Forgotten females: Women and girls in post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs

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Abstract—Sommaire

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs slowly developed gender-policies to reflect the recent upsurge in females' participation in armed groups in combat and support roles. This has not translated, however, into females' successful inclusion in DDR. The thesis considers the influence of the provisions for DDR in peace agreements, the definitions of combatants and eligibility criteria for program entry, institutional responsibility for DDR programs, DDR program implementation, and the agency of DDR target populations on the participation of females in DDR. It examines DDR programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan. The case studies demonstrate that gender-sensitive DDR policies are important pre-conditions but do not serve as guarantees for females' inclusion in DDR. The thesis concludes that the resource constraints faced by leading actors and a limited recognition of the agency of DDR target populations play decisive roles in determining the level of females' participation in DDR.

Les programmes de désarmement, de démobilisation et de réintégration (DDR) ont lentement développé des politiques pour adresser les besoins des femmes associées aux groupes rebelles. Ces politiques n'ont pas réussi à assurer leur participation. Cette thèse traite l'influence des articles portant sur les DDR dans les accords de paix, les définitions de combatants et les critères d'admission aux programmes, les acteurs responsables, la mise en vigeur des programmes ainsi que la capacité d'agir des participants aux programmes sur la participation des femmes. Les programmes au Mozambique, au Sierra Leone, au Libéria, et au Soudan démontrent que l'inclusion des politiques de genre dans les programmes de DDR est essentielle pour permettre l'"inclusion des femmes; pourtant, elle ne l'assure pas. La thèse conclut que les manques de resources et la reconnaissance limitée de la capacité d'agir des participants exercent une influence décisive sur la participation des femmes aux programmes de DDR.

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Acronyms

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
CAAFG	Children Associated With Armed Forces and Groups
CAFF	Children Associated with Fighting Forces
CDFs	Civil Defense Forces
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRRU	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Unit
DDRU	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Unit
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOMIL	Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
FAAFG	Females Associated with Armed Forces and Groups
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação National
GPA	General Peace Agreement
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NCDDR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
NCDDRR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NSDDRC	North Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional de Moçambique
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SLA	Sierra Leone Army

SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSDDRC	South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDDA	United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNODA	United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
WAAFG	Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups
WAC	Women's Artillery Commando
WAFF	Women Associated with Fighting Forces

Introduction

Earlier conceptions of women in warfare centered around their traditional gender roles: women as mothers, nurturers, caregivers, the womb of the nation; women as wives and lovers; women preserving the domestic sphere; women supporting the boys on the home front. Women's roles in conflict changed with the recent shift from inter- to intra-state conflict. Violence against women is increasingly a weapon of modern warfare. Alongside women's increased victimization, however, recent conflicts also witnessed a growth in their participation in armed groups,[1] where they assumed roles as combatants, as cooks, as porters, as sex slaves, as nurses, and as "bush wives." This participation occurs voluntarily, through conscription, through abduction, or through forcible recruitment. Estimates of women's presence in armed groups vary widely, with women forming between 10% and up to one third of participants in armed groups.[2] Girls' involvement in conflict also grew with the rise of the child soldier phenomenon.

The increasing participation of women and girls in conflict challenges traditional gender roles. Recognition of these changing gender relations differs greatly among actors in conflict and post-conflict settings. Armed groups may capitalize on females' labour by promoting gender equality during conflict to mobilise support; however, these shifts in gender relations are rarely preserved in the post-conflict context. In the policy sphere, recognition of women and girls' experiences in conflict, including the need to address their gender-specific needs in peacebuilding and post-conflict policies and programs, is far more widespread.

Despite the prevalence of policy documents identifying the gender-specific needs of women and girls in all aspects of peacebuilding, programming efforts continue to fall short in meeting these needs. This gap is particularly evident in disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programs implemented in the immediate aftermath of conflicts to stabilise the security situation and prevent the recurrence of hostilities between armed groups. Leading actors in the DDR process, such as the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the

[1] The term "armed groups" is used throughout the thesis to denote both armed forces and irregular armed groups.
[2] Tsjeard Bouta, Georg Frerks, and Ian Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development* (Washington: World Bank, 2005), 8.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), all have policy guidelines for gender-sensitive DDR programs. Nevertheless, DDR programs continue to marginalize women and girls in both their design and implementation. In Sierra Leone, but 506 of the estimated 12,056 girls affiliated with armed groups participated in DDR. In Liberia, women and children formed 38% of armed groups, yet only represented 17% of participants in the subsequent DDR program.[3] Instead of benefiting from the support offered to combatants through DDR programs as they make the transition back into civilian life, countless numbers of women and girls 'self-demobilise,' silently disappearing into war-affected communities where they struggle alone to reintegrate.

The policy literature on gender and DDR recognises the continuing marginalization of females. Explaining this marginalization, however, is generally not the analytical focus of such documents. They concentrate instead on identifying the means through which to improve females' presence in DDR programs by providing further policy guidelines. This thesis addresses the existing gap between the gender-sensitive policy literature on DDR and the consistent failure to design and implement DDR programs in a gender-sensitive manner. It asks why females continue to be marginalised in DDR programs in the face of widespread recognition among international agencies of their role in conflict and the importance of addressing their needs in programming activities.

The thesis' discussion of gender-sensitivity in DDR programs adopts a narrow approach that focuses on the factors limiting the participation of women and girls in the DDR process. While the existing literature on females in DDR programs treats women and girls as separate analytical categories, the thesis considers obstacles to the participation of both. The separation of women and girls disguises many of their shared access issues in DDR programs, especially as adolescent girls and young adult females form the majority of females in armed groups. It does not consider the

[3] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," ed. Sarah Douglas and Felicity Hill (New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2004), 8. S. McKay and D. Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique* (Montreal: Rights and Democracy: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2004), 99.

effectiveness of DDR programs in addressing females' needs outside of how this influences women and girls' decisions to participate. In doing so, it recognises that the successful delivery of gender-sensitive DDR programs plays an important role in influencing females' participation. However, it argues that the design of future gender-sensitive DDR programs is intimately linked to the ability of existing programs to demonstrate their success in delivering support to women and girls in armed groups. In the interim, the central puzzle thus becomes explaining the gap between women and girls' increasing involvement in armed groups and their present absence from the DDR process. The thesis examines the factors explaining this gap through analyzing DDR programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan. It seeks to marry the policy and academic literature on gender and DDR to provide a comprehensive analysis of women and girls' absence.

The thesis examines the influence of DDR frameworks in peace agreements, eligibility requirements, institutional responsibility for DDR programs, the implementation process of DDR programs, and the agency granted to DDR target groups on the continuing failure of DDR programs to include females. It finds that gender-aware peace agreements contribute to the development of gender-sensitive DDR programs, even with the limited involvement of women in the peace process, but that these are not sufficient to guarantee gender-sensitive programs. It reaches the same conclusion about the definitions of combatants and eligibility criteria adopted by DDR programs. The presence of broader definitions of combatants contributes to the gender-sensitivity of DDR programs by allowing a greater number of women associated with armed groups to participate. Although expanding the definition of combatants does represent an important and necessary step, it must be accompanied by more flexible eligibility criteria to ensure women and girls' greater inclusion in the DDR process. Moreover, it does not guarantee their participation at the stage of implementation. The thesis argues that the limited participation of women and girls in DDR programs must be understood through a two-pronged approach that considers both the institutional responsibility for DDR and from the perspective of participants themselves, including commanders and females associated with armed groups. While some DDR programs simply fail to take females' needs adequately into account due to resource constraints, other explanations for females'

limited participation lie at the level of individual commanders and the decisions of females themselves.

To develop an explanation of females' persistent absence from DDR programs, the thesis proceeds in six parts. Section I outlines the methodology of the thesis. Sections II-IV provide the theoretical framework for the thesis. Section II defines DDR and its component parts and presents different approaches to the DDR process. Section III then discusses females' shifting participation in armed groups and their roles in conflict. Section IV reviews the international policy framework for females in DDR programs. It then considers the factors affecting the participation of females in DDR programs based on the existing literature. Finally, it outlines the five factors considered in the current thesis that affect their presence in DDR. Sections V-VI provide the analytical discussion. Section V uses the framework developed in Section IV to review the participation of females in select DDR programs, beginning with a historical case study of the DDR process in Mozambique followed by case studies of DDR in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan. Section VI synthesizes the factors affecting women's participation in DDR programs based on the empirical evidence in the case studies, the existing literature, and a series of interviews with academics, policy-makers, and humanitarian practioners. Finally, Section VII draws conclusions about the appropriateness of existing DDR programs for accessing and assisting females associated with armed groups and highlights questions for future research.

Methodology

The thesis bridges the discussions in the academic and policy literature on females' participation in DDR programs. It adopts a qualitative approach that draws from the broad academic, governmental, non-governmental, UN, and World Bank literature on DDR. Given the breadth of the literature, it focuses narrowly on that which is most relevant to the current discussion. The diversity of sources enables a more comprehensive grasp of the political and socioeconomic factors affecting the gender-sensitivity of DDR programs. The analysis relies extensively on the policy literature; nevertheless, it is not intended as a policy document or as an organizational tool for international agencies. In this respect, it echoes a point made by Prügl and Lustgarten of their research on gender mainstreaming. They state, "although we draw on the extensive work of gender experts and consultants involved in the implementation of gender mainstreaming, we write from an academic location that puts us outside these organizational contexts."[4] The same is true of this exercise.

The thesis preserves the distinction between the development literature and peacebuilding and post-conflict literature. Much of the development literature contains relevant discussions of international agencies and their gender practices. Sorensen points out that the division between these two sets of literature is arbitrary in many ways as they overlap in both space and time. Their different operational environments exert a crucial influence, however, on the policy-making processes and on program implementation.[5] Development actors in non-conflict settings operate in highly different milieus than those operating in a conflict or post-conflict environment. A further distinction is made between a peacebuilding perspective, concentrating on the establishment and stabilisation of a security situation in the immediate aftermath of conflict, and the post-conflict reconstruction perspective,

[4] Elisabeth Prugl and Audrey Lustgarten, "Mainstreaming Gender in International Organizations," in *Women and Gender Equity in Development Theory and Practice: Institutions, Resources, and Mobilization*, ed. Jane S. Jaquette and Gale Summerfield (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 53.

[5] Birgitte Sorensen, "Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources," (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies 1998), 2.

where the focus is on the longer-term stabilisation of the state and society.[6] The use of these conceptual distinctions facilitates the analysis process.

A comprehensive explanation for the absence of females in DDR programs ideally develops through fieldwork including interviews with participants in DDR programs, policy-makers, and DDR practioners. This was unfortunately not feasible for the current project. The thesis relies instead on interviews conducted remotely with academics, policy-makers, and field practioners to gain greater insight into the institutional and structural barriers affecting females' inclusion in DDR programs. The thesis uses these interviews to overcome the gaps in the secondary literature. The use of interviews in conjunction with the use of secondary literature and country case studies enables a more comprehensive, if still rudimentary, discussion. The interviews assist in the identification of additional theoretical and policy-based explanations. Their use further guards against biases in data collection associated with relying solely on one research method.

Interviewees were identified through a combination of a snowball sampling technique and cold emailing. The risk of bias leading to an unrepresentative sample is an important methodological limitation of the snowball sampling technique. Recognising this, an effort was made to include individuals from a range of organizations. The interviewees cannot be claimed to be a fully representative sample. The author conducted semi-structured interviews with 19 individuals according to their professional capacities, including with 5 academics, 3 from non-governmental agencies, 7 from United Nations (UN) agencies, 1 from government, 2 independent consultants, and 1 from the World Bank.[7] Due to time constraints, there were no interviews with representatives of the DDR national commissions for the country case studies. The thesis overcomes this limit in part through reference to the secondary literature on national DDR commissions.

All interviewees received an email of introduction outlining the scope and aims of the thesis. Interviewees were given the option to respond to questions by

[6] For a good discussion of peacebuilding activities, see Ho-Won Jeong, *Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Societies: Strategy and Process* (Boulder: Lynner Rienner Press, 2005).

[7] For full information on the interviews, see Annex 1. All interviews were conducted with persons whose regular duties include communicating with the public on behalf of their organization on the selected interview topic.

electronic correspondence or through a phone interview. The phone interviews allowed the author to clarify responses and to probe the interviewees for additional information, thus allowing for more comprehensive answers. Electronic correspondence, by contrast, made it possible to reach interviewees much quicker and access those who were unable to provide a phone interview due to their present location in the field. Interviews included a standard set of research questions common to all interviews as well as additional questions that focused on interviewees' experiences. Those responding by email received the same list of questions as those having phone interviews. Interviewees were given the option to not respond to questions outside of their scope of knowledge or expertise. All interviewees were asked to approve a final version of the transcript of their interview, giving them the opportunity to add clarifying comments and to highlight sections on which they preferred to be quoted anonymously. This allowed interviewees to confirm that their responses were accurately recorded. Interviewees also had the option to review the inclusion of their responses in the thesis prior to final submission. This enabled more frank discussions. Where possible, the thesis used secondary sources to confirm the interviewees' responses. The views stated by these individuals are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of their organization.[8]

[8] The author refered to Chava Frankfort-Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*, 6 ed. (New York: Worth Publishers and St. Martin's Press, 2000). to develop the methodology for the thesis.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Conceptual Issues

Addressing the security dilemma faced by parties to the conflict is an important focus of armed groups, conflict mediators, and the international community during peace negotiations and the post-conflict phase.[9] Adversaries' troops are a key contributor to this security dilemma; reducing the size of armed groups is therefore an important component in the transition from conflict to peace. From the late 1980s onwards, this process has occurred through disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programs.[10] DDR programs are important in both reducing the chances of renewed conflict and in facilitating the transition of combatants into civilian life. Furthermore, the DDR process serves as an important long-term confidence-building measure between former adversaries.[11] Together, the components of DDR represent "a single entity that affects both the chances of peace and the chances of recreating a secure and safe environment for countries emerging from conflict."[12] It is a highly political process of negotiating power between armed groups wherein their political will is the ultimate criterion for success.[13]

What is DDR?

With the growing number of DDR programs in the post Cold-War period, the number of actors involved in DDR program design and implementation increased. As actors' gained knowledge and experiences in DDR programming, so too did their understandings of DDR and its respective parts. The definitions differed between organizations, however, leading to gaps in program design and implementation both within and across DDR programs. Recognizing the fragmented

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[9] For a discussion of the security dilemma faced by armed groups in civil wars, see Jack Snyder and Barbara Walter, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

[10] For overviews of early DDR programs, see Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, "Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combattants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda," in *African Technical Department Series* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996). Also Kees Kingma, ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts*, International Political Economy Series (Hampshire: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2000).

[11] Jeong, *Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Societies: Strategy and Process*, 45.

[12] Virginia Gamba, "Post-Agreement Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: Towards a New Approach," in *Violence and Reconstruction*, ed. John Darby (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 56.

[13] Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper No. 303 (Oxford: Oxford University Press and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).

approach to DDR, the UN initiated the drafting of the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) in 2004. The purpose was to outline "a set of policies, guidelines and procedures for UN-sponsored DDR programs in a peacekeeping context."[14] The IDDRS project sought to engage in a process of reflection among DDR partners and to develop standards reflecting their shared expertise.[15] Following a series of workshops and consultations with DDR actors of the policy, practice, government, and non-governmental spheres, the Interagency Working Group on DDR issued the final IDDRS documents in 2006.

IDDRS provides the most recent and broadly accepted definition of DDR.[16] IDDRS defines *disarmament* as,

> The collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.

The disarmament phase of DDR is understood as the first step in reducing the possibility of future outbreaks of hostilities. Disarmament programs may include incentives to combatants for turning in weapons such as cash payments or weapons-for-development schemes.[17]

The *demobilisation* phase concentrates on decreasing the numbers of participants in armed groups in order to begin their transition into civilian life. IDDRS defines it as follows:

> Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in individual centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion.

IDDRS' definition of demobilisation increases the emphasis on the discharge of individual combatants and the disbanding of entire military structures compared to

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[14] UN, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards," (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006), 1.10, 1.

[15] Mario Malanca, Phone Interview, June 1 2007.

[16] The IDDRS definitions of DDR are from the Secretary General's Note to the General Assembly on administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the UN peacekeeping operations, 24 May 2005, A/C.5/59/31. See IDDRS definitions of disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration. UN, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards," 1.10, 2.

[17] For example, Sierra Leone's DDR program included an 'Arms for Development' program. See Derek Miller, Daniel Ladouceur, and Zoe Dugal, "From Research to Roadmap: Learning from the Arms for Development Initiative in Sierra Leone," (Geneva: United Nations Institue for Disarmament Research, 2006).

earlier UN definitions of demobilisation.[18] The amassment of combatants in cantonment sites allows for their registration and for information gathering, the identification of vulnerable groups, and pre-discharge orientation.[19]

IDDRS' understanding of reinsertion is grouped elsewhere with the *reintegration* component of DDR. *Reinsertion* is defined as,

> The assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

The amount of reinsertion assistance offered to combatants varies according to criteria such as individual needs assessments, rank, and the number of years with an armed group.[20] IDDRS' definition of reinsertion marks it clearly as a short-term process, distinguishing it from a longer-term process of reintegration. Ball and Van de Goor agree that most of the activities associated with reintegration are better understood as reinsertion support that link the 'DD' aspects with the 'R' of reintegration.[21] Reintegration is defined separately by IDDRS as follows:

> Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

Other definitions of reintegration consider reinsertion activities as short-term reintegration assistance offered through DDR, to be understood separately from long-term reintegration support available through other post-conflict programs.

The presentation of DDR as a linear process with successive phases is the dominant tendency within the policy literature. It is certainly easier at a conceptual

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[18] See UN, "Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," (New York: United Nations, 2000), 2.

[19] Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and the Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 4 (2004): 507.

[20] Nathalie de Watteville, "Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs," http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp33.pdf.

[21] Nicole Ball and Luc Van de Goor, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', Conflict Research Unit, 2006), 2.

and at an operational level to approach disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration as sequential phases with distinct objectives and endpoints. In 2000, DPKO defined DDR as "a natural continuum," stating, "Where disarmament ends, demobilisation must begin and must eventually lead to reintegration."[22] DPKO's approach to DDR stands in opposition to the UN Secretary-General's rejection of DDR as a clearly defined continuum. He stated,

> The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process cannot be viewed as a simple sequence of events. Rather, these activities form a continuum whose elements overlap with one another, and are related and mutually reinforcing. The success of the process is dependent on the success of each of these steps.[23]

Further literature supports the latter approach to DDR. For example, Ball and Van de Goor argue that DDR consists of a set of programs embedded in an integrated process rather than distinct, linear activities. Berdal also notes the considerable overlap between the phases of DDR while arguing that the extent to which actors recognise this overlap during program design and implementation affects the overall success of DDR programs.[24]

Why DDR?

Individual DDR programs sometimes adopt alternative terminologies. These vary with the context in which DDR programs are implemented. Kingma notes that all stages of the DDR process have different meanings according to the context in which they are used.[25] Additional 'R's' added to DDR programs include rehabilitation, repatriation, reinsertion, resettlement, and reunification where child soldiers are present. [26] Liberia's program added an additional 'R' to emphasize the rehabilitation component of DDR, creating a disarmament, demobilisation,

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[22] UN, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines," (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Lessons Learned Unit, 2000), 5, 1, 17.

[23] ———, "Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 2.

[24] Ball and Van de Goor, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 7. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars*, 39.

[25] Kees Kingma, "Demobilization, Reintegration and Peace-Building in Southern Africa," in *Demilitarization and Peace-Building in Southern Africa*, ed. Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), 135.

[26] See Reto Rufer, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR): Conceptual Approaches, Specific Settings, Practical Experiences," in *Working Paper* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005).

rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) program. The appending of different 'R's' to the DDR process is indicative of different conceptions of the scope and purpose of DDR programs during post-conflict transitions.

The ultimate objective of DDR is to contribute to the stabilization of the security environment and to establish a peaceful post-conflict environment As such, it marks the beginning of a process of long-term transformation. Disagreement exists, however, over the extent to which DDR itself must contribute to this long-term process. The most noteworthy debate considers whether the primary purpose to address short-term security concerns or whether DDR is a program for post-conflict social transformation. The IDDRS are unclear on this point, stating the objective of DDR as follows:

> The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process.[27]

The narrowest approach to DDR argues that it is purely a short-term security project. Disarmament followed by the demobilisation of combatants becomes the primary concern. Social development is a secondary goal compared to the security objectives.[28] DPKO previously argued that a failure to immediately and effectively disarm and demobilize combatants could contribute to an immediate relapse into conflict.[29] The military-centered perspective views DDR as one of many post-conflict programs that must coordinate with parallel peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Knight and Ozerdem criticize the UN for linking demobilisation too closely with disarmament such that disarmament becomes the key strategic and political focus. They argue that a concentration on the disarmament aspect of DDR leads to little consideration for the socioeconomic needs of

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[27] UN, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards," 1.10, 1-2.
[28] Jeong, *Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Societies: Strategy and Process*, 27.
[29] UN, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines," 16.

combatants and their dependents.[30] Berdal also notes that there is no automatic relationship between disarmament and security unless it is connected to a reconciliation process.[31]

A second perspective sees DDR as a demilitarization process.[32] Batchelor notes that demilitarization is less well defined than militarization. Enloe identifies the mobilizing of civilians in support of the war effort as a process of militarization. She defines militarization as,

> A step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually becomes controlled by the military *or* comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal. Militarization, that is, involves cultural as well as institutional, ideological, and economic transformations.[33]

Through militarization, war becomes the "dominant mode of production" in society.[34] Militarization contributes to the increasing involvement of both men and women in warfare. The militarization of women is a key ingredient for that of men. Demilitarization is thus a social process of reducing societies' involvement in warfare through redirecting resources from conflict-related activities, decreasing strength of armed groups, and shifting combatants into civilian life.[35] Farr supports DDR as part of a broader demilitarization process that includes both the demilitarization of state apparatuses and the demilitarization of society.[36] The demilitarization approach to DDR understands demobilisation as the dismantling of the entire military structure

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[30] Knight and Ozerdem, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and the Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace," 506.

[31] Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars*, 24, 38.

[32] See Peter Batchelor, "The Economics of Demilitarization in Southern Africa," in *Demilitarization and Peace-Building in Southern Africa*, ed. Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma, *Concept and Processes, International Politial Economy from New Regionalisms Series* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004).

[33] Cynthia Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 3.

[34] Elise Fredrikke Barth, "Peace as Disappointment, the Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Postconflict Societies: A Comparative Study from Africa," (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2002), Ch.1.

[35] Gamba, "Post-Agreement Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: Towards a New Approach," 71, Vanessa Farr, "Paper 20: Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool," (Bonn: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2002), 9.

[36] She states, "Although initially an expensive process, in the long-term, demobilisation facilitates re-direction of economic resources once used for the maintenance of war into development initiatives." Vanessa Farr, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes: Where Do Women Stand," in *Women in an Insecure World: Violence against Women Facts, Figures and Analysis*, ed. Lea Biason and Marie Vlachova (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 197. See also Vanessa Farr, "Paper 20: Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool," (Bonn: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2002), 9 Sarah Douglas, Phone Interview, June 5 2007.

and apparatus of armed groups. This perspective argues that a failure to fully dismantle this apparatus allows chains-of-command to persist and increases the chances of a resumption of violence. A focus on demilitarization includes an increasing role for communities in DDR processes.[37]

Finally, the third perspective envisages an even greater role for DDR in post-conflict socioeconomic transformation. It views DDR as a social contract between ex-combatants and those responsible for the design and implementation of DDR programs. In disarmament and demobilisation, combatants surrender their primary means of livelihood, their weapons, and the support structure offered by armed groups.[38] The DDR process must therefore offer socioeconomic support for combatants as they integrate into civilian society. The recent IDDRS favour a more comprehensive approach to DDR going beyond disarmament to address the needs of combatants, recognising the impact of DDR on long-term development and peace. They link DDR to broader peacebuilding initiatives, thereby promoting sustainable reintegration assistance beyond immediate reinsertion support.[39] While the link between DDR and peacebuilding is evident, critics argue that DDR itself can only influence a narrow range of political and security objectives as part of the wider process of security sector reform.[40] It is not intended as a replacement for development initiatives or to guarantee the successful reintegration of combatants. Clearly, as DDR programs assume a greater role in providing long-term socioeconomic support to ex-combatants, questions arise at the operational level about the responsibilities of different implementing agencies and the mobilization of resources to support these programs.

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[37] Knight and Ozerdem, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and the Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace," 506.

[38] UN, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards," 2.10, 1, 4.

[39] Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars*, Ball and Van de Goor, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 1, 4.

[40] UN, "Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 3-4. Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," (Stockholm: Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR), 2005), 10-11, 23-24. For a discussion of security sector reform, see Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi, eds., *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Munster: Lit Verlag, 2004).

It is undoubtedly a gross simplification to suggest that these three approaches to DDR are mutually exclusive. While there is considerable overlap between them, however, each contributes to a different orientation during DDR program design and implementation. The context in which DDR programs are designed, particularly the basic framework for DDR, affects the prioritization of these different goals. Most basic frameworks for DDR programs are laid within ceasefire agreements and further anchored in peace agreements between armed groups. These include information on the size of armed groups, the responsibility of leading DDR institutions, and outline the goals of the DDR process. The development of DDR programs continues through national DDR commissions. The UN argues that programs are stronger when entrenched in a peace agreement by providing political support for peace by parties, by preventing delay in DDR, and by imposing legally binding obligations on parties.[41] Where parties are unable to agree on DDR during peace negotiations, peace agreements will include a commitment for future DDR.

[41] UN, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards," 2.10, 3.

Women and Girls in Armed Groups

Historical accounts of war stereotypically present it as a primarily male phenomenon. Women and girls have always been involved in conflict. Armed conflict is "profoundly gendered,"[42] as was females' participation in armed groups. Conflict reified their gender roles and emphasized their reproductive roles. Females' involvement with armed groups in support roles reflected their socially constructed gender roles.[43] The limited historical evidence of females' involvement in armed groups centres detail women and girls' roles as camp followers, prostitutes, and wives. They generally ignore females' more active participation in armed groups and their gender-specific experiences in conflicts.[44] The multiple and essential roles performed simultaneously by women and girls' are presented as peripheral to the core combat functions of armed groups..[45]

Recognition of females' active participation in armed groups is recent. Vlachova argues that this is in part because women's more active formal and informal roles in armed groups dates from the Second World War.[46] Figures on women's participation in armed groups range from 10% to up to one third of

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[42] D. Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 8, no. 2 (2002): 98. Gender is defined according to Mazurana et al. as follows: "Gender refers to socially constructed differences between men and women and boys and girls. Gender is about the social roles of men, women, boys, and girls and relationships between and among them. The experiences and concerns of men, women, boys, and girls before, during, and after wars and armed conflicts are shaped by their gendered social roles. These roles are in turn formed by cultural, social, economic, and political conditions, expectations, and obligations within the family, community, and nation. Because gender is not natural or biological, it varies over time and across cultures." See also Haleh Afsar, "Women and Wars: Some Trajectories Towards a Feminist Peace," in *Development, Women, and War: Feminist Perspectives* ed. Haleh Afsar and Deborah Eade, *A Development Practice Reader* (Oxford: Oxfam, 2004).

[43] Cynthia Cockburn, "The Gendered Dynamics of Conflict and Political Violence," in *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, ed. Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark (London: Zed Books, 2001), 20-21.

[44] Joshua S. Goldstein, *War and Gender. How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, 36. See also Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, 40.

[45] Sheila Meintjes, "War and Post-War Shifts in Gender Relations," in *The Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict Transformation*, ed. Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay, and Meredeth Turshen (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 64.

