

CHINA'S NATIONAL INTEREST:

A Comparison of Nationalist and Communist Views

by

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## PREFACE

In the course of my graduate work at McGill I attended an International Relations seminar where, as a group, we conducted an analysis of the framework of foreign policy. This thesis is an effort to apply a segment of foreign policy study to China's national interest.

Although the research for this thesis is my own, I benefited greatly from conversations with other graduate students, among them Mr. William Badour and Mr. Paul Nobel. Both Dr. Blema Steinberg and my husband were of considerable help and encouragement. I am especially indebted to my research director, Professor Michael Brecher, for his constant interest, supervision and encouragement.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The aim of this thesis is to explore the concept of the 'National Interest' as seen through the writings and speeches of China's leaders, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung.

The definition of the 'National Interest' varies among Western theorists. Generally speaking, the 'National Interest' may be termed the driving force of international politics, the essential framework for the definition of state objectives and the conduct of policy. A leading theorist, Hans J. Morgenthau, explains<sup>1</sup> that the controversy which surrounds the concept of the 'National Interest' has its roots in the two different schools of thought, "utopianism" and "realism". On the one hand, the follower of the utopian school believes in the essential goodness of human nature. He believes that man can achieve a rational and moral political order through his own good ordering of the world. On the other hand, the follower of the realist school sees an imperfect world of opposing interests. These opposing interests, inherent in human nature, are continually in conflict.

Professor Morgenthau's definition of the concept of the 'National Interest' stems from a "realist" analysis of international

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<sup>1</sup> American Foreign Policy, A Critical Examination, London 1962 pp. 13-23

relations. He states that the concept of the 'National Interest' contains two elements, "one that is logically required and in that sense necessary, and one that is variable and determined by circumstances. The former is, then, of necessity relatively permanent while the latter will vary with circumstances."<sup>1</sup> The relative permanency of the hard core of the 'National Interest' stems from three factors, "the nature of the interests to be protected, the political environment within which the interests operate, and the rational necessities which limit the choice of ends and means by all actors on the stage of foreign policy."<sup>2</sup> The minimum requirement of the 'National Interest' is survival of the physical, political and cultural identity of the nation. All governments, both past and present, when faced with the necessity of protecting the hard core of the 'National Interest', have resorted to exertions of power. Thus Professor Morgenthau claims that "the idea of interest is indeed the essence of politics and, as such, is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place."<sup>3</sup>

The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the 'National Interest' and must be supported by adequate power. "The national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, and national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and of its

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<sup>1</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, Chicago 1958, p. 66

<sup>2</sup> ibid., p. 66

<sup>3</sup> ibid., p. 67

institutions."<sup>1</sup> Here one might argue that the concept of the nation state - and the 'National Interest' - has become obsolete in the atomic age.<sup>2</sup> But, as Professor Morgenthau points out,<sup>3</sup> as long as the world is politically organized into nations, the 'National Interest' is indeed the last word in international politics. China is still undergoing a process of re-emergence as a strong nation, still seeking to defend national more than supernational interests.

Usurpation of the 'National Interest' can come from three sources; subnational, other-national and supernational interests. Charles A. Beard<sup>4</sup> emphasizes the point that the economic interest of certain subnational groups were often presented as those of the United States.

Professor Beard denies the changlessness of the 'National Interest', claiming that the 'National Interest' is but a rationalization for the pursuit of policy, a cloak to cover the interest of the group who have captured control of the national government. He sees the 'National Interest' as a composite of foreign policy goals, selected at the moment by controllers of the government machinery. Professor Beard claims that the entire development of the 'National Interest' has come into being through

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<sup>1</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed., New York 1960 p. 562

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed discussion of the changing concept of the nation state see John Hertz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, New York 1959 chapters 1, 2 and 4.

<sup>3</sup> Dilemmas of Politics, p. 68

<sup>4</sup> The Idea of National Interest; an Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy, New York 1934, pp. 167

a routine process of interpretation and enforcement. Since the government itself is an essential part of the routine, it has taken the initiative, and on its own account has interpreted, advanced and enforced what is conceived the 'National Interest' to be. Professor Beard stated that, "where the national interest is interpreted and applied, there is a division of powers, a diversity of views and an endless conflict of opinion subject to no ultimate tribunal of reconciliation and adjudication. The interpretation, advancement and enforcement of national interest are not confined to the use of institutions and agencies of a national character only.... the entire field of international organizations has been made the vehicle of the attainment of national interest."<sup>1</sup> Although Professor Beard claims that static national interest does not exist, he nevertheless recognizes that survival is the irreducible minimum of the 'National Interest'.

Several other Western theorists concur with Professor Morgenthau's analysis. Felix Gross states that,

"National interests may be defined as the general and continuing end for which a nation acts. They embrace such matters as the need of a society for security against aggression, the desirability to a society of developing higher standards of living, and the maintenance of conditions of stability both nationally and internationally. Despite changing modes of expression, national interests are the constants rather than the variables of international relations. They are desirable and few in number and .... are conditioned by the geographical location of the state and shaped by the network of power relationships."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> ibid., pp. 452 and 453

<sup>2</sup> Felix Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis, New York 1954, p. 53

Professor William Fox<sup>1</sup> believes that the 'National Interest' is not subordinate to, or a part of, a transcendent social interest. Rather, the 'National Interest' is the common focus of secular social interests, and is constant over long periods of history.

It is, of course, unnecessary here to examine all the theories of the concept of the 'National Interest'. Max Weber states that the 'National Interest' can only be defined in terms of national security; <sup>2</sup> Arnold Wolfers writes, "state interests are indeed human interests";<sup>3</sup> Ivo Duchacek agrees with Professor Morgenthau that the 'National Interest' is relatively changeless. All the theorists agree that the 'National Interest' must refer to survival as the minimum requirement.

In this thesis I propose to compare the 'National Interest' of China as seen through the writings and speeches of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. My aim is to compare their words, not their deeds vis-à-vis China's national interest. The first purpose of this thesis is to test the validity of the view, expressed by Professor Morgenthau and others, that the 'National Interest' is changeless. Is China's national interest, verbally expressed by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, static or dynamic? The second purpose of this thesis is to discover the influence or non-influence of ideology on the 'National Interest' of a country such as China. Is the 'National

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<sup>1</sup> William T.R. Fox, "The Uses of International Relations Theory" in Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, ed. by William T.R. Fox, University of Notre Dame, Indiana 1959, pp. 38

<sup>2</sup> Marianne Weber, Max Weber, Tuebingen, Germany 1926, p. 528

<sup>3</sup> Arnold Wolfers, "Actors in International Politics", in Fox, op. cit., p. 86

Interest' shaped by power or is it moulded by ideology, or by both? My third purpose is to compare the points of agreement and disagreement between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung as to their world view, their foreign policy goals, and the tactics they use to attain these goals.

For the purpose of this thesis Chiang Kai-shek is considered the spokesman for the 'National Interest' of the Nationalist régime (1928-1949). For the Chinese Communists both Chou En-lai's and Liu Shao-ch'i's pronouncements are considered, in some places, in lieu of Mao Tse-tung's. Except for some recent pronouncements, for example on Tibet and the Sino-Indian border dispute, Chiang Kai-shek's writings and speeches after 1949 are not examined in this thesis. It is too confusing and unnecessarily complicated to make a triple comparison - that is to say, a comparison of the Nationalist and Communist national interest as well as a comparison of the 'National Interest' of today's "two Chinas".

Any analysis of the 'National Interest' of China requires a continual adjustment of scope depending on the time-span considered. For example, throughout Chiang Kai-shek's rule, the Chinese were continually at war, at times fighting a civil war, at times fighting an external enemy. It is only natural then that Chiang Kai-shek's speeches are highly charged with "resistance to the enemy" pronouncements.

There are many difficulties in attempting an analysis of China's national interest. These obstacles fall into two categories,

physical and interpretative. Foremost among the physical difficulties is the language problem, an overwhelming barrier which prevents most students of Chinese politics from pursuing their research through the use of original documents. Although more and more material on Chinese history and foreign policy is being translated,<sup>1</sup> both the number of these translations and their availability are still limited.

Official censorship and government control over all media of communication continue to hamper our access to material. During Chiang Kai-shek's rule China's policy was of little interest to the outside world - she was the object of the international power game rather than a subject. At the present time there is a vital concern over China's increasing power, an interest which meets the obstacles outlined above.

The interpretative obstacles to analysis are somewhat nebulous. Within the Chinese Communist élite, and to a lesser degree within Chiang Kai-shek's circle, the outward appearance of an élite "monolithic unity" masks any trace of controversy within the group. The lack of public discussion about policy limits our insight, our interpretation, of the motives behind policy decisions.

One difficulty in making an accurate analysis of the Nationalist and Communist view of the 'National Interest' is that of

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<sup>1</sup> For example, the documents concerning the T'ai P'ing Rebellion have only been translated in the past ten years. See Allen S. Whiting, "Foreign Policy of Communist China", in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1959, p. 226

selecting pronouncements which give a "true" picture. The danger is simply that of being able to "prove" something one is predisposed to believe. I have therefore tried to quote at random only the most typical excerpts, and have not offered any predetermined conclusions.



## II THE CONTENT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S and MAO TSE-TUNG'S WORLD VIEW

### 1. THE CONCEPT OF IMAGE

"Image" is a highly complex concept dealing with the emotions, judgements and beliefs that a person holds towards the world.

"We must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the "objective" facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their "image" of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like that determines our behaviour. If our image of the world is in some sense "wrong", of course we may be disappointed in our expectations, and we may therefore revise our image; if this revision is in the direction of the "truth", there is presumably a long-run tendency for the "image" and the "truth" to coincide. Whether this is so or not, it is always the image, and not the truth, that immediately determines behaviour. We act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it "is".<sup>1</sup>

Kenneth Boulding defines the image as the total cognitive, affective and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe. In the international system the images which are important are those which a nation has of itself and those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment.

The "image" is always in some sense a product of messages received in the past. That is to say, the more conscious a people is of its history, the stronger the national image is likely to be. However, for the purpose of this thesis, we are

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<sup>1</sup> Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in J.A. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, New York 1961, p. 391

not concerned with the 'national' image, but rather with the 'élite' image, specifically the image held by China's two leaders.

Kenneth Boulding points out<sup>1</sup> the ambivalent nature of the image, saying that on the one hand the image is a distortion of the truth, easily perverted to justify monstrous cruelties, and on the other, it is a noble and driving force, leading men to act for higher causes. The 'National Interest' is reflected through the image the élite has of the external setting to which they must adjust policy and through the image of the rôle the state plays in the regional system. Expressions of Chinese images are found in the writings and speeches of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung.

There are five components of the overall image, the image of the unity of China and the Chinese people, the image of Chinese hegemony in East Asia, the image of China's historic Great Power status, the image of foreign encroachments, and the Chinese Communist image of the necessity of world domination. It is difficult to draw distinct lines of separation among these images, for by their very nature they overlap and shade into each other. For example, the images of Chinese unity, Chinese hegemony in Asia and China's historic Great Power status all, consciously or unconsciously, have their basis in the Chinese historical tradition.

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<sup>1</sup> Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in J.A. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, New York 1961, p. 393

## 2. THE IMAGE OF THE UNITY OF CHINA AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE

The first ingredient of the central world-view held by both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung is the image of the unity of China and the Chinese people. The roots of this image are found in China's past.

The Ch'in dynasty (221-206 B.C.) was the first to form a united state by abolishing the feudal system of ancient China and establishing a centralized monarchy in its stead. Under the Ch'in state, standardization was effected throughout the empire in such matters as forms of writing, codes of law and coinage.

Expansion and consolidation of the empire took place under the Han rulers (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.), whose armies invaded and annexed parts of Annam and Korea, pushed back the Huns in the north and extended Chinese influence westward to Ferghana and Bactria in Central Asia. Succeeding dynasties from the fourth century A.D. expanded southward from the Yangtze River and ultimately occupied South China. With their suzerainty stretching over increasingly large areas, the Emperors were constantly plagued with problems of unification. The early T'ang rulers (618 - 906) succeeded in building a larger empire than that of the Han, establishing a protectorate over Turkestan and consolidating power in Korea. However, even this consolidation was shattered by internal rebellion.

At the zenith of Ming power (1368 - 1644), the Chinese armies pushed back the Mongols and reconquered Annam. The centralized bureaucratic system of the Ming rulers was adopted by the Manchus,

and before the decline of the dynasty, the Manchus pushed back the Mongols, reasserted Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia and Turkestan, checked Russian expansion in the north and sent invading troops to Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Annam.<sup>1</sup> Like all preceding dynasties, the Manchus failed to secure a permanent unification of China. Like all preceding dynasties, the central control of the Emperor disintegrated, and the remaining power vacuum was filled by a new ruler.

Internal disunity favoured the weakening of ties with outlying areas of the empire, and as China's weakness grew so did the ambitions of foreign powers. Russia penetrated into Manchuria, Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. One by one the peripheral states that had once acknowledged the suzerainty of China came under the domination of another power. "France, victorious in war with China in 1883, made Annam a protectorate; Great Britain extinguished China's limited suzerainty over Burma; Japan, newly emerged from its century-long seclusion, annexed the Liu-ch'iu Islands, and, by defeating the Chinese in Korea (1894-95), gained control of that peninsula as well as of Taiwan".<sup>2</sup>

Chiang Kai-shek came to power when China's solidarity was at a low ebb. Civil war, the ineffectual rule of the Manchus during the latter part of the nineteenth century, external pressure

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<sup>1</sup> These conquests were made under the two Emperors, K'ang-hsi (1654 - 1722) and Ch'ien-lung (1711 - 1799).

<sup>2</sup> Chang-tu Hu, China, Its People, Its Society and Its Culture, New Haven, Conn. 1960, p. 26

from the Western powers, all contributed to a disintegration of internal unity.<sup>1</sup>

In his book, China's Destiny, Chiang Kai-shek distinguishes between "nation", the people within China, and "state", the political and governmental structure of a nation. He projects the image of the unity of both the Chinese "nation" and the "state".

"According to its historic development our Chinese nation was formed by the blending of numerous clans. The clans were originally branches of the same race, spreading to the east of the Pamir plateau, along the valleys of the Yellow, the Huai, the Yangtze, the Heilungkiang, and the Pearl rivers. They maintained different cultures according to the differences in their geographical environment... during the past five thousand years, they (the clans) have been continuously blended into a nation... The unification accomplished by the Sui and T'ang dynasties was the fruit of four hundred years of nation-blending during the Wei, Tsin and north and south dynasties... When the Manchus occupied China, they were assimilated in the same way as the Ch'in dynasty. Thus, after the revolution of 1911 the Manchus and the Chinese were really blended into one body, without the slightest trace of any difference between them."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For a survey of the historical drive for unity see Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Clinton, Mass. 1940, Chs. 14, 15 and 16, and C.P. Fitzgerald, China, A Short Cultural History, 3rd Rev. Ed., New York 1950, Parts II, IV, V, VI and VII.

<sup>2</sup> Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, ed. by Philip Jaffe, New York 1947. pp. 30, 32 and 33. In this edition, edited by Philip Jaffe, the words used in the revised edition are put in square brackets. I have followed the text of the revised edition. In this excerpt we see an example of Chiang's romanticized version of Chinese history - that the Chinese, Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans and Turks come from a common stock and are members of the same family. This view is rejected by modern historians - See Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, p. 167

This "blending together" of the clans reinforced the national consciousness of China, the stoutness of the nation's strength and the enduring quality of its culture.<sup>1</sup>

"This (strength) has enabled the Chinese nation to resist external aggression and humiliation, and has made it unwilling to encroach upon or humiliate other nations. Because it would not yield to aggression and humiliation, the Chinese nation always rose together and drove out any alien clans to recover its territory when the Central Plains were invaded... the Chinese nation, by virtue of its great and enduring civilization, was able to blend these neighbouring clans into a nation."<sup>2</sup>

The fact that Chiang Kai-shek believes that the various clans stem from a common origin intensifies his desire to maintain a united people. He says,

"We all know that the united demand of our four hundred and fifty million compatriots for the past hundred years has been to avenge our national humiliation and build up our national strength... We know too that the united demand of our four hundred and fifty million countrymen during the last thirty years has been for unification, and that the Nationalist Revolution is the most peaceful and most logical way to attain this goal."<sup>3</sup>

Equally vital to Chiang Kai-shek's view of China's national interest is his image of the territorial unity of China. To Chiang all members of the Chinese "nation" must live in unity under the "state". The territorial claims of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung are based on their concept of historical possession.

Yet historical China has never been a static geographical entity. The frontiers have changed with the gradual extension of

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<sup>1</sup> China's Destiny, p. 33

<sup>2</sup> ibid., p. 34

<sup>3</sup> ibid., p. 130

the Chinese culture area. Although the boundaries of the political state have fluctuated throughout the centuries, the area of Chinese civilization has steadily increased. As expressed by C.P. Fitzgerald, "No territory once fully subjected to this civilization has ever been wholly lost, and no territory permanently incorporated in the Chinese area has withstood the penetration of Chinese culture. This fluidity of frontiers is explained by the fact that the Chinese are less a nation than a fusion of peoples united by a common culture, and the history of China is the record of an expanding culture, not that of a conquering empire."<sup>1</sup>

Chiang Kai-shek's image is that of a unified state determined by "the limits of Chinese culture bonds". He says,

"In regard to the living space essential for the nation's existence, the territory of the Chinese state is determined by the requirements for national survival and by the limits of Chinese cultural bonds. Thus, in the territory of China a hundred years ago (circa 1840), comprising more than ten million square kilometers, there was not a single district that was not essential to the survival of the Chinese nation, and none that was not permeated by our culture. The breaking up of this territory meant the undermining of the nation's security as well as the decline of the nation's culture. Thus, the people as a whole must regard this as a national humiliation, and not until all lost territories have been recovered can we relax our efforts to wipe out this humiliation and save ourselves from destruction."<sup>2</sup>

Although Chiang Kai-shek does not specify the "lost territories", an official Chinese textbook published shortly after his statement contains a list of them.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the official China

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<sup>1</sup> C.P. Fitzgerald, China, A Short Cultural History, 3rd Ed., p. 1

<sup>2</sup> Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 34

<sup>3</sup> See table 1.

Handbook 1937 - 1943<sup>1</sup> lists Mongolia and Tibet as "special areas" of China, and states that,

"The nation has about 26,000,000 non-Chinese speaking peoples mostly in the northeastern, northwestern and southwestern provinces. A rapid process of assimilation as a result of intermarriage and the development of education and communication has brought about a new Chinese nation in the making."<sup>2</sup>

Before the mid-nineteenth century the ruling élite had to grapple only with invasion from neighbouring areas and warlordism. From 1850 onwards the impact of Western pressures had an increasingly disuniting influence on China. Faced with a country "carved up like a melon among the great powers" Chiang Kai-shek's desire to unify China was reinforced. He says,

"During the last hundred years, China's national position and the morale of the people deteriorated to such an extent that an unprecedented situation developed. Territories required for the survival of the Chinese nation experienced the painful process of partition... the opportunity for the recovery of the nation and the hope of the rebirth of the state are now presented to the citizens of the entire country."<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, Mao Tse-tung stresses both the unity of the Chinese people and the territorial unification of the country.

"The aim of driving out imperialism and destroying the Kuomintang is to unify China"..<sup>4</sup> Disagreeing with Chiang's statement that "our

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<sup>1</sup> Compiled by the Ministry of Information and edited by Hollington K. Tong, New York 1943

<sup>2</sup> ibid., pp. 1 and 2. For a full description of China's territory see pages 1 to 8.

<sup>3</sup> Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 43

<sup>4</sup> As quoted by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, New York 1938, p. 438



Chinese nation was formed by the blending of numerous clans"<sup>1</sup>, Mao says that,

"China is a country... composed of many nationalities. Besides the Hans, who compose nine-tenths of the population, there are scores of national minorities including the Mongols, the Huis, the Tibetans, the Uighurs, the Miaos, the Yis, the Chuangs, the Chung-chias, and the Koreans, all of whom, through different stages of cultural development, have long histories of their own... The history of the Hans, for instance, shows that the Chinese people would never submit to rule by the dark forces and that in every case they succeeded in overthrowing or changing such a rule by revolutionary means."<sup>2</sup>

As mentioned earlier the image is often a product of messages received in the past. With visions of reunifying his country, Mao lists the past holdings he would include in his united China:

"... This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend to them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Formosa... The Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples, likewise, will form autonomous republics attached to the Chinese federation."<sup>3</sup>

Like Chiang Kai-shek, Mao's sense of urgency for the unification of China is tempered by memories of the imperialists' gains.

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 30

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 3 Lawrence and Wishart pub. London 1954, p. 73 & 74. All further citations from Mao's Selected Works are from the Lawrence and Wishart Publications, unless otherwise indicated.

3 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China p. 96; interview with Mao Tse-tung in 1936.

"In defeating China in war, the imperialist powers have taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took Korea, Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores Islands, Port Arthur; England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hongkong; France occupied Annam, and even an insignificant country like Portugal... took Macau".<sup>1</sup>

A comparison of Nationalist and Communist maps place China's borders far down in the South China Sea off the shores of Borneo. Mao would subscribe to a statement in the official China Yearbook 1959-60:

"In the northeast, Manchuria is contiguous to Korea and Soviet Russia. In the north and northwest, Mongolia and Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) are contiguous to Soviet Russia. In the south and southwest, Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunnan and Kwangsi are contiguous to India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Pakistan... The eastern boundary of China... is contiguous to the sea. In the ocean lie thousands of islands... among the most prominent are Taiwan and Hainan... Further, there are large continental shelves of territorial waters along the sea coast which constitute the maritime boundaries of China.

Except for the undemarcated areas in Southeast Sinkiang adjoining Soviet Russia, Afghanistan, Pamir and India in the south, and those in West Yunnan bordering Burma, the present land boundaries of China are fixed as a result of negotiations with the various countries concerned over a period of several centuries."<sup>2</sup>

These "undefined areas" are territories which were long dominated by China. Authorities such as C.P. Fitzgerald hold that every Chinese believes that a territory once ruled by China remains forever Chinese.<sup>3</sup> That Chiang and Mao look back into history for their view of what China's territorial limitations should be is certain.

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1 Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", published in Chinese November 15, 1939 and translated into English on March 22nd, 1949. Quoted in R. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists, Stanford, California 1953, p. 272

2 China Yearbook, Taipei, Taiwan, 1959-60, p. 29. For an interesting analysis of China's changing frontiers see Theodore Shabad, China's Changing Map, New York 1956, particularly chapters 2, 12, 13, 15 and 16.

3 C.P. Fitzgerald's view was put forth in the Economist (London) "A Dragon with Memories", November 17, 1962, p. 641.

Although both leaders hold the same image of Chinese unity, only Mao Tse-tung was able to translate this image into successful policy acts.

### 3. THE IMAGE OF CHINESE HEGEMONY IN EAST ASIA

The assumption of Chinese hegemony in East Asia is rooted in the concept of the 'Middle Kingdom'<sup>1</sup> and the memories of the tributary system. According to John Fairbank<sup>2</sup>, the tributary system was an application to foreign affairs of the Confucian doctrine by which Chinese rulers gained an ethical sanction for their exercise of political authority. To the Chinese it was natural that the 'barbarians' from the frontier regions be attracted to China's cultural superiority. The Emperor, exercising the Mandate of Heaven, had the right to rule all mankind. The foreigner was to submit, to pay 'tribute' to this imperial benevolence. Throughout East Asia states in the periphery area were linked to China by the tributary system, creating an "all embracing Sinocentric cosmos".<sup>3</sup> Aside from the incorporation of the ceremonial right of kowtow and the bestowal of gifts, the tributary system was an important vehicle

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1 The Chinese thought their country was the 'Middle Kingdom', the central core of the world, the heartland of civilization. As C.P. Fitzgerald points out in Flood Tide in China, London 1958, p. 241, the name 'The Far East' reveals the Europe-centered outlook. Geographically, China is the 'Middle Kingdom' of East Asia. It is interesting to note a comment by Mr. Nehru, who said to the House of the People in New Delhi on May 11, 1959, "The Chinese look down upon every country other than their own. They consider themselves as a Middle Kingdom, as a celestial race, as a great country." as quoted by Denis Warner in Hurricane from China, New York 1961, p.64

2 The United States and China, Revised edition, Cambridge, Mass. 1961 p. 116

3 ibid., p. 116

for trade between China and the trading states of East Asia. In fact, this trading relationship was the driving force of the tributary system. In the early part of the Ming dynasty (circa 1450), missions from Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Annam, Siam, Burma, Korea, the Liu-ch'iu Islands, Turkestan, Mongolia, Manchuria - all paid tribute and acknowledged Chinese overlordship. However, with the ebb and flow of dynastic power, China's ascendancy over East Asia was ever transient.

China's leaders have not forgotten that only two other cultural groups have had as dominating an influence as China over so large a section of mankind.<sup>1</sup> Not only did Chinese culture spread through the outlying areas of the Empire - Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet, Turkestan, Annam, Burma and Korea - but Chinese culture also furnished the model for the development of Japan. Chiang Kai-shek states succinctly:

"Speaking of culture, what independent culture is there in East Asia except that of China?... Speaking of economics, if China should lose her independence, what would be left of the present economic structure of East Asia? Speaking of politics, has not the traditional political thought of China founded on neighborliness, loyalty, humanity, peacefulness and sincerity been the central support of East Asia?"<sup>2</sup>

Further,

"China is the only nation in the Far East with an independent cultural achievement. This is borne out by history."<sup>3</sup>

Chiang's tone of arrogance points to his image of China's

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1 The two other cultural groups are the Indian and the Mediterranean Basin groups. See Kenneth Latourette, The Development of China, New York 1929, p. xi

2 Chiang Kai-shek, All We Are and All We Have, New York 1943, p. 144-145

3 ibid., p. 167

superiority over neighbouring states. That the salvation of Asia is inexorably linked with China's destiny is illustrated in this excerpt:

"China's independence and freedom are the forerunners of the liberty and equality of other Asiatic nations. That is, only when China obtains her independence and freedom can Asia be stabilized and advance into the realm of liberty and equality."<sup>1</sup>

Of China's historical rôle as protector of East Asia, Chiang says,

"... during the past five thousand years, all the various nations of East Asia, whether they have been affiliated with or assimilated by China... have contributed to the common progress of humanity."<sup>2</sup>

The rise of Japan, her invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and her wartime bid to dominate Asia served to reinforce Chiang's image of Chinese hegemony. Despite China's crumbling power, Chiang still considered peace in his country the panacea to all of East Asia's turmoil.

