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**COMMUNISTS AND THE RUSSIANS:  
THE KALININ PROVINCE UNDER STALIN**

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November 1993

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in  
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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## Abstract

This history of the Tver' (Kalinin) province of Russia, with particular emphasis on the years 1945-1953, uses primary sources from archives of the Party and Soviet State, oral interviews, and readings of Russian, French, English, and German publications. The first chapters discuss the socio-economic and political effects of the events prior to 1945. Subsequently, the post-war rôle of Communist Party, Soviet government, security organs, and Komsomol and the results of Communist policies in agriculture and industry are analysed. The province's demographic losses between 1929 and 1945 and their consequences in Stalin's final years are assessed. The life of male and female kolkhozniks, workers, and intelligentsiia, and their relationship with the authorities are depicted. Post-1953 changes are appreciated in the last chapter. Four maps, forty-seven tables, and four appendices are included.



## Résumé

Ce mémoire historique sur la province russe de 'I'ver' (Kalinin), avec un intérêt particulier pour les années 1945-1953, se base sur un nombre de sources originales provenant d'archives du Parti et de l'État soviétique, d'entrevues orales et de lectures de publications en langue russe, française, anglaise et allemande. Les premiers chapitres traiteront des effets socio-économiques et politiques des événements précédant 1945. Après quoi, on analysera le rôle qu'ont joué dans l'après-guerre le Parti communiste, le gouvernement soviétique, le Komsomol, les organismes de sécurité et les résultats des politiques agricoles et industrielles communistes. On évaluera les pertes démographiques de la province entre 1929 et 1945 ainsi que leurs conséquences dans les dernières années au pouvoir de Staline. On décrira l'existence des membres des kolkhozes, des ouvriers et de l'intelligentsia et leurs rapports avec les autorités. Le dernier chapitre s'intéressera aux changements après 1953. Quatre cartes, quarante-sept graphiques et quatre appendices sont inclus en complément du travail.

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Finally, it must be noted that I alone am responsible for any errors or deficiencies in this study.

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## PREFACE

In January 1945, Ivan Pavlovich Boitsov, the first secretary of the Communist Party organization of the Kalinin oblast', had the distinction of delivering the political report on the current situation of the province and its prospects in the coming years<sup>1</sup>. The war had not yet come to its official end, but the Kalinin province had been cleared of the presence of German troops more than one and a half years earlier. Boitsov's speech was cautiously optimistic: there were many shortcomings, but he saw no reason to suspect that the problems the oblast' was experiencing would not be presently resolved. More than eight years later, in February 1953, V.I. Kiselev, already the third leader of the provincial Party since Boitsov's transfer to Stavropol, received a disturbing report on the province's agricultural development<sup>2</sup>. Collective farmers were leaving the kolkhozy in droves. The farms were apparently unable to offer any attractive prospects to its members. The tone of the report is entirely negative: none of the agricultural problems noticed by Boitsov in January 1945 had been solved. In fact, the situation had deteriorated gravely by February 1953. Many of the report's original recommendations foreshadowed actual Soviet agricultural reforms introduced in September 1953. A few days after Stalin's death, on March 10, 1953, Kiselev ordered the members of the obkomburo (buro of the oblast' Party committee) S.N. Shatalin and

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<sup>1</sup>The former Party Archive of the Communist Party of Kalinin oblast' in the " *Tverskoi tseñtr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii* " (from here Pako), fond 147, opis' 3, delo 2679, listy 1-23ob. (from here 147/4/1495, ll.1-23ob.).

<sup>2</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, ll.1-18.

G.A. Demirskii to make proposals for agricultural reforms on the basis of the report.

What had happened? Who or what is to blame for the dismal performance of the provincial agriculture and industry -- neither of which had transcended the difficulties encountered during the war? Did Boitsov have any reason for his optimism in January 1945? The following dissertation will attempt to explain what happened between 1945 and 1953 in the Russian province. In many ways, its story may be typical for the history of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic in its entirety during this immediate postwar period. Its research explores sources which have never been used by Western or even by Russian historians or social scientists.

Upon my first arrival in Russia in September 1991, the central archive of the former Communist Party appeared to be closed, or not accessible. Later on, in the summer of 1992, it was possible to visit at least one section of the archive, which was kept on Sovetskaia Ploshchad' in Moscow, but the location of most of the documents concerning the Party's policies towards the Kalinin oblast' in the postwar years remained unclear<sup>3</sup>. It is likely that documents concerning this period were, or are still, being sorted out and declassified in the buildings of the former Central Committee on Staraia Ploshchad'.

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<sup>3</sup>One part of the Central Committee archives appeared to be located in the buildings of the former Central Committee of the Communist Party on Staraia Ploshchad' in Moscow, another part probably is preserved within the Kremlin. Access to many of the records in these three collections is still restricted to Russians and other nationals of the former USSR, and cannot be investigated freely by foreigners, which is also the case with the archives of the Cheka/OGPU/GPU/NKVD/NKGB/MVD/MGB/KGB and, for instance, with the military archives that are kept in Podolsk.

Apart from my research in Moscow, I spent most of November 1991 in the former Kalinin, that was given back its pre-1931 name of Tver' in 1989. Here I worked both in the State Archive of Tver' oblast', and in the former Party Archive, renamed at this time "*Tverskoi tseñtr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii*". In Tver' it proved much easier than in Moscow to locate important information on the province during the postwar period. For example, in contrast to extremely difficult -- often humanly impossible-- and time-consuming efforts to find material on the Kalinin oblast' in the Central State Archive of the October Revolution (TsGAOR), in Tver' the data were easy to locate and were handed over to me for inspection without cumbersome formalities. Only twice during this first visit was I not allowed to look at a certain record in the State Archive of Tver' oblast', something that was remedied in the summer of 1992.

The quantity of records in the oblast' archives in Tver' is staggering: in 1986 in the State Archive alone, according to its "*reklamnyi prospekt*", more than 600,000 records could be found on the Soviet period<sup>4</sup>. The former Party archive possesses a similar amount of records<sup>5</sup>. The length of these records varies: some of them consist of a mere ten pages of text, others of several hundred. The State Archive harbours a large number of handwritten texts, much more so than the former Party archive, where manuscripts form only a fraction of the total. The records of the Soviet period in the State Archive cover an enormous range of institutions and organizations, almost all part of the oblast' (guberniia, okrug), government:

<sup>4</sup>Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv kalininskoi oblasti, Kalinin 1986, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup>Tverskoi tseñtr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii: Reklamnyi spravochnik, Tver', 1992, p.6

...[records] of the local organs of state power and state government, state control, of the institutions of the judiciary, the courts, and the procuracy, of the organs of social order, planning, statistics, financing, credit, and state insurance, of institutions, organizations and enterprises of the economy, of communications, of the education of the people, of culture, of science, of healthcare, of labour and social insurance/welfare, of *fizkul'tur* and sport, of social organizations.<sup>6</sup>

Although at first sight this collection seems like a veritable goldmine for anyone trying to describe the life of the Russian people under Communism, on the whole most of these records are not very useful. Since they are official documents, with some exceptions they only recount the official view of matters, the bureaucratic side of affairs, especially for the post-1945 period. If one were to base one's research merely on these documents, it would probably result in a tedious and rather positive account of life under Stalin. One interesting exception can be noted in the letters of constituents at the end of the 1940s and first half of the 1950s with complaints and requests to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputy, I.F. Gagurin<sup>7</sup>. Here something of an idea

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<sup>6</sup>Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv kalininskoi oblasti, pp. 11/12.

<sup>7</sup>Its importance is described by the local archivist Leont'eva (O.G. Leont'eva, "Dokumenty po istorii razvitiia Kalininskoi derevni v kontse 1940-nachale 1950-kh godov." Istoriia v cheloveke. Materialy. (Seminara rabotnikov gosudarstvennykh arkhivov Kalininskoi oblasti po povysheniiu professional'nogo urovnia(1989g.)). Tver', 1990. [Rotaprint], p.137) It seems possible that the State Archive of Tver' has more evidence on the pre-World War II events, particularly on collectivization, as is indicated in an article, written by the head of the archive, M.A. Il'in (M.A. Il'in, "Raskrytie arkhivov-vazhnoe uslovie vosstanovleniia istoricheskoi pravdy," in: Sovetskie Arkhivy, 1989, No.4, pp.11-15). Much of the political repression from the second half of the 1930s and after remains hidden in the documents that can be found here. In the materials preserved by the State Archive, indications of the real state of affairs are buried among an enormous amount of bureaucratic trivia. In a sense it proves Volkogonov's point that: "In fact the course that Stalin took after the war was a course of total bureaucracy." (D.A. Volkogonov, Triumf i Tragediia. Politicheskii portret I.V. Stalina, Kniga I, Chast' 1&2, Kniga II, Chast' 1&2, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Agentstva pechati Novosti, 1989, Kniga II, Chast' 2, p.21).



could be gained about the real state of affairs in the countryside in particular, for Gagurin, a model tractor operator, represented a rural riding in the Supreme Soviet.

It turned out to be far more interesting and worthwhile to concentrate on the records in the former Party archive. In the Kalinin oblast', too, these archives confirm Merle Fainsod's truism that "...it was the Party which played the dominant role..."<sup>8</sup> in Soviet society.

Although the government was formally separate from the Party, its sphere overlapped with that of the Party, and the Party made the decisions<sup>9</sup>. Fainsod describes the omnipresence of the Communist Party in the postwar period<sup>10</sup>. The Party's ubiquity also applies to the Kalinin oblast' in the later 1940s and early 1950s. Among themselves, the members of the higher echelons of the Party in the provinces were relatively frank about the real state of affairs. The oblast' first secretary and the obkom secretariat received a continuous stream of information on all aspects of life in their fief; meanwhile, the Central Committee in Moscow considered the first secretary to be responsible for the successes and failures in the oblast'. As a result, there are several thousand *dela* of various sizes for the period, now ensconced in the archive of the former Communist Party in Tver'. The Party tried to be informed on every aspect of life in order to avoid unpleasant

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<sup>8</sup>Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958, p.93.

<sup>9</sup>Fainsod, Smolensk..., p.90: "The transcendent position of the obkom bureau vis-a-vis the oblast congress of soviets and the oblispolkom is unmistakable. The obkom bureau laid down the policies and drafted the directives which guided their actions; it initiated the key appointments which were subsequently ratified and approved by the oblast congress of soviets and the oblispolkom. The secretariat of the obkom paralleled the governmental departments; it intervened constantly to direct, scold, and prod the administrative organs subject to its supervision."

<sup>10</sup>M. Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1955, pp. 184-186.

surprises in the field of ideological matters, the economy, and so on, for which the obkom members could be held responsible by Moscow. Obviously, the Party obkom was aware that it was not possible to hide the sometimes unpleasant truth from the Centre: the oblast' was at all levels under the surveillance of employees and stool-pigeons of the NKVD(MVD), NKGB(MGB), the representatives of the Party Control Commission, the central and RSFSR ministries, of Gosplan, and so forth. It would appear that no detail could be left to the initiative of outside agencies, perhaps apart from some minor innovations in industry; any initiative for change came necessarily from the government and the Party, and mainly from the central Party and government organs at that. As Anatolii Rybakov writes:

HE [Stalin] created a party of a completely new type; a party, distinct from parties of all times; a party, that was not only a symbol of the state, but also the only social force in the state; a party, for whose members it was not only the main virtue to belong to it, but was also the substance and thought of their lives. HE created the idea of the party as such, as something absolute, substituting for everything: god, morals, home, family, morality, the laws of social development.

Such a party had not yet existed in the history of humanity. Such a party was a guarantee of the indestructable state, HIS state.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, by focussing on the recorded concerns of the obkom secretariat, its departments, and its first secretary, one derives an impression not only of Party life under Stalin, but also of the existence of the large majority of the population, of that 95% or so who remained

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<sup>11</sup>Anatolii Rybakov, Tridtsat' piaty i drugie gody: Roman. Kniga pervaiia, Moskva: Sovetskii pisatel', 1989, p.262/263.

outside the Party in the Kalinin oblast'<sup>12</sup>. The Party records have been maintained far more methodically than the State Archive records: in the case of the latter, some collections were randomly transferred to the archive if a certain governmental (soviet) institution or enterprise no longer needed to keep the records on hand. Other records fell into the care of the archive when reorganizations took place, certain departments were dissolved, or the internal borders of the oblast' were redrawn, as in the case of certain *raions* (districts) which disappeared from the map in the 1950s. While at first the material on the kolkhoz financial accounts of some raions appeared interesting, on the whole those records' contents proved disappointing, and might only be of use to researchers trying to offer a detailed account of the financial and economic viability of the different collective farms<sup>13</sup>. Only with great difficulty can any impression of life on the kolkhoz be gleaned from these accounts.

Owing to the frequent reorganizations of the obkom apparatus, important leads were sometimes lost. Other leads disappeared because no standard method for the collection of the records prevailed throughout the various obkom departments. It is possible to gain a fair amount of data on the activities in the first postwar years of certain organizations which were part of the NKVD/MVD, such as those of the *militsia*, which cannot be found for later years, for the method of collection was altered. It is impossible through scrutiny of the *opis'* to determine where these records might have ended up. One imagines that

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<sup>12</sup>For numbers on Party and Komsomol membership, see Tables 2, 35, 38, 42 and the dissertation itself.

<sup>13</sup>See Chapter VIII.3.

the internal security was tightened and the records on the security organs were to be kept by those organs themselves. After all, during his trial in 1953, Beria was accused of trying to place those organs above the Party. This accusation may have been part of an effort to fashion the security organs into a scapegoat for the excesses of the Stalin era, while in fact Beria himself may have lost control over these organs in Stalin's later years. The accusations against Beria were not wholly a flight of the imagination on the part of Khrushchev or Malenkov. For example, no transcript of the MGB representative's speech was entered into the *stenogramma* at an oblast' Party conference in 1949; previously such a speech would not have been repressed<sup>14</sup>. Inferring from circumstantial evidence, one presumes that the representative spoke about a politically sensitive case at Kalinin's largest factory. V.A. Feoktistov, the head of the *Tverskoi tsentr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii*, suggested to me that this repression of the transcript was done on the request of the security organs. By the late 1940s, the security organs enjoyed the prerogative of prohibiting the obkom to record the contents of the speech made by one of its employees for reasons of secrecy. Nevertheless, the security organs in the Kalinin oblast' could not act in complete independence from the Party. Meanwhile, the Party itself was just as unscrupulously eager to avail itself of the labour force to be requited from Soviet convicts and prisoners of war.

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<sup>14</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.74. A part of the oblast *prokuror's* speech made at this meeting, involving a quote of Malenkov about the state organs, was also left out in the record (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.79).

Despite such difficulties with the archival records of the Communist Party in Tver', it is possible to get a fairly complete picture of the manifold aspects of the activities of the Party in the oblast', and, consequently, of the life of the inhabitants of the oblast'.

I was unable to inspect one essential archival source: the records of the local and central security organs. There is no doubt that these records would probably yield a most intriguing account of life under Stalin. However, in Tver' oblast', similar to the state of affairs with the central KGB archive, most of these materials remain classified because, one suspects, it is deemed to be politically inconvenient and perhaps even dangerous to allow people to inspect these records without restriction<sup>15</sup>. Quite likely, the devastating results of opening of the Stasi records in Germany has reinforced the idea among the members of the Russian government that at this point free access to the KGB archives would be a grave political mistake. After all, not only in Moscow, but also in Tver' today, the political leadership is preponderantly made up of ex-Communists, who probably all have been involved at some stage of their career in certain reprehensible acts of political harassment or oppression<sup>16</sup>. To give but one example: the

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<sup>15</sup>An indication of the kind of material that has been preserved in the archives of the former KGB are the transcripts of telephone and domestic conversations between colonel-general Gordov, his wife, major-general Kulik, and major-general Rybal'chenko ("Podslushali i rastreliali," *Izvestia*, July 17, 1992, p.7). The criticism they uttered in these conversations about the regime's policies and Stalin personally proved to be fatal to all four involved. As the journalist Ella Maksimova wrote in the introduction to the article ("Podslushali...", p.7): "Probably this kind of thing we have not read yet, although papers of a similar kind are preserved more than sufficiently in secret archives, above all those of the KGB."

<sup>16</sup>The events in Moscow in early October 1993 may exert a beneficial influence on the freedom of the Western researcher for her or his efforts to investigate the history of the Soviet Union. However, the outcome of this disturbing episode is by no means certain, and the abortive (?) attempts by the Yeltsin government to close down the "hard-line" newspapers do not bode well.

dissidents Krasin and Iakir spent part of their banishment as employees of the Kalinin' typographical *kombinat* in the early 1970s. Undoubtedly some of the current local authorities must have gone along or been involved with the execution of the sentence against the two dissidents. At the moment, it could be quite harmful politically to be confronted with one's participation in this type of case. The difficulties encountered by researchers, both Russian and foreign, who try to gain access to the former KGB archives are well illustrated in a recent article of Vladimir Abarinov in the English-language digest of Nezavisimaya Gazeta<sup>17</sup>. Roy Medvedev, rather curiously, has claimed that NKVD documents especially falsify reality, although he has not offered any evidence to support this argument<sup>18</sup>. If this were true, which I doubt, there would be no need to lament researchers' inability to comb the archives of the security organs. Medvedev's point can only

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<sup>17</sup>Vladimir Abarinov, "More Troubled Waters in KGB Files." Nezavisimaya Gazeta/Independent Newspaper, Vol. III, 12-13, October 1992. The vice-chair of the Committee for Archival Affairs under the Government of the Russian Federation, V.P. Kozlov, recently described the organizational problems of making formerly secret archives available to the public (V.P. Kozlov, "Ob ispol'zovanii dokumentov rossiiskikh arkhivov," in: Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 6, 1992, pp.77-82). It cannot be denied that the lack of accessibility to certain records is partly due to the enormous amount of work involved in this reorganization and cannot be blamed solely on ill-will from the side of Russian archivists or authorities.

<sup>18</sup>See Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge. The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism. Revised and Expanded Edition. Edited and translated by George Shriver. New York: Columbia University Press: 1989, p.468, footnote 14. A.P. Fedoseev even predicted that the trustworthiness of other archival documents and of the accounts of eyewitnesses would be highly questionable: "One can almost be convinced that, even after the ruin of dictatorship in the USSR, one cannot succeed in revealing objective information through these documents. It seems that in documents Soviet power is as clean as a baby.

Of course, the evidence of the obvious will sharply contradict that, but also the witnesses (as sources of objective, unfavourable, and dangerous information for the leadership) are under supervision, and the leadership takes any measure to keep trustworthy information out of their hands. That's why even this source will turn out to be incomplete as well. Essentially, in the history of a great people, a gaping lacuna will remain, and for the ill-informed this time will be perceived as an almost heavenly epoch." (A.[P]. Fedoseev, Zapadnia. Chelovek i sotsializm, Frankfurt/Main, 1976: Possev-Verlag, p.340).

be confirmed when independent investigations in the archives of the former NKVD, MVD, MGB, et cetera. are permitted --provided that nothing of these records has been or is being deliberately destroyed<sup>19</sup>.

We can only hope that Russian and foreign researchers will eventually gain access to these sources, but for now we have to fill in the gaps by other means. In order to enhance the picture derived from archival materials and secondary works, I decided to turn to oral sources<sup>20</sup>.

In November 1991, I reached an agreement with two professors of Tver' University to conduct a series of two hundred interviews with

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<sup>19</sup>A.N. Mertsalov claims precisely this ("Stalinizm i osveshchenie proshlogo," pp. 382-447, in A.N. Mertsalov(ed.), *Istoriia i stalinizm*, Moskva: Politizdat, 1991, pp.445/446).

<sup>20</sup>Oral history is certainly not an entirely new phenomenon in Soviet historiography; James Hoopes points out that "[one] of the greatest writers in the world today, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, might fairly be called an oral historian, because *The Gulag Archipelago*, his trilogy on the Soviet Union's forced labor camps, is based on the spoken accounts of his fellow prisoners, who could not safely have written their stories." (James Hoopes, Oral History: An Introduction for Students, U. of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1979, p. 11). Oral history has a specific additional advantage for those who try to understand and analyse the mentality of individuals, as the present author has tried to do occasionally in this dissertation: "The first thing that makes oral history different, therefore, is that it tells us less about *events* than about their *meaning*. This does not imply that oral history has no factual validity. Interviews often reveal unknown events or unknown aspects of known events; they always cast new light on unexplored areas of the daily life of the nonhegemonic classes. From this point of view, the only problem posed by oral sources is that of verification (...).

But the unique and precious element which oral sources force upon the historian and which no other sources possess in equal measure is the speaker's subjectivity. If the approach to research is broad and articulated enough, a cross section of the subjectivity of a group or a class may emerge. Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did. Oral sources may not add much to what we know, for instance, of the material cost of a strike to the workers involved; but they tell us a good deal about its psychological costs....The organization of the narrative reveals a great deal of the speakers' relationships to their history.

Subjectivity is as much the business of history as are the more visible "facts." What informants believe is indeed a historical *fact* (that is, the fact that they believe it), as much as what really happened." (Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990, p.50).

inhabitants of 'Tver' oblast' who had lived through the postwar period. Upon my return to 'Tver' in June 1992, it appeared that, because of communication problems with the History Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, nothing had been done with the questionnaires, in spite of the above mentioned agreement. The interviewers were left with roughly two months to conduct the survey. It proved to be impossible to interview two hundred respondents in this relatively short timespan, and in the end only 109 interviews were received. Although I intended to let the survey be "sociologically representative" on the basis of socio-economic statistics of the Kalinin oblast' in the postwar period, using geographical, occupational, gender, political, and other criteria, little came of this. Thus, the results of the survey are in some ways limited, but by no means useless: they still yield a fairly interesting illustration of many of the concerns and difficulties with which inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' had to deal in the 1945-1953 period<sup>21</sup>. In the answers of the respondents one can assess the priorities in their lives under the Communist regime and, more specifically, at the time of Stalin. Below will be described the events that made a lasting impression in the memory of the Soviet citizens of the oblast', and what some of their reactions were to certain policies and measures of the time. Naturally, the answers vary greatly, and, although the survey is by no means representative, it supplies insights into the life of ordinary individuals in Stalin's time, perspectives which would be impossible to acquire by

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<sup>21</sup>See the remarks on the limitations of the survey in Appendix I.



using only published and archival materials<sup>22</sup>. On the whole, however, the survey results will be used only to support some of the central arguments of this dissertation, that is largely based on the documents in the Tver' archives<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup>Of course, I am aware of the Harvard interview project of Russian refugees in the 1940s and 1950s, but, already due to the fact that those respondents managed and *wanted* to leave the Soviet Union in the war and postwar confusion, it cannot claim to be representative of the mentality of average Soviet citizens (For example, see A. Inkeles, R.A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen. Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961). Perhaps the results of the interviews that I collected can form somewhat of a counterbalance to the results of those surveys. See the following remark of Peter Rutland: "No doubt Sovietology will make great strides forward in the next few years, as more memoirs are published and documents slowly released. The last major surge in our knowledge of the Soviet system came in the mid-1950s, with the publications from the Harvard interview project. This time around, however, scholars will be able to interview not displaced persons and ex-POWs, but former members of the Politburo and Central Committee." (Peter Rutland, "Sovietology: Notes for a Post-Mortem," in: The National Interest, No.31, Spring 1993, pp.109-122, p.122). And I might add, referring to my own research, scholars will be able to interview former citizens of the USSR, i.e. those who were exposed to the consequences of the policies of the Central Committee and Politburo.

<sup>23</sup>See Aleksandr Zinoviev's parody on the questionnaire of Sociologist; some of the questions in it closely resemble the ones this author conceived (Aleksandr Zinoviev, The Yawning Heights. (Ziiaiushchie Vysoty), Translated from the Russian by Gordon Clough. London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1979, p.518).

## INTRODUCTION

Who, except hopeless bureaucrats, can rely on written documents alone? Who, except archive rats, does not understand that a party and its leaders must be tested primarily by their deeds and not merely by their declarations?  
Stalin<sup>1</sup>

This dissertation attempts to describe and analyse the life of the inhabitants of Tver' province under Stalin. Upon close examination, a myriad of questions arise: how exactly did the life of the Russian province change in the roughly hundred years from Emancipation to the death of Stalin? What were the effects on Russian society of the different economic policies of the pre- and post-Revolutionary political leaderships? How did society change under the impact of modernization, industrialization, modern warfare, collectivization, and other challenges? How did the provincial population react to the enormous transformations in their lives? To what extent did the people respond to the politicization of society attempted by the Bolsheviks and more particularly by Stalin? When did social groups and individuals in the Tver' guberniia-Kalinin oblast' accept the policies of the New Regime and when did they resist them? To what point were they aware of the excesses of Stalin's regime and to what degree were they subject to them?

I propose to concentrate on the changes in the average Soviet citizen's life as a result of the "socialist experiment," with particular stress on the little explored postwar period. As much as

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<sup>1</sup>J.V. Stalin, Works, Volume 13, July 1930-January 1934, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955, p.99.

the sources allowed, changes and continuities in the mentality of the population will be part of my analysis. The Party's policies will be scrutinized, along with their horrendous consequences for the population of the Kalinin oblast'.

The failure of what were ultimately Stalin's policies became particularly obvious in the immediate postwar period. An assessment of the long-term effect of this period's events on the population will be attempted<sup>2</sup>. Some of the Kalinin oblast's historical development will be compared to the larger framework of Soviet history, because of the exemplary nature of the region's history for it. This final comparative reckoning remains tentative at times, inasmuch as not enough research has been done in the field of Russian regional history.

Few outside the Soviet Union have tried to approach the history of Russia from a regional point of view<sup>3</sup>. One notable exception is the German historian Helmut Altrichter, who, despite his very limited access to Soviet sources, has written a remarkable account of the life of the Russian peasants in the Tver' guberniia

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<sup>2</sup>It can be argued that industrialization and modernization for any community have been a traumatic experience; compare for instance its impact in two different areas, one in Italy (Terni), and the other one in the United States (Harian): "In both places, a thriving traditional, rural culture was suddenly brought face-to-face with full-blown industrial development; there was hardly any gradual process of adaptation, or time for change and growth from within. So one theme of this book is the interplay of traditional cultures and industrialization --the uses of traditional culture by working people as they struggled with and tried to make themselves at home in a world which they built but, to a large extent, they did not choose to make" (Portelli, *The Death...*, p. XIII). One can propose that industrialization in Russia would have been a painful and cumbersome process in any case, but that Stalin's concomitant extreme repression of the population made it an immeasurably worse experience than was necessary or desirable.

<sup>3</sup>Peter Rutland also noticed this lack, when he examined the contents of eighty-seven Ph.D.-dissertations written on Soviet domestic politics in the United States between 1976 and 1987 (Rutland, p.115).

during the 1920s<sup>4</sup>. Thanks to the capture of the Smolensk Archive by American troops at the end of World War II, another interesting account on life in the Russian provinces could already be written in the 1950s by Merle Fainsod<sup>5</sup>.

The deficiency in regional studies was of course mainly due to the lack of access to primary sources for the post-1917 period. The impression that everything of importance in the hyper-centralized USSR was being decided in Moscow played a role. As long as Moscow's machinations would become clear, automatically a picture of the historical development of the Soviet Union as a whole would emerge. Nevertheless, only a small percentage of the Soviet population lived in Moscow during Stalin's time, while the majority lived in the countryside. In fact, according to one Soviet historian writing in 1989, the USSR only became an industrial country in the 1960s<sup>6</sup>. Apart from that, most Western specialists zeroed in on Soviet politics, a tendency which to a large extent would be justified in a society so artificially politicized between 1917 and 1953. In Marxist terms, it would be far from an exaggeration to

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<sup>4</sup>Helmut Altrichter, Die Bauern von Tver: Vom Leben auf dem russischen Dorfe zwischen Revolution und Kollektivierung. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984. The town of Tver' was called Kalinin from 1931 to 1989 (See: V.I. Smirnov and others(eds.), Ocherki istorii kalininskoi organizatsii KPSS, Moskva: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1971, p.364; from here: Ocherki). From the end of the 18th century the town was the centre of a guberniia in tsarist Russia (See Chapter I). In 1929 Tver' guberniia was dissolved, and only resurrected as the Kalinin oblast' in 1935. In 1989 it was redubbed Tver' oblast'. The terms province, guberniia, and oblast' are used synonymously in this thesis, although on the whole the researched lands of Tver' are called Tver' guberniia when describing the period until 1929, and Kalinin oblast' for the period from 1935-1989.

<sup>5</sup>Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule.

<sup>6</sup>V.S. Lel'chuk, "Industrializatsiia...", pp.329-354, in: V.A. Ivanov (ed.), Perepiska na istoricheskie temy. Dialog vedet chitatel', Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989, p.354.

maintain that the superstructure (politics, ideology) more or less determined the basis (the economy) in this period in the USSR<sup>7</sup>. No Bolshevik or Communist, of course, would ever allow for this point of view, because it would mean that "Hegel would have been turned back on his feet," after, in the middle of the 19th century, "Marx had stood him on his head." This would imply a denial of the fundamental truth that Lenin, Stalin, and their followers claimed to have found in the works of Marx and Engels.

Soviet history presents a sometimes deceptively simple facade: after all, the rules were laid down in Moscow, and everybody had to comply with them. Thus, the wages for similar work in industry were the same everywhere; everyone had the right to the same amount of housing space, and the like. Nevertheless, decisions could be made in Moscow, but their subsequent practical execution was quite a different matter. Even in a province such as that of Tver'-Kalinin, bordering Moscow oblast', the decrees and initiatives from the centre were often tacitly ignored, or adapted to local circumstances, by the local authorities or by the locals themselves. The theoretical image of Soviet society's monolithic uniformity was particularly undermined by the accounts of the inhabitants of Tver' in the survey that was conducted in the summer of 1992. It became

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<sup>7</sup>Francis Fukuyama might be right arguing that "civil society" made a difference in the last years of the existence of the Soviet Union and that it played a crucial role in its dissolution (Francis Fukuyama, "The Modernizing Imperative: The USSR as an Ordinary Country," in: The National Interest, No.31, Spring 1993, pp.10-18, pp.10/11). However, Fukuyama has to admit that under Stalin, "civil society" had been abolished to a large extent, and politics, the Party, ideology, the state, and the security organs shaped the course of social life (Compare to Fukuyama, pp.11/12).

clear that all had had to deal with the same kind of difficulties, but that every individual had found a different way to cope.

Both the Soviet Union and Russia are far too large, in terms of geography and demography, to serve as subjects of a comprehensive, yet concise, social history; moreover, the scope and depth of research done in this field until now are far too limited. It would be of great interest, if both Russian and Western researchers, would systematically explore the regional history of other Russian provinces, as well as the Ukraine, Belarus', and so on. Perhaps at some point in the future, a sufficient number of regions will have been described by historians. Then it will become possible to synthesize a relatively complete picture of the social history of Russians and other nationalities who lived in the Soviet Union; in turn, this would enable us to analyse the relation between the situation in the regions and Moscow's policies.

At the moment, however, far too little has been accomplished towards this goal. A considerably more detailed and certainly more comprehensive history of the former Soviet Union and its people could emerge with the help of regional studies.

To a certain extent, one can consider the Kalinin oblast' a "microcosm" of the historical development of Russia and the USSR as a whole<sup>8</sup>. In the first place, the province was agriculturally

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<sup>8</sup>The choice for the Kalinin oblast' was facilitated by the fact that it bordered Smolensk oblast'. The latter's development in approximately the 1917-1941 period had been described by Fainsod. Altrichter, furthermore, had already written about the situation during the 1920s in the countryside of Tver'. Combined with the research presented in this dissertation, it seemed to be possible to create a fairly complete picture of the social history of the Soviet Union from 1917-1953 in the area to the north-west of Moscow. Its history is rather typical of the history of the oblasts that constitute the "Central

comparable to others in the Russian "heartland." Around 1960, two Soviet ethnographers, L.A. Anokhina and M.N. Shmeleva, studied the life of the collective farmers in the Kalinin province:

The choice for the Kalinin oblast' as an object of an ethnographic study was determined by the fact that it appears to be in an economic and cultural sense in many ways typical for the central provinces of the RSFSR.<sup>9</sup>

Secondly, the province boasted a long industrial tradition by Russian standards<sup>10</sup>. Industrialization began in Tver' and Vyshnii Volochek, the two major towns of Tver' guberniia, at the same time as in St. Petersburg and Moscow, Russia's two dominant cities.

Because of its economic landscape, the oblast' could be said to be a "typical" province for European Russia. Since the last century it has been, and to some extent still is, divided into two distinct economic parts by the Nikolaevskii or October Railroad. The industry of the province is concentrated along the railroad and in the south-east, while the western and north-eastern areas have a predominantly agrarian character.

Lastly, during the Second World War, the oblast' endured German occupation in the west, but remained in Soviet hands in the east. The west was occupied by the Germans in the first months of the war, but the advance of the German army was halted in the

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Industrial Region" of Russia. On the idea that the study of the Kalinin oblast' can yield a microcosm of history of the USSR at large, see M.A. Il'in, "Raskrytie...", p.11.

<sup>9</sup>L.A. Anokhina, M.N. Shmeleva, *Kultura i byt' kolhoznikov kalininskoi oblasti*, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", Moskva, 1964, p.5.

<sup>10</sup>"In Russia the process of industrialization on a capitalist basis began later than in economically advanced countries. At the beginning of the century, it disposed of a developed light industry, especially of textiles," states V.P. Danilov in: V.P. Danilov, V.P. Dmitrenko, V.S. Lel'chuk, "NEP i ego sud'ba," in : (V.S. Lel'chuk(ed.), *Istoriki sporiat. Trinadtsat' besed*. Moskva: Politizdat, 1988, pp.122-190, pp.175/176).

province in December 1941. Upon the first serious Russian counteroffensive during December of that year, the oblast' capital was liberated by Soviet troops. Geographically, therefore, the history of the war in the Kalinin oblast' reflects on a smaller scale that of the Soviet Union: the west was occupied, but Nazi troops never penetrated much beyond the central artery of the October Railroad. There are some ultra-patriotic Tver' provincials who argued that the battle of Rzhev, liberated in early 1943, was as significant as the battle of Stalingrad.

The final years of Stalin's regime, the period from 1945 to 1953, have often been neglected in the historiography on the Soviet Union. This has partially been the outcome of the dearth of primary sources for this timespan prior to "Perestroika" and the dissolution of the USSR, and partially a consequence of the fact that those less eventful years failed to attract Western historians<sup>11</sup>. The wave of social, political, and economic transformations, that after 1914 changed society irrevocably, seemed to peter out after World War II. The focus of Western historiography with respect to Stalin's later years has been mainly on different aspects of repression by the regime: Zhdanov's activities in the field of culture, the rise of Lysenko and its consequences for the sciences, the Leningrad Case, the Doctor's Plot, state-sponsored anti-Semitism, the deportation of the nationalities and the terror in the Baltics, Western-Ukraine, Western-Belorussia, and Moldavia. This has been extended somewhat

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<sup>11</sup>For the 1929-1941 period primary evidence could be found in the Smolensk archive, and sometimes in the testimonies of those who had managed to escape during the confusion of the war.



thanks to revelations following Perestroika, but the pattern here described remains unchanged. Between 1953 and 1985, the only small political eruptions in the relatively tranquil internal life of the Soviet Union were the reassessments of the merits of Stalin, initiated by Khrushchev in 1956.

In spite of the tremendous loss in human life and material damage upon the war-ravaged western part of its territory, the USSR remained capable for more than forty years of maintaining its status as the "other" superpower, a profile gained from the triumph of its armed forces in the war. In part the USSR's elevated postwar stature was awarded by default. Germany had been defeated, and Great Britain and France had cleared the field, or were in the process of doing so, with the decolonization process being ushered in after 1945. At the same time, Stalin's eminently shrewd and crafty foreign policy led to an enormous increase of Communist-controlled territory on a global level, the size of which was startlingly enhanced towards the end of the 1940s by the unexpected victory of Mao's Communists in China.

While Stalin could have resigned himself to the internal rebuilding of the devastated USSR in 1945, he decided otherwise, in keeping with his ideology and the policies he had followed before 1941. For despite Stalin's advocacy of "Socialism in One Country" in the 1920s, the prospect of Communism's international triumph --in its Stalinist version-- remained paramount in the mind of the *Vozhd'*. He therefore rejected the Marshall Plan extended to him by Washington. Instead, Stalin chose to simultaneously rebuild and defend the Soviet Union and the new Communist empire it had won in

Eastern Europe and East Asia with its limited domestic economic means. The sustained effort this required was almost beyond the capacity of the Soviet population, but somehow Stalin's empire presented an economically and militarily competitive image to Western eyes. Perhaps this facade convinced Stalin towards the end of his life that the USSR was indeed just a few steps behind the impressive progress of the United States since 1941. To Stalin, this perception of the strength of the Communist world may have been sufficient proof that the extreme material sacrifice involved in making the choice he did after 1945 was justified.

Were the hardships that almost all inhabitants of the USSR experienced as a result of his policies ever a cause for concern or even reflection for Stalin? During the whole of Stalin's tenure as the sole and unchallenged leader of the Soviet Union, from approximately 1929 to 1953, he proved indifferent to the fate of the Soviet citizens, Party or non-Party<sup>12</sup>. The end, the triumph of Communism all over the world, or at least the defense of the Communist bastion against the enemies --imaginary or not-- who surrounded it, always justified the means, which more often than not led to the ruthless exploitation of the Soviet people<sup>13</sup>. Soviet citizens had only duties,

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<sup>12</sup>An attitude which only differed to a certain degree from the other "Old Bolsheviks." As Conquest remarks: "Non-Party people were hardly taken more into account, even by the better Old Bolsheviks, than slaves were by Plato." (R. Conquest, The Great Terror. A Reassessment, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1990, p.27).

<sup>13</sup>In forced retirement, Stalin's comrade-in-arms Molotov still defended the Great Terror as a defensive move to get rid of a potential fifth column in the case of a German attack (see Sto sorok besed s Molotovym. Iz dnevnika E. Chueva, Moskva: Izdatel'skii tsentr "TERRA," 1991, p.390 and p.417. He added: "As long as imperialism exists, this all will repeat itself again --rightists, leftists. As long as imperialism exists, we will not get rid of it." (Sto sorok besed..., p.406). He also explained the continuous shortages of consumer goods in Stalin's time, and under Brezhnev, as a consequence of the continued existence of "imperialism", which should be attacked by the Communists,

and no rights. In 1986, on Molotov's desk, among the last notes that he would ever write, the remark was found that "...the fundamental principle of socialism (in distinction to communism) is the fulfillment of the labour norms as established by society."<sup>14</sup>

This was the theoretical justification for the inhumane policies of Stalin and his close comrades during Stalin's life; as long as Communism had not triumphed on a global scale, all Communists and all Soviet citizens were expected to sacrifice everything they had on the altar of the cause. In return for their efforts, they were not supposed to expect anything until some unspecified point in the future, when the worldwide proletarian revolution would be victorious. It is, however, hard to believe that the repression came strictly from one side, as A.N. Sakharov has pointed out in a criticism of Western theoreticians of the concept of totalitarianism<sup>15</sup>. Sakharov indicates here that it is false to pronounce only the authorities guilty of the startling cruelties under Stalin, as has been done by some Westerners and in recent years (ex-) Soviet specialists:

Stalin, the stalinist bosses, and the administrative-command state-political apparatus are one thing, and the suffering *narod* is something completely different. We are dealing here with an artificial opposition: all horrible characteristics of totalitarianism emanated from the former part of society, while the latter part only plays a role as poor

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instead of trying to live with it in "peaceful coexistence." (*Sto sorok besed...*, pp.383 and 388).

<sup>14</sup>*Sto sorok besed...*, p.553.

<sup>15</sup>A.N. Sakharov, "Revolutsionnyi totalitarizm v nashei istorii," in: *Kommunist*, No.5, 1991, pp.60-71, p.60/61.

non-resisters, as lambs, ready to be slaughtered, for whom the only thing that was left was crying.<sup>16</sup>

The examples of Hitler Germany or Pol Pot's Kampuchea, too, have shown that uncritical, active, and sometimes enthusiastic, participation of large groups of people in morally despicable deeds against their fellow human beings on the instigation of the leadership occurs regularly in certain ideologized societies in this supposedly "civilized" age. The ardent involvement of rank-and-file Communists in collectivizing the peasantry and the craze of denouncing "enemies of the people" proves the point. Although allowing for a certain role which revanchism must have played among certain zealous participants in the repressions, I disagree with the idea of A.N. Sakharov that the explanation for the terror of the 1930s should be sought in a grandiose retribution, exacted from the better-off by the formerly downtrodden masses for centuries-old wrongs done to them<sup>17</sup>. After all, why then did so many people become victims of the collectivization and particularly the purges, who were from the same social background as their persecutors? The point of view of N.P. Poletika seems closer to the truth<sup>18</sup>. Poletika suggests that in the USSR the wholehearted collaboration of only a certain minority of society (20%, in the opinion of Poletika) was needed to unleash the necessary terror on the large

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p.61.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 63-69; see as well another article by Sakharov, in which he tries to explain the historical roots for the events of the twentieth century in the USSR: A.N. Sakharov, "Demokratia i volia v nashem otechestve," in: *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, 17, 1991, pp.42-53.

<sup>18</sup>N.P. Poletika, *Vidennoe i perezhitoe (Iz vospominanii)*, Israel: Biblioteka-Atia, 1982, pp.406/407.

majority, which would turn Soviet citizens into mortally afraid, and almost unconditionally obedient, subjects of the Stalinist regime.

Beyond the perspective of global policies and sweeping theories, one must recognize that politics played a significant role in the life of every Soviet citizen between 1929 and 1953. Of course, there were always stretches of time when personal affairs overshadowed politics temporarily. However, no one was able to ignore, and all had to participate in, the tremendous changes that were ordained in 1929. Everyone (if lucky enough not to become a victim oneself) was expected to applaud the purges in the second half of the 1930s, and no one escaped the ravages of the war, in which virtually all lost a relative.

After the war, the situation became more settled in the territories that had been part of the Union before 1939, except for some areas, where indigenous ethnic groups were deported in retaliation for their alleged collaboration with the Nazis. Arrests for political reasons took place more selectively, but were not yet a thing of the past. The state tried to mobilize the population with a renewed ideological offensive, but many of the slogans had grown stale<sup>19</sup>. It was not genuine political enthusiasm for the creation of socialism, but a combination of fears, as well as a desire to live a life without undue harassment by the authorities, which made people carry out the duties everyone was burdened with by the authorities (*v/asť*). The economically extreme postwar deprivations felt by a

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<sup>19</sup>In the 1950s Klaus Mehnert noticed a decline of interest in politics in comparison to the 1930s in the USSR (Klaus Mehnert, The Anatomy of Soviet Man. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961, pp.224/225).

large majority made a profound impression on their memories. For many elderly people, the anxiety, uncertainty, and economic hardships that are concomitant with the dissolution of the Soviet empire seem to resemble the difficulties they coped with in Stalin's last years<sup>20</sup>.

Much of the rationale for Stalin's policies has been extensively discussed in Western publications and, more recently, in historiography which has appeared in the former Soviet republics. However, a perhaps overbearing focus has been directed on the personality of Stalin, as well as his personal involvement in and responsibility for the many crimes against humanity perpetrated by Soviet civil servants, members of the Communist Party, and agents of the security organs against the Russians and other nationalities within the USSR. The last word on Stalin, obviously, has not yet been said.

In approaching this historical era, it may be helpful to keep in mind the following verdict by the author of the most recent history of the Russian Revolution:

The relationship between political, intellectual, and social factors is by its very nature a complicated subject, with sometimes one factor, sometimes another serving as the prime mover. The historian never confronts a stark choice: for him, the problem is always one of emphasis.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>See Elena Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia atmosfera posle voiny (1945-1946)," in: Svobodnaia Mysl', 6, 1992, pp.4-14, p.4.

<sup>21</sup>Richard Pipes, "1917 and the Revisionists," in: The National Interest, No.31, Spring 1993, pp.68-79, pp.70/71.

In this dissertation, more emphasis will be given to the fate of "the cogs in the wheel" of the system that has been dubbed "totalitarianism" in its Russian emanation<sup>22</sup>.

The urge to pursue research on Stalin's Soviet Union from a socio-historical perspective is not itself a novelty. Scholars such as Moshe Lewin and Richard Lorenz, and the "revisionists," of whom Sheila Fitzpatrick is the most renowned proponent, have been examining evidence on the life of Soviet citizens for years<sup>23</sup>. Nevertheless, according to some astute observers, little worthwhile knowledge can be derived from reading the revisionists' publications. Recently, Robert Conquest acerbically noted that the application of "political science criteria" to Soviet history had led to an astonishing underestimation or even denial of the "sheer nastiness of the system and its paragons, or the blinkered triviality of their [i.e. those paragons'] ways of thinking."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>For example, Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. New Edition, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966. For the use of the term "cogs in the wheel" by Stalin immediately after the war, see Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia... (1945-1946)," pp.8/9.

<sup>23</sup>See for example Sheila Fitzpatrick(ed.), Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978 --particularly the articles by S.Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution as Class War," pp.8-40 and by M. Lewin, "Society, State and Ideology," pp.41-77--, N. Lampert, G.T. Rittersporn(eds.), Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath. Essays in Honour of Moshe Lewin, London: MacMillan, 1992, and R. Lorenz, Sozialgeschichte der Sowjetunion I, 1917-1945. Frankfurt/ Main: Suhrkamp, 1976. Fitzpatrick characterizes the "revisionists" as "...the so-called revisionist movement in American Sovietology which was associated both with repudiation of Cold War scholarship, particularly the totalitarian model, and with a challenge from social historians to the dominance of political scientists" (Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front. Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia, Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1992, Preface, p.X).

<sup>24</sup>R. Conquest, "Red for Go. How Western Pundits Got the Wrong Signals about the USSR," in: Times Literary Supplement, July 9, 1993, pp.3-5, p.4. Peter Reddaway agrees with Conquest's criticism of the inappropriate application of social science methods (Peter Reddaway, "The Role of Popular Discontent," in: The National Interest, No.31, Spring 1993, pp.57-63, p.58). The present author agrees with this criticism to a large extent

Meanwhile, many other works --on Stalin's personality and political role, certain aspects of the history of the USSR, the workings of its political system, general histories-- describe the fate of the Soviet citizens and the repercussions of Stalin's policies on daily life as well<sup>25</sup>. Both these works and those of the "social historians" neglect the postwar period to a large extent, with the exception of Fainsod's How Russia is Ruled.

Because of the lack of regional studies and the neglect of the study of the postwar period, I decided to try to find out how the Russians had lived in the "province" from approximately 1945 to 1953. It was here that the overwhelming majority of the population had to live with the consequences of Stalin's policies.

The structure of this dissertation employs both linear and conceptual approaches to the history of the Tver' province. The division among the first four chapters is chronological. Within the subdivisions of these chapters, a certain element of the history of the particular period is described. Chapter I deals with the history of Tver' guberniia under the last Romanovs, the events of 1917 and the subsequent Civil War, and an analysis of the NEP. The second chapter delves into the subject of Stalin's revolution: what were the

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and will particularly criticize for similar deficiencies the work of G.T. Rittersporn in Chapter III (G.T. Rittersporn, Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications. Social Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR, 1933-1953, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers GmbH, 1991).

<sup>25</sup>For example R. Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1986, and The Great Terror, Fainsod, How..., Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge, R.C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above 1928-1941, New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, Volkogonov, Triumf i Tragediia, or M. Heller and A. Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, New York: Summit Books, 1986.



initial results of collectivization and industrialization for the provincial population? In the next chapter, an estimate will be given of the extent of the Terror and its consequences in the Kalinin oblast'. Chapter IV discusses the events of World War II in the province, with particular stress on the political, social, and economic consequences of the war.

The ensuing chapters are divided thematically. The position of the Communist Party will be the focus of Chapter V. The perception of reality by the central and provincial leadership, as well as the measures taken to improve matters on the basis of this perception, will be analysed. An assessment will be made of the degree of success of Party, government, and Komsomol in implementing policies. As a part of that, I will describe the discrepancy between the formal efficiency of these organizations and the complicated reality of their operations. In Chapter VI, the interaction between the Party and the population is the centre of attention. On the one hand, the authorities' efforts to render politically conformist Soviet citizens out of the inhabitants of Kalinin oblast' are appraised. The sanctions applied as a part of these efforts form part of this appraisal. On the other hand, the reaction of the people to the extreme imposition of conformism by the rulers needs to be determined.

The seventh chapter is concerned with the exceptional character of demographic development of the population of the Kalinin oblast'. The inordinate losses resulting from collectivization, migration, the purges, and the war are reviewed. An attempt is made to establish the relative weight of these four

factors for the population loss. Political and economic factors contributing to the stagnation of the population level after the war, as well as the causes for the flight from the collective farms, are described. Chapter VIII raises the question of what life was like for the inhabitants of the Kalinin province after the war. How did they try to survive? With which means did they attempt to rebuild all that had been destroyed in the war? To what degree was the postwar "revival" successful? What were the wages, what was the standard of living? How were people housed, how were they educated? For which groups was life comparatively superior? What was the position of women?

In addition, Chapters V to VIII attempt to elucidate how the population was constantly urged on and harassed by the Party, the government, and the security organs, and how the inhabitants tried to evade the outrageous demands imposed on them as best as possible under the circumstances of the constant supervision and interference from above. With the help of the survey, the *narod's* perception of the authorities and of life in general under Stalin becomes an integral part of the narrative.

The reception, implementation, and results of some of the reforms initiated by Malenkov and Khrushchev, particularly from the point of view of the contrast they made with the pre-March 1953 period, provides the basis for discussion in Chapter IX. This tries to establish how much the "socialist experiment" changed the customs and attitudes of the average Russian.

## Translation and Transcription

All translations of the Russian of secondary sources, archival documents, and of answers of the survey respondents are my own. In translating direct quotations, I have tried to stay as closely as possible to the original Russian. Therefore, lower and upper cases are used in the way they were used in the original Russian of the quote. This leads to certain discrepancies with the rest of the text of the dissertation: for example, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Russian abbreviation: *KPSS*) or its predecessor the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (Russian abbreviation: *VKP(b)*), are often referred to as "the Party" in my account. In archival documents or secondary sources, this organization is referred to as "party"; i.e. with the use of the lower case, which I have kept in the translation of the direct quotes. Similarly, in the text I use "Communist," with a capital "C," when referring to a (candidate or full) member of the above organizations, while in Soviet sources the lower case is used for the word.

As well, the original Russian of certain quotations was grammatically incorrect or stylistically flawed. For the most part, I corrected the grammatical errors, while leaving the stylistic ones untouched. Therefore, some of the quotations might come across as rather awkward to the reader. I have decided to concede the stylistic errors, because the mode conveys something of the education level of most protagonists, as well as their rather simplistic and repetitive way of speaking and writing, in the following account.

All translations of secondary German sources are mine as well. The transcription of Russian names and words generally follows that of the Library of Congress, unless a name or word is commonly known in another transcription (e.g. Voznesensky is used instead of Voznesenskii).


Dates in the dissertation for events before January 31, 1918 (February 13, 1918, in the West), usually correspond to the Julian calendar that traditionally prevailed in Imperial Russia (sometimes called "Old Style"). For events after January 1918, the Gregorian calendar is used ("New Style").

Occasionally, the references to archival documents have the abbreviation "ob." added to the numbers of the *listy*. This indicates that the verso side of the *list* had no separate page numbering. Thus 1.244ob. means *list* 244 verso (Russian: *obratnyĭ*).


The references to the respondents' answers to the survey of 1992 in Tver' province are designated by the phrase "testimony of ...[initials and last name of respondent] in the survey".

## MAPS

European Russia in 1913


Based on Altrichter, *Die Bauern von Tver'*, Abb.1, p.6

## Tver' Guberniia in 1928




Based on Altrichter, Die Bauern von Tver', Abb.2, p.11

Maximum Extent of German Occupation of the Kalinin Oblast' (in 1941/1942)



The shaded area represents the furthest German advance in the autumn of 1941  
 Based on *Bol'shaia Sovetskaja Entsiklopediia*, Tom XIX (Second ed.), map in between  
 pp.432 and 433, and *Kalininskaja Oblastnaja Organizatsiia*..., p.257

The Kalinin Oblast' in 1952



Most towns and raion centres are indicated on the map. Selizharovo was the capital of Kirov raion.

Based on Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Tom XIX (Second ed.), map in between pp.432 and 433, and Kalininskaiia Oblastnaia Organizatsiia..., p.257



## CHAPTER I: BEFORE 1929

### I.1. Before 1917

Although the borders of the guberniia and oblast' have been redrawn many times, its territory has remained roughly the same size --about 65,000 square kilometers-- since the end of the 18th century<sup>1</sup>. The Tver' territory lies in the heartland of European Russia on the Russian Plain, and is considered to be part of the so-called Central or Central Industrial Region. Around 27% of the oblast' today consists of forest<sup>2</sup>. While the oblast' possesses an abundance of rivers, lakes, canals, and smaller waters, as well as swamps, its soil is poorly suited for agricultural purposes<sup>3</sup>. The population density in 1959 was the smallest of all oblasts in the Central

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<sup>1</sup>See Table 1 and the maps. Except for a period between 1929 and 1935, when the area was split up roughly between the Western Oblast' and Moscow Oblast'; from 1935 - 1944 it was significantly larger than it had been since the 18th century, or would be after 1944; in 1957 the oblast' received most of its western territory of today --the raions of Belyi, Zharkovo, Il'inskoe, Lenino, Nelidovo, Oktiabr', Peno, Serezhinskii and Toropets--, an expansion of almost 20,000 km<sup>2</sup>). See Ocherki, p.337; Ts.S.U. RSFSR, Statisticheskoe Upravlenie Kalininskoi oblasti, Kalininskaiia oblast' za piat' desiat let v tsifrakh. Statisticheskii Sbornik, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Statistika", 1967, p.11. The 19th century size of the guberniia was 80% of the size of the enlarged oblast' in 1960 (See: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Geografii, Tsentral'nyi Raion. Ekonomiko-geograficheskaiia kharakteristika, Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Geograficheskoi Literatury, 1962, [from here: Tsentral'nyi Raion] p.526).

<sup>2</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.42.

<sup>3</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, pp.32-34 and p.525. At least until the introduction of modern fertilizers, the circumstances of climate and the soil in the guberniia and subsequent oblast' were too poor for the cultivation of wheat; most of the grains grown were rye, oats and buckwheat. See Altrichter, Anmerkungen zu Kapitel II/1, endnote 8, p.289. See as well Basile Kerblay, Du Mir aux Agrovilles, Paris: Institut d'etudes Slaves, 1985, p.30, for a description of the similarly inimical natural environment for agriculture in the neighbouring Smolensk guberniia-oblast'.

Region: twenty-one people per square kilometer<sup>4</sup>. In January, the coldest month of the year, the temperature averaged -8 degrees Celsius in the western and -12 degrees Celsius in the eastern parts of the oblast' in 1953<sup>5</sup>. The warmest month of the year was July, with an average temperature of between 18.5 and 19.5 degrees Celsius. The vegetation period amounted to 130 to 140 days annually, while precipitation varied between 52 to 63 centimeters per year.

The Tver' lands have featured prominently several times in the history of Rus' and the Muscovite state. The town of Tver' is mentioned for the first time in 1209 in the chronicles<sup>6</sup>. It became famous for the revolt of the *Tveriane* against the Tatars in the early 14th century, and competed with Moscow during the fourteenth and early fifteenth over the rule of the lands of Rus'<sup>7</sup>. In 1485, Ivan III finally incorporated the principedom of Tver' into the Muscovian state<sup>8</sup>. The proximity of Moscow would remain an influential element in the subsequent economic, political, social, and cultural

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<sup>4</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.120; of course, this count was taken including the area that was added to the oblast' in 1957; the sparsely populated western part of the contemporary oblast' decreased the density. The population of the oblast' was larger before the war, and consequently the density was higher (see Table 2).

<sup>5</sup>B.A. Vvedenskii(ed.), Bol'shaia Sovetskaiia entsiklopediia, Tom XIX(Istorizm-Kandi) 2nd. edition, Moscow:1953, p.431.

<sup>6</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.541. Torzhok ("Novi-torg") is mentioned in an entry for 1139 of the Novgorodian Chronicle (The Chronicle of Novgorod. 1016-1471, translated by R. Mitchell and N. Forbes, Hattiesburg, Miss.: Academic International, 1970 (1914), p.16). The same chronicle mentions the area around Bezhetsk ("Bezhitsy, Bezhitski Verkh") in an entry for 1196 (ibid., p.40); Tver' in 1215 (ibid., p.54); and Rzhev ("Rzhevka") a year later (ibid., p.55).

<sup>7</sup>In 1327, *Kniaz* Aleksandr Mikhailovich of Tver' revolted; the revolt was bloodily suppressed (e.g. The Chronicle.... pp.124-125).

<sup>8</sup>Torzhok --probably together with Novgorod-- joined the Muscovite state a few years earlier, in 1478; see Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.568.

development of the Tver' lands<sup>9</sup>. In later times the influence of St. Petersburg-Leningrad would be added to that of Moscow; even today, many Tver' locals visit the two capitals regularly or settle down permanently in one of the cities. Conversely, Muscovites and Petersburgers visit the oblast' as tourists; Seliger Lake in the north-west is particularly popular. In recent times, Politburo members, such as Suslov and Brezhnev, enjoyed hunting in the Zavidovo raion south of Kalinin-Tver'.

The Livonian War and the Time of Troubles devastated the Tver' lands, and they would only begin to recover approximately a century later, around 1700<sup>10</sup>.

At the beginning of the 18th century, the lands of Tver' rose to renewed prominence because of their location on the route from Moscow to the new capital, St. Petersburg. Around the town of Vyshnii Volochek, the first inland canal system in Russia was built under the auspices of Peter the Great. In this way the Volga, originating in the area to the west of Tver', was connected with the Msta river and thus with the Baltic<sup>11</sup>. The towns of Vyshnii Volochek, Torzhok, and Tver' became postal stops along the Moscow-St. Petersburg highway. Under Catherine the Great in the 1770s the Tver' guberniia was formed<sup>12</sup>. In the 18th century 64% of the peasantry, who formed the bulk of the population, were serfs<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup>See for instance Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.527.

<sup>10</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.529.

<sup>11</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.32.

<sup>12</sup>In 1775-1776, to be exact; A.N. Vershinskii, Goroda Kalininskoi oblasti (Istoricheskie ocherki), Kalininskoe Oblastnoe Literaturnoe Izdatel'stvo, Kalinin, 1939, p. 41.

<sup>13</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.67

While this may appear to be a large share of enserfed among the peasantry, it represented the smallest percentage in all of the Central Region at that time. Radishchev in his Journey travelled through the guberniia, as did Marquis de Custine almost fifty years later<sup>14</sup>. The travels of Pushkin around Tver' are today widely advertised as a reason to visit the Upper Volga region and to follow in the poet's footsteps.

The population of the guberniia in 1815 came to 538,030 men and 572,081 women, for a total of 1,110,111<sup>15</sup>. The guberniia's number of inhabitants grew by 25% between 1796 and 1851, in contrast to the population of many other central provinces, which stagnated during this period<sup>16</sup>. The advantageous position on the land and water routes from Moscow to St. Petersburg quite likely exerted influence here. From an ethnic standpoint, (Great) Russians represented the large majority of the population; in the 17th century groups of Karelians had settled in the *uezdy* of Bezhetsk, Vyshnii Volochek, Torzhok, Ves'egonsk, in the Northern parts of Tver' *uezd* and in a few villages of the Rzhev *uezd*<sup>17</sup>. The consistency of this ethnic composition is exemplified by the results of the census of 1926. In that year, 92.95% of the population of the *guberniia* was

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<sup>14</sup>A.N. Radishchev, A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1966, pp.156-212. Empire of the Czar: A Journey Through Eternal Russia. By Marquis de Custine. London: Double Day, 1989, pp.369-371.

<sup>15</sup>Kraevedcheskii atlas Tverskoi gubernii, Tver', 1928. S ob'iasnitel'nym tekstom. Pod red. A. Vershinskogo. Izdanie Tverskogo Gubono i komiteta assotsiatsii po izucheniiu proizvod. sil. gub., p.4.

<sup>16</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, pp.72/73.

<sup>17</sup>Kraevedcheskii atlas, pp.3/4; *uezd* can be translated as district.

Russian, while 6.26% were Karelian; less than 1% was of other nationality.

As in all of Russia before the revolution, the inhabitants engaged primarily in agriculture. Barge-haulers were active along the water route, and several "clusters" of artisan settlements existed, among them the cobblers around Kimry. As Altrichter points out, the circumstances for agriculture in this somewhat northern and overpopulated area proved to be not particularly favourable, so that many peasants were forced to take up other work on the side or adopt a permanent non-agricultural trade<sup>18</sup>. Emancipation did not lead to an automatic improvement of the lives of many of the peasants. On the one hand, they were obliged to pay compensation fees to their former lords and, on the other hand, they often had to rent additional plots of land from large landowners, since their own plots were of insufficient size<sup>19</sup>. The peasants were forced to do some forms of disguised *corvée* in order to discharge of some of their resulting debts to the large landowners. On the subject of the peasants' domestic artisanship, Seton-Watson has written:

Especially in the central provinces, the peasants worked in their houses and sold the product (for instance cloth, sacking, cutlery, leather or wood work) to a merchant entrepreneur. In some areas *artels* marketed their members' wares.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Altrichter, p. 13; Kerblay, p.30/31. After the Emancipation of 1861, the average yield of grain that was fit for human consumption in Smolensk oblast' hovered around 220 kilograms per head, far below the average of the more southern areas of the Russian Empire.

<sup>19</sup>Kerblay, pp.32-34.

<sup>20</sup>H. Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961(5), p. 112.

The guberniia never became a genuinely industrial centre during the 19th century: industrialization developed somewhat more in the eastern part, since it formed, thanks to the railroad, a bridge between Moscow and St. Petersburg, but the western part remained almost strictly an area of forests and agriculture<sup>21</sup>.

Economically, the guberniia served as an appendage to the Central Industrial Region around Moscow and to the region around St. Petersburg<sup>22</sup>. Those areas, industrially more developed, drew part of their labour force, raw materials, fuel (mainly wood and peat), and foodstuffs from the Tver' guberniia. The Tver' province exported predominantly flax, flaxseed, dairy products, wood, and berries to neighbouring guberniias.

Throughout the 1880s, about 10% of Tver's rural population was engaged in some form of domestic artisanship<sup>23</sup>. One can note how the trades were geographically distributed within the guberniia. In the north and north-west many peasants engaged in logging, felling, and floating trees, and near Ostashkov, located on Lake Seliger, there were fisheries. Many coopers lived near Vishnii Volochek. In the south-west, the area around Rzhev was known for linen manufacturing, while in the Bezhetsk *uezd* in the east, felt and wool were produced. In the south-east, around Kimry, people engaged in shoemaking, and there were cabinet makers and woodcutters in the proximity of Kaliazin.

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<sup>21</sup>P. Alampiev, "Promyshlennost' Kalininskoi oblasti (vvodnyi ocherk)", pp. 4-22, in: Uchenye zapiski MGU. 37: Geografiia. Promyshlennost' Kalininskoi oblasti, Tom II, chast' vtoraiia, Moskva, 1939 [from here, MGU 37], pp.4.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p.4.

<sup>23</sup>Altrichter, pp.78/79; see the maps.

Still more widespread was the habit of migrational labour. Due to migration, the population of the guberniia remained more or less stagnant between 1850 and 1900<sup>24</sup>.

There was a considerable migration within European Russia. From the central provinces, north of the black-earth line, peasants moved to the industrial cities, especially to the two capitals.<sup>25</sup>

Just before the First World War, the number of these workers reached 400,000. One gets an idea of the scope of the movement of the population, when one reads that in 1890 more than 100,000 natives of the Tver' guberniia resided in St.Petersburg, forming 11% of the capital's population; this group accounted for 40% of the migratory workers of the Tver' guberniia<sup>26</sup>. Although Seton-Watson points out, with some justification, that the ties between urban industrial worker and the countryside had eroded since at least the 1880s, when they hardly returned "home" anymore to help with harvesting, the countryside continued to influence the workers' mentality far into the Soviet period<sup>27</sup>. Almost 80% of the provinces' peasant households derived additional income from some form of non-agricultural employment during the early 20th century. Around

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<sup>24</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.86. A curious example of itinerant tradesmen of Tver' guberniia were its gelders, who visited Smolensk guberniia and stood there in high esteem (Kerblay, p.55).

<sup>25</sup>Seton-Watson, p.112. Some peasants gave up agriculture for a position in a nobleman's household as a servant. The servants' children could then enjoy some education and move up on the social ladder as a result (Kerblay, pp.63/64).

<sup>26</sup>Altrichter, p.14; see also Tsentral'nyi raion, p.86.

<sup>27</sup>Seton-Watson, p.123. G.T. Robinson has pointed out the survival of rural traditions in the towns before 1917 (See G.T. Robinson, Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord-Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960, pp.108/109). See below in this chapter and in the following chapters for the influence of the towns on the villages (e.g. I.6, IX.1).

1900, one quarter of the rural population was engaged in some form of handicraft, and every second family had its migratory workers<sup>28</sup>. In 1913, the guberniia administration issued 445,018 permissions to locals wanting to leave the territory of the province; for the large majority, the search for employment appears to have been the underlying purpose for such a move<sup>29</sup>. After the revolution, most of the rural artisanship disappeared in the countryside because of prohibition of certain trades and lack of demand<sup>30</sup>.

It can, however, be argued that the decline already began much earlier, in the 1880s. In this decade, domestic trade was beginning to be eclipsed by both competition from factories and larger units; the latter were formed by an amalgamation of craft enterprises, and eventually became factories themselves<sup>31</sup>. An example of this in Tver' guberniia can be noted in the development of the shoe industry of the town of Kimry<sup>32</sup>. The 1920s witnessed a further decline of seasonal work in the towns. In 1920, less than 23% of the amount of passes to leave the guberniia were issued in comparison to those issued in 1913, although the disruption of the Civil War undoubtedly played a role here<sup>33</sup>. The peasantry's habit of migratory and seasonal work, most pronounced in the area around the guberniia capital of

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<sup>28</sup>Altrichter, p.79.

<sup>29</sup>Ocherki, p.265.

<sup>30</sup>Altrichter, p.79; for the prohibition of certain trades in the 1930s, see II.2.

<sup>31</sup>Seton-Watson, p.117.

<sup>32</sup>Vershinskii, *Goroda...*, p.61.

<sup>33</sup>Ocherki, p.265. See also Altrichter, p.81. These temporary migrations, which sometimes turned into a permanent move to the cities, where the peasants joined the growing industrial proletariat, were rather specific to the Central Industrial Region (Robinson, p.107).



Tver', found its cause partially in rural overpopulation<sup>34</sup>. One of the most striking aspects of the social transformation of the Tver' guberniia and its successor under the Bolshevik regime, the Kalinin oblast', is the fact that the territory after 1941 has experienced a structural underpopulation in rural areas.

From the 1850s until today, the peasants' (semi-)permanent move to the city has remained a seminal theme of Tver's provincial history, as we will observe further on in this account. As in the rest of Imperial Russia, the urban population was quite small during the pre-railroad age: in 1825, 87,625 of the guberniia's population, less than 10%, were classified as town dwellers<sup>35</sup>. In 1897, 154,769 people lived in the towns out of a total population of 1,769,135. Notwithstanding its early beginnings in Vyshnii Volochek and Tver, where in the 1850s and 1860s textile factories began to operate, large scale industrialization took place comparatively late in the 19th century, similar to its late development in the rest of Russia<sup>36</sup>.

The early development of the textile industry was relatively typical of the central provinces around Moscow<sup>37</sup>. Not surprisingly, the textile entrepreneurs in the guberniia, such as Morozov and Riabushinskii, were based in the Moscow area<sup>38</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup>Tsentralnyi Raion, p.550. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Russian peasant on average had far more land than his counterpart in France, and, in spite of the adverse climatic circumstances, would have been able to produce a much larger surplus on the land in his possession before the 1917 revolution, given the right expertise, incentive and equipment (Robinson, p.97).

<sup>35</sup>Kraevedcheskii atlas, p.40.

<sup>36</sup>Vershinskii, Goroda..., p.30; Vershinskii, A.N., Khlopchato-bumazhnaiia promyshlennost' Rossii i Angliiskie krizisy 60-kh g.g. XIX v. Po perepiski Morozovykh, Tver', 1930, p.6.

<sup>37</sup>See Seton-Watson, p. 112.

<sup>38</sup>Tsentralnyi Raion, p.530.

The Tver' guberniia underwent an economic upheaval after the opening of the first railroad in Russia, the Nikolaevskii, that connected Moscow and St. Petersburg. In the 1850s Vyshnii Volochek fell into a rapid decline, as its canals and the highway were losing their important role in the transport of goods, an activity which employed thousands of people as pilots, barge haulers, coachmen, and carriers<sup>39</sup>. As a result, almost half of the population of the town and of the surrounding villages moved away. However, attracted by the abundance of cheap labour, the abundance of fuel (wood from the forests), and the proximity of the railroad, industrialists opened textile factories in the town starting from 1857. By 1914 Vyshnii Volochek had become one of the centres of industry of the guberniia, and ranked third in population size after Rzhev and Tver'<sup>40</sup>. In contrast, some of the smaller towns lost their economic importance as river or canal stations, and failed to experience any growth in the second half of the 19th century, as was the case with Zubtsov<sup>41</sup>. Within sixty years after the opening of the Nikolaevskii Railroad in 1851, a whole network of railroads had been built in the oblast'<sup>42</sup>.

By 1913, 114 industrial enterprises, employing 46,045 workers, were operating within the borders of the province; twenty-seven of those, with a total of 25,302 workers, were located in Tver' itself<sup>43</sup>. The most important factories at that time were the

<sup>39</sup>Vershinskii, Goroda..., p.30.

<sup>40</sup>Vershinskii, Goroda..., p.31; Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.102; see also Table 3.

<sup>41</sup>Vershinskii, Goroda..., p.41; see Table 3.

<sup>42</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.539.

<sup>43</sup>V.D. Chernishov, "Rabochii klass i promyshlennost' Tveri v 1917-1918 gg.", in: Tverskaia guberniia v pervye gody sovetskoi vlasti(1917-1920 gg.): Sbornik statei i dokumentov. Kalinin: Kaliminskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1958, pp. 42-66, pp.42/43

cotton-mills<sup>44</sup>. The railroad-car construction factory already existed at the time, but was still far from being the largest in the guberniia, having only 1,770 workers. The textile industry accounted for two-thirds of the total guberniia production and 66.4% of the industrial workers of the guberniia. In the town of Tver', 85.6% of all the industrial labour force worked in this branch.

The life of the workers before 1917 presented many hardships: illiteracy was still high, alcoholism rampant, wages low. After the revolution, the Bolsheviks would engage in an offensive against alcoholism and illiteracy, in the same way that earlier the Western European middle classes, social-democrats, and liberals had been involved in a "civilization" process, trying to "educate" the working class and combat its perceived barbarism<sup>45</sup>. A somewhat puritan Soviet account tells us with obvious distaste that, before October 1917, the town of Tver' had twenty-six inns, nineteen beer retail outlets, fifty-seven wine and beer shops, fifty-one churches, and three monasteries<sup>46</sup>. These last items may strike us as out of place in this list, but both presumably fall under the heading of Marx's "opium of the people," evil temptations leading the innocent workers astray. The disapproving Stepanskaia goes on to cite that Kimry's 15,000 inhabitants made use of thirty-six inns and taverns. She

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p.43.

<sup>45</sup>R. Stites, Russian Popular Culture. Entertainment and Society since 1900. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992, pp.12 and 18; here Stites indicates that in the last decades of the tsarist regime the Russian intelligentsiia and the political parties were engaged in a similar "offensive."

<sup>46</sup>E.P. Stepanskaia, "Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i kul'turnyi pod'em narodnykh mass Tverskoi gubernii(1917-1920 gg.)," in: Tverskaia guberniia v pervye gody sovetskoi vlasti(1917-1920 gg.), Sbornik statei i dokumentov. Kalinin: Kalininskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1958, pp.94-111, p.96. See also I.6 and VI.3.

opines that it was only after 1917 that the toilers of the guberniia were led to knowledge, to "culture." I would choose to disagree with this point of view, judging from the continuous complaints about alcoholism and the observance of religious rites, even in the 1940s and 1950s, which can be found in archival material, and from some of the answers given in the survey<sup>47</sup>. People continued to drink and observe religious rites after the revolution of 1917, but they retreated to the privacy of their homes to indulge in these customs, for to do so publicly was prohibited on the whole.

The first signs of social mobility stemming from access to post-primary education, had started before 1917: in Bezhet'sk *uezd* two peasant youths managed to graduate from the technical school in Tver' in 1913, the first ones ever in the guberniia from that "humble" background<sup>48</sup>.

When discussing the pre-revolutionary history of the Tver' guberniia it is necessary to reiterate that a mere 10% of the population was living in towns around 1900. Urbanization was a phenomenon in the province which started slowly in the 19th century, accelerating its pace after 1900; yet, even by April 1956, only slightly more than 40% of the population lived in towns or "urban type settlements"<sup>49</sup>.

Between 1900 and 1920 the guberniia's urban population grew by 90%<sup>50</sup>. However, in order to establish the degree of urbanization,

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<sup>47</sup>See e.g. VI.1-3.

<sup>48</sup>Stepanskaia, p.101.

<sup>49</sup>Narodnoe Khoziaistvo Kalininskoi Oblasti: Statisticheskii Sbornik, Kalinin: Kalininskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1957, pp.6/7.

<sup>50</sup>Chernishov, p.44.

one must add the number of workers, who left the oblast' and migrated to Moscow or St. Petersburg before the revolution. Although there are no definitive statistics, it is obvious that the number was significant, judging by some of the aforementioned numbers on the contingent of Tver' natives in St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, the Tver' workers demonstrated that they had not fallen behind the times politically, and that the province was far from a solidly rural backwater, when they organized a soviet of workers' deputies in the provincial capital in 1905<sup>51</sup>.

Following the emancipation of 1861, some specialization took place in agriculture in dairy farming, and more extensive flax cultivation was undertaken<sup>52</sup>. Animal husbandry and flax cultivation sometimes interfered with each other, because flax was sown on hayfields. A solution was found by sowing clover on the fallow, ending the strict adherence to the traditional three-way crop rotation that still dominated agriculture into the 20th century<sup>53</sup>.

An overview of the Central Region's farming practices in 1913 reveals that grains and leguminous plants accounted for 80% of the crops of the sown area, potatoes for 8% (a crop becoming gradually more popular in the Tver' guberniia from the second half of the 19th

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<sup>51</sup>Markov, N.N.(ed.) and others, Profsoiuz tekstil'shechikov. Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo VTsSPS profizdat, 1963, p.12.

<sup>52</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, pp.99/100. Flax had been cultivated before 1861 by the peasants, but almost strictly for domestic use (Kerblay, p.42). After 1861 its cultivation was sometimes intensified and the surplus sold off on the market. Moreover, in certain villages, besides clover, potatoes replaced oats and rye in the three-way crop rotation system.

<sup>53</sup>See below and also Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.108.

century onwards), flax for 5%, and fodder crops for 5%<sup>54</sup>. The high proportion of corn bears witness to the fact that before 1917, most peasants engaged in subsistence farming, producing mainly for the needs of their own family and not for the market.

The landed nobility entered a period of further economic decline after the Emancipation, in spite of the compensation payments they received from their former serfs, as well as the paying off of the peasants' loans (repaid by either *corvée* or money to the landowners)<sup>55</sup>.

Mismanagement of the estates seems to have been the primary cause for their downfall: the landowners were ignorant in agricultural matters and did not feel the urge to improve their

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<sup>54</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.100. Statistics for Tver' guberniia itself list for 1913, 75.3% of land allotted to grain crops (mainly rye and oats), 10.8% to technical crops (almost exclusively flax), 6.9% to potatoes and vegetables, and 7.0% to fodder crops. By 1950 in the Kalinin oblast's agriculture, 50.0% of the sown area was sown with graincrops, 13.8% with flax, 10.3% with potatoes and vegetables, and 25.9% with foddercrops (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., pp.28/29). On the whole, the proportion of the sown area sown with flax (or technical crops) and potatoes and vegetables slightly rose after collectivization. The cultivation of flax was drastically reduced between 1914 and 1921, because the foreign market for the crop disappeared (A.M. Bol'shakov, Sovetskaiia Derevnia (1917-1924 gg.): Ekonomika i byt, Leningrad: Priboi, 1924, p.35). In the 1930s, flax seems to have been planted much more than before in comparison to the other three main kinds of crops that the statistics list, but after the war its relative share decreased. It was particularly the increase in fodder crops that caused the decrease of the share of grains in the crop cultivation after 1917. The relative growth of the cultivation of grasses clearly began before collectivization, since already in 1928 almost 20% of the total sown area of Tver' guberniia was sown with fodder crops. In absolute numbers, after 1917 the area under grain crops never reached the level of 1913 again (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., pp.26/27). The area sown with flax was 50% larger in 1950 than in 1913 (for a while, in the 1930s, the land on which flax was grown had even doubled in comparison with 1913). The size of the fields sown with potatoes and vegetables had doubled in the 1930s compared to 1913, but after the war decreased, although from 1945 to 1953 these crops were still sown on between 70% to 90% more land than in 1913. Fodder crops were sown in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s on three to four times as much land as in 1913; they were always planted on more land than in 1928, when they were sown on almost three times more land than in 1913.

