Cultural Transmission, Popular Nationalism and Attitudinal Constraint

An Analysis of Immigrant Identities

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the ethnocultural identities of immigrants and maps how these identities are organized in the mind, transmitted from parents to children, and consequential for nationalist beliefs. Across three empirical chapters, I engage with different substantive debates and exploit different quantitative tools to test my theoretical propositions. At the same time, all three chapters focus on how immigrant-origin individuals make sense of themselves and the social worlds they inhabit; acknowledge that identities (or self-related attitudes) derive from cognitive schemas that are fundamentally *cultural* — that is, widely (but not universally) shared; and rely on techniques that can capture these cultural-cognitive networks in survey data.

In the first chapter, I test two longstanding assumptions about the cultural heterodoxy of Muslims in Europe: (i) that European Muslim youth "stand out" from their non-Muslim peers in cultural affairs; and (ii) that parent-to-child transmission is a key mechanism underlying this pattern. Using dyadic parent-adolescent data from the *Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries*, I show that Muslim youth stand out from their peers vis-à-vis their cultural identity profiles. However, I find *no* evidence to suggest that this pattern is driven by cultural transfers from parents to children. Crucially, this implies that forces exogenous to the family unit are more proximately associated with the cultural identities of Muslim children than transmission chains within households.

In the second chapter, I use panel data from the *Friendship and Identity in School* (FiS) survey to explore how nation-state schemas (configurations of national attachments and membership criteria) influence intergroup attitudes among native and second-generation Germans.

Strikingly, I find that schemas of the nation that feature high levels of national identification and restrictive membership criteria are *exclusionary* for natives but *inclusionary* for the children of immigrants. Conversely, thinner sets of nationalist beliefs map onto *exclusionary* attitudes among minorities and *inclusionary* attitudes among natives. Taken together, my results imply that similar configurations of nationalist beliefs are associated with different kinds of political claims across ethnic lines.

In the final chapter, I use data from the FiS to identify latent schemes (networks of interrelationships) that organize and constrain responses to identity-related survey items among second generation Germans. After clarifying the differences between these schematic networks, I show that religious affiliation is significantly associated with the type of scheme an individual adopts. Unlike most studies on cultural variation using European data, my analysis not only documents differences between Muslims and their peers, but between members of non-Muslim faith communities as well. Most notably, I highlight significant differences between Catholic and Protestant respondents vis-à-vis the organizational schemes they encode.

Résumé

Cette thèse examine les identités ethnoculturelles des immigrants, illustre comment ces identités sont conceptualisées, transmises de parents à enfants, et comment elles affectent les sentiments nationalistes. À travers les trois chapitres empiriques, j'adresse différents débats et utilise différentes méthodes quantitatives pour évaluer mes hypothèses théoriques. Les trois chapitres présentent également la façon dont les individus d'origine immigrante construisent leurs identités, comprennent les milieux sociaux qui les entourent, et reconnaissent leurs identités (ainsi que leurs attitudes reliées à ces identités) comme produites par des schémas cognitifs qui sont fondamentalement culturels (soit très largement partagés, même s'ils ne sont pas universels). J'utilise des techniques qui permettent de capturer ces schémas culturo-cognitifs à partir de données de sondages.

Dans le premier chapitre, je test deux hypothèses de longue date concernant l'hétérodoxie culturelle des musulmans en Europe : (i) l'idée que les jeunes musulmans européens se sentent différents des autres (non-musulmans) dans les milieux culturels, et (ii) l'idée que la transmission de parent à enfant est un mécanisme principal derrière ce phénomène de distinction. Je me base sur des données dyadiques parents-adolescents provenant de l'Enquête Longitudinale d'Enfants d'Immigrants dans quatre pays européens pour montrer que les jeunes musulmans se sentent effectivement différents de leurs camarades non-musulmans en termes de leurs profils d'identité culturelle. Cependant, les données ne soutiennent pas la deuxième hypothèse qui dénote que cette différence est produite par des transferts culturels de parents à enfants. Ce résultat suggère que des forces externes au milieu familial ont un effet plus important sur l'identité culturelle des enfants musulmans comparées aux liens de transmission internes aux ménages.

Dans le second chapitre, j'utilise des données de panel provenant du sondage Amitié et Identité à l'École (AIE) pour explorer comment les schémas d'états-nations (soit les configurations d'attachements et de critères d'appartenance reliés aux nations) influencent les attitudes entre les Allemands de souche et les Allemands de seconde génération. Notamment, je démontre que les schémas de nation qui incluent une forte identité nationale et des critères d'appartenance plus restrictifs sont associés à des positions d'exclusion chez les Allemands de souche mais associées à des positions d'inclusion chez les enfants d'immigrants. À l'inverse, des schémas nationalistes moins prononcés sont associés à des attitudes d'exclusion chez les minorités ainsi qu'à des attitudes d'inclusion chez les Allemands de souche. Pris ensemble, mes résultats impliquent que des configurations de sentiments nationalistes sont associées avec des positions politiques particulières pour différents groupes ethniques.

Dans le dernier chapitre, j'utilise les données provenant de l'AIE pour identifier les schémas latents (concernant les réseaux relationnels) qui organisent et restreignent les réponses des Allemands de deuxième génération aux questions du sondage portant sur des points identitaires. Après avoir expliqué les différences parmi ces réseaux schématiques, je démontre que les appartenances religieuses sont significativement reliées au type de schéma adopté par les individus. Contrairement à la plupart des autres études qui se basent sur des données européennes pour comprendre des processus de variation culturelle, mon analyse ne s'intéresse pas seulement aux différences entre les musulmans et non-musulmans, mais également aux différences entre des membres d'autres communautés religieuses. Notamment, je présente des différences significatives entre les schémas organisationnels adoptés par les répondants catholiques et protestants.

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This dissertation is, first and foremost, the product of Thomas Soehl's mentorship. When I arrived in Montréal over a half decade ago, I knew little about the intricacies of social research. Over time, the lessons Thomas provided as an advisor and collaborator moulded me into the scholar I am today. When I began experimenting with ideas as a first-year student, Thomas used the whiteboard in his office to visualize the puzzle I was grappling with and clarify my thinking. His dedication to supervision has not waned since. Today, he is still providing feedback on my manuscripts, writing reference letters on my behalf, and pushing me to refine my ideas. Thomas, thank you so much for all that you've done for me over the years. If I ever find myself on the other side of the supervisor-supervisee divide, I will do my best to follow your lead.

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will take with me as I embark on my next chapter. Jennifer Elrick and Jason Carmichael shared important insights about academia during the formative stages of my doctoral journey — insights that have, in many ways, set me on my current path. Carl F. Falk, along with Jennifer and Thomas, read my dissertation proposal and helped me refine my thesis when it was in its infancy. Thank you all for helping me get to this point. I am profoundly grateful.

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List of Abbreviations

AME Average Marginal Effect.

APR Adjusted Predictions at Representative Values.

CCA Correlational Class Analysis.

CILS4EU Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries.

ER Ethnicity-Religion Scheme.

FiS Friendship and Identity in School Survey.

LCA Latent Class Analysis.

MER Marginal Effects at Representative Values.

MHMM Mixture Hidden Markov Model.

NR Nation-Religion Scheme.

OLS Ordinary Least Squares Regression.

RCA Relational Class Analysis.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The indignity of "always looking at one's self through the eyes of others"—as a cognitive constraint limiting Black Americans' options for self-definition in a social field organized around the rigid, symbolic divide between individuals of European origin and the descendants of enslaved Africans. At the start of the 20th century, Cooley ([1902] 1983: 184) introduced his theory of the *looking-glass self* by positing that humans "perceive in another's mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on," and that these perceptions, in turn, shape how we sketch our portraits of selfhood. As these examples illustrate, the idea that our identities are based on intuitions that are *culturally* rooted (i.e., socially learned and widely shared) has a long history in sociology and cognate fields. In the empirical chapters to follow, I build on this insight to examine questions about identity and culture that foreground immigrants and their descendants.

Both identity and culture have inspired a considerable amount of academic debate. More than two decades ago, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) encouraged scholars to move *beyond identity* as a category of social analysis. Earlier, Fine (1979: 733) observed that treatments of culture often reduce the concept to "an amorphous, indescribable mist which swirls around society." While the problems highlighted in these papers have not disappeared entirely, the literatures on identity

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and culture have moved in promising directions.

For instance, students of culture have—in recent years—used insights from the cognitive sciences to *concretely* measure how cultural knowledge is acquired, shared and mediated by the social environment, and have punctuated this cognitive turn by developing new theoretical frameworks (such as the sociological dual process model) and methodological tools for the measurement of shared understandings (Boutyline and Soter 2021; Hunzaker and Valentino 2019; Mohr et al. 2020; Vaisey 2009). In other areas of sociological inquiry, researchers have shifted away from nominalist treatments of identity and towards highly *contingent* models—i.e., focused on graded membership and prototypicality (Monk 2022), intragroup heterogeneity (Drouhot 2021), situational uncertainty (Schröder, Hoey, and Rogers 2016) and so on—that reinforce the idea that "identities" are bound up in cultural knowledge and cognitive processes (in the form of schemas, prototypes, attitudes or beliefs) and should be understood as "perspectives *on* the world," not "things *in* the world" (see Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004).

This dissertation attempts to bring these developments to bear on the study of immigrant identities. To this end, it draws a through-line linking the sociology of migration and ethnicity (broadly defined) to the sociological study of culture and cognition. These subfields *should*, in principle, be part of a complementary research program centred around culture, its acquisition and its evolution. Scholars of migration and ethnicity have long analyzed how immigrants acquire and modify culture via assimilatory or acculturative channels (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964); construct and deconstruct cultural schemes through boundary-making strategies and political contestation (Bloemraad 2018; Wimmer 2008); resist and reproduce cultural ideals via reactive processes and intergenerational transfers (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Soehl 2017); and *so on*.

For their part, scholars of culture and cognition have tracked how the *public culture* that exists in social settings (behavioural codes, schemes, frames, narratives *etc.*; see Wood et al. 2018) is cognitively encoded as forms of *personal culture* (attitudes, beliefs, schemas, prototypes, implicit associations) that become "ingrained in brain and body" as individuals interact with the social world and its schematizing institutions (Cerulo, Leschziner, and Shepherd 2021: 64; Lizardo 2017).

The elective affinities between these literatures appear self-evident; and yet, there has been little cross-pollination between them (some notable exceptions notwithstanding: e.g., Brubaker et al. 2004; Enriquez and Saguy 2016; Roth 2015). In the chapters to come, I address this shortcoming by bringing the study of culture and cognition into dialogue with research on migration and ethnicity to analyze immigrant identities.

What is gained by bridging the divide between these subfields? As this dissertation sets out to prove, methodological tools from the study of culture and cognition—which are especially useful for locating different cultural grammars in a population—can help challenge longstanding assumptions in the study of migration and ethnicity. At the same time, incorporating insights from the literature on migration and ethnicity can enhance cognitively oriented research on culture by clarifying how an individual's ethnic position shapes the structure and *valence* of the beliefs they hold about themselves and the world around them.

With these complementarities in mind, the current dissertation uses insights from both subfields—work on culture and cognition on the one hand, research on migration and ethnicity on the other—to map the transmission of cultural identity from immigrant parents to their children (Chapter 2); examine the relationships between nationalist beliefs and intergroup attitudes along the majority-minority divide (Chapter 3); and identify the logics or schemes that immigrant-origin people use to interrelate attitudes about selfhood (Chapter 4).

Each chapter engages with a different substantive debate and topic. At the same time, the three analyses converge around a common set of themes and first principles. All three chapters explore how individuals with migrant roots make sense of themselves and the social worlds they inhabit. Moreover, each chapter is undergirded by the same cognitivist assumptions: i.e., that self-understandings are rooted in the constellation of beliefs individuals hold about themselves, that these beliefs derive from shared cognitive structures that operate beneath the threshold of consciousness, and that these structures are *unevenly distributed* in human populations due to the different life trajectories, structural constraints and embodied experiences that permeate greater society. As I emphasize in the sections to follow, this latter emphasis on *cultural heterogeneity*—in

terms of both theory and measurement-is one of the primary contributions of this thesis.

Having clarified the broad contours of what this dissertation grapples with, I now turn to the specifics. In the sections below, I discuss the theoretical propositions that bind my empirical chapters together, outline the core objectives of this dissertation and provide a roadmap for the analyses to come. To conclude, I summarize how this thesis contributes to original knowledge.

1.1 Operationalizing Identity

Questions about *identity* lie at the heart of this dissertation. Identity can, of course, carry many different meanings and stand-in for several analytical concepts that bear little resemblance to one another (Abdelal et al. 2006; Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). It is therefore worth clarifying what identity means in the forthcoming analyses and how the definitions used in each chapter belong to a unified theoretical framework. In this section, I begin with a high-level summary of how I operationalize identity as a cultural-cognitive construct. Later, I use insights from the study of migration and ethnicity to link this treatment to substantive debates.

My model of identity broadly aligns with what Brubaker and Cooper (2000: 17) call *self-understandings*; seen through this lens, identity is a "dispositional term" that is "at once emotional and cognitive" and taps "one's sense of who one is, of one's social location, and of how (given the first two) one is prepared to act." As the authors note, self-understandings "may be tacit ... and inform action ... without themselves being discursively articulated" (ibid.:18). This vision of the self has roots in Bourdieusian practice theory and maps onto recent work on the sociological dual process model (Vaisey 2009), cultural schemas (Leschziner and Brett 2021), and other types of *nondeclarative culture* – i.e., forms of cultural knowledge acquired through "implicit, durable, cognitive-emotive associations" and forged via repeated social exposures (Lizardo 2017: 92).

Cultural sociologists have made significant strides towards measuring and conceptualizing these implicit forms of culture. To simplify matters greatly, these conceptual and empirical interventions rest on a view of cultural knowledge as the product of weighted neural associations built up out of lived experiences—a view that Hunzaker and Valentino (2019) characterize as the "connectionist model of cognition." In applying this model, scholars have increasingly analyzed the web-like *associations* that link concepts together in the mind and have, in turn, shifted to configurational measures of cultural phenomena from political ideology (Boutyline and Vaisey 2017) to popular nationalism (Soehl and Karim 2021).

To be more concrete, applied studies on culture and cognition often avoid treating survey responses as independent attributes that can be pulled apart or analyzed on their own terms; instead, attitudes are viewed as the building blocks of *belief systems* where units of cultural knowledge are held together via associative ties and acquire meaning in relation to one another (Emirbayer 1997; Hunzaker and Valentino 2019; Mohr 1998). These systems of belief (or in applied settings, item-response vectors related to nationhood, literature *etc.*) are assumed to derive from shared cognitive structures that operate beneath the threshold of conscious thought.

In line with the now-classic work of Strauss and Quinn (1998), my dissertation posits that *identities* can be understood through the lens of connectionism as well. Analysts can, for instance, imagine attitudes tapping national identification as nodes in, or subcomponents of, cross-cutting belief systems that derive from shared schemas about the nation (see Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). Depending on our analytic goals, attitudes about national identification can also be viewed as building blocks of a more general class of belief systems related to the *self* – e.g., an aggregation of the attachments, preferences and beliefs that shape our "intuitions about 'the kind of people we are'" (Vaisey 2009: 1707), a phenomenon I call *cultural identity* in Chapter 2.

More broadly, this dissertation treats identities (whether understood as sets of attitudes or durable portraits of the self) as forms of nondeclarative culture imprinted into the mindscapes of immigrant-origin people via "repeated long-term exposure to consistent patterns of experience" (Lizardo 2017: 92). This treatment is, in many respects, in line with how several generations of migration scholars have understood "assimilation." As Park and Burgess ([1921] 1969: 736) explained over a century ago, immigrants' attitudes and sentiments do not change "as the result of conscious reflection, but as the outcome of the unreflective responses to a series of new experiences," including "intimate associations of the family and of the play group, participation in the ceremonies of religious worship and in the celebrations of national holidays" (see also Alba and Nee 2003). My dissertation inherits and builds on this foundational insight by positioning *identity* (broadly defined) as the product of slow-moving social learning processes and long-term cultural exposures.

The operational treatment of identity detailed above is not only aligned with foundational theoretical precepts but provides analytic leverage as well. It implies that the relational tools and perspectives that are used to understand associations between cultural concepts *in general* can be fruitfully applied to analyses anchored to attitudes about the *self*. Each empirical chapter in the present dissertation builds on this intuition — but does so in a different way, a point I clarify towards the end of this introduction. Below, I describe another theoretical precept that cuts across the three empirical chapters: namely, that beliefs about selfhood and the social world are *widely* but not *universally* shared among immigrant-origin people.

1.2 Immigrant Identities and Cultural Heterogeneity

Cognitivist perspectives on culture provide a robust framework for conceptualizing identities, but do not tell us a great deal about the life experiences that lead to different *kinds* of self-understandings or why these understandings are consequential. The topics explored in this dissertation all emanate from ongoing debates in the study of migration and ethnicity that make these points clear.

For over a century, studies in this tradition have documented how immigrant-origin people forge their identities in disparate ways and have linked this variation to the distinct contexts of reception (whether defined by boundary configurations, gradient positionality or institutional arrangements) that await members of different national origin communities in host societies around the world (see Bloemraad 2018; Park and Burgess [1921] 1969; Rumbaut 1994). These identities are sociologically *consequential* because they inform intergroup relations and shape the incorporation of newcomers in immigrant societies that are steadily diversifying (Berry et al. 2006; Koopmans et al. 2005; Leszczensky, Maxwell, and Bleich 2020). This is by no means an exhaustive summary of why immigrants' ethnocultural attachments vary across sociodemographic lines or why these differences matter. Still, it provides a broad view of the substantive literature that this dissertation is in dialogue with.

While this literature has long highlighted cultural differences *across* national origin communities, quantitative studies on the personal culture of immigrants have rarely searched for heterogeneity *within* immigrant-origin groups. As Drouhot (2021: 805) explains, "[d]espite what is virtually a theoretical consensus on the importance of intragroup heterogeneity ... quantitative research routinely relies on samples split by ethnically, racially, or religiously defined immigrant groups as the key categories of analysis." In effect, this research may be reducing different cultural patterns, probability distributions and *belief systems* into average, group-level parameter estimates. To avoid this pitfall, Drouhot argues that cultural variation should be measured using techniques that can faithfully detect heterogeneity within and across group boundaries.

This insight nicely dovetails with a growing methodological literature in the study of culture and cognition. Since the "breakdown of the Parsonian system" (Martin and Lembo 2020), cultural sociologists have sought to understand how multiple meaning structures or networks of intersubjectivity might emerge in a single society due, in part, to the constraints imposed by institutions and other objectified forms of culture. In the last two decades, this emphasis on *multiplicity* has given rise to a flurry of methodological innovations, including Goldberg's (2011) pathbreaking work on relational class analysis, cognitively oriented applications of latent class analysis (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016) and recent attempts at locating cultural patterns in text corpora (Taylor and Stoltz 2020; Underwood et al. 2022).

Like Drouhot's (2021) approach to fuzzy clustering, these methods are designed to find hidden subsamples nested within a broader population of respondents (or corpus of texts). Yet, while Drouhot mined for these clusters using *structural* indicators, cultural analysts seek to find subsamples using units of cultural knowledge (e.g., attitudes) as input variables. The empirical chapters to follow are built around these multidimensional approaches to cultural measurement. Specifically, they rely on quantitative instruments (latent class analysis, mixture hidden Markov models, correlational class analysis) that can partition samples into subgroups bounded by specific attitudinal configurations or cultural constraints. Given the substantive focus of my dissertation, this requires a view of immigrant identities as phenomena that are fundamentally *cultural* (see Markus and Kitayama 2010) and thus shaped by forces (families, boundaries, organized religion and so on) that set probabilistic bounds on the types of self-understandings or belief systems that immigrants can encode.

1.3 Core Research Objectives

Broadly, this dissertation sets out to apply the propositions detailed in the foregoing discussion to different debates related to migration and ethnicity. More specifically, it aspires to reorient how analysts *conceptualize* the structure of immigrant identities and *analyze* cultural variation within and across immigrant-origin communities.¹ As I discuss in the chapter-by-chapter summary to follow, this reorientation should provide analytic utility by allowing us to (i) recover different cultural grammars within and across social groups that have heretofore been invisible; and (ii) use this cultural heterogeneity to challenge longstanding assumptions in the study of migration and ethnicity.

A secondary objective of this dissertation is to shift focus away from national majorities in cognitively oriented analyses of culture. Survey-based research in cultural sociology has rarely theorized how the meanings individuals assign to *sets of domain-specific attitudes* might vary

¹ Throughout my thesis, I emphasize that *immigrant-origin people* are my population of interest. This is, of course, a rather broad and heterogeneous population, inclusive of individuals who were born outside of the country of settlement as well those whose parents or grandparents have roots "elsewhere" (i.e., beyond the host society). Despite this internal diversity, members of my target population are united by a latent ability to *identify with*— or forge attachments to—social categories that signal ties to societies that lie outside the territorial bounds of the country of settlement. As I explain in the chapters to follow, immigrant-origin people are often *constrained* in their ability to claim full membership in the settlement society due to these (at times distal) ties to putative "ethnicities" or "nations" associated with other parts of the world (see Brubaker 2010). Therefore, despite their differences, the immigrant-origin respondents featured throughout this dissertation differ from so-called "natives"—e.g., ethnic Germans, Swedes and so on—whose claims to membership in the national community tend to be unassailable.

across ethnocultural cleavages (but see Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014). Conversely, studies of migration and ethnicity have long analyzed how an individual's ethnocultural position influences the boundary-making strategies they use to navigate daily life (Wimmer 2013) and the criteria they use to define themselves and the social world around them (Bloemraad 2018). Using these insights as points of departure, the third and fourth chapters of this thesis seek to understand whether attitudinal configurations carry different meanings across ethnocultural lines.

1.4 The Three Empirical Chapters

1.4.1 Chapter 2

The first empirical chapter of this dissertation speaks to debates about the incorporation of Muslims in European societies of immigration. Research in this tradition often highlights cultural differences between Muslim children and their peers, and arrives at two key explanations for why these differences exist: (i) discrimination from native majorities—and repeated cultural exposures that reinforce their distinctiveness—may push Muslim youth away from the cultural ideals promoted by mainstream institutions; and (ii) Muslim parents may be more likely or inclined to transmit their cultural beliefs to their children *vis-à-vis* their non-Muslim peers, thereby blocking the road to acculturation for their children (Drouhot and Nee 2019).

My second chapter challenges this latter, intrafamilial explanation by adopting a broad treatment of personal culture that stretches across several cultural domains. More concretely, I analyze how immigrant parents and children configure attitudes related to their ethnocultural attachments, tolerance norms and gender role attitudes at the same juncture in time. To this end, I draw on dyadic parent-adolescent data from the first wave of the *Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries* (CILS4EU), 12 input variables and multigroup latent class analysis (LCA). This allows me to recover disparate belief systems from my data that correspond to, or are derivatives of, distinct types of *cultural identity* – i.e., an aggregation of the

beliefs, preferences and attachments that inform our tacit sense of who we are.

Overall, I find four types of cultural identity among immigrant-origin respondents in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. After assigning each respondent to a cluster corresponding to one of these identity types or profiles, I use a series of regression models to determine: (i) whether Muslim children stand out from their peers with respect to the *distribution* of their cultural identities; and (ii) whether Muslim parents are more successful at transmitting their cultural identities to their children than their non-Muslim peers. Ultimately, I find that although Muslim youth *do* stand out from their classmates, there is no evidence to suggest that this pattern is driven by cultural transfers from parents to children.

Before proceeding to a summary of the second empirical chapter, it is worth clarifying what the belief systems identified by LCAs (and other conventional approaches to data segmentation) represent. In cultural sociology, many of the methodological innovations of the past two decades have sought to capture the *tightness* of attitudes in a network of beliefs — that is, "the degree to which holding some belief implies holding or not holding other beliefs" (Martin 2002: 861). Techniques like relational class analysis and correlational class analysis are well-equipped to identify (and cluster on) this property of belief systems.

However, heated debates about the incorporation of newcomers tend to interrogate whether immigrant-origin people *agree* with the beliefs, preferences and attachments that are promoted by cultural institutions in the country of settlement. This implicates a second property of belief systems *— consensus*, "or the degree to which all group members agree" (ibid.:861) on a range of issues as determined by the concentration of attitudes in similar regions of the belief space. Latent class models and their variants are well-equipped to identify (and cluster on) this latter property, which is why they are featured in the second and third chapters of my dissertation.

1.4.2 Chapter 3

The third chapter of this dissertation attempts to find similar *types* of nationalists along the majority-minority divide. It is therefore also concerned with attitudinal consensus, but at a lower

level of cognitive aggregation. While Chapter 2 foregrounded *cultural identities* that correspond to a global, interconnected set of beliefs that inform our intuitive sense of who we are, Chapter 3 zooms-in on a specific cultural domain of interest: an individual's beliefs about the nation.

As I explain in the chapter, a burgeoning body of research in social and political sociology asserts that widespread attachments to (or *identification* with) the nation can breed unity in diverse, multiethnic societies. I challenge this view by positing that associations between national identification and intergroup attitudes will move in different directions and vary in magnitude depending on (i) how an individual defines the bounds of nationhood; and (ii) an individual's ethnocultural origin or position. In crafting this argument, I rely on methodological insights from cultural sociology (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016) as well as recent theoretical insights from the study of migration and ethnicity (see Bloemraad 2018, 2022).

To evaluate my argument, I test whether the association between nation-state schemas (proxied by one's beliefs about national attachments and membership criteria) and intergroup attitudes (outgroup affect, ingroup affect, ingroup favouritism) is moderated by ethnicity. To this end, I use the *Friendship and Identity in School* (FiS) survey from Germany, mixture hidden Markov models and mixed-effects regressions. Strikingly, I find that thicker sets of nationalist beliefs (higher levels of national identification, restrictive definitions of the nation) are *exclusionary* for natives but *inclusionary* for the children of immigrants. Conversely, thinner forms of individual-level nationalism are *exclusionary* for minority respondents but *inclusionary* for native Germans.