[46] Marie Vlachova, "Female Combatants: Dilution of Gender Barriers in Times of War," in *Women in an Insecure World: Violence against Women. Facts, Figures and Analysis*, ed. Marie Vlachova and Lea Biason (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 135.

combatants.[47] Women played an active role in multiple conflicts and civil wars, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau South Africa, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Algeria, and Liberia.[48] Women and girls' involvement in armed groups challenges the traditional portrayal of their participation in conflict, in particular their experience as being primarily one of victimization.[49] Females' demonstrated capability "to learn the skill to kill" undermines the assumption that women are inherently more peaceful in conflict settings.[50]

International recognition of the girls presence in armed groups is even more recent than that of women. With the emergence of the child soldiering phenomenon, it was believed that child soldiers were boys. Girls' participation was largely invisible. International actors assumed that girls' involvement occurred as camp followers and victims of sexual abuse in a minority of conflicts. Mazurana et al. note that the majority of international reports on child soldiers use the term "child soldier" to mean boys.[51] Denov and Maclure make a similar point, arguing that reports tend to "pathologize" child soldiers, presenting the term "child soldier" in gender-neutral or masculine terms without considering its gendered dimensions.[52] Systematic discussion of girls' roles and recruitment developed slowly.[53]

There are no accurate figures on the number of girls participating in armed groups. Of the estimated 300,000 child soldiers worldwide, it is currently estimated that 120,000 (40%) of these are girls. Between 1990 and 2003, girls were present in

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[47] Tsjeard Bouta, "Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Building Blocks for Dutch Policy," (The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael", 2005), 5.

[48] Barth, "Peace as Disappointment, the Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Postconflict Societies: A Comparative Study from Africa," Ch. 3. Michael Wessells, *Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 85.

[49] Vlachova, "Female Combatants: Dilution of Gender Barriers in Times of War," 136.

[50] Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay, and Meredeth Turshen, "There Is No Aftermath for Women," in *The Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict Transformation*, ed. Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay, and Meredeth Turshen (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 7. Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development*, 11. Rachel Brett, "Girl Soldiers: Challenging the Assumptions," ed. Quaker United Nations Office (New York: Child Soldiers Newsletter, 2002).

[51] Myriam Denov and Richard Maclure, "Engaging the Voices of Girls in the Aftermath of Sierra Leone's Conflict: Experiences and Perspectives in a Culture of Violence," *Anthropologica* 48 (2006): 74.

[52] D. Mazurana and Susan McKay, *Women and Peacebuilding*, Essays on Human Rights and Democratic Development, No. 8 (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 1999), 4.

[53] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 18, 21.

the fighting groups of 55 countries, including in government forces, paramilitary and militia forces, and armed opposition groups. They were involved in armed conflicts in 38 of these countries, all of which were internal conflicts.[54] The majority of these child soldiers are adolescents.[55] The lower figures for girls in armed groups may be due to a lack of information on their participation or due to lower participation stemming from local socialization that girls are not meant to engage in violence activities.[56]

Reasons for females' involvement in armed groups vary according to individual-specific factors and the profiles of armed groups. Armed groups rely on both incentives and coercion to secure females' participation. Brett argues that it is possible to separate explanations for females' participation into situations where they are abducted and those where they joined "voluntarily."[57] Mazurana et al. contest the idea that women and girls' join armed groups voluntarily, stating, "Many girls' options are already so limited that the idea that they freely make this choice is doubtful."[58] For example, females raped by members of armed groups often encounter community stigma that drives them to join armed groups.

In a militarized society, a certain extent of women and girls' involvement with armed groups, whether direct or indirect, is inevitable. Brett and Specht argue that environmental factors such as militarization are insufficient to fully explain females' voluntary participation in armed groups. They argue that both environmental and contextual factors prompt child soldiers to volunteer with armed groups, including violence from war, poverty, access to education and its relevance for employment, employment opportunities, the influence of family and friends, the politics and ideology of armed groups, the features of adolescence, and the influence of culture and tradition. They also point out gender-specific factors for girls such as

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[54] Matt Hobson, "Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict," (London: Save the Children, 2005), 1.

[55] Graça Machel, "Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/157," (New York: United Nations, 1996). Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, *Young Soldiers. Why They Choose to Fight* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 87.

[56] Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 100.

[57] Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 109.

[58] Brett and Specht, *Young Soldiers. Why They Choose to Fight*, 9-38, 85-104.

domestic abuse and exploitation, their vulnerability to abuse during conflict, and a desire to assert gender equality.[59]

Armed groups may dilute gender barriers and champion women's rights to garner the support and involvement of females.[60] Vlachova argues that women's participation plays an important propaganda function for rebel groups by serving as "a vivid reminder of the emancipating intentions of future political leaders."[61] The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) provides one example. Although Eritrea is traditionally a patriarchal society, the EPLF recognised the eventual need to mobilize women to support the country's development. It therefore sought to maximize their participation in the conflict and to promote gender equality within its ranks.[62] In Mozambique, the perception that women were easier to discipline and to train contributed to the use of gender equality rhetoric by armed groups to mobilize support.[63] Bouta, Frerks and Bannon argue that there is a tendency towards greater gender equality within armed groups espousing gendered political ideologies; however, they note that these cases are offset by conflicts in which girls are subject to sexual slavery.[64] Cockburn also challenges the concept that women gain gender equality through participating in conflict.[65] Enloe describes appeals to females on the basis of gender equality a "cruel hoax" whereby the armed groups remain ideologically and physically dominated by men.[66]

Women and girls often become involved involuntarily with armed groups through abduction, being born into armed groups, and forced recruitment. Abduction occurred in 27 of the 38 conflicts in which girls participated between 1990 and 2003.[67] Abduction occurs both within countries and across borders by

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[59] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 22. See also Afsar, "Women and Wars: Some Trajectories Towards a Feminist Peace," 45.
[60] Vlachova, "Female Combatants: Dilution of Gender Barriers in Times of War," 136.
[61] Barth, "Peace as Disappointment, the Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Postconflict Societies: A Comparative Study from Africa," Ch.3. See also Amanuel Mehreteab, *Wake up, Hanna! Reintegration and Reconstruction Challenges for Post-War Eritrea* (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 2004), 152.
[62] Barth, "Peace as Disappointment, the Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Postconflict Societies: A Comparative Study from Africa."
[63] Bouta et al do not specify which armed groups in Mozambique adopted this attitude. Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development*, 16. Amanuel Mehreteab, Phone Interview, June 6 2007.
[64] Cockburn, "The Gendered Dynamics of Conflict and Political Violence," 21.
[65] Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, 48.
[66] Brett, "Girl Soldiers: Challenging the Assumptions."
[67] Caroline O. N. Moser, "The Gendered Continuum of Violence and Conflict," in *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, ed. Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark

armed opposition groups and government forces. Turshen describes abduction as "perhaps the crudest form of asset transfer in civil war, in this case women's productive labour."[68] Abduction commodifies women and girls' bodies and labour into objects that are sought and controlled.[69]

Upon entry into armed groups, women and girls perform a number of different roles. Bouta classifies females' roles into four categories: combatants, supporters, abductees, and as wives or dependents.[70] There is considerable overlap between these categories. Wessells describes females roles as "fluid, multiple, and overlapping."[71] Bernard et al. point out significant variation in the roles of women and girls according to their ages and mode of entry into armed groups, particularly with regard to the level of sexual exploitation.[72] Brett also observes a strong correlation between recruitment through abduction and the level of sexual abuse experienced by females.[73]

The rate of females' participation as combatants varies greatly. Where groups include gender equality in their political ideology, women may play a more active combat role. In Eritrea, the EPLF integrated women into all political organizations and combat units. By contrast, this did not occur in Mozambique. Women may receive combat training equal to that of men; however, they are rarely promoted to high commanding positions.[74] They are often forced to adopt 'male characteristics'

(London: Zed Books, 2001), Meredeth Turshen, "The Political Economy of Rape: An Analysis of Systematic Rape and Sexual Abuse During Armed Conflict in Africa," in *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, ed. Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark (London: Zed Books, 2001), 61.

[68] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 26.

[69] Bouta, "Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Building Blocks for Dutch Policy," 7-9.

[70] Belinda Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration," (Bethesda: Development Alternatives, Inc. , 2003), 13-14.

[71] Wessells, *Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection*, 97. See also Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 111.

[72] Vlachova, "Female Combatants: Dilution of Gender Barriers in Times of War."

[73] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 23.

[74] Linda Etchart and Rawwida Baksh, "Applying a Gender Lens to Armed Conflict, Violence, and Conflict Transformation," in *Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace*, ed. Rawwida Baksh, et al., *New Gender Mainstreaming Series on Development Issues* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005), 16.

to be recognised as a combatant.[75] All-female combat units are a relatively rare phenomenon. Women and girls' involvement in mixed-gender units is much more common. They played a crucial role in mixed-units in groups such as the Yugoslavia National Liberation Army, the Vietnamese People's Liberation Armed Forces, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, and the African National Congress.[76]

Many receive basic combat and weapons training upon entry into armed groups; however, the majority act in supporting roles. They serve as sexual slaves, gatherers, cooks, porters, looters, child keepers, spies, and informants, and messengers.[77] Goldstein suggests females are confined to support roles because their labour "keeps the war machine running."[78] Women in these roles are frequently described as 'camp followers.' Enloe rejects the use of this term as it implies a "parasitic" relationship with armed groups that disguises the centrality of women and girls' roles for the functioning of these groups.[79] Farr also argues that women "supply the essentials of war: information, food, clothing and shelter."[80]

Women and girls may be allocated to commanders or combatants as 'wives.' This often occurs without relinquishing their support roles. Females abducted to fill support roles may seek a 'husband' themselves to access the greater protection and benefits yielded by a 'bush marriage.' Such women fall into the categories of supporters, abductees, and wives simultaneously. Efforts by women to combine roles should not overshadow the persisting inequality in gender relations in armed groups.[81] Wives of commanders and combatants may also be excused from performing support roles within armed groups. Some do not move with the armed groups. These women and their children who do not fill support roles qualify as dependents.

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[75] Goldstein, *War and Gender. How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*, 77.
[76] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 24.
[77] Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, 37-38.
[78] Goldstein, *War and Gender. How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*, 380.
[79] Enloe explains, "the idea of the woman-as-camp-follower can become publicly salient whenever authorities imagine women impoverished by war to be strategizing to survive by creating some sort of relationship with men as soldiers."
[80] Farr, "Paper 20: Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool," 6.
[81] Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, 39.

Women and Girls in DDR programs: Policies and practice

International Policies on Women and Girls in DDR

International acknowledgement of the specific impact of conflict on women occurred slowly. The Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality points out that it took "several decades to develop a strong normative framework and strengthened operational policies and procedures and make the UN system increasingly responsive to the needs and priorities of women and girls in countries in conflict." [82] Recognition of females' participation in armed groups and their post-conflict needs followed the increasing attention paid to gender and conflict.[83] The adoption of the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* in 1979 was a "milestone" in women's rights; however, it did not address the subject of women in conflict.[84] The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) recognised women's gender-specific experiences in conflict. It devoted a full chapter to women and conflict, including a comprehensive action plan for their protection and empowerment in conflict settings.[85] While the Beijing Platform did not explicitly mention DDR, it did call on the international community to better address women's needs in conflict and post-conflict settings and for their inclusion in conflict resolution at decision-making levels.[86]

On October 31, 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325, known as *Women, Peace and Security*, following a series of international workshops, conferences and campaigns led by civil society for a commitment to protecting women's rights in conflict. Resolution 1325 was "the first

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[82] UN, "From the Charter to Resolution 1325," www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/history.html. Lea Biason and Marie Blachoud, "Executive Summary," in *Women in an Insecure World. Violence against Women: Facots, Figures and Analysis.* , ed. Marie Vlachoha and Lea Biason (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 5.

[83] See Emily Schroeder, "A Window of Opportunity in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Incorporating a Gender Perspective in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Process," *Conflict and Development* 5 (2004), http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/Other/windowdrc.pdf.for a good outline of international policy developments related to gender-sensitive DDR programming.

[84] UN, "The Unted Nations Fourth World Conference on Women Platform for Action, Women and Armed Conflict," United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/armed.htm.

[85] Vanessa Farr, "The Importance of a Gender Perspective to Successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Processes," *Disarmament Forum* 4 (2003).

[86] Reem Bahdi, "Security Council Resolution 1325: Practice and Prospects," *Refuge* 21, no. 2 (2003): 41.

time the issue of conflict's specific impacts on and the importance of considering women in all aspects of the decision-making and peace process"[87] was formally acknowledged and made into a legally binding document by the Security Council. Schroeder credits Resolution 1325 with providing "a new momentum on the inclusion of gender perspectives in international peace and security work."[88] Resolution 1325 calls for specific actions to ensure the protection of women in armed conflict. Specifically, it calls for,

> (1) The participation of women in peace processes; (2) gender training in peacekeeping operations; (3) protection of women and girls and respect for their rights; and (4) gender mainstreaming in the reporting and implementation systems of the United Nations in relation to conflict, peace and security.[89]

Farr credits Resolution 1325 with placing women firmly on the agenda of DDR planning and implementation by highlighting the specific needs of women and asserting the dynamic nature of gender roles. Furthermore, it highlighted the continuing gender deficit in DDR processes.[90]

Awareness of women's importance in the DDR processes gradually developed among international actors involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Initial efforts to include women in DDR, however, failed to recognise the multiplicity of their roles in armed groups. They focused on the role of civilian women as strategic partners in pressuring male combatants to participate in DDR programs and in providing information about armed groups and weapons caches. Farr questions whether the focus on civilian women was empowering given that attention paid to women was due to their relationship to male combatants while failing to recognise them as active participants in armed groups. [91] As knowledge of

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[87] Sheri Gibbings, Isabelle Solon-Helal, and Chantale Walker, *Canadian Perspectives on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security*, ed. Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group (Ottawa: Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, 2004), 2.

[88] Emily Schroeder, "Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Gender Desk Study," (Washington: World Bank, 2005).

[89]Kristin Valasek, "What Is Security Council Resolution 1325?," International Action Nework on Small Arms, http://www.iansa.org/women/bulletin8/what-is-1325.htm, UNIFEM, "Security Council Resolution 1325: Annotated and Explained," United Nations Development Fund for Women, http://www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/Annotated_1325.pdf. See also Farr, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes: Where Do Women Stand," 197.

[90] Farr, "The Importance of a Gender Perspective to Successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Processes," 27. UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 3.

[91] Farr, "The Importance of a Gender Perspective to Successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Processes," 29. Farr also notes that a focus on women as partners in DDR without

the women's engagement in armed groups expanded through the 1990s, international agencies devoted increasing attention to addressing their gender-specific needs in DDR.

DPKO released the *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines* in 2000. The document recognised the importance of addressing the needs of special target groups, including women and girls, during the design and implementation of DDR programs. It did not outline, however, the special considerations to be given to women and girls' until a brief reference in the concluding paragraphs.[92] Even then, it focused on their needs during the reintegration phase rather than obstacles to their participation in DDR. Provisions for dependents, widows, and wives of combatants remain vague. Furthermore, the principles clearly stated that entrants unable to surrender weapons and unable to prove combatant status should not be accepted into DDR. Although it noted that child-conscious DDR programs should accept girl child soldiers regardless of their ability to provide a weapon, it did not include equivalent provisions for women.[93] The DPKO document exemplifies the difficulties in incorporating gender into DDR at the policy level. Farr states,

> While it does make an effort to "engender" its work by referring to both male and female soldiers, it epitomizes an "add women and stir" approach since the authors have not examined, with enough care, the practical challenges that might arise when their strategies are applied to women soldiers.[94]

Although reference to women and girls' as special target groups demonstrates gender-awareness at the policy level, this does not necessarily translate into gender-sensitivity in DDR programs at the operational level.

In 2001, the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) produced *Briefing Notes: Gender Perspectives on Disarmament, Demobilization and*

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including them in this process assumes that these women will not participate in the smuggling or storage of weapons. Farr, "Paper 20: Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool," 20. Noeleen Heyzer, "Gender, Peace and Disarmament. Women, Men, Peace and Security," *Disarmament Forum*, no. 4 (2003), http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1993.pdf. See also Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration," 10.

[92] UN, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines," 51.

[93] Farr, "Paper 20: Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool," 22.

[94] Agnes Marcaillou, "The Gender Action Plan for the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs," *Disarmament Forum*, no. 4 (2003): 47.

Reintegration. These emphasized the relationship between gender and disarmament.[95] The *Briefing Notes* called for recognition of the different experiences of women in conflict and for the construction of DDR programs "that respond to the actual (rather than assumed) needs of all those involved."[96] They also recognised females' unequal ability to access DDR programs. To address these gender gaps, UNDDA recommended paying special attention to gender during program design and implementation with regard to eligibility, target group consultations, service provision, timeframe, local capacities and organizations, and the context of DDR.

UNDDA's *Briefing Notes* led to the development of the 2003 *Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan*. UNDDA again highlighted how the inclusion of a gender perspective would improve the DDR process and overall security. Marcaillou argues that UNDDA's work was crucial "to identify potential synergies and opportunities to support simultaneously effective disarmament and greater gender equality."[97] The Action Plan aimed to strengthen the incorporation of gender perspectives by improving UNDDA's internal capacity to address gender, engaging in outreach and gender advocacy, and supporting the equitable participation of women and men in disarmament discussions.[98] It argued for the need to ask both how and why gender matters rather than creating a specific "women's issues" program components.[99] It detailed the steps to mainstreaming gender in DDR through the definition of combatants, eligibility criteria, security, and the family and community dimensions of DDR.

There is a marked difference between the number and substance of provisions for women and girls in DDR at the policy level. Specific policies on girls in DDR emerged much earlier than policies on women. Among most significant of these policy-documents are the *Cape Town Principles* (1997), the *International Labour Organization Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour* (1999), the *Optional*

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[95] UNDDA, "Briefing Notes: Gender Perspectives on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)," (2001), 1.
[96] Marcaillou, "The Gender Action Plan for the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs," 49.
[97] Ibid.
[98] UNDDA, "Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan," (Geneva: United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 2003), 16.
[99] UN, "Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Hcildren in Armed Conflict," Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, http://www.un.org/children/conflict/keydocuments/english/crcoptionalproto19.html.

Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement in Armed Conflict (2000), and the *Paris Principles* (2007). Convention 182 and the Optional Protocol both establish 18 years as the legal age for the recruitment of children into armed groups and their direct participation in armed conflict.[100] The Optional Protocol raised the minimum age level from 15 as outlined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It entered into force in 2002.

The Cape Town Principles and the Paris Principles are much more in depth in their discussion of child soldiers. In 1997, the international community agreed on a common set of principles for child soldiers at an international conference by the United Nations Fund for Children (UNICEF) and the Non-governmental organization (NGO) Working Group on the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This led to *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa*. They define a child soldier as follows:

> 'Child Soldier' in this document is any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.[101]

These principles lay out a series of recommendations for children throughout the DDR process. The Cape Town Principles represented the first internationally accepted framework for addressing girls' needs in DDR programs. The Principles did not include concrete recommendations to ensure that girls' needs were addressed in practice. They do not address the gendered obstacles to accessing DDR. The Cape Town Principles also state that reunification is "the principle factor in effective social

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[100] ———, "International Labour Organization Convention 182. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour," Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, http://www.un.org/children/conflict/keydocuments/english/iloconvention1828.html. UNICEF, "Cape Town Principles and Best Practices Adopted at the Symposium on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa" (Cape Town, April 27-30 1997).

[101] UNICEF, "Cape Town Principles and Best Practices Adopted at the Symposium on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa".

reintegration" without recognising the gender-specific stigma faced by girls during reunification.[102]

In February 2007, the international community met in Paris to update the Cape Town Principles and to broaden their geographic scope. The *Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment of Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups* confirmed 18 as the age for participation in armed groups. They reiterated the Cape Town Principles' definition of a child soldier. Importantly, the Paris Commitments demonstrated greater gender-sensitivity. The Commitments recognise the invisibility of girls in DDR programs. They call for gender-sensitive procedures at each stage of the DDR process. Le Rutte reports that there was a significant discussion during the drafting of the Paris Commitments over whether the needs of girls in DDR should be completely integrated throughout the document or whether a separate section was necessary. He notes that the inclination among members of the working group on girls was to include girls' needs as much as possible.[103] In the final document, a brief section on girls outlines their needs in each part of the child soldiering process to ensure the full involvement and inclusion of girls in DDR programming, including the needs of "bush wives," child mothers, and girls born into armed groups. This section also highlights the stigma faced by girls in accessing DDR and the consequent importance of their participation in program development. [104]

Women and Girls' Absence from DDR Programs

The policies developed by international agencies to address the gender-specific needs of women and girls did not translate into dramatic improvements in females' participation in DDR. A significant gap emerged between DDR policies and DDR operations. Women and girls' continued to be largely absent during the implementation of DDR programs. Their participation rates did not match their presence in armed groups. Their exclusion reflected a broader trend of women's

[102] Ibid.
[103] Mathijs Le Rutte, Phone Interview, May 23 2007.
[104] UNICEF, "Paris Commitments. Consolidated Version. The Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups" (paper presented at the Free Children from War, Paris, February 5-6 2007).

marginalization throughout the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction phase.[105]

Women and girls' absence from DDR programs spawned an impressive canon of literature over the past decade reviewing DDR programs at the operational level. This literature built on past programs to provide guidelines based on best practices for future DDR programs. Gender advocates highlighted the importance of addressing gender in all stages of DDR, including recommendations on topics such as specific information campaigns and communication strategies for females, recommendations for females' needs, and the specific services for women.[106]

The best practices literature sparked a debate over the dangers of marginalizing females in DDR programming, in particular with regard to those with children. Humphreys and Weinstein challenge the assumption that combatants' post-conflict acceptance into their community depends on their participation in DDR. Their research in Sierra Leone suggests that acceptance depends on the abusiveness of the unit in which combatants participated.[107] They find little empirical evidence that women and girls face significantly more difficulties during post-conflict reintegration. They criticize the "growing chorus" calling for the targeting of women and girls in DDR.[108] Gender advocates such as Farr strongly disagree with this position. Farr argues that the community isolation faced by females excluded from DDR threatens long-term community security by making their children more vulnerable to future recruitment and abduction into armed groups.[109] Bernard et al. attribute the increasing attention to females in DDR to a growing international recognition of the importance of their participation in achieving demilitarization and

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[105] For a discussion of women's marginalization in post-conflict reconstruction, see Sorensen, "Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources."

[106] A full overview of the recommendations for addressing women's needs in DDR programs is beyond the scope of the current work. For more information, see Nathalie de Watteville, "Demobilization and Reintegration Programs: Addressing Gender Issues," *Findings*, no. 227 (2003). de Watteville, "Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs." UNIFEM, "Gender-Aware Disarmement, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): A Checklist," (New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2003).

[107] Macartan Humpheys and Jeremy Weinstein, "Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration," (Centre for Global Development, 2005).

[108] Ibid., 4, 22.

[109] Farr, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes: Where Do Women Stand," 200.

development.[110] Bouta notes that females' inclusion in DDR is necessary to combat the impression that DDR rewards combatants with weapons.[111]

The best practices literature on gender and DDR identifies women and girls as particularly vulnerable groups in DDR programming whose gender-specific needs are sidelined by DDR's focus on short-term security. The literature identifies the following factors as contributing to the marginalization of females during DDR:

Table 1. Factors affecting females' participation in DDR programs[112]

Absence of women and girls in DDR program design	Armed groups denying or underreporting presence of women or girls	Inadequate provisions for child care in DDR programs
Definitions of 'combatant'	Incomplete information on number of females leading to underestimation	Dependency on commanders
Eligibility criteria, i.e. weapon to enter DDR program	Refusal by commanders to allow them to participate	Lack of gender perspective in DDR camps
DDR focus on short-term security	Perceived insecurity at demobilisation centres for females and for their children	Loyalties to male commanders or "husbands"
Resource constraints	Lack of information about DDR process	Gaps in monitoring and evaluation
Self-demobilisation or "spontaneous reintegration"	Inaccessibility of DDR programs	Fear of stigmatization

The best practices literature on women and DDR falls into two categories. The first creates a series of policy guidelines based on a review of existing DDR programs. This category of literature highlights the multiplicity of factors influencing females'

[110] UN, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines," 10, 27, 90-91.

[111] Bouta, "Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Building Blocks for Dutch Policy," 13.

[112] Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development*, Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration.", de Watteville, "Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs.", McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, MDRP, "Workshop Report" (paper presented at the Taking a Gender Perspective to Strengthen the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes Region, Kigali, Rwanda, October 31-November 2 2005), UN/OSAA, "Issue Paper: Children and Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups," in *Second International Confernece on DDR and Stability in Africa* (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo: United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), 2007), Irma Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia " (Geneva: International Labor Office, 2006), STC, "Girls Formerly Associated with Armed Gorups and Armed Forces Who Did Not Go through Formal Demobilisation: Save the Children Uk's Experience in West Africa," (London: Save the Children, 2005), Farr, "Paper 20: Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool." Heyzer, "Gender, Peace and Disarmament. Women, Men, Peace and Security." UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.", Brett and Specht, *Young Soldiers. Why They Choose to Fight*, 99-100.

participation in DDR. In doing so, it creates important programming tools for practioners through checklists for creating female's marginalization at the operational level.

Creating a list of factors without further exploring the origins of these phenomena limits the analytical utility of this category of literature. It makes it difficult to weigh the relative importance of these factors for understanding obstacles to females' participation in DDR. Having a hierarchy of these factors is vital in determining why females are marginalized despite the widespread recognition of the need for gender-sensitivity in DDR. Such knowledge is important given the limited resources and time constraints affecting DDR program design and implementation. It is particularly important that efforts to improve women and girls' access to DDR programs focus on the primary sources of their absence. Without a hierarchy of factors, policies to address females' marginalization risk being diffuse and ineffective as the number of factors apparently requiring simultaneous attention overwhelms policy-makers and practioners.

A second major weakness of the best practices policy literature is the absence of comprehensive cross-country analyses. Such discussions are necessary to highlight the influence of context on the relative importance of the factors affecting females' participation in DDR. The influence of 'loyalties to commanders,' for instance, may only play a role in affecting females' participation where recruitment occurred on a voluntary basis or where females did not experience sexual abuse. Conversely, it may be that females are most loyal to commanders where they face sexual abuse due to the stigma they would face upon return to civilian communities. Cross-country analysis of these factors is important in improving the international community's collective knowledge, especially given its role in providing technical support to national DDR commissions in based on previous DDR experiences.