<sup>55</sup>Kerblay, pp.45/46.

limited expertise. They had a highly inflated permanent staff to actually take care of matters on the estate, since they were mostly absent themselves. As a consequence, many of the landed nobility became increasingly indebted and had to sell off part of their estate or even the whole of it to others, such as wood entrepreneurs, merchants, and peasants.

In order to get an idea of the situation and development of agriculture in the pre-revolutionary guberniia, one may consider the example of the south-eastern *uezd* of Kashin<sup>56</sup>. In keeping with the emancipation from serfdom in 1861, the peasantry received 168,000 *desiatin* out of a total of 251,000 of agricultural land in this *uezd*<sup>57</sup>. Thus, more than one third of the land remained in the hands of the state, the clergy, and the *dvorianstva*. Here, as in other areas of the guberniia, "capitalist relations" started to appear after the emancipation; in particular, the cultivation of flax developed. The peasants suffered from a lack of land and needed to rent additional plots from the landowners in order to grow flax at a profit<sup>58</sup>. Thanks to the appearance of the railroad around 1900, the *uezd's* flax began to be transported to Moscow and St. Petersburg. The town became a centre of the purchase and sale of flax. Initially this trade was controlled by local merchants; however, around 1900, foreign

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<sup>56</sup>See the maps.

<sup>57</sup>Vershinskii, *Goroda...*, p.51.

<sup>58</sup>Vershinskii, *Goroda...*, pp. 51/52.

companies had already established five or six offices in the town and started to dominate the flax market<sup>59</sup>.

By 1916 there were roughly 110,000 peasants in the *uezd* of Kashin<sup>60</sup>. The density of the rural population was extremely high in comparison to other *uezdy* in the guberniia: 45.7 persons per square kilometer<sup>61</sup>. One third of Kashin's agricultural lands by this time was devoted to flax cultivation. Out of 24,000 peasants' households of the *uezd*, one-sixth did not possess any horses or cows, and one-third lacked both horses and oxen.

It was in this district, in the village of Verkhnaia Troitsa, that one of the leaders of the future Soviet Union was born in 1873:

Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin. Kalinin's birth place inevitably became a shrine to faithful Communists under Stalin and after. We can find a rather biased, though on the whole probably faithful, account of 19th century Verkhnaia Troitsa in a book by one of the most renowned local *kraevedy* (students of local lore, history, traditions, etc.) of the Tver' guberniia/Kalinin oblast', A.N. Vershinskii (1888-1944)<sup>62</sup>.

Vershinskii indicates that by 1937, when he wrote his book, the village had become the model kolkhoz "M.I. Kalinin," which disposed of electricity --as we shall see very untypical at the time--

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<sup>59</sup>Vershinskii, *Goroda...*, p.52. Offices of foreign companies that traded in flax were also found in Bezhet'sk (see *Tsentral'nyi Raion*, p.563). The third centre of the flax trade in the guberniia at this time was Rzhev, in the south-west.

<sup>60</sup>Vershinskii, *Goroda...*, p.53.

<sup>61</sup>*Tsentral'nyi Raion*, p.560; i.e. 51.4 per *verst*. In 1960 in the Bezhet'sk-Kashin area, the population density in the countryside would still be comparatively high, but far below the pre-revolutionary level: around 19 people per km<sup>2</sup> (*Tsentral'nyi Raion*, p.562).

<sup>62</sup>Vershinskii, *Goroda...*, pp.51ff.



-, and even an automobile for transporting produce to Kashin<sup>63</sup>. The village is located on the right bank of the river Medveditsa, thirty kilometers from Kashin, a town of around 7,500 inhabitants during the second half of the 19th century<sup>64</sup>. Before emancipation, the local peasantry around Verkhnaia Troitsa were serfs of the *pomeshchik* Mordukhai-Boltovskii, of a monastery, and of the state<sup>65</sup>.

Verkhnaia Troitsa itself formed a community of state peasants. In 1858, the village consisted of twenty-six households, the total population amounting to 214 people. Following Emancipation every male 'soul' received 4.8 *desiatin* of land. Towards 1890, it was estimated that ploughed fields made up one-third of 468 *desiatine* of land, the hayfields occupied another third, while the rest consisted of woods belonging to the *dvorianin* and of swamps. The hayfields were too small to provide the villagers' cattle with sufficient fodder. The three-way crop rotation was still the customary farming practice, as it must have been for hundreds of years. The only equipment to work the land were ploughs and harrows (*sokha*, *borona*). Abysmally low, the harvests yielded perhaps only two grains of oats for every one sown, and perhaps three or four potatoes for each planted.

Altrichter remarks that in the Tver guberniia, before and after the revolution of 1917, the peasants harvested on the average about fifty *pud* of rye --about 800 kilograms-- from one hectare<sup>66</sup>. That was a yield of about five times the quantity of the seeds that were

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., pp.56/57.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p.52.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., pp. 55/56.

<sup>66</sup>Altrichter, p.77; A *pud* is 16.38 kilograms.

sown<sup>67</sup>. In comparison, the latest recordings of such low harvest results were found in Germany in the first half of the 19th century, and in other areas of Western Europe the dates go back even further.

The villagers of Verkhnaia Troitsa gradually moved away, due to poor harvest results as well as the compensation payments for their emancipation; as a consequence its population decreased<sup>68</sup>. The situation for those who remained was unpromising, to say the least. In 1887 seventeen households out of forty-seven, almost one-third of all households, did not possess horses; the same amount of hearths lacked cows, and fifteen households were bereft of both horses and cows. Some villagers left for the towns to join the labour force in factories and plants, while others worked for large landowners. In 1889, twenty-two of forty-seven households sent members of their family to work in seasonal jobs, and a quarter of these *otkhodniki* earned additional income outside the borders of their *uezd*. As we observed before, the guberniia's smallest landholders were forced to earn extra income by specializing in handicraft.

Out of Verkhnaia Troitsa's 270 inhabitants in 1890, only fifteen were literate, all of them male. Throughout the entire guberniia just before the revolution, three-quarters of the men still could not read or write<sup>69</sup>. A Soviet source notes as well that the level of literacy of the total population in 1913 was somewhat

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<sup>67</sup>Altrichter, p.77 and p.88.

<sup>68</sup>Vershinskii, *Goroda*..., pp. 55/56.

<sup>69</sup>Altrichter, p.22.

below 25%<sup>70</sup> However, literacy before 1917 might have been on the rise, when already special publications "for the people" circulated, although these were often of a doubtful literary quality<sup>71</sup>. Towards the turn of the century, the *zemstva* attempted occasionally to improve the lot of the peasants' communities by assisting with the opening of schools, libraries, and hospitals, by organizing readings for the villagers, and so on<sup>72</sup>. Owing to the poverty and lack of prospects in his village, the young Mikhail Kalinin, too, decided to find his luck elsewhere and moved to St. Petersburg<sup>73</sup>.

Instances of rural unrest took place between 1905 and 1907 in Tver' guberniia, though they were less severe than those transpiring in the south of the Russian empire. Stolypin's reforms after 1905 did not exert a lasting impact on the Tver' countryside, as was the case for Russian agriculture in general, because of the short period of time that the reforms were in force. It became possible in 1906 for a household to amalgamate its various, small parcels of land into one continuous stretch within the lands of the peasant commune (*obshchina*)<sup>74</sup>. The peasants were disappointed by another key element of the land reform: instead of the desired additional land from a distribution of state, crown, landowner, and church lands

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<sup>70</sup>I.D. Korzun, *Pervye shagi sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii (Iz istorii bor'by tverskikh kommunistov za sotsialisticheskuiu industrializatsiiu v period mezhdia XIV i XVI s'ezdami partii)*, Kalinin, 1960, p. 95.

<sup>71</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.252. That is, at least in the eyes of these two Soviet ethnographers. Unfortunately, in general, most literate people have a craving for the reading of texts that neither belong to high-brow literature nor are academic publications.

<sup>72</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.237 and p.250.

<sup>73</sup>See Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin. Kratkaia biografiia. Moskva: Politizdat, 1975, p.10.

<sup>74</sup>Altrichter, pp.20/21.

among them, they only received the possibility of full property rights over lands they already owned within the community. The claiming of such property frequently presented itself as a treacherous path, as it would be risky to simply abandon the shared responsibility of the village commune. If the full ownership of land would become popular, the fate of the poorer peasants seemed sealed for they would be obliged to discontinue farming. The attitude of the majority of the peasants towards the few individuals who wished to leave the *obshchina* reminds us of the attitude of the *kolkhozniks* and *sovkhoz* workers today towards the *fermery*: peasants who set up shop individually were excluded from using the village well, were not allowed to use the village roads or meadows, and sometimes their houses were even set on fire. The statistics clearly demonstrate how much Stolypin's reforms lacked popularity<sup>75</sup>. In 1905, still 99% of the peasants in the Tver' guberniia lived in the *obshchina*. Ten years later, less than 50,000 households had registered their lands as private property. This translates into merely 15.7% of the households, who owned 12.8% of the total *obshchina* land. Apart from this less than impressive turn to private ownership of the land, in almost half of this 12.8%, the land of the new individual owner's property was still not consolidated and a more effective cultivation of the soil was therefore impeded.

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<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p.22.

In 1916, the guberniia counted 340,065 peasant households within its borders<sup>76</sup>. 46,906 of these, or 13.79%, did not possess any lands that were sown with crops; 96,507 (28.38%) did not own draught cattle; 189,000 households could only boast of one head of draught cattle<sup>77</sup>. As a result, the exodus from the countryside continued.

In both the 19th and 20th centuries, Tver's role in national affairs remained limited, a reflection of the size of the guberniia. Yet the nobility of Tver' province suggested liberal reforms to Tsar Alexander II around the time of the Emancipation Act of 1861<sup>78</sup>. A generation later, the gubernial zemstvo made an impact at the accession of Nicholas II, when it expressed the hope in a manifesto that the new Tsar would lend his ear to the wishes of the people<sup>79</sup>. The Bakunin family owned estates in the province, and prominent Stalinists, such as Zhdanov and Pospelov, were active in Tver' in the social-democratic party in the pre-1917 years<sup>80</sup>. And there were more Tver' natives or residents who would join the roster of Party bigwigs under Stalin. The infamous head of the Writers' Union, Aleksandr Fadeev, was born in the province, in Kimry. Kalinin has already been mentioned; the secretary-to-be of the Central

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<sup>76</sup>Chernyshov, p.43.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., pp. 43/44.

<sup>78</sup>Both in 1859 and in 1862 (Seton-Watson, pp.47/48).

<sup>79</sup>Seton-Watson, p.144.

<sup>80</sup>See, for example, *Ocherki*, pp. 140, 141, and 144; also V.S. Platon, "Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov (1896-1948 gg.), pp.114-122, in: *Iz istorii Kalininskoi Partinnoi organizatsii. Shornik statei*, Kalinin, 1972; and *Schast'e s nami*. Kalinin: Kalininskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1960, p.20. Pospelov played a crucial role in the preparation of the "Secret Speech" of Khrushchev in 1956, and perhaps in this way redeemed himself somewhat (see L.Rogovaia (ed.), "Zapiska P.N. Pospelova ob ubiistve Kirova," in: *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, 9, 1992, pp.64-71).

Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet --and thus of M.I. Kalinin for a while--, A.F. Gorkin, was also a native of the province<sup>81</sup>. The unfortunate M.S. Chudov was another participant in the early history of the guberniia in Soviet times<sup>82</sup>. From 1918 to 1920, he was chairman of the *uezd* Party committee of Bezhetsk and of the ispolkom of the same *uezd*. Following this, until 1922, he served as the chairman of the gubisplokom of Tver' guberniia, in which he was the predecessor of Zhdanov. He became gubkom secretary of the Party in 1922, in which position he remained until 1925, when he was transferred to Rostov on the Don. Then, in 1928, he became second-in-command to Kirov in Leningrad. After the latter's murder on December 1, 1934, the old comrades from Tver', Zhdanov and Chudov, were for a while respectively first and second secretary of Leningrad. Zhdanov perhaps had an old grievance against Chudov, because in June 1937 he announced that Chudov had been exposed as an "enemy of the people."<sup>83</sup> Consequently, Chudov was executed on October 30, 1937<sup>84</sup>.

After the Civil War, it might have been in Tver' that Stalin first noticed Zhdanov, who had become chairman of the guberniia executive committee of the soviets<sup>85</sup>. At the Tenth guberniia Party conference in December 1921, Pospelov benefited from some kind of attack on the agitprop department of the Party gubernatorial

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<sup>81</sup>Ocherki, p.144.

<sup>82</sup>Kalininskaia Oblastnaia Organizatsiia KPSS v dokumentakh i fotografiakh. 1880-e-1987gg.. Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989, p.454.

<sup>83</sup>Conquest, The Great Terror, pp.215/216.

<sup>84</sup>Conquest, The Great Terror, p. 217.

<sup>85</sup>Ocherki, p.252; around 1919/1920 he was also a member of the Party guberniia committee, see Ocherki, p.233.

committee and was appointed head of this *otdel*<sup>86</sup>. In 1921, Gorkin, Pospelov, and Zhdanov tried their hand at writing, of course, at the modest level of writing that was thought to be fitting to provincial Party leaders of little seniority<sup>87</sup>. It is recounted in a Brezhevite source, how, in the fall of 1921, Gorkin worked as gubkom secretary, Zhdanov as chair of the gubispolkom (perhaps as second-in-command of Chudov?), and Pospelov as head of the guberniia trade unions<sup>88</sup>.

Lastly, A.I. Todorskii, an often used and important source for Roy Medvedev's Let History Judge, earned his first stripes in the Bolshevik Party in Ves'egonsk *uezd*. He wrote a book about his experience of the first year of Soviet power there, that was praised by Lenin<sup>89</sup>.

## 1.2. 1917

After the outbreak of war in 1914, quite a few textile workers joined the forces at the front<sup>90</sup>. As a consequence more women became textile workers, taking over positions vacated by the men. When the successes on the battlefield turned out to be few and far between, the homefront grew gradually restless. Strikes were on

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<sup>86</sup> Ocherki, p.257.

<sup>87</sup> Ocherki, p.256.

<sup>88</sup> Ocherki, p.272.

<sup>89</sup> Kalininskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia..., p. 173. The book by A. Todorskii is entitled God-s vintovkoi i plugom and was published in 1918 by the *uezd*ispolkom of Ves'egonsk in 1918. Lenin referred to it in an article titled "Malen'kaia kartinka dlia vyiasneniia bol'shikh voprosov," written in the winter of 1918/1919, and posthumously published in Pravda on November 7, 1926 (see V.I. Lenin, "Malen'kaia kartinka dlia vyiasneniia bol'shikh voprosov," Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (izdanie piatoe), Tom 37 (iiul' 1918-mart 1919), Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1963, pp.407-411).

<sup>90</sup> Chernyshov, p.44.

the rise in 1916<sup>91</sup>. After the news of the revolution in the capital reached Tver', rebelling soldiers murdered von Biunting, the tsarist governor of the province<sup>92</sup>. Immediately in March 1917 two guberniia soviets were organized, one for soldiers' deputies, and one for workers' deputies<sup>93</sup>. Initially, as elsewhere in the country, the moderate socialists were preponderant in the workers' soviet<sup>94</sup>. In general, Tver' guberniia seems to have been comparatively radical in 1917, probably because of its industry, which was more developed than that in the Central Black Earth Region, for example, as well as its proximity to, and close connection with, the two capitals.

Meanwhile, a commissar --functioning as a sort of governor-- was appointed by the "Provisional Guberniia Executive Committee of Tver'", the self-proclaimed representative of the Provisional Government in the spring of 1917<sup>95</sup>. The first commissar was the leader of the Kadet party of the guberniia. Apart from the liberals, there were eight local Socialist Revolutionary organizations in the guberniia, while there were still fewer than two hundred Bolsheviks, all town dwellers<sup>96</sup>.

In the early days after the February Revolution the textile workers founded their own union; in May its membership had reached

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<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p.45. The number of workers (25,703) that struck between January 1916 and February 1917, however, was still much smaller than in 1913 (around 56,000) (*Kalininskia oblastnaia organizatsiia*..., pp.113 and 120).

<sup>92</sup>Altrichter, p.24; Bol'shakov, p.72.

<sup>93</sup>G.A. Trukan, *Otkryt' v Tsentral'noi Rossii*. Moskva: "Mysl'", 1967, pp.46/47; Altrichter, p.24; Chernyshov, p.45.

<sup>94</sup>Chernyshov, p.45.

<sup>95</sup>Altrichter, p.24; Trukan, p.53.

<sup>96</sup>Trukan, p.54; at least in March 1917. Three quarters of the Bolsheviks were from Tver' (*Kalininskia oblastnaia organizatsiia*..., p. 130).



585 members, and in July already 5,270<sup>97</sup>. In October 1917, 13,000 workers were organized in a united Union of Textile Workers of 'Tver', Vyshnii Volochek, and Rzhev. In the same month, weavers of the Morozov textile works in 'Tver' seemed to have called for government by the soviets<sup>98</sup>.

According to Marc Ferro, factory committees of industrial workers were comparatively weak in 'Tver'. In his opinion, this would indicate a strong trade union movement<sup>99</sup>. Already in March and April of 1917, factory committees were formed by the workers in the 'Tver' guberniia<sup>100</sup>. Some of the committees acquired gradually more power in 1917, and forced the owners to involve them in the management of the factories<sup>101</sup>. Just before the Bolshevik putsch, in October, a conference of factory committees of the town of 'Tver' brought forward radical political and economic demands<sup>102</sup>. For a while after the October Revolution and the subsequent decree of the Central Executive Committee on workers' control of November 14, 1917, the workers' committees were allowed to run the factories<sup>103</sup>. Although the argument of Markov is seriously flawed (could a Bolshevik majority truly be discernible at the first conference of textile workers of the Central Industrial Region in

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<sup>97</sup>N.N. Markov(ed.) and others, Profsoiuz tekstil'shchikov. Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk, izdatel'stvo VTsSPS profizdat, 1963, Moskva, pp.38/39.

<sup>98</sup>T.A. Il'ina, "Ustanovlenie sovetskoi vlasti v Tverskoi gubernii," pp. 5-41, in: Tverskaia guberniia v pervye gody sovetskoi vlasti (1917-1920 gg. Sbornik statei i dokumentov. Kalinin: Kalininskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1958, p.7.

<sup>99</sup>Marc Ferro, October 1917. A social history of the Russian Revolution. Translated by Norman Stone. London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, p.172.

<sup>100</sup>Chernyshov, pp.45/46.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p.51.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., pp.52/53.

1907, at a time when the split in the RSDLP was hardly pronounced, least of all within Russia?), it is perhaps true that the Tver' textile workers may have demonstrated comparatively radical inclinations<sup>104</sup>. Their enthusiasm for managing their own factories after October 1917 would be presently suppressed, when the Bolshevik government could ill afford socialist experiments in the precarious situation of the Civil War. Instead, the workers would be disciplined in military manner by the authoritarian command system of the organization of the economy that has been dubbed "War Communism."

In May 1917 elections were held for municipal duma's in Tver' and Vyshnii Volochek<sup>105</sup>. The combined showing of the moderate socialist parties was better than that of the Bolsheviks, yet the results revealed something of the radicalism among the guberniia's urban population. In Tver', the Bolsheviks received 30% of the vote and in Vyshnii Volochek 25%, while the SR won respectively 28% and 28%, and the Mensheviks 20% and 12.5%. We are not informed about the support for the other parties, although in Vyshnii Volochek these received 34.5% of the votes cast. The Kadets were perhaps the largest recipients. Around 50% of those eligible, however, did not vote. This indicates a surprising lack of interest in political affairs in this highly politicized period. And while the Bolsheviks supposedly made a strong showing in those elections, they were

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<sup>104</sup> See, for example: Markov, p.5 and pp.38/39.

<sup>105</sup> Trukan, pp.122/123.

unable to publish a newspaper in the guberniia, in contrast to the Kadets, the SRs, and the Mensheviks<sup>106</sup>.

Demonstrations of workers took place in June, but at the time of the restless "July Days" in Petrograd it remained quiet in Tver'<sup>107</sup>. Then, in August, political engagement re-emerged when the soviet of Tver' sent its representatives with troops to Bologoe --in the north of the guberniia-- to thwart Kornilov's advance on St. Petersburg<sup>108</sup>.

Around this time, the first signs of starvation among the population became evident. Extreme deprivation would continue to plague the guberniia until the introduction of the NEP in 1921<sup>109</sup>. The worst hunger descended upon the towns, where food shortages started to occur at the end of 1917; according to one source, more than half of the population of the guberniia was starving in December 1917<sup>110</sup>. Since 1913, prices had increased four to ten times and more. As in the rest of the country, the industrial production during 1917 dropped drastically, the annual output decreasing 28% compared to the output of 1913<sup>111</sup>. Because of this, the workers' wages fell as well<sup>112</sup>. Raw materials and fuel became

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<sup>106</sup>Altrichter, p.30.

<sup>107</sup>Trukan, p.138 and p.153. Perhaps proving the point of some of the Bolshevik leaders in Petrograd that it was too early to make a grab for power, since the rest of the country was not yet ready for it.

<sup>108</sup>Trukan, p.178.

<sup>109</sup>Trukan, pp.188-190; (A.I. Moiseev et al. (eds.)) Podgotovka i provedenie Velikoi Oktiabrskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii v Tverskoi gubernii. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Kalinin: Arkhivnyi otdel UVD Kalininskogo oblispolkoma, 1960, pp. 21/22; Altrichter, pp.33/34.

<sup>110</sup>Chernyshov, p.48.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., p.47.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., p.48.

short in supply, and unemployment grew with the decrease of production.

Marc Ferro relates a quick victory of the Bolsheviks in Tver' province in October 1917<sup>113</sup>. It appears that the Tver' soviet of workers' deputies had gone over to the Bolshevik side on October 16, and was calling for the immediate transfer of power to the soviets<sup>114</sup>. Still, the Bolshevik Party had earned genuine popularity only in the towns of Rzhev, Tver', Kimry, and perhaps in Vyshnii Volochek; not one Bolshevik was active in the small town of Bezhetsk, and the Bolsheviks were unknown in the countryside sometimes as late as October and November 1917<sup>115</sup>. It would seem that the only truly active radical organ of revolutionary fervor was the soviet of soldiers' deputies in Tver'<sup>116</sup>. There is some further evidence in the literature of the Bolsheviks' limited success in Tver' guberniia before the October coup<sup>117</sup>. From September 30 to October 5, 1917, the second congress of soviets of the Moscow region, in which Tver' guberniia was included, took place. About one third of the delegates were Bolsheviks. The soldiers' and workers' soviets of Tver' guberniia were represented by eight delegates, on behalf of seven soviets. Only two of the delegates were Bolsheviks, one was a

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<sup>113</sup>Ferro, October 1917..., p.132; also, John L. H. Keep, The Russian Revolution. A Study in Mass Mobilization. New York, 1976: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., pp.361/362.

<sup>114</sup>Chernyshov, pp.51/52.

<sup>115</sup>Altrichter, p.30. Apart from that, one has to doubt that the people even in the larger towns understood what exactly was going on. One document of the ispolkom of the soviet of soldiers' and workers' deputies of Vyshnii Volochek shows that it felt obliged to warn the town's population not to engage in rioting and pogroms in celebration of the October revolution (Kalininskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia..., p. 142).

<sup>116</sup>Altrichter, p.31.

<sup>117</sup>Trukan, pp.193/194, and the tables on pp. 195 and 196.

Socialist Revolutionary, one a social-democrat who did not belong to either party faction, and four delegates were not committed to any party. Thus, on the verge of the October Revolution, the guberniia's soviets were still far from supporting the Bolshevik faction.

### I.3 October 1917

It took a few days after the coup of October 25-26, 1917, before the two town soviets --reinforced by the return from Petrograd of delegates to the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets-- declared themselves, on October 28, 1917, as the sole representatives of the new government in Petrograd<sup>118</sup>. The soldiers and Red Guards seem to have given the signal for the revolt; the garrison soldiers were instrumental in tilting the balance of power in the soviets against the "counter-revolutionaries"<sup>119</sup>. Troops from Tver' guberniia assisted in the Bolshevik coup d'état in Moscow<sup>120</sup>. In October and November 1917, we are told by Soviet sources, in almost every *uezd* of the guberniia, agitators, dispatched by the Central Committee, helped to establish 'Soviet power'<sup>121</sup>. Thereafter, before the end of the year, the executive committee of the soviets of workers' and of soldiers' deputies of Tver' --now united-- had to deal with political opponents to the coup<sup>122</sup>. In the

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<sup>118</sup>Podgotovka, p.25; Il'ina, p.8; Trukan, pp.331/332.

<sup>119</sup>Il'ina, p.6; p.8. Just before the October putsch, 95% of the local garrison voted for the Bolsheviks in elections for the municipal Duma, according to Trukan, p.225.

<sup>120</sup>Il'ina, pp.8/9.

<sup>121</sup>Il'ina, p. 6; Trukan, p.293.

<sup>122</sup>Altrichter, p.30, Podgotovka, p.26; the unification took place in the middle of November; ten out of fifteen members were Bolsheviks, see Il'ina, p.9.

November elections for the Constituent Assembly in Tver' guberniia, the Bolsheviks received 54% of the votes cast, and the SR 39%<sup>123</sup>. On December 2, 1917, the executive committee of the soviet decided to dissolve the municipal дума<sup>124</sup>. It, together with the guberniia land office (*zemskaiia uprava*), continued to resist the new authorities until the end of January 1918<sup>125</sup>.

From the beginning of Bolshevik rule, a new government apparatus was created by the Tver' soviet, while the old one was dismantled<sup>126</sup>. Soon, starting with the forced closure of the local Kadet newspaper, censorship was reinstated<sup>127</sup>. The Cheka was organized on December 7, 1917. Already on December 20, 1917, the valuables --gold, silver and copper-- of at least one of the monasteries, a popular place of pilgrimage before 1917, were confiscated by the new regime<sup>128</sup>. This was the beginning of a series of dramatic transformations of this monastery; it would become the stage for several of the Soviet state's experiments, some of them performed by the Cheka and its successors<sup>129</sup>. In 1920, for example, the iron fence of the complex was dismantled and subsequently reassembled for a cemetery for victims of the revolution<sup>130</sup>.

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<sup>123</sup>*Kalininskaia Oblastnaia Organizatsiia*..., p.149. This translated into five Bolshevik and three SR delegates in the Assembly; curiously enough, there were nine vacancies (Bol'shakov, p.75). In the latter case, in nine different districts, none of the candidates had received sufficient votes to gain a mandate for the Assembly.

<sup>124</sup>*Podgotovka*, p.27.

<sup>125</sup>*Ibid.*; Il'ina, p.12. In Goritsy *volost'* the soviet executive committee definitively took over all affairs of the *volost' zemskaiia uprava* on February 3, 1918 (Bol'shakov, p.75).

<sup>126</sup>Il'ina, pp.10/11 and p.13.

<sup>127</sup>Il'ina, p.13.

<sup>128</sup>Of the Nilova Hermitage near Ostashkov (Vladimir Abarinov, *Katynskii Labirint*. Moskva: Novosti, 1991, p.45).

<sup>129</sup>See III.2 for a description of some of subsequent metamorphoses of the monastery.

<sup>130</sup>Abarinov, p.45.

In December 1917, too, the soviet of peasant' deputies merged with the soldiers' and workers' soviet, creating one united guberniia executive committee<sup>131</sup>. Around this time, Soviet power had been established in all of the guberniia's towns. The soviets were led by Bolsheviks and "left"-SRs, with the exception of Ves'egonsk, where "right"-SRs temporarily assumed the political leadership in the local soviet<sup>132</sup>. The pattern of the Bolshevik take-over in Vyshnii Volochek, Torzhok, and Rzhev basically followed that of Tver'<sup>133</sup>. It can be suspected that the presence of representatives of the "left"-SRs in many of the new local governments made people accept the new regime without too much protest. After a few months, when most of the SRs left the government as a protest against the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks were comparatively firm in the saddle, and could do without the SRs. Nevertheless, the "left"-SRs in Vyshnii Volochek held on and would only leave the ispolkom of the *uezd* on July 8, 1918<sup>134</sup>.

Almost everywhere in the countryside, the Bolsheviks experienced difficulties in establishing their power<sup>135</sup>. This

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<sup>131</sup>Altricher, p.32; Il'ina, p.12.

<sup>132</sup>Altrichter, p.32; Il'ina, p.6; and see the map of Kalininskaia Oblastnaia Organizatsiia..., p.151.

<sup>133</sup>See: Il'ina, pp. 15-21; also, on Rzhev, Keep, p.196.

<sup>134</sup>Kalininskaia oblastnaia..., p.169.

<sup>135</sup>In Bezhetsk *uezd*, the SRs had the support of the "backward" peasantry. In Zubtsov *uezd*, the soviet of peasants' deputies, formed as late as December 1917, was initially controlled by the SRs. In Kashin *uezd*, no Bolshevik organization existed until the spring of 1918. In Kaliazin *uezd*, no Bolshevik organization existed in October 1917, and in Ves'egonsk *uezd*, the most remote district of the guberniia, only in the second half of January 1918 did soviet power (read Bolshevik power, although the situation was rather muddled, because of the temporary collaboration at the time with the "left"-SRs) become established. See Il'ina, p.27; p. 29; p.30; pp.31/32; and, again, see the map of Kalininskaia Oblastnaia Organizatsiia..., p.151, which seems to indicate that the

reluctance of the peasants to declare themselves for the Bolsheviks is interpreted by a Soviet author as a sign of "backwardness" of the Bezhet'sk and Zubtsov *uezdy*. However, it should be understood that they were "backward" only in the eyes of the new rulers. Before October, compared with other *uezdy*, the militsiia had recorded more incidents involving revolutionary activity among the peasantry precisely in these two districts<sup>136</sup>. In Bezhet'sk *uezd*, the Decree on Land probably persuaded the population to agree to the establishment of the new government, but full victory for the Bolsheviks would not be attained without bloodshed<sup>137</sup>.

On the other hand, in Kashin *uezd*, where it had been difficult to establish Soviet power, the people showed a remarkably large support for the Bolsheviks in the elections for the Constituent Assembly (24,463 of the voters voted for them out of a total of 45,207 votes cast)<sup>138</sup>. In this instance, an explanation for this ambiguous behaviour could stem from the popularity of the first Decrees of the Bolshevik government<sup>139</sup>. Lenin himself deemed an account of the takeover in Ves'egonsk *uezd* interesting enough to dedicate a short review to it<sup>140</sup>.

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Bolshevik take-over in the other *uezdy* came several weeks or even months later than in the larger towns.

<sup>136</sup>Keep, p.195.

<sup>137</sup>Il'ina, p.29.

<sup>138</sup>Il'ina, p.30.

<sup>139</sup>The participation in the elections was relatively high in the *uezd*, since in 1916 24,000 peasant households were counted, and the town of Kashin probably had no more than 8,000 inhabitants (Vershinskii, *Goroda*, p.53; see Table 3). Even though these population numbers are not complete, it seems that, if in the countryside per household two adults had the right to vote, and perhaps three fourths of the town's population, only a few thousand in the *uezd* did not exert their right to vote.

<sup>140</sup>Il'ina, p.33; Lenin, "Malen'kaia kartinka..."; this was the above mentioned treatise of Todorskii (Todorskii, *God-s vintovkoi i plugom*).



In the case of Ves'egonsk, the *uezd*-soviet of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies, apparently of "right"-SR inclination, organized the opposition against the new government, after having taken sole possession of power in the district. The soviet defended the Constituent Assembly<sup>141</sup>. It armed three hundred of its followers for this purpose. The vice-people's commissar of internal affairs, Latsis, embroiled himself in the affair, dispatching troops to Ves'egonsk to suppress the soviet; thus, the "revolt" was quickly suppressed<sup>142</sup>.

Ves'egonsk's resistance serves as an illustration of the fact that residents of certain rural areas were most determined against Bolshevik rule. By comparison, the towns witnessed a relatively smooth transition of power by virtue of several factors: the prior existence of Bolshevik organizations; the presence of soldiers' garrisons, generally inclined to support the new government due to the promise of peace, and perhaps of land, too; and the superior systems of communication, such as telegraph, telephone, and railroads, linking them to news and information from Tver', Petrograd, and Moscow.

The countryside was won with more difficulty, but the lack of organization among anti-Bolshevik groups, the general confusion caused by inadequate and obsolete information, the collaboration of the left SR with the new rulers, and the promises of peace and land made the initial establishment of Bolshevik rule still relatively simple --except in the remote Ves'egonsk *uezd*. Nevertheless, Tver'

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<sup>141</sup> Il'ina, p.35.

<sup>142</sup> Il'ina, pp.35/36; Keep, pp.455/456.

guberniia was apparently far from "Bolshevized" on the eve of the October Revolution<sup>143</sup>. The possibly negative consequences of the October Revolution only began to dawn upon the peasants, when forced grain requisitions began in the countryside in 1918.

#### I.4 The Early Years of Bolshevik Power and the Civil War

The first guberniia Congress of Soviets took place on January 8, 1918<sup>144</sup>. The new regime was still not uncontested in the province: it appears to have been rather dangerous even in 'Tver' for the members of the executive committee of the guberniia soviet (*ispolkom*) to show themselves on the streets after dark<sup>145</sup>. The official view of this period describes the 'Tver' peasantry as being remarkably supportive of the new regime. At the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the peasant Zhegunov, a native of the 'Tver' guberniia (from Rzhev *uezd*), greeted Lenin with great enthusiasm. Zhegunov appears in the Soviet literature to confirm the popularity of the new regime among the peasants<sup>146</sup>. However, this enthusiasm was either an anomaly or at best temporary, even though it can be argued that many peasants welcomed the new regime because of its promises of peace and land.

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<sup>143</sup>See I.2.

<sup>144</sup>Il'ina, p.14.

<sup>145</sup>Il'ina, p.14; see as well *Kalininskaia oblastnaia...*, p.152.

<sup>146</sup>Il'ina, p.12; *Ocherki*, pp.320/321.

There is some evidence for this argument, if it is true, as the Soviet historian G.A. Trukan maintains, that in elections held for peasants' soviets directly after the October putsch, the Bolsheviks became the largest party in twenty-five out of thirty-nine councils<sup>147</sup>. In contrast one Western author maintains, that the Decree on Land of the new regime was more instrumental in bringing about the land redistribution than the personal initiative of the peasants; yet, the redistribution must have been welcomed by the land-hungry local peasants<sup>148</sup>. There is evidence as well that the peasants' expropriation of large landowners had started in the summer of 1917, which would disprove the view that they were socio-politically conservative. The peasantry's conservatism in this matter strikes one all the more as incongruous because, if Trukan's account is to be accepted, in all the guberniia's *vezdy*, soviets of peasants' deputies were active already in early July 1917<sup>149</sup>. Trukan sees the existence of these soviets as proof of the political radicalism of the peasantry before October 1917. This last argument is not convincing, however, since the *volost*-committees had much more political clout than the rural soviets before October. The latter were few in number, and both urban and rural soviets displayed little activity<sup>150</sup>.

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<sup>147</sup>Trukan, p.324.

<sup>148</sup>Ferro, p.133.

<sup>149</sup>Trukan, p.46.

<sup>150</sup>A *volost* is an administrative subdivision of an *vezd* Altrichter, pp.25/26; on the *volost*-committees, Altrichter, pp.28/29; on the soviets, Altrichter, p.30; also Keep, p.195.

At least all authors seem to agree that the redistribution proceeded in a relatively peaceful fashion<sup>151</sup>. Altrichter points out that events in the countryside far from resembled something like class war, but rather reflected an implementation of the peasants' sense of justice:

However, the expropriations concerned --in the estimate of the peasants-- in any case only the people, who did not work the land with their own hands; those, who had in abundance, while others were famished or froze; and those, who sold surplus to the outside world, although the supplies in the village itself were not enough. After all, the local demand should be satisfied first. The peasants did not see a difference between the ownership of the land by either a large landowner or the church, as they took it regardless; nor between either a private person or the state allowing "their forest" to be felled and taken away, as they tried to stop it; nor between either the labour of Russian labourers or that of prisoners of war on the lands of the estate owner, as they expelled both.<sup>152</sup>

The actual introduction of a systematized network of soviets in the countryside, as distinct from the activity of some scattered soviets as described by Trukan, happens rather late, during the first half of 1918 in the *volosti* of the guberniia<sup>153</sup>. Subsequently, soviets were created in the villages<sup>154</sup>. Here, the soviets' authority was invested in the same people who held sway in the traditional village meeting (*skhod*) in pre-revolutionary times. These meetings would continue to govern village life. At least until collectivization, the villagers would ignore the soviets as much as possible. The outbreak of the Civil War would spell the end of the villages' temporary

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<sup>151</sup>E.g. Ferro, p.132; Altrichter, p.27.

<sup>152</sup>Altrichter, p.28.

<sup>153</sup>Ibid., p.35.

<sup>154</sup>Ibid., p.36.

autonomy from the centre, a freedom prevailing throughout the confusion of 1917 and early 1918<sup>155</sup>.

In order to mobilize forces for the war effort, a centralization policy was introduced by the regime. This was expressed by the introduction of the state monopoly of the grain trade in May 1918, and in the committees of the rural poor<sup>156</sup>. Their purpose was to facilitate grain requisitioning by the state, which started in June of the same year.

Only then did peasant opposition against the new regime begin to emerge. Several instances of villages revolting against the practice of grain requisitioning are recorded<sup>157</sup>. The government's effort to create a chasm in the villages between "rich" and "poor" peasants --by trying to recruit the latter for the committees of the rural poor and thus make them the executors of its policy-- had failed long before the Soviet government's decision to disband the committees of rural poor in the winter of 1918-1919. The organization of collective farms in this period resulted in similar failure<sup>158</sup>. Meanwhile, by 1920, almost all foodstuffs were requisitioned in the countryside<sup>159</sup>.

In urban areas, the supply of fuel and raw materials did not improve after October 1917, no matter how hard the factory committees or the economic departments of the town-soviets

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<sup>155</sup>Ibid., pp.36/37.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid., p.37.

<sup>157</sup>Ibid., p.39.

<sup>158</sup>Ibid., pp.39/40.

<sup>159</sup>Ibid., p.37.

attempted to rectify the shortages<sup>160</sup>. Factories started to barter their products for foodstuffs in the countryside. In the spring of 1918, the daily ration of a worker in 'Tver' amounted to no more than half a pound of bread a day<sup>161</sup>. Several groups of workers in the town walked out. Such was the case at the railroad-car construction factory, where in May 1918 workers left their job because they did not receive any food in return for their labour. High taxes were imposed on the local "bourgeoisie" in the first half of 1918 in order to cope with the expense of the growing unemployment benefits<sup>162</sup>. From early 1918 onwards, trade unions and factory committees attempted to improve labour discipline in industry<sup>163</sup>. During the second half of 1918, it became necessary to defend the factories from the frequent occurrence of thefts<sup>164</sup>.

Nationalization of factories began as early as January 1918; however, on the whole, the larger factories were nationalized only after the Decree on Nationalization of the Council of People's Commissars on June 28, 1918<sup>165</sup>. From that point onward, the guberniia's industry would be controlled by Economic Councils, that were organized within different sectors of industry<sup>166</sup>. By the end of 1920, the nationalization of the guberniia's industry had practically reached completion: 183 --out of 232-- factories had been

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<sup>160</sup>Chernyshov, p.55.

<sup>161</sup>Ibid., p.56.

<sup>162</sup>Chernyshov, pp.57/58.

<sup>163</sup>Ibid., pp.58/59.

<sup>164</sup>Chernyshov, p.60.

<sup>165</sup>Chernyshov, p.60/61.

<sup>166</sup>Chernyshov, p.62.

nationalized, in which 93% of all guberniia workers were employed<sup>167</sup>.

The Soviet state genuinely endeavoured to "civilize" the masses during the initial post-revolutionary fervor, although this was partially intended to serve immediate political purposes<sup>168</sup>. One of these aims was to mobilize the population's support for the Red Army. The effectiveness of these first efforts, which included anti-religious propaganda, the attempted liquidation of illiteracy, and the introduction of more modern farming practices, remains dubious<sup>169</sup>. It seems that the educational programs --workers' colleges (*rabfak*), courses taught at the factories, clubs in which communist propaganda was conducted, the opening of more libraries-- had some impact in the towns<sup>170</sup>.

There is no single explanation that can explain the new regime's ability to stay in power in 'Tver' guberniia. Different elements played a rôle. In the first place, an explanation should be sought in the disorganization of the resistance against the Bolsheviks.

Secondly, one can point to the satisfaction of the peasants with the newly acquired lands, officially granted to them in October 1917 by Lenin's government. In the final analysis, this factor might have rallied the peasants more than the threats to political rights

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<sup>167</sup>Ocherki, p.237.

<sup>168</sup>See Stepankaia, pp.96/97.

<sup>169</sup>Stepanskaia on p.97 gives us a rather glowing report of these activities; see also her conclusion on p.111. Altrichter shows that the success of these actions was extremely limited in the countryside, at least up to 1929, when terror was introduced on a massive scale to command the obedience and attention of the people. See Altrichter, p.134, and especially pp.167-174.

<sup>170</sup>Stepanskaia, pp.102-106.

and freedoms proclaimed by the Provisional Government. Such concepts were largely alien to the peasantry anyhow. The peasants' life took place in the village, where their families had lived for many generations. As long as the central government did not interfere in their daily life, they were not inclined to actively oppose the state<sup>171</sup>. But because of compulsory grain requisitioning, the state almost did lose the passive credit it enjoyed among the peasantry. Scattered and uncoordinated rebellions occurred, lacking political leadership and determination to hold out against the Bolshevik forces; but if they were therefore unsuccessful, the fear of more jacqueries did lead in 1921 to the proclamation of the New Economic Policy.

Thirdly, the enormous degree of physical and mental exhaustion over a period of many years of war and upheaval would be difficult to quantify. Not only were many people killed in combat, but a large number in the guberniia lost their lives due to epidemics, including the infamous Spanish influenza<sup>172</sup>. In both the countryside and the towns prevailed a tremendous desire to return to "normal"

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<sup>171</sup>Makhno's remark to Lenin in June 1918 shows that the "Green" leader knew much better than the self-styled leader of the proletariat how the peasants viewed the revolution: the peasantry saw it as a means to get rid of any intrusion by the outside world in local affairs (Heller and Nekrich, p.107).

<sup>172</sup>G.S. Mazanov, N.A. Frolova, "Zdravookhranenie Tverskoi gubernii-Kalininskoi oblasti za 50 let Sovetskoi vlasti," in: Zdravookhranenie Kalininskoi oblasti za 50 let, Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1967, pp.5-24, pp.9/10. A cholera epidemic killed 155 inhabitants of 'Tver' between July 13 and August 15, 1918. When this epidemic had more or less subsided, the Spanish flu took its place. In the second half of September 1918 in Bezhet'sk *vezd* 8,476 cases of infection were registered, while 14,787 cases were found in Tver' alone in October 1918. Furthermore, eruptions of typhoid and smallpox succeeded or were concomitant with these epidemics. In May 1919, 3,418 cases of people infected with smallpox were registered in Tver'; typhus (spotted fever) was registered among 15,867 inhabitants of the guberniia in five and a half months in 1919, while typhoid (enteric fever) infected 1,990 people within the same timespan.



life after seven years of constant battle; after all, by the time the Civil War had more or less ended in 1920, millions of people had sacrificed their lives<sup>173</sup>.

Lastly, the guberniia's geographical position was such that it never fell into the hands of the anti-Bolshevik forces; those who chose to revolt could only rely on their own limited forces. And revolts did occur, at first immediately at the time of the October Revolution, as well as later in the same, or other, areas. After it became clear that the Bolsheviks were less than supportive of the peasants' plight, peasants decided to try to throw off the Bolshevik yoke. In Bezhetsk *uezd* we are told that "...the building of Soviet power... was accompanied also later on --after January 1918-- by a very sharp struggle, armed clashes, and kulak revolts."<sup>174</sup>

Armed revolts occurred in Zubtsov *uezd* where not only the SRs, but also anarchists enjoyed popular support<sup>175</sup>. In Kaliazin *uezd*, the "cluster of counterrevolution" was liquidated only by the summer of 1918<sup>176</sup>.

A few other factors explain the relative ease with which the Bolsheviks held on to power in 'Tver' guberniia. Particularly the workers, but perhaps some peasants as well, welcomed the new regime's repression of the old ruling classes<sup>177</sup>. Although the "toilers" were living in abysmal poverty, at least the former elite,

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<sup>173</sup>It is not clear how many of the local population were killed in the First World War and Civil War and the concomitant deprivations, but some estimates are as high as twenty-five million for the territory of the Russian empire (see 1.5).

<sup>174</sup>Il'ina, p.29.

<sup>175</sup>Il'ina, p.30.

<sup>176</sup>Il'ina, p.33.

<sup>177</sup>See Heller and Nekrich, p.85.

such as the landowners in Vyshnii Volochek *uezd* suffered even worse hardships<sup>178</sup>. Keep identifies the factor of Moscow's proximity and consequent influence, as well as the tradition of militancy and social homogeneity among the factory workers, as other elements that contributed to the support for the Bolshevik cause<sup>179</sup>.

The Civil War was a precarious period for the Communists of Tver guberniia, in spite of the fact that the territory was never invaded by any White Army units. By the summer of 1919, because of the Communists' extensive mobilization for the Red Army, the guberniia Party organization had decreased by roughly two-thirds, and many Party cells in the *volosti* had been liquidated<sup>180</sup>. This, and probably the general dissatisfaction with the government's Civil War policies, led to the growth of the influence of "kulaks" in local soviets -- "kulaks" being peasants opposing the regime's policy<sup>181</sup>.

Desertion from the Red Army became rampant around May and June 1919; revolts against the government flared up in several *uezdy* around this time. The destitution must have been great in the countryside, where the following anecdote is recorded by a Brezhnevite source<sup>182</sup>. The head of a *volost'* executive committee in

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<sup>178</sup>See Keep, p.399.

<sup>179</sup>Keep, pp.361/362.

<sup>180</sup>Ocherki, pp.228/229.

<sup>181</sup>Ocherki, p.229.

<sup>182</sup>Ocherki, pp.229/230. The testimony of M.A. Sysoe in the survey corroborated the story; in her village, a monument was placed to commemorate these heroic fighters for Soviet power (testimony of M.A. Sysoeva in the survey). However, she said that the cause of the killings was to be sought in the requisitioning by the soviet workers among the village population, which had led to desperate poverty in the village, adding "What kind of fighters were these? People say they were monsters."

Vyshnii Volochek *uezd* a certain Antonov, who had taken part in the storming of the Winter Palace in 1917, was detained by a group of deserters, because he refused to open up the granary in which bread and salt were kept. He and five soviet workers were brutally beaten up. Following the death of two of them, the "bandits" proceeded to torture the other four the next day. After this, the villagers brought all six, dead or alive, to the cemetery; the mutilated survivors were ordered to dig a grave, and all were buried in it together.

It is quite likely that SR-supporters were still involved in stirring up people against the regime in 1919<sup>183</sup>. But these activities hardly mattered since the revolts were the result of pure despair among the peasantry. The authorities resorted to hard measures: the Cheka was sent in. It divided the guberniia into four parts and allotted an armed detachment to each. Meanwhile, an effort was made to involve the local peasants in political work and to gain their support by means of propaganda. Even Kalinin himself delivered a speech in the *uezd* of Kimry.

The regime's precarious situation in 1919 can be deduced from the events at the fifth guberniia Congress of Soviets that opened on June 15: only 143 communists and 54 "sympathizers" (*sochustvuiushchie*), representing 42% of the total number of delegates, were elected among the 465 voting delegates of the congress<sup>184</sup>. A Soviet source tells us that

[enemies], who appeared at the Congress disguised as partyless delegates, tried to persuade [the peasants] to follow

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<sup>183</sup>Ocherki. p.230.

<sup>184</sup>Ocherki. p.230/231.

them [the enemies], and used the fact, that many peasant delegates poorly understood politics. On behalf of the fraction of "partyless," which they [the enemies] organized against the communists, and in which, as a matter of fact, left and right SRs, as well as anarchists and mensheviks apparently could be found, they insinuated counterrevolutionary resolutions on the question of supplies and the current moment.<sup>185</sup>

However, this moment probably represented the nadir of Bolshevik success. In the end, at this perhaps crucial meeting of the fifth Congress of Soviets of Tver' guberniia, the Bolsheviks were victorious. All Bolshevik candidates were elected in the *gubispolkom* (Guberniia Executive Committee of the soviets)<sup>186</sup>. After the meeting, *agitprop* groups were assigned to counter the desertion in the countryside. Concomitantly, the aid to the families of Red Army soldiers was increased. Together with the above mentioned Cheka activities, these measures appear to have stopped the desertion from service in the Red Army<sup>187</sup>.

When, in October 1919, the Bolshevik Party, organized a "Party week" to enlarge its membership at the height of Denikin's offensive, 2,557 people became members in Tver' guberniia, 1,303 of whom were inhabitants of the town of Tver'<sup>188</sup>. Although Red Army soldiers and workers together accounted for 80% of the new memberships, more than 16% were peasants. This was a very good showing in comparison to the rest of the Bolshevik territory in

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<sup>185</sup>Ibid., pp.230/231.

<sup>186</sup>Ibid., p.231.

<sup>187</sup>According to Bol'shakov, in July 1919, there were on average six deserters per village in Goritsy *volost'* (Bol'shakov, pp.76/77). A revolt broke out when some of them were arrested by the military commissar. Thirty-five Red Army soldiers were dispatched to the district to suppress the revolt: two of the leaders of the deserters were executed after its suppression.

<sup>188</sup>*Ocherki*, p.232.

Russia, where on the average peasants represented only 7% of the new members. The Bolsheviks' situation might have improved, but the population in general continued to suffer: during the following winter of 1919-1920, famine, cold, and epidemics plagued the guberniia<sup>189</sup>.

In March 1920, the number of Party members in the guberniia had surpassed 10,000; it sent ten delegates to the Ninth Party Congress, one of whom was A.A. Zhdanov<sup>190</sup>. Although political opposition outside the Party had been effectively repressed before 1921, up to the Tenth Party Congress oppositionists to the Party's policies within the Party still made themselves heard, including in Tver' guberniia<sup>191</sup>. Perhaps this was owing to the Party's large number of peasants, artisans, and employees, who together formed 63% of its membership. Yet there is reason to doubt that they were specifically responsible for the calls against bureaucracy and inequality within the Party<sup>192</sup>. Evidence of the workers' more radical attitude in comparison to that of the full-time Communist Party workers can be found in the tough battle that took place at a Party conference in Vyshnii Volochek in February 1921 with a group (or groups) that defended the "anarcho-syndicalist platforms"<sup>193</sup>. Vyshnii Volochek was one of the most industrialized towns of the

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<sup>189</sup>Particularly typhoid; Ocherki, p.243.

<sup>190</sup>Ocherki, p.234.

<sup>191</sup>Ocherki, p.251.

<sup>192</sup>Ibid. One of the few "genuine" workers in the Party leadership, Shliapnikov, was at this time also subscribing to an opposition platform.

<sup>193</sup>Ocherki, p.253. These platforms were probably those of Shliapnikov's and Kollontai's "Workers' Opposition," and of that of the "Democratic Centralists" (for these, see for example Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front, pp.26-30).

Tver' guberniia, in which textile factories had already appeared around 1860.

Regardless of this, the decree on Party unity at the Tenth Party Congress made even inner-Party opposition virtually impossible after March 1921<sup>194</sup>. Concurrently, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was announced at this Congress<sup>195</sup>. The government had been forced to abandon its oppressive policy towards the countryside as enforced under War Communism, because of growing peasant resistance. In Central Russia the most outspoken example of this was the celebrated Antonov rebellion in Tambov province. Peasant rebellions also erupted in Tver' guberniia; at least one such "green" revolt occurred in the *uezd* of Novotorzhok<sup>196</sup>.

### I.5. The NEP Period

Recently some demographers estimated that perhaps more than twenty-five million people died as a result of, World War I, the Civil War, and the subsequent famine in the Soviet Union between

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<sup>194</sup>Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle. Translated from the French by A.M. Sheridan-Smith. London: Pluto Press, 1975(1968 I), pp.12/13, p.32.

<sup>195</sup>Heller, Nekrich, p.114.

<sup>196</sup>See Heller and Nekrich, pp.105/106; Ocherki, pp.250/251; Pako, 147/1/527, 1.129. A. Suslov and A.Fomin note that in the village of Kuvshino a "kulak" revolt took place in July 1919, which might be another revolt or the same one (A.Suslov, A. Fomin, Torzhok i ego okresnosti, Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1983, p.71). According to N.A. Akhov, in 1923 or 1924 a revolt erupted in the town of Korcheva, when de-kulakization was taking place (testimony of N.A. Akhov in the survey). It is likely that he meant 1933-1934, because no de-kulakization, according to all evidence, was conducted in 1923-1924. Korcheva, by the way, would be flooded in 1936, when the Volga-Moskva canal was being built, and its inhabitants moved to Konakovo (testimony of N.A. Akhov in the survey).

1917 and 1922<sup>197</sup>. Economically, the Civil War had left the guberniia prostrate: there were shortages of grain, salt, and matches<sup>198</sup>.

Bartering had established itself as the preponderant way of trading.

The announcement of the NEP led to a temporary re-emergence in the Tver' guberniia of the SR party, and possibly of the Mensheviks and the anarchists; around this time, the "left"-SRs were even able to publish the journal "*Trudovnaia mysl*" for a while<sup>199</sup>.

Although the use of terror was largely absent from the life of Tver' guberniia until collectivization, Solzhenitsyn has pointed out that in Tver' during the early 1920s a trial took place against Orthodox priests<sup>200</sup>. Since 1917, the Church experienced a relentless assault by the Bolsheviks. The plunder of the Nilova Hermitage in 1917 has already been described. It is unclear whether Solzhenitsyn refers specifically to the trial of twelve monks of the Nilova Hermitage near Ostashkov, occurring probably in 1928, just after the state had closed the monastery, or another earlier trial<sup>201</sup>. The transformation of the Boris and Gleb monastery in Torzhok into a transit camp apparently occurred during or soon after the Civil War<sup>202</sup>.

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<sup>197</sup>V.Z. Drobizhev, Iu. A. Poliakov, "Istoricheskaiia demografiia-vazhnoe napravlenie nauchnykh issledovani," in: (V.S. Lel'chuk(ed.)), *Istoriki sporiat. Trinadtsat' besed*. Moskva: Politizdat, 1988, pp.461-480, pp.468/469.

<sup>198</sup>*Ocherki*, p.250.

<sup>199</sup>*Ocherki*, p.255.

<sup>200</sup>A.I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956. An Experiment in Literary Investigation*. Part I-II, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, 1973, p.325.

<sup>201</sup>Vladimir Abarinov, *Katynskii Labirint*, p.45.

<sup>202</sup>See Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag*..., Part III-IV, p.74.

Indeed, organized religion seemed to have been one area that was never left alone by the authorities in the 1920s. Anti-religious propaganda increased during the NEP period. In 1921 in the town of 'Tver', forty-five places of worship still operated: forty-one Orthodox and two Catholic churches, one synagogue, and one mosque<sup>203</sup>. In the guberniia a further twenty diverse sects were active. But these houses of worship and religious groups began to disappear rapidly in the 1920s. Chapters of the Union of the Godless were created at this time<sup>204</sup>. Church valuables were confiscated on a large scale once again in 1921, in connection with the efforts to bring relief to the famine sufferers along the Volga<sup>205</sup>. This famine itself seems to have bypassed 'Tver' guberniia<sup>206</sup>.

Even in the towns, religious feelings had not disappeared overnight after the Bolshevik takeover: in 1925 the Central Council of the Trade Unions in Moscow felt obliged to criticize the religious sentiment among factory workers<sup>207</sup>. The local trade unions promised to increase the level of anti-religious propaganda. Nevertheless, at the end of the 1920s proselytizing Protestant sects in Vyshnii Volochek still disturbed the Party<sup>208</sup>.

Although these attacks on the Church were persistent, it would be wrong to conclude that they automatically further antagonized the population's view of the regime. In all likelihood, the

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<sup>203</sup>Ocherki, p.258.

<sup>204</sup>Ibid., p.259.

<sup>205</sup>Ibid., p.267.

<sup>206</sup>Bol'shakov, p.41, footnote 2.

<sup>207</sup>Chris Ward, Russia's Cotton-Workers and the New Economic Policy: Shop-Floor Culture and State Policy 1921-1929, New York: Cambridge UP, 1990, p.118.

<sup>208</sup>Ward, pp.122/123.



institutionalized church did not enjoy strong popularity among the *narod*, and the destruction of the Orthodox Church's organization after 1917 did not lead to significant protest in the guberniia<sup>209</sup>. Altrichter describes the Church's weak position in the countryside<sup>210</sup>. Previously, the Church's hierarchy had functioned as a branch of the tsarist bureaucracy, and the image of the priesthood was rather tainted by 1917. Also, popular religion in the countryside had retained many semi-pagan traditions that were unfavourably judged by official Orthodoxy. The peasants' religion could be deemed a hybrid of Russian Orthodoxy and popular magic<sup>211</sup>. A female activist relates how women in the countryside fell under the influence of anti-soviet "preachers", sectarians, and witch doctors during the 1920s<sup>212</sup>. Russia had never undergone a proselytizing renewal of its religion such as the Reformation or Counter-Reformation elsewhere in Europe, which caused some elements of popular religion to survive long after they had disappeared in the West.

Still, the village priests retained a role in the rural communities during the 1920s<sup>213</sup>. Because of the disappearance of the Church's organization, these priests were elected at the village meetings. The village community accorded an elected priest some land, following the local custom of land distribution. He augmented

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<sup>209</sup>Altrichter, p.112.

<sup>210</sup>Altrichter, p.91.

<sup>211</sup>See Altrichter, pp.116/117 for instance.

<sup>212</sup>Shest'e s nami, p.36.

<sup>213</sup>Altrichter, p.112.

his income by charging fees for the performance of certain religious ceremonies<sup>214</sup>.

Although the regime engaged in atheist propaganda in the 1920s, such a program was not very effective in the countryside, since it relied heavily on literary means and the readership of the guberniia rural newspaper was small in the countryside<sup>215</sup>. Moreover, the rather sophisticated character of the religious criticism on its pages was too far removed from the peasants' reality. In the villages, women persisted in relying on traditional religion rather than accepting the vision propagated by urban Communist emissaries<sup>216</sup>. It seems that Communist criticism completely failed to understand the unorthodox elements of popular religion, and the seminal stature of traditional rites; the peasantry did not worship dogma and the Bible<sup>217</sup>. The ceremonies maintained their traditional position in the community's life: in the south-east of the guberniia --on the whole, the most modernized area of the province-- almost all births, weddings, and deaths were accompanied by the appropriate Church ceremony<sup>218</sup>. Popular magic and natural healing methods continued to be practised, also because there was a shortage of doctors in the countryside<sup>219</sup>. The proliferation of these traditions in the countryside often undermined the authorities' combat against epidemics, in particular syphilis<sup>220</sup>.

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<sup>214</sup>Ibid., p.116.

<sup>215</sup>Ibid., pp.115/116.

<sup>216</sup>Schast'e s nami, p.37.

<sup>217</sup>Altrichter, p.118.

<sup>218</sup>Bol'shakov, p.142.

<sup>219</sup>Altrichter, pp. 118-122; Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.250.

<sup>220</sup>Altrichter, p.122.

Besides the attack on the Church, the Soviet state exiled in the NEP period most of the remaining former landowners, who had already lost their estates in 1918. In 1925, 181 of them still resided in the guberniia, on a fraction of their property which they had been allowed to keep<sup>221</sup>. Their number diminished even more in that year:

As a result of the work of the commission on the banishment of former *pomeshchiks*, a part of the *pomeshchiks* who had remained on their property in 1918, were exiled in 1925. The use of hired labour on their farm and anti-soviet conduct served as motives for their banishment.

In several cases the commission acknowledged the right of *pomeshchiks* to continue to use the land and property.<sup>222</sup>

Apart from these ominous events, the state's interference in the life of its citizens generally lessened after 1921, and a certain tranquillity reigned in the guberniia during the 1920s. The last tremor for a while of the revolutionary events was felt with the influx of refugees from the famine in the south and south-east into the guberniia in the second half of 1921<sup>223</sup>.

As before 1917, the eastern part of the guberniia remained substantially more industrialized than the west in the 1920s<sup>224</sup>. In this respect, the gap between the province's east and west would remain a permanent feature of the territory's economic geography, and would become further emphasized by the devastation inflicted upon the western part during World War II. In some ways, this

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<sup>221</sup>See N.S. Zhuravleva, "Konfiskatsiia pomeshchich'ikh imenii v Tverskoi gubernii v 1917-1918 gg.", *Istoricheskii Zapiski*, 29(1949), pp.48-64, p.58.

<sup>222</sup>*Ibid.*, p.59.

<sup>223</sup>Altrichter, p.41.

<sup>224</sup>See Alampiev, p.4.

everywhere with misunderstanding, lack of interest, scepticism, and rejection<sup>230</sup>.

Throughout this dissertation, the term 'peasant' is being applied to a person who cultivates the land<sup>231</sup>. 'Peasant' corresponds to 'kolkhoznik' and the like for the post-1929 era. "...[P]easants differ chiefly from farmers in that they have their own distinctive 'part culture' or sub-culture and regard agriculture as a way of life rather than a business."<sup>232</sup> In George Jackson's opinion, in further distinction to farmers, peasants are allotted a low socio-economic status; they live in a family household closely connected with their neighbours in the village; they comprise the most numerous social group ("class"); and others dispossess them of the bulk of their produce<sup>233</sup>. The last distinction, however, does not apply to the 'Tver' peasantry during NEP: in the 1920s, the peasants consumed most of their agricultural output themselves<sup>234</sup>. Only after collectivization would the largest share of the peasantry's produce be appropriated by the state. According to Jackson's terms, until Stalin's death and even after, the cultivators of the soil undoubtedly remained peasants.

During the 1920s, these peasants had an almost diametrically opposed view of affairs from the Bolsheviks:

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<sup>230</sup> Altrichter, p.48.

<sup>231</sup> George D. Jackson, Jr., "Peasant Political Movements in Eastern Europe," in: Henry Landsberger (ed.), Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change, London, N.Y.: Macmillan, 1974, pp.259-315, p.273.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> See I.6.

For the Bolshevik policy and propaganda, Party cells and village soviets were the main focus, [but] in the everyday life of the village they were ephemeral phenomena, in the same way as the village paper, the agitator from the city, or the isolated collective farms.<sup>235</sup>

The mentality of the peasant was based on a system of norms and rules that had nothing to do with the idea of social classes, but were rather grounded in the idea of the homestead (*dvor*) and the family<sup>236</sup>. Life did not centre around the state, but around the village community. Under Khrushchev, one female activist, employed in the guberniia women's department in the 1920s (*gubzhenorde*), described the difficulties she experienced in bringing the message to the women in the villages:

The work among the peasant women was difficult. The men did not let the women go to the meetings. The kulaks, for fun, bothered and threatened the more advanced women with punishments. The following situation comes to mind. When in the 'Trestenskaia *volost*' of Bezhetsk *uezd* one peasant woman was elected to the soviet, her husband became abusive, waved with his hands and screamed that she would regret it.... The kulak agitation and the backwardness of the peasant women strongly hindered our work.<sup>237</sup>

Some effort was certainly made to combat illiteracy during the 1920s: in 1924-25, 17,000 illiterate people were taught to read and write, and in 1925-26, 46,000<sup>238</sup>. How effective this teaching was remains to be seen. A Soviet source cites the level of literacy

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<sup>235</sup> Altrichter, p.49.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., p.49.

<sup>237</sup> *Schast'e s nami*, p.33.

<sup>238</sup> *Ocherki*, p.258.

in 1920 to be 46% for the guberniia, and in 1926 at 52.6%; in the Tver' *okrug* in 1929, 56% of the people were literate<sup>239</sup>.

Illiteracy was widespread, and the contents of the literate population's reading material must have upset the Communist authorities. In most families in which someone managed to read, he (or less often, she) read the gospel, prayer books, or saints' lives aloud to the other family members<sup>240</sup>. In this connection, Altrichter points again to the state's weak influence over the village, and the reluctance to use force to make the population comply with its policies in the 1920s<sup>241</sup>. Around 1923, only every seventh community in the countryside had a primary school, less than in the last pre-World War I school year. The number of primary schoolteachers was also less in the early 1920s. It and the number of schools only would reach prewar levels at the end of the decade. It is possible that, in the first half of the 1920s, the number of illiterates was higher than before the war<sup>242</sup>. Through the failure to oblige school-age children to attend classes, even towards the end of the NEP period, perhaps more illiterates proliferated annually than people educated by the special literacy projects<sup>243</sup>. In the survey, quite a few respondents turned out to be semi- or even fully

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<sup>239</sup>Korzun, *Pervye*..., p.95.

<sup>240</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.183.

<sup>241</sup>Altrichter, p. 169; a recent Soviet publication confirms the low level of education in the countryside (M.G.Pankratova, *Sel'skaia zhenshchina v SSSR*, Moskva: "Mysl", 1990, p.40). Towards 1940 the majority of the rural population had about three to four years of elementary school at most, according to Pankratova.

<sup>242</sup>Altrichter, p.170. Bol'shakov warned in 1924 that illiteracy among children of school-going age in Goritsy volost' was on the increase (Bol'shakov, p.8).

<sup>243</sup>Altrichter, p.171.

illiterate if they were born before roughly 1925<sup>244</sup>. Most village schools were still composed of only three or four grade levels; there was a lack of materials such as notebooks and textbooks<sup>245</sup>. Many pupils did not acquire more than a rather elementary knowledge: quite a few girls --as was confirmed in the interviews-- attended school for only one or two years, and "...even those who left after third grade, were often still half-literate."<sup>246</sup>

Consequently, women tended to be less literate than men<sup>247</sup>. Literacy was further impeded owing to the rather short school year in the countryside, because the children were obliged to help with the work in the fields<sup>248</sup>. Many peasants were reluctant to expose their children to an education, since they were unsure of the benefits that would derive from it, and feared the influence of the regime's ungodly ideas. In the census of 1926, 122,000 illiterates between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four were found in the guberniia: 19,000 men and 103,000 women, translating into more than 5% of the total population<sup>249</sup>. This clearly illustrates the traditional lack of interest of a large part of the population to send specifically their daughters to school. In this respect, the results of my survey of 1992 confirmed, on the one hand, the deficiency of the education of many of the respondents. On the other hand, these illiterate or semi-literate people, sons and daughters of peasants

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<sup>244</sup>See VIII.6.

<sup>245</sup>Altrichter, p.170.

<sup>246</sup>Ibid., p.170.

<sup>247</sup>I.D. Korzun, *Pervye*..., p.95.

<sup>248</sup>Altrichter, p.170.

<sup>249</sup>Korzun, *Pervye*..., p.96. Of course, most of those above thirty-four were illiterate.

suspicious of the state, would acquire a view of education that was completely the opposite to that of their parents: they would almost all praise the "free" Soviet educational system, and the possibilities it had offered their own children<sup>250</sup>. Inevitably, in the towns and "urban type settlements" school attendance was more strictly observed and literacy was higher, even before 1917; in 1926, however, only 286,305 people out of a total of 2,242,350 inhabitants (13%) lived in these (semi-)urban surroundings according to the census<sup>251</sup>.

Economically, the rural dwellers' highest priority was to secure their own and their family's existence, rather than to produce the largest possible surplus and reap the highest possible profits by selling the produce on the market<sup>252</sup>. Among the peasantry, the persistence of a pre-industrial mentality can be discerned, with a strong dislike for any change<sup>253</sup>. Still, caution should be exercised in summarily assessing the peasants' economic mentality in the 1920s, since insufficient research has been done in the archives on the subject. Certainly, much of Tver' guberniia's male population had become somewhat politicized through their army service in the First World War and the Civil War. These men must have influenced the way of thinking in the villages upon their return from the army.

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<sup>250</sup>See VIII.6.

<sup>251</sup>Vershinskii, A., Zolotarev, D., Naselenie Tverskogo kraia, Tver', 1929, pp.12/13; Korzun, Pervye..., p.95.

<sup>252</sup>Altrichter, p.100.

<sup>253</sup>Compare C.G.A. Clay's description of the mentality of the English peasantry in the early 16th century, C.G.A. Clay, Economic Expansion and Social Change: England 1500-1700. Volume I. People, Land and Towns. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984, pp.60-67, and particularly pp.63 and 64 on their conservatism.



Apart from the produce from their lands, many peasants derived a large part of their income from non-agricultural pursuits. One source goes as far to say that, in general, the basic income of the peasantry in this area was formed not by agriculture, but by other employment<sup>254</sup>. This claim cannot be taken at face value, as no numbers are given to prove the point, and Sergeev tries to justify collectivization --supposedly introducing a more modern and rational method of agricultural production-- with the help of this statement. It is unclear whether Sergeev tried to account for the peasants' moneyed income alone. It is obvious that the peasants did not generate much money from the sale of agricultural production on the market, because they consumed the largest share of their produce themselves. Therefore, Sergeev's argument might hold if he looked strictly at the cash income of the peasants' households, but it would seem to be a rather weak premise for defending collectivization.

Be that as it may, the number of migrant or seasonal labourers and of people engaged in cottage industries swelled in the course of the 1920s<sup>255</sup>. These workers came into contact with the world beyond the village. This surely must have influenced their *Weltanschauung* and habits and, indirectly, those of their neighbours in the village. For example, in the 1900s, the lure of urban taste had

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<sup>254</sup>See G.S. Sergeev, "Sel'skoe khoziaistvo tsentral'no-promyshlennogo raiona v 1921-1929 gg.", pp.239-274, in: Iz proshlogo i nastoiashchego Kalininskoi oblasti (Istoriko-kraevedcheskii sbornik), Vyp. I, Moskva: "Moskovskii rabochii", 1965, p.267. Altrichter denies this: in his opinion, this was the case before 1914, but certainly not in the 1920s (Altrichter, p.79). Sergeev seems to have been trying to find another justification for collectivization in exaggerating the lack of economic viability of the small subsistence-level farm.

<sup>255</sup>See 1.6 as well.

become already strong enough to awaken an interest among the peasantry to acquire wooden beds, divans, and so on<sup>256</sup>. Postcards and prints were displayed on the walls, and cotton curtains were hung in front of shelves, the stove, and the beds.

During the Civil War, the sown area had undergone a drastic reduction from 753,230 hectares (691,039 *desiatina*) in 1916 -- which already was significantly smaller than in 1913-- to 595,870 hectares in 1920<sup>257</sup>. The relative prosperity of the peasantry comes to light through the fact that in 1925 the sown area reached 961,270 hectares, exceeding the size of the sown area in 1913 by 4%. In 1928, the sown area had grown once more, this time by 20% compared to 1924, or 10% compared to 1925<sup>258</sup>. 86% of the peasants' farms remained small during the 1920s: they had from one to four and a half hectares of crop land at their disposal, depending as a rule on their family's size<sup>259</sup>. Furthermore, the peasants used some meadows and sometimes a patch of forest. Grain crops represented by far the most frequently sown crops, even more so than before 1917, covering 80% of the sown area in 1923<sup>260</sup>. Rye rated as the most important crop, followed by barley and oats. Flax, a widely sown industrial crop in the guberniia before 1917, only accounted for 9% of the cultivated lands in 1923. Nevertheless, the cultivation of flax during the 1920s did rise to 12% of the sown area in 1927

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<sup>256</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.113.

<sup>257</sup>Ocherki, p.250 and p.291; compare to Altrichter, Tabelle XXIII, p.222, who gives a slightly smaller sown area for 1916 and a slightly larger one for 1925 (the difference is less than 2% in both cases).

<sup>258</sup>Altrichter, p.78 and Tabelle XXIII, p.222.

<sup>259</sup>Ibid., p.74.

<sup>260</sup>Ibid., p.77.

and 1928<sup>261</sup>. The 1920s also witnessed a significant increase in the farming of potatoes, vetch, and clover. During the period, potato cultivation doubled; the sowing of vetch and clover taken together even increased five times. The tilling of the land was hampered by the fact that most peasants still held many small-sized plots, distributed all around the village's lands. Stolypin's reforms of 1907 to consolidate the strips had but little effect<sup>262</sup>. Even if the consolidation had been executed in some areas before 1917, then from February 1917 onwards it was largely undone during the redistribution period --in particular after the October Revolution. Gradually, under pressure from the authorities, the lands were again surveyed, regulated, and consolidated in the 1920s, and the splitting up came to a halt: at the end of 1928, 46.1% of all lands were consolidated<sup>263</sup>.

Notwithstanding this rationalization, peasants still practised the three-course crop rotation system on their consolidated lands<sup>264</sup>. One-third of crop lands was lying fallow every year. At least 75% of the 'Tver' peasantry still followed the traditional rotation system of tillage at the end of the 1920s. The harvest yields were extremely low on average: about five times the amount of grain sown was collected at harvest time<sup>265</sup>. This is about the same yield as in Germany in the second half of the 18th century<sup>266</sup>.

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<sup>261</sup>Ibid., p.78.

<sup>262</sup>Ibid., pp.74/75.

<sup>263</sup>Ibid., p.75.

<sup>264</sup>Ibid., p.76.

<sup>265</sup>Ibid., p.77.

<sup>266</sup>See Jan De Vries, The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1976, p.35.

Clover and vetch began to be sown on the fallow during the 1920s, thus reducing its total size, and making a first step toward an improved form of the three-course rotation system --a system called "alternate husbandry" in the 17th century, when it already was practised in Flanders<sup>267</sup>.

In the 1920s the livestock in the guberniia grew: from 1920 to 1928 the number of horses increased from about 360,000 to 480,000, of "strong horned cattle" (bovines) from 795,000 to 991,000, and of goats and sheep from 1.1 to 1.5 million<sup>268</sup>. On average, in 1928, ninety-five draught horses were counted per hundred households, less than the 110 of 1913<sup>269</sup>. The gradual increase of the livestock was interrupted at times, since the size of the herd was dependent on the harvest results each year. In case of a bad hay harvest, the number of cattle fell. Peasants were forced to sell off some of their animals due to a shortage of fodder crops.

As late as 1920, only sixty-six ploughs per hundred households were counted in the countryside<sup>270</sup>. Seasonal work was widespread during NEP, although its incidence was less than before the First World War: in 1920, 101,079 permissions for departures outside the guberniia were issued by the administration; in 1925, 6% of the rural population worked seasonally in the cities<sup>271</sup>. In general, in spite of the addition of the land of the former large landowners, the sown area of many a peasant remained too small to provide for an

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<sup>267</sup>Altrichter, p.78; De Vries, p.40.

<sup>268</sup>Altrichter, p.72.

<sup>269</sup>Ibid., p.73.

<sup>270</sup>Ocherki, p.264.

<sup>271</sup>Ibid., p.265; p.292.

existence much above subsistence level, because of "... the many strips of land, the narrowness of the strips, and the remoteness of the lands."<sup>272</sup>

The practice of redivision of lands among members of the family could lead to a tense situation, especially if the small amount of land that barely supported one household was split into two, after which neither part was able to support a household<sup>273</sup>. Agriculture remained largely at subsistence levels: animal husbandry and crop cultivation mainly supplied the peasant's own household with foodstuffs<sup>274</sup>. Flax and dairy products were sold on the market in fairly substantial amounts. However, around 1925 only 20% of all gross agricultural production was sold on the market. Certain individuals in the countryside prospered under NEP<sup>275</sup>. They are dubbed "kulaks" in official Soviet historiography in order to justify the subsequent events, specifically the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class".

They [those "kulaks"], together with former *pomeshchiki*, impeded the execution of land-tenure regulations, rented out land at debt-slavery terms to the bedniaks, created false cooperatives, traded in stalls and at markets.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>272</sup>Ibid., p.265.

