

THE FLQ:
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

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Abstract

This study examines the question of why some terrorist groups have become a permanent fixture on the political scene, surviving all efforts by governments and authorities to eliminate them, while other groups have appeared, been active for a time, and then disappeared, often with little or no action by authorities. Developed by Tilly (1978), a framework for analysis of collective action problems will be applied to the organizational history of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ). The study investigates factors that presumably contributed to the demise of the FLQ in the early 1970s, slightly less than a decade after it first appeared. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the findings derived through the use of Tilly's framework. Specifically, implications for the study of terrorism and of low-intensity conflict are discussed, especially in the context of government potential to respond to terrorist threats.

Résumé

Il est l'objet de cette recherche d'étudier pourquoi certains groupes terroristes ont réussi à s'implanter dans la vie politique d'une façon permanente en dépit des efforts constants de la part des gouvernements et des autorités de les supprimer, tandis que d'autres groupes ont apparu, ayant une activité passagère pour ensuite disparaître, souvent sans même l'intervention des autorités ou presque. C'est en suivant la méthode de Tilly (1978) pour l'analyse des problèmes d'action collective que se fera l'étude historique de l'organisation du Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ). Cette recherche se veut une étude des facteurs qui auraient probablement contribué à la disparition du mouvement FLQ dans le début des années 1970, près de dix ans après sa naissance. En conclusion, cette étude présente une analyse des constatations obtenues par la recherche selon la méthode de Tilly. Plus particulièrement, il y a l'examen de ce que cela implique pour l'étude du terrorisme et des conflits d'une moindre intensité, surtout dans le contexte des moyens que possède le gouvernement pour faire face aux menaces terroristes.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In a little while the English, the Federalists, the exploiters, the toadies of the occupiers, the lackeys of imperialism -- all those who betray the workers and the Quebec nation -- will fear for their lives and they will be right.

For the FLQ will kill.¹

-- La Victoire
(Official organ of the FLQ)

Political conflict, defined as violent (or potentially violent) interactions among groups and nations for political ends², has existed for centuries and in many forms. But of all the manifestations of political conflict -- riots, revolutions, wars -- few are as frightening as contemporary terrorism.

One of the more puzzling aspects of terrorism is that, throughout history, numerous groups have appeared, been active for a period of time, and then faded away with their goals unachieved, while others have become permanent fixtures on the political scene despite all efforts by authorities to destroy them. In the former sense, the past quarter century has seen the creation of many terrorist groups including the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) in Canada, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Weathermen in the United States, and the Japanese Red Army in Japan, none of which would survive into the latter half

of this decade. With regard to the latter, some groups have managed to survive, most notably the Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland.

This contrast raises the question of why one terrorist group will survive despite all efforts to destroy it, while another disappears, often with little or no action from law enforcement agencies. Discovering why some terrorist groups thrive while others do not could prove to be valuable in the quest to understand and control terrorism, perhaps even in dealing with its underlying causes. If a terrorist group, in its infancy, could be denied some resource which it needs to grow and survive, or if some vulnerable feature of a more established group could be exploited to its detriment, that could simplify the task of law enforcement authorities in the attempt to deal with the terrorist threat.

Terrorism is assumed, for present purposes, to be illegitimate. In Western liberal democracies, where there exist the mechanisms to bring about change through peaceful means, violence cannot be considered a legitimate form of political action. To say that terrorism poses a threat to the survival of the Western democracies would be a gross exaggeration, but terrorism can lead to the erosion of civil liberties and the rule of law as governments enact repressive measures in an attempt to suppress terrorist violence.

It is the guiding principle of this study that the continued survival versus demise of a terrorist organization can be explained, to a large extent, using the framework for analyzing collective action developed by Tilly (1978). More specifically, it is hypothesized that, among Tilly's five sets of variables -- interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action -- the organization and mobilization variables will be the most useful in explaining why a terrorist organization has or has not survived. Even a cursory examination of terrorist and revolutionary groups suggests that organizational factors, such as the quality of the leadership and its ability to plan and coordinate action, group cohesiveness and loyalty of the membership, collectively play a major role in the success of the group. Some excellent examples would be the Baader-Meinhof group and the SLA, neither of which survived the imprisonment or death of its leadership.

Logically, a comparative study of terrorist organizations, comprising groups known for their longevity and others that are defunct, should provide the answers sought. Unfortunately, such a study would prove far too lengthy to be undertaken here. Still, this does not prevent the undertaking of a case study of one group as a base upon which to build in the future, making comparisons as case studies are added.

Any of the groups cited above would provide a suitable

subject for the first case study based upon a model like Tilly's. However, a study of the Front de Libération du Québec presents certain advantages as an initial case.

First, because the FLQ appears to have been defunct for almost two decades, the layers of secrecy and misinformation which have surrounded the events of the relevant period of Canadian history have begun to peel away. Some who were active in the FLQ have come forward to tell their stories, revealing much about the group's organization, membership and activities. Much also has been learned about how the government and its agents dealt with the threat to Canadian unity posed by the FLQ, and the nationalist movement in general, in Quebec. In other words, to choose the FLQ as a first case is to choose one of the comparatively accessible cases.³

A second advantage of a study of the FLQ is that it had a sustained history. Unlike some defunct groups, such as the short-lived SLA, the FLQ survived long enough and engaged in enough actions to provide an interesting case study. In 1963, the FLQ embarked on a campaign of bombing and theft which climaxed in October, 1970, with the kidnapping of the British trade commissioner in Montreal, James Cross, and the kidnap and murder of, Pierre Laporte, a minister in the provincial government. In response to the kidnappings, the Canadian government cited an "apprehended insurrection", mobilized the armed forces and suspended

civil liberties. By December, with many of its members either in jail or in exile, the FLQ was severely weakened. By 1972, faced with continued pressure from the authorities, the FLQ was a spent force.

The Meaning Of "Terrorism"

If the FLQ is to be the subject of this study, it is necessary first to demonstrate that the FLQ was a terrorist group. To do this, it is necessary to define "terrorism"; in other words, to show both what it is and is not.

As noted above, terrorism is a mode of political conflict. If created, a scale of political conflict could range, in ascending order of severity of violence, from no violence, to agitation, terrorism, revolutionary or guerilla war, conventional war, and finally through to nuclear war. Figure 1 is an illustration of a tentative scale of political conflict. Since terrorism is the focus of this study, to place it in context it is necessary only provide a brief description of the other types of political conflict on the scale.

Agitation refers to strikes, demonstrations and riots carried out for political purposes, such as when the citizens of a country call a general strike or demonstration to demand greater democratization of their political system. Revolution refers to clashes between an armed group and government forces or, if a state of anarchy exists, between armed groups, for control of the state. Castro's war against




Fig. 1. Scale of political violence.*

*This scale of political conflict is a derivation of a number of scale of conflict charts found in Loomis (1985). The scale of conflict charts were used by Jean Victor Allard, a Canadian Armed Forces commander, during a briefing on Canada's military requirements that he gave in the 1960s to members of parliament. The various scales indicated the military response required to deal with different kinds of conflict.

This scale of political conflict is based on the assumption, borne out by Allard's scale of conflict that, for a given state and its citizens, a nuclear war would be a more violent event than would be a conventional war, a conventional war would be more violent than a revolution, and so on. While this ranking may not hold true in all cases (some revolutions might, conceivably, be more violent than some conventional wars), it is believed to be reasonable for the great majority of cases.

The spacing between the various types of conflict on the scale is not indicative of any empirical measure of violence. The labels are spaced roughly equally along the line, but this is simply a convenience and should not be taken to mean that nuclear war is X units more violent than conventional war, which is X units more violent than revolution, etc.

the Batista regime in Cuba provides an excellent example of a revolutionary war. Conventional war involves armed conflict between the military forces of two or more states, and could range from border skirmishes between two states to a world war. Nuclear war, at its worst, would involve unlimited nuclear exchanges between two or more states.

For the purposes of this study, terrorism will be defined as

the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.⁴

This definition encompasses more than is necessary for the purpose of this, and related, future studies. While the definition refers to groups acting both for and against established authority, this study's immediate interest is in terrorist groups acting in opposition to established authority, i.e. the state.

More precisely, this study is concerned with discovering the factors most important in determining how violent, clandestine, politically motivated groups survive or fail to meet efforts by the state to destroy them. In a trivial sense, it is not difficult to determine why a group acting for a government (such as some Latin American death squads) can survive: such a group will face no opposition from the state and will, in all probability, survive as long

as that government wishes. The anti-government cases are more complex. Thus, it is important to recognize the existence of many different kinds of terrorist groups: leftist and rightist, state-supported and non-state-supported, and so on.

The diversity of interests among terrorist groups is just one of the reasons it was found to be preferable to distinguish terrorism from revolution, in particular, along the scale of political conflict. Some terrorist groups seek, through their actions, to spark a revolution; others try only to influence government policy to their advantage. It is true that terrorism can be an integral part of the revolutionary process, especially in the early stages. But not all terrorists seek revolution, and there exist sufficient differences between terrorism and revolution to warrant a distinction between the two.

Terrorism and revolution may be distinguished on the basis of both the number of people involved and their activities. Revolutions are generally characterized by mass participation, and revolutionary groups have as their primary objective seizing control of the state by waging war against the established authority to exhaust the resources of the latter and/or to undermine its legitimacy. Like the parties in a conventional war, revolutionaries seek a military victory, and, therefore, concentrate on "the destruction of the enemy's military potential..."⁵

Terrorism, on the other hand, including terrorism by those seeking to spark a revolution, is a tool used by those who possess neither the membership nor the weapons necessary to seize control of the state through the force of arms. Hence, terrorist groups rely on the creation of fear in a target group, or on blackmail, to influence government policy. Although a terrorist group may have many hundreds of members, its actions are of a type which can be carried out by only one individual or a few members at a time, such as assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings.

It should not be inferred that terrorist acts stop when revolution begins. Actions which can only be labelled as terrorism may occur in the course of both revolutions and conventional wars. Soldiers have been known to murder groups of civilians in order to intimidate others into doing, or not doing, something, such as aiding the enemy.

The FLQ qualifies as a terrorist group as defined above. It sought, through the use of violence, to spark a revolution which, if successful, would have resulted in the creation of a socialist state of Quebec separate from the rest of Canada. The FLQ never had the number of members or the weapons necessary to have even considered seizing control of the Provincial government. Furthermore, its actions clearly were directed toward creating extreme anxiety and/or inducing fear in a target group, or in this case, target groups. For seven years, beginning in 1963, the

FLQ carried out numerous thefts of weapons, explosives and money, and engaged in a systematic bombing campaign meant to intimidate Anglophone Quebecers, the federal and provincial governments, and British, American, English-Canadian and French-Canadian capitalists. In seven years, the FLQ planted almost 100 bombs [not all of which exploded], most directed at businesses, post offices, and mailboxes. In one night, the FLQ placed bombs in 15 mailboxes in the wealthy, overwhelmingly anglophone Montreal suburb of Westmount.

Some may believe that a study of the factors which might help to explain the survival or decline of a terrorist group, such as the FLQ, will yield little more than what can be learned more easily from studying the decline of any less secretive organization such as a church or a political party. This is a partially valid point. However, unless a terrorist-oriented study is undertaken, it is impossible to be certain that the decline of a given terrorist organization is not a unique occurrence. There is good reason to believe that its evolution might be unique, given that a terrorist group is a clandestine organization.

In Western democracies, it is generally true that few organizations, with the possible exception of organized crime rings, face more destructive pressure than do terrorist groups. By comparison, governments usually are either helpful or indifferent towards most groups. To discover why terrorist groups rise and fall is to discover

how clandestine or covert organizations continue to exist under unfavourable conditions.

In Chapter 2 of this study, the framework of analysis to be used will be described. Chapter 3 will apply the framework of analysis to an organizational history of the FLQ. Chapter 4 will analyse the historical findings from Chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 5 will conclude the study with a discussion of the implications of the findings for the study of terrorism and of low-intensity conflict in general.

CHAPTER 2
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Introduction

In any study, there must be a framework of analysis. A method of organizing or categorizing data into a manageable form for analysis is required. In this case, it is especially needed, in order to facilitate comparison between this study and other case studies. If it is not possible to compare case studies, then it will be impossible either to build upon earlier research or to discover the commonalities and variations among cases. Only through the ability to compare the findings from this study with those from future studies, will the potential exist to find the answers sought.

A framework of analysis also must ensure that the resultant explanation for an event or phenomenon meets certain minimum requirements. Olson (1982) provides a succinct account of the kind of minimum requirements which an explanation of any phenomenon should strive for, and what ought to be avoided. More specifically, it almost goes without saying that one ought to be wary of "folk wisdom". While such popular suppositions may sometimes have some basis in truth, unless there is some evidence to support

them (if they are at all testable), and for more than one case, they are best omitted from a study. For example, in this instance, it may be wise to avoid any explanation which attributes the longevity of the Provisional IRA to the Irishman's love of a good fight. Such a "theory" might be testable, but such an explanation could not also account for the longevity of ETA or any other long-lived, non-Irish terrorist group.

Beyond ensuring what an explanation is not, there are some requirements which it must meet: 1] A little must explain a lot. Any good explanation must be both powerful and parsimonious, explaining a large number of phenomena with as few variables as possible. 2] It must fit data and observations beyond those from which it was derived. An explanation is of relatively little value if it is useful only for one particular case. A framework which does not meet these minimum requirements is, in the long run, of little practical value and makes no contribution to the accumulation of knowledge.

One way to help ensure that a study will be of value, therefore, is to find a good organizing framework. This is not a simple task, but the long-term benefits will justify the difficulty. One analytical framework which would appear to satisfy the sought-after conditions is that developed and used by Tilly (1978) to analyze collective action problems.

On the surface, terrorism and Tilly's analysis of

collective action appear too dissimilar to make his framework useful for a study of terrorism. Tilly's book deals with "publicly visible assemblies"⁶; terrorism certainly cannot be described that way. Also, Tilly's minimum requirement for the number of people involved in a collective action is "commonly twenty or fifty persons"⁷. He states:

As the minimum size goes down, collective violence begins to fade into banditry, brawling, vandalism, terrorism, and a wide variety of threatening nonviolent events....⁸

Clearly, Tilly is not dealing directly with terrorism, nor does he appear to want to confront it as subject matter. Terrorism, after all, is a covert activity; strikes, riots, rebellions and revolutions are not. There are no rampaging crowds in the streets, because the essence of terrorism is secrecy. When terrorists are caught, it is discovered that usually two or three individuals, rarely more than a half dozen, were involved in carrying out a particular terrorist incident. It is difficult, accordingly, to think of this behaviour as collective action.

But upon closer study, it becomes apparent that terrorism and collective action do share some traits. Those few captured terrorists may be members of an organization consisting of a hundred or more people, without which the violent act never could have taken place. Standing behind the organization may be thousands of sympathisers whose aid has allowed it to flourish. Thus, terrorism could be

described as "covert" collective action. Also, as will be shown later, terrorist groups share more than just a slight similarity with a type of group which Tilly labels as "zealots". Furthermore, the commonalities do not stop with those just noted.

Tilly asserts that the "study of collective action ordinarily requires us to deal with at least two"⁹ of three intersecting areas: 1] a particular population, 2] a set of beliefs, and 3] certain kinds of action. This study of terrorist groups will deal with all three of the intersecting areas -- the belief held by a group of people that violent action is necessary to achieve their political goals.

Finally, Tilly writes:

collective action is about power and politics; it inevitably raises questions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, hope and hopelessness; the very setting of the problem is likely to include judgements about who has the right to act, and what good it does.¹⁰

These very same issues are part of any study of terrorism. Even to use the term "terrorism" is to make a judgment about right and wrong, and who has the right to act. However, unlike Tilly, who states that the tone of his book "is generally hostile to the collective action of governments and favorable to the collective action of ordinary people"¹¹ this study will take an apparently opposite stance sympathetic to the governments. The reason for this difference is simple, the belief that terrorist violence has

no place in the politics of Western democratic states. Terrorism is not a legitimate form of political action where the possibility for change through peaceful means exists.

Application of the Framework

Perhaps the best endorsement of the usefulness of the Tilly model for the purpose of studying terrorism arises from its excellent fit with the requirements of this study. This is true of both his model of interaction and his components of collective action. To begin, Tilly's model of interaction -- the polity model -- consists of five elements: a population, a government, one or more contenders, a polity, and one or more coalitions.

A population is, simply, the major element within which the other elements are found. For the purposes of this study, the population consists of the people of Canada.

Government refers to "an organization which controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within the population".¹² This will refer to the Governments of Canada, Quebec and Montreal.

A contender is "any group which, during some specified period, applies pooled resources to influence the government". The polity element of the interaction model becomes important here. The polity "consists of the collective action of the members and the government". This refers to the normal daily interactions between the government and those with whom it deals. Governments do not deal with all

contenders in the population on an equal basis. Contenders include challengers and members of the polity".¹³

Members of the polity are those contenders who "have achieved recognition of their collective rights to wield power over the government, and have developed routine ways of exercising those rights".¹⁴ Membership in the polity carries with it some advantages in the ability to influence government policy in one's favour. Membership can change at any time as contenders are included or excluded from the polity based on their ability to pass certain tests. The ability to mobilize or coerce a significant number of people is one of the ways a contender may acquire membership in the polity:

The likelihood that a new contender will accept and employ the means of acquisition of power the members of the polity prescribe...depends on the congruence of the conceptions of justice which prevail within it to those built into the operation of the polity. Where they diverge widely, the challenger is likely to employ irregular means -- which means applying resources to the government and to members of the polity which are rarely used in those relationships.¹⁵

All other contenders are challengers. One example of a group which does not employ the prescribed means of power acquisition, according to Tilly, are revolutionaries who kidnap government officials to gain the release of captured comrades. Certainly terrorist groups, including the FLQ, would fall into the same category.

Coalition formation is defined as the "tendency of a set of contenders and/or governments to coordinate their

collective action".¹⁶ This will refer to any coordination of action between the governments and their allies or the terrorist groups and their allies. For example, the coordination of counter-terrorist policies between the Governments of Canada, Quebec and Montreal will be dealt with here and referred to as behaviour by a coalition.

One final note which will be important in the forthcoming study is that coalitions between members of the polity and non-members is possible. Tilly believes that these coalitions reduce the level of violence which often accompanies a challenger's quest for membership, except in those cases where "the effect of coalition is to split the polity into factions making exclusive and incompatible claims on the government", i.e. a revolutionary situation in which there will be a high level of violence.¹⁷

Once it is decided who and what are represented by the elements of the polity model, the actual study of collective action can begin. Tilly has labelled five components of collective action: interests, organization, mobilization, opportunity and collective action; he has provided a rather detailed definition for each. The five components will facilitate analysis by allowing for the convenient separation, identification and comparison of the various characteristics of a terrorist group.

According to Tilly, discovering a group's interests, the first component, is not an easy task. There is more than

one way to go about it. Millians (followers of John Stuart Mill) would infer a group's interests from what that group says and what it does -- its "utterances and actions", while a Marxist would infer a group's interests from an analysis of the connections between interest and social position. Both methods have drawbacks, which we need not go into here. Tilly decides to solve his dilemma by using a "general analysis of the connections between interests and social position" as a "predictor" of long run interests but to use a group's own utterances, as much as possible, to explain their short run behaviour.¹⁸

In the forthcoming study, it will be necessary to constantly be alert to the difficulty in determining a group's true interests. A group's stated interests may not always be reflected in its actions. Over the long run, some terrorist groups often lose sight of, or drift away from, the causes they once espoused and engage in seemingly irrelevant actions. It would be a prudent course of action to use all available sources for inferring interest.

The study of a group's interests is hampered by another dilemma, according to Tilly: individual interest vs. group interests. The reasons for an individual joining a particular group may have little to do with what the group stands for. Terrorist groups are certainly no exception. While there are, no doubt, terrorists who are genuinely committed to the causes they espouse, there are others who

may be in it for money, excitement or because of psychological illness. It will therefore be necessary to take these possibilities into account in the study.

Determining individual interest will not easily be done, however, since it is impossible get inside the head of each individual group member. However, those members whose interests did not coincide with those of the majority of members should "stand out from the crowd", by virtue of their actions or statements. Tilly suggests that, as the degree of conflict between individual and group interest increases, so does the cost of collective action. Renegade members of a group might be prone to acting against the wishes of the leadership (and other group members) to the detriment of that group. Recognizing the existence of this conflict is particularly important when examining a group's organizational capabilities. If it is discovered that a large number of group members appeared to have interests at variance with the majority of members, then it may be surmised that the group had some organizational difficulties.

Organization refers to "that aspect of a group's structure which most directly affects its capacity to act on its interests".¹⁹ More specifically, the organization component focuses on the group's cohesiveness, inclusiveness, and efficiency and effectiveness.

Cohesiveness seen as a set of interrelated variables

gauges the group's "catness" and "netness". Catness refers to a commonality of characteristics -- a common identity, a common category -- shared by the members of a group. Netness comprises the links -- a network -- between people who may not share immediately identifiable characteristics. Both catness and netness are considered to be either high or low. Using the residents of a city as an example, it would be said that they have a high degree of catness, i.e. all are Montrealers, but low on netness since not all Montrealers are linked by some interpersonal bond.

Inclusiveness seeks to discover how close a group comes to absorbing its members' whole lives in terms of "the amount of time, the amount of energy, or the proportion of all social interaction in which the members and other people are taking into account the fact of group membership"²⁰.

Finally, the organization component also must take into consideration the efficiency and effectiveness of the group. This includes such variables as differentiation, centrality and stratification. While the other variables contained in the organization component were concerned with the members themselves, efficiency and effectiveness refer to how the terrorist group operates: Does it have a political and a military wing? Does each member have a particular task within the organization? Is there a clear chain of command?

Mobilization is defined as "the process by which a

group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life".²¹ Mobilization is not the accumulation of resources necessary for collective action; it is the actual change in control and use of resources which is important. In the mobilization component we are trying to estimate the value of a group's resources and the probability of their delivery when needed. Put succinctly,

"1 Quantity of resources collectively controlled X Probability of delivery = Mobilization"

2 Mobilization = f(organization)

3 Organization = catness X netness".²²

A terrorist group's resources are such things as money, weapons and explosives. The factors which will effect the probability of those resources being delivered where and when they are needed depends, largely, on a group's assets. Assets are the loyalty and committment to the group of the members of a terrorist organization, the quality of the group's leadership and recruits [full-time or part-time, professional or volunteer] and their loyalty to the group. Tilly believes professionals are generally more effective but volunteers are more loyal. Loyalty refers to the amount and range of personal resources [time, money, expertise] its members have committed to the group and under what circumstances they will commit those resources.

Mobilization is also dependent and on how well the

terrorist group is organized to begin with. This is why mobilization is seen as a function of organization, and especially of the inclusiveness variable within the organization component, since inclusiveness refers to the amount of time and energy a group's members devote to the group.

Both organization and mobilization may prove difficult to measure. Since terrorist groups are clandestine organizations some of the necessary information -- number of members, financial assets, and the like -- will not be readily available. At times, it will be necessary to rely on estimates by experts.

Opportunity refers to "the relationship between a group and the world around it".²³ This relationship changes over time, presenting a group with threats to its interests or with new chances to act to further its interests. Groups, therefore, must constantly be aware of the changes and be ready to act. But, since all collective action requires the expenditure of resources which generally are not inexhaustible, groups must weigh the expected costs and benefits before any action is taken.²⁴ Further complicating the cost/benefit analysis is the possibility that collective action could result in collective "bads" instead of the acquisition of collective goods.²⁵ For example, periodically a terrorist group has miscalculated the costs and benefits of a particularly brutal act of violence and found that the

act resulted in a decline in their popular support.²⁶

How much of its valuable resources a group is willing to use, and how many collective bads a group is willing to endure in the achievement of a goal, depends on the type of group. Terrorist groups are similar to class of groups which Tilly calls "zealots", those who "set an extremely high value on some collective good in terms of the resources required to achieve that good -- willing to expend life and limb, for instance, in order to acquire self-government..."²⁷. Zealots will continue a struggle long after other contenders, fearing heavy losses of mobilized resources, give up. History is full of examples of groups who would stop at nothing, short of death, to achieve their goals. A current example of a group of zealots would be the army of Afghans rebels who, against tremendous odds, waged war on the Soviet army in Afghanistan.

Ultimately, all groups, even zealots, must analyse costs and benefits. The range of possible costs and benefits which a group must consider fall into one of three elements which are contained within the opportunity component of collective action: repression/facilitation, power, and opportunity/ threat.

Repression is any action taken by the government or another group which raises the cost of collective action to a particular group. In other words, how the government and other groups responded to the terrorist violence, and the

effectiveness of that response. Within a population, countering the threat from a terrorist group is usually the responsibility of the government and its agencies, though groups and individuals may aid in the fight by their vigilance; i.e., reporting suspicious individuals and activities, reporting a suspicious package left unattended in a public place etc.

