

The Study of International Crisis:

A Theoretical Assessment and

Application to Berlin 1961.

by

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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS: THEORY  
AND APPLICATION TO BERLIN 61

Abstract:

In recent years a growing scholarly debate has arisen in reference to the study of international crisis. The importance of this debate can be said to extend beyond academic circles to the actual problems of crisis behavior: an explanation of such behavior being a necessary prerequisite to crisis management.

This thesis proposes to examine the crisis debate. The point of focus is the decision-making approach to foreign policy behavior, by far the most important in number of contributors to the study of crisis. Three basic research goals provide direction to the thesis: (1) to define the decision-making approach through a theoretical comparison with the other principal approach to foreign policy behavior in general and crisis behavior in particular, the systemic approach; (2) to define the decision-making approach by means of an empirical application of that approach to the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961; (3) to determine the mechanics of a possible synthesis of the decision-making and systemic approaches.

### Résumé:

Récemment un débat académique s'est développé autour de l'étude de la crise internationale. L'importance de cet débat s'étend au-delà du monde académique. Le problème réel du contrôle des crises exige une explication de cet phénomène.

Cette thèse examinera le débat académique. Le centre d'intérêt sera la 'decision-making approach', l'approche qui contribue le plus à l'étude de la crise internationale. Trois objectifs principaux orientent l'examination: (1) définir la 'decision-making approach' à travers une comparaison théorique avec l'approche systémique; (2) définir la 'decision-making approach' par une application empirique à la crise du Berlin de 1961; (3) évaluer la possibilité d'une synthèse des deux approches.

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(1)

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I am particularly indebted to Professor Michael Brecher not only for his patient reading of this thesis, but especially for his unbounded enthusiasm. I must also mention the many helpful discussions with fellow students in Political Science 678A and 778B.

Dedication:

This thesis is dedicated to S.K. and F.K.

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## INTRODUCTION:

In way of introduction, the study of international crisis may be considered in reference to two problem levels, the practical and the theoretical, a distinction which does not deny their interrelatedness.

At the practical level are the real dangers potential to a crisis situation. These dangers take on great significance when those involved are identified as high policy decision-makers.

"They assume extraordinary wide significance when the individuals are national leaders and the context is that of a contemporary international crisis: upon the ability of national leaders to cope with situations of intense stress may depend the lives of millions, if not the future of mankind."

The study of international crisis promises to provide an explanation of such crisis behavior; this explanation is a necessary prerequisite to crisis management.

At the theoretical level, one encounters a growing scholarly debate over the direction to be taken by the study of international crisis, a debate fuelled by the works of among others, Charles Hermann, Ole Holsti and Charles McClelland. It is noteworthy that to the present little real consensus has been achieved even in terms of concept definition, let alone with regard to the development of explanatory propositions.

"Policy makers , journalists, and academics all have undertaken descriptions and analyses of international crises. But one remarkable quality about most studies of crises has been their failure to provide cumulative knowledge about the class of events they investigate."<sup>2</sup>

This thesis proposes to examine the crisis debate. In so doing , the thesis will also speak to the problem of crisis management, as this examination should provide some indication of the level of explanation achieved in the study of international crisis. The point of focus is the decision-making approach , by far the most important in number of contributors to the study of crisis. Three basic research goals provide direction to the thesis: (1) to define the decision-making approach through a theoretical comparison with the other principal approach to foreign policy behavior in general and crisis behavior in particular , the systemic approach; (2) to define the decision-making approach by means of an empirical application of that approach to the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961; (3) to determine the mechanics of a possible synthesis of the decision-making and systemic approaches.

A theoretical comparison of the decision-making and systemic approaches will involve an investigation of basic theoretical components. In each case a similar set of questions is imposed. How is the

crisis phenomenon defined? What are the underlying assumptions and the key variables of the causal model? What kinds of research questions are asked? What methodological techniques are employed? The responses to these questions should provide findings sufficient to paint a basic theoretical outline.

The Brecher , Steinberg , Stein framework of foreign policy behavior<sup>3</sup>, and the Hermann definition of a perceived crisis situation<sup>4</sup> provide the basic guidelines for the empirical application of the decision-making approach: it will focus specifically upon United States foreign policy behavior during the Berlin Wall crisis. This decision-making study is divided into two parts, a case study analysis and the testing of hypotheses. The case study is broken down into four tasks: (1) a description of the foreign policy system; (2) the operationalization of Hermann's concept of a crisis situation; (3) an examination of the inputs to foreign policy decisions; (4) an analysis of the feedback process. The second part of the decision-making study includes the testing of approximately forty hypotheses all of which relate changes in either decision-makers' perceptions or the decision process to changes in perceived situation.

In his study of international crisis, "Modelling and Managing of International Conflict: The Berlin Crises",<sup>5</sup> Raymond Tanter contends that a synthesis of the decision-making and systemic approaches will

increase the explanatory capacity of research. While not questioning the desirability of such a synthesis of the two approaches, this thesis does question how synthesis is to be achieved. The question of how leads the discussion to consider James Rosenau's proposal of a pre-theory of foreign policy<sup>6</sup>, then to examine Raymond Tanter's synthesis of event/interaction and organization processes, and finally to explore the possibility of an alternative proposal.

FOOTNOTES - INTRODUCTION

- 1 Helsti, O.R., Crisis, Escalation, War.  
Montreal: McGill-Queens Univ. Press, 1972,  
p. 8
- 2 Hermann, Charles F., "Some Issues in the  
Study of International Crisis", in C.F.  
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- 3 Brecher, M., B. Steinberg, and Stein, J.,  
"A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy  
Behavior", Journal of Conflict Resolution,  
XIII, 1969, pp. 75-102.
- 4 Hermann, Charles F., "International Crisis  
as a Situational Variable," in James  
N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics  
and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York:  
Free Press, 1969, pp. 409-421
- 5 Tanter, Raymond, Modelling and Managing of  
International Conflict: The Berlin Crises.  
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974.
- 6 Rosenau, James, The Scientific Study of  
Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press, 1971.

## CHAPTER ONE

### THEORETICAL COMPARISON

#### (a) Systemic Approach:

As set forth in the introduction , the first of three basic research goals of this thesis is to define the decision-making approach through a theoretical comparison with the systemic approach to foreign policy behavior in general, and to crisis behavior in particular.

The systemic approach to foreign policy behavior, international system analysis , focuses upon unit-state interaction, that is , the interplay of action-response occurring between units in the international system. The structure of the international system is said to be defined by these patterns of unit interaction. Specifically , information as to the quantity , variety and direction of interaction flows is sought in order to achieve a detailed delineation of system structure. As such , a basic task of international system analysis, at the descriptive level , is the mapping of these interaction flows. Importantly , the structure of the international system is conceived to be transitional, a consequence of changes in interaction flows over time. Furthermore, at the level of explanation a basic assumption is that patterns of interaction at time (t) can be explained in reference to previous patterns of interaction at time (t-1). Similarly, patterns of interaction at time (t) predict to

subsequent patterns at time (t+1).

What are the descriptive and explanatory implications of this systemic approach for the study of crisis? These may be stated generally: (1) the systemic perspective identifies crisis as a particular set of interaction patterns; (2) it is hypothesised that crisis patterns tend to repeat themselves and consequently may be explained and predicted in reference to previous crisis patterns. The specification of these statements leads to discussions of analytical focus, concept definition and research questions.

The systemic approach can be said to impose a limiting focus upon the study of crisis. One aspect of this focus is the emphasis upon inter-unit processes. In his systemic study of international crisis, (1972b) "The Beginning, Duration and Abatement of International Crises: Comparison in Two Conflict Arenas",<sup>1</sup> Charles McClelland excludes reference to intra-unit processes, notably perceptual and organizational variables: these variables he assigns to the decision-making approach.

"The systemic approach followed in the reporting of research in this chapter ignores the impact of public opinion, the effects of informal and non-governmental pressures, and the part played by the organizational, perceptual, motivational, and personality aspects of crisis behavior. No attention is given to the processes of making decisions within governments under crisis conditions. The focus is on the interflow of actions and responses of the crisis participants."<sup>2</sup>

As such , and this is of particular importance in distinguishing the two approaches , McClelland can be said to 'blackbox' all variables internal to the unit state:the causal model identified only inter-unit processes as explanatory variables.

A second aspect of the systemic focus imposed upon the study of crisis by McClelland is a-historical analysis. This is not to argue that a systemic study of crisis does not refer to historical events. However, in the analysis of those events classification is determined not according to their particular historical content , but by 'objective' measurements of quantity and variety. Two assumptions apply here: (1) international events are all amenable to interpretation by quantity and variety measurements; (2) they are comparable regardless of historical context.

"In a word, the stream of action  
..... has been defined and treated  
technically rather than historically."<sup>3</sup>

It will be argued in later discussions that it is this 'objectification' of crisis and not the emphasis upon inter-unit processes which constitutes the real barrier separating the systemic and decision-making approaches.<sup>4</sup>

How is the concept of crisis defined at the systemic level? Although McClelland does not attempt an explicit definition of crisis in two earlier studies , (1964)"Action Structures and Communication in Two International Crises:Quemoy and Berlin"<sup>5</sup>, and (1968)"Access to Berlin:The Quantity and Variety of Events , 1948-1963"<sup>6</sup>, underlying both is an initial



assumption that crisis somehow refers to a 'change of state' in the pattern of inter-unit behavior, the flow of interactions within the international system. More specifically, there must be an identifiable change from a pre-existing 'status quo' pattern of interaction. The term status quo is particularly significant in that its use implies an attempt to account for the motivation behind patterns of interaction.

"It was conceived that at the active beginning of an acute international crisis, one side or the other would hold a position of such character to put the problem of responding - deciding what to do next - on its opponent. As long as the opponent is unable to cope with his problem of an effective response, it is assumed that a 'temporary status quo' is in being and dominated by the initiating government. Once the party upon whom the responsibility for the next move makes good his claim and changes the situation, the problem of the next move is shifted to the erstwhile holder of the initiative. The behavior of the latter must change until he can put the burden of response back on his opponent. The amounts of shift in this see-saw motion were chosen to demarcate the states of the crises."<sup>7</sup>

Clearly a major difficulty with the above interpretation of crisis patterns is a lack of specificity. A record of a shifting see-saw motion remains particularly vague without, for example, any reference to levels of intensity or time. This raises a number of questions including:

Does any modification of the temporary status quo indicate a crisis? Conceivably in one case there may be slight shifts recorded over a ten year period, while in another, violent shifts may occur in a period of days. Are these both examples of crisis?

McClelland's (1964) study incorporates this interpretation and attempts a comparative application to the Quenoy and Berlin Blockade crises. In this study the basic research goal is to identify the characteristics of crisis interaction; however, no quantitative techniques are employed - intensity levels are not tapped. The demarcation of crisis phases is achieved by essentially judgemental historical reconstruction. Consequently, the research findings are not found to be readily comparable and no concept definition of crisis emerges.

McClelland's (1968) study employs measurements of quantity and variety to map yearly and monthly patterns of interaction. This represents a considerable advance on the earlier study, to the degree that these techniques permit McClelland to:

- (1) identify crisis patterns of interaction;

"a measurable change of state takes place in the transition from a non-crisis situation to a crisis situation."<sup>8</sup>

- (2) compare crisis patterns of interaction in terms of levels of intensity and time.

"The figures for both volume and variety suggest that the Blockade and Wall Crises were intense phenomena for only short periods-

three months would seem to be about the duration."<sup>9</sup>

Employing similar measurement techniques but in a comparison of the Taiwan and Berlin Wall conflict arenas, McClelland's (1972b) study contains an explicit definition of crisis consistent with the (1968) findings.

"...it is a particular kind of alteration of the patterns of the interflowing actions between conflict parties. The change takes place in a short time and is large enough to be recognized. ...the uptrend stage of a crisis should establish a change from the noncrisis condition to the crisis condition and the downtrend should be another change of state in the interaction flow."<sup>10</sup>

What distinguishes the (1972b) study is the attempt to more precisely identify crisis phases - to distinguish crisis from noncrisis conflict patterns through a comparison of the up-down fluctuations found in each. The research findings obtained do differentiate crisis from noncrisis patterns. Most problematic however, are the significant differences recorded across the two conflict arenas.

"...the patterns throughout in the two conflict arenas are unlike."<sup>11</sup>

This finding points to a weakness underlying conceptual development in the study of crisis at the systemic level, that is, a low level of comparability. The consequence is that the concept of crisis at the systemic level remains at a very high level of generalization.

What kinds of research questions give direction to the study of crisis at the systemic level? In his (1972b) study Charles McClelland proposes two important problems for crisis research. The first, a basic descriptive task, is to identify crisis patterns of interaction: to distinguish between real and pseudo crisis patterns. It is hypothesized that certain patterns of interaction lead to war, others do not.

"The relations between hostile and contending nations may become exacerbated at times so that observers characterize the resulting interchanges as evidence that a crisis exists. These instances may be only fluctuations in the amount or type of confrontation and would not properly be called crises. On the other hand, it is possible that a serious and important sequence of exchanges between the parties to a long-standing international conflict will occur as a final exploration of positions before the 'ultimate' step of concerted warfare is undertaken."<sup>12</sup>

The second problem, an explanatory task, is to determine why some crises commence and then are abated, while others lead to war. Of the two problems McClelland's study addresses only the former. The research questions which direct the study are of a descriptive nature, that is they are concerned with pattern identification and differences.

"Are there any particular patterns or combinations of acts and responses peculiar to a crisis?"<sup>13</sup>

"Is there anything to be found in the data which would permit measurements of crisis abatement processes against the up and down fluctuations of noncrisis conflict?"<sup>14</sup>

This is not to imply that the systemic approach is without implications at the explanatory level for the study of crisis. In the earlier (1968) study McClelland employs measures of variety as indirect measures of motivation.

"Some indirect evidence in support of the routinizing tendency appears in the research. The general trend toward decreasing variety in the actions of both parties...are pieces of supporting evidence...The underlying principle is that a situation which becomes increasingly a 'known' quantity' will be dealt with in increasingly routinized fashion. The administrative approach, at its ultimate is to dispatch a problem by dealing with it as a type and by solving it by a formula."<sup>15</sup>

Of course this interpretation raises the question of whether evidence of underlying motivation can be built into such measures, whether a parallel investigation of intra-unit processes, specifically organizational processes is not required? All of which is suggestive of a possible linkage between the systemic and decision-making approaches. Indeed, this particular linkage of event/interaction and organizational processes underlies Raymond Tanter's attempted synthesis of the two approaches to crisis, the subject of a later discussion.<sup>16</sup>

In conclusion the basic features of the systemic approach to crisis may be summarized as follows:

(1) the systemic approach imposes a limiting focus, the two principal aspects being an exclusive preoccupation with inter-unit processes, and an a-historical analysis; (2) measurements of quantity

and variety identify crisis as a particular set of interaction patterns; (3) research questions are mostly of a descriptive nature, that is they are concerned with pattern identification and differences.

(b) Decision-Making Approach:

A survey of foreign policy studies suggests that those preoccupied with intra-unit phenomena may be broadly categorized into two groupings. The first, as exemplified by the work, of among others, Rudolph Rummel, considers national attributes as relevant for explaining foreign policy behavior, specifically, Rummel calculates the relationship between national attributes and foreign conflict behavior.<sup>17</sup> The second grouping identifies processes internal to the unit-state as an explanation of foreign policy behavior. The decision-making approach which focuses upon the decision process internal to the unit can be located within this grouping.<sup>18</sup> In this approach the descriptive task is to identify the elements, internal and external, and connecting linkages which comprise the foreign policy system. The researcher proceeds to explain foreign policy behavior in terms of the dynamic interaction of these elements as they 'pass through' the formulation and implementation stages of the decision-process.<sup>19</sup>

Basic to the decision-making approach is the intrusion of the perceptual variable.<sup>20</sup> Specifically, individuals and/or groups acting as authoritative decision-makers become the focal point of investigation.

Giving direction to this investigation is the assumption that these decision-makers act not in direct response to the so-called 'objective reality' of the environment, but according to their perceptions of that reality. This assumption leads the researcher to explore decision-makers' perceptions as an explanation of foreign policy behavior.