"To-day the situation is such that an enemy rampant is incompatible to the existence of China, or to the peace and security of East Asia. If the enemy should succeed in his invasion of China, and the South Seas, the world will experience endless calamities from now on. Consequently, the outcome of China's resistance is inseparably bound up with the peace or peril in East Asia, as well as the beauty or disaster of the whole world."<sup>3</sup>

There are two facets of Mao Tse-tung's image of Chinese hegemony in East Asia. The first may be labelled 'traditional', the image stemming from an assumption of China's innate superiority over her neighbours. This image is one of reasserting an old and 'rightful'

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 236

2 ibid., p. 41 and 42

3 China Handbook, 1937-43, p. 63

position rather than climbing to a new one. Here Chiang Kai-shek is more consciously and verbally aware of China's past dominance than is Mao Tse-tung. The second facet of Mao's image stems from his belief that the Chinese Communists are entitled to assume the leadership of all Asian peoples in their common struggle against imperialist domination. Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues, Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-chi, project the image of Chinese Communism as the model for other Asian nations. Thus the traditional image of Chinese hegemony is reinforced by a contemporary one - the image of China as the Asian leader of an 'anti-imperialist front'. Liu Shao-chi in an address to the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian countries on November 16, 1949, stated,

"The path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China is the path that should be taken by the peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy."<sup>1</sup>

Chou En-lai also expressed this view on various occasions. Thus, in a statement on foreign affairs to the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (C.P.P.C.C.) on November 2, 1951, he said,

"Under the influence of the success of the Chinese revolution, the level of consciousness of the Asian people has been raised to an unprecedented degree and liberation movements are developing more and more strongly with each passing day. The unity of the Chinese people and the peoples of Asia will certainly create a powerful and matchless force in the Far East which will rapidly push forward the great wheel of history in the movement for independence and liberation of the peoples of Asian countries".<sup>2</sup>

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- 1 Broadcast by the New China News Agency on November 23, 1949. This conference was held under the auspices of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Speech quoted by Allen Whiting in China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, New York 1960, p. 30
  - 2 New China News Agency, November 6th, 1951, as quoted in R.G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, New York 1962, p. 36

At the Geneva Conference in 1954 Chou En-lai portrayed China as the Protector and spokesman for Asian interests. For example,

"We consider that the aggressive acts of the United States should be stopped, that the independence and sovereignty of Asian countries should be safeguarded, that interference in the affairs of Asian peoples should cease, and that all foreign bases should be liquidated. The remilitarization of Japan must be prevented, and all economic blockades and restrictions removed. All the countries of Asia should consult together to seek measures to safeguard peace and security in Asia. The people of China, as well as the people of Asia, are concerned not only about peace in Asia, but also about peace in Europe and all parts of the world... China regrets that Asian states who have expressed concern about peace, such as India, Indonesia and Burma, could not take part in this conference. I hope that this conference will be guided by the interests of consolidating peace in Asia and the whole world, and will find ways to solve the problems on its agenda."<sup>1</sup>

Fundamentally the image of hegemony in East Asia is the same for both the Nationalist and Communist leaders. The new dimension to Mao's image, that of leading an 'anti-imperialist front', stems from Lenin's teachings. Mao accepts the doctrines of Lenin, the teaching that imperialism is the final stage of capitalist decay, the stress upon the importance of 'colonial' and 'semi-colonial' countries in the revolutionary struggle against capitalism, and the importance of anti-imperialism in world revolution. A combination of the two facets of Mao's image of Chinese hegemony in Asia result in a very clear-cut image.

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1 Chou En-lai's speech at the Foreign Minister's Conference on Indochina, Geneva, 1954. As reported in the New York Times, April 28, 1954.

#### 4. THE IMAGE OF CHINA'S HISTORIC GREAT POWER STATUS

Akin to the image of Chinese hegemony in East Asia is the image of China's historic Great Power status. As pointed out, the source of this image lies in the historical greatness of the 'Middle Kingdom'.<sup>1</sup> Believing their kingdom to be the most civilized on earth, the Chinese insisted that all contact with the outside world be carried out on a tributary basis. In the middle of the eighteenth century, Li Shih-yao, viceroy of Kuangtung and Kwangsi, writing on the regulations for control of foreigners, said that, "It is my most humble opinion that when uncultured barbarians who live far beyond the borders of China, come to our country to trade, they should establish no contact with the population except for business purposes."<sup>2</sup> Events since Li Shih-yao's day show little break in continuity so far as the élite's interpretation of most foreign relationships are concerned.

It is an historic truism that the China of the past held Great Power status among the countries of the world. Early in the nineteenth century China's power began to show signs of weakness and decay. The Manchu government was impotent. Insurrections broke out in Taiwan, in the northwest amongst the Moslems, in the

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1 See pages 19 and 20 above for an outline of the extent of China's suzerainty in Asia and the scope of the tributary system.

2 Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics, Peking 1955, p. 9



southwest, and, most important, in the south.<sup>1</sup> External pressures on China increased with vigour. Thus after centuries of other people paying respect and obedience to her superior culture and civilization, China was accorded third-rate status by the European powers. These powers, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, proud of their advances in science, industry and government, looked down on China as backward and decadent. The Chinese, in turn, arrogently regarded them as ignorant 'barbarians'. The effect on China of a century of national humiliation, of being a pawn among nations, was to spur on the desire to reassert her past greatness. In the opening words of China's Destiny, Chiang Kai-shek says;

"Five thousand years ago the Chinese nation established itself on the continent of Asia. Other states established five thousand years ago are now only matters of historical record. China is not merely the only ancient state still in existence, but also, in company with other peace-loving and anti-aggressor states, is fighting an unprecedented war for justice and righteousness, and the freedom and liberation of mankind."<sup>2</sup>

In an outline of the 'National Reconstruction' plans Chiang Kai-shek summarizes China's effort:

"... the scope, the plans, and the determination and ability to carry through these plans should be derived from the lessons of China's five thousand years of history, and should be determined in the light of China's geographical environment and the evolution of the world situation."<sup>3</sup>

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1 The T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, 1851-1864, was the most important of the anti-Manchu uprisings. Although unsuccessful, it stirred up discontent, and was certainly a stumbling block for the downfall of the dynasty.

2 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 29

3 ibid., p. 174

Defeat by Japan in 1895 stripped China of any remaining prestige and the foreign nations negotiated the division of the vast empire into 'spheres of influence'. However the outbreak of World War II and the termination of the Unequal Treaties in 1943 made China a partner of the powerful democratic nations. Chiang Kai-shek stated:

"Without the Kuomintang, not only would China not have been one of the four Great Powers in the world, but she would certainly have been partitioned by the other powers and the name of China would not be seen on the map of the world."<sup>1</sup>

Nominally, Nationalist China emerged from the war a Great Power; in fact, however, the nation's economy was undermined, and the political scene was divided and confused.

Equally influenced by the glorious tradition of the 'Middle Kingdom' is Mao Tse-tung. In 1939 he stated that,

"China is a great nation with a vast territory, an immense population, a long history, a rich revolutionary tradition, and a splendid historical heritage."<sup>2</sup>

More succinctly, in 1938 he said,

"Our nation has a history of several thousand years, a history which has its own characteristics and is full of treasures.... The China of to-day has developed from the China of history; as we are believers in the Marxist approach to history, we must not cut off our whole historical past. We must make a summing up from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen, and inherit this precious legacy. This will help us much in directing the great movements of to-day."<sup>3</sup>

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 222

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 72

3 ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 259 and 260

When Mao Tse-tung came to power in 1949 China was weak and disunited. His image of Great Power status did not alter. Mao's spokesman, Liu Shao-ch'i, addressing the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1956, stated that "the Chinese régime was the most democratic, the most efficient and the most consolidated in the history of mankind."<sup>1</sup>

The Geneva Conference of 1954 was the first international conference in which the People's Republic of China took part. This was an unprecedented opportunity for China to express her idea of a world system and China's place in it. Chou En-lai stated:

"No solution of any international problem, any Asian problem in particular, is possible without the participation of the Chinese People's Republic... no force in the world can prevent the Chinese people from marching along the road to a strong and prosperous China."<sup>2</sup>

## 5. THE IMAGE OF FOREIGN ENCROACHMENTS

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, China was like a melon carved up by the Powers. She was the object of the injustices of the power game in international relations, particularly in the settlements after World Wars I and II.

The image of foreign encroachments stems from the impact of

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1 The speech is quoted by R.G. Boyd in Communist China's Foreign Policy, p. 72

2 Chou En-lai's speech at the Geneva Conference, as quoted in the New York Times, April 26, 1954.

the Unequal Treaties on China. The first of these treaties, the Treaty of Nanking, was concluded in 1842 at the end of the first Opium War between China and Great Britain. Under the terms of the Treaty, Britain gained special trading privileges in the five ports of Canton, Foochow, Ningpo, Amoy and Shanghai. Extraterritorial law, economic concessions, leased territories, rights to railroad construction, mining rights, the right to station foreign troops in Chinese cities - all added to the humiliation and injustice heaped upon the Chinese, all added to a heightening xenophobic attitude towards the West.<sup>1</sup> Chiang Kai-shek claims that,

"The deterioration of China's national position and the low morale of the people during the last one hundred years can be largely attributed to the Unequal Treaties. The implementation of the Unequal Treaties constitutes a complete record of China's national humiliation."<sup>2</sup>

He continues,

"... the evils of the Unequal Treaties can be clearly seen. They not only rendered China no longer a state, but also made the Chinese people no longer a nation."<sup>3</sup>

Chiang explains that the Unequal Treaties "completely destroyed our nationhood, and our sense of honor and shame was lost."<sup>4</sup>

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1 For a survey of the 'Concessions System' see John Fairbank, The United States and China, revised edition, Cambridge, Mass. 1961, ch. 17, A.S. Quigley and G.H. Blakeslee, The Far East, Boston 1938, and S.F. Wright, China's Struggle For Tariff Autonomy: 1843-1938, Shanghai, 1938.

2 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 44

3 ibid., p. 80

4 ibid., p. 79

In his view China's experience in international relations can be grouped into three periods. In the first period, the imperialist powers competed in China on a basis of equality. In the second, the situation changed into one of imperialist rivalry, which produced the Russo-French Alliance of 1884 and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Listing the 'spheres of influence' and treaties concluded with Great Britain, France, Germany, Czarist Russia and Japan, Chiang said the third period was one of foreign domination. Chiang believed that the main objective of the Nationalist Revolution was to escape from the bondage of the Unequal Treaties. That his image of China's external setting was hostility towards, and fear of, other nations is evident from the following excerpt:

"The establishment of foreign consular jurisdiction in China undermined the judiciary power of China as well as infringed upon the sovereignty of the state; moreover, trade and intercourse between Chinese and foreigners were no longer on an equal footing. Thus a fatal blow was struck against both the welfare of the state and the livelihood of the people."<sup>1</sup>

Chiang Kai-shek continually damns the Manchus for their weak and ineffectual stand against Western imperialism. He says that "during the two-hundred-and-sixty-year reign of the Manchus, our people in the whole nation never saw a single day of light."<sup>2</sup>

Blaming the chaotic years after the downfall of the dynasty on 'foreign encroachments', Chiang says,

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 54

2 ibid., p. 48

"The secret activities of the imperialists were actually the chief cause of the civil wars among the warlords following the establishment of the Republic. Extraterritorial rights made possible the protection of their spies and secret service agents. Special areas like the concessions, leased territories, and railway zones and the special rights enjoyed by the powers on the railroads and waterways afforded facilities for the powers to store and sell munitions to local warlords, thus prolonging the internal disorders."<sup>1</sup>

In his book Chiang Kai-shek devotes an entire chapter to a description of the crushing effects of the Unequal Treaties. For example, he writes that the effect of the treaties on the psychology of the people was as serious and harmful as their effect on politics, economics and national defense.<sup>2</sup>

Although much of Chiang's hostility was directed against the Western imperialists, the 'foreign barbarian' of old, the main enemy during his rule on the mainland was Japan. With the Japanese invasion of Manchuria on September 18th, 1931, the central issue of China's foreign and domestic affairs became the War of Resistance against Japan.

"Of all the Unequal Treaties of this period, the "Twenty-One Demands" of the Japanese aggressors were the most brutal and vicious. They demonstrated that the Japanese imperialists' policy toward China had advanced another step, from partition to monopolistic possession... All political, judicial, military, police, customs, communications, mining, religious and educational matters - all the factors of culture, national defense, and economy essential to the maintenance of China's statehood - had long been sold out through the successive treaties concluded with the powers. The "Twenty-One Demands" were simply intended to transfer the special privileges separately enjoyed by the powers to the exclusive control of the Japanese imperialists."<sup>3</sup>

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, pp. 78 and 79

2 ibid., chapter 3, p. 94

3 ibid., pp. 72 and 74. The intensity of Chiang's hostility to Japan is probably due to the fact that Japan was China's enemy at the time these words were written.

Thus, beginning with the legacy of 'Gunboat Diplomacy' during Manchu times, oppressed by increasing foreign pressure, and finally facing invasion by Japan, we witness Chiang Kai-shek's vision of the external setting becoming intensely hostile, intensely xenophobic.<sup>1</sup>

This fourth component of the élite image - the image of foreign encroachments - is also held by Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists. It is indeed striking to find so many parallels among the images held by China's two leaders. Mao Tse-tung states:

"As everyone knows, China has for nearly a hundred years been a semi-colonial country under the joint control of several imperialist powers... The main characteristic of the present situation is that Japanese imperialism wants to reduce China to its colony."<sup>2</sup>

In an address in 1939, Mao asked,

"What are the targets of the revolution?... Everyone knows that imperialism is one and feudalism the other. What are the two targets of the revolution to-day? One is Japanese imperialism, and the other the Chinese collaborators."<sup>3</sup>

Further, he said,

"... as the imperialist oppressions are the severest, imperialists are the most deadly enemies of the Chinese people."<sup>4</sup>

As we will see, the foreign scapegoats serve both internal

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1 Of this xenophobia, Chiang wrote, "The Chinese government and people are conditioned to fear foreigners", China's Destiny, Pp. 81 and 82

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 2, p. 154

3 ibid., vol. 3, p. 13

4 Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution", as quoted by H. Arthur Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy", in American Journal of International Law, vol. 44, No. 1 January 1950, p. 78

psychological needs and external policy goals. To Mao the modern history of China

"is nothing but a history of imperialist invasion of China, of obstruction by it of the path of China's independence and of the hindrances placed by it in the growth of Chinese capitalism."<sup>1</sup>

Chiang Kai-shek's "one enemy" was Japan. Mao's arch enemy since 1945 is the United States, leader of the 'imperialist front'. Although both leaders hold the image of foreign encroachments, Mao's view is influenced by Communist ideology. Saying that imperialism is forever oppressive, Mao wrote in 1949 that, "this is a Marxist law. When we say "imperialism is ferocious", we mean that its nature will never change, that the imperialists will never lay down their butcher knives....."<sup>2</sup> From the following bitter interpretation of Sino-American relations, we find a succinct expression of Mao's image, written in 1949.

"The history of the aggression against China by the United States' imperialism from 1840, when it helped the British in the Opium War, to the time when it was thrown out of China by the Chinese people, should be written into a concise textbook for the education of Chinese youth. The United States was one of the first countries to force China to cede extraterritoriality-witness the Treaty of Wanghia... All the "friendship" shown to China by the United States' imperialism over the past one-hundred-and-nine years (since 1840, when the United States collaborated with Britain in the Opium War) and especially the great act of "friendship" in helping Chiang Kai-shek slaughter several million Chinese in the last few years."<sup>3</sup>

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- 1 Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy" (1940), as quoted in Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbanks, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, London 1952, p. 269
  - 2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (Foreign Languages Press pub.), Vol. 4, Peking 1961, p. 428
  - 3 ibid., pp. 447 and 448. Here the vehemence of Mao's statement is greatly influenced by his image of communism, that is to say, his vision of the United States as the leader of the imperialist camp.



The 'facts' underlying this biased view are that from 1937 to 1941 Western governments vacillated over helping China in her resistance to Japan while Soviet Russia provided the sole military support for beleaguered China. Further, at the end of World War II the United States appeared to support Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communists. It is not the facts of history but how they are interpreted that determine the image.

Allen S. Whiting points out<sup>1</sup> that Chinese hostility to foreigners has existed at various levels of society. Over the past century, foreign troops in China repeatedly abused the populace and affronted Chinese dignity. At higher levels official suspicion of Western governments fed on alleged injustices at the Versailles and Yalta conferences. Here is a typical Communist diatribe against the external threat:

"They (the imperialists) will not only send their running-dogs to bore inside China to carry out disruptive work and to cause trouble. They will not only use the Chiang Kai-shek bandit remnants to blockade our coastal ports, but they will send their totally hopeless adventurist elements and troops to raid and cause trouble along our borders. They seek by every means and at all times to restore their position in China. They use every means to plot the destruction of China's independence, freedom, and territorial integrity and to restore their private interests in China. We must exercise the highest vigilance... They cannot possibly be true friends of the Chinese people. They are the deadly enemies of the Chinese people's liberation movement."<sup>2</sup>

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- 1 China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, p. 5
  - 2 K'o Pai-nien, "Hsin min chu chy yi te wai chiao tse" (The Foreign Policy of the New People's Democracy), Hsueh Hsi (Study), vol. 1, No. 2 October 1949, pp. 13-15. Quoted in ibid., p. 5. K'o Pai-nien, who wrote this 'study' in 1949, later became the Chinese Communist ambassador to Romania.

## 6. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST IMAGE OF THE NECESSITY OF WORLD DOMINATION

An ideological component is non-existent in the thought of Chiang Kai-shek. For Mao, by contrast, the image of a world communist system influences in varying degrees all his other images. Some components are reinforced, others are modified.

The image of the necessity of a world communist system strengthens the image of Chinese unity. China must present herself as a strong and unified member of the socialist camp, a powerful nation capable of helping to overthrow the capitalist aggressors. The ideological component reinforces the expansionist-irredentist urge, the image of both hegemony in Asia and Great Power status, through its messianic mission to spread communism throughout the world. For example, the new dimension to Mao's image of Chinese hegemony in Asia, that of the assumption of the leadership of an 'anti-imperialist front',<sup>1</sup> stems directly from Marx-Lenin doctrine.

The ideological component has the effect of reshaping the xenophobic element to exempt Soviet Russia and "socialist" countries from attack, while intensifying hostility against the United States and other non-communist countries. Judged on the basis of encroachments in China, Czarist Russia should be no less a target of Chinese criticism than the United States.<sup>2</sup> Czarist practices in Sinkiang, Mongolia and Manchuria exemplified foreign imperialism. The Soviet stripping of factories and their retention of railroad and military-base

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1 See pages 20, 21 and 22 for examples of Mao's leadership of the 'anti-imperialist' front.

2 See Mao Tse-tung's invective against the United States' imperialism on page 30.

privileges in Manchuria after World War II, as well as the continuation of Sino-Soviet joint stock companies in Sinkiang, aroused the resentment of the Chinese people. On the official level, however, Mao's régime steadfastly countered all criticism of Soviet Russia.

The entirely new element filtering through Mao Tse-tung's image of the world is that of the inevitability of conflict among nations and classes. Viewed through the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist prism, he sees the world engaged in a prolonged and revolutionary struggle, a struggle to achieve the victory of the world communist system, and its corollary, the downfall of the capitalist system. That Mao Tse-tung is committed to the communist system was clearly stated in an article he wrote in 1941,

"From the very beginning our Party has been based on the theories of Marx-Leninism, for Marx-Leninism is the crystallization of the most correct and most revolutionary scientific thought of the world proletariat."<sup>1</sup>

For the purpose of analysis the premises underlying communist ideology can be divided into six themes.<sup>2</sup> The first is that of a world divided into a socialist or anti-imperialist camp and a capitalist or imperialist camp, each hostile to each other. The hostile, the aggressive element in communist ideology has its foundation in a set of assumptions basic to Marxist thought. These posit the destruction of capitalism as not only necessary to

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1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 44, pp. 14 and 15.

2 These are outlined by Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, p. 8.

safeguard the existing socialist center, but also desirable in order to create the universal good society. The assumption of omnipresent conflict brings capitalism and communism to a life-and-death struggle. As early as 1926, Mao Tse-tung echoed Lenin's doctrine of a bipolar world divided into two mutually antagonistic camps.

"The present world situation is one in which the two big forces, revolution and counter-revolution, are engaged in the final struggle."<sup>1</sup>

More recently, Liu Shao-ch'i stated:

"The world to-day has been divided into two mutually antagonistic camps: on the one hand, the world imperialist camp composed of American imperialists and their accomplices, the reactionaries of all countries of the world; on the other hand, the world anti-imperialist camp composed of the New Democracies of Eastern Europe, and the national liberation movements in China and South East Asia, plus the people's democratic forces of all countries of the world; while the Soviet Union has become the bastion of all progressive forces, these two camps include all the peoples of the world of all countries, classes, parties and groups."<sup>2</sup>

The second assumption of Chinese Communist ideology is that of the necessity of belonging to one camp or another - the view that neutrality is a camouflage for membership in the capitalist camp.

In 1940 Mao wrote,

"All countries in the world will be swept into one or the other of these two camps, and in the world to-day "neutrality" is becoming merely a deceptive phrase."<sup>3</sup>

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1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 1, pp. 14 and 15.

2 Liu Shao-ch'i, On Internationalism and Nationalism, 2nd edit. Peking 1952, p. 23

3 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 135

And, eight years later, he wrote,

"Has not the history of the past thirty-one years of Soviet power proved how completely false and bankrupt is the so-called "middle way", the so-called "third path" which, to deceive the working people, is so loudly proclaimed by all those who hate the Soviet Union."<sup>1</sup>

After Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, Liu Shao-ch'i wrote,

"If one is not in the imperialist camp, assisting American imperialism and its agents to enslave the world or one's own people, then one must be in the anti-imperialist camp.... To refrain from lining up with one side or the other and to keep neutral is impossible... so-called neutralism... is nothing but deception, international or otherwise."<sup>2</sup>

It is interesting to note that although, ideologically, the Chinese Communists continued to oppose 'neutrality', this premise was modified from 1954 to 1958 to accommodate the "peaceful co-existence" theme of the Bandung Conference. The acceptance of non-aligned nations was only a short-run strategy, only a tactically wise and temporary deviation from the élite's fundamental outlook.

That alliance with the socialist camp is necessary to the success of the revolution in China, and to its survival, is the third assumption of Chinese Communist ideology. Opposition to the "imperialist camp" and denial of a "neutral" path was paralleled by alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1940 Mao argued,

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1 Mao Tse-tung, "Revolutionary Forces of the World Rally to Combat Imperialist Aggression", quoted by Arthur Steiner in American Journal of International Law, January 1950, p. 89

2 On Internationalism and Nationalism, 2nd edition, pp. 26 & 27

"All the imperialist powers are hostile to us; if China wants independence she can never attain it without the aid of the socialist state and the international proletariat... without the assistance of the Soviet Union and the assistance given through anti-capitalist struggles waged by the proletariat in Japan, Britain, the United States, France, Germany and Italy... In particular, aid from the Soviet Union is an absolute indispensable condition for China's final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet aid and the revolution will fail."<sup>1</sup>

Specifically, Mao stated in 1948 that the Chinese Communist Party was indebted to the Soviet Union:

"The Communist Party of China is a party built and developed on the model of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. With the birth of the Communist Party of China, the face of the Chinese revolution took on an altogether new aspect."<sup>2</sup>

The fourth assumption is that alliance with the socialist camp is essential to promoting revolution throughout the world.

"We know that many difficulties lie ahead, but we do not fear them. Our path is lighted by the October Revolution... The struggle of the Chinese Revolution, isolated in the past, is now, after the victory of the October Revolution, isolated no longer. We have the support of the Communist Parties and of the working class throughout the world."<sup>3</sup>

And further, in July 1949, Mao wrote,

".... ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the Peoples Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front."<sup>4</sup>

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1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 124

2 ibid., (Foreign Languages Press pub.), vol. 4, p. 284

3 Mao Tse-tung, "Revolutionary Forces of the World Rally to Combat Imperialist Aggression", (1948) quoted by Arthur Steiner in American Journal of International Law, January 1950, p. 90

4 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, (Foreign Languages Press pub.), vol. 4, p. 415

In summary, on the eve of victory, Mao Tse-tung restated his ideological outlook:

"You (China) lean to one side... Presicely so... Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. To sit on the fence is impossible... a third road does not exist. Internationally, we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and we can look for genuinely friendly aid only from that front, and not from the imperialist front."<sup>1</sup>

Although the assumption of conflict between the two camps is omnipresent, Mao claims that the inevitable conflict may be postponed temporarily by strengthening the unity of the socialist camp. Following Lenin's dictum, Mao in 1940 wrote,

"Our tactical principle remains one of exploiting the contradictions among them (the imperialists) in order to win over the majority, oppose the minority, and crush the enemies separately."<sup>2</sup>

The sixth assumption underlying Chinese Communist ideology is that the final victory inevitably belongs to communism. Mao affirms his belief in the necessity and inevitability of victory in an article he wrote in 1948,

"The enemy's basis in his own camp is unstable; it is a camp divided. The enemy is isolated from the people. He is faced with an economic crisis which imperialism is incapable of averting. That is why the imperialist camp can and will be vanquished."<sup>3</sup>

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1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, (Foreign Languages Press pub.), vol. 4, pp. 415, 417 and 425.

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 3, p. 218.

3 Mao Tse-tung, "Revolutionary Forces of the World Rally to Combat Imperialist Aggression", as quoted by Arthur Steiner in American Journal of International Law, January 1950, p. 90.

And, dramatically, he stated,

"In the end, the socialist system will replace the capitalist system. This is an objective law independent of human will. No matter how hard the reactionaries try to prevent the advance of the wheel of history, revolution will take place sooner or later and will surely triumph."<sup>1</sup>

In Mao Tse-tung's image, this incessant struggle must be sustained until the inevitable proletarian victory is complete on all fronts, and the foundations of the new world order - of communism - are finally secured.

The importance of the ideological component of Mao's image relative to the other five components will be discussed in the concluding section of this thesis. Suffice to mention here the view that this component at times modifies or reinforces the five other components. It does not change them substantively. The identity, or near-identity of world views held by Chiang and Mao is by no means undermined by Communist ideology.

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1 In a speech made in Moscow to the Supreme Soviet of The U.S.S.R., November 6, 1957, Current Background, No. 480, Nov. 13, 1957



### III THE CONTENT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S and MAO TSE-TUNG'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

#### 1. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE IMAGE TO FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

As outlined in Chapter Two, the image is the totality of assumptions one holds about the world and one's position in it. Foreign policy goals have their basis in the élite's image of the world.