Governments may respond to a terrorist threat in many ways, depending on how large or widespread is the threat. In a study of insurgent groups (which included terrorist groups), O'Neill (1980) identified six types of government response: civic action, administrative action, low-level police activity, intensified police activity, low-level military response and conventional military response.²⁸ Civic action refers to government programs geared to gaining support from the population, such as satisfying some of the population's needs and grievances. Administrative action refers to a government ensuring that the necessary bureaucracy exists to deal with the population's needs and grievances. The remaining four types of government response are largely self-explanatory, and range from normal police procedures, to declaring all-out war on an insurgent group.²⁹

Conversely, facilitation refers to any action taken by a government or another group which lowers the cost of collective action to a particular group. Although it is

unlikely a government would wish to facilitate the actions of a terrorist group which seeks its destruction, there may be groups within the population which support the terrorists. Such popular support can be either active or passive. Passive supporters refer to those who sympathize with the aim of a terrorist group and will not act to hinder its activities; active supporters are those individuals or groups who aid terrorists with everything from safe-houses to information and supplies to a terrorist group.³⁰

Terrorist groups also may experience repression and facilitation from groups outside the population and from foreign governments. Groups outside the population and foreign governments may provide moral support, political support and/or material support. Moral support involves public statements favouring the terrorist group and its aims. Political support entails the application of pressure on other governments to support a terrorist group. Material aid involves the actual provision of money and/or resources to terrorists. Additionally, foreign governments are able to provide sanctuary to terrorist groups or individual terrorists from other countries. Sanctuary refers to the provision of a safe haven to members of a terrorist group where they may train, make plans, or store weapons, as well as sheltering group members on the run.³¹

Examples of foreign aid to terrorist organizations abound. Some Irish-American groups in the United States have

been accused of sheltering IRA members wanted by the British police and of channeling large sums of money to the IRA in Northern Ireland.³² In recent years, Western governments have accused some states in the Middle East, especially Libya, of harbouring, training, and equipping terrorists. For example, Libya provided passports to the members of the Abu Nidal group who were responsible for a machine gun attack on an El-Al check-in counter at a Vienna airport in December, 1985.³³ Libya also provides one of the few examples of overt statements of support for a terrorist group by a foreign government.

In February 1985, ...the official Libyan newspaper, "Green March" threatened that the Red Army Faction would be financed and armed by Libya to renew its terror campaign if the [West German] Federal government failed to hand over eight Libyan dissidents living in West Germany.³⁴

Such overt statements of support from a government are rare given the possibility of retaliation by other governments.

Tilly uses the terms political repression and political facilitation if the action is undertaken by a government to distinguish it from the repression or facilitation which may be undertaken by groups or individuals. In this study, the focus is on a Western state with what Tilly refers to as a "tolerant" regime -- one which allows for a wide range of behaviour by groups. But tolerant regimes also are capable of instituting strong repressive or facilitative measures when they choose.

The ability to repress or facilitate, and whether one

wins or loses a struggle is directly related to the power which one possesses. Tilly defines power as "the extent to which its [a government's or a group's] interests prevail over the others with which it is in conflict". Therefore, power is "always relative to a specific (1) other party or set of parties; (2) interest or set of interests; (3) interaction or set of interactions". Groups are described as being either power-efficient, i.e. getting a large return in relation to resources used, and power-effective, i.e. the group succeeds in doing what it set out to.³⁵

Finally, along with opportunity comes threat. Opportunity is "the extent to which other groups, including governments, are vulnerable to new claims which would, if successful, enhance the contender's realization of its interests". Threat is "the extent to which other groups are threatening to make claims which would, if successful, reduce the contender's realization of its interests". Like power, opportunity and threat are assessed in relation to interests, parties and interactions. For the purposes of this study, the opportunity component and its elements will refer to such variables as the level of repression and/or facilitation (by the government as well as by other groups) existing before and after the terrorist groups began their campaigns and the level of support within the population, and from outside the population, for the group.³⁶

The level of government repression existing in Canada

before the terrorist group became active could be considered low. Indeed, it may be the freedom from repression by government enjoyed by virtually all citizens of a democracy which allows these groups to exist in the West. But terrorist groups can continue to exist under repressive laws if they have sufficient support from within the population. Widespread popular support has meant the difference between success and failure for many groups, not just terrorists, who faced a high level of repression by government. One example would be the partisan groups which fought the Nazis in occupied Europe during World War II.

Societal cleavages play an important role in determining how much public support a terrorist group will receive:

Societal cleavages such as ethnicity, religion, and language may be helpful to dissident elements. This would seem to be especially true where the majority of the population is from the same ethnic, religious, and/or language group, as the insurgents, whereas the authorities are not.³⁷

In Quebec, with the presence of two different language groups, the French and the English -- aptly referred to as the "two solitudes" by author Hugh MacLennan (1945) because of the historical lack of communication between the two communities -- societal cleavages did exist and could have been used to the advantage of the FLQ. The FLQ claimed to be acting in the interests of the majority of French-speaking Canadians against Anglo-Saxon and American domination. Unfortunately for the FLQ, as shall be seen later, the fact

that the government of Quebec was dominated by francophones meant that the FLQ could not take full advantage of societal cleavages to create a "we/they" mentality in Quebec.

The fifth and final component, collective action, refers to "the extent of a contender's joint action in pursuit of common ends; as a process, the joint action itself".³⁸ Tilly suggests that when examining collective action one should identify all (or a representative sample) of the events which meet certain pre-established criteria such as severity and duration. Terrorist activity, e.g., bombings, assassination etc., is usually well-reported and well-documented, as is the number of people killed and/or wounded in the incident. Terrorists also are generally willing to claim responsibility for their actions, so compiling such a sample should not prove difficult.

The goal in examining the collective action variable is to discover which tactics were preferred by the FLQ, why they were preferred, whether those tactics changed over time, and when and why there was an escalation or de-escalation in the group's violent activities. The type of collective action which a group chooses to undertake can have an effect on how the government, other groups and the population react to that group.

Adapting a framework of analysis designed for one purpose to suit another inevitably will create some problems. However, the chore is made simpler if the

framework is an inherently good one. Critics of Tilly's From Mobilization To Revolution most often use the term "uneven" to describe the book and their concern has focused on some of the hypotheses concerning collective action which may be of questionable validity. The critiques have not focused on the framework itself which generally is accepted as sound by scholars of comparative politics. Since this study borrows only Tilly's framework to formulate its hypotheses, the potential faultiness of his hypotheses is of less concern.

The fact that the Tilly study was not specifically devoted to terrorist groups could have created some uncertainty as to the factors which might be examined within each of the components of collective action. This shortcoming was remedied by borrowing from a study by O'Neill (1980) which deals more specifically with insurgent groups, including terrorists. The inclusion of some of O'Neill's descriptive elements aided in the discovery of the factors to examine vis-a-vis the variables within some of Tilly's components of collective action. For example, within the opportunity component, the four kinds of external support described -- moral, political, material, sanctuary -- were taken from the O'Neill study and grafted onto the Tilly framework, thus allowing a more well-defined delineation of the variables and, it is hoped, facilitating analysis.

Although some concepts could be borrowed from it

usefully, the O'Neill framework is unsuitable for the purposes of this study. His study had a different focus, attempting to discover why some insurgent conflicts, including terrorism and guerilla war, succeeded while others failed. By contrast, the focus of this study is why the groups themselves succeeded or failed. Since O'Neill focused not on groups themselves, his framework lacks the comprehensive examination of factors internal to a group which is found in Tilly's interest, organization and mobilization components. Also, it was determined that much of the discussion of variables in the O'Neill study to be geared more toward larger groups, which are more aptly considered revolutionary. Nonetheless, a great deal is owed to the O'Neill study for enabling the fleshing out of Tilly's five components. A brief review of the variables within each of the components of collective action is provided in Table 1. Everything considered, the Tilly framework is well-suited to the task demanded of it: separation of the variables acting in and on a terrorist organization, variables which may explain the success or failure of that organization.

TABLE 1

THE FIVE COMPONENTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

COMPONENT	VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION
Interest	Long Run vs. Short Run Individual vs. Group	
Organization	Cohesion Inclusiveness Efficiency and Effectiveness	Catness X Netness Time Energy Interaction Differentiation Centrality Stratification
Mobilization	1] Quantity of Resources X Collectively Controlled Probability of Delivery	
	2] Mobilization = f(Organization) 3] Organization = Catness X Netness	
	Assets	Loyalty Committment Quality
Opportunity	Repression Facilitation Power Opportunity/Threat	Type Effectiveness Popular Support External Support Efficient Effective
Collective Action	Type Preferred Severity Duration Changes	No. of Fatalities Escalation De-escalation

Chapter 3

THE FLQ

Quebec In The 1960s

It has become almost a cliché to say that the 1960s were a period of great change. There was political and social upheaval as a wave of revolution and decolonization swept many parts of the world early in the decade. The Cuban revolution had just ended. The Algerians had been fighting for independence since 1954. The conflict in Vietnam was beginning to heat up. In 1960, 17 African nations gained independence. No part of the world remained unaffected by the changes taking place. In North America, the Black civil rights movement was underway in the United States, while in Canada, 1960 saw the start of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec.

The root of the problems which would necessitate a social revolution in Quebec in the 1960s can be found almost 200 years earlier. From the time of the conquest of Quebec by the English in 1763, French-Canadians had been told by their religious and political leaders that the only way to preserve their faith (Roman Catholicism) and their language was to maintain their pastoral way of life. It was a belief which their leadership would perpetuate, for its own

purposes, well into the twentieth century and long after the vast majority of French Quebecers had ceased to live in rural areas. "But so long as the myth (of the pastoral French-Canadian) remained strong, governments were excused from developing complicated strategies for promoting industrial development, or paying much attention to the problems of industrial workers in an urban context."³⁹

The social revolution which finally brought Quebec into the mainstream of North American society began in 1960. It would have begun sooner had Quebec not been ruled by the conservative, anti-union iron fist of Maurice Duplessis, leader of the Union Nationale party and premier from 1944 to 1959. "Duplessis's conservatism would not allow the transformation of structures and traditional institutions to meet the demands of the new era, and so the social revolution grew in the catacombs."⁴⁰ With the death of Duplessis in 1959, and the sudden death of his successor shortly after, the Union Nationale was in disarray.⁴¹ In a provincial election in 1960, the Liberal party under Jean Lesage won on a platform which promised to bring much-needed changes to Quebec. His government soon embarked on a program of modernization which included expansion of the public sector, educational reform, social service measures and nationalization of electrical generation.

French-Canadians certainly had a legitimate grievance about their economic standing. In 1961, French-Canadians

earned 35% less on average than English-Canadians, Quebec had 40% of Canada's unemployed but only 27% of Canada's population, and francophones controlled less than 20% of Quebec's economy.⁴² Certainly, much of the blame for the inequalities had to be shared by French-Quebeckers themselves, for having shunned the business world for so long, on the advice of the church. But much of the problem was due to the economic policies of past provincial and federal governments, who had allowed the United States unfettered access to the Canadian economy, and to the rich resources of Quebec, to the point where, by 1960, half of Canada's manufacturing industries were American controlled.⁴³

With a new awakening in the 1960s French-Canadians began to reassess their place in Confederation. French-Canadians declared that they felt like second class citizens in Canada, neglected by an uncaring government in Ottawa dominated by and responding to the desires of English-Canadians, and doing little to promote or enforce the bilingual and bicultural nature of the country. Unless they spoke fluent English, French-Canadians were excluded from the powerful government posts in Ottawa.⁴⁴

The lack of French influence in Ottawa, coupled with intrusions into provincial powers by a federal government struggling to equalize living standards across the country and statements from English-Canada accusing Quebec of trying

to dictate to the rest of the country, led many French-Canadians to believe that satisfying their social, economic, and cultural needs and desires would require greater autonomy for the province or, possibly, the creation of a state of Quebec, separate from the rest of Canada.⁴⁵ This desire to be maîtres chez nous found a voice in the various nationalist and separatist groups which sprang up in Quebec during the 1960s. The most radical and impatient members of the separatist movement gave voice to their desires through the violence of the FLQ.

The FLQ was only one of about a half dozen underground nationalist groups which were established in the early 1960s. The autumn of 1962 saw the creation of two such groups, the Comité de Libération Nationale (CLN) and the Réseau de Résistance (RR).

The CLN was formed on October 31 in Montreal by four members of the Rassemblement Pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN), a mainstream nationalist, leftist political movement. The CLN leadership hoped, one day when they were better prepared, to engage in political violence in addition to legal activities, but for the time being were satisfied with seeing to the political education of future leaders and activists.⁴⁶ To this end, they established a training school which emphasized political theory and the history of revolutionary movements, and had courses on propaganda and agitation, security and intelligence, and the formation of

underground cells and networks. The CLN eventually had about 20 members, and organized cells in the RIN and in another nationalist, leftist political movement the Action Socialiste Pour l'Indépendance du Québec (ASIQ). A year after the CLN was founded, some of its members launched a newspaper, La Cognée, which was eventually to become the official organ of the FLQ [later to be replaced by La Victoire].

The Réseau de Résistance was formed in November 1962 by about 24 members of the RIN. The purpose of the group, which was opposed to violence, was to engage in minor acts of vandalism and sabotage. Other similar groups were formed, such as the Réseau de Libération Nationale and the Réseau Québec Libre. But eventually, some members of these groups grew impatient and began to engage in more destructive activities. On February 23, 1963, members of the Réseau de résistance firebombed the building housing a Montreal english language radio station.⁴⁷

The FLQ was founded in February 1963 by three members of the RIN. Its first activists were friends of the founders and most were, themselves, members of the RIN or of ASIQ. By June, the FLQ had about 35 members, some had come from other underground groups, such as the RLN, all of whose members had joined the FLQ. CLN members, on the other hand, had preferred to continue with their plan of building a real revolutionary movement, with a political and a military

wing, and a solid organization, before engaging in violence, rather than move directly into violence as the FLQ was going to do.⁴⁸ It was not long, however, before the CLN ceased to exist, as more and more of its members left to join the FLQ.

The people of Canada first heard of the FLQ on the night of March 7-8, 1963. On that night, three Canadian military establishments were hit with molotov cocktails and the letters "FLQ" were spraypainted on the walls. It was the beginning of almost a decade of terrorism.

Interests

The day after the three Canadian military barracks were firebombed a communique entitled "Notice to the Population of the State of Quebec" was delivered to the media announcing the birth of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ). The communique called the group "a revolutionary movement of volunteers ready to die for the political and economic independence of Quebec".⁴⁹ The objective of these "suicide-commandos" was:

the complete destruction, by systematic sabotage, of:

- a) all colonial (federal) symbols and institutions, in particular the RCMP and the armed forces;
- b) all the information media in the colonial language (English) which hold us in contempt;
- c) all commercial establishments and enterprises which practise discrimination against Quebecers, which do not use French as the first language, which advertise in the colonial language (English);
- d) all plants and factories which discriminate against French-speaking workers.⁵⁰

In addition, their campaign would "attack all American cultural and commercial interests" which were seen as the "natural allies of English colonialism". Finally, collaborators with the colonial "occupiers", the French-Canadian bourgeoisie, were to be targets as well. The communique ended with a call for the students, workers and peasants (farmers) of Quebec to rise in revolution "against Anglo-American colonialism".⁵¹

Fournier (1984) describes the FLQ not as a group dedicated to armed struggle, but rather as a group designed to work alongside the "legal" movements for Quebec independence, using armed agitation and armed propaganda as a catalyst or accelerator to advance the independence movement, to awaken French-Canadians to their domination by the English-Canadian majority and to the inequalities to which they suffered, to bring about the revolution, and to bring the cause of Quebec independence to the attention of the world.⁵²

What label best describes FLQ ideology is a matter of some disagreement. Parry (1976) states that ideologically, the FLQ were a mixture of Trotskyites and Maoists.⁵³ Loomis (1985) describes FLQ ideology and tactics along Maoist lines.⁵⁴ Pelletier (1971) would reject both descriptions, calling FLQ ideology "ambiguous".

Going through the propaganda texts of the movement, one has the painful impression of a recital of various dogmas culled from several rather disparate sources, indeed, of a sort of political impressionism.⁵⁵

Charters (1986) agrees with Pelletier, referring to FLQ ideology as an "amalgam of muddled revolutionary socialist thought, angry nationalist and separatist rhetoric, pledges of solidarity with American blacks and various Third World revolutions, and calls for popular action -- all heavily influenced by the writings of Fanon and Sartre"⁵⁶. Despite the mish-mash of ideologies, there was always a common theme in FLQ statements: "the oppression, exploitation and colonization of the Quebecois"⁵⁷.

One man whose ideas had a strong influence on the FLQ was Raoul Roy, leader of a small independence group called Action Socialiste Pour l'Indépendance du Québec (ASIQ), and publisher of La Revue Socialiste. Some of his followers were among the first members of the FLQ. He saw the cause of Quebec's political and economic problems in the political domination by Ottawa, economic domination by English-Canadians and Americans, domination by French-Canadian capitalism, and domination by the Church. True liberation lay in a peculiarly Quebec-style of socialism which could only be brought about through independence. In an article in his La Revue Socialiste in 1962, Roy referred to French-Canadians as "peaceable, peace-loving, non-violent, and civilized people" and remarked that it was a tradition worth preserving, but, in closing, he stated: "We have reached a point where we have no way of making ourselves heard except through violence"⁵⁸.

Much of the ideology of the early FLQ was described in La Cognée, the official FLQ newspaper which made its debut in October 1963. The name La Cognée means "the ax" and was taken from the passage "I do my work with an axe. There is no time for being subtle in Quebec" from the book Les Insolences du Frère Untel, a best-seller in Quebec, by Jean-Paul Desbiens.⁵⁹

The first issue of La Cognée trumpeted: "'We will follow the trail blazed in 1837'"⁶⁰, referring to the Rebellion of 1837-38. The FLQ had chosen themselves as the successors to the "Patriotes" of the rebellion, when Louis-Joseph Papineau and Les Fils de la Liberté rose up in revolt against the British rulers. The result then had been several hundred dead, more than a thousand imprisoned, deported or exiled, and 12 were hung in Montreal. The FLQ adopted the green, white and red flag of the rebels and, later, communiques carried the outline of a French-Canadian 'habitant' with a gun in his hand, a participant in the rebellion.

La Cognée stated that political independence for Quebec was "a precondition for 'overall revolution' or 'social revolution'". To bring about Quebec independence, the first step was to be the creation of an underground revolutionary party to coordinate clandestine and overt action and to educate political and military cadres, and to organize the cells and networks, all in preparation for the

popular armed uprising which the writers of La Cognition believed was coming. While it was workers' support which was most sought after, class alliances were not rejected if it furthered the cause of independence. All means, whether violent or non-violent, from general strikes to guerrilla warfare were to be used.⁶¹

FLQ ideology underwent a slight alteration as the ideas of Pierre Vallières began to become popular with many members. Vallières took issue with the FLQ's two stage strategy which held independence first and socialism later. He believed that the two were inseparable and had to be achieved simultaneously.

Here in Quebec the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism is inseparably linked to the struggle for national independence. One will not work without the other.⁶²

For this reason, he was not as ready as some of the FLQ leadership to support those mainstream separatist movements, like the Rassemblement Pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN), which preached independence without socialism.⁶³

Vallières deplored violence in principle, but saw it as a necessary part of the struggle for a free Quebec. In 1969, while in prison in Montreal, sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of murder and theft of explosives, he wrote "Even if violence is a phenomenon detestable in itself, it is nonetheless true that for exploited and colonized people like ourselves, freedom grows out of the barrel of a gun"⁶⁴.

Vallières felt Ottawa should not be the primary enemy of Quebec, it should be Washington. This grew out of his belief that Canada itself was under the control of American capitalists and that it was the Americans who "called the shots" in Ottawa.⁶⁵ But if Vallières was opposed to American capitalism, so he was also opposed to the "new brand of capitalism and imperialism" of the Soviet Union, blaming both Lenin and Stalin for leading the revolution. He urged the citizens of the Soviet bloc countries to rise against their oppressors, which the same as he called for revolution in the West.⁶⁶

In December 1965, Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon established a rival FLQ organization which began to challenge the old one. Their new organization began to print special editions of La Cognée, directed at a particular readership or devoted to a particular topic, such as labour or students. The Vallières-Gagnon (VG) group, aside from printing special issues of La Cognée, also launched Avant Garde, a publication which they claimed was now the official organ of the FLQ's central committee.⁶⁷ The new VG group and the old La Cognée group did not always see eye-to-eye.

The split between the two rival organizations became evident during the 1966 provincial election campaign. While the special trade union edition of La Cognée, published by the Vallières-Gagnon group advised its readers to boycott

the election, the "national" edition, published by the other group, told its readers that FLQ members would be voting for the RIN.⁶⁸

The original FLQ, identified with the La Ccgnée organization, had been in decline anyway, and the challenge by the VG group was the last nail in its coffin. The June 15, 1966 edition proved to be the last for the original La Ccgnée network. Almost all its members had left to join mainstream independentiste movements.⁶⁹

The new Vallières-Gagnon network, in keeping with Vallières ideas, emphasized socialism rather than independence.

To break the yoke of exploitation, it is not enough to proclaim oneself a separatist, one must take concrete and unequivocally anti-capitalist action. And how could our bourgeois nationalists be anti-capitalist, being capitalist themselves?⁷⁰

The anti-capitalist action of which they spoke was a series of bombings at companies, most of which were in the midst of strikes or some other form of labour troubles.

Vallières led the FLQ to greater support of the workers at a very opportune time, given the economic downturn which hit Quebec in 1966. Labour unrest was becoming increasingly violent. The FLQ, as well as other revolutionary groups in Quebec, began to favour, more and more, supporting working class struggles.⁷¹

The long run aim of the Vallières-Gagnon group, as outlined in a memorandum written in the summer of 1966 by

Vallières, was "to form a genuine revolutionary army, supported by a popular militia"⁷². He saw Quebec as the only place in North America where conditions were "ripe" for a socialist revolution to begin and to succeed.⁷³ In 1969, Gagnon stated that there were two strategies, the electoral and the revolutionary; the FLQ had rejected the electoral strategy in favour of "a revolutionary overthrow of the established order"⁷⁴.

With the arrest of many of its members in the fall of 1966, the Vallières-Gagnon group was destroyed, leaving what remained of the old La Cognaée group to reassert its claim as the central committee of the FLQ.⁷⁵ But the influence of Pierre Vallières made a lasting impression on the ideology of the FLQ. Statements made by the FLQ during the October crisis of 1970, when the group kidnapped a foreign diplomat and kidnapped and murdered a provincial government minister, show a heavier emphasis on socialism than on independence, especially the FLQ Manifesto, made public during the crisis, which is a vicious attack on capitalism. Also, the tendency to see the Canadian government as a puppet of the United States continued. The FLQ believed that the federal government's decision not to negotiate for the hostages was, in large part, made at Washington's urging. This emphasis on socialism prompts Pelletier (1971) to remark:

I wonder whether the members of the FLQ are still part of the ideological current called nationalism. They identify themselves less and less with the Quebec nationalist cause, and more and more with an anarchist-socialism that is as extremist as it is loosely defined.⁷⁶

The FLQ Manifesto, which accompanied the first ransom note for the British diplomat James Cross, kidnapped by the Liberation cell of the FLQ on October 5, 1970⁷⁷, is the best and most complete statement of FLQ ideology toward the end of the group's life. That first communique was a lengthy document, covering eight pages and 1,400 words, and written in language which could easily be understood by the average French-Canadian.

