INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA

UMI®
800-521-0600

Multinational Operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia:

A Comparative Study

Dominique Orsini

Department of Political Science

McGill University, Montreal

July 1997

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts.

Multinational Operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia:
A Comparative Study

Table of Contents

Abstract

The number of United Nations interventions in civil conflicts has increased since the end of the Cold War. Traditional peace-keeping has proved ill-suited to deal with them; second-generation, multi-task peace-keeping operations have emerged as a substitute. These new operations have strained UN resources and the willingness of nations to provide troops is not as forthcoming as it used to be. Therefore, the UN has shared in recent years the burden of conflict resolution with regional organisations and *ad hoc* coalitions. This thesis studies multinational interventions in three conflicts (Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia) and asks what lessons can be drawn with regard to co-operation between the different actors involved on the ground. Moreover, it discusses the problems involved in the transfer of an operation between the UN and non-UN actors.

Résumé

Le nombre d'interventions des Nations Unies dans des conflits civils a augmenté depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Les opérations traditionnelles de maintien de la paix sont inadéquates pour résoudre ces conflits; des opérations de maintien de la paix de seconde génération, à tâches multiples, s'y sont substituées. Ces nouvelles opérations ont épuisé les ressources de l'ONU et la volonté des nations de fournir des troupes fait défaut. C'est pourquoi ces dernières années l'ONU a partagé le fardeau de la résolution des conflits avec des organisations régionales et des coalitions *ad hoc*. Ce mémoire se penche sur les interventions multinationales dans trois conflits (la Somalie, Haiti et la Bosnie) et tente de tirer des lecons quant à la coopération entre les différents acteurs présents sur le terrain. De plus, les problèmes posés par le transfert d'une opération entre l'ONU et des acteurs non onusiens seront discutés.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Rex Brynen, for his thorough review of my work and insightful comments.

A special thanks to Marc Lanteigne and Carl Young for reading over earlier drafts of this thesis.

Finally, many thanks to my parents without whom I would have never got so far.

It is hard to get money for medicine but easy to raise funds for a coffin.

Chinese Proverb

Introduction

The United Nations has been playing a more prominent role in international affairs since the end of the Cold War. Requests for UN peacekeepers have dramatically increased: sixteen missions are currently deployed world-wide and blue helmets could potentially be used in many more troubled spots. Yet the ability of the UN to resolve conflicts is questioned by many. It seems that the world body does not have the appropriate tools to restore peace: it gets bogged down in intractable conflicts, its peacekeepers are being humiliated, if not killed, and the world organisation often ends up being blamed for the continuation of conflicts.

In recent years the UN has begun sub-contracting peace operations to *ad hoc* coalitions of states and regional organisations. This approach enables the UN to share the increasing burden of conflict resolution with other international actors. But new problems have emerged: co-operation between the many actors in the field is difficult to establish and responsibilities are not easily transferred from one organisation to the other.

This thesis will attempt to analyse the problems resulting from the transfer of an operation between the UN on the one hand, and *ad hoc* coalitions or regional organisations on the other. Problems of co-ordination between the different UN and non-UN actors in the field will also be considered.

The first chapter will look at the evolution of sovereignty since the end of the Cold War; the transformation of peace-keeping resulting from this new understanding of sovereignty will then be examined. Finally, the option of sub-contracting peace operations to regional organisations and *ad hoc* coalitions will be considered. The

second chapter will illustrate the problems posed by the sub-contracting option and second generation peace-keeping. Three case studies will be presented. First, the relations between the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) will be studied as well as the transfer from the US-led operation to the second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). Second, the transition from the US-led Multinational Force (MNF) to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) will be assessed. Finally, co-operation between the UN and NATO as well as the transfer from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia will be analysed. The third chapter will conclude by suggesting some lessons for future multinational operations.

Chapter I

Peace-keeping in the Post-Cold War Era

The Issue of Sovereignty

When Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the view in 1988 that UN peace-keeping should be improved, many thought that the world organisation was finally going to be given the means to "maintain international peace and security". Indeed, Soviet willingness to co-operate with the other members of the Security Council meant that the UN's ability to stand as a peace broker between conflicting parties would be enhanced and proxy wars no longer fuelled by the two superpowers.

The members of the Security Council, and especially the Permanent Five (P5), have indeed been more willing to co-operate in resolving conflict. Yet, it seems that the UN is having trouble coping with conflicts around the world. As Mackinlay and Chopra have put it, the Charter does not seem adequate for addressing post-Cold War wars:

> "In the Charter world, wars erupt across frontiers; the UN's mandate does not clearly extend to maintaining peace within a state. "[1]

They aptly point out that the Charter refers to "aggression", "self-defence" and "armed attack" in which force is used by conventional armies in interstate conflicts.

---

[1] John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations", in *The Washington Quarterly*, 15 (Summer 1992), p. 114.

In the post-Cold War world, most conflicts are intrastate conflicts. These conflicts have led to a new understanding of sovereignty. Barnett makes a distinction between what he calls juridical sovereignty and empirical sovereignty.[2] He argues that there has been a shift in the international community away from sovereignty defined exclusively as juridical sovereignty to the realisation that empirical sovereignty underpins juridical sovereignty. Indeed, a state cannot claim juridical sovereignty if it has no control over its territory and society. Barnett then asserts that how UN members conceive what fosters international order determines what a threat to this order is. If the international order is to be based solely on juridical sovereignty, then interstate conflicts only are a threat to this order. On the other hand, if the international order rests on empirical sovereignty, what happens within states is important too. To him, what now matters for most UN members is empirical sovereignty. Hence, greater attention is given to internal threats to the state. At the same time, the way states treat their population has also come under greater scrutiny.[3] As former secretary-general Pérez de Cuéllar put it in 1991:

> "We are witnessing what is probably an irreversible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."[4]

This trend was also expressed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali:

> "The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international

---

[2] Michael Barnett, "The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty", in *Global Governance*, 1(1995), pp. 79-97. He defines juridical sovereignty as follows: "That states recognize each other's existence and honor the principle of non-interference". As for empirical sovereignty, he states: "That states have some degree of legitimacy and control over their society and within their borders".

[3] Some advocate that human rights should be considered on equal foot with the principle of sovereignty. See Janina W. Dacyl, "Sovereignty versus Human Rights: From Past Discourses to Contemporary Dilemmas", in *Journal of Refugee Studies* 9, 2 (1996), pp. 136-65.

[4] Cited in Charles Greenwood, "Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?", in *The World Today*, 49, February 1993, p.35.

> progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world."[5]

The "CNN factor" also plays an important role in this evolution. Because the media cover civil wars much more extensively and more rapidly than in the past, public opinions put pressure on governments to "do something".[6]

In short, a more co-operative Security Council coupled with a new conception of sovereignty and intensive media coverage has led the UN to consider new threats to international peace and security. What tools did it have at its disposal to address these issues?

The Evolution of Peace-keeping

Traditional Peace-keeping

The Cold War prevented the Security Council from functioning according to the Charter. Moreover, the existence of nuclear weapons meant that direct involvement of the two superpowers in any conflict had to be avoided at all costs. Unable to fulfil the task for which it was designed, the UN could have fallen apart like the League of Nations. Thanks to the ingenuity of its then-Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, and of the Canadian Permanent Representative, Lester Preston, the Organisation found a way to circumvent the paralysis of the Council during the 1956 Suez crisis: a UN "buffer" force was sent in to defuse the situation. Peace-keeping was born.

---

[5] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*. (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 9.

[6] See Larry Minear, Colin Scott and Thomas G. Weiss, *The News Media, Civil War and Humanitarian Action*. (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1996).

Three principles are considered fundamental in what has come to be known as traditional peace-keeping. First, the principle of impartiality. This means that the UN force must be completely impartial with all parties. Second, peace-keeping operations are established with the consent of the parties, and if that consent is withdrawn, so are the peacekeepers. Third, the use of force is authorised only in self-defence.[7]

This *ad hoc* system worked for the duration of the Cold War. From 1948 to 1987, thirteen operations were deployed in the field. However, the nature of peace-keeping (limited use of force, relatively simple mandate) and the Cold War prevented the UN from developing an effective operational capacity to mount large-scale operations. Mackinlay and Chopra explain:

> "Because peacekeepers, in principle, had no enemies in their area of operations, there was little pressure on them to be militarily effective. In the field, there was no need for total operational reliability by day and night, and gaps in logistic arrangements were tolerated because they did not diminish results. This in turn removed pressure on the Secretariat to maintain an effective staff capability in New York. There was seldom any need, or facility, to maintain elaborate map rooms, with 24-hour vigilance and daily situation briefings. When the need arose, contingency planning could be carried out by co-opted staff officers who came and went on an ad hoc basis. Operational lessons were lost, UN equipment became obsolete, and military functions were largely conducted by a largely civilian Secretariat. Although the deployment of each peace-keeping force began with minor blunders, once the modus operandi was established, lessons were soon forgotten. With the cold war stalemate in the Security Council, member nations had no incentive to improve military competence."[8]

At the end of the Cold War, the UN only had traditional peace-keeping at its disposal to cope with internal conflicts. It soon appeared that it was ill-suited to deal

---

[7] For a more detailed discussion of these principles, see James H. Allan, *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer.* (Westport: Praeger, 1996). pp. 3-4. There is no consensus over which activities fall under the label of traditional peace-keeping. Allan considers that peace-keeping activities are limited to monitoring cease-fires and dispatching "interpositional" forces between belligerents. For Durch, peace-keeping activities range from monitoring buffer zones to the transitional administration of a country [see William Durch, ed. *The Evolution of UN peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). p. 3]. Despite the lack of an agreement over this issue, all authors agree that traditional peace-keeping is characterised by impartiality, consent and limited use of force.

[8] John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

with these conflicts and UN officials began to look for alternatives to traditional peace-keeping.[9]

Second Generation Peace-keeping

The term second generation peace-keeping is used to identify complex, multi-task UN interventions in post-Cold War internal conflicts. These operations involve activities ranging from monitoring buffer zones to the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the monitoring of elections. For example, in 1993 only, UN peacekeepers around the world were engaged in the following tasks: (a) election observation (Eritrea and Liberia) and organisation (Cambodia); (b) humanitarian assistance and securing safe conditions for its delivery (Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq); (c) observation and separation of combatants along a more or less demarcated boundary (Croatia, Kuwait-Iraq); (d) disarmament of military and paramilitary forces (Cambodia, Somalia, El Salvador); (e) promotion and protection of human rights (Cambodia and El Salvador); (f) mine clearance, training and mine awareness (Afghanistan and Cambodia); (g) military and police training (Cambodia and Haiti); (h) boundary demarcation (Kuwait-Iraq border); (I) civil administration (Cambodia); (j) provision of assistance to and repatriation of refugees (the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia); (k) reconstruction and development (Cambodia and Somalia); and (l) maintenance of law and order (Cambodia and Somalia). [10]

---

[9] See Paul F. Diehl, "Peacekeeping in Civil Wars", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds. *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990's*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 223-36.

[10] Compiled by Trevor Findlay in "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping" in Trevor Findlay, ed. *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*. (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1996). SIPRI Research Report No. 12. p. 17-18.



Second generation peace-keeping has posed serious challenges to the three principles of traditional peace-keeping.[11] First, consent may be problematic from the outset because the parties have been forced into a peace process or compelled to agree to a UN presence. It may also be withdrawn during the operation because of external factors or simply because the parties feel that the UN presence is damaging their

[11] *Ibid.*, pp.24-28.

interests. The worst scenario is a complete loss of consent. This is likely to occur after the UN has attempted punitive or retaliatory action against one of the parties.

Second, impartiality on the part of the UN may be difficult to maintain when a party deliberately violates an agreement, international law or human rights. If impartiality is understood as treating the parties the same way, as in traditional peace-keeping, then indeed second generation peace-keeping is problematic in that regard because it compels peacekeepers to behave the same way with all parties, no matter how they act.

Third, as Allan bluntly put it, this is not all:

> "[I] would suggest that the major difference between the new peacekeeping and the old will be that more peacekeepers will die to little purpose in the new version. Most old peacekeepers died in vehicle accidents and other normal soldiery peacetime fatalities. When increasing numbers of new peacekeepers begin to die in Somalia-type ambushes, Serbian mortar attacks, Croatian minings, and so forth, the member states will demand that the UN codify, clarify, and legitimize the new phenomenon or abandon it."[12]

Allan points to one of the major problems raised by complex, intrastate UN operations: the use of force, even limited, by and against peacekeepers, means that these operations greatly put their lives at risk. Pressured by their public opinions, member states are no longer willing to embark on operations which may result in casualties.[13] Smaller and middle powers, the traditional providers of troops for peace-keeping, will prefer that the major powers "take care of it". Allan makes the point that support for the new peace-keeping may drop dramatically even among major powers if the number of casualties is too high.[14] Furthermore, the increasing number of internal conflicts that

---

[12] See James H. Allan, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[13] The withdrawal of the Belgian contingent from UNAMIR, the UN mission in Rwanda charged to monitor the implementation of the peace accord between the rebels of the PRF and the government, illustrates this problem. Indeed, the assassination of 10 Belgian peacekeepers in the aftermath of the Rwandan President's assassination triggered the withdrawal.

have erupted since 1991 has also exhausted the already limited resources of the middle and smaller powers -including Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, the Nordic countries, Poland and Fiji- that habitually provided contingents for peace-keeping missions. Not only is the UN in need of more peacekeepers, but it also needs peacekeepers with sophisticated assets in order to fulfil more complex mandates.[15]

Other problems exist. The operational capability of the UN to mount large-scale operations has been questioned for a long time. As Mackinlay and Chopra argued above, traditional peace-keeping did not lead the UN to develop an effective infrastructure and operational mechanisms. Second generation peace-keeping only revealed what was already known in diplomatic circles: the UN has trouble mounting and managing complex operations.[16] It is significant that the forces which formed the coalition against Iraq in the Gulf war never seriously considered the possibility of surrendering the control of the operation to the UN.[17]

Moreover, the UN has encountered difficulties in financing peace-keeping operations in recent years. With many countries still owing large arrears to the Organisation, the UN's ability to reimburse troop-contributing states has been hampered and its budgetary autonomy limited[18]. Peace-keeping cost about US$ 1.6 billion in 1996. It cost US$ 2.8 billion in 1995, mainly because of UN peace-keeping in the Former Yugoslavia. As of 1 September 1996, Member States owed the UN a total

---

[14] The public outcry demanding the withdrawal of American troops from Somalia following the ill-fated attack on Aideed's headquarters is a good example of this problem.

[15] See Mackinlay and Chopra, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[16] Michael Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

[17] Indeed, since the onset of the Cold War, the UN has never been given the resources to develop a capability to mount enforcement operations. See Mackinlay and Chopra, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[18] See United Nations, *Frequently Asked Questions*; available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/faq.htm; Internet; accessed 13 July 1997.

of US$ 2.1 billion in current and back peace-keeping dues. Of the five permanent members of the Council, all but France owe varying amounts of past years' peace-keeping dues. The US is the largest debtor, owing over US$ 1 billion.