An image is basically an assumption about something which precedes the formulation of a foreign policy goal. For example, the policy goal of restoring China's hegemony in East Asia flows from the image of historical Chinese hegemony. The distinction between the assumption of hegemony and the objective of restoring this position of leadership is a fine one. Nevertheless, the distinction between the two, image and goal, is significant.

It is necessary, then, to identify the components of the élite image through a careful examination of the writings and speeches of the élite. The goal, or objective for action is then derived from the image. The relationship between the image and foreign policy goals is illustrated in this chapter.

## 2. THE UNIFICATION OF CHINA AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE

One of the most important policy goals sought by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung is the unification of China. The physical barriers impeding unification are formidable, as, except in the northeast at the short Yalu and Amur rivers, none of China's vast borderland is demarcated by natural phenomena. The boundaries twist tortuously through jungle, mountain and desert.

Because the peripheral areas have frequently been closer to rival centers of power than to Peking, China's leaders have long been plagued by external pressure on the border areas. Until Mao Tse-tung's rule there were few lines of communication to the remote border provinces. Now there is a railroad linking Outer Mongolia to North China and Peking, one through Sinkiang, and a road joining Tibet and South China. China's security has been confronted with "British pressure upon Tibet from India; Russian pressure upon Sinkiang from adjacent Kazakhstan, upon Mongolia from Siberia, and upon Manchuria from the Far Eastern territories; and Japanese pressure first upon Korea and from there upon Manchuria, as well as upon the Ryukyu Islands and Formosa".<sup>1</sup> Almost no point along the twelve thousand miles of China's perimeter has been safe

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<sup>1</sup> Allen S. Whiting, "Foreign Policy of Communist China" in Foreign Policies in World Politics, ed. by Roy Macridis, pp. 270-271.

from these pressures during the past three hundred years.

Added to the pressures from modern invaders who sought markets (Great Britain), raw materials (Japan), or imperialist prestige (Germany)<sup>1</sup>, has been the disuniting influence of China's inferior economic development compared with that of the predatory powers arraigned against her. For example, the past remoteness of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia has facilitated Russia's piecemeal nibbling at Chinese territory.

Summarizing the forces working against China's unification in the twentieth century, Allen Whiting says,

"Military attack literally tore off chunks of territory. Economic concessions carved out sheltered spheres of influence, disrupting domestic economic development through artificial emphasis upon coastal points of foreign control. Finally, ideological pressures were exerted by foreign missionaries, who, protected with force when necessary, challenged the Confucian order with destructive vigor."<sup>2</sup>

After the downfall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, China returned to a period of warlordism, and only in the 1920's did a semblance of national unity emerge. Having consolidated Kuomintang strength in South China, Chiang Kai-shek embarked in 1926 on his Northern Expedition, an expedition aimed to bring that area under Kuomintang control. By 1928 Chiang had achieved considerable

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1 Allen S. Whiting, "Foreign Policy of Communist China", in Foreign Policies in World Politics, ed. by Roy Macridis, p. 271.

2 ibid., p. 271.

consolidation, with the government at Nanking issuing directives to the country as a whole. This consolidation was, however, based on Chiang's agreements with the northern warlords rather than on a solid base of authority there.

That one of Chiang Kai-shek's policy goals was unification of the Chinese "nation" and "state" is illustrated in the following two speeches delivered in 1938:

"During the past seven years, and especially since the beginning of armed resistance by our whole nation, our soldiers and people have sacrificed without stint and have endured unparalleled pain. Why?... Has it not been to secure the independence and freedom of China and recover our lost territories?"<sup>1</sup>

And further he stated that,

"Any settlement reached (with the Japanese aggressors) must not infringe upon China's territorial integrity and sovereign rights".<sup>2</sup>

Outlining the areas to be unified under his régime, Chiang remarked,

"... Therefore, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Four Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria), Inner and Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet and the Liuchiu Islands are each a strategic area essential for the nation's defense and security."<sup>3</sup>

Although Chiang's aim was territorial unification of China, and the repossession of 'lost territories', he never achieved this

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1 The Collected Wartime Speeches of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1931-1945, vol. 1 New York 1946, p. 110

2 ibid., p. 24

3 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 36

goal. Throughout his rule the keynote to action was resistance to the enemy rather than expansion into lost territories. Chiang's régime enjoyed peace only from 1929 to 1931. In 1931 the Japanese moved into Manchuria; in 1932 Shanghai was attacked; and from 1932 to 1937, when the full-scale Japanese invasion began, all of North China was progressively infiltrated by the Japanese.

Prior to 1931, however, the Kuomintang had made important strides in the internal unification of China, in creating a national currency and tax system, in making progress in transport, industry, education, public health and agriculture and in establishing relations with foreign powers on the basis of conventional international law. Although time and time again Chiang stated<sup>1</sup> that a primary national interest was the territorial security of the country, he nevertheless had to wait for the consolidation of power by the Chinese Communists to see this goal achieved.

Mao Tse-tung is also determined to unite China's past territorial holdings. In 1938 he said,

"We Chinese people possess the heroic spirit to wage the bloody war against the enemy to the finish, the determination to recover our lost territories."<sup>2</sup>

Further,

"Thus, once more the central point of the problem becomes the mobilization and unification of the entire Chinese people."<sup>3</sup>

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1 See, for example, Chiang's statements on pages 14, 15 and 16 of this paper.

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 2, p. 173.

3 As quoted by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 87

Chou En-lai, in his address to the National People's Congress at Peking on April 18th, 1959, said,

"But it is well-known, the undetermined boundary lines between our country and certain of our neighbours are the result of many historical causes, first and foremost, prolonged imperialist aggression."<sup>1</sup>

When he came to power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung was extremely sensitive to the problem Chiang Kai-shek was never able to solve, namely the powerful tendency for regional autonomy to persist.

The policy acts flowing from the central image of Chinese unity are numerous. For the purpose of this thesis six 'cases' have been selected. The first of these is Tibet.

### Tibet

With the downfall of the Manchus in 1911 Chinese authority in Tibet weakened steadily and came to a halt.<sup>2</sup> The Chinese were not, however, prepared to accept Tibetan 'independence', and in 1912 Yuan Shih-ka'i, the President of China, declared that from that time on Tibet would be regarded as a province of China. In 1914 at the Simla Conference<sup>3</sup> this demand was modified. Under the terms of the Simla Convention Tibet was divided into two zones, Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet. Chinese suzerainty over the whole of Tibet was recognized,

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1 Asian Recorder, 1959, p. 2660

2 For a survey of Tibet's status before 1911, see Tieh-Tseng Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, New York 1956, Parts I, II, III and IV.

3 Attended by delegates from Great Britain, China and Tibet.

together with the 'autonomy' of Outer Tibet. By the terms of the Treaty China was forbidden to 'colonize' Outer Tibet.<sup>1</sup>

In 1928 the Kuomintang sent a mission to Lhasa to invite Tibet to become part of China. This invitation was ignored, and in 1931 Chiang Kai-shek declared Tibet to be a province of China.

That Chiang considered Tibet to be a rightful part of China is clear from the following excerpt:

"Following the conversion of the Tufans in Tibet to Buddhism, the orientation of Tibet's development was towards China. Under the Sui and T'ang dynasties, Tibet looked to China for direction. During the Yuan dynasty, Tibet was under the jurisdiction of the government department responsible for Mongolian and Tibetan affairs. Thus, Tibet's period of assimilation has lasted over thirteen hundred years."<sup>2</sup>

Confronted with the difficulties of trying to re-establish control over Tibet, Chiang said,

"The Tibetan problem was similarly subject to foreign influence. The British likewise took advantage of the conflicts between the Tibetans and the Szechwanese and Yunnanese."<sup>3</sup>

Fighting between the Tibetans and the Chinese Nationalists broke out between 1931 and 1932. Thereafter, from 1932 to 1949,

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- 1 In Inner Tibet, however, China was permitted to maintain her administrative system, subject to the proviso that the Tibetan government in Lhasa was to retain its existing rights, including the power to select and appoint the high priests of the monasteries, and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions. In return for China's pledge not to convert Outer Tibet into a province, Great Britain promised not to station troops, nor to establish colonies in Tibet. See Li, op. cit., p. 138
  - 2 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 38
  - 3 China's Destiny, loc. cit., p. 77

Chiang Kai-shek had neither the troops nor the energy to tackle Tibetan 'independence', so pressing were the problems of the Japanese invasion. Chiang Kai-shek's régime was too weak to succeed in regaining Tibet.

In October 1950, only a year after Mao's advent to power, Chinese Communist forces advanced into Tibet, and soon after, despite an agreement guaranteeing broad autonomy to Tibet, Mao's régime tightened control throughout the area, using such techniques as improved communications and settling Chinese nationals in Tibet.

The official communiqué of October 1950 stated:

"The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would like to make it clear; Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China..."<sup>1</sup>

In August 1952 a "General Program for Enforcement of National Regional Autonomy" was adopted by the Central People's Government Council. This Program was designed to deal with the 'national minorities' in an effort to promote fuller integration of the minority areas with China proper through a policy of national autonomy combined with greater political direction and control from Peking. It was claimed that by the end of June 1952 no less than

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1 Note of the People's Republic of China to India, October 30, 1950, quoted in Margaret Fisher and Joan Bondurant, Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, India Press Digests, Monograph Series no. 1, Appendix I (C), pp. iii-iv.



one hundred and thirty "national minorities autonomous districts" had been established in various parts of the country, with a total national minority population of some 4,500,000.<sup>1</sup> One of the main points of the General Program is the clause affirming the subordinate status of all such 'autonomous' areas:

"All national autonomous districts shall be an inseparable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China... (and shall be) under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and subject to guidance by people's governments of superior levels".<sup>2</sup>

Tibet was the first province to be granted national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.

By March of 1959 wide-spread rebellion against Chinese control had flared up in Tibet. This rebellion was suppressed by invading Chinese forces and fierce fighting took place between Chinese troops and the Tibetan people.<sup>3</sup> Tibet, at last, came under the complete domination of Peking.

The official announcement from Peking stated:

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- 1 Report to the Central People's Government Council by Inner Mongolian leader, Ulanfu, on August 8, 1952, Peking, New China News Agency, August 12, 1952, quoted in S.B. Thomas, Government And Administration in Communist China, rev. ed., New York 1955, p. 95.
  - 2 "Programme for Enforcement of National Regional Autonomy" (passed by Government Administrative Council, February 22, 1952 and ratified by Central People's Government Council August 8, 1952) Text released by the New China News Agency August 12, 1952, quoted in ibid., p. 96
  - 3 New York Times, March 19, 1959, For an analysis of the 1959 uprising see Frank Moraes, The Revolt in Tibet, New York 1960, Chs. 1, 2 and 3.

"The Tibet Local Government is dissolved and the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region shall exercise the functions and powers of the Tibet Local Government."<sup>1</sup>

Chou En-lai, addressing the National People's Congress in April 1959, stated that, "This is a great victory for our policy of national unity."<sup>2</sup> Two years later, reflecting on the Tibetan situation, Chou said,

"They don't want Tibet to become a Socialist Tibet as had other places in China. Why are they acting like this? If they want to oppose socialism, why come to China's Tibet to oppose it? This is interfering in China's domestic affairs. That is why, after the rebellion was quelled in Tibet, when the Dalai Lama had run away and democratic reforms were started in Tibet, they become more dissatisfied and shortly afterwards, the Sino-Indian border question came to the fore".<sup>3</sup>

Mao's policy acts are explicit; first a period of moderate domination followed by tightening control, and then the coup, the forceful invasion and take-over of the area. Allen Whiting points out<sup>4</sup> that restoration of Chinese control over Tibet was politically both just and necessary for Mao Tse-tung as for Chiang Kai-shek. The important difference lay in Mao's ability to implement his words where his predecessors had failed. Viewed from Peking, this was not invasion of a neighbouring state, but re-establishment of legitimate sovereignty.

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1 New York Times, March 24, 1959

2 Asian Recorder, 1959, p. 2660

3 Edgar Snow's interview with Chou En-lai, "A Report From Red China", Look, January 17, 1961.

4 China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, p. 3 C.P. Fitzgerald remarks that the Chinese Communists "were able to do what every previous Chinese Government hoped and intended to do", Revolution in China, New York 1952, p. 250.

## Sinkiang

Sinkiang, Chinese Turkestan, has always been claimed by the Chinese as part of their territory.<sup>1</sup> For more than a century writers have described this province as "a vacuum which was being filled competitively from China, India and Russia."<sup>2</sup> Before 1911 the authority of the Manchu Empire had become particularly weak in the frontier territories. From 1912 to 1926 China was a republic with power divided between the various war lords. There was no strong central authority either in China or in the frontier territories. Poor communications, unrest among the local population and Russian penetration in the area made China's hold over Sinkiang increasingly tenuous.

During Chiang Kai-shek's rule from 1927 to 1949, Sinkiang was, in effect, under the predominant influence of the Soviet Union. Prolonged negotiations between the Chinese Nationalist government and local Sinkiang administrators resulted in a complete blockage of Chinese control over the province. Even the local armed forces refused to be conscripted into the Nationalist army.<sup>3</sup> The Chinese Nationalists were too preoccupied with the Japanese invasion to make any effective effort to cope with Soviet penetration into Sinkiang.

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1 See pages 16 and 17 above for statements by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung.

2 Owen Lattimore, "At the Crossroads of Inner Asia", Pacific Affairs, vol. 23, no. 1, March 1950, p. 34. For a complete discussion of Sinkiang and its relationship with China and Russia, see Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? East Lansing Michigan, 1958, Part I.

3 A. Whiting, "Nationality Tensions in Sinkiang", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 25, No. 1, January 1956, p. 10.

In 1934, Chiang Kai-shek, explaining his laissez-passer policy towards Russian domination in Sinkiang, said,

"The situation in Sinkiang is an international problem in which communization will cause serious effects on other nations. I am trying to separate this district from Soviet influence, but unfortunately my country is too occupied with Japanese relations."<sup>1</sup>

Chiang granted the Soviet Union monopoly over the air lines as well as control of oil and mineral resources in the province. It seemed that as Chiang's central authority increased, his control over Sinkiang and other frontier territories decreased.

The Chinese Communist government, immediately after achieving power, sent a strong military force into Sinkiang. The 'provincial army' was ordered to integrate with the People's Liberation Army.<sup>2</sup> The difficulties facing Mao in 'federalizing' Sinkiang were many. He had to deal with strong nationalist sentiment and with a national minority which had successfully veered from the sway of Chinese control for over a century. He had to liquidate the local leadership<sup>3</sup> and provide Peking-trained cadres to prepare the area for the new-styled 'autonomy'. He had to deal diplomatically with Soviet Russia's deep-rooted economic, racial and political affiliations with Sinkiang.

Revolt against the occupation of Sinkiang by Chinese Communist

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, quoted by Allen Whiting and General Sheung Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot, p. 35.

2 Whiting in op. cit., Far Eastern Survey, p. 10.

3 An airplane crash on August 27, 1949 wiped out almost all the leaders en route to the first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. See ibid., p. 9. A purge in 1951 liquidated those who were not killed in the crash, New York Times, December 23, 1951.

forces continued until as late as 1951. Seeking to persuade the population to unite under Chinese authority, the chairman of the Sinkiang People's Government said,

"At this juncture, any nationality movement which seeks separation from the People's Republic of China for independence will be reactionary since, objectively considered, it would undermine the interests of the various races and particularly the foremost majority of the race concerned and thus would work to the advantage of imperialism."<sup>1</sup>

Widespread hostility to "new China" aroused familiar fears of Pan-Turki and Pan-Islam appeals which might unite the people of Sinkiang against the Communist régime. However, little by little, Mao's control tightened. The liquidation of the nationalist élite eliminated the spearhead for the movement for 'autonomy'. The building of the Lanchow-Alma Ata railroad and a road linking Sinkiang and China proper helped increase Peking's hold over the area. An intensive re-education campaign was launched. Editions of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung and various government publications were disseminated throughout the province. "Friendship delegations" from Peking carried out intensive political propaganda campaigns. In 1953 an official communist communiqué admitted:

"It was only after all this that the entire Kazakh people returned to the fold of the Fatherland."<sup>2</sup>

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1 Speech by Burhan, quoted in Whiting, op. cit., Far Eastern Survey, p. 10.

2 New China News Agency, May 6, 1954, quoted in ibid., p. 11

The Soviet Union's control over oil and mineral resources was replaced by joint Chinese-Soviet companies which were later taken over entirely by the Chinese.<sup>1</sup> The economic and agricultural programmes that had once been under Soviet direction were transferred to, and intensified by the Chinese.

These policy acts aimed at regaining control over Sinkiang stem from Mao's image of the unity of China, from his refusal to renounce any territory claimed as Chinese. As early as 1922 Mao stated that the Chinese Communist Party must secure the following objectives:

- "(1) The achievement of a genuine democratic republic by the liberation of Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.
- (2) The establishment of a Chinese Federated Republic by the unification of China proper, Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang into a free federation."<sup>2</sup>

Owen Lattimore assesses the importance of Sinkiang, saying that it is in a pivotal position in the heart of Asia, close to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran,--an important position from which Mao can influence other Asian countries.

### Mongolia

Historically Mongolia was an important province of China.

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- 1 The joint-stock companies were one of the by-products of the Stalin-Mao negotiations of February 1950. The Soviet shares in these companies were liquidated in December 1954, following the Khrushchev-Bulganin mission to Peking.
  - 2 The Manifesto of the Second National Congress of the C.C.P., July 1922, quoted by Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbanks, Documentary History of Chinese Communism, p. 64
  - 3 "At the Crossroads of Inner Asia", Pacific Affairs, vol. 23, No. 1, 1950, p. 34.

Strategically it was both the key line of defense in the northwest and the essential buffer area between China and Russia. Economically it served as a field for colonization and for Chinese trade, both imports and exports.

The case of Mongolia serves well as an example of the unsuccessful realization of the élite image, unsuccessful for both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. That unification of Mongolia under Chinese rule was a policy goal of Chiang Kai-shek is evident from his statement in 1912:

"To conquer and pacify Mongolia and Tibet, one cannot look only at the ease or difficulty of the immediate circumstances... When Britain and Russia insist on intervention, our country, through not having the strength to declare war, should oppose them strongly on a basis of principles, and should demand the restoration of our sovereignty... There is no greater loss of our rights, no greater humiliation to our country than this."<sup>1</sup>

The Manchu dynasty exercised suzerainty over all Mongolia until 1911, when both the Mongols and the Chinese revolted against dynastic rule. Under the Republic, however, Chinese authority was re-established over Inner Mongolia, and the four provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, Ch'inghai and Jehol were created. Manchu rule was more indirect, more tenuous, over Outer Mongolia than over Inner Mongolia. It was therefore not surprising that from the very outset Outer Mongolia took advantage of the weakness of the Republic and declared herself independent of Chinese rule. As early as 1912 Russia concluded an agreement with the Outer Mongolian princes,

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, pp. 77 and 78.

an agreement in which she recognized that the old relations between China and Mongolia had come to an end.<sup>1</sup> President Yuan Shih-ka'i protested against this 'encroachment' and demanded that a tripartite conference be held, with China, Russia and Outer Mongolia participating. Just at the moment when Russian influence was dominant in Outer Mongolia, a combination of the first World War and the Russian Revolution in 1917 gave China a new opportunity to assert her influence. China's short-lived rule over Outer Mongolia collapsed in 1921 when Soviet Russian troops aided Mongolian nationalists to take control of the country. Although Soviet Russia insisted that Outer Mongolia was an independent country, the area still remained, until 1949, subservient to Russian interests. In fact it can be said that from 1924 onward Outer Mongolia was under Russian 'protection'.

Chiang Kai-shek continued to claim that Outer Mongolia was an integral part of China. The official China Handbook, 1937-43, begins with a statement that "the frontier of China marches with... Siberia..."<sup>2</sup> With the occupation of large parts of Inner Mongolia by the Japanese in 1937-1938, Chiang's hopes of regaining Outer Mongolia dimmed. Finally, in 1945, he agreed to the conduct of a plebiscite in Outer Mongolia. The result of this plebiscite confirmed the desire of the Mongolian people to have complete independence and sovereignty. Following this, under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Agreement

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1 For a complete discussion of China's relations with Inner and Outer Mongolia before 1949 see Gerard Friters, Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, London 1951, chs. 2 and 3, and Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, Leiden, Holland, 1955, Part 1.

2 Compiled by the Ministry of Information and edited by Hollington K. Tong.



of 1945, Chiang Kai-shek's government relinquished all claims to sovereignty over the area. Shortly before the plebiscite Chiang stated:

"... Our people shall realize that if we ignore the aspirations of these racial groups for freedom and restrain their urge for independence and self-government, it will not only be contrary to the spirit of our National Revolution, but will also tend to increase friction between the racial groups and jeopardize our entire program of national reconstruction... The racial group of Outer Mongolia had, in effect, declared its independence from the mother country as early as 1922... We should recognize with bold determination and through legal procedure, the independence of Outer Mongolia, and establish friendly relations with it."<sup>1</sup>

This statement contrasts sharply with Chiang's earlier declarations,<sup>2</sup> as well as his later accusations of Russian subversion of Mongolia. In retrospect, Chiang said,

"After 1920, Soviet Russia repeatedly declared that she had discarded Czarist Russia's imperialist policy toward Outer Mongolia and that she recognized China's sovereignty in that territory. Actually, beginning in 1921, she proceeded to create a puppet regime in Outer Mongolia."<sup>3</sup>

And,

"Had Outer Mongolia been really independent and free, and able to stand between China and Russia as a buffer for the security of all concerned, then this excessive sacrifice (agreeing to Outer Mongolia's independence) would have been justifiable. It was quite contrary to my expectation that Russia, after China's recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence, should have imposed tyranny and slavery on the Mongolian people. The puppet regime of Outer Mongolia became an instrument of Russian aggression, and proceeded to foment insurrection in Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang in the very first year after our recognition of its independence."<sup>4</sup>

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1 The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, vol. 11, pp. 855-57.

2 See pages 13, 14, 15, 16 and 55.

3 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, rev. ed., New York 1958, pp. 383-84.

4 ibid., p. 153-54.

Chiang's volte face towards the Mongolian People's Republic (M.P.R.) is illustrated by his policy towards the Republic's admission to the United Nations. In 1946 China voted for Mongolia's membership, but this approval was withdrawn in the following year. In 1946 the Chinese representative at the United Nations said, "As far as the Chinese delegation is concerned, we are prepared to support the application."<sup>1</sup> In the summer of 1947, he stated that China had reversed her position on the grounds of "an armed invasion of her province of Sinkiang by the applicant State, ... She has not shown herself to be a peace-loving State."<sup>2</sup>

Chiang continued to object to the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations until, in 1961, the admission of the M.P.R. was approved.<sup>3</sup>

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1 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, First Year, Second Series, no. 4, 53rd Meeting, August 16, 1946, p. 51

2 United Nations Documents, S/C, 2/SR, 18-29 July 1947, p. 89

3 Owen Lattimore, "Communism - Mongolian Brand", The Atlantic, vol. 210, no. 3, September 1962, p. 81. The General Assembly's resolution of April 19, 1961 declared that the M.P.R. should be admitted to membership in the United Nations. Outer Mongolia's admission was sponsored by 23 delegations. The Soviet Union spoke briefly in favor, and China stated its opposition and announced that it would not participate in the voting. See, "New Members: Sierra Leone, Outer Mongolia, Mauritania", United Nations Review, vol. 8, no. 11, November 1961, pp. 25-26.

It is interesting to note that, indirectly, Communist China opposed Outer Mongolia's entry into the United Nations. See Sheldon Appleton, "The United Nations China Tangle", Pacific Affairs, vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 1962. pp. 164-165.

As mentioned earlier, China's control over Inner Mongolia was severely weakened during the Japanese occupation. In 1947 Chiang recognized the formation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, an 'autonomous' region under the sovereignty of China.<sup>1</sup>

The Nationalist government was completely unsuccessful in its policy of regaining its lost provinces in Mongolia. To-day, following the pattern established over the centuries, "Chinese influence has once again flowed into Outer Mongolia as the Chinese People's Republic has gained in power and influence. This time it has been less aggressive than in the past, reflecting in part Outer Mongolia's new status as a nominally independent country, as well as Sino-Soviet political realities."<sup>2</sup>

In 1936 Mao Tse-tung expressed the expectation that,

"When the People's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will."<sup>3</sup>

Since it was "the sacred task of the whole Chinese people to win back all the lost lands of China"<sup>4</sup> we can perceive in Mao's policy a ~~drive~~, sometimes subtle, to reassert Chinese hegemony over the M.P.R. The Manifesto of the Second National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1922 stated that a policy objective

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1 The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region added to its area the western part of Manchuria in 1949. See Robert Rupen, "Outer Mongolia since 1955", Pacific Affairs, vol. 30, no. 4, December 1957, p. 129

2 Richard Geisler, "Recent Developments in Outer Mongolia", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 28, no. 12, December 1959, p. 183.

3 Quoted by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 96

4 Anna Louise Strong, China's New Crisis, London, no date, p. 50 quoted in Friters, op. cit., p. 207

was "the establishment of a Chinese Federated Republic by the unification of China proper, Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang into a free federation."<sup>1</sup>

It was therefore with reluctance that, during the Sino-Soviet discussions of 1950, China agreed to recognize the 'independence' of the M.P.R. and to exchange ambassadors with the Republic. As pointed out by R.G. Boyd<sup>2</sup> Chinese maps issued since 1950 have shown much of the Sino-Mongolian border as unsettled, although the U.S.S.R. evidently regards the boundary as fixed,<sup>3</sup>

That Sino-Soviet rivalry in Outer Mongolia does exist is clear. "Sinkiang, Tibet, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia are definitely Chinese; Tuva and Buryat Mongolia definitely Russian. Outer Mongolia is suspended between the two, subject to the stresses and pulls of both."<sup>4</sup>

The specific policy acts of Mao's régime towards Outer Mongolia are as follows. In 1951 Outer Mongolia and China signed the first of their annual trade agreements, and in the following year the two governments concluded a ten year treaty on economic, cultural and educational co-operation. Highways linking Inner and Outer Mongolia were constructed, and by 1956 rail connections between Peking and Ulan Bator

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1 Brandt, Schwarz and Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, p. 64.

2 Communist China's Foreign Policy, p. 67.

3 See, for example, 1954 World Atlas published by the Soviet Bureau of Geodesy and Cartography, and the map enclosed in China in Transition, Peking 1957.

4 Rupen, op. cit., p. 132.

were completed.<sup>1</sup>

On November 25, 1954, in a joint message to the Mongolian People's Republic, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai sent greetings to the leaders of the Republic. It is interesting to note that there is no indication that they harbour any irredentist ambitions or feel that they are addressing a 'lost' territory.