The exploration of decision-makers' perceptions is basic to the mediated stimulus-response model, a psychological stimulus-response model applied to inter-state behavior.<sup>21</sup> The model (see diagram d-1) follows a system input-output design: the acts and words of one state become inputs to another. Importantly, it diverges from those models which explain foreign policy behavior only in terms of action-response (S-R), with no consideration of internal processes. Two intermediate steps, perception (r) and expression (s) are included in the mediated stimulus-response model. As such, foreign policy behavior (R) is to be explained not by (S), a physical or verbal act taking place in the environment, but by (r), an actor's perception of that act,<sup>22</sup> and by (s), the expression of the actor's attitude and behavior toward the other actor, the initiator of that act.<sup>23</sup>

As would be expected the focus imposed by the decision-making approach upon the study of crisis is essentially dissimilar from that imposed by the systemic approach. Whereas the latter includes only inter-unit phenomena and disregards intra-unit sources of international events, the former while not excluding inter-unit phenomena emphasizes internal processes as an explanation of foreign policy behavior.

S-r:s-R Interaction Model




diagram d-1



Perhaps most significantly it is remembered that the systemic approach identifies crisis as an 'objective' phenomenon, a particular pattern of interaction determined by technical measurements. The decision-making approach provides a perceptual, 'subjective' definition: Charles Hermann defines crisis as a situation which,

"(1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed and (3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence."<sup>24</sup>

Threat, time saliency and surprise are indicators which cannot be measured independently of participants' perceptions. This is to be contrasted with the systemic definition which is clearly independent of such perceptions:

The Hermann definition is a basic element of the decision-making approach to crisis. Hermann hypothesizes that the impact of situation upon the decision process will be significantly different when all three elements of his definition are present than when one or all are absent. A review of the historical literature lends support to this hypothesis. The importance of the element of time, for example, is emphasized by Ted Sorensen in his analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis.

"The knowledge that time was running out dominated our discussions and kept us meeting late into the night. The stepped up U-2 flights had apparently

not alerted the Soviets to our discovery. But we had to formulate and declare our position, said the President, before they knew we knew, before the matter leaked out "to the public and before the missiles became operational."<sup>25</sup>

The great value of this threefold definition is that it is both explicit and specific: specificity promises the formulation of rigorous relational statements. However, specificity is not achieved without complications. This threefold definition requires not only that each element be identified, but that the interrelationship of these elements be determined. Perceptions of increasing threat might, for example, lead to perceptions of increasing time saliency which may in turn serve to heighten the levels of perceived threat.

Furthermore, over a given period of time it is conceivable (although unlikely) that the levels of perceived threat and time saliency may follow opposing tendencies, or what is more likely, one level may increase while the other remains constant. One would expect the impact on the decision process in the latter example, to be different from a period in which both levels record increases. As such a corollary to the Hermann hypothesis should read: even when all elements are present the impact on the decision process may differ according to the pattern of that presence.

What are the important research questions related to the decision-making approach to crisis? In the

studies by Helsti, North and Brody , "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis", and "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis", the basic research question investigated is the relationship between the perception of hostility by decision-makers and levels of violence in state action.<sup>26</sup> In his later study of crisis, "Crisis, Escalation, War", Ole Helsti identifies the central research question of how decision-makers, individuals and/or groups , respond to the pressure and tension of a perceived crisis situation: the Helsti study is in fact concerned with a two part relationship , (1) perception of crisis situation leading to stress, (2) the impact of stress upon decision processes and outputs. (see diagram d-2)

"The central concern of this book is to explore the possible consequences of crisis induced stress on individual and organizational performance that are most likely to affect the processes and outcomes of foreign-policy making."<sup>27</sup>

Of course it may be argued that stress as an intervening variable may or may not be critical to changes in the decision process and/or decision output. The model of crisis behavior as it appears in diagram d-3 excludes the intervening stress variable and expresses the relationship simply in terms of perception of situation → decision process/ decision output.<sup>28</sup> In reference to this model, research questions relating situation to changes in decision process can be clustered into two broad categories, structure and process: (1) organizational

Crisis Behavior Models  
(with stress as an intervening variable)




diagram d-2

(without an intervening variable)




diagram d-3

Crisis Behavior Model  
(with perception as an intervening variable)




diagram d-4

structure - As the perceived crisis becomes more intense will the number of participants in decisions tend to increase? (2) organizational process - As the perceived crisis becomes more intense will there be a greater tendency to rely upon extraordinary or improvised channels of communication?

A third model of crisis behavior is one which includes perceptions both as an independent and intervening variable. (see diagram d-4) By the latter is meant changes in the perceptions of decision-makers in regard to environment and self: (1) in terms of environment; As the crisis becomes more intense will decision-makers perceive the range of alternatives open to them narrowing? (2) in terms of self; As the crisis becomes more intense will decision-makers tend to supplement information about the objective state of affairs with information drawn from their own past experience? It is hypothesized that these changes will have an impact upon decision-process/decision output.

Importantly, methodological roadblocks not encountered in the systemic approach<sup>29</sup> are inherent to research questions which require perceptual data such as those above. Constraints to the gathering of both accurate and sufficient perceptual data are numerous. Personal interviews are often not possible and data from private memoirs, when such memoirs exist, are often of uneven quality and frequently contradictory. Commonly researchers must rely on public statements which regardless of the sophistication of the analytical techniques used<sup>30</sup> remain indirect sources of perceptual data,

which may not accurately represent the perceptions of decision-makers.<sup>31</sup> Consequently, and this is a weakness of the decision-making approach to crisis, research findings may not achieve the level of specificity demanded by research questions.<sup>32</sup>

In the application of the decision-making approach to crisis, a prior step to the investigation of research questions is the ordering of foreign policy data. Indeed ordering must be considered a necessary prerequisite. What is required is a decision-making framework capable of both classifying and relating foreign policy data. The Brecher, Steinberg, Stein foreign policy framework<sup>33</sup> (see diagram d-5) imposes a systemic ordering: data are fitted into the set of components comprising the foreign policy system, environment<sup>34</sup>, actors, structures and processes, all of which are located within three decisional phases, input, process and output. Implied in this ordering is an ongoing interrelatedness - the continuous flow of policy inputs, policy process and policy outputs. A basic assumption is that systemic ordering allows for the investigation of cause-effect relations, as well as, the detection of regular patterns of state behavior.

Without at this point attempting a further description of the Brecher et al. research framework (this will be presented in detail in the following chapter), attention is directed to basic attributes which render the framework particularly suitable to the decision-making approach to the study of crisis as outlined above. Firstly, the focus of

Brecher et al. Framework of Foreign Policy Behavior




diagram d-5



the framework is upon the intra-unit decision process, although it does incorporate extra-unit variables as inputs to this process. Secondly, the framework identifies the decision-making elite, individuals and/or groups authorized to decide in matters of high policy, as the basic component of the decision-making process: the images of this elite are considered to be the decisive input to the foreign policy system. The basic underlying assumption is that,

"decision-makers act in accordance with perception of reality, not in response to reality itself."<sup>35</sup>

As such, the notion of crisis as a perceived situation is provided for.

In conclusion, this chapter has attempted, albeit briefly, to define the theoretical framework of the decision-making approach to crisis: in so doing, in preparation for subsequent chapters, laying the theoretical groundwork for an empirical application of that approach. In a theoretical comparison with the systemic approach two basic aspects distinguish the decision-making approach. First is a focus emphasizing intra-unit processes. Second is a perceptual, 'subjective', definition of crisis. Importantly, these two aspects can be said to direct decision-making research to specific analytical tasks: at the descriptive level - to delineate the foreign policy system and to gather and categorize foreign policy data, including

perceptual data; at the explanatory level - to determine the causal sequences within the intra-unit processes leading to foreign policy outputs , including the impact of perceived situation. These are the tasks to which the following chapters address themselves in an application of the decision-making approach to the Berlin Wall crisis.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER ONE

- 1 McClelland, C.A., "The Beginning, Duration and Abatement of International Crises: Comparisons in Two Conflict Arenas", in C.F. Hermann (ed.), International Crises. New York: Free Press, 1972, pp. 83-105
- 2 Ibid., p. 86
- 3 McClelland, C.A., "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963", in David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics. New York: Free Press, 1968, p. 161
- 4 See the discussion of synthesis in Chapter Four.
- 5 McClelland, Charles, A., "Action Structures and Communication in Two International Crises: Quemoy and Berlin", in James N. Rosenau, (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 473-482
- 6 in David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics. New York: Free Press, 1968, pp. 159-186
- 7 McClelland, Charles, A., "Action Structures...." pp. 474-475
- 8 McClelland, Charles, A., "Access to Berlin...." p. 183
- 9 Ibid., p. 184
- 10 McClelland, Charles, A., "The Beginning, Duration..." p. 97
- 11 Ibid., p. 100
- 12 McClelland, Charles, A., "The Beginning, Duration..." p. 84
- 13 Ibid., p. 93
- 14 Ibid., p. 95
- 15 McClelland, Charles, A., "Access to Berlin...." p. 184
- 16 See the discussion of synthesis in Chapter Four.
- 17 Rummel, Rudolph, "The Relationship between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior", in David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics. New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 187-214
- 18 It should be noted, and this will become apparent in the elaboration and application of the Breeher et. al framework, that the decision-making focus does include the incorporation of extra-unit phenomena as external inputs to the decision-process.

- 19 Not all decision-making studies are equally concerned with policy formulation and implementation. For example, in "The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics" (See Bibliography), Synder, Bruck and Sapin emphasize formulation.
- 20 Clearly not all decision-making studies emphasize the perceptions of authoritative decision-makers. Graham Allison's organizational processes model, for example, considers organizational routine as an explanation of foreign policy behavior. See Allison, G.T. in bibliography.
- 21 Osgeed, Charles, "Behavior Theory and the Social Sciences", in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1958.
- 22 (r) also refers to the decision-makers' definition of the situation.
- 23 See the articles by Robert Jervis and Robert North in K. Knorr and J. Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969, for a debate of the strengths and weaknesses of the S-r:s-R model.
- 24 Hermann, C.F., "International Crisis as a Situational Variable"; in James N. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 409-421.
- 25 Sorensen, Theodore, C., Kennedy. New York: Harper and Row, 1965, p. 580.
- 26 Holsti, Ole R., Robert C. North and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Case," in J. David Singer, (ed.) Quantitative International Politics. New York: Free Press, 1968, pp. 123-158.
- 27 Holsti, Ole R., Robert C. North and Richard A. Brody, "Affect and Action in International Reaction Models", Journal of Peace Research, no. 3-4, 1964, 170-190.
- 28 It is to be noted that as represented in diagrams d-2 through d-4 by the enlarged arrow, it is conceivable that situation may have an impact upon

decision output without any changes having taken place in the decision process. This is not to argue that decision process does not precede decision output sequentially, but it is to argue that decision process may not always act as an intervening variable.

- 29 This is not to suggest that there are no methodological problems encountered at the systemic level. These would certainly include incompleteness of data and reliance upon single sources. See McClelland, C.A., "Access to Berlin..."
- 30 See Helsti, O.R., Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1969.
- 31 This is one of Robert Jervis's major criticisms of the S-r:s-R model. See Jervis, R., "The Costs of the Quantitative Study of International Relations", in Knerr, K., and Rosenau, J. (eds.) Contending Approaches to International Politics. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 181-203
- 32 See the conclusion of Chapter Three of this thesis for a confirmation of these remarks.
- 33 Brecher, M., B. Steinberg, and Stein J., "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior", Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII, 1969, pp. 75-102
- 34 The framework differentiates between the operational and psychological environments. The operational environment refers to the setting in which foreign policy decisions are made. Brecher specifies that this includes "potentially relevant factors and conditions which could affect a state's external behavior." The psychological environment contains two related components. The attitudinal prism groups societal and personality factors. This provides the lens through which the second component, elite images of the operational environment are filtered.
- 35 Brecher et al., "A Framework for Research..." p. 84

## CHAPTER TWO

### BERLIN WALL CRISIS - A CASE STUDY

#### Historical Preface:

The historical background of the Berlin crisis of 1961 is best characterized as one of protracted conflict. This conflict had its roots in the post-war occupation of Germany by the four 'allied' powers. Berlin situated in the middle of the Soviet zone proved to be particularly vulnerable to access controls. The first major Berlin crisis erupted on June 23, 1948 when the Soviet Union, protesting currency reforms undertaken by the United States, Britain and France in the Western zones, sealed off all Western access routes to Berlin with the exception of the air corridor. The blockade endured eleven months. Its imposition provoked the 'institutionalization' of hostility toward the Soviet Union by the Western Powers: on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, this treaty formalized a collective defense arrangement directed against Communist incursions in Europe. The blockade officially came to an end with the Paris Agreement of June 20, 1949: the Paris Agreement contained pledges by East and West not to restrict Berlin-zonal and interzonal traffic and communications.

The second major Berlin crisis was initiated in November of 1958 when the Soviet Union demanded that

the United States, Great Britain and France withdraw their troops from West Berlin. The Soviet leader, Khrushchev, proposed that Berlin become a free city. He further threatened to turn over control of access routes to the East German government within six months if the Western Powers refused to accept his proposal. In response, the American Secretary of State, Dulles, promised military retaliation should access to Berlin be blocked. An apparent downturn in the crisis came in June of the following year. In notes to the Western powers in which the Soviet Union rejected their claims to continued occupation of Berlin and restated the proposal for a free city, there was no reference to the previously declared six months deadline. Furthermore, the Soviets now declared themselves to be receptive to Allied modifications. The crisis effectively ended on the twenty-seventh of September, 1959, when in a joint communique issued during the Khrushchev visit to the United States, the American and Soviet leaders agreed to reopen negotiations on Berlin and Germany. The following day it was announced that the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin had been dropped. The reprieve was short lived however, and renewed Soviet-American intransigence over Berlin in the spring of 1960 was climaxed by the cancellation of the Paris Summit meeting.

It was against this historical backdrop of continuing Soviet-American antagonism over Berlin that the new administration under John Kennedy took office in January 1961.

Introduction:

The application of the decision-making approach to the Berlin Wall crisis is divided into two parts, a case study analysis and the testing of hypothesis. The case study, the subject of this chapter, is directed by four tasks:

- (1) a description of the foreign policy system, in particular , to identify the members of the decision-making elite and their roles in the decision-making process; (Is it possible to identify an individual or group as the key component of the foreign policy system?)
- (2) the operationalization of Hermann's concept of a crisis situation; (Can the Berlin Wall crisis in fact be classified according to the Hermann definition as a crisis situation?)
- (3) an examination of the inputs to foreign policy decisions , that is to determine the key inputs to the decision-flow; (Are particular inputs present consistently throughout the decision flow? What is the impact of situation?)
- (4) an analysis of the feedback process; specifically to determine the consequences of the Berlin crisis decisions for the operational and psychological environments and the impact upon subsequent decisions; (Did the decisions taken during the Berlin crisis have an effect on later decisions?)

Importantly, the analysis which follows does not employ quantitative techniques: there is no quantitative content analysis of primary data.



In this sense the study may well be criticised for its lack of rigor. In response to this eventual criticism it should be stated that the absence of quantitative analysis does not imply a rejection of quantitative techniques. It does however, reflect the judgement, which of course remains open to debate, that the available data is better suited to qualitative analysis. Basically, the available sources of primary data are limited to a few public statements and for the most part the study must rely upon the later writings of those involved, writings which at best provide a partial and often contradictory account.

In reference to this incompleteness of available sources, Ted Sorensen in his text, "Kennedy"<sup>1</sup>, indicates his awareness of the difficulties involved.

"At the urging of the eminent historian on his staff, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., he (Kennedy) agreed that procedures should be established to record the first-hand recollections of participants in crucial events while our memories were still fresh.

But he never found time to do it. He arranged for the comprehensive transcription of major deliberations, and at times he dictated memoranda of conversations for the files. But he communicated many of his key decisions by voice instead of in writing, by telephone instead of letter and to one instead of many..."<sup>2</sup>

From all of this it should not be inferred that no attempt is made to achieve a rigorous, systematic analysis, despite the absence of quantitative techniques.

Decision-Making Elite:

Under the heading of decision-makers the Brecher et al. framework identifies "individuals or groups with authority to decide in the sphere of external behavior."<sup>1</sup> To this general identification a number of specifications must be attached (1) the authority to decide refers to "authorization sanctioned by the conventions of the system."<sup>2</sup> (2) these individuals or groups are involved with decisions of high policy (3) the decision-making elite includes individuals and/or groups whose images of the operational environment can be said to 'shape' decisions (4) the decision-making elite is 'categorically' separated from the bureaucratic environment which surrounds it. The latter is placed under the heading of institutional interest groups.

