Utilitarianism Captures the University

--a study of marketization in contemporary higher education through an examination of the humanistic model and market model

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Abstract

This project is to investigate higher education through historical and philosophical examination of the humanistic and market models. It scrutinizes the overwhelming economic impact and weakened humanistic influence in education and society. The core research question is: What is higher education for? The thesis body presents higher education in history and contemporary times and illustrates the humanistic model and the market model and relevant discussion and debate. I intend to expound how marketization influences higher education, how utilitarianism undermines humanism and has captured higher education, and how the university should function as an educational and humanistic institution. This study reveals that the university is not merely an educational institution but a humanistic organization with social responsibilities to facilitate flourishing life, extend civilization, and build robust democracy. However, these social functions of universities are repressed because contemporary higher education prioritizes economic aims over humanistic aims. Under such circumstance, contemporary higher education is "inefficient" because its operation and practice of education fall into utilitarianism that supports marketization in universities. Therefore, I argue, a radical shift of the two models is needed to restore humanism in contemporary higher education.

Résumé

Ce projet vise à étudier l'enseignement supérieur contemporain grâce à un examen historique et philosophique des modèles humanistes et de marché. Il examine l'influence écrasante des marchés sur l'éducation et la société et l'affaiblissement des valeurs humanistes en éducation et dans la société. La principale question de recherche est: à quoi sert l'enseignement supérieur? Le corps de la thèse, qui resitue l'enseignement supérieur dans l'histoire et dans l'époque contemporaine, entreprend de comparer le modèle humaniste et le modèle de marché à travers une discussion et un débat pertinents. Je compte expliquer en détail comment la commercialisation influence l'éducation supérieure, comment l'utilitarisme nuit à l'humanité et a pris en otage l'enseignement supérieur et comment une université devrait fonctionner en tant qu'établissement d'enseignement et d'humanisme. Cette étude révèle que l'université n'est pas uniquement une institution à vocation éducative, mais également une organisation humaniste ayant les responsabilités sociales de faciliter une vie prospère, faire rayonner la civilisation et construire une démocratie solide. Cependant, les fonctions sociales de ces universités sont réprimées parce que l'éducation supérieure priorise les gains économiques plutôt que les objectifs humanistes. En ce sens, l'enseignement supérieur contemporain est «inefficace», car son fonctionnement et la pratique de l'éducation tombent dans une fonction utilitaire qui soutient la commercialisation des universités. Par conséquent, je soutiens qu'un changement radical des deux modèles est nécessaire pour rétablir l'humanisme dans une éducation supérieure contemporaine.

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Introduction

Introduction

In recent years, controversies about higher education at the college and university level have occupied the attention of scholars from diverse fields. Many of these debates concern the increasingly commercial or market-oriented focuses on higher education at the global level. According to critics of these recent shifts in higher education, universities have established numerous research centers and labs that focus on developing economy, technology, and science; by contrast, investment in the arts and Humanities has shrunk. Consequently, training students in marketable skills has become a dominant component of higher education, while cultivating humanistic characters have become less of a focus. These criticisms are aimed especially at the modern and postmodern university—an institution that has allegedly allowed economic aims to supplant humanistic goals. Hence, disciplines and curricula in universities are tailored to facilitate economic progress and material outcomes. For the concern of geographical scope, this thesis is primarily concerned with educational issues in North American society; I use the phrase "the university" to refer to the educational organization that evolved into the institution now known as "university." For the concern of the level of education, I use the term "higher education" to refer to public university- and college-level education.[1]

This thesis aims to illuminate problems that have emerged from contemporary higher education due to an unfortunate misalignment of economic aims over humanistic aims in higher education. I argue that the economic aims have become overwhelmingly dominant in contemporary higher education and the interactions of commercialism and consumerism have reinforced economic operation in universities; meanwhile, humanistic aims have been taken over by utilitarian practice through maximizing the utility of individuals as human capital for economic growth. Against this status quo, this thesis endorses humanistic goals as the primary purposes of higher education and promotes its function of building civilization and democracy. By drawing relevant scholarly literature and academic debates, I emphasize that a democratic social life needs humanistic education, and I advocate a strong shift from an economic focus to humanistic focus in contemporary higher education.

[1] Quebec has a unique educational system, Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel (CEGEP). Known as "General and Vocational College" in English, CEGEP is considered two-year post-secondary education between high school and three-year university. This thesis does not deal with CEGEPs because they would require a comprehensive examination beyond the scope of this thesis.

The speculation and analysis of contemporary higher education focusses on two broad, conceptually distinct, and potentially conflicting theoretical models. I call these the humanistic model and the market model respectively. I borrowed the terms "humanistic model" and "market model" and their associated conceptual frameworks from the research of Nussbaum and McMurtry, respectively. I am aware that different scholars have used different terms referring to the two types of educational models, but I acknowledge that Nussbaum and McMurtry very clearly demonstrated and applied the conceptions of the two models in their work. Nussbaum detailed the aspects and application of "humanistic education" that focuses on humanism in contrast with the contemporary education that prioritizes profit-making (2012, p. 28). McMurtry used the term "market model" (1991, p. 37) to illustrate how market influence has misled higher education in practice, and how market and education have contradicted in principles. I adopted the two terms from these two authors and will extend the analysis of each model to a bigger scope and more aspects in my discussion.

The two models represent two strings of contrasting values and principles: as the names suggest, one represents humanistic goals and another represents market goals. The humanistic model prioritizes values of human's dignity, potential, and freedom in teaching and learning, and politically it aims to promote social democracy. By contrast, market model prioritizes economic aims and follows market principles in educational practice. This model considers human as capital and education as an investment, and its primary goal is to maximize utility of human capital and facility economic outcomes. Although I concede that economic values have an appropriate and limited place within a humanistic model of higher education, I argue that the main problem of the market model is that it fails to assign principled limits to economic values within higher education. As such, higher education that is guided by market principles inevitably subordinates humanistic and democratic values to economic ones, even to the extent of reducing values of human dignity, potential, freedom and democratic agency to purely economic terms. Ultimately, my thesis presents an analysis of how this change has emerged, both historically and philosophically, and why this change is regrettable. In the final chapter, I also examine some possible ways in which a humanistic conception of higher education might be revitalized.

Grounded in a detailed explication and analysis of these two models, my thesis is guided by the following research questions:

1. What are the main characteristics of the humanistic model and market model in contemporary higher education, and how do these models emerge from a historically informed understanding of the contemporary university?

2. What are some of the main conceptual tensions and conflicts between these two models?

3. How do these conceptual tensions and conflicts translate into actual practices and policies in the contemporary university, with consideration of views and comments from critically minded scholars who are concerned with these practices?

4. What are the most significant threats posed by the marketization of higher education, especially towards the viability and prospects for humanistic education?

5. What possibilities exist for reinvigorating the contemporary university as a humanistic institution, and for restoring its role as a key vehicle for stabilizing a democratic society?

Academic reason for this topic and potential contribution.

I am far from the first to examine such questions. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why this topic is appropriate for an MA thesis. First, criticisms of the marketization of higher education can be difficult to navigate due to their complexity and the amount of literature on the topic. One contribution of this thesis is that is sets out a number of significant analytical distinctions, and examines them with philosophical care. Second, debates about the marketization of higher education are especially timely, as public debates about the role of colleges and universities are growing in both quantity and urgency. This thesis potentially contributes to the existing literature by the following aspects. First, the conceptualization of the two models of higher education—the humanistic model and the economic model – bring together and explain conceptual relationships between a number of key concepts employed by scholars who have written on similar topics. Second, by breaking down these two models into their component parts, and analyzing their logical relationships, my analysis enables a clearer understanding of the various ways in which these models are operationalized in contemporary higher education contexts. Third, by combining a historical and philosophical analysis of these complex conceptual relationships, my thesis shows how the broader tensions that have always existed between humanistic and economic models of higher education can be, and are in fact, endowed with new and shifting meanings. Overall, my study brings constructive insights that will boost and reaffirm the urgency of changing and improving contemporary higher education.

Personal reasons for this topic

My choice of this topic stems in part from my personal experience of higher education in various parts of the world, which has shaped my understanding of higher education's purpose, humanity, and democracy. I received higher education in several countries, traversing several academic disciplines – in China (Management), South Korea (Theology), and Canada (Education). My higher education was extensive and focused on Humanities and Social Science. For me, the paramount importance of higher education lies in its capacity to convey humanistic values and aims. Higher education has a strong impact on human understanding, social development, and politics, which mutually influence each other. It helps determine what quality of life people will live and how this world will be. My academic experiences have shaped my values and pursuits beyond practical and economic ends. I have become a person who chooses to take action on what is meaningful for a life worth living. Higher education did not make me a rich or powerful person, but it did improve my integrity and maturity, expanded and deepened my understanding, and equipped me with social abilities and skills. Now I can look at the world as a big picture, analyze information with strong logic and reasoning, receive things with independent and critical thinking, and discover hidden causes and deep meanings of things. The humanistic higher education I received shaped me to be an independent and grounded individual who has social and political sensitivity, and has enabled me to rationally respond to social and political events around me.

Contemporary Debates and Discussion About Higher Education

My analysis of the impact of marketization on higher education engages with many hotly contested issues and debates about the place of universities and colleges in society. In this section, I provide a snapshot of some of these debates and the disputes they involve. Outlining these debates helps to illustrate both the timeliness and the urgency of addressing these questions in a philosophically rigorous and historically informed way.

In 2011, the research center of Social Sciences and Humanities (CRASSH) at the University of Cambridge initiated a lecture entitled "The Very Idea of the University." Professor Stefan Collini presented the aims and goals of universities throughout history, and explained how they were incompatible with current educational practices in universities. He advocated that the university, unlike any other institution in society, should carry the primary mission of "extending and deepening human understanding" (Collini, 2011). Collini's argument is thus grounded in

educational values, which are central to what I will refer to in this thesis as the humanistic model of higher education. Collini's lecture provided an academic platform for academicians to discuss the role of universities, respond to the market model in contemporary higher education, and to repel forces that increasingly make education an industry geared toward economic growth.

At about the same time that Collini was presenting his views, a public discussion on "University Futures" was launched at the University of East London on the topic of the purpose of a university, which was reported on in *The Guardian* (Swain, 2011). A broad range of public intellectuals and faculty professors participated in the discussion. Divergent opinions, ideas, and insights emerged, resulting in a clash of perspectives and varying responses from the audience. Simon Goldhill, director of CRASSH, along with Stephen Anderson, director of the Campaign for Social Science, strongly expressed their concerns that the economic aims of current universities that were against the nature of higher education. Aligning themselves with Professor Collini, they called for social awareness about this educational and ethical problem and advocated the recovery and preservation of humanistic aims.

Opposing opinions also arose in this public discussion. Professor Mike Rustin from the University of East London shared his observation that "students have always seen benefits beyond learning for its own sake." He supported the motivations of pursuing higher education for practical purposes. Liam Burns, the president of the National Union of Students, expressed his disagreement with "learning for its own sake" and proclaimed that "everyone has a purpose for why they want to learn." Carl Lygo, chief executive of the private higher education provider BPP, discussed his views through his personal experience of striving to receive an education while growing up in a single-parent family. He chose to study law because it "offered a clear career path" that would change his life. He delivered a clear message that "learning for its own sake" was not realistic because most people could not afford this. In general, the perspectives shared during the forum fell into one of two categories: learning for knowledge or learning for future income. In short, both the market model and humanistic model were represented at the event, which aptly reflected the wider public debate about the purpose of higher education.

Outside the UK, similar discussions continued with wider scholarly involvement and broader participation. In May 2016, *Boston Review* (Allen, 2016) held an academic forum entitled "What is Education For?" with the subject of Education and Democratic Citizenship. This forum touched upon fundamental aspects of education and society, such as educational

practices, social justice, public policy, and social democracy. Danielle Allen, director of the Safra Center for Ethics and Professor of Government and Education at Harvard University, opened this debate by arguing that a Humanities-centered university education was essential to prepare people for democratic citizenship. She expressed a regret about the fact that governments and schools prioritized subjects such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) but ignored Humanities. She argued that it was the cultivation of people by Humanities disciplines, not technology and scientific training, that created democratic and responsible citizens. Economic and social equality were fundamental components of social democracy, she argued; however, the market model undermined social balance by expanding the income gap. Allen pointed out that "gross economic inequalities" were "products of policy choices" because political choices, economic dynamic, and educational directions were intertwined and influenced each other. Therefore, the dominance of market model was the essential reason for economic and political inequality (Allen, 2016).

Some commentators in the *Boston Review* symposium resisted Allen's arguments. Carlos Fraenkel, Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, rejected Allen's call for greater emphasis on the Humanities by claiming that "no citizen today can participate in building the social world [and democracy] without a solid knowledge of the natural sciences and technology." Furthermore, he suggested, skills traditionally associated with Humanities-based studies can also be taught and learned in non-Humanities fields, sometimes with greater effect. For example, he explained that math was a great subject to train students in the logic and reasoning skills needed to analyze complex problems and make sound arguments. Fraenkel also took up the implications of these points for another aspect of Allen's argument – the educational implications for democracy and citizenship. According to Fraenkel, STEM subjects and Humanities are equally essential to empowering citizens to build social democracy. This view was supported by Professor Rob Reich from Stanford University. He affirmed the significance of STEM disciplines in preparing democratic citizenship participation through training individuals with necessary knowledge and skills in the industry world.

Approaching the debate from a different perspective, Lelac Almagor, an English teacher from a charter school, proclaimed that the problem of modern education did not fall between STEM and Humanities disciplines, but lies on the harsh crevice between those who were privileged and those who were left behind. She pointed out that the question was how education

could help "students master the skills and content that elite students take for granted" (Almagor, as cited in Allen, 2016). Education should facilitate students acquiring abilities of all kinds, including arts, history, philosophy, math, and techniques. Almagor's argument directed the problem from the "market model or humanistic model" to the weaknesses of educational practice, such as "how to measure learning and evaluate teaching" and "when and how to use the resulting data" (Almagor, as cited in Allen, 2016).

Overall, the symposium "What is Education For?" reveals the complexities that attend debates about the encroachment of market forces in higher education today. My argument in this thesis nevertheless crosses the divisions and lines of the debate outlined above between scholars and teachers like Allen, Fraenkel, Reich, and Almagor. The humanistic model of higher education I defend in this thesis is broadly in line with Allen's vision of the purpose of higher education. At the same time, I do not argue that STEM subjects should be sidelined in favor of Humanities subjects. My concern here is primarily with the underlying educational values of a Humanities based education – intellectual and moral values associated with knowledge-seeking, understanding complex relationships between ideas, open-minded inquiry, and virtues of intellectual courage and integrity. These values can be fostered in various life experience and through the study of different subjects. However, these values first have to be recognized and assigned a certain priority in the design and practices of institutions of higher education in order for students to learn them, for teachers to encourage their development, and for institutions to embody them. Relying on ideas and arguments from a range of scholars such as McMurtry (1991), Molnar (2013), Nussbaum (1998; 2012), and Readings (1996). I try to show how and why these values, and their priority, are at serious risk in contemporary higher education, even if they are not yet altogether lost.

The risk I have in mind is illustrated by an example, which received considerable media attention when it occurred in the 1990s. I am referring to the case of Nancy Olivieri, which featured a dispute over intellectual property resulting from privately funded university research. This dispute was a particularly bitter example of dangers that can arise when educational and market values clash. Olivieri worked at the University of Toronto's Hospital for Sick Children. In 1989, she was part of a group evaluating the use of a drug, deferiprone, for the treatment of thalassaemia. The research was financed by a pharmaceutical company, Apotex. Olivieri found that deferiprone led to progressive hepatic fibrosis, which would potentially threaten a

substantial proportion of patients. Thus, she found, deferiprone was ineffective and unsafe. This discovery was obviously not welcomed by Apotex, which had invested considerable resources in its drug, whose profitability was now at risk. When Olivieri moved to disclose her discovery in peer-reviewed research articles, Apotex threatened to sue for breach of the confidentiality established in their contract. Olivieri refused to back down. Subsequently, her employer, the University of Toronto, terminated her employment. Olivieri also experienced a series of character attacks, humiliation, and threats from Apotex, media, and her colleagues. The legal process lasted two and half years from 1996 to 1999. Olivieri went through a long and complicated court battle, investigation, and negotiation until both sides settled with an agreement. Olivieri was awarded the 2009 AAAS Award for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility (Olivieri, 2003; Schafer, 2004). However, despite these victories, the personal and financial damage from this feud was incalculable. Two of the most prominent blood researchers, David Nathan of Harvard and David Weatherall of Oxford, who were involved in the final settlement of Olivieri dispute, summarized the affair as a "debacle … complicated by personal animosity, poor administrative judgment, and bad behavior among academic colleagues" (Nathan & Weatherall, 2002).

This affair shocked academic and medical world, but this is not the sole scandal produced by the increasing marketization of education. When two entities with contrasting values (in this case, academic researchers and a pharmaceutical company) come together to collaborate via financial support, there is a great risk that educational institutions will fail to live up to their educational and ethical responsibilities. From my perspective for this thesis, the Olivieri case simply illustrates that the relationship between market and educational values should not be taken for granted as benign, or as a 'win-win' for universities and whatever economic interests they align themselves with. Market values can and do conflict with educational goals, sometimes with disastrous consequences for education, such as in the Olivieri case. But, as I shall argue below, the harms to education often occur in less spectacular and more invisible ways. Nathan and Weatherall identify close partnerships between universities and private industry as a crucial factor in generating such ethical problems (Nathan & Weatherall, 2002). In this thesis, I will explore a wide variety of different ways in which market values influence higher education, with potentially harmful results. Ultimately, I argue, the educational mission of higher education can

be protected only if education administration and practitioners are conscious of the humanistic aims of education and persistently guard this ground.

A Note on the title of this thesis: utilitarianism captures the university.

The title of this thesis "Utilitarianism Captures the University" – is inspired by my reading of one of the most prominent and widely cited critics of the contemporary university -- the late Bill Readings. Readings, in his widely-read book *The University in Ruins*, laments that "excellence" is such a popular slogan of universities. "Excellence," Readings argues, has become a god-term, whose power and pervasiveness as a tool of administrative rhetoric just reveals its intellectual emptiness (Readings, 1996). Contemporary higher education has reduced the Humanities and Liberal Arts disciplines and investment while increasing investment and offering more courses in economic and technological subjects. By doing so, higher education has imposed an emphasis on economic aims and practical goals, thus, has ignored care for humanity.

Following this trajectory, according to Readings, commercialism and consumerism have become popular doctrines guiding higher education; and educational operations have been undertaken following these doctrines. This kind of higher education glorifies capabilities such as producing wealth, consuming goods, and maximizing utility. The value of individuality is merely taken as human capital for economic purposes, and higher education is simply an investment to optimize the utility of individuals for economic growth. At this point, Readings argues, higher education is driven by utilitarianism.

In Readings' view, utilitarian higher education has already caused devastating consequences, such as pursuit of short-term profit from exploiting natural resource at the cost of damaging the planet; fast outcome of medical research and rapid profit from medicine sales at the expense of people's health and lives; improper distribution of national resources because of shortsighted policy makers; and many pure profit-oriented projects and research at the cost of myriad potential disasters. The more advanced the knowledge is and the more developed the technologies are, the more devastating consequences can be caused by misdirection of education and misuse of knowledge. For Readings, it is past time to face this crisis that utilitarianism has wrought on higher education. It is necessary to generate a radical shift from an economic focus to a humanistic focus in higher education to create and maintain a healthy, sustainable, and democratic society. At the same time, Readings notes that goals associated with advancing a robust democracy and a critical citizenship are degraded by contemporary higher education that

maximizes profits. On this account, the humanistic goals and the by-products of education have been reversed, and contemporary higher education betrays fundamental goals centered on civilization and democracy.

In this thesis, I follow Readings, arguing that in the current global industrial and informational environment, it is even more crucial for higher education to cling to and realize fundamental humanistic goals. Furthermore, doing so requires resisting prevailing educational, social, and political agendas, which have prioritized economic values, goals and outcomes. Worldwide problems such as political corruption, economic inequality, cultural and national conflicts, and ecological crises have been rampantly sweeping most nations and threatening sustainable development in a global scope. Scholars like Readings, Martha Nussbaum, Harry Brighouse and others discussed in the following pages have expressed concern by posing the question: do we want an economic society or a humanistic society? An education that focuses on training people to contribute economically will facilitate an industrial society; and this kind of education unavoidably accommodates school commercialization and school consumerism, endorses and applies the idea of human capital in education, and lets universities fall into the mesh of utilitarianism. By contrast, an education that emphasizes teaching and learning cultivates independent and critically minded citizens who will build a humanistic society, where humanism, progressive civilization, and robust democracy are endorsed and pursued.

Underlying these different debates is a fundamental philosophical question: what is higher education for? Philosophers seek to intervene in debates about higher education – for example, disagreements about the ethics of corporate funding in higher education (Readings, 1996), about the "for profit" university (Nussbaum, 2012), the place of Humanities and the fine arts in the university curriculum (Nussbaum, 1998), and a host of other issues that will be discussed in this thesis – by viewing them in light of a consideration of higher education's fundamental purposes. Nevertheless, many commenters on higher education neglect, or pay only passing attention, to this critical question. This thesis carefully explores the work of prominent scholars—including Martha Nussbaum, John McMurtry, Bill Readings and numerous others – who have addressed critical and philosophical issues about higher education. Examining the purpose of higher education is especially important when higher education is facing an unprecedented dynamic of globalization, and as such, is taken as a powerful engine to accelerate economic growth, accumulate wealth, and meet market demands.

Major Themes in Relation to Previous Work on the University

As I have stated previously, my main goal in this thesis is twofold. First, it is to cast a historically and philosophically informed eye on the marketization of contemporary global higher education. Second, it is to recover and explain the attractiveness of humanistic education that might enliven and enable the reinvigoration of the contemporary university. The detailed argument will unfold over the next chapters. Here, however, I would like to highlight three major themes that inform the ideal of higher education that motivates my arguments and analysis in this thesis. My intention is to orient the reader to some of the broader themes that inform my subsequent focus on the two major 'models' of higher education – the market and humanistic models

1 The University as a "civilizing force."

My thesis draws on a tradition of scholarly work that links higher education as a vehicle for promoting humanistic values and as a vehicle of democratic citizenship. One of the most well known figures in this tradition is John H. Newman, a Catholic (later Anglican) Priest in England who had significant influence in higher education at his time. He argued that the purpose of university education was to obtain a free, equitable, calm, moderate, and wise mind (Newman, 1992). At the time Newman wrote, Humanities and Liberal Arts dominated the curricula of Western universities, whose role was widely understood to be helping student cultivate their minds and advance civilization. It was grounded in helping students explore their desire "to know" and to explore and study "unknowns" in domains such as religion, philosophy, literature, and politics. Such an investigation and study provoked drastic social, political, and ideological changes. One outstanding change was reflected in Newman's bold statement about the University, "…it is not a Convent, it is not a Seminary; it is a place to fit men of the world for the world" (Newman, 1992, discourse 9).

In this period, according to Newman, a university played a crucial role in examining and advancing understandings of human beings and societies beyond the once-dominant religious and political boundaries and purposes. Intellectuals and academicians, among many other pioneers, moved civilization and explorations of life beyond entrenched religious and political limits. They strived to move education to a stage of free learning, expression, and thinking. The desires and pursuits to advance the understanding of humanity and societies also stimulated aspirations to liberate human beings from superstitious and suppressive powers (Pedersen, 1997).