"Thirty years ago, the Mongolian people under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party overthrew by their valiant struggle the reactionary feudal rule and established a people's democratic state. Thanks to the tireless efforts of the Mongolian people and the selfless assistance of the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People have freed themselves forever... The Chinese people are happy and inspired by the brilliant success of the Mongolian People."<sup>2</sup>

On the basis of the 1955 trade agreements, over 10,000 Chinese agricultural and industrial workers immigrated to the M.P.R. to help alleviate the shortage of manpower. In the following year outright grants of 160 million rubles were extended to the M.P.R.,, to aid their industrialization programme.<sup>3</sup> Under the terms of the December 1958 Treaty, China gave the M.P.R. a 100 million rubles loan.<sup>4</sup>

In the field of "cultural and educational co-operation", Mao's régime extended its influence in various ways. 'Friendship Associations' disseminated propaganda; the Chinese government

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1 Geisler, op. cit., p. 183.

2 Quoted by Peter Tang, Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies, New York 1957, p. 406

3 Rupen, op. cit., p. 132.

4 Robert Rupen, "Outer Mongolia, 1957-60", Pacific Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2, June 1960, p. 127.

undertook to build a sports stadium in Ulan Bator; a textile and glass factory, apartment house developments, new roads and bridges were all built by the Chinese government.<sup>1</sup>

In May 1960 Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi went to Ulan Bator to negotiate a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. Included in the terms of the treaty was a loan of 200 million rubles to the M.P.R. for the 1961-65 period.<sup>2</sup> At the end of their visit, Chen Yi stated,

"These tremendous achievements gained by the Mongolian people have not only laid a good foundation for further economic and cultural development of the Mongolian People's Republic, but also augmented the might of the entire socialist camp... We support each other in international struggles; we closely co-operate with and help each other in socialist construction. The development of this friendship and co-operation between our two countries is beneficial not only to the socialist construction of our two peoples but also to the solidarity of the socialist camp and to the safeguarding of world peace."<sup>3</sup>

From the above survey of Mao's strategy, notably, his foreign aid and his propaganda, one can suppose that the Chinese Communist régime has calculated that it need only wait for time to bring Outer Mongolia back into its orbit. Even if Outer Mongolia never returns to Chinese sovereignty, China may well become the dominant power in the area.

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1 Robert Rupen, "Outer Mongolia, 1957-60", Pacific Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2, June 1960, p. 127.

2 New York Times, June 1, 1960.

3 Asian Recorder, 1961, p. 4080.

On December 25, 1962, Peking reached a border settlement with the Mongolian People's Republic. Commenting on this agreement, The Economist stated that "Peking could have carried out this exercise any time since 1950, when, at Russia's request, it recognized the "inviolability of the independent status of Mongolia". Failure to do so suggests that Peking still hopes to see Mongolia return to the Chinese world, of which, until 1911, it was a part."<sup>1</sup>

### Manchuria

Manchuria has always been somewhat apart from the main body of the Chinese world, partly because there are enough indigenous characteristics in the Manchus to create an ethnic barrier between them and the Chinese, and partly because the Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria) were not easily accessible to China proper. From 1644 to 1911 successive Manchu rulers imposed their rule on the Chinese. "When the last Manchu ruler had abdicated (1911), the Manchus found themselves without any national territory to fall back on and had no alternative but to allow themselves to be merged in the surrounding Chinese population".<sup>2</sup> Thus, in the early days of the Republic Manchuria was an integral part of China. During

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1 "China's Neighbours", January 5, 1963, p. 23.

2 Henry McAleavy, "The Manchus", History Today (London) vol. 10, no. 1, January, 1960, p. 41

the 1920's Manchuria was under the control of the warlords.

The natural riches of Manchuria made it the focus of international cupidity. Between 1931 and 1945 the entire area was occupied by the Japanese. In 1932 the Japanese established a puppet Manchurian state, Manchukuo, under Henry P'u-yi.<sup>1</sup> By 1940 the invading forces had extended their domain to North China, the coastal regions and the Yangtse valley, thereby completely detaching Manchuria from Chinese control.

Chiang Kai-shek attached great importance to the recovery of Manchuria. He hoped to utilize its resources and industry to help rebuild China's economy. In his determination to crush the Japanese and repossess the area, he stated, in a message delivered to the nation in 1941:

"For a decade our Northeastern fellow-countrymen have endured under the oppression of the Japanese a hellish life of isolation and outrage... the will of the nation (is) unanimously prepared to make all the sacrifices required. This is because we are resolved to assert and maintain the absolute inviolacy of China's territorial sovereignty, to recover the lost territory of the Northeastern Provinces... There will be no cessation of resistance until the freedom of the Northeasterners is regained and their provinces restored. It is a matter of the loss to China of an area geographically essential to her national defenses, where there are resources equally indispensable to us... there can be no separating any portion of Chinese territory from the whole... Until all lost territory is recovered, victory will not have been gained."<sup>2</sup>

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1 Henry McAleavy, "The Manchus", History Today (London) vol. 10, no. 1, January 1960, p. 42. As a child Henry P'u-yi reigned as the last Manchu Emperor of China. This puppet régime ended with the Japanese surrender in 1945.

2 Chiang Kai-shek, Resistance and Reconstruction, New York, 1943, pp. 250 and 260



In the late 1950's he reiterated this theme:

"The Northeast Provinces are an integral part of China, the inhabitants there are Chinese, and the resources there are essential to China's reconstruction. Therefore, our stand on the restoration of Chinese sovereignty in these provinces has been immutable."<sup>1</sup>

Chiang's policy act of waging war against Japan was aimed inter alia at the liberation of Manchuria. In 1938 he said,

"You (Manchurians) should realize that today four hundred and fifty million people are standing solidly together with you, with the same purpose - ready to sacrifice everything... for the survival and independence of the Northeastern Provinces and the nation."<sup>2</sup>

As witnessed in the case of Mongolia and Sinkiang, there is also an historical legacy of Russian rivalry with China in Manchuria. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin made Great Britain and the United States agree that, in return for his country's entry into the war against Japan, the Soviet Union would recover "the former rights of Russia (in Manchuria) violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904".<sup>3</sup> In August 1945 Chiang Kai-shek's government and the Soviet Union agreed that the major Manchurian railways would be placed under joint Sino-Soviet ownership for thirty years, that Port Arthur would be jointly used as a naval base, and that Dairen would be turned into a free port with half of its harbour facilities leased free of charge to the Russians. In return for these 'privileges', the Soviet Union agreed to respect China's

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 245.

2 The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, vol. I, p. 114.

3 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, New York 1960, p. 341.

sovereignty over Manchuria.<sup>1</sup>

In September 1945, in a somewhat premature statement, Chiang said,

"With the military assistance of our ally, Soviet Russia... our Northeastern Provinces (are) liberated, and our countrymen there brought back into the fold of the fatherland... With regard to Allied assistance in the reconstruction of our Northeastern provinces, so far as economic aid and technical collaboration are concerned, we have already concluded a friendly pact with the Soviet Union for thirty years."<sup>2</sup>

The Nationalist government objected strongly when Russian troops, sent to 'liberate' Manchuria, began to dismantle and remove all the industrial equipment in the area. In a retrospective view of the Sino-Soviet agreement, Chiang stated,

"(it is) useful today as a logical yardstick with which to measure Soviet Russia's bad faith, as demonstrated in her subsequent diplomatic and military actions... Russia stepped up her looting of factories and mines in the Northeastern Provinces. Her intention clearly was to ruin the industrial potentials of these provinces while augmenting those of her own in Siberia."<sup>3</sup>

One of the main targets of Chiang's "War of Resistance" against Japan was repossession of Manchuria. Although his agreement with Soviet Russia in 1945 gave him 'theoretical' sovereignty over Manchuria, little by little his control over the area declined. Before 1949 the Chinese Communists had already established a stronghold in Manchuria.

The 'United Front', the period of co-operation between Nationalists and Communists in their war effort against Japan, was

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1 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, New York 1960, p. 341.

2 Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Part II, New York 1946, pp. 871-72.

3 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia and China, pp. 145 and 179.

brief, lasting from 1937 to early 1941. Mao's goal and Chiang's were identical, that of defeating Japan and regaining China's lost territory. In 1937 Mao wrote,

"The Chinese Communist Party is willing to form a common front with the Kuomintang... to defeat the infamous Japanese invaders and strive for a new China of independence... and fight bitterly in defense of North China and the sea-coast."<sup>1</sup>

As mentioned above, by 1949 the Chinese Communists had successfully penetrated most of Manchuria, and, through their strategy of combining the redistribution of land with new political measures, they gained the support of the population.

Under the terms of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Mao's régime was forced to make concessions to Soviet Russia in return for Moscow's support. The agreement provided for joint Sino-Soviet administration of the principal railways in Manchuria, as well as for the joint use of the naval base at Port Arthur. Later agreements called for the establishment of several long-term joint-stock companies to operate mainly within China's borderlands, where Russia had traditionally pressed for special rights.<sup>2</sup>

One of the side effects of the Korean war was the emergence of a relatively well-trained, well-equipped Chinese army in Manchuria. The overwhelming strength of these troops produced the logical

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1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 2, pp. 70 and 75.

2 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 345.

consequence of increased Chinese control in the area. In September 1952, when Chou En-lai was in Moscow for talks on political and economic questions of mutual concern, the Soviet Government agreed to transfer all its rights to the joint administration of the Manchurian Railways to the Chinese People's Republic.<sup>1</sup> It had been agreed that Russian control of Port Arthur and the joint control of the base in time of peace was to be forfeited on the signing of a Japanese peace treaty, or, at the latest, by the end of 1952. In that year, however, it was announced that, at the Chinese's "request", the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Port Arthur was to be delayed. It was finally completed in May 1955.

These specific policy acts of tightening Chinese control over Manchuria reflect not only Mao's goal of uniting China but also the shifts in the balance of relations between China and Russia.<sup>2</sup>

The struggle in Manchuria has been won by China. The area is now under the complete control of the Peking government. Chinese funds, equipment and manpower have flowed into Manchuria. This would seem to reflect the overall importance of the province, with its industrial facilities and agricultural surpluses, to future Chinese

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- 1 This was completed on December 31, 1952. The text of the Sino-Soviet communique of September 15, 1952 was issued by the New China News Agency, September 16, 1952. Quoted in Barnett, op. cit., p. 346.
  - 2 In 1950 China desperately needed Russian aid, so Russia was in the more favourable position to dictate terms of the agreement. In 1952 Russia's hold over China lessened. Significantly, in October 1954, the Chinese did not go to Moscow, but a Soviet delegation headed by Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin went to Peking. At that time, Soviet Russia promised to evacuate Port Arthur by May 31, 1955 and to relinquish its shares in the joint-stock companies.

economic development.<sup>1</sup>

A significant policy act in the sinicization of Manchuria is the successful attempt, since 1958, to introduce Chinese as the primary language.<sup>2</sup> This is a reversal of the régime's earlier policy of the development of non-Chinese languages in ethnic minority areas. As pointed out by Henry Schwarz<sup>3</sup>, the purpose of that policy was, probably, to ensure maximum effectiveness of official propaganda and indoctrination. By 1958 that policy ceased to function and 'regional autonomy' was further reduced with the forceful introduction of Chinese as the primary language.

#### The Sino-Indian Border Area

The fifth case in an analysis of Chiang's and Mao's policy acts directed at the unification of China is the Sino-Indian border area. The tradition of Chinese domination in part of the border region is illustrated by the annual 'tribute' paid to the Chinese Emperor by the rulers of present-day Ladakh.<sup>4</sup> Domination of that area fluctuated with the strength and fortune of the ruling Chinese dynasty. By 1911 the tribute missions had ceased.

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1 In 1952 Manchuria instituted a "large scale basic construction plan". See Kao Kang, "The 1952 Plan for Northeast China and the Production of Extra Wealth", People's China (Peking), June 16th, 1952, pp. 6-8, mentioned in S.B. Thomas, Government and Administration of Communist China, rev. ed., p. 122.

2 See Henry G. Schwarz, "Communist Language Policies for China's Ethnic Minorities; The First Decade", China Quarterly, no. 12, October - December 1962, p. 182.

3 ibid. p. 182.

4 Kusum Nair, "Where India, China and Russia Meet", Foreign Affairs, vol. 36, no. 2, January 1958, p. 332.

Before the Simla Conference of 1914 the demarcation line between China and India had been imprecise. The three-hundred-and-fifty mile border line agreed upon at the Conference was named after the British delegate, Sir Arthur McMahon. Although the Simla Convention was initialled by all three participating countries, Britain, China and Tibet, China withdrew her consent only two days later.<sup>1</sup> "Historically, in the border areas between China and India, control has fluctuated between China, Britain and India. This suggests that in the mid-twentieth century, the friction between China and India over these areas is not a new development, but the continuation of an ancient conflict."<sup>2</sup>

In his list<sup>3</sup> of 'lost territories' Chiang considers much of the Himalayan border area as belonging to China. As was the case with Tibet, Chiang's policy goal of incorporating the southern and southwestern border areas under his rule remained unfulfilled. The pressures of the Japanese war dashed all hopes of exerting any force in the area.

Seeking friendship with her neighbour, India was one of the first countries to recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China.<sup>4</sup> As well, India has continually been an ardent supporter of the admission of Communist China into the United Nations.

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1 For details, see George N. Patterson, "China and Tibet; Background to the Revolt", China Quarterly, no. 1, January - March, 1960. p.90.

2 Blema S. Steinberg, India's Neutralism in Theory and Practice, McGill University Ph.D. Thesis, Montreal 1961, p. 221.

3 See Table I

4 Recognition was accorded in December 1949.

Yet the validity of the McMahon Line has been an issue of strong contention between the two countries. China denies the legality of the Simla Convention without her signature and claims sovereignty over approximately 35,000 square miles of Indian territory in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Mr. Nehru expresses his country's position succinctly:

"The McMahon Line is the frontier - firm by treaty, firm by usage and right, and firm by geography."<sup>1</sup>

Chou En-lai states China's position thus;

"... The Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Historically, no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been concluded between the Chinese Central Government and the Indian Government... the McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people... We do not hold that every portion of the boundary line (on the Chinese maps) is drawn on sufficient grounds... our Government would like to propose... that the two sides temporarily maintain the status quo."<sup>2</sup>

Further, in a letter to Mr. Nehru in 1959, Chou wrote,

"The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history. In tackling this question one cannot but, first of all, take into account the historical background of British aggression on China when India was under British rule... using India as a base, Britain conducted extensive territorial expansion into China's Tibet region, and even the Sinkiang region... China and India were both countries which were long subjected to imperialist aggression... Unexpectedly, however, the Indian Government demanded that the Chinese Government give formal recognition to the situation created by the application of the British policy of aggression against China's Tibet region as the foundation for the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question...."<sup>3</sup>

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1 New York Times, August 14, 1959.

2 Asian Recorder, 1959, p. 2884.

3 Extract from Chou En-lai's letter to Mr. Nehru, September 8, 1959, quoted in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation", China Quarterly, no. 1, January - March 1960, p. 113.

In 1961, Chou said,

"Our stand has been very clear. It is to maintain the status quo and seek a friendly settlement."<sup>1</sup>

Although the frontier dispute had been developing since 1954, the opening in 1957 of a Chinese Communist road from Sinkiang to Tibet across eastern Ladakh (about forty miles inside Indian territory)<sup>2</sup> sparked the controversy between Peking and New Delhi. By the summer of 1959, following the Tibetan revolt and India's grant of asylum to Tibetan refugees, hostilities had broken out.

As outlined in the China Quarterly,<sup>3</sup> Peking claims that no part of the Sino-Indian frontier has been delimited and that any settlement must take into account British imperialist annexations. China's claim to an area of 13,000 square miles in Ladakh is backed by reference to the establishment of Manchu forts in the area in the eighteenth century and to the fact that many place names are in the Uighur language of Sinkiang. China also claims that Tibetan jurisdiction was exercised over the area until very recently. It must be remembered that Ladakh, bordering on Sinkiang, is strategically important to both China and India; it is the best route of entry for Communist forces into the sub-continent.

In September 1962 clashes between Indian and Chinese soldiers

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1 Chou En-lai to Edgar Snow, "A Report From Red China", Look, January 17, 1961.

2 New York Times, September 29, 1959.

3 "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation", No. 1, January - March 1960, p. 112.



occurred along the McMahon Line,<sup>1</sup> and by October 20th, there was open hostility in both the Ladakh area of northeast Kashmir (claimed by China as part of Sinkiang) and across the McMahon Line in the NEFA. In Ladakh the Chinese did not advance beyond the area claimed by them as Chinese territory, but in the NEFA they fought their way almost to the plains of Assam before they ceased hostilities on November 21. The cease-fire of December 1 left the problem of territorial claims unsettled.

During the dispute voluminous notes were exchanged between the Chinese and Indian governments. A Chinese Government note of March 22, 1952 stated:

"... China has not seized an inch of Indian territory... Even the Government of old China had clearly expressed its non-recognition of the so-called McMahon Line. If even the Government of old China took such an attitude, how could one expect the Government of new China to recognize this Line as legal?"<sup>2</sup>

From the beginning of the dispute the Chinese government asserted that their forces were acting in "self-defense", both on the McMahon Line and in the Ladakh area.<sup>3</sup> On October 25, 1962, an official note from Peking proposed that,

- " 1) there be a withdrawal of troops twelve miles beyond the line of actual control which existed between India and China on November 7, 1959.
- 2) that both sides agree not to cross the line,
- 3) that talks should be held between Mr. Chou En-lai and Mr. Nehru for a friendly settlement of the border dispute."

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1 It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse the Sino-Indian border dispute. For a detailed analysis, see H.A. Steiner, "India Looks to Her Northern Frontier", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 28, no. 11, November 1959, pp. 167-175; Michael Brecher, "Five Fingers of Tibet", The Nation, vol. 189, no. 1, October 3, 1958, pp. 183-186, and G.F. Hudson, "The Frontier of China and Assam", China Quarterly, no. 12, October - December 1962, pp. 203-206 and the New York Times, November 25, 1962.

2 Asian Recorder, 1962, p. 4598.

3 New York Times, November 25, 1962.

This proposal would give the Chinese control of some 12,000 square miles of disputed territory.<sup>1</sup> "In other words, the Indians are being offered the right to re-occupy the eastern piece of disputed territory, at the price of letting the Chinese hold on to the western piece - minus, in each case, a strip of no-man's land."<sup>2</sup>

On November 21, the Chinese government announced a cease-fire. In a partial summary of the Chinese position a note stated:

"In the past two years, first in the western then in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, Indian troops crossed the line of actual control between China and India, nibbled into Chinese territory, set up strong points for aggression and provoked a number of border clashes... the Indian troops eventually launched massive armed attacks all along the line against the Chinese frontier guards... the Chinese frontier guards finally had no choice but to strike back resolutely in self-defense."<sup>3</sup>

For the purpose of this thesis the most important aspect of the Himalayan dispute is that Chiang Kai-shek openly supported Mao in his claim to territorial rights on the Indian frontier. Bitter as Chiang is against communism, he is at one with Mao on this matter. In a statement on October 30th, 1962, the Government of (Nationalist) China said,

"The so-called McMahon Line is a line unilaterally claimed by the British during their rule over India. The Government of the Republic of China has never accepted this line of demarcation and is strongly opposed to the British claim."<sup>4</sup>

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1 New York Times, November 25, 1962.

2 "Mao The Moderate", The Economist, November 24, 1962, pp. 744-745.

3 The Times (London), November 21, 1962.

4 New York Times, November 1, 1962.

This statement strongly suggests that for China's leaders the boundary question is not one of political ideology but one of territorial sovereignty.

In a protest to the United States over its recognition of the McMahon Line as the Chinese-Indian border, the Chinese Nationalist Government spokesman said,

"... As the American view on this matter is obviously contrary to historical facts, my Government has lodged a formal protest with the United States Government."<sup>1</sup>

The fact that Chiang Kai-shek supports Mao in open defiance of United States' policy gives convincing strength to his government's statement.

To neither Nationalist nor Communist leader has there been any satisfactory delineation of China's southern and southwestern borders. As well as Ladakh and the NEFA, there are the three buffer states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan to consider as potential Chinese targets for reassertion of sovereignty. During periods of dynastic strength China has experienced some sort of overlordship over these three states.

In Ladakh, Mao's policy goal of reclaiming the area has been partially successful through the use of overt force. In Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, the tactics followed by Peking are those of cultivating friendship, of giving aid and assistance in the long-run hope of at least dominating the area, economically, politically and

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<sup>1</sup> The Montreal Gazette, November 10, 1962.

ideologically. "Indeed one does not need to think in terms of an open attack, but rather in terms of spasmodic infiltration and the subjugation of exposed areas close to the Soviet Chinese boundaries."<sup>1</sup>

### Taiwan and Sinic Unity

The final illustration of policy flowing from the image of the unity of China and the Chinese people is Peking's and Taipei's continual opposition to the idea of "two Chinas". Both Chiang and Mao maintain the goal of Sinic unity as their ultimate ideal; both hold that Taiwan and the offshore islands are China's sovereign territory.<sup>2</sup> As John K. Fairbank points out,

"Chinese politics for two thousand years has been focused on the unity of all Chinese under one rule. The Anglo-Saxon concept of "two Chinas" has been denounced by practically everyone from Chou En-lai to Chiang Kai-shek."<sup>3</sup>

In 1950, in a message to the Republic, Chiang stated,

"We shall do our best and exert our utmost for national resurgence. We should not only defend Taiwan, but also construct it as a model for the whole country... and concentrate the spiritual force of the Chinese race so as to lay a foundation for the counter-offensive on the mainland."<sup>4</sup>

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- 1 José Korbél, quoted in Nair, "Where India, China and Russia Meet", loc. cit., p. 334.
  - 2 See page 17 of this paper and Table I.
  - 3 The United States and China, rev. ed., p. 277.
  - 4 Message of Chiang Kai-shek to the Republic of China, October 10, 1950, quoted in F.W. Riggs, Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist Rule, New York 1952, p. 155.

More succinctly, reviewing the situation on Taiwan, he said,

"During the past few years on this bastion of freedom - on this strip of China's own territory - we have sought to sustain the will to resist, of our compatriots on the mainland, and to rally the Chinese people both on Taiwan and overseas to continue our struggle,"<sup>1</sup>

Since 1949 there have been many proposals for the recognition of "two Chinas", one the governing authority of the mainland, the other the island under Nationalist rule. In a recent interview, Chiang reiterated his stand:

"The so-called "two China" concept is, to put it bluntly, only wishful thinking entertained by neutralists who hope to achieve peace without paying any price for it."<sup>2</sup>

Both Chiang and Mao reject the idea of "two Chinas", both claim that Taiwan is an integral part of China and cannot be separated from it. Speaking of Chiang's attitude to the "two China" thesis, Chou En-lai states,

"Even Chiang Kai-shek said that... (the United States) had no right to meddle in this question, to interfere in China's domestic affairs. This I read from the statement of a spokesman of the so-called foreign ministry of the Chiang Kai-shek clique... It (the "two China" theory) is opposed even by Chiang Kai-shek."<sup>3</sup>

Chou En-lai, expounding his government's policy stated:

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- 1 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, rev. ed., p. 254.
  - 2 An interview with President Chiang Kai-shek published on June 17 1961 in National Review and quoted by Vladimir Petrov, What China Policy?, Hamden, Conn. 1961, p. 120.
  - 3 In an interview with Edgar Snow, "A Report from Red China", Look, January 17, 1961. See also John K. Fairbank's argument against the "two China" thesis in the New York Times, March 9, 1961.

"The Chinese people are firmly opposed to any ideas or plots of the so-called "two Chinas"... Provided the United States does not interfere with China's internal affairs, the possibility of peaceful liberation of Taiwan will continue to increase... as long as Taiwan is not liberated, China's territory is not intact."<sup>1</sup>

And further, at the Bandung Conference he said,

"The question of Formosa is entirely a matter of our internal affairs, and the exercise of our sovereignty."<sup>2</sup>

On the question of Quemoy and Matsu, Chou En-lai stated:

"Whether or not Chiang Kai-shek's troops withdraw from these islands is China's internal affair; it is an issue of civil war between the central government of new China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique."<sup>3</sup>

Chiang's determination to invade the mainland<sup>4</sup> and Peking's policy of "liberating" Taiwan flow from Chiang's and Mao's concept of Sinic unity, the incorporation of Taiwan under one Chinese rule. Echoing his régime's determination to carry out this policy, Chou said,

"The Chinese people's determination to liberate their own territory of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands (the Pescadores) is unshakeable... (these islands) have been China's territories since ancient times. The exercise by the Chinese people of their sovereign right to liberate these areas is entirely China's internal affair. This is the Chinese people's sacred and inviolable right."<sup>5</sup>

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- 1 Excerpts from a speech delivered to the first National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, July 30, 1955, quoted in Important Documents Concerning the Question of Taiwan, Peking, 1955.
  - 2 New York Times, April 20, 1955.
  - 3 Snow, op. cit., "A Report from Red China", p. 98.
  - 4 See New York Times, June 27, 1962 for an analysis of Chiang's unrealistic 'preparations' to invade mainland China.
  - 5 A statement made by Chou En-lai on September 6, 1958 and redorded in "Current Documents" Current History, vol. 35, no. 208, December 1958.

During 1954-1955, the Chinese Communists followed a policy of heavy bombardment of the Nationalist-held offshore islands, obtaining only very limited gains. When the Communist attack was at its height, Chou said,

"... The Chinese people must liberate Taiwan"<sup>1</sup>

More recently, in 1961, General Lo Jui-ching, Vice-Premier and Chief of the General Staff said that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was "ready at any time to liberate Taiwan: As a part of our sacred territory Taiwan will certainly be restored to the bosom of the Motherland".<sup>2</sup>

Both Chiang and Mao reject the principle of any self-determination for the people of Taiwan. "The one thing on which Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek agree is that the people of Formosa should not be encouraged to ask for self-determination."<sup>3</sup>

As pointed out by Allen Whiting,<sup>4</sup> there is vigorous agreement between Chiang and Mao in asserting China's sovereignty over Tibet, Sinkiang, the South China Sea area, and in asserting prerogatives over the overseas Chinese. There is also similar agreement on the question of "two Chinas", both sides insisting that Taiwan and all its nearby islands are inalienably Chinese, and not subject to international negotiation or supervision.

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1 In a speech on September 23, 1954 to the National People's Congress, Current Background, no. 296, September 28, 1954.