Taken together, these results imply that similar configurations of nationalist beliefs are associated with different kinds of membership claims across ethnocultural fault lines. Moreover, they show the issues inherent in assuming that two respondents with similar domain-specific response patterns *necessarily* agree about the implications of those beliefs. As I note in the chapter, restricting analyses to a specific cultural domain (the *nation*, religion, political tolerance, literature, musical preferences and so on) may partial out some important sources of cultural heterogeneity: Black and white Americans who have similar beliefs about religion may, for instance, have drastically different views about morality. Similarly, Black and white Americans who are omnivorous with respect to musical consumption may have drastically different views about sports and film.

If the goal of an analysis is to find thought communities who see the world in similar ways, implicating *multiple* cultural domains that are theoretically linked (e.g., religion and morality) should prove fruitful. Chapter 2 is, of course, an example of such an approach. Alternatively, it may be useful to test the theoretical validity (on a case-by-case basis) of the second *desideratum* for survey-based cultural analysis identified by DiMaggio and colleagues (2018: 32) — i.e., the importance of clustering "without reference to demographic or biographical information about respondents" or "based on attitudes alone." If an analysis is restricted to a single cultural domain, abiding by this precept may—as the third chapter of my thesis suggests—lead to faulty inferences.

1.4.3 Chapter 4

The fourth chapter of this dissertation also explores how ethnocultural differences shape the meaning of respondents' item-response vectors. However, it does so by focusing on a different property of belief systems. While Chapters 2 and 3 home-in on systems of attitudes defined by *consensus*, Chapter 4 analyzes belief systems characterized by *tightness*. Within these systems, attitudes can be visualized as nodes that are "linked to one another via webs of implication, so that what one thinks about one thing affects what one thinks about others" in a relational network of interdependencies (Martin 2002: 873).

This shift to prioritizing tightness over consensus is a response to the substantive literature that the fourth chapter engages with: i.e., the growing body of work on the interrelationships between immigrant identities (here, *identities* simply refer to attitudes related to the self). Recent research in this area suggests that if two "identities"—say, ethnic and national attachments— are positively associated, they are *compatible*. Conversely, if two modes of identification are negatively correlated, they are *in conflict* (see Fleischmann and Phalet 2016).

The goal of my fourth dissertation chapter is not to dispute the logic of this correlational approach to conceptualizing conflict and compatibility, but to propose a more cognitively oriented

framework for using correlational patterns to track the organization of immigrants' ethnocultural attachments. My broader argument consists of two main propositions: (i) self-related attitudes should not be analyzed as independent attributes that can be isolated or pulled apart from one another, but as nodes in a system of interrelations; (ii) there may be *multiple* systems of interrelations—or *organizing schemes*—nested within a global population of immigrant-origin respondents [what Baldassarri and Goldberg (2014) call "sociocognitive heterogeneity"].

To illustrate the value of this framework, I use data from a sample of second-generation Germans featured in the *Friendship and Identity in School* (FiS) survey, a vector of 14 identityrelated indicator variables and a correlational class analysis (or CCA; see Boutyline 2017). This allows me to find three organizing schemes (or networks of identity conflict and compatibility) that have not been detected in prior research.

In a final empirical step, I consider whether a respondent's religious affiliation shapes the type of organizing scheme they gravitate towards. Using a multinomial logistic regression model, I find that religious affiliation is significantly associated with the schemes, principles or logics immigrant-origin respondents use to interrelate attitudes about selfhood. Unlike most studies on cultural variation among European immigrants, my analysis not only documents differences between Muslims and their peers, but between members of other faith communities as well. Most notably, I find meaningful differences between Catholic and Protestant respondents in terms of the organizational schemes they encode. While these differences are important to keep in mind, my regression results also reveal substantial *intragroup* diversity (or sociocognitive heterogeneity) that has been largely overlooked in the extant literature.

1.5 Contributions to Original Knowledge

As a collective body of work, my dissertation makes several contributions to original knowledge. Each chapter serves as a standalone journal article that engages with a distinct substantive debate and breaks new ground in the process. To wit, the current dissertation makes a series of *local* (or chapter-specific) contributions: Chapter 2 challenges existing assumptions about why Muslim children in Europe stand out from their peers in cultural affairs, pointing to the importance of extrafamilial explanations in lieu of intrafamilial mechanisms; Chapter 3 shows that nationalist beliefs carry a different *meaning* across ethnocultural lines and correspond to different kinds of claims for natives *vis-à-vis* the children of immigrants; and Chapter 4 reveals that there are multiple schemes (or networks of identity conflict and compatibility) that secondgeneration respondents use to organize their identities. Each of these contributions should, in principle, push conversations forward in different substantive literatures or areas of research.

Beyond these *local* contributions, my thesis makes three *global* contributions to sociology writ large. First, it synthesizes two sociological subfields (the study of culture and cognition; the sociology of migration and ethnicity) that have rarely been in dialogue despite their elective affinities. In doing so, it introduces a new framework for conceptualizing and measuring the cognitive microfoundations of culture among immigrant-origin respondents. Moving forward, this should challenge how scholars of migration and ethnicity understand concepts like "cultural integration" or "cultural transmission" and push the subfield—both theoretically and empirically—in a more multidimensional direction.

Second, this thesis introduces a new perspective on the conceptualization and measurement of identity. As noted, the idea that culture comes to bear on our self-understandings is not new (Du Bois 1897; Mead 1934). However, few studies have specified how collective identity aligns with connectionist or relational models of cognition that are central to modern cultural analysis in sociology (for a partial exception, see Boutyline and Vaisey 2017). Across three empirical chapters, this dissertation positions self-related attitudes as nodes in broader belief systems related to specific cultural objects or phenomena (like the nation) or *self*-understandings more generally. Moreover, it suggests that different debates implicating identity may require different kinds of empirical interventions: e.g., when debates are focused on *cultural integration*, capturing belief systems defined by *consensus* is critical; when debates are related to the *organization* of attachments, focus should shift to capturing the *tightness* of attitudes about the self. Third, and relatedly, this dissertation makes a methodological contribution. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis marks the first time that quantitative tools developed or repurposed by cultural sociologists to locate structures of meaning in survey data have been applied to samples that are largely or exclusively comprised of immigrants and their children. This not only presents an opportunity to systematically map cultural heterogeneity within and across immigrant-origin groups, but to refine some of the guiding assumptions and desiderata (see DiMaggio et al. 2018) motivating quantitative methods in cultural sociology.

1.6 Contributions of Author

Sakeef M. Karim is the sole author of all three manuscripts comprising this dissertation.

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Chapter 2

Islam and the Transmission of Cultural Identity in Four European Countries

TNRECENT DECADES, the integration of Muslim immigrants has been hotly debated by European politicians, academics and commentators (Foner 2015; Modood 2003; Sunier 2014; Yazdiha 2019; Zolberg and Woon 1999). The trajectories and lived experiences of Muslim children have been central to these debates. Whether born or raised in Europe, the children of Muslim immigrants should, pursuant to the predictions of straight-line assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964), adopt cultural identities in line with the liberalism and secularism that pervade public institutions in countries like England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden – the four host societies featured in the present study. A voluminous literature on integration patterns in Europe suggests that this has not transpired. Instead, scholars tend to report that Muslim youth "stand out" from their peers due to the intensity of their religious beliefs as well as their traditional value systems (Bisin et al. 2008; Drouhot 2021; Drouhot and Nee 2019).

What explains this cultural distance? In their review of the literature, Drouhot and Nee (2019) point to two key explanatory mechanisms. First, discrimination from natives—and repeated exposures to cultural templates, frames and schemas that reaffirm their distinctiveness—may lead some Muslim children to drift away from greater society and adopt values that mirror

their parents' beliefs or are even farther removed from the ideals promoted by mainstream institutions (Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011; Maliepaard and Alba 2016; Wimmer and Soehl 2014). Second, Muslim parents may be much more likely or inclined to transmit cultural values to their children *vis-à-vis* parents in other faith communities, thereby preserving cultural gaps between Muslims and the so-called mainstream over time (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Jacob and Kalter 2013; Soehl 2017).

In the current study, I shine a spotlight on the second (i.e., intrafamilial) mechanism and challenge two of its key assumptions: (i) that parent-to-child cultural transmission is *especially* common within European Muslim households and (ii) that the cultural distance between Muslim youth and their peers can be *directly* explained by parent-to-child cultural transfers. Specifically, I argue that these assumptions are only valid if we reduce personal culture, or the cultural knowledge encoded within individuals (Kiley and Vaisey 2020; Lizardo 2017, 2021), to religious values and attachments. As I detail in the sections to follow, a narrow focus on religiosity does not sufficiently capture cognate axes of cultural variation that are routinely implicated in debates about integration in Europe (e.g., norms about political tolerance) and may consequently understate the cultural differences that distinguish Muslim parents from their daughters and sons.

An example can help clarify this point. Consider the stylized cultural profiles displayed in Figure 2.1. These profiles belong to a Muslim parent (top panel) and three of their children (bottom panel). Each profile represents a set of cultural beliefs tapping religious attachments, ethnic attachments, national attachments, gender norms and tolerance norms (see the caption for additional details). Analytically, if we *only* homed-in on the transmission of religious attachments, we might conclude that Parent A successfully transmitted their cultural beliefs to Child 1 and Child 2. Similarly, if we *only* analyzed the transmission of gender norms, we might assume that Parent A successfully transmitted their cultural beliefs to Child 2 and Child 3.

However, a broader treatment of cultural identity should lead to a much different conclusion: once multiple dimensions of personal culture are considered at the same point in time, Child 2 emerges as the only sibling featured in the bottom panel of Figure 2.1 whose cultural beliefs



Figure 2.1: Stylized example of cultural differences across generational lines.

mirror Parent A's.

In line with this broad treatment of individual-level culture, the present study shifts focus away from responses to specific survey items or issue domains and towards multidimensional profiles of cultural identity. To capture these profiles, I draw on dyadic parent-adolescent data from the first wave of the *Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries* (CILS4EU), 12 input variables and multigroup latent class analysis. The 12 input variables span three substantive dimensions: ethnic attachments (inclusive of subjective religiosity); norms about political tolerance (inclusive of attitudes towards homosexuality); and norms about gender roles (inclusive of attitudes towards the division of household labor). As I contend, each of these

	Dimension of Cultural Identity		
Identity Profile	Ethnic Attachments	Tolerance Norms	Gender Norms
Liberal	Host-Oriented	Liberal	Egalitarian
Hybrid	Multiply-Oriented	Liberal	Egalitarian
Traditionalist	Host-Oriented	Conservative	Traditional
Ethno-Traditionalist	Multiply-Oriented	Conservative	Traditional

Table 2.1: Cultural Identities in Four European Countries

dimensions is viewed as a core component of cultural identity in contemporary Europe (Brubaker 2017; Hansen 2011).

Overall, the results of my latent class analysis reveal four profiles of cultural identity among respondents in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Table 2.1 provides a thumbnail sketch of the key differences between these cultural-cognitive models. After recovering the identity profiles listed in Table 2.1, I estimate a series of regression models that show that Muslim children stand out from, or are appreciably different than, their non-Muslim peers across the four survey countries featured in my analysis.

At the same time, regression results suggest that Muslim parents are, relative to their nonnative Christian peers (the reference group), *less* successful at transmitting their cultural identities to their children. This disparity is easy to miss in raw or unadjusted data, as nearly 60% of Muslim parents and children possess ethno-traditional identities. Yet, the likelihood of encoding an ethno-traditional profile is *not* associated with parental identities for Muslim children: per model predictions, even if parental identities were evenly distributed among Muslim parents (i.e., with a quarter of parents encoding each of the profiles listed in Table 2.1), over 50% of Muslim children would end up in the ethno-traditionalist cluster. Framed differently, Muslim children of all stripes—even those whose parents belong to liberal or hybrid thought communities—gravitate towards ethno-traditional understandings of the social world.

Taken together, these results are at odds with popular, intrafamilial explanations for why Muslim children stand out from their peers in Europe (see Drouhot and Nee 2019). Compared to cultural transmission within households, forces exogenous to the family unit—such as boundary mechanisms and supranational religious fields (Alba 2005; Bowen 2004; Wimmer and Soehl 2014)—may be more proximately associated with the cultural identities of Muslim children, a point I flesh out towards the end of the paper.

2.1 Cultural Transmission Among European Muslims

A vast body of scholarship suggests that parent-to-child transmission drives cultural heterogeneity among the children of immigrants in European host societies (Jacob and Kalter 2013; Kretschmer 2018; Maliepaard, Gijsberts, and Lubbers 2012). As the story goes, over time and across generations, immigrant parents who are more able or inclined to pass their values, beliefs and attachments to their children will decelerate the process of acculturation for their daughters and sons (i.e., the acquisition of cultural identities that align with the public culture of mainstream institutions), an outcome strongly patterned by religious affiliation (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2018; Soehl 2017). Specifically, scholars have argued that parentto-child transmission can, in conjunction with discrimination, explain why European Muslim children stand out from their peers in cultural affairs (Drouhot and Nee 2019).

To support this argument, researchers have often pointed to the resilience of religiosity within Muslim households in Europe and have linked this resilience—and the enduring presence of Islam in the region—to cultural transmission chains. Studies in Germany (Jacob 2020), France (Soehl 2017), the Netherlands (Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013) and beyond (e.g., de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014) show that Muslim parents routinely transmit their religious beliefs and identities to their children and do so at a rate that far exceeds that of their non-Muslim immigrant peers. To the extent that high levels of religiosity contravene the normative secularism associated with the European mainstream, these patterns map onto the idea that cultural reproduction within Muslim households, driven by cultural transmission across generational lines, underlies the heterodox beliefs, values and attachments of Muslim youth.

Yet, once we move past religiosity and consider other aspects of personal culture, we are left with a more complex empirical story. For instance, while some studies suggest that the gender role attitudes of European Muslim children are intimately shaped by cultural transfers from parents to children (e.g., Kretschmer 2018), others claim that Muslim children are, in stark contrast to their parents, shedding their ethnic ties to the heritage society in pursuit of purer, de-ethnicized forms of Islam (see Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Moreover, while some Europeanbased studies emphasize associations between Islam and anti-abortion attitudes that survive generational controls (implying cultural continuity; see Carol and Milewski 2018), others feature Muslim children who, while deeply influenced by parental expectations, allude to "generation gaps" that distinguish their views of homosexuality from those of their mothers and fathers (e.g., Hooghe et al. 2010).

These inconsistencies complicate the idea that cultural retention is especially common in European Muslim households. Moreover, they reveal inefficiencies baked into the standard, disaggregated approach to studying cultural integration, where some studies focus on religiosity, others foreground tolerance norms, and still others analyze attitudes about gender roles. This disaggregated approach to measurement is at variance with broader trends in cultural sociology, where beliefs, attitudes and attachments are understood to be bundled together in the mind and are thus modelled as multidimensional systems or schematic networks (Boutyline and Soter 2021; Goldberg 2011; Hunzaker and Valentino 2019; Vaisey 2009).

Unlike analyses of specific attitudes or beliefs, multidimensional approaches to cultural measurement can account for complex interactions between different aspects of personal culture (see Fox et al. 2013). As a result, they can illuminate cultural discontinuities within households that fall out of view in studies focused on a single attitudinal dimension. For example, survey-based research on the transmission of subjective religiosity (as measured via a single item or scale) might miss, distort or otherwise erase the cultural differences between practicing queer Muslims and their parents (see Peumans 2014; Yip 2004). In contrast, a multidimensional approach to measurement (i.e., where religiosity and tolerance norms are modelled at the same point in time)

should provide a more accurate portrait of respondents' cultural beliefs and make it easier to track differences in personal culture across generational lines. As this example illustrates, the *meaning* of a cultural belief—as well as the implications of that belief being reproduced across generations— is difficult to understand in isolation from other domain-specific beliefs that individuals hold.

In line with this proposition, the current study adopts a broad approach to the measurement of personal culture by analyzing several sources of cultural variation at the same time. In doing so, it shifts the requirements for, and substantive implications of, cultural transmission from one generation to the next. In previous work, transmission was deemed successful if parents and children reported similar scores on select survey items (e.g., related to attitudes towards homosexuality) or unidimensional scales (e.g., indexing gender norms). In the analysis to follow, transmission is deemed successful if parent-child dyads *generally* agree on a variety of survey items that span multiple dimensions of cultural meaning. Below, I argue that these agreements signal that a parent and child possess the same *type* of cultural identity — an elusive concept that is, in many respects, central to debates about the incorporation of European Muslims.

2.2 Theorizing Cultural Identity

To social psychologists, *cultural identity* encompasses an individual's attachments to social categories as well as the attitudes, beliefs and values they pair with these attachments in semantic space (see Jensen 2003; Schwartz, Montgomery, and Briones 2006). Seen through this lens, cultural identity can be imagined as an aggregation of the socially learned beliefs, attachments and preferences that inform our "intuitions about 'the kind of people we are'" (Vaisey 2009: 1707).

Following recent work on culture and cognition, I view these intuitions as products of cognitive structures that operate well beneath the threshold of consciousness (Boutyline and Soter 2021; Kiley 2021). As cultural sociologists have argued, these structures are *widely* shared in human populations due to the schematizing influence of social institutions and other objectified forms of public culture (see Lizardo and Strand 2010). At the same time, they are not shared

universally due, in part, to local constraints and patterned variation in cultural exposures and embodied experiences. Thus, within and across societies, different thought communities emerge to make sense of the social world in unique ways (Boutyline 2017; Soehl and Karim 2021; Valentino 2021; Zerubavel 2009).

In the current study, I perform a latent class analysis (LCA) to identify these cultural communities in survey data. Each community should, in principle, be bounded by a distinct type of cultural identity. The input variables I use to identify these hidden subgroups span three substantive dimensions: ethnocultural attachments; tolerance norms; and norms about gender roles. The first dimension captures attachments to one's origin society, but also to one's religion and host society;¹ the second implicates "tolerance" and captures the extent to which respondents accept behaviors that may not align with their moral priors; the third covers an individual's attitudes about gender roles, or their thoughts about the activities men and women ought to be doing in the household.

These three dimensions serve as key indicators of the secularism and liberalism associated with contemporary European culture (Andreassen and Lettinga 2011; El-Tayeb 2012; Hansen 2011; Spruyt 2007). As Brubaker (2017) notes, they are also prominently featured in the *civiliza-tional* discourse sweeping parts of Europe — a discursive frame that positions Christian-tinged liberal-secular values against the alleged illiberalism of Islam (see also Helbling and Traunmüller 2020; Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020). Consequently, when scholars use ethnocultural attachments (e.g., Leszczensky, Maxwell, and Bleich 2020), tolerance norms (e.g., Berggren, Ljunge, and Nilsson 2019) and gender norms (e.g., Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009) as windows into respondents' cultural dispositions, they do so to gauge how far members of different immigrant groups—and *especially* Muslims (see Sunier 2014)—veer from the ideals of European liberalism.

In my analysis, I use responses to survey items tapping each of these dimensions to find subgroups with similar cultural identities or views about the social world. In LCAs, two respondents may be assigned to the same unobserved subgroup even if they report different

¹ In the spirit of parsimony, I follow Wimmer (2008) by treating "ethnicity" as a superordinate category that includes attachments to one's religion, origin society and host society as subcomponents.

scores on any given survey item. As Kiley (2021) explains, the logic of class assignment in LCAs is *probabilistic*, not *deterministic*: while cultural identities (or other shared cognitive structures) should constrain vectors of survey responses in pattern-wise fashion, answers to specific survey items may be shaped by local influences, situational constraints or *other* cognitive processes. Put differently, LCAs assign respondents to thought communities whose members *generally* agree on a wide range of issues. Throughout my analysis, I assume that this general agreement indicates that respondents assigned in the same latent class possess the same kind of cultural identity.

This treatment has consequences for the measurement of cultural transmission and cultural distance: to measure transmission, we can straightforwardly model whether parents and children are assigned to the same cluster; this should, in principle, allow us to gauge whether parent-child dyads generally agree on a range of issues of interest to scholars of migration. Moreover, to capture the distance between social groups, we can assess whether *distributions* of cultural identity are meaningfully different across sociodemographic (e.g., religious) lines.

As noted in the foregoing discussion, researchers often assume that Muslim youth in Europe stand out from their peers in terms of their cultural profiles. In formal terms, this means that the distribution of cultural identity among young Muslims should be appreciably different from the distributional profiles of their classmates. To account for this distance, scholars often suggest that parent-to-child transmission is a key explanatory variable. The analysis below is, to the best of my knowledge, the first quantitative attempt to evaluate both propositions while weighing several sources of cultural variation at the same point in time.

This analysis can arrive at one of three major conclusions. First, it can support the cultural retention thesis described in the preceding paragraph by confirming that Muslim youth stand out from their peers due to parent-to-child cultural transmission chains. Second, it can upend current understandings in the literature by revealing that the cultural distance between Muslim youth and their peers is either overstated or nonexistent. Third, it can confirm that Muslim youth stand out from their classmates while *failing* to find that parent-to-child transfers drive this pattern. To consider each of these possibilities, I turn to my empirical analysis.

2.3 Data and Analytic Strategy

My analysis draws on the first wave of the *Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries* (henceforth CILS4EU) — the only round to feature data from the parents of youth respondents across the four participating countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The CILS4EU includes large samples of immigrant youth and their native peers across these four nation-states. The first wave of the survey was fielded in 2010-2011, a time when respondents were, on average, around 15 years of age.

All four survey countries were included in my analysis due to the heterogeneity of my population of interest. After all, Muslims in Europe are a remarkably diverse population: the stories of Bangladeshis in East London, Turks in Cologne, Moroccans in Amsterdam and Bosnians in Gothenburg share few points of convergence beyond the link to Islam. Yet, studies exploring the relationship between Islam and cultural transmission are often centered around a single destination country or national origin community, limiting the possibilities of generalization for a puzzle that is often framed in supranational terms. A comparative framework should, at least statistically, allow me to isolate the effects of religious affiliation in a more systematic fashion.

My overall analysis proceeds in two major steps. In the first step, I fit a multigroup latent class analysis to capture the cultural identity profiles that are available to respondents before sketching two hypotheses based on my cluster solution. Prior to estimation, I restrict my sample to respondents who (i) have migrant roots;² (ii) responded to at least one item per cultural dimension (see Table 2.2); and (iii) have a parent or a child who was also surveyed. This yields an analytic sample of 8,436 parents and children for the first leg of my analysis. In Table 2.2, I provide the definitions and ranges (or nominal categories) for the 12 input variables.

In the second step, I estimate a series of logistic regression models to evaluate my hypotheses. In each regression model, I treat youth respondents as my unit of observation and, in full

² While the inclusion of "natives" (or majority group members) would have been interesting, it would have required the omission of the Origins/Customs survey items (which only apply to individuals with migrant roots). Attachments to the origin society are a key axis of cultural variation among children with migrant roots, and these attachments are an important aspect of cultural differentiation or retention across generational lines.

Dimension	Indicator	Definition	Range or Category	
Ethnic Attachments	Host	How strongly do you feel like you're a [<i>host nationality</i>]?		
	Religion	How important is religion to you?	1 to 4 (not at all strongly to very strongly)	
	Origin	How strongly do you feel like you belong to [<i>origin community</i>]?		
	Customs	How important is it for you to maintain your ethnic customs and traditions?		
Tolerance Norms	Abort	Do you think abortion is okay?		
	Cohabit	Do you think cohabiting is okay?	1 to 4 (never to always)	
	Divorce	Do you think divorce is okay?		
	LGBTQ+	Do you think homosexuality is okay?		
Gender Norms	Child	In a family, who should take care of the children?	Mostly the Man; Both; or Mostly the Woman	
	Clean	In a family, who should clean the house?		
	Cook	In a family, who should cook?		
	Money	In a family, who should earn money?		

Table 2.2: Indicator Variables

models featuring a vector of control variables, "parent-level" indicators (parents' cultural identity, university status, employment status) as covariates for every child whose mother or father participated in the survey, yielding an analytic sample of 4,218 youth respondents. For an overview of the sample size by country and other summary statistics, please consult Section 2.A of the Appendix.

2.4 Latent Class Analysis and Hypotheses

To begin my empirical sequence, I use the 12 input variables outlined in Table 2.2 to estimate a multigroup latent class analysis (LCA).³ Broadly speaking, LCAs search for common response

³ In the CILS4EU, questions about ethnicity were only posed to respondents who indicated that they feel like they belong to an ethnic group. Among those who signaled such an ethnic attachment, the vast majority selected a response category in the 2 to 4 range for the two ethnicity items, leaving the lowest response category nearly unpopulated (and generating a marked left skew for both indicators). In the spirit of simplicity, I assign all

patterns in the haze of survey data before clustering individuals into mutually exclusive groups based on their vector of responses to select items. Like other forms of unsupervised learning, the logic underlying LCAs is inductive: since there is no observed target variable to predict, researchers use LCAs to reveal hidden structures (or latent variables) in high dimensional space by modelling the covariation between observed indicators. In the context of LCAs, this covariation is assumed to derive from a discrete latent variable — the class a respondent belongs to with respect to a latent attribute (in this case, cultural identity). In technical terms, conventional latent class models exploit the covariation between input variables to estimate structural and measurement parameters (class proportions and conditional item-response probabilities respectively).

To account for potential biases, I adjust the conventional LCA in two ways: first, I include direct effects between the eight pairs of items with the largest model residuals to account for violations of the local independence assumption (McCutcheon 2002); second, I restrict item-response probabilities to be equal across the four host societies to account for country-level effects, thereby generating multigroup, structurally homogeneous models (Kankaraš, Moors, and Vermunt 2011). With this specification in place, I use model parameters to calculate the posterior probability of membership in a given class for each respondent in my sample. To generate classifications, I follow the *modal assignment rule* and assign each respondent to the latent cluster for which their probability of membership is the highest (Magidson and Vermunt 2004).

LCA model parameters are estimated based on the number of latent classes chosen by the analyst. This number is unknown, but different solutions—or numbers of classes—will fit the data to a greater or lesser extent. Ultimately, the number of latent classes in a population of respondents is determined by the relative fit of candidate cluster solutions as well as theory. To make this determination, I iteratively estimate a series of LCAs using the Latent GOLD 6.0 software package (Vermunt and Magidson 2021). Then, I settle on a four-cluster solution based on interpretability and fit statistics. For more information about the fit statistics that facilitated the model selection process, see Section 2.B of the Appendix.

respondents who did not signal an attachment to an ethnic group a value of 1 for the two items related to ethnicity - the lowest value along the two ordinal scales.