<sup>273</sup>Altrichter, pp.128/129.

<sup>274</sup>Ibid., p.78.

<sup>275</sup>One early perestroika publication on the Tver' oblast' undermined the thesis of the increase of the kulaks, by stating that during NEP the number of bedniak households systematically decreased, while the number of seredniak households was on the increase(*Kalininskaja oblastnaja organizatsiia...*, p.215). This opinion is closer to that of Altrichter(see below).

<sup>276</sup>Ocherki, p.265.

This seems to be an extreme distortion of the truth, when 0.4% of all households had more than two draught horses, and 85% of all households had just one or two cows<sup>277</sup>. The guberniia neither had many "landless labourers" (*batraki*): 53,000 in 1928, or about 2.5 to 3% of the total population in the countryside<sup>278</sup>. Most of the batraks either worked as village herdsmen or, in the case of adolescent women, as nannies<sup>279</sup>. In the same year 25,000 people worked as day labourers at harvest time<sup>280</sup>. It is hard to equate these 78,000 people in all as some kind of a "rural proletariat," because a systematic use of hired hands in agriculture was almost non-existent. The Soviet image of collectivization as a form of class struggle, in which village proletarians and half-proletarians united against the "kulaks", in the wake of which the middle peasants joined the poor, was entirely false<sup>281</sup>. The organizations of the landless labourers and of the poor peasants remained marginal in the 1920s. Most households even had a surplus of labour: there was simply not enough work for all family members during long periods of the year.

Agriculture seemed to have quickly recovered from the trials and tribulations of the previous period: the average harvest results of rye, oats, barley, flax, and potatoes, the basic crops of the guberniia, were markedly higher in 1924 than the annual average

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<sup>277</sup> Altrichter, p. 73.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., pp. 81/82.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid., p. 159.

yields of the five-year period from 1910 to 1915<sup>282</sup>. There were almost 150,000 more cows, and more than 50,000 more horses in 1924 compared to 1916. It is clear that agriculture recuperated from the devastation of the Civil War much earlier than industry. In the 1920s, the former sector performed economically much better than the latter: while in 1924-1925 factory output was at 80% of its prewar level, the total production of agriculture in 1925 had already reached 93% of that level<sup>283</sup>.

The enthusiasm for the new regime was not large in the countryside, especially if one measures by the yardstick of participation in the elections for the local soviets in the countryside: in 1922, only 24.8% of the voters took part, in 1923, 41.8%, and in 1925, 51.1%, indicating that nevertheless participation was on the rise<sup>284</sup>.

### **I.6 Some Aspects of Daily Life in the Countryside**

Life in the Russian village in the 1920s was based on traditions and customs which had been forged over an extremely long period. Only recently certain aspects of it had begun to change as a consequence of the intensified acquaintance of the rural population with a more modern, urban society.

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<sup>282</sup>Ocherki, p.271.

<sup>283</sup>Ibid., p.291.

<sup>284</sup>Ibid., p.263.

The peasants lived in wooden houses with straw or shingled roofs constructed by the villagers themselves<sup>285</sup>. Through the abundance of wood in the forests of the north of the guberniia, the houses tended to be somewhat larger there than in the south. The villages were comparatively small in size<sup>286</sup>. The small village of about thirty to forty houses, sometimes less, remained preponderant in the province long after collectivization<sup>287</sup>. The lay-out of the village was typical for settlements of the East Slavs since ancient times: the houses were placed in a single row, facing a lake, river, or road<sup>288</sup>. Because of the rural overpopulation, the peasants were in the habit of building their houses very close to each other, as it was hard to find a plot of free land<sup>289</sup>. Adult children were inclined to erect a house on the plot where their parents' house was located. As

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<sup>285</sup>See Altrichter, pp. 51-72 and 92-95. One of Altrichter's sources is the work of A.M. Bol'shakov. Bol'shakov conducted in the 1920s field-research in an anthropological manner --he actually lived for several years as a peasant among the peasantry of Goritsy *volost'* of Kimry *uezd*. His work is also used in a recent work by a Soviet author (Pankratova, *Sel'skaia zhenshchina*..., e.g., p.35ff). Bol'shakov, *Sovetskaia derevnia*, is the first publication in which the author gave a description of peasant life on the basis of his "anthropological" research in Tver' guberniia. Kerblay gives a similar description for the peasants' houses in the 19th century in Smolensk guberniia (Kerblay, pp.38/39).

<sup>286</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.78.

<sup>287</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.78. Around 1960, these authors noticed that the size of the villages had remained basically unchanged, even after the two waves of amalgamation of collective farms into larger ones --in 1950 and in Khrushchev's time; the small size was apparently typical for Tver' guberniia (ibid., p.80). Compare also to Altrichter, Tabelle III, p.202. Kalinin oblast' seemed to have been rather exceptional in preserving the typical small village even after collectivization (see Anokhina, Shmeleva, p. 80). In 1960, still around two-thirds of the villages in the Kalinin oblast' had less than 100 inhabitants (*Tsentral'nyi Raion*, p.526).

<sup>288</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, pp.82/83. Again, in the early 1960s the same grouping of houses could still be found in the Kalinin oblast' along the Volga or on Lake Seliger.

<sup>289</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, pp. 83/84.



a consequence, once fire broke out in a village it frequently meant the destruction of all the buildings<sup>290</sup>.

Typically, the houses were graced with small windows in the front<sup>291</sup>. The floor was raised from the ground: one reached the living, eating, and dining room --all in one-- by ascending the steps outside, turning a corner, crossing a roofed landing, and turning another corner, before arriving at the entrance of this communal room. The room was thus sheltered from direct exposure to the cold winter winds. In the room the all important stove was located: on it, the cooking was done, and along it, the members of the household slept on benches. Some even made their bed on the top of the stove<sup>292</sup>. In the coldest winter period, the young cattle were kept often for several weeks in the same room as its owners.

There was not much furniture in the "living" room: a table, a cupboard, a pair of chests, a small mirror<sup>293</sup>. Most windows did not have curtains. Along the sides of the room benches were placed. A little shelf hung on the stove with pots, plates, and cutlery. Sometimes an area next to the stove was separated to make it function as a distinct kitchen area. People slept on straw mattresses, on the floor, on the stove, or on the benches. Most peasants owned hardly any bedding at all. As late as the 1920s the peasants took the greatest pride in the icon corner, located in the front of the room, next to the windows. In northern areas people

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<sup>290</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p. 84.

<sup>291</sup>Altrichter, p.51ff.

<sup>292</sup>Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974, p.143.

<sup>293</sup>Altrichter, p.51ff.

often had two rooms; however, one of them was mainly used in summertime, and then mostly to receive guests.

Behind the living room the courtyard and stables could be found, both covered by a roof: here the cattle was stalled and the agricultural tools were kept<sup>294</sup>. A small granary and a haystack, and sometimes a threshing floor, or perhaps a bathhouse, were located between 50 to 250 meters to the back of the house and stables. For fear of fire, in between was the *usad'ba*, the plot, where horticultural crops were cultivated. Traditionally, almost every generation witnessed the family house burn to the ground<sup>295</sup>.

In the post-1917 years much construction took place in the countryside<sup>296</sup>. No restrictions were enforced --although the state continuously threatened to do so-- with respect to the cutting of wood in the forests. The peasants built up a reserve for the time that the free lumbering would be brought to an end by the authorities, which was apparently expected. A lack of iron nails, clamps, and other metal building materials was not a problem, as the peasants knew how to manufacture wooden substitutes for these. The villagers were just as self-sufficient in the manufacture of other consumer goods, such as clothes, tablewear, and ceramic pots<sup>297</sup>.

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<sup>294</sup>Altrichter, p.56ff.

<sup>295</sup>Ibid., p.57.

<sup>296</sup>Altrichter, p.59; compare to Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.79.

<sup>297</sup>Traditionally, clothes were made from flax in the Tver' province (Bol'shakov, p.18). Wool and leather from the household's cattle could be used to make boots and warm outer clothing (ibid., pp.18/19). In 1920, when the internal market had almost completely collapsed in Tver' gubernia as a result of the Civil War, most Goritsy *vlast'* peasants had no difficulty in returning to home-manufacturing of clothes, etc.

Initially, collectivization would not change the physical appearance of the villages very much; even a Soviet source had to admit that the possibilities of improving one's homestead only emerged after the amalgamation of the kolkhozy in the 1950s<sup>298</sup>. In dress, the turmoil since 1917 was reflected in the habit of many men to wear their Red Army clothing, which was emulated by the youth<sup>299</sup>. Some women showed their solidarity with the Communist regime by donning a red kerchief<sup>300</sup>.

A peasant household sheltered, as a rule, five to six members. Around 50% of the households were of this size in 1920, while 20% consisted of one to three persons, and approximately 30% from seven to ten persons<sup>301</sup>. In the north of the guberniia, the average household accounted for one head less than in the southern *vezdy*. The standard household was made up of the nuclear family: parents with two or three children. Sometimes another relative or a nanny was part of it. Young couples, either without children, or with only one child, regularly lived for a while after their wedding in the house of one of their parents.

The household was almost without exception patriarchal: the husband and father was its head<sup>302</sup>. However, the loss of many males in the period prior to NEP led to women's further involvement in field work, which, even before 1914, had been a not uncommon phenomenon in certain parts of the guberniia. A lot of women had

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<sup>298</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.116.

<sup>299</sup>Ibid., p.145.

<sup>300</sup>Ibid., p.146.

<sup>301</sup>Altrichter, pp.59ff.; Bol'shakov, p.16.

<sup>302</sup>Altrichter, p.67ff.

been taking care of the farming, while their husbands worked as itinerant artisans or as seasonal workers in other places. Thus the economic role of the husband was diminished, and to a certain extent his authority decreased socially as well.

However, in spite of the cracks in the patriarchal foundation, the head of the family tried with all his might to maintain power over the family members in his own hands, all the more so, because at the occurrence of conflicts, law, religion, and custom were all on his side<sup>303</sup>.

After the revolution, at least the law was not on the side of the *pater familias* anymore, but Soviet law carried much less weight in the 1920s than local custom<sup>304</sup>.

As one Soviet source points out, the practice of seasonal work (*otkhodnichestvo*), which returned in the NEP among the male population, led to a situation in which many women had to shoulder the agricultural work in the villages:

Men, as a rule, only ploughed and sowed the land. Even in the busy period a preponderance of old people and women remained [to do the work] at home. Women were doing both the haying, the reaping, and the threshing, and dealt with the flax, as well as tended to the livestock. In the Russian countryside, labour in flax cultivation and animal husbandry were since primordial times considered female work.<sup>305</sup>

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<sup>303</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.172.

<sup>304</sup>Altrichter, pp.62/63. See for the legal changes of the status of women in 1918 Barbara Alpern Engel, "Engendering Russia's History: Women in Post-Emancipation Russia and the Soviet Union," in: *Slavic Review*, Volume 51, Number 2, Summer 1992, pp.309-321, p.317. Abortion by a physician was legalized in 1920. Further changes to family law ensued in 1926, when common-law unions were legally equated with registered marriages (Engel, p.318).

<sup>305</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.25; compare as well to Altrichter, p.67.

Literacy among women was on the rise in the 1920s, and they became more politically involved<sup>306</sup>. In the final analysis, their position in rural society can be considered as largely marginal in this period, although some inroads on the way to gender equality were being made:

If the [male] head of the family in the 1880s and 1890s was still fully in charge of the fate of the sons, and ordered them to marry according to his wishes, then in the 1900s, in general, only girls were subject to comply with a wedding according to the wishes of the parents and even then not always.<sup>307</sup>

Despite the change noticed in the above quote, marriages were concluded all the same frequently for economic reasons in the 1920s: the household and its economic future, and not the spouses and their feelings, were the decisive criteria for marriage<sup>308</sup>. The parents of the future spouses traditionally played a crucial role in selecting the partner-to-be. They visited the parents of the prospective spouse of their child in a neighbouring village, a return visit followed, and if everyone liked each other, and more particularly each other's material situation, the marriage was a *fait accompli*<sup>309</sup>.

When agreeing to the wedding of his daughter or son, the father sometimes behaved as if standing on the market, which illustrates the quintessential economic quality of the marriage<sup>310</sup>. The actual wedding followed only a few weeks after the first meeting. These

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<sup>306</sup>Altrichter, p.67.

<sup>307</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.172.

<sup>308</sup>Altrichter, pp.62-67; see as well Pankratova, p.55.

<sup>309</sup>Compare to Pankratova, p.34, who describes the same practice.

<sup>310</sup>Altrichter, pp.62-67.

practices were not changed by the liberal family laws that were promulgated in 1917 and 1926, which established the legal principle of an individual's free choice of a spouse. The influence of urban life in previous decades was probably more important for the gradual change of traditional marriage habits in the countryside. The introduction of alimony by the family laws of 1917 and 1926 led sometimes to difficulties, as some unmarried older women lured "innocent" young lads into making them pregnant, and then hoped to be able to enjoy the alimony for their child.

As opposed to the "improvement" of the rights of unmarried mothers, it is important to point out that the custom of bringing a dowry into a marriage was still in force in the 1920s. Dowry size was crucial, and, in Khrushchev's time, one former rural activist lamented the fate of poor peasant girls<sup>311</sup>. In the 1920s, if they became pregnant, they were unable to marry the father in the absence of a sufficient dowry. The poor women were left to take care of the child on their own. Weddings were held in the agricultural low season: in autumn and winter, after January 6 and before Lent, because the Church did not marry people during Advent or after Ash Wednesday<sup>312</sup>.

Childhood was hardly recognized as distinct, and was considered to be over before a child had reached the age of ten<sup>313</sup>. The rearing of children was not understood as a duty needing much special attention. Children started to work early, helping out with

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<sup>311</sup>*Schast'e s nami*, p.34.

<sup>312</sup>Altricher, p.64, Kerblay, p.58.

<sup>313</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, pp.177-179. Kerblay notice that children oft from the age of six or seven were employed as village herds.

agricultural tasks, working as nannies, messenger boys, and so on. The mortality of newborn children was still quite high, around 30% of all babies dying before reaching the age of one<sup>314</sup>.

Roughly three-quarters of all households had the following amount of cattle and equipment at its disposal: one horse (in some exceptional cases two), two cows or calves, three sheep, an iron or wooden plough, a wooden or iron harrow, one to two scythes, and the same number of sickles; there was no machinery<sup>315</sup>.

The agricultural year in this area of Russia is relatively short, because of climatic circumstances. Annually, there are only between 140 and 150 days without frost, winters being normally long and cold; in January the average temperature hovers around minus eight to minus ten degrees Celsius<sup>316</sup>. Only in the middle of April the peasantry could begin with their field work, when the land finally was free of frost<sup>317</sup>. Even in May the work was sometimes interrupted because of a temporary return of cold weather. Real summer weather commenced in the middle of May, lasting until halfway September, when the average temperature dropped again below ten degrees Celsius. Spring and autumn were short, the latter over around the first of November in the Tver' territories<sup>318</sup>. Apart from the unpredictable cold spells, agriculture also suffered from excessive rainfall at the time of the grain harvest and of haying<sup>319</sup>.

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<sup>314</sup>Compare to VII.2.

<sup>315</sup>Altrichter, pp.51-72 and 92-95.

<sup>316</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, pp.27/28.

<sup>317</sup>*Ibid.*, p.29.

<sup>318</sup>*Ibid.*, p.30.

<sup>319</sup>*Ibid.*, p.206; both problems still plagued agriculture in 1959, and, no doubt, today.

Because of the excessive humidity, most peasant villages were located at elevated areas in the landscape<sup>320</sup>. The slopes of the hills were ploughed, while hay was grown on the excessively wet lower land in between the higher points.

The months of April and May brought the sowing of oats, summer rye, flax, summer wheat, barley, and buckwheat<sup>321</sup>. At the end of June the meadows were mown with the scythe. The grain crops were harvested in July and August with the sickle to avoid losing ripe grains or ears. The grain was subsequently dried in the kiln or dryer, and in the fall, after the conclusion of the fieldwork, threshed with the aid of a flail, although simple "threshing machines" were sometimes used in the north. The fields were ploughed for the coming spring sowing at this time of the year, and some were sown immediately with winter grains.

Peasants reserved livestock mainly for personal use<sup>322</sup>. In the summer cattle grazed together under supervision of a village-herd. Already in the 1920s a shortage existed of fodder crops in the guberniia, a problem which would continue to plague the authorities in the next decade, as well as after the Second World War. Because of this, the average yield per milk cow was only six to eight litres of milk per day --a much better result, however, than the average yield after collectivization, when on average in the oblast' cows gave frequently less than 1000 litres per year! The introduction of clover and vetch gave a little more room to manoeuvre with respect

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<sup>320</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.525.

<sup>321</sup>Altrichter, pp.68ff.

<sup>322</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.71ff.



to cattle holding for the peasant. The increase in potato growing had a similarly beneficial effect, for potatoes were used as fodder.

Animal manure was used as fertilizer, and horses did the ploughing.

The peasants' farms boasted more cattle on average than in the pre-revolutionary period: the practice of handicrafts dwindled in the chaos of revolution and Civil War, and the peasant's income began to derive more exclusively from agriculture alone<sup>323</sup>. For this reason the household acquired additional cattle, as much as their lands allowed for it.

The village was largely a self-sufficient society, even in the 1920s, and was ruled by the village meeting, the *skhod*<sup>324</sup>. All village household heads participated in these meetings, and they were dominated by the males. Here matters were settled: the village mill, the purchase of a communal bull, or fire prevention. Most importantly, issues were discussed concerning the village lands. In practice, the *skhod* was far more important than the village soviet, which was perceived merely as a marginal administrative-fiscal institute, and was frequently at the mercy of the community leaders of the *skhod*<sup>325</sup>.

The *skhod*'s attitude can be traced in the Party archive's records about events in the village of Metitskaia in the 1920s<sup>326</sup>. Both the conflict between the priorities of village communities and state and the peasants' independent mood before collectivization are

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<sup>323</sup>Ibid., pp.71ff.

<sup>324</sup>Altrichter's account of the functioning of the *skhod* (Altrichter, pp.92ff.) is confirmed by Anokhina, Shmeleva, pp.233-248.

<sup>325</sup>The village community aided the elderly and indigents of local society as well, and the *skhod* meted out justice in cases of violations of customary law (Kerblay, pp.53/54).

<sup>326</sup>See Pako, 147/1/527, ll.104/105.

evident from these documents. Apparently, Zhukov, a candidate for the obkom at the Second Party conference of the Kalinin oblast' in June 1937, had been sentenced in 1922 to one year of imprisonment for a resolution of the Metitskaia *skhod* together with the rest of the "presidium" of the *skhod*. The resolution had called for a *volost'* congress of the Tolmachi *volost'* to discuss the *prodanalog* (the tax in kind requisitioned by the state). It seems that there had been something of a bad harvest in that year; the resolution probably was an attempt to try to lower the level of taxation. Zhukov defended himself in 1937 by noting that at the time he had not been a Party member, and that the conviction had been lifted a month after the trial. Thus he argued that his actions had not been deemed a serious mistake by the authorities in 1922, and did not deserve the attention they were given in 1937.

Rural youth in the 1920s had very limited ambitions for themselves in life<sup>327</sup>. In 1920, in Goritsy *volost'* most boys wanted to become retail traders or artisans. Shoemaking was the most popular future profession, inasmuch as the cobbler was thought to work in warm surroundings, to eat well, and to have a decent income (Stalin would have disagreed).

As in most pre-industrial rural communities, no clear distinction was made between work and leisure-time in the 1920s<sup>328</sup>. Many religious holidays were observed, dispersed over the

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<sup>327</sup>Pankratova, p.35.

<sup>328</sup>Altrichter, pp.100-105. Anokhina and Shmeleva suggest that the indulgence in alcohol became more pronounced at the beginning of World War I; from that time onwards fights became more violent through the diffusion of knives and daggers (Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.245).

year in a pattern that went back to the pre-Christian era, following the rhythm of annual agricultural activity. Although most holidays did not interfere much with the busiest times of the field work, several did; the state especially targeted these in its anti-religious propaganda from the early 1920s onwards. All together, some hundred days per year, including Sundays, were non-working days. Alcohol, mainly home-brewed or -distilled, was widely consumed during the holidays<sup>329</sup>. This practice was prohibited, but the law against it was rarely enforced for the local militsia joined in the festivities as well<sup>330</sup>. Some holidays spread out over several days. The copious alcohol consumption often led to crime: hooliganism, armed and non-armed fights, theft, and rape. Many crimes went undetected or remained unsolved, since the villagers protected each other against the authorities. Instead, they sometimes engaged in private justice according to customary law<sup>331</sup>. On holidays, tensions within the village community or between villages came to a head, emotions were expressed and aggression vented<sup>332</sup>. The state-ordained holidays enjoyed limited popularity in the 1920s: at best

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<sup>329</sup>It is, however, mistaken to equate the proliferation of this practice with a high incidence of alcoholism (see K.B. Litvak, "Samogonovarennie i potreblenie alkogolia v rossiiskoi derevne 1920-kh godov," in: *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 4, 1992, pp.74-88, p.75). Until 1915, according to Litvak, home-distillation was virtually unknown in the Russian countryside (ibid., p.76). Bol'shakov notes the importance of the discontinuation of the sale of alcohol by the state in 1914 for the subsequent emergence of domestic beer-brewing and *samogonovaren'ia* (Bol'shakov, pp.84-87). The habit only became widespread after the Civil War. This had partially an economic ground: many peasants engaged in it to add some money to their income which had been lost as a result of the disappearance of the sale of flax on the market or because family members, who had worked as *okhodniki* in the past, could find no employment as seasonal worker or artisan in the early 1920s.

<sup>330</sup>Altrichter, pp.100-105. In 1927, the private distillation of alcohol was allowed for a while (Litvak, p.77).

<sup>331</sup>Altrichter, pp.105 and 108/109.

<sup>332</sup>Ibid., p.109.

they were added to the traditional holidays on the calendar, and remained to replace these<sup>333</sup>. Even during the 1940s, as will be shown below, people continued to celebrate many traditional holidays, enjoying frequent respites from agricultural labour.

In the evening, after the workday, older women met outside, weather permitting, to sit and chat on the *zavalinka* --a mound of earth around a peasant hut or house to serve as protection from the weather and often used for sitting out. This habit is still common today in most Russian towns, where benches have been placed outside apartment buildings to facilitate these meetings<sup>334</sup>. The custom of *gulian'e* --perhaps best translated as strolling--, traditionally a favourite pastime of the country youth of both sexes, still fills the hours after work of many in the oblast' capital of Tver' today<sup>335</sup>. Both habits show something of the influence the country had on the ways of the city populace. It contradicts the assumption that cultural influence was only exerted in one direction, from the towns to the villages. Collectivization destroyed much of this pre-industrial, traditional society and its habits, but it proved to be impossible to extinguish all traces of it.

In sharp contrast to the succeeding years, political crime was hardly ever prosecuted by the guberniia's courts in the 1920s<sup>336</sup>. Most infringements of justice in the countryside had the character of defying the administrative order, such as illegal distilling of

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<sup>333</sup>Ibid., p.111.

<sup>334</sup>*Schast'e s nami*, p. 36.

<sup>335</sup>See Altrichter, p.104 e.g. for a description of this practice in the 1920s. Compare as well to Stites, *Russian Popular Culture*, p.11 and Bol'shakov, p.23.

<sup>336</sup>Altrichter, pp. 123/124.

alcohol, illegal tree felling, and poaching<sup>337</sup>. Such acts would have been prosecuted in a similar way by the judiciary in the Western world of the 1920s. The incidence of crime in the countryside was less than in the towns, although the occurrence of either manslaughter or molestation was more frequent in the villages<sup>338</sup>. Many minor offences must have been settled by the villagers among themselves. In rural areas, a substantial number of unofficial abortions were performed, which sometimes led to the death of the mother, and a few cases of infanticide are on record<sup>339</sup>. Already then, married women underwent abortions as a means of birth control<sup>340</sup>. Today in the countries that previously formed the USSR, this crude form of birth control is still common among married women. But in the 1920s, unmarried pregnant women formed the bulk of abortion-seekers, faced as they were with the undesirable prospect of fending for themselves after the birth of their child.

### I.7 Industry, the Trades, and the Communists

The character of industry did not change much in the 1920s, remaining geared towards textiles, foodstuffs, and other forms of

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<sup>337</sup>Ibid., pp.124/125.

<sup>338</sup>Ibid., p.126.

<sup>339</sup>Ibid., pp.125-127. The first wife of the rural cobbler V.F. Nepriaev apparently died of a "criminal abortion" in 1927. This term is rather ambiguous, but it probably means that the abortion had been performed by a rural "wise woman" (*babka*) (testimony of V.F. Nepriaev in the survey; on folk medicine, see Altrichter, pp.118-122). Abortion was not illegal in the USSR in the 1920s.

<sup>340</sup>Altrichter, p.127.

light industry (glass, leather, and footwear)<sup>341</sup>. The number of industrial workers at the end of 1920 was around 13,000 less than in 1913: 33,311, or 72% of the number of factory workers in 1913<sup>342</sup>. In comparison with 1918 the drop in numbers was even higher, from 52,848 to 33,311<sup>343</sup>. Industrial workers represented only a fraction of the guberniia labour force: on April 1, 1924, 39,427 were counted, approximately 6,000 more than in late 1920<sup>344</sup>. More telling about the industrial situation is the fact that in 1920 its over-all production was five times less than that of 1913 in the guberniia<sup>345</sup>. Because of the difficult living conditions in the towns, many workers had left for the countryside. Factory output in 1924-25 was still a mere four-fifths of the value of the production of 1913<sup>346</sup>. Only at the end of 1927 did the number of industrial workers surpass that of 1913, and in the same year the industrial output was 23% higher than in 1913<sup>347</sup>. In early 1929, the ranks of industrial workers swelled to 58,000, indicating an acceleration of industrialization in the second half of the 1920s<sup>348</sup>. The lot of the factory workers was unenviable: wages were low, and housing circumstances primitive, many falling victim to diseases as a result of the latter<sup>349</sup>.

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<sup>341</sup>Alampiev, pp.4/5.

<sup>342</sup>Ocherki, p. 237.

<sup>343</sup>Ibid., p.238.

<sup>344</sup>Ibid., p.281.

<sup>345</sup>Ibid., p.250.

<sup>346</sup>Ibid., p.291.

<sup>347</sup>Ibid., p.305.

<sup>348</sup>Ibid., p.317.

<sup>349</sup>Ward, p.43.

In 1923, 26,000 unemployed people resided in the guberniia<sup>350</sup>. By the end of the 1920s, before the great changes of 1929 and 1930, the level of unemployment began to fall: 23,700 people were registered as unemployed on October 1, 1926, and 12,000 on October 1, 1928<sup>351</sup>. Workdays were relatively short, possibly because of the lack of sufficient employment; for example, a working day in the glass industry amounted to six hours around 1928<sup>352</sup>. In 1924 and 1925, the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth guberniia Party conferences tried to solve the manifold problems weighing down industry: shortages of machinery and raw materials, inadequate planning, slipshod relations among the factories, difficulties with sales, and so on<sup>353</sup>. Little mechanization, and much obsolete machinery burdened industry further<sup>354</sup>. Another problem was the lack of specialists (engineers, technical workers) in industrial fields. Around 1929, one specialist was employed in industry for every hundred workers<sup>355</sup>. Some of these skilled cadres would be removed upon accusations of wrecking towards the decade's end. In their stead some new cadres were hired who had matriculated in the 1920s from the workers' faculties, tekhnikums, factory colleges (*FZU: Fabrichno-zavodskoe uchilishche* or *FZO: Fabrichno-zavodskoe*

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<sup>350</sup>Ocherki, p.271.

<sup>351</sup>Korzun, *Pervye...*, p.92.

<sup>352</sup>Ibid., p.93.

<sup>353</sup>Ocherki, p.274.

<sup>354</sup>Ibid., p.275.

<sup>355</sup>Ibid., p.317.

*otdelenie*) and professional courses<sup>356</sup>. In 1929, a workers' university opened in Tver<sup>357</sup>.

In the middle of the 1920s the most important field of large industry was still textiles, which produced 80% of the total industrial output<sup>358</sup>. In the cotton mills, the bulk of the labour force was composed of women workers<sup>359</sup>. The share of "means of production" (industrial machinery) amounted to a mere 1.1% of total industrial production<sup>360</sup>.

Reintroduced by NEP, the limited possibility to own privately small-scale firms in local industry did not lead to any remarkable results. Around 1925, the private industrial enterprises --between 150 to 180-- only employed approximately 2,000 workers and employees, an average of about twelve people per company<sup>361</sup>. The private sector owned about 30% of the small-scale industry, yielding about 1% of the total industrial production of the province<sup>362</sup>.

Handicrafts enjoyed continued prominence: 72,350 people were employed as artisans in 1924-25<sup>363</sup>. These trades accounted for more than one-third of the guberniia's total industrial production in

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<sup>356</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 317/318.

<sup>357</sup>*Ibid.*, p.318. The workers faculty (*rabfak*) was intended to prepare industrial workers for university in a time-span of three to four years, in order to complement the "bourgeois-specialists" with real "proletarian" specialists (Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front*, p.66).

<sup>358</sup>*Ocherki*, p.318.

<sup>359</sup>Ward, p.24.

<sup>360</sup>*Ocherki*, p.289.

<sup>361</sup>*Ocherki*, p.275.

<sup>362</sup>*Kalininskaia Oblastnaia Organizatsiia...*, p.215.

<sup>363</sup>*Ocherki*, p.292.



these years; artisans outnumbered evidently factory workers. The same trades dominated as before 1914<sup>364</sup>. The Kimry *vezd* leather and footwear artisans formed by far the largest group of people engaged in handicrafts in the guberniia (33% of the total). A substantial number manufactured felt boots in Kaliazin *vezd* (10% of all artisans thus employed). Furthermore, the traditional net-making artisanry in Ostashkov *vezd* and knitted wear manufacturing in Likhoslavl' and Tver' *vezdy* remained in force. As before 1914, close to 90% of the artisans lived in countryside villages. Almost nine-tenths of the handicraft manufacturing belonged in private hands in 1924-25<sup>365</sup>.

Despite all this, handicrafts had undergone an enormous decline. While before 1914 almost 80% of all rural households derived additional income from either domestic manufacturing or seasonal work in the cities, in 1922 less than one-fifth did so<sup>366</sup>. Among the rural population, villagers with a non-agricultural occupation had decreased from 24% of the total to 4%. In the first place, this resulted from the fact that by then in the cities there was neither work nor bread. Secondly, the demand for artisans' products had drastically declined because of the economic hardships. Many of the former handicraft workers had returned to agricultural work; only the few that produced for the small demand of the village itself remained in business.

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<sup>364</sup>Ibid., p.275.

<sup>365</sup>Ibid., p.292.

<sup>366</sup>Altrichter, p.79.

Towards the end of the 1920s the habit of working on the side regained popularity: at least 45,000 people resumed their trade in the villages, and towards 1926 more than 124,000 inhabitants in the guberniia were migratory workers (*otkhodniki*)<sup>367</sup>. In 1927 roughly one third of all rural households added to their income because one or more of its members practiced a non-agricultural occupation. The source for these numbers is more reliable than the one that maintained that before collectivization all peasant households were dependent on work outside agriculture<sup>368</sup>. In any event, the numbers confirm that agriculture was incapable of providing adequately for many rural dwellers.

My description of the rural population's exodus before 1914 pointed to the fact that the peasants not only left for the towns of Tver' guberniia, but also for towns outside of it, Moscow and St. Petersburg in particular<sup>369</sup>. The troubled times from 1914 to 1921 did temporarily reverse this trend. The nomadic urge returned in the 1920s, when several tens of thousands of migratory workers chose to settle down permanently in the towns<sup>370</sup>. In this way they diminished the number of migratory workers who used to be counted as rural dwellers in the statistics. Country dwellers' migration to urban areas has persisted until our own time: although the oblast' had fewer inhabitants in 1991 than in the 1920s (1.67 million compared to 2.24 million in 1926), the capital Tver' has more than

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<sup>367</sup>Altrichter, p.81.

<sup>368</sup>Sergeev, "Sel'skoe khoziaistvo...", p.267; see I.5.

<sup>369</sup>See I.1.

<sup>370</sup>Altrichter, p.81.

450,000 inhabitants, four-and-a-half times as many as in 1926<sup>371</sup>. The provincial population dwindled gradually from probably at least 1914 until 1941, dropped dramatically in the war, and underwent a more gentle decline or stagnation after 1945<sup>372</sup>. The war, collectivization, the *Ezhovshchina*, and the exodus to the Moscow, Leningrad, and other areas contributed to this trend<sup>373</sup>. The largest population increase of the city of Tver' occurred after approximately 1950. Obviously, Soviet industrialization and the gruesome countryside life as a result of collectivization were causes for some of the urbanization, but migration to towns had started before 1917 or 1929. The process resembles to a certain extent migratory movements in other industrialized countries during the 19th and 20th centuries. It is rather remarkable to notice that, in the 1960s, when life in the countryside finally became hospitable again, migration to urban areas was perhaps stronger than ever before, just as one would expect the trend to slow down. Increased movement to the towns probably ensued after the abolition in 1976-78 of the law that in 1932 had introduced the internal passport system; finally rural inhabitants also got a passport in the second half of the 1970s<sup>374</sup>. In Chapter VII, it will be shown that a renewed migratory

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<sup>371</sup>See Vershinskii and Zolotarev, *Naselenie*..., pp.8/9 and Tables 2 and 4.

<sup>372</sup>*Tsentral'nyi Raion*, pp.116-119; see Tables 2 and 4. The losses will be further examined in VII.1 in particular.

<sup>373</sup>*Ibid.*, p.119; between 1926 and 1939, the population declined by 6.7% according to Soviet statistical handbooks (see Table 2 and compare to VII.1). During these years, the urban population almost doubled.

<sup>374</sup>Heller and Nekrich, p.260; Zhores A. Medvedev, *Soviet Agriculture*, p.95; Iu.

Borisov, "Stalin: Chelovek i Simvol. Fakty istorii i istoriia kul'ta," in: (V.A. Ivanov(ed.)), *Perepiska na istoricheskie temy. Dialog vedet chitatel'*, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989, pp.435-492, p.478.

movement to the towns began at the end of the 1940s, in spite of the restrictions on the *kolkhozniks'* free movement that were part of the 1932 passport regimentation.

In the NEP period, most of the internal wholesale and retail trade belonged to private persons<sup>375</sup>. The NEP created possibilities for private trading, but in the course of the 1920s the private merchant and shopkeeper had to compete gradually more with consumers' cooperatives<sup>376</sup>. At the same time, the freedom of action for the private trader was being restricted towards 1929.

In a political sense, the bulk of the guberniia's population experienced a period of calm in comparison with previous or later periods. In the campaign for the enrollment of industrial workers into the Party after Lenin's death, the Party underwent significant growth<sup>377</sup>. While on January 1, 1924, the Communist Party had 4,892 members and candidates in the guberniia, the membership increased to 8,660 by January 1 of the next year. Still, this number --although it continued to increase afterwards, surpassing 10,000 by November 1925-- appears insignificant if compared to the guberniia's population, 2,242,350 in December 1926<sup>378</sup>. Only about 0.4 to 0.5% of the people of the Tver' province were full or candidate members. In some areas, the Communists represented a mere drop in the ocean, as in the Vasil'evskii *volost'* of Tver' *uezd* where, at the end of

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<sup>375</sup>Ocherki, p.276/277.

<sup>376</sup>Altrichter, pp.164/165.

<sup>377</sup>Ocherki, pp.278-281.

<sup>378</sup>Vershinskii, Zolotarev, pp.12/13; Ocherki, p.290.

1924, four full and one candidate members lived amongst a total populace of over 45,000<sup>379</sup>!

The Lenin Enrollment was certainly disappointing for the Party with respect to the entry of peasants: only 274 in the whole guberniia became Communists. This was only a small fraction of the total increase of 3,768 during 1924. In January 1927, almost half of the guberniia's Communists were working in the Factory district of the town of Tver' and in the Tver' town- and *uezd* organizations<sup>380</sup>. In contrast, at this time the Party organization of Ves'egonsk *uezd* numbered 200 out of a population of roughly 110,000, according to the 1926 Census<sup>381</sup>. Obviously, the presence of the Party in the countryside was hard to discern. It was left to the village soviets to implement and control the execution of Party and government decisions. By the mid-1920s there were around 800 soviets -- representing more than 15,000 villages and hamlets--, a more manageable number than the more than 9,000 initially created in 1918<sup>382</sup>. The soviets were responsible for the infrastructure, the school system, the libraries, the registration of conscripts, the organization of breeding, veterinary, and other agricultural stations, agricultural modernization, the registration of births, deaths, and marriages, the enforcement of civil and criminal law, the fire brigade, tax collection, and social aid<sup>383</sup>. It was difficult to involve the local communities in the work of the soviets: in the villages, as

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<sup>379</sup>Ocherki, p.283.

<sup>380</sup>Ocherki, p.300.

<sup>381</sup>Ocherki, p.301; Vershinskii, Zolotarev, pp.12/13.

<sup>382</sup>Altrichter, p. 136 and p.143.

<sup>383</sup>Altrichter, p.36.

pointed out above, the authority in local matters was in fact vested in the *skhod*. The soviets had been given the authority by the state over fifteen to twenty settlements. This made them hardly effective organs of local government, inasmuch as they were often located too far away from the villages; in the village the *skhod* ruled<sup>384</sup>.

Similarly the Komsomol made significant progress after Lenin's death: within half a year, in 1924, its membership increased from 10,421 to 17,089; more than 30,000 Komsomols were registered on October 1, 1926<sup>385</sup>. More than 60% of the Komsomol membership were peasant youths at the end of 1926<sup>386</sup>. This membership became something of a fashion among the youth around this time<sup>387</sup>. It would be a mistake to read too much into this, as the behaviour of the Communist youth was hardly different from their non-Communist peers, nor did many Komsomols demonstrate strong political convictions<sup>388</sup>. However, it is probable that the Komsomol caught on with some of the younger generation as a means to be used in the eternal generational conflict between parents and children. Pankratova points out that in Goritsy *volost'* a substantial part of the youth in 1920 had ambitions of which their parents would never have dreamt<sup>389</sup>. Perhaps young people were more inclined to support

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<sup>384</sup>*Ibid.*, p.143.

<sup>385</sup>Ocherki, p.282 and p.298. This was a development of the later 1920s: in early 1924 no Komsomol organization existed for instance in Goritsy *volost'*, which had a population of approximately 9,000 at the time (Bol'shakov, p.124 and Tablitsa 15, p.155).

<sup>386</sup>Ocherki, p.298.

<sup>387</sup>Altrichter, p.152.

<sup>388</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.152/153.

<sup>389</sup>Pankratova, p.36. Nevertheless, we noticed above that these ambitions did not go much beyond the desire to abandon agriculture for artisanry.

change, while some of the Komsomols might have taken part wholeheartedly in the collectivization of agriculture owing to an antagonistic attitude towards their elders<sup>390</sup>.

### I.8 The End of NEP

This quiet interlude came to a close in 1928: at the end of October, the first guberniia conference of poor peasants' (*bedniak*) groups took place, "uncovering" the perversion of the class line and of the Party's policies in the countryside<sup>391</sup>. "Kulaks" countered by threatening the activist members of these groups in several *uezdy* during the winter of 1928-1929. Until autumn, affairs did not escalate any further. As Altrichter points out rightfully, at this point, the Party was not terribly disturbed by the kulaks' activity itself or the procurement crisis that began to take shape<sup>392</sup>. Most important was the perception that almost all peasants, rich and poor, had become small "capitalists" after the land distribution of 1917-1918, and were indifferent to Party slogans. They were trying to maintain their independence as much as possible, and were inimical to any state interference in their affairs. Altrichter actually discerns a trend in the 1920s towards levelling the difference between rich and poor in the countryside. Certainly no polarisation was developing between "kulaks" and the rest of the peasantry<sup>393</sup>. The peasants, too, seem to have been

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<sup>390</sup>Altrichter notices that conflicts with their elders caused some youth to join the Komsomol(Altrichter, p.153).

<sup>391</sup>See *Ocherki*, p.312.

<sup>392</sup>Altrichter, p.74.

<sup>393</sup>Altrichter, p.85; as was admitted by *Kalininskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia...*, p.215.

wary of the danger of excelling, because they might be classified consequently as 'kulak,' and thus lose the right to vote<sup>394</sup>.

What really worried the Party brass was the awareness that the countryside was almost outside their control. The adversity to cooperation with the state and the adherence to a production level geared to satisfying their own households' limited needs prevented the peasantry from producing a sufficiently large surplus to finance the ambitious industrialization plans<sup>395</sup>. Radical measures were needed to enduce the peasantry to change their minds, forcing them to collaborate--enthusiastically, it was hoped by the more naive Party members--with the accelerated building of socialism. Stalin apparently perceived the violence of collectivization as the only possible way to change this antagonistic mentality. He might have crudely come to the conclusion that the peasants would be magically reborn as model collective farmers after collectivization. For them, the first priority in life would always be the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the state-ordained plan in expectation of the radiant future of socialism and communism. The belief that the peasants would soon see the light, following their entry into the kolkhozy, was certainly not Stalin's alone. Many of the rural activists who executed collectivization seem to have thought along the same lines. If the peasants did not understand, then it would be at least easier, after the organization of the collective farms, to extort surplus necessary to finance the ambitious industrialization plans, and recruit labour necessary for the expanding industry. In many ways collectivization would indeed break

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<sup>394</sup>Altrichter, p.86.

<sup>395</sup>See for this point of view: Altrichter, p.186.



the peasants' will, but for a long while old habits and some traits of independence survived among them.

In hindsight, the discussions at the end of December 1928 at the nineteenth gubernatorial Party conference seem ominous. They called for the "socialist transformation" of the countryside through collective and state farms, but both kinds of farms already did exist, and had previously received praise as the ultimate end of the Bolshevik agricultural policy<sup>396</sup>. Even in December 1928 it was certainly not yet perceived as a call for the rushed, all-out collectivization that would begin one year later. In 1928, the first drafts for the economic and cultural development of the guberniia in terms of the First Five Year plan were discussed: the stress lay on the expansion of heavy industry<sup>397</sup>.

The internal Party struggles between Stalin's "General Line" and Trotsky's, Zinoviev's, and Kamenev's opposition in Moscow were felt as a weak tremor in Tver' guberniia: a mere handful of Communists supported this opposition<sup>398</sup>. The "Right Opposition," which is a bit of a misnomer for Party members who supported a less drastic line in agricultural policy, would enjoy more popularity, as expected in this predominantly agricultural area. Support for the "Right" platform, or, more appropriately, for the continuation of NEP, occurred in the Esenovichi raion for example, where the raikom pursued a "conciliatory" line in agricultural policy<sup>399</sup>. "Oppositionists" were found in the

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<sup>396</sup>Ocherki, p.314.

<sup>397</sup>Ibid., p.309.

<sup>398</sup>Ibid., pp.303/304.

<sup>399</sup>Ibid., pp.312/313; Fainsod, *Smolensk...*, p.179. The "Right" deviation was apparently discovered around September 1929: see Fainsod, *Smolensk...*, note 5 of Chapter 9, p.461. In 1929, Tver' guberniia was dissolved, split up in roughly four okrugs, and divided until 1935 between the Moscow, Leningrad, and Western oblasts.

agricultural and financial organs of the guberniia and subsequent okrug of Tver', as well as in the factories of Torzhok. Others opposing the "General Line" were uncovered in the *uezd* Party committee and the rural credit council of Kimry *uezd* and in one of the people's courts of the town of Rzhev.

Within a period of two years three large fires damaged the railroad-car construction factory of Tver'<sup>400</sup>. This, too, supposedly was caused by the class enemy, although it is more likely that they were caused by the somewhat over-optimistic plan for the factory's development during the rather chaotic beginnings of Stalinist industrialization<sup>401</sup>. The pressure was enormous on management and many of the workers. Many of the latter were freshly recruited from among rural dwellers, new urban arrivals, who were hardly skilled as a consequence and bound to make mistakes in their new jobs.

Although the Party enjoyed very little popularity among the majority of the population in the countryside, there is sufficient indication that the Plan had the genuine support of most industrial workers, who in large numbers hailed its announcement with enthusiasm<sup>402</sup>. The textile workers of Tver' sent a delegation to the Fifteenth Party Congress to greet the Congress delegates and offer them a present<sup>403</sup>. Factory workers, however, formed only a small section of the labour force.

By the end of 1928, the guberniia Party organization began to feel the cold wind that started to blow from Moscow: the Central Committee

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<sup>400</sup>Ocherki, p.313.

<sup>401</sup>See Ocherki, p.309 for the high planning targets for this factory.

<sup>402</sup>See as well for example Ocherki, p.305.

<sup>403</sup>Ocherki, p.305.

issued a resolution condemning a Party conference in Vyshnii Volochek *uezd* for infringements of internal Party democracy<sup>404</sup>. The *uezd* representative to the gubkom was dismissed. Between the lines of this case, one can glean that the *uezd* Party committee of Vyshnii Volochek probably had been defending a "Bukharinite" platform. At this time, such a position still officially conformed to the "General Line," but was of course in the process of being abandoned. The official 1971 version of this incident alleged that several delegates at the *uezd* Party conference of Vyshnii Volochek were exposed to merciless pressure and groundlessly accused of veering away from the Party line by the local leadership<sup>405</sup>. In fact, this means that the local Party leadership in Vyshnii Volochek was deviating from the --Stalinist-- "General Line." In other words, in this case it seems that the Party bosses of Vyshnii Volochek defended the continuation of NEP policy.

The "right deviation" was supposedly already condemned at the nineteenth Party conference of the guberniia, at the end of December 1928<sup>406</sup>. And already by October 1928, too, seventeen leading *volost'* workers in the guberniia had been released from their duties for "...distortion of the class line and the politics of the party in the countryside...".<sup>407</sup>

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<sup>404</sup>Ibid., pp. 310/311; Korzun, *Pervye...*, p.47.

<sup>405</sup>Ocherki, pp.310/311.

<sup>406</sup>Ocherki, p.315.

<sup>407</sup>Korzun, *Pervye...*, p.48.

## CHAPTER II: STALIN'S REVOLUTION

*Les rubiat-shchepki letiat*

Stalin's decision to introduce the great change (*velikii perelom*) of 1929-1930 was probably based on a mixture of political and economic grounds. On the one hand he might have grown impatient with the peasants' independent spirit, so clearly expressed in the grain-procurement crisis at the end of the 1920s<sup>2</sup>. The Bolshevik leadership, too, was constantly in fear of an "imperialist" attack, for which the country was ill-prepared in its view, because of an insufficient armaments industry. Stalin *cum suis* perceived collectivization and industrialization as the only way to mobilize the country for the defensive effort that was imagined to be required. From a theoretical point of view, NEP had been no more than a "temporary" retreat for Stalin and his supporters, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances allowed it. The leadership was eager to start with the creation of a socialist society, for which it had staged the October Revolution and won the Civil War. Certain personal motives might have played a rôle, particularly Stalin's attempted emulation of Lenin as a fundamental transformer of the Russian lands, and his desire to outdo people like Trotsky, Zinoviev, or Bukharin with a grandiose policy which would change the face of the Soviet Union forever.

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<sup>1</sup>Old Russian saying, popular among Stalin and his cronies in the 1930s, meaning approximately the same as "you cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs." (literally: "when trees are felled, chips fly").

<sup>2</sup>V.P. Danilov, V.P. Dmitrenko, V.S. Lel'chuk, "NEP i ego sud'ba," in : V.S. Lel'chuk(ed.), *Istoriki sporiat. Trinadsat' besed*. Moskva: Politizdat, 1988, pp.122-190, p. 178

Thus he would be considered a politician second only to the founding father of Bolshevism. The necessity of industrialization and collectivization, and the methods used in the process, were questionable. The Soviet Union could have forgone it, remaining strong enough to withstand an attack from the outside. After all, as recently (ex-) Soviet historians have begun to admit, the country was certainly not fifty or a hundred years behind the more industrialized countries in 1929<sup>3</sup>. The USSR was no longer a strictly agrarian country, but rather a country that was "agrarian-industrial."<sup>4</sup> However, as Danilov remarks, history does not know a subjunctive clause<sup>5</sup>. Once Stalin embarked on this road, no one and nothing was able to stop him. In the second half of the 1930s, Stalin would blame anyone for the failure of the strategy of collectivization and industrialization. The main culprit remained at liberty, of course, and continued to make terrible blunders. In the following two chapters, the horrendous consequences of Stalin's policies in the 1930s for the province of Tver' will be related.

## II.1 Collectivization

Although the actual all-out collectivization drive only began in the winter of 1929-1930, the first steps towards it took place in the

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<sup>3</sup>For example V.P. Danilov in: *ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>4</sup>Danilov a.o., "NEP...." p.176.

<sup>5</sup>Danilov a.o., "NEP...." p.174.

fall of 1927<sup>6</sup>. At that moment, for the first time since the activities of the requisition units of the Civil War, detachments composed of soviet, Party, and OGPU representatives were sent into the countryside to find grain. Grain deliveries had fallen far short of expectations. In the next autumn, the procurement crisis recurred because of a bad harvest, and in early 1929 the state once more organized forced requisitions<sup>7</sup>.

Altercations between peasants and the authorities, as well as peasants' revolts against the confiscations, took place<sup>8</sup>. In I.8, I described the first political measures taken by the Party's gubkom against local authorities who advocated a "conciliatory" line. The state tried --as it had in the earlier delivery campaigns--, through the mediation of the village soviets, to exert most of the pressure on the richer farmsteads, when it ordained its initial procurement quotas for the deliveries of the winter of 1929-1930<sup>9</sup>. However, this strategy would oblige the state to remain dependent on the peasantry's cooperation; to avoid this, it decided to make a radical switch<sup>10</sup>. All-

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<sup>6</sup>Altrichter, p.182. Compare as well to an interesting recent article on the Stalinists' attack in 1928 on the leadership of neighbouring Smolensk guberniia (V.G. Afanas'ev, "'Smolenskoe delo' 1928 g.: Podgotovka 'velikogo pereloma'," in: *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriia 8 Istorii*, No.3, 1991, pp.56-73). Afanas'ev argues with some justification that, in comparison with the well-known 'Shakhty-case,' the Smolensk one had a far larger importance. Other than 'Shakhty,' in which accusations were forged of wrecking and connections with foreign intelligence services against a comparatively small group of engineers-specialists, 'the Smolensk case' accused a whole Party organization of degradation, of 'a political bloc with the kulaks', and the whole peasantry of the guberniia of a transition to the capitalist way of development. (Afanas'ev, "'Smolenskoe...'," p.58). It is likely that in Tver' guberniia an extensive purge of the leading Party positions took place in 1929 as well, as the attack on the Vyshnii Volochek leadership indicates, but that it was less severe than in Smolensk guberniia, where in 1929 "practically a new Party organization was created." (Afanas'ev, "'Smolenskoe...'," p.69; see I.8).

<sup>7</sup>Altrichter, p.183.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp.183/184.

<sup>9</sup>Altrichter, p.184.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp.184/185.

out collectivization of agriculture and "de-kulakization" comprised the solution<sup>11</sup>.

According to Danilov, in February 1930, in the Western, Moscow, Leningrad, and the industrial Ivanovo oblast', 17,000 kulaks were arrested for counterrevolutionary agitation and their families were exiled to remote areas of the USSR; they were classified as belonging to the 'first category' of kulaks, the most harmful<sup>12</sup>. 15,000 kulak households --of the 'second category'-- were exiled in their entirety to faraway regions. An unknown number of kulaks were assigned to a 'third category' and were "merely" exiled to the periphery of their administrative raions. In 1930 and 1931 in the Soviet Union, a total of 381,000 families (1,803,392 people) were banished to outlying areas of the Union, as part of the 'first' or 'second' category<sup>13</sup>. Another 400,000 to 450,000 families were exiled to less remote areas as part of the 'third category' in the same period<sup>14</sup>. Between 1932 and 1936 an additional 100,000 households were de-kulakized. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of Danilov's and Bugai's numbers. According to Bugai, of those deported to peripheral areas, 973,693 remained by 1939, while 3.4 million had been deported to these areas by the end of 1932<sup>15</sup>. Perhaps 800,000 people (roughly 600,000 between 1932 and

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<sup>11</sup>On the dekulakization, see V.P. Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia...", pp.355-400, in: V.A. Ivanov(ed.), Perepiska na istoricheskie temy. Dialog vedet chitatel'. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989, pp.388-391 and N.F. Bugai, "20-40-e gody: Deportatsiia naseleniia s territorii evropeiskoi Rossii," in: Otechestvennaia istoriia, 4, 1992, pp.37-49, p.41).

<sup>12</sup>Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia...", pp.388/389; the former Tver' guberniia had been mainly divided up between Moscow and Western oblast'.

<sup>13</sup>Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia...", p.391; Bugai, p.41.

<sup>14</sup>Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia...", p.391.

<sup>15</sup>Bugai, p.41.

1937) successfully escaped; one could therefore conclude that at least half of these deportees (approximately 1.7 million) died, since kulaks were still being deported after 1932. The head of the State Archive of the Kalinin oblast' wrote an article in 1989 based on the documents on collectivization and further repressions in the 1930s that were being declassified in his archive<sup>16</sup>. He relates how even people possessing one cow were expropriated of everything they had<sup>17</sup>. The loss of voting rights was often a prelude to further repressions, as the case of Mironov below illustrates. The internally exiled "kulaks" --the "third" category-- would be sometimes organized into forced labour battalions to log, build roads, and the like.

The arbitrariness of de-kulakization becomes obvious from the concrete example of Nikolai Mironovich Mironov, a rural dweller of the area around Udoml'ia, not far removed from Vyshnii Volochek<sup>18</sup>. In this raion about 500 people were dekulakized. Judging from a document in the oblast' archive, Mironov had lost his electoral rights some time before 1931. He tried to appeal for the restitution of his rights with the rural soviet of Moldino (raion of Udoml'ia). The case was heard on May 4, 1931. His request was rejected, because of his "kulak farm" (*kulatskoe khoziastvo*). He had been dekulakized by the poor peasants (*bednoty*) of the commune "Moldino" in February 1930, and his property was confiscated on the initiative of local

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<sup>16</sup> Il'in, "Raskrytie...".

<sup>17</sup> Il'in, "Raskrytie...", pp.11/12.

<sup>18</sup> See Gennadi Asinkritov, "Raskulachennyi", in: Glasnost'(Udomel'skaia obshchestvenno-politicheskaia gazeta Tverskoi oblasti). Vol. II, No.9(46), July 1992, pp.4/5. See the maps. Today the nuclear power station of the Tver' oblast' is located in Udoml'ia raion, which has transformed this formerly strictly rural raion.



authorities<sup>19</sup>. The communal house of the collective was being built from the logs of Mironov's house<sup>20</sup>. Unfortunately for him, Mironov's family had owned a wool-beating machine and had employed hired hands before the revolution. However, according to Mironov at the hearing of his case, the machine had been out of order since 1914. Furthermore, since the death of his brothers in 1927 -- together with whom Nikolai Mironovich had lived and taken care of the farm their father had bequeathed to them--, the family property had been divided into several units. After the division of the property among his nephews and himself following his brothers' death in 1927, he only owned one horse, one cow, one calf, and two sheep, i.e. an amount of livestock below the norms set to identify a kulak. He did not seem to have cultivated an allotment of land that was above the "kulak-norm." Perhaps Mironov was envied or disliked by some of the other, poorer, villagers, who seized the opportunity offered by

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<sup>19</sup>In the 1960s, the operation of the kolkhoz "Moldino" would be described in glowing terms in a series of articles by Leonid Ivanov in *Novyi Mir* (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh mestakh," in: *Novyi Mir*, 3, 1963, pp.174-200, Leonid Ivanov, "Snova o rodnykh mestakh," in: *Novyi Mir*, 2, 1965, pp.181-212, Leonid Ivanov, "Litsom k derevne," in: *Novyi Mir*, 5, 1966, pp.201-221). The hero of Ivanov's account, kolkhoz director Evgenii Aleksandrovich Petrov, already led "Moldino" in the early 1930s as a young Komsomol, and might have been partially responsible for the reckoning with Mironov. Petrov himself was for a while detained in 1937, but could return to the farm without being sentenced, perhaps because he did not admit to "anti-Soviet activities." (Leonid Ivanov, "Snova...", p.183, p.196, p.203). Petrov had been excessively concerned with the standard of living of his kolkhozniks, according to Ivanov, and was forced to defend himself for being the son of a tsarist general as well (Leonid Ivanov, "Snova...", p.203; in the 1966 article by Ivanov, Petrov's father has been reduced to the rank of captain --perhaps he was demoted when he took service with the Red Army, perhaps Ivanov exaggerated in 1965, see Leonid Ivanov, "Litsom...", p.211). Both Leonid Ivanov and Petrov were mobilized "to aid with collectivization" in Udoml'ia raion in 1930 (Leonid Ivanov, "Snova...", p.186). Ivanov himself claimed to have only been active as land surveyor. The involvement of either Ivanov or Petrov in "de-kulakization" is not mentioned by Ivanov in the articles.

<sup>20</sup>Asinkritov, pp.4/5.

collectivization, and "de-kulakized" him with the aid of their newly formed commune. Mironov's family was evicted from their home, all property confiscated, and he was forced to resettle elsewhere as a *khutor* (individual farmer, living in a house in the middle of his fields, outside any village)<sup>21</sup>. He subsequently worked in Rybinsk, then returned home, and bombarded the authorities with requests that justice should be done<sup>22</sup>. The end came in 1937, when he was convicted by a "troika" as an "anti-Soviet element" and "enemy of the people." His sentence entailed no rights of correspondence, which meant execution. It seems likely that the authorities became fed up with the bothersome Nikolai Mironovich and simply decided to get rid of him. Mironov's daughter was recently informed that her father had been posthumously rehabilitated on January 16, 1989, during the second wave of rehabilitations of Stalin's victims<sup>23</sup>.

The state shirked from the responsibility of supplying farms with machinery by proposing the liquidation of the richer ("kulak") households and the transfer of their supposed machinery and equipment to the kolkhozy. For example, in Likhoslavl' raion in February 1930, 270 kulaks were expropriated, losing their tools, equipment, and all their livestock; the property was transferred to the indivisible funds of the kolkhozy<sup>24</sup>.

The poor and middle peasants were made to join the collectives with promises, threats, and force<sup>25</sup>. Their property

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<sup>21</sup>See Altrichter, p.22, for a description of *khutory*.

<sup>22</sup>Asinkritov, p.5.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p.5.

<sup>24</sup>Ocherki, p.346.

<sup>25</sup>Altrichter, p.185; Afanas'ev, "'Smolenskoe...'," p.70.

became part of the collective farm's "indivisible fund," and it was rendered difficult or impossible for them to retrieve their share from it. Rules laid down for the fund dealt with the kolkhoz' property, production, investment, and consumption, effectively taking any related decisions out of the hands of the individual peasants.

In 'Tver' guberniia --which was split up in the course of 1929 into okrugs, which became part of either the Moscow or the Western oblast'--, the collectivization movement was hampered by the Party's minimal presence and the weakness of the government in the countryside<sup>26</sup>. In 1929, the number of collective farms rose from 210 on January 1, to 492 on July 1, but still comprised only 2% of all peasant households<sup>27</sup>. The number of Party members at this point in the countryside was still very small<sup>28</sup>. In 'Tver' okrug, where the situation was probably more favourable than in the other three okrugs of the former guberniia, 103 rural Party cells operated, with a total of 1,242 Communists. This translated into only 12% of all Communists of the okrug. Presently, the local Party leadership introduced ideas of complete collectivization of certain raions by 1932-1933. Even rather utopian plans cropped up, which deemed it feasible to create a huge agro-industrial complex in the Likhoslavl' raion. This plan was akin to the proposals of Khrushchev in the early 1950s that would be equally rejected.

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<sup>26</sup> Altrichter, pp.187/188; Ocherki, p.337. In the wake of the Sixteenth Party Congress of June/July 1930, the okrugs were dissolved and split up in raions, residing under the administration of the two oblasts (Ocherki, pp.361/362).

<sup>27</sup> Altrichter, p.189.

<sup>28</sup> Ocherki, p.337.

Meanwhile the resistance against the collectivization drive was on the rise: activists were threatened, beaten, and sometimes assassinated<sup>29</sup>. In Bezhetsk okrug more than fifty "terrorist" acts were registered in the last months of 1929<sup>30</sup>. In four months, during the autumn and winter of 1929-1930, more than nine hundred people were brought to trial here in connection with "terrorism". "Counterrevolutionary groups" were formed. Arson and the slaughter of cattle proliferated<sup>31</sup>. It is doubtful that "kulak-propaganda" caused the widespread slaughter of cattle; a far more likely cause can be found in the threat of cattle confiscation by the kolkhozy, combined with the promise of machinery to substitute for the cattle. The peasants of Likhoslavl' raion brought 62% more cattle to the slaughterhouse in November 1929 than in September of the same year<sup>32</sup>. In the Kalinin rural raion the number of cattle would continue to decrease until 1935<sup>33</sup>. Realizing the danger of resisting by refusing to join the kolkhoz, some decided to join them in order to distract the authorities' attention from other persecuted practices they were involved in. These "pseudocommunes" --of Baptists, for instance-- were subsequently exposed<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup> Altrichter, p.190; Ocherki, p.338.

<sup>30</sup> Ocherki, p.339.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.; Heller and Nekrich, p.237.

<sup>32</sup> Ocherki, p.338.

<sup>33</sup> S.I. Ledovskikh, "Kalininskii raion", pp.38-43, in: Uchenye zapiski Moskovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Trudy Kalininskoi ekspeditsii nauchno-issledovatel'skogo instituta geografii. Zony, goroda i raiony Kalininskoi oblasti. Geografiia: Vypusk 38, Tom III, chast' pervaiia. Moskva: 1940 [from here: MGU 38], p.41.

<sup>34</sup> Korzun, Pervye.... pp.82/83.

By roughly December 1929, local authorities became "dizzy with success": three raions of the 'Tver' okrug promised each other, by way of "socialist competition", to have their territory fully collectivized before the 1930 spring sowing<sup>35</sup>. Industrial workers had begun to propagate the virtues of the collective farms in the countryside in the second half of 1929<sup>36</sup>. In January 1930, two hundred industrial workers from the town of 'Tver' were sent into the countryside of the okrug to lead the collective farm movement; the following ceremony set the tone of their mission<sup>37</sup>:

On January 24, 1930, at a solemn evening organized for the occasion of the dispatch of the workers, a resolution of the 'Tver' workers was read out and given to each activist. In the resolution the workers called upon their comrades to be firm fighters for socialism, to develop and strengthen the kolkhoz movement, and to guarantee the economic and political durability of each kolkhoz.<sup>38</sup>

Activists from Moscow, 'Tula, Smolensk, Briansk, Iaroslavl', and Ivanovo also joined in the collectivization drive in the four okrugs<sup>39</sup>. In Rzhev okrug, 187 communists and Komsomols were sent into the countryside, thirty-six of whom were women<sup>40</sup>. Not all city dwellers were supporting the collectivization drive: in the autumn of 1929, a student of the Pedagogical Institute of 'Tver', one Nikitin, whose parents were peasants, protested the onslaught on the

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<sup>35</sup> Altrichter, p.190.

<sup>36</sup> Qcherki, p.341.

<sup>37</sup> Altrichter, pp.189/190, mentions December, but the actual dispatch of these activists took place later.

<sup>38</sup> Korzun, *Pervye*, p.84.

<sup>39</sup> Qcherki, p.344.

<sup>40</sup> Qcherki, p.343.

peasantry<sup>41</sup>. At a political meeting in the Institute, he was defended by many of those present. As a result, he could not be dismissed initially. However, the Institute's Party *biuro* forced Nikitin to leave one week later.

In some households, adult males were working as itinerant artisans or seasonal workers. As a consequence, the authorities had to apply pressure specifically on the women, who had stayed in their village to take care of the family farm. The stronger opposition of peasant women to collectivization can perhaps be discerned when reading the following quote:

The participation of female workers in collectivization was very important in this period. They found more easily a common language with the female peasants, on whom depended to a significant level the unification [in the kolkhozy] of the peasantry.<sup>42</sup>

A Soviet source indicates that, on the whole, women in the countryside only turned away from religion after the establishment of the collective-farm system<sup>43</sup>. They might have had religious reasons to resist the collectivization, particularly because of the uninhibited attack on priests that accompanied the events<sup>44</sup>.

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<sup>41</sup>L.A. Kotliarskaia, M.M. Freidenberg, Iz istorii Tverskoi Kul'tury. Anatolii Nikolaevich Vershinskii (1888-1944). Uchebnoe posobie, Tver' 1990, p.83.

<sup>42</sup>Ocherki, p.343. For an example of the marked antagonism of women towards collectivization, see Conquest, Harvest, p.157.

<sup>43</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.268.

<sup>44</sup>A report of August 15, 1929 described the situation with religion and anti-religious propaganda in the guberniia to the Tver' gubkom; still almost 1,000 churches and monasteries functioned in the province, and 1058 priests and monks had survived up to that point (see Tverskoi tsentr..., p.11). Around 5,000 people belonged to non-Orthodox denominations. The Old Believers were the largest among these: they numbered approximately 2,800. In order to comprehend the results of the anti-religious offensive of the 1930s, compare to VI.2.

Women's increased significance in agriculture, that had evolved since 1914, was sustained<sup>45</sup>. When, in the fall of 1932, 5,886 kolkhoz shock-workers were counted in the raion of Bezhetsk, 3,976 of them were women.

In early 1930 workers' activists were also involved in the setting up of the first Machine Tractor Stations; workers donated part of their pay for equipping the MTS<sup>46</sup>. In 1932, there were about twenty MTS in the area of the future oblast<sup>47</sup>. A Soviet source says somewhat euphemistically that the workers' involvement was conducive not only for the most effective use of the agricultural machinery, but also "...showed models of a high organization of labour to the kolkhozniks."<sup>48</sup>

As Robert Conquest observes, the MTS "was seen as a node of proletarian consciousness, headed by party officials and staffed by workers, and was given considerable powers over the kolkhozes it served."<sup>49</sup> However, even in the eyes of the authorities, matters got out of hand in the late winter of 1930:

On February 6, 1930, the *okruzhkom* took the politically mistaken, and in practice harmful, decision to declare the Tver' okrug to be an okrug of all-out collectivization, and ordered the localities to take appropriate measures for carrying out this decision.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>Ocherki, p.374. However, M.K. Chesnokova claimed that she immediately joined the kolkhoz in 1929. She had lost her father, and she --seventeen-years-old at the time-- and her mother were probably classified as *bedniaks*. Nevertheless, they were both devout (testimony of M.V. Chesnokova in the survey).

<sup>46</sup>Ocherki, pp.344/345.

<sup>47</sup>Ocherki, p.373.

<sup>48</sup>Ocherki, p.373.

<sup>49</sup>Conquest, *Harvest*, pp. 181/182.

<sup>50</sup>Korzun, *Pervye...*, p.84.

The *okruzhkom's* decision ordered collectivization to be completed in the spring of 1930, that is three years earlier than required by the Central Committee for the Moscow oblast' (of which Tver' okrug at this time was a part)<sup>51</sup>. In the middle of February 1930, already 70% of the households were collectivized in the okrug of Tver', and on March 1, 78%<sup>52</sup>. Thus the Tver' okrug surpassed the level of collectivization of the whole country, which stood at 58% in March 1930<sup>53</sup>. Resistance increased concurrently:

In the Tver' countryside the kulaks [read: many peasants] conducted malicious anti-soviet agitation against the kolkhozy, killed kolkhoz activists, burned kolkhoz property, inflicted damage on the kolkhoz lands, privateered, and destroyed the kolkhoz cattle.<sup>54</sup>

Within the territory of the Tver' okrug 15,000 people lost the right to vote, or 3.8% of the total number of voters<sup>55</sup>. In an account, written during the Khrushchev era, it was admitted --along the lines of Stalin's Pravda article "Dizzy with Success"--, that local Party workers violated the principle of the voluntary entrance of the peasantry into the kolkhozy, and that erroneously some *seredniaks* ("middle peasants") were de-kulakized<sup>56</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup>Korzun, Pervye..., pp.84/85.

<sup>52</sup>Altrichter, p.191; Korzun, Pervye..., p.85.

<sup>53</sup>Heller and Nekrich, p.234.

<sup>54</sup>Korzun, Pervye..., p.84.

<sup>55</sup>Korzun, Pervye..., p.83.

<sup>56</sup>Korzun, Pervye..., p.85. The arbitrariness of the process is obvious from the account in the survey of M.M. Kozenkova-Pavlova, who lived in Torzhok raion. Her father had two cows, two horses, and much land. When in 1933 [the year might be slightly off] a kolkhoz was organized in their village, they somehow avoid de-kulakization, because two relatives were workers in the factory (testimony of M.M. Kozenkova in the survey). Similarly the father of A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva was saved because one of his sons was a Party member (testimony of A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva in the survey). For "Dizzy with Success," see J.V. Stalin, "Dizzy with Success. Concerning Questions of the



Against the ideas of common sense, the socialization of all small animals and domestic fowl took place in the Likhoslavl', Tolmachi, Emel'ianovo, and Novotorzhok raions. Efforts to create giant kolkhozy and communes were undertaken. In various places voices were heard, calling it unnecessary to have rural soviets in the areas of all-out collectivization. The harmful line on the withering away of the rural soviets was most pronounced in the raion of Rameshki. A chairman of one of the rural soviets in that raion gave the executive of the rural artel' all records and printed matter after a kolkhoz had been organized.<sup>57</sup>

Unrest among the peasants is listed at least for the Sandovo, Molokovo, Ves'egonsk, Rameshki, Likhoslavl', Novotorzhok, Esenovichi, and Tolmachi raions<sup>58</sup>.

In 1937, at the second Party conference of the Kalinin oblast', the current chair of the *raispolkom* of Ovinishche, Zhukov, was criticized for having been too lenient during collectivization<sup>59</sup>. The accusation shows that not all Party members enthusiastically participated, in contrast to the manner in which the leadership of Novotorzhok and the three other raions in the above quote threw themselves into the movement. Zhukov was working as chair of the Tolmachi *raispolkom* from July 1929 until February 1930. He was released from his duties by the *okruzhkom* after having "...rather passively pursued the party line in the matter of collectivization of

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Collective-Farm Movement," in: J.V. Stalin, *Works*, Volume 12 (April 1929-June 1930), Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955, pp.197-205. The original appeared in *Pravda* on March 2, 1930 (ibid., p.205). Compare as well Conquest, *Harvest*, p.160.

<sup>57</sup>Korzun, *Pervye...*, p.85.

<sup>58</sup>Korzun, *Pervye...*, p.86; *Ocherki*, p.349. Revolts against the collective farming and the forced closure of churches at this time were taking place in the raions of Sandovo, Molokovo, and Ves'egonsk.

<sup>59</sup>Pako, 147/1/527, 1.105; see I.6 for his other *saux pas*

agriculture; particularly in the question of the first collectivization in 1929."<sup>60</sup> Someone came to his defense at the conference of 1937:

Indeed, they dismissed him for a poor policy in the collectivization, for a somewhat liberal attitude towards some backward elements in the countryside. However, this clearly had to do with the fact that there were large exaggerations in the okrug in the area of collectivization. Zhukov was not discredited then, they gave him leading work, and a year later he already worked as raikom secretary in the Likhoslavl' raion.<sup>61</sup>

Following this discussion, the question was asked to what category his father belonged: kulak, bedniak ("poor peasant"), or seredniak ("middle peasant")<sup>62</sup>. Zhukov answered seredniak, which was suspicious. In the end, too many doubts about Zhukov arose among the delegates of the Party conference; he was crossed off the list of candidates for the obkom by a vote of 113 to 382<sup>63</sup>. In 1930, Stalin allowed himself to criticize distortions in collectivization, but in 1937, a low level *apparatchik*, such as Zhukov, certainly was not forgiven for exhibiting "rotten liberalism" during collectivization.

After Stalin had called off the drive for full-scale collectivization in early March 1930, many peasants left the kolkhozy again, just before spring sowing<sup>64</sup>. Leading Party workers were released from their duties; in the T'ver' okrug, for example, the

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<sup>60</sup>Pako, 147/1/527, 1.105.

<sup>61</sup>Pako, 147/1/527, 1.106.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 1.107.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 1.108.

<sup>64</sup>Alttrichter, p.192; Heller, Nekrich, pp.239/240.

raikom secretaries of Likhoslavl' and Novotorzhok raions were dismissed, as well as the raispolkom chair of Likhoslavl' raion<sup>65</sup>.

Many of the peasants, in particular the seredniaks, supposedly had not yet been ripe for the radical transformation that was attempted in the December-March period of 1929 and 1930<sup>66</sup>. Some middle peasants, who had been mistakenly held for kulaks, received their property back after Stalin's cautioning of early March, 1930<sup>67</sup>.

Much of the livestock had been slaughtered by the peasantry before joining the farms, and there was little idea of how to start, after the kolkhoz's formation, with the "socialist" cultivation of the land<sup>68</sup>. How unpopular the collective farm movement had become is clear from the fact that, according to one Soviet source, in early May of 1930 only 4.6% of the peasant households were still collectivized in the Tver okrug<sup>69</sup>. The retreat would prove temporary, only a handful individual farmers surviving by the late 1930s<sup>70</sup>. The kolkhozes received more privileges with regard to the payment of state taxes than the individual peasants; when, in July 1934, the taxes and delivery quotas for individual peasants were once more

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<sup>65</sup>Korzun, *Pervye...*, p.87; *Ocherki*, p.351.

<sup>66</sup>*Ocherki*, p.347.

<sup>67</sup>*Ocherki*, p.350. See Stalin, "Dizzy with Success."

<sup>68</sup>Altrichter, p.192. According to Danilov, from 1929-1932, half of the cattle in the country was slaughtered (Danilov a.o., "NEP...", p.181). In the areas that were designated in late 1929 for all-out collectivization 100% of draught cattle and cows, 80% of hogs, and 60% of sheep and goats were to be socialized; as a consequence almost one quarter of the stock of strong horned cattle was lost in the USSR in just two months in the winter of 1930 (Iu.S. Borisov, V.M. Kuritsyn, Iu.S. Khvan, "Politicheskaya sistema kontsa 20-30kh godov. O Staline i stalinizme," in: V.S. Lel'chuk(ed.), *Istoriki sporiat. Triadsat' besed*. Moskva: Politizdat, 1988, pp.228-303, pp.274/275).

<sup>69</sup>Korzun, *Pervye...*, p.87.

<sup>70</sup>See below; also Heller and Nekrich, p.240.

increased, collectivization of all peasants' households was close to completion<sup>71</sup>. Already in 1931 a renewed wave of collectivization swept several raions in the former guberniia of 'Iver': in Bezhetsk raion that year the proportion of collectivized households rose from 3.2% to 69.9%, and in Kalinin raion from 3% to 50%. At the end of the First Five Year Plan (December 1932), the number of collectivized households in both raions was respectively more than 80% and around 70%<sup>72</sup>. Thus, two and a half years after the excessive first wave of collectivization was criticized and discontinued in early March 1930, the level of collectivization in the Kalinin raion (part of the former Tver' okrug) was again at 70%.

Most peasants must have been baffled by the collectivization drive. Even an official Soviet account of the collectivization in the area has to admit that it was sometimes difficult to change ideas to which the peasantry had been accustomed for generations<sup>73</sup>. The class model that the Party applied to the countryside did not conform at all to the Russian peasantry's concepts about rural society<sup>74</sup>. The peasants thought in different categories, rendering them incapable of accepting the regime's policies. In the villages of the Russian countryside of NEP, the poor peasants and landless labourers stood in low esteem: the predominant conviction was that prosperity came about through hard work and poverty was caused by

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<sup>71</sup>Ocherki, p.352; Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia...", p.397.

<sup>72</sup>Ocherki, pp.372 and 376.

<sup>73</sup>Ocherki, p.347.

<sup>74</sup>See Altrichter, p.96. V.G. Afanas'ev noticed that in Smolensk guberniia even the railroad workers stated in 1928 that "Moscow had imagined those kulaks," because they did not know of any in their province (Afanas'ev, "'Smolenskoe...'", p.62).

inability and laziness<sup>75</sup>. The peasantry, both rich and poor, was only egalitarian in so far that it did not tolerate the existence of those who had property without having worked for it. The village community was not divided by class solidarity among rich or poor peasants; prestige was based on family ties<sup>76</sup>. Altrichter notes in this respect:

Household-family relationship-village was the peasants' credo, and the Bolshevik class policy had not been able to change or expand on it.<sup>77</sup>

In an eerie way, it might be true that a basis was created for the education of a new person, but it is doubtful that he or she would harbour a socialist conscience<sup>78</sup>. That is, unless one equates socialism with Stalin's primitive statist ideas about it<sup>79</sup>.

