukraine in 1917, particularly among ethnic Ukrainians. From a labor force of nearly 2 million, in 1918 the Bolsheviks were merely 4,000-5,000 strong (mostly in the Donetsk industrial region) while the Ukrainian SRs had over 300,000 members. And ethnic Russians and Jews comprised nearly 75% of the Ukrainian Bolshevik party,[4] all of which gives some sense of the exceptionality of Ukrainians within Bolshevism. The leadership of the three Bolshevik Ukrainian factions was ethnically mixed: the Kharkov-Katerinoslav group led by 'Rightists' Kviring (son of a German colonist) and Sergeev (Russian), the 'Leftists' in Kiev by Piatakov (Ukrainian-born Russian) and Bosh (Jewish), and the 'centrists' by Skrypnyk (Ukrainian). So the question is not only how the few Ukrainians who came to Bolshevism did so, but also how the small Ukrainian Bolshevik party held

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[2] On the western regions, Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914, DeKalb, Illinois, 1996, p.76; on the areas of pogromism, John D. Klier & Shlomo Lambroza (eds.), Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.194, 43.

[3] I include Chubar' a Ukrainian Jew (discussed in Chapter 6), and I do not consider Matei Muranov because of insufficient biographical information, though he was Ukrainian. Kollontai was also part Ukrainian. Her father was Ukrainian and her mother Finnish. Ukrainians constituted the largest non-Russian ethnicity in the empire with 17.81% of the imperial population, but only half that proportion in this elite. Henning Bauer, Andreas Kappeler, Brigitte Roth, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszahlung von 1897, Vols. I&II, Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1991, Tabelle 040, p.212.

[4] Figures in Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, (2nd Edition), Toronto, 1994, pp.348-349.

together Russians, Jews, Germans, and Ukrainians.

After a discussion of Ukrainians under Tsarist rule, I first consider Tsiurupa and zemstvo radicalism, then the two workers Lebed'' and Petrovskii, then Skrypnyk and 'national socialism' and finally the internationalists Krestinskii and Manuil'sky.

I. Ukrainians under imperial rule

Because of the discussion on Ukrainian radicalism developed later in this chapter, it is useful to distinguish the consequences of the acquisition of "Cossack Ukraine", "Little Russia", Left-bank or the Hetmanate, from that of the Right-bank or the Polish Ukrainian provinces west of the Dnieper.[5] Until the 17th century the area now the Ukraine (literally 'border region') had been variously under Polish, Muscovite, and Tataric rule. The entwined and contentious history of Kievan Rus' in Ukrainian and Russian history has been *the* key feature of Ukrainian politics, typically dating to the Treaty of Pereiaslavl' (1654) which made Left-bank Ukraine the site of a new Cossack-led state, the Ukrainian Hetmanate, with significant autonomy and cultural distinctiveness until its suspension and abolition in 1763. Between 1763 and the mid-1830's the Hetmanate was institutionally 'absorbed' into the Tsarist empire through administrative-integrative moves and through the cooptation of Ukrainian gentry, burghers, clergy, and peasantry.[6] Setting aside persistent debates about whether 1654 was an 'incorporation' by an imperialist state or an 'alliance' between two 'nation-states', and setting aside the terms of its subsequent 'reincorporation' under Peter I, the most significant effect (for purposes of this thesis) of the territorial expansion was the 'absorption' of Ukrainian elites in these Left-bank territories -- nobles and Cossacks -- into the Russian *dvorianstvo* and imperial army: by the early 19th century

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[5] The historical material in the next several paragraphs draws from the following: Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, especially pp.201-278; Zenon E. Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s-1830s, Harvard University Press, 1988; Stephen Velychenko, "Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism in Great Britain and Imperial Russia, 1707 to 1914: Institutions, Law, and Nationality in Scotland and Ukraine", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.39, No.3, 1997, pp.413-441; Robert Paul Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993, pp.70-92; Daniel Beauvois, La Bataille de la Terre en Ukraine, 1863-1914: Les Polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques, Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1993; Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, pp.7, 49.

[6] This is a key argument of Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy.

Ukrainian rural elites had been almost entirely Russified. I elaborate on this below.

With the second Polish Partition in 1793 Tsarist Russia acquired 3,000,000 inhabitants from territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuanian and the Ukrainian-inhabited Kiev, Podolia, and Braclaw, and with the Third Polish Partition, in addition to the Duchy of Courland and the remainder of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Romanovs also acquired Polish-Ukrainian Volhynia to the south. So Russia's share of Poland -- now disappeared from the map -- was the Dnieper's Right-bank Ukrainian provinces of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia; Austria's share had been Galicia-Lodomeria and West Galicia. Most of the Ukrainians incorporated in these partitions were peasants, with a number of Polonized Ukrainian notables and landed gentry, and small *meshchane* and merchant groupings in Kiev particularly. Imperial administrative structures on Ukrainian territories took final form by the 1830's when Ukraine was by then divided into 9 *guberniia*. Left-bank Ukraine and southern Ukraine (the four provinces of the Left-bank, Chernigov, Kharkov, Poltava, Ekaterinoslav, and the additional Kherson, and Taurida [Crimea] provinces), and the Right-bank provinces of Podolia, Kiev, and Volhynia.

There were at least three immediate consequences of the Partitions in terms of the ethnic composition of the empire. First, from the Tsarist state's point of view the incorporation of 'Little Russians' (and Belorussians) into the imperial fabric allowed 'Russians' to continue to claim majority status within their empire by counting 'Ukrainian' as 'Russian' -- an important claim since the partitions brought into the empire the most diverse ethnic and religious groups to date, including Catholic Poles and Jews, which otherwise would have rendered ethnic Russians a numerical minority in 'their' empire. Second, the imperial expansions did not include all those of 'Little Russian' dialect, most notably in Austrian Galicia, a substantial proportion of whom belonged to the Uniate Church which had become not a force for Polonization (as its founders had hoped) but a center of Ukrainian anti-Polish sentiment -- and a source of Ukrainian nationalism, both anti-Polish and anti-Russian.

Third, and most often overlooked, is the fact that despite regional differences in socioethnic stratifications and political histories, the territorial Ukrainian provinces became nearly co-terminous with the creation of the Jewish Pale of Settlement, permanently

entwining Jewish and Ukrainian political developments under Tsarist rule, with important effects in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[7] The empire's worst anti-Semitic violence during both centuries took place in the Ukrainian provinces, and it was these provinces that produced the greater number of socialist internationalists. Both of these distinctions seem to me to be related.

Even within general Ukrainian incorporation, the different modes of incorporation, historical trajectories, and socio-ethnic structures of the Ukrainian regions gave rise to different regional political identities and radicalizations. As Velychenko notes, cultural and regional identities persisted longer in the old Cossack lands of Left-bank Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov and Poltava provinces, due to slower rates of commercialization and urbanization and the presence of an historical indigenous elite. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries this meant that Ukrainian national identity was weaker there than in the Right-bank provinces. By contrast, in Right-bank Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia which were more socioeconomically advanced, the nobility tended to support Russian nationalists (in opposition to Ukrainian calls for cultural rights in Left-bank) while acute competition for seasonal work among peasants tended to make them more receptive to the nationalist message inside Ukrainian socialism.[8]

These are important considerations since the Ukrainian Bolsheviks were from Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, Kiev and Volhynia, from Belorussian Mogilev, and from St. Petersburg. And their political radicalization reflected this geographical dispersion: the Bolsheviks from the Polish-dominated Right-bank and Mogilev were the most staunchly internationalist in political activism, while those from the 'old Cossack' lands and the industrializing south where *starshyna* traditions with regional identities persisted seemed more conflicted in their socialist-nationalist politics.

Although I do not dispute Velychenko's claim that differences in socioeconomic

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[7] In addition to the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian provinces (Minsk, Kovno, Vilna, Mogilev, and Vitebsk) and Bessarabia which was added after 1812, the Pale included the Ukrainian provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev (except the city of Kiev), Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Crimea (Taurida), Poltava, and Chernigov.

[8] Velychenko cites the fact that in the 1917 Duma elections approximately 77% of voters in Right-bank provinces voted for Ukrainian parties while only 55% of voters in Left-bank provinces did so. Stephen Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?", Russian Review, No.2, 1995, p.194, ftnts. 23 & 24.

development were a source of the different patterns of radicalization between the Left- and Right-bank Ukrainian provinces, I think greater causal priority should be placed on the regions' respective ethnopolitics. Given that more Bolsheviks -- of any nationality and all social strata -- were radicalized in the territorial provinces of the Ukraine, the radicalization of these provinces suggests something else may have been at work. It is very possible that the crucially important Southern Front in Ukraine during the Civil War had a profound impact on those 'old Bolsheviks' involved in the battles for the Ukraine: Graziosi suggests that part of the emerging Soviet (Russian) elite was formed in the "southern front" as "foreigners in their own land", a "'conquering minority' surrounded by a hostile population -- the peasants primarily but also the [nationalist] intelligentsia".[9] Though I think the emphasis on the nationalist Ukrainian intelligentsia may be overstated, there is something to the idea that they were 'foreigners in their own land' -- and here I include most of the Russified Ukrainians.

To better understand this, I discuss three related features of 19th century Tsarist Ukrainian policy: (i) Tsarist repression of Ukrainian elites and restrictions on Ukrainian language and literature, (ii) Ukrainian Russification, imperial acculturation, and Russophilia, and (iii) the 'missing' middle strata and the 'splitting' of Ukrainian elites through integrative and co-optive state policies. Since they directly impinge upon the early radicalization of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks.

The first key feature of Tsarist Ukrainian policy, and that most often addressed, concerns repressive or exclusionary policies. Although in the first part of the 19th century, the Russian state not only tolerated, but actually supported, the local or regional culture of the "Little Russians" because of its potential anti-Polish value,[10] Tsarist restrictions on Ukrainian language were introduced in 1863 and intensified in 1876 with the prohibition on the importation of Ukrainian materials from abroad and the ban on theatrical presentations. The well-known mid-century closings of the Cyril and Methodious Society, and the south-

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[9] Andrea Graziosi, "G.L. Piatakov (1890-1937): A Mirror of Soviet History", Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol.16, No.1/2, June 1992, pp.102-166, esp. p.121. So Graziosi argues that Piatakov's activities in the southern 'front' triggered profound remorse, manic depressiveness and alcoholism due to his 'barbaric acts'.

[10] Velychenko makes this point, "Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism", p.436. This was in a manner similar to the tolerance initially accorded Finnish nationalism because its anti-Swedish value.

western section of the Geographical Society because of 'Ukrainophilism' were no less illiberal. That this was the most significant cause of the rise of Ukrainian nationalism is now a truism. However most educated Ukrainians (and nearly all the peasantry) were unaffected by Ukrainian language restrictions, and most of the educated were anyway linguistically Russified or bilingual. Tsarist language laws practically (and arguably intentionally) implicated an extremely small, though influential, minority of Ukrainian cultural elites.

A number of reasons have been adduced for the shift in Tsarist policies toward Ukrainians in the last third of the century. Kappeler highlights the most common: Russian elites worried about the strength of Polish cultural influence over Ukrainians (whom the Poles at various times tried to court, particularly during the 1863 Right-bank rebellions); or the alternative possibility of alliance between Polish *szlachta* and Ukrainian intellectuals given general Austrian tolerance in Galicia's "Ukrainian Piedmont"; and finally the Russian almost visceral refusal to accept 'Little Russians' as nationally or ethno-linguistically distinct from Great Russians.[11] The effects of Austrian policies toward Ukrainians in Galicia on Tsarist Ukrainian radicalization were significant -- if only to Russian elites. Exiled Ukrainian intellectuals and academics were sympathetically treated by the Austrian state, since they were considered useful in the Austrian state's struggle with Tsarist Russia, and battles with Galician Poles only strengthened the virulence of Ukrainian exile nationalism.[12]

To imperial elites, the most 'disloyal' separatist and irredentist Poles were the petty *szlachta* of the borderlands (particularly educated sons of semi-impoverished landed elites), but among Ukrainians, intellectuals and cultural elites were considered the carriers of separatist nationalisms for several related reasons. First, Ukrainian cultural elites, like the

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11 Andreas Kappeler, "Aspekte der ukrainischen Nationalbewegung im 19. und fruhen 20. Jahrhundert", in Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler (Hrsg.), Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1993, pp.76-77.

12 Many Ukrainians nationalists were not Russian-educated, but German-educated and brought German and European nationalist sensibilities, with their preferences for Vienna and Berlin, drawing from Central and East European nationalist doctrine. On the latter point, see Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914-1923", in Peter Potichnyj and Howard Aster, (eds.), Ukrainain-Jewish Historical Perspective, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton, 1988, pp.205-246.

Poles, were involved in 'international' politics since the center of gravity of their radical groups were outside Tsarist borders. The fact that the potentially disloyal Ukrainians were in close proximity to German borders and even sought German assistance was of considerable concern, potentially destabilizing the frontier in the face of growing pan-Germanism -- a conflation of 'counter-cultural' with geopolitical threats. The response was essentially a cultural suppression of the cultural activities, loosely defined, which were producing the revolutionaries: educational restrictions, language restrictions, prohibitions of publication of cultural materials, exile of intellectuals, historians, and writers, etc.

Moreover, potential alliances between separatist Polish *szlachta* and Ukrainian intellectuals were considered by some state elites to be immanent,[13] entwining worries of local cultural influence (Polish-Ukrainian alliances) with more strictly geopolitical worries (Ukrainians near Germany, and Austria's conciliation of Galician Ukrainians). But there is evidence that also runs the other way. As Seton-Watson observed, Polish-Ukrainian shared interests within Tsarist territories would run directly counter to their contrary interests in Austrian Galicia and in their respective relationships with Germany.[14] Indeed the Ukrainian nationalist Kostomarov thought the possibility of solidarity between Poles and Ukrainians "very funny, if it were not offensive".[15] And as Saunders notes not only did Tsarist elites consider 'Ukrainophile separatist tendencies' "trivial with no chance whatever of attracting mass support" as late as 1881, but also that at the peak of the state's Ukrainian cultural suppression, Russia's relations with Austria were far less problematic than they would become immediately prior to WWI.[16]

Saunders offers instead a 'demographic approach' to understanding Tsarist Ukrainian policies: the Tsarist state feared Ukrainians because of their numbers, or more generally of a fear of the numerous Ukrainian community (as against the numerically insignificant Latvians or Estonians). Specifically, Saunders argues that the Russian state's

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[13] Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914, DeKalb, Illinois, 1996, p.123.

[14] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, pp.410-411.

[15] Quoted in David Saunders, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy (1847-1905): A Demographic Approach", European History Quarterly, Vol. 25, 1995, p.185.

[16] Saunders, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy", pp.185-186; see also Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.64-65.

educational and linguistic restrictions on Ukrainians derived from a combination of their demographic weight and the potential of a non-Russian language and education. The evidence for the demographic growth of Ukrainians in the empire over the course of two centuries is powerful and convincing.[17] By 1900 Ukrainians were the third largest ethnolinguistic group in East Central Europe with more than 13,500,000 inhabitants, of which just over 10,000,000 were in Tsarist provinces west of the Dnieper; in total the Ukrainian population in the same year was circa 26 million, 85% of whom lived under Tsarist rule, and comprised nearly 18% of the empire's population.[18] Saunders shows that the Russian state was concerned with the "long-term cultural orientation of Ukrainians in general": "They were alarmed by the emergence among an educated Ukrainian minority of concern for the uneducated majority", and therefore suppressing 'low-brow' literature in Ukrainian was particularly important.[19] In short, the main reason seen for repressive language policies, particularly the famous Ems Ukaz of 1876, were demographic fears that if Ukrainians pursued their own 'dialect' it would render Russians a minority in their own empire.

While I do not dismiss the importance of these concerns for the Tsarist elites, and while I do think that 'fear' was behind much nationality policy (not only Ukrainian policies), demographic concerns may have been a lesser priority. Other fears may have been equally important. The potential influence of an educated Ukrainian minority on the Ukrainian masses because of their numbers mattered, but the state may have been more concerned with *Polish* cultural influence on Ukrainian peasants (and Jewish 'exploitation of rural 'rooted slavs') whom they considered 'slavic' and loyal to the Tsar, than with 'Ukrainian' cultural influence,which they anyway considered a 'backward peasant culture' of dubious appeal. I agree with Weeks' assessment that the more general motivating fear in the western borderlands was Polish cultural, political, and socioeconomic influence on 'slavic' peasantries, and encouraging the possibility that the Ukrainian peasantry could be

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17 Saunders provides the figures, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy", pp.188-196.

18 Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, pp.97-98; Kappeler, "Aspekte der ukrainischen Nationalbewegund", p.71.

19 Saunders, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy", p.201.

potential allies against Poles and Jews.[20] While Ukrainians were 18% of the empire's population, they were also 19% of its *rural* population, and given the Russian preoccupation with 'Jews on the land', the relationship between the 'rooted' Ukrainian peasant and the 'alien' Jew was pervasive and ran deep. Moreover, the Russian state was as much concerned about 'vertical' association between social strata as it was about 'horizontal' association, so splitting cultural elites from peasants was practiced throughout the empire (the notable exception was in Azerbaijan), not just with Ukrainians. These fears also explain the similar language restrictions on the 'Latin script' which affected the demographically smaller populations of (Catholic) Belorussians and Lithuanians.

In short, a much more realistic concern was arguably that Polish culture had a strong assimilatory power, offering an attractive and vibrant alternative 'High Culture' to Russian imperial culture, and something historically socially-rooted in the fact that Ukrainian nobles and educated elites had relatively substantial levels of Polonization. Saunders correctly points out that Katkov, a Ukrainophobe, dismissed the potential of elite-alliances,[21] but Katkov's more extreme and more significant Polonophobia derived from his fear that Polish culture had, for 'lower peasant cultures', an assimilatory power not unlike the imperial Russian culture. In the end, language policies were intended not to Russify Ukrainian elites, but to exclude or 'dissimilate' them. And language policies toward the Ukrainian peasantries, e.g. linguistic Russification in education, were never pursued. Indeed the Tsarist state showed remarkable indifference to Ukrainian peasants as 'Ukrainians'.

Moreover, most of the nationality policies with the greatest effect on Ukrainians involved considerations of Ukrainian relations with other ethnicities. Most immediately, though most Ukrainians were Orthodox, a number were Catholic or Uniate, so restrictions targeted at Catholic Poles were also felt by Catholic Ukrainians. The fate of Ukrainian Uniates (Byzantine-rite Greek Catholics) of Belorussia and Ukraine also underwent significant changes over the course of the 19th century, culminating in the creation of the

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20 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, pp.123-125.

21 Saunders, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy", p.185.

Khlom province,[22] not least because the Uniate (created in the 16th century to romanize and Polonize the borderlands of Belorussian and the Ukraine) was still considered a pernicious 'Polish Catholic influence'. Moreover, the decision to withhold provincial government and zemstvo from the Right-bank provinces also had significant impact on the development of Ukrainian politics, although it was a policy designed to exclude not Ukrainian cultural elites but Polish landowners. Mid-century reforms of local government -- zemstvo provincial assemblies and municipal government -- differentially affected the Ukrainian regions depending on the local or provincial socio-ethnic composition. Because zemstvo were introduced in some of the Left-bank provinces (Kharkov, Chernigov) where Polish landed elites were fewer, this enabled the development of a provincial political and 'civil' society in contrast to the Right-bank provinces (where Polish *szlachta* still dominated). Therefore this venue for local activism -- for Ukrainians -- was blocked. These decisions had to do with local ethnic compositions, not with demography.

A related feature of Tsarist Ukrainian policies in the 19th century concerned not the state's exclusionary policies, but its integrative policies toward Ukrainian elites. The fact that so many Ukrainians were voluntarily Russifying and Ukrainian cities were all but linguistically Russified should question, at least in part, the seriousness of demographic concerns. During the course of the 19th century, the Tsarist state sought to incorporate a substantial segment of educated Ukrainians, some Russified but more often bilingual, into provincial and imperial civil and military service, and this continued after the introduction of language policies.[23] As I noted above, the Romanovs almost completely coopted the Ukrainian gentry into the Tsarist *dvorianstvo*.[24] This involved several enticements: by 1785 dvorianstvo rights were on par with those of the Polish-Lithuanian *szlachta*, prompting many Ukrainian *szlachta* to switch to *dvorianstvo* status; Ukrainian peasants were for the first time enserfed in 1783 by Catherine II to the delight of the landed

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22 In 1796 the Uniate metropolitanate of Kiev was abolished. Two eparchies were restored in 1798 and in 1806 the church was fully restored as the Uniate Metropolitanate of Russia. After reorganizations in 1828 and 1839, the only Uniate eparchy in Kholm (Chelm) remained until 1875 as an Orthodox bishopric.

23 Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia", pp.188-208.

24 I use Kohut's definition of 'gentry' here to mean notables, including nobles, *szlachta* and *starshyna*. Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy.

Ukrainian gentry; in 1785 Russian noble status was granted to all Cossack officers; *dvorianstvo* status held out the promise of access to imperial careers in both the civil and military imperial service -- the latter was further propelled by the substantial increase in military posts during the Napoleonic Wars, while the former was boosted by administrative provincial reforms which gave Ukrainian elites the greatest opportunities as experienced administrators in Kursk, Orel, Voronezh, and the Right-bank, and with the conquest of Georgia, the Left-bank as well.[25] Tsarism had initially invited Ukrainians to administer the empire as priests and monks because of their education, but by the end of the 18th century thousands of Ukrainian nobles had been given access to imperial careers.[26] Indeed Ukrainian nobles had entered the *dvorianstvo* in such large numbers that Russian nobles complained of the careerism of the "creeping Little Russians".[27]

All of this had several important consequences. First, as Velychenko notes, Catherinian toleration had initially "made it very easy for the Ukrainian elite to reconcile itself to the abolition of their separate institutions".[28] In particular petty gentry access to imperial careers meant that the loss of 'regional' or local institutions was not greatly felt. By 1835 nearly all Ukrainian military and civilian ranks had been recognized as *dvorianstvo*, so no political privileges now distinguished Russian officers, administrators, and merchants from their Ukrainian counterparts. With this, privileged and 'Russianized' Ukrainians began to associate 'Ukrainian' culture and 'cossackdom' with anarchy and lawlessness, in contrast to the civic inclusiveness, reason, and order of the imperial state, and so consistently supported state centralization.

Secondly and relatedly, although a certain kind of "Little Russian" patriotism did exist, Ukrainian elites remained quintessentially typical of traditional imperial elites in their capacity for different loyalties without need of reconciling them -- Tsarist, imperialist, Hetmanate, noble estate, etc. Hetmanate traditionalists retained both a loyalty to the Tsar

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25 See Kohut's discussion of the various enticements on offer by the Tsarist state, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy, pp.237-256 and *passim.*

26 Ibid., p.240. By the late 1790's 25,000 petitions had been presented, including fake petitions and geneologies, requesting entry into the Russian *dvorianstvo.*

27 Quoted in Velychenko, "Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism", p.421.

28 Ibid., p.429.

and an active desire for Ukrainian autonomy, particularly in terms of native judicial institutions and a restoration of the Cossack armies and military formations. They both resisted total assimilation *and* never questioned the Tsar's claim to sovereignty.[29] Others were more assimilationist in their desires for merger into the Russian empire: access to imperial court society and opportunities for imperial careers attenuated their 'local' sentiment and made them avid supporters of the imperial system. Besides access to careers, positions, titles, wealth and land, another important advantage of empire for Hetmanate Ukrainian elites was its geopolitical value: only inside the Russian empire could the Hetmanate cope with its traditional enemies, Poles, Tatars, and Turks.[30] The empire's anti-Polish and anti-Tatar value was amply demonstrated, respectively with the Polish partitions and with the Russian destruction of the Crimea. Indeed Kohut argues that many Ukrainian nobles had felt poorly treated by the Poles in the Right-bank, and on the view that Polish institutions were outdated they deemed it better to be governed by Russians than by Poles. So even among the 'assimilationists' dual Hetmanate and imperial identities easily coexisted in some sort of balance between greater political issues of the Hetmanate and concern for their rights and privileges.

Third was the *absence* of the set of attractions of empire that would seem most obvious: common 'ethnic' slavic origin, similarity of language, and shared Orthodox religion. It is true that the 19th century Ukrainian clergy was easily reconciled to Russian rule as shared Orthodoxy meant shared culture: they were themselves heavily Russified, wrote to each other in Russian, spoke Russian at home, and even preached village sermons in Russian.[31] Ukrainian Russification and assimilation were made easier since they were anyway Orthodox, removing the religious barriers to Russification variously encountered by Polish, Jewish and Muslim elites,[32] but these were not the reasons for the state's integrative policies, since Polish, Jewish and Muslim elites were in similar ways also integrated. Likewise, the fact that Ukrainian and Russian elites had similar language,

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[29] Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy, pp.266-267.

[30] Ibid., pp.261-263.

[31] Ibid., p.295.

[32] Kappeler makes both points, "Aspekte der ukrainischen Nationalbewegund", pp.78-79.

culture, and religion placed their integration on a level different from that of Polish or German elites, but it was not a source of the attraction of empire in the first instance. In short, it was not 'ideas' but 'interests', Ukrainian and Russian, which seemed more important.

Fourthly, after notables, Cossacks, and clergy (and setting aside the peasantry,) the only other element of Ukrainian society to be integrated, with virtually no resistance at all, were the 'middling strata' of burghers, artisans and merchants. Typically weak and outnumbered in most Ukrainian cities and towns by Jews, Poles, or Russians, they were folded into what essentially became ethnically-mixed burgher (*meshchanstvo*) and artisan classes. Both at the central and local levels the state resisted organizations as "ethnic monopolies" and so permitted guilds, in Kiev for example, to organize by profession, not by nationality. Similarly, Ukrainian artisan guilds (especially in the building trades) confronted large numbers of incoming Russians and Jews, with the result that their 'estates' and guilds became de facto Russified or 'imperialist' in character. This had the effect of diluting 'Ukrainian' identity within status and corporative structures.

All of the above leads to two related observations. First, Ukrainian elites became imperial elites through integrative Tsarist policies, and as I argue below, this had as much a causative influence on the development of Ukrainian political radicalism -- nationalist and socialist -- as did repressive Tsarist policies. That is, high levels of Ukrainian acculturation-Russification were as important in shaping Ukrainian radicalism as were repressive or illiberal state policies. In this much Ukrainian radicalism resembled Jewish radicalism, at least in terms of the spectrum of radical groupings.

Secondly, and more generally, what seems most distinctive in Ukrainian politicization in comparative terms has been, *pace* Ukrainian nationalists' discourse, not Ukrainian separateness or distinctiveness from Russia, but its abiding assimilationism and willing integrationism. When compared with the radicalism of other nationalities in the empire Ukrainian radicalism, I think, has been as much about battles between Russian centralism and Ukrainian separatism, as about the consequences of the historical willingness to give up autonomy, largely a product of the assimilation of the Ukrainian elite into imperial Russian culture to an extent and in a manner different from any other

nationality. Ukraine's loss of distinct identity was indeed perhaps more complete than any other region of the empire,[33] but it is significant and interesting that this process of imperial integration from the mid-18th century through the mid-19th century, as Kohut showed, occurred not only with remarkably feeble resistance on the part of Ukrainian gentry (the only Ukrainian social group in a position to pose a problem to the state), but that they integrated with apparently equal measures of passivity and eagerness.

Ukrainian Russophilism, or the idea that though possessed of a certain distinctiveness, Ukrainians were nonetheless part of the Russian 'nation' because of profound historical, linguistic, and religious ties, was the product of both socio-historical roots and political expediency. By some estimates circa 1.4 million Ukrainians 'Russified' between the 1860's and 1890's.[34] As much of educated Ukrainian society was siphoned off into the imperial bureaucracy, assimilating and becoming 'Russians' in the process, old Ukrainian families became Russified, and though conscious of their descent, the indifference of the Russified Ukrainian nobility to their 'native' lands left them in a state of "disturbed apathy".[35] "Little Russian" *dvorianstvo* loyalty was unquestioned through most of the 19th century. Even Dragomanov's own politics contained this dualism: at once worried about Russification among young Ukrainians while opposing Ukrainian 'provincialism' in literature in favor of the more 'cosmopolitan' Russian.[36] The strength of the "Little Russian" identity and Russophilism, particularly in the Left-bank provinces, was a contrast with the virulence with which Right-bank Kievian cultural elites asserted their "Ukrainian" identity, but overall, Russification and russophilia remained pronounced among Ukrainians generally.

High levels of Russification and russophilia among Ukrainians had immediate consequences for radical politics. First, the humanist or cultural intelligentsia's motivating

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33 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917, Fontana Press, 1997, pp.26-27.

34 Figure cited in Saunders, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy", p.193.

35 Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, p.12, notes that Hrushevsky's mentor in Cossack history arrived in Kiev in 1850 and found only 5 nationally conscious Ukrainians in the city. On Russified Ukrainian nobles' indifference to 'Ukraine', Velychenko, "Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism", pp.436-437. On the Russification of Ukrainian nobles in the Tsarist bureaucracy, Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, pp.204-205.

36 Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, p.9.

fear was essentially one of cultural minorization in the face of russophilic elites (and to a lesser extent Polonization in the Right-bank provinces). The battle of the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia was as much against pro-imperialist, Russified Ukrainians as it was against the Russian state itself. Conversely, Russified educated Ukrainian elites in socialist groupings (Populist and Marxist) too were battling Ukrainian nationalism as much, if not more, than they were the Tsarist state. Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian socialism defined themselves in opposition to each other as much as in opposition to the state.

Second, Russified Ukrainians (socialists in the RSDLP or the SRs and national socialists in the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party) were generally the most ardent supporters of their new 'Russified' social identities. Ukrainian nationalists (e.g. the Ukrainian People's Party) tended to be equally staunch: the more Russified one's co-nationals, the deeper one has to go to find a social basis for ethnic identity. It is true that a cultural ethnolinguistic basis of 'national' identity (incompatible with the imperial state) had to be sought where there was not the civic institutional criteria,[37] but it also had to be sought where the primary threat was the persistence of voluntary cultural assimilation and Russification, russophilia, and "Little Russianism" among Ukrainians themselves. This seemed equally important as well to the new generation of Ukrainian cultural elite in the face of the russophilism that had developed in the 1860's in Eastern Galicia among many educated Ukrainians and Ukrainian noblemen.[38]

Third and partly as a consequence of the above, as with the other highly Russified ethnic minority in the empire, the Jews, a commitment to a Russified social identity and politics made all-Russian radical groupings highly attractive. The fourth 'time zones'' complicated socio-ethnic mixes (most acutely experienced in the Pale's provinces) tended to produce 'internationalist' socialists, both in response to local nationalisms and to Russian centralism. So the Ukrainian and Jewish Bolsheviks (and Latvians, though for different reasons) more than any others tended to espouse internationalism: high levels of Russification and/or russophilism, residence among numerous nationalities in the Pale's

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[37] This is Velychenko's central claim in "Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism", p.346 and *passim*.
[38] Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, pp.317-319.

territories and their respective nationalisms, and a commitment to internationalist socialism were all of a piece. Left Communists and internationalists Bolsheviks were most common in the Ukrainian provinces.

The final key feature of Tsarist Ukrainian policies concerns the 'missing Ukrainian middle class'. Discussions of ethnic ranking typically conclude that Ukrainians were the vast majority of the peasantry in the territories, above them were Polish, Russian, and Jewish urban 'middle classes', Russians (and a few Poles) in administrative positions as officials and bureaucrats, and Russians and Poles (and few Russified Ukrainians) as landed elites. Consequently, within the social structure ethnic Ukrainians formed the peasant (or peasant-worker) masses, and constituted only a small educated intelligentsia, the latter comprising the leadership of the national movement and the former its 'ethnic' base. In brief, Ukrainians had only two 'classes', a large peasantry and a tiny intelligentsia.

While on the whole accurate, there may be insufficient attention paid (a) to the heterogeneity of the Ukrainian peasantry, (b) to the relatively substantial and Russified Ukrainian noble and service elites (judged by their presence in imperial civil and military posts),[39] or (c) to the Ukrainian intelligentsia as a 'middling class' or strata rather than simply as a set of cultural intellectuals. Ukrainian peasants in the southern provinces was profoundly affected in the 1890's by the huge influx of industrial workers -- Russian, Jewish, Tatar, Armenian -- while Ukrainian peasants in the Right-bank provinces politicized in acute economic competition with Polish and Jewish workers. The different ethnic and economic contexts contributed to the differential appeals of socialist and national socialist politics, and therefore the weakness of "Ukrainian nationalist" politics. Even among the Ukrainian peasantry not only was 'passive' Russification and bilingualism common, but distinct regional identities persisted at least until 1917.[40]

There were at least five distinct strata within the albeit small Ukrainian 'middling'

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[39] I have not found a study on the history of the politics of the Ukrainian nobility, or their patterns of Russification and Polonization. Velychenko writes that we know virtually nothing about how or if they pursued 'regional' vs. 'imperial' interests, membership in national groupings, or regional associations. Velychenko, "Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism", p.435.

[40] See John Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study of Nationalism, Princeton, 1952.

and 'petty noble' classes by 1897: (a) there was indeed a small cultural, intellectual, and academic elite, most of whom were, by 1897, in exile, (b) there were also Ukrainians in the 'liberal or free professions', many of whom were in the employ of local zemstvo (as the 'Third Element') or elsewhere in the empire and in the *advokatura*, which was largely Russified, (c) there was a relatively substantial strata of Ukrainians in the employ of the imperial state as bureaucrats and civil servants in middling and low-level positions both in the Ukraine and elsewhere in the empire, (d) there was a comparatively large Ukrainian nobility, including service nobles in higher imperial posts, and (e) there was a very substantial Ukrainian presence in the Imperial military bureaucracy and the Imperial Army. Of the eight Ukrainian Bolsheviks, five came from these strata.

Of these five strata, the last three were *de facto* Russified and co-opted into the imperial state to varying extents. The second group, those Ukrainians in the free professions and the 'new' professions (statisticians, teachers, agronomists, engineers etc) were most often in the employ of the zemstvo, which as noted above were introduced in those Left-bank and southern provinces (Kherson, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Poltava) where the local Russian landowning and propertied presence was deemed sufficient to introduce the provincial assemblies (albeit on restricted electoral qualifications). As we will see with Tsiurupa, they tended to participate in a political activism which was regional or local in scope, calling for increased local government, limited cultural and linguistic rights in education, and in general a more 'democratic' and civil political society. Their politicization tended to be pragmatic in nature (concerning rural schooling, building railroads, engineering projects, agricultural innovation and production etc.) and centered on regional issues rarely broader 'nationalist' politics. By contrast only the first strata, the small cultural and intellectual elite, were the most nationalist in radicalization, and geographically they they tended to come from the Right-bank provinces, particularly Kiev, though most of their political lives were in exile.

Tsarist nationality policies contributed to the splitting of the Ukrainian middling strata. The state generally repressed only the Ukrainian cultural and humanist elite, and generally conciliated both those Ukrainians in the imperial civil service and the Ukrainian peasantry. Ukrainian cultural elites, notably writers and academics, who had nurtured the

development of a literary Ukrainian vernacular and a anti-Russian historical interpretation of Ukrainian history were viewed by the Tsarist state as associated with 'separatism' and considered potentially disloyal. As Velychenko argues this blocked the emergence of a 'loyalist' Ukrainian nationalism: 19th century repression alienated educated Ukrainians and instead of winning the loyalty of cultural nationalists, forcing them to choose between empire and nation, giving them reason for opposition, and provoking their radicalization.[41] While on the whole true, there *did* develop among educated Ukrainians a 'loyalist' Ukrainian nationalism, as Ukrainian national socialists (like the Bolshevik Skrypnyk) and indeed the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party itself testify. Moreover, the radicalization of a 'non-loyalist' Ukrainian nationalism was due to a number of factors (discussed below) among which Tsarist repression was probably not the most causally important.

The incorporation of noble and educated Ukrainians into the imperial bureaucracy where they could make careers not only contributed to their Russification, but in splitting the Ukrainian middling classes, it created dual-identity educated elites and removed an important source of resentment of the educated intelligentsia, an absence which clearly hindered the formation of a broader nationalist intelligentsia.[42] It also goes to the question of imperial vs. provincial access for educated Ukrainians. Specifically, in his excellent study of the composition the Tsarist civil bureaucracy, Velychenko found that through the 19th century Ukrainians ('Little Russians') comprised 9% of the military governors and governors-general, 12% of the heads of the Kievan chancery, and 21% of the governors, vice-governors and gentry marshals.[43] Broken down even further, 13% of the governors, 24% of the vice-governors, and 30% of the gentry marshals were "Little Russian'. While there were variations across provinces, in the top-level positions the "Little Russian" share dropped from 50% in 1800 to 13% by 1914, while the percentage of Russians increased from 33% to 63%. Similar patterns of decline were also reflected in the middling-level

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[41] Velychenko, "Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism", pp.437-439.

[42] On the latter point, Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia", p.20. For Hosking the Ukrainian intelligentsia was confined to "small town employment" in zemstvo and municipalities. But as Velychenko shows, this must be substantially qualified. Hosking, People and Empire, p.380.

[43] Of the latter category, Russians were 57%, Baltic Germans were 13% and Poles were 9%.

positions.[44] This meant that in absolute terms Russians dominated the bureaucracies of the Ukrainian provinces in a manner out of proportion to their share in the population at least through to 1897. Moreover 47% of nobles, 49% of honorary citizens and 29% of merchants in the Ukraine were Russians, and by the 1890's Russians and Baltic Germans together comprised fully 88% of the governors, vice-governors, and gentry marshals.

Yet notwithstanding the underrepresentation in absolute terms of Ukrainian speaking "Little Russians" in the local bureaucracy, significant numbers of "Little Russians" from those strata of Ukrainians who *could* qualify from government jobs (that is, educated, literate, non-peasant urban dwellers, nobles, and honorary citizens) *were* so employed. For instance, in Kharkov, Chernigov, and Poltava, Ukrainians were the majority of administrative legal and police personnel. On average for every 9 Ukrainian speakers (men) with higher education, there was 1 ranking administrator, while for Russians the ratio was 20:1.[45] In short, on these criteria educated Ukrainian-speaking elites tended to be less alienated from the Tsarist state that their Russian counterparts, and although a minority of Russians dominated the higher offices by the late 19th century, many more than half of the middling-level government positions were staffed by "Little Russians", their numbers declining less than at the highest levels.[46]

Velychenko also found that "Little Russian" underrepresentation in absolute terms was not due to their lack of education in the literary non-Russian vernacular as an impediment to their 'social mobility' (partly because of the strong tradition of bilingualism among literate and educated Ukrainians). Rather it had more to do with the workings of the patronage appointment and promotion system, favoritism, and nepotism, as lower postings were contingent upon clientalist appointments from those in higher posts, who displayed a

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[44] All figures in Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia", pp.195-196.

[45] Ukrainian figures for educated Ukrainians to officials were 28,566 to 3,309 and the Russian were 4,134 to 8. Ibid., p.197.

[46] Numbers declined from 50% to 40% at the middle levels. In fact Velychenko argues that given the pervasive tendency to under-declare "Little Russian" as one's native language, if the figures are correspondingly readjusted, almost 2/3 of those classified as "Russians" were likely "Little Russians" -- figures presumably reflected in provincial administration as well. Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia", pp.197-198.

remarkable turnover rate.[47] Family-patronge appointments tended to place non-local men (Germans if Baltic German, Russians if Russian, Poles if Polish).

Most interestingly, though, Velychenko found no evidence of "ethnic discrimination" on the part of the Tsarist state with respect to "Little Russians" -- in stark contrast to the measures applied against the Polish *szlachta* after the 1831 and 1863 revolts particularly in Right-bank provinces -- because the percentages of "Little Russian" administrators corresponded very closely to the percentage of Ukrainian urban dwellers and noblemen who declared their native language Ukrainian. Indeed there was a *shortage of educated, literate Ukrainians*. The needs in the expanding Tsarist civil bureaucracy were so acute that, for instance, in 1897 there were 5,631 Ukrainians serving outside the Ukrainian provinces, and 16,129 Russians and Germans serving inside the Ukrainian provinces. But even if all the former could have replaced the latter, as Velychenko points out, the Ukrainian provinces would have had 10,498 positions unfilled -- and insufficient numbers of educated, literate Ukrainians to fill them.[48]

In sum, nearly all available educated, urban, literate Ukrainians who so desired were integrated in some fashion into Tsarist service, both in the Ukrainian provinces and throughout the empire. The small Ukrainian middling and noble strata, loosely 'the intelligentsia', was split by integrative state policies between those whose Russification and 'interests' lay within the imperial state, those whose 'interests' and occupations gave them a certain dualism of identity and radicalism (at once provincial and imperial), and the most well-known, the intellectuals who had neither social 'interests' or anchor in Ukraine nor occupational incorporation into the state and were forced into exile. The Russian state pursued *at once* inclusionary *and* exclusionary policies toward educated Ukrainians -- encouraging social mobility through imperial state service while trying to limit the number of commoners made noblemen.[49]

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[47] Ibid., pp.200-202. Another factor may also have been state centralization.

[48] Ibid., p.204.

[49] On the application of this idea to the *raznochintsy* see Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter,"Problematics of Status Definition in Imperial Russia: The *Raznocincy*", Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 40, 1992, p.331-332. These policy aims pulled in opposite directions, and as Wirtschafter argues likely contributed as much to noble status insecurity as did economic impoverishment and other socioeconomic processes.

All of this with the consequence that a substantial portion of the Ukrainian educated 'middling classes' were fully co-opted by the imperial state and therefore not receptive to nationalist mobilization. Ukrainian socialism, national-socialism, and socialist internationalism was largely the product of the two former strata. For those educated Ukrainian elites, 'blocked mobility' was hardly operating. However, in contrast to educated middle class Jews who were 'blocked' from local provincial posts and therefore turned to imperial-level posts, and unlike the Polish *szlachta* who were precluded from positions in their native provinces and who found high-level imperial posts in other corners of the empire, the total number of Ukrainians serving in their native provinces at the middling levels actually appeared to *rise* at the turn of the century. Both Kollontai's (though I do not further discuss here here) and Tsiurupa's fathers, to which I now turn, derived from this social strata of Ukrainians.

II. Tsiurupa and zemstvo radicalism

Together with Skrypnyk Alexandr Tsiurupa was the oldest generation of Ukrainian Bolsheviks, and among the most well-educated. Born in Kherson in 1870, Tsiurupa was the son of a municipal government official or civil servant in Aleshki, where he attended local elementary and urban schools. After the death of his father when Tsiurupa was young, the family moved to Kherson. In 1887 Tsiurupa attended and graduated from the Kherson Agricultural College and began a career as an agronomist and statistician.[50]

His family were likely comfortable but not well-off, but they were clearly of the incorporated educated middling-strata of Ukrainians discussed above. Tsiurupa's own level of education would have placed him among the 0.36% of Ukrainians with more than elementary education, and occupationally either a member of the 'free professions' (only 0.46% of all Ukrainians) or a government employee (0.61% of Ukrainians). By *soslovie* or estate membership, depending on his civil service rank, he was somewhere within the 0.16% of 'distinguished citizens' (essentially educated, professional urbanites) or more likely in the upper levels of the more omnibus *meshchanstvo* estate which comprised

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[50] "Biografiia", Deiateli SSSR i revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia Rossiia: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Granat, Moskva: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1989, (hereafter Granat), p.750; Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 30 Vols., 3rd Ed, 1969-1978, (hereafter BSE) pp.611-612.

5.69% of Ukrainians, and from which zemstvo statisticians typically derived.[51]

There is no mention either in Tsiurupa's Granat biography or in official Soviet biographies of any political activism prior to attending the Agricultural College. Tsiurupa's first political radicalism seemed to have been while at the Kherson Agricultural College. In 1891 Tsiurupa helped to organize Marxist circles among students at Kherson, activities for which he was arrested in 1893 (with six months imprisonment and four years of police surveillance) followed by another period of imprisonment in 1895.[52] His first student radicalism coincided with the famines in 1891-1892 in which zemstvo statisticians and agronomists were directly involved in providing assistance to the peasantry.[53] Tsiurupa was no doubt influenced by this. And yet encounters with Tsarist authorities, prison, and surveillance did not prevent Tsiurupa from completing his studies and obtaining employment in 1893 as a zemstvo statistician.

Tsiurupa's pre-Bolshevik radicalism cannot be understood outside the context of more general zemstvo reformism and the radicalism of the zemstvo 'Third Element'. The greatest problems with the zemstvo were budgets and personnel: not enough functionaries and specialists were available to staff positions -- contributing to their politicization and eventually the gulf that developed between the zemstvo Third Element and the state.[54] The zemstvo employed increasing numbers of trained experts, the most important of which were doctors, teachers, engineers, agronomists, and statisticians. By the turn of the century these expert zemstvo employees became known as the 'Third Element' (the 'first' were elected assembly members and the 'second' appointed government officials).[55] Zemstvo statisticians were charged as 'specially trained researchers' whose jobs it was to

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51 The figure was 2.94% for Ukrainians in urban areas. Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 015, p.107, on education, figure by 'nationality'. Census figures for 'mother tongue' and 'nationality' are the same on occupation compare Tabelle 023, p.157 and Tabelle 045, p.329.Tabelle 031, p.198 for estate.

52 BSE, pp.611-612.

53 Robert E. Johnson, "Liberal professionals and professional liberals: the zemstvo statisticians and their work", in Terence Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich, The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.347.

54 Frederick Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870, Princeton University Press, 1992, pp.304-306.

55 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.471, fnt.2.

gather information directly from peasants and landlords, to illuminate the causes of poverty and indebtedness, and to provide factual data as a basis of land reform. But after 1893 zemstvo statisticians were charged with carrying out property assessments (value and profitability of land) prompting clashes with zemstvo gentry and government officials.

In the Left-bank and southern Ukrainian provinces where zemstvo were introduced the majority of members -- up to 75% -- were nobles. Manning refers to the zemstvo as "the almost exclusive political preserve of the local gentry landowners".[56] These zemstvo had three important political properties. First, the extent to which the 'gentry-dominated' zemstvo were really a 'civil society' in opposition to the state was minimal -- gentry activists were only mildly liberal and consistently closed ranks with conservatives in the face of challenges to their position, moving to the 'right' during periods of reaction.[57] By the 1880's and 1890's zemstvo experts like Tsiurupa tended to be radical or socialist political reformers, often combining professional activity with political activism; while zemstvo landowners elected to the assemblies tended to be more moderately liberal or conservative. Secondly, because their mandate involved local issues such as building roads, rural education, irrigation techniques and so on, they tended to be sensitive to provincial and often specifically Ukrainian issues rather than All-Russian issues that fell under the mandate of the imperial bureaucrats. Though the Poltava zemstvo may even have served as a training ground for many of the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement,[58] generally before the war zemstvo intelligentsia activism was liberal or socialist, rarely nationalist.[59] Although zemstvo in Ukraine supported some Ukrainian cultural autonomies, they tended to be more interested in self-government and de-centralization than in cultural-national issues. And thirdly, the zemstvo employed significant numbers of educated Ukrainians, thereby giving them a provincial venue for social mobility. Most

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56 Roberta Thompson Manning, "The Zemstvo and Politics, 1864-1914", in Emmons and Vucinich, The Zemstvo in Russia, p.143. As *raznochintsy* and career bureaucrats supplanted the hereditary landed nobility in imperial civil and military bureaucracies, and gentry turned to provincial affairs, transforming themselves into activist 'country gentlemen'.

57 Ibid., pp.148-155.

58 Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, p.257.

59 Ibid., p.299. With the outbreak of WWI the Russian zemstvo responded with heightened patriotism. Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.698.

educated Ukrainians in Kharkov for instance were employed in civil service positions, zemstvo-associated positions, or free professions typically associated with the zemstvo.[60]

Tsiurupa's career as a zemstvo statistician-agronomist spanned more than two decades: he worked for the Kherson zemstvo from 1893-1895 (just after the famines of 1892-1892), in Simbirsk in 1896, and in Ufa from 1897-1901, in Kharkov and Tula in 1901(during the peasant unrest of 1902 in Kharkov and Poltava) and from 1905 as an agronomist in Ufa.[61] Zemstvo statisticians and agronomists tended to be oppositional elements in the zemstvo intelligentsia, and particularly influential during the periods in which statistical activity flourished in the mid-1880's, between 1906-1914, and in the 1890's.[62] Tsiurupa's activism brought him to the RSDLP in 1898. Although most zemstvo statisticians spent their entire careers in one locality, Tsiurupa was among the few who were highly mobile. Mobility for zemstvo statisticians, and for Tsiurupa as well, was likely related to educational and political activism: those who had been in oppositional circles in student days or who had engaged in conflicts with zemstvo officials were labeled unreliable and were therefore moved around. (Repeated arrests were common since they were rarely underground and easily traceable within the bureaucracy). But despite this mobility, they consistently performed the same work and, like Tsiurupa's positions in the new Bolshevik state, remained statisticians throughout their careers.[63]

In his capacity as a zemstvo professional Tsiurupa published articles and studies on the rural economy of the Lower Volga and on demography and landownership in Ufa. At the same time, also like most zemstvo experts, he was deeply involved in political activities

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[60] In Kharkov, of those 45,000 of Ukrainian 'mother tongue', 1,352 and 1,355 (or 3% in both cases) were employed in administrative/government positions and in the 'free professions' respectively. And though ethnic Russians were numerically more significant (3,828 and 5,337 respectively in civil service and 'free professions') the number of Ukrainians employed in civil service or in free professions (many of which were associated with the zemstvo) is significant considering that only 4.16% of the city's Ukrainian population had more than an elementary school education. In addition to state officials, there were between 1,000-2,000 zemstvo employees in each of the Ukrainian provinces by the early 1900. Figures in Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties, and Service in Imperial Russia", p.19.

[61] "Biografiia", Granat, p.750.

[62] There was a lot of oppositional activity after 1893 and 1901 during the "crises of statisticians" in their clashes with conservatives. Johnson, "Liberal professionals and professional liberals", pp.344,350,348-349; Manning, "The Zemstvo in Politics", pp.141-143.

[63] Johnson, "Liberal professionals and professional liberals", pp.352-354, 357.

as a statistician: in 1901, as a member of the Kharkov Committee of the RSDLP, Tsiurupa led a strike of statisticians. "Activist statisticians" contributed articles to populist and liberal journals, and attended public demonstrations -- but none of this prevented them from taking part in the zemstvo bureaucracy.[64] Followed by Tsarist police Tsiurupa fled to Tula, was arrested in 1902, and was exiled for three years in Olonets.[65] In 1905 Tsiurupa took part in the revolution in Ufa and was again arrested. It was common for zemstvo activists to take part in "political strikes", particularly in 1905, but elected (gentry) zemstvo deputies retaliated with widespread dismissals.[66] Indeed it took Tsiurupa three years to secure a position as an agronomist for the Tsarist provincial food administration in Ufa, a post he held until 1915.[67]

Tsiurupa was for years simultaneously involved in both socialist political activism and in the employ of the either the provincial or the imperial state as a statistitian-agronomist. His daily work implicated him directly with the interests and experiences of the Russian and Ukrainian peasantries and landowners -- a rarity among Bolsheviks in the region. Tsiurupa's activism in Russian socialist groups in the southern Ukraine and in central and north Russia clearly nurtured certain ideological prejudices about the peasantry. But the prejudices of his occupation also provided sociological assumptions about the peasantry. From Johnson's work we may draw at least two which characterized zemstvo statisticians. Most immediately, they tended to be idealists and their choice of profession was a direct result of this. Zemstvo employees like Tsiurupa were typically young and poorly paid, and would likely have found more profitable careers in private practice. In fact for many young radicals, zemstvo service was a *consequence* of youthful radicalism; and this seemed to have been especially true of the statisticians, who had a reputation of being been politically unreliable.[68] As Seton-Watson noted, to have opted for zemstvo

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[64] Ibid., pp.353, 356-357.

[65] "Biografiia", Granat, p.750; BSE, pp.611-612.

[66] Manning, "The Zemstvo and Politics", p.141.

[67] BSE, pp.611-612.

[68] Johnson, "Liberal professionals and professional liberals", p.354.

employment would itself have been a mark of young idealism.[69] Secondly, though there is actually little reliable biographical data, it appears that most tended to view the peasantry as an "undifferentiated mass", overlooking economic differentiation and polarization -- perhaps their strong idealist sympathies for traditional craft production and village communes caused them to underestimate the influence of capitalism in the countryside.[70]

Tsiurupa displayed these traits. The discrepancy between the social-economy of the peasantry as seen by a zemstvo agronomist-statistician and the Marxist sociology of the peasantry as seen by a committed socialist may not have been very great. Much of this was reflected in Tsiurupa's policies on grain requisitioning and NEP in the early years of the Soviet state. From February 1918 to December 1921, as the Deputy Commissar of Food at Narkomprod during the most critical years of the early state's collapsing economy and fledging political infrastructure, Tsiurupa was charged with supplying urban areas and the Red Army with grain and other foodstuffs at a time when severe unemployment was forcing workers to leave the industrial centers and making it even more difficult to exchange manufactured goods for agricultural products. Under these conditions Tsiurupa, in typically "Marxist Bolshevik" fashion, concluded that the problem was not control of production, but most especially of distribution. Tsiurupa agreed with the Bolsheviks that this stemmed, at least in part, from 'kulak' hoarding of grain either to push up prices or to weaken the new regime. The famously disastrous grain requisitioning policies that resulted, with their grain monopoly and organized armed food detachments were supported by Tsiurupa.

It is certainly possible that Tsiurupa's analysis of the problems facing the new regime were the result of his ideological commitment to Marxist socialism. And yet it is more likely, I think, that it was less his ideological commitments but his practical experiences which in the end organized his political thinking. More than 20 years of employment in the Tsarist imperial and provincial bureaucracies as an agronomist-statistician both in zemstvo and in the Tsarist food administration during the war years

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69 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.471. Consequently conservatives stereotyped them as 'political unreliables' and 'subversives', while liberals and socialists (including Lenin himself) considered them naive and prejudiced. Johnson, "Liberal professionals and professional liberals", p.343.

70 Johnson, "Liberal professionals and professional liberals", pp.358-359.

likely produced in Tsiurupa a view of the state as incompetent, inefficient, and corrupt in its agrarian policies, and an equally impressive view of the peasantry as a 'undifferentiated mass' whose problems could be solved through a 'commune writ large'. The need for immediate and drastic policies would likely have been substantially magnified under the enormous chaos and pressures of setting up a new regime during conditions of war and Civil War. Centralization and requisitioning to the point of 'dictatorship' between 1918 and 1921 may have had less to do with Marxist sociology of the peasantry and more to do with panic conditions. That this was more likely the source of at least Tsiurupa's politics is supported by the fact that after 1921, when crisis conditions had abated, Tsiurupa supported and helped implement -- with certain reservations because it meant a diminishment of his own position as Commissar of Food -- NEP programs. From 1923 to 1925 Tsiurupa chaired Gosplan, and as Commissar of Foreign and Domestic Trade, Tsiurupa continued to support all centralized planning, although in his work on Gosplan's first five year plan he advocated a relatively modest transformation of agriculture. Tsiurupa died of a heart condition in 1928.

III. Petrovskii and Lebed': Russified worker radicalism in Left-bank Ukraine

Unlike Tsiurupa's zemstvo radicalism which was essentially limited to rural issues in Ukraine and Russia, Petrovskii's and Lebed's experiences made them receptive to socialism's classic working class appeal. Both similarly shared the experience of struggling in poverty after Petrovskii's father left and Lebed's father died. This not only interrupted their studies by forcing them into manual labor while very young, but it also made them available to social democratic radical workers' circles in the factories with varying emphases on the 'national' or Ukrainian dimension.

Petrovskii was born in 1877 in Kharkov to a very poor Ukrainian family of artisans. His father had been a tailor and his mother a laundress. When Petrovskii was only 3 his father left the family, and he was raised by a stepfather Petrovskii described as rough and violent, spending his daily wage of 50 kopecks on drink. Petrovskii's account

of his childhood depicts one of misery and extreme poverty.[71] Because of the family's financial circumstances, Petrovskii was constrained to work while in secondary school. He began working in 1889, as a child of 11 in Kharkov, as a locksmith, machine lathe operator, and various other piecework in shops and guilds.[72] Official sources say Petrovskii was a member of the CP since 1897, at age 19 joining the Ekaterinoslav Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, an essentially all-Russian socialist radical group.[73] But Petrovskii had been working since 1889, dated his activism among workers to 1895, and had previously been expelled from seminary school in Kharkov for political activity.[74] He had clearly been active in radical groups before the (Russian) Emancipation of Labor.

Dmitri Lebed'' was born 16 years later in 1893 in the village of Nikolaevka in Ekaterinoslav *guberniia* to a peasant-worker family. His father was a "black worker" and died when Lebed'' was 15 years of age, leaving the family in very difficult material circumstances, and causing Lebed' to leave school after 2 years at a local 'railway' school to seek employment.[75] Lebed' had already been involved in small-scale anarchist skirmishes and with student terrorists -- stealing revolvers, holding-up vodka shops, handing out illegal brochures and leaflets -- all of which he subsequently described as 'heroic'. For Lebed', as with two of his brothers who were active in the anarcho-terrorist movement, the belief that single acts of individuals could terrorize or 'explode' capitalism out of existence was powerful.[76] Unlike the early anarcho-terrorist and anarcho-communist radicalism of the wealthy and privileged Ukrainian-born Russian Piatakov whose anarchist radicalism was of a more 'cerebral' nature and involved reading Kropotkin in student circles and organizing assassinations of Governor-Generals, Lebed's anarchism

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71 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.581. There is some discrepancy as to his date of birth, compare the official BSE, p.488 which dates it to 1878 with Granat, p.581. I use the latter.

72 BSE, p.488-489; "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.581.

73 BSE, pp.488-489; see also account in "Piatnitsa", dated 4 February 1938, No.29, in Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 796, Accession No.63013 8.41/44, Series 291, Folder 11.

74 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.581.

75 Ibid., p.491.

76 Ibid., p.491.

seemed far more visceral and anger-inspired, without any clearly articulated intellectual principles. Moreover, 'capitalism' in semi-rural Ukraine would likely have been associated with Jews, and indeed 'vodka shops' were often Jewish (see Chapter 6). This suggests that anti-Semitism may have played some role here, and I consider this below.

Though less 'heroic', Petrovskii wrote in considerable detail of the difficulties of his working life: he worked at what were (to him wrongly) considered proper wages of 2 1/2 rubles a day. In 1895-1896 Petrovskii's daily work experiences brought him into contact with large numbers of workers, most of whom were earning extremely low wages for 13 hour days, since industrial working conditions (in contrast to those in the Right-bank sugar industries) were, even after 1890's government legislation, such that shifts of 12 to 15 hours were common, safety precautions and medical care virtually non-existent, and pay was only a fraction of those for comparable jobs in most of Europe.[77] Strikes and confrontations between workers and employers were frequent, and Petrovskii describes his "living in fear of the tyranny of the chief assembler or worse, the police".[78] His discussions and activities among workers at the job and during meals seemed to revolve almost exclusively around the difficult working conditions, making them receptive to the canonical socialist brochures which circulated at their three-hour evening meetings. Petrovskii's description of his involvement in an 1898 Briansky factory mutiny where workers stormed the gates and were beaten back by guards is at pains to emphasize the arbitrariness of factory administration and the brutality of the repression, but it no time does he invoke his 'Ukrainian' identity.[79] Missing from Petrovskii's detailed account -- and Lebed's -- are discussions or consciousness of ethnic or national differences.

Official biographies claim that Lebed' joined the Social Democrats in 1909.[80] Though he may no doubt have been involved in SD circles he hardly viewed himself in this manner. As early as 1905 Lebed' was active in various radical groupings around the Dnieper, a number of which were Menshevik organized, and by 1910 he considered

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[77] Ibid., p.581. On industrial working conditions in the region, Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, pp.270-271.
[78] "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.581.
[79] Ibid., p.582.
[80] BSE, p.231.

himself a "class conscious worker", the 'hero' of the inevitable revolution.[81] His activities included the distribution of literature and transport of revolutionary materials, and he wrote at some length of the revolutionary movement, particularly after the 1912 Lena massacres.[82] Although he studied Marxism and read Bebel in workers' circles, he was uneducated and by his own admission excelled instead in practical work.[83] Not well-versed in intellectual subtleties and debates within Russian socialism, particularly between Bolshevism and Menshevism, Lebed's enthusiastic description of the nobleness of his activism is either careless, or dispassionate, or perhaps disingenuous, about labeling the radical groupings -- to him radicalism was radicalism and it was exciting and heroic. This leaves the question of his political affiliation open.

Because both Petrovskii and Lebed' were among the relatively small class of ethnic Ukrainian urban workers in the industrial cities of the south, we should be as precise as possible in situating them within their social and ethnic context.[84] Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav were one two of the four principal urban centers in the Ukraine, together with Kiev and Odessa. Though Ekaterinoslav was more industrialized, between 1870 and 1900 Kharkov's urban population increased significantly, and it became the center of trade and industry on the Left-bank. Between 1870 and 1900, and especially in the 1890's, the Donets basin and southeastern Ukraine became the fastest growing industrial region of the empire, prompting substantial migrations of ethnic Russians in search of work.

By the turn of the century when Petrovskii and Lebed' were working in Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov only 7.31% of Ukrainians (by 'nationality') and 4.78% of Ukrainians (by 'mother tongue') were employed in manufacturing.[85] If the difference is split, this suggests that just under 1/3 of those ethnic Ukrainians engaged in manufacturing in the region did not consider Ukrainian their mother tongue. Together with what we know

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81 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.491.

82 Ibid., p.492.

83 Ibid.

84 The Ukrainian Matvei Muranov should also properly be included here, but I do not discuss him because there seems to be a dearth of biographical information. Muranov was born in 1893 to a peasant family and became a worker in Kharkov. He was particularly active among railroad workers. BSE, pp.121-122.

85 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 023, p.156 by 'nationality' or ethnicity, and Tabelle 043, p.277 by 'mother tongue'.

of the ethnic composition of the industrial cities in the south -- namely that among the most experienced workers in heavy industry in the south only 25% of coal miners and 30% of metallurgical workers were ethnic Ukrainians,[86] the levels of linguistic Russification -- if not social acculturation Russification -- would have been extremely high among Ukrainian workers in these southern cities. Indeed in Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav, more than 39% and 40% respectively of ethnic Ukrainians could read Russian.[87] While a significant portion of these were no doubt members of the free professions, civil servants, and other intelligentsia since their rates of Russian literacy were higher, the conclusion is this: though the numbers of ethnic Ukrainian workers in the cities of the south was comparatively small, of those within this group who were literate, the rates of Russian-literacy were substantial. Lebed' and Petrovskii came from within this comparatively small strata of Russian-literate, ethnic Ukrainian urban workers.

That they gravitated to all-Russian or even specifically Russian radical workers' groupings is therefore hardly surprising. For instance both Petrovskii and Lebed' were involved in the Emancipation of Labor Group in Ekaterinoslav which was likely the result of daily involvement and socialization with ethnic Russian workers in the face of 'capitalist' exploitation. Significantly, unlike some cities of the borderlands in which ethnicity and class co-stratified (e.g. the 'bourgeoisie' was German, the 'workers' Latvian), and though there were substantial minorities, in the Ukrainian south and Left-bank *both* 'capital' and 'labor' were primarily Russian. In proportional terms Russian workers to Ukrainian workers were approximately 2.5:1 in Kharkov and more than 4:1 in Ekaterinoslav, and similar proportions held in 'banking and commerce'. In 1897 ethnic Russians comprised nearly 2/3 of an industrial labor force of just over 99,000 in Kharkov, with the remainder Ukrainian; in Ekaterinoslav Russians were just under 1/2 of the industrial labor force with 25,000, compared to the 15,000 Yiddish-speaking (Jewish) workers and the 11,000 Ukrainian workers. So in Kharkov in 1897 Petrovskii was one of 7,447 Ukrainians (by 'mother tongue') employed in manufacturing, and in Ekaterinoslav Petrovskii and Lebed'

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[86] Figures from Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, p.272.