Some notable exceptions to these criticisms exist. In *Where are the girls?*, McKay and Mazurana provide a comprehensive discussion of the DDR programs in Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique and outline the factors affecting girls' participation in DDR. They highlight a lack of awareness of the situation of girls among implementing actors one of the primary factors. Their work concludes by outlining policy recommendations for DDR actors; however, it does not specify the

relative importance of these recommendations for improving women and girls' participation.[113]

UNIFEM's *Getting it Right, Doing it Right* provides another cross-country discussion of gender in DDR programs in Liberia and Papua New Guinea. The document argues that gender-specific provisions must be improved during DDR planning process. UNIFEM highlights the narrow definition of combatants, the lack of gender-disaggregated data, the absence of gender experts, poor program design, and resource constraints as sources of females' marginalization. It does not, however, specify the causal relationships between these factors and the participation of females in DDR. The document also fails to consistently discuss these factors in the case studies. It highlights budgetary constraints as a key variable affecting females' participation in DDR, but does not actually discuss resource allocation in the case studies. It also does not specify the relationship between budgetary constraints and target numbers for women's participation in DDR.[114]

The second category of best practices literature discusses the broader themes affecting females' participation in DDR. Farr suggests that the lack of gender awareness in DDR stems from the lack of women's substantive engagement in the peace negotiations that establish the framework for DDR. Women are often denied leadership roles and forced into traditional gender roles in post-conflict setting by men trying to demonstrate their control.[115] She notes a tendency to limit women's participation in decision-making to the reintegration dimension of DDR.[116] Bouta, Frerks and Bannon reiterate Farr's argument. They suggest that women's more substantive involvement in peace negotiations will affect the presence of gender issues on the agenda. They note, however, that women's presence in negotiations does not guarantee a discussion of gender equality.[117]

While the best practices literature has obvious limitations, we must credit it with playing a crucial role in prompting greater awareness of the marginalization of

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[113] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*.
[114] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration."
[115] Farr, "Paper 20: Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool," 16.
[116] ———, "The Importance of a Gender Perspective to Successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Processes," 30.
[117] Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development*, 49, 53.

females in DDR. DPKO tapped into this growing literature during IDDRS' drafting to develop an integrated approach to gender and DDR. In bringing together the expertise of other agencies and organizations involved in DDR, the IDDRS process sought to address the sources of females' absence from DDR and to outline policy recommendations to prevent their future neglect. Douglas notes that UNIFEM played a key role in pushing for the effective integration of gender and women's issues into the IDDRS process based on its previous research for *Getting it Right, Doing it Right.*[118]

Gender advocates hail the final IDDRS document as "one of the most gender-sensitive documents in the UN."[119] It remains the most agreed upon standards for women and girls associated with armed groups in DDR. IDDRS includes separate sections on children, youth, and women, with the first two sections making specific reference to the needs of girls in DDR. It integrates gender concerns throughout the document to avoid relegating "women's issues" to a separate chapter that risks being overlooked by DDR actors.

The IDDRS sections on children, youth, and women include critical discussions of the absence of women and girls from DDR programs. They outline reasons for this exclusion at the level of armed groups and at the level of implementing agencies. The IDDRS section on children adopts the Cape Town Principles definition of a child soldier. This section includes a discussion of girls aiming to combat their "invisibility" in DDR. It concentrates, however, on addressing girls' needs throughout the DDR process instead of obstacles to their access. The section stands out in its recognition of girl mothers in DDR, a first at the level of international DDR policy.[120]

IDDRS is the first internationally accepted policy document to include a separate section identifying the specific needs of youth. This reflected recognition among IDDRS drafters that adolescents were particularly marginalized in earlier DDR programs.[121] The section recognises that youth often fall between the legal categories of DDR programs. It notes that DDR programs do not serve adolescent

[118] Douglas.
[119] Ibid.
[120] UN, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards," 5.30, 9-14.
[121] Malanca.

girls where leading actors treat DDR as purely a security-oriented program. The youth section includes a section on the needs of young women. It argues that young women who self-demobilised must be eligible for DDR programs. The section calls for a greater analysis of reasons for young women's exclusion from DDR programs.[122]

The IDDRS section on women outlines their gender-specific needs in DDR.[123] IDDRS' definition of female combatants and eligibility criteria for DDR is perhaps its most significant contribution. IDDRS recasts the definition of female combatants. It adopts the term 'females associated with armed forces and groups' (FAAFG) to include both women and girls, defining it as follows:

> Women and girls who participated in armed conflicts in supportive roles, whether by force or voluntarily. Rather than being members of a civilian community, they are economically and socially dependent on the armed force or group for their income and social support (examples: porter, cook, nurse, spy, administrator, translator, radio operator, medical assistant, public information officer, camp leader, sex worker/slave).[124]

The section on women separates the concept of FAAFG from female combatants and female dependents, who are socially and financially dependent on ex-combatants. It makes a significant contribution to current discussions of gender and DDR by identifying factors influencing women's marginalization at each phase of DDR programs; however, it remains a policy-oriented document in which analysis of the origins of these factors and their relative importance is limited. In examining the factors affecting females' participation at each phase of the DDR process, it fails to move beyond the listing mentality that dominates the policy literature.

The section suggests that women who fought briefly for armed groups and have since reintegrated into their communities are unlikely to come forward for DDR and should not necessarily be encouraged to do so.[125] This position sits in uneasy opposition to the best practices literature that highlights the importance of including women who self-demobilised. Moreover, it is difficult to determine if women who were briefly with armed groups and who have self-demobilised have in

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[122] UN, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards," 5.20, 19-22.
[123] This includes a discussion of their needs during the negotiations, pre-program assessment, demobilisation, transitional support, assembly, cantonment, disarmament, resettlement, social reintegration, and economic reintegration.
[124] UN, "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards," 5.10, 8-9.
[125] Ibid., 5.10, 2.

fact reintegrated into their communities. The section includes a DDR gender checklist for policy makers; however, it is lacking in many concrete recommendations. For example, it calls for dedicating "sufficient resources" to gender issues in DDR budgets, but does not specify how to determine the appropriate level of resources.[126]

Theoretical Framework

The thesis considers the influence of five phenomena on the marginalization of FAAFG in DDR. The first factor considers the influence of peace agreements on the structure and content of DDR programs and the participation of women and girls. Where peace agreements establish a broader approach to DDR programming as their primary goal, attention to FAAFG is likely to increase. It also considers the influence of women's inclusion in peace negotiations on the gender-sensitivity of DDR programs. If peace negotiations include female representatives, the basic framework of DDR programs will be more gender-sensitive.

The second factor is the definition of 'combatant' and the eligibility criteria for accessing DDR in the final DDR framework. More expansive definitions of 'combatant' that include those in supporting roles in armed groups will have a positive impact women's inclusion in DDR. This factor considers the different accepted definitions of 'combatant' for women and girls. Girls' inclusion in DDR programs is expected to be greater than that of women. The variable also considers the impact of eligibility criteria on women and girls' access to DDR programs. If handing in a weapon is necessary to accessing DDR, FAAFG will be more marginalized. Conversely, unclear eligibility criteria may also translate into a greater marginalization of FAAFG.

The third factor is institutional responsibility for DDR program design and implementation. As a multidimensional, multi-actor process, DDR involves a number of actors each with their own institutional priorities and gender-expertise. A complete review all DDR actors is not possible. Instead, it considers the role of national commissions, UN peacekeeping missions, and UNICEF as lead actors

[126] Ibid., 5.10, 37. Malanca advises caution in advancing this criticism of IDDRS given the many challenges associated with developing generalized benchmarks given the specificities of each conflict and the DDR process. Malanca.

whose actions influence both women and girls' different inclusion in DDR. Where lead actors lack clear gender mandates, FAAFG are expected to be less included in DDR programs. Where multiple actors are competing for limited resources for DDR, provisions for FAAFG are expected to be greater in number but to not necessarily translate into greater inclusion in DDR programs. Finally, organizations facing budgetary constraints are likely to include women and girls in DDR less.

The fourth factor is the implementation of DDR programs. This examines the impact of gender-sensitivity in DDR programming on the participation of FAAFG in DDR. It considers factors such as the length of different phases of the DDR program, information distribution about DDR, and provisions for females in service delivery. Greater gender-sensitivity is expected to yield greater participation of FAAFG.

Finally, the fifth factor considers the agency of target populations, notably of commanders and FAAFG in the DDR programs. This considers the agency of commanders and FAAFG and the incorporation of their views in the design and ongoing development of DDR programs. It also considers the agency of FAAFG in their decision-making about participation in DDR. If DDR designers and implementing actors recognise a greater degree of agency for FAAFG, they will be better able to tailor programs to meet the needs of females and thus increase their participation.

The overlapping nature of these variables makes the identification of direct causal relationships between these factors and females' absence from DDR difficult beyond a simple correlation. This is particularly true given the number of intervening factors and the inability to test each factor independently from one other. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias note that conceptual frameworks that derive explanations from empirical phenomena rely on highly interrelated categories or factors. The inter-relatedness of these factors reflects the complex nature of the reality that they seek to explain.[127] DDR programs are complex processes with multiple interrelated dimensions that render the complete separation of these factors impossible. The difficulties in this task, however, should not prevent its undertaking. The factors are defined such that their interrelatedness is separated as much as possible to determine

[127] Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*, 35.

their relative importance. The factors may also be criticized for being path dependent. It is important to recall, however, that DDR processes are dynamic, continually evolving processes. A DDR program with narrow initial goals may yet develop into a gender-sensitive DDR program.

The limits of the best practices literature and the existing policies on women in DDR programs point to a clear need for a deeper analysis of women and girls' marginalization in DDR. The thesis argues that a comprehensive explanation must draw a cross-country comparison of females' inclusion in DDR programs. This analysis must consider both structural factors and individual agency-related factors. While it is not fully possible to attribute women and girls' absence from DDR to one side of the structure-agent debate, it is important to consider the factors on each side to fully grasp the reasons for their marginalization. An analytical treatment of the agency element is largely absent in previous studies.

An explanation of females' absence from DDR must not reiterate existing policy checklists. Rather, it demands a greater engagement with DDR programs to understand the numerous factors accounting for FAAFG marginalization. The thesis thus subsumes the current policy discussions of females' inclusion in DDR programs. This is necessary to determine the primary factors contributing to females' absence from DDR and to not recreate existing policy checklists of gender and DDR. Stated in other terms, the thesis seeks to be analytically prior to existing policy guidelines. It combines macros-level structural factors with micro-level agency factors to develop an integrated explanation for women and girls' persistent absence from DDR.

Women and Girls in DDR Programs in Comparative Perspective

This section compares the influence of the DDR in peace agreements, the definitions of combatants and eligibility criteria, institutional responsibility for DDR, the implementation of DDR, and the agency of target populations on FAAFGs' marginalization in DDR programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Sudan. While these conflicts are extremely diverse in their origins and outcomes, their location on the African continent, where two thirds of the DDR programs occurred between 1992 and 2005,[128] allows one to rule out cross-regional sources of women and girls' marginalization. This better enables us to draw conclusions about the cross-country themes. Women and girls' shared experiences in these conflicts represent another important factor. In all four internal conflicts, armed groups relied significantly on abduction to recruit females. Specht and Attree note that the means of females' recruitment into armed groups influences their needs and ambitions in the DDR process.[129] These cases allow us to hold the sources of women and girls' involvement constant. Moreover, women and girls in these conflicts acted predominantly in support roles and experienced a high degree of sexual abuse.

The empirical realities are such that it is not possible to include cases where there is significant variation on the level of females' participation in DDR programs. The DDR programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan do illustrate, however, limited changes in women and girls' inclusion in DDR. The spread of these cases over time further allows us to consider the sources of FAAFGs' marginalization before and throughout the development of gender-sensitive DDR policies. The association of all four DDR programs with a UN-sponsored peace support operation allows us to understand the changing influence of gender-sensitive policies.[130] The Mozambique DDR program acts as an important reference point in this regard. It was the first program to raise the issues of women in armed groups

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[128] Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 2.. There were 36 DDR processes globally during this period.

[129] Irma Specht and Larry Attree, "The Reintegration of Teenage Girls and Young Women " *Intervention* 4, no. 3 (2006).

[130] See Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 31-32.for a list of DDR programs involving UN-mandated peace support operations.

and the use of child soldiers.[131] It allows us to consider the sources of women and girls' marginalization in DDR prior to widespread international recognition of their gender-specific needs. The Sierra Leone and Liberia DDR programs developed within a few years of each other as gender guidelines in DDR programming were established by the international community. Finally, Sudan's DDR program is the most recent DDR program that reflects many of the IDDRS developments.

DDR in Mozambique

The civil conflict between the government Frente de Libertação National (FRELIMO) forces and the insurgent group Resistencia Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) began in 1974 shortly prior to Mozambique's gaining full independence from Portugal in 1975. It followed an extended armed struggle for independence. The conflict lasted until the signing of the October 1992 General Peace Agreement (GPA) brokered by Italian Catholic groups between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The conflict left one million civilians dead, 45% of whom were children. It created 1.5 million refugees and 3 million internally displaced persons.[132]

FRELIMO and RENAMO used abduction and forcible recruitment as the primary method to recruit females. They also used promises of gender equality to encourage females' voluntary recruitment. AMODEG, the Mozambican association for former combatants, found that 36% of females entered the armed groups under the age of 18. It further found that 17% of these joined FRELIMO and 82% joined RENAMO. Both groups kidnapped females to provide sexual services to combatants and to be "wives." RENAMO distributed abducted girls to traditional leaders to secure their loyalty and to combatants as rewards for good behaviour.

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[131] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 32.

[132] Sally Baden, "Post-Conflict Mozambique: Women's Special Situation, Population Issues, and Gender Perspectives: To Be Integrated into Skills Training and Employment Promotion. Report of a Consultancy for the Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship in Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict (International Labour Office)," in *Bridge: Development-Gender* (Brighton: Institute for Development Studies, 1997), McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique.*

Females performed important supporting tasks for armed groups. They were assigned to roles according to the changing needs of the armed groups [133]

The DDR program in Mozambique lasted from late 1993 until the end of 1996. In official terms, women constituted less than 2% of combatants in armed groups. They represented 1390 (1.48%) of the total 92881 DDR participants.[134] Twenty-seven percent of the DDR participants were under 18 years of age.[135] There is no data about girls' participation. Little attention was paid to the combatants' estimated 215,000 dependents; they were "basically cast as appendages of the (mainly male) ex-soldiers."[136] The majority of females associated with RENAMO and FRELIMO were forced to accompany their "husbands" in the reintegration process or were abandoned.[137] De Watteville notes countless instances of females screaming, "I want to go to *my* home."[138]

DDR in Peace Agreements

The GPA outlined provisions for the disarmament and demobilisation of 70,000 FRELIMO and 22, 000 RENAMO troops. Women's issues were virtually non-existent in the peace negotiations despite Mozambique's commitment to gender equality in the 1990 constitution and women's involvement in grassroots reconciliation activities.[139] Malanca suggests that cultural context that excluded women from decision-making power structures contributed to their absence from the negotiating table. He argues that this was the major reason that the final peace agreement did not include women's issues. External mediators were not able to push

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[133] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 107. See also Carol B. Thompson, "Beyond Civil Society: Child Soldiers as Citizens in Mozambique," *Review of African Political Economy* 80 (1999).

[134] Baden, "Post-Conflict Mozambique: Women's Special Situation, Population Issues, and Gender Perspectives: To Be Integrated into Skills Training and Employment Promotion. Report of a Consultancy for the Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship in Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict (International Labour Office)," vii.

[135] There was no official cateogry of "child soldiers" in Mozambique's DDR program.

[136] Ibid., 77.

[137] Exact figures do not exist. Thompson, "Beyond Civil Society: Child Soldiers as Citizens in Mozambique," 201, Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 117.

[138] de Watteville, "Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs." Italics in original.

[139] Sumie Nakaya, "Women and Gender Equality in Peacebuilding: Somalia and Mozambique," in *Building Sustainable Peace*, ed. Tom Keating and W. Andy Knight (Saskatoon and Tokyo: United Nations Univerity Press and the University of Alberta Press, 2004), 151.

for women's inclusion in the negotiating process.[140] McKay and Mazurana suggest that external mediators were fully aware of the extent of females' presence in both armed groups.[141]

Definition of Combatants and Eligibility Criteria

The DDR program outlined in the GPA prioritized combatants due to their perceived threat to political stability. Baden notes, "female soldiers, like child soldiers, were not perceived as a security threat and thus their needs were not given priority."[142] The DDR process treated combatants as a homogenous group. It made no specific provisions for the entry of women or girls. The peace agreement provided DDR for soldiers who were members of both armed groups up until the day that the Assembly of Mozambique adopted the GPA.[143] To access the DDR process, combatants had to be officially demobilised by their commanders, to hand in weapons, ammunition, equipment, a uniform and documentation in their possession. They then received an identity card and a demobilisation certificate to access subsequent DDR programs.

Institutional Responsibility for DDR Program Design and Implementation

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) presided over the Cease-Fire Commission created by the GPA to oversee the DDR process, including its organization and implementation.[144] ONUMOZ thus held primary responsibility for verifying and monitoring the DDR program in Mozambique. The peacekeeping orientation of the ONUMOZ resulted in a greater focus on immediate security concerns over long-term development.[145] UNICEF and the International

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[140] Malanca.
[141] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 109.
[142] Baden, "Post-Conflict Mozambique: Women's Special Situation, Population Issues, and Gender Perspectives: To Be Integrated into Skills Training and Employment Promotion. Report of a Consultancy for the Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship in Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict (International Labour Office)," 71, 75.
[143] "General Peace Agreement for Mozambique," United States Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/mozambique/mozambique_10041992_p4.html.
[144] Ibid.
[145] See UN, "Mozambique: ONUMOZ Background," Information Technology Section, Peace and Security Section of Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozFT.htm, Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars*.

Organization Migration provided support for vulnerable groups, but these did not specifically target those formerly associated with armed groups.

ONUMOZ worked in partnership with a number of government agencies and international actors. Baden reports that their efforts were poorly coordinated in the absence of an overall planning framework. Actors implementing DDR adopted gender-sensitive language; however, she argues that this was a top-down imposition resulting in ad hoc and informal attention to gender at the level of implementation. NGOs with varying knowledge of gender issues included gender in programming to respond to funding opportunities from international donors, who supplied 89% of the finances for the DDR program.[146] Berdal notes that DDR funding was ad hoc and inconsistent, with donors only financing specific parts of the program.[147] The diversity of funding sources had a negative impact on the attention devoted to women and girls, especially given the initial reluctance of donors to provide post-demobilisation assistance. Few women could access the estimated $79.5 million US allocated for reinsertion assistance due to their ineligibility for the DDR program.[148]

DDR Program Implementation

The absence of gender-specific services in the DDR program further contributed to access difficulties for women and girls. The program encountered logistical difficulties, including problems in accessing supplies and financial

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[146] Baden, "Post-Conflict Mozambique: Women's Special Situation, Population Issues, and Gender Perspectives: To Be Integrated into Skills Training and Employment Promotion. Report of a Consultancy for the Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship in Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict (International Labour Office)," x, 84, 86-87. Mohammed Hassan Babiker and Alpaslan Ozerdem, "A Future Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Process in Sudan: Lessons Learned from Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda," *Conflict, Security and Development* 3, no. 2 (2003): 224.

[147] Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars*, 67. Funding for Mozambique's DDR program occurred through the Government of Mozambique, a UN assessed budget, bilateral development assistance, bilateral security-related funds, bilateral food market aid, UN agency funding, and the World Bank. It lacked a centralized coordination mechanism, with funding occurring through a multilateral trust fun, financial transfers to international agencies, funding to government, funding to specific programs, and co-financing between donors. See Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 26.

[148] Ball and Hendrickson estimate the total budget of the DDR program to be $112.9 million US. Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 33.

shortages.[149] This delayed the DDR process and contributed to insecurity at cantonment sites. Camps did not include security measures to protect women. The long waiting time further limited females' participation. Females who assembled to receive assistance for vulnerable groups were forced to wait so long that they were unable to support themselves economically. This drove many to leave before accessing the support.[150]

Females unable to access the demobilisation camps did not receive financial support to return to their places of origin.[151] The DDR program was poorly prepared to meet the needs of females who qualified for DDR. [152] The women who participated in reintegration programs for vulnerable groups found that the programs for women were limited and reinforced their traditional gender roles and occupations.[153] The absence of child-care programs prevented many from participating.

Agency of DDR Target Populations

Some implementing agencies and NGOs consulted war-affected women and girls about their needs through information counseling referral services.[154] There is no evidence to suggest that DDR actors recognised the agency of women and girls associated with FRELIMO and RENAMO. Their experiences in the conflict were not acknowledged in the design of the DDR program. FRELIMO and RENAMO's refusal to recognise the participation of females in their groups undoubtedly contributed to absence of provisions for women and girls in the DDR program.[155] Thompson does not accept that this refusal is entirely responsible for females'

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[149] Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars*, 44.
[150] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 111.
[151] de Watteville, "Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs."
[152] Malanca recalls giving male clothing to females at cantonment sites and the absence of sanitary supplies. Malanca.
[153] Baden, "Post-Conflict Mozambique: Women's Special Situation, Population Issues, and Gender Perspectives: To Be Integrated into Skills Training and Employment Promotion. Report of a Consultancy for the Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship in Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict (International Labour Office)," 73,, 119.
[154] Malanca.
[155] McKay and Mazurana find that "a number of former FRELIMO combatants attributed their exclusion [from DDR programs] to the fact the government did not want to admit or have evidence generated regarding their use of girls." McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 111.

exclusion from the DDR process. International agencies, she argues, were aware of females' presence in these armed groups.[156] She cites a 1990 UNICEF-sponsored study conducted by Ivette Jeichande that interviewed 132 displaced women captured by RENAMO. The study noted the issue of women and girls "attached" to FRELIMO and RENAMO combatants. She states,

> Given the Jeichande study was completed in 1990, it is quite astonishing that Mozambican girls and women still accompanying soldiers at the time of the demobilisation in 1994 were not counted, addressed, nor cared for. It appears that no one among either the international or national agencies knows exactly what happened to them.[157]

DDR in Sierra Leone

The Sierra Leone civil war began in March 1991 with the series of raids on the eastern and southern parts of the country by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under Foday Sankoh. The RUF received support from Charles Taylor and the Liberian armed forces. Pro-government militias, the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), emerged in response to violence between the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and RUF. They received financial, and logistical support from the government.[158] In 1996, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) gained power with Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as president. The RUF acquiesced to peace negotiations with the SLPP leading to the November 1996 Abidjan Agreement. The agreement collapsed in May 1997 when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), comprised of SLA and RUF members, overthrew the Kabbah government. The AFRC invited the RUF to form a new government; however, the new government was never established. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) restored Kabbah to power in 1998. In January 1999, the AFRC invaded Freetown once more. On May 18, 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF sighed a ceasefire that led to the July 7, 1999 Lomé Peace Accord. The Lomé Accord failed

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[156] For an example of this argument, see Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 116.
[157] Thompson, "Beyond Civil Society: Child Soldiers as Citizens in Mozambique," 202.
[158] The CDFs were based on the traditional *kamajor* community defense units. Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 11.

to end hostilities. A final ceasefire was signed in November 2000 at Abuja. The conflict officially ended in February 2002.[159]

The civilian population suffered the brunt of the conflict's violence. Both the RUF rebels and the government forces, known for fighting the rebels by day and terrorizing local populations by night, targeted civilians. As the RUF failed to gain widespread support among the Sierra Leone population, it relied increasingly on forcible recruitment and abduction.[160] Civilians were branded, drugged, and forced to commit atrocities against their own communities to instill fear and support for the RUF. The conflict left 75,000 civilians dead, with a further 4,000 amputees, two thirds of the population displaced.

Women played an active role in all armed groups in the conflict. Some joined the groups voluntarily or stayed with them after temporary capture or rape.[161] A number of females joined the CDF at the request of husbands or with family approval upon the threat of violence.[162] The majority of females were abducted or forcibly recruited into armed groups. Bah argues that the RUF particularly targeted females from marginalized rural areas for forcible recruitment.[163] There are no precise figures on the number of women associated with the armed groups in Sierra Leone. Estimates suggest that 10,000 women were associated with armed groups; 9,5000 of these having been abducted.[164] Approximately 12% of armed groups were made up of women.[165]

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[159] For details on the Sierra Leone conflict, see Elizabeth Evenson, "Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination between Commission and Court," *Columbia Law Review* 104 (2004), Jennifer L. Poole, "Post-Conflict Justice in Sierra Leone," in *Post Conflict Justice*, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni (Ardsley: Transnational, 2002), Tom Perriello and Marieke Wierda, "The Special Court for Sierra Leone under Scrutiny," International Center for Transitional Justice, http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Sierra.study.pdf , Miller, Ladouceur, and Dugal, "From Research to Roadmap: Learning from the Arms for Development Initiative in Sierra Leone."

[160] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 30.

[161] Binta Mansaray, "Women against Weapons: A Leading Role for Women in Disarmament," in *Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, ed. Anatole Ayissi and Robin-Edward Poulton (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), 144.

[162] Khristopher Carlson and D. Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, ed. Sanam Naraghi Anderlini (Cambridge: Hunt Alternatives Fund, 2004).

[163] K. A. Bah, "Occasional Paper: Rural Women and Girls in the War in Sierra Leone," (Conciliation Resources, 2003).

[164] Ibid, Farr, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes: Where Do Women Stand."

[165] Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 2.

The figures on the number of girls in armed groups are more precise. Mazurana et al. find that 80% of RUF members were children aged 7-14 and that 30% of these were girls.[166] UNICEF reports that 8466 children were officially documented "missing" between 1991-2002 and that girls likely represented half of this number. Brooks points out that 4814 children were "missing" after the January 1999 Freetown attack, 48% of whom were female.[167] McKay and Mazurana suggest that 12,056 girls participated in armed groups.[168] Denov and Maclure attribute the paucity of information on girls' participation to the widespread assumption that the child soldiers were all boys.[169]

Females associated with the armed groups moved fluidly between roles as aggressors and supporting positions. The armed groups used the threat of violence to enforce compliance.[170] Carlson and Mazurana found that 44% RUF females received basic military and weapons training.[171] A limited number achieved higher-ranking roles as commanders and members of the RUF war council.[172] Most commonly, females in armed groups served in overlapping support roles.[173] Many females were treated as the sexual property of commanders and of combatants through 'bush marriages.' Wives typically received more privileges, such as a weapon for protection and better access to food. Commanders' wives were left in charge of camps in their absence. Some abducted children attached themselves to these wives to secure additional protection.[174] Commanders' wives also played a role in directing

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166 Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 107.

167 John Williamson, "The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: Social and Psychological Transformation in Sierra Leone," *Intervention* 4, no. 3 (2006): 186, Andy Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," (Dakar Yoff: UNICEF, West and Central Africa Regional Office, 2005), 2.

168 McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 92.

169 Denov and Maclure, "Engaging the Voices of Girls in the Aftermath of Sierra Leone's Conflict: Experiences and Perspectives in a Culture of Violence," 73.

170 Ibid.: 77.

171 Training was provided by commanders and by "husbands." Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 12.

172 Mansaray, "Women against Weapons: A Leading Role for Women in Disarmament," 145.

173 McKay and Mazurana found females served in armed groups as follows: 72% as cooks, 68% as porters, 62% caring for sick and wounded, 60% as wives, 44% as food producers, 40% as messengers, 34% as fighters, 22% as spies, 18% in communications, 12% in diamond mining. McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 92.

174 Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 12,14.

the small boys units, known for their civilian-directed violence.[175] When wives fell out of favour, they were sent to be combatants.

The DDR program in Sierra Leone occurred in three phases. In late 1996, the SLPP launched a disarmament program through the Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation. The program ended abruptly with the 1997 coup. It restarted in August 1998 with Phase I, which lasted until June 1999. Plans to start Phase II failed due to lack of security and logistics. Phase II began in earnest with a symbolic ceremony in October 1999. It ended in April 2000 with the resumption of violence. This created an "interim phase" lasting until May 2001. In May 2001, Phase III, hailed as "the final and most comprehensive phase,"[176] began systematically targeting districts to achieve national DDR.[177] It finished in January 2002.

Sierra Leone's DDR program demobilised 72,500 combatants. The number of female DDR participants is unconfirmed. All statistics indicate a substantial gap between females' participation in armed groups and their presence in DDR programs. McKay and Mazurana find that 3925 women and 506 girls participated in DDR.[178] Women and girls represented 8% of the total DDR participants. They find that while the total number of participants increased substantially with each DDR phase, the proportion of females remained relatively constant.[179] Sierra Leone's DDR program is "touted as one of the most successful demobilisation efforts in history." It is presented as a "model for disarmament" for other programs.[180] Denov states,

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[175] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 93.

[176] UNICEF, "From Conflict to Hope: Children in Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme," (New York: United Nations Children's Fund, 2004), 2.

[177] Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 6.