This process has shaped the world of today. Higher education empowered individuals to write the course of history by enabling them to think and act with an expanded understanding of nature, human beings, and societies. In this sense, a university is a cradle for thinking to raise heirs to inherit valuable knowledge, skills, culture, and traditions of their ancestors and to preserve, continue, and enrich their heritage. It is a significant task to ensure these invaluable elements that composed a civilization will not disappear, be forgotten, or become overaged as time goes by. A university is a center for that task. A social environment in which this task is recognized and realized, is most appropriately equipped to foster humanism understanding, generate personal and social wellbeing.

2 Higher education is inefficient.

Higher education is an indispensable necessity for a civilized society and robust democracy. The more highly educated citizens are, the more civilized society will become, and the more robust social democracy will be. Against this backdrop, contemporary higher education is inefficient in playing this role because it has favored another type of "efficiency". Many commentators have argued that systems of higher education have lost a strong sense of purpose in serving civilization and democracy. Instead, they argue, higher education has been drawn into the industry machine of "efficiency" to propel economic progress. For example, Janice Gross Stein (2002) argues that "efficiency" can become a cult when it serves utilitarian or material goals. What Stein describes as "efficiency" is what happens when material goals surpass humanistic pursuits. As Stein explains, efficiency is a concept that can be attached to any goal or purpose, without regard for how it impacts, degrades, or enhances individual lives and society. In institutional contexts, Stein observes, hospitals can be efficient regarding the number of hours per patient served, even as they operate in ways that are cruelly indifferent to the well-being of those same patients (p. 111-112). Another scenario in which "efficiency" being a cult is when "efficiency" becomes the ends, then it serves the purpose for itself; this might cause damage rather than development. For example, one can be a ruthlessly efficient torturer, but being efficient in torturing people does not generate development or advancement.

In educational contexts, the criticism is often that higher education may efficiently serve as an engine of economic growth – expanding human capital that will lead to new technologies, medications, and other products – even as they neglect or underemphasize the broader humanizing functions of a traditional education. Nevertheless, in contemporary discourse,

according to critics like Stein (2002), the term "efficiency" tends to justify and serve itself, while people who pursue efficiency and those who are served by it become tools of whatever purposes happen to be most expediently at hand. Insofar, efficiency becomes a "cult".

The "cult of efficiency" (Stein, 2002, p. 3-4) is reflected in the higher education of today, as more and more universities market themselves as generating economic growth, material profits, desired employment, and social status. These aspects of universities are not merely by-products of higher education; now they have become principal goals in higher education. And educational success is increasingly measured by the efficiency of educational institutions in producing these by-products. As a result, universities of today do not show much patience or tolerance to the "inefficiency" of Humanities and Liberal Arts disciplines. According to the National Science Foundation of the US, the spending on Humanities in 2011 was less than half of one percent of the funds devoted to science and engineering (National Science Foundation, 2011). In the UK, according to National Health Service, the annual budget for arts and Humanities is less than that for just one field of IT research (National Health Service, 2011).

In seeking to cast a critical eye on such developments, I assume that the University is not merely a training factory to raise qualified workers or knowledgeable people. I acknowledge that the goal of expanding human capital may be an important function of the contemporary university; but I insist that it is not the sole, or even the most essential, goal of a university. Moreover, one significant role of university education is to sustain and progress civilization, democracy, and above all, build characters of a person, and illuminate humanity.

In order to understand the possibility of a humanistic role in contemporary higher education, we must confront what may seem to many like an uncomfortable thought: humanistic education is indispensable, yet unashamedly, inefficient. Unlike technologic and applied science that can produce rapid profits and immediate effects, it takes Humanities a longer time to "shine." Reading literature, learning analytical reasoning, and discussing and debating ideas are required to forge humanistic knowledge, experience, and actions, and that is a comparatively long process. The knowledge and skills that result from a humanistic study may indeed produce significant economic and material benefits, even though these benefits are not the primary reason for this kind of education. The point is not simply that it takes even a longer time to reveal the economic profits and benefits from humanistic disciplines; the point is that there is no way to conduct a humanistic education in the service of any predefined or predetermined economic or

other material benefits. The humanistic student and teacher seek first to understand what human values should be served, not how some instrument or tool may serve a predetermined value. For example, it is a humanistic scrutiny to ask whether this or that medication will create benefits that outweigh its risks or harmful side effects, we need to ask whether the proposed benefits are the ones upon which we should be focusing on in the first place? Are they properly understood, or are they misrepresented and distorted in hopes of profits? Asking such questions, and attempting to find answers to them, are inefficient because they may delay designing and testing the "product." Humanistic education is inefficient because its influence and outcomes are not momentary and obvious, such as making a breakthrough in a medical problem or making a new chemical discovery. By contrast, influence and outcomes from Humanities are infused in the course of human development, which is a long, slow, and unpredictable process whose progress may not be measurable until it is well underway.

3 Robust democracy.

Besides human civilization and individual cultivation, higher education plays an essential role in building and maintaining democracy. A civilized society needs cultivated and educated individuals to carry on civic service and maintain good social order. A free society needs to be maintained by free men and women who are informed and capable of participating in social and political matters, which is a fundamental element to build and preserve a democratic society. One of the founding fathers of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, created an education system that could reach common people and could foster responsible and capable citizens. He believed that democracy would only be safe in the hands of people; citizens needed to be rightly educated to guard the new republic against internal division and external threats. Therefore, he advocated and initiated an inclusive education system with goals beyond economic growth. Jedediah Peck, a strong supporter of Jefferson and an early legislator and education reformist, emphasized that "in all countries where education is confined to a few people, we always find arbitrary governments and abject slavery" (Young et al., 2011, p. 385). Upon Jefferson's retirement from being president, he and his allies secured state funds to build a new state university aiming to raise the next generation to guard democracy and expand education to more common people.

Higher education is an essential channel to realize democracy because higher education enables every individual to be a participant— not just a spectator— in political and social life. Citizens need to be able to think, understand, and judge in order to vote with a comprehensive

understanding of what they are voting for and how it will affect their lives. A higher education primarily aims for economic outcomes cannot nurture such mindsets and abilities. Only a higher education rooted in promoting civilization, cultivation, and a high social and political awareness can raise independent minds and foster critical thinking. It is crucial for citizens to be capable to understand political and social issues such as public policy, social crisis, poverty, and injustice by their own minds. Therefore, humanistic education is critical to equip people to sufficiently and effectively practice democracy, such as voting and assembly. For example, people need the ability to analyze and process information logically to understand others' opinions and situations; and they need skills of speaking, discussing, and debating in order to build a strong argument and make judgments about complex situations. furthermore, they need adequate knowledge and understanding of how to spend tax, how to allocate national resources, and how to balance demands from high-income and low-income groups. After all, how to react to these profound issues is what constitute a democracy in society. Well-educated individuals are more prepared to involve themselves in these issues with effective manner, and they are better equipped to inspect and urge the government to make sound decisions to guard and strengthen democracy.

The three themes presented two fundamental functions of higher education in history: civilization and democracy. The two functions are core components of humanistic education. However, the contemporary university have shifted the focus from the humanistic foundation to an economic ground. Such a shift has created a contemporary discourse of higher education, which represented by the market model that prioritizes market needs and economic outcomes.

In subsequent chapters, I will explain in more detail what market and humanistic models consist of. However, since my ultimate goal is to clarify and support contemporary critics of the market model of higher education, I will provide here a brief outline of some key conceptual elements of that model. The purpose of this overview is to enable the reader to better understand from the outset what is being criticized and why. This is necessary because commentators on higher education often advance criticisms of the "commodification", "commercialization", "marketization", or "privatization" of the university without clearly distinguishing between these concepts and without explaining the relationships between them.

What is The Market Model of Education?

Key concepts.

The Market Model of education has a number of components which are embodied in the realization of higher education and echoes the overwhelming commercial influence in higher education. The key ones of which I outline and explicate in this section.

I. *Marketization.* A market is a social system in which individuals pursue their self-interest through exchange with others in mutually beneficial trades (Stein, p. 27). In capitalist markets, as distinct from markets based on barter exchange, for example, the specific measure of benefits is monetary profits. For example, educators and scholars, including Nussbaum, Stein, and Molnar, have stated that university education has become a profit-making industry (Molnar, 2013; Nussbaum, 2012; Stein, 2002). However, this claim needs to be qualified somewhat. In my discussion of the market model of higher education, I do not mean that universities or educational systems themselves necessarily behave exactly and at all times as if profits are the sole purpose of education. Rather, the concept of marketization is meant to indicate that contemporary universities have become enmeshed in broader systemic market relationships, and that this influences all aspects of their functioning. For example, the idea of marketization pertains to the idea of a university education as a product to be consumed, to the transformation of students as consumers who purchase this product, and to changes in the role of educators and school administrators who become product and service providers. It also refers to the complex ways in which these distinct phenomena are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Such scenarios change the whole dynamic of education to a new paradigm in which educating and learning are operated on and processed by market principles.

II. *Utilitarianism.* The term "utilitarianism" can mean different things in different fields. Its most common meaning is in moral philosophy, where it denotes a comprehensive moral theory grounded in the principle of maximizing the greatest overall happiness or welfare (McDonough, 2016). Jeremy Bentham (1789) explains that utilitarianism centers on the utility of all resources; its principle is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. It lays the theoretical and philosophical foundation for the market model in higher education. In other contexts, utilitarianism is used to designate an economic approach to theory and

practice in various fields such as health care or education (Postman, 2011). In this case, the focus is on maximizing economic benefits, rather than happiness, though money is assumed to be a proxy for and hence instrumental to happiness. Here the claim is that a utilitarian approach to education focuses on the economic bottom line – whether schools promote greater productivity or economic growth – while ignoring other educational values or assuming that economic benefits will necessarily translate into other types of benefit. For example, a utilitarian approach to education in this sense might hold that an education that focuses on preparing students for jobs is justified on the grounds that it will promote economic growth for society, while also assuming or claiming that individual students can use the skills acquired during their education to finance their own non-economic pursuits. On this view, utilitarian educators may or may not find a reason to include art, music, literature, philosophy, history, or some other subject in the university curriculum; but there is no necessary reason for doing so unless economic benefits (current or future) warrant it. For the utilitarian educator, there is thus no intrinsic, specifically *educational*, reason to teach students about the worth or value of these subjects, or how to appreciate them, or how they may enrich one's life and outlook. The logic of utilitarianism thus contributes to 'commodification' by erasing the possibility that the content of education – knowledge and understanding – might have a value that cannot be measured monetarily and thus might require means other than money to access. In Chapter Four, I provide a more detailed account of utilitarianism and its influence on, and interrelation with, the market.

III. *Human Capital*. Chapter Two features a detailed account of the concept of human capital and its role in defining the aims of education. This concept is also important more broadly as an element of the market model of education. Human capital was much explored by scholars such as Adam Smith, Theodore Schultz, and Gary S. Becker who have explored and examined the concept of *human capital* for centuries. A modern definition and analysis from Becker is widely accepted. Becker (2009) conceives human capital as "physical means of production," in precisely the same sense as factories and machines. Here, individuals are understood in terms of their expected costs and productivity. Accordingly, investments in education are evaluated on the basis of their expected capacity to increase or expand the productivity of those being educated, such

as students, as compared to the cost of such an investment. Consequently, applying this concept to contemporary higher education, individuals are considered as physical and intellectual capital, and higher education is viewed as an investment that yields economic growth.

IV. *Commercialism*. Derek Bok states that commercialization occurs when there are opportunities in the university to make money (Bok, 2009, p. 99). As such, commercialism refers to specific, clearly defined profit-making initiatives within a broader pattern of *marketization* in higher education. Critics of commercialism in the university, like Bok (2009), focus on the moral costs of commercialism, which they argue threaten to dramatically change the character of the university (2009). For example, under the circumstance of commercialization, mentoring and educating relationships between professors and students become interactions between producers and consumers. The concept of commercialism can be further analyzed into its component parts— Consumerism and Commodification.

   a. *Consumerism*. Molnar proclaims that the market produces a "consumer culture" that pervades the social life of the school. According to Molnar (2013), once education is subject to forces of 'marketization,' consumerism is an inevitable consequence (Molnar, 2013). Explicit, visible indicators of consumerism include the presence of marketing campaigns and 'brands' in the schools. However, consumerism also has broader effects on the character and content of education, as part of the larger pattern of marketization. Thus, when consumerism enters higher education, the monetary exchange of price and product between professors and lecturers is highlighted – the former is now understood to provide academic training and feedback in exchange for tuition fees. Correspondingly, students pay tuition in exchange for academic and administrative services provided by the university and its employees, ultimately culminating in the conferral of a degree, which is now explicitly and forthrightly transformed into a commodity, rather than a symbol of knowledge and understanding gained.

   b. *Commodification*. Commodification refers both to the outcome of commercialization in education – namely, the transformation of goods, benefits, or goals into 'products' or commodities – and to a particular aspect of the larger,

complex processes of marketization that produce and reinforce the system of education within which commodification occurs. Molnar summarily announces that education has become a "knowledge industry," – "commodity rather than consciousness-raising experience," – and is no longer considered as "public trust" but "profit opportunity service" (Molnar, 2013, p. 127-131). When market principles pervade higher education, and commercial activities take place in universities, higher education becomes a commodity to be purchased and consumed. Many scholars such as Molnar (2013), Postman (2011), and Stein (2002) categorically criticize the fact that higher education as a commodity in the "education market" has been widely practiced by universities, students, and governments. Business series actions of selling, purchasing, and consuming transfer education from social service to the commodity.

V. *Privatization*. Privatization can have different meanings in scholarly and popular debates about the marketization of education and schools. In higher education contexts, privatization often refers to the primary source of funding coming from foundations, corporations, student tuition, or philanthropy—i.e. non-government sources. The term also refers to a distinction between education itself as a 'private' or a 'public' good. This distinction does not refer to the source of funding for private education, but to different ways of understanding the nature of the content of education itself. In this study, the idea of privatization is used in the latter sense. Privatization of education is not necessarily against the goals of education, such as promoting breadth and depth of knowledge and understanding, fostering intellectual values of open-mindedness, and encouraging intellectual aspiration. However, the idea of privatization alludes to the ways in which the goals of education are increasingly marginalized in favor of clear and direct utilitarian values for economy.

Brief discussion of key concepts.

The integration and assertion of these market concepts into education have changed the nature and substance of education. Allowing market concepts and principles to intervene has transformed education from being a "public good" to a "private good." The nature of education being a public good is to benefit everybody. An individual's acquisition of education has a positive influence on others' opportunities to benefit from education. First, the more the

individual benefits from education, the higher the likelihood that a person will become a more aware, productive, and cooperative citizen. Second, the more knowledge that person obtains from education, the more likely he/she can contribute to enhancing the knowledge body; as Molnar notes, knowledge-accumulation depends on the increase of "free exchange of ideas" (Molnar, 2013, p. 38). Education as a public good does not exclude others from benefiting from it, oppositely, include others to be beneficiaries in affluent ways. In contrast, the nature of education as a private good generates private benefits and virtually excludes others' access to these benefits. It is rather an outcome of the personal investment, and it is meant to produce private enjoyment and benefits; it excludes or has an adverse impact on others' appropriation of its benefits. McMurtry comments on this phenomenon by observing that "the greater the amount of its accumulation for self, the greater the inaccessibility of others to any use or control of any unit of its possession" (Molnar, 2013, p. 38). For example, an individual purchases education as a private product which gives him/her more opportunities to occupy privileged positions and possess more resources. As a result, there are fewer places and fewer resource for others. From this stance of education being a private good, education empowers individuals in the competition of limited resources. Hence, education as private good that advantages people who are privileged to purchase education thereby disadvantages those who are unable to do so.

Structure of The Thesis

I structure this thesis in four chapters to elaborate different yet correlated components and aspects of contemporary higher education. Chapter One presents a historical and contemporary exploration of higher education. I introduce and analyze the historical foundation of higher education, and I compare humanistic values and goals of ancient times to market values and goals in contemporary times. Chapter Two focuses on the *humanistic model* and the *market model* in higher education, laying out the philosophical foundation of these two competing models. I introduce the theoretic features of the two models, analyze current research about them, and expound on how they play out in contemporary higher education. Chapter Three is centered on *utilitarianism* that underpins marketization in education. I expound on the relationship between the two models and highlight four threats that marketization imposes on higher education. I also investigate how higher education meshes into the values and misguidance of utilitarianism and how utilitarianism "captures" higher education. The scrutiny on utilitarianism facilitates my diagnosis of the "illness" of higher education and serves to

uncover the cause of marketization in education and connect previous key concepts. Chapter Four then returns to the classic interrelation of education and democracy. I argue that the university is not merely an educational institution but also a humanistic organization with social responsibilities. Here, I advocate that the core social responsibility of the university is to build robust democracy. I elucidate the university as a humanistic institution within a democratic society through seeing it as an instrument of cultivating courage, defending democratic values, upholding social and economic equality, facilitating political engagement and participation, and raising humanistic leadership with accountability.

Chapter One: Historical and Contemporary Exploration of Higher Education Aims

Introduction

This chapter examines humanistic aims of higher education in history, and juxtaposes them with the economic aims of contemporary higher education. It also analyzes the historical and philosophical underpinnings of present discussions about higher education. The purpose of the chapter is to shed light on two sets of competing goals of higher education, and to arouse critical thinking on how to evaluate the two different sets of goals and how to position them in educational practice. The aspect of the both models are necessary and important in leading to the creation of universities in the early modern period and sustaining higher education in large; however, I argue the two models have been placed in inappropriate scales in higher education. I illustrate how pursuing humanistic values in contemporary higher education does not require eliminating economic values from education, but does require restricting economic motivations and operations. This view is critical of those who defend a central place for economic purposes such as preparing students for the workplace, teaching job skills, or advancing economic growth. Instead, I argue, university education should focus primarily on cultivating humanistic values.

In order to distinguish and compare some aspects of higher education in different epochs, I use the Industrial Revolution as a transitional phase between the old and modern higher education. I choose the Industrial Revolution because it framed the shift from a more traditional value system to an industrial one that prioritizes efficiency and economic outcomes. This division choice merely indicates a transition from a humanistic focus in higher education to an economic one; it does not nullify the merits of Industrial Revolution in propelling social development. Specifically, this thesis mainly focuses on the emergence, formation, and development of higher education in the West, along with brief descriptions of some relevant events in other parts of the world, for instance, China. I am aware that many factors have shaped the discourse surrounding higher education in the West, yet this thesis focuses on the things that reveal the philosophical and ideological stances of higher education. For example, how social ideology and dominant social trends have shaped the goals of higher education in a period and a geopolitical space. I will review and discuss the aims of higher education in historical and modern times by building off the work of contemporary scholars. I then will juxtapose the two sets of dominant goals from historical and contemporary higher education. This comparison will reveal a radical shift from humanistic aims to economic aims in higher education over time.

Historical Exploration

In this section, I provide a historical survey of the emergence of the university as an idea, which eventually took institutional form, in the West. Before doing so, I should address a terminological matter in order to prevent unnecessary confusion. I use the terms "higher education" and "university" throughout to mark off a domain of education that is meant to signify the most advanced or culminating stage of formal education, as this has been understood or conceptualized in different ways in Western societies. In this thesis, "higher education" in the discussion of ancient educational sessions refers to teaching and learning subjects and skills beyond technical training, such as learning basic language skills for daily communication and learning basic math to calculate. Rather, "higher education" in history mainly focused on disciplines that we call Humanities and Liberal Arts today, i.e., Rhetoric, Theology, Philosophy, History, and Law. In the contemporary discussion, "higher education" refers to college and university education that differs from vocational training schools and institutions. The term "university" appeared only when the early universities organized in Europe around 11th century, particularly, the first university established in Italy (Pedersen, 1997).

Considering the expansiveness of my topic in this chapter—the emergence of the university in Western societies—I limit my discussion to a consideration of the distinctive and characteristic educational aims that marked the origins and early history of the university. These aims have been interpreted by a number of influential contemporary scholars, including Harry Brighouse, John McMurtry, Martha Craven Nussbaum, and Bill Readings, among many others. By focusing on the debates about the fundamental aims and values of higher education, I show that the historical discussion also has a philosophical component. Philosophy of education is primarily concerned with the interpretation, analysis, and justification of fundamental aims of education (Brighouse, 2006). The guiding questions, then, are what is education ultimately for, and what goods or values should it seek to promote? As these questions indicate, the term "fundamental" here is used normatively rather than casually. That is, the philosophical aim is to identify what matters most in education as an aspirational ideal, not to describe how universities function in reality. Universities may succeed or fail in achieving their aspirations, but from a philosophical perspective, judgments of success and failure can only be made in light of a clear understanding of the concepts and values that provide the underlying purpose of education.

Throughout this chapter and the thesis, I structure my philosophical analysis through a contrast between two different and potentially competing models of higher education. One is the humanistic model grounded in the aims and purposes of humanism. The other is the market model grounded in economic and utilitarian drives and aims. These two models of higher education serve as a way to structure my discussion of a perennial set of conflicts and tensions in aspirations for higher education – conflicts and tensions that have, as I argue below, existed since the very origin of the university in Western contexts. I show that there have been dramatic and significant changes in the particular patterns of interaction between these two educational models. Despite these changes, the contrast between humanistic and economic frameworks for understanding competing visions of education in the university remains useful and illuminating, even if there may be alternative (and conceptually coherent) ways of understanding the historical and contemporary evolution of higher education in the West.[2]

Studying the roles of universities in history can provide valuable evidence about the creation and growth of today's universities, especially when historical data is supplemented by normative philosophical analysis. This philosophical-historical approach to higher education touches upon its fundamental reasons and structural issues. For example, the observation on higher education in history will provide evidence and analysis to the inquiries of why human society needs education after all, why higher education was institutionalized to "universities," how higher education facilitated individual and social development, and how individuals, education practice, and politics constructed the discourse of this type of educational compound that we call "higher education" today. The historical exploration attends these concerns to lead to a profound examination of higher education both historically and in the present.

Before moving on to my main discussion in this chapter, one further cautionary note is necessary. This section does not aim to provide specific solutions to the problems and dilemmas of contemporary higher education; rather, it offers an historical overview of the ongoing debate about what values and purposes universities are meant to serve in the first place. My approach in this chapter, then, is mainly to observe, reflect, and ask philosophical questions about fundamental issues of higher education. More specifically, this historical and philosophical

[2]There are alternative models in contemporary higher education, such as posthumanism (Snaza & Weaver, 2015). Yet, this thesis focuses on the categorization of *humanistic model and economic model* to present contemporary higher education

exploration intends to lay a foundation for subsequent chapters which contrast the humanistic and economic models of higher education which are in competition today.

Early higher education and the formation of early universities.

Following perspectives from scholars such as Charles Homer Haskins and Olaf Pedersen, I argue that early higher education was centered on the Humanities and was driven by the goal of improving society. In Latin, the word "university" reflects its humanistic value, as it originates from the Latin word "universitas" which means "a whole." In medieval times, higher education institutions were referred to as the "bâtie en hommes," which means "building of men" (Haskins, 2002). The concept of the university as "a whole" also refers to "a number of persons associated into one body, society, company, community, guild, corporation" (Lewis, Charlton T.; Short, Charles (1966) [1879]. A Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon Press). This meaning of "university" reveals its original purpose as centered on the "making a man." Following this idea of "making a man," higher education was infused in the training and cultivation of mind, body, and aesthetic sense.