[87] The illiteracy rates among Ukrainians were 55.35% in Kharkov and 56.66% in Ekaterinoslav. All figures from Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 051, p.413.

were two of only 381 Ukrainians. This created a situation in Ukrainian cities where ethnic Russian workers -- the majority of the urban labor force -- were to a great extent organized by Russian SDs against ethnic Russian industrialists and 'capital'. Part of the strength of Russian social democracy and worker radicalism in these industrial cities rendered ethnicity for the most part irrelevant and the 'class conflict' clearer. The presence of both Russian capital and Russian workers diluted ethnic divisions. And for the comparatively few ethnic Ukrainian workers, Russification would almost have been unavoidable and activism in all-Russian groupings quite common.

But ethnopolitics must also have involved a Jewish dimension. And although recent studies of the economic history of the Dnieper-bend railroad workers, for instance, are meticulous, they pay scant attention to the relationship between the ethnic composition of the workers and their politics, though we know that those individuals who launched southern Russia's coal industry and its supporting railroad infrastructure were themselves quite ethnically and socially mixed: in the last decades of the 19th century they were Cossacks, Jews, Ukrainians, Russians, merchants, nobles, engineers, and even female landowners.[88] McCaffray shows that southern industry was especially vulnerable to the virulent strain of anti-Semitism emanating from Nicholas II's government: although the Tsar's ministers had been keen to limit Jewish participation in corporate ownership, by 1914 state officials had began to equate corporate enterprise with Jewish (and foreign) influence.[89] Restrictions on Jews and Poles in the southern industries had increased after 1880, and although Jews could move with relative ease in Ekaterinoslav province (a part of the Pale), they could not own or rent land in the Don region. In 1899 Jews were forced to leave the two Donbass port cities Taganrog and Rostov-on-Don.[90] And yet many of the engineer-managers of these southern coal, mining and railroad industries were Jewish or German. While most of the engineer-managers of the Southern Association industries

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[88] Susan McCaffray, The Politics of Industrialization in Tsarist Russia: The Association of Southern Steel and Coal Producers, 1874-1914, DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1996, p.24. The "Association of Southern Coal and Steel Producers", the cohort of industrializers who created and ran southern Russia's (Ukraine's) most important steel and coal industries, were technical intelligentsia.

[89] Ibid., p.210.

[90] Ibid., pp.9-10.

were ethnic Russian, in 1882 at least 1/3 were not and by 1905 fully 1/2 were not. In the 1890's 13% were Jewish or German and by 1914 the figure rose to 23.3%, while 10% were Polish engineers; ethnic Ukrainians were extremely few.[91] Most of the engineer-managers in the Donets basin, typically liberal westernizers educated in Europe, were not local men and made little distinction between Russia's interests and their own professional interests.

In Kharkov Jewish capital was negligible, but in Ekaterinoslav where both Lebed' and Petrovskii worked and were politically active in the Emancipation of Labor, Jewish capital comprised about 1/3 of the total, behind Russian capital,[92] and Jewish workers constituted a significant portion of the industrial labor force. Because of the very strength of anti-Semitism in Ukraine, Jewish workers tended to organize in all-Russian SD groupings rather than in specifically Jewish groups (unlike Jewish activism in the Vilna Bund, for instance), in part because they were anyway Russified, and in part because Russian groups were more appealing because of local (rural) ethnopolitics.

From this context, in 1899 Petrovskii was called into military service in the Imperial Army but poor health forced him to leave. He subsequently found work in a Kharkov steam engine factory and began party work in Nicolaev workers' circles for the Social Democrats. From Nicolaev he went to Ekaterinoslav and again worked with the SDs until his arrest. Petrovskii spent more than one year in solitary confinement in prison reading Marxist literature and studying math, geometry and German. After his release he found employment in the Donets mine pits for 2 1/2 years until another arrest in 1903.[93] On release Petrovskii returned to Ekaterinoslav and was elected deputy to the Ekaterinoslav soviet until the 1905 revolutions. During the events of 1905 Petrovskii helped to organize and lead the Ekaterinoslav soviet and city strike committee.[94]

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91 Ibid., p.82.

92 In 1897 in absolute numbers the figures were (by 'mother tongue') the following: Russian workers in Kharkov 16,751 and Ukrainians 7,447, and in Kharkov the figures were respectively 8,581 and 1,986. The figures for Russians and Ukrainians in banking and commerce were for Kharkov 5,761 Russians and 1,848 Ukrainians, and 1,198 Russians and 381 Ukrainians in Ekaterinoslav. Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 054, p.452.

93 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.582.

94 BSE, pp.488-489.

Neither Petrovskii's employment in the Donbass mine pits, nor his political activism during the 1905 revolutionary events are explored in official or Granat biographies. Yet some of these experiences can be reconstructed. We know, for instance, that local mine operators offered a number of inducements to attract peasants from the surrounding villages such as comparatively high wages, free housing and heating coal, and often train tickets to the Donets basin. Indeed by the mid-1880's an Injured Miner's Fund had been established. And yet even with these inducements, the great boom of the 1890's meant that the local workforce was still insufficient. Accordingly, many of the European-educated technical engineer-managers understood that only by increasing general workers' welfare and the "cultural level" of the local populations could the struggle for industries be won; and by "cultural level" they intended education, health, living conditions, and so productivity itself.[95] Petrovskii, like the other miners in the Donets pits, were generally peasants, landless, single, and typically seasonal workers. They had come to the Donbass as a land of opportunity, and indeed by the turn of the century it was the fastest growing area of the empire. Although barrack housing and heating was provided, conditions were barely acceptable. But it seemed that while housing and living conditions were only between 5-9% of strike grievances, far more significant concerns for strikers were wages and terms of payment, that is, money with which to secure more adequate housing.[96]

In 1905, events in Ekaterinoslav itself were initially limited and traditional in terms of their economic demands. And yet competition between Bolshevik, Mensheviks, Bundists, and Anarchists was intense, ratcheting-up political and anti-government demands. In June 1905 Ekaterinoslav was drawn into revolutionary events that had begun with the naval mutiny in Odessa. But as strike activity produced few results, workers grew frustrated and anti-Jewish sentiment among Russian and Ukrainian workers surfaced: Ekaterinoslav experienced some of the most violent pogroms of the 1905 revolutions, particularly among factory workers in the industrial neighborhoods. Just as the government issued its October Manifesto -- seemingly the political victory that the revolutionaries had been seeking -- the Ekaterinoslav soviet, of which Petrovskii was a key

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[95] McCaffray, The Politics of Industrialization in Tsarist Russia, Chapter 5.

[96] Ibid., pp.104-105.

figure, called off the political general strikes. Pogroms followed the Manifesto all over the Donbass, in the steel towns and in the mining settlements, making Ekaterinoslav the city with the greatest economic property damage. Strikes and pogroms moved out in waves along the railroad lines and at railroad stations. In the end, Cossacks restored the mines and mills to the managers.[97]

These two ethnic-class groups -- Russified Ukrainian day laborers and peasant-workers and ethnic Russian workers and day laborers in the southwest Ukrainian provinces -- were the shock troops of pogromism in 1881 and in 1905. The enemies were clear -- the capitalist, the state, and Jews. And yet rightist xenophobia, towards foreign industry owners and Jews, underlay much of the violence and strike activity, often targeting both "*yids* and democrats". But the conflation of "yid" and "democrat" was significant and complex, since it brought Jews and Russified Ukrainian socialists (like Petrovskii and Lebed') into the same political camp, something made even easier by the fact that the poor urban Jewish workers and craftsmen tended toward all-Russian parties, primarily the urban-based SDs. In contrast to Polish Jewry which was radicalized within the context of Polish socialist parties, especially in their internationalist left-wings, Ukrainian Jewry tended to be quite Russified and gravitated toward Russian and Russified urban parties, SDs and SRs.[98]

Without minimizing the presence of anti-Semitism, which I am quite sure Lebed's early anarchism involved, and in contrast to Ukrainian workers in the sugar factories in the Right-bank provinces where intense ethnic competition made them more receptive to nationalist messages, industrial workers in the Left-bank and southeastern Ukraine like Lebed' and Petrovskii had generally weaker Ukrainian and stronger Russified identities and so were typically not politicized on that basis. For the few ethnic Ukrainians in the urban industrialized south radicalization was of a piece with their social acculturation into the essentially Russian industrial milieu, though strains of anti-Semitism should not be discounted. But as we will see below this was also stood in contrast to the radicalization of educated Ukrainians like Manuil'sky or Krestinskii: politicized in non-Russian and non-

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[97] Ibid., 169-176.

[98] On the russophilia of the Jewish workers, Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, pp.253-254.

proletarian contexts, attraction to Russian socialism derived from a different kind of Russification in a different social and ethnic context.

Ethnic cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian workers in the southern Ukraine was, ironically, made easier by the war. With the war workers' strikes and radicalism generally increased. Lebed's Ekaterinoslav group formally joined the Ukrainian Social Democrats and accordingly adopted Zimmerwald's opposition to the war. "Imperialism" was easy to sell to Dnieper workers: industrialists had started the war in their pursuit of profits. For Lebed' and most Ukrainian and Russian workers the war was experienced as an extension of their already formidable economic hardships; the war's capitalist-imperialist rhetoric resonated with practical worker concerns, and nationalist dimensions fell silent. For the time being 'economic' imperialism seemed more persuasive for workers already implicated in labor disputes on a daily basis than than did vague national or 'political' imperialist motives, perhaps because of the naturalness of ethnic alliances and high levels of Russification.

Sometime in 1912 Lebed' came into contact with Ukrainian Bolsheviks and began organizing for the 4th Duma elections in which Petrovskii would be the Ukrainian Bolshevik delegate. Lebed' and Petrovskii developed a close friendship, and though both were highly Russified workers, they clearly recognized a common Ukrainian identity in their activism. In working with railroad workers along the Dnieper Lebed', and to a great extent Petrovskii, were politicized not only among ethnic Russian railroad workers, but also among Russified Ukrainian workers. Ukrainian Social Democracy at the level of the worker, particularly railroad workers who moved with great frequency along the rail lines (this is surprisingly understudied given the high level of worker radicalism among railroad employees), meant that Russified Ukrainians were organizing with other Ukrainians, but (as with Russified activist Jews) they were doing so in the company of other Russified Ukrainians. There may therefore have been little occasion to call into question the tension in this social identity, and there appeared to be an accepted naturalness in alliances between ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians.

The 'reaction' following the social unrest of 1905 prompted Petrovskii to go abroad to Germany where he found work in factories. Petrovskii was abroad as a worker, not as

an intellectual or party theoretician, working in Germany until his return to Russia in 1911-1912 when he was elected, with the assistance of a fellow Ukrainian Lebed', Social Democratic deputy to the Fourth Duma, a position he held until 1914 when the 13 men of the SD faction were famously arrested by state authorities and exiled.[99] On his last arrest Petrovskii was sent to Iakutsk and only liberated with the Revolution.

In 1916 Lebed' was drafted into the Imperial Army in the 228 Regiment in Ekaterinoslav, a post he served for only three months also due to poor health.[100] The remainder of the war years were spent in prison, administrative exile, and in continued strike organization and activity among Ekaterinoslav railroad workers. With the revolution Lebed' began editing Bolshevik paper *Vlast' sovetov*, in October 1918 he was appointed Secretray of the Ukrainian CP(b) and in 1924-25 served in various posts in the Ukrainian Communist Party.[101]

IV. Skrypnyk: Ukrainian radicalism, the 'national' and the 'social'

Scholarly studies on Skrypnyk's post-1917 nationality policies are excellent and comprehensive,[102] but there is far less biographical data on his pre-Bolshevik radicalism. Skrypnyk was an 'Old Bolshevik', a friend of Lenin's, and among the last Ukrainian national-Bolsheviks. Skrypnyk was also one of the most important and prolific writers in the revolutionary cohort, having penned more than 270 articles, brochures and books on a wide range of subjects, including an important tenure on *Pravda*'s editorial board during the first years of the war. After 1921 Skrypnyk's role in the de-Russification or Ukrainianization of the Ukraine led to charges of "national deviationism"; it had also been Skrypnyk who had won the battle over the name of the 'local' communist party -- the Communist Party of the Ukraine, an essentially independent 'national' party linked to the

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99 The record of his famous arrest is in HIAPO, Outgoing Dispatch card 199-1914.

100 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.493.

101 BSE, p.231.

102 Panas Fedenko, "Mykola Skrypnyk: His Nationality Policy, Conviction, and Rehabilitation", Ukrainian Review, No.5, 1957, pp.,105-143; D.M. Corbett, "The Rehabilitation of Mykola Skrypnyk", Slavic Review, XXII, June 1963, pp.304-313; and discussions in Jurij Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917-1923, Toronto, 1982, and George S.N. Luckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934, New York, 1956.

RSDLP. Skrypnyk committed suicide in 1933 in protest of Moscow's policies in the Ukraine. In 1962 he was rehabilitated and retrospectively deemed "an implacable foe of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists", though he had in fact been one of 'national communism's' most vocal supporters.

Skrypnyk more than any other Ukrainian Bolshevik was implicated in the 'national question', opposing Russian centralism and Russification as remnants of imperialism. Usually considered a representative of "Ukrainian national communism", I think that Skrypnyk's Ukrainian nationalism reflected its Kharkov Left-bank roots. He was not a nationalist of the Galician emigre type that was a product of Kiev and exile. And though an internationalist who opposed Russification, his internationalism was not of the European type and product of the Right-bank provinces, as was initially Manuil'sky's. Skrypnyk navigated between two opposing pressures, Great Russian chauvinism (centralism) and Ukrainian nationalism (separatism). In the end Russian centralism won and an open campaign against Skrypnyk began in 1933 when he was denounced as a nationalist -- at a time in which he was one of only four Ukrainians (Petrovskii, Chubar' [a Ukrainian Jew], and Manuil'sky) on the CC of the CPSU which had 71 members. Before turning to this, however, I first consider his early radicalization and the sources of his politics.

Mykola Skrypnyk was born in 1872 in a village in Ekaterinoslav *gubernia* to a Ukrainian railroad clerk-official.[103] His mother was a trained mid-wife. His father, a telegraph operator and subsequently assistant station master, was uneducated and as a state railroad employee he would have been among the 0.38% of those Ukrainian-speakers occupationally considered "administrative-government" employees.[104] According to Skrypnyk, his family had an "uneasy and restless relationship" with the landowning classes, most of whom would have been ethnic Russians. His parents had been vaguely involved in the revolutionary movements in the 1850's and 1860's in Kharkov.[105]

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103 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.668, although Okhrana sources erroneously dated his birth to 1880, HIAPO, Box 162, Index No. XIIId(2) Processing Intelligence, Folder 24A, HQ Circular No.3918, Warning Lists, dated, 6 June 1902.

104 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.668; Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 043, p.277,'mother tongue' by 'occupation'.

105 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.668.

Skrypnyk wrote that he was nurtured on 'a discontent with the established order'.

It is possible then, that his family was semi-Russified by virtue of their state employment, yet retained a certain ambivalence toward the propertied classes, both Russian and Polish, a dualism in social identity typical of Ukrainian civil servants. He was likely bilingual, with at least a passive understanding or Russian or, most probably, spoke and understood a Ukrainian-Russian hybrid. One of Skrypnyk's early passions was hearing about his family's revolutionary tradition: a Zaporozhian Cossack, his great-great grandfather had been killed by a Polish nobleman for having participated in the Zalizniak and Gonta insurrections in the 18th century, which Skrypnyk coupled with readings of the "Black Caste Cossack" and the wars of liberation, general Ukrainian history, and the poems of Shevchenko.[106] This would have been, for Skrypnyk, a relatively traditional 'Ukrainian' identity which reflected the 'regionalism' of the historical Cossack Left-bank lands, rather than a sense of the more modern 'ethnic' Ukrainian national identity as it developed in the urbanized context of Polish, Jewish and Russian Right-bank Kiev.

Skrypnyk wrote that his early cultural and political development differed from that of most Russian revolutionaries because of his rural isolation in the Ukraine of the 1880's: working for the railroads his father's employment meant that the family was transferred every 6 months, but always in rural southeastern Ukrainian villages where there were no local revolutionaries. So Skrypnyk procured books and reading materials from railroad employees, Polish revolutionaries, old Decembrists, and because illegal progressive materials were unavailable, he only had access to the legal "reactionary" press.[107] Skrypnyk considered himself a member of the Russian Social Democratic Party as of 1897 at age 25. But after attending village primary schools (most likely zemstvo schools), Skrypnyk was expelled from *Realschule* for radicalism, and began attending another *Realschule* in Kursk as an 'external', suggesting that prior to becoming a Social Democrat Skrypnyk had at least 10 years of political activism.

The content and direction of his early radicalism is hard to precise, since it invoked both a cultural Cossack-Ukrainian identity and an imperial-Russian education in

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106 Ibid., p.668.

107 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.668-669.

Realschule. His earliest activism was among the Ukrainian peasantry. Propagandizing on the pretext of spreading Ukrainian folk songs, his political ideas were by his own admission very unclear.[108] Although mentioned only briefly and without much qualification in his autobiography, Skrypnyk's first exposure to organized revolutionaries was among Galician Ukrainian radicals, which obviously invoked a 'Ukrainian' identity, if only cultural or linguistic. This is also suggested by the fact that Skrypnyk wrote that his conversion to Marxism was difficult: after reading Ricardo, Marx and Kautsky, he read the Erfurt Program of the German Social Democrats "in Galician translation", and from there considered himself a Marxist, though this simply entailed an acceptance of the general vision, not all its intellectual subtleties.[109]

The radical groupings available to Skrypnyk by the 1890's would also likely have been dualistic in political identity and content, Ukrainian and Russian, and highly multi-ethnic in leadership. In 1893 in Kiev the first relatively stable Marxist group in Ukraine, the Russian Group of Social Democrats, was led by an ethnic Russian. Other groups then appeared in Odessa, Kharkov, and Ekaterinoslav. As Subtelny notes, ethnic Ukrainians were very rare in these early groupings, and in composition most early socialism in Ukrainian cities was Russian, Jewish, and Polish.[110] In this respect, early Ukrainian socialism resembled early Lithuanian socialism in the ethnic composition of its elites. This is not surprising given both the national composition of urban Ukraine and given the fact that socialism focused on urban proletarians -- largely non-Ukrainian. In part as a response, in 1901 the Socialist Revolutionary Party was formed, with a mix of populism, socialism, and political terrorism. In 1904 the largely liberal and constitutionalist members of the zemstvo formed the Union of Liberation, later becoming the Kadets. And finally, very active in the Ukraine were ultra-rightist groups such as the Black Hundreds. Significantly, both the Kadets and the SRs attracted a large number of Russified and russophile Ukrainians and Jews, and a number of Russified Ukrainians also joined the Rightist, anti-Ukrainian groups -- though this latter phenomenon is understudied.

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108 Ibid., p.669.

109 Ibid., p.669.

110 Subtelny, The Ukraine: A History, p.290-291.

While Skrypnyk's early activism likely had a greater Ukrainian component, by 1900 Skrypnyk had enrolled in the St. Petersburg Technological Institute where he joined a Social Democratic group,[111] although which one is unclear. Skrypnyk remained active, however, and between 1901 and 1917 he was arrested no less than 15 times, exiled 7 times (from which he escaped 3 times) and was sentenced to death (in abstentia) for organizing an armed uprising. In his period of exile in Iakoutsk he met Uritskii and Dzierzynski, and while in Saratov he worked both for the SDs and SRs. During these years he worked as an *Iskra* agent in committees in Saratov, agitating among students and workers for both the SRs and SDs since there was much collaboration between them in Saratov, as well as working among textile workers in the Urals and in Perm where he tried to siphon off SRs to the SDs. In Saratov Skrypnyk also worked as a technical draftsman.[112]

While in Odessa in 1903-1904 he worked in liaison with other non-SD organizations during the Russo-Japanese War and before his arrest and exile. Skrypnyk moved from city to city during the years of reaction, all the while writing for and editing revolutionary journals with Krestinskii and the Latvian Stuchka, and after 1913 he joined the editorial board of *Pravda* (through the *Spilka* connection) until he was arrested and exiled for the remainder of the war.[113] He subsequently secured employment as an accountant in a Petersburg bank, while continuing to organize workers.

So what we know from Skrypnyk's early radicalism seems to accord with Left-bank and Ukrainian-based radical groups more generally: they were multi-ethnic in leadership, uneasily combined elements of Russian-centralism with Ukrainian autonomy, and were often Menshevik in sympathy. Indeed Skrypnyk only came to Bolshevism as a Menshevik with Trotsky, a relationship likely begun in the Ukrainian *Spilka*. The RUP's leftist elements formed the Ukrainian Social Democratic Union, *Spilka*, which generally accepted the RSDLP's platform on nationalities and an all-Russian unity of socialist

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111 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.669; HIAPO, Box 162, Index No. XIIId(2) Processing Intelligence, Folder 24A, HQ Circular No.3918, Warning Lists, dated, 6 June 1902.

112 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.670.

113 Ibid., pp.672-673.

national groupings.[114] *Spilka* joined the RSDLP as an autonomous Ukrainian group. Pragmatically stressing trade unionism and cooperation with Russian groupings, *Spilka* membership was substantial prior to 1905 but was decimated in the reaction that followed. Interestingly, *Spilka* had many ethnic Russian and Jewish members and its publications were largely in Russian, not Ukrainian. The future Bolshevik Uritskii had been a member of *Spilka* in Kiev, as was Trotsky (see discussion in Chapter 6). Although it condemned appeals to Ukrainian nationalism, its very *raison d'etre* was premised on at least a territorially distinct 'Ukrainianness', something Skrypnyk felt quite deeply. In the events of 1905 *Spilka* was most active in Poltava, Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav *gubernii*, as it wrestled with combinations of centralist-federalist and autonomist policies in order to attract more people within the Ukrainian territories.[115]

In his more than 20 years of political radicalism before 1917 Skrypnyk had organized strikes and engaged in other political activism in Kazan, Perm, Ekaterinoslav, Petersburg, Saratov, Samara, Kharkov, Kursk, Ekaterinburg, Odessa, Riga, Krasnoiarsk, and other cities in the Volga region.[116] His subsequent 'all-Russian' radicalism was also substantial. But unlike Manuil'sky's, Skrypnyk's activism -- and his education -- were limited to the Ukraine and Russia and his exile to prisons and Siberian locations; Skrypnyk spent only a very brief time in emigration (in Geneva). His political activism moved from vaguely culturally Ukrainian-based groups through Ukrainian-Russian groups (with multi-ethnic leaderships) and finally to Bolshevism (through Menshevism). His shifting

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[114] Ukrainian parties developed in the 1890's and early 1900's. In 1900 the Ukrainian Socialist Party was founded in Kiev by Polish students sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause. But more significant was the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party (RUP) founded in 1900 in Kharkov by a small group of Ukrainian and Ukrainophile students, which because of internal differences (mostly battles between liberals, nationalists, and socialists over the proper combination of 'national' to 'social') split into a number of parties. The RUP had called for an independent Ukraine, from Galicia to the Caucasus, and had gained support from *gimnaziia* students and members of local *hromada*. It constituted the core of the future Ukrainian socialist party, but with the splits, its right wing in 1902 formed the Ukrainian People's Party, an essentially nationalist party with small doses of socialism, and which in its nationalism and anti-Semitism resembled Dmowski's Polish National Democrats. K. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizhenii", pp.201-206.

[115] Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizhenii", pp.202-203.

[116] Ibid., pp.669-674; BSE, p.530; HIAPO, Box 162, Index No. XIIId(2) Processing Intelligence, Folder 24A, HQ Circular No.3918, Warning Lists, dated, 6 June 1902; HIAPO, Box 201, Index Nos.XVIIn-XVIIr(1): Revolutionary Leaders and Activities, Index No.XVIIn, Folder 5B, "Spravka", No.66.; Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp.432-433.

loyalties, however, were never rigid and my sense is that he had a strong 'negative capability', that is, he could hold what Marxists considered incompatible identities in tension without the need to resolve them. This derived in part from the traditional multiple identities of Ukrainian elites in the Left-bank provinces. And this, too, contributed to his particular internationalism, namely one which gave priority to the development of national culture within an 'imperial' framework: Skrypnyk always wanted a socialist Ukraine closely associated with Soviet Russia, but with equal status to develop its own cultural institutions.

With the 1917 revolution Skrypnyk became a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Council, and in December was named secretary of labor and industry of the Ukraine.[117] In 1918 he presided over the conference of Ukrainians in Kharkov, and then the Poltava Soviets conference after the Germans took Kiev. Aside from posts in the Comintern, the remainder of Skrypnyk's post-1917 career was intimately entwined with the life of Ukraine. Countering Piatakov's efforts on behalf of the Bolsheviks in Kiev, Skrypnyk was involved in the other Bolshevik seat of power in the industrialized Donbas: the newly set up Ukrainian Soviet Republic in Kharkov. While Piatakov's Kiev Bolsheviks battled the nationalist Ukrainian Rada, Skrypnyk's battles in Kharkov and Moscow were less with the anti-Bolshevism of the Don Cossacks in the east, then the non-Ukrainian Bolsheviks centered in Katerinoslav (led by the German Kviring, Stalin, and the Jew Kaganovich) who wanted Ukrainian communists fully integrated and led by Moscow.

In this Skrypnyk was politically closer to the Ukrainian-born Russian Piatakov: Piatakov was no friend of Ukrainian nationalism or of significant Ukrainian autonomy, but for reasons of political expediency wanted the establishment of a separate Ukrainian Communist Party in coordination with Russia.[118] At the source of this was no doubt the internal weakness of Bolshevism in the Ukraine and the fact that it had few social roots -- most Bolsheviks in Ukraine were Russians or Russified Ukrainians and fought bitterly

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[117] BSE, p.530.

[118] On the rival centers of Bolshevik power and their respective battles during the crucial 1917-1921 years in the Ukraine, Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, p.223 and *passim*.

among themselves as to the configuration of the Ukraine.[119] In 1922 nearly 54% of the party were Russians and Russified Ukrainians, and the First Secretaries were usually non-Ukrainians -- Piatakov (Russian), Kviring (German), Kosior (Polish), Kaganovich (Jewish). Ukrainians formed a majority of the party with 51.9% only in 1927.[120] Indeed in 1925 Bukharin claimed that the composition of the Ukrainian party was Russian-Jewish.

Piatakov fought bitterly against Lenin's position on the nationality question and opposed self-determination as anti-internationalist, while Skrypnyk was very attracted to this position in Leninist Bolshevism. Skrypnyk derided the fact that 'nationalist deviation' occurred within the Russian party in its failure to fulfill its promises of self-determination. Forced out of the Ukraine by German forces, in 1918 Skrypnyk created a separate Communist Party of the Ukraine (CP[b]U) linked to the Russian Party only through the Comintern, though later its independent status was removed.[121] His and Lenin's desire was to set up a separate Ukrainian Republic free of Moscow so that it could fight the German-supported Ukrainian Rada government without causing Moscow to violate the terms of Brest-Litovsk.

For Skrypnyk, national self-determination within the Revolution was almost synonymous with national cultural liberation, but as Luckyj observed, his interpretation in the 1920's deviated as much from Marxist theory as did Stalin's in the 1930's.[122] Judging from his activities in the early 1920's, particularly in discussions surrounding the 1922 creation of the USSR and in his defense of a weak confederalism, it may be fair to say that Skrypnyk's internationalism was less a response to local nationalisms (as with Jewish Bolsheviks) than it was an attempt to hold Russian 'chauvinism' and Russification in check.[123] Skrypnyk was fearful of Great Russian nationalism, and in his vigorous defense of Ukrainian rights against a centralizing Russian state (typified in the Russification

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[119] Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: An Essay on the Persistence and Limits of Ukrainian National Communism", p.108.

[120] Ibid., p.112.

[121] Ibid., pp.108-111.

[122] George Luckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934, New York, 1956, p.175.

[123] On constitutional issues Skrypnyk wanted broad autonomy for the nationalities. Skrypnyk's record in the Comintern was substantial, representing the Ukraine at the first six Congresses and in 1928 he was elected to the Comintern's Executive Committee. Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, pp.432-433.

of the Red Army) he called for the de-Russification of the party, education, the civil service, etc. After 1927, as Ukrainian Commissar for Education in charge of cultural affairs, Skrypnyk dictated the CP(b)U's policy on Ukrainian literature. By this time, it was determined that Ukrainianization policies had led to 'national deviationism". The Ukrainian Jew Kaganovich bitterly attacked Ukrainian national deviationists because of their strength in western (formerly Polish-ruled) Ukraine. The battles within Ukrainian communism were brought before the Comintern, where Skrypnyk delivered an important speech on the "Tasks of Cultural Construction in the Ukraine" infusing a new enthusiasm for Ukrainian revolutionary art and literature.[124]

Skrypnyk took part in the literary discussions of 1925-1928 not merely as a party official (which as Commissar for Education he was) but as an intellectual leader. He believed that a "a parallel and balanced development of Ukrainian and Russian culture could only be satisfactory if the boundaries between these two cultures were well-defined, even though the party were the supreme arbiter in all matters of cultural policy".[125] He was aware of the inherent tensions in cultural relations and he was an enthusiastic Ukrainianizer. But he was also intensely interested in relations between the Ukraine and the West and so acted as a Ukrainian intellectual and statesman, not just as a party functionary. In 1929 Skrypnyk wrote, "we are building Ukrainian national culture because we are internationalists".[126]

Skrypnyk almost believed national oppression impossible in a sovietized state. Ironically he thought Ukrainian literature's achievements to be greater that her literary organizations, which were now burdened with social and political platforms, believing that "writers should be concerned with literature as one of the arts and not as an expression of the ideological tendencies of a culture". Luckji argues that Skrypnyk's attempt to force literature onto a purely aesthetic plane was un-Marxist and driven by practical considerations: "by telling writers to attend to their writing and not to meddle in politics, Skrypnyk was on the one hand trying to protect them from the pitfalls of deviationism,

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[124] Luckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, pp.79-82.
[125] Ibid., p.105.
[126] Ibid., p.185.

while on the other he was hoping to reserve any decisions in literary policy for himself, as the representative of the party and the Comissar of Education."[127] But in the end the literary discussions showed how hard it was to divorce political dependence on Russia from cultural subservience.

Skrypnyk found political alliance with the de-centralizers since he opposed *both* Stalinist 'Russian centralism' *and* Trotskyst 'internationalist centralism'.[128] In the end Skrypnyk supported *korenizatsiia* on the grounds that it would help Ukrainians develop their cultural institutions and socioeconomic standing. His Ukrainianization policies (including the use of Ukrainian in schools and colleges, offices and theaters, and Ukrainianizing the CP(b)U apparatus) were perhaps different only in intensity from those of other secretaries of the CP(b)U such as Kviring (German), Kaganovich (Jewish), and Kosior (Polish) since they were anyway official Soviet policies. He viewed these policies as means of both strengthening Bolshevism among the peasantry and assisting the heretofore disadvantaged Ukrainians. Yet by 1926 Stalin began to oppose *korenizatsiia* policies, most likely because the Bolshevik hold on power was by then more secure, and eventually cultural Ukrainianization was brought to a halt in Stalin's war against the Ukrainian peasant. Though Skrypnyk had been most responsible for Ukrainianization until 1932, it was always within a sovietized state. This may indeed have been rooted in his interpretation -- formed early -- of Ukrainian history and the role of the revolution within it.[129]

The contrasts between Skrypnyk and the Lithuanian Kapsukas on these issues is revealing. While Skrypnyk had wanted to divorce 'politics' from 'aesthetics' (in non-Marxist fashion), Kapsukas had desperately wanted a politicization of all 'aesthetics'. But Kapsukas' had been a mediocre literary talent, marginalized from the Lithuanian cultural elite as they formed the core of Lithuanian nationalism; his subsequent internationalism and "Marxist aesthetics" were something like the 'bent twig' righting itself out. Skrypnyk, in contrast, had achieved a respectable intellectual stature, and his politics anyway reflected

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[127] Luckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, pp.180-110.

[128] Bilinsky, "Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest", p.114.

[129] Luckyj, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, pp.180-110.

the tensions and ambiguities of an only semi-Russified educated Left-bank Ukrainian -- and perhaps his politics reflected this identity more than they did Marxist theory.

V. Krestinskii and Manuil'sky: the internationalists and the western provinces

Born in the same year, both Krestinskii and Manuil'sky were Russified ethnic Ukrainians (although to different extents and for different reasons), both were from the ethnically-mixed western provinces of the Pale, and both became internationalists, concerned to fight nationalist separatism in any form. But while Krestinskii remained an avid internationalist, Manuil'sky's internationalism eventually ceded to an imperialist 'Russian-centralism'. Their fates as Bolsheviks tragically reflected these differences. Krestinskii had forged a diplomatic career as a Bolshevik, notably as the Soviet delegate to Berlin -- grounds for Stalin's later accusations, which Krestinskii denied, of being an agent of the German Gestapo.[130] Despite pleas of innocence to charges that he had collaborated with Trotsky, after torture at Lubianka Krestinskii confessed and was shot in 1938. However Dmitri Manuil'sky became one of the few "Old Bolsheviks" to survive the purges. Indeed Manuil'sky lived to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Revolution and died in 1959 a natural death by prolonged illness.

Krestinskii was from the Belorussian provinces. He was born in 1883 in Mogilev to Ukrainian parents from Chernigov. Krestinskii's father was a *gimnazia* teacher in Mogilev and Vilna, and must have been fluent in Russian in order to retain his post since by this time most *gimnaziia* in the *kresy* were nearly completely Russified. While in *gimnazia*, his father had himself been active in the nihilist movement.[131] According to Krestinskii his mother was a "petty intellectual" who continued to be active in the populist movement. That their activism was in populist and not nationalist groups is also evidence of the family's Russification. Apart from the clear influence he received from his parents, Krestinskii attributed much of his early radicalism to one of his teachers at the *gimnazia* in Vilna who was a Social Democrat.[132] In contrast to the Pole Dzierzynski's experience in a

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130 Georges Haupt and Jean-Jacques Marie, Les Bolsheviks par Eux-memes, Paris, 1969, p.150.
131 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.462.
132 Ibid., p.462.

Russified Vilna *gimnazia* which contributed to his early Polish nationalist radicalism, the likelihood was that the Ukrainian Krestinskii would already have been Russified was great, and his activism in Vilna's Social Democratic circles between c.1897-1901 would have been natural. As noted in Chapter 7, at the time the membership in these groups was very ethnically mixed, with Russians, Jews, Poles, Latvians, and Lithuanians.

It is worth noting that Krestinskii would likely have been among the very few Ukrainians in Vilna since the city, and its *gimnaziia*, were largely Polish, Russian, and Jewish. To get a further sense of Ukrainian minorization in Vilna or Chernigov, most of the intelligentsia and petty officials in these cities were Polish or Jewish, and most of the teachers were by the last decades of the century were ethnic Russians brought in from the interior.[133]

In 1901 Krestinskii entered the Faculty of Law at St. Petersburg University from which he graduated in 1907. He became a member of the Social Democratic Party in 1903 in the Vilna section of the organization.[134] He was arrested in 1904 and in 1905, prohibited from residing in Petersburg, and sentenced to two administrative exiles to Vilna.[135] Krestinskii's radicalism was limited to the cities of the Polish-Lithuanian *kresy* -- Vilna, Vitebsk, and Kaunas, and to Petersburg, and he only became a Bolshevik after 1905. Several more arrests in Vilna and Vitebsk did not prevent him from completing his degree. Krestinskii returned to Petersburg working initially as an assistant barrister and subsequently as a barrister/lawyer until the 1917 revolution.[136] Little is known about Krestinskii's successful employment as a lawyer in Petersburg for more than 10 years, likely as a member of the St. Petersburg branch of the *advokatura* 'profession-estate'. As noted in Chapter 4, this was one of the three recognized bar associations in imperial Russia, and because of its restrictions on non-Christians (namely Jews) after 1889, it would have been quite Russian or Russified in these years. But it was also something of a progressive estate, governed by an ethos of public and not state service. This meant that

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133 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.78.

134 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.462.

135 Ibid., p.463.

136 Ibid., p.462; BSE, pp.393-394.

for barristers like Krestinskii, professional commitments and political activism served each other quite compatibly.

Dmitri Manuil'sky was born in 1883 in rural Krements (Kremiannets') in Volhynia province near the Galician border, the son of a Ukrainian Orthodox cleric. Right-bank Volhynia was ethnically-mixed, though slightly less so in the rural areas and villages. Religiously, in 1897 Volhynia was largely Orthodox Ukrainian and Russian (70.52% of the population), with Jewish (13.31%), Catholic Polish and Belorussian and few Ukrainian (9.93%), and Protestant German colonist (5.08%) minorities.[137] The comparatively lower number of Jews with respect to (the mostly Orthodox) Ukrainians actually masked their social significance: only 7.8% of the Volhynia population was urbanized, but the vast majority were Jews.[138] While Volhynia's capital Zhytomyr was an important center of Jewish trade and handicraft, the Kremenets region had a lower density of Jewish population, Kremenets itself was between 30-50% Jewish.[139]

This is important, I think, for understanding Manuil'sky's early radicalism and politicization. Although official biographies claim that his parents were peasants, his father was actually an Orthodox priest (or rural scribe) in the Ukrainian village.[140] Not only was his father likely semi-Russified, but Ukrainian peasants and especially Ukrainian priests in the region were well-treated by local Russian authorities since they were seen by officials

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137 "Rossiia", Bol'shaia Entsiklopediia, Vo.16, St. Petersburg, 1904, chart between pp.456-457. Ethnically Poles were 6.2% of the population, and because religion and ethnicity was the same for official statistical purposes with respect to Jews, the Jewish population of Volhynia province was 13.3%, higher than neighboring Kiev and Podolia provinces (12.0 and 12.2 respectively), but lower than the Polish-Lithuanian provinces to the north, Minsk (15.8%) and Grodno (17.3%).

138 Figures drawn from "Rossia", Bolsh'aia Entsiklopediia, p.453; Paul Robert Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993, p.108-109; "Rossiia", Entsiklopediia slovar', Vol.2/d, St. Petersburg, 1906, p.XIV.

139 Magosci, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, Map 33, p.108. Neighboring Luts'k and Rovno were more than 50% Jewish Zhytomir had a numerically larger Jewish population than either Luts'k or Rovno -- indeed it was the 21st largest "Jewish" city in East Central Europe -- but Jews were a slightly smaller proportion of its population, 46.6%.

140 Compare BSE, p.340 with "Biografiia", Granat, p.793 and Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.295, and the omission in L.O. Suiarko, Dmitro Zacharovich Manuil'skii, Kiiv, "Naukova dymka", 1979, early chapter on "Profesional'nii revoliutsioner".

as potential allies against Poles and Jews particularly in the rural areas.[141] Though there is no evidence of anti-Semitism in his own family, Manuil'sky would likely have been familiar with the strain of anti-Semitism found in rural villages, later famously converted to 'kulakism'.

After attending village school Manuil'sky was transferred to a *gimnazia* in Ostrog, from which time he gave lessons to earn his way.[142] Manuil'sky's socialization was classically from a predominantly Ukrainian rural area, in a devout Orthodox family, to a multi-ethnic city in a Russified *gimnazia*. His radicalism began in *gimnazia* when he began involvement in student circles. Although not discussed in his authorized biography in Granat, his later biographer Suiarko briefly addresses Manuil'sky's earliest intellectuals influences while in *gimnazia*: Russian revolutionary Marxism of university students in Kiev and Petersburg and, not surprisingly, (one of the most famously Russified Ukrainians) Gorky.[143] The influences in Volhynia *gimnazia* would have been those of the the western borderland's cities: Russian, Jewish, and Polish. Part of the local strength and appeal of Russian socialism in these ethnically mixed cities lay precisely in the ethnic diversity itself: most Jews were Russified -- in part in response to local rural ethnic Ukrainian anti-Semitism, and urban Polish anti-Semitism, as were most urbanized, educated Ukrainians who by virtue of the local ethnic make-up of the region had no alternative but to attend Russian state schools, *gimnaziia* and *Realschulen*.

Though obviously Russified, Maniul'sky still maintained a vague 'Ukrainian' identity: he was active in a group of 'foreign students' while in the Russianized *gimnazia*, and he wrote radical pamphlets, very conscious of the fact that he was studying in the same location where in 1580 Ivan Fedorov had established one of the first printing presses on his estate in Volhynia, printing the first Bible in a Slavic language as Ostrih became one of the most important intellectual centers for Orthodoxy and religious book publishing.[144] His Ukrainian identity was less an ethnically conscious one than it was simply an intellectual

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141 Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia, p.125.

142 "Biografiia", Granat, p.793; Suiarko, Dmitro Zacharovich Manuil'skii, p.5.

143 Suiarko, Dmitro Zacharovich Manuil'skii, pp.5-6.

144 On Manuil'sky's knowledge of all this, ibid., p.6; on the historical background of Fedorov and Ostrih, Subtelny, The Ukraine: A History, pp.96-98.

awareness of local Ukrainian historical roots. In this a knowledge of an historical Ukrainian lineage and a present Russified existence would have been highly compatible identities, and Ukrainian national parties (even of the socialist variety) would hardly have been consonant with Manuil'sky's close identification with imperial Russia. This imperial Russianness would remain part of his world view for the remainder of his career.

In 1903 Manuil'sky enrolled in the Philological Faculty at St. Petersburg University, and immediately joined RSDLP circles in Petersburg.[145] Manuil'sky was typical of the 'new' Ukrainian intelligentsia as it emerged in these decades: by 1900 most educated Ukrainians were sons of burghers, professionals, or clerics, only 20-25% were of gentry-noble origin.[146] Because of the Tsarist state's concern with local Polish influence, especially in the Right-bank provinces, and because of the state's equal worries of 'Jewish exploitation', particularly in the rural areas, zemstvo were not introduced here, and language and property-owning restrictions applied in full force. Some of these policies benefited Ukrainians however, particularly in terms of access to local civil service and administrative posts, and as noted earlier in this chapter, those educated Ukrainians who sought such positions found them. However the absence of a provincial civil or political institutional structure prompted many educated Ukrainians, and the comparatively more numerous educated, urbanized Jews and Poles, to turn to Russian or imperial society for further education, employment, and other forms of social mobility. Unsurprisingly, this also made them very receptive to Russian radical groupings, particularly the Social Democrats which had greater influence in the urban areas than the SRs. Manuil'sky opted for the imperial venues, and activism in Russian socialist groups followed.

Already a Bolshevik agitator in 1904 Manuil'sky was arrested and beaten for his participation in protests against the war in Japan. He took part in the 1905-1906 revolutions in Petersburg, Dvinsk (Vitebsk *guberniia*) and Kronstadt as a Bolshevik under the pseudonyms 'Mefodii' and 'Foma'. In 1906 he was arrested, deported and sentenced to five years exile in Iakutsk, but he escaped and continued work in the party committee in

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145 "Biografiia", Granat, pp.793-794; Suiarko, Dmitro Zacharovich Manuil'skii, pp.6-7.
146 Subtelny, The Ukraine: A History, p.271.

Kiev.[147] Although both official Soviet biographies and the authorized Granat biography recount Manuil'sky's period of emigration in Paris beginning in 1907, the reasons for his self-imposed exile are left unclear but we may suppose that it was connected with the Tsarist repressions in Russia.[148] By 1907 the state's post-1905 revolution reaction had set in with mass arrests of revolutionaries of all kinds, but so too had the strength of the Black Hundreds -- ultra-rightist groups (largely ethnically Russian but also Russified Ukrainians) who took part in the reaction against Jews in the form of pogroms, and against Ukrainian nationals. The Black Hundreds militias had emerged in the Fall of 1905 to defend the monarchy from radical students, Jews, and socialists, and all non-Russians in efforts to make 'Russia one and indivisible'.[149] Black Hundreds' gangs were particularly strong in St. Petersburg in 1905, and so for Manuil'sky, the 'reaction' may have been experienced as much in state persecution as it was in social unrest and ethnic exclusiveness.[150]

By 1905 at least three parties had evolved from the defunct RUP: the Radical-Democratic Party (the Ukrainian equivalent to the Russian Kadets), the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (*Spilka*) in loose association with the RSDLP but combining socialism and national autonomy in the manner of the Polish PPS, and the rightist Ukrainian People's Party, similar to the Polish National Democrats, nationalist and highly anti-Semitic.[151] So by 1905 the Ukrainian parties began to resemble their Polish counterparts, with similar consequences: given the growing strength of the nationalist groups, the socialist parties began to 'find' their 'national' identities. Ukrainian socialism, too, was finding its ethnic basis. This had immediate effects on those Russified Ukrainians in the all-Russian parties like Manuil'sky, who had been defining their non-Ukrainian political identities in opposition to the growing peasant and worker appeal of Ukrainian socialists more than in opposition to Ukrainian nationalists. Now Russified Ukrainian socialist activism was

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147 "Biografiia", Granat, p.794.

148 See both BSE, p.340, and "Biografiia", Granat, p.794. See also the brief account of his emigration in the Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.295.

149 Hosking, People and Empire, pp.439-440.

150 For a brief account, Suiarko, Dmitro Zacharovich Manuil'skii, p.10.

151 A Ukrainian People's Party 1904 publication stated that "Muscovites, Jews, Poles, Hungarians, and Rumanians are enemies of our people", quoted in Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.608. Seton-Watson equates the program of the *Spilka* with that of the PPS.

caught between the non-Russified Ukrainian Left and the Ukrainian nationalists.

As we saw in Chapter 7, at the heart of the national-social and international question among the Polish parties in Russia, Prussia, and Austria was the tension between a desire for a solution to the geopolitical 'Polish problem' (the position of the nationalists) and the opposing internationalism of Polish socialism's most important elites, the Jews, to transcend this growing national political identity. Among the Ukrainians similar political tensions reflected different social and cultural roots: the heart of the tensions between the national-socialists, the nationalists, and the 'internationalists' (those in the all-Russian parties), I think, lay in the social fact of very high levels of Russification and russophilism among Ukrainians themselves. Reshetar expressed the essence of it this way: "probably the greatest single obstacle to the establishment of an independent Ukraine lay in the apparent difficulty which the Ukrainians have had in severing their ties with the Russians. Petliura as an exile recognized that such a severance was imperative if his conception of Ukrainian nationalism was to prevail."[152]

After 1905 arguably those activist Ukrainians with the strongest ties to 'imperial Russia' were those most Russified and most implicated in Russian Social Democratic groups, as were Manuil'sky and Krestinskii, and in a different way Lebed' and Petrovskii. They increasingly found themselves in common radicalism with both non-Ukrainians -- Russians, Jews, and Germans -- and with other, similarly Russified Ukrainians with similarly weak 'national' identities. These 'foreigners' and 'imperialists' would become the core of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine in the crucial 1917-1921 revolutionary period. It is worth noting, too, that Manuil'sky (and the other Ukrainian Bolsheviks profiled here) remained indifferent to the plight of the Ukrainian peasantry, and almost all of their activism was limited to urban workers (usually non-Ukrainian) in other Russian cities.

The post-1905 years of reaction in Tsarist Russia began Manuil'sky's years in emigration. Between 1907 and 1912 in Paris and Geneva, Manuil'sky was an *Otzovist* member of the Vpered group.[153] In 1910 he had completed his studies at the Law faculty

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[152] Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, pp.330-331.

[153] BSE, p.340.

of the Sorbonne, while active in French and German workers.[154] During his *Vpered* period Manuil'sky closely collaborated with a Jewish Social Democrat from Petersburg, Alexinsky, whose positions caused him to be expelled from *Vpered* by Lenin.[155] As with the Pole Dzierzynski, the influence on Manuil'sky's internationalism of close collaboration with Jewish socialists while in emigration should not be underestimated. Indeed, while in emigration Manuil'sky collaborated as a Bolshevik with SRs, Anarchists, and Mensheviks in Paris and Geneva. He wrote primarily for Paris-based Russian socialist papers like *Golos*, which he co-founded with Antonov-Ovseenko, and after the beginning of the war he wrote for Trotsky's *Nashe slovo*, espousing clearly internationalist-pacifist views and even attending Zimmerwald in 1915.[156] Eventually both *Golos* and *Nashe slovo* were forbidden by the French government for their opposition to the war. It was during this period in emigration that Manuil'sky first became involved in theorizing his internationalism -- the potentials for workers revolutions among the French and German working classes and eventually the imperialist character of the war. Manuil'sky now straddled the Bolshevik-Menshevik divide, an apt reflection of both his Ukrainian-Russian early experiences and his time in 'cosmopolitan' European emigration.

While Manuil'sky was abroad, Krestinskii took active part in the Duma elections in 1912. He was deported in 1914 to administrative exile in the Urals and Ekaterinburg. He remained in the Urals through the revolution and was locally active in the Ekaterinburg soviet, before being elected to the Constituent Assembly for Perm.[157] Krestinskii was elected to the CC in 1917, but had been collaborating on Gorky's leftist Menshevik journal *Novaia zhin*. Together with the Crimean Jew Ioffe and the Pole Dzierzynski, as a Left Communist Krestinskii abstained from the crucial vote on Brest-Litovsk which *de facto* dismembered the empire. Consistent with Leninist tolerance in the early years, Krestinskii was re-elected to the CC in 1918 and appointed Commissioner of Finance from 1918 to

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154 Suiarko, Dmitro Zacharovich Manuil'skii, p.11; HIAPO, Index XIIIb(1), Box 125, Folder 1H, Outgoing Dispatch No.1532, 6/19 November 1914.

155 Collaboration with Alexinsky documented in HIAPO, Index XIIIb(1), Box 125, Folder 1G, Outgoing Dispatch No.1314, 7/20 August 1914; activities in *Vpered* and conflicts relations Lenin are documented in detail in Suiarko, Dmitro Zacharovich Manuil'skii, pp.11-14.

156 "Biografiia", Granat, p.795.

157 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.463; BSE, pp.393-394.

1921, and in 1919 was elected to the Politburo and Orgburo. In 1921 he was removed form all posts because of his association with Trotsky, beginning of his diplomatic career as the Soviet representative in Berlin from 1921 to 1930 -- and beginning his 'fall' a few years later.[158]

Manuil'sky was also a part of the internationalist Left in 1917. In May he was on the second sealed train which followed Lenin to Russia, but continued to belong to Trotsky's *Mezhraionka* group until its merger with the Bolsheviks in August.[159] Manuil'sky's shift in loyalty from a Europeanized-internationalism to Russian centralism reflected events in the Ukraine during the War and revolutionary period, which unfolded with dizzying rapidity and complexity: three Ukrainian governments were attempted, power in Kiev changed five times, and the Bolsheviks -- among others -- invaded the Ukraine three times. Manuil'sky's positions reflected the ambiguity in his 'Ukrainian' and 'imperial' identities.

The first Ukrainian government, the Central Rada in Kiev, led by the Ukrainian Progressives between March 1917 and April 1918, comprised a small, liberal bourgeois grouping.[160] Because its objectives were national-cultural, it was initially generally opposed by Russian conservatives, socialists, and Jews -- that is, by all urban minorities in Ukrainian cities. But in July 1917 Russian and Jewish parties joined, so that at its peak between 1/3 and 1/4 of the Rada's 822 seats were held by non-Ukrainians.[161] After considerable hesitation the Kerensky government recognized the Rada as legitimate over five Ukrainian provinces (Right-bank Podolia, Kiev, and Volhynia, and Chernigov and Poltava). But in practice the Rada's jurisdiction excluded the ethnically mixed provinces of the southwest and Left-bank (Taurida, Bessarabia, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav). Oppostion to

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158 Haupt, Les Bolsheviks par Eux-memes, p.149.

159 "Biografiia", Granat, p.795.

160 Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, pp.346-347. It was led by Hrushevsky and Petliura as its Minister of War. Membership included Ukrainian moderates, Ukrainian SDs (including a few Bolsheviks) and Ukrainian SRs; in composition it was petty intelligentsia, teachers, lower clergy, students, petty bureaucrats, zemstvo officials, and representatives of Prosvita societies.

161 Jonathan Frankel, "Dilemmas of Jewish national autonomism: the case of Ukraine 1917-1920", in Peter J. Potichnyi and Howard Aster (eds), Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective, Edmonton, 1988, p.265. Jews numbered 50 from all the major parties including the Bund and the Zionists.

the Rada now came primarily from Russified urban Ukrainians -- like Manuil'sky, despite the fact that linguistic Russification was so pervasive that all prominent persons in the Rada spoke Russian fluently.[162] Governance was impeded by the Rada's weak social base, by internal factionalism, by inefficiency, and by the very limited cultural resources available to the political elite (there were even too few qualified Ukrainian-speaking teachers to staff courses in Ukrainian language, history, and literature).[163] The Rada's ineffective government was tolerated by the Germans who required supply lines through the Right-bank, an assistance which proved decisive when the Bolshevik's first invasion of the Kievan government in early 1918 was pushed back by the German armies. But in defying Russian imperialism Hrushevsky's Rada had miscalculated German imperialism -- the German government disbanded the Rada in 1918.[164] The Central Rada government, or the "Ukrainian National Republic", had lasted one year.

The second attempt at a Ukrainian government was in the southern old Cossack lands: the Hetmanate led by Skoropadsky, himself a landowner of an Old Cossack *starshyna* family linked to the Imperial Cavalry. It was a government of what amounted to propertied interests in the Left-bank and southern provinces of those who had a stake in maintaining the social order. Because Skoropadsky's Hetmanate had a great many Russians in its ministries, and despite its attempts to 'Ukrainianize' education, Ukrainian national socialists and nationalists opposed the Hetmanate and viewed the government as only very thinly 'Ukrainian' with deep 'Russian' interests.[165] Also highly dependent on support from the German government, the Hetmanate's "Ukrainian State" lasted 8 months.

In 1918 a third attempted Ukrainian government took the form of the nationalist Directory. The Bolsheviks were split in 1918 between Skrypnyk and the Kiev faction who considered it essential that the Ukrainian party have a high degree of autonomy, and those of the Ekaterinoslav faction who wanted greater centralist control. In the event, while Rakovskii and Manuil'sky were dispatched by Lenin to negotiate with the Directory, the

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162 Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, pp.137-138.

163 Ibid., pp.137-138.

164 Ibid., p.119.

165 Ibid., pp.145-207 has a complete discussion of the Hetmanate.

Bolsheviks under Antonov-Ovseenko (with the help of Hryhoriiv and Makhno) invaded the Ukraine a second time and in 1919 Kharkov fell to the Bolsheviks. Leftist Ukrainian Social Democrats and leftist SRs (Borotbists) then joined the Bolsheviks.

In good imperialist fashion, Lenin appointed Christian Rakovskii, a Romanian-Bulgarian, to head this Ukrainian government. Rakovskii expressed concern that his not being Ukrainian might pose difficulties. "Could not he unearth a Ukrainian grandmother among his ancestors to establish his legitimacy?", was Lenin's reply.[166] This (second Soviet) Rakovskii government lasted 10 months, in large measure because it alienated the Left (the Ukrainian SDs and the Borotbisty) and had prompted the defections of both Hryhoriiv and Makno. The Rakovskii government, too, was comprised mainly of non-Ukrainians, primarily Russians and Jews.[167] The Bolsheviks had also vastly underestimated the importance of the peasantry and the countryside, by focusing on the largely non-Ukrainian cities they continued to have a very small and unstable social base.[168] Lenin had misjudged Ukrainian politicization *qua* Ukrainians by the war and German occupation[169] -- a mistake he did not repeat in December 1919.

By this time Lenin understood the need to win the support of the nationalities, viewing the greatest obstacle to be Russian 'chauvinism', particularly within the Bolshevik leadership itself. Lenin was opposed by both internationalists like Piatakov and Krestinskii who considered concessions to nationalities counterrevolutionary for socioeconomic or political reasons, and internationalists like Trotsky who came to the same position -- but on the remarkable grounds that the whole question of national self-determination was actually of minor significance in the face of socialism. In 1918 Rakovskii seemed closer to Trotsky's position that Lenin's. (As early as 1896 Liebknecht had written to Rakovskii warning of too close involvement with the Russians in Zurich: "you must at all costs avoid

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166 Recounted in Francis Conte, Christian Rakovskii (1873-1841): A Political Biography, (Translated by A.P.M. Bradley), East European Monographs, Boulder, CO, Columbia University Press, 1989, p.146.

167 The Rakovskii government had implemented disastrous grain requisition policies, did not allow the use of Ukrainian, and had turned the largely Jewish and Russian Cheka against Ukrainian counterrevolutionaries. Rakovskii opposed the use of Ukrainian as the official language because he viewed such a step as 'reactionary' since nearly 2 million ethnic Russians lived in Ukrainian cities.

168 Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, p.258.

169 For a general discussion, Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation", pp.205-246.

this danger: acting in the interest of socialism, try not to work in the interest of Russia alone".[170] Then Denikin's armies in the Left-bank and Petliura's armies in the Right-bank toppled the Bolshevik's 'non-Ukrainian' government, and the Bolsheviks returned to Moscow. Of the two Bolshevik failures in the Ukraine, Manuil'sky was to have said: "Each year we equip a successive troupe for the Ukraine which, after making a tour there, returns to Moscow in the autumn".[171] Manuil'sky's 'internationalism' was ceding to a 'Russian centralism'.

After the Polish war in Galicia, after battles with Petliura's Directory and the Whites, and after the 1918 Peace Settlements, in December 1919 the Bolsheviks (with a 3.5 million strong Red Army led by 50,000 Tsarist Army officers) formed a third Soviet government, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic which, because of the terms of Brest-Litovsk, was nominally distinct from the Russian CP and putatively treated as 'sovereign'. This new and more nationally conciliatory Soviet government brought in a large number of Ukrainian Bolsheviks, like Manuil'sky, who were given prominent roles, and whose futures as Bolsheviks necessarily entailed *both* a degree of Russian centralization *and* an acknowledgment of their 'Ukrainianness'. If before the war and Revolution the less 'Ukrainian' the politics the greater its social base, now the more 'Ukrainian' the politics the greater its social base. In these years the Bolsheviks sorely needed Ukrainian speaking members, even causing them to co-opt 4,000 Borotbisty (nationally-conscious Leftists) into the party and giving them posts in the government.[172] After the Red Army pushed out the last of the Ukrainian and White armies in November 1920, and had broken the Ukrainian partisan movement by the following year, Lenin recognized that the greatest challenge would be 'Great Russian chauvinism' *within* Bolshevism, and pressed hard for the 1924 'union of equals'.

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170 Francis Conte, Christian Rakovskii, pp.143-145, quote p.145. Rakovskii's extremely wealthy ethnic Rumanian family (Bulgarian by territorial designation) had a long history of radicalism, opposing all nationalisms and a passion for Russia. Rakovskii had been active in nearly every socialist and national socialist group in Europe: Polish and Armenian Social Revolutionaries, Russian, Bulgarian and Rumanian social democratic groupings, French socialists, the Polish PPS. "Avtobiografiia", Granat, pp.610-616, on his activities and russophilism.

171 Quoted in Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, p.365.

172 Ibid., p.384.

Against this context Manuil'sky was appointed First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party from December 1921 to 1923. But by now the battles between Ukrainians themselves had been so vicious, and with the Revolution itself now at stake, Manuil'sky was increasingly 'Stalinist' in his view of Russian centralism. The political lines were acrimoniously drawn between those Ukrainians in the party like Skrypnyk -- a leading figure in all three Soviet governments -- who became avowed anti-centralists in defense of Ukrainian autonomy and Ukrainianization as a way of making Bolshevism more attractive, and those Ukrainians like Manuil'sky who were considered 'red imperialists'. Following the 1920's *korenizatsiia* in line with Skrypnyk's visions, in 1933 it was the Russified Ukrainian Manuil'sky who, in tenacious defense of his 'new' identity, launched the party purge in the Ukraine, accusing Skrypnyk, among others, of nationalist conspiracy. Manuil'sky's 'internationalism' had become Russian centralism in battles against not only 'pure' Ukrainian separatism, but even more ferociously against Skrypnyk's Ukrainian autonomy within the soviet state.

Chapter 9
The Transcaucasian Bolsheviks

There were nine Bolsheviks from Transcaucasia in this elite, four Armenians, four Georgians, and one Azerbaijani Turk. After a contextual discussion of the ethnicities' respective relationships to the Tsarist state and to eachother, I consider first the Azerbaijani Nariman Narimanov in some detail. I then consider the Georgians more or less as a group, and finally discuss three of the Armenians. In brief, my sense is that as ethnic groups they were radicalized for different reasons: the Armenians were politicized for reasons fundamentally geopolitical, the Azerbaijani due to a sense of 'cultural' colonial rule, and the Georgians because of exclusion from political influence in Transcaucasia. But for all three socialist politics were predicated on federalist arrangements within the empire. These Bolsheviks from the Caucasus were decidedly in the minority: Bolshevism was the weakest and least influential of the radical political groups as most radical Armenians became Dashnaks, Georgians Mensheviks and Azerbaijanis Musavat. Transcaucasia produced no real internationalists, as had the Ukraine.

For more than 500 years Armenians were divided between the Persian and Russian states and the Ottoman state, with the former culturally and linguistically oriented toward Russia and northern Europe, and the latter oriented toward Istanbul and southern Europe.[1] In both empires Armenians were considered a religious community: the *Ermeni Millett* under the leadership of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and as of 1836 the Tsarist *Polozhenie* guaranteed the Armenian Apostolic Church a number of rights and privileges.[2] Armenian social structure throughout its diaspora was distinctive, with a large peasantry,

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[1] This paragraph draws from Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History, Indiana University Press, 1993, pp.32-62, 221; Claire Mouradian, "Die armenische Nationalbewegung im Osmenischen and Russischen Reich bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg", in Uwe Halbach and Andreas Kappeler (Hrsg.), Krisenherd Kaukasus, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1995, pp.80-93

[2] The differences between Ottoman and Tsarist rule over Armenians were perhaps not great. The position of Ottoman Armenians under Turkish rule is contentious: the Armenian millet seen as *both* a token of tolerance and liberality (particularly in the retention of their own laws) *and* as a sign of intolerance, a segregation of 'inferior' to 'chosen' people. The reality may have been somewhere in between. This is the argument in Mary Mangigian Tarzian, The Armenian Minority Problem, 1914-1934: A Nation's Struggle for Security, Scholar's Press, GA, University of Pennsylvania, 1992, pp.30-31. Although a key difference may have been the greater possibility for social mobility in Transcaucasia than in Ottoman Turkey.

urbanized commercial middle classes,[3] a clergy influential within the community, and the absence of a nobility or aristocracy. The Armenian commercial bourgeoisie has received the most attention as it developed into an economically powerful class from the Crimean, Tiflis, Muscovite, and Astrakhan merchant classes of the 1600's and 1700's. As Christians in a largely Muslim world, Armenians were in an advantageous position to trade with fellow Christians outside the Turkish and Persian empires. Russo-Persian trade increased in the mid-1600's, and Armenian merchants began to develop a 'Russian orientation', formalized in commercial agreements with the Muscovite government. Indeed Armenians consistently petitioned Christian states, from the Polish and the Austrian to the Russian, for protection from Persian overlords. Over the course of the 19th century Armenian capital supplied Russian arms during the Caucasian wars, traded sugar and cotton, eventually dominating the cotton, leather, and tobacco industries in Tiflis, and the banking and oil industries in Baku where Armenian financial elites flourished under Russian protection.