[178] There were 6052 boys in DDR. These figures do not include the women associated with the SLA. Girls represented 6% of the total RUF child soldiers demobilised, 2% of the AFRC child soldiers, 2% of the SLA child soldiers, and 0.4% of the CDF child soldiers. McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 99-100. See also Williamson, "The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: Social and Psychological Transformation in Sierra Leone," 187.

[179] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 101.

[180] WCRWC, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, and Gender-Based Violence in Sierra Leone. Excerpts from 'Precious Resources: Adolescents in the Reconstruction of Sierra Leone'. Participatory Research Study with Adolescents and Youth in Sierra Leone, April-July 2002.," (New York: Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2002), 1. Miller, Ladouceur, and

> The irony of all this is that people have said that the DDR program enhanced security in Sierra Leone, and it was looked at as one of the success stories, which is ironic given the levels of exclusion of women and girls. We need to obviously call that into question as a great success story. It was originally seen as a success case that other countries could use as a model.[181]

DDR in Peace Agreements

The 1996 DDR effort laid the framework for the future DDR program. The Government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG, and UNDP orchestrated Phase I to target persons participating in all armed groups following the May 1997 coup.[182] The Lomé Accord formally established the framework for the remaining DDR phases. The goal was to stabilize the security situation. DDR sought to,

> 1) To collect, register and destroy all conventional weapons turned in by combatants; 2) to demobilize approximately 45,000 combatants, 12 percent of whom were thought to be women, from the SLA, RUF, AFRC and CDFs, and; 3) to assist ex-combatants through demobilization to prepare them for reintegration.[183]

Article XVI of the Lomé Accord outlined the encampment phase of the DDR program and called on the international community to extend of Phase I. Article XXVIII recognised women's victimization during the war and the importance of special attention to their needs during post-conflict reconstruction.[184] The Lomé Accord set a "crucial precedent" in being the first peace agreement to explicitly recognise the presence of child soldiers and their special needs during DDR through Article XXX.[185]

The women's movement in Sierra Leone played an important role in promoting peace at the local grassroots level. Solomon credits it with playing a critical role in mediating the end of the conflict. Carlson and McKay highlight the movement's "catalytic role in bringing an end to the conflict." Sesay also emphasizes

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Dugal, "From Research to Roadmap: Learning from the Arms for Development Initiative in Sierra Leone," 11.

[181] Myriam Denov, Personal Interview, April 18 2007.

[182] Miller, Ladouceur, and Dugal, "From Research to Roadmap: Learning from the Arms for Development Initiative in Sierra Leone," 11.

[183] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 98.. See also UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sierra Leone," United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60.

[184] *Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Rebel United Front of Sierra Leone*, (July 7, 1999).

[185] Williamson, "The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: Social and Psychological Transformation in Sierra Leone," 187.

women's role in promoting the viability of a negotiated settlement.[186] Despite women's roles in armed groups and in mobilizing for peace, they were absent at the negotiations for the Abidjan Peace Accord. The peace negotiations leading to the Lomé Accord included two women, one with the government delegation and the other with the RUF. No women were in chief negotiators positions.[187] The Lomé Accord contained gender-inclusive language; however, Farr notes that the peace agreement made no provisions for females who were combatants or otherwise involved in armed groups.[188] Mansaray suggests that exclusion of women during the peace negotiations reflected women's exclusion from political decision-making since independence.[189]

Definition of Combatants and Eligibility Criteria

The Lomé Accord did not define the term 'combatant.' Eligibility criteria for accessing DDR changed across the three phases. To access DDR in Phases I and II, combatants over 18 had to provide a weapon at a DDR reception centre. Upon the presentation of a weapon, individuals answered a series of questions about the disassembly and reassembly of a weapon to confirm their eligibility. The weapons requirement was thought to be a "good litmus test" to establish individuals' participation in armed groups as combatants.[190] Phase III expanded the eligibility criteria. It allowed for group disarmament, whereby a group of combatants could be demobilised with the presentation of a number of heavy weapons or ammunition. The intention was to increase the ability of women associated with armed groups to participate. In group disarmament, commanders provided a list of individuals

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[186] The women's movement began organizing in 1994 in preparation for the 1995 Beijing Conference. Christiana Solomon, "The Mano River Union Sub-Region: The Role of Women in Building Peace," in *Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Buildign Sustainable Peace*, ed. Rawwida Baksh, et al., *New Gender Mainstreaming Series on Development Issues* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005), 171, 74, Kadi Sesay, "Sierra Leone: Women in Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction," in *Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace*, ed. Rawwida Baksh, et al., *New Gender Mainstreaming Series on Development Issues* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005), 182, Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 17.
[187] Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 14-16.
[188] Farr, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes: Where Do Women Stand," 196.
[189] Mansaray, "Women against Weapons: A Leading Role for Women in Disarmament," 140-41.
[190] Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 18, McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 98.

disarming with each group. Sierra Leone's DDR program made no provision for combatants' dependents, although they outnumbered combatants four to one.[191]

The Sierra Leone DDR program adopted the Cape Town Principles' definition of child soldiers. The eligibility criteria for proving child combatant status were narrow. Girls had to meet one of the four criteria used for all child soldiers: being between the age of 7 and 18; have learned to cock and load a weapon; have been trained in an armed group; and, have spent six months or more in an armed group.[192] Officially, girls did not have to present a weapon to access DDR. Brooks argues that the "randomness of eligibility" excluded many children, especially girls, from entering the DDR program.[193]

Institutional Responsibility for DDR Program Design and Implementation

Institutional responsibility for Sierra Leone's DDR program varied with the different phases of the program and target groups. Sierra Leone had operational instruments in place and finances committed from 1998 in anticipation of a peace agreement. Article VI of the Lomé Accord formally established the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR). NCDDR was responsible for coordinating the parties to the conflict, peacekeeping forces, and donor representatives in the DDR process.[194] It was responsible for DDR policy design with support from peacekeeping forces for implementation and UNICEF for child soldiers. No women were represented at the decision-making level of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace that supervised the NCDDR or in the NCDDR itself. The Sierra Leone Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs was not present in any of the organization's technical coordinating committees. Carlson and Mazurana argue women's exclusion created a bias in

[191] Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 13.
[192] UNICEF, "From Conflict to Hope: Children in Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme," 2.
[193] Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 12.
[194] Francis Kai Kai, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-War Sierra Leone," in *Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, ed. Anatole Ayissi and Robin-Edward Poulton (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), 116.

program design that contributed to females' marginalization during the DDR process.[195]

The Lomé Accord granted international peacekeeping forces a leading role in the DDR process. Article XVI grants the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and ECOMOG the responsibility for disarming all combatants. ECOMOG acted with the NCDDR to implement Phase I of the DDR process. Its role in the overall DDR process was limited, however, given the small number of participants in Phase I. The United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in Resolution 1181 of July 13, 1998. UNOMSIL's mandate included monitoring of the DDR process. The Security Council increased UNOMSIL's initial strength of 70 military observers to 210 in August 1999. The Security Council replaced UNOMSIL with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) through Resolution 1270 of October 22, 1999. It mandated UNAMSIL to assist in the implementation of the DDR program and to establish a presence at DDR centres while reiterating the importance of paying attention to child soldiers and including personnel with training in gender issues.[196] The peacekeeping mission included a gender advisor. Only 1% of UNAMSIL's military personnel were female as of January 2000. On average, females formed 11% of the operation's total staff. There were no female military observers in the field with the DDR program.[197] UNAMSIL worked with NCDDR during Phase III of the DDR process. UNAMSIL military observers assisted in operationalizing the disarmament sites and demobilisation centres.[198]

UNICEF was the lead agency for the DDR of child soldiers. It participated in the NCDDR Technical Coordinating Committee on Children Associated with

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[195] Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 26.

[196] UN, "Sierra Leone: United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL (July 1998-October 1999)," Information Technology Section, Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/Unomsil.htm. UN, "Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Mandate," Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/mandate.html.

[197] UN, "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations," (New York: United Nations. Lessons Learned Unit. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2000), 39. Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 12, 16.

[198] Kai Kai, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-War Sierra Leone," 114.

Fighting Forces with technical expertise. UNICEF's experiences in previous DDR programs contributed to the priority placed on rapid assistance, program development and implementation for child soldiers.[199] UNICEF' advocated for the release of all children from armed groups. Mandates restricted UNICEF and its implementing partners from working with dependents of combatants. Its mandate did allow it to address a number of girls below the age of 18 in supporting roles.[200] Girls who were below the age of 18 when they entered armed groups but where over this age by the time of the DDR process "ironically [could not] receive the support they need because they have "aged out.""[201] UNICEF's programming efforts centered around boys. After the January 1999 attack on Freetown, it began receiving more girl combatants. Brooks suggests this was because these girls were becoming an increasing liability to their abductors.[202] Responding to girls' absence from DDR, UNICEF created the Girls Left Behind project at the end of Phase III. By the end of 2003, the project reached 1000 girl child soldiers who did not participate in DDR.[203]

Budgetary concerns shaped Sierra Leone's DDR program. Funding for the program's $100 million US budget arrived from the Government of Sierra Leone, the World Bank, UN assessed funding, UN agency financing, bilateral development assistance, and contributions to the multi-donor trust fund led by the United Kingdom and the World Bank.[204] UNICEF had approximately $5,609,400 for child-related costs of DDR program.[205] Foray suggests that the early resources for the DDR process were "more than adequate."[206] He rejects the idea that they were the

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[199] Denov and Maclure, "Engaging the Voices of Girls in the Aftermath of Sierra Leone's Conflict: Experiences and Perspectives in a Culture of Violence," 74.
[200] WCRWC, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, and Gender-Based Violence in Sierra Leone. Excerpts from 'Precious Resources: Adolescents in the Reconstruction of Sierra Leone'. Participatory Research Study with Adolescents and Youth in Sierra Leone, April-July 2002.," 4.
[201] Ibid., 7.
[202] Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 16.
[203] Heyzer, "Gender, Peace and Disarmament. Women, Men, Peace and Security."
[204] Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 35.
[205] UNICEF, "From Conflict to Hope: Children in Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme," 4.
[206] Michael Foray, "Peace by Other Means: The Missing Link in DDR Programmes. What Went Wrong: The Politics of Bad Governance," in *Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, ed. Anatole Ayissi and Robin-Edward Poulton (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), 100.

determining factor in the design and implementation of the program. Brooks notes that the visibility of child combatants helped to mobilized donor funds and prompted a number of organizations to start specific programs to address their needs.[207] Based on this evidence, it is difficult to establish an initial link between the marginalization of females and the budget of the DDR program.

As the program progressed, however, budgetary constraints played a larger role in shaping the DDR process and the participation of females. This is hardly surprising given that more than double the anticipated number of combatants passed through DDR. Funding constraints' impact on girls' access to DDR programs is better documented than for girls. Hobson argues that a broad application the definition of child combatants was abandoned as funds became increasingly scarce. Program access was increasingly restricted to children passing the weapons test.[208] Robinson explains,

> Before the DDR was completed, my understanding is that a lot of the funds were dried up, so there were some practical decisions to change the definition based on a demonstrated ability of assemble and disassemble weapons. A lot of girls and young women, especially those with children, were overlooked.[209]

There is no direct evidence linking the limited participation of women in DDR to funding constraints. It is highly probable that the limited finances contributed to an increasing reliance on a weapons test for adults to access DDR, which would have had a negative impact on women's ability to participate in the program.

DDR Program Implementation

The weapon requirement presented a number of obstacles to women's accessing DDR programs. A number of women had escaped from armed groups prior to the beginning of Phase II and thus did not have a weapon to enter the DDR process. The weapon requirement proved particularly problematic for CDF females, who frequently only had access to weapons from a communal source. Many of the

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[207] Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," ix. Williamson also notes that while there was a generally inadequate resource base for DDR in Sierra Leone, he has not heard a direct link made between this and the absence of women and girls in the DDR process. John Williamson, Phone Interview, June 13 2007.

[208] Hobson, "Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict," 8.. See also STC, "Girls Formerly Associated with Armed Gorups and Armed Forces Who Did Not Go through Formal Demobilisation: Save the Children Uk's Experience in West Africa," 8.

[209] Malia Robinson, Phone Interview, June 2 2007.

weapons used by females in the CDF, such as machetes, were not accepted as weapons for entering DDR. Furthermore, a number of women and girls believed that a weapon was necessary to participate in DDR; 46% of women cited not having a weapon as the reason for not going through DDR.[210]

The emphasis on the rapid implementation of the DDR program further contributed to women and girls' marginalization. Williamson attributes the scant attention to females to the pressures faced by many implementing agencies to rapidly disarm combatants during Phase III. This forced many actors to engage in rapid decision-making that did not allow them the opportunity to undertake the necessary steps to ensure that they included women and girls. He also notes that the pressure for rapid disarmament contributed to the absence of a parallel track for females to access reintegration directly without passing through disarmament or demobilisation.[211]

Children entered the DDR process through a number of avenues, including escape, organized operations, release by armed groups, and presentation by their families.[212] The high turnover rate of military observers meant that many "did not have the relevant preparation for the aspects of their job related to demobilizing and separating children."[213] This contributed to the inconsistent application of eligibility criteria by UN observers and staff of child protection agencies at the disarmament sites. Military observers and DDR administrators repeatedly used possession of a

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[210] McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 100.

[211] Williamson, "The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: Social and Psychological Transformation in Sierra Leone," 188.

[212] Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 11.

[213] Williamson, "The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: Social and Psychological Transformation in Sierra Leone," 188, UNICEF, "From Conflict to Hope: Children in Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme," 6. A poor understanding of the DDR mandate was not limited to UNAMSIL staff. Adebajo also states, "A UN assessment mission sent to Sierra Leone in June 2000 found serious managerial problems in UNAMSIL and a lack of common understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement." Adekeye Adebajo, "West Africa's Tragic Twins: Building Peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone," in *Building Sustainable Peace*, ed. Tom Keating and W. Andy Knight (Saskatoon and Tokyo: United Nations University Press and the University of Alberta Press, 2004), 180.

weapon and the weapons test to determine eligibility for DDR programs,[214] thereby preventing many girls from accessing DDR.

Brooks also notes that a number of military observers demonstrated sympathy for the desire of children to access the individual benefits available in the adult DDR program. They allowed children to access DDR programs as adults.[215] Girls wishing to access the adult programs were frequently excluded when they did not have access to a weapon during Phases I and II. Cultural conceptions of age also meant some girls under 18 entered DDR programs as women and did not benefit from girl-focused programs.[216] Williamson is cautious in linking the marginalization of females to the division between women and girls. He recognises that many girls over 18 were inappropriately excluded from the special benefits for children. However, he states, "I am not aware of the age distinction being a barrier for girls accessing the DDR programs, which isn't to say that this wasn't the case for some. I never heard that commanders of the girls were considering their age as a barrier."[217]

To access the reintegration assistance, eligible DDR participants had to pass through the disarmament and demobilisation phases. They then received reinsertion assistance and pre-discharge orientation prior to reintegration.[218] No parallel reintegration track existed for those excluded from disarmament and demobilization. Williamson suggests that the linear implementation of the DDR process contributed to women and girls' exclusion.[219] The reintegration stage received significantly less attention than the first two stages of the DDR process.[220] Following complaints by male ex-combatants about the inadequacy of DDR assistance to support their families, wives were able to apply for microcredit at the end of Phase III; however,

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[214] Denov, Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 13, 11, Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 19, UNICEF, "From Conflict to Hope: Children in Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme," 5.
[215] Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 12.
[216] Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 20-21, Denov.
[217] Williamson. He does, however, note that inappropriateness of the age distinction in service delivery in Sierra Leone.
[218] See Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, "Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration," (Centre for Global Development, 2005), 11.
[219] Williamson.
[220] See McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 104.

they had to be identified by their husbands. This excluded abducted wives who had escaped and forced others to remain in such unions.[221]

Agency of DDR Target Populations

There is extensive evidence that commanders in all armed groups prevented females from participating in the DDR program. During Phase I and II of the DDR program, commanders removed weapons from women and girls and "parceled them out as patrimony to chosen recipients." These were primarily male and often included members of commanders' inner circle.[222] Women and girls continued to be excluded from the DDR process with the shift towards group disarmament due to commanders' ability to control the lists of disarming individuals. They frequently excluded women and girls.[223] Access to DDR for CDF women and girls was also complicated by the government and commanders' denial of their presence. Carlson and Mazurana state, "For some women and girls, official denial was considered a direct attempt to prevent them from entering DDR programs and collecting benefits.[224]

Commanders created difficulties for child protection agencies to access girl combatants. Commanders again played a role in deliberately misinforming girls about the eligibility criteria for DDR.[225] Denov suggests that commanders' efforts to keep girls from accessing the DDR program attests to girls' critical role in supporting armed groups. Brooks also argues that commanders who lost power with the

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[221] Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 3.
[222] WCRWC, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, and Gender-Based Violence in Sierra Leone. Excerpts from 'Precious Resources: Adolescents in the Reconstruction of Sierra Leone'. Participatory Research Study with Adolescents and Youth in Sierra Leone, April-July 2002.," 3.
[223] Miller, Ladouceur, and Dugal, "From Research to Roadmap: Learning from the Arms for Development Initiative in Sierra Leone," 13, McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 101, Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 11.
[224] Carlson and Mazurana, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, 20, 12.. See also McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 98. Williamson suggests that the CDF may have wished to avoid recognising the presence of girl soldiers among its ranks to avoid tarnishing its image or out of fear of prosecution. Williamson.
[225] STC, "Girls Formerly Associated with Armed Gorups and Armed Forces Who Did Not Go through Formal Demobilisation: Save the Children Uk's Experience in West Africa," 9.

surrender of a weapon compensated by "keeping as many children as possible under [their] control."[226]

Women and girls in armed groups also acted on their own accord to avoid DDR programs. The decision of many to self-demobilize provides a prime example. Females self-demobilised by escaping from armed groups prior to accessing the formal DDR program. Worthen explains, "When the groups started to demobilize, it was the girls' opportunity to run. They were not going to stick around for broken promises."[227] A number of females cited the desire to avoid being labeled as an ex-combatant as their reason for not participating in DDR programs. Denov notes that many females did not want to "seal the deal that they were in fact fighters."[228] The limited recognition of females' agency had a negative impact on the ability of those responsible for the design and implementation of DDR to incorporate their concerns into the program.

Labeling young mothers as "girl mothers" affected their willingness to participate in DDR. These young mothers gave birth and raised their children in extremely harsh conditions. According to Carpenter, the international community's insistence on labeling young mothers in Sierra Leone as girls was disempowering to these young adults. Many rejected the label given its failure to recognise their agency or ability to contribute their insights to the DDR process.[229]

The limited recognition of the agency of girl mothers is indicative of a more salient issue relating to the division between women and girls instituted by Sierra Leone's DDR program. The strict classification of females under 18 as children contributed to an overwhelming emphasis on these individuals as victims. It led to a limited recognition of their experiences and subsequent needs during DDR. Denov and Maclure state,

> That girls in fighting forces have remained invisible and have had little to say in the conceptualization and implementation of social programs designed to meet their psycho-

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[226] Brooks, "The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. Lessons Learned in Sierra Leone, 1998-2002," 16-17.
[227] Miranda Worthen, Phone Interview, June 23 2007. Williamson also states, "A lot of the girls had excluded themselves from the DDR process. For some of them, as soon as they had the opportunity as the DDR process was approaching, such as when the unit was going to the DDR site, they found the opportunity to separate themselves and leave, and they would leave." Williamson.
[228] Denov.
[229] R. Charli Carpenter, Phone Interview, May 29 2007.

> social needs is in part a reflection of the predominant view of children as individuals who are not fully formed and are thus incapable of rational, far-sighted actions.[230]

Women and girls exhibited ingenious forms of resistance to preserve their agency.[231] Ignoring females' acts of resistance in the design and implementation of the DDR program resulted in DDR programs with a "one size fits all" approach to DDR that failed to meet the diversity of girls' needs.[232]

DDR in Liberia

The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under the leadership of Charles Taylor first launched attacks on Liberia from neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire in 1989. The NPFL sought a military victory over the Samuel Doe regime.[233] Following a series of international efforts to end the violence, the parties to the conflict agreed to a ceasefire in 1996. The ceasefire provided for disarmament and demobilisation of all armed groups and elections. In 1997, Charles Taylor was elected as President.[234] After Taylor's election, crime, insecurity, political repression, corruption, and human rights abuses continued in Liberia. In 2000, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebel group, composed mainly of exiled ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J members, launched attacks from Guinea.[235] The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) broke away from LURD in 2003. The conflict persisted until the signing of the June 17, 2003 ECOWAS-sponsored Agreement on

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[230] Denov and Maclure, "Engaging the Voices of Girls in the Aftermath of Sierra Leone's Conflict: Experiences and Perspectives in a Culture of Violence," 75.

[231] Denov and Maclure cite examples of females pretending to menstruate to avoid sexual violence, deliberately refusing sexual intercourse even when faced with the threat of violence, and creating close relationships with other females to create a safe space. Ibid.: 80-81.

[232] Cecilia Abdul Shereef et al., "The Reintegration of Formerly Abducted Girls and Girl Mothers in Sierra Leone: Sealing the Past, Facing the Future," in *Interagency Reintegration Workshop* (Christian Children's Fund, 2006), 2.

[233] Between 1989 and 1997, the conflict was fought primarily between eight factions: the NPFL, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL); the NFPL-Central Revolutionary Council (CRC); the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson (ULIMO-J) led by Roosevelt Johnson; the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah (ULIMO-K) under Alhaji Kromah; the Liberian Peace Council (PLC); and, the Lofa Defence Force (LDF). Adebajo, "West Africa's Tragic Twins: Building Peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone," 168.

[234] See UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements," United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, http://www.unddr.org/tool_docs/Liberia%20DDR%20Programme%20Institutional%20arrangements.pdf., Festus B. Aboagye and Alhaji M. S. Bah, "Liberia at a Crossroads: A Preliminary Look at the United Nations in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Protection of Civilians," (Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 2.

[235] UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements.", Adebajo, "West Africa's Tragic Twins: Building Peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone."

Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities. Taylor resigned and went into exile August 11, 2003. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, LURD, and MODEL followed on August 18, 2003 in Accra, Ghana. The conflict left 250,000 civilians dead and created 2 million displaced persons.[236]

All Liberian armed groups relied extensively on the participation of women and girls. The majority of females were forcibly recruited or abducted into armed groups.[237] Specht describes females, especially girls, as "cheap, effective and obedient fighters" for armed groups.[238] A small percentage of females joined armed groups willingly to escape poverty, to take revenge, to protect their families or themselves, or to gain greater gender equality. Taylor explains, "Those [girls] who actively seek equal status with men have sometimes surmised—perhaps correctly—that the only way to achieve this is to prove themselves as fighters."[239]

Exact figures on the participation of females in Liberian armed groups do not exist. UNDP suggests that women and children represented 38% of the eligible caseload for DDR in 2004, placing the number of women combatants between 1,000-10,000. It is unclear whether this conservative estimate includes women in supporting roles. UNICEF suggests that 15,000-20,000 children participated in armed groups, representing as many as 40% or more of the total combatants in combat or support roles and that 80% of these children partook in direct hostilities. Hosbson reports the presence of 5,000 girls between 1989 and 1997 and 8,500 girls by December 2003 in armed groups of the total 21,000 child soldiers. Specht estimates that over half of the adult females in armed groups were below 24 years old. There are no official numbers of females in the 18-24 age category; however, she suggests that over 25,000 girls up to 24 participated in armed groups.[240]

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[236] Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 15.

[237] This occurred during recruitment drives by armed groups, the capture of new territories, armed groups picking up civilians along the roadside, and raids on displaced persons camps. HRW, "How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia," (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 9.

[238] Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 15.

[239] Diane Taylor, "'I Wanted to Take Revenge'," *Guardian Weekly* (2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/westafrica/story/0,,1814700,00.html.. Specht argues that the distinction between forced and "voluntary" recruitment is blurred. She questions whether viable alternatives existed for women and girls who joined armed groups voluntarily for such "feminist" motives. Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 11, 16, 29.

[240] The eligible caseload for DDR was estimated between 38,000 and 53,000. UNDP, "Strategic and Operational Framework of Reintegration Support for Ex-Combatants (2nd Draft)," (Monrovia: United Nations Development Programme Liberia, 2004), UNICEF, "Protecting Children,"

Women and girls typically received basic military training, even if their primary roles did not involve combat.[241] Females filled a range of combat and support roles. LURD's military structure included all-female units, Women's Artillery Commandos (WACs). The WACs mainly attracted victims of sexual abuse.[242] Older females typically played combat roles in WACs while younger girls served in supporting roles. The Government of Liberia armed forces also had WACs; however, they were in a less prominent role. Women and girls suffered a high degree of sexual abuse in all armed groups. Females in non-combat roles were accorded an inferior status and were more likely to suffer sexual abuse; consequently, many tried to gain combatant status as their experiences worsened. Younger girls in supporting roles were the most likely to suffer sexual abuse. [243]

The 1996 ceasefire's disarmament and demobilization program began on November 22, 1996. Ex-combatants received food rations and transportation to their homes. The program did not include reintegration assistance. By February 1997, 74% of the total combatants passed through the process.[244] One third of the estimated 15,000 child combatants participated; only 78 of these were girls.[245] Human Rights Watch attributes the partial success of this program to limited funding and poor security conditions.[246]

Liberia's 2003-2004 disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) program was more successful at including females. The DDRR process occurred in three phases: Phase I lasted between December 7-2003-

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(Monrovia: United Nationa Children's Fund, Liberia, 2004), Hobson, "Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict," 7.. Human Rights Watch also notes an increase in the number of child combatants from 2000 onwards. HRW, "How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia," 29, Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 82.

241 Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 21, UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 10, HRW, "How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia," 19.

242 Specht explains, "The WAC's self-image was of a fighting unit for all women who needed protection or who could not avenge themselves." Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 24, 56.

243 Post-conflict surverys find that 75% of demobilised girls associated with fighting forced suffered sexual and gender-based violence. Ibid., 10, 11, 45.

244 Adebajo, "West Africa's Tragic Twins: Building Peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone," 173.

245 Wessells, *Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection*, 168, Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 117. Bernard et al. suggest that girls represented up to 2% of the total number of demobilised. Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration," 12.

246 HRW, "How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia," 8.

January 1, 2004; Phase II between April 15-September 8, 2004; and, Phase III between July 7-October 31, 2004. Mobile DDRR operations occurred between October 23-November 23, 2004. In April 2004, 17485 individuals passed through the DDRR process, including 2292 women and 352 girls, representing 24% of the beneficiaries. By the end of August 2004, women represented 12,000 of the 70,000 combatants to go through DDRR, while girls represented 1,000 of the 5,800 child participants. By September 2004, the percentage of women fell to 17%.[247] At the end of the DDRR process, 103,019 combatants had participated, including 22,456 women (22% of adults) and 2,511 girls (24% of children).[248] The overwhelming majority of DDR participants were between the ages of 20-28, with the most significant concentration of child soldiers between the ages of 14-18.[249]

DDR in Peace Agreements

The 2003 Accra Peace Accord included limited provisions for DDRR. Article VI detailed the timeline for the disarmament and demobilisation stages of the DDRR process. It established the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR). The Accra Accord also requested the United Nations to deploy an international stabilization force to assist in the implementation of the peace accord, including the development and implementation of DDRR. Article IX called for the release of all prisoners by armed groups, including non-combatants and abductees. Article XXXI recognised the importance of paying special attention to vulnerable groups. It included reference to child soldiers; however, the only mention to women is as war victims. It committed to maintaining a gender balance in allocating responsibilities for national

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[247] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 14, 15, Hobson, "Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict," 19.

[248] There were 69,281 males and 8,871 boys disarmed in the process. These figures represent the number of persons disarmed. The figures for the demobilisation stage are lower, with 68,162 adult males, 22, 370 adult females, 8,523 boys, and 2,440 girls.NCDDRR, "DDRR Consolidated Report Phase 1, 2 &3 (Status of Disarmament and Demobilization Activities as of 1/16/2005," (Monrovia: National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR), Joint Implementation Unit, 2005). See also UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements."