The manifesto described the FLQ as a group of working people seeking "the total independence of the Quebecois". Their violence was merely a response to the aggression of corporations and government against the workers. The FLQ members had lost all confidence in the possibility of bringing about the changes, which they believed were necessary, through an electoral process which favoured the rich and so they called on the working people of Quebec to rise in revolution. Quebec, they said, was "a society of terrorized slaves", terrorized by big business, politicians and the Roman Catholic church. As proof, the manifesto included a list of the principal recent strikes and business-labour conflicts in Quebec, most of which had ended unfavourably for the workers.⁷⁸

The ransom note which accompanied the manifesto laid

out the conditions for release of Cross as follows: the police were not to search for Cross, nor were there to be any investigations, raids or arrests arising from the kidnapping; 20 jailed members of the FLQ were to be released and flown to Cuba or Algeria along with their families, and three FLQ members already out on bail were to be allowed to accompany them; the manifesto of the FLQ was to be printed on the front page of all major newspapers in Quebec, and had to be read over Radio-Canada and commented upon on television by the "political prisoners" before they left for Cuba or Algeria; a "voluntary tax" of \$500,000 in gold bullion was to be placed aboard the plane; the Postmaster-General had to promise to reinstate the drivers of Lapalme, who had recently lost their jobs when the Post Office took over the company; the name and the picture of an FLQ informer who had led the police, recently, to an FLQ cell had to be made public. Once again, the FLQ made reference the Patriotes of 1837-38, and declared their support for revolutionary movements around the world, including American and African Blacks, the PLO and the IRA, as they had done from the beginning in 1963.⁷⁹

The FLQ, originally, had planned to kidnap an Israeli diplomat, not Cross. With the arrest of two FLQ activists in February 1970, however, that plan came to an abrupt end, as did a plan to kidnap the United States consul in June 1970 when the police raided a cottage in the Laurentians which

was an FLQ camp. The cell which eventually carried out the successful abduction of Cross, may have done so because he symbolized the exploitation of Quebec by the British and as such his kidnapping would have more of an impact on the English-Canadian establishment than would the kidnapping of an American.⁸⁰

As the kidnapping dragged on, the Liberation cell reduced the number of demands to two: the release and transport of the "political prisoners" and the suspension of "searches, raids, arrests, and tortures" by the police.⁸¹ However, on October 10, the Chenier cell of the FLQ kidnapped the Minister of Employment and Immigration, Pierre Laporte. Pierre Vallieres had listed Laporte as an enemy of the people in his book White Niggers of America in 1967 and, for the FLQ, he symbolized exploitation of the working class by the French-Canadian capitalists.⁸² The ransom note for Laporte called on the government to fulfill all the original demands of the Liberation cell before the FLQ would release him.

On October 27, 1970, a joint communique was issued by three FLQ cells, the Liberation, Chenier, and Dieppe cells, which was an attempt to clarify the ideas and intentions of the FLQ, which the group felt the authorities had perverted. It reiterated much of what had been written in the manifesto. The communique stated that the FLQ was a group of workers who did not want political power but were taking a

"step towards the revolution", a revolution which would require "all the people" if it was going to succeed. They claimed to be fighting to end "the daily acts of state terrorism" against the workers. Once again, they made reference to the Patriotes of 1837-38.⁸³

Right to the very end of the October Crisis, the FLQ wanted to make clear that they were not the ones who had instigated the violence. In a tape recording which the Liberation cell had delivered to the media before their departure for exile in Cuba, they maintained that their campaign of violence was a response to the violence of others.

Don't forget that it wasn't the Front that started the fighting. We have been subjected to humiliation, hate, and racism by the Anglophones for two hundred years. One of the main short-term objectives of the FLQ is to strip power of all its trappings and bring it out in the open.⁸⁴

Few could take issue with the sincerity of the vast majority of FLQ members. Most had a history of political activity, usually left-wing. Many joined the FLQ after having tired of trying to win independence through the democratic process and believing that others would also soon tire as they had.⁸⁵

Some of the members had already worked in labour unions or in radical movements, others were new to politics and only motivated by the desire "to get things going".⁸⁶

To evade capture by the police, many activists had fled to Cuba or Algeria, countries they admired for having won their independence.

After his release, James Cross, a former member of British Intelligence, said of his captors: "We discussed revolution a lot.... They were fervent revolutionaries, that was clear...".⁸⁷ But this was not true of all FLQ members. Some activists had no interest in socialism, desiring only independence for Quebec. Strangely enough, some members were opposed to violence. Inevitably, there are stories of FLQ members who were in it for the kicks or for personal gain, but only an insignificant minority.⁸⁸

One cannot help but be struck by the number of FLQ activists who were formerly members of the Canadian armed forces. They seem to have been moved to undertake political action by the discrimination which they, as French-Canadians, experienced as members of the armed forces.⁸⁹ At the time, English was the language used exclusively in the forces, and one had to speak English in order rise beyond the lower ranks in the forces.⁹⁰

As for their education, according to psychiatrist and criminologist Dr. Gustave Morf, most of the FLQ members he interviewed in jail were of above average intelligence but only about half had had a secondary level education. Many had dropped out of high school, "usually to go directly into terror".⁹¹

Many FLQ members were to show their disdain for the system they sought to overthrow, even after they had been arrested. For example, at their trials, the members of the

Chenier cell, who had kidnapped and murdered Pierre Laporte, engaged in a number of antics including throwing paper balls at the judge. Bernard Lortie, who was sentenced to twenty years, "announced that it was not important whether or not the jurors found him guilty; what was important was whether the jurors favored Quebec's separation". Paul Rose, who was sentenced to life imprisonment, was to remark: "The people of Quebec will judge us when the people of Quebec have taken over the government".⁹²

Organization

A few months after the founding of the FLQ, in June 1963, the decision was taken to reorganize the FLQ's 35 members into more tightly knit cells and splitting the FLQ into a political wing (the FLQ) and a military wing (to be called the Armée de Libération du Québec, or ALQ), with a central committee in charge. Each cell would specialize in some activity such as financing, usually through robbery, some would specialize in bombing, still others would specialize in building up an arsenal of weapons and explosives. A training camp was to be set up in the Saguenay-Lac Saint Jean region. However, before the changes could become fully effective, the police, acting on information supplied by an FLQ member turned informer, arrested twenty-eight members, including the FLQ's founders.⁹³

This first FLQ group probably had no structure, beyond the split between the group responsible for printing La

Cognée, and the group responsible for undertaking armed action. Morf (1970) describes the first FLQ group as having one member to make bombs, another to recruit new members, and the rest to assist in actions.⁹⁴

The police had been able to arrest so many members of the first FLQ because the group had not completed its restructuring which would have included the introduction of the Nechayevist method of organizing and running terror cells. In the Nechayevist method, a group is organized into cells of about three to seven people and only a small minority of the members of the group know the identity of members outside their own cell. This makes it much more difficult for the authorities to destroy the group, since arrested members, infiltrators, or informers are only able to identify a few members. Many incarnations of the FLQ, over the group's decade in existence, would ignore the Nechayevist method, to their detriment.

Those members of the FLQ who were not arrested in the summer of 1963 began immediately to reorganize. In a development which was to have a profound impact on the FLQ from then on, other cells, not connected to the founding group, began to organize as well.

From then on, the FLQ was no longer a single organization, a unified movement, but a collection of more or less connected but still clearly distinct groups, a set of initials to which all supporters of political violence laid claim.⁹⁵

The new group which could lay claim to being the true

offshoot of the original FLQ were the two branches made up of a political branch, which was responsible for producing the FLQ newspaper La Cognée, and a military branch, the ALQ, a fusion of a group of students from the Outremont "bourgeoisie" and young workers from east-end Montreal. The ALQ's founders had met as members of leftist political movements, such as the RIN and the Action Socialiste.⁹⁶

But, by far, the most successful and professional part of the FLQ organization was the group responsible for producing La Cognée. The four leaders of the La Cognée network developed such a sophisticated security system that the authorities never figured out who they were. According to Fournier (1984) they were well-known and rose to high positions in overt groups dedicated to independence and socialism, such as the RIN and the Parti Socialiste. They referred to themselves as the "Central Committee" or the "Political Bureau" of the FLQ. They met with certain leaders of the ALQ, and recruited more than 100 activists over the years.⁹⁷

Despite the arrest of many FLQ activists between 1963 and 1967, and despite their best efforts, the police were unable to put La Cognée out of publication, and it survived right up to April 15, 1967. La Cognée was published usually twice a month, with about 100 copies being printed at the beginning. Occasionally, as many as 3000 copies of some issues were printed. Regional editions were published

briefly in the Quebec City, Trois Rivieres, and the Saguenay-Lac Saint Jean areas.

Since La Coqnée had been created by members of the CLN, many of whom were still active on the staff of the publication when it became the official organ of the FLQ, the newspaper urged its readers to be patient, to take the time to properly organize and train before engaging in revolutionary activity. Their warnings were largely ignored, as a history of the FLQ organization will attest.

The ALQ did not fare as well as the military wing of the FLQ. The police arrested many of its members early in 1964. Shortly thereafter, in June, a new group was formed as the military wing of the FLQ, called the Armée Révolutionnaire du Québec (ARQ). The ARQ was similar to the ALQ but, given that two of its founders and several of its members were formerly in the Canadian military and a third founder was a veteran of the French Foreign Legion, the group was organized much more like a true army.⁹⁸

The ARQ leadership sought to create well-trained and highly mobile commando units. Toward this end, a camp was established about a hundred miles north-east of Montreal. Members of the ARQ were anxious to begin the revolution and were impatient with the political wing, who still wanted to take the time to build a proper organization. But the whole scheme came to an abrupt end on August 29, when police showed up while the ARQ were in the middle of robbing a

firearms store in Montreal. Four members were arrested by police, including the leader. In the days that followed, more arrests were made and the camp was uncovered.⁹⁹

The leaders of La Cognée became extremely wary and redoubled their precautionary measures against adventurist and militaristic operations. The network never again succeeded in creating a military branch on the same scale as the first ALQ, despite various attempts to rebuild it.¹⁰⁰

By September 1965, the FLQ appeared to be in trouble. In the La Cognée issue for that month, the announcement was made of a change in "the leadership of the FLQ and in the editorial staff of its newspaper". Fournier interpretes this to mean, on the basis of later articles as well, that the number of FLQ activists had dwindled, owing to people leaving the movement to carry on the fight elsewhere, or to differences in beliefs. At that time, Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon had yet to join the FLQ, due to differences in opinion between themselves and the La Cognée leadership.¹⁰¹

Before Vallières and Gagnon took over the leadership of the FLQ, Vallières was invited to express his opinions of the FLQ in the October 1965 issue of La Cognée. He took advantage of the opportunity to clarify why he was hesitant to join the FLQ. He chastised La Cognée for not contributing to "the theoretical and practical education of the revolutionary cadres" and called the FLQ a "vague collection of tiny, more or less active groups, whose members are all known to the police and to each other"

which lacked an "'overall strategy'" and was in need of serious organization.¹⁰²

The Vallières-Gagnon (VG) group eventually took over from the declining La Cognée network in December, 1965. In a clandestine document entitled "What Is The FLQ", released in 1966, the VG group described its internal structure. At the head of the group was a seven member Central Committee whose members were chosen at the yearly meeting of the General (or National) Congress. The General Congress was attended by members of the Central Committee, network heads, regional leaders, and delegates from each region. The Central Committee was responsible for: executing the decisions of the Congress, choosing "the members of the various offices that coordinate the different forms of FLQ activity", the treasury, etc.¹⁰³

The group was further organized into regions, sub-regions and zones, and into neighbourhoods, villages and sectors. Each of these divisions had an executive whose duty it was to "co-ordinate the activities of the different networks according to the needs and possibilities of the particular milieu and the movement".¹⁰⁴

There were three networks: Propaganda, Action, and the People's Liberation Committees. The People's Liberation Committees were originally envisioned to be underground committees established in neighbourhoods and in the workplace; however, they never got beyond the early stages.

Network heads were to assign tasks to cell leaders and sit on the central committee.¹⁰⁵

Within each network, the group's basic division was the cells, which consisted of three people. Three cells formed a group, two to four groups formed a detachment. Throughout the organization, "clandestinity (was) obligatory and the use of pseudonyms (was) general".¹⁰⁶

As to whether this structure held true in practice as in theory seems doubtful. It may have been just one more case of the FLQ exaggerating the soundness and the strength of its organization. For example, in early June 1963 an FLQ "Notice to the population of the State of Quebec" contained the sentence: "As a matter of fact we have just terminated the complete organization of our structures". In reality, the police had just arrested several members of the group, and by the middle of June, several more members, including the author of the "Notice" had been arrested.¹⁰⁷

The ease with which each incarnation of the FLQ was broken up by the police after just a few members of a cell were arrested is evidence that not much attention was paid to internal security. The VG group was itself compromised after the arrest of three of its members in August 1966. Police soon arrested 15 more of the groups members in September 1966.

Even by 1969, the FLQ had not learned its lesson about the need for better internal security measures. In 1969, the

Hudon brothers, Robert and Gabriel, both out on parole for earlier FLQ-related crimes, founded a new FLQ group which consisted of three cells, each with a particular specialization. However, each member of the cells knew one another.¹⁰⁸ While this did not play a direct role in their eventual capture, it very well could have.

By October 1970, according to an RCMP document leaked to the Gazette and printed October 16, 1970, the RCMP estimated that there were about 22 FLQ cells, most in the Montreal area, each with five to seven members, totalling about 130 people in all.¹⁰⁹ This number is quite close to the estimate made by Pelletier (1971) of the strength of the FLQ around the time of the October Crisis of 1970:

- a) A nucleus of 40 to 50 extremists (perhaps 100) ready to plant bombs, carry out kidnappings, even to commit murders.
- b) A more limited group, or "permanent cell," holding itself apart from violent action, which constitutes the editorial and propagandist element of the FLQ.¹¹⁰

But whether these 100 or so members were well organized is not clear.

In a recording made by the members of the Liberation cell during the period in which they were holding James Cross hostage, the group chatted openly about the FLQ. They thought that the 1970 incarnation of the FLQ was "better organized" and "better structured" than it had been in the past, referring to such things as improved communication between the cells. They admitted, however, that the need for secrecy made communication difficult.¹¹¹

There is evidence, however, to suggest that, once again, FLQ claims about its own organization were somewhat inflated. The two kidnappings which the FLQ carried out in October 1970 had not been properly coordinated. James Cross said that the kidnapping of Laporte came as a complete surprise to the cell which was holding him.¹¹² Francis Simard, a member of the Chenier cell which kidnapped Pierre Laporte, states that while the kidnappings had been planned all summer, the Liberation cell kidnapped Cross without first informing the Chenier cell that they were going to do it, and there was no time to set up an organization. In fact, most of the members of the Chenier cell were in Texas at the time of the Cross kidnapping, and raced back to Quebec to carry out a hastily thought out kidnapping of Laporte.¹¹³ Members of the two cells met later and agreed to issue joint communiques.

What happened to the FLQ in 1971 and 1972 is a matter of some controversy. It is known that the organization emerged from the October Crisis with at least one police informer in its ranks -- Carole de Vault. She was later joined by François Séquin, although exactly when he became a police informer is not certain. The police maintain Séquin was recruited in May 1972, but Fournier believes he was recruited in 1970.¹¹⁴ The presence of at least two police informers has led some observers sympathetic to the FLQ to charge that the police had actually created, rather than

infiltrated, a pseudo-FLQ. It is a charge which de Vault vehemently denies.¹¹⁵

One fact which has been documented in the report of the MacDonald Commission inquiry into police wrongdoing is that the police used various illegal means, and questionable "dirty tricks" to destroy the FLQ, including bugging, wiretaps, break-ins and phoney communiques. RCMP activities against the FLQ were eventually halted in 1975.¹¹⁶

An examination of FLQ membership over the ten years of the groups existence reveals that FLQ activists came from diverse backgrounds; students and intellectuals, working class and middle class. Most were young, ranging from 16 to 30 years of age. A great many members were introduced to the group by friends, room-mates, and even by family members. Being an FLQ activist often ran in families, with many members having brothers who had been or were active in the FLQ. Jean Gagnon and Robert Hudon each had a brother in jail when they founded the Armée de Libération du Québec.¹¹⁷

How much time an activist devoted to the FLQ must have varied widely. Some members had jobs or attended school. Many others were unemployed, or had dropped out of school or left jobs to work full-time for the FLQ. The FLQ's own documents stated that activists could "work by day and fight by night"¹¹⁸ Of the five members of ARQ who took part in a failed robbery attempt at a firearms store, only one was a full-time worker for the FLQ.¹¹⁹

The FLQ tried to assign particular tasks to certain members and certain cells. Whenever possible, different cells were given the responsibility for different tasks such as, financing (through robbery), acquiring weapons and explosives, or carrying out bombings. Within a cell or group, the job of bomb-maker, especially, was usually assigned to one person. The very first FLQ group assigned the task of bomb-making to one person in the hope that by having one individual specializing in bomb-making, they could improve the reliability of the bombs.¹²⁰ The practice was followed by successive FLQ groups, although it had the drawback that if that individual was arrested, bombing activities had to cease until a new individual could be trained. This occurred when Serge Demers was arrested in 1966 and when Pierre Paul Geoffroy was arrested in 1969. In both cases, the number of explosions declined for a short time.

Mobilization

A number of factors, and the weight of anecdotal evidence, would indicate that the FLQ had trouble with mobilization. We have defined mobilization as the quantity of resources collectively controlled and the probability of their delivery when needed. Further, the degree of organization of a group weighs heavily in the determination of its ability to mobilize. We have already seen that the FLQ, for most of its existence, did not have a good

organization. As shall be seen below, the FLQ lacked resources and lacked the ability to deliver these scarce resources when necessary.

The FLQ did not have a great quantity of resources available nor, therefore, could they expect to have everything they needed when they wanted it. With the group having to start almost from scratch after the destruction of each incarnation, and with each incarnation being destroyed generally within a few months to one year after its formation, there could not have been the time to be able to build up a reserve of money, weapons, or explosives which could be called on when needed. There are numerous examples of occasions when resources proved insufficient to meet needs.

There must certainly have been a supply shortage when the decision was taken in 1964 to establish the ARQ as the military wing of the FLQ. The ARQ training camp in St. Boniface lacked food, guns, ammunition and money. Supplies which the FLQ had promised never arrived. The considerable amount of money and supplies which the group's predecessor, the ALQ, had stolen, had all been confiscated by the police when its members were arrested. The ARQ came to a premature end during an attempt to steal the needed weapons, when the police showed up before the ARQ members had finished robbing a firearms store.¹²¹

Even seven years later, the FLQ lacked resources.

Despite having a "fund-raising cell" which had recently stolen \$35,000, the cell which kidnapped Pierre Laporte, the "Chenier financing cell", had to use \$60 offered to them by their hostage to buy food.¹²² The cell which kidnapped Cross, the Liberation cell, also experienced a shortage of money when the hostage-taking lasted much longer than the five or six days they had anticipated.

These supply shortages occurred despite the FLQ's rather impressive record of thefts. Much of the stolen money, weapons and explosives was recovered by the police, but figures on what was stolen and what was recovered seem not to exist. If not all of the stolen goods were recovered, it is unclear where it went. Haggart and Golden (1971) speculate that what dynamite was not used quickly must have deteriorated shortly after being stolen due to improper storage.¹²³ There are one or two stories of FLQ members who lived well on the stolen money, but such abuse does not seem to have been widespread.¹²⁴

Since the organization and mobilization components are so closely related, what was noted in the organization component applies in the mobilization component as well -- the number of bombings and thefts which the FLQ engaged in would indicate that, despite a lack of resources, they could get things done, but the number of arrests, and fact that there were six identifiable incarnations of the group in seven years, shows that something was wrong. Part of the

problem was the quality of FLQ activists and leadership, as well as the loyalty of some members.

Problems of member loyalty within the FLQ were not many but they were serious problems given the lack of proper organization. More than once, the police were able to break up FLQ cells using information provided by informers, or members who provided information in order to collect reward money. A better cell organization, with greater secrecy, would have minimized the potential damage which could be wrought by a member-turned-informer.

But loyalty, in this case, also refers to the amount of his or her own "resources" a member will commit to the group. The FLQ was, by and large, made up of committed volunteers who understood when they joined the group that they would be engaging in illegal acts. It is, therefore, not surprising that there seemed to have been only a few instances where activists refused to engage in a bombing or robbery. In those few cases, the reluctance stemmed from the poor "quality" of the recruit vis-a-vis the actions which are required of a terrorist i.e., the recruit had never handled a gun and was afraid he might shoot someone. This was only occasionally a problem for the FLQ, surprisingly so, considering that few of the FLQ's recruits, or leaders for that matter, had any real training at handling weapons or explosives.

The ill-fated ARQ hold-up at the International

Firearms store is indicative of the kinds of problems the FLQ had with inexperienced recruits. Although the plan was good, as good as any devised by "professional hold-up men", the robbery was a failure. Of the five activists who took part in the robbery, two showed a lack of nerve, and a third lost his head during the robbery and shot the manager, killing him. The leader, François Schirm, had had experience with weapons and tactics as a soldier in the French Foreign Legion but, like the other four, had no experience in staging an armed hold-up. In fact, only one member had ever taken part in an illegal FLQ activity. Everything they knew about armed robbery had been taught to them by FLQ instructors.¹²⁵

The Liberation Cell which kidnapped Cross demonstrated a strange mix of professionalism and amateurism. They forgot to put on their masks when they kidnapped Cross, but for the many weeks he was held hostage, Cross was never able to see the faces of his captors, and they never used their real names in addressing one another. Since the Liberation cell had no intention of killing Cross (unless the police discovered where the cell was hiding him, and tried to gain his release by force), they ensured that he could not identify them after his release.¹²⁶ Still, Cross described his kidnappers as "six kids trying to make a revolution".¹²⁷

Opportunity

Government Response

For seven years, governments at all levels were more or less content to deal with FLQ violence through intensified police work. The first act of violence by the FLQ, the firebombing of three Canadian military establishments, was investigated by the Montreal police, the security intelligence (SIS) branch of the RCMP, and the intelligence services of the military, all three of whom, along with the Quebec Provincial Police, were to be involved in operations against the FLQ throughout the life of the organization.¹²⁸

Intensified police work necessitated the creation of special police units. By the spring of 1963, the authorities had established the Combined Anti-Terrorist Squad composed of members of the RCMP, the Montreal police, and the provincial police. On their own, the RCMP formed a special squad composed of agents from the SIS and the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) to fight the FLQ and by the autumn of 1963, the Montreal police had set up a special anti-terrorist squad. Intensive police work by the Combined Squad, and by the police forces alone, usually succeeded in breaking up FLQ cells, generally within a few months to a year of their creation.¹²⁹

Combined police operations against the FLQ were increased in 1967 in an attempt to prevent trouble for the upcoming Expo 67 in Montreal. This increased surveillance

and questioning of known or suspected FLQ members paid off in a couple of ways. The RCMP felt that questioning suspected members often "neutralized" the individual.¹³⁰ The job of breaking up FLQ cells was made easier because FLQ members who had served time in jail often returned to the FLQ. The police knew who to look for and were often led straight to new cells.

The police did not always demonstrate a concern for civil rights in their attempts to break up terrorist cells. Arrests, raids, searches, and the seizing of documents were often carried out without proper warrants, resulting in complaints and, occasionally, public demonstrations by nationalist and civil rights groups. There were also charges that some of those arrested were subjected to intense interrogation, beatings, and indefinite confinement without trial. The first group of FLQ activists arrested by the police were held incommunicado and were unable, immediately, to speak to a lawyer. These measures were taken in order not to warn other activists that the group had been compromised. One Quebec premier, Jean Lesage, responded to the charges that FLQ members were being held illegally by stating that sometimes "extraordinary" measures were necessary when dealing with a revolutionary group.¹³¹

As for the governments themselves, occasionally, during a period in which the FLQ was particularly active, the city of Montreal and the provincial government would

offer rewards for information leading to the arrest of FLQ activists. The rewards were sometimes successful, even enticing some members of the FLQ to turn informant.

The federal government, for its part, did not take lightly the violent events in Quebec. Pearson saw the threat to Canadian unity and social peace posed by the nationalist movement in Quebec, and by the FLQ in particular. Separatist parties were enjoying far too much success with the voters in Quebec. By 1967, federal authorities had identified the separatist movement in Quebec as the number one security problem facing the country.¹³²

One of Pearson's earliest concerns was to find ways of keeping the federal government better informed about the actions of Quebec separatists. It was in late 1964 that the police began intelligence operations against the nationalist movement in general in Quebec. The RCMP was also authorized to run security checks on members of the federal civil service for possible involvement in separatist organizations such as the RIN.¹³³

But Pearson did more than just keep tabs on the nationalist movement. Pearson realized that the grievances voiced by the FLQ, and by French-Canadians in general, were legitimate.¹³⁴ Therefore, according to Loomis (1985), Pearson instituted a program, which the Trudeau government continued, aimed at righting wrongs and at "opening opportunities long denied".¹³⁵ It was a program of

political, social and economic reform which was designed to weaken and defeat the FLQ and the other forces of separatism in Quebec by winning the hearts and minds of French-Canadians for Canada. The objectives of the reform program were: 1] to strengthen national unity; 2] to improve federal-provincial relations; 3] to devise a more appropriate constitution; 4] to guard against the wrong kind of American penetration.