In ancient Greek, the word used for education, "paideia," was associated with culture and civilization. As such, economic or practical goals were eschewed or de-emphasized. "Paideia" was translated into Latin as "humanitas" and eventually became "Humanities" in English. The philosophical conception of education reflected the humanistic aims of education, upon which ancient Greeks based their educational values. In Ancient Greece, education emphasized the shaping of intellectual, artistic and physical standards of humankind. Pedersen observes that "making" good citizens is the goal of Greek education; and a good citizen is an individual who is well-grounded in comprehensive social knowledge (Pedersen, 1997). Francesco Cordasco divides Greek education into Old Greek education and New Greek Education via the Periclean Age, from approximately 459 B.C. to 431 B.C. New Greek education covers Sophists who were teachers of the new education, theorists such as Socrates and Plato, and the fusion of Greek with Roman learning (Cordasco, 1976). The content and principles of New Greek education strongly influenced the curricula and educational models of European medieval education, and Greek and Roman literature has played and continues to play a big role in shaping European education and philosophy (Cobban, 1975; Knowles, 1962). I observe that European universities during the medieval period carried the humanistic values of ancient institutions of learning into the educational practices of modern Western societies.

"Higher education" was not a clearly identified, let alone a fixed and stable, concept in the early education practice of ancient times; it was a changing meaning of the underlying educational aims across centuries. What we would think of as higher education existed in shifting forms throughout early history until the development of the modern university in the medieval period (Pedersen, 1997). In ancient Greece, universities were not initially institutions, but rather were processes of learning and the transmission of knowledge situated in cultural, social, and intellectual movements. The university of Athens, for instance, did not appear until the end of the New Greek period which was indicated by Macedonian conquest and the thorough integration of Roman life (Cordasco, 1976, p. 4). Prior to this, the teaching of law, rhetoric, and philosophy was mostly organized and practiced by private masters. The purpose of such teaching and learning was primarily to explore knowledge, not to gain credentials or prerequisites for employment. Famously, Socrates and Plato did not issue certificates or diplomas to their pupils. A "university" as an institution of higher education did not come into existence until long after "higher education" was practiced and categorized in different ways. To this day, academics debate the exact years in which institutionalization of higher education were first formed. Indeed, the formation of universities was an uneven and halting historical process. In what follows, I will present a few examples of universities from different places and periods to illustrate how the formation and growth of universities was not a seamless process.

In the Old Greek period, particularly in the city-state of Sparta, education was under direct governmental control for the purpose of producing citizens of courage, obedience, and physical strength; this education system was established in the constitution of Lycurgus (850—800 B.C.). At approximately the same time, Athenian education aimed to train citizens through to four integrated stages: 1) family education of reading, writing, and physical training; 2) the public school featuring music and gymnastic classes; 3) preparing for Athenian citizen life; and 4) cadet training under direct state control. All these stages of training included reading, writing, gymnastic, poetry, drama, history, oratory, and sciences, with the emphasis shifting among these different elements at different stages (Cordasco, 1976, p. 4-6). Even though the Spartan education and Athenian educational systems differed in terms of both their content and structure, both demonstrated a focus on creating good citizens, without expectation of financial outcome.

In contrast to the Old Greek emphasis on the collective values and the rule of authorities, the New Greek education placed a great emphasis on strengthening individuality both in content

and method. According to Cordasco, the New Greek education evolved in three distinct stages (p. 6). The first stage was sustained by Sophists who acted as agents of the new education. The Sophists modified the Old Greek education by emphasizing the value of knowledge itself, intellectual training, and the appreciation of individuality. The second stage was supported by so-called "educational theorists" (p. 6), including famous philosophers such as Socrates and Plato. Socrates agreed with the well-known Sophist Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things;" but he emphasized that the prerequisite of this statement was that man had to know himself. He held the principle of "knowledge is virtue," and this principle guided his so-called Socratic Method. Since he did not leave anything in writing, Socrates' method and educational philosophy were mostly studied through the dialogues of Plato such as *The Apology, Protagoras*, and *Euthyphro*. Plato inherited Socrates' pedagogical and philosophical principles, and manifested them through his great works such as *Republic* and *Lysis*, which revealed his socialistic, political, and aesthetic ideals and aspirations (p. 7-10). Education at this stage in Greek history placed a strong emphasis on humanism and individuality. The education in the third stage was a modified extension of Greek education after Roman conquest around 164 B.C. As a matter of fact, Greek education had already begun to exert an influence on Roman education a century before the military conquest was complete. Roman education stressed the training of good citizens with vigorous discipline in order to enable them to participate in politics and social governance. For example, students were taught literature and oratory in order to be effective speakers and debaters; they would go on to engage in public and political issues through public speeches and debates. At the same time, Roman education ignored many Greek studies such as gymnastics, music, and science.

By the end of the New Greek period, when Greek civilization was thoroughly integrated with Roman life, philosophical schools had been formed and had finally been organized into the University of Athens (Cordasco, 1976; Joyal et al., 2009). Greek education placed a strong focus on training and cultivating people to be good-quality individuals and citizens. I summarize these aims as threefold: first, it fostered personal and social life skills such as reading, writing, music, gymnastics, oratory, and rhetoric; second, intellectual and personal qualities such as philosophical thinking, political awareness, and aesthetic awareness; and third, citizenship qualities such as courage, discipline, and physical and mental strength. These three goals of education integrated intellectual, individual, and citizenship aspirations, and together exhibit a

clear picture of humanistic education. As mentioned earlier, "higher education" was a notion that did not exist prior to the Greeks (Pedersen, 1997). The process of "making of higher education" was aligned with two discourses: one about shifting purposes of education at each level; and one about the transformational role of the birth of the university. Since recounting the institutionalization of a university is not the purpose of this thesis, I will move on to the discussion of early universities about their changed ways and transformed performances in expressing humanistic values in education.

The university of Bologna and the University of Paris are widely recognized as the earliest universities in the modern sense. The University of Bologna was established in 1088, and the University of Paris emerged around 1150 and was officially chartered in 1200. Both of them began their prosperous development during the early Renaissance in the last thirty years of the twelfth century (Rashdall, 1895, p. 151; p. 273-278). The two universities were pioneers of humanistic academic practice, and aimed to be largely independent of political and religious authorities. They each reveal the pursuit of humanistic educational goals in the early higher education in four different ways.

First, these two universities emphasized the aspiration of knowledge of umanities and Social Science. They embraced humanistic subjects such as Literature, Philosophy, History, and the Arts, aside from Theology which was once the dominant discipline for higher education. Moreover, they positioned these humanistic subjects in prominent positions and trained students with professional skills, which implies an economic or practical motivation that was embedded in supporting and continuing humanistic training. For example, the two universities taught Philosophy to train professionals rather than merely for cultivation or curiosity of philosophy (Pederson, 1997), so some philosophy students would become professionals and train more philosophy students. The two universities were pioneers of promoting humanistic values in higher education through official and public channels.

Second, the two universities gradually integrated humanist subjects and research in institutional settings. For instance, they placed subjects such as Philosophy, Law, and Literature in independent departments (Rashdall, 1895). This was the first time in history when different subjects were so divided. These subjects formed distinctive sections in which professors and students carried on specialized research and studies. At the same time, professors, academicians, and students largely benefited from interdisciplinary academic influence through broad

knowledge and understanding of different fields. This situation propelled both humanistic education and social function such as the development of technology, science, and the economy.

Third, the two universities moved in the direction of gaining academic freedom and institutional autonomy from political control. For example, the University of Paris established the first teachers' union in history, which was the Parisian Society of Masters. There was a continuous tension between local people and students. After a severe a violent confrontation between them caused the death of five students, the university masters united into a union. They appealed to King Philip and demanded a series of rights and privileges. A legendary quote from the masters' appeal was "Then we shall shake the dust of the streets of Paris from the hems of our gowns" if the King refused their appeal (Nelson, 1993). This event ended with the compromise of the King. Such a firm move and "break off" attitude from these masters gained the University of Paris significant rights, which ranged from faculty autonomy, curriculum freedom, police protection, and judicial privilege (Rashdall, 1895). This event demonstrated the determination of the academicians to sustain autonomy in university operations, education design, and student management from state power.

Fourth, the two universities attempted to gain independence of education from religious control. Paris set the model for the Universities of Masters with a focus on dialectical and theological studies, while Bologna gained complete autonomy from government and church authorities (Haskins, 2002; Rashdall, 1895). The university of Bologna attained protection for scholars when legislation passed that "scholars… shall be legally protected in the place in which they come, and where they live and study" (Pedersen, 1997, p.140). At that time, students were vulnerable to local judicial regulations. For example, some students were forced to pay for the debt incurred by their peers. Bologna also earned juridical privilege for students. For instance, legislation passed to abide by the tradition that "professors of law had authority of judgment on a par with bishops" (Pedersen, 1997, p.140). Therefore, students accused in law could choose to be judged by the court of the bishop or by their professors of law. This revolutionary movement asserted some legal rights and privileges for higher education, improved the legal situation of academic practice, and to some extent, weakened control of the church in education.

Following Bologna and Paris, many other early universities emerged in European countries such as Italy, France, Great Britain, Spain, and Germany in different periods. Some of them were built by the ruling class and some by religious organizations aimed at educating the

higher class and elites of that society. Some of them were officially launched as educational institutions, while many of them gradually "grew" from loose organizations to become universities (Haskins, 2002). The university of Oxford in England was established between the eleventh and twelfth century. It stood out from most early universities for its dominant academic and political position and contribution to English society. At that time, it was the church, not the university, issuing degrees to students; but Oxford University was granted this privilege by Pope Innocent IV to issue degrees to students (Woods, 2005). In the thirteenth century, the aristocracy's children received a chivalric education. In the case of Oxford and many other schools, its organization and formation was based on a combination of Renaissance humanism and religious reformation.

From its beginnings in the twelfth century to its climax in the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries, the Renaissance greatly influenced early universities. Humanistic ideals such as exploration of individuality, humanistic courses such as arts and science, and humanistic methods such as open discussion and debate, were encouraged and widely practiced in these universities (Cordasco, 1976; Rashdall, 1895). University education focused on subjects that we call "Humanities" today. During the Renaissance, Humanities were differentiated from Liberal Arts. Namely, Humanities focused on subjects such as theology and philosophy, while Liberal Arts contained seven subjects: grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astrology (now called astronomy), and music. Humanities and Liberal Arts gradually merged and integrated into higher educational institutions as one sector. Later university education expanded to include within the Humanities a broader range of subjects.

Medieval education reflected the wide scope of humanistic educational pursuits. Nevertheless, humanistic goals were still restrained by a broad range of factors. For example, churches still imposed substantial religious control in curriculum and teaching; scholars and students were expected not to question orthodox theories and principles; studying materials were poor, and research resources were lean (Pedersen, 1997). Nevertheless, these medieval higher educational institutions and organizations provided opportunities for people who had intellectual aspirations and abilities, opened doors for humanistic exploration, and, more importantly, polished the minds and sharpened the tongues of many talented and ambitious students who could contribute to social and political development by their knowledge and talents.

In other parts of the world, higher education had also developed, even earlier than in Europe. Taking China as an example, approximately from 550 B.C.E. to 350 B.C.E., scholars and philosophers such as Lao Tzu, Confucius, and Chuang Tzu initiated and promoted higher education to civilians. The developments initiated by these scholars also reflected educational aims and ideals that are recognizably "humanistic." These ancient Chinese scholars focused on philosophical discussion of subjects such as nature, life, politics, and government. They expected their teaching would lead to the better rule and management of societies, as many of their students became counselors and advisors to political leaders. Between the Sui Dynasty (581—618) and the Tang Dynasty (618—907), higher education started being institutionalized by central governments in order to select civil servants among both noble and civilian intellectuals for their service in governmental and academic offices (Kong, 2006). Around the seventh century, the central government of the Tang Dynasty started to set official academic positions. Initially, these "academic officers" were mainly to serve the nobles for their intellectual aspirations; gradually, their responsibility and authority expanded to governmental counseling.

In the twelfth century Song Dynasty, the central government established bureaucratic higher education organizations. These organizations were called "Xueyuan" or "Shuyuan," which means "Academy." The members were selected from the country by their academic talents and merits. They were called "Xueshi," which meant "Master." These "Xueshi" studied and discussed political and philosophical matters, provided training and counseling to nobles; some of them were given authority and responsibilities over government and political matters. The most prominent ones were "Hanlin Academy" in the Tang and Sung dynasties and "Donglin Academy" in the Ming and Ching dynasties. In the Ching dynasty, "Xueshi" occupied the most important positions in the central government (Davis, 1983; Elman, 1989). This civil-service oriented higher learning and examination system lasted 1299 years in China until the end of the Ching Dynasty in 1905. The system was built on a stringent and rigid government control; it was designed and operated with the aims of serving the government and intellectual betterment for the higher classes. Nevertheless, this system opened the door for a wide range of people who had strong intellectual talents, academic capabilities, and political aspirations. It also revealed a robust and consistent emphasis on humanistic study and disciplines for higher learning.

In this section of Chapter One, I have provided a brief overview of key developments in the origin and evolution of the medieval and modern university as a way of highlighting key

humanist aims and values that were employed by educational thinkers who were most influential in building and sustaining these institutions. I have noted also that despite the positive and salutary "ring" of these humanistic educational ideals, the historical evolution of humanism in higher education is marked by different circumstances of local and temporal context, including some that seem very far from contemporary humanistic educational values of the twentieth and twenty-first century. Nevertheless, I suggest that despite these disparities, educational humanism in early universities reflects certain continuities with contemporary educational humanism, such as the emphasis on citizenship, individual liberty, advancement of knowledge, and development of civilization. Even if the specific interpretations of these values vary radically across different periods, the underlying values themselves form a coherent and persistent, if somewhat abstract and general, conception of higher education's central purposes. The coherence of this humanistic vision of education appears even more clearly when contrasted with a second model of higher education, which I call the "market model," that I turn to in the next section of this chapter.

The market model in early higher education.

The market model of higher education, as I employ the phrase, refers to a range of different economic functions that higher education plays, including a number of distinct but interrelated goals and purposes. These include, for example, the idea of the university as an institution that prepares students for employment, which draws funding from private and corporate sources, hires non-academic "business managers" for upper administration positions in order to make the university more "efficient," and which plays an important role in developing and bringing to market new technologies and other applications of research. These examples and many others are familiar features in the landscape of contemporary higher education. Furthermore, as I indicated in the Introduction of this thesis, the expanding influence of the market model in education is a source of grave concern for many scholars. I will return to these contemporary concerns in the next chapter. In this section of Chapter One, however, my aim is to explore the historical origins of the market model and its associated educational purposes.

I begin to do this by exploring the role of economic forces in the shaping and formation of early universities. Although economic forces have always played an important role in higher education, the particular nature of their role is not always and everywhere the same. The purpose of this next section is to show how the role of economic forces in early universities is

fundamentally at odds with the role attributed to it by both proponents and opponents of the contemporary market model of higher education.

The early higher educational movements and organizations described in the previous section were mainly focused on humanistic content, and their initial purposes were to serve humanistic aims. At the same time, sufficient wealth is necessary to sustain the humanistic higher education. According to educational scholars, the role of money and wealth in early forms of higher education was confined mainly to supporting the humanistic aims of curricula. That is, economic influences were not meant to determine the content and aims of education. Instead, economic influences were supposed to provide the resources and means for pursuing humanistic endeavors, which were understood to be properly independent of economic purposes. Nevertheless, in practice, the relationship between humanistic and market values in education has not always followed this simple and clean division of labor.

Within higher education, humanistic goals interacted with economic progress organically throughout history. Between 388 B.C.E. and 387 B.C.E., Plato started his Academy to teach, discuss, and debate philosophy, which served mainly rich people who were free from having to labor to make a living (Chroust, 1967). Financial sufficiency and guaranteed free time enabled privileged people engage in intellectual activities. Those who had to work to make a living, and slaves, were excluded from these educational and intellectual activities. Nevertheless, the Academy's activities and practices did not aim at serving social and individual economic prosperity; rather, the Academy focused mainly on the training of philosophical thinking, public speaking, and rhetorical skills. Alfred Edward Taylor points out that Plato's teaching is not based on science but rather "opinions" with humanistic interest. Plato was training people to express their "point of view" on life, society, and politics (Taylor, 1926). Financial resources supported Plato's Academy, but the "training of opinions" was not meant to serve financial wealth; rather, training at the Academy focused on social and individual development in humanistic aspects.

Such a humanistic higher education, though, had indirectly supported economic progress. Intellectual betterment and skills training served to broaden the study of subjects such as natural science and political science. For example, Aristotle initiated his Lyceum around 335 BC. As the successor to Plato's Academy, Aristotle's Lyceum conducted study and research in areas that moderns would recognize as involving both natural science and speculative philosophy (though this conceptual distinction was not yet available to Aristotle himself). Indeed, Aristotle's

intellectual influence expanded to diverse areas such as biology, political science, and literature (Lloyd, 2013). These early academic activities contributed to scientific research and technical inventions, and improved economic development.

However, it is important to bear in mind that, in early higher education, these intellectual, educational, and cultural innovations were not designed primarily to serve economic interests. Rather, economic progress supported higher education by meeting its material needs, and at the same time, higher education also contributed to the economy by advancing knowledge and techniques. Such a dynamic made economic outcomes "side –products" from the advancement of knowledge and development of technology. As such, higher education and the economy mutually accelerated each other when humanistic goals were the priorities of higher education. In contrast, contemporary education has prioritized economic goals such as employment, income, wealth accumulation, and increasing human productive power, over humanistic goals. This shift in priority changes the correlation between education and society. Economic outcomes are not indirect side-products anymore, but directly sought ends in the educational and political agenda.

The development of universities during the Renaissance serves as an excellent example of how humanistic higher education and economic progress mutually support each other when humanistic goals are prioritized. The Renaissance originated in Italy and spread quickly to almost all Europe, uplifting the value of arts such as painting and writing, science such as geography and math, and philosophy of humanism to unprecedented prosperity. Hale proclaims the Renaissance to be a significant cultural movement that had influenced the intellectual and social life in almost all European societies (Hale, 2001). Development in navigation and business enabled more and more people in Europe to work in trading and banking, which brought massive fortunes to people who were once of middle or low classes. Rich people of various classes became active in patronizing art and scholarship, which represented their involvement and contribution to arts and sciences (Cordasco, 1976; Grendler, 2002). In this case, economic growth and material wealth were favorable and beneficial factors of higher education. Economic outcomes functioned as a strong force in humanistic higher education and indirectly drove cultural and educational movements, even though they were not primary educational goals.

As I have elaborated above, even though economic progress propelled higher education by providing material support, the humanistic framework of higher education that predominated in ancient and medieval times did not directly serve economic purposes. The Medici family in

Renaissance Italy serves as a good example. The Medici family, led by Lorenzo de Medici, was the most influential and well-known patron in the sixteenth century. An affluent banking family and a ducal ruling house in Italy, the Medicis stimulated the arts and sciences, including painting, architecture, and philosophy. As devoted as they were to making money, the Medici family expressed the same devotion to spending money in areas they considered meaningful for humanity and society. They sponsored artists and philosophers and urged them to contribute to social progress, including manifesting their talents and skills to serve society by cultivating an appreciation of art, spreading aesthetic education, and refreshing self-awareness. The Medici family carried out an ambition to change the world for the better by promoting these aims (Cordasco, 1976; Grendler, 2002). Though focusing on arts and philosophy, these aims were rooted in classical learning of advanced education. These aims were grounded in humanistic values and served to educate the public. Even though the relationship between the concepts of higher education and of universities was very blurry and fluid, particularly in this period; the patronage of the Medici family contributed to what we perceive of as higher education in modern times. Therefore, I consider the Medici family to have made a profound contribution to higher education through patronage of arts, philosophy, and sciences.

Through its unprecedented creation and appreciation of art and philosophy, the Renaissance explored and expanded understanding of humanistic values through aesthetic expressions. The Renaissance perfected a form of humanistic education for society, which is a way of searching for knowledge of the world and meaning of life in arts and philosophy. The ideology of the Renaissance was consistent with the doctrine of Plato's Academy, and the initiatives and prosperity of the Renaissance continued the spirit and reflected the values of early universities. Indeed, Cordasco argues that Greek education reflected a type of humanistic education that inspired and fueled the Renaissance (Cordasco, 1976). At the same time, the Renaissance revealed economic progress as a precondition for pursuing, exploring, and expanding the study and production of humanistic subjects. Taking the Medici family as an example, they seized the opportunities to accumulate material wealth and build prominent social status from trading and banking. Then they invested their wealth in patronizing artists and scholars and encouraging them to produce quality products. Their devotion to supporting artistic, scientific, and academic activities was a way to influence individuals and society, but not to

make a profit. Early higher education and the Renaissance demonstrate that economic development and higher education have mutually supported and prospered each other in history.

In summary, the formation and evolution of early higher education systems reveals a pattern: economic growth and capital accumulation provided financial and material support for early universities, as well as cultural and educational movements. However, the initial agenda for higher education did not prioritize the generating of profits. Hence, economic progress and the material prosperity that resulted from universities were by-products of higher education—the "indirect" outcome of educational advancements. Higher education can produce values and knowledge that benefit economic development, but it should not be used to generate a profit and accumulate financial wealth. In fact, as history reveals, the original purposes of universities were to explore knowledge and expand understanding of the world and human life.

Contemporary Exploration

University of "excellence" or "in ruins."

In the previous section, I showed that the idea of higher education was initially grounded in a broadly humanistic mission of caring, constructing, and advancing humanity, ideas, and civilization. Economic resources were needed to support and advance this mission, but for centuries, including the period in which the first universities in the West developed, money and wealth (and the power that goes with them) were viewed in mainly instrumental terms – as means to other, humanistic, educational aims. But these educational aims were also seen as independent of economic concerns such as employment and economic growth, and as a result, the assumption was that the pursuit of a humanistic educational mission could be relatively insulated from the influence of the economic power that supported it. In this section, I argue that this belief or assumption is no longer tenable in contemporary educational contexts, where economic influences have become dominant, and humanistic values are on the defensive.

According to many scholars, this present-day situation has its roots in the Industrial Revolution. In the wake of this global movement, the concept of "useful knowledge" was widely endorsed; this provided an ideological incentive for emphasizing and prioritizing educational goals for practical and material purposes. To some extent, this situation served social development at that time. Nevertheless, it went too far to the point that humanistic values are eclipsed by market values in contemporary higher education. Bill Readings expressed his opinions on this transformation in a pointed examination and analysis. Namely, Readings

suggests that universities no longer participate in the old project for humanity that was the legacy of the Enlightenment; he goes so far as to pronounce that the university is now a "ruined institution" (Readings, 1996, p.169). As he shows, the trends that have, at least in his pessimistic view, laid waste to contemporary higher education gained momentum as the Industrial Revolution hit top speed at the end of the nineteenth century. By the end of the twentieth century, the destruction was nearly complete.