[249] These figures are important in highlighting that a number of the combatants under the age of 18 at the time of signing of the Accra Accord were likely over the age of 18 when the majority of the DDRR program occurred in 2004. HIC, "Population Pyramid of Ex-Combatants by Sex and Age (Data Provided by JIU May 11th, 2004)," Humanitarian Infomation Centre for Liberia, http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/coordination/sectoral/DDR/index.asp.

rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development.[250] The Accra Accord does not stipulate DDRR's objectives. The absence of specific provisions on the rehabilitation or reintegration components suggests that DDRR's primary objective was to establish short-term security. UNDP later described DDRR as a precondition for post-conflict development and peacebuilding.[251]

Women played an active role in promoting peace and disarmament throughout the Liberian conflict. In 1993, the Liberian Women's Initiative called for armed groups to disarm before the installation of a transitional government. A number of women's organizations formed the 'Funds for Disarmament' to raise money for a weapons buy-back scheme. Despite women's activities, the 1996 ceasefire did not include mention females or child combatants. In 2003, women's groups organized the 'Mass Action for Peace' campaign. The campaign succeeded in gaining women's entry in key meetings at the peace negotiations in Accra. Women played a key role in preventing parties from physically leaving negotiation sites. The delegations of the armed groups to the peace negotiations did not include women.[252]

Definition of Combatants and Eligibility Criteria

The DDRR program outlined the term 'combatant' narrowly in accordance with the program's security goals. To enter DDRR, combatants over 18 had to present "serviceable weapons." The disarmament sites accepted unserviceable weapons; however, these did not secure access to the DDRR program.[253] Upon confirmation of status, eligible individuals received identification cards to access

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[250] "Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, Accra, 18th August 2003," United States Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_cpa.html.

[251] UNDP, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) Activity Report: United Nations Development Programme Administered Trust Fund, December 2003 to August 2004," (Monrovia: United Nations Development Programme Liberia, 2004), 7.

[252] UNIFEM credits the actions of female activists' with securing reference to women's human rights in the peace agreement. There does not appear to be any other evidence directly linking women's activism to these references. UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 9-10, Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration," 11. Solomon, "The Mano River Union Sub-Region: The Role of Women in Building Peace," 176-78.

[253] UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements."

further DDR programs.[254] Eligibility for DDRR's later components was based on a linear approach to DDRR.

The weapon requirement created many obstacles for those without weapons. The DDRR program included special eligibility criteria for women associated with fighting forces (WAFF) and children associated with fighting forces (CAFF).[255] Both categories allowed females acting in support capacities in armed groups to participate in DDRR; however, it did not make them eligible to receive the transitional safety allowance provided to ex-combatants during the rehabilitation stage.[256] WAFF and CAFF were not required to provide a weapon for DDRR entry. They passed through a special screening process to confirm their participation in armed groups.[257] The DDRR program did not allow retroactive demobilisation, with the exception of children in interim care centres or identified as child combatants prior to December 7, 2003. WAFF and CAFF that self-demobilised prior to the DDRR program were ineligible.[258]

Institutional Responsibility for DDR Program Design and Implementation

The international community played a leading role in the design and implementation of Liberia's DDRR process. On September 19, 2003, the Security Council created the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in Resolution 1509. Previously, the ECOWAS-sponsored Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) supervised the

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[254] Individuals' status was verified through a demobilisation reintegration form that allowed DDRR staff to confirm whether individuals were truly eligible for the DDRR or if they were only attracted to the program because of the benefits offered. UNDP, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) Activity Report: United Nations Development Programme Administered Trust Fund, December 2003 to August 2004," 13.

[255] Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 14 fn. 18.. The UNDP suggests that the importance of having special provisions for WAFF and CAFF was debated. The DDRR activity report states, "the Programme does acknowledge that not all persons within each faction possess weapons or ammunitions, however, past experiences have proven that once fighting forces perceive eligibility criteria as open for discussion, flexible and lenient, they tend to hide their best weapons, and generally are pre-disposed to submit unarmed men, children, women and the handicapped." UNDP, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) Activity Report: United Nations Development Programme Administered Trust Fund, December 2003 to August 2004," 19.

[256] UNDP, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) Activity Report: United Nations Development Programme Administered Trust Fund, December 2003 to August 2004."

[257] UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements."

[258] Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration," 30.

ceasefire and established the conditions for DDRR.[259] UNMIL's mandate included responsibility for supporting the DDRR process.[260] The resolution tasked UNMIL with the development of an action plan for DDRR paying special attention to the needs of child combatants and women. To fulfill its mandate, UNMIL created a DDRR Unit (DDRRU).

UNMIL contained a Gender Advisor responsible for ensuring that gender issues were mainstreamed into all UNMIL programs and activities, including attention to gender in the development and implementation of the DDRR program.[261] The Gender Advisor created a Gender Task Force with representatives in different UNMIL sections. The Gender Advisor's responsibility for the inclusion of a gender perspective in the DDRR process is unclear. Due to financial constraints and a lack of manpower, the Gender Advisor was unable to place gender officials outside of Monrovia's immediate surrounding areas to oversee the implementation of gender-sensitive programs. Aboagye and Bah suggest that this represented a major challenge to the implementation of its mandate.[262]

The Accra Accord tasked the NCDDRR with supervising and coordinating the DDRR programme by working closely with the international stabilization force and the relevant international and governmental agencies.[263] UNMIL's DDRRU worked with NCDDRR to develop the DDRR process. UNDP, UNMIL and NCDDRR formed the Joint Implementation Unit as "a working mechanism for carrying out the planning as well as the day-to-day operations of the programme."[264] The Unit's responsibilities included all aspects of DDRR planning and implementation.

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[259] See UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements.", Aboagye and Bah, "Liberia at a Crossroads: A Preliminary Look at the United Nations in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Protection of Civilians," 6.

[260] UNMIL, "UNMIL Mandate: Resolution 1509," United Nations Mission in Liberia Public Information Office, http://unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=mandate.

[261] _____, "Office of the Gender Advisor," United Nations Mission in Liberia, Public Information Office, http://unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=gender.

[262] Aboagye and Bah, "Liberia at a Crossroads: A Preliminary Look at the United Nations in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Protection of Civilians," 14.

[263] This included representatives of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), LURD, MODEL, ECOWAS, UN agencies, and members of the International Contac Group on Liberia. Ibid., 7.

[264] UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements." For a chart of the institutional arrangements of the DDRR program, see UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements."

The DDRR Action Plan of October 2003, developed by the DDRU, NCDDRR, UN agencies, donors, NGOs, included an institutional framework and operational strategy for Liberia's DDRR program. It contained specific provisions for female combatants and WAFF. UNMIL worked further with UN agencies and donors to develop a results-focused transition framework with a specific emphasis on women's inclusion in DDRR.[265] It targeted 2,000 female ex-combatants and WAFF for DDRR. It is unclear why the framework adopted such a low target number given their significantly higher participation rate in armed groups. UNIFEM states,

> While the establishment of a clear target number of beneficiaries marks an improvement from earlier DDR processes where female combatants, supporters and dependents were not considered a target group, the Framework does not establish a numerical target that approximates the actual proportion of women combatants, supporters and dependents…The gross under-estimation of the number of women fighters is all the more puzzling because a significant lesson learned from Sierra Leone is that women were associated with armed groups in far larger numbers than originally imagined.[266]

The DDRR action plan accorded UNICEF responsibility for overseeing the DDRR of CAFF. UNICEF worked with its implementing partners in the Child Protection Working Group to assess the scale of the child combatant phenomenon. This assessment later informed the policy-development process and implementation of programs for CAFFs. UNICEF also sensitized DDRR staff to the needs of CAFF. [267] It is unclear how much it devoted specifically to girl CAFFs and their access to DDRR. NCDDRR's payment of a transitional safety allowance to CAFF despite UNICEF's opposition indicates that the organization's control over the DDRR process for children was hardly absolute.

A UNDP-managed Trust Fund established by the Accra Accord channeled resources for DDRR. It provided "a mechanism for donors to collect resources and coordinate support."[268] The DDRR program also received bilateral development

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[265] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 9-13.
[266] Ibid., 13.
[267] UNICEF, 2004 #172}
[268] UNDP, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) Activity Report: United Nations Development Programme Administered Trust Fund, December 2003 to August 2004," 10.

assistance and UN agency funding.[269] The budget of Liberia's DDRR program was $88 million US. It contained special allocations for child combatants and disabled ex-combatants; however, it did not include allocations for addressing female ex-combatants or WAFF.[270] Budgetary targets planned for 38,000 to 53,000 expected DDR participants.[271]

The Trust Fund received $13.5 million US of the $28.8 million US pledged for DDRR by August 2004. This represented a 63% shortfall from the total amount required. Only $3.2 million US remained for Phase III disarmament and demobilisation activities and the entire rehabilitation and reintegration program.[272] Reasons for this shortfall include the unanticipated number of beneficiaries, abuse of the programme, the slow arrival of pledged funds, and poor management of program access.[273] In November 2004, UNDP launched an appeal for further funds, citing "critical funding shortfalls" for the rehabilitation and reintegration components of the DDRR program. While the pledges for the RR of 20,035 disarmed and demobilised individuals, UNDP appealed for an additional $58 million for 47,025 individuals not yet registered.[274]

There is no direct evidence linking the funding constraints to the absence of females from DDRR. Hobson suggests, however, that the disconnect between DD and RR funding had a negative impact on women and girls' participation as it limited

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[269] Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 41. Hendrickson also breaks down contributions to the Trust Fund according to donor.

[270] UNDP, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) Activity Report: United Nations Development Programme Administered Trust Fund, December 2003 to August 2004," 50, Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration," xiii.

[271] UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements."

[272] UNDP, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) Activity Report: United Nations Development Programme Administered Trust Fund, December 2003 to August 2004," 6, Hobson, "Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict," 22, STC, "Girls Formerly Associated with Armed Gorups and Armed Forces Who Did Not Go through Formal Demobilisation: Save the Children Uk's Experience in West Africa," 20 fn.56.

[273] UNDP, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) Activity Report: United Nations Development Programme Administered Trust Fund, December 2003 to August 2004," 18-19, Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 108, Aboagye and Bah, "Liberia at a Crossroads: A Preliminary Look at the United Nations in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Protection of Civilians," 9.

[274] UNDP, "UNDP Launches Appeal for Additional Funding for DDRR-Programme: Reintegration of Former Combatants at Risk in Liberia," (Monrovia: United Nations Development Program, Liberia, 2004).

the funding allocated to the rehabilitation and reintegration activities. The Trust Fund itself recognised that the limited financial resources had negative impact on the delivery of reintegration programs.[275] As funding shrunk, combatants with weapons were increasingly targeted as the primary DDRR target group.

DDR Program Implementation

Despite the gender-sensitivity at the level of DDRR policy, females encountered a number of obstacles to their accessing DDRR during program implementation. UNIFEM argues this reveals that "the advances made on paper have not been sufficient to ensure participation of those combatants are not accompanied by sufficient funds and programmes that are aimed specifically at women and girl combatants, supporter and dependents."[276]

The DDRR program began with a rapid but false start on December 7, 2003. Cantonment sites had inadequate logistical arrangements for females. Poor security conditions contributed to the program's suspension on December 17.[277] The poor planning was due in part to the failure of armed groups to provide complete lists of their members and the lack of facilities and personnel to process the combatants.[278] Security concerns prevented many females from participating. Bernard suggests that the DDRR process faced a political timeline that "did not accurately reflect the amount of time actually needed to plan and set up a peacekeeping mission, establish a functioning NTGL and prepare for a DDR."[279]

Following the debacle of Phase I, UNMIL developed a Joint Operational Plan with specific provisions for programs to better address the needs of females during DDRR. Specht suggests that even with this operation plan, the DDRR process did not include enough research on women and girls to guarantee their

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[275] Hobson, "Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict," 22, UNDP, "Liberia Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) Activity Report: United Nations Development Programme Administered Trust Fund, December 2003 to August 2004," 47.
[276] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 9.
[277] Ibid., 13. UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements."
[278] UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements.", Aboagye and Bah, "Liberia at a Crossroads: A Preliminary Look at the United Nations in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Protection of Civilians," 7.
[279] Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration," 62.

participation. Wessells also argues that the program continued to be poorly planned when it restarted in April 2004. UNIFEM further questions the success of this plan in soliciting greater participation from females, noting that the 1,789 combatants to enter in the first week of Phase II only included 130 women.[280]

Logistical difficulties with the DDRR's implementation contributed to women and girls' absence. Poor information dissemination on the DDRR process outside of Monrovia lessened females' participation. Women were sometimes unaware of the program or assumed that it required a weapon for participation. UNMIL eventually developed information campaigns specifically to encourage females' participation; however, radio transmissions occurred at "inappropriate times," leaving most women and girls dependent on commanders to learn about DDRR.[281] Specht finds that delays in the implementation of the program were one of the most significant factors affecting females' participation.[282] Women and girls self-demobilised to escape their captors. The majority of this occurred before the official start of the DDR process. Females who self-demobilised were thus excluded from participating in DDR.

Although the interim care centres for CAFF were impressive in their provision of age-appropriate and gender specific programming,[283] many girls were unable to access them. In the early stages of the DDRR implementation, specific provisions for girls did not exist; they were being required to produce a weapon to access DDRR.[284] As the program progressed, children were no longer required to produce a weapon; however, the large number of false combatants contributed to UNMIL's increasing reluctance to admit unarmed children to DDRR.[285]

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[280] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 14, Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 13, Wessells, *Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection*, 168.

[281] UNDDR, "National Institutions for DDR: Liberia DDR Programme: Institutional Arrangements.", STC, "Girls Formerly Associated with Armed Gorups and Armed Forces Who Did Not Go through Formal Demobilisation: Save the Children Uk's Experience in West Africa," 9.

[282] Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 91.

[283] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 17.

[284] Hobson, "Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict," 8.

[285] STC, "Girls Formerly Associated with Armed Gorups and Armed Forces Who Did Not Go through Formal Demobilisation: Save the Children Uk's Experience in West Africa," 9.

Agency of DDR Target Populations

Commanders' central role in the DDRR process provided them with significant control over women and girls' participation. Commanders responsible for presenting lists at disarmament centres frequently denied the presence of abducted women and girls in their armed groups.[286] Commanders replaced excluded females with their family members. The separate treatment of female ex-combatants and WAFF in DDRR allowed commanders to remove weapons from many female combatants to prevent their participation in the program.[287] This was particularly true during the early stages of the DDRR program when girls were being required to produce a weapon.[288] DDRR's payment of a transitional safety allowance to participants further contributed to commanders' manipulation of females.[289] Many girls were only included on lists submitted to DDRR authorities in exchange for bringing money back to commanders. Mazurana et al. attribute females' absence from the DDRR program to their support roles in armed groups. In the post-conflict setting, females were still "of more use" than boys; consequently, commanders kept them behind. They also argue that commanders did not want to "relinquish their possessions."[290]

Not all commanders prevented females from accessing DDRR. Female WAC commanders often played a leading role in informing girls about the DDRR program.[291] The quasi-maternal bonds between female commanders and their girls prompted these commanders to act as role models in encouraging girls to participate in DDRR. Female commanders often provided an important alternative support structure for girls who feared the stigma they may face if they returned to their communities.[292]

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[286] HRW, "How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia," 34.
[287] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 16.
[288] STC, "Girls Formerly Associated with Armed Gorups and Armed Forces Who Did Not Go through Formal Demobilisation: Save the Children Uk's Experience in West Africa," 9, 19.
[289] Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 117. See also Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 93.
[290] Mazurana et al., "Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilisation," 117-18.
[291] STC, "Girls Formerly Associated with Armed Gorups and Armed Forces Who Did Not Go through Formal Demobilisation: Save the Children Uk's Experience in West Africa," 13.
[292] Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 17, 85, 98.

Liberia's DDRR program underplayed females' agency throughout the design and implementation process. The failure of the 2004 Joint Operations Plan to immediately attract more females highlights the influence of females' decision-making on their participation in DDRR despite the existence of gender-specific programming. DDRR's emphasis on breaking bonds formed in armed groups dissuaded many girls who maintained a strong sense of loyalty towards their commanders or "husbands" from participating. This was particularly true in the WACs.[293] Specht finds that the loss of status and perceived gains in gender equality associated with the DDRR program prevented many girls in armed groups from entering DDRR. This was especially true given the exclusion of women and girls in the design of the DDRR process.[294] A fear of stigmatization prevented women and girls' from entering DDRR, especially if they suffered sexual abuse during their time in armed groups. Girls and their parents often avoided the DDRR process because they were "reluctant to acknowledge their engagement in contravention of acceptable female roles and fearful of further contact with their former commanders and possible retribution for leaving them."[295]

While the DDRR process underplayed the agency of females in armed groups, it did recognise a role for women's organizations in encouraging DDRR participation. In December 2003, UNMIL invited the Liberian Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) to help calm combatants to address the security problem at cantonment sites and provide services to CAFF. Women's organizations also played an important role in identifying the gaps in gender programming at cantonment sites and in communicating the benefits of DDRR participation to target groups. Their role likely encouraged more female combatants to participate in the process as women and girls were more comfortable with disarming with women's NGOs than with military personnel.[296]

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[293] Ibid., 14, 68.
[294] Ibid., 64.
[295] STC, "Girls Formerly Associated with Armed Gorups and Armed Forces Who Did Not Go through Formal Demobilisation: Save the Children Uk's Experience in West Africa," 8.
[296] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 13-14, 19.

DDR in Sudan

The origins of the Sudanese civil conflict lie in the independence of Sudan in 1956. Sudanese independence institutionalized the dominance of North Sudan.[297] During the 1960s, the Anya Nya movement led an insurgency to pursue secession for the South. This culminated in the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement providing the South with its own elected assembly and control over internal matters.[298] In 1983, civil war broke out once more after continued interference by the Nimeiri regime in the politics of the South and the statewide imposition of shari'a law.[299] The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) emerged as a new rebel movement under the leadership of John Garang fighting the central government's Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). The 1990s witnessed a series of unsuccessful negotiation attempts. A polarized political context persisted, however, with neither party willing to compromise its core beliefs.[300]

In 2001, facing increasing international pressure, the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A returned to the negotiating table under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In July 2002, the parties signed the Machakos Protocol, which addresses the major disputed questions, including an agreement for a broad framework for peace, the transitional process, the structures of governance, and self-determination for South Sudan.[301] In May 2004, they signed a

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[297] Between 1940-47, the British colonial power imposed the 'Southern Policy' in South Sudan whereby they treated it as separate from the North. After the policy was abandoned, Deng explains, "[Britain] had neither the time nor the political will to put in place constitutional arrangements that would ensure protection for the South in a united Sudan." Francis M. Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1995), 11.

[298] Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, "Civil War and Failed Peace Efforts in Sudan," in *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*, ed. Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (Montreal McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 205. Markakis explains, "It was the realization that a military solution was not a realistic option, and awareness of the political danger a protracted and unwinnable struggle posed for his regime, that brought Nimeiri to the negotiation table in Addis Ababa in 1972." John Markakis, *Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, International Peace Research Institute (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 119. See also Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, and Atta El-Batahani, "Sudan's Civil War: Why Has It Prevailed for So Long?," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington: World Bank Group, 2005), 199.

[299] Peter Woodward, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 46. Martin J. Kent, *Identity Politics: Filling the Gap between Federalism and Independence* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 159.

[300] Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan--Contested National Identities*, ed. Mark Tessler, Indiana Series in Middle East Studies (Bloomington: Indiana Univeristy Press, 1998), 183.

[301] Tabitha Jeptoo Sei, "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Sudan Peace Process," in *Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects*, ed. Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh, and Eddy Maloka (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004).

final framework for peace at Navaisha. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed January 9, 2005, addressing power and wealth sharing, security arrangements, and self-determination for the South through a referendum after six years. The conflict claimed 2 million lives while creating 4 million internally displaced persons and 600,000 refugees.[302]

Armed groups in Sudan forcibly recruited women and girls. Some females also chose to associate themselves with armed groups to access resources, to defend their families or protect themselves, or for revenge.[303] Many were associated with the armed groups from childhood. Armed groups relied on a two-pronged approach that allowed extensive looting among civilians for personal gain and the use of coercion to prevent the defection of combatants and persons associated with the armed groups. Forcible recruitment decreased the vested interest of SPLM/A commanders in the welfare of their combatants by making them more dispensable; new combatants could easily be obtained through further forced recruitment. Women and girls played critical roles in armed groups by filling a number of supporting roles, including as intelligence gatherers, cooks, cleaners, porters, and nurses. Officially, the SAF and the SPLM/A did not send females into frontline combat; however, post-conflict studies suggest that 40% of females had engaged in battle. Many received weapons training to defend their communities, but not for conflict.[304] Females

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[302] UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan," United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, http://unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35.

[303] UNMIS, "Assessment of Women Associated with the SPLA and Female Combatants in the SPLA, Southern Sudan, October 2005," ed. UN DDR Unit and the Southern Sudan Psychological Programme Southern DDR Interim Authority (Tonj, Thiet, Rumbek, Leer, Mirmir, Panyagor, Yei, Nimule: United Nations Mission for Sudan, 2005), 9. Accusations of this practice began in the 1980s by international human rights agencies and Western journalists. Evidence from Human Rights Watch indicates that this practice continued throughout the conflict. Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, "'Food Itself Is Fighting with Us': A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Sudan's Civil War on South Sudanese Civilian Populations Located in the North and South," in *Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa*, ed. Vigdis Broch-Due (London: Routledge, 2005), 135. Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, 232. Human Rights Watch, "Child Soldier Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict," http://hrw.org/reports/2004/childsoldiers0104/17.htm#_edn270. See also United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Sudan," (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2006).

[304] See UNMIS, "Assessment of Women Associated with the SPLA and Female Combatants in the SPLA, Southern Sudan, October 2005," 6 fn.9, 11, UNMIS, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," (Khartoum: United Nations Mission in Sudan, 2005), 7.

received food, security, and shelter primarily through the sexual relations or "bush marriages" with combatants and commanders.

DDR in Peace Agreements

Section III of the CPA outlined the basic framework for DDR. The section stated, "the overarching objective of the DDR process is to contribute to creating an enabling environment to human security and to support post-peace-agreement social stabilisation across the Sudan, particularly in war affected areas." It provided for the establishment, composition, and responsibilities of DDR institutions. Article XXIV on DDR's guiding principles highlighted the importance of the reintegration dimension of DDR for sustainable peacebuilding and reconciliation in Sudan. The emphasis reflected a partial recognition among CPA parties of the threat that the low level of development in South Sudan posed for DDR. The article further stated that the DDR program would be gender sensitive, and commits the parties to the demobilisation of all child soldiers within six months. The agreed DDR program only applies to SAF and SPLM/A members. Other armed groups must integrate into the SPLM/A and SAF to access DDR.[305]

Prior to the final peace negotiations, Sudanese women struggled to participate in the peace process. In 2000, Sudanese women gathered at the IGAD-sponsored International Conference on Sudanese Women and Peacemaking in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in an effort to "to link women's peace activities to IGAD's efforts" and to integrate gender and peacebuilding policies.[306] The IGAD Secretariat for Sudan created a Women's Desk later that year to strengthen women's presence in peace initiatives. Women's organizations, such as the Sudanese Women Advocacy Mission to New York in July 2003, succeeded in raising awareness about the importance of addressing women's issues in the peace process.[307] Throughout the final negotiations leading to the CPA, women's organizations such as the Strategic

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[305] "Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) During the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods," (Naivasha, December 31: 2004), Articles 23-26.

[306] ReliefWeb, "Axworthy Addresses Sudan and Chechnya at UN Meeting in Geneva," Government of Canada, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/748dfc4b0b7b9b7dc12568c1005a5433.

[307] ———, "Scio Sudan Monthly Report Jun 2000," Sudan Catholic Information Service, http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/f0ef48f71ac6a492c125692d0048a511.

Initiatives for the Horn of Africa and the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace, called for attention to gender issues in the peace talks.[308] These organizations also called for women's presence in Government of Sudan and SPLM/A delegations to the talks. Despite the presence of women in armed groups in North and South Sudan, women's presence in the peace talks was negligible. The exact number of females in the talks is contested. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that the Government of Sudan delegation to the peace talks in Kenya only included one female. The SPLM/A, by contrast, claimed to have five females listed as delegates to the peace talks; however, it did not have the resources to facilitate their travel to the negotiations in Kenya. Where delegations did include women, this inclusion was tokenistic.[309]

In the CPA, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A agreed to a phased timetable for DDR to overcome the challenges posed by the highly militarized context. The first step, the pre-interim period, included the demobilisation of all child soldiers and the preparation of the Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP). The second phase, the implementation of the IDDRP, is scheduled to last one year. IDDRP aimed to address the needs of special target groups, to build the capacity of national DDR institutions and civil society organizations, and to lay the framework for a multi-year full-scale DDR program in Sudan to follow IDDRP.[310] In doing so, it aims to restore basic security as a prerequisite for sustainable peace and development.[311]

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[308] IPS, "Sudanese Women Demand a Place at the Negotiating Table," *Inter Press Service UN Journal* 12, no. 64 (2004): 4.

[309] ReliefWeb, "Sudan: Focus on Women and War," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/271380af2321c613c1256c6f004bb64e.
Kezia Layinwa Nicodemus, the Commissioner for Women, Gender and Child Welfare of the SPLM/A since 2000, notes that the pressures from the international community to include females into the peace talks at Naivasha contributed to the SPLM/A's inclusion of some women. She states, however, "They bring two or three [women], and then after some few days they dismiss them. Their participation is not at the negotiating table, the women are in the committees behind the scenes." IRIN, "Sudan: Interview with SPLM Women's Commissioner Kezia Layinwa Nicodemus," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=49044.

[310] UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan."

[311] UNMIS, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," 5.

Definition of Combatants and Eligibility Criteria

To overcome obstacles to females' participation in DDR, IDDRP included a broad definition of the category of combatants reflecting the broad spectrum of women and girls' roles in Sudanese armed groups. It defines women's role in armed groups according to four levels of engagement. IDDRP first defines female combatants as members of armed groups who carried a weapon and were recruited and trained by armed groups. Second, it defines women associated with armed forces and groups (WAAFG). These are direct supporters of the armed groups in non-combat roles that are fully dependent on these groups. They are excluded from social support by civilian communities. Third, it defines female dependents as those who may assist on occasion in the armed groups but maintain strong ties with civilian communities and have access to civilian community support mechanisms. They do not always travel with the armed groups. Finally, it defines women in war-affected communities as females not directly associated with members of armed groups.[312]

To determine females' level of association in armed groups and their consequent eligibility for DDR, IDDRP created a series of questions to ask females at DDR reception centres.[313] Female combatants must either be included on the roster lists of the armed groups or have their membership in the armed groups confirmed by a commander. They may be asked to provide information on weapon operation and their involvement in combat, as well as to list their other roles in the armed group. The questions used to establish WAAFG status are greater in number. This reflects the difficulty of identifying WAAFG, particularly given that many armed groups deny their existence.[314] WAAFG are assessed according to their displacement with armed groups, the possibility of abandonment by armed groups, their roles in armed groups, their relationship with soldiers, their inter-reliance with the armed groups, their ties to civilian communities, and the possibility of abduction.