UN peacekeepers are paid by their governments according to national standards. In addition, the UN compensates peacekeepers at a flat rate of US$ 1,000 per month and their governments are reimbursed for their equipment. Financial shortages due to unpaid arrears have however deferred reimbursements to troop-contributing nations, thereby making countries more reluctant to participate in peace-keeping.

Besides initiating internal reform, these difficulties have led the UN to look for partners with which it could share the burden of these new operations. Essentially two options have been explored: a partnership with regional organisations and the use of *ad hoc* coalitions.[19]

The Regional and *Ad Hoc* Coalition Options

Regional Organisations: Partners for Peace?

Boutros-Ghali, in *An Agenda for Peace*, contemplates a role for regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security:

> "But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter."[20]

---

[19] Sometimes, as in Bosnia, the two options may overlap: NATO formed an *ad hoc* coalition with other nations.

[20] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

A difficulty involved with regional organisations is their definition. The Charter does not provide a precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus allowing flexibility for governments in fashioning regional frameworks.[21] On the other hand, the lack of a precise definition allows almost any kind of regional arrangement to claim the status of regional organisation. If peace operations are to be sub-contracted to regional organisations, the UN may need to ensure that it authorises organisations that are really representative of regional interests to act in its name.[22]

Another way to look at the problem would be to ask which non-global organisations have the capability to conduct large scale operations on behalf of or in collaboration with the UN. The record of joint operations in the post-Cold War era leaves us with very few candidates. NATO seems to be the only regional organisation that has decisively intervened in an internal conflict, i.e. Bosnia. Moreover, as Malone argues, only NATO can call on more resources than the UN:

> "[P]ractical problems loom large for regional organisations: only NATO... can call on resources significantly greater than those available to the UN. Consequently, fashionable emphasis on the primary role of regional organisations may represent both attachment to an ideal, a flight from reality or both."[23]

MacFarlane and Weiss quote an African observer:

> "I do not believe that it will be possible in the near future for regional organizations to respond effectively to the challenge of conflict within states. Few regional organizations have relevant traditions....Also, regional groups often suffer from the perception of being partisan....Moreover, in the case of Third World regional organizations, there is also the problem of resources."[24]

---

[21] See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[22] For instance, the credibility of the defunct Warsaw pact as a representative of the interests of Eastern European nations was doubtful.

[23] David Malone, *The Security Council in the 1990's*, paper delivered to the 1996 Jules Léger Seminar. (Ottawa: DFAIT), p.7.

[24] S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations, Regional Organisations and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America", in *Third World Quarterly*, 15, 2, 1994, p. 283.

The Ad Hoc Coalition Option

The Somali case presents us with another possibility: large-scale operations could be conducted by *ad hoc* coalitions of states under the lead of the United States. Since the US is the only power with the capability to carry out military operations just about anywhere in the world, its leadership seems indispensable. However, to some extent, France has the military capacity to conduct operations in Africa (i.e. *Opération Turquoise*) and Russia has a somewhat similar capacity in the former Soviet Union.

There are two problems with this approach. First, the US needs to be convinced that its participation in peace operations is crucial. Second, by letting certain powers intervene in particular areas of the world (i.e. France in Africa and Russia in the former Soviet Union), the UN runs the risk of legitimising spheres of influence.

Regarding the latter issue, Barnett talks of a trade-off between "arms and autonomy".[25] As the UN looks to individual states or coalitions of states to assist in the implementation of its security objectives, it finds that these arrangements result in a considerable loss of autonomy, as the case studies will show. Indeed, the actors conducting the operation, because they have a strategic interest in doing so, are unlikely to be perceived as a neutral force. Non-UN actors expect the intervention to further their interests. On the other hand, the UN tries to portray itself as an autonomous, impartial representative of the international community.

Despite these problems, and mainly because it lacks the resources to address all the emergencies around the globe, the UN has had to co-operate with regional

---

[25] Michael Barnett, "Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-keeping", in *Review of international Studies*, 21, 1995, p. 429.

organisations and *ad hoc* coalitions in recent years. Three operations illustrating this trend will be discussed in the next chapter: Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia.

Chapter II

Case Studies

UN resources have been strained by the increasing number of post-Cold War internal conflicts. Moreover, traditional peace-keeping has proved inadequate to deal with these conflicts; second generation peace-keeping is also problematic. The UN has therefore turned to *ad hoc* coalitions and regional organisations to support UN operations or mount large-scale peace operations. The case studies presented here illustrate this option.

In Somalia, the UN attempted to address the situation by establishing a traditional peace-keeping operation, UNOSOM I. UN troops were prevented by the parties from discharging their mandate. UNOSOM I gave way to UNITAF, a US-led coalition. They were then both replaced by UNOSOM II in May 1993.

As for Haiti, a US-led multinational force (MNF) was sent in to facilitate the "return of democracy to the people of Haiti". Among other things, the mission was to facilitate the return of President Aristide. MNF was replaced in March 1995 by a UN peace-building operation, UNMIH.

In Bosnia, UNPROFOR did not have the capacity to impose its will on the parties. NATO became gradually involved, first to support UN operations, and later to see to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II were international efforts to address both the humanitarian and the political situation of a country where even the state had ceased to exist. By 1992, the civil war had slowly exhausted the population and the already scarce resources were almost exclusively used for military purposes by the different factions. Between November 1991 and March 1992, the war claimed 30,000 lives and 300,000 died of hunger. By June, 5,000 Somalis were dying every day and 1.5 million were on the brink of starvation.[1] The continuing fighting between the different factions made the work of humanitarian agencies very risky. Moreover, most of the supplies were looted by the combatants and used as a weapon of war.

UNOSOM I

The first international peace initiative came in December 1991: the under-secretary-general James Jonah went to Mogadishu to initiate negotiations with the main factions. He met with Mohamed Aideed and Ali Mahdi, the two main warlords, and attempted to secure their approval for a UN presence. From the onset Aideed came to consider the UN to be biased against him. Jonah's decision to negotiate with Mahdi without the participation of a representative of Aideed's faction led him to become suspicious of UN's impartiality. He felt that the UN was attempting to legitimise Mahdi by directly negotiating with him. This suspicion was reinforced when Jonah announced publicly that Mahdi had agreed to an international presence in

[1] Gerry Yemen, Saira Zuberi and Ivana Gotzeva, *The UN in Somalia: Humanitarian Success, Political Failure* (Research Project, McGill University, 1997), p. 3.

Mogadishu. Aideed thought that this international force was an attempt to affect the balance of power in favour of Mahdi. Jonah returned to New York with the conviction that Somalia could no longer be ignored and that a UN peace-keeping should be sent to Mogadishu as soon as possible.

In January 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali took over as UN secretary-general and set out to address the Somali crisis. His personal involvement in the negotiations and later in UN operations in Somalia strengthened Aideed's suspicion that the UN favoured Mahdi. As Gérard Prunier explains:

> "In his capacity as leader of Egyptian diplomacy, he [Boutros-Ghali] had dealt for years with the Siad Barre regime and taken care of substantial financial and military aid given by Cairo to the Somali dictatorship. He had been a major player (together with the Italians) in the last minute negotiations in November-December 1990, which were aimed officially at a smooth transition out of the dictatorship but which were also designed to preserve the interests of some of its supporters. As a result, he was never seen by the Somalis as a neutral player but rather as somebody who still had the same political agenda, using the UN's rather than Cairo's resources. This resulted in the UN intervention being from the start supported by the Ali Mahdi group and considered as hostile by the Aideed coalition..."[2]

In April 1992, Siad Barre attempted for a second time to recapture Mogadishu. His forces were defeated by Aideed's in Baidoa and he fled to Kenya with was left of them. Two days after the beginning of Barre's assault, the Security Council authorised the deployment of 50 unarmed UN observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. The deployment of a 500-men security force was also authorised.[3] The first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was born. The newly appointed special

---

[2] Gérard Prunier, "The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope", in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons Of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 146. Indeed, Aideed was one of the main opponents to Barre's regime.

[3] Resolution 751, April 1992. The observers were to monitor the "Green Line", a street dividing Mogadishu between Aideed's and Mahdi's forces. As for the 500 troops, they were to provide "security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the port of Mogadishu and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in Mogadishu and its immediate environs. They would also, as necessary, provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the airports in Mogadishu."

representative, Mohammed Sahnoun, was sent to Somalia to initiate negotiations with the main factions and to secure effective channels for the distribution of emergency help. Aideed considered the eventuality of a UN presence as dangerous. He had just won an important military victory and had no intention of letting the UN undermine his position. To him, any kind of international intervention was aimed at protecting Mahdi. After delicate negotiations, Aideed eventually agreed to the deployment of the military observers and of 500 UN troops. These were authorised by Aideed to escort food supplies to storage and distribution centres in Mogadishu alone. Also, they could only operate in the port and the airport. By laying these restrictions on UN activities, Aideed made sure that the peacekeepers would have a very limited impact on the situation.

In September 1992, the Security Council authorised the increase of UNOSOM I to 4,219 troops to extend UN activities to the rest of the country and another plan to provide humanitarian assistance was prepared.[4] Implementing the program proved again difficult. The Somali factions were still at war and the role of the UN remained most unclear. Aideed had demanded that the Pakistani battalion leave Mogadishu. Mahdi wanted UNOSOM to take full control of the port. Both parties were unsatisfied with UN behaviour and during the month of October 1992, UN troops were shelled and came under attack on several occasions. At the same time, relief organisations were experiencing increasing hijacking of vehicles, looting of convoys and warehouses and detention of expatriate staff.

---

[4] Resolution 775. Aideed refused that they be deployed.

Given the difficulties created by Aideed, traditional peacekeeping appeared increasingly ill-suited to deal with the Somali situation. In his report to the Security Council on 25 November 1992, Boutros-Ghali contemplated different options under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. Favouring a UN-led enforcement operation, he however acknowledged that the UN did not have the capability at that time to command and control an enforcement operation of the size required. Furthermore, on the same day, the United States had made the offer to the UN to take the lead of a multinational operation with the aim of securing a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The American decision to get involved was facilitated by three factors: first, the fact that President Bush, at the time of the operation, had already lost the presidential election made his administration less sensitive to domestic constraints. Second, the intensive media coverage had put pressure on the American government to "do something". Third, in the wake of the "new world order", the US was more willing to commit US troops to support UN resolutions.[5] The shift from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement was taking shape.

---

[5] Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo, Fighting for Hope in Somalia, in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 26 October 1995 [journal on-line]; available from http://131.111.106.147/Articles/a007a.htm; Internet; accessed 27 March 1997. Section III. Other nations had different motivations for joining operation "Restore Hope". For example, the French did not want to appear to be leaving the initiative to the Americans. Moreover, the media coverage of the famine had moved French opinion. Finally, the French control Djibouti, which is populated by ethnic Somalis. The situation in Somalia could have had a destabilising effect on an already tense situation in Djibouti. The Italians, as the former colonial power, felt they had to be part of the operation. Moreover, Italy was at that time undergoing major political changes and a participation in a peace operation in Somalia was seen as a way to try to fix the mistakes inherited from the past. Initially not welcomed by the Americans, the Italian contingent carried a feeling of not being taken seriously by the other contingents during the entire operation. These considerations would influence the behaviour of their troops during UNOSOM II. See Gérard Prunier, *op.cit.*, pp. 136-38.

On 3 December 1992, the Security Council passed resolution 794 under Chapter VII of the Charter, which gave the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) -- the US-led coalition-- the authorisation to "use all necessary means to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". On 9 December 1992, the first American elements landed on the beaches of Mogadishu. UNITAF would soon deploy 28,000 American troops alongside 10,000 other troops.

The areas of deployment of the different contingents were negotiated with the UN and the US. For example, the French initially wanted to deploy in the north, close to Djibouti. When the UN refused, and realising that "Restore Hope" was an "American show", they asked to be stationed where "nothing was likely to happen". Indeed, French commanders thought that since French troops were to watch from the sidelines, they would rather watch from a safe spot.[6] This decision illustrates the nascent tensions within UNITAF regarding US domination. Indeed, France wanted to pose itself as the EC representative in Somalia. The French were already thinking about economic reconstruction and potential contracts for their companies; in that perspective, US dominance was deemed "irritating".[7]

After the deployment of UNITAF, it soon appeared that the US and the UN disagreed on the objectives to be fulfilled by the coalition. The US had no other aim than to provide humanitarian relief to the Somali people. Because their troops had only been committed for a short period of time and with the objective of avoiding any sort of entanglement, the US had no intention of embarking in forcible disarmament of the

[6] Interview with a French officer. Cited by Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

[7] *La lettre de l'Océan indien*, 30 January 1993.

factions nor of negotiating a political settlement.[8] Even pressed by Boutros-Ghali, who felt that the American presence had created a momentum, American troops preferred collaborating with the warlords to facilitate the passage of humanitarian aid, thereby contributing to the latter's legitimisation.[9] UNITAF was nevertheless quite successful in opening up supply routes and getting food aid to the worst hit areas in the south.

Italy was not very pleased with this American policy. Given their experience of Somali politics, the Italians knew that not disarming the parties, even partially, would prove to be a fatal mistake. In March 1993, the Italian foreign minister, Emilio Colombo, went to New York to tell Boutros-Ghali that disarmament, even partial, was a necessity. He came back to Rome having realised that the UN had no means to force the US to disarm the factions.

Italy, whose presence had been mainly determined by domestic factors, was keen on showing that it was implementing a new policy towards Somalia. Indeed, during operation "Restore Hope", the Italian press revealed that Paolo Pilliteri, former mayor of Milan and then president of the Italo-Somali Chamber of Commerce, had received a 900 million lire kickback on the SOMALFISH aid contract. A few days

---

[8] Clarke explains that the military tasking orders given to UNITAF contained no civil affairs nor military police training components. At its peak, UNITAF only deployed 30 US civil affairs officers in Somalia, whereas it had deployed approximately 1,000 in Panama and 300 in Northern Iraq after the Gulf War. Moreover, the MP's sent to Somalia did not train the new Somali police force, as originally planned. See Walter Clarke, "Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates", in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons Of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 9.