In this respect, two ideas introduced by Readings are worth highlighting further. The first is "excellence." Readings declares that the early modern universities were devoted to promoting and protecting national culture; but increasingly, contemporary universities have been involved with transactional corporations, and the idea of "culture" has been replaced by the idea of "excellence." The criteria of "excellence" are rooted in economic outcomes and financially beneficial results; hence the university of "excellence" focuses on profit-making and material benefits. The university has thus been transferred from an entity of academic disciplines and humanistic education to an entity that is financially sound but void of meaning (1996, p. 159-160). Readings urges us to ponder upon the role of higher education as primarily a social sector responsive to society, or as designed mainly to meet demands from students and market. He argues that a university providing certain types of courses, research, and knowledge requested by students, corporations, and groups does not fulfill the responsibilities of the university to foster social development before economic development. The university being primarily responsive to economic progress and capital reproduction puts the subject and object of the university education in doubt: How can universities teach truth and objective knowledge if they ignore humanistic education and social responsibility but permit an internationalized "cash nexus" to define their identities and roles (1996)? Allowing the invasion of commercialization, marketization, and consumerism, the contemporary university has shifted its focus from humanism to the economy.

A comparison of Readings' account of "excellence" with that of Aristotle serves to elucidate my point. For Aristotle, the overarching aim of human life, and hence of education, was "eudaimoni," or a flourishing life (Nagel, 1972). Furthermore, Aristotle considered a flourishing life as a life lived in accordance with virtue, which Aristotelian scholars often translate as "moral excellence." Such "moral excellence" was tied to objective, substantive views about the goodness of human life – a life associated with virtues such as courage,

temperance, patience, broad-mindedness, and civic harmony. My point in referring to Aristotle is not to recommend his specific conception of "the good," or of his goals of education. Aristotle's views suffer from a range of assumptions, attitudes, and beliefs that seem morally horrific, such as his views about the moral inferiority of natural slaves that lack of eudaimonia (Heath, 2008). Nevertheless, Aristotle's notion of moral excellence as a goal of education is far from conceptually empty. The goodness of education, for Aristotle, consisted in the gradual progression towards substantive virtues. The well-educated person, for Aristotle, is the man who exemplifies virtue – not merely someone who conforms to moral duty, but one who "excels" in performing those duties.

For Aristotle, a person who demonstrates outstanding competence in some area of life cannot be said to demonstrate "excellence" unless the area of competence is itself virtuous. For example, someone who demonstrates great skills in managing money and budgets may demonstrate moral excellence only if such skills are directed towards virtuous ends. Money management is not "excellent" in and of itself. A university administrator who scrupulously and competently balances his or her departmental budget, but does so without regard for any worthwhile educational ends and values, or does so in ways that are manifestly unfair and unjust, cannot be considered to demonstrate "excellence." However, for Readings, the term "excellence" is nefarious when applied to education, because it is often detached from any substantive notion of educational or ethical good. Thus, such "excellence" literally serves as an "all-purpose" concept in contemporary universities. As Readings argues, the essence of so-called "excellence" is simply administrative effectiveness—an idea that can apply to any purpose or value, regardless of its ethical worth. According to Readings, the contemporary university driven by the empty concept of "excellence," teaching, learning, and administration are being diverted from humanistic goals and drawn towards economic and practical aims (Readings, 1996).

The second key idea from Readings' analysis is that of "thinking." Universities performed different functions at different historical stages and in different societies. Most of them shared the core value and primary goal of guiding people in their thinking and cultivating them in their living (Cordasco, 1976; Pedersen, 1997). Put another way, one of the fundamental goals of higher education was to raise and nurture a community of thinkers, not raise a union of profit makers and product consumers. Readings denounces the disguised appearance of "excellence" and "usefulness" that contemporary higher education advocates— a disguise that he

views as the enemy of human thinking. Readings attempts to provoke people to question universities' credentials on teaching the truth when the relations between subject and object are not placed in educational and ethical lines. Readings boldly concludes that universities, whose educational goals are not prioritized in training how to think, whose bureaucratic administrations intend to keep the educational body "financially sound," and whose motivation and operations are incited by material aims, are "in ruins" (Readings, 1996, pp. 31-33; pp. 107-108). His examination and diagnosis of higher education mainly draw evidence from the devaluing of Humanities disciplines, which delivers a strong message: the primary values and goals are initially rooted in Humanities; so when Humanities fall, universities fail.

Despite Readings' assertions, there is consensus among critics that higher learning has been integrated within a complex machinery that drives massive economic development. The material shifts that have driven this integration can be properly understood through examining the shifting aims, values, and purposes of higher education. After all, the rise of business transactions on campuses and the private corporate ownerships of intellectual products did not happen by accident. Another phenomenon that has emerged recently is the changing role of educators and students. Students are increasingly treated as "consumers" who purchase the "product" of their education; teachers are treated as producers and service providers of education. For example, under Chapter 15 of the new Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, teachers are conceptualized as "business persons" who function as "providers of goods and services" subject to the requirements of free trade across borders (McMurtry, 1991). This conceptualization from national governments reflects not only changes in terminology, but also significant shifts in the underlying ethical priorities and meanings of education.

Today, one of the most appealing ranking criteria of universities is graduate employability. Numerous educational websites and magazines, such as the guardian.com, topuniversity.com, and timeshighereducation.com, evaluate and rank global universities by how they perform on employability. Most universities tend to advertise themselves to prospective students by highlighting their employability ranking. For instance, Oxford University, The University of Toronto, and the University of Waterloo, among many others, have allocated considerable space on their official websites to demonstrate and analyze their graduates' employment prospects. Ranking employability has become the most plausible and persuasive way to attract students and parents who seek a higher education in order to secure a future job.

Most people purchase higher education for this potential benefits, and universities tend to cater to this need. Under such fierce competition, more and more universities are adopting this pattern to recruit students to ensure their survival, growth, and ranked positions. The goals of higher education are no longer caring for humanity, but are determined by market demand. Thus, a market relationship has been established in higher education between universities as service providers and students as consumers.

When market principles and commercial mechanisms determine the aims and operation of higher education, the motives for higher education are altered from the care of humanity and civilization to profit-making and employment, and the standards of education evaluation are narrowed to standardized tests and job placement figures (Molnar, 2013; Nussbaum, 2012). Teachers produce teaching, training, feedback, and mentorship. Students purchase and consume these products for the prospects of employment, wealth, and social status. The teacher-student relationships of "mentorship" and "academic friendship" (Weithman, 2015) are transformed by consumerism. When Plato started the Academy, Aristotle initiated the Lyceum, and Confucius taught his disciples, teaching and learning within "mentorship" and "academic friendship" were a vital part of education. Now, this essential part of education is downgraded by economic drive and material motivations.

The university of "usefulness."

I now turn from a focus on Readings' dire account of the university in ruins to a broader review of some critical, theoretical literature on the extensive influence of economic forces on contemporary higher education. One feature of this influence is that universities increasingly emphasize and invest in training skills associated with science and technology, such as engineering, medicine, and IT subjects, even as they ignore the Humanities and Social Sciences (Bok, 2009; Nussbaum, 2012). Even though these subjects are also important for society, i.e., IT and medical skills are compulsory for providing adequate social services. Nevertheless, overemphasis on these subjects accepts the dominance of commercialism in higher education. External merchants have used commercial activities to invade schools in either a tangible way, such as promoting products and services, or in an ideological way, such as imposing marketing principles onto school administration and curriculum design. This commercial invasion has maximized profit making with full consideration of merchandizing products and expanding consumer-commercial relationships in education. Merchants have been rampantly growing their

profit-making activities with slogans of facilitating education and serving students. Their attempts to be educational facilitators have, to some extent, succeeded in disguising their profit-making purpose. The dominance of this economic model has rationalized and popularized the collaboration between schools and businesses.

Scholars of educational sociology have sharply criticized the realities and consequences of commercial expansion in education. Alex Molnar (2013) recognizes three dimensions of commercialism in schools: selling to schools, selling in schools, and selling of schools (pp. 6-8). Selling to and selling in schools result in exclusive contracts of services and products, popular school programs, and marketing and advising; selling of schools, on the other hand, is privatization (pp. 21-26). I will focus on selling to and selling in schools. Driven by commercialism, schools provide a channel for the rules of the market to direct the educational operations and to influence educational practice at schools. The No Child Left Behind Act is widely criticized because this policy motivated schools to open doors for profit-making corporations. Like Molnar, Nussbaum criticizes this Act because it facilitated the use of standardized tests and it created the practice of "teaching to the test" (2012, p. 134). Nussbaum's critique is especially relevant to the present thesis. Whereas Molnar is primarily concerned with how thoroughly economic considerations and metrics have come to influence K-12 schools, Nussbaum recognizes the extension of these effects to all parts of the education system, including higher education. I identify several problematic aspects related to the increasing emphasis on standardized testing in higher education. First, evaluation standardization is rather an industrial concept than an educational concept; standardizing evaluation of learning copies the industrial operation that prioritizes efficiency and productivity. Thus, standardized tests largely follow economic principles in evaluating teaching and learning which are not primarily embedded in efficiency and productivity. Second, standardized tests bring in business possibilities—which shows the market mentality. For example, standardized tests provide private companies an opportunity to create a niche market for educational service and products, such as after-school tutoring, summer school training, and learning software. Consequently, the test competition largely depends on the students' financial capabilities of purchasing the extra-curricular services. Third, even though standardized tests are not often administered in higher education, they prepare students for higher learning, such as tests for next level studies. The most relevant tests are the ACT, the SAT, the TOEFL, and the GRE that are required by most North

American universities for their evaluation of admissions. The mentality and mindsets built by standardized tests are docile to market principles and economic goals in higher education.

With the market mentality, higher education easily submits to market principles. Universities naturally seek funds from non-educational corporations and allow commercial invasion and expansion in education. Molnar (2013) claims that the natural drive of the market is to make a profit; and this drive will generate changes in education. Universities have sharply increased tuition and fees and, meanwhile, opened the gate wider to admit more students who can pay. Market operation in universities converted campus facilities from tools of serving academic achievement for students to tools making a profit from students. Readings offers a good example of how universities have become "markets" by noting the case of a university bookstore being transformed into "souvenir store" where "students [were] asked to buy the symbolic sign of belonging" (1996, p. 11). Unfortunately, such an "integrated industry" failed in forming a sense of community belonging for alumni; instead, it just shaped a consumer relationship in a commercial contract rather than membership in an educational and living community. This cycle pushes universities into the catch of marketization. Readings frankly states, "students were encouraged to think of themselves as consumers rather than as members of a community" (p. 11). Universities become agents of selling products, and students become consumers of purchasing these products for private benefits.

As mentioned earlier, Molnar recognizes three dimensions of commercialism at schools: selling to schools, selling in schools, and selling of schools (Molnar, 2013, pp. 6-8). In such dimensions of school commercialism, he emphasizes that the selling of schools amounts to privatization (pp. 21-26). Put another way, school marketization can lead directly to the privatization of education. The monetary contribution from students and their parents become a private investment for their own good. This private investment is centered on the expectation of economic and practical returns such as employment, material wealth, and many other personal benefits. Education and knowledge are thereby privatized in practice. Knowledge, intellectual capacities, and intellectual products that were once seen as shared assets serving public good through adding knowledge and enhancing public life have evolved to be private assets primarily serving private needs and benefits. Consequently, students acknowledge their knowledge and capacities as the return of their investment in education.

Conclusion

In history, higher education burgeoned to explore humanistic subjects. It aimed to serve humanistic goals in different forms, and it was humanistic orientated. Yet, in contemporary times, higher education has drastically shifted from a humanistic focus to an economic an. I have shown that higher education historically played a substantial role in educating and cultivating individuals, deepening and expanding human understanding, and building social civilization. This prodigious achievement was accomplished through studies and practices of the humanistic subjects such as philosophy, archaeology, history, literature, and arts. Early universities, as the institutionalized organizations of higher education, were the centers where knowledge and skills were transmitted, where people's thoughts and behavior was cultivated, and where inventions were made. This process is the path where knowledge becomes strength and courage; generation and generations have walked on this path and it erected numerous milestones in human development. Along with other means and channels, early higher education lionized and accommodated intellectual pursuits beyond material purposes; on the other hand, it also has contributed to economic progress by propelling the development of science and technology. However, pursuing higher education to advance scholarship, science, and the economy was not based on the motivation of economic return.

Although universities are educational institutions by nature, most contemporary universities consider profit making one of their principal aims. Falling into marketization, universities operate according to market principles; at the same time, they face fierce competition in the education market. Markets and competition drive universities to attract "customers," namely, students, by promoting the benefits of attending their institution, such as employment prospects, higher income, and prominent social status. This cycle falls into the catch of marketization, which changes the goals and values of higher education, and makes contemporary higher education a great contrast with the humanistic higher education in history.

Education is undoubtedly one of the most profound contributors to a sustainable and healthy individual and social life. Studying higher education in both history and today reveals contrasting meanings and values. Under a humanistic drive, early universities aimed to equip people with knowledge and capacities to advance public goods more than individual interests (Chroust, 1967; Pedersen, 1997; Rashdall, 1985). In such a dynamic, knowledge and intellectual capacities were acknowledged as public goods; intellectual and technical outcomes were shared

assets to benefit society. It is not deniable that higher education and credentials also benefitted individuals in boosting financial and social capitals. Nevertheless, early higher education was grounded in humanistic aims and goals, and the to-be-sought returns were intended to serve the public interest. In contemporary higher education institutions, by contrast, economic goals and market principles are dominant, and the expected returns are centered on private goods and personal benefits. This is the most prominent difference between higher education historically and in contemporary times.

Chapter Two: Philosophical Foundation of Two Competing Models in Contemporary Higher Education

Introduction

Chapter One provided an historically-grounded overview of two broad conceptions of higher education, which I categorized as the humanistic model and the market model. I highlighted their shifting roles, values, aims, and expectations. This chapter builds upon and extends that analysis by examining the philosophical foundations of these two models. First, I draw on the fundamental aspects of the two models, such as their theoretical foundations to provide background information; I will also scrutinize how the two models work and how they compete in higher education. Second, I draw upon current discussions and debates to investigate the positions and influences of the two models in education and society today. Here, I examine marketization in education and the extension to which there is a correlation between education and democracy. These themes will continue to be explored in greater detail in later chapters.

I argue in this chapter that the two models are each valuable in different ways; however, they are positioned in inappropriate scales in contemporary higher education. In the majority of institutions in North America, higher education is being operated according to market principles without much resistance from administration and faculty. Operating higher education in this way has drastically weakened the foundation and practice of the humanistic model. Consequently, the unity of higher education focuses on facilitating economic and market demands. This phenomenon is currently being criticized from a number of different perspectives.

Many scholars and educators call on contemporary higher education to preserve the humanistic aims and emphasize its social responsibilities. George Counts (2009) argues that while schools carry the basic task of teaching and delivering skills, knowledge, and experience, many are neglecting their responsibilities of educating and preparing students for a life in a world of massive changes. "Education as a force for social regeneration," according to Counts, "must march hand-in-hand with the living and creative forces of the social order" (p. 28). He strongly advocates that education must go beyond "hard" skills training to include the acquisition of "soft" skills such as thinking and communication. Further, Counts demonstrates the social responsibility of education within democracies. He

reminds educators that they "cannot evade the responsibility of participating actively in the task of reconstituting the democratic tradition and of thus working positively toward a new society" (p. 28). Harry Brighouse (2006) examines the same issue from a different angle. He questions how education should contribute to human flourishing. He criticizes the current educational system in North America for its failure to facilitate a flourishing life. For Brighouse, flourishing lives share two common features: they are worthwhile and lived from the inside. Lives that are worthwhile must contain objectively good things such as meaningful life goals; within a flourishing life, people must examine the lives they are living from the inside (p. 15). The two features cannot be reconciled with contemporary higher education because a life devoted to monetary purposes is not worthwhile and does not require examination from inside.

In what follows, I offer an overview of market model to identify its theoretical foundations, elucidate its conflicts with educational aims, and analyze scholarly views on it. I then do the same for the humanistic model.

Market Model

Human Capital Theory in education

Understanding businesses according to the market model requires using various methods "in determining the effect of many different forces that can affect the performance of the market, including the economy and individual choices of investors" (Businessdictionary, 2017). When the market model is applied to education, education will serve the essential goals of market demand; hence, market principles will intervene in education. Globally, there is a relatively recent consensus that education is the key to economic growth and competitiveness (Brighouse, 2006). Human capital is the theoretical concept that attempts to justify economic goals in education. Human capital is the idea that productive human labor drives social-economic growth. An approach to education that prioritizes human capital means treating education as the primary mechanism for equipping students with skills to perform labor necessary for economic growth. While heavy machinery and other resources provide the material capital necessary for economic productivity, students provide the human capital for economic productivity. As such, human capital approach to education underwrites the market model of education.

Brighouse (2006) argues that the key to understanding the human capital approach

lies in understanding how economic aims and purposes are assigned priority within universities, which leads to the exploitation of students. Proponents of the market model believe that the human capital approach to education "benefits everyone [because everyone gains] from higher Gross Domestic Product, and children gain from the fact that they are more able to operate well in the workplace" (p. 27). Market model advocates insist that the aim of education under the market model is to develop "a robust and competitive economy" by "educating children to be productive workers" (Brighouse, 2006, p. 27). Brighouse's analysis of human capital exposes its weakness in theory and practice. The whole idea of human capital is based on the assumption that humans are social resources; however, humans are much more than social resources since they are complex units with complicated needs. Thus, applying human capital theory to education is based on a fallacious assumption and it cannot work for educational purpose.

As noted above, there is a broad consensus that the aims and values of the human capital approach are now highly influential in higher education. My purpose in this section is to provide a more detailed account of their precise conceptual structure and logic. Doing so leads to the exploration of the specific ways in which the economic model of education conflicts with humanistic educational values in next section.

Human capital is a concept developed by twentieth-century economists, including Theodore Schultz and Gary Stanley Becker. Nevertheless, the idea has its roots in the 18th century political-economic ideas of Adam Smith. Smith (1817) defined four types of fixed capital in his famous book *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.* He categorized one of them, human capital, as an "acquired and useful [ability] of all the inhabitants or members of the society" (p.122). He explains that this ability can be improved through "training, education, and experience," and thus can the "individual enterprise [be] more profitable" and increase the "collective wealth of society" (p. 59). This capital comes with an expense, but it repays with a profit. Based on the insights of Adam Smith, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Theodore Schultz (1971) developed Human Capital Theory in the 1960s. Like Smith, Schultz considers human capital a reflection of the value of human capacity. He reckons that human capital is like other types of capital in that it can be improved by investment such as education, which ultimately leads to better quality work and a higher level of production. Moreover, he acknowledges

that human capital should include "value for human potential" (pp. 25-28). Gary Becker (1993) expounded and expanded this concept in his book *Human Capital*, where he treats human capital as similar to other physical means of production, like tangible factories, machines, and other tools. Jacob Mincer and Becker agree that more investment in human capital will produce greater and better outcomes, even though human capital as a means of production is not transferable like tangible capital (Becker, 1993; Mincer & Becker, 1964). Importantly, human capital refers to a broad range of economically useful human capabilities and potentialities. For example, the concept refers to skills and knowledge embodied in individuals, and it recognizes various investments that can improve the quality of human capital and gain extra output. Education, training, and experience can advance knowledge, talents, skills, and understanding within a workforce, which according to theorists of human capital can grow a society's production levels and economy.

It is this insight—that investment in education can vastly expand the store of human capital—that provides the foundation of human capital approaches to education. And this idea is perhaps the most fundamental pillar of the economic model of education that I explore in this section. According to this view, the foremost purpose of most universities is to grow the human capital of society by providing students with advanced training, so their skills and output can be made better and more efficient. To put this perspective another way, individuals are taken as physical and intellectual capital, and higher education is considered as an investment for marshaling that capital to increase the total wealth of a nation.

One troubling implication of human capital theory in educational contexts is that it has unsettling implications for the educational value of human freedom. If the goal of education is to foster economic growth, and promoting growth requires that students be prepared to fill certain "slots" in the economy, then an education that seeks to expand and nurture students' freedom represents a potential threat. As long as students willingly accept their proscribed economic station, no problems arise. But this is unrealistic in any society that values individual freedom. In circumstances of freedom, we expect individuals to have diverse aspirations and desires. If this is true, then we should also expect students who have been educated for freedom and liberty to sometimes, if not often, make choices that diverge from the demands of the economy and economic growth. So, long as economic

growth remains the "imperative" of education (Brighouse, 1999, p.27), as it is in the human capital perspective, then that goal can be pursued only by constraining and restricting students' freedom. In short, individual freedom of choice is incompatible with treating individuals as human capital, in the service of societal economic goals.

In this light, human capital approaches to education will undoubtedly require methods and practices of restricting freedom in order to succeed. As many scholars have noted, for example, the adoption of human capital values as educational values increases the likelihood that students will be manipulated or forced into career paths they do not like or that do not fit their personalities. Consequently, this situation will create a social identity where, as Molnar describes, "you are what you do for a living" (2013, p. 33). Human capital theory in education also increases the possibility that children may receive an education of unequal quality, and some of them may not even receive an education at all. Not all jobs provide equal compensation in the form of wages, social status, and recognition. Furthermore, the cost of educating different students for economically desirable jobs varies according to students' abilities. Thus, a human capital approach to education will calculate the costs and benefits of educating students with an eye to calculating expenses and profits. Indeed, when young people are taken as human capital, the educational investment in them will be assessed and allocated according to their future income potentials. Some outstanding students are very likely to receive more resources from schools and more attention from teachers because the cost of investment in them will be liable to be repaid by promising economic outcomes. The likely result of such patterns, when scaled over large societies, is deeply entrenched economic inequality.

A stark example illustrates this general point. Under a human capital regime, children with severe intellectual disabilities and mental disorders are most likely to be removed from regular educational programs because the cost of resources for them will be very high, and their future economic contributions to society will not be anywhere near the same level (Ben-Porath, 1967). Like these children, most children who are from low-income families or have difficult home lives may be marginalized for similar reasons. By the principle of human capital, these children are too expensive to educate without assured economic outcomes to recoup the investment. As a result, some children are restricted from appropriate educational programs for reasons that are out of their control. Brighouse

strongly chastises these unjust treatments in many education intuitions. Among many others, human capital is the primary reason propelling such unjust treatments. He says, "Restricting the education of some children simply for the sake of long-term growth of the economy, in an economy that is not impoverished, is wrong" (p. 36). The rights and needs of individuals to receive a proper education should not be determined by how much economic output they can produce. Educational philosopher David Blacker states the point more bleakly. As he points out, in some cases where students represent potential human capital, the goal of education is to exploit their labor for social profit. In other cases where no economic value is perceived, or where the costs of exploiting that labor are too high, people are viewed as no longer worth exploiting. They are capitalism's "extra people," whose value if any depends on the mercy or compassion of whatever private agencies may or may not exist (2013, p. 12).

An example used by Brighouse shows how public policy favors human capital theory. According to a World Bank strategy paper, educating females in developing countries helps raise healthy children and reduce poverty; thus, educating females is beneficial for state development and should be prioritized. However, education for external benefits other than benefiting women themselves should not be the dominant reason to educate them. It is the right of the women to be educated, and education should be for their own good. In this case, these women gain the right to be educated because they can produce beneficial outcomes for their country; then the education is manipulated by human capital theory. Brighouse castigates applying human capital theory in education. He claims that "schools do have an obligation to ensure that children can be economically self-sufficient…But that is not the only reason that schools should prepare children for the world of work" (pp. 28-29). Therefore, "the content and distribution of educational opportunities should not be tailored to the interests of employers" (p. 28). Most modern scholars and educators criticize human capital theory in education. Lucas Stanczyk, a Professor of Political Science at MIT, participated in the debate of What's Education For (2016). He proclaimed that "the most important reason to improve education is not to make children fit for tomorrow's job market," but, instead, to "give them capacities to appreciate richer pursuits and to produce their own complex meanings." After all, individuals are not human capital, and education should not be an investment in a type of capital. Indeed,

taking people as human capital in education is not ethically right, because it does not respect the nature of education nor humanity, which is against democratic principles about resource distribution and quality of life.