Ethnic Attachments









Host Religion Origin Customs











Abort Cohabit Divorce LGBTQ



Figure 2.2: Estimated item-response probabilities for each latent class.

2.4.1 Results: Latent Class Analysis

I summarize the results of my preferred latent class model using Figures 2.2 and 2.3. In the first figure, I visualize class-specific item-response probabilities for the 12 indicators listed in Table 2.2. In the second plot, I illustrate the distribution of latent classes across the four survey



Figure 2.3: Estimated class proportions across the four survey countries.

countries. To ease interpretation, I assign the following labels to these classes: *liberal, hybrid, traditionalist* and *ethno-traditionalist*. Below, I summarize each of these cultural profiles in turn.

Individuals with *liberal* identity profiles are deeply attached to the host society, score relatively low on subjective religiosity, and do not implicate their ancestral origins when sketching their self-portraits. As the label implies, these individuals are also resolutely liberal in terms of their tolerance norms: e.g., the probability that someone with a liberal schema scores a 4 on the indicator probing acceptance of sexual minorities is roughly 0.66 (highest among the four classes). In addition, the vast majority of liberals espouse egalitarian values and are extremely likely to report that men and women should make equal contributions to the family unit.

Respondents in the *hybrid* cluster show moderate-to-high levels of affect towards multiple ethnocultural categories, as their attachments to the society of settlement, the origin society and

their religion are in equilibrium, with no category prevailing over the others. Along the ordinal scales tapping tolerance norms, individuals with hybrid profiles exhibit response patterns that are broadly in line with the tenets of liberalism — for instance, their probability of scoring a 4 on the item about homosexuality is 0.56 (a clear second among the four classes). Like their liberal counterparts, those with a hybrid profile are also staunchly egalitarian with regards to their gender norms.

Traditionalists are, in terms of ethnic attachments, very similar to liberals. For these parents and adolescents, the society of settlement is the locus of ethnocultural identity, religious attachments are tenuous-to-moderate, and heritage society attachments are non-existent. Yet, in terms of tolerance norms and gender norms, traditionalists are more akin to their ethnotraditionalist peers (described below), as they score relatively low on tolerance and endorse traditional positions on items that tap norms about gender roles; for instance, the probability that an individual with a traditionalist profile supports the male-breadwinner model is around 0.70 (by far the highest among the four classes).

Finally, *ethno-traditionalists* are firmly attached to their ethnic origins, score very high on subjective religiosity, and have a relatively low affinity for the destination society. In terms of tolerance, ethno-traditionalists are a counterimage of those with a liberal or hybrid cultural profile: for example, the probability that an ethno-traditionalist scores a 1 on the item about homosexuality is 0.55 (lowest tolerance of homosexuality among the four classes). In addition, ethno-traditionalists are, as the label implies, quite traditional when it comes to their attitudes about cooking, cleaning and earning within the family unit (at the same time, their views on childcare are more egalitarian).

2.4.2 Hypotheses

The results of my LCA provide a broad view of the cultural differences that distinguish individuals with migrant roots across four European nation-states. Moreover, they provide a multidimensional measure of personal culture that can be used to formalize claims about how religious affiliation *might* shape the transmission of cultural identities across generational lines. Based on these insights and the foregoing discussion, I formulate two basic hypotheses informed by the extant scholarship.

First, in light of the large literature documenting high levels of religiosity, social conservatism and traditionalism among European Muslims (Diehl et al. 2009; Hansen 2011; Soehl 2017), I predict that Muslim youth "stand out" in cultural affairs because they adopt ethno-traditionalist identities at a much higher rate than their non-Muslim peers and because they are much less likely to encode liberal understandings of the social world.

Second, in line with intrafamilial explanations for this cultural gulf that are popular in extant studies, I expect that Muslim parents are more successful at transmitting their cultural identities to their children *vis-à-vis* their non-Muslim peers. As noted, scholars tend to agree that cultural reproduction is especially common in European Muslim households (Drouhot and Nee 2019), even though the evidence for this claim is decidedly mixed once cultural dimensions beyond subjective religiosity (e.g., gender norms) are brought into the analytical horizon.

2.5 Analysis and Results

To evaluate these hypotheses, I use a series of logistic regression models. I fit four models in total: two multinomial logistic regressions and two binomial logistic regressions. For my multinomial specifications, I regress a child's class membership or cultural identity profile on religious affiliation (the baseline model) or religious affiliation and a vector of control variables (the full model). For my binomial specifications, I predict the likelihood of transmission—or the probability that a parent and child are assigned to the same cluster—in models with just the religious affiliation indicator (the baseline model) or the full covariate adjustment set (the full model). Table 2.3 offers an overview of the variables used in my regressions.

Across the four regression models, I include country fixed-effects and cluster standard errors at a composite "host society-ethnic origin" level (i.e., Turkish respondents in Germany

Variable	Definition	
Dependent Variables		
Child's Identity Profile	Nominal variable with four categories: <i>Liberal</i> (omitted), <i>Hybrid</i> , <i>Traditionalist</i> and <i>Ethno-Traditionalist</i>	
Transmission	Dichotomous variable: 1 indicates that the parent and child were assigned to the same cluster (or possess the same profile)	
Individual-Level Predictors		
Religious Affiliation	Nominal variable with four levels: Christianity (omitted), Islam, Other, and Non-Affiliated	
Age	Age of respondent	
Sex	Sex of respondent	
Immigrant Generation	Interval variable with three levels: 1st Generation (omitted), 2nd Generation (includes interethnic second generation), and Above 2nd Generation (includes the "2.5 generation")	
School Context	Immigrant proportion of child's school, discretized	
Parent-Level Predictors		
Parent's Identity Profile	Nominal variable with four categories: <i>Liberal</i> (omitted), <i>Hybrid</i> , <i>Traditionalist</i> and <i>Ethno-Traditionalist</i>	
Parent's Relation to Child	Dummy indicator of whether the parent is the child's mother or father	
Parent's Job Status	Indicator of whether the parent is employed with three levels: employed, unemployed and missing	
Parent's University Status	Indicator of parent's educational background with three levels: completed university, did not complete university and missing	

Table 2.3: Variables in Main Regression Analysis

Note: All models include country fixed-effects. Standard errors for all parameter estimates are clustered at the composite "host society-ethnic origin" level. Highlighted variables enter the models as part of a three-way interaction.

and Turkish respondents in the Netherlands represent different groups). Moreover, across the two *full* models, I enter the religious affiliation indicator as part of a three-way interaction with two other variables of interest (parent's cultural identity profile and immigrant generation) as I assume the three constructs jointly shape a child's cultural identity. To facilitate interpretation, I display all my results visually and relegate my broader set of findings—inclusive of regression tables—to Section 2.C of the Appendix. For instance, in Figure 3.B.1 of the Appendix, I show that the results I present below are robust to alternative modelling strategies (including random effects) and sample restrictions (e.g., isolating the second generation).

According to my first hypothesis, Muslim children should "stand out" from their classmates due to their high levels of religiosity, traditionalism and *relatively* low levels of tolerance. To evaluate this proposition, I turn to my multinomial logistic regressions. I do so in two steps. First, I use parameters from the baseline *and* full models to predict the average marginal effect (AME) of religious affiliation on the cultural identities of youth respondents. This should, in principle, allow me to map the association between religious affiliation and youth cultural identity before *and* after background variables are statistically adjusted.

In a second step, I use parameters from the full multinomial logistic regression model to predict the share of youth respondents assigned to each cultural subsample or cluster at different levels of religious affiliation (after adjusting for background variables). This should highlight the distributional consequences of the AMEs reported in the first step.

Multinomial Logistic Regression Results: AMEs

2.5.1

The AMEs I use to facilitate interpretation of my multinomial logistic regression models convey the average change in the dependent variable—i.e., the probability of assignment to a specific cluster—based on a unit change in a focal regressor (i.e., religious affiliation) for all respondents in my sample. Crucially, the AMEs I report for the full multinomial model account for the effects of the three-way interaction described in Table 2.3 (see Leeper 2018; Long and Mustillo 2021; Williams 2012). Across my regressions, Christianity serves as the reference group for the religious affiliation indicator. Thus, the AMEs I report represent the average change in the probability for assignment into a given cluster (i.e., liberal, hybrid, traditionalist or ethnotraditionalist) for Muslims, the non-affiliated and those in other faith communities *relative* to Christian respondents.

In Figure 2.4, the panel on the left displays AMEs associated with my baseline multinomial logistic regression model, while the panel on the right shows AMEs associated with my full multinomial specification. Therefore, moving from left to right should allow the reader to assess



Figure 2.4: Average marginal effect of religious affiliation on child's cultural identity profile (with 95% confidence intervals). Christianity is the reference category. Baseline model features religious affiliation indicator and country fixed-effects. Full model features all covariates listed in Table 2.3. In both models, standard errors are clustered at the composite "host society-ethnic origin" level.

whether baseline associations survive the inclusion of controls. For instance, consider individuals from *other* faith communities: while they appear to be significantly less likely to adopt liberal identities—and more likely to encode ethno-traditionalist profiles—than Christians in the baseline specification (panel on the left), these associations disappear once background variables are controlled (panel on the right).

Conversely, regression adjustment does not meaningfully change the relative differences

between Muslim respondents and their classmates. Once we zoom-in on the panels near the top and bottom of Figure 2.4 (for both the baseline and full models on the left and right panels), a clear pattern comes into focus: an affinity for ethno-traditionalist identities, and a disaffinity for liberal identities, is what distinguishes Muslim youth respondents from their non-native peers.

For a more precise illustration, consider the panels at the top and bottom right of Figure 2.4. Even after accounting for background variables in the full multinomial specification, the AME of being Muslim (versus Christian) on the probability of holding an ethno-traditionalist identity profile is substantively large (corresponding to a 0.25 increase on the probability scale) and highly significant. While moving in the opposite direction, the AME of being Muslim (versus Christian) on the probability of possessing a liberal profile is also large (-0.13) and statistically significant.

Multinomial Logistic Regression Results: Adjusted Predictions

The substantive implications of these differences are difficult to pin down using AMEs alone. This is especially true given the discrete nature of the target variable (a child's cultural identity). That said, conceptualizing cultural identity as a discrete variable has utility: it not only acknowledges the fundamentally *cultural* (that is, socially shared) aspects of identification, but also reveals significant heterogeneity within putative social groups.

Yet, as Figure 2.4 makes clear, demographic attributes—such as religious affiliation—strongly *constrain* the types of cultural identities individuals adopt. I use Figure 2.5 to cast this point into sharp relief. The figure visualizes the predicted share of youth respondents assigned to each identity profile by religious affiliation (based on the full multinomial specification).

Here, we see the distributional consequences of the patterns reported in the preceding subsection. Even after regression adjustment, a *majority* of Muslim youth respondents would—per model estimates—be expected to end up in the ethno-traditionalist cluster. Conversely, only about 13 in 100 Muslim children would be expected to encode liberal identity profiles.

As the four polygons visualized in Figure 2.5 suggest, no other faith community exhibits a similar distributional profile. Although distributions of cultural identity are unique for each of



Figure 2.5: Predicted share of youth respondents assigned to the four clusters-or *distributional profiles* of cultural identity—by religious affiliation (based on results of full multinomial logistic regression model).

the three non-Muslim groups, their aggregate *profiles* (see the polygons) are clustered together in similar regions of the plot. These patterns, and the AMEs reported in Figure 2.4, are consistent with my first hypothesis: on an aggregate scale, Muslim children *do* stand out from their immigrant peers with respect to their cultural identities. Moreover, this distinctiveness appears to be rooted in the significantly (i) positive association between Islam and ethno-traditionalist profiles and (ii) negative association between Islam and liberal cultural identities.

2.5.2 Are European Muslim Parents More Successful at Cultural Transmission?

According to my second hypothesis, that European Muslim youth gravitate towards ethnotraditionalist identities and away from liberal cultural profiles derives, in large part, from parentto-child transmission. To evaluate this proposition, I use both sets of regressions. First, I use binary logistic regression models to provide an intuitive test of whether transmission is more likely within Muslim households in Europe — or whether Muslim parents and children are, relative to their non-Muslim peers, more likely to end up in the same cluster. Then, I use estimates from multinomial regressions to paint a more granular portrait of the transmission process.

Binomial Logistic Regression Results

Figure 2.6 uses predicted probabilities to provide a summary of the key results associated with my binary logistic regressions. The baseline model provides *some* evidence that Muslim parents are more likely to transmit their cultural profiles than parents from other faith communities. However, this difference does not reach significance at conventional levels. Moreover, in the full model, it appears that transmission is significantly *less* likely within Muslim households. This finding should, of course, be interpreted with caution, as it likely stems from conditioning on a variable (parent's cultural identity) that is downstream from religion along the causal path.

At the same time, including the parental cultural identity indicator in the full model offers insights that are invisible in the baseline specification. Specifically, it reveals (via predictive margins not shown here) that transmission rates within Muslim households are *very* high among parents with ethno-traditionalist identities (around 0.6) and *very* low for parents assigned to the other three clusters (below 0.4). For context, the unadjusted transmission rate for all parent-child dyads in my sample is roughly 0.47 (see Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix).

At first glance, these results support the idea that the cultural distinctiveness of European Muslim children is shaped by parent-to-child transmission. More concretely, if cultural transmission is common in Muslim households with ethno-traditionalist parents, and if the cultural



Figure 2.6: Predicted transmission probabilities by religious affiliation based on binary logistic regressions. Dotted lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals. Baseline model features religious affiliation indicator and country fixed-effects. Full model features full suite of controls (see Table 2.3). In both models, standard errors are clustered as the composite "host society-ethnic origin" level.

heterodoxy of European Muslim youth derives, in part, from their propensity to adopt ethnotraditionalist views, then intrafamilial theories popular in extant research may still hold some explanatory power.

However, the results of my full multinomial logistic regression model challenge such an interpretation. Specifically, they show that high transmission rates observed in Muslim households with ethno-traditionalist parents mask a more general trend — i.e., the shift towards ethno-traditionalism among Muslim youth respondents of all stripes. I turn to these results below.

Multinomial Logistic Regression Results

Figure 2.7 plots AMEs derived from my full multinomial model and zooms in on a pairwise comparison between Christians and Muslims – the two largest faith communities in my sample.



Figure 2.7: Average marginal effect of parent's cultural identity profile on child's cultural identity profile (with 95% confidence intervals). Liberal is the reference category. Results are based on the full multinomial regression model. Standard errors are clustered at the composite "host society-ethnic origin" level.

Concretely, the AMEs in the graph show the (associational) effects of parental identities on the cultural identities of Christian and Muslim adolescents with immigrant roots.⁴ In the plot, parents with liberal identities serve as the reference group. Therefore, each AME should be interpreted as the average change in probability associated with having a parent with a hybrid, traditionalist or ethno-traditionalist profile *relative* to having a parent with a liberal identity.

⁴ These quantities can also be described as average marginal effects at (counterfactual) specified values.

On balance, Figure 2.7 suggests that parental influences are relatively acute for Christian youth respondents, as AMEs associated with parental identities tend to be large and statistically significant (see the panel on the left). For example, having an ethno-traditionalist parent (versus a liberal parent) corresponds to a 0.25 *decrease* in the probability of adopting a liberal identity and a 0.3 *increase* in the probability of encoding an ethno-traditionalist identity among Christian youth respondents. As the associated confidence intervals lay bare, these estimates are not only substantively large but easily clear the threshold of statistical significance.

Turning to the panel on the right of Figure 2.7, we see the opposite pattern. Among Muslims, AMEs associated with parental identities tend to be relatively small⁵ and are often non-significant. Most strikingly, the panel on the bottom right of the figure suggests that the probability of a Muslim child adopting an ethno-traditional identity profile is not significantly associated with the cultural identity of his or her parent. In other words, we cannot confidently claim that Muslim respondents with liberal parents are less likely to adopt ethno-traditional views *vis-à-vis* Muslim children with ethno-traditionalist mothers and fathers (i.e., the relative difference may very well be 0).

Broadly speaking, this implies that the high transmission rates observed in Muslim households with ethno-traditionalist parents are inflated by a general shift towards ethno-traditionalism among Muslim adolescents of all stripes and backgrounds. To visualize this shift, Figure 2.8 uses estimates from the full multinomial model to perform a final empirical illustration.

In Figure 2.8, I produce a set of predictions to highlight the probability of assignment into each of the four classes (panel on the right) for Muslim youth at each level of the parental identity variable (panel on the left). Since each parental identity profile makes the same contribution to the predicted distribution displayed on the right-hand side of the plot, these estimates *necessarily* portray a counterfactual scenario where the cultural identities of Muslim parents are evenly distributed. Even in this counterfactual setting, over *half* of all Muslim youth respondents would, per the prediction grid underlying the estimates in Figure 2.8, end up in the ethno-traditionalist

⁵ For instance, the AME associated with having a parent with an ethno-traditionalist profile (vs liberal identity) on the likelihood of a child adopting an ethno-traditionalist identity is three times greater for Christians *vis-à-vis* Muslims.



Counterfactual: Cultural Identities Evenly Distributed Among Muslim Parents

Parental Identity Distribution

Predicted Child Identity Distribution

Figure 2.8: This plot maps intergenerational transmission within Muslim households in four European countries, assuming that the four cultural identity profiles are *evenly distributed* among Muslim parents (a counterfactual scenario; see the panel on the left). The panel on the right illustrates the predicted distribution of cultural identities among Muslim *youth* in this counterfactual scenario.

cluster — including just under half of all adolescents with parents in the liberal or hybrid classes. Taken together, the results displayed in Figures 2.6 to 2.8 are at odds with the second hypothesis; that is, they do not support the idea that parent-to-child transmission is especially common within Muslim households.

2.6 Discussion

In broad terms, the results summarized in the last section suggest that forces outside the family unit are driving the cultural distinctiveness of Muslim youth in Europe. A key objective for future research is to list and describe these extrafamilial mechanisms in some detail. As noted in the front end of this manuscript, existing studies suggest that structural discrimination is one such variable. The link between discrimination and cultural heterodoxy may be summarized as follows: due to the social closure wrought by discrimination in European host societies, Muslim

children may be less exposed to mainstream actors, networks and institutions than their nonnative peers and thus less likely to adopt cultural identities that align with the identities of their classmates (Alba 2005; Drouhot and Nee 2019; Wimmer and Soehl 2014).

While this may be an important part of the story, explanations centered around discrimination often position parents as key cogs in the machinery of cultural reproduction and blocked acculturation. In other words, parents are treated as conduits who translate disadvantage from above into proximate sets of normative constraints and attitudinal prescriptions (e.g., pressure to maintain origin country values; see Wimmer and Soehl 2014). The results of my analysis do not neatly map onto this conclusion. Rather, they suggest that discrimination may be shaping the cultural heterodoxy of Muslim youth independent of parental mediation.

In my analysis, large pluralities of Muslim children with parents in the *liberal* or *hybrid* classes encoded *ethno-traditionalist* identities. In line with this result, descriptive results not shown here suggest that Muslim parents who score very low on subjective religiosity (a 1 on the 4-point ordinal scale listed in Table 2.2) are raising children who score higher on religious identification than their Christian classmates raised in moderately religious households (i.e., whose parents scored a 3 on the same 4-point scale). These findings suggest that the turn to ethno-traditionalism among Muslim adolescents is part of a broader, *group*-level social process that some scholars have described as *reactive ethnicity* — the hardening of ethnocultural attachments across immigrant generations (Maliepaard and Alba 2016).

Although their household environments may differ in important ways, *all* Muslim children are implicated in—and can thus be exposed to—discriminatory narratives, frames and discourses about *Muslims* writ large that are often tacitly reinforced in school settings (Welply 2018). This diffuse discrimination may, in time, compel Muslim children from a variety of backgrounds to seek out Islam as a protective resource (Soehl 2020) and to encode cultural identities that draw directly from the well of a *doctrinal*, transnational Islam (Bowen 2004) stripped of its "ethnic" trappings and free of parental modulation (see Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Evaluating the validity of this theory is an important task for future scholarship to take up.

2.7 Conclusion

What explains the cultural distance between Muslim youth in Europe and their non-Muslim peers? Previous research has identified two key explanatory mechanisms: (i) discrimination from native majorities and the *reactive* processes it sets into motion; and (ii) cultural transmission within Muslim households. This article examined the second, intrafamilial mechanism by drawing on conceptual and methodological tools from cultural sociology. With these tools in hand, I evaluated whether the core assumptions of the intrafamilial account survive a multidimensional treatment of cultural identity. Using dyadic parent-adolescent data from four European countries and several quantitative instruments, I showed that European Muslim children *do* stand out from their non-native classmates, but that there is little evidence to suggest that this distance is driven by the transmission of cultural identity across generational lines.

Instead, regression estimates suggest that Muslim parents may be *less* successful at transmitting their cultural identities to their children, and that the high transmission rates observed within certain Muslim households (i.e., those with ethno-traditionalist parents) are likely inflated by the influence of extrafamilial variables. As discussed, these extrafamilial variables seem to be pushing Muslim children of all stripes, even those whose parents belong to liberal or hybrid thought communities, towards ethno-traditionalist identities.

Taken together, my results illustrate the value of modelling culture in multidimensional terms. In studies mapping cultural integration in Europe, researchers have generally analyzed different aspects of personal culture (such as ethnocultural attachments, gender norms or norms about political tolerance) in isolation from one another. Yet, cultural *meaning* derives from how these dimensions cluster, coalesce and interrelate within the mindscapes of individuals (Boutyline and Soter 2021; Hunzaker and Valentino 2019). This article has shown that building conceptual and empirical models attuned to this precept is not only useful for robustly measuring an individual's cultural identity, but for conceptualizing cultural *transmission* across generational fault lines. After all, that parents and children agree on certain matters does not mean that they agree on other, domain-specific issues. These generational conflicts are easy to miss when we

focus on a single cultural dimension and treat it as window into a person's cultural disposition – something that is, in every meaningful sense, a multidimensional construct.

At the same time, the tools I used in this paper are not silver bullets, nor are they always desirable. Researchers may want to isolate the effects of specific cultural dimensions on downstream behavioral outcomes, determine which forms of cultural knowledge are most consequential for shaping social or economic trajectories, or study specific dimensions of personal culture that are most salient to political debates in a given host society. For these problems and others, mapping attitudinal configurations in survey data may not provide any analytic leverage. However, if the goal is broader—say, to rigorously explain the cultural differences that distinguish social groups a theoretically-motivated turn to connectionism or related frameworks like intersectionality (see Crenshaw 1989; Scarborough et al. 2021) may prove fruitful.

Despite some of the contributions detailed above, this study suffers from two major limitations that are worth highlighting. First, given its focus on differences across faith communities, heterogeneity *within* religious groups is not scrutinized. As a result, the stories of Muslim youth respondents with liberal, hybrid or traditionalist identities are reduced to statistical noise. In future work, a more focused accounting of the different cultural segments *within* social groups (religions, ethnic origin communities and so on) may lead to novel insights and provide a richer view of the cultural landscape in different national contexts.

Second, it is possible that the statistical patterns I uncovered in my analysis will break down as youth respondents reach emerging or early adulthood. However, recent studies in the United States note that many attitudes, including those related to abortion, gender roles and religious values, begin to stabilize and cohere in adolescence (Keskintürk 2022; Kiley and Vaisey 2020). While this suggests that my results may not be sensitive to the passage of time, mapping the temporal horizon of the patterns identified in this paper is a matter for future research.

Although these limitations are important to keep in mind, this article has, on balance, broken new ground. By bridging the divide between the study of migration and the study of culture and cognition, it has provided a blueprint for embedding cognitivist models of culture into quantitative analyses of cultural integration. Moving forward, more cross-pollination between the sociological sub-fields of culture and migration can redefine how researchers conceptualize the cognitive microfoundations of culture for immigrant groups around the world.

2.8 References

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Appendix

Appendix 2.A Descriptives



Figure 2.A.1: Distribution of indicator responses (pooled across countries). For variable definitions, see main text.

	Child's Cultural Identity	
	Liberal	25.77%
Dependent Variables	Hybrid	17.05%
	Traditionalist	26.79%
	Ethno-Traditionalist	30.39%
	Transmission	
	Unsuccessful	53.18%
		46.82%
	Religious Affiliation	
	Christianity	41.71%
	No Affiliation	20.00%
	Other	7.77%
	Age in Years	$15.55 (\sigma = 0.72)$
Individual-Level	Sex or Gender	
Predictors	Male	48.49%
	Female	51.51%
	Immigrant Generation	
	1st Generation	16.34%
	2nd Generation	52.39%
	Above 2nd Generation	31.27%
	Parent's Cultural Identity	
	Liberal	32.69%
	Hybrid	21.05%
	Traditionalist	16.69%
		29.56%
	Parent's Relation to Child	
D (1 1	Father	22.66%
Parent-Level Predictors		//.34%
110000000	Parent's Employment Status	
	Unemployed	25.04%
	Employed Missing	/4.23% 0.73%
	Derent'a University Status	0./ 3%
	Did Nat Council to U	79.05%
	Completed University	78.03% 20.46%
	Missing	1.49%
	School Context	
	0-10% Immigrants	10.41%
	10-30% Immigrants	31.58%
	30-60% Immigrants	28.28%
	60-100% Immigrants	28.33%
Contextual	Independent Schools (EN)	1.40%
variables	Country	
	England	14.51%
	Germany	46.99%
	Netherlands	18.30%
	Sweden	20.20%





Figure 2.B.1: Relative fit of a series of multigroup latent class models.