[9] Hirsch and Oakley describe the American vision for UNITAF in the following terms: "The United States believed its discussions with the secretary-general had made amply clear that American forces would operate only in southern Somalia; that the creation of a benign security environment pertained only to providing security for UNITAF forces, the relief convoys, and the humanitarian relief personnel; and that in the near future a large, conventional UN peacekeeping operation would take over, with limited US participation." See John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, DC: USIP, 1995), pp. 102-103. This "misunderstanding" contributed to the failure of UNOSOM II. Indeed, UNITAF passed the problem of disarmament to UNOSOM II, which the UN force turned out to be incapable of handling (see below).

later, another article revealed that part of the cattle deliveries for the agro-zootechnical Italian aid project in Afgoye valued at US $33 million had in fact been weapons. Mohamed Sheikh Osman, now a key Ali Mahdi man, had been linked to these deals as Siad Barre's finance minister. The only way for the Italian government to avoid accusations of following the same path as its predecessors was to make political deals with Mahdi's enemy, Aideed.[10] While this policy was originally consistent with the American choice to negotiate with the warlords, major difficulties arose when the US began the hunt for Aideed.

Relations Between UNITAF and UNOSOM I

UNOSOM I, still under the authority of the secretary-general, and UNITAF, under US control, coexisted but were independent of each other. The nature of their respective mandates accounted for this situation. Indeed, UNITAF operated under Chapter VII, whereas UNOSOM I was still working under a traditional peacekeeping mandate.[11]

Knowing that they were soon to leave, UNITAF officials kept UNOSOM staff informed of the developments on the ground. Oakley, the US special envoy, and Johnson, the UNITAF commander, met regularly with Kittani, the secretary-general

[10] Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-43.

[11] Resolution 794, authorising the establishment of UNITAF was vague with regard to its relations with UNOSOM I. Paragraph 13 states: "[The Security Council] Requests the Secretary-General and the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces;". Paragraph 15 is not much clearer: "[The Security Council] Invites the Secretary-General to attach a small UNOSOM liaison staff to the Field Headquarters of the unified command;" This liaison staff was responsible for planning the transition to UNOSOM II.

special representative.[12] However, their relations never went beyond the exchange of information.[13] Probably aware of the disagreement in New York regarding the mandate of UNITAF, the American leadership of UNITAF had no intention of allowing the UN to mingle with their decisions.

However, there were times when UNITAF acted without first informing the UN officials on the ground. This problem, coupled with the fact that Kittani and Shaheen (the UN commander) took no action without the authorisation of UN headquarters in New York, meant that UNOSOM was often left on the sidelines. Indeed, the pace of UNITAF operations demanded swift decisions. UNOSOM was still operating with a traditional peace-keeping concept, which made it slow to respond to changes in the field. Furthermore, UNOSOM focused on long-term projects such as political reconstruction, which reinforced the impression on the part of Somalis that only UNITAF was capable of "getting the job done". Oakley was more often consulted by the warlords than Kittani, even though they knew that the he would soon depart. When he did, along with the bulk of American troops, the relationship established with the media, NGO's and the Somalis faded away.[14]

But most important, as acknowledged by Jonathan Howe, the former SRSG in Somalia, the warlords knew very well that UNOSOM had no power of its own:

---

[12] See John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

[13] In addition to these contacts, a policy group composed of senior US government officials met three times a week with Boutros Boutros-Ghali to discuss the evolution of the operation. See United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-96* (New York: United Nations, 1996), p. 33.

[14] A joint security committee was established by the two main Somali factions under the auspices of UNITAF. It soon became a body where security matters were negotiated between the Somalis themselves and but also with UNITAF officials. This committee met daily, most of the time in presence of US officers and civilian officials. When UNOSOM II took over, the pattern of frequent meetings was discontinued and the committee withered away. See John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

"The UN representatives, who were trying to promote political reconciliation and co-ordinate humanitarian activities, did not have control of the power on the ground. To some extent the UN role seemed to be marginalised."[15]

The Kismayu Incident

The US secured Aideed's co-operation from the onset of operation "Restore Hope". Deeply suspicious of UN intentions, Aideed came to the conclusion that UNITAF would not affect the balance of power to his detriment. Indeed, Johnston and Oakley announced in the US, before the start of the operation, that the deployment of US Marines would be strictly humanitarian and that US soldiers would only use force in self-defence and to protect food convoys. This restrictive interpretation of resolution 794 led Aideed to wish operation "Restore Hope" good luck, thereby implicitly agreeing to the international presence.

Things deteriorated in February 1993 when US and Belgian troops stationed in Kismayu were unable to prevent Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan" and his militia to eliminate Omar Jess' militia, allied to Aideed's SNA (Somali National Alliance). Back in Mogadishu, Aideed was furious that UNITAF had not been able to protect the city. Moreover, the "loss" of Kismayu convinced Aideed that the international community was trying to isolate him by supporting anybody hostile to him. Finally, he felt that, despite their firepower, international forces could be defeated.

[15] Jonathan T. Howe, "Relations Between the United States and the UN in Somalia", in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons Of Armed Humanitarian Intervention.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 184.

UNOSOM II

In his report to the Security Council in March 1993, Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted that UNITAF was only covering 40% of the Somali territory. The security situation had somewhat improved, while the delivery of humanitarian aid was much more effective. However, he remarked, not much had changed on the political side. There still was no functioning government in the country, no organised civilian police nor disciplined national army. UN personnel was still under threat in some areas of Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia.

On 26 March 1993, as the bulk of American troops was preparing to withdraw, resolution 814, establishing the second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), was passed.[16] The task given to UNOSOM II was a daunting one.[17] In addition to peace enforcement operations to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, UN forces were given peace- and nation- building responsibilities. Their mandate included the following tasks: monitor the cease-fire and use force, if necessary, to prevent any resumption of violence; disarm of the parties and maintain control of the heavy weapons brought under international control; secure all ports, airports and lines of communication required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; protect UN, ICRC and NGO's personnel; continue the delivery of humanitarian aid; repatriate refugees and displaced persons within Somalia; develop a mine-clearing program; promote

[16] UNOSOM I was terminated by the creation of UNOSOM II. Approved under Chapter VII of the Charter, resolution 814 authorised the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

[17] While UNOSOM's mandate was broader than UNITAF's (and was supposed to apply to the entire country), UN forces were reduced to 28,000 troops. See UNDPKO, *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992- March 1995* [article on-line] (New York: United Nations, 1996, accessed 03 April 1997); available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/somalia.htm; Internet.

political reconciliation and create a place for civil society in the process; rebuild state institutions and the economy; re-establish a Somali police force.[18]

The Transition

On 4 May 1993, command was formally transferred to UNOSOM. The transition between the two operations had begun in March and had been intended to be "seamless".[19] According to Chopra, Eknes and Nordbo, this was a mistake:

> "There was supposed to be a seamless interface in the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It was to be a process of painting UNITAF blue. The principle was a piece-by-piece transfer of authority to UNOSOM. When UNOSOM was in place after a general transfer, the US would pass the hat of command to the UN. The seamless strategy had been a US proposition which the UN accepted. There was the belief that the population should not even notice the difference on the ground. This was a critical mistake: the transition was from mandate to another, from one mission to another, and from one flag to another. The shift should have been dramatically marked for the population and NGO's. There was a much wider mandate with many more tasks. The political nature of the mission and the force was altering. However, in the minds of the population it was the same force, particularly since the flags did not change significantly. Although it was never explicitly stated, much more would have to be accomplished with far fewer resources, and the effects of this caused frustration locally and amongst NGO's. This gave the impression of a failing mission rather than the slow start of a new operation."[20]

Moreover, as Crocker aptly argues, how could a seamless transition be expected when the US and the UN were still disagreeing on whether the UN should even take over and whether the US had completed its task?[21] Boutros-Ghali had stated that the transition would not take place until UNITAF "had achieved its goal". This goal

---

[18] See UNDPKO, *Somalia - UNOSOM II* [article on-line] (New York: United Nations, 1997, accessed 27 Mars 1997); available from http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b. htm; Internet.

[19] Boutros Boutros-Ghali: "UNOSOM II would have to take 'seamlessly' from UNITAF in each area from which it withdrew." See United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-96* (New York: United Nations, 1996), p. 43.

[20] Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo, *op. cit.*, section IV.

[21] Chester A. Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong", in *Foreign Affairs*, 74, 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 4-5.

(according to Boutros-Ghali) included securing a cease-fire; carrying out disarmament: removing land mines in Somaliland; and creating a police force. Disarming the factions was thought to be a long and dangerous endeavour. As for mine clearance, it had been estimated by experts that it could take up to twenty years. The US was not prepared to embark on such a long-term operation, and set out to address the effects of the war, the famine, but not its political causes.

This issue slowed down the planning of UNOSOM II. Boutros-Ghali expected the US to remain longer and intentionally delayed the preparations of UNOSOM II. When the Marines departed, some UN staff were taken by surprise.[22] Furthermore, the operational concept UNOSOM II inherited from UNITAF was mainly military. With its new mandate, UNOSOM II was supposed to rebuild Somalia and the objectives set out in resolution 814 demanded a political operational concept. At the time of their arrival, UN officials had not developed such a concept.

Crocker points to another difficulty on the ground. Many vital US combat units left before the new UNOSOM II management arrived.[23] Regarding UNOSOM troops, a large number of anticipated troops had not arrived either at the time the Marines left. The number of UNOSOM forces initially dropped to 16,000 before eventually climbing back to 28,000.[24] Many, such as the Indian Brigade and the 1,500 Germans, did not arrive until the late summer or fall. Furthermore, the Indian contingent arrived in

---

[22] See John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *op. cit.*, p. 112. Another factor accounts for Boutros-Ghali's wish to see the US remain in Somalia. 75% of the costs of UNITAF were borne by the US. When UNOSOM II took over, the operation was financed by the UN peace-keeping account, to which the US contributed for 30%. As the account was already badly overdrawn by ongoing operations in Cambodia and Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali tried to secure American presence (and financial support) for as long as possible.

[23] Chester A. Crocker, *op. cit.*, p. 4. The incoming UN commander, Cevik Bir, had no staff upon his arrival in Somalia. See *The Daily Telegraph*, 3 March 1993.

[24] Jonathan T. Howe, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

Somalia with a condition from New Delhi that it could not be deployed in Mogadishu. The Australians and the Canadians were scheduled to leave in mid-May and June; the Italians and the French reluctantly agreed to stretch to cover their areas. Units from Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Botswana also had to be pulled out of Mogadishu to fill in the gaps, further weakening UN control over the city. Also, many units present lacked adequate equipment. Pakistani forces had no armour, there were not enough helicopters at the disposal of the force.[25] All these difficulties contributed to a perceptible drop in the UN's ability to even perform UNITAF's limited tasks.

The Command Structure of UNOSOM II

The relations that had been established between the different contingents of UNITAF and the US command led to the fragmentation of the operation when they were transferred to UNOSOM II.[26] The way the US builds a coalition differs considerably from the UN. The US considers the type and quality of assets offered by the potential contributors. The UN requires that a force represents as wide a geographic spectrum as possible. This principle was established to enhance the legitimacy of the force as an agent of the international community. In fact, the UN is often left with little choice regarding the composition of the force since potential contributors for second generation peace-keeping are difficult to find. The US also convenes the personnel that are going to be working in the field. The means of interoperability between the contingents are established prior to their arrival in the field

---

[25] See John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

[26] See Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo, *op. cit.*, section IV.

and around a "centre of gravity" formed by the US command. Even though the contingents retain a certain autonomy, this centre of gravity "glues" the different contingents together. This is not done by the UN. The interoperability of the contingents, their relations to the UN command and the type of assets available are all sorted out once in the field.

When UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF, the American "centre of gravity" was removed and the contingents felt more independent. Moreover, with the deterioration of the situation and the confrontation with Aideed in Mogadishu, tensions appeared within UNOSOM. Chopra, Eknes and Nordbo conclude:

> "The attempt to transfer a coalition to a UN command structure without devising a means to further integrate those contingents in the manner necessary for a collective command structure, resulted in the existing coalition fragmenting further: like satellites revolving around a large centre with a powerful gravitational pull that is suddenly replaced by a much smaller body with a pull weaker that any individual satellite, UNOSOM II contingents floated in their independent directions."[27]

Confrontation With Aideed

UNOSOM II, with a reduced number of troops and a weak command structure, was no longer capable of imposing its will on the parties. Disarmament of the factions by UN forces led to increased tensions and on 5 June 1993, 25 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in an ambush staged by Aideed's militia. This incident led the UN, pushed by the US, to consider him an enemy and an obstacle on the road to peace. The mounting tension between the UN and Aideed led many Somalis to side with militias against the UN, which was increasingly seen (and described) as a threat to Somali sovereignty.

---

[27] *Ibid.*

In response to the attack on the Pakistanis, resolution 837 was adopted on 6 June 1993. It stated "that the Secretary-General [was] authorised under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks [against Pakistani troops],...to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment". Even if he was not explicitly named in the resolution, the hunt for Aideed had begun.

The "division of labour" between the different contingents involved in operations against Aideed rapidly led to tensions within UNOSOM. There were roughly three "layers" in UNOSOM's military scheme: the first was composed of American troops, who, from their armoured vehicles, controlled the operations. The second was formed by French and Italian troops, who were providing "back-up" for Pakistani and Moroccan soldiers, who had been put in the vanguard. They were given the task of searching houses and suffered the most casualties.[28] After an evaluation of the first operations, the French decided to withdraw their troops from Mogadishu on 17 June. Afraid to undermine their position in Hoddur, which had been totally pacified[29], the French did not want to be seen as associated with an operation staged by the Americans.[30]

---

[28] *La lettre de l'Océan indien*, 26 June 1993.

[29] Upon returning to Hoddur, French officers were afraid of complications with the local SNA leadership. Mohamed Nur Adiyow, the local pro-Aideed chief, told them: "No problem. We know that in Mogadishu you had to obey the Americans. Here, it is different." Cited in Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 147(n29).

[30] The French had no control over the planning of the operations against Aideed. Although they had received 10 commanding positions in UNOSOM II HQ, they were completely marginalised by the Americans, who controlled the mission. Moreover, they had limited access to information regarding the developments on the ground. See *La lettre de l'Océan indien*, 26 June 1993.