In reference to this last specification, the separation of the decision-making elite from its bureaucratic environment may prove difficult in terms of an empirical study. In regard to the American decision-making process during the period of the Berlin crisis it may be argued that this separation is indeed possible. Furthermore, the relevant weight of individual and group contributions within the decision-making elite may also be determined. This argument draws support from three sources:

(1) President Kennedy's assertion of control over the bureaucracy as demonstrated by his redefinition of the decision-making environment;<sup>3</sup> (2) the nature of the President's redefinition; (3) the degree of

President Kennedy's personal involvement in the decision-making process.

(1) Redefinition of the Environment - A basic component of the decision-making environment is what Graham Allison refers to as the 'action-channel'.

"Action-channels, i.e., regularized ways of producing action concerning types of issues, structure the game by pre-selecting the major players, determining their points of entrance into the game and distributing particular advantages and disadvantages for each game..."<sup>4</sup>

Control over the fashioning or refashioning of action channels permits the President, in part, to shape the bureaucratic outlook according to his own values. In way of an example, although he would become disenchanted with the performance of the State Department during the Berlin crisis, it remains that this department's hierarchy was dominated by Kennedy picked men, among them Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Bowles, UN Ambassador Stevenson and Assistant Secretary Williams. To this extent at least Kennedy's values can be said to have penetrated the State Department, the principal institution of the foreign policy bureaucracy.

(2) Nature of the Redefinition - The nature of Kennedy's redefinition was largely determined by what he considered to be the principal requisites of the decision-making process. Speed, coordination, informal personal contact, these requirements account for the important role accorded the National Security

Council staff, the Berlin task force, and White House assistants. Essentially it was these groups and individuals who would come to define the alternatives from among which Presidential decisions ultimately developed. Indeed if one argues that definition of alternatives implies active participation in decision formulation then one may include these groups and individuals within the decision-making elite as previously defined: their images of the operational environment would shape American foreign policy decisions.

The National Security Council staff headed by McGeorge Bundy constituted the coordinating link between the White House and the State Department.

"But, if the National Security Council played a diminishing role, the National Security staff was indispensable. Bundy saw his function as that of the clarification of alternatives set before the President."

In point of fact the functions of the NSC staff were never formally delineated, but evolved in part as a consequence of President Kennedy's intensive involvement in national security affairs and in part as a result of what the President viewed as State Department inadequacy. The Bundy staff, in an effort to furnish Kennedy with information and analysis, penetrated the internal activities of governmental departments and agencies. Material was provided at a speed which State Department responses did not match. Increasingly, the Department was unable to measure up to Presidential expectations.

"The President was discouraged with the State Department almost as soon as he took office. He felt that it too often seemed to have a built-in inertia which deadened initiative and that its tendency toward excessive delay obscured determination. It had too many voices and too little vigor. It was never clear to the President (and this continued to be true even after the personnel changes) who was in charge, who was clearly delegated to do what, and why his own policy line seemed consistently to be altered or evaded."<sup>6</sup>

Accordingly the size of the Bundy staff and the scope of its activities increased. In this way the basic task of inter-agency coordination initially considered by the President to be a State Department function came more and more to be performed by the NSC staff.

Task forces created under the Kennedy administration were problem-oriented ad hoc bodies made up of representatives from a number of departments, one of whom was given the duty of formulating recommendations. The task force was an instrument designed to speed and coordinate the decision-making process. In particular, the Berlin task force, appointed in June 1961 under the chairmanship of Paul Nitze, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs was a response to the inability of the State Department to formulate an effective response to the developing crisis situation.

Members of the White House staff were also heavily involved with questions of foreign policy. This

involvement was not restricted to policy advice. Not only did staff members provide independent criticisms of department recommendations, they also attempted to draw out ideas directly from middle level officials and attempted to determine whether Presidential directives were being followed.

The Kennedy redefinition also brought about the decline in importance of two previously influential groups. Specifically, antipathy for decision by committee motivated a reappraisal of Cabinet and National Security Council functions.

"He was not interested in unanimous committee recommendations which stifled alternatives to find the lowest common denominator of compromise."

"He abandoned the practice of the Cabinet's and the National Security Council's making group decisions like corporate boards of directors."<sup>8</sup>

According to Sorensen few matters of importance in foreign affairs were discussed in Cabinet and no decisions of importance were taken. Schlesinger notes that the President convened the National Security Council only when he was at the point of decision.<sup>9</sup> In contrast to the Eisenhower administration the Cabinet and the National Security Council were to play much diminished roles in the decision-making process.<sup>10</sup>

(3) Presidential Involvement - Any discussion of the decision-making process taking place during the Berlin crisis must take into consideration the extent of the President's personal involvement in

foreign affairs. Schlesinger writes that Kennedy came more and more to direct the daily affairs of American foreign policy personally. Particularly in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco the President was unwilling to depend entirely upon bureaucratic information and analysis and was apprehensive about possible bureaucratic initiatives. Kennedy was determined to make his own decisions before the force of events deprived him of the authority to choose. In view of this predisposition to active involvement in the direction of American foreign policy it is hardly surprising to discover that the President immersed himself in and took personal charge of the Berlin operation.

"His second basic decision was to take complete charge of the operation. For months he saturated himself in the problem. He reviewed and revised the military contingency plans, the conventional force build-up, the diplomatic and propaganda initiatives, the Budget changes and the plans for economic warfare."<sup>11</sup>

Clearly the dominant presence of the President must be regarded as the significant component of the foreign policy system.

In terms of the crisis behavior model displayed in chapter one (diagram d-3) this means that Kennedy's perceptions of the situation should be considered as the key determinant of decision process and foreign policy output. This will be the assumption underlying the operationalization of the Hermann concept of crisis in this case study: employing Kennedy's perceptions as a basis for determining

both the presence of a crisis situation and its impact.

Decision-Flow: Framework of Analysis

In this analysis of the decision-flow occurring during the period of the Berlin crisis, the Breeher et al. research framework emphasizing three systemic phases - input, process and output - is imposed upon the available empirical data.

Inputs may be indirect environmental stimuli which imprint upon the decisional setting or they may be direct environmental stimuli which provoke a decision.<sup>1</sup> Inputs are broadly classified according to source and are further subjected to ordinal scale ranking.<sup>2</sup>

Process comprises two stages, formulation and implementation. Formulation involves the selection among specified alternatives leading to the choice of a particular option. This choice is referred to as an output or decision. Decisions are classified as strategic or tactical on the basis of the gravity of consequences intended and perceived, as well as, on the basis of their definition of objectives and/or acceptable alternatives with reference to preceding and subsequent decisions.<sup>3</sup> Decisions are also classified according to content and placed within one or more of the four broad issue areas which include, Military-Security, Political-Diplomatic, Economic-Developmental, and Cultural-Status.



Subsequent to the act of formulation is the act of implementation , the carrying out of a decision by word or deed. Implementation acts in that they impact directly upon the operational environment provide a vital feedback link to subsequent decision-flows.

A basic difficulty particular to crisis analysis is the specification of marker points indicating the commencement of the pre-crisis , crisis, and post-crisis phases of the decision-flow. Although the Hermann typology<sup>4</sup> does provide for the differentiation in static terms of a crisis and non-crisis situation, Hermann's study of crisis as a situational variable fails to come to grips with the developmental qualities inherent to a crisis situation. As such, the Hermann study does not provide a solution for the immediate problem, that of locating the initial time point of the pre-crisis phase.

One possible avenue of approach involves the recording of events taking place in the 'operational environment': an event or series of events denoting greater levels of intensity would indicate the commencement of the pre-crisis phase.

However, it may be argued, and with some justification, that in order to remain consistent with the Decision-making perspective two requirements must be imposed:

- (1) changes in environmental intensity must be recognized as such by the decision-makers;
- (2) changes in environmental intensity should be interpreted by the decision-makers to mean increasing

levels of threat.

A complicating factor well represented in the Berlin setting is the historical presence of protracted conflict. In this setting the mean level of threat experienced over the previous fifteen year period is assumed to be considerably higher than that found in a setting free from a legacy of protracted conflict. It may be stated though, that in both settings the same basic indicator can be used to determine the commencement of the pre-crisis phase. That indicator is the perception by the decision-maker(s) of increasing levels of threat.

In terms of this study , the beginning of the pre-crisis phase is located approximately in the first week of February 1961. It was then that President Kennedy , in receiving Ambassador Thompson's dispatches forecasting a toughening stand by Khrushchev over Berlin , perceived an increasing level of threat to the existing balance of power and to world peace.<sup>5</sup>

Pre-Crisis Phase: Introduction:

The pre-crisis phase of the decision-flow extended from February 1, 1961 to June 3 , 1961. It was characterized by a reappraisal of American policy toward Berlin , specifically , a reappraisal of the American response to threatened Soviet initiatives.

Three principal factors dominated: (1) as perceived by American decision-makers , the increasingly

exigent Soviet demands for a settlement of the German-Berlin question; (2) President Kennedy's image of American military capability, in particular, the need to develop a massive conventional response to Communist incursions worldwide; (3) Kennedy's desire for a personal meeting with Soviet leader Khrushchev in order to assess Soviet objectives and to avoid miscalculation which he perceived could lead to nuclear war.

The pre-crisis phase was marked by four decisions of significance to Berlin:

February 11, 1961 - This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to have United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson deliver a personal message to Soviet Premier Khrushchev suggesting a meeting of the two state leaders.

March 10, 1961 - This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to publicly declare United States' policy toward Berlin as no longer bound by concessions made by the previous administration.

March 28, 1961 - This was a 'military-security' decision which redefined basic defense policy, a redefinition emphasizing flexible military response and requiring an additional \$650 million in expenditures.

April, 1961 - This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to reinforce the bonds of the Western Alliance through personal contacts with Western leaders: a reinforcement being necessary to assure a concerted response to Soviet initiatives directed at Berlin.

The decisions of February 11, and March 10 are classified as 'preceding tactical decisions' (p). Neither decision can be placed within the boundaries of a prior definition by the Kennedy administration of basic objectives and/or acceptable alternatives in regard to Berlin. As well, that of March 10 explicitly stepped outside of the previous administration's definition. The two decisions are not considered to be strategic as in themselves they contain no definition/redefinition of basic objectives and/or acceptable alternatives, only partial reorientations. Furthermore, in terms of the decision-makers' perceived and intended consequences they cannot be labeled as grave.

The decisions of March 28 and April are classified as strategic. The decision of March 28 did involve a redefinition of basic defense policy to emphasize massive conventional response. Decision-makers clearly intended and perceived important consequences in terms of American military capability. The classification of the April decision does raise certain difficulties. This decision was in part designed to implement a previously defined defense policy and in this sense cannot be labeled as strategic. However, this decision also incorporated basic political objectives which though interrelated with military policy may be considered as distinct from it. Again, the decision-makers intended and perceived important consequences in terms of military capability, as well as, in regard to bilateral relationships.

Pre-Crisis Phase: Operational Environment - Soviet Behavior:

February 17, 1961 - A memorandum from Soviet Premier Khrushchev was delivered to the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. This memorandum contained a redefinition of the Soviet position vis-a-vis the Berlin problem: the Soviet position taken at Geneva in 1959 was to be publicly discarded. The memorandum also demanded that any solution to the Berlin problem provide for the eventual demilitarization of the city, as well as , its transformation into a 'free city'. Khrushchev further 'suggested' that Soviet-West German negotiations should take place in regard to a settlement of the Berlin problem and the signing of a Soviet-German peace treaty: this treaty would sanction the existence of two German states. Most importantly , pervading these Soviet demands and proposals was an insistence upon immediacy.

"It is now obvious , that all the time limits have expired for understanding the need to sign a peace treaty and thereby solve the problem of occupation status of West Berlin , making it a free city."

March 31, 1961 - A Warsaw Pact Communique , the output of the annual session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee , identified West Germany as the major danger spot in Europe and potentially the principal enemy of the Warsaw Pact members. The communique did contain a pledge of peaceful coexistence with the West; however, this pledge was

juxtaposed with demands relating to a proposed solution of the Berlin problem. These demands included the signing of a peace treaty with both German states and the transformation of Berlin into a free city.

April 19, 1961 - In an interview with Walter Lippman (New York Herald Tribune) Khrushchev emphasized his determination to press for a prompt settlement of the German problem. The Soviet Union was not willing to accept indefinitely the existing status quo. Expressing his fears over the probability of West Germany obtaining nuclear weapons, the Soviet leader reasoned that the U.S.S.R. must obtain a peace treaty with West Germany before this occurred. Such a treaty would guarantee the present borders and recognize the existence of the East German state. The Soviet leader implied that Soviet strategy in Berlin was directed toward this end.

May 3, 1961 - Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko indicated to U.S. Ambassador Thompson a Soviet interest in a Khrushchev-Kennedy meeting.

Pre-Crisis Phase: Decision-Flow:

Tactical Decision (lp) - February 11, 1961.

This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to have United States' Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson deliver a personal message to Soviet Premier Khrushchev suggesting a meeting of the two leaders.

The decisive input to this decision were warnings from the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union forecasting a toughening Soviet stand on Berlin.(DB<sub>2</sub>) In light of these warnings Kennedy perceived an increasing level of threat to the existing balance of power and to world peace. Importantly, the exact nature of this threat , specifically , the exact content and direction of Soviet policy remained unclear to the American decision-makers. As such this decision may be interpreted as a response to the unknown quality of threat, a response which reflected a desire on Kennedy's part to avoid 'war by miscalculation'.

The American political structure (PS) specifically, the transferal of authority to a new decision-making elite may be considered an important input. The newly installed Kennedy administration , in the process of defining its position in regard to the Soviet Union and Berlin, required a re-evaluation of the international situation.

In summary the inputs were Dominant Bilateral Relations (DB<sub>2</sub>) (Rank 5) and Political Structure (PS) (Rank 3).

Implementation of Tactical Decision (1p)

May 4, 1961 - President Kennedy agreed to meet with the Soviet leader in June.

June 3, 1961 - Kennedy met with Khrushchev in Vienna for a general exchange of views covering major international issues including Berlin.

Tactical Decision (2p) - March 10 , 1961.

This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to publicly declare United States' policy toward Berlin as no longer bound by concessions made by the previous administration.

The Soviet memorandum of February 17 announcing a redefinition of the Soviet position taken at Geneva in 1959 should be ranked as an important input to this decision. A 'new' American policy response was required to meet the Soviet redefinition.

The dominant input however, was the desire to dissociate the Kennedy Administration from the previous administration's policy.

"...Harriman in his March debut as roving ambassador had said that "all discussions in Berlin must begin from the start." This was a move to disengage Kennedy from the concessions the Eisenhower administration had made in 1959 and even more from the ones we had been informed Eisenhower was ready to make at the 1960 summit meeting in Paris."

In summary the inputs were PS (Rank 5) and DB<sub>2</sub> (Rank 3).

Strategic Decision (1) - March 28, 1961.

This was a 'military-security' decision which redefined basic defense policy, a redefinition emphasizing flexible military response and requiring an additional \$650 million in governmental expenditures. Specifically it was determined that United States' military capability was to be used to deter war, to provide support for diplomatic efforts, to



provide an adequate bargaining power for ending the arms race. Given that the principal threat to 'Free World' security was perceived to be essentially non-nuclear in form , an adequate American response required a considerable conventional force build-up.

"Those units of our forces which are stationed overseas, or designed to fight overseas , can be most usefully oriented toward deterring or confining those conflicts which do not justify and must not lead to a general nuclear attack."<sup>8</sup>

"But our objective now is to increase our ability to confine our response to non-nuclear weapons, and to lessen the incentive for any limited aggression by making clear what our response will accomplish."<sup>9</sup>

A number of inputs must be considered in regard to this decision. The dominant input was undoubtedly American military capability (M) , specifically , Kennedy's concern over the deteriorating state of conventional response.

"Kennedy was appalled to discover a few weeks after the inauguration that if he sent 10,000 men to Southeast Asia , he would deplete the strategic reserve and have virtually nothing left for emergencies elsewhere."<sup>10</sup>

A review of American military capability by Defense Secretary McNamara provided detailed support for Kennedy's initial impressions. McNamara's investigation began on the first of March.

"By March 28 the review had advanced sufficiently for Kennedy to send a special message asking Congress for an additional \$500 million for the defense budget."<sup>11</sup>

The Dominant Bilateral input, the insistency of Soviet demands, impressed a sense of urgency upon military redevelopment.