Georgia's position within the empire was ambiguous from its early integration.[4] Through the 18th century Georgian society was *quasi*-autarkic comprised of highly segmented principalities, kingdoms, and khanates with varying degrees of autonomy under Turkish or Persian overlordship. Georgian Bagratids faced warfare between themselves, from Muslim khans, and from mountaineers of the North Caucasus who raided Georgian valleys. But no political authority was able to unite the numerous territorial Georgian lands, and constant invasions and political instabilities prevented the development of urban commerce and rural agriculture. Some trade did develop however, as Russian-Astrakahan routes weakened commercial ties with Persia, and Russian money was used in eastern Georgia slowly tying her political and economic interests to the Romanovs.

Georgian society was firmly feudal-aristocratic and hierarchical with nobilities

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[3] Itself highly differentiated, the Armenian middle class consisted of small-scale artisans, petty merchants, journalists, teachers, a small yet wealthy bourgeoisie and others in the liberal professions.

[4] The next paragraphs draw from Oliver Reisner, "Die Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien bis 1921", in Halbach and Kappeler (Hrsg.), Krisenherd Kaukasus, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995, pp.63-79; Andreas Kappeler, Russland Als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Gescgichte, Zerfall, Munchen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, Indiana University Press, 1994.

exercising complete power over the enserfed peasantry.[5] Suny stresses the importance of rigidly hierarchical feudal Georgian society, but rural Georgia was also quite ethnically closed or homogenous, with important effect for subsequent politicization. And unlike medieval European towns, urban dwellers in Georgia were not free. Georgian towns were not self-governing communes but property of kings or lords and comprised of urban serf craftsmen, serf merchants and serf moneylenders -- all bound either to king, noble, church or monestary. Most of these urban craftsmen and merchants were Armenian, in Tiflis comprising 3/4 of the urban population at the time of Georgia's annexation.[6]

Unlike rural Georgia, the Azerbaijani countryside remained traditionally agricultural with compartively little social stratification: Muslim bays and aghas owned very small plots of land, barely distinguishable from peasant holdings, yet their political influence over the community remained in village assemblies and courts.[7] This distinguished the role of the Azerbaijani rural aristocracy from the Georgian rural nobility as the former exercised religious and political influence while the latter were more 'European-style' feudal lords. Indeed there was historically very little class conflict inside the Azerbaijani Muslim community.

The ethno-religious origins of the Azerbaijani Turks are complicated and contested.[8] From the 16th to the mid-18th centuries what is now Azerbaijan was part of Safavid Persia (Iran), with the exception of brief occupations by the Ottomans and the Russians. Safavid rule had lasted more than two centuries, during which Caucasian Muslims were forced to adopt Shi'ism,[9] simultaneously strengthening ties to the Persian state and its Turko-Persian culture and weakening ties to other Turkish groups, notably the

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[5] At the highest level were Bagratid princes; the princes organized into clans within which were noble rankings; then the vassal gentry, the clergy or princes -- royal vassals outranked church vassals, who outranked the vassals of nobles, with many poor vassal gentry though their status carried privileges.

[6] Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, p.88.

[7] Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition, Columbia University Press, 1995, p.18.

[8] This discussion draws from Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, Hyperion Press, 1951, Chapter 1; Audrey Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1992, Chapters 1 and 2; Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, Chapter 1.

[9] This was largely for geopolitical reasons: Safavid rulers were engaged in nearly constant warfare with two Sunni Muslim Turkish empires, the Ottomans and the Central Asian Shibanids to the northeast.

Sunni Ottomans.[10] By the 15th century the Azerbaijanis emerged as a people of Irano-Turkish origin, speaking a mixture of the two languages, yet religiously Shi'ite as a consequence of their Persian cultural heritage. The Azerbaijanis' ethno-political and religious position along these cultural and linguistic faultlines, clearly of long historical standing, would shape the development and radicalization of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia under Tsarist rule in the late 19th century.

I. Tsarist colonial and military rule in Transcaucasia

When the Russian state pushed into the 'Transcaucasus' (a Russian designation) it found an exceedingly intricate mosaic of linguistic, religious, and ethno-cultural populations. Pipes described "the Caucasus" as merely a geographical, not historical or cultural concept.[11] In addition to Muslim (Azerbaijani Turkish), Armenian, and Georgian 'high cultures', Russians also found a number of smaller 'mountain highlander' populations.[12] Indeed to the Arabs the Caucasus were known as "The Mountains of Languages". The myriad (Trans)Caucasian languages, religions, and 'ethnicities' had historically retained distinctiveness though the centuries partly because of geography: the mountainous terrain had kept its various peoples in isolation. Most of the settled population of the Caucasus had for centuries been engaged in agriculture, with nomads typically keeping herds, regional economic integration was predicated on interdependent socio-ethnic niches (Persians sold silks, Leshgens made rugs, "Tatars" weapons). A related reason for the persistence of local diversity was geopolitical -- for centuries the site of Roman, Persian, Mongol, Ottoman, and Russian, invasions. In 1858 the novelist Alexandre Dumas travelled through the Caucasus as 'Circassian' and Lesghen tribesmen were engaged in fierce mountain fighting against Russian rule. On arrival in Kizlyar

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10 The Turkization of the eastern Caucasus seems to have been linked to the culture of the wider Turko-Persian world, which by the time of the Turkic Seljuks ranged from Turkistan to Asia Minor, as Persian was replaced by a Turkic dialect. Though this, too, is contested, Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, pp.6-7. Slow Turkification may also have been sustained by successive waves of nomads from Central Asia

11 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917, 1923, Harvard University Press, 1964, p.17.

12 Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkereich, Chapter 5. Chechens, Ingush, Cherkassians, Ossetians, Avars, Mingrelians, Imeretians, Abkhazians, and Dagestanis, discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

(northeast of Grozny) he wrote that even sheepherders were fully armed in "warlike dress" -- something Dumas ascribed to the fact that history had taught each man to protect himself since the nearest civil authority was too far to offer any protection.[13] This insight is suggestive: the Caucasus were easy to conquer but extremely difficult to rule, administer or control bureaucratically, leading most of its conquerors either to 'rule by neglect' or to military rule, with the Tsarist state initially displaying elements of both.

Yet Russian imperial rule in the Caucasus differed from previous Persian or Turkish attempts at pacification of the region. Unlike Tsarist acquisitions from the Polish Partitions, the Baltics, or Finland, the state's original expansion into the Caucasus had been a combination of motives: *civilizatrice* , imperial expansionist, Great Power rivalry, and economic-colonialist. Tsarist geopolitical interests viewed their Transcaucasian holdings not only as 'colonies' but as geostrategic footholds in an area in which the local Christian populations would be the support in rule and administration, and as a base for further expansion. In the 18th century Transcaucasia had became a major theater of war between Turkey and Persia. Peter the Great captured Derbent in 1722 and Baku the following year, but did not push further for fear of provoking Turkish resistence. In the 1730's Empress Anna returned the lands. With the end of the Safavid line, Persian central control (though it had been weak) disintegrated and parts of the region were contested by Caucasian khanates and principalities. Georgians and Armenians repeatedly appealed to Tsarist Russia to extend her sovereignty and unseat the khans. But from Catherine the Great Tsarist policies toward the Caucasus were uneasy combinations of *realpolitik*, "civilizing mission", and prestige -- always careful not to provoke Ottoman actions near their border.[14] Despite the rhetoric, Russian policies were rarely propelled by concern over fellow Christians living under Muslim rule. After Peter the Great's first excursions, his successors were not interested in Transcaucasian conquests and welcomed a strong Persia as counterbalance to the Ottomans. Muscovite expansionism was *realpolitik* not Christian oriented -- Georgia,

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[13] Alexander Dumas, Adventures in the Caucasus, (translated from the French "En Caucase" and edited by A.E. March), Peter Owen, London, 1962, pp.15-16; a similar argument is made in Kazemzadeh's classic, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, pp.6-7.

[14] Altstadt makes this point, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.8

for instance, was in itesIf of no great importance to Russia.[15] Catherine later attempted expansion into Georgia and Erekle willingly placed his kingdom under Russian protection in 1783. However in 1787 Russians withdrew their troops and evacuated Georgia in order to concentrate on the strategically more important Balkans. Then in 1800 Tsar Paul again annexed Kartli-Kakheti for the Russian crown and in 1801 Alexander I fully incorporated it into the empire by removing the Bagratids from the throne, without mutual agreement.

Perhaps as is typical of imperial expansionism, and certainly with Tsarist imperial incorporation of the Ukrainian Hetmanate more than a century earlier, eventually Tsarist officials no longer considered the Caucasus an imperial "border area" or a base from which to launch further expansion, but a core and constituent part of the empire's domains.[16] And unlike the previous conquests by Turks and Persians, by mid-century the Russians had asserted cultural, political, and economic control in degree and manner previously unseen.

Boundary settlements and wars themselves initially contributed to this. For instance, the Russian conquest had important effects on Azerbaijani Muslims' sectarian divisions. Similar to the effects of the Polish Partitions, the boundary settlements of the famous 1828 Treaty of Turkmanchai, later a symbol of national bitterness, permanantly divided both Armenians and Azerbaijani Turks between two empires. Roughly corresponding to the Araxes River, the new boundary split the territory of Arran from the historical core of Azerbaijan, with the larger proportion of the Azerbaijani population remaining in Persia, eventually following a different course of political development and nation-building. The Shirvanis or Turkic-speaking Muslims of Azerbaijan (sometimes known as Arranis) differed from their ethnic counterparts on the Persian side of the Turkmanchai border because a substantial proportion of the former were Sunni. Although the data are not entirely reliable, Russian 1830's figures show that Shi'ites and Sunnis

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[15] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, p.61. makes this last point. Indeed with the 1774 Russo-Turkish Treaty Russia conceded Imeretia to the Ottomans.

[16] On this shift in official thinking on the Ukrainian Hetmanate, see Zenon E. Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s-1830s, Harvard University Press, 1988, p.303 and *passim*. On plans for further expansion, Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, pp.7-9, cites Lord Curzon's assessment of Russia's geopolitical ambitions. Azerbaijan was drawn largely as a result of Anglo-Russian rivalry and a desire to penetrate Persia in order to hem in Ottoman Turkey. The Tsarist state may have viewed Persia as geopolitically doomed, in time falling under Russian domination.

were nearly equally represented, and though sectarian divisions did not correspond precisely to khanate boundaries, Sunnis tended to be in the northern territories influenced by the regional heart of Sunnism, the Caucasus mountains. But by the 1860's substantial numbers of Sunnis had migrated to Turkey under threats of Russian armed struggle, with the effect that Shi'ites soon had a two to one majority in the regions north of the Araxes.[17]

In due course the combined effects of new territorial boundaries, wars, and military and administrative policies prompted substantial population transfers and migrations, and altered age-old ethnic patterns, perhaps affecting Armenians most directly. The eastern Armenian population rose from 20% of the local population before the Russian annexations to more than 1/2 the local population by 1832. And this continued. In Erevan province in 1827 there were 20,000 Armenians, but by the close of the century there were nearly 700,000.[18] Armenian migration was partly a response to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 when Russia annexed parts of the Armenian plateau and thousands of Armenian refugees fled into Transcaucasia. Indeed Armenian migration to Transcaucasia increased after each successive war or ethnic conflict: Russo-Turkish and Crimean Wars, the 1876-1878 War, and after the Kurdish massacre of Armenians in the mid-1890's in Anatolia.

As Armenians migrated into the Tsarist territories from the Ottoman and Persian empires, Muslim Caucasians, now finding themselves under an intolerant Christian empire, fled. With successive annexations, Tsarist reprisals, and forced migrations, thousands of Caucasians mountaineers and Azerbaijani Turks crossed the Araxes River into Persia, and even more left for Ottoman lands. Mid-century Russian military campaigns to 'pacify' the region resulted in massive forced and un-forced Cherkassian migrations.[19]

In short, the relative position of Armenians in the plateau of eastern Anatolia

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[17] Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p.10. Azerbaijani attitudes toward the Russian wars reflected divergent sectarian loyalties: Shi'ite volunteers were used by the Russian state in the1828-1829 and 1853-1855 wars against Turkey, and in suppressing Sunni Daghestanis; the same wars caused substantial migrations of Sunni Muslims from Russia to Turkey.

[18] Mouradian, "Die armenische Nationalbewegung im Osmenischen and Russischen Reich", p.81.

[19] Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.417; Ben Fowkes (ed.), Russia and Chechnia: The Permanent Crisis, MacMillan, 1998, pp.3-6. The state expelled more than 81,000 followers of the Shamil movement in 1859 and an additional 22,500 in 1865 -- by some accounts more than 400,000 Cherkassians had emigrated or been expelled to Turkey by 1864 -- or more than 1/2 the Cherkassian population.The state was less 'successful' with Chechens since 80% remained.

worsened (because of Armenian out-migration and Caucasian Muslim in-migration, and rapid Kurdish population growth), making Armenians a small minority among Kurds and Turks. But they became an increasingly larger minority in Transcaucasia, a 'population exchange' de facto sanctioned by imperial decree in 1834 with the establishment of an Armenian district out of the former Erevan and Nakhichevan khanates, regarded ancient Armenian lands.[20] The new boundaries and migrations had also (unintentionally) attenuated khanate particularisms and diminished sectarianism between Sunni and Shi'ite Azerbaijanis.

The militarization of Russian rule in the Caucasus also distinguished it for a time from other regions in the empire. Thousands of Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Poles received their military training in the imperial armies and administrations of the Caucasus in the 1830's and 1840's,[21] patterns which continued through the turn of the century. Indeed this classic imperialist policy of sending non-Russians to 'pacify' the Caucasus was not lost on Lenin who in 1922 sent three Bolsheviks -- a Pole (Dzierzynski), a Lithuanian (Kapsukas), and a Ukrainian (Manuil'sky) -- to restore order in Georgia. Tsarist practices of sending criminals and exiles to the Caucasus hardly alleviated matters: travelling through the Caucasus Dumas repeatedly commented on what he perceived as the region's pervasive sense of violence and indifference to human life, quoting Pushkin who believed that in the Caucasus murder was "merely a gesture".[22]

The militarization of the region seems an important feature of Tsarist rule. Suny writes: "Russian military government, characterized by arbitrariness and dishonesty, was the reality that lay behind the facade of Russia's civilizing mission in the Caucasus".[23] For Reisner, too, Russian bureaucratic corruption and incompetence and the arrogance of its civilizing mission caused great local opposition.[24] And yet this may insufficiently distinguish what was unique to Tsarist rule over the Caucasus from what were general

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20 Ronald Grigor Suny, "Nationalism and Class", in E. Rogovin-Frankel, J. Frankel, B. Knei-Paz, (eds), Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917, Cambridge, 1992, p.232.

21 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p.293.

22 Dumas, Adventures in the Caucasus, pp. 23, 30, and *passim.*

23 Suny, "The Making of the Georgian Nation", p.69.

24 Reisner, "Die Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien", p.65.

patterns of imperial rule, and it does not allow distinctions distinctions to be made between policies toward the different groups within the Caucasus. Without denying that the Tsarist administration of the Caucasus was corrupt, arbitrary, and incompetent, these qualities were likely no more true of the Caucasus than of most other regions of the empire, and they did not necessarily derive from either military rule or from its 'civilizing mission'. It may be possible to be more precise about the causes and consequences of Tsarist rule over Transcaucasia in order to better situate the region's subsequent radicalization.

Tsarist policies in the Caucasus were indeed broadly militarist and less bureaucratic than, for instance, imperial rule over Russian Poland. In part this derived from the geopolitical sensitivity of the region: one of the last regions to be incorporated into the empire it was also the least stable geostrategic border through the 1878 Russo-Turkish War, in contrast to the Baltic, Polish-Lithuanian, and Ukrainian borders which had been geostrategically settled for several decades (though they continued to remain politically sensitive).[25] And in part it was due to the huge Muslim population of the region whose resistance to Russian rule and disloyalty to a Christian empire were virtually taken as given from the start. 'Pacification' of the 'alien' Muslim populations, particularly of the Caucasian mountaineers, was in certain respects purely militarist for much of the 19th century, even under the liberal midcentury rule of Vorontsov.

Yet this too should be qualified. The empire's use of military governors was common across the imperial borderlands, not just in the Caucasus.[26] Moreover, when compared with other non-Russian regions of the empire, the Caucasus did not have greater numbers of Russian military personnel, nor were there proportionately more military than

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[25] The exceptions were the Central Asian and Afghan borders, the latter would not be stabilized until 1895.

[26] W.E. Mosse, "Russian Provincial Governors at the End of the Nineteenth Century", The Historical Journal, Vol.27, No.2, 1984; Richard G. Robbins, The Tsars Viceroys, Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of the Empire, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987. And indeed the same governors were circulated from region to region.

civil servants.[27] And although disproportionately ethnic Russian, the military and bureaucratic presence in Transcaucasia did have Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani contingents.[28] Transcaucasia was indeed characterized by militarist rule, but it was highly bureaucratized as well.

That Russian rule in (Trans)Caucasia was 'colonial' is also only partially accurate, and does not allow us to distinguish what*were* in fact purely 'colonialist' policies. Because the new Russian territories were geographically seperated from Russia by the Caucasus mountains, and because they flanked the Persian and Ottoman states, they were viewed both as 'colonies' on the French model and initially as geopolitical assets to be used for further expansion. To Tsarist officials this meant that, in a manner similar to Poles or Jews of the western borderlands near Germany or Austria, local social unrest and local links to the Persian and Turkish states were dangerous -- again the conflation of imperial geopolitical concerns with nationality policies. Russian rule was 'colonial' or *civilizatrice* vis-a-vis some Caucasian Muslims: policies toward the Caucasian highlanders and to a lesser extent the Azerbaijanis, the state's consistent attempts to economically exploit the region through 'commercial colonial' policies, and sustained efforts with Russian settlers in the urban and rural Transcaucasia were notable, and I discuss elements of these below.

But in their substance Russian policies toward Georgians and Armenians (and even Azerbaijanis) actually resembled Tsarist Polish or Ukrainian policies. Policies aimed at the co-optation of Georgian nobles and Armenian capital via privileges and status had in them

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[27] Both in relation to the regional population bases and in relation to the number of civil service or bureaucratic posts in local administrations, the Transcaucasus were in line with other borderland regions. To get a sense of this, with a population base of 9.4 million Russian Poland, the most bureaucratically ruled region of the empire, had just over 253,000 military posts and almost 100,000 posts in local administration; with a population of 2.3 million the Baltics had approximately 29,500 military posts and 27,500 administrative -- or about 2/3 the number of military posts as Transcaucasia; with just over 10 million Lithuania-Belorussia had more than 157,000 in military and 63,000 in administrative posts; the Ukraine 159,000 in military and almost 94,000 administrators; and with a population of 4.9 million the Transcaucasus had 84,400 in military posts and 39,000 in administrative posts. Figures rounded and based on 'mother tongue'. Henning Bauer, et.al, (eds), Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszahlung von 1897, Vols. I&II, Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1991, Tabelle 042, pp.254-264.

[28] Of the 84,406 persons employed in a military posts in 1897, 36,223 were Russian, 15,897 Ukrainian, 9,039 Polish, and 5,796 Georgian. Of the 39,094 persons employed in local administration (excluding supportive 'services'), 11,620 were Russian, 7,933 Azerbaijani, 7,367 Armenian, and 7,701 Georgian. Figures based on 'mother tongue' and occupation. Georgian figures include Georgians, Mingrelians, Imeretians, etc. Ibid., Tabelle 042, pp.263-264.

no specific *civilizatrice* designs; they were designed to create local loyal elites through which to rule in the case of the Georgians especially, and at supporting Armenian commercial industriousness and the economic development of the Transcaucasus. And Tsarist policies aimed at eliminating local particularities in order to administratively integrate the region were remarkably similar to those adopted in other regions of the empire: the introduction of new territorial divisions and administrative boundaries without regard to ethnic demarcations, with important effects on (re)distributions of political power and access to civil service careers among the ethnicities of the region and eventually setting the boundaries for the 'creation' of 'territorial nations'; the decision not to introduce zemstvo because of fear of fueling local 'seperatisms' or disloyalty; cooptation of nobilities, cultural repression of cultural or religious elites; emancipation settlements to regularize serfholding relations with those of Russia; the introduction of Russian laws and judicial system; and the use of Russian in the bureaucracy, education, and commerce. Though not applied with consistency, attempts at imperial integration were neither specific to the Caucasus nor were they specifically 'colonialist'. I discuss key features of these processes and their effects on political radicalization of the Bolsheviks in the remainder of this chapter.

II. Imperial incorporation of elites and 'divide and rule'

The series of anti-Russian Georgian rebellions in 1802, 1812-1813, 1819-1820 culminated with the 1832 uprising demanded the restoration of the former noble privileges without Russian tutelage. Largely in reaction to the Georgian 'conspiracies' the new Russian administrator, Baron Hahn, intended to fully integrate Transcaucasia into the empire and eliminate local particuliarities. Among other policies, Russian was introduced as the official language of state business, local legal customs and laws were removed, and large numbers of Russian officials were brought into the expanded local bureaucracy. But Hahn's system fell apart in 1841 under the combined weight of the Georgian noble and Gurian peasant rebellions. Hahn was replaced by the Viceroy Mikhail Vorontsov who, during his nine year reign in the Caucasus (re)incorporated Georgian nobles and Azerbaijani aristocrats, liberalized economic policies in the region and otherwise ruled pragmatically and flexibly.

Tsarist policy toward Armenians was initially almost wholly preferential. As with Polish Jews, Armenians were historically resented by Georgian nobles but supported by Georgian monarchs for their commercial activities. Under Russian rule Armenians were no longer beholden to the Georgian kings but to the Russian Tsar -- and the protection of Russian arms. Initially on the premise that trade was 'civilizing, under state protection Armenian merchants flourished. In ways similar to the Jewish commercial bourgeoisie of the 19th century, the Armenian bourgeoisie derived privileges and protections from the Tsarist state and therefore remained loyalist Tsarist imperial subjects.

But the congruence of interests between Armenians and the Russian state was both commercial and geopolitical. Catherine the Great had granted Armenians the same rights and privileges extended to Russians. Because russophile Armenian elites were considered loyal and reliable, they were allowed to settle in lands along the Black Sea and in the Crimea. 'Muslim' areas were often given over to Armenians from Persia and Turkey, to the great resentment of Azerbaijanis. But this typically conflated geopolitical concerns with nationality policies: the state preferred Christian settled agriculturalists along its 'Muslim frontiers' with Turkey and Persia.[29] In turn, geopolitical peace allowed Armenian commercial activities to thrive, assisted by Russian arms and even by the Russian wars themselves: the Armenian bourgeoisie typically did well after the wars, particularly in their investments in industry.[30] Through the reform period following the Crimean defeat and after the Russo-Turkish Wars Armenians firmly tied their fate and geopolitical security to the Tsarist state, an affinity particularly evident in the liberal russophile sections of the Armenian intelligentsia.[31] As with the empire's Jews, the relatively liberal rule of Alexander II (1855-1881) was also notable for the acculturation and Russification of Armenians. Armenians adopted Russian names or Russified their names, learned Russian, and viewed Russian imperial culture as a venue to European culture.[32] As one observer at the time noted, "Caucasia was Russified without Russification, and at the forefront of this

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[29] By 1891 the Ottoman state, too, used Kurds to police the Russian-Armenian border.

[30] Mouradian, "Die armenische Nationalbewegung im Osmenischen and Russischen Reich", p.83.

[31] The hero of the Russo-Turkish Wars, the famous Armenian Loris-Melikov, was invited by the Tsar to head the Russian government.

[32] Suny, Looking Toward Ararat, p.23.

natural Russianizing were... the Armenians".[33]

Then Russian attitudes shifted as they began to conceive of Transcaucasia not as a military outpost but more firmly as a potentially lucrative colony and a source of raw materials for Russian industry. Commercial development was no longer viewed as 'civilizing' but as a means of exploiting raw materials: the Caucasian colonies should be confined to agriculture, the production of materials (silk, cotton, cloths) for Russian industry, supplies for the Imperial Armies, and profits. Coupled with preferential policies toward Russian merchants and factory owners, the development of industry was discouraged because it would create more Armenian competition at the expense of Russian industry. In this respect Tsarist rule was qualitatively different from the empire's other peripheries. And one effect of growing distrust of Armenian commerce (as Suny showed) was that it made the Armenian an 'alien' element in the Transcaucasian social structure.

Tsarist policies toward Azerbaijanis had entirely different bases, and differed even from policies toward other Muslims in the empire. Attempts at religious conversion, for instance, were minimal and the Il'minskii system of spreading Orthodoxy and Russification among the Volga Tatars was never attempted in Azerbaijan. Conversion was not the aim of education -- the Russian and Russo-Tataric schools in the region were designed to recruit bilingual civil servants, sons of Azerbaijani aristocrats and bourgeoisie, into Tsarist service.

At the time of the annexations, the khanates' administrative machineries were coopted by the military government, and though they were re-organized as provinces, they were staffed by native officials, based on local laws and *shar'ia* courts with Persian remaining the official language. In 1841 under Baron Hahn the military government and the supporting khanate system were abolished, boundaries were redrawn and large-scale dismissals of native officials followed. But under Vorontsov in 1845, policies were reversed in another administrative reorganization.[34] In contrast to the centralizing and

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33 Quoted in ibid, p.41.

34 Initially Transcaucasia was divided into a Georgian-Imeretian gubernia with Tiflis its capital and a Caspian oblast' at Shemakhi, putting Azerbaijani Ganji (Elizavetpol) and Nakhichevan in the Georgian gubernia.In 1846 the gubernia were redrawn as Tiflis, Kutais, Shemakhi, and Derbent. In 1859 Shemakhi was destroyed by an earthquake and Baku became the new capital and the name of the gubernia.

exclusionary policies of the previous administration, Vorontsov integrated Azerbaijani elites: the social status of the impoverished bays and aghas had been declining, so he raised their legal status to *dvorianie*. In 1846 Muslim landed aristocrats with *tul* lands were formally given hereditary noble rights and they and their sons were given access to imperial civil service careers. More civilian bureaucratic posts were opened and members of the new "Muslim privileged estate" could qualify in the newly created gubernia, with the result that a Caucasian Muslim class of bilingual imperial civil bureaucrats was created through Russian-European education of the "Russo-Tatar" schools.

In policies designed to educate and train Muslim elites in Russian and European languages and culture for imperial service, the Tsarist state had created a new elite -- a secular progressive Azerbaijani Turkish intelligentsia. But in subsequently excluding these educated from political society, and in cultural and religious restrictions, Russian policies also made them 'anti-colonial'. For instance, 1867 gubernia reorganizations were drawn in such a way that the 'Azerbaijani' gubernia included substantial non-Muslim minorities, eventually resulting in the replacement of Muslin civil servants at the lower levels of the imperial civil bureaucracy by Russians and Armenians between 1881-1894.[35] Similarly, Baku's 1874 municipal administration and city council reforms granted sufferage based on wealth or religious qualifications. Although Azerbaijanis were the majority of property-holders in Baku and should have constituted more than 80% of the electorate, restrictions on non-Christians meant that they would only sit 1/2 of the council seats.[36] The Reforms of 1892 were even more restrictive, limiting non-Christians to 1/3 of the seats. Azerbaijanis only gained a majority in the city dumas after 1908. Then with the exception of the brief period between 1896 and 1904 under Golitsyn's tenure, policies were generally anti-Muslim.[37] Although under Golitsyn many Armenians in the civil service had been replaced by Azerbaijanis, Vorontsov-Dashkov, Golitsyn's successor, returned to pro-

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[35] In 1871 Elizavetpol gubernia "Tatars" to Armemians were 878,000 to 292,000, while in Baku "Tatars" were 465,000, Russians 77,000, Caucasian mounaineers 63,000, Armenians 52,000. Azerbaijanis were now substantial minorities in Erevan gubernia (between 32-57% of the population) and a small minority in Tiflis gubernia. Figures in Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p.16.

[36] Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.25.

[37] Ibid., p.19.

Armenian, anti-Turkish policies in 1905.

Tsarist policies toward the Azerbaijani Turkish Islamic clerical establishment also deserve emphasis. The Russian state both incorporated and weakened the Islamic clerical establishment. It created Sunni and Shi'ite Ecclesiastical Boards, respectively headed by the mufti and the sheikh ul-Islam, with specified judicial, administrative, and educational responsibilities. Placed into an administrative-bureaucratic structure under the Ministry of Internal Affaris, these Boards were intended to control and co-opt the social group seen as most likely to lead opposition to Russian rule: the ulema. But Muslim clerics were exempted from state, property, and municipal taxes and corporal punishment; their children inherited privileges owed to their father's rank, or the same privileges as hereditary and personal nobles; in return the mullahs' obligations toward Tsar and state were so strictly circumscribed that any opposition to state authority was virtually impossible. In short, the ulema were co-opted in classical imperial fashion with tax exemptions, rank and status privileges, and high wages.[38]

On the belief that under Islam's lines of authority, the Muslim masses would more likely follow clerical elites than Russian secular authority, Tsarist officials had calculated that by controlling or co-opting the ulema or clerical hierarchy, they would also indirectly be controlling the Muslim masses. (It is worth noting that this is the only case I have found in which 'vertical' associations between elites and peasantries were actually sought by the Tsarist state, in contrast to its otherwise common policies of preventing any form of intra-ethnic association.) And the ulema were indeed co-opted. But this caused distrust and undermined much of their legitimacy in the eyes of the faithful.[39] It also may have eliminated any possibility of social mobilization on a purely religious basis since it undermined religious elites' potential political influence. Indeed in a purely religious role, as we will see with Narimanov, Islam actually played a very small part in Azerbaijani radicalization. But in its elision of the political and religious lines of authority in Islam, the imperial state not only misjudged the political effects of the co-optation of a religious elite in a context perceived as 'colonial', it equally underestimated general indifference to secular

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[38] Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, pp.58-60.

[39] Ibid, pp.60-61.

authority of any kind, and so the persistence of Islamic religious lines of authority despite the political impotence of the clergy. This, too, had its effects on the politics of the secular intelligentsia.

Unlike Azerbaijani society, Georgian society was 'culturally recognizable' to Russian elites. The similarity of Georgia's feudal structure to the Russian, its noble culture and Christian religion, made Georgian integration initially relatively unproblematic. Georgian monarchical privileges were retained, the Georgian Orthodox Church remained autocephalic with catholicos given seats on the Holy Synod of the Russian Church, and the church retained its monopoly on education. Noble incorporation was not unproblematic however. Though the patriarchal structure of Georgian society was initially respected, through the first half of the 19th century the state sought to eliminate the Georgian seigeurial system and the independent powers of the Georgian nobility so as to better conform to Russian standards.[40]

In 1804 a Tiflis Noble School was opened (which the Bolshevik Dzhaparadize attended) and Georgians were encouraged into state service as sons of Georgian nobles could enroll in the Russian cadet corps. In 1808 the clergy was freed from serfdom, taxes and duties, in 1811 lesser nobles were freed from dependence on the church and placed under state authority, the vassal gentry were emancipated and placed under a single noble corporation. In 1827 Georgian nobles were made equal in every way and given all the same privileges and access as the Russian nobility. Noble assemblies were formed in Tiflis and Kutais. Charged with defining noble status membership, these assemblies entailed humiliating petitions over claims to noble status, with processes taking over 30 years and challenging previous noble status security. But Georgian nobles retained substantial -- albeit different from their pre-Russian existence -- status and privileges, so much so that in 1897 Georgians had the empire's single largest noblity as a proportion of their population. There is an argument to be made that among Georgians there was indeed an 'overproduction of nobles'.

The relationship between Georgian noble and peasant serf also changed when serf

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[40] Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, p.66. Part of the problem from the state's point of view was that princes held nobles in vassal relations and clergymen as simple serfs.

ownership was removed from clergy, merchants, and other serfs, and nobles could no longer enserf free men -- an historically common practice in Georgia. Since its collapse at the end of the 18th century, the Georgian rural economy remained essentially one of low productivity. But in light of the 1863 Polish rebellions, the state was determined neither to create a large mass of landless peasants with a socially disruptive potential in Transcaucasia, nor to create a fully impotent Georgian nobility. By the 1864-1865 emancipations almost 70% of eastern Georgian peasants and 30% of western Georgian peasants were 'state peasants'. The emancipation settlements required that the lands be divided between noble and peasant, although serf dependence would continue in the form of specific dues for allotments, and the state controlled peasant migrations to maintain the landed elite's labor force, partly to bind Georgian nobles to the state.[41] Full free proprietorship was phased in but it was far slower than in Russia, and as late as 1912 most Georgian peasants remained landlord serfs with "temporary obligations".[42]

There were a few large landed magnates by mid-century, and small landowners with less than 21 serfs comprised half the Georgian nobility in eastern Georgia. And although there was a sizable middle gentry in Tiflis province which had benefited from state service, most were driven into debt in their adoption of European accountrements and in efforts to keep up with wealthier nobles above them. Combined with their tendency to consume lavishly while their only income derived from peasant dues (guaranteed by Russian arms) and state service, Georgian noble dependency on the Russian state now also derived from economic insecurity.[43] While greater nobles were unanimously keen on Russian rule, the petty and middle gentry were more ambivalent. It was these small and middle landholders -- many outside state service -- who felt the threat of emanicpation the most and were the most vulnerable to impoverishment.[44] The Georgian nobility had now become perhaps more economically and politically dependent on the Russian state than any other national noble or corporative estate.

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[41] Ibid., pp.83, 103-104.

[42] Reisner, "Die Entstehungs-- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der national Bewegung in Georgien", for a discussion on peasant proprietorship.

[43] Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, pp.110-111.

[44] Ibid., p.98.

Besides different modes of elite cooptation, Tsarist policies generally privileged one or another strata by triggering political and economic insecurities. For instance, it is often suggested that the Russian state set Armenians against Muslim 'Tatars' in local 'divide and rule' policies,[45] an ethnic conflict anyway intensified by their socio-ethnic ranking: Armenians as capitalists and Azerbaijanis as peasants-workers; or that Russo-Azerbaijani tensions derived from their respective socio-economic rankings, Russians in the skilled and higher-paid positions and Azerbaijanis in the unskilled, lesser-paid, and more dangerous positions in the oil fields. Although Altstadt argues, I think correctly, that Azerbaijani-Armenian conflicts were due not primarily to economic competition, she believes that the "root of the conflict must be sought in historical differences manipulated over decades by Tsarist colonial policies meant to invite jealousy, perhaps violence, as a means to control", causing economic envy toward Armenians as surrogates of Russian rule.[46] The essence of this was captured at the time of the 1905 violence by Azerbaijanis themselves. In Ganje in 1905 the Difai (Defense) group was formed on the initiative of local Azerbaijani notables to protect Azerbaijanis from Armenian communal violence. What is interesting is that they tried to blunt the edges of ethnic strife not only by condemming all violence, but by placing most of the blame on the Russian state not on Armenians, arguing that Muslims and Armenian had lived in peace for centuries before the Russians came.[47]

Similarly, Suny argues that Georgian-Armenian animosities were socio-economic resentments politicized by Tsarist policies which then crystallized into specific class-based resentments.[48] Kazemzadeh viewed much of Armenian and Georgian ethno-politics in the revolutionary years as Armenians-as-capitalists inviting the resentment of impoverished Georgain nobles and peasants and re-fracted through geopolitics.[49]

And yet beyond a very few crude and inconsistently applied policies, the Tsarist state was unable to articulate or implement 'divide and rule' policies in the region. It is true

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[45] Seton-Watson said this early, The Russian Empire, pp.500-501. And that Armenians aroused 'social envy' as did Jews.

[46] Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.43 and *passim*.

[47] Ibid., pp.40-41 and Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920, p.44.

[48] Suny, "Nationalism and Class", p.231.

[49] Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p.12 and *passim*.

that Shi'ite volunteers were enlisted in 1828-1892 and 1853-1855 by imperial armies to fight Turkish forces, and that certain divide and rule attempts were made to seperate the ethno-linguistically similar elements between the Ingush and Terek Chechens,[50] yet these tactical measures did not translate into coherent administrative or civil policies, nor were they effective instruments of social or ethnic control.

The Russian state's primary concern was not to stir up local unrest via 'divide and rule' but to maintain social order and to secure the stability of its southern geopolitical asset. There is no evidence that Russian officialdom engineered or incited ethnic violence, especially the 1905 Armenian-Tatar pogroms/war.[51] Although this is far less well-researched than anti-Jewish pogromism, arguably the Tsarist state's fear of social unrest and local disorder in this region was substantial, above all for fear of geopolitical spill-over effects. On the evidence we have, it is more true to say that the Tsarist state's abiding fear of social unrest and the *loss* of social control worked *against* 'divide and rule' policies intended to incite violence or ethnic envy.

In fact, the state's primary concern in Transcaucasia was not the relationship between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, mostly because until 1905 relations were relatively stable, and there were no worries of inter-ethnic alliances similar to those of the Polish *szlachta* and Ukrainian intellectuals. Rather, the state's concern was more narrowly geopolitical and focused on the relationship between the local Muslim clerical establishment, and later the cultural intelligentsia, and the Ottoman and Persian states, and sporadically with British interference in the region as part of an ongoing Anglo-Russian rivarly in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

But policies which privileged one or another group did have the effect of raising insecurities, though they actually did not have that as their intention. For instance, Tsarist censorship regulations had granted Armenian and Georgian religious authorities censorship over their own communities -- privileges denied to the Muslim Ecclesiastical Boards. But this derived form the Russian state's fear of pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic associationalism, not from any desire to 'divide' Muslim clerics from Georgian or Armenian clergy. Though

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[50] Fowkes, "Introduction", Russia and Chechnia: The Permanent Crisis, pp.3-6.

[51] Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p.39. I have not been able to find any evidence either.

the effects were the same: Azerbaijani clerics felt differntially (poorly) treated and in turn perceived Armenians as surrogates of Russian rule. Moreover, Armenians were latterly seen (by Azerbaijanis particularly) as lackeys of the Russian state, a designation which derived from privileges accorded them at the expense of the Azerbaijanis and Georgians. In ways similar to Jews who were artifically limited by the Russian state to certain occupations, trades, and to certain urban areas, Armenians were typically favored economically and politically. In both cases 'political distinctiveness', favorable or otherwise, gave local ethno-politics a distinct quality; they were regarded by other groups as somehow different and distinct in part by virtue of their treatment by the Tsarist state. It is likely that pogroms and ethnic violence against these two groups were in measure affected by this.

III. Provincial and imperial access and estate memberships

The patterns of incorporation of Transcaucasia elites into provincial and imperial civil and military posts differed between the Transcaucasians and those nationalities of other regions in at least one significant respect. The Ukrainain nobility had been most fully incorporated in both imperial- and provincial-levels posts, and as noted in Chapter 8, their presence in middle level posts in the Ukrainian provinces actually rose by the turn of the 19th century. In Chapter 10 we will see that the Baltic German nobility was also fully incorporated into the imperial *dvorianstvo*, but that their service was overwhelmingly in their own Baltic *Ritterschaften* and far less in Russian venues. Polish *szlachta* and Jewish elites, on the other had, were excluded from provincial or local civil service posts either because of regional ethnopolitics, or because the state distrusted their potential influence, or both, so they sought positions in imperial-level service outside their home provinces. But Georgians and Azerbaijanis (and to lesser extent Armenians) actually had higher rates of participation in local provincial administrative posts than in imperial-level posts.[52] That is, while Poles and Jews were 'blocked' locally, different imperial venues remained open; the

[52] Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 042, pp.251-251, 263, Tabelle 043, pp.277-278, Tabelle 045, pp.329-330, 341, the last counts only those employed. All are by mother tongue. Of the total administrative posts in the empire, 8,372 were held by Armenians, 7,207 by Georgians, and 13,280 by "Tatars" (all-empire). Of the 8,372 Armenians, 7,367 were assigned to posts in Transcaucasia, of the 7,207 of Georgians, 7,049 were so assigned, and 7,933 of the 13,280 "Tatars" were in Transcaucasia.

reverse was true for Georgians and Azerbaijanis whose presence in provincial and local adminstrative posts seemed to surpass possibilities for 'imperial' careers.[53] Georgians served in large numbers in civil and military service, but unlike the 'disloyal' Polish *szlachta*, they did so in their home provinces.

Likewise for Azerbaijanis. As noted earlier, during Vorontsov's tenure Muslims were given access to imperial careers, allowing the possibility of 'personal noble' status (via Russian military or Russo-Tatar schools) as sons of impoverished bays and aghas gained *dvorianie* status.[54] Muslims entered the local bureaucracy in high numbers. By the second half of the 19th century with the redrawing of gubernii boundaries, imperial civil service positions were closed off to Muslims at the lowest bureaucractic levels and positions were given to Russians and Armenians.[55] Though their numbers and influence in municipal administration were limited, with the municipal reforms of 1870, and especially after 1900, Azerbaijani Turks could legally engage in local politics and played a substantial role in Baku City Council politics.[56] Additionally, in 1897, of the 13,937 provincial or local civil service posts in Transcaucasia, Armenians held 2,353, Georgians 2,139, "Tatars" 2,668, and Russians 4,046.[57] That is, although local provincial imperial administration was (in absolute figures) dominated by Russians, Azerbaijani Turks held slightly more such posts (in absolute figures) than Armenians and Georgians. Taking into account literacy levels (e.g. availability for positions), Azerbaijani access to provincial imperial service was more or less on par with that of the other ethnic groups, and it was greater in Transcaucasia than elsewhere in the empire.

Employment in the free professions and administration or civil service in Tiflis and Baku reveal similar patterns. Tiflis was dominated by ethnic-Russians: 1/2 of those

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53 Of the more than 13,700 Georgians in combined administrative (excluding supportive 'services') and military service, nearly 13,500 or fully 96% were assigned to posts *in Transcaucasia*. By contrast, of the more than 187,000 Poles in similar posts, just over 50% were assigned to (usually low level) posts in the Polish provinces with the remainder assigned elsewhere in the empire. Similarly, of the more than 260,000 Ukrainians holding these posts 140,000 or between 50% and 66% held them in the Ukrainian and 'new Russian' provinces, the remainder were sent to non-Ukrainian provinces. Ibid., Tabelle 042, pp.251-264.

54 Swietochowski, Russian and Azerbaijan, pp.15, 26.

55 Ibid., p.16.

56 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, pp.62-63.

57 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 044, p.315.

employed in the free professions and nearly 60% of those in administrative and civil service posts were ethnic Russians. Armenians and Georgians each held approximately 1/4 of the administrative and civil service posts, however Georgians were *underrepresented* (in absolute and proportional terms) in the free professions, with merely 755 of the 6,149 total as against Armenians' 1,151.[58] Russians similarly dominated the Baku free professions, again holding about 1/2 (1,065) of the 2,177 positions; and Russians held more than 60% (2,039) of the city's 3,233 administrative or government posts. Armenians and Muslim "Tatars" held respectively 307 and 316 in the free professions, yet while for Armenians this constituted 1.61% of their total population, for "Tatars" this was only 0.78%.[59]

So Russians dominated both the free professions and civil service posts in both cities.[60] In Tiflis Armenians and Georgians were similarly represented in civil service posts, but educated Georgians (most especially sons of impoverished nobles) were underrepresented in the free professions; in Baku proportionally twice as many Armenians found posts in the free professions and in administrative and civil service posts as Azerbaijani Turks. Given that these strata produced most of the radical intelligentsias of all three ethnicities, these patterns, I think, may have been more important in radical politics than the ethnicties' respective positions within the Baku oil industry or Tiflis' economic relationship between Armenian capitalists and Georgian workers.

Moreover, Tsarist policies of placing Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani elites in provincial civil service posts may have had the effect of strengthening local identities. This is also suggested by patterns of acculturation, Russification, and radicalization. When 'mother tongue' is compared to levels of education and literacy 84.68% of Armenians, 80.23% of Georgians, and 96.72% of Azerbaijani Turks were illiterate. This is fairly consistent with educational access in the Caucasus. At the end of the 19th century, the

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[58] Ibid., Tabellen 052, pp.437-438.

[59] Though 500 "Tatars" were so employed as against 384 Armenians, these figures represented 1.24% of the Azerbaijani population as compared to 2.01% of the Armenian. Ibid., Tabellen 052, pp.437-438.

[60] The differences in the Russian presence in Baku and Tiflis are also worth noting. Of the nearly 45,000 Russians in Tiflis 17.63% held military posts and 18.63% were in the manufacturing sector, while of the more than 37,000 Russians in Baku more than 41.81% were in the manufacturing sector and only 1.81% in military service. 5.45% of Russians in Baku and 9.71% in Tiflis were in civil service/administration. The Russian presence in Tiflis was mostly administrative and military; in Baku it was industrial and economic.

Caucasus had one school for every 3,000 Russians, one for every 4,800 Georgians, one for every 5,400 Armenians, and one for every 17,300 Azerbaijani Muslims.[61] Armenians were the most educated, with 1.66% attending levels of schooling greater than primary school, followed by Georgians with 1.58%, and Azerbaijani Turks with 0.09%.[62]

Georgians and Armenians also had very similar levels of Russian-language literacy, respectively 5.77% and 5.51%, while Azerbaijani Turks' level was far lower at 0.55%. Literacy in languages other than Russian revealed similar proportions, 12.42% for Georgians, 8.15% for Armenians, and only 2.63% for Azerbaijanis. But when distinguished by rural-urban inhabitants, 22.34% of Armenians and 22.38% of Georgian, and only 6.63% of (empire-wide) "Tatar" urbanites could read Russian, below those of the empire's other urbanite minorities (Jews, Latvians, Estonians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians ranged between 25-50%), but far higher than their own national averages.[63]

These figures can be placed in comparative perspective in three ways. First, other Turko-Tataric ethnicities had levels of Russian-language literacy similar to the Azerbaijanis (Bashkirs 1.36%, Uzbeks 0.20%, Kirghiz 0.11%), as did other religiously Muslim groups (Chechens 0.45%, Lesghens, 0.76%, Cherkessians 1.55%). But the Chuvash -- ethno-linguistically Turko-Tataric, but religiously Orthodox -- could read Russian at a level almost nine times that of other Turko-Tatars (9.23%), implying that religious affinity played a role in access and desirability of linguistic Russification. Secondly, even though Armenians and Georgians could read Russian at higher levels than Azerbaijanis (and therefore access both imperial careers and radical literatures), all three were at lower levels than other nationalities (31.13% of the empire's Yiddish-speakers, 36.58% of her Latvian speakers, 29.95% of Estonian speakers, could read Russian). So Georgians and Armenians were less linguistically Russified than Jews or Latvians.

Besides imperial or provincial positions, estate memberships are also revealing of

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61 Francois Georgeon, "Note sur le modernisme en Azerbaidjan au tournant du siecle", Cahiers du Monde Russe, 37/1-2, janvier-juin, 1996, p.98.

62 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 041 , pp.231-232, 241. All figures for persons older than 10 years and 'mother tongue'. 83.55% of "Tatars" empire-wide were illiterate. Empire-wide figures for Georgians and Armenians as against their numbers in the Transcaucusus differed little.

63 Ibid., Tabelle 015, pp.111-112.

region's status-based ethnic relations. In Tiflis and Baku Armenians occupied similar socio-economic positions though ethno-political relationships involved respectively Georgians and Azerbaijanis. In Baku the proportion of Azerbaijani Turkish propertied men of independent means or 'rentiers' was nearly comparable to that of Armenians. In absolute figures "Tatars" dominated the banking and 'commercial' professions by more than 2:1, but Armenians dominated as 'rentiers' by the same margin.[64] Armenians had the fourth greatest proportion in the distinguished citizens and merchant estates, surpassing Georgians, "Tatars", and Russians. And Armenians had the second highest proportion of members in the urban 'merchant' estate, behind the Jews. Although very few Georgians entered these two urban estates, Georgians had the highest proportion of their co-ethnics in the exclusive hereditary noble, personal (service) noble, and clerical estates -- as proportions of their populations more hereditary nobles than Poles and Russians and more personal nobles than Russians.[65]

In short, Armenians dominated in the economic-status estates while Georgians dominated in the traditional-status estates in Tiflis; in Baku Armenians dominated in one economic sphere while Azerbaijanis dominated in another. The latter conclusion is also consistent with what we know of the organization of capital in the Transcaucasian oil industry. When oil lands were auctioned, Armenians and Russians purchased them and rose as the financial elite of the oil industry. Although very few Azerbaijani Turks

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64 'Banking and commerce' as an occupational category includes everyone from shopkeepers and wealthy merchants. Of the 19,099 Armenians, 4,114 were in banking and commerce, and 4,138 were 'rentiers'; of 40,341 Muslim "Tatars", 8,459 were in banking and commerce, and 2,869 were 'rentiers'. Of the 20,000 engaged in banking and commerce in Tiflis, over 1/2 were Armenian, yet they comprised 1/4 of those in Baku while "Tatars" comprised 1/2. Of the 13,839 rentiers in Tiflis, Armenians, Georgians, and ethnic Russians comprised respectively 4,869, 3,451, and 4,313. By contrast, in Baku "Tatars" comprised just under 1/2 of the city's rentiers, which was almost three times the figures for Russians and Armenians. Ibid., Tabellen 052 and 053, pp.429, 440.

65 In absolute numbers Armenians were 5th behind Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Moldavians. Moldavians, Germans, and Kalmyks had proportionally more members in the distinguished citizens estate. Jews had 1.42% and Armenians 0.82%. In absolute figures Armenians were 4th after Russians, Jews, and Germans. 5.28% of Georgians were members of the "hereditary nobility" -- the highest proportion in the empire, followed by Poles (4.41%), Lithuanians (2.41%), "Tatars" (1.60%), and Belorussians (1.50%), Germans (1.39%) and Russians (0.87%). And 1.04% of Georgians were members of the 'personal nobility' estate, followed by 0.84% of Russians. Finally, 2.17% of Georgians were members of the clerical estate followed, unsurprisingly, by Armenians (1.30%), and Russians (0.82%). Ibid., Tabellen 030 & 031, pp.197-198. Figures by nationality, not mother tongue.

succeeded in buying oil lands, Azerbaijanis were more numerous in small-scale extraction and refining. But the boom of the Baku oil industry also gave rise to a supporting financial and technical infrastructure including relatively well-developed banking and transportation systems. The latter were largely in the hands of Azerbaijanis: they own almost 1/2 the ships and 42% of the Caspian's merchant fleets' carrying capacity and 52% of the tankers -- an Azerbaijani dominance that was at no point relinquished.[66]

Though only one indicator, ethnic patterns in estate memberships suggest that perhaps the Transcaucasian ethnicities were not organized in the manner of the Ukraine, Poland-Lithuania, or even the Baltics. Unlike these latter territories, where ethnicities were ranked or "stacked vertically" (though I qualify the Baltics in Chapter 10), in Transcaucasia it is likely that pure 'ethnic ranking' was really limited to the working classes in the industrial sectors, particularly the newer oil industry. The regions' ethnicities were organized "horizontally" or "segmentally" in complex status-type relationships.

It also suggests that socio-economic competition caused by industrialization from the 1870's, even if exacerbated by inept Tsarist policies, may not have been the basis of subsequent politicizations. For instance, Suny argues that ethnic conflict between Armenians and Georgians was due to economic competitions and changes in social stratification, as well as to changes in political power relations prompted by Russian imperial rule. While this seems essentially true, it may be possible to be more precise about which was more causally important. Armenian economic dominance in Tiflis was clear, but it would have been far more the concern of the new, small Georgian working class than of either the impoverished Georgian nobility or the Georgian professional classes for whom the capitalist sphere held no interest. And even here it is difficult to ascertain just how much of Georgian urban working class radicalism was due to purely to 'Armenian' control of capital and industry, and how much of it was due to the more classical socio-economic processes inherent in the dislocating effects of larger-scale industry on traditional artisanal and craftwork production. Given the structure of Tiflis' industry, the latter may

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66 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, pp.21, 23.

have been more likely.[67]

It is most likely that the impoverished Georgian noble and new professional classes responded not to Armenian economic power *per se*, but to several layers of political exclusion: the Russian-imperial military-bureaucracy which was becoming increasingly 'Russian', and the fact that property and wealth, not birth and status, were increasingly the determinants of position in local government, thereby privileging the city's Armenians and their low representation in the liberal professions. 'Noble status' was in decline, and this more so in the economically 'colonial' conditions of Transcaucasia that in economically less dynamic parts of the Tsarist empire. This clearly privileged Armenian capital, but Armenian economic dominance of Tiflis was hardly new -- it had existed for centuries with Georgian nobles' assistance -- since seigneurial Georgia's anti-capitalist ethos was powerful and long-standing. The impoverished Georgian aristocracy was politicized not by Armenian capitalist ascendancy, but by Armenian political ascendency, the privileging of wealth and property over birth and status, rendering Georgians politically powerless locally.

III. Narimanov and Muslim Azerbaijani radicalism, cultural and socialist

Narimanov was a cultural-intellectual who engaged in a range of activities aside from his socialist radicalism: he wrote plays and dramas, he was a schoolteacher, he worked in local politics on Muslim education reform committees, and he worked as a medical doctor, all as part of a cultural and literary revival which spanned the imperial Turkish world -- Crimea, Turkey, the Volga-Ural area, Turkistan, and Azerbaijan. It is possible that his cultural activism and his socialist radicalism served each other.

One of only three Muslim Bolsheviks in this elite, Nariman Kerbalai Nadzhaf-Ogly Narimanov, was born in 1870 in Tiflis, the son of a petty Azerbaijani Turkish merchant. In his autobiography Narimanov claims that his family was poor and a more recent

[67] The Georgian working class was actually quite small and limited largely to railroad workers in Tiflis and to a few Tiflis industries, primarily of small-scale workshops and craftsmen. Until 1900 manufacture took place either in the 4,000 artisanal workshops in cities and towns or in individual village households; in 1888 78% of workshops in Georgia were either occupied by a single craftsman or run with one assistant. The Tiflis economy then shifted from transit trade and small handicraft production to larger-scale industrial production, mostly financed by Armenian capital with the help of Russian protective tarriffs. Suny, Making of the Georgian Nation, pp.117-118.

biographical account claims that his was a "poor peasant family".[68] Though Narimanov's family may not have been wealthy merchants -- they were clearly not 'peasants'. Their rural origins were aristocratic, and they were highly cultured and literate, as their sons joined the liberal professions, an elite status for Azerbaijani Turks. Indeed the father, who spent most of his life in Tiflis, was apparently a highly popular muscial virtuoso in the Caucasus, traveling and playing eastern musical instruments and singing in Armenian, Azerbaijani Turkish, and Georgian, who also showed interest in Georgian romantic poets.

Although the Narimanov's had roots in eastern Azerbaijan, Narimanov's older brother wrote that the family traced its descendents in the 17th century to the noble family deriving from Kakhetii Irakliia I. This is possible. In the rural areas many Azerbaijani Turks were hereditary nobles, though very few were personal nobles. At the time it is possible that, unlike Georgians and Armenians, there may have been less opportunity for Azerbaijanis for advancement through imperial service.[69] As likely former Azerbaijani Turkish rural nobility (perhaps with Georgian noble ties), by mid-century they were in all likelikood impoverished with restricted imperial service venues. As was common, the family therefore turned to commercial pursuits. However by the turn of the century Russified "Tatars" once again gained political and imperial service access, and certainly their numbers in the service sectors, most notably as teachers, were by 1897 substantial -- indeed on par with their numbers in the banking, merchant, and commercial sectors.[70]

I make two observations in connection with Narimanov's social context. First, as a comparatively small ethno-religious minority in Tiflis and rural Georgia -- the former characterized by Georgian, Armenian, and Russian cultural influences, and the latter dominated by the historic Georgian feudal nobility -- upward social mobility and urbanization almost necessarily entailed some form of acculturation. Georgian aristocratic culture was the most immediately accessible for Azerbaijani elites since Armenian culture

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68 "Avtobiografiia". Deiateli SSSR i revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia Rossiia: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Granat [from here Granat], Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1989, p.559; Teimur Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, Baku, 1988, p.7.

69 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.31.

70 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 044, p.315. The figures were as follows: in 'service sector' there were total 47,627, of which 12,285 were "Tatars" (comparable to the 12,794 in banking, commerce etc.), 9,906 Georgians, 8,339 Armenians, and 8,801 Russians.

lacked an aristocratic tradition and since Russian had not yet been firmly planted in the Caucasus. So the Narimanov's identification with the hereditary Georgian king and the attractiveness of Georgian poetry and 'high' culture' seems plausible. Secondly and relatedly, although his brother had studied the Koran at a madresh, secularization was almost inevitably a part of this process, something which eventual lead to the reformist progressive politics of the Azerbaijani Muslim intelligentsia which emerged mid-century.

At age 9 Narimanov attended Muslim schools which in Tiflis were the under the control of the Muslim Ecclisiastical Boards, and which were in turn subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the personal authority of the viceroy. Narimanov's school was under the state-appointed sheik ul-islam (Shi'i head of the Ecclesiastical Board). This line of authority ensured that the schools taught Azerbaijani Turkish, Persian, and Arab languages, with instruction in Russian -- all of which Narimanov apparently studied with great enthusiasm.[71] Muslim multi-lingual education was consistently a battleground between Muslim clerics, Azerbaijani aristocrats, and Russian officials, and these schools were no exception. Because native language instruction was offered only in these religious schools, higher secular education in the imperial environment was made more difficult.[72]

But Narimanov could already read in several languages by age 15, and in 1885 entered the Gori Teacher's Seminary.[73] In the Tsarist state's efforts to train loyal bureaucrats for imperial service in Transcaucasia, and in efforts to 'protect' Muslim students from the influences of 'religious fanaticism', in 1879 the Gori Teacher's Seminary opened a "Tatar" department to Transcaucasian "Tatars" as a teachers' preparatory school. The experience for the young Azerbaijani Turks who attended was ambiguous however. On the one hand Narimanov viewed it as connected to Tsarist Russificatory policies (with good reason). On the other hand, the instructors were themselves quite 'democratic' in attitude and progessive ideas were infused in the curriculum.[74] This combination

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[71] On the Muslim Ecclesiastical Boards, Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, pp.58-62; on Narimanov's particular school and experience, Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, pp.8-9.

[72] Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.55.

[73] Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, p.10; "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.559 claims that he entered at age 12, but this may be because it dates his date of birth as 1872. He was born in 1870.

[74] Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, p.9.

apparently had the effect of radicalizing at least some of the Muslim students against the imperial state, but in doing so they were armed with progessive, democratic, European ideas which they then applied to their own culture, language, and historical tradition. This caused Narimanov to re-evaluate his own cultural traditions and Muslim society. During holidays he would return home to Tiflis, bringing with him concerns about Muslim cultural 'backwardness' and the desperate need for social progess.[75] To this point however, his ideas were purely academic, since he had as yet no contact with 'the Caucasian Muslim masses'. The Gori Teachers Seminary experience also provided a basis for Narimanov's first literary forrays igniting an interest in *belles lettres* and dramatic arts which would define his subsequent career.[76] He studied Russian language, geometry, algebra, music, and especially liked Russian and European literature -- Turgenev, Cervantes, Jules Verne. And he was interested in Russian and Azerbaijani dramatic arts.

Another important effect -- and one which would shape his world view -- was that Narimanov's cultural and literary pursuits were developed within an essentially European humanist and multi-ethnic setting, and he set Azerbaijani culture and language against an 'internationalist' or ethnic cooperative background, rather than as a form of ethnic or nationalist retrieval. In other words, I think that Narimanov's interest in Azerbaijani culture and language was to preserve it and move it into a humanistically inspired modern world rather than to essentialize it into some form of nationalism. This is what would distinguish his politics from those of the majority of Azerbaijani Turkish reformers, most of whom sought the latter purpose, and most of whom were not trained in multi-ethnic 'middle class' Tiflis. This goes some way to explaining his attraction to Bolshevism -- unlike most other Azerbaijani elites who would become nationalist Musavatists.

Narimanov's writings during the five years he spent at the Gori Teachers Seminary and his earliest political radicalism reflected this academic training and educational experiences. His thesis, written in 1890, concerned the majesty and splendor not of an Azerbaijani city, but of Moscow, which he considered to be the embodiment of Russia's people and history, and a city he believed belonged not to the Tsars or to the empire, but to

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[75] Ibid., p.11.

[76] "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.559.

the *narod*. Narimanov was very interested in Russian history, and particularly in Peter the Great's progressive political and social reforms, and praised his "patriotism" and ability to bring Russia 'into Europe'.[77]

In his notebook while at the teacher's seminary Narimanov wrote of his interest in Russian poetry, and was particularly drawn to Russian works concerning struggles against backwardness, despotism, and ignorance. He read Pisarev, Marx, Nekrasov, Pushkin, and Lermontov.[78] His biographer Akhmedov suggests that under the influence of these works and the program of study at the Gori Seminary Narimanov developed both a 'democratic' world view and an appreciation for aesthetics and literature.[79] Certainly Narimanov's intellectual influences were well within the humanist tradition in Russian and European literature, and from these he did focus on 'democratic' struggles for social justice against despotism. However this may be reading back into his early life what we now know of his later political career. Narimanov's attraction to these works at that time was arguably intellectual and not based on social experience. To the extent that Narimanov sought intellectual ideas to explain his social experiences, my sense is that the social critique which resonated *experientially* lay not in socio-economic or political struggles against despotism, but in his Azerbaijani Turkish identity in the Russian empire and his existence at several cultural and linguistic borders.

In other words, my sense is that assimilation was at the core of his social experience, not socio-economic justice. Narimanov was a privileged, acculturating Azerbaijani Turkish cultural-intellectual who lived not in the heart of Azerbaijan but as a very tiny minority in Tiflis, and as one of only five Muslim Azerbaijani Turks at the Gori Teacher's Seminary.[80] As such Narimanov experienced the empire not as 'colonial' in the socio-economic sense, as would have most other Caucasian Muslims, but as a culturally appealing and religiously ecumenical empire. His concerns were directed against cultural imperialism and only derivatively against either the socio-economic or purely political

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[77] Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, pp.14-15.
[78] Ibid., pp.15-17.
[79] Ibid., p.17.
[80] This figure is found in Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, p.15, ftnt.1.

injustices of Russian colonial rule. He was, accordingly, attracted to the culturally ecumenical empire of the era of Peter the Great.

Indeed Narimanov was also deeply interested in the German Protestant Reformation. Why this should be so is of interest in understanding his early radicalism. Narimanov's intellectual interest in Luther and the Reformation lay in what he considered its reformism, viewing the Lutheran Reformation as constituting a *quasi*-secular attack on religious 'fanaticism' and hierarchy, on absolutist monarchy, and on backwardness and ignorance all at once. Through a hero in his work "*Bakhadur i Sonal*" he wrote: "the Muslim world awaits its Luther".[81] But this was both a cultural critique of the Azerbaijani cultural position vis-a-vis Russian imperial culture and latter's potential anti-ecumenical, colonial tendencies, as well as a critique of the 'Catholicism' of the Muslim religious estalishment and the effects of 'fanaticism' on backwardness and ignorance. In short, Narimanov's social and educational experiences shaped a world view anchored in a kind of 'Protestant' secularism and in a culturally and linguistically ecumenical empire.

This view was then reinforced by his experiences as a rural schoolteacher. At age 20, after graduating from the Teacher's Seminary in 1890, Narimanov took a position teaching at an elementary school in a small settlement in rural Tiflis gubernia. This elementary school was the only Muslim school established in the *uezd*, and in 1889 it fell under the direction of the Governor-General of the Caucaus.[82] Narimanov's teaching Muslim peasants in rural Tiflis gubernia was his first exposure to peasant life, and he was most impressed by the poverty, backwardness, ignorance, and poor treatment of the Turkish peasantry.[83] He completed a dramatic work that he had begun while at the Teacher's seminary on the plight of the peasants, entitled "*Nevezhestvo*" ("Ignorance") in which the focus of the work was less on the peasant's socio-economic backwardness and relations between peasant and *beks*, than on their 'cultural ignorance'.[84]

After a year in the rural village school Narimanov left for Baku. In Baku and

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81 Quoted in ibid., p.18.