Before and during the operations against Aideed, Somalis developed a different perception of the various contingents, which was based on the way each nation operated in the field and stood on the issue of the use of force. The French were keen on maintaining the good reputation they had acquired. Indeed, upon their arrival in Somalia on 25 December 1992, they developed an operational approach different from US troops. Their heavy equipment was left in Hoddur and the troops spread out in the bush, on foot, in small groups of thirty to forty. Carrying their own food and ammunition, they remained in radio contact with Hoddur, and had close air support. They would walk at night and resurface at dawn next to villages and nomad encampments. The surprise effect on the Somalis was strong: the French seemed to be everywhere. On the political side, a regional committee and four district committees were created. Chaired by French officers, these committees included local leaders and representatives from NGO's and UN agencies. Heavy weapons were immediately confiscated and destroyed; rifles were left with their owners and simply tagged and registered with a serial number. If someone carrying a registered gun was caught doing some mischief, the weapon would be "recalled" for a period of time proportional to the offence.[31]

The Americans were the most hated, not less because they were the ones pushing for Aideed's arrest than because they would not fight in the streets. Always moving around in trucks, surrounded by a very impressive display of force, Somalis

[31] Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p.139-41. Two elements mitigate the success of "opération Oryx". First, the French were assigned a relatively peaceful area. Second, the system set up was almost one of recolonisation. It was however very effective: "The Independent" reported that while heavy fighting was going on in Mogadishu, the French had secured their entire area. There was no more need for emergency feeding and trading had resumed. See *The Independent*, 15 July 1993.

considered them as cowards, not willing to fight to death. Moreover, Somalis were resentful of their using other contingents to do the "dirty work".[32]

The Italians, once very unpopular as the former colonialists, were admired by the locals for cutting deals with the faction leaders. Reports circulated that the Italians paid money, ignored the movement of arms and even provided weapons to avoid confrontation with Aideed's militia.[33] In addition, Italy pursued a classic hearts-and-minds campaign: Italian troops mingled with the population, more than 100,000 civilians were treated in Italian military hospitals, schools were rebuilt and even young Somalis were won over by a trendy radio station playing 1960's Italian hits.[34] Italy also had a clear objective: obtain the control of Mogadishu, which would have allowed it to play a major role in the negotiation process. Italian troops were already deployed in the northern part of the city, and after the 5 July incidents Italian officers began to question the use of force against Aideed. By doing this, Italy was not only showing that it had no intention of supporting Mahdi but was also positioning itself to take over from the Pakistani battalion (which was still operating in southern Mogadishu) once the military strategy failed.

The "Checkpoint Pasta" incident brought to a head the divergence between the UN/ US and Italy on the use of force against Aideed. On 9 July 1993, the UN commander ordered the Italians to attack the checkpoint which was held by Aideed's militia. The Italian commander, who had just lost three men, refused to carry out the

---

[32] *The Independent*, 26 October 1993.

[33] 7 Nigerian soldiers were killed in an ambush by Somalis in September 1993. They were on their way to replace the Italians at various checkpoints; Somalis were angered by the decision because they had a "special arrangement" with the Italians. Shots were fired in the air by the Nigerians and snipers started firing on them from both sides of the road. See *The Daily Telegraph*, 6 September 1993.

[34] *The Times*, 18 July 1993.

order and persuaded Aideed's forces to back down by negotiation. The checkpoint was eventually surrendered to Italian troops, but the UN asked Rome to withdraw their commander, General Bruno Loi. The Italian government replied by threatening to pull out its whole force. The relations between Americans and Italians deteriorated.[35] In August, defence minister Fabio Fabbri announced that the Italian contingent would be redeployed in the countryside. Other contingents are worth mentioning. The Pakistanis were less hated than one could expect given their record of shooting civilians. Somalis appreciated their courage in standing their ground in Mogadishu and returning fire when attacked. The Saudis and the Kuwaitis were probably the most popular. They intelligently played the Islamic card and avoided any confrontation with the population. These differences severely weakened the overall cohesion of UNOSOM II because contingents became keen on maintaining their reputation.[36]

On 3 October 1993, in an attempt to capture Aideed, US Rangers launched an attack on his headquarters. Aideed escaped and 18 American soldiers were killed in the operation. Many have blamed the American deaths on the UN, which, it is argued, requested the Americans to arrest Aideed. Moreover, it took nine hours for UN forces

---

[35] A young Italian diplomat explained: "We are able to communicate with the Somalis, at least the older generations. Until recently, Italy provided the structure for their schooling. The Americans don't have that. Perhaps there is some resentment, or at any rate some misunderstanding... Italy must be proving to be an awkward bedfellow because of its tendency not to leap to doctrinaire Protestant condemnations" of questionable leaders or warlords. Defence minister Fabbri:"[A]t all times the use of force must be limited and controlled and in strict proportion to its ends... We think that a permanent state of urban guerrilla warfare with repeated deaths is incompatible with the humanitarian and pacificatory aims of the UN missions." General Domenico Corcione, commander in chief of Italian armed forces declared: "If we are not in agreement in Mogadishu, then we aren't in agreement anywhere. It would be better to go completely." *The Times*, 18 July 1993 and *The Independent*, 16 July 1993.

[36] See *The Independent*, 26 October 1993.

to put a together a relief convoy to rescue the wounded Rangers.[37] The command structure of UNOSOM II contributes to the explanation of this incident. There were actually not one but three command structures within the operation. First, the UN commander, General Bir, had the responsibility of the entire UN operation. Second, "attached" to this chain of command, there was the American Quick Reaction Force (QRF), under the command of US General Thomas Montgomery. General Montgomery was also deputy commander of UNOSOM II. Third, the Rangers, under the command of US General William Garrison, were not under the operational control of General Montgomery nor of General Bir. They had been brought in July with the specific task of arresting Aideed. Both General Montgomery and Garrison reported directly to General Hoar, in the US, who was in charge of all American troops in Somalia.[38]

When the 3 October operation was planned, neither UN forces nor the QRF were informed of the plans.[39] When the Rangers were pinned down, a second rescue mission set off from the air base, but was ambushed and forced to turn back. The Rangers called on the QRF, but knowing nothing of the operation, it took the Americans an hour to mount a rescue team. It, too, was ambushed and had to retreat. Finally, as a last resort, General Montgomery called on the UN, which intervened with

---

[37] John Drysdale, "Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia", in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons Of Armed Humanitarian Intervention.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 132.

[38] Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, in *Federal News Service*, 12 May 1994.

[39] Other sources claim that General Bir only was informed of the operation. See Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, in *Federal News Service*, 12 May 1994.

tanks around midnight. By that time, 16 Rangers had been killed, 80 wounded and 200 Somalis had lost their lives.[40]

Soon after, President Clinton, under intense domestic pressure, decided to withdraw American troops from Somalia.

UNOSOM II: A Wrong Concept?

UNOSOM II was plagued with many difficulties, but it seems that the major problem resided in its conception. When the UN took over from UNITAF, it had not a clear idea of the political situation in Somalia. UNOSOM staff did not how to translate resolution 814, the nation-building mandate, into an operational concept. Instead, it carried on with the military concept inherited from UNITAF, which proved ill-suited for a UN operation of that scope.

In addition to these problems, UNITAF, by not addressing the causes of the famine in Somalia, only postponed the confrontation with an Aideed suspicious of any international intervention. For example, the issue of disarmament, at the root of the incidents mentioned above, had been considered from the onset of the operation. As Clarke and Herbst argue,

> "American leaders, in trying to get in and out of Somalia as quickly as possible, simply postponed the problems that logically followed from the intervention. The United Nations was left to confront those ramifications and inevitably found the going rough.... The American refusal to face up to the consequences of its intervention was especially damaging to the critical issue of disarmament."[41]

---

[40] *The Independent*, 17 October 1993.

[41] See Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention", in *Foreign Affairs*, 75, 2 (March/ April 1996), p. 75

The problem of disarmament was passed to UNOSOM II. The Somali warlords soon realised that their power would not be challenged by UNITAF. All they had to do was move their weapons to safe locations until the arrival of UNOSOM II, which had fewer arms and a weaker command structure. When UNOSOM II tried to address the issue, it realised it did not have the firepower to do so.[42]

It is often heard that UNITAF was successful because it had a simple mandate and was led by the US. On the other hand, UNOSOM II failed because the UN embarked on an unrealistic nation-building operation. The two operations can not be seen as separate as they appear. Clarke and Herbst explain:

> "When US officials in Somalia gave formal control to the United Nations on May 4, 1993, they had already determined the nature of the follow-on operation. Admiral Jonathan Howe, who had been the deputy national security adviser in the Bush administration, was named the secretary-general's special representative to Somalia and took charge of the operation. The allegation that the United Nations greatly broadened the mission the United States had outlined is simply not true. In fact, all the major Security Council resolutions on Somalia, including the 'nation-building' resolution, were written by US officials, mainly in the Pentagon, and handed to the United Nations as *faits accomplis*."[43]

In the light of this statement, it seems more sensible to argue that both the UN and the US embarked on some sort of an "experimentation phase", with the success of "Desert Storm" still in mind. The failure of UNOSOM II put an end to this era of UN euphoria.

---

[42] Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *ibid.*, p. 76.

[43] Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *ibid.*, p. 73.

Haiti: From the MNF to UNMIH

Haiti has had a long history of dictatorial rule.[44] It gained its independence from France in 1804 and since then has known political instability and repression. In 1915, invoking political chaos and its duty to protect foreign citizens, the US invaded the island. The brutal American rule came to an end in 1934. In 1957, Francois Duvallier, known as "Papa Doc", won the presidency and set out to eliminate his opponents. His human rights record was overshadowed by Cold War considerations. His son Jean-Claude took over from him in 1971 but was incapable of maintaining his grip on power. He was swept away in 1986. In 1989, the presidents of France and Venezuela began lobbying the US and Canada to support internationally organised and monitored elections in Haiti. These four countries would later form a loose coalition in support of democracy in Haiti called the "Group of Friends" of the secretary-general, hereafter referred to as "the Friends". In 1990, as elections were being prepared, the interim government requested the help of the UN and of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in organising them. Both organisations dispatched observers and on 16 December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected as president with 67.5% of the votes. His failure to secure the support of the economic elites, as well as his antagonising of the armed forces through personal moves aimed at strengthening his position led to a *coup* on 30 September 1991. Colonel Raoul Cédras took power and Aristide was exiled to Caracas.

---

[44] See Marc McNeill, Tara Gavin and John Ting -Lu Chung, *The Haitian Crisis and the Role of the International Community*.(Research Project, Montreal: McGill University, 1997), pp. 1-20 and David Malone, "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study", in *Survival*, 39, 2, Summer 1997, pp. 126-27.

The foreign ministers of the OAS met to address the crisis on 2-3 October. They adopted a text rejecting the *coup* and calling for "the diplomatic isolation" of its authors. In the meantime, the Security Council had been seized of the crisis by the Haitian permanent representative and came to the conclusion that the situation was to be considered an internal matter.

By 1993, human rights violations by the police and the military were widespread. The promise of a more liberal policy towards Haitian refugees made by the then-candidate Clinton decided many Haitians to seek asylum in the US. With an exodus of up to 150,000 refugees in view, the international community began to take a more active interest in the Haitian situation.[45] As negotiations between Aristide and the junta were blocked, the UN and the OAS chose Dante Caputo as special envoy to Haiti. His first achievement was to convince the *de facto* regime to allow the immediate deployment of a UN/OAS human rights monitoring mission called the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). It was hoped that their presence would create a more secure atmosphere in Haiti, thereby reducing the flow of refugees.

The OAS voluntary sanctions that had been imposed on Haiti proved ineffective in bringing about a change. The option of a UN embargo against the Haitian regime came to be considered. It was decided on 16 June 1993: resolution 841 imposed an arms and fuel embargo against Haiti along with a global freeze on its government's assets. The sanctions did indeed bring Cédras to the negotiation table and after difficult talks, the Governors Island Agreement (GIA) was signed on 3 July 1993. It included the following provisions: suspension of the sanctions after the Haitian government parliament ratified a new prime minister chosen by Aristide; deployment of

[45] Roland I. Perusse, *Haitian Democracy Restored: 1991-95.* (New York: University Press of America, 1995), p. 41.

UN personnel to assist with modernising the Haitian armed forces; an amnesty for coup leaders by Aristide ratified by the Haitian parliament; the establishment, also with the help of the UN, a new police force distinct from the armed forces; Cédras resignation - but no guarantee that he would leave Haiti; and Aristide's return to Haiti on 30 October 1993.[46]

On 24 September, resolution 867 authorised the dispatch for six months of a UN Force to Haiti (UNMIH), as agreed upon in the GIA. It was to comprise 700 military and about 600 police personnel. 80 UNMIH staff soon arrived in Port-au-Prince. On 11 October, the first UN troops, including 200 Americans, arriving on board the *USS Harlan County* were met by a noisy crowd of *attachés* - henchmen working for Cédras and his clique. As Malone explains, this demonstration had a stunning effect on the contingent:

> "Only a week before, 18 US Rangers operating alongside the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) had been killed while attempting to apprehend the warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed. Reaction to the killings in the US was extremely negative. For Washington, the safety of US military personnel could no longer be jeopardised in non-essential tasks, particularly under the UN flag. Although most Haiti-watchers concur that *the Front Révolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et le Progrès en Haiti* (FRAPH) thugs would have disappeared at the first sight of well-armed UN troops, Washington -without consulting the UN- ordered the *Harlan County* back to the US. The result was a *débâcle*."[47]

UN personnel was withdrawn as well as MICIVIH; political repression resumed. The GIA seemed to have failed. Sanctions were reimposed on Haiti but it soon became clear that the military and the elite were largely unaffected.

By July 1994, the military option was increasingly mentioned in Washington. Malone identifies two reasons for this shift.[48] First, large numbers of Haitian refugees

---

[46] David Malone, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[47] *ibid.*, p. 131.

[48] *ibid.*, p. 132.

were again seeking refuge in the US. Second, Aristide had managed to gain support within the electorally influential Black Caucus. His cause was now heard and defended in Congress; the White House was under pressure to address the situation.

The MNF

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his report on the situation, advocated a military intervention *à la* UNITAF.[49] Conscious that the operations in Somalia and Rwanda were showing the limits of UN-led missions, he pushed for the US to get involved in a peace-enforcement mission, which would be followed by a UN peace-keeping mission as already provided for by resolution 867. The US was initially not keen on intervening under the US flag, believing that a UN-led operation would secure more contribution from other nations.[50] But the enforcement option raised many objections, mainly from Latin American countries. Brazil pressed for provisions to circumscribe the MNF's mandate. Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay were against the use of a Chapter VII operation in the Americas. Even the "Friends" were reluctant to support military intervention, but for different reasons. Venezuela was distressed by the prospect of a US-led intervention so close to home; it felt that mediation could still prove successful. Canada refused from the onset to provide troops for the MNF. Its argument was that sanctions were a preferable route; and that participation in the MNF would have undermined its effectiveness as "a guarantor of public order during the pacification

---

[49] UN Document S/1994/828, pp. 5-6.

[50] See David Malone, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

phase".[51] France, disappointed by the lack of US support for *opération Turquoise*, argued that it was already overextended in Bosnia.[52] Meanwhile, Latin American countries were sensitive to the fact that, for the first time, the US was seeking UN consent to intervene in the Western hemisphere. This consideration muted their opposition.[53] Finally, resolution 940 was passed on 31 July, authorising, under Chapter VII, the US-led multinational force (MNF) to use "all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership,... the prompt return of the legitimately elected president and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment...".[54] Furthermore the resolution conditioned the hand-over from the MNF to UNMIH to the agreement of the Security Council: the Security Council "decides that the multinational force will terminate its mission and UNMIH will assume the full range of its functions... when a secure and stable environment has been established and UNMIH has adequate force capability and structure to assume the full range of its functions; the determination will be made by the Security Council, taking into account recommendations from the Member States of the multinational force, which are based on the assessment of the commander of the multinational force, and from the Secretary-General" This provision was intended to reduce the risk that Washington would decide to rush the hand-over and then "abandon" the UN.[55]

---

[51] *The Washington Post*, 21 September 1994.