Appendix 2.C Regression Analyses

Table 2.C.1: Full Binary Logistic Regression Results

	AME	z
Cultural Identity (Parent)		
Liberal	_	_
Hybrid	-0.09	-2.90
Traditionalist	0.10	2.68
Ethno-Traditionalist	0.12	2.54
Religious Affiliation		
Christianity	-	_
Islam	-0.09	-2.52
No Affiliation	0.01	0.33
Other	-0.04	-1.07
Immigrant Generation		
1st Generation	_	_
2nd Generation	-0.01	-0.27
Above 2nd Generation	0.01	0.57
Age (Years)	-0.01	-0.58
Sex or Gender		
Male	_	_
Female	0.04	2.80
School Context		
0 to 10% Immigrants	_	_
10 to 30% Immigrants	-0.05	-1.88
30 to 60% Immigrants	-0.05	-1.99
60 to 100% Immigrants	-0.03	-1.09
Independent Schools (EN)	0.02	0.27
Parent's Relation to Child		
Father	_	_
Mother	-0.01	-0.36
Parent's University Status		
Did Not Complete University	_	_
Completed University	0.05	2.32
Missing	0.03	0.58
Parent's Employment Status		
Unemployed	_	_
Employed	0.01	0.66
Missing	-0.11	-1.06
Country		
England	_	_
Germany	0.00	0.10
Netherlands	0.01	0.39
Sweden	0.09	3.04

Note: Model features 4,126 respondents. Highlighted cells indicate that a marginal effect is significant at an α of at least 0.05 (teal) or 0.10 (pink). AMEs account for three-way interaction between parental identity, immigrant generation and religious affiliation. *Z*-statistics reflect standard errors clustered at a composite "host society-ethnic origin" level.

	Liberal		Hybrid		Traditionalist		Ethno- Traditionalist	
	AME	z	AME	z	AME	z	AME	z
Cultural Identity (Parent)								
Liberal	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_
Hybrid	-0.12	-5.97	0.11	5.53	-0.09	-3.57	0.10	4.25
Traditionalist	-0.16	-7.29	-0.05	-2.30	0.15	6.32	0.06	2.03
Ethno-Iraditionalist	-0.21	-7.51	0.00	0.14	-0.03	-0.95	0.23	7.81
Religious Affiliation								
Christianity	-	-	-	-	_	-	_	_
Islam	-0.12	-4.50	-0.02	-1.01	-0.11	-2.67	0.25	6.16
No Affiliation	0.07	4.71	0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.47	-0.06	-2.13
Other	-0.02	-0.76	0.00	2.32	-0.07	-2.42	0.03	0.98
Immigrant Generation								
1st Generation	_	_	_	_	_	_	-	-
2nd Generation	0.01	0.40	0.02	1.12	0.02	1.05	-0.06	-2.77
Above 2nd Generation	0.11	4.84	-0.06	-2.79	0.08	2.95	-0.12	-5.55
Age (Years)	0.00	0.22	-0.02	-1.92	0.01	0.71	0.01	1.14
Sex or Gender								
Male	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_
Female	0.07	5.17	0.07	7.42	-0.10	-6.40	-0.04	-2.41
School Context								
0 to 10% Immigrants	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_
10 to 30% Immigrants	-0.03	-1.74	0.02	1.17	-0.02	-0.98	0.03	1.34
30 to 60% Immigrants	-0.03	-1.31	0.02	1.14	-0.04	-1.70	0.05	2.33
60 to 100% Immigrants	-0.09	-3.83	0.05	3.04	-0.04	-1.38	0.07	2.58
Dependent Schools (EN)	-0.03	-0.75	0.05	0.89	-0.07	-1.11	0.07	0.93
Parent's Relation to Child								
Father	-	-	-	-	_	-	-	-
Mother	0.03	1.19	0.00	-0.10	-0.03	-1.40	0.00	0.20
Parent's University Status								
Did Not Complete University	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Completed University	0.05	3.00	0.04	2.44	-0.05	-2.65	-0.05	-2.13
Missing	-0.04	-0.63	0.09	1.72	-0.07	-1.38	0.02	0.44
Parent's Employment Status								
Unemployed	—	—	-	—	—	—	—	—
Employed	0.01	0.63	0.03	2.06	-0.02	-1.19	-0.02	-1.24
Missing	-0.06	-0.62	-0.02	-0.44	-0.01	-0.11	0.09	1.23
Country								
England	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany Notherlanda	-0.06	-2.38	-0.06	-2.71	0.07	2.51	0.05	2.32
sweden	-0.07	-2.29	-0.03	-1.11	0.06	-3.65	0.04	1.41
owcucii	0.07	2.15	0.10	5.00	0.09	5.05	0.07	2.50

Note: Model features 4,126 respondents. Highlighted cells indicate that a marginal effect is significant at an α of at least 0.05 (teal) or 0.10 (pink). AMEs account for three-way interaction between parental identity, immigrant generation and religious affiliation. *Z*-statistics reflect standard errors clustered at a composite "host society-ethnic origin" level.



Figure 2.C.1: Robustness checks (full multinomial logistic regression). Including Random Effects reflects a robustness check where the multilevel structure of the data is treated using a random intercept at the "host society-ethnic origin" level in lieu of clustered standard errors. Excluding Germany reflects a robustness check where German respondents (who comprise almost half of the sample) are removed. Second Generation Narrow reflects a robustness check where the analysis is limited to second-generation respondents (using the original indicator for immigrant generation; this model specification uses a *two-way* interaction between parental identity and religious affiliation in lieu of the three-way interaction featured in the main analysis). Second Generations; this model specification uses a *two-way* interaction between parental to distinguish generations; this model specification uses a *two-way* interaction between parental to distinguish generations; this model specification uses a *two-way* interaction between parental to distinguish generations; this model specification uses a *two-way* interaction between parental to distinguish generations; this model specification uses a *two-way* interaction between parental identity and religious affiliation in lieu of the three-way interaction that uses 0.25 intervals to distinguish generations; this model specification uses a *two-way* interaction between parental identity and religious affiliation in lieu of the three-way interaction between parental identity and religious affiliation in lieu of the three-way interaction between parental identity and religious affiliation in lieu of the three-way interaction featured in the main analysis).

INTERLUDE I

Chapter 2 attempted to capture the *cultural identities* of immigrant-origin respondents across four European countries. As noted, I conceptualized these "identities" as broad, intuitive understandings of the self (or more concretely, an aggregation of deeply-held beliefs, attachments and values) that linger beneath the threshold of consciousness. Of course, these broader portraits of selfhood are not always of interest to scholars analyzing attitudes implicating the *self*. At times, self-related attitudes are understood as subcomponents of *specific* cultural phenomena that operate at lower levels of cognitive aggregation — such as political ideology or *individual-level nationalism*, the focus of the upcoming chapter.

As I explain in Chapter 3, *national identification* is often viewed as a subcomponent of the nationalism ingrained within the minds of social actors. However, individual-level nationalism is not reducible to one's attachments to the nation. Rather, it is more fruitfully understood as a *system* of beliefs that implicate national attachments and ideas about the nation's boundaries. As in Chapter 2, I conceptualize these belief systems as derivatives of socially-shared cognitive structures that *probabilistically* constrain how people respond to a series of attitudinal survey items. To capture traces of these structures in survey data, I use panel data from Germany and a longitudinal variant of the latent class analyses (LCAs) featured in the previous chapter.

While sharing many similarities with Chapter 2, the forthcoming analysis slightly changes course by treating cultural-cognitive phenomena as *predictors* of different outcomes of interest. Moreover, it more directly evaluates whether cultural beliefs (such as ideas about the nation) take on different *meanings* across ethnocultural lines.

Chapter 3

Popular Nationalism, Intergroup Attitudes and the Moderating Role of Ethnicity

GROWING LITERATURE in social and political psychology asserts that attachments to the nation can breed unity in diverse, multiethnic societies (Charnysh, Lucas, and Singh 2015; Elkins and Sides 2007; Levendusky 2018; Robinson 2016; Transue 2007). Drawing on insights from the social identity perspective (social identity theory, social categorization theory and so on), studies in this tradition posit that the affective distance between social groups will begin to wane when individuals on opposite sides of a social boundary come to identify with the *nation* (a common ingroup) and develop nested, cross-cutting attachments that spill over the categorical divide. These cross-cutting loyalties should, in turn, blur the lines between *us* and *them*, transform ethnic outsiders into co-nationals, and reduce ethnic prejudice within the territorial nation-state.

In the present study, I argue that the links between national identification and intergroup attitudes are not always so unidirectional or uniform. Rather, associations between national attachments and affective attitudes may move in vastly different directions or vary in magnitude depending on (1) how an individual defines the bounds of the national community; and (2) an individual's ethnocultural background. To capture these interactions, I build on conceptual and methodological advances in the study of popular nationalism (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Soehl and Karim 2021). Conceptually, I treat national attachments and national membership criteria as indicators of the nationalism ingrained within the minds of individuals. Empirically, I use a sample of German adolescents and hidden Markov models to recover individual-level nationalism—or discrete *schemas* of the nation (ibid.)—in longitudinal data.

With a time-varying measure of nationalist beliefs in hand, I fit a series of mixed-effects regressions to determine whether ethnic origin moderates the association between nation-state schemas on the one hand and intergroup attitudes on the other. Following recent scholarship on national identification and claims-making among immigrants (Bloemraad 2018; Waldinger, Soehl, and Luthra 2022), I expect that the same nation-state schema (or configuration of nationalist beliefs) will carry a different normative valence and substantive meaning across ethnocultural fault lines. Thicker sets of nationalist beliefs should, for instance, serve as expressions of ethnonationalism among natives but represent civic-minded claims to membership in the host society among the children of immigrants. Such polysemy should, in turn, lead to sharp ethnic differences in how attitudes about nationhood pattern affect towards ingroups and outgroups.

In line with these expectations, my regression results show that ethnicity moderates the association between nation-state schemas and intergroup attitudes. Most notably, schemas of the nation that feature high levels of national attachment along with restrictive definitions of nationhood appear to be *exclusionary* for native Germans (associated with lower outgroup affect and greater ingroup favoritism) but *inclusionary* for the children of immigrants (associated with greater outgroup affect and lower ingroup favoritism). Conversely, thinner forms of nationalism translate to greater exclusionism among immigrant-origin respondents and greater outgroup affect and greater outgroup affect.

As I detail in the sections to follow, these results lend credence to Bonikowski's (2016) depiction of the nation as a site of symbolic struggle and theater for cultural conflict. In Germany and other societies of immigration, nationalist beliefs act as prisms into a broader set of political claims and cultural commitments related to the incorporation of newcomers, the limits

of accommodation, the meanings of citizenship and the constitution of *the people* (Abizadeh 2012; Bloemraad 2018; Brubaker 2004, 2020). These varied claims and commitments emerge out of the interaction between nationalist sentiments and ethnicity and have stark affective consequences, structuring how individuals relate to their peers in a diversifying social world.

3.1 Nationalist Beliefs

Studies from the borderlands between Malawi and Zambia (Robinson 2016), India (Charnysh et al. 2015), the United States (Transue 2007) and parts of Europe (see Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012) posit that intergroup relations within a country will improve when members of diverse ethnic communities rally under the common banner of nationhood. The mechanisms linking identification with higher-order social categories (like the nation) to bias reduction are discussed in similar ways across disparate bodies of research, including work on panethnicity (Kim and White 2010), common ingroup identities (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2007), and mutual intergroup differentiation (Hornsey and Hogg 2000).

Across these literatures, widespread attachments to superordinate categories are associated with the blurring of subgroup boundaries and the emergence of solidaristic bonds that bridge social divides. Seen through this lens, individuals on opposite sides of an ethnic boundary should come to display similar types of outgroup biases (e.g., against members of other nations) and ingroup affinities (e.g., towards fellow Germans) as they cleave to the nation as a locus of collective identity. This should, in turn, transform ethnic outsiders into compatriots and reduce ethnic prejudice within the territorial nation-state.

Despite its intuitiveness, several scholars have challenged the generality of this argument by noting that associations between national identification and affective attitudes likely depend on, or are conditioned by, the criteria individuals use to limn the bounds of the nation. High levels of national identification may, for instance, *heighten* exclusionary attitudes if attachments to the national community are coupled with parochial ideas about the boundaries of nationhood (Pehrson, Brown, and Zagefka 2009a, Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009b; Zagefka et al. 2013). More concretely, higher levels of national identification may come to amplify outgroup hostilities and increase prejudice towards "others" among those who define nationhood in ascriptive terms (e.g., by emphasizing the importance of nativity; see Bonikowski 2016).

Consequently, understanding how nationalist beliefs shape intergroup attitudes requires an attentiveness to two distinct but interconnected dimensions of nationalism at the individual level: *national identification*, or an individual's affective and evaluative attachments to the nation; and *national ingroup definitions* or *membership criteria* — that is, an individual's attitudes and beliefs about the symbolic boundaries that distinguish *us*—as Eritreans, Canadians, Germans, Kurds and so on—from *them*, the masses who exist beyond the symbolic bounds of the imagined community.

In social and political psychology, national identification and ingroup definitions have often been specified as independent attributes or distinct variables that can be isolated in empirical settings. In this study, I adopt a more connectionist approach to measurement and theory inspired by the cognitive turn in cultural sociology (see Boutyline and Soter 2021; Cerulo, Leschziner, and Shepherd 2021; DiMaggio 1997; Hunzaker and Valentino 2019). Specifically, I treat national attachments and membership criteria as units of cultural knowledge that are bundled together in the mind and in similar regions of the "belief space" (see Martin 1999) due to cognitive networks that operate far beneath the level of conscious thought. In doing so, I build on the canonical work of Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) who leaned on similar, cognitivist principles to identify the varieties of popular nationalism in the United States. The broad strokes of their argument, which informs much of the analyses to follow, can be reduced to three core propositions.

First, popular nationalism, or the nationalism manifest within individuals, can be captured by mapping how attitudes about nationhood are configured at the individual level. Second, these configurations derive from cultural schemas in the mind that are shared by broad segments of the population due to common sets of structural, institutional and environmental exposures within nation-states. However, nation-state schemas are not *universally* adopted, reflecting variation in how different "cognitive subcultures" (Zerubavel 2009) or thought communities within the same social field come to interpret and encode the same reality. Third, shared understandings of nationhood can be retrieved from survey data by using inductive, person-centered techniques like latent class analysis that are designed to identify subgroups with similar item-response profiles.

In recent years, a series of articles has helped push Bonikowski and DiMaggio's (2016) propositions forward by analyzing how shared understandings of nationhood (or nation-state schemas) are patterned by legacies of geopolitical turbulence around the world (Soehl and Karim 2021), shape support for the radical right in countries like France and Germany (Bonikowski 2017b), condition anti-Muslim sentiments throughout Europe (Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020), and undergird partisanship in the United States (Bonikowski, Feinstein, and Bock 2021).

While insightful and generative, these articles have largely focused on national majorities (i.e., natives) and relied on cross-sectional samples of adults. Immigrants and ethnic minorities, when included, represent small shares of the respondents featured in these analyses and have therefore made minor contributions to the data-driven typologies of nationalist beliefs that pervade the extant literature. Similarly, adolescents and young adults have either been omitted from analytic samples or represent small subsets of the global population of respondents.

As a result, the scholarship on popular nationalism has at least three limitations worth highlighting. First, existing studies implicitly assume that associations between nationalist beliefs and affective attitudes operate in similar ways across ethnocultural lines. Yet, for reasons I detail below, ethnic origin may *moderate* how beliefs about the nation come to bear on attitudes towards ingroups and outgroups.¹ Second, the extant literature has paid little attention to how younger cohorts—i.e., individuals coming of age against a backdrop of "superdiversity" (Vertovec 2007)—configure their understandings of nationhood. As theories of cultural evolution suggest, cohort succession is a key catalyst of cultural change (Beugelsdijk and Welzel 2018; Underwood et al. 2022); thus, emergent varieties of nationalism shaped by exposure to "superdiversity" in

¹ In recent years, migratory movements around the world have fueled sea changes in the ethnic composition of nation-states — *especially* in greying societies in Europe and the Anglosphere (Banting 2021; Castles, Haas, and Miller 2014; Grzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore 2018) In these countries and others, immigrant-origin people comprise an increasingly large share of the national population and exert a significant influence on how nationalist beliefs are distributed. Thus, to explain *popular nationalism* in the modern world, it is critical to account for ethnic variation in the meanings assigned to nationalist beliefs.

the formative years may be missing from the literature. Third, existing research has painted a resolutely static portrait of nationalist beliefs; tracking evolutions in these beliefs *within* individuals can minimize the measurement error baked into cross-sectional models of individuallevel nationalism and allow for cleaner estimates of the associations linking nationalist beliefs to intergroup attitudes.

The present study addresses each of these concerns. The panel survey at the heart of the forthcoming analysis oversamples adolescent respondents with a migration background (who represent over half the sample) and features a rich set of items on nationalist beliefs and affective attitudes that are repeated over time. This, in turn, allows me to robustly evaluate how schemas of the nation map onto outgroup attitudes and ingroup preferences along ethnic lines.

Below, I consider the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism in more detail. In doing so, I complicate the idea that individuals with similar patterns of nationalist beliefs belong to the same thought community or cognitive subculture. More precisely, I argue that two individuals reporting similar attitudes about the nation may attribute different *meanings* to those beliefs based on their "sociocultural location" (Cerulo 2018; see also Lizardo and Skiles 2016). As I detail, this suggests that the second *desideratum* for survey-based cultural analysis put forth by DiMaggio et al. (2018: 32) — i.e., the idea that cultural subgroups should be identified "without reference to demographic or biographical information about respondents" and "based on attitudes alone"—*may* be problematic if researchers limit their analysis to a single cultural domain (such as the *nation*, literature, sport and so on). I build on this idea in the sections to come.

3.2 Nationalism, Migration and Ethnicity

At its core, "nationhood is not an ethnodemographic or ethnocultural fact; it is a political *claim* ... on people's loyalty, on their attention, on their solidarity" (Brubaker 2004: 115; emphasis added). The nationalisms of the 19th-century brought with them a clear set of *transformative* claims "aimed at redrawing the macro-political map and altering the boundaries of political

units" (Brubaker 2020: 51). Today, nationalist claims-making has taken on more of a *restorative* character due, in part, to the arrival of millions of immigrants from all corners of the world.

In response to these demographic changes, some majority group members have aspired to return "'ownership' of the polity to the nation" (Brubaker 2020: 51). Here, we see the revanchist spirit of thicker and more exclusionary strains of nationalism that are often associated with high levels of national identification and restrictive national ingroup definitions at the individual level (see Bonikowski et al. 2021). In contrast, other majorities have advanced *inclusionary* claims about nationhood in response to demographic shocks, signaling an opposition to (or disinterest in) the maintenance of rigid national boundaries; this is the hallmark of thinner or more "liberal" forms of nationalism (Harell et al. 2021) associated with moderate to high levels of national identification and inclusive membership criteria at the individual level (see Soehl and Karim 2021).

While this summary aligns with conventional wisdom, it leaves little room for the claims and lifeworlds of immigrant-origin people. As Waldinger and colleagues (2022) argue, international migration shakes up our taken for granted assumptions about nationhood, creating classes of individuals whose membership in the nation is contested, conditional and capricious. In many respects, this conditionality is endogenous to the lives of the second generation, whose claims to *formal* membership (e.g., via legal citizenship or permanent residence) are unassailable even as *substantive* membership (i.e., being a "full member" of a polity) remains elusive (see Brubaker 2010). What do beliefs about the nation mean for those subjected to this asymmetry?

Recent studies on citizenship, belonging and claims-making offer some clues. To simplify matters greatly, these studies posit that nationalist beliefs, ideas about citizenship, and claims on membership are recursively entwined for immigrants and their descendants (Bloemraad 2018). Second generation Americans may, for instance, appeal to the normative heft and moral legitimacy of formal citizenship in listing nativity, civic behaviors (e.g., obeying the law) and English ability as key criteria for "being American" (Bloemraad 2022; Warikoo and Bloemraad 2018). In this instance, the importance attached to nativity, lawfulness and English proficiency acts as a civic-minded claim to membership in the American nation and a call to include the US-

born children of immigrants within the bounds of nationhood. In contrast, when white Christian nationalists consecrate nativity, law and order and English proficiency as core aspects of being American, it is part of a broader syndrome of ethnocultural exclusion that flatly rejects civic-minded conceptions of the American creed (Gorski 2017; Whitehead and Scheitle 2018).

As these examples illustrate, nationalist beliefs can take on vastly different meanings along the majority-minority divide. Webs of attitudes that signal exclusionary forms of nationalism among natives may signal civic-oriented claims to membership in the nation among the children of immigrants. At the other extreme, thinner sets of nationalist beliefs may map onto exclusionary attitudes among minorities (see Hindriks, Verkuyten, and Coenders 2014) and inclusionary forms of nationalism among native majorities.

How can we make sense of these differences? The relationship between social position and personal culture is likely an important part of the explanation. Across different literatures, scholars have emphasized how *social position* (defined by race, sex, immigration status, class *etc.*) constrains how people think about cultural objects and the meanings they attribute to them. For instance, Cerulo's (2018) work on olfactory sense-making suggests that race and class shape the cultural meanings individuals assign to *scents*. Similarly, Lizardo and Skiles (2016: 2) show "that cultural likes and dislikes are driven by the presumed connections between genres and their audiences"² and that these associations are mediated by respondents' social positions.

As Bloemraad (2022) has argued, attitudes about national membership operate in much the same way. To her immigrant-origin respondents, "Americanness was a matter of positionality with respect to some proto-typical (and often stereo-typical) American ideal" marked by whiteness, nativity and other ascriptive attributes; thus, respondents' acute awareness of *civic* and *cultural* pathways to (partial) inclusion in the US "might, in part, stem from a sense that their starting position for membership is distant from an ascriptive norm" (ibid.:1025, 1030).

In other words, the nation functions as a cultural object that, like forms of art or music (Bryson 1996), becomes linked to specific social categories in the popular imagination (whites

² For instance, individuals associate *rap* as a cultural object with *Black* as a racial category (Lizardo and Skiles 2016).

To be sure, popular associations between cultural objects and social categories are not set in stone. As Lizardo and Skiles (2016) note, forms of "high culture" became increasingly associated with women over the last century, just as jazz became less associated with Black audiences. A key insight from Bloemraad's (2018; 2022) recent work is the idea that attitudes about national membership act as claims designed to reorient *or* reaffirm popular associations between the nation (e.g., England) and certain ethnoracial categories (e.g., white). These attitudes should, in principle, take on different meanings depending on one's location in social space and explain why the *valence* of nationalist beliefs differs along the majority-minority divide.

community (e.g., Arabs in Saudi Arabia) – just as meanings attributed to an artform are patterned

by one's social position *relative* to social groups associated with the artistic genre in question.

There may, of course, be interminority differences in the structure of nationalist beliefs as well. After all, boundaries are often brighter for some ethnonational communities than others (Alba 2005; Foner and Alba 2008) — a sign that different immigrant-origin groups are located in different quadrants of sociocultural space. However, in the spirit of simplicity, this study focuses on *broad* differences along the majority-minority divide while acknowledging (but not fully fleshing out) differences among members of different minority communities. A key contribution of the present paper is that it supplements this broad *between-group* analysis with a *within-group* theorization of nationalist beliefs that has been largely missing from the existing literature on claims-making among immigrants. I return to this point shortly.

3.3 Intergroup Affect and Social Position

An individual's social position should not only constrain their beliefs about the nation but inform how they relate to ethnocultural outsiders. In this section, I consider how social position serves as a bridge that, via the life experiences it sets into motion, connects individuallevel nationalism to intergroup attitudes. Here, I take seriously the idea that attitudes about social groups "are embedded within a much broader context of intergroup relations" (Van Assche et al. 2017: 758) that provide socially-shared heuristics for how to appraise others.

To make this argument, I build on Blumer's (1958) group position model of prejudice as well as recent attempts to broaden this model's theoretical scope (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Denis 2015). In his classic essay on the social roots of American racism, Blumer (1958: 3) developed an explanation for intergroup prejudice that did not reduce the phenomenon to a "set of feelings lodged in the individual." In Blumer's view, prejudice should be imagined as a *collective* process shaped by institutions that diffuse normative ideas about how different ethnocultural categories (e.g., Black and white in South Africa) are related to one another. Individuals internalize these norms and come to develop a *sense of group position*: i.e., intuitions about where "their" group is oriented in social space in relation to other ethnocultural communities.

When these intuitions are paired with chauvinistic beliefs that are widely shared among putative group members (outgroup derogation, feelings of ingroup superiority and a belief that one's ethnocultural group should enjoy rarefied privileges), prejudice emerges as a social force. In classic iterations of group position theory, a key precondition for prejudice is the perception of *threat* from outgroups who, pursuant to cultural narratives built up over time, seek to challenge the entitlements of ingroup members (Denis 2015). In many respects, this precondition is in line with the idea that *collective status threats* are driving exclusionary political movements around much of the modern world (Bonikowski 2017a; Gidron and Hall 2017).

Classic formulations of group position theory were developed to explain prejudice towards minorities by majority group members. In recent decades, scholars have broadened the scope of the theory to account for multiethnic contexts. In these settings, socially shared ideas about "a group's historical position in the social structure" are encoded by individuals as normative heuristics that capture the degree of *alienation* separating "their" ethnocultural group from the core of society (Bobo and Hutchings 1996: 956). As alienation rises, so too should collective perceptions of threat and, *ceteris paribus*, prejudice among minorities (Hutchings and Wong 2014).

In sum, a person's location in social space should constrain their beliefs about the nation *as well* as their intergroup attitudes. Understood in this way, the ethnonationalism of majorities can be viewed as expressions of chauvinistic ideas that derive from intuitions about their group's privileged position at the heart of the national community. In a similar vein, low levels of national attachment and outgroup affect among some minorities may derive from their sense of alienation from greater society and their distance from social groups unconditionally located within the bounds of the nation (see Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012).

3.4 Intragroup Heterogeneity and Main Expectations

The group position model provides a robust framework for understanding how socially shared ideas about the ethnic order can fuel prejudice. At the same time, it does not consider how individuals located in similar regions of social space can acquire *different* cultural beliefs about so-called outsiders and the nation at large: as noted, although some majorities gravitate towards ethnonationalism, others encode inclusive ideas about the contours of nationhood (Bonikowski 2016). Similarly, recent studies on claims-making among immigrants rarely account for immigrant-origin people who *reject* the nation as a locus of collective identity; how might the membership claims advanced by these individuals differ from those seeking inclusion within the bounds of the nation? Further still, how might these disparate membership claims relate to intergroup affect?