A democratic society cares not only about producing wealth, but also about how to equitably distribute both tangible resources such as money and jobs, as well as intangible resources such as freedom of choice and social capital among its people. Social democracy requires a certain level of distribution of resources to be vibrant and healthy which the free market alone cannot provide. As Brighouse puts it, the goal of education in a genuinely democratic society, rather than a society that prioritizes only economic growth, is to ensure that all individuals, and not just the lucky few, are equipped with knowledge, dispositions, and skills needed to lead flourishing lives (2006). Brighouse offers a thought experiment to illustrate his point. He asks us to consider two non-compatible options for society, from which we choose as aspirational goals for education. Option A is based on human capital theory; it sets social sectors and policies for optimal economic growth. Option B sets lower economic growth targets while setting aside some resources to enable people to live a flourishing life, facilitate personal autonomy, foster awareness of alternatives of living and jobs, and provide opportunities for people to pursue happiness via their personal choices. Brighouse argues that Option B is superior to option A because he believes that "schooling should equip us to live a flourishing life" (p. 28).

Brighouse's thought experiment indicates that human capital approaches to education cannot co-exist with democratic and humanist education values. Advocates of humanistic education, including myself, would agree with Brighouse. Nevertheless, my point here is not to offer arguments that justify the conclusion of his thought experiment. Instead, I have sought to explain the philosophical underpinnings of the economic model, the deficiencies of this model, and how this model goes against nature of humans and nature of education. These aspects are central to the conflicts between education and human capital theory. In the next section, I explore the ideas of Canadian philosopher John McMurtry, which help further illuminate the sources of this conflict between an educational paradigm based on economic values and one based on humanistic values.

Four conflicts between the two models and scholarly review.

McMurtry (1991) analyzes how market values invade contemporary education and how education is embedded into business corporations, which is caused by market forces and accommodated by school administrations. He distinguishes market and education by elucidating what he sees as several conceptual contradictions between them. And he firmly criticizes the value changes and role changes in education caused by market and business demands (McMurtry, 1991). Above all, McMurtry's central claim is that the educational values are in complete contrast to market values. The economic marketplace and education possess different natures and produce fundamentally different product. The essential products of the markets are external commodities or services, whereas the essential products of education are knowledge and internal comprehension. McMurtry elaborates four categories of the fundamental values of education and market. I will illustrate and analyze the four aspects and conflicts, and I will also speculate the interaction and performance of education and the market in practice.

1 Opposing educational goals

The first conflict McMurtry outlines concerns opposing educational goals. The goal of education is to "advance and disseminate knowledge" whilst the goal of the market model is to "maximize private money profits" (1991, p. 38). The natural drive of the market is to pursue profit and accumulate money. Profit making and accumulation require competition with others. In other words, an increase in profit for one party or parties necessarily means a decrease in profits for their competitors in the same industry. This makes the goals of market exclusionary, in a way that the goals of education are not. Education, according to McMurtry, prioritizes the pursuits of knowledge, understanding, and truth; these pursuits are inclusionary in contrast to the economic pursuits that are exclusionary. When some actions produce knowledge for a party or parties, that knowledge in principle represents an opportunity to increase knowledge for everyone. For example, the research results of climate change, when shared with researchers of the world, might assist other research to discover reasons of plan and animal extinction. I say "in principle," because there are practical ways in which this knowledge expansion may be limited by excluding some from its benefits. In contrast, when new knowledge is copyrighted or otherwise "privatized," these practical means are precisely the means of the market. Absent

such limiting forces, McMurtry points out, the natural drive of knowledge pursuit is to encourage knowledge sharing and advancement, which does not exclude but includes others. The opposition of economic and educational goals is the opposition between private economic goods—knowledge as a commodity and a profitable product. In this sense, the value of knowledge lies in exclusion and strict boundaries of ownership. However, an education as public good, whose value increases precisely because it is shareable in principle, and by the fact that it is in fact shared in practice.

2 Disparate motivations

The second conflict between market and educational views of higher education lays in their disparate motivations. According to McMurtry, the motivation of the market is to meet market demands from customers— "satisfy the wants of whoever has the money to purchase." Yet the motivation of education is to "develop the understanding" of those who encounter it (p. 39). The most important educational implication of this opposition concerns the ways in which economic motivations may distort educational process. For the market proponent, the idea that the university's job is to sell its "products" is benign. It simply means that students must be persuaded that the knowledge or tools they are taught are desirable. Perhaps the market proponent also has in mind the stereotype of the boring and stilted professor who knows much but who cannot explain his or her insights to students or non-specialists. In this sense, improved salesmanship represents an educational advancement. The problem, however, lies in the fact that "school selling" and "marketing education" are tied to a particular understanding of educational goals related to private goods and profitable values.

An example will help to illustrate. Consider a mattress salesperson, whose job is to sell the store's mattress inventory at the best price possible. An effective salesperson will emphasize the advantages of the mattresses he/she is selling while downplaying the advantages of competing products. The task of helping the customer better understand which mattress best meets his/her needs is a secondary concern. At worst, such understanding is the enemy of an effective salesperson, since better understanding may lead the customer to purchase a mattress elsewhere or even decide that a new mattress is not necessary after all. As this observation shows, the logic and virtues of sales are contradictory. Few would object to the idea of a salesperson manipulating information or

denigrating a competitor's products. This sort of behavior is expected as part of the "the job" of marketing. Perhaps outright lying and coercion could render the salesperson subject to moral disapproval, yet, the disapproval would necessarily be based on non-economic ethical values and not because it constitutes poor sales practice. The same cannot be said for the effective teacher. A teacher who presents material in a biased or uneven way is generally thought to be mis-educating her students. The motive of trying to get students to believe a controversial position in a knowledge debate, simply because it is the teacher's favored viewpoint, is a form of indoctrination rather than education (Callan & Arena, 2009). The values that are characteristic of effective teaching are values of open-minded reflection, autonomous critical thinking, and of patient study and the like. These are virtues that foster students' understanding, including their ability to intelligently judge whether the 'goods' their education offers are worthwhile or not. In this sense, motivations that are perfectly acceptable in the economic marketplace are not appropriate in learning and educational environments.

3 incompatible methods of acquisition

The third way that market and educational values conflict concerns their incompatible methods of acquisition (pp. 38-39). What McMurtry has in mind here is as follows: the outcomes of education, such as knowledge and understanding, can only be obtained by certain means—means that are cannot be provided by the market. McMurtry does not purport to identify every possible means available to be educated. Instead, he offers a general principle: the goods of education can only be acquired autonomously by the processes of one's own thought (p. 39). One might challenge some of the details of McMurtry's account. For example, recent accounts of embodied cognition may suggest a less cognitivist or intellectualist account of educational thinking than McMurtry's terminology suggests. Furthermore, McMurtry says little about the role of emotions and affective dimensions of learning. Finally, McMurtry's account seems highly individualistic, at least in some places, in ways that may seem to denigrate the social and collaborative aspects of educational learning.

While I agree with a number of these criticisms, they do not detract from McMurtry's basic point. While there may be many different educational avenues for acquiring knowledge and understanding, and while knowledge and understanding

themselves may be richer and more complex than McMurtry's account suggests, these are not the sorts of goods that can be purchased by money. McMurtry seems correct to suggest that the basic "currency" of education is fundamentally different from the currency of markets. As he emphasizes, the principle activities in the market are to "buy or sell the goods," not to understand the reasons why they get sold or bought (p. 38). While goods and services that are in the marketplace can be purchased by money, the same is not true of the goods in education, unless of course education has already been defined in economic terms. However, my argument in this thesis is that education cannot simply be 'defined' in this way and then reorganized to fit an economic division. The point of my account of humanistic and economic models as competing models is that neither model has emerged as a definitive victor in contemporary higher education, even if the humanistic model is currently on the defensive. As long as the humanistic model of education remains a viable alternative to the market model, it is important to recognize that the methods associated with education stand opposed to the methods of market, which is why McMurtry suggests that referring to education as a product in market is an "essential violation" of its deepest and most fundamental meaning (p. 39).

4 opposing measures of excellence

The fourth point of conflict identified by McMurtry concerns opposing measures of excellence—an issue I discussed in Chapter One with reference to the work of Bill Readings. According to McMurtry, the market, by its nature, determines excellence through the performance of sales. Almost all marketing activities are geared towards arousing buyers' desires and encouraging purchases. Here, high sales equals excellent performance (p. 40). By contrast, according to McMurtry, education locates standards of excellence in presenting knowledge and information that are "disinterested" and "impartial" (p. 40). These standards demand that learners work to come up with their individual comprehension, ideas, and opinions and not simply accept them on authority. Again, McMurtry may oversimplify the inherently dynamic and interpersonal dimensions of education and teaching. Personally, I consider this process of teaching and learning a two-way process in a bilateral relationship—aspects which highlight the relationship between education and values of democracy. Market values excellence; this dynamic encourages customers to rely on the easy and immediate benefits from the market.

Excellence in the market relies on how much customers depend on products and service; the better the market is, the more customers depend on market and the less they think and act. In contrast, excellence in education lies in fostering learners' independent thinking and acting; the better the education is, the less its benefits are immediately clear; the deeper and wider problems it poses, the more independent and creative the learners become. Good education never guarantees problem free learning; instead, it poses deep and broad problems for learners to ponder and solve (pp. 39-40). The benefits of education, in short, are long term; while the benefits of purchasing goods and services in the economic marketplace, by contrast, tend to be short term.

In summary, McMurtry argues that the market model and humanistic model of higher education are opposed in four distinct but overlapping respects—marked by different goals, motivations, methods, and standards of excellence. At the same time, McMurtry does not claim that these two models are rendered completely separately in practice. His point about the opposition of market values and educational values is conceptual and philosophical, rather than empirical. Thus, he does not deny that education requires financial resources to survive and support study and research. One point that McMurtry firmly stands for is that external conditions should not be the same as goals. On the one hand, McMurtry acknowledges that money provides "the external conditions for an education to be pursued, or neglected" (1991, p. 212), i.e., people need material resources to survive and pursue their educational goals. On the other hand, he insists that money is not the purpose or fulfillment of education. External conditions enable the pursuit of education; and education goals provide content and direction for the activities of itself.

More scholarly views about market model in education.

McMurtry's writing casts a clear philosophical light on the key points of contrast between the economic and humanistic models of higher education. The four aspects of opposition highlighted by McMurtry have been recently reflected in several critical accounts of the marketization of higher education in Western countries. Like McMurtry, Martha Nussbaum, in her recent book *Not for Profit: Why democracy needs the Humanities* (2012), argues that the goals of the market model of education are fundamentally opposed to those of the humanistic model. For Nussbaum, the main goals of humanistic higher education are the promotion of critical thinking and other creative

capacities, such as a sense of narrative imagination. Nussbaum's book highlights some important and regrettable practical consequences associated with the increasing influence of economic values in higher education. While she does not deny that fostering critical and creative abilities can be economically useful, she does argue that in contemporary higher education, where economic values hold such enormous influence, there is a danger that educational institutions send a message that "it would be perfectly all right if these abilities were allowed to wither away for more useful disciplines" (2012, p. 3). She acknowledges that this message is tantamount to an official announcement that it is both moral and beneficial for society to focus on the market model in education. Looking at the consequences of this trend, she worries that the substance of education is being recognized as an industry which provides merchants easy channels to be involved in education; insofar as this is true, a consumer culture is created.

Nussbaum also emphasizes that the market model is promoted by a supportive political agenda. One consequence of this broader political support is that schools and universities, in the name of pursuing wealth, transform young people into "profit-makers" rather than "thoughtful citizens." Under the pressure of fierce competition to make profit and cut costs, education disregards humanity-oriented educational values which are crucial in "preserving a healthy society" (p. 141). Nussbaum also points out the consequence of education submitting to market model in personal and social development; namely, when Humanities and Liberal Arts are subordinated to profit-focused disciplines, content and pedagogy designed to foster critical thinking, compassion, imagination, sympathy, and creativity are undermined and weakened. Correspondingly, institutions and practices of social democracy, which depend on citizens who possess such qualities for their healthy functioning, are jeopardized. Humanistic education and education for economic growth require the cultivating of different skills and mindsets. In the current situation of higher education, freedom of mind is suppressed, because it is a danger to the desire of "a group of technically obedient workers to carry out the plans of elites who are aiming at foreign investment and technological development" (Nussbaum, 2012, p. 21).

Alex Molnar (2013) is another well-known critic of economic influences in education. He provides a thorough examination of commercialism in schools on a global scope through studies of the past and present in education. By elaborating on the

connections between public relations, market promotions, the for-profit education management industry, and the relationship and benefits between the market and government, Molnar presents a big picture view of how the market model of education impacts on society. Like McMurty and Nussbaum, Molnar condemns the current situation in which "schools have come to be seen as markets for vendors, venues for advertising and marketing, and commodities to be bought and sold" (Molnar, 2013, p. 16). He clearly describes the commercialism in schools through an analysis of the three dimensions of "selling to schools, selling in schools, and selling of schools" (pp. 6-8). Commercialism transforms public schools from centers of learning and serving the public good to centers of generating profit to benefit private interests. Another aspect Molnar ardently cares about is education and democracy. He points out that market model in education is lethal to social democracy. Like Nussbaum, he suggests that even though education and the economy were never completely separated, the noblest function of education is to engender citizenship and assert shared values. Furthermore, he argues, when a school becomes a marketplace, individual and community development are unavoidably supplanted by wealthy-creating cultures and values, which threaten democratic values and practice.

Further, both Molnar and Nussbaum draw attention to the way in which marketization presents a danger to, and threatens to suppress, students' "freedom of mind" (2012). Molnar, for instance, observes that freedom becomes synonymous with consumption when it is understood in economic or market terms. In this way, he shows, the market model in education creates a deceptive perception of freedom of mind being freedom of consumption. Under this educational and social atmosphere that is enchanted by commercialism, independent and critical thinking, civic awareness, and political involvement capabilities are disregarded. As a consequence, Molnar laments, corporate interests, mass commercialism, and market-based school reforms are "rendering our society correspondingly less democratic" (p. 81).

One especially worrisome development, begun in the late twentieth century and gaining steam in the early decades of the twenty first century, is the increasingly collaboration between public institutions of higher education and private corporations. According to Derek Bok, former President of Harvard University, the present relationship between higher education and marketplace is so overwhelming that it almost supplants the

humanistic values of education and the spirit of academia. Bok documents a wide range of cases to illustrate how university researchers from a wide range of different disciplines are attracted to the pursuit of profit (Bok, 2009). Faculty members in engineering and computer science, for example, gain profit from selling patents to corporates such as inventions of digital products. Or they receive funding from corporations in return for developing an exclusive technology. These developments serve as reminders of McMurty's worries about the privatization of knowledge within the market model.

Academic entrepreneurship is another phenomenon discussed by Bok. For example, he discusses the trend among faculty members in the Social Sciences of personally profit from being itinerary lecturers and trainers. They gain financial benefits from their side jobs at the sacrifice of the teaching and supervision for their students. Another situation is that university administrators also contribute to the tide of the profit-making by selling the university logo to merchants or allowing donors to use university's name and fame for their products. When educational activities, including teaching, researching, and administration, become subordinate to profit-making, education is placed in the marketplace and operated by market principles. Bok's description of this system offers a detailed portrait of the current situations in major research universities. He unsparingly concludes that "commercialism typically begins when someone in the university finds an opportunity to make money" (p. 99).

In highlighting such trends, Bok's primary concern is that universities are changing from non-profit institutions, entrusted with public responsibilities and social service, into post-industrial institutions driven by commercial incentives. Situating themselves in the marketplace, universities have learned that they can make massive profits from their research, scientific, and technological discoveries by cooperating with industry and corporations. According to Bok, the problem is not just that commercialism enters higher education in the first place—this trend has been developing for some time – but that it increasingly enters without much resistance, and hence with little demand for accountability to educational standards as opposed to economic ones. Furthermore, as mentioned above, an increasingly significant portion of university faculty members and administrators engage themselves in profit-making by bridging their educational duties and

profitable opportunities, such as reducing their teaching and research time in order to increase collaboration with commercial bodies.

The problem that worries Bok is this: the opportunities for profitable reward on the part of individual faculty and administrators have larger and more lasting institutional effects, helping to accelerate the cooperation between education and business at the institutional and systemic level. This is problematic because emerging monetary-incentive universities compromise educational values and scholarly standards. Bok reviews many well-known scandals in contemporary higher education, which serve as concrete illustrations of how higher education is increasingly governed by commercial laws, how educational and scholarly activities and research results become commodified, and how commercial values transform and distort student-teacher relationships. For example, Bok examines cases in which human subjects are involved in medical research for commercial purposes such as the development of in-demand medications and energy products. As he illustrates, this dynamic creates a threat to the well-being of patients in two ways. First, the university medical research and results are to benefit profit-making corporations, which do not guarantee what is best for patients. Second, medical practitioners who have received an education that is commercial and consuming orientated are possibly not devoted to the benefit of patients but instead to profit-making. Hence, the education that is dominated by the market model debases the honor and privileges of education, disregards public responsibilities, and threatens the public good.

Humanistic Model

Rooted in constructivist social ideas, the renewed focus on humanism emerged as a subject of scholarly analysis in the 1960s. The central principles of contemporary humanism were evinced in the work of psychologists like Erik Erickson, Carl Rogers, and Abraham Maslow whose work covered human dignity, potential, and freedom. In the philosophy of education, influential proponents of humanist educational ideals, such as John Dewey and John McMurtry, developed and applied humanistic principles in educational disciplines by subjecting them to philosophical scrutiny. In this section, my main goal is to elucidate the principal ideas of these humanist educational scholars.

From the humanistic perspective, the learner is regarded as a human being, understood as a person with a sense of dignity, having open-ended potential for growth and

development, and enjoying both the capacity and freedom to pursue and determine the direction of their growth and development. As such, common labels for students in present day educational contexts—students as "clients" or "consumers" or "stakeholders," for example—tend to obscure humanist educational values. Each of the terms in the preceding sentence may seem "reductionist" from a humanist perspective, in the sense that they suggest that teaching and learning are reducible to economic or commercial terms. Humanist educators need not reject the view that students should in part be encouraged to appreciate their economic values; however, they reject the view that economic values should help shape self-conception and identity. The claim that learning or teaching is solely comprised of economic elements misses an enormous part of what it means to be a human. As such, humanistic education denotes an educational view that emphasizes primary care and concern for humanity. Based on the central principles of humanism, I recognize three essential aspects of humanistic educational values: dignity, potential, and freedom. These values distinguish the humanistic model from the market model in contemporary higher education.

The first value central to humanistic education is human dignity. Aloni (2011) claims that humanistic education prioritizes human dignity above all other social and cultural issues, such as economy, religion, and ideology. Each individual's dignity underlies personal idiosyncrasy and unique capabilities and is expressed through his/ her capacities for moral reasoning, free will, creativity, imagination, and so on (Aloni, 2011, pp. 35-36). Such traits also provide the basis for distinguishing human from non-human dignity. Human dignity is the central part of human development and education, and a strong awareness of students' dignity is a key factor of humanistic education. Gage and Berliner (1991) reaffirm the significance of students' dignity by highlighting that each person follows a unique path to self-actualization. An awareness of his or her dignity has a powerful psychological impact on learning and growth of each student.

The second value of humanistic education is a strong concern for "holism" or holistic humanity, which requires discovering and developing human potential in both its intellectual and emotional dimensions. Educators mindful of holistic humanity are aware that education aims to ensure that each student is recognized as a fully functioning person; therefore, the cognitive, emotional, and physical selves of each student should be

recognized. Marples (2012) presents some essential characteristics and capacities of the "whole person" that humanistic education intends to meet. He names a few, such as flexibility, adaptability, receptiveness to experience, and openness to change (pp. 85-92). This type of education aligns with the study of self, motivation, individual growth, and self-discovery; in sum, it centers on individual growth and discovering personal potential based on a holistic understanding of each person. Application of holistic humanity is embodied in caring for both the intellectual and emotional aspects of the learner. Humanistic education values emotional and affective factors of students as well as their intellectual and rational capacities; it also treats these factors and capacities as an integrated and complex whole.

The third value relates to freedom, which I consider coming largely from independent and critical thinking. Individuals can examine their internal and external conditions and environment with independent and critical minds, which are crucial to recognizing social, personal, and media control. However, a divide within humanist thought exists when it comes to critical thinking. For instance, Rogers believed that rationality and critical thinking are overemphasized in education. Consequently, he sought to prioritize the emotional and spiritual aspects of education (Rogers, 1989). By contrast, some humanists such as Nussbaum emphasize critical thinking by tracing humanistic education back to Plato and earlier times (Nussbaum, 2012). For many humanists, critical thinking is acknowledged as one of the key qualities for a "whole human being" in the humanistic approach. This quality is both a goal as well as a method of humanistic education. Richards et al. (2005) describe the "power of critical thinking in students" in the scenario of "a level of reading comprehension or discussion skills when the learner is able to question and evaluate what is read or heard" (p. 174). Blooms' taxonomy describes a hierarchy of different cognitive-learning levels. For him, rational and critical thinking means going beyond knowledge, comprehension, and even application, but going towards analysis, synthesis, and evaluation, which require the capacity to think in highly abstract ways (Blooms, 1956). An education like this demands that students process learning through active thinking and evaluation with critical thinking abilities which mobilize the pursuit of freedom.

Grounded in the three essential aspects of humanistic education—dignity, holism, freedom—humanist educators argue that education should benefit a person as a whole and support individual growth and development throughout a lifetime. Gage and Berliner's research on the three dimensions of humanist education (1998) reflects John Dewey's work on education and democracy. Specifically, Dewey has proclaimed that achieving individual maturity and self-discovery are the prerequisites for a high level of democracy; and democratic social life is one of the essential goals of education (1916). The Humanistic model of education focuses on studying fundamental elements of human nature and ideological components of the ancient concept of "building of men" (Haskins, 2002). It respects individuality, aims to release individual potentials and creativity, supports individuals in exploring their internal and external worlds, and encourages and facilitates them to participate in social democracy building. Based on the features, characteristics, and implications of humanistic education, this educational model respects and carries these principles in teaching, learning, and administration.

Humanistic model contemporary times.

The humanistic model in education demonstrates tremendous concerns and interests in fostering characteristics such as being humane, creative, critical, independent, and empathetic; it also expresses a strong sense of mission in building a democratic society and promoting social equality. The central feature of the humanistic model of producing well-informed and well-educated citizens is correspondent with the core value of higher education in history. As expounded in Chapter One, the goal of higher education in Ancient Greece and renaissance in Europe was to encourage self-development and cultivate good citizens. Although the content and methods associated with humanistic educational aims have shifted over time, this two-fold educational aim has remained relatively constant. The shaping of citizenship and individuality was exemplified by Plato's Academy through the study of public speaking, philosophical debate, and training in rhetoric (Taylor, 1926), as well as through the practice of maintaining rigorous intellectual, artistic, and physical standards (Pedersen, 1997).