"But circumstances do not permit a postponement of all further action during the many additional months that a full reappraisal will require. Consequently we are now able to present the most urgent and obvious recommendations for inclusion in the fiscal 1962 Budget."<sup>12</sup>

The Political Structure may be considered a consequential input. The neglect of conventional forces could be traced to the Eisenhower Administration's emphasis upon massive retaliation. A public statement advocating strategic pluralism would clearly dissociate the Kennedy Administration from the past policy.

In summary the inputs were Military Capability (M) (Rank 5), DB<sub>2</sub> (Rank 3) and PS (Rank 2).  
Implementation of Strategic Decision (1)

May 25, 1961 - In a message to the Congress, President Kennedy requested further additions to the fiscal 1962 budget in order to meet the increasing costs of military build-up.

Strategic Decision (2) - April, 1961.

No specific date is entered for this decision as no available source provides actual evidence of decision

formulation. The decision is inferred from a number of implementing acts beginning with Secretary of State Rusk's address to the NATO Council on May 8, 1961.

This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to reinforce the bonds of the Western(Atlantic) Alliance through personal contacts with Western leaders: a reinforcement being necessary to assure a concerted response to Soviet initiatives in Berlin.

The general military strategy decided upon in March by the Kennedy administration emphasized a flexible military response. The implementation of this strategy required a considerable build-up in conventional forces. In respect to European defense, the expected cost attached to the strengthening of conventional forces was not considered, by U.S. decision-makers, to be solely an American responsibility. As such their task was to persuade members of the Western Alliance, in particular the recalcitrant nationalist, French President de Gaulle, in to accepting the direction and costs of the American military strategy. This proved to be a difficult task. In his meeting with Kennedy on June 1 De Gaulle emphasized that,

"..in Europe the revival of national pride, especially in France, meant that integrated defense under American command was no longer acceptable."

The Dominant Bilateral component provided a significant setting variable, specifically the perception of a continuing Soviet threat to Berlin. Kennedy considered this threat to be a menace to all of Western Europe.

"The pressure on West Berlin was the first move in a Soviet effort to break up NATO. The Soviet campaign left the United States no choice but to resist - or to see our position in Western Europe disintegrate... But if we don't meet our commitments in Berlin, it will mean the destruction of NATO and a dangerous situation for the whole world. All Europe is at stake in West Berlin."<sup>14</sup>

A second setting variable of significance to this decision was the historical pattern of consultation and 'public' unity among the Western powers in regard to Berlin. (B1/2/3)<sup>15</sup> This pattern dated back to the initial division of Germany. In the face of a determined Soviet challenge Kennedy considered that it was essential to achieve not only military but political unity. The Joint Statement issued June 5 ending discussions between Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan confirms this.

"The situation in regard to Germany was reviewed and there was full agreement on the necessity of maintaining the rights and obligations of the allied governments in Berlin."<sup>16</sup>

A final setting variable of importance to this decision related to American involvement in Western Europe. American military involvement in Western Europe was formally integrated under NATO command. Although American leadership was clearly the dominant component of the organization, nevertheless, the parameters of the organization did impose the burden of collective planning.

In summary the inputs were M. (Rank 5), DB<sub>2</sub> (Rank 4) , B<sub>1/2/3/</sub> (Rank 4), Subordinate System (S) (Rank 3).

Implementation of Strategic Decision (2)

May 8, 1961 - Secretary of State Rusk addressed the NATO Council in Oslo and emphasized a concerted response to any Soviet threat against Berlin. He assured the members that the United States would act with its allies.

May 29, 1961 - The New York Herald Tribune reported that U.S., British and French military staffs had prepared a contingency plan to meet a new Soviet blockade of Berlin.

May 31, 1961 - President Kennedy and de Gaulle held talks in Paris . A principal subject of discussion was the Soviet threat to Berlin. The nature of the Allied response and the future of the Atlantic Alliance were also discussed.

June 4, 1961 - Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan held talks in London. Soviet demands in regard to Berlin and the nature of the Allied response were the chief topics of discussion.

Pre-Crisis Phase: Summary:

Four decisions of significance to the Berlin problem marked the pre-crisis phase. (as indicated in diagram df-1) The DB<sub>2</sub> input, in particular , Kennedy's perception of Soviet demands and the threat of nuclear war, is considered relevant to all of

these decisions. What should be emphasized is the increasing level of the Soviet threat in determining the impact of this input upon the American foreign policy decisions. The M input, what Kennedy felt was the need to develop a massive conventional force response, is ranked as the decisive input to both the strategic decision of March 28 and that of April. The interrelationship of the military and diplomatic is clearly apparent in this latter decision. The importance of the military input was in part a consequence of the increasing level of threat: the apparent need for a substantial military build-up. Finally, the PS input, essentially the desire to break away from the previous administration's policies, is mentioned in reference to three decisions, but is considered as relatively much less important in determining the foreign policy decisions during the pre-crisis phase.

Crisis Phase: Introduction:

The fourth of June, 1961 marks the beginning of the crisis phase which continued through to the seventeenth of October, 1961. Marker points are based upon the Hermann typology of crisis and non-crisis situations. That is to say, the American decision-making elite perceived grave threat, short time and surprise simultaneously with regard to the Berlin issue for the first time on June 4. The precipitating event was the Soviet Berlin

Pre- Crisis Chart  
(Summary of decision-flow)




diagram df-1

ultimatum containing a six month deadline. Documented evidence of this 'crisis perception' is provided by Arthur Schlesinger.

"Berlin held the threat, if not the certitude, of war. Filled with foreboding, the President flew on to London. It was a silent and gloomy trip."<sup>17</sup>

The crisis phase ended with Khrushchev's withdrawal of the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin: the level of threat as perceived by American decision-makers was greatly reduced.

"While inconclusive talks began between Gromyko and western officials, Khrushchev took the occasion to report in a six-hour speech to the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party on October 17 that "the western powers were showing some understanding of the situation and were inclined to seek a solution to the German problem and the issue of West Berlin." If this were so, "we shall not insist on signing a peace treaty absolutely before December 31, 1961." The crisis was suddenly over."<sup>18</sup>

The crisis phase can be said to have been characterized by three basic features: (1) the Kennedy Administration's definition of a Berlin strategy; (2) the construction of the Berlin Wall; (3) the initiation of Soviet-American negotiations regarding Berlin.

Four factors<sup>19</sup> dominated during this phase: (1) the formalization of the Communist threat, in particular the Soviet Berlin ultimatum of June 4,



and the building of the Berlin Wall beginning August 13; (2) President Kennedy's image of American military capability, specifically the need for the development of a conventional response to the Soviet challenge; (3) President Kennedy's fear of war by miscalculation which motivated him to insist upon the preparation of a diplomatic strategy; (4) allied disunity, in particular the French refusal to accept American proposals for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Five decisions of significance with reference to Berlin will be examined.

July 25 , 1961 - This was a decision related to both the 'military-security' and the 'political-diplomatic' issue areas. The decision incorporated military and negotiating strategies, specifically in regard to the Soviet challenge over Berlin. In essence this decision amounted to the Kennedy Administration's definition of a Berlin strategy.

August 15, 1961 - This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to protest in strong diplomatic terms the erection of the Berlin barricade.

August 18, 1961 - This was a two part 'political-diplomatic' decision involving (1) the sending of Vice President Johnson to West Berlin as a Presidential emissary, (2) the ordering of a 1500 man battle group from West Germany to West Berlin.

August 30, 1961 - This was a 'political-diplomatic'

decision to dispatch General Clay to West Berlin as the personal representative of the President. It was intended that Clay become a symbol of the American commitment.

September 1, 1961 - This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to invite the Soviets to commence negotiations on the Berlin problem.

The July 25 decision is classified as strategic because it meets the requirement of grave consequences intended and perceived by the decision-makers; and as well, the decision involved the definition of basic objectives and acceptable alternatives in regard specifically to the Berlin situation. The four subsequent decisions are classified as tactical. Relative to the July 25 decision the intended and perceived consequences were considerably less grave. Further, none of these decisions involved the definition of basic objectives and/or acceptable alternatives in regard to the Berlin situation.

Crisis Phase: Operational Environment - Soviet Behavior

June 4, 1961 - A Soviet memo issued at the conclusion of the Vienna Conference threatened that the U.S.S.R. would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany unless the two German states achieved a negotiated settlement on the Berlin matter within six months.

\*In order not to drag out the peace settlement it is necessary to establish deadlines within which the Germans must explore the possibilities of agreements on

questions falling into their internal competence. The Soviet government regards a period not exceeding six months adequate for such talks."<sup>20</sup>

June 15, 1961 - In his report to the Russian people on the Vienna meeting with President Kennedy, Khrushchev restated the ultimatum contained in the memo of June 4.

June 15, 1961 - At a press conference the East German leader Walter Ulbricht warned the Western powers that they must renegotiate agreements regarding access to Berlin,

"...if they do not want traffic to be interrupted."<sup>21</sup>

June 21, 1961 - In a speech marking the 20th anniversary of the Hitler invasion of Russia, Soviet Premier Khrushchev insisted that the Western powers must come to recognize a change in the World balance of power.

"It is necessary at long last to understand that the land of Soviets has now changed, the world has changed, the correlation of forces and armaments has changed."<sup>22</sup>

He indicated further that Soviet military capability was sufficient to punish aggression.

"...because a great deal depends on rocket troops. It is their devastating power which deters in the first instance any potential aggressor from attacking us and our allies. Their capacity to strike a retaliatory blow is the force which will inevitably punish an aggressor if he nevertheless decides on an act of folly and unleashes a new war."<sup>23</sup>

The speech also contained a reiteration of the Berlin deadline.

June 28, 1961 - At a Kremlin reception in honour of North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate an East-West accord on Germany. He warned however, that Western strategies designed to deter Soviet attempts to achieve a German solution would not be tolerated.

"If the enemies of...peaceful coexistence call a mobilization ....., we shall not allow them to catch us unawares. We...,if need be, shall take additional steps to strengthen our security."<sup>24</sup>

July 8, 1961 - At a Kremlin meeting of military academy graduates the Soviet Premier announced that planned troop reductions had been shelved and that defense expenditures for 1961 would be increased by twenty-five percent.

August 7, 1961 - In his reply to President Kennedy's speech of July 25, Khrushchev reasserted the Soviet determination to sign a peace treaty with East Germany. Criticising the threatening tone of the Kennedy address, Khrushchev warned that continuing NATO pressures might necessitate a westward movement of Soviet troops.

August 13, 1961 - The border between East and West Berlin was closed to all citizens of East Germany, and the construction of the Berlin Wall began.

August 23, 1961 - In notes to the American, British and French embassies in Moscow, the U.S.S.R. protested against what it considered to be Western provocations in Berlin.

August 27, 1961 - In an interview with columnist Drew Pearson, Krushchev indicated a readiness to negotiate with Western leaders.

"...he was "ready at any moment" to negotiate with Western leaders on a "realistic settlement of the German problem on a mutually acceptable basis."" 25

August 29, 1961 - The Soviet Union announced its decision to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

Crisis Phase: Decision-Flow:

Strategic Decision (3) - July 25 , 1961.

This was a decision related to both the 'military-security' and the 'political-diplomatic' issue areas. The decision incorporated military and negotiating strategies, specifically in regard to the Soviet challenge over Berlin. In essence this decision amounted to the Kennedy Administration's definition of a Berlin strategy.

The decision contained: (1) a request for a speed-up of the military preparations already underway , a request designed to communicate a strong American commitment to Berlin and by this discourage Soviet initiatives; (2) a negotiations option, the second component of the Berlin strategy , intended to communicate both a desire for continued dialogue to avoid escalation by misjudgement and the American belief in negotiations as the only acceptable road to settlement.

In discussing the 'Berlin strategy' decision of July 25 a valuable first step is to examine the two basic alternatives proposed during the formulation process.

The 'mixed-option' strategy which ultimately emerges can then be discussed in terms of these two basic alternatives. This should provide the analyst with an indication as to the weight of the various decision inputs.

The military option, specifically that contained in the June 29 report prepared by the special advisor to the President, Dean Acheson, emphasized the build-up of conventional and nuclear forces. The report proposed a contingency plan to respond to a Soviet interruption of military access to Berlin. In later discussions, most notably during the National Security Council meeting of July 13, Acheson would further press for an immediate build-up of massive proportions calling for a defense budget increase of five billion dollars. This could be achieved with a proclamation of national emergency. The military option outlined by Acheson was admittedly one of high risk designed to impress upon Soviet decision-makers the extent of the American commitment. Significantly, the report contained no discussion of the broader political objectives to be achieved by this military strategy. As well, negotiation was not considered as either a prior or as an alternative response.

Serious criticism of the Acheson report emanated from two groups. McGeorge Bundy and the NSC staff questioned the "dangerous rigidity of the strategic war plan",<sup>26</sup> which heavily biased American response toward nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union. White House advisors Schlesinger, Chayes and Kissinger in their memorandum to the President reiterated the McBundy criticism.

In particular , they deplored the absence of a political definition of the situation.

"What political moves do we make until the crisis develops? If we sit silent, or confine ourselves to rebutting Soviet contentions...we permit Khrushchev to establish the framework of discussion."<sup>27</sup>

"It is essential to elaborate the cause for which we are prepared to go to nuclear war. Where do we want to come, but if we win this test of wills?"<sup>28</sup>

At the July 8 meeting with Rusk, McNamara, and General Maxwell Taylor , Kennedy , cognizant of the serious political omissions in the Acheson report now voiced strong dissatisfaction over the existing strategy. Acheson would be asked to develop a political strategy for Berlin, while Secretary of State Rusk worked out a program for negotiations.

At the July 13 meeting of the National Security Council Rusk confirmed Acheson's argument against immediate negotiations. For his part, Acheson backed by Lyndon Johnson now advised a proclamation of national emergency. However, opposition to a proclamation of national emergency was widespread among members of the council and others. Secretary of State Rusk and Defense Secretary McNamara remained skeptical as to the advantages of this scheme. Criticisms came also from the Council of Economic Advisors which discouraged the tax increase implied by an immediate jump in the defense budget. A memorandum written by

Ted Sorenson representing the opinion of the White House staff, viewed the Acheson proposal as a needless provocation which could

"..engage Khrushchev's prestige to a point where he felt he could not back down from a showdown and provoke further or faster action on his part in stepping up the arms race."<sup>29</sup>

Sorenson records that by July 18, President Kennedy had decided upon the essential elements of the American response. The 'presidential strategy' did not completely abandon the Acheson formula, it did however, introduce considerable alterations. Principal among these alterations was an emphasis upon the continuing, but gradual build-up of United States' military capability, as well as a recognition of the importance of a negotiating option.

DB<sub>2</sub>, specifically Khrushchev's Berlin deadline of six months, first contained in the Soviet memo of June 4, must be considered as the critical input. Acheson viewed the Soviet demands on Berlin as a test of American will, an attempt to shatter American influence worldwide. Kennedy accepted this interpretation.

"West Berlin...But above all it has now become - as never before - the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation."<sup>30</sup>



It was clear to Acheson that Soviet objectives were unlimited. The target area extended far beyond Berlin. Kennedy shared this perception of Soviet goals.

"Soviet strategy has long been aimed, not merely at Berlin, but at dividing and neutralizing all of Europe, forcing us back on our own shores."<sup>31</sup>

American willingness to negotiate, reasoned Acheson, could only serve to embolden Soviet initiatives.

Kennedy did not entirely reject this reasoning.

During their meeting in London on June 4,

"He and Macmillan then agreed that western proposals for negotiation over Berlin would be taken in Moscow as a sign of weakness unless the situation grew so much worse that there seemed imminent danger of war."<sup>32</sup>

Kennedy was however, influenced by Ambassadors Thompson and Harriman to the extent that he felt that Soviet leaders would be impressed less by an American refusal to talk than by a tough negotiating position. Acheson contended that Khrushchev dared provoke the ~~fast~~ <sup>test</sup> over Berlin because he no longer feared the American nuclear threat. The essential task, concluded Acheson, was to convince the Soviets of the credibility of that threat. Kennedy though, feared that American determination would be misinterpreted.

"But, while Kennedy wanted to make this resolve absolutely clear to Moscow, he wanted to make it equally clear that we were not, as he once put it to me, "war-mad"."<sup>33</sup>

Military Capability was undoubtedly a significant input into the July 25 decision. Indeed military needs received top priority. The military component of the Berlin strategy was essentially a continuation of the build-up decided in March, although this build-up was now to proceed at a more rapid pace.