The collective movement in the countryside had been weak in the 1920s: collective farms had been in decline up to 1929, and the membership of consumers' and agricultural cooperatives was not popular everywhere, although these cooperatives were growing towards the end of the decade<sup>80</sup>. When a peasant joined a

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<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p.98.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p.99. This perception existed in the Soviet Union among the academics of the group of the rural economist Chaianov during the 1920s. The ideas of Chaianov and his followers, and many of the members themselves, were repressed after 1929 (Kerblay, pp.13, 115, and 142). With respect to the position of the kulaks in the village community, Kerblay writes: "En réalité [as opposed to the fantasies about rural society that haunted the minds of the Bolshevik leadership], la puissance des kulaki reposait moins sur des moyens de production importants ou le louage de main d'oeuvre (critères du capitalisme) que sur un réseau de relations." (Kerblay, p.259).

<sup>77</sup>Altrichter, p.100.

<sup>78</sup>Ocherki, p.357.

<sup>79</sup>See Heller, Nekrich, p.281.

<sup>80</sup>Altrichter, pp. 159-167 and pp.175-182; G.S. Sergeev describes the early collective farms that had been formed in the first years of Soviet power (G.S. Sergeev, "Iz istorii sozdaniia i deiatel'nosti kollektivnikov khoziaistv v pervye gody sovetskoi

cooperative, he often derived little benefit from it. He was inclined to pay at most a tiny fraction of his income as a membership fee, which limited the the cooperative's ability to manoeuvre. The peasant did not see many tangible results of the cooperative's activities, which often suffered from its functionaries' incompetence, corruption, and theft.

Collectivization must have made the impression on the peasants of a world turned upside down: at once the good-for-nothings were being rewarded for having previously worked so poorly, and the ones who deserved to live in some prosperity were hauled off by the town's emissaries<sup>81</sup>. It must have left those who stayed behind in a perplexed state of mind. In the words of Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich,

It [collectivization] destroyed the old peasantry and in its place produced a new social type --the collective farmer, a being who very quickly lost all interest in working the land.<sup>82</sup>

*Uravnilovka* (wage levelling) and *obezlichka* (the obliteration of personal responsibility) were indeed rampant in the countryside of the former Tver' guberniia during the early years of

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vlasti (Po materialam tverskoi gubernii)," in: {M.A. Il'in et al.(eds.)}, *Iz istorii Kalininskoi oblasti. Sta'ti i dokumenty*, Kalinin, 1964, pp.56-77). Their number was drastically reduced from 532 to 88 between 1921 and 1925 (Sergeev, "Iz istorii...", pp.74ff.).

<sup>81</sup>Peasants with any talent for farming had often used the opportunities of the 1920s to rise above their previous poor existence and become what were termed "seredniaks" (L.A. Gordon, E.V. Klopov, Chto eto bylo? Razmyshleniia o predposylkakh i itogakh togo, chto sluchilos' s nami v 30-40-e gody. Moskva: Politizdat, 1989, pp.134/135). As a reward for their efforts, many of them were de-kulakized in the collectivization. At the same time, many of the "bedniaks," unable to succesfully cultivate their lands in the 1920s, saw their chance at the onset of collectivization and tried to make a career with the help of it.

<sup>82</sup>Heller and Nekrich, p.243.

collectivization, which seems to confirm this lack of interest<sup>83</sup>. The Central Committee was forced in 1932 to underline the importance of piecework in the kolkhozy<sup>84</sup>. The leadership resorted to the threat of force to discipline the kolkhozniks as well, particularly by the decree of August 7, 1932, of the Central Executive Committee and the Sovnarkom "*Ob okhrane imushchestva gosudarstvennykh predpriatii, kolkhozov i kooperatsii i ukreplenii obshchestvennoi (sotsialisticheskoi) sobstvennosti*." <sup>85</sup>

Despite the removal of the most capable figures within the village, some of the new collective farms cannot have functioned all that dismally<sup>86</sup>. After all, for the successful operation of a kolkhoz quite a different type of leader was required. It is obvious that peasants who were prospering as private farmers, working for their personal benefit, were perhaps not the kind to be subjected easily to

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<sup>83</sup> Qcherki, p.373.

<sup>84</sup> Qcherki, pp.373/374.

<sup>85</sup> Iu. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaiia...", "pp.275/276. Translation: "On the protection of the property of state enterprises, kolkhozy and cooperatives and the strengthening of public (socialist) ownership."

<sup>86</sup> See Heller and Nekrich for an estimate of the debilitating effect on rural society by the removal of the kulaks (Heller, Nekrich, p.233), as well as Kerblay (Kerblay, p.235). A.N. Sakharov described the effects: "One should neither look over the following fact: At the end of the 20s (before and during the beginning of collectivization), according to data of Soviet specialists, more than 200,000 of those, for whom de-kulakization was waiting or who were already de-kulakized, legally or illegally resettled in the towns. These were the strongest, the most viable, the best prepared for a reversal of fortune, and the most strong-willed layers of the countryside." (A.N. Sakharov, "Revoliutsionnyi...", p.62). Therefore it seems that many of the more enterprising and imaginative individuals succeeded in avoiding the harsher treatment meted out to some of the "kulaks" in collectivization. Sakharov's numbers here were mentioned by Kuritsyn, who talks about 200,000 families fleeing the countryside (Iu. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaiia...", p.277). See as well Danilov a.o., "NEP...", p.184, and Iu. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaiia...", p.274. Borisov argues that the more capable seredniaks were not trusted, and therefore were much less considered for the position of kolkhoz chair than bedniaks and batraks. As a result, in 1933 alone, more than one third of the kolkhoz chairs had to be changed in the Trans-Ural area for example.

the decisions of the kolkhoz meeting or, more importantly, to those of the village soviet and the raion committee of the Party. A new elite took over from the people who had formerly wielded clout in the *skhod* : a few were town dwellers, but the majority were peasants<sup>87</sup>. From collectivization's beginning, the authorities endeavoured to improve the skills of the agricultural workers through courses, schools, and so on<sup>88</sup>. The new elite worked as chairs of the kolkhoz, brigadiers, MTS employees, bookkeepers, agronomists: what sometimes has been called the kolkhoz "aristocracy."<sup>89</sup> Apart from technical aid, the MTS workers had to introduce among the peasants the

...workers' spirit of creation [how unfortunate that they apparently needed to learn about this, as they certainly did not seem to lack in creative spirit in the 1920s], of organization, of care about the interests of the state [about which they indeed had hardly been worried in the 1920s].<sup>90</sup>

Efforts were undertaken to increase the town's influence on the villages<sup>91</sup>. Many factory workers had been born in the villages; these workers were sometimes persuaded to return to their native homes to propagate the immense benefits for the peasantry of

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<sup>87</sup>See Altrichter, p.194; Ocherki, p.339; the town dwellers, such as the "25,000ers" ("*rabochie-dvadsatipiatitsiuchniki*") were on the whole incapable of leading the collective farms to any significant economic success, because of the total ignorance of agriculture of the majority of them (Gordon, Klopov, p.136; for the 25,000ers, who were dispatched in 1929-1930: Ocherki, pp.342/343. More than 500 were sent by the okruzhkom of Tver'). V.G. Afanas'ev maintains that, in the eyes of the leadership, even the 25,000ers lacked the necessary subservience to the commands from above, and that therefore the most preferred kolkhoz directors were demobilized Red Army soldiers (Afanas'ev, "Smolenskoe...", p.71).

<sup>88</sup>Ocherki, pp.355-357.

<sup>89</sup>Altrichter, p.194.

<sup>90</sup>Ocherki, p.373.

<sup>91</sup>Ocherki, p.339.



working on a collective farm. The Party's policy tried, within the realm of the very limited means made available to the countryside, to stress the "cultural enlightenment." The cultural revolution had to be transmitted through the workers of the "reading huts" (*izba-chital'naiá*), or the "red corners" (*krasnyi ugoлок*)<sup>92</sup>. Film projectors also began to appear in certain larger villages<sup>93</sup>. At the same time, the peasant's education was enhanced by the staging of show trials against the kulaks in the countryside<sup>94</sup>. Here the peasants were said to have applauded the severe sentences that were handed out to these "inveterate enemies" of Soviet power and collective farming.

The less imaginative the members of a certain collective farm were, the easier it probably was for Party and government officials to compel a kolkhoz chair and kolkhozniks to execute the orders as laid down by the plans<sup>95</sup>. Collectivization, as Altrichter points out, was actually a euphemistic term for making the collective farms fully part of the state organization ("*Verstaatlichung*")<sup>96</sup>. Obviously, not all kolkhozniks longed for a return to the old days, as can be concluded from the accounts of a few rank-and-file toilers, who were decorated in 1935 or 1936 by the Supreme Soviet, visited

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<sup>92</sup>Korzun, *Pervye...*, p.97.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p.98.

<sup>94</sup>Ocherki, p.339.

<sup>95</sup>Gordon, Klopov, p.72: "He [the independent thinking peasant of the 1920s] was succeeded by the executor as a mass social figure, in some cases honest, hard-working, disciplined, in other cases unstable, idling, predisposed to drinking and deceit, but in all cases without an economic feeling of initiative and frequently not attempting to acquire it." Also see Gordon, Klopov, p.136.

<sup>96</sup>Altrichter, p.185. The same argument is defended by Rittersporn (Rittersporn, p.323 and p.328).

Moscow, and met Stalin, Kalinin, Voroshilov, and Mikoian<sup>97</sup>. A religious reverence for Stalin and his cronies is expressed by some of the decorated in this publication, which is, of course, largely propaganda.

The Party needed obedient executors of its will in the countryside. The Stakhanov movement would be followed there too, and certain exemplary kolkhozy excelled<sup>98</sup>. In 1935, the chairman of the kolkhoz "*Novaya zhizn*", N.I. Ivanov, received the Lenin Order for his farm's extremely high harvest yield. In 1936, V.F. Moliakov, chair of the kolkhoz "*Krasnyi kolesnik*" of Krasnyi Kholm raion, earned the same honour for the kolkhoz's highly successful conduct of the flax harvest. Considering the fact that at this time around 13,500 kolkhozy had been created in the Kalinin oblast', it is hard to label such feats typical. The flourishing collective farms were used as examples to be held up to the many poorly operating kolkhozy, showing the supposedly enormous potential inherent in the collective-farm system. It is quite possible that collectives such as the two mentioned above were helped by the authorities to achieve such excellent harvests, considering the fact that Stakhanov himself took credit for the work done by a whole team of miners<sup>99</sup>.

The lack of agricultural talent must have hindered the attainment of satisfactory results. The continuous threat of punishment for the kolkhoz executive prompted many talented and

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<sup>97</sup>See My byli u Stalina. Rasskazy ordenostsev sovkhozov i kolkhozov Oporetskogo raiona Kalininskoi oblasti. (n.p.): Izd. gazety "Kolkhoznaya stroia", 1936.

<sup>98</sup>Ocherki, p.415.

<sup>99</sup>See Mertsalov, "Stalinizm...", p.415.

imaginative people, even after the collectivization was completed, to try to leave the villages as soon as possible<sup>100</sup>. We will see that still in the 1940s and 1950s the incumbents of kolkhoz chairs were constantly changed, whenever they failed to achieve results desired by the Party. The overly frequent replacing of the kolkhoz chair was harshly criticized in Party meetings at times, and Party functionaries were instructed to persuade and educate instead. Since the success of these tactics was slight, the impatient authorities virtually always resorted to removing the chair. A new one was appointed, who often failed just as much, if not more, than the predecessor. Thus, anyone who cherished any aspiration to prosper in life tried to look beyond that position of kolkhoz chair. Employment in the towns was far preferable, inasmuch as poverty and insecurity threatened less by comparison with the countryside<sup>101</sup>. Moreover, the possibility to succeed in towns was far more promising, the state remunerated industrial workers and employees better, and was less inclined to fire factory workers who failed to meet planning targets. However, obviously, management's fate did depend on the the factory's performance in the same way as that of the kolkhoz director depended on the success of the collective farm.

Another hindrance to the flourishing of the collective farms was the low level of technology in agriculture. An official account relates, with apparent pride, that in 1930 in the Rzhev okrug the kolkhozy received for their spring sowing 928 ploughs, 448

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<sup>100</sup>See Conquest, *Harvest*, p.169 and Gordon, Klopov, p.71. See also VII.3.

<sup>101</sup>See A.N. Sakharov's remark above.

cultivators, 139 seed drills, 20 grain cleaners, and 33 separators<sup>102</sup>. One cannot help but notice the miserly amount and primitive tools.

In theory, in an area such as the 'I've' guberniia, collectivization was perhaps not such a bad idea<sup>103</sup>. According to one source, the guberniia's relatively small industries produced three quarters of the territory's total output in the 1920s<sup>104</sup>. This indicates the small share on the market of agricultural production, in which more than 80% of the work force was employed, permanently or temporarily.

Agriculture had a subsistence character; the peasants did not feel much urge to produce a large surplus which could be sold on the market. The peasantry's crop cultivation and animal husbandry were primitive, as we noticed in Chapter I. The output of the farms was so low that many had to look for additional sources of income. 'Therefore the authorities' rationale in deciding on collectivization might have been sound. Theoretically, the mechanization of the production process and the efficient organization of labour would be able to create large surpluses of agricultural products, and could free work hands for industry. However, economic rationalization of agriculture as a result of the introduction of the collective-farm system failed in practice. For example, already in 1931 more than

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<sup>102</sup>Ocherki, p.355. Only 27,000 tractors were counted in the whole of the USSR in 1929 (Kerblay, p.18). As a result of collectivization, an estimated 20 million horses were killed in the course of a few years in the Soviet Union.

<sup>103</sup>In the 1920s, a genuine specialist on agriculture, A.M. Bol'shakov, argued already for the gradual collectivization of the 52% of the peasants --in forty-nine provinces of Soviet Russia-- that could be termed "poor" peasants (Bol'shakov, pp.44/45). He had different methods in mind than Stalin in order to achieve the collectivization of these households.

<sup>104</sup>Korzun, Pervye..., p.19.

1,000 workers and employees in Kimry raion were sent into the fields to aid with harvesting<sup>105</sup>. *Shelstva*, the patronage by factories over collective farms, involving technical assistance and help with sowing, weeding, and reaping, was already widespread in the same year in the area as well<sup>106</sup>.

It is difficult to estimate how important outright coercion was in the process, but Boitsov's numbers of arrests in the countryside of early 1938 indicate that it is hard to overestimate this factor in the peasants' joining the collectives<sup>107</sup>. Part of the coercive measures in the countryside was the prohibition of the free movement of citizens within the USSR: in December 1932, a passport regime was introduced, particularly aimed at keeping the peasantry in their villages and collective farms<sup>108</sup>. Meanwhile, concomitant with collectivization, the intensified anti-religious offensive continued, and not in rural areas alone: at the end of 1932 and in

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<sup>105</sup>Ocherki, p.368.

<sup>106</sup>Ocherki, p.369.

<sup>107</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.95; see below under III.2.

<sup>108</sup>The exact date was December 27, 1932 (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.21). The decree was probably connected with the famine that was gaining momentum in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and in other places. Iu. Borisov, "Stalin: Chelovek i Simvol," p.478: "Characteristic was also the introduction in December 1932 of a special passport regime. Passports were given to the inhabitants of towns, workers' settlements, raion centres, construction projects, sovkhozy, MTS, and introduced as well in a 100-kilometers wide zone along the European borders of the USSR and in several suburban zones. In all other rural localities the population (the kolkhozniks) did not receive passports and were taken stock of by lists, that were kept by the rural soviets." The introduction of the passports also led to a purge among the urban population of "alien elements" in 1933. In order to get an idea of the extent of this measure: the plan for this purge in Kharkov in the Ukraine called for the banishment of 50,000 people from the town. (O. Khlebniuk, "30-e gody. Krizisy, reformy, nasilie," in: *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, 17, 1991, pp.75-87, p.82) Some of the features of the passport regime, particularly the restrictions on settlement in certain towns for non-residents, survive until this day (Iu. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaiia...", p.278). Only in 1974 the right to a passport of all rural dwellers was legally acknowledged in the USSR (ibid.; Kerblay claims that this was only the case in 1979 {Kerblay, p.19}).

early 1933 in the town of Kalinin and in the rural raion around the town, an anti-Christmas campaign was conducted under the auspices of the town's Party committee<sup>109</sup>. Anti-religious terror played its role not only through arresting priests --the 'Tver' chapter of *Memorial* in 1990 counted at least thirty-two repressed in just two rural raions in the Stalin era--, but was also used to forge a new work habit among the peasantry: around 1936, one Sazonov was sentenced to six months corrective labour for failing to go to work on an Orthodox holiday<sup>110</sup>.

First in 1930, and then in 1935, a kolkhoz statute (*Ustav*) was issued which circumscribed the collective farm's rights and duties<sup>111</sup>. All lands of the kolkhoz members were joined together in the collective farm, and could from that point onwards never be returned to kolkhozniks who wanted to leave the collective<sup>112</sup>. The draught livestock, agricultural equipment, all productive cattle (the produce of which was intended for sale), all seed funds, all fodder, all buildings necessary for the socialized agriculture, and all processing tools were given to the kolkhoz. Labour tasks were assigned by the kolkhoz leadership and remunerated according to a performance and normation system<sup>113</sup>. It was prohibited to decline the execution of a task ordained by the kolkhoz direction. Production brigades were to be formed for the full agricultural year and were to

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<sup>109</sup>Ocherki, p.390.

<sup>110</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, l.95; *Tverskoi memorial*, vypusk 3, iul'-avgust 1990, p.3.

<sup>111</sup>Altrichter, pp.192/193; Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia...", p.397. The new *Ustav* was introduced on February 17, 1935 (Kerblay, p.222).

<sup>112</sup>Altrichter, p.192.

<sup>113</sup>Altrichter, p.193.

be led by a brigadier, who was to be appointed for at least two years. A labour book was introduced for the kolkhozniks. Every week the brigadier wrote down his or her brigade members' performance in the labour books according to the legal norms. On the basis of this account the kolkhozniks were to be paid. The kolkhoz was supposed to operate, under the 1935 Statute, according to a blueprint based on the state's production plans. It was to fulfill the obligations towards the state as laid down in the plans. The sowing plan for the kolkhoz was determined at the MTS, and confirmed by the raiispolkom<sup>114</sup>. This meant that the kolkhoz hardly had any freedom to make independent decisions with respect to its agricultural operations<sup>115</sup>.

From 1933 to 1940, the delivery norms were calculated on the basis of the size of the sown area and the number of heads of cattle<sup>116</sup>. As a consequence, the kolkhozy often tried to decrease their sown area and cattle herd in this period, for that would translate in lower delivery norms. Only in 1940 would the level of obligatory procurements be made dependent on the total amount of the kolkhoz's land.

The annual plenary meeting of all kolkhoz members allowed for elections of an executive and a revision committee, who were responsible for the internal order of the kolkhoz<sup>117</sup>. Supervision, however, was exercised by the kolkhoz-association over the kolkhoz,

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<sup>114</sup>Iu. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaia...", p.278.

<sup>115</sup>Altrichter, p.193.

<sup>116</sup>Iu. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaia...", pp.278/279.

<sup>117</sup>Altrichter, p.193.

and the raion soviet had to confirm the election of the revision committee by the annual meeting. All jurisdiction over village commune (*obshchina*) property was transferred to the village soviet, which eclipsed the *skhod*<sup>118</sup>. Indeed, the *skhod* was transformed into the kolkhoz meeting<sup>119</sup>. In 1935, the kolkhoznik's private plot (*usad'ba*) was circumscribed: 0.25 to 0.50 hectares, a cow, maximally two calves, a sow with piglets, up to ten sheep and goats, and unlimited poultry and rabbits<sup>120</sup>. This optimum, however, was hardly reached anywhere. Nevertheless, even in 1958-59 the average kolkhoz family still received most foodstuffs from their private holdings: 95% of the vegetables, 93% of potatoes, 96% of fruit (in the Kalinin oblast', apples and pears mainly), 98% of milk, and 100% of eggs and meat<sup>121</sup>.

In Chapters V to IX, the effect of this enormous forced transformation of the peasant's attitude and behaviour will be related. Collectivization certainly did not make agriculture much more productive during Stalin's life<sup>122</sup>. As a result, several Party

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<sup>118</sup>Ibid., p.194.

<sup>119</sup>When after two rounds of consolidation in the 1960s the collective farms consisted of several villages, the meeting of the village community, the *skhod*, still met to discuss certain village affairs and even seems to have dealt with some minor offenses (Kerblay, p.257 and p.352; see as well, I.E. Zelenin, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia zhizn' sovetskoi derevni.1946-1958 gg.*, Moskva: Nauka, 1978, pp.141/142). It had, of course, lost much of its pre-collectivization authority, since matters of importance were decided by the meetings at the enlarged kolkhoz, by the Party, or by the soviets. Not surprisingly, in 1957 some local Party workers in the Soviet Union proposed to discontinue the calling of the *skhod* in the future (Zelenin, *Obshchestvenno...*, footnote 88, p.141).

<sup>120</sup>Altrichter, p.195

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., p.196.

<sup>122</sup>See Conquest, *Harvest*, p.340 e.g. Rittersporn gives a very convincing argument for the failure of collectivization and the tacit resentment it created among the peasantry in the neighbouring Smolensk oblast' (Rittersporn, pp.36/37).



workers responsible for agriculture, were sacrificed in the purges<sup>123</sup>. In the *Ezhovshchina*, scores of references to wrecking activities were made that had allegedly hindered agriculture from achieving satisfactory results. In 1937, Mishnaevskii, head of the oblast' agricultural direction, stated that everywhere in the oblast' clover was cultivated in a mistaken manner, an erroneous system of crop rotation was used, the wrong kind of sheep were bred, cadres were prepared wrongly, 30 to 35% of the MTS tractors were not operating, and so on<sup>124</sup>. Indeed, in the period between 1933 and 1937 the average milk cow's production in the oblast' was between 700 and 800 litres per year, a far from impressive output<sup>125</sup>. This was all the more low, because one dairy maid in 1935 milked apparently 3,118 litres from one cow. Again, the credibility of this last result is slight, because results may have been artificially inflated in the same manner as those of the miner Stakhanov.

In 1937, Mishnaevskii seemed to be trying to save his skin by admitting all, or most, of collective farming's failures and errors, and by promising to improve matters<sup>126</sup>. It was all to no avail, since he was arrested by the NKVD in early 1938. The sole conclusion that can be derived from this information is that the theoretical ideas applied to the collective farming system in order to make agriculture more efficient mostly failed, wherever and whenever

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<sup>123</sup>E.g.: Pako, 147/1/526. 1.66-74.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid.

<sup>125</sup>Ocherki, p.416.

<sup>126</sup>See the Table in Appendix III.

they were introduced. An official Soviet history summed up the problems of the socialist agriculture in the mid-1930s as follows:

The fundamental transformation of agriculture, the sharpened resistance and wrecking of the kulaks, the lack of experience in the organization of large collective farms, the unsatisfactory leadership of the kolkhozy, the weakness of political work in the countryside...[caused agriculture to perform below expectations]<sup>127</sup>

Some improvement, by way of heightened control over the kolkhozy, must have been attained by the introduction of MTS and sovkhoz political departments in January 1933<sup>128</sup>. It is difficult to understand the abolition of the MTS *politotdel* in late 1934: perhaps they were less useful than was hoped for, or they had indeed, *pace* the official version, fulfilled their obligations<sup>129</sup>. Direct control within the kolkhozy themselves remained weak: in 1933 in the Kalinin raion, which was probably more politically conformist than the more peripheral rural raions, only 23% of all chairs were either Communist or Komsomol<sup>130</sup>. Even the rural soviets were not always

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<sup>127</sup>Ocherki, p.398.

<sup>128</sup>Ocherki, p.398. See as well I.E. Zelenin, "Politotdely MTS-prodolzhenie politiki 'chrezvychaishchiny' (1933-1934 gg.)," in: Otechestvennaia istoriia. 6, 1992, pp.42-61, pp.43/44). The MTS in the non-Black Earth Central Region, which included the territory of the future Kalinin oblast', only aided the agricultural labour of between one quarter to one third of all the kolkhozy (ibid., p.45).

<sup>129</sup>However, the MTS still had vice-directors for political affairs in 1937 (Pako, 147/1/528, 1.34). They were supposed to supply the economic and organizational supervision over the kolkhozy: to select cadres, and improve assignments of specialists and machinery to the farms, among other duties (Pako, 147/1/528, 1.30). Zelenin suggests that many of the *politotdely* gradually began to defend the interests of the kolkhozniks, and forgot their fundamental task as agencies for the execution of the Party's policies (Zelenin, "Politotdely...", p.53).

<sup>130</sup>Ocherki, p.399. This situation was similar to that of the rest of the USSR and probably worsened as a result of Party purges in 1934 (compare to Zelenin, "Politotdely...", pp.48/49).

chaired by Party or Komsomol members at this time. Usually the blame for the collective farms' abysmal results was thrust on the chairs, who were frequently replaced<sup>131</sup>. In the second half of the 1930s, many chairs were still semiliterate, and lacked the expertise necessary to lead a socialized farm. As before, a solution was sought by launching a delegation of urban activists into the countryside to serve as teachers to improve the chairs' literacy, as functionaries within rural soviets, and as actual kolkhoz chairs. Peasants' resistance to collective farms apparently was still present in the mid-1930s:

A certain part of the former kulaks was honestly included in the socially beneficial labour, but another part did not come to terms with their situation and, changing tactics, continued to struggle against the kolkhozy, on the sly wrecking the kolkhoz production [from within the collective farms, apparently]. The sallies of class alien elements especially increased at the time of the spring sowing, harvesting, and procurement campaigns in 1933.<sup>132</sup>

The date mentioned here is significant, as it was the year of the man-made famine in Ukraine; the delivery quotas in European Russia were increased at this time, as hardly any deliveries were coming out of the Ukraine in early 1933, and the Russian countryside was obliged to shoulder part of the burden<sup>133</sup>. Concomitantly, the authorities decided on a renewed attack on the "kulaks":

Everywhere meetings of peasants were held, at which decisions were taken to exclude good-for-nothings from the

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<sup>131</sup>Ocherki, p.400. See also Zelenin, "Politotdely...", p.51.

<sup>132</sup>Ocherki, p.400/401. This statement reflects Stalin's remarks at the January Central Committee Plenum of 1933 (Zelenin, "Politotdely...", p.46).

<sup>133</sup>Conquest, *Harvest...*, pp.239-253.

kolkhozy. In the first half of 1933 in the Kalinin [rural] and Bologoe raions, already about 100 households were excluded from the kolkhozy. In all, in two years in the Kalinin raion 680 households were excluded from the kolkhozy, and in Bezhetsk raion 875, which translates into 5.1% of all collectivized households of the raion.<sup>134</sup>

This renewed attack on the uncooperative was brought to a halt by the decree of Stalin and Molotov on May 8, 1933; Fainsod argues that this year simultaneously marked the turning point in the fate of the collective farms: "Helped by a good harvest, grain collections mounted and the kolkhozes began to take on life."<sup>135</sup>

Collectivization came close to completion in the years 1935 to 1937 in the newly created Kalinin oblast'<sup>136</sup>. At the beginning of the second Five Year Plan (1933), the share of kolkhoz and sovkhos lands was 56.7% of the sown area; 40% was still in the hands of individual peasants. In 1934, 23% of the peasants' households were not yet collectivized, but in 1937 the individual peasantry had dwindled to 5% of the total households.

Collectivization apparently came to an earlier end in the more urban-influenced eastern part of the oblast' --around 1935--, than in the western raions --more towards the end of 1936<sup>137</sup>.

In 1933 only thirty-four MTS had been founded on the territory of the future oblast'; by halfway 1937 there were already 119, close

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<sup>134</sup>Ocherki, p.401.

<sup>135</sup>Fainsod, Smolensk..., p.263; see as well Fainsod, Smolensk..., pp.262-264. Until 1932 in the USSR the harvest yields of technical and grain crops had fallen significantly as a whole in comparison with 1928, and the production of livestock was in 1932 half of that in 1928 (Danilov a.o., "NEP...", p.186). See as well Zelenin, "Politotdely...", p.59.

<sup>136</sup>Ocherki, p.403. After the war Proletarskaia Pravda, the oblast' newspaper, maintained that all peasants in the oblast' were collectivized by 1936 (Proletarskaia Pravda[from here PP] 8390, October 18, 1947, p.2 ).

<sup>137</sup>Ocherki, pp.403/404.

to the planned amount deemed necessary<sup>138</sup>. Still, their operations demonstrated a less than desired range in early 1937; the MTS tractors supplied hardly more than 20% of all draught power in the oblast'. When the Kalinin oblast' was formed in early 1935, the thirty-four MTS in existence possessed 1,535 tractors with a capacity of fifteen horse power<sup>139</sup>. However, these tractors' draught power was far from impressive, estimated to be equivalent to that of two horses; indeed, the horse remained the preponderant means of draught supply<sup>140</sup>.

In the second half of the 1930s, the Party was forced to try to include more women in operating agricultural machinery. Many of the male MTS operators already were leaving for the army, especially -- although this is not mentioned in the account-- during and after the Winter War of 1939-1940, in which many Soviet males lost their lives<sup>141</sup>. This trend of incorporating women in the MTS labour force would, of course, be strengthened by the Second World War.

The official Brezhnevite account of the rural situation at the end of the 1930s is as bleak as for the earlier part of the decade<sup>142</sup>. In January 1938, an obkom plenum concerned itself with the disappointing agricultural performance, for which finally a good

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<sup>138</sup>Ocherki, p.404.

<sup>139</sup>Zare navstrechu, ocherki istorii Kalininskoi oblastnoi organizatsii VLKSM. Moskva: Moskovsiii rabochii, 1968, p.189.

<sup>140</sup>See the review by W. Klatt of Eberhard Schinke, Die Mechanisierung landwirtschaftlicher Arbeiten in der Sowjetunion, in: Slavic Review, Volume XXVII, Number 4, December 1968, pp. 675/676, p.676.

<sup>141</sup>Ocherki, p.453.

<sup>142</sup>Ocherki, pp.445-447.

reason had been found: wrecking<sup>143</sup>. Things were apparently looking up, because of

...the crushing defeat by the Central Committee of the *VKP(b)* the obkom of the *VKP(b)* the organs of the NKVD, and the local party organizations of the Kalinin oblast', of counterrevolutionary nests, trotskyite-bukharinite spies, wreckers and diversants, of kulak and other enemy groups through whose base wrecking a serious loss was incurred on the cause of the socialist construction in the Kalinin oblast'.<sup>144</sup>

The "enemies of the people" were accused of sabotaging agriculture, through wrecking the planning of sown areas and rupturing crop rotation; by confusing matters with respect to crop seeds; through neglecting agro-technique; by causing the breakdown of the machine-tractor park in a number of MTS; through the rupture and distortion of the Party line in the procurement system of agricultural products; by distorting the rural *artel'* statute of 1935; by exterminating cattle in a number of kol- and sovkhozy; and so forth<sup>145</sup>.

Oblast' and raion Party organizations were prohibited from increasing on their own authority the plans made by higher-placed organs<sup>146</sup>. As was the habit, most of the other suggested remedies increased the Party's control over agriculture.

At the third Party conference, six months later in July 1938, it was announced that, in agriculture, the basic tasks confronting the

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<sup>143</sup>Pako, 147/1/529, 11.7/8. This plenum was concerning itself with the local ramifications of the "first attempt at a national plan for agriculture," of 1938 (Rittersporn, p.37).

<sup>144</sup>Pako, 147/1/529, 1.7.

<sup>145</sup>Pako, 147/1/529, 1.7.

<sup>146</sup>Pako, 147/1/529, 1.8.

Party were the speedy liquidation of the consequences of wrecking of flax cultivation, crop rotation, seed quality, animal husbandry, and other areas<sup>147</sup>. In other words, not much had changed for the better in almost any aspect of agriculture in the previous half year: flax production and animal husbandry, in which matters were seriously wrong, ranked as the two most important agricultural branches of the oblast'.

Matters, still not improved, prompted the Central Committee to issue a resolution in early 1939 condemning the obkom's vast shortcomings in agricultural management, and trying to recommend solutions<sup>148</sup>. Several raikoms apparently distorted their district's agricultural performance by concentrating on the spotty achievement of record results --which once more smacks of the Stakhanov method of exaggerating--, while neglecting in general the diffusion among the kolkhozy of improved agricultural methods<sup>149</sup>. This practice of distorting the truth was condemned at the fourth Party conference in February 1939.

We have noticed previously the Party's perception that too few Communists were active in the countryside. The problem was aggravated by the fact that the rural Party organizations did not seem to understand how to exert control over agriculture so as to improve its results<sup>150</sup>. A major ideological offensive was launched in the countryside with the propaganda for the first elections for the Supreme

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<sup>147</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, l.4.

<sup>148</sup>Ocherki, p.447.

<sup>149</sup>Ibid., p.451.

<sup>150</sup>Ibid., p.445.

Soviet of the USSR, which took place on December 12, 1937. Komsomol members from the oblast's towns and larger settlements descended upon the villages in the countryside with *agitfurgony* (agitation vans, carts, sledges)<sup>151</sup>. The young propagandists brought books, gramophones, and accordions on their carts. In the collective farms they held discussions and gave concerts. This propaganda offensive can only have had a very marginal influence on agricultural results; at best, a few peasants could have been deluded by the promise of a democratic socialist state and, as a result, would have decided to dedicate themselves more intensively to the socialized sector of the collective farm.

Brigades of more capable and experienced Communists were sent around the rural Party cells to impart the correct socialist agricultural methods in the later 1930s<sup>152</sup>. But the roughly 10,000 rural Communists of March 1940 (less than a year earlier there had only been 6,670) were far too few to have much impact on the almost 13,000 kolkhozy of the oblast'. Some aid undoubtedly was forthcoming from the Komsomol's primary organizations, of which there were more than 4,500 among the kolkhozy in March 1940 -- less than two years earlier there had only been 1,926!<sup>153</sup>. However, as Brandin, the provincial Komsomol leader, had noticed in 1937, not all Young Communists could be trusted as worthy examples to be emulated by the peasantry. This complaint would be repeated by many diverse voices in the Kalinin Party organization after the war;

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<sup>151</sup>Zare navstrechu, p. 209.

<sup>152</sup>Ocherki, pp.443-445.

<sup>153</sup>Ibid., p.446.



consequently, the value of the Komsomol's presence was less than its sheer numbers may suggest<sup>154</sup>.

Curiously, the vehement reassurances of a Brezhnevite source about collectivization's successful completion by roughly 1937 were qualified in the same account<sup>155</sup>. In 1939, still more than 50,000 *khutory* (homes of peasants, located outside the central kolkhoz village or hamlet) were counted in the oblast<sup>156</sup>. If the average household size was 3.6 -- a reasonable estimate--, then of those engaged in collective farming at that point still at least 180,000 people, more than 10% of the rural population, were living outside the central villages of the kolkhozy<sup>157</sup>. Thus, they were probably more difficult to control by the authorities, and probably tried to, and could, escape part of their duties on the collective farm. In order to make them fall into the fold, most of the *khutoriane* were resettled in houses within the kolkhoz villages in the spring of 1940. This forced resettlement of tens of thousands may be considered as collectivization's final chapter; once more scores of people were uprooted on the authorities' orders. However, even by 1940, 3.3% of the oblast's peasant households were not yet collectivized, which translates into 9,000 households at least<sup>158</sup>.

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<sup>154</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, II.82-92.

<sup>155</sup>I.e. *Ocherki*.

<sup>156</sup>*Ocherki*, p.447; N.G.Korytkov, *Kalininskoe selo: proshloe, nastoiashchee, budushchee*. Moskva: Kolos, 1978, p.31/32.

<sup>157</sup>The average size of the household is based on the calculation for the kolkhoz' household size in 1941; see Table 14.

<sup>158</sup>Calculated according to *Ocherki*, p.443 and Table 14.

Another indication that not all lands were used for purposes intended by the authorities is the fact that, in 1939, the Sovnarkom and the Central Committee had to produce a resolution that attempted to put an end to the practice of squandering the socialized kolkhoz lands, something that had to be repeated in 1947, for example<sup>159</sup>.

One negative influence on agricultural success remained fully outside the Party's control: in 1940-41 bad weather caused the loss of an important part of the flax crop<sup>160</sup>.

Notwithstanding the innovative activities of the MTS machinist of Krasnyi Kholm raion, I.F. Gagurin (who would be rewarded for his efforts with a mandate for the Supreme Soviet after the war, among other things), flax production particularly relied on manual labour long after 1945<sup>161</sup>. On the whole, the promise of a mechanized, rationalized agriculture as a result of collectivization remained unfulfilled by 1940. In that year still less than 50% of plowing was done with machinery, and just 5% of spring sowing and 13% of sowing of winter crops<sup>162</sup>.

Today there is no doubt that collectivization was not the triumph official Soviet sources have made it out to be. In January 1945, first Party secretary Boitsov described the agricultural situation on the eve of the war<sup>163</sup>. His account allows us both a view of the official image of

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<sup>159</sup>Ocherki, p.447.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid., p.450.

<sup>161</sup>Ocherki, p.452; for Gagurin: see below and Appendix III.

<sup>162</sup>Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., p.57.

<sup>163</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.7ob.

country life before the war, and a glimpse at the actual state of affairs, thus warranting a perusal of certain facts and figures on the next few pages.

Before the war the Kalinin oblast' [he describes the oblast' in its larger dimensions, before the splitting off of the Western part in August 1944] had a large, highly developed agriculture. The 12,957 kolkhozy had 6,697,000 hectares of land, given to them by the Soviet state for perpetual use. On the kolkhoz lands operated 5,639 tractors, 730 combines, and thousands of other agricultural machines and equipment<sup>164</sup>.

Therefore less than one tractor per two kolkhozy was available, if these numbers are correct. In addition to the poor capacity of the tractor, the tractors were of very little economic significance because of their petty numbers. Boitsov did not mention how many of these tractors were not working and under repair, something which permanently hampered field labour in Soviet times. In the postwar period, most field work was accomplished by hand, especially in flax cultivation. This was undoubtedly true for the prewar period also. After noting that the MTS had aided more than 80% of the kolkhozy with [some of their] agricultural operations, Boitsov stated that,

The sown area in 1940 reached 1,893,000 hectares, 57.5% of which was sown with grain, 15.1% with flax, 5.3% with potatoes, and 18.5% with perennial grasses.<sup>165</sup>

Here we see the enormous share grain cultivation still had in an area that, through its geographical location, is not very conducive

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

to grain growing at an economically profitable level. Boitsov continued by pointing to the diffusion of the supposedly correct -- grassland-- crop rotation:

The necessary minimum of agrotechnical regulations of the tilling of the land existed in the kolkhozy and sovkhozy. 30% of the kolkhozy was secured with the right grassland crop rotation, and in the majority of the backward kolkhozy existed the right alternation of crops.<sup>166</sup>

The last clause does not signify anything: did he mean the ancient three-course crop rotation? Or "alternate husbandry"?

In flax production our oblast' took and takes one of the first places among the flax oblasts of the country. It gave annually more than 60,000 tons of fibre, which constituted about 25% of the USSR State Plan<sup>167</sup>.

It does not necessarily follow that the plan targets for flax were met by the oblast', something it would be hardly ever capable of doing after the war because, for instance, of the lack of mechanization.

The widely developed fodder-grass cultivation, because of the large meadows and pastures, served as the basis for the development of animal husbandry. In 1940, all kolkhozy had each four to five livestock farms.<sup>168</sup>

This last term is somewhat misleading, as it can signify anything from a beehive or pigsty to a warmed, mechanized cattle stable. However, we can safely assume --because of the descriptions of postwar livestock farms-- that more than three quarters of them belonged to the primitive type of the first

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

category. This would have been a wooden building, often without adequate heating, and certainly without electricity. Here the responsible kolkhozniks had to tend to the communal livestock manually, without the help of any sophisticated technology. As in the other parts of this passage of Boitsov's speech, we also have the impression that he was overstating the prosperity of the kolkhoz system before the war. On the one hand, he might have attempted to defend once more the general superiority of the collective farms to his audience. On the other hand, he might have tried to hold up a target to reach for the oblast's leading Party workers in the postwar reconstruction.

After building up strength in organizational, economical and, political relations, the oblast' kolkhozy developed all branches of kolkhoz production and increased their income. Every year the value of the *trudoden'* grew. In 1940, for every *trudoden'* in the oblast' two kilograms of grain and three kilo's of potatoes were paid.<sup>169</sup>

Boitsov did not state how many *trudodni'* the kolkhoznik earned on average, nor did he want to notice differences among kolkhoz incomes within the oblast', which could be quite substantial, as will be shown for the postwar period.

<sup>169</sup>Ibid. In 1940, in the territory of the post-1944 oblast', there were 9,016 kolkhozy, composed of 282,600 households (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., p.57; Table 14 indicates 275,900 households in the kolkhozy on 1/1/1941. The number in Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., p.57, might be for early 1940). In 1941, there were 275,900 households, in which 999,000 people lived (see Table 14). Thus the average size of a kolkhoz household was 3.6 in 1941. The kolkhoz household received on average 551 *trudodni'* in 1940 (See Table 12). The average cash income per kolkhoz was 24,368 rubles annually (see Table 12; this information is virtually useless, as it is impossible to assess how much of this income was distributed among the kolkhozniks as their wage). The average kolkhoz had thirty-one households (my calculation).

So much for Boitsov. No matter how good or bad the situation was in the countryside before June 1941, the war would completely change the picture. In the western parts of the oblast', most of the kolkhoz property would be destroyed, and agriculture ruined; the east escaped severe war damage, but the remuneration of the kolkhozniks during the war would be minimal, and there would be a huge shortage of labour through the men's departure to the front<sup>170</sup>.

Something was seriously wrong with the Kalinin oblast's agriculture during the 1930s, but it was not only the result of unsound planning, and certainly not of sabotage by foreign agents. In the first place, the incentives offered to the peasants were minimal. Secondly, the alienation forged by collectivization's brutal methods of in the Kalinin oblast', as elsewhere, seriously undermined agricultural performance. The Brezhnevite version of events admitted at least the first fundamental mistake:

But the largest shortcoming in the management of agriculture had to do with the fact that the principle of material incentives was violated in a number of branches of kolkhoz production. Material stimuli were underestimated in particular in the development of the production of cereals and potatoes.<sup>171</sup>

## 11.2 Handicrafts

Without exaggeration one can say, that the liquidation of the artisan and the small cooperative had the same consequences for industry, as collectivization had for

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<sup>170</sup>See Pako, 147/3/2679, l.8ob.

<sup>171</sup>Ocherki, p.454.

agriculture. The factory and plant turned into bureaucratic institutions for the production of goods. The lace-makers of Kaliazin, the fullers, the wooden and stone tile makers, the masters of ceramics, the cobblers of Kimry and Ostashkov, the concertina makers of Tver' disappeared.<sup>172</sup>

Thus lamented a few years ago a local writer of Tver' province. The decline of the cottage industry was certainly aggravated by collectivization and industrialization. As in agriculture, the small private producer disappeared in handicrafts. It should be noted, however, that even though industrialization's long-term consequences for artisanship were similar to those of collectivization for agriculture, there is no evidence that the process led to the same amount of victims.

In the early 1930s, some of the private entrepreneurs in industry apparently tried to avoid expropriation by creating "false cooperative artels" (*izhekooperativnye arteli*)<sup>173</sup>. However, the government was forced to acknowledge the craftsmen's vital role in the economy, and allowed them substantial economic freedom in 1932<sup>174</sup>. Thus even at the end of the 1930s the footwear manufacturing around Kimry --where 9,800 cobblers were united in an industrial cooperation-- still existed, as well as Ostashkov's net-knitting, the cloth fulling near Kaliazin and Nerl', and the knitted-wear manufacturing in several locales<sup>175</sup>. The grief over the disappearance of the traditional artisans is understandable, but in

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<sup>172</sup>M. Petrov, "Kul'tura v provintsii," pp.257-268, in: *Novyi Mir*, August 1989, No.8, p.265.

<sup>173</sup>Korzun, *Pervye*..., p.53.

<sup>174</sup>O. Khlebniuk, "30-e gody....," p.79. See also Lorenz, p.228.

<sup>175</sup>Alampiev, p.15; A.V. Pervozvanskii, "Kozhevenno-Obuvnaia promyshlennost'", in: *MGU* 37, pp.72-80, p.77.

this case the Soviet regime cannot be held solely responsible. The decline of handicrafts had begun with the industrialization in late 19th century Russia; at different times in other areas in Europe the appearance of large-scale industry has led a similar demise of small artisanship.

Notwithstanding the diminishing practice of handicrafts, the number of shoe and boot makers near Kimry was substantial even after the war. The cottage industry in that area employed more people than Vyshnii Volochek's textile factories at the same time<sup>176</sup>. The gold embroidery of Torzhok, and the embroidery of Kushalino, both employing almost exclusively women, also survived. All of these handicrafts were now organized in industrial cooperatives (*artel's*)<sup>177</sup>. In the later 1930s, knitted goods persisted as the domain of small industrial artels, involving a workforce of about 4,500<sup>178</sup>. In many of those raions (Likhoslavl', Rameshki, Novokarel', and Vyshnii Volochek, for example) that engaged in the production of knitted wear, the oblast's largest ethnic minority, the Karelians, dominated the industry<sup>179</sup>. The labour force in this cottage industry was predominantly female. Other cooperatives were engaged in clothing repair and in the production of construction materials<sup>180</sup>. However, the output of these local cottage industries could not keep up with the demand in the oblast' for goods such as building bricks,

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<sup>176</sup>See VIII.1.

<sup>177</sup>Alampiev, pp.15/16.

<sup>178</sup>V.I. Pashkevich, "Trikotazhnaia promyshlennost'", pp.59-64, in: MGU 37, pp. 61/62.

<sup>179</sup>Pashkevich, "Trikotazhnaia...", pp. 59 and 62; Alampiev, p.15.

<sup>180</sup>Alampiev, p.16.



tiles, and furniture, or for the repair of clothes and footwear, and so on<sup>181</sup>. To meet the demand, new small state, industrial *artel'*, and kolkhoz industries appeared, which in fact also failed to meet consumers' demands<sup>182</sup>.

At the end of the 1930s, many cottage industries were prohibited by the government, as they distracted the collective farmers into pursuing non-agricultural activities<sup>183</sup>. Even today, nevertheless, some of the old crafts survive, such as the gold-embroidery of Torzhok.

### II.3 Industrialization

Pressure was also building up in the towns at the end of the 1920s: in the course of the year 1928, several people holding responsible positions in the guberniia were prosecuted by the courts as a result of letters of complaint from workers' correspondents (*rabkory*) in factories and institutions<sup>184</sup>. The first foundation seems to have been laid for the mushrooming of denunciations in the 1930s. At the same time a ration-card system was introduced, which would remain in force until 1934<sup>185</sup>.

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<sup>181</sup>*ibid.*, pp.16/17.

<sup>182</sup>Alampiev, p.17; V.A. Anuchin, "Novozavidovskii raion", pp.44-51, in: *MGI* 38, p.45.

<sup>183</sup>Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p.800.

<sup>184</sup>Ocherki, p.310; see also Kotliarskaia, Freidenberg, p.84. The authors of the latter work describe the end of the 1920s --the years from 1927-1929-- as the beginning of the storm in Tver'.

<sup>185</sup>Iu.S. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaiia ...," p.275, Gordon, Klopov, p.98.

Capitulatory and enemy activity was disclosed and eradicated at enterprises and institutions of the town of Torzhok. In the factory "Krasnyi Kozhevnik" party work was neglected, criticism suppressed. This led to serious violations of labour discipline, to flourishing of absenteeism, and drunkenness. This situation was used by enemy elements in the mechanical workshop of the plant. They fulfilled orders for private persons, by the use of materials available in the factory, and during worktime systematically wrecked the preparation of orders for the workshops of their own factory.

All these irregularities were disclosed at the leather factory during a party purge, when criticism and self-criticism were deployed.<sup>186</sup>

It is likely, however, that these are more cases of maladjustment of former peasants who had recently found employment in the factories and were not yet used to the work attitude required in industry, than of deliberate acts of sabotage<sup>187</sup>. It also shows the beginnings of the "second economy", which had to fill the gaps that the "official economy" could not.

However, the arbitrariness of the authorities, in this case the OGPU, in their application of pressure on the population in the same town of Torzhok can be seen from a letter written by V.A. Zavorina in 1987<sup>188</sup>. In 1931 her father, Aleksandr Kovalev, was arrested on accusation of tax evasion. The letter hints that part of the accusation was the exploitation of the labour of others; one can

<sup>186</sup>Korzun, *Pervye*..., p.50.

<sup>187</sup>Compare Moshe Lewin's description (Lewin, "Society,...", pp.52-56 and p.61/62). Also lu. Borisov a.o, "Politicheskaiia...", p.277: "The industrialization of the country led to a rapid growth of the numbers of the urban population, on the whole as a result of the massive migration of the rural population into the towns. An acute housing crisis, a shortage of foodstuffs, of industrial products(...), difficulties with adapting to the circumstances of urban life of those who were until recently peasants occurred."

<sup>188</sup>V.A. Zavorina, "Brat postradal za brata," in: A.M. Samsonov, *Znat' i pomnit'. Dialog istorika s chitatelem*, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989, pp. 215-217.

deduce from this that the family was either semi-rural, or had fled from the atrocities of the collectivization drive in the countryside<sup>189</sup>. It turned out that the OGPU had confused Aleksandr with his brother Aleksei, but at the "collection place" (*mesto sbora*) in Torzhok the OGPU was unwilling to admit its mistake. The whole family --Aleksandr, his wife, and his two daughters-- was exiled to Siberia. The train with exiles was unloaded in the wilderness, and the exiles were housed in primitive barracks, often even without roofs. Meanwhile a brother of Zavorina's mother, a worker of a leather factory in Torzhok, tried to prove that a mistake had been made. He gained permission from the Torzhok town soviet to collect his nieces at least and was allowed to rear them within his own family in Torzhok. Life here for the two girls was extremely difficult, as the uncle had a family of nine.

We lived half-starving, ate all out of one bowl: the children, the adults, the ill ones, the healthy ones. Uncle divided bread and sugar into equal parts. At the time a ration system was in force: a worker's ration card was good for 800 grams of bread, and dependents got 300 or 400 grams. We kept a cow, and cultivated hay and potatoes. The plot was small. All

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<sup>189</sup>The mother goes to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets( *VTsIK*) in 1933; part of her statement is supposed to have been, according to her daughter: "... that we never exploited other labour, and tilled the land ourselves." (Russian: "... *chto my ne eksploatirovali chuzhuu silu, a zemliu obrabatyvali sami.*") It is hard to assess how urbanized the family actually was, but the fact that the uncle still had a private plot shows that some workers at least were still close to the land. In this case the father might have worked at a factory, while his wife took care of the land. The poor mother was put into the Butyrki prison, as a penalty for having left her place of exile without permission. After a month she was released, and received a certificate to live wherever she wanted to. However, upon arrival in Torzhok she was told by the local OGPU that she would not be allowed to live in the town and would be exiled to any town of choice for three years. She chose to live in Voronezh.

children slept on the floor, on straw mattresses, without sheets, and grandmother on the stove (...).<sup>190</sup>

Zavorina managed to finish a seven-year school in 1932 and started to work at the age of fourteen --which was normal at the time-- at a Torzhok shoe factory<sup>191</sup>. There she was denounced by a fellow worker for being the daughter of an exiled father, and was fired. In despair, she visited the factory's director at home after a week, begging him to hire her on again. She was assigned to another workshop. Zavorina was keen to learn, but was not accepted at the factory's workers' faculty, because of her father. She wrote to Stalin, asking why her father was exiled. The callous reply stated that he had not payed his taxes.

Zavorina's mother then went to Kalinin and visited Rabov, one of the Party secretaries of the oblast' at the time (this must already have been after January 1935)<sup>192</sup>. Perhaps Rabov gave the *rabfak* permission to enroll Zavorina --she entered the faculty in 1936--, but he seemed to have been unwilling to investigate her father's case.

Another example of the authorities' increased oppression of the urban population was the "unmasking" of a "counterrevolutionary organization" in a *rabfak* in the workers' settlement Kamenka (the contemporary town of Kuvshinovo)<sup>193</sup>. For a period of seven weeks from November 1930 to January 1931, some young factory workers

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<sup>190</sup>Ibid., pp. 215/216.

<sup>191</sup>Ibid., p.216.

<sup>192</sup>See III.2 for P.G. Rabov. Zavorina did not know if Rabov was oblispolkom chair or obkom secretary; he was at the time probably either third or second obkom secretary after Mikhailov and, perhaps, Kalygina.

<sup>193</sup>Tverskoi tsentr... p.16.

had met as part of the group *Zemlia i glina* ("Land and clay"); their program is unclear, but, considering the short period of existence of the group, cannot have consisted of more than a few vague ideas. After their exposure in early 1931, some of the group's members were excluded from either the Communist Party or the Komsomol. Initially, they escaped more serious consequences, but between 1935 and 1938 all participants were arrested, as well as many of their relatives. Hardly anyone seems to have survived.

There was a large shortage of specialists for the expanding old industrial branches and some of the new factories that were being built: around 45% of industrial specialists were practitioners without special education<sup>194</sup>. However, the Party worried more about the fact that only 20% of all specialists was Soviet-schooled, and that a mere 8.5% was a candidate or full member of the Communist Party<sup>195</sup>. "Old" specialists were held responsible for "wrecking" in the territory's largest factories, an economically self-defeating action<sup>196</sup>. In order to compensate for the lack of Soviet-trained

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<sup>194</sup>Korzun, *Pervye*..., p.58.

<sup>195</sup>*Ibid.*, p.58.

<sup>196</sup>*Ibid.*, p.58 and pp.72/73. One such case was discovered by the OGPU at the railroad car factory in the early 1930s (B. Badeev, "Neozhidannyi povorot," pp.37-49, in: Peklialis' my v vernosti otchizne... Dokumental'nye ocherki, vospominaniia i stat'i o Kalininskikh chekistakh, Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, Kalininskoe otdelenie, 1983, pp.41-43). A group of engineers was denounced by workers of the smithery-press workshop for their alleged enemy attitude towards Soviet power, which had been noticed in their utterances, procrastination, the way they influenced some faltering elements among the workers, and so on. Sabotage was suspected. The supposed head of the group, Leonid Iosifovich Vainshtein, broke down after two weeks of interrogation by the OGPU and confessed to his wrecking activities. This case seems to belong to the country's general offensive against the "old" specialists, unleashed around 1930, of which the Shakhty trial was one expression. The case might have been the subject of discussion in 1931 at a plenum of the Moscow oblast' Party committee, which in one orthodox text is said to have discussed the frequent stoppages at the factory at this point in time (*Ocherki*, p. 364). The frequent interruptions of the production process, although

specialists, workers' faculties (*rabfaki*), a workers' college, and *tekhnikums* (technical colleges) were operating, study-circles organized, and excursions undertaken<sup>197</sup>. The results of the experimental education methods of the 1920s were now criticized for yielding an inadequate number of skilled cadres<sup>198</sup>. To make matters worse, many teachers at *tekhnikums* and the Pedagogical Institute of Kalinin were scions of the priesthood, former landowners, or the bourgeoisie; moreover, these teachers allegedly had engaged in "right opportunism" or even "SR opposition."<sup>199</sup> Despite the purging of these enemy elements, the skills of students graduating at the end of the 1929-1930 school year, remained --not surprisingly-- far from satisfactory<sup>200</sup>. The level of graduates from the workers' faculties did not improve markedly in the later 1930s; the class of 1936 apparently demonstrated an appalling level of knowledge, and little command of the Russian language<sup>201</sup>.

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probably due to the delirious frenzy of the first years of the crash industrialization, could, in the mind of the Party, only be due to the activities of "masked enemies", i.e. Vainshtein and his cronies. As Danilov noted: "The back-breaking speed of the development of industry immediately resulted in violations of technological demands, a sharp fall in the quality of labour and production, accidents in the mines, electro stations, and construction projects, non-fulfilment of planned targets, deterioration and interruptions in the provision of consumers' goods, a sharp lowering of the living standard in the country. For all this, engineers, planners, distributors, "economic workers" in general were made to answer. One after the other, trials were conducted against "wreckers" in the mines, at the electro stations, in the provisioning network." (Danilov a.o., "NEP...", p.185).

<sup>197</sup>Korzun, *Pervye*... pp.59-61.

<sup>198</sup>*Ibid.*, p.61.

<sup>199</sup>*Ibid.*, pp.61/62. This is illustrated by Kotliarskaia and Freidenberg: an old employee of the oblast' library stated, that, when she started working at the library in 1931, all former employees with higher education had to resign from their jobs, because they were priests' children (Kotliarskaia, Freidenberg, p.53). Because his father was a priest, the subject of the biography, Vershinskii, also lived in fear in the early 1930s, but remained unharmed (*ibid.*, p.104).

<sup>200</sup>Korzun, *Pervye*... p.63.

<sup>201</sup>Kotliarskaia, Freidenberg, p.107.

The 'Tver' okrug --which also included the town of Vyshnii Volochek-- appeared at the end of 1929 to have overfulfilled the industrial goals of the first Five Year Plan<sup>202</sup>. The Soviet Union's first agreement of socialist competition was concluded in the spring of 1929 among textile factories in Vyshnii Volochek, 'Tver', and plants in towns of Moscow oblast' and Ivanovo-Voznesensk oblast'<sup>203</sup>. At the end of 1929, meetings of "shock-workers" were held in the okrugs for the first time<sup>204</sup>. The Central Committee ordered the establishment of one-headed directions (*edinonachal'e*), solely responsible for the factory's operation at industrial enterprises on September 7, 1929<sup>205</sup>. Socialist emulation was taken up by almost every larger enterprise around this time, and, for many decades to come, it would remain one of the standard methods of stimulating workers' productivity, both in industry and agriculture<sup>206</sup>.

Crash industrialization met with difficulties, as is obvious from the fact that a plenum of Vyshnii Volochek's raion committee announced a month-long drive to prevent wasted goods and

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<sup>202</sup>Ocherki, p.359. The First Five Year Plan was officially accepted by the Sixteenth Party Conference of the Bolshevik Party in April/May 1929 (Danilov a.o., "NEP...", p. 179).

<sup>203</sup>Kalininskaiia oblastnaia organizatsiia..., p.226; Ocherki, pp.320/321. The emulation between the factories was called the "Agreement of the Thousands."

<sup>204</sup>Ocherki, p.359.

<sup>205</sup>Korzun, Pervye..., p.89.

<sup>206</sup>Ocherki, p.360. Rittersporn, pp. 34-36 argues that the Stakhanov campaigns, which first began at the end of 1935, can be seen as a similar effort to improve labour productivity. In his opinion, they were a political and economic failure. Undoubtedly the enthusiasm for this kind of movement grew rather stale after a few years, particularly because the workers derived little material benefit (some premiums mainly) from it.

production losses in December 1931<sup>207</sup>. In the same year, apparently, workers went on strike in the town, and Kaganovich had to descend from Moscow to settle matters<sup>208</sup>. In 1937, the workers' strained mood that previously existed in Vyshnii Volochek was explained as the result of the wrecking activities of an enemy of the people, one Krivos<sup>209</sup>. Under orders from the Central Committee in September 1930, the Communist workers of 'Iver' and other towns in the country "increased the struggle for labour discipline," which was apparently lacking among the numerous new arrivals from the countryside, who had found employment in industry<sup>210</sup>.

The lack of labour discipline still bothered the Party at the end of the 1930s<sup>211</sup>. Fluctuation of the labour force was another problem that the Party had to combat in the 1930s<sup>212</sup>. Part of the problem was undoubtedly the peasant background of many of the newly

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<sup>207</sup>Ocherki, p.363.

<sup>208</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.49. The strike in Vyshnii Volochek was not unique, if one must believe a recent article by O. Khlebniuk (Khlebniuk, "30-e gody...", pp.77/78). Khlebniuk describes a whole wave of protest in the spring of 1932, which was provoked by a diminishing of the ration-card norms for bread in the towns. It is not impossible that the strike in Vyshnii Volochek in fact took place in the spring of 1932 as well, instead of in 1931. Kaganovich was also dispatched to the Ivanovo-Voznesensk oblast' to settle matters.

<sup>209</sup>Ibid. The cause of the strike was flatly explained as the result of wrecking, but the lack of adequate housing, the unhealthy labour surroundings, the small wages, the price rises of the 1930s, and the lack of goods in the shops are more likely causes for it, judging from the post-war situation in the town's industry (see also, for example, Gordon, Klopov, p.98). In 1931, the workers had apparently not lost the courage to stage a strike; Kaganovich, with the possible help of the OGPU, might have made them understand that strikes were a thing of the past.

<sup>210</sup>Ocherki, p.363; Heller and Nekrich, p.226.

<sup>211</sup>O.A. Garmonov, "Bor'ba partiinykh organizatsii Kalininskoi oblasti za ukreplenie trudovoi distsipliny na promyshlennykh predpriiatiakh (1937-iun' 1941 gg.)", pp. 62-74, in: Iz istorii Kalininskoi Partiinoi organizatsii: Sbornik statei, Kalinin, 1972, p.65.

<sup>212</sup>Ocherki, p.363; Garmonov, p.65; see also Rittersporn, pp.33/34.



arrived industrial workers, not yet accustomed to the different rhythm of factory work<sup>213</sup>. Breakdowns in the production process at the railroad car construction factory were discussed at a plenum of the Moscow Oblast' Party committee in 1931<sup>214</sup>.

It is impossible to trust the official Soviet version, which claimed that the First Five Year Plan in the territory of the future Kalinin oblast' was successfully fulfilled in four years<sup>215</sup>. However, there is no reason to disbelieve the information that the industrial work force in the town of Kalinin grew by 36.4% from 1929 to 1933, because much of the construction work in industry and housing had to be done manually in the expanding town; the production process itself in the factories was often very labour intensive, owing to lack of mechanization<sup>216</sup>. New factories were under construction, others modernized. Workers' clubs appeared, more urban libraries and cinemas opened, and factory papers started cropping up around this period<sup>217</sup>. With the First Five Year Plan, urban unemployment in the

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<sup>213</sup>Garmonov, p.65. Causes for the "weakness" of the Russian worker and his low productivity in comparison to the factory workers of more advanced industrial countries at the time are suggested by Gordon and Klopov (Gordon, Klopov, pp.63 and 65).

<sup>214</sup>See I.8.

<sup>215</sup>See Heller and Nekrich, p.230, Ocherki, pp.366/367. If one looks at the 1967 statistical handbook on the development of the oblast' during fifty years of Soviet rule, one is struck by the fact that hardly any numbers are listed for the production of industrial goods in 1928 and 1932, so that it is impossible to get a clear idea of the industrial development in the First Five Year Plan (see Kal.Obl. za 50 let v tsifrakh, pp.42 and 43). It is perhaps telling that the production of woollen cloth actually decreased between these years. The numbers cited on pages 23-25 of the same book are even less reliable, as only percentages are listed.

<sup>216</sup>Ocherki, p.367. Compare to Jean-Paul Depretto, "Construction Workers in the 1930s," pp.184-210, in: N. Lampert, G.T. Rittersporn (eds.), Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath: Essays in Honour of Moshe Lewin, London: Macmillan, 1992, pp.189-192.

<sup>217</sup>Korzun, Pervye..., p.98.

former guberniia of Tver' came to an end<sup>218</sup>. One source claimed that unemployment was eradicated there by 1931, which was officially the case for the rest of the Soviet Union as well<sup>219</sup>.

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<sup>218</sup>Ocherki, p.377; for an explanation for it, see Heller, Nekrich, p.226.

<sup>219</sup>Korzun, Pervye, p.93.

## CHAPTER III: TERROR

### III.1 'The Kalinin Oblast'

On January 29, 1935, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR resolved to form the Kalinin oblast<sup>1</sup>. The continuous redrawing of the map since 1929 in the Soviet Union seems rather mysterious, but the cause for the (re-)formation of the administrative unity of the former 'Tver' guberniia's territory must be sought in a realization in the higher echelons of the Party and government that the enormous post-1929 oblasts were too large to administer effectively. 'The new oblast' was composed of fifty raions from the Moscow, Western, and Leningrad oblasts<sup>2</sup>. Less than ten years later, in August 1944, the leadership would conclude that the Kalinin oblast' was still too vast; a large western part, which stretched to the Latvian borders, became part of the Velikie Luki oblast', which was dismantled again after Stalin's death<sup>3</sup>. The area around Velikie Luki was not a part of the former Tver' guberniia; the distance between the towns of Kalinin and Velikie Luki was gaping, which hindered the western area's incorporation into the Kalinin oblast' from 1935 onwards. Between 1935 and 1944, the authorities apparently tried to solve the problem by creating two okrugs in the western area, those of Velikie Luki and Opochetskii. The idea here might be that the okrugs could function with a certain amount

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<sup>1</sup>Ocherki, p.382.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.382.

<sup>3</sup>See below and Table I.

of autonomy from the oblast' capital of Kalinin. Similar to the leadership's economic policy, the administrative reorganization shows the inclination of the authorities in Moscow to induce more efficient operations through initiatives from the centre. However, these realignments, devised without taking account of local circumstances and traditions, failed to improve matters, or even worsened them. These frequent administrative transformations must have costed rather dearly in terms of human effort and economy.

M. Petrov felt that the traditional cohesiveness of the Tver' lands, which were more or less equivalent to the territory of the pre-1929 guberniia, was destroyed by the redivision of the map in 1929-1930<sup>4</sup>. In Petrov's opinion, this destruction facilitated the demise of the allegiance to the region, and played a role in the aggravated emigration from the oblast', to the detriment of the local culture, turning Tver' oblast' into a provincial backwater.

In 1935, an organizational buro under the Central Committee (CC) was formed to create a Kalinin oblast' Party organization<sup>5</sup>. A candidate member of the CC, M.E. Mikhailov, was appointed its head; Mikhailov was a member of the Central Executive Committee, and had been working as a secretary of the Moscow oblast' Party committee. He would be elected first Party secretary of the oblast' in June 1935<sup>6</sup>. A.S. Kalygina, another CC candidate member, became second secretary of this orgburo, while V.F.Ivanov took on the chair of the organizational committee of

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<sup>4</sup>Petrov, "Kul'tura....," pp.259-261.

<sup>5</sup>Ocherki, p.382.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p.385.

the oblast' soviets; he had earlier worked as vice-chair of the Moscow oblispolkom<sup>7</sup>. Four more people worked in the orgburo.

The organizational period formally ended with the opening of the first oblast' Party conference of the Kalinin oblast' on June 10, 1935<sup>8</sup>. The local Party consisted of 26,000 members and candidates; almost one third of these were candidate members<sup>9</sup>. Only 8,000 of the Communists were rural dwellers, clearly revealing the Party's weakness in the countryside where, at the time, 13,500 kolkhozy existed and the population exceeded 1.8 million<sup>10</sup>. Half of these rural Communists operated on their own, without the support of a primary Party organization<sup>11</sup>. Some assistance was offered in the countryside by the oblast's 45,000 Komsomols. Still by January 1, 1941, merely forty-one kolkhoz Party organizations and 480 rural territorial Party organizations would exist in the Kalinin oblast', once more showing the Party's precarious hold in the countryside<sup>12</sup>.

Economically, the new oblast' was certainly not without significance for the USSR<sup>13</sup>. It ranked first in flax production, and the value of its marketable agricultural output made it the fifth oblast' of importance in the country; indeed, as one observer comments, "at this

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<sup>7</sup>Ocherki, pp.382/383. Kalygina had been from 1929-1935 resp. secretary of the Tver' gubkom, secretary of the Tver' okružhkom, and secretary of the Kalinin gorkom (see Kalininskaja oblastnaja..., p.449/450).

<sup>8</sup>Tverskoi tsentr..., p.12.

<sup>9</sup>Ocherki, p.384.

<sup>10</sup>See Table 2.

<sup>11</sup>Ocherki, p.384.

<sup>12</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.6.

<sup>13</sup>Ocherki, p.384.

time the oblast' sowed as large an area of flax, as did the whole capitalist world combined."<sup>14</sup>

Industrially, the new province exhibited far less importance, although by 1935 already 250,000 workers lived within the oblast' borders<sup>15</sup>. However, on January 1, 1935, supposedly only 115,000 people, of which almost 95,000 were actual factory workers, worked in large-scale industry<sup>16</sup>. Industry focussed primarily on consumer goods, although the influence of the Union's concentration on heavy industry in the Five Year Plans was felt to some extent<sup>17</sup>. In 1935, textiles (mainly cotton and flax processing) comprised the most hefty part of industry, followed by metal works, wood processing, food processing, paper, leather and footwear, silicate brick, and ceramics<sup>18</sup>. Thus the industrial character of the former guberniia continued to resemble its pre-1917 period, as it would remain to a large extent until our own days.

In 1934, 91% of industry was owned by the state, and 9% by cooperatives<sup>19</sup>. As everywhere in the USSR, the socialist emulation and Stakhanov movements increasingly enjoyed popularity during the 1930s. For example, K.A. Shevaleva became a shock-worker during the First Five Year Plan<sup>20</sup>. She was employed at the "Proletarka" textile

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<sup>14</sup>Ocherki, p.384. One of the reasons for the high value of the marketable output of agriculture was that the price paid for flax was higher than that for cereals. Moreover, the size of the oblast' was enormous between 1935 and 1944 (see Table I).

<sup>15</sup>Ocherki, p.384.

<sup>16</sup>Kalininskaia Oblastnaia..., p.236. The terms workers and factory workers are not clearly distinguished in the Soviet literature on the oblast'.

<sup>17</sup>Ocherki, pp.384/385.

<sup>18</sup>Ocherki, p.385; Kalininskaia oblastnaia..., p.236.

<sup>19</sup>O.A. Garmonov, p.65.

<sup>20</sup>Ocherki, p.411.

*kombinat* in Kalinin, and became a Stakhanovite in 1936<sup>21</sup>. At the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1936, concerning itself with the acceptance of the new constitution, Shevaleva was even allowed to give a speech<sup>22</sup>. Thus the impression is created that she was the outstanding model worker of Kalinin oblast' during the 1930s: under Khrushchev, Valentina Gaganova would become her successor as such<sup>23</sup>. Similar to Gaganova in the 1950s, Shevaleva was promoted quickly: by 1938 she already occupied the position of vice-director of the "Kalinin" factory; furthermore, she received a Lenin Order<sup>24</sup>.

The paltry spontaneity of these "workers'" movements is obvious from the text of one of the resolutions the Party oblast' committee of January 1937<sup>25</sup>. These (secret) resolutions outlined the most urgent tasks facing the oblast' Party organization and the obkom departments during the first four months of 1937. The text of resolution No. 5 ran as follows:

5. To develop socialist emulation and the stakhanov movement according to the [following] lines:

a/ the dispatch of all-round (*skvoznye*) brigades in textile for the struggle with waste goods, and the further organization of all-round brigades in other branches of industry;

/Industrial [obkom] department/

b/ the organization of railroad workers for the support of the Leningrad workers' letter [presumably a call for socialist emulation];

/Industrial department/

v/ the further development in agriculture of the movement of the milkmaids and of that of the kolkhozy, who have pledged

<sup>21</sup>Ocherki, p.413.

<sup>22</sup>Ocherki, p.419.

<sup>23</sup>For Gaganova, see Appendix I.

<sup>24</sup>Ocherki, p.443. Undoubtedly, the purges had furthered her career.

<sup>25</sup>Pako, 147/1/528, 11.27-34.

themselves to the obligation to procure from each hectare five *tsentner* flax fibre for each kolkhoz.

/Agricultural department/<sup>26</sup>

The urban population grew at a dramatic pace in the 1930s: while 'I'ver' had 108,400 inhabitants in 1926, Kalinin was the home of 216,100 in 1939; in other words, the town's population had virtually doubled in only thirteen years<sup>27</sup>. The population of Vyshnii Volochek, Kimry, and Torzhok also roughly doubled during the same period, and that of Rzhev grew from 32,800 to 54,100, although it relinquished second place to Vyshnii Volochek in the oblast' by 1939. The oblast's total urban population around 1939-1940 is given as being more than 650,000<sup>28</sup>. Meanwhile, the old tradition of migration to Moscow and St. Petersburg-Leningrad continued<sup>29</sup>. Between roughly 1930 and 1960, the rural population decreased by approximately one million people, according to a Soviet source<sup>30</sup>; this phenomenal drain occurred predominantly between 1930 and 1945<sup>31</sup>. Many of these people left for the towns and settled down there permanently, but it is hard to establish how many actually moved to urban surroundings as opposed to falling under the heading of "Unnatural Deaths."<sup>32</sup>

The oblast' capital of Kalinin remained the territory's industrial centre: 30.4% of all industrial workers worked there in 1937, and the town's industry accounted for 44.2% of the oblast's total industrial

<sup>26</sup>Pako, 147/1/528, 1.29.

<sup>27</sup>See: Kal.Obl. za 50 let y tsifrakh, p.13 and Table 3.

<sup>28</sup>Ocherki, p.442; see also Table 2; the 650,000 included the later separated area in the west.

<sup>29</sup>See: V.A. Anuchin, "Novozavidovskii raion", pp.44-51, in: MGU 38, p.45.

<sup>30</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.525; see Table 2.

<sup>31</sup>See Table 2 and VII.1.

<sup>32</sup>See III.2, IV.2, and VII.1.



output<sup>33</sup>. In this year, when about 207,000 people resided in the town, the labour force of Kalinin amounted to 85,400 people: 50,700 were industrial workers, 12,800 white collar workers, and around 15,000 were employed in services (trade, catering at *stolovye* [food canteens], housing etc.)<sup>34</sup>. At this time, 98.6% of the town's population was literate<sup>35</sup>. Kalinin's main branch of industry still found its strength in the textile factories, where roughly 50% of the industrial work force was employed at the end of the 1930s<sup>36</sup>.

Most people were housed in apartment buildings (*doma*) made out of stone<sup>37</sup>. How much they enjoyed the use of modern amenities in their apartments, such as electrical or gas stoves, and running water, is unclear<sup>38</sup>. That certainly not all apartment buildings and houses had these can be derived from a statement written in 1940. It related that more people's dwellings had been connected to the hydro system in recent years, without mentioning any precise information about the number of households which had discontinued the use of water pumps or outhouses<sup>39</sup>. In the summer of 1992, I witnessed several inhabitants of Tver' pumping water; they were living in wooden houses, albeit with a charmingly rustic appearance, in the middle of town<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup>M.S. Minuskin, "Kalininskaia zona", pp.10-25, in: MGU 38, p.10.

<sup>34</sup>A.G. Leshchinskii, "Gorod Kalinin", pp.26-37, in: MGU 38, p.28.

<sup>35</sup>Leshchinskii, p.37.

<sup>36</sup>Qcherki, p.434.

<sup>37</sup>Leshchinskii, p.28.

<sup>38</sup>However, many must have lived in either wooden barracks or one-room apartments with communal kitchens, and communal toilets. Baths were taken in public bathhouses.

<sup>39</sup>See Leshchinskii, p.28.

<sup>40</sup>The houses still showed in some places the bullet-holes of the battles in the town in October and December 1941.

In the middle of the 1930s, both in Kalinin and in the rural raions, electricity was in short supply<sup>41</sup>. The housing situation can be illustrated by the following numbers: in 1937, 805,900 square meters of floor space were available for 207,000 inhabitants, an average of less than 3.9 square meters a person<sup>42</sup>. In 1939 the average was exactly four square meters<sup>43</sup>. At the second Party conference in June 1937, failings in the town's sewerage system were attributed to wrecking activities in the town soviet<sup>44</sup>. The schools' fuel supply in the town had fallen into disarray in the second quarter of 1937<sup>45</sup>. On top of that, according to gorkom secretary Goliakov, the town had to deal with a potato shortage around this time<sup>46</sup>. The streetcar network, operating since before 1917, had undergone extensions in the 1930s<sup>47</sup>. Some of the town's major roads were paved with asphalt at the end of the thirties<sup>48</sup>. Again, in 1992, I observed that several urban roads were

<sup>41</sup>Ocherki, p.396 and p.435.

<sup>42</sup>See Ocherki, p.455.