Humanistic education looks very different in contemporary universities, even if there is some obvious overlap. The study of Liberal Arts, including literature, philosophy, history, language, and other subjects, remains in most university curricula, though their

importance and relevance to the needs of students are frequently challenged. Equally important, these subjects are increasingly relegated to a niche in the curriculum—viewed as important for those who choose to study Humanities, but irrelevant at best and an impediment to progress at worst for those in the natural sciences and other non-humanistic fields. Where the Humanities once defined the very idea of higher education, they are now increasingly viewed as one option among others. Perhaps more worrisome, the status of Humanities-based education is now less secure in universities than ever, due to the ascendance of commercial forces and profit-making motives throughout higher education.

In contemporary contexts, social intelligence is viewed as a necessary standard of scholarships; this view places humanistic values as secondary or even dispensable. People who try to "save" humanistic education have raised a strong voice across educational philosophy and practice. Nevertheless, if, as I have argued, humanistic educational values remain alive and viable in the contemporary university, they are increasingly under pressure from a competing model of higher education—the market model. Martha Nussbaum clearly sums up this situation: "creativity and individuality… [have] a hard time finding room to unfold" in the current institutions of higher education (2012, p.134).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have expanded my description and analysis of the humanistic model and market model of higher education, by subjecting their key values, principles, aims, and purposes to philosophical scrutiny. By doing so, I have also shown how the two competing models are incompatible in concrete ways. Finally, I have surveyed the work of several well-known scholars who argue, critically, that contemporary universities have largely adopted the market model in their drive of to achieve economic goals, and that they have done so at the expense of humanistic values. According to these theorists and educational leaders, higher education, public policy, and the public have allowed marketization to circumscribe higher education, permitted commercialism to guide educational operation, accommodated consumerism and commodification in controlling relationships and interactions in the educational sphere. and facilitated the privatization of higher education. These results from the dominance of market model have caused problems from personal development to social justice.

Nevertheless, I have also argued that it would be an exaggeration to suggest that humanistic ideas have been eliminated or lost within the landscape of contemporary higher education. Even if the market model is currently in ascendance in contemporary higher education, vital elements of humanistic education remain. The critiques advanced by Nussbaum, Molnar, and Bok all assume and acknowledge the continuing force of humanistic ideals in contemporary higher education. These authors provide a valuable service by highlighting numerous signs that the modern university is in poor health. The authors whose ideas I have reviewed in this chapter do not all agree on this issue. For example, while Nussbaum chastises for-profit universities, at the same time, she also calls for revitalization and reconstruction of humanistic goals in contemporary higher education. Such a stance is in contrast with Bok who worries that the commercial trend in education may be irreversible because the research of many disciplines largely depends on the financial support of corporations. As such, he suggests, it is not clear how corporate influence can be surgically removed from higher education without also killing the body that hosts them (2009). Nonetheless, I want to suggest that these critiques should not be interpreted as a eulogy for a humanistic university that has perished and now lies "in ruins" as Readings suggests (1996).

Although scholars may disagree on the prognosis, there remains at least one further important reason for recognizing the conflict that exists between economic and humanistic educational values and models. University officials and the media often speak and act as if the tension or conflict between these two models pose no critical threats to education. The fact that the market model misleads the goals and compromises the quality of education is disguised or diluted. The fact that universities increasingly turn to corporate support to fund their projects rather than governments and tax dollars is viewed as merely a technical issue—different sources of funding supporting educational enterprises. Parents and students pursue higher education for employability and economic outcomes but cannot see or refuse to see that these economic benefits may be achievable only at the cost of sacrificing humanistic attributes and values. This situation raises a potential danger in underestimating and tolerating the threats that the market model poses on higher education.

Chapter Three: Four Threats the Market Model Poses to Humanistic Education

Introduction

In Chapter One, I outlined two competing conceptions of higher education: the humanistic model and the market model. In Chapter Two, I elaborated on the philosophical underpinnings of these two models. So far, I have elucidated different and conflicting goals, values, methods, and conceptions of knowledge within the two models. I also have indicated that criticism of higher education has centered on the increasing influence of the market model, and the corresponding declining influence of the humanistic model, in contemporary university education. The purpose of Chapter Three is to identify some of the key threats that the market model poses to humanistic education in contemporary universities. These threats have distorted understanding of the fundamental aims of higher education, changed the nature of the student-teacher relationship, and disturbed the design of curricula. In particular, I focus on four types of threats that endanger educational values, academic mentorship and friendship, curricula, and academic freedom, which I will expound later with details.

Before enumerating these specific threats, however, I examine an important preliminary question: What does it mean to say that the market model, or some aspect of market values, poses a "threat" to humanistic values in higher education? I make a distinction between two conceptions of such a threat. The first view, supported by scholars like Readings and McMurtry, holds that market and humanistic values are radically incompatible. According to this view, treatment of the threat to humanistic educational values requires expelling all market influences from higher education. The second view holds that market and humanistic values can be coherently combined in a single conception of higher education, though they frequently conflict in practice. According to the second view, the threat that the market model poses to higher education is serious but more manageable. Instead of eliminating market influences, the task before us is to ensure that market influences are properly confined to a secondary, and supporting, role to humanistic educational values.

Understanding The Relationship Between The Humanistic and Market Models

The scholars whose ideas have informed the discussion and analysis in Chapters One and Two are not always as clear as they should be about their understanding of the relationship between the market and humanistic models. For example, McMurtry's criticisms of the market model, discussed in Chapter Two, are motivated by his commitment to humanistic educational

values. Yet it is not clear from his analysis how he can logically maintain such a commitment. According to McMurtry, the two models are radically incompatible, and as such, there is a deep and inevitable conflict between them. McMurtry explains this conflict regarding four opposing aspects—diametric aims, motivations, methods and standards of excellence. According to him, whenever education is driven by economic aims, the goals, motivations, methods, standards, and evaluation will be shifted away from humanistic purposes. McMurtry's position thus seems to leave little room for a conception of higher education in which humanistic and market values can co-exist within a single system of higher education, or within the same university. The humanistic and market values have co-existed in higher education in the period since the late 19th century, and have been necessary for higher education to sustain the two sets of values. What has caused a problem in education and aroused criticism is the overemphasis on market values and debasement of humanistic values—McMurtry points out this problem, but he reveals an idealistic attitude towards higher education by eliminating the market model.

McMurtry's analysis implies that when market values are allowed to influence or direct university education, humanistic educational values are thereby blocked or eliminated. Such an adamant position raises questions of feasibility. If the very possibility of humanistic education requires a complete eradication of market influences in higher education, then it is not clear whether humanistic education has any chance at all of surviving in contemporary universities. Nevertheless, it is not possible or necessary to eradicate economic influences from higher education. It is hard to imagine a higher education system that completely ignores its economic role since economic influence has always existed in universities. To some degree, McMurtry's position seems to disallow a potential compromise between humanistic and economic educational values by viewing them as radically opposed and incompatible. I argue that, despite the tenacious economic aims in higher education causing devastating consequences, current higher education still has the capacity to facilitate a radical shift between the two sets of aims.

On the other hand, scholars such as Nussbaum and Brighouse provide an alternative and less draconian understanding of the relationship between humanistic and economic values in higher education. They provide a second way of understanding the conflict between the two models. These authors advocate that higher education can and should have the capacity to include or accommodate both models. They assert that, to some extent, it is necessary and significant to integrate the two sets of goals into a single conception of higher education. Even

though they both criticize contemporary higher education for permitting economic aims to supplant humanistic aims, they hold out hope that the relative influence and power of each model might be altered or even reversed. For example, Nussbaum is highly concerned with the economic focus in contemporary higher education; she believes it is so drastic that its influence detracts egregiously from humanistic pursuits. She argues that this impact needs to be sharply curtailed and counterbalanced by a greater appreciation for and emphasis on humanistic considerations. But her criticism of the market model and its overtaking of the humanistic model does not imply that economic goals must be eliminated (2012). From Nussbaum's view, it is more of a question of striking a different proportion between the two models than a question of restoring one while eliminating the other.

Similarly, Brighouse argues that education should reflect capacities for economic participation, values of personal autonomy, critical thinking, and human flourishing (2006). As such, education should include both economic and humanistic aims, though the latter should have priority over the former. According to Brighouse, acquiring skills that are beneficial for economic life are intrinsically tied up with an individual's capacity, personal autonomy, and well-being. Brighouse recognizes that personal autonomy "plays an important role in enabling people to live flourishing lives" (2006, p. 15). Implemented and practiced properly, he states, economic goals can promote or enhance the humanistic values of education rather than superseding them. More specifically, Brighouse distinguishes between a view of economic education that is grounded in a conception of the educated person as a unit of "human capital" and in a conception of personal autonomy as a fundamental aim of education. As Brighouse notes, education making use of human capital is likely to equip students with skills from which they can earn an income, but the reasons it provides for doing so have little to do with the "flourishing" of the individual. This kind of education does not care whether the work that a student acquires is meaningful or meaningless, fulfilling or not, suited to one's personality or not. What matters, from this point of view, is that students are prepared by their education for an appropriate "slot" in the economy they serve (2006, p. 34).

Instead, Brighouse advocates what he calls education for "economic participation." According to this view, every student "has a right to expect that her education will prepare her for a range of different kinds of employment" (2006, p. 34). Based on this view, the university education cannot rightfully be organized in ways that pressure students into economic "slots"

determined to be valuable or necessary by others, i.e., employers or political leaders. Rather, education should prepare students to evaluate the alternatives available to them, including what kind of employment they find worthwhile and how much time and influence employment will have in the person's life compared to other aspects of life, such as family and leisure activities. Although Brighouse does not explicitly say so, an education for "economic participation" should presumably enable students to choose whether or not they wish to live a life that includes paid employment. Ultimately, for Brighouse, an education for economic participation should prepare students for economic life in ways that can reliably contribute to their autonomy and flourishing rather than solely to the growth of the economy. In this view, individual good augments public good, rather than the pursuit of the public good to the detriment of the individual. Like Nussbaum's, and unlike McMurtry's, this view implies a conception of higher education within which economic values and humanistic values can be combined and reconciled.

I believe, with Brighouse and Nussbaum, that both the market and humanistic models have a role to play in contemporary higher education; nevertheless, I insist that humanistic aims should be the primary and ultimate goals of higher education. As such, economic or market values should at most play an instrumental role—they can be accommodated and their value be recognized when they support and promote humanistic values. But when market values undermine humanistic educational goals, university education is in danger. This conception of the "instrumental" role of market values in higher education does not require a complete rejection of the market model. However, it does imply a radical reversal of contemporary trends. Marketization has invaded the modern university campus—teaching, learning, and administration have all been co-opted by ends such as monetary benefits, efficiency, productivity, and excellence. Such "excellence" is not reflective of intrinsic development or knowledge accumulation but is a mere pursuit of economic ends. Utilitarian values and motivations created this reality. I argue that higher education should not give precedence to economic progress and market prosperity in its educational agenda. In what follows, I identify four especially salient "threats" that the market model poses for humanistic education in contemporary universities.

Four Threats That The Market Model Poses to Humanistic Education

When economic influences are dominant in higher education, and when economic values are allowed to marginalize important educational aims and values, they do more harm than good.

In this section, I identify four threats that the economic model poses to higher education—first, it undermines educational values; second, it demolishes the conditions of mentorship and academic friendship; third, it is a threat to curricula; fourth, and finally, it poses a threat to academic freedom. The four aspects lead to and accelerate one another. Promoting economic values while undermining humanistic values leads students to consider their teachers as employees (service providers). This situation destroys mentorship and enables the market to dictate curricula, and some teachers might feel beholden to the students who view their education as a product to be consumed. When curricula, the central component of education, are taken over by the market, humanistic education faces a fatal defeat. When the market controls curricula, it also controls the principles of education, then teachers and students no longer have academic freedom. As such, the production of knowledge is dictated by the values and goals of the market.

1 Values and aims.

The first and foremost threat is that the primary values and aims of higher education have been replaced by goals of profit-making and economic growth. The essential attributes of universities are not the mere historical heritage that belongs to the past but the fundamental knowledge and instruments to continue and renew human society; therefore, they should be placed in an indispensable position among all social sectors. A university is an institution different from the rest of social and political institutions because it carries and focuses on these primary values and aims. This unique purpose of renewing human society also makes it different from elementary or vocational education, which focuses on basic education and job training. Unfortunately, higher education is accused of being short on efficiency and not catching up to the speed of economic development. For example, the Canadian Manufacturer Association says, "Universities must be encouraged to shed low-yield, costly baggage from the past" (Graham, 1989, p. 3). This educational ideology prompts a series of adjustments in education policies, including closing schools and faculties and cutting funding.

The market encourages people to rely on the products and services it sells. Conversely, as people receive more and better education, they become more independent from market pressure that tends to manipulate how they think and act. The market prioritizes the goal of maximizing profits, while a university prioritizes the mental process of acquiring knowledge and critical thinking skills; the market promotes private actions in competition to make a private profit, while education provides an inclusive platform to share, accumulate, and criticize knowledge.

However, when market forces gain dominance in educational settings, there is no guarantee that both economic and humanistic goals can be respected simultaneously. The faster the market develops, the more demands will be placed on education to serve economic purposes, and the less time and room there will be for educational endeavors whose economic value is vague. The first threat of the economic model is thus not that it is logically incompatible with humanistic values, as McMurtry claims; rather, the primary danger is a practical one: when market forces gain dominance in educational settings, there is no guarantee that both economic and humanistic goals can be respected simultaneously. In short, the importance and role of the humanistic model of education are that it provides the basis for setting limits on economic imperatives in education. The humanistic model is needed to demonstrate economic values in proper ways. More specifically, economic benefits should not be taken as ultimate goals of higher education, but rather as by-products of humanistic ends. A strong university education can foster these by-products without allowing itself to become defined or driven by them.

When education is required to be useful and practical for the market, academic freedom is confined to its by-products and education is hindered from achieving its values. When academic workers are considered "business agents" who provide goods and services for "education consumers," education is subjected to the demands of the market; as a result, the values of academic work are compromised. When professors are preoccupied by publishing and securing funding, and when academic workers grow weary of the burden of marketing their products, academic freedom is breached by utilitarian goals. When education becomes business-oriented, it cannot focus on the humanistic values of truth and knowledge.

2 Roles and relationship change mentorship and academic friendship.

The second threat that arises when economic values and aims become dominant in higher education is a drastic and undesirable change in the relationship between students and teachers. According to a humanistic conception of higher education, teachers should provide academic and moral mentorship to students. Mentorship in academic settings fosters friendship through academic communication such as discussion and debating, project collaboration, and moral support. The philosopher Paul Weithman endorses such mentorship and articulates "academic friendship" between students and teachers. He describes the academic friendship as teachers playing the role of "mentors" and "friends" to help students with their intellectual achievement, assist them to choose good influences, shape characters, and foster values of social justice (2015,

pp. 53-56). Mentorship impels mutually beneficial interactions that contribute to improving, strengthening, and solidifying academic capabilities and progress. Academic mentorship and friendship are achieved in the pursuit of humanistic goals, and the reward of success is beyond the tangible fulfillment of material and economic means. The relationship and communication from academic mentorship and friendship are founded upon the pursuit of humanistic knowledge. Within a university fully embraced by such communication, teaching and learning serve to enrich the roles of teachers and students, which in turn nourish and prepare students for pursuit and fulfillment of their personal lives and careers. At the same time, it also benefits teachers. Conversations, discussions, and debates in university seminars and academic conferences—which always extend to social and political issues—provide a platform for students and teachers to share their understanding, which in turn sparks new ideas. Teachers and researchers can benefit from these ideas by adding much richness to their academic work. This effect enables them to add to the store of knowledge which is the domain of higher education. Hence, mentorship and academic friendship from the humanistic model benefit both students and teachers in advancing education and knowledge.

This conception of academic mentorship can be elaborated by reference to educational philosopher John Dewey's idea of "communicative" educational relationships. As Dewey states, "Social life is identical with communication, all communication is educative." For Dewey, when an educational setting becomes a community of social life, rather than an institution to prepare for economic life, education nourishes and creates social life through all forms of communications that occur within that setting. A university that prioritizes humanistic values is one in which student-teacher relationships are characterized primarily by such communicative educational relations. By contrast, a university that prioritizes market values poses a serious hazard to damage and distort these relationships.

Unlike McMurtry, however, I do not claim that academic mentorship is necessarily demolished whenever academic values and market values are combined in university settings. Once again, I suggest that the key consideration here is the relative priority given to each set of values. So long as universities respect and recognize the fundamental role of teachers in promoting the autonomy and flourishing of students, then market considerations must occupy only a secondary or "back seat" role. For example, there is no necessary threat to the mentor-student relationship if a professor employs a student as a research assistant, even if doing so may

lead to commercial benefit for the university or the professor. Such employment may be enriching for the student academically, personally, as well as providing him/her with skills beneficial for future employment. But when such employment is used solely or primarily as a cost-cutting measure, without taking account of the student's interests, needs, and intellectual growth, then it risks becoming a purely commercial transaction. Of course, in drawing this distinction, one needs to be careful of the powerful motivation to rationalize the humanistic benefits of commercial relationships. Many employers and researchers may claim that even very exploitative relationships are nevertheless "beneficial" to the exploited student. Humanistic educators should be wary of such claims that intend to disguise the economic drive. Hence, although the humanistic ideal of academic mentorship and friendship is not necessarily impossible within a university that is also partly devoted to economic and commercial gain, those who care for humanistic values ought to be alert to the serious threat that market values pose to teacher-student relationships in practice.

3 Curriculum.

These concerns about academic relationships lead to the third threat: the threat that market values pose to the university curriculum. When academic mentorship is replaced by a client—service provider relationship, the client's opinion on what they're consuming, in this case the curriculum, gains the gravitas to warp the "service" being provided. This threat is particularly prescient because if the university is about the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge, then any force that attempts to dictate what knowledge has value threatens the primary purposes of the university and the common good of the society. Beyond its role in framing classroom activities, the curriculum serves as a repository of the conception of knowledge that the university values and commits itself to communicating between teachers and students. The curriculum is not just a package of courses to teach or hand over; it is both training and experience that move students to reflect on what education values are for themselves, the society, and the world. Educator and scholar Teresa Strong-Wilson claims that the curriculum starts in daily life and people's experience, and this understanding should be the guideline of curriculum-making (2006). Obviously, such a conception of curriculum is compatible with the inclusion of economic and market experiences and interests, but it is not compatible with a conception of education that is dominated by such interests.

Indeed, humanistic values and aims are central to this profound conception of curriculum, even in contexts where economic values play some role. Consider, as a simple illustrative example, questions about the place and value of technology in the university curriculum. From a market perspective, there is a clear value of including in the curriculum tasks associated with effective use, development and dissemination of economically expansive technologies (especially new ones whose commercial value can be exploited in emerging markets). However, a humanistic curriculum—grounded in a broad and pluralistic conception of human experience and interests—would necessarily include a wide range of alternative academic tasks, many of which could have unclear economic value and some of which may even be inimical to immediate economic interests. Such a curriculum would require students to inquire into the potential harms of technology to the environment, to established or traditional cultural formations, to human relationships, and to non-human animals. From a humanistic perspective, technology must be viewed not merely as an economic resource whose potential costs and benefits must be weighed and balanced, but as a "way of life," with implications for all aspects of human existence, including questions about the value of relationships between humanity and the non-human world (Wood, 2003). Indeed, a humanistic curriculum should take seriously account of teaching students that technology, in some cases, must be "tamed" rather than "unleashed," even if expanding technology is economically beneficial (2003).

Once again, I do not argue here that such a humanistic curriculum is totally incompatible with market values in higher education. Nevertheless, when market values are given too much significance, they obviously pose a serious threat to the humanistic curriculum. Even though it is very likely that a humanistic curriculum will teach students much that can contribute to their potential for economic productivity, the value of such a curriculum is not defined by whether it promotes economic growth and total wealth. More importantly, the value of such a curriculum is inevitably seriously compromised if it is mostly delivered by teachers who view themselves as "producers" to students whom they view as "consumers" of their expert knowledge. This situation is lethal to higher education because it creates a top-down hierarchy in which the teacher transmits knowledge and the student receives. Such a hierarchical circumstance forecloses the possibility of the student contributing to the teacher, eliminates teachers' mentorship, and limits the academic values that flow between them. Questions about the value, place and nature of technology cannot be explored freely and in a spirit of creative inquiry when

the interaction between teacher and student is governed by an explicit or implicit demand that there be an economic payoff to the transaction. As in the case of the first two threats to higher education, the question of whether a humanistic curriculum can be pursued in the contemporary university depends on whether that curriculum is understood and valued in light of its likely mixed contributions to economic growth and expansion, i.e. as an educational means by which students learn skills and knowledge that enable economic growth, but by which they also learn ways of thinking and understanding that disclose the need for human values to question and impose limits on such growth.

The threat posed by the market model of higher education to a humanistic curriculum is understood more clearly when one recognizes the political nature of curriculum. According to William Ayers, the curriculum is political because education is political (Ayers, 1992). Franklin Bottitt builds a more radical connection between education and society by emphasizing that "education must take a pace set, not by itself, but by social progress" (1924, p. 42). The threat posed by the market model occurs when social development is equated with economic growth, and when this equivalence sets the agenda for higher education. Accordingly, in contemporary universities, curriculum design and practice are increasingly enmeshed with economic interests. What to teach is increasingly driven by the utilitarian focus of how to maximize the utility of education. The curriculum has been standardized in a bureaucratized education system in order to fit into the industrialized world. Dewey long ago criticized that the structure of curriculum left out most important elements in fostering individuality and creativity (1916). According to the humanistic model, higher education is supposed to serve the concept of "building of men" and a university is the institutional vehicle to realize this purpose; thus, it is meant to be as "a whole" with integrated disciplines, faculties, curriculum, as well as an academic culture. In contemporary systems of higher education, in which the market model predominates, this idea has been swallowed by the current utilitarian focus on training productive workers and developing the economy. The humanistic goal of "building of men" by Haskins (2002) has been transmitted to the contemporary goal of building labor.

According to proponents of humanistic education, economic dominance in higher education is not inevitable even if it is the state of affairs that currently predominates. As Brighouse points out, emphasis on economic growth as an important educational value does not necessarily imply that economic growth is the only, or even the most important, value. Drawing

on numerous recent empirical studies, Brighouse points out that economic growth does not necessarily promote increased personal or collective happiness, especially in societies that are already wealthy. As he says, "once a society has achieved some degree of material success, further growth is not fundamentally very important" for human flourishing (2006, p. 48). In such cases, he argues, education should focus primarily on enabling students to appreciate the value of, and to make choices about, non-economic pursuits rather than economic ones. I would go further at this point: a materialist driven education is more likely to undermine human flourishing. For example, people whose central purposes are materially driven will restrict their time and resources for personal cultivation, family, and friends—which are intrinsic components of a flourishing life. Despite the merits economic aims have in shaping and supporting higher education, higher education is by no means created to grow the economy; moreover, when economic drives surpass a certain degree, they might constrain human flourishing.