"A first need is to hasten progress toward the military goals which the North Atlantic allies have set for themselves...The supplementary defense build-ups that I asked from the Congress in March and May have already started moving us toward these and other defense goals...These measures must be speeded up and still others must now be taken."<sup>54</sup>

The Economic Capability input appeared as a constraining factor to rapid military build-up. The Council of Economic Advisors strongly advised against any proposal to increase taxes. Such an increase, it was argued, would set off an inflationary spiral. This input provided strong evidence against a proclamation of national emergency.

Institutional Interest Groups, in particular groups within the State Department and the Defense Department can be said to have had an important influence upon the July 25 decision. For his part, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn Thompson 'lobbied' for a negotiations response. Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor 'informed' the President of the requirements of military build-up and the logic of military confrontation.

Bilateral Relations , and by this is meant the impact of French, British and West German leaders, are considered to have had marginal impact. In fact the Allies were deeply divided.

"The French were against all negotiations; the British were against risking war without negotiations; and the Germans as their autumn elections drew nearer were against both of these positions and seemingly everything else."<sup>35</sup>

Competing Elites, the final input of note , must also be ranked as marginal. There is only scant evidence to suggest that President Kennedy was greatly influenced by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield who publicly argued for a free city status for Berlin , or by the public criticisms of Senators Fulbright and Humphrey.

In summary the inputs were DB<sub>2</sub> (Rank 5) , M (Rank 4), Economic Capability (E) (Rank 3), Institutional Interest Groups (IG) (Rank 3), B<sub>1/2/3</sub> (Rank 2) , Competing Elites (CE) (Rank 2).  
Implementation of Strategic Decision (3)

July 31, 1961 - The House of Representatives approved the reserve bill.

August 1, 1961 - Sixty-four Air National Guard and Air Reserve units were placed on alert.

August 2, 1961 - The House of Representatives authorized \$950 million for the arms build-up.

August 8, 1961 - Three army training divisions are converted into combat-ready units for deployment overseas if necessary.

Subsequent Tactical Decisions:

A series of subsequent tactical decisions (a) related to the military and diplomatic components of the July 25 decision can be traced across the succeeding two month period.

Tactical Decision (1a) - August 15 , 1961  
This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to protest , in strong diplomatic terms , the erection of the Berlin barricade.

DB<sub>2</sub>, the construction of the Berlin barrier provided the critical input. The diplomatic form of response was adopted because the Kennedy Administration did not perceive the East German action as a test of its Berlin strategy. The Rusk statement of August 13 made it quite clear that the events then occurring in East Berlin fell outside of what he defined as United States' interests. Sorenson records total agreement within the administration in regard to this interpretation.

"Not one responsible official - in this country ...suggested that Allied forces should march into East German territory and tear the Wall down."

Tactical Decision (2a) - August 18, 1961  
This was a two part 'political-diplomatic' decision involving (1) the sending of Vice President Johnson to West Berlin as a Presidential emissary, (2) the ordering of a 1500 men battle group from West Germany to West Berlin.

The Dominant Bilateral input , the building of the Berlin Wall , must be considered as a significant

underlying factor. The immediate input however emanated from U.S. - West German relations. ( B<sub>3</sub>) In his letter to the President dated August 16, the Mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt, criticized the weakness of the Western response. This response had contributed only to the demoralization of the city's population and invited further East-German/Soviet initiatives.

"..Mayor Brandt warned that  
"more defensive tactics"  
would give the Soviets the  
impression that it was only  
"a matter of time" until they  
could sever West Berlin's  
connections to the Federal Republic,"<sup>37</sup>

This decision of August 18 was essentially an attempt to appease West Berliners. It clearly did not step outside of the basic definition of the Berlin strategy.

In summary the two inputs of note were B<sub>3</sub> (Rank 5) and DB<sub>2</sub> (Rank 4).

Tactical Decision (3a) - August 30, 1961

This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to dispatch General Clay to West Berlin as the personal representative of the President. It was intended that Clay would become a symbol of the the American commitment.

In reference to the Dominant Bilateral input, the initial construction of the barrier was followed by a Soviet note on August 23 menacing the interruption of air access. The critical event however, was the Soviet announcement of August 29 proclaiming the

resumption of nuclear testing.

The further deterioration of morale in West Berlin (B<sub>3</sub>) must also be considered as an important input into the August 30 decision.

In summary the inputs were DB<sub>2</sub> (Rank 5) and B<sub>3</sub> (Rank 4).

Tactical Decision (4a) - September 1, 1961

This was a 'political-diplomatic' decision to invite the Soviets to commence negotiations.

Following the public presentation of the Berlin strategy on July 25, the Kennedy Administration attempted to piece together a negotiating formula. These attempts first encountered Allied dissension at the Western foreign ministers' meeting on August 5th. The second major obstacle was the building of the Berlin Wall. Nevertheless, Kennedy was determined to follow up the diplomatic option.

The Dominant Bilateral Relationship, U.S. - Soviet Union, provided both setting and immediate inputs. The setting was one of increasing military build-up on both sides, a pattern of response which Kennedy feared would ultimately lead to nuclear war. Of immediate importance were the Soviet actions of August 23 and August 29, both apparently in response to American actions, both evidence, for Kennedy, of dangerous brinksmanship.

American attempts to enlist Allied support (B<sub>1/2/3</sub>) for negotiations proved to be particularly difficult

in the face of French opposition and German hesitancy. Only the British offered eager support. French and German leaders reasoned that the Khrushchev strategy was one of bluff from which he would retreat in a showdown.

(IG)Sorenson writes that the State Department's slowness in responding to Kennedy's demands for the formulation of negotiation proposals was indicative of a continuing resistance to negotiations. Implied in this resistance was the belief that,

"...any willingness to negotiate on anything other than obviously unattainable proposals was a sign of weakness; that there was nothing to negotiate about since the Soviets had no legitimate interests in Central Europe that we could concede and the West wanted no changes that the Soviets could accept."<sup>38</sup>

For its part , the National Security Council staff strongly endorsed immediate negotiation initiatives.

"On August 14 , the day after the first crossing points were closed, Bundy reported to the President unanimity in his immediate staff for the view that we should take a clear initiative for negotiation within the next week or ten days."<sup>39</sup>

In summary the inputs were DB<sub>2</sub> (Rank 5), B<sub>1/2/3</sub> (Rank 4) and IG (Rank 4).

#### Implementation of Tactical Decision (4a)

September 1, 1961 - President Kennedy requests that Ambassador Thompson invite Soviet leaders to begin

negotiations.

September 21, 27, 30 - Secretary of State Rusk met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in an effort to review possible negotiations on Berlin.

October 6, 1961 - President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko held exploratory talks in reference to the Berlin problem.

Crisis Phase: Summary:

In summary the crisis phase of the decision-flow (as indicated in diagram df-2) was dominated by the strategic decision of July 25 in which President Kennedy established his Berlin strategy. By far the two most important inputs to this decision were DB<sub>2</sub>, Kennedy's perceptions of Soviet actions, in particular the Berlin deadline and a continuing military build-up, and M, Kennedy's image of American military capability - the need for a large conventional response. The impact of perceived situation is most evident in reference to the DB<sub>2</sub> input. While in the pre-crisis phase the perception of an increasing threat from the Soviet Union confirmed the need for a substantial military build-up, as well as, increased diplomatic efforts to avoid nuclear war by miscalculation. In the crisis phase this threat was greatly intensified both by the surprise of the Berlin deadline and the time limit (actual and psychological) that it imposed. Consequently the decision of July 25 was to intensify both the military build-up and the search for a negotiated solution to the Berlin problem.



Crisis Chart

(Summary of decision-flow)

DECISION-FLOW




diagram df-2

Feedback: Introduction

Clearly a most important attribute of the Brecher et al. framework is its incorporation of dynamic interaction. This incorporation is achieved through an emphasis upon the continuous nature of the decision flow, "from inputs to perceptions, to the formulation of decisions, to their implementation, and to the feedback effect on various environmental components, operational and psychological, in the future."<sup>1</sup> A basic task in this decision-making study of the Berlin crisis is the operationalization of the concept of feedback. This task requires the tracing of consequences through the components of the operational environment, through the psychological environment of the decision-makers and finally to subsequent decisions.

In reference to the series of decisions made by American decision-makers during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the feedback process is to be traced through five components, three external -  $DB_2$ ,  $B_2$ ,  $S$ , two internal -  $M$ ,  $IG$ , across both the operational and psychological environments.<sup>2</sup>

$DB_2$  - Operational Environment:

The Berlin crisis of 1961 did not conclude with an agreement between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Indeed, not only had there been no negotiated solution, no meaningful negotiations had even taken place. Foreign Minister Gromyko would only reiterate the Soviet position on Berlin in his talks with Rusk and Kennedy in late September and early October 1961.

Evidently American proposals for negotiations, a basic component of Kennedy's Berlin strategy, did not achieve their intended goal of a more conciliatory Soviet response. Conventional force build-up, the other basic component proved to be equally unsuccessful: it did not prevent the construction of the Berlin Wall; it did provoke hostile Soviet reactions in the form of troop build-ups and the resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere.<sup>3</sup>

How did Khrushchev perceive<sup>4</sup> the consequences of this crisis period?<sup>5</sup> In the face of Western force increases the Soviet Union had demonstrated that it could not be intimidated. In the case of the Berlin Wall, its successful construction did reinforce the East German regime. In regard to the international strategic balance, although the U.S.S.R. had not been able to force the Western powers into accepting an alteration of the status quo, the United States had been persuaded to enter into negotiations. Importantly, as later demonstrated by his Cuban Missile strategy, Khrushchev was not yet prepared to abandon his belief in the efficacy of military power to extract Western concessions.

DB<sub>2</sub>- Psychological Environment:

Kennedy interpreted the Soviet doctrine of coexistence to mean continuing Communist incursions against the existing international balance of power. Ruling out the conversion of these forces he sought to achieve a global standstill. The principal obstacle to the realization of this objective, as perceived by Kennedy,

proved to be Khrushchev's intransigence. The Soviet leader's response to American offers of negotiation was particularly discouraging, although Kennedy remained convinced that the Soviets did not intend war.

"When Rusk commented to the President on September 5 that Moscow was showing little interest in negotiations, Kennedy replied grimly, "It isn't time yet. It's too early. They are bent on scaring the world to death before they begin negotiating, and they haven't quite brought the pot to boil." "6

The fear that most haunted the American President was the fear of Soviet miscalculation. Despite the experience of face to face contact at Vienna, the hostility of Khrushchev's reaction to Western force build-up, his unwillingness to adopt a more conciliatory position in response to offers of negotiation, indicated to Kennedy that the Soviet leader continued to misinterpret American intentions.

"What worried him was that Khrushchev might interpret his reluctance to wage nuclear war as a symptom of an American loss of nerve. Some day, he said, the time might come when he would have to run the supreme risk to convince Khrushchev that conciliation did not mean humiliation. "If Khrushchev wants to rub my nose in the dirt,".... "it's all over." But how to convince Khrushchev short of a showdown? "That son of a bitch won't pay any attention to words," the President said bitterly on another occasion. "He has to see you move." "7

Kennedy's hope that Soviet leaders, 'being rational men', would at least recognize the necessity of moderating the cold war, was not supported by Soviet behavior during the Berlin crisis. Particularly alarming to the American President was the Soviet announcement on August 29 of a decision to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere. This decision was clearly in contradiction to statements made by Khrushchev at Vienna in June.

In a future decision, that in response to the construction of Soviet missile sites in Cuba in October of 1962, Kennedy would again encounter what he perceived to be Soviet intransigence, brinksmanship (apparent irrationality), and the danger of miscalculation. However, in October 1962 the American President did not emphasize a diplomatic response.

"While he desired to combine diplomatic moves with military action, he was not willing to let the UN debate and Khrushchev equivocate while the missiles became operational."

Past experience, and the Berlin crisis was a case in point, had demonstrated the ineffectiveness of diplomatic action in achieving a more conciliatory Soviet response.

B<sub>2</sub> and S - Operational Environment:

The period of the Berlin crisis was marked by an increasing deterioration in Franco-American relations. This deterioration cannot be explained solely in reference to the immediate Soviet threat on Berlin: throughout the crisis De Gaulle did remain firm in

his opposition to Soviet demands. It was over the long term though that the French President refused to accept the continuation of American military and political dominance in Western Europe. It was the reconciliation of these two policies, the immediate and the long term, which determined the French response to Kennedy's Berlin strategy.

For the immediate, De Gaulle's firm commitment to the maintenance of the Western position in Berlin was communicated by word and deed. At his June meeting with Kennedy, the French President insisted that Khrushchev be made to understand that Soviet military initiatives in Berlin would provoke a general war. In his address to the French nation on July 12, 1961, De Gaulle sternly warned the U.S.S.R. against unilateral action on their part.

"Mais, dès lors qu'en remuant le tonnerre dans la coulisse on manifeste l'intention de disposer de Berlin, comme si trois grandes puissances n'y avaient pas les droits qui sont les leurs et comme si les Berlinoises ne devaient pas être maîtres d'eux-mêmes, on prend d'avance à son compte la responsabilité des graves conséquences qui pourraient en résulter."9

France also participated with Great Britain, the United States, and West Germany in Berlin crisis contingency planning: planning included all aspects of the Berlin problem, political, military, economic. At the military level, specifically in regard to the proposed American Autobahn strategy of gradual, probing escalation, the French were prepared to predelegate

authority in the initial preparatory stages. The committing of combat forces would however, require governmental approval.

For the long term, De Gaulle could accept neither the military, nor the diplomatic aspects of Kennedy's Berlin strategy. The former although it did hold out the promise of a NATO nuclear force refused any consideration of an independent force under French control. The latter the French President interpreted as being tantamount to a capitulation in the face of Soviet blackmail tactics. A brief investigation of De Gaulle's global perceptions and objectives provides certain insights into his rejection of the American strategy.

De Gaulle perceived the Superpower relationship as the greatest danger to the preservation of the nation-state: the nation-state being the basic component of international stability and legitimacy. This Superpower relationship promised to evolve in either of two directions , global war or mutual accord. Both directions would prove harmful to weaker states. In the instance of global war these states would be forced to exchange their autonomy for guarantees of security. In the instance of mutual accord the states would be subjected to Soviet-American direction.

Given this interpretation of the dangers inherent in a bi-polar system a principal objective became France's return to global power status , permitting France to assume the role of international critic and balancer. A necessary first step to the attainment of global power status became the achievement of independence,

specifically independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the United States: in this regard there was no distinction to be made between enemy and ally.

"Being French and in the French interest were defined by the Gaullist regime as being equally opposed to the encroachments of enemies and to the presumption of allies."

"Over time, there were neither permanent allies nor enemies but persistent threats, altering ceaselessly in shape and substance, to the independence of France and to the expansion of its global power and prestige."10

Employing this line of reasoning, the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, dominated as it was by the United States, did not serve to extend French power, it only permitted the continuing subordination of France both politically and militarily.

President de Gaulle's refusal to enter into four power ministerial talks in August and again in September 1961, his public address of September 5 insisting upon a firm stand, all rejections of Kennedy's negotiations strategy, were all part of a larger scheme to disengage France from American policy leadership. A similar interpretation could also be advanced with reference to the French rejection of the American military strategy.

Future French decisions, the withdrawal of French forces from NATO, the development of an independent 'force de frappe', were also to be understood in terms of this incompatibility of U.S. global strategies and French national interests.



B<sub>2</sub> and S - Psychological Environment:

How did President Kennedy perceive the consequences of the American decisions taken during the period of the Berlin crisis with reference to Franco-American relations and the future of the Atlantic Alliance?

In a statement made during his meeting with President de Gaulle in early June 1961, Kennedy indicated that American policies would reflect an appreciation of the shift in power relationships.

"He gave a frank appraisal of the changing shape of problems in Europe. The policies of the late forties, he said, were no longer "adequate" for the circumstances of the sixties. "All of the power relationships in the world have changed in the last fifteen years, and therefore our policies must take these changes into account." America had lost its nuclear monopoly..."<sup>11</sup>

However, this apparent appreciation of the changing power relationship did not convince Kennedy of the need for an independent European nuclear force. The American guarantee remained sufficient.