<sup>43</sup>In the second half of the 1980s, the average living space per person hovered in general around 15-16 m<sup>2</sup> in the USSR and RSFSR, according to Soviet sources; in urban areas this average was somewhat less, being between 14.3 and 15.5 m<sup>2</sup> for the USSR and 14.4 and 15.7 m<sup>2</sup> in the RSFSR. It should be noticed that the average for people living in a family was much lower in 1989, being 10 m<sup>2</sup> for the whole USSR and 9 m<sup>2</sup> for the RSFSR (see Soiuznye respubliki. Osnovnye ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye pokazateli. Moskva: Informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr Goskomstata SSSR, 1991, pp.98-100). Compare as well to Rittersporn, p.40.

<sup>44</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.225.

<sup>45</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.226.

<sup>46</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.226

<sup>47</sup>Leshchinskii, p.28; Ocherki, p.418.

<sup>48</sup>Leshchinskii, pp.35/36; Ocherki, p.418. M. Petrov would complain in 1989 that the oblast' roads were in a deplorable state, which appalled him all the more because necessary raw materials for pavement could be found within the oblast' (Petrov, "Kul'tura...", p.266).

still simply dirt tracts. Prices also increased in the 1930s, rendering life more difficult for the urban dwellers<sup>49</sup>.

Around 1939, the oblast's industrial production accounted for 1.5% of the USSR's total industrial production<sup>50</sup>. Geographically, most of the larger industry was located, as before, along the October (the former Nikolaevskii) Railroad, and along the Volga, from Kalinin eastwards to Kaliazin, i.e. in the south-eastern part of the oblast<sup>51</sup>. Along the railroad, urban growth was to be found at several stops: apart from the towns of Kalinin and Vyshnii Volochek, Likhoslavl', Spirovo, and Bologoe began to grow rapidly in the 1930s<sup>52</sup>. Near Bologoe and Vyshnii Volochek, several smaller urban settlements expanded because of the forest industry<sup>53</sup>. Another area of significant (semi-) urban growth was the Zavidovo raion to the south of Kalinin, where peat digging and processing developed<sup>54</sup>.

Light industry dominated: cotton-fibre production and the new sewing industry (since 1930), primary processing of the flax grown so abundantly in the oblast', glass production, the processing of berries and dairy produce, baking in bread factories, and paper mills<sup>55</sup>. In 1937, 18,075 workers were employed in Kalinin's five textile factories and 10,655 in the five of Vyshnii Volochek<sup>56</sup>. According to a different (and

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<sup>49</sup>Sto sorok besed..., p.368. As was noted above, in the early 1930s, ration cards had been in use.

<sup>50</sup>Alampiey, p.5.

<sup>51</sup>Alampiey, p.17. Compare to the maps.

<sup>52</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.127; by 1959, the latter three had grown three times in comparison to their pre-1917 size.

<sup>53</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.120. Again a trend that would continue after the war.

<sup>54</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.120.

<sup>55</sup>Alampiey, p.5, pp. 12/13.

<sup>56</sup>V.I. Pashkevich, "Khlochatobumazhnaia promyshlennost'", pp.48-58, in: MGU 37, p.52.

on the whole somewhat less reliable source), 25,000 workers were employed in Kalinin in the textile industry and 13,500 in Vyshnii Volochek in 1939-1940<sup>57</sup>.

Just before the war, the textile plants' industrial potential was still not exploited to its fullest because stoppages of the machinery occurred, labour was poorly organized, there were instances of rush work (*shturmovshchina*), violations of labour discipline were rampant, and people changed jobs too often<sup>58</sup>. Around 1937, about eighty-five flax factories operated in the oblast', half of which were either near Rzhev or Bezhetsk<sup>59</sup>. In the leather and footwear industry, only 9% of the production was done by large factories during the later 1930s<sup>60</sup>. The footwear industry in particular was still mainly located in artels. The glass and ceramics industry involved 6,365 workers in 1937; meanwhile, food industries employed 7,500 workers<sup>61</sup>. Peat digging increased, and chemical peat processing began in Redkino, close to Kalinin<sup>62</sup>. Logging retained its importance, while wood-processing factories --sawmills, paper mills, furniture factories, and so on-- employed more than ten thousand people in 1936<sup>63</sup>. The indiscriminate

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<sup>57</sup> *Ocherki*, p.434.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p.434.

<sup>59</sup> N.V. Morozov, "L'naia promyshlennost'", pp.65-72, in: *MGU 37*, p.67. The areas around Bezhetsk and Rzhev were the main flax growing areas in the oblast'.

<sup>60</sup> See Pervozvanskii, "Kozhevenno...", p.74, p.77, p.79. See above in II.2 for the large cooperative of Kimry.

<sup>61</sup> N.V. Morozov, "Osnovnye proizvodstva silikatno-keramicheskoi promyshlennosti", pp.80-93, in: *MGU 37*, p.87; N.V. Morozov, "Pishchevaia promyshlennost'", pp.94-106, in: *MGU 37*, p.94.

<sup>62</sup> Alampiev, p.12.

<sup>63</sup> Alampiev, p.14; A.G. Pigulevskii, M.I. Novik, "Lesnoe khoziaistvo i lesnaia promyshlennost'", pp.107-117, in: *MGU 37*, p.115.

felling of trees had been halted in 1936, when a significant part of the oblast' territory was decreed a forest reserve by the government<sup>64</sup>.

Heavy industry was still proportionally small at the end of the 1930s, when only 0.5% of the total production in machine building in the USSR was conducted in the oblast'<sup>65</sup>. Yet, new small-machine factories had started to appear in the 1930s, and Kalinin's factory of peat-digging machinery and its railroad-car construction factory expanded. In the machine-building and metal industries, 25,400 workers --18% of all workers in large industries-- were employed in 1936<sup>66</sup>. Chemical industry had appeared in Redkino, Kalinin, and Vyshnii Volochek<sup>67</sup>.

Although industrial production had greatly increased as a result of the Five Year Plans, in particular the more successful second, the same problems plagued industry at the end of the 1930s as earlier during this decade<sup>68</sup>. At the "Proletarka" textile factory in Tver', for example, too many waste goods were produced through a lack of labour discipline, and norms unfulfilled by the workers. The railroad-car construction factory had to deal with insufficient labour discipline in 1937 as well: the plan was not fulfilled in the first quarter of 1937, and *shturmovshchina* occurred<sup>69</sup>. The country's leadership attempted to solve the universal problem of insufficient labour discipline, the examples above being probably typical, by stepping up coercion. The

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<sup>64</sup>Pigulevskii and Novik, p.109.

<sup>65</sup>Alampiev, pp.5 and 13.

<sup>66</sup>A. Braude, "Mashinostroitel'naia i metalloobrabatyvaiushchaia promyshlennost' ", pp.38-47, in: MGU 37, p.38.

<sup>67</sup>Alampiev, pp. 5 and 14.

<sup>68</sup>Garmonov, pp.66/67.

<sup>69</sup>Garmonov, p.66.

infamous decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of June 26, 1940, called for draconian measures in cases of labour-discipline violations, while introducing an eight-hour workday and a seven-day working week<sup>70</sup>. The decree was immediately applied in Kalinin: four workers in the rubber foot-soles factory were punished for absenteeism<sup>71</sup>.

Another problem lay in industries' faulty supply of electricity: electrical shortages frequently interrupted the production process at the factories<sup>72</sup>.

It would be mistaken to conclude that the situation was gloomy for everyone living in towns during this period. One of the new regime's --which might have been only interested in political indoctrination and in heightening the economic performance of the toilers by improving their basic skills, and not in the development of independent thinking among the students-- achievements was perhaps the improved level of education of the population at large. Measures towards this amelioration were taken in the 1930s; in 1992 many Tver' guberniia inhabitants, reflecting upon the past, considered the possibility to receive schooling as one of "socialism's" positive elements<sup>73</sup>. In early

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<sup>70</sup>See Ocherki, p.436. In the 1930s five day weeks had been in force: four days of work in shifts of six to seven hours followed by one day of rest (see V.S. Lei'chuk, "Industrializatsiia...", pp.329-354, in (V.A. Ivanov(ed.)), Perepiska na istoricheskie temy. Dialog vedet chitatei', Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989, p. 349). However, most industrial workers also worked on these days of rest, and on workdays many worked overtime after their shifts were over.

<sup>71</sup>Garmonov, p.68.

<sup>72</sup>Ocherki, p.435.

<sup>73</sup>See some of the answers to the survey discussed in VIII.6. In 1930, the four-year curriculum of primary education became obligatory in the USSR (Lei'chuk, "Industrializatsiia...", p.346).

1947, several textile workers in Kalinin looked back upon the positive changes in their lives thanks to socialism:

"In the old days," remembers the former weaver of the Morozov factory Aleksandra Matveevna Baburina, "we also did not dream of the possibility of giving our children an education. And look what happened under Soviet power! My sons Aleksandr and Fedor finished a higher institution of learning and became engineers. My daughter Antonina received specialized secondary education and became a technician. And thus it is not only in our family...."<sup>74</sup>

In the same article, other retired industrial workers praised the improvement of their lot with regards to the general standard of living:

"If there would not have been Soviet power and the Bolshevik Party, we would still live in the swamp [the area, where their apartments were located, used to be a swamp with ill-constructed workers' barracks on it], lead a dog's life, would not see light. Soviet power and the Party of the Bolsheviks made us into human beings. Because of all that we are profoundly grateful to them and a humble bow to our compatriot Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin!"<sup>75</sup>

Surely, part of this is the result of propaganda --later on it will become clear how much of the oblast' newspaper's items were determined *a priori* by the obkom--, but these statements could have been partially genuine: industrial workers did occasionally witness improvements in the 1930s compared to earlier periods. They could not compare their fate to that of their counterparts in other countries, so that it appeared possible, according to the information they were given, that life was better than in any other country. After 1945, it was even harder to imagine that life abroad could be better, since the USSR had

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<sup>74</sup>See PP, No. 14 (8197), January 19, 1947, p.3.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p.3.

proved itself to be the world's strongest country by the victory in World War II<sup>76</sup>. Reinforced by this triumph to which they had contributed, quite a few workers must have felt a certain degree of satisfaction with their lives.

### III.2 The *Ezhovshchina*

In September 1936, N.I. Ezhov succeeded G.G. Yagoda as the USSR's People's Commissar of Internal Affairs<sup>77</sup>. Ezhov's tenure as head of the NKVD is better known as the Great Terror or Great Purge, or rather euphemistically by its Russian name of *Ezhovshchina*. This latter term, although a misnomer (*Stalinshchina* would be more appropriate), will be deployed in the following description of the ramifications of the 'Terror for the Kalinin oblast', besides the more conventional Western names for this horrific period. For it appears that *Ezhovshchina* is the term by which the years 1936-1938 are harboured in the collective memory of the (ex-)Soviet people.

In order to deal with throngs of people arrested in the dekulakization and so on, many juridical practices used during the *Ezhovshchina* originated in 1929-1930, when concomitantly the basis was laid for the extensive labour-camp system<sup>78</sup>. The percentage of

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<sup>76</sup>Before the war the population, particularly the many peasants who had joined the urban work force and the peasantry at large, possibly compared their standard of living with that of the 1920s, which had been generally higher, although more particularly so in the countryside. The fall of the standard of living was expressed in a declining birth rate in the USSR in the First Five Year Plan (Lel'chuk, "Industrializatsiia...", p.346, Moshe Lewin, "Society...", p.53). The (former) peasants would not forget the "Golden Age" of the 1920s as easily.

<sup>77</sup>Heller, Nekrich, p.303.

<sup>78</sup>Iu.S. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaiia...", pp.272/273.



"class enemy elements" in the Soviet Union had been determined at 4.6% of the total population already in the early 1930s; a large portion of this group was to come to grief before 1936<sup>79</sup>.

Following the lead of Khrushchev's so-called "Secret Speech," the historical and literary tradition has concentrated much more on the 1936-1938 Purge than on collectivization. Solzhenitsyn lamented this tendency, since he saw the essence of the "Great Terror" to be the liquidation of (ex-) Communists by Communists --which had been the main focus of Khrushchev's own criticism of the purges in 1956<sup>80</sup>. If this were the case, there would be perhaps little reason for deploring the extermination of those who had butchered the peasantry in the first half of the 1930s. In the opinion of Solzhenitsyn and other Soviet dissidents, the masses had been forced into submission through the terror of collectivization and of other waves of repression, reaping far more tragedy than the *Ezhovshchina* <sup>81</sup>.

G.T. Rittersporn argues against Western Sovietologists' "accepted" idea about the large number of people who fell victim to the "Great Purge," and its prominent place in the historiography on the Stalin era<sup>82</sup>. Unfortunately, by overstating his case, he makes a rather exaggerated attempt to reduce the number of victims, thus tilting the

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<sup>79</sup>Iu.S. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaiia...", p.272.

<sup>80</sup>"In evaluating 1937 for the Archipelago, we refused it the title of the crowning glory." (A.I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956. An Experiment in Literary Investigation. III-IV. New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, 1974, p.640). See also, *ibid.*, pp.328-342.

<sup>81</sup>"Nevertheless, the breadth of repression in 1936-1938 was not on a par with the genocide against the peasants in 1930-1934" (Heller, Nekrich, p.301).

<sup>82</sup>Rittersporn, pp.1-24.

balance to the other extreme, for which he, too, lacks the necessary evidence.

In the 109 interviews conducted in the summer of 1992 in 'I'ver' oblast', most did not remember 1937 (the climax of the *l'zhov'shchina*) as a particularly terrible year with respect to repressions<sup>83</sup>. After the experience of the Second World War, the second event to leave a marked impression on most respondents was collectivization. Hardly anyone referred to the *l'zhov'shchina*, unless they remembered the confiscation of bibles and icons in 1937 or 1938<sup>84</sup>. It should be emphasised, that there were no specific questions asked about the respondents' experiences during the 1930s, while they were, for example, specifically asked about the war<sup>85</sup>. As well, there was a large proportion of Communists in the survey --most of whom joined the

<sup>83</sup>For example, M.A. Zabelin, an agronomist and the brother of N.A. Zabelin, was arrested in 1937; he survived the camps and was rehabilitated in 1956 (testimony of N.A. Zabelin in the survey). His suffering was typical of that of the Communist elite, who bore much of the brunt in 1937. L.P. Felkova only remembered the arrests and repression of the collectivization (testimony of L.P. Felkova in the survey). See also below.

<sup>84</sup>As did M.A. Sysoeva and N.V. Kurganova --see below (testimony of M.A. Sysoeva and N.V. Kurganova in the survey). The renewed attack on religion might have been connected with the fact that the Census of January 1937 had found an unexpectedly high number of religious believers (see the report to Stalin and Molotov in Iu.A. Poliakov, V.B. Zhiromskaia, I.N. Kiselev, "Polveka molchaniia (Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937 g.)," in: *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia*, No.6, 1990, pp.3-25 {from here Poliakov et al., "Polveka...", [1] p.12). Nevertheless, the father of N.A. Kotov was arrested as a kulak in 1937 and sentenced to ten years. He was apparently denounced as such by his fellow-villagers, after the raion authorities had demanded that the kulaks in the village be named. His brother was also arrested. Kotov maintains that, before the war, villagers who had been released from the camps --they had been probably arrested during collectivization-- after a brief spell of freedom were arrested again --around 1937/1938-- and transported back to the camps without any investigation or trial (testimony of N.A. Kotov in the survey). Similarly, the father of A.N. Nikolaev, who was the chairman of a kolkhoz in the village of Iamskaia in the Khvoinsinskii raion of Leningrad oblast', was arrested in 1937 for anti-Soviet activities. N. Nikolaev was sentenced to ten years of labour camp, and served his time in the camps of Karaganda. Only half a year after his return home he died. Nikolaev senior had been a "convinced Communist," but it is not clear if he indeed was an actual Party member (testimony of A.N. Nikolaev in the survey).

<sup>85</sup>See Appendix I for the questionnaire.

Party after 1937. Their stubborn allegiance to the former Party may have caused a certain reluctance to mention the terror of the *Ezhovshchina*, and thus befoul the image of the Party. Even for most Soviet Communists, the terror unleashed in 1936-1938 can only be considered as a grave error and must linger as a very bad memory indeed. A further explanation may be that many of the gruesome events in the 1930s have been fully suppressed in the minds of the respondents or blended with memories about the collectivization and other events. Lastly, few victims of the Great Terror have survived as a result of the numerous executions and the atrocious life in the prisons and camps. Thus only one person among the 109 had been a convict, and he was only dispatched to the camps in 1940, long after *Ezhov's* demise<sup>86</sup>.

The experiences in the 1930s in general, however, turned out to have been so crucial in the lives of many respondents that they related something about it during the interviews. Quite a few people referred to collectivization, when they were asked if they personally, or their family members, had been exposed to political repression<sup>87</sup>. Certainly

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<sup>86</sup> A.S. Lukovkin.

<sup>87</sup> The fact that his father-in-law was arrested during collectivization for refusing to enter the kolkhoz, did not restrain A.M. Afanas'ev from becoming a loyal Party member (testimony of A.M. Afanas'ev in the survey). The testimony in the survey of T.A. Novikova, M.V. Kornetova (who maintains that a quarter of the households in her ancestral village were de-kulakized), V.P. Pimenova, T.I. Bol'shakova, M.K. Chesnokova, M.A. Sysoeva (whose grandfather was dekulakized) is evidence of the incredible impression collectivization made on the rural population. Naturally, particularly those who saw a relative arrested in collectivization referred to it: the father of E.A. Golubev was arrested in the early 1930s, and Golubev grew up without ever having known his father (testimony of E.A. Golubev in the survey). P.A. Kashninov's uncle was de-kulakized (testimony of P.A. Kashninov in the survey). The father of N.N. Golubeva was arrested in the 1930s and died, according to her, at the construction of the Volga-Baltic canal. His arrest was due to the fact that he had been a tsarist army officer, despite the fact that he had commanded afterwards a Red Army unit in the Civil War (testimony of N.N. Golubeva in the survey). The year of the arrest was 1933 or 1934, when Golubeva was twelve years old. The parents of A.E. Malysheva, who was three

people sometimes provided examples of repression after the collectivization period<sup>88</sup>. Nevertheless, the impression exists that many cases of arrest and repression described by the respondents took place either before or after Ezhov's tenure as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs<sup>89</sup>, although this cannot be completely proven, for reasons described in Appendix 1 (as well as above and below), indicating that the chronological accuracy of the respondents' memories is not always trustworthy.

Confirmation of the fact that numerous arrests happened before Ezhov's appointment can be found in the words of I.P. Boitsov in March 1938. The intention of his remark was to criticize the virtually indiscriminate arrest of people in the countryside before his take-over, and to justify his own appointment and the removal of his predecessors:

An enemy attitude towards the soviet, [and] kolkhoz *aktiv*, and the kolkhoznik was expressed by the fact that, in 1935-1937, 59,000 people of the rural *aktiv* and of the kolkhozniks were convicted. In 1937 the oblast' court reviewed

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years old at the time, were de-kulakized in 1931 and sent to Siberia. The mother fled twice from the exile, the father once. He was caught in Rzhev and sentenced to six years of imprisonment in 1937. He probably died in the North-Eastern Labour Camps (*SV772*) of the NKVD. Her mother lost her son --she had been pregnant when they were de-kulakized--, because he froze to death in exile in Siberia (testimony of A.E. Malysheva in the survey). Tucker's remarks on the absence of fear of arrest in 1936-1938 among the population seem to be rather perceptive (R.C. Tucker, *Stalin in Power*, pp.548/549). Many seem to have reasoned along the lines of the old adage: "Where there is smoke, there is fire." Many might have been of the opinion that the arrests during the *Ezhovshchina* were not aimed at them, but at people higher up.

<sup>88</sup>N.S. Smirnova's sufferings cannot be considered as entirely typical, since her parents were arrested in Leningrad, where the family resided in 1937. Nevertheless, she did end up in an orphanage for children of "enemies of the people." She moved to Kalinin only after 1945.

<sup>89</sup>Ezhov was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in late September 1936, and replaced by Beria in December 1938 (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, pp.138/139).

decisions in order to correct wrecking in the judicial practice, and the cases against 2,060 people were discontinued....<sup>90</sup>

The above number of almost 60,000 is startling; considering that during this period probably around 2.6 million people lived in the countryside of the oblast', it would seem that in these few years, which are post-collectivization and partially pre-*Ezhovshchina*, more than two percent of the rural population in the Kalinin oblast' was arrested<sup>91</sup>.

Because the large majority of the peasantry had joined the kolkhozy, the momentum of all-out collectivization began to abate in the lands of Tver'-Kalinin in 1934<sup>92</sup>. The Party, soviet, and OGPU workers were instructed to bring the indiscriminate arrests in the countryside to a halt. However, the local authorities were not discouraged from arresting rural dwellers, but merely to be more selective<sup>93</sup>. If Boitsov's numbers are correct, these directives did not lead to any significant changes with respect to the arrests; it is not unlikely that the decrees of the Central Executive Committee immediately after the assassination of Kirov in December of 1934 led to a renewed orgy of arrests, including the arrest of the 59,000 in the countryside mentioned by Boitsov<sup>94</sup>.

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<sup>90</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.95.

<sup>91</sup>In early 1937, the oblast' population of the 1935-1944 stood at 3.2 million (Poliakov et al., "Polveka...", [I], p.16). Of them, roughly 20% must have been urban dwellers (see Table 2), and the population size must have been around 2.6 million in the countryside.

<sup>92</sup>M.A. Il'in, "Raskrytie...", p.12.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., "Raskrytie...", p.13.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., "Raskrytie...", p.13 describes these decrees. G.T. Rittersporn gives a description of the methods of coercion in the countryside in order to make the kolkhozy meet the targets of the state procurement plans, based on the materials of the Smolensk Archive, which can serve just as well as an explanation of this staggering amount of arrests in the countryside of neighbouring Kalinin oblast' (Rittersporn, pp.38-41). Additional arrests could have been a consequence of tax collection.

The staggering number of arrests of rural dwellers mentioned by Boitsov casts grave doubts on Rittersporn's "revisionist" numbers for the amount of arrests and people in camps, which are much lower than those of Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko<sup>95</sup>. Antonov-Ovseyenko probably has given the highest estimate of victims between 1917 and 1953 in the USSR: one hundred million! Rittersporn is correct in stating "...that none of the data that we yet possess will allow us to arrive at an entirely reliable estimate of the number of arrests in those years."<sup>96</sup> He criticizes Western Sovietologists' selective use of sources and the doubtful way of calculating to establish the number of politically repressed<sup>97</sup>. However, he fails to perceive that his own sources for the number of victims might be rather suspect: a small article in *Argumenty i fakty* of 1989, and a few items in *Pravda* and *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* in 1989 and 1990, plus a calculation based on a small district of Smolensk oblast<sup>98</sup>. The USSR was still intact when these articles were published, and quite a few people within the KGB and the Communist Party might not have deemed it wise to publish the real numbers on the mass repressions of the 1930s (apart from that, some of the documents on the purges and other crimes of the Stalinist era might have been destroyed)<sup>99</sup>. In 1992, Oleg Khlebniuk stated that "...[as] of now we simply do not know, what the total number of

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<sup>95</sup>Ibid., pp.12-14. Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, The Time of Stalin. Portrait of a Tyranny, New York: Harper and Row, 1981, p.307.

<sup>96</sup>Rittersporn, p.13.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., pp.12-14.

<sup>98</sup>See Rittersporn, pp.28/29, Footnotes 59-68 and p.302, footnote 44

<sup>99</sup>See, e.g., Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs, New York: Vintage Books, 1990(II), p.531, or Volkogonov, *Kniga II*, chast'2, p.43.

repressions is."<sup>100</sup> Therefore, Rittersporn's criticism of the high estimates as for example proposed by Antonov-Ovseyenko was premature, to say the least.

In the former Soviet Union, V.N. Zemskov in particular has been publishing articles in recent years on the numbers of the *repressirovannye* Zemskov seems to support Rittersporn's low estimates. Basing his work on sources found in the TsGAOR archive in Moscow, he calculates that 3,777,380 people were sentenced for counter-revolutionary crimes between 1921 and 1954<sup>101</sup>. Historians and social scientists of Zemskov's type were recently described by Richard Pipes as "...[having] been unable to break out of the mental straitjackets imposed by decades of regimentation."<sup>102</sup> I agree with Pipes' view.

A strong argument against Zemskov and Rittersporn's low estimates has been presented by Robert Conquest. He denies the reliability of the sparse numbers issued as a result of the 1939 Census, and for good reason<sup>103</sup>. First of all, the results of the 1937 Census had been suppressed. The members of the Census Board had been shot as spies for "deliberately" diminishing its results. Therefore the functionaries of the 1939 Board had good reason to deliver numbers high enough to satisfy the leadership. Secondly, Stalin announced the

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<sup>100</sup>Oleg Khlebnuk, "Prinuditel'nyi trud v ekonomike SSSR. 1929-1941 gody," in: *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, 13, 1992, pp.73-84, p.74.

<sup>101</sup>V.N. Zemskov, "Zakliuchennye, spetsposelentsy, ssyl'noposelentsy, ssyl'nye i vyslannye (Statistiko-geograficheskii aspekt)," in: *Istoriia SSSR*, 5, 1991, pp.151-165, pp.151-153.

<sup>102</sup>Pipes, "1917...", p.79.

<sup>103</sup>Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.487; also Drobizhev, Poliakov, p.470 and Gordon, Klopov, p.163.

totals of the 1939 Census before the new Census Board had actually examined the material. Finally, the censuses of the period --those of 1937 and 1939-- omitted the deaths of those who had "died in custody." According to Drobizhev, a large portion of the materials collected in 1939 All-Union Census were lost<sup>104</sup>. In addition to the doubtful quality of the 1939 Census numbers, there has been an extraordinary juggling with the numbers on Soviet losses during World War II. To my knowledge, nobody has explained yet why the number of Soviet citizens killed in the war was suddenly increased from roughly twenty million to twenty-seven million a few years ago<sup>105</sup>. Might it not be possible, for instance, that the Soviet leaders a few years ago deemed it convenient to transfer a large number of purge victims to the category of war victims? Because of the numbers mentioned by Boitsov in 1938, I am inclined to concur with Conquests' estimates. Conquest notices for instance that, according to information of Mikoyan's son Sergo, the KGB reported to the Politburo almost twenty million arrests and seven million deaths between January 1, 1935 and June 22, 1941 in the USSR<sup>106</sup>.

It should be pointed out that sometimes no official judicial prosecution took place, as exemplified by the cases of A.S. Lukovkin and

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<sup>104</sup>Drobizhev, Poliakov, p.465.

<sup>105</sup>For the twenty-seven million, see, e.g., G.F. Krivosheev(ed.), Grif sekretnosti sniat: Poteri Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v voynakh, boevykh deistviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh. Statisticheskoe issledovanie, Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1993, p.128. This publication maintains that the demographic loss sustained by all armed forces of the Soviet Union amounted to 8,668,400 (Krivosheev, p.129). In other words, almost 19 million Soviet citizens were killed in the war, which seems to be an unlikely high number.

<sup>106</sup>Conquest, The Great Terror, p.487; Antonov-Ovseyenko, p.307.



N.A. Kotov<sup>107</sup>. The latter witnessed the re-arrest of many of his fellow villagers, claiming that no investigation or trial ever took place before they were once more shipped off to the camps. Lukovkin was sent to the camps without any form of judicial process just as, according to his testimony, happened with many of the soldiers captured by the Finns in 1939-1940. In the camps of Norilsk, Lukovkin and his fellow former POW's were handed a ticket on which was written that they had been sentenced either to five or eight years of camp. His testimony indicates that nothing was handled in these cases by way of "normal" judicial procedures. However, since he was rehabilitated in 1957, something must have been entered in the books. Recently P.A. Aptekar' wrote in the Russian journal of military history about these events:

We do not know anything about the further fate of the POW's, who returned home to the Motherland [after the Soviet-Finnish War], except that, in accordance with the directives of the General Staff, they were sent to army camps with the aim of political reeducation and a further distribution into units or in the reserves. How much these directives were followed, we can only guess at this point, as long as no corresponding documents will be found of the GULAG and NKVD.<sup>108</sup>

The statements of these eyewitnesses and the remarks of Aptekar' cast grave doubts on the reliability of the precise numbers that have been recently issued on the total number of arrests and convictions under Stalin (which keep on changing meanwhile). One Brezhnevite publication gives the USSR population of early 1946 as 166 million, while in 1941 the population had been 194.1 million according

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<sup>107</sup>Testimony of N.A. Kotov and A.S. Lukovkin in the survey; compare also to Fainsod, *How...*, p.317.

<sup>108</sup>P.A. Aptekar', "Opravdanu li zhertvu? (O poteriakh v sovetsko-finliandskoi voine), " in: *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 3, 1992, pp.43-45, p.44.

to Heller and Nekrich: this would imply an loss in the neighbourhood of twenty-seven million in the war, even though the natural growth of the Soviet population was probably negative in 1941-1943<sup>109</sup>. However, these numbers are doubtful, because the population number for 1939 is probably false<sup>110</sup>. Have some of the victims of the Great Purge been entered under the heading of war victims?

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<sup>109</sup>I.M. Volkov et al., Sovetskaia derevnia v pervye poslevoennye gody. 1946-1950, Moskva: Nauka, 1978 [from here Sovetskaia derevnia...], p.263; Heller, Nekrich, p.462

<sup>110</sup>See above. The number of 194.1 million is mentioned as the population of the USSR on January 1, 1940 by V.T. Eliseev and S. N. Mikhailov (V.T. Eliseev, S.N. Mikhailov, "Tak skol'ko zhe liudei my poteriali v voine," in: Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 6-7, 1992, pp.31-34, p.31). The number of 166 million of Sovetskaia derevnia... is an estimate, and it is not clear how much one can trust it. In his recent article, B. Sokolov stated that in early 1946 the USSR had 167 million inhabitants, while it had had 200 million in June 1941 (B. Sokolov, "Tsena poter'-tsena sistemy," in: Nezavisimaia Gazeta, June 22 1993, p.5). Unfortunately, Sokolov omits to mention the source for these numbers, and his numbers on the war losses sustained by the USSR, seem exceptionally high (see IV.2 and VII.1). In February 1939, Stalin was informed that the 1939 Census had counted 167 million inhabitants within the borders of the USSR (Iu.A. Poliakov, V.B. Zhiromskaia, I.N. Kiselev, "Polveka molchaniiia (Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937 g.)," in: Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia, No.8, 1990, pp.30-52 [from here Poliakov et al., "Polveka....," [II]], p.50). Problems also arise with the calculations of Eliseev and Mikhailov (Eliseev, Mikhailov, p.31). After stating that the USSR, without the soon-to-be-annexed Polish, Karelian, and other areas, had a population in early 1939 of 167,306,000, and the natural growth rate was about 1% in 1939, they suddenly give for January 1, 1940 for the USSR of the same territory of early 1939, a population number of 177,180,000, which would indicate an absurd growth rate of 6% in 1939. Similar vague and erroneous calculations plague an article by V.V. Tsaplin in Voprosy istorii (V.V. Tsaplin, "Arkhivnye materialy o chisle zakliuchennykh v kontse 30-kh godov," in: Voprosy istorii, 4-5, 1991, pp.157-163). On the basis of materials mainly consisting of accounts of the People's Commissariat (Ministry) of Finance, Tsaplin tries to calculate the number of inmates of the GULag in the later 1930s (Tsaplin, p.157). He uses the term "man-day" (*cheloveko-den'*) in his calculation, which he never clearly defines (Tsaplin, p.158). Although he points out at the end of the article that no convict worked 365 days per year (following Solzhenitsyn, he states that they had on average three days off per month), he pretends in his calculations that every healthy worker worked 365 days per calendar year (and seems to imply that one "man-day" is the equivalent of a work-day of one person, regardless of how much work the person got done; Tsaplin, p.158 and p.160); it appears that the three days of leisure were introduced in July 1940, see O. Khlebnik, "30-e gody...", p.86). In this respect Aleksandr Zinoviev's remark seems still to be appropriate [Teacher thinks]: "Who's going to be convinced by all these graphs and tables. Everyone knows that any figures they see in our country are pure fabrications, and there's no chance of anyone believing that they are accurate. And the conclusions that can be derived from this sea of figures are self-evident without any analysis" (Aleksandr Zinoviev, The Yawning Heights, p.517).

It is not inconceivable that Boitsov might have been padding the numbers in order to blacken the record of his predecessors even more. But it can be proven that, in a speech a few months later at the third oblast' Party conference, he understated the number of arrests within the Party elite of the province between June 1937 and July 1938<sup>111</sup>. In Boitsov's speech of March 1938, he claimed that, only in 1937, numerous complaints from citizens had been received by the oblast' and raion procuracies about all kinds of illegal proceedings:

This means that 122,000 of the citizens of our oblast' searched for a settlement, for justice in our court- and procuracy organs<sup>112</sup>.

It could be proposed that some, or maybe even the majority, of these complaints may concern criminal, and not political, cases. Even then, however, many people prosecuted as criminal offenders were not criminals in the strict sense of the word, that is people accused of engaging in burglaries, bank robberies, fraud, murder, rape, etc., as the aforementioned case of Sazonov showed<sup>113</sup>. Boitsov himself admitted this discrepancy in the language of the time:

In the oblast' court resided Gribov, an enemy of the people, and sat there for a long while [and] he purposely urged the judicial prosecution of comrades in order to terrorize our kolkhoz and soviet cadres of our [sic] countryside.<sup>114</sup>

To restore a semblance of order, Vyshinskii sent a special commission to check on the operation of the oblast' procuracy<sup>115</sup>.

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<sup>111</sup>See below in this chapter.

<sup>112</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.96.

<sup>113</sup>See II.1. Compare Conquest's description of the effects of the decree of August 7, 1932, and similar resolutions in Conquest, *Harvest*, p.184 and Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.21.

<sup>114</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.96.

<sup>115</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.96.

Apart from the information above, most of the consequences of the Great Purge for those outside of the Party leadership remain hidden in the Party's records<sup>116</sup>. Something can be gathered about these consequences for individuals outside the Party elite, from the example of the postwar director of the Kalinin philharmonic orchestra, V.F. Afanas'ev, a Party member<sup>117</sup>. He was subject to an MGB check in 1947, and it turned out that two of his brothers were arrested in 1937, and that in Moscow several of his and his wife's relatives were arrested in the Great Purge by the NKVD.

The image of life in the Kalinin oblast' in the 1930s would not be complete without trying to establish the events of the Terror and its consequences. Perhaps one should not make a division between the 1936-1938 period and the rest of the 1930s, inasmuch as the survey respondents do not seem to designate thus their memories either. Although the terror never ceased during the whole decade, it peaked during the periods of 1930 to 1931 and 1936 to 1938 in the Kalinin oblast'. We will now turn to this second "peak."

In these years, the Party's leadership in Moscow inflicted terrible suffering on the lives of many oblast' inhabitants, both the average peasant (again, as in the case of Mironov), and the very leadership of the oblast' (as in the case of first Party secretary Mikhailov)<sup>118</sup>. People

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<sup>116</sup> In the work of Anatolii Rybakov, some of the atmosphere in Kalinin in 1937 is portrayed (Anatoli Rybakov, *Fear*, Boston, Toronto, London: Little, Brown and Company, 1992, e.g. on pp.451, 469-502, 530-540, 552-561, 666-686). During the summer of 1937 Kalinin became a town that had passport regimentation, according to this novel (Rybakov, p.680).

<sup>117</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, 1.230.

<sup>118</sup>See II.1. The *Ezhovshchina* also unleashed a further anti-religious offensive. According to N.V. Kurganova, around 1937 or 1938, rural soviet workers took away Bibles and icons from the people in her village in Udoml'ia raion (testimony of N.V. Kurganova in the survey). It is not unlikely that these measures were accompanied by arrests of those zealous

of the first category had been largely coaxed into submission before 1936, but their ultimate end sometimes came in the *Ezhovshchina*, as the case of Mironov shows<sup>119</sup>. Then, "[in] 1937 a massive purge began of the entire oblast' apparat. Individually and in groups, party and soviet workers and economic cadres were arrested."<sup>120</sup>

Finally, it was the turn of the elite of the oblast'. By 1936, society's upper crust comprised almost exclusively Communists. Within two years, they would be liquidated, sent to camps, or scared into submission by their peers' arrests in the Great Purge of 1936-1938. How far the cornerstone of Soviet society, the proletariat, was simultaneously affected by the terror is hard to assess, but G.V. Lubov, who was in general very supportive of the regime, noticed that in Konakovo "...before the war workers of the factory, of urban institutions..." were arrested by the NKVD<sup>121</sup>. He added that "...we were of the opinion, that they were arrested for a reason, as these were people who, through anecdotes, had expressed an anti-Soviet mood."<sup>122</sup> The fate of the group *Zemlia i glina* seems to confirm that politically suspect proletarians were not spared the repressions of these years<sup>123</sup>.

Part of the explanation for the extreme application of coercion towards the leading cadres during the Great Purge was undoubtedly a

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believers, who refused to part from these possessions. It should be noted here, too, that those who confiscated the Bibles and icons were apparently not NKVD-employees.

<sup>119</sup>Another example of the pre-1936 repressions could be found at a permanent exhibition in Tver' details where evidence was shown of a case against church functionaries in 1933 (permanent exhibition on Stalinist repressions in the 'Tver' museum of *knievedenie*).

<sup>120</sup>*Tverskoi tsentr...*, p.13.

<sup>121</sup>Testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey; Rybakov mentions the --fictional?-- arrest of workers at the "Proletarka" textile factory in 1937 (Rybakov, p.489).

<sup>122</sup>Testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey.

<sup>123</sup>See II.3.

misguided effort to improve, by way of repression, the efficiency of the economy, the government, and the Party machine<sup>124</sup>. The classic apology for the purges was given in 1948 by Politburo member

<sup>124</sup>"Secondly, the mass repressions were not an accident, but an essential element not only of the political system of Stalin, but above all of the socialism of Stalin: in a society, where the stimuli for work had been undermined, precisely the fear for punishment, which was buttressed by the massive repressions, along with the still present enthusiasm of the masses, who believed in sacrifices in the name of socialism, were most important elements of the successful functioning of the political system" (A.P. Butenko, "O sotsial'no-klassovoi prirode stalinskoi vlasti," in: *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 3, 1989, pp.65-78, p.76). See also Rittersporn on the repressions among the factory workers (Rittersporn, pp. 47-53). I do not, however, agree with Rittersporn's "class" explanation for the purges (see Rittersporn, pp.54/55. This explanation seems rather artificial, and contains too much overbearing and vague language (e.g. "The organisation of the apparatus was the concrete manifestation of a policy generally accepted by the ruling class. From within its ranks could come no effective opposition to the objective conditions of the functioning of the Party-State. Neither sustained opposition to central control, nor complete eradication of "subversive" methods were possible without the total collapse of the system,..." and so on (Rittersporn,p.55)). This kind of pseudo-theoretical reasoning seems to have been introduced in his work to meet a certain theoretical standard supposedly in use among some social scientists today. However, what does it mean? ("concrete manifestation"?, "objective conditions of the functioning of the Party-State"?). As he is apparently his own translator, this vagueness cannot be blamed on misunderstandings of the original French. He is no less fortunate when he tries to assign the 1930s a place in the *longue durée* of Soviet history (Rittersporn, p.320). Pipes notices as well the mistaken application of concepts that were used by the *Annales* school among many of the revisionists --to whom Rittersporn belongs-- in their efforts to offer an alternative view of the October Putsch (Pipes, "1917...", p.78). As we know today, Soviet history came to an end in 1991 --when Rittersporn's book was published--, so that it is rather difficult to speak of any kind of *longue durée* within Soviet history, which lasted only 74 years. What is perhaps much more interesting, and which has been tried at certain places in this thesis --particularly when discussing the countryside--, is to place certain aspects of Soviet reality in a concept of the *longue durée* of Russian history (perhaps of Russian-Soviet history). Apart from that, the concept of *longue durée* has been most successfully applied to pre-industrial societies (as in the works of the *Annales* school in France); it is questionable how much one can use it at all to understand 20th century industrial societies. In my opinion, it could be useful to understand some aspects of the Russians' collective mentality during the years of Soviet power, because undoubtedly the roots of some ways of thinking and acting of the Russian people, Communist Party, and government in Soviet times are to be found in the remote past of Kievan Rus', Muscovy, and Imperial Russia. The efforts of Richard Pipes are a case in point, although some of his extrapolations and conclusions might be rather suspect (Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*). As Leopold von Ranke stated in the 1840s: "But I assert: every epoch is immediate to God, and its worth is not at all based on what derives from it but rests in its own existence, in its own self. In this way the contemplation of history, that is to say of individual life in history, acquires its own particular attention, since now every epoch must be seen as something valid in itself and appears highly worthy of consideration" (Leopold von Ranke, *The Theory and Practice of History*. Edited with an Introduction by Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke. Indianapolis, N.Y.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973, p.53).

Voznesensky in his book on the USSR's wartime economy<sup>125</sup>. He maintained that the purges had removed "the roots of parasitic classes and groups" from society. The "cleansing" had forged a unified entity of the people, supposedly strong enough to withstand any outside attack, which was proven subsequently by the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II. However, this was a justification *a posteriori*, because during the *Ezhovshchina* an imminent German attack did not seem to be anticipated, in spite of the spy mania expressed in the show trials. The terror, of both the "Great Purge" and the repressions of the first half of the 1930s, might have provided an additional advantage for the regime: it was so widespread --Conquest justifiably calls it a "social phenomenon"<sup>126</sup>-- that no one failed to witness some of its manifestations. The horrible memory of it made anyone think twice about voicing criticism about the regime's policies. This "benefit," however, would not be openly applauded by Stalin or any of his cronies.

'The impact of the Great Terror on the Party organization of the Kalinin oblast' is somewhat reflected in documents in the Tver' oblast's

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<sup>125</sup>N. Voznesenskii, *Voennaiia Ekonomika SSSR v period otechestvennoi voiny*, (s.p.): OGIZ. Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1948, p.4. Molotov, too, thought afterwards that the terror had the purpose of the liquidation of a (potential) fifth column in case of war (*Sto sorok besed...*, p.338, p.390). I do not believe in the "social" explanation of the purges as a final reckoning by the *nurod* with the last remnants of the pre-revolutionary intellectual elite which had managed to survive until 1936/1937 by virtue of their membership of the Bolshevik Party, after which the gates were opened for unprecedented social mobility for certain peasants and workers. It cannot be denied that an unintentional consequence of the *Ezhovshchina* was the rise to positions of power of certain former peasants and workers, but it should be stressed that this was unintentional. Djilas perception seems true in this respect: "The social origin of the new class lies in the proletariat just as the aristocracy arose in a peasant society, and the bourgeoisie in a commercial and artisans' society" (Djilas, *The New Class*, p.41). Stalin and some of his cronies master-minded the onslaught, which perhaps even in their eyes by the the second half of 1938 began to get out of hand.

<sup>126</sup>R. Conquest, "Academe and the Soviet Myth, " in: *The National Interest*, 31, Spring 1993, pp.91-98, p.94.

Party archive<sup>127</sup>. Unfortunately, the records are far from complete, mainly consisting of changes (*smeny*) in the transcription of the stenographic accounts of Party obkom meetings, two Party conferences, and the protocols for these sessions<sup>128</sup>. It is likely that some of the records on this period were lost during the wartime evacuation of the oblast' Party archive.

Nevertheless, there is enough in the documents which have survived to create an image of the events and hysteria within the Party during the Purge. A more complete picture might emerge from an investigation into records about the *Ezhovshchina* that are at the present moment being held in the collections of the central archives of the former Communist Party in Moscow. As this period does not fall within the main focus of my research, and owing to certain difficulties --gaining timely access to the central archives, particularly in the fall of 1991--, to investigate the documents preserved in Moscow on the Kalinin oblast' for this period, the following account brooks certain lacunae<sup>129</sup>.

Between 1933 and 1935 a countrywide purge of the Party was staged, although with less severe consequences for the targeted people than during the deadly 1936-1938 period<sup>130</sup>. At least 9.4% of the Party

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<sup>127</sup>See the Table in Appendix III for a more detailed account of the consequences of the Great Purge for the Party's elite in the oblast'.

<sup>128</sup>This probably means that the fifty-two exclusions of obkom members during 1937 and 1938 from Party and obkom that could be definitively established, represent an absolute minimum (see Appendix III).

<sup>129</sup>It also seems that at the moment the access to the materials on the purges is restricted to a commission of three Russian researchers (see Nataliia Gevorkian, "Vstrechnye plany po unichtozheniiu sobstvennogo naroda", in: *Moskovskie Novosti*, No.25, June 21, 1992, pp.18 and 19).

<sup>130</sup>*Ocherki*, p.388.



raions it seems that these purges were more rigorous. In Bezhetsk raion, for example, more than 25% of the Party's membership was shunned. Supposedly, the share of workers in the Party's composition swelled owing to the purges --85% of the full members in the Kalinin raion in 1934 is a sample figure mentioned--, but one must take into account that many of those classified as workers were employed full-time in the Party apparatus. In 1935-1936 a new purge took place, which formally was called "...a verification, and then an exchange of party documents."<sup>131</sup> Temporarily, until November 1936, no new members were accepted into the Party<sup>132</sup>.

A more serious attack on the oblast's obkom members would start already before the infamous February-March Central Committee Plenum of 1937<sup>133</sup>. At the second Party conference of June 1937, references were made to the "unmasked enemies of the people, the trotskyites," A.S. Kalygina and Lipshits, the latter having been active in the Maks Gel'dt Factory of Velikie Luki<sup>134</sup>. By June 1937, Lipshits had already

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<sup>131</sup>Ocherki, p.388.

<sup>132</sup>Pako, 147/1/529, 1.47. Rittersporn notices that the Central Committee decree that authorised new enrollments was dated September 29, 1936 (Rittersporn, p.90). He points out that in fact until July 1938 the entry of new members into the Party was very limited, which seems to be confirmed by the table on the Party membership in Kalinin oblast' (see Table 35). In how far the growth or decline in the years 1935-1938 was influenced by exclusions is not explored by Rittersporn.

<sup>133</sup>Here Stalin proposed that the more successes were booked by socialist construction, the more desperate the resistance of the class enemy would become, and the more the class struggle intensified (Iu. Borisov a.o., "Politicheskaiia...", p.291). It was also the stage for the final political attack on Bukharin and Rykov, after which their case was taken over by the NKVD from the Central Committee (see "Materialy fevral'sko-martovskogo plenuma TsK VKP (b) 1937 goda," in: Voprosy istorii, 2, 1993, pp.3-33).

<sup>134</sup>See Pako, 147/1/526, 1.93, 1.216. Kalygina had been transferred in 1936 to the gorkom of Voronezh; she was "illegally repressed", died in 1937, and was posthumously rehabilitated (see Kalininskaia oblastnaia..., p.449/450). In late February 1937, she apparently was still in good grace, because she participated in the notorious February-March Plenum of 1937 on February, 26, 1937 (see "Materialy fevral'sko-martovskogo plenuma...", p.10).

been executed "by the people." Perhaps in order to achieve better results Lipshits had been too fond of hiring "bourgeois" specialists instead of Communist specialists and practitioners, since "[t]his bandit threw the factory into a situation where the people in positions of command in the factory, except for the head of the factory, were all class-alien elements."<sup>135</sup>

One of the vices of Kalygina and Lipshits was the --supposed-- purchase of activists' allegiance; Lipshits was said to have squandered 260,000 rubles in 1935 and 1936 of factory money for this purpose<sup>136</sup>. The director of Kalinin's "Vagzhanov" textile factory, Guzenko, who had been on the receiving end of Lipshits' alleged bribing, was still among the obkom members in the first months of 1937<sup>137</sup>. Others who were implicated in the case against Lipshits and Kalygina were Kalinin's town-soviet members Solomonov and Novikov, who perhaps can be equated with people in the table<sup>138</sup>. How many local leaders fell victim to that first wave of Party purges remains unclear; Kalygina is mentioned in Roy Medvedev's Let History Judge<sup>139</sup>. The story of the

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<sup>135</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.93. The accusations against Lipshits particularly confirm the idea of the change of focus in the show trials from "terrorism" (as expressed in the first Moscow Trial of 1936) to "economic sabotage" (which was much more pronounced in the Piatakov Trial of January 1937), as traced by Rittersporn (Rittersporn, pp. 78-101). I am of the opinion that Rittersporn's hypothesis of a rivalry going on between two factions in the "Party-State" is wholly artificial (compare in this respect Walter Laqueur's remarks on opposition within Stalin's Politburo to those of Rittersporn: W. Laqueur, Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations, London, Sydney, Wellington: Unwin Hyman Limited, 1990, pp. 163-167, Rittersporn, pp. 188ff.).

<sup>136</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.216.

<sup>137</sup>Tverskoi tsentr..., p.15. Guzenko disappeared in the Ezhovshchina; see Table in Appendix III.

<sup>138</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.218. It could be that this Solomonov is the same as a certain N.P. Solomonov, a one-time raikom secretary of Bologoe, who was another victim of the purges (Tverskoi tsentr..., p.15). See Table in Appendix III.

<sup>139</sup>R. Medvedev, Let History Judge, p.409. As well Tverskoi tsentr..., pp.14/15.

Kalinin oblast' Communist Party organization is in some ways similar to Merle Fainsod's account of the events in the neighbouring Smolensk oblast'<sup>140</sup>. At the second Party Conference in June 1937, Kalinin's Party chief Mikhailov reminds one of Smolensk's Rumyantsev in his efforts to appear as a zealous purger, with more than sufficient Party vigilance. Just as in the case of Rumyantsev, the first secretary of the Kalinin obkom was unable to protect himself from the onslaught. Towards the end of 1937, he was *in absentia* excluded as an enemy of the people. Mikhailov and NKVD-head Dombrovskii compiled reports on the state of affairs in the oblast' at the second Party conference. Here they referred to a whole network of Trotskyite and Rightist groups in the town of Kalinin, headed by Lipshits, Guzenko, Gorov, and other enemies of the people<sup>141</sup>. A thorough purge of the town's Party committees was under

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<sup>140</sup>See Table in Appendix III. At exactly the same moment, a Party conference was staged in Smolensk oblast' (see Fainsod, Smolensk..., p.59). Fainsod's description of Rumyantsev's behaviour as a Bolshevik provincial Party leader, at least partially, could probably be applied to Mikhailov, although Mikhailov was more of a newcomer than Rumyantsev (see Fainsod, Smolensk..., pp. 59-60). Fainsod's description of Rumyantsev's zealousness can be found for instance in Fainsod, Smolensk..., p.237. Mikhailov had worked in the CC-*apparatus* in the late 1920s, was in the early 1930s a student of the Agricultural Institute of the Red Professoriat, and then, until 1935, head of the organizational department and secretary of the Moscow Party committee. He died in 1938, "illegally repressed" and was posthumously rehabilitated (see Kalininskaia oblastnaia..., p. 451; Mikhailov's trial after he, as First Secretary of the Voronezh obkom, was "unmasked" took twenty minutes (Conquest, The Great Terror, p.339); see also Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 1, 1988, No. 22(5192), p.12 on the Mikhailov case. He was apparently accused of trying to organize a "feudal revolution" in the Soviet Union; his trial took place on August 1, 1938). Mikhailov's behaviour was emulated at the same conference in Kalinin by Goliakov and others. Time and again in 1937 and 1938, vigilance was supposed to increase and new nests of enemies were uncovered. A good example is the resolution of the obkom plenum of January 1938, which makes a rather hysterically paranoid impression (see the table in Appendix III). Nevertheless, following this resolution, vigilance was apparently still not sufficient, because Andreev and Malenkov attacked the obkom leadership for its lack of vigilance in March 1938. By July 1938 Boitsov still discerned everywhere in the oblast' remnants of anti-Soviet elements, and "...the liquidation of the consequences of wrecking was only beginning" (Pako, 147/1/554, 1.4 and 1.9).

<sup>141</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.211.

way by this time, bringing to the fore many young Party workers<sup>142</sup>. As a consequence, many women became secretaries of factory Party committees in Kalinin for the first time<sup>143</sup>. In the records some evidence can be found of an attack at this 1937 conference on many of the candidates for the new obkom, mainly veteran members standing for reelection. The military contingent had to sustain extreme criticism in particular. This, of course, stemmed from the beginning of the Red Army purges in the Soviet Union. The speakers occasionally mentioned the recent unmasking of Gamarnik --although not yet that of Tukhachevsky<sup>144</sup>. It even seems likely that the professional soldier Ziuz'-Iakovenko, who remained on the list of candidates for the obkom, was arrested right after the elections. Among other things, he had been taken to task at the pre-election discussions for having worked as military attaché in Germany. Ziuz'-Iakovenko disappears without a trace in the records and was not present immediately after the conference at the "organizational" plenum of the obkom, nor at any of the following plenums<sup>145</sup>.

Division commander Stepynin was removed from the list for his ties with the unmasked enemy of the people, Enov, and for his support for the resolution at the Tolmachevskii political-military academy in

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<sup>142</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.213.

<sup>143</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 11.216/217.

<sup>144</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, 1.229. Gamarnik committed suicide on May 31, 1937, and was for the first time publicly attacked on June 6, 1937 (Conquest, The Great Terror, p. 201). From June 1 to June 4, the Military Revolutionary Soviet met at the People's Commissariat of Defense. Stalin himself attended and discussed the discovery of a "counter-revolutionary fascist organization" within the military.

<sup>145</sup>See Pako 147/1/527, 11.7/8 and the Table in Appendix III.

1928<sup>146</sup>. This resolution had demanded that the army's political commissars be maintained, an assessment dubbed "trotskyite" in 1937.

Just before the elections at the second Party conference, all candidates for the new obkom were obliged to state whether they had ever deviated from the Party's general line<sup>147</sup>. At least one individual declined to remain on the list of candidates, declaring himself to be already too busy with his other duties; it is not clear whether this move saved him from arrest<sup>148</sup>.

It was announced at this conference that agriculture in the oblast' was infected by a plague of wreckers<sup>149</sup>. The Komsomol membership, according to Brandin, its first secretary in June 1937, had been similarly infiltrated by "enemies":

Thus, for example, in the October raion at the timber factory a group of Komsomols was discovered, led by a Komsomol-Hitlerite, led by fascists, in effect an underground organization, which in the course of a considerable period engaged in diversionist work at the factory. At the pedagogical tekhnikum in Kimry raion, a group of three people was exposed, all three committee members, who waged counterrevolutionary propaganda among the students. In Kalinin, in the medical workers' faculty, a group of Komsomols under the leadership of Sergeev was found, which succeeded in demoralizing the organization. The enemy led the Komsomol organization of the

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<sup>146</sup>Pako, 147/1/527, II.10-19. For the opposition at the Tolmachevskii academy, see R. Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p.423 and Iu. P. Petrov, *Stroitel'stvo politorganov. partiinykh i komsomol'skikh organizatsii armii i flota (1918-1968)*. Moskva: Voennoe izdatel'stvo Ministra Oborony SSSR, 1968, pp.214-219, and in particular p.217. For its role in the Great Purge: Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p. 207. Strangely enough the "trotskyite" dual command was reintroduced on May 8, 1937 (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.194), making the accusation even more hypocritical.

<sup>147</sup>Pako, 147/1/527, II.3-130.

<sup>148</sup>Pako, 147/1/527, I.103.

<sup>149</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, I.81.

medical workers' faculty to a state of organizational-political disintegration.<sup>150</sup>

Brandin disappears in the records after the conference in June 1937 --he was "repressed," but survived the camps and died in 1960<sup>151</sup>-- and was succeeded on recommendations from the Komsomol Central Committee by Karatiaev<sup>152</sup>. In contrast to the Party, the Komsomol grew substantially: by halfway 1935 it had 35,000 members, less than two years later 54,000, and in July 1938 already 82,000<sup>153</sup>.

In all, at least fifty-one members of the oblast' committee were excluded between January 1937 and December 1938, most of them labeled "enemies of the people", "members of counterrevolutionary anti-soviet organizations," et cetera<sup>154</sup>. This certainly does not imply that no more than around fifty people, at one time or another obkom members during 1937 and 1938, fell victim to the *Ezhovshchina*. Former members of the Party elite, such as Kalygina, had already been removed from the higher echelons by early 1937; the records used by the present author were far from complete; and many obkom members disappear without a trace in the documents during this two-year period. This could mean they were transferred to other work without any serious consequences for themselves, but could also signify that they disappeared into the labyrinth of repressions<sup>155</sup>.

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<sup>150</sup>Pako, 147/1/526, l.82.

<sup>151</sup>Tverskoi tsentr..., p.20.

<sup>152</sup>Pako, 147/1/527, l.70.

<sup>153</sup>Ocherki, p.425.

<sup>154</sup>See the Table in Appendix III.

<sup>155</sup>Naturally, some might have fallen ill or died; others might have left on their own request, although that was probably not a healthy move to make at this time. Compare to Conquest's observation: "This was in accordance with a common practice of Stalin's. Arrest was decided on; the dismissal occurred; and then for months the victim was left in some minor post, never knowing when the blow would fall" (Conquest, The Great Terror, p.241).

The obkom elected at the third oblast' Party conference under the auspices of the new first secretary of the Kalinin oblast', I.P. Boitsov, had virtually no "veterans" of the obkom elected by the previous Party conference, thirteen months earlier; the fate of many of these "veterans" remains unclear. A similar cleansing, but on a somewhat smaller scale, probably took place at the second Party conference in June 1937, judging from the number of members of the last two pre-conference plenums in 1937, who were not reelected<sup>156</sup>.

Around July 1937 Ezhov ordered the creation of a troika to carry out repressions in the oblast': it was composed of Dombrovskii, Rabov, and Bobkov<sup>157</sup>. These three, or another troika that replaced them, were directed by the Central Committee to repress a quota of 2,000 people within six weeks in February and the first half of March 1938<sup>158</sup>. According to the July 1938 version, the former oblast' leaders at the time of Ezhov's "additional order," Rabov, Ivanov, and Gusikhin followed an anti-Party line of behaviour<sup>159</sup>.

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<sup>156</sup>In Pako, 147/1/526 it is noticed at the beginning of the record that the speech at the second Party conference of Dombrovskii, who was the head of the oblast' NKVD at the time, is to be found in a separate file; this speech could not be unearthed in the archive of the former Party in Tver' by the present author. Dombrovskii's speech probably gave an account of the sins of recently "unmasked" local leaders.

<sup>157</sup>Gevorkian, p.18; the USSR NKVD was assigned 75 million rubles to execute the arrests that resulted from this order, and spent more than 100 million between July and the end of 1937 for this purpose (Bugai, p.42). Rabov had succeeded Mikhailov as first secretary after the latter's transfer to Voronezh, Dombrovskii headed the oblast' NKVD; Bobkov was probably the oblast' state prosecutor, which confirms Gevorkian's idea of the composition of these special courts (Gevorkian, p.19; Pako, 147/1/528, 1.89, noted that Mikhailov had been appointed first secretary of Voronezh oblast' on July 8, 1937 by the Central Committee, and that Rabov had been appointed his successor). Bobkov was criticized in July 1938 by Boitsov, because he had insufficiently fought the wreckers' activities within the oblast's procuracy (Pako, 147/1/554, 1.95). Dombrovskii was arrested at some point between July 1937 and July 1938 (Pako, 147/1/554, 1.120; R. Medvedev, Let History Judge, p.426; Pako, 147/1/594, 1.2).

<sup>158</sup>Gevorkian, p.19.

<sup>159</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.3.

...[they] held back the process of unmasking and extirpation of partakers of counterrevolutionary trotskyite-bukharinite bands, placed at the head of the most important parts of party, soviet, cultural, and economic work<sup>160</sup>.

The pre-Perestroika, post-Stalin version of the attack on Rabov *cum suis* was the following:

In March 1938, a plenum of the party oblast' committee was held, at which the subject was the supposedly large "mistakes" of the Kalinin obkom of the VKP(b) and the oblispolkom. After the plenum in Kalinin and the oblast', a number of honest workers, not guilty of anything, were repressed. There were occasions of baseless exclusions of communists from the party<sup>161</sup>.

These last events were instigated by the very leadership in Moscow, since it is exactly at this plenum in March 1938 that A.A. Andreev and G.M. Malenkov made an appearance, and that I.P. Boitsov was elected first secretary of the oblast'<sup>162</sup>. Boitsov would not experience any negative consequences from his involvement in these baseless exclusions; on the contrary, he would stay in Kalinin until late 1946, and then be promoted to lead the more important Stavropol krai, where at different times M.A. Suslov and M.S. Gorbachev, too, were groomed<sup>163</sup>.

In the opinion of Boitsov, voiced in July 1938 at the third Party conference of the oblast', Rabov, Ivanov, and Gusikhin continued the enemy work of Mikhailov and his clique, but apparently it was still

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<sup>160</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.3.

<sup>161</sup>Ocherki, p. 424.

<sup>162</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.3ob., 1.9ob., 11.240/241.

<sup>163</sup>See Kalininskaja oblastnaia, p. 447/448; he would lead the kraikom of Stavropol' until 1956, after which he was transferred to the Party Control Commission in Moscow (see V.1 for more on I.P. Boitsov).



unclear at that moment whether they had done this willingly or not<sup>164</sup>. It is unlikely, however, that Rabov did escape arrest in the end, for Boitsov remarked:

All people who most closely surrounded Rabov, with whom he worked for a long period, have been unmasked recently as enemies of the people.<sup>165</sup>

Ivanov was attacked for his exaggerated support of the Karelian minority: in other words, for being a "bourgeois-nationalist."<sup>166</sup> As what happened elsewhere to other nations in the 1930s' USSR, the rights of the Karelian minority were severely curbed, and their autonomous *okrug* was dissolved in 1939<sup>167</sup>. Perhaps the Soviet-Finnish War also influenced this decision.

After the venomous attack on the disgraced Rabov, Gusikhin, and Ivanov at the third Party conference in July 1938, Boitsov added that five of eleven obkomburo members, who had been elected in June 1937, had been subsequently unveiled as enemies of the people: Mikhailov and the troika member and NKVD head, Dombrovskii, were among them<sup>168</sup>.

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<sup>164</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.121.

<sup>165</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.121; see below for Rabov's possible fate.

<sup>166</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.122.

<sup>167</sup>Kotliarskaia, Freidenberg, p.117.

<sup>168</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.120. Mikhailov was "illegally repressed" and died in 1938 (Kalininskaia oblastnaia organizatsia..., p.451). I.F. Gusikhin was either executed outright or died in a camp, according to Roy Medvedev (R. Medvedev, Let History Judge, p.410), but according to Ocherki, p.703, he survived and worked in a much lower position after the war (in 1937/38 he headed the oblispolkom, in 1946-1953 the raispolkom of Kalinin's Tsentral'nyi raion, according to this source). Gusikhin and Rabov had been shunned at the end of June 1938 (Pako, 147/1/529, 1.31). V.F. Ivanov, until June 1937 oblispolkom chair, died in 1938 at age 44, which probably means that he was killed in the purges (Ocherki, p.703). P.G. Rabov died at the age of 39 in 1943, apparently not at the front -- otherwise it would have been mentioned by the source-- which probably indicates that he was another victim of the purges (Ocherki, p.705). The head of the militsiia, which was subordinate to the NKVD, M.V. Stoinimskii, was excluded from the obkom and Party on September 1, 1937, for being a Trotskyite and maintaining contacts with enemies of the

Perhaps surprisingly, none of the three leaders who had been removed in or after March 1938 was mentioned among them. Together with the five buro members, twenty-three other full obkom members and five candidate members had been exposed<sup>169</sup>. Thus, in Boitsov's calculation, thirty-three out of the eighty-eight elected at the second Party conference had been arrested<sup>170</sup>. However, he omitted the exclusion and arrest of other buro members, such as Alekseevskii, Voskanian, and Gadbank, for example. A head count shows that, in July 1938, at most fourteen (three of whom may have been demoted to the rank of raikom secretary, one was to be arrested soon after, and another was to be excluded from the obkom at the year's end) out of eighty-eight elected in June 1937 continued as obkom members. Of the sixteen elected candidates and members of the buro of thirteen months before, only one buro candidate member (M.Ia. Petrova) still lingered<sup>171</sup>. In July 1938, she would lose her position in the buro, though she may have escaped further demotions and arrest.

Boitsov apparently tried to cover up to a certain extent the enormous metamorphosis that the oblast' Party leadership had sustained over the previous thirteen months, possibly in order not to shock his audience too much --although many of them must have been aware of what had been going on. The destiny of several of the minimally seventy-four obkom members who had disappeared remains

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people. He was killed in the purges (Pako, 147/1/528, 1.122; R. Medvedev, Let History Judge, p.426).

<sup>169</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.121.

<sup>170</sup>See Table in Appendix III. A similar faulty calculation is made in the recent brochure of the former Party archive (Tverskoi tsentr..., p.13). The archivists appear to have used Boitsov's statements of July 1938 as the source for their calculation.

<sup>171</sup>See Table in Appendix III.

shrouded in mystery; perhaps a few died of natural causes; some might have committed suicide; and others might have left the oblast'.

Nevertheless, the bulk most likely had been arrested by the NKVD in the period between the two conferences. An exception is the fate of V.F. Zazulina, who in 1947 worked as head of the organizational and instructor's *otdel* of the Kushalino raikom<sup>172</sup>. She had been relegated in 1938 from her position as *otdel* or vice-*otdel* head of the obkom, which she had occupied in the autumn and winter of 1937-1938<sup>173</sup>. She was dismissed and assigned low-level work as a reprimand for her close connections with the "Trotskyites" Mikhailov and Kalygina, according to the 1947 MGB report on her<sup>174</sup>. Zazulina must have indeed known both quite well, as she had apparently started working in the obkom apparatus in 1935<sup>175</sup>.

The Kalinin Party organization increased but slightly between June 1935 and July 1938; at the latter date, 27,348 members and candidates were counted<sup>176</sup>. Thus the increase in three years amounted to around 1,350 people or 1.7% annually, the lowest growth ever probably, except for the first two war years. The purges were of influence here, and the pause in accepting new members partly coincided with it (see above). Boitsov announced at the third Party conference that the Party had increased by 954 members between the second and third Party conferences, representing a growth of 3.6%<sup>177</sup>.

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<sup>172</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, 11.303/304.

<sup>173</sup>Pako, 147/1/528, 1.124, 1.129, 147/1/529, 1.3.

<sup>174</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, 11.303/304 (and perhaps that of I.F. Gusikhin as well).

<sup>175</sup>She will appear in Chapter IX.1 as the author of a propagandistic article in Bloknot Agitatora.

<sup>176</sup>Ocherki, p.424; Pako, 147/1/554, 1.109.

<sup>177</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.109.

In the same period 1,560 people were supposedly excluded. So in fact, 2,514 people should have become full or candidate members in this period. Boitsov, however, stated that 1,592 people had become candidates, and 1,128 had been promoted from candidate to full membership. The explanation for the discrepancy in the numbers could be that a substantial number of people (922) were added to the Kalinin Party organization, coming from outside the oblast', of whom Boitsov himself was an example. However, a very plausible explanation for the divergence between the different figures on Party exclusions and entries here was the fact that some fell victim to the purges. Probably, as well, general confusion reigned in July 1938 about the oblast's exact membership of the Communist Party. The fact that Boitsov's numbers on the arrests of obkom members and members of its buro were evidently flawed increases the likelihood that the Party membership numbers mentioned were false.

It is remarkable that in February 1939 --less than one year later-- the Party boasted already 34,000 members, a growth of roughly 24% in eight months, and in March 1940, 52,000, a growth of around 50% in one year!<sup>178</sup> At that point, around 10,000 Communists were rural dwellers<sup>179</sup>.

Stalin and Molotov called off the terror on November 17, 1938; the troikas in the USSR were dissolved<sup>180</sup>. In December 1938, the height of the terror, concurring with the years of Ezhov's tenure as NKVD People's Commissar, came to an end in the Kalinin oblast' with

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<sup>178</sup>Qcherki, pp.426/427.

<sup>179</sup>Qcherki, p.444.

<sup>180</sup>Gevorkian, p.19.

the arrest of the province's five leading NKVD workers<sup>181</sup>. Two of the five apparently came off with very benign sentences and were released within three years; we do not know what happened to the other three.

The reasons for the order to stop the purges were probably both demographic and economic<sup>182</sup>. Because of the continuous arrests, by late 1938, the depletion of the population had probably reached such a level that more arrests would have seriously damaged the economy, inasmuch as there was a danger that soon too few people would remain at freedom to perform labour. Moreover, the economy itself was ruined by the permanent turnover of cadres in 1937 and 1938, and labour productivity shrank dramatically. Everywhere in the economy, people tried to avoid appointments to positions of responsibility, as well as taking any imaginative decisions for fear of arrest.

By declaring that in their residential area after the war arrests did not take place anymore, some survey respondents seemed to give support to the hypothesis that the 'Terror decreased after Beria took over, at the end of 1938. However, the unwillingness to remember this undoubtedly gruesome period of their lives (which was sometimes clearly noticed by the interviewers), or faulty memories on the whole, might have created this impression. The respondents especially seem to have been slightly mistaken when trying to place certain events in time; often they made chronological divisions using the war as a gauge (before the war, the war, and after the war). Because of the other evidence, it seems true that even before the war the scale of arrests decreased.

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<sup>181</sup>See the Table in Appendix III.

<sup>182</sup>See Lorenz, pp.232/233.

In early 1939, the obkom cadre department, at the time led by P.S. Vorontsov, a future first secretary, and the oblast' NKVD, at this point led by Tokarev, exchanged reports with the raion NKVD of Novotorzhok - i.e. Torzhok raion on the prosecution of excessively zealous purgers in that raion<sup>183</sup>. These reports illustrate the aftermath of the *Lizhovshchina*. On December 21, 1938, a closed Party-Komsomol session of the NKVD direction of the raion was held, with the following outcome:

The violations of procedural rules have still not been fully eliminated. Individual employees of the militsiia raion committee [RKM] still cope poorly with investigative work and are insufficiently familiar with the operations of the militsiia service. The individual workers of the criminal investigation department, BELOUSOV, MATVEEV, and SMIRNOV, were disposed to panic and defeatism in their work. This is underlined by the fact that criminal proceedings have been instituted against BELOUSOV, MATVEEV, and SMIRNOV; their case is in the hands of the Special Inspection of the raion militsiia committees of the Kalinin oblast'.

After having discussed the question of the prosecution of BELOUSOV, MATVEEV, and SMIRNOV, the general party-komsomol meeting is of the opinion that:

- they are made answerable for the fact that, in the period of the conduct of the campaign for the elimination of wreckers in society in 1937, they created artificial investigative cases about individual citizens, and arrested them.
- this operation took place under the immediate leadership of the enemies of the people who had penetrated in the Kalinin oblast' Direction of the RKM: the head of the NKVD Direction Dombrovskii and the head of the RKM Direction Slonimskii.
- the former head of the raion NKVD department, MIKHAILOV, and the head of the raion militsiia plenipotentiaries, BOGDANOV, supervised directly the elimination of [these elements] from the raion of Novotorzhok.

<sup>183</sup>Pako, 147/1/594, 11.2-12.

-MIKHAILOV and BOGDANOV appear to be in particular guilty of the illegal arrest of citizens and the fabrication of artificial cases. It were these men, who gave the militsiia apparatus the directive to "put pressure to the hilt," and suggested to detain called up witnesses in the corridor of the raion NKVD department for twenty-four-hour periods.<sup>184</sup>

The participants of the Party-Komsomol meeting of the Torzhok-raion NKVD requested to release the three<sup>185</sup>. The case against them and others had dragged on for a year already. Steps against Mikhailov and Bogdanov were suggested instead. The final outcome of this case remains in shadows; Mikhailov apparently was employed somewhere in the oblast' direction of the NKVD, while Bogdanov had been transferred earlier to the Buriat-Mongol republic<sup>186</sup>. Obkom secretary Boitsov asked Vorontsov to check the records on Mikhailov<sup>187</sup>. The chaotic and hysterical situation within the NKVD, created by the purges during 1937, is evident. Local NKVD workers in Torzhok lost all sense of proportion and started to round up too many people --at least in the opinion of the their successors a year later. Most of these detained witnesses and suspects must have been regular citizens, who probably had nothing to do with the Party.

The NKVD workers' opinion that their colleagues had misbehaved - although not enough to hold them responsible in a serious way, since they had been under pressure of others higher-up-- probably found its roots in the return to a more routine "revolutionary legality." This return to "regular proceedings" has often been connected with Ezhov's succession by Beria as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

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<sup>184</sup>Pako, 147/1/594, 1.2.

<sup>185</sup>Pako, 147/1/594, 11.2-12.

<sup>186</sup>Pako, 147/1/594, 1.3.

<sup>187</sup>Pako, 147/1/594, 1.3.

D.S. Tokarev, NKVD head from early 1939, retained his post (later he became NKGB/MGB chief, when the NKVD was split in two during the war) until December 1946, another sign of a return to some kind of routine<sup>188</sup>. He left the Kalinin oblast' when I.P. Boitsov was transferred.

In Stalin's lifetime, Party and security organs preserved a very positive image of the Purges. In January 1945, oblast' NKVD boss Pavlov appreciated the events of the 1930s and the role of the NKVD therein:

In the period of peacetime construction, our organs protected the productive work of industry, transport, agriculture, etc., from the intrigues of foreign spies and internal enemies. We protected our society from spies, saboteurs, bandits, swindlers, and crooks, [and] ensured social order.<sup>189</sup>

One of the results of the 1930s terror was the enormous expansion of the labour camps in the Soviet Union<sup>190</sup>. Penal institutions for political prisoners, however, were probably not new to the 'Tver' area. A native of Vyshnii Volochek remembered the existence of a prison for political convicts in the town in the second half of the 19th century<sup>191</sup>.

In Soviet times, the Kalinin oblast' also "benefited" from the forced labour of the convicts. In the middle of the 1930s convicts were building the Moskva-Volga canal near Konakovo<sup>192</sup>.

<sup>188</sup>See e.g. PP No. 257 (8132) December 29, 1946.

<sup>189</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.88ob./89.

<sup>190</sup>For an account of its history from 1929-1941 and the variety of types of camps, colonies, places of exile and so on, see Khlebnik, "Prinuditel'nyi..." See also N.G. Sysoev, "'Praktik marksizma'," in: *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 2, 1993, pp.84-87, which describes the career of one of the heads of the GULag in the 1930s, Marvei Berman.

<sup>191</sup>According to the testimony of I.A. Yukhotsky in a recent work on Russian emigrés (Norman Stone, Michael Glenny, *The Other Russia*, London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1990, p.80 and p.82).

<sup>192</sup>Testimony of G.V. Lubov and others in the survey. See VI.4 for more on the camp-system in the Kalinin oblast', and on the construction of this canal by convicts. They inhabited the "Dmitrovskoi lager'" (Khlebnik, "Prinuditel'nyi," p.78). In all, 196,000 *zetsi* helped to



There exists a somewhat more detailed account about the foundation of one of the camps in 'I'ver' guberniia, located in the Nilova Hermitage on Stolbny Island in Lake Seliger, near Ostashkov<sup>193</sup>. There during the autumn and winter of 1939-1940, the largest group of victims of the Katyn massacre --a misnomer probably in this case-- were interned before departure to their place of execution.

After the dissolution of the monastery, the buildings first accommodated, between 1929 and 1935, a workhouse (*bogadel'nich*)<sup>194</sup>. From 1935 to 1939, a children's labour colony was located in the former monastery, where the pupils were raised according to the ideas of the pedagogue A.S. Makarenko; the colony strikes one as well equipped:

...a workshop was built for the production of blow lamps; it [the colony] had its brass band, theatre, cinema in the Bogoiavlenskii Cathedral, in the park was a Ferris-wheel, a swing, and a sports field.<sup>195</sup>

Then, in 1939, the monastery was turned into a camp, and placed in the care of the 135th battalion of the 11th *KV*-brigade of the NKVD, under the command of Major Mikhail Naumovich Ishchenko<sup>196</sup>. This

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build the canal. The canal was finished by the middle of 1937, although additions or perfections of the water-way continued until at least the end of 1938 (Sysoev, "Praktik...", p.86).

<sup>193</sup>On the Polish officers in the Hermitage, Vladimir Abarinov, *Katynskii Labirint*, pp.44-54; Heller and Nekrich call Ostashkov erroneously Ostashkovo, but their account is similar to Abarinov's (Heller, Nekrich, p.404-406). Conquest mentions the camp, and calls the location Ostachkov (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, pp.447ff.).

<sup>194</sup>Abarinov, p.46.

<sup>195</sup>Abarinov, p.46.