These questions speak to the importance of considering *intragroup heterogeneity* in analyses of personal culture. Normative heuristics about the positional arrangement of social groups may very well be shared by most people in greater society. However, the meaning structures that emerge out of these positional intuitions should vary *within* and *across* regions of social space due, in part, to different life experiences (schools, neighborhoods, peer networks, parental influences and so on; see Boutyline and Soter 2021) within and across social groups. This does not mean that social position is inconsequential. Rather, positional intuitions should *constrain* attitudes as opposed to exerting a deterministic effect on how individuals perceive the nation or their peers.

Within these constraints, minorities in similar regions of social space should have flexibility in how they respond to alienation just as native majorities should have flexibility in how they engage with widely shared ideas about "group superiority" (see Denis 2015). For example, some Turkish-origin Germans may aspire to diversify popular understandings of German nationhood in response to alienation, while others may withdraw from the national community and remain susceptible to "competitive threats" from ethnocultural outsiders (see Bobo 1999). Similarly, some ethnic Germans may embrace chauvinistic ideas about the boundaries of nationhood, while others may adopt more inclusionary conceptions about the nation's bounds.

As a result, individuals located in different quadrants of social space may be advancing similar claims about the boundaries of nationhood (e.g., about a relatively inclusive Germany) but may use different *kinds* of attitudes to signal these membership claims. As noted, second-generation immigrants may emphasize the importance of ascriptive attributes like nativity to stake their claim to membership in the host society or challenge popular associations that link the nation to specific ethnocultural categories (e.g., ethnic Germans). From the perspective of majorities, challenging these same associations should involve *de-emphasizing* the importance of nativity and other ascriptive attributes when defining the nation's boundaries.

As I discuss below, this polysemy suggests that two individuals with very similar attitudes towards the nation may—as a function of their social location—be pursuing vastly different *boundary-making strategies*. In principle, these disparate strategies should lead to sharp ethnic differences in how nationalist beliefs are associated with intergroup attitudes.

3.4.1 Boundary-Making

Following the canonical work of Fredrik Barth ([1969] 1998), scholars across the social and behavioral sciences have used the *boundary* metaphor to make sense of ethnic phenomena (Alba 2005; Kroneberg, Kruse, and Wimmer 2021; Lamont and Molnár 2002; Zolberg and Woon 1999). In Barthian terms, ethnic units are not defined by a fixed set of characteristics, but by dynamic acts of boundary-making that create insiders and outsiders—or *us* and *them*—through processes of classification, distancing and closure (Bloemraad 2018). While intimately shaped by features of the social field, boundary-making often takes place at the individual-level, with actors employing distinct boundary-making strategies in pursuit of material or symbolic ends.

Scrutinizing these strategies can, in my view, help clarify the linkages between social position, nationalist beliefs and intergroup attitudes. Interactions between nationalist sentiments and sociocultural location should, for instance, serve as windows into individual-level boundary-making strategies. Thus, when native majorities encode ardent schemas of the nation (high levels of national identification, restrictive boundaries; see Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016), they show signs of boundary *policing* or *contraction*: motivated to maintain their privileged *social position*, these majority group members either police the bounds of nationhood to "make assimilation and other strategies of boundary crossing difficult" (Wimmer 2008: 1002) or contract them to remove individuals who could qualify for membership on civic grounds. Conversely, majorities with thinner sets of nationalist beliefs pursue *blurring* or *expansion* to transcend ethnicity "as a principle of categorization and social organization" (Wimmer 2013: 61) or relax criteria for national membership to include a range of ethnic communities within the bounds of the nation.

On the other side of the majority-minority divide, the logic of boundary-making is likely inverted. When minorities encode disengaged nation-state schemas (low identification, inclusive boundaries; see Soehl and Karim 2021), they show signs of *contraction* by "shifting emphasis" away from the nation and towards subgroups at "lower levels of differentiation" (Wimmer 2013: 55), blocking acculturation in the process. Conversely, when minorities adopt thicker sets of nationalist beliefs, they pursue *blurring* or *crossing* to dampen the social resonance of ethnic distinctions or cross the native-immigrant boundary via acculturative channels.

Nationalist beliefs and boundary-making strategies can therefore be imagined as prisms into membership *claims* that are tied up in an individual's position in social space. Below, I use this insight to develop two hypotheses that link claims about the nation to intergroup attitudes.



Figure 3.1: Visual representation of main analytic expectations. The panels represent stylized (and for simplicity, bidimensional) renderings of "social space." Each *claim* corresponds to a different vision of the nation *vis-à-vis* the current state of affairs (leftmost panel) – and should have distinct (associational) effects on intergroup attitudes.

3.4.2 Hypotheses

When native majorities embrace thinner forms of nationalism (via boundary blurring or expansion), they are rejecting many of the chauvinistic beliefs that are available to them by virtue of their social position. When minorities encode thicker forms of nationalism, they are attempting to reduce the distance—or degree of *alienation*—between themselves and greater society via boundary blurring or crossing. Thus, minorities with thicker sets of nationalist beliefs and natives with thinner nation-state schemas are advancing similar claims about *nationhood*: namely, that the bounds of the nation can encompass individuals of different ethnic backgrounds (i.e., *Claim I* in Figure 3.1). In my view, this should reduce perceptions of social distance between ethnocultural communities — and in turn, lead to greater outgroup affect and lower levels of ingroup favoritism.

In contrast, when majorities adopt thicker forms of nationalism, they are attempting to entrench their position atop the ethnic hierarchy via boundary *contraction*. When minorities adopt thinner forms of nationalism, they are shifting emphasis away from the national community and increasing their distance from greater society in turn - *also* via forms of boundary contraction. Thus, natives with thicker sets of nationalist beliefs and minorities with thinner nation-state schemas are advancing similar kinds of claims about the *entrenchment of ethnic differences* (i.e., *Claim II* in Figure 3.1): among native majorities, thicker forms of nationalism signal a desire to define nationhood in ethnic terms and remove outsiders from the bounds of the nation; among minorities, thinner forms of nationalism signal a desire to define selfhood in ethnic (or non-national) terms and withdraw from the national community. This should, in my view, increase perceptions of social distance between ethnic communities — and in turn, lead to lower outgroup affect and greater ingroup favoritism.

3.5 Data and Methods

3.5.1 Data and Setting

To evaluate these ideas, I draw on six waves of data from the *Friendship and Identity in School* (FiS) survey, a longitudinal study of 2,700 students in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. Survey waves were administered in nine-month intervals and ran from 2013 to 2017. The first wave of the study featured students in grades five to seven who were then followed for up to five additional waves. For technical details about the FiS, please refer to Leszczensky et al. (2020).

In the present study, German schools serve as a strategic research site. Schools are, of course, major social institutions where children are enculturated (Guhin, Calarco, and Miller-Idriss 2021; Lizardo 2017), learn cherished civic values (Winter 2009) and internalize the stories, myths and shibboleths of nationhood (Hiers, Soehl, and Wimmer 2017). Moreover, as the native share of younger age cohorts continues to fall in Germany and other European societies, "... it is in schools where increasing levels of ethnic diversity often become visible for the first time" (Kruse and Kroneberg 2019: 432). In effect, schools stand at the vanguard of symbolic and material struggles over the meanings of nationhood; therefore, they are ideal environments to analyze the propositions detailed in the foregoing discussion.

3.5.2 Analytic Strategy

My analysis proceeds in two major steps. I begin by fitting a mixture hidden Markov model (MHMM) to generate a discrete, time-varying measure of nationalist beliefs within individuals (*nation-state schemas*). Then, I estimate a series of mixed-effects linear regression models where intergroup attitudes are regressed on the interaction between nation-state schemas and ethnic origin along with a vector of background variables.

Throughout my analysis, I apply two inclusion criteria: first, I only include respondents coded as native or second-generation Germans to isolate the two largest generational clusters in my sample (accounting for 77% of all respondents) and to provide a clean comparison of individuals born in the same country but with different ethnic backgrounds. Second, I only include respondents who appeared in (at least) *half* of the FiS survey waves to ensure that the clustering procedure I use to generate my measure of nation-state schemas is not influenced by respondents whose belief trajectories cannot be reasonably mapped. This yields an analytic sample of 1,520 individuals and 6,573 individual time points. In the sections below, I walk through the two stages of my analysis and provide details about the indicators, predictors and covariates that I leverage. For each step of the analysis, I provide results graphically to ease interpretation and relegate more detailed information (e.g., fit statistics, coefficient estimates) to my Appendix.

3.6 Measuring Nationalist Beliefs

3.6.1 Mixture Hidden Markov Models: An Overview

My analysis begins with a mixture hidden Markov model (MHMM), a technique designed to track latent evolutions in panel data and a natural, longitudinal extension of the latent class analyses used in previous research on nation-state schemas (see Bonikowski et al. 2021; Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020). MHMMs feature two types of discrete latent variables: a time-invariant latent class variable that distinguishes subgroups in the data with similar transition patterns (for



Figure 3.2: Structure of latent evolution model used in this analysis. The mixture component of the model (a timeinvariant, mover-stayer latent class variable) is omitted from the diagram to highlight the variables and parameters of interest. Each circular node (S_0 to S_5) represents a latent state. Each square node (y_0 to y_5) represents a set of input variables (see Table 3.1). Time-heterogeneous transition probability parameters are represented by horizontal arrows (b_1 to b_5). The arrow preceding the first circular node (b_0) represents a set of initial state probabilities. Vectors of item-response probabilities are captured by the p_k parameters.

my purposes, a nuisance parameter)³ and a dynamic latent state variable that captures subgroups in the data who are in the same state (or demonstrate similar response patterns) at a given moment in time. Unlike conventional latent class approaches, this second variable can vary over time within individuals; that is, respondents can transition between hidden states across measurement occasions (Magidson 2013; Magidson, Vermunt, and Tran 2007; Wang and Chan 2011).

Figure 3.2 provides a graphical summary of the latent evolution model used in this analysis. The six circular nodes at the top of the diagram (S_0 to S_5) represent the hidden states respondents may be assigned to at a given time point. In the present study, these states correspond to nation-state schemas (or configurations of nationalist beliefs). In MHMMs, the probability of assignment to a hidden state (at a given time point) is determined, in part, by the measurement portion of the model, as represented by the six square boxes at the bottom of the diagram (y_0 to y_5). These boxes capture responses to 12 indicators from the FiS. The input variables used in the present study span two substantive dimensions related to nationalism at the individual level (national identification and national membership criteria) and are detailed in Table 3.1.⁴

³ The inclusion of the time-invariant latent class variable (omitted from Figure 3.2) improves model fit relative to standard (unmixed) latent Markov solutions by capturing unobserved heterogeneity in the transition process (see Vermunt and Magidson 2008).

⁴ As Section 3.C of the Appendix shows, removing the *ancestry* indicator does not affect my overall results.

Dimension	Indicator	Definition	Ordinal Range
National Identification	Important	Being German is an important part of who I am.	
	Satisfied	I am satisfied to be German.	
	Glad	I am glad to be German.	1 + - 5
	Trouble	It troubles me if somebody speaks ill of Germany.	(Lowest, Low, Neutral, High, Highest)
	Heart	Germany is dear to my heart.	
	Close	I feel closely connected to Germans.	-
	Part	I feel like I am part of Germany.	-
National Membership Criteria	Born	Importance of birth in Germany.	
	Language	Importance of speaking German.	1 +- 4
	Feel	Importance of feeling German.	(Lowest, Low, High,
	Ancestry	Importance of German parentage.	Highest)
	Obey	Importance of obeying German rules	-

Table 3.1: Indicator Variables

Beyond being functions of the measurement parameters of the MHMM, state probabilities are also shaped by the likelihood of moving from one state to another across adjacent measurement occasions (e.g., Wave 3 to 4). These transition probability parameters are represented by the horizontal arrows leading into and out of the different nodes in the middle of the diagram (b_1 to b_5). The arrow preceding the first latent state node (b_0) represents the set of initial state probabilities for assignment to the different hidden states. All transition probability parameters are conditioned by a time-invariant, mover-stayer variable; this suggests that a respondent's overall propensity to update their nationalist beliefs (captured by membership in a mover or stayer class) influences the hidden state they are assigned to at a given moment in time.

3.6.2 Mixture Hidden Markov Models: Results

Using the Latent GOLD 6.0 software package, I iteratively estimate different versions of the MHMM summarized in Figure 3.2. After fitting a series of candidate models, I select a restricted two- class (mover-stayer), four-state mixture hidden Markov model based on fit



National Identification

National Membership Criteria



Figure 3.3: Estimated item-response probabilities for members of each hidden state.

statistics, interpretability, and validity. For an overview of the fit statistics that guided the model selection process, please see Section 3.B of the Appendix.

Using the model parameters from my preferred MHMM, I assign respondents to the latent states (dynamic four category nominal variable) for which their posterior probabilities of membership are the highest. To ease interpretation of my MHMM results, I assign the following labels to the four hidden states in the data: *Ardent*; *Thick*; *Thin*; and *Disengaged*. The differences between these states are graphically summarized in Figure 3.3.

Following previous scholars, I use the *ardent* label to describe configurations of nationalist beliefs that feature very high levels of national identification and exclusive conceptions of the national community and the *disengaged* label to describe nation-state schemas that pair very low levels of national identification with inclusive national ingroup definitions (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Soehl and Karim 2021). The remaining categories—*thick* and *thin*—occupy the middle ground, broadly differing in degrees of national attachment and ingroup exclusionism from relatively low (thin) to relatively high (thick).

Yet, thinking about the differences between these disparate belief systems in terms of degrees obscures the fact that they are most fruitfully understood in qualitative terms; that is, as differences in kind. If we imagine each column in the heat map as a high dimensional belief space, we can see how the four hidden states—or orientations towards the nation—*probabilistically* restrict item-responses to specific regions. Within these regions, there is some room for variability (due to local influences, situational constraints and so on), but the overall pattern of item-response probabilities sets unique bounds for each unobserved state. As I will illustrate, membership in these hidden states does not *directly* indicate the kind of cultural community that a respondent belongs to; instead, domain-specific state memberships acquire meaning via their relation to a respondent's sociocultural location.

3.7 Overview of Regression Models

3.7.1 Model Specifications

To evaluate whether ethnicity moderates the association between nationalist beliefs and intergroup attitudes, I fit a variety of linear mixed-effects regression models. Across all models, measurement occasions are nested within individuals (the Level 2 unit), yielding a separate random intercept for each respondent featured in the analysis (Bell and Jones 2015). These regressions can be summarized as follows:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 E_j + \beta_2 S_{ij} + \beta_3 E_j S_{ij} + \beta_4 Z_j + \beta_5 X_{ij} + (\nu_j + \delta_{ij})$$
(3.1)

In Equation (1), Y_{ij} is one of three time-varying target variables; E_j is the main effect associated with ethnic origin; S_{ij} is the main effect associated with nation-state schemas (which are free to vary over time); E_jS_{ij} represents the parameter of theoretical interest: i.e., the interaction between ethnic origin and nationalist beliefs; Z_j is a vector of fixed respondent-level attributes (e.g., birth year); and X_{ij} is a vector of time-varying controls.⁵ The *random* component of the model is in parentheses, and features δ_{ij} -the occasion-level residual term—and v_j , the respondent-level error term which yields different intercepts for each individual.⁶

3.7.2 Outcome Variables

For ease of exposition, I group my regressions into two sets: (1) models predicting outgroup attitudes and (2) models predicting ingroup attitudes *or* ingroup favoritism. In the FiS, respondents were asked questions about the extent to which they *like* members of the following social groups along five-point ordinal scales (ranging from low to high affect): Germans, Christians, Muslims, Jewish people, Turkish people, Polish people and Italians. Using these seven feeling thermometer items, I generate three primary outcome variables: an index of outgroup affect, an index of ingroup affect and a measure of ingroup favoritism.

To construct the *outgroup affect* scale, I take the average score on items measuring attitudes towards social groups that respondents do not belong to. For example, among native German

⁵ For the main models, time-varying controls include religious affiliation (which changed for roughly 1 in 5 respondents) and *gender* (which changed for some respondents over time). In Section 3.C of the Appendix, I visualize results of a model where survey wave fixed effects and a control for parental employment (omitted from main model due to significant missingness) are included. The inclusion of these additional covariates does not affect my results.

⁶ Some recent research emphasizes the importance including a random slope term for the lower-level regressor in models featuring cross-level interactions (Heisig and Schaeffer 2019). For simplicity's sake, random slopes (i.e., adding a $v_j S_{ij}$ term to the parentheses in Equation 1) were omitted from the main models presented in this manuscript. In a robustness check, I fit models that allow the slope for nationalist beliefs to vary at the individuallevel. The results, which are presented in Section 3.C of the Appendix, are broadly the same as the results associated with my main regressions.

respondents who are Christian, outgroup affect would equal the mean value on survey items probing attitudes towards Muslims, Jewish people, Turkish people, Polish people and Italians. To construct a measure of *ingroup affect*, I take the average score on feeling thermometer items related to social *ingroups* (e.g., Christians and Germans for native German respondents who identify as Christian). Finally, to develop a measure of *ingroup favoritism*, I divide values on the ingroup affect scale by scores on the outgroup affect scale. In essence, ingroup favoritism works as a simple ratio measure, with a value of 1 indicating alignment between ingroup and outgroup attitudes (or no ingroup bias), and values above 1 signaling preferences for ingroup members relative to "others."⁷

Attitudes towards Germans are baked into minority respondents' outgroup affect scores. This could introduce bias (for models predicting outgroup affect *and* ingroup favoritism) if some of these respondents view themselves as Germans as well. As a robustness check, I generate an adjusted outgroup affect measure that does not include attitudes towards Germans as a scale component. The results of this robustness check are presented in Section 3.C of the Appendix and are virtually identical to those associated with my main models.

Overall, the Cronbach's α for the seven feeling thermometer items used to construct the indices ranges from 0.77 to 0.87 across the six survey waves. While this signals a high degree of scale reliability, the relationship between my focal predictors and outgroup attitudes may differ in important ways as a function of the social group being evaluated (e.g., Muslims versus Italians or Christians).⁸ To account for this possibility, I disaggregate the outgroup affect index and run separate linear regressions for each possible outgroup as a robustness test (with affect towards the outgroup in question serving as the target variable). Below, I show that analyzing each outgroup independently has no appreciable effect on my results, nor does it challenge my

⁷ Respondents who do not belong to any of the social groups featured in the set of feeling thermometer items did not receive a score on the ingroup affect scale or on the ingroup favoritism measure and are therefore omitted from the second set of results

⁸ The ingroup affect index is based on values from one or two items per respondent, while the outgroup affect scale uses values from as many as seven different items. To the extent that heterogeneity in affective attitudes could bias a mean score, it would most proximately influence the latter measure — which is why I test its robustness.

substantive conclusions.⁹

3.7.3 Focal Predictors and Covariates

The interaction between nationalist beliefs and ethnic origin is centrally important to the analysis that follows. As detailed above, I use model parameters from the MHMM to develop a nominal, time-varying measure of *nation-state schemas* by assigning respondents to one of four hidden states: ardent, thick, thin or disengaged. To generate a measure of ethnicity, I transform the country-of-origin variable from the FiS into a three-category indicator of ethnic origin that distinguishes respondents who are native German (45% of observations) from those with ancestral roots in Turkey (25% of observations) and Other sending societies (30% of observations).¹⁰

In each of my models, I control for a respondent's birth year, sex or gender, religious affiliation and the ethnic composition of their school. Section 3.A of the Appendix includes descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control variables used in my analysis and Section 3.C summarizes findings from a series of robustness checks. As these checks demonstrate, the results presented below are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications.

3.8 **Regression Results**

3.8.1 **Results: Outgroup Attitudes**

In the first set of models, I regress outgroup affect on the interaction between nation-state schemas and ethnicity along with the vector of covariates listed above. To summarize my models, I estimate marginal effects and adjusted predictions at representative values (MERs and APRs

⁹ This is true even if I fit mixed-effects ordinal logistic regressions in lieu of linear specifications. For the parameters of interest (e.g., terms associated with the nation-state schema *x* ethnicity interaction), point estimates associated with linear and ordinal models are highly correlated (r = 0.93) and their corresponding significance levels are substantively the same. For a detailed summary of the ordinal logistic regression results, please contact the author.

¹⁰ Outside of Turkey, no other sending society represented more than 4% of the analytic sample. Consequently, aggregating non-Turkish heritage societies into a broad "Other" category is a necessary and parsimonious strategy.



Figure 3.4: Marginal effects of nationalist beliefs on outgroup affect by ethnic origin.

respectively; see Leeper 2018; Long and Mustillo 2021; Williams 2012).

In the graphs I use to summarize these quantities, MERs capture the average change in outgroup affect (along a five-point linear scale) associated with having *ardent*, *thick* or *disengaged* schemas of the nation as opposed to *thin* sets of nationalist beliefs (the reference category) at different levels of the ethnic origin variable. APRs, on the other hand, capture regression-adjusted predictions for the score on outgroup affect at different levels of ethnicity and for different types of nation-state schemas (after adjusting for background variables).

Figure 3.4 plots MERs for the baseline model predicting scores on the outgroup affect scale. Consistent with theoretical expectations, associations between nationalist beliefs and outgroup affect are moderated by a respondent's ethnic origin. For native Germans, possession of an ardent



Figure 3.5: Predicted outgroup affect scores across nationalist clusters and ethnic origin groups.

schema of the nation (as opposed to a thin set of nationalist beliefs) is associated with a significant decline in outgroup affect. Conversely, possession of an ardent schema (versus a thin alternative) is associated with a significant *increase* in outgroup affect for second generation respondents.

On the other hand, disengagement from the national community is associated with a significant decline in outgroup affect (when compared to individuals with thin nation-state schemas) for minority respondents. While a similar pattern (or negative association) holds for native Germans, it does not clear the threshold of statistical significance. For second generation respondents with roots in Turkey, the development of a *thick* set of nationalist beliefs (versus a *thin* set) also translates to greater outgroup affect. However, this association does not reach significance for native Germans or Other minority respondents, a point I return to shortly.

Figure 3.5 plots the APRs for the baseline model predicting scores on the outgroup affect scale (first panel) along with models predicting affect towards select social groups. Full results for

all outgroup models are presented in Section 3.C of the Appendix. As Figure 3.5 demonstrates, even if we disaggregate the outgroup affect scale, the moderation effect uncovered in the baseline model would not disappear. Put another way, associational patterns described in the previous paragraph are largely the same across models predicting attitudes towards different outgroups.

Let's take attitudes towards Jewish people as an example and briefly compare respondents with ancestral roots in Turkey to those with roots in Germany. For native Germans, respondents with an ardent nation-state schema would be expected to score 2.87 on a five-point scale of affect towards "others" with a Jewish background, while those with thin schemas would be expected to score a 3.26 (difference of about 12.8%). For those of Turkish descent, respondents with an ardent nation-state schema would be expected to score a 3.20 on the same five-point scale, while individuals with thin schemas would be expected to score a 2.68 (a difference of about 17.7%).

Moreover, model predictions show that disengagement from the national community has starkly different affective consequences for native Germans vis-à-vis respondents of Turkish descent. Among native Germans, the possession of a disengaged nation-state schema translates to a predicted score of 3.36 on the five-point scale of affect towards Jewish people. Among those with ties to Turkey, disengagement translates to a score of 2.22 along the same five-point scale.

These results illustrate how affective attitudes map onto distinct boundary-making strategies and claims about nationhood. In Germany and elsewhere, high rates of antisemitism are often attributed to Turkish-origin Muslims (Özyürek 2018; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2009), even as anti-Jewish bigotry remains foundational to the ethnonationalism of natives (see Özyürek 2018). My results suggest that the interaction between ethnicity and nationalism is an important part of this story. Thicker sets of nationalist beliefs are, for instance, signs of boundary *crossing* or *blurring* for respondents of Turkish descent and serve as claims to membership in a multiethnic Germany; unsurprisingly, these beliefs push Turkish-origin respondents with *thick* and *ardent* schemas closer to the philosemitic ideals promoted by mainstream institutions (ibid.).

In contrast, natives with thick and ardent schemas show signs of boundary *policing* or *contraction*. For these respondents, a narrow understanding of German nationhood works against
institutional efforts to combat anti-Jewish bigotry, fomenting intolerance in turn. Taken together, the results described in this subsection map onto theoretical expectations and suggest that associations between nationalist beliefs and outgroup attitudes operate in different ways along the majority-minority divide.

3.8.2 Results: Ingroup Attitudes and Ingroup Favoritism

In my second set of models, I regress two different outcomes—ingroup affect and ingroup favoritism—on the interaction between nation-state schemas and ethnicity along with my suite of controls. Once again, I use marginal effects and adjusted predictions at representative values (MERs and APRs) to summarize my results. For my second set of summary plots, MERs show the average change in ingroup affect (along a five-point linear scale) and ingroup favoritism associated with having *ardent*, *thick* or *disengaged* nation-state schemas as opposed to *thin* configurations of nationalist beliefs (the omitted category) at different levels of ethnicity. APRs reflect adjusted predictions for scores on the ingroup favoritism measure at different levels of ethnic origin and for different networks of nationalist beliefs (after regression adjustment).

Figure 3.6 plots MERs for models predicting scores on the ingroup affect scale and the ingroup favoritism measure. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the association between nationalist beliefs and ingroup affect only reaches significance for native Germans, since attitudes towards the nation and attitudes towards ingroups are tightly coupled. As one might expect, disengagement from the nation has a deflationary effect on ingroup attitudes for native Germans, while ardent and thick schemas of the nation tend to translate to greater ingroup affect.

For second generation respondents, variation in nation-state schemas does not robustly predict attitudes towards social ingroups. In other words, sets of nationalist beliefs may pattern attitudes towards *them* but are not consistently linked to attitudes towards *us*. This is, in broad terms, consistent with Brewer's (1999) contention that "ingroup love" and "outgroup hate" are not inversely-linked concepts that are counterimages of one another, but unique phenomena unto themselves that are driven by different sets of explanatory forces.



Figure 3.6: Marginal effects of nationalist beliefs on ingroup affect or ingroup favoritism by ethnic origin.

Since ingroup attitudes and outgroup attitudes are not inversely proportional quantities, measuring the *interplay* between them can offer important clues about intergroup dynamics. With this in mind, social psychologists have often studied *ingroup favoritism*—or the extent to which individuals prefer ingroups over outgroups—as a distinct and proximate cause of discrimination (see Greenwald and Pettigrew 2014). As noted, the ingroup favoritism measure I use in this study functions as a simple ratio of ingroup affect over outgroup affect. The closer the value of ingroup favoritism is to 1, the more blurred the boundaries between *us* and *them* are.