The political reforms included Pearson's "Federalism for the Future" program, the Declaration of French-Canadian Rights, the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, a new Official Languages Act, and a new Canadian flag. The social reforms were aimed at creating a more just society and improving the quality of life for all Canadians included equalization payments to the provinces, the Medicare Act, and the Canada Assistance Plan. The economic reforms were designed to foster economic growth and to combat what the FLQ referred to as the "contradictions of economic colonialism" -- the inequalities of economic development among the regions of Canada and perceived exploitation: exploitation of Canada by the United States; exploitation of Quebec by English Canada; and the exploitation of the Maritimes and the Western provinces by Central Canada. The economic reforms included greater government regulation of the economy, a general attempt to increase Canadian control of its own economy, and the creation of the Foreign

Investment Review Agency and the Department of Regional Economic Expansion.¹³⁶

There were also numerous actions taken to promote Canadian unity including: the promotion of Canadian culture in the arts, on television and on radio; Canadian content regulations for radio and television; the removal of tax breaks for American magazines; and name changes for Crown Corporations such as Air Canada and Canada Post.¹³⁷

The programs culminated in the 1980s with the Bill of Rights and the repatriation of the constitution. Loomis believes the programs worked but were expensive, with some being ended in the 1980's.¹³⁸

Pearson also took steps to ensure that the military would be prepared to deal with the FLQ, if necessary. Loomis says that as a force development planning officer he took part in the restructuring of the Canadian armed forces to readapt them to increase their ability to fight a low-intensity conventional war of the type one encounters in a protracted revolutionary war.

The restructuring began in 1965 with the establishment of Mobile Command Headquarters at St. Hubert, just south of Montreal. Mobile Command was created for the task of deterring, and if necessary, waging mobile warfare against "agitation, terrorism and guerrilla warfare".¹³⁹ Programs were initiated to organize, train, and equip the Canadian Forces for such low-intensity operations, hence, according

to Loomis, Pearson's desire that Canada be involved in international peacekeeping operations. Experience in low-intensity operations would help to ensure that, if it were necessary to use troops in Canada, they would know how to respond, especially when dealing with riots and demonstrations. Pearson wanted to avoid a repeat of the army's behaviour during the 1918 conscription riots when they used more force than was necessary.¹⁴⁰

Despite the best efforts of governments and police, FLQ thefts and bombings continued. The government had tried curfews, the prohibition of large gatherings without a permit, and wartime explosives control laws.¹⁴¹ Then, on October 5, 1970, the FLQ used a tactic they had not used before -- kidnapping. Since the beginning of the year, through raids on suspected FLQ safe-houses and arrests of FLQ members the police had twice thwarted FLQ plans to stage a kidnapping. Despite this, no special precautions had been taken by the authorities to warn or to protect people who were possible kidnap targets. On their third attempt at kidnapping, the FLQ targeted James Cross, British Trade Commissioner in Montreal. This time, they were successful.

Cross's wife and his maid both identified Jacques Lanctot, an FLQ activist already known to police, as one of the kidnapers. Despite this, the police waited days before releasing his name and photo to the press and did not immediately issue a warrant for his arrest. Whether this was

done deliberately or was an example of police bungling is not clear. Pelletier (1971) says that, in general, the police were ill-equipped and ill-prepared to deal with the events of October 1970, never having dealt with such matters before.¹⁴²

But if police response was slow, so was the response from government. Gwyn (1980) describes the response to Cross's kidnapping as "almost languid". Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa went ahead with a planned visit to New York, remarking to a companion as they boarded the plane, "Isn't it alarming that the people aren't concerned?" Prime Minister Trudeau decided to go ahead with his upcoming official visit to the Soviet Union.¹⁴³

The day after Cross was kidnapped, Prime Minister Trudeau and his inner cabinet decided to reject the FLQ's demands. Still, the statement read over the media on October 7 by Quebec Minister of Justice Jérôme Choquette said: "The governments are ready to investigate all practical means out of this impasse". The governments seemed to want to negotiate, an appearance that was further strengthened by a statement read later that same day by the federal Minister of External Affairs Mitchell Sharp which called the kidnappers demands "wholly unreasonable" and called for the FLQ to name a negotiator with whom the government could deal. Both governments, while rejecting the kidnappers demands, kept talking of the possibility of reaching a

compromise.¹⁴⁴ On October 8, as a gesture of good faith, the government allowed the FLQ Manifesto to be read in full on television as the kidnappers had demanded, though only on the French CBC.¹⁴⁵

Because Cross was a diplomat, the federal government had responsibility for his safety. In answer to a question in the House of Commons on October 7, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that he would not leave negotiations in the hands of the provincial government. However, on October 8, the decision was made that while Ottawa would handle negotiations, decisions would be seen to be coming from Quebec rather than Ottawa. This was done in the belief that the people of Quebec would be more "sympathetic" to statements coming from the provincial government and its members.¹⁴⁶

But while it was decided that, regarding negotiations, Ottawa would make the decisions and Quebec would make those decisions public, in private there was not always complete agreement between the two levels of government on how to respond to the kidnapping. The Quebec government, in a statement made on October 9, was prepared to make an offer to the Cross kidnappers. According to the statement, the government would put into place a mechanism to better allow it to hear demands from the people for reform, and would consider the cases of the FLQ "political" prisoners with clemency. The provincial government also offered safe

passage out of the country for the kidnappers, in return for the safe release of Cross.¹⁴⁷ The federal government, however, would have nothing to do with the deal, and since many of the FLQ prisoners were serving time in federal penitentiaries, Ottawa's approval of any such deal was necessary.¹⁴⁸

The kidnapping of Quebec's Minister of Employment and Immigration, Pierre Laporte, on October 10, was a major escalation of the crisis by the FLQ. People were suddenly very interested. "One kidnap by one cell might have been a lucky fluke. Two kidnaps by two separate cells had to be conspiracy."¹⁴⁹

The FLQ suddenly was taken much more seriously. The police escalated their activities and the premier moved into a heavily guarded room at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel. Messages were sent to prominent Quebecers warning them that the government could not be responsible for their safety.¹⁵⁰ On October 12, the army was called into Ottawa to provide "armed assistance" to the RCMP in guarding federal buildings and the homes of VIP's in the Ottawa area.¹⁵¹ Troops remained in Ottawa until November 21, 1970.

As the situation in Quebec continued to worsen, with the prospect of mass street demonstrations, with innumerable bomb threats, and two kidnappings, the federal government, at the urging of the governments of the city of Montreal and the province of Quebec, decided to invoke the War Measures

Act. The War Measures Act went into effect at 3 A.M. on the morning of October 16, 1970; the deadline set by the government for a response from the FLQ to its latest offer. No response came.

The Act went into effect in the early hours of the morning, and without Parliament first being consulted, to ensure maximum effect. The absence of warning was sure to catch the FLQ unprepared. The objective was to cut off the FLQ from its domestic and foreign support.¹⁵² By the time the House of Commons met on the morning of October 16, 150 people had been arrested.¹⁵³

The War Measures Act gave the police sweeping powers. It:

outlawed the FLQ, made membership or support a crime, and gave police the power to search and detain without warrant and to imprison without charge, trial, or opportunity for bail.¹⁵⁴

Those taken into custody could be held for up to 21 days without being charged, and longer if the Minister of Justice desired. The act also banned political rallies. Before the crisis was over, almost 500 people were arrested, of which only 62 were ever charged and less than a dozen were ever sentenced.¹⁵⁵

The War Measures Act brought out the army but at no time was Canada or, more specifically, Quebec, under martial law, since the troops were responsible to Maurice St. Pierre, head of the Quebec Provincial Police. The army was used to guard government buildings and the homes of

politicians, and to assist in searches and sweeps.

From October 16 to November 24, the police and soldiers carried out 3,068 raids and apprehended 453 suspects, more than half of whom (252) were between the ages of 19 and 25 years. "The list of seized weapons included 159 firearms, 4,962 rounds of ammunition, 677 sticks of dynamite, and 912 detonators."¹⁵⁶

On November 2, the three levels of government offered a reward of \$150,000 for information leading to the arrest of the kidnappers. On the same day, the War Measures Act was replaced by the Public Order Temporary Measures Act. Similar to the WMA in many respects but it limited "presumptions of affiliation" with the FLQ and added some legal safeguards for those arrested. It was to expire on April 30, 1971.¹⁵⁷

The events of the last days of what has become known as the October Crisis are, by now, familiar. The police continued the search for Cross and his captors, as well as for the murderers of Laporte. On December 3, police and soldiers surrounded a house in Montreal North which they had had under surveillance for a week, certain that Cross was inside. They were right. Negotiations between the government and the Liberation cell of the FLQ resulted in Cross's safe release, in return for the safe passage to Cuba for the cell's members. Later that month, on December 28, the remaining members of the Chenier cell surrendered to police, who had surrounded their hideout. They would face trial for

the murder of Laporte.

By the end of the year, the crisis was over. The troops were withdrawn from the streets of Quebec on January 4, 1971, by agreement between Bourassa and Trudeau.¹⁵⁸ However they continued to act as bodyguards for some time after. With the FLQ severely weakened, a return to intensified police work, including "dirty tricks", against the FLQ proved sufficient to destroy the group.

Public Support

The history of public support for the FLQ is one marked by contradictions and transformations. There were many who wanted an independent Quebec, but few who would condone violence to achieve it. Further, the public support which the FLQ did have, they proved unable to use to their advantage.

The reaction to the first acts of violence by the FLQ, in nationalist circles, was almost uniform condemnation. The leadership of the major separatist party in Quebec, the RIN, said that it "approv(ed) of the demands of the FLQ but deplor(ed) the extreme means which it uses to achieve them"¹⁵⁹. It was an attitude which was to continue among the mainstream of Quebec nationalists throughout the life of the FLQ.

The response from the press was equally cool. No major Quebec newspaper, except Le Devoir would print any of the FLQ's statements, and it would print only selected parts.

Le Devoir would, for some years, remain the only major newspaper to print statements of the FLQ.¹⁶⁰

The reaction to the first death caused by an FLQ bomb, on April 20, 1963 was further condemnation of violence. La Press called it a murder, Le Devoir accused the FLQ of dishonouring Quebec nationalism, and the RIN stated:

Violence, whether it is carried out by terrorists or by the police, is unacceptable, because violence breeds violence and those who resort to it never know where to stop.¹⁶¹

The reaction from the indépendantiste political community to the arrest of 25 FLQ members in June 1963, trumpeted the same tone. The statements deplored the violence, but also condemned the society and the system for making the resort to violence inevitable. The RIN even went so far as to accept some of the responsibility for pushing the activists to violence "because we (the RIN) have not worked hard enough for the cause of independence". René Lévesque, meanwhile, went to great lengths to disassociate the separatist movement in Quebec from the FLQ terrorists. The two were becoming inextricably linked in many people's minds, due partly to statements by the authorities and partly to statements within the media. With few exceptions, leaders of the nationalist movements and political parties in Quebec, denounced the violence of the FLQ, even though they may have publicly supported the motives.¹⁶²

There were those exceptions within the nationalist/separatist community in Quebec who were ready to applaud the

actions of the FLQ. In general, these were short-lived organizations such as the Front Républicain pour l'Indépendance (FRI), a radical and semi-secret organization which chose to engage in agitation and propaganda rather than electoral work, or the Chevaliers de l'Indépendance, a group which took part in demonstrations and made no secret of its support for the FLQ.¹⁶³

As early as 1964, there began the realization, among some in the intellectual community who had initially supported the FLQ, that something was amiss, that the FLQ was not getting the hoped for support from the public. They began to reassess their own support of the group, pointing out either that the FLQ was proving too amateur or that the time for a revolution had not yet come. Bombing was an effective form of agitation, they felt, but not when carried out by "'isolated terrorists and romantic rebels...it must be part of the overall strategy of an organized revolutionary party...'"¹⁶⁴

In the 1964 manifesto of the Parti Pris, an organization which published a monthly left-wing, indépendantiste political and cultural review, the group withdrew their support of the FLQ because "'It has reached the point of trying to carry out a people's revolution without the participation of the people'". The violence had been ineffective, and could no longer be justified since it had neither the support nor the approval of the people.¹⁶⁵

Still, there was sympathy for the FLQ activists themselves. There were always groups ready to aid and defend arrested FLQ members.

When, at the beginning of June 1963, the terrorists were arrested, a sentimental undercurrent of sympathy and pity began to stir: they were so young, so intelligent, they meant so well -- although of course they used the wrong means.¹⁶⁶

The first wave of arrests of FLQ activists in June 1963, saw the publication of two books in defence of the activists, and the creation of the Comité Chénier, a group to aid those arrested. The Comité referred to the arrested activists as political prisoners, a term which was to be used often in the coming years when referring to FLQ members arrested and jailed.

The Comité Chénier, like many similar groups which would follow, claimed many prominent Quebecers as members including journalists, university professors, intellectuals, artists, lawyers, trade unionists, and student leaders. as well as, in later groups, some who had previously been arrested for FLQ-related activities. The Comité was established by Bernard Smith, a teacher and a leading figure in the RIN. The prisoners were defended by a number of lawyer's, some from the RIN.¹⁶⁷

As for the RIN itself, while some of its members aided arrested FLQ activists, and a few others had left to join the FLQ, the leader of the RIN, Pierre Bourgeault, took a step to disassociate his party from the FLQ. At the party's

May 1965 convention, Bourgeault announced that the RIN would adopt the non-violent resistance tactics of the Black Civil Rights movement in the U.S..¹⁶⁸

Groups which supported the FLQ came and went. Some merged with others, some simply disappeared as new ones appeared. According to Loomis, a partial list of organizations which supported the FLQ in the late 1960s would include: Christians of the University of Montreal, Mouvement de Libération du Taxi, Front de Libération Populaire, Le Mouvement Syndicalpolitique, Comité d'Aide Vallières-Gagnon, Mouvement de Défense des Prisonniers Politiques au Québec, L'Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal, Le Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux, Union Générale des Étudiants du Québec, La Corporation des Enseignants du Quebec, and Le Syndicat de la Construction de Montreal.¹⁶⁹

But despite the number of groups which, in one way or another, supported the FLQ, support did not seem to be forthcoming from the public. At the Université de Montreal, a petition supporting a manifesto in support of the jailed Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon, collected only 61 signatures, although the university had 10,000 students. Four years later, in 1970, a planned week of demonstrations in support of Pierre-Paul Geoffroy, a recently arrested FLQ activist, was "a complete flop", and an appeal for funds raised only \$550.¹⁷⁰

Despite the lack of support for the FLQ from the general public, by the time of the October Crisis in 1970, some people, like Jean Marchand, minister of regional economic expansion in the federal government, were seeing FLQ activists around every corner, including inside the provincial government. According to Don Jamieson, federal minister of transport, Jean Marchand was "convinced that there was widespread FLQ infiltration of various important agencies in Quebec..."¹⁷¹ While there is no evidence to substantiate statements that the FLQ had infiltrated all levels of government, there were examples that the FLQ had friends in helpful places in the past.

The FLQ had had inside help in 1965 when issues of La Cognée were being printed on federal government paper which had been provided by a sympathizer. "It was mailed to certain selected recipients (the media, politicians, etc.) in prepaid envelopes intended for government mail". In another such incident, more than a thousand copies of La Cognée were mailed to the houses of Montreal policemen. It was later discovered that a Montreal police information centre clerk was providing the FLQ with many secret documents, not just the names and addresses of policemen. A Quebec civil servant was also implicated but was eventually acquitted.¹⁷²

At the start of the October Crisis, reaction to the Cross kidnapping from prominent members of the nationalist

community ran from disgust to unbridled support of the FLQ action. Rene Lévésque, leader of the separatist Parti Québécois (PQ) referred to the kidnappers as "sewer rats" but said that he understood the conditions which pushed them to terrorism. Michel Clartrand of the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU) in Montreal, who was to make many statements during the October Crisis which would endear him to none but a very few people¹⁷³, stated "I have no more sympathy for Mrs. Cross than for the wives of thousands of men without jobs in Quebec at the present time". Paul Cliche, leader of the Front d'Action Politique (FRAP), a party contesting the upcoming Montreal civic elections said "the violence of a system which has produced so many unemployed is much worse and much more to be condemned".¹⁷⁴

As for what they thought the government should do, reaction in the press was divided. Claude Ryan of Le Devoir was in favour of the government negotiating with the FLQ for the release of Cross. Jean-Paul Désbiens of La Presse, however, echoed the sentiments of most of Quebec's newspapers when he stated that no government "should at any time give in to this blackmail".¹⁷⁵

On October 8, 1970, three days after Cross was kidnapped, the FLQ manifesto was read over the airwaves on the French CBC; it was one of the few concessions the government made to the FLQ. The manifesto denounced all aspects of the Quebec establishment, sparing only the unions

and the people. Once again, many prominent Quebecers expressed their opinions, some supported the goals of the FLQ, some did not.

Excellent examples of the mood of the people of Quebec during the October Crisis can be found in Carole de Vault's book Confessions of An Ex-Terrorist. As a young woman who believed in independence for Quebec but not in the violence of the FLQ, she suddenly found herself involved with the FLQ in 1970, and made the decision to become a police informer. Carole de Vault writes of the reaction to the FLQ manifesto the morning after it was made public:

Everyone was discussing the manifesto the next morning. Everyone now felt involved. Some were for, some against, but no one remained neutral. The populist tone had touched a responsive chord among the Quebecois. It seemed to many that the FLQ had just spoken the plain truth -- expressed in bold language what everyone privately thought.¹⁷⁶

Even within her own family, discussion of the Manifesto led to arguments. Some in her family feared the harm that the FLQ would do to the Parti Québécois and the cause of independence, while others argued that the PQ was moving too slowly.¹⁷⁷

She writes that the manifesto was the subject of conversation at university among the students and teachers for days. All the students and professors she encountered approved of the manifesto.

For the five days that followed the kidnapping of Cross, all Quebec was wrapped up in it. If the truth be known, they even joked about it. There was no crisis yet, merely suspense.¹⁷⁸

Gwyn echoes the same sentiments.

The affair took on something of the air of a lark; press and public began to treat the kidnapers as Robin Hoods robbing Steinbergs and Molsons to give to the poor.¹⁷⁹

Similarly, Pelletier (1971) attributes the favourable reception the Manifesto received in some circles to a kind of vicarious thrill which people derive from seeing those in authority berated. "But terrorist escalation put an end to this quasi-indulgent attitude...."¹⁸⁰

The thrill was to last only a few days, "it all changed suddenly at 6:18 in the evening of October 10". The kidnapping of Pierre Laporte changed everything, spreading panic through the population, and stunning the nation. The FLQ seemed to be much more than just a group of idealistic young people. It now seemed as if the FLQ could do whatever it wanted: could kidnap at will.¹⁸¹

The population began to rethink its assessment of the FLQ. Until now, its members had been considered rash young idealists, perhaps impractical, but likeable overall. You couldn't help but feel sorry for all those young people who had caused a commotion for a while before ending up in prison.¹⁸²

Even after Pierre Laporte was kidnapped, however, many continued to cling to their support of FLQ aims, and called on the government to accede to the kidnapers' demands. The days leading up to the imposition of the War Measures Act were marked by increasingly vocal calls for the government to negotiate with the FLQ and increasingly vocal statements of support. On October 14, a manifesto urging the government to release the 23 "political prisoners" and to bargain with

the FLQ was signed by dozens of prominent people from the media, the arts, and the business and professional communities. Later that day, a group of leaders from the media, labour, professional associations and political sectors of society issued a similar statement.¹⁸³

On the evening of October 14, Robert Lemieux and a group of high-profile Quebecers addressed a rally of 1000 University of Montreal students and urged them to boycott classes -- Operation Debrayage [Walkout] began the next day. A campaign to organize a general student strike began as well.

The next day, October 15, CEGEP Vieux-Montreal held an all-day teach in to study the FLQ Manifesto. University of Quebec students occupied administration offices and promised to keep the university closed until the 6 demands were met. A mass rally was planned for that evening with a march to city hall and the Palais de Justice after. 3000 people showed up for the rally at the Paul Sauvé Arena on October 15 to hear speeches by Pierre Vallières, Charles Gagnon, Robert Lemieux [a young lawyer who later became the negotiator for the FLQ kidnapers] and Michel Chartrand in support of the FLQ.¹⁸⁴

That evening, Pierre Vallières addressed a huge student rally in east-end Montreal, declaring that the time had come to rise up and fight for the liberation of Quebec in each district, in each factory, in each business office and sector of society.¹⁸⁵

While this was going on, at 9:00 in the evening,

Premier Bourassa went on television to issue the government's final statement to the FLQ which offering safe passage out of the country for the kidnappers providing they surrendered, and promises that it would not oppose parole for those jailed FLQ members who were entitled to it. The government gave the FLQ six hours to reply. When no reply came by 3 A.M., the War Measures Act was invoked an hour later.

The French-Canadian press was divided in its reaction to the War Measures Act. At Le Devoir, Claude Ryan opposed the use of the Act, but reluctantly recognized the need for the army since the police had been constantly on alert for two weeks and were exhausted. Le Soleil and La Presse supported the use of the WMA. The English Canadian press gave cautious approval of the War Measures Act, calling on the government to provide more proof that it was necessary.¹⁸⁶

The discovery Pierre Laporte's body shortly after midnight on October 16 changed much. The FLQ drove the final nail into their coffin themselves, when they murdered Pierre Laporte. His murder proved to be too much for the public. "Instantly, the FLQ lost all public sympathy"¹⁸⁷. Support for the FLQ withered overnight as "few Québécois were sufficiently committed to violent revolutionary separatism to accept the murder of a fundamentally decent and innocent man"¹⁸⁸. And finally, it strengthened the belief of those

who agreed with the use of the WMA and even turned Claude Ryan into a believer though he hoped it would be used "with a maximum of discretion"¹⁸⁹.

Given the clandestine nature of the FLQ, it is impossible to know exactly how many people were active or passive supporters of the FLQ at any one time. Pelletier, again through conversations, estimates the number of active supporters [those willing to give financial aid, provide safe-houses, etc.], at the time of the October Crisis, at approximately 200 to 300 people. The number of passive sympathisers [those who approve of FLQ methods and "desire its victory"] he would estimate at 2000 to 3000.¹⁹⁰ An RCMP document, leaked to the Montreal Gazette and printed on October 16, 1970, estimated passive support at about 2000 people, mostly students.¹⁹¹

Pelletier is convinced that support for the FLQ had increased from 1963 to 1970. He points out that Laporte's murderers were able to find several people willing to hide them, although it was known publicly that they were wanted by the police, whereas in 1964, when the ARQ shot a store manager during a hold-up, no one was willing to help them evade capture.¹⁹²

Public opinion polls taken during the October Crisis may help to determine the level of passive support for the FLQ. Admittedly, this is a very crude method, but one which has some degree of validity. Through it, it is possible to

determine the absolute upper limit of passive support for the FLQ within the population. For example, it can be reasonably assumed that those who favoured the FLQ also opposed the invoking of the War Measures Act, since the Act was an attempt to thwart FLQ action. However, since it is clear that not everyone who opposed the War Measures Act also approved of FLQ methods, FLQ supporters form only a subset of those who opposed the War Measures Act. Since there is no way of separating out this subset, the percentage of people opposed to the War Measures Act can be used only as an upper limit in determining the level of support for the FLQ within the population.

Public opinion polls taken at the time of the October Crisis¹⁹³ paint a very revealing picture: the vast majority of Quebeckers, and Canadians in general, supported the use of the War Measures Act. A Canadian Institute of Public Affairs poll taken October 17, the day after the War Measures Act was invoked, but the day before Pierre Laporte was found murdered, is perhaps the most revealing, since it was untainted by the emotion which surrounded Laporte's death. The poll found that 32% of Quebeckers and 37% of Canadians as a whole felt the government had not been tough enough while 54% of Quebeckers and 51% of Canadians as a whole felt the government response was about right.¹⁹⁴

A poll by the Information Collection Institute published on October 19, but undoubtedly taken before the

murder of Laporte, found that 78% of Montrealers totally disapproved of the kidnappings while 1% totally approved. Further, a majority believed that the maintenance of law and order was more important than the lives of the two men.¹⁹⁵

Later polls showed similar results. A CTV "W5" poll made public on November 15 showed 87% of Canadians approved of the use of the WMA while only 6% disapproved.¹⁹⁶ Another poll, published on November 27 in La Presse revealed Quebecers overwhelmingly approved of the government's use of the War Measures Act, though the figure was somewhat lower than the national figures, with 72.8% of respondents approving the use of the WMA while 15.6% were opposed.¹⁹⁷ A Toronto Star poll published on December 12 found that 89% of English-speaking Canadians and 86% of French-speaking Canadians approved of the government's use of the War Measures Act while only 5% and 9% respectively, disapproved.¹⁹⁸

Invoking the War Measures Act did not hurt the Prime Minister's popularity with the majority of Canadians. By October 29, 1970 Prime Minister Trudeau had received about 11,500 letters, 97% of which supported his action.¹⁹⁹

Based on the public opinion polls cited, passive support for the FLQ at the time of the October Crisis was not more than 15% of the population, and most probably was about half of this figure. Judging by these figures, the FLQ was not making great progress in convincing French-

Quebeckers of the need for a violent revolution.