82 Ibid., pp.20-21.

83 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.559.

84 Ibid., p.559. Narimanov was also apparently impressed by the murder of Alexander II in 1881, inspiring him to translante into Azerbaijani Gogol's *The Inspector*.

thoughout Central Asia a number of Russo-Tatar Schools had just been opened by the state. Narimanov requested, and was granted, a position teaching in one of the Russo-Tatar *gimnaziia* in Baku.[85] While teaching at the *gimnazia* in Baku Narimanov was also active in organizing theatrical productions, and strived to create closer associations with libraries, magazines and newspapers of other countries; and he developed literary groups and societies as he saw Azerbaijani Turkish cultural dominance of Baku recede in the face of capitalist development.[86] In 1894 Narimanov opened the first Azerbaijani public library and reading room which contained not only literature in Azerbaijani Turkish but also Turkish language materials, mostly newspapers, obtained from Constantinople.[87]

This need for cultural activism was intensified for Narimanov by the fact that in 1890 the publication of Turkish language newspapers was banned. And during this period, in 1895, Narimanov published his second novel, a comedy entitled "*Shamdan bek*". In order to have the novel developed into a theatrical production in 1896 Narimanov, as a Muslim dramatist, had to submit it to the Caucasian Censure Committee. The same year he was also allowed to publish his new novel "*Bakhadur i Sona*" in Azerbaijani Turkish. This was an historical novel of the love between an Azerbaijani and an Armenian, and in it Narimanov pursued the idea that the 'enemies' were the feudal-capitalist social order and the Tsarist autocracy, and that the two 'nations' should live in brotherhood and in united fashion join the struggle against the injust social and political order.[88] Narimanov was then hired to teach at a Baku *realschule*, and not only continued his social-cultural activities organizing plays and cultural productions for philanthropic purposes, but also began publishing: he published a Turkish language grammar book, and self-instructional textbooks on Turkish language in Russian and one in Turkish.[89]

Narimanov was clearly firmly part of a new generation of mostly Russified secular Muslim intelligentsia. A first generation of Azerbaijani intelligentsia familiar with Russian

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[85] Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, pp.25-26.

[86] "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.559; Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, p.27

[87] BSE, p.251; "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.559.

[88] Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, p.29.

[89] "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.560.

imperial culture through military or civil service had appeared mid-century; many had attended the Russo-Tator schools set up in the 1830's and 1840's. After receiving traditional early education, these sons of Azerbaijani aristocrats completed studies in Russo-Tatar schools, in *gimnaziia* and *realschulen*, and at Russian universities -- all in preparation for government service as bureaucrats, interpreters, and teachers. By the 1870's they had become a substantial social group, though some linguistically and culturally identified with the Ottoman empire.[90] When the civil service was purged of the 'native' element the intelligentsia came to be constituted almost solely by graduates of Russian universities and Transcaucasian teacher's seminaries. The second generation of Azerbaijani intelligentsia came of age in the 1870's as part of an Azerbaijani-Turkic literary revival for whom Ottoman Turkey now appeared more 'modern' than Persia.

Narimanov was of the third generation of intelligentsia which was comprised largely professionals -- teachers, journalists, and cultural-literary intellectuals. For Azerbaijani cultural elites of this generation, the crucial dilemma was linguistic. Nation-building was primarily through the dramatic arts and theater and through the beginning of an Azerbaijani press. In these modernization and reformist efforts they tried to reduce clerical influences and 'fanaticism' and to heal sectarian divisions. Central to their efforts -- and Narimanov's -- was the institution of an Azerbaijani language, a vernacular understood by Azerbaijani people, promoted through the poetry, theater productions, and dramas to which Narimanov contributed. Another key element was the modernization of schools and education which placed pedagological efforts at the core of Azerbaijani reformism, something in which Narimanov was also intimately involved: in the 1870's and 1880's several modern reformist Azerbaijani schools were set up (teaching Turkish, Persian, Russian, maths, sciences, etc.).[91]

Unlike much of the Jewish intelligentsia, Russification among average Azerbaijanis was rare and regarded as either retrograde or 'foreign', so for acquiring the ways of the Infidel, many were criticized as 'assimilators' or renegades.[92] The Azerbaijani's ancient

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90 Georgeon, "Note sur le modernise en Azerbaijan au tournant du siecle", p.100.

91 Ibid., p.101.

92 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.39; Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, pp.25-26.

Turkish Islamic inheritance was considered of more distinguished standing than the imperial Russian. But in ways similar to the Jewish intelligentsia's debates over Russian or Yiddish, Azerbaijani debates over the proper language upon which to base social reformist efforts were divisive. So between 1879 and 1891 their writings reflected a linguistic Ottomanization, in contrast to those among them who called for the use of the 'popular dialect', or Azerbaijani, in order to 'go to the masses', much as Yiddish-language proponents among the Jewish intelligentsia had.

But Azerbaijani reformism and nascent 'nation-building' were only minimally linked to the wider reformism of the empire's other Muslims. The empire's educated Muslims had embarked on a reformist and 'modernization' movement to reform cultural, religious, and social institutions. It began amongst the Volga Tatars, then Russian Muslims, then Central Asians, and in the last decades of the 19th century centered around the Crimean Tatar reformer Gasparili, who introduced new pedagogical methods. But reformist Azerbaijani elites' connections to the empire's wider Muslim reformism were tangential for a number of related reasons. While the vast majority of the empire's Muslims were Sunni, 60% of Azerbaijanis were Shi'ite. Moreover, in Transcaucasia Persian had been the language of Azerbaijani administration, clergy, and merchant-commerce until the reforms of the 1840's. Faced with educational Russification, the Shi'ite clergy had dissuaded Muslim parents from sending their children to Russo-Tatar schools, a fact which allowed the Shi'ite tradition and Persian influences to last longer than clerical tradition elsewhere.[93] Consequently large *jadidist* centers never developed in Azerbaijan as they did in Kazan, Ufa, or Orenburg.

Yet the reformist Azerbaijani intelligentsia which emerged in the last third of the century -- and of which Narimanov was a leading figure -- was strongly anti-clerical and their secularist reformism effectively displaced the political influence of the Shi'ite clergy,[94] (although equally consequential were Tsarist policies which controlled and coopted the ulema). In its anti-clerical reformism, the Azerbaijani educated liberal elite turned away from their religious Shi'ite Iranian identity and embraced their Turkish ethno-linguistic

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[93] Georgeon, "Note sur le modernisme en Azerbaidjan", 1996, pp.97-98.

[94] This is Georgeon's contention, ibid., p.98.

roots, and in so doing moved toward an ethno-linguistic, 'nationalist' secularism.[95] From mid-century the key feature of Azerbaijani Turkish political reformism involved attempts to reconcile a Muslim identity (first Turkish then Azerbaijani) within a modernizing Russia. This too was at the heart of Narimanov's political and cultural radicalism.

Until this point Narimanov's work had been exclusively in the cultural and literary realm as part of these reformist and 'national' efforts and as of age 30 he had not participated in any political grouping. Then in 1902 Narimanov decided to change career. He sat the maturity certificate exams for *gimnazia* and enrolled in Novorossiia University in Odessa to study medicine.[96] Although his biographer writes that Narimanov's "revolutionary world view" was developed in Odessa, it may be more accurate to say that he now began his first direct political activity.[97] Odessa's university student radicalism was associated with the city's wider revolutionary movement, often based on ethnic-cooperation, directed to specific university-based issues, and in these years militated against the Russo-Japanese War. Narimanov took part in these anti-war protests and found himself in the midst of a student radicalism that he had not experienced in Transcaucasia. In this milieu he became active in student political circles. But because the students represented a number of nationalities, including considerable numbers of Tatars and Caucasians, he associated with other acculturated Muslim students. In Odessa Narimanov deepened his cultural activism. He again organized theatrical productions for Muslim students.[98] After spending his winter holidays in Simferopol in the Crimea, Narimanov took these productions and the reperatory theatrical group of Novorossiia students called "Caucasians in the Crimea" to Simferopol.

Narimanov took part in, and helped to organize, political strikes although in Granat

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[95] Ibid., pp.98, 102. Turkish influences were made concrete when Ottomans begans sending pedagogues to Azerbaijan to help with educational reforms after 1905 bringing Turkish books and periodicals, and as Azerbaijani intellectuals replaced Persian with Ottoman script. The intelligentsia shifted from pan-Islamic to Pan-Turkish to Azerbaijani identities -- while the 'masses' remained at essentially 'umma consciousness' is the key argument of Swietochowski's work, Russian Azerbijan, and Russia and Azerbaijan.

[96] "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.560.

[97] Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, p.65.

[98] Ibid., pp.67-69.

it is claimed that he only concentrated on studies his first two years at the medical faculty.[99] These strikes were generally political in nature and directed against Tsarist autocracy, in sympathy with the worker's movement. As well they tended to be multi-ethnic in composition. However Narimanov also actively organized in groupings as essentially acculturated Muslims, calling for 'internationalist solidarity'. But they were clearly not internationalists in European sense, their internationalism really meant inter-ethnic cooperation in the Caucasus. There is mention also in Granat that a number of Novorossiia university professors were members of the Black Hundreds, and that Narimanov managed to complete his studies despite his hatred for them.[100] Whether accurate or not, it is true that Narimanov completed his medical degree without trouble from university authorities.

Narimanov's medical studies were financed by one of the Azerbaijani commercial communities' wealthiest and most famous millionaries, Tagiev. Much like Armenian elites, wealthy benefactors among the Azerbaijani community were common, and many of the most prosperous of the commercial and industrial elites supported not only Muslim students at Russian universities, but also reading rooms and libraries, theaters, newspapers, charitable institutions, and other cultural associations. Narimanov's Granat account however, goes to some lengths to show that eventually Narimanov distanced himself from his wealthy 'bourgeois' benefactor because of the latter's nationalist leanings. While it may be true that he distanced himself and even turned down the financial support on offer, it is unlikely that at this time it was solely because of Tagiev's nationalism. Though most were themselves barely literate, many of the Azerbaijani commercial financiers actively promoted and subsidized the activities of the reformist intellectuals and cultural elites. The Azerbaijani bourgeoisie was financially at the core of Azerbaijani reformism, in a manner similar to that of the Volga Tatars.

One of the most significant hurdles to this Azerbaijani educational reformism was not the conservative Shi'ite clergy -- already now *quasi*-decimated by the Russian state -- but the competing influence of the Russian 'assimilationist' schools: the Russian state opened a *Realschule* for Azerbaijanis in Baku, several *gimnaziia*, and expanded their

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99 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.560; Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, p.65 for his participation.
100 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.560.

Russo-Tatar school, the first in 1885 in Baku, and by 1910 of the 41 elementary schools in Baku, 10 were Russo-Tatar.[101] These schools accorded primacy to Russian language in attempts to attract Azerbaijani's to Russian culture by using Azerbaijani teachers such as Narimanov. Though in time many of these teachers would become the core of the Azerbaijani nationalist movement, Narimanov did not.

Narimanov was an Azerbaijani intellectual, nurtured on both Russian and Azerbaijani culture, but most of his intellectual contacts were non-Azerbaijani. His generation struggled with pan-Islam and pan-Turkism, with Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts and with the arrival of socialism. And yet, remniscent of the Lithuanin Kapsukas, although Narimanov's 'cultural abilities' as a dramatist and writer were notable, he was not among the ranks of the most gifted of the Azerbaijani cultural elite. It is easy to read back from his subsequent fame and ascribe to Narimanov a certain literary status, but judged from a purely literary perspective Narimanov was not of the status of others.[102] As something of a lesser figure in this milieu Narimanov was perhaps marginalized.

But more importantly is the possibility that as a Muslim cultural and literary elite, Narimanov's experiences and encounters with the Tsarist state were essentially in this cultural realm. Narimanov's involvement with the Russian state was unlike the patterns of arrest, exile, and escape of many of the Bolsheviks. Rather it consisted of essentially cultural repression and literary controls, albeit within the context of a generally Russified experience. In 1904 while staging a play for Muslim students, Narimanov's work was subjected to censorship: the Russian officials feared that it would result in increased social unrest, but as Narimanov perceived it, Tsarist censorship of Muslim literary and artistic works was a 'cultural colonialist' violation of his ideal ecumenical empire.

With revolutionary events of 1905 Narimanov left for Baku where the working classes of all nationalities were highly politicized. Narimanov joined the SD "Himmat" (also "Hummit" and "Gummet") group as a publicist and translated the program of the RSDLP into Azerbaijani. The Himmat (Muslim Social Democratic Group) had been founded in 1904 to organize Baku's Azerbaijani workers. Himmat called for a range of

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101 Georgeon, "Note sur le modernise en Azerbaijan au tournant du siecle", p.102.

102 Georgeon lists some of the key figures, ibid., pp.103-105.

social improvements including medical care, education, maternity leaves, and political rights. It was founded by members of the secular Azerbaijani intelligentsia, usually of privileged backgrounds, but it used "Muslim" in the Tsarist official sense, as a political and not a purely religious designation.[103]

In composition the Himmat leadership during Narimanov's activism resembled the early leadership of a number of radical groupings: though nearly exclusively Azerbaijani in its following, the elite was ethnically mixed -- indeed as we will see below, the Georgian Bolshevik Dzhaparidze was one of its most influential agitators -- and it represented a range of views, mixing mild socialism with anti-colonialism with nationalism. Some of its members (e.g. Narimanov) were simultaneously members of the RSDLP, and many had studied in Russian secondary schoools. The Bolsheviks in the Himmat, and especially Narimanov, used it as a vehicle to fight the illiteracy, 'cultural backwardness', and 'religious fanaticism' of the Muslim workers. And as in his literary and dramatic work, Narimanov never regarded this as politically incompatible with imperial rule or even an ecumenical imperial culture, only with autocracy.

Narimanov became one the most influential and well-known leaders of the Himmat, particularly in 1905 when the group's influence peaked. Ganji and Tiflis soon became important centers of Himmat organization, as well as Daghestan and Central Asian.[104] While most Azerbaijani liberals aligned with the Russian Kadets in 1905, and produced nearly all the Azerbaijani representation in the First and Second Dumas in 1906 and 1907, Narimanov and the Baku Azerbaijani socialists aligned with the RSDLP.

Religious and ethnic affiliations converged within Himmat's recruitment policies. The large numbers of Iranian immigrants in Baku had become an important target of Himmat recruitment, so in 1906 Narimanov created the first organization of Iranian workers under the name *Ejtima-i Amiyyun* (Social Democracy) which soon branched into Tabriz. He then founded a secret committee in Tiflis in charge of supplying the Tabriz revolutionaries with contraband arms, munitions, and printed materials.[105] Besides the

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[103] Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.64.

[104] Edward Lazzarini, "Hummat", in Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, Vol.14, p.55.

[105] Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, pp.43-44.

Muslim Himmatists, Georgian and Russian SDs and Armenian Dashnakists also joined Tabriz's revolution, introducing new dimensions of ethnic and religious cooperation, but also competing with the local SD party in Iran, the "Nidzhat".[106]

One of Himmat's claims was that the Baku Muslim bourgeoisie had politically isolated Muslim workers from other nationalities. Himmatist socialists, and Narimanov, believed that this political isolation allowed the Muslim bourgeoisie to successfully compete against Russian, Armenian, and European bourgeoisies in Baku, and it was also what allowed the development of nationalist ideas in the form of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism.[107] Accordingly, only other 'bourgeois' associations such as "The United Front Against Christians", "The Islamic Union", "Azerbaijani Union" organized the Muslim working classes in Baku, Tiflis, Erevan, Nakhichevan, and Elizavetpol. Against this, Narimanov and other Azerbaijani SDs called for ethnic cooperation in the form of 'proletarian internationalism'.

Yet the Himmat published leaflets (often in Russian) addressed to their "Muslim Brothers", and even dated its leaflets by the Islamic calendar.[108] The party's ideology may actually have been more liberal (at least until 1917) than socialist.[109] The Himmat maintained close association with the RSDLP, which later granted this only mildly socialist and mildly nationalist Muslim party autonomous status -- perhaps because the RSDLP did not resonate among Muslim workers. But its membership was not entirely Marxist, and although it opposed the traditional Islamic clergy, it was not anti-Islamic.[110] Indeed by 1907 with Narimanov as a key figure, Himmat had within its ranks nearly all the nationalist movement. With Tsarist post-1905 reaction, most leaders were arrested or fled to Persia, and in 1909-1912 most Himmatists gravitated toward the RSDLP.

While most radicals were either in prison, exile, or emigration, Narimanov completed his medical degree, continued his cultural work, and in 1908 began working as a

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106 Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, pp.83-85.
107 Ibid., p.79.
108 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.61.
109 Lazzarini, "Hummat", p.56.
110 Ibid.

physician in Tiflis. In 1906 Narimanov attended the First Congress of Muslim Teachers in Baku. In 1906-1907 a Baku educational committee was formed to address Azerbaijani concerns of both securing their cultural traditions and language while providing the neccesary linguistic and secular training for careers in a modernizing Russian society. Narimanov was named co-chairman of this committee. The committee recommended an essentially reformist, progressive, bilingual and bicultural educational curriculum so as to allow participation in both local Muslim society and in imperial Russian society. This involved study of literature, language, religion and certain secular subjects -- all in Azerbaijani Turkish. But Russian language would also be taught, and subjects such as accounting would be taught only in Russian. This plan for the "nationalization" of education as well as continued emphasis on religious instruction was proposed by a committee largely composed of individuals such as Narimanov in some way associated with either the RSDLP or with the socialist movement.[111]

In 1909 Narimanov was arrested and exiled to Astrakhan where he spent five years publishing articles on political events in Turkish journals and newspapers, and the "*Astrakhan krai*"with the Armenian Shaumain.[112] Narimanov was active in the new Astrakhan University and was even elected to the council of the Astrakhan city duma.[113] While Narimanov was in Astrakhan, the Azerbaijani nationalist Musavat (Equality) was founded in 1911-1912 and included former SDs and Himmatists. The Musavat appealed to 'umma' and Pan-Islamic sentiment, rather than to Pan-Turkism and called for a unity of all Muslims who wanted reform regardless of national and sectarian affliation. The Musavat was vague in direction and diversified in its membership, though most of its following came loosely from intelligentsia -- journalists, students, merchants, and entrepeneurs. Though founded by socialists, the Musavat soon moved to the right, becoming the most powerful secular nationalist party of the rising Azerbaijani bourgoiesie. But Azerbaijani nationalism had a greater social base in Ganje's more ethnically homogeneous context than in multi-ethnic and socialist Baku. This ethnically homogeneous milieu was foreign and

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111 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, pp.55-56.

112 BSE, p.251.

113 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.650.

unfamiliar to the urbane Narimanov, for whom Tiflis' multi-ethnic 'middle class' cosmopolitanism or Baku's multi-ethnic working classes had more familiarity. So on his return from exile Narimanov found a weakened socialist movement and a growing nationalist one, and risked being marginalized within Azerbaijani politics.

Although anti-colonial appeals worked equally for both groups, the socialist Himmat and nationalist Musavat,[114] religion played a relatively diminshed role in the politicization of Muslim society because the secular progressive Muslim intelligentsia was 'secular' only up to a point: at no time did they reject Islam or religious practice generally, really advocating a 'reformed' Islam. We see this within Narimanov's own politicization. As much as religious identity was not integral to his own identity, and as much as Narimanov regarded the influence of the Muslim clerical elite as an impediment to both social progress and to Azerbajian's place in modernizing Russian (imperial) society and therefore fought assiduously against 'religious fanaticism','ignorance', and 'obscurantism', he was in equal measure conciliatory to a more 'Protestant' Islam, repeatedly supporting religious education in school reforms for instance. In this religious ambivalence the secular Muslim intelligentsia differed quite radically from some of their Jewish counterparts for whom a rejection of Hasidism and the traditional religious establishment were almost mantric. The Azerbaijani intelligentsia, socialist and nationalist, had no religious-secular schism, so the successful politicization of 'exploitation' was conceived not in capitalist terms, but in colonial terms.[115] Azerbaijani elites believed that most Azerbajiani's would remain Muslim, perhaps at level of *umma*, and that the most successful mobilizational appeal would be predicated on some form of anti-colonialist sentiment. In fact, writing after the revolution, Narimanov noted how sensitive and flexible Muslim socialism was to religion, consistently making policy adjustments.[116]

During the early years of the Revolution, the Himmat was excluded from the RSDLP because of its nationalist positions, and most Himmatists who remained faithful to

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[114] Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.69.

[115] On the conception of 'exploitation', Ibid., p.64.

[116] Ibid., p.61.

socialism joined the RSDLP; the remainder adopted a clearer Muslim identity.[117] This was true of Narimanov. He had been based in Baku, and joined the Bolsheviks while other Himmatists in Tiflis joined the Mensheviks (although cooperation on a Muslim basis continued in practice). Part of the reason for their dissipation in Baku was the fact that Azerbaijani socialism was also represented in the *Adalat* (Justice), an organization of immigrants from Iran, and by the *Birlik* (Unity) which represented the Volga Tatars, both of whom in practice affiliated with the Himmat. Himmat never regained its former strength and following in the face of the powerfully appealing Musavat.

A number of related causes for the consolidation of the Muslim community have been offered. Altstadt argues that it was largely colonial Russian rule which provided the focus.[118] Swietochowski adds that the Tatar-Armenian ethnic violence caused Azerbaijanis to transcend local sectarian loyalties,[119] that nationalism was an answer to sectarianism, perhaps more than to colonialism. But in either case, Azerbaijani attitudes toward Russia were far more ambivalent than 'anti-colonial' implies.[120] In this context three Azerbaijani identities are emphasized: pan-Islamic most broadly, Ottoman ethnolinguistically, and Persian religiously. But this ignores any identification with either the Russian or the imperial state. There may also have been a 'Russian-imperial' identification among a portion of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia, particularly evident among Himmatists, Leftist Musavatists, and reflected in the geopolitical programs of the Musavatists more generally.

This "Russian-imperial" identity is quintessentially captured in Narimanov's biography: at once a secular Muslim, a Russified 'Tatar' elite, culturally and linguistically Turkish, and ethnically-nationally Azerbaijani -- all very self-consciously embedded in an ecumenical Russian imperial society. My sense is that this plethora of identities were neither uncommon nor were they necessarily competing, and that the extent of 'anti-colonialism' which their radicalism embodied should perhaps be softened. We know, for instance, that Volga Tatar political elites in both their popular and elitist attitudes perceived

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117 Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p.63.

118 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.43 and *passim*.

119 Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, pp.42-43.

120 Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p.192.

themselves to exist within Russia and sought political arrangements within all-Russian democratic reforms -- reforms often predicated on a multi-ethnic and poly-confessional citizenry.[121] Most dissenting Volga Tatars tended towards all-Russian radicalism, sharing the political aspirations of the Russian revolutionsry socialists, democrats, and anarchists And we know that this identification survived the test of WWI -- and beyond, even through Turkish occupation.[122]

Only against these sorts of identities can we really understand Narimanov's nationality politics as a Bolshevik in the new regime. Narimanov served as deputy commissar to Stalin at Narkomnats. As head of the Azrevkom (Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee) he had argued against the Red Army invasion. When *korennizatsiia* in Azerbaijani was used to enforce central, not local, control and interests, Narimanov worked for local interests and was eventually discredited and removed.[123] One of Narimanov's core beliefs was that socialism could liberate Azerbaijan from Russian *cultural* colonial-imperialism but still remain within an imperial *ecumenical* polity -- but this presupposed an extension of native rule. He argued (not without merit) that AzerCP politics carried out by non-Azerbaijanis (notably Armenian and Georgian Bolsheviks) simply provoked national hostility. In the end Narimanov was, I think, a particular kind of nationalist, but his early radicalization and political activities suggest, too, that he had always viewed his Azerbaijani national identity in essentially cultural and imperialist terms not in religious terms, and that this was a product of his own experiences and struggles against Tsarist cultural and censorship policies. Narimanov was anti-colonial in a cultural sense as he fought *cultural* imperialism, not economic imperialism; his anti-capitalism, though secondary, may have been more classically derivative of capitalism's encroachment over the cultural world of

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121 Galina M. Yemelianova, "Volga Tatars, Russians, and the Russian State at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century: Relationships and Perceptions", The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.77, No.3, July 1999, pp.470-471.

122 Ibid., p.471 on the persistence of all-Russian political identifications through WWI; Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, p.205 and *passim* on Azerbaijani responses to Turkish rule. Azerbaijanis were in the end ambivalent toward Turkish rule. During their brief hold over eastern Transcaucasia, the Turks were initially welcomed by the Muslims, urban and rural, but support declined when the Ottomans rejected land reform, closed the labor unions, suppressed socialist groups, and "in general enforced a policy which deprived the population of the social and political gains which they had made since 1917".

123 Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.123.

literary and humanist elites. Narimanov sought the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional ecumenial empire of Peter the Great while it was becoming a 'Russian' empire.

In the 1930's the Himmat and anyone who had formerly been associated with it were labeled nationalists. Indeed an often repeated accusations was: "from what time did you begin your ties with the nationalists, with the *Narimanovshchina* [the time of the influence of Narimanov]", making Narimanov - a key Bolshevik and creator of the Azerbaijani SSR -- the incarnation of Azerbaijani nationalism.[124] Narimanov died in 1925 at age 54 under unknown circumstances, but presumably of heart failure. Though his ashes were placed in Lenin's Masoleum, Narimanov's vilification as a nationalist persisted, and biographies on him only appeared in the 1960's.

IV. Orakhelashvili, Ordzhonikidze, Dzhaparidze: Georgian petty gentry socialism

The first Georgian Marxist grouping appeared in 1892 in one of the most economically backward regions of the empire. By 1895 Marxism had become the most powerful and important intellectual force among educated Georgians, and by 1905 Georgian Menshevism claimed not only the best organized peasant movement in the Tsarist empire, but in 1917 became one of the most consequential 'national liberation' movements. The prominence of Georgians inside Bolshevism and in the Revolution has been most visible in the figure of Stalin (Dzhugashvili). Yet in sociologically significant ways Stalin was neither representative of Georgian Bolshevism, nor of Georgian socialism generally: Stalin was the son of a shoe cobbler, attended seminary, and was barely educated; while Dzhaparidze, Orakhelashvili, and Ordzhonikidze were Russian-educated sons of impoverished Georgian gentry, and two had years of gainful employment in the medical profession in Transcaucasia. For this reason -- and because treatments of Stalin abound -- I focus on them and consider their biographies together in order to better understand Georgian Bolshevism.

In considering the situation of the sons of the impoverished rural Georgian nobility, and particularly the politicization of three of the four Georgians of this elite who derived from this social group, several related questions are worth raising. Given that Menshevism

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[124] Quoted in ibid., pp.144-145.

and not Bolshevism was so appealing to Georgian socialists, how can we understand these Georgian Bolsheviks? Moreover, the socialism (Menshevik and Bolshevik) of the sons of impoverished or *declasse* nobles appealed to both workers and peasants, but did its strength derive primarily from the former or from the latter? And finally, in addition to Stalin's famed nationalities' policies, Ordzhonikidze's brief rule in Transcaucasia was also notoriously brutal, violent, Russificatory, and generally 'anti-Georgian'. This implies the need to better sort out the relation between 'nation' and 'class' inside Georgian socialism, and it may be useful to understand why any form of pure non-socialist Georgian radicalism was so weak -- why no Georgian nationalism?

The discussion that follows highlights what I consider three essential features of their politicization and early radicalism. Most immediately, their membership in the Russified, Tiflis liberal professions -- as a would-be teacher, as a medical assistant, and as a doctor -- draws attention to the fact that they were neither implicated in 'capitalism', nor were they in the legal profession, for instance, seeking political or administrative posts. Indeed this was true of all the Transcaucasians: given the number of highly educated Transcaucasian Bolsheviks there was only one lawyer among them. Secondly, their early radicalism involved them primarily with Armenian and Azerbaijani workers in Baku, and with Georgian and Azerbaijani peasants in rural villages, but rarely with Georgian urban workers. As we will see they seemed more 'at home' in the rural areas, among the multi-ethnic working classes, and with Armenian and Muslim Bolsheviks than among Georgian workers and socialists. And finally, that they were all three from the impoverished rural nobility should turn attention to the social context of this particular Georgian social strata. I discuss this last feature first.

All three Bolsheviks were from the impoverished nobility of Kutais gubernia where Russian arms had historically protected western Georgia, and where experience of Turkish occupation was still fresh.[125] Kutais gubernia was the quintessential Christian border area between the potential threats of Muslim Caucasus highland invasions on one side and Turkish occupation and invasions on the other. Unfortunately, unlike the attention paid to

[125] Reisner, "Die Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien", p.77.

the Tiflis urban gentry, there is far less attention paid to the life of the rural gentry of of western Georgia at the turn of the century.

Grigorii (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze was born in 1886 in Goresh, Kutais gubernia in Imeretiia, to a family of the rural petty nobility.[126] At the turn of the 18th century the Ordzhonikidze's were solidly within the historic Georgian nobility, however in the ensuing decades their status within the noble estates represented that of classic rural noble impoverishment. In 1865 the serfs of Guria and Imereti (including Kutaisi and Shorapani *uezdy*) had been emancipated, one year later than in Tiflis. In addition to a communal system of self-government (for the first time involving Georgian peasants in tax collection and assessment),[127] with the introduction of private property socio-economic differentiation between petty and middle nobles and the new 'peasant proprietors' was substantially reduced.[128] Georgian peasants lost something economically in the emancipation, but they gained greater freedom and limited proprietorship; the Georgian gentry was impoverished, but the gradual nature of the emancipation and nobles' police powers over peasants maintained noble prerogatives.

Particularly after the mid-century emancipations Georgian nobles had failed to change agricultural techniques, and each year extracted less from their holdings. This appeared especially true in western Georgia where peasants remained in a half-nomadic existence, supplementing agriculture with other kinds of work. So too Ordzhonikidze's family's level of impoverishment had so declined that his father maintained a job 10 versts away transporting manganese extracted from the mines in order to support the family.[129] So while they nominally retained their privileged noble estate status, in practice their material circumstances were even more difficult than those of Dzierzynski's (comparatively less) impoverished Polish rural *szlachta* family. Yet the social effects were broadly the same: a generalized bitterness toward the Tsarist state and the flight of impoverished

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126 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.567; Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze: Biografiia, Moskva, Izd. polit. lit., 1986,p.9.

127 Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, p.108.

128 Reisner, "Die Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien", pp.76-77.

129 Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, p.9.

nobles' sons from the rural areas into the urban professions. And as with the elite of Polish socialism in the *kresy*, it was among the sons of *declasse* and petty Georgian nobles that the greatest majority of its social democratic leadership derived.

Shortly after Ordzhonikidze's birth his mother died. When he was age 10 his father died, leaving Ordzhonikidze an orphan, subsequently to be raised by a distant relative in Mingrelia. At age 8 Ordzhonikidze began parish school which was non-tuition based, and which included Russian language courses. Here he was first exposed to classical Georgian literature.[130] After completing his studies in 1898 Ordzhonikidze left for Goresh to stay with relatives, and through contacts by 1901 he made his way to Tiflis and enrolled in its medical assistants (feldsher's) school. By this time Tiflis was arguably quite cosmopolitan with Europeanized Georgian nobles, as a result of mid-century reforms under Vorontsov's liberalizing, though 'imperial', rule. With the promotion of education and culture, theaters, Italian opera, and the spread of Russian imperial culture to Tiflis nobles and aristocrats, new *gimnaziia* were opened in Kutais for western Georgians to ease the burden of the Tiflis *gimnaziia*. Vorontsov was determined that education be *the* key institution for assimilation, indeed more schools were opened for Georgians than for Armenians. Katkov's dictum that the empire's minorities would only adopt imperial Russian culture if it raised their self-esteem was applied best here, and to the Russified Georgian Bolsheviks.

Ordzhonikidze stepped into this new urban environment. In 1903, at age 17 and while in feldsher's school, Ordzhonikidze first became politically active, joining the RSDLP, and according to the Granat account, consistently remained in its Bolshevik faction.[131] Ordzhonikidze's biography seems to follow the Granat account in suggesting that Ordzhonikidze immediately adhered to the party's 'Leninist wing' under *Iskra*'s influence.[132] This is possible but unlikely. Ordzhonikidze was influenced by fellow student's while at the feldsher's school and he was active in a series of student socialist circles before officially joining the RSDLP in 1903, becoming a member of the socialist circles through acquantainces and illegal literature. Ordzhonikidze's studies in Tiflis

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130 Ibid., pp.9-10.

131 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.567.

132 Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, pp.12-13; "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.567.

coincided with the years of the greatest revolutionary activity in that city, and most especially of the social democratic groupings. The RSDLP had set up a committee in Tiflis in 1901 and published a Georgian language paper. In 1902 the Tiflis RSDLP committee was small, but they had organized SD student circles at the feldsher's school and student radicalism in Tiflis was quite active, producing mostly political demostrations against Tsarist autocracy as in other major imperial cities, Kiev, Kharkov, Petersburg, but very little specifically nationalist radicalism. And yet as of 1902-1903 social democracy in Tiflis had not yet split into the Bolshevik-Menshevik factions, and even when the Zurich Russian colonists did so, in practice it had very little effect in the more pragmatic and isolated Caucasus. Indeed as in Latvian socialism, in Georgia the practical demarcation between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks did not really become clear until 1917.[133] Ordzhonikidze had began his radical activities at the time of the protests against the 'imperialist' Russo-Japanese War in which he took part with other students at the feldsher's school. His greatest influence was meeting Kamo, soon to become one of the most famous Georgian revolutionaries, and who may have caused Ordzhonikidze to align with the Bolsheviks.[134] His work consisted of distributing leaflets in Georgian and Russian in eastern Georgia.

Under Kamo's influence Ordzhonikidze took part in party work in Tiflis. But he also began 'agitating' among peasants in the surrounding rural areas, propagandizing against both landowners and Tsarist autocracy. His rural radicalism among peasants, quite unique to Georgian socialists, deserves attention. Suny and Jones argue that the Tiflis working class was mostly ethnically Georgian, the bourgeoisie Armenian, and that these were important factors in the success of Social Democracy in Georgia: a class war against the dominant Armenian bourgeoisie and a liberation against Russian and Armenian political dominance made 'social' and 'national' appeals virtually synonymous, fusing the class

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133 Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p.13; on Latvia, Andrew Ezergailis, The 1917 Revolution in Latvia, New York, 1974, Chapter 10.

134 Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, pp.14.

with the national struggle.[135] However the Tiflis RSDLP committees at the time directed their proclamations to workers of all nationalities -- Georgian, Armenian, and Russian -- not just Georgians. But the Tiflis working class was actually quite multi-ethnic, with Russians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis and others. Indeed part of the reason for socialism's move into the countryside was precisely because the ethnic Georgian urban working class base was limited. Indeed none of the Georgian Bolsheviks worked primarily among the Tiflis working classes. Dzhapraidze, Orakhelashvili, Ordzhonikidze, and Stalin were either in multi-ethnic Baku or among rural Georgians, and in Dzhaparidze's case, rural Azerbaijanis. Although much attention has focuced on *urban* Georgian working class radicalism in confrontation with Armenian capital, the effects on Georgian socialism (and nationalism) of both *rural* ethnic composition and socio-economic differentiation should probably be considered.

Ordzhonikidze's socialist work in the rural areas is important, I think, because it captures something of the socialist politicization of the impoverished Georgian rural gentry. The Caucasian sections of the RSDLP were quite active in the rural areas among ethnic Georgians, unlike RSDLP groups elsewhere in the empire. Georgian SDs had extended their influence into the countryside and organized the Georgian peasantry in a manner following the Austrian SDs or the Bavarian section of the SPD -- by not limiting themselves to urban 'proletarians' and by regarding poor and middle peasants, and lower class non-proletarian groups as part of the 'exploited working people'.[136] But why not organize them on a nationalist basis as did Lithuanians, Latvians, Poles, or Ukrainians? Going into the countryside Georgian socialists found a relatively homogeneous rural population, and low productivity as a result of the emancipation settlements. The socio-economic situation of rural Georgian nobles and peasants had been converging for decades with increasingly less economic disparity between them. So when Georgian socialists went into rural Georgia they found not only ethnic homogeneity, but also socio-economic

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135 This is the argument in Stephen F. Jones, "Georgian Social Democracy in 1917", in E. Rogovin-Frankel, J. Frankel, B. Knei-Paz, Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917, Cambridge, 1992, p.248; Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, pp.12-13; Suny, "Nationalism and Social Class in the Russian Revolution: the Cases of Baku and Tiflis", in Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change, p.252 and *passim*.

136 Jones, "Georgian Social Democracy in 1917", pp.248-250.

'sameness'. Rural Georgia by this time did not have the socio-economic differentiation of the Lithuanian or Latvian countrysides, and with the exception of a very tiny rump gentry, a large majority of rural Georgian were like the socialists themselves -- poorer or impoverished gentry and small-propertied peasants.

Jones argues that this lack of socio-economic differentiation contributed to a sense of solidarity between impoverished gentry and peasants in their embattled social statuses and muted the classic working-class--intelligentsia suspicions typical of socialist parties.[137] But I draw the opposite conclusion for two related reasons. Socio-economic 'sameness' (*viz.* decline) was what had contributed to the poorer gentry's radicalization in the first instance, while 'blocked' upward mobility was affecting the small-propertied peasant and the landless laborer alike. So their respective 'elective affinities' inside socialism differed. But perhaps more importantly, any call for 'national' mobilization on the part of impoverished nobles was interpreted by the peasantry as a call for the restitution of the older feudal-seigneurial noble-dominated order, so nearly any form of purely nationalist politics carried out in the Georgian countryside by sons and grandsons of impoverished rural nobles would have failed as a variation of 'gentry nationalism'. As Reisner observes, Georgian peasants likely feared the restoration of the antecedent feudal order,[138] perhaps as much as they wanted social reform. Georgian peasants could *only* be mobilized on a socialist basis. Socio-economic sameness did not produce a solidarity of the ethnic group otherwise it would have been a pure nationalist movement; socio-economic sameness politicized the group in decline and the only basis for a 'nationalist' mobilization of the 'masses' was the socialist call. Suny argues that traditional Georgian 'gentry nationalism' was irrelevant to the new Georgian working class,[139] but given that socialism's social base was in the countryside, and given what we know of the countryside, this may misspecify the 'elective affinity' -- Georgian 'gentry' nationalism was irrelevant to the Georgian rural peasantry.

Ordzhonikidze, then, the son of a deeply impoverished Georgian noble family, was

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137 Jones, "Georgian Social Democracy in 1917", p.250.

138 Reisner, "Die Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien", p.76.

139 Suny, Making of the Georgian Nation, p.140.

first radicalized in Tiflis in a Russified feldsher's school, but socialist political activism carried him to the rural Georgian countryside. Ordzhonikidze was involved with the RSDLP's Imeretian-Mingrelian committee which worked almost exclusively among peasants in the Shoripani region. Ordzhonikidze's political work was almost entirely practical, rarely implicating him in theoretical debates, and most was limited to western Georgia (Mingrelia, Imeretia, Abkhazia) and Tiflis. Ordzhonikidze graduated in 1905, went to Batum and began working as a medical assistant, but continued organizing and agitating not only among peasants but also among his patients.[140] In this Ordzhonikidze was not a professional revolutionary and to this point his activities among *any* urban working classes was very limited. Ordzhonikidze's influence in the Batum RSDLP slowly increased however, and he began organizing worker's strikes in Batum, Kutais, Gori, and other western Georgian cities.

Like Ordzhonikidze, Orzkhelashvili's early radicalism also involved his rural gentry status and an imperial-cum-Russian education. Biographical accounts of Orakhelashvili's life before the Revolution are either very sketchy or unreliable.[141] According to Granat Mamia Orakhelashvili was born in the same region as Ordzhonikidze in 1883 in Shoropani *uezd*, Kutais guberniia, to a "poor peasant family".[142] Yet even the official Soviet biography claims that he was of *dvorianstvo* or gentry origin.[143] This is most likely true given that his course of studies involved considerable financial resources on the part of the family. His family were, like Ordzhonikidze's, likely semi-impoverished rural aristocracy.

Orakhelashvili studied at the Russified Kutais classical *gimnazia* and then enrolled in the Medical Faculty at the University of Kharkov, subsequently joining the Military Medical Academy in St. Petersburg in 1902.[144] His education brought him across the empire -- but not to Europe. Whether Orakhelashvili had been active in radical groupings while in *gimnazia* or medical school is unclear, though if he had it did not prevent him from

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140 Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, p.19.

141 For instance, S. Kvachaze, S. Mamia Oraxelashvili (biogr. narkvevi.), Tiblisi, 1965 is dated and full of 'sovietisms'; Granat devotes one-half page, and BSE only several brief paragraphs.

142 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.567.

143 BSE, p.468.

144 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.567; BSE, p.468.

completing his studies. The fact that he joined the empire's most important Military Medical Academy is itself testament to his already high level of identification with the Russian state or acculturation into imperial career. While in Petersburg Orakhelashvili took part in the student unrest of 1905, and in the summer of 1906 he left for Paris and Geneva, though he was arrested and imprisoned in Tiflis. Like Ordzhonikidze, Orakhelashvili too completed his studies: in 1908 Orakhelashvili graduated from the Petersburg Military Medical Academy and worked the next six years as a doctor in the Transcaspian oblast.[145]

Dzhaparidze's youth was as privileged as Orakhelashvili's, though expulsion for radical activity meant that he was never employed as a professional. Prokofii Aprasionovich Dzhaparidze, also known by his party name Alesha, was born in 1880, and like Orakelashvili and Ordzhonikidze he too was born in Kutais gubernia to a landed family in the village of Shardometi. Dzhaparidze's father died when he was young, leaving the family in more difficult financial circumstances. Nevertheless he attended a Russified school for sons of the nobility, and in 1894 (or 1896) he enrolled in the Aleksandrovskii Teachers Institute in Tiflis and remained there until 1900.[146] This was the same teacher's institute which Narimanov had attended and as we saw, it was multi-ethnic in composition and its purpose was to train qualified, bilingual teachers for imperial *gimnaziia* and *Realschulen*. Like Ordzhonikidze and Orakhalashvili, Dzhaparidze also made the transition from rural Kutais to multi-ethnic Tiflis and its Russified educational system.

While a student at the institute in Tiflis in 1898 Dzhaparidze began frequenting illegal political circles, which soon disolved into clearer nationalist, Marxist, and quasi-Marxist factions.[147] Dzhaparidze joined one of the latter as well as teachers' and educators' professional circles and associations. These were likely vague in orientation, but generally oppositional. Also in 1898 Dzhaparidze took part in the first strike of the Tiflis railroad workers. In 1900, during his third year at the institute, Dzhaparidze took part in the May Day demonstrations, was arrested, and spent 11 months in prison before deportation back to Kutais in 1901. He was subsequently banned from residing in the

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145 BSE, p.468.

146 BSE, p.193.

147 "Biografiia", Granat, p.407.

three major cities of Transcaucasia.[148] However unlike Narimanov, Dzhaparidze was expelled from the institute for his activism,[149] and in 1900 he joined the Imeretian-Mingrelian Committee of the RSDLP, as had Ordzhonikidze. As a Party activist in 1901 Dzhaparidze helped to direct strikes of tobacco workers in Kutais. By 1904 he was sent to work in Baku where he began to direct oil workers' strikes and the same year was elected to the Baku Committee of the RSDLP.

During the same period, while engaged in political work in Abkhazia during the revolutionary events of 1905 Ordzhonikidze was arrested for transporting arms. This first arrest began his revolutionary existence. As Mikoyan noted in his memoires, Ordzhonikidze would spend at least 8 of his 15 years of pre-revolutionary radicalism in prison, hard labor, or exile.[150] This is on par with Dzierzynski, and unsurprisingly both would become famous for their political brutality and ruthlessness. Like Orakhelashvili who had fled to Paris and Geneva after the 1905 reprisals, in April 1906 Ordzhonikidze too, left for Europe on his release.[151] In Berlin Ordzhonikidze lived amongst Russian and Caucasian revolutionaries and met the Georgian socialist Makharadze. Apparently he did not like life in emigration because of its almost obsessive emphasis on theoretical discussions.[152] After six months in Berlin Ordzhonikidze returned to Baku, and in 1907 worked again a medical assistant.[153] It is also likely that Ordzhonikidze felt out of place amongst what would have been essentially Europeanized Georgian socialists in Berlin. Indeed throughout his life Ordzhonikidze distrusted all 'foreign' influences -- including those among Georgians themselves.

During these years the Baku working classes were among the most militant in the empire, and Ordzhonikidze's organizational skills brought him some prominence. Although as a Georgian in an Armenian-Azerbaijani city Ordzhonikidze was clearly an

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148 BSE, p.193; "Biografiia", Granat, p.407.

149 BSE, p.193.

150 Memoires of Anastas Mikoyan, p.413.

151 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.567 dates his release to April; Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, p.21 dates his release to May.

152 Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, pp.26-27.

153 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.567.

ethnic minority. Within the Baku Bolshevik committee he found other Georgians like Dzhaparidze. Baku attracted Georgian Bolsheviks since the Tiflis party organization was slowly becoming dominated by Mensheviks. As in Vilna and Kiev the socialist parties' leadership in Baku was more ethnically mixed in composition than the rank and file. Ordzhonikidze worked as a feldsher and agitated in the rural areas surrounding Baku among the Azerbajani peasantry. He also agitated in the workers' barracks in Baku against their unsanitary conditions, and took part in May Day demonstrations with Dzhaparidze.

Ordzhonikidze was arrested with 40 other strike leaders during demonstrations for distributing leaflets and brochures, and many of his own writings were confiscated in the arrests. In March 1908 Ordzhonikidze was tried and sentenced to administrative exile, spending the years of reaction outside Trsancaucasia.[154] While in prison and exile Orzhonikidze may have been 'sustained' by Marxist literature and 'ideas', as his biography claims,[155] although I think it more likely that he was 'sustained' by the politically active exile colony which not only produced legal and illegal literature, but also brought together exiles of different nationalities and political parties. Tsarist documents specifically make mention of his gentry status, which may explain the severity of the punishment despite his young age (19 years old).[156] In all, Ordzhonikidze spent almost two years in prisons and in exile in Enisei gubernia.[157]

Dzhaparidze, too, was not among Georgian workers in Tiflis, but organized strikes among Armenians and Azerbaijanis in 1905 in Baku. According to his official biography Dzhaparidze was a co-founder of the Muslim-Azerbaijani SD Himmat.[158] Although I have found no other evidence of this, Dzhaparidze was indeed involved with the Muslim Himmat: as a member of the RSDLP's Baku Committee he had maintained close relations with various Himmatists, as apparently had Stalin who in 1906 unsuccessfully attempted a

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154 Grigorij Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, pp.32-34.

155 Ibid., p.36.

156 Ibid., p.34.

157 BSE, pp.494-495; "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.568; the arrest figure is in Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, p.29.

158 BSE, p.193.

merger between the Himmatists and the Caucasian Party Committee.[159] The Georgian Dzaparadize made efforts to present 'Russian' socialism (Bolshevism) as representing the interests of Muslim working classes.

That Ordzhonikidze and Dzhaparidze were more 'at home' among Azerbaijani peasants than among the more nationalist and European-educated Georgian Mensheviks in Tiflis makes sense only in the context of their impoverished rural upbringing and subsequent Russified education. The relationship between the Georgian Bolsheviks and the Baku Muslim working class, or indeed the wider relationship between the leaderships of the radical groupings and the Transcaucasian Muslim populations, was ambiguous however. On the one hand the Muslim proletariat was substantial and potentially determinative in the revolutionary struggle. On the other hand, organizing and mobilizing them was extremely difficult. As Dzhapradize had characterized the essential problem, "political leadership had not ignored the Muslims -- it was simply that they were culturally more backward than the rest of the population and revolutionary groups had no influence over them".[160] That is, the "Russian" party or the RSDLP had no influence. And in the years following the 1905 revolution and the subsequent reaction, Dzhaparidze worked on several Bolshevik newspapers, helped organize agreements for oil workers, and was active -- among largely non-Georgian workers -- in Rostov, Nakhichevan, and in the Kuban.[161]

Ordzhonikidze organized Muslim workers, but in Persia. In 1909 Ordzhonikidze escaped to Persia where he activily participated as a social democrat, and arguably by this time as a Bolshevik, in revolutionary events. The Persian revolution began in 1905 after the first Russian revolution and drew radical activists from the Tsarist empire, in part because of the thinning of their ranks under Stolypin and the lack of activity inside the empire. By many it was viewed as progressive and because it drew Russian, Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Georgian socialists and national-socialists, the "Tsarist emigres" in Tabriz themselves formed something of an internationalist colony. Again Ordzhonikidze and Dhzaparidze were more 'at home' among the multi-ethnic parties than among the ethnically

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159 Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p.54.

160 Quoted in Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, pp.103-104.

161 "Biografiia", Granat, p.407.

Georgian parties.

Much of the otherwise rather disparate politics of the various groups seemed to converge around an anti-colonialist core: the Iranian people were overturning their colonial and despotic regime in the creation of a democratic-parliament -- 'Tsarist radicals' too had sought something similar in Russia. Ordzhonikidze's activities in Persian events involved work for the Baku committee and a position as a liaison between Persian radicals and the Bolshevik emigre group in Paris. He wrote as a special correspondent, mostly for Bolshevik publications, analyzing political and economic life in Persia and the Iranian people's struggle against feudalism.[162] Ordzhonikidze also smuggled literature between Baku and Persia.

At the end of 1910 Ordzhonikidze emigrated to Paris and in early 1911 he attended the Bolshevik party school in Longjumeau.[163] On his return to Russia, Ordzhonikidze spent a brief time in Transcaucasia, but was arrested (with Stalin) in 1912 in St. Petersburg. Sentenced to hard labor and permanent residence in Siberia, between 1912 and 1915 Ordzhonikidze spent 3 years in the Shlissel'burg fortress, was exiled to Iakutsk and released with the February revolution.[164] While in Iakutsk Ordzhonikidze worked in the exile settlement colony as a medical assistant. His years in the labor camp were spent with other revolutionaries -- Mensheviks, SRs, Bundists, Dashnaks, etc. -- and there he met and worked with the Jewish Bolsheviks Iaroslavskii and Sverdlov, and the Ukrainian Bolshevik Petrovskii.[165] Together with Petrovskii and Iaroslavskii Ordzhonikidze helped edit the Bolshevik paper "The Social Democrat" which defended a Bolshevik-Menshevik unity in the Caucasus.

After repeated arrests Dzhaparidze, too, was exiled to Rostov and forbidden from residing anywhere in the Caucasus for 5 years. While in Rostov he joined the local party organization before his next arrest. He was then sent for 3 years to Vologda. In 1913 he returned to Tiflis and took courses at the University, was again arrested in 1915 for May

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162 Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, pp.41-42.

163 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.568; BSE, pp.494-495.

164 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.568.

165 Grigorii Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze, pp.61-62; "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.568

Day demonstrations and deported to Enisei. After his escape and until the February Revolution Dzhaparidze joined the Red Cross and under the name of Prince Baratov conducted propaganda among soldiers of the Imperial Armies in Trebizond.[166]

In contrast, with the outbreak of the War Orakhelashvili served as a medical doctor in an Imperial field army with an officer's rank, for three years until the February Revolution.[167] The duration of his service was apparently near the front lines. In 1917 and 1918 Orzkhelashvili served as chairman of the RSDLP Vladikavkaz Committee and its Soviet, and he was a member of the RSDLP Caucasian Regional Committee. In 1918 Orakhelashvili worked in Tiflis, Batum, and Kutais, was arrested by the Menshevik government and remained in prison for 18 months until 1920. On his release Orakhelashvili became chairman of the Georgian Bolshevik CC and served as a member of the Caucasian Bureau of the RCP(B). Among other positions, Orakhelashvili was deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars between 1923 and 1925, and by 1930 he was on the editorial board of *Pravda*.

With the Revolution Dzhaparidze was elected to the RSDLP Baku Committee (together with the Armenian Shaumian and Narimanov) and then chairman of the Baku worker's strike committee. In January 1918 Dzhaparidze became chairman of the Baku Soviet and in March he was a member of the Committee of Revolutionary Defense which was responsible for the violent suppression of the nationalist Musavat revolt. Although he had been initially only a reluctant supporter of Lenin's "All Power to the Soviets" because of the Baku Bolsheviks' only weak hold, and although he had also initially opposed the Bolshevik signing of Brest-Litovsk, he eventually agreed. Dzhaparidze had also favored, during the summer of 1918, British aid.

On Lenin's suggestion Ordzhonikidze took a position on the CC of the Petrograd Soviet, and following the October Revolution he was sent to the Ukraine and the North Caucasus, where he remained during the Civil War. In the spring of 1919 Ordzhonikidze and a group of others crossed (now) Menshevik Georgia, then to Baku and sailed with Kamo and Dzhaparidze to Astrakhan, finally arriving in Moscow. In 1920 and 1921

166 "Biografiia", Granat, p.407; BSE, p.490.

167 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.567.

Ordzhonikidze was instrumental in securing Soviet power in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia: Ordzhonikidze and Stalin were responsible for the Soviet offensive in Georgia in February of 1921. Ordzhonikidze had directed the military aspects of the invasion and was made member of the Military Council of the Caucasian Front.

This was the beginning of Ordzhonikize's close ties with Stalin -- he had met Stalin in Tiflis in 1906 but otherwise had brief and infrequent contacts -- and now became one of the most ardent and violent Georgian Russifiers. In fact Ordzhonikidze's Russification tactics in Georgia were so vicious that on his deathbed Lenin was to have condemmed Ordzhonikidze's policies and demanded his expulsion from the party.[168] His antipathy for Europeanized Georgian socialists finally had a venue. In 1926 Ordzhonikidze was made candidate member of Stalin's Politburo and despite holding a number of high level positions during Stalin's rise, he died in 1937 during the purges under (not so) mysterious circumstances -- although Andrea Graziosi believes that Ordzhonikidze may have committed suicide.[169] Like Ordzhonikidze, Orakhelashvili did not survive the purges and died sometime in 1937.

The three Bolsheviks were politicized in Tiflis as students and in the professions. Why did they not become Mensheviks? In social profile Georgian Bolshevism and Georgian Menshevism were actually quite similar. One difference was educational insitutions. In response to the Russification of the Tiflis seminary, 1886 a Tiflis seminary student had killed the Russian rector and 60 students were expelled as a result. An anti-Tsarist nationalist response emerged in the Georgain seminaries. A number of Georgian Mensheviks were quite Europeanized and cosmopolitan -- Makharade and Zhordania were famously educated in Warsaw, influenced by Polish nationalists and European socialism. Dzhaparidze, Orakhelashvili, and Ordzhonikidze did not attend the seminaries and European universities where many 'nationalists' studied, but Russian and imperial educational institutions, Kutais *gimnaziia* and *Realschulen*, Tiflis' Noble School, feldsher's school, the Russified Teacher's Institute, and the Universities of Kharkov and

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168 Georges Haupt and Jean-Jacques Marie, Les Bolsheviks par Eux-memes, Paris, 1969, p.172.

169 Andrea Graziosi, "The New Soviet Archival Sources. Hypotheses for a Critical Assessment", Cahiers du Monde Russe, 40/1-2, janvier-juin, 1999.

Petersburg.[170] Their education was Russian and their social and professional experiences were in multi-ethnic contexts. The key difference, then, was in the quality of their Russification.

This had important implications toward their differing sensibilities, 'national' (Menshevik) and 'class' (Bolshevik). The 'national' and the 'social' inside Georgian Marxism are notoriously difficult to sort out. For Suny, Marxism provided Georgians a non-nationalist ideology which could be used against both the Armenian bourgeoisie and the Tsarist state. Suny links the reason for Marxism's success (especially its Menshevik variant) in Georgia from the 1890's onwards to the "particular way in which capitalism and political reform developed in Georgia", in that Georgians remained on the bottom of the economy and excluded from the political arena.[171] However Hosking argues that "Georgians developed their own variety of nationalism, based paradoxically on Marxism", and that "[Georgian] nationalism had an anti-capitalist colouring, owing to the competition with the Armenians...[and] Marxism fulfilled both the internationalist and the anti-capitalist requirements".[172] Hosking concludes, "Georgian Marxists became perhaps the most sophisticated Marxists in the empire, taking over from the Austrian Marxists the notion of individual cultural autonomy as the best way of making possible inter-ethnic cooperation in a multi-national state".[173] So was this primarily a nationalist ideology which was also anti-capitalist in battle with Armenian capital and internationalist to preserve cultural autonomy, or was it a non-nationalist ideology to be used against both Armenian capital and Tsarism? My sense is that it was not tied to either, but rather to redefining a political dependency on imperial Russia which had become increasingly restrictive.

Georgian socialism had been borrowed from Europe not from Russia. Most of the Georgian socialist leadership of the 1880's and 1890's were intellectuals of the professional classes and of the impoverished aristocracy, and most were European or Russian educated. The more impoverished nobility often entered the professions as

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170 Reisner, "Die Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsbedingungen der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien",p.70.
171 Suny, Making of the Georgian Nation, p.140.
172 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917, Fontana, 1997, pp.385-386.
173 Ibid., p.386.

doctors, lawyers, teachers, clerks -- as did these Bolsheviks. But they were not attracted to nationalism but to the RSDLP. Why did their anxiety on returning to find an autocratic 'colonial' government and exclusion from municipal dumas and civil service not make them nationalists? As noted earlier, the political sociology at work was not tied to Armenian capitalist ascendency *per se*, but Armenian ability to translate economic power into political influence -- in short, to Russian policies. The urban economic estates (merchants and distinguished citizens) were Armenian-dominated, but were shifting into positions of political influence once held by the 'status-based' estates (hereditary nobility, service nobility, and clergy) which had been Georgian-dominated. This did not mean a shift from traditional 'status' to modern 'class', but simply that state policies politically privileged one 'status' (Armenian commerce) over another (Georgian nobility), in electoral laws, in civil service, in the free professions, and in imperial access. There may have been a sense of blockage from regional political influence among educated Georgians.

Although Georgian Mensheviks and Bolsheviks differed in the extent and quality of their Russification, as members of an impoverished Georgian aristocracy seeking entry into a political and civil society which appeared increasingly Armenian and Russian in composition (the city dumas, the liberal professions, local administartion and civil service), they nevertheless continued to identify their security, position, economic well-being, and political status within the imperial Russian state. Both Georgian Mensheviks and Georgian Bolsheviks did this. In this, and in the absence of Russification, Georgians -- both nationalist and socialist -- did not develop a national-social identity in confrontation with the Russian empire, but in conjunction with it. But because of the strength of Menshevism and the weak ethnic Georgian social base of Bolshevism, Georgian Bolshevism defined itself in Russian-centralist terms in opposition to Menshevik nationalism and internationalism. The extent to which Georgian elites were politically and economically dependant upon, and incorporated into, the Russian state was matched -- though for purer geopolitical reasons -- by Armenian elites, to which I now turn.

V. Mikoyan, Miasnokov, Shaumain: Armenian socialism and geopolitical insecurity[174]

The political vision of "the imperial idea", as pursued by socialist Armenians, sought Armenians' place within cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic, 'liberal' empire.[175] But this possibility was becoming more remote after the turn of the century. As both empires became increasingly 'nationalist', Armenian attention focused on a territorial homeland. Inter-ethnic massacres of Kurds and Armenians in Anatolia and Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Transcaucasia solidified impressions that neither the imperial states nor the European powers would come to their rescue. Armenian socialists' solution was in ethnic-alliances and cooperation. The reasons may lie in the sources of Armenian russophilia more generally, and specifically geopolitical urgencies, something which I think was at the core of Shaumian's and Mikoian's early radicalism, and in a differnt manner Miasnikov's as well. I briefly address this by way of context before turning to their respective biographies.

As the Russian state increasingly viewed Armenians as radicals and disloyalists involved in social unrest and international conspiracies, it responded repressively: in 1885 500 Armenian parish schools with 20,000 students and 900 teachers -- now unemployed -- were closed and replaced by Russian schools. They were re-opened in 1886 but under surveillence.[176] Similarly, after the Hamidian massacres of Armenians in 1895-1896, the Russian response was not protection but increased repression: in 1896 Armenian church schools were again closed as were Armenian charitable institutions and libraries, together with censorship restrictions. In 1903 Armenian church properties were seized. After seeing Tsarist indifference to the Hamidian massacres in 1895-1896, and as illiberal policies at home continued, Armenian radicalism among the upper and middle strata stiffened into opposition not to Russification, but to illiberalism.

The russophilic liberalism which had characterized the mid-century Armenian intelligentsia ceded to divided loyalties and an increasingly anti-Russian stance. Loyalist

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[174] Georgi Safarov should also be counted here but I do not discuss him because of a dearth of biographical material on him.

[175] Suny, Looking Towad Ararat, pp.24-26.

[176] The Minister of Education during the most intense Russificatory period in Transcaucasia (1882-1897) was ironically an Armenian, Count I.V. Delianov.

Armenian russophilia waned as Russified middle class Armenians began to de-Russianze their names.[177] But Armenian socialists found that because of their geographic dispersion and marginalization by the increasing strength of the nationalist Dashnaks after 1903 and 1905, they could only be a viable political force in Tiflis or Baku though ethnic alliances with Transcaucasia's non-Armenians. And so explaining, as we will see, Shaumian's and Mikoian's pre-occupations with ethnic alliances.

Moreover, socialist and nationalist battles with the Ottoman state on behalf of Anatolian Armenians similarly required ethnic alliances with Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Persian Muslim reformers of the Persian constitutional and Young Turk movements, if only because simply mobilizing the numerically and economically weak Armenian peasants in the vilayets of Anatolia was a theory of revolution doomed to failure.[178] So they sought, in effect, imperial policies of 'all-Russianism' and 'Ottomanism' to battle Ottoman and Tsarist autocracies.

And yet the Armenian radical response to the Russian state was softened for reasons of ethnic survival. Most distinctive about Armenian radicalism was its persistent Russophilia -- even when faced with illiberalism, Russification, and political challenges to Armenian privileges. Armenians were attracted to Russian imperial language and culture, but at base it was really a geopolitical necessity. Armenian nationalist radicalism was motivated primarily by a fear of the disintegration of the region to Turkish rule, hence their unwavering Armenian support of Tsarist armies in the Russo-Turkish wars, and high levels of volunteers in the Imperial Army during WWI -- including Mikoian. Ethno-political struggles with Azerbaijanis (and to a lesser extent Georgians) were of secondary concern -- and so was Russification. The response to Armenian massacres and genocide were either territorial arrangements within imperial political boundaries or nationalist seperatism. But the latter depended on a level of Great Power assistance which did not materialize, and in the face of ethnic survival Russification seemed a minor infraction.

The difference with Jewish radicalism is subtle but important because it is also

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[177] Suny, Looking Toward Ararat, p.81.

[178] Anahide Ter Minassian, "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (1887-1912)", in Ronald Grigor Suny (ed), Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change, pp.183-184.

embodied in the Bolshevisk themselves. None of the Bolshevik Armenians in this elite were internationalists, despite their diasporic 'middle class' status. For Jewish radicals, socialist commitments to imperial territorial integrity and nationalist desires for a seperate Zionist state may have been similarly inspired by ethnopolitics -- fears of growing local nationalisms and of the possibilities of unitary, possible national states arising where Jews would inevitably be unwelcome minorities, and pogroms or ethnic violence. But Jews were far more geographically dispersed inside and outside Russian imperial borders and therefore faced more complex ethnopolitics. Pure 'socialist internationalism' was a key feature of Jewish radicalism. By contrast, Armenian radicalism did not have 'internationalist' groups, despite their 'diaspora' and despite the fact that the vast majority of Armenian radicals were outside Armenia. In their precarious geopolitical situation Armenian nationalists did not want seperation from Russia, but Russian protection. The geopolitical threat was geographic and ethnic survival was at stake, giving Armenian nationalist and socialist radicalism a 'territorial' immediacy which Zionists could only theorize about.