It has become urgent to demand a renaissance on the current curriculum of higher education which would realize Brighouse's statement that "traditional academic subjects themselves present opportunities that are relevant to the child's long-term flourishing and are not merely preparation for the world of work" (p. 53). This call would be no less than a revolution in higher education. Many educators and curriculum scholars such as Bobbit advocate a thorough change on curricula. He proclaims the urgency of changing curricula lays the methods and duties before us (2009). These are calling for a curriculum that can reflect true values of education, listen to the voice of ordinary people, express the passion for knowledge, and facilitate a flourishing life for individuals rather than satisfying the government's agenda of economic growth. A higher education that belongs to and serves individuals can only be shaped and delivered through genuine academic and personal relationships. Much respected school teacher and writer Frank McCourt boldly criticizes the dominant groups who manipulate curricula with their power of managing education because they "want order, routine, discipline" (2005, p. 148). He calls on educators to teach not only knowledge but to build mentorship and friendship with students that helps, inspires, and supports them. Weithman, whose conception of academic friendship informed my earlier discussion of teacher-student relationships, also points to this revitalized conception of humanistic curriculum, by calling on teachers to "model a commitment to intellectual life" and to help students to "imagine how else the world might be" (Weithman, 2015, pp.70-71). Weithman's point aligns with Dewey's perspective that education should

deliver knowledge, skills, understanding, and imagination from those who are more mature to those who are less mature, and those who are more experienced to less experienced (1916).

The market model imposes a threat on curricula to distort educational values and academic relationships by the economic focus and utilitarian drive. When curricula serve primarily economic goals and dominant powers through explicit and implicit ways, the curricula facilitate "miseducation" (Aoki, 2005, p. 359). Such a threat is devastating, however, not insurmountable. I suggest that higher education needs a renaissance on its curriculum to prioritize humanistic goals that will enable students to lead a flourishing life. A humanistic higher education needs a humanistic curriculum that serves to connect learning with real life, foster humanistic understanding and character, and express the values of higher education, and sustains academic mentorship and friendship.

4 Academic freedom.

Breach of academic freedom is the fourth threat I recognize in contemporary higher education. Economic distraction and political agendas have turned academic freedom into a contested topic within a worldwide scope. Strong focus on national economic growth and profit for organizations have been jeopardizing academic freedom globally; utilitarian-focused policies have hindered educational activities and distorted the humanistic aims of universities. For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on how these economic and political factors interfere with preserving and continuing the values of academic work.

Traditionally in the West, academic freedom has promised prosperous academic achievement; nevertheless, it has been degraded by the consistent pressure to publish and to obtain funding. Most funding providers are corporations and organizations that hold certain beliefs and norms. Applicants have to compromise their academic stances to fit the funders' prerogatives, and research outcomes are dictated by funding priorities. To an extent, funding becomes the client and academics become service providers. A notorious example of this is the Olivieri Medical Dispute which I elaborated in Chapter Three. Nancy Olivieri, a medical scientist, was mistreated and harassed for revealing her medical discovery that was against the market purpose and financial benefit of the funding body. This event shocked the academic and educational world, and it served as strong evidence of how damaging market principles are for education. Another essential element of academic work significantly influenced by the market is publication. Competition to publish is not merely to share research findings but to secure

academic positions. Publication is a token of qualification for professorship, funding, and authority. Alarmingly, when the pressure of publication overwhelms the other purposes of academia, it becomes a barrier to academic freedom. When professors reduce the time spent lecturing in the classroom, discussing with students, and building a community of peers, while increasing the time and efforts in their own projects and publications, an essential resource for higher education is drained. This misallocation of resources becomes a severe hindrance in building mentorship and academic friendship (Weithman, 2015). Academic freedom is in doubt when people do not do what they are trained to do but what they are paid to do. The virtue of academia is to pursue knowledge and seek out the truth without fear and external pressure; higher education should speak for and live up to the pursuit of truth. The agenda of academia should be the advancement of knowledge, and only be that. Unfortunately, the current higher education climate does not support that notion because any boldness may jeopardize teachers' positions and employment.

The loss of academic freedom in higher education has manifested in various forms, and has resulted in a reduction of communication and educative values that strengthen democratic social life. Dewey proclaims education needs a central purpose that can unify and guide intellectual activities (1916). This statement diagnoses the current problems in contemporary higher education. When professors adapt for-profit teaching guidelines, curriculum extensively shifts emphasis to science and practical skills, and schools like Western Governors University that completely focuses on business and technology rampantly grow, the commercialization of teaching, learning, and researching cannot preserve the virtues that have created and sustained civilization. Today, the loss of academic freedom and the decreased impact of higher education have become a direct threat to the university that was once the center of cultivating humanistic society. When academic freedom is jeopardized by economic focus and manipulated by utilitarian purposes, teachers and students cease taking their academic inheritance seriously. Academic research and arguments are narrowed in limited scope, scholarly conversations are restrained or ignored, and the humanistic ideals and spirits to influence the world are oppressed.

Many societies recognize economic power as the cornerstone to the making of a powerful nation. This misconception has forced higher education into the political agenda and prioritized its extrinsic value over its intrinsic value. Higher education is losing its autonomy in society and politics, in order to fulfill government agendas. And thus, academic work is losing its power to

influence and guide social and political activities. The meaning and value of higher education are discounted as academic practice is subordinated to economic incentives by external powers and utilitarian motivations. The suppression of free academic dialogues and debates by economic and political interference also affects communication in the culture at large. As such, it results in academic degradation and, eventually, the elimination of academics' impact on social life.

Humanistic goals, mentorship and academic friendship, curricula, and academic freedom are essential for humanistic higher education. Now they are all at risk because of utilitarian interferences and threats. Humanistic values will lose their last ground in higher education if these threats not alleviated and, eventually, eliminated. Higher education has an obligation to examine the leading values in social and individual development. Universities have both intrinsic and extrinsic worth within this institutional entity. Intrinsic worth formulates inner power to expand and deepen human understandings, which reflects humanistic goals in higher education; extrinsic worth generates external power to accumulate financial capital through commerce and technology. Both can strengthen a country's national strength and international influence; both can improve one another when they are structured and operated in a way that celebrates ethical principles and the fundamental purpose of higher education. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the current situation of education and society. The market model and utilitarian guidelines are overwhelmingly instructing education and undermining its fundamental values. The decay of humanistic influence in higher education is not only a compromise to current worldwide economic demands but, rather, is also a threat to healthy and democratic social life. Dewey states, "Social life is identical with communication, all communication is educative" (2016, p. 10). People who come together in public need to be educated to allow them to communicate critical ideas (1927, p. 157). In this scenario, freedom to learn and know is indispensable to better serve the social purpose of education to make better societies and communities.

Conclusion

The economic model and humanistic model in higher education both have their roles and share responsibilities from different stances. Both have served higher education and society from different perspectives. However, the economic model has been overly emphasized in educational practice because of a misperception that economic achievement is the most important aim for individuals and society. As a matter of fact, economic goals fall short of fulfilling and supporting the core values of higher education. Prioritizing these goals runs the risk of influencing public

policy and individuals in negative ways. The current heavy focus on the economic model has caused problems in education and society. A radical shift from economic goals to humanistic goals should be sought to preserve the humanistic purpose of the university.

Facing the reality that economic growth has occupied a more important position than ever and under the circumstance that the incentive of maximizing utility in higher education has been significantly stimulated, the economic model that promises immediate benefits is seen to be more advantageous than the humanistic model that promises long-term values. Humanistic goals are supposed to be primary reasons for higher education, yet economic goals are justified insofar as they support and advance social development through economic growth. Therefore, nullifying one or another of the two models is not a possible solution to the urgent situation in higher education. A notion of synthesizing the humanistic model and the economic model in an effective way is more constructive and realistic to reweigh the two sets of goals and adjust both in practice. Virtues and characteristics, which the economic model may foster, such as being practical, resilience in pursuing employment, and a sense of how the economy influences personal life, are also necessary for a flourishing life of humanistic pursuits. As one example among many, these economic characteristics shape a common sense for individuals to secure material needs for themselves and their families, plan finances well to sustain their humanistic ideals and support their flourishing personal life. Most of us have to respond to the reality that long periods of a philosophical leisure are no longer possible. This is the notion that Nussbaum draws upon in saying "the national interest of any modern democracy requires a strong economy and a flourishing business culture" (2012, p.10).

Utilitarianism has captured higher education through the dominance of economic aims and the eclipse of humanistic aims in universities. Both aims are supposed to work together for civilization and a flourishing life with material abundance as the support. This ideal fades away when material prosperity is overemphasized and humanistic aims are ignored. When higher education focuses on serving economic goals and the disciplines of science and technology, the Humanities and the Social Sciences cannot gear up in a constructive way to sustain a higher education that can build a strong connection between education and society. Higher education has been drained by focusing on serving material needs while not influencing society with its humanistic values. Together with other factors, education can shape and change a society. In other words, education is not neutral but social and political. George S. Counts strongly

advocates that education should carry out its power to influence society, public life, and political life. He states that “the men and women who have affected the course of human events are those who have not hesitated to use the power that has come to them” (1932, p. 47). On the contrary, contemporary higher education is being heavily influenced and shaped by economic demands; the utilitarian drive is shaping attitudes, ideals, and behaviors of individuals and societies. Higher education and society have tilted enormously towards economic aims, they both have been advocating and training students to devote themselves to boundless wealth growth but ignore flourishing social and personal life.

Chapter Four: Universities as Humanistic Institutions for A Democratic Society

Introduction

In an age during which economic values have eclipsed humanistic educational concerns, what are the prospects for revitalizing humanistic education in the contemporary university? In this chapter, I argue that these prospects can be located in a conception of the university as a means of strengthening democratic values. My approach in this chapter is selective and impressionistic rather than systematic and comprehensive. I do not aim to provide a complete theory of the university as a humanistic and democratic institution, as this would go beyond the scope of my topic. Instead, I divide the key elements of a humanistic education into eight different categories. My aim is to identify these eight categories of elements that an attractive and compelling conception of humanistic higher education should include. Together, these elements provide a framework of humanistic education that is well suited to Twenty-first century circumstances. In order to capture the spirit of these conditions, I refer to these eight elements as components of a post-national humanistic conception of higher education. In addition to describing these elements, I also explain how they might counteract the excesses of the economic model in higher education. In short, in this chapter, I intend to outline a more positive, alternative role for humanistic values in contemporary higher education.

The academic forum "What is Education For" that I discussed in previous chapters renders this positive view. Numerous scholars discussed and endorsed a system of higher education that could produce wise, well-informed individuals. These individuals are "good citizens"—in the sense of the purpose of Greek education, whose capacities for rational, collective deliberation and whose concern for both individual rights and the common good enables them to "steer" social decision-making, much as a well-trained crew might collaborate to steer a boat. The kind of education envisioned in this forum is one that equips citizens with strong humanistic understanding, shapes a broad, pluralistic political awareness, and enables architectonic skills that are crucial for a humane and democratic world. According to this view, the university is most fundamentally a humanistic institution whose central mission is to foster citizens with acute awareness and sturdy capabilities to strengthen and protect democratic societies. Citizens equipped with a humanistic education and influenced by a humanistic social atmosphere will have a mature mindset and high consciousness about securing collective safety, dignity, well-being, and happiness. Citizens who acquire these capabilities have a strong

awareness of inadequate politicians and extreme powers. Such citizens are motivated to pursue democracy, and they are sensitive to the accountability of democracy. Furthermore, I suggest, a humanistic view of higher education, such as that envisioned in the Boston Review forum, provides a potential antidote to market excesses and threats described in the preceding chapters of this thesis. In what follows, I outline eight features that such an education should include.

Eight Elements of A Humanistic Conception of Higher Education

1 Cultivation of courage.

First, a revitalization of humanistic education should combine a concern for promoting knowledge with the active cultivation of a courageous disposition. Great courage is imperative for exploring the world, expanding the understanding of humanity, conquering fear of the unknown, and standing up to extreme power. Both knowledge and courage, in this sense, are required for individuals to take transformative action in their personal lives and to contribute to transformative collective movements.

An education grounded in humanism serves as the flintstone that kindles the human desire and strength needed to push away the arrogance of economic power. Universities can and should be centers for facilitating not merely "economic imperatives" but for enabling individuals to participate effectively and independently in shaping their social lives. While some individuals will inevitably seek a flourishing life through their desired occupations, others may locate their flourishing primarily in non-occupational related activities, viewing paid labor as of secondary and instrumental importance to their other aims. A university education ought to teach students that different alternatives are both possible and worthwhile, and are not only confined to those that serve the demands of economic growth and competitiveness. However, it may be insufficient simply to teach an awareness of such alternatives. To enable young people to incorporate this awareness into their practical decision-making, both knowledge and a sense of moral and intellectual courage are essential qualities that a humanistic conception of university education is able to instill.

2 Defense of democracy and democratic values.

The second trait a humanistic university education should promote is a disposition to care for and defend democratic values on a global scale, not just within one's nation of citizenship. Will Kymlicka refers to this disposition as "intercultural citizenship," which instills high levels of intercultural skills and knowledge. We should encourage both the ability and desire of

interacting with members of other groups, being curiosity about the larger world, and learning about the habits and beliefs of other peoples. Unfortunately, in some instances of education for intercultural citizenship, the main focus is less on inculcating the political principles that support the multicultural state and more on inculcating the personal skills that support positive intercultural exchanges (2003, p. 57). Put another way, education which purports to teach global citizenship is often concerned with how individual students can benefit from cultural contacts, not the inherent value of those contacts themselves.

The idea of intercultural citizenship emphasizes the value of educational activities that go beyond the transmission of knowledge and practical skills to focus on facilitating intercultural communication among citizens from diverse backgrounds. Such communication supports inclusive participation in social life and strengthens a sense of shared membership in a political community. Universities, as institutions largely responsible for transmitting humanistic values, have historically, played a key role in reproducing the values of civilization and democracy in many societies. The idea of education for intercultural citizenship, however, goes beyond the idea of fostering parochial, nation-based conceptions of democracy. Instead, the focus extends beyond the cultural, economic, and social boundaries of a particular nation-state. As Kymlicka says:

> There is a much higher level of interdependence today between members of different groups. No group is truly "self-sufficient" anymore. No group is truly "institutionally complete." Even the most sizeable group, with the most extensive rights of self-government, is not self-contained, but is integrated into larger transnational economic and political structures, and subject to international forces relating to the economy, or the environment, or security. As a result, everyone needs to be able to deal with people from outside their own group, and hence must learn how to deal with diversity (2003, p. 57).

This goal of promoting intercultural citizenship contrasts sharply with the rhetoric of economic globalization often invoked by contemporary leaders in higher education. Far from serving imperatives of human capital or economic neoliberalism (Harvey), the ideal of global intercultural citizenship provides a bulwark against the unrestrained demands of global capitalism. When humanistic goals in higher education are overshadowed by economic goals, the function of a university is tantamount to vocational training; as a direct consequence, the strength of education that supports citizens in building a democratic society is drained by the drive to

create total wealth. At this point, higher education has shifted its focus from building and renewing civilization to creating wealth. Political philosopher Christopher Bertram states that "we do not need for all citizens to be educated in the Humanities in order to play their part, but we do need the Humanities to contribute to public debate and discussion in order to make all citizens aware of the full range of values and considerations bearing on public issues" (2015, p.47). The conception of higher education I affirm in this chapter embraces his view, but also extends its application beyond the democratic preparation of future citizens. An education for intercultural citizenship, instead, embraces Nussbaum's call for a university dedicated to "cultivating humanity," not just one devoted to "cultivating citizenry" (Nussbaum, 1998).

3 The university as a democratic institution: extending the ideas of John Dewey.

The two elements and goals of humanistic higher education outlined above—an education for "courageous knowing" and for "intercultural citizenship"—are broadly consistent with historically prominent conceptions of democratic education, even though they suggest a way of expanding and extending these traditional notions to suit the unique circumstances of the twenty-first century. The third aspect of a post-national conception of higher education, then, is one that incorporates a transnational understanding of democracy and democratic community. John Dewey's conception of democratic education serves to extend the goals of democratic higher education, though as I shall argue it must go beyond Dewey's conception.

It is widely recognized that education plays an essential part in building democracy. John Dewey famously devoted his life to researching and defending the correlations between education and democracy. In a widely quoted passage from his major work *Democracy and Education*, Dewey writes that "democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (1916, p. 87). Dewey theorized democracy as a process of social development and a challenge for existing liberal democratic systems. He delineates democracy as having three components: protection of common interests, democracy as social inquiry, and democracy as the expression of individuality (Dewey, 1916). Dewey also connected education and democracy by explaining the values and goals of education. He states that the purpose of education is to enable people to become individuals with their own sense of values and beliefs, through training, teaching, and experiences inside and outside of school. In his view, communication should be an essential extension of education in which people can express, share, and debate their ideas and positions (Dewey, 1927). Such

communication is to create a democratic community. Education plays an essential role in building a democratic community by helping individuals with their "self-discovery" and "individual maturity" (Dewey, 1916). Proper education initiates the process of creating a democratic social life that Dewey advocates: democracy as a form of social life rather than a form of political governance. Deweyan democracy states that the ultimate goal of education is to convert a "great society" into a "great community" that is able to facilitate a higher level of democracy (Dewey, 1916, 1927).

According to Dewey, democratic social life has two necessities. One is a social platform that enables a free and open communication in public; this platform is built by people's desire to communicate and the tolerance of the state. The other is the management capabilities of people—individual maturity and political consciousness, which stem from the practice of public participation in governance. A responsible and democratic society should provide opportunities to foster these qualities in the public sphere. Otherwise, society gives people "no opportunity to reflect and decide upon what is good for them," which is a subtle form of suppression and exclusion from participation (Dewey, 1937, pp. 457-67). On the other hand, people who initiate autonomous organizations and come together to discuss, debate, and manage public issues in non-governmental organizations will need high levels of maturity and strong social management skills. Otherwise, these organizations are more likely to practice a democracy without accountability. According to Dewey, a democratic government in its behavior should provide an open social platform and opportunities for individuals to engage in social matters (1927).

Dewey's ideas about democratic societies—and the individuals needed to participate in them— are precisely aligned with the core values of humanistic higher education. He claims that an adequate education should equip individuals with necessary knowledge and skills, improve their maturity, and foster their capabilities for social and political participation (1916). This view echoes Haskins's view that education is about "bâtie en hommes"—building of men (2002). Building up men through humanistic education is essential in establishing and sustaining a democratic social life. Some may argue that people can vote in liberal democratic societies; thus, these governments are institutionalized and ruled by people through their voting rights. However, voting itself cannot sufficiently represent democracy. First, it should not be the only channel to sustain democracy—there must be many other channels in society to practice democracy; second, citizens without the traits, such as independent and critical thinking skills, are not able to

adequately practice their voting rights. Therefore, the cultivation of capabilities and traits to practice democracy by humanistic education is crucial for practicing and sustaining democracy.

Nevertheless, I suggest that a conception of a globalized, transnational conception of higher education—one based on Nussbaum's ideal of "cultivating humanity" and Kymlicka's conception of "intercultural citizenship"—may need to go beyond even Dewey's conception of democratic education. Dewey's conception of democracy envisioned an education in the service of individual growth (Feinberg 2016, p. 68). Although individual growth, for Dewey, is inseparable from communal relations and interactions, the kind of community Dewey envisioned was nevertheless somewhat limited. As Feinberg notes, growth for Dewey was grounded in an idea of community as a community of "shared interests" (p. 29). But when the idea of an educational community is expanded to take into account human relationships that cross national boundaries, the assumption of shared interests is problematic. The political theorist Williams (2003) proposes an alternative conception of community—one based on the idea of "shared fate"—which seems better suited to globalized humanistic institutions of higher education. A community of "shared fate" does not presuppose that members share common interests or goals, but only that their "fates" are linked. In this sense, global economic elites share a fate with even the most severely disadvantaged individuals, whether that fate is caused by climate change or global economic conditions. The importance of this idea of community as a community of shared fate is that it provides a basis for theorizing democratic education as the process of realizing and enhancing "communicative relations" (Feinberg, 2016, pp. 71-72), and it provides the basis for a global and intercultural conception of higher education.

The conception of higher education for a post-national conception of intercultural citizenship outlined above is not a neutral training agent that only delivers objective knowledge and skills. Rather, it is a social agent designed to train people in skills, as well as influence the course of social and political development. According to Dewey (1916), this conception of higher education closely correlates with social and political life; it is shaped by social and political movements, yet at the same time is shaping societies and politics. Furthermore, it understands that contemporary patterns of social and political life need to account for increasingly permeable national and cultural boundaries.

4 The conscious and reflective relationship between higher education and power.

There is a further element to this post-national conception of higher education that I

would like to amplify: its conscious and reflective relationship to power. This is the fourth element of a humanistic conception of higher education I turn to. This conception of higher education I envision is embedded in political power and, at the same time, has an impact on politics. Apple (2008) indicates that everything about education is political. He explains that it is the dominant groups within a society that direct and decide educational policies. Scholars consistently call on educational institutions to genuinely deliver and continue the values of human civilization, bridge the gap between schools and society, and influence the public and build a new social order. Unfortunately, the reality is that, higher education has receded from humanistic aims by prioritizing economic development, has overshadowed the connection between education and democracy by creating social conditions that discourage democracy, and has raised individuals who are apathetic or unable to participate in social management.

The education needed for a democratic society is an education that not only trains efficient workers, but one that cultivates minds to think and question current political policies and social structures that have been constituted by authorities. Mirabeau B. Lamar, the second president of the Republic of Texas, said, "The cultivated mind is the guardian genius of democracy" (Alexander, 1929, p. 2). Higher education, along with many other social sectors, should create a critical public culture by endowing individuals with critical thinking skills and elevating incentives for participating in constructing the society. Democracy needs such an education and social influence to raise mature individuals who can examine and question the course of social and political movements, not just follow, obey, and reproduce the social system. Such an education enables people to evaluate the conflicts between state and civic demands and make choices and changes when necessary. In a democratic society, if the public demands a social structure with a more egalitarian distribution of wealth, people should have the social and economic means to influence political policies in this direction. Enabling these means is a crucial task of higher education because, without this task accomplished, higher education can be manipulated by ruling powers. if the public lacks critical consciousness to discern the purposes and examine the educational operations. the fundamental components, such as the Humanities and Liberal Arts, of a humanistic education can be thought of as ways of promoting marginalization, patriarchy, and racism.

5 Higher education's role in combatting social and economic inequality.

The fifth dimension of humanistic higher education for a post-national world concerns the role of universities in combatting social and economic inequality. In a democratic society, if the public demands a social structure with a more egalitarian distribution, people should have the means to influence political policies on social resource allocation. Enabling students to articulate such demands and enabling them to seek effective, legal, and peaceful means for pressing their demands to influence public policy and legislation is a crucial task of higher education. Unless higher education prioritizes this goal of empowering citizens to resist economic and social inequality, students who graduate from universities will likely be manipulated by ruling powers.

Humanistic higher education enables students to resist and counteract social forces of economic inequality and provides access to leadership positions in society or a means of influencing those in positions of leadership. I would note here that the knowledge and skills needed for citizens to resist to economic inequality includes contents of both the humanistic and market models in higher education. In addition, ethical and interpersonal aspects are also indispensable for citizens who offer effective input on social and economic issues. Relevant questions here are not merely about the most effective ways of maximizing economic gain, but of ensuring that these gains are distributed in egalitarian ways, that they do not involve either terrible environmental impacts nor harmful consequences for vulnerable communities.

Humanistic higher education is essential for social and economic equality because it contributes to motivating and developing students' social management and political participation. People who are aware of social and economic matters and are motivated to intervene are likely to influence the social-political paradigm and impact rules that are critical in determining economic and social life. Contemporary higher education that suppresses humanistic goals in favor of economic values exacerbates social and economic inequalities. People who lack social-political awareness tend to ignore social matters but focus on economic and practical aims. For example, in most situations, a political science teacher might care more about social and political changes more than a brain surgeon who might care more about skills and technology for brain operations.