Only female combatants and WAAFG are eligible for individual IDDRP assistance. Preston recalls that there was less resistance to the definition of female

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[312] See Ibid., 48-51.
[313] See ———, "Developing Criteria for Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups," (Khartoum: United Nations Mission in Sudan, UN DDR Unit, 2006).
[314] ———, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," 50, Douglas.

combatants than there was for WAAFG. The ineligibility of female dependents and war-affected populations for individual DDR assistance contributed to their perception that DDR was a reward process.[315] The widespread practice of polygamy in Sudan also creates an incredible number of dependents on combatants. Their inclusion in DDR opens the possibility for the exclusion of some dependent wives.[316] IDDRP provides for female dependents through community security support programs to assist them during their reintegration into civilian communities. War-affected are also included in community security programs.[317] Community security support programs only occur, however, in communities "that are assessed as posing a greater strategic risk to overall peace and security in Sudan."[318]

Girls in armed groups in Sudan fall into the category of 'children associated with armed forces and groups' (CAAFG). IDDRP defines CAAFG according to the Cape Town Principles; however, it notes that definition of Principles may still exclude some children living with armed groups. It thus calls for special attention to girls in applying the eligibility criteria for DDR access.[319]

Institutional Responsibility for DDR Program Design and Implementation

The CPA places primary responsibility for policy formulation, supervision of the DDR program, and coordination of the DDR process on the National DDR Coordination Council. Although the Government of National Unity endorsed the IDDRP, it has not yet inaugurated the Council.[320] In keeping with policy of self-determination for South Sudan, the CPA created North Sudan DDR Commission

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[315] Meredith Preston, Electronic Correspondence June 27 2007.
[316] Douglas.
[317] IDDRP states, "Support should be given for full initial reintegration of ex-combatants. However, in the context of longer-term reintegration, a balance must be struck between continuing to support ex-combatants specific needs and the needs of the wider community, in order to present resentment. Any focus on the longer term reintegration of ex-combatants must therefore be accompanied by complementary interventions that focus on both the families of ex-combatants and their respective communities, without which sustainable reintegration cannot succeed…It is important to ensure that communities are at *the centre* of planning for reintegration." UNMIS, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," 28. Italics in original.
[318] _____, "The Sudan Interim DDR Programme. DDR Quarterly Report. July-September, 2006," (Khartoum: United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Unit: United Nations Mission in Sudan, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Children's Fund, 2006), 15.
[319] _____, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," 6.
[320] UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan."

(NSDDRC) and South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC), which include members of armed groups, civil society, and the international community assisting in DDR.[321] The DDR commissions in North and South Sudan are charged with the design, implementation, and management process of the DDR process in their respective territories.[322]

The national commissions played the lead in developing the IDDRP. The IDDRP is the most gender-sensitive DDR policy framework to date. It prioritizes the demobilisation of women and girls associated with armed groups as an IDDRP target group to be demobilised prior to the full-scale disarmament program along with children associated with armed groups and disabled ex-combatants. Schroeder explains,

> [IDDRP] was designed to address more vulnerable groups first, so women, children, and disabled combatants prior to wider DDR process, which is unusual for DDR processes, where women are usually included as an afterthought. This one made a more conscious effort to focus on women at the beginning. There are various reasons for that. One could say that because of all of the lessons learned from earlier DDR process, which completed marginalized women, and that they wanted to take a new approach this time. But, I think that it was more a case of a political decision, because it provided more time to negotiate the wider DDR process.[323]

IDDRP makes a clear commitment to gender-sensitivity and gender awareness in the DDR process. There is no information available on women's inclusion in the development of the IDDRP. The SSDDRC included Angelina Teny, the wife of the Vice President of South Sudan, Riek Machar, during the early stages of the commission.[324] It is unclear whether she participated in developing IDDRP.

Given the SAF's official denial of having WAAFG, women's involvement in the NSDDRC has been problematic and remains minimal.[325] The NSDDRC has,

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[321] UNMIS, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in Sudan Information Sheet," (Khartoum: United Nations Mission in Sudan, United Nations Development Programme Sudan, United Nations Children's Fund, 2006).

[322] This includes responsibility for the definition of DDR objectives, target groups and eligibility criteria, the approval of DDR programs, and public information campaigns."Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) During the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods," Article 50.

[323] Emily Schroeder, Phone Interview, May 24 2007.

[324] Ibid.

[325] Ibid.

however, hired a Gender and HIV/AIDS focal point, as has the SSDDRC.[326] The SSDDRC also includes some female SPLM/A members. The current participation levels of women in NSDDRC and SSDDRC are far from the 30% representation of women in all CPA institutions called for by Sudanese women.[327] The national DDR commissions in the North and South are currently discussing a policy on how to address women in the final DDR program.[328] While the institutional structure exists to address the needs of WAAFG, the national commissions must overcome difficulties stemming from staff shortages that limit the attention that they can pay to gender issues. A further danger arises from the arrival of staff from other DDR programs. These individuals may assume that other DDR models can be exported to Sudan. The former head of the NCDDR in Sierra Leone, for example, runs the NSDDRC.[329] Staff unfamiliar with Sudan's conflict might develop DDR policies that do not reflect the roles of females in Sudanese armed groups.

The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) plays an important role in the DDR process. The UN Security Council created UNMIS in Resolution 1590 of March 24, 2005. It mandated UNMIS to "assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program…with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants."[330] UNMIS created a unified UN DDR structure (DDRU) to ensure a coordinated approach to DDR by UN actors. The original DDRU of April 2005 included UNMIS and UNDP. It later expanded to include UNICEF. The DDRU provides technical support for program development to the national DDR commissions.[331] It also promotes the incorporation of women

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[326] Xanthe Scharff, "Supporting a Gender Responsive DDR Program. Review of the UNMIS Ddru Gender Policy for Providing Technical Assistance to the NSDDRC and SSDDRC [Confidential Draft for Internal Circulation]," (Khartoum: United Nations Mission for Sudan, 2006), 3.

[327] Although IGAD calls for the principle of 50% representation for women, Sudanese women recommend 30% representation as a minimum threshold to reflect the Sudanese context. WomenWarPeace, "Sudanese Women's Priorities and Recommendations to the Oslo Donors' Conference on Sudan, 11-12 April 2005" (paper presented at the Symposium on Women's rights and Leadership in Post-Conflict Sudan, Oslo, April 10 2005), 2.

[328] Schroeder.

[329] Schroeder notes the different context of DDR in South Sudan, where the SPLM/A is not being disbanded. Ibid.

[330] UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan.", UNMIS, "Mission's Mandate," United Nations Mission in Sudan, http://www.unmis.org/english/mandate.htm.

[331] UNMIS, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in Sudan Information Sheet.", UNMIS and UNDP, "Establishment of a Unified UN DDR Support Structure and Programme in

into the national commissions; however, it does not have the authority to oblige the NSDDRC and SSDDRC to include them.

DDRU is the first unit to have gender and DDR specialists integrated into the planning process from the outset.[332] The inclusion of two Gender and HIV/AIDS focal points and two Gender and HIV/AIDS officers in the DDRU's structure firmly established its reputation as a gender-sensitive unit. DDRU's Gender Strategy further entrenched this reputation.[333] DDRU's actions appear to support this reputation. Meredith Preston, a UNDP consultant, and Vanessa Farr helped the interim authorities to build gender-sensitive DDR policies into the CPA. Later, as DDRU's Gender and HIV/AIDS focal point, Preston assisted in developing a comprehensive section on WAAFG for the IDDRP that recognised the potential obstacles to their accessing DDR. DDRU staff members continue to meet with gender focal points in SSDDRC and NSDDRC to discuss gender issues.[334] On having gender experts engrained in DDRU, Douglas states, "having that institutional capacity translated into results on the policy-front."[335]

Despite DDRU's gender-sensitive structure, it has encountered difficulties in supporting genders-sensitive DDR policies and programs. The lack of support at the senior levels for gender-focused policies represents a major obstacle. DDRU's gender experts spend much time fighting internal bureaucratic battles that detract from their ability to concentrate on DDR program development. The gender-balance

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Sudan. Plan of Action for the Period May 2005-June 2006," (Khartoum: United Nations Mission in Sudan and United Nations Development Programme, 2005).

[332] Vanessa Farr, Electronic Correspondence, July 11 2007.

[333] The key principles of the DDRU gender strategy are as follows: "***Women play an essential role in security*** and the have a right to participate in DDR-related activities within communities and in security institutions; ***DDR programming will be gender-inclusive***, and will aim to ensure the equitable involvement of women at all levels and in all aspects of DDR; ***The DDR program will not discriminate between men and women.*** Men and women, when eligible for DDR, will receive equitable benefits and will have equitable choices regarding their reintegration; ***UNMIS will take a coordinated approach so that gender issues outside the scope of the DDR program can be supported by other agencies;*** and, ***DDR Will Follow a Do No Harm and a Conflict Sensitive Approach*** to prevent interventions from creating pockets of insecurity and vulnerability through its activities."Scharff, "Supporting a Gender Responsive DDR Program. Review of the UNMIS Ddru Gender Policy for Providing Technical Assistance to the NSDDRC and SSDDRC [Confidential Draft for Internal Circulation]," 3, 9. (Bold and italics in origina)

[334] Ibid., 3, Schroeder, Douglas, UNMIS, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," 48.

[335] Douglas.

of the DDRU is also skewed; only 23% of the current staff is female and they are largely concentrated in the lower-level positions.[336]

Bureaucratic tensions between the agencies in DDRU further limit its ability to concentrate on ensuring females' inclusion in DDR. The CPA and the IDDRP grant UNICEF responsibility for addressing CAAFG in Sudan. IDDRP recognises the potential for overlap between the WAAFG and girls with the possibility that girls will present themselves as WAAFG. It highlights the importance of coordination between DDR actors to ensure these girls receive appropriate support.[337] UNICEF recognises that some who entered armed groups under the age of 18 are now over the age of 18. It is thus also designing programs to meet the needs of youth who were under 18 when the CPA was signed but are now too old to qualify for CAAFG.[338] No UNICEF staff were available to comment on UNICEF activities in Sudan.

NSDDRC and SSDDRC receive funds for IDDRP from the United Nations via UNMIS, voluntary contributions from donors, and the governments of North and South Sudan. The preliminary budget for IDDRP was for $58.8 million US.[339] IDDRP received $42 million US of this budget through donor support combined with $12.7 million US UNMIS funding. This budget increased to $69 million US for the 2006-2007 year. Of the IDDRP budget, $4 million is earmarked for the disarmament of WAAFG and disabled ex-combatants. This only partially meets the demand for a specific women's fund by Sudanese women.[340] The amount for CAAFG is unclear; however, DDRU's quarterly report for June-September 2006 suggests that the direct targeted support of CAAFG is greater than for WAAFG. This does not automatically mean, however, that girls benefit from this funding. To

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[336] Ibid.
[337] UNMIS, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," 53.
[338] Douglas.
[339] UNMIS and UNDP, "Establishment of a Unified UN DDR Support Structure and Programme in Sudan. Plan of Action for the Period May 2005-June 2006," 8.
[340] WomenWarPeace, "Sudanese Women's Priorities and Recommendations to the Oslo Donors' Conference on Sudan, 11-12 April 2005".

date, IDDRP has massively under spent its funding; the expenditures of the program as of September 2006 were $10.3 million.[341]

Budgetary considerations for IDDRP affect the inclusion of females in Sudan's DDR programs. The finite resources and the sheer scale of the armed groups in Sudan limit the scope of the DDR process. The forcible recruitment of combatants militarized the Sudanese society. This is particularly true in Southern Sudan. The UN Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre explains,

> The prolonged civil war and the communal nature of South Sudanese life has meant that virtually every male has been involved in the fighting in one way or another. Furthermore, a large number of women have also participated in the conflict either in a combat role or in a support role.[342]

Douglas explains that the decision to not extend DDR assistance to female dependents stems from the sheer number of individuals who would qualify for DDR. In Sudan, where a large proportion of the population can legitimately claim to be connected to armed groups, an "open-ended" DDR process including dependents of armed groups would attract more DDR participants than is logistically feasible.[343] Such process would make 2.2 million women eligible for DDR. The decision to limit DDR access was thus made to ensure that DDR would be "programmatically feasible."[344]

Bureaucratic tensions within DDRU between DPKO and UNDP over budget allocations have a negative impact on programming efforts more generally.[345] Donors' focuses on traditional funding patterns wherein clear target numbers are established prior to the release of funds create problems in Sudan. Preston explains that resource constraints contribute to the criticism that WAAFG is too vaguely defined and therefore too expensive for the DDR program. The suggestion is that resources should be spent on those posing the greatest risk for security.[346]

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[341] UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan.", Douglas. UNMIS, "The Sudan Interim DDR Programme. DDR Quarterly Report. July-September, 2006," 3, 37.
[342] UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan."
[343] UNMIS, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in Sudan Information Sheet."
[344] Douglas.
[345] Schroeder.
[346] Preston.

DDR program implementation

The IDDRP program has encountered a series of difficulties resulting in a delay in its implementation. Armed groups have yet to fully disclose the numbers of their armed groups to NSDDRC and SSDDRC. This is due in part to the difficulties of establishing the size of the armed groups.[347] The SAF has a clearer set of numbers. The militarization of South Sudan makes it much more difficult to determine the number of SPLM/A members eligible for DDR. The presence of militias and paramilitary groups further complicates the establishment of the number of persons associated with armed groups throughout Sudan.

In the absence of clear numbers from armed groups, IDDRP is experiencing difficulties confirming the number of eligible WAAFG. IDDRP estimated the presence of 3,500 WAAFG in South Sudan and 2,100 WAAFG in North Sudan.[348] In October 2005, DDRU conducted a lengthy field assessment of WAAFG and girls in South Sudan. The assessment estimated that there were 3,178 WAAFG with the SPLM/A, 1,824 female combatants, and 545 women veterans in South Sudan. The assessment found that WAAFGs in extremely difficult circumstances owing to SPLM/A's lack of resources to address their needs. The assessment highlights the difficulties in accessing WAAFG.[349] It also notes the difficulties in identifying the number of WAAFG and female combatants.

DDRU has been encouraging the NSDDRC and the SSDDRC to engage in pre-registration exercises to establish the lists of participants in armed groups necessary for DDR implementation. While IDDRP includes clear recommendations for a gender-sensitive registration process, neither national commission has clear guidelines to ensure gender-sensitive interviewing.[350] Pre-registration by NSDDRC began on December 12, 2006. The SPLM/A has not conducted a comprehensive pre-registration exercise. In the absence of a full-scale pre-registration campaign,

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[347] UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan."
[348] UNMIS, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," 7.
[349] Preston, UNMIS, "Assessment of Women Associated with the SPLA and Female Combatants in the SPLA, Southern Sudan, October 2005."
[350] UNMIS, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP),"!54-55. Scharff, "Supporting a Gender Responsive DDR Program. Review of the UNMIS Ddru Gender Policy for Providing Technical Assistance to the NSDDRC and SSDDRC [Confidential Draft for Internal Circulation]," 4.

identifying WAAFG for assistance is extremely difficult. Registration efforts to date lacked a clear gender-strategy.[351] A limited number of WAAFG have been registered and provided with initial reinsertion assistance in Sudan's DDR process. IDDRP has demobilised 102 persons in Khartoum, of whom 52 were WAAFG.

Information on girls' inclusion during the preliminary implementation of IDDRP programs for CAAFG is more difficult to obtain. UNICEF's community-based reintegration approach aims to minimize the stigma attached to returning CAAFG by offering support to these children through recipient communities, as well as to enhance the capacity of communities to absorb these CAAFG. It is also intended to reduce tensions between children and other war-affected populations.[352] The emphasis on community-based reintegration means that many girls do not receive the appropriate services to address their gender-specific needs throughout the DDR process.[353] UNICEF's current approach to the DDR suggests that the agency's operations in Sudan consider the needs of CAAFG universal.[354]

Regional child DDR officers around North and South Sudan are working to demobilize children. These efforts include outreach activities to distribute information on the IDDRP process to CAAFG in SPLM/A barracks.[355] If girls have self-demobilised due to delays in IDDRP's implementation, it is possible they will not receive this information. Officers have encountered particular difficulties in accessing CAAFG where registration lists are inaccurate. Reintegration exercises have begun for CAAFG under NSDDRC and SSDDRC. Preliminary figures on the DDR of children suggest girls' marginalization in this process; of 181 children released in South Kordofan in June 2006, only 7 were girls. In South Sudan, 1,040 CAAFG were removed from the SPLM/A and other armed groups by December

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[351] Scharff recommends that the Gender Focal Point for SSDDRC should review the pre-registration exercise to document gender-issues and develop guidelines to integrate gender issues into future registration campaigns. Scharff, "Supporting a Gender Responsive DDR Program. Review of the UNMIS Ddru Gender Policy for Providing Technical Assistance to the NSDDRC and SSDDRC [Confidential Draft for Internal Circulation]," 4, 5.

[352] UNMIS, "Sudan UN DDR Newsletter: November," (Khartoum: United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit: United Nations Mission in Sudan, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Children's Fund, 2006), 3-6.

[353] Douglas.

[354] Ibid.

[355] UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan.", UNMIS, "Sudan UN DDR Newsletter: November."

2006. No information is available on the number of girls in this group.[356]

Agency of DDR Target Populations

The CPA includes a clear call for the inclusion of women and girls throughout the DDR process, stating,

> The DDR programme shall be gender sensitive and shall encourage the participation of the communities and civil society organizations with the view to strengthening their capacities to play their role in improving and sustaining the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants.[357]

IDDRP also includes significant recognition of the agency of WAAFG and CAAFG in the DDR process. It recognises that "equal involvement of women and men through all levels of the process will be constrained by the extreme gender disparities ingrained in Sudanese society;" nevertheless, it continues to call for their presence in all levels of decision-making. IDDRP also recognises the importance of consulting CAAFG about their removal from armed groups and their reintegration to create a participatory and inclusive DDR process. Discussions of the agency of CAAFG make no mention, however, of the importance of special attention to girls. [358] The official recognition in DDR policy documents of females' agency in DDR is a significant step forward in the DDR sphere.

The translation of these gender-sensitive principles into practice is more problematic. The actions of commanders in both North and South Sudan obstruct females' access to the IDDRP. The IDDRP in fact recognises the role of commanders in curbing WAAFG access to DDR programs.[359] Commanders'

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[356] UNMIS, "Sudan UN DDR Newsletter: November." UNMIS, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in Sudan Information Sheet.". See UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan." for the most up to date figures.

[357] "Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) During the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods," Article 24.8.

[358] UNMIS, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," 17, 21-22, 24, 28, 42. IDDRP further states, "Recognising the role of women in supporting security—within communities as well as in security institutions—as well as their potential as spoilers, is essential and demonstrates the importance of women's equitable participation and inclusion in various aspects of DDR for it to be successful in establishing lasting security."

[359] Ibid., 48.. The DDRU October 2005 of WAAFG in South Sudan also highlighted this problem, stating, "The informal nature of WAAFG links with the military mean that many are at the mercy of arbitrary decisions by commanders to assist them, or not." It also notes a correlation between the attitudes of commanders towards WAAFG and the quality of information available on the presence of these women. UNMIS, "Assessment of Women Associated with the SPLA and Female Combatants in the SPLA, Southern Sudan, October 2005," 16.

integrity in the IDDRP pre-registration verification process grants them the ability to exclude female combatants, WAAFGs and girl CAAFGs in both North and South Sudan. The commanders who present and confirm candidates for the DDR process may have personal and political reasons for excluding females, whether they do not want to admit of their presence or because of their reluctance to release them. SAF commanders were present during the NCDDRC's pre-registration campaign in North Sudan to identify combatants from their units.[360] Many commanders in North Sudan are reluctant to identify WAAFG as the SAF does not have WAAFG in North Sudan. Registration of females in North Sudan is complicated as many WAAFG in the North were formerly associated with the SPLM/A.[361] DDR staff have no access to these groups. The majority of WAAFG associated with the SAF were with them in the South. Douglas notes that the DDRU does not have the capacity to obligate commanders to identify these women.[362]

Regional DDR actors are sensitizing local commanders and members of armed groups to identify CAAFG and WAAFG to secure their release. NSDDRS conducted a workshop on CAAFG that included commanders to develop an implementation plan for CAAFG under the DDR process. SSDDRC has trained SPLM/A commanders on the identification of WAAFG and female combatants. This does not guarantee, however, the accurate identification and inclusion of females in DDR. DDRU has evidence that some women being presented by the SPLM/A are not genuine WAAFG, while other WAAFG are being presented as female ex-combatants or not being included at all. There is concern on how this will affect reporting for donors who targeted money specifically for WAAFG; if this

[360] UNMIS, "Sudan UN DDR Newsletter: December," (Khartoum: United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit: United Nations Mission in Sudan, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Children's Fund, 2006), 2.
[361] Knowledge of this problem existed before the pre-registration process. IDDRP explains, "Women associated with SPLM/A forces in northeastern Sudan who are preparing to disengage are another priority consideration. Anecdotal information suggests that there are relatively large numbers of southern women who have been moved with these forces to the area, and it is unclear whether they will be supported by the military to return to the south." ———, "Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program for Sudan (IDDRP)," 51.
[362] Douglas.

targeting is not successful, it raises questions about future DDR programs including specific provisions for WAAFG.[363]

DDRU's October 2005 assessment of WAAFG and female ex-combatants in South Sudan recognised their agency. It sought to collect information on the needs of these women to inform the design of the DDR process.[364] It was important in providing a good understanding of the needs and capacities of these women.[365] The assessment emphasizes the importance of consulting these females to design a DDR process that meets their needs and thus encourages their participation in DDR.

DDRU continues to emphasize women and girls' agency to ensure that the DDR process reflects their needs. It currently sponsors the Hakamas project, where a group of WAAFG travels between communities to hold workshops on conflict resolution, reconciliation, the CPA, the DDR process and HIV/AIDS awareness. DDRU recognises the importance of distributing similar information to the communities into which CAAFG will be released. The Hakamas project aims to build women and girls' leadership roles in the peacebuilding process. The same assistance is currently available to female combatants and WAAFG; however, it is possible that they will receive separate assistance packages according to their needs once the full-scale demobilisation program begins. DDRU's aims to incorporate services for WAAFG into larger programs for war-affected women to combat stigma.[366] SSDDRC continues to hold workshops on sexual and gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS for civil society to encourage these organizations to address these issues within their communities. If successful, these activities may combat much of the insecurity faced by WAAFG and may thus encourage them to present themselves for DDR.[367]

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[363] Douglas states, "I am worried that [problems identifying WAAFG] might be a problem when it comes to reporting to donors, because they gave [the DDR program] funding specifically for target groups, and we need to be able to show that we reached them. At the policy level, this is the first DDR program that officially recognised WAAFG as a target group and prioritized them. If we can't show that this works, it will have ramifications for future DDR programs. We are trying to get the SPLM/A to disaggregate the numbers into these categories so that we can provide figures on the number of WAAFG reached in the South." Ibid.

[364] UNMIS, "Assessment of Women Associated with the SPLA and Female Combatants in the SPLA, Southern Sudan, October 2005."

[365] Douglas.

[366] See Ibid, UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan."

[367] UNDDR, "Country Programme: Sudan.", UNMIS, "Sudan UN DDR Newsletter: November," 1-2.

DDRU also emphasizes the importance of engaging CAAFG in reintegration activities to break their dependence on armed groups and to ensure that they understand the DDR process. No information is available to ascertain whether there is a call for special attention to the agency of girls as a sub-group of CAAFG. At the policy-level, UNICEF's community-based reintegration holds the potential to include more girls in the DDR process by not singling them out for individual assistance. This may encourage more girl CAAFG to present themselves to receive support as they are not forced to self-identify as individuals formerly associated with armed groups. Recognising the agency of CAAFG in this process also creates a vested interest for them in the successful implementation of the DDR program.[368]

The emphasis on national ownership of the DDR process may translate into recognition of women and girls' agency in Sudan's on-going DDR program design and implementation. Capacity building activities for women's community-based organizations are extremely important in this regard. Their role will likely increase when the full-scale DDR process begins given the tendency of UN agencies and international NGOs to contract local organizations as implementing partners. Schroeder suggests that the current weakness of civil society organizations represents a unique opportunity to support the development of civil society while instilling principles of gender equality.[369] This process will be extremely resource-intensive; however, it may play a key role guaranteeing women's future inclusion in the DDR process.

[368] UNMIS, "Sudan UN DDR Newsletter: November," 5-6.
[369] Schroeder.

Understanding the Absence of Females Associated with Armed Forces and Groups from DDR Programs

A DDR program that successfully includes females to an extent that reflects their participation in armed groups does not yet exist. The gaps in the information available about the DDR programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan make it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the relative influence of the provisions for DDR in peace agreements, the definition of combatants and eligibility criteria adopted by DDR programs, institutional responsibility for DDR program design and implementation, and the agency of commanders and FAAFG, on the inclusion of women and girls in armed groups in the DDR process. The DDR case studies indicate that it is not possible to establish direct causal relationships between these factors and the current absence of FAAFG from DDR. Furthermore, the case studies indicate that the context in which DDR programs occur influences the ordering of these five factors. This does not prevent us, however, from reaching general conclusions based on the DDR case studies to understand these factors' relative influence on FAAFGs' participation in DDR.

DDR in the Peace Agreements

The peace agreements in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan all contain provisions for the disarmament and demobilisation of armed groups. Despite their enormous political function in gesturing the parties' willingness to decrease their reliance on violence to obtain their objectives, the provisions for DDR within the peace agreements remain brief. Peace agreements generally include crucial articles through which armed groups agree to disarm and demobilize their troops; however, they do not always include definitions of those eligible for DDR or statements linking DDR to broader post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The limited participation of females in Mozambique and Sierra Leone's DDR programs suggests that a failure to state DDR's broader goals within peace agreements serves as an important warning beacon of the likely absence of females from DDR programs. Given the attention devoted to the inclusion of women and girls in armed groups in the DDR process, the Liberian and Sudanese cases suggests that a recognition of DDR's broader goals is fundamental for establishing the foundations of an inclusive

peace process. More importantly, the peace agreements in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Liberia do not recognise the importance of the reintegration dimension of DDR for persons associated with armed groups. Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement stands out as the only peace agreement to do so. The CPA demonstrates that recognition of the importance of reintegration programs that accompany disarmament and demobilisation is vital for establishing DDR programs that are relevant to the needs of women and girls.

The case studies illustrate an important historical progression in the inclusion of articles in peace agreements relevant to females in DDR. Sudan's CPA is not the first to recognise the importance of addressing the needs of vulnerable groups in the post-conflict setting. The Lomé Accord, the Accra Accord, and the CPA all recognize women and girls' gender-specific experiences in conflict and the importance of including them in post-conflict reconstruction. The peace agreements from Sierra Leone onwards recognise the special needs of child combatants during DDR. These do not, however, recognise girls as a vulnerable sub-group during the DDR process. Sudan's peace agreement is the first to recognise both women and girls as active participants in armed groups with special needs during the design and implementation of the DDR program. This recognition represents an important forward shift in the gender-sensitivity of peace agreements, although the reasons for this shift remain unclear. The case studies demonstrate that a recognition of women and girls' experiences, whether as victims or as participants in armed groups, and the importance of gender-sensitivity in the post-conflict setting hardly serves as an automatic guarantee of their inclusion in the eventual design and implementation of DDR. It does serve, however, as a necessary point of departure from which the post-conflict authorities can design programs reflecting the gender-specific needs of females in armed groups during DDR.