As Figure 3.6 demonstrates, the relationship between nationalist beliefs and ingroup favoritism maps onto theoretical expectations for native Germans and respondents of Turkish descent, but not for minorities assigned to the Other category. For native Germans, ardent and thick schemas of the nation are associated with greater ingroup favoritism (relative to the thin



Figure 3.7: Predicted score on ingroup favoritism scale by ethnic origin and nationalist beliefs.

reference category), while disengagement from the nation is associated with lower levels of ingroup bias (albeit to a non-significant degree). For respondents with ties to Turkey, the inverse is true: ardent and thick nation-state schemas are associated with *lower* rates of ingroup favoritism (relative to those with thin sets of nationalist beliefs), while disengaged schemas lead to increased preferences for ingroups.

The story is quite different for second generation respondents assigned to the Other category. For these respondents, associations between nation-state schemas and ingroup favoritism fail to reach significance at conventional levels and are substantively small. This becomes apparent when we look across Figure 3.7, where APRs from the ingroup favoritism model are visualized. In the previous subsection, we saw that links between nationalist beliefs and outgroup attitudes

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do not always manifest in the same way for all minorities. These differences stand out in the ingroup favoritism model: while the overall pattern of associations is similar for minorities with roots in Turkey vis-à-vis other origin societies, the differences in magnitude are stark.

As Figure 3.7 illustrates, predicted levels of ingroup favoritism are not only modest (1.25) among those in the Other category with disengaged nation-state schemas, but are nearly indistinguishable from the predicted scores associated with thin (1.22), thick (1.18) and ardent (1.18) nationalism. For their peers of Turkish descent, a disengaged nation-state schema translates to a predicted score of 1.59 on the ingroup favoritism measure, substantially higher than the predicted level of ingroup favoritism associated with thin (1.32), thick (1.22) or ardent (1.16) nationalism.

Despite these differences, the overall predictions mapped in Figure 3.7 broadly suggest that associations between nationalist beliefs and affective attitudes *are* moderated by ethnicity. For individuals of German ancestry, thicker and more exclusionary types of nationalist beliefs (ardent, thick) lead to greater ingroup preferences, while disengagement from the nation has the opposite effect. Among second generation respondents, thicker and more exclusionary configurations of nationalist beliefs seem to attenuate ingroup preferences, while disengagement from the national community leads to greater preferences for social ingroups. In broad terms, these patterns lend credence to the theoretical model sketched in the front end of this paper.

3.9 Discussion and Conclusion

As Bonikowski (2016: 428) explains, "[t]he nation is not a static cultural object with a single shared meaning, but a site of active political contestation between cultural communities with strikingly different belief systems." The results outlined in the preceding section lend credence to this summary but add a layer of complexity: two individuals with similar attitudes about the nation—but who are lodged in different quadrants of social space—may be advancing vastly different claims about the contours of nationhood. To make this argument, I demonstrate how ethnic origin moderates the link between nationalist sentiments and intergroup attitudes.

Overall, I find that the same configuration of nationalist attitudes carries a different *meaning* across ethnocultural lines. More simply, beliefs about the nation influence intergroup attitudes in different ways for native and second-generation respondents.

Native majorities with thicker sets of nationalist beliefs (higher levels of national attachment, restrictive conceptions of the national community) score lower on outgroup affect and higher on ingroup favoritism than natives who endorse thinner forms of nationalism (lower rates of national identification, inclusive conceptions of the nation). On the other side of the majorityminority divide, the *inverse* is true: for the children of immigrants, thicker strains of nationalism map onto inclusionary attitudes while thinner nation-state schemas appear to be exclusionary. These are striking differences that have been hidden from view in the extant literature on popular nationalism. Studies in this tradition have, on balance, treated native majorities as their central protagonists or units of observation. As my results suggest, this amounts to telling one part of a richer story.

In all multiethnic societies, ongoing processes of social definition give rise to ideas about the relationships between social categories (e.g., *Turkish* and *German*) (Blumer 1958; Lizardo and Skiles 2016). These widely shared ideas are encoded by individuals as an intuitive sense of social position — i.e., intuitions about where their (putative) ethnocultural community is located in the popular imagination *relative* to members of other so-called ethnic groups. Individuals in all regions of social space can, in theory, stake claims to membership in the nation but are driven to do so through different motivational channels that have complex effects on intergroup attitudes (Bloemraad 2018; Brubaker 2010; Wimmer 2013). In a diversifying social world, theorizing how social position constrains beliefs about nationhood should be a key objective for the study of popular nationalism. This study is, to the best of my knowledge, one of the first quantitative attempts at taking up this challenge.

The results of my analysis also have implications for the measurement of personal culture. In their treatise on survey-based cultural research, DiMaggio et al. (2018: 32) argued that *thought communities* should be extracted from survey data "based on attitudes alone" and "without reference to demographic or biographical information about respondents." My results suggest that this precept may be reasonable when more than one cultural domain is considered (e.g., *science* and *religion*; ibid), but can lead to faulty inferences when analysis is limited to a single domain (e.g., the *nation*). With this in mind, future research should continue to test whether belief systems identified via empirical clustering carry similar meanings across all regions of social space.

Despite the contributions detailed in preceding paragraphs, the current study suffers from at least three limitations that merit further discussion. First, it did not systematically examine differences within the minority ranks. As my results indicate, these differences are far from trivial: while patterns of association linking individual-level nationalism to intergroup attitudes are similar for Turkish-origin respondents and minorities with roots elsewhere, the differences in magnitude are at times stark. These differences likely stem from the social position of Turkish-Germans relative to other minority groups in German society. As a long line of research has shown (Alba 2005; Diehl, Fischer-Neumann, and Mühlau 2016), Turkish-origin Germans encounter boundaries that are especially bright, discriminatory and difficult to cross. Bright boundaries are, of course, a signal of *alienation* (or a disadvantaged social position) and likely an important part of how nationalist beliefs acquire disparate meanings in Germany and other multiethnic contexts. Due to sample constraints, I could not directly evaluate this proposition say, by nesting individuals within ethnic groups and adding context of reception variables in a multilevel framework (see Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018). Conducting this kind of empirical test is therefore a matter for future research.

Second, this study was limited to a single multiethnic society. Thus, it is worth asking if my results would hold in other countries or regions of the world. With this question in mind, future research should specify the scope conditions for the theory presented in this paper by mapping the link between nationalist beliefs, ethnicity and intergroup attitudes in places where diversity is *not* tied to immigration (like India) or where established, non-immigrant minority groups represent a large share of the national population (like Brazil). Recent research on how Christian nationalism shapes perceptions of injustice in unique ways for Black and white Americans (Perry et al. 2021) suggests that the conclusions presented in this manuscript may travel to other contexts. Still, more work will need to be done before any definitive statements can be made about the generality of my argument.

Finally, my analysis was restricted to adolescent respondents. It is entirely possible that the associations I reported in this paper would change if I included Germans from across the age distribution. This is, to be sure, an important caveat to keep in mind. At the same time, there are benefits that come with cohort-specific analyses of personal culture. As noted, theories of cultural change often point to cohort succession or generational replacement as a key engine of cultural evolution. As Inglehart (2008: 145) explains, these changes are especially likely if "the formative experience of the younger birth cohorts are substantially different from those that shaped the older generations." Younger cohorts in many parts of the modern world are, in stark contrast to their generational predecessors, coming of age in social world defined by "demographic multiculturalism" (Koopmans 2013) and "superdiversity" (Vertovec 2007). Many of these adolescents and young adults are members of minority groups themselves and stand at the vanguard of cultural conflicts over the bounds of the nation. To understand the popular nationalism of tomorrow, it is critical to foreground their stories and perspectives.

Using panel data from Germany and a variety of quantitative instruments, I was able to accomplish this goal — albeit imperfectly. In general, my results show that beliefs about the nation systematically pattern intergroup attitudes and are prisms into specific sets of cultural commitments and political claims. However, these claims are not reducible to the nationalist beliefs that individuals hold. Rather, they emerge out of the *interaction* between nationalist beliefs and ethnicity, creating allies out of individuals with vastly different attitudes about nationhood.

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Appendix

Appendix 3.A Descriptives



Figure 3.A.1: Distribution of indicator responses (pooled across waves). Within panels, values run from low (left) to high (right) levels of agreement. Variable definitions can be found in main text.

Dependent Variables	
Outgroup Affect Ingroup Affect Ingroup Favoritism	$3.69 (\sigma = 0.95) 4.53 (\sigma = 0.70) 1.33 (\sigma = 0.52)$
Nation-State Schema	
Disengaged Thin Thick Ardent	14.61% 39.49% 32.10% 13.80%
Ethnic Origin	
Native Turkish Other	44.67% 24.94% 30.40%
Respondent's Birth Year	
1997 Or Before 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Or After Sex or Gender Female Male	0.12% 3.74% 17.72% 32.25% 28.81% 16.44% 0.69% 0.23% 47.66% 52.34%
Religious Affiliation	
Christianity Islam No Religion Another Religion	51.09% 30.61% 15.11% 3.19%
School Composition (Strata)	
 > 15% Foreign & < 5% Turkish Students 10-14.9% Turkish Students >= 15% Turkish Students 	36.80% 20.28% 42.92%

Table 3.A.1: Summary Statistics (Pooled)



Figure 3.A.2: Distribution of nationalist beliefs by ethnic origin (pooled across waves).

Appendix 3.B Model Selection: Mixture Hidden Markov Model



Figure 3.B.1: Relative fit of a series of restricted, two-class hidden mixture Markov models.

Appendix 3.C Regression Analyses

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	Outgroup Affect		Ingroup Affect		Ingroup Favoritism	
	Coef	t	Coef	t	Coef	t
Ethnic Origin						
Native	_	_	_	_	_	_
Turkish	-0.15	-1.88	-0.07	-1.23	0.02	0.50
Other	0.15	2.51	-0.01	-0.19	-0.07	-2.18
Nation-State Schema						
Thin	_	_	_	_	_	_
Thick	-0.06	-1.46	0.21	6.82	0.09	4.09
Ardent	-0.31	-5.91	0.26	6.74	0.29	10.00
Disengaged	-0.03	-0.50	-0.18	-3.53	-0.06	-1.53
Ethnic Origin x Nation-State Schema						
Turkish <i>x</i> Thick	0.34	4.92	-0.17	-3.19	-0.19	-5.01
Turkish <i>x</i> Ardent	0.79	7.56	-0.30	-3.82	-0.45	-7.84
Turkish <i>x</i> Disengaged	-0.32	-3.72	0.18	2.69	0.32	6.67
Other <i>x</i> Thick	0.13	2.03	-0.14	-2.65	-0.14	-3.62
Other <i>x</i> Ardent	0.49	5.18	-0.15	-1.86	-0.33	-5.83
Other <i>x</i> Disengaged	-0.14	-1.58	0.09	1.30	0.08	1.64
Respondent's Birth Year						
1997 or before	_	_	_	_	_	_
1998	0.76	1.48	0.07	0.21	-0.26	-0.98
1999	0.67	1.33	0.18	0.55	-0.15	-0.57
2000	0.64	1.27	0.18	0.55	-0.12	-0.47
2001	0.64	1.28	0.19	0.59	-0.10	-0.37
2002	0.59	1.16	0.18	0.53	-0.07	-0.26
2003	0.69	1.26	0.29	0.82	-0.09	-0.33
2004 or After	0.31	0.52	0.40	1.00	0.21	0.67
Sex						
Female	_	_	_	_	_	_
Male	-0.11	-3.11	-0.04	-1.77	0.06	2.99
Religion						
Islam	_	_	_	_	_	_
Other Religion	-0.13	-1.41	-0.68	-6.25	-0.23	-2.86
Christianity	-0.03	-0.57	-0.51	-11.66	-0.17	-5.14
No Religion	-0.07	-1.05	-0.33	-6.06	-0.08	-2.02
School Composition (Strata)						
> 15% Foreign and < 5% Turkish Students	_	_	_	_	_	_
10-14 9% Turkish Studente	0.05	1.06	0.09	2 57	0.00	-0.08
>= 15% Turkish Studente	0.05	3.94	0.09	0.75	-0.00	-3.85
	0.17	5.74	0.02	0.75	0.07	5.05
Number of Observations	1,502		1,430		1,428	
Number of Measurements	5,984		5,710		5,532	
σ Random Intercept	0.62		0.37		0.31	

Table 3.C.1: Linear Re	gression Results	(Main Models)
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Note: Highlighted cells indicate that a coefficient is significant at an α of at least 0.05 (teal) or 0.10 (pink).



Figure 3.C.1: APRs for all outgroup affect models (disaggregated).

Note: The vast majority of ethnic Germans are Christian and virtually all Turkish-origin respondents are Muslims. Therefore, predictions associated with models predicting affect towards Christians and Muslims should be interpreted with caution.



Figure 3.C.2: Summary of robustness checks. 3 Levels = a robustness check where a random intercept at the *school*level is included. Random Slopes = a robustness check where the slope for nationalist beliefs is allowed to vary at the individual-level. More Controls = a robustness check where indicators for parental occupational prestige (omitted from the main models due to significant missingness) and survey-wave fixed effects are included. Adjusted DV = a robustness check where attitudes towards Germans was not included as a component of the outgroup affect index. 3 Step = a robustness check where a threestep procedure is used to account for uncertainty in the hidden state classifications. No Ancestry = a robustness check where classifications from a hidden Markov model *without* the ancestry indicator are used in the regressions in lieu of the original classifications.

INTERLUDE II

Chapters 2 and 3 attempted to capture belief systems defined by consensus — i.e., where attitudes are concentrated in similar *regions* of the belief space. Put another away, the cultural clusters or subsamples identified in the previous chapters feature respondents whose *attitudes* are very similar or who tend to agree on a battery of survey items.

The upcoming chapter shifts focus to cultural belief systems defined by *tightness* – i.e., where attitudes are strongly linked by patterns of affinities and oppositions such that a value on one survey item should strongly predict values on others. As in Chapters 2 and 3, I build on the idea that self-related attitudes or attachments are *widely* but not *universally* shared in human populations. Thus, I once again use an empirical technique (*correlational class analysis*) that can faithfully detect this heterogeneity (or mine for cultural subgroups) in survey data.

Yet, the subgroups I identify feature immigrant-origin respondents who likely *disagree* on a range of issues (here, attitudes related to the self). What unites respondents assigned to the clusters I recover in the forthcoming analysis are the *organizing schemes* (or in more concrete terms, web-like networks of positive and negative associations) they use to interrelate attitudes about ethnocultural selfhood, not the positions they hold about self-identification.

Building on an emerging literature on *identity conflict and compatibility*, I assume that the distinct patterns of association I identify in Chapter 4 reflect how different immigrant-origin respondents make sense of the entailments between ethnocultural categories. As I explain, these networks of identity *conflict* and *compatibility* likely emerge due to the different life trajectories and embodied experiences of immigrant-origin respondents.

Chapter 4

Attitudinal Constraint and the Organization of Ethnocultural Attachments Among Second-Generation Immigrants

S INCE THEIR PERSONAL CONNECTIONS and affective ties often stretch across oceans and borders, individuals with migrant roots have a range of identity options available to them (see Verkuyten et al. 2019). To account for these varied identity options, recent studies have examined how immigrant-origin people interrelate attitudes about selfhood and determine which forms of ethnocultural identification (ethnic, religious, national *etc.*) are in alignment and which ones are at odds.

According to this growing literature, two bases of ethnocultural identification—say, national and ethnic identification—are *compatible* if they are positively associated and *conflicting* if the association between them is negative (Fleischmann, Leszczensky, and Pink 2019; Fleischmann and Phalet 2016; Martiny et al. 2017). Understood in this way, relationships between immigrant identities can range from absolute discordance (r = -1) to absolute concordance (r = 1).

The goal of this article is not to challenge the logic of this correlational approach, but to propose a more cognitively oriented framework for using correlational patterns to explore how immigrant-origin people organize their attachments to ethnocultural categories. In existing work, these attachments (which are often described as *identities*) are generally treated as independent attributes that can be isolated using regressions or other variable-centered techniques, while the relationships between "identities" are often summarized using average, populationlevel coefficients. In the sections to follow, I argue that this treatment provides a limited view of how immigrant-origin people interrelate attitudes about selfhood.

My broader argument consists of two key propositions. First, attitudes about the self do not exist on their own — say, as "ethnic identities," "religious identities" or "national identities" that can be pulled apart or isolated in empirical settings. Instead, they belong to a network of selfrelated attitudes, ideas and beliefs that are held together in the mind via patterns of concordance and discordance (see Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; DellaPosta 2020; Martin 2002). Second, all immigrant-origin people do not organize their self-related beliefs in the same way; instead, different thought communities turn to different schemes, logics and principles to interrelate attitudes about ethnocultural selfhood (see DiMaggio et al. 2018; Sotoudeh and DiMaggio 2021; Taylor and Stoltz 2020).

Taken together, these propositions call for a conceptual shift: to think about self-related attitudes as interconnected nodes in the mind and to acknowledge that multiple patterns of concordance and discordance (what scholars typically call *identity compatibility and conflict*) can exist within a single population of immigrant-origin respondents.

After discussing what is gained (both substantively and methodologically) by implementing this shift, I turn to a multistage empirical illustration. I begin by applying correlational class analysis (CCA)—a graph partitioning technique that clusters respondents into subgroups based on the associations they draw to link concepts (Boutyline 2017)—to a longitudinal sample of second-generation adolescents in Germany and a vector of 14 identity-related variables. Ultimately, I find three subgroups in my sample who align and dissociate identities in similar ways.

The associative patterns that define each subgroup [what McDonnell, Stoltz, and Taylor (2020) call "patterns of relative adjudication"] reflect complex networks of attachments that have not been detected in previous research: for instance, *none* of the subgroups perceive conflicts

between ethnic and national attachments (on balance); attachments to dual identity (i.e., origin-German) labels are *compatible* with ethnic and religious identification for some respondents, but in *conflict* with ethnoreligious attachments for others; and a subset of respondents perceive religious and national identification to be in alignment while interpreting a slight disaffinity between ethnic and religious modes of identification.

These associative patterns (or networks of conflict and compatibility) can be described as logics, construals or organizing schemes. Throughout this paper, I use the latter term to describe the latent construct driving individuals to organize their self-related attitudes in patternwise fashion. In the second stage of my analysis, I use six linear regressions and a descriptive visualization to clarify the differences between the schemes identified via the CCA procedure and to highlight how these schemes are adopted by respondents who *organize* their attitudes in similar ways, not those who display similar levels of attachment to various identity categories.

In a final empirical illustration, I briefly consider why individuals adopt specific organizing schemes over others. Drawing on a long line of research exploring immigrant religion in Western Europe (e.g., Foner 2015; Foner and Alba 2008), I zero-in on religious affiliation as a likely part of the explanation. To this end, I estimate a multinomial logistic regression model where cluster assignment (or adoption of one the three schemes identified via the CCA) is the outcome variable and religious affiliation is the focal predictor.

Even after adjusting for a suite of background variables, I find that religion significantly influences how second-generation immigrants organize their ethnocultural identities. Unlike standard analyses that home-in on variation along the Muslim/non-Muslim divide, I show that this result is not solely a product of differences between Muslim respondents and their non-Muslim peers: more specifically, I highlight sharp *denominational* differences among Christians in my sample, as respondents with Protestant roots have cluster membership profiles that are substantially different than those of their Catholic peers.

To conclude this paper, I emphasize that while religion exerts a sizeable influence on how immigrant-origin people organize their ethnocultural attachments, this association is only part of the story. Within faith communities, there is a considerable amount of heterogeneity—or multiple ways of perceiving associations between identity categories—that has not been highlighted in the extant literature. As I note, detecting this heterogeneity is a key benefit of the conceptual and empirical strategy presented in this article. Exploiting this strategy should, in principle, allow future research to unpack how organizing schemes are distributed across and *within* immigrant-origin communities.

4.1 Interrelationships Between Immigrant "Identities"

In his classical treatise on assimilation, Gordon (1964) argued that members of immigrantorigin groups would, in time, shed their ethnic and cultural attachments to the country of origin and encode "a sense of peoplehood based exclusively on (the) host society." In effect, Gordon saw ethnic and national attachments as *intrinsically* oppositional — i.e., tightly linked through a chain of negative associations such that higher levels of national identification (within individuals, across generations and so on) would naturally depress levels of ethnic identification.

In recent decades, the literature on immigrant identities has moved past these teleological assumptions by highlighting multiple pathways to immigrant incorporation, none of which require the disappearance of ethnic attachments or distinctions (Brubaker 2001; Nee and Alba 2013). In contrast to linear models of ethnic decay associated with classical assimilation theory, these studies offer a richer portrait of the diverse and cross-cutting identity options that are available to immigrants and their descendants in host societies around the world (Berry 2017; Spiegler, Wölfer, and Hewstone 2019; Verkuyten et al. 2019; Wiley et al. 2019).

Despite this theoretical shift, the assumption that different aspects of ethnocultural selfhood are tightly linked has persisted. While classical scholarship viewed the association between ethnic and national identification as decidedly negative, recent work has embraced a wider range of possibilities. For instance, studies on acculturation (Phinney et al. 2006), oppositional identifies (Battu and Zenou 2010) and national disidentification (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007) often suggest that national, ethnic and religious attachments are chained together via negative or positive associations in the minds of immigrant-origin people, while papers evaluating whether immigrants' "identities" are *compatible* (positively associated) or in *conflict* (negatively associated) cast this correlational logic into high relief (Fleischmann et al. 2019; Fleischmann and Phalet 2016; Martiny et al. 2017).

While focused on different substantive issues, the studies listed in the preceding paragraph advance similar claims about the mental organization of immigrants' ethnocultural attachments— namely, that attachments to different identity categories are, to varying degrees, interrelated in the minds of immigrant-origin people. However, the cognitive implications of this claim have not been fleshed out in the existing literature, leading to an incomplete view of how ethnocultural attachments are fused together in the mind.

4.2 Constraint and Attachments

Research on the organization of immigrant "identities" belongs to a broader body of scholarship that explores the interrelationships between *attitudes* or beliefs. This literature spans multiple fields, from social and political psychology (Brandt, Sibley, and Osborne 2019; Converse [1964] 2006; Fishman and Davis 2022) to the sociological study of culture and cognition (Boutyline and Vaisey 2017; DellaPosta 2020; Keskintürk 2022). Across these fields of inquiry, attitudes are assumed to acquire meaning in *relation* to one another. In other words, units of cultural knowledge (attitudes, beliefs, ideas and so on) do not exist on their own; instead, they are fused together in the mind through social learning mechanisms and the accumulation of cultural exposures over the life course (see Lizardo 2017). To the extent that this is true, responses to items tapping attachment to one identity category (e.g., ethnicity) should *constrain* responses to items tapping other aspects of ethnocultural identification (e.g., religious or national attachments).

What does it mean for one attitude to *constrain* another attitude? To Converse ([1964] 2006: 3), "... 'constraint' or 'interdependence' refers to the probability that a change in the

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perceived status (truth, desirability, and so forth) of one idea-element would *psychologically* require, from the point of view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in the status of ideaelements elsewhere" in a belief system. More broadly, attitudes (idea-elements) are, in Converse's view, organized around an internal but socially patterned logic of association that binds different beliefs together in a recursive system of interrelations (ibid). Studies exploring the organization of immigrant identities implicitly test this idea by mapping how attitudes about ethnocultural selfhood are (or are not) linked together "via webs of implication" in the mind (see Martin 2002).

To capture this constraint in social survey data, researchers have estimated bivariate associations between pairs of ethnocultural "identities"¹ using correlation matrices, regression models, dynamic panel models and other variable-centered techniques. Some general patterns have emerged in this literature: i.e., associations between ethnic and national attachments tend to be negative (Phinney et al. 2006), associations between ethnic and religious modes of identification tend to be positive (van Heelsum and Koomen 2016), while religious and national attachments tend to be inversely linked (Fleischmann and Phalet 2018) among immigrant-origin samples in Western Europe.²

These studies have offered rich insights into the dynamics of identity formation among immigrants and their children. Yet, by framing interrelationships between identity categories in dyadic terms, they have provided a limited view of how immigrant-origin people organize their self-related attitudes more broadly. As I detail in the next section, analyzing bivariate associations in isolated, pairwise matchups ignores the *overall* pattern of relationships that underlie a system of beliefs (say, about ethnocultural selfhood) and can obscure the extent to which any two respondents display the same pattern of concordance and discordance (see Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; DellaPosta 2020; Martin 2002). To illustrate this point, I turn to a stylized example.

¹ Or more concretely, *attachments* to different ethnocultural categories.

² However, recent findings have cast the generality of these findings into question (see Fleischmann et al. 2019; Niechziol and Medeiros 2022).

Respondent	Nation	Ethnicity	Religion	Dual Identity
Ömer	1	5	5	4
Sara	5	1	1	2
Aylin	4	4	3	4
Andrei	2	2	1	2

Table 4.1: Response Profiles for Four Hypothetical Survey Respondents

4.3 A Motivating Example

This section presents a stylized example to clarify what existing studies have missed (or at least failed to consider) when analyzing the organization of immigrants' attachments. Table 4.1 features four hypothetical survey respondents in Germany–Ömer, Sara, Aylin and Andrei–and lists their responses to items tapping attachments to Germany (*the nation*), their origin society (*ethnicity*), their faith community (*religion*) and a hybrid, origin-German label (*dual identity*).

The response vectors for Ömer and Sara (the first two respondents in Table 4.1) are counterimages of one another: Ömer scores high on ethnic and religious identification but is not attached to Germany; Sara is deeply attached to Germany, but scores low on ethnic and religious identification. Despite their substantive disagreements, Sara and Ömer use the same *organizing scheme* or "pattern of evaluation" (Taylor and Stoltz 2020) to distinguish the four survey items: most notably, national identification is understood to be *in conflict* with ethnic, religious and dual identification.