2 The Statesman, (Calcutta), September 10, 1961.

3 "A Formosan Third Force", The Economist, March 17, 1956.

4 "The Logic of Communist China's Policy", The Yale Review, Autumn 1960.

### 3. RESTORATION OF CHINESE HEGEMONY OVER EAST ASIA.

The foreign policy goal flowing from the image of Chinese hegemony in East Asia is the restoration and reassertion of this hegemony. Although this aim has been pursued by both Nationalists and Communists alike, Mao's policy acts have been more successful than Chiang's. The reason for this is clear: throughout Chiang's rule, Nationalist China was continually confronted with invasion and occupation by Japanese forces. Even though the problem of national survival was continually pressing the government, Chiang Kai-shek nevertheless was able to translate this goal of restoring Chinese hegemony in East Asia into policy acts. Lauding the strength and perseverance of the Chinese people, Chiang said, in the early 1940's,

"For this reason they have been for thousands of years the leaders of the people of Asia."<sup>1</sup>

After China was freed from Japanese domination, he stated,

"We firmly hold that China's freedom and equality will spearhead a struggle for freedom and equality by all Asian peoples."<sup>2</sup>

Mao's objective of extending his nation's influence has frequently been echoed by Chou En-lai. In 1955, speaking as the 'protector' of interests in the Far East, he said,

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 231.

2 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 255.



"China advocated the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea so that the Korean people in both South and North of their country can achieve peaceful national unification through free general elections without foreign interference. China advocated negotiations between the Vietnam Democratic Republic and the competent authorities of South Vietnam according to the stipulations of the Geneva Agreement... The Chinese Government, moreover, urges the convening of a Far Eastern Conference with wide representation of Asian countries to seek a peaceful settlement of these and other pressing questions in the Far East."<sup>1</sup>

Not only does Mao want to restore China's hegemony in East Asia; he also wants his country to be the Asian model, the leader of the "anti-imperialist front".<sup>2</sup>

#### Weaken China's Main Competitors

One of the major policies forged by both Chinese leaders is that of weakening their country's major competitor for hegemony in East Asia. That Chiang was aware of Japan's long-range goal of dominating East Asia is evident:

"Japan's policy of the "New Order in East Asia" was announced by Konoye in December 1938... showing that the aim of Japan is to make Japan mistress of the Pacific by dominating China on the one hand, and by eliminating European and American interests from Asia on the other."<sup>3</sup>

In 1938 he stated,

"What is Japan's real aim?... They mean the overthrow of international order in East Asia and the enslavement of China so that Japan may divide the world and dominate the Pacific."<sup>4</sup>

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1 New China News Agency (NCNA), Peking, October 20, 1955, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, Department of State Publication 7379, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, 1962.

2 See pages 22 and 23 for statements.

3 The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, vol. 1, p. 250.

4 Chiang Kai-shek, Resistance and Reconstruction, p. 59.

There were several specific Nationalist policy acts aimed at weakening Japan's position. First and foremost was the policy of the "War of Resistance" against Japan.

"Our objective is well-defined. We want to protect our territorial integrity and sovereignty. We are determined to force our enemy to abandon his aggression, and to alter his traditional conception of our country. Our final aim is the re-establishment of peace in East Asia. We shall carry on our War of Resistance until we attain this object."<sup>1</sup>

The war with Japan lasted from 1937 to 1945. It halted all progress in China; it left the country economically prostrate and politically divided; it so corrupted and weakened the Nationalist Government that the way was paved for Mao Tse-tung's victory in 1949.

One of Chiang's first acts during the war was to introduce and enforce a system of conscription. The Chinese government drafted a total of 14,053,988 men between 1937 and 1945.<sup>2</sup> General mobilization of the country for war began in 1937.

"The Chinese strategy, as decided by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek... .. is gradually to scatter and break the enemy's strength in China's vast countryside over a long period of time."<sup>3</sup>

A second specific policy act was that of appealing to the overseas Chinese to join in support of the "War of Resistance".

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1 The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, vol. 1, p. 77.

2 Ministry of Defense source quoted in China Handbook, 1950, quoted by F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-49, Princeton, New Jersey 1956, p. 135.

3 China Handbook, 1937-43, p. 350.

Chiang requested that the overseas Chinese send money, medical equipment, food and clothing back to China. He urged the overseas 'citizens' not to co-operate in any way with Japan.

"Our War of Resistance has benefited much, materially and spiritually, from this continuous support by overseas Chinese... The overseas Chinese have played an admirable part in the... present struggle against Japan... We must be united.... We are fighting in defense of our fatherland."<sup>1</sup>

The outbreak of World War II made China a partner of the powerful democratic nations. The terms of the Yalta Pact, concluded without Chiang's knowledge, brought Russian troops into Manchuria to fight against the Japanese. By 1945, with allied help, China's main competitor for hegemony in Asia was defeated.

That Mao considered China's enduring competitor in Asia to be Japan is clear from his "Anti-Japanese foreign policy statement" of 1937. The Chinese Communist policy was to

"accord the Japanese imperialists no advantages or facilities, but on the contrary confiscate their property, repudiate their loans, weed out their lackeys and expel their spies in China... To defeat the Japanese invaders we should in the main rely on our own strength, but foreign aid is indispensable... Immediately conclude a military and political alliance with the Soviet Union."<sup>2</sup>

Mao's domestic policy was to join a United Front with the Kuomintang in the war against Japan.<sup>3</sup> Internationally, he sought co-operation with the allies against Japan. In 1941 he said,

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1 "A Call to Overseas Chinese", The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, vol. 1, pp. 239-244.

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 2, p. 62.

3 See page 67 for a statement.

"In foreign affairs unite against the common foe with all the people in Britain, the United States and other countries who are opposed to the fascist rulers of Germany, Italy and Japan."<sup>1</sup>

Yet in August 1945 Mao said,

"As a historical stage, the War of Resistance against Japan is now over... During the past eight years the people and army of our liberated areas, receiving no aid whatsoever from outside and relying solely on their own efforts, liberated vast territories and restricted and pinned down the bulk of the Japanese invading forces and practically all the puppet troops."<sup>2</sup>

After 1945, China was a reluctant witness to Japan's advance to the highest level of industrial and technological efficiency in Asia. From 1949 to 1952 Mao's attitude towards Japan combined suspicion and hostility. This view of Japan as China's enduring competitor is reflected in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty which explicitly named Japan as a potential enemy and aggressor nation. Each side pledged co-operation and common action in the event of aggression by "Japan or any state allied with Japan".<sup>3</sup> "This, 'other power' was clearly the United States of America, which then had considerable armed forces occupying Japan."<sup>4</sup>

Neither Taiwan nor Communist China signed the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951. Chou En-lai's protests both against the "illegal

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1 Mao, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 23.

2 Mao, op. cit., (Foreign Languages Press) vol. 4, pp. 11 and 12.

3 Documents on International Affairs, 1949-50, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, p. 541.

4 R.G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, p. 66.

peace" and America's military position in Japan were completely ignored.

Gradually, after 1952, Mao discarded his former defensive appraisal of Japan as his major antagonist and competitor in the Far East. Increasingly, Peking appeared to regard Japan as a complementary power, a non-Soviet source of aid for China's industrialization programmes and a market for Chinese exports. In a concerted effort to impress Japan with her resurgent rôle in Asia and in an attempt to "lure" Japan away from American ties, Peking repatriated Japanese prisoners of war who had been held in China since 1945.<sup>1</sup> The Chinese élite also expanded their efforts to establish political and economic ties with influential groups in Tokyo, but these efforts were often blocked or frustrated by Japan's close alignment with the United States. It is natural that Peking place special importance on the rôle of Japan as the key nation in terms of regional security. In 1953 Liu Shao-chi stated:

"It can be said that peace in the Far East is assured as long as it is possible to prevent the resumption of aggression and violation of peace by Japan, or any other state that may collaborate with Japan,"<sup>2</sup>

And further, he said,

"It would be impossible for American imperialism or any other imperialist power to launch large scale aggressive war in the Far East without Japan as a base."<sup>3</sup>

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1 Peter Tang, Communist China Today, p. 485.

2 Quoted in A. Doak Barnett, "Red China's Impact on Asia", The Atlantic, vol. 204, no. 6, December 1959, p. 48.

3 ibid., p. 48.

Mao's actions directed at weakening Japan as a competitor for Asian hegemony include "threats and lures to try to win Japan away from the United States coalition,"<sup>1</sup> The chief inducement is trade, the chief propaganda weapon the theme that all of Japan's economic ills stem from the American policy which prevents trade with Communist China. Peking has wooed Japanese trade since 1952, first through arrangements with individual businessmen, and later, after 1954, through contacts on a governmental level.<sup>2</sup>

In July 1957, Chou En-lai, in an interview with Japanese press correspondents, asserted that "Japan to-day is under the control of the United States."<sup>3</sup> Working through the Communist Party of Japan (C.P.J.), Peking seeks to provoke a growing anti-American sentiment. For example, in November 1953, the C.P.I. organized demonstrations against U.S. Vice-President Nixon when he visited Tokyo.<sup>4</sup>

In a recent television interview, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi said,

"The biggest stumbling block (to closer relationships) is that some of those who are in power in Japan, in defiance of the will of their own people, are docily following the anti-Chinese policies of the United States. The U.S. policies are the fundamental obstacles in the way of Friendship between our two countries."<sup>5</sup>

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1. Tang, op. cit., p. 486.

2. ibid., p. 487.

3. NCNA, July 29, 1957, quoted in A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 273.

4. Tang, op. cit., p. 485.

5. Peking Review, no. 40, 1962, quoted in China Quarterly, "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," no. 12, October-December 1962, p. 258.

Among the under-developed countries, India is in the best position to compete against China's projection of herself as the model - political, economical and ideological - which other Asian nations should follow in their development as strong and independent nations. In order to reassert China's hegemony in Asia, Mao's policy is aimed at weakening her neighbour and strengthening her own position at India's expense.

In 1954 India and China became co-sponsors of the "five principles of peaceful co-existence"<sup>1</sup>, and in the following year differences between the two countries were glossed over by the "Bandung spirit". This climate of friendship greatly facilitated the publicizing of China's achievements in India and facilitated the "projection of the nation building appeal of Communism."<sup>2</sup> Within this cordial relationship, which lasted from 1954 to 1959, China was able to direct much undermining propaganda to India. The Indian Communist Party (C.P.I.) had established organizations for the promotion of Sino-Indian friendship. These various 'cultural associations' helped to disseminate Chinese Communist propaganda. "Meanwhile, the Indian Government made few attempts to counter the propaganda appeals of Communist China or to rally public opinion behind its own efforts to develop the country."<sup>3</sup> In 1955, in a

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1 These are: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each others' internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, (5) peaceful co-existence, quoted from the Preamble to the Sino-Indian Treaty of April 29, 1954, on Tibet, Chinese Communist World Outlook, p. 85.

2 R.G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, p. 112.

3 ibid., p. 112.

speech praising Sino-Indian peaceful co-existence, Chou En-lai said,

"The People's Republic of China always holds that countries with different social systems can co-exist in peace provided that they don't commit aggression against each other... The friendly co-operation between China and India... fully testifies that peaceful co-existence is entirely possible and is an equitable and mutually beneficial relationship."<sup>1</sup>

The policy acts of the Peking régime often have multiple motivations. For example, the current Sino-Indian border dispute<sup>2</sup> may be viewed in one way as a policy directed towards reclaiming China's 'lost territory'. The dispute also can be viewed as a facet of China's struggle with India for the leadership of Asia.

As Werner Levi points out,<sup>3</sup> India has established her prominent position and has acquired a considerable following in Asia partly on the basis of a non-aligned policy. If China could force her out of this position, force India to abandon a non-aligned road, the Communist élite could demonstrate the futility of neutralism and stress China's superiority. This action would presumably lead the smaller Asian nations to abandon neutrality and swing towards China.

By his show of force on the Himalayan frontier, Mao hoped to

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1 Chou En-lai's speech at the Reception Celebrating the Fifth Anniversary of the Republic of India, January 26, 1955, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, p. 87.

2 Outlined on pages 72, 73 and 74 of this thesis.

3 "Chinese-Indian Competition in Asia", Current History, vol. 38, no. 222, February 1960, p. 67.



expose India before other Asian states as an essentially weak power unworthy of leadership. In this way, it can be said that Mao has weakened India's position as the leader of developing nations.<sup>1</sup>

It is also true that the border war forced New Delhi to divert India's scant economic resources to defense, thus striking a blow at India's economic advance.

Finally, it can be said that India's awkward and frustrating position over the frontier dispute has somewhat damaged Mr. Nehru's prestige in the eyes of other Asian nations. Presumably this loss has been Peking's gain.

Certainly her show of force on the Himalayan frontier instilled a fear and a respect of China among many Asians. It is too early to predict how successful China has been in her objective of weakening India.

#### Drive for Economic Superiority

A second major policy stemming from the goal of the restoration of hegemony is that of achieving economic superiority over East Asia. During his rule, Chiang vainly attempted to rejuvenate China's sagging economy through his "National Reconstruction" policy.

"At the beginning of the war... the Nationalist Government immediately adopted the dual policy of resistance and national reconstruction.... We must initiate a system of planned economy that will combine national defense with the people's livelihood."<sup>2</sup>

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1 For an analysis of Chinese gains in the border war, see New York Times, November 25, 1962.

2 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, pp. 136-37.

In 1938, an emergency session of the Kuomintang Party Congress adopted the "Programme of Resistance and Reconstruction".<sup>1</sup> The economic facet of the programme, outlined in articles 17 to 24<sup>2</sup>, stated that "investments by people both at home and abroad shall be encouraged", and that the greatest measure of energy shall be devoted "to the development of village economy, the cultivation of waste land, and the work of irrigation". The proclamation also stipulated that heavy industry and increased mining should be undertaken. The programme placed a heavy burden on the individual, stating that "war-time taxes shall be levied,... the banking business shall be strictly controlled", and "no profiteering shall be allowed".

All segments of the Chinese population were urged to support the programme. Spurring the Youth Corps to action, Chiang said,

"..... fulfill your great revolutionary ambitions and carry out the great enterprise of National Reconstruction... the foundation for China's revival."<sup>3</sup>

Chiang's drive for economic superiority over Japan was unsuccessful. The war strained China's economy to the breaking point. Production failed to keep pace with demand and the resultant scarcity of consumer goods, together with the over-issue of currency, led to a spiraling inflation. Even though it was Chiang's policy to attain economic superiority in East Asia, China, economically speaking, was

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1 This was a quasi-constitutional proclamation adopted at Hankow on March 29, 1938. See Paul Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek: A Political Study, Boston 1941, Appendix I, Government Documents, pp. 309-10.

2 ibid., p. 311-12.

3 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, pp. 218 and 220.

the defeated nation in 1945.

Mao's two Five Year Plans and the "Great Leap Forward" have been reasonably successful in setting China on the road to economic progress.

The significance of a recent article<sup>1</sup> in a Peking journal, A Study of International Problems, is that China regards India as her great economic rival in Asia. The article said that,

"In the eight years between 1948 and 1957, the total value of Indian industrial and agricultural production increased from Rs. 57,300 million to Rs. 74,2000, or 29.5 per cent. In approximately the same period, the total value of the Chinese industrial and agricultural production increased... 166 per cent."

The article stressed three points; that India's economic development is slow compared to China's; that such progress as has been made has benefited the capitalists rather than the working class; and that India's economy is becoming increasingly dependent upon Western foreign capital, especially "American imperialist" investment and influence.<sup>2</sup>

The outline of China's first Five Year Plan (1953-57) stated that "in keeping with our peaceful foreign policy, and in

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- 1 "China's Economic Achievements Compared to India's", reported by the Times of India, November 5, 1961.
  - 2 Since 1958, China's rate of progress has dropped sharply, Wilfred Malenbaum wrote, "India achieved an annual rate of growth of real income of almost 3.5 per cent in the period from April 1, 1950 to March 31, 1959. The Chinese growth rate was at least three times as great over essentially the same period. "India and China: Contrast in Development Performance", The American Economic Review, vol. 49, no. 3, June 1959, p. 285.

accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit, we should expand our trade with the countries of Southeast Asia,"<sup>1</sup> Peking's expanding trade helped to spread propaganda of her industrial progress and thus enhanced China's national prestige.

The "Great Leap Forward" of 1958, with its intensification of output targets, of industrial, military and agricultural development, was a programme intended to boost China's production figures vis-à-vis those of other Asian countries, particularly India.

"By realizing and stating the limitations governing the industrialization of China, while laying down principles for making the maximum use of her manpower reserves, the Chinese Communist leaders may strengthen the Communist bid for uncommitted Asia - irrespective of any promises of industrial aid by the Soviet Union."<sup>2</sup>

The decline in China's rate of development since 1958 is intimated in the following communiqué issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1961:

"In heavy industry... the scope of capital construction in 1961 should be appropriately reduced, the rate of development should be readjusted, and a policy of consolidating, filling out, and raising standards should be adopted on the basis of the victories already won... The temporary difficulties in supplying the market caused by the poor harvest and the shortage of raw materials for light industry are important problems demanding

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- 1 First Five Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic of China, 1953-57., Peking, 1956, p. 162, quoted by Shao Chuan Leng, "Communist China and Economic Relations with South East Asia", Far Eastern Survey, vol. 28, no. 1, January 1959, p. 2.
  - 2 Ralf Bonwit, "Communist China's Leap Forward", Pacific Affairs, vol. 31, no. 2, June 1958, p. 172.

immediate solution."<sup>1</sup>

Even though China's economic progress has declined, the élite's goal of achieving economic superiority over India remains the same. China's rapid advance in the military sphere is dependent on her economic progress. One of the motivations for attaining economic superiority over India is to achieve military superiority.<sup>2</sup>

On January 25, 1963 Chou En-lai announced the existence of a Third Five Year Plan. As pointed out by The Economist, current Chinese comment on economic development suggests that the new plan will be a modest one. "Three years of "readjustment" and a reasonable harvest in 1962 are at last putting China on a low but even economic keel from which to start thinking of growth once again."<sup>3</sup>

The psychological overtones of China's progress run deep, and affect not only China's competitor for economic superiority - India - but also the other Asian nations who are watching the progress of the Chinese and Indian economic systems.

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- 1 Communique of the Ninth Plenary Session of the C.C.C.P.C. NCNA, Peking, January 20, 1961, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 50. Reviewing the natural calamities which hampered economic progress, Liao Lu-yen declared in 1961, "... because of the serious natural calamities in 1959 and... in 1960, the agricultural production plan was not fulfilled. Red Flag, February 1, 1961, quoted in ibid., p. 52.
  - 2 In 1956 Liu Shao ch'i stated that "in order to defend our country, we must continue to strengthen our national defense", NCNA, Peking, September 16, 1956, quoted in ibid., p. 72..
  - 3 "The Tiptoe Plan", February 2, 1963, p. 398.

Policy Towards the Overseas Chinese

A third policy aimed at restoring Chinese hegemony in East Asia is the use of the overseas Chinese.

There are approximately fifteen million overseas Chinese unevenly scattered through Southeast Asia. In Malaya they constitute a little less than forty per cent of the population, in the Philippines approximately one per cent.<sup>1</sup> Beginning in the sixteenth century, mass migration of Chinese to Southeast Asia reached its peak in the century ending in 1900. As pointed out by William Skinner,<sup>2</sup> the overseas Chinese often achieved a social and economic position superior to that of the indigenes. In many Southeast Asian countries they play a dominant rôle in the national economy.

In "A Call to Overseas Chinese" in 1939 Chiang Kai-shek urged:

"Young overseas Chinese should ever keep in mind their duty to the land of their ancestors... when you have completed your training you should answer promptly the call of your country... Take part in all pro-Chinese activities. Invest your capital in industrial enterprises in China... Many overseas Chinese have already brought their savings here and I hope more will follow their example. The Government's policy is to guarantee the interests of the people, to encourage production, and to protect investments."<sup>3</sup>

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1 G. William Skinner, "Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 321, January 1959, p. 137.

2 ibid., p. 138.

3 The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937-45, vol. 1, p. 243.

To look after the 'welfare' of the overseas Chinese, Chiang established the Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs. This Commission rarely acted through official channels; rather it sought to implement its policies through the various Chinese community associations.

The Commission made it known to all overseas Chinese that they were citizens of China and that they were expected to support Chiang's régime, as well as to give economic aid to their homeland. The Commission was most active during China's "War of Resistance", squeezing every means of assistance from the overseas 'nationals' to help the war effort. Chiang said in 1939,

"Overseas Chinese have written a long and glorious chapter in the history of our revolution... Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities our brethern overseas have contributed lavishly of manpower, materials and money to help their country... The patriotism of Chinese living abroad has won world-wide admiration and has increased the prestige of our country."<sup>1</sup>

Through a partial harnessing of the economic resources of the overseas Chinese, through an exploitation of their 'national spirit', China gained both in economic strength and in sympathy and support from other countries.

As pointed out by A. Doak Barnett the nationalist-communist struggle for political influence among the overseas Chinese since 1949

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<sup>1</sup> The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937-45, vol. 1, p. 239.

has simply been an extension of civil war between the two régimes.

"The Chinese Communists have also inherited the belief, held by virtually all political groups in modern China, that the backing of the Overseas Chinese is important to China's domestic policies".<sup>1</sup>

Mao's policy was succinctly outlined in the Common Programme of 1949:

"The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad."<sup>2</sup>

And further,

"China's permanent policy is to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese overseas as provided by the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Government, in accordance with this, will protect Overseas Chinese who have chosen Chinese nationality."<sup>3</sup>

In 1956 Liu Shao-ch'i stated,

"We must continue to unite with patriotic Chinese living in various places abroad; they too are a component part of the United Front."<sup>4</sup>

Before 1954 Mao's régime followed a "hard-line" policy of forcing remittances from the overseas Chinese, so desperate were

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1 Communist China and Asia, p. 186.

2 Article 58, text in China Digest, October 5, 1949, supplement, quoted in ibid., p. 185.

3 People's Daily, Peking, April 23, 1955, quoted in op. cit., Chinese Communist World Outlook, p. 121.

4 Report to the First Session of the Eighth National Congress of the C.P.C., NCNA, Peking, September 16, 1956, quoted in ibid., p. 121.



they for foreign exchange. It was natural therefore, that the southeast Asian governments had greater fears that the overseas Chinese would become tools of the Peking régime undermining their governments and dominating their economy. They also feared that the overseas Chinese would direct extensive trade and investment to China. On the one hand, Peking followed a policy of forcing financial support from the overseas nationals, on the other, they protested to Asian governments when any 'persecution' of the overseas Chinese was reported. In 1951 Chou En-lai stated,

"There are more than ten million Chinese nationals living overseas. Lawful rights and interests of these people, as a result of unreasonable discrimination and even persecution on the part of certain countries, have been seriously infringed. This cannot but arouse serious attention and deep concern of the Chinese people and government."<sup>1</sup>

At the Bandung Conference, 1955, Chou announced a new policy designed to allay the fears of other Asian governments and to disrupt any potential coalition of anti-Chinese Southeast Asian states. More important, this shift to a "soft-line" was designed to use the overseas Chinese to help establish more friendly relations with the non-aligned Asian nations and thus play a valuable rôle in the spread of Chinese Communist influence.

The crux of Peking's policy was the rejection of the idea of dual nationality. This was a complete reversal of the policy

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1 Report to the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, October 23, 1951, quoted in op. cit., Chinese Communist World Outlook, p. 121.

followed by Chiang Kai-shek. At Bandung Chou stated,

"The People's Government of New China... is ready to solve the problem of dual nationality of overseas Chinese with the Governments of the countries concerned."<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after the conference, A Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Agreement was signed. It provided that the overseas Chinese in Indonesia should choose Indonesian or Chinese Communist citizenship within two years. The nationality question is being exploited by Peking to achieve her goal of reasserting Chinese hegemony in Asia. As outlined by A. Doak Barnett,<sup>2</sup> the Chinese Communists have insisted on conducting bilateral negotiations with any country concerned with the citizenship problem. Chou En-lai has intimated that a settlement of the nationality question must be preceded by formal recognition of the Peking régime. He emphasized that Peking was ready to "settle" the citizenship issue "first with Southeast Asian countries which have established diplomatic relations with us."<sup>3</sup>

Mao's policy towards the overseas Chinese cannot be accurately judged from official statements alone. Since 1949, all actions show that his régime has worked energetically to capture the support of the overseas Chinese, to get control of their remittances,

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1 Supplementary speech at Bandung, NCNA, Peking, April 19, 1955, quoted in the New York Times, April 20, 1955.

2 Communist China and Asia, pp. 187-88.

3 "Report on Government Work", made on September 21, 1954, to the National People's Congress, Current Background, no. 296, September 28, 1954, quoted in ibid., p. 188.

to expand trade with Southeast Asia through the manipulation of local Chinese businessmen. However, official statements have been made on "safeguarding overseas remittances" and on "attracting overseas Chinese capital and investment into socialist enterprises and construction in China."<sup>1</sup>

In 1949 two agencies were established to direct and co-ordinate Peking's programme among the overseas Chinese, the United Front Department of the Communist Party Central Committee, and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.<sup>2</sup> Peking's policy of using the overseas Chinese to strengthen the régime is illustrated by the large-scale propaganda effort directed at appealing to the nationalistic and patriotic sentiments of the overseas Chinese. In some areas, Peking offers the overseas Chinese credit through their branch banks, loans subject to the condition of compliance with Peking directives. In others, it attempts to woo the Chinese youth back to their homeland for training and indoctrination. In these ways the régime has calculated to gain influence over the overseas Chinese, to use them as a vehicle of economic and political penetration in Southeast Asia, as a tool to increase China's domination in Asia.

On February 2, 1960 the State Council in Peking issued a directive defining the attitude of the Government to the overseas

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1 "Fourth National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs in Communist China", American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, no. 390, June 25, 1956, quoted by Shao Chuan Leng, op. cit., p. 4.

2 Barnett, op. cit., p. 190.

Chinese. The Council also issued a directive to establish a Commission to receive and accommodate the Chinese who had returned from overseas. This was the first time since the communists' assumption of power that China officially clarified her position on the overseas Chinese. The directive assured those overseas Chinese who retained their Chinese nationality that "their legitimate rights and interests would be effectively protected. This has always been the policy of the Chinese Government and will remain so in the future."<sup>1</sup> The directive expressed regret over the recent "anti-Chinese activities and discrimination against Chinese in certain Southeastern countries". It continued,

"In view of these conditions, the Chinese Government has decided to accommodate all overseas Chinese who are homeless, have no means of livelihood or are unwilling to continue to live abroad... We warmly welcome the return of all overseas Chinese who want to come back and contribute to the building up of the socialism of their motherland."<sup>2</sup>

The overseas Chinese who return to the mainland form "Returned Overseas Chinese Associations", and, working through local "Friendship Associations" in South and Southeast Asian countries, they carry out enthusiastic propaganda campaigns.