<sup>196</sup>Abarinov, p.46. The abbreviation *KV* is unclear, but likely meant punitive (*karatel'noe*) department (*vedomstvo*), analogous to *karatel'nyi otdel* (compare to J. Rossi, *The Gulag Handbook: an encyclopedic dictionary of Soviet penitentiary institutions and terms related to the forced labor camps*. New York: Paragon House, 1989, p.152).

batallion had made its mark as guards of the Lefortovo, Butyrka, and Taganka Jails in Moscow. Polish prisoners of war started to arrive in September and October 1939; they were transported by boat to the island in Lake Seliger<sup>197</sup>. One source mentions that 5,692 police officers and gendarmes were interned in the Ostashkov camp<sup>198</sup>. The camp's living conditions must have been bitterly spartan: many of the Poles traded their gold watches for a loaf of bread. Starting from around the first of April 1940, the Poles were escorted ashore over the frozen lake, and later, when the ice had thawed, in barges<sup>199</sup>. In all likelihood, the Poles were then transported to the NKVD jail in Kalinin, and subsequently executed near Mednoe, around thirty kilometers from the oblast' capital<sup>200</sup>. By June the camp near Ostashkov was empty of Poles, according to one author; this might not be completely accurate<sup>201</sup>. In VI.4 it will be shown that, by 1946, some Poles were still interned in the same camp, or another one located nearby.

During the war, the camp near Ostashkov accommodated army units, and later a military hospital<sup>202</sup>. In 1944 it became again NKVD territory in an incarnation as a labour colony for juvenile delinquents. At the end of the 1950s, it would provide the scene of a prisoners' revolt which was bloodily suppressed by the colony's authorities. Some of the latter were penalized for excesses in suppressing the revolt. Finally, in 1961, it was definitively dismantled as a camp,

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<sup>197</sup>Abarinov, p.47.

<sup>198</sup>Iu. Zoria, "Rezhisser katyn'skoi tragedii," in: Beria: Konets kar'ery, Moskva: Politizdat, 1991, pp.174-184, p.177

<sup>199</sup>Abarinov, p.47.

<sup>200</sup>Abarinov, pp.51-53; also Iu. Zoria, p.175.

<sup>201</sup>Iu. Zoria, pp. 179/180.

<sup>202</sup>Abarinov, p.53.

appropriately perhaps, considering Stalin's concomitant removal that year from the mausoleum in Moscow.

## CHAPTER IV: THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

It is hardly possible to give a clearly defined moment in chronological terms for the ending of World War Two in the oblast' and the beginning of the so-called postwar reconstruction. Officially, of course, the war in Europe ended in May 1945. However, by the middle of 1943, German troops had been cleared out of the oblast', and German air raids were reduced to a minimum<sup>1</sup>. The reconstruction of the economy in the only briefly occupied centre of the oblast', which included a short lived occupation of Kalinin, already began in the second half of December 1941. At the same time, new levies of conscripts for the war against Germany and its allies were called up until May 1945. The Red Army soldiers were not all immediately demobilized, and many returned only in 1947 from army service.

How difficult it is to define the war in precise temporal terms can be understood from the fact that around 1960 the town of Rzhev, the second largest town in the prewar oblast', had not yet recovered from the devastation. Until today, it has remained less populated than Vyshnii Volochek<sup>2</sup>. Its countryside --roughly Rzhev, Zubtsov, Vysoko, Olenino, and Staritsa raions-- suffered just as much: all livestock was destroyed, orchards disappeared, and the area

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<sup>1</sup>That is, if the geographical territory of the oblast' described is that of the immediate post-war period, as it is in this thesis. Once more, in August 1944 the Velikie Luki and Pskov oblasts were formed, to which the western-most part of the Kalinin oblast' was given. To be precise, this officially occurred on August 23, 1944; see Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Kalininskoi oblasti. Putevoditel', ch. 2, Kalinin, 1977, p. 116 and Ocherki, p. 507; the oblast' lost twenty-three raions to the Velikolukskaia oblast' and three to Pskov oblast'; see Kal. obl. za 50 let v tsifrah, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>See Tsentral'nyi Raion, pp. 571, 573, 574.

suffered a huge depopulation<sup>3</sup>. Similar to the town of Rzhev, these rural areas still felt the effect of the war in 1960. Nevertheless, the chronology followed in this chapter conforms to the traditional periodization of the war between the USSR and Nazi Germany from June 1941 to May 1945, although some of the events described in this chapter were of great importance for the period afterwards. The only exception to this is a discussion of the demobilization of the Red Army soldiers, which was deemed more appropriate within this chapter. Some of the war's consequences, when they seem to be of greater significance to the postwar period, will be described in the next chapter.

#### IV.1 'The War

Not long after the commencement of hostilities in June 1941, the rapid advance of the German armies reached the Kalinin oblast', at that time still bordering Latvia. Towards November 1941, 60% of the oblast' territory (pre-1944 borders) was occupied by the Germans<sup>4</sup>. The oblast's final liberation (pre-1944 borders) only occurred on July 17 and 18, 1944<sup>5</sup>.

The Nazis destroyed almost all kolkhoz property, M'TS, and M'TM (Machine-Tractor Repair Stations) in the occupied territories, and slaughtered most of the cattle that fell into their hands. According to obkom secretary Boitsov, the Germans eliminated eighty M'TS and

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<sup>3</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, pp.572/573.

<sup>4</sup>Ocherki, p.464.

<sup>5</sup>Z. Karpenko, Pod fashistskim igom. Kalinin: Izdanie gazety "Proletarskaia Pravda", 1945, p. 34.

MTM, twenty sovkhozy, more than 5,000 kolkhozy, more than 115,000 communal buildings, 67,000 kolkhozniks' houses, and stole and slaughtered 543,000 heads of cattle<sup>6</sup>. The total sum of the damage amounted to more than five billion rubles. When he mentioned these numbers in January 1945, Boitsov exaggerated. He conveniently included the damage done to the raions that had become part of the Velikie Luki and Pskov oblasts in 1944. In a very authoritative source, the 1950s edition of the Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, a much lower estimate was given:

The Hitlerite armies destroyed a large number of industrial enterprises and cultural institutions, more than 1,000 kolkhozy, thirty-one MTS....<sup>7</sup>

This seems to reflect the truth more closely, inasmuch as only fifteen raions of the smaller post-August 1944 oblast' were fully or partially occupied, a raion harbouring two MTS on average. According to one source, 350,000 inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' --of the larger size between 1935 and 1944-- fought at the front<sup>8</sup>.

The oblast' capital Kalinin was occupied only for a short while in 1941, from the middle of October until December 16, when it was liberated by Soviet troops. who were likely aided by the

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<sup>6</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1. 8. See also Ocherki, p.486, or Iu.K. Strizhkov, "Deiatel'nost' SNK SSSR po organizatsii vosstanovleniia narodnogo khoziaistva na osvobozhdennoi territorii v pervyi period velikoi otechestvennoi voiny(1941-1942 gg.)," in: Iu.A. Poliakov(ed.), Vozrozhdenie prifrontovikh i osvobozhdennykh raionov SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. 1941-1945, Moskva: Nauka, 1986 [from here: Vozrozhdenie], pp. 38-64, p.57, who gives a lower number for the cattle that was lost.

<sup>7</sup>(B.A. Vvedenskii, ed.), Bol'shaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia. Tom XIX (Istorizm-Kandi), 1953(2), p.432. Compare to the map.

<sup>8</sup>N.G.Korytkov, Kalininskoe selo: proshloe, nastoiashchee, budushchee. Moskva: Kolos, 1978, p.37.

exceptionally cold weather (in December 1941, the temperature reached minus thirty to minus thirty-three degrees Celsius)<sup>9</sup>.

Kalinin's town population was given a respite of two days in October 1941 when the German advance was temporarily halted outside the town: through this a large part of the population escaped German occupation<sup>10</sup>. Sergei Sergeevich Sergeev was not so lucky; he lived in 1941 for a while under German occupation in Kalinin:

In 1941, I was excepted from service at the front as a factory worker --I was "*na bron'i*" [exempted]. We left Kalinin on October 14, 1941, along the Staritsa highway, through the forest; no one defended the town. We met Germans. We reached Putelovo --my village of birth. Then the Germans began to take the cows in the villages. It became difficult to live there: the Germans began to round up the men to work. Kalinin burned --that was clear from twenty-five kilometers away. At the end of November we returned to occupied Kalinin. We came home, father had stayed there, Germans already lived there. The front was in Kalinin. The front-line Germans did not misbehave. They even protected our things. We scoffed at our Russians much worse. We were liberated on December 16, 1941. On January 10, 1942, I was called up for the army.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>A.N. Vershinskii, Boi za gorod Kalinin. Kalinin: Izdanie gazety "Proletarskaia Pravda", 1945, pp. 25-36; Iu. M. Boshniak, D.D. Slezkin, N.A. Iakimanskii, "Kalininskoe operatsionnoe napravlenie v Bitve pod Moskvoi," in: Na pravom flange Moskovskoi bitvy. K 50-letiiu osvobodzheniia g. Kalinina v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine. Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1991, pp.7-61, p. 51; also I.S. Konev, "Vospominaniia," pp.62-65, in: Na pravom flange .... Konev, later commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armies, was the commander of the Kalinin front. The severity of his command is obvious from an order of October 12, 1941, in which his subordinate Khomenko had to immediately execute any deserters and cowards, and those who panicked (Boshniak a.o., p.17). He also demanded that Colonel Rotmistrov would be charged by a Military Tribunal for unauthorized retreat (Boshniak a.o., pp.19 and 20). Zhukov, however, seems to have felt that Konev himself was responsible for many of the mistakes on the Western Front, and that Konev put the blame on others for his own failures (Boshniak a.o., p.14). The chaos was obviously enormous in early October 1941, judging from the fact that only 450-500 regular Soviet troops were in Kalinin (Na pravom flange ...., p.157). They were supported by a unit of the "home-guard", some cadets and telegraphists in training, and an NKVD destruction battalion.

<sup>10</sup>Vershinskii, Boi, pp.7/8.

<sup>11</sup>Testimony of S.S. Sergeev in the survey.

Sometimes in the countryside the authorities succeeded to evacuate some of the cattle; some industry of the town of Kalinin was evacuated to the east before the Nazi onslaught. The evacuation was not all that organized: for example, a knitted-wear factory was bestowed upon the unoccupied town of Kimry, when a barge with machinery from an evacuated factory in Toropets somehow never travelled further than Kimry<sup>12</sup>. Apparently, the Party Archive of the oblast', according to V.A. Feoktistov, the director of the recently created archival centre for recent history in Tver', was evacuated at this time to the town of Tiumen, behind the Urals<sup>13</sup>. Unfortunately, part of the transport was bombed by German airplanes, which is why only a certain portion of the Party records for the pre-1941 period is available for scrutiny today.

One G.V. Lubov, a survey respondent, has written an account of the 1930s and the war in the Konakovo raion of the Kalinin oblast', that temporarily bore the front line in the autumn of 1941<sup>14</sup>. The account conveys some intriguing images about the wartime situation. Unfortunately, the author apparently remains to this day a die-hard Communist or, more precisely, a Stalinist. Hence his

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<sup>12</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.557.

<sup>13</sup>Personal conversation with him, August 1992. Compare also the Nazi confiscation and plundering of Russian and Soviet archives in N. Muller (and others), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweilig besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941-1944), Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1991, pp.408-414. One archive mentioned here is a collection of documents concerning Rzhev (Muller, p. 412). I.S. Konev remembered how he, on the verge of the German occupation of the town, discussed with Boitsov and other obkom members the evacuation of banks, state valuables, and important documents, which indicates the high priority attributed to the latter by the authorities (I.S. Konev, "Vospominaniia," pp.62-65, in: Na pravom flange...., pp.62/63).

<sup>14</sup>G.V. Lubov, Material vstupitel'noi stat'i "Knigi Pamiati" Konakovskogo raiona. Konakovo, sentiabr'-noiabr 1991 goda (carbon copy).



peculiar view of reality distorts the picture, especially of life before the war. A paragraph he dedicated to the war gives some idea of his treatise as a whole:

In the town, the settlements, [and] the villages, it [the war] manifested itself for the present in the tears of the soldiers' mothers and wives, in the queues of mobilized and volunteers at the Konakovo and Zavidovo mobilization points. Soldiers from the dear and tender *Mataia Rodina* went to defend their great Soviet native land: Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic countries [only recently having become involuntarily part of this great Soviet land] and Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Moldavia [!], the Transcaucasus and the Centralasiatic republics [sic]. They were prepared to spill their blood for them, and if it was demanded, to give [their] life itself.<sup>15</sup>

Soon after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, windows began to be blinded; ration cards appeared; nocturnal blackouts were decreed for enterprises, houses, and streets; passes were issued for staying outside during curfew in Konakovo raion<sup>16</sup>. During October and November 1941, almost all equipment, material, specialists, and workers of responsible positions of the porcelain factory in the town of Konakovo were evacuated to the Urals and Bashkiria. Also removed were the artificial fur and textile factories, the peat-chemical products' *kombinat*, and the wood-processing works that produced insulation-plate. A destructive (*istrebitel'nyĭ*) subdivision was formed to combat German paratroopers<sup>17</sup>. An underground raion

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<sup>15</sup>Lubov, p.3. Compare the last sentence to the essay by the secondary school pupil in the second half of the 1940s as quoted in VIII.6.

<sup>16</sup>Lubov, pp.3-5.

<sup>17</sup>These are also mentioned in *Ocherki*, pp. 461/462; see also V.1 and here below. These paramilitary units were apparently engaged in the combat against criminality and banditry as well. They were subordinate to the NKVD, and many members of the Party and employees of the militsiia joined them (I.S. Konev, p.62; Iu. Panov, "Etapy bol'shogo puti," pp.5-16, in: *Kazhdyi mig nacheku. Ocherki o militsii*, Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1987, p.12).

committee of the Party and partisan units was established in case the enemy succeeded in conquering the district's territory<sup>18</sup>. On November 16, the German troops invaded the raion in the south and south-west. The German advance at this point was already running out of steam. Thanks to the blowing up of some bridges over the Volga and the Soviet army's fierce resistance, it would eventually grind to a halt<sup>19</sup>. The district became one of the battlefields on the flanks of the larger battle for Moscow. On November 20, 1941, the German advance to the east was quelled. The Germans decided to concentrate on the attack southward and conquered the town of Klin in Moscow oblast'. And then, "[on] November 25 the temperature dropped strongly and there was abundant snowfall....Towards early December the front of the 30th [Soviet] army stabilized...."<sup>20</sup>

Beginning on December 5, 1941, the Soviets, on the orders of Zhukov, launched an unexpected counterattack<sup>21</sup>. The whole territory of Konakovo raion --1990 borders--, was liberated on December 20, 1941. The Germans had, according to Lubov, inflicted ruin on the raion, although at this point in the text he conveniently lists the destruction of the bridges (see above) as being the work of the Germans. By February 1942, the porcelain factory resumed operations in Konakovo. In May 1942, the peat-chemical *kombinat* of Redkino reopened. In the same year, the lumber industry was quickly resurrected, and traffic resumed along the October Railroad and the

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<sup>18</sup>Lubov, pp.3-5.

<sup>19</sup>Lubov underplays the role of the ferocious cold that set in at the beginning of December, which caught the Germans unprepared.

<sup>20</sup>Lubov, p.6.

<sup>21</sup>Lubov, pp.6-8.

Leningrad Highway. Lubov notes the "heroic" (forced, one may add) contributions of rural dwellers to the Soviet war effort:

The kolkhozniks had it more difficult than anyone. Basically women, children, invalids, and old people remained in the villages. But also under those circumstances the village coped with the orders from the front for foodstuffs and raw agricultural materials.<sup>22</sup>

Industrial artels (making, for instance, felt boots) and larger industrial enterprises produced for the front in Konakovo raion as well. In the battles for the raion 2,031 Soviet soldiers lost their lives<sup>23</sup>. Perhaps more telling, however, is the number of raion inhabitants who perished at the front: over 6,000 did not return home out of more than 17,000 who fought in the war.

At the time of the first Soviet counterattack in the Battle for Moscow, the cold weather surprised the Germans and added to their problems. As a part of this counterattack, the town of Kalinin and the Konakovo raion were liberated. The Germans were so unprepared for a Soviet counteroffensive that they failed to secure a large amount of trophies, which had been prepared in Kalinin for transport to Germany<sup>24</sup>. The town had been almost completely razed to the ground: the Germans obliterated more than seventy industrial enterprises, among which the railroad-car construction factory, a factory producing weaving machinery, the cotton-fibre *kombinat*, and the Vagzhanov and Volodarskii textile factories<sup>25</sup>. 7,700

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<sup>22</sup>Lubov, p.9.

<sup>23</sup>Lubov, pp.9-10.

<sup>24</sup>This experience was somewhat traumatic for the Germans; they tried to avoid this mistake on future occasions (See Muller, pp.237/238 and 259).

<sup>25</sup>Ocherki, p.484/485.

apartment buildings were demolished. The electricity network, the sewers, and the hydro system did not function, and the streetcar, telephone and telegraph lines were out of operation as well. The bridges over the rivers T'maka and Volga were in ruins. In the entire oblast', 312 food-industry factories, and many of the construction-material factories, would be equally ruined<sup>26</sup>. The Party's task was unenviable:

Complicated questions stood before the oblast' party organization: it was necessary to provide for an uninterrupted operation of railroad transport and of communications serving the front; to protect the operation of industrial enterprises in the districts which had not been exposed to the conquest of the enemy; as soon as possible to re-evacuate and resurrect the destroyed industrial enterprises of raions that were liberated from fascist occupation; and to produce new armaments. The solution to these problems took place without qualified labourers, equipment, and electricity.

As a rule, together with advanced units of the Red Army, leading raion workers arrived in the liberated raions, and re-established the party raikoms and the organs of Soviet power.<sup>27</sup>

Already on December 27, 1941, the first of Kalinin's hydro-electrical stations resumed operation, and two more electro-stations functioned by February 1942<sup>28</sup>. On January 6, 1942, the oblispolkom already stressed the urgent need for the resurrection of schools, kindergartens, and hospitals in the oblast' capital<sup>29</sup>. A few

<sup>26</sup>Strizhkov, p.54.

<sup>27</sup>Ocherki, p. 486.

<sup>28</sup>Strizhkov, p. 53; Ocherki, pp.484/485. Still in January 1942, the USSR People's commissar of the food industry, V.P. Zotov, issued an order on the resurrection of food-processing enterprises in the town of Kalinin and in the oblast' (see Strizhkov, p. 55).

<sup>29</sup>Strizhkov, p. 40

days later the town *aktiv* met to discuss how to resuscitate the town. Here Soviet president Kalinin made an appearance<sup>30</sup>.

In the midst of the ruins, an obkom plenum was held, on February 2 and 3, 1942<sup>31</sup>. Only twenty-eight candidate and full members attended, together with some rai- and gorkom secretaries, rai- and gorispolkom chairs, heads of MTS political departments, and a few unnamed guests<sup>32</sup>.

On February 20, 1942, the oblispolkom accepted a plan for the resurrection of the smaller industries --those that did not resort under the Central USSR or RSFSR people's commissariats<sup>33</sup>. In February and March 1942, the oblispolkom was actively organizing the rebuilding of roads, bridges, and crossings<sup>34</sup>. At this time, the USSR People's Commissariat of Communications monitored reconstruction work in the oblast'. During 1942 a part of the railroad-car construction factory of Kalinin was rebuilt and started to operate<sup>35</sup>.

In the late winter of 1942, measures were taken to revive some of the ravaged sovkhozy<sup>36</sup>. The resurrection of destroyed MTS and livestock farms within the kolkhozy were, in March 1942, the

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<sup>30</sup>See below.

<sup>31</sup>Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniiia dokumentov noveishei istorii (Moscow), f.17, op.43, d.741, ll.1-3 [from here indicated in the following manner: Moscow, 17/43/741, ll.1-3]; compare to Strizhkov, p.39.

<sup>32</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, ll.1; the rai- and gorkom secretaries and ispolkom heads here mentioned were not members or candidates of the obkom.

<sup>33</sup>Strizhkov, p.55.

<sup>34</sup>Strizhkov, p.43.

<sup>35</sup>Strizhkov, p. 45. This factory also made mines and grenades for the front during the war, see (V.G. Osipov, A.N. Kosarev), *Obelisk pobedy (pamiati pavyshikh bud'te dostoiny)*. Kalinin: Ordena Trudovogo Znameni Kalininskii poligraficheskii kombinat Glavpoligrafroma Komiteta po pechatu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 1971, n.pag.).

<sup>36</sup>Strizhkov, p. 57.

subject of resolutions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissariats<sup>37</sup>. Aid from the central government enabled the oblast's kolkhozy to dispose at spring sowing in 1942 of a full stock of spring seeds for flax, 99% of the grain seeds necessary, and 70% of potato seedlings<sup>38</sup>. Meanwhile, the front was pushed back further to the west in the spring of 1942<sup>39</sup>.

In June 1942, in the recently liberated raion of Turginovo, only forty tractors and 426 horses were available for spring sowing<sup>40</sup>. Most of the ploughing had to be done manually<sup>41</sup>. The majority of the kolkhozniks lived in threshing barns, sheds, and in houses of neighbouring kolkhozy which had escaped destruction<sup>42</sup>. However, the Party was already dissatisfied with the work habits of some of the kolkhozniks, whose work days were said to be no longer than ten hours<sup>43</sup>. The political departments of both raion MTS in Turginovo raion had failed in making these kolkhozniks toil harder.

When Rzhev was finally liberated in the spring of 1943, it was a heap of rubble after the prolonged battle for the town<sup>44</sup>.

<sup>37</sup>Strizhkov, p. 58.

<sup>38</sup>Strizhkov, p. 58.

<sup>39</sup>Strizhkov, p. 59.

<sup>40</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.14.

<sup>41</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.28.

<sup>42</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.14.

<sup>43</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, II. 28/29.

<sup>44</sup>Ocherki, pp.484/485. Part of the destruction was apparently due to the "scorched earth" strategy of the retreating German troops (N. Muller, "Uberblick uber die Okkupationspolitik in den vom faschistischen Deutschland besetzten Gebieten der UdSSR," in: N. Muller(ed.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweilig besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941-1944). Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1991, pp.28-99, pp.84/85). On certain aspects of the Battle for Rzhev, A.M. Samsonov, Znat' i pomnit'. Dialog istorika s chitatelem. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1989, pp.69/70, p.94, and I.S. Konev, "Vospominaniia," pp.62-65, in Na pravom flange....

According to one questionable source, railroad lines, especially of the October Railroad, were continuously bombed until December 1944, frequently obstructing provisions to the North-Western, Kalinin, Leningrad, and Volkhov fronts<sup>45</sup>. This is dubious, as the Germans had already retreated from the oblast' territory by halfway 1943. From around January 1944, they were doubtless unable to launch serious bombardments that far behind Russian lines anymore. It remains unclear how much damage the Soviets actually inflicted on themselves in 1941, at the time of the initial retreat, as a part of their 'scorched earth' tactics.

A joint resolution of the Sovnarkom and the Central Committee in August 1943 ordered the evacuated livestock to be returned to the Kalinin oblast'<sup>46</sup>. This is an indication of the extent of the province's liberation, which then included the areas bordering Latvia. Liberation must have been almost completed. Only the few westernmost raions remained in German hands. These would be separated administratively from the oblast' one year later. In the resolution of August 1943, the oblispolkom was instructed to purchase cattle from kolkhozniks, workers, and employees for resale to the kolkhozy that were being revived in the formerly occupied areas. Some of the rural and urban dwellers who possessed a plot of land or some cattle were exempted from paying taxes on their private possessions in 1943. People's Commissariats were instructed to deliver materials and spare parts for the resurrection of the MTS and MTM. Leading

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<sup>45</sup>Ocherki, p.485.

<sup>46</sup>The abbreviated text of the resolution, "*O neotlozhnykh merakh po vosstanovleniiu khoziaistva v raionakh, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetskoï okkupatsii*" can be found in *Vozrozhdenie*, pp.202-204.

agricultural workers and specialists, after returning from their place of evacuation, were to be designated to the formerly occupied territories by the obkom and oblispolkom. Furthermore, Party and soviet organizations were to organize the construction of houses out of locally available materials.

'The oblast' had the honour to receive two Politburo members at the front during the hostilities: immediately in January 1942, oblast' native M.I. Kalinin visited the town of Kalinin and, in March 1943, the newly liberated town of Rzhev welcomed Stalin, making his only excursion close to the front line during the war<sup>47</sup>. The house in which Stalin spent the night was quickly turned into a Communist tourist attraction after the war<sup>48</sup>. Kolkhoznitsa N.K. Kondrat'eva was forced to cede her house to the authorities, in exchange for a similar house and "...corresponding objects of household articles and necessary consumer goods."<sup>49</sup> It is, by the way, rather curious that the document (an account of one of the obkomburo sessions in the Party archive) gives the date of Stalin's visit as August 3 and 4, 1943, which might be a misprint. But if this date is correct, the visit would have taken place almost half a year later than the Brezhnevite version of the history of the oblast' Party indicates. It could be explained by the fact that the front line in March 1943 was still very close to the newly liberated town of Rzhev, while in August the Germans had already retreated further westward. Stalin was overconcerned for his personal safety in his later years, so the

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<sup>47</sup>Ocherki, p. 486.

<sup>48</sup>Pako, 147/3/2701, 1.190ob.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.



second date seems the more likely one. The question persists, of course, did Stalin ever really visit this area at the time<sup>50</sup>?

After the war, the partisan movement could have functioned as one of the sources of pride in the defense of the Motherland against the German army. It is still a matter of debate as to how far partisans were entrusted with political responsibilities immediately after liberation. Soviet sources argue that they were, while Western specialists have indicated that the Soviet regime did not trust the partisans<sup>51</sup>. The official post-1953 publications on the war period never fail to dedicate a large passage to the partisans<sup>52</sup>.

In January 1945, I.P. Boitsov also commended the partisan movement: from the moment of Stalin's speech on July 3, 1941, Party committees had been organizing partisan units<sup>53</sup>. From July 1941 until the year's end, three obkom secretaries were supervising these activities; in order to lead the partisans, most prominent Party and soviet workers stayed behind in their area after the Germans occupied it. Others were sent into the occupied zone later.

The resistance distributed newspapers and brochures among the population in the occupied territories. On November 1, 1941, in thirty-eight occupied raions of the oblast (pre-August 1944 borders), there were fifty-five partisan units, with a total of 1,650 partisans. Exactly one year later 5,640 partisans were active in

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<sup>50</sup>In 1956 several inhabitants of the oblast' had their doubts about this; see IX.2.

<sup>51</sup>R.I. Kirichek, "Vozrozhdenie i organizatsionno-politicheskoe ukreplenie komsomol'skikh organizatsii v osvobozhdennikh raionakh," in: *Vozrozhdenie*, pp. 77-95, p.80.

<sup>52</sup>See, for instance: *Ocherki*, pp.473-483, *Kal.Obl.Org.KPSS v dokumentakh i...*, pp.268-283.

<sup>53</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, II.20,20ob.,21.

fourteen fully and seven partially occupied raions. There were more than 12,000 in early 1944<sup>54</sup>. The damage they inflicted on the Germans was huge: 62,390 German soldiers and officers were killed by the partisans during the war. Of course, the Party had supposedly kept strict control over all their activities.

Boitsov's account was designed to instill pride in his audience about the war effort, and the numbers given on German casualties were probably exaggerated. From a numerical point of view, Boitsov's numbers would translate into each partisan, out of the maximum amount of 12,000, killing five Germans on average. A book published in 1989 claimed that the "avengers" even killed more than 100,000 enemy troops<sup>55</sup>. However, a recent German publication on the German occupied territories in the Soviet Union does not indicate the area of the "smaller" Kalinin oblast' as harbouring a major concentration of partisans<sup>56</sup>. If one accepts the information of this latter source, significant partisan activities were only to be found in the later Velikie Luki oblast'. The approximate number of 60,000 German deaths that Boitsov spoke about, in January 1945, is mentioned in a publication of 1971<sup>57</sup>. This publication explains the skewed arithmetic used by the Party secretary in January 1945: first, he added up all German troops killed by the partisans from

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<sup>54</sup>Although the Germans already had retreated earlier from the territory of the oblast' of post-August 1944, through which Boitsov's account of the partisan's feats for this period (spring 1943-spring of 1944) was rather superfluous in January 1945.

<sup>55</sup>Kal.Obl.Org. KPSS..., p.282.

<sup>56</sup>See the map of Müller, pp. 628/629.

<sup>57</sup>Ocherki, pp.482 and 483. This publication cannot be accused of outright lying in this case, because by 1971 the Kalinin oblast' had regained quite a large slice of the oblast' of Velikie Luki, dissolved in 1957.

July 1941 to July 1944. 'This, of course, was not really correct; the oblast' territory of January 1945 was already cleared of Germans by at least the summer of 1943, more than one year before July 1944 (see above). 'Then he must have included some casualties that resulted from the open battles in which partisan units began to participate towards the end of the liberation of the "greater" oblast':

'The struggle of the partisan units especially was activated in July 1944, during the final liberation of the oblast from the German invaders. In that period the partisans fought sixty-two open battles, defeated eight garrisons and strong points of the enemy<sup>58</sup>.

It is impossible to believe that so few Russian partisans killed so many Germans, when on the whole during the war probably four to five Russians died for each German<sup>59</sup>. Because of the partisans' necessary freedom from involvement of superiors, it is certainly plausible that they were generally more efficient fighters than the regular soldiers. After all, the Red Army service men had to follow the orders based on the wolfish strategies of Stalin and his commanders.

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<sup>58</sup> *Ocherki*, p.482.

<sup>59</sup> This is denied by a very recent publication on the war casualties (G.F. Krivosheev{ed.}), *Grif sekretnosti sniat*, p. 129 and p.391). This publication maintains that the USSR sustained roughly the same amount of military deaths as Germany and its allies during the war, but its information is suspect (see III.2). An even more recent article challenged the number of twenty-seven million victims (B. Sokolov, p.5). The author arrived at the startling number of forty million of deaths during the war, of which twenty-six million were military deaths. Sokolov added that the losses on the Eastern Front translated into nine-and-a-half Russian deaths for each German or German-allied death. The number of people who served in the Red Army during the war was around forty-three to forty-four million, more than one person in five of the total Soviet population. Sokolov's numbers are supported by V.I. Kozlov (V.I. Kozlov, "Dinamika naseleniia SSSR {Obshchii i etnodemograficheskii obzor}," in: *Istoriia SSSR*, 5, 1991, pp.3-17, p.17, endnote 2).

It remains difficult to assess the Kalinin Party organization's appreciation of the partisans after the war<sup>60</sup>. Boitsov gave full praise to the movement while the war was still raging in January 1945. Then he apparently felt obliged to petition Stalin himself in the summer of 1946 for Decorations for all the former partisans<sup>61</sup>. From 1941 to 1944, 799 partisans became candidate Party members, and 349 full members<sup>62</sup>. If 12,000 partisans had been operating in the oblast' at the height of the movement in 1944, this results in a paltry number, especially in light of the fact that so many of the regular troops would join the Party at the front<sup>63</sup>. In the end, more than 5,000 partisans were decorated in the oblast', but it is unclear if this number refers to those partisans who lived on the oblast' territory of before August 1944, or only to those who lived on the smaller post-August 1944 territory<sup>64</sup>. Apart from that, many decorations were probably only awarded long after the war, while only slightly more than 1,000 had been decorated by the USSR Supreme Soviet with different medals and decorations by December 1946<sup>65</sup>. Furthermore, if the survey is any indication, almost anyone, either working in the rear or fighting at the front, seems to have been decorated by now for their efforts during the war.

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<sup>60</sup> As opposed to during the war, to which Boitsov's speech of January 1945 really belonged.

<sup>61</sup> Pako, 147/4/63, II.175/176.

<sup>62</sup> Kalininskaiia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v dokumentakh i fotografiakh. 1880e-1987gg., Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989, p.274. This would mean that about 10% of the growth of the party between 1941 and 1944 was composed of partisans.

<sup>63</sup> See V.3, for example.

<sup>64</sup> Kalininskaiia oblastnaia..., p.283.

<sup>65</sup> Blotnoi agitator, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia Pravda" 1948, No.1, pp.23-26.

Certainly some underground Party organizers, who were sent behind German lines, were still members of the oblast' leadership after the war<sup>66</sup>. Perhaps a distinction should be made between those who were deliberately sent by the Party and those who became partisans on their own initiative after the German occupation. It is possible that the first group mainly engaged in political and organizational work, and left the active fighting to the "spontaneous" partisans. At the outset, the first group was probably small in comparison to the second one, and only gathered in strength after the Soviet defense mustered more organization.

There is an example of one case related in the survey, which might be a confirmation of the authorities' distrust of self-styled resistance fighters. It concerns an interviewee's brother, who was executed on the orders of the partisan leader Kovpak in Belorussia.

Nikolai Mikhailovich Gaponenko had previously, in 1942 to 1943, distributed partisan literature among Czechoslovak troops who were part of the Nazi occupation force in Belorussia<sup>67</sup>. Then he had been forced to join the German side as a member of the *Polizei*. Gaponenko and a friend arrested the head of the German police, when their *Polizei* unit --ten days after his forced enlistment-- was attacked by partisans. The two delivered the German police commander to the partisans, who eventually executed all three. After the war, Gaponenko's mother had to pay double the amount of taxes for being a relative of a collaborator, although her husband and

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<sup>66</sup>For example, I.S. Borisov, in the war secretary of the Leninskii raikom, became after the war obkom secretary, and M.N. Zinger remained raikom secretary after 1945 (see Kalininskaia oblastnaia..., p. 270).

<sup>67</sup>Testimony of L.M. Gaponenko in the survey.

another son fought in the Red Army. A copy of a statement by two fellow partisans of Gaponenko, testifying his good behaviour during the war and participation in anti-Nazi activities (part of the effort to have N.M. Gaponenko rehabilitated) was given to the interviewer. In the end the KGB rehabilitated him, but only long after Stalin's death.

This anecdote at least illustrates the partisan leaders' distrust of the population in the territories where they operated, which might be a reflection of the paranoid suspicion of the *narod* and, consequently, of more independent-minded partisans, among Soviet authorities in general. However, this kind of paranoia is by no means exceptional in resistance groups in other European countries which were under German occupation. Double agents were a reality, and were dealt with harshly everywhere when exposed. Of course, this does not diminish the personal tragedy of this case.

#### IV.2 War Damage

As has been described above, the Kalinin oblast' of the borders drawn after August 1944, when the western area of Velikie Luki was administratively separated (and some smaller parts of the oblast' territory were transferred to the oblast' of Pskov), was not occupied for more than one and a half years by the Germans, although the damage inflicted by the war was substantial. Yet, in several official publications<sup>68</sup>, and even in several speeches given after August 1944

<sup>68</sup>E.g. Ocherki, or Kalininskaia Oblastnaia Organizatsiia KPSS v dokumentakh i fotografiakh.

by the Party elite of the oblast' --as in Boitsov's at the sixth oblast' Party conference in January 1945--, the destruction occasionally took on an exaggerated quality.

In a very frank report, written just before Stalin's death, it was noted that the Germans only occupied fifteen out of a total of forty-seven districts of the post-August 1944 oblast'<sup>69</sup>. In other words, no more than about 30% of the oblast' had been actually occupied, much less than the 60% mentioned above, a figure given in the "official" history of the Kalinin oblast' Party organization published in the early 1970s<sup>70</sup>. In the war, according to the same source, 1,394 schools, 236 clubs and theatres, fourteen museums, twenty-three libraries, 375 hospitals, polyclinics and out-patient departments, and 122 children's institutions were wiped out in the oblast'<sup>71</sup>.

Strictly speaking, of course, the authors of the latter account were not lying, but it gave the impression that the oblast' was in more desperate ruins than was in fact the case. By depicting the damage in these inflated terms, not only authors such as those who wrote the 1971 history of the local Communist Party, but also the contemporary Party leaders of the oblast' in their speeches after August 1944, wanted to create an image of an utterly devastated territory<sup>72</sup>. This image could then be used as a convenient excuse for

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<sup>69</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.1. See also the Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Tom XIX, p.432, in which it is stated that the oblast' was liberated by March 1943.

<sup>70</sup>I.e. Ocherki.

<sup>71</sup>Ocherki, p.485.

<sup>72</sup>Witness as well the pre-August 1944 numbers on the razing of MTS, MTM, kolkhozy in IV.1.

explaining the difficulties and delays in the subsequent rebuilding of the economy after the German retreat, both to oblast' inhabitants and to the central Party leadership and government. There is sufficient indication that these exaggerated numbers served at certain moments as an excuse for the poor performance of various sectors of the oblast' economy after 1943, all the way up to 1953, and even later<sup>73</sup>.

In 1945, Karelinov, head of the oblast' agricultural department, reported to Boitsov on the extent of the most heavily damaged rural areas of the oblast', in which he included only twelve raions<sup>74</sup>. To his numbers on the agricultural destruction in the occupied territories, Karelinov added figures on the extirpation of draught horses, of tractors of fifteen-horse power, and of the total number of horses in these raions. On average, just 10% to 15% of draught horses remained in 1945 of their prewar number<sup>75</sup>. Roughly 60% of tractors, and 30% of the total amount of horses of 1941, survived the war. Clearly, the damage was enormous in these raions, and it should be remembered that for a short while, apart from the above twelve raions, the raions of Zavidovo, Mednoe, and Kalinin were also partially occupied, and some others (Konakovo raion, for example) lay in the front line<sup>76</sup>.

<sup>73</sup>As for example in the case of the protracted reconstruction of the town of Rzhev, that was still not, eighteen years after liberation, completely restored in 1961.

<sup>74</sup>See Table 10.

<sup>75</sup>Pako, 147/3/1966, 1.62.

<sup>76</sup>See, e.g., Pako, 147/3/1966, 1.76, and 147/3/2701, 1.86.



The situation of the oblast' agriculture was described on March 1, 1946, in one of Boitsov's reports to Malenkov<sup>77</sup>. Between the lines, Boitsov admitted that at most fifteen out of forty six raions had been partially under German occupation. Although he described the situation three years after the Germans had retreated from the oblast' territory, the agriculture of the liberated raions was still a shambles. Instead of 3,067, only 2,310 collective farms operated in the formerly occupied raions; instead of 186,974 kolkhozniks able to work, there were only 86,484 in March 1946. Draught horses numbered less than 10,000, compared to 64,143 before June 1941, and tractors only 884, compared to the prewar 1,484. Within the socialized sector of the collective farm, the average kolkhoznik had more than twice as much land to take care of, and each horse had to work nineteen hectares of arable land instead of 6.1 hectares. From Table 10 one can deduce, as Boitsov had done in January 1945 at the sixth Party conference, that the greatest damage was done in the districts of Rzhev, Zubtsov, Molodoi Tud, Olenino, and Pogoreloe<sup>78</sup>. Here the socialist sector of the kolkhozy and the houses of the kolkhozniks were almost completely obliterated. In the Imel'ianovo, Turginovo, Vysoko, and Kirovo raions, 56% to 78% of kolkhozniks' houses had been razed. After the German troops had retreated, only eleven draught horses and twenty-one cows were left for the

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<sup>77</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 11.67/67ob.

<sup>78</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.8. See Table 10. Boitsov added in the above mentioned report to Malenkov of March 1, 1946 also the raions of Ostushkov and Staritsu (see Pako, 147/4/63, 11.67/67ob.).

kolkhozniks of Olenino raion<sup>79</sup>. More than 6,000 inhabitants of this raion had been deported to perform forced labour in Germany.

Without the number of soldiers who were killed in battle, the following figures on victims of the war in the oblast' are given: 40,876 civilians killed, 17,055 people became prisoners of war, and 23,755 "fell into German slavery", in other words, were forced to work in Germany<sup>80</sup>. In two sources the number of total casualties for the oblast' is 248,000, and the number of Soviet army troops and partisans killed on the territory of the oblast' is higher than 200,000<sup>81</sup>. A commemorative publication, published in connection with the official opening of the victory obelisk in the town of

<sup>79</sup>N.G. Korytkov, Kalininskoe selo: proshloe, nastoiashchee, budushchee, Moskva: Kolos, 1978, p.42.

<sup>80</sup>Puko, 147/3/1966, 1.88; also see the publication Kalininskaiia oblast' v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny (V ekspozitsiakh Kalininskogo gosudarstvennogo ob'edinnennogo istoriko-arkhitekturnogo i literaturnogo muzeia), Kalinin 1985 (this publication has no page numbering), and Z. Kurpenko, p.4. Some of the German atrocities against Communists, Komsomols, non Party members and Jews are described in the publication Ne zabudem! Ne prostim. Zlodeianiia nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov v raionakh Kalininskoi oblasti, Kalinin: Izdanie Kalininskogo obkoma VKP(b), Kalinin, 1942, pp.3-5. The atrocities against Jews described here, were omitted in post-war publications. In the fall of 1941, the Germans at one point massacred most of the patients of a psychiatric hospital (Ne zabudem!..., pp.17/18 and Kurpenko, p.19). Some civilians died of starvation in 1941-1942 (Kurpenko, p.27). According to a map in Muller, *op.cit.*, p.632, German concentration camps were organized in Olenino and Rzhev, and mass executions of civilians took place in Rzhev and Zubtsov. For the RSFSR, the total number of civilian victims was 1,793,000; 400,000 inhabitants of the RSFSR were forced to work in Germany (see the table and text of the essay of N. Muller, "Uberblick...", p.96). There are some documents available in Moscow with a limited amount of information on the war damage in the Central State Archive of the Great October Revolution (TsGAOR). Fond 7021, opis 26, delo 528 of TsGAOR contains letters in which Soviet citizens of the Kalinin oblast' ask the government for restitution of money and goods lost in the war; f.7021 op. 26 d.529 has further information on damage inflicted on some of the oblast' kolkhozy; f.7021 op.26 d. 539 lists the names of roughly 6,600 oblast' inhabitants who had been in German concentration camps; f.7021 op.26 d.541 contains information of oblast' citizens' experiences of the German camps: when they were arrested, how they were transported, and what their lives were like in the camps.

<sup>81</sup>Kal. obl. v Vel. Otc. Voi. (V ekspozitsiakh...).

Kalinin in the autumn of 1970, mentions a number of 248,329 people, born and raised on the territory of the oblast' of the post-1967 size, who perished in the war either in battle or as a consequence of German terror<sup>82</sup>. Both these publications do not mention sources for their numbers. At the time of their publication, the oblast' was substantially larger than after 1944, so that the deaths resulting from acts of war on the territory of the size of the immediate postwar period might have been more in the neighbourhood of 200,000<sup>83</sup>. According to this calculation, around 165,000 soldiers, who were inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' of the 1944-1956 size, died in the war<sup>84</sup>.

It is unclear whether deaths resulting from the natural drop in the population in 1941-1945 were included in the 248,000. That does not seem likely, because both publications were commemorative, and therefore not written on the basis of extensive archival research. I know for a fact that V.G. Osipov, the coauthor of one of the publications (Obelisk pobedy), had never seen the inside of the Party archive before the autumn of 1991. Therefore he cannot have used in his calculations the demographic numbers that I found

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<sup>82</sup>Obelisk pobedy.

<sup>83</sup>See Table I.

<sup>84</sup>Ocherki, p.472. At least, if we do not take seriously stories that the post-war Soviet government was prohibiting the demobilized soldiers to return to their native provinces, proof of which could neither be found in documents, nor in the survey; if one adds the 40,000 civilians killed, one arrives at a total number of deaths that is 240,000. However, Kal. obl. v Vel. Ote. Voi. (V ekspozitsiakh...) is describing the total losses for the larger territory of the 1985 oblast' (see Table 1 for its size in comparison with the size of the oblast' in 1945). If one extrapolates Lubov's numbers for the Konakovo raion (6,000 deaths out of 17,000 soldiers), then around 110,000 soldiers (roughly 35% of 320,000) would have been killed in the war, substantially less than the above estimates.

in the archive on the natural population's movement during the war (which I have rendered in Table 5).

The problem with the statistics on war casualties is discussed in Krivosheev's introduction to a very recent publication in which the number of casualties of the Soviet armed forces during the war is analysed<sup>85</sup>. This publication maintains that the demographic loss of all Soviet military amounted to 8,668,400<sup>86</sup>. It suggests that almost nineteen million Soviet citizens were killed in the war, which seems an unlikely high number. In fact, it is highly improbable, because the relation between battle victims and civilian casualties is quite different in the Kalinin oblast': five soldiers and partisans to one civilian (see the numbers above). It should be pointed out that the partisan deaths were not considered to be part of the losses of the Soviet armed forces in the 1993 publication<sup>87</sup>. However, as was seen above, no more than 12,000 partisans engaged in battle in the Kalinin oblast' during the war; obviously, they were not all killed. In appreciating Krivosheev's distribution of army and civilian deaths, one should consider the much shorter period of occupation of Kalinin oblast's western parts, because of which many civilians were spared, for example, the fate of the Belorussians. The amount of military deaths in the Kalinin oblast', probably the equivalent of 9% of the total oblast' population, if extrapolated to the whole USSR, would lead one to an estimate of about seventeen million Soviet soldiers and partisans killed; this presumes that the

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<sup>85</sup>Krivosheev, pp.3-8.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p.129.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., pp.128/129.

Soviet population was roughly 190 million in June 1941 (a figure probably too low), much more than the 8.67 million cited by Krivosheev<sup>88</sup>. Krivosheev admits that it was impossible to find precise figures on the casualties in the first months of the war because of the chaos created by the German attack<sup>89</sup>. The number of military deaths in Krivosheev's publication for the consecutive Kalinin, first Baltic, and Zemland fronts for 1941-1943 seems to indicate that more than 200,000 soldiers of the Soviet armies who made up these fronts died<sup>90</sup>.

After the war and demobilization, only 93,000 to 94,000 troops returned to the Kalinin oblast'<sup>91</sup>. However, even before the loss of territory of 1944, the largest proportion of the population lived in the area of the October Railroad and the south east. During World War II, 350,000 soldiers might have served in the army who were oblast' inhabitants of the territory of the 1970-province, which is confirmed by a number of 320,000 inhabitants serving in the army of the 1935-1944 oblast' territory --only until the end of

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<sup>88</sup>Heller, Nekrich, p.462 indicate that in 1941, 194.1 million people lived in the USSR; B. Sokolov gave the precise number of 200,100,000 for June 22, 1941 (B. Sokolov, p.5). The 9% is based on an estimate of 165,000 Red Army and partisan deaths during the war (78% of the 200,000 military and partisan deaths for the 1967-size oblast'; this 1945 oblast' --see Table 1-- was approximately 78% of the size of the 1967-1970 oblast'). See below as well.

<sup>89</sup>Krivosheev, p.4.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p.252. The Kalinin Front was created on October 17, 1941, and was transformed into the First Baltic Front on October 20, 1943 (Svet oktiabria. Kalininskaia oblast' za 70 let. Sobytiia. Fakty. Dokumenty. Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1987, p.123). Volkogonov's estimate of the amount of deaths among civilians and military are similar to those of Krivosheev's publication (Volkogonov, *Kniga II, chast' 2*, pp. 26/27): ten million killed in battle and died in captivity, twenty-six to twenty-seven million deaths in all, the majority of deaths therefore attributed to non-military people.

<sup>91</sup>See Table 8.

1943<sup>92</sup>. If one accepts this number, then roughly 273,000 inhabitants of the 1944-1956 territory of the oblast' might have served. According to this calculation, since only 93,000 to 94,000 returned, about 180,000 soldiers were killed during the war; this is rather more than the 165,000 estimated above. If one adds 40,000 civilian deaths attributed to the war, then the total number of victims would have been 220,000 for the 1944-1956-size province.

All in all, these figures should be regarded with extreme caution. On the basis of available numbers, a maximum of 220,000 deaths on the province's territory of the 1944-1956 size as a direct consequence of acts of war in the "Great Patriotic War" would seem reasonable<sup>93</sup>.

On February 2, 1946, second oblast'-secretary Vorontsov reported to Malenkov in Moscow about the employment situation of the demobilized soldiers in the oblast'<sup>94</sup>. At that time, there were, according to Vorontsov, 215,395 families of Red Army soldiers in the oblast (it is unfortunately unclear whether Vorontsov is merely referring to soldiers who had dependents, or to the families of all soldiers). The oblast' had 29,516 war invalids, of whom more than 20,000 had found work.

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<sup>92</sup>See for the 350,000 in IV.1; *Ocherki*, p.472.

<sup>93</sup>Thus the death rate is less than that given by Sokolov, who claims that about 20% of the USSR population died in the war, but Sokolov included the deaths in Soviet camps and those that died from hunger, cold, and illness (B. Sokolov, p.5). If only the victims are counted who died as a direct result of acts of war, then in Kalinin oblast' the proportion was around 11.5% (see Table 2; in this calculation the population of the 1946 oblast' is used, to which the 220,000 victims of acts of war are added and the "natural" demographic loss of 100,000). However, if one adds the decrease of the civilian population as a result of the high mortality rate from June 1941 to May 1945 (see Table 5) --another 100,000 probably--, one would arrive at a proportion of 16.7%.

<sup>94</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.36.

In June 1942 oblispolkom chairman Starotorzhskii announced at an obkom plenum that "[at] the moment we are experiencing the effect of adverse market relations for our ruble, which has given rise to bartering."<sup>95</sup> He added that not all of the loss of cattle could be blamed on the Germans:

An adverse factor was the fact that at the moment of the evacuation of cattle, when, one year ago, many of our raions were being occupied, self-seeking elements emerged among the cattle drivers, as a consequence of which we had exceptionally serious losses of cattle. Incidents of the squandering of communal cattle took place and take place among the majority of the kolkhozy of the raions.<sup>96</sup>

The last complaint would be endlessly repeated in the records until Stalin's death. In contrast to the personal cow and pigs, the communal or socialized animals --i.e. the livestock that was kolkhoz property-- was never taken care of very well. It was not valued by the kolkhozniks in the same way as private livestock, essential often for their sheer personal survival.

At an obkom plenum in November 1942, one Zubynin, probably a local Party leader responsible for agriculture, said that many kolkhozniks had started to sow grain on their personal plot, for instance, amounting to 22% of all kolkhoz households in Goritsy raion<sup>97</sup>. In this way, according to Zubynin, the kolkhozniks tried above all to secure cereals for their personal household. This would point to the fact that, indeed, several kolkhozniki abandoned the socialized sector of agriculture during the war, and were engaged in

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<sup>95</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.39ob.

<sup>96</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.39ob. See Table 11 for the extent of the extermination of cattle in 1942.

<sup>97</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.141.

private farming; or in Soviet terms: "[t]he deterioration of the material situation of the kolkhozniks during the war also gave rise to negative phenomena, such as the revival of a greedy mentality of private gain."<sup>98</sup>

The lack of enthusiasm for the socialist cause, or of "socialist responsibility," even while the Motherland was at war, was not strictly limited to the countryside. In the *protokol* of an obkom plenum of July 13 and 14, 1944, the following statement can be found:

The plenum of the *VKP(b)* notices that as a result of poor political-educational and cultural-educational work in many towns and raions of the oblast', in particular in the town of Kalinin and in the raions of Rameshki, Kushalino, and Toropets, hooliganism and other amoral phenomena are growing among the youth.<sup>99</sup>

In 1943, more than 320,000 families of Red Army soldiers were counted in the oblast'; almost 100,000 households received some form of dispensation from the state procurements or from taxation<sup>100</sup>.

Obkom secretary P.S. Vorontsov, at an obkom plenum of June 1942, portrayed the exceptional renewal of leading cadres, another consequence of the war:

In this period [from February to June 1942], as a consequence of the call-up for the Red Army, and of the liberation of raions from the German occupiers, 6,606 people were selected for various leading positions, and just for functions of responsibility that have to be confirmed by the

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<sup>98</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.286.

<sup>99</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.113.

<sup>100</sup>Ocherki, p.472.



party obkom and the CC of the *VKP(b)* [i.e. part of their *nomenklatura*] more than 1,000 people were selected.<sup>101</sup>

In some areas, 90% of the kolkhoz directors had to be changed since

...in raions, such as those of Turginovo and Molodoi T'ud, up to 60, 70 or even 90% of the chairmen had to be changed, as one could not trust these people anymore, after some of them had been used by the Germans as *starosty* [village elders] and several others simply had become accomplices of the German occupiers, had worked for the Germans<sup>102</sup>.

Many of the chairs left to serve in the Red Army<sup>103</sup>. Perhaps as a result of this, out of 6,545 kolkhoz directors only 660 were Party members, 163 candidates, and sixty-eight Komsomols in June 1942<sup>104</sup>. Vorontsov, who did not give the impression in his ensuing career of a proponent of gender equality, lamented the insufficient number of women who were promoted to responsible positions<sup>105</sup>. The motive for his complaint was surely the fact that the trifling number of men remaining behind could not fill all positions anymore. Many of those few males lacked competence, were too advanced in age, and so on, to acquit adequately of the demanding task of leading

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<sup>101</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, l. 79. The number of communists after the German retreat in the liberated areas of the RSFSR stood at 38% of the pre-war level, see N.I. Kondakova, "Partiia-organizator ideino-politicheskoi raboty v osvobozhdenikh i prifrontovykh raionakh," in: *Vozrozhdenie*, pp.20-37, p.26.

<sup>102</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, l.80/80ob. This statement is a sign of the exceptionally vindictive attitude, which was common for the whole of Stalin's tenure at the helm of the Soviet Union. Since many were forced into collaboration by the Germans through the use of death threats and the like --resistance led often to immediate execution by the Nazis-- the summary condemnation of these people was rather heartless, but very much typical (for the threat of execution, see Karpenko, pp.28-31).

<sup>103</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, l.81.

<sup>104</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, l.81ob. However, a high percentage of Party members among kolkhoz chairs did not exist either before 1941; see Chapters II, V, VI and VIII.

<sup>105</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, l.81ob. See Chapters V, VI and VIII for more on Vorontsov, as well as Appendix III.

collective farms. Half a year later, at the end of 1942, obkom member Borisov returned to this subject<sup>106</sup>. 20% of the chairs were women at that moment, as opposed to 9% before the war. Borisov noted that:

The composition of the kolkhoz chairs has sharply changed. At the time of the beginning of the patriotic war more than 4,500 kolkhoz chairmen entered the ranks of the Red Army. At the head of the kolkhozy now stand comrades who have been very recently promoted to this work. We have the following breakdown of kolkhoz chairs according to work experience: 1,330 people have worked up to six months, from six months to one year 2,641, and from one to two years 1,681 people.<sup>107</sup>

In other words, more than 5,600 chairs were highly inexperienced, something that did not help the desired quick recovery of agriculture. But the lack of work experience would be only one of the problems plaguing the countryside in these years.

In April 1944, Vorontsov analysed the composition of the kolkhoz chairs again: 1,518 of the 7,306 kolkhoz directors in 1942, or 20.7%, were female; in 1943, 2,229 out of 7,942 (28%) were women<sup>108</sup>. The Party layer among the leading kolkhoz cadres was precariously thin: in 1942, out of a total of 7,306, 523 were full Party members, 235 candidate members, and 96 Komsomols. Thus 854 in all were (young) Communists, slightly more than 10%. In 1943, these numbers were respectively 7,942, 752, 590, and 111. In other words, there was a significant rise of Party and Komsomol membership, but still less than one in five chairmen was a

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<sup>106</sup>Moscow, 17/43/742, 1.10.

<sup>107</sup>Moscow, 17/43/742, 1.10.

<sup>108</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.73ob.

Communist or Komsomol. In 1943 already 1,042 of these 7,942 chairs were war invalids.

The Party itself suffered from the loss of experienced members too, as Vorontsov pointed out at the obkom plenum of April 11, 1944<sup>109</sup>. Seventeen secretaries of raion committees perished in the war, in particular of raions in the German-occupied western part of the oblast'. Eliseev, Semenov, and Grigor'ev, who were respectively Party secretaries of Rzhev, Staritsa, and Kalinin's Zavolzh'e raion, had lost their lives. Most of the other victims among the secretaries were from raions which would become part of the Velikie Luki oblast' a few months later. Vorontsov added in April 1944 that not all positions in the obkom *apparatus* were filled. Instead of 160, 145 people worked there, 33% (forty-seven) of whom were women. Still, despite the lack of cadres, some Party secretaries had been excluded from the Party since June 1941, most of them for drunkenness.

The Germans never stretched their hold much further than the oblast' capital, from which they soon had to retreat. Staritsa in the south-west was liberated in January 1942. The oblast' within its post-August 1944 borders was more or less fully liberated by March 1943, when Rzhev was reoccupied. Thus the Germans had little time to try to incite the local population to take up private agriculture, if they did that at all. It is consequently impossible to assess through

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<sup>109</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.70-71ob. A.A. Kondrashov was twenty-nine or thirty in 1941, and, although chairman of the raisspolkom of Torzhok, left to serve in the army at the beginning of the war. After he was wounded in 1942 in battle, he almost lost one of his legs to gangrene. Upon his dismissal from the hospital in 1942 he was demobilized (testimony of A.A. Kondrashov in the survey).

an analysis of the response to German measures in transforming agriculture how much the collective farms were unpopular in the oblast'<sup>110</sup>. On the whole, any German effort in the direction of a reintroduction of private farming seems to have been very limited. Although there were certainly exceptions among individual

*Wehrmacht* soldiers, the Nazis generally behaved as if Russians were nothing more than a higher form of cattle, as one wartime publication described their attitude<sup>111</sup>.

At an obkom plenum in June 1942, oblispolkom chairman Starotorzhskii exclaimed:

...this result is remarkable, because in the end the Hitlerite German fascists tried a year ago to disorganize our economy, to destroy our kolkhoz system, counting on the collapse of the kolkhoz, on the weakening of the rear. A year ago, to the German burgher, and also to the German bourgeois, it was inexplicable, and hardly do they even now suspect, that our kolkhoz life is so stable, so much of a powerful factor in the economy of our country that, with the fullest right and justification, we can rely on it, precisely as on cement. On this firm basis our agricultural production is created.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>110</sup>Karpenko indicated that the Germans tried to create "communal farms" (*obshchinnye khoziaistva*), led by German functionaries and, in areas further away from the front, reintroduced large landownership (Karpenko, pp.28/29).

<sup>111</sup>Karpenko, pp.36-41. It was part and parcel of the Nazi theories of racism, that had declared the Slavs to be *Untermenschen*.

<sup>112</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.39. Something is discernible of the surprise among the Party membership itself of the endurance and tenacity of the kolkhoz system and its relatively simple restoration after the German retreat. The vacillations and "anti-Soviet mood" among the population of Moscow in the autumn of 1941 can be found in an article published in 1991 in *Istoriia SSSR* ("Moskva voennaiia. 1941 god...(Novye istochniki iz sekretnykh arkhivnykh fondov)," in: *Istoriia SSSR*, 6, 1991, pp.101-122). It is likely that this "anti-Soviet mood" was much more pronounced in Russian territories that were actually occupied by the Nazi troops, such as the western part of the Kalinin oblast'. In the final analysis, however, here, as in Moscow, the majority of the population remained loyal to the Motherland as a consequence of the inimical behaviour of the occupiers.

Thus the Germans found no sympathy in the temporarily occupied districts apart from that of a few renegades, Starotorzhskii concluded. The degree of collaboration is unclear, and was undoubtedly smaller than in the Baltic republics, since the memory of pre-Bolshevik times must have faded among the oblast' population by 1941<sup>113</sup>.

In the Party archives, a few examples of people who actually collaborated can be encountered. These examples concern predominantly people who had been Party members before the German invasion, or had joined it after the German retreat; they were exposed as collaborators after the war. The kolkhoz chairman D.V. Bobrov (1899) was one of them<sup>114</sup>. In 1943, he had become a Party candidate, seemingly an honest, if little educated, peasant. However, the raikomburo of Kirov raion moved to exclude him from the Party on July 18, 1946; Boitsov subsequently ratified their decision. Whether criminal prosecution ensued is unclear in this case. Bobrov's misdeeds were described as follows:

Bobrov maintained contacts with the Germans when he lived on German occupied territory in the Kirov raion, and had German officers living in his house. Bobrov worked for the Germans, made them a wooden sledge, slaughtered cattle seized by the Germans from kolkhozniks, and made sausages. Bobrov confiscated potatoes for the Germans from the kolkhozniks. In contrast to all other inhabitants, Bobrov was not forced to leave his village, when people of areas close to the front were forced to resettle by the Germans. At the time that he entered the *VKP(b)* as a candidate member,

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<sup>113</sup>And the German attitude was, of course, by comparison more benevolent to the Baltic peoples than to the Russians.

<sup>114</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, 1.535.

Bobrov concealed from the party that he had worked for the Germans.<sup>115</sup>

It is impossible to establish how many people deliberately stayed behind to welcome the Germans, instead of attempting to flee from them. It strikes one as rather odd when some Soviet authors in 1986 implied that many who stayed were criminals, traitors, and renegades<sup>116</sup>. After all, how could there have been many of those after the cleansing perpetrated in the 1930s?

In the records, there is at least one blatant case of someone who saw his chance to take revenge on Soviet power with the aid of the Nazis<sup>117</sup>. This case is proof that Stalin's policy of trying to create disciplined, monolithic, obedient, and faithful subjects with the aid of terror on a massive scale in the 1930s produced the opposite result among certain individuals. Georgii Stepanovich Siniukov was born in 1891. In 1929, he and his father were dekulakized and exiled to Arkhangel'sk oblast'. There Siniukov junior engaged in "subversive" economic activities for which he was arrested by the NKVD in 1935. He was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment as an enemy of the people, according to one or more of the clauses of article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. He apparently was released early, moved to the Kalinin oblast' and, upon the Germans' arrival in the fall of 1941, immediately volunteered for the German police. After the war, he was repatriated to the Soviet

<sup>115</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, 1.535.

<sup>116</sup>S.V. Bilenko, S.V. Borodin, V.P. Maslov, "Vozrozhdenie i dal'neishee ukreplenie sotsialisticheskogo pravoporiadka v osvobozhdennikh raionakh," in: *Vozrozhdenie*, pp. 107-117, p. 109.

<sup>117</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, 1.17ob.

Union and exposed by the NKVD as a collaborator in the *filtratsiia* process. He probably did not survive this time.

In the autumn of 1945, the former *Bürgermeister* of Rzhev was discovered by the NKVD among a group of repatriated Soviet citizens<sup>118</sup>. He was probably one of the relatively few inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast', who can be called a genuine war criminal. NKVD head Pavlov reported his crimes to Boitsov in early 1946 as follows:

KUZ'MIN VLADIMIR IAKOVLEVICH, born in 1900, in the town of Ostrov in the Leningrad oblast', partyless, seredniak ancestry, no criminal record.

In October 1941, after having deserted from the Red Army and gone over to the side of the enemy, KUZ'MIN took up residence in the town of Rzhev, which was occupied by the German armies.

In January 1942, KUZ'MIN joined of his own free will the German-installed authorities in the function of burgomaster of the town of Rzhev and worked as such until May 1943, that is until the expulsion of the Germans by Red Army units.

Through his subordinate apparatus, the police, and the town elders (*starosty*), KUZ'MIN established the fascist system and order in the town of Rzhev.

In May 1942, on the orders of KUZ'MIN, fourteen Jewish families, thirty-one people in all, were exposed in the town of Rzhev, handed over to the *SD*, and all executed.

Aided by the active personal participation of KUZ'MIN in the years 1942-1943 10,000 inhabitants of the town of Rzhev were sent off to German slavery in Germany. KUZ'MIN carried out these measures in the following way [apparently a document is quoted, that was found by the NKVD in Rzhev, or elsewhere, and was addressed to Russian functionaries, who worked for the Germans]:

"Utmost urgency, to all elders of the town quarters. The German command has asked the municipal authorities to evacuate immediately 500 persons of both sexes without children to Germany.

<sup>118</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, II.17/17vv.

As the municipal government is giving this question high priority, it proposes to smoothly execute these measures, without any roughness. ...In order not to have to turn to the gendarmerie for help, you are obliged, upon notification, to give [the evacuees] a full expianation of the importance of the assignment and of the prospects that are lying ahead of them, that we have sufficient evidence about flourishing life in Germany. People are obliged to appear without any delay on November 14, 1942, at seven in the morning, at Decembrists' Street No.77, from where they will be directed to the village of Sapino for transport in railroad cars to Germany.<sup>119</sup>

And so on. Kuz'min fled with the German troops to Germany, but failed to escape repatriation. His fate is unknown, but it seems likely that he was sentenced to the death penalty. Not all collaborators automatically received capital punishment. For example, T.V. Karavashkin was sentenced to ten years of labour camp in late 1942 for having worked as a village elder under the Germans<sup>120</sup>.

After the war, 3,075 full members and candidates of the Communist Party, who had lived temporarily on German-occupied territory, were investigated: 2,040 were excluded outright from the Party, but some 390 were allowed to keep their membership<sup>121</sup>. Others had died or left the oblast' before their case could be investigated. It is difficult to interpret these statistics, as it remains cloudy if all of these people were natives of the Kalinin oblast', or if they had only moved there after the war. If the large majority had been in the Party organization of the Kalinin oblast'

<sup>119</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, II.17/17vv.

<sup>120</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, 1.80.

<sup>121</sup>Pako, 147/4/1344, 1.96. According to another document, a letter by Boitsov of July 1946 to Andreev, at the time head of the Central Control Commission, and to Zhdanov, during the war 3,067 Party members had lived on German-occupied territory (Pako, 147/4/63, II.166-167).



before the war, a probable scenario, it would indicate that a substantial number of Communists did not choose to or did not have a chance to retreat before the German offensive in 1941. The number says nothing about actual collaboration, because sometimes the fact that one had lived on German territory was enough to be excluded. Some of the more fortunate, a minority, would only be put on probation for this offense.

In October 1946, I.G. Tsvetkov's exclusion from the Party by the raikomburo of Olenino was confirmed by Boitsov<sup>122</sup>. His case is typical. Tsvetkov was not well educated, having completed only four years of primary education. In 1940, Tsvetkov had become a full Party member, when working as vice-brigadier of a MTS brigade. He was about thirty-one years old when the Germans occupied his native district; apparently, he was unable or unwilling to leave this native locale at that time. He remained a passive bystander during occupation, neither resisting or aiding the Germans; he had burned his Party membership card when the Germans closed in on his village. After the German retreat, he was sent to the Sonkovo raion, further behind the front line, and was called up for service in the Red Army. From November 1942 until March 1945, he fought in the army, without ever mentioning his Party membership to the Party organization of the army unit in which he served. This, combined with his passivity during the occupation, was the pretext for his exclusion. Perhaps further judicial steps were taken against him after his exclusion. This seems unlikely, since there was no

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<sup>122</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, 1.597.

reference in the records, when there usually was one when criminal procedures were instigated against a former Party member.

Tsvetkov's attitude seems fairly typical for many Soviet citizens at the beginning of the war. The Party and Soviet government appeared to be on the verge of collapse, so one could easily conclude that resistance against the Germans was useless, and that it would be best to try to adapt to the new rulers. After all, in October 1941, almost all the Party and government apparatus evacuated Moscow, and only at the last moment, did Stalin himself apparently decide to stay and lead the city's defense.

Tsvetkov's decision came at the time when the Kalinin oblast was being marauded by the Germans, and nothing seemed capable of bringing the German advance to a halt. Even if he had made a conscious decision to await further developments, Tsvetkov's decision to remain would be understandable. He seemed to have served his duty after the German retreat, when he was called up for army service and had regained confidence in the Soviet regime's ability to survive the onslaught. In the end, he ran out of luck after the war, when the Party began to check the war record of its members, and Tsvetkov was exposed as having survived on German-occupied territory. How far he tried, after the war, to "rejoin" the Party (paying his dues, attending meetings, et cetera) before he was exposed, is foggy.

One wonders what Tsvetkov should have done to minimize the damage. Obviously, he decided against reporting on his "sin" during or after the war, hoping to pass unnoticed. This was somewhat naive, since the Party's control of its membership was one of its more

efficient activities. Would he have been wiser to give himself up immediately in 1942? The answer is probably no because, in the confusion of wartime, he might have been regarded as an outright Nazi collaborator, and he executed or sentenced to a long term in the camps. 'Tsvetkov must have feared of being equated with the German and Japanese spies who had been exposed everywhere between 1936 and 1938. Perhaps his behaviour was in the end the wisest. He lost his Party membership in 1946, but he may have escaped more severe punishments.

Others deserted the Red Army in 1941, since they probably had lost all faith in a Soviet victory. The kolkhoznik M.I. Gantsev, of the same birth year as 'Tsvetkov, deserted in 1941, joined the army once more under another name in 1942, and became a candidate member of the Party in 1943<sup>123</sup>. In 1946 he was exposed and shunned from the Party. The MVD was investigating the case further at the time of his expulsion.

That all was not well with the citizenry's steadfast loyalty behind the lines is illustrated by a remark in the protocol of the obkom plenum of November 1942:

'The party organizations of the oblast', especially of the districts at the front line and of the districts liberated from the German aggressors, do not appreciate the exceptional character of political work among the population in wartime; they combat the effects of the German occupation inadequately, and do not expose and eradicate when they should the diffusion of all kinds of rumours and unhealthy attitudes among several groups of the inhabitants.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>123</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, 1.659.

<sup>124</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.105; compare to Kondukova, p.26.

The level of propaganda in certain places cannot have been very conducive to the eradication of these "unhealthy attitudes," if people were treated, for example, to explanations about the postponed opening of a second front by the Allies, at the Krasnaia Zvezda factory of Kimry:

The agitator Chudova answers to the question of a [female] worker, why the second front is not opened and where it could be opened:

"This is a war secret, about which no one is allowed to speak, otherwise our enemies will find out. Moreover, one cannot say as well, where the second front will be opened, whether on the Kalinin front, whether on the Moscow one. Wherever it will be more advantageous, there it will be opened."<sup>125</sup>

Religion and all kinds of superstitious beliefs gained some ground during the war<sup>126</sup>. A Soviet postwar publication disparagingly described this phenomenon:

Almost in every district, from the ranks of either spiritually inferior people or deliberate charlatans, fortune-tellers and soothsayers appeared who exploited naive women and became wealthy on their account.<sup>127</sup>

At some point between August 1943 and May 1945, the Central Committee (that is, its Orghuro and Sekretariat that handled the affairs in between the sparse plenums of the CC) made the obkom report on the oblast's state of affairs, with particular respect to the problems of the economic recovery, and to the improvement of the *agitprop* work among the population at large<sup>128</sup>.

<sup>125</sup> Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.118.

<sup>126</sup> Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.286.

<sup>127</sup> Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.286.

<sup>128</sup> Kondratova, p.34.

In July 1944, the new chair of the oblast' ispolkom, Simonov, returned to the subject of the pernicious influence of the Germans on the minds of the locals:

In the first place, we should not forget that the absolute majority of those Komsomols and youth, as well as the rest of the population liberated from the German occupation --who lived on territory occupied by the enemy for a longer period-- were cut off from the Motherland, and, naturally, did not find out about all that has happened during this time. They have not been explained, for instance, how this "miracle" occurred, that in the course of the war, in the beginning so unfavourable for our country, all of a sudden a turn around took place and the enemy has come to the edge of destruction.<sup>129</sup>

This is a revealing way of putting it; perhaps it conveys again something of the surprise of the Soviet Communists and of others that the Soviet troops in the end did fight for their country and managed to defeat the Nazis, and that the prewar system could be restored without too many problems in most areas (except in the areas annexed in 1939-1940). Stalin's total despair in the first two weeks of the German attack was perhaps typical for the initial attitude of some of the Communists, for example, of those, who did not flee from the German troops<sup>130</sup>. Simonov continued his speech by exclaiming:

<sup>129</sup> Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.149ob.

<sup>130</sup> For Stalin's reaction to the beginning of the war see Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*. Ed. and trans. by Harold Shukman, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991, pp.405-414. It is still, I presume, a matter of some controversy how many Soviet troops at the beginning of the war deliberately, willingly, surrendered, and how many were forced to surrender, so to say, owing to German encirclement et cetera. In 1941, some apparently thought that German rule would be preferable to Soviet rule ("Moskva voennaia," p.112). Perhaps it is appropriate to speak of a "miracle," when trying to describe the stubborn resistance the Soviet troops put up, defending a system which had so much previously oppressed them. It might be that traditional patriotic loyalties, skillfully exploited by Stalin, proved decisive. Incidentally, according to A.A. Kondrashov, Starotorzhskii had made way for Simonov, because of the promotion of the

Secondly, at the time of the occupation, the Hitlerite blackguards spread the most shameless lying demagoguery about the course of the war, about the situation in the Soviet rear and the international position of the USSR. They tried to poison our people with the venom of doubt and disbelief in the possibility of the return of Soviet power and the former life. They distributed the most vile slander about the system in the Soviet Union, tried to discredit the kolkhoz system and, although the efforts of the fascist occupants and their stooges to intimidate the population were shipwrecked, still some backward people came close to accepting the bait, apart from those traitors who wittingly sold themselves. Among them the opinion arose that the Germans were not all that bloodthirsty, not those kind of robbers and ...[unclear in text] as we had portrayed them.<sup>131</sup>

It is undoubtedly true that the returning Soviet authorities more easily reestablished the former pre-1941 order in the only briefly occupied parts of the Kalinin oblast', than in areas only annexed by the USSR in 1939-1940 which spent a longer period in German hands<sup>132</sup>. However, the mood in the newly "liberated" Russian regions was far from satisfactory for a long while after the German retreat as well. In order to improve matters on the ideological front, the Central Committee dedicated several resolutions to the importance of political education of those who, at some point or other, had been banefully influenced by the Germans or the West<sup>133</sup>.

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former to the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR (testimony of A.A. Kondrashov in the survey). In the middle of October 1941 the whole system temporarily collapsed in Moscow as a result of the rapid German advance on the city and the ensuing panic ("Moskva voennaya," p.102). Undoubtedly, a similar collapse occurred in Kalinin at this time.

<sup>131</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.149ob.

<sup>132</sup>Kondakova, p.25.

<sup>133</sup>Kondakova, p.25, names two general resolutions, one of 1943-"*O meropriyatiakh po usileniu kulturno-prosvetitel'noi raboty v raionakh, osvobodivshiesya ot nemetskoi okkupatsii*"-, and one of 1945-"*Ob organizatsii politiko-vospitatel'noi raboty s*

The judiciary was involved in the speedy resurrection of the passport regimentation in the liberated areas, and in the trials of active Nazi collaborators<sup>134</sup>.

While Simonov's speech of July 1944 may wander into abstract notions, another speech at the same plenum by the Military Tribunal head, Starilov, can be found, which gives a more concrete picture of the lack of order in Stalinist, war torn Central Russia<sup>135</sup>. After Starilov had pointed out that *khuliganstvo* and other forms of crime were recently on the rise, he provided some specifics:

Except for *khuliganstvo*, a particularly characteristic sort of crime is the carrying of arms, including firearms; moreover, these weapons are actually used in violent robberies. I will mention a number of examples, which are a colourful illustration of the shortcomings of our work [with the education of the youth]. At the railroad-car construction factory the secretary of the Komsomol committee, Martynov, stood at the head of one group of hooligans; he, together with others, organized a group of hooligans, armed with knives and revolvers. They kicked up a row, moreover, not only at their own factory, but also in other places; these hooligans went into the Voroshilov club and provoked fights and beatings. Once they were arrested, they attacked the *militsionery* [policemen], killed one, and the other one had to flee.

... Thus not long ago, in June something else happened: near the drama theatre they killed one *militsioner*, wounded another one.

...These kind of things take place at the railroad-car factory and especially flourish strongly in Vyshnii Volochek, where we are examining many cases of *khuliganstva*

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*repatriirovannyimi sovetskimi grazhdanami*, although there were many more, in particular resolutions concerning a specific republic or oblast'.

<sup>134</sup>Bilenko, Borodin, Maslov, p.115.

<sup>135</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.154.

...We are publicly examining these cases in the military tribunal; we try to influence the unstable as much as possible through open trials, but that is not enough.<sup>136</sup>

In the scarcity of the war period, several people had apparently no scruples about making a profit off the backs of their needy compatriots: in December 1944 alone, the local NKVD arrested 264 people for theft, speculation, and similar offenses<sup>137</sup>. Another 114 were arraigned strictly for fraud and theft of grain in the countryside. In the same month, 350 people were still on the run who had deserted the Red Army or dodged the draft<sup>138</sup>. Some of these had already deserted in 1942. Bandits were also terrorizing some areas<sup>139</sup>. How far these phenomena were a consequence of the pernicious Nazi propaganda is not clear. They probably resulted from the system's breakdown in 1941-1942, that led some people to believe that it was worth taking risks, attempting to profit from the temporary chaos following the German invasion. Others might have simply increased the scope of their criminal activities because, in spite of the official propaganda, what perhaps could be called "professional criminality" existed both before and after the war in Stalinist Russia<sup>140</sup>.