Within the current higher educational system, economic and humanistic principles promote distinctly different aims that contradict each other. Promoting economic aims and ostracizing humanistic aims reduce people's access to humanistic education and further weaken

them in pursuing a higher level of social-political participation. As the preceding discussion shows, a lack of humanistic education will contribute to a social order in which most citizens are condemned to obey the rules and policies that are uninformed by egalitarian values. Cliver Harber (2004) thinks that this phenomenon not only creates conflicts with school disciplines and competition between academic institutions and economic needs, but also, much more severely, introduces a symbolic violence that is maintained by the ruling powers. Bourdieu (1979) defines symbolic violence this way: people in a certain society tend to follow certain rules that are produced by known and recognized influences; the rules are so widely implemented and sufficiently repeated that they become "norms" that people are obliged to follow. The "norms" of depressing the value of humanistic education and promoting economic aims in higher education, in this scenario, shape a symbolic violence in education. Such a symbolic violence deprives students of opportunities and resources to receive and appreciate the knowledge and value imparted by humanistic education. It also hinders their opportunities to participate in making decisions in economic and social matters.

Rampant "norms" of such a symbolic violence suppress the values of humanistic education in universities. Such a suppression is shown in forms of closing Humanities disciplines and faculties, cutting funding to these disciplines, and more devastatingly, more and more students do not choose humanistic majors. Such a circumstance creates a lack of knowledge and resources that reveals the political and social value of higher education. Consequently, students' values are measured by their qualities of meeting the demands of the job market and their performance in profit-making. After all, the reason for them to receive an education is to produce social wealth. With fewer citizens who are socially aware and highly motivated in participating and influencing social-political issues, those who are in the positions of making decisions are less challenged in their leadership and accountability. As such, it is unlikely to expand this group in a way that is inclusive, diverse, and representative of the broader social makeup of society. This cycle of humanistic education promoting socio-political involvement and producing socially aware citizens is thus challenged, which results in a weakening of social democracy.

6 The university as an instrument of political engagement and participation.

The sixth feature of humanistic education lies in the university's role of stimulating political engagement and participation. When most students lack a strong awareness of the significance of humanistic education and lose the incentive to acquire resources and qualities for

social-political participation, their chances to be involved in decision-making in society are very slim. As discussed, this inevitably creates economic and social inequalities. This also creates a pessimistic impact on social democracy because a lack of humanistic education sets barriers to political engagement and participation.

Contemporary higher education occupied by consumerism and commercialism has become an engine to produce efficient workers who are, according to Harber, "conformist, passive, and politically docile"; but it has not produced citizens who have "critical consciousness, individual liberation, and [are] participatory" (Harber, 2004, p. 59). Harber's point of view is grounded in theories of social democracy and social equality, which are closely correlated and reinforced. Allen draws on the work of Dani Rodrik to point out that economic inequalities do not result from market rules or rapid global economic development. Rather, "[economic inequalities] are products of policy choices, which are themselves the outcome of politics" (Rodrik, as cited in Allen, 2016). In line with the same idea, Carola Binder and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2015) argue that economic inequality "has been a choice." It has been generated by the following decisions: letting the state promote economic aims in higher education; allowing universities to facilitate economic aims; and having the public submit to a higher education system with an economic focus. Therefore, people have "chosen" inequality by depending on economic dominance for social and personal prosperity. When the public is lethargic in questioning the current political system, it is unable to become involved in social management and discover the root of social inequalities and unfair distribution. In this case, the chance to develop a social system to build and exercise democracy sufficiently is very slim. In such a circumstance, democracy occurs from the top to the bottom without a counter movement from the bottom up; democracy is then restricted to voting, which I analyzed earlier, and is not sufficient for exercising democracy or building a democratic social life.

Universities that focus on economic outcomes and profits have long forgotten their intrinsic functions of building and cultivating an individual and have barely recognized the individual values of students and scarcely provided humanistic training. Economic dominance and humanistic decline have shaped a higher education to serve dominant groups. When people blame the government for unemployment, the government distracts most people from discovering the fundamental reasons such as political corruption and unequal resource-distribution, but turns public attention to secondary causes such as the global economic

environment. Apple clearly articulates that the real causes of social problems are "economic, cultural, and social policies and effects of the dominant group [that transfers the blame] to the school and other public agencies" (Apple, 1995). He proclaims that the existing political structure and resource-distribution system sustain the power of the dominant groups and cause many social problems.

Universities are educational institutions not only to deliver knowledge, skills, degrees, but also build a humanistic ground to sustain a democratic social life. In other words, higher education is not just a qualification but a channel to enable and empower people to move beyond the existing political structure and social order. Higher education is supposed to be a place for gathering, equipping, mobilizing, and driving individuals to build a social order and world structure with collective efforts. However, a higher education that facilitates democracy will not be possible considering the current economic dominance within universities. Currently, universities are agents for producing power systems, promoting unfair distribution, and marginalizing the majority from participating in and influencing politics along with these privileged groups. It is crucial to build a higher education structure under which both humanistic disciplines and economic subjects will serve democratic social life and social development. A democratic social life needs a higher education that revitalizes the humanistic model to cultivate independent and critical minds to participate in social matters and politics.

7 The university as an institution that is democratically accountable.

The seventh element of a humanistic education that contributes to a democratic society is about accountability. Higher education that takes a humanistic approach to education is crucial to building a democratic society and a just social system because educated, mature, and well-informed individuals engaging in public affairs help ensure that democracy is not utilized by privileged social groups to serve their purposes. Generally, democracy is built either from top to bottom, such as a liberal democratic government, or from bottom to top, such as self-governance. These two modes of building democracy are not mutually exclusive; they supplement, complement, and realize each other. Democratic institutions must create democratic conditions and generate democratic results —and their performance has to be responsible for this aim—that is democratic accountability. Accountability of both official and nonofficial organizations that practice social democracy is crucial to upholding democracy. Without being held accountable for

organizational performance, it is very likely that either liberal governments or autonomous organizations will fall short of their proclaimed responsibilities.

In modern times, the liberal government is the main channel for social democracy; however, it often fails to adequately fulfill this role when it is not held accountable for its public performance. Government accountability is widely studied and discussed by many scholars such as Craig T. Borowiak (2011), Forrest D. Mathew (1999), and James S. Fishkin (1997). While scholars examine the accountability of governments from different angels, they generally reach a similar conclusion: government alone is not sufficient to ensure democracy. Borowiak maintains the view that promoting public challenges and encouraging social divergence are essential to holding a government accountable. He argues that "institutional order or the authority of a formally constituted demos" are the "aspirations of self-governance and principles of freedom and equality" crucial to democratic accountability (p. 151). A society that generates self-governance and contains different ideals and aspirations is one that likely to produce democracy with accountability. Most of the time, people want to rely on elected representatives to speak for them and stand for their benefits. Unfortunately, the reality is often that these representatives stay in office for long periods and no longer interact with people, which Mathews refers to as the phenomenon of "citizens without representative," and as a result, ordinary people are "forced out of politics" (p. 74; p. 20; p. 42). Fishkin asks, "Who speaks for the people" when the elected "people's representatives" are distracted by their busy political agendas and restricted from fully standing for the benefits of people (p. 17-20). He enunciates that political representatives do not genuinely and sufficiently represent the will of the people who elected them. Governmental actions are not sufficient to sustain democracy; therefore, the public should oversee and challenge governmental actions (Fishkin, 1997).

Given that governmental action does not necessarily secure democracy because it is not consistently accountable, another channel of sustaining democracy is to be sought—the one from bottom to top. Grassroots organization is one method that seeks to realize this version of democracy. People who are aware of the dominant powers and do not let institutional power define their thoughts, rights, identities, and actions, come together to defend their social ideas through grassroots movements. In modern history, the grassroots movement (e.g., the African-American Civil Rights Movement) is one of the most significant channels for people to realize their political opinions and social ideals. Grassroots organizations appear to improve democracy

when the government is short of accountability. At the same time, accountability is also exceptionally important for grassroots organizations themselves. When they perform poorly and cannot be held accountable, they fail to enact positive change in the world, potentially creating social chaos and inequality. My case study of a co-op housing grassroots organization illustrates the necessity of adequately practicing democracy with accountability.

In Quebec, there are many co-op housing organizations that offer low-rent housing to low-income people. My study focuses on Milton-Park Community (MPC) co-op housing in downtown Montreal. I visited and talked with some board members and attended a board meeting. MPC manages 146 residential buildings and two commercial buildings, comprised of 616 housing units and 22 commercial spaces. These buildings are not under the management of Montreal's municipal offices or rental board. Co-owners who are part of the management team comprise a "General Assembly," which deals with management issues and is considered the "highest authority" for this autonomous housing organization. Granting the General Assembly such an authority has led to two significant problems that jeopardize democracy. The first problem concerns financial corruption, and the second concerns abuse of power.

Financial corruption occurs when many co-op members, including the leaders, profit from their low-rent residences by re-renting their apartments at market price to non-members who are unaware that these apartments are intended for low-income groups. For example, in 2012, some members paid around $300 for a two-floor apartment while the market price for that apartment was around $1200. Some co-op members maintained low-rent housing even though they acquired additional housing resources. They were able to do so because the membership regulation had not been updated for decades. That is, because there was no time limit or termination terms on MPC memberships, co-op members were able to take advantage of the membership regulation and keep the low-rent housing. Once applicants were given a membership, they became permanent co-owners even if their financial and personal situations changed. This is a typical situation where "democracy" without accountability creates social inequality and unfairness that impose devastating impact on society. This situation leaves those who are truly in need little opportunity to share the housing resource; in addition, profiting from low-income status rather than honest work discourages social morality. As an autonomous organization building democracy from bottom to top, MPC was initiated to help those in need and improve social fairness; however, its poor management has contributed to social inequality.

By maintaining out-of-date regulations, leaders have tolerated the self-benefiting behaviors of co-op members. Under such circumstances, corruption is unavoidable due to a lack of internal moral control and external intervention, which leads to the second problem: the abuse of power.

The second problem of granting the General Assembly 'highest authority' concerns the abuse of power. The General Assembly is entitled to circumvent any external intervention because of such power. Without external intervention, the MPC will not be held accountable for the performance of its management. This is problematic because a lack of management accountability leaves the tenants vulnerable. When members profit from re-renting their low-rent housing, those they rent to are at a disadvantage because their contracts are not legally binding. They are not legally protected in the event of conflicts with – or mischief by— MPC members. When moral control loses its function and impartial and external intervention is absent, an abuse of power is inevitable. In this case, this grassroots organization that once fought for democracy and autonomy failed in its mission, and was no longer democratically accountable to its residents and community. This is a negative example of a grassroots movement with poor leadership that lacks accountability.

The lessons from the Milton-Park case are applicable to the problems of leadership and accountability in universities. The Milton-Park case demonstrates that accountability within democracies requires moral, vigorous, and wise leadership. It also indicates that accountable leadership must assume responsibility for the organization's performance and respect the principles of democracy. The university is an educational institution that has a powerful influence on social democracy; one of its fundamental social responsibilities is to prepare people for social and political participation, and to build a democratic social life. As such, the leaders of universities should be held accountable for university performance to facilitate democracy.

As discussed throughout the thesis, the type of higher education that builds democracy is humanistic model not market model education. However, the reality is that contemporary higher education prioritizes the aims of market model over aims of humanistic model. Market model education cannot bring up leaders with sufficient humanistic morals and values. When higher education leaders permit educational values to be subordinate to market and political powers, they are less accountable to humanistic concerns and more interested in economic concerns. Hence, these leaders cannot lead higher education to fulfill its social responsibilities. To return to the case of MPC, just as the leaders sacrificed their mission and morality to self-interest and

financial benefits, many higher education leaders have been tempted or forced to sacrifice humanistic concerns when market, economy, and power assumed priority. Therefore, bringing up humanistic leaders who are accountable and responsible is one of the many duties of higher education. Humanistic education is crucial to the democratic accountability of political and social movements. To avoid following a similar path as MPC, I argue, the leaders of contemporary higher education should prioritize humanistic model and make university democratically accountable for its educational performance and social influence.

8 Market model leadership and humanistic model leadership.

So far in this chapter, I have identified seven elements of humanistic education for a post-national world. Each of the elements challenges market values in higher education from different angles. The eighth and the final element concerns leadership. I recognize two types of leadership in contemporary higher education: market model leadership and humanistic model leadership. Humanistic model leadership encompasses the previous seven principles. This leadership is a principle of mobilizing economic values for humane purposes. However, it is market leadership that largely characterizes contemporary higher education. In this section, I briefly illustrate the two types of leadership and argue that the humanistic model of leadership is superior.

The market leadership model embodies values of utilitarianism, economic competition, and efficiency. It attaches lucidly defined economic goals to administration and education, and it aims to achieve efficiency and profit. Such leadership considers individuals as human capital. It aims to maximize the utility of human capital in order to fulfill the market ends. Patricia Pitcher discovered that leadership based on utilitarian ends was neither accountable nor sustainable for an organization. In fact, this type of leadership itself is the problem of the organization (Pitcher, as cited in Morris, 2001). Pitcher's study is about the downfall of a corporation that started when this corporation placed technocrat-minded employees in leadership positions. These leaders applied principles of market leadership, put uncompromising technocrats in important positions, and established meticulous and methodical processes. By contrast, the artist-minded and craftsmen-minded employees primarily applied humanistic principles and pursue humanistic goals; I call them "humanists." They contributed to their organization with their knowledge, visionary skills, and people skills. These two distinct types of employees came into conflict, which led the technocratic leaders to ostracize the "humanists" workers.

The dominance of the technocrats and their utilitarian goals led to the eventual breakdown of this organization. Pitcher's study reveals a crucial point: organizations composed of human beings, even those with business and commercial savvy, cannot achieve sustainable development and long-term success without a humanistic spirit and performance. Morris refers to this study to prove that the market model of leadership cannot lead the university to achieve its aims and values. The market model of leadership combines utilitarian principles and technocratic practices and does not empathetically appreciate people as human beings in its organizational operation. Nussbaum claims that "a democracy filled with citizens who lack empathy will inevitably breed more types of marginalization and stigmatization, thus exacerbating rather than solving its problems" (2012, p. x). The university is an educational, humanistic, and democratic institution; market model leadership cannot guide and lead universities in achieving their aims and realizing their values.

In contrast to market model of leadership, the humanistic model of leadership highlights humanity, democracy, and storytelling. This leadership style embraces humanistic and democratic values and principles, appreciates the well-being of individuals, communities, and families, and aims to fulfill educational and social responsibilities. It acknowledges market goals, but it prioritizes humanistic aims over them. It embodies strong ethical principles in the pursuit of organizational goals. It aligns with Philip Woods' terminology of *democratic leadership* because democracy is the essential trait that the humanistic model of leadership possesses. According to Woods, democratic leadership "aims to create an environment in which people are encouraged and supported in aspiring to truth about the world, including the highest values [such as ethical rationality] ... for the common human good" (2005, p. xvi). The third important trait of humanistic model leadership is storytelling. According to Kouzes and Posner, storytelling is one of the seven essential attributes of good leadership (Morris 2001, as cited in Kouzes and Posne, 1999). It is a powerful way "to convey the values and ideals shared by a community" (p. 24). Howard Gardner asserts that effective leaders are often those "who succeed in making changes without coercion," and that they are often good storytellers (Morris 2001, as cited in Gardner, 1999). Good stories express empathy and care for humanity; they are often more persuasive than hard regulations because stories can touch hearts. Leaders of institutions often find storytelling more effective and efficient in demonstrating ideas, motivating people to achieve goals, and building team morale than enforcing regulations. Embodying humanity, democracy, and

storytelling, the humanistic model of leadership surpasses the market model in leading and operating higher education, given that the university is historically an educational and humanistic institution and not a business organization. Such leadership can guide higher education to facilitate holistic personal development and build a democratic and sustainable society.

Conclusion

All eight elements compose a humanistic conception of higher education, and contrast with the market model. Yet contemporary higher education falls short of the eight elements. As I have argued throughout this thesis, the ascendance of the market model in higher education marginalizes humanistic values. It does so by making economic values fundamental and primary, which preserve and maintain humanistic educational goals, aims, motivations, and standards only so far as they serve economic aims. In short, contemporary higher education can be characterized as one that is currently under the leadership of economic values. A humanistic conception of higher education would reverse this leadership. Instead of humanistic educational values being mobilized in the service of economic goals such as profit-making, growth, and competitiveness, employing a humanistic model of education would use a different set of values to limit and guide economic life and economic decision-making. In short, leadership in higher education should be clearly and firmly grounded in humanistic educational values, while market values should be relegated to a secondary and subordinate role.

I acknowledge that accountability and leadership attributes of the humanistic education conception. Higher education is critical to sustaining accountability for social democracy and humanistic and efficient leadership in higher education is urgently demanded to run the university. The democratic social life cannot be perverted into chaotic anarchy or be exploited for self-interest; the organizations that lack accountability cannot serve democratic social life. Leaders and members should be equipped to run these organizations ethical purposes and humanist care, aiming to achieve social justice and a fair social order. Therefore, an education embedded in humanistic principles is especially crucial, not only in fostering political consciousness and gaining participatory democracy but also shaping a democracy that is accountable and sustainable.

Education in general, and higher education in particular, is a social and political institution; as such, education design, curriculum design, and teaching are heavily influenced by political dynamics. An education system and its impact are not confined to school environments,

but extend to family and community, not to mention an individual's personal world and sense of self. Education and society are shaping each other, and this process intimately interacts with politics. Education is playing a vital role not only in building up individuals but also shaping society. To achieve this aim, contemporary universities should shift the focus from economic progress to humanistic advancement. The eight elements of humanistic conception of higher education are the essential components of the humanistic conception of higher education, which are either completely disregarded or not sufficiently implemented in the contemporary higher education. Only when universities situate themselves as humanistic intuitions in society, can higher education foster democratic mindsets and holistic social insights, and can the academic and social activities form a strong force to forge education and democracy.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have highlighted and elaborated on two models of higher education—the humanistic model and the market model—as a theoretical framework for understanding, analyzing, and evaluating certain problematic features of contemporary higher education. The market model is overwhelmingly prioritized in higher education, and the humanistic model is ignored or even supplanted. In this thesis, I tried to discover complex reasons and causes for the triumph of utility over humanism and have expounded the historical background, philosophical foundation, theoretical evidence, social causes, and value orientations for this triumph.

In Chapter One, I used this theoretical framework of the humanistic and the market models to review historical accounts of higher education and the emergence of the modern university. I then discussed how this framework is exemplified in scholarly critiques of the contemporary university. My central claim in this discussion was that a comparison of historical and contemporary accounts reveals a significant reversal of educational values and priorities. Whereas ancient conceptions of higher education and early iterations of the modern university prioritized humanistic educational considerations over economic ones, contemporary universities have reversed this set of priorities. Specifically, I explained how these shifts occurred across two different sets of educational goals, values, and principles, and how these shifts were illustrated by corresponding radical changes in educational practice and administrative operation in higher education.

In Chapter Two, I focused primarily on the task of clarifying the philosophical and normative foundations of the humanistic and market models of education. My purpose in this chapter was to show that not only do the two models differ in their relative values, they also represent two conflicting sets of educational priorities. As such, I showed that the strong emphasis on one set of values—market values—in education threatens to marginalize or overshadow values that are central to humanistic education.

In Chapter Three, I extended and elaborated the argument of Chapter Two, identifying four key threats that the market model poses to higher education: to humanistic educational values, to academic mentorship and friendship, to curriculum, and to academic freedom. And I showed that these elements accompanied an over-emphasis on commercialism and marketization.

Finally, in Chapter Four, I outlined eight elements of humanistic education in a post-national humanistic conception of higher education. These elements were preliminary proposals for revitalizing humanistic education in the contemporary university. They were also, admittedly, tentative alternatives to renew the university's role as a democratic institution to contribute to building and sustaining social democracy.

Throughout this thesis, the core argument has been that the market model is overwhelmingly and wrongly prioritized in contemporary higher education, to the extent that the humanistic model is now largely supplanted, or at least relegated to a minor supporting role. Marketization now dominates higher education without efficient resistance from administration and faculty. Educational activities fall into commercial principles. Education has become a commodity, students become consumers to purchase educational products and services, and educators become producers who provide these services. The value of utility has surpassed the value of humanism in higher education. Utilitarianism motivates the university and society to take students as human capital and maximize the utility of this capital. In short, I have argued that universities are now largely instruments of economic utility—or, put more dramatically, utilitarianism has captured the university.

Nevertheless, in a more hopeful spirit, I have also tried to suggest that the current antagonism between economic and humanistic conceptions of higher education is not irreversible, and that a more hospitable coexistence may be possible. In Chapter One, I show that, as a matter of fact, there have been periods historically where market and humanistic values have functioned in a mutually supportive way, especially when higher education was taken primarily to involve humanistic training and cultivation. Following Nussbaum (2012), my own proposals in Chapter Four calls for scholars and educational leaders first to acknowledge the problems associated with the current embracing of market ends, profit-seeking, and cynical disregard of social responsibilities in humanism and democracy. With Nussbaum, I also argue that "the economic interest, too, requires us to draw on the Humanities and arts" because "a flourishing economy requires the same skills that support citizenship" (p. 10). The skills and characters that the humanistic model fosters, such as imagination, creativity, and critical thinking, are crucial for economic growth and national prosperity. Humanities cultivate "minds that are flexible, open, and creative for innovation in business" (p. 112). Economic growth and humanistic prosperity both require strong personalities, resilience, perseverance, creativity, free

thinking, and critical engagement. The two sets of goals organically combined are most likely to equip individuals who can embrace the values and contributions of different disciplines.

A healthy and balanced humanistic lifestyle and holistic perspectives are indispensable attributes to enable people to lead flourishing personal and social lives. I consider recognition of the supplementary interactions between the two models essential for sustainable social and personal development. Nevertheless, only if this recognition works with greater weight to humanistic aims and aspects of education and social life, can the two models sit side by side in the long run. As mentioned multiple times in this thesis, economic aims are to provide material support for humanistic purposes, and material achievements are a side-product of accomplishment from humanistic activities. Therefore, economic growth is not supposed to be achieved at the cost of humanistic values. If ever conflicts emerge between the two sets of aims, humanistic education and action should always be above economic aims. This assertion is not merely at a defense of the original purposes of higher education but also for a long-term sustainable development of human societies. This thesis advocated and argued that it is necessary and possible to facilitate a positive collaboration between the two models. The possible solution is to reposition the two sets of goals with different weights. Humanistic aims and values should be the primary ends of higher education, market principles and economic aims should be the supplementary and supporting ends and resources.

This thesis also explored the classic arguments of education and democracy. Higher education is far beyond teaching and learning; it has wider values and functions because it carries social responsibilities. The university is not merely a humanistic institution but, more significantly, is a humanistic institution for social democracy, equality, and justice. This old idea should still be valid in the present. The more educated citizens are, the more robust social democracy is. To this end, higher education must turn its emphasis from economic goals to humanistic aims to foster citizens who can protect and uphold democratic society. In order to recapture the university from utilitarianism, we must first recognize that only an education situated in humanistic care can foster the traits and virtues that a democratic society requires.

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