"I consider it an honor, and it does give me an opportunity to once again restate the basic conviction of the people of the United States that our security is inevitably tied up with the security of Europe. The United States cannot look forward to a free existence if Western Europe is not free."<sup>12</sup>

However, two attempts by the American President to reconcile the U.S. and French positions, his proposal for the creation of a limited NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force of June 1961, and in September 1961, an agreement with France for 'cooperation on the uses of atomic energy' for mutual defense', failed to elicit enthusiastic French responses. In the succeeding months Kennedy and his advisers would become convinced that the existing American military policy was indeed not reconcilable with French demands. Following a European visit in March of 1962, General Taylor, President Kennedy's military representative, concluded that,

"Every official, American or European, with whom I talked was perfectly convinced that de Gaulle would carry out his plans to get nuclear weapons regardless of the cost or American opposition..."<sup>13</sup>

Although he did not publicly condemn the French government during the crisis period, Kennedy's attitude toward French tactics, particularly those designed to sabotage the American negotiations strategy, became increasingly more intolerant.

"The prolonged, fruitless consultations on Berlin in 1961, and the constant criticisms emanating from unnamed sources in Allied capitals, often annoyed him. He noted sarcastically that NATO members who complained about U.S. "interference" in European security still expected the U.S. to bear the brunt of NATO military

outlays while they failed to meet their quotas. ("A coherent policy," he said, "cannot call for both our military presence and our diplomatic absence.")<sup>14</sup>

Ultimately Kennedy would conclude that talks if they were to be held at all would have to be carried on without French involvement.

"The President decided, therefore, that the United States would jaw, jaw on its own as a self-appointed agent for the Alliance."<sup>15</sup>

Kennedy did not however, totally abandon his efforts to achieve Alliance unity; to do so he felt would only encourage Soviet ambitions. Kennedy remained convinced that in spite of French dissension the preservation of Alliance unity was too essential for the achievement of American aims to be abandoned.

#### M - Operational Environment:

In terms of U.S. military capability, the consequences of the Berlin crisis decisions were considerable. Kennedy's military strategy emphasized a large scale conventional build-up. The army grew from 14 to 16 divisions, with three of the original fourteen divisions being converted from training to combat status. In all, total strength of the armed forces increased by 300,000 men, while 40,000 additional troops were sent to Europe.<sup>16</sup> In support of this increase the defense budget climbed eight billion dollars above previous estimates.

M - Psychological Environment:


For Kennedy the most important consequence of his military strategy was the development of an adequate non-nuclear response. Under the old policy Kennedy concluded, the escalation distance from conventional , through tactical to all-out nuclear war was dangerously short. It was necessary to (1) strengthen the conventional level response - to match the West's conventional forces in Europe the Soviet Union would need to mount an all-out attack.

"The President did not hope to defeat an all-out Communist attack on Western Europe by conventional forces alone , but he doubted that the Communists would try an all-out attack since it would guarantee a nuclear response."<sup>17</sup>

(2) reduce reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons - this would be accomplished through re-organization of the army.

IG - Psychological Environment:

The State Department proved unable to measure up to Presidential expectations during the Berlin crisis. Charged with the task of formulating a reply to the Soviet memoire of June 4, the Department's draft , "a compilation of stale , tedious and negative phrases,"<sup>18</sup> required over a month to prepare. Kennedy was plainly dissatisfied with this bureaucratic inability to meet a situation which clearly required a quick response.



"The frustrations of the summer over Berlin brought the President's discontent with his Department of State to a climax. One muddle after another - the Department's acquiescence in the Bay of Pigs, the fecklessness of its recommendations after the disaster...the maddening delay over the answer to Khrushchev's aide-memoire and the banality of the result, the apparent impossibility of developing a negotiating position for Berlin - left Kennedy with little doubt that the State Department was not yet an instrumentality fully and promptly responsive to presidential purpose."19

Unable to integrate the Department into the decision process according to his own designs Kennedy came to rely almost exclusively upon the NSC staff, his White House advisors and problem task forces.

Conclusion:

What are the principal findings of this case study analysis?

- (1) A decision-making elite, dominated by the President, is identified as the key component of the American foreign policy system.
- (2) The perceptions of the American decision-making elite, in particular those of the President, to a large extent determined the make-up of the high policy structures; the fashioning of the action channels.
- (3) Using the perceptions of this decision-making elite as a basis, the concept of crisis, as a perceived

situation , is operationalized. However, lacking developmental qualities the 'static' Hermann definition must be modified when applied to the decision-flow in order to locate the pre-crisis phase.

(4)  $DB_2$  and M , specifically Kennedy's perceptions of Soviet actions and United States' military capability were the key inputs to the decision-flow throughout the crisis.

(5) The impact of perceived situation upon foreign policy decisions is particularly evident in reference to the  $DB_2$  input. While in the pre-crisis phase the perception of an increasing Soviet threat confirmed the need for a substantial military build-up , as well as, increased diplomatic efforts to avoid nuclear war by miscalculation, in the crisis phase this threat is greatly intensified both by the surprise of the Berlin deadline and the time limit (actual and psychological) it imposed. Consequently the decision of July 25 was to intensify both the military build-up and the search for a negotiated solution to the Berlin problem.

(6) The consequences of decisions made by American decision-makers during the Berlin Wall crisis can be traced in both the operational and psychological environments of a number of external and internal variables. Perceptions of Soviet behavior during the Berlin crisis may have influenced President Kennedy during the later Cuban Missile crisis.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER TWO

Introduction:

- 1 Sorenson, Theodore, C., Kennedy. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965.
- 2 Ibid., p.5

Decision-Making Elite and Decision-Process:

- 1 Brecher, M. Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy. London: Oxford Univ. Press, and New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1974, p.3
- 2 Brecher, M., B. Steinberg and J. Stein, "A Framework for research on foreign policy behavior", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13, 1969, pp. 75-101
- 3 See Krasner, S.D., "Are Bureaucracies Important?" Foreign Policy No. 7, Summer 1972, pp. 159-179
- 4 Allison, G.T., "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", American Political Science Review Vol. LXIII, pp. 689-718
- 5 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 421
- 6 Sorenson, T.C. Kennedy. p. 287
- 7 Ibid., p. 281
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 During the Berlin crisis the President did convene informal meetings of the NSC including many of the formal members.
- 10 Sorenson, T.C., Kennedy. p. 283
- 11 Ibid., p. 586

Decision-Flow:

- 1 Indirect stimuli may be regarded as 'passive' inputs while direct stimuli may be considered as 'active' inputs.
- 2 Ranking follows a five point scale: 5 Decisive / 4 Significant / 3 Important / 2 Consequential / 1 Marginal. Ranking is based upon a qualitative analysis of both primary data - Presidential speeches and secondary data - memoirs of advisors.

- 3 In reference to strategic and tactical decisions the problem is twofold: (1) to differentiate a strategic from a tactical decision; (2) to relate tactical decisions and strategic decisions in a decision-flow.

The indicators of differentiation are consequence and definition or redefinition of objectives and/or acceptable alternatives. By consequence is meant the scope and range of consequences - changes in the operational environment - perceived or intended by the decision-makers. By definition or redefinition is meant the definition or redefinition of basic objectives and/or acceptable alternatives in regard to a given situation.

Strategic and tactical decisions are determined according to the above indicators in the following manner. In reference to consequence, the scope and range of a strategic decision is significantly greater. In reference to objectives and/or acceptable alternatives, a strategic decision involves the definition or redefinition of basic objectives and/or acceptable alternatives in regard to a given situation. A 'subsequent' tactical decision (subsequent to a strategic decision) is a 'narrow' decision in the sense that the total space of alternatives has been previously reduced by a strategic decision so that choice is now among fundamentally (directionally) consistent alternatives. A 'preceding' tactical decision (preceding a strategic decision) is a 'partially oriented' decision in the sense that this decision cannot be placed within the boundaries of a previous definition of basic objectives and/or acceptable alternatives in regard to the given situation. The 'preceding' tactical decision cannot be placed within the boundaries of a previous definition of basic objectives and/or acceptable alternatives either because there was no previous definition or because the decision has stepped outside of a previous definition.



- 4 Hermann, C.F., "International Crisis as a Situational Variable", in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. New York: The Free Press, 1969.
- 5 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 348
- 6 Schick, Jack M., The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962. Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. Press, 1971, p. 140
- 7 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 348
- 8 "Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget- March 28, 1961" in U.S. President: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Registrar, John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp.229-234
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 315
- 11 Ibid., p. 318
- 12 "Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget - March 28, 1961"
- 13 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days, p.353
- 14 Ibid., pp. 379-380
- 15 B<sub>1</sub> (U.S. - British Relations) B<sub>2</sub> (U.S.-French relations) B<sub>3</sub> (U.S. - West German relations)
- 16 "Joint Statement Following Discussion With Prime Minister Macmillan - June 5, 1961" in Public Papers - J.F.K. p. 441
- 17 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days, p.375
- 18 Ibid., p. 400
- 19 A 'Factor' is to be distinguished from a 'Feature' in the sense that the former is an explanatory variable, while the latter is a descriptive characteristic.
- 20 Camp, Glen D., Jr., (ed.), Berlin in the East-West Struggle. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1971, p. 144
- 21 Ibid., p. 154
- 22 Slusser, Robert M., The Berlin Crisis of 1961. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973, p. 15
- 23 Ibid., pp. 17-18
- 24 Camp, Glen D., Jr., (ed.), Berlin in the East-West Struggle, p. 152
- 25 Ibid., p. 191
- 26 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 388
- 27 Ibid., p. 387
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid., p. 390

- 30 "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis - July 25, 1961" in Public Papers - J.F.K. pp. 533-540
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days., p. 376
- 33 Ibid., p. 391
- 34 "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis - July 25, 1961."
- 35 Sorenson, T.C., Kennedy., p. 283
- 36 Ibid., p. 594
- 37 Schick, Jack M., The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962., p. 167
- 38 Sorenson, T.C., Kennedy., p. 596
- 39 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days., p. 398

Feedback:

- 1 Brecher, M., Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy., p. 4
- 2 It may be argued , with justification , that much of what follows will not be a rigorous analysis of feedback as intended by the Brecher framework. While accepting this criticism it should be noted: that insufficient data made such rigor impossible to achieve.
- 3 There is much speculation that these Soviet actions were in fact part of a long term strategy. See Slusser pp. 157 -178
- 4 The verb 'to perceive' placed as it is in the Operational Environment may lead to some confusion. It is argued here that it is important to determine not only what impact a set of decisions has on the operational environment , but why it has this impact. It is assumed that the perceptions of Soviet decision-makers largely determined the impact of these decisions upon Soviet behavior.
- 5 Slusser offers an in-depth examination of Soviet perceptions during the Berlin crisis in his text previously noted.
- 6 Schlesinger , A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days., p. 398
- 7 Ibid., p. 391
- 8 Sorenson, T.C., Kennedy., p. 683
- 9 De Gaulle, Charles, Memoires d'Espoir:Le Renouveau 1958-1962. Paris: Plon, 1970, p. 273

- 10 Kelodzief, Edwar, A., French International Policy Under de Gaulle and Pompidou. Ithaca N.Y.:Cornell Univ. Press, 1974, p. 70
- 11 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days., p. 356
- 12 "Remarks in Paris before the North Atlantic Council - June 1, 1961" in Public Papers - J.F.K. p. 427
- 13 Taylor, Maxwell, D., Swords and Plowshares. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972, p. 213
- 14 Sorenson, T.C., Kennedy., p. 563
- 15 Ibid., p. 597
- 16 For more detailed information see Sorenson, p. 627
- 17 Ibid., p. 627
- 18 Ibid., p. 587
- 19 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days., p. 406

## CHAPTER THREE

### BERLIN WALL CRISIS - HYPOTHESIS TESTING

#### Introduction:

Underlying the Brecher study of Israeli decision-making, "Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy", is a basic impulse to theory-oriented empirical research: research must not be confined to the limits of a single case study. The development of generalizations - theory building, Brecher insists, requires that hypotheses be tested against the data of a number of comparable case studies. "Only then can any of these hypotheses be regarded as valid building blocks for a theory of state behavior."<sup>1</sup> By this method the degree of internal validity is determined - the capacity of hypotheses to predict outcomes (probable) in those case studies investigated, as is the degree of external validity - the generalizability of hypotheses, the capacity of hypotheses to predict outcomes in similar uninvestigated studies.

There are approximately 40 hypotheses to be tested against the Berlin 1961 data. These relate changes in decision-makers' perceptions and the decision-process, identified as the dependent variables, to changes in perceived situation, identified as the independent variable.<sup>2</sup>

These hypotheses have been gathered from a number of sources, for the most part previous research efforts

into the study of foreign policy crises.<sup>3</sup> Importantly, many of these hypotheses have been subjected to reformulation. In each case this reformulation was dictated by the structural requirements of explanatory statements. These requirements are identified in Eugene Meehan's differentiation of description and explanation.<sup>4</sup>

"Descriptions may contain a record of differences over time; the concept of change is an inference from such records and not directly observed - a point we owe to David Hume."

"In effect, a description is a static record, similar to the individual frame in a moving picture.."

"Descriptions are records of differences, and over time, records of differences in particular sets of differences."

"Explanations always deal with changes and not with differences; concepts, and particularly classifications, are concerned with differences and not with changes."<sup>5</sup>

On the basis of the above reasoning the following two hypotheses are considered to be static descriptions.

"Crisis decisions tend to be reached by ad hoc decisional units."<sup>6</sup>

"...in times of 'national stress' when national aspirations seemed threatened, decision-makers are likely to be less aware of the complexity of their environment."<sup>7</sup>

Neither example incorporates the dimension of change. Neither example contains a relationship of variance. In regard to the reformulation of these and other like static descriptions the basic assumption is that

situation and internal processes possess dynamic properties, that is , they evolve through time. A basic research question asks whether changes (variance) in situation, (the independent variable) bring about identifiable changes in the decision-process, (the dependent variable)? To determine this impact one examines situation/decision-process at succeeding points along the time dimension. This should not be confused with a static comparison of different situations. The focus is upon situational change , specifically the relationship of variance in situation to variance in process. (see diagram h-1)

The Berlin data are not subjected to exact measurement. Consequently , hypothesis testing becomes an essentially interpretative , that is to say, non-mathematical procedure. Admittedly the results obtained are especially vulnerable to the bias of subjectivity, and this is a possible basis for criticism. However, this subjective content cannot be regarded as sufficient basis for a total a priori rejection of all such interpretative results. So-called mathematical techniques are clearly not without elements of subjectivity.

The hypotheses to be tested may be clustered according to two broad categories of dependent variables, perceptual and organizational. The former can be further subdivided into perceptions of environment and of self. The latter breaks down into structural and functional aspects. (see diagram h-2)

Situation/Process

(Diagrammatic Representation of Relationship)





diagram h-1

Hypotheses Clustering





Hypothesis Testing: (S / Support) (NS / Non-Support)

A. Threat:

H1 As threat increases in a crisis situation, decision-making becomes increasingly centralised. (Derived from Lentner 1972:309,130)

(S) In the face of increasing threat precipitated by the Soviet memoire of June 4 , the State Department was unable to measure up to Presidential expectations. Charged with the task of formulating a reply, the Department produced an unimaginative draft which required over a month to prepare. In order to respond effectively to the crisis Kennedy came to rely almost exclusively upon the NSC staff, his White House advisers and the Berlin task force.

H2 As threat increases in a crisis situation, the number of participants in a decision tends to increase. (Derived from Hermann 1972c:311,197)

(S) On the 16th of June Kennedy named an outside adviser , Dean Acheson , to lead a policy task force whose assignment it was to prepare recommendations for confronting Soviet initiatives in Berlin. Retired General Maxwell Taylor was also appointed as special military representative to the President in June of 1961.

H3 As threat increases in a crisis situation, the greater the felt need for face-to-face proximity among decision-makers. (Derived from Paige 1968:288)

(S) During the crisis phase members of the decision-making elite were in almost continual face-to-face contact. Informal meetings of the National Security Council occurred frequently throughout the summer months. The erection of the Berlin barricade on August 13 occasioned around the clock meetings of the Berlin Task force. Throughout the crisis phase the President's three chief subordinates, Secretary of State Rusk, Defense Secretary McNamara and special military representative, Taylor, met regularly with the President. As well, White House advisers and MacGeorge Bundy provided President Kennedy with daily interpretations.

H4. As threat increases in a crisis situation, the more the leader's solicitation of subordinate advice. (Derived from Paige 1968:290)

(S) Kennedy continually sought the advice of his subordinates. The President repeatedly requested submission of written reports providing definitions of the Berlin situation, United States' objectives and alternative strategies. In the decision of August 15, Kennedy depended almost totally on the recommendations of the Berlin Task force.<sup>8</sup>

H5 As threat increases in a crisis situation, the greater the acceptance of responsibility for action by the leader. (Derived from Paige 1968:289)

(S) In his text Sorenson writes that President Kennedy took complete charge of the Berlin operation. Kennedy considered the July 25 and August 15 decisions ultimately as his decisions to make. Similarly the consequences flowing from those decisions he accepted as his responsibility.