The cases of Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan do not allow a clear picture of the impact of women's presence in peace negotiations on females' eventual inclusion in DDR programs. The complete absence of women from Mozambique's peace process and their treatment in the peace agreement and the subsequent DDR process suggests a positive correlation between women's presence in peace processes and gender-inclusiveness of peace agreements. As such, women's

participation in peace negotiations may contribute to females' inclusion in DDR by providing the foundations of a gender-sensitive program. Women's limited representation in the peace processes in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan, however, hardly stand out as definitive evidence of a direct causal relationship. The notable gender-sensitivity of Sudan's CPA despite the continued absence of women at the negotiating table especially challenges the existence of a relationship. International actors such as IGAD may support women's participation in the peace talks; however, this does not translate into women's substantive inclusion in practice.[370] Peace negotiations continue to be male-dominated, high-level negotiations in which women continue to be largely absent and underrepresented, despite the significant body of policy literature and UN resolutions calling for their inclusion. Pankhurst argues that, until recently, it was thought that conflict settlements could be created without the purposeful involvement of women and still succeed in addressing women's needs in the final agreement.[371] A number of deeply embedded structural, cultural, and social barriers continue to prevent women's more active engagement in peace processes.[372]

The absence of a clear relationship between women's role in peace negotiations and their participation in DDR programs begs the question of whether a greater inclusion of women in future negotiations will translate into more gender-sensitive peace agreements leading to more gender-aware DDR programs that include females. Bouta, Frerks and Bannon point out that the role of peace accords in shaping the post-conflict context mean that a gender perspective on peace must

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[370] ReliefWeb, "Axworthy Addresses Sudan and Chechnya at UN Meeting in Geneva."

[371] Donna Pankhurst, "'The 'Sex War' and Other Wars: Towards a Feminist Approach to Peacebuilding," in *Development, Women and War: Feminist Perspectives*, ed. Haleh Afsar and Deborah Eade, *A Development in Practice Reader* (Oxford: Oxfam, 2004), 13.

[372] These include factors such as the lack of recognition of women's informal peacebuilding activities by negotiators, a failure to recognise their active roles in armed groups, local customs and traditions that exclude women from the political sphere, and a lack of resources. Sorensen, "Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources," 6-9, Worthen, Rawwida Baksh et al., eds., *Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace*, New Gender Mainstreaming Series on Development Issues (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005), 38-39, Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development*, 49. Mazurana and McKay, *Women and Peacebuilding*. Even where armed groups cite gender equality as one of their objectives, women and girls are excluded from formal peace processes. Mehreteab gives the example of Eritrea, where the Marxist ideology of the EPLF included gender equality. Although many women rose to important positions within the organization, different pretexts were used at the end of the conflict to force them into their traditional social roles and to marginalize them in the process of peace negotiations. Mehreteab. See also Aili Tripp, Phone Interview, April 18 2007.

be included.[373] Peace agreements represent the framework upon which DDR programs lie. Women's involvement in peace negotiations does not automatically guarantee a gender-perspective in future DDR programs; nevertheless, it remains an important contribution to this process.[374] Although women in peace negotiations cannot represent the diverse concerns of all women, they can "provide insights or priorities not stated by men" which will contribute to the recognition of their rights in the peace agreement.[375] For women's involvement to have a major impact on DDR programs, their inclusion in peace processes must be substantive and not merely tokenistic. A simple shift in the gender-balance of representatives to peace negotiations will not translate into a greater recognition of gender issues unless this shift occurs in both quantitative and qualitative terms.[376]

Definition of Combatants and Eligibility Criteria

The attention devoted to gender in the definition of combatants used in DDR programs and the criteria for determining eligibility have both developed considerably compared to the gender-sensitivity of peace agreements. Mozambique's narrow, non-retroactive focus on combatants negated virtually all opportunities for females to access DDR. The strict eligibility criteria excluded female combatants not in possession of a weapon and all females in supporting roles. The DDR programs following Mozambique increasingly recognised females' multiple roles in armed groups. This is most true for girls, whose diverse functions in armed groups have been recognised internationally since the 1997 Cape Town Principles. Recognition of women's multiple roles in armed groups expanded more incrementally since Mozambique. Liberia's recognition of WAFF and Sudan's definition of WAAFG in the IDDRP are the most recent developments. IDDRP represents the most far-

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[373] Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development*, 51, Malanca. Preston also states, "the peace agreement provides a framework of issues of which the DDR process is one part. If the negotiation teams do include women, this will catalyze discussions about women's contributions to the entire reconciliation and post-conflict stabilization of society." Preston.

[374] Preston, Schroeder.

[375] UNDDA, "Briefing Notes: Gender Perspectives on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)," 17.

[376] See also Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development*, Baksh et al., eds., *Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace*, UN, "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations," 6. for a discussion of gender balance versus gender mainstreaming.

reaching recognition of women's diverse roles and their right to participate DDR programs.

Negotiations over the definitions of combatants in DDR are intensely political processes between armed groups that reflect their visions for the DDR program. Recent definitional advances lead to the cautious conclusion that a recognition of women and girls' participation in armed groups is becoming less of a political issue. The expanding definition of combatants is clearly crucial in establishing a greater basis for females' right to participate in DDR. Preston states, "Naturally, the definition is everything in terms of inclusion."[377] The case studies demonstrate that where definitions do not clearly recognise women and girls' diverse roles in armed groups, the likelihood of their exclusion from DDR increases exponentially. Progress in definitions of combatants hardly occurred in a linear fashion, however, as demonstrated by the continuing non-recognition of females' supporting roles such as some armed groups are currently doing in the Democratic Republic of Congo's DDR program.[378]

The empirical case studies demonstrate that expanding the definition of combatants is not sufficient to guarantee women and girls' access to DDR. Developments in eligibility criteria for accessing DDR in the case studies did not keep apace with the expanding definition of combatants. Eligibility criteria continue to present significant obstacles to women and girls' participation. The narrow eligibility criteria for child combatants and CAFF in Sierra Leone and Liberia prevented many girls from accessing DDR. Sierra Leone's shift from individual disarmament to group disarmament in Phase III suggests an increasing awareness among DDR authorities of the problems with eligibility criteria based on weapons. However, group disarmament continued to marginalize females by making them dependent on commanders for DDR access. Liberia and Sudan's DDR programs continue to use eligibility criteria that rely on armed groups for confirmation of females' status in armed groups. The continuing emphasis on non-retroactivity

[377] Preston.
[378] MDRP, "Workshop Report", 22.

within DDR continues to exclude the large number of women who self-demobilised or were released before accessing formal DDR programs.[379]

Institutional Responsibility for DDR Program Design and Implementation

Four aspects of the institutional responsibility for DDR programs stand out in the case studies for their effect on women and girls' participation in DDR. The first is the absence of females and gender advisors or focal points in national DDR commissions. National commissions play a leading role in the design and implementation of DDR programs. Assessing the relative influence of these national commissions on women and girls' access to DDR programs is difficult. The empirical information from the case studies does not provide adequate evidence to establish a direct causal relationship between women and girls' representation in national commissions and their inclusion in DDR. The level of women's inclusion in national DDR commissions in Sierra Leone, Liberia and North Sudan is unclear. Sudan's SSDDRC is the only national commission for which there is evidence of women's inclusion in key decision-making positions. The only firm conclusion we may draw is that DDR programs are less likely to be gender-sensitive if women's perspectives are not incorporated during the design process. Females' representation in national commissions is important to bring attention and their insights into the situations of FAAFG. The inclusion of women in national DDR commissions will not automatically result in more gender-friendly DDR programs unless gender advisors are also present. Farr states, "Women aren't gender specialists by virtue of being born women: to be a gender advisor requires training…The point is to get trained gender advisors in place who can actually offer a gender analysis of the situation and program accordingly."[380]

The direct link between gender advisors and women's participation in DDR remains unproven as of yet. Liberia's program paid greater attention to the participation of females in DDR programs in Mozambique and in Sierra Leone. This occurred without the apparent addition of a gender advisor or focal point to the

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[379] This is particularly problematic given the tendency of women and girls to be over-represented in the troops that are instantly dismissed by commanders prior to demobilisation. Farr, "Paper 20: Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool," 23.

[380] _____.

NCDDRR. The NSDDRC and SSDDRC are the first national DDR commissions to have had embedded Gender and DDR focal points. Sudan's DDR program is also the most gender-sensitive thus far. The presence of gender focal points in Sudan facilitated the coordination of gender policies in DDR. It remains unclear, however, whether these focal points are responsible for these policies. Moreover, the impact of gender focal points in Sudan's national commissions on the participation of females in the final multi-year DDR program remains to be seen.

The central role of UN peacekeeping operations in the DDR process represents the second element affecting FAAFGs' participation in DDR. In the four DDR case studies, peacekeeping missions played an integral role in the design and the implementation of the DDR process. While their role in the disarmament and demobilisation of armed groups is clear, many humanitarian actors question the quantity of military involvement. They express concern that the dominant role of peacekeeping operations creates a bias in favour of military security-oriented DDR that marginalizes reintegration activities.[381] Bush summarizes this position clearly, stating,

> While there are often clear military security tasks in "post"-conflict settings that are best undertaken by military actors, it is an increasingly common mistake to cast military activities as the cardinal referent from which all other activities take their bearing.[382]

Peacekeeping missions' leading role in DDR programming risks creating a narrow focus on combatants with weapons that excludes FAAFG in armed groups from receiving DDR support. With the forcible recruitment of civilians into armed groups, one can debate whether peacekeeping missions have the necessary expertise to lead the design and implementation of non-military oriented tasks.[383] Oyen questions the helpfulness of asking peacekeeping missions to address FAAFG. He argues,

> By using a security tool to do rights driven programming, we end up in partnerships which are unnatural and very messy, and risk undermining our credibility in the long run. Instead, we should be able to focus on vulnerability criteria unencumbered by a DDR process that may or may not move.[384]

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[381] Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars*, 62. Specht and Attree, "The Reintegration of Teenage Girls and Young Women ": 222.

[382] Kenneth Bush, "Commodification, Compartmentalization, and Militarization of Peacebuilding," in *Building Sustainable Peace*, ed. Tom Keating and W. Andy Knight (Saskatoon and Tokyo: United Nations University Press and the University of Alberta Press, 2004), 30-31.

[383] See Jeong, *Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Societies: Strategy and Process*, 191. about balancing the functions of organizations with the tasks they are being asked to complete in peacebuilding.

[384] Mads Oyen, Electronic Correspondence, June 4 2007.

The security orientation of peacekeeping missions does not mean, however, that their leading role in DDR entirely explains the exclusion of FAAFG from DDR. As knowledge of FAAFGs' participation in armed groups improved, the respective peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan paid greater attention to gender issues. The mandates of all of these missions included attention to women's needs. Since the UN's 1997 adoption of gender mainstreaming as an organizational policy, UN peacekeeping missions contain gender advisors responsible for mainstreaming gender into in all aspects of peacekeeping programs and implementation.[385]

The DDR programs in Sierra Leone and Liberia indicate, however, that the presence of gender advisors is insufficient to guarantee FAAFGs' inclusion in DDR programs. Gender advisors' broad mandates and limited resources constrain their ability to address gender issues in DDR.[386] Hirshmann finds that gender focal points in international organizations are generally overburdened and under resourced.[387] Despite DPKO's recognition in 2000 of the importance of female staff in making gender issues more salient and accessing the female population, females continue to be under represented in the staff of peacekeeping missions in senior positions and among the missions' military observers. The absence of female military observers at DDR sites prevents many FAAFG from identifying themselves at demobilisation centres.[388]

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[385] For an overview of gender mainstreaming as a tool for advancing gender equality in international organizations, see Prugl and Lustgarten, "Mainstreaming Gender in International Organizations."

[386] See Nadine Puechguirbal, Martin Bohnstedt, and Lea Biason, "Gender Mainstreaming of Peace Support Operations," in *Women in an Insecure World: Violence against Women. Facts, Figures and Analysis*, ed. Marie Vlachova and Lea Biason (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 249. DPKO defines gender focal points as "staff members assigned to support the incorporation of gender perspectives into the substantive work of their departments or offices." UN, "Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations," (New York: United Nations. Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003), 113.

[387] David Hirshmann, "From "Home Economics" To "Microfinance": Gender Rhetoric and Bureaucratic Resistance," in *Women and Gender Equity in Development Theory and Practice: Institutions, Resources, and Mobilization*, ed. Jane S. Jaquette and Gale Summerfield (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 78. Also,Farr.

[388] DPKO suggests that the gender balance in senior positions in peacekeeping missions should be 50% female. UN, "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations," 14, 20, UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 6.

The presence of an embedded Gender and DDR focal point in UNMIS was a significant improvement in the ability of the peacekeeping mission to address females' needs in DDR. The presence of gender and DDR focal points serves as a more robust guarantee of the ability of institutional actors to support the design and implementation of gender-sensitive DDR programs that will ensure females' participation. Their ability to do so, however, continues to be constrained by the periodic exclusion of peacekeeping missions from the policy-making process of national commissions.[389] The peacekeeping missions' mandate in providing technical support to national commission further limits the ability of gender and DDR advisors to compel national commissions to create gender-sensitive programs.

The lack of awareness of gender issues at the level of senior-decision makers involved in peacekeeping missions also undermines efforts by gender advisors to include women in DDR. UN peacekeeping missions have yet to overcome what DPKO identifies as the three I's of promoting gender mainstreaming: "overcoming inertia; implementation; and institutionalization."[390] Le Rutte notes that the policy tools for addressing gender issues in DDR are only just being properly understood and launched in the field.[391] In 2000, DPKO recognised the key role of senior leadership in peacekeeping operations in promoting attention to gender issues throughout peace operations. It reiterated this commitment more forcefully in 2003, stating,

> The Head of Mission is responsible for promoting and facilitating attention to gender perspectives in all areas of work and demanding accountability from managers and personnel at all levels…To be effective, a clear commitment to promoting gender equality throughout the entire mission is required from the beginning. This commitment…should be the responsibility of all personnel, particularly senior managers.[392]

Gender advisors and gender focal points support heads of mission and senior leaders in incorporating a gender perspective; however, they should not be responsible for convincing senior leadership of the need for this perspective. The DDR case studies suggest, however, that this had not occurred in practice. The time that gender advisors in peacekeeping operations must spend in fighting bureaucratic battles over

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[389] Le Rutte.
[390] UN, "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations," 28.
[391] Le Rutte.
[392] UN, "Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations," 121.

the attention to gender issues detracts from their ability to promote policies that ensure FAAFGs' participation in DDR.

The separate treatment of women and girls by different actors raises a third dimension of institutional responsibility for DDR that affects FAAFGs' participation. The empirical evidence in the case studies support the oft-made argument that girls' are even more marginalized than women in during DDR programs. The international policy framework for child soldiers allows UNICEF to devote special attention to them. The separate treatment of girls under 18 in the previous DDR programs allowed it to include girls in supporting roles in DDR where these same programs excluded adult females in support roles. It allows UNICEF to develop specific policies to meet the protection needs of girls associated with armed groups.[393] Treating all females as a single target group in DDR would most likely disguise the separate experiences and needs of women and girls in armed groups in the post-conflict setting.[394]

The programs in Sierra Leone and Liberia suggest, however, that the separation of girls and women in DDR programs does not guarantee girls' greater ability to participate compared to women. Women and girls' separate treatment in DDR is not always beneficial for the ability of either group to participate in these programs. Preston points out that the division is only appropriate as long as the programs for women and girls do not contradict themselves. If they offer very different support, then the division becomes "artificial and counterproductive."[395]Actors responsible for addressing women and girls in DDR can have conflicting objectives. They may find themselves competing to access limited resources for DDR.[396] In such situations, the triumph of one organization increases the possibility that females addressed by the other organization will be further marginalized.

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[393] Worthen. Patel notes that the division between women and girls is also necessary at a programming level to ensure the feasibility of these DDR programs. Ana Patel, Phone Interview, June 14 2007. Denov also states that having a separate category for girls is very important at the practical level to treat their separate needs. Denov.

[394] Carpenter.

[395] Preston.

[396] Worthen, UN/OSAA, "Issue Paper: Children and Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups," 5, 7.

A division between women and girls in DDR by institutional actors creates the distinct possibility that some females are overlooked based on their age. The division of females on the basis of age meant that many females did not receive the necessary support from DDR in the case studies. Where a division occurs between women and girls, the potential absence of appropriate programs and services will disincline some FAAFG from participating in DDR. For instance, the educational focus of many DDR programs for CAAFG was often inappropriate for older adolescent girls who required vocational support that was not as readily available to them.[397] This was particularly true for girl mothers, whose experiences in armed groups and self-perception as adults frequently challenged the child rights framework adopted in DDR programs. DDR programs often ignore their experiences as mothers and continue to treat them as girls.[398]

The resource constraints in the DDR case studies mark the fourth dimension of institutional responsibility for DDR that has a negative effect on FAAFGs' participation in DDR.[399] Following the poorly coordinated financing of Mozambique's DDR program, funding in subsequent programs in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan was more systematized and centralized through multilateral funding mechanisms. Ball and Van de Goor note that the existence of pre-committed resources for DDR introduces flexibility to the planning process.[400] The centralization of DDR funding did not eliminate all difficulties in financing DDR programs. The international community played an essential role in financing the DDR programs in the case studies. This gave them some influence over the design of the DDR process. Resources for DDR remained "diverse and uncoordinated."[401]

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[397] Sarah Michael, Phone Interview, July 3 2007, Specht, "Red Shoes. Experiences of Girl-Combatants in Liberia ", 81.

[398] Susan McKay et al., "Girls Formerly Associated with Fighting Forces and Their Children: Returned and Neglected," (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2006).

[399] The influence of resource constraints on the attention devoted to women and girls' in DDR programs obviously varies between the different organizations involved in DDR programming. This does not prevent us, however, from drawing general conclusions about the impact on resource constraints on women and girls' inclusion in DDR programs based on the case studies.

[400] Ball and Van de Goor, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 19. This is particularly true when funds are unearmarked. Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 9, 15-16.

[401] IPA, "IPA Workshop Report" (paper presented at the A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations, New York, 12-13

With the rise of the "commodification of peacebuilding," the DDR programs in the case studies encountered pressure from donors to apply models that were not necessarily appropriate for their post-conflict settings.[402] This is particularly true where donors pushed for budgets based on evidence-based planning.[403] The questionable registration of WAAFG in South Sudan illustrates the dangers of such pressures. Malanca notes that, in DDR, donors often want to see tangible results in terms of weapons collection and demobilisation. It is not always possible for DDR programs to immediately provide this information.[404] If donors push for evidence of FAAFG prior to financing programs to meet their needs, there is a risk that these programs will be under-funded or under-resourced due to the inability of DDR actors to provide early accurate statistics on females' presence in armed groups.

Donors can also have a positive influence on the attention paid to women and girls in DDR. When donors enter the DDR process early, they have a greater ability to influence the inclusion of gender issues in DDR. A high level of commitment by international donors and pressure groups to get females included in the DDR process will likely have a positive impact on their participation in DDR.[405] This does not serve as a guarantee, however, that gender-sensitive budgeting occurs. The DDR case studies in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan illustrate this. Farr states, "To my knowledge, no-one's ever done a proper gender budget when planning DDR."[406] Hirshmann claims that the "ascending rhetoric" of gender continues to meet resistance at the level of program development and implementation. He argues,

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December 2002), 8, Ball and Van de Goor, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 11. McKay and Mazurana note, "As a result of the lack of coherence and coordination in DDR programming, women do not always get the assistance they need." McKay and Mazurana, *Where Are the Girls? Girls Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique*, 223.

[402] Bush, "Commodification, Compartmentalization, and Militarization of Peacebuilding," 24, Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 14.

[403] Schroder notes, "The way that traditional DDR programs have functioned is that donors wait until the numbers [of DDR participants] have been established and the criteria have been established. The UN then goes to governments for funding… Donors' preoccupation with traditional DDR programs has been a limitation." Schroeder.

[404] Malanca. Also Schroeder, Douglas, Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 14.

[405] Malanca, Preston.

[406] Farr, Mehreteab.

"The gender transcript is overt and comes from the mouths of the powerful." The DDR case studies suggest that the gender transcript has not yet been engrained in the organizational structures of the institutional actors responsible for DDR. [407]

The limited quantity of financing available for DDR also represents a significant obstacle to the participation of FAAFG.[408] For DDR programs facing resource constraints, UNIFEM explains that the focus on the military security dimensions of DDR increases. UNIFEM states, "In the face of a paucity of resources, pragmatic decision-makers have focused DDR efforts on the perceived "real" problem the DDR programmes aim to address; namely, disarming men with guns."[409] Faced with the "tyranny of the emergency," the attention of leading institutional actors shifts to DD over R. [410] Delinking disarmament and demobilisation from reintegration assistance "creates institutional rivalries that undermine the effective and efficient delivery of DDR programs."[411]Funding constraints translate into a narrow definition of who qualifies as combatants and narrow criteria for determining DDR eligibility.[412] Oyen argues that the priority given to men with weapons in such situations is not because women's issues are

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[407] Hirshmann explains, "It is supported when it is limited in scope and ambition, has its own resources to support it, does not wander too far or fast beyond its accepted confined, and does not complicate or burden life too much for busy professionals. The result is a quiet undermining of the effectiveness of gender analysis and committed to women through chronically delayed or unimplemented mandates."Hirshmann, "From "Home Economics" To "Microfinance": Gender Rhetoric and Bureaucratic Resistance," 71, 74, 83.

[408] UNIFEM also states, "the human and financial resources committed to both gender issues and DDR are inadequate. Because both DDR and gender issues are underfunded, the intersection between them is even less likely to receive attention or resources." UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 5.

[409] Ibid., 3. Ball and Hendrickson note that the majority of UN assessed budgets for DDR operations only deal with the disarmament and demobilisation aspects of DDR and do not always include funding for reintegration activities Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 6.

[410] Baksh et al., eds., *Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace*, 34. Exact figures on the proportion of funds available for DD versus R was not available. Ball and Hendrickson note that much of the information available in DDR processes cannot be disaggregating into expenditures for different sections of the DDR process, particularly given the absence of data on actual versus budgeted expenditures Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 2-3, 8.

[411] Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 23.

[412] Farr, Angèle Dikongué-Atangana, Electronic Correspondence, June 12 2007, Michael.

considered less important, but because they are not the most threatening group of spoilers.[413] Williamson also notes that disarmament and demobilisation are pre-conditions for peace.

In Mozambique, the limited funding available for the DDR program resulted virtually no attention to reintegration programs. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, similarly, resource constraints contributed to a focus on disarmament and demobilisation over reintegration. Resource constraints meant that Sierra Leone's DDR program did not address reintegration until a full year after the demobilisation of many ex-combatants.[414] The budgetary constraints faced by the DDR programs in the case studies led to an increasing focus on reinsertion support over reintegration support. The priority placed on DD aspects of programs meant that reintegration was contingent on the successful initiation (or even implementation) of disarmament and demobilisation programs. [415]

Reinsertion's focus on the provision of short-term assistance is certainly more quantifiable than long-term reintegration support.[416] Reintegration includes assistance in multiple aspects of civilian life, including economic, political, social, and psychological support. Conceptually, the definition suggests successful reintegration occurs "when ex-combatants and families are able to generate enough income to ensure their financial independence, and when the community has accepted them."[417] Gauging the success of reintegration challenges donors and recipients alike. Its open-ended nature makes it less likely to receive targeted funding from donors. Increasingly, donors consider reintegration as part of a broader process of post-

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[413] Oyen. Bernard also explains, "There is a practical budgetary reason for restricting access to programs. DDR programs are usually underfunded, often because of underestimating the numbers of combatants or dependents who will eventually appear. Because funding is inadequate, there is a desire to utilize it only for the primary target—combatants" Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration," 92. Ball and Hendrickson, "Review of International Financing Arragements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Phase I Report to the Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR)," 22.

[414] Sarah Michael, "Reintegration Assistance for Ex-Combatants: Good Practices and Lessons for the MDRP," (Washington: World Bank, 2006), 22.

[415] Bernard et al., "Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children Combatants in the Liberian Post-Conflict Period and Recommendations for Successful Integration," 5.

[416] For a comprehensive discussion of the different stages of reintegration support, see Michael, "Reintegration Assistance for Ex-Combatants: Good Practices and Lessons for the MDRP."

[417] de Watteville, "Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs."

conflict transformation including rehabilitation and community reconciliation.[418] Williamson states,

> It has been argued, and I think appropriately, that the planning process needs to begin with reintegration goals, and then figure out what is necessary to achieve that and work backwards from that, rather than tagging reintegration on to disarmament and demobilisation planning.[419]

The limited attention to reintegration programs in the DDR process has a negative impact on women and girls' participation. It lessens the attention devoted to the reintegration programs most relevant to their needs.[420] In the absence of a strong reintegration dimension, DDR programs may fail to attract the participation of FAAFG.

DDR Program Implementation

The DDR program in Mozambique yields the unsurprising conclusion that the absence of gender-sensitive DDR policies results in females' exclusion from DDR. The levels of females' participation in the DDR programs in Sierra Leone and Liberia illustrate a more interesting picture. The increasing presence of gender-sensitive DDR policies has not guaranteed the participation of females in DDR programs. Obstacles remain at the level of policy implementation.

Delays in the implementation of DDR had a negative impact on women and girls' participation in DDR in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Many self-demobilized prior to the start of DDR. The timelines for DDR included in peace agreements were frequently not respected during program implementation. These cases suggest that delays in the DDR process will have a particularly negative impact on females' participation where the level of forcible recruitment into armed groups is high. Faced with the opportunity to escape captivity or to wait indefinitely for DDR programs to which their admittance is uncertain, females often self-demobilise as they try to disappear anonymously into the war-affected population. The current delays in implementing Sudan's gender-sensitive IDDRP will likely result in the non-participation of many FAAFG.

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[418] Gamba, "Post-Agreement Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: Towards a New Approach," 71.
[419] Williamson.
[420] Hobson, "Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict."

Liberia's DDR program indicates, by contrast, that the implementation of DDR programs too hastily can also create barriers to women and girls' participation. It demonstrates that DDR implementation without adequate planning often comes at the expense of incorporating a gender perspective into programming.[421] Furthermore, poorly planned DDR programs encounter numerous security issues at cantonment sites that dissuades women and girls from participating, especially if they have children.

The application of eligibility criteria in cantonment sites represents a further barrier to women and girls' participation in DDR. The inconsistent application of these criteria in the case studies, such as the administration of weapons tests to CAAFG, prevented many females from entering DDR. Hobson notes that the international community is far from consistent in its application of the Cape Town Principles definition of child combatants during DDR program implementation.[422] This contributes to misinformation among women and girls about the need for a weapon to access DDR programs that marginalizes them further.[423]

A linear approach to DDR programming also prevents many women and girls' from participating in DDR. DDR reintegration programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Liberia did not occur in parallel with disarmament and demobilisation activities; instead, they followed after a considerable interim period. DPKO recognised in 2003 the importance of ensuring that females in support roles are able to access reintegration and rehabilitation programs; however, it did not recognise that many of these females are unable to access these DDR programs due to the linear approach to DDR that required proof of participation in disarmament and demobilisation to access reintegration activities.[424] The consecutive implementation of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programs delays the DDR dimension that is perhaps the most relevant to women and girls' gender-specific needs as they exit armed groups. Specht and Attree explain,

> Within the [DDR] process, by the time the reintegration stage is reached, the eligibility criteria, the communication strategy and the provisions for women in the disarmament and

[421] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 2.
[422] Hobson, "Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict," 8.
[423] Dikongué-Atangana.
[424] UN, "Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations," 119.

> demobilisation phases of the programme have usually resulted in the registration of a disproportionate number of males and earmarked them for reintegration assistance…They have therefore had to begin the reintegration process by themselves, before the official process begins to work on the reintegration of their more directly targeted male counterparts. In many cases, it is already too late to attempt to mainstream the concerns of women and girls associated with fighting forces at this stage in the DDR process.[425]

Eligible FAAFG will often not wait to access DDR reintegration programs. Furthermore, requiring proof of participation in disarmament and demobilisation activities to access reintegration programs excludes women and girls from armed groups who self-demobilised. Sudan's community security support programs promise to overcome the effects of a linear approach to DDR on FAAFGs' participation. Whether this occurs in practice, however, remains uncertain.