The other respondents (Aylin and Andrei) perceive associations between the four survey items using a *second* organizing scheme. Aylin's views about nationhood, ethnicity, religion and dual identification directly parallel Andrei's, but are simply *shifted* up or higher in intensity. For example, despite reporting different levels of attachment to the four ethnocultural categories, both Andrei and Aylin perceive dual identification to be slightly more important than their religious attachments and assign equal weight to their ethnic and national identifies.

Figure 4.1 highlights what we lose when these relational differences are not taken into account. Each panel (or correlogram) in the figure visualizes interrelationships between the four



Figure 4.1: Correlation matrix for all four respondents featured in Table 4.1 (first column) and two hidden subsets.

identity-related items listed in Table 4.1 for different populations of interest. The panel on the left summarizes the *global* correlation matrix (for all respondents), the panel in the center visualizes the correlation matrix for Sara and Ömer, while the panel on the right summarizes the correlation matrix for Aylin and Andrei. In the leftmost panel, the two organizing schemes described in preceding paragraphs are subsumed under a single matrix of associations that summarizes some networks of conflict and compatibility (Ömer and Sara's) better than others (Aylin and Andrei's).

To be sure, a single correlation matrix *may* fit a dataset featuring thousands of observations well. However, this is an assumption that needs to be tested using techniques that can faithfully capture *relational heterogeneity* - i.e., the idea that "meaning emerges not from single entities but out of relations among them ... (such that) [t]he same survey response may mean different things to different respondents" (DiMaggio et al. 2018: 31; see also Goldberg 2011). Detecting this heterogeneity is critical for understanding the cultural foundations of immigrants' ethnocultural attachments, a point I flesh out below.

4.4 The Substantive Implications

In the last section, I explained why distinct patterns of "identity conflict and compatibility" are difficult to *statistically* isolate if self-related attitudes are analyzed one pair at a time. Figure 4.1 makes this point clear: while all four respondents positively correlate their ethnic and religious attachments, they use distinct organizing schemes to forge this association. In the current section, I consider why this is *substantively* consequential.

To put it simply: the type of organizing scheme a respondent internalizes carries traces of their exposure to different aspects of public culture (see Lizardo 2017)—symbols, institutions, classification schemes, narratives and so on—over time. These exposures can create latent tradeoffs or complementarities between attitudes about the *self*.

Imagine the life experiences of Ömer and Sara — two (hypothetical) survey respondents featured in both Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1. Both respondents perceive national identification to be *in conflict* with their attachments to ethnic, religious and dual identity labels, but their *views* about self-identity are diametrically opposed: for Ömer, levels of national identification are very low; for Sara, they are very high. Why would two respondents with divergent identificational profiles come to organize their ethnocultural attachments using the same latent scheme?

In short, this schematic similarity reveals something about the social and institutional environments that Sara and Ömer are embedded within (see Goldberg 2011). Specifically, Ömer and Sara were likely exposed to similar *social boundaries* — i.e., salient distinctions between their ethnoreligious communities and greater society made manifest during encounters on the street (Papadantonakis 2020), the cultural frames they observed in classroom settings (Wood et al. 2018), the discourses they saw diffused in the media (Cisneros 2008), or the sermons they received inside houses of worship (Kim 2010). For Sara and Ömer, these cultural exposures were encoded as tradeoffs between ethnic and national attachments, such that higher levels of identification with one category necessitated lower levels of attachment to the other. For Aylin and Andrei (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1), different *kinds* of cultural exposures over the life course led to affinities between all aspects of the ethnocultural self (listed in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1).

Thus, by identifying different *networks* of ethnocultural attachments, the conceptual shift proposed in this paper should provide a holistic portrait of how cultural knowledge embedded in social settings is internalized by immigrant-origin people. By mapping this symbolic terrain, we can track how organizing schemes are distributed across sociodemographic lines and draw inferences about the cultural roots of group differences. Moreover, we can capture differences within social groups that illustrate the *extent* to which sociodemographic attributes shape how immigrant-origin people organize their ethnocultural attachments.

4.5 The Current Study

Using tools at the intersections of cognitive and cultural sociology, the present study attempts to extract these organizing schemes from survey data. To this end, I begin my analysis by applying a correlational class analysis (CCA) to a vector of identity-related survey items. In a second empirical step, I use a set of regression models as well as a descriptive visualization to (i) clarify the differences between the schematic clusters identified through the CCA procedure; and (ii) clearly establish what these clusters *are* and *are not* capturing.

In the final leg of my analysis, I focus on religious affiliation as a key variable that influences how second-generation Germans organize their ethnocultural attachments. The objective of this exercise is to provide a broad view of how social attributes—such as religious affiliation—impose *constraints* on the organizing schemes that immigrant-origin respondents use to interrelate their ethnocultural attachments. Why might this be the case?

As noted in the previous section, the logics or principles individuals adopt to organize their ethnocultural attachments should emerge out of repeated *cultural exposures* over the life course: via interpersonal interactions, engagement with school curricula, media consumption patterns and so on. These exposures should be cognitively encoded by individuals as latent schemes that structure the entailments between different aspects of ethnocultural selfhood.

Of course, cultural exposures will not be uniformly distributed. Rather, these exposures

should be *socially patterned* — say, by one's religious affiliation. In Western Europe, religion has long functioned as a major fault-line that distinguishes immigrants—and *especially* Muslims—from the so-called mainstream (Drouhot 2021; Foner 2015). Thus, immigrant-origin respondents from different ethnoreligious communities may encounter boundaries that differ in their rigidity (Alba 2005); interact with different *kinds* of discourses about their faith community (Brubaker 2017); and attend houses of worship that differ in their level of state institutionalization (Foner and Alba 2008). This should, in turn, create different cultural *constraints* across religious lines that compel Muslim, Protestant and Catholic respondents to gravitate towards different schemes to organize their ethnocultural attachments.

To evaluate the ideas presented in the foregoing discussion, I turn to a multistage empirical strategy. Below, I flesh out this strategy in greater detail.

4.6 Data and Methods

4.6.1 Data and Setting

The analysis to follow draws on data from the *Friendship and Identity in School* (FiS) survey, a panel study of 2,700 students in the German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The first wave of the survey featured students in grades five to seven; these respondents were followed for up to five additional waves that were administered in nine-month intervals from 2013 to 2017. For more information about the survey, please consult Leszczensky et al. (2020).

Situating my analysis in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) provides analytic leverage. NRW not only "features a high share of students with a migration background" (ibid) but is, on an aggregate scale, religiously fragmented: Catholics represent roughly 36% of the population; around 23% of the population is Protestant; and the rest of the population are either unaffiliated or members of non-Christian faith communities (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland 2021). Moreover, *schools* in Germany are where compositional shocks and changes in the country (e.g.,

along ethnic lines) are felt most acutely, and where inequality produced through systems of academic sorting are deeply patterned by ethnicity and religion (Kruse and Kroneberg 2019). Taken together, these demographic and contextual characteristics should make religious and ethnic differences salient in NRW, which should, in turn, affect how respondents interrelate attitudes about ethnocultural selfhood.

4.6.2 Analytic Strategy

My analysis has three parts. I begin by applying a correlational class analysis (CCA) to a subset of the FiS sample. Then, I estimate six linear regressions to simplify the patterns that distinguish CCA clusters before using a descriptive visualization to explain how these subgroups differ from the clusters or classes generated by more conventional approaches to data segmentation. In a final step, I estimate a multinomial logistic regression model that treats cluster assignment as the target variable and religious affiliation as the focal predictor. This allows me to determine whether members of different faith communities are more likely to encode certain organizing schemes over others.

Across these three stages, I apply two inclusion criteria. First, I only include secondgeneration respondents because they are, as the native-born children of immigrants, uniquely positioned to stake claims to membership in several ethnocultural communities at the same time (Fleischmann and Phalet 2016; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut 2008). Second, I remove observations (respondents at time t) with missing values on any of the identity items³ listed in Table 4.2 since imputation "is fundamentally at variance with the relational nature of CCA by assigning individuals scores based on aggregate statistics" (Daenekindt, Koster, and Waal 2017: 808). After applying these criteria, I end up with analytic sample of 3,290 observations.

³ Some readers may question the inclusion of dual identity items *on top* of items probing national and ethnic identification. The decision was made based on a review of the literature and broader theoretical considerations. As several scholars have noted (see Fleischmann and Verkuyten 2016; Hopkins 2011; Simon and Ruhs 2008; Verkuyten et al. 2019), we cannot *a priori* assume that dual identification—in terms of its intensity or *meaning*—is a composite function of one's ethnic and national attachments. The results presented in this paper clearly reinforce this point.

Indicator	Definition
Nation (I)	Being German is an important part of who I am
Nation (T)	It troubles me if somebody speaks ill of Germany
Nation (D)	Germany is dear to me
Nation (P)	I feel like I am part of Germany
Origin (I)	Being [<i>ethnic origin</i>] is an important part of who I am
Origin (T)	It troubles me if somebody speaks ill of [origin community]
Origin (D)	[Origin community] is dear to me
Origin (P)	I feel like I am part of [origin community]
Religion (I)	Being [<i>religion</i>] is an important part of who I am
Religion (T)	It troubles me if somebody speaks ill of [religion]
Religion (D)	[Religious community] is dear to me
Religion (P)	I feel like I am part of [religious community]
Dual ID	I feel like I'm both German and a member of [origin community]
Dual ID (S)	Sometimes I feel more German other times I feel more [origin community]

Table 4.2: Indicator Variables

4.7 Finding Organizing Schemes in Survey Data

4.7.1 CCA: An Overview

CCAs are an extension of relational class analysis (RCA), a modelling framework introduced in Goldberg's (2011) seminal article on the measurement of shared understandings. In the article, Goldberg set out to locate cultural schemas—"socially shared representations deployable in automatic cognition" (Boutyline and Soter 2021: 730)—in attitudinal data. A comprehensive overview of the cultural theory underlying RCAs, CCAs and other schematic class analyses is beyond the purview of this paper. For a richer discussion, see Boutyline (2017), Goldberg (2011) or Taylor and Stoltz (2020).

All schematic class analyses build on the logic used by Goldberg (2011) to develop RCA as a tool for the quantitative measurement of meaning. The basic intuition behind RCAs was laid out in the front end of this manuscript. Simply put, they aspire to identify clusters of respondents—such as Sara and Ömer or Andrei and Aylin—who *associate* items in similar ways or use the same

In RCAs, the schematic similarity between two respondents is determined by a pairwise *relationality* score (a scale that runs from -1 to 1). This score summarizes *between-respondent* variation in *within-respondent* differences⁴ in item-response values. In a second step, the *absolute* pairwise relationalities (a scale that runs from 0 to 1) for all respondents in a dataset are used to create a large adjacency matrix; running a graph partitioning algorithm on this matrix yields the clusters (Aylin and Andrei; Ömer and Sara) that an RCA sets out to find. Finally, the set of inter-item correlations that define each cluster are used to interpret the substantive meaning of the classes identified through the clustering procedure.

In a recent innovation, Boutyline (2017) extended relational class analysis (or RCAs) to *correlational* class analysis (or CCAs). As Taylor and Stoltz (2020) explain, CCAs and RCAs are based on the same set of principles, but with one important difference: instead of using relationality as a measure of schematic similarity, CCAs rely on the absolute *correlation* between pairs of observations (or rather, their response vectors). This shift is based on the intuition that if two observations interrelate attitudes using the same organizing scheme, their response patterns should be *linear transformations* of one another; simulations and model comparisons showing that CCA outperforms RCA across a range of empirical settings lend credence to this idea (Boutyline 2017; but see Sotoudeh and DiMaggio 2021).

To simplify how CCAs transform response vectors into schematic clusters, I turn to Figure 4.2. In the figure, I include the same hypothetical respondents we encountered before (Aylin, Ömer, Andrei and Sara) as well as five hypothetical classmates. In technical terms, CCAs turn the relationships between respondents (or survey rows) into a weighted, undirected graph where the nodes are respondents and the ties are absolute correlations between respondents' item-response vectors (e.g., Aylin and Ömer's attitudes towards ethnicity, religion *etc.*).⁵

⁴ This *within-respondent* variation is calculated by transforming a *respondent*'s (e.g., Ömer's) vector of survey responses into a square matrix of pairwise arithmetic differences. The schematic similarity across respondents (e.g., between Aylin and Sara) is based on the overall distance between their respective *within*-respondent matrices. For a more detailed and technical overview, see Goldberg (2011) and Boutyline (2017).

⁵ To improve performance, pairwise correlations that are insignificant are set to 0 (for my analysis, α was set to 0.05).


Extremely Strong Weak or Moderate

Figure 4.2: Network plot of relationships between eight survey respondents (based on absolute row correlations).

In Figure 4.2, the darker lines indicate that two respondents organize their attitudes in similar ways, while lighter lines indicate that the association between two respondents' response vectors (whether positive or negative) is weak or moderate. Using a modularity maximization algorithm, CCAs should split the overall graph into two communities: the five respondents clustered near the top of the plot (including Aylin and Andrei); and the three respondents clustered near the bottom (including Ömer and Sara). In CCA results not shown here, I confirm this cluster solution using 1000 copies of the eight respondents featured in Figure 4.2.

4.7.2 CCA vs Other Clustering Methods

CCAs are designed to find population clusters bounded by similar patterns of *tightness* or entailments between attitudes (see Martin 2002). When applied to attitudinal data, more conventional approaches to data segmentation (such as *k*-means clustering or latent class models) cluster on another property of belief systems—*consensus* (ibid.)—and identify people who hold similar positions or generally agree on a variety of items (DiMaggio et al. 2018).

Recall that Ömer scored low on national identification and high on ethnoreligious identification, while the inverse was true for Sara. If we were to use a standard data segmentation method, Sara and Ömer would be assigned to different clusters due to their diverging views an intuition I confirm via a k-means clustering exercise not shown here. Despite their divergent beliefs about self-identity, Ömer and Sara *associated* concepts using the same scheme (see Table 4.1 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2). To assess the extent to which identities are compatible or in conflict, *these* associative similarities should be of interest to analysts — and so, CCAs should be preferred to other clustering methods. To find hidden subgroups who generally agree on a set of domain-specific items, latent class analyses and other finite mixture models should be preferred.

4.7.3 CCA Results

Having clarified the logic of CCAs, I now turn to the results of the first stage of my analysis. Using the corclass package in R, I apply a CCA to my full sample of observations⁶ and arrive at a three-cluster solution.⁷ Each of these clusters is defined by a unique correlation matrix (or set of inter-item correlations) that, in principle, reflects a distinct organizing scheme or network of interrelationships.

⁶ As a result, the same respondent can be assigned to different classes over time. Of all respondents to appear in multiple waves, 65.7% transitioned from one cluster to another cluster on at least one occasion.

⁷ Following other scholars, I use a multiple-groups analysis framework from structural equation modelling to evaluate whether a single correlation matrix fits the data as well as the multiple matrices identified through schematic clustering. Whether I use the full sample of observations or analyze each wave in isolation, CCA clusters fit the data better than the single matrix equivalents (or the relational homogeneity models) based on both AIC and BIC values—*except* for wave six (which featured significant attrition). For full results of this model comparison exercise, please contact the author.



Figure 4.3: Set of correlograms summarizing the correlation matrix associated with each latent scheme identified through the CCA procedure. The percentages (in brackets) reflect the share of all observations assigned to a given class (total is less than 100 due to rounding).

In the spirit of simplicity, I assign the following labels to the three schematic clusters identified through the CCA procedure: *Ethnicity-Religion* (ER), Concordant and *Nation-Religion* (NR). Figure 4.3 visualizes the differences between these schemes using a set of correlograms. Each box in a correlogram represents the pairwise association between items on the *x* and *y* axes for a given cluster. For instance, among ERs, the correlation between Dual Identity (S) and Religion (I) is -0.37; among Concordants, the association between the same two items is 0.31. In Section 4.A of the Appendix, I show that limiting my sample to one row of observations per respondent (i.e., by isolating the latest wave for every student) does not affect my results.

4.8 Clarifying Cluster Differences

Summarizing each pairwise association depicted in Figure 4.3 would lead to an overly complex empirical portrait. Thus, to ease interpretation, I first transform the set of survey items listed in Table 4.1 into a smaller set of scales related to national, ethnic (origin), religious and dual identification (using mean scores). Then, I use a battery of linear regressions to clarify how class assignment into the Ethnicity-Religion, Concordant or Nation-Religion categories moderates the relationships between these identity scales. Finally, I use a descriptive visualization to discuss what these classes do not capture (belief agreement) to further clarify the substantive meaning of the latent construct of interest (organizing schemes).

The first item (scale construction) is worth explaining in more detail. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, there are 91 pairwise associations that distinguish the three schemes identified by the CCA procedure. Describing each of these associations and noting how they differ across clusters would muddy interpretation of the *patterns* that serve as empirical signatures for each organizing scheme. Scales can help simplify the story. Of course, using scales as *input* variables for CCAs or other methods designed to capture relational heterogeneity would introduce bias, as fine-grained differences at the subscale level would be reduced to noise or averaged out.⁸ However, as Baldassarri and Goldberg (2014) have shown, using scales *after* schematic clustering can substantially reduce the universe of pairwise associations that need to be described while retaining information (via class membership) about relational differences that were detected during the clustering process.

4.8.1 OLS Specifications and Results

To clarify the differences between the three classes identified by the CCA, I reduce the 91 pairwise associations featured in Figure 4.3 to six using a set of six linear regressions. All six

⁸ For example, among NRs, the association between Origin (T) and Religion (T) is positive while the association between Origin (H) and Religion (T) is negative. These pockets of relational variation are flattened when scales are used in lieu of individual items ahead of schematic clustering.



📕 Ethnicity-Religion (ER) Scheme 📕 Concordant Scheme 📒 Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme

Figure 4.4: Visual summaries of model predictions from six linear regressions where one identity scale is regressed on the interaction between a second scale and cluster assignment. Across all models, survey wave fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

models include survey wave fixed-effects and standard errors clustered at the respondent-level. In each model, a specific identity scale (e.g., *ethnicity*) is regressed on the interaction between a different identity scale (e.g., *religion*) and cluster assignment — a discrete grouping variable with three levels: Ethnicity-Religion (ER), Concordant and Nation-Religion (NR). Since the objective of this exercise is to highlight broad differences across clusters, no additional controls are included.

I use Figure 4.4 to present regression results while relegating parameter estimates to Section 4.B of the Appendix. The six panels in Figure 4.4 visualize adjusted predictions from each model and highlight differences across clusters. More concretely, each panel summarizes the association between two identity scales constructed using the input variables listed in Table 4.2.

Within each panel, different regression lines illustrate how correlations between the two scales mentioned in the panel text differ as a function of the scheme a respondent adopts.

As the first panel in Figure 4.4 shows, values on the ethnic identification scale are weakly but *positively*—associated with values on the nationality scale (Model 1). The top-center panel (Model 2) is where clear differences between the schematic clusters start to emerge: among NRs, the relationship between religious and national attachments is *sharply* positive; among Concordants, the link is moderately positive; and among ERs, the association is almost flat. In the panel on the top right (Model 3), we continue to see stark differences: the correlation between religious and ethnic identification is slightly *negative* for NRs and sharply positive for Concordants and ERs.

The bottom row of Figure 4.4 visualizes results from a series of models that feature the dual identity scale as the target variable. For members of all three classes, national and dual identification appear to be eminently compatible (Model 4). Intercluster differences are easier to spot in Models 5 and 6. In the bottom-center panel (Model 5), ethnic and dual identification appear to be in conflict for ERs while the inverse is true for Concordants and NRs. The panel on the bottom right (Model 6) features a similar pattern: i.e., religious attachments and dual identification appear to be in *conflict* for ERs but are positively linked for NRs and those in the Concordant cluster.

Taken together, these results reveal patterns of compatibility and conflict that have not been detected in prior research. *None* of the clusters are defined by a conflict between ethnic and national attachments (on balance). *Dual identity* appears to underlie much of the differences across classes, as some respondents (ERs) perceive an antinomy between dual identification and their ethnoreligious attachments, while others (NRs and Concordants) do not. Finally, while some respondents see ethnic and religion identification as highly compatible (Concordants and ERs), others perceive a slight *discordance* between their ethnic and religious attachments (NRs); for this latter group, it is religion and nationhood that appear to go hand-in-hand.



Figure 4.5: Distribution of scores on the four identity scales across the schematic clusters.

4.8.2 CCA Clusters and Levels of Identification

As noted, CCAs do not divide samples into classes based on the beliefs that individuals hold. Rather, CCAs find clusters of respondents who associate concepts in similar ways (should such heterogeneity exist). To make this point clear, I use Figure 4.5 to illustrate the distribution of scores on the four identity scales within and across the three schematic classes.

Figure 4.5 illustrates how the three CCA clusters contain multitudes: individuals with substantially different beliefs about self-identity are often members of the same class and many respondents with similar identificational profiles belong to different schematic clusters. This underscores a point made in the previous section: CCA classes are not bounded by consensus, but by patterns of "affinity, entailment and opposition among beliefs" (DiMaggio et al. 2018: 32).

Thus, cluster-specific means or central tendencies are not especially informative for interpreting the results of relational class methods (Goldberg 2011).

At the same time, some of the descriptive results displayed in Figure 4.5 merit further discussion. For example, the conflict between dual identity and ethnoreligious attachments among ERs corresponds to very low levels of dual identification for most cluster members. Here, the relative difference between two modes of identification (e.g., dual identity and religious identity) in terms of *levels* aligns with the oppositional patterns described above.

On the other hand, although Concordants perceive all aspects of ethnocultural selfhood to be compatible, their *levels* of national identification are generally quite low. More concretely, Concordants tend to score low on national identification and high on dual, ethnic and religious attachments, but perceive all four bases of ethnocultural identification to be compatible. Thus, their low scores on national identification (on average) are not a product of their other ethnocultural attachments — a possibility that has often been overlooked in existing research on "oppositional cultures" or *oppositional identifies* (e.g., Battu and Zenou 2010).

4.9 Religious Affiliation, Organizing Schemes

4.9.1 Multinomial Logistic Regression: Specifications

Having clarified the broad differences between the three organizing schemes, I turn to the main substantive question posed in the foregoing discussion — namely, are members of different faith communities more likely to encode certain organizing schemes over others? To arrive at an answer, I estimate a multinomial logistic regression model (Model 7) where class assignment— into the ER, Concordant or NR clusters—is the dependent variable and religious affiliation serves as the focal predictor. In my analysis, religious affiliation is a four-category variable with the following levels: Catholic (19% of all observations), Protestant (14% of all observations), Islam (60% of all observations) and a residual Other category (7% of all observations).

In Model 7, I include survey wave fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the respondentlevel. In addition, I include the following variables as controls: respondent's birth year, sex or gender, ethnic origin (a discrete variable with four levels: Turkey, the Former Soviet Union, Poland and Other), the ethnic composition of the respondent's school, and the average occupational prestige score of their parents' profession(s). To account for missingness, I impute missing values using chained equations and pool the estimates of five imputed datasets to generate the statistical quantities presented in this manuscript. Summary statistics for the covariates featured in this analysis can be found in Section 4.B of the Appendix.

4.9.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression: Results

I estimate average marginal effects (AMEs) and adjusted predictions at representative values (APRs) to summarize the results of Model 7 (see Leeper 2018; Long and Mustillo 2021; Williams 2012). To facilitate interpretation, I present these quantities graphically and move more detailed information (coefficient estimates, test statistics) to Section 4.B of the Appendix.

The AMEs in Figure 4.6 capture the average change in the probability of encoding the three organizing schemes (identified through the CCA) for Protestants, Muslims and other non-Christian respondents *relative* to Catholics. Like other scholars, I find sharp differences along the Muslim/non-Muslim divide. Compared to Catholics (the reference group), Muslim respondents are far more likely to adopt ER and Concordant schemes and far less likely to encode an NR scheme. These differences are substantively large (ranging from a change in probability of -0.22 to +0.16) and often reach significance.⁹ Yet, as Figure 4.6 suggests, there are sharp *denominational* differences among Christians as well: relative to their Catholic peers, Protestants are significantly less likely (-0.15) to adopt ER schemes and more likely (+0.11) to encode NR schemes.

Figure 4.7 uses APRs to display the distributional consequences of these differences. More concretely, it plots adjusted predictions for class assignment as a function of religious affiliation.

⁹ However, the probability of adopting an ER scheme is not significantly higher for Muslim respondents relative to their Catholic counterparts (at an α of 0.05 or 0.10).



Model 7: Predicting Cluster Membership (AMEs)

Figure 4.6: Average marginal effect of religious affiliation on cluster membership probability.

As the top two panels show, second generation respondents with Catholic and Protestant roots tend to display substantively different profiles (on an aggregate scale) when it comes to their organizing schemes. For instance, roughly 43% of Catholic respondents should-pursuant to estimates from Model 7-adopt an ER scheme, while only 29% of Protestants should be assigned to the ER cluster. Conversely, while 46% Protestants should be assigned to the NR category, just 35% of Catholics would be expected to adopt an NR scheme (based on model predictions). Moreover, Figure 4.7 suggests that religious and national identities-or attachments to Islam and Germany-are largely orthogonal for Muslim respondents: per Model 7 estimates, only 13% of Muslims should have an NR scheme while about half should be assigned to the ER cluster.





Figure 4.7: Predicted class proportions by religious affiliation (based on the results of Model 7).

4.9.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression: Discussion

The results presented in the last subsection illustrate how sociodemographic attributes (like religious affiliation) constrain the kinds of organizing schemes that immigrant-origin people adopt. In other words, opportunity structures for the schematic organization of identities are not evenly distributed in the immigrant-origin population.

For Muslims, bright symbolic boundaries (Alba 2005) and *civilizational* discourses pitting Islam against European liberalism (Brubaker 2017) ensure that schemes that sharply align religion and nationhood (NR) are largely out of reach. As a result, Model 7 predicts that almost 9 in 10 Muslims should be assigned to the ER and Concordant clusters. The differences between these schematic classes do not derive from the affinities or disaffinities between ethnicity, religion and nation (on balance). Instead, it is *dual identification*—or attachments to an origin-German label—that drives much of the interclass variation. For Muslim respondents in the ER cluster, dual identification is at odds with their attachments to Islam and the society of origin; among Concordants, dual identity is compatible with attachments to Islam and the heritage society.