H6 As threat increases in a crisis situation, performance by the decision-makers generally worsens. (Derived from Milburn 1972:318,264)

(NS) There is no evidence to suggest that the performance of American decision-makers worsened as they perceived increasing levels of threat: with reference to public appearances of the President there are no reports of grave physical or mental fatigue; neither Sorenson nor Schlesinger indicate a breakdown of communication or cooperation within the decision-making elite.

H7 As threat increases in a crisis situation, the greater the felt need for information. (Derived from Paige 1968:292)

(S) In his description of Kennedy's involvement in the Berlin operation, Sorenson emphasizes the President's interest in and awareness of the daily information flow. Kennedy sought direct information, "...he kept track of all the cables, he read transcripts of all the conferences."<sup>9</sup>

- H8 As threat increases in a crisis situation, the greater the propensity for decision-makers to supplement information about the objective state of affairs with information drawn from their own past experience. (Derived from Paige 1968: 295)  
(Insufficient Data)
- H9 As threat increases in a crisis situation, the more information about it tends to be elevated to the top of the organizational hierarchy.  
(Derived from Paige 1972: 305,47)  
(S) In his description of President Kennedy's involvement in the Berlin operation Sorenson emphasizes the President's interest in and awareness of the daily information flow. A good deal of this information with reference to Berlin, reached the President directly, without prior interpretation from within the State Department or even by White House advisers.
- H10 As threat increases in a crisis situation, the rate of communication by a nation's decision-makers to international actors outside their country will increase. (Derived from Hermann 1972c:312,202)  
(S) President Kennedy regarded close personal contact as an important strategy to achieve Allied unity in the face of the increasing Soviet threat. The meetings with British Prime Minister Macmillan on June 4 and 5 are representative of Kennedy's efforts to communicate with an Allied leader in an effort to deal with the apparent crisis.

H11 As threat increases in a crisis situation, the influence of the armed forces in the making of decisions becomes greater.

(Derived from Brecher 1974b:174)

(NS) Although retired General Maxwell Taylor was appointed as military representative to the President in June of 1961, there is no evidence to suggest that this appointment was indicative of or resulted in an increasing influence of the armed forces in the making of decisions. Indeed the July 8 meeting clearly demonstrated a strong tendency by the President away from an emphasis on military strategy as the 'only' option.

H12 As a threat to survival increases in a crisis situation, the influence of the economic variable on decisions tends to decrease. (Derived from Brecher 1974b:175)

(NS) In reference to the July 25 decision the economic variable appeared as an important constraint to any rapid military build-up. The Council of Economic Advisors voiced strong opposition to any measures necessitating an inflationary tax increase - a view which Kennedy apparently heeded.

H13 As threat increases in a crisis situation, decision time becomes more important in determining how many alternatives will be considered. (Derived from Hermann 1972c:312,199)  
(Insufficient Data)

B. Time:

H14 As time salience increases<sup>10</sup> in a crisis situation, the greater the likelihood of decisional unit consensus. (Derived from Paige 1972:305,52)

(S) The decision of August 15, 1961, in response to the erection of the Berlin barricade, was a product of continuous around the clock discussions. Sorenson records total agreement within the Administration in regard to the content of that decision.

H15 As time salience increases in a crisis situation, the number of participants in a decision tends to decrease. (Derived from Hermann 1972c:312,197)  
(Insufficient Data)

H16 As time salience increases in a crisis situation, the lesser the consultation with persons outside the core decisional unit. (Derived from Paige 1972:305,52)

(NS) The formulation of the August 15, 1961 decision to protest, in strong diplomatic terms, the erection of the Berlin barricade, did involve consultation among the governments of the Western powers.

H17 As time salience increases in a crisis situation, the lesser the search for alternatives. (Derived from Robinson 1972:304, 23)

(Insufficient Data)

H18 As time salience increases in a crisis situation, less alternative courses of action are considered.

(Derived from Paige 1972: 306, 52)

(NS) Throughout the crisis Kennedy refused to perceive response in the narrow terms of a single strategy. Relative to the July 25 decision, the decision time for the August 15 decision was perceived to be extremely limited and yet a number of alternatives, both military and non-military were considered.

H19 As time salience increases in a crisis situation, the greater the inputs of oral versus written information and interpretation. (Derived from Paige 1972: 305, 52)

(Insufficient Data)

H20 As time salience increases in a crisis situation, the greater the efforts to communicate with allies on a face-to-face basis. (Derived from Paige 1972: 306, 52)

(S) Following his European visit in June 1961, President Kennedy did not again personally meet with Allied leaders during the crisis period. However, constant communication did take place among the Allies: the Berlin contingency planning sessions provided one forum for interchange of ideas.

H22 As time salience increases in a crisis situation, shifts in the value bases designed to legitimate the crisis responses will tend to decrease.

(Derived from Paige 1972: 306, 52)

(S) Throughout the crisis there is not any indication of a shift in the value bases underlying the American responses. Kennedy remained firm in his commitment to arrest Communist penetration and prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.

H22 As time salience increases in a crisis situation, the greater the investment of emotional affect by decision-makers in policy and personal differences. ( Derived from Paige 1972: 305,52)

(S) In his text Schlesinger writes that Kennedy was preoccupied with the Berlin problem throughout the summer of 1961. "He's imprisoned by Berlin."<sup>11</sup>, remarked the secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall. Kennedy was determined that the United States would not yield to Soviet threats. However, his fear of prompting a nuclear war inclined Kennedy toward a build-up of conventional forces and to insist upon the importance of negotiations as in fact the only acceptable alternative.

C. Intensity:

H23 As the crisis becomes more intense<sup>12</sup>, the greater the centralization of authority in the decision-making process. ( Derived from Milburn 1972:319,266)

(S) Sorenson indicates that President Kennedy took complete charge of the Berlin operation. Although the President encouraged any number of oral and written submissions it was he who drew from these



sources to construct a Berlin strategy. The July 25 decision was in this sense not a committee decision.

H24 As the crisis becomes more intense, the decision process tends to be dominated by ad hoc decisional units. (Derived from Paige 1968:281)

(S) The State Department did not measure up to Kennedy's expectations during the crisis phase. Its apparatus proved unable to deliver quick, decisive responses. Ad hoc decisional units including the Berlin Task force, and White House advisers became the basic components of the decision process.

H25 As the crisis becomes more intense, the less complex the form of behavior. (Derived from Milburn 1972: 318,265)

(NS) There is no indication that as the crisis became more intense the perceptual abilities of American decision-makers declined. Throughout the crisis Kennedy demonstrated a keen awareness of the complexity of the situation. Nor is there evidence of the simplification of the motivational processes. The basic survival needs were of course present, but these did not replace, on the one hand, the commitment to a negotiated solution, and on the other hand, the sense of commitment to the 'Free World'.

H26 As the crisis becomes more intense, the heavier the overload of channels of communication.  
(Derived from Holsti 1972a:307,73)  
(Insufficient Data)

H27 As the crisis becomes more intense, the greater the tendency to rely upon extraordinary or improvised channels of communication.  
(Derived from Holsti 1972a:307,75)

(S) A substantial amount of the communication among the Western powers bypassed normal diplomatic channels. These extraordinary channels included personal contact among the leaders, Berlin contingency planning groups and foreign ministers' meetings.

H28 As the crisis becomes more intense the stronger the tendency for rumour to be transmitted as fact. (Derived from North et al. 1963: 165)  
(Insufficient Data)

H29 As the crisis becomes more intense, decision-makers are likely to be less aware of the complexity of their environment. (Derived from Pruitt 1965:411)  
(NS) During the crisis phase United States' decision-makers remained cognizant of the complexity of the operational environment. In particular, President Kennedy appreciated the interrelatedness of the Soviet challenge in Berlin, United States' relations in Western Europe and the American position worldwide.

H30 As the crisis becomes more intense, the more attention decision-makers will give to domestic constraints on choice. (Derived from Brecher 1974b: 174)

(S) In response to arguments for a proclamation of national emergency the Council of Economic Advisors counselled the President to avoid inflationary tax increases. This warning provided a strong case against any dramatic force build-up as suggested by Acheson.

H31 As the crisis becomes more intense, the role of interest groups as transmitters of demands to decision-makers becomes greater. (Derived from Brecher 1974b:175)

(NS) Although institutional interest groups , in particular, groups within the State Department and the Defense Department did influence the July 25 decision, to some extent, the role of institutional interest groups actually declined during the crisis: witness the decline of the State Department.

H32 As the crisis becomes more intense, the influence of competing elites decreases. (Derived from Brecher 1974b:174)

(S) In reference to the July 25 decision there is little evidence to suggest that President Kennedy was greatly influenced by competing political elites including Senate Majority leader Mansfield who publicly argued for a free city status for Berlin.

H33 As the crisis becomes more intense, decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future.

(Derived from Holsti 1965:226)

(NS) The emphasis upon the broader political context contained in the July 25 decision indicates that the decision-makers continued to be much concerned with the future situation. The August 15 decision to protest in strong diplomatic terms, but not to respond militarily, revealed an appreciation of the Wall as one event within a continuing conflict, an event not important enough to risk all future solutions.

H34 As the crisis becomes more intense, decision-makers are likely to consider fewer alternatives.

(Derived from Pruitt 1965: 411)

(NS) A number of alternatives contained within the broad headings of military and negotiating strategies were considered as possible responses to the Soviet threat. Throughout the crisis Kennedy refused to perceive American response simply as a choice among military options. In reference to the August 15 decision, the Berlin Task force considered numerous alternatives ranging from the severing of interzonal trade to an alteration of interzonal passes before recommending a strong diplomatic response.

- H35 As the crisis becomes more intense, the decision-makers will perceive the range of alternatives open to themselves to become narrower. (Derived from Holsti 1972a:307, 70)
- (NS) As the crisis became more intense Kennedy actually perceived an enlarging of the range of alternatives. This occurred with the development of a large conventional response and the formulation of a mixed-option strategy.
- H36 As the crisis becomes more intense, decision-makers are likely to choose among alternatives with less adequate review of their consequences. (Derived from Pruitt 1965: 411)
- (NS) Throughout the crisis Kennedy considered negotiations as the only acceptable alternative, in terms of consequences, to a solution in Berlin. At the July 8 meeting President Kennedy, troubled by what he considered as an inadequate appreciation of political consequences, ordered an exhaustive review of alternative strategies and their probable consequences. The decision of August 15 not to invoke strong measures of retaliation, i.e. severing of interzonal trade or military intervention, indicated an appreciation of the consequences of such measures.
- H37 As the crisis becomes more intense, various costs and side effects of a preferred option tend to be neglected. (Derived from Milburn 1972: 319,273)

(S) Despite a recognition by Kennedy that American offers of negotiation would probably be regarded by Moscow as a sign of weakness, the President came to insist more and more upon the negotiations option.

Conclusion:

As noted in the discussion of the decision-making approach in chapter one , because of the constraints to the gathering of perceptual data , research findings may not achieve the level of specificity demanded by research questions. To some extent the above findings may well be criticized for this failure. To the discussion in chapter one it could be added that hypotheses may not be testable due to an insufficiency of data. (Perhaps one could also fault the absence of quantitative content analysis.) Certainly any assessment of this chapter must take note of the fact that seven hypotheses fall into this category. Nevertheless, 80% of the hypotheses did prove to be testable and of these , sixty percent did support some kind of relationship between the independent variable , perceived situation and the dependent variable , either perceptual or organizational. As such, this chapter does provide a number of fairly specific and comparable research findings, which in general confirm that crisis as a situational variable is an important explanatory variable in reference to foreign policy behavior.

Hypotheses Summary

<u>Supporting</u>	<u>Not Supporting</u>	<u>Insufficient Data</u>
1	6	8
2	11	13
3	12	15
4	16	17
5	18	19
7	25	26
9	29	28
10	31	
14	33	
20	34	(7) = 18%
21	35	
22	36	
23		
24		
27	(12) = 33%	
30		
32		
37		
(18) = 49%		

Total Support of Testable Hypotheses

$$= \frac{18}{30} = 60\%$$

diagram h-3

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER THREE

- 1 Brecher, M., Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy p. 518
- 2 Refer to the crisis behavior models in the discussion of the decision-making approach in chapter one.
- 3 See Appendix in Hermann, C.F. (ed.), International Crisis. New York:Free Press, 1972.
- 4 Meehan, Eugene J., The Foundations of Political Analysis. Homewood, Illinois:The Dorsey Press, 1971.
- 5 Ibid., p. 48
- 6 See Hypothesis 24
- 7 See Hypothesis 29
- 8 Responses to hypotheses four and ten may be criticized for not stating whether increases occurred over time. The difficulty here is that high levels of subordinate solicitation and communication to foreign actors are recorded throughout the crisis.
- 9 Sorenson, T.C., Kennedy. p. 586
- 10 "Increasing time salience" means the perception by decision-makers of less time in which to decide.
- 11 Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., A Thousand Days. pp. 390-391
- 12 "Increasing intensity of crisis" refers to a combination of perception of increasing threat and perception of increasing time salience.



## CHAPTER   FOUR

### A SYNTHESIS OF TWO APPROACHES TO CRISIS?

In his (1972b) study of international crisis , Charles McClelland indicates that decision-making and systemic analyses of crisis - the one he depicts as being preoccupied with intra-unit processes , the other with inter-unit processes - should ultimately be brought together in a synthesis. Notably, no elaboration of a scheme to achieve synthesis is provided by McClelland. As such , even if one were to accept the intra/inter distinction as a basis for synthesis , in the absence of such a scheme the critical question of 'how' remains unanswered, that is , how is synthesis to be achieved? In particular, what are the mechanisms of linkage? It is to this question that the final chapter of this thesis addresses itself.

McClelland's reference to a synthesis of approaches is not without precursors in the literature on foreign policy behavior. As one example , the idea of a synthesis underlies James N. Rosenau's proposed development of a pre-theory of foreign policy<sup>1</sup>. For Rosenau a necessary task is to merge intra and extra unit analyses. The problem is to construct some sort of incorporating framework.

"To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other."<sup>2</sup>

Rosenau devises a pre-theory structure to incorporate foreign policy variables , variables which have been previously classified into five groupings: four he considers as intra-unit - idiosyncratic, role , governmental and societal; the fifth includes any systemic variables.<sup>3</sup> The formulation of this pre-theory of foreign policy requires an assessment of the relative potencies of the variable groupings.

"That is, one has to decide which set of variables contributes most to external behavior , which ranks next in influence and so on through all sets."<sup>4</sup>

To be noted here is an implicit assumption , one to which this discussion will return later, that these five sets of variables are comparable.

Unfortunately, Rosenau fails to elaborate the mechanics of comparison: a failure which Rosenau attributes to the purpose of his study.

"There is no need here to elaborate at length on the reasoning underlying each ranking. The point is not to demonstrate the validity of the rankings but rather to indicate what the construction of a pre-theory of foreign policy involves."<sup>5</sup>

Whether justified or not, it remains that while he does indicate the bases for synthesis, Rosenau does not satisfy the question of how - the mechanisms of synthesis.

To this point it has been established that both McClelland and Rosenau fail to specify how synthesis is to be achieved. Both also in their elaborations

of the bases of synthesis portray the principal approaches to foreign policy behavior essentially in terms of intra/inter-unit variables. Drawing upon the earlier discussion of the systemic and decision-making approaches in chapter one, it may be argued that these portraits are incomplete. Specifically, they disregard a second critical aspect, that is, the perceptual variable, included in the decision-making approach, excluded by the systemic approach. Indeed, if the differences were simply those of intra/inter-unit foci then the Brecher et al. research framework which incorporates both intra and extra unit variables could be presented as a framework of synthesis. But it is not presented precisely because its basic mechanism of incorporation is the perceptions of decision-makers.


Significantly, this argument seems to have found acceptance in Raymond Tanter's study of international crises, in particular his elaboration of a synthesis of the systemic and decision-making approaches, an elaboration in which he confronts both aspects.