The incidence of orphaned children multiplied due to the enormous losses the Soviet population sustained during the war. On January 1, 1946, 7,480 orphans were counted in the oblast', 4,252 of

<sup>136</sup> Moscow, 17/44/546, I.154.

<sup>137</sup> Puko, 147/3/2748, I.18-22.

<sup>138</sup> Puko, 147/3/2748, II.23-25.

<sup>139</sup> Puko, 147/3/2748, II.28-31.

<sup>140</sup> See Chapter VI in particular. The hardened criminal convicts in the labour camps, who are to be encountered in almost any description of camp life under Stalin, provide other testimony of flourishing crime in the USSR.



whom were living in orphanages (*na patronate*), and 3,228 of whom were in wardship<sup>141</sup>. The number of "neglected" (*beznadzornye*) and homeless (*besprizornye*) children became a problem for the Soviet authorities<sup>142</sup>. In the absence of supervision, some of them became little criminals, even when housed in an orphanage, of which examples will follow<sup>143</sup>.

The Kalinin oblast's Komsomol had come under the attack of the Central Committee of the VLKSM in April 1942, when the deficient reorganization of the Komsomol in the recently liberated areas was criticized<sup>144</sup>. Komsomol obkom secretary Ivanov complained about the small proportion of Komsomol membership among the oblast' youth two years later<sup>145</sup>. Of the more than 300,000 youngsters who reached Komsomol age, only 60,000 had chosen to join. This is an illustration of the depletion of Komsomol ranks in the first war years: at the beginning of the war, the Communist Youth League had counted 138,135 members in the oblast'<sup>146</sup>. The frustration of the Komsomol Central Committee two years earlier becomes understandable if, even in the middle of 1944, so few young people were attracted to join the League's ranks.

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<sup>141</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.136ob.

<sup>142</sup>Bilenko, Borodin, Maslov, pp.114/115.

<sup>143</sup>Their fate is graphically described in some of the works of Vladimir Maksimov; see VI.3 and VI.4.

<sup>144</sup>Kirichek, p.90.

<sup>145</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, II. 161ob/162. This plenum was staged before --in July 1944-- the separation of the parts of the Velikie Luki oblast' in August 1944. The statement of Kirichek, that an obkom plenum in 1942 or 1943 took decisions on the Komsomol could not be verified in the archive (Kirichek, p.89). However, the plenum of July 1944 did deal with the "...improvement of Komsomol- and party work among the youth..." of the oblast' (see Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.113 ff.).

<sup>146</sup>Kirichek, p.77.

However, the situation in the Kalinin oblast' was by no means exceptional, for on January 1, 1945, the Komsomol in all liberated areas of the USSR had but 40% of its prewar membership<sup>147</sup>. The depletion of the ranks had been extremely severe in the areas that had undergone occupation, since at the moment of liberation of the last of them, in the thirty-eight formerly occupied raions of the pre-August 1944 Kalinin oblast', only 9,213 Komsomols were counted, where there had been more than 47,000 in 1941<sup>148</sup>. Komsomol leader Ivanov was of the opinion that, owing to the fathers' absence in the families and the mothers' employment, children remained without sufficient supervision while growing up; the Komsomol should have been filling this void<sup>149</sup>. The youth, however, demonstrated its good points: it was responsible for clearing the mines, rendering harmless 600,000 explosive units found in the soil, basements, and ruins in 1,700 settlements throughout the oblast'<sup>150</sup>. Furthermore, soon after the expulsion of the Germans, the Komsomol organized field-crop cultivation "links" (*zven'ia*) for the attainment of the highest possible harvest<sup>151</sup>.

In July 1944, conservative family values were highlighted by the head of the oblast' health-care department, Ermolov, who tried to emphasise the importance of the decree of June 8, 1944, of the Supreme Soviet<sup>152</sup>. His oratorical style stands out as markedly

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<sup>147</sup>See the footnote of Kirichek on p.93.

<sup>148</sup>V.G. Eremin, "O vklade molodezhi v likvidatsiiu ushcherba, nanesennogo fashistskoi okkupatsiei," in: *Vozrozhdenie*, pp. 96-107, p.97.

<sup>149</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, ll.162/162ob.

<sup>150</sup>Eremin, pp.99/100.

<sup>151</sup>Eremin, p.106.

<sup>152</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, l.166ob.

hypocritical, even more than that of most other speakers at this and later plenums. Instead of frankly admitting that the Party and government had realized that it was necessary to increase the birthrate to compensate for the immense slaughterhouse of the war, he explained the decree as follows:

Comrades, the Ukaz of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on motherhood and infancy, published on June 8, is a most important historical document of the party of the bolsheviks and the Soviet government. In the terrible days of the patriotic war the government issued a new law full of love for mother and child. This document once more underlines the concern of the government for mother and child, for the strengthening of the foundations of the family, the basis of Soviet morality. The Soviet country liberated woman from great oppression, lifting up to a new height the woman-mother, who rears the children. The rearing of children has become a case of valour and honour.<sup>153</sup>

Goodbye, Alexandra Kollontai! Girls had to be impregnated with the feelings of motherhood; special attention should be paid to this in the education of the youth<sup>154</sup>.

Perhaps this is merely a florid testament of the simple proposition that: "...the Communist state is interested in increasing the population, and consequently increasing the birthrate."<sup>155</sup>

The demographic tables, discussed more extensively in Chapter VII, show that the natural population growth was in fact negative around this time<sup>156</sup>. This, combined with earlier civilian losses and

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<sup>153</sup>Ibid. In 1936 abortion had become once more illegal, which led to a rise in "back-alley abortions" and to the use of anti-conceptive home-remedies that were dangerous to the health (Engel, p.319). See also VII.2 on the extent of illegal abortions after the war.

<sup>154</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.166ob.

<sup>155</sup>I.A. Kurganoff, Women in the USSR, S.B.O.N.R. Publishing House, London, Ontario, 1971, p.147.

<sup>156</sup>See Tables 2, 5, and 6.

the deaths at the front, made it imperative to substantially raise the province's natality. The high mortality during the 1942-1944 period is a sign of the extreme hardships and malnutrition that plagued the population in the rear<sup>157</sup>. The countryside especially suffered from the privations<sup>158</sup>.

First oblast' secretary Boitsov summarized the war's consequences for the oblast' in January 1945<sup>159</sup>. 96% of the conscripts from 1940 to 1944 inclusive had been literate. In the oblast' seventy-three destruction battalions were formed during the war, into which more than 2,000 Communists and more than 1,000 Komsomols were sent<sup>160</sup>. *Opolchenie* (somewhat similar to the British Home Guard of World War II, distinct from the regular police, which in Russian is called *militiia*) units were formed by Communists and Komsomols. The oblast' became a battlefield from August 1941 onwards. At that time the government ordered the oblast' to construct a defensive line of 240 kilometers in the shortest possible time. The Party *aktiv* led hundreds of thousands workers and kolkhozniks in building this defense. Up to thirty strong points were created. These fortifications were constructed within a

<sup>157</sup>See Tables 5 and 6.

<sup>158</sup>Compare to I.E. Zelenin, rev. of Ural'skaia derevnia v period velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg.), by G.E. Kornilov, and of Kolkhozy Urala v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, by V.P. Motrevich, in: Istoriia SSSR, 6, 1991, pp.168-172, p.170.

<sup>159</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, II.12ob.,13.

<sup>160</sup>These were subordinate to the NKVD, and after the German retreat continued to exist, although they no longer were engaged in finding German paratroopers (Pako, 147/3/2679,II.89/90). Instead they focussed strictly on the eradiction of criminality. The battalions consisted predominantly of pre-conscription age boys. By January 1945 more than 17,000 veterans of the destruction battalions had been transferred to the Red Army or to partisan detachments.

very short period in 1941 (from June to October). They had a most important defensive significance, and, Boitsov added proudly, had played their role in stopping the German advance. Afterwards, in 1942 and 1943, roads were built, and the defensive fortification combined with these roads undoubtedly made the battle operations of the Red Army easier. According to the Party leader, these construction works turned into

...a serious school of patriotic education of a large mass of people, a test of their determination in the face of danger, a test of their preparedness to do all for the defense of their native soil against the enemy<sup>161</sup>.

The oblast's toilers donated more than 200 million rubles to the country's defense fund during the war<sup>162</sup>. Apart from this, they collected and sent packages to the front. 150 tons of meat and dairy products, 455 tons of potatoes and vegetables, 6.5 tons of tobacco, fifty-five tons of bread and confectionery products, more than 250,000 varied goods, and so on, were dispatched. Evacuation hospitals were equipped by workers and kolkhozniks. Women working for the Red Cross were singled out for praise by Boitsov. Never wanting to give the impression that he failed to notice certain negative phenomena, he mentioned that, unfortunately, among several of the hospitalized soldiers instances of hooliganism and drunkenness had occurred. Party and government had constantly concerned themselves with the care for the families of the soldiers and invalids. Livestock, firewood, clothes, and pensions had been distributed. On December 1, 1944, 22,096 invalids lived within the

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<sup>161</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, I.13.

<sup>162</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, II.13/13ob.

oblast' borders, 17,134 of whom had been provided with work, mainly in agriculture. About 2,000 of them were engaged in prominent kolkhoz, soviet, and Party work. Courses were created for the requalification of invalids. For those who needed permanent care, invalid houses had been opened, graced with some farmland, animals, fowl, and beehives. Furthermore, financial aid was handed out to invalids.

However, the state of affairs was not so apparently sunny for everyone. Certain raion bosses had to be warned, inasmuch as their districts failed to support the families of soldiers and invalids. It transpired that one request was rejected by the department of welfare in Sandovo raion, because the raion's grain reserves had been exhausted. And this case was far from unique, as five other raions were criticized for neglecting the provision of aid to families who were legally entitled to it. One suspects that it was simply insurmountable for the welfare departments to come up with any relief funds because of the poor economic situation of these raions in wartime<sup>163</sup>.

At the end of this part of Boitsov's speech --to which we will return in the next chapter--, he uttered a complaint about the dismal state of the *fizkul'tur* and sports' associations in the oblast'<sup>164</sup>.

One interesting development might have transpired under the influence of the patriotic wave generated by the war. Some Party members noticed in 1945 a genuine improvement in the kolkhozniks'

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<sup>163</sup>In 1944 the raiispolkom of Olenino raion turned away several requests for bread of "very needy" families of conscripts, because it did not have any bread reserves left (Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.49).

<sup>164</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.14.

attitude during the war<sup>165</sup>. As a consequence, the produce that they were obliged to hand over to the state was now regularly delivered. However, it is not impossible that the improvement of the labour discipline partially resulted from the widespread use of plenipotentiaries (*upolnomochennye*) in the countryside<sup>166</sup>. Furthermore, the labour discipline did not improve unrestrictedly. Particularly in their obligatory work in the wood procurement industry, many kolkhozniks continued to operate below the norm<sup>167</sup>.

### IV.3 Demobilization

Soon after the conference of January 1945, the Party was forced to consider the effect of the imminent return of Red Army soldiers to the oblast'. In June 1945, an obkom plenum discussed the dangers connected with this<sup>168</sup>. In September 1945 a second group of

<sup>165</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.47.

<sup>166</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 11.47ob.-48ob., 1.51. These plenipotentiaries, judging by the remarks of different obkom members in these records of early 1945, had special authority and could order everyone living on a certain territory to aid the completion of a particularly urgent agricultural task. Some of them were appointed by the obkom and sent to the raions, where they had the responsibility for the successful performance of the whole raion in agriculture; others were dispatched by the raikoms, and had the responsibility for the kolkhozy of one or several rural soviets, or even of just one or more collective farms. Some plenipotentiaries were responsible for non-agricultural sectors of the economy, such as the wood procurements in a certain area. After May 1945 plenipotentiaries were used almost as often as during the war. Furthermore, it is likely that even more radical punishments were applied during the war for the failure to discharge of the obligations for grain deliveries to the state. In the Urals, some kolkhoz directors were even executed for this offense (Zelenin, rev., p.170). Rank-and-file kolkhozniks were threatened by severe penalties for failing to work the minimum of *trudodni*, which were significantly increased on April 13, 1942.

<sup>167</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.49ob.; several kolkhozniks avoided the work in the forests fully or partially by resorting to bribery of those responsible for the upkeep of the workbooks (*trudovye knizhki*).

<sup>168</sup>Moscow, 17/45/732, 11.34ob. ff. This discussion was provoked by a Supreme Soviet decree of June 23, 1945, that called for the demobilization from the Soviet army and

servicemen was demobilized. The obkom secretary for propaganda and agitation warned:

...as a result of the Patriotic war and our victory, the contacts of our state with capitalist society have significantly broadened. Today and in the future many of our people are and will be abroad, directly mixing with the capitalist world. In this respect the possibility increased substantially for the penetration in our Soviet midst of bourgeois ideology, and bourgeois ideas and moods<sup>169</sup>.

In July 1945 the question of supplying the demobilized soldiers with work was brought up in an obkom buro session<sup>170</sup>. Those demobilized were mainly the most senior ex-soldiers. The obkom ordered the lower Party committees to provide work for the veterans, in which they could use the skills they had acquired in the army. The calibre of the jobs had at least to equal the work they had done before their call-up. Kolkhoznik veterans were to be provided with a personal cow, if their family did not possess one already. Factory directors were to organize special courses for veterans who were willing to improve their expertise. Several of the veterans would find employment in the NKVD/MVD: in 1946 alone 1,013 were recruited by the security ministry<sup>171</sup>.

Despite the political education the veterans had to endure, it seems clear from this information that they were to be treated with proper respect, and given advantages over people who had not participated in the actual fighting. However, the same record shows

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navy of the oldest veterans among the conscripts: those that belonged to the thirteen oldest years of birth (Sovetskaiia derevnia... p.43).

<sup>169</sup>Moscow, 17/45/732, 1.74.

<sup>170</sup>Pako, 147/3/2701, II.178/179.

<sup>171</sup>Pako, 147/4/811, 1.129.



that there were limits to the Party's preferential treatment of veterans, even if they were invalids. The buro noticed that the care for the invalids in special institutions had been failing<sup>172</sup>. They did not receive sufficient food or medical care, and the institutes were dirty. However, the fact that some invalids thieved and were engaged in selling off state property was not tolerated. In Torzhok raion, fifteen war veterans were thrown out of their institution. It is unclear from the records what these disabled people were supposed to do after their expulsion.

In August 1945 the Central Committee reprimanded the obkom for failing to provide for the returning demobilized soldiers<sup>173</sup>. In Kalinin, some of these men discovered upon their return that their former apartments were being used by other people or for purposes other than housing. Some apartments had not been rebuilt, and some were in urgent need of repair. Families of demobilized soldiers, of those still serving in the army, of war invalids, and of those who perished at the front --if the soldier had been the breadwinner-- did not receive the legal ration of consumer goods, nor the fuel that had been promised to them. Apart from that, of the almost 10,000 demobilized who had arrived in the oblast' by August 15, 1945, only 3,276 had been employed. In certain rural areas the veterans had not been obliged to participate in agricultural work, which was unforgivable at harvest time.

The situation had improved by October 1945, but the obkomburo apparently was still very worried about the destiny of

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<sup>172</sup>Pako, 147/3/2701, 1.183ob.

<sup>173</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.56.

demobilized soldiers<sup>174</sup>. On October 1, already 22,904 army veterans were counted within the oblast', of whom 53% had found work. Their housing remained inadequate; some of them did not receive either their entitled pensions nor tax breaks. Rzhev was singled out for its neglect of the heroic defenders of the Motherland. More than three hundred of their families were housed in dugouts and hovels for lack of decent alternatives. The head of the town's welfare department, Miasnikov, was dismissed by the obkomburo for what was called a "criminally negligent attitude towards his work."<sup>175</sup>

By July 20, 1946, 69,367 demobilized soldiers were in the Kalinin oblast'<sup>176</sup>. Boitsov reported around this time to Zhdanov on the veterans' reentry in the labour force, emphasising in particular the political work conducted among them. The Central Committee had underlined the weightiness of this political work and given guidelines for it in a resolution on May 27, 1946<sup>177</sup>. Towards July 1946, 59,558 of all returned veterans had found employment; out of the last group of returnees, already 5,919 (70%) had found work. Among the almost 70,000 who had made their way home by this month, there were 19,661 full and candidate Party members<sup>178</sup>. By October 1 of the same year, 74,756 demobilized servicemen had

<sup>174</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, II.241-243.

<sup>175</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, I.241ob.

<sup>176</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, II.179/180ob.

<sup>177</sup>The title of the resolution was *"O politicheskoi rabote sredi demobilizovannykh iz Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuzn SSR, v svyazi s demobilizatsiei tret'ei ocheredi lichnogo sostava Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuzn SSR."* (Pako, 147/4/63, I.179).

<sup>178</sup>Thus being largely responsible for the exceptional growth of the Party in the years 1945 and 1946.

arrived in the oblast', and 95.5% had found work<sup>179</sup>. In the end, perhaps 93,000 to 94,000 war veterans returned to the Kalinin oblast' from the Red Army<sup>180</sup>.

Another group of natives were tracing their way home to the Kalinin oblast after the war: those who had been forced to go to Germany (few had departed willingly). In the last three months of 1945, 3,481 such people returned to the Kalinin oblast'<sup>181</sup>. They all, apart perhaps from the 113 children among them, underwent the so-called *filtratsiia*: the NKVD check on their behaviour and activities in Germany. NKVD head Pavlov informed Boitsov that thirteen people had been discovered who were German spies, *Polizei*, or other collaborators. The example of the burgomaster of Rzhev has already been related. Towards the end of 1946, 3,492 former Soviet prisoners of war were counted in the oblast', 396 of whom had

<sup>179</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.214; out of the 10,554 of the "third group", 95% had found work.

<sup>180</sup>See Table 8. In some ways the rather late demobilization of many conscripts is somewhat mysterious. Perhaps the events in the reconquered territories in the Baltic, western Belorussia, and western Ukraine were a cause for the late release of so many of them. N.D. Eliseev had been in the army since 1942, and reached Lubeck with his unit in 1945. However, he had to wait until 1947 to return to Kalinin. He gave an impression of the activities of the Soviet army in the Baltic region: "By the way, in Germany itself there was no resistance after the victory: we went around without being cautious, without arms. And then, when they transported us to our own territories --to the Baltic--, we had to endure a great deal of fear. In Lithuania not one day passed without one of the soldiers being killed. They were able to throw a noose over a soldier who was walking along the sidewalk, from a gateway, or from the second floor [of a building], and hang him from a tree. I walked along the middle of the street with a Parabellum in my briefcase --the whole time I was alert. Once in the town of Kaunas anxiety rose to a pitch. Groups were formed: five soldiers and an NKVD or army counter-intelligence officer heading it. They ordered us to comb out every apartment. All, both the right-wing ones, and the guilty ones [presumably of armed resistance against Soviet rule], were at the slightest suspicion loaded onto trains and sent off into the depths of Russia, to Siberia. When the election campaign began, a part of the local inhabitants actively resisted it: they burned the polling stations, murdered soldiers, who stood guard. Once, when I was on duty as head of the guard, an attack took place that was aimed at the blowing up of the unit's storage of ammunition" (testimony of N.D. Eliseev in the survey).

<sup>181</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, 11.17-22.

served as Red Army officers<sup>182</sup>. However, this number did not include those who have been placed in the "first category" by the MGB and MVD, according to this record<sup>183</sup>. Ostensibly those who fell under this "first category" ended up in Soviet camps or were executed outright. This information renders the claim that all former POW's were immediately sent on to Soviet camps rather difficult to maintain<sup>184</sup>.

It seems that the reintegration of the veterans into peacetime society was not extremely difficult in the Kalinin oblast'. They were perhaps at times looked upon with a measure of suspicion by the authorities, but the latter did not really have sufficient time to concern themselves with the ideological orthodoxy of demobilized soldiers. Because of the labour shortage there was plenty of work for them, and the ex-soldiers themselves must have been glad to have survived it all, longing for a more quiet way of living after the hardships of the front. As they were often lauded for their part in the defense of the Motherland, received special privileges (for example, special stores for war veterans) and preferential treatment when seeking work, the degree of alienation among them would have been slight, and they did not seem to encounter exceptional difficulties in adjusting themselves to the realities of peacetime.

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<sup>182</sup>Pako, 147/4/67, 1.226; the report is of December 31, 1946. See below on the fate of some of the respondents of the survey in the *fil'tratsia*.

<sup>183</sup>Pako, 147/4/67, 1.226ob.

<sup>184</sup>Fainsod's sober appreciation of the treatment of repatriates and the demobilized is probably close to the truth (Fainsod, *How...*, p.257). It is hard to assess how many of the repatriates were former émigrés, and how many had been either prisoners of war or forced labourers, although it seems obvious that the first group must have been very small in the Kalinin oblast'. See IV.4 as well.

#### IV.4 The Experience of the War

All the official Soviet accounts, and the one by Lubov (which reads like an official Soviet account) do not manage to convey the population's experience of the war as a whole<sup>185</sup>. In this dissertation, the stories of the survey interviewees can produce a clearer idea of what the war actually meant to the Russian people, what horrors the individual had to endure, how people coped with the extraordinary situation<sup>186</sup>. From the interviews a highly varied picture emerges. First of all, many of the men sent to the front never returned<sup>187</sup>. Those who did return had often become invalids. Obviously, most women did not serve in the army, although some worked as nurses. Many helped with the building of defense trenches, with logging, and so on. In 1941 almost 140,000 people, largely

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<sup>185</sup>As A. Portelli pointed out, be it in a language somewhat top-heavy with Marxist or Gramscian ideas about the hegemony of ruling classes:

"Oral history is not where the working classes speak for themselves. The contrary statement, of course, would not be entirely unfounded: the recounting of a strike through the words and memories of workers rather than those of the police and the (often unfriendly) press obviously helps (though not automatically) to balance a distortion implicit in the sources. Oral sources are a necessary (not a sufficient) condition for a history of the nonhegemonic classes; they are less necessary (though my [sic] no means useless) for the history of the ruling classes, who have had control over writing and leave behind a much more abundant written record" (Portelli, pp.55/56).

<sup>186</sup>See, for a similar approach, A.M. Samsonov, *Znat' i pomnit'*.

<sup>187</sup>The husbands of N.G. Timofeeva, V.F. Akimova, A.N. Ivanova, Z.M. Vinogradova, M.N. Nadyseva, A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva, M.I. Veselova, E.S. Shigorenkova, P.N. Bashilova, L.P. Fel'kova, A.Z. Zhuravleva, A.V. Skobeleva, the father of N.N. Osipova, and six(!) relatives of M.M. Golovnova all died at the front (testimony of the same in the survey). N.D. Eliseev lost a brother (testimony of the same in the survey). A.S. Efremov said that after the war in his native village in Emel'ianovo raion, men returned from the front to only five out of eighty houses. Other than him, no one of his birth year returned home. The conscripts of the birth year 1925 fell all near Rzhev, according to Efremov (testimony of A.S. Efremov in the survey). In the sixty households of the village of Korosteleva only three of the men after the war returned home (testimony of A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva in the survey).

kolhozniks --and probably females--, were engaged in building defensive works<sup>188</sup>. In the rear, women took over many of the jobs involving heavy physical labour that had been done exclusively by men before the commencement of hostilities<sup>189</sup>. Pensioners rejoined the work force<sup>190</sup>. The population in the rear worked between twelve to eighteen hours a day in the autumn of 1941<sup>191</sup>. Quite a few people were under German occupation for a while. Some men became partisans. Some, undoubtedly, collaborated with the Germans, but their testimony is lost, since they were dealt with summarily after the war, with the exception of a few who managed to cover up their activities after the return of Soviet power, or of those who escaped to the West with the retreating German armies, avoiding the reevacuation of Soviet citizens. One has to assume, though, that most lost their lives during, or immediately after, the war.

No one of the respondents could be classified as an outright collaborator, but that collaboration was not such an outlandish move became clear from the stories of quite a few people, who maintained that the German occupiers behaved quite decently, and that at least some of Hitler's troops did nothing to cause resentment or hate among the native population. It makes sense that someone observing this might be willing to perform certain tasks or services for the Germans without having to be coerced into doing so. Although we

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<sup>188</sup>Korytkov, Kalininskoe selo, p.38.

<sup>189</sup>I.D. Korzun, "Kalininskie vagonostroiteli i pervye mesiatsy velikoi otechestvennoi voyny (iun'-dekabria 1941 goda)", pp.275-286, in: Iz proshlogo i nastoiashchego Kalininskoi oblasti (istoriko-kraevedcheskii sbornik), Vyp.I, Moskva: "Moskovskii rabochii", 1965, p.276.

<sup>190</sup>Korzun, "Kalininskie...", p.279.

<sup>191</sup>Korytkov, Kalininskoe selo, p.38.

know that many Party members sacrificed their lives at the front, died as partisans, and were sometimes deliberately sent behind the German lines to organize or aid partisan units, Party membership, or more particularly full-time work as a local Party leader, kept some from actively participating in the fighting.

'The women of the non-occupied part of the oblast' continued to do the same kind of work as before 1941, working on collective farms or in the towns' factories. 'The difference was that the amount of labour increased immeasurably. No one enjoyed any leisure time during the war. The war stamped a tremendous impression on all people without exception: the male population was decimated or worse in certain villages, and almost anyone lost family members in the war, both in town and country<sup>192</sup>. For example, Mariia Mikhailovna Golovnova, of above mentioned Konakovo raion, reminisced:

... I worked in the rear, helped the front. Brought up the [seven] children, milked the cow. I did not engage in combat, but my three brothers and three brothers-in-law were killed at the front. My husband they took to work at the mines, although he was excused from the front. In the mines he, too, found his end.

...The German [forces] did not reach us, the swamp stopped them. It [the swamp] is large here. Their machines also got stuck. The battles were huge, the killed soldiers were buried in the village of Selikhovo. Here several times more Russians were killed than Germans.

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<sup>192</sup>As Laqueur wrote rightfully: "The "Great Fatherland War" has been the central event in Soviet postwar consciousness." (Laqueur, *Stalin...*, p.213). Compare also to Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia...(1945-1946)," p.5.

In 1941, the Germans threw a bomb on the village -- it fell on our house, the house was in splinters--, father was killed.<sup>193</sup>

Several other female respondents continued to work in the rear, while most men fought at the front, and if so, they were almost always wounded<sup>194</sup>.

Some people lived for a while under German occupation; for instance Mariia Matveevna Kozenkova-Pavlova states:

At the time of the war I worked in our native kolkhoz. I was a participant of defensive works: I dug trenches under Staritsa, sawed wood for the front.

...The Germans were not long in our village. Father dug a trench, and I with the small children [two at the time] sat in there, when they were shooting. The Germans took many goods: eggs, fowl, destroyed the beehives. We hid food and victuals from them. We did not betray communists. They did not kill anyone in our village. The Germans took my grammophone from me -- a present from my husband.<sup>195</sup>

Mariia Ivanovna Veselova also could not escape German occupation:

Yes, the Emel'ianovo raion was occupied from October 12 to December 1941. It is terrible to remember those years [i.e. the war years]. The Germans took our cow from us. They immediately stole eleven cows from the village, grabbed all meat that was buried in pits, all food products, except for potatoes, beets, pickles, and onions, but luckily the old house survived. But it was possible to live; we were very happy

<sup>193</sup>Testimony of M.M. Golovnova in the survey. It is remarkable that many of the survey respondents used the singular *Nemets* for the (Nazi-) Germans instead of the plural *Nemtsy*. The use of the singular transforms the enemy into something not altogether human, something quintessentially evil.

<sup>194</sup>A.M. Afanas'ev was wounded and demobilized after three months in the hospital in 1942 (testimony of A.M. Afanas'ev in the survey). Often they were injured more than once, as in the case of V.P. Gavrilov, who was demobilized in 1943 after his second injury, and in the case of the three-times-wounded N.A. Arkhangel'skii, P.A. Kashinov, and A.F. Antonov (testimony of V.P. Gavrilov, P.A. Kashinov, A.F. Antonov, and N.A. Arkhangel'skii in the survey).

<sup>195</sup>Testimony of M.M. Kozenkova-Pavlova in the survey.



when again ours came. From January 2, I once more started to work in the school in the village in which my own mother lived (just across the Volga); our house [probably of the mother] was burned (the Germans set it afire) but our cow remained, which ran into the woods and was saved, thus Mama also helped us to live.<sup>196</sup>

Although it is true that a large part of the population of the town of Kalinin was evacuated, not everyone left town, which explains the seemingly contradictory answers Evgeniia Stepanovna Shirochenkova gave<sup>197</sup>. She was born in Tver', lived in Kalinin during the war, and is still living in the town today. When she was asked what she did during the war, she answered that she worked (she gave her profession as factory weaver). But in reply to the next question, if she lived in German occupied territory at some time during the war, she stated that she did not, "...and in Tver' the German [army] was only for a short while...", perhaps indicating that she tried to conceal that she resided in Kalinin at the time.

On the whole, it should be remembered that after the war it was not appreciated if one had lived under Nazi occupation. Not only was the government highly suspicious of this, but even one's neighbours might ostracize (or denounce!) one. In the Tver' of today the war is often a sacred cow. I observed for myself in 1991 and 1992 that even now it is unwise to declare that one has not always been on the right side of the front line. Nikolai Dmitrievich Eliseev was in Kalinin in October 1941:

I lived as a student for two months on temporarily occupied territory, when the German [troops] took Kalinin. Our

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<sup>196</sup>Testimony of M.I. Veselova in the survey.

<sup>197</sup>Testimony of E.S. Shirochenkova in the survey.

family did not manage to evacuate: the bridge over the Volga was already mined and they did not allow us, a family and a handcart with luggage, to cross to the other side of the river. We returned home. German tanks came in sight in the direction of Migalovo. We boys, who still had no fear for the occupiers, went out into the streets. The German tank personnel gave us chocolate. In the area where the Iuzhnyi raion is today was a civilian airfield. The Germans used it as an airfield for their planes. In our house a German officer was billeted the pilot Hans. And through the whole two-month period of occupation we lived under his guardianship without fear and without brutalities. Once two soldiers, obviously Finns, tried to take food from us, but when they saw an officer's uniform in our room they quickly cleared out. In our area the Germans did not commit acts of violence. It is true that I heard that they hung the raikom secretary Sergeev. Soon our troops liberated Kalinin.<sup>198</sup>

Eliseev was then called up for the army in February 1942, and was sent to fight on the Kalinin front<sup>199</sup>. Almost two years later he was wounded in the head and treated for three months in a hospital. He returned to the army in an engineer-sapper brigade at the second Belorussian front, was wounded at the liberation of Warsaw, and was in Lubeck at the time of the German capitulation. His active

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<sup>198</sup>Testimony of N.D. Eliseev in the survey.

<sup>199</sup>Testimony of N.D. Eliseev in the survey. He adds that the war was much more cruel and inhuman than portrayed for a long while in books and films. During the first two weeks in Eastern Prussia in January 1945, the Soviet troops followed the slogan "Death for death, blood for blood," part of an order of the Supreme Command issued at the time of the crossing of the German borders. "...everywhere we appeared, we did terrible things. Our tanks crushed German carts with refugees, the autobahns were a human mash. They raped German women, and at the first sign of resistance executed them.... After a while, clearly, after denunciations [think of the desperate actions of Lev Kopelev as described in his *Khranit' vechno*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ardis, 1975], protests, a new order was issued, pushing the commanders in the opposite direction: 'Death for marauders. To behave peacefully towards the civilian population.' Then, it is true, they allowed packages to be sent home with confiscated property --ten kilograms of packages per month. It was allowed to officers to take German automobiles for their personal use" (Testimony of N.D. Eliseev in the survey). Eliseev is the only one who describes such scenes of the handful of people in the survey who, as Soviet soldiers, reached Germany. It should be added, however, that the respondents were not explicitly asked for details about their army experience in Germany.

service continued for another two years, when he was stationed in Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. In 1947 he was finally demobilized.

The traumatic impression the war left with people is also noticeable in the lengthy answers given to questions dealing with it in the survey. The family of Aleksandr Vasil'evich Zelentsev certainly had an unforgettable experience:

I fought near Stalingrad, and landed in such a mess that it seemed that I belonged to the number of killed, and they sent my parents a message announcing my death. Still, after several months of hospital, I appeared at home, and all gave a start and rejoiced.<sup>200</sup>

Mariia Vasil'evna Bakhtina, a kolkhoz worker, still considers herself fortunate that her husband returned from the front<sup>201</sup>.

Nikolai Arsen'evich Arkhangel'skii said:

I fought from 1942 until the end of the war, and finished it in Germany as sergeant-major. I was three times wounded, the last time in the head, the splinter is yet located in my brain, which was discovered only three years ago. At the beginning of the war, as a youngster, I took it as being not all that serious; but when in July 1941 the Germans started to bomb Udomlia, I sensed how horrible it was.<sup>202</sup>

Nikolai Petrovich Golubev (II), an MTS worker, fought heroically in the war:

In Belorussia in 1941, I fell into captivity, fled, again was captured, again fled, reached the partisans and joined battle in a partisan troop right up to the liberation of Belorussia. I was heavily wounded in the head and demobilized in 1943. I was decorated for participating in the partisan movement, and with the medal "For Bravery".

<sup>200</sup>Testimony of A.V. Zelentsev in the survey.

<sup>201</sup>Testimony of M.V. Bakhtina in the survey.

<sup>202</sup>Testimony of N.V. Arkhangel'skii in the survey.

...In the forests, of course, it wasn't sugary, but the local inhabitants provided us with foodstuffs that somehow poured off from the Germans.<sup>203</sup>

Some people fell into German hands more permanently; in contrast to the idea existing today among some Soviet specialists, when they reached the USSR after their liberation by Soviet or Allied troops, they were not all thrown into the GULag<sup>204</sup>. Apparently, upon return, the NKVD did screen them (in the *fil'tratsia*), but let them return home<sup>205</sup>. Nikolai Fedorovich Alekseev, a kolkhoz bookkeeper, reflects:

From 1939 onwards I served in the army, in 1941 I fell into captivity under Smolensk, I was liberated from captivity in 1945 by the Americans, after which I still served another year in the army.

...Yes, I was in captivity in Germany, was transferred several times, worked on the farms of landowners. The circumstances were difficult.<sup>206</sup>

Later on, he said, answering a question as to whether he ever had experiences with the "organs":

It happened that I had contact with that system after liberation from captivity, when they exposed me to a check.

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<sup>203</sup>Testimony of N.P. Golubev (II) in the survey.

<sup>204</sup>This view is, for instance, represented in the work of Nicholas Bethell on the fate of the Russian POW's after World War II (Nicholas Bethell, The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944-7, London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1974, p. 3 and p.22). Bethell, of course, had no access to any Soviet material on the repatriates. See IV.3 for documentary evidence of the discrimination between the repatriates applied by the NKVD in the *fil'tratsia* process.

<sup>205</sup>An exception is the case of A.S. Lukovkin, who was wounded and captured by the Finns in the Winter War. Upon his return to the USSR in 1940, he was sentenced to five years of labour camp. After his return to Kalinin in 1946, he was never allowed to resume his old job of train driver, and had to work as metal worker until his pension in 1966, although he was rehabilitated in 1957 (testimony of A.S. Lukovkin in the survey).

<sup>206</sup>Testimony of N.F. Alekseev in the survey.

But it wasn't bad, it came to nothing with me, they did not drive me into some kind of camp.<sup>207</sup>

How much this was typical, and thus would undermine Bethell's and others' idea that every Soviet POW ended up in camps after return to the homeland, remains unclear, of course. Nevertheless, because of the documentary evidence and the fact that two more respondents were ex-POWs, who escaped German captivity and joined the partisans, it would be undeniable that the security organs used a degree of discrimination in the *filtratsiia*<sup>208</sup>. Some were allowed to return home after the German retreat and subsequent interrogation by the NKVD, and escaped arrest as traitors to the Motherland. The proportion of ex-POWs who did end up in Soviet camps is dubious at best: Golubev (II) implied that one of his comrade-in-arms served time in a camp as a result of the latter's surrender to the Germans at the beginning of the war<sup>209</sup>. Therefore, ostensibly, a substantial number were sentenced to camp terms upon return.

Petr Arsen'evich Kashinov, a carpenter and sometimes joiner, fought from 1941 to 1945 in the Soviet army, and was wounded three times. He levels a devastating criticism on the conduct of the war by the army staff and officers:

<sup>207</sup>Testimony of N.F. Alekseev in the survey. Again, in IV.3, documentary evidence is described which corroborates Alekseev's point that not all were dispatched to labour camps as punishment for their "surrender" to the Germans.

<sup>208</sup>Testimony of N.P. Golubev (I) and N.P. Golubev (II) in the survey. Nevertheless, there is enough evidence to suggest that many of the former POWs were penalized (A.Z. Vakser, "Personal'nye dela chlenov KPSS kak istoricheskii istochnik," in: *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 5, 1992, pp.91-104, p.98). Apparently, the Central Committee and Sovmin took a resolution in 1956 that was intended to right the wrongs committed after the war against the ex-POWs.

<sup>209</sup>Testimony of N.P. Golubev (II) in the survey.

This was not a war, but an extermination of the *narod*. We went directly through open fields to smash a pillbox. Our cover was the one front shield of the gun. In the beginning my hair stood on end. In the river Volkhov there was more soldiers' blood than water.<sup>210</sup>

The artificially created state of siege of the 1930s and the real state of siege of the war had left the population of the USSR and of the Kalinin oblast' just as exhausted as the events between 1914 and 1921 had enfeebled their parents' generation. In contrast to Lenin, who decided to introduce the NEP in 1921, Stalin would not embark on a course of political retreat in 1945. Apart from the armed resistance in the Baltic and western Ukraine, opposition to the renewed political and economic offensive of the postwar reconstruction of socialism hardly emerged in the Soviet Union. The experience of the 1930s had brought both countryside and cities to heel. Its memory impelled people to fulfill to the best of their abilities the extreme demands by the authorities after 1945. The *narod* refrained from voicing any expectations of more freedom in public. They might have hoped for less interference by the Party and state in their lives, but restrained themselves from expressing this desire, even in a most tentative way.

After 1945, personal freedom would be again minimized as much as possible by the authorities. Every partner in conversation could be an informer. What remained for some was hope for a better future (socialist, Communist, or other), but the more sceptical ones did not expect any improvement of their fate. They adapted and tried to live as best as possible in the circumstances. Some people had

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<sup>210</sup>Testimony of P.A. Kashinov in the survey.

joined the Communist Party during the war, or would join the Party after it, and grasping as much as possible the privileges derived from its membership.

Some genuine Communist zealots remained. Their number was conceivably reinforced by those susceptible to the wartime patriotism propagated by the authorities, taking pride in the victory of 1945. Others tried to exploit the scarcities that resulted from the failing distribution system, which had been particularly pronounced in the war years. Most, after fulfilling their daily work norms, retreated to the relative privacy of their homes to enjoy the little they had, which at least included peace after 1945.

## CHAPTER V: THE COMMUNISTS

Later Stalinism (and Marxism) was a reasonably fair approximation [of the *Idealtypus* of totalitarianism]. Its triumph consisted not simply in that virtually everything was either falsified or suppressed --statistics, historical events, current events, names, maps, books (occasionally Lenin's texts)-- but that the inhabitants of the country were trained to know what is politically "correct." In the functionaries' minds, the borderline between what is "correct" and what is "true," as we normally understand this, seems really to have become blurred; by repeating the same absurdities time and again, they began to believe or half-believe in them themselves. The massive and profound corruption of the language eventually produced people who were incapable of perceiving their own mendacity.<sup>1</sup>

Totalitarianism involves a systematic effort to control every aspect of social and intellectual life. Thus the Nazi *Gleichschaltung*, the top-down coordination of economy, politics, education, religion, culture, and family. Radical control, control in detail: perhaps earlier rulers dreamed of such a thing, but it became technically feasible --this is one of the central themes of *1984*-- only in the twentieth century.<sup>2</sup>

### V.1 The Party's Point of View: Boitsov's Speech

The oblast' in its post-August 1944 borders was liberated by March 1943. Therefore, in reality, the local period of postwar reconstruction began at that point. Before the announcement of the

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<sup>1</sup>Leszek Kolakowski, "Totalitarianism and the Virtue of the Lie," in: Irving Howe (ed.), *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in Our Century*. New York: Harper and Row, 1983, pp.122-135, p.129.

<sup>2</sup>Michael Walzer, "On 'Failed Totalitarianism'," in: *1984 Revisited*..., pp.103-121, p.106.



Fourth Five Year Plan in 1946, which would coordinate the development of the oblast' economy more extensively within that of the whole USSR, the sixth oblast' Party conference took place in January 1945. Here a description was given of the oblast's state of affairs; tasks were set for the future development of the oblast', in relation to both the ruin inflicted by the war and the further "triumph" of socialism. Second secretary Vorontsov opened the conference the evening of January 13, 1945, setting the tone:

In appreciating our work in the past period, the oblast' party conference needs to bring to light, on the basis of detailed criticism, the large shortcomings in the labour of the Party obkom and other oblast' organizations and to show the way to the elimination of these shortcomings.<sup>3</sup>

It is surprising to find this Party boss so critical of the provincial organization. After all, victory was assured in January 1945. The Party could have been solely portrayed as the successful organizer of the defeat over the Nazis. Instead, Vorontsov pointed immediately at "shortcomings." The key to the understanding of Vorontsov's unexpected criticism is the peculiar mentality forged within the Party during the purges of the 1930s. Too many Party leaders had been accused of complacency in the *Ezhovshchina*, and purged as a result. Vorontsov obviously tried to forestall such accusations. The powerful memory of the Great Terror had not lost much of its force.

In some ways this conference was a moment of triumph for the first Party secretary of the oblast', I.P. Boitsov, who, after surviving the purges in 1938, had become the unrivalled leader of the Party

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<sup>3</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.1.

organization during the war, and a hero of the defense of the *rodina* against the invaders<sup>4</sup>. He played a crucial role during and directly after the war, and is together with his successors Vorontsov, Konovalov, and Kiselev certainly the most prominently present person in the Party records up to 1953. Boitsov was a model of the "young guard" who benefited from the slaughterhouse of the purges of 1936-1938. In comparison, his tenure of the first secretaryship of the Kalinin oblast' would be unusually long: his appointment in the spring of 1938 would last until the end of 1946. He was promoted to the position of first Party secretary of the Stavropol krai, a position from which in recent times someone emerged, who became General

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<sup>4</sup>See for example, *Ocherki*, p.465, and *Kalinin ob. org KPSS*, p.285. Boitsov was fondly remembered in the survey by A.A. Kondrashov, who erroneously believed that he had led the Party from 1937 until 1947, together with A.P. Starotorzhskii, who was thought by Kondrashov to have served in the same years as oblispolkom chairman. Starotorzhskii, however, only served this function from 1938 to 1944. These two men became apparently leading paragons for Kondrashov, who worked during the purges in Torzhok as raion plenipotentiary for the People's Commissariat of Procurements, and as raispolkom secretary and chairman of Torzhok raion. Kondrashov then fought in the war, was wounded and demobilized in 1943, after which he became raispolkom chair of Sonkovo raion. In 1945, he was appointed chair of the gorispolkom of Kimry, and from 1947 to 1952 first gorkom secretary of the same town. After a brief spell in the obkom apparatus in 1952-1953, he went to study by correspondence at the Higher Party School under the Central Committee. He ended his career in the Party in 1970 as obkom secretary of the Kalinin oblast'. His career was quite a good one for someone who had only received seven years of education at a rural school between 1918 and 1925, and attended subsequently a few years of factory school, where he learned the trade of weaving. In 1928, he became assistant foreman in weaving production, and joined the Party at the age of seventeen (testimony of A.A. Kondrashov in the survey). Kondrashov's background is not much different from that of I.I. Tiaglov, who also completed a seven year school in a rural area, attended the oblast' Party school from 1948 to 1950, and was at the Higher Party School under the Central Committee between 1955 and 1958. Tiaglov was active at a similar level of the Party hierarchy as Kondrashov. Tiaglov was from 1945 to 1948 secretary for cadres in Sandovo raion, and from 1950 to 1955 second, and then first, secretary of Krasnyi Kholm raion. In 1962, he was elected USSR Supreme Soviet delegate. Tiaglov showed the same appreciation for Boitsov and one of his successors, V.I. Kiselev (see below) (testimony of I.I. Tiaglov in the survey). Tiaglov's career was aided by the fact that he led the raion of Krasnyi Kholm, one of the most successful raions with respect to agricultural production. Krasnyi Kholm raion received, for example, in early 1945 the order of the Red Banner of the State Defense Committee for its successful conduct of the 1944 harvest (PP 7669/January 1, 1945, p.1).

Secretary of the Central Committee. He certainly demonstrated staying power compared to his successors: Vorontsov was ousted in 1949, Konovalov was made to leave in 1951, and Kiselev had already left the stage in early 1956.

To a degree, Boitsov's success was just plainly due to luck, in 1938 and again in 1941. In the first year when he became secretary, the purges, that had consumed his two predecessors, started to abate. In 1941, the Germans were unable to conquer all of Boitsov's fief, where furthermore part of the first Soviet military victory took place. He probably received some credit for this triumph. A personal description of his earlier career given at the third oblast' Party conference has survived in the records:

I was born in 1896 in the former Guberniia of Vladimir, in the Shuiskii district, in the village of Chasevo. I lived there until 1915 and worked at a factory. In 1915, I was in the old army --rank and file--; after I was demobilized from the old army, I worked at the railroads at the Fifth division of the October railroad, in the function of traindriver-helper. In October 1918, I was taken into the Red Army, served in the railroad armies --in the Fifteenth railroad company, later batallion, later division, thus its name changed. In 1925, I was, for reasons of age, demobilized, and I was in Leningrad at party work; at the time of the Zinovievite opposition, I worked as secretary of the party committee of the Finland division of the October railroad; in 1926 I was transferred to study in the courses for party workers in Moscow, after which I was sent to the disposal of the Leningrad party obkom and assigned to work as a raikom secretary not far from Leningrad.

After that I worked as *partkom* secretary of the Engels' works; in 1930 I was sent to the *PKI* in its Leningrad branch. Until 1932 I studied, after which I was again taken into the Red Army. Following that, I was sent to the Academy as a teacher. By a decision of the Central Committee in 1934, I was directed to work as a party organizer. In 1937, I worked as a

secretary of the committee of the Pskov okrug. I have been a party member since March 1919.

/Voice: were there any party penalties?/

I never had any. I did not take part in the oppositions, took part in the struggle with those people everywhere I happened to work. Neither was I in anti-party groups.<sup>5</sup>

This autobiography constitutes the makings of a fairly typical career, similar to that of his predecessor Mikhailov, who was actually some years his junior. More than anything else, he lacked the imagination to even consider joining the oppositions against the "general line," to which he referred in his presentation. Although portraying himself as a worker, it can be assumed that he actually came from a peasant background, a member of the first generation of Russians who resettled in towns and found employment as industrial workers. In any other country, he probably would have remained a railroad worker for the rest of his life.

However that may be, Boitsov found himself on the centre stage of the Kalinin Oblast' in January 1945. He had the honour to read the political report on the oblast's state of affairs and its Party and government during the war, and the prospects for the development and improvement of life in the province. In order to give an impression of this kind of account, typical for the reports given in subsequent years, a critical résumé of his speech follows. Many of the problems touched upon in the speech would not be solved until 1953. Time and again the oblast' Party leadership returned to the same kind of, or even precisely the same, difficulties.

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<sup>5</sup>Pako, 147/1/555, 1.244/245; *PKI* stands for Institute of Red Professors (see *Kalininskaia oblastnaia...*, p. 447). The Academy mentioned by Boitsov was army-political (see: *Kalininskaia oblastnaia...*, p. 447).

As was usual with these speeches, after devoting minimal praise for certain accomplishments of individuals and organizations, the greater part of it was taken up by reprovals. Boitsov had learned his lesson too from the *Ezhovshchina*. His style is unimaginative and repetitive, but although Boitsov certainly epitomized the colourless apparatchik, his successors' speeches are in no way more interesting<sup>6</sup>.

Boitsov started out by criticizing construction labour in the oblast', a sign of the priority it had in the Party's policy, still very much focussed on the revival of the areas destroyed during the war<sup>7</sup>. 'The major building organizations had not fulfilled their plan in 1944. Boitsov admitted that there was a labour shortage; yet the available workers did not receive sufficient training, nor were there decent living conditions for them. This led to a fluctuation of manpower. The building industry was also hardly mechanized<sup>8</sup>. As always was the case at Party conferences, obkom plenums, and sessions of the obkomburo, the first secretary accused the Party gorkoms and raikoms, and in this case the obkom itself as well, of being responsible for this situation<sup>9</sup>. These Party committees did not keep a close enough eye on affairs. When a certain shortcoming is described in the documents of the archive, this accusation is invariably hammered home again and again. In the above case, as a result of the oversights in construction work, the housing situation

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<sup>6</sup>This was undoubtedly partially due to the emulation of the "seminary" style of Stalin, nor was originality a quality much appreciated by the higher leadership of the USSR.

<sup>7</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.5.

<sup>8</sup>Which comes as no surprise because it had not been terribly mechanized in the 1930s either (Depretto, "Construction workers...", pp.192-194).

<sup>9</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.5.

was singled out as being particularly bad in the Proletarskii and Novopromyshlennyi districts of the town of Kalinin, and in the town of Bezhetsk.

In 1944, industry had performed satisfactorily on the whole, inasmuch as it had fulfilled the state plan by 103.5%<sup>10</sup>. However, some factories had not come up to scratch, the most important of which was the railroad-car construction factory (it had met the production plan in 1944 by only 89.7%). The textile factory "Voroshilov," as well as the paper and window-glass industry, were mentioned as other poor examples<sup>11</sup>. Boitsov was not satisfied with the explanation of the direction of the railroad-car factory that it was all due to the lack of raw material; after all, the factory had lost in ten months of 1944 a total value of 1,313,000 rubles to wastage. Stoppages of the production process had reached 23,000 man-hours at the factory during this period.

The industrial plan had not been fulfilled for a whole range of products, especially consumer goods: steel castings, ceramics for electrical stoves, blackboard chalk for schools, tailoring chalk, soap, furniture, and so on<sup>12</sup>.

The situation with labour productivity was unsatisfactory: technology was not skillfully implemented, and the labour force was not efficiently distributed within the production process<sup>13</sup>. In

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., I.S.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., I.Sob.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., I.Sob.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., II.Sob./6. Voznesensky noticed after the war that the the labour productivity in the war in the textile, light, and foodstuff industries had fallen as a result of interruptions in the supply of electricity, fuel, and raw materials of the factories (Voznesenskii, p.114).

particular, the textile industry had not met the planning targets, not just in 1944, but also in the two previous years, even though the plans had been significantly lowered in comparison with the prewar levels<sup>14</sup>. Here, as well as in other branches such as the food industry, machinery repairs were not done on time<sup>15</sup>. Boitsov stated that stoppages surpassing the planned norms happened in almost all branches of industry. Shortages of qualified people and problems resulting from the shoddy organization of labour were perceived by Boitsov to be additional causes for low labour productivity:

During the war our industry trained tens of thousands of workers, female labour became numerically predominant in many of our branches of industry, yet we do not have enough people.<sup>16</sup>

Part of the problem stemmed from the unsteadiness of the work force<sup>17</sup>. In 1944, for example, in the textile factory "Proletarka," 669 people were hired and 477 left; in the rubber-sole factory, 514 were taken on, while 351 left<sup>18</sup>. The lack of housing and other primary necessities was a major cause of this rapid turnover of workers.

<sup>14</sup>The post-1945 situation of this branch of industry would not be much better (see V.2 and VIII.1).

<sup>15</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.6.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 1.6.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 1.6.

<sup>18</sup>For a description of this problem in the 1930s, see Rittersporn, pp.33/34. It is rather surprising to encounter this problem, since in 1940 labour laws had been introduced that made it much more difficult to change jobs (Heller, Nekrich, p.321). As in the case of the exodus of the kolkhozniks from the countryside --although it was supposedly almost impossible to leave the kolkhoz and receive a temporary work permit or a passport (see below)-- it seems that, in practice, it was not all that difficult for industrial workers to change employers either.

The quality of some industrial output was too often deficient<sup>19</sup>. Still, many factories did not sufficiently economize in their production process.

The socialist emulation movement had been joined on a large scale: in textile and light industry, 92.3% of the workers participated<sup>20</sup>. But the trade unions did not propagate and stimulate advanced methods of production frequently enough.

In order to better performance, Boitsov concluded this section on the situation of industry by recommending the emulation of the decisions of the Eighteenth All-Union Party Conference and Stalin's wartime speeches. Boitsov attempted to rectify matters in industry by demanding better organization and discipline, because that was the only recourse available at the time to the Kalinin Party organization and the provincial government. He indicated areas where he hoped, by way of a more efficient organization, conditions could improve even with the limited disposable means. The war was still being waged, and the state was unable and unwilling to invest any significant monies in the provincial industry. The Party leaders and the industrial managers were thus admonished to rely on their own strength in order to raise or maintain production levels.

After the outline of the prewar situation of agriculture, Boitsov proceeded to describe the havoc caused by the war<sup>21</sup>. The first secretary was satisfied with the fact that the kolkhozniks'

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<sup>19</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.6ob.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 1.6ob./7.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 1.7ob. ff. In III.1 Boitsov's description of agriculture before the war has been recounted; some of Boitsov's statements on the extent of the war damage have been analysed in Chapter IV.



faith in the superiority of the kolkhoz organization had not been shaken by Nazi propaganda. Immediately after liberation, the kolkhozniks, MTS, and sovkhoz workers, under the lead of the Party, began to resurrect the destroyed farms. Of course, the speech's stress was here on the Party's leadership in this process. However high or low the enthusiasm of the population may have been, Boitsov claimed that, in January 1945, already 3,300 kolkhozy, forty-three MTS, twenty-eight MTM, and eight sovkhozy had been revived. He did not mention whether these collective farms were in fact functioning satisfactorily, which leads one to suspect that this impressive number was one Potemkin had a hand in.

The kolkhozniks of the unoccupied eastern raions had given large support to their brethren in the west, sending 3,200 construction workers and 1,500 carters to help out<sup>22</sup>. 139,000 people had moved from huts (*zemlianki*) to new houses<sup>23</sup>. In 1944, the sown area in the liberated raions only amounted to 57.5% of the prewar level. In the earlier liberated raions (i.e. in December 1941) of Zavidovo, Turginovo, Emel'ianovo, Mednoe, and Kalinin, only briefly and often not completely occupied, the sown area had reached the prewar levels<sup>24</sup>. In these districts, too, the livestock numbers had attained the pre-1941 level by November 1944, with the exception of the Emel'ianovo raion. In January 1945, in the previously occupied

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<sup>22</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.8.

<sup>23</sup>The term "house" (*dom*) here is perhaps misleading, because the raikom secretary of Rzhev raion, Fochenkov, described these constructions in July 1953 as built from old army dugouts, old railroad sleepers, and collapsed farm houses (Pako, 147/5/662, 1. 69). Even these had not been kept up between 1945 and 1953, because Rzhev raion had no forests, and therefore no wood had been available for the repair of the houses.

<sup>24</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.8/8ob.

area of the oblast', taken together, strong horned cattle was at 86.4%, sheep and goats were at 86.8%, and hogs were at 59.2% of the 1940 level. Boitsov mentioned as the most important problems plaguing agriculture in the liberated districts a lack of inventory and machinery, the housing situation of certain kolkhozniks who were still living in huts, the lack of draughtpower, the slipshod organization of labour, the greatly neglected cultivation of land and consequently low harvest results, and finally the creeping progress of communal building construction.

Then Boitsov launched into a more detailed description of agriculture as a whole, specifically focussing on the unoccupied eastern part<sup>25</sup>. The sown area of the oblast' in its post-1944 borders was 1,098,000 hectares. The thirty-one raions that did not undergo occupation sowed 830,000 hectares in 1944, or 6% more than in 1940; 2% more grain crops were sown, 41% more potatoes, and 60% more vegetables, while the area sown with flax remained at the 1940 level. Per hectare the harvest of cereals and flax surpassed the 1940 level, while potatoes only reached 80% of that level. The average yield of grain crops in 1944 was 12.2 *tsentner* [100 kilograms] per hectare, of flax 3.8 *tsentner*, and of potatoes 121 *tsentner*.

These numbers are rather suspect if compared to a report on the state of agriculture in the early 1950s. In this report it was noted that in no year from 1947 to 1952 had the harvest result been higher than 9.4 *tsentner* of cereal crops per hectare, and of potatoes

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., I.8ob. ff.

per hectare never more than 108.1 *tsemtner*<sup>26</sup>. The grain yield is also remarkably high if we compare to the average grain yields for the whole USSR in the years between 1933 and 1937, which was 7.1 *tsemtner* per hectare, while for 1949 to 1953 it reached 7.7 *tsemtner* per hectare<sup>27</sup>. What are the explanations for this?

First, the wartime agricultural production was higher because of the relatively relaxed policy towards private farming, which might have led to better results. Second, Boitsov used the method of measuring the crop "standing in the field," as was common under Stalin, and the 1953 report only counted the actual collected harvest<sup>28</sup>. Third, because of the lack of incentive and workfolk, combined with bad weather or soil exhaustion, agriculture in the oblast on the whole was performing worse after the war than during it<sup>29</sup>.

Lastly, however, it is possible that Boitsov deliberately exaggerated the yield per hectare in his speech, in order to urge the delegates to have the oblast' produce at least similar yields in future years. Because many of the conference delegates were leaders of the rural raions --Party secretaries, raisspolkom chairs-- and therefore responsible for their territory's agricultural results,

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<sup>26</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.9; see Table 16. The numbers for 1943 for cereals, flax, and potatoes were even better; Boitsov added that in 1940 the average yield of grain per hectare had been 11.8 *tsemtner* in the oblast', of flax 3.1 *tsemtner*, and of potatoes 160 *tsemtner* (Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.8ob.).

<sup>27</sup>Heller, Nekrich, p. 472.

<sup>28</sup>For this inflated way of measuring the harvest crop, see *Sovetskaia derevnia*, pp.232-236.

<sup>29</sup>Although most of the potato production came from the personal plot of the kolkhoznik! (see e.g. *Sovetskaia derevnia*.... p. 51) In 1940, 65% of the potatoes were grown on the private plots, in 1945 even 75%.

Boitsov might have decided that it would be a wise move to convince them that these crop-yield levels had been reached even during the difficult years 1943 and 1944. These kinds of tactics of Boitsov would resemble those wielded by the Party and government in Moscow, when setting astronomical production targets in the Five Year Plans for the whole of the USSR.

The most consistent and best results in agriculture were attained in the raions of Krasnyi Kholm, Bezhetsk, Kashin, Sonkovo, and Sandovo<sup>30</sup>. Subsequently Boitsov analysed one of the advanced kolkhozy, and the reasons for its success<sup>31</sup>. Unfortunately, there were still many kolkhozy and even complete raions that produced mediocre harvest results. Boitsov thought that the primary cause was to be found in violations of the elementary rules of agro-technology, of which the failure to introduce the proper crop rotation was the most glaring. The harvests were small in the majority of the sovkhozy, in the collective farms in the liberated raions, and in the Firovo, Lesnoe, Novokarel', Spirovo, and Kozlovo raions. More than seven hundred kolkhozy in the oblast' remained "backward," around 10% of the total number. The average reaping of cereal crops at these collective farms did not surpass 600 to 700 kilograms per hectare.

Boitsov went on to argue for the system of using small brigades or links (the *zven'ia* ) in fieldwork, not only for flax cultivation --they had dealt with 81% of the flax production in

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<sup>30</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.8ob.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 1.9. Compare to VIII.3, where a similarly successfully operating collective farm is described.

1944-- , but also for grain cultivation. The *zven'ia* had cultivated 24% of the sown area for grain and of 44% for potatoes. Later, in 1950, these small brigades would be deemed inefficient for most farming by the central leadership of the USSR<sup>32</sup>. After this change of heart, they would only be preserved in flax cultivation and vegetable growing. The *zven'ia* seemed to have been most adept in cases where intensive manual labour was needed. Especially during the war, with little agricultural machinery available, this system was apparently quite useful.

However, Boitsov added somewhat enigmatically, many of the *zven'ia* , formed in springtime, dissolved during the agricultural season<sup>33</sup>. The first obkom secretary did not explain what happened to the members of these links, and who took care of agricultural production in their absence. The kolkhozniks probably gathered the harvest individually, a task not done all that badly, if the harvest yields given by Boitsov earlier in his speech are to be believed.

The MTS, that numbered ninety in all in January 1945, often did not fulfill all their duties ordained by the plans<sup>34</sup>. Machines were not repaired on time before spring sowing, the cadres were inadequately trained, labour suffered from inept organization, and insufficient leadership by the Party prevailed as much as in other areas. The complaints about the MTS were similar to those voiced before the war. Boitsov's remarks were very brief on the sovkhozy, a reflection of their insignificant role in the oblast's economy. Their livestock

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<sup>32</sup>*Sovetskaia derevnia*.... p.171.

<sup>33</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.9.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.9ob.

production had prospered in 1944, but their grain harvests amounted to a pittance.

Surprisingly, Boitsov stated that there was more livestock in the oblast' than before the war<sup>35</sup>. He proudly added that the oblast' took first place in animal husbandry among the centrally located oblasts of the RSFSR. A table was added to the written transcript of his speech to prove his point<sup>36</sup>.

Apart from that positive news, other uplifting results were reeled off about the milk production from dairy cows. Already within eleven months of 1944, 98.2% of the annual plan had been met; the average yield per cow was 1,080 litres, while the plan had aimed at 1,100 litres for the full year<sup>37</sup>. These results are quite striking compared to the later livestock results of the oblast'. They stand out brightly against the sombre background of continuous grumblings about the performance of animal husbandry of subsequent years. In 1949, the highest annual average milking per cow was reached for the years until 1953: 1,140 litres for the entire oblast'<sup>38</sup>. In 1947, 1950, and 1951, the average yield per cow would be less than 1,000 litres, and only in 1948 and 1949 were the 1,100 litres surpassed. Once more the fact was quintessential that the kolkhozniks enjoyed more freedom in their activities during the war, because much of the milk originated from their private cattle. Nevertheless, the same reasons undermining our faith in the figures on crop yields may apply here too.

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 1.9ob.ff.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 1.10; see Table 19.

<sup>37</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.10.

<sup>38</sup>Pako, 147/1/906, 1.9.

Ostensibly, more cows were in the kolkhozniks' private possession in January 1945 than before the war<sup>39</sup>. Whereas before the war 21% of the kolkhozniks did not personally own a cow, in 1945 only nine in every hundred households had to do without one. However, Boitsov's argument is only correct if one calculates the relative distribution of personal cows among the kolkhozniks, since in absolute numbers on January 1, 1946, there were fewer cows for personal use in the oblast' than in January 1941<sup>40</sup>. There were in fact far fewer pigs and sheep, too, the absolute number of goats alone being on the rise. The latter trend continued until at least 1956<sup>41</sup>. Once more, the total number of strong-horned cattle, sheep, and goats in 1941, 1946, or even 1956 in public and private herds combined fell far short of the numbers for these animals in 1928<sup>42</sup>.

Although one would expect Boitsov to relish such reasonable results, the fact that many sucklings died disturbed him: 11.7% of calves, 24% of lambs, and 9.4% of piglets had perished in 1944<sup>43</sup>. This would remain a continuous problem in the subsequent years. On top of that, in some raions (those of Molokovo, Lesnoe, Ovinishche, Brusovo, Bologoe, and Maksatikha), the annual milk production per

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<sup>39</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.10.

<sup>40</sup>See Table 18. A comparison between Table 17 and Table 19 shows that Boitsov's statement is untrue. On January 1, 1941 the total number of cows in the oblast' was 342,500, and the number of cows that were part of the socialized herds of the kolkhozy amounted to 137,200. Thus the kolkhozniks possessed for personal use 205,300 cows. On January 1, 1945 the total number for the oblast' was 266,600 cows and the kolkhozy had 88,900 of those. Therefore, in January 1945, the kolkhozniks had 177,700 cows.

<sup>41</sup>See Table 18 or *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo*, p.44.

<sup>42</sup>See Table 17 or compare Altrichter, Tabelle X, p.209 to *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo*, p.44. In 1916 in the Tver' guberniia there was a total of 714,700 heads of strong horned cattle, i.e. more than in either 1941, 1946, or 1956.

<sup>43</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.10.

cow did not surpass more than 700 to 800 litres. Boitsov would have been more satisfied if he had known that in 1947 and 1951 the average for the whole oblast' would be less than 900 litres per cow<sup>44</sup>. These two phenomena were allegedly caused by irresponsible tending of livestock, execrable organization, and faulty remuneration of labour at the animal farms<sup>45</sup>. Afraid of having been too complimentary, Boitsov further deplored the very minimal development of fowl production, rabbit farming, and beekeeping.

The worst sector of animal husbandry was horse breeding. Annually the number of horses in the oblast' decreased, as too few foals were born and many horses perished. In 1944 the number of horses fell by 6%.

In fact, from collectivization onwards, the number of horses would never again come close to the level of 1928. Although in 1941 there were more than twice as many horses as in 1946, the drop between 1928 and 1941 had been just as dramatic: in 1928, there were 480,000 horses in the Tver' guberniia; in 1941, 230,800; in 1946, 101,500; and in 1956, 123,500<sup>46</sup>. However, by 1956 the reliance on horses for draught power would have become less pressing for the collective farms, since by that time a large number of tractors had finally appeared in the countryside.

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<sup>44</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.9. In 1971 the average milk production of one dairy cow in the USSR was 2,110 litres, half as much as that of a cow in the United States (Kerblay, Table II, p.252).

<sup>45</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.10 ff.

<sup>46</sup>See Altricher, Tabelle X, p.209, Narodnoe Khoziazstvo, p.44. Even in 1916 there were far more horses (347,100) in the guberniia than in Soviet times in the oblast' that succeeded the guberniia.



At this point of his speech Boitsov singled out a group of raions which were performing poorly with respect to breeding and caring for horses: those of Udoml'ia, Rameshki, Kushalino, Firovo, Likhoslavl', and some unmentioned other ones<sup>47</sup>. His address creates the impression that it was designed so that no district would feel complacent with its economic performance. Lack of personal responsibility (*obezlichka*), and barbarous attitudes towards the horses were cited as the main causes of the fall in number of horses. Raikoms and raispolkoms were not taking measures to combat these shortcomings.

Finally, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the oblast' had been able to discharge completely its procurement obligations assigned by the state for all areas of crop and livestock production from 1941 to 1945<sup>48</sup>. In 1943 and 1944, even more than the required amounts of cereals and potatoes had been delivered. Curiously enough, during the war years the oblast' had delivered, according to its first secretary, more grain on average to the state than in 1940. One reason for the fulfillment of the delivery of the agricultural produce quotas was undoubtedly the fact that the state procurements were assessed at a much lower level during the war than before or after it.

In conclusion Boitsov reminded his audience that the successes recounted should not overly inspire smugness:

Comrade Stalin continuously warns us against the danger of complacency, which unavoidably leads to showing off, to the

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<sup>47</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, l.10ob.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., l.10ob.

enfeebling of our work, and to the coming apart of successfully started work.<sup>49</sup>

The oblast' already had shown some signs of a self-satisfied attitude as it came in second place in the second round of the All-Soviet socialist competition --presumably in agriculture--, while it had won the blue (red) ribbon in the first round. The oblast' Party organization was obliged to straighten out the failings in farming.

Boitsov subsequently paid lip service to the wartime achievements of the soviets, the official government<sup>50</sup>. However, the mass-organizational work of the soviets at all levels remained unsatisfactory. He discussed the oblast' budgetary plans of the 1941-1944 years, which on the whole, except for 1941, had been realized. The oblast' plan for its budgetary income had been fulfilled in the years 1942-1944, and there had been less spent than the plan called for. These savings on expenditure had been transferred to the Union budget. In 1943 the oblast' had received fewer donations from the All-Union budget than in 1942: 48% of the oblast' income came from internal sources, while in 1942 they merely contributed 22%<sup>51</sup>. This illustrates the low level of state investment in the wartime oblast' economy. The preliminary results of the 1944 budget --for nine months of 1944-- had been below expectations because of a revenue decrease from the trade organizations, suburban sovkhozy, economic organizations in agriculture, and from the communal-housing sector in the oblast'.

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 1.10ob.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 1.11.

<sup>51</sup>Fainsod notes that in 1951 the central government handled almost 80% of the total budget (Fainsod, How... p.342).

The subscription to state loans developed poorly. These state loans were an extra burden on the meagre incomes of the oblast' population. In May 1945, a new state loan would be written for the recovery and development of the USSR's economy<sup>52</sup>. The subscription went well in most urban areas, where the target of the loan was quickly reached. However, in certain rural areas the new loan received a less than enthusiastic welcome. By May 6, the plan for the subscription was fulfilled for 97.9% by workers and employees, but only for 74% by the kolkhozniks. In the Ostashkov, Molokovo, Lesnoe, and Kesova Gora raions, the height of the loan subscriptions exceeded the "available means" of the population. Peat diggers refused to subscribe, as they had not been provided with work clothes, consumer goods, and decent nourishment. Nevertheless, virtually every household in the oblast' held obligations of state loans after the war<sup>53</sup>.

In the final analysis, budgetary motives were of a low priority in the local implementation of the Party's policy by the oblast' Party organization. The obkom, the rai- and gorkoms, and the soviet' ispolkoms at the different levels of the government administration had to operate within the limits of the financial and economic plans set by the centre in Moscow. They only influenced decisions on

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<sup>52</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, II.133-134; Janet G. Chapman argues convincingly that this compulsory purchasing of government bonds in fact functioned as an additional tax (Janet G. Chapman, Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since 1928, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1963, p.116). They added around 50% to the total amount of taxes paid by Soviet households in 1944, 1948, and 1952 (Chapman, p.119). Every year after the war, the state "borrowed" money in this way from the Soviet citizens (see Zelenin, Obshchestvenno.... Tablitsy 14 i 15, pp.220/221). Only in 1958 was the practice discontinued (ibid., p.222).

<sup>53</sup>Bloknot Agitatora, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia Pravda," 1948, Nos.4 and 5, p.65: in 1945 there were 508,000 obligationholders, in 1947 more than 570,000.

distributing the limited funds within the local economy, funds which had been allocated to the oblast' by the centre, or which the oblast' government had been allowed to retain. With this money, the oblast' government had to execute public works, build houses, operate the educational and health-care systems, and so on.

The means were probably always far too limited, as the tediously difficult and drawn-out resurrection of Rzhev shows. The first economic priority centred on meeting the production plans. The oblispolkom was left with very meagre funds to spend on public housing, healthcare, culture, and so on. The records reveal a continuous call to economize, to manage with the means available. One infers that at no point in this period enough money was left to improve municipal services and living conditions of the population in any meaningful way. That, as we know, was indeed not something about which Stalin and his clique unduly worried. For the average citizen, there always seemed to be only duties, and hardly rights, especially in an area with the economic make-up of the Kalinin oblast'. All means, even after the war, were dedicated to the maintenance and improvement of the country's defense, a result of the leadership's paranoid fear of foreign intervention<sup>54</sup>. Largely agrarian, Kalinin oblast' with an industry mainly auxiliary in character (i.e. the production of consumers' goods), did not play a major role in the leadership's plans for the development of Soviet defense. The oblast' seemed to have been assigned the task to

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<sup>54</sup>Some people are convinced that Stalin was actually preparing for a new, offensive war towards the end of his life, which would bring the blessings of Soviet Communism to the rest of the world (for example Heller and Nekrich, pp.504-506).

produce as much as possible for as little as possible in its contribution to the large armaments' industry.

An illustration of the exceptional sacrifices of the oblast' inhabitants in an economic sense were Boitsov's numbers on what he called the toilers' "voluntary" contributions toward the war effort in World War II<sup>55</sup>. More than 900 million rubles, in the form of loans, had been donated by the citizens to the state for the deployment of a tank column and similar defensive expenses. Apart from this, seventy-eight million rubles of obligations to the defense fund had been bought, and in four lotteries 143 million had been collected. These numbers were quite significant, as is clear when compared to the oblast's total budgetary income in 1942 (289.6 million rubles) or 1943 (304.1 million rubles)<sup>56</sup>. It is no wonder that complaints were often uttered in the survey about these "voluntary" loans, siphoning off the last little extra that people had earned<sup>57</sup>.

Boitsov proceeded with his speech by describing the resurrection of the school network and cultural-educational institutions<sup>58</sup>. Although the results of the resuscitation of primary schools, village reading rooms, schools of workers' youth, and schools of rural youth were significant, he lamented children's high truancy. Apparently, in the eastern raion of Krasnyi Kholm, many army conscripts were semiliterate, and there was a disturbingly

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<sup>55</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.11ob.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 1.11.

<sup>57</sup>Even G.V. Lubov, who is still today an unreformed Communist, noticed that he and his family, although urban dwellers, complained about the height of the state loans (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey). In VI.2 some more will be said about the state loans and their "voluntary" quality.

<sup>58</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.11ob.ff.

acute level of juvenile delinquency. Orphanages in the oblast' had mushroomed from twenty-eight in 1940 to sixty-six in early 1945; at the time 5,640 children were reared in these. Some cultural institutions, such as one of the prewar drama theatres, the puppet theatre, the philharmonic orchestra, and the musical school in Kalinin, and the drama theatres of Kimry and Vyshnii Volochek, had all been revived by January 1945. However, the oblast' drama theatre still had not been restored. Amateur art, on the other hand, was supposedly flourishing.

Epidemics had been quickly eradicated in the oblast' after the German retreat<sup>59</sup>. In January 1945, 189 permanent daycares, six clinics for childbirth, sixty-one consultation points for pregnant women, and twenty-nine milk kitchens existed in the oblast'. There were more food canteens in 1944 than in 1940, and forty-two special children canteens were operating, where more than 24,000 children were taking their meals<sup>60</sup>.

'The oblast' retail network operated inadequately: many necessities were not offered to the consumers<sup>61</sup>. Boitsov mentioned among other things an absence of pots and iron hardware. He complained that these shortages were unnecessary, inasmuch as the raw materials for such products were to be found in the oblast'. The enterprises of local industry were being blamed for these scarcities. Here the decline of the cottage industries would make itself felt<sup>62</sup>. Boitsov, obviously, was not prepared to criticize the central

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid., I.12; compare to VII.2.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., I.12ob.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., I.12ob.

<sup>62</sup>See II.2.

government's decrees at the end of the 1930s that had prohibited the kolkhozniks' employment in nonagricultural trades.

Local industry would fail to provide the oblast' population with the consumer goods in demand during the postwar period. The ubiquitous queues associated with shopping in the former Soviet Union were a widespread phenomenon in the 1945-1953 period as well, if the Kalinin oblast' can serve as an example.

Boitsov demanded that the quality and quantity of consumer goods ameliorate, and urged the opening of more repair shops for the toilers<sup>63</sup>. The efficiency of internal distribution failed to improve during 1945. At the end of 1945 in Vyshnii Volochek, Bezhetsk, Kaliazin, Kimry, Likhoslavl', and Bologoe, bread would not be available for six to eight days, because of the absence of fuel for bread factories and bakeries<sup>64</sup>. In several rural raions, most of which had suffered occupation, the flour mills languished, and grain was sold directly to customers.

From this point onwards in his speech, Boitsov concerned himself with the Komsomol and Party proper<sup>65</sup>. In the war years, the Komsomol membership had fallen from 138,135 to 51,928 on October 1, 1944, 63% of whom were young women. The first secretary of the Kalinin oblast' Party organization explained this as the result of the Red Army mobilizations and the evacuation of sections of the population before the German occupation. He did not refer to the loss of territory to the Velikie Luki oblast', which

<sup>63</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.12ob.

<sup>64</sup>Pako, 147/4/390, 1.4.

<sup>65</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.14.

erroneously was thought to have been subtracted from these numbers<sup>66</sup>. Party members and candidates were extremely scarce in the Komsomol: only 1,297 in all had been counted. 3,372 Komsomols were employed in functions of authority. In the countryside, 188 worked as chairs, and 469 as secretaries of rural soviets, 241 as kolkhoz directors, 191 as heads of livestock sectors of collective farms, and 515 managed village reading rooms.

During the war, 60,000 Komsomols had filled the places left open in industry by their comrades who had departed for the front<sup>67</sup>. *Zven'ia* of youth working for a large harvest and female-youth tractor brigades had been formed. Political-educational work, however, was conducted at an insufficiently serious level: as Boitsov remarked,

That explains to a large extent why a significant part of the Komsomols remained behind on territory occupied by the Germans. 846 Komsomols have been excluded from the league for direct relations with the enemy.<sup>68</sup>

A lot of Komsomols only formally pursued the required political education<sup>69</sup>. In Kimry raion, not occupied during the war, more than two hundred kolkhozy were bereft of a Komsomol organization, and two of the raion Komsomol leadership were not even members of the Komsomol<sup>70</sup>. A similar situation prevailed in several other raions.