Within this geopolitical context we can best understand the Armenian Bolsheviks' radicalism. Known as "the Caucasian Lenin" Stepan Shaumian was the oldest and most influential of the Armenian Bolsheviks. It is surprising that Shaumain's early life is rather sketchy: the 1978 Soviet publication of a two-volume collection of his writings begins in 1902 and has only a brief biographical introduction, and the Granat biography begins in 1900.[179] Shaumain's stature became instantly heroic when, together with the Georgian Dzaparidze and 24 Bolshevik Commissars, he was shot by the SRs in the Turkestan desert in 1918, dying in the heroic construction of the new socialist state.

Shaumian was born in 1878 in Tiflis where he spent his early years and first began his political radicalism. According to Granat his family were Armenian merchants in Tiflis, though his official Soviet biography claims that his father was a shop clerk.[180] In all

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[179] S.G. Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, (tom.1, 1902-1914; tom.2, 1915-1918), Moskva: Izd- Polit. Lit., 1978. The Granat biography is a mere half page in length, "Biografiia", Granat, p.762.

[180] "Biografiia", Granat, p.762; BSE, p.299-300.

likelihood if his father was a shop clerk he would have been quite well-off to send his son to a tuition-paying Tiflis *Realschule* and not the Armenian seminaries which were the most common destination of the Armenian socio-economic lower strata.

In 1889 at age 11 the family enrolled Shaumian in the multi-ethnic -- but Russified -- Tiflis *Realschule* with Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis. Closure of the Armenian schools in 1885 had prompted many Armenians to send their sons to *Realschulen* and *gimnaziia* and on to Russian and German universities. Shaumian was immediately emersed in Russian culture and language, and into *Realschule* student radicalism which in the late 1890's was largely Marxist. Around age 16 Shaumian began reading revolutionary literature and organizing student study circles. Unlike the Armenian literature and history to which Mikoian and Miasnikov (below) had been exposed in the Armenian seminaries, Shaumian's *Realschule* experience exposed him to an illegal, essentially Russian radical literature which included Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and Marxist tracts.[181] Shaumian's family's decision to send their son to a Russified imperial secondary school not only testified to their socio-economic status but also to their level of acculturation and desire for their son to enter Russian imperial society.

After graduating from the Tiflis *Realschule* in 1898 in the spring of 1899 Shaumian entered the Riga Polytechnical Institute in Latvia to study chemistry. While in Riga Shaumian joined that city's popular RSDLP and became active in the Riga student radical movement, taking part in all-Russian social democratic student congresses. Shaumian spent nearly three years in Riga's social democratic student circles, but in the summer of 1899 he organized the first Armenian national-social democratic circle in the village of Dzhalal-ogli, outside Tiflis.[182] According to the BSE account this was the first Marxist circle in Armenia, but actualy in 1898 the first Marxist Armenian Worker's Group was founded in Tiflis and disbanded two years later, having linked Armenians not to fellow Armenians, but to Georgian workers.[183] This group developed ties with Georgian SDs in Tiflis, and began organizing strikes on a cross-ethnic basis in tobacco, leather, and shoe

181 "Predislovie", S.G. Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, (tom 1), p.6.

182 "Biografiia", Granat, p.762; "Predislovie", Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, (tom 1), p.6.

183 BSE, pp.299-300; Ter Minassian, "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement", p.164.

factories where Armenians were a majority.

Shaumian returned to Riga to complete his studies but was expelled from the Polytechnical Institute for his political activities. After his expulsion in 1902 he returned briefly to the Caucasus where he took part in the Tiflis worker's SD organization. Blaming the Armenian national question for the isolation of the Armenian worker, and in efforts to 'internationalize' between 1896-1902, it was on an inter-ethnic basis that small groups of Armenians, Russians, and Georgians began to organize small SD groupings. Most of the leadership were of the generation -- like Shaumian -- who had studied in Russian universities in Petersburg, Moscow, Dorpat, Riga and many had earlier joined Russian radical groupings. On their exile to the Caucasus for student radicalism -- as with Shaumian in 1902 -- they re-established these groups. While there he helped found the Union of Armenian Social Democrats, which would be affiliated with the Tiflis RSDLP, but which was disbanded in 1903 when it merged with the Caucasian Union.[184] It was this new Armenian group which published the first Armenian paper "*Proletariat*" whose original manifesto, written by Shaumian, called for class war against the capitalist dictatorship.

This drew Lenin's attention. Written before the national revolutionary events of 1905, and fresh from his three years in Riga's radical circles, Shaumian's Armenian socialist manifesto called for the Armenian group's solidarity with the Russian labor struggle because of a convergence of interests between the 'two proletariats'.[185] He viewed capitalist exploitation in the Caucasus as canonically capital vs. labor, and believed that 'national' workers' movements became socialist *internationalist*, not (socialist) nationalist. By 'internationalist', at least in 1902, Shaumian's experience was based on 'nations' inside the Russian empire with whom he had had contact, e.g. the Latvian working class, Russian, Polish and Jewish workers (in Latvia), and Tiflis Georgian and Armenian workers. But Shaumian also called for forms of political and cultural autonomy for the Caucasian peoples, particularly in terms of language and schools.

Shaumian then entered the Philosophical Faculty of Berlin University, and joined

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184 On the brief existence of the Union and Lenin's interest in it, ibid., pp.165-166.

185 "Manifest 'Soiuza Armianskikh Sotsial-demokratov'", Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, pp.29-33.

the Berlin radical groups of Russians and the foreign groups of the RSDLP. He also participated in the German Social Democratic labor movement and in various internationalist groupings. He met Martov and Kautsky, and in 1903 met Lenin in Geneva. Lenin placed Shaumian in charge of all Armenian (and some Georgian) language publications for the RSDLP's social democratic literature, and Shaumian began to translate into Armenian works by Lenin, Marx, and Engels.[186] Shaumian spent three years in Berlin and though it is unclear, it seems that he did not complete his studies.[187]

In 1904-1905 Shaumian returned to Tiflis and was elected a member of the Caucasian Union of the RSDLP, editing its influential *Bor'ba proletariata*.[188] In 1906 and 1907 Shaumian devoted most of his energies to the Bolshevik party committee in Baku, now the center of working class radicalism in Transcaucasia. He worked with the Georgians Dzhaparidze and Ordzhonikidze as well as with Azerbaijani Turks. In 1909 and again in 1911 he was arrested and sent to Astrakhan. In 1914 Shaumian returned to Baku, was arrested and exiled to Saratov where he remained until the Revolution.[189]

Thoughout this period of reaction, however, Shaumian published extensively on art, literary theory, religion, aesthetics, and philosophy, all of which he considered Marxist weapons. Shaumian's writings on nationalism, and particularly on Transcaucasian nationalisms, were substantial and of comparatively high quality, explaining Lenin's interest.[190] After his earliest tract with the Armenian social democratic manifesto, Shaumian's writings on nationalism were limited to the immediate post-1905 years and to the WWI and Civil War years. His first tract on Georgian and Armenian nationalism, published following revolutionary events of 1905 in *Kaytz* (Spark) in 1906, was "The

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186 "Predislovie", Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, (tom 1) p.7; BSE, p.299-300; "Biografiia", Granat, p.762.

187 According to official sources he graduated, see BSE, pp.299-300, while Ter Minassian writes that he dropped out, "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement", p.171. Granat only states that he attended, "Biografiia", p.762.

188 "Predislovie", Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, (tom 1), p.7;

189 "Biografiia", Granat, p.762.

190 A. Karinian, Shaumian i natsionalisticheskie techeniia na Kavkaze, Baku: Tipografiia 3-i internatsional, 1928, pp.3-45.

Nationality Question and Social Democracy".[191] This was one of the earliest socialist tracts on the national question and encapsulated the thinking of Transcaucasian Social Democracy, centered in Tiflis and multi-ethnic in leadership. In addition to the standard socio-historical materialist argument linking the development of nationalisms to capitalist development which had created new forms of struggle, Shaumian's tract followed the German Social Democrat Kautsky and not the Austro-Marxist's 1899 Brunn program.

The latter had formed the basis of the Armenian 'Specifists'' politics,[192] arguing that Armenian workers' politics should be more 'specifically' addressed, and detached from cross-class nationalist politics. The Specifists had split from both the 'internationalist' Armenian Social Democrats (who in turn accused the former of being "imitators of their Jewish [Bund] and Austrian masters [a reference to the nationalist positions of the Austro-Marxists]") and from the more stridently nationalist Dashnaks.[193] So for one branch of Armenian radicalism the "Austrian" and Bundist models appealed because of their emphasis on a federation of autonomous national parties which could battle Russian centralism. While for others the Russian-internationalist model was more attractive because emphasizing socialist goals could counter 'bourgeois seperatism'. Shaumian was resolutely within this latter camp. Although the Specifists were effectively disbanded by Tsarist authorities by 1908, their call for national workers organizations within a multinational state continued to resonate, and Shaumian's polemics against both the Specifists and Dashnaks are illustrative of his 'imperial' commitments. Shaumain, argued that the 'national specificity' of the Jewish Bund would only lead to the disintegration of the empire. For Shaumian the response to 'the Armenian question' lay in destroying autocracy, and this could only be done in cooperation with the Russian working class. Since autocracy and socio-economic relations were the sources of nationalist seperatism, ethnic cooperation on a Transcaucasian socialist basis was the only response.

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191 Ibid., p.7.

192 "Natsional'nii vopros i sotsial-demokratiia", in Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, tom.1, pp.138-164 Especially pp.140-143 on the historical argument and pp.143-144 on Kautsky's influence. A Brunn line had been advanced by the newly formed Georgian-Armenian organ several years earlier, *Proletariati krive* on the Caucasian Union's RSDLP program, discussed in Ter Minassian, "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement", pp.165-166.

193 Ibid., pp.168-171, quote p.169.

Without entering into the merits of the polemics, two substantive observations are worth making. First, in Shaumian's desire for decentralized forms of national autonomy, his experiences to this point suggest the same imperative for ethnic cooperation which we found in Dzierzynski's, Piatnitskii's, or Gusev's politics. But as an Armenian, for Shaumian the socialist response to nationalism was a "federative brotherhood" based on ethnic cooperation,[194] not a purely socialist internationalism. Though the contexts differed, similar ethnopolitical dynamics prevailed. Specifically, after 1903's Russification policies and especially after the interethnic violence of 1905, 'national' or ethnic identities began to chrystallize more coherently and the various radical groupings reflected this: the Armenian nationalist Hunchak party saw an influx of members between 1903 and 1905 with at least 25 new groups forming in Baku, Erevan, and Alexandropol;[195] the Mensheviks were rapidly becoming a predominantly 'Georgian national' party, and the Azerbaijani Himmatists were increasingly influential among Muslim workers. Moreover, Armenian-Azerbaijani violence of 1905 had prompted a response by the nationalist Dashnaks similar to that of the Jewish Bundist in reponse to anti-Jewish pogroms in the same year -- Dashnaks formed self-defense units designed to protect the Armenian community, urban guerilla warfare style. After 1905 the Dashnaks were the dominant Armenian radical grouping, a dominance that would only grow in subsequent years.

Secondly, Shaumian also wrote on the "Tatar-Armenian War" of 1905 in which he polemicized against both 'Tatar' and Armenian reactionaries, who by their ethnic violence undermined the true revolutionary movement -- all of which was provoked by the "crimial Caucasian bureaucracy", a commonly made contention.[196] The Armenian Bolsheviks, and Shaumian most influentially among them, not only condemmed the autocratic state and the 'nationalist reactionaries' on both sides of the conflict, but they also condemmed the self-defense organizations, organizing instead a Turkish-Armenian fraternal union through the Armenian section of the Baku and Himmat committees.[197]

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[194] Karinian, Shaumian i natsionalisticheskie techeniia na Kavkaze, p.10.

[195] Ter Minassian, "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement", p.167.

[196] "Armiano-Tatarskaia provocatsiia", in Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, tom.1, pp.185-186.

[197] Ter Minassian, "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement", p.177.

While involved in polyglot and multi-ethnic Baku working class radicalism, with the outbreak of WWI Shaumian again revisited the national question and the need for national-cultural autonomy in a series of publications in which he canonically took Lenin's position on nationalities' rights to cultural expression and an internationalist position on the War. His writings on nationalism during the revolution differed from those written earlier in at least one significant respect: nationalism was no longer a theoretical question involving bourgeois capitalism, but a practical issue facing a new state. He therefore began to accomodate a certain decentralization and wider national-regional autonomies. Shaumian viewed the nationality question as the Russian state's -- not the Armenian people's -- most pressing concern. Though in oppostion to the nationalist politics of the Dashnaks whom he now viewed (not entirely incorrectly) as representing the professional and economic interests of the Armenian middle classes, he softened his earlier position on the language issue.[198] Not completely embracing the Austro-Marxists' positions, Shaumian, like Lenin, made accomomdation for the nationalisms that the War had aroused,[199] although by 1917-1918 Shaumian was arguing that it was nationalist seperatism in Transcaucasusia which had caused a weakening of the front lines.[200]

Shaumian called for three autonomous national Transcaucasian regions within a broader, decentralized federal structure, similar to Lenin's 'self-determination to the point of separation'. Shaumian's proposals were rejected in favor of a more centralist model of Transcaucasian governance, but the change in his thinking was nevertheless significant. He fought the 'bourgeois nationalism' of the Dashnaks, I think, as did many Armenian socialists not because it undermined internationalist working class solidarity but because at its core he believed it undermined the positions of Armenians within the Russian empire.

At a crucial Dashnak congress in 1907 the Party had adopted a socialist program

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198 The Armenian middle classes had joined the Dashnaks in substantial numbers after 1905 as the Party moved beyond its traditional Ottoman aims.

199 See Shaumian tracts published in 1914 and 1916, "O natsionnal'no-kul'turnoi avtonomii" [1914], pp.418-419 (tom.1); "Natsional'nii vopros i revoliutsionniia sotsial-demokratiia"[1916], and "Intelligentsiia i nationalizm"[1916], pp.28-30, 31-41. All in Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, the latter in tom.2. Also Karinian, Shaumian i natsionalisticheskie techeniia na Kavkaze, pp.11-13 for a similar discussion..

200 "Natsionalizm na Kavkaze i ogolenie fronta", Shaumian, Izbrannie proizvedeniia, tom.2, pp.160-162.

and ensconced this within the national question.[201] In the choice between the Armenian-cum-Transcaucasian worker (the Transcaucasian class struggle) vs. the Anatolian peasant (the struggle for national emancipation from the Ottomans), the Dashnaks straddled both and adopted a program similar to the SRs calling for extra-territorial cultural autonomy.[202] Though still committed to socialist aims, Armenian, Georgian and Russian SDs all viewed the Dashnaks as using socialism (they retained a place in the International) for nationalist ends.[203] As Ter Minassian argues, the radical groupings were engaging in a kind of 'socialist-one-up-manship' (though nationalist appeals were rising) now viewing socialism as a defense against national oppression, rather than a stage in economic development.[204] Ter Minassian argues that a section of Armenians interested in new answers to the national problem and "ideologized though the medium of Russian culture", joined the Russian parties, the SDs or the SRs.[205]

The Transcaucasus were 'balkanizing' into nationalist groupings -- Georgian Mensheviks, Armenian Dashnaks, and Azerbaijani Musavatists. As the respective nationalities' ethno-politics worked their way through geopolitical events and Tsarist policies, national or ethnic identities became more clearly focused and they viewed each other more distinctly. But their commitment was not to a Russian or imperial culture because they were anyway not Russified or assimilated in the same way as Jews or Ukrainians. For Transcaucasian radicals, and especially Armenians, the commitment was to the geopolitical, not the cultural, empire.

By 1916 it was clear that Armenian fate would be tied to Russian success in the War, and middle class Armenians and the Kadet Party became outspoken defenders of

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201 Until the early 20th century the Dashnaks were concerned only with organizing on a non-socialist basis. Until this time they remained loyalist to the Tsarist state, but between 1903 and 1905 turned to defense of Transcaucasian Armenians in addition to Turkish Armenians. Ter Minassian, pp.174-175. Dashnak influence included the Tiflis liberal and conservative Armenian bourgeoisie, workers in Baku and peasants in Karabagh; paradoxically in Erevan, the heart of Armenia, the Dashnak were weak.

202 Ter Minassian, "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement", p.179.

203 Leibknecht distrusted their motives, Luxemburg, Bernstein, Kautsky, and the French socialists supported them and their association with the Second International really represented a nationalist grouping under the Socialist banner.

204 Ter Minassian, "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement", p.180.

205 Ibid., pp.180-181.

Russian expansionism -- understood as annexation of Turkish Armenia.[206] During the revolutionary and Civil War years Shaumian was among the most influential and most respected Bolsheviks in the Caucasus, particularly through the famous Baku Commune in 1918 and directing the Baku Military Revolutionary Committee. He consistently supporting 'all-Russian' solutions in political arrangements. Shaumian endeavored to establish Soviet power in the Caucasus, suppressing Armenian Dashnaks, anti-Soviet Musavatists in 1918 in Baku, and 'rightist' socialist parties.

Ter Minassian writes that after 1905 Shaumian was almost exclusively in Transcaucasia where, "similar to a number of other Caucasians such as Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Eukidze, he became a typical revolutionary, organizer, and propagandist of the interior".[207] Yet Shaumian's writings and his radicalism reflected not the world view of a 'propagandist of the interior', but of the Armenian intelligentsia whose activism was almost exclusively outside of Armenia. He was active in the interior after 1905, but his world view as a radical activist had already been formed in the empire's Russified schools, in Latvia, and in Berlin. It was these experiences which he used to read Caucasian politics, both nationalist and socialist.

Born in 1895 Anastas Ivanovich Mikoian was only 22 years old in 1917. Though his political assignments remained in the Caucasus, Mikoian was elevated to national stature by 1919 as part of the group of Bolsheviks who took power in Baku in April 1920. Arrested and jailed by the SRs, Mikoian was not shot with the other commissars after the fall of the Baku Commune, though the circumstances surrounding his escape are unclear. He was one of the few Old Bolsheviks not only to survive the purges (though his name was on Stalin's next list) but he outlived Stalin, serving under Khrushchev and Brezhnev and remaining a member of the CC until 1976. Mikoian died at the age of 83 in 1978.

From his early interest in politics while a student in Tiflis until his official entrance into the CP in 1915, remarkably little is known about Mikoian's pre-Bolshevik political radicalism. His autobiography, otherwise full of detail and minutea from 1917 through the

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206 Suny, Looking Toward Ararat, pp.120-121.

207 Ter Minassian, "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement", p.171.

early years of Soviet Transcaucasia, is silent on a substantial 10 year period of his early politics and radicalization, as is his "Biografiia" in Granat. Some sources claim he was active in the Constitutional Democratic Party (the Kadets) before joining the Bolshveiks, while others note that Mikoian was involved in the Armenian Dashnaks. There may be some truth to both these claims. In 1923 Mikoian had accused the Azerbaijani Turk Narimanov of nationalism, and the latter in turn accused Mikoian of remaining in Azerbaijan to carry out "Dashnak work under the flag of communism". Narimanov recalled that his own 1890 novel *Sona and Bahadur* had dealt with the love between an Armenian and an Azerbaijani and had been written "when Mikoian was still a Dashnak".[208]

Born in the small mountain village "a picturesque corner of Armenia" near Tiflis, Mikoian was raised in an extended family which had lived in Sanain for generations. Only the local monk and priest in the village could read and the rest of the population, Mikoian's parents included, were illiterate, apparently without access to teachers, books, or newspapers.[209] Mikoian's Granat biography states that his was a working class family, although in 'estate' terms Mikoian's father classified himself as 'peasant' on official documents. Mikoian's grandfather had been a serf and they lived in the country, so the other two estates -- noble and *meshchanstvo* (townsmen) -- clearly did not apply. However Mikoian's father was likely not a peasant but a "laborer-carpenter" (although this is disputed) after six years as an apprentice to a master carpenter in Tiflis.[210] Although not urbanized like Shaumian, and although Mikoian does not describe it in this way, his socio-economic status was effectively lower middle class, not peasant, with important urban cultural influences despite surrounding illiteracy: his father's work brought him to cosmopolitan Tiflis on a daily basis where he acquired a simple, conversational knowledge of several languages in frequent contact with Tiflis' multi-ethnic urban classes. Indeed, he taught young Mikoian to count to one hundred in Armenian, Russian, Georgian,

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208 Quoted and recounted in Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, pp.123-124. For a discussion on biographical sources on Mikoian in Graziosi, "The new Soviet archival sources", p.26, fnt.41.

209 Anastas Mikoyan, (Sergo Mikoyan, Ed.), The Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan: The Path of Struggle, Vol.I., Madison, Connecticut, Sphinx Press, 1988, p.7. According to Granat, Mikoyan was born in Tiflis gubernia, "Biografiia", p.543.

210 "Biografiia", Granat, p.543; Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, pp.11,14.

Azerbaijani, and Greek.[211] His father "looked like a Tiflis craftsman", dressing neatly with a city shoes and a city hat, not a Caucasian fur cap.[212]

Near the village there was also a copper ore mine under French ownership which had been there since 1801 before the territory passed from Persian to Russian control and which produced, according to Mikoian, 1/4 of the copper smelted in Russia. Mikoian's father worked for the factory as a carpenter and his brother as a hammerman, even bringing the entire family to live in the factory barracks. Mikoian credits this experience as opening his eyes to the abuses inherent in factory working and living conditions: management were French and lived luxuriously, Armenians, Russians and others comprised the clerical staff, the miners were Greek, and the most menial jobs went to foreigners and "drifters, emigres from northern Iran".[213] The workforce, he also notes, was illiterate.

Although relatively sparse in realistic detail on his early childhood (he wrote his autobiography sometime after 1970 while in retirement), Mikoian's otherwise romanticized autobiography also vividly describes the waves of peasant unrest which swept through the region in 1905 and their subsequent suppression by detachments of Tsarist Cossack infantry. Peasants had seized manor lands but with the state's reprisals most were restored to the landlords. Mikoian describes events as he saw them a child and considered his family to have experienced "prolonged oppression" by a "hostile regime".[214] Whether accurate or not what is significant about these passages both on the copper mining and on peasant unrest, I think, is the fact that Mikoian throughout stresses not class or social conflict, as he would in his later socialist polemics, but an essentially political radicalization. His focus is not on an archaic economy, though he mentions their backwardness, but on an archaic regime, social customs and traditions. He also avoided references to ethnic relations, except to say that although the miners were multiethnic, there was no ethnic strife.[215] Concerns are depicted in terms of the corrupting effects of foreign

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211 Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, p.11 on Mikoyan's early linguistic influences.
212 Ibid., p.20.
213 Ibid., pp.26-27.
214 Ibid., pp.9-11.
215 Ibid., p.27.

influence and in the state policies. Moreover Mikoian self-consciously writes, some 60 years later, that he sought explanations for the mining and factory conditions he saw in books of revolutionary history, particularly in histories of Rome and in French Revolutionary history and heroism.

European investments in Georgian mining were indeed substantial and locally resented. Firstly, we know that even if Greeks were most of the miners in this particular factory, this would have been highly exceptional: in the Transcaucasus in 1897 there were just under 7,500 miners of which circa 2,000 were Armenian, 2,200 Azerbajani, and 900 Lesghen, with Greeks a mere 372.[216] While Mikoian may have had it right in describing a certain 'ethnic ranking' among French owners, Russian and Armenian clerks, and Greek and miners of other ethnicities, *the* key feature of the ethnic composition of the miners and copper factory workers was the direct competition between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, both vying in these rural areas for the same jobs. Secondly, a significant portion of the landed elites in the countryside were not Armenian but Georgian nobles (mostly resident in Tiflis) and Azerbaijani landed aristocrats. Indeed in this region most of the landlords were Azerbaijani while peasants were both Armenian and Azerbaijani. But as Mikoian wrote, "that was the way it had always been".[217]

A number of reasons can be adduced for Mikoian's failure to address what by the late 1890's and early 1900's would have been visible ethnic tension in rural Transcaucasia (besides obvious retrospective and selective biases). Historically the two national-religious historic peoples had indeed coexisted for years in relative harmony. Additionally, as we will see below, Mikoian was most concerned with geopolitical developments as they affected Armenians and this took some precedence over Azerbaijani-Armenian antagonisms. Related to geopolitical concerns of historic Armenia were Armenian relations to the Tsarist state, which often similarly took precedence over the 'Azerbaijani Turkish threat'. In other words, given the socio-ethnic context, it may be that many Armenians later adopted anti-Azerbaijani sentiments as a consequence of their more longstanding anti-Ottoman Turkish politics and not the other way around. We find clearer evidence of this

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216 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 044, p.315.
217 Ibid., p.57.

dynamic in Mikoian's military service in WWI below.

Mikoian's education began when an Armenian Narodnik was exiled to Sanain and began teaching village children how to read. This continued when an Armenian bishop from Tiflis spent a year in the village and arranged for Mikoian to attend seminary school in Tiflis. In 1906 at age ten he left for Tiflis for an eleven year course of studies.[218] Although initially the family paid for the schooling costs, as a needy student Mikoian eventually received financial assistance from an Armenian charitable society.[219] He writes that it was during his early years in seminary that he became the local atheist, and was even given the nickname "Anastvats" ('atheist' in Armenian) -- this despite Scripture lessons and despite the fact that his family were devout.[220] Also during his first years at seminary Mikoian was attracted to historical novels of Armenia's national struggles against foreign oppression, as well as tp Armenian literary works. Once he could read Russian however, he became interested in science, Darwin, the history of the French Revolution, Russian literary works -- Pisarev, Belinsky, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Cherneshevsky -- and European classics.[221] While in seminary in Tiflis Mikoian and other Armenian students were also affected by the waves of worker unrest in 1911-1912, prompting them to now read Marxist literature -- Kautsky, Plekhanov, and Ulianov's (Lenin's) *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. After a couple of years of student radicalism Mikoian was first 'persecuted' by Tsarist authorities when they ransacked his apartment for illegal literature.[222]

Mikoian's memoirs provide additional insight into how seminary students were radicalized -- even before the state's repressive measures set in. Mikoian notes that many of his classmates became radicals, something he attributes to several causes. Those who attended semiary schools were typically sons of the less well-off Armenians since wealthier families could send their sons to tuition-based *gimnaziia* or commercial schools. So according to Mikoian seminary students were a more economically homogeneous group of

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218 Ibid., pp.13-14.
219 Ibid., pp.22-23.
220 Ibid., pp.16-17.
221 Ibid., pp.25-29.
222 Ibid., pp.32-33.

the lower classes, and therefore more receptive to revolutionary ideas. However we know this to be inaccurate: the empire's *ginnaziia* and *realschulen* produced as many radical youth as the less prestigious seminaries, and this was equally true of Transaucasia with its numerous seminaries. The differences lay in the direction of the radicalism -- with exceptions, seminaries mostly produced nationalists while *realschulen* and *gimnaziia* tended to produce socialists. Mikoian also speculates that his was a particular generation politicized between the two Russian revolutions when revolutionary activity and Marxist ideas flourished. This is only partially true. The years of repression following 1905 actually muted much radical activity and decreased membership in nearly all radical parties; yet by this time both socialist and nationalist ideas were firmly entrenched.

Mikoian's third reason for high levels of student radicalization in the Armenian seminaries seems to be the most likely. Namely, that most of the seminary teachers had received their higher education and training in Germany, Switzerland, and France and tended to promote European democratic-liberal views. Mikoian notes that there was not a single member of the clergy in the seminary's administration, and the only teacher who was a priest was the Scripture instructor. Indeed, most of the seminary curriculum was not religious in content, but more general: geography, mathematics, literature, the physical sciences, and physiology. A foreign language, either French or German, was required, as was Old Armenian and Armenian history. Though it was a seminary it actually provided the equivalent of a *gimnaziia* eleven-year secondary education, training students not to be clergy -- indeed not a single student from Mikoian's class actually entered the clergy -- but to be teachers in Armenian schools.

The three key Armenian educational institutions were the Nersesian Academy in Tiflis founded in 1825, the Academy in Etchmiadzin founded in 1874, and the Lazarev Academy for Oriental Languages in Moscow founded in 1815. But Nersesian and Etchmiadzin were seminaries only on paper and for official designation, in practice they served as teacher-training schools.[223] These institutions trained Armenian-language teachers, journalists, and writers in essentially 'nationalist' subjects, particularly in the history of Armenian literature and culture. Mikoian speculates, it seems correctly, that part

[223] Ter Minassian "Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement", pp.147-148.

of the explanation for this lay in Tsarist language laws which by this time forbade teaching in Armenian language in secondary schools. Yet religious seminaries were except from these restrictions and so became religious in name but *gimnaziia* in substantive curriculum. And though seminary diplomas were not acceptable to Russian universities -- another reason which promoted the more well-off families like Shaumian's to send their sons to *gimnaziia* and *realschulen* as -- they were accepted in Europe. If a student could not afford to study abroad he would became a teacher in the Armenian schools.[224] Nationalism among Armenians was most powerful in these clerical institutions, no doubt assisted by the fact that so many Armenian school closures had freed teachers for radical activity.

Mikoian learned both Georgian and Azerbaijani, although it is unclear for what reason. He was engaged in student radicalism with Georgian and Russian students and in "a spirit of internationalism" in 1914 they read poetry in Russian, sang Georgian folk songs, and put on Azerbaijani theatrical productions. Mikoian also held to the need for class revolution in order to free all peasants -- Armenian, Azerbajiani, and Georgian -- from oppressive landlords, and wrote that he opposed any Armenian nationalist response to rural class conflict since Azerbaijani and Georgian peasants also "suffered cruelly under the landlord's yolk".[225] This was written in the 1970's however, and it is likely that even at the time Mikoian's view of the 'peasant question' and rural social conflict was more intellectual and romantic than real. My sense is that Mikoian's experience with nationalities had been more geopolitical than socio-economic. This seems even more likely when taken in the context of Mikoian's politics and activities during WWI, to which I now turn.

Mikoian volunteered to fight for the Tsarist Armies against the Turkish-German threat, and in this he would have been typical of young educated Armenians, and particularly seminarians. In 1914 Armenian volunteer units were formed and sent to the Turkish front in support of Russian forces' potential for liberating Armenians from Turkish rule or 'Armenian liberationists'. Mikoian joined the Armenian volunteer units "as an opportunity to take part in the national liberation movement". He saw the Bulgarians doing the same by fighting on the side of the Russians, just as he romaticized the poet Byron in

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[224] Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, pp.44-45.

[225] Ibid., pp.56-57.

his "courageous" support of the Greek armies in their wars of liberation from the Turkish sultan".[226] In November 1914 he arrived at the Turkish border and subsequently saw battle in Persian Azerbaijan as Armenian regiments fought alongside ethnic Russian divisions against the Turks in what were apparently bloody battles with heavy losses and a Turkish retreat. Mikoian's battle descriptions are detailed, surprisingly realistic, and even un-heroic. Though wounded he did not experience at first hand the "tragedy that befell the western Armenians in Turkey", that is, the Armenian genocide by the Turks.[227]

I make only two observations. Firstly, Mikoian's account of his fighting and support for the War for Armenian national liberation is unique in Bolshevik memoirs and autobiographies, since most were at pains to deplore ethnic and nationalist hatreds of WWI. But it was not an untypical response of the Armenian community as a whole, including its religious and nationalist communities. On the German declaration of war on Russia, and *pace* Mikoian's account of the seminary teachers' reluctance to send students to the front, the Armenian clerical establishment and the Catholicos specifically wrote the Viceroy asking that the propitious moment be used in furtherance of Armenian concerns, notably that the Armenian vilayets in Anatolia be subsumed under a single Christian governor-general and that the Armenians under Turkish rule be assisted.[228] Although the Catholicos desired a Russian attack on Turkey, the Tsarist state's concerns were geopolitical, strategic, and to some extent expansionist, but in any case the protection of fellow Christian Armenians was of little interest to the Russian state. The Armenians were the only Transcaucasian people to engage in both diplomatic and quasi-independent military activities during the war; Georgians served in the Tsarist armies on the same basis as other subject nationalities with no particular stake in events, the Azerbaijani Turks were exempt from military service and generally remained politically inactive, despite perhaps hoping for a Russian defeat.[229]

Secondly, Mikoian volunteered for Tsarist war service because of his Armenian

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[226] Ibid., pp.33-34.

[227] Ibid., pp.33-37.

[228] Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, pp.24-25.

[229] Ibid., pp.24-31.

nationalist and anti-Turkish sentiments, and in so doing solidified his commitment to Russian-cum-imperialist political relationships. The Tsarist empire was seen as geopolitically necessary to Armenian survival. While most revolutionary parties denounced Russian imperialism and the empire's minorities claimed their rights, an Armenian radical in 1917 could claim:

> "The attacks upon the so-called Russian imperialism are incomprehensible. In the Caucasus that imperialism has created law and order and the secure life which the Armenians did not have before. Russian imperialism had its dark sides but generally it was a positive force...[The Russians] are bringing freedom to peoples, [the Russians] are bringing security of life to those who were groaning under the Muslim yoke, and your rejection of imperialism.... would be a fatal mistake in regard to the East. For long years Armenia has waited for Russian imperialism to say its commanding word in Turkish Armenia and lead the Armenians from under the Turkish yoke...."[230]

Years later Mikoian wrote that he had been overwhelmed by the news of the Armenian genocide in 1915, and shortly thereafter found resonance with the Bolsheviks' opposition to the imperialist war, "its underlying class implications" and its "correct proletarian stance....as the struggle to turn the Imperialist war into a Civil War".[231] Yet this appears highly disingenuous. This was the internationalist class language of socialism, but clearly his attraction to imperialism had far more to do with its ethno-nationalist implications, particularly in the face of the Armenian slaughter than it did with Lenin's capitalist class analysis. Mikoian's general silence on the Armenian genocide while he was fighting in the war, as well as his neglect to write of his political affiliations at the time, suggest that he although may have been a Marxist, he was also likely an Armenian nationalist Dashnak as well, and Narimanov's assessments of his politics seem very likely to have been accurate.

Indeed Mikoian's position on the nationality issue is vague during these years, although he wrote that it was considerably clarified (!) after several readings of *Kapital*.[232]

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230 Quoted in ibid., p.44.

231 Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, pp.37-38.

232 Ibid., pp.39-40.

He wrote that the Marxist class analysis resonated with his experiences, and after meeting workers and leaders of the local illegal Bolshevik organization at the Copper works, in 1915 he officially joined the CP and began writing tracts on social democracy and the nationality question. It seems more likely, based on his experiences thus far, that once again it was not the Marxist analysis of class exploitation that resonated -- as we have seen with other Bolsheviks this was merely the language of socialism -- but Marxism's *political* implications which constituted, in 1915, an antidote to geo- and ethno-politics.

After his return from the war Mikoian attended the Echmiadzin Theological Academy where he engaged in party work and wrote for the Social Democratic press.[233] He propagandized soldiers stationed nearby on the necessary fall of the autocracy and on the need to bring an end to the War. By this time Mikoian considered himself a Bolshevik, but joined at a time when the party was no longer part of the illegal underground. In March 1917 Mikoian withdrew (or was expelled) from the academy and went to Tiflis to work as secretary of the Bolshevik's Tiflis committee activities.[234] The leadership of the Bolshevik Tiflis and Baku committees were ethnically-mixed, with Georgians, Armenians, and a few Azerbaijanis. Apparently the Baku Bolsheviks had too few Armenian speakers for propaganda purposes among workers to be able to compete with the Dashnaks, so Mikoian volunteered and joined the Baku committee.[235]

At the time Shaumian headed the Baku Bolshevik Committee (his prestige among the radicals earned him this position though he was in exile). In Baku worker-capitalist conflicts were more pronounced than they had been in Tiflis, largely because of the increasingly important -- and now internationalized -- oil industry. But this should not be overestimated: not only was there an extreme diversity of active political parties,[236] making combinations of competing and overlapping claims to class and national interests, but multinational 'capital' itself was fiercely competitive, even more so during the War. It is not surprising that Mikoian notes that *the* key issue for the Bolsheviks in Baku was the

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233 BSE, p.222.

234 "Avtobiografiia-Biografiia", Granat, p.543.

235 Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, p.64.

236 Notably the Bolsheviks, Azerbaijani Himmatists, Iranian immigrant SD Adaletists, Mensheviks, Azerbaijani nationalist Musavatists, Armenian nationalist Dashnaks, and the most numerous SRs.

national one, both because it undermined class unity and because of the difficulty of workers to clearly identify their 'enemy'. In the event, Mikoian was recruited by the Georgian Dzhaparidze as one of the few who could speak to the workers in Armenian. Here Mikoian met Shaumian, and the latter became his mentor and hero.[237] Mikoian worked in the oil fields trying to recruit workers, and editing an Armenian paper, *The Social Democrat*, with Shaumian. At the time the Baku Mensheviks and Bolsheviks remained effectively unified, together editing *The Baku Worker*.

With revolutionary events in 1918, Mikoian was wounded in the suppression of the Musavatists' Azerbaijani nationalist uprising; yet he was also involved in the organization in Baku of so-called "workers' international friendship societies" for the various ethnic groups, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Russians, Daghestanis, etc. He writes that the need to attract Azerbaijanis to the Soviet cause was particularly crucial because of the threat of a German-Turkish invasion of Baku.[238] That is, a geopolitical basis for ethnic cooperation. According to Mikoian Azerbaijani peasants were still tied to the beks, khans, Musavatists, and clergy (although Lenin's decree on granting land to peasants seemed to have had its effects and was supported by the Himmat under Narimanov).

In 1918 Mikoian fought as a Brigade Commissar in the Red Army against the German-Turkish military offensives.[239] This was now the second time he was involved in a military capacity against the Turks, now in the Caucasian Red Army. In both cases the underlying commitments to the continuation of the 'imperial' geopolitical-state were clear and unqualified. Mikoian's opposition to the SRs, Mensheviks, Dashnaks, and Musavatists, like that of most of the other Transcaucasian Bolsheviks had less to do with their positions on the social or class question, on the feasibility of socialist revolution in Russia, or on any strictly socialist-nationalist disagreement. Rather their opposition was rooted in imperialist geopolitics: these parties were counterrevolutionary because they had closed ranks with foreign imperialist powers of the Entente, particularly in their support of British intervention to 'save Russia' from the German-Turkish threat, which Mikoian and

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237 Ibid., pp.73-74.

238 Ibid., pp.110-111.

239 BSE, p.222 on his position; Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, pp.124-133.

others viewed, not necessarily incorrectly, as the replacement of one foreign power with another. Mikoian especially viewed Dashnak support of the British as treasonous to Russian/Soviet imperial integrity.[240] And during both the Turkish and British occupations of Baku in his work in the Baku underground, Mikoian was a consistent supported of *Russian* re-occupation, not independence. In short, it is impossible to understand Armenian radicalism, both socialist and nationalist, outside of the geopolitics of the region and of the deep fear of Turkish occupation, particularly in light of the 1915 genocide. Baku politics may have been as much implicated in strategic manuevers between powers as they were in the proletarian class conflict in the Baku oil fields, even in its ethnic dimensions.

Mikoian's early post-revolutionary politics in the Transcaucasus were certainly hostile to Azerbaijani politics, both socialist-autonomist and nationalist. But it is unclear whether his political commitments derived from an Armenian-Azerbaijani antagonism or whether their source was Russified-imperialist. Mikoian's voluntary participation in the Tsarist Army during WWI, his role in the suppression of the "counterrevolutionary" Musavatist uprising in 1918, and his politics in March 1919 as head of the Bolshevik underground in Azerbaijan are suggestive of his generally anti-Azerbaijani, pro-imperialist, and pro-Armenian convictions. But more than hostility to Azerbaijani concerns was general indifference. Even his support of the Bolshevik attempts to undermine the "national-bourgeois" Musavatist Azerbaijani government during the British occupation with campaigns for the 'sovietization of Azerbaijan' are consistent with his commitment to imperial territories.[241] Mikoian's memoirs reveal a great lack of understanding Azerbaijani concerns, cultural or otherwise, although he continued to support party publication in both Russian and Azerbaijani.[242]

This is not surprising. Mikoian's radicalism, I think, was at base driven by the geopolitical relationship between Armenians and the Russian state and the need to preserve it -- almost consistently to the exclusion of both rural or urban class conflict and,

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[240] Discussion in Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, pp.167-168 and *passim.*

[241] Discussion in Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, pp.351-365.

[242] Ibid., p.314 on workers publications during the British occupation of Baku.

importantly, to the exclusion of concerns of local inter-ethnic Armenian-Azerbaijani relations -- except as they affected the wider strategic relationship between Azerbaijanis and Turks outside Tsarist borders. His fear of the Turks was that they could control Transcaucasia bringing Armenians under Turkish rule; his fear of the British was that their military and economic potential, combined with the Entente powers, could cause a disintegration of the empire. Mikoian's memoirs from the revolution through the establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus are of interest, not for their insights or for the details they recount. They are of interest because of what he chose to emphasize. Mikoian's discussions of the Baku commune, of the infamous execution of the 26 Baku Commissars in the Turkestan desert in 1918, of his work in the Baku underground during the British occupation, and even of the 'unification of workers of Transcaucasia', are seen in terms of foreign intervention (German and British), in relationship to the Turkish threat, and in inextricable connection with *the* key imperative -- the preservation of imperial borders. There is remarkably little and highly superficial discussion of class, even as it related to ethnic conflict. All local class and ethnic politics are read through a geopolitical prism and his commitment to the preservation of the 'empire'. For this commitment Mikoian twice volunteered to fight in the War on the Russian side.

Alexandr Fedorovich Miasnikov (Miasnikian) was born in 1886 in Nakhichevan in Erevan gubernia. Nakhichevan was historically a Safavid administrative center, by the 18th century a Muslim khanate, and under Russian control in 1828 with Turkmanchai. By 1897 Nakhichevan had just over 100,000 inhabitants, of which just under 2/3 were Azerbaijani Turks and only 1/3 were Armenian.[243] Not only were Azerbaijanis a majority in the Nakhichevan *uezdy*, but they also held most of the available positions in the local administration.[244] Ethnopolitically ambiguous, Nakhichevan was designted part of the Armenian Erevan guberniia for Tsarist purposes, but the majority of its inhabitants were Azerbajiani Muslims, thereby rendering Russo-Armenian relations very important for the

[243] Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.30.

[244] Ibid., pp.31,92. During the years of the Azerbaijani Republic between 1918-1920, Nakhichevan would be a highly disputed territory within the otherwise Armenian Erevan area, claimed by Azerbaijan because of its ethnic composition.

local Armenians. Therefore Miasnokov's family were part of a substantial ethnic minority in an otherwise Azerbaijani Muslim city.

Miasnikov's was an Armenian petty bourgeois or *meshchanstvo* family. As with so many other Bolsheviks, his father died when Miasnikov was young leaving the family in difficult financial circumstances.[245] Official sources claim his father had been a small merchant.[246] Though this occupational designation does not specify the kind of activity or the wealth of the family, their socioeconomic status would anyway have suffered a considerable reversal after the death of the father. Indeed his Granat biography says that the family of several children were deprived of any means of subsistence, and dependent on a mother in a "backward and patriarchical society".[247]

At age 8 Miasnikov attended four years of Armenian parish school near Nakhichevan.[248] As noted above, parish schools were non-tuition based and therefore permitted children of the less well-off families to receive at least a primary education. The school was rigid and disciplined, and Miasnikov found difficulties with language studies. Interestingly, Misanikov's Granat biography notes that his early studies in parish schools were made difficult because he could not speak proper Armenian but only a Nakhichevan dialect which was apparently a mixture of Armenian, Russian and Turkish.[249] Miasnikov completed Armenian seminary schooling in 1903, and enrolled in the Nakhichevan Armenian seminary. By age 13 Miasnikov was living on his own. In 1901 at age 15 he entered radical student circles of a "cultural and revolutionary character", through which he began publishing in student journals. Official biographies and Granat claim that Miasnikov was active in underground student groups in Nakhichevan at age 15 from 1901, but more formally joined the revolutionary movement in 1904.[250] Around 1901 these groups would have likely been loosely associated with the nationalist Dashnaks since social democratic groupings had not yet reached the area. They would also have been largely Armenian and

245 "Avtorizovannaia Biografiia", Granat, p.558.
246 BSE, p.180.
247 "Avtorizovannaia Biografiia", Granat, p.558.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 BSE, p.180; "Avtorizovannaia Biografiia", Granat, p.558.

Azerbaijani in ethnic composition. There is also reference in Granat admitting that as late as 1904-1905 Miasnikov was "briefly under the influence of nationalist-revolutionary trends".[251] In all likelihood Miasnikov was an Armenian nationalist before becoming a Bolshevik, as was likely with Mikoian.

Miasnikov only officially became a member of the CP in 1906 although in 1905 he continued to be active in radical groupings while in *gimnazia* in Moscow at the Lazarev Institute of Eastern Languages -- another school which produced nationalist revolutionaries. Therefore during the ethnic violence on the 1905 "Tatar-Armenian War" in the Caucasus Miasnikov was in Moscow far from Caucasian events. In fact he was apparently "gripped" by 1905's revolutionary events in Moscow and remained relatively indifferent to violence in Erevan. It was only with this exposure to revolutionary events in 1905 in Russian Moscow that he was first influenced by social democracy.[252] In short, Miasnikov's earliest radicalism was in Armenian cities and it was effectively nationalist; this continued through his first years in a Moscow *gimnazia* , after which he became involved in (Russian) social democratic politics with the Revolution of 1905. This sequence is important because it suggests that he experienced the first Russian Revolution in Russia in the context of urban worker radicalism, not in Erevan in the context of the regions ethno-political violence in 1905.

From 1905 until 1917 Miasnikov's political life was largely outside Armenia, and indeed not only is he absent from most accounts of Transcaucasian politics, he also plays no role as a co-Armenian Bolshevik in Mikoian's memoirs. He was involved in workers circles in Rostov in 1906 and in student political activism.[253] Miasnikov was first arrested in 1906 in Moscow, escaped, and fled to Transaucasia. Unsurprisingly he immediately became active in Baku socialist organizations and worked there for two years. During this period Miasnikov he was active in Armenian social democratic circles (most likely of the leftist Dashnaks) and in the Baku Bolshevik underground RSDLP group at the same time. It was quite typical to be affiliated with more than one radical group simultaneously, as we

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251 "Avtorizovannaia Biografiia", Granat, p.558. Not included in later official biographies: BSE, p.180.
252 On this last point, "Avtorizovannaia Biografiia", Granat, p.558.
253 Ibid.

saw with Radek, Dzierzynski and several of the Jewish Bolsheviks, and still claim that his membership in the CP was from 1906.[254]

Miasnikov's arrests and exile in the Caucasus did not, however, preclude his continuing his studies. During the years of Tsarist reaction between 1909-1911 Miasnikov returned to Moscow to study economics at the Moscow University Law Faculty, from which he graduated with a degree in 1911.[255] Through these years at university he continued to remain active in student socialist circles and "other groups".[256]

Between 1912-1914 Miasnikov was employed -- legally --as an assistant barrister while beginning his work as a journalist and writer. He 1914 he returned to the Caucasus with the outbreak of the War he was drafted into the Army, initially serving behind the lines and briefly on several fronts, though this too remains quite vague. Miasnikov remained in the Tsarist Army though the War until the 1917 February Revolution.[257] Both biographies claim that he engaged in political work during the War, spreading revolutionary propaganda among soldiers at the front. While possibly accurate, it is unlikely: as noted above in connection with Mikoian, most Armenians, socialists and ntionalists, supported Russian military objectives in the southern front, if for no other reason than to prevent the region falling under Turkish control.

For the first two years of the Revolution Miasnikov was active in Belorussia on the western front where he was engaged in party work as a commisssar. He was a member of the western front committee and directed its Bolshevik faction. While in Belorussia Miasnikov was, together with the Moldavian Bolshevik Mikhail Frunze, a founder and co-editor of the influential Bolshevik paper *Zvezda* (Star) in Minsk, and he assisted in that city's preparation of the Bolshevik seizure of power. Miasnikov's activism in the northwestern region earned him the post of Chairman of the Northwestern Oblast Party Committee and in October 1917 he was appointed chairman of the Bolshevik Military Revolutionary Committee of the Western Oblast; the following month Miasnikov was

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254 BSE, p.180. This is the official date given.

255 Ibid.

256 "Avtorizovannaia biografiia", Granat, p.558.

257 BSE, p.180; "Avtorizovannaia biografiia", Granat, p.558.

elected commander-in-chief of the Bolshevik armed forces on the entire western front. Miasnikov's career in the newly emerging 'Soviet empire' was further solidifed in 1918 when he served as a Bolshevik Red Forces on the Volga Front against the Czechoslovak Legion. In 1919 he became Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Belorussia and later of the Central Bureau of the CP of Belorussia.[258] After a period in the Moscow Party Committee, in 1920 Miasnikov was active on the Polish Front.

The Armenian Miasnikov's career in Belorussia-Lithuanian-Ukrainian territories is interesting. The Bolsheviks were relatively few in the area during the revolutionary years and it would have been in keeping with 'the good imperial idea' to send a loyalist Armenian to 'pacify' the ethnically-mixed Belorussian territories. In this respect Miasnikov's commitment to the integrity of the imperial territories may have differed from that of Mikoian, but it was similar to Shaumian's: much of Miaskinov's Russification had taken place in the context of radical political activity in Moscow among students, initially Armenian and subsequently Russian, while Mikoian's radicalism had been almost entirely in Transcaucasia. As was noted with many young Jewish radicals, Armenian radicals were acculturating and Russifying *in the company of other acculturating Armenians*. In this context Russification and support of the empire's territories would not have been seen as disloyal to other Armenians. Moreover, because Mikoian remained largely in the Caucasus, his early political radicalism and his wartime loyalties seemed to have derived most directly from Transcaucasian Armenians' geopolitical concerns with the protection of Armenians from the Turks.

Most of Miasnikov's pre-1917 radical activity was not only outside of Armenia but also outwith the Caucasus. Except for the brief period in Baku follwing a 1906 arrest, Miasnikov's activism was largely in Moscow and in Belorussian Minsk. At the time of the 1917 revolution Miasnikov was in Minsk as a member of the western committee of the Bolshevik party and active in the military activities on the western front.[259] Indeed he only appears very briefly in Mikoian's memoirs which document Bolshevik activity in the Caucasus in the decades preceding the Revolution. Miasnikov's military activities, then,

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258 "Avtorizovannaia biografiia", Granat, pp.558-559.

259 Ibid

were on the Polish and western fronts and against the Czecholsovak Legions in the Volga during the Civil War and he was oddly absent from the most crucial events in the Caucasus, only returning in 1921 after most matters there had been decided.

Once he returned to the Caucasus, Miasnikov chaired the Council of People's Commissars of the Armenian SSR and served as Commissar for Military Affairs. In 1922 he worked in Tiflis as chairman of the United Council of the Transcaucasus SFSR and later as secretary of theTranscaucasian Krai Party Committee.[260] After Lenin had reprimanded the Caucasian Bolsheviks for their overly-aggressive policies in the Caucasus, it was Miasnikov, whose party experience had been in European Russia, who was sent to head the Soviet Armenian government. And in this capacity in 1921 he began to implement more cautiously various NEP measures. As party secretary, Miasnikov was the first to propose that the Transcuacasian republics be included in the VTsIK, a political initiative subsequently taken up by Stalin.[261] Miasnikov died in an airplane crash in 1925.

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260 Ibid., p.559.

261 Stephan Blank, "Bolshevik Organizational Development in Early Soviet Transcaucasia: Autonomy vs. Centralization, 1918-1924", Suny, ed., Trancaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change, p.338.

Chapter 10
The Latvians

Andrew Ezergailis situated Latvian socialist internationalism to the left of Russian Social Democracy and far to the left of the Jewish Bund. This is probably a fair assessment, in part because Latvian socialism was initially borrowed from the German not the Russian. But Latvian socialists found strong affinity with Russian Bolshevism, and so must be understood against the sources of both their internationalism and their russophilia. Latvians never developed a strong non-Bolshevik socialist option. In fact Bolshevik prestige among Latvians was so substantial that it was the only party which continued to exist after the 1906-1908 repressions when the others were all but decimated, and until 1917 Latvian SDs were the largest component of the RSDLP with more members than the Russian party.[1] In the first constituent assembly elections in November the Latvian Bolsheviks defeated the Peasant Union and the Latvian Mensheviks with nearly 72% of the vote overall and more than 67% of the vote in the crucial Cesis and Riga districts.[2] If Georgian socialism was overwhelmingly Menshevik, Latvian socialism was in equal measure Bolshevik -- though in the Latvian party there were few doctrinal disagreements between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, prompting Lenin to refer it as a "swamp" because accommodated everything.[3]

Famously providing the "Rifles" during the seizure of power, Latvians were also disproportionately represented in the Bolshevik revolutionary elite -- there were six. Yet despite its enormous influence the Latvian party elite was actually quite small and close-

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[1] Andrew Ezergailis, The Latvian Impact on the Bolshevik Revolution, The First Phase, September 1917 to April 1918, Boulder, Co: East European Monographs, 1983, p.23; Andrew Ezergailis, The 1917 Revolution in Latvia, New York, 1974, p.7. The Peasant Union was numerically strong but not politically influential. Of the four Latvian SD factions in 1917-- Leninist-Bolshevik, Unionist-Bolshevik, Unionist-Menshevik, and Menshevik-- the first was the most important. In September the Bolsheviks had 12,000 members and the Mensheviks 2,600.

[2] The Bolsheviks received 97,781 votes, the Peasant Union 31,253, and the Mensheviks 7,046 in the Valmiera, Cesis, Valka and Riga districts. Ezergailis, Latvian Impact on the Bolshevik Revolution, p.87.

[3] Ezergailis, 1917 Revolution in Latvia, pp.23-26. Lenin had a particular fondness for Latvians, famously surrounding himself with Latvian servants, chauffeurs, Cheka guards, kitchen maids. Berzins was was one of Lenin's closest pre-war confidants in emigration,hiding together in a summer house in Finland in1906; Smilga was one of Lenin's closest contacts during the revolutionary months and while in Finland; and after the Revolution Stuchka was Lenin's hunting companion and a pall-bearer in 1924. Ezergailis, Latvian Impact on the Bolshevik Revolution, p.178.

knit, with shared backgrounds and lots of intermarriages. A rural element was also notable: the propertied Latvian rural bourgeoisie (Stuchka and Smilga), the rural intelligentsia (Berzins), and the lower strata of peasants and rural laborers (Rudzutaks). The sources and consequences of this, too, should be better understood.

Before turning to the biographies of the Bolsheviks I situate Latvian radicalism first in the context of Baltic German society, and then within imperial Russian society. I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion on the absence of Estonians in this elite.

I. Latvians in Baltic German society

The three Baltic provinces were differently incorporated into the Tsarist empire.[4] Livland came under Russian rule as a result of the conquests of Peter the Great who took it from the Swedes. With the First Polish Partition in 1772 the Tsarist empire gained 1.8 million inhabitants of Polish Inflanty, or Lettgallia, reorganized the territories into new administrative units, and thereby altered Lettgallian territorial distinctiveness. Most Lettgallian elites were Polish *szlachta* and a minority of German nobles. Russians arrived later. Though the region was predominantly Catholic, Russian rule introduced large flows of Russian and Belorussian immigrants, resulting in cultural and linguistic assimilative blends and creating groups distinctive from the rest of the Baltic littoral. The Duchy of Courland-Semigallia had been a battleground between Polish and Swedish armies, but Russian imperial influence had grown after the beginning of the 18th century through a series of court intrigues. Eventually successful with the Third Polish Partition, Russia won and Courlandic nobles pledged loyalty to Catherine the Great in return for guarantees of certain rights and privileges.

Through the 17th century most Latvians in the Baltic littoral were peasant serfs in

[4] With settlements between Poland-Lithuania and Sweden in 1629, old Livonia was divided into thirds, Lettgallia (Polish Inflanty or Polish Livland), the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia. The latter fell to the Polish-Lithuanian sovereigns, and Livland to the Swedish Vasa. With qualifications, Polish Lettgallia became Catholic affected by the Counterreformation; Swedish Livland with its German nobility was Lutheran affected by the Reformation. The next paragraphs are drawn from Andrejs Plakans, The Latvians, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995, Chapters 4 and 5; Gert von Pistohlkors, Baltischer Lander, Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas, Vol.2, Siedler Verlag, 1992; Andreas Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall, Munchen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992, pp.67-70; Anders Henriksson, The Tsar's Loyal Germans, The Riga German Community: Social Change and the Nationality Question, 1855-1905, East European Monographs, Boulder, Co., 1983.

rural Livland, the Duchy of Courland, and Lettgallia, though there were pockets of free peasants in Courland. The most ethnically-mixed regions were in the east and southeastern Courland with Latvians, Germans, Poles, Jews, Lithuanians and Belorussians. The westernmost areas were more ethnically homogeneous with only Latvians and Germans. The three provinces were also highly socioethnically stratified. Courland and southern Livland comprised largely Latvian peasants and Latvian urban lower classes. In Estland and northern Livland the peasantry and the urban lower classes were Estonian. In all three provinces the rural nobility, the clergy, and the middle and upper urban classes were German. Baltic cities, Riga most notably, had Old Believer, Russian Orthodox, and Jewish minorities, and by the turn of the 19th century Riga also had substantial and growing Lithuanian and Polish minorities.

The only Protestant region in the empire, the Baltics had four *Ritterschaften* (Estland, Livland, Kurland, and Osel), each with its own Diet or Landtag. Rooted in German constitutional and *Rechtsstadt* traditions, the Baltics had a tradition of German self-government by three privileged Baltic estates -- a merchants guild, an artisans guild, and a magistracy composed of twenty merchants and lawyers. Initially Russian rule changed Baltic social life very little. Because regional nobilities were crucial to Russian administration of its borderlands, great local autonomy was permitted by the new sovereign: Baltic German estate privileges were confirmed with the Capitulations of 1710 between the Russian state, the Riga Estates, and the Livland and Estland provincial Diets.[5] The Capitulations guaranteed estate self-government, maintained the Lutheran Church's position in local authority, and permitted German as the official language of all government and crown offices in the Baltics. The Capitulations were reconfirmed under every Tsarist administration until Alexander II's 1877 municipal government reforms which drew back urban estate privileges.

The cultural and commercial heart of the Baltic littoral was Riga. By the 19th century Riga transformed from a commercial city and Baltic port into a major industrial metropolis. Riga had since its foundation in the 13th century been distinctly German, and remained one of the most "European" of Russia's cities, and even after 150 years of

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5 Reinhard Wittram, Baltische Geschichte: Die Ostseelande Livland, Estland, Kurland, 1180-1918, Wissenschaftlische Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1973, pp.133-140.

Russian rule Riga's German culture and character remained substantially in tact.[6] Riga would be the fifth largest city in the Tsarist empire (after Moscow, Petersburg, Warsaw, and Odessa), with the fourth largest industrial proletariat (after Moscow, Petersburg, and Warsaw), and the third largest port (after Petersburg and Odessa). But equally important for understanding Latvian radicalism and especially Bolshevik socialism, Riga also became one of the empire's most ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse cities.[7]

At the end of the 18th century, increasing peasant unrest in the Baltic littoral had occasioned such substantial migration flows into the cities that the Livland *Ritterschaften* proposed (at the request of Alexander I) to expand the basic terms of serf status. The Russian state posed no real opposition to the Baltic nobilities expansion of their serf estates' system, since it had no intention of giving German lands to Baltic peasants.[8] Peasants continued to be brought in as hereditary serfs, and by the end of the 18th century 78.9% of Livland's population, 87.7% of Courland's and 93.8% of the Lettgallian populations were enserfed as the number and size of estates increased.[9] Land reform was introduced in stages beginning in 1804 and 1816.[10] In 1816-1817 serfdom was abolished in the Baltic provinces, one-half century prior to its abolition in Russia. In Lettgallia serfdom continued until 1861. In the emancipations serfs were granted rural peasant courts, but settlements were also implemented over several decades to slow outmigration. Agreements required that peasant farmstead names be replaced by assigned surnames, likely encoding cultural differences and linguistic assimilation.[11] Crucially, Baltic peasant reform was only completed in the 1850's and 1860's when Livland and Courland peasants were allowed to purchase land. In the decades that followed rural small-ownership increased considerably, yet landlessness, and growing debt of those with land,

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6 Riga was incorporated into the Russian empire in 1710 when Peter the Great took it from the Swedes. Henriksson, "Riga: Growth, Conflict, and the Limitations of Good Government, 1850-1914", in Michael F. Hamm (ed.), The City in Late Imperial Russia, Indiana University Press, 1986, p.179; Plakans, The Latvians, pp.52-54.

7 Stephen Corrsin, "The changing composition of the city of Riga, 1867-1913", Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol.13, No.1, 1982, pp.19-39.

8 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, Oxford, Clarendon, p.497.

9 Plakans, The Latvians, pp.64-65.

10 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, pp.155-161.

11 Plakans, The Latvians, pp.81-83.

also increased commensurately keeping peasant unrest and agrarian reform vibrant social issues.[12]

The emancipation settlements had other important effects. Because land reform was promised but introduced incrementally, perhaps there was indeed throughout an element of social restlessness born of rising expectations.[13] This is understudied in the Latvian case, but social restlessness was likely channeled and voiced through the rural institutional infrastructure that developed alongside. Indeed the elision between Latvian rural associational and institutional life and Latvian nationalism is perhaps less precise than it could be. The peasant rural courts established in 1816-1820 gradually gave rise to a considerable Latvian rural bureaucracy and the effective institutionalization of schools, councils, treasuries, etc. -- all linguistically-Latvian, not German. I discuss other effects of these rural institutions below, since the Latvian Bolsheviks were of rural origin.

In addition, the terms of the land purchase agreements resulted in both an increase in rural small ownership and an increase in peasant landlessness. This resembled the serf emancipations in Polish Lithuania, with similar consequences: substantial socioeconomic differentiation in rural Latvia set the bases for intra-Latvian class-based conflict in addition to the historic Latvian-German conflicts. This is crucial, I think, for understanding class-national tensions and the appeal of socialism in rural Latvia by the 1890's and 1900's, something I discuss in connection with the Bolsheviks Stuchka and Smilga.

And finally, the emancipation settlements did not tie peasants to repartitional communes as they had in the Russian settlements, with the effect that landless peasants migrating to Riga, for instance, were not seasonal workers as in Petersburg and Moscow. Rather, Latvian peasants tended to settle permanently and quickly in the cities and rapidly assimilated into a distinctive -- multi-ethnic -- urban working class culture. I consider the consequences of this for radicalization with the Bolshevik Rudzutaks.

By the turn of the century the socio-ethnic composition of the Baltics, and of Riga, was more complex and multi-ethnic than is usually thought. In 1897 the majority of the

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12 Ibid., p.87. By 1877 41.4% of rural properties in Livland, 36.9% of Courland, and 38.6% in Letgallian properties were owned by peasants

13 Plakans, "Latvia before the 1880's", in Edward C. Thaden (ed.), Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914, Princeton University Press, 1981, p.216.

Baltic population was either Latvian (44.86%) or Estonian (37.10%), though there were nearly 20% fewer Estonians than Latvians.[14] But the proportion of Latvians was decreasing: in 1800 Latvians comprised 89.9% of the total population, 68% by 1897, and only 60% on the eve of WWI.[15] Germans comprised 6.94% (165,627) of the Baltic population and ethnic Russians comprised 4.79% (114,193) -- so there were just over 50,000 more Germans then Russians, and in Riga alone there were more than 44,000 Russians.[16] Although there were 43,710 Yiddish speakers in the Baltics, of which more than 2/3 were urbanites, these figures certainly underestimate the number of Jews because many more had by this time linguistically Germanized.