[52] David Malone, *op.cit.*, p. 133.

[53] Moreover, Aristide formally requested military intervention.

[54] In addition, the resolution provided for 60 UN personnel to be sent to Haiti to prepare the hand-over to UNMIH and to monitor the activities of the MNF.

[55] *The Times*, 3 October 1994. Resolution 794, which authorised UNITAF, did not mention the conditions of the hand-over to UNOSOM II. It merely requested "the Secretary-General to submit a

On 19 September 1994, the first American troops arrived in Haiti, unopposed.[56] Former president Carter had led four days earlier a surprise diplomatic mission to Haiti.[57] He managed to secure the consent of the military to the operation. Pressed by a Congress hostile to the intervention, Clinton wanted to avoid loosing troops in the invasion. The Carter mission was a last attempt to pacifically remove the junta.[58] But as Perusse explains, this development led to some confusion:

> "While Carter's agreement with General Cédras undoubtedly had the very favorable result of avoiding combat and bloodshed, the last-minute change in the military's mission, from subduing an enemy to co-operating with him, confused many of the troops. A different mindset was required, with little time for explanation and reorientation by commanders with respect to changed tactics and strategy and new rules of engagement. The "army thugs" that their Commander-in-Chief had described in his September 15 address to the nation had suddenly become persons with whom the US military was expected to co-operate."[59]

This change rapidly led to dilemmas for MNF troops. As part of their mandate, they had received the authorisation to prevent the abuse of civilians by the police. On 24 September, a US Marine patrol stopped in front of a police station where it appeared that civilians were being beaten. A firefight ensued and ten policemen were killed. With the possibility of similar incidents occurring, how could the MNF maintain the friendship and the co-operation of the police?[60]

---

plan to the Council... to ensure the UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;".

[56] At its peak, the MNF numbered 22,000 troops, of which 2,000 were not American. The composition of the force led many to question its multinational character. The fact that the costs of the operation were to be borne by the participating nations contributed to the lack of international participation in the MNF. See *The Independent*, 19 September 1994 and *The Guardian*, 16 September 1994.

[57] The UN was not consulted over the Carter mission.

[58] While Carter was negotiating with Cédras, US airborne troops were en route for Haiti. See *Le Monde*, 19 September 1994.

[59] Roland I. Perusse, *op. cit.*, p.107. The "new" rules of engagement of US troops were that force could only be used in self-defence or to protect the lives of civilians. See *The Guardian*, 20 September 1994.

[60] *ibid.*, p. 108.

The situation deteriorated further on the 29th, when a grenade killed pro-Aristide demonstrators who were celebrating the return of Evans Paul, the mayor of Port-au-Prince. The next day, pro- and anti-Aristide supporters clashed after a mass celebrated in commemoration of Aristide's ouster three years earlier. Seven people were killed and twenty-one wounded. The situation seemed no longer under the control of the police, but US troops stood by as street-fighting and looting were occurring.[61] Moreover, paramilitaries continued to beat and execute Aristide supporters.[62]

The MNF was reluctant to involve itself in the maintenance of law and order. American officials still remembered the painful Somali experience, where their attempt to affect the local balance of power had cost the lives of eighteen men. At the same time, US rules of engagement authorised American troops to use force to defend civilians; this provision could have led them to be caught in a crossfire between Aristide opponents and supporters. Finally, the agreement brokered by Carter bound the Americans to co-operate with the junta. This intractable situation led US officials to reconsider their attitude *vis-à-vis* the military junta.[63]

---

[61] *The Sunday Times*, 2 October 1994 and *AFP*, 30 September 1994.

[62] A US officer was court-martialed for having defied orders from his superiors not to go to the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, where human rights abuses had been reported. See *Inter Press Service*, 18 May 1995.

[63] The media coverage of human rights abuses in front of passive US soldiers also put pressure on the administration to contemplate more forceful measures against the junta.

It soon appeared that the US had decided for a more interventionist strategy. On 3 October, a raid was organised against FRAPH headquarters in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitian. 110 FRAPH members were arrested and the organisation dismantled. Hours later, its leader, Emmanuel Constant, stood under American "protection" in front of the national palace to announce that the return of president Aristide was the "only solution for Haiti" and to tell his followers to lay down their arms.[64] The next day, Haiti police chief, Joseph Michel Francois left the country. He was followed by other leaders of the *de facto* regime, and on the 12th, Cédras left Haiti for Panama aboard a US plane.

However, American officials, as in Somalia, refused to engage US troops in systematic house-to-house searches for weapons, which they argue, was outside the UN mandate.[65] Heavy weapons were nevertheless seized and many weapons caches confiscated.[66] A buy-back program was also initiated.

---

[64] *The Times*, 6 October 1994.

[65] UN officials warned the US in October 1994 that Haitian paramilitaries had to be disarmed before the transition to UNMIH could be contemplated. However, most former *attachés* are believed to have gone underground with their weapons. See *Reuters*, 20 October 1994.

[66] Between 14,000 and 30,000 weapons were seized by the MNF. It is nevertheless believed that more than 30,000 are still in circulation. See *The Times*, 6 October 1994.

There were in fact two US operations in Haiti: one led by the 10th Mountain Division, operating in the two Haitian major cities, Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien; the other, conducted by the Special Forces in the countryside. They differed by their operational concepts. The 15,000 infantrymen under the command of General David Meade, who was also the MNF commander, worked in a classic theatre of operations: hostile and limited to the main cities. The 1,000-plus Special Forces operated in an unconventional and rural environment; they had to cover 95% of the Haitian territory. Their main task was to establish a rapport with the local population.

According to the "conventional" operational concept, the goal of a stable and secure environment was achieved, to all intents and purposes, in October 1994, when the FRAPH was dismantled and President Aristide returned to power. But for the Special Forces, the stabilisation of Haiti was a long-term endeavour.[67]

On 15 January 1995, General Meade, the commander of the MNF, certified that a "secure and stable environment" existed in Haiti. American officials, pressed by a Congress hostile to the intervention, were eager to transfer the operation to the UN. However, in New York, there were worries that the situation had been declared "secure and stable" by the US in order to move forward with the transfer.[68] Other factors eventually led the UN to believe that the US was still committed to the success

---

[67] The relations between the two contingents were also rather difficult: in October 1994, a Special Force captain requested support three times from the 10th Mountain in nearby Cap-Haitien. His request was ignored. *The New York Times*, 8 January 1995.

[68] A UN official explained: "the U.S. is anxious to move to put a U.N. face on this operation, but unless the situation in Haiti is more stable, it will be more difficult for the U.N. to carry out its mandate". See *The New York Times*, 15 January 1995.

of the Haitian operation. First, the number of MNF troops in the country at the time of the hand-over was almost the same as the one planned for UNMIH.[69] The UN was not going to have to do more with less. Second, half of UNMIH troops were American, which led the UN to believe that the US was not going to take advantage of the transition to disengage from Haiti.

The human rights situation had also improved dramatically, even though abuses and political crimes were still committed. The Haitian Armed Forces and the paramilitaries had been dismantled. But criminality was soaring, not less because of the dismantlement of the Armed Forces than because of a disastrous economic situation. The interim police force, which had been trained by the MNF was no match for the situation. Numbering about 4,000 members, of which 3,000 were members of the former police force, it was violently rejected by the population, which considered it an emanation of the former paramilitaries.

On 31 March 1995, UNMIH took over from the MNF. The transition had been authorised by resolution 975, which stated that "a secure and stable environment, appropriate to the deployment of UNMIH as foreseen...[by] resolution 940, now exists in Haiti". UNMIH received the following mandate: sustain the stable and secure environment established during the MNF phase; help the professionalisation of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force; and help the organisation of elections. UNMIH operated under Chapter VI, with rules of engagement authorising the use of force in self-defence and to discharge its mandate. The new mandate was not intended to be as "intrusive" as the one given to the MNF;

[69] The MNF had 6,500 troops in Haiti at the time of the hand-off. UNMIH's planned strength was 6,000, with 5,500 troops deployed when the transition took place. Furthermore, 550 US troops formed a Quick Reaction Force in support of UNMIH.

the focus was on building peace.[70] In that perspective, the UN deployed some of its troops in the countryside, home of 70% of the population and still politically very tense.

The transition was considered a success. Several factors account for it. First, intensive planning between the UN and the US occurred before the transition. The UN knew it had six months to prepare the take-over. The future SRSG and its staff were trained for two weeks in Haiti and the US before taking over. Second, the UN secretariat staff had been strengthened. When planning for UNOSOM II, the secretary general's military advisor had a staff of two officers. By the time the UN started planning UNMIH, the office had expanded to over a hundred officers. Third, most UN forces were in Haiti at the time of the transition which meant that the security situation would not be allowed to deteriorate because of the hand-off.[71] Some 5,500 UN personnel out of the 6,000 planned for had been deployed in Haiti at the time of the transition. About 3,000 troops were American. They were technically under US command, although the US commander was also the UN commander. Pakistan and Bangladesh provided the two next largest contingents, at about 850 each. There were more than 20 nations involved in UNMIH.

---

[70] See *Le Soir*, 1 February 1995.

[71] See David Bentley, *Operation Uphold Democracy: Military Support for Democracy in Haiti*, [article on-line] (Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997, accessed 05 June 1997); available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum78.html; Internet; and David Bentley and Robert Oakley, *Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti*, [article on-line] (Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997, accessed 05 June 1997); available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum30.html; Internet.

UNMIH continued the training of the new police force and, with OAS observers, monitored the local elections in June. It also provided security to humanitarian convoys, airports and conducted patrols throughout the country. The situation nevertheless remained volatile. Criminality was still very high and looting of humanitarian aid occurred frequently. By the time UNMIH's first six-month mandate expired the lack of progress in the training of the new police force led the secretary-general to request that UNMIH's mandate be extended until the end of February 1996. China argued that UNMIH had discharged its mandate and therefore should be terminated. In fact, the Chinese were outraged by the fact that the most senior foreign representative at the inauguration of Haiti's president earlier in the month had been Taiwan's vice-president. China expected an "apology" from Préval, the new Haitian president. This was out of the question for Haiti. After lobbying by Latin American countries and the Non-Aligned Group, China relented partially. It only agreed to UN financing of 1,200 military and 300 police. Canada, soon to take the command of UNMIH, refused to participate in an operation which did not have the means to fulfil its mandate. Ottawa offered to dispatch 700 troops at its own expense, to work under UN command.

In May, the secretariat requested again the extension of UNMIH's mandate until December 1996, with the same level of troops. After negotiations with China, again under pressure from the Non-Aligned Movement, the Security Council decided to establish UNSMIH (United Nations Support Mission in Haiti). The level of UN personnel was again reduced to 600 troops and 300 civilian police. Canada decided to continue to fund its troops, and the US funded the Pakistani battalion, thereby

maintaining the same level of international presence in Haiti. UNSMIH's mandate was extended for a final until 31 July 1997. Canada has made the decision to stay in Haiti until the end of this year.[72]

Haiti: Hostage of the US and the Security Council?

Haiti strengthens the view that the UN, if given the means to do so, is capable of mounting successful operations. UNMIH shows that the UN had learned from the Somali experience. Boutros-Ghali especially, realised that the American card was the best option in the Haitian case. Resolution 940 also "locked in" the US by leaving the decision of the transfer to the Security Council. However, this approach illustrates the danger of relying too much on one member state. The UN was totally dependent on the US for the operation. The episodes of the *Harlan County* and the Carter mission, where the UN was not even informed of American decisions, illustrate this problem.

Haiti also raises the issue of the operational soundness of UN mandates. The level of UN troops in Haiti was more influenced by the bargaining between China and the other P5 than by the operational assessment of the secretariat. This problem of political bargaining at the Security Council often leads to the deployment of troops incapable of discharging their mandate.

[72] See David Malone, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-40.

Bosnia: UNPROFOR and NATO

The shock waves of the fall of Communism were felt in the former Yugoslavia. Pressure to open the political system to the nascent civil society was intense and led to the organisation of elections. From April through December 1990, competitive elections were held in the different republics of Yugoslavia. Ascending nationalistic political forces had already been at work in the country since the late 1980's and elections only served to confirm this trend. The Yugoslav federation would soon fall apart. In Bosnia, influenced by the break-up of the federation, relations between the three communities (Muslim, Croat and Serb) rapidly soared. The Serbs were in favour of the *status quo*, while the Croats were contemplating independence with the idea of joining the newly independent Croatia at a later time. Caught between the two, Muslim leaders eventually felt that independence was the best way to maintain their dominant position in Bosnia and prevent the partition of the republic.

In February and March 1992, a referendum was organised by the Bosnian presidency. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) declared it illegal on the grounds that it had not been authorised by the full Assembly (SDS deputies left the session in protest when the proposition was presented to the Assembly) and did not have the support of all three constituent nations. 63.4% of eligible voters (with the exception of all Serbs) participated and 99.7% cast their ballots for sovereignty and independence. Bosnia-Hercegovina was recognised as an independent state in April 1992.[73] The next day, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina was formally proclaimed. SDS representatives withdrew from governmental institutions and openly recognised the

[73] On the 6th by the European Community and on the 7th by the United States.

authority of separate Serb administrative organs. The political deadlock rapidly degenerated into outright armed conflict.

The Security Council felt it should not get involved right away. Their view was that the Europeans should lead the way. A European solution through the EC was indeed strongly advocated by France. Moreover, this position was reinforced by Boutros-Ghali's view that the Yugoslav crisis was a good opportunity to test the relation between regional organisations and the UN set out in Chapter VIII of the Charter. Moreover, he felt that a peace-keeping operation would not make sense in such a confuse situation.[74]

There also was a clear lack of political will within the Security Council to confront the issue seriously. Berdal identifies two reasons for this: first, there was no compelling national interest to bear the costs in terms of resources and casualties that could sustain public support in potential troop-contributing states. This is especially true in the eventuality of a "tougher" turn of events. Second, there was no consensus among the P5, let alone the UN as a whole, as to how mutually exclusive principles such as the right for minorities to self-determination and state sovereignty should be reconciled. All these factors led initially to the establishment of a humanitarian operation instead of a military one.[75]

By the late summer 1992, the failure of the EC to stop the war[76] and to handle its humanitarian consequences led the Security Council to authorise the extension of

---

[74] See Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, "Former Yugoslavia", in James Mayall, ed. *The New Interventionism 1991-94: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, Cambridge University Press, 1996. pp. 65-66.

[75] See Mats Berdal, 'United Nations in the Former Yugoslavia", in Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes, eds. *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), pp. 228-29.

[76] European mediation and the dispatch of monitors -the "ice-cream men"- to the Former Yugoslavia did not bring any tangible results.