Agency of DDR Target Populations

Clearly assessing the attention given to target populations' agency by DDR programs is difficult. The agency of target populations affects all aspects of DDR design and implementation. Current discussions of DDR target populations' agency typically focus on the agency of a select number of high-ranking commanders, such as their inclusion in national DDR institutions and the development of the DDR framework. These discussions rarely include, however, a separate analysis of the agency of the participants in DDR programs. A comprehensive assessment of the effect of the agency on the participation of females in DDR requires a two-part discussion that considers the agency of commanders in the implementation of DDR programs and the agency of FAAFGs in their decisions of whether to participate in DDR.

The case studies clearly illustrate that the agency granted to commanders during DDR program implementation has a decisive impact on the participation of women and girls. The DDR case studies suggest that the agency granted to commanders has a net negative effect on the participation of females in DDR even where gender-sensitive DDR policies exist. Mozambique's DDR program and the behaviour of CDF commanders in Sierra Leone demonstrate the potential for commanders to exercise absolute control over access to the DDR process. The

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[425] Specht and Attree, "The Reintegration of Teenage Girls and Young Women ": 223.. See also Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development*.

DDR programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Liberia relied on commanders for presenting candidates for DDR and confirming their participation in armed groups. Commanders' denial of the participation of women and girls in armed groups prevented these females from accessing DDR.

The DDR case studies reveal the continuing ability of commanders to control FAAFGs' access to DDR even where they acknowledge the presence of females in armed groups. Commanders played an essential role in the case studies in distributing information about DDR programs to members of their units. The case studies show that commanders' refusal to distribute information on DDR to females in armed groups contributes to a lack of awareness or misinformation among FAAFGs that reduces their participation in DDR. Commanders prevented FAAFGs' access to DDR in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and, now, in Sudan by manipulating the membership lists for armed groups. Commanders often included male combatants and members of their inner circles on these lists in the place of FAAFGs. They also removed weapons from FAAFG. These actions all prevented FAAFG from meeting the eligibility criteria for entering the DDR programs. The case studies suggest that commanders' reticence to allow FAAFGs to participate in DDR stems from a desire to compensate for their loss of power and to continue to exploit females' labour. Many commanders perceive females as wives performing essential support functions; consequently, they rebuff calls to release their "wives" to DDR programs.[426] Sudan's IDDRP process continues to rely extensively on commanders during the pre-registration of armed groups in North and South Sudan. Commanders thus continue to hold the ultimate power in determining FAAFGs' access to the interim DDR program.

Current DDR programs do not have mechanisms or the authority to force commanders to disclose the presence of females in armed groups. This represents a significant barrier to the ability of DDR programs to ensure FAAFGs are included.

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[426] In the DDR program in the Democratic of Congo, some commanders accuse child protection agencies of breaking up families in seeking the release and demobilisation of girls. The evidence from this program also suggests that the increasing participation of girls in DDR programs can be due to an increase in the number of successful escapes from armed groups rather than a willingness of commanders to release girls.
Beth Verhey, "Reaching the Girls: Study on Girls Associated with Armed Forces and Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo," (London: Save the Children UK and NGO Group: CARE, IFESH, and IRC, 2004), 6, 12.

Schroeder stresses that the absence of such a mechanism increases the importance of raising awareness among commanders.[427] Malanca argues that commanders' influence in determining DDR participation means that commanders must feel empowered to take a lead role ensuring women and girls' participation instead of being forced to do so. The DDR units associated with peacekeeping missions to Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan increasingly recognise the key role of commanders in mediating access to DDR programs. They are placing a growing emphasis on the sensitization of commanders to gender issues in DDR.

The empirical evidence in the DDR case studies does not allow the establishment of a direct link between commanders' sensitization to gender issues and improvements in the participation by FAAFG in later DDR programs. In theory, however, increasing commanders' knowledge has a positive impact on their willingness to recognise FAAFG. Michael suggests that the failure of many commanders to present women and girls for DDR programs arises partially from a simple lack of knowledge of gender issues among commanders rather than a lack of will. She reports that some commanders have actually come forward during DDR programs saying that they want to be gender-sensitive, but that they lack the knowledge of how to do so.[428] Increasing commanders' awareness of FAAFG is not a surefire guarantee of FAAFGs' future ability to access DDR. FAAFG will continue to play essential roles in armed groups in post-conflict contexts. In such circumstances, commanders have a continuing inducement to prevent FAAFG from participating in DDR. Overcoming this barrier to females' entry into DDR is a gradual process through which the costs of keeping FAAFG from participating in DDR must eventually outweigh the benefits of doing so. In the interim, however, raising the awareness of gender issues in DDR among commanders is an important first step in improving the ability of FAAFG to participate in DDR.

Specht's findings on commanders' role in encouraging women and girls' to enter DDR in Liberia suggest the potential for commanders to have a positive influence on FAAFGs' participation in DDR. The Liberian case illustrates the potential for female commanders to have a particularly positive impact on females'

[427] Schroeder, "Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Gender Desk Study," 7.
[428] Michael.

inclusion in DDR. Elsewhere, Specht and Attree state, "The powerful influence of former commanders is often the basis for a girls' decision whether or not to participate in DDR programmes."[429] This challenges calls for the immediate post-conflict separation of females, especially girls, from commanders. Farr cautions against relying too greatly on female commanders to improve women and girls' participation in DDR.[430] While they can sometimes do a better job in presenting females for DDR, this is not guaranteed. Moreover, the case studies show that armed groups rarely promote females to high-ranking positions. The small number of female commanders in armed groups further limits this avenue as a means through which to improve females' participation in DDR.

In comparison to the recognition of the agency of commanders in the DDR process, recognition of the impact of women and girls' agency on their participation in DDR developed more slowly. Considered in a historical perspective, the DDR case studies reveal a definite, if limited, improvement in the recognition of women and girls' agency. Mozambique's DDR program entailed a complete failure to recognise the agency of FAAFG in the design and implementation of DDR. This resulted in a program that did not address females' needs. The limited agency granted to females failed to differentiate between those in armed groups and war-affected women; furthermore, the institutional actors responsible for DDR approached women as victims rather than as active agents.

Since Mozambique, recognition of FAAFGs as active subjects in DDR programs rather than simply as passive participants in DDR improved at the level of international DDR policies. The recent IDDRS and Paris Principles are important steps in this regard. In 2003, the DPKO section "Gender Mainstreaming" in the *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* recognised the need to incorporate women's skills and responsibilities to create relevant DDR programs for FAAFG.[431] Dikongué-Atangana argues that the overall awareness of the issue of

[429] Specht and Attree, "The Reintegration of Teenage Girls and Young Women ": 224.
[430] Farr.
[431] UN, "Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations," 116-17.

agency has increased dramatically, particularly with regard to the agency of girls; however, systematic treatment of this issue remains limited.[432]

The case studies indicate that discussions of FAAFGs' agency at the level of DDR policy do not translate into automatic changes during DDR program design and implementation. Sierra Leone and Liberia's DDR programs continued to underplay the agency of females. It is important to not confuse DDR programs that target women and girls with a recognition of their agency by these programs. Many of these programs were designed without the adequate consultation of FAAFG.[433] Sudan's IDDRP policies include a greater emphasis on women and girls' agency. The actual recognition of this agency during the design of the DDR process remains a separate question.

Overall, the recognition of females' agency in the design and implementation of DDR programs has not been adequately formalized in DDR documents to be effective. Douglas reports of a continuing tendency to include women with other vulnerable groups in DDR. This continues the trend of treating women as victims rather than subjects.[434] This is particularly true of females under 18, who are treated as CAAFG. DDR programs treating those under 18 as children failed to recognise CAAFGs' many adult-like responsibilities and experiences in armed groups. Recognition of the agency of adolescent girls and young mothers under the age of 18 was particularly limited in Sierra Leone and Liberia. While many girls entered armed groups below the age of 18, the DDR programs in the case studies treated these girls as adults once over 18 even though this was not always accurate in local cultural terms.[435] The females over 18 did not receive the same consideration as those under 18 as there are less specific programs and services to meet the needs of adult females

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[432] Dikongué-Atangana.. Farr's gender-demilitarization checklist stands out as an important exception to this trend. See Farr, "Paper 20: Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool."

[433] Speaking of programs targeting women and girls formerly associated with armed groups in Northern Uganda, Baines states, "I've seen it 101 times that girls are receiving money and their not really sure what it's for. They are beign told to assemble, they're told what to do, they do it, and they leave, and they are completely confused."

[434] Douglas states, "Women are adults. This is always the perennial issue that we have to deal with in the terminology. Being a woman is always associated with the same thing as being disabled or a disadvantage, and this is not the case. They have choices, they have rights, that they can exercise."Douglas. Worthen makes a similar point. Worthen.

[435] Specht and Attree note that the notion of age is context-specific depending on cultural, economic and social systems defining age limits and roles Specht and Attree, "The Reintegration of Teenage Girls and Young Women ": 228, fn.1.

during DDR. Malanca suggests that the failure to recognise FAAFGs' agency stems from the situational imperatives faced by actors implementing DDR programs and a failure to overcome local cultural perceptions that may exclude women and girls from participating in decision-making.[436]

The limited recognition of women and girls' agency in the design and implementation of DDR programs is extremely problematic for their participation in DDR. UNIFEM notes, "The utility and relevance of women's analysis, information and insight on peace and security issues in general, and on DDR in particular, are underestimated."[437] At the most basic level, Brett and Specht point out the importance of understanding girls' reasons for joining armed groups in order to address these in the DDR programs.[438] In South Sudan, for example, insecurity and food shortages contributed to the involvement of many FAAFG in armed groups. These conditions persist and many CAAFG who passed through the community-based reintegration process continued to face a lack of food and security. Re-recruitment has been a massive problem.[439] If FAAFGs' recruitment into armed groups occurred chiefly through abduction due to poor security conditions, post-conflict peacebuilding programs must overcome these to prevent re-recruitment. If FAAFGs joined primarily to escape domestic violence, then DDR programs that prioritize reunification risk returning girls to abusive domestic situations and will be less likely to solicit their participation. If DDR programs do not consult females about the reasons for their involvement in armed groups, they will fail in addressing these during DDR.

More importantly, however, allowing women and girls to exercise their agency in the design and implementation of DDR programs is important to gain their insights about their needs from the DDR process. The case studies indicate the potential drawbacks of placing an automatic priority on totally dismantling armed groups. This may deprive FAAFG of whatever support systems they are offered through their participation in armed groups, whether from other females,

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[436] Malanca.
[437] UNIFEM, "Getting It Right, Doing It Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 4.
[438] Brett and Specht, *Young Soldiers. Why They Choose to Fight.*
[439] Douglas.

commanders, or their husbands. FAAFG may be less inclined to participate in DDR programs that cut off their access to material support or security without replacing this with equivalent assistance.

Across the cases of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan, the issue of stigma arises as one of the primary reasons for which women and girls chose to self-demobilize rather than participate in DDR programs that will openly label them as being formerly associated with armed groups. The current community-based reintegration approach by UNICEF in Sudan reflects a partial recognition by the agency of the importance of not singling out CAAFG, including girls, for DDR assistance that might further stigmatize them within recipient communities.[440] A greater emphasis on the agency of females will allow a better grasp on the type of stigma faced by females. Robinson points out that in Sierra Leone it did not matter to communities what females' roles in armed groups were. Communities simply assumed that all females were subjected to sexual abuse at some point. What mattered was whether females participated in rebel groups or not.[441] Girl mothers are often the most vulnerable group trying to reintegrate post-conflict, as they face the double stigma of being victims of rape and bearing illegitimate children.[442] In DDR programming, their voices are often not heard in needs assessments and in the implementation of DDR programs. This contributes to their exclusion from DDR.

DDR programs may make a significant effort to be gender-sensitive; however, women and girls may not participate for reasons unforeseen to DDR program staff.[443] Combating stigma issues can be done more effectively if women and girls are consulted from the outset. It will allow DDR programs to design community sensitization programs with the input of these females. Likewise, learning of the obstacles identified by the FAAFG themselves to their accessing DDR programs is a vital step on the path to overcoming these in the design of DDR programs. The DDR program case studies show that FAAFG are not easily induced

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[440] Verhey makes a similar point in her discussion of community reintegration mechanisms for girls. Verhey, "Reaching the Girls: Study on Girls Associated with Armed Forces and Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 20.
[441] Robinson.
[442] Shereef et al., "The Reintegration of Formerly Abducted Girls and Girl Mothers in Sierra Leone: Sealing the Past, Facing the Future," 3.
[443] Michael.

into participating in DDR programs where they perceive this programs as contributing to their further stigmatization or as failing to address their immediate post-conflict needs. There must be in-depth assessments of women and girls during the design of DDR process. This will enable DDR programs to more successfully incorporate FAAFGs' concerns about DDR participation. Such programs will be better able to address the needs of FAAFG. The DDR case studies indicate that these programs must provide relevant support for FAAFG before they will participate in DDR and risk identifying themselves as being formerly associated with armed groups in front of their communities. De Watteville suggests it will also require supporting the capacity building of associations of female ex-combatants.[444] Baines suggests that the inclusion of women's NGOs in the DDR process could play an important role here in encouraging women and girls' participation.[445]

[444] de Watteville, "Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs."
[445] Erin Baines, Phone Interview, June 19 2007.

Conclusion

International awareness and recognition of the multiple and essential roles performed by women and girls in armed groups has increased substantially since the DDR program in Mozambique. Attention to females as active participants in armed groups during disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs moved from being non-existent to assuming a central position in policy discussions. The number of policy guidelines available to assist humanitarian practioners to address the needs of females associated with armed forces and groups in DDR based on lessons learned in previous DDR experiences increased dramatically in the past decade. Most often, these stress the importance of addressing women and girls' gender-specific needs during the implementation of DDR programs.

The DDR programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan indicate that the emphasis placed on integrating gender-sensitive policies into the implementation stage of DDR programs in current policy discussions is important but misleading. It disguises the multiplicity of factors beyond the implementation stage of DDR programs that lay the groundwork for women and girls' participation in the process. The policy guidelines have proved insufficient to guarantee the participation of FAAFG in DDR to an extent that reflects their participation in armed groups.

DDR programs continue to marginalize women and girls in armed groups during both their design and implementation. Figures from the DDR programs in Sierra Leone and Liberia illustrate a slow increase in the number of FAAFGs in DDR programs; however, these figures do not serve as guaranteed proof of an upwards trend of their participation in DDR. This is particularly true of girls' participation. It is too early yet to determine if the DDR programs in North and South Sudan will continue this upward trend. The empirical evidence suggests that DDR programs as a whole continue to fail in their efforts to capture the full number of eligible FAAFG.

To an extent, the gap between women and girls' participation in armed groups and their participation in DDR is due to the lack of information on the true rates of females' participation in armed groups. In the absence of such data during the design of DDR programs, it is extremely difficult to implement programs that

fully meet the needs of FAAFG. DDR programs, however, are dynamic processes in which the possibility of females' inclusion or exclusion is constantly shifting. Information gaps on females' participation in armed groups cannot provide a complete explanation for their non-participation in DDR. The case studies indicate the need for a more integrated conceptual framework that considers the influence of factors that are both analytically prior to and following the implementation stage of DDR programs in order to understand the reasons for women and girls' absence during DDR.

The framework laid for DDR in peace agreements plays an important role in shaping the DDR process. Within the case studies, the inclusion of specific articles recognising women's gender-specific experiences and subsequent needs in the post-conflict context in the peace agreements of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan represented significant steps in establishing the basis for a gender-inclusive peacebuilding program; however, these articles concentrated primarily on women's experiences as victims. Peace agreements in these three case studies included such articles despite the absence of women from the peace negotiations. The inclusion of these articles suggests that parties to peace agreements are either more cognizant of the gendered nature of conflict or under greater pressure from international actors to create gender-sensitive peace agreements. The presence of these articles despite women's marginalization does not mean that peace agreements can be gender-sensitive without women's presence at the peace table. The DDR case studies indicate that the presence of gender-sensitive peace agreements is not sufficient to guarantee the creation of DDR programs that allow for the participation of females associated with armed groups. Women's inclusion in peace negotiations may be necessary to include articles recognizing women's active engagement in armed groups in the final peace agreement. Such recognition is undoubtedly a necessary step for obligating parties to the conflict to including FAAFG in post-conflict DDR programs. The empirical evidence does not exist, however, to confirm this link.

The case studies exhibit a clear trend in DDR programs to include broader definitions of combatants, particularly in the recent programs in Liberia and the emerging program in Sudan. The slow development of more expansive definitions of combatants represents a crucial step in establishing the framework for DDR

programs that include FAAFG. This is particularly true for the inclusion of adult females in supporting roles. Provisions for girls in supporting roles have existed for a longer period. The widening definition of combatants has not been accompanied by equivalent changes in the eligibility criteria for DDR programs. The continuing focus on narrow eligibility criteria excludes many females. Conversely, more flexible eligibility criteria are not sufficient to guarantee FAAFGs' presence in DDR either. A lack of clarity over eligibility criteria can also exclude females by allowing DDR staff a great deal of flexibility in their application of criteria.

As with the creation of gender-sensitive peace agreements, however, the creation of broader definitions of combatants and eligibility criteria represents an important pre-condition for FAAFGs' inclusion in DDR but is not sufficient to guarantee their participation. These findings challenge the argument that females' absence from DDR programs is due to a lack of gender-sensitive policy frameworks. In early DDR programs, this was true; however, later programs indicate that the gender-sensitive programs will not guarantee the presence of female combatants or females in support roles.

What, then, determines the participation of females in DDR programs? The case studies suggest that institutional responsibility for DDR programs represents one leading factor that influences females' presence. The programs examined in this thesis illustrate a slow but steady learning process at the level of institutional actors responsible for DDR program design and implementation. Nevertheless, the leading actors, namely national commissions and peacekeeping operations, maintain their narrow approach to DDR. Although they recognise the increasing participation of civilians, including females, in armed groups, peacekeeping operations continue to privilege conceptions of DDR as a security-driven process over those of DDR as a process of demilitarization or social transformation. While this is partially due to the military-orientation of peacekeeping operations, the case studies suggest that budgetary constraints during the DDR process exert a determining influence.

The DDR programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan indicate that the budgetary constraints faced by institutional actors affect all aspects of the design and implementation of DDR programs. Eligibility criteria are only determined in part by the framework in peace agreements and the definition of

combatants; the case studies suggest that it is resource constraints and institutional responsibility that shape eligibility criteria. Limited resources in the case studies contributed to limited concentration to the needs of FAAFG during DDR. Gender advisors, where present, were overburdened and under-resourced in both financial and human capital terms. This constrained their ability to promote the inclusion of FAAFG. The participation of females during the implementation of DDR programs is also undermined by the lack of resources that delay the implementation process and curb the attention devoted to reintegration programs.

Child protection agencies such as UNICEF who focus on child combatants and children in support roles have mandates that allow a more flexible conception of the goals of DDR. In the face of resource constraints, however, the case studies indicate that they too focus on those children in armed groups who pose an immediate threat to security. Moreover, the empirical evidence of the case studies reveals that the separate treatment of women and girls in the DDR process by different institutional actors can contribute to the absence of FAAFG. Their separate treatment during DDR results in programs that overlook the needs of older adolescent females and young females over the age of 18. In such contexts, FAAFG are less likely to participate in DDR and risk being further stigmatized by their community if they perceive the support offered as inappropriate for their needs.

The decision of females in armed groups to not participate in DDR programs that do not meet their needs in indicative of the second factor exerting a decisive influence on females' participation in DDR programs, namely the agency of commanders and FAAFG. The agency of these two groups remains grossly under-analyzed in a systematic fashion across DDR programs. The realities of the post-conflict context mean that commanders' leading roles in the process are unlikely to ever be fully eliminated. Faced with resource constraints and the potential abuse of programs by war-affected populations that were not directly involved in armed groups, programs are likely to continue relying extensively on commanders to mediate access to DDR. Commanders' actions in the DDR case studies illustrate the danger that this poses for the participation of FAAFG. The case studies also indicate that females facing programs that fail to meet their needs, such as their fear of stigmatization and varying needs from reintegration programs, will deliberately

exclude themselves from DDR in favour of self-demobilizing anonymously into the war-affected population.

For DDR programs to be truly gender-sensitive and able to solicit the full participation of FAAFG to an extent that reflects their presence in armed groups, the DDR process must recognize the agency of DDR target populations. Actors must increase their efforts to sensitize commanders to the needs of FAAFG and their right to participate in DDR. The must also develop eligibility criteria for accessing programs so that FAAFGs' participation is not contingent on the goodwill of commanders who have a vested interest in denying females' entry into DDR. Meanwhile, programs must recognise the agency of women and girls in armed groups more fully throughout the entire process of program design and implementation. This is necessary to create programs that reflect the needs of females in armed groups and overcome the obstacles they identify to their participation in DDR.

Most importantly, the study of females' absence from programs in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan indicate the need to explore a radical re-conceptualization of the DDR process. The security dimensions are clearly crucial for establishing immediate post-conflict security. The removal of weapons and disbanding of armed groups is insufficient, however, to guarantee long-term post-conflict stability where programs continue to marginalize FAAFG during their design and implementation. DDR programs cannot ignore the essential roles of FAAFG in armed groups. Without weapons, they may represent a "lesser" security threat in the short-term; however, this must absolutely not lead to their treatment as "lesser" members of armed groups. A greater emphasis must be placed on demilitarization as an integral component of the DDR process. Lead actors must shift from an emphasis on disarmament and demobilisation to an emphasis on "engendering the 'R' of DDR."[446] As such, these programs will assume a greater role in enabling participants in armed groups to integrate into the post-conflict society.

DDR programs must introduce a greater element of flexibility to reflect the different post-conflict realities of the contexts in which they operate. In this process, DDR actors consider whether DDR programs are indeed the most appropriate

[446] Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon, *Gender, Conflict and Development*, 19.

process through which to address the needs of female combatants and females in support roles. FAAFG have distinct needs from war-affected populations stemming from the experiences during the conflict. Addressing FAAFGs' needs, however, may be best achieved by linking support for this group to wider community-support packages in order to not single out those who were in armed groups. The integration of support for females in armed groups into community programs may lessen the stigmatization they face and the tension between program participants and war-affected populations. It creates the risk that FAAFG do not receive as much targeted support to meet their specific needs; however, it may increase the likelihood of a greater number of them receiving some form of post-conflict support. More research is clearly required about the benefits and drawbacks of offering support to FAAFG through community-based programs.

Given the findings of the current discussion of the impact of budgetary constraints faced by leading actors on the participation of females in DDR, this raises the question of who will assume responsibility for leading a broader approach in post-conflict settings. Already, programs form one part of a larger set of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction programs. Leading actors are currently under resourced and are unlikely to be able to devote more attention to the reintegration aspect of DDR. Moreover, without increasing the resources available to these actors, placing responsibility for a renewed process that pays greater attention to FAAFG during reintegration on them may in fact overburden them such that they are overwhelmed by the number of DDR participants and even less able to devote specific attention to FAAFG. Instead, leading DDR actors must work to integrate all programs relevant to participants in armed groups in the post-conflict setting. Implementing actors must cooperate to achieve a new division of labour to ensure the existence of new programs to equally address the needs of all FAAFG, regardless of their age.

In the interim, the international community must pay close attention to the DDR process in North and South Sudan. Sudan already has a peace agreement and policy framework establishing the most gender-sensitive definition of combatants and eligibility criteria for DDR thus far. As it unfolds, IDDRP will allow leading actors to increase their knowledge of the effects of institutional responsibility for

DDR and the agency of commanders and FAAFG on the participation of women and girls in DDR. The challenges in implementing the program in Sudan indicate that a gender-sensitive policy framework is an important first step in combating FAAFGs' absence from DDR. Unless this framework is matched, however, by the necessary resources, mandates, and recognition of the agency of target populations, it will not succeed in fully incorporating FAAFG. The time of forgetting the females in armed groups has passed. Institutional actors, policy-makers, gender advocates, and independent consultants alike involved in DDR must learn from the Sudan DDR process in order to combat the future absence of women and girls associated with armed groups during the post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs.

Annex 1. List of interviewees

Name	Position	Date	Type
Baines, Erin	Research Director of the Conflict and Development Programme at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia	19-Jun-07	Phone Interview
Carpenter, R. Charli	Assistant Professor, International Affairs, University of Pittsburg Graduate School of Public and International Affairs	29-May-07	Phone Interview
Denov, Myriam	Associate Professor, Department of Social Work, McGill University	18-Apr-07	Personal Interview
Dikongué-Atangana, Angèle	Senior Regional Legal Advisor, Africa Bureau, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	12-Jun-07	Electronic Correspondence
Douglas, Sarah	Gender and HIV Officer, DDR Unit/UNMIS	5-Jun-07	Phone Interview
Farr, Vanessa	Senior Gender Advisor, Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, UNDP	11-Jul-07	Electronic Correspondence
Le Rutte, Mathijs	Senior Legal Officer, Protection Operations and Legal Advice Section, Department of International Protection Services, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	23-May-07	Phone Interview
Malanca, Mario Lito	Emergency and Post-Conflict Advisor, International Organization for Migration	1-Jun-07	Phone Interview
Mehreteab, Amanuel	Independent consultant, Executive Secretary to Eritrea DDR processes	6-Jun-07	Phone Interview
Michael, Sarah	Social Development Specialist, Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, World Bank	3-Jul-07	Phone Interview
Mininger, Ron	Project Manager, Chemonics International	4-Jul-07	Electronic Correspondence
Oyen, Mads	Child Protection Officer, UNICEF	4-Jun-07	Electronic Correspondence
Patel, Ana	Research Project Manager, Transitional Justice and DDR in post-conflict societies, International Center for Transitional Justice	14-Jun-07	Phone Interview
Preston, Meredith	Head of Field Office, UN Resident Coordinator's Office, Upper Nile State	27-Jun-07	Electronic Correspondence
Robinson,	Child Protection Officer,	2-Jun-07	Phone Interview

Malia	International Rescue Committee		
Schroeder, Emily	Program Associate, Project Ploughshares	24-May-07	Phone Interview
Tripp, Aili	Professor of Political Science and Women Studies, Associate Dean of International Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison	18-Apr-07	Phone Interview
Williamson, John	Senior Technical Advisor, Displaced Children and Orphans Fund, US Agency for International Development	13-Jun-07	Phone Interview
Worthen, Miranda	Co-Coordinator for 'Girl Mothers' Project	23-Jun-07	Phone Interview

Annex 2. Standard list of interview questions

1. What is your background in DDR-related work? Primarily field or policy development?
2. Generally, based on your experiences, what would you suggest are the main obstacles to the participation of female ex-combatants and females associated with fighting forces to accessing DDR programs?
3. How does the context in which DDR programs are designed affect the eventual participation and access of women and girls to DDR programs? Are some contexts more conducive to their participation than others?
4. Does institutional responsibility for DDR design and implementation (i.e. national commissions vs. UN agencies vs. NGOs) affect women and girls' participation? Are some more successful than others?
5. How to different understandings of 'combatant' or eligibility requirements for DDR programs affect the inclusion of females?
6. How appropriate are the divisions made between women and girls in DDR programs based in a numerical division? Does this affect the participation of either group in DDR programs?
7. Do resource constraints in DDR programs affect the inclusion of female ex-combatants?
8. What efforts were made to distribute information on DDR processes to females in the countries where you have experience? Are some means of communication more successful than others?
9. From your field work with females associated with armed forces and young mothers, what obstacles do they identify themselves to their inclusion and participation in DDR programs?
10. How much agency are females granted in creating and implementing DDR programs? Are these perspectives being included in DDR programs?
11. How is it possible to determine where DDR programs are "successful" in encouraging female participation?
12. How effective has "gender mainstreaming" as a tool been in ensuring females' access and participation in DDR processes?
13. Could you recommend other contact persons and/or resources?

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