Germans had the majority of industrial, commercial, proprietary, and professional posts. The German free professions, known in Baltic society as "literati", formed a distinctive group in the Baltic littoral. Typically educated at Dorpat University, the "literati" were pastors, teachers, lawyers and other educated elites, forming a peculiarly Baltic German estate or social group with a certain social and professional cohesiveness.[17] Though not a legally defined corporate estate, the literati carried specific privileges (i.e.the right to join the merchants guild) and were eligible for posts in the executive organs of municipal government. A substantial number of ethnic Germans were also part of the Baltic city's *Kleinburgertum*, an urban lower middle class of shopkeepers, non-certified artisans and servants, clerks and minor civil servants.[18]

The first ethnic Russians to settle in the Baltic in the 1600's were Old Believers fleeing Tsarist persecution and arriving in Riga when it was still under Swedish rule. In the 1700's Russian merchants and peasant migrants from neighboring provinces arrived.

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[14] Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 040, pp. 215. In 1897 1,435,399 Latvians in the empire or 1.14% of the imperial population, in numbers comparable to Georgians, Lithuanians, and Caucasian 'mountaineers'.

[15] Plakans, The Latvians, pp.73-74, 88. In mid-century Germans comprised 45% of Riga's inhabitants, Latvians 31%, Russians 14%, Poles 9% and 'others' 1%. All figures are estimates due to the substantial but imprecise levels of Germanization of many ethnic Latvians, and the fact that 'identity' designations were by language and occupation, not nationality or ethnicity.

[16] Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 040, p.215, Tabelle 052, p.435, both by mother tongue. Because the figures are by mother tongue they may actually be an overestimate of Germans because they include Germanized Latvians and Jews.

[17] Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, pp.141-142; Henriksson, The Tsar's Loyal Germans, pp.1-2.

[18] Henriksson, The Tsar's Loyal Germans, p.2.

The Baltic Russian community was hardly cohesive. Mostly in Riga and Tallinn, Baltic Russians were highly socially, occupationally, and religiously diverse. In Riga more than 1/5 of the city's ethnic Russians were soldiers stationed in local garrisons and therefore not permanent residents; there was a thin layer of civil servants (which would increase after 1905) and affluent merchants on par with the Baltic Germans (though they were excluded from guild offices and affairs), and petty traders, artisans, unskilled laborers, and urbanized peasants. Only 62% of Baltic Russians were Orthodox, with the remainder Old Believers. The motley composition of the Riga Russian community, combined with its substantial Old Believer dissident sectarians, did not form a stable social base for 'Great Russian' nationalism, and indeed it was quite weak at least until the War.

Jews had arrived in the Baltics from the Pale of Settlement in the 1800's. Upwardly mobile Jews typically Germanized within two or three generations.[19] Most were engaged as artisans, petty merchants and tradesmen, and though Riga Jews could not join guilds or hold property until after 1858, 27.4% of the Jewish labor force was engaged in commercial pursuits and 53% in craft production.[20] By 1881 11.9% of Riga's population was Jewish, an increase from their 5.1% in 1867. These are underestimates since the levels of assimilation are unmeasurable, but given that Riga was outside the Jewish Pale, given Baltic Germans' generally liberal rule, and given that Riga was a city to which Jews migrated, Jewish Germanization would likely have been substantial.

Latvians comprised the lower urban classes, unskilled laborers and domestic servants, with a thin layer of shopkeepers, clerks, and members of the so-called "Latvian trades" -- a group of 19 semi-skilled occupations with corporate organization and self-regulatory authority and a small but growing urban bourgeoisie.[21] In 1897 58.41% of Latvians were employed in agriculture, followed by 15.60% in manufacturing or

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[19] Anders Henriksson, "Riga", p.178.

[20] Henriksson, The Tsar's Loyal Germans, pp.3, 184, fint.11. Census figures for *Stande* closely parallel those for occupation. Of the circa 1,400,000 Latvians 1,300,000 were in the 'peasant estate', which included peasants and a range of rural strata: artisans, landless laborers, small landholders, larger landed proprietors, rural schoolteachers. Only 66,545 Latvians were considered members of the *meshchane* estate. Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 046, p.355.

[21] These included longshoremen, weavers, hempbinders, cab drivers, fishermen, salt and beer carters, and port authority employees. Henriksson, The Tsar's Loyal Germans, pp.2, 184, fint.6.

industrial sectors, and 12.23% in domestic service.[22] By the turn of the century Riga was the empire's largest export center and ranked second in imports behind St. Petersburg. Riga's industrial proletariat numbered more than 75,000 on the eve of the war, making it the fourth largest industrial city behind Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Warsaw. I discuss Riga's working class radicalism in connection with Rudzutaks and Lepse.

While much is made in the literature about the rise of a Latvian urban bourgeoisie, both commercial in its socioeconomic power and educated in its nationalist 'blocked mobility' potential, as a proportion of Latvians these middling classes were actually comparatively small, their influence was out of proportion to their numerical weight, and most tended to be status quo and even conservative in their politics, eager to preserve their hard-earned entry into the German merchant or literati estates.[23] If the political weight of urban Latvian radicalism may be overestimated, then that of the rural Latvian educated and propertied bourgeoisie is underestimated. I address this below.

By 1897 Riga's very multi-ethnicity guaranteed that it would be an 'imperial Russian' city, perhaps even more than a Latvian one. The ethnic Russian presence, particularly in Riga, was not only substantial, but often decisive in local ethno-politics. And Jews, Poles, and Lithuanians -- the ethnic groups whose proportion of Riga's population increased most substantially between 1867 and 1914 -- were quite influential in radical politics and contributed to making Riga both more of an 'imperial' city and more of a linguistically Russified one. Riga's cultural and social life were fragmented along national or ethnic lines: each ethnic group had its own network of clubs, cultural institutions, credit unions, political organizations, charities, and insurance societies.[24] This differed considerably from the 'ethnic stratifications' of Polish-Lithuania or Ukraine, for instance, where 'provincial civil society' was almost entirely the purview of the higher status ethnicities. This was no doubt facilitated by general Baltic German tolerance.

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22 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 023, p.156, based on nationality of employed persons only.

23 Only 1.38% of Latvians were employed in banking and commerce (though this does not distinguish between high finance or petty merchants and shopkeepers) and 0.76% in the 'free professions'.

24 Henriksson, "Riga", p.193. Baltic Russians had no nationalist counterpart to the RLA, though they did have a social club, two daily newspapers, a literary society, a credit union, a salesclerk's mutual aid society, a church-sponsored school league, and several charities specifically for the Russian community.

A distinctive feature of Baltic social stratification was that upward mobility, urbanization, and occupational diversity, entailed linguistic and cultural Germanization. This was true of Latvians and Jews. Upwardly mobile Latvians had always Germanized as a matter of course accounting, in part, for the absence of a large 'purely' Latvian 'middle class'. Latvians entering the 'literati' or merchant guilds adopted German names and closely identified with the new professional circles; Latvian laborers and artisans integrated and were gradually absorbed into the *Kleinburgertum* (often via marriage). Russification, by contrast, typically occurred among Latvian peasants and artisans who were recruited into the Russian army, at the time described as "becoming Russian".

By some accounts the "line of demarcation between Latvian and German in Riga was at best indistinct",[25] since many for whom German was their daily language spoke Latvian as children and had Latvian-speaking parents. Linguistic assimilation was typically to German until the last third of the century, not Russian. In 1881 of the 414,000 Livlanders who gave "Latvian" as their 'nationality', 0.3% listed German as their home language and only 0.03% listed Russian. In Riga 10.3% of those 'Latvians' by 'nationality' gave German as their home language and only 1.0% gave Russian. And while 18,547 people in the Livland countryside gave German as their nationality, 21,294 said German was the language they spoke at home -- so roughly 2,700 Latvians were "on the path of denationalization" (Plakan's term); by contrast, while 15,822 people gave Russian as their nationality, fully 15,426 gave Russian as their home language -- a difference of only 400. In Riga 52,787 gave German as their 'nationality', but 66,775 gave German as their home language -- so roughly 14,000 people (Latvian and Jewish) spoke German at home but considered themselves of another 'nationality'.[26] The ease of transition from 'Latvian' to 'German' in Riga was described by a visitor in the 1840's as "astounding", as shared Lutheranism made Germanization via marriage common.[27] And social climbing and prestige were associated with German; virtually any education beyond

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25 Plakans,"The Latvians", p.232.

26 Ibid.

27 Acculturation sometimes went the other way as Germans Latvianized, especially in the rural areas: "if a German worker married a Latvian girl, the remnants of German nationality which he still preserved from his parents home, from school, or from military service would disappear like snow in March; and the children would speak only Latvian". Henriksson, The Tsars Loyal Germans, pp.91-92, quote p.2.

primary school meant the adoption of a non-Latvian language and culture later in life.[28]

The mid-century emergence of Latvian nationalism does not require sustained attention here. I make only a few relevant observations. First, the nationalist activists re-conceived the Latvian language as a marker for ethnic or national status rather than as the Baltic's historic lower socioeconomic class as Baltic Germans continued to do. But mid-century generations of nationalists were of divided loyalties: many were married to Germans, wrote more proficiently in German than Latvian because of their education, had benefited from German patronage and spoke German at home.[29]

Second, the Latvian nationalism was numerically small as compared to Latvian socialism's subsequent strength, and it was quite weak by the 1890's. In the late imperial period the Riga Latvian Association's membership -- the key nationalist organization -- was never large, with between 800 and 1,000 members drawn almost exclusively from the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie.[30] While Latvian nationalists had turned increasingly to new urban Latvians as recipients of their cultural programs,[31] by the 1890's new Latvian urbanites were more likely to be attracted to socialism than to nationalism.

Third, in the 1860's and 1870's Latvian nationalist leaders welcomed the expansion of Tsarist influence to diminish German influence.[32] Indeed Latvian liberals had always wanted to circumvent local German dominance, demanding Russian zemstvo to push back the *Ritterschaften*. This russophilic strain in Latvian nationalism was also manifested the Latvian bourgeoisie's electoral politics. For instance Latvians had entered electoral politics between 1877 and 1897 with joint-slate candidates in anti-German alliance with the Russian electoral committees on the belief that Latvian-Russian tickets stood some chance of success against entrenched German position.[33] This changed between 1901 and 1913 when Baltic Russians defected and began voting with the

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28 Plakans, "The Latvians", p.232.

29 Plakans, The Latvians, pp.92-93; Plakans, "Latvia before the 1880's", p.225.

30 Henriksson, "Riga", p.205, fint.58 for membership estimates.

31 Plakans, The Latvians, p.94.

32 Ibid., p.100.

33 Henriksson, The Tsars' Loyal Germans, p.33.

Germans, against the Latvians.[34] In short, russophilia and the extent to which Russian rule in the Baltics was often welcomed by Latvians (and Estonians) is particularly underestimated in accounts of Latvian nationalism. Latvians (and Estonians) had viewed administrative Russification as a welcome counterbalance to German position, and not as a cultural threat.[35] Stanley Page wrote, "in some ways, perhaps, the Russian influence was a liberating one, for only an antidote as strong as the poison could successfully combat age-old German cultural dominance".[36]

Since the 1860's the growth of an associational and institutional life among Latvians had been underway. Because of the comparatively liberal and well-institutionalized character of Baltic German society, the vast number of Latvian societies, associations and 'civic institutions', rural and urban, mirrored the social organization into which they had been socialized and even reflected its social and institutional divisions. There were Latvian mutual aid societies for the urban working classes, literary and teachers organizations for the educated urban classes, merchant 'corporations' for Riga's Latvian commercial-industrial elites, rural institutions for the rural landed bourgeoisie, peasant aid societies for the rural poor, etc. In the 1880's better-off Latvian farmers increasingly found sufficient voice in rural courts and councils. By 1887 Livland had 231 Latvian organizations, ranging from local literacy groups to fire insurance companies.[37] Agricultural societies, literacy societies, insurance societies, rural courts and institutions mushroomed by the late 1880's -- raising commensurately Latvians' level of self-confidence.

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[34] Henriksson,"Riga", p.197. Henriksson writes that this was because Russian merchants found greater social affinity with Germans than with the new Latvian bourgeoisie, and because Latvian-Russian alliances had gotten them very little success. The latter is probably more true, since the 20 years of Latvian-Russian alliance were never able to unseat German dominance.

[35] Edward Thaden, Russification in the Baltic Provinces, p.11; Toivo Raun, "The Estonians", in Thaden (ed.), Russification in the Baltic Provinces, p.340. This may also have been true of Finnish nationalism: for a long time inward-looking in battles with the Swedish ruling class, ties to imperial Russia, though not exactly welcome, helped to offset this feud. And though Finnish socialism did not draw inspiration from Russian socialism, the highly literate and Lutheran Finnish rural proletariat overwhelmingly supported the socialists. David Kirby, "'The Workers' Cause': Rank-and File Attitudes and Opinions in the Finnish Social Democratic Party, 1905-1918", Past and Present, No.111, May 1986.

[36] Stanley W. Page, The Formation of the Baltic States: A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics Upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, Harvard University Press, 1959, p.23.

[37] Plakans, "Russification Policy in the 1880's", p.228.

Record keeping in these new rural institutions, councils and courts labor-rent agreements was increasingly in Latvian, and the Latvian language itself appeared flexible enough to include neologisms for more specialized German or Russian terminologies. Latvian was de facto becoming a viable language of communication among an increasingly socially differentiated society. Not only was a 'provincial civil and political society' developing among Latvians, but political inclusion and social mobility no longer required Germanization. Plakans argues that this gave rise to the idea that Latvian could be used to express a 'high culture'.[38] Perhaps. But this may have been more true of culturally sensitive elites in mid-century. By the late 1880's and 1890's most Latvians (rural and urban) likely viewed Latvian-language use in institutional terms and more pragmatically.

The effects of growing socioeconomic differentiation among Latvians were important. By the late 1880's, when socialism was 'borrowed' from Germany, Latvians had clearly demarcated class lines, urban and rural: an influential urban merchant/manufacturing bourgeoisie and educated professional 'class', a working class of landless peasants and rural laborers from the countryside, a strata of more skilled urban workers and craftsmen, a well-institutionalized and increasingly self-confident rural bourgeoisie of wealthier farmers and landowners, a middling strata of smaller proprietors, and a larger strata of landless laborers, peasants, and rural artisans. Growing social differentiation among Latvians blunted the 'purity' of national appeals and opened the way for Latvian socialism.

Much of this was made possible by the fact that Baltic Germans were not threatened by a civic life for and by Latvians, and indeed viewed 'nationality' as a matter of choice, not birth: any Latvian wishing to enter the middle upper strata of Baltic society simply had to learn German. For the Baltic German elite "Baltic society " encompassed a common culture, language, constitution, and religion -- all German -- and Latvians and Estonians were considered "German" in every way except language. Crucially, Baltic Germans had consistently rejected linguistic Germanization of the Baltic lower social strata on the grounds that "next to religious persecution there is nothing more inhuman and odious than coercion to use a foreign language" -- 'Germanizing' the lower classes would

[38] Plakans, "Latvia Before the 1880's", pp.216-217.

be an illiberal violation of their civic rights.[39] This was an ethnolinguistic tolerance unmatched anywhere in the empire. But social conservatism ultimately rendered them unable to reconcile Latvians-as-lower-social-strata with Latvians-as-nation: Baltic Germans held to the belief that Latvian demands would vanish with more 'liberalism'.[40]

The Protestant Baltic littoral was as close to having a 'civil society' as anywhere in the empire. Its institutional strength and organization reflected a comparatively *ethnically tolerant* Baltic German ethos -- and this mattered in the development of a vibrant civic and political associational life among Latvians -- but Baltic German *social conservatism* eventually became humiliating, and when it closed ranks with Tsarist conservatism after 1905, traditional conservatism, German or Russian, became intolerable for progressive Latvian politics.

II. Latvians in Imperial Russian society

If German rule mattered, so too did Russian rule in the last decades of the empire. Russian rule began to assert itself in the mid-1880's. The famous Manesein report, considered the blueprint for Russification, had considered Latvian and Estonian Germanization the most pressing problem in the Baltic provinces, although Plakans correctly maintains that by 1881 'de-nationalization' [sic] was negligible.[41] With the appointment of M.N. Kapustin as curator of the Dorpat educational district in 1883 Russification was felt in full force in education. I discuss the effects of these policies in

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[39] Quoted in Henriksson, The Tsars Loyal Germans, pp.13, 39. Germans also made cultural concessions to ethnic Russians as a distinct group in Baltic society. In accusing Baltic Germans of disloyal pan-German sentiment Russian nationalists like Katkov were mistaken. That the Baltic Germans disdained identification with Germany and consistently refused any form of pan-Germanism was misunderstood by Russian nationalists, though curiously -- and uncharacteristically -- it was understood by Tsarist officials. Baltic Germans despised all nationalisms as un-civic -- the German as much as the Russian. Until 1905 Baltic Germans denounced Pan-Germanism, found Russian nationalism illiberal, intrusive, and unnecessary, and viewed Latvian nationalism as a false front for social radicalism.

[40] Ibid., Chapter 2.

[41] Baltic Russian merchants, civil servants, and other administrative officials welcomed Russificatory policies, since they brought state subsidy to Russian cultural activity in Riga, but they did not inspire it. Henriksson, "Riga", p.194. Though never implemented, the report introduced a new quality to German-Latvian relations, with proposals that Latvian, Estonian, and Russian join German as official languages of local government, that schools above the elementary be Russified, and that the provinces be redrawn to better reflect ethnolinguistic distributions. Plakans, "Russification Policy in the 1880's", pp.231-232.

connection with the Bolshevik schoolteacher Berzins.

Beyond educational Russification, an *ukaz* in 1885 ordered that Riga's military conscription board use Russian instead of German. This was followed in the same year with another *ukaz* designating Russian as the sole language of correspondence between Baltic authorities and the imperial government and made Russian the language of those public institutions which came under mixed crown and local jurisdiction. In Riga these had the effect of Russifying the city police, for instance, and since most could not speak Russian, translators were hired to render official paperwork into Russian for local court officials.[42] In 1889 the Russian judicial system was introduced in the Baltic provinces; Russian was made the language of courts, administration and civil business of local government.[43] Other initiatives sought to enlarge the Orthodox Church by forcing conversions in mixed-marriages.[44]

But the effects of Russification should not be overestimated. As Thaden notes, there was no "coherent Tsarist policy aiming at making Russians out of Estonians". [45] Russification of the Baltics in this period is usually taken as strengthening Latvian nationalism and politicizing Baltic Germans. In fact neither was the case. As with the Estonian, the Latvian national movement had been in decline from the mid-1880's for reasons quite aside from Russification.[46] Plakans' discussion implies that Latvian attitudes toward Russification have been profoundly affected by Latvian historians in exile and emigration in the immediate post-WWI and interwar years, producing interpretations of Russification likely skewed by the requirements of nation-state building.[47] Russification was really only enforced between 1885 and 1895 and, on the evidence, it appears that there was no lessening of Latvian-language *belles lettres* or publications --

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[42] Henriksson, The Tsars Loyal Germans, pp.47-48,50; Pistholkors, Baltischer Lander, pp.398-400.

[43] Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, pp.218-219.

[44] Plakans, "Russification Policy in the 1880's", p.235.

[45] Thaden, Russification in the Baltic Provinces, p.8.

[46] On the Estonians, Toivo Raun, "Russification and the Estonian National Movement", in Thaden, (ed) Russification in the Baltics, p.341.

[47] Plakans, "Latvians Before the 1880's", p.207.

indeed these increased between 1884 and 1904.[48] Latvians entering professional life in the 1890's -- as did most of the Latvian Bolsheviks -- were educated in Russian without much resistance and often learned German since it was still necessary for nearly all professions.[49] Russification hit Latvians long after their 'national awakening', and it came at a time when Russian was increasingly seen by culturally sensitive elites as 'cosmopolitan', enabling access to European culture, and superior to 'provincial Latvian'. I also discuss this below in connection with Berzins.

For Baltic Germans Russification affected mostly those in the educated and professional middle layers of society, effectively breaking the German hold on the provincial civil service and in the professions by displacing them with linguistic restrictions.[50] 'Literati' (teachers, lawyers, journalists, clergymen) insufficiently conversant in Russian paid with their jobs and most emigrated to Germany.[51] In response to Russian legal and constitutional encroachments, those who remained gravitated to a Baltic German nationalism, a new collective identity ironically modeled on Latvian nationalism,[52] and German liberalism ceded to conservatism.

Tsarist policies were viewed (with reason) by Baltic Germans as threats to their *Rechtsstadt*. In turn the Russian state viewed (with reason) the Baltic *Rechststaadt* as anathema to their concept of an administratively uniform empire. Baltic German political retrenchment was, in effect, a conservative defense of traditional privileges. But they continued to remain absolutely loyal to Tsarist Russia: they balked at Russification's

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[48] Plakans, The Latvians, p.101.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Henriksson, "Riga", p.183. By 1897 Germans were only 47% of Riga's professionals, Russians 19.2% and Latvians 18.6%. The extent to which Russification itself threatened Baltic Germans' politically privileged status overall is debatable.

[51] Of the 23 faculty in Riga city *gymnasium* 6 resigned because of poor Russian; many more were dismissed for lack of proficiency or for subversion. By 1905 Russians comprised 1/2 of the Riga gymnasium faculty. German lawyers found themselves in difficult positions after 1889 when judicial reform brought wholesale dismissal of German judges. The following year only one of 27 judges in Riga district court was German. Henriksson, The Tsars Loyal Germans, p.55 and *passim*.

[52] Ibid., p.56. Many of the Riga free professions found haven in Germany. Half of the city's *gymnasium* teachers and by 1914 more 70 Baltic Germans fled Dorpat University and the Baltic Polytechnical Institute, held professorial chairs in *Reich*-German universities.

illiberalism, but hardly viewed it as a cultural threat.[53] Indeed the post-1905 German-Russian *detente* revealed the depth of both German and Russian commitments to social conservatism, and the Russian state's priority of maintaining social conservatism over Russification. Though Russificatory, Tsarist reforms were as fearful of the entrance of the lower orders into positions of municipal and provincial power as had been the Baltic German *Ritterschaften*. Zemstvo had not been introduced not because of fear of local political influence and separatism as in other parts of the western borderlands, but because of fear of subverting the pragmatically effective and socially conservative Baltic German Diets. In the end, the Russian state's social conservatism outweighed its concern with Russification.

Russian imperial rule before 1905 seemed to matter for educated Latvians more in terms of cultural access but less in terms of social mobility. When employment in provincial government posts, civil service, administration and various supportive employments is compared with similar imperial-level positions interesting results emerge for all the Baltic's constituent ethnic groups. In all 9,755 (or 0.68%) Latvians were employed in administrative or civil service posts empire-wide, but of these 8,205 (or 0.77%) were so employed in the Baltic provinces alone. Of the more than 29,500 such posts in the Baltic provinces, Latvians held just under 1/3 or about 8,000), Russians and Poles held just under 1/3 (about 6,900), Estonians about 1/5 (about 6,000), and Germans about 1/6 (about 5,100). Moreover, Latvians (and Estonians) were hardly 'incorporated' into the Tsarist noble estates: only 0.08% of Latvians (0.05% of Estonians) were members of the imperial 'personal noble' or service estate as compared to double that figure for Ukrainians (0.16%), and 0.03% as 'hereditary nobles'.[54] Given the high proportion of Germans in these estates, Latvians were hardly able to circumvent Baltic Germans to enter 'imperial civil society'.

All of this suggests that, as of 1897, the imperial state provided only a very limited venue for educated Latvians seeking government or civil service posts. Rather, a great many were employed in local Baltic civil service and provincial or rural posts. Of the

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53 Pistholkors, Baltischer Lander, pp.397-416.

54 These figures are all lower than Russians (0.84%), Poles (0.78%) , Germans (0.96%) and Georgians (1.04%). Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 031, p.198.

more than 114,000 ethnic Russians in the Baltic provinces a mere 5,050 were employed in direct government capacity, suggesting that the Russian 'official' presence was actually quite low. The low number of Germans in these posts is accounted for by their high numbers as 'rentiers' or men of 'independent means' (circa 22,500) who tended to be part of the Baltic noble 'estates' and noble assemblies and therefore did not hold 'imperial' government and official posts but held posts in their own Baltic German institutions. Indeed empire-wide 0.97% of the empire's Germans were so employed, while in the Baltics the figure was 3.08% -- a figure unsurpassed by any nationality in the empire anywhere, and the best evidence for the scope of Baltic German self-government and their wide-ranging autonomy.[55] There was no need for Baltic Germans to make careers outside Baltic society. Similarly, of the approximately 7,800 ethnic Latvians employed in the free professions empire-wide, fully 6,700 were so employed in the Baltics. In short, in terms of career access for educated Latvians and Germans, the Baltic provinces were really quite a closed and insular world unto itself, at least until the turn of the century, and most official and government posts and offices were within the well-institutionalized Baltic civil and political bureaucracy and not the sparser imperial bureaucracy.

In considering Riga itself, in 1897 only 0.20% of the city's ethnic Latvians held government, administrative or civil service posts.[56] This figure is far lower than their empire-wide representation (0.68%) and especially than their Baltic representation (0.77%). If most Latvians interested in government or civil service posts found them locally in the Baltics and not at the imperial-level, now we can be more precise: most Latvians in government related civil service or administrative posts were not in Riga, but in the rural areas of Livland and Courland gubernii in 1897. This is consistent with the high level of associational and local institutional life in the rural areas among the rural Latvian bourgeoisie and in the rural schools and educational networks. It also means that, in the end, not only was 'provincial civil society' and 'provincial political life' more vibrant in the Baltics, but that this was not limited to the Riga or Revel. It was equally, if not more, true of the countrysides. And this in a region in which Russian zemstvo were

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55 Ibid., Tabelle, 042, pp.255-256, mother tongue/occupation; Tabelle 042, p.251 empire-wide; Tabelle 043, pp.277, 281-282 the percentages.

56 Ibid., Tabelle 053, p.446.

not introduced. The absence of zemstvo in other parts of the empire, as we have seen, resulted in a certain blockage of local civil and political society -- and it ensured that rural illiteracy rates would remain high since education was the key social mandate of the zemstvo. In the Baltics, however, their absence may actually have *facilitated* the development and differentiation of provincial civic and political life, and since rural literacy rates were the highest in the empire, the Baltic Lutheran Church was far more efficient. German rule over the Baltics influenced the provinces' development in important and powerful ways -- ways that differed from Russian rule elsewhere.

Therefore we cannot account for Latvian radicalism's 'Russification' or russophilia as a function of integration into the Russian imperial civil service, and to the extent that educated Latvians sought civil service, administrative, or governmental posts until 1897 they did so either entirely within Baltic German provincial society or, as was the case latterly, within their own Latvian urban and especially rural associational and institutional life.

This changed after the political earthquakes of 1905-1908. The 1905 revolutions in Latvia and the brutal suppressions by the state, especially in the rural areas, brought Russian presence and autocratic repressiveness into the Baltics with a new intensity. Besides a new wave of politicization in response to the repressions, two major social changes resulted. First, Latvian associationalism increased at the expense of the German. This is best captured by the fact that while in 1897 75% of Riga's estate owning voters had been German, by 1913 Latvians and Germans each commanded the same number of votes, as German predominance had all but disappeared and Latvians for the first time in the city's 700 year history were in a position to take control of Riga.[57] And secondly, the Russification of the Baltic civil service -- i.e. the replacement of Germans with lower class Russians and Latvians -- provided both 'imperial' career access and an increase in Russian centralism. A better understanding of this hints at some of the sources of Latvians socialists' internationalism as their politics navigated between the 'nationalism' inherent in increased Latvian institutional life on one hand and Russian centralism on the other.

Manfred Hagen's short but important early study found that while Russification in

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57 Michael F. Hamm, "Riga's 1913 City Election: A Study in Baltic Urban Politics", The Russian Review, p.448 and *passim*.

the 1880's and 1890's hit education and culture, after 1905 and especially after 1908 it was targeted at the Baltic civil service to bring the region administratively in line with the rest of the empire.[58] In order to Russianize the civil service the Stolypin administration had to 'democratize' its civil service social base, that is, recruit ethnic Russians from the lower social strata, to replace German, Latvian, Estonian and Jewish petty civil servants and officials.[59] High numbers of ethnic Russians from the lower social strata in the central Russian provinces were flocking into the Baltic civil service as a means of social advancement. Using state service as a vehicle for social promotion also appeared true of Latvians (and Estonians) from the lower social strata, as Hagen concludes, "we find strong evidence for the fact that the Estonian and Latvian population was anxious to improve its social status by using the [new] channel of state service, attempting to make up for the age-old and overall deprivation of their nationalities".[60] Latvians appeared to be present in larger numbers in the middle and lower ranks of the Baltic civil service, as ethnic Russians displaced Germans, and at certain levels Latvians as well.

III. Stuchka: Latvian socialist radicalism and Baltic German society

Stuchka's socialization and politicization occurred from the 1860's through the 1880's -- before Russification -- and firmly within the context of Baltic German liberal society. Yet Berzins' radicalization (below) was almost entirely within a Russificatory context in the late 1880's and 1890's, and had already exited from Baltic German society and entered 'imperial Russian' and cosmopolitan European society. These contexts were reflected in their leftist internationalism: Stuchka's 'internationalism' was a means of countering both Latvian nationalism and Russian centralism; two generations later, Berzins' 'internationalism' was more russophile, cultural, and Europeanized.

Peter Stuchka, *aka* 'Veteran' and 'Paragraph', was among the oldest in the

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58 Manfred Hagen, "Russification via 'Democratization'? Civil Service in the Baltic after 1906", Journal of Baltic Studies, vol.9, no.1, Spring, 1978, p.57.

59 Ibid., pp.59-62. Because there were so few Russians of 'higher social status' available in the Baltics, and because most such Russians from the interior did not want ot serve in the 'provinces' unless they got a good deal, between 45% and 75% of civil servants in the State Comptrol Board, the Courland finance department, and other state servitors were ethnic Russians from the 'peasant' and *meshchanstvo* estates, and most had to be drawn from the central Russian provinces.

60 Ibid., pp.59-60. Quote p.60.

Bolshevik elite and a key figure in Latvian Social Democracy with enormous influence over the Latvian Party in 1917.[61] Until 1917 Stuchka was known as an influential Latvian theoretician, publicist, and lawyer, but with the Revolution he emerged as its unchallenged leader.[62] Leninist and internationalist, Stuchka was perhaps the most prolific and talented of the Latvian publicists, writing three-fourths of the early issues of *Cina* .

Stuchka was born in 1865 in the rural Koknese district of Lifland to a family of prosperous landowners. His family were "Latvian grey barons", the new class of propertied rural Latvians discussed above, and which in the socialist literature after 1905 acquired a highly politicized connotation. Although official biographies claim Stuchka's family were "peasants", like Smilga's (below), they must actually have been quite prosperous given that Stuchka attended a German *gymnasium* in Riga, an expensive and private institution which would have presupposed a certain socioeconomic status.[63]

Stuchka likely attended Latvian elementary school since these schools were common in rural Livland and Courland. There is very sparse information on Stuchka's *gymnasium* years, but quite a lot is known about Riga's German secondary schools more generally. In the 1860's and 1870's the Baltic school system had expanded significantly with the addition of several realschulen and *gymnasium*. Baltic Germans were essentially liberal in their educational policies in the 1860' and 1870's, regarding Latvian and Estonian as the proper languages of primary education -- they viewed education as most effective at this level when it was in the student's native language -- but reserved German as the only defensible language of secondary and higher education. Anyone wishing to secure an occupation in Baltic society which required more than elementary-level education also required knowledge of German.

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61 What follows is based primarily on Russian and English language sources. The Latvian-language biography which likely contains additional information since it was written by a friend of Stuchka's is inaccessible to me: P. Dauge, P. Stuckas dzive un darbs, Riga, 1958. Even so, according to James White Stuchka's biographer was unable to find out exactly what Stuchka did before his involvement in the Petrograd Soviet, "Latvian and Lithuanian Sections of the Bolshevik Party on the Eve of the February Revolution", Russian Review, p.43, fnt.106.

62 Ezergailis, 1917 Revolution in Latvia, p.75.fnt.31 citing Dauge's biography on Stuchka.

63 On official sources stating his was a 'peasant' family, BSE, p.15, and "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Deiateli SSSR i revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia Rossiia: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Granat, Moskva: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1989, p.708 (hereafter Granat); on the *gymnasium* in Riga, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.451.

Stuchka's *gymnasium* education promised a social mobility within Baltic society. There is no evidence that he had any involvement in radical student circles -- indeed the Riga German *gymnasium* before the advent of Russification were generally quiescent. He was of a generation of educated Latvians exposed *neither* to the humiliations of Russification which the Riga German school system would suffer after 1886 *nor*, because of his socioeconomic position, to the growing anti-German nationalism in the Latvian school system of the 1860's and 1870's. Stuchka was linguistically and culturally Germanized, but he was also multi-lingual with some fluency in Russian. In well to do Latvian Riga homes, many had the 'Russianisms' and 'Germanisms' naturally present in a multi-lingual society.[64]

After completing *gymnasium* Stuchka attended the Juridical Faculty of St. Petersburg University, not "separatist" Dorpat University -- a further indication of his integration into not only educated Baltic society but now also in imperial Russian society. After receiving his law degree in 1888 Stuchka worked for 9 years as an advocate's associate in Riga.[65] The fact that he worked in Riga's legal profession, Russified since 1889 and now an uneasy combination of Russian and German, was both a testament to his language skills and proof of his successful entry into the privileged German literati. Stuchka also worked in St. Petersburg, and likely associated with the St. Petersburg Bar Association. As a member of the *advokatura*, Stuchka was at once part of a profession and an estate, with membership based solely on acquired knowledge and open to all applicants regardless of ethnic or religious background. As noted with the Ukrainian Krestinskii, the *advokatura* was governed by the idea of public service, not state service,[66] making political activism and *advokatura* membership perfectly consonant.

But by the 1890's tensions between 'localism' and 'cosmopolitanism' were deeply felt by Latvian cultural elites now able to access European and Russian cultures. The 'Baltic world' and 'provincial nationalism' were feeling too stifling against the more cosmopolitan appeal of new ideas from Europe, especially Germany, and especially for

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64 Plakans,"The 1890's", p.256.

65 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.708.

66 William Pomeranz, "'Profession or Estate'? The Case of the Russian Pre-Revolutionary *Advokatura*", The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.77, No.2, April 1999, esp. pp.246-247 and *passim*.

those now educated in Petersburg or Germany.[67] We see the beginning of the identity fractures of this cultural restlessness in Stuchka, though it is more complete in Berzins. Some of the appeal of European (and Russian) socialism for Latvian cultural elites in the 1880's and 1890's was its wider cultural vistas -- a need perhaps more intensely felt by cultural elites in Europe's smaller peripheral cultures. By this time Russification was no longer an issue as Latvian problems were addressed in more 'cosmopolitan' European social class terms.[68] European ideas brought a class critique to Baltic society.

In the 1890's two important forms of Latvian political radicalism emerged: 'new current' *jaunastrava* (its followers were the *jaunstravnieki)* Latvian socialism and Lettgallian (Latgalian) nationalism among the eastern Latvians in Lettgallia (Latgale) and in Vitebsk.[69] I focus here only on the first since Stuchka was a key figure and important contributor to the borrowing of Latvian socialism, which after 1905 transformed into Latvian social democracy. In parallel with his employment as an advocate's associate, between 1888 and 1897 Stuchka was also co-editor, with his brother-in-law Peteris Plieksana, of one of the most influential 'new current' papers, *Dienas Lapa.* After 1893 *Dienas Lapa* became the ideological organ of the 'new current' movement of the Latvian democratic intelligentsia and the first major Latvian progressive non-nationalist journal with a Marxist analysis of Baltic socioeconomic conditions.[70] The first Marxist and socialist writings had entered the Baltics from German Social Democracy (in fact the *Dienas Lapa* took not only a western orientation but also a German socialist-style analysis of capitalism) from German writings, and from Austria where the nationality question was clearly important.[71] But this was a non-nationalist 1890's Latvian radical intelligentsia which focused solely on Latvian socioeconomic divisions and high income differentials, and centered on the rural landless and the poorer urban workers, to the exclusion of nationalist issues and politics. In the battles between Latvian nationalism and German-

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67 Plakans, "The 1890's, p.255.

68 Ibid., pp.255-256.

69 Plakans, The Latvians, p.103. Lettgallian nationalism appeared in the 1890's among the roughly 500,000 who claimed Lettgallian, a linguistic variant of Latvian.

70 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.708 on Stuchka's involvement; Plakans, The Latvians, pp.102-103 on Plieksans and the journal; on *Dienas Lapa*, Oktiabr'skiia revoliutsiia v latvii, p.418.

71 Plakans, The Latvians, p.102; Pistohlkors, Baltischer Lander, pp.339-394.

inspired socialism, a politicized socialism won the day -- and this during the height of cultural Russification in the Baltics.

Most of the *jaunastravnieki* were, like Stuchka, of rural origin. The 1890's group differed from earlier nationalist intelligentsia because most of the former had been more urban in origin. Moreover, while the Young Latvians had been products of 'separatist' Dorpat University; the *jaunastravnieki* were more likely products of Petersburg, Moscow, and Zurich Universities.[72] *Dienas Lapa*, for instance, was published by Rainis (Janis Pliekans) who, like Stuchka, was born in 1865 during 'the national awakening' and, like Stuchka, had obtained a law degree from Petersburg in 1888 and, like Stuchka, worked in the free professions (literati), though as a writer and publicist in Riga and, like Stuchka, translated socialist classics from the German.

Members of *Dienas Lapa* , Stuchka among them, were instrumental in organizing strikes, lectures, and work stoppages, and in the formation of radical workers groups in Riga, Libau, and Mitau. With the labor unrest of 1897 the *jaunstravnieki* and other leftist radicals were arrested, exiled to the Russian interior or abroad, or expelled from the Baltic provinces, turning many against the Russian state for the first time. Some 80 *jaunstravnieki* had been arrested and brought to trial in 1899. Among the arrested *jaunastravnieki* in the 1897 reprisals was Stuchka. He was sentenced to five years in exile and in 1902 settled in Vitebsk guberniia where he continued his political activism. The reprisals not only further radicalized the *jauna strava*, but as Plakans explains, their radicalism now also attacked the Latvian nationalism of the nationalist Riga Latvian Association as representing Riga merchants and propertied interests.[73]

This is important for understanding Stuchka's attraction to socialism and his anti-nationalism. Although the municipal reforms of the 1860's and 1870's had allowed Latvians and Russians entry in city council elections, property restrictions on the franchise were still narrow enough to ensure that the social and ethnic composition of Riga city government remained basically unaltered, e.g. German-dominated. Even the 1892

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[72] Ezergailis, 1917 Revolution in Latvia, pp.4-5.

[73] Plakans, The Latvians, pp.103-104.

counterreforms had solidified the German position in urban government.[74] Germans dominated municipal elections between 1877 and 1913. Latvians had risen economically and culturally, but as late as 1905 they remained politically excluded from provincial government, with negligible representation in the Riga city council, majorities in only four small towns, and poor representation in city patronage jobs.[75] Latvian bourgeois underrepresentation was hardly commensurate with their new economic position.

But this did not mean that middle class Latvians became nationalists. Different 'interests' developed between the urban Latvian commercial bourgeoisie, the cultural activists of the RLA, and the now powerful Latvian rural bourgeoisie which had been acquiring holdings since the 1850's.[76] Interests did not coalesce around the Latvian 'nation' but remained local and status particularistic. So, for instance, in local elections most propertied Riga Latvians supported German tickets in defense of the privileges they had acquired with merchant estate and 'literati' status -- against the program of the Latvian nationalists; indeed as late as 1913 Riga's enfranchised elite remained more politically united than its Latvian counterpart.[77] Nationalists polemicized that the Latvian defeat in the 1886 municipal elections was due to the high number of Germanized Riga Latvians who had voted against the Latvian-Russian ticket.[78] Because of property restrictions on the franchise, Latvian electoral victories (and failures) in town council representation represented affluent and propertied Latvian groups, relegating social reform and 'progressivism' to secondary position. This allowed, for instance, the Leftist paper *Dienas Lapa* and its editorial staff led by Stuchka to maintain in 1909 that "progressive" Latvians, *viz.* the urban and rural lower classes, had nothing to gain from supporting the Latvian 'national' tickets, since they represented the Latvian propertied establishment as

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74 Henriksson, "Riga", p.189.

75 Plakans, The Latvians, pp.104-109; Henriksson, "Riga", p.196. Latvians held only 2 of 72 places in the Riga city council in 1878 and 8 of 80 in 1901, though their proportion increased somewhat thereafter.

76 Plakans implies this in "Latvia Before the 1880's". p.210.

77 Hamm, "Riga's 1913 City Election", p.459.

78 Many wealthier Russians voted for conservative German tickets to preserve the status quo. Old Believers were not attracted to the Great Russian nationalism of the Orthodox and conservative variety. In 1877 Jews received the franchise but did not organize as an independent political force: the upwardly mobile Germanized and most voted for the German establishment. Henriksson, The Tsars Loyal Germans, p.37.

much as that of the Germans,[79] with the effect of reinforcing both class distinctions and urban and rural divisions. And even as late as the landmark 1913 Riga city elections, the numbers of Latvians who voted for German tickets, though imprecise, was substantial -- so much so that *Dienas Lapa* and other progressives were concerned about the level of cooperation that persisted between Latvians and Germans.[80]

While in exile Stuchka worked on the Latvian journal *Sotsialdemokrat* published in Berne and between 1903 and 1906 did party work in Riga.[81] In 1903 Stuchka was a founder of what would become the Latvian Bolshevik Party, and in 1904 he became a member of the CC at the first congress of the Latvian Social Democratic Party in Riga. Initially the Latvian Party admitted only ethnic Latvians, collaborating with other ethnic groups in federative committees in Latvian territories; but their ethnically exclusive membership position later ceded to a more 'pluralist' one.[82] In 1906 Stuchka was instrumental in bringing the Latvian party into coalition with the Russian RSDLP as the 'SDLK' (Social Democracy of the Latvian Krai), which in 1914 fully joined the RSDLP on a basis similar to that of the Jewish Bund and the Polish-Lithuanian SDKPiL.[83]

After 1905 Stuchka worked as a barrister in St. Petersburg and took active part in the trials of many of the Revolution's participants. In 1907 Stuchka became a key Latvian delegate at the Stuttgart, Brussels, and Berlin internationalists' conference.[84] At the time Stuchka was the only practical Marxist theoretician, most others were more concerned with *belles lettres*, and as of 1905 he became *the* Latvian theorist on the agrarian issue.[85] During this period Stuchka also wrote quite extensively on the "national question" and on the relationship between nationalism and socialism in Latvia. Along with the Armenian Stepan Shaumian, Stuchka was one of the national minority Bolsheviks to address the nationalities question as early as 1905-1906, far earlier than Lenin's 1913 tract. Ezergailis

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79 Henriksson, "Riga", p.196.

80 Hamm, "Riga's 1913 City Election", pp.459-460.

81 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.708.

82 Plakans, The Latvians, p.104; Plakans, "The 1890's", pp.260-261.

83 Oktiabr'skiia revoliutsiia v latvii, p.418.

84 Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.451.

85 Ezergailis, 1917 Revolution in Latvia, p.70.

suggests, I think on the evidence plausibly, that the national minority or borderland Bolsheviks actually led Lenin (and the Russians) on this question and not the other way around.[86] In 1906 Stuchka wrote, "was it [the 1905 Revolution] a national or a class struggle?...it appeared that the Latvian people were without any class differences [sic] and had risen against the ruling Germans and the companions -- the bureaucracy", but he believed this to be only temporary since the Latvian bourgeoisie tied itself to its German counterpart.[87] How can we understand his call for a pure class struggle within Latvia?

The 1905 activities of Baltic German landowners and the Tsarist army's punitive expeditions had now turned large segments of the Latvian intelligentsia against Latvian membership in the empire.[88] The events of 1905, as both Stuchka and Shaumian admitted, were in the imperial borderlands largely national rebellions, and the most important consequence of these borderland revolutions was that most of the nationalist groupings, which had until then been fairly weak and cultural in character, now took on clearer political dimensions. Though they were still some way from being 'mass movements', nationalists now had to be explicitly countered by socialists. And although the Jewish Bund had raised the nationalities question in the RSDLP in 1903, after 1905 not only nationalist groupings, but also "national" socialists in the empire's borderlands were winning substantial support. In this connection Stuchka wrote,

> "We are all against nationalism, even when it comes under a socialist label, and as a frightening example we are mentioning the demands of the *Bund* for national cultural autonomy which is even unacceptable at the Menshevik conferences...."[89]

Although Lenin had promised self-determination to Poles, Finns, Ukrainians, Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians at various points between 1913 and 1917, as Ezergailis notes Stuchka himself never mentioned Latvian national self-determination and consistently promoted only "democratic centralism". This was a position which he maintained through 1917 on the grounds that there could not be a free Latvia in an unfree Russia, political

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[86] Ibid., p.88.

[87] Quoted in ibid., p.79.

[88] Plakans, "The 1890's", 266-267.

[89] Quoted in Ezergailis, 1917 Revolution in Latvia, p.81.

autonomy could be carefully circumscribed only in a union with democratic Russia.[90]

Ezergailis argues that Stuchka's position in 1917 differed little, if at all, from his position in 1906, although he suggests that in 1906 Stuchka may have been under the influence of the 'Austrian heresy' and its cultural nationalism.[91] I disagree -- based on Ezergailis' own evidence. While it is true that Stuchka had never sanctioned national self-determination and that his position had changed little between the two revolutions, it is most likely that given the vast differences between Latvia in 1906 after the failure of the revolutions and the brutal and violent Russian 'chauvinist' response, and Latvia in 1917 after two years of War and after a seemingly successful Revolution in Russia, his positions were held under rationales arguably more cogent to the circumstances.

Ezergailis writes that "at both junctures Stuchka...sought escape from the Great Russian chauvinistic bear and from Latvia's own nationalists", and in so doing continually emphasized democracy.[92] This seems true. Stuchka's internationalism was a way to navigate between Russian centralism and Latvian separatism. But my sense is that 'democracy' was only the socialist language behind a desired imperial territorial integrity. At both junctures Stuchka emphasized an imperialist union, the replacement of the imperial "prison of nations" with an equally territorially imperial "democratic centralism", something Ezergailis only hints at but which could be more usefully considered. For Stuchka, the lesson -- and the fear -- of 1905 was that the greatest threat to Latvian socialism was now Russian 'chauvinism', not Latvian nationalism. And the appropriate 'socialist' response was Latvian autonomy within a socialist federation. Stuchka's post-1905 fear of Great Russian reaction may not have been misplaced: arguably Latvia was now leading Russia in revolutionary social dynamic (even Lenin thought so), so the fear of a Great Russian reaction during this first revolutionary period was well-founded. So Stuchka also understood -- mostly because he was implicated in it on a professional basis as a practicing lawyer -- that 1905 had changed Latvia in practical, institutional terms: Latvians were moving to the fore in provincial, city, and local parliamentary and

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90 Ibid., pp.84-85.

91 Ibid., pp.85-86.

92 Ibid., p.87.

administrative structures and electoral dynamics were changing. This was an institutional independence of the Latvian bourgeoisie. Baltic society was now firmly in Latvian hands, not in German hands, and Stuchka would have no place within it.

During the 1915-1917 period, the fears were both geopolitical and pragmatic. The fear of losing German-occupied Courland was quite realistic. Courland would be kept by Germany after the War, and Latvia would itself be dismembered, so stressing unity was important, again a well-founded (and prophetic fear): with Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks offered up Latvia to Germany.[93] In September 1915 Riga had fallen as the German armies moved into Livland. The German occupation had caused the entire Russian bureaucratic structure to flee, prompting the Germans to organize a military apparatus for administrative purposes.[94] German occupation had insulated Courland and Lithuania from the direct effects of the Russian Revolution,[95] but it opened new possibilities for Latvian local political control, something which threatened to sever Latvian socialist ties to Russian events. With the near complete breakdown of administrative authority in these unoccupied regions, in Livland (Vidzeme) and Lettgallia (Latgale) the propertied bourgeoisie had formed regional administrative councils acting as local legislatures, which in composition were Latvian, and in direction tended toward autonomy within Russia.

Page argued that the greatest obstacle to the autonomous administrative aspirations of the Latvian propertied and landed bourgeoisie (rural and urban) in the unoccupied territories was not the Provisional Government in Russia, but the *rural 'proletariat'* of Latvia.[96] The reverse was also true: the greatest obstacle to the Latvian Left was not the Provisional Government or even Baltic German control, but the interests of the propertied Latvian bourgeoisie as reflected in their rural councils and associations. Their plans had been restricted largely to the propertied Latvians, ignoring the rural landless peasants and rural laborers -- precisely those most highly represented in the Latvian Infantry units of the Imperial Armies. It soon began to appear to rural landless -- and soldiers -- that in this

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93 Ibid., p.91, ftnt.31.

94 The German armies considered Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles in the occupied territories completely foreign, but interestingly 'recognized' the Jews. Page, Formation of the Baltic States, pp.28-29.

95 Ibid., p.62.

96 Ibid., p.63. Emphasis is mine.

landowners' struggle (for national liberation) they would remain excluded.

The Latvian Bolsheviks seized the 'radical moment' and moved the editorial offices of *Cina* from Petrograd to Riga, becoming the *de facto* leadership for the Latvian Rifles, and proclaiming not only Latvia's right to secede from Russia Leninist-style, but also promised land to the landless peasants and soldiers. A dual administrative power emerged: the SD's landless councils and the autonomous (bourgeois) councils, further entrenching Latvian class-divisions. The Latvian bourgeoisie wanted independence, while peasants and workers sought autonomy within a federated Russia.[97] The latter prevailed. The Latvian Bolsheviks retained wide support among the Latvian *strelnieki* and in the unoccupied cities of Cesis, Valmiera, and Valka.

But the rapidity of events in the War and Revolutionary years ensured that the relationship between nationalism and socialism would not stand still. Though he remained 'imperialist', and committed to Latvian unity with Russia, geopolitics forced another reassessment on Stuchka. The German VIII Army was deployed in Estonia and Latvia in 1918 when the Bolsheviks signed at Brest-Litovsk. Though this army was vulnerable to partisan attacks and disintegration, nationalist movements were recognized by German military authorities, and any Red Army offensive would constitute foreign invasion by the terms of the Treaty. The decision was made to create independent Soviet states in the path of the Red Army, first in Estonia, then in Lithuania and Latvia. When Lenin asked that Stuchka head a Latvian "Provisional Revolutionary Government" comprised of key members of the Latvian SD, "he [Stuchka] was horrified and opposed it strenuously" as a flagrant concession to nationalist separatism. Eventually Stuchka reluctantly agreed to become a "separatist", not least because "the German social-traitors would scream that Soviet Russia did not liberate small nations, but conquered them". Stuchka edited the Latvian Soviet Government's manifesto and agreed to a Red Army offensive -- which included the Latvian Rifles -- so that it could claim to be "a Latvian Army".[98] .

In wake of the Soviet VII Red Army and German collapse and evacuation, a

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97 Ibid., p.66.

98 Discussion and quotes in James White, "National Communism and World Revolution: The Political Consequences of German Military Withdrawal from the Baltic Area in 1918-1919", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.46, No.8, 1994, pp.1362-1363.

communist government was established in Walk and headed by Stuchka, Danisheviskii, and Lencmanis. Stuchka proclaimed the independence of Soviet Latvia and declared that the Latvian republic would be part of the "Universal Union of Soviet Republics".[99] Soviet states had successfully been created with the collusion of internationalist Bolsheviks such as the Lithuanian Kapsukas, Stuchka, the Bulgarian Rakovskii, and the Armenian Miasnikov in Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania. Stuchka imagined these as a Universal Union of socialist republics created by the spreading world revolution. Indeed he referred to it as "Union of Soviets of the Communist International", which he thought would portend revolutions in Germany, Austria, and Hungary. In the end, Latvian socialists' internationalism had caused them to view the Communist International not as collection of parties, but as a federation of socialist states.[100] So after a tactical concession, agreeing to set up a 'separatist' Latvian Soviet government, Stuchka's commitment to internationalism remained substantially in tact in theory, if only in the belief that Soviet Latvia was part of an 'international of states'. In practice, however, geopolitics had obviously forced Stuchka's internationalism into a 'nationalist-separatist' corner, if only to save the revolution in Russia.

IV. Berzins and Danishevskii: russophile socialist radicalism of the Latvian bourgeoisie

If Stuchka was radicalized in a crumbling Latvian-German world, Berzins and Danishevskii were radicalized, at least two generations later, in an emerging Latvian-Russian world. Their political radicalism reflected this important shift in the Latvian radical intelligentsia. And more subtlely it was in turn reflected in their respective sources of leftist internationalism.

Posthumousthly rehabilitated, Ian Antonovich Berzins was arrested in 1937 by Stalin as a "Latvian nationalist" and died in 1938 under unknown circumstances. By that time Berzins' diplomatic career for the Bolshevik regime had been considerable. He had served as the Bolshevik Ambassador to Switzerland in 1918, in 1921 as Ambassador to Finland, and as Ambassador to Austria. Karl Danishevskii was one of the key Latvian

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[99] Ibid., p.1364.
[100] Ibid., p.1366.

Bolshevik orators in 1917, and together with Stuchka, played an important part in tactical decisions and in writing party resolutions.[101] As a Bolshevik, Danishevskii was a member of the Izkolat (the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers', Landless Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, or a Latvian 'Soviet of Soviets'), the Riga Soviet, the Latvian Social Democratic CC, and that of the brief Soviet Latvian government with Stuchka established after Brest-Litovsk.[102] Like Berzins, Danishevskii, too, died in 1938 in the purges. Though the reasons for their arrests by Stalin are difficult to precise, Berzins was considered a 'Latvian nationalist', and there is evidence that before becoming a Bolshevik in 1917 Danishevskii had been a Menshevik.

Born Janis Berzins-Ziemelis in 1881 in the Cesis district in Lifland, Berzins' family were peasant farmers. Danishevskii, aka, "German", was born in 1884 also in rural Livland to a peasant family.[103] Both soon entered the Latvian liberal professions. Though there is little reliable data on their education, we know that Danishevskii attended the Moscow Commercial Institute in 1910, but was expelled in 1912 for radical activity; Berzins attended the Riga Teacher's Seminary.[104] Berzins and Danishevskii were socialized in the 1880's and politicized in the 1890's, two decades after most Latvian nationalist radicals had died.[105] Relatively few Latvians of the 1880's generation had experienced serfdom or the corvee period when social mobility was first experienced by rural Latvians of Stuchka's generation. By the 1890's German dominance and control of the Baltic littoral, and particularly of Riga's administrative, judicial, and educational systems had been eroded. The bite that Latvian nationalists of previous decades felt toward Baltic German social and political position was substantially attenuated. And given what we know about Baltic Germans' non-nationalist response (until after

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101 Ezergailis, 1917 Revolution in Latvia, pp.42-43.

102 Ibid., pp.44-49, 156; Oktaibr'skiia revoliutsiia v latvii, p.42. In 1914-1917 The Latvian SD CC included Berzins (abroad as a candidate member), Danishevskii (coopted Menshevik as of March 1917) in Moscow, and Stuchka (elected member from July 1917 in Petrograd).

103 BSE, p.529.

104 Oktaibr'skiia revoliutsiia v latvii, p.42 on Danishevskii; HIAPO, Box 210, Indexes XXII-XXIV, Index XXII, Folder 1B, Circular 768, 11/24 November, 1915, Paris, on Berzins.

105 On the deaths in the 1870's of the Latvian nationalist intelligentsia and on the generational shift more generally see Plakans, "Russification Policy in the 1880's", in Thaden (ed), Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, p.227.

1905),[106] Latvian intelligentsia radicalism was shifting from a traditional anti-German inspiration to a firmly pro-Russian oriented one.

More precisely, Berzins' and Danishevskii's first political radicalism occurred not during the period of greatest nationalist activity against German rule, but in the early years of the introduction of Russian language education and curriculum of the early 1880's. Latvian parents in rural districts sent their children to Russian-language schools, with the scholarship on this suggesting that the vast majority of Latvians seemed to have accepted educational Russification without objection and even with certain enthusiasm, as parts of the Latvian intelligentsia welcomed the extension of Russian as a way of diminishing German control over provincial life.[107] Plakans refers to this process as "unplanned Russification", a misnomer I think. A more accurate sociological description would be "acculturation".

Indeed in the last decades of Tsarist rule, the empire appeared attractive to the many thousands of Latvians who emigrated from the Baltics. In 1897 115,000 Latvians, or 8% of all Latvians in the empire, lived outside the Baltic provinces, mostly in the provinces of Kovno, Pskov, Vitebsk, and Petersburg. Estimates vary, but on the eve of the war circa 220,000 Latvians -- or 1/8-1/5 of the Latvian population -- lived in non-Baltic Russia, most seeking land or employment in industry.[108] A significant segment sought imperial venues for education as many attended institutes in Petersburg or Moscow, as did Danishevskii and as had Stuchka. Though understudied, based on anecdotal evidence it is interesting that many Latvians with advanced degrees from Russian universities were viewed suspiciously by Baltic Germans on their return,[109] resulting in an increasingly strong identification with Russian language and culture, and with the empire more widely.

Another effect of these academic migrations was that unlike Stuchka, Berzins and Danishevskii were likely more fluent in Russian than German. For the generation

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106 Henriksson, The Tsar's Loyal Germans.

107 Plakans, "Russification Policy in the 1880's", p.241.

108 Figures in Plakans, The Latvians, p.110.

109 Ibid., p.111. There is evidence of Latvian 'blocked mobility' on return from Russia. For instance, of the 150 Latvians with theology degress from Dorpat, only 1/2 found work in Baltic Lutheran churches.

educated in the 1880's who reached intellectual maturity in the 1890's and early 1900's, not only advanced education, but also urbanization was now into Russian, not German. Stuchka had gone from a well-off rural landowning family to membership in the Baltic German 'literati' as a lawyer; Berzins now went from a rural (substantial) peasant family to membership in a Russified Latvian intelligentsia as a schoolteacher.

By most sources Berzins was employed as a teacher in Lifland gubernia. Although there is little specific biographical information available outside Latvian-language sources about Berzins' career in Latvia, several general comments can confidently be made about the social and political context of ethnic Latvian teachers in these years. The Okhrana files indicate that Berzins was employed as a public or state school teacher either in the city or in the rural schools.[110] This meant that his Russian proficiency would have been good. In 1885 all primary schools in the Baltic provinces were centralized under the St. Petersburg Ministry of Education, and by March 1891 all city schools in Riga taught all subjects in Russian. In 1887 Russian was made the language of instruction in certain *gymnasiums* and in 1889 this was extended to privately run secondary schools. In 1893 German Dorpat University was closed and re-opened as a Russian institution with a primarily ethnic Russian student body, the Baltic Polytechnic Institute followed.[111] By the mid-1890's all schools in the Baltics had Russian as their official language of instruction. By 1897 many of the rural Latvian schoolteachers were unable to teach because their Russian skills were not proficient enough. Though promised careers in city and rural schools if they showed the right political attitude, careers could be hurt of they had been members of Latvian nationalist organizations or associations.[112] Latvian schoolteachers clearly understood and felt the impact of educational Russification.

More professionally trained Latvians became teachers than any other occupation, and most mid-century nationalist efforts had famously been in the teaching professions.

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110 HIAPO, Box 210, Index XXII-XXVIa, Index XXII, Folder 1B, Circular No.1274, 9/22 October 1912, Paris, and Circular No.858, 27/10 June-July 1912, Paris. These Okhrana reports are the only non-Latvian language sources I have found which specify his employment as a Baltic public school teacher. The first was based on a Lifland Okhrana report, the latter an Okhrana translation of intercepted correspondence of the Foreign Bureau of the SDLK. Similar information is repeated in both.

111 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, pp.219-.220; Pistholkors, Baltischer Lander, pp.408-410.

112 Plakans, "The Eighteen Nineties", p.250.

Yet as noted earlier, the radicalizing role of Russification among Latvians should not be overstated. Baltic German schools were of the highest quality in the empire, educating the greatest proportion of the population, but Russification of the Riga school system actually allowed Latvians and Jews to make substantial gains.[113] Administrative Russification was to ensure that the Baltic provinces be "Russian" and not part of "another, foreign culture", as the educational bureaucracy was symbolically moved from 'separatist' Dorpat to Riga in 1886.[114] But this involved a series of administrative centralizing moves which undermined Baltic educational autonomy. Arguably it was this that radicalized, not the introduction of Russian itself. We know, for example, that since the late 1880's jurisdictional questions continually arose between local school districts and state governing authorities, with the latter often reserving the right to terminate teachers. This "jurisdictional confusion", as Plakans notes, "was to be reflected in hundreds of disputes in the 1890's and after the turn of the century".[115] The struggle over the Russification of schools had been most strident between the imperial government and the Baltic German Ritterschaften over control of the *gymnasium* and *realschulen*, not between Latvians and Russians. At the 1905 conference of 1,000 Latvian schoolteachers the leading faction were social democrats, not nationalists, calling for greater autonomy within a socialist Russia. While teachers were earlier the backbone of Latvian nationalist radicalism, now in the 1890's-1900's a large segment was radicalized on a russophile socialism, not on an anti-German or anti-Russian nationalism. If Berzins' own politicization as a Latvian teacher did not spring from Russification, there was evidently political restlessness with Tsarist illiberalism and centralism more generally -- which may have chafed all the more in the context of historically liberal Baltic society.

In 1902 at age 21 Berzins joined the Latvian Socialist Party in Riga, which indeed

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113 Henriksson, "Riga", pp.188-189; Michael H. Haltzel, "Baltic particularism and the beginnings of Russification", in Thaden, Russification in the Baltic Provinces, pp.141-142. While there was one school for every 2,665 of the empire's inhabitants, in Livland province there was one for every 630 inhabitants, with the result that by 1900 the literacy rate in Livland was more than three times the Russian average. Henriksson, The Tsars Loyal Germans, p.49.

114 Henriksson, The Tsars Loyal Germans, p.50.

115 Plakans, "Russification Policy in the 1880's", p.240.

had large numbers of students and teachers in its membership.[116] In 1903 he was arrested for illegal activities, released, arrested again in 1904 and escaped from prison in 1905. Berzins took part in revolutionary events in Valka (Walk) in 1905-1907. In 1906 Berzins collaborated in the RSDLP journal *Proletariat*. And in 1907 he became secretary of the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP and a delegate to the London party conference under the name Pavel.[117]

Because of the severe repression in the Baltics after 1905 Berzins, as with many other Latvian leftists, began a long period of emigration. In 1906 in Finland and then in Paris, Berzins' political radicalism in the European emigre community was not only substantial, but it was also at a relatively high level of influence judging by the attention paid to him by the Tsarist Okhrana. Abroad Berzins was on the editorial board and an active contributor to the Latvian Bolshevik publication *Cina*, on the main organ of the Latvian SDs *Sotsialdemokrat*,.and edited the newspaper of the Foreign Committee of the Latvian party *Biletens* (Bulletin).[118] First published in Riga in 1904 as an organ of the Latvian social democrats,*Cina* became the central organ of the SDLK and would undergo several incarnations during and after 1917 events.[119]

Berzins was simultaneously a member of several related SD parties, a reflection, but not a cause, of cultural vistas beyond what may increasingly have seemed 'Latvian provincialism'. In 1910 Berzins joined the foreign bureau of the RSDLP.[120] In 1912 he had organized a Bureau for Groups Abroad in order to undermine the legitimate Committee Abroad and to organize a competing press.[121] He was secretary of the

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116 The sources that date this as the year he joined the "CP" do not address his activism, if any, prior to 1902, BSE, p.229, and Oktiabr'skiia revoliutsiia v latvii, p.432; see Granat account on Rudzutaks for an anecdotal account of the composition of the party circa 1904, "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.632..

