MORE THAN A PEACEMAKER: CANADA'S COLD WAR POLICY AND THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1948-1956

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ABSTRACT

This paper will rather seek to uncover and emphasize Cold War imperatives that served as significant guiding factors in shaping the Canadian response to the Suez Crisis. The success of Canadian diplomacy in the 1956 Suez Crisis was in the ability of Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and his Canadian colleagues to protect Western interests in the context of the Cold War. Suez threatened Anglo-American unity, and the future of the North Atlantic alliance. It also presented the Soviets an opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force ensured that Britain and France had a means to extricate themselves from the Crisis. Canada wished to further protect Western credibility in the eyes of the non-white Commonwealth and Afro-Asian bloc. It was, therefore, important to focus international attention on Soviet aggression in Hungary, and not Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette thèse dévoile et met l'emphase sur les impératifs de la Guerre Froide qui ont servi de facteurs déterminants à la formation d'une solution canadienne à la Crise de Suez. Le succès de la diplomatie canadienne à la Crise de Suez de 1956 résida dans l'habileté du Secrétaire aux Affaires Étrangères, Lester B. Pearson et ses collègues canadien à protéger les intérêts occidentaux dans le contexte de la Guerre Froide. La Crise de Suez menaçait l'unité anglo-américaine et le futur de l'Alliance du Nord Atlantique. Elle présentait de plus une opportunité pour l'empire Soviétique de gagner de l'influence au Moyen-Orient. Or, la Force d'Urgence des Nations Unies permit à l'Angleterre et à la France de se retirer de la crise. Le Canada pu ainsi protéger davantage la crédibilité occidentale aux yeux du Commonwealth et du bloc afro-asiatique. Il fut, par conséquent important d'orienter l'attention internationale sur l'agression soviétique en Hongrie plutôt que sur l'intervention anglo-française en Égypte.

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Canada stood at the peak of its international prestige when Lester B. Pearson accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. Through force of personality and conviction, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs had managed to guide the United Nations Emergency Force through the tumult of the United Nations General Assembly. Pearson's success brought a temporary peace to the Suez; peacekeeping became a central activity of the UN through the 1960s. Canada's international prestige was also based to a large extent on the idea of Canada as an internationalist middle power, and a peacemaker.[1] The rise of peacekeeping and Pearsonian diplomacy permeated Canadian national mythology, and the idea of, "Canada as compassionate, middle-power peacekeeper," has since become engrained.[2]

Peacekeeping and the idea of Canada as a peacemaker has since come to occupy an almost unquestioned position of importance in Canadian foreign and defence policy. It is not regarded as a tool in implementing policy, but instead an integral part of Canadian values and identity. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade affirms that, "peacekeeping is an important aspect of Canada's national heritage and a reflection of our fundamental beliefs."[3] The 1994 Defence White Paper acknowledges:

> We uphold a proud heritage of service abroad. We take pride in Lester B. Pearson's Nobel Prize for Peace not simply because it did a great Canadian considerable honour, but because it was a reflection of our evolving

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[1] Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse. *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 113.

[2] Sunil Ram. "Canada the peacekeeper? A myth that should die." *Globe and Mail*, 25 August 2004, online edition: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20040825.w/BNStory/Front/> Retrieved 2 September 2004.

[3] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Canada and Peace Support Operations." In *Canada and Peacekeeping* (2003). <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/menu-en.asp> Retrieved 5 August 2004.

> international personality. ... Multilateral security cooperation is not merely a Canadian tradition; it is the expression of Canadian values in the international sphere.[4]

A surface examination of Canadian participation in peacekeeping missions would support this position. Canada has been involved in more than forty UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions since 1948; more than 100,000 Canadian personnel have participated in these missions, during which the Canadian Forces has suffered more than one hundred casualties. Tens of billions have been spent on peacekeeping missions, and the oft-repeated aphorism, Canada has participated in every peacekeeping mission.[5] As such, it would seem that Canada's primary military activities since the end of the Second World War have been peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.[6]

The position of peacekeeping in Canadian popular culture is remarkable. A Molson beer advertisement released in 2000 declared, "I believe in peacekeeping not policing ... I am Joe and I am Canadian." In the June 2004 federal election campaign, the idea of a 'peacekeeping brigade' was proposed, and may become the central focus of the Canadian Forces. Despite the Shidane Arone murder in Somalia, and Romeo Dallaire's experience in Rwanda, a 1999 Department of National Defence survey revealed that 92% of Canadians believed it was important for Canadian Forces to be able to protect human rights in fragile democracies.[7] Canadians continue to regard the country's role as one of a benevolent peacekeeper, and not a fighter.

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[4] Department of National Defence. "Chapter 6 Contributing to International Security." *1994 White Paper on Defence* (2002). <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/5118_e.htm> Retrieved 5 August 2004.
[5] Ram, "Canada the peacekeeper? A myth that should die."
[6] Sean M. Maloney. *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970.* (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002), 2.
[7] Ram, "Canada the peacekeeper? A myth that should die."

The 1956 Suez Crisis is undoubtedly the genesis of the modern concept of Canada as 'compassionate, middle-power peacekeeper.' There had been some division in the prelude to the crisis. Many subscribed to the internationalism of Lester Pearson and the External Affairs mandarins, but scores demanded Canada stand 'ready aye ready' at Britain's side. The diversity of opinion seems all but forgotten when Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his achievements in abating the Suez Crisis. The popular image of Pearson in many ways has become the embodiment of the Canadian ideal; though no 'barefoot boy,' a humble, hard-working man just trying to do a little good in a tough world. Though the world has changed many times over since the 1950s, Canada remains confidant in its compassionate international image and role as a 'helpful fixer.'

The popular image may indicate otherwise, but to say that Canada's response to the Suez Crisis was motivated by little more than humanitarianism is an oversimplification. The success of Pearsonian diplomacy was not simply a triumph of Canadian national character, nor was it the achievement of peace in international affairs despite the best efforts of aggressive Great Powers seeking only to serve selfish national interests. Rather the success of Canadian diplomacy in 1956 was the ability of Pearson and his Canadian colleagues to protect Western interests in the context of the Cold War.

The purpose of this paper will not be to debunk any so-called 'peacekeeping myth,' nor will it seek to argue that humanitarian or peaceful motives did not in any way guide Canadian efforts to abate the Suez Crisis. This paper will rather seek to uncover and emphasize Cold War imperatives that served as significant guiding factors in shaping the Canadian response to the Suez Crisis. In this sense, Canada was much more than a peacemaker. The Suez Crisis threatened Anglo-American unity, and the future of the

North Atlantic alliance. It also presented the Soviets an opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force ensured that Britain and France had a means to extricate themselves from the Crisis and salvage some credibility. Canada further wished to protect Western credibility in the eyes of the non-white Commonwealth and Afro-Asian bloc. It was additionally important to focus international attention on Soviet aggression in Hungary, and not Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. But the success of Pearsonian diplomacy contributed little towards solving outstanding Arab-Israeli disputes. Egyptian President Gamal Nasser asked the UN force to leave in 1967, in order to launch the Six Days War.

Canadian foreign and security policy post-1945 is a well-researched topic that has produced an abundance of texts. In the book, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970*, author Sean Maloney takes issue with the myth of 'Canadian exceptionalism,' the idea that Canadians are an inherently non-violent, anti-colonial, and neutral, if not impartial people. Maloney, a professor of War Studies at the Royal Military College, argues that peacekeeping had little to do with altruism, and was instead directed as an effort to contain Soviet Union expansion. Maloney concludes that the bulk of Canadian military forces have been committed to NATO operations since the Second World War, despite the public perception that, "Canada's primary military activities have ... been peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations."[8] Rather, Cold War Canada, "was a tougher, more realistic country with clearly articulated national interests and the means to protect them. UN peacekeeping was just one of those means."[9]

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[8] Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping*, 2.
[9] *Ibid.*, 246.

Through successive crises in Suez, Cyprus, and the Congo, Maloney convincingly applies the thesis that Canadian peacekeeping efforts were designed to protect Western interests in the Cold War. Though Maloney seems to underestimate the magnitude of idealism in Canadian foreign policy, his underlying conclusions are a considerable guiding force in this paper.[10]

Norman Hillmer and Jack Granatstein's *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s*, first published in 1994, represents one of the most popular and comprehensive works on the topic. Granatstein, a former professor at York University, and Hillmer, a professor at Carleton University, are both well-respected scholars of Canadian history and have written extensively on the topic. An examination of Canada's place in the international community was certainly relevant in the upheaval of the early 1990s and the end of the Cold War system. On the issue of peacekeeping and Suez specifically, Hillmer and Granatstein acknowledge that, "in the 1990s Canadians have the sense that their suitability for peacekeeping operations derive from their innate talents as a middle power, from their ability to be impartial if not quite neutral."[11] The authors doubt that in 1956, Canadians felt as confident in a role as peacekeeper; instead, "Canada was a Western democracy, a member of NATO, an ally of the United States, a member of the British Commonwealth, and proud of all these things. Opposition within the country to the role that Pearson had played in New York reflected confusion that Canadians felt at seeing their leaders speak and act against Britain and France."[12]

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[10] Desmond Morton. Review of Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970 by Sean Maloney. *International History Review* 25:1 (March 2003), 202.
[11] Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein. *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s.* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994), 233.
[12] *Ibid.*

Another joint work was published in 1994, though research had begun in the mid-1980s, co-authored by York University Political Science professor Reg Whitaker and journalist Gary Marcuse. As Western Marxists who rejected Stalinism, they hoped to demonstrate how the left was repressed in Canada during the early stages of the Cold War.[13] Their resulting book, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957*, identifies the salient dilemma in Canadian Cold War policy in great detail. Whereas Canada enjoyed a considerable degree of international prestige based on the notion of Canada as an internationalist, middle-power and peacemaker, the 1945-1957 period, "also saw Canada forge a role as a partisan Cold Warrior, a loyal ally in the Western alliance against Communism."[14] Whitaker and Marcuse argue that Canada was active in the earliest stages of the Cold War, seeking to build a new world order that could best safeguard Western interests and values. Rather that being a victim of American bullying, "Canada was at Britain's side in encouraging greater American participation and leadership in blocking Soviet ambitions ... and thus in shaping what was to become a powerful Western alliance."[15]

Denis Smith, a former professor of political science at the University of Toronto and York University, published *Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948,* in 1988. Smith insists that his account is not primarily concerned with particular events, but rather the, "Canadian government's changing perceptions of the USSR and

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[13] John English. Review of *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957*, by Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse. *The American Historical Review* 101:4 (October 1996), 1319.
[14] Whitaker and Marcuse. *Cold War Canada*, 113.
[15] *Ibid.*, 114-115.

East-West relations: a history of ideas in politics."[16] As a political scientist, Smith makes every effort to explain his approach to the period. Realist, conventional or orthodox interpretations of the Cold War are rejected as simplistic. Such an interpretation reasons that Soviet domination of Eastern Europe precipitated the creation of a Western alliance designed to contain Soviet expansion. Likewise, revisionism is rejected for simply reversing the roles of the Soviet Union and the United States. Smith characterizes his analysis as post-revisionist. In such a conception of the origins of the Cold War, blame is divided between, "the totalitarian, insecure, but not inherently expansionist Soviet Union and the liberal, democratic, but also clumsy and crusading United States."[17] Smith hopes that such an approach will best suit a discussion on Canada's place in the Cold War, since Canadian actions, "do not fit any simple revisionist pattern or explanation."[18]

Memoirs are a particularly interesting source. Lester B. Pearson was an especially important actor in the events of the Suez Crisis, and, of course, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. The second volume of his memoirs, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, covers the period from 1948 to 1957. Unfortunately, the book was about only half complete when Pearson died in 1972. His research associates, John Munro and Alex Inglis completed the manuscript after his death, though they chose to continue to write in the first person. There is a certain tension present in many political memoirs, between a desire to represent events in the best possible light, but also as accurately as possible. Perhaps this potential friction is of

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[16] Denis Smith. *Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War 1941-1948.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 9.
[17] Joseph T. Jockel. Review of *Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948* by Denis Smith. *American Review of Canadian Studies* 19:4 (Winter 1989), 467.
[18] Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear*, 8.

lesser concern considering the substantial contributions of Munro and Inglis. Reviewers nonetheless agree that in Pearson's account, "Canada's role is not minimized; but neither are its achievements ... blown up."[19]

In 1993, Pearson's son Geoffrey, who had followed his father's footsteps into the Department of External Affairs, published *Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy*. The book spans 1948 to 1957, the years that the elder Pearson served as Secretary of State for External Affairs. The formation of NATO, Korea, recognition of Red China, and the Suez Crisis, therefore all fall under the scope of the manuscript. Geoffrey Pearson, however, does not describe his work as a history or a biography in the usual sense, but rather, "a study of diplomatic method in a particular period and the various factors which help to explain ... its high reputation at the time."[20]

A series of detailed first-hand accounts have been published by Escott Reid, who served as Canada's High Commissioner in India from 1952 to 1957. Reid was well positioned to observe and participate in the operation, and erosion of Canada's 'special relationship' with India. This is the particular topic of his 1981 book *Envoy to Nehru*. Reid seems to have become enamoured with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and calls for, "the reestablishment of a special relationship between India and Canada."[21] This despite the 1974 test of an Indian nuclear device using Canadian technology obtained through a technical aid program.[22] *Envoy to Nehru* includes a fascinating

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[19] Thomas P. Peardon. Review of *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson* Volume 2, by L.B. Pearson. *Political Science Quarterly* 89:3 (Autumn 1974), 696.
[20] Geoffrey A.H. Pearson. *Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy*. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), xv.
[21] Escott Reid. *Envoy to Nehru*. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), 258.
[22] David van Praagh, David. Review of *Envoy to Nehru*, by Escott Reid. *Pacific Affairs* 55:3 (Autumn 1982), 518.

chapter on the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprisings, which Reid expands upon in *Hungary and Suez: a view from New Delhi* published in 1986. Finally, Reid published his complete memoirs in 1989, entitled *Radical Mandarin: the Memoirs of Escott Reid.*

The National Archives of Canada maintains the Department of External Affairs fonds and the Lester B. Pearson fonds, which are both of value to this study. The National Archives seeks to maintain the functional integrity of documents deposited at their facilities. That is to say, the filing system used by the Department of External Affairs or by Pearson has been maintained in order to keep records in their original context. The rare exception, in the case of the Department of External Affairs, are records that exist elsewhere in the public record such as hansard, which may have been removed when departmental staff prepared documents for transfer to the National Archives. Otherwise the files should remain intact.

Of particular interest within the Department of External Affairs fonds is the 1940 Central Registry series, or '40 series.' The Department of External Affairs organized its records in registry systems that include records created in Canada and abroad. The original registry system, called the '39 series,' was incapable of managing the significant increase of documents produced by the Department as its responsibilities grew in the Second World War. The '40 series,' indicated by a – 40 suffix, was created at the Department of External Affairs headquarters in Ottawa and at Canadian diplomatic posts. Records produced at diplomatic posts abroad, including despatches, memoranda, and reports were regularly sent to the Ottawa headquarters and placed in the same registry file as the headquarters. These records were mostly transferred to the National Archives

through the 1970s and 1980s. Volumes concerned with intelligence matters between 1940 and 1963, were transferred to the National Archives in 1995.

Beyond the general registry, the 1940 Central Registry includes sub-series 's' and sub-series 50,000. Sub-series 's' was created in 1940 as a secret and top secret system that ran concurrently with the '40 series' main registry. The 's' series was organized the same way as the '40 series,' that is subjects were given the next consecutive number when created, but similar subjects were filed together. For example, the file on Post-Hostilities Planning began with file 7-(s), and over a hundred files were added with the same prefix, but different file numbers including 7-D(s) and 7-CA-1(s). The 's' sub-series was superseded in about 1948 by the 50,000 sub-series, which was used into the 1960s. The 50,000 series, which also includes secret and top secret files, is also organized numerically and similar subjects are filed together. For instance, the main file on the Korean War, 50069-40, was expanded into 86 parts and then expanded into 50069-J-40. The series as a whole covers a wide range of issues in the post-war period, including NATO, United Nations, the Korean War, and the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The file *Nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt*, file 50372-40, is a part of the 50,000 sub-series.[23]

The Pearson fonds consists of the official and personal papers of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. Though the collection places particular emphasis on Pearson's years as Prime Minister from 1963 to 1968, it also includes extensive

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[23] National Archives of Canada. *Descriptive Records: Department of External Affairs fonds.* <http://data4.collectionscanada.ca/netacgi/nph-brs?s6=49&s1=&s2=&s9=&s8=&Sect4=AND&l=20&Sect1=IMAGE&Sect2=THESOFF&Sect5=MKDOPEN&Sect6=HITOFF&d=MIKA&p=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.collectionscanada.ca%2F02%2F02012302_e.html&r=1&f=G> Retrieved 2 April 2004.

documentation on his diplomatic career and the Suez Crisis. Files are arranged chronologically to reflect the different stages of Pearson's career, and include correspondence, reference material, and Pearson's speeches. Of particular interest are series N1 consisting of pre-1958 correspondence and subject files, and series N9, which is a comprehensive set Pearson's speeches.[24]

With the exception of those destroyed and those still classified, British documents relating the Suez Crisis have been open to the public since 1987. There is, however, no official published collection of British documents through this period. The *British Documents on Foreign Affairs* series has not yet reached 1956; Part IV, the most recent, ends in 1950. There are, however, several published collections of documents that are of value. Though Canadian historian James Eayrs is better known for his *In Defence of Canada* series, in *The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey*, he has collected a series of British documents, as well as records from important Commonwealth nations including Canada, Australia, and India. Ritchie Ovendale, a former professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystywth, is well-known for his work on Anglo-American relations and British defence policy. In *British Defence Policy since 1945*, Ovendale has collected a documents relating to British defence policy from 1945 through the early 1990s. His selection of documents especially draws attention to the importance of the Middle East in British defence planning. Scott Lucas from the University of Birmingham has also published a collection of British documents focused

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[24] National Archives of Canada. *Descriptive Records: Lester B. Pearson fonds.* <http://data4.collectionscanada.ca/netacgi/nph-brs?s1=Pearson&s2=&s6=&s10=FO+OR+FO_S+OR+CO&s11=PRI&l=20&Sect4=AND&Sect1=IMAGE&Sect2=THESOFF&Sect5=MKDOPEN&Sect6=HITOFF&d=MIKA&p=3&u=http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/02012302_e.html&r=47&f=G> Retrieved 2 April 2004.

on the incident itself in *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar*. Lucas has included documents on the collusion between Britain, France and Israel, the role of MI6, but most importantly on the Anglo-American alliance.