Another method of estimating public support for the FLQ which could prove valuable is to examine election results for the 1963-1970 period. Although the FLQ often counseled its supporters not to vote for "bourgeois" indépendantiste parties [because these parties did not support the overthrow of the capitalist system and therefore could not bring true independence for Quebec], it is unclear how many would have heeded this call. Nevertheless, we can assume that those who supported the FLQ are a subset of those who voted for the indépendantiste parties in provincial elections. Again, this gives us a number for the upper limit on passive support for the FLQ.

There can be little doubt that, throughout the 1960s, the call for greater provincial autonomy was popular with the majority of Quebeckers. Separatism, on the other hand, was not nearly as well-received. In the provincial election of 1965, the separatist parties, the RIN and the Ralliement Indépendentiste, captured less than 10% of the popular vote. The Union Nationale, which won the election, ran a very nationalist campaign based on "Equality or Independence" theme. Their slogan was "Put Quebec First".²⁰⁰

In the provincial election of April, 1970, the separatist party, the Parti Québécois, captured 24% of the vote (one-third of Francophone votes cast) but took only 7 seats. The provincial Liberal party, under Robert Bourassa,

which preached economic development, won 44% of the popular vote and 72 seats.²⁰¹

In the Montreal municipal election on October 25, during the height of the October Crisis, Mayor Jean Drapeau's Municipal party was re-elected receiving 92% of the votes cast and all seats. The opposition Front d'Action Politique (FRAP) party, had not condemned the kidnappings as vehemently as had Mayor Drapeau. Indeed, some members of FRAP had been censured by the party for speaking out against the FLQ and a FRAP rally has been addressed by FLQ theorists Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon.²⁰²

The various election results, and the public opinion polls taken during the October Crisis, analysed together would seem to indicate that, certainly, less than 20%, though more probably less than 10%, of Quebec adults approved of the methods of the FLQ. The percentage of the vote received by the FLQ in the 1970 election would appear to put a ceiling of 24% on the number of people who, even moderately, sympathized with the goals of the FLQ.

External Support

Details of foreign involvement in the FLQ do not exist, which may be why Charters (1985) was led to conclude that there was no "credible evidence of foreign involvement"²⁰³. However, the matter should not be so lightly dismissed. The weight of evidence would indicate that certainly the French government, and possibly the Cuban

and Algerian governments, were aiding the FLQ, though not in ways which could have been of great assistance.

In the 1967 report of the Royal Commission on National Security, concern was expressed over the possibility of the revolutionary movement in Quebec linking up with radical elements in other countries. It is likely that the FLQ would not have refused aid from outside sources. In a confidential memorandum written in August 1966, Pierre Vallières wrote that "'like all revolutionary movements, the FLQ desires outside help, from a country or a fraternal party more advanced than we are'".²⁰⁴

For its part, the FLQ was willing to help other revolutionary groups when it could. Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon were on tour in the U.S. at the time warrants were issued for their arrest in 1966 trying to organize a coordinating committee of North American liberation movements.

An earlier incident is more telling of how far the FLQ were willing to go to help other revolutionary groups. On February 16, 1965, the FBI in New York arrested Michèle Duclos, a Quebec woman on her way to deliver dynamite to the Black Liberation Front (BLF) who had planned to use the dynamite to blow up historic monuments in the U.S. including the Statue of Liberty. It was later revealed that she had had contacts with Cuban officials in Montreal and New York and with the Algerian FLN, and that an FLQ activist had made

contact with the BLF in Havana in 1964.²⁰⁵

Cuban involvement with the FLQ would certainly not have been surprising. At the Tricontinental Conference in January 1966, which was attended by members of the Vallières-Gagnon group, Fidel Castro, in his closing speech, proclaimed that Cuba was ready to support all revolutionary movements in the world. Certain members of the FLQ thought this should include them. However, that support was not immediately forthcoming. In spite of U.S. objections, Canada had maintained trade relations with Cuba; relations which Castro must have valued more than his support for revolutionary causes. In the fall of 1965, a number of FLQ activists, including Pierre Vallières, contacted the Cuban consul in Montreal, Julia Gonzales, who happened to be a supporter of Quebec independence. When the Canadian government heard about the meeting, Julia Gonzales was removed as Consul at the request of the Canadian government and was replaced by someone more neutral.²⁰⁶

Cuban neutrality did not last long, however, as was revealed by Gerardo Perazo Amerchazurra, a Cuban intelligence officer, who fled to the United States from London in December, 1971. He revealed that the KGB had taken control of the Cuban intelligence service (DGI) in 1968, and had ordered the DGI to open clandestine relations with the FLQ.²⁰⁷ This may explain how in August 1970, a reporter doing a story on a PLO training camp in Jordan encountered

two French-speaking trainees who claimed to be members of the FLQ.²⁰⁸

By far, however, the greatest evidence of foreign support for the FLQ involves the French government. It would not be the first time that France had been involved in the affairs of its former colony. For example, a French military officer, Charles Hindelang, took part in the rebellion of 1837-38, and was hung for it.²⁰⁹ More recently, in 1967, while on a visit to Canada, French President Charles De Gaulle made no secret of where his sympathies lay when he shouted "Vive le Québec libre", an RIN slogan, from the balcony of the Montreal city hall, to a large, approving, crowd below.²¹⁰

The Frenchman most involved with the FLQ was Philippe Rossillon, a left-wing Gaullist and member of the staff of the French prime minister's office. Rossillon was also a member of Patrie et Progrès (Homeland and Progress) which was a "semi-secret network of senior civil servants dedicated to the advancement of French-speaking communities throughout the world". He also maintained close ties to the Comité International pour L'Indépendance du Québec which was founded in Paris in 1963.²¹¹

Beginning in 1956, Rossillon had been coming to Canada and was known to be in contact with Quebec separatists and members of the FLQ.²¹² He helped FLQ activist Gilles Pruneau, the man responsible for the Westmount mailbox bombs

in 1963, to flee to Algeria after he fled to Paris while out on bail. He was the "grey eminence, the protector, and even the financial backer of the indépendentistes in Paris".²¹³

His activities were known to the Canadian government and, in September, 1968, Trudeau publicly called him "'a secret agent of France'", secretly sent to Canada "to stir up separatist trouble". It was hoped that, by publicly accusing Rossillon of being a French agent, it could act as a warning to France that Canada was aware of the activities of its agents in this country.²¹⁴

Gilles Pruneau, the activist whom Rossillon helped flee to Algeria, was heard from while he was in Algeria. The July 15, 1964 issue of La Cognée carried a letter from him in which he said he had made contact with the Algerian FLN, though the nature of those contacts was not disclosed. It is known that the Algerian FLN had contacts with the FLQ up until the seventies and Algerian President Ben Bella himself has stated that in a private meeting with Charles de Gaulle, in Paris, de Gaulle urged Bella to help the Québécois in their fight for national liberation.²¹⁵

In addition to the aid which may have been provided by the French government, some aid was provided by French citizens also. When ARQ member Edmund Guénette was sentenced to death for the shooting of Leslie MacWilliams, the manager of the International Firearms store, the Prime Minister of Canada and the Premier of Quebec both received a plea for

clemency signed by a number of well-known French personalities.²¹⁶ The plea proved unnecessary because Canada abolished the death penalty before Guénette's sentence was to be carried out.

If the FLQ had outside help, and it appears they did, it is not entirely clear what was provided beyond moral support, sanctuary for some of the activists, and perhaps some advice and expertise. But it is clear that the FLQ never had large reserves of cash or weapons beyond what they could steal for themselves.

Collective Action

A list of actions undertaken by the FLQ reveals that the group was quite active during its lifetime, but that the activities lacked diversity. By far, the FLQ's favourite weapon was the bomb.

The targets for FLQ bombs were chosen for different reasons. Some were chosen for their symbolic value, such as anything which represented the federal government's presence in Quebec or Canada's ties to England: federal government buildings, post offices and mailboxes, RCMP and military establishments (including Canadian Legion halls), railroad tracks and bridges, statues, and even a flagpole bearing the Union Jack.

The provincial government was also the target of FLQ bombs. Quebec Labour Department buildings were the target of several bomb attacks. The Liberal party's Le Club Canadien

and the Union Nationale's Le Club de Réforme were both damaged more than once by FLQ bombs. Not even municipal government buildings were spared. Both the Montreal and Westmount city halls were singled out by the FLQ bombers as well.

Businesses and commercial establishments, especially, though not exclusively, those owned by English-Canadians or Americans and those in the midst of labour difficulties or strikes, were also favourite targets, as were the homes of businessmen and company executives.

One point which should be made is that the FLQ was not a particularly ruthless terrorist organization. In a recording made by the Liberation cell, and delivered to the media after the cell's members had left for exile in Cuba, they discussed the objective of FLQ bombings. They said the bomb attacks weren't "made really to kill the people who live in Westmount or any other capitalist hangouts, but more to frighten them". The object was to frighten Anglophones so that they would go "back where they came from: to Ontario, or Great Britain, or the United States".²¹⁷ Still, 4 people were killed and many more were injured by FLQ bombs. But it is clear that the death toll could have been much higher had the FLQ so desired.

To finance their activities and to obtain weapons and explosives, the group engaged in theft. Money was usually stolen from banks or Caisse Populaires, although the FLQ was

also known to have robbed a Montreal theatre, a private home, and the student union at the University of Montreal. Weapons, if not purchased, were stolen from gunshops, military armouries and reserve barracks, sometimes in broad daylight on busy streets. Explosives were stolen from mining sites and quarries, as well as from construction sites of which there were many in and around Montreal due to construction of the subway system and for Expo 67.

One action in which the FLQ deviated from their usual thefts of money and weapons occurred in November, 1963, when the military wing of the group, the ALQ, stole broadcasting equipment from a radio station in Granby in the Eastern Townships. The ALQ was planning on using the equipment to broadcast taped propaganda programs from a small van over AM radio. Later, they planned to do something similar for television. The ALQ also planned lightning occupations of radio stations to broadcast their programs. With the arrest of many members of the group five months later, their plans for clandestine broadcasting came to an end.²¹⁸

FLQ members took part in many violent demonstrations, with the intention of radicalizing the demands of workers and students and of making the FLQ more popular among the workers and students.²¹⁹ Some of the larger demonstrations included, a march on McGill University staged by Operation McGill Français, a group which sought to turn the university in a French-language institution, the Saint-Jean-Baptiste

parade riot in June 1969, and a riot at the garage of the Murray Hill Bus Company in October 1969.

...it is well known that its principal leaders and avowed sympathizers have been active, either on stage or behind the scenes, in most of the demonstrations that have degenerated into violent confrontations with the police.²²⁰

It was only in 1970, seven years after their formation, that the FLQ decided on a major escalation of their activities. In early 1970, the plan was made to kidnap the Israeli consul and trade commissioner in Montreal. The plan was thwarted in February when the police stopped a rented panel truck in east-end Montreal and found it contained a weapons, a large wicker basket, and a document announcing the kidnapping. The driver and passenger, Jacques Lanctôt and Pierre Marcil, disappeared while out on bail.

In June 1970, the police, during a raid on a house in the Laurentians, arrested members of the FLQ and uncovered a new kidnap plot. This time, the target was the United States consul in Montreal. The police knew the FLQ was planning a kidnapping, but they had no way of knowing who the next target would be.

It was not until October 5, 1970 that the police, and the world, found out who the new kidnap victim would be. The FLQ successfully kidnapped the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal, James Richard Cross. But the attempt at escalation, from bombing to diplomatic kidnapping, fizzled. It was only with the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte that the

FLQ got the escalation it had sought, but his murder brought a negative response from the government and the public which the FLQ proved unable to withstand.

Pelletier (1971) notes an escalation in the FLQ's activities, which occurred after 1967. The first escalation he notices is in the number of bombing incidents.

From 1963 to 1967 (a period of four years) the FLQ planted about 35 bombs, most of them low-powered.

From 1968 to 1970 (a period of two years) the FLQ planted 50 to 60 bombs, most of them high-powered.²²¹

But it was not only the number of bombs which increased. Pelletier also notes that from 1963 to 1967, fifty per cent of the bombs could be dismantled before exploding, after a telephone warning had been received. From 1968 to 1970, only twenty-five per cent of bombs could be dismantled in time. The increase in bomb strength, coupled with an increase in the number of bombs which exploded, resulted in an increase in the number of deaths and injuries. During the first five year period, there were five deaths and four injuries; during the next three years, there were two deaths and thirty-seven injuries. Pelletier attributes the increased ruthlessness of the FLQ to a desire, on their part, for more publicity.²²² It is equally possible that the FLQ became more ruthless because almost five years of bombing had not resulted in any victories for them. This failure also may have driven the group to escalate to kidnapping in 1970.

In addition to bombing incidents, there also was an increase in the number of bank hold-ups carried out by the

FLQ. The FLQ carried out eight hold-ups in the first five years, this number jumps to 25 in the years between 1968 and 1970.²²³

One last form of action which FLQ members engaged in occurred after they were arrested. Many continued to show their contempt for the system through courtroom antics. The first group of FLQ activists to be tried, claimed to be "before a foreign court having no jurisdiction in Quebec and being judged according to a law they did not recognize". They knew the press would be watching, and used the opportunity to "disseminate revolutionary propaganda".²²⁴

This history of the FLQ is by no means an exhaustive one. Since, in a study of this size, it has not been possible to describe in detail everything which could be relevant to the subject, a representative sampling of the major events in the life of the FLQ was chosen, showing the group's strengths and its weaknesses. This history is now sufficiently complete that a picture of the FLQ has emerged in each of Tilly's components. It is now, therefore, possible to proceed with an analysis of the decline and disappearance of the FLQ.

CHAPTER 4

THE TILLY FRAMEWORK AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE FLQ

It is the hypothesis of this study that the primary reasons for the demise of the FLQ can be found in the organization and mobilization components. To set the stage for presenting the case, however, the findings for each of the five components of collective action will be reviewed. The objective is to assess the possible contribution of each set of factors to the demise of the FLQ. This process will culminate in a reassessment of the more prominent explanations for the FLQ's failure which can be found in secondary literature.

Interest

It has been shown that the long run goal of the FLQ was to bring about the creation of an independent state of Quebec. It was generally agreed within the group that the new state would be socialist, though whether it would be socialist before or after achieving independence created some debate.

The short run objective of the FLQ was, through violence [effectively, armed propaganda], to prod French-Canadians into launching a revolution that would result in independence. Violence was supposed to destabilize the

system and goad the government into increasingly repressive measures to curb the violence, thereby causing the people to revolt in anger. The tactic is a familiar one, used by many revolutionary groups, seldom with success.²²⁵

As predicted, individual interests proves to be difficult to ascertain. However, the history of political involvement shared by many FLQ members prior to joining the group indicated a genuine desire for an independent Quebec. The evidence suggests that some members did not share the belief in socialism of most FLQ members, and that a few [though only a few] members of the FLQ sought personal gain, or joined "just for kicks". Hence, there existed a high correlation between the group's stated goals and the desires of individual FLQ members. However, while there was a high correlation between what its individual members sought and the group's stated goals, one interest shared by many individual members was not in the group's best interest: a desire for quick action.

FLQ activists differed from members of the more mainstream nationalist movements in that they were impatient to bring about Quebec independence. They viewed the democratic means of achieving independence as being too slow. But their impatience may have been their downfall. Numerous sources, including many of the FLQ's own leaders and theoreticians, warned of the dangers of premature action: acting before a proper clandestine organization had

been established or before the conditions were "ripe for revolution". And yet, successive incarnations of the FLQ ignored the warnings, moving almost immediately from formation into violent action. As was seen, and shall be seen more clearly below, the FLQ never had a proper clandestine organization. But also, the conditions were never ripe for a socialist revolution. Indeed, doctrinaire socialism has never been popular with Quebeckers.

Organization

On the whole, organizational components are difficult to gauge with great accuracy, given the paucity of information on the FLQ's internal workings. However, enough is known to be reasonably certain that the FLQ was too poorly organized to perform the functions which its members had claimed for the group.

According to Tilly, "a set of individuals is a group to the extent that it comprises both a category [catness] and a network [netness]"²²⁶. Therefore, the greater the catness and the greater the netness, the more cohesive the group will be. Certainly, in the case of the FLQ, catness was high. The vast majority of its members were young, French-Canadian Roman Catholics disenchanted with their religion. All shared a desire to take action which they felt could remedy the injustices which had been inflicted on French-Canadians in general, and French-Canadian workers in particular, for two centuries.

Netness is somewhat more difficult to determine but it can be judged to be high based on indications that the majority of members of the FLQ were friends or acquaintances before they were members of the group. Many members were introduced to the group through friends or room-mates, while other members were from the same family, having had brothers or sisters who were active in the FLQ.

As for inclusiveness, there is certainly ample evidence to indicate that there must have been members who devoted a great deal of time to the group. Those members who had jobs obviously could not devote all their time and energy to the FLQ; however, there were a number of members who were unemployed, had quit their jobs, or dropped out of school after joining the group. These individuals had a great deal of time to devote to the planning and execution of actions. The sheer number of bombing incidents and robberies alone, over the seven year period, would indicate that much planning and preparation time was required, given the small number of people normally involved in the FLQ at any one time. Also, there are examples of members who spent weeks at the secluded training camp which each incarnation of the FLQ would establish. The fact that group members were friends, room-mates, or relatives before being members of the FLQ, coupled with the likelihood that much time was spent in planning and preparation, would favour the argument that most members -- even those members who had jobs --

spent a large proportion of their free time interacting with other members.

There are also specific examples of individuals who devoted a great deal of time to the group. Pierre-Paul Geoffroy was the FLQ's sole bomb-maker during the very active fourth wave, and was in the process of making a bomb at the time of his arrest. At one time, Pierre Vallières was writing almost all of the articles for La Cognée himself. And finally, the most obvious example of total devotion to the FLQ is provided by the members of the Liberation and Chenier cells who carried out the kidnappings during the October Crisis. Those responsible for guarding the hostages had to devote all their time to that task and could have no other commitments.

Judging the efficiency and effectiveness of the FLQ organization is no easy task, given that their claims about the organization were most certainly inflated. Evidence indicates the FLQ desired and attempted some differentiation. It is certain that, at the very least, there existed a propaganda wing of the FLQ responsible for writing La Cognée and an action wing responsible for carrying out bombings, thefts, etc. Within the action network, whenever possible, cells were assigned specific tasks such as financing (staging holdups), stealing dynamite and weapons and carrying out bombings. Also, individuals within the cells sometimes were assigned specific tasks,

such as bomb-making.

By far, the greatest analytical difficulty is in determining whether the FLQ was centrally controlled, and whether it ever possessed the self-proclaimed stratified organization in the clandestine document of 1966 What Is The FLQ?. Undoubtedly, each incarnation of the FLQ had a person who was the acknowledged head of the organization and each cell had an acknowledged leader. But there never has been any evidence to prove the existence of an organization of the magnitude described in What Is The FLQ?.

It is entirely possible that the police succeeded only in uncovering successive incarnations of that part of the FLQ which was responsible for engaging in violent action. There may have existed a central guiding group which escaped detection. However, the weight of evidence gives no indication that the FLQ possessed an extensive, secret organization. Neither informers and infiltrators, nor the searches and seizures carried out under the War Measures Act, ever uncovered any evidence of a wide-spread, organized revolutionary movement, directed from a single source.

The question is, then, why did the FLQ never develop an organization which could survive constant, destructive pressure from authorities? The ability of the La Cognée network to survive a few years, and their repeated warnings to others to organize properly before engaging in violence, proves that someone in the FLQ had the necessary expertise

to establish a proper organization, and knew what was wrong with the groups that did not survive. It already has been determined that, to a large extent, the problem was impatience on the part of its members, which also must include its leaders. Successive leaders of the FLQ were as impatient as other members of the group. Pierre Vallières knew what was wrong when he took over in 1965, but did not remedy the situation before engaging in violent action.

It was this lack of a good clandestine organization which allowed the police to so easily break up each incarnation of the FLQ, once they got a lead. This constant routing of the FLQ by the authorities meant each incarnation had to start over virtually from scratch. It was an unfavourable situation which impacted heavily on the group's ability to mobilize.

Mobilization

As has been seen above, the FLQ lacked a good organization. Given that the ability to mobilize is very dependent on the level of organization, it must be concluded that the FLQ would have great difficulty with mobilization of resources. Indeed, the FLQ gets a failing grade all around in the mobilization component.

The FLQ experienced some problems with the loyalty of its activists. Few FLQ activists had so much committed to the organization that they could not leave if they so chose, but loyalty problems were of a more serious nature for the

FLQ, problems which were exacerbated by the lack of a good organization. More than once, the police were able to break up FLQ cells through informers and activists who turned others in for the reward. Greater secrecy within the organization would have lessened the damaging effects of "members-turned-informers".

As for the availability of resources such as weapons, explosives and money, the FLQ did not have a great quantity of resources available nor, therefore, could it expect to have everything required to act at will. With the group having to start from scratch after the destruction of each incarnation, there was neither the time nor the ability to build up a reserve of money, weapons or dynamite which could be called on when needed. Numerous examples were cited which provide evidence of supply problems.

It is likely that the quality of both leadership and recruits was low, with the possible exceptions of Georges Schoeters and François Schirm, both of whom had had some direct experience with revolutionary tactics. Those FLQ activists who had been members of the Canadian Armed Forces undoubtedly had received some weapons training, but the vast majority of FLQ members had never handled explosives or weapons.

To make matters worse, it is unlikely the FLQ was able to provide good training for its members beyond what could be learned from other members or revolutionary literature.

This lack of training led to mistakes being made. It may have been inexperience which led to the death of Leslie MacWilliams in a botched attempt to steal weapons from the International Firearms store in Montreal in 1964.

Opportunity

For seven years, the three levels of government, municipal, provincial and federal, used a mix of responses to counter the FLQ's campaign of terror. The most obvious response came in the form of intensified police activity. Within months of the FLQ's first act of violence, the RCMP, the Quebec Provincial police, and the Montreal police had established a Combined Anti-Terrorist squad. Periodically, they were aided by members of military intelligence. This intensified police work had the desired effect; within months of the formation of a new FLQ network, the police usually were able to break the organization and arrest the majority of its members, often aided in their work by the substantial rewards offered by the provincial and municipal governments for information leading to the arrest of FLQ members.

The major drawback seemed to have been in the inability of the police to prevent the creation of new cells. This may have been largely due the lack of an effective FLQ organization. The fact that the FLQ generally started over from scratch each time the organization was uncovered by the police would make it difficult to keep tabs

on a new organization. There were instances of ex-FLQ members returning to the latest incarnation of the organization upon release from jail, and in those instances they were often under police surveillance. The police were then able to infiltrate the new organization. But, largely, the police were left to react, rather than being able to stop the violence before it began.

The only major failure by the police was their inability, for a number of years, to infiltrate and destroy that part of the FLQ which published La Cognée. This certainly indicates the kind of organization which the FLQ could have built. But, available expertise was ignored, as they would have counseled building a good organization rather than moving straight into violent action.

In addition to the intensified police work, the government, especially the federal government, reacted to the FLQ violence by attempting to rectify sources of French-Canadian discontent. Relevant programs were discussed in some detail in the previous chapter, and so it is unnecessary to restate them here. Successive provincial governments attempted to rectify sources of French-Canadian discontent also, either by claiming increased provincial powers or through greater economic development. The major shift in government response to FLQ violence occurred during the October Crisis when the government escalated to a low-level military response and invoked the War Measures Act, a

move which some credit with destroying the FLQ.

Public support for the FLQ, both active and passive existed, but was generally low. The population was unwilling to throw its support behind a campaign of violence. Some of the FLQ's more active supporters tried, numerous times, to muster public support to help jailed FLQ activists, but were unsuccessful.

The public reaction to the kidnapping of Cross and Laporte indicates that there was passive support, not for the methods of the FLQ, not so much for its call for independence, and even less for its call for a socialist Quebec, but for what its manifesto expressed. The FLQ, through their manifesto, was giving voice to the feelings of frustration, among French Canadians, at being second-class citizens, and to their desires for change.

While the FLQ received little support from within Quebec, they received even less from external sources. Although there exists some possibility that certain members of the governments of France, Algeria, and Cuba may have personally supported the objectives of the FLQ, there exist no examples of public statements of moral support for the FLQ from another government, and no examples of those governments pressuring other governments to support the FLQ. It is also unlikely the FLQ received much material support from sources outside Canada, short of the training of two activists in Jordan. If the FLQ received weapons or money

from outside sources, there is no evidence of it to this day. France, Cuba and Algeria did provide sanctuary for some FLQ members fleeing Canada, but it is not unusual for these countries to provide a haven for political dissidents from other countries. For all intents and purposes, there was no serious external support of the FLQ.