117 Oktiabr'skiia revoliutsiia v latvii, pp.42, 432. We know less about Danishevskii's activities in these crucial years than Berzins'. Danishevskii had joined the CP in 1905, and conducted party work between 1907 and 1914 in Petersburg, Baku, Tiflis, Warsaw, Riga, Libau, and Moscow.

118 Ibid., p.432; the Tsarist Okhrana followed his editorial party work in Paris and Europe, HIAPO, Box 210, Index XXII-XXIVa, Index XXII, Folder 1B, Circular No.1274 dated 9/22 October 1912, Paris.

119 Oktiabr'skiia revoliutsiia v latvii, p.415.

120 Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.27; HIAPO, Box 124, Index XIIIb(1), Folder 1E, Outgoing Dispatch, No.852, 30 April/13 May 1914, Paris.

121 Ezergailis, The 1917 Revolution in Latvia, p.29.

Foreign Bureau of the Paris group of the SDLK, and in this capacity was involved in publishing, writing and in overseeing the transport of materials from Russia.[122] But the impulse for Berzins' internationalist socialism had already been formed as a Russified schoolteacher in Latvia. His world view was similar to Stuchka's in one respect: Berzins, too, was a culturally sensitive radical in the Baltics which was by 1900 increasingly feeling like a culturally peripheral and insular society far from European excitement -- escape from which was either via imperial-cum-Russian or European cultures. My sense is that Berzins' cosmopolitanism reflected elements of both.

Berzins' internationalism would only be strengthened by his experiences during the war, though he was in America, Europe, and in the Russian interior, not war-devastated Latvia. For Stuchka the war and its surrounding geopolitical considerations had pressed him to make 'nationalist' concessions in order to preserve the revolution and Latvia's place in the 'new empire'. Until this point Berzins' internationalism had been more truly cosmopolitan and abstract, far less pragmatically implicated in tactical decisions. Berzins had spent more than nine years in emigration as a key figure in the Latvian socialist emigre community. As with most Latvian socialist emigres, he opposed the war as member of the Foreign Bureau of the Latvian branch of the RSDLP.[123] In 1915 Berzins took part in the Zimmerwald Conference as a member of the rump internationalist Left. He was also among the small but active Latvian and Russian socialist community in the United States, as had been the Lithuanian Kapsukas. In 1916-1917 Berzins edited the Latvian social democratic paper *Stradnieks*(Worker) in Boston and the Russian leftist internationalist paper *Novii mir* in New York.[124] Latvian socialist publications abroad called for struggle against Russian autocracy, not a national unity. To these political emigres Russification seemed only a minor infraction.[125] Both Kapsukas

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122 This according to Paris Okhrana agents, HIAPO, Box 210, Index XXII-XXIVa, Index XXII, Folder 1B, Circular No.858, 27/10 June-July 1912, Paris, and Box 190, Index XVIb(2), Folder 4, Circular No.1186, 18 September/1 October 1912, Paris.

123 HIAPO, Box 210, Index XXII, Folder 1B, Circular no.768, 11/24 November 1915, Paris. At the 13th Conference of the Latvian Party in 1917, Danishevskii too, stressed the imperialist character of the war. Ezergailis, 1917 Revolution in Latvia, pp.66-67.

124 Oktiabr'skiia revoliutsiia v latvii, p.432.

125 Plakans makes this last point, "The 1890's", p.259.

and Berzins, as socialists from small, geopolitically fragile potential states, internationalism during the War was not uncommon. This changed only when the Revolution in Russia opened new geopolitical possibilities.

But Berzins' activism now also implicated him more immediately among Latvian refugees in the Russian interior. The Tsarist government was confronted with between 2.6 million and 3.0 million refugees fleeing into central Russian provinces from war-occupied Polish, Lithuanian, and western Latvian territories. As the "refugee crisis" brought them by the thousands into Petrograd, it visibly became a matter of state importance.[126] As with refugees from Minsk and Podolia, Livland refugees too, now came under the Russian high command. The Latvian refugee diaspora among the wider diaspora in Russia was substantial. Within six months of the German declaration of war on Russia, the southern part of the Baltic littoral had become an active war zone, with the dislocative effects of the German armies in Courland and the southern Latvian territories most appreciable on rural Latvians. About 570,000 refugees had fled or were evacuated from Courland into Livland and Lettgallia as the German armies advanced and established a military-civilian government.[127] This refugee flow continued for two years reaching an estimated 760,000, with nearly 2/3 of the local population fleeing. The Latvian Central Committee for Refugee Relief registered one million Latvians outside the Baltic area.

The Latvian refugees in unoccupied Livland (Vidzeme) posed a considerable problem to the Russian state. Many, including factory workers and their families, completely uprooted by the German advance began to organize relief organizations to meet the needs of their now sizable community: they set up ad hoc educational facilities with at least 15 new Latvian schools created in Petrograd alone (adult education for the Latvian Worker's Educational Society "Kultura" was founded in October 1915 which sponsored lectures on nationalism and socialism -- Stuchka himself gave a lecture on Latvian poetry). By some estimates Latvian political refugees had up to 260 different organizations in Petersburg alone with as many as 100,000 ethnic Latvians in the imperial capital in

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126 Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia During World War I, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999, p.47.

127 In 1910 Courland had a population of 741,2000 which by 1916 was reduced by about 500,000. Figures in Page, Formation of the Baltic States, pp.38-39.

1917.[128] It is possible, as White speculates, that the Latvian (and Lithuanian) SD refugee organizations in Russia were more organized than local Russians precisely because they had to cater to specific refugee needs.[129]

In 1915 and 1916 Berzins was among these organizers as a key figure in "Prometejs" in Petrograd.[130] Prometejs essentially became a 'national' section of the RSDLP(b) and its main function was to canvass support among Latvian war refugees in the Russian interior. With the evacuation of factories in the Baltics due to German occupation, membership to Prometejs increased substantially as more and more Latvian SDs came to Petrograd, even organizing its own "passport bureau" which Russian radicals also used. Prometejs campaigned against the War and the Tsarist government, demanding peace and a democratic republic.[131] They were the most active group in March in 1917, with variously between 80 and 141 members comprising a *raion* committee, a military guard, a communications committee, and an agitation committee.[132]

In 1918 the coordination of 'national' left wing groups -- Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, Polish, Finnish in the occupied regions -- then commonly referred to as the "Little international" -- created important communist parties and links between the Russian and German Revolutions,[133] and they had come into existence during WWI. The Latvian version, Prometejs, together with Latvian sections of the Russian Bureau of the CC of the Latvian SD Party, was headed by Stuchka and Danishevskii. This 'national' left wing group formed among Latvian refugees in

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128 In 1916 Kultura membership was 415 Latvian of the refugee community. In 1916 20 Latvian grammar schools and 9 *gimnazija* had been set up with 1,853 pupils. For more details and on Stuchka's involvement see, White, "Latvian and Lithuanian Sections of the Bolshevik Party", pp.91-92; for figures, Ezergailis, Latvian Impact on the Russian Revolution, p.250. Other estimates have 100 organizations in Petersburg alone with 2,000 staff members -- teachers, doctors, journalists and more than 200 organizations across Russia. Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, pp.157-160.

129 White, "Latvian and Lithuanian Sections of the Bolshevik Party", p.100.

130 Ibid., p.93. In 1915 Riga Latvian Social Democrats established Prometejs, which quickly became attached to Trotsky's Mezhraionka interfactional group, but then shifted to alliance with the Bolsheviks and joined the party as a *raion*.

131 Ibid., pp.92-93.

132 Ezergailis, The 1917 Revolution in Latvia, pp.40-41.

133 This is a key argument in White, "National Communism and World Revolution".

Petrograd would become the basis of the new communist underground organization founded on the 'national' sections of the Bolshevik party (Lithuanians in Petrograd had the Lithuanian Section of the RSDLP),[134] and in which Danishevskii would be an important figure in Riga in 1918.

As Berzins and other socialists frantically organized the first soviets in cities, factories, among refugees and in Latvian army units, support came primarily from the most desperate, displaced and unskilled landless peasants, and substantial numbers of disillusioned soldiers in the Latvian infantry units. The war, German occupation, evacuation, starvation, and disease had made of most Latvians either demoralized soldiers, terrified civilians under German military occupation, or uprooted refugees in the Russian interior, permitting levels of politicization and organization that radical groups could only dream of. I return to this at the end of the chapter in discussing the differential effects of the war on Latvians and Estonians. But for Berzins and Latvian socialists these desperate circumstances perhaps made organizing Latvians easier.

Many of these refugee organizations naturally to took 'national' forms,[135] creating new frameworks for cultural and political activity. Refugees responded to radical politics, but the direction could be socialist or nationalist. For instance, Latvians in the Russian interior were often mistaken for Germans because they were Lutheran and had German surnames, in turn prompting them to "find pride in their Latvianness" and a new affection for their "backwoods", linking "refugeedom" (Gatrell's term) with nationality.[136] This new 'mass national sentiment' and fondness for Latvia was hardly present before, particularly among cultural elites, but now became most evident in the ad hoc network of schools that were set up. Indeed Latvian refugee organization was so diffuse that it formed, in effect, "an embryonic political authority", at the head of which were Latvian cultural and professional elites.[137]

Gatrell only hints at the possibility that ethnic dispersion caused by 'refugeedom' gave rise to a fear of the "dilution of Latvianness", that dispersion would sever bonds

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134 Ibid., p.1350.

135 Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, pp.95, 141.

136 Ibid., pp.142-143.

137 Ibid., pp.143-144, 158-160.

between ethnic Latvians (particularly in Latgale and Vidzeme) -- a fear which likely anticipated the Latvian interwar government's commitment to the Latvian peasantry as the backbone of the new nation-state.[138] Though work on these empirical connections is lacking, if true it is more likely that this was felt by the activist cultural elites than by the displaced peasants and workers themselves. But for Russified Latvian socialists like Berzins, the fact that 'war suffering' was now taking a 'national' form could only be regarded as threatening the internationalist Revolutions.

In this context the need to tie Latvian socialism even tighter to the Russian was quite acutely felt by Latvian activists in Petrograd like Berzins. The war had caused Stuchka to battle both growing Latvian institutional presence and Great Russian centralism *in the Latvian territories*, but socialist activism in Petrograd among Latvian refugees was more squarely confronted with a growing Latvian national identity. And yet the substantial class-status divisions within Latvian society meant that the 'interests' of the various social strata would diverge -- and so too their 'ideas'. So, the wealthier Latvian farmers -- the independent and affluent rural bourgeoisie -- also organized within their new self-conscious social and civic status as 'refugees' and they became the central preoccupation of the (nationally-inclined) Latvian Central Refugee Committee. In contrast, the mass evacuations of poorer Latvian farmers and agricultural workers from Kurzeme (Courland) and as of July 1915 the 75,000-145,000 dependents of Riga factory workers -- fully 3/4 of Riga's workers, Latvians, Poles, Lithuanians, Jews -- who had been ordered evacuated into Russia, were responsive to socialist appeals.[139] A source of the strength of Latvian socialism, I think, was that Berzins and others in Petrograd were targeting especially those uprooted Latvian refugees with the *weakest cultural or ethnic identities* : impoverished peasants, unemployed rural laborers, displaced factory workers, and disaffected Latvian soldiers in imperial armies.

Ezergailis writes that the Latvian party maintained strict internationalism "for good psychological and traditional reasons", that internationalism brought them closer to the

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138 Ibid., pp.159-160.

139 Ibid., pp.25, 85.

Bolsheviks.[140] While I think that Radek and Dzierzynski, for instance, became Bolshevik internationalists for reasons of exclusion from 'nationalizing' socialist parties, I agree with Ezergailis' insight regarding the Latvians, though I would phrase it slightly differently: Latvian socialists were generally Russified and russophilic -- 'for good psychological, traditional, and geopolitical reasons'. Latvian leftist internationalism, in the first instance, flowed from this.

V. Rudzutaks and Lepse: socialist labor radicalism in Riga

For the theoretician Stuchka 1905 had forced a reconciliation of nationalism with socialist radicalism; for Berzins 1905 had begun a long period as a political emigre. With Rudzutaks' and Lepse's experiences of 1905 we may focus attention on several dimensions of Riga's urban labor unrest. Lepse and Rudzutaks were urban working class Bolsheviks: Ivan Lepse was born in 1889 in Riga to a worker father, Rudzutaks was born in 1887 in Kursisu district in Courland to a family of farmhands and laborers. Because there is little unofficial biographical information on Lepse, I focus primarily on Rudzutaks.[141] There is indeed vast biographical material on Rudzutaks in Russian, English and Latvian, the greatest portion refers only to his post-1917 political career. In part this is because Rudzutaks spent between 1907 and 1917 in Riga's Central Prison and in Moscow's famed Butyrka Prison, effectively removing him from political activity. Moreover, because Rudzutaks was a prominent victim of Stalin's purges, his post-1917 party career is repeatedly traced in meticulous detail. Even the lengthy Granat account pays greater attention to a Marxist account of Baltic social conditions than to Rudzutaks' early life.

Rudzutaks attended a rural parish school, in all likelihood one of the Lutheran

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140 Ezergailis, 1917 Revolution in Latvia, p.33.

141 Lepse was drafted into the Tsarist army during the War; official accounts do not specify the Latvian Units so he may have been an early draftee. Between 20,000-25,000 soldiers were mobilized in the Latvian territories, with between 10,000-15,000 killed between 1914 and 1915. At the front Lepse conducted propaganda among soldiers, was wounded and worked in Riga and Petrograd. Lepse did political work for the Red Army during the Civil War, helped in the defense of Petrograd, and took part in the suppression at Kronstadt. Geroi Oktiabria: Biografii aktivnykh uchastnikov podgotovki i provedenija Oktiabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniia v Petrograde, 2 Vols., Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1967, pp.37-38, BSE, p.346.

rural schools, and this seems to have been the extent of his formal education.[142] Lepse too had received in Riga only two years of elementary schooling.[143] Rudzutaks worked as a farmhand and as a shepard for a "kulak" from age 15.[144] He wrote that he suffered "bitter privations", and there is indeed a bitterness and anger at the treatment he experienced in this 'peasant-landowner' relationship. In the Marxist language of 'exploitation', whether the "kulak" or "bourgeois landowner" was German or a Latvian "grey baron" remains unspecified in the Granat account, although there is considerable discussion on the historical role of German barons in Latvian feudal society. The Latvian "grey barons" which Rudzutaks despised were, in effect, the families of Smilga and Stuchka.

From the 1870's onwards rural unrest in the Latvian countryside, and especially around Mitau, was common. This intensified rural-landowner animosity, particularly against local German landed elites and rural officials. Immediately after 1905 both class and national divisions came into even sharper relief in Livland and Courland: in the rural areas the national dimension was intensified when German landed elites struck back at Latvian farmers, rural laborers, and even the Latvian rural bourgeoisie and provincial political strata. (In Riga the Latvian urban bourgeoisie was indecisive, first siding with the revolutionary forces, and then moving to the 'right' to protect their social position from the "red social forces" from below.) So strong were the class divisions between Latvians that even the rightist nationalism of the Latvian People's Party applauded the Tsarist government's military tribunals, anti-Semitism, and the 'punitive expeditions' -- of which rural (often poor) Latvians were the targets. Rudzutaks had experienced, quite deeply if the Granat account is to be believed, the class tensions within Latvian society between the propertied rural elites and the landless peasants and rural laborers to such an extent that at age 16, without a passport and apparently against his father's wishes, he left the countryside for Riga.[145] The rising number of rural migrants like Rudzutaks to Riga was made easier after the 1905 reforms in the empire which made it easier for peasants to

142 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.631.

143 Geroi Oktiabria, p.37.

144 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.631.

145 Ibid., pp.631-632.

obtain internal passports to leave their villages.[146]

To contextualize Rudzutaks subsequent biography is, in effect, to access several important social dynamics of Latvia's socialist urban radicalism. He was part of the considerable migration of rural Latvians into the city's factories, forming the main of labor unrest. Between 1867 and 1913 Riga's population grew nearly 500% as the expanding economy and rural unrest attracted Latvian peasants; between 1890 and 1900 Riga's labor force tripled -- only Moscow, Petersburg and Warsaw had larger working classes.

The Latvian peasant migration experience to Riga in search of work in factories was different from that of the empire's other cities in at least two ways. Firstly, and as noted earlier in this chapter, because peasant emancipation had not tied peasants to repartitional communes, they had severed any economic obligations. As a result their ties to the land were weaker and so few were seasonal workers. The vast majority -- Rudzutaks among them -- settled permanently. Rudzutaks' ties to the countryside were completely severed on arrival in Riga. This meant a more rapid urban acculturation than occurred in Petersburg or Moscow. Indeed so quick and complete was Latvian peasant-workers 'assimilation' to their new urban environment that the conservative editor of the *Rigasche Rundschau* wrote that in Riga it was difficult to distinguish between former peasants and members of "good society", unlike in other Russian cities where the streets were full of people easily identifiable as "rural".[147] A key empirical question then is this: as these rural populations migrated to urban areas in the late 19th century, did they become nationalists, did they become socialists, or did they acculturate-assimilate into the dominant urban culture or into an urban working class culture? While difficult to answer with precision, in this case, rural Latvian peasants arriving in Riga seemed not to have been confronted with their 'Latvianness' -- and therefore were not politicized on this identity. Instead they appeared generally to have 'acculturated' into a particular urban working class culture, which in Riga was socialist, multi-ethnic, and russophilic.

Secondly, acculturation and radicalization were facilitated by the fact that Latvian workers had high levels of literacy. Because the Lutheran church, the Baltic aristocracy,

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146 Corrsin, "The Changing Composition of the City of Riga", p.29.

147 Henriksson, "Riga", p.202.

and peasant rural communities had consistently maintained effective networks of village and rural schools, the vast majority of Latvian peasant migrants to Riga were already literate -- unlike Russian peasants arriving in Petersburg or Moscow.[148] Interestingly, Riga had the lowest illiteracy rate of any of the major cities with only 18.51%, the next lowest was the imperial capital Petersburg with 33.17%.[149] This is significant since Riga was also the fourth largest *industrial* city and the third largest port city in the empire, therefore it had among the largest industrial and shipbuilding labor force of any imperial city, and yet it still had the lowest rates of illiteracy and the highest levels of *Russian*-reading population.[150] In 1897 Rudzutaks was among the 38.34% of rural Latvians or 57.61% of urban Latvians who could read Russian. These are among the highest levels of Russian-language literacy of all the empire's minorities, on par with those of the Jews. The implications here are important for socialist radicalism. Riga's Latvian working class was not only literate, but Russian-literate, something which may have been behind the 'elective affinity' with Russian socialism.

Thirdly, Rudzutaks and Lepse became metalworkers, the dominant of the new industries. Metalworkers were among the most politically radicalized and organized. With Riga's industrial expansion, dozens of large plants for producing machinery for industrial and military uses and associated tools had been created, together with shipyards for marine equipment.[151] Riga was becoming one of the empire's greatest industrial centers in the 1890's and most of the growth was in machine-building, metalworking and light industries such as textiles and wood finishing, and by 1900 about 1/3 of Riga's labor force was in metalworking and machine-building.[152] Lepse worked in Riga as a founder in a one of the metalworks and Rudzutaks worked in a steel factory. Lepse and Rudzutaks were in the growing industries, not in the struggling trades as had been the

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148 Ibid., p.202, ftnt.76.

149 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 051, pp.410-428, figures for 10 and older.

150 More than 56% of Riga's Germans over 10 read Russian. More than 46% of Riga's Jews and 48% of Latvians also read Russian, 49.66% of Russians who could read Russian. More than 50% Riga's Poles and 65% of Ukrainians could read Russian. ibid., Tabelle 051, p.421, mother tongue for 10 years plus.

151 Henriksson, "Riga", pp.180-181. Though deeply affected by the depression in Russian industry after 1900, by 1907 Riga had recovered and industrial growth lasted until the outbreak of the War.

152 Henriksson, "Riga", p.180.

Jewish Bolshevik artisan Piatnitskii in Vilna, giving their early radicalism as workers a different organizational base. Lepse made his subsequent career on this. He organized the Metalworkers Trade Unions in Riga as well as conducting party work among metalworkers in Petrograd. In 1917 Lepse became a member of the Central Administration of Metalworkers Union and from 1918 Secretary of the Petrograd Committee of the Metalworkers Union.

Piatnitskii had joined the Jewish Bund as a *Jewish* worker in small ateliers and workshops, while Rudzutaks and Lepse were immediately active in large-scale 'all-Russian' industrial strikes, with no particular 'Latvian' dimension. Social democratic literature from Germany through the socialist radicals of the late 1890's had immediately developed strong links with Riga's factory workers. Though Rudzutaks and Lepse were part of the generation of politically active Riga urban factory workers around 1904-1905 in Riga, the first waves of labor radicalism had affected Riga and Libau in 1895, 1897, and 1898-1899.[153] Unlike Georgian or Armenian socialism which initially developed un-implicated with their respective working classes, Latvian socialism from the start was led by, as much as it led, Riga labor unrest: during 1905 events estimates suggest that nearly 8,500 Latvian workers took part as socialists -- a socialist strength which did not diminish by repression since in the 1907 Duma elections the Latvian Social Democrats outpolled other parties in every Riga district except the conservative German city center.[154] Though fairly disorganized, factory workers' strikes pressed specific economic demands under some measure of social democratic leadership.

Fourthly, after 1905 Riga's working class radicalism developed and organized on inter-ethnic bases. By 1897 approximately 43.16% of Latvians were in engaged in the manufacturing and industrial sector, 32.18% of Riga's ethnic Russians, and fully 50% of her Jews.[155] Rural Latvians continued to migrate to Riga (though large numbers also left

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153 Strikes and riots increased in Riga in the 1890's, peaking with the "Riga Riots" of 1899, and involving more than 12,000 workers from 28 factories. ibid., p.198.

154 Ibid., p.199.

155 24.34% of Latvians were in domestic service, more than 10% in the service sector, and 4.81% in banking and commerce; 17% of Riga Russians were stationed in military service, 4.14% in government civil service posts, just over 9% in banking and commerce; 1/3 of Jews were in banking and commerce. Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 053, p.446, by mother tongue.

for other imperial cities) and greater numbers of Lithuanians, Poles, and Russians arrived. So while in 1867 only 8% of Riga's inhabitants were from outside the Baltic provinces, by 1913 nearly 30% were. Germans declined as proportion of Riga's population and Latvians increased, but Russians, Poles, Jews, and Lithuanians also increased most substantially.[156] Most of these migrants found work in factories -- predominantly Latvian, but with substantial numbers of Russians, Jews, Lithuanians, and Poles.[157] This latter fact accounted, in part, for the activism of Russian, Bundist, SDKPiL, and Lithuanian SD parties in Riga, and in the end, for much of the internationalism of Riga's socialism. With the legalization of Marxist and other groups after 1905 Riga housed a great variety of radical, non-nationalist groupings: the Latvian SD Workers' Party, the Riga Bolshevik Committee of the RSDLP, the Riga Menshevik Committee of the RSDLP, the Latvian SRs, the Latvian Peasant Union branch, the Russian SRs, the Jewish Bund, the Polish-Lithuanian SDKPiL, the Lithuanian SDs. Riga also had one of the largest circulation of newspapers, journals, and periodicals -- all now legal. In 1905-1907 there were 107 periodicals in Latvian, of which 63 were daily periodicals and weekly newspapers, and by 1910 there were a record 45 publishing firms in Riga alone and 75 in the Latvian territories.[158] And Rudzutaks accessed all of this.[159] Indeed during the labor unrest of 1905 a federated Latvian-Russian-Jewish socialist committee functioned an as *ad hoc* city government, even forming a militia. Unsurprisingly, anti-Jewish pogroms, historically absent in the Baltics anyway but nevertheless a key feature of the 1905 Revolutions elsewhere in the empire, were non-existent in Riga's politicization.

Rudzutaks and Lepse were not part of a "Latvian working class", but of an increasingly ethnically differentiated one. And unlike Vilna's multi-ethnic urban working class which tended to employ workers in smaller shops and factories often on an ethnic basis, as with Piatnitskii and Dzierzynski, Riga's much larger industrial factories did not appear to be ethnically segregated. Despite their differences, and in ways very similar to Vilna's working class organization, Riga socialists organized on 'all-Russian', inter-ethnic

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156 All figures in Henriksson, "Riga", p.181.

157 Henriksson, "Riga", p.184.

158 Figures in Plakans, The Latvians, p.106.

159 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.632.

bases within factories.

Fifth and lastly, Rudzutaks political radicalism in Riga shifted from involvement in Riga's network of legal worker's associations upon arrival (e.g. mutual aid societies, insurance fund groups) to political activism in factory worker circles and cells organized by the SDs. To some extent these two forms of associationalism were not incompatible, and it may have been that the success of Latvian socialism, in Riga especially, owed something to the city's vibrant (and now legal) 'civil society'. Socialist organizations were grafted onto an already quite vibrant associational life. Riga arguably had the greatest number and variety of radical groups in the empire -- and among the best organized. As early as the 1860's Latvian workers and masters in the small factories and workshops had begun to establish mutual aid societies, secret strike funds, they had administered schools, held evening lectures and discussions, and maintained libraries. The Granat account on Rudzutaks also recounts his activism in these various workers' groups, library societies and legal workers' associations -- the mutual aid societies, cultural-educational groups, and artisanal associations.[160] Once he began work in a steel factory however, by 1905 the labor struggle had moved further left, and factory work finally made Rudzutaks "a true proletarian" as he began associating in Riga's socialist underground and industrial worker's circles.[161] The overlap in these two spheres of association was likely considerable. Their ability to organize and mobilize for specific economic or political demands may have reflected Riga's 'civil society'.[162] Riga's social democratic radicalism derived much of its organizational strength from its being layed upon a considerable and long-standing Baltic associational life.

By 1904 Rudzutaks was involved in illegal SD circles, and began reading the progressive *Dienas Lapa*, taking part in demonstrations in 1905 in Riga and circulating illegal literature.[163] As a founder in a Riga factory in 1903 Lepse joined worker's radical circles, and official sources date his party membership to 1904.[164] A member of the

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160 Ibid.

161 Ibid., p.632.

162 Henriksson, "Riga", p.202.

163 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.632.

164 BSE, p.346; Geroi Oktiabria, p.37.

RSDLP Riga committee, after the 1905 unrest Lepse led the Party's factory organization. In 1906 Rudzutaks joined the Riga committee of the RSDLP(b), but conducted party work in Mitava and Vindava.[165] He was arrested and spent 1 1/2 years in Riga and Moscow prisons studying French and German. While in prison Rudzutaks also developed tuberculosis.[166] Official biographies claim that Rudzutaks was a member of the CP as of 1905.[167] Rudzutaks' Granat account implies that he joined the Bolsheviks because (a) they addressed the nationality question and federalism, and (b) because they had a strong cadre of Latvian agitators and propagandists with leaflets in Latvian.[168]

The second reason may be more accurate than the first. The Bolshevik Latvian organization had split off into the first Latvian cadres at the beginning of 1905, and the same year the first illegal Bolshevik press appeared in Latvian. Rudzutaks was dispatched into factories and workers' meetings to distribute Latvian language brochures and leaflets among Latvian workers.[169] By this time Latvian socialism's social base was workers, soldiers, students, teachers, and rural landless, like Rudzutaks. The Revolution of 1905 in Riga was characterized by considerable labor radicalism, arguably leading the rest of the empire: more than 80,000 people took part in a general 8-day strike in January, with numerous riots, demonstrations, and strikes throughout the year. Workers from the Russo-Baltic Wagon, the Aetna Wire Corporation, Provodnik and other major factories led the strikes. Russian, Jewish, and Latvian socialists cooperated, even demanding in unison, an end to linguistic Russification. This was arguably the first instance of widespread working class radicalism, different from the generally economic demands of 1899, calling for constitutional reforms, free speech and other political reforms. The Riga labor movement only mildly abated after the Tsarist suppression of 1905. Major work stoppages took place in 1908 involving 20,000 workers, and between 1910 and 1912 Riga was swept by waves of political strikes, including a 1912 solidarity strike with the

165 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.635.
166 Ibid.
167 BSE, pp.348-349.
168 "Avtorizovanniia biografiia", Granat, p.633.
169 Ibid.

massacres at Lena.[170] Rudzutaks was active in 1905 in both Riga and Mitau.

In the end, the extent to which Rudzutaks' political radicalism identified with his "Latvianness" was quite minimal, and to the extent that it was there not only was it not incompatible with 'Russian', but they appeared almost complementary identities. Rudzutaks' post-1917 roles in the Bolshevik government were 'Russian' not 'Latvian': positions in the All-Russian Central Council of the Union of Textile Workers, a member of the Moscow City Soviet of Trade Unions, in 1920-1921 Chairman of the Turkestan Bureau of the RCP(b), and from 1922-1924 Chairman of the Middle Asian Bureau of the RCP(b).[171] These assignments may have been a measure of Lenin's trust in 'Latvian loyalty', but at no time in his political career was Rudzutaks assigned to a "Latvian" post.

VI. Ikars Smilga: rural gentry radicalism and Baltic Revolutions

Usually considered an Old Bolshevik, "the blonde intellectual" Ikars Smilga was the youngest of the Bolshevik elite, just 25 years old at the time of the Revolution. Smilga was a key figure assisting Lenin in Finland, in Kronstadt events, and directing the Baltic Fleet. Smilga's activism as a Latvian Bolshevik was decisive not before or during the War but during revolutionary events in the Baltics. Between 1917 and 1920 he was repeatedly elected to the Bolshevik CC, and his activities in Finland, in Petrograd, and with the Baltic Fleet would make Smilga one of *the* key Bolsheviks in military revolutionary work.[172] The Bolsheviks propagandized most successfully among soldiers -- in the Baltic Fleet, in garrisons, among German soldiers on the eastern front, among Russian and Latvian soldiers, etc. In short, and this is not often enough repeated, the Bolsheviks organized disaffected armed men near the imperial capital. Smilga was a key figure in the politicization of these military units.

Ikars Smilga was born in 1892 in Lifland gubernia to a Latvian aristocratic landed gentry family. His family were members of the wealthy and propertied rural elite, Latvian "grey barons". According to Smilga his parents were "radicals and intellectuals", his

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170 Henriksson, "Riga", p.198.

171 BSE, pp.348-349.

172 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.676.

father used to recount stories from Greek mythology. A great admirer of that great 'democracy', Smilga regarded him as a kind of "democratic educator".[173] He wrote that his "revolutionary conscience" developed in 1901 when the famous student Karpovich killed the Minister of Education Bogolepov. In the years immediately following, 1901-1903, his entire world view was changed. Despite his "free thinking" and liberally inclined family, Smilga had considered himself -- as early as 9 or 10 years old -- devout, and could not understand why his family treated the death of Bogolepov as something of a holiday. It was, according to Smilga, under the influence of radical social democratic students that he began to understand the implications of the assassination.[174] In 1904-1905 at age 12 Smilga became a convinced atheist and supporter of the revolution, though he was not yet an active radical.

What brought Smilga to political activism, however, was an event that he himself recounted with brevity and dispassion. During the 1906-1908 "punitive expeditions" of the Tsarist Armies following the 1905 revolution in rural Livland, Smilga's father was executed by the Imperial Army.[175] My sense, from Smilga's narrative, is that the brutality of this event formed in Smilga a particular world view, a set of political impressions that came to shape his political radicalization in ways more profound than 'the influence of social democratic student circles'. In Smilga's political radicalism both his ruthless militarism and his 'Leninist' pragmatism are most striking. Never employed in any profession, Smilga became a quintessential professional revolutionary from a young age, with a sensitivity to military solutions to political impasses. His father's execution by the Tsarist state in the rural "punitive expeditions", I think, goes some way to understanding these qualities in his radicalism.

What appears to have been most significant about post-1905 events in rural Livland as they affected the 13-16 year old Smilga was that much of the revolutionary violence was directed not at the Tsarist state but at German privilege and landownership. In the rural areas successful strikes of farmhands were organized, probably by Latvian

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173 Ibid., p.675.
174 Ibid., p.676.
175 Ibid.

SDs, which then moved to administrative centers and even churches. Estimates claim that circa 316,000 people participated in 1905 events in Livland and Courland. In Livland alone some 183 German estates and 72 manors were torched, and 229 estates and 442 manors in Courland, with rural destruction estimated at 8.8 million rubles in the two provinces combined. Baltic Germans were stunned by this level of Latvian radicalism, calling it "a severe mass psychosis", which for Germans changed everything and for the first time turned them to a political nationalism and to violence.[176]

Also impressive in 1905 in rural Latvia was the depth and extent of the Tsarist government's response. The violent repression lasted for almost two years until April 1907. In the rural areas the "punitive expeditions" of the Russian Army units and of the privately organized baronial German self-protection squads became legendary in their desire not for restoring order, but for revenge, as they moved across the countryside burning farms, hunting peasant activists and revolutionaries. Trials and summary executions followed: estimates are that by 1908 between 2,041-2,596 Latvian peasants and revolutionaries were executed, 724 tried by military tribunals and executed, 128 tried by civil courts and executed, 713 sentenced to hard labor, jail or deportation, 2,652 resettled and/or subjected to corporal punishment (among them 688 were members of Leftist groups, 80% of them SDs), and 1,817 had been expelled from the Baltic provinces. Among these peasants and revolutionaries were also 600 Latvian rural schoolteachers, and 5,000 political refugees who fled either abroad or to forests and became roving bands.[177]

Smilga's father was among the more than 2,000 executed. Smilga's father had not only been a propertied 'grey baron', but he was also a "Leftist", and according to Smilga, had also been active in local rural administration and 'revolutionary' politics. The effects of the Tsarist-German punitive expeditions and suppressions in 1906-1908 in the memoir literature can hardly be underestimated, and there are numerous angry and passionate accounts of events and their effects. Images of 1906 and 1907 were firmly planted in the

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176 Henriksson, The Tsars Loyal Germans, p.110. A socialist perspective on 'national' events in rural Latvia and the response, K. Zalevskii, "Natsional'niia dvizheniia", in L. Martov et al. (eds.), Obshechestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii nachale XX-go veka, Tom.4, St. Petersburg, 1912, pp.190-100.

177 Plakans, The Latvians, p.105.

Latvian imagination as literary and cultural products of the period testify.[178] But Smilga's account is oddly brief and dispassionate, and this despite not only his father's execution but also despite his having lived through this for three years. These trials and executions had a pronounced radicalizing effect on the Latvian intelligentsia and politicized them against the Tsarist state in ways that Russificatory policies had not, making revolutionary socialism very attractive.

Smilga was 14 years old at the time of his father's execution during the 'punitive expeditions', and the following year when he enrolled in a Riga *Realschule* he was amply receptive to the influence of revolutionary socialism. Smilga joined the Latvian SDs in 1907, and wrote that it was during his *Realschule* years immediately following his father's execution that his "Marxist vision was completed".[179] Smilga found in revolutionary socialism a way to explain and account for his experiences. But I think socialism appealed to Smilga not because of its 'scientific' or 'materialist history', or accounts of class exploitation and capitalism -- in all likelihood Smilga was himself of the 'exploitive class' in rural Livland and presumably understood this. Neither was he particularly concerned with German influence. Rather, the 'elective affinity' may have been in socialism's revolutionary and radical *political* potential for destroying the Tsarist order, something Smilga would interpret in very personal terms.

In 1907 Smilga was himself searched and detained during the May Day demonstrations. In 1910 he was again arrested in Moscow during student demonstrations in connection with the death of Tolstoy and released a month later.[180] This effectively ended his *Realschule* studies and any subsequent education. In 1911 he was arrested for political party work, and after three months of prison was exiled to Vologda. After three years of exile Smilga was released in 1914 and began party work in Petersburg as a Bolshevik. He was soon arrested again and exiled for three more years to Enisei in Siberia and released only with the February Revolution.[181] Smilga therefore spent most

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178 Ibid., p.106.

179 "Avtobiografiia", Granat, p.676.

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid.

of the War years in Siberia, far from German-occupied Latvia and Riga.

On his release Smilga found that by the autumn the centers of Bolshevik strength were not only in Finland among the Baltic sailors, in the Latvian countryside, and in Riga, but also among the eight Latvian *Strelnieki*, or the separate units of Latvian infantry within the Russian Army, in Petrograd, Helsinki, and Riga.[182] Though the evacuation of Riga in 1915 had weakened Riga's SD organization from 2,200 members in 1914 to a mere 168 in mid-1916, the war had introduced the famous Latvian Rifles into the Latvian SD organization. According to Ezergailis, the Rifles had 100 members in March 1917, 1,000 in May, 1,826 in July, and 3,000 by September.[183] For those Riflemen from Courland, Lenin's 'peace at all costs' was hardly attractive since it meant conceding Courland. Petrograd, Helsinki, and Riga formed the famed 'rotten triangle' -- and Smilga's revolutionary role in the 'rotten triangle' was substantial. Smilga played an important role in events in Petrograd, he was president of the Finnish Soviets, and a Bolshevik party organizer in the important Baltic Fleet when it passed to Bolshevik control. With Lenin in Viipuri Smilga was one of the key Bolsheviks in Finland, shoring up both Bolshevik military positions, the garrisons stationed in Finland and the Baltic Fleet.[184]

But Smilga's activities as a Bolshevik in the 'Baltic Revolutions' invoked less an 'ethnic' Latvian than a *rossisskii* identity. We see this most clearly in connection with the Baltic Fleet. The Baltic Fleet had been an integral part of Russian naval expansion in the run to WWI, and during the War Helsingfors became its main base. But Baltic naval bases (Revel, Kronstadt, Sveaborg [Helsingfors], Libau, Riga) were in close proximity

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182 These famous eight Latvian Battalions had been formed in 1916 with 130,000 mostly volunteer soldiers and joined the thousands of Latvians who had been conscripted into the Russian Army units on the eastern front, as a potential 'national' army'. At the time there were only two other 'national' forces in the imperial army -- the Polish Legion and the Armenian Druzhinas. Highly politicized these units had fought on the Courland front and around Riga from 1915-1917 suffering huge causalities and making no gains. Some 5,000 Latvian Riflemen lost their lives in battle, no doubt contributed to the formation of the radical Riflemen's Soviet of Deputies, as "an organization of riflemen and officers from common Latvian goals". Ezergailis, 1917 Revolution in Latvia, pp.103, 174 and *passim*. Danishevskii became the "spiritual leader" of the Second Congress of the Riflemen's Soviet of Deputies, as a representative of the Latvian SDs.

183 Ibid., pp.93-94.

184 Upton, The Finnish Revolution, p.128.

and highly interdependent with the industrial bases.[185] Since the routes through Finland and Norway were also used by the radical underground organized by the Bolshevik Shliapnikov, the Baltic Fleet was centered "practically on top of the 'northern underground'".[186] And Baltic Fleet sailors were no less affected by the growing disillusionment with the war, by industrial strikes in the port cities, and by the ability of radical groups to create cells among the sailors. Although most sailors were inclined to the idea of revolt, party affiliation remained vague and loose, but Bolshevik membership in the Soviets was smaller than that of the SRs, Mensheviks, and the 'non-affiliated'. The Bolsheviks were almost singular in their efforts to agitate among the sailors of the Baltic Fleet bases, and although 'radicalism' did not translate into Bolshevik loyalty, as Saul noted, the Bolshevik Baltic organization, experience, and leadership of Smilga, Dybenko, and Antonov-Ovseenko were crucial in the use of the Fleet in the October Revolution.

Interestingly the Baltic Fleet was comprised of a significant number of non-Russian officers, primarily German and Finno-Swedish who, though apparently loyal to the crown, nevertheless triggered suspicion on the part of the crews: Finno-Swedish officers "appeared German" to the Latvian, Estonian, and Russian Baltic Fleet sailors.[187] With the intensity of nationalist sentiment as the war progressed, the multi-ethnic composition of the Baltic Fleet became an inevitable source of disunity. Though instrumental in the Bolshevization of these military bases and crews, it is not clear whether Smilga was sensitive to the 'national issue'. But then it is not clear that he needed to be. Politicization led to the creation of sailors' organizations, and particularly elected representative soviets, Petrograd-style. Smilga was a key member of the first Bolshevik committee in Kronstadt, and Helsingfors, organizing May Day demonstrations of 1,000 Kronstadt sailors in Petrograd. But the Kronstadt soviet and the Helsingfors Soviet, for instance, represented only ethnic Russians; the Revel Soviet was predominantly ethnic Estonian and 'worker' in composition. There were Latvian party cells in Helsinki among

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185 See the early classic, Norman Saul, Sailors in Revolt: The Russian Baltic Fleet in 1917, Regents Press, Kansas, 1978, p.19 and *passim*.

186 Ibid., p.41.

187 Ibid., pp.13, 50. Very few Finns volunteered in the imperial armies, and they were not recruited, so there were very few in the Baltic Fleet.

Latvian refugees and servicemen -- the radicalized Latvian diaspora in the "rotten triangle" during WWI was unmistakable. Revel, the most politically 'moderate' of the bases, elected the most Bolsheviks to its soviet, but they tended to be ethnic Russian not Estonian.

Lenin had arranged for Smilga to move from Petrograd to Helsinki where Lenin was hiding. As head of the committee of the Helsingfors soviet, and one of the few Bolsheviks with regular contact with Lenin during the latter's exile in Finland, Smilga was instrumental in Lenin's coming to the idea in September-October that a seizure of power should be immanent, and that the radicalism of the Baltic sailors could be capitalized upon. Smilga was apparently a message carrier for Lenin from Helsinki to Petrograd including the September 15 message to take power. Lenin's plans for insurrection depended heavily upon the Baltic Fleet, and his writings and thinking at this time were in large part dependent on the advice of Smilga, Podvoiskii, Dybenko, and Antonov-Ovseenko. Convinced of the need for immediate revolutionary action, and under Smilga's control, the "Red Fleet" was determinative in deposing the Provisional Government.

Smilga's loyalty to Lenin was also unconditional at the time of the debates on Brest-Litovsk, in part because his own assessments of circumstances were similar to Lenin's.[188] Smilga's efforts as the senior "Russian" representative in Finland during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations notwithstanding, he believed, with Lenin, that peace with Germany had to be concluded in order to preserve whatever gains had been made in Petrograd.[189] In this, and in his willingness to "lose Latvia", we see further evidence of Smilga's weak national ties to his Latvian inheritance in order to preserve whatever 'imperial' military gains had been gotten. As the empire lost Finland at Brest-Litovsk Smilga, again like Lenin, read the new socialist government of 'independent' Finland as confirmation that their position on national self-determination was correct: 'fraternal, socialist Finland' now provided a basis for an 'internationalist federation' Lenin wrote, "I am profoundly convinced that more and more diverse confederations to free nations will

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188 Haupt, Les Bolcheviks par Eux-memes, p.213.

189 Smilga's position was made clear in connection with events in Finland, Upton, The Finnish Revolution, pp.187-188.

group themselves around revolutionary Russia".[190]

Similarly, Smilga wrote an article for *Izvestiia* as head of the Area Committee calling all soldiers to fight the Finnish Whites in common struggle with the Finnish SDs and Red Guards against the 'bourgeois Whites', insisting that the Finnish Revolution -- now usefully distinct from the Russian -- was evidence of the 'spreading revolution across Europe'.[191] In fact, and in Smilga's estimation, this effectively committed the new Bolshevik government to full armed intervention in the Finnish Civil War. But the reality was that the troops would not obey and simply wanted to go home, and in the end supplied only very limited assistance as volunteer units.[192] The Russian rank and file did not, apparently, share Smilga's and the Bolshevik's enthusiasm for the Finnish revolution. Given the weakness of the Russian commitment on the ground, Smilga was forced to confront the Helsinki Soviet, and considered bringing in a 'disciplined Latvian regiment' to deal not only with "anarchist sabotage" but to fight on behalf of the Russians who would not fight on behalf of the Finns.[193] Smilga was likely thinking more 'as a Russian' than 'as a Latvian'.

Smilga was never involved or implicated in Baltic society as a professional, as had been Stuchka or Berzins, or as a worker as had been Rudzutaks. His radicalism, begun with his father's execution, took him to student demonstrations, to years of exile, and to the military seizure of power. As a professional revolutionary -- really one of the few among the non-Russian elites -- his activism was defined by a pragmatism, a militarism, and an 'all-Russian' identity. Given that he had not distinguished his life in any way prior to Revolutionary events on the Northern Front, perhaps on a personal level, saving the 'Russian' revolution was the only way to render meaningful the price he had paid with his father's execution and years of exile and imprisonment. For the 'good imperial idea', as an ethnic Latvian he was a key organizer of Russians, Estonians, Latvians and Finns in furtherance of Finnish and Russian revolutions -- an irony likely lost on Smilga himself.

Smilga was a Leftist who opposed Trotsky, particularly for the latter's decision to

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190 Quoted in Upton, The Finnish Revolution, p.294.

191 Ibid., pp.294-295.

192 Ibid., pp.295-296, and chapters 13 and 14.

193 Upton, The Finnish Revolution, pp.418-420 on Smilga's role.

appoint officers to the Red Army from the Imperial Army -- a hatred for the Imperial Russian Army that Smilga had nurtured since 1906. Smilga was eventually dispatched, with the Jewish Bolshevik Kaganovich, to the Ukraine, and drew closer to Stalin. In 1920 Smilga became part of the army units led by Tukhachevsky in Poland, and with that catastrophe he became an avowed anti-Stalinist. But because of subsequent tensions with Stalin, Smilga was not re-elected to the CC after the 9th Congress and was moved into "economic areas". He was again re-elected at the 11th Congress. In 1927 Smilga sided with the Left Opposition with Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev.[194] Considered a threat by Stalin, Smilga was sent to eastern Siberia in administrative exile the same year. In 1929 he joined the 'conciliators' with Radek and Preobrazhenskii and was readmitted into the Party in 1930. With another political *bouleversment* in 1932 Smilga was condemned to five years in prison, disappeared in a concentration camp, and died in 1937 or 1938.[195] With Smilga's death, not a single Latvian Bolshevik of the revolutionary elite had survived Stalin.

VII. The absent Estonians

In 1917 the Bolsheviks captured 35% of the vote in Estonia -- a figure ascribed to the rise of Bolshevism in Russia affecting the Russian soldiers, sailors, and workers in Estonia. Bolshevism was strong among ethnic Estonians in Petersburg and among ethnic Russians in Estonia. But parallel elections in Latvia resulted in an overwhelming majority in favor of union with "Red Russia". In Latvia socialism was carried by the majority against a minority Latvian nationalist group; in Estonia terror was used against Estonians by the minority Bolsheviks who required Russian assistance to seize power.[196]

Why such a divergence in the two Baltic nationalities' attraction to Bolshevism? In what has become a classic comparative account Stanley Page wrote that although Latvians and Estonians shared a common German oppressor, the same religion, Baltic ports, a similar westward orientation, a substantial segment of rural landless peasants and

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194 Haupt, Les Bolcheviks par Eux-memes, p.214.

195 Ibid., pp.214-215.

196 Page, Formation of the Baltic States, p.83.

workers, considerable industrial development, and small [sic] industrial proletariats, on their attractions to Bolshevism they diverged. For Page the determinative differences were two: the kinship between the Estonians and Finns and the differential effects of the war on the two nationalities. The war was absolutely determinative, and I briefly discuss this below. But if the affinity between Estonians and Finns was indeed important, as a causal factor in Estonian rejection of Bolshevism this may be overstated. Finnish influence was certainly crucial for Estonian nationalism (most especially through personal contacts and relationships of the leaders involved -- though it took a more Russian orientation under Carl Robert Jakobson, whose mother was apparently Russian-born),[197] and the victory of the Finns over the Provisional Government in part explained the increased expectations of their "ethnic cousins" the Estonians.[198] But rather than Estonian affinity with Finns, more causally important in the differing attractions to Bolshevism was, I think, Latvians' comparatively greater affinity with Russians.

There were several sociologically relevant differences between Estonians and Latvians. First, although urban-rural ratios were similar for both nationalities, Estonians were more geographically concentrated in the Baltics. This tended to give Estonians a greater geographic ethnic homogeneity. A second important difference between Estonians and Latvians was confessional: 4.25% of Latvians and 13.20% of Estonians were Orthodox, but while 76.62% of Latvians and 86.56% of Estonians were Lutheran, 18.17% of Latvians (mostly in Lettgallia) were Catholic.[199] So there was greater religious heterogeneity among ethnic Latvians than among ethnic Estonians. Thirdly, while together they formed the majority of rural inhabitants in the Baltics, there were nearly twice as many Latvians in Baltic cities than Estonians, respectively 209,860 and

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197 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, pp.204-209.

198 Page, Formation of the Baltic States, pp.70-71.

199 Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 004, p.75 & 005 p.76. (9.25% of Estonians lived in north Russian provinces) Latvians: 1,204,991 (83.96%) were rural and only 230,348 (16.05%) were urbanites (compared with 86.08% and 13.92% respectively of Estonians). Tabelle 003, p.74, Tabelle 001, pp.69-71, the first figure is by nationality; the percentage by mother tongue. In 1897 there were 308,806 Lettgallians in the Belorussian-Lithuanian guberniia comprising 3.07% of the region's population, and 98.26% were rural inhabitants. Tabelle 040, p.216, by mother tongue. Tabelle 006 for figures and 007 for percentages, pp.77, 79: 63.975 Latvians were Orthodox, 131,645 Estonians were Orthodox; 1085194 Latvians were Lutheran, while 863,003 Estonians were Lutheran; 257,351 Latvians were Catholic; and 502 'Latvians' were Jewish.

108,604. This gave Latvians a numerically greater urban presence -- an important factor in radical groups. A fourth difference was their respective ethno-politics. Although both Baltic nationalities were 'stratified' with Germans 'above' them, the two most important cities Tallinn and Riga had different *urban* ethnic-compositions.

Through the 19th century the number of Latvians had grown in Riga at the expense of every other nationality. Yet between 1897 and 1913 this reversed in the face of the growing number of Russian-speakers.[200] Riga was becoming too large for Latvians alone since it needed more workers in the expanding economy, in the ports, shops and factories. It became more 'imperial', multi-ethnic, and Russian-speaking, and less German and Latvian. Besides Russians themselves, its Yiddish, Polish, Estonian, and Lithuanian-speaking populations also increased.[201] But Tallinn never matched Riga's industrial and economic power and influence. And unlike Riga, in Tallinn Estonian-speakers grew much faster that any other nationality, including Russians. As Corrsin writes, Tallinn simply did not have the "migratory pull" that Riga had, and in the end lacked its ethnic heterogeneity.[202] In short, Tallinn was far less Russified than Riga. And Riga's Latvians experienced a different ethno-political milieu than Tallinn's Estonians, with effects on the attraction of Russian socialism.

In summary, Latvians were more geographically dispersed, religiously differentiated, slightly more urbanized, and lived in more ethnolinguistically differentiated contexts, complicating Latvian-German relations. Estonians were more geographically concentrated, religiously homogeneous, slightly more rural, and had more direct Estonian-German relations with fewer other ethnic groups involved in urban ethno-politics. These differences may have made more likely the success of socialist appeals in (comparatively more) heterogeneous Latvia while making nationalist appeals more attractive in (comparatively more) homogeneous Estonia. This goes some way toward understanding the predominance of Bolshevism in Riga and of Menshevism in Tallinn.

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200 Stephen Corrsin, "Urbanization and the Baltic Peoples: Riga and Tallinn before the First World War", East European Quarterly, Vol.12, No.1, pp.72, 80-81.

201 Between 1881-1913 Latvians increased by 244.8%, Russians by 200.4%, Poles by 786.6% (and Poles were the group most inclined to adopt Russian), and Lithuanians and 'others' by 1,142%. Corrsin, "The Changing Composition of the City of Riga", p.21; Hamm,"Riga's 1913 City Election", pp.443-445.

202 Ibid., p.77.

But Latvians' particular ethnolinguistic affinity with Russian also likely contributed to the greater appeal of Russian socialism. I already noted the high levels of Russian-literacy among Riga's working classes in connection with Rudzutaks, but we may now add that Russian-reading ability was significantly higher among Latvian males than among Estonian males, though they had similar educational levels.[203] Latvian males were slightly more illiterate (29.62%) than Estonians (21.71%), but on Russian-literacy alone nearly as many Latvians (and Jews and Poles) could read Russian as could Baltic Russians.[204]

When literacy and Russian-reading levels are considered in terms of rural and urban patterns, we find the following: in 1897 only 16.18% of rural Latvians were illiterate as compared to 10.44% of urban Latvians, Estonian figures were 6.29% and 5.58% respectively; 38.34% of rural Latvians and 57.61% of urban Latvians could read Russian, while Estonian figures were 29.81% and 55.34% respectively. The greatest difference was in reading languages other than Russian (Latvian, Estonian or German). Of rural Latvians 44.82% could read Latvian and 28.50% of urban Latvians read either Latvian or German. In contrast, 35.29% of urban Estonians could read other languages, but fully 63.43% of rural Estonians could read Estonian (or German).

So the key differences between Estonians' and Latvians' Russian-literacy were in the rural areas: (1) illiteracy rates in rural Estonia were 1/2 those of rural Latvia (though both were well below the imperial average) making rural Estonians among the most literate in the empire, and (2) more literate rural Estonians could read Estonian than literate rural Latvians could read Latvian, the latter tended to read Russian at slightly higher rates. (These differences may be partly attributable to different confessional profiles and the absolute dominance of the Lutheran Church in the Estonian countryside -- regionally

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[203] Fully 0.50% Latvians (and 0.88% of men) had more than elementary school education. Estonian figures were 0.46% and 0.75% respectively; 32.98% of Latvian men could read Russian, against 26.95% of Estonian, yet more Estonian men (49.92%) could read languages other than Russian than Latvian men (35.83% of). Bauer, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches, Tabelle 012, pp.93-94.

[204] Between 41% and 52% of Jews, Poles, Latvians, and Germans in the Baltics could read Russian by 1897 -- roughly as many as Russians. The exception were Estonians (only 28.57%), a figure higher than other nationalities of the empire but substantially lower than other Baltic groups. Ibid., Tabelle 041, p.235 (figures for ages 10 and older and for males only).

broken down illiteracy levels were likely more common in Catholic Lettgallia.)[205]

In sum, more Estonians could read, but more Latvians could read Russian. If high levels of Latvian literacy were behind the strength of Latvian nationalism of 1850's and 1860's, then in contrast to Estonian Russian-literacy patterns, high levels of Latvian Russian-language literacy were in part behind the strength of the russophile Latvian socialism in 1890's and 1900's.

Page's second assertion -- that the War had much to do with Latvia's 'Bolshevization' -- seems crucial in understanding the appeal of Bolshevism in Latvia and its weakness in Estonia. Divided in two, unoccupied Latvia was a war front for more than two years and the last hold-out preventing a German march on Petrograd. War brought exile and imprisonment to Latvian Bolshevik leaders, a transfer of much of the Latvian sindustrial proletariat into the interior of Russia as refugees, heavy casualties in the Latvian Infantry, and the German sack and control of Riga. Nearly 800,000 Latvians, or one half of the Latvian population either had to flee or were forcibly evacuated from their homes in the two years prior to the Revolution. In contrast, the Estonian Army, which was formed much later in 1917, had seen no combat until 1918 when it was turned against the Bolsheviks.[206] The eight Latvian regiments went over to the Bolsheviks, eventually providing the foundation for the Red Army.[207]

Ezergailis argues that it is not clear how the war strengthened Latvian Bolshevism, but suggests the following: "we may assume that people finding themselves in these extreme circumstances believed to need extreme solutions for their problems...[since] the war quite naturally created the apocalyptic landscape which provided fertile ground for the millennial Bolshevik visions to mature".[208] This is questionable, but Ezergailis also notes that although no good statistics on this are available, it was widely believed at the time that

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205 Ibid., Tabelle, 015, p.109.

206 The Provisional Government granted the formation of an Estonian national regiment in April 1917. Page wrote, "by 1917 [Latvian] soldiers knew privation and the disillusionment that only front-line warfare can produce...[and] Bolshevik slogans echoed their desires," Page, Formation of the Baltic States, p.84. A Russian General visiting the First Latvian Brigade in 1917 found that "revolution had wrought havoc...they all profess to be Bolsheviks and stand for 'peace without annexations, reparations, etc." Quoted on p.84, ftnt.59.

207 They were the only regiments of the Russian Army to be incorporated in tact into the Red Army.

208 Ezergailis, The Latvian Impact of the Bolshevik Revolution, p.24.

Bolshevism found disproportionately greater appeal among Latvian war refugees than among the population as a whole. This latter claim appears to be correct and important. The effects of the war on Estonians were comparatively minimal, and therefore allowed more political stability for the institutionalization of more locally coherent "Estonian" radical organization.

Chapter 11
Summary and Conclusions

The regional area chapters of this thesis considered the sources of radicalism of the non-Russian Bolsheviks in the imperial borderlands. Chapter 6 concerned the fifteen Jewish Bolsheviks. Arguably one of the most substantial ethnic cohorts of this elite -- both in terms of numbers and influence -- the Bolsheviks of Jewish origin represented the diversity of imperial Jewry. In understanding their political radicalism I situated them in their respective 'national' contexts: the Lithuanian Jew Piatnitskii, the Ukrainian Jews Kaganovich, Chubar' and Trotsky, the Russian Jews Kamenev, Sverdlov, and Sokol'nikov, the Kievan Polish Jew Uritskii. Their 'Jewishness' was also differently invoked. Piatnitskii was involved in Vilna's Bundist groups where anti-Semitism was milder and Jewish workers could organize *qua* Jews; Uritskii was active in Kiev's Polish and Ukrainian socialist groups; Chubar' and Kaganovich were politicized in connection with Ukrainian rural anti-Semitism and pogromism, with Chubar' finding 'refuge' in Russified SR groups; Trotsky was a product of Odessa's Jewish liberalism; and Gusev, religiously-trained on the Talmud, was beaten in the street as a "zyd", eventually cultivated a 'non-Jewish' identity in Russian radical groups. Most were acculturated, Russified Jews, radicalized and politically active in groups and in associations with other acculturated Russified Jews.

In terms of social origin the Jewish Bolsheviks were relatively privileged, educated in the empire's elite institutions, especially the *gimnaziia* which were arguably the most important social location for acculturation, and Russified to varying degrees as their families had benefited from mid-century social and political openings. But by the 1880's and 1890's, the decades of their politicization, these acculturated and Russified Jews became blocked in an atmosphere of anti-Semitism and political and civic exclusion. In addition, regional diversity implicated Jews in relations with Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, and they faced varying degrees of societal anti-Semitism as Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles began to find and articulate their 'national' identities. Because of growing national and ethnic (anti-Semitic) identities 'provincial' access was blocked and Jews turned to the bureaucratic state -- as they had done previously -- for protections,

preferments, and political inclusions. Russification and attraction to 'imperial' or all-Russian and internationalist political solutions followed. Their leftist internationalism seemed more often a response to nationalisms and 'nationalizing' socialisms than to an a priori commitment to international socialism.

Though similar in form, Chapter 7 focused in greater detail on only three Bolsheviks: the Pole Feliks Dzierzynski, the Lithuanian Vincas Kapsukas, and the Polish Galician Jew Karl Radek. Most striking about these Bolsheviks was that they were involved in nationalist radical groups before coming to Russian socialism. Dzierzynski and Radek had been Polish nationalists and Kapsukas had been active in Lithuanian nationalism. Therefore I considered the purpose of the chapter to be one of understanding how their radicalism shifted loyalties and moved from one group to another. Two were products of the multi-ethnic Polish-Lithuanian *kresy*, not Russian Poland, and one was Galician. These regions were characterized by 'vertically ranked' ethnicities, where complex ethno-political relations and multi-lingualism was common, and where most Jewish, Polish, and Lithuanian elites had multiple cultural and linguistic affiliations.

The Catholic Lithuanian Kapsukas was in origin from a propertied *quasi*-aristocratic family. His radicalism brought him from Lithuanian nationalism -- anti-Polish, anti-Russian, and anti-clerical -- to Polish-Lithuanian socialism, to Lithuanian socialism, to a Russified anti-Lithuanian Bolshevism. Each political shift also entailed cultural and linguistic shifts, and ultimately Kapsukas was marginalized from Lithuanian politics becoming an ardently Russificatory Bolshevik.

The Pole Dzierzynski's social origins were in the declining petty Polish *szlachta* of the *kresy* -- a 'gentleman intellectual' -- possessed of a particular kind of cultural attitude and radicalism. Dzierzynski's radicalism was initially in Polish nationalist groups in response to Tsarist Russification in a Vilna *gimnazia*, then he joined Polish socialism, then Lithuanian socialism, then Lithuanian-Polish socialist groups, and finally Bolshevism -- each move prompted by the 'balkanization' of the multi-ethnic *kresy* into 'nationalist' and 'nationalizing' socialist parties. 'All-Russian' or 'imperial' political groupings, in the end, became the best political expressions consistent with the cultural and political status of the declining Polish borderland gentry. A once devout Catholic who considered the Church

the last remaining bastion of Polish resistance to Russian rule, as a socialist Dzierzynski later studied Yiddish in order to agitate among Jewish workers in Vilna.

Similarly Karl Radek, a Germanized and Polonized Galician Polish Jew was also a Polish nationalist, though for reasons more youthful and romantic, at a time when Polish socialism, particularly in Lvov, was still 'open' to Jews. Born Sobelsohn, Radek chose his name based on a fictional Polish nationalist schoolboy hero. Radek was active in nearly every major socialist party in Europe -- the Polish, the German, and the Russian -- becoming a Bolshevik in 1917 and a Spartacist in 1918. Despite considerable linguistic and cultural capabilities Radek could speak neither Yiddish nor Russian. As an Austrian Jew his leftism carried him from Polish socialism (until it became 'nationalist'), to the then more 'ethnically open' German socialism which dominated the International (until it became 'imperialist'), to Bolshevism's internationalist proletarian revolution (until it became 'Russian').

Chapter 8 concerned the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. Numerically underrepresented in the Bolshevik elite, what seemed most distinctive about the eight Ukrainians was their high levels of Russification and identification with the imperial state, and that as ethnic Ukrainians they were in the minority of a Ukrainian Bolshevik party leadership which was largely Russian, Jewish, German, Polish, and otherwise non-Ukrainian. So here the emphasis was not on Ukrainian nationalism, but on the analytically opposite social process -- Ukrainian assimilation and integration. A key feature of Ukrainian elites was their willing integrationism and russophilia, with correspondingly high levels of Russification, bilingualism, and both imperial and provincial access to careers. This characterized Kollontai's radicalism, whose Ukrainian father was a high ranking military officer in the Tsarist army, and despite his fondness for the "Ukrainian sun", his 'anti-state political views' were marked not by an anti-Russianism, but by an anti-autocratic liberalism. Kollontai's own politics followed suit. The two ethnic Ukrainian workers, Petrovskii and Lebed', were Russified and drawn to all-Russian and Russian radical groups. As Russified Ukrainians organizing with other Russified Ukrainians within Russian groups there was no need to question these social identities.

So despite the disproportionate attention paid to it in the scholarly literature, the

social base of Ukrainian nationalism was decidedly weak prior to WWI in Tsarist Ukraine (and arguably through 1917) and geographically located in Austrian Galicia. But socialism did have certain social roots here as the Ukrainian territories produced more Bolsheviks of any nationality than any other region of the empire. This became the region which produced both the most left communists and the most nationalist 'rightists'. Together with high levels of Ukrainian Russification, the coincidence of much of the Ukrainian territories with the Jewish Pale of Settlement, as well as the intricate socio-ethnic stratifications of the Left- and Right-banks and of the industrializing southwest, ensured a complexity of ethno-political relationships. Besides producing Bolsheviks and left communists, these regions also produced Russian nationalists and Russified Ukrainians, many in confrontation with Jewish, Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian nationalisms. It is not surprising that perhaps the most vicious battles inside the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the Tsarist territories were not those between Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian socialists; rather, they were between highly Russified Ukrainian socialists (often inside all-Russian radical groups) and dual-identity Ukrainian socialists who sought greater autonomy within a socialized, federated Russia.