Broadly, these results support Simon and Ruhs' (2008: 1355) claim that conceptualizing dual identity as a composite function of ethnic and national attachments "may be too mechanistic and restrictive to adequately capture the rich phenomenology of dual (hyphenated or hybrid) identity in the context of migration." With this in mind, future research should consider why some German Muslims perceive dual identity to be in line with their ethnoreligious attachments while others perceive a strong antagonism — a point I return to towards the end of this paper.

Beyond highlighting relational variation among Muslims, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 also document significant *denominational* (that is, intra-Christian) differences among Catholic and Protestant respondents. These differences may have deep-seated roots. A growing literature on religion and nationalism suggests that nationalist projects in Europe were fueled by Protestantism and its embrace of ideas that challenged tradition and Papal authority (Dingley 2013), while nationalisms that spread to other world regions were galvanized, in part, by the evangelizing efforts of Protestant missionaries (for an overview and critique, see Amasyali 2021).

In contrast, the Catholic Church, buoyed by a commitment to ultramontanism, often positioned itself against nationalist projects (as in France) unless "nationalism was prepared to submit to Catholicism as its prime authority" (as in Ireland; Dingley 2013: 103). That secondgeneration Protestants are more inclined to perceive affinities between nation and religion *visà-vis* their Catholic peers may stem from these entrenched differences — i.e., the disparate relationships between Protestantism, Catholicism and nationhood across time and space that are reproduced in church settings in Germany.

There are, to be sure, other potential explanations that cannot be ruled out with the data at hand. For instance, since Christianity and nationhood are integrated in different ways around the world (McLeod 2015; Rieffer 2003), the patterns summarized in the last subsection may very

well be tied up in the ethnic composition of my sample.¹⁰ Evaluating this possibility (and other explanations) should anchor future research on immigrant-origin Christians.

4.10 Conclusion

This paper set out to reorient research on the organization of immigrants' ethnocultural attachments. In prior work, scholars explored the conflict or compatibility between identity categories using correlational summaries at the population level. In the current study, I advocated for a more connectionist approach to conceptualizing the affinities and oppositions between self-related attitudes. To this end, I shifted focus away from bivariate correlations between specific concept pairs (e.g., ethnic and national attachments) and towards a global assessment of the organizing schemes, logics and principles immigrant-origin people use to interrelate attitudes about ethnocultural selfhood.

The main argument I outlined in this paper can be reduced to two key propositions. First, attitudes about ethnic, national, religious or dual identity do not exist on their own; instead, they acquire meaning through their interrelationships in the mind. Second, all individuals with migrant roots do not think about the entailments between ethnocultural attachments in the same way; instead, there are *several* organizing schemes—or patterns of identity concordance and discordance—that are used by members of the immigrant-origin population to interrelate attitudes about the ethnocultural self.

With these propositions in mind, I conceptualized self-related attitudes as nodes in correlational *networks* that are unevenly distributed among immigrant-origin respondents. To capture these schematic networks in survey data, I used correlational class analysis (CCA), a technique designed to find hidden subgroups who associate and dissociate attitudes in similar ways.

Ultimately, I found three subpopulations in my sample who lean on three distinct schemes

¹⁰ As noted, an ethnic origin indicator is included on the right-hand side of Model 7. Still, the tight link between national origin and denominational affiliation—as well as selection effects endogenous to migration—makes it difficult to conclusively net out the influence of ethnicity when analyzing religious variation among immigrants.

to organize their attachments to various ethnocultural categories: individuals with Ethnicity-Religion (ER) schemes align their ethnic and religious attachments and perceive a *discordance* between dual identification and their ethnoreligious identities; Concordants view all aspects of ethnocultural selfhood to be compatible, but often score low on national identification; finally, individuals with Nation-Religion (NR) schemes align their ethnic and national identities but interpret a slight *dissonance* between their ethnic and religious attachments.

Each of these schemes correspond to patterns of identity conflict and compatibility that have not been reported in the extant literature: *none* of the clusters are defined by oppositions between ethnic and national attachments (on balance), *dual identity* drives much of the relational variation across subgroups and some respondents dissociate ethnic and religious attachments (or at the very least, view them as orthogonal). This heterogeneity would have been pushed out of view if conventional, variable-centered tools were used in lieu of schematic clustering.

In the final step of my empirical sequence, I considered why individuals adopt specific schemes over others and homed in on religious affiliation as an important part of the story. Using a multinomial logistic regression model, I showed that religious affiliation places strong constraints on the kinds of organizing schemes that individuals encode. Muslim respondents were, for instance, rarely assigned to the NR cluster; Protestant respondents were most likely to encode NR schemes; and Catholic respondents were—like their Muslim peers—most likely to end up in the ER class.

These differences highlight the demographic foundations of what Baldassarri and Goldberg (2014) call "sociocognitive heterogeneity." As my results suggest, an individual's location in social space and the life experiences that emerge out of that "gradient positionality" (Bloemraad 2022) help assign a positive or negative charge to the ties that bind identity-related attitudes together.

At the same time, an individual's social position does not exert a *deterministic* effect on which organizing scheme they gravitate towards. Within religious groups, there is a significant amount of sociocognitive diversity: Muslims who adopt NR schemes, Protestants who encode ER schemes, Catholics who internalize Concordant schemes and so on and so forth. Detecting this cultural heterogeneity—not only across putative social groups but *within* them—is a key benefit of the approach presented in this article.

Although my analysis was able to detect broad differences across and within religious groups, it did not systematically examine *why* these differences exist. This is a critical avenue for future research to pursue. Whether explanations are rooted in structural factors, experiences of discrimination or the influence of *other* cognitive-cultural phenomena, a multimethod approach will likely be needed to capture how one's social position, cultural beliefs and embodied experiences give rise to specific patterns of conflict and compatibility.

As this paper demonstrated, techniques that can faithfully retrieve correlational networks must be included in this multimethod toolkit — to provide a bird's eye view of the interrelation-ships that fuse different immigrant identities together and to identify *distinct* organizing schemes in a population should such heterogeneity exist.

4.11 References

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Appendix

Appendix 4.A Correlational Class Analysis



Figure 4.A.1: Robustness check for the CCA procedure used in the main text. The top panel represents the original cluster solution (featuring more than one wave per respondent). The bottom panel visualizes the results of an *alternative* CCA restricted to the latest wave per respondent. In both cases, k = 3 is the optimal solution; moreover, the associational patterns across clusters are broadly the same.

Appendix 4.B Regression Analysis: Descriptives and Results

Organizing Scheme	
Ethnicity-Religion (ER)	44.38%
Concordant	31.40%
Nation-Religion (NR)	24.22%
Religious Affiliation	
Catholic	18.85%
Protestant	13.71%
Islam	60.21%
Other	7.23%
Survey Wave	
1	20.00%
2	22.46%
3	23.16%
4	14.01%
5	12.43%
6	7.93%
Origin Society	
Turkey	48.81%
Former Soviet Union	10.58%
Other	33.31%
Poland	7.29%
Respondent's Birth Year	
1997 or before	0.34%
1998	4.54%
1999	20.94%
2000	30.79%
2001	25.69%
2002	16.43%
2003	0.78%
2004 or after	0.50%
Sex or Gender	
Male	48.48%
Female	51.52%
School Composition (Strata)	
> 15% foreign and < 5% Turkish students	25.17%
10-14.9% Turkish students	29.06%
>= 15% Turkish students	45.78%
Occupational Prestige, Household	
ISEI Value (Divided by 10)	3.34 (1.53)
	` /

Table 4.B.1: Summary Statistics

Note: These are unimiputed statistics. Variables indexing occupational prestige have significant missingness.

		Coef	t	
Model 1			L	
	Ethnicity	0.09	2.03	
	Ethnicity-Religion (ER) Scheme	_	_	
Nationality	Concordant Scheme	-0.70	-2.35	
Nationality	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme	-0.11	-0.39	
	Concordant Scheme x Ethnicity	0.09	1.29	
	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme x Ethnicity			
Model 2				
	Religion	0.02	0.53	
	Ethnicity-Religion (ER) Scheme	_	-	
Nationality	Concordant Scheme	-1.02	-3.21	
	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme	-1.23	-6.65	
	Concordant Scheme x Religion	0.15	2.23	
	Nation-Keligion (NK) Scheme x Keligion	0.45	10.02	
Model 3				
	Religion	0.52	18.54	
	Ethnicity-Religion (ER) Scheme	_	_	
Ethnicity	Concordant Scheme	-0.68	-3.57	
	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme	2.03	13.05	
	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme x Religion	0.14	5.54 -14.48	
Model 4	Waton-Kengion (WK) Scheme x Kengion	-0.00	-14.40	
	Nationality	0.67	25.20	
		0.07	23.20	
	Ethnicity-Religion (ER) Scheme	2 20	20.25	
Dual Identity	Nation Paligion (NP) Scheme	2.30	20.35	
	Concordant Scheme x Nationality	-0.27	-6 74	
	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme x Nationality	-0.36	-8.56	
Model 5				
	Ethnicity	-0.36	-7.77	
	Ethnicity-Religion (ER) Scheme	_		
	Concordant Scheme	-2.34	-7.99	
Dual Identity	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme	-1.79	-6.91	
	Concordant Scheme <i>x</i> Ethnicity	0.83	13.16	
	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme x Ethnicity	0.72	12.00	
Model 6				
	Religion	-0.39	-10.78	
	Ethnicity-Religion (ER) Scheme	_	_	
Dual Identity	Concordant Scheme	-2.79	-12.23	
	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme	-1.26	-6.55	
	Concordant Scheme <i>x</i> Religion	0.93	18.69	
	Nation-Religion (NR) Scheme x Religion	0.63	13.64	

Table 4.B.2: Linear Regression Results

Note: Highlighted cells indicate that a marginal effect is significant at an α of at least 0.05. All models include survey wave fixed effects. Leftmost column indicates outcome variable associated with each model.

	Concordant vs Ethnicity-Religion		Nation-Religion vs Ethnicity-Religion			
	Coef	t	Coef	t		
Religious Affiliation						
Catholic	_	_	_	_		
Protestant	0.56	2.45	0.72	3.41		
Islam	0.41	2.14	-1.19	-5.80		
Other	0.39	1.51	-0.11	-0.48		
Survey Wave						
1	_	_	_	_		
2	0.17	1.55	-0.12	-0.84		
3	-0.10	-0.85	-0.17	-1.23		
4	-0.07	-0.51	-0.27	-1.64		
5	-0.27	-1.84	-0.11	-0.64		
6	-0.18	-1.08	-0.35	-1.71		
Origin Society						
Turkey	_	_	—	_		
Former Soviet Union	0.66	2.69	0.93	3.49		
Other	0.16	1.16	0.56	2.89		
Poland	0.67	2.53	1.31	4.64		
Respondent's Birth Year						
1997 or before	_	_	_	_		
1998	-0.80	-1.40	0.29	0.31		
1999	-0.78	-1.50	0.37	0.41		
2000	-0.85	-1.65	0.23	0.25		
2001	-0.77	-1.49	0.37	0.40		
2002	-0.77	-1.48	0.47	0.51		
2003	-0.18	-0.24	0.94	0.90		
	-1.28	-1.88	0.80	0.66		
Sex or Gender						
Female	-	-	_	—		
Male	-0.11	-1.01	-0.05	-0.41		
School Composition (Strata)						
> 15% foreign and < 5% Turkish students	_	_	_	_		
10-14.9% Turkish Students	-0.06	-0.39	-0.35	-2.01		
>= 15% Turkish Students	0.04	0.31	-0.12	-0.75		
Occupational Prestige, Household Average						
Average ISEI Value (Divided by 10)	0.01	0.16	0.10	2.58		

Table 4.B.3: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results

Note: Missing values were imputed using chained equations. Results are pooled (pursuant to Rubin's rules) across five imputed datasets. Highlighted cells indicate that a coefficient is significant at an α of at least 0.05 (teal) or 0.10 (pink).

Chapter 5

Discussion and Conclusions

ULTURE SERVES as a key explanatory resource and object of inquiry in the study of migration and ethnicity. Over a century ago, Chicago School sociologists described assimilation as "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by sharing their experience and history are incorporated with them in a common cultural life" (Park and Burgess [1921] 1969: 735). This process of cultural acquisition should, in time, intimately shape immigrants' conceptions of selfhood while redefining the host society's cultural horizons (Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018; Nee and Alba 2013).

In most cases, immigrant-origin people do not acquire cultural knowledge (*identities*, language skills, stereotypes, value systems and so on) through conscious, discursive reflection. Instead, cultural acquisition unfolds as a largely imperceptible or unreflective consequence of the strategies immigrants employ to achieve success and stability in the country of settlement (Alba and Nee 2003). While the link has not been explicitly made, this idea is eminently compatible with how cultural acquisition—and especially the acquisition of *nondeclarative* culture—is understood and modelled by scholars of culture and cognition (Lizardo 2017, 2021).

Despite their elective affinities, insights from this cognitivist branch of cultural sociology have been absent from recent scholarship in the areas of migration and ethnicity. Across three empirical chapters, I showed how melding these two traditions provides analytic leverage. To this end, I applied insights from cognitively oriented work in cultural sociology to different debates about the identities of immigrant-origin people. In doing so, I made contributions to three distinct literatures: Chapter 2 shed light on the transmission of cultural identity within immigrant-origin families; Chapter 3 clarified how ethnicity moderates the affective consequences of nationalist beliefs; and Chapter 4 reoriented analyses of identity conflict and compatibility.

In the section below, I provide a more detailed summary of the key findings associated with each empirical chapter and highlight some of the implications of these results. Then, I briefly discuss the limitations of my three empirical studies and outline how future scholarship can push my research agenda forward. To conclude, I provide a global summary of my thesis and discuss how my core research objectives (as laid out in Chapter 1) were met.

5.1 Chapter Summaries and Key Findings

5.1.1 Chapter 2

The first empirical chapter in this thesis tested a popular, intrafamilial explanation for why European Muslim children "stand out" from their classmates in cultural affairs. This explanation derives from two key assumptions: (i) that cultural transmission or reproduction is *especially* prevalent in European Muslim households; and (ii) that the cultural distance between Muslim youth and their peers is *directly* shaped by cultural transfers across generational lines. In Chapter 2, I challenged both assumptions by using a multidimensional framework to conceptualize and measure the personal culture of immigrant-origin respondents.

More concretely, I generated a multidimensional measure of *cultural identity* [defined in the chapter as an aggregation of the socially learned beliefs, attachments and preferences that inform our "intuitions about 'the kind of people we are'" (Vaisey 2009: 1707)] using indicators tapping respondents' ethnocultural attachments, tolerance norms and gender role attitudes. To develop

this measure, I used dyadic parent-adolescent data from the *Children of Immigrant Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries* (CILS4EU), 12 indicator variables and multigroup latent class analysis (LCA).

Ultimately, I found four types of cultural identity among immigrant-origin parents and children in my sample: *liberal, hybrid, traditionalist* and *ethno-traditionalist*. Using statistical quantities from a battery of logistic regression models, I showed that Muslim children *do* stand out from their peers with respect to their cultural identities. However, I found no evidence to suggest that this pattern is driven by cultural transfers from Muslim parents to their children – or that Muslim parents are *especially* likely to transmit their cultural identities to their children.

Relative to "cultural reproduction" within households, it appears that forces *outside* the family unit—such as the social closure wrought by bright, discriminatory boundaries—are more proximately associated with the cultural profiles of Muslim youth. Thus, my findings do not support the idea that cultural transmission is especially common in Muslim households or the notion that intergenerational transfers *directly* shape the cultural identities of Muslim adolescents.

5.1.2 Chapter 3

In my second empirical chapter (Chapter 3), I examined the link between nationalist beliefs and intergroup attitudes along the majority-minority divide. While a growing body of scholarship suggests that national identification can breed unity in multiethnic contexts, my results suggest that the relationship between national attachments and intergroup affect is highly contingent. More specifically, the association between national identification and group attitudes varies in both direction and magnitude depending on (i) how an individual defines the bounds of the nation; and (ii) an individual's ethnic origin (or more broadly, *social position*).

To arrive at this conclusion, I used panel data from the German *Friendship and Identity in School* (FiS) survey, hidden mixture Markov modelling (HMMM) and a variety of mixed-effects regressions. HMMM techniques allowed me to develop a time-varying measure of individuallevel nationalism that captures respondents' attachments to Germany and their ideas about the Strikingly, I found that ardent and thick sets of nationalist beliefs (corresponding to higher levels of national identification and restrictive definitions of the nation's boundaries) are *exclusionary* for native Germans but *inclusionary* for the children of immigrants. Conversely, thin and disengaged forms of nationalism (corresponding to lower levels of national attachment and inclusive definitions of the nation's bounds) are *exclusionary* for second-generation Germans but *inclusionary* for natives.

Taken together, these results imply that similar types of nationalist beliefs take on different meanings across ethnocultural lines and correspond to different kinds of membership claims. More concretely, an individual's *location in social space* should inform the kinds of attitudes they use to signal claims about national membership — which should, in turn, create sharp ethnic differences in how attitudes towards the nation map onto attitudes about ingroups and outgroups.

5.1.3 Chapter 4

The final empirical chapter set out to reorient research on the organization of immigrant identities. In the extant literature, scholars explore whether immigrants' attachments to different identity categories (e.g., ethnicity and nationality, religion and dual identity *etc.*) are *compatible* or *in conflict* using bivariate correlations at the population level. In Chapter 4, I proposed a more cognitively oriented approach for using correlational patterns to map the affinities and disaffinities between immigrants' ethnocultural attachments. More precisely, I shifted focus to the *correlational networks* that immigrant-origin respondents encode to interrelate attitudes about ethnocultural selfhood.

This strategy is rooted in two key propositions. First, an individual's attitudes about ethnic, national, religious or dual identity do not exist in isolation, but acquire meaning through their web-like interconnections in the mind. Second, all immigrant-origin people do not think about the entailments, affinities and oppositions between identity categories in the same way; rather,

there are likely *several* patterns of conflict and compatibility—what I call *organizing schemes* nested within a broader population of immigrant-origin respondents due to the different types of cultural exposures—via disparate interpersonal relationships, media consumption patterns, religious institutions, classroom interactions *etc.*—that define the lived experiences of different immigrant-origin people.

With this conceptual framework in hand, I treated self-related attitudes (or attachments to identity categories) as nodes in broader *systems* of interrelations that are unevenly distributed within immigrant-origin populations. To identify these belief networks in survey data, I used data from the FiS, 14 identity-related items and correlational class analysis (CCA), a recently developed technique for identifying hidden clusters who associate and dissociate attitudes in similar ways. Ultimately, I found three subgroups in my sample who leveraged three distinct schemes to interrelate attitudes about ethnocultural selfhood: an Ethnicity-Religion (ER) scheme; a Concordant scheme; and a Nation-Religion (NR) scheme. As I detailed in the chapter, each of these schemes correspond to patterns of identity *conflict* and *compatibility* that have not been detected in prior research.

In a final empirical illustration, I used a multinomial logistic regression model to highlight how religious affiliation shapes the type of scheme an individual adopts. Beyond highlighting these intergroup differences, regression results revealed significant "sociocognitive heterogeneity" *within* faith communities that has not been reported in the existing literature.

5.2 Limitations and Future Directions

While each of my empirical chapters pushed conversations forward in different areas of research, they are not without limitations. In the paragraphs below, I present a brief chapterby-chapter summary of these limitations and chart an agenda for future research to advance the ideas developed in this dissertation.

5.2.1 Chapter 2

The latent class analysis I implemented in Chapter 2 revealed a significant amount of cultural diversity *within* religious groups (e.g., among Muslims or Christians). However, given the substantive debates I was in dialogue with, I zeroed-in on differences *across* faith communities. As a result, the cultural heterogeneity identified within religious groups was not directly examined. Instead, it was used to highlight variation *across* faith communities (in terms of distributional differences). Shifting the focus inwards and analyzing variation in cultural identities *within* social groups is an important avenue for future research to pursue.

Future scholarship should also assess whether the composition of my sample affected the results reported in Chapter 2. My sample for the chapter only featured: (i) parents and adolescents at a single time point; (ii) data from four European countries (England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden); and (ii) responses from one parent in two-parent households — who were, more often than not, *mothers*. With this in mind, future research should explore whether the patterns presented in Chapter 2 persist in longitudinal settings, survive the inclusion of respondents from other immigrant societies (France, Belgium, Italy and so on) and hold if both parents (in two-parent households) are surveyed.

5.2.2 Chapter 3

Chapter 3 shined a spotlight on how beliefs about the nation are associated with intergroup attitudes in different ways along the majority-minority divide. However, it did not systematically explore differences *within* the minority ranks. Due to sample constraints, minority respondents of non-Turkish descent were aggregated into a residual Other category. This aggregation strategy may have flattened variation among non-Turkish immigrant groups and subsumed different associational patterns under broad, group-level estimates.

Still, the broader story presented in Chapter 3 is consistent with my theoretical priors: predicted associations between nationalist beliefs and intergroup attitudes were *especially* acute

for Turkish-origin respondents. As mentioned in the chapter, Germans of Turkish descent face boundaries that are especially bright, discriminatory and difficult to cross: and thus, are likely lodged in the outer regions of social space in Germany. Moving forward, scholars should develop more rigorous techniques for measuring a group's *sociocultural location*; this may, in principle, allow researchers to sidestep the aggregation strategy detailed above (say, by using a graded measure of distance in lieu of discrete indicators of ethnic origin).

Chapter 3 suffers from at least two *other* sample-related limitations that are worth noting. First, Chapter 3 relied on data from a single immigrant society. It is therefore possible that my results are rooted in the idiosyncrasies of the German context or only applicable to societies where diversity is tied to immigration regimes (as opposed to postcolonial contexts or countries shaped by institutionalized slavery). Second, Chapter 3 relied on a sample *exclusively* comprised of adolescent respondents. Consequently, it is possible (albeit theoretically unlikely) that the associational patterns I reported would break down if Germans from across the age distribution were included in my analysis. At the same time, a focus on adolescents provided a considerable amount of leverage — i.e., normative ideas about the bounds of nationhood are most likely to be in flux among younger and more diverse cohorts whose ideas about the nation have been pushed to the margins in the extant literature on popular nationalism.

With these compositional dynamics in mind, scholars of nationalism should respond to Bachrach's (2013) call to integrate analyses of demography and culture by exploring the broad *demographic* determinants—inclusive of age, period and cohort effects, fertility regimes and so on—that underlie nationalist beliefs around the world. As recent work has shown (Underwood et al. 2022), cohort succession is a key catalyst for cultural evolution; thus, contestation over the nation's bounds may very well be tied up in compositional processes (e.g., the link between age structure and political disafffection) that have not been highlighted in existing studies of popular nationalism. Exploring these processes is an important task for future scholarship.

5.2.3 Chapter 4

The final empirical chapter of my dissertation introduced a new framework for conceptualizing and measuring how immigrant-origin people *organize* their ethnocultural attachments and highlighted religious differences in the organizational schemes that respondents adopt. However, it did not systematically explore *why* these intergroup differences exist (e.g., between Catholic and Protestants) or interrogate intragroup heterogeneity within faith communities (e.g., among Muslims). As previous work on conflict and compatibility has shown (Fleischmann, Leszczensky, and Pink 2019), individual-level experiences of discrimination are likely an important part of the story. This is a critical avenue for future research to consider.

In addition, Chapter 4 did not map the downstream *consequences* of the three schemes identified by the CCA procedure. As a result, it is not clear whether these schemes are associated with the friendship networks that immigrant-origin respondents adopt, the kinds of cultural products (music, literature and so on) that respondents consume, or the forms of nondeclarative skills (e.g., math ability or linguistic proficiency) that respondents encode. Treating *organizing schemes* as predictors of psychosocial adaptation processes should, in theory, help link the study of conflict and compatibility to broader discussions about acculturation (Berry et al. 2006) or emerging research on network homophily in immigrant societies (Leszczensky and Pink 2019).

5.3 Conclusion and Summary

This dissertation set out to reorient how analysts *conceptualize* the structure of immigrant identities and *analyze* cultural variation within and across immigrant groups. Moreover, it sought to shift focus away from national majorities in cognitively oriented analyses of culture.

To achieve these goals, I synthesized insights from the sociological study of culture and cognition and the sociology of migration and ethnicity. This allowed me to develop a novel perspective on the conceptualization and measurement of immigrant identities and highlight cultural heterogeneity that has heretofore been invisible in the extant literature. As detailed in the foregoing discussion, this thesis modelled self-related attitudes as nodes in broader belief systems related to specific cultural objects or phenomena (like the nation; see Chapter 3) or *self*-understandings more generally (see Chapters 2 and 4). Moreover, it operated under the assumption that these belief systems are *unevenly* distributed among immigrant-origin people due to different life trajectories and embodied experiences.

To capture these belief systems in survey data, I leaned on multidimensional approaches to cultural measurement. Specifically, I implemented latent class analyses (LCA), hidden mixture Markov models (HMMM) and correlational class analyses (CCA) to find different cultural grammars nested within immigrant-origin populations in different European societies (for more information about these techniques, see Boutyline 2017; Magidson 2013; Magidson and Vermunt 2004). To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation marks the first time that the methodological innovations made by cultural sociologists over the past two decades have been applied to samples that are largely (or *exclusively*) comprised of immigrants and their descendants.

In sum, my thesis reoriented how analysts can conceptualize the structure of immigrant identities by linking self-understandings to relational (or connectionist) models of cognition and cultural meaning (see Hunzaker and Valentino 2019; Strauss and Quinn 1998). It reoriented how scholars can analyze cultural variation within and across immigrant-origin populations by using measurement models from cultural sociology that are particularly useful for identifying cultural subsamples or sources of heterogeneity. Finally, it shifted focus away from national majorities in cognitively oriented analyses of culture by highlighting the perspectives of immigrants and their descendants.

Despite these contributions, the three studies comprising this dissertation are not beyond reproach. As discussed in the preceding section, each empirical chapter has a series of limitations that future research should examine and address. This should, in principle, help push my research agenda forward and lead to sustained cross-pollination between two sociological subfields (the sociology of migration and ethnicity; the study of culture and cognition) that share elective affinities but have rarely been in dialogue. Through this sustained cross-pollination, we should, in time, acquire a better understanding of the cognitive microfoundations of culture among immigrant-origin people around the world.

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