British post-war and Cold War planning is an instrumental factor in the Suez Crisis. John Kent, in *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1949*, suggests that Britain was not acting out of fear of the Soviet Union, but perhaps contributed to rising tension from 1944 to 1949 by means of a strategy designed to retain imperial prestige. Indeed, the British saw the vital Middle Eastern and Mediterranean regions in power-political terms. Prestige and influence had to be maintained if Britain hoped to overcome the military and economic weakness that was believed to be a temporary condition. This attitude, however, led to, "a confrontational stance against the Soviets which almost certainly contributed to the Cold War tensions that were evident by 1947."[25] The emerging tensions undermined British imperial ambitions since Britain did not have the necessary means to compete. The Cold War, however, quickly became a way to preserve an imperial strategy in terms of protecting Western interests against Soviet expansionism.

Keith Kyle was a journalist in 1956, but capitalized on the main British, American, French and Israeli sources in the production of his book, *Suez*. His work on the UN politics is extensive, but his research questions are mostly focused on Britain and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. Kyle argues that the idea of British military intervention in the Canal Zone was not as absurd as it might seem at first glance. Anglo-French military operations were halted not because of a tactical defeat, but rather the

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[25] John Kent. *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49*. (London: Leicester University Press, 1993), 214-215.

impetus for withdrawal came from firm international, especially American and Commonwealth, opposition. As for President Dwight Eisenhower, Cole Kingseed demonstrates that the American leader, "met the Suez crisis with a clearly established leadership role, capable subordinates, a definite policy framework, and an efficient system for responding to foreign policy problems."[26] *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956*, is Kingseed's edited doctoral dissertation. The book provides a detailed overview of Eisenhower's approach to foreign policy, but little original insight.

Based on these and related sources, this paper will seek to outline the major Cold War imperatives that guided the Canadian response to the Suez Crisis. The first chapter will examine Canada's position in the Cold War. Canada would seek to prosecute the Cold War by two principal means, namely, redressing economic inequities, and overcoming racial inequalities. The 1950 Colombo Plan was an important instrument for Canadian aid policy, and a principal means by which Canada sought to redress economic inequities. Likewise, Canada used personal diplomacy and the Commonwealth link to forge strong relations with the new Afro-Asian bloc, especially independent India. Though Canadian officials held generally peaceful objectives in the Cold War, Canada was a Western power, and not a quasi-neutral peacemaker.

The second chapter will consider the 1956 Suez Crisis, and in part the concurrent Hungarian uprisings. The effects of the Crisis on the Anglo-American relationship are of particular importance to Canadian interests. As such, the chapter will begin with an examination of British and American Middle East policy as well as attitudes towards Nasser. Once the French and British intervened in the Suez, international attention

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[26] Cole C. Kingseed. *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956.* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 25.

focused squarely on the Middle East. It was in the midst of this Crisis that Pearson successfully guided the United Nations Emergency Force into existence. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of Canadian efforts to preserve Western credibility, and turn international scrutiny away from Anglo-French intervention in Egypt and towards Soviet aggression in Hungary. Though not a Great Power, Canada could play an important role as a 'middle power' to protect Western interests against Soviet encroachment.

A confluence of circumstances at the end of the Second World War thrust Canada into an unfamiliar position. Out of the ruins of the war emerged a new world order. Though victors, the war ravaged traditional Great Powers, France as well as Britain, and undermined their ability to maintain Great Power commitments. Germany and Japan were in ruins, while the Soviet Union and United States emerged as World Powers. It is amidst this upheaval that the threat of Soviet expansionism gained prominence. Canada for her part, had contributed valiantly to the war, and had earned a position of prominence among the United Nations in the struggle against fascist aggression. As a result, Canada made the transition from isolationism to internationalism and from British Dominion to independent Middle Power.

Though the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 accorded Canada control over its own foreign affairs, the young country was not yet willing to take on the burdens of full autonomy. It was the British Foreign Office that continued to represent Canadian interests in most countries in the world. In 1935, Canadian representatives abroad were stationed only in the capitals of the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Japan.[27] When Canada made the decision for war on 10 September 1939, she did so because of strong political, cultural and economic ties with Britain. It is virtually inconceivable that English-Canada would have let Canada stay out of this war. The ties were deep; Canada maintained British traditions in Parliament and the Governor General was still the King's representative in Canada. Canadian humorist Stephen Leacock explained in 1939, "if you were to ask any Canadian, 'Do you have to go to war if

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[27] Hillmer and Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire,* 115.

England does?' he'd answer at once, 'Oh, no.' If you then said, 'Would you go to war if England does?' he'd answer, 'Oh yes.' And if you asked, 'Why?' he would say, reflectively, 'Well, you see, we'd have to.'"[28] Somewhat reluctantly and committed to a war of limited liability, Prime Minister Mackenzie King brought Canada into its second great war in a generation.

On 10 May 1940, Hitler let loose his Panzer Divisions on France and the Low Countries. By 20 May the Germans had reached Amiens, and by the next day had reached the English Channel. The British Expeditionary Force was surrounded at Dunkirk and trapped with their backs to the English Channel. Royal Navy ships and hundreds of fishing boats managed to evacuate 338,000 British and French troops.[29] In the retreat, British forces had to leave behind a significant portion of their armaments. Britain still had an army, but it was now dangerously under-equipped. The outlook was particularly bleak for Canada and Britain. The Nazis and Soviets were respecting the terms of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, and Hitler had yet to unleash Operation Barbarossa. France had been captured, along with Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Czechoslovakia. Austria was united with the German Reich, while Italy and Spain were allied with Hitler. Meanwhile, the Americans had yet to enter the war. Britain was left alone with Canada as her ranking ally to fight the powerful Nazi threat now just across the Channel. Although Canada was a minor power in world affairs, "for many long months it was to stand as the second power opposing the German advance

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[28] J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell. "A Self-Evident National Duty: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935-1939." In *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, ed. J.L. Granatstein. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 158.

[29] J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton. *A Nation Forged in Fire: Canadians and the Second World War 1939-1945*. (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Bennys Publishers, 1989), 17.

across the world."[30] Any hopes that a limited Canadian commitment would suffice were dashed.

In this time of peril, Canada contributed a great deal to the war effort and the eventual defeat of Hitler's Germany. By the end of the war, Canada was the second largest Allied food-producing country and had the third largest standing navy. Canada provided a great deal of minerals and strategic materials necessary for the production weapons and munitions, and had committed a substantial number of troops for a country of its size. Over the course of the war, Canada had contributed an astounding ten percent of the total British Commonwealth wartime production.[31] Considering the size of the Canadian contribution to this war effort, logic seemed to dictate that Canada should also seek a voice in decisions of interest to the country. Canadian officials, therefore, sought a place on the Combined Food Board, which was set up in 1942 to distribute scarce food supplies. The British did not wish to grant Canada such concessions since that would weaken their negotiating position relative to the Americans and Soviets. But the British soon relented and Canada was granted full membership on the Combined Food Board and the Combined Production and Resources Board.

The war did limit Canada's efforts to gain a voice. Securing a role in the Allied combined boards may have been a worthy pursuit for the country, but of even greater importance was victory over Hitler's Germany. In an 8 August 1942 memorandum, Hume Wrong, assistant to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, noted, "we may have good cause for complaint over the manner in which the combined organizations

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[30] Glazebrook, G.P. de T. *A History of Canadian External Relations.* Volume 2, *In the Empire and the World, 1914-1939.* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 131.
[31] Hillmer and Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire*, 181.

have been built up, [but] the aim must now be to improve the machinery even though we may not like its pattern."[32] The war did, however, establish a tradition of engaged internationalism in Canadian politics. Whereas Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King had sought a policy that divided Canada the least in bringing the country to war, the war changed even his traditionally staunch isolationist position. No longer could he defend the position that Canada stood secure in her fireproof house far from the flames of Europe. Instead, Mackenzie King proclaimed, "we should not forget that a major lesson of this war is the truth that the seas do not divide and that the peace and prosperity of the world are indivisible."[33] As early as July 1943, Mackenzie King argued before the House of Commons that, "authority in international affairs must not be concentrated exclusively in the largest powers ... [r]epresentation should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question."[34]

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent and his deputy Lester B. Pearson came to similar conclusions. Canada's newfound international status, earned as a result of sacrifice and contribution on the battlefields of Europe, placed the country in a new category of nations. In a 1944 letter, Pearson wrote:

> Canada is achieving, I think, a very considerable position as a leader among a group of States which are important enough to be necessary to the Big Four but not important enough to be accepted as one of that quartet. As a matter of fact, the position of 'little Big Power' or 'big little Power' is a very difficult one, ... The big fellows have power and responsibility, but they also have

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[32] Donald Barry. *Continuity and Change in Canadian Foreign Policy: From the Pre-War to the Post-War Experience, 1935-1957.* (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1977), 102.
[33] Hillmer and Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire,* 183.
[34] W.L. Mackenzie King. "Statement by the Prime Minister," 9 July 1943. In R.A. Mackay. *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents.* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971), 3.

> control. We 'in-between States' sometimes get, ... the worst of both worlds. We are necessary but not necessary enough. I think this is being felt by countries like the Netherlands and Belgium ... That is why these countries are not only looking towards the Big Powers, but are looking towards each other for support. There is, I think, an opportunity for Canada, if we desire to take it, to become the leader of this group.[35]

Though not necessarily a world leader, Canada had to potential to assume a leadership position in this group of middle powers. Canadian officials believed that they had had the potential to positively contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the postwar world. The newfound interest in the conduct of international relations was reflected in the growth of the Canadian Department of External Affairs. In 1939-1940, the Department employed 208 people, but the number rose to 1,610 by 1955. The Departmental budget for 1935-1936 was about $1,192,000, and by 1955-1956 the budget had grown to more than $12,200,000. And from six diplomatic posts abroad before the war, by 1955 Canada maintained diplomatic posts in 47 countries in all major regions of the world.[36]

The Soviet Threat

The 1945 Gouzenko Affair served as the catalyst that sparked an abrupt transition in Canada-Soviet relations from wartime ally to Cold War enemy. Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, had carefully marked and smuggled out 109 incriminating documents on the evening of 5 September 1945.[37] He went to Canadian authorities and produced documents that Gouzenko claimed would prove the

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[35] James Eayrs. "Defining a New Place for Canada in the Hierarchy of World Power." *Towards a New World: Readings in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. J.L. Granatstein. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1992), 84.

[36] James Eayrs. *Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957.* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), 9.

[37] Laurence Hannant. "The Man with a Bag on his Head: Igor Gouzenko and Canada's Cold War." *Beaver* 75:5 (October/November 1995), 20.

existence of Soviet spy rings operating in Canada. The documents were eventually translated and Soviet spies were identified working in the Department of External Affairs code room, the British High Commission, the Canadian laboratory that conducted research on atomic weaponry, and even in the House of Commons. Norman Robertson, Canadian High Commissioner in London, told Mackenzie King, that, "everything was much worse than we would have believed ... [the documents] disclose an espionage system on a large scale ... things came right into our country to a degree we could not have believed possible."[38]

At first Mackenzie King did not believe Gouzenko's tale. He confided in his diary, "I do not believe his story about their being avowed treachery."[39] The Prime Minister feared that the incident would injure Canada-Soviet relations. He wrote, "I felt that no matter what happened we should not let it be assumed that the Government of Canada had itself sought to spy on the [Soviet] Embassy or to take advantage of a situation of the kind to find out something against a trusted ally."[40] Canada and the USSR had been allies on paper from June 1941 until September 1945. Gouzenko's revelation signalled the end of the alliance of convenience and the beginning of the Cold War for Canada.[41]

In the Soviet mind, Canada assumed a distinct role as a consequence of the Second World War. The war was considered evidence of a deepening crisis in

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[38] Hillmer and Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire*, 187.
[39] W. L. Mackenzie King. "Entry for 6 September 1945." *Mackenzie King Diaries, Collections Canada.* < http://king.collectionscanada.ca/EN/GetImage/GetImage.asp?MKDTHView=0&ID=3486181&zynetid=> Retrieved 24 September 2004.
[40] W. L. Mackenzie King. "Entry for 6 September 1945." *Mackenzie King Diaries, Collections Canada.* < http://king.collectionscanada.ca/EN/GetImage/GetImage.asp?MKDTHView=0&ID=3486185&zynetid=> Retrieved 24 September 2004.
[41] Hannant, "The Man with a Bag on his Head," 23.

capitalism. In 1940, the USSR's foremost economist, Eugene Varga, argued that Canada would become the prize in an imperial struggle between Britain and the United States.[42] Soviet analysis of Canada's place in the wartime alliance was largely developed in late 1944 and early 1945, while Soviet policymakers were in the process of formulating their policies for the postwar peace. It was clear in reports from Ivan Maiskii, Soviet Ambassador to Britain, Maxim Litvinov, Chair of the Soviet Postwar Treaties Commission, and Andrei Gromyko, Moscow's negotiator at the United Nations, that senior policymakers were very much guided by their Bolshevik worldview. They were convinced that internal contradictions inherent in capitalism would make another war probable. Therefore, the key to Soviet security would be an arrangement between the United States, Britain, and the USSR that would require a division of separate spheres of influence. To the Soviets, "it was not yet clear ... into whose sphere Canada would fall."[43] It was in the Soviet interest to maintain an alliance that kept Britain and the United States on an equal, but separate basis. Some sort of Anglo-American alliance that might isolate the USSR was regarded as particularly threatening. Canada, therefore, warranted observation for the Soviets. As the object of imperial competition between the United States and Britain, Canada was regarded as a place from which the Soviets could observe the dynamics of the Anglo-American relationship.