Collective Action

By far, the FLQ's preferred form of action was bombing, although they also engaged in firebombing, as well as in thefts of money, weapons and dynamite when it became necessary to acquire materials. The FLQ was also active in legal demonstrations, though they often sought to turn those demonstrations to violent gatherings.

Bombing had a number of advantages for the FLQ. It requires little manpower (given the small size of the group), little planning, (when compared to hijackings, or kidnappings), the risk of being caught is minimal, given that an activist need not be present when the bomb goes off, and the bombings were sure to attract media attention. Also, the dynamite needed to build the bombs was easily stolen, especially from the Montreal subway and Expo 67 construction sites.

Since most FLQ actions were bombings or thefts, the duration of specific acts was short. The bombings themselves were not very large, and were not meant to cause large numbers of fatalities. Most bombings of buildings occurred

at night when they were unlikely to cause injuries or deaths. Those bombings which did take place in the daytime were generally with a warning, though the warning was not always heeded. Many of the bombings were symbolic: statues, transmission towers etc. At no time was the object to kill or cause a great number of injuries. The FLQ certainly could have been far more ruthless had it so desired.

The vast majority of FLQ activities took place on and around the island of Montreal. The reasons for this are obvious. Montreal was and remains the most densely populated area in the province and it is where the vast majority of the province's economic wealth and activity is concentrated. At the time when the FLQ was active it was Canada's largest city and the principal economic centre in the country. It was the location of many head offices of Canadian companies and the head offices of the Canadian branches of foreign firms. It is also the area in the province with the largest concentration of Anglophones and was the place where a Francophone was most likely to have to speak English in his job.

The FLQ changed tactics in 1970, escalating to kidnapping and murder. But the kidnapping scheme backfired when the FLQ murdered Pierre Laporte. It was an act which lost them much of the support and sympathy that had been building up over the course of the crisis.

In reviewing the findings in each component, an attempt was made to highlight what appeared to be the major weaknesses in each component which may have contributed to, or caused, the FLQ's demise. What is most most striking is the considerable overlap which occurs between some of the group's weaknesses. It was found that, within the interest component, the member's impatience contributed to the inability to develop a good organizational structure, which, in turn, created mobilization problems.

Within the opportunity component, it is difficult to say which variable may have contributed most to the FLQ's demise. Neither external support nor public support were forthcoming to any helpful degree. Government response, in the form of the War Measures Act, also must be considered as a factor contributing to the group's demise.

Within the collective action and opportunity components, there existed once again a situation of overlap -- how the FLQ's violent actions impacted negatively on public support. The population, it seems, was not ready for the murder of a government minister. Based on the evidence in the collective action component, it could be said that what caused the FLQ's demise was the choice of terrorism as a collective action, before the conditions were ripe for revolution.

The FLQ, it appears, was a group with many weaknesses. The next step, therefore, must be to eliminate some of the

variables which are less likely to have contributed to the demise of the group. At least one variable should be eliminated immediately -- government response or, more specifically, the War Measures Act -- as the major factor in the FLQ's demise.

It certainly cannot be denied that the FLQ emerged from the October Crisis of 1970 a very much disorganized and impotent group. Although several FLQ cells remained in existence into the early 1970s, the organization had secretly been infiltrated by the police, and engaged in only a few minor acts. The October Crisis did not kill the FLQ, but it left the group fatally wounded. It is, therefore, easy to attribute the death of the FLQ to the Trudeau government's reaction in the October Crisis. Indeed, Trudeau's use of the army and the War Measures Act often is cited as a model of the efficacy of the "tough-line" approach to dealing with terrorists. Rivers (1986) states:

If the object is to rid a nation of terrorism, Trudeau's actions should be studied. If the object is to rid the world of terrorism, Trudeau's methods should be learned and used... .²²⁷

Wilkinson (1986) agrees that Trudeau's use of the War Measures Act is an "illustration of the efficacy of a tough-line response to terrorism..."²²⁸

Trudeau's tough approach to dealing with the FLQ in October 1970 certainly gave the government some advantages in its struggle with the terrorists. The use of troops to guard government buildings and prominent individuals during

the October Crisis freed the police from tasks which otherwise would have robbed them of much needed manpower, and allowed the police to concentrate on finding Cross and the murderers of Laporte. Instituting the War Measures Act gave the police the wide-ranging powers which they felt were necessary in order to rid Quebec of what they believed to be a pervasive revolutionary movement.

But some observers are not so ready to heap praise on the Act or on Trudeau's tough-line approach. There were those, including politicians and other prominent Quebecers, who, during the October Crisis, called on the government to negotiate with the FLQ kidnappers. Most were motivated by a sincere desire to save the lives of the two men held hostage. But the experience of many South American and European countries shows that a "soft-line" response to terrorist kidnappings, i.e. giving-in to terrorist demands, generally leads to more kidnapping. Concern over setting a dangerous precedent must certainly have figured prominently in the Trudeau government's final decision as to how to respond.

Still, Haggart and Golden (1971) condemn the use of the War Measures Act as an infringement of civil liberties, and warn against ascribing the demise of the FLQ too much to the Act. Although the Act allowed the police to make almost 500 arrests of known or suspected FLQ activists and sympathizers, few of whom were ever formally charged, it was

in no way directly involved in the eventual discovery of the Cross kidnappers' hideout, nor did it contribute directly to the capture of Laporte's murderers. Both were the result of police investigations which could just as easily have been carried out without special powers.²²⁹

Charters (1986) takes a more moderate position. While he does not entirely support the use of troops and the invoking of the War Measures Act to deal with the FLQ, he is willing to admit that such a show of force may have prevented other "hot heads" from engaging in another "ill-considered" act, as was the kidnapping of Laporte. Such harsh measures may have "slowed the forward momentum of events".²³⁰ Pelletier concurs:

The presence of the army and special emergency measures prevented a situation propitious to such potential violence [demonstrations, rioting, looting] from arising.²³¹

But Charters is concerned that the October Crisis did not have to end the way it did, with the restoration of civil rights and return of relative social peace. Instead, the situation in Quebec could have deteriorated, becoming increasingly violent. Charters uses the example of Northern Ireland.

The following year in Northern Ireland the 'internment' operation, similar in scale to the detention operation in Quebec, produced exactly the opposite reaction. The level of violence increased dramatically, and the presence of the army was not a deterrent.²³²

Also, Charters points out that, had the situation in Quebec become worse, rather than improving, the Canadian government

would have had a much more difficult time controlling the violence than does the British government in its attempts to quell the violence in Northern Ireland, given that the Canadian government had fewer troops at its disposal.

(I)n mid-1972, British Army operations in Northern Ireland - an area roughly comparable in size to the Eastern Townships - consumed 21,000 troops, about four times the number available for the entire province of Quebec.²³³

The Canadian government took a dangerous gamble which, in the end, paid off. But the example of Northern Ireland provides evidence that it was not, directly, Trudeau's tough-line approach which destroyed the FLQ, since a similar approach has been unsuccessful in eliminating the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). If it was not the use of the army and the War Measures Act which finally spelled the end for the FLQ then, consequently, it is necessary to look to other possible explanations for the FLQ's demise.

Charters provides some possible explanations for why the PIRA has not been defeated by the British security forces in Northern Ireland. His explanations would correspond to the popular support variable, and the organization and mobilization components of the Tilly framework.

The reasons for this are probably that in Ulster the Catholic population was highly politicized and militant, and that the Provisional IRA had deep roots in the community, and was well organized to exploit the opposition to internment.²³⁴

Charters' explanations, then, diminish the government response variable, but strengthen the popular support variable, and the organization and mobilization components as factors in the longevity or demise of a terrorist group.

It is certainly true that the PIRA receives much more active and passive popular support from the public, especially the Catholic community, in Northern Ireland, than the FLQ received from the public in Quebec. Bishop and Mallie (1987) ascribe a great deal of the PIRA's ability to survive to its public support.

Even in the blackest and most destructive passages of the IRA's history, sectarian loyalty meant that there was always a large enough reservoir of sympathy and support in the North to ensure its survival.²³⁵

The large number of possible reasons for why the PIRA receives more support from the Catholics in Ireland than did the FLQ from French Quebecers precludes discussing them all here. Certainly, historical experiences play a role. The history of relations between the Irish people and the English in Ireland is a long and bloody one marked by violent wars and uprisings, far longer and bloodier than the historical experiences of French-Canadians.

Another possible reason for the FLQ receiving less public support than does the PIRA could be based on O'Neill's (1980) theory which states that it helps an insurgent group to gain popular support when they are of the same language, culture, and religion as the population group they claim to be acting for.²³⁶ Unfortunately for the FLQ,

they could claim no such advantage. While it is true that Anglophones dominated the federal government, for most of its life the FLQ faced destructive pressure from the Francophone-dominated provincial government and police forces in Quebec. This robbed the FLQ of the ability to fully recreate the "we/they" mentality which the PIRA can make use of in Northern Ireland, pitting Catholics against a system dominated by Protestants.

It was only during the October Crisis that the Anglophone-dominated federal government took over the major responsibility for responding to the FLQ threat. At that time, the federal government took great care to maintain certain appearances, so as not to alienate French-Canadians or increase FLQ popular support. There was an attempt to ensure that it at least appeared as though the major decisions, throughout the October Crisis, were being made by the provincial government rather than by the federal government. Public statements were made either by Premier Bourassa or by the Minister of Justice, Jérôme Choquette; Trudeau, by and large, avoided the appearance of being in charge until he went on TV to announce the War Measures Act, which he ensured looked as though it had been requested by the government of the province of Quebec, on the advice of the city of Montreal and the provincial police.

Everything feasible, was done to ensure that Ottawa's handling of the October Crisis did not look too much like

interference from Ottawa in Quebec's affairs. After all, interference by Ottawa in Quebec's affairs had been a major sore point with Quebec nationalists for years. But such appearances could not fool everyone. In that case, it could only have helped the federal government's cause that Trudeau, himself, was a French-Canadian.

But, as Charters alludes to in the above quote, public support is only useful if a group is able to use it to their advantage or, more accurately, if the group is able to make use of the public support which it does have, regardless of how small that might be. Making use of the public support a group does have, requires that the group be properly organized.

In the case of the PIRA, the group not only enjoys a higher level of public support than the FLQ ever did, it also has proven itself capable of rapidly increasing that public support on occasion. For example, in 1981, Bobby Sands, an IRA member imprisoned on a charge of possessing a weapon, went on a hunger strike to protest the British government's refusal to recognize him as a political prisoner. He died after sixty-six days. The IRA used the media coverage of the hunger strike, successfully, to increase public sympathy and support for the IRA, and to blacken the image of the British government, in Northern Ireland and throughout the world. The ability of the IRA leadership to order an imprisoned member of the group to go

on a fatal hunger strike is an indication of the IRA's control of its members, and of the discipline and loyalty of IRA members.

It has been the hypothesis throughout this study that the FLQ was not well-organized and that, in the long run, the group lacked the level and sophistication of organization necessary to survive. Loomis (1985), however, would disagree, arguing that the facts would not support the view that the FLQ was not well-organized. He would refer to our hypothesis as the "easy answer".

The easy answer is that the FLQ, composed of a handful of misguided teenagers, never posed a threat to Quebec, let alone Canada.²³⁷

He provides four pieces of evidence as proof that the FLQ did pose a threat to the country: (1) the statements by members of the Quebec caucus in Ottawa, such as Jean Marchand, which spoke of the FLQ as having a "far-flung revolutionary infrastructure"; (2) the FLQ's long record of bombings, thefts and kidnappings between 1963 and 1970; (3) the "sizeable" number of left-wing activists from Algeria, Cuba and Eastern Europe present in Canada at the time, as well as the willingness of some countries, such as France and Cuba, to meddle in Canadian affairs, and (4) the large number of weapons, ammunition and dynamite which had been stolen, was unaccounted for, and could have been in the FLQ's possession.²³⁸ But, as noted earlier, the weight of evidence is against Loomis. More specific consideration

of these four claims will demonstrate why.

Jean Marchand's statements are refuted by Don Jamieson, another member of the federal cabinet at the time of the October Crisis. He maintains that the government had no proof of a "far-flung revolutionary organization" and, certainly, none ever was found.²³⁹

The fact that the FLQ had a long record of bombings and thefts tells little about whether it was well-organized or posed a threat to the country. The rapidity with which the police arrested FLQ members and broke up cells indicates the FLQ was not well-organized. Nor is it easy to believe, from what is now known of the size of the group and its weaponry, that the FLQ ever posed a threat to the country.

As for Loomis' claim of sizeable numbers of foreign activists being in the country, he has provided no evidence. Also, previously cited evidence offers little reason to believe the FLQ received much useful help from foreign sources.

Loomis fourth claim, that the FLQ may have had large amounts of stolen weapons and explosives, is unsubstantiated as well. Some weapons were confiscated during the October Crisis, 157 according to reports. Even if all of these 157 had been in the hands of the FLQ, it is not enough to have posed a threat to the country. Further, reports that the FLQ possessed large amounts of dynamite were common during the October Crisis, but those figures have since been refuted.²⁴⁰

Haggart and Golden (1971) take a completely opposite position to Loomis, believing that the FLQ had virtually no organization and no membership requirements short of the voluntary commission of a criminal act, such as a robbery, a bombing or a kidnapping.²⁴¹ They believe the FLQ to be

the first terrorist organization in legal history to be incorporated by a special act of Parliament.

By calling these largely unrelated groups of violent agitators an organization, the government created it, as surely as if it had decided to give it a constitution.²⁴²

For Haggart and Golden, the FLQ was a creation of the War Measures Act. There was no evidence for the existence of a hierarchy within the group and very little evidence that there was anything but the slightest coordination. This, according to Haggart and Golden, is the main reason why the police had so much trouble infiltrating the FLQ, there was no organization to infiltrate.

The evidence provided in the preceding chapter would indicate that Haggart and Golden's opinion of the FLQ, while true in some respects, is a bit extreme. The FLQ had an organization, but one which, by and large, ignored the procedures necessary for the survival of a clandestine group such as, using pseudonyms and organizing according to Nechayevist rules.

Charters (1986) also takes this middle position, stating that while the FLQ may have tried to create an structured organization of the kind they claimed to possess in their document What Is The FLQ?: "it was never able to

produce it on more than a limited scale in individual cells, and then only for intermittent periods".²⁴³

Charters describes the FLQ as "bush league" in comparison with other terrorist organizations such as the IRA or the Italian Red Brigades.

Where the other groups demonstrated discipline, professionalism, and ruthlessness, the FLQ from its inception showed impulsiveness (indicative of a lack of effective leadership and discipline), amateurism, and an almost total lack of ruthlessness.²⁴⁴

For Charters, the best example of the poor quality of discipline and organization in the FLQ as well as its weakness as a revolutionary movement can be found in its failure to heed the warnings of both its own organ La Cognée and the Quebec preface to Carlos Marighella's Little Handbook (Mini Manual) of the Urban Guerrilla. Both warned against launching a revolution before the "objective conditions" for revolutionary warfare were present. This, according to Charters, led to botched operations leading to innocent people being hurt, and also made it easier for the police to infiltrate and destroy the cells. Although attempts were made, the FLQ seemed unable to create an organization which could provide effective leadership. Problems with internal security allowed the police "to make a series of arrests after each wave of incidents".²⁴⁵

But what about Charters' claim that the FLQ lacked ruthlessness? He compares the FLQ's campaign of violence to the campaigns of other groups, including the supposed

inspiration of the FLQ, the Algerian FLN. The FLN had a two-pronged plan of indiscriminate killing coupled with a selective terrorism campaign against the Algerian security forces. Their objective was to drive a wedge between the two communities in Algeria -- the Arab natives and the French settlers -- and to prevent the security forces from operating effectively against the FLN. "The IRA uses similar tactics in Northern Ireland. But the FLQ had no similar plan: "The FLQ never made a concerted attempt either to polarize the 'two solitudes' or to 'blind' the security forces."²⁴⁶

Charters believes that the FLQ's poor organization caused them to misdirect their bombing campaign. The FLQ chose to focus on symbolic targets. While this enabled them "to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty" and was "useful for propaganda purposes", it "posed no real threat to the stability or the structure of the state".²⁴⁷

There is no doubt that the FLQ could have been more ruthless, but what purpose would that have served? It seems unlikely that French Quebecers would have supported a campaign of "indiscriminate killing coupled with a selective terrorism campaign" against what would have been security forces made up of French Quebecers, any more than they supported the murder of Pierre Laporte. The FLQ could not have been more ruthless without losing more of what little public support it had. It is for this reason that the

collective action component has been eliminated from the list of possible reasons for the FLQ's demise. The FLQ's low-level terrorism campaign, designed more to scare than to kill, was as ruthless as the FLQ could dare to be. The population was not yet ready for anything more bloody, as the response to the murder of Laporte demonstrated.

There remains one variable which has yet to be discussed -- external support. The fact that the FLQ had virtually no effective external support makes it difficult to assess the impact which it had on the group's demise. Material aid from external sources certainly would have remedied many of the FLQ's mobilization problems. But can the lack of external aid mean the difference between life and death for a terrorist group? Or, is it more likely that external aid merely makes it easier for a terrorist group to survive?

In the final analysis, the hypothesis that the demise of the FLQ can be attributed to poor organization and the inability to mobilize resources has been neither proven nor disproven. The FLQ's poor organization was a contributing factor in the group's demise. But, given that the poor organization was, in large part, due to impatience to get things moving on the part of the activists, perhaps it is to the interest component that the focus should be shifted. However, there is a suspicion that impatience may be a trait of many terrorists, even of the members of long-lived groups

-- they turn to terrorism out of impatience with gradual, more peaceful means. If this is true, then emphasis must be placed, once again, on the organization component, and the closely related mobilization component. At the same time, the role played by popular support, or by external support, cannot be ruled out.

Given that the FLQ had so many weaknesses, the inability to choose between them and say that one in particular was the reason for the group's demise must be admitted. What is really needed, as was pointed out at the beginning of this study, is a comparative study. A case study of a second group, preferably a long-lived terrorist group, would allow for comparison between the two groups to see what one was lacking and what the other has in abundance and, perhaps, to permit certain variables to be eliminated as possible contributors to the demise of the FLQ.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This study began under the watchful eye of Olson's conditions for the satisfactory explanation of a phenomenon. In specific terms, an explanation had to be powerful and parsimonious, along with fitting data and observations beyond those from which generated it. The Tilly framework has turned out to be more than adequate for organizing and categorizing data into a manageable form. Furthermore, the progress made in studying the FLQ demonstrates that the framework could be useful for studying other groups, terrorist and otherwise.

Although it cannot be concluded with certainty that one factor had particular responsibility for the demise of the FLQ, the number of candidates has been narrowed to four. Specification of one crucial factor, if ever possible, will have to wait for the results of a more in-depth study of that terrorist organization, and comparison with similar case studies of other terrorist organizations.

It had been proposed that an explanation for the demise of the FLQ could be found within Tilly's five components of collective action: interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, collective action. More

specifically, it was hypothesized that the answer would be found in the closely related components of organization and mobilization. The first -- and less ambitious -- of these two hypotheses has been supported. The Tilly framework has proven to be sufficiently extensive; it encompasses all intuitively plausible variables which could have contributed to the decline of such a terrorist organization.

Confirmation of the second hypothesis is less clear. It proved to be impossible, based on the results of the single case study, to narrow the factors to just one. If it is assumed that the demise of the FLQ was due either to the absence of something which a group may require to survive, or to the action of something, internal or external, upon the group, then it is possible to narrow the list of likely factors to four.

The four factors which best explained the demise of the FLQ were impatience, poor organization, virtual lack of public support and lack of external support. The impatience of FLQ members to engage in action was included as a factor since it impacted negatively on the leadership's ability to properly organize and mobilize the group for the necessary functions.

The FLQ's poor organization was cited as a separate, possible factor in the group's demise. This factor's inclusion is based on the assumption that impatience may be a common trait among members of many terrorist groups. If

impatience is common among terrorists, then it ceases to be a truly causal factor; the members of a long-lived, "successful" terrorist organization will be impatient also. Poor organization, therefore ceases to be an outgrowth of impatience on the part of members of a terrorist group, and becomes a causal factor, on its own, in the demise of a terrorist group.

The degree of popular support was cited as a factor, based partly on preliminary evidence that the PIRA, a more successful group, appears to have much more public support than did the FLQ. The same is true of the PIRA's relative amount of external support. Although it is unlikely that external support alone determines whether a terrorist group will survive, both it and public support were included. Of course, their effects are uncertain, based on a single study in which neither played a primary role.

The collective action component has been removed entirely as a possible factor in the group's demise. It was determined that the group's lack of ruthlessness may actually have been an asset, given that Quebeckers very evidently were not ready for a ruthless terror campaign. The overwhelmingly negative public reaction to deaths attributed to FLQ bombs is evidence of this.

Each of the potential explanations for the demise of the FLQ has a different implication for the ability of governments to counter the threat posed by terrorist groups

in general. If the longevity of a terrorist organization depends on the creation of a good organization, this will have some impact on government attempts to counter the threat. The creation of a good organization depends primarily on the members of a group and is a factor which governments cannot control. Constant pressure from authorities on a fledgling terrorist group, i.e., frequent arrests, may delay or even prevent the creation of a good organization. However, once a functional clandestine organization is created, it may prove difficult or even impossible to eliminate the group entirely. This possible connection means that governments may only be able to keep terrorist activity to a minimum, as opposed to wiping it out.

In contrast, the possibility that the longevity of a terrorist group depends on its level of public support has very different implications. Public support is a factor which a government may be able to affect through a campaign to capture the "hearts and minds" of the public, much like the one the Pearson government initiated in Canada in the 1960s [described in Chapter 3].

Although the FLQ was not directly successful as a terrorist group, according to Griffin (1984) it did have an effect on the politics of Quebec, which naturally survived the group's demise. Griffin has argued that the FLQ had two contrasting effects on the politics of Quebec. Firstly, the

FLQ, due mainly to their murder of Pierre Laporte, had a negative effect on the independence movement:

The period between the elections of 1970 and 1973 was a time of crisis and retrenchment for the independence movement. The October crisis of 1970 had tarnished its image and reduced its appeal; many Quebecers were unwilling to admit publicly that they supported independence.²⁴⁸

At the same time, according to Griffin, the October Crisis and the invocation of the War Measures Act had the effect of increasing the visibility and, ultimately, the popularity of mainstream separatist groups.

The October crisis and the invocation of the War Measures Act had the effect of forcing underground the more radical Separatist groups, and increasing the visibility of the Parti Québécois.... At the same time, the severity of Ottawa's reaction and the failure of the Liberals to mitigate Ottawa's position in the developing crisis alienated many [Quebecers]. The crisis increased their distrust of Canada's peremptory attitudes toward the internal affairs of Quebec, and for those who still had hoped for a political solution, it enhanced the appeal of the Parti Québécois.²⁴⁹

The Parti Québécois won the 1976 provincial election, when dissatisfaction with the Liberal party was running high, by downplaying the separatism issue and emphasizing other issues. "Nevertheless," as Griffin observed, "Quebec had taken her first giant step in the direction of independence."²⁵⁰

It is likely that the election of the PQ in 1976 forestalled any re-appearance of the FLQ which might have been planned. Those who might have reactivated the FLQ could have reconsidered, given that the PQ had promised to hold a referendum on independence.

Even though the independence option was defeated in a 1981 referendum, there has yet to be a rebirth of the FLQ. This may be due to the last PQ government, which took measures to improve the status of the French language in Quebec during its eight years in power. These measures, by and large, have remained intact despite a change of government in Quebec. The PQ's legislation removed many of the sources of frustration among Francophone Quebecers which had led to the creation of the FLQ in the 1960s. Thus, it is even more likely that the PQ's success pre-empted the creation of a new FLQ.

It was recognized at the beginning of this study that, because of the nature of terrorism, some valuable information would be unavailable. For example, documents on the deliberations of the federal cabinet during the October Crisis would be useful. These documents, which have yet to be released, contain the intelligence reports --if any exist -- on which the government based its decision to use the army and the War Measures Act. There is, to this day, some doubt as to whether the government had any intelligence information which supported its claims of a planned insurrection.

Other existing sources of information have not been tapped because of the limited scope of this study. Interviews with former FLQ members and members of the Combined Anti-Terrorist unit would have been useful. Such

interviews might have provided further insights about the existence or non-existence of a higher body directing the FLQ.