UNPROFOR's mandate to Bosnia. France and Britain provided the bulk of the force. Initially, the envisaged mandate had been caught between traditional peace-keeping and a humanitarian operation. Resolution 752 requested "the Secretary-General to keep under active review the feasibility of protecting international humanitarian relief programmes..." but also requested "the Secretary-General, having regard to the evolution of the situation and to the results of the efforts undertaken by the European Community, to continue to keep under review the possibility of deploying a peace-keeping mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina under the auspices of the United Nations". The humanitarian option became clearer in resolution 758 which established UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The force's role was limited to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

With no tangible progress in the negotiations and a UN force incapable of discharging its mandate, a tougher approach was adopted. Resolution 770 constituted a breakthrough in that regard. It authorised UNPROFOR, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to camps, prisons and detention centres by the ICRC and other humanitarian organisations. The envisaged use of force was however limited to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and only minor further military actions were proposed. UNPROFOR was never intended to enforce a solution on the parties; however the operation would slowly drift towards peace-enforcement.[77]

Given this stalemate, the new Clinton administration began to advocate a more "muscular" international response to the conflict. NATO air strikes were contemplated as a means to bring the Serbs to the negotiation table, who were seen by the Clinton administration as responsible for the continuation of the conflict. The US wanted to

use NATO in Bosnia for several reasons. First, it dominates the organisation politically and militarily. Second, NATO has an integrated military command and control structure. Furthermore, its firepower is unmatched in Western Europe. Third, NATO provided a political framework in which the US could promote its policy regarding Bosnia. As NATO had formally acknowledged its new role in support of UN peace-keeping missions, its involvement in the Balkans was seen as part of this new trend.[78] This rather aggressive stance was not enthusiastically welcomed by the Europeans, who feared for the safety of their troops on the ground. France also wanted to avoid American involvement in what it still considered a European problem. Moreover, Boutros-Ghali was reluctant to give an American-dominated NATO too much leeway. The air strike option was temporarily abandoned. Nevertheless, the US continued to use NATO as a means to implement its Balkan policy. With the evolution of the conflict and the slow realisation on the part of the Europeans that force would eventually have to be brought to bear on the Serbs, NATO began to be called upon to provide support to UN troops. It gradually strengthened its role in Bosnia which culminated with the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.[79] The involvement of NATO in the Bosnian crisis can be divided in three phases: first, it mounted maritime operations to monitor the UN arms embargo and economic sanctions on the Adriatic Sea. Second, it set up air operations to monitor then enforce the no-fly zone over

---

[77] Despite this show of force in the Security Council, most of the tasks given to UNPROFOR were undeliverable given the strength of the force, which was understaffed and undermanned.

[78] See NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 17 Dec. 1992, p. 2.

[79] See Steven R. Rader, "NATO', in Trevor Findlay, ed. *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers.* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1996). SIPRI Research Report No. 12. pp. 144-45 and Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Bosnia 1992-94.* (New York: St. Martin's), pp. 136-154.

Bosnia and later launched air strikes on Serb positions. Third, NATO provided ground troops to see to the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement.

NATO's Maritime Operations

The first task performed by NATO was to monitor the UN arms embargo and economic sanctions on the Adriatic Sea ("Operation Maritime Monitor") from July 1992 on. In November 1992, the operation became "Operation Maritime Guard" after resolution 787 changed its mandate to include enforcement powers. NATO was given the task of stopping, inspecting and diverting ships possibly violating UN embargoes. In June 1993, NATO and the WEU combined their separate enforcement operations under a NATO unified command in a new operation called "Sharp Guard". It extended its area or operation to the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to prevent coastal smuggling. The UN has phased out the embargo as part of the Dayton Agreement.

In October 1992, NATO, pushed by the Americans, went a step further and made the offer to the UN to monitor the newly no-fly zone established over Bosnia (resolution 781). The Security Council had stopped short of authorising enforcement measures, advocated by the US, under French and British pressure, their being fearful of retaliation against their peacekeepers. UNPROFOR received the task of monitoring the no-fly zone, but from the ground. By having NATO monitor the no-fly zone, the US was seeking to extend its role in the crisis, which so far had been limited to maritime operations.[80]

In March 1993, as negotiations were deadlocked and the fighting intensifying, the Security Council authorised the enforcement of the no-fly zone by NATO aircraft. The resolution (816) was not easily passed. Introduced by France, which was slowly backing away from its traditional favourable attitude towards the Serbs, and supported by the US, the resolution contained certain restrictions, aimed at securing a Russian affirmative vote.[81] This resolution virtually passed the control of the air space over Bosnia into the hands of NATO, which offered to implement it. The US was slowly taking control of the peace process and would strengthen its role in the crisis -through NATO- at the expense of the UN. However, UNPROFOR, because it was perceived

[80] NATO AWACS were already monitoring the Adriatic Sea and the creation of the no-fly zone allowed them to expand their activities in the region.

[81] Aircraft flying unofficially in the no-fly zone could only be shot down after repeated warnings or if attacking; NATO aircraft were not to bomb aircraft on the ground, or at air bases, either in Bosnia or Serbia. See Edgar O' Ballance, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-60.

as associated with operation "Deny Flight", began to be seen as another party to the conflict.[82]

At the end of April 1993, the Serbs launched an offensive on Muslim-held enclaves in eastern Bosnia. On 6 May, the Security Council declared six locations in Bosnia to be "safe areas". In Resolution 844, passed in June, the Security Council decided "to extend to that end the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to enable it ... to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population...". UNPROFOR was authorised to use force to fulfil its mandate. The shift towards peace-enforcement was taking shape. In addition to the use of force on the ground, UNPROFOR was also given the option of requesting NATO air strikes to defend the enclaves.

The co-ordination between the UN and NATO with regard to air strikes proved difficult. When in March 1994, French troops under attack in Bihac requested air support, NATO was unable to intervene effectively because the authorisation procedure was much too long.[83] After the intervention of NATO secretary-general, Boutros-Ghali delegated his authority to request air strikes to his special representative on the ground. This decision did somewhat improve the situation, but the mechanism was still rather rigid. These difficulties illustrate the tension between NATO and the UN over Bosnia. The Americans pushed NATO members to advocate a strong

[82] The success of the operation can also be called into question. By late 1994, UNPROFOR had identified more than 1,200 violations of the ban on flying, most of them being helicopter flights. See Mats Berdal, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

[83] Boutros-Ghali had to secure the authorisation of the P5 before proceeding.

response to Serb attacks and demanded to be able to strike when and where NATO commanders wanted. The UN, and especially Boutros-Ghali, was not keen on giving a blank cheque to NATO. Moreover, France, Spain, Britain and Canada feared for the security of their troops on the ground.[84] With the American Senate contemplating a unilateral lifting of the embargo against the Muslims, the escalation of the conflict was a realistic possibility for many European governments. Therefore, it was necessary for EU nations to accept a more aggressive stance against the Serbs while not jeopardising the safety of UNPROFOR troops.

Finally, the "dual-key" arrangement was adopted in August 1993. By this agreement, both the UN and NATO had still to consent to all air strikes.[85] The authority to decide on targeting and execution was however delegated to the commander-in-chief of the Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) for NATO and to the UN commander on the ground.

After a mortar shell killed some 65 civilians in Sarajevo, an "exclusion zone" of 20 kilometres was established around the city in February 1994. The same was done for Gorazde two months later. These two zones as well as the safe areas were placed under the direct protection of NATO, which threatened the parties with air strikes should they attempt to attack them. NATO's "key" was also delegated to CINCSOUTH. This determination on the part of NATO bore fruit: the Serbs withdrawn most of their heavy weapons from the exclusion zones and attacks against

---

[84] Greece, a NATO member, considered itself the ally of the Serbs and was more than reluctant to be associated with a decision to attack them.

[85] This system actually gave both organisations a veto power over air operations in Bosnia. This solution satisfied the Europeans and Canada who retained the right -through the UN- to veto NATO/US initiatives.

the safe areas stopped.[86] But UNPROFOR proved again too vulnerable to militarily sustain such a commitment. The UN "key", still in the hands of the SRSG, was slowing down the decision process. Moreover, UNPROFOR was still reluctant to use force against the parties because it knew it was vulnerable to retaliation. When the Serbs realised it, attacks resumed.

In November 1994, under Congressional pressure, the US administration directed American ships to stop enforcing the naval blockade against ships carrying weapons for the Bosnian government. They were also forbidden to share intelligence about violations in favour of the Muslims with other NATO vessels. Furthermore, the US Senate was still strongly advocating the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnians. With the Republican victory in the November elections, the probability of the lifting of the embargo being approved was very high. As the situation was further deteriorating, NATO bombed a Serb ammunition depot near Pale in May 1995. This attack was significant because it destroyed a target of greater strategic importance at a symbolic location (Pale being the "capital" of the Bosnian Serbs). In retaliation, some 370 peacekeepers were taken hostage and used as human shields against further bombings. They were set free by mid-June.

Consequently, the UN decided to go along America's strategy of escalation. UNPROFOR was strengthened, peacekeepers were removed from remote locations and the UN "key" was given to the UN commander in the field. Britain and France sent a Rapid Reaction Force to Sarajevo in support of the UN.

An attack on Sarajevo in August 1995 ignited a three-week air campaign against the Serbs (Operation "Deliberate Force"). This time, air strikes were successful

[86] The US took the initiative of proposing the ultimatum against the Serbs. Supported by France, the Americans pressed London to agree to it, by arguing that a disagreement would have fuelled

in bringing the Serbs to withdraw from the exclusion zones and to stop attacking the safe zones. Two factors account for this. First, UNPROFOR was no longer vulnerable to retaliation. It had the means to defend itself and had been redeployed in defensive positions. Second, NATO air strikes destroyed strategic Serb positions. The balance of power on the ground was being affected in favour of the Muslims. This campaign revived the negotiation and led to the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement on 14 December 1995.

From UNPROFOR to IFOR

The Dayton negotiation, under the auspices of the Contact Group (Germany, Russia, the US, France and Britain), produced a complex agreement. But it was the first that had been accepted by all parties. A division of labour was established between the different international organisations involved in the peace process: to NATO the military aspects; to UN agencies and regional organisations the civilian aspects.[87] A Peace Implementation Council was established to oversee the whole peace process.[88] The role of the UN in the new scheme was limited to the training of a new police force.

Congressional opposition to a strong American commitment in Europe.

[87] Resolution 1031 authorised the operation.

[88] Britain, the US, France, Italy, Germany, Canada, Japan, Russia, the European Commission and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference are members of the council. See *The Independent*, 11 December 1995.

IFOR's Mandate

UNPROFOR was terminated by the creation of IFOR (NATO's Implementation Force)[89]. Indeed, the condition *sine qua non* for an American participation in a force on the ground was that it would have to be under NATO command. IFOR was given the following tasks: monitor (and enforcement if necessary) of the cease-fire; ensure the withdrawal behind agreed upon lines and the separation of forces; ensure the collection of heavy weapons and the demobilisation of forces; control the airspace over Bosnia; and finally, facilitate the withdrawal of UN troops not transferred to IFOR.

The official transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR took place on 20 December 1995, six days after the signing of the Agreement. NATO planners had been working on a possible NATO operation in Bosnia since 1993 and their plans had been shared and discussed with the DPKO (Department of Peace-keeping Operations). Some 17,000 troops serving in UNPROFOR were transferred to IFOR.[90] This transfer brought about two changes: the troops were now under the command of the IFOR commander who was reporting to the North Atlantic Council; and they were operating under NATO rules of engagement which authorised "the robust use of force if necessary, to accomplish its mission and to protect itself."[91] Non-NATO troops were

---

[89] IFOR was financed by NATO. However, non-NATO nations were responsible for the funding of their contingents. See NATO, *NATO Fact Sheet no. 11: NATO's Role in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement* [article on-line] (Brussels: NATO, 1997, accessed 05 June 1997); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/ facts/fs11.htm; Internet.

[90] IFOR was made up of some 60,000 troops: 18,000 from the US, 29,000 from the EU and about 10,000 from non-NATO nations. See S. Victor Papacosma, "NATO in the post-Cold War Balkans", in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 1996, 24 (Winter), p. 248.

[91] See NATO, *NATO Fact Sheet no. 11: NATO's Role in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement* [article on-line] (Brussels: NATO, 1997, accessed 05 June 1997); available from

also placed under the command of the IFOR commander and arrangements were put in place in Brussels for political consultations with non-NATO troop contributing nations.[92]

The way NATO selected the contingents that were going to be part of IFOR was very different from the UN. NATO established a specific group of nations from which to solicit non-NATO contributions: Russia and other countries which had entered the *Partenariat For Peace*, as well as non-NATO nations which were already on the ground. By doing this, IFOR was able to build on the existing forces and infrastructure which were already in the field.[93] Furthermore, NATO was keen on showing that the Peace Agreement was not just supported by the West.[94]

The Civilian Aspects of Dayton

Several international organisations are involved in the implementation of the civilian aspects of Dayton.[95] The OSCE is responsible for electoral support, human rights monitoring, and arms control implementation; UNMIBH (United Mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina) oversees the operation and restructuring of civil police; the European Commission and the World Bank are in charge of the economic

---

http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs11.htm; Internet. IFOR was authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter.

[92] The Russian contingent was not placed under NATO command. Its commander served as deputy to the IFOR Commander.

[93] Of course, some NATO countries also had troops on the ground.

[94] Gregory L. Schulte, "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO", in *Survival*, 39, 1, Spring 1997, p.31.

[95] See James A. Schear, "Bosnia's Post-Dayton Traumas", in *Foreign Policy*, 104, Fall 1996, pp. 93-94.

reconstruction programmes; the UNHCR is responsible for humanitarian relief, refugees and displaced persons; and the ICRC cares for prisoners of war. The activities of this rather loose coalition are co-ordinated by a high representative who is the primary interlocutor with the parties. Under the provisions of the Agreement, he did not have any authority over IFOR.

The integration between IFOR and the other international organisations was thus rather limited.[96] Despite this relative isolation, IFOR supported at times civilian-led missions. In September 1996, it provided protection for refugees who were going back to either the *Republika Srspska* or the Croato-Muslim entity to vote in the elections supervised by the OSCE.[97] American troops also provided security to UN experts mandated by the war crime tribunal to investigate the mass graves believed to be those of more than 6,000 Muslims missing from Srebrenica.[98]

The multinational force was nevertheless always treading very carefully. As Schear explains:

> "[I]FOR's willingness to support civilian-led missions, such as elections, law enforcement, and reconstruction, could well prove...consequential in the long run. But these roles will very likely expose the force to greater controversy, stretching it between competing priorities, triggering charges of 'mission creep,' and possibly generating tensions among IFOR's major national contingents."[99]

Indeed, until recently, NATO troops never endeavoured to arrest individuals indicted by the war crime tribunal in The Hague.[100] Furthermore, on 10 July 1997, SFOR

---

[96] These remarks also apply to SFOR, the follow-on NATO mission who took over from IFOR in December 1996. Its mandate is similar to IFOR's, but the number of troops has been reduced to 31,000. See *Le Monde*, 21 December 1997.