In the postwar world, Canadian officials could ill-afford to ignore the Soviet threat. Just as Belgium had occupied a position between France and Germany in two previous wars, Canada's territory occupied a strategic position between the United States

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[42] Larry Black. "Canada and the Soviet Union in 1945: The View from Moscow." In *Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and Their World in 1945*, ed. Greg Donaghy. (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1997), 287.
[43] *Ibid.*, 296.

and Soviet Union. In two world wars with Germany, Canada was far from the battlefields of Europe and Asia. But Canadian territory would not be secure if any conflict arose between the Americans and Soviets. Canadian authorities feared that they would be caught in the crossfire. This was a detail that Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev was keen to point out in 1955. He explained that if there was to be conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, "this time Canada would not be geographically secure."[44]

Despite the geographic realities facing Canada, the perception and even existence of the Soviet threat has been a matter of some contention for Canadian scholars. A Canadian nationalist interpretation of the period reads that Canada was forced into America's anti-Communist crusade. But there is little evidence to support this claim.[45] Indeed, Lester B. Pearson notes in his memoirs, "we did not accept United States Cold War analyses or tactics without examination and, when necessary, criticism. The idea that we were brainwashed by the Pentagon is nonsense."[46] The Soviet Union ultimately did succeed in forming a satellite bloc in Eastern Europe, and the United States did take on the burdens of Western leadership in the Cold War. But none of this was clear in the 1940s. Canadian officials did not know how Stalin would behave after the Second World War, and they did not know that the Americans would enthusiastically carry the burdens of military and political leadership. Far from being bullied into the Cold War, a major preoccupation of Canadian policymakers, until the announcement of the Marshall Plan

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[44] Hillmer and Grantstein, *Empire to Umpire*, 221.
[45] Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada*, 114.
[46] Lester B. Pearson. *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson,* Volume 2, *1948-1957.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 25.

and Truman Doctrine in 1947, was the possibility that the Unites States would slip back into a pattern of isolationism.[47]

Pearson recognized that the Soviet Union might have legitimate security interests exacerbated by certain American statements and policies, but, "the fact, the indisputable fact, remains that the main and very real threat to world peace during the first years of Cold War was the armed might, the aggressive ideology, and the totalitarian despotism of the Communist empire of the USSR and its satellite states under the iron hand of one of the most ruthless tyrants of all time."[48] The Soviet Union presented a serious challenge to Canadian policymakers. Soviet planners considered Canada an imperial prize in capitalist competition; Canadian leaders, "saw the USSR as inherently aggressive and driven by both historical imperative and Communist ideology to strive for further world domination."[49] Those Canadians in the business of foreign and security policy, "worried about the Soviet Union, in 1944 as in 1945 and every year thereafter until the cold war finally imploded."[50]

The Canadian public shared the concern of the foreign affairs professionals. The revelations of the Gouzenko Affair were troubling, but the growing public distrust and dislike of the Soviet Union exceeded the particulars of the incident. Canadians were proud of their new position in international affairs. Soviet efforts to keep matters of international security under the control of the Great Powers, or proposing concessions

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[47] Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada*, 114.
[48] Pearson, *Mike*, 25.
[49] David J. Bercuson. "'A People so Ruthless as the Soviets': Canadian Images of the Cold War and the Soviet Union, 1946-1950." In *Canada and the Soviet Experiment*, ed. David Davies. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1994), 90.
[50] Robert Bothwell. "The Cold War and the Curate's Egg: when did Canada's Cold War really begin?" *International Journal* 53:3 (Summer 1998), 410.

that benefited Yugoslavia or Albania but not Canada, proved to be frustrating. Canadians were intimately involved in the origins of the Atomic Energy Commission, and supported American proposals for international control of atomic energy. These proposals were consistently blocked by the Soviets, while they developed an atomic weapon of their own. The Soviets angered Canadians with their excessive use of their veto power in the Security Council that seemed to obstruct the work of the United Nations. Likewise, Canada had contributed billions to British reconstruction and supported economic assistance programs for Europe to restore stability and prosperity. As such, Canadians were disappointed by the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan for European recovery.[51] Above all, Stalin's tyranny and Soviet brutality in Eastern Europe were too easily equated with the Nazi model, and was therefore rejected in fear by many Canadians.[52]

Canadian Foreign Policy Priorities

In the aftermath of the war, Prime Minister Mackenzie King relieved himself of the duties of Secretary of State for External Affairs and placed Louis St. Laurent in the position. From 1946 until he became Prime Minister in 1948, St. Laurent served as the first to occupy the post other than Mackenzie King. As such, the Quebec politician had an integral role in shaping Canadian policy through this period. On 13 February 1947, St. Laurent used the Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto to present a series of general principles, which he considered basic in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy:

> 1 National Unity
> No policy can be regarded as wise which divides the people whose efforts and resources must put it into effect. ...
> 2 Political Liberty

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[51] F.H. Soward. "Canada in a Two-Power World." *Behind the Headlines (Canadian Institute for International Affairs* VIII:1 (April 1948), 9.
[52] Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear*, 236.

> We believe that the greatest safeguard against the aggressive policies of any government is the freely expressed judgement of its own people. ...
> 3 The Rule of Law in National and International Affairs
> ... respect for the rule of law has become an integral part of our external and of our domestic policy ...
> .... the freedom of nations depends upon the rule of law amongst states.
> 4 The Values of a Christian Civilization
> No foreign policy is consistent nor coherent over a period of years unless it is based upon some conception of human values.
> 5 The Acceptance of International Responsibility in Keeping with our Conception of our Role in World Affairs
> ... security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organization.[53]

Though the list was not exhaustive and took for granted the protection of national interests and the promotion of freedom in international trade, it served as an important statement of foreign policy objectives. Pearson recalls in his memoirs that St. Laurent's statement of principles, "remained a guide to me in the direction of Canada's foreign policies during the years when I was the Minister for External Affairs."[54]

Pearson took ample opportunity to develop and adapt St. Laurent's basic statement of principles as he guided Canada through the first stages of the Cold War as Secretary of State for External Affairs. In the Stafford Little lectures delivered at Princeton University in 1955, Pearson argued that, "we should ... be careful not to concentrate our time, our energies, and our planning exclusively on the tactics and strategy of defence ... to the point that we delay or prejudice the more important task of making their use unlikely by solving international problems and easing international

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[53] Pearson, *Mike*, 26.
[54] *Ibid.*

tensions."[55] In his remarks to the opening session of the 1954 UN General Assembly, Pearson identified salient divisions in the international community:

> ... there is the division between the self-governing and the non-self-governing parts of the world. Many people often, but I think mistakenly, equate this division with that between colonial administering countries on the one hand, and the dependent territories on the other. ... Then there is the distinction between the highly industrialized parts of the world, with relatively advanced material standards of living, and what are called the "underdeveloped" areas.[56]

It is in these divisions that Pearson and the other mandarins of the Department of External Affairs identified opportunities for creative Canadian diplomacy to curb Soviet expansionism. Canada could seek to abate Cold War tensions without sacrificing Western values. Pearson argued, "our direction is clearly laid down: it is toward economic and social progress and away from poverty ... toward the progressive realization of human rights and the dignity and worth of the individual person."[57] It is in redressing economic inequities, as well as overcoming racial inequalities, therefore, that that Canada sought to prosecute the Cold War.

Redress Economic Inequities: The Colombo Plan

In January 1950, Commonwealth Foreign Ministers met at Colombo in Ceylon to, "exchange views on world problems and particularly on the needs of the countries of South and South-East Asia."[58] The meeting produced one of the most ambitious economic and technical assistance programs the world had ever seen, encompassing all

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[55] Lester B. Pearson. *Democracy in World Politics*. (Toronto: S.J. Reginald Saunders and Company Ltd., 1955), 20.
[56] *Ibid.*, 80-81.
[57] *Ibid.*, 80.
[58] *The Colombo Plan: The Eighth Annual Report of the Consultative Committee on Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, Jogjakarta, Indonesia, November 1959.* (Jogjakarta: Government Printing Office Republic of Indonesia, 1959), iii.

members of the Commonwealth and later the United States. The main objective of the Colombo Plan, further developed in successive meetings in London, Karachi, New Delhi, Ottawa and other Commonwealth capitals, was, "to raise the standard of living by accelerating the pace and widening the scope of economic development in the countries of South and South-East Asia by a co-operative approach to their problems."[59] The program was to total about $5 billion over an initial six-year period. Britain allocated $900 million over the six years through sterling balance releases, grants for colonial development and loans. Australia had announced that its contributions in the first year would amount to $21 million and over the six-year program would total not less than $75 million.[60]

Canada also committed itself to contribute a significant portion of the necessary funds. As Secretary of State for External Affairs, Pearson took the decision to the House of Commons in 1951, asking Parliament to contribute $25 million to the first year of the program.[61] Canadian allocations to the Colombo Plan between 1950 and 1959 totalled more than $224 million in economic assistance and almost $7 million in technical assistance.[62] Canada contributed significantly to the plan with, "a vigorous anti-Communist instinct and an exhilarating vision of a new and free multi-racial

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[59] *The Colombo Plan: The First Annual Report of the Consultative Committee on Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, Karachi, March 1952.* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1952), 4.
[60] L.B. Pearson. "Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs," 21 February 1951. In Mackay, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 368.
[61] *Ibid.*, 369.
[62] *The Colombo Plan: The Eighth Annual Report of the Consultative Committee on Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, Jogjakarta, Indonesia, November 1959*, 192.

Commonwealth."[63] Consistent with Canadian foreign policy, aid policy was the chief mechanism by which policymakers sought to redress international economic inequities.

Many Canadians officials attributed the rescue of democracy in Western Europe to the immense injections of aid under European recovery plans, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), and the Marshall Plan. In the cases of France and Italy, for example, a sound case could be made that American dollars helped stop the rise of Communism in these countries. In January 1950, when the Commonwealth leaders met at Ceylon, the potential parallels were compelling despite significant differences between Europe and Asia. Whereas Western Europe enjoyed long democratic traditions and a large industrial base that needed to be rebuilt, Asian nations had no similar experience with democracy and virtually no industrial base. Nevertheless, the apparent lessons of postwar Europe were invoked at Colombo. The conference declaration read:

> During the past five years political events have moved fast in South and South-East Asia. ... The horizon of thought and action in the economic as well as the political field has been greatly extended, and Governments are grappling with the problem of promoting the economic improvement which is indispensable to social stability, and necessary to strengthen their free institutions. It is of the greatest importance that the countries of South and South-East Asia should succeed in this undertaking. The political stability of the area, and indeed of the world, depends upon it, and nothing could do more to strengthen the cause of freedom.[64]

The founders of the Colombo Plan envisioned a great role for their program. It was hoped that economic and technical assistance would diminish the most brazen inequities between, "rich and poor nations ... [and thereby] the latter's latent aggressive instincts will be smothered in the satisfaction of conquering domestic economic enemies inherited

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[63] James Keith Spicer. *External Aid in Canadian Foreign Policy: A Political and Administrative Study of Canada's Assistance under the Colombo Plan.* (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1962), 5.
[64] *Ibid.*, 48.

from nature and wicked colonialism."[65] It was hoped that the Colombo Plan would promote goodwill between rich and poor nations, and the program further conformed to the Christian ideals of humanity and charity.

The far-reaching aid plan also had the potential to remove the seeds of discontent believed necessary for communist infiltration. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru recommended that, "in Asia, where many thousands of people were without the primary necessities of life, the best defense against communism was to raise living standards."[66] Statements delivered by Canadian leaders reveal similar sentiments in the formative years of the program. Pearson reported on the Colombo Conference to the House of Commons on 22 February 1950:

> ... communist expansionism may now spill over into South-East Asia as well as into the Middle East ...
> ... It seemed to all of us at the conference that if the tide of totalitarian expansionism should flow over this general area, not only will the new nations lose the national independence which they have secured so recently, but the forces of the Free World will have been driven off all but a relatively small bit of the great Eurasian land mass. In such circumstances it would not be easy to contemplate with equanimity the future of the rest of the world.
> ... we agreed at Colombo that the forces of totalitarian expansionism could not be stopped un South Asia and South-East Asia by military force alone ...
> ... If South-East Asia and South Asia are not to be conquered by communism, we of the free democratic world ... must demonstrate that it is we and not the Russians who stand for national liberation and economic and social progress.[67]

Canadian participation in the Colombo Plan rested on a desire to fulfill Cold War objectives.

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[65] *Ibid.*, 28.
[66] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 22.
[67] L.B. Pearson. "The Colombo Conference: Statement by Mr. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons," 22 February 1950. No. 50/6 in *Statements and Speeches.* (Ottawa, Department of External Affairs), 3-4.

Though curbing Soviet expansionism and fighting Communism were important to the Colombo Plan, it was also essential, "to guard against any false idea that we can purchase or should try to purchase allies."[68] Pearson argued that:

> It would be deplorable if Asians believed Westerners had insulted their dignity, or misread their integrity, by entertaining such notions. We must also avoid the superficial idea that the appeal of communism is merely to the hungry, and that a higher a higher material standard of living will remove the appeal. Men are not so simple as that.[69]

Canadian Colombo Plan Administrator, Nik Cavell, acknowledged that, "we must sympathize with them [the Asians] and help them, if we want to keep them in the free world we are trying to build."[70] Some officials refused to accept that Canada should be guided in her aid policies by anything other than moral humanitarianism. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker told Malaysian hosts in 1959 that, "each of us regards the other as his brother's keeper... that the first responsibility of each of us is to assure... that men everywhere may have something of the better things of life."[71] Describing possible commercial and security aims of the Colombo Plan and aid policy as nauseating, Department of Trade and Commerce official Mitchell Sharp called for a return to simple principles of Christian charity, saying, "there is one good and sufficient reason for international aid and that is that there are less fortunate people in the world who need our help."[72] Perennial Ontario candidate for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation

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[68] Pearson, *Democracy in World Politics*, 89.
[69] *Ibid.*, 88-89.
[70] Nik Cavell. "The Colombo Plan: An address by the Administrator of the Canadian participation in the Colombo Plan, Mr. Nik Cavell, delivered at the Empire Club, Toronto." 4 December 1952. No. 52/52 in *Statements and Speeches*, 5.
[71] John Diefenbaker. "A new Concept of the Commonwealth: A speech by J.G. Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of Canada, at a State Banquet at Kuala Lumpur, Malaya," 28 November 1958. No. 59/13 in *Statements and Speeches*, 3-4.
[72] Spicer, *External Aid in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 11.

(CCF), F. Andrew Brewin, issued an appeal to Canadians, saying, "it is to be hoped that the whole programme of aid to the East will not be conceived solely in terms of meeting the challenge of communism or of expanding world trade ... the motivation for effort should be a missionary zeal that expresses the best spiritual traditions of Western civilization."[73]

Although sincere moral considerations may have motivated some popular support for the Colombo Plan and other humanitarian initiatives, political and strategic aims in the fight against Communism were significant features of Canada's foreign aid policy. Donald Fleming, soon to become Diefenbaker's Minister of Finance, had difficulty in maintaining an entirely humanitarian view of aid in the Cold War context, "I hope that our principal reason and motive [for aid] is humanitarian. Nevertheless we have to bear in mind the strategic nature of [Asia] ... and the fact that Russia has its eyes on it as well."[74] Nik Cavell in 1957 outlined the dilemma to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs:

> I would like to think that in our aid... we are actuated only by our Christian ideals and humanitarian principles, but, for the moment, let us suppose that we are also concerned about the material nature of our future, the preservation of a free world and our democratic way of life. Taking those realistic factors into consideration, the balance of power and whether it accumulates to the advantage of Totalitarianism or a Free World is something of vital importance to us.[75]

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[73] F. Andrew Brewin. "Canadian Economic Assistance to Under-developed Areas." International Journal 5:4 (Winter 1950-1951), 314.

[74] Donald Flemming House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* No.6, Third Session Twenty-second Parliament, 3 May 1956. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Printer of Stationary), 137.

[75] Nik Cavell. House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* No.4, First Session Twenty-third Parliament, 10 December 1957, 116.

It was inevitable that aid policy be guided by Cold War priorities. Canadian officials could not deny the pressing policy imperatives, and as such it was impossible to separate moral inspiration from security, political and economic interests.

Canada hoped to fight the spread of Communism in Asia and promote peace in the region. Aid policy was designed to remedy the most grievous economic inequities to win friends and markets for Canadian goods, but most importantly to combat social and economic ferment believed necessary for Communist infiltration. Canadian officials also wished exert a stabilizing influence through specific programs designed to conciliate or reduce tensions between members of the Colombo Plan. A clause in the Canada-India Reactor Agreement opened Indian facilities that were to be built to researchers from other Colombo Plan nations, including Pakistan. Canada completed extensive aerial surveys in the Mekong River Project completed in 1961 in an effort to diminish conflict between the Indochinese states. Likewise, Canada provided financial support for a rare instance of Indo-Pakistani cooperation in the Indus Waters Settlement. The project's importance lay in strengthening Asian peace, and promoting better relations between Canada's Commonwealth partners. In the same way, Canadian officials usually refused to contribute to programs that had potential military applications. Pakistan had investigated the possibility of a gift of Canadair CL-44 transport aircraft from Canada, but the query was quickly rejected because of possible military applications.[76]

Overcome Racial Inequalities: India and the Commonwealth

The Second World War destroyed the capacity of European Imperial powers to maintain overseas empires. The war also aroused nationalist fervour among colonial

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[76] Spicer, *External Aid in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 33-34.

possessions, especially in Asia. As a direct result, millions of men and women in Asia and Africa, previously dominated by foreign rulers, began to acquire political independence. The rising tide of Third World nationalism was present in force when representatives of twenty-nine Afro-Asian countries met at Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 to form the Non-Aligned Movement. The new states of Asia and Africa came be objects of competition in Cold War strategy. Two rival camps offered competing visions for economic and social progress. The Soviet experiment offered a system where human dignity could acquire new meaning; the Western democracies offered a vision whereby economic progress could be achieved by democratic institutions.[77]

The Western powers persistently struggled to convince the Third World of the virtues of democracy and dangers of Soviet imperialism. At the fourth unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference hosted by the Canadian Government in September 1949, the Indian and Pakistani delegates suggested that Canada, "might be playing Stalin's game by stressing defence so much and burdening our budgets with arms appropriations to the detriment of welfare measures."[78] Rising defence appropriations and costs in Western countries delivered Communists the necessary evidence to fuel propaganda, which claimed that it was democratic countries preparing for a war of aggression, not the Soviets. The Indian and Pakistani delegates, therefore, argued that emphasis on democratic values and institutions was a better response to Communism than firm allegiance to one bloc or another. Prime Minister Nehru offered his analysis at the first meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in October 1948 saying:

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[77] Eayrs, *Canada in World Affairs*, 1-2.

[78] F.H. Soward. "The Adaptable Commonwealth." *Behind the Headlines (Canadian Institute for International Affairs* X:1 (March 1950), 17.