Essentially Chiang's and Mao's policy approach to the overseas Chinese is the same. That Mao has more power to manipulate, to control, to direct the overseas Chinese is evident from the above analysis.

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1 Asian Recorder, 1960, p. 3152.

2 ibid., p. 3152.

### Foreign Aid Programme

The final illustration of China's drive to restore hegemony in Asia - the foreign aid programme - refers only to Mao Tse-tung's policy acts. Particularly during the war years, Chiang Kai-shek constantly sought aid from Great Britain, the United States and from the overseas Chinese. The aid he did receive was not enough to revive China's crumbling economy.

Peking's aim in fostering a foreign aid programme is two-fold. Within the sphere of aid and technical assistance to communist countries, the régime has both reinforced and reasserted China's influence and has helped to win the unconditional support of these countries adjacent to China. The giving of aid to non-communist countries is designed to reinforce Communist China's general policy of "encouraging non-alignment in South and Southeast Asia, to foster closer Chinese relations with the recipient nations and to expand China's influence throughout the area."<sup>1</sup> "Mao's trade and aid programmes win good will and score propaganda victories. Most significant and dramatic was Peking's decision to give out-right grants to Cambodia and Nepal in 1956."<sup>2</sup>

Peking's first venture in the foreign aid field was a grant of 338 million dollars to North Korea in 1953 for rehabilitation after the Korean War.<sup>3</sup> A similar grant was made in 1955 to North

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1 Barnett, op. cit., p. 247.

2 For details, see Leng, op. cit., p. 2.

3 November 23, 1953, Sino-Korean agreement, text in NCNA, November 23, 1953, quoted in Barnett, op. cit., p. 245.

Vietnam.<sup>1</sup> Outer Mongolia, Hungary and Albania all received grants or long-term credits from Peking. After the initiation of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1958 new aid programmes to Communist neighbours were announced. Long-term loans were extended to North Korea, North Viet Nam and Outer Mongolia and a technical assistance programme was inaugurated in these countries.<sup>2</sup>

Even more significant has been the régime's policy of extending aid to non-Communist nations. Cambodia received a grant of 22.4 million dollars in 1956,<sup>3</sup> and two years later, when Cambodia and Communist China established formal diplomatic relations, China expressed her willingness to undertake new aid projects. Here is a good example of the success of Mao's policy: Peking's aid to Cambodia influenced the government to accord formal recognition and form closer ties with China.

Nepal and Ceylon both were recipients of Chinese communist aid in 1956 and 1957. In 1958 the régime began to offer long-term loans to several non-communist countries, including Burma and Ceylon. This planned penetration of the economies of these small Asian states is particularly significant, as "China cannot extend economic assistance

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- 1 July 7, 1955, Sino-Vietnamese agreement, text in NCNA, July 8, 1955, quoted in ibid., p. 245.
  - 2 For figures relating to the amount of aid sent to non-communist countries see Charles Wolf Jr., Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia, Princeton, New Jersey 1960, p. 386-87. For figures of aid to communist countries, see Asian Recorder, 1961, p. 4141.
  - 3 June 22, 1956, Sino-Cambodian agreement, text in NCNA, November 3rd, 1956, quoted in Barnett, op. cit., p. 244.

without sacrificing some of her industrial and agricultural development".<sup>1</sup> An overall goal is to alienate the region from Western domination, drawing it into the orbit of China's hegemony and into the "camp of socialism".

The policy of weakening the main competitors for Asian hegemony, of striving for economic superiority, and of using the overseas Chinese to advance China's strength are common to Chiang and Mao in their effort to restore China to a position of hegemony in East Asia. The foreign aid programme is a policy followed by Mao's régime to attract smaller Asian nations into China's orbit, to gather a nucleus of 'dependencies' around Peking.

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1 R.G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, p. 101. It should be mentioned that Peking's penetration into the economies of other Asian states through bilateral trade agreements has helped to restore her hegemony in Asia. A number of smaller states are semi-dependent on Chinese trade. For a table outlining the bilateral commercial agreements between Communist China and South and Southeast Asian countries, 1951-58, see Leng, op. cit., p. 3. For an excellent analysis of Peking's foreign aid and technical assistance programme, especially to Africa and Latin America, see Howard L. Boorman, "Peking in World Politics", Pacific Affairs, vol. 34, no. 3, Fall 1961, pp. 227 - 241.

#### 4. ACCEPTANCE OF CHINA AS A GREAT POWER

Linked to the objective of restoring China's hegemony in Asia is the Nationalist and Communist foreign policy goal of gaining acceptance of Great Power status for China.<sup>1</sup> The image of the past greatness of the 'Middle Kingdom' has a profound influence in determining this foreign policy goal.<sup>2</sup>

Criteria determining the qualifications for Great Power status are ever-changing. Certainly in geographical size and in population China fills the necessary requirements.<sup>3</sup> The actions taken by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung are less directed at improving the quantitative requirements for Great Power status than they are aimed at influencing other nations to accept China as a Great Power. It must be remembered that China, despite her area, population, history, and level of civilization, was never considered a Great Power by the West. In fact she was not even regarded as a member of the 'Family of Nations', or accorded full rights and privileges until during World War II.

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1 The term 'super-power' is not used here as it is an acknowledged fact that only the United States and the Soviet Union are 'super-powers' to-day. See John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, ch. 7. Although 'super-power' status may be a long-term goal of the Peking élite, there is, at present, only evidence of policy acts seeking Great Power status.

2 For an expression of the image, see pages 26 and 27 of this paper.

3 For an analysis of what determines Great Power status, see Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of National Power, 2nd ed., New York 1951, p. 106.



### Participation in International Organizations

The rôle played by China's delegation at the League of Nations exemplifies a facet of Chiang's policy to gain recognition and acceptance of China as a Great Power. Briefly stated, Chiang used the League to enhance his country's prestige, to gain recognition for China's war effort against Japan, to achieve world-wide publicity for the Chinese cause and to seek revision of China's "Unequal Treaties".

Although China was represented at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, she was not on an equal footing with the other nations represented. China's claims received little consideration. The Chinese delegation refrained from signing the Treaty of Versailles but signed the Treaty of St. Germain, of which the Covenant of the League of Nations was also a part. Thus China became an original member of the League.<sup>1</sup> The chief Chinese delegate, Dr. V.K. Koo, made contributions to the drafting of the Covenant and took an active part in the Commission on the League of Nations at the peace conference.

In order to gain recognition and acceptance as a great sovereign power, China claimed the right to be permanently represented on the Council of the League.<sup>2</sup> In 1920 Dr. Koo asked the Assembly

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1 Hu Ti Chu, China and the League of Nations, an abstract of a doctoral thesis, University of Illinois, Urbana 1937, p. 2.

2 Stephen S. Goodspeed points out that "legal recognition of a great power first occurred with the Council of the League". Article IV of the Covenant specified that "The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers". According to the Preamble of the Versailles Treaty, these were the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. See Nature and Function of International Organization, New York 1959, p. 17.

of the League to adopt the geographical principle for the allocation of non-permanent Members of the Council. He asserted that the criteria for Great Power status should not be based on military strength alone, and that China, from every point of view except military force "was in no way inferior to the Great Powers".<sup>1</sup> With the exception of the acceptance of the geographical principle, China's plea for permanent representation on the Council was ignored by the Assembly. Annually the Chinese delegation applied for re-eligibility for election to the Council in a non-permanent capacity.<sup>2</sup> In 1936 when Japan was no longer a Member of the League, China won the approval of the Assembly to hold a semi-permanent Council seat.<sup>3</sup>

The rôle played by the Chinese delegation on the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium was significant, and helped to publicize the activities of Chiang's régime. On this Committee it can be said that China was accepted as an equal power.<sup>4</sup>

A third specific policy followed by China's delegation in the League was that of trying to influence the other Members to repeal the "Unequal Treaties". China demanded revision of the treaties on the grounds of "justice and equality". In 1925 and in 1929 China made two unsuccessful appeals to the League to

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1 Committee on the Composition of the Council. Report on the Work of the First Session, 1926, pp. 67-68. Records of the Special Session of the Assembly, March 1, 1926, p. 31.

2 China had been represented on the Council for the following periods: 1921-23, 1926-28, 1931-34.

3 Monthly Summary, October 1936, Report on the Committee Appointed to Study the Composition of the Council, 1936, p. 287.

4 From 1920 to 1937, except for one occasion, China was continually represented on the Advisory Committee. See Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium, The First Session - The Twentieth Session (1920-1935) and The League of Nations: Ten Years of World Co-operation. Secretariat of the League of Nations, Geneva 1930, pp. 299-312

abolish the "Unequal Treaties".<sup>1</sup>

After Japan invaded Manchuria, China appealed to the League for assistance in 1931. From then to 1933 League efforts were directed towards achieving five goals in dealing with the dispute: to halt hostilities, to restore the status quo ante, to obtain the fullest possible information on the dispute, to conciliate between China and Japan, and to crystalize world opinion against the aggressor.<sup>2</sup> Eventually articles X and XV of the Covenant were evoked, but in the end all League efforts to help China settle her 'dispute' with Japan proved fruitless. Even though China ceased to depend on the peace machinery of the League to help defend her national security, she still derived extensive technical assistance during the war from different League organizations.<sup>3</sup> The direct and continuous contact between China and other countries under League supervision widened China's international rapport, publicized various activities taking place in China and, generally speaking, made other nations more aware of conditions in China.

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1 Dr. Koo invoked article XIX, but was overruled by an Assembly resolution in 1929. Hung Ti Chu, op. cit., p. 7.

2 See Appeal by the Chinese Government, Report of the Commission of Enquiry, League of Nations, Geneva 1932.

3 Hung Ti Chu, op. cit., pp. 10-11. Between 1928 and 1933 twenty-seven experts were commissioned by the League to aid China. For example, China received assistance from the League's Financial Committee to help re-establish her currency. The country also received help from the World Health Organization. See Goodspeed, op. cit., pp. 66 and 68.

Shortly after China became a member of the League Council Dr. Koo gave a speech to the Assembly defining China's attitude towards the future of the League. This, it seems, is an address by the spokesman of a Great Power. Dr. Koo declared:

"We believe that the League of Nations not only represents an ideal, but fulfills a vital need of the world. If it has failed in the past, the course for us to take now is to correct the mistakes, mend the defects and improve its workings, without impairing in any way the fundamental principles of the Covenant."<sup>1</sup>

Despite the failure of the League to cope with the Japanese invasion, it can be said that Chiang's Government effectively used the League of Nations to increase China's acceptability as a Great Power.

The recognition of China as an allied power at the outbreak of war in 1939 and the repudiation of the "Unequal Treaties" in 1943 were two momentous steps on China's path to Great Power status. After the war China emerged nominally a Great Power. It was with reluctance, however, that Britain, the United States and Russia accepted China's major power status. In 1943, Prime Minister Churchill wrote to the Foreign office, "China is not a World Power equal to Britain, the United States or Russia, and I am reluctant to subscribe to such statements".<sup>2</sup> In 1944, Cordell Hull remarked, "I myself believe that China has only a fifty-fifty chance to re-establish herself as a great power. But if she's rebuffed now by the other major Allies even

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1 Records of the Sixteenth Assembly (1936) Plenary Meetings, II, p. 51.

2 Hinge of Fate, Boston, 1950, p. 940.

that chance might be lost, and the Chinese Government would tend to dissolve".<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless in 1944 China took part in the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, and with the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, put forth the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to the San Francisco Conference.<sup>2</sup>

Article 23 of the United Nations Charter states that "The Republic of China... shall be a permanent member of the Security Council". As Stephen Goodspeed remarks,<sup>3</sup> the Charter continued legal recognition of Great Power status by providing for permanent membership on the Security Council. In 1945 China was accepted by Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and France as a permanent member of the Security Council, as an equal of the "great nations". Chiang stated:

"As one of the authors of the United Nations Charter and one of the four original sponsors of the United Nations Organization, China should stand for the preservation of peace and justice and firmly support the Organization."<sup>4</sup>

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1 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, New York 1948, p. 1586.

2 For details see Dumbarton Oaks Documents on International Organization, U.S. Department of State Conference Series 56, Publication 2192, Washington 1944. At the San Francisco Conference Dr. T.V. Soong was the chairman of the Chinese delegation. For a record of the Chinese proposals see Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Published by the United Nations Information Bureau, New York 1945, vol. III, Doc 1G/1(a), May 1, 1945, p.25.

3 Nature and Function of International Organization, p. 17.

4 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 140.

China was elected to a three year membership in the Economic and Social Council, and by 1947 she was a member of no less than eight Specialized Agencies of the United Nations.<sup>1</sup> In 1947 the Chinese delegate declared:

"The Security Council, which is entrusted with the great responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, has laboured strenuously though not always successfully.... Our task is arduous, our responsibility great."<sup>2</sup>

From 1945 to 1949, China was accepted in the United Nations as one of the five Great Powers on the Security Council. In 1949 Chiang Kai-shek was defeated in the Civil War by the Communists. Nationalist China ceased to be accepted as a Great Power by many members of the United Nations. Although the Nationalist régime still maintains its permanent seat on the Security Council, this is largely due to pressure exerted by the United States Government.<sup>3</sup>

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1 These were the I.L.O., UNESCO, F.A.O., ICAO, I.M.F., IBRD, W.H.O., and the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugees Organization. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47., New York 1947, p. 865.

2 Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, vol. 1, Lake Success, New York 1947, pp. 55-57. In 1947 Dr. T.F. Tsiang was appointed the Chinese representative on the Security Council.

3 It is not the purpose of this thesis to examine the problem of China's seat in the United Nations. The issue of whether the Nationalists or Communists should occupy China's seat is raised annually. The Soviet Union first posited this question in early 1950, proposing that the Peking régime be seated in place of the Nationalists. In the autumn of 1950, India took the initiative in urging this step. "Since then the question of seating China has been raised, either by one of the nations of the Communist bloc or by India, in virtually every session of every United Nations body to which China belongs. Barnett, op. cit., pp. 446-447. See also David Brook, The United Nations and the China Dilemma, New York 1956.

An aim of the Chinese Communist Government is to replace the Chinese Nationalists in the United Nations and thereby to capture a permanent seat on the Security Council. As early as 1945 Mao stated:

"... The Communist Party welcomes the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. It has sent its own delegate to join the Chinese delegation to San Francisco, as a means of expressing the will of the Chinese people."<sup>1</sup>

It soon became evident that Mao's régime would not gain an easy admission into the United Nations. On November 15, 1949, on January 8 and on January 15, 1950, Chou En-lai cabled Lake Success demanding that "The Kuomintang reactionary clique representatives be ousted from international organizations."<sup>2</sup>

In a statement in 1953, Chou strongly re-affirmed his country's opinion that Communist China belongs in the United Nations:

".... without the participation of the People's Republic of China, it is impossible to settle any major international questions, above all the questions of Asia. Therefore, for the United Nations to carry out truly and effectively its duty of safeguarding world peace and international security, it is essential first of all to restore to the People's Republic of China its legitimate rights in the United Nations."<sup>3</sup>

That Communist China would be content only with exclusive representation in all United Nations organizations was clearly stated by Chou in 1961:

"If the so-called "Taiwan Clique" is to appear in the United Nations under whatever form and in whatever name... we will

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- 1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 4, p. 302.
  - 2 Hsin Hua Yueh Pao, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 340 and vol. 1, no. 4, p. 841, quoted by A. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War, p. 26.
  - 3 Statement of October 8, 1953, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 99.

definitely refuse to take part in the United Nations."<sup>1</sup>

Communist China's aim to gain admission to the United Nations has so far been thwarted.<sup>2</sup> In 1955, in a message to the United Nations, Chou stated that all Security Council actions concerning China were invalid without Communist China's vote:

"What is especially intolerable is the fact that the People's Republic of China, representing 600 million Chinese people, is up to now still deprived of its legitimate position and rights in the United Nations, while the representatives of a small handful of remnants of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique, repudiated long ago by the Chinese people, continue to usurp the position of representing China in the United Nations... it must be pointed out that without the representative of the People's Republic of China participating in the name of China in the discussions of the United Nations Security Council, all decisions taken in the Security Council on questions concerning China would be illegal, null and void."<sup>3</sup>

The United States is blamed for blocking Communist China's admission to the United Nations:

"... It is only as a result of U.S. imperialism persisting in its policy of hostility to China and manipulating the voting machinery of the United Nations that the Chinese People's Republic.... is deprived of its lawful seat in the United Nations."<sup>4</sup>

From the above excerpts it is evident that Peking feels that

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- 1 Edgar Snow's interview with Chou En-lai, "A Report from Red China", Look, January 17, 1961.
  - 2 The only Chinese Communist 'participation' in the United Nations occurred during the Korean War. The C.P.R. sent telegrams of protest to the Security Council and to the United Nations Headquarters. The Security Council invitation to China to participate in the Council discussion on Korea was declined. See Whiting, op. cit., pp. 101, and 146-50 and Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Washington 1955, pp. 135-40.
  - 3 on February 4, 1955, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 99.
  - 4 People's Daily, October 12, 1960, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 100.



non-participation in the United Nations hinders Communist China's acceptance as a Great Power. The régime is no doubt encouraged by the number of countries who have voted for China's admission into the United Nations.<sup>1</sup> It is more than feasible that at some date in the future the Peking Government will be accepted into the United Nations.

### Participation in Conferences and Negotiations

World War II marked the turning point for China's acceptance as a Great Power. During and after the war China was recognized as one of the "Big Four" in the post-war planning programme. Shortly after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour, China joined with the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and twenty-six other countries in signing the Washington Declaration of the United Nations. This declaration reaffirmed the principles of the Atlantic Charter and pledged joint prosecution of the war until final victory was won.

"There was now only one war, one alliance and one outcome. China's task was to work with the allies not only to defeat Japan, but also to build a lasting world peace."<sup>2</sup>

After the Washington Declaration Chiang said:

"The Washington Conference made China one of the four main powers and that was an expression of the high regard in which our allies hold us."<sup>3</sup>

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- 1 See New York Times, November 4, 1962 for a comparative chart of votes for China's admission to the United Nations, 1950-1962.
  - 2 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 110. The Washington Declaration was signed on January 1, 1942.
  - 3 Chiang Kai-shek, The Voice of China, London 1943, p. 44.

In October 1943 "China was given Great Power Status as a co-signatory of the Moscow Declaration that united war would be waged against those Axis powers against which each signatory was fighting."<sup>1</sup> In the following month at Cairo Chiang Kai-shek, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that after surrender Japan's territory would be reduced to the status quo of 1868, and that "all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China".<sup>2</sup>

Commenting on his participation at the Cairo Conference, Chiang said:

"At the Cairo Conference I had maintained that the question of preserving or abolishing the Japanese monarchy should be left entirely to the Japanese people themselves... President Roosevelt understood my point of view and agreed with me."<sup>3</sup>

China was not asked to participate in the Yalta Conference of 1945. In return for Russia's participation in the war against Japan, Roosevelt and Churchill promised Stalin post-war restoration of Russian territories taken by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, as well as assuring Russia of the status quo in Outer Mongolia. The impact of the Yalta Agreement on China was severe.<sup>4</sup>

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1 David N. Rowe, Modern China: A Brief History, Princeton, New Jersey 1959, p. 68. The abrogation of the "Unequal Treaties" in January 1943 heightened China's self-image of great nationhood. See China Handbook, 1937-43, p. 179.

2 Rowe, op. cit., p. 68.

3 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 136.

4 The terms of the Yalta Agreement, signed on February 11, 1945, were not disclosed to the Chinese Government until June 15th of that year. Perhaps one could say that although China was accepted as an equal of the Great Powers, she was not treated as one when it came to protecting the national interests of one of the Great Powers.

Chiang wrote in the mid-1950's:

"It was at Yalta that China's sovereignty in Outer Mongolia and her administrative integrity in the Northeast Provinces were sacrificed in exchange for Soviet Russia's participation in the war against Japan."<sup>1</sup>

From 1946 to 1949 Chiang's government was pre-occupied with the Civil War. During this time the United Nations became the major arena in which the Nationalists asserted their status.

The Chinese Communist élite have also used international conferences and negotiations as a vehicle to further the acceptance of China as a Great Power. Voicing his approval of China's wartime emergence into the 'Family of Nations', Mao said in 1945:

"The Chinese Communist Party approves of the Atlantic Charter and the decisions of the international conferences of Moscow, Cairo, Teheran and Crimea".<sup>2</sup>

It was not until 1954, at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, that Communist China entered the realm of diplomacy through negotiation. Chou En-lai sat at the conference table as an equal of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the United States, Russia and France. It seemed that Peking discovered the importance of legitimate government-to-government relations as a technique for achieving the goal of Great Power status. Chou En-lai's

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 133.

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 4, p. 302.

rôle in gaining a negotiated settlement at the Conference was crucial. From the opening session it was evident that he held the power of decision which would lead to a settlement or a broadening of the conflict.<sup>1</sup> It was reported<sup>2</sup> that Chou's private meetings with the British Foreign Minister and the French Premier during the two weeks of restricted conference sessions were instrumental in achieving an agreement. "Chinese Communist views on the importance of concluding an armistice, and on the acceptability of the formula finally agreed upon, appeared to have prevailed in the end over differing views held by the Vietminh."<sup>3</sup>

In an address at the Conference Chou stated:

"This is the first international conference in which the People's Republic of China has taken part... No force in the world can prevent the Chinese people from marching along the road to a strong and prosperous China."<sup>4</sup>

Chou's coup at Geneva marked the beginning of a series of negotiations and conferences that greatly enhanced Communist China's status. The first of these were agreements on "Peaceful Co-existence"

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1 See New York Times, April 26, April 28 and May 12, 1954.

2 New York Times, June 16, 1954.

3 Shen-Yu Dai, "Peking and Indo-China's Destiny", Western Political Science Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 3, September 1954, p. 367. The final formula was "to divide Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, as well as to accept separate settlements for Laos and Cambodia". See Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 99. Originally the Vietminh argued strongly for some kind of general settlement for all of Vietnam rather than have a territorial division of the country.

4 New York Times, April 26, 1954.

made with India and Burma in 1954 and 1955. Together with Mr. Nehru, Chou En-lai shared the spotlight at the Bandung Conference in 1955. That China's participation and leadership at Bandung raised the country's prestige and acceptability among the Afro-Asian nations is evident from the number of governments that accorded Peking diplomatic recognition soon after the Conference adjourned.<sup>1</sup> Identifying himself as the leader of the Afro-Asian bloc, Chou said:

"In the interest of defending world peace, we Asian and African countries, which are more or less under similar circumstances, should be first to co-operate with each other."<sup>2</sup>

Recently the Peking élite have penetrated a new field in international agreements, that of disarmament negotiations. Arthur Steiner, among others, points out<sup>3</sup> that any large-scale international efforts to limit armaments, which necessarily requires agreement among all armed powers if they are to be effective, can be frustrated or made relatively meaningless without Communist China's participation and concurrence. That this concurrence is denied was clearly stated by Foreign Minister Chen Yi in 1960:

"China is ready unhesitatingly to commit itself to international obligations to which it agrees. However, any international disarmament agreement which is arrived at without the formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic or the

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1 See H.A. Steiner, "Communist China in the World Community", International Conciliation: no. 529-533, May 1961, p. 444 for a list of the governments who have accorded diplomatic recognition to Communist China.

2 Speech at the Bandung Conference, New York Times, April 19, 1955.

3 Steiner, op. cit., p. 392.

signature of its delegates cannot, of course, have any binding force on China."<sup>1</sup>

Despite the non-participation of Communist China in international organizations and in many international conferences, despite her isolation from diplomatic relations with many countries, "the objective force and presence of the Chinese People's Republic on the world scene is a reality."<sup>2</sup> The explicit veto exercised by Peking on the disarmament question is proof of the country's Great Power status. "China therefore casts a brooding shadow over all generalized international deliberations, and all who would act against its interests need take account of its capacity for independent action or retaliation... In a sense, its abstention (from international organizations and conferences) magnifies its power. The basic anomaly then is the vital rôle China plays in the life of the international community and in the future of its members, in spite of the non-participation of the C.P.R."<sup>3</sup>

The Peking élite's policy of trying to achieve a 'Partnership of Equals' with the Soviet Union is an illustration of the régime's efforts to gain Great Power status. The terms of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty illustrate definite Soviet leadership of the Communist camp and China's dependency on the Soviet Union at that time.

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1 Statement of January 20, 1960, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 101. The theme of this speech was restated by K'ang Sheng at the Warsaw Treaty Meeting the following month.

2 Steiner, op. cit., p. 391.

3 ibid., p. 393.

In 1954, when Khrushchev visited Peking, a joint Sino-Soviet declaration reflected growing Soviet acceptance of China as an independent and equal power. There were no references to China's recognition of the U.S.S.R. as the leader of the Communist bloc, and relations between China and the Soviet Union were said to be based on the principles of "equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity". The two governments agreed to consult each other in order to achieve "unity of action".<sup>1</sup>

Beginning with China's intervention in the Eastern European crisis in 1956, the Peking élite have shown that they can take a stand independent from that of the Soviet Union. In 1957, Chou En-lai succinctly stated:

".... All the socialist countries take Marxism-Leninism as their guiding philosophy... Yet this does not mean that all socialist countries, while being unanimous on principle, have also identical views on all questions at all times."<sup>2</sup>

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- 1 NCNA, October 12, 1954, quoted by R.G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, p. 68. Mr. Boyd states that "the declaration indirectly accorded China the status of a great power", ibid., p. 68.
  - 2 "Report on a Visit to Eleven Countries in Asia and Europe" given to the third session of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political and Consultative Conference, March 5, 1957, NCNA, Peking, March 5, 1957, quoted by Allen Whiting, "Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 321, January 1959, p. 105. For an account of Mao's encouragement to Mr. Gomulka throughout 1956-57 contrasted with Mr. Khrushchev's personal opposition to him, see Whiting, "Contradictions in the Moscow-Peking Axis", The Journal of Politics, vol. 20, February 1958, pp. 142-59. See also Klaus A. Prigsheim, "New Dimensions in China's Foreign Policy", China Quarterly, no. 4, October-December 1960, pp. 40-54.