In his study, "Modelling and Managing International Conflicts: The Berlin Crises", Raymond Tanter sets forth three basic goals of inquiry: (1) "to explain the level and variability of East-West conflictive intensity on the basis of three attributes - alliance, conflict and phase; (2) to explain East-West conflictive intensity on the basis of two parameters - event/interaction and organizational processes - within the context set by the alliance, conflict and phase attributes;

(3) to infer from the explorations some implications for conflict modelling and management in other situations."<sup>6</sup>

In terms of this discussion it is the second goal with its promise of synthesis which receives particular attention. Related to this goal are two principal assumptions. The first assumption appears in the form of a working hypothesis: the intensity of Alliance behavior at a given point in time (t) is a consequence of the previous behavior of its opponent at time (t-1), and the previous behavior of the Alliance itself- its organizational process, at time (t-1). (see diagram s-1) Essentially the Tanter synthesis involves a combining of the systemic approach with Graham Allison's 'model'<sup>7</sup> of organizational processes.<sup>8</sup> Without at this point entering into a discussion of the bases of this synthesis it certainly may be argued that the Allison organizational processes model is not truly representative of the decision-making approach. Going beyond the persistent criticism of its limited applicability outside of the United States' foreign policy decision-process, it is not entirely clear, as Stephen Krasner indicates, that the model provides an accurate representation even in this select case.<sup>9</sup> Krasner is willing to concede that organizational processes may indeed dominate in periods of incremental policy change; however, in periods of directional, non-incremental policy change it is the values of the authoritative decision-makers (these decision-makers act according to a rational decision-making process) which account for foreign policy decisions.

Tanter Hypothesis  
(event/interaction-organizational processes  
synthesis)



Warsaw Treaty Organization

North Atlantic Treaty  
Organization

diagram s-1

If accepted, the Krasner argument is particularly damaging to the Tanter study. One of the study's basic research questions, "do the event/interaction processes dominate alliance conflictive behavior during the crisis phase, and do organizational processes dominate in pre- and post-crisis phases;"<sup>10</sup>, clearly excludes any possibility of a rational decision-making process, in the Krasner sense. The Krasner argument would suggest that with the decline of organizational dominance during a crisis period the authoritative decision-makers would come into their own. The Tanter study does not provide any basis for a rejection of this statement, it simply fails to deal with it.

The second related assumption is that in combining the systemic and decision-making approaches the capacity of the research for explanation is increased. Tanter indicates three bases for this synthesis. (1) "The concepts of organizational rationality and learning provide one theoretical basis for the linkage."<sup>11</sup> Tanter provides two indicators of organizational rationality which he defines in terms of rational adaptation. The first is the tendency to repeat learned behavior as expressed by standard operating procedures.<sup>12</sup> The second is the search for new solutions which more adequately respond to the external environment than those provided by existing procedures. Tanter hypothesizes that Alliances engage in organizational search processes in crisis situations and that this accounts for patterns of high reciprocal intensity.<sup>13</sup>

"In short , standard operating procedures may be an inadequate basis for crisis decision-making and thus an alliance engages in search for more innovative solutions to a crisis situation. As a result patterns of high reciprocal intensity should occur during the crisis phase, which indicate both increased organizational search and, thus, heightened event/interaction."<sup>14</sup>

Certain questions must be directed toward the above interpretation of organizational rationality and related statements. From where does the impulse for search come? If the source of this impulse lies outside of the organizational structure can one impute adaptive rationality to the organization? In his application of the organizational processes model to the Cuban Missile Crisis , Graham Allison indicates that the role of governmental organizations was to specify previously established alternatives.

"Deliberations of leaders in ExComm meetings produced broad outlines of alternatives. Details of the alternatives , and blueprints for their implementation, had to be specified by the organization that would be responsible for execution. These organizational outputs effectively answered the question: What, specifically, could be done."<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore , it is not at all evident why a search process should necessarily mean increasing reciprocal intensity. Indeed a search period may be characterized by a cautious non-committal strategy, with state leaders being unwilling to proceed blindly.<sup>16</sup>

(2) "Analogies from psychology, economics and political science give another basis..."<sup>17</sup> As a basis for a psychological analogy Tanter draws upon the concepts of other and inner-direction developed by David Riesman.<sup>18</sup>

"According to Riesman, other-directed personalities base their actions on their perception of the goals and values of others, while inner directed personalities are motivated by internalized goals and values. The same individual, however, may exhibit both other- and inner- directed tendencies, depending upon the situation."<sup>19</sup>

Similarly, argues Tanter, alliances may also alternate between other and inner direction according to the situation. He hypothesises that during the pre- and post-crisis phases both alliances, the WTO and NATO were inner directed, while,

"During the crisis phase, each coalition becomes more aware of the other coalition's behavior and one coalition's behavior becomes more a response to the other's actions."<sup>20</sup>

A problem inherent to such analogies is that of cross-level distortion: the comparability of an individual to an alliance. Tanter does admit to the problem; however, this admission does not absolve his argument from a major analytical inconsistency. According to Riesman, the actions of other-directed personalities are based on their perception of the goals and values of others; in the Tanter application an other-directed alliance responds to the actions of the other. Response to another's



actions is not the same as response based on the perception of another's goals and values.

Tracing the analogy further, Tanter employs the Riesman concepts to illustrate the inability of an alliance to adapt to a changing situation.

"Inner-direction implies difficulty in dealing with change because values and goals become internalized to the extent that the changing environment offers a threat to the very existence of the inner-directed actor. As standard operating procedures cease to be adequate in a changing environment, the organization should redefine its behavior so that it may continue to function. This adaptation in turn may create new standard operating procedures, new internalizations and new reinforced patterns of behavior."<sup>21</sup>

Tanter implies that it is the organization which establishes new values and goals and in this way redefines its behavior. Again referring to the thesis advanced by Stephen Krasner, one might argue that this redefinition is in fact dictated by 'new' values and goals of authoritative decision-makers outside of the organizational structure. This argument suggests that the psychological analogy, an apparent attempt to impart cognitive qualities to organizations, is misplaced.

(3) "A further basis of the synthesis comes from the tentative findings of empirical research."<sup>22</sup> Tanter regards the findings of the McClelland et al. (1971) study<sup>23</sup> as supportive of a synthesis. The study examines three explanations of Soviet-American interactions. Model I assumes that Soviet-American interactions

are random. The second model assumes that Soviet-American behavior is totally reciprocal, and model III assumes limited reciprocity. On the basis of the research findings it is determined that limited reciprocity provides the best explanation of the historical Soviet-American relationship.

"The limited reciprocal simulation thus provides an empirical basis for the combined model of the present study. The validity of their limited reciprocal simulation indicates that both event/interaction (complete reciprocity) and organizational processes (no reciprocity) may be operating, thus suggesting a synthesis."<sup>24</sup>

One may certainly question whether no reciprocity is a consequence of organizational processes, and whether limited reciprocity can be explained only in terms of event/interaction and organizational processes. Is it not possible that Soviet and American interactions were in part responses to the actions of other states? More importantly, Tanter excludes any reference to the impact of internal actors other than organizations.

The final aspect of the theoretical framework to be specified by Tanter is the role of perception in the explanation of foreign policy behavior. Perception appears as an independent variable affixed to the event/interaction hypothesis:

"..current WTO actions are a result of prior NATO actions and WTO perceptions of NATO actions and vice versa."<sup>25</sup>

The placing of the perceptual variable in this hypothesis is particularly significant as it implies that response is both directly (action-response) and indirectly (perceptual mediation) linked to stimulus, and further that perceptions and actions are additive phenomena: methodologically perceptions are coded as event data and subjected to measurements of intensity and frequency.

The logical inconsistency revealed in the above statements is inescapable. The action-response and action-perception-response processes which distinguish the systemic and decision-making approaches are qualitatively different processes. How then can response be both directly and indirectly linked to stimulus? Furthermore, to take perceptions and code them as event data is to strip those perceptions of their content. How then can the impact of perception on foreign policy behavior be accurately determined?

In conclusion it may be stated that the significant achievement of the Tanter study lies in the realm of intention: an attempted synthesis of the systemic and decision-making approaches. Without in the least denying the truly impressive inventive qualities of the study it must be concluded that the theoretical bases for synthesis remain insufficient for the reasons expressed above.

However discouragingly the above conclusion may read it should not be interpreted as a statement of abandonment before an apparently insurmountable barrier.

Indeed an approach to synthesis in terms of levels of analysis may yet prove useful. It is remembered that in his elaboration of the bases for synthesis, Tanter hypothesises that Alliances engage in organizational search processes in crisis situations and that this accounts for patterns of high reciprocal intensity. In fact what Tanter had done is to link the explanation of intra-unit organizational processes with the descriptive patterns of inter-unit behavior. One might propose a synthesis which while drawing upon Raymond Tanter's attempted marriage of the two approaches across two levels of analysis, redefines that marriage union. This redefinition would exclude full partnership, that is each approach being assigned a particular analytical role. Full partnership is replaced by a supplementary relationship: the systemic approach providing a descriptive supplement to decision-making analysis. While crisis would be defined in terms of decision-makers' perceptions, and foreign policy behavior explained in reference to these perceptions, the systemic approach would specify the general patterns of inter-unit behavior associated with a perceptually determined crisis situation.

Clearly, the function of the systemic approach in this scheme is essentially that of an appendage to a decision-making analysis of crisis. Furthermore, this scheme does not provide for a synthesis in the McClelland or Rosenau sense of the term. It is not entirely without merit however, for even though it circumvents the perceptual/non-perceptual barrier it does link the two approaches to the same phenomenon and thereby

establish an additive base. To this extent the scheme might promise a certain advance.

Raymond Tanter contends that a synthesis of the decision-making and systemic approaches will increase the explanatory capacity of research. This chapter has not debated that assumption per se. It has however, questioned how such a synthesis is to be achieved, and in questioning, discovering the perceptual/non-perceptual barrier separating the two approaches to be the major obstacle. Certainly the recognition of this barrier is essential for any attempt at synthesis even if the ultimate solution is to circumvent it.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER FOUR

- 1 Rosenau, James N., "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1968.
- 2 Ibid., p. 31
- 3 Ibid., p. 43
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ibid., p. 47
- 6 Tanter, Raymond, Modelling and Managing International Conflict: The Berlin Crises. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974, p. 12
- 7 In employing the term 'model' the statement follows Allison's usage. This does not imply an agreement with the use of the term, only an attempt to avoid confusion.
- 8 Allison, G.T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
- 9 In his discussion of the bureaucratic paradigm, contained in Krasner, S.D., "Are Bureaucracies Important?", Foreign Policy No. 7, Summer 1972, pp. 159-179, Krasner is actually dealing with two models, the one the organization process model, the other the bureaucratic politics model. The inadequacies of the bureaucratic paradigm as determined by Krasner may be traced to his interpretation of the decision-making process.  
(1) The basic determinants of foreign policy are the values of the decision-makers although the behavior of states can reflect satisfactory and not optimal outcomes. (2) The American government cannot be described in terms of a balance of power system. A minimal representation would be that of a loose hierarchical system. (3) The hierarchical pattern of the American government culminates in the office of the President, an office which possesses an unrivaled superiority of power. (4) In this case (assumption three) the concept of power is indicated by the ability to fashion a bureaucratic environment. Specifically, the President chooses bureau chiefs, structures action channels and establishes statutory powers. (5) In that it is the President who 'creates' the bureaucratic

environment, this environment necessarily reflects his values. That is to say, independent policy-making on the part of governmental organizations is not attributable to the independent powers of these organizations, but to the 'failure' of the chief decision-makers to assert control. (6) Established bureaucratic procedures do constrain the President in regard to the implementation of policy. However, programs are highly fungible and the President does have the power to direct organizations toward specific tasks. (7) Given these characteristics of the governmental structure the 'crucial' analytical questions refer to the substance of choice and not to matters of administrative management.

- 10 Tanter, Raymond, Modelling and Managing., p. 21
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Allison, G.T., Essence of Decision., p. 77
- 13 Tanter does not assume that there exists a linear relationship between search activity and rising levels of conflict intensity. He describes it as a curvilinear relationship. See page 31 of the Tanter study.
- 14 Tanter, Raymond, Modelling and Managing., p. 31
- 15 Allison, G.T., Essence of Decision., p. 123
- 16 See Chapter Two for evidence of this.
- 17 Tanter, Raymond, Modelling and Managing., p. 21
- 18 Riesman, D., The Lonely Crowd. New Haven, Conn: Yale Univ. Press, 1950.
- 19 Tanter, Raymond, Modelling and Managing. pp. 31-32
- 20 Ibid., p. 32
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid., p. 21
- 23 McClelland, Charles, et al., The Management and Analysis of Event Data: A Computerized System for Monitoring and Projecting Event Flows. Los Angeles: Univ. of Southern Cal. Press, 1971.
- 24 Tanter, Raymond, Modelling and Managing. p. 37
- 25 Ibid., p. 41
- 26 Although the focus of this discussion is upon a summary and critique of the theoretical framework of the Tanter synthesis, a brief note on methodology and data collection should be included

given the extensive development of a research design. The research design incorporates quantitative comparative analysis across two case studies, the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961. Data employed are event data, conflictive words and deeds from NATO-WTO interactions during the Berlin Blockade and Berlin Wall conflicts. These data are subjected to measurement by the Corson conflict indicator and scaling scheme which provides intensity scalings. Intensity readings are first aggregated from the national to the alliance level. A second step is the aggregation of average intensity scores by time. The basic technique of analysis is statistical. Analysis of variance is employed to determine the effect of alliance conflict and phase on action intensity. Regression analysis is used to determine the strength of association between Alliance behavior on the one hand, and prior Alliance and opponent behavior on the other. A number of methodological criticisms should be considered. (1) In relying almost totally upon the New York Times as a source of data are research findings not liable to contain strong ethnocentric bias? (2) The measurement reliability of the Corson scale is low. (3) Can measurements of event intensity be aggregated from the national to the alliance level without distorting these measurements? (4) There is no control for the impact of extraneous variables, such as events occurring outside of the immediate conflict, upon action intensity.



### CONCLUSION:

Three basic research goals directed this thesis. These were: (1) to define the decision-making approach through a theoretical comparison with the other principal approach to foreign policy behavior in general and crisis behavior in particular, the systemic approach; (2) to define the decision-making approach by means of an empirical application of that approach to the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961; (3) to determine the mechanics of a possible synthesis of the decision-making and systemic approaches.

A theoretical comparison of the systemic and decision-making approaches to crisis revealed two basic distinctions. Firstly, the systemic focus is preoccupied exclusively with inter-unit processes: crisis patterns of interaction are explained in reference to previous patterns. The decision-making focus while not totally limited to intra-unit processes does explain foreign policy in reference to these processes. Secondly, in the systemic approach crisis becomes an 'objective' phenomenon to be determined by measures of frequency and variety. In the decision-making approach crisis is a perceptual 'subjective' phenomenon which is determined by the perceptions of the actual decision-makers.

From the empirical application of the decision-making approach to the Berlin Wall crisis, specifically a case study analysis and hypothesis testing, come a number of research findings: (1) the images of the

decision-making elite did to a large extent determine the structures of the U.S. foreign policy processes and the content of foreign policy outputs; (2) the decision-making elite did perceive a situation of grave threat which was intensified especially by the surprise of and time limitations imposed by the Berlin deadline, and later the building of the Berlin Wall; (3) crisis as a perceived situation was particularly evident in reference to the DB<sub>2</sub> input and did have an impact (of varying degree) upon foreign policy output, decision-makers' perceptions, and decision-process; (4) in the form of feedback, the consequences of the decisions taken during the Berlin crisis can be traced through external and internal variables, and to later crisis decisions.

In questioning how a synthesis of the decision-making and systemic approaches might be achieved it was determined that while the differing preoccupations with intra and inter-unit processes held, at first glance, a promise of linkage, the perceptual/non-perceptual barrier proved quite insurmountable. Charles McClelland and James Rosenau appear not to have considered this obstacle, whereas Raymond Tanter confronts it head on. This confrontation does not however, meet with the desired success. In response to this lack of success an alternative proposal is advanced. The merit of this proposal is that it does tie the two approaches to the same phenomenon. Admittedly however, the

linkage is achieved by circumventing the perceptual/non-perceptual barrier.

Finally, viewed in reference to the two problem levels , the theoretical and the practical: at the theoretical level this thesis reveals a crisis debate sharply divided by the decision-making and systemic approaches. With the nature of the perceptual/non-perceptual barrier even a consensus on concept definition, a fundamental step, is not possible; at the practical level this thesis reveals what is at best uneven and essentially low levels of explanation in the study of international crisis - clearly insufficient as a prerequisite to crisis management. As such it may be concluded that the study of international crisis, at present, provides no satisfactory solution at either problem level.

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