> Originally, communism had supported nationalism, as championing the underdog against imperialism; and it had then been welcomed in Asia by many people who lacked any general understanding of its economic doctrine or its international implications. When, however, imperialism was removed in a country which had attained its independence, communism then came into conflict with nationalism and when this conflict became apparent, communism had no hold on Asian peoples. ... Asian peoples had, however, no sympathy for Russian expansionist policies; and publicly drawing attention to the dangers of Russian encroachment upon Asia would be much more likely effective [than an anti-communist appeal].[79]

Despite the suffering and hardships brought about by Japanese occupation in the Second World War, Asian nations were enticed by the potential of, "Asia for the Asians."[80] Nehru's advice to the Western democracies was to ally themselves with the forces of nationalism in Asia. The delegates at the September 1949 Commonwealth Relations Conference agreed that it was imprudent to underestimate the success of Soviet ideological weapons without practical proof that democratic systems offered more for mankind.[81]

Opportunities for Canadian diplomacy were made evident by the revolution in Afro-Asian affairs. Canada's membership in the Commonwealth linked the country not just to London, but also to New Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. The Commonwealth connection was all the more effective in view of the fact that Canada had no record of colonialism or imperialism; a distinction not shared by Canada's European and American allies. As such, Canada might have been in a better position

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[79] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 21.
[80] W. MacMahon Ball. "East Asia and the West." *Behind the Headlines (Canadian Institute for International Affairs)* VIII:7 (January 1951), 15.
[81] Soward, "The Adaptable Commonwealth," 17.

than the United States or Britain to appreciate the problems of the Third World, "despite the experience of the former, the energy of the latter and the assurance of both."[82]

Among the Afro-Asian bloc, newly independent India emerged as a leader in international affairs. Colonial India had been the jewel in the British Imperial crown; independent India was the keystone of the new Commonwealth. A Commonwealth without India, "would not have been the kind of new Commonwealth which could capture the imaginations of so many people."[83] The importance of India in Commonwealth affairs was unmistakable. It was then unsurprising that Canada sought to reconcile India's desire to remain a part of the Commonwealth and its decision to become a republic at independence in 1948, thereby removing the King of England as head of state. The relatively simple solution was for all Commonwealth members to recognize and accept, "the king as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the head of the Commonwealth."[84]

There was every initial indication that the new Commonwealth would be a united and positive force for the Western powers. Despite a growing Communist threat in Asia, Nehru remained a vocal defender of democracy. At the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in April 1949, the Indian Prime Minister affirmed:

> Free democracy as it obtained in the United Kingdom was a form of government worthy of imitation. All the peoples of the world should be able to see that it was infinitely preferable to the regime established by the Soviet Government. ... Democracy was ... threatened at the present time from two

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[82] Eayrs, *Canada in World Affairs*, 4.
[83] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 19.
[84] L.S. St. Laurent. "Statement by the Prime Minister," 27 April 1949. In Mackay, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 362.

> directions – first, by a direct onslaught by communism; and secondly, by an internal weakening, largely due to unfavourable economic conditions.[85]

Nehru first visited Canada in 1949, after a series of largely unsuccessful meetings in the United States. Nehru was unimpressed by some of the more important members of the American administration and likewise Nehru annoyed American officials. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was quick to conclude that he and Nehru, "were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship... [h]e was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal."[86] Nehru felt far more comfortable in Canada and had already met St. Laurent and Pearson at earlier meetings of Commonwealth leaders. Likewise, Escott Reid, Canadian High Commissioner to India, felt that, "there is perhaps no western democratic country whose foreign policy is closer to that of India than Canada."[87] Pearson and St. Laurent got along well with Nehru, indeed, they agreed with much of what he said. The Canadian Prime Minister and his Secretary of State for External Affairs considered Nehru to be the most influential statesman in Asia, as well as an indispensable intermediary between the Western powers and the Afro-Asian bloc.

In the struggle to offer a democratic alternative to Communism, Canada sought to bridge the divide between the West and the Third World, particularly through India. Personal diplomacy and the Commonwealth link were especially important in the Indo-Canadian relationship. Pearson supposed that, "one of the jobs of a Canadian in New Delhi would be to help disabuse Indians of their more extreme prejudices against the United States."[88] Likewise, Canadian officials would seek to interpret Nehru and India

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[85] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 17-18.
[86] Dean Acheson. *Present at Creation.* (New York: Norton, 1969), 336.
[87] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru,* 26.
[88] *Ibid.*, 10.

for the United States. In so doing, "the search for policies acceptable to India and satisfactory to the United States was one of the principal features of Canadian diplomacy under St. Laurent and Pearson."[89]

The Cold War in Asia

In the postwar era, Europe quickly settled into two competing camps, divided along the 'iron curtain,' from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was assured when Czech President Edvard Benes was forced to resign in 1948, and Marshall Plan aid for the Soviet bloc was rejected. Equally important was President Harry S. Truman's 12 March 1947 declaration that, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[90] The declared Truman Doctrine, accompanied by Public Law 75, which authorized military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey through June 1948, assured active American leadership of the Western world. Though the focus of the Cold War remained on Europe, the strategic situation on the continent varied little until the fall of the Soviet Union. It is in Asia, where the outcome was not yet assured, that many Cold War crises were destined to be played out.

Soviet forces officially withdrew from Manchuria in 1946, and in the process turned over arms to Mao Tse-tung's Communist forces. Despite American military backing, Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang had lost much of its popular and political support. By October 1948, the Generalissimo had been driven back to Formosa, and Mao

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[89] *Ibid.*, 26.

[90] "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," 12 February 1948. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* 1948 Volume IV – *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union*, 47.

declared the People's Republic of China and immediately signed a mutual defence pact with Joseph Stalin.[91] At the same Soviet occupation forces withdrew from the Korean peninsula, and installed a People's Republic under Kim Il Sung. American forces withdrew from the South by 1949 and President Syngman Rhee established the Republic of Korea.

The situation was similarly tumultuous in South and Southeast Asia. The United States granted independence to the Philippines in 1946, but maintained a military presence in the region. In December 1946, France refused to grant full independence to her colonies in Indochina. Vietnamese Communist Ho Chi Minh took the opportunity to found the League for the Independence of Vietnam, more commonly known as the Vietminh, and launch a rebellion against French colonial rule. Local uprisings in the Dutch East Indies led to the creation of the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. Britain granted full independence to India and the Republic was declared in 1948. Muslim Pakistan broke away from India and the bitter dispute over the provinces of Jammu and Kashmir remains unresolved. Burma was granted independence in 1948, and Communist groups worked to co-opt the left wing of Indian and Burmese nationalist movements. In the same year, a Communist insurgency broke out in Malaya, led by elements of the ethnic Chinese community. The 'War of the Running Dogs' lasted more than twelve years before the Republic of Malaysia was finally secured.

It is certain that the international system underwent a series of changes through the 1948-1956 period, and accordingly, Canadian policy evolved to meet emerging Cold War challenges and crises. But there is a certain consistency in the Canadian response

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[91] Larry H. Addington. *Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century.* 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 268.

throughout the period. In the immediate postwar period, the West was concerned with the apparent expansionist plans of the Soviet Union, and thereby adopted policies to prevent the further spread of Soviet power and influence. For instance, when the British announced on 21 February 1947 the immediate withdrawal of aid to Turkey and Greece, the United States responded with the Truman Doctrine to prevent Soviet penetration of those countries. Canada was similarly active in seeking solutions to international crises that could buy time to reduce tensions, and avoid direct conflict with the Soviets. The apparent, "awakening of the sleeping masses of Asia and their search for a better life," was of significant concern and guided Canadian efforts to, "aid these people in attaining their goal through evolution and not revolution."[92] Canada's commitment to this process was reflected in its emphasis on redressing economic inequities and overcoming racial inequalities. Though these guiding objects may have been sufficient for times of relative peace and stability, times of crisis and conflict required more of Canada.

The 1948 expiration of the British mandate in Palestine sparked an international crisis when Israel declared independence. Canada's participation in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was intended to prevent Soviet penetration in the region and avoid drawing Britain and the United States into the conflict. Problems of partition and conflict between India and Pakistan over the provinces of Jammu and Kashmir in 1948-1949 threatened Western interests. Pakistan provided important bases for American bombers and U-2 spy planes directed against Soviet territory nearby. India was an important Commonwealth link between the West and the Afro-Asian bloc.

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[92] "Canada's Contribution." Sydney Post Record, 14 October 1955. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Lester B. Pearson fonds (MG 26) N1 volume 70, *Pearson, L.B. - Visit to USSR, Asia, Egypt - Clippings File 4-5 1955.*

Canada, therefore, supported the formation of the United Nations Committee on India and Pakistan (UNCIP), and United Nations Military Observer Group in India Pakistan (UNMOGIIP) to ensure stability in the region. When North Korean troops invaded the South in 1950, American-led United Nations forces intervened on behalf of South Korean democracy. But the conflict escalated to include Chinese troops, and Canada feared Soviet forces would also intervene. Though unsuccessful, Canada took the initiative along with Indian officials to broker an early ceasefire.

After Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, some Canadian officials believed that the greatest hope for the creation of a sensible *modus vivendi* between the Soviet Union and the West, was the gradual transformation of Soviet society into one more anxious for peaceful, normal relations with the West. Canada would, therefore, seek to speed the process of transformation without adopting an uncompromising attitude that threatened to drive the Soviet Union back into Stalin-esque xenophobic isolationism.[93] Escott Reid noted that, "no curtain, even of iron, is impenetrable ... [t]he longer ... that the Soviet and western worlds live side by side in peace, even if it is an uneasy peace ... the more manageable will become the conflicts an crises which will arise between them."[94] But compromise and peace with the Soviets was not valued above all else, it was argued that the West, "should try to reach acceptable compromises with the Russians on certain foreign policy issues ... if we can do so without sacrificing any basic security interest."[95] When the 1954 Geneva conference founded the International Control and Supervisory

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[93] NAC, MG 26 N1 volume 67, *Handbook for the Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the USSR and the Far East, September 30 - November 16, 1955.*
[94] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 9.
[95] NAC, MG 26 N1 volume 67, *Handbook for the Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the USSR and the Far East, September 30 - November 16, 1955.*

Commission (ICSC) for Indochina, Canada agreed to serve along with Indian and Polish representatives in the hope that the Commission would avert serious Cold War conflict in Southeast Asia. A strategy of containment may have been the watchword of the West, but Canadian officials did not want to risk a Third World War over Palestine, Kashmir, Indochina or Korea.

'Ham in the Sandwich' – Canada as Partisan Cold Warrior

Canada had been invited to play a prominent role in the founding of the United Nations. Officials were split on the role the institution might play in international affairs or how it might operate to provide collective security for member states. While some favoured a sort of world government, others envisioned a larger and more effective version of the League of Nations.[96] Either way, Pearson acknowledged:

> It was not long ... before it became clear that the UN, through the Security Council, could not guarantee the peace and security given priority in the Charter. Collective security could not, in fact, be organized on a basis of world-wide agreement. ... Regional or limited associations for collective defence and security such as NATO, consistent with the UN Charter, might have to be organized.[97]

Canada did, in fact, seek out alternative arrangements to guarantee its security in the face of the Soviet threat. More than a full year before the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, Escott Reid authored a top-secret memorandum circulated to Prime Minister St. Laurent, and Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson. Reid articulated a position that would diminish the possibility of war, and prevent further Soviet encroachment by seeking a preponderance of force relative to the Soviets. Accordingly the Western democracies should, "organize in advance an alliance which would become immediately

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[96] Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping*, 18.
[97] Pearson, *Mike*, 30.

effective if the Soviet Union should commit aggression [against western Europe] ... [and] would undertake to pool all its economic and military forces with those of the other members if any power should be found to have committed aggression against any member."[98] Though interested in seeking means to abate the Soviet threat without resorting to conflict, the United Nations system was insufficient as a security organization. Canada sought a cooperative approach that bound nations with shared culture, tradition, and values to protect themselves from the Soviets. Such an arrangement was only logical since Canadian interests were closely tied to the collective interests of all Western powers.[99]

At a June 1955 ceremony marking the tenth anniversary of the San Francisco Charter, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov extended an invitation to Pearson to visit the Soviet Union. The next month, Pearson announced to the House of Commons that he had accepted the invitation and would become the first Western foreign minister to visit Soviet officials in their home country since 1947. Pearson explained that he would stop in Russia on his way to that year's Colombo Plan conference in Singapore. He emphasized that his week-long visit that October was intended only as a sociable swap of ideas, "so I will be in a better position to assess the nature and the objective of the Soviet policies and they'll be in a better position to understand our objectives."[100]

The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs was greeted with a flood of friendly Soviet advice on his arrival in Moscow. The Soviet government newspaper, Izvestia, advised that Canada should take advantage of the markets offered by the Soviet

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[98] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 9.
[99] G.A.H. Pearson, *Seize the Day*, 158.
[100] Jerry Clark. "Canadian Minister's Key Role Recognized by Soviet Officials." Montreal Star, 5 October 1955. NAC, MG26 N1 volume 69, *Pearson, L.B. - Visit to USSR, Asia, Egypt - Clippings File 1955.*

Union, the Eastern bloc, and Red China to end its 'deficit trade' with the United States. Meanwhile, the Soviet newspaper Pravada suggested Canada cut arms spending and end the Cold War with the Soviets.[101] Khrushchev declared that, "NATO was an aggressive bloc, directed against the Soviet Union. If Canada desired friendship with Russia, what was she doing in such company?"[102] To support the claim, First Deputy Chairman Lazar Kaganovich produced a report dated 4 October 1955 in which the RCAF Chief of Air Operations indicated that Canada's air units in Europe were directed against the Soviet Union, and that, "our position is to make the Russians know we can knock hell out of them."[103] Pearson was forced to stand up for the Alliance as purely defensive. He insisted that the United States had no intention to use NATO against the Soviet Union or any other country. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs concluded his argument with a question of his own, "if the Americans were as imperialistic as Soviet statements suggested, why had not Canada long ago been absorbed into the American Union?"[104]

The meetings, for the most part, were hardly confrontational. Soviet leaders were far more interested in impressing their Western counterpart with hospitality and extravagance. At one function, Pearson found himself in the unusual position of describing Canada as a small nation when compared to the Soviet Union or United States. But Molotov said he did not agree with the Canadian foreign minister, and that in Russia, children were taught that Canada was one of the world's major countries. Molotov

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[101] William L. Ryan. "Pearson Gets Lots of Advice: Russians Would Like to See Canada-U.S. Split." Kingston Whig Standard, 6 October 1955. NAC, MG26 N1 volume 69, *Pearson, L.B. - Visit to USSR, Asia, Egypt - Clippings File 1955.*

[102] Eayrs, *Canada in World Affairs*, 26.

[103] *Ibid.*, 26-27.

[104] *Ibid.*, 26.

accused Pearson of being too modest, saying that, "Canada is among the great powers."[105] Pearson jokingly compared Canada's position between the Soviet Union and the United States to that of the 'ham in a sandwich,' Kaganovich interrupted to insist that a 'good bridge' was perhaps a better analogy.[106] In a later conversation, Russian officials remarked that they found the American Secretary of State difficult to deal with. Pearson replied that, "Canadians were glad to serve as a bridge between Russia and the United States since they knew and understood Americans well."[107]

There was some public interest in the possibility that Canada might assume such a bridge function. A 21 October 1955 editorial in Victoria's Daily Colonist noted:

> Canada's chief function in international affairs seems to be shaping up as that of the mediator, and no more worthy one could devolve upon this nation. If this country can be a persuasive influence in keeping the peace, and particularly by being the link of liaison and understanding between two great rival powers of the world, such is no mean destiny. The ham in the sandwich can then be as it always should be, a relish, and not merely something squeezed between conflicting slices.[108]

Pearson, however, soon had misgivings about his statement, and feared that it might be misinterpreted. When he arrived at the Colombo Plan conference, he delivered a speech to the Rotary Club of Singapore. Pearson explained his 'bridge' remarks saying that while he Canada might be qualified to explain certain aspects of American policy to the Soviets, but, "I doubt ... if many Canadians – not I certainly – feel qualified to explain Soviet policies, motives, tactics and actions to our American friends."[109]

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[105] R.J. Needham. "Red Leader calls Canada Great Power." *The Globe and Mail*, 7 October 1955, 1.
[106] *Ibid.*
[107] Eayrs, *Canada in World Affairs*, 30.
[108] "Ham in the Sandwich." Daily Colonist Victoria, 21 October 1955. NAC, MG 26 N1 volume 70, *Pearson, L.B. - Visit to USSR, Asia, Egypt - Clippings File 4-5 1955.*
[109] C.R. Blackburn. "Pearson Doubts Canada to Act in Bridge Role." *The Globe and Mail*, 20 October 1955, 1.

Any hopes Soviet leaders may have harboured that Pearson's cordial visit marked a Canadian move away from old allegiances were soon dashed. In an 8 December 1955 speech, Pearson spoke of the Soviet leadership saying, "the remarks made by them on their Asian tour ... display an ignorance and insult the intelligence of the people whom they are addressing."[110] In a visit to India, Khrushchev told an audience that in 1941 the United Kingdom had encouraged the German attack on the Soviet Union. Referring to these particular remarks, Pearson continued, "if remarks of that kind ... are based on ignorance it is frightening to think that the destiny of 175 million people in Russia, and therefore our own destiny to some extent, is in the hands of such men. If it was not based on ignorance, it must be based on a calculated effort to cause trouble."[111] Canada was interested in reducing Cold War tensions. Efforts to redress economic inequities and overcome racial inequalities were evidence of this desire, as was the temptation for Canada to act as a bridge between the Soviet Union and the West. But there should be no doubt that Canada was a Western power, and a partisan Cold Warrior.