[97] *Le Monde*, 11 September 1996.

[98] *The Daily Telegraph*, 14 July 1996.

[99] *Ibid.*, p.92

[100] Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, is said to have driven trough NATO checkpoints several times. See John Kidnam, "Justice in Bosnia", in *The Economist*, 17 February 1996, 16 and *Libération*, 11 July 1997.

troops arrested one and killed another Serb indicted by the war crime tribunal. The operation was apparently aimed at putting pressure on Karadzic, who still is a major actor in Bosnian politics. It also triggered negative reactions from France, who was not informed of the operation, and Russia, who felt that "this operation was beyond the mandate of the international force."[101] The danger of creating tensions among SFOR's main contingents could prevent the repetition of such operations. Regarding refugees, 2.3 million Bosnians (from all three communities) are waiting to be authorised to reintegrate their homes. So far, repatriation attempts, even supported by NATO troops, have been unsuccessful.[102] The UN International Police Task Force (UNIPTF), who is supposed to monitor the activities of the Bosnian police, has also proved unsuccessful in discharging its mandate. Undermanned and unarmed, the international monitors have not been authorised to intervene to prevent human rights violations by the local police. Such violations are to be reported to NATO, who is authorised to use force. In many instances, NATO troops have been unwilling to intervene.[103]

NATO's reluctance to fully support the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement can be explained by different factors. First, IFOR and SFOR are composed of troops from Russia, Germany, Turkey and who all have direct links with the parties. By engaging in activities that could penalise one party more than the others, NATO would undermine the coherence of the force. Second, the US has no intention of

---

[101] See *Le Soir*, 17 July 1997.

[102] On 26 January, Muslim families who had been authorised to return to their village in Northern Bosnia were attacked Serb civilians. When the mob attacked the Muslims, American and Russian soldiers looked on. See *Le Monde*, 29 January 1997.

[103] Last February, Croat police stopped Muslims in Mostar, confiscated their identity cards and forced them to leave the area. UNIPTF monitors were absent because it was deemed that their "safety was at risk". NATO troops, present in the streets, stood by, arguing later that the monitoring of the police was outside their mandate. See *The Guardian*, 12 February 1997.

getting bogged down in Bosnia as in Somalia. If NATO troops came to be seen as an enemy by one of the parties, the cease-fire could rapidly degenerate in outright conflict. The costs in American casualties of such an eventuality would be unacceptable for the US. But as in Somalia, the issues that are not addressed now (refugees, war criminals) could undermine the long-term viability of the Agreement.

These issues underline one of the greatest difficulties of second generation peace-keeping. The range of activities performed by the new peacekeepers entail the reallocation of political and economic resources. These activities are not neutral; they affect the local balance of power. Roughly, the civilian aspects of Dayton fall under this category. On the other hand, NATO's mandate is more of a traditional peace-keeping mandate: monitoring the cease-fire, controlling heavy weapons. By getting involved in the civilian aspects of the Agreement, NATO runs the risk of being perceived as favouring one side over the other, thereby exposing itself to military retaliation.

The UN and NATO in Bosnia: A Co-operative Relationship?

The relationship established between NATO and the UN throughout the Bosnian crisis was not as co-operative as one could believe. As this short account has described, both organisations were competing for the control of the peace process. NATO, pushed by the US, would have liked the UN to let it handle the crisis more forcefully. On the other hand, the UN wanted to defend its prerogatives as the main organisation responsible for the maintenance of peace.

Both organisations were influenced by the power play between the major powers. The US used NATO to implement its policy whereas France and Britain

(which both had troops on the ground) and mainly Russia, who is not a member of NATO, were keen on seeing the UN play a role in Bosnia. But there is also a difference of culture between the two organisations. NATO needs a clear enemy and military targets; the UN has developed over the years a culture of patient negotiation and impartiality with the parties.[104] These two approaches proved irreconcilable.

[104] For example, UN HQ in Bosnia did no intelligence gathering, "because advance warning is irrelevant to peacekeepers with no intention of taking countermeasures". See *International Herald Tribune*, 3 November 1994.

Chapter III

Lessons for Future Multilateral Operations

The three cases presented above provide important lessons for future peace operations. If generalisation on the basis of these cases is indeed desirable in the perspective of enhancing future multinational operations, two obstacles stand in the way of meaningful generalisation. The first is the very notion of a successful operation. If an operation was successful, then the "formula" should be applied elsewhere. But success is a very subjective notion. How is it to be measured? An operation could be assessed against its mandate. If the mandate was discharged, then the operation can be deemed a success. By this criterion, UNOSOM II was a failure. Another criterion to measure success is the end of hostilities. If a war was stopped, then the international community intervened successfully. In that regard, Bosnia was a success. But if human rights are used as a yardstick, international intervention in Bosnia failed to prevent ethnic cleansing and the whole operation can be seen as a failure. Given the different conceptions of a successful operation, generalisation is problematic.

Second, interests determining participation in a multilateral operation vary greatly from nation to nation and from case to case. France and the US did not intervene in Somalia for the same reasons. Likewise, the US did not intervene in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia for the same motives. The notion of interest itself is subject to fluctuations and various definitions. The political mood in Washington is certainly not the same today as it was at the time the decision to launch operation "Restore Hope" was made. Therefore, to expect a US-led intervention to be followed by a UN

operation in each country where there is a civil conflict is nothing more than wishful thinking. Sudan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone remind us of the limits of generalisation.

Instead of speaking in terms of success or interest, one could ask if Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia do not teach us something about improving the effectiveness of multilateral operations. In that perspective, the lessons learned during these three conflicts could be useful in the future.

The Participation Of The United States In Multilateral Operations Is Decisive

In all three conflicts, US participation was a decisive factor. In Somalia, the American initiative led to the creation of UNITAF, which, despite its political shortcomings, was a humanitarian success. Again in Haiti the US took the lead in resolving the crisis; at times the UN was not even notified of American decisions (i.e. the *Harlan County* incident and the Carter mission). In Bosnia, divided Europeans were unable to stop the bloodshed and again the US through NATO brought the fighting to an - perhaps temporary- end.

American military assets are unmatched and can be deployed just about anywhere in the world. Therefore, it seems logical to wish US involvement in multinational operations. However, isolationist tendencies in Congress considerably reduce the freedom of the administration to commit US assets to multilateral operations. The eagerness of an administration under Congressional pressure to transfer the Haiti operation to the UN illustrates this trend. The definition of US

national interests is indeed much more narrow than it used to be. Christopher Layne explains what the role of US military should be in this context:

> "The American military must avoid being sidetrackted by the kinds of peripheral 'imperial policing' entailed by the peacekeeping/peacemaking operations....It is important for the United States to remember that the purpose of its military is to protect American security against potential great-power challengers".[1]

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, adopted by president Clinton in May 1994 lays down the conditions for American participation in UN operations. It also illustrates the current US reluctance to get involved in multinational operations in general. It talks of participation in operations that "advances US interests", when "domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshalled" and where "the role of US forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for US participation can be identified".[2] All these factors lead to think that American participation in multilateral operations will be more difficult to secure in the future.

With regard to the issue of US national interest, Edward Luck identifies several reasons why the US should be actively engaged in seeking to affect the course of events around the world.[3] These reasons could both influence and justify a US decision to get involved in any kind of multilateral operations. Two are particularly relevant to this discussion: first, as a global economic power, the US seeks free trade and open markets. Conflicts can destabilise entire regions, thereby affecting international trade. Indeed, the Bosnian conflict could have spread to the Balkans and then to Western Europe. Therefore, the US has a stake in a peaceful global environment in which the

---

[1] Christopher Layne, "Minding Our Own Business: The Case for American Non-Participation in International Peacekeeping/Peacemaking Operations, in Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), p. 96.

[2] See Donald C. F. Daniel, "The United States", in Trevor Findlay, ed. *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*. (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1996). SIPRI Research Report No. 12. p. 96.

[3] Edward C. Luck, "The Case for Engagement", in Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), pp. 76-79.

demand for American products can grow. Moreover, American refusal to participate in the maintenance of international security could lead its partners to also take an isolationist stance, but with regard to trade this time. Second, the long-term costs of caring for refugees, as in Haiti, and of providing humanitarian assistance for states that have failed, like Somalia, can be enormous. These conflicts should therefore be resolved as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, alternatives to US leadership should be sought. At the regional level, the ability of regional organisations to deal with conflicts should be enhanced. In Western Europe, the development of a European identity within NATO, with its own command and control structure, could give the EU the means to conduct its own peace operations under UN auspices. Much would depend on the ability of European nations to agree on a common foreign policy, which is, as Bosnia demonstrated, wishful thinking for now. In Africa, the US is attempting to invigorate the OAU by providing funds (US$ 3.5 million to date, US$ 4.5 million authorised), advice and technical assistance in the hope of increasing the OAU's capacity to cope with civil conflicts.[4] Repeated elsewhere, this pattern could increase regional resources needed to address internal conflicts. On an *ad hoc* basis, the US could also repeat the Haitian experience of funding contingents in order for them to remain on the ground. The US could provide logistic support as well for nations who have an interest in mounting multilateral operations, but who either lack the resources to mount them or are not willing to bear alone the burdens of these operations. In the perspective of the

---

[4] See Edward Marks, *Peace Operations Involving Regional Organisations*, [article on-line] (National Defense University: INSS, 1996, accessed 05 June 1997); available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/ forum25.html; Internet.

American withdrawal from SFOR, the option of having the Europeans stay on while the US would provide logistic support is being discussed.[5]

These options, if implemented, would not completely phase out the decisive US role in multilateral operations. They should nevertheless make the UN and the international community less dependent upon the last superpower.

The Tasks To Be Fulfilled By Each Actor Must Be Clearly Defined

The mandate given to each actor must be clear and contain precise objectives. Ambiguity over the mandate usually leaves unresolved problems to the follow-on operation, as in Somalia: UNITAF was the force who had the best chance of disarming the parties but refused to do so. Since mandates are negotiated and passed by the Security Council, it is critical that the P5 agree, first, on a clear solution to the conflict and second, on the division of labour between the different international organisations and/or member states involved.

The veto power also allows the P5 to block any proposition that does not suit them. This situation has an impact on the mandate given to UN forces, as in Haiti. China decided to only allow UN funding of 1,200 peacekeepers and 300 police when the secretariat requested the extension of UNMIH's mandate. This level of personnel would have been insufficient for the UN to discharge its mandate. The willingness of Canada to fund its troops and the funding of Pakistani troops by the US also show

[5] *Le Soir*, 12 July 1997.

that, when countries have an interest in a settlement, solutions to mount operations can be found.[6]

On the other hand, a too precise mandate lacks the flexibility necessary to adjust to changes on the ground. Some middle ground needs therefore to be found and the expansion of the secretary-general's military staff is likely to improve the UN's ability to draft operationally sound mandates.

Potential troop-contributing nations should also be consulted and associated to the negotiation of the mandates. This would reduce the odds that contingents will refer to their governments for instructions or refuse to obey the commander's orders, as the Italian attitude in Somalia illustrates.

Multinational Operations Are Not Neutral; They Have An Impact On The Local Balance Of Power

One of the arguments put forward to explain the success of UNITAF can be summarised as follows: the coalition was successful because it focused on the delivery of humanitarian aid; UNOSOM II, on the other hand, got bogged down because it disrupted the local balance of power.[7] To think that UNITAF's intervention did not affect the balance of power in Somalia is simply not true. Warlords fought over humanitarian aid; it was looted and then used to feed their combatants. The intervention weakened this pattern and affected the power of the warlords, but not enough to trigger a military reaction. Aideed's reluctance to allow even UN observers

[6] See David Malone, "Haiti and the International community: A Case Study", in *Survival*, 39, 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 126-46.

in Somalia strengthens the view that any kind of foreign intervention affects local politics. Likewise, in Bosnia, UNPROFOR's humanitarian activities affected the development of the war. For example, the siege of Sarajevo was prolonged and eventually broken; and ethnic cleansing was limited in some areas (the "safe heaven" concept) because of international intervention.

Intervening forces should consequently follow the consequences through and accept the fact that intervention cannot be "limited" either: the political, military and humanitarian aspects of a situation cannot be arbitrarily separated. Peace-building[8] in Bosnia particularly illustrates the impossibility of a neutral, limited intervention. While international organisations have been influencing Bosnian politics by their peace-building activities, NATO's reluctance to support them because it does not want to be perceived as "favouring" one side over the other has blocked the whole process. Accepting the consequences of intervention does not necessarily mean engaging in military actions against reluctant parties; it means treating all parties by the same rules, even if that means reallocating local resources. This can be done by excluding reluctant parties from political processes, restraining their access to economic aid or political resources and favouring more co-operative interlocutors.

---

[7] Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention", in *Foreign Affairs*, 75, 2 (March/ April 1996), p. 75.

[8] Peace-building can be defined as a sub-category of second generation peace-keeping. It is defined by Barnett as follows: 'Peace-building... involves a myriad of activities that are designed to facilitate the transition from civil war to civil society, including: economic reconstruction; election engineering; the demobilization of militaries and irregular forces; de-mining; and the retraining of police forces.' See Michael Barnett, "Partners in Peace ? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-keeping", in *Review of International Studies*, 21, 1995, p. 417.

There Must Be A Unified Chain Of Command In Multilateral Operations

The killing of 18 Americans in Somalia shows the danger of having multiple chains of command in multinational operations, especially when troops are likely to be involved in combat situations. On 3 October, the Rangers set out on their mission without having even informed the American commander nor the UN of their plans. When they got in trouble, precious time was lost informing the QRF and UNOSOM commanders of the situation. Putting together a rescue mission took another few hours. With a unified command, contingency planning could have been done and support troops made ready to come to the rescue of the Rangers.

The need for a unified chain of command raises the problem of US unwillingness to place American troops under foreign command. PDD 25 makes clear that US troops will always remain under American command but the possibility of operational control by a "competent non-US commander" is left open. Operational control here means the assignment of tasks to US forces for a specific mission or during a specific time-frame. The extent to which the US would agree to place US troops under UN command is limited by two conditions. One is the number of troops involved in the operation: the more the US does, the less likely it is to give up control.[9] Bosnia illustrates this issue: the US refused to commit troops on the ground until it took control of the operation through NATO. One way of circumventing these rules would be to choose an American as UN commander, as in Haiti. US troops were technically under US command but at the same time the US commander wore the UN commander's hat. This arrangement proved successful in Haiti, although one could ask

---

[9] Donald C. F. Daniel, *op. cit.*, p.96.

whether the commander was taking instructions from Washington or New York. Second, if US forces take part "in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat", operational control will not be surrendered. Such a mission "should ordinarily be conducted under US command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or *ad hoc* coalitions". This condition may be the price to pay by the UN to have the US commit troops to enforcement operations.