The tensions between these positions virtually defined the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. The Left-bank Bolshevik Skrypnyk was a 'national socialist' who opposed both Ukrainian separatism and Russian centralism, defended Ukrainian language and culture until his death, but consistently envisaged a sovietized Ukraine within a sovietized Russian state. Manuil'sky and Krestinskii were respectively of the Right-bank and Belorussia, and though both were initially Russified Ukrainian socialists and avowed internationalists, Manuil'sky was caught between the non-Russified Ukrainian left and Ukrainian nationalists, and his 'internationalism' eventually became a virulent Russian centralism. Krestinskii, by contrast, remained a leftist internationalist, and latterly paid for this with his life.

The three key Transcaucasian ethnicities were discussed in Chapter 9: four Georgians, four Armenians, and one Azerbaijani Turk. The longest of the area chapters, I tried to understand not only the radicalism of each of the three groups as with previous cohorts, but I also endeavored to consider their radicalism in relation to each other and in

the context of Tsarist 'colonial' rule in Transcaucasia. Specifically, the chapter considered to what extent their radicalism was a product of 'divide and rule' policies, militarist rule, or 'colonial' rule. Though policies were not specifically 'divide and rule', the Russian state's privileging one or another group did have the marked effect of raising cultural, political, and economic insecurities. This involved an appreciation of geopolitical threats (particularly relevant to Armenians and Azerbaijani Turks) and 'cultural-colonial' relations (favorable in the Georgian case and unfavorable for the Azerbaijanis), access to *local* political power and influence, the strength of local identities, the relatively mild application of russificatory policies, the degree of economic and political dependence on Tsarist preferments and privileges, and the fact that the Transcaucasian ethnicities were, in my view, 'horizontally segmented' and not 'vertically stacked' as in the western borderlands or in the Ukrainian territories, and thereby retained local identities with greater facility than other of the empire's minorities.

Stalin aside, the Georgian Bolsheviks were sons of the impoverished rural gentry who sought and obtained posts in the liberal professions in Tiflis and Kutais. Though well-represented inside Bolshevism, they constituted a minority among Georgians who were overwhelmingly (nationalist) Mensheviks. Largely linguistically Russified because of training in imperial *gimnaziia* and universities, these Georgian Bolsheviks were more 'at home' among Armenians, Russians, and Azerbaijanis in Baku, and even among rural Azerbaijani peasants, than they were among their Georgian co-ethnics in the Tiflis Menshevik groups.

The Azerbaijani Turk Narimanov was a cultural and literary figure who sought to raise the "cultural ignorance" of the Muslim Azerbaijani masses through an anti-clerical, secular reformism. His experiences as a dramatist, teacher, writer, and political reformer were profoundly imprinted with *both* his Russian-cum-imperial education and his Muslim-Turkish identity within a 'colonial' imperial state and society. Consistently seeking a 'modern' identity in a culturally and religiously 'ecumenical empire', battles with assimilationism were at the core of Narimanov's social experience.

One of the distinguishing features of the political activism of the Armenians (two of whom had likely been involved in nationalist groups before Russian socialism) in the

Bolshevik elite was their consistent commitment to Russian imperial integrity (and so ethnic cooperation) and a generalized fear of regional disintegration each time the potential for Turkish rule of the region became a possibility. A cultural and literary figure, Shaumian was among the first in the Bolshevik elite to address the 'national question' but interestingly from the perspective of the Russian state not from the perspective of the Armenian nation, drawing even Lenin's attention. So abiding was his commitment to the integrity of the empire, that in 1918 Shaumian argued that nationalist separatism in Transcaucasia -- Armenian included -- was weakening the front lines. Similarly, Mikoyan chose twice to fight the Turks on behalf of Russia: he had volunteered to fight for the Tsarist armies on the Turkish front in 1914 for Armenian liberation from 'the Turkish yoke' and again in 1918 as Brigade Commissar in the Red Army against the German-Turkish military offensives in defense of the fragile new sovietizing geopolitical state.

The final chapter concerned the six Latvian Bolsheviks. Unlike in Transcaucasia or the Ukraine, Bolshevism was highly popular in Latvia. The Baltics were the only Protestant region in the empire and, unsurprisingly, under a combination of Baltic German liberalism and Lutheranism also had the highest levels of industrialization, literacy, education, civic associationalism, and ethno-linguistic tolerance. (The latter interestingly measured by the tolerance accorded not only Jews -- Riga had virtually no anti-Semitism -- but also Old Believers and ethnic Russians). Moreover, high levels of urban and rural socioeconomic differentiation among Latvians, Riga's huge and multi-ethnic industrial working classes and their vicinity to the Baltic Fleets, and Riga's extensive associational life were important factors in Latvian socialist radicalization. Indeed Riga was one of the most multi-lingual -- and linguistically Russified -- cities of the empire by the turn of the century, and the appeal of Russification and its general acceptance by most Latvians was important in understanding the appeal of Russian socialism. If liberal and Protestant Baltic German rule mattered in Latvian radicalism, so too latterly did Imperial Russian rule.

Historic Latvian russophilia, initially a counterweight to German dominance, and later a cultural 'escape' from 'Latvian provincialism', was evident in the political impulses behind, respectively, Stuchka's early radicalism in the 1870's and 1880's and his subsequent negotiations between Latvian nationalism and Russian centralism, and behind

Berzins' attraction to cosmopolitan and internationalist vistas in the 1890's and 1900's as he 'Europeanized' via the empire. Similarly, russophilia and Latvian affinity for all-Russian or Russian groupings was clearly evident in Rudzutaks' radicalism as an ethnic Latvian peasant-turned-worker in Riga's multi-ethnic working class. By the 1890's and 1900's when rural Latvians migrated to Riga in search of work they typically became socialists, not nationalists, and acculturated into multi-ethnic, linguistically-Russified, ethnically tolerant, and highly organized socialist organizations, among which Bolshevism was consistently the most popular and influential.

These chapter summaries lead to the two most general claims of this thesis. In Gellner's essay on the nineteenth century "myths of nation and class" he argued, among other things, and in critique of Hroch's account of an essentially independent emergence of 'nation' and 'class' (though 'class' still had an underlying motor force), that in the transition from absolutist-feudalist to capitalist society, 'nation' and 'class' were not independent, but aspects of a single transition. More specifically, Gellner argued that industrial society led to both class conflicts and to nationalism, and that it was the conflation of class with cultural differences which gave rise to revolutionary potentials: while national movements were effective if they were sustained by class rivalry, class conflict by itself could not engender revolution -- politically consequential movements occur "when the two converge".[1] Gellner did not intend this as an account of the Russian Revolution itself (or more generally of the transition from capitalism to socialism), and he most likely did not consider this a source of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary Marxism. But because the essential claim is, I think, most sensitive to the 'third' and 'fourth time zones', is also suggestive for understanding particular dimensions of both the Russian Revolution and Bolshevism. Indeed, if 'class transitions' should not be treated independently of 'nationalist' developments in accounts of 'third' and 'fourth time zone' nationalisms, then why should they not be considered together in accounts of 'third' and 'fourth time zone' socialisms?

The relationship between nationality and class was complex and regionally

[1] Ernest Gellner, "The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class", in Gopal Balakrishnan, (ed.), Mapping the Nation, London, Verso, 1998, pp.141-143.

differentiated. There may be some truth to the insight that the 19th century intelligentsia's quest for public identity and political space *preceded* rather than followed the socioeconomic changes of the late 19th century, and that their quest resulted not from the rigidity of social structures, but from the possibilities increasingly conceivable from their fluidity.[2] Indeed in important respects, Russian imperial society was arguably moving from traditional estate or *soslovniie* identities to rather distilled 'modern' ethnic, national, cultural, and linguistic identities within traditional 'imperial' categories perhaps even more than it was to 'modern' economic 'class' identities. I tried to show in Chapter 4 that late Imperial Russia remained quite traditionally status particularistic in terms of societal identities, social positions, and state policies; guilds, *soslovniie*, professional-estates like the *advokatura*, culturally-differentiated ranks and positions, variations in ethnicities' political and social access, all combined to form an intricately differentiated society. But although the traditional categories persisted, e.g. *soslovniie*, *inorodtsy*, *raznochintsy*, their empirical referents were in flux both because of socio-cultural changes and because of state policies.

Given the Tsarist empire's national, ethnic, linguistic, religious status complexities *and* the manner in which they cross-cut, or were themselves cleavaged by, increasing socioeconomic or class differentiation, socialist class conflict is by itself hardly a justifiable interpretation of the seismic social shifts that resulted. Moreover, in the manner in which social, ethnic, and political identities were affected by state policies (deliberate or otherwise), as well as by the great variety of ethno-political contexts across the empire, shifting patterns of "power" and "culture" necessarily meant that the identities subsequently articulated were conceived as much in ethnic and cultural/linguistic terms -- both nationalist and assimilationist -- as they were purely economic-positional terms.

One of the key themes of the biographical accounts presented was the Bolsheviks' multiple linguistic and cultural affiliations and their memberships in nationalist groupings and activism in cultural politics. Some were culturally sensitive elites in what were, in effect, Europe's cultural peripheries, which by the turn of the century felt to them

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[2] This is suggested but not developed by Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, "Problematics of Status Definition in Imperial Russia: The *Raznocincy*", Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 40, 1992, p.337, ftnt.89.

increasingly 'provincial' (the Latvian Berzins, the Galician Jew Radek). Others were socially, culturally, or linguistically situated at ethnic, cultural or linguistic borderlines, as was the *kresy* Pole Dzierzynski, or the Vilna Lithuanian Jew Piatnitskii. Some were highly Europeanized (the Ukrainian Manuil'sky and famously Trotsky); others deeply locally rooted in their region (the Jew Kaganovich, the Georgian Ordzhonikidze), while most were somewhere in between with several identities, local (national) and Russian (imperial) in various combinations (the Ukrainian Skrypnyk or the Armenian Mikoyan). Some were highly Russified while others could not even speak Russian. While for some Russian socialism was attractive for its cultural 'European' vistas (the Latvian Stuchka), for others it represented an 'imperial' escape from tensions in local ethno-politics, most notably anti-Semitic nationalisms (the Jews Gusev and Chubar'), and for still others it promised an ecumenical 'modernity' (the Muslim Azerbaijani Turk Narimanov). In short, attractions to Russian socialism invoked national, ethnic, or religious affiliations, and while sometimes choices were based on 'interests' or political and social necessities, other times they tended to be predicated on the political-cultural options on offer and experimentations with identities.

Bolshevik Russian socialism may have been in great measure a response to the tensions arising from both Tsarist policies (conciliatory and repressive) and from tensions in the very multi-ethnicity of imperial society itself, with much of its appeal residing in its secularism, its universalism-cum-internationalism, its practical commitment to imperial political integrity, and most especially its anti-nationalism. The attraction of Russian socialism for many of these Bolsheviks was in important respects a secularist and universalist response to rising exclusionary nationalisms which began sorting the traditionalist overlapping political positions in status, linguistic and cultural differentiations into new cultural categories of loyalties and belonging. This was perhaps most quintessentially true of the Jewish Bolsheviks' response to rising nationalist anti-Semitisms.

So the second related claim is this: an understanding of the high numbers of non-Russians in the Bolshevik revolutionary elite must necessarily involve a better understanding of how ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural identities were worked out

by national minority elites in the social and political context of the late Russian empire. The Tsarist state was modernizing and industrializing. But in its last decades especially -- those in which the Bolshevik elite were socialized and radicalized -- the Russian empire was also struggling with its own 'national' identity in order to preserve both autocracy and geopolitical position. Accordingly, policies toward its national and ethnic minorities -- particularly her Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians -- quickly became central to both domestic and geopolitical worries. In this the Tsarist state devised policies intended to incorporate some, exclude others, assimilate some, dissimilate others, and both granted statuses, preferments, and privileges, and withheld them. 'Divide and rule' was typically applied *within* ethnic groups, not between them, and by the turn of the century Russification, though never systematically applied, was as much a set of fear-driven attempts at 'divide and rule', dissimilation, and social control than it was a coherent homogenizing nationality policy.

All of this with the result that national minority elites' politicization invoked ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural identities in ways that tended as much toward nationalist 'balkanization' as toward a Russified assimilationism. The political consequences of the latter seem to me to be consistently underestimated: the extent to which the Tsarist empire succeeded -- most often despite itself -- in integrating, coopting, or Russifying its non-Russian minority elites into a linguistically and culturally Russified 'imperial' society within the complex cultural diversity of its realm was considerable. Linguistic Russification, bilingualism and multi-lingualism, identification with the imperial state for both protection (social and geopolitical) and access, and the voluntary acquisition of Russian or 'imperial' political and cultural identities were social processes arguably more common and pronounced than was nationalism -- at least until 1914. As the century closed, most of the empire's national minority elites were not becoming linguistically monolingual or 'nationally pure', but bilingual, multi-lingual, and culturally 'European'. The national minorities of the empire's peripheries who came to Bolshevism, often via nationalist groupings, came to an essentially Russified and 'internationalist-cum-imperialist' group via these social processes. Given the fragility of the social bases of 'pure' nationalist groupings before 1914 (and arguably before 1917), and given the wide diffusion of Russified national minority elites, both inside and outside radical groups, how

non-Russians came to identify with the Russian or imperial state (or both) underlays much socialist radicalism, Bolshevik or otherwise.

Gellner wrote: "The root of nationalism is not ideology, but concrete daily experience". That is, the way in which 'ethnic classification' affects how one is treated by others, by the state, by imperial and provincial civil bureaucracies and political institutions, etc. can create social experiences in which 'escape' is sought either via a (re)asserted national identity or via assimilation, or, as Gellner suggested, even in a vacillation between the two.[3] On the whole Gellner was, I think, perhaps more interested in the nationalist response, although assimilation had its analytical place. In this thesis I have been primarily concerned with various gradations of assimilation and acculturation and with the 'vacillation' between nationalism and assimilation, social processes which may spring from similar social and political sources: nearly two-thirds of the Bolshevik socialist revolutionary elite of 1917-1924 were drawn from the Tsarist empire's national minority elites, but these 'ethnic peripherals' joined a revolutionary group of the 'imperial center' and created a new 'Russian' social order.

Although the 'class' language of socialism has dominated accounts not only of the causes of the Revolution but also of the sources of Bolshevik socialism, in my view the Bolsheviks were more a response to this variety of cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic social identities than they were a response to class conflict. The appeal of a theory about class conflict does not neccesarily mean that class conflict produced it. Judging from the political biographies and early radicalism of the non-Russians inside the Bolshevik revolutionary elite, a great attraction of Russian (Bolshevik) socialism and many of the motivating impulses behind their radicalism were not what socialism said about capitalist class conflict but what it meant for ethno-politics in the multi-ethnic borderlands: much of the appeal lay in its secularism, its 'ecumenical' political vision, its universalism, its anti-nationalism, and in its implied commitment to "the good imperial ideal". The Bolsheviks were much more a product of the tensions of a multi-ethnic imperial state than of the alienating 'class' effects of an industrializing Russian state.

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[3] Gellner, "The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation", pp.123-124.

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APPENDIX to CHAPTER 5

Sources for Map: Six Bolsheviks have been omitted. I have compiled ethnographic information from the following sources, Bol'shaia Entsiklopediia, "Rossiia", Vol.16, St. Petersburg, 1904, maps within pp.436-530; Carte Ethnographique de L'Europe, Premiere Edition, Union des Nationalites 36, Office Centrale, Lausanne: Librairie Central des Nationalites, 1918; Petermann's Geographische Mitteilungen, Gotha: Justus Perthes, "Russland", No.12, 1878; "Jews and Armenians in East Central Europe, ca.1900", in P.R. Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, Toronto, 1993, pp.107-109, Map 32A "Germans in East Central Europe, ca.1900", and Map 30 "Ethnolinguistic Distribution, ca. 1900"; Bauer, et al, Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszahlung von 1897, Vols. I & II, Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1991, pp.37, 41, 39, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 57, 59, 61, 63, and 65; Petermann's Geographische Mitteilungen, Gotha: Justus Perthes, "Sprachenkarte von Russisch-Polen nach der ersten rassuschen Volkszahlung von 1897", No. 60, 1914, pt.2, Plate 34; Paul Langhans, "Die Ethnographischen Verhaltnisse im Baltland and Lituaen nach der Volkszahlung von 1897", Petermann's Geographische Mitteilungen, Gotha: Justus Perthes, No. 61, 1915, Plate 43.

A. Social origins

On the Jewish Bolsheviks: Iaroslavskii's parents were penal settlers, a furrier and a schoolteacher, Granat, p.785, BSE, p.558; Kamenev's father, a rail worker, studied at the Petersburg Technological Institute, his mother was also educated. Granat, p.427; Kaganovich was born to a poor Jewish family, Medvedev, All Stalin's Men; Sokol'nikov, Granat, p.681; Sverdlov, Granat, p.651, Duval, The Forgotten Bolshevik, p.9; Trotsky's father was a property owner, Granat, p.720; Uritskii's father was a merchant, Granat, p.734, BSE, p.78; Zelenskii's father was a small craftsman (a tailor) and a soldier, BSE, p.453, Granat, p.417, and "O partiinosti lits", ITsK, (1989), No.5, p.89; Zinoviev's family was petty bourgeois, owners of a small milk company, Granat, p.418; Ioffe's father was a wealthy merchant, BSE, p.390, Granat, p.422; Gusev's parents were teachers, Geroi Oktiabria: p.311; Radek's father was a civil servant, his mother a schoolteacher, Granat, p.593; Chubar's peasant family was poor and illiterate, BSE, p.239, Granat, p.759, Geroi Oktiabria, p.572; Piatnitskii's father was a carpenter, BSE, p.293, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.362.

On the Ukrainians: Krestinskii's mother was a 'petty intellectual', his father a secondary school teacher, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.236, "O partiinosti lits", ITsK, (1989), No.5, p.91; Lebed', Granat, p.491, BSE, p.231; Manuil'sky, Granat, p.793 states his father was an Orthodox priest, while the official source BSE, p.340 claims his parents were "peasants". I use the Granat version, Muranov, BSE, p.121-122; Petrovskii, Granat, p.581, BSE, pp.488-489; Skrypnyk, Granat, p.668, BSE, p.530, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.432; Tsiurupa, BSE, pp.611-612; Kollontai's father was a General in the Tsarist Army, Granat, pp.443-444.

On the Caucasians and Central Asians: Dzhaparidze, Granat, p.407; on Miasnikov compare Granat, p.558 with BSE, p.180; Mikoian, Granat, p.543, however there are questions as to whether his father was really a carpenter; Narimanov's was a "poor turkish family" but was more likely a petty aristocratic family, "Konchita predsedateliia tsik SSSR gov. N.N. Narimanov", Pravda, 21 March 1925, Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 796, Accession No. 63013 8.41/44, Series 291, Folder 9, Granat, p.740, BSE, p.251 indicate his father was a poor merchant; Orakhelashvili was of *dvorianstvo* background, BSE, p.468, but Granat, p.567 claims he was of poor peasant background, given his subsequent education and medical training the former description is likely more accurate; Ordzhonikidze, Granat, p.567, BSE, p.494; Rakhimbaev, BSE, pp.508-509; on Ryskulov, BSE, p.454;

Shaumian, Granat, p.462 his father was a merchant, while in the official BSE, pp.299-300 his father was a shop clerk; among the numerous sources for Stalin, see the original Granat, p.698, and the Tsarist Police's description in 1904 in HIAPO, Box 163, Index No.XIIId(2), Folder 31A, Headquarters Circulars and Warning Lists, p.20, "Spicok 1", No.5500, 1 May 1904.

On Poles, Lithuanians and Belorussians: Dzierzynski, Granat, p.407; Robert Blobaum, Feliks Dzriezynski and the SDKPiL, Chapters 1-4; Kiselev, Granat, p.442, BSE, p.194; Kosior, Granat, p.453 states he was from a workers' family, while Geroi Oktiabria, p. 577, states he was of 'polish peasant' background. On the remaining Bolsheviks: Krivov, BSE, p.420; Rakovskii, Granat, p.610; Shliapnikov, Granat, p.766; Shmidt's parents were domestic workers and he often spent summer either in orphanages or in the country as a servant, Granat, p.770; Kviring's father was a German colonist, employed as s small rural district clerk, BSE, p.12; Frunze, Granat, p.740, BSE, p.109.

On the Russians: Andreev parents were peasants-turned-workers, BSE, p.16; Badaev, BSE, p.515; Beloborodov, Granat, p.359; Buhkarin's parents teachers, Granat, p.372, and more recent Russian sources, "O partiinosti lits", ITsK, (1989), No.5, p.86; Iakovleva, BSE, p.487; Kalinin, Granat, p.424; Kirov, Granat, p.440, BSE, pp.183-184, whose maternal grandfather was a soldier for Nicholas I; Kolotilov, BSE, p.457; Kubiak parents were workers, BSE, p.450; Kutuzov's parents were peasants and seasonal workers, Granat, p.473; Lobov, BSE, p.590; Lomov, BSE, p.7-8 'bourgeois intelligentsia milieu' in Saratov ,Granat, p.515; Miliutin parents were rural schoolteachers, BSE, p.267; Mikhailov's parents were laborers (his father a printer), BSE, p.345; Molotov's father was an estate steward, BSE, pp.484-485; Nogin, BSE, p.89, Granat, p.565, but compare HIAPO, Box 163, Index XIIId(2) Processing Intelligence, Index XIIId(2), Folder 28A, Spickov, 1 July 1903; Osinski (Obolenski) BSE, p.558 on his aristocratic origins, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.347; Preobrazhenskii, Granat, p.584; Rykov's class background is disputable, Granat, p.636 and HIAPO, Box 164, Index XIIId(2), Processing Intelligence, Index XIIId(2), Folder 35, Warning List, No.1100, 1 February 1905, but compare with more recent, "O partiinosti lits", ITsK, (1989), No.5, p.86; on Sapronov, Granat, p.649; Serebriakov, Granat, p.665; Sergeev, BSE, p.260; Vladimirskii, BSE, p.148; I.N. Smirnov, Granat, p.68, HIAPO, Box 163, Index No. XIIId(2), Folder 28A, Processing Intelligence, 1 February 1903; A.P. Smirnov, BSE, p.610; Stasova, Granat, pp.700-701; Tomskii, Granat, p.717, "O partiinosti lits", ITsK, (1989), No.5, p.92; Ukhanov's father was a stevadore, BSE, p.147, Granat, p.735; Voroshilov, compare Granat, p.393 stating his father was a soldier under Nicholas I and worked in the mines and railroads, while BSE, pp.371-372 claims only that his father was a railroad worker,and Medvedev "a retired army railway trackman", in All Stalin's Men, p.2, noting that his mother was a cook and washerwoman, and his family poor and illiterate; Sulimov, BSE, pp.62-63; Kuibyshev's mother a teacher at a Cossack school, his father an army officer, Elena Kuibyshev, Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev, 1888-1935, Gosudarstvennoe izd-polit lit, 1938, p.3; on Piatakov, Granat, p.591.

On the Latvians: Berzins, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.27, BSE, p.229; Danishevskii, BSE, p.529; Lepse, BSE, p.346, Geroi Oktiabria, p.37; Rudzutaks, Granat, p.631; Smilga, Granat, p.675; on Stuchka there is discrepant information, compare Granat, p.708, BSE, p.15, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.451.

B. Bolshevik occupation

On the Ukrainians: Krestinskii was a lawyer, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern,

p.236; Lebed', Granat, p.491; Muranov, BSE, p.121-122; Petrovskii, Granat, p.581 and BSE, p.488-489; Tsiurupa, BSEa, pp.611-612; Manuil'sky as a 'professional revolutionary', L.O. Suiarko, Dmitro Zakharovich Manuil'skii, Kiev, "Naukova dumka", 1979, pp.5-22; Kollontai worked as a journalist, Granat, pp.443-444. On the Latvians: Berzins, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.27, BSE, p.229, and a 'former public school teacher', HIAPO, Box 210, Indexes XXII-XXIVa, Index XXII, Folder 1B, Circular No. 1274, 9/22 October 1912; Lepse, BSE, p.346, Geroi Oktiabria, Ibid, p.37; Rudzutak, Granat, p.631; Stuchka, Granat, p.708. On the Caucasians and Central Asians: Miasnikov Granat, p.558, BSE, p.180; Narimanov was a writer, teacher, and medical doctor, Granat, p.559, BSE, p.251; Orakhelashvili, BSE, p.468; Ordzhonikidze, Granat, p.567; Rakhimbaev, BSE, pp.508-509; Shaumian, Granat, p.762; Stalin a "Tiflis peasant", HIAPO, Box 205, Indexes XVIIr(1)-XVIIIa, Index XVIIu, Folder 1, MVD Circular No.102383, 11 July 1912. On the Poles, Lithuanians: Kiselev, BSE, p.194, Granat, p.442; Kosior, Granat, p.453. On the others: Krivov, BSE, p.420; Shliapnikov, Granat, p.767. Shliapnikov "an authentic worker", Haupt, Les Bolcheviks par Eux-memes, p.111; Shmidt, Granat, p.770; Kviring worked in a pharmacy, Granat, p.438. On the Russians: Andreev was a hotel dishwasher, BSE, p.16, Granat, p.349; Badeav, BSE, p.515; Beloborodov, Granat, p.359; Bukharin Granat, p.372; Iakovleva, Granat,p.784; Kalinin, Granat, p.424 was a lathe operator and a lackey for a wealthy St. Petersburg family, BSE, pp.207-208; both Andreev and Kalinin were employed at the Putilov factory, Andreev, "Biographie: A.A. Andrejew", Ost Probleme, no.51-52, 1952, Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 791, Series 291, Folder 6,; Kirov, BSE, p.183-184; Kolotilov, BSE, p.457; Kubiak was a factory worker in the Briansk Steam Locomotive Plant, BSE, p.450; Kutuzov, Granat, p.473; Lobov, BSE, p.590; Lomov, BSE, p.7-8, Granat, p.515; Miliutin was an economist, BSE, p.267; Mikhailov was a printer and binder, BSE, p.345; Nogin, HIAOPO, Box 163, Index XIIId(2) Processing Intelligence, Index XIIId(2), Folder 28A, Spickov, 1 July 1903; Osinski, BSE, p.558, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.347; Sapronov, Granat, p.649; Serebriakov, Granat,p.665; Vladimirskii, BSE, p.148; I.N. Smirnov, Granat, p.680, HIAPO, Box 163, Index No. XIIId(2), Folder 28A, Processing Intelligence, 1 February 1903; A.P. Smirnov, BSE, p.610; Tomskii, Granat, p.717-718; Ukhanov worked at the Dinamo Plant in Moscow, BSE, p.147; Voroshilov worked from age 6 in the mines, Granat, p.393. On the Jews: Iaroslavskii, though trained as a chemist's assistant, also worked as a bookbinder and a lawyer's assistant, Granat, p.785, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.190; though educated, by occupation Kamenev was a worker; Sokol'nikov, Granat, p.681; unable to find gainful employment, Sverdlov became a revolutionary, Duval, The Forgotten Bolshevik, p.36; Uritskii was a lawyer but could not practice, Granat, p.734; Zelenskii waa a tailor, BSE, p.453, and Granat, p.417; Ioffe was a physician, and studied law, BSE, p.390, Granat, p.422; Gusev worked in a bank, Granat, p..400; Chubar' worked as a plumber, plater, metalworker, fitter, and lathe operator during his war service, and as a day laborer on the railways, Granat, p.759; Piatnitskii was an apprentice and tailor, Piatnitskii, Memoirs of a Bolshevik, New York, International Publishers, 1933, p.15; Lashevich, a professional revolutionary, Geroi Oktiabria, p.18; Kaganovich was an artisan (cobbler), Lazar' Moisievich Kaganovich: Pamiatnii zapiski, Rabochego Kommunista, bol'shevika, profesoioznogo partiinogo i cobetsko gosudarstvennogo rabotnika, Moskve, 1996.

C. Education

On the Jews: Iaroslavskii completed secondary school and passed a vocational exam, Granat, p.785; Sokolnikov, Granat, p.682, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, (1990), No.7, p.123; Sverdlov dropped out of *gimnazia* after 5 years for financial reasons, Granat,

p.651; Trotsky completed secondary school, and attended mathematics classes in the Faculty in Nicolaev, Granat, p.720, although the latter is not mentioned in "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, (1990), No.7, p.127; Uritskii attended the Law Facutly at Kiev, Granat, p.734; Zelenskii completed elementary school, BSE, p.453, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, pp.95-96, and "O partiinosti lits", ITsK, (1989), No.5, p.89; Zinoviev attended the Chemistry Faculty in Berne, then the Law Faculty, Granat, p.418; Zinoviev was self-taught, but received a university degree from Bern, Granat, p.418, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.96; Ioffe attended the Medical Faculty at the University of Berlin, and later studied at the Law Faculty at Zurich, Granat, p.423; Gusev completed secondary school, but then did not attend the St. Petersburg Technological Institute because or entrance quotas, Granat, p.400, yet other sources claim he was eventually admitted, BSE, pp.460-461, The Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.160, Geroi Oktiabria, p.311; Radek attended *gymnasium*, Granat, pp.594-596; Chubar' attended the Aleksandrovsk (Oleksandrivske) Mechanical and Technical School, BSE p.239, Encyclopedia of Ukraine, ed. V. Kubijovyc, University of Toronto, 1984, p.464 "Sostav rukovodiashchikh organov Tsentral'nogo Komiteta partii", ITsK, (1990), No.7, p.131, Geroi Oktiabria, p.572; Kaganovich received only primary education, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.98; Kamenev attended Moscow University, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.99.

On the Russians: Andreev completed two years of village school, Granat, p.349; Beloborodov completed primary school, Granat, p.359, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.86; Bubnov attended the Moscow Agricultural Institute Granat, p.370, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.87; Bukharin Granat, p.373, "O partiinosti lits", ITsK, p.86; Evdokimov attended urban elementary school, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.93; Iakovleva Granat, p.783-4, BSE, p.487; Kalinin Granat p.424, BSE, p.207-208, *zemstvo* primary schooling and worker night school courses at Putilov at age 16, also "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, (1990), No.7, p.99; Kirov graduated from Kazan Mechanical Technical School, BSE, pp.183-184, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.101; Komarov attended city school, Ibid., p.102; Korotkov attended zemstvo school, ibid; Kutuzov attended parish school, Granat, p.473; Lobov received only primary education, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.107; Lomov graduated from St. Petersburg Law Faculty, BSE, pp.7-8, Granat, p.515; Miliutin studied at St. Petersburg University, BSE, p.267; Mikhailov attended village school and workers' courses, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.111; Molotov attended St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, BSE, pp.484-485, Granat, p.556; Nogin Granat, p.565; Osinski BSE, p.558; Preobrazhenskii did not complete secondary studies, Granat, p.584; Rykov, HIAPO, Box 164, Index XIIId(2), Processing Intelligence, Index XIIId(2), Folder 35, Warning List, No.1100, 1 February 1905, Granat, p.636, "O partiinosti lits", ITsK, p.86; Sapronov had some primary schooling, Granat, p.650; Serebriakov completed primary (city) school, Granat, p.665, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.122; Vladimirskii attended Berlin and Kazan Universities, BSE, p.148, Granat, p.388, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, pp.88-89; A.P. Smirnov was self-educated, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, (1990), p.122; I.N. Smirnov completed primary school Granat, p.680, HIAPO, Box 163, Index No. XIIId(2), Folder 28A, Processing Intelligence, 1 February 1903 attended Moscow city school; Stasova, Granat, p.701; Piatakov, Granat, p.591; Tomskii had elementary school, Granat, pp.717-718, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", p.127, "O partiinosti lits", ITsK, p.92; Uglanov, Granat, p.727; Ukhanov attended a preparatory school in Nizhnii-Novgorod and a crafts school in Kostroma, Granat, p.735, but compare "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.128 that he completed only primary school; Voroshilov attended two years of zemstvo school, Granat,p.393, but "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, pp.89-90 states that it was only a village school. Medvedev says only "local primary school", Medvedev, All Stalin's Men; Kuibyshev attended officer cadet school, the Military Medical Academy in St. Petersburg, V.V. Kuibyshev, Epizodi iz moie zhin, Partizdat Tsk BkP(b), 1935, p.11, "Sostav

rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.105; Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev, Biografiia, Moskva, Izd-Polit. lit. 1988, p.9 on his pro-*gimnazia* and Kazan schooling.

On the Ukrainians: Krestinskii studied law at St. Petersburg University, BSE, p.393-394, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.104; Lebed', Granat, p.491; Manuil'sky, Granat, p.793, BSE, p.340 studied in Russia in France, L.O. Suiarko, Dmitro Zakharovich Manuil'skii, p.5 on university; Petrovskii was expelled from seminary school, Granat, p.581, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.114 makes no mention of his expulsion; Skrypnyk, Granat, p.669; Tsiurupa, Granat, p.750 primary city school, BSE, pp.611-612, the Kherson Argicultural Institute; Muranov was self-taught, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.112; Kollontai attended Zurich University, Granat, pp.443-444.

On the Caucasians and Central Asians: Dzhaparidze, Granat, p.407, BSE, p.193; Miasnikov, Granat, p.558, university BSE, p.180; Mikoian, BSE, p.222; Narimanov, a teachers Seminary and a medical faculty, Granat, p.559, BSE, p.251, Teimur Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, Baku, Iazichi, 1988, pp.7-15, 24-77; Orakhelashvili, BSE, p.468, Granat, p.567; Ordzhonikidze, a feldsher's school, BSE, p.494-495, Granat, p.567, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.113; Rakhimbaev, BSE, pp.508-509; Shaumian, Granat, p.762. On the Poles and Lithuanians: Dzierzynski,*gimnazia*, Granat, p.407; Kosior, a factory school, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.103; Kiselev, Granat, p.442, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.101; Zalutskii, elementary school, Ibid., p.95.

On the remaining Bolsheviks: Krivov, BSE, p.420; Rakovskii, Granat, p.609; Shliapnikov completed primary school, Granat, p.767; Shmidt Granat, p.770; Kviring left school at 15 to work, completing only 5 years, he received a Doctorate in Economics in 1934, BSE, p.12, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.100; Frunze, Granat, p.740, BSE, p.109-110.

On the Latvian Bolsheviks: Berzins, HIAPO, Police Circular no.607, 20 March/2 April 1914, Box 210, Index Nos.XXII-XXIVa, Index XXII, Folder 1B; Danishevskii, BSE, p.529; Rudzutaks, Granat, p.631, parish school, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, pp.119-120; Smilga, Granat, p.676; Stuchka, BSE, p.15, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.451; Lepse elementary school, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.107, Geroi Oktiabria, p.37.

D. *Gimnaziia, realschulen*, parish schools

On the Russians: Bubnov, *realschule*, Granat, p.370, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.87; Bukharin attended *gimnazia*, Granat, p.373, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh ", Ibid., p.88, as did Iakovleva, Granat, p.783-4, BSE, p.487; Komarov, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.102; Korotkov, ibid.; Kubiak attended parish school, Ibid., p.104; Preobrazhenskii attended *gimnazia*, Granat, p.584, and "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.117; Osinskii, Granat, p.569, Rykov, Granat, p.636, *gimnazia*, HIAPO, Headquarters Circular, Warning Lists, No.1100, 1 February 1905, Box 164, Index xiiid(2), Processing Intelligence, Index XIII(2) Folder 35, no.288; Molotov attended *realschule*, Granat, p.553, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.111; Nogin, urban and parish schools, HIAPO, Box 163, Index XIIId(2) Processing Intelligence, Index XIIId(2), Folder 28A, Spiskov, 1 July 1903; Osinski, *gimnazia*, Granat, p.569; Preobrazhenskii attended *gimnazia*, Granat, p.584-586; Rykov attended *gimnazia*, Granat, p.636 and HIAPO, Box 164, Index XIIId(2), Processing Intelligence, Index XIIId(2), Folder 35, Warning List, No.1100, 1 February 1905; Serebriakov, elementary city school, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.122; Stasova, *gimnazia*, Granat,p.701, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.124; Sulimov, "elementary

education", ibid, p.125; Tomskii spent 1 year in boarding school, then state elementary school, Granat, p.717-718; on Uglanov, Yaroslav seminary according to Granat, p.727, but village school according to "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.127; Voroshilov, a zemstvo school, Granat, p.393. On the Poles: Dzierzynski attended *gimnazia* , Granat, p.407, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.92; Kiselev, parish school, Granat, p.442. On the Jews: Radek attended *gimnazia*, Granat, p.594; Iaroslavskii attended *gimnazia* by one source, Granat, p.785, but city school by another, "Sostav rukovodiashchikhi", ITsK, p.135; Kamenev, *gimnazia*, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.99; Lashevich, *gimnazia*, Geroi Oktiabri, p.18; Sokol'nikov *gimnazia*, Granat, p.681; Sverdlov, *gimnazia*, Granat, p.651, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, pp.121-122; Trotsky, *realschule*, Granat, p.720; Uritskii, 'progymnasium' and *gimnazia*, Granat, p.734; Zinoviev was self-taught, Granat, p.418; Ioffe, *gimnazia*, Granat, p.422; Gusev, *realschule*, Granat, p.399-400; Chubar', village school, Geroi Oktiabri, p.572. On the others: Rakovskii, *gimnazia*, Granat, pp.610-611; Shmidt, a city school, Granat, p.770, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.133; Kollontai, *gimnazia*, Granat, pp.443-444; Frunze *gimnazia*, Granat, p.740, "Sostav rukovodiashchikh", ITsK, p.129; Shliapnikov, village school, Aleksandr Zavrilovich Shiapnikov, Moskva, Izd.-"znanie", 1991, p.4. On the Ukrainians: Manuil'sky, *gimnazia*, Granat, p.793, L.O. Suiarko, Dmitro Zakharovich Manuil'skii, p.5; Skrypnyk, *realschule*, see Granat, p.668; Tsiurupa, state city schools, Granat, p.750. On the Latvians: Rudzutaks, Protestant parish schools, Granat, p.631; Smilga, *realschule*, Granat, p.676. On the Caucasians and Central Asians: Dzhaparidze Granat, p.407, a gentryschool; Miasnikov, *gimnazia*, Granat,p.558; Mikoian, parish schools before seminary, BSE, p.222; Narimanov, seminary/parish schools, Granat, p.559, BSE, p.251; Orakhelashvili, *gimnazia*, Granat, p.567; Shaumian, *realschule*, Granat, p.762; Stalin, seminary/parish schools Granat, p.698, HIAPO, Box 163, Indexes XIIId(2), Folder 31A, Headquarters Circulars and Warning Lists, p.20, no.5500, 1 May 1904; Ordzhonikidze, religious school before feldshers school, Grigorii Konstantinovich Orzhonikidze: Biografiia, Moskva, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literaturi, 1986, pp.9-12.

E. First radicalization

On the Jewish Bolsheviks: Iaroslavskii was radicalized before age 13 amongst penal settlers in Chita, his parents were themselves involved in political activity, Granat, p.785; Kamenev, during secondary school reinforced by his parents' activism, Granat p.427; Lashevich began in student circles at 16, Granat, p.489; Sokol'nikov, Granat, p.681; Sverdlov while in *gimnazia*, Granat, p.651, Duval, The Forgotten Bolshevik, p.19; Lashevich was radicalized in *gimnazia*, Geroi Oktiabria, p.18; Trotsky, Granat, p.720; Kaganovich was recruited by several parties because he was Jewish, Medvedev, All Stalin's Men, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p.114; Uritskii organized radical circles in *gimnazia*, Granat, p.734; Zinoviev, Granat, p.418; Ioffe joined circles in *gimnazia*, Granat, p.422; Gusev, Granat, p.399; Radek in *gumnazia*, Granat, pp.593-594; Chubar' was influenced by a teacher, Granat, p.759, but compare, Geroi Oktiabria p.572; Piatnitskii's radicalization was prompted by his older brothers' activities, Memoirs of a Bolshevik, pp.15-16. On the Ukrainians: Lebed', Granat, p.491; Manuil'skii in *gimnazia*, Granat, p.793; Petrovskii, BSE, pp.488-489; Skrypnyk, Granat, p.668; on Tsiurupa's fairly late involvement, BSE, pp.611-612. On the Latvians: Rudzutaks, during the 1903-5 revolution in Latvia Granat, p.631; Smilga, Granat, p.676. On the Caucasians and Central Asians: Dzhaparidze Granat, p.407; Miasnikov Granat, p.558; Narimanov, Granat, p.559, "Konchina predsedateliia tsik SSSR Tov. N.N. Narimanov", in Pravda, 21 March 1925, Nicoleavsky Collection, Box 796, Accession No. 63013 8.41/44 Series No. 291, Folder 9; Shaumian, Granat, p.762; Stalin, Granat, p.698. On the Poles and Lithuanians: Drierzynski, Granat, p.407; Kiselev's first radical activity in 1898 as a worker Granat, p.442; Kosior, Granat, p.453. On the remaining Bolsheviks: Rakovskii's revolutionary family and relations Granat, p.610 and *passim*; Shliapnikov, Granat, p.767-768; Frunze,

Granat, p.740.

On some of the Russians: Andreev Granat, p.349; for Beloborodov 1905 was his 'baptism', Granat, p.359-360; Piatakov, Granat, p.591; Bubnov, Granat, p.370; Bukharin, Granat, p.373; On Kirov's early contacts with political exiles Granat, p.440; Lomov was radicalized at 13, Granat, p.515; Molotov was influenced by administrative exiles in Kazan, events of 1905, three of his brothers' radicalism, Granat, pp.553-554; Nogin, Granat, p.565; Osinski's father was a radical, his brother arrested in 1902 in student unrest, Granat, p.569; Preobrazhenskii, Granat, p.584; Rykov, Granat, p.636; a highly personal account of Sapronov's early struggles Granat, pp.649-650; Serebriakov Granat, p.665; Vladimirskii, in circles as a medical student Granat, p.388; I.N. Smirnov Granat, p.680; Stasova, her father's politics and women's charitable activities Granat, p.700-702 and *passim*; Tomskii, Granat, p.718; Kuibyshev's politics began in 1904 at age 26, Granat, p.469.

F. Other political groupings

No other group involvement is known for Andreev, BSE, p.16; Piatakov was an anarchist, Granat, p.591; Iakovleva, in women's groups and Menshevism Granat, p.784; Kalinin was a member of Lenin's "Union for Struggle of St.Petersburg for the Liberation of the Working Class", Granat, p.425, BSE, p.207-208; Miliutin became a Menshevik in 1903, BSE, p.267; Molotov, with the SRs, Granat, pp.554-555; Rykov, Granat, p.636, HIAPO, Box 164, Index XIIId(2), Processing Intelligence, Index XIIId(2), Folder 35, Warning List, No.1100, 1 February 1905; Stasova's involvement in women's organizations Granat, p.700-702; Rakovskii, Granat, pp.610-614; although the extent of his involvement with the SRs is not precisely known, Shliapnikov was arrested for participating at a SR event in Moscow, Granat, p.769; Kollontai, Finnish Social Democracy, Menshevism between 1906-1915, German Social Democracy, and Belgian Social Democracy, Clements, Bolshevik Feminist, pp.17-86 and *passim*; Frunze, Granat, p.7; Krestinskii was a Menshevik, BSE, p.393-394, Lebed' was an anarchist, Granat, p.491; Manuil'sky straddled Bolshevism-Menshevism, and was a member of the *mezhrayonka* group, Granat, p.795, Biographical Dictionary of the Cominterm,p.295; Skrypnyk, Granat, p.669; Dzhaparidze BSE, p.193; Miasnikov's involvement in Armenian nationalist and national social democratic circles Granat,p.558; Mikoian may have been active in the Kadets, BSE, p.222 and Granat, p.543; Narimanov, Granat, p.559-561, also "Konchina predsedateliia tsik SSSR Tov. N.N. Narimanov", in Pravda, 21 March 1925, in Nicoleavsky Collection, Box 796, Accession No. 63013 8.41/44 Series No. 291, Folder 9, and Akhmedov, Nariman Narimanov, pp.78-81 on his involvement in Himmat and his struggles with Azerbaijani language rights; Shaumian, Granat, p.762, and on his politics on nationalism see A. Karinian, Shaumian i natsionalisticheskii techeniia na Kavkase, Baku, tipografiia '3-i internatsional', 1928, p. ; according to Okhrana records Stalin was first a member of the Menshevik faction, HIAPO, Box 205, Indexes XVIIr(1)-XVIIIa, Index XVIIu, Folder 1--under the names "Coco" and "Koba", Stalin worked as SD propagandist first as Menshevik. On the Poles and Lithuanians: Dzierynski was a Polish nationalist and Lithuanian national socialist, Granat, p.407 and *passim*.; Berzins was active in a number of Latvian radical organizations, James White, "Latvian and Lithuanian Sections of the Bolshevik Party on the Eve of the February Revolution", Revolutionary Russia, p.93, HIAPO, Box 210, Index Nos. XXII-XXIVa, Index XXII, Folder 1B, Circular No.1274, 9/22 October 1912 under the names "Pavel", "Ian", and "Georgi", and on his roles in the Latvian Social Democratic Party from 1902 Oktiabreskaia revoliutsii v latvii: Dokumenty i materialii, p.432 (Riga,1957); Danishevskii, Oktiabreskaia revoliutsiia v latvii, p.42; on Rudzutaks' involvement in Latvian radical movements Granat, p.632; Stuchka, BSE, p.15, Granat, p.708, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.451.

On the Jews: Iaroslavskii was a member of the *Narodnaya Volya* prior to becoming a Social Democrat in 1898, Granat, p.785; Kamenev had been a member of the Bund prior to 1903 Granat, 427-428, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.205; Sokolnikov, Granat, pp.681-682; Sverdlov was involves with the SRs, Duval, The Forgotten Bolshevik, pp.15-19, and Granat, p.651; Trotsky's political activities prior to 1917 are well-known and well-documented, Granat, p.722; Uritskii was active in Polish socialist organizations while a student at Kiev, and he had been a member of "Spilka" before joining the RSDLP in 1898, BSE, p.78, HIAPO, Notecards: outgoing circular 242-1916; Ioffe was involved in the German Social Democratic movement and the Swiss Socialist Party, Granat, p.423; Gusev had been a member of the "St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class", and with the "People's Will", Granat, p.400, BSE, p.460-461, Geroi Oktiabria, p.311; on Radek's extensive involvement in various nationalist and socialist groups, Granat, pp.594-597, and HIAPO, Box 205, Index Nos. XVIIr(1)-XVIIa, Index XVIIa, Folder 1, Circular No.1570, 29 November/12 December 1912 for his activities for the Polish press in Leipzig, Paris Okhrana Archive, Box 208 Index XIX Polish revolutionaries, Index XIX, Folder 6, Circular No.1017, 30 July/12 August 1911 on membership in German and Polish groups, HIAPO, Box 208, Index XIX Polish revolutionaries, Folder 6, Circular No.1167, 14/27 November 1916(?) contains a letter from Radek as Polish Social Democrat in Zurich and member of the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania on a "tax-free Poland", and a Circular on Radek, aka Aronson, as a "Leftist" in the Social Democratic Party, HIAPO, Box 208, Index XIX Polish Revolutionaries, Folder 6, Circular No.140513, 12 December 1909; Chubar' had early populist and SR involvements, Granat, p.759; Piatnitskii was in the Jewish Bund, Piatnitskii, Memoirs of a Bolshevik.

G. Prison, emigration, and exile

On the Russians: Badeav BSE, p.515; Beloborodov spent at least 4 years in prison (1908-1912), Granat, p.360; Bubnov Granat, p.370; Iakovleva Granat, p.784; Kalinin had numerous arrests, Siberian exiles, and brutal beatings, Granat, p.425; Kirov's first arrest was in 1905, after which he became a revolutionary, Granat, p.441; Kubiak's 7 years in prison and exile BSE, p.450; Lomov spent two early years in exile in Arkangel'sk and Eastern Siberia in 1911-1913, Granat, p.515; Molotov, Granat, p.555; on Nogin HIAPO, Box 163, Index XIIId(2) Processing Intelligence, Index XIIId(2), Folder 28A, Spickov, 1 July 1903; Rykov, Granat, p.636, HIAPO, Box 164, Index XIIId(2), Processing Intelligence, Index XIIId(2), Folder 35, Warning List, No.1100, 1 February 1905; on Serebriakov, Granat, p.666; Sergeev BSE, p.260; Vladimirskii Granat, pp.388-389; I.N. Smirnov, Granat, p.680-681; Stasova, Granat, pp.703-704; Tomskii Granat, pp.718-719; Voroshilov, Granat, pp.393-394; Kuibyshev was arrested 9-10 times, including exile in Tomsk, Granat, p.470, V.V. Kuibyshev, Episodi iz moei zhizni, p.91, arrests in 1906, 1908, 1909, 1910 (twice), 1912, 1914, 1915, and 1916.

On the Jews: raised on a penal settlement in Siberia, Iaroslavskii was arrested several times, including a 1907 (or 1910) arrest when he was sentenced to 5 years hard labor in Siberia prior to returning to penal settler status, BSE, p. 558, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.190, Granat, p.787; Sokol'nikov, Granat, p.682; Sverdlov's time in internal exile and prison (in Narym and Turukhansk), Granat, pp.652-653, Duval, The Forgotten Bolshevik, pp.182-183; Uritskii spent years in exile and prison in Iakoutsk, Vologda, and Archangelsk, Granat, p.734; Zelenskii was arrested in 1908 and sent under police surveillence to Orenburg, again exiled to Narym in 1912 for 3 years; in 1915 Zelenskii was exiled to Irkoutsk, where under hard labor he contracted typhus, BSE, p.453, Granat, p.417; Ioffe spent a number of years in prison and internal exile, including 5 years (1912-1917) in exile in Siberia, deported from Germany as a political undesirable in 1907, HIAPO, Box 122, Index XIIIb(1), Folder 1A, Outgoing Dispatch No.76, Paris,

18/31 January 1912, and on his time abroad, Granat, p.423; Gusev had at least two documented arrests: in 1897 he was sent to Orenburg, and in 1906 he was arrested in Moscow and placed under surveillence for 3 years, Granat, p.400; Chubar was arrested for having illegal literature in 1904 and 1909, Granat, p.759; Piatnitskii was arrested in 1906, 1908, 1914, and sent to Siberia before being released in 1917, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.363. On the Poles and Lithuanians: Dzierzynski's prison career was unparalleled--of his 20 years of illegal radical activity, more than 11 years were spent in Tsarist prisons and exile, among other sources, Granat, p.408 and *passim*, Haupt's brief account, Les Bolcheviks per Eux-memes, pp.304-306, on Dzierzynski's famous escape from Podolsk prison, Hoover Institution Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 88, Accession No. 63013, 8.41/44, Series 54, Folder 28, Report/Circular No. 4226, 12 July 1902; Kiselev was forbidden from residing in 52 cities of the Empire Granat, pp.442-443; Kosior spent 3 years in exile in Irkoutsk Granat, p.453.

On the Ukrainians: Krestinskii's arrests and exile Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.236; On Manuil'sky's several arrests Granat, p.794; on Tsiurupa's prison or exile record Granat, p.750, BSE, pp.611-612. On the Latvian Bolsheviks: Danishevskii BSE, p.529, and Oktiabreskaia revoliutsii v latvii: Dokumenty i materialii, p.42; for Smilga Granat, p.676; for Stuchka Granat, p.708; Kollontai's time abroad (excluding her home in Finland) was extensive: Switzerland, Germany, France, England, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Norway and the US, see Granat, p.446 and *passim*.

On the Caucasians and Cenrtal Asians: Dzhaparidze's time in prisons and exile, Granat, p.407; Miasnikov Granat, p.558; among other arrests, Narimanov spent 5 years in exile in Astrakhan, BSE, p.251, Pravda, "Konchina predsedateliia tsik SSSR Tov. N.N. Narimanov", in Pravda, 21 March 1925, Nicoleavsky Collection, Box 796, Accession No. 63013 8.41/44 Series No. 291, Folder 9; Ordzhonikidze spent extensive time in prison and exile, Granat, pp.567-568, BSE, pp.494-495; Ryskulov BSE, pp.508-509; Shaumian spent more than four years in exile/prison but the exact dates are unclear, Granat, p.762; Stalin's Okhrana record is well-documented in Tsarist police files: HIAPO, Box 205, Indexes XVIIr(1)-XVIIIa, Index XVIIu, Folder 1, and Box 163, Index No.XIIId(2) Folder 31A, Headquarters Circulars and Warning Lists, p.20 No.5500, 1 May 1904, including a physical description the deformities on his left foot; Safarov must have spent at least 1 year abroad in Zurich as a Bolshevik propagandist, though little else is known, HIAPO, Box 122, Index XIIIb(1), Folder 1B, outgoing dispatch No.325, Paris, 5/18 March 1912, and Folder 1D, outgoing dispatch No.615, paris, 2/15 May 1912.
On the remaining Bolsheviks: Krivov, BSE, p.420; Shliapnikov's extensive police surveillence reports in Paris see under 'time abroad' above, also the account of his stay in Vladimir prison, Aleksandr Zavrilovich Shliapnikov, p.5. Shmidt was prohibited from living in 27 cities in the Empire, Granat, p.770; on Frunze, BSE, p.109-110, Granat, p.740.

On some of the Russians: Kalinin did spend some time abroad, although it must have been minimal, see his file in HIAPO, Box 119, Index No. XIIIb(1), Folder 1C, Circular no.585 Paris, 27 December 1907/9January 1908; Iakovleva's time abroad included time in Switzerland or Sweden, HIAOPO surveillance in 1913, Box 124, Index XIIIb(1), Folder 1H, No.1550, Paris, 3/16 October 1913; on Osinski BSE, p.558; Sergeev spent considerable time abroad, especially working in Australia as a stevedore and farm laborer, BSE, p.260; Vladimirskii was very active as an emigre in Paris, Granat, p.388-389, the brief resume in BSE, p.148, and the Tsarist police's tracking of his activities in the following: HIAPO, Box 123, Index XIIIb(1), Folder 1G, Outgoing Dispatches (Paris to Headquarters), No.1331, 19 October/1 November 1912.

On the Jews: On Iaroslvskii's time abroad Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern,

p.190, BSE, p.558, Granat, p.785 on his involvement in the transport of illegal literature; On Sokol'nikov, Granat, p.682, HIAPO, Box 126, Index XIIIb(1),1G, Outgoing Dispatches No.1412, 3/16 December, 1915; Uritskii spent at least 3 years abroad from 1914-1917, and had a long Okhrana file on his activities and correspondences: series of correspondences and a letter dated 12/11/14 to contact in Zurich, contained in Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution, Box 185, Accession No.63013, 8.41/44, Series No.119, Folder 17; Zinoviev's time abroad with Lenin is well-known, his first emigration began in 1902 after his first arrest, and spent time in Berlin, Paris, Berne, and Geneva, Granat, pp.418-420; Ioffe spent a number of years abroad both studying and engaging in political activities, most famously in Vienna with Trotsky editing "Pravda", Granat, pp.422-423; Gusev spent several years abroad in Brussels publishing illegal literature, and in Geneva and Paris, Granat, p.400; Radek's time abroad was well-known and considerable, Granat, pp.593-597 and *passim*, and his Okhrana files documenting his involvement in various radical groupings is equally impressive: the Okhrana knew his real name to be "Sobelsohn'", and his party name to be 'Radek', when he was a member of the Austrian Social Democratic Party "Narezod" in 1900 while in Berne, a member of the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania in 1905 while in Warsaw, and after 1905 there is dispute as to whether he was also a member of the PPS as mentioned in earlier Okhrana circulars (No.1347 dated October 1911), while in Leipzig he was a member of the central organ of the SDKPiL and simultaneously wrote for the German Social Democratic organ "Leipzig Volkszeitung", etc., HIAPO, Box 208, Index XVIIr(1)-XVIIIa, Index XVIIIa, Folder 1, Circular No.1570, Paris, 29 November/12 December, 1912, for Radek's activities as a Polish revolutionary see Box 208, Index XIX, Polish Revolutionaries, Folder 6, Circular No.1017, Paris, 30 July/12 August 1911, on his activities on behalf of a "Tax-Free Poland", HIAPO, Box 208, Index XIX, Polish Revolutionaries, Folder 6, Circular 1167, Paris, 14/27 November 1916(?), and finally as "Aronson" and a Leftist in the Social Democratic Party, HIAPO, Box 208, Index XIX, Polish Revolutionaries, Folder 6, Circular No.140513, 12 December 1909; Piatnitskii spent a time abroad doing party work in Geneva and Leipzig, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, p.363.

On Rakovskii's life outside Tsarist Russia see especially Conte's biography Christian Rakovskii, 1873-1941: A Political Biography, (trans. APM Bradley) East European Monographs, Boulder, 1989, and Granat pp.611-618 and *passim*; Shliapnikov spent a great deal of time in Western Europe, especially in Paris where he was constantly under Okhrana surveillance--one surveillence report even states that he wore an orange hat and yellow boots around Paris: HIAPO, Box 201, Indexes XVIIn-XVIIr(1): Revolutionary Leaders and Activities, Index XVIIn, Folder 5A, 'other important revolutionaries', report of 6 September 1915, London letter of 20 December 1915 (in French), note of 22 July/4August 1915, letter from London of 29 November 1915, reports (in French) of Agent Powell dated 1 August 1915, 29 July 1915, handwritten letters dated 8 September 1915, 14 December 1915, and 3 October 1915, and an "outgoing dispatch" is found in Box 126, Index XIIIb(1), Folder 1B, No.221, 2/15 March 1916, and on his work experience in 1912-14 in France, England and Germany under the name "metallist", Aleksandr Zavrilovich Shiapnikov, p.7 and *passim*; on Shmidt's years working in Germany on a steamship and as a painter, and his 4 years in Finland, see Granat, p.770. The exception was Berzin: On the Tsarist police's knowledge of Berzins' whereabouts in Europe after fled Russia in 1906, see HIAPO, Box 210, Index Nos.XXII-XXIVa, Index XXII, Folder 1B, Circular No.1274, 2/22 October 1912; Mikoian was never abroad before the revolution; Orakhelashvili spent brief periods in Paris and Geneva; Ordzhonikidze spent 1 1/2 years in Germany and some time in Paris at the Bolshevik school in Longjumeau, Granat, p.567-568 and BSE, pp.494-495; Shaumian studied in Berlin and there joined the foreign section of the RSDLP; Dzierzynski's time outside the Empire was considerable, especially in Germany and in Cracow and non-Imperial Poland, see Granat, p.408 and

passim. On Manuil'sky had extensive stays in France and Switzerland; Skrypnyk went abroad in 1908 because he was followed too much by the Tsarist authorities, Granat, p.672

H. Pre-1917 publications

On the Russians: Badeav's role on Pravda, BSE, p.515; Bubnov, while in Siberia, wrote brochures on statistics and economic issues, Granat, p.370; Beloborodov wrote articles for Pravda, Granat, p.360; Lomov contributed to the journal "Shkola i Zhin" and wrote numerous brochures on economic questions, Granat, p.515; Miliutin was a prolific writer of articles, brochures, and full works on economic questions; Mikhailov participated in the publication of the Bolshevik journal "Golos pechatnogo truda", BSE, p.345; Molotov wrote especially for Pravda, under the pen-name "Akim the Simple", Granat, p.556; for Vladimirskii's work on "Zhin", HIAPO, Box 123, Index XIIIb(1), Folder 1G, Outgoing Dispatches, No.1331, 19 October/1 November 1912; Stasova wrote articles for "Echo", Granat, p.703; Voroshilov, despite only two years of primary school education, managed to edit the local Bolshevik paper in Lugansk, Medvedev, All Stalin's Men, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p.3. On the Ukrainians: Manuil'sky was a prolific writer and nearly full-time editor, especially on Nache Slovo with Trotsky and Golos with Antonov-Ovseenko Granat, p.794-795; Kollontai wrote extensivley on feminist issues, Clements, Bolshevik Feminist; Skrypnik was extremely prolific both within Russia and abroad, BSE, p.530; Petrovskii's most well-known works on his experience in the Duma were written *after* the Revolution, as for instance, "Natsionalnii voprosi, religiosii voprosi", in Hoover Institution Archives, Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 180, Accession No. 63013 8.41/44, Series No.112, Folder 1. On the Latvians: Berzin's record on editorships and publications, among other sources, HIAPO, Box 210, Index Nos.XXII-XXIVa, Index XXII, Folder 1B, Circular No. 1274, 9/22 October 1912, and compare with the Soviet account BSE, p.229; Stuchka was extremely prolific both within the Empire and in Western Europe, Granat, p.708, BSE, p.15. On the Poles and Lithuanians: Dzierzynski was a prolific publicist, particularly in Polish journals like "Kovno Worker",Blobaum, Feliks Dzierzinski and the SDKPiL; Kapsukas helped to edit journals in the United States and in Lanarckshire, Scotland, in 1915-16, see M. Rogers, "The Anglo-Russian Convention and Lithuanian Immigrant Community in Lanarckshire, Scotland 1914-1920", Immigrants and Minorities, 1982, pp.60-85, also references to Kapsukas' editorial activities in James White, "Scottish Lithuanians and the Russian Revolution", Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol.6, no.1, 1975, on his editorship of Draugas in 1904, Sabaliunas, Lithuanian Social Democracy, p.32 and *passim*. On the Caucasians and Central Asians: For Dzhaparidze publications in Bolshevik papers, BSE, p.193; Miasnikov's cultural and literary writings were extensive, BSE, p.180, Granat, p.559; Mikoian worked as an editor and journalist in Baku for "Sotsial Demokrat" and "Izvestiia Bakinsnogo Soveta", BSE, p.222; Narimanov was extremely prolific Granat, p.559-561 and "Konchina predsedateliia tsik SSSR Tov. N.N. Narimanov", in Pravda, 21 March 1925, Nicoleavsky Collection, Box 796, Accession No. 63013 8.41/44 Series No. 291, Folder 9; on Orakhelashvili Granat, p.567; while in exile Ordzhonikidze edited "Sotsial Demokrat" with Petrovskii and Iaroslavskii, among other things, see Granat, p.568; Shaumian was a prolific writer, see the official source for instance, BSE, pp.229-300. On the Jewish Bolsheviks: Soviet historiography records Iaroslavskii as the "party historian" and journalist (see BSE, p.558), but he had no significant or substantial publications prior to the Revolution, despite working abroad as a correpondent for *Iskra*; On Kamenev, Granat, p.427-429, on his Pravda editorship HIAPO, Box 124, Index XIIIb(1), Folder iF, Outgoing Dispatches No.1276, 7/20 August 1913; according to Duval, Sverdlov was largely responsible for the paper Rabochii, an illegal newssheet, The Forgotten Bolshevik, p.86; Zinoviev was a prolific pamphleteer, writer, and editor for, among other journals, "Vpered", "Sotsial Demokrat", "Proletarri", "Vorbote", and later "Pravda", Granat, pp.419-420; Ioffe has numerous publications and was an active editor, Granat, pp.423-424; Gusev published extensively after 1917, and

less so before, though he was actively involved in printing brochures and leaflets, and between 1900-3 contibuting articles to "Prizovskii Krai", "Donskoi Peri", and "Vpered", Granat, p.400-401; Radek was one of the most prolific Granat, pp.596-609 and *passim*. On the other remaining Bolsheviks see: Rakovskii was extremely prolific, writing most famously for Trotsky's papers, "Nache slovo" (1915) and "Pravda" (1908).