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[110] Eayrs, *Canada in World Affairs*, 31.
[111] *Ibid.*

Despite withdrawals from Greece, Turkey, Palestine and India, Britain enjoyed an inflated sense of international importance in the 1950s. After all, Britain had managed to contribute significantly to the defeat of Nazi Germany and was one of the occupying powers. After an interlude, the great Winston Churchill returned to the office of Prime Minister for a second time in 1951. Queen Elizabeth II ascended the throne in 1953 and her coronation was a grand event that some hoped would mark the beginning of a second Elizabethan Age. Despite Britain's many debts, economic weakness, and demobilization problems in the years immediately following the war, there was a general feeling among the peoples of Britain that she occupied a position among the top-ranking powers.[112] In the 1950s, the British believed that they had overcome their weakness, or at least, were capable of significant independent action. But Britain's worldwide commitments exceeded her means. Prime Minister Anthony Eden's drastic action against Egypt left Britain in an untenable position and forced a withdrawal in the Suez Crisis.

The old debates about the Suez debacle have largely been played out. Despite the adamant denials of Anthony Eden and his Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, collusion with the Israelis is unquestioned. According to journalist Keith Kyle, Eden called Chief of the Air Staff Sir Dermot Boyle every fifteen minutes on the afternoon of 29 October 1956 to see if there had been any surprise Israeli aggression against Egypt.[113] The United States and Britain both regarded Egyptian President Gamal Nasser as a long-term threat that would have to be dealt with. The source of the policy divergence had much more to

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[112] David Carlton. *Britain and the Suez Crisis*. (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1988), 2.
[113] Keith Kyle. *Suez*. (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), 350.

do with Britain's chosen approach to remove Nasser. The Americans feared any drastic action on the part of Britain would provoke anti-Western Arab nationalism. President Dwight Eisenhower put the fundamental question to the American National Security Council in November 1956, "how could we possibly support Britain and France if in doing so we lose the whole Arab world?"[114] The President and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, favoured instead a 'northern tier' defence strategy anchored in the Baghdad Pact.

Canadian officials believed 'collective security' to be the only way to maintain peace in the midst of East-West rivalries and atomic weapons.[115] Pearson noted the obvious, saying, "we hope that atomic weapons will never be used."[116] Though the creation of a sensible *modus vivendi* with the Soviets was a laudable goal, it was to be achieved only, "if we can do so without sacrificing any basic security interest."[117] Cold War imperatives, therefore, guided Canadian actions to abate the rising crisis over the Suez Canal. For Canadian interests, Anglo-American policy divergence and conflict between NATO allies was intolerable. Soviet penetration of the Middle East was unacceptable. The Suez Crisis threatened to give the Soviets the very grounds they required to gain a foothold in the region, and UN intervention offered the West an alternative to prevent this possibility. Likewise, the British and French invasion of the Canal Zone appeared to be representative of old-style imperial ambition. This threatened Western credibility with the Afro-Asian bloc. It was important to end the crisis quickly,

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[114] Geoffrey Warner. "The United States and the Suez Crisis." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)* 67:2 (April 1991), 317.
[115] Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada*, 113.
[116] Pearson, *Democracy in World Politics*, 22.
[117] NAC, MG 26 N1 volume 67, *Handbook for the Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the USSR and the Far East, September 30 - November 16, 1955.*

to shift international attention away from Western intervention in the Middle East, and towards simultaneous Soviet transgressions in Hungary.

British Imperial Strategy

The strength of the British Empire was seriously undermined in the Second World War. But Britain's primary wartime and postwar objective was to maintain her position among the first rank of World Powers. Of primary concern was the maintenance of an exclusive sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.[118] Such a desire was not without historical precedent, indeed, "the Pax Britannica, ... had underpinned a free world order ... one of its safeguards was British ascendancy in the Middle East. Tsarist Russia, pushing out from land-locked confines to warm-water ports, had been kept at bay."[119] As a result of British efforts to maintain an imperial strategy, historian John Kent has concluded that, "the Cold War was partly caused by and then helped maintain an imperial strategy that avoided acceptance of the permanent nature of the post-Second World War."[120]

British leaders could be under no illusions about the country's economic weakness as a result of the war. As early as 10 April 1941, Prime Minister Churchill wrote to the Earl of Halifax, Britain's representative in Washington, noting that, "it must be borne in mind that Great Britain will emerge from the war an impoverished Power."[121] By the end of the war, Churchill could not have understated Britain's economic vulnerability, as the British Treasury warned of a 'financial Dunkirk' in August 1945.

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[118] Kent, *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War*, 211.
[119] Lionel Gelber. *America in Britain's Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-American Unity.* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), 230-231.
[120] Kent, *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War*, 217.
[121] "Mr. Churchill to Viscount Halifax (Washington)," 10 April 1941. *British Documents on Foreign Affairs* (BDFA) *Part III, Series L, Volume 1 – World War II, January 1940 – December 1941*, 370.

British invisible income had dropped from £248 million in 1938 to £120 million in 1946. The British overseas debt had climbed to some £3,355 million in June 1945. Meanwhile, the balance of trade was estimated to have soared to a deficit of £750 million by 1946. The war also saw the loss of one quarter of Britain's national wealth, about £7,300 million. British exports amounted to only 40% of the pre-war figure, and the merchant fleet was 30% smaller than the pre-war level. The loss of overseas assets meant that Britain would have needed to increase exports by as much as 75% over the pre-war level to be able to pay for pre-war levels of imports.[122] The British Foreign Office agreed that if resulting dollar shortages were not overcome, then Britain, "would become a second-rate power, a colonial appendage of the United States or a satellite of one or other of Britain's wartime allies."[123]

Despite this apparently crippling weakness, Foreign Office policy objectives continued to be stated in terms of Great Power status, on par with the United States and the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office position was not at all modest. In an 8 May 1942 speech delivered by Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he declared, "because we are a great people our own responsibility is great. We must never neglect our own British interests. ... We must assume the burden of leadership. It is a burden which others will share with us. But a great part of that burden is for us."[124] The assumption of Britain's Great Power status ensured that there was no proper examination of Britain's place in world affairs. This was less a refusal to accept Britain's weakness,

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[122] Stuart Croft. *The End of Superpower: British Foreign Office Conceptions of a Changing World, 1945-51*. (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1994), 38-39.
[123] Kent, *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War*, 214.
[124] "Speech made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at Usher Hall, Edinburgh," 8 May 1942. *BDFA Part III, Series L, Volume 2 – General Affairs, January 1942 – March 1943*, 124.

than it was a refusal to accept that this weakness was anything more than temporary. Therefore, of central importance was the maintenance of an exclusive sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East to maintain imperial prestige in the peace settlements of the Second World War. Indeed, in wartime policy deliberations, possible Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean was considered of greater harm to British prestige and influence than British strategic interests. Prestige and influence were essential if Britain hoped to overcome the military and economic weakness that plagued the country. This attitude, however, led to, "a confrontational stance against the Soviets which almost certainly contributed to the Cold War tensions that were evident by 1947."[125]

Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe came as no surprise to British planners. The acquired Soviet sphere of influence was simply a direct result of the Red Army's presence in Eastern Europe at war's end. In wartime, the possibility that the Soviets might exit the war once they had regained lost territories was of greater concern to British officials. But Britain did not dread Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe in the same way it feared Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. To the British, an exclusive sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean was a matter of life and death, representing an, "all important link between Great Britain on the one hand, and India, Malaya, Australia, New Zealand and our Persian and Iraq oil supplies on the other."[126] Therefore, any Soviet or international presence in Libya and the Suez was unacceptable, in the same way that the Soviets would object to American or British presence in Eastern

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[125] Kent, *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War,* 214-215.
[126] *Ibid.*, 56.

Europe. The United States was hostile to any plans that involved the division of regions into spheres of influence and it was the Americans, not the Soviets, who were essential to the future of the British Empire. It was the United States who would prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism in the Far East and act as a regional policeman. The war had severely damaged Britain's financial position and British industry was overwhelmingly geared towards the production of armaments, not consumer goods. The goodwill of the United States was necessary if Britain were to retain her position. The advantage of publicly renouncing European spheres of influence was, therefore, clear. To avoid offending American sensibilities, the British justified their Middle Eastern and Mediterranean desires in terms of establishing 'bastions of liberalism' in Greece and Turkey, and as an essential base from which to attack Russia if the Cold War went hot.

Britain and the Suez Canal

The Truman Doctrine is unquestionably the direct result of Britain's announcement on 21 February 1947 of an immediate withdrawal of financial aid to Greece and Turkey. President Harry Truman's commitment, "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," is further regarded as the formal beginning of the Cold War for the United States.[127] At the very least, it marks a declaration of full American involvement in the struggle. The view from Britain was strikingly different. Prime Minister Clement Attlee's Labour government was often charged with abandoning Britain's position in Greece and Turkey, as well as India and Palestine. Churchill, as Leader of the Opposition, declared before the House of Commons in March 1947, that, "it is with deep grief I watch the clattering

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[127] "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," 12 February 1948. *FRUS* 1948 Volume IV – *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union*, 47.

down of the British Empire with all its glories, ... 'scuttle,' everywhere, is the order of the day."[128] Attlee was slow to abandon hopes of reaching an accommodation with the Russians within the United Nations framework. He was critical of demands for high defence spending, and supported the formulation of a '5 + 5' rule, which anticipated no risk of war until 1950 and a gradually increasing risk in the five following years. The Labour Prime Minister favoured such a strategy since it implied a limited defence commitment, at least until Britain had overcome its postwar economic weakness. Indeed, Attlee told his Cabinet's Defence Committee in January 1946, that it, "was not necessary in present circumstances to have a large fleet ready for instant action as there was no one to fight."[129] An additional, and consistent Labour target was Britain's position in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially in Greece and Turkey.

Some have speculated that the British announced their withdrawal of aid from Greece as a part of some sort of plot to 'trick' the Americans and draw them into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Cold War. But as Robert Frazier demonstrates in his article, *Did Britain Start the Cold War?*, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that Attlee's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was engaged in any plot of this nature.[130] Although the trend was for, "U.S. influence to replace British influence in the [Eastern Mediterranean]," the Americans emphasized the, "British ability [to] aid in the preservation of western security interests in the area."[131] In an address to Congress

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[128] David Reynolds. *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century.* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Ltd., 1991), 159.
[129] *Ibid.*, 157.
[130] Robert Frazier. "Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine." *The Historical Journal* 27:3 (September 1984), 726.
[131] Steven Z. Freiberger. *Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957.* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992), 54.

following the British withdrawal of aid to Greece, President Truman announced what became the Truman Doctrine:

> I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures... Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece.[132]

In Public Law 75, passed by the 80th Congress of the United States confirmed, "the national integrity and survival of these nations (Greece and Turkey) are of importance to the security of the United States," and by that law authorized military and economic aid to Greece through June 30, 1948.[133]

It is not surprising that the announcement of the Truman Doctrine was regarded as a significant turning point for Britain. The February 1947 decision to withdraw aid from Greece and Turkey was considered to have marked the moment when world power changed hands as Britain made, "an irrevocable admission of impotence."[134] The burdens were too great and benefits too slight in India, as well as Greece, Turkey and Palestine. Attlee's government, therefore, decided to cut losses. But Britain did not pull out of Middle Eastern countries, particularly Egypt and Iraq, which remained of central importance for British planners. American policymakers wished to maintain British influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East to the exclusion of Soviet domination. Likewise, Britain did not abandon efforts to establish an informal empire,

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[132] "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," 12 February 1948. *FRUS* 1948 Volume IV – *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union*, 47.
[133] *Ibid.*
[134] Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*, 159.

based on informal means of influence in Africa and Southeast Asia.[135] This new British strategy was made possible by the revolution in American policy heralded by the Truman Doctrine.

The Middle East only gained importance for British defence planning following the British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey. In a British policy paper entitled *Defence Policy and Global Strategy* prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff in 1950, the importance of the Middle East was clearly acknowledged:

> The Defence of the Middle East has always been one of the three pillars of British defence policy and it is of equally critical importance in Allied strategy. It is ... a most important link in our Commonwealth system of sea and air communications. Its oil supplies are of very great importance, and, if it fell under Russian influence, the repercussions on the whole Moslem world ... would be critically serious. There can be no doubt that to retain the countries of the Middle East within the western orbit is a vital cold war measure, and we must be prepared to make military sacrifices to that end.[136]

In early 1951, the Assistant Under-Secretary of Middle Eastern Affairs from the Foreign Office rendered a similar assessment to the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal:

> Suez remains of vast importance as the back door to Egypt and will no doubt be of great importance in the next war in servicing the vital Australian and New Zealand, and also South African, contribution to Middle Eastern Defence. In a word, Egypt still remains the essential point from which to defend the Middle East and all that the Middle East entails.[137]

Just as the Middle East occupied a central position in British defence policy, the Suez Canal occupied a strategically important position in the Middle East. The Canal was important to the very notion of British Empire, and since the First World War the Canal

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[135] *Ibid.*, 160.
[136] "Defence Policy and Global Strategy," 7 June 1950. In Ritchie Ovendale. *British Defence Policy since 1945*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 75-76.
[137] R.J. Bowker. "Importance of Suez," January 1951. In *Ibid.*, 87.

Zone had been treated as a British territorial possession. The importance of the Canal only increased with decolonization. With Indian independence, British presence in the Suez Canal was the only link with the rest of the Commonwealth; without the Commonwealth, Britain was not a World Power. In 1953, Lord Hankey, Churchill's emissary to Egypt, asked his Prime Minister, "if we cannot hold the Suez Canal, the jugular vein of World and Empire shipping and communications, what can we hold?"[138]

Britain's entanglement in the Suez Canal was the culmination of more than a century of relations with Egypt. The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal, formally constituted on 20 December 1858, was the creation of a former French diplomat, Ferdinand de Lesseps. Capitalizing on his friendship with the Viceroy of Egypt, Mohamed Said, de Lesseps received a concession to dig a one hundred mile Canal linking the Red Sea with the Mediterranean. Despite its name, the Universal Company had only French shareholders and French management. As a French enterprise, the construction of the Canal was fiercely opposed by Britain. But British opposition would prove fickle.

Under the arrangements de Lesseps secured in the 1858 concession, Egypt had supplied free labour, land grants and customs exemptions. But eight years later, the Turkish Sultan, who still held ultimate powers of sovereignty over Egypt, forced changes in the concession arrangements. Viceroy Ismail, Said's successor, agreed to compensate the Canal Company in cash for concessions withdrawn. The Canal was finally opened in 1869, but six years later, Ismail was in such a dire financial position that it became known in Britain that he was seeking a buyer for the forty-four percent share of the

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[138] Kyle, *Suez*, 43.

Company he owned. Although Britain has so vehemently opposed the French Canal project, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli jumped at the opportunity. Over the opposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary, Disraeli acquired the share of the Company for £4 million.

The acquisition ignited British public imagination. The *Cheltenham Free Press* declared that, "Egypt is as necessary to England as Alsace and Lorraine to Germany." Meanwhile the *Daily Bristol Times and Mirror* revelled in the acquisition, saying that, "[the British] hold Turkey and Egypt in the hollow of our hands, the Mediterranean is an English lake and the Suez Canal is only another name for the Thames and the Mersey."[139] Though the rhetoric was fierce, it was misleading. The Canal Company did not own the Canal, which remained Ottoman, and subsequently Egyptian territory. Rather it was a joint-stock company, which held a concession until November 1968, when it would revert to the Egyptians. Britain's forty-four percent share only entitled the British government to three directors on a board of thirty-two. British ships were the largest users of the Canal, but it was not until after 1883 that seven more seats were reserved for private British ship-owners. Britain's share of the Canal Company did excite imperial passion, but it was Britain's 'temporary' occupation of the Canal Zone that served to preserve those passions through the next seven decades.

By the end of the 1870s, Egypt's relations with international creditors had deteriorated to such a degree that Ismail was deposed, while French and British financial controllers were installed with sweeping powers. This sparked an upsurge of Egyptian nationalism against the foreign controllers and non-Arab residents of Alexandria and

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[139] *Cheltenham Free Press* and *Daily Bristol Times and Mirror* cited in *Ibid.*, 14.

Cairo. Britain and France responded with an ultimatum, claiming that their nationals and property were threatened. On 11 June 1882, riots exploded in Alexandria where at least fifty Europeans were killed. Prime Minister William Gladstone dispatched the Royal Navy, and using the Canal for passage British troops soon landed at Ismailia. After a quick victory at Tel al-Kebir, Egypt was soundly defeated. With this victory and ensuing occupation of the Canal Zone, Britain assumed political and military responsibilities it found difficult to escape. The occupation was intended to be temporary, and the British made clear their intention to withdraw no less than sixty-six times between 1882 and 1922. But the stated pre-conditions for withdrawal, including the restoration of order, were never fulfilled to British satisfaction.[140]

In the aftermath of the Second World War, appeals for British withdrawal from Egypt intensified. In addition to general support for the principle of decolonization, the United States pressured Britain to find a speedy resolution lest the tensions encourage Arab neutralism. But Britain hoped to maintain its dominant position in the region, and as a result of the war, British military facilities in the Canal Zone consisted of at least ten airfields, thirty-four military stations, railways, roads, ports, flying boat stations, and a vast array of communication networks, including a local radio station.[141]

Winston Churchill returned to the Prime Minister's Office in 1951, and he initially took a decidedly harsh position with Egypt in withdrawal negotiations. But as the British government engaged in a series of defence strategy reviews, there was a sober recognition that Britain would be unable to sustain its military commitments worldwide.

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[140] A.J.P. Taylor. *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918.* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1954), 289.
[141] Freiberger, *Dawn Over Suez*, 55.