The Issue Of Disarmament Must Be Addressed

Disarmament is an issue that was -and is- crucial in all three cases. The argument for disarmament in Somalia was simple: new actors could not emerge in Somali politics as long as the warlords had the means to maintain their position. In other words, what kind of incentive was there for them to surrender their power? The failure of UNITAF to disarm the parties only postponed the problem. In Haiti, the MNF was not in control of the situation until it dismantled the paramilitaries and sent the junta away. Even then, the security situation was not stable: the number of light weapons in circulation is still a problem. The problems encountered by the international community in Bosnia also stem from the fact that faction leaders still command military resources. Even if they are officially no longer active in Bosnian Serb politics, Karadzic and Mladic have been able to retain control of the military and of most of the police. These resources almost give them a veto over the peace process.

One can argue that disarmament in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia was impossible given the size of international forces operating in those countries. Rather, one should

say that extensive disarmament is a dangerous endeavour, that could have led those forces to suffer many casualties for disarming the parties. But other options exist. Buy-back programs allowed international forces to book some success in Haiti. In Bosnia, the US is trying to affect the balance of power not by reducing the amount of weapons available to one party (the Bosnian Serbs), but by increasing the military power of the other (the Bosnian government). The danger with this approach is that it could lead to the resumption of hostilities, with dreadful humanitarian consequences.

Moreover, carrying guns is socially acceptable in some societies, as in Somalia. An "acceptable" number of weapons in circulation would also be difficult to determine; and there is not even a consensus over this issue in the West. Instead of confiscating weapons, international forces could focus on controlling them as the French did -rather successfully- in their sector in Somalia. They registered the weapons and only confiscated them when they were used to commit a crime. In Bosnia, heavy weapons have also been put under international control. This approach assumes the co-operation of the parties; it also does not prevent people from hiding weapons. But it attempts to address the issue and that seems crucial for the success of multinational operations.

Ad Hoc Coalitions Should Be Preferred To Regional Organisations For Enforcement Operations

The use of regional organisations for enforcement operations is problematic for two reasons. First, only NATO has the capacity to mount large-scale operations. Second, regional decision-making is usually slower than in *ad hoc* coalitions. In enforcement operations, where swift decisions are imperative, a slow decision process can have dire consequences.

Furthermore, *ad hoc* coalitions are formed around a set of short-term objectives. In Somalia, UNITAF focused on the delivery of humanitarian aid. In Haiti, the MNF helped Aristide get back in power and restored some order in the country before the arrival of UNMIH. Once these objectives were reached, the coalition dissolved. It is not the case for regional organisations. Therefore, the resolution of a given conflict may be slowed down by the "side games" that are being played simultaneously within the organisation. In Bosnia, discussions within NATO were not only about its role in the conflict but also about the internal transformation of the Atlantic Alliance. The proximity of the parties to members of the regional organisation may also be a source of difficulties. Within NATO, Germany was more favourable to Croatia, France -initially- and Greece supported the Serbs and the US as well as Turkey advocated the cause of the Muslims.

In Somalia and Haiti, the *ad hoc* coalitions were dominated by the US which provided its assets to support the operation. The dominance of one nation, i.e. the US, over the coalition can be problematic for two reasons. First, the dominant power usually sets the objectives of the mission. The input of the other participants being

limited, they may end up being used to serve the interests of coalition's leader. Second, the dominant power may decide to withdraw before the objectives set initially are attained, thereby leading the coalition to fall apart.

A UN Peace-keeping Mission Should Not Co-exist With A Non-UN Enforcement Operation

Both in Somalia and Bosnia UN peace-keeping troops worked alongside a non-UN body. In Somalia, UNOSOM I was left on the sidelines by UNITAF. Moreover, UN initiatives were limited by the fact that it did not control UNITAF's assets. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR's vulnerability prevented NATO from striking where and when it wanted. Moreover, the parties gradually came to associate UNPROFOR with NATO. This had the effect of undermining the impartiality of the UN contingent and exposed it to retaliation. The UN should intervene independently in situations where the three principles of traditional peace-keeping can be upheld. Indeed, over the years, the peace-keeping experience has led the UN to develop an operational culture that is not propitious to enforcement. The UN, by introducing a peace-keeping force, seeks less a military deterrent effect than a political one. Small, non-threatening operations are preferred to large-scale military operations and the UN proceeds by negotiation rather than by threat of the use of force. If such a situation does not exist, the UN should leave to a non-UN body the responsibility of creating such an environment, as in Haiti with the MNF. Haiti was successful in that regard because there was a clear distinction between the two operations: the MNF was operating with strong rules of engagement whereas UNMIH was a classic UN operation. The UN should therefore do what it

does best: long-term operations governed by the principles of impartiality, consent from the parties and use of force only in self-defence. Short-term operations should be sub-contracted to either coalitions or regional organisations.

The second best option -if such a thing as a best option exists- is a UN intervention *à la* UNPROFOR: the UN initially limited its activities to the delivery of humanitarian aid and hoped that it would not suffer too many casualties. The consequences of the conflict were addressed, but eventually the UN could not help being accused of contributing to the continuation of the war, by "preventing" a side from winning a complete victory.

Deadlines For Transitions From One Operation To Another Should Be Avoided.

When dates are set by which an operation is to be transferred from a non-UN contingent to a UN one, the parties can slow down the peace process until the UN arrives. This happened in Somalia, where the warlords knew when the Americans were to leave. They avoided any major confrontation with international forces until UNOSOM II took over, with a less powerful force. Likewise, in Bosnia, the June 1998 deadline set by president Clinton, by which American troops are to withdraw from SFOR, raises fears that fighting will resume after that date. In Haiti, the instability of the situation at the time of the end of UNMIH's mandate led the secretary-general to request the creation of another UN mission to Haiti (UNSMIH).

Instead of a deadline, the fulfilment of conditions, to be evaluated by the Security Council and troop-contributing nations/organisations, would determine the

date of the withdrawal. In Haiti, the main condition for the withdrawal of the MNF was that "a secure and stable environment" be established. The determination thereof was made by the Security Council. The US still had a decisive influence in the timing of the transition, but the "environment" condition gave more power to the UN in the bargaining process. The state of readiness of the follow-on UN operation should also be taken into account. Likewise, the UN force would not withdraw until a set of objectives has been reached. These objectives could be both political and military. Disarmament, demobilisation of troops, mine clearance, reorganisation of armed forces, elections, creation of a police force, safe delivery of humanitarian aid, repatriation of refugees, could all be considered.

The UN Should Be Fully Deployed By The Time It Takes Over From A Non-UN Operation

One of the main problems encountered by UNOSOM II was the low level of troops it had on the ground at the time of the transition from UNITAF. It prevented the UN from effectively taking over the task previously performed by the US-led coalition. In Haiti, the UN had deployed nearly 90% of its contingent when it replaced the MNF and was ready to function. The extent to which the UN has deployed should be one of the criteria determining the date of the hand-over.

The Transition From One Operation To Another Should Be Clearly Marked

The parties, NGO's and other actors involved in the conflict should notice the transition from one operation to another. Transitions usually involve a new mandate, different objectives and means. By not marking it, the incoming force runs the risk of disappointing the different actors already present on the ground, who do not understand why the "same" force is not performing as well as before.

Conclusions

The immediate post-Cold War period saw an increase in the number of multinational operations. A broader understanding of sovereignty, extensive media coverage of conflicts and the end of the East-West rivalry account for this change. However, the UN rushed into enforcement operations without having designed effective and sound operational mechanisms to co-ordinate the efforts of disparate contingents. In Somalia, UN troops got bogged down and lives were lost. By 1994, the UN had become much more cautious about its capacities to mount and manage large scale operations. The United States, the most powerful member of the organisation, demanded and received the UN's blessing to set up its own multinational operations, either by putting together a coalition or by using existing regional organisations. At the same time, the UN has begun enhancing its capacity to plan and manage peace operations. Some successes have been booked in Haiti and Bosnia.

The international community has learned lessons from past multinational operations. Prospects for more effective missions are good. Nevertheless, there seems to be much less political will on the part of nations to commit troops to UN or even non-UN operations. The US has laid strict restrictions on its participation in UN operations; other nations could follow. Furthermore, the long-term viability of interventions in Haiti and Bosnia is in question. One can wonder whether these

interventions really contributed to address the causes of conflict or simply put a temporary end to the bloodshed.

These three conflicts teach us that peace is a long-term endeavour. Multinational interventions can stop the fighting and create the conditions for peace. But much more needs to be done and the international community should be ready to support those who strive to create a durable peace. One can only hope that nations will resist the temptation of isolationism and respond to the calls of peacemakers for help.

Appendix


Addis
Ababa
Dire Dawa
Hargeysa
Berbera
Burao
Qardho
Garoowe
Ethiopia
Galcaio
Hobyo
Beledweyne
Luuq
Baidoa
Kenya
Jamaame


Cuba
Trou
du Nord
Pignon
Gueyamout
Artibonite
Dominican
Republic
Mirebalais
Manneville
Petionville
Anse-
d'Hainault
Camp-
Perrin
Miragoane
Aquin
Petit-
Goave
Jacmel


Croatia
Bosanska Gradiska
Bosanski Brod
Bosanska Novi
Prijedor
Omarska
Derventa
Bihac
Bosanska Krupa
Banja Luka
Gradacac
Sanski Most
Doboj
Gracanica
Tuzla
Una
Teslic
Vrbas
Bosanski Petrovac
Drvar
Zavidovici
Zivinice
Jajce
Bosna
Travnik
Zenica
Kladanj
Vlasenica
Vares
Bugojno
Croatia
Semizovac
Sarajevo
Livno
Konjic
Gorazde
Drina
Jablanica
Neretva
Foca
Mostar
Citluk
Gacko
Bileca
Albania

Bibliography

Primary Sources

NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 17 Dec. 1992.

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti. S/1994/828 of 15 July 1994.

United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-96.* (New York: United Nations, 1996).

Secondary Sources

Books and Documents

James H. Allan, *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer.* (Westport: Praeger, 1996).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace.* (New York: United Nations, 1992).

Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons Of Armed Humanitarian Intervention.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes, eds. *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).

William Durch, ed. *The Evolution of UN peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

Trevor Findlay, ed. *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers.* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1996). SIPRI Research Report No. 12.

John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.* (Washington, DC: USIP, 1995).

Marc McNeill, Tara Gavin and John Ting-Lu Chung, *The Haitian Crisis and the Role of the International Community.*(Research Project, Montreal: McGill University, 1997).

James Mayall, ed. *The New Interventionism 1991-94: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia.*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Larry Minear, Colin Scott and Thomas G. Weiss, *The News Media, Civil War and Humanitarian Action.* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1996).

Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Bosnia 1992-94.* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).

Roland I. Perusse, *Haitian Democracy Restored: 1991-95.* (New York: University Press of America, 1995).

Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds. *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990's.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

Gerry Yemen, Saira Zuberi and Ivana Gotzeva, *The UN in Somalia: Humanitarian Success, Political Failure* (Research Project, McGill University, 1997).

Articles

Michael Barnett, "Partners in Peace ? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-keeping", in *Review of International Studies*, 21, 1995, pp. 411-33.

----------, "The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty", in *Global Governance*, 1(1995), pp. 79-97.

Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention", in *Foreign Affairs*, 75, 2 (March/ April 1996), pp. 70-85.

Chester A. Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong", in *Foreign Affairs*, 74, 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 2-8.

Janina W. Dacyl, "Sovereignty versus Human Rights: From Past Discourses to Contemporary Dilemmas", in *Journal of Refugee Studies* 9, 2 (1996), pp. 136-65.

Charles Greenwood, "Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?", in *The World Today*, 49, February 1993, pp.32-47.

S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations, Regional Organisations and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America", in *Third World Quarterly*, 15, 2, 1994, pp. 277-295.

John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations", in *The Washington Quarterly*, 15 (Summer 1992), pp. 113-31.

David Malone, "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study", in *Survival*, 39, 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 126-46.

----------, *The Security Council in the 1990's*, paper delivered to the 1996 Jules Léger Seminar. (Ottawa: DFAIT).

S. Victor Papacosma, "NATO in the post-Cold War Balkans", in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 1996, 24 (Winter), pp. 233-252.

James A. Schear, "Bosnia's Post-Dayton Traumas", in *Foreign Policy*, 104, Fall 1996, pp. 82-96.

Gregory L. Schulte, "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO", in *Survival*, 39, 1, Spring 1997, pp. 19-42.

Newspapers and Magazines

The Daily Telegraph, 3 March; 6 September 1993; 14 July 1996.

The Economist, 17 February 1996.

Federal News Service, 12 May 1994.

The Guardian, 16, 20 September 1994; 12 February 1997.

The Independent, 15, 16 July; 17, 26 October 1993; 19 September 1994; 11 December 1995.

International Herald Tribune, 3 November 1994.

Inter Press Service, 18 May 1995.

Reuters, 20 October 1994.

The New York Times, 8, 15 January 1995.

The Sunday Times, 2 October 1994.

The Times, 18 July 1993; 3, 6 October 1994.

The Washington Post, 21 September 1994.

AFP, 30 September 1994.

La lettre de l'Océan indien, 30 January; 26 June 1993.

Le Monde, 19 September 1994; 11 September; 21 December 1996; 29 January 1997.

Le Soir, 1 February 1995; 12, 17 July 1997.

Libération, 11 July 1997.

Internet Sources

David Bentley, *Operation Uphold Democracy: Military Support for Democracy in Haiti*, [article on-line] (Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997, accessed 05 June 1997); available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum78.html.

David Bentley and Robert Oakley, *Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti*, [article on-line] (Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997, accessed 05 June 1997); available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum30.html.

Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo, Fighting for Hope in Somalia, in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 26 October 1995 [journal on-line]; available from http://131.111.106.147/Articles/a007a.htm; accessed 27 March 1997.

Edward Marks, *Peace Operations Involving Regional Organisations*, [article on-line] (National Defense University: INSS, 1996, accessed 05 June 1997); available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum25.html.

NATO, *NATO Fact Sheet no. 11: NATO's Role in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement* [article on-line] (Brussels: NATO, 1997, accessed 05 June 1997); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/ facts/fs11.htm.

UNDPKO, *Somalia - UNOSOM II* [article on-line] (New York: United Nations, 1997, accessed 27 March 1997); available from http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm.

UNDPKO, *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992- March 1995* [article on-line] (New York: United Nations, 1996, accessed 03 April 1997); available from http://www.un.org/Depts/ dpko/somalia.htm.

United Nations, *Frequently Asked Questions*; available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/faq.htm; accessed 13 July 1997.