Peking's increased military, economic and political power paved the way for Chinese interference in Poland and Yugoslavia. Allen Whiting points out that "acceptance of the Chinese formula for bloc relations elevated Peking's prestige both inside and outside the bloc."<sup>1</sup>

There are many prisms through which the current Sino-Soviet dispute can be viewed. One is that of China's effort to gain "equality" and "independence" in her relations with Russia, to gain acceptance by the Soviet Union and the world of her independent great power status. The 1960 Declaration,<sup>2</sup> issued after the momentous Moscow Conference of eighty-one Communist parties, represented a partial victory for the Soviet Union's leadership of the Communist bloc. It must be noted that although the 'dispute' was temporarily suspended, Russia felt obliged to make some concessions to the Chinese position.<sup>3</sup> "Khrushchev was able to carry his most important point about the non-inevitability of war, but in turn he had to accept a definition of co-existence which by all accounts he would have preferred to leave undefined."<sup>4</sup>

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1 "Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis", op. cit., p. 106.

2 Text in G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet Dispute, New York 1961, pp. 179-205. See also William E. Griffith, "The November 1960 Moscow Meeting: A Preliminary Reconstruction", China Quarterly, no. 11, July-September 1962, pp. 38-57.

3 Briefly stated, the Chinese uphold the thesis that it is naive illusion to think that war can be avoided before capitalism is abolished. The Soviet Union upholds the view that Lenin's theory of the inevitability of war is no longer valid, that 'peaceful co-existence' with the West is possible. The Chinese denounce Russia's policy as "revisionist" and the Russians label China's position as "ultra-dogmatist". For an account of the ideological differences, see Edward Crankshaw, London Observer, "The Moscow-Peking Clash", February 12, 1961 and "The Moscow-Peking Clash: More Disclosures", February 19, 1961.

4 Edward Crankshaw, "Khrushchev and China", The Atlantic, vol. 207, no. 5, May 1961, p. 47.



China's more recent defiance of Soviet leadership points to the élite's increased confidence in their own great power. In the autumn of 1962 the Chinese refused to join with the Soviet Union in the development of a Communist common market area. Through radio broadcasts, newspaper and periodical articles, the Chinese élite constantly level abuse at all "modern revisionists."<sup>1</sup>

The realm of Sino-Soviet relations can be viewed in the context of China's drive to gain acceptance as a Great Power, independent of Russian leadership. It may be said that to date the Peking élite have been partially successful in achieving their goal.<sup>2</sup>

#### Diplomatic Representation

The third broad area which Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung utilize in promoting and advancing their country's Great Power status is the field of diplomatic relations. In the early 1940's, after China became an ally of the Great Powers, Chiang began to court other nations to accord China formal diplomatic recognition. Between 1940 and 1943 China negotiated treaties with numerous countries and established diplomatic representatives in their capitals.

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- 1 Such derogatory comments and statements glorifying violent revolutionary action were particularly evident at the Fifteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1962. See Edward Crankshaw, "Khrushchev Meets China Challenge", reprint from the Observer in the Montreal Star, November 13, 1962. For a comprehensive account of Sino-Soviet relationships, See Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Princeton 1962.
  - 2 This brief survey is not intended to be a thorough review of Sino-Soviet relations. It is included in this thesis only to illustrate the point that China has increased her power status within the "socialist camp".

For example, in August 1941 China and Canada agreed to exchange diplomatic missions. The British Ambassador expressed the belief that the establishment of the Canadian legation "will promote the maintenance and development of cordial relations between China and Canada".<sup>1</sup> In other instances, overtures made by the Chinese Government led to a changing of the status of their envoys. For example, in 1943 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that "The Netherlands Government and the Chinese Government have decided to raise the status of their respective envoys to that of Ambassador".<sup>2</sup>

Efforts were made to enlarge China's diplomatic representation and to create an atmosphere of special 'cordial relations' with both the United States and Great Britain. For example, the United States and China exchanged military missions in 1942, and in that same year the United States concluded a lend-lease agreement with China. The British Government presented China with three British gunboats and conferred upon Chiang Kai-shek the highest military honour, the Grand Cross of the Bath (G.C.B.).<sup>3</sup>

The exigency of the war precluded the sending of many

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1 China Handbook, 1937-43, pp. 162-63. The other countries according to China diplomatic representation were Australia, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, the Vatican, Egypt, Iran, Chile, Panama, Iraq, Salvador and Turkey.

2 ibid., p. 171.

3 ibid., pp. 147-48 and 159.

Chinese cultural representatives abroad. Nevertheless Chiang's Government made a great effort in the 1940's to maintain diplomatic status symbols equal to those of a Great Power.

Similarly, Mao's régime has been quick to negotiate and to exchange diplomatic representatives with as many countries as possible, but particularly with newly-emerging nations in Asia and Africa.<sup>1</sup> For example, China was one of the first governments to recognize the Republic of Algeria. In 1961, in a speech accepting the credentials of the Head of the Algerian diplomatic mission to Peking, Liu Shao-ch'i declared:

"The Chinese people fully support the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria which, while conducting armed struggle, does not exclude the conquest of national independence by means of negotiations based on equality."<sup>2</sup>

In both size and activity present-day Chinese Communist embassy staffs equal their counterparts from nations already accepted as Great Powers. Most frequently the Chinese Communist embassy staff includes a commercial attaché who devotes much of his time to expanding China's area of trade, and a cultural attaché who promotes the dissemination of propaganda. However, probably the most effective organ for enhancing Communist China's international

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1 For a list of countries who accord the Chinese People's Republic diplomatic recognition see Steiner, "Communist China in the World Community," op. cit., p. 444.

2 NCNA, Peking, April 19, 1961. quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 101.

status of Peking's 'unofficial' foreign ministry.<sup>1</sup>

Prominent among the 'unofficial' associations which promote China's Great Nation status are the Friendship Associations which operate so effectively in different countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (C.P.I.F.A.), the Peking Foreign Languages College and the Institute of Diplomacy are all organizations specializing in increasing favourable contact between China and the countries who do not recognize the communist régime. For example, former French Premier Edgar Faure was elaborately entertained by the C.P.I.F.A., and scores of influential leaders have visited Peking under the aegis of the C.P.I.F.A. or similar organizations.<sup>2</sup>

As well as enhancing China's position as a Great Power through embassies abroad, and through 'unofficial' diplomatic channels, "personal contact at the élite level has appeared to be an increasingly favoured means of Chinese Communist diplomacy, as it has come to appreciate the advantages of exploiting shared attitudes of anti-colonialism and pan-Asianism."<sup>3</sup> Chou En-lai, and to a lesser degree Ch'en Yi, have used this personal diplomacy to the fullest advantage.

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1 For an excellent discussion of the Chinese Communist diplomatic representatives, see Donald W. Klein, "Peking's Evolving Ministry of Foreign Affairs", China Quarterly, no. 4, October-December 1960, pp. 28-39.

2 ibid., pp. 37-38.

3 Allen Whiting, "Communist China's Foreign Policy", in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, 2nd. ed., p. 293.

The Communist régime has added a new dimension to its efforts of enhancing China's status with other countries. Many individuals and delegations have been invited from all parts of the world to Peking. The list of foreign dignitaries received in the capital is impressive and is an additional "status symbol" of a great nation.

American policy of non-recognition of the Chinese People's Republic continues to block China's complete acceptance as a Great Power by other members of the international community. However, Arthur Steiner points out,<sup>1</sup> the very existence of China will continue to make itself felt in world affairs.

##### 5. ASSERTION OF CHINA'S COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE

Flowing from the image of foreign encroachments is the Nationalist and Communist foreign policy goal of asserting China's complete independence. In 1937 Chiang Kai-shek stated his government's aim, as,

".... Racial and National independence. We must focus the total strength of our people upon the task of elevating our position as a race and nation. We must get rid of all aggression and oppression and build a truly independent China."<sup>2</sup>

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1 "Communist China in the World Community", op. cit., p. 451.

2 Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, vol. 1, p. 26.

Outlining the steps that China must take in order to achieve independence, Chiang said:

"... The goal of independence and rehabilitation, strictly speaking, means that China must first become self-reliant. In order for China to become self-reliant, she must, spiritually and materially, seek freedom and independence, and she must also seek progress and development in the fields of national defense, economics, politics and culture."<sup>1</sup>

As early as 1928 Mao stated:

"A programme for thorough democratic revolution in China includes, externally, the overthrow of imperialism so as to achieve complete national liberation,"<sup>2</sup>

Twenty years later he restated the same goal:

"China must be independent, China must be liberated, China's affairs must be decided and run by the Chinese people themselves, and no further interference, not even the slightest, will be tolerated from any imperialist country."<sup>3</sup>

Even a brief survey of Chinese history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries leads us to understand the significance, the urgency, of Chiang's and Mao's policy of asserting China's complete independence. Both leaders believe that a sound domestic and foreign policy can be built only on a foundation of Chinese independence.

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 233.

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 1, p. 99.

3 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Peking Foreign Languages Press, vol. 4, p. 407. For an interesting survey of the Chinese Communist view of imperialism, see Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics, Peking 1955.

Policy of 'National Liberation'

To Chiang Kai-shek the essence of 'national liberation' was the abrogation of the "Unequal Treaties". ".... The main objective of the Nationalist Revolution was to escape from the bondage of the unequal treaties."<sup>1</sup> Chiang's policy was to rally the entire country "to fight determinedly for the abolition of the unequal treaties, to lay a foundation for the rehabilitation of the nation and to secure freedom and independence."<sup>2</sup>

Prior to World War II, nineteen countries enjoyed extra-territoriality and consular jurisdiction rights in China. The Chinese Government repeatedly made efforts to abrogate these treaties, but were unsuccessful in every attempt.<sup>3</sup> Sino-American

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 68.

2 ibid., p. 72.

3 These countries were Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Germany and Austria-Hungary lost their extraterritorial rights in 1917 when China declared war against the Central Powers. The delegates at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 refused to discuss the "Unequal Treaties", and Dr. Koo's attempts to repeal them in the League of Nations fell on deaf ears. See China Handbook, 1937-43, pp. 178-90, for a summary of the steps leading up to the abrogation of the Treaties, and for extracts of the negotiations between China and the countries still retaining extraterritorial rights. When the United States and Great Britain began negotiating to abrogate their rights, the smaller nations followed suit and renounced their special spheres of influence in China. See ibid., p. 190-91.

and Sino-British negotiations "for the revision of treaties on the basis of reciprocity and equality" began in 1941. On January 11, 1943 the new equal Treaties between China and the United States and China and Great Britain were signed.<sup>1</sup> Under the terms of the treaties, the United States and Great Britain relinquished their special privileges of consular jurisdiction, of legation quarters and garrison areas, of concessions, special courts, navigation rights, and of coastal trade and custom rights. "We need only compare the new treaties with the previous treaties to recognize their great significance."<sup>2</sup>

In a message to the nation celebrating the ratification of the treaties, Chiang stated:

"Today marks a new epoch in China's history... until today we could rightly assert that unequal treaties with foreign powers had hindered and prevented our efforts to build a nation."<sup>3</sup>

Chiang's second specific policy act aimed at asserting China's complete independence was the Nationalist's "War of Resistance" against Japan. Only by liberating China from all foreign aggressors "can we hope to achieve national liberation".<sup>4</sup> In 1938 Chiang appealed to the nation, saying,

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1 For a text of the Treaties, see China Handbook, 1937-43, pp. 181-88.

2 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 154.

3 Chiang Kai-shek, "New Treaties: New Responsibilities", Resistance and Reconstruction, pp. 320-21.

4 ibid., p. 145.



"Let us rise... to resist the Japanese aggressor and to win freedom for our nation."<sup>1</sup>

By 1945 Chiang had achieved independence for his country - the "Unequal Treaties" were abrogated and the Japanese had been defeated and driven out of China.

It must be pointed out that, although Chiang's policy was to "liberate China from foreign encroachments", he nevertheless welcomed foreign aid, technical assistance, financial help and foreign military advice and assistance.<sup>2</sup> For example, in a speech of encouragement to the American Volunteer Group of the Chinese Air Force, Chiang said:

"To be with you American volunteers... fills me with delight and admiration... I have already communicated the news of your repeated successes to your Government and President Roosevelt."<sup>3</sup>

The main part of Chiang's foreign aid after the war came from the United Nations' specialized agencies, and from the United States and Great Britain.

Outlining the basis of the Communist policy of 'national liberation', Mao stated in 1945:

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- 1 Chiang Kai-shek, Resistance and Reconstruction, p. 48.
  - 2 See Goodspeed, op. cit., pp. 66 and 68.
  - 3 Speech delivered in 1942, All We Are and All We Have, p. 13. During the war Chiang's government was in desperate need of outside help. The extent to which he encouraged foreign aid to China from any and all sources contrasts with Mao's policy of accepting aid only from the "Socialist Camp".

"On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, and that means regeneration through one's own efforts. We are not alone; all the countries and people in the world opposed to imperialism are our friends. Nevertheless we stress regeneration through our own efforts. Chiang Kai-shek, on the contrary, relies entirely on the aid of U.S. imperialism, which he looks upon as his mainstay."<sup>1</sup>

During the war with Japan, Mao was in agreement with Chiang that China must be liberated from all foreign 'invaders'. In 1937, Mao echoed Chiang's statements, saying, "This is a matter of policy, .... Drive the Japanese invaders out of China!"<sup>2</sup>

Even before 1949, Mao's policy had become one of purging all 'imperialists' from Chinese soil. In a succinct statement he said:

"The People's Liberation Army demands that Britain, the United States and France quickly withdraw their armed forces - their warships, military aircraft and marines stationed in the Yangtse and Whangpoo Rivers and other parts of China - from China's territorial inland waters, seas, land and air... The Chinese People's Government... will tolerate no act of intimidation by any foreign government."<sup>3</sup>

Mao's policy of 'national liberation' was aimed not only at expelling all foreign armed forces from China; it also sought to rid China of foreign missions and schools, foreign trading establishments and banks and all foreign 'agents and reactionaries'.

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1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Peking Foreign Languages Press, vol. 4, p. 20.

2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 2, p. 58.

3 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Peking Foreign Languages Press, vol. 4, p. 402.

Moreover, the 'foreign influences' in Chinese life - the returned - student class of educators, Christian leaders, and professional workers formally trained abroad - were, for the main part, driven from the mainland. For example, as early as September 1949, Western diplomats were recalled to their homelands because of "continuing difficulties in performing their tasks". The following month Communist authorities in Shanghai ordered Western journalists to cease their activities. Beginning in January, 1950, French, Dutch and other Western consular properties became objects of requisition. Western consular officials became subject to arrest, deportation and even public abuse.<sup>1</sup>

Mao refused to be bound by any treaties which had been concluded between China and the Western powers before 1949. Article 55 of the Common Programme provided that the new People's Government should,

"examine the treaties and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign governments, and recognize, abrogate, revise, or renew them according to their respective contents."<sup>2</sup>

The Common Programme also called for diplomatic relations on the basis of "equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty".<sup>3</sup> The 1954 Constitution adopted similar policy lines.

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- 1 Peter Tang, Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies, p. 452. The case of the American Consul-General in Mukden, Angus Ward, was dramatized at the time. He was subjected to extensive abuse by the Chinese Communists.
  - 2 Otto van der Sprenkel, Robert Guillan and Michael Lindsey, New China: Three Views, "Documents", The Common Programme of the C.P.P.C.C., New York 1951, p. 216.
  - 3 Article 56, ibid., p. 216.

That Mao's policy of 'national liberation' from foreign influence was more all-encompassing than Chiang's is evident from the above analysis. So thoroughly did the Communist régime sever relationships with the Western powers that, until the mid-1950's, Chinese Communist foreign contact was limited almost entirely to the Soviet bloc and non-aligned Asian states.

### Resurgent Nationalism

Both Chiang and Mao declared Imperialism to be the mortal enemy of China. For both leaders, then, nationalism became the strongest single rallying force for progress and regeneration in China. Chiang stated that,

"The present stage of the Nationalist Revolution marks the realization of the principle of nationalism."<sup>1</sup>

The Kuomintang's aim in promoting nationalism was to gain complete economic, political and cultural independence for China.

In the introductory remarks to Chinese Economic Theory, Chiang explains that the national economy had been too much dominated by Western powers. Subtly he asserted the superiority of all things Chinese over things Western. He stated that when Japanese imperialism was defeated,

"China will become a free and independent country. Our economic development can then be based on independent and free plans which must be worked out now. And still

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1 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 160.

more important, we must establish our own free and independent economic theories as the basis for these plans."<sup>1</sup>

Chiang's goal of a revived independent national economy was never realized. Post-war economic dislocation shattered China's economy.

Chiang harnessed nationalist sentiment to spur his people on to greater sacrifices in the war effort, to force them to accept the difficult conditions of wartime life. Politically, he mobilized nationalist feelings in an effort "to unite with all anti-aggressor nations in support of the principles of independence and self-government, and fight shoulder-to-shoulder against imperialist aggression."<sup>2</sup>

Resurgent Chinese nationalism also took the form of a revival of appreciation of Chinese cultural achievements. To promote this end, Chiang attached a Cultural Branch to his personal headquarters. From this center the nations' cultural activities were directed.

Strong expressions of nationalism were the natural outcome of China's subjection to "a semi-colonial status". It is ironic that the Chinese Communists were greatly helped to power by the wave of nationalism which engulfed China before 1949.

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1 China's Destiny, p. 242. In the Jaffe edition of China's Destiny, Chinese Economic Theory is incorporated in the book.

2 Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 137.

Since coming to power, Mao's régime has skillfully used every opportunity to keep this nationalist sentiment alive. Like Chiang, Mao has harnessed resurgent Chinese nationalism to the goal of complete independence from foreign encroachments. In 1957 a Chinese Communist spokesman stated:

"There are three kinds of bourgeois nationalism. One is anti-imperialist nationalism - it is revolutionary and we approve it."<sup>1</sup>

Chinese nationalist sentiment has helped the Communist élite to stir up anti-Western feeling. A combination of intense nationalism and ethnocentrism has also provided the régime with a pretext for policies of domestic repression and external aggression. For example, at the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the Communist élite initiated a "Hate-America" propaganda campaign, focusing their intense anti-imperialist hatred on the Western leader of the 'camp'. Hate towards the United States constitutes an important element in the Chinese Communist approach to internal and external affairs. Internally, the enemy is made to appear so evil that any and all sacrifices seem justified for the sake of solidarity against her. Externally, the enmity is so strong that the isolation and defeat of the United States has become one of the main aims of China's foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>

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1 Lu Ting-yi, "The Basic Differences Between the Bourgeois Rightists and Us", NCNA, Peking, July 11, 1957, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 82.

2 For an analysis of the "Hate-America" campaign, see Richard Walker, China Under Communism, New Haven, Conn. 1955, ch. 4.

In a report in 1951, Chou announced a further success in China's efforts to gain complete independence from foreign control.

"In the course of the movement to resist American aggression and aid Korea, the Chinese people have smoothly put a complete end to the aggressive cultural activities which the American imperialists conducted in our country for so many years, and have gradually eliminated the pro-American outlook which worships everything American as well as America. All this is very beneficial to our country and people."<sup>1</sup>

In a more positive sense, nationalist patriotism is being encouraged among the Chinese people to-day. This brand of nationalism is embodied in a,

"fervent love of one's fatherland and its people, language, culture, literature and best traditions."<sup>2</sup>

Mao has been successful both in his policy of 'liberating' China from foreign control and in his efforts to harness Chinese nationalism to help develop an integrated national state, to help achieve a status of complete independence.

## 6. A WORLD COMMUNIST SYSTEM

The Chinese Communist foreign policy goal flowing from the image of communism is the establishment of a world communist system. In 1947 Mao stated:

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1 Speech to the National Committee of the C.P.P.C.C., October 23, 1951, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 63.

2 Liu Shao-ch'i, Internationalism and Nationalism, p. 50.

"This is the historic epoch in which world capitalism and imperialism are going down to their doom and world socialism and people's democracy are marching to victory. The dawn is ahead... "1

Defining the "Master Plan" of the Party, he wrote in 1949:

"Our present task is to strengthen the apparatus of the people's state... when this condition is met, China will be enabled to advance steadily under the leadership of the working class... from a new democratic society to a socialist society and communist society, to abolish classes and to achieve world communism."2

That China's international outlook focuses on her rôle in establishing world communism is illustrated both by the élite's policy of alignment with the Soviet Union and by Communist China's assumed leadership of 'national liberation' movements throughout the world.

#### Chinese Communist Policy of "Learning to One Side".

To achieve world communism, Communist China has followed a policy of alliance with the Soviet Union and other nations of the "socialist camp". These countries constitute an "international united front" and are engaged in an incessant struggle against the "imperialist states". That the ideological foundations for the establishment of a world communist system are

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1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Peking Foreign Languages Press, vol. 4, p. 173.

2 ibid., p. 418.



rooted in Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism is clear from Mao's statement in 1948:

"To carry out a revolution (to establish world communism), there must be a revolutionary party, a Party of the new type on the model of the Party of Lenin and Stalin. The working class and the people as a whole cannot be successfully led in their struggle against imperialism... without such a revolutionary party based on the ideological organization and theoretical principles of Marxism-Leninism, and guided by the all-powerful ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin."<sup>1</sup>

The terms of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance attest to China's policy of "leaning to one side". As has been pointed out, Sino-Soviet relationships were based on the principle of leadership by the Soviet Union until Stalin's death in 1953. Howard Boorman remarks that from 1953 to the present, "the bloc has evolved into a new polycentric international system in which the distribution of authority is dominated by the presence of two major powers of nearly equal rank".<sup>2</sup>

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- 1 Written to commemorate the thirty-first anniversary of the October Revolution and published in For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!, quoted by Arthur Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy", American Journal of International Law, vol. 44, no. 1, January 1950, p. 74.
  - 2 "Peking in World Politics, Pacific Affairs, vol. 34, no. 3, Fall, 1961, p. 229. See George Modelski, The Communist International System, Princeton, New Jersey 1960. His analysis concludes that the contemporary Communist system contains the core of a potential state system. For an analysis of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, see Howard Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip Mosely and Benjamin Schwartz, Moscow-Peking Axis: Strength and Strains, New York 1957, and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, Cambridge, Mass. 1960.

The shift in Sino-Soviet relations from Chinese dependency to equal partnership has had little effect on China's fundamental posture of close association with the Soviet Union and other members of the "socialist camp" - until 1962. Both ideology and common goals have been the foundations of the alliance. In 1956 the People's Daily stated:

"During these past thirty-nine years, the Soviet Union has been the center of the international communist movement, owing to the fact that it is the first triumphant Socialist country, the most powerful and experienced country in the socialist camp since its emergence, capable of giving the most significant help to other socialist countries, and to the peoples of various countries in the capitalist world. This is not the result of anyone's arbitrary decision, but the natural outcome of historical conditions."<sup>1</sup>

Specifically, not only did Peking and Moscow support each other on such broad questions as disarmament and control of nuclear weapons, but they also have co-ordinated their tactics towards Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. "During 1958, the skill with which they shifted the focus of world tension rapidly from Iraq to Lebanon to Taiwan and then to Berlin, keeping the West off-balance, illustrates the advantages which accrue to an alliance of partners facing outward from opposite ends of the Eurasian continent."<sup>2</sup> The alliance between the Soviet Union and China in the military and economic fields is proof of unity in the socialist camp. In 1961 Chou En-lai stated:

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1 "More on the Historical Experience Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", December 29, 1956, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 106.

2 Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 371. This policy of mutual support was in effect only before 1962.

"Any imperialist attack against any socialist country would be deemed by China as an attack on China and on the entire Socialist camp, and in that event China would never sit by idly."<sup>1</sup>

It must be pointed out that the present Sino-Soviet dispute, although significant vis-à-vis the communist international community, does not yet substantially alter Peking's policy of alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as a means of achieving the goal of a world communist system. A recent article in the Economist stated that Mr. Khrushchev is serious when he describes the Sino-Soviet conflict as merely "a family quarrel". The article commented that "the two rivals... do believe, and will go on believing, in the ultimate victory of communism."<sup>2</sup>

The counterpart of the "permanent and unbreakable" friendship between China and the Soviet Union is enmity towards the non-communist world, in particular to the United States, the leader of the "imperialist camp". Internally, the "Hate-America" campaign can be viewed as an expression of the élite's determination to bring about the final downfall of world capitalism. Externally, the necessity to crush the "other side" has manifested itself in the four major areas of face-to-face contact between Communist China and the United States - Korea, Indo-China, Taiwan and Japan. Peking has faith that the downfall of imperialism will lead to the 'natural' corollary, a world communist system. In 1960 the

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1 Quoted by Edgar Snow, "A Report From Red China", Look, January 17, 1961.

2 "Mr. K's Loyal Opposition", The Economist, February 16, 1963, p. 586.

People's Daily reported:

"No matter how frenziedly imperialism headed by the United States may carry out arms expansion and war preparations and put up a last-ditch struggle, they eventually cannot escape the fate of final extinction."<sup>1</sup>

Mao's alliance with the "socialist camp" and enmity towards the "imperialist camp" is the central instrument of the régime's goal of establishing a world communist system.

Chinese Communist Policy in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa

Chinese intervention in Algeria, the Congo, Iraq and Cuba makes sense only in terms of the Communist component of policy, i.e. the goal of extending communist control with the long-range aim of achieving world-wide victory for communism.

Applying Lenin's anti-imperialist doctrine, Peking has assumed the rôle of leader of all 'national liberation' movements. As early as 1948 Lui Shao-ch'i claimed:

"Communists must be the staunchest, most reliable and most able leaders in the movement for national liberation and independence of all oppressed nations; they must unconditionally aid the liberation movements of all the world's oppressed nationalities..."<sup>2</sup>

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1 "Holding High the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Banner of the Moscow Declarations", June 29, 1960, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, p. 31.

2 "On Internationalism and Nationalism," China Digest, vol. 5, no. 4, December 14, 1948, p. 6, quoted by Arthur Steiner, "Main-springs of Communist China's Foreign Policy", op. cit., p. 77.

Eight years later he declared:

"The Chinese people deeply sympathize with, and actively support the struggle against colonialism and for national independence being waged by all oppressed peoples and all countries that are suffering from aggression. Every victory won in this struggle, whether in Asia, Africa or Latin America, will further strengthen the forces of peace."<sup>1</sup>

Until recently, Chinese Communist penetration into Latin America, the Middle East and Africa have been marginal. Now, as reported by the NCNA, "Latin America has become the front line in the anti-imperialist struggle".<sup>2</sup> The Chinese Communists use various techniques to increase their influence in Latin America. By 1960, Peking had established unofficial contact with groups in all South American republics. From its headquarters in Havana, the New China News Agency established propaganda outlets throughout Latin America. Radio Peking beamed Spanish-language broadcasts to the South American continent, and Spanish translations of Mao's Selected Works and other communist doctrinal guides began to circulate in many Latin American countries.<sup>3</sup> Sino-Latin American Friendship Associations were established in the major cities, and the Central

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- 1 Liu Shao-ch'i, Political Report to the Eighth Party Congress, vol. 1, Peking Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1958.
  - 2 Broadcast by Peking radio on December 27, 1959, quoted by Victor Alba, "The Chinese in Latin America", China Quarterly, no. 5, January-March 1961, p. 59.
  - 3 In 1960 a Spanish edition of the magazine China Reconstructs was introduced into Cuba. See Howard Boorman, "Peking in World Politics", Pacific Affairs, vol. 34, no. 3, Fall 1961, p. 237.