In 1953 and 1954 alone, British troops were required to participate in disturbances in Malaya, Kenya, Korea, and Cyprus. Meanwhile, the British maintained a force of over eighty thousand in the Canal Zone. Churchill confessed to his Cabinet in 1954 that:

> ... in spite of earlier doubts he was now satisfied that the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt could be fully justified on military grounds. [The British] requirements in the Canal Zone had been radically altered by the admission of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the extension of a defensive Middle Eastern front as far east as Pakistan [the Baghdad Pact]... it would not be right to continue to retain in Egypt 80,000 troops who would be better placed elsewhere.[142]

After much negotiation, and under a great deal of pressure from the Americans, Britain and Egypt came to an agreement. Both accepted a period of seven years during which Canal Zone bases could be reactivated in case of attack against Turkey, and a twenty-month evacuation period. Though the agreement was reached in principle in July, the final Anglo-Egyptian settlement was signed 19 October 1954.

Eisenhower and American Middle East Policy

America's wartime hero, Dwight Eisenhower was elected President in the 1952 elections. As the leader of the United States, questions surrounding Korea and Germany were of primary concern to the new President before 1955. Initially, he sought to avoid major forays into the Middle East, and believed that, "Great Britain and France had far more experience in dealing with the troublesome Arabs."[143] Eisenhower's only significant involvement in the region took place in 1953 when he was forced to confront the Iranian nationalist leader Mohammed Mossedeq. The Iranian leader enjoyed growing support among his people, when he nationalized the oil fields and refineries of the Anglo-

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[142] "Acceptance by Churchill of new British Middle East defence policy," 7 July 1954. In Ovendale, *British Defence Policy since 1945*, 105-106.
[143] Kingseed, *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis*, 29.

Persian Oil Company. Fearing economic chaos, the British appealed to Eisenhower for support, but the American leader resisted and hoped to remain neutral in the affair. Mossedeq then forced the pro-British Shah to abdicate for 'reasons of health,' and courted the Communist Tudeh Party in 1953. Eisenhower, therefore, decided to remove Mossedeq and restore Mohammed Reza Shah Rahlavi to power by means of a CIA-sponsored coup. Interest in the Middle East grew through the course of Eisenhower's first term.

Containment of the Soviet Union remained the dominant axiom of American foreign policy through the 1950s. As such, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, initiated diplomatic plans keep the Middle East friendly to Western interests and free from Communist interference. To support the policy of containment and enhance an American position in the Middle East, Eisenhower prepared a series of policy objectives to guide American strategists and policy makers. These policy objectives included:

> ...promoting regional stability, guaranteeing the free flow of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe, supporting Arab nationalism and Israeli independence, improving relations with the Arab states, hastening the decline of European colonial empires, maintaining the solidarity of the Western alliance, and avoiding an arms race between Israel and its Arab neighbors, with the United States and Russian the principal arms suppliers.[144]

Some of these objectives did prove fundamentally contradictory. For instance, it was virtually impossible to simultaneously support both Arab nationalism and Israeli independence. As such, these policy contradictions made it difficult for British officials, in particular, to anticipate American support or opposition to decisions and proposals in Middle Eastern affairs.

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[144] *Ibid.*, 26-27.

In response to Egyptian President Gamal Nasser's nationalism and fears of Soviet expansionism, Iraq and Turkey had concluded the Baghdad Pact in 1955, "to ensure the internal stability and security of the Middle East."[145] The United States offered support to the Pact, and encouraged others to join, including Great Britain in April, Pakistan in July and Iran in October 1955. But the American response to the formation of the 'northern tier' defence pact was perplexing to British policymakers. Eisenhower and Dulles wished to avoid limiting their diplomatic options in the Middle East and refused formal American membership in the Pact. The British, who had wholeheartedly endorsed the enterprise, were somewhat mystified by the American decision. After repeated British appeals, Dulles assigned the American Ambassador to Iraq to participate only as an observer to the Baghdad Pact. Britain was assured that the United States would join, "if and when it seemed in doing so, it would be a contribution to the general stability of the area."[146] Whereas in other regions Britain found the Americans unnecessarily activist, "in the Middle East it was Washington which saw no need for that closer Anglo-American co-operation."[147]

British and American officials did agree, however, to provide funds for an Egyptian dam at Aswan, "so that Egypt might be enticed from Muscovite clutches."[148] Nasser had long envisaged the construction of a dam at Aswan that would create a reservoir of 23 billion cubic meters of water over an area of 739 square miles and would

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[145] *Ibid.*, 31.
[146] *Ibid.*
[147] Gelber, *America in Britain's Place*, 231.
[148] Ibid.

increase Egypt's arable land by one quarter.[149] The Egyptian Ambassador to Washington, Ahmed Hussein explained to Dulles that, "Egypt regarded the Dam as its most important economic project," therefore, if Nasser was the key to good relations with Egypt, then the Dam was the key to Nasser's goodwill.[150] The chief obstacle to the dam's construction was the prohibitive cost estimated at $1.3 billion, which far exceeded Egypt's financial resources. The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, later renamed the World Bank, began to examine the feasibility of the Aswan Dam in 1953, and in 1955 negotiations to secure financial aid from Britain and the United States began in Washington. By December 1955, the Bank along with American and British representatives reached an agreement with Egypt to fund later stages of construction, subject to legislative approval. The Bank planned to lend Egypt $200 million, while the United States would make an initial grant of $54 million and the British $14 million. Egypt would contribute the remaining $900 million for the project.[151]

Nasser was reluctant to accept the offer. His lack of enthusiasm seemed to indicate that Nasser was courting Soviet officials, and playing both sides. Eisenhower's diary reveals his growing apprehension about the project and the Egyptian leader, "we have reached the point where it looks as if Egypt, under Nasser, is going to make no move whatsoever to meet the Israelites in an effort to settle outstanding differences. Moreover, the Arabs, absorbing major consignments of arms from the Soviets, are daily growing more arrogant and disregarding the interests of Western Europe and of the

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[149] Kingseed, *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis*, 33-34.
[150] Mohamed Hassanein Heikal. *The Cairo Documents: The inside story of Nasser and his relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen.* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973), 59.
[151] Kingseed, *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis*, 34.

United States in the Middle East region."[152] Indeed, in September 1955, Nasser had announced that his country had concluded an arms deal with Communist-bloc Czechoslovakia. Nasser assured the world:

> We harbour no aggressive intentions; our aims are only peaceful. We want an independent army which will support this country's independent aims. We want a strong army for the purposes of peace, not for those of aggression. I said this in Egypt's name to America, Britain, France, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and many other nations and then I waited for their replies. What was the result? ...
> When we received a reply to our request from the Government of Czechoslovakia declaring its readiness to supply us with weapons in accordance with the Egyptian army's needs and on a purely commercial basis, and stating that the transaction would be regarded as any other commercial one, we accepted immediately.[153]

Nasser was unable to purchase weapons from American or British sources. The United States would have wanted assurances that American weapons would not have been used against Israel, while the British would have wanted Nasser to temper his vocal opposition to the Baghdad Pact. But when Nasser turned to the Communist bloc for arms, "he not only flung his door open to Soviet influences but afforded Russia, foiled for two hundred years, the chance to buy her way down into the Middle East rather than fight for it."[154] Harold Macmillan, Eden's Foreign Secretary and eventual successor, was enraged by the announcement of the Czech arms deal and his department noted that, "we may have to get rid of Nasser."[155] Cooler heads prevailed when Dulles decided, "we should not take

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[152] Dwight D. Eisenhower. *The Eisenhower Diaries*, ed. Robert H. Ferrell. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981), 318.
[153] "Speech by President Nasser," 27 September 1955. In Scott Lucas, ed., *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 16.
[154] Gelber, *America in Britain's Place*, 203.
[155] Lucas, *Britain and Suez*, 16.

any threatening or drastic step at this time because of the lack of a better alternative to Nasser."[156] The British agreed for the time being.

The decision was initially made to proceed with the Aswan deal in an effort to charm Egypt away from further Soviet influence. But in a 28 March 1956 meeting with Dulles and others to revise American policy towards Egypt, the President identified, "a fundamental factor in the problem is the growing ambition of Nasser, [and] the sense of power he has gained out of his associations with the Soviets."[157] Eisenhower directed his Secretary of State to prepare a memorandum which would let, "Colonel Nasser realize that he cannot cooperate as he is doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favored-nation treatment by the United States."[158] Through the spring of 1956 there was a shift in American policy from accommodation to pressure tactics, intended to compel Nasser to settle outstanding Arab-Israeli disputes and temper criticism of the West. But Nasser refused to be intimidated, and in May 1956 committed the unpardonable act of recognizing the People's Republic of China. For Eisenhower, this act confirmed Nasser's pro-Communist inclinations.[159] The American administration cancelled the initial offer of support for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July 1956. Secretary Dulles explained the American position, "developments in the succeeding seven months [since December when the initial offer of support was negotiated] have not

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[156] *Ibid.*, 17.
[157] Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, 323.
[158] Kingseed, *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis*, 35.
[159] *Ibid.*

been favourable to the success of the project, and the United States has concluded that it is not feasible in present circumstances to participate in the project."[160]

The Suez Debacle

Nasser's sinful behaviour continued through 1956. After Nasser was unable to secure sufficient international funding for his Aswan Dam project, he chose to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, ostensibly in order to raise the necessary revenues. In a speech 26 July 1956, Nasser announced:

> As I talk to you, some of your Egyptian brethren are proceeding to administer the canal company and to run its affairs. They are taking over the canal company at this very moment – the Egyptian canal company, not the foreign canal company... They are now carrying out this task so that we can make up for the past and build new edifices of grandeur and dignity.[161]

Though British officials were enraged, no immediate action was taken against Nasser. Prime Minister Anthony Eden put the question to his Cabinet, but decided against a unilateral response.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal was a serious affair and inaction would hardly prove to be an acceptable response. A leader in *The Times* (London) in August 1956 called for action, arguing, "if Nasser is allowed to get away with his coup, all the British and other Western interests in the Middle East will crumble. Quibbling over whether or not [Nasser] was legally entitled to make the grab will delight the finicky and faint-hearted but entirely misses the issues."[162] The same newspaper appealed to Britain's sense of greatness in continued calls for action against Nasser:

> ... the sun of Venice set because of the double event of the Turkish blockade of the caravan routes and the discovery of the Cape Route and America. A

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[160] *Ibid.*, 38.
[161] "Speech by President Nasser," 26 July 1956. In Lucas, *Britain and Suez*, 46.
[162] "Leader in *The Times*," 1 August 1956. In *Ibid.*, 53.

> pleasure-loving people more interested in their revels than in their responsibilities did the rest. ... Doubtless it is good to have a flourishing tourist trade, to win Test matches and to be regaled by photographs of Miss Diana Dors being pushed into a swimming pool. But nations do not live by circuses alone. The people, in their silent way, know this better that the critics. They still want Britain to be great.[163]

British public opinion was seemingly united against Nasser. If Britain was to remain a Great Power it was a matter of will and commitment to form the necessary response to Nasser.

The House of Commons was similarly united against Nasser. The Leader of the Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, spoke before the British House of Commons in August 1956, "we can not forget that Colonel Nasser has repeatedly boasted of his intention to create an Arab empire from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. The French Prime Minister, M. Mollet, the other day quoted a speech of Colonel Nasser's and rightly said that it could remind us only of one thing – of the speeches made of Hitler before the war."[164] Gaitskill further argued that, "this episode must be recognized as part of the struggle for the mastery of the Middle East... It is all very familiar. It is exactly the same that we encountered from Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war."[165] Eden had resigned from Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1938 over the issue of appeasement. He could ill-afford to appear to be appeasing Nasser in this developing crisis.

The British did consult with American officials on the matter and it had been agreed that Nasser was an undesirable leader. Secretary of State Dulles, however, expressed reservations to Eden, saying, "that United States public opinion was not ready

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[163] Thomas, Hugh. *The Suez Affair*. 3rd ed. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986), 195-196.
[164] *Ibid.*, 200.
[165] "Statement by Leader of the Opposition Gaitskill to the House of Commons," 2 August 1956. In Lucas, *Britain and Suez*, 53.

to back a military venture by Britain and France which, at this stage, could be plausibly portrayed as motivated by imperialist and colonialist ambitions in the general area."[166] From the very beginning of the crisis, Eisenhower warned Eden of, "the unwisdom even of contemplating the use of military force ... to recover the Canal as long as an international solution was available."[167] Eisenhower expressed his concerns in a letter to Eden:

> If unfortunately the situation can finally be resolved only by drastic means, there should be no grounds for belief anywhere that corrective measure were undertaken merely to protect national or individual investors, or the legal rights of a sovereign nation were ruthlessly flouted. ... Public opinion here [in the United States] and, I am convinced, in most of the world, would be outraged should there be a failure to make such efforts [towards a peaceful solution].[168]

The Canal was regarded as a colonial relic by the Americans, and Nasser's nationalization backed by offers of compensation was considered legal even if disruptive. The upcoming 1956 Presidential election further made Eisenhower entirely sensitive to potential public opinion problems. The United States did not want Britain to pursue any drastic action against Nasser before the elections, and Dulles, "felt confident that the British and French would not resort to any of these [military or other] measures before the election as they did not want to make it an election issue."[169] The American Secretary of State feared that any drastic action would give the Soviets the necessary justification

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[166] "Secretary of State Dulles' record of meeting with Prime Minister Eden," 1 August 1956. In *Ibid.*, 52.
[167] Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*, 192.
[168] "Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden," 31 July 1956. In Lucas, *Britain and Suez*, 51.
[169] Diane B. Kunz. *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 112.

for infiltration into the region. Eisenhower was clear that Suez, "was not the issue upon which to try to downgrade Nasser."[170]

Eden had told his Cabinet in October 1955 that Britain's experience and interests in the region exceeded America's, and therefore the British should not feel, "restricted overmuch by reluctance to act without full American concurrence and support. We should frame our own policy in the light of our interests in the area and get the Americans to support it to the extent we could induce them to do so."[171] Therefore, a lukewarm American response did not deter Eden, as he turned to the French and Israelis who were already exploring other alternatives. The resulting military plan seriously underestimated the potential international backlash and the willingness of the Americans and Commonwealth to acquiesce to British actions. British Treasury contingency plans made for a potential invasion of Egypt counted on either, "full US and general UN and Commonwealth support," or Britain would, "go it alone with France – with only limited US, Commonwealth and other support."[172]

It was decided that Israel would launch a full-scale attack against Egypt. British and French forces would bomb Egyptian airfields to protect Israeli cities against retaliation from the Egyptian air force. Britain and France would then demand the Israeli forces to pull back from the Suez Canal and would occupy the Canal Zone in accordance with Anglo-Egyptian Treaty signed 19 October 1954. Israel launched its attack on 29 October 1956 and two days later French and British planes began bombing Egyptian airfields. British and French paratroopers were dropped at Port Said and Port Faud on 5

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[170] Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*, 192.
[171] *Ibid.*
[172] *Ibid.*

November, which was followed by the main landing of British and French troops the next day. That very same day, 6 November, the British Cabinet agreed to stop military operations in the face of strong opposition from the international community, some of the Commonwealth and the United States.

The international response had been immediate. Iraq, one of Britain's main allies in the Middle East, mused publicly about expelling Britain from the Baghdad Pact. Britain had previously enjoyed significant influence in Jordan, since the Jordanian armed forces were largely staffed by British or British-trained Jordanian officers. But Jordan now ended the 1953 Anglo-Jordanian Defence Treaty. Syria and Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, and at a meeting of Arab heads of state in Beirut, the possibility of combined economic sanctions against Britain was considered.[173] Secretary Dulles led the way in the UN on 2 November 1956, calling for the cessation of military action in the Suez Canal by all parties, including the British and French. The resolution passed 64 to 5 with only the United Kingdom, France, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand voting opposed. Canada, Belgium, Laos, the Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa abstained.[174]

The United States wanted to end the embarrassing and divisive crisis quickly. British actions had received worldwide condemnation, divided the Western allies and overshadowed far more grievous Soviet offences taking place in Hungary at the same time. CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence, Robert Amory, relayed his frustration in a phone call to a counterpart stationed in Britain saying, "tell your [British] friends to

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[173] David Sanders. *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945.* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), 101.
[174] Mahmoud Fawzi. *Suez 1956: An Egyptian Perspective.* (London: Shorouk International Ltd., 1986), 87.

comply with the God-damn ceasefire or go ahead with the God-damn invasion. Either way, we'll back them up if they do it fast. What we can't stand is their God-damn hesitation, waltzing while Hungary is burning."[175] Eisenhower was entirely angered by the developments. In a phone call with Eden he indicated that, "I have just had a partial Cabinet meeting on this thing, & they think that our timing is very bad... although I had a landslide victory last night, we are not like you, and have lost both Houses of Congress."[176] In addition to the Republican Party's electoral failings, military reports emerged that indicated the Soviets might intervene in the Middle East.[177]

The Americans had not expected the British and French to proceed with plans against Nasser, and had made an effort to indicate to their allies that they would be no more predisposed to such operations after the Presidential elections.[178] By the second half of October, Britain's weak financial position and shrinking reserves of American currency made it appear that Suez question had passed the crisis stage. If not for the sale of the Trinidad Leasehold Company to American investors for $177 million, British reserve losses would have amounted to $125 million for September. By the end of October, it was clear that reserve losses for the month would amount to $80 million, leaving the British reserves at $2,248 million for November. If a loan payment of $175.5 million due under US agreement and an accompanying Canadian loan are taken into account, British reserves dipped perilously close to the $2,000 million level. British

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[175] "Telephone call by Robert Amory, CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence, to Chester Cooper, CIA representative in London," 3 November 1956. In Lucas, *Britain and Suez*, 99.
[176] "Telephone call from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden," 7 November 1956. In *Ibid.*, 105.
[177] "Allied Forces Headquarters, Cyprus, to Air Ministry, London," 6 November 1956. In *Ibid.*, 107.
[178] Kunz, *Economic Diplomacy of Suez Crisis*, 114.

contingency planning had continued nevertheless for an invasion of Egypt, and American support remained unquestioned.[179]

By the end of October 1956, the Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula placed a downward pressure on British currency and threatened British oil supplies, as was expected. But British planning had always depended on, at least, soft American and Commonwealth support. W. Randolph Burgess, Under-Secretary for the US Treasury Department, noted, "the British no sooner invaded than they immediately recognized immediately that they couldn't carry on a war of this scale without financial help." The Americans were in no mood to bail out the British; Burgess continued, "in view of the U.S. position, taken promptly at the United Nations, we were not prepared to finance their war effort."[180] British collaboration with the French and Israelis roused fervent American anti-colonialism and the Crisis provided the Soviets with the very opportunity to gain a foothold in the Middle East that American leadership had hoped to avoid.