But the true completion of this analysis must await the generation of another, similar case study. As one might already suspect, a natural choice for such a second study would be the IRA. Although the group has been referred to by many different labels -- including guerrilla, revolutionary and insurgent -- the present incarnation of the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA, most certainly qualifies as a terrorist group, according to Wardlaw's definition. It also qualifies as a long-lived terrorist group, having been formed from a split in the ranks of the IRA in December, 1969. The PIRA is now twenty years old, and shows no signs of waning. Indeed, it is now believed by many members of the British army in Northern Ireland, as well as some British politicians, that the Provisional IRA cannot be defeated. The PIRA should provide an excellent contrast to the FLQ in many of Tilly's components.

One criticism which may be levelled at this study is that it seeks to cure the symptoms without concern for the cause of the disease; although the study purports to seek a method of eliminating terrorism, it fails to address the problem of the causes of terrorism.

The great Liberal hope is that the objective causes of terrorism will be attacked. Thus the focus might be on the redistribution power and wealth, the provision of adequate social services and the settlement of just claims for ethnic, religious, and social rights, for example.²⁵¹

These are goals worth achieving, but, as Wardlaw states, these are goals which are not likely to be attained in the near future, if ever, "and certainly not quickly enough to suit those who are disadvantaged by the fact that they are not attained"²⁵². Meanwhile, Western society, indeed all societies, must seek additional means of countering the terrorist threat. It is hoped that, in some small way, this study can make a contribution to that search.

APPENDIX 1
 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS*

DATE	DESCRIPTION	DETAILS
31/10/62		Comité de Libération Nationale formed.
?/11/62		Réseau de Résistance formed.
23/02/63	Firebomb	Réseau member firebombs building housing Montreal english radio station CKGM.
?/02/63	Formation	FLQ formed from disenchanting members of Réseau de Résistance.
8/03/63	Firebomb	3 Canadian Army military establishments are hit with molotov cocktails. "FLQ" spraypainted on the walls.
?/03/63	Theft	Dynamite stolen from Montreal subway construction sites.
29/03/63	Vandalism	Wolfe monument on Plains of Abraham knocked over. Work of free-lancers but action welcomed by FLQ as show of support.
01/04/63	Bomb Bomb Bomb	National Revenue Building in Montreal. Found in corridor at Central Station. Blew out section of CNR track between Montreal and Quebec City, at Lemieux near Nicolet, a few hours before Prime Minister's train was to pass.
02/04/63	Bomb	Explodes in front of Canadian Legion hall in St Jean.

*The chronology is derived from events described in de Vault, Fournier, Morf, Pelletier, Saywell and Stewart. It is impossible to know if the FLQ was responsible for all the violent events listed, but they are suspected of having committed most. Events marked with a " # " indicate events which resulted in death.

06/04/63 Bomb 24 sticks of dynamite found beside television transmission tower on Mount Royal. Bomb fails to explode due to technical defect. "FLQ" spraypainted on tower.

12/04/63 Response Police launch "Good Friday Raids" on houses and hang-outs, arresting about 20 RIN and Action Socialiste activists in attempt to get FLQ.

16/04/63 Manifesto Manifesto of FLQ made public.

20/04/63 Bomb Thrown at window of RCMP headquarters in Montreal, falls to ground and explodes. Marks beginning of Operation Lesage.

Bomb# Explodes in garbage container in back alley behind an army recruiting centre on Sherbrooke St. killing a 65 year old nightwatchman Wilfred Vincent O'Neill, on his way to work. Bomb had originally been meant for the statue of Sir John A. MacDonald in Dominion Square.

30/04/63 Robbery Robbery of army payroll nets FLQ \$35,000. Paymaster Marcel Ste. Marie is wounded.

FLQ has about 30 members.

03/05/63 Bomb Explodes under steps of Canadian Legion Hall in St. Jean.

Bomb Found at Prevoyance office building on Place D'Armes housing Solbec (copper) Mining Company. Police tipped-off. First FLQ operation directed against French-Canadian middle class (Beauchemin family).

07/05/63 Response City of Montreal offers \$10,000 reward for information leading to arrest of FLQ members.

10/05/63 Bomb Explodes at Black Watch Armoury in Montreal.

13/05/63 Bomb Explodes at RCAF technical services in Montreal suburb of Town of Mount Royal

16/05/63 Bomb Explodes against oil tank at refinery in east end Montreal.

17/05/63 Bomb 15 bombs placed in mailboxes in Montreal suburb of Westmount. 5 explode, others are dismantled. Sgt. Major Walter Leja is maimed, and lays near death for days, by a bomb which explodes while he is dismantling it.

19/05/63 Response Government of Quebec offers \$50,000 reward for information leading to arrest of FLQ members.

20/05/63 Bomb In honour of Victoria Day weekend, bomb explodes against wall of Army Engineers armoury on St. Gregoire street. Bomb originally planned for target in Ottawa (Operation Chénier).

FLQ has about 35 members.

01/06/63 Restructure Strategy meeting held to restructure FLQ into a political branch (FLQ) and a military branch (ALQ), and to reorganize into more tightly knit cells with a central committee, each cell to have a specialized function.

13/07/63 Bomb Statue of Queen Victoria in Quebec City is blown up. Believed to be work of Résistance du Québec(RQ).

22/08/63 Bomb Explodes on CPR lift bridge over the St. Lawrence Seaway near Caughnawaga (now Kahnawake) Indian reserve. "FLQ" is painted in red on one girder. Believed to be work of RQ.

25/08/63 Robbery 700 sticks of dynamite stolen from Laurentian Autoroute construction site near St. Sauver. Believed to be work of RQ.

?/08/63 Arson Toward end of August, fires were set at the Montreal barracks of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal on Avenue des Pins and of the Regiment de Maisonneuve on Craig street, and at the Canadian Legion building in Laval West and at a CNR shelter on Ile Bigras. Believed to be work of RQ.

Period of ALQ begins.

26/09/63	Response	Two of five members of ALQ are arrested after staging a bank hold-up. Group had left behind an unprimed bomb.
?/10/63	La Cognée	First issue of La Cognée appears.
09/10/63	Bomb	Bomb d-fused in post office in Saint Lambert.
	Bomb	Bomb defused in post office in Jacques Cartier (now Longueuil).
27/10/63	Response	Police arrest Guy de Grasse, Richard Bros, and Jacques Lanctôt, the three members of RQ.
25/11/63	Theft	ALQ steal technical equipment from CHEF in Granby to set up own radio station.
30/01/64	Theft	ALQ begins "Operation Barracks" with a raid on barracks of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal. Leave with \$22,000 worth of weapons, ammunition, and other supplies. Military responds by posting 24 hour guard.
20/02/64	Theft	ALQ raids barracks of the 62nd Field Artillery in Shawinigan making off with over \$25,000 worth of weapons, ammunition, and other supplies.
27/02/64	Robbery	ALQ rob Shawinigan Caisse Populaire of \$9,000.
?/ ?/64	Response	Police set up Combined Anti-Terrorist Squad composed of members of RCMP, Montreal police, and provincial police.
02/03/64	Bomb	Bomb defused at base of main flagpole in the centre of the Plains of Abraham. The Union Jack had been pulled down and used to wrap the bomb. Planted by an FLQ cell in Quebec City.
13/03/64	Arson	Rear of home of captain in Combined Squad is set on fire causing \$15,000 worth of damage.

23/03/64	Robbery	\$17,500 stolen from Caisse Populaire in east-end Montreal.
26/03/64	Robbery	\$23,000 stolen from Banque Provinciale in Rosemere.
30/03/64	Response	Police launch large-scale manhunt. Some arrests made, FLQ cell of students at University of Montreal is broken up.
09/04/64	Robbery	\$5,000 stolen from bank in Mont Rolland. Six arrests made later.
19/04/64	Bomb	CNR track dynamited near Ste. Hyacinthe.
	Bomb	Bomb planted near the military drill hall on Craig Street.
21/04/64	Bomb	To mark 38th birthday of Queen Elizabeth II, bomb was planted under statue of Queen Victoria on McGill Campus, defused by police.
19/05/64	Bomb	Police, acting on a tip, drop bomb off Victoria Bridge into the river before it explodes.
24/05/64	Response	Police arrest three young men connected with the Front Républicain pour l'Indépendance who had founded an FLQ cell.
?/06/64	ARQ	FLQ establishes military wing: Armee de Résistance du Québec (ARQ). New wing is given neither money nor guns.
29/08/64	Robbery#	Leslie MacWilliams, manager of International Firearms on Bleury street is shot dead as ARQ rob store and carry weapons to a waiting car. Alfred Pinish, a store employee, is shot dead by police after they arrive on scene and mistake him for ARQ member. ARQ members are arrested shortly after.
01/09/64	Bomb	Bomb explodes at St. Laurent home of Mario Barone.

02/11/64	Bomb	Transmission tower at Caughnawaga for english language radio and television station CFCF was blown up by a bomb. "FLQ" painted at base of tower.
?/11/64	Theft	More thefts of dynamite from subway construction areas.
16/02/65	Response	FLQ activist Michèle Duclos is arrested in New York trying to deliver dynamite to the Black Liberation Front.
18/04/65		FLQ activist Gilles Legault hangs self in cell while awaiting trial.
30/04/65	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Place Victoria, site of the Montreal Stock Exchange.
01/05/65	Bomb	Bomb explodes at United States consulate in Montreal.
24/05/65	Bomb	Bomb explodes outside Prudential Insurance Company building on Dorchester street. Building housed office of British Trade Commissioner. Damage estimated at \$15,000.
	Bomb	Defused at central post office on Peel street, one day before 4000 postal employees are to start illegal strike.
26/05/65	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Expo '67 construction site on Ile Ste. Hélène causing \$25,000 damage. Believed to be related to labour dispute.
SUMMER/65	Theft	Explosives stolen from Expo '67 construction site and from Price Paper Company in Alma.
	Bombs Etc.	Throughout summer, acts of violence (bombs, molotov cocktails) occurred during strikes of dock workers, truckers (five trucks were dynamited, with damage totaling \$100,000), and employees of Sanitary Refuse Collectors and the International Envelope Company.
14/06/65	Bomb	Bomb defused at entrance to RCMP headquarters in Quebec City.
01/07/65	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Westmount City Hall.

02/07/65	Bomb	Bomb explodes at transmission tower of Sherbrooke English radio station CKTS. Signed "FLQ".
15/07/65		FLQ "commando unit" (made up of two cells) discovered in vicinity of La Macaza military base in the Laurentians, site of Bomarc nuclear missiles, with: weapons, more than 200 detailed military maps, documents detailing how to sabotage electricity and phone lines, and a complete medical kit worth over \$15,000.
20/07/65	Response	Montreal police information centre clerk is arrested for feeding secret documents to FLQ. Quebec civil servant also arrested, as his accomplice, but is later acquitted.
28/07/65	Bomb	Explodes at head office of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce on Dorchester St..
02/08/65	Bomb	CNR track dynamited at Sainte-Madeleine about 30 miles from Montreal. Oncoming train just manages to stop in time.
	Bomb	44 sticks of dynamite, without a detonator, found on CPR railway bridge between Ile Jésus and Montreal, at Bordeaux.
22/10/65	Response	Police break up an FLQ cell connected with La Cognée network.
02/11/65	Bomb	Incendiary bomb found on chair in middle of a hall after a rally attended by Prime Minister Lester Pearson.
?/12/65		Vallières-Gagnon group formed.
3-14/01/66		Representatives from the Vallières-Gagnon group attend the Tricontinental Conference in Havana.
04/04/66	Theft	Large quantity of dynamite stolen from construction plant south of Montreal. Vallieres-Gagnon group responsible.

16/04/66	Theft	Rifles, ammunition, and uniforms stolen from Collège Mont St. Louis in Montreal. Vallières-Gagnon group responsible.
01/05/66	Robbery	\$2,400 stolen in holdup at downtown Montreal theatre.
05/05/66	Bomb	Bomb explodes in shoe box at La Grenade shoe manufacturing company killing 64 year-old Miss Thérèse Morin, a secretary, and wounding three others. Company was experiencing labour troubles. General Manager of company, Henri La Grenade, had chosen to ignore warning since it was one of many the company had received. Vallières-Gagnon group responsible.
22/05/66	Bomb	Bomb explodes at strike bound Dominion Textile plant in Drummondville.
24/05/66	Bomb	Bomb explodes at statue of Dollard Des Ormeaux. Believed to be an attempt by the FLQ to spark English - French animosity.
03/06/66	Bomb	Bomb explodes in toilet at Paul Sauvé Arena during provincial Liberal election rally with Jean Lesage.
05/06/66	Election	Provincial election: Union Nationale defeats Liberals.
09/06/66	Robbery	FLQ commandos rob a private home taking \$500 and a bottle of liquor.
15/06/66	Theft	20 rifles plus ammunition and military equipment (including uniforms) is stolen from the arms room at the College Mont Saint-Louis in Montreal. Arrests made same day due to undercover soldier in the FLQ cell.
14/07/66	Bomb#	Jean Corbo, 16 year-old courier for the FLQ, is killed when a bomb he was placing at the Dominion Textile plant in Montreal, for the Direct Action cell, explodes prematurely.

27/08/66 Robbery Attempted robbery of Montreal theatre ends in arrest of three members of Direct Action cell. Vallières-Gagnon group compromised during interrogation of those arrested.

15/09/66 Response 15 members of Direct Action cell arrested.

28/09/66 Response Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon arrested in New York.

01/01/67 Bomb Mailbox bomb explodes at corner of Notre-Dame and Saint François Xavier streets in Montreal's financial district shattering the windows of the Anglo-American Trust building.

13/01/67 Response Vallières extradited to Canada to face charges of murder and theft of explosives.

12/02/67 Bomb Bomb explodes in Montreal mailbox.

15/04/67 La Cogne Last issue of La Cogne.

24/07/67 French President Charles de Gaulle shouts "Vive le Quebec libre" from the balcony of Montreal City Hall. His visit to Canada is cut short.

27/07/67 Bomb Newly formed Mouvement de Libération du Québec plants bomb beside Greenfield Park city hall. Bomb defused by an army specialist after warning phone call.

14/08/67 Response Meeting of Security Panel in Ottawa.

AUTUMN/67 La Victoire First issue of La Victoire appears. Is published intermittently until summer of 1968.

12/09/67 Bomb Two bombs defused at MacDonald High School in Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue. Part of a protest to get a French high school in nearby Pierrefonds.

16/10/67 Bomb Bomb explodes at strike-bound Seven-Up bottling plant in Ville Mont-Royal. First of several bombings related to the strike.

?/12/67 Robbery Gunsmith's shop in Cap-de-la-Madeleine is robbed of forty heavy-calibre guns as well as revolvers, ammunition, and telescopes, all valued at \$9,000. A note left at the premises read: "Thank you. FLQ."

12/02/68 Bomb Bomb fails to explode at branch of the Royal Bank of Canada. Dummy dynamite had been provided by RCMP infiltrator.

26/02/68 Trial of Pierre Vallières for murder begins.

14/03/68 Response RCMP and Montreal police arrest long-time FLQ leader Jacques Desormeaux for possession of explosives. Police had been watching Desormeaux for 18 months and attempting to infiltrate FLQ. He is later acquitted of the charges.

15/03/68 Pierre Vallières' book Negres Blancs d'Amerique is released.

05/05/68 Theft Two cases of dynamite stolen from the Dominion Lime quarries at Saint Bruno de Montarville. The initials "FLQ" were left at the scene. Later, detonators were stolen from a quarry at Acton Vale.

11/05/68 Bomb Bomb at Seven-Up plant in Montreal. Workers had been on strike since June 15, 1967. The bomb was the first of the Geoffroy network bombs.

24/05/68 Bomb Bomb explodes near U.S. consulate in Montreal. Words "FLN Vaincra" (The FLN Will Win) were painted on the building.

24/06/68 Riot Riot at the St. Jean Baptiste Day parade. Trudeau is pelted but refuses to leave his ground. Paul Rose and Jacques Lanctôt, both arrested, met in the back of a police paddywagon.

25/06/68 Election Liberal party wins federal election. Trudeau becomes prime minister of Canada.

20/08/68	Bomb	Bomb explodes at a Liquor Commission outlet.
	Bomb	Bomb explodes in car of a negotiator in Liquor Commission strike.
	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Victoria Precision Works plant in east-end Montreal. Workers had been on strike for nearly eight months.
08/09/68	Bomb	Bomb dismantled behind Liquor Commission outlet on St. Denis Street in Montreal. Employees on strike.
18/09/68	Bomb	Bomb explodes behind home of Bordeaux Jail warden. FLQ bomb to support hunger strike by Vallieres and Gagnon and to protest slow pace of proceedings.
20/09/68	Bomb	Bomb fails to explode at Black Watch Armoury on Bleury St. in Montreal.
	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Liquor Commission outlet.
25/09/68	Bomb	Bomb discovered at base of statue of Sir John A. MacDonald in Dominion Square in Montreal.
26/09/68	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Liquor Commission outlet.
28/09/68		Quebec Union Nationale Premier Daniel Johnson dies of a heart attack. He is replaced by Jean-Jacques Bertrand.
	Bomb	Bomb explodes in front of Liquor Commission outlet on Sherbrooke St. West in Montreal.
07/10/68	Theft	300 sticks of dynamite, 50 sticks of Pento-mex and about 100 detonators stolen from the Legace Quarries in Laval.
11/10/68	PQ	Parti Québécois is formed from the union of two Quebec nationalist groups.
12/10/68	Bomb	Bomb discovered near the Chamber of Commerce building in Quebec City.

13/10/68 Bomb Bomb dismantled near a provincial Ministry of Labour building in Montreal after an anonymous telephone tip.

14/10/68 Bomb Bomb at Union Nationale's Club Renaissance is dismantled.
Bomb Bomb explodes at the Club de Réforme, Liberal Party headquarters.

16/10/68 Bomb Bomb explodes near Lord Company in east-end Montreal. Plant in middle of strike.

17/10/68 Bomb Bomb planted near Montreal office of the Centre des Dirigeants d'Entreprise.

29/10/68 Bomb Bomb damages Voyageur bus terminus. Strike in progress.

30/10/68 Riot The Mouvement de Libération du Taxi stages massive protest against Murray Hill monopoly of service at Dorval Airport. Roads to the airport are blocked, and molotov cocktails are hurled at Murray Hill buses and garage. Among the leading activists in the MLT were Gaston Therrien, Marc Carbonneau, and Jacques Lanctot.

04/11/68 Bomb Bomb explodes in front of Murray Hill Limousine Service office in Montreal.

11/11/68 Bomb Bomb explodes in Central (railroad) Station in Montreal.

12/11/68 Bomb Bomb discovered at entrance to the Chamber of Commerce and Board of Trade building in Montreal.

14/11/68 Bomb Bomb placed in front of Domtar head office on Molson street in Montreal. Telephone warning allowed police to dismantle bomb before it exploded. Company in middle of strike.

15/11/68 Bomb Bomb dismantled at Lord Company in Montreal. Company in middle of strike.

17/11/68	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Standard Structural Steel Company in Montreal. Company also having labour problems.
	Bomb	Explodes at Cr�merie Crete in Grand-M�re, near Shawinigan. Workers had been on strike for nine months.
21/11/68	Bomb	Bomb explodes in front of Liquor Commission outlet on Boul. St. Laurent in Montreal.
24/11/68	Bombs	Bomb explodes in downtown Eaton's department store at 3 a.m.. Later that day, another is discovered after an anonymous telephone call.
27/11/68	Bomb	Montreal police car dynamited in parking lot of Trans-Island Motors in Montreal.
01/12/68	Bomb	Bomb explodes near home of Lord Company plant manager. Bomb planted by Dubreuil cell of FLQ.
12/12/68	Bomb	Bomb defused near home of president of Standard Structural Steel.
13/12/68	Support	Comite Valli�res-Gagnon organizes a demonstration in Montreal to demand release of "political prisoners". Supported by some left-wing groups.
	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Westmount home of Murray Hill president Charles Hershorn.
	Bomb	Explodes at the home of a Domtar company executive.
14/12/68	Bombs	Two bombs found and dismantled on the premises of South Shore Chambly Transport. A third explodes in front of the home of the company director.
17/12/68	Response	City of Montreal offers \$10,000 reward for information leading to arrest of terrorists.
30/12/68	Response	Province also offers \$10,000 for information leading to arrest of terrorists.

31/12/68	Bomb	Two bombs placed against Montreal City Hall, only one explodes, the other is dismantled.
	Bomb	Bomb at explodes in front of National Revenue Building in Montreal.
	Bomb	Bomb explodes in mailbox in front of office of Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier, in Ottawa.
02/01/69	Bombs	Three bombs discovered in Ottawa mailboxes near federal buildings.
04/01/69	Bomb	Bomb discovered in Ottawa mailbox.
08/01/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes near east-end residence of Montreal Police Chief Jean-Paul Gilbert.
10/01/69	Bomb	Eleven sticks of dynamite found in garbage can in front of the Quebec Federation of Labour. FLQ had accused the Federation of being run by "collaborators".
21/01/69	Bomb	Powerful bomb explodes at Montreal offices of the Canadian Federation of Independent Associations (an association of company unions). 2 people are injured.
	Theft	Dynamite stolen in St Jerome.
24/01/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes on eighth floor of the Bank of Nova Scotia building. Probably directed at the Noranda Mining Company.
08/02/69	Bomb	Bomb found in front of Quebec Ministry of Labour building in Montreal.
10/02/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at armed forces establishment in Town of Mount Royal injuring a guard.
11/02/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at downtown armoury of the Regiment de Maisonneuve injuring a guard.
13/02/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes in visitors gallery of the Montreal Stock Exchange injuring 27 people. Prior warning was dismissed.

?/02/69	Response	Quebec government increases reward for information leading to arrest of terrorists to \$40,000, added to \$10,000 from City of Montreal, \$10,000 from the management of the Stock Exchange and \$1,000 from Canadian Federation of Independent Associations.
22/02/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes, again, at Liberal Club, injuring 4.
25/02/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Queen's Printer bookshop on Ste. Catherine street. Employee gets description of perpetrator.
04/03/69	Arrest	Police raid downtown flat and arrest Pierre-Paul Geoffroy. Geoffroy network is broken, although no other arrests are made.
28/03/69	Support	March on McGill. 15,000 people demonstrate in Operation McGill Francais organized by a number of left-wing nationalist groups.
02/05/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at head office of the Association des Entrepreneurs en Construction in Montreal. Strike of building workers had just begun.
18/05/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at St. Jean Baptiste Society offices in Sherbrooke probably to protest a visit by Trudeau the following week. The invitation to Trudeau was withdrawn.
27/05/69	Bombs	Three bombs explode at construction sites of the Nord Construction company in Montreal. Planted by Dubreuil cell.
24/06/69	Riot	FLQ and separatists attack, overturn and decapitate statue of St. Jean Baptiste during the parade.
07/07/69	Bombs	Five bombs damage offices of five Montreal construction companies. Planted by Dubreuil cell.
14/07/69	Bombs	Six incendiary devices found in the downtown Eaton's store overnight.

08/08/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at offices of the provincial Ministry of Labour in Montreal. Probably connected to an unsettled strike in the construction industry.
09/08/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at head office of Industrial Acceptance Corporation in Town of Mount Royal.
12/08/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at National Revenue building in Montreal.
17/08/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes in Ministry of Labour building in Quebec City.
22/08/69	Response	Newly appointed Minister of Justice, Remi Paul, announces a ten point program to combat terrorism and subversion.
28/09/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at home of Montreal mayor Jean Drapeau damaging it beyond repair. Although bomb explodes very early in the morning, no one is at home.
07/10/69	Riot	With Montreal police on strike, MLT stages another demonstration in which Murray Hill buses and garage are firebombed. Rioting and looting occur in streets of Montreal. When police returned to work the next day, they launched a series of raids on citizen's committees, trade unions, worker's committees and several left-wing organizations.
07/11/69	Support	3000 people march demanding release of Vallieres and Gagnon.
12/11/69	Response	City of Montreal passes bylaw forbidding demonstrations and some public meetings.
20/11/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes at home of Mario Barone, vocal opponent of the Ligue pour L'intégration Scolaire, a movement to force immigrants into French schools.
	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Loyola College, linked to the recent dismissal of a professor. Planted by Dubreuil cell.

01/12/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes on McGill campus near the administration building and computer centre.
08/12/69	Bomb	A second bomb explodes at the home of Mario Barone.
12/12/69	Robbery	First of 30 robberies by the Hudon cell.
22/12/69	Bomb	Bomb explodes in mailtruck in Rosemont district of Montreal. Picked up from mailbox on Pie IX.
15/01/70	Theft	Theft of explosives in Saint Paul d'Abbotsford on the South Shore.
17/01/70		Robert Bourassa elected leader of the Quebec Liberal Party.
?/02/70	Theft	150 pounds of dynamite stolen from the Dominion Lime quarry at Saint Bruno de Montarville.
20/02/70		Charles Gagnon, an FLQ leader charged with homicide, is freed on \$2500 bail paid by the Confederation of National Trade Unions. At a press conference held immediately, he announces plan to revive the FLQ.
26/02/70	Response	Police stop rented panel truck in east-end Montreal and find Pierre Marcil and Jacques Lanctôt with arms and a large wicker basket and a document announcing that the FLQ had just kidnapped Moshe Golan, Israeli consul and trade commissioner in Montreal. Both men are charged with conspiracy to kidnap and released on bail. Lanctot disappears.
12/03/70	Robbery	Canadian National Bank branch in Montreal is robbed. FLQ member is arrested.
29/04/70	Election	Robert Bourassa and his Liberal Party defeat Jean-Jacques Bertrand and the Union Nationale. Liberals garner 44% of popular vote. PQ capture 24% of popular vote but only seven seats.