Committee of the C.C.P. established a special Institute for South American Affairs. The number of official visitors exchanged between China and Latin America increased substantially.<sup>1</sup>

The short-run aim of increasing contact in Latin America by every means is to gain influence and prestige for China at the expense of the United States' position. The propaganda themes used are simple and consistent: violent denunciation of United States "imperialist" policies and activities and steady reiteration of Chinese friendship and support for Latin Americans.<sup>2</sup> The régime's long-run goal is to "free Latin America from Yankee imperialism" and to win victory for communism on the South American continent.

Cuba was the focal point of Peking's policy. From the outset Communist China supported Fidel Castro's régime. In the second half of 1960, Cuba broke off diplomatic relations with Nationalist China and formally recognized the C.P.R. Mutual recognition was followed by an economic agreement between China and Cuba providing for the "Chinese purchase of 1,000,000 tons of sugar... and a loan from China of sixty million dollars from

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1 In 1959 alone, invitations were extended to 402 Latin Americans. They were grouped into 107 delegations, of which fourteen came from Chile, thirteen from Brazil, twelve from Venezuela, eleven from Uruguay, ten from Argentina and nine from Cuba. The flow of influential Latin American visitors to China has increased steadily. See Victor Alba, op. cit., p. 55.

2 Howard Boorman, op. cit., p. 238.

1961 to 1965 for the purchase of capital goods".<sup>1</sup> Peking also sent Chinese agricultural experts to Cuba to help improve rice cultivation and established a training programme for Cuban technicians.

During the crisis in Cuban-American relations, Mao's régime gave Castro full support. In April 1961 the People's Daily announced:

"... the armed attacks on Cuba by the mercenary troops of the United States constitute a flagrant encroachment on the sacred independence and sovereignty of Cuba, a serious provocation against the freedom and security of the Latin American peoples, and a grave menace to world peace."<sup>2</sup>

Communist China's recognition, support and aid to Cuba was rewarded in December 1961. In a television broadcast, Castro declared his intention of forming a United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, absorbing all other political parties, in order "to lead Cuba through Socialism to a People's democracy, or the dictatorship of the proletariat.... I am a Marxist-Leninist".<sup>3</sup>

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1 Victor Alba, op. cit., p. 60. In late 1960 Castro's right-hand man, Ernesto Guevara, made an official visit to Peking. Some of his statements reveal the reasons why Chinese propaganda is both easy and effective in Latin America. For example, he said: "We Cubans can well understand the Chinese people because both of us have been subjected to American imperialist blockade, to insult and aggression. The implacable hatred of imperialism of our two peoples, and our great yearning for complete liberation and for peace, have long united us in fraternity." ibid., p. 60.

2 April 19, 1961, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 118.

3 New York Times, December 2, 1961.

Communism has gained victory in Cuba. With one foothold in Latin America, the Peking régime is presently increasing its influence in other Latin American areas. Chou En-lai said:

"So long as the Cuban people and the other Latin American peoples remain united... the final victory of the national and democratic revolution (i.e. Communism) cannot be prevented by any power on earth."<sup>1</sup>

Communist China's policy towards countries in the Middle East follows a pattern similar to that in Latin America. Peking's interest in the Middle East was sparked by the Suez crisis in 1956, continued through the Turkish-Syrian crisis in 1957 and the American landing in Lebanon after the Iraqi coup in 1958. This influence has grown steadily ever since.<sup>2</sup> The ultimate goal of Communist China is to dominate the Middle East and eventually incorporate the area into a world communist system. The approach Peking uses to attract the sympathy of Middle Eastern countries is unique. Many of the Middle Eastern countries are Islamic. The People's Republic of China, argues Peking, is also an Islamic nation with a population of over ten million Chinese Muslims. These Muslims are grouped in the China Islamic Association, founded in 1953 to take "an active part in the world-wide struggle for peace", and therefore, the régime claims, they have a direct interest in developments affecting the

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1 United Press International, November 18, and 28, 1960, quoted by Victor Alba, op. cit., p. 60.

2 Howard Boorman, op. cit., p. 233. The substance of this section on China's penetration into the Middle East is based on Howard Boorman's analysis.



larger Islamic world.<sup>1</sup> Communist China also identifies her subjection to imperialism with the experience of the countries in the Middle East. For example,

"The Chinese nation and the Arab nations have experienced the same suffering from long-standing imperialist oppression and exploitation. They are linked together and share common anxiety and happiness in their struggles against imperialism."<sup>2</sup>

The first act of penetration was to establish diplomatic relations with the Arab governments of the Middle East. Since 1956, Peking has exchanged diplomatic missions with the United Arab Republic, Iraq and Yemen. Mohammed El-Badr, the Crown Prince of Yemen, was the first Arab leader to visit Peking. Shortly after his visit China agreed to send substantial economic aid to Yemen.<sup>3</sup> Trading and cultural contracts have also been developed between Communist China and Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

Indicative of China's increasing influence in the Middle East is the rôle the régime played in organizing and directing the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo in December, 1957. As well as contributing to the work of the Preparatory Committee, Peking sent a twenty-man delegation to participate in the Conference. China led a diatribe against American imperialism, particularly attacking the recent extension of American

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1 Howard Boorman, op. cit., p. 233. See, for example, China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1958. Propaganda is spread by all media in the Arabic, French and English languages. One theme stressed is that China guarantees freedom to all religions.

2 "Imperialism is the Sworn Enemy of Arab National Liberation", Red Flag, April 1, 1959, quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p.117

3 Boorman, op. cit., p. 234. The aid allotted was equivalent to seventeen million dollars, to be used in the 1958-59 period.

military power in the Middle East.<sup>1</sup> At the second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, held at Conakry, Guinea in 1960 Communist China played an equally important rôle. In a special message to the opening session of the Conference, Chou En-lai stated:

"The Chinese people will continue in the future to unite closely with other Asian and African peoples, and we will support each other in the common cause."<sup>2</sup>

The most recent Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was held in Moshi, Tanganyika, in February 1963. As well as thwarting India's attempt to pass a resolution re the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Chinese Communist delegation reiterated their pledge of giving "all possible support" to the Afro-Asian fight against colonialism.<sup>3</sup>

Chinese Communist policy towards newly-emerging African states can be viewed in the context of extending Communism with the ultimate goal of incorporating the continent under a world communist system. The élite's speedy recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government in September 1958, and the support given that government against the French 'imperialists' illustrates Chinese

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1 Mr. Kuo Mo-jo, the President of the Academy of Science, was the chief Chinese delegate to the Conference. See New York Times, December 26, 1957.

2 Peking Review, vol. 111, no. 15, April 12, 1960, p. 25.

3 "Solidarity My Way", Economist, February 16, 1963, pp. 590 and 593.

Communist expansionist ideology. Shortly after recognizing the Provisional Government, Peking embarked on a policy of supporting the rebel régime with substantial material and financial aid. In a joint message sent to Ben Youssef Ben Khedda in 1962, Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-ch'i said:

"Algeria's independence is a great event in the African national liberation movement to-day. It shows that the people of Algeria and those of the rest of Africa are invincible and that imperialism and colonialism, old and new, can be defeated. The brilliant example set by the heroic Algerian people is sure to help bring about a further upsurge in the national-independence struggle in Africa."<sup>1</sup>

1960 marked the beginning of Communist China's thrust into the newly-emerging states of southern Africa. In April, Peking founded the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association. The stated purpose of the Association was:

"... to back the just struggle of the African people against imperialism and colonialism and foster friendly relations and economic and cultural exchanges between the Chinese and African peoples"<sup>2</sup>

Just after the founding of the Association a mass rally was held in Peking to focus attention on the new Sino-African 'friendship'.<sup>3</sup>

In the sphere of diplomatic relations, Communist China has established contact with the Sudan, Ghana, Tunisia, Morocco, Mali,

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1 Message sent July 3, 1962, "China Recognizes the Republic of Algeria", Peking Review, vol. 5, no. 27, July 6, 1962, p. 9. Previously, in 1960, Ferhat Abbas, then head of the Provisional Government, had visited Peking.

2 Asian Recorder, 1960, p. 3460.

3 See Peking Review, vol. 111, no. 16, April 19, 1960, pp. 7-8. At the rally, Kuo Mo-jo said, "The flames of struggle of the peoples of the African countries against imperialism and for national independence have lit up everywhere... The face of Africa is undergoing a profound change... eleven countries have already gained independence." Speech given on April 17, 1960, ibid., p. 9.

Guinea, the Congo and the Somali Republic.<sup>1</sup> The régime's policy towards Guinea provides a good illustration of the strategy used to extend the influence of communism. At the conclusion of a visit to Peking in September 1960, Guinea's President, Sékou Touré, signed a Sino-Guinea treaty of friendship and an economic and technical assistance agreement. In a joint communiqué with Liu Shao-ch'i Sékou Touré stated:

".... development of the friendly and co-operative relations between China and Guinea is not only in the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, but is also conducive to the strengthening of the solidarity and co-operation of Asian and African countries and the safeguarding of world peace."<sup>2</sup>

Before Mr. Touré's visit, Communist China had given Guinea a 'gift' of 1,000 tons of rice. The two governments had also signed an agreement on cultural co-operation, under which Guinean teachers and students would study in China.<sup>3</sup> Under the terms of the September 1960 treaty, Guinea was to receive an interest-free loan of twenty-five million dollars from China, as well as substantial benefits accruing from agreements on economic and technical co-operation.<sup>4</sup>

In August 1961, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah paid a state visit to China. At the end of his visit a treaty of friendship and an

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1 See Robert Counts, "Chinese Footprints in Somali", The Reporter, vol. 24, no. 3, February 2, 1961, pp. 32-34.

2 Asian Recorder, 1960, p. 3567.

3 See Denis Warner, "Chinese Bearing Gifts", The Reporter, vol. 23, no. 8, November 10, 1960, p. 27.

4 ibid., p. 27. For an interesting slant, see "New Stage in Sino-Guinean Friendship and Co-operation" Peking Review, vol. 111, no. 37, September 14, 1960, pp. 6-8.

agreement on economic and technical co-operation was signed.

At a State banquet in honour of Dr. Nkrumah, Liu Shao-ch'i called for a strengthening of ties between Ghana and China.

"... For the common interests of our two peoples, we need to support each other, strengthen our unity, and advance hand in hand."<sup>2</sup>

Chinese Communist propaganda capitalizes on the similarity of circumstances in the development of China and many newly-independent African states. In the struggle for men's minds, the truths of a situation are not as important as the way in which the 'facts' are presented. For example, a statement in the People's Daily said:

"The Chinese people always regard the just struggle of the African peoples as their own struggle; they look upon every victory of the African people as their own. We maintain that the victory of the Congolese people in their anti-colonialist struggle is a support and encouragement to the Chinese."<sup>3</sup>

Mao's policy of supporting the Congolese in their "struggle against imperialism" is a clear example of China's identification with African 'national liberation' movements.<sup>4</sup>

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- 1 "New Stage in Sino-Ghanaian Relations", Peking Review, vol. IV, no. 34, August 25, 1961, pp. 5-8. The terms of the economic agreement provide Ghana with an interest-free loan. Under the terms of the technical co-operation agreement, China undertook to send technical experts and technicians to Ghana, as well as doctors and engineers, See ibid., p. 5.
  - 2 "Rousing Welcome for President Nkrumah", Peking Review, vol. IV, no. 33, August 18, 1961, p. 5.
  - 3 June 30, 1960. Quoted in Chinese Communist World Outlook, op. cit., p. 114.
  - 4 For a Government statement on the Congo situation, see Peking Review, vol. III, no. 38, September 20, 1960, pp. 16-18.

The struggle between the "imperialist camp" and the "anti-imperialist front" continues to-day. In an article entitled "China's Socialist Construction Will Triumph", Chen Yi recently reviewed China's past successes:

"The struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples against colonialism, old and new, is continuously winning new victories... We pay tribute to the great Cuban people who have won victory in their revolution, embarked on the road to socialism and continually defeated the U.S. imperialist's aggressive schemes! We pay tribute to the heroic Algerian people... We pay tribute to the Laotian people who have frustrated U.S. intervention and won peace and neutrality! We pay tribute to the Indonesian people who have waged a successful struggle for the recovery of West Irian. We pay tribute to the Japanese people who have conducted continued heroic struggles against U.S. aggression and oppression. We pay tribute to all the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who are fighting against imperialist aggression and oppression and for independence and freedom!"<sup>1</sup>

That the Peking élite are aware of the recent changes that have taken place in the political distribution of the world's population is evident from Mao's well-known dictum:

"At present... it is not the West wind which is prevailing over the East wind, but the East wind over the West wind."<sup>2</sup>

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- 1 Quoted in Peking Review, vol. V, no. 40, October 5, 1962, p. 8.
  - 2 Speech to the Chinese students and trainees at Moscow University on November 17, 1957. Post-war dislocation and the ensuing period of nationalism and international strife produced changes in political affiliations. In his speech at Moscow University, Mao estimated that "the whole world now has a population of 2.7 billion, of which the various socialist countries have nearly one billion... and the imperialist, only about 400 million", NCNA, Peking, November 18, 1957, quoted by Shen-Yu Dai, "Peking's International Position and the Cold War", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 321, January 1959, p. 120.

#### IV CONCLUSIONS

##### 1. POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT IN CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S AND MAO TSE-TUNG'S WORLD VIEW

The milieu within which Chiang's and Mao's world view were formed has altered vastly over the past fifty years. The image of China's rôle in both the global and regional systems has altered little. The classical Chinese view, sustained by centuries of cultural superiority and dominance in East Asia, was that of a Sino-centric world unified by the pervasive force of a superior civilization and maintained by the august virtue emanating from the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, through the Middle Kingdom and extending to the adjacent tributary states on the empire's periphery, even to the barbarians beyond the pale. Howard Boorman points out that, in contrast to the traditional view, the present vastly altered perspective which Peking now has is that of maintaining its position within the bloc and expanding its influence throughout the world. In this new external setting, Peking moves in a pluralistic world, composed of several major competing societies of wide variety of new and nationalistic states, and revolutionary scientific technologies.<sup>1</sup>

At the level of verbal expression, both Chiang Kai-shek and

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1 "Peking in World Politics", op. cit., p. 232.

Mao Tse-tung look back into history for a view of what China's territorial limits should be. Both have a sense of urgency about the unification of China tempered by memories of "imperialist" gains. Both issue maps which accept certain border regions as "undefined areas".

Similarly, the image of Chinese hegemony in East Asia held by both leaders is rooted in the concept of the 'Middle Kingdom' and the tributary system. Chiang and Mao are in complete agreement in their views of China's superiority over her neighbours and her historical rôle as protector of East Asia. Mao reinforces the traditional image of Chinese hegemony in East Asia with the Communist vision of Chinese leadership of all Asian peoples in their struggle against imperialist domination. The communist élite thus legitimizes and rationalizes the traditional image to reinforce their image of world communism. Yet in their writings and speeches Chiang's and Mao's image of Chinese hegemony are substantially the same.

The effect on China's leaders of a century of national humiliation, of being a pawn among nations, has been the same desire to reassert China's past greatness. As pointed out, there is complete unanimity between Chiang and Mao vis-à-vis their image of China's historic Great Power status.

Although both leaders hold the image of foreign encroachments, rooted in the Chinese xenophobic attitude towards the

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West, China's subjection to the "Unequal Treaties" and Japan's domination of China, Mao's image is reinforced by communist ideology. He claims that the oppressiveness of imperialism "is a Marxist law".<sup>1</sup>

Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung are in substantial agreement in their world view. The four images, as expressed in their writings and speeches, are both relatively akin and constant.

The present task is to assess the importance of the communist ideological component relative to the four constant images. The dirth of any ideological element in Chiang's world view is evident. In contrast to Mao's view of China as the 'vanguard of history', a view stemming from the Marx-Lenin dialectic, the lack of even a myth in Chiang's writings tends to relegate China to the 'backwash of history'.

Mao's image of a world communist system influences, in varying degrees, all the other four images. The ideological component reinforces, reshapes, modifies, legitimizes or rationalizes the other images. It does not alter their core contents. These core contents are linked to constant geographical and historical factors.

Mao's image of the necessity of a world communist system strengthens the image of the unity of China. The urgency for

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1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Peking Foreign Languages Press, vol. 4, p. 428.

a unified nation is reinforced by the communist thesis that China must be a powerful and united nation capable of overthrowing the "capitalist aggressors". Both the image of Chinese hegemony in East Asia and of China's historic Great Power status are reinforced by the communist mission to spread their doctrine throughout the world. Chou En-lai speaks of China as the "Asian leader of the anti-imperialist front", and the "model which all other Asian nations should follow".

The image of foreign encroachments is reshaped by the communist ideological component. The Soviet Union and other members of the "socialist camp" are exempted from attack, while the Chinese Communist's hostility towards the United States and other "capitalist-imperialist countries" is intensified.

One cannot say emphatically that any one image is influenced more than another by the communist ideological component. All are affected. The crucial point is, in my judgement, that the images are first and fundamentally Chinese and constant over long periods of time. The 'communist' image is a supplement to the 'Chinese' images. The importance of the 'communist' image is too frequently overrated. For, in fact, the world view held by succeeding leaders of any nation is not apt to change drastically over relatively short periods of time, so bound is any leader or élite corps by history and geography. In the case of China the identity or near-identity, of Chiang's and Mao's world views is particularly striking.

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## 2. POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT IN CHIANG'S AND MAO'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

At the level of verbal expression, Chiang and Mao are in complete agreement in their goal of unifying China and the Chinese people. Although both leaders stated their aim to re-establish control over Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria and the Sino-Indian border area, only Mao Tse-tung has had (partial) success in regaining control over these "lost territories". The Nationalist Government's November 1962 statement of non-recognition of the McMahon line was one of the clearest expressions of agreement on the goal and content of unification. The unanimity between the Communists and the Nationalists on the concept of Sinic unity vis-à-vis Taiwan also attests to the vigorous agreement between Chiang and Mao. Their stated goal of unifying China is the same. They differ in that Mao alone has the power to implement his policies.

Similarly, both leaders agree on the goal of restoring China's hegemony in East Asia and both use the strategy of weakening their neighbours and mobilizing the support of the overseas Chinese. Mao has added a new dimension to his policy by posing China as the Asian model of the "anti-imperialist front". His foreign aid programme has the dual purpose of helping to restore China's hegemony in Asia and expanding communist influence in the area. Although the ideological element adds a new dimension to the goal of restoring hegemony, it does not change the fundamental agreement between the Nationalists and Communists.

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Howard Boorman remarks that, "Both as Chinese and as Communists, the leaders in Peking are convinced of the validity (and attainability) of their major strategic goal - status as a major world power -"<sup>1</sup> Chiang and Mao are at one in their goal of winning acceptance of China as a Great Power. There are distinct parallels in the policy acts employed by the two leaders in their effort to attain this goal - the use of international organizations, participation in conferences and negotiations, and the vehicle of diplomatic representation.

There is also agreement between the two leaders on the foreign policy goal of asserting China's complete independence. Whereas Chiang's policy was one of accepting foreign aid from the United States and Great Britain, the communist ideological component presupposes an inter-dependence between China and the "socialist camp", balanced by an enmity between China and the "imperialist camp". Thus, although both leaders asserted the goal of China's complete independence, the ideological element reshapes the classical xenophobic attitude for the Chinese Communists into a partial acceptance of dependence on the Soviet Union. More succinctly stated, Mao's goal of a world communist system necessitated his "leaning towards Russia" and his enmity towards the United States.

Mao's goal of a world communist system may retard or accelerate the achievement of the four policy goals common to the Nationalists and Communists. The goal of a world communist system exerts little

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1 "Peking in World Politics", op. cit., p. 240.

influence on the other four goals. Aside from the communist policy of alliance with the "socialist camp", China's recent expanded influence and authority in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa is the only example<sup>1</sup> of a Chinese foreign policy that is explainable only in terms of the communist ideological component. The influence that Mao's goal of world-wide communism has, for example, on the goal of restoring China's hegemony in East Asia is minimal.

### 3. ROLES OF IDEOLOGY AND POWER

Are we then to ascribe a relatively minor position to the rôle of ideology vis-à-vis China's national interest? As has been pointed out, in many instances China's present-day national interest has been both served and reinforced by Marxist-Leninist ideology. Arthur Steiner cites<sup>2</sup> the example of Communist China's decision to intervene in the Korean War in 1950. The decision was clearly based on a concept of 'National Interest' - to defend China's territory from possible invasion - but this 'defense of the 'National Interest' ' was reinforced by an ideological evaluation of the war. The ideological justification for intervention took the form of an argument which asked "whether the Chinese people", just beginning to consolidate their internal revolution, could carry out their national revolutionary purpose when "American imperialist" forces stood in such close proximity?

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- 1 Although this is a rather formidable example, and China's influence is likely to expand still more in the future, seen in the perspective of the other foreign policy acts, it does not seem so important.
  - 2 "Communist China in the World Community", op. cit., pp. 399-400. Allen S. Whiting agrees with Steiner's analysis. See China Crosses The Yalu: The Decision to enter the Korean War, ch. 8.

The propaganda campaign of "Hate-America, Aid Korea" was coupled with another campaign which reflected the more classical 'National Interest' - "Protect Our Country, Protect Our Homes". Here we have an example of an expression of traditional Chinese national interest - territorial security - reinforced by the ideological overtones of the Marx-Lenin dialect. The Chinese Communist argument for entering the Korean War continued thus: "Could the Chinese people, linked by ties of proletarian internationalism to a "people's" revolutionary régime, tolerate the obliteration of Korea, a fraternal revolutionary régime, - when that régime also served as a buffer?"<sup>1</sup> The ideological component is important in that it helped to rally the Chinese people in the war effort. It affects little the 'National Interest' of defending China's territory.

The Sino-Indian border dispute can also be cited as a policy stemming from the concept of 'National Interest'. That both the Nationalist and Communist régimes have struggled to reclaim unredeemed portions of China's territory is clear from the analysis in Chapter Two. However Mao's régime injected ideology into the boundary dispute, attributing "imperialism" to the Indian government and charging that government with "expansionism". It is interesting to note that Chinese negotiations with Burma, (1955-1960) on minor rectifications of the McMahon line were successfully carried out with little reliance on ideological arguments.

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1 "Communist China in the World Community", op. cit., p. 400.

The evidence strongly suggests that, apart from the Chinese Communist image of world communism, the rôle of ideology in determining China's national interest is minor. That, at the level of verbal expression, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung have been in substantial agreement on their world view and foreign policy goals points to the conclusion that the 'National Interest' is relatively changeless. It has, at least, been constant from 1927 to 1962, the period analysed in this thesis. History points to the relative changelessness of the 'National Interest' before 1927.<sup>1</sup>

The Morgenthau thesis, that the core elements of the 'National Interest' are changeless would therefore seem to be valid for China. It can also be concluded that China's national interest, verbally expressed by Chiang and Mao, is shaped overwhelmingly by power, not by ideology. The rôle of communist ideology is one of reinforcing, rationalizing, modifying and legitimizing any and all actions in the name of the 'National Interest'. Ideology can accelerate or retard actions taken in the name of the 'National Interest' but cannot 'create' 'National Interest'.

The 'National Interest' of the Nationalist and Communist régimes are fundamentally the same. Both seek to protect strategic and territorial objectives, both seek economic and political independence, both seek major power status. Arthur Steiner has commented:

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<sup>1</sup> See C.P. Fitzgerald, China, A Short Cultural History, Rev. ed. and Kenneth Latourette, The Development of China.

"... Peking can see eye to eye with Chinese compatriots on Taiwan: both seek to protect overseas Chinese communities; both seek to treasure, develop and enhance the cultural influences of the Chinese nation, both are concerned with maintaining the territorial integrity of China and protecting the national heritage against external encroachments. If one could imagine the restoration of the Nationalist government to power on the mainland, one would also need to contemplate the probability that the restored régime would build its foreign policy on the elements of strength presently accumulated under Communist rule. The basic continuum of Chinese national interest is a major fact of contemporary political life in Asia and the Far East, and any Chinese government would act upon it - the Nationalists as well as the C.P.R."<sup>1</sup>

China's national interest is, then, tied indissolubly to power considerations. It is her history, economics and geography, not ideology, that have exercised the predominant influence on the 'National Interest'.

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1 "Communist China in the World Community", op. cit., p. 402.



## APPENDIX

Table 1.<sup>1</sup> CHINA'S "LOST TERRITORIES"

Date	Area in square kilometers	Location	New ownership
1689.....	240,000	North side Khingan Mountains	Russia
1727.....	100,000	Lower Selenga Valley	Russia
1842.....	83	Hong Kong	United Kingdom
1858.....	480,000	North of Heilungkiang	Russia
1858.....	8	Kowloon	United Kingdom
1860.....	344,000	East of Ussuri River	Russia
1864.....	900,000	North of Lake Balkhash	Russia
1879.....	2,386	Liuchiu Islands	Japan
1882-1883	21,000	Lower Ili Valley	Russia
1883.....	20,000	Irtysch Valley east of Lake Zaysan	Russia
1884.....	9,000	Upper Koksol Valley	Russia
1885-1889	738,000	Annam and all Indochina	France
1886.....	574,000	Burma	United Kingdom
1890.....	7,550	Sikkim	United Kingdom
1894.....	122,400	West of the Upper Salween	United Kingdom
1894.....	91,300	West of the Upper Yangtze	United Kingdom
1894.....	100,000	Upper Burma, Savage Mountains	United Kingdom
1895.....	220,334	Korea	Japan
1895.....	35,845	Taiwan	Japan
1895.....	127	Pescadores	Japan
1897.....	760	The edge of Burma	United Kingdom
1897.....	2,300	The edge of Burma	United Kingdom
Total....	4,009,093		

1 Hou Ming-chiu, Chen Erh-shiu, and Lu Chen, General Geography of China (in Chinese), 1946, as cited in G.B. Cressey, Land of 500 Million, New York 1955, p. 39. Chiang Kai-shek's "lost territories" correspond closely to the territories mentioned by Mao Tse-tung on pages 17 and 18 of this thesis.

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