British expectations and planning were far removed from reality. On 30 October 1956, a senior Bank of England official stated that he felt the invasion might strengthen the position of the sterling. Harold Macmillan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, indicated that he did not believe that there would be any attempt to transfer sterling funds in bulk. As a result, the Bank of England did not prevent foreign holders of sterling from exchanging their holdings and withdrawing the funds, which served to further weaken the currency. When the British Foreign Office asked their representative in Washington on 31 October 1956 to approach the Americans to begin joint Anglo-American oil planning,

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[179] *Ibid.*, 113.
[180] *Ibid.*, 116.

they were surprised he replied that he did not dare approach the Americans in their current mood.[181] Amidst the building pressure, Eden was forced to end British military operations and concede, "we must now get US support."[182]

Canada and Suez

The initial crisis provoked by Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956, was not yet of significant concern to Canada. Though it was noted that, "while Canada has no share in the ownership of the Suez Canal Company, as a trading nation we have a very real interest in the efficient and non-discriminatory operation of this waterway of great importance in peace and war."[183] Between 29 July and 2 August 1956, representatives of France, Britain, and the United States held tripartite talks in London. They agreed that Egypt's nationalization threatened the freedom and security of the Canal, and that, "steps should be taken to establish operating arrangements under an international system designed to assure the continuity of operation of the canal, as guaranteed by the Convention of 29 October 1888, consistently with legitimate Egyptian interests."[184] But Britain and France also reserved the right to use force. Norman Robertson, Canadian High Commissioner in London, reported, "on the one side the UK see very clearly the danger of having an irresponsible and unfriendly dictator in a position where he can close the Suez Canal [but] ... [f]rom British sources I understand that the

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[181] *Ibid.*, 127.
[182] "Memorandum by Prime Minister Eden," 7 November 1956. In Lucas, *Britain and Suez*, 104.
[183] "Statement by Mr. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs." 27 July 1956. NAC, Department of External Affairs fonds (RG 25) A-3-b volume 6107, *Nationalization of Suez Canal by Egypt [pt. 1.1] 50372-40.*
[184] Pearson, *Mike*, 228.

Americans have thus far been pretty cautious and noncommittal."[185] Increasingly, Canadian officials became concerned with an apparently widening gap between France and Britain on the one side, and the United States on the other, "always a nightmare to Canadians."[186]

The tripartite talks ended with the announcement of a further meeting in London that would include the eight parties to the 1888 Constantinople Convention and other states, "largely concerned in the use of the canal whether through ownership of tonnage or pattern of trade."[187] Canada did not fit the criteria, and as such did not receive an invitation to participate in the London Conference beginning 16 August 1956. Canadian Minister of National Defence, Ralph Campney, noted on 3 August that Nasser's seizure was, "primarily a European matter ... not a matter which particularly concerns Canada. We have no oil there. We don't use the Canal for shipping."[188] Besides, in the opinion of Canadian officials, "so long as there is no interference with shipping, the Egyptian expropriation action is presumably not in violation of the Constantinople Convention."[189] The Canadian government was hardly concerned that it would be excluded from the talks. Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson explained that had an invitation arrived, Canada would have participated. But none arrived, and the government felt no misgivings about being left out. Besides, Prime Minister St. Laurent assured the House

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[185] Telegram from Canadian High Commissioner in London to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. "Expropriation of Suez Canal Company." 30 July 1956. NAC, RG 25 A-3-b volume 6107, *Nationalization of Suez Canal by Egypt [pt 1.1] 50372-40.*

[186] Pearson, *Mike*, 228.

[187] *Ibid.*

[188] Mr. Rowe, 26 November 1956 in Fourth (Special) Session, Twenty-Second Parliament in House of Commons Debates. *Official Report.* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Printer of Stationary), 13.

[189] Jules Leger. "Memorandum to the Minister: Seizure of the Suez Canal Company." 27 July 1956. NAC, RG 25 A-3-b volume 6107, *Nationalization of Suez Canal by Egypt [pt 1.1] 50372-40.*

of Commons that, "we would be kept in the closest touch possible during the conference."[190] Canadian officials could only hope that the London Conference and subsequent proposals could avoid further escalation of the crisis. St. Laurent articulated his expectations for the international processes on 4 November 1956, saying, "the Canadian Government welcomed the ... proposals agreed to at the London Conference in August as a sound basis for settlement."[191]

The London Conference produced no final settlement acceptable to all parties, nor did the following conferences in September and October 1956. As such, on 29 October 1956 the Israelis moved against Egypt. As had been planned, the French and British governments issued an ultimatum that both sides withdraw from the Canal Zone. The ultimatum was immediately rejected by Egypt and on 31 October 1956 British and French forces began bombing select positions in the Canal Zone. The sequence of events came as a surprise to Canadian officials. Eden immediately sent a note to St. Laurent, stating his concern for the Canal Zone and hopes to stop the Egyptian-Israeli conflict before it developed into a wider war. The British Prime Minister tried to reassure his Canadian counterpart, indicating that the British would be interested in taking the matter to the UN in an appropriate manner. In a 1 November 1956 telegram to Eden, St. Laurent laid out his concerns:

> ... apart from the danger of a war which might spread, there are three aspects of this distressing situation which cause us particular anxiety. ...

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[190] Mr. St. Laurent, 3 August 1956 in Third Session, Twenty-Second Parliament in House of Commons Debates. *Official Report*, 6920.

[191] "Extracts from broadcast by the Prime Minister, Mr. L.S. St. Laurent," 4 November 1956. In James Eayrs. *The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 223.

> The first is the effect of the decisions taken on the United Nations, ... The fact that the action which you took was taken while the Security Council was seized of the matter is, I think, most regrettable...
> There is also the danger ... of a serious division within the Commonwealth in regard to your action, which will prejudice the unity of our association. ...
> Finally, and this is a matter of deep and abiding interest to Canada, the deplorable divergence of viewpoint and policy between the United Kingdom and the United States in regard to the decisions that have been taken, and the procedure followed, is something that will cause as much satisfaction to the Soviet Union and its supporters as it does distress to all those who believe that Anglo-American co-operation and friendship is the very foundation of our hopes for progress toward a peaceful and secure world.[192]

St. Laurent made it clear to Eden that he did not believe that situation called for a 'ready, aye, ready,' response from Canada.[193]

In one of his final speeches before the 1957 federal election and one of his last as Secretary of State for External Affairs, Pearson identified, "a first principle of Canadian foreign policy ... [as close cooperation] with the two countries with whom every impulse of sentiment, history, self-interest, trade, and geography counsels such cooperation," and when they disagreed, "we are in trouble."[194] It would be even more frightening for Canadians if American and British policy diverged to such a degree that the circumstances might force the country to choose between the two. Pearson reasoned that such a choice would, "be an impossible one, fatal to her national unity and indeed her existence."[195] The Suez Crisis threatened this very possibility. Pearson had been frustrated with the British decision to intervene. The Secretary of State for External Affairs wrote in a 1957 letter:

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[192] Pearson, *Mike*, 239.
[193] *Ibid.*, 238.
[194] G.A.H. Pearson, *Seize the Day*, 157.
[195] Lester B. Pearson. *Words and Occasions: An Anthology of Speeches and Articles selected from his papers by the Right Honourable L.B. Pearson.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 31.

> How the British ever expected to get away with military action with the Americans strongly opposed, with the Asian members of the Commonwealth even more strongly opposed, with the certainty that the matter would be referred to the UN Assembly where the UK and France would be in the dock ... and with the knowledge that the Communists would exploit the situation to their own advantage, is something I will never know.[196]

In any case, immediate Canadian objectives were to establish conditions to work out, "an enduring and honourable settlement for that area," and just as important for Canada was to, "restore unity amongst the allies."[197]

The Crisis placed American leaders in an increasingly difficult position. Direct American intervention in the Crisis would have precipitated a Soviet response, "and a major preoccupation of American policy [at the time] was to liquidate the crisis without direct Soviet penetration into the Middle East."[198] American military intervention against Britain and France would have ended the NATO alliance, upon which the United States and Canada depended to oppose the Soviet threat. On the other hand, American military intervention on the side of the British and French, "would have tainted the United States with a colonialism brush and would have invited the Soviet Union's entry into this conflict on behalf of the oppressed, underdeveloped and subjected people."[199] It was in this situation that Canada had the opportunity for creative diplomacy to, "try to find some kind of solution on which the British and Americans can agree."[200] Canada enjoyed the trust and confidence of the United States, Britain, France, India, Israel and many other

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[196] G.A.H. Pearson, *Seize the Day*, 154n.

[197] Mr. Pearson, 27 November 1956 in Fourth (Special) Session, Twenty-Second Parliament in House of Commons Debates, *Official Report*, 64.

[198] Inis L. Claude, Jr. Swords into Plowshares: Problems and Progress of International Organization., 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1964), 290.

[199] Aditya N. Gupta. *The Egyptian Crisis and the U.N. General Assembly: with Special Emphasis on the Role of Canada, Colombia, India and Norway*. (M.A. diss., The American University, 1967), 116.

[200] Blair Fraser and Lionel Shapiro. "Where Canada stands in the world crisis: Lester B. Pearson in an exclusive tape-recorded interview." *Maclean's*, 6 July 1957, 47.

members of the General Assembly. It was necessary to end the conflict without compromising Western interests in the region, and find a solution that would not provoke Soviet intervention.

In consultations with British officials, Pearson and his colleagues learned, in advance, of Eden's intention to state in the British House of Commons that there must be, "police action ... to separate the belligerents and to prevent the resumption of hostilities between them. If the UN were then willing to take over the physical task of maintaining peace, no one would be better pleased than we."[201] In this statement, Pearson saw the opportunity to, "reinforce the disposition of the invading States to comply with the recommendations of the Assembly for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces."[202] The time was ripe for the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs to introduce the idea of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).

Dulles had pushed forward a ceasefire resolution in the General Assembly on 2 November 1956. Though the resolution passed overwhelmingly, but Canada abstained. When rising to explain his vote, Pearson used the opportunity to introduce the idea of the UNEF. He said:

> What is the use of passing a resolution which brings about a cease-fire and even a withdrawal? What are we withdrawing to, the same state of affairs? In six months we'll go through all this again ... I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution ... authorizing the Secretary General to begin to make arrangements with Member Governments for a United Nations force ... My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations Force, a truly international peace and police force.[203]

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[201] Pearson, *Mike*, 246.
[202] Gupta, *The Egyptian Crisis and the U.N. General Assembly*, 121.
[203] Pearson, *Mike*, 247.

A Canadian proposal, Resolution 998, was presented to the General Assembly on 4 November 1956, that, "requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit ... within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up ... of an emergency international United Nations Force."[204] The resolution passed, and the Secretary General's office managed to meet the requirements of Resolution 998 and submitted a plan. This made possible Resolutions 1000 (ES-I), 1001 (ES-I), and 1002 (ES-I) which were all passed between 5 and 7 November 1956. Britain and France were forced to concede that solution was acceptable because, as they had insisted, it provided for an effective international force. But Israel and Egypt were reluctantly dragged along in the process. Egypt abstained on all three resolutions; Israel abstained on the first two, and was the only to vote in opposition to Resolution 1002 (ES-I), which called for, "Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949."[205] The project nonetheless moved forward at the United Nations over the reluctance of Egypt and Israel.

Pearson's progress at the United Nations was not universally supported by his colleagues in the House of Commons. Some thought that Canada should have come to Britain's aid as she had in two previous wars. Ontario Opposition MP William Earl Rowe lamented, "the Nasser government has made considerable headway towards turning a military defeat into a political victory. This has been made possible by the unfair criticism and the unnecessary compromises ... by our Canadian statesmen ... they

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[204] "GA Res. 998 (ES-I)," 4 November 1956. In Rosalyn Higgins. *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary.* Volume I *The Middle East.* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 231.
[205] "GA Res. 1002 (ES-I)," 7 November 1956. In *Ibid.*, 236.

have encouraged our enemies and so embarrassed our friends."[206] On behalf of MP Howard Green, who became Diefenbaker's External Affairs Minister in 1959, Rowe moved that, "this house regrets ... a course of gratuitous condemnation of the action of the United Kingdom and France, ... [and] encouraged a truculent and defiant attitude on the part of the Egyptian dictator."[207] Pearson responded to these charges, saying that, "we were ... anxious to do everything we could ... to prevent any formal condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as aggressors ... Our purpose was to be as helpful to the UK and France as we possibly could be."[208]

On 7 November 1956, Canada's Department of National Defence indicated that it intended to allocate The Queen's Own Rifles for the UNEF. When he received the message, Pearson, "shuddered ... because we were, after all, participating in a United Nations force which was going to move into territory which had been Egyptian and from which the British army was about to be thrown out ... Yet here we were sending in The Queen's Own, wearing essentially a British uniform with UN badges."[209] As might be expected, Nasser objected to the participation of these Canadian troops in the UN force. The Canadian Opposition criticized Pearson for having, "placed Canada in the humiliating position of accepting dictation from President Nasser."[210] High Commissioner Reid was asked to take the matter to Nehru, who had a good relationship with the Egyptian leader. The Indian Prime Minister said that he had heard that Nasser

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[206] Mr. Rowe, 26 November 1956 in Fourth (Special) Session, Twenty-Second Parliament in House of Commons Debates. *Official Report*, 13.
[207] *Ibid.*, 18.
[208] Mr. Pearson, 27 November 1956 in Fourth (Special) Session, Twenty-Second Parliament in House of Commons Debates, *Official Report*, 54-55.
[209] Pearson, *Mike*, 261.
[210] Mr. Rowe, 26 November 1956 in Fourth (Special) Session, Twenty-Second Parliament in House of Commons Debates. *Official Report*, 18.

might object on the grounds of Canada's close association with Britain, but, "informed Nasser that he was much distressed to hear this since Canada would be a good choice."[211] After Nehru's intervention, Nasser affirmed that he was satisfied that Canada was an independent country and that he respected Pearson. But the Egyptian President argued that it would be hard to explain to his people, "the difference between Canadian troops and the British troops which had been fighting them; they have the same uniform; they both use the Queen's emblem."[212] A compromise was struck, whereby Canadian troops would wear a United Nations flag with a maple leaf instead of the Union Jack. The Queen's Own Rifles would not serve in Egypt. Nasser's objections delayed the departure of the Canadian troops, and the contingent finally set sail for Egypt on 29 December 1956. The Canadian contribution initially included a Royal Canadian Engineers detachment, a Canadian Signal Squadron, a Canada Transport Company, and a Canadian Infantry Workshop totalling four hundred officers and men, more than two hundred vehicles and four Otter aircraft.[213]

On 22 December 1956 the Anglo-French forces withdrew from the Suez, and Canada's allies were spared further political humiliation. The menace of Soviet intervention in the region was averted, and the Soviet Union no longer threatened to use atomic weapons on Britain and France as a response to Anglo-French intervention in the Suez.[214] Though Yugoslavia contributed a reconnaissance battalion to the UNEF, the Soviet bloc contributed no additional troops. But most importantly to Canada, a major

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[211] Escott Reid. *Hungary and Suez, 1956: A View from New Delhi.* (Oakville, ON: Mosaic Press, 1986), 95.
[212] *Ibid.*
[213] Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping*, 73.
[214] *Ibid.*, 74.

irritant was removed in the Anglo-American relationship, paving the way for a renewal between the allies.

The Dual Crises: Hungary and Suez

The Hungarian uprisings, which broke out in Budapest on in 23 October 1956, should have presented the West with an unprecedented opportunity to prove the moral bankruptcy of the Soviet system. Though Communism had apparently supported the under-classes and underprivileged especially in Asia, Soviet forces undertook harsh measure to subordinate and crush a people fighting to free themselves from foreign domination in Eastern Europe. But when Anglo-French forces began bombing targets in the Canal Zone on 31 October 1956, international attention quickly shifted from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. As such, a major preoccupation of Canadian officials was to salvage Western credibility and convince the Afro-Asian bloc of the impiety of Soviet transgressions in Hungary. India, as a Commonwealth ally and leader of the Afro-Asian bloc, was the focus of Canadian efforts. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke strongly in opposition to Anglo-French military action against Egypt and characterized the action as representative of old imperialist methods. Canada may have agreed that Anglo-French actions in Suez were reprehensible, but, "as to Soviet colonialism, it is clearly in our view at least as objectionable as the Western brand."[215] Indeed, Nehru was slow to condemn Soviet transgressions in Hungary as strongly as he had Anglo- French intervention in Egypt.