05/05/70 Beginning of Operation Vallières week, declared by Charles Gagnon, to "demand the unconditional liberation of Pierre Vallieres as well as of all the other political prisoners. Highlighted by public speeches by Gagnon, unauthorized street demonstrations, meetings between FLQ representatives, union representatives and worker's committees. CEGEP students also mobilized.

07/05/70 Bomb Bomb explodes near post office on Papineau street in Montreal. First of a series of explosions to protest the firing of the Lapalme drivers.

09/05/70 Theft 114 sticks of dynamite stolen from the Dulude quarry in Sainte Julie.

12/05/70 Police disperse street demonstration as Operation Vallières week ends. Gagnon declares week a success.

20/05/70 Pierre Vallières begins hunger strike in prison.

24/05/70 Theft 150 sticks of dynamite stolen from the Billet quarry in Laval.
Bomb Bomb explodes at the entrance to the former Montreal Board of Trade office in the financial district, shattering windows for two blocks.

25/05/70 Robbery Hudon cell rob \$3,000 from Caisse Populaire in St. Calixte, 35 miles north of Montreal.

26/05/70 Pierre Vallières released on bail. Once again, money paid by CNTU.

28/05/70 Bomb Bomb explodes outside the doctors' residence at Queen Mary's Veterans Hospital.
Bomb Bomb explodes outside the General Electric plant.
Robbery University of Montreal Student Union robbed of \$58,000.

28/05/70	Robbery	Five members of the Hudon robbery cell arrested after hold-up in bank in Laurentians. String of almost 30 robberies is ended.
31/05/70	Bombs	Seven bombs in Westmount. Five explode, four at private homes, two are dismantled. Three people are injured.
01/06/70	Response	Justice Minister Jérôme Choquette announces \$50,000 reward for information leading to the arrest of the bombers.
02/06/70	Response	A woman who had rented her garage to two men found a cache of dynamite, two machine guns, hoods, and a bullet proof vest.
	Theft	Four hundred sticks of dynamite stolen.
05/06/70	Bomb	Bomb explodes at Le Club Canadien, mainly damaging a nearby medical centre.
08/06/70	Response	Justice Minister Jérôme Choquette forms high-powered committee of the Quebec Provincial Police, the Montreal police, and the RCMP to coordinate anti-terrorist activities.
09/06/70	Bomb	Bomb defused near postal substation on Decarie Blvd. in Montreal.
13/06/70	Bomb	Bomb planted at barracks of Fusiliers Mont-Royal in Montreal.
15/06/70	Bomb Bombs	Bomb explodes on McGill campus. Following a tip to CKAC, police defuse two bombs, one outside IBM, the other outside Domtar Research Centre.
18/06/70	Bomb	Bomb shatters windows of a post office in Longueuil.
19/06/70	Bomb	Bomb explodes at home of financier Jean-Louis Lévèsque. Although everyone was at home, no one is injured.

21/06/70	Response	Police raid cottage in Laurentian village of Prevost arresting 6 people and uncovering rifles, revolvers and ammunition, 300 pounds of dynamite, clocks and detonators, hoods, \$28,000 (probably from U of M Student Union robbery), tracts calling for a revolution of Quebec workers, and the draft of a proposed ransom demand for a kidnapped U.S. consul (Harrison Burgess) in Montreal. Conditions of release were virtually identical to those which were to be demanded for Cross.
	Response	Police raid on house in Laval, arresting 2, and seizing a quantity of dynamite.
22/06/70	Response	Acting on information obtained at the previous day's raid, police raid a farm in Sainte Anne de la Rochelle in the Eastern Townships. Although many FLQ activists were present, no one was arrested.
	Bomb	Bomb explodes in furniture store in Tracy belonging to relatives of Premier Bourassa.
24/06/70	Bomb	Bomb explodes at postal station in Montreal.
	Bomb#	Bomb explodes at Department of National Defence "B" building in Ottawa killing Mrs. Jeanne D'Arc St. Germain, a 50 years old communications supervisor. Two soldiers are also injured.
26/06/70	Bomb	Bomb explodes in post office in Sainte Therese.
03/07/70	Bomb	Bomb explodes near Petrofina refinery in east-end Montreal.
10/07/70	Bomb	Bomb defused at Royal Bank head office in Montreal's financial district.
11/07/70	Bomb	Bomb explodes at head office of Wawanesa insurance company in Town of Mount Royal.

12/07/70 Bomb 150 pounds of dynamite in a Volkswagen outside the Bank of Montreal on St. James Street was defused before it exploded.

14/07/70 Response Justice Minister Jérôme Choquette rushes an explosion control bill through the National Assembly. Claims terrorism due to "ideological elements of foreign inspiration...which have no support among our population." Bill has little effect as 3000 sticks of dynamite are stolen in August and September.

16/07/70 Bomb Bomb defused outside Hotel Victoria where Premier Bourassa is staying.

?/08/70 While in Jordan, reporter comes across two french speaking terrorists in a PLO training camp. The two state that FLQ will shortly begin a campaign of "selective assassination".

05/10/70 Kidnapping James Cross is kidnapped from his home on Redpath Crescent by the Liberation Cell, at 8:15 in the morning.

06/10/70 Response Federal External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp, calls the FLQ demands "wholly unreasonable" and states they will not be met. Premier Bourassa announces his upcoming visit to New York will continue as planned.

07/10/70 Response Police make a series of early morning raids, arresting thirty people, all of whom are later released. In the evening, the FLQ manifesto is read over radio station CKAC.

08/10/70 Response FLQ manifesto read over french television.

09/10/70 Response Police reveal identity of Jacques Lanctôt, a suspect in the kidnapping.

10/10/70 Response Quebec Justice Minister, Jérôme Choquette, reads statement over media rejecting demands of FLQ, but offering them safe passage to Cuba and recommendations of parole for six of the "political prisoners" in return for safe release of Cross.

Kidnapping Minister of Employment and Immigration, Pierre Laporte, is kidnapped outside his home in St. Lambert.

Response Provincial police begin assigning guards to homes of prominent people.

12/10/70 Response Operation Ginger, the use of troops to protect VIP's in Ottawa, gets underway.

14/10/70 Rene Lévesque, Claude Ryan, Marcel Pepin, Louis Laberge and eleven other prominent Quebecers hold a press conference to urge the government to negotiate with Cross kidnapers. Government makes offer of safe passage to Cuba, and recommendation of parole for six of the "political prisoners" in return for release of Cross and Laporte.

15/10/70 Response Troops begin guarding government buildings and residences of prominent citizens in Quebec.

16/10/70 W.M.Act At 4 A.M. War Measures Act goes into effect. 12,000 troops used in Quebec, 7,500 of which are in Montreal to aid the 10,000 police in the greater Montreal area. Rene Lévesque makes appeal over radio station CKAC to kidnapers to accept government's last offer and release the hostages.

17/10/70 Murder# Pierre Laporte's body found in trunk of car at airport in St. Hubert.

20/10/70 Pierre Laporte's funeral.

25/10/70 Election Jean Drapeau wins landslide re-election as mayor of Montreal.

26/10/70 Barbara Cross, wife of James Cross, makes appeal to husband's kidnappers over radio station CKLM.

02/11/70 Response Three levels of government offer \$150,000 for information. Communique says Cross is still alive and blames the assassination of Laporte on the "established authorities".

06/11/70 Response Police raid Queen Mary Road apartment of Colette Therrien, a girlfriend of Jacques Rose, arresting her, her two friends Francine and Françoise Belisle, and Bernard Lortie. Paul and Jacques Rose, and Francis Simard hid out in a small room built into the back of a closet for 24 hours, avoiding arrest.

03/12/70 Response War Measures Act is replaced by the Act To Provide Temporary Emergency Powers For The Preservation Of Public Order In Canada. Police surround an apartment building in Montreal's north end where Cross is being held. A deal is struck for the release of Cross. Later that night, the members of the Liberation cell leave for exile in Cuba. Early the next morning, Cross is free.

03/01/71 Theft Theft of explosives at St. Paul d'Abbotsford.

04/01/71 Response Troops removed from Quebec.

06/01/71 Molotov Molotov cocktails thrown at Brinks Canada premises on Ottawa street. Carried out by Andre Ouimet Cell.

08/01/71 Bomb Bomb at Cardinal Newman School, a police training centre.

20/02/71 Bomb Bomb placed at post office on Papineau street. Failed since police informer had replaced real dynamite with phoney.

29/03/71 FLQ activist François Mario Bachand found murdered in his Paris apartment. Possible FLQ assassination.

06/05/71 Robbery Bank of Montreal branch robbed of \$1500. One of two FLQ activists arrested.

24/09/71 Robbery Bank robbery in Mascouche.

1975 RCMP operations against FLQ ended.

NOTES

¹La Victoire (Official organ of the FLQ), No. 3, March 1969; quoted in Gerard Pelletier, The October Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 224.

²Ted Robert Gurr, "Introduction," in Handbook of Political Conflict, ed. Ted Robert Gurr (New York: The Free Press, 1980), 1-4.

³It must be recognized from the very beginning that, in studying terrorist groups (even defunct ones), one is studying covert organizations and, therefore, it will be impossible to learn everything. If the "easy" case does not yield at least some of the answers we are seeking, then it is unlikely the more difficult cases would, either. Thus, it is best to discover that a study will not bear fruit before one has progressed too far.

⁴Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 16. Of the many definitions of terrorism which are available in the literature, Wardlaw's definition was found to be the most satisfactory. It captures the essence of what we believe terrorism to be, the creation of anxiety or fear in a target group for political purposes. Also, the definition does not specify "innocents" as the sole target of terrorists. If innocents are the sole target of terrorists, then the assassination of a democratically elected head of state would not be considered an act of terrorism since it is that head of state who is directly responsible for a policy which the terrorists find so abhorrent.

⁵Regis Debray, Revolution In The Revolution?, trans. Bobby Ortiz (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), 41-42.

⁶Charles Tilly, From Mobilization To Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 8.

⁷Ibid., 91.

⁸Tilly, 91.

⁹Ibid., 8.

¹⁰Ibid., 5.

¹¹Tilly, 6.

¹²Ibid., 52.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., 125.

¹⁵Ibid., 132.

¹⁶Ibid., 52.

¹⁷Ibid., 126.

¹⁸Ibid., 57-59. Tilly later drops the interest variable from his analysis because he finds it impossible to develop a suitable empirical measure of interests. Our study does not require an empirical measure of interest and, therefore, we can retain this important variable.

¹⁹Ibid., 7.

²⁰Ibid., 62.

²¹Ibid., 67.

²²Ibid., 82.

²³Ibid., 7.

²⁴Ibid., 121.

²⁵Ibid., 119.

²⁶For example, in early 1972, the Official IRA 'tried' and executed a 19-year-old British soldier. The incident wiped out support for the Official IRA in Derry. In that same year, the Provisional IRA engaged in a number of bombings and shootings in which they showed little regard for the lives of passersby. The result was an outcry from the Catholic community. For a detailed account, see Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (Great Britain: William Heinemann Ltd., 1987; Corgi Books, 1988), 199, 221-222.

²⁷Ibid., 86.

²⁸Bard E. O'Neill et al., Insurgency In The Modern World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 19-26.

²⁹Obviously, the last option of conventional military response is seldom, if ever, considered by a government

facing a threat from an urban terrorist group. The clandestine nature of terrorism, coupled with the small number of people in terrorist cells, would quickly turn a massive military response into an exercise in futility. Such a response must be reserved for larger revolutionary groups, such as the Afghan rebels. Northern Ireland provides the best example of the kind of intense low-level military response open to a government battling urban terrorism.

³⁰O'Neill, 6.

³¹O'Neill, 14-16.

³²For a description of the connections between Irish-American groups and the IRA see Holland, Jack. The American Connection. Markham, Ont.: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1987.

³³U.S. Department of State, "Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression" Special Report No. 138, January 1986 in The Terrorism Reader, Rev'd ed., eds. Walter Laqueur and Yonah Alexander (Scarborough, Ont: New American Library of Canada Ltd., 1987), 337-345.

³⁴Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Never-Ending War: Terrorism in the 80's (New York: Facts On File, 1987), 62-63.

³⁵Tilly, 115.

³⁶Ibid., 133.

³⁷O'Neill, 18.

³⁸Tilly, 53.

³⁹John L. Finlay and D.N. Sprague, The Structure of Canadian History (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 421-422.

⁴⁰Laurier L. LaPierre, "The 1960s." In Part One of The Canadians 1867-1967, eds. J.M.S. Careless and R. Craig Brown (Toronto: MacMillan, 1967), 365.

⁴¹Finlay and Sprague, 424.

⁴²Louis Fournier, FLQ The Anatomy of an Underground Movement, trans. Edward Baxter (Toronto: New Canada Press, 1984), 17.

⁴³William Kilbourne, "The 1950s." In Part One of The Canadians 1867-1967, eds. J.M.S. Careless and R. Craig Brown (Toronto: MacMillan, 1967), 318.

⁴⁴LaPierre, 371-374.

⁴⁵Ibid., 371-375.

⁴⁶Fournier, 25.

⁴⁷Ibid., 27-28.

⁴⁸Ibid., 29-30.

⁴⁹James Stewart, The FLQ: Seven Years of Terrorism (Montreal: The Montreal Star, 1970), 10.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid., 10.

⁵²Fournier, 14.

⁵³Albert Parry, Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat (New York: Vanguard Press, 1976), 366.

⁵⁴Dan G. Loomis, Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ (Ottawa: Deneau, 1985), 15-20.

⁵⁵Pelletier, 57.

⁵⁶David A. Charters, "The October Crisis: Implications For Canada's Internal Security." In Terror, ed. Brian MacDonald (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986), 59.

⁵⁷Pelletier, 67.

⁵⁸Fournier, 17-19.

⁵⁹Ibid., 45-46.

⁶⁰Ibid., 47.

⁶¹Ibid., 46-47.

⁶²Pelletier, 206.

⁶³Fournier, 47.

⁶⁴Parry, 366.

⁶⁵Fournier, 70.

⁶⁶Parry, 366.

⁶⁷Fournier, 95.

⁶⁸Ibid., 97.

⁶⁹Ibid., 98.

⁷⁰What Is The FLO? Clandestine document published by the FLO, 1966; quoted in Pelletier, 244.

⁷¹Fournier, 109.

⁷²Ibid., 98.

⁷³Ibid., 99.

⁷⁴Quoted in Parry, 367. Although Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon remained dedicated to revolution, they were to become increasingly pessimistic about the chances of one occurring in Quebec. The people of Quebec, it seemed, were not as ready to rise in bloody revolution as the two had believed.

⁷⁵Fournier, 106.

⁷⁶Pelletier, 67.

⁷⁷To describe the events of the October crisis in detail would be beyond the scope of this study. We will refer only to those events which are relevant for our purposes.

⁷⁸Dan Daniels, ed., Quebec/Canada and the October Crisis (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1973), 116-120.

⁷⁹Stewart, 58.

⁸⁰Parry, 369, 371.

⁸¹John T. Saywell, Quebec 70: A Documentary History (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971), 51.

⁸²Parry, 371.

⁸³Saywell, 121.

⁸⁴Ibid., 134.

⁸⁵Ibid., 132-133.

⁸⁶Gustave Morf, Terror In Quebec: Case Studies of the FLO (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Ltd., 1970), 110.

⁸⁷parry, 373.

⁸⁸Morf (1970) mentions Yves Labonté as being in the FLQ "for the 'kick'" and to boost his ego (p. 15), and that certain members of the ALQ in 1963, and of the Hudon financing cell in 1969, lived high on proceeds from bank hold-ups (pp. 36-37, 155). Robert Lévesque had served time as a thief before joining the FLQ (p. 85). Examples of those who had no strong socialist leanings are Gilles Brunet and Marcel Tardif of the ARQ. In addition, Brunet hated violence (p. 58).

⁸⁹Fournier, 65.

⁹⁰Morf, 67, 74-75.

⁹¹Parry, 368.

⁹²Ibid., 374.

⁹³Fournier, 38.

⁹⁴Morf, 21-22.

⁹⁵Fournier, 44.

⁹⁶Ibid., 44-45.

⁹⁷Ibid., 48.

⁹⁸Ibid., 65.

⁹⁹Ibid., 66.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 67.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 91.

¹⁰²Ibid., 91-92.

¹⁰³Pelletier, 212-213.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 213.

¹⁰⁵Fournier, 95.

¹⁰⁶Pelletier, 213.

¹⁰⁷Morf, 10.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 153.

¹⁰⁹Loomis 28-29. Parry, 368.

- 110 Pelletier, 51.
- 111 Saywell, 131.
- 112 Parry, 371.
- 113 Francis Simard, Talking It Out: The October Crisis From Inside (Montreal: Guernica, 1987), 13, 20-23.
- 114 Fournier, 275-276.
- 115 Carole de Vault, The Informer: Confessions Of An Ex-Terrorist (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982),
- 116 See D.C. McDonald et al. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Ottawa, 1981.
- 117 Morf, 68; Fournier, 45.
- 118 Pelletier, 215.
- 119 Morf, 58.
- 120 Ibid., 2-3.
- 121 Ibid., 39-40.
- 122 Ron Haggart and Aubrey E. Golden, Rumours of War (Toronto: New Press, 1971), 268-269.
- 123 Ibid., 10.
- 124 Morf, 36-37, 155.
- 125 Ibid., 54-55.
- 126 Haggart and Golden, 232.
- 127 Richard Gwyn, The Northern Magus (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980; Paperjacks, 1981), 113.
- 128 Fournier, 32.
- 129 Fournier, 54, 32; Loomis, 24.
- 130 Fournier, 111.
- 131 Ibid., 32-33.
- 132 Ibid., 107, 114-115.

- 133 Fournier, 73.
- 134 Ibid., 43.
- 135 Ibid., 90.
- 136 Loomis, ch. 4.
- 137 Ibid.
- 138 Ibid., 69.
- 139 Ibid., 111.
- 140 Ibid., 71.
- 141 Ibid., 137.
- 142 Pelletier, 139.
- 143 Gwyn, 112.
- 144 Saywell, 39-42.
- 145 Gwyn, 108.
- 146 Saywell, 41, 52-53.
- 147 Ibid., 53-54.
- 148 Gwyn, 114.
- 149 Ibid., 115.
- 150 Saywell, 58.
- 151 David A. Charters, "The October Crisis: Implications For Canada's Internal Security," in Terror, ed. Brian MacDonald (Toronto: The Canadian Institute Of Strategic Studies, 1986), 57.
- 152 Loomis 140-141, 138.
- 153 Saywell, 90.
- 154 Haggart and Golden, 251.
- 155 Gwyn, 109.
- 156 Parry, 374.
- 157 Saywell, 122-123.

158 Saywell, 128.

159 Fournier, 31.

160 Morf, 5.

161 Fournier, 36.

162 Ibid., 39.

163 Ibid., 59, 61-62.

164 Ibid., 92.

165 Ibid., 70.

166 Morf, 17.

167 Fournier, 104, 40.

168 Ibid., 82.

169 Loomis, 135-136; Morf, 88. Despite orders from prime minister Pearson in 1963 to stop spying on university organizations and their members, the RCMP, in late 1967, began to spy on university organizations. They claimed to have "proof that terrorist sympathizers are active in the universities and other institutions of higher learning in Quebec". See Fournier, 119.

170 Donald Jamieson, "Overkill," Saturday Night, April 1988, 24.

171 Ibid., 82, 84.

172 Morf, 87-88, 141, 153.

173 Haggart and Golden, 83.

174 Saywell, 44-45.

175 Ibid., 44.

176 de Vault, 91.

177 Ibid., 91-92.

178 Ibid., 92.

179 Gwyn, 108.

180 Pelletier, 23.

¹⁸¹de Vault, 92-93; Saywell, 58.

¹⁸²de Vault, 93.

¹⁸³Loomis, 156-157.

¹⁸⁴Saywell, 79, 81-82. It should not be assumed that Michel Chartrand was speaking with the support of the members of his union. Most Quebec labour leaders later would oppose the use of the War Measures Act but Pierre Vennat of La Presse wrote that it was clear that the central councils of the unions did not have the support of the membership on this issue. See Saywell, 98, 110; Pelletier, 149.

¹⁸⁵Loomis, 157.

¹⁸⁶Saywell, 83, 95-96.

¹⁸⁷Gwyn, 109.

¹⁸⁸Charters, 61.

¹⁸⁹Saywell, 106.

¹⁹⁰Pelletier, 51.

¹⁹¹Parry, 368.

¹⁹²Pelletier, 81.

¹⁹³An earlier public opinion poll of 2000 young French-Canadians conducted by a Montreal radio station in 1967 found the following: 89% were against the use of violence to solve political problems, 10% approved of violence as a political weapon and 18% had never heard of the FLQ. See Morf, 33.

¹⁹⁴Saywell, 94.

¹⁹⁵Ibid., 61.

¹⁹⁶The survey also showed that more than 50% of Canadians favoured the prevention or suppression of communist demonstrations and student militants, 43% the suppression of hippies, more than 30% favoured the suppression of labour militants and "woman's lib". See Saywell, 107-108.

¹⁹⁷Saywell, 107.

¹⁹⁸Bruce W. Hodgins et al, eds., Canadiens, Canadians and Quebecois (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 62.

¹⁹⁹David McIntosh, Ottawa Unbuttoned (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1987; General Paperbacks, 1988), 54.

²⁰⁰Fournier, 97.

²⁰¹Ibid., 187-188.

²⁰²Saywell, 116, 107, 115.

²⁰³Charters, 59.

²⁰⁴Fournier, 108, 99.

²⁰⁵Ibid., 75-76.

²⁰⁶Ibid., 93-94.

²⁰⁷John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work Of Soviet Secret Agents (Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1974), 22, 151.

²⁰⁸Fournier, 207-208.

²⁰⁹Ibid., 15.

²¹⁰Dale Thompson, Vive le Quebec Libre (Toronto: Deneau, 1988), Ch. 10.

²¹¹Ibid, 42.

²¹²McIntosh, 51.

²¹³Fournier, 42.

²¹⁴McIntosh, 51.

²¹⁵Fournier, 68-69.

²¹⁶Morf, 60.

²¹⁷Saywell, 133-134.

²¹⁸Fournier, 51.

²¹⁹Morf, 110.

²²⁰Pelletier, 81.

²²¹Ibid., 71.

²²²Ibid., 77, 79.

²²³Ibid., 79, 81.

224Morf, 12.

225Pelletier, 206-211. The "Tupamaros" of Uruguay used similar means in an attempt to spark a popular revolution.

226Tilly, 61.

227Gayle Rivers, The War Against The Terrorists: How To Win It (New York: Stein and Day, 1986), 242.

228Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: The Problems of Response," in Contemporary Terrorism, ed. William Gutteridge (New York: Facts On File Publications, 1986), 16.

229Haggart and Golden, 251-253.

230Charters, 67.

231Pelletier, 113.

232Charters, 68. In 1973, the government of the United Kingdom enacted The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act which, in combination with later acts, gave the authorities sweeping powers similar to those used in Quebec in 1970. These acts: proscribed membership in organizations connected to terrorism; expanded police powers of search, seizure, arrest and detention; limited the procedural protections of individuals arrested for certain crimes related to terrorism; gave authorities the power to intern those suspected of participating in or aiding terrorist activities. Despite these measures, the violence in Northern Ireland has continued. For an in-depth description of these laws, see Matthew Lippman, "The Abrogation Of Domestic Human Rights: Northern Ireland and the Rule of British Law," in Terrorism In Europe, ed. Yonah Alexander and Kenneth A. Myers (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 185-188.

233Ibid.

234Charters, 68.

235Bishop and Mallie, 287.

236O'Neill, 18-19.

237Loomis, 154.

238Ibid., 154-155

239Jamieson, 27.

- 240 Haggart and Golden, 9-10.
- 241 Ibid., 264.
- 242 Ibid., 267.
- 243 Charters, 70 (see footnote, 10).
- 244 Ibid., 58.
- 245 Ibid.
- 246 Ibid., 60.
- 247 Ibid.
- 248 Anne Griffin, Quebec: The Challenge of Independence
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