To Canada's consternation, India began to foster closer relations with the Soviets in the second half of the 1950s. American military aid to Pakistan had angered the

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[215] "Colonialism and Anti-Colonialism in the United Nations." 14 December 1956. NAC, MG26 N1 volume 34, *Pearson, L.B. Subject Files Pre-1958 Series.*

Indians, and the Soviets exploited the situation. In 1955, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin made a two-week state visit to India. The visit was largely successful for Soviet officials, since they managed to discredit, "the old picture of Russia as a barbarous, dangerous northern bear, and by their joviality and friendship and offers of aid they had substituted a picture of a great, friendly, progressive, peace-loving country which had no quarrel with either the external or internal policy of India."[216] But Soviet leaders also invoked crude anti-Western rhetoric, and even charged that it was the Western powers that precipitated the Second World War in 1939 and Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.[217] In the spirit of the occasion, Nehru did not challenge the exceptionally strong anti-Western language. India's extraordinarily warm reception prepared for the Soviet state visit also angered many Western leaders. When Nehru had visited the Soviet Union on an earlier occasion, Soviet citizens lined the streets to greet him. The Indian Prime Minister wished to provide the Soviet leaders with an equally impressive reception. It was arranged so that hundreds of thousands of Indians lined the streets and chanted government-led slogans including *Hindi-Rusi ek hai* (Indians and Russians are one) and *Hindi-Rusi bhai bhai* (Indians and Russians are brothers).[218] It was reported that about a million Indians lined the twelve-mile route from the airport and almost six hundred thousand were on hand for the civic reception the next day.[219]

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[216] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru,* 136.
[217] Escott Reid. *Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 280.
[218] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru,* 134.
[219] Reid, *Radical Mandarin*, 280.

In the next year, while the West was becoming embroiled in the Suez, the Soviets were forced to deal with an uprising in Hungary. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Stalin had imposed a Communist regime on Hungary in 1949 without much popular support. In the 1947 and 1948 elections, the Communist Party received only twenty- two percent of the popular vote. Additionally, many of those Hungarians who voted for the Communists supported L. Rajka, who was more liberal and was executed in 1949 after Stalinist purges. When Khrushchev denounced Stalin in February 1956, it emboldened dissidents in Poland and Hungary to rebel against their Stalinist governments. In Hungary, Rajka was posthumously exonerated and more than two hundred thousand turned out for a state funeral. The Polish anti-Stalinist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka successfully defied Moscow and Khrushchev. Encouraged by the developments, mass demonstrations, led by students and factory workers, broke out in Budapest in 23 October 1956. They demonstrators demanded solidarity with the Poles, free elections and neutralism.[220]

In response, the Hungarian Government ordered the security police to crush the rebellion. When they failed to quickly put down the uprisings, Hungarian officials turned to the Soviets for help. Soviet tanks promptly arrived in Budapest, and on 26 October 1956 opened fire on demonstrators in Kossuth Square. The next day, heavy fighting between Hungarian demonstrators and Soviet forces broke out all over Hungary. Though the Hungarian rebels fought with valour, they were no match for the well-equipped and well-supplied Soviet forces. British Opposition Leader, Hugh Gaitskell, declared his condemnation of, "the ruthless intervention of Soviet tanks and troops against the

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[220] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 147.

Hungarian workers – most of them unarmed – and the bloodshed thus caused."[221] On 27 October 1956, Britain, France, and the United States called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council, and all but the Soviet representative openly opposed Soviet military intervention in Hungary. Pearson added his voice to the growing number of world leaders speaking out against Soviet aggression in Hungary. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs declared:

> The view of the Canadian Government is that the United Nations should immediately be seized of the Hungarian situation in order to prevent further bloodshed and to enable Hungary freely to choose its own course as a new member of the United Nations. ... The forces of world opinion must be mobilized in favour of the forces of national freedom in these countries and against foreign armed intervention and foreign domination.[222]

The uprisings in Hungary presented a crack in the iron curtain, and a direct repudiation of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. The military response against unarmed civilians offered an opportunity to finally expose the Soviets as inhumane and ruthless.

Indian leaders, however, were entirely lukewarm in their disapproval of Soviet aggression in Hungary. Nehru first spoke about the developments in Hungary on 26 October 1956, the same day Soviet tanks opened fire on demonstrators in Kossuth Square. The Indian leader said that the developments in Poland and Hungary were a nationalist upsurge, "a feeling that they themselves are going to fashion their policies and not necessarily others. Anyhow, it is not for us to interfere in any way even by expressing an opinion on the internal affairs of these countries."[223] A few days later, on 28 October 1956, Krishna Menon, India's representative to the United Nations, echoed Nehru's remarks, saying that the developments in Hungary were an internal matter.

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[221] *Ibid.*, 149.
[222] Reid, *Hungary and Suez, 1956*, 38.
[223] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 148.

Menon compared the uprisings in Hungary to recent riots in the Indians cities Bombay and Ahmadabad over proposals to redraw the boundaries of the states, asking, "how Indians would feel if these riots were described in the foreign press as rebellion against the Congress regime."[224]

In November 1956, Nehru hinted that the Soviets were justified in putting down the Hungarian uprisings by force. He suggested that the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt convinced the Soviets of an impending international war and, therefore, could not tolerate dissent among its allies:

> If something happened in Hungary, it made Hungary a hostile power to Russia. Then the hostile frontier comes up to the Soviet Union. Then this may have affected Romania and Bulgaria and upset things and, in addition to German militarism, this, that and anything may happen.[225]

Certainly it is reasonable to argue that Soviet decision-making would be affected by simultaneous events in the Middle East. Indeed, American officials speculated that, "in deciding to crush the Hungarian Revolution by force, Moscow must certainly have been influenced by the knowledge that the Western powers were just then intensely preoccupied with an unprecedented situation ... [in] the Suez Canal."[226] It was, however, somewhat preposterous for Nehru to justify Soviet transgressions in Hungary on such grounds, when they so harshly condemned Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. Nehru had reacted strongly to the situation in the Middle East, characterizing it as, "old colonial methods, which we had thought in our ignorance belonged to a more unenlightened age,

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[224] *Ibid.*, 148-149.
[225] Reid, *Hungary and Suez, 1956*, 35-36.
[226] Richard P. Stebbins. *The United States in World Affairs, 1956.* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 320.

are revived and practiced."[227] Pearson wrote to Reid in New Delhi, explaining that, "I have no quarrel with the Indian Government's decision in this matter but the contrast between its quick and strong denunciation of Israeli action with its complete silence over events in Hungary."[228]

Indian inconsistency proved to be entirely frustrating to Western powers. Nehru was condemned in *The New York Times* as one, "who has been extremely active in publicizing his zeal for Egyptian nationalists but who has said nothing to date in support of the Hungarian people."[229] But the Indians argued that there was no parallel between Egypt and Hungary because Soviet forces had been invited into the country by Hungarian authorities. Furthermore, Indian officials reasoned that they might similarly criticize Canada for not issuing a strong condemnation of Anglo-French actions in Egypt. It further became clear that Nehru was being supplied information from the Soviets through the Indian Ambassador in Moscow.[230] Nehru commented on the state of affairs in Hungary:

> One difficulty about the Hungarian situation is that there are disputes about the facts. Apparently there were not only Russian troops in Hungary but also technicians and it is said that a thousand of the Russian technicians were murdered. There seem to have been massacres on both sides. The Russians had agreed to withdraw but came back when new developments took place in the rebellion. It is said, for example, that people were streaming across the border to help the rebels and that planes were landing in Hungary from outside the country to help the rebels.[231]

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[227] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 158.
[228] Reid, *Hungary and Suez, 1956*, 40.
[229] *Ibid.*, 41.
[230] K.P.S. Menon. *The Flying Troika: Extracts from a Diary by K.P.S. Menon, India's Ambassador to Russia, 1952-1961*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 172-173.
[231] Reid, *Radical Mandarin*, 284.

Such a statement was, of course, outrageous and Reid expressed his frustrations saying, "I wish it were possible to fly to India immediately for the express purpose of seeing Nehru about four active leaders of the abortive Hungarian rebellion."[232] Nehru and Krishna Menon remained confident in their views on Hungary, and on 9 November 1956 India voted against an UN resolution that called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and free elections in Hungary.

It is likely that the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit from the previous year and resulting cordial Indo-Soviet relations were still fresh in Nehru's mind. Krishna Menon, who advocated closer relations between Indian and the Soviet Union, was also becoming increasingly influential. Furthermore, Nehru had strongly opposed British colonialism in India and had been a leading advocate of Indian independence. It was easy to equate Anglo-French intervention in Egypt with old-style colonialism, whereas it was more difficult to see the domination of one white population over another in the same light. A similar circumstance had arisen when Justice Radhabinod Pal, the Indian member of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, absolved Japan of the charge of aggression, "on the ground that her belligerence was an inevitable reaction to Western imperialism."[233] As such, Nehru was perhaps more willing to accept Soviet accounts of events in Hungary.

Reid nevertheless continued his efforts to convince Nehru that Soviet transgressions in Hungary warranted an open and forceful condemnation. At long last, Reid had success in compiling first-hand accounts of events to help provide Nehru with a

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[232] *Ibid.*
[233] Ball, "East Asia and the West," 15-16.

more accurate assessment of Soviet conduct in Hungary. On 12 November 1956 the Swiss Minister Clemente Rezzonico agreed to have his government send a day-by-day account from the Swiss Legation in Budapest for transmission to Nehru. The Yugoslavians and Americans also began sending their reports. At the same time, domestic pressure was building in India. V.T. Khrishnamachari, and elder statesmen and Vice Chairman of the Indian Planning Commission, confided to Reid, "if Gandhi were alive today he would not have spoken as Nehru has. He would have attacked what Russia has done in Hungary."[234]

Finally, in a 19 November 1956 speech, Nehru started a process the Indian Opposition called his de-Bulganin-isation, affirming:

> The major fact is that the people of Hungary ... claimed freedom from outside control or influence, objected to the Soviet forces coming, wanted them to withdraw and wanted some internal changes in the Government. This is a basic fact which nobody can deny... The Soviet armies were there [in Hungary] against the wishes of the Hungarian people...If in the course of ten years [of an imposed Communist government] in Hungary the people could not be converted to that particular theory, it shows a certain failure which is far greater it seems to me than the failure of the ... [the Hungarian Revolution]. ... So far as communism is concerned, quite apart from the military adventure which it has indulged in, ... it has done something which has uprooted even the deep faith of many communists.[235]

Nehru seems to have been significantly influenced by first-hand accounts of Soviet atrocities in Hungary. Nor could the Indian Prime Minister ignore building domestic pressure. Stanislas Ostrorog, French Ambassador in New Delhi, noted that in his five years in the country, never had the press been so united and open in expressing its disagreement with Nehru on a matter of foreign policy.[236] Nehru had finally been forced

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[234] Reid, *Hungary and Suez, 1956*, 101.
[235] *Ibid.*, 109-110.
[236] *Ibid.*, 101.

to publicly recognize the severity of Soviet transgressions in Hungary. The international spotlight was now focused on the Soviets, and Canada's allies were spared further scrutiny.

When the press informed Pearson that he would be awarded the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for his part in the creation of the UNEF, he humbly replied, "Gosh, gee ... Gosh, I am thunderstruck and overwhelmed."[237] The outpouring of international praise and gratitude for the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, made it very easy to forget that Pearson's leadership at the UN had not been universally supported by Canadians. Letters arrived from all over the world. Mr. Edward E. Gelber of Jerusalem wrote Pearson to praise his, "contributions to the maintenance of peace in a sorely troubled world ... The idealistic, democratic impulse over the years that have motivated you in the exercise of your statecraft has been outstanding."[238] Mr. C. Wilfred Jenks working for the International Labour Organization in Geneva, noted that when, "the Commonwealth and the Anglo-American understanding both seemed to be flying apart, many of us who were precluded by official position from expressing any view on the situation, even in private, were muttering perpetually between our teeth, 'Thank God for Mike Pearson.'"[239] A young Jean Chrétien wrote Pearson, saying, "c'est avec énormément de plaisir que je vous fais parvenir mes plus sincères félicitations pour le

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[237] "Pearson response to news of Peace Prize." NAC, MG 26 N1 volume 43, *Pearson, L.B. Subject Files Pre-1958 Series Nobel Peace Prize 1957-1958.*

[238] Letter from Mr. Edward E. Gelber of Jerusalem to L.B. Pearson, 22 October 1957. NAC, MG 26 N1 volume 26, *Pearson, L.B. Subject Files Pre-1958 Series, Congratulations - International 1957 Nobel Peace Prize.*

[239] Letter from C. Wilfred Jenks of the ILO-Geneva to L.B. Pearson, 17 October 1957. NAC, MG 26 N1 volume 26, *Pearson, L.B. Subject Files Pre-1958 Series, Congratulations - International 1957 Nobel Peace Prize.*

magnifique prestige que vous avez acquis a notre cher Canada en obtenant le prix Nobel pour la paix."[240]

Peacekeeping has undoubtedly come to occupy of position of importance in Canadian national identify. Whether peacekeeping warrants such a position has become a matter of some contention. The notion does appeal to Canadians' sense of altruism, and hopes that their nation might be able to alleviate the suffering of those less fortunate. The horrors of Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Romeo Dallaire's experience in Rwanda, and the 1997 Somalia Inquiry report, however, have brought into question the value of certain peacekeeping operations.[241] The Liberal government's June 2004 election promise to create a 5,000-soldier 'peacekeeping brigade' has added another level of complexity to the matter. An April 2004 poll reported that only 41% of respondents advocated more federal spending on peacekeeping, let alone increased spending on defence.[242] The proposed 'peacekeeping brigade' has therefore concerned some military experts, who have speculated that the only way to fund such a force, without increasing spending, would be to strip Canada's Navy or Air Force.[243] In any case, the Department of National Defence has begun a Defence Policy Review in conjunction with an overall government

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[240] Letter from Jean Chretien, Vice-President de la Canadian University Liberal Federation to L.B. Pearson, 14 October 1957. NAC, MG 26 N1 volume 28, *Pearson, L.B. Subject Files Pre-1958 Series Congratulations Oct-Dec Part 7 1957 Nobel Peace Prize.*

[241] Romeo Dallaire. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda.* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 1993), 516-517.
Dallaire writes, "How do we pick and choose where to get involved? Canada and other peacekeeping nations have become accustomed to acting if, and only if, international public opinion will support them – a dangerous path that leads to a moral relativism in which a country risks losing sight of the difference between good and evil."

[242] Roland Merbis et al. Canadians' Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy: Report prepared for the Canadian Institute for International Affairs (CIIA). (Toronto: Pollara Inc., 2004), 13.

[243] Ram, "Canada the peacekeeper? A myth that should die."

examination of Canada's place in the world.[244] Sean Maloney has advanced the thesis that peacekeeping was, "but one blue-feathered arrow in Canada's Cold War quiver."[245] In this sense, peacekeeping was a means to achieve policy objectives, rather than an objective in itself. Canadians and their leaders will need to determine what role peacekeeping has in contemporary security and defence policy.

How peacekeeping came to occupy its current position of importance in Canadian national identity invariably starts with Suez. Though the ostensible triumph of the UNEF in the name of world peace was laudable, the success of the operation ultimately proved to be in its abilities to satisfy Canadian Cold War imperatives. Though the Arab-Israeli conflict was subdued for a decade, Nasser forced the UNEF to leave in 1967 so he could launch the Six Days War. The Suez Crisis in 1956 threatened Anglo-American unity, and threatened the future of the North Atlantic alliance. The Crisis also provided the Soviets with an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force ensured that Britain and France had a means to extricate themselves from the Crisis. Canada further wished to salvage Western credibility in the eyes of the non-white Commonwealth and Afro-Asian bloc. It was vital to focus international attention on Soviet transgressions in Hungary, and not Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

Any serious study of Suez must accept the importance of Cold War imperatives in shaping Canada's response to the Crisis. It would be inaccurate, however, to argue that

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[244] Department of National Defence. "Speaking Notes for The Honourable Bill Graham, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence at The Royal Canadian Military Institute Conference 22 September 2004." In *Minister's Speeches* (2004). <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1456> Retrieved 2 October 2004.

[245] Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping*, 249.

humanitarianism and idealism played no role in Pearson's leadership at the United Nations. This matter should be addressed in further study, particularly because public memory of the Suez Crisis emphasizes so heavily the concept of Canada as a compassionate, middle power, peacemaker. It would be fascinating to trace the rise of peacekeeping in Canadian national identity, and the mechanisms by which it came to occupy a position of such importance. There is no doubt that public conceptions of Canada's place in the world and peacekeeping have evolved considerably since 1956, but contemporary Canadian identity is undoubtedly rooted in the history of the period. No matter the popular image, it should be clear that Canada was more than just a peacemaker. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the success of the United Nations Emergency Force and Pearsonian diplomacy without understanding the Cold War imperatives they sought to satisfy.

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