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<sup>66</sup>See IV.2.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*, I.14ff. Some of them had been apparently dispatched to the front when their turn came, because the number of Komsomols in November 1944 was below 52,000.

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*, I.14ob.

<sup>69</sup>*Ibid.*, I.14ob.

<sup>70</sup>In other words, hardly any kolkhoz in this raion had a Komsomol cell, because on July 1, 1946, 230 collective farms would be counted here (see Table 13).



In general, Boitsov was satisfied with the way in which the Party organizations in the oblast' had coped with the evacuation, the creation of a partisan movement, and the resurrection and further development of the economy<sup>71</sup>. In the war years, 23,364 Communists, or 43% of the total amount of Party members and candidates, had served in the Red Army<sup>72</sup>. Meanwhile 8,807 Communists had left in connection with the evacuation, and 3,870 members and candidates had been transferred to the newly created Velikie Luki and Pskov oblasts. Through all this, the membership had dwindled by 44% on November 1, 1944: on January 1, 1940, there were 50,277 members and candidates, and on November 1, 1944, only 27,987<sup>73</sup>.

The social composition of the Communists had significantly transformed. In early 1940, 40.8% of the members had been defined as industrial workers, but on January 1, 1944, 29.5% were workers, while in the same period the number of employees in the Party had risen proportionally from 37.1% to 53.1%<sup>74</sup>. The number of peasant

<sup>71</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.15.

<sup>72</sup>When referring to "Communists" in the records of the Party's archive, the speaker-writer always meant full members and candidates combined.

<sup>73</sup>The number given for January 1, 1945, by an official Soviet source is 28,667 (see Table 35).

<sup>74</sup>This confirms the evidence from other sources that the positive discrimination with respect to entry into the Communist Party of blue-collar workers came to an end towards the end of the 1930s (see, for example, Hans-Henning Schröder, "Upward Social Mobility and Mass Repression: The Communist Party and Soviet Society in the Thirties," pp.157-183, in: N. Lampert, G.T. Rittersporn(eds.), Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath. Essays in Honour of Moshe Lewin, London: MacMillan, 1992, pp.178-180). Nevertheless, the postwar Party leadership of the Kalinin oblast' seemed to remain always concerned with the size of the workers' contingent among the Party's membership. Another factor was of influence on the drop of the proportion of factory workers: most of them had been recruited into the Red Army, while hardly any of the women who took their place at the work benches was Communist. Women, in general, always formed a small proportion among the Party's membership (compare to VIII.5).

Communists had decreased from 22.1% to 17.4% Focussing only on the drop in workers' membership, Boitsov mentioned three causes for the decrease: army conscription, the fall in industry's share of production in the oblast' economy, and the weak growth of Party membership among the workers<sup>75</sup>.

The composition of the Party's membership appeared to shift towards more gender equality and to a better educational level<sup>76</sup>. Boitsov noticed a slight increase in the Communists' degree of schooling<sup>77</sup>. However, the absolute number of people with more education than merely primary --which at this time still meant the four-year curriculum-- did not exactly boom in the previous period (11,391 in 1944, 13,072 in 1940). The low educational level within Party ranks was a reflection of the social situation in general: on the average in the 1930s --and this seems a somewhat optimistic guess-- a child on the collective farm received five to six years of schooling, which was still more than children received in the 1920s<sup>78</sup>. In the countryside during the war, many of the children

<sup>75</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.15.

<sup>76</sup>See also Chapter V, particularly for the representation of women in the Party.

<sup>77</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.15ob. Boitsov gave the following numbers:

Education	1944	1940
Finished higher	4%	2,8%
Secondary*	16,8%	9,9%
Incomplete secondary*	19,9%	13,5%
Primary(four years)	58%	73%

\*: Probably the seven year curriculum.

Iu. Borisov noticed that at the beginning of the 1940s more than 70% of rai- and gorkom secretaries in the Soviet Union had only primary education (Iu. Borisov, "Stalin: Chelovek i Simvol...., p.487). The numbers on the situation in 1940 in the Kalinin oblast' concur with Borisov's. In 1946, still more than a quarter of rai- and gorkom secretaries in the USSR had only primary education, after which the number of these dropped rapidly (Iu. Borisov, "Stalin: Chelovek i Simvol...., p.487). In 1952 merely 3% of them had only basic education.

<sup>78</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.280. In the Soviet Union obligatory seven-year education was only introduced in September 1949 (See: Bloknot Agitatora, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia

profited from even less instruction than their counterparts of the 1930s, since the difficult situation in that period often prevented them from attending more than three or four grades<sup>79</sup>. Combined with the scant education dispensed to people in the 1920s, it is no surprise that the survivors of the war within the Party were so poorly educated.

Boitsov was either weak in his arithmetic in this part of his speech, or tried to convince his audience that the Party was on its way to gender equality and becoming intellectually more powerful. This flew in the face of facts. Did he succeed in deluding those at the conference? Considering the limited education of most of its participants, deception such as this carried no risks.

A Party member who had left for the front in 1941 and returned after May 1945 would have hardly been able to find anyone he had known before the war in the oblast' Party organization<sup>80</sup>. During the war, roughly 22,000 people had become candidate or full members, or, in other words, it was theoretically possible that only around 6,000 Communists were left from before June 1941. However, only 47% (13,154) of the Party membership of November 1, 1944, had become candidate or full members during the war. The other new members, almost 9,000, must have left the oblast'

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Pravda," 1949, No.9, p.30); see also V.S. Iel'chuk, *Industrializatsiia...*, p.346. Compare to VIII.6 as well.

<sup>79</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.285.

<sup>80</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, I.15ob. 77% of the Party organization on January 1, 1948 had become members in or after the war (Pako, 147/4/1095, I.29). In December 1946, 53,355 people were candidate or full members of the Communist Party organization of the Kalinin oblast' (Pako, 147/4/18, I.3). More than 22,000 of that membership were war veterans, who had joined the Party predominantly during the war.

territory before 1945 after their entry into the Party, which, owing to the war, is not surprising.

Party exclusions in the period between the fifth and sixth Party conferences (in March 1940 and January 1945, respectively) had been significant: 6,018 Communists in all<sup>81</sup>. A disturbing number of 1,925 of these had been excluded for "voluntarily residing and un-Party behaviour in the territory of the enemy." Even more, however, were shunned for "violations of government and Party discipline," 3,733 in all. Finally, a small group of 360 people had been excluded for "loss of communication with the Party." Quite a few of the exclusions (2,279) had been of people who had become Party members or candidates after the Great Purge, that is between 1939 and 1944<sup>82</sup>. Concluding this section, Boitsov said, in the spirit of the Purges, "... having cleaned its ranks from unstable and enemy elements, our oblast' party organization became even more united and battleworthy."<sup>83</sup>

On November 1, 1944, there were merely 117 Party organizations and fifty-four candidate groups on 6,901 kolkhozy, plus eighty-nine MTS Party cells and 648 rural territorial Party organizations<sup>84</sup>. The primary cells in the town of Torzhok, as well as in Lesnoe, Spirovo, Firovo, Goritskii, Rzhev, Kimry, and other raions, were being led unsoundly by the district Party committees in the opinion of the provincial leader. This complaint would be belaboured

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<sup>81</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, l.15ob.; *Ocherki*, p.427.

<sup>82</sup>Here is a typo in the record (Pako, 147/3/2679, l.15ob.), which actually states "...2279, or 52.4%,...", the last of which numbers must be wrong if we accept the total of 6,018.

<sup>83</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, l.16.

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*, ll.16ff.

again and again in the following years. The underlying reason --then and later-- for the reprimanding of the rai- and gorkoms can be traced to the fear of future poor economic performance. In the immediate postwar period hardly any rai- or gorkom --nor the obkom itself-- escaped such criticism. Often a few were singled out as scapegoats for shortcomings existing within all local Party organizations. When a few districts apparently had strengthened, other ones took their place, while the subject of criticism remained essentially the same. The problem had only shifted spatially.

Conceivably, economic or other performance in certain areas, originally deemed deficient, actually did amend after a wave of finger pointing. In the first place, some local Party leaders who were thus pressured might remedy matters within their realm--or pretend that matters had improved. The appointment of a more capable local leadership which managed affairs more competently could sometimes better the situation, a measure to which the obkom turned in extreme cases. Finally, the obkom would become actively involved in improving the state of affairs at a local level, which could lead to praiseworthy results in some cases. An example of this attention, which could translate into measures of economic aid, was the case of the increased agricultural mechanization in the formerly occupied western parts of the oblast'. After it had dawned upon the obkom, towards 1950, that it would be futile to wait for the arrival of sufficiently large numbers of settlers to augment the labour force in these areas, the lack of labour was partially solved by introducing more farming machinery to substitute for manual labour.

Boitsov proceeded with his shower of criticism by stating that there was too much talk, and too little action, in the activities of certain rai- and gorkoms, singling out the raikom of Maksatikha and its frequent discussions on improving performance of its three MTS<sup>85</sup>. This raikom was too fond of administrative measures and penalizing the Communists in its organization. In Boitsov's view, the obkom itself should shoulder part of the blame, because its departments had failed to pursue the implementation of certain recommendations and resolutions.

Boitsov then stated frankly what the first priority for the Party organizations in the oblast' should be:

The decisive standard of measurement in all our work should be the ability to organize the blue-collar workers, the engineering-technological workers, the employees, and the kolkhozniks for the fulfillment of the plan. An estimate of the work of a factory party cell must be done by establishing how much it is able to guarantee the deliveries for the front, how much the factory is fulfilling the production obligations with respect to the assortment of goods, and for a kolkhoz and territorial party cell, how much it is able to discharge its obligatory state procurements, to increase the total amount of agricultural produce, and so on.<sup>86</sup>

This statement clearly reveals how central economic criteria were for the provincial leadership in the appreciation of the functioning of the Party cells within the Party organization.

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<sup>85</sup>Ibid., II.17/17ob.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., I.17ob.

Once more, Boitsov hammered on the importance of the control over the execution of decisions made at higher levels of the Communist Party and of those made by regional organizations in the oblast<sup>87</sup>.

It should be added that the responsible positions in the oblast had been considerably infused with new blood, because many people had left to join the Red Army or the partisans, or accompanied the evacuated enterprises --and probably never returned<sup>88</sup>. From January 1, 1942, through December 1944, 22,860 people, of whom 12,270 were females, were appointed to perform "leading work." It is likely that in this case the function of the kolkhoz chair was considered to be leading work. In January 1943, obkom member Borisov had already mentioned that 4,500 kolkhoz directors had joined the Red Army<sup>89</sup>. More than 5,500 had less than two years of experience in this job. The Party membership among the kolkhoz chairs was slowly on the rise, but still very low. The ample attention that Boitsov devoted in January 1945 to the situation with "cadres" was probably a result of criticism of the obkom by the Central Committee in December 1943<sup>90</sup>. A plenum in April 1944 had directed its undivided attention to the question of cadres<sup>91</sup>. As Boitsov remarked in January 1945, the composition of the oblast's leading cadres had undergone a considerable renewal, and 80% of these had been appointed in the war years<sup>92</sup>. Most of these individuals were young, and had only

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<sup>87</sup>Ibid., 1.18.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.; see also IV.2 and VII.1.

<sup>89</sup>Moscow, 17/43/742, 1.10. Here he referred to the territory before the splitting off in 1944 of the Velikie Luki and Pskov parts.

<sup>90</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.19ob.

<sup>91</sup>See IV.2.

<sup>92</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.18.

joined the Party quite recently. 'The chairs of the raion and town soviets' executive committees had not sustained very abrupt changes, but leading cadres in the countryside had been renewed extensively in the war years: 79% of raion agricultural departmental heads, raion plenipotentiaries for the people's commissariat of procurements, and MTS directors were appointed after the German attack.<sup>93</sup>

Boitsov was disgruntled with the large group of people among the cadres who merely had primary schooling, although he did not include in this group those with an incomplete secondary education<sup>94</sup>. This undereducated lot was hardly well equipped to discharge the tasks required of someone in a position of authority. Certain measures had been taken to ameliorate the quality of the new local leaders, such as having them follow special courses or attend the annual oblast' Party school. The yawning lack of necessary experience and education had been countered in 1943-1944 through short-term courses, in which 6,000 leading raion workers participated: among this group were the heads of raiispolkom departments, the above mentioned plenipotentiaries, the judges of the People's Courts, and so on<sup>95</sup>. Other schooling and reschooling programs, as well as several courses, were being conducted.

A subject which would preoccupy the obkom for many years to come was the next issue tackled by Boitsov in his speech: the

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<sup>93</sup>Ibid., 1.18ob.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., 1.18ob.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., 1.19.



flagging number of specialists in agriculture<sup>96</sup>. The appropriate statistics are not revealing because Boitsov selected his data according to personal whim, using them only to drive home his point. Furthermore, from 1945 to 1953, every time this problem was discussed, different figures were given for the number of specialists thought to be required in the countryside. In order to obtain an idea of the extent of the shortage of specialists, however, it is perhaps worth mentioning that, in the eyes of the provincial authorities in January 1945, the oblast' lacked fifty crop specialists (*zemleustroitel'i*), 139 cattle technicians, and 168 veterinarians.

Another kolkhoz saga concerned the appointment and sacking of kolkhoz directors<sup>97</sup>. In three years, from 1942 to 1944, 1,383 kolkhoz chairs had been released from their duties simply because they could not cope with the job. In the Rameshki raion, on average every kolkhoz had seen more than two directors in this period; a graphic example can be witnessed in the "Molotov" kolkhoz, that had been led since its inception --probably in the early 1930s-- by eighteen different chairs, and twelve of the incumbents had not been up to the job.

The obkom had been forced to take measures against this phenomenon. In March 1943, a resolution made it necessary to receive the fiat of the cadre department of the obkom to dismiss a kolkhoz chair<sup>98</sup>. Although Boitsov seemed to think that this action had remedied matters, since after the resolution fewer chairs had

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<sup>96</sup>Ibid., I.19.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., I.19; see also IV.2.

<sup>98</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, II.19/19ob.

been released from their duties, the turnover would remain high until 1953, and was even on the increase after the first amalgamation of the kolkhozy in 1950. In January 1945, 23% of the chairs were Party members or candidates<sup>99</sup>. Boitsov thought that the presence of more Communist kolkhoz directors would amend the situation.

There also prevailed a shortage of MTS cadres, mechanics, tractor brigadiers, and combine and tractor drivers. Annually up to 50% of the tractor operators were new on the job<sup>100</sup>. To make matters worse, a majority of MTS workers available needed to submit to some form of retraining. After the war ended, an effort was made to have returning demobilized soldiers take up these occupations. It was, by the way, normal for many of these jobs to be only temporarily filled by people who remained formally kolkhozniks. The quality of the MTS work would still be deemed mediocre in 1953<sup>101</sup>.

Notwithstanding the graduation of 500 young specialists from the oblast's twelve secondary technical institutions in 1942-1944, a shortage of 600 engineers and 1,200 technicians beleaguered industry<sup>102</sup>. Many people in responsible positions in industry were dismissed for not being able to cope with their duties.

In December 1943, the Direction of Cadres of the Central Committee, in reaction to a report on the state of affairs by the

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<sup>99</sup>ibid., 1.19; that is, already many more were Communists than at the end of 1943 -- see Chapter IV.2--, when a mere 17% of kolkhoz directors was Communist on the territory of the pre-August 1944 oblast'.

<sup>100</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.19ob.

<sup>101</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.15.

<sup>102</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.19ob.

obkom of the Kalinin oblast', had indicated huge shortcomings and negligence in the work with cadres<sup>103</sup>. The Direction stated its displeasure with the insufficient organization of the educational programs for the cadres, through which errors were committed in the selection of workers and their assignment to workplaces. Thus frequent alterations were inevitable. The oblast' committee, and all raion and town committees, discussed the problem and a ten-day seminar for all rai- and gorkom secretaries for cadres was conducted. Still frequent changing of jobs by leading cadres continued. In 1944, 908 (27%) of the workers in the obkom *nomenklatura* were replaced<sup>104</sup>. In 1943-1944, the oblispolkom had replaced people in 830 out of 1,370 leading positions (60%)<sup>105</sup>. Boitsov then also stressed the fact, without seeking an explanation for it, that too few women were being promoted to leading positions<sup>106</sup>. To prove his point, he complained that, among the 411 leading workers in agriculture who were, in this case, the MTS directors, the sovkhoz directors, and the heads of the raion agricultural departments, only fifty-three were women. Boitsov then turned his attention to the partisan movement (discussed above)<sup>107</sup>.

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<sup>103</sup>Ibid., 1.19ob.

<sup>104</sup>This gives us, by the way, a total of 3,363 jobs as being part of the obkom *nomenklatura* in the spring of 1944, still 3,813 positions fell under the *nomenklatura* of the oblast' leadership, which undoubtedly was a consequence of the oblast's larger size at the time (compare to Table 39).

<sup>105</sup>Ocherki, prilozhenie 2, p.706.

<sup>106</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.20.

<sup>107</sup>See IV.1.

*Agitprop* (agitation and propaganda) and the printing press were the next items on Boitsov's agenda. Twice the obkom had discussed these questions at plenums, in November 1942 and January 1944<sup>108</sup>. In 1942, complaints were uttered that the Party organizations in the oblast', particularly in the areas near the front line and recently liberated raions, were not sufficiently or seriously enough engaged in the liquidation of the consequences of the German occupation. "Detrimental rumours and unhealthy moods" among certain sectors of the population immediately after liberation were ignored<sup>109</sup>. At the same plenum, the obkom secretary for propaganda, M.M. Obratsov, was released from his duties since his father had lived on German-occupied territory, and had even worked as a village elder (*starosta*)<sup>110</sup>. He was succeeded by a certain Maksimov, who was recommended by the Central Committee for the job --this position being part of the Central Committee's *nomenklatura*<sup>111</sup>. Maksimov, somewhat surprisingly, was able to report immediately on the state of *agitprop* in the oblast'. He was critical of the mood among the population of Molokovo raion<sup>112</sup>. There, people had expressed impatience with the lack of victories, while others had defended the Germans who were "only killing partisans." In January 1944, the Central Committee apparently informed the obkom about its displeasure with the popular mood in the oblast'<sup>113</sup>. Again it was

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<sup>108</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.21ob.

<sup>109</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.103. See IV.2.

<sup>110</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.110.

<sup>111</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1. 110ob. Maksimov was already gone by January 1945, and his position had been taken over by Kalachev.

<sup>112</sup>Moscow, 17/43/741, 1.114ob.

<sup>113</sup>Moscow, 147/44/546, 1.19.

insufficiently monitored by local Party organizations. Apparently lists of questions, posed at different meetings, discussions, and speeches, were to be sent to the higher levels of the Party hierarchy, and accounts on the toilers' grievances needed to be passed on to town and raion committees<sup>114</sup>.

As a result of these admonitions from above, Party educational rooms and libraries were furnished with necessary literature and supplies<sup>115</sup>. Since 1943, evening universities in Kalinin, Kimry, and Torzhok were operating to educate leading workers in the oblast'; forty leading oblast' workers studied by correspondence with the Higher Party school under the Central Committee. 1943 also saw the creation of raion Party schools in towns and raion centres. In 1944, the obkom ordered the creation of general educational studies for leading cadres. In January 1945, ninety-five leading oblast' and raion workers studied by correspondence in the Kalinin Pedagogical Institute. Others were students of the oblast' correspondence secondary school. More attended district schools for general education<sup>116</sup>.

The method of independently studying Marxism-Leninism had been revived in the oblast' during the war years<sup>117</sup>. However, many of these students apparently neglected their studies. Permanent and temporary lecturers of the obkom, and of the rai- and gorkoms, had been giving talks in 1944; these addresses were often considered

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<sup>114</sup>VI.1 gives some examples of these reports.

<sup>115</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.21ob.

<sup>116</sup>It is probably only true that the education level of the leading cadres improved if the situation of 1945 was compared to the previous war years; see the remark on the state of the education in the oblast' above.

<sup>117</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.21ob.ff.

deficient in quality and content. The history of the Party -- as told, inevitably, by the Short Course -- and questions concerning the Soviet economy were seldom discussed by the lecturers<sup>118</sup>.

The intelligentsia, especially in the countryside, could hardly be persuaded by the Party organizations to educate politically the population<sup>119</sup>. In previous months, the propaganda of atheism had been resumed, but had barely reached the countryside; some raions did not even engage in this work. This is a sign that the wartime relaxation in the policy of Party and state towards religion was already on the wane by January 1945, when victory was certain<sup>120</sup>.

Immediately after liberation, special propaganda groups, Party and *agitprop* workers, had been sent into the formerly occupied raions<sup>121</sup>. In January 1945, 1,100 agitational collectives formally existed in the oblast', comprising 12,000 agitators. This was an astonishing number, if one keeps in mind that the total population was around 1.5 million at the time: one agitator per 125 persons<sup>122</sup>. In several raions --those of Pirovo, Spirovo, Likhoslavl', Lesnoe, and Molodoi T'ud, already hounded earlier in the speech--, however, the raikoms were not actively supervising their agitators. As a result, the agitation work among the population was being neglected. This

<sup>118</sup>See VI.1 for more on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, Toronto: Francis White Publishers, 1939 [from here: Short Course]. Were these lectures always given? The case of Tsvetkov described in VI.2 indicates that the interest in the lectures both on the part of lecturers and their intended audiences was sometimes quite limited.

<sup>119</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.22.

<sup>120</sup>Although religion itself had made a come-back; see IV.2, VI.1, and VI.2.

<sup>121</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.22/22ob.

<sup>122</sup>See Table 2.

was seen as a crucial cause of these raions' failure to comply with the obligations of the economic plans.

The equation of languishing political propaganda with lack of economic output is common for the period up until 1953. *Agitprop* had to serve as virtually the sole catalyst for workers and peasants for a long while, since material incentives were not made available. At the same time, many of the raikoms probably shrugged off ideological missions because they were swamped by economic work. In the final reckoning, the economic results of a particular territory constituted the yardstick by which the obkom measured the competence of the lower authorities.

Some improvement was noticed after a CC decision of July 1943: it called for political lectures by leading Party workers among the rural population; several raions --this time those of Sonkovo, Spirovo (again!), Goritskii, Kimry, Sandovo, Rzhev were mentioned-- organized far too few political lectures in the kolkhozy<sup>123</sup>.

Many buildings that had housed cultural institutions were destroyed by the Germans, yet by January 1945 the oblast' already had thirty-three "Palaces of Culture" (*doma kul'tury*), 1,076 village reading rooms, ten museums, 260 libraries, and 126 cinema installations<sup>124</sup>. In a lot of raions, these were appropriately deployed for political agitation among the toiling masses; yet, some raikoms --now those of Rameshkii, Emel'ianovo, and Kalinin rural district were named-- made no attempt to guide, stimulate, and control the activities of the reading rooms and so forth.

<sup>123</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.22 ob.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., 1.22 ob.

In January 1945, one oblast', five urban, and forty-one raion newspapers were published in the oblast', with a total edition of 226,000 copies per issue<sup>125</sup>. This is undoubtedly a sizable number, but they had a low frequency of publication (the oblast' newspaper Proletarskaia Pravda came out about four times a week, being the most frequently issued paper).

Boitsov praised Proletarskaia Pravda for its enhanced reportage on the problems of agriculture and Party life, but criticized it for its failure to deliver on the questions pertinent to industry and culture<sup>126</sup>. The Stakhanov movement was inadequately popularized. This criticism was heeded by those responsible for the paper: on August 31, 1945, Proletarskaia Pravda would commemorate in an editorial the tenth anniversary of Stakhanov's feat and its lesson for the toilers of the oblast'<sup>127</sup>. Boitsov noticed that the newspapers had played a strategic role in educating the population and its mobilization for tasks demanded by the war economy<sup>128</sup>. The papers of Emel'ianovo, Lukovnikovo, and Kushalino raions were dubbed "semiliterate and dull." Boitsov cautioned the editorial staff not to forget their educational and propagandistic purposes.

Finally, after more than forty pages (type-written, A-4, single-spaced) Boitsov came to a conclusion<sup>129</sup>. In his opinion, the Party in the oblast' had travelled a difficult road. It should now

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<sup>125</sup>Ibid., I.22 ob.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., I.23.

<sup>127</sup>PP 7839/Aug 31, 1945, p.1.

<sup>128</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, II.22 ob./23ff.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., II.23/23ob.



dedicate itself to rectifying all the shortcomings that he had noted. 'The most pressing issues of the moment were the successful discharge of flax, timber, and other deliveries to the state, and the rapid execution of preparations for spring sowing in the countryside. 'The revival of industry and construction were of prime importance. 'The war was not over yet, so everyone should try to work even better for the purpose of final victory. 'The training of Party members and candidates, the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism, and the education of cadres needed to upgrade. 'The political work among the population should be increased. 'Then, the Communist Party, the Soviet Union, and Stalin --in this order-- were hailed by the first secretary of the Party's obkom.

Although complaints of different aspects of activities in the oblast' may be found in most speeches by oblast' Party secretaries at plenums or conferences in subsequent years, they are startlingly similar. Similarly tedious as well: it should be remembered that Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev at this point was at the same level within the Party as Ivan Pavlovich Boitsov. These kind of speeches will only be referred to later, when elements brought up in them throw some light on certain aspects of daily life, point at anomalous events, or describe emergencies occurring in the oblast'.

## **V.2 The Party's Point of View: Postwar Failures of Leadership**

Boitsov would be the most successful of all Party secretaries between 1935 and 1953; he stood at the helm of the province for

almost nine years (from March 1938 until December 1946). He was exceptional as well in receiving a promotion as reward for his activities in Kalinin: in late 1946, he was appointed first secretary of the Stavropol krai<sup>130</sup>. In contrast, Mikhailov and Rabov were (probably) both arrested in the 1930s. Vorontsov and Konovalov would be released from their duties by the Central Committee. Kiselev does not receive any mention in the official history of the Kalinin Oblast' Party organization of 1971. This should be interpreted as an ominous sign. By December 1955 at the latest, Kiselev had disappeared from the scene<sup>131</sup>. All five had only brief periods of tenure in the 1940s and 1950s.

Boitsov's triumph seems to have been hardly owing to superior talents in comparison to those of his predecessors or successors. Instead, his longevity in office would derive from lucky coincidences. He arrived too late in the purges to fall victim to them himself; during the war he led a province in which the German advance was halted for the first time. Then, within the first postwar years, the province's economic performance was passable. It remains doubtful how much more staying power than Vorontsov he would have had, if he had stayed after 1946. Of course, whoever it was who supported Boitsov in Moscow undoubtedly contributed to his success. Although Vorontsov was ostensibly removed from his duties

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<sup>130</sup>See, e.g., *Ocherki*, prilozhenie 2, p.701; or *Biographic Directory of the USSR*, New York: Scarecrow Press, 1958, p.91. He led the Stavropol krai until 1956, after which he was appointed deputy chairman of the Party Control Commission of the CPSU.

<sup>131</sup>"A plenum of the oblast' committee of the party, discussing the situation in the oblast', acknowledged the necessity to strengthen the leadership of the *KPSS* obkom and elected the member of the Central Committee of the *KPSS* F.S. Goriachev, first secretary of the *KPSS* obkom" (*Ocherki*, p.580).

in 1949 for exhibiting the wrong "style" of work, and behaving as a moody dictator in his relations with subordinates, he surely would have been able to continue if the economic results in the oblast' had been more satisfactory --or if he had had the right person(s) to champion him in Moscow<sup>132</sup>. It is not impossible that Vorontsov's dismissal was connected with the fall of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov in 1949<sup>133</sup>. But such a link appears rather doubtful, because he was

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<sup>132</sup>Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.2ob.-3. Already in April 1949, Vorontsov received a severe reprimand from the Central Committee; in his own words, at the November 1949 obkom plenum, he lost from that point onwards confidence in himself (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.4). In March 1946, the Central Committee had announced in a resolution that it would judge the local Party organizations according to the economic results of their territories (Zelenin, *Obshchestvenno...*, p.10).

<sup>133</sup>The official reasons for his dismissal in November 1949 were the following, in the words of a resolution of the obkomplenium that was convoked to discuss his dismissal: "The plenum of the obkom notices that, in the work of the party obkomburo and of the first obkom secretary, comrade Vorontsov, serious errors and shortcomings were allowed. The leadership of the party's obkom suppressed criticism and self-criticism in the party organization, did not take necessary measures for the straightening out of uncovered shortcomings in party- and economic work. The obkomburo of the *VKP(b)* and c[omrade]. Vorontsov allowed an unbolshevik approach in the selection of cadres, promoted to leading positions people who had been unproven, and who had compromised themselves in their former work. In the practical work of the first obkom secretary c. Vorontsov incidences of running affairs by decrees (*administrirovanië*) took place. The large shortcomings in the leadership over the economy of the oblast', noticed in the resolutions of the Central Committee of the *VKP(b)* of October 4, 1948, with regards to the Kalinin obkom of the *VKP(b)* have not been righted until now, the organizational-party and party-political work remains as before on a low level. C. Vorontsov has shown himself to be unprepared for the leadership of the oblast' party organization"(Pako, 147/4/1511, 1.1ob.). In other words, the basic reason seems to have been that the Central Committee lost patience with the lack of economic performance, because all the other arguments are part of the standard, meaningless language used within the Party at this time. When the Central Committee representative Dedov, a vice-head of the Department of Party, Trade Union and Komsomol organizations of the Central Committee, explained the reasons for Vorontsov's dismissal to the plenum, he repeated the same arguments, although he pointed at the slow pace of the recovery of the economy in a more detailed manner (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.2ob.). Vorontsov's second-in-command Zimin said that the Central Committee penalized --probably in April 1949-- Vorontsov and Sadovnikov for the organization of two parties for the leadership of the oblast' (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.5). He implied that these drinking bouts led to the strengthening of the sense of "familyness" (*semeistvennost'*) among the oblast' leaders. Another element of Vorontsov's downfall might have been the "case" of the railroad-car construction factory that was uncovered in 1949, to which the raion secretary of Kalinin's Zavolzh'e district, Moniakov, referred in November 1949 (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.7). By one speaker at the plenum, Vorontsov was even accused of organizing a regime of terror and a general

very much of a local worker who had known the factory floor in his younger years, and then had been apparently sponsored by Boitsov<sup>134</sup>. Boitsov did not seem to have experienced any negative consequences as a result of the "Leningrad Affair." Vorontsov's successor, Konovalov, managed in fact with even less proficiency than Vorontsov in the eyes of the Central Committee, and thus was removed even faster<sup>135</sup>.

Kiselev, the last of the provincial Party leaders in Stalin's lifetime, witnessed as first secretary further economic hard times, but it remains in doubt why he was transferred, recalled, or dismissed after Stalin's death; in his case, it is not out of the question that he was considered to belong to the *clientèle* of one of Khrushchev's rivals and was therefore released of his duties<sup>136</sup>.

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mood of fear for his heavy hand within the oblast' Party organization (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.19ob.). This seems hardly fair, because all indicators are that someone a little higher up had created that atmosphere, and had done so several years before Vorontsov's entry in the leadership of the Kalinin oblast'. Some of those who attended this plenum disagreed about Vorontsov's rudeness: "The rudeness of comrade Vorontsov is a Russian rudeness, direct, not malicious. Comrade Vorontsov did not only swear, but he also showed how to correct mistakes." (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.21.ob). In hindsight, Vorontsov's best defense was the fact that in the last two years of his leadership, the oblast' had the best results in agriculture of the entire 1945-1953 period (compare to VIII.3 for example).

<sup>134</sup>In 1937 he failed to get elected in the revision committee of the obkom (Pako, 147/1/527, 1.200/201).

<sup>135</sup>Konovalov was perhaps too collegial; he was accused by Cherkasov in July 1951 of catering too much to ispolkom head Sadovnikov, and the vice ispolkom chairs Shcheplikov and Gorokhov (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.35). The Central Committee was right in his case that the economic results had been even less satisfactory than under Vorontsov, who at least was able to make the oblast' procure the required amount of grain to the state during his tenure (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.19). N.S. Konovalov was apparently demoted to a position within the CC-apparatus (see H.E. Schulz, S.S. Taylor (eds.), Who's Who in the USSR 1961/1962, Montreal: Intercontinental Book and Publishing, 1962, p.377, p.918, and p.920). His career was not wrecked by the episode in Kalinin. Between 1956 he would work as second secretary of Kaliningrad oblast', and became subsequently first secretary of this oblast' and full Central Committee member in the early 1960s.

<sup>136</sup>Kiselev (1907-?) was a native of the Saratov province; perhaps he was a protégé of Suslov, who was born in the same province, which would make the above explanation

Boitsov's account of the situation and prospects in January 1945, although critical, was not without optimism, betraying a sense of confidence about the oblast's development in the next years. His expectations of economic prosperity were to be proven wrong, but this became only gradually clear after he had left the oblast<sup>137</sup>.

Already in early August 1945, a joint resolution of the oblispolkom and obkom had to reiterate Boitsov's criticism of the insufficient progress with respect to the revival of the agriculture in several of the formerly occupied raions<sup>138</sup>. The tempo of construction work had decidedly dropped in these raions between January 1944 and July 1945<sup>139</sup>. People were still sometimes housed

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impossible, and would lead to the conclusion that Kiselev was promoted to another job (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.218).

<sup>137</sup>In July 1951 the head of the obkom department for agitation and propaganda, Moiseev, lamented the fact that during the war the economic plans were fulfilled in contrast to those of recent years (Pako, 147/5/10, 11.104/105).

<sup>138</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.23; the raions named were those of Vysoko, Olenino, Turginovo, Ostashkov, Zavidovo, Kalinin, and Rzhev.

<sup>139</sup>In the records the impression is created that not long after the war almost every kolkhoz family lived in their own house (Proletarskaia Pravda announced in November 1947 that every kolkhoznik lived once more in a real house and had left the dug-outs; PP 8407/ Nov 12, 1947, p.3). Some respondents of the survey qualified this impression, by stating that they lived, even as a married couple, in their parents' house (which was the custom in the 1920s; see Altrichter, p.61). They stayed in their parental home after their parents died (testimony of V.P. Gavrilov, T.A. Novikova, A.F. Antonov, M.V. Bakhtina, V.P. Stepanov, I.V. Ratataev in the survey). The housing situation in the countryside was at the same time less pressing, because many of the former inhabitants of the German-occupied area never returned after the war, and because of the constant stream of rural dwellers to the towns. The departure for the towns particularly increased after 1949, and must have lessened the strain on rural housing further (see VII.3). It should be remembered that many of the rural dwellers built their houses themselves, with or without the aid of the *shubashniki* (see I.6, VIII.3, and IX.1). A.E. Vakhmistrov remarked that there were enough trees in his neighbourhood in Udoml'ia raion, and that he and his brother were sufficiently skilled carpenters to build his own house (testimony of A.E. Vakhmistrov in the survey). The houses in the countryside did not change much in outlook in comparison with the 1920s; A.P. Stepanov lived in the 1940s in his parental home, which he described as "... a hut (*izba*) with three windows, a Russian stove, an inner porch (*senj*), a farmyard (*skotnyi dvor*) and a toilet--in the yard [i.e. an outhouse]" (testimony of V.K. Stepanov in the survey).

in dugouts (*zeml'ianki*), buildings adapted for temporary housing, or with more than one family to a house. The kolkhoz livestock was insufficiently sheltered in adequate stables, some of which were too small. This led to an unnecessary loss of farm animals, in particular of young cattle. The collective farms sustained a plethora of problems with construction, ranging from the fact that kolkhozy failed to organize permanent construction brigades, to a lack of local production of building materials (e.g. bricks), and an absence of labour to assist the kolkhozy with construction. The building of stables and the like in the unoccupied areas was deficient as well, showing once more that the kolkhozniks were less interested in the upkeep of the kolkhoz property than in the maintenance of their private domain.

The Party's feeble control in the countryside persisted: in July 1945, out of a total of 6,940 kolkhozy, there were only 167 Party organizations and forty-seven candidate groups<sup>140</sup>. The Party had to rely to a large extent on the "territorial" Party organizations, which were often based in a rural soviet. Apparently, the Party had difficulty after the German retreat to reestablish itself in the liberated areas, as no kolkhoz in the raions of Vysoko, Emel'ianovo, Zavidovo, Zubtsov, Molodoi Tud, and Pogoreloe had a Party organization in July 1945<sup>141</sup>.

The Party's weak presence must have been even more disturbing for the obkom when, on August 4, 1945, the Central Committee criticized the measures taken by the republican, oblast',

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<sup>140</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.53ob.

<sup>141</sup>Compare to the maps.

and krai Party committees to reeducate Soviet citizens, who were being repatriated from Germany<sup>142</sup>. The obkom warned Party and soviet workers of underestimating the pernicious influence of "fascist and reactionary bourgeois propaganda" on those who had been in "German slavery". Serious political education should be undertaken to prove the superiority of the USSR, that had been so clearly expressed by the victory of 1945. Moreover, the propaganda workers were to explain to the repatriated (rather hypocritically, considering the Party's general disdain for those who had been in German camps or recruited for the *Arbeitseinsatz*) that the Soviet state "...had been ceaselessly worried about the soviet citizens who had been dispatched into German bondage..."<sup>143</sup>

In the Party's opinion, the repatriates were enormously indebted to the Motherland for their release<sup>144</sup>. They should now be taught what socialist discipline meant. Radio, films, slogans, portraits, posters, and so on should generate the proper sense of respect for the boundless achievements of the Soviet Union. The oblast' newspaper was ordered to publish items about the constant concern of the Soviet government and the Communist Party for their compatriots in Germany. Obviously, the paper would have to fabricate considerably in order to inveigle these former captives to believe such heartwarming concern.

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<sup>142</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.63ob.-65. The resolution was called "*Ob organizatsii politiko-vospitatel'noi raboty s repatriirovannymi sovetскими grazhdaniami*".

<sup>143</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.64ob.

<sup>144</sup>Ibid., 1.64ob.

In 1948, the Central Committee expressed its displeasure with the labour of the obkom<sup>145</sup>. A session of the Central Committee's Orgburo, under the chairmanship of Malenkov, criticized the Kalinin obkom in October 1948<sup>146</sup>. Several of those present at the meeting were playing a significant role in the affairs of the province or would do so in future years. First provincial secretary Vorontsov gave an account of the situation in his see; Kiselev, at this point in time a CC inspector, presented an accompanying report, while CC candidate Storozhev was present at the session. N.N. Shatalin, the brother of S.N. Shatalin of Kalinin, was also present as member of the Orgburo (and was a CC member)<sup>147</sup>.

The Central Committee emphasised its dissatisfaction with the situation in a resolution, in which the shortcomings and mistakes of the obkom were pointed out<sup>148</sup>. In agriculture, the low yields of grains, potatoes, and other crops were far below the norm. The socialized cattle herd was being squandered and perishing. The results of dairy farming were poor: in 1947, only 878 litres per cow had been milked. The labour discipline in the kolkhozy was often lax, and quite a few kolkhoz members escaped punishment for avoiding any work in the socialized sector of their collective farm.

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<sup>145</sup>Moscow, f.117, op.116, delo 381 (Microfilm), ll.10-17.

<sup>146</sup>Moscow, f.117, op.116, delo 381 (Microfilm), l.1, among others present were Central Committee secretaries A.A. Kuznetsov, V. Kuznetsov, Aleksandrov, Mikhailov, and Ponomarenko, and Central Committee members Suslov, Pegov, and Pospelov. According to Conquest, Ponomarenko and Pegov belonged to Malenkov's clique in the Central Committee, while Shatalin was his "closest associate" on the Revision Committee (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.438).

<sup>147</sup>Compare to Appendix III as well.

<sup>148</sup>Moscow, f.117, op.116, delo 381(Microfilm), ll.10-17.



In industry in 1947, the total production only reached 57% of the prewar level. The textile factories especially disappointed: in 1948 only 24% of the prewar output total was produced. This partially resulted from the lacklustre aid to the Kalinin textile industry by the Ministry of Textile Industry. The obkom failed to take measures to ensure a speedier tempo in the development of the building-materials industry, which led to a stagnation of building projects in industry, and so forth.

The Orgburo noticed that insufficient attention was paid by Party, trade union, and economic organizations to the urban workers' housing conditions, some of whom lived in poorly constructed apartment buildings and 'communal' houses. The workers' needs were also not satisfied with respect to middling municipal services, in particular in Rzhev, Kalinin, and Torzhok. Schools and education, particularly in the formerly German-occupied areas, were in tawdry condition<sup>149</sup>.

The obkom was neglecting political work, as a consequence of which many primary Party cells functioned badly and were found wanting in exerting a favourable influence on the situation in kolkhozy and factories<sup>150</sup>. For lack of supervision, many Communists did not work on enriching their political knowledge and education. Agitational work among the population was deficient because the local Party leaders failed to pay much attention to it. The root of the problem was perceived to lie in the ineffectual way the obkom was

<sup>149</sup>In 1949 seven-year schooling would be declared compulsory, which must have put an additional strain on the rather limited educational budget of the different levels of the government hierarchy. See Inkeles, Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen...*, p.156.

<sup>150</sup>Moscow, f.117, op.116, delo 381(Microfilm), ll.10-17.

leading the Party organization, as opposed to personally interfering with the situation at lower levels.

In the resolution, it appears that the Central Committee was primarily interested in the increase of flax deliveries -- as a technical crop, flax had an importance for the national economy of the Soviet Union<sup>151</sup>. The obkom was obliged to report to Moscow on January 1, April 1, and June 1, 1949, on the mechanization of both flax cultivation and its primary processing.

A few days later the Council of Ministers authorized the obkom to transfer more than 3,000 households from the east of the oblast' to the western regions, in order to overcome the labour shortage in these formerly occupied territories<sup>152</sup>.

Twenty months after Vorontsov's dismissal in November 1949, at the second plenum of the obkom after the eighth Party oblast' conference, once again Storozhev, the representative of the Central Committee, descended upon the oblast'<sup>153</sup>. He explained the second resolution within a year by the Central Committee on the mistakes and shortcomings of the Kalinin Party leadership.

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<sup>151</sup>A reading of the oblast' newspaper *Proletarskaja Pravda* during this period gives an impression of the importance of flax. In January, November, and December of 1945, there was hardly one issue of the paper which did not mention the (lack of) progress with flax procurements and treatment (e.g. PP 7670/Jan 3, 1945, p.1; PP 7672/Jan 5, 1945, p.1; PP 7673/Jan 7, 1945, p.1; PP 7674/Jan 9, 1945, p.1; PP 7686/Jan 28, 1945, p.2; PP 7903/Nov 30, 1945, p.1 carries the message in thick print that "The Motherland expects excellent flax from us"; also, PP 7885-7916/Nov-Dec 1945).

<sup>152</sup>Pako, 147/4/1126, 1.146. The resolution of October 9, 1948, was titled "*O merakh pomoshchi kolkhozam Kalininskoi oblasti v pod'eme l'novodstva i vosstanovlenii sel'skogo khoziaistva v raionakh, postradavshikh ot nemetskoj okkupatsii*".

<sup>153</sup>The resolution was called "*O nedostatkakh v rabote Kalininskogo obkoma VKP(b)*" and was taken on June 20, 1951; see, e.g., the titlepage of Pako, 147/5/10. Vorontsov was released from his duties in November 1949 "...for mistakes in the leadership of the oblast' party organization." (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.5).

Thus in 1951, notwithstanding all the previous benevolent (?) admonitions, the Central Committee felt once more forced to interfere in the oblast's affairs. An earlier resolution of August 1950 had apparently failed to wake up the recently installed leader, Konovalov, although this resolution was probably of a more limited scope<sup>154</sup>. A special plenum was convoked in July 1951 to discuss the CC resolution but, in fact, it turned out to be more than a "discussion." The plenum would serve as Konovalov's swan song in Kalinin; the purpose of the exercise seems to have been to discard him, a decision certainly made already before by the CC, but the pretense of form kept up by having the first secretary dismissed by an obkom plenum.

Central Committee representative Storozhev, who was a vice-head of the Central Committee Department of Party, Trade Union and Komsomol organs, unleashed the avalanche of denunciations on Konovalov<sup>155</sup>. He began by angrily pointing out the CC's repeated intervention in the previous two and a half years: in October 1948, November 1949, August 1950, and then again, in June and July 1951. He proceeded to sketch the deplorable state of agriculture in the oblast'. Flax cultivation still fell short, and the productivity of animal husbandry in the previous two years had sharply decreased.

<sup>154</sup>Central Committee resolution of August 1, 1950, called (Pako, 147/5/7, 1.3a): "*O nedostatkakh v rabote Kalininskogo, Kaluzhskogo i Kirovskogo obkomov partii po ukрупneniiu kolkhozakh*". Konovalov, in his apology before the obkom plenum of July 1951, also referred to a confidential letter of April 2, 1951, in which additional resolutions on the errors of the Kalinin obkom had been enumerated (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.124).

<sup>155</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 11.5-31. In all 109 members and candidates of the obkom participated at the plenum, 29 of whom actually addressed the meeting (Pako, 147/5/35, 1.1).

This was all the more lamented because the Soviet Union had embarked on a special three-year plan for the development of animal husbandry. The deliveries to the state of meat, milk, wool, and eggs fell far below the plan. There was a lack of fodder crops which was somewhat of a structural problem in agriculture, and would not be solved too easily<sup>156</sup>. Too few hayfields and meadows constituted a cause for the insufficient fodder supply for the increasing cattle herd, but other factors must have played a more decisive rôle, since in the 1920s a much larger amount of livestock had been able to survive on the same territory<sup>157</sup>. In this area too, apparently, the operations of the MTS were found wanting, and the stations for soil amelioration failed to aid in solving the problem<sup>158</sup>.

Kolkhoz directors were engaged in squandering agricultural produce, stemming from the drop in labour discipline within the oblast' procurement organs<sup>159</sup>. The cattle were not stalled in proper stables --the building of these was below the norms. Of the 11,900 kolkhoz Communists far too few were working in the livestock farms of the kolkhozy. The MTS had recently been able to fulfill only one of their tasks: the portion of grain harvesting in which their combines were used. They had been suffering from a vast fluctuation in their labour force: in the previous three years, in their courses and mechanization schools, more than 6,000 tractorists had been trained, yet simultaneously more than 5,000 tractorists had quit the

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<sup>156</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.46.

<sup>157</sup>See Table 17.

<sup>158</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.11ff. Compare as well to IX.1: the high incidence of rocks in the deeper soil would prevent machine-driven ploughs from being more useful in the early 1960s.

<sup>159</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.11ff.

MTS. In retrospect, one source described the limited role of the MTS during this period in the following manner:

The labour in the kolkhoz fields done by the MTS amounted predominantly to aiding with ploughing and sowing. In the kolkhozy that we investigated, harvesting and other tasks in the first postwar years were done to a significant extent by the kolkhozy themselves with their own horse-drawn equipment. The deficiency of machinery was particularly strongly felt at harvest time.<sup>160</sup>

The disruption caused by the amalgamation in 1950 was still noteworthy, although Storozhev claimed that it was above all caused by the indolence of the obkom in acting upon the recommendations of the resolution of August 1950:

This led to the disruption of the most important agro-technological measures, to disorganization of labour with harvesting, to a large loss of the harvest, and to the decrease in value of the *trudoden'*, both in kind and in money.<sup>161</sup>

The kolkhozniks had received in the last two years less and less per *trudoden'*<sup>162</sup>. In 1950, the kolkhoznik received on average 792 grams of cereals and 773 grams of potatoes, which was about half the remuneration of 1949<sup>163</sup>. Of the almost 2,000 kolkhozy in

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<sup>160</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.45.

<sup>161</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.14. Fainsod gives perhaps the best translation of the word *trudoden'* with "workday credit" (Fainsod, *How...*, p.461). Compare the following remark on the results of the amalgamation of the kolkhozy in Pskov oblast': "However, the enlargement of *kolkhozy* alienated the *kolkhoznik* from the land because now it no longer coincided with the land of the former community (*obshchina*). The peasantry's response to amalgamation was increased flight from the village" (Ivan V. Karasev, "The Reconstruction of Agriculture in Pskov Oblast' 1945-1953," in: *Soviet Studies*, 1991, 43(2), pp.301-309, p.305). Karasev is of the opinion that the amalgamation, which was aimed to make agriculture more efficient, failed to do so. In the light of the agricultural results in the Kalinin oblast' during the early 1950s, I have to agree with Karasev's point of view.

<sup>162</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.14.

<sup>163</sup>In 1947 per *trudoden'* in the oblast', in 1% of the kolkhozy, the kolkhozniks received more than three kilograms of grain, in 9% from two to three kilograms, in

1950, more than 1,300 paid less than a rouble per *trudoden'*<sup>164</sup>. This had led to an exodus of 36,000 kolkhozniks from collective farms. Storozhev did not want to consider a solution by way of proposing a superior basic remuneration for each *trudoden'* through better prices for the obligatory state deliveries. This would only be suggested one and a half years later, and then implemented in the agricultural reforms after Stalin's death<sup>165</sup>. According to the logic of Stalin's Central Committee, represented here by Storozhev, the value of the *trudoden'* could only be increased through the attainment of high production levels on each collective farm. The more a kolkhoz procured, the better off its members would be, as there would be more left for the collective farm.

In 1950, no kolkhoz complied with the harvest plan for grains, while less than 1% did so for flax or met the requirement for milk production<sup>166</sup>. This is an indication of the consequences of the 1950

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38% from one to two kilograms, in 28% from 500 grams to one kilogram, in 11% from 300-500 grams, in 12% from 0-300 grams, and in 102 collective farms (slightly more than 1%) no grain was paid at all for the *trudoden'* (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.14ob.; the total of kolkhozy on January 1, 1948, was around 7,235). In 1948 the overall picture seemed to have been better, but then 1948 was the best agricultural year after the war according to most indicators (see Table 16 and VIII.3). Even though 1948 was a good year, in early 1949 first Party secretary Vorontsov felt obliged to say, since many still lived in miserable circumstances as a result of the low remuneration of the *trudoden'*: "The task of the party organization consists of, on the basis of the strengthening of the socialist farming of the kolkhozy, in the fastest amount of time, liquidating the violations of the rural artel' Statute, increasing the harvest yields, attaining a sharp increase of the value of the *trudoden'*, and in this way improving the material welfare of the kolkhozniks" (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.15). In Maksatikha raion, where 185 collective farms operated in 1947 and 1948, the number of kolkhozy where less than 500 grams of grain per *trudoden'* was received fell from forty-eight in 1947 to seven in 1948; sixty-four kolkhozy in 1947 had received 500-1000 grams of grain, and forty-one in 1948 (Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.59ob.). This is further evidence of the good agricultural results of the year 1948.

<sup>164</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.14.

<sup>165</sup>See VII.3 and IX.2.

<sup>166</sup>Ibid., 1.14ff.

amalgamation; instead of having bumper crops and so on, thanks to this supposed rationalization, the consolidated collective farms in the Kalinin oblast' lagged behind the plan targets for the three most important areas of production. Storozhev --i.e. the Central Committee-- believed that this disaster could have been avoided by selecting more carefully the kolkhoz chairs for the amalgamated kolkhozy. In this respect the obkom and raikoms failed. Within one year, the chosen directors had already been heavily replaced: 26% (509) had been dismissed.

The All-Union Institute for Flax in Torzhok had been persistently ignored by the obkom<sup>167</sup>. It had failed to show any significant results during the last fifteen years, and agricultural specialists on the whole were neglected. In the countryside the Party did not combat sufficiently the relics of the past, a euphemism for religion.

Storozhev subsequently turned to industry and transport<sup>168</sup>. More than two hundred enterprises had not satisfied their plans in 1950. In July 1951, 328 were not achieving planning targets. The quality of much produce did not meet the standards, nor was the required assortment of goods produced. Many machinery breakdowns occurred, and lengthy stoppages in the factories were common. The problem, in the eyes of the CC, was partially attributed to a lack of care for cadres --Stalin's famous adage of cadres deciding everything was appropriately quoted. This deficiency led to an enormous turnover of the labour force, and to many incidents of

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<sup>167</sup>Ibid., I. 16/17.

<sup>168</sup>Ibid., II. 18ff.

labour discipline violations. The shortage of stable cadres especially troubled the forest industry.

Another reason for the deficient industrial results lay in the authorities' neglect of the workers' living conditions<sup>169</sup>. The communal-housing accommodations were still only at 74.8% of the prewar housing space. Apart from that, the prewar network of children's institutions, public baths, cultural, and sports facilities had yet to be restored. There were far from sufficient repair shops, the number of which in urban areas had precipitated even in the previous two years from 720 to 589. As a result of the trade unions' lack of sufficient interest in the workers' plight, workers' wages were being paid too late, the incidence of workers' injuries and illnesses was high, and workdays were too long. The oblast' also suffered from a scarcity of medical workers, and there seems to have been a lack of more than eight hundred doctors.

Especially in the countryside, the supply of consumer goods was flawed, and in many raions essential products such as kerosene --for lamps--, salt, and other basic necessities were simply not available<sup>170</sup>. In the retail network of the oblast' squandering and theft were rampant. The food and tea canteens were unkempt. Owing to the obkom's neglect, the Party organization was in a sorrowful state: some of the leading Party workers in the oblast' did not even subscribe to a newspaper, such as the raikom secretary of Vysoko raion, Dmitriev, and of Esenovich raion, Voskresenskii<sup>171</sup>.

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<sup>169</sup>Ibid., 1.20ff.

<sup>170</sup>Ibid., 1.21.

<sup>171</sup>Ibid., 1.23ff.



Worse, a significant number of oblast' and raion Party leaders had not subscribed to the collective works of Lenin and Stalin, that were being published in installments. Others had a subscription to these essential tomes, but were not picking up their copies in the shops. Compared to the size of the Party before the war in the countryside, the Party had certainly augmented in rural areas, but the competence of the rural Communists was deplorable:

...they do not take active part in party and community life, carry out their vanguard role in production poorly, abandon their labour in the kolkhozy, and on their own initiative depart to find more lucrative employment.

In the last two years the quantity of communist kolkhozniks has fallen by almost 2,000 people. A most serious shortcoming in the activities of the kolkhoz primary party organizations is the fact that they do not surround themselves with the kolkhoz *aktiv*, do not invite non-party kolkhozniks for open party meetings, seldom communicate with them on matters of productive and economic importance for the kolkhozy, and poorly organize socialist emulation.<sup>172</sup>

For these reasons, in the three years before July 1951, 3,329 people had been excluded from the Party<sup>173</sup>.

1,300 Komsomol organizations operated in the kolkhozy, but their prowess was undermined in just the same way as that of the Party, for they were left to cope on their own as well, without any supervision from above<sup>174</sup>. As a result, many religious customs were still being practised in the countryside. These exerted a negative influence on rural youth, and furthermore distracted a significant number of kolkhozniks from work in the collective farms.

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<sup>172</sup>Ibid., 1.27.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid., 1.28.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid., 1.28ff.

Kononov had shown himself for what he was at the previous Party conference in Storozhev's opinion<sup>175</sup>. For then the secretary had ignored the foul farming situation --here Storozhev had to admit that this was partially a consequence of the difficult year agriculture experienced in 1950, probably referring to both the weather and the amalgamation. Kononov's colleagues in the leadership, Sadovnikov, Shatalin, and Borisov, similarly failed to notice the plight of agriculture. Storozhev in his concluding remarks advised the plenum to replace this leadership.

Thus Kononov was made the scapegoat and axed by this plenum<sup>176</sup>. He was transferred to the Central Committee apparatus, but his demise would only be temporary<sup>177</sup>.

The agricultural production in the oblast', however, continued to sink. At the end of 1952, the obkom ordered a commission to establish the causes of the reduction of the number of households and able-bodied workers in the collective farms in the oblast'<sup>178</sup>. Its report provides a telling description of the low pay and constant scarcity that beleaguered the lives of the kolkhozniks<sup>179</sup>. Apart from that, the report also admitted that the downward trend in the production of cereals, flax, potatoes, and in animal husbandry had

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<sup>175</sup>Storozhev described Kononov as "...a weak-willed, liberal leader." (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.30); Kononov admitted that he had been working in a different style than his predecessor Vorontsov, who "...was extremely rude, did not have any qualms about using foul language to a leading worker, about beating his fist on the table..." (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.127).

<sup>176</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.181.

<sup>177</sup>In 1956, he was appointed second secretary of the Kaliningrad oblast' (see above).

<sup>178</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 11.1-18.

<sup>179</sup>See VII.3 for more about the report.

continued in 1951, so that the results of that year were the worst annual results of the period 1947-1951<sup>180</sup>.

Storozhev's list of shortcomings echoed that of Boitsov six and a half years before. It seemed that the system gradually lost its ability to entice the population to produce more after the war in the Kalinin oblast'. The lack of investment and absence of any meaningful material incentives for the workers began to tell on the economic performance. Initial revolutionary enthusiasm had led to herculean efforts, in particular among industrial workers, and was responsible for some of the growth in the 1930s. The subsequent sense of patriotic duty during the war, combined with the (limited) room for personal profit, were not replaced with similar abstract or material incentives after the war<sup>181</sup>. The population at large was overwhelmed by a sense of apathy with regards to the Party propaganda promises of a "radiant future" and the like. Perhaps for a few years after March 1943, the people in the Kalinin oblast' were stirred by some of the slogans. Conceivably, they tried to rebuild the economy as best as they could for a while. However, towards 1950 they ran out of steam, and almost everyone, as will become clear here below, began to cheat the authorities in order to improve their personal existence. It was virtually fatal to be caught because the

<sup>180</sup>See Table 16.

<sup>181</sup>Compare to the opinion of Iu. Borisov: "The generation of the people, that had endured and won the war, had a number of new traits in comparison with the pre-war one. It was in the field of social relations both more independent, and, as a rule, more literate. ... The people emerged from the war with a different psychology and different ideas, than with which they had entered it. And although after the war once more the former processes resumed, life definitely demanded changes, but the clear recognition of this took place significantly later" (Iu. Borisov, "Stalin: Chelovek i Simvol....," p.482). In other words, the leadership displayed a startling absence of imagination to cash in on this changed attitude and the expectations among the population that resulted from it.

penalties were severe until Stalin's death. But everyone was covering for everyone else with respect to this *tufta*<sup>182</sup>. Society became consistently more corrupt after Stalin's death. Khrushchev would be the last Party leader until *perestroika* and *glasnost* who tried to reinvigorate revolutionary enthusiasm<sup>183</sup>.

Brezhnev, for all intents and purposes, accepted Soviet reality and let the "second economy" have almost free reign in the country. In his years, metaphorically speaking, the train had come to a full stop against the buffer at the end of the track. The term *Zastoi* (stagnation) aptly describes the Brezhnev years. Sporadically the leadership attempted to revive the attitude of selfless sacrifices and strict discipline of the 1930s and early 1940s. Occasionally some scapegoats --the Party leadership of Georgia, the dissidents-- were persecuted in those years and, more often than not, they were the ones who really wanted to change society. The dissidents ran against a wall of complacency and conformism erected by their fellow citizens. The latter were probably glad to be left alone for a while and did not want to be bothered by having to imagine new changes, let alone experience them. They were all too happy to be allowed smugness. The right to be complacent --witness Boitsov and Vorontsov in V.1-- had only been obtained after Stalin's death. The

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<sup>182</sup> *Tufta* padding, forgery; *tufta*; deception, chicanery, work done only for show, purposely false inflated indicators in an official report. From *T.F.T.: tiuzhelyi fizicheskii trud* (hard physical labour), later mockingly used as an abbreviation of *Tekhnika Ucheta Fiktivnogo Truda* (the technique of counting fictive labour) (Rossi, pp.455-457). See also Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.338, and Khlebnik, "Prinuditel'nyi," p.83.

<sup>183</sup> In particular with his promises, at the Twenty-First Party Congress in 1959 and in the new Party Program of the CPSU in 1961, of the imminent arrival of Communism (e.g. V.V. Zhuravlev(ed.), *XX s'ezd KPSS i ego istoricheskie real'nosti*, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1991, p. 20/221 and pp.229-238).

average Russian had witnessed too many upheavals during his or her lifetime, and was not prepared to jeopardize the low, but adequate standard of living that greatly exceeded that of Stalin's days. Only with the nascent generation in Soviet society, who had hardly experienced the deprivations and fear of the Stalin years, could the success and initial popularity of Gorbachev's policies become possible.

Until 1953, agriculture would continue to stagnate or even deteriorate, despite all the Central Committee's warnings, threats, and some of the measures taken to improve it. Only the substantial increase of procurement prices in that year would ameliorate performance somewhat and temporarily curb the exodus to towns. In industry also, matters ostensibly convalesced after Stalin's death, although some factories --mainly heavy industry-- did meet their plans even before 1953, probably because the remuneration and living conditions of their personnel were superior to others. The textile factories would only fully recuperate in Khrushchev's time. The explanation of this phenomenon would be obvious: although the priority of heavy industry was certainly not relinquished --as the criticism of Malenkov by Khrushchev in 1955 showed--, the investment level in light (consumer goods) industry would be heightened<sup>184</sup>. Consequently, the incentive became larger, by way of higher wages, to enhance and increase production in the factories. At the same time it was then possible to introduce some long overdue technological improvements to the production process.

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<sup>184</sup>Zhuravlev, XX s'ezd..., pp.25-27.

How much ideological enthusiasm increased under Khrushchev is dubious since personal initiative from lower levels of the Party hierarchy was almost always thwarted, although under Stalin and his successors extraordinary lip-service was paid to "Party democracy". Only rarely were ideas from below seriously considered, when some higher authority found it convenient to use an idea of a lower Party worker<sup>185</sup>. It could then be portrayed as an example of real democracy at work. Probably more often the case, the superior would simply plagiarize the idea.

It is obvious that many talented people must have turned away from the Party in frustration, because genuinely original ideas were nipped in the bud. After Stalin's death, to leave the Party, remain outside of it, or remain aloof from politics within the Party, while developing alternative ideas --even if only in one's own study, for oneself-- were no longer literally deadly sins, and many of the more imaginative people probably opted to do so<sup>186</sup>. Perhaps the Soviet Union would still exist today if Khrushchev would have allowed more profound criticism of the Party leadership, both at local levels and

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<sup>185</sup>An example of this "real democracy" was Khrushchev's praise for the initiatives of the first secretary of Riazan oblast', Larionov, in 1959 (Zhuravlev, XX *S'ezd*..., pp.119/120).

<sup>186</sup>As the recently published works of Konstantin Simonov, Iuri Trifonov, and Anatolii Rybakov prove (K. Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia: razmyshleniia o I.V. Staline. Moskva: "Pravda," 1990; Iu. V. Trifonov, The Disappearance. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ardis, 1992; A. Rybakov, Fear). Some people were of course persecuted and harassed for their authoring of works that were critical of the regime, of which Pasternak was the most famous example during Khrushchev's reign. Vakzer noticed in a study of the personal records of Communist Party members in the Leningrad Party organization that, already in the middle of the 1950s, among many of them ideas arose which anticipated the transformations of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Vakzer, "Personal'nye...", pp.102/103).

in the centre, and would have given the Party rank and file the opportunity to blackball their leadership on their own initiative.

'The direction of the Kalinin oblast' failed in the postwar period to create a vibrant economy, but it would be incorrect for us to blame people like Vorontsov or Konovalov. The economic problems did not stem from the incompetence of the local leadership, but rather from policies of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and, more particularly, from those of Stalin.

### V.3 The Organization of the Party and Government

'The Party swelled significantly between 1945 and 1948, after which its growth was checked until 1953<sup>187</sup>. The heftiest increases took place in 1945 and 1946. Although the Party membership and candidacy on January 1, 1949, was 32,285 larger than on January 1, 1945, more new members had been admitted than that, because 5,749 Communists had been excluded during the years 1945-1949<sup>188</sup>. The growth during and after the war was so rapid that the Central Committee felt forced to caution the local Party organizations, in late July 1946, not to accept everyone who had written a statement requesting to be admitted as a candidate<sup>189</sup>.

<sup>187</sup>See Table 35.

<sup>188</sup>Pako, 147/4/1551, 1.105 and 1.110.

<sup>189</sup>By way of a resolution that was titled "*O roste partii i merakh po usileniu partiino-organizatsionnoi i partiino-politicheskoi raboty s vnov' vstupivshchimi v riady VKP(b)*" (Pako, 147/4/18, 1.3). The Central Committee resolution was issued on July 26, 1946 (Zelenin, *Obshchestvenno*..., pp.14/15). A large number of the new members were army veterans, who had entered the Party during their army service (ibid., p.20).

The Party was led by the oblast' committee (*obkom*) or, more particularly, its buro, in which the obkom secretaries, the head of the security organs, the newspaper editor, the chairman of the executive committee of the oblast' soviet (*oblispolkom*), one secretary of the town committee (*gorkom*) of Kalinin, and the head of the Komsomol always had a seat after 1945<sup>190</sup>. As Fainsod noticed, the obkom secretariat was held responsible for the degree of economic success of its domain, and was at the same time obliged to guarantee a sufficient amount of political loyalty towards the Communist regime among the population at large of its constituency<sup>191</sup>. In the postbellum Kalinin oblast', the obkomburo and its secretariat were running the government. There is no evidence to suggest that the "official" government of the oblast' (the executive elected by the oblast' soviet (*oblispolkom*)), was able to make a decision in any critical matter without having received definitive instructions about the affair from the obkomburo or the first secretary<sup>192</sup>. The chairman of the executive committee of the oblast' soviet was always a member of the buro, and other lesser

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<sup>190</sup>See Appendix III; its composition exactly corresponds to Fainsod's description of it, except for the fact that it seems that the NKGB/MGB chief was the usual representative of the security organs, instead of the head of the local branch of the MVD (Fainsod, *How...*, pp.191/192). At times, however, both were members of the buro. Most of Fainsod's description of the way the oblasts in Russia were ruled was confirmed in the records. For this reason the description of the governmental system has been kept comparatively brief here.

<sup>191</sup>Fainsod, *How...*, p.192.

<sup>192</sup>Thus the obkomburo --although the record says obkom, the few plenums certainly did not discuss more than ten issues during entire war-- looked into 305 issues that were related to agriculture in 1944 (Pako, 147/3/2679, l.81). It is, of course, wrong to assume that the obkomburo itself was free from supervision and control. Both the Central Committee and the MVD/MGB tried to keep a close watch on its activities. Many of the buro's decisions concerned the implementation of measures and decrees that came from above.



government administrators were members of the obkom. They never seem to rank very high in seniority within the Party, although Sadovnikov, the head of the oblispolkom from the end of 1948 onwards, was virtually second-in-command in the early 1950s. This was not so much the result of his position as leader of the oblast' government, however, but more a result of his exceptionally long work experience as a high administrator of the oblispolkom. He began his career in the oblispolkom as one of the vice-chairs, then became caretaker chair for Simonov, and finally chairman. Regarding weighty issues he was probably heavily relied on by Konovalov and Kiselev, who were newcomers to the oblast' and needed someone to introduce them to the specifics of the Kalinin oblast'<sup>193</sup>. In order to survive as long as he did in the leadership of the Kalinin Party organization, Sadovnikov must have been either a talented politician or under the patronage of someone higher up in the Party, for he certainly was criticized at times. In contrast to the disgraced Vorontsov, Konovalov, or Borisov, to mention a few of the more noteworthy obkom secretaries, he held on to his position.

So did S.N. Shatalin, who became one of the obkom secretaries in 1947. It is obvious that he survived because of the presence of his brother, N.N. Shatalin, in the Cadres Section of the Central Committee Secretariat and the Orgburo<sup>194</sup>. In 1952, at the ninth

<sup>193</sup> Konovalov was accused by Cherkasov in July 1951 of being too friendly to the ispolkom head, and Sadovnikov's deputies Shcheplikov and Gorokhov (Pako, 147/5/10, I.35).

<sup>194</sup> Fainsod, *How...*, p.189. Shatalin was little appreciated by the few Party workers who remembered him in the survey. D.A. Dukinin said that he was conspicuous for his shouting and pressuring when he visited Konakovo raion; he even threatened the kolkhozniks in 1950 that all who did not join the amalgamated kolkhoz would be sent to a camp (testimony of D.A. Dukinin in the survey). I.I. Tiaglov clashed with him in 1952,

Party conference, Dubinin, the ispolkom chairman of Kamen raion, suggested explicitly that the presence of N.N. Shatalin in the Central Committee was the cause of his brother's longevity in the Kalinin leadership<sup>195</sup>. S.N. Shatalin endured at least verbally as much criticism, if not more, as some of his colleagues in the obkomburo but somehow, in contrast to many of them, never lost his job. In 1952, Kiselev came to Shatalin's defense and, after a brief discussion of Shatalin's candidature for the obkom, the latter was allowed to remain on the list of candidates and reelected. Apart from that, S.N. Shatalin was elected concomitantly as a delegate to the Nineteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party by the ninth Party conference<sup>196</sup>.

In early 1953, the obkomburo generally convened once every two weeks, although in exceptional cases it met weekly<sup>197</sup>. The obkom had a similarly organized secretariat as the Central Committee: in early 1945, it comprised of at least five departments, that of cadres, headed by a full-fledged obkomsecretary, propaganda and agitation, also led by a full secretary, and the organization-instruction, agriculture, and school departments (*otdely*) and

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although he did not explain the cause (testimony of I.I. Tiaglov in the survey). S.N. Shatalin is the father of the radical economist Stanislav Shatalin who knew a brief moment in the limelight during the last years of the existence of the USSR (see Angus Roxburgh, The Second Russian Revolution: The Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, London: BBC Books, 1991, pp.183-185, 194, and 198; and Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "The Nature of the Beast," in: The National Interest, No. 31, Spring 1993, pp.46-56, p.52).

<sup>195</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, II.350-353. Dubinin stated that he felt Shatalin to be incompetent in his job.

<sup>196</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, I.356.

<sup>197</sup>See Pako, 147/5/764, II.54-58.

probably a sixth department for military matters<sup>198</sup>. These last four were led by *otdel* heads, who ranked lower than the secretaries. There was also a "Special Sector" of the obkom, but in how far this sector counted as a genuine department before the autumn of 1948 is unclear<sup>199</sup>. After the Eighteenth All-Union Party Conference of 1941, because of the neglect of industry, according to Fainsod, secretaries were appointed to deal with economic matters<sup>200</sup>. In the case of the Kalinin oblast' in 1945, these secretaries bore the title of obkom vice-secretaries. Each of them dealt with a specific branch of the economy, and therefore there were vice-secretaries for

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<sup>198</sup>Compare to Fainsod, *How...*, p.173 and p.192. According to Fainsod, there was no school department at the oblast' level in 1939, when the reorganization took place upon which the organization mentioned here was based (Fainsod, *How...*, p.173). However, in the sources for the Kalinin oblast' for 1945, there was no evidence that the school department had been replaced by a department for military affairs. In fact, in 1947/1948, evidence of the existence of an obkom (and gorkom and raion) army department has been found in the records, together with a school department, at least within the obkom secretariat (Pako, 147/4/1125, l.71). Apart from the military department in 1945, there was a military *kommissar*, who probably was subordinate to the Red Army command, and was presumably more or less independent from the obkom leadership. After all, 1945 was still a war year, and it seems logical that the military representatives at lower levels of the Party were under the direct command of the Stavka. The obkom department for military matters supervised in 1947 *Osoaviakhim* (the paramilitary organization for civilians, again comparable to Britain's Home Guard in World War II), the committee for physical exercise and sport, and the Red Cross (Pako, 147/4/1125, ll.71/71ob.). It aided local army administration organs, organized physical and military training for school children, helped the war invalids find work, aided the families of soldiers, and was responsible for communication with units of the Soviet Army stationed in the Kalinin oblast'. The raion and town Party committees had a similar department.

<sup>199</sup>The "Special Sector" also existed in Moscow --perhaps under a different name, led by Poskrebyshev--, where it was Stalin's domain. In Kalinin it was, judging from the records --an enormous amount of *del'a* in the former Party's archive were records that had been collected or created by the "Special Sector" of the obkom after the war-- the personal secretariat of the first obkom secretary (for Poskrebyshev's role: Zhuravlev, *XX s'ezd...*, p.217). The most varied reports ended up by way of the Special Sector on the table of the first secretary of the Kalinin Party organization: on crime, agriculture, industry, the MVD/MGB, construction, welfare, and so on.

<sup>200</sup>Fainsod, *How...*, p.174.

animal husbandry, industry, textile and light industry, lumbering, machine building, transport, and the food industry.

In 1948 the organization of the obkom was altered: from then on, there were five full-fledged secretaries and eleven obkom departments, analogous to the concomitant reorganization of the Central Committee Secretariat<sup>201</sup>. In 1951, the obkom agreed to the creation of a separate department of education, which was split off from the *otdel* for agitation and propaganda<sup>202</sup>.

One step below the obkom and its secretariat functioned the raion- and town Party committees (*raikomy, gorkomy*). A detailed description of them here is unnecessary, as Fainsod has described their operation very accurately<sup>203</sup>. Kalinin had a gorkom for the town as a whole, but was simultaneously divided into four raions, all with their own raikom. 'Towns of oblast' subordination (*oblastnoe podchinenie*) had their own gorkoms: Rzhev, Vyshnii Volochek, Bologoe, Torzhok, Kimry and, from February 18, 1948, Bezhetsk<sup>204</sup>. The attrition rate among the raikom secretaries was perhaps less

<sup>201</sup>See Appendix III and Fainsod, *How...*, p. 175, Chart V. In Kalinin, the Foreign *Otdel* and the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces were replaced by the financial and economic sector (which mainly dealt with the financial state of the Party organization itself) and the machine-building sector, a successor to the *otdel* of defense, and possibly the military *kommissar*. This machine-building *otdel* is somewhat mysterious, and probably had more than anything to do with the armaments industry. Its name reminds one of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, in which the Soviet nuclear defense program was developed (see Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs*, New York: Vintage Books, 1992, p.104).

<sup>202</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.182. The former schoolteacher and director Azarov would head the department; in 1953 the obkomotdels of industry, machine-building, light industry and transport were combined into one *otdel* of industry and transport. The administrative *otdel* and that of planning, finance and trade were also combined into one (Pako, 147/5/661, 11.127/128).

<sup>203</sup>Fainsod, *How...*, pp.193-195.

<sup>204</sup>Pako, 147/4/1125, 1.91ff.

severe than in Belorussia directly after World War II, but dismissal and transfer was a common phenomenon among these functionaries<sup>205</sup>. During 1951, when the first obkom secretary was replaced in July, twenty-three of the incumbent first raikom secretaries of the forty-four rural raions changed their job, and eighteen of the second raikom secretaries<sup>206</sup>. Similarly, twenty-five out of forty-seven heads of the agricultural raikom otdeIs were replaced in this year, and forty-seven out of eighty-eight secretaries of raion Komsomol organizations in the countryside<sup>207</sup>. The raikoms and gorkoms were formally under the obkom's very strict supervision, and acted with a rather limited independence<sup>208</sup>. In Krasnyi Kholm raion in 1944, for example, the raikom received more than three hundred telegrams on the most varied subjects from the obkom, its departments, and the secretariat.

Once more, the evidence found in the archives of the Party organization of the Kalinin oblast' confirms Fainsod's description of the primary Party organizations, that formed the basis of the Party's hierarchical structure<sup>209</sup>. Although these primary cells officially were supposed to enjoy some independence in making decisions concerning certain political, social, and economic matters, they were bypassed by higher levels in the Party for the slightest matter of importance<sup>210</sup>.

<sup>205</sup>On Belorussia, see Fainsod, *How...*, p. 195.

<sup>206</sup>Pako, 147/5/202, II.28/37.

<sup>207</sup>Pako, II. 42 and 46.

<sup>208</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.47.

<sup>209</sup>Fainsod, *How...*, pp. 196-200.

<sup>210</sup>Pako, 147/4/18, 1.7.

Meanwhile, the execution of decisions made higher up was dependent on the actions of the authorities at a lower level of the hierarchy. No matter how much the obkomburo attempted to supervise everything that happened in its fief, simple logistics made it impossible to keep a close eye on each move made by lower levels of the Party and government, and by the economic authorities<sup>211</sup>. M.A. Smirnov was a director of a brick factory in the countryside between 1946 and 1951, led the rural soviet of his area for the next two years, and returned in 1953 to the brick factory:

The taxes, the tough, or sometimes cruel, laws came from above, but the realization of these laws,...could be done in different ways: either with arbitrariness and cruelty or with maximal understanding and the appreciation of people's psychology.<sup>212</sup>

Smirnov admitted, though, that his factory often was visited by a MVD-MGB plenipotentiary, who gauged the mood of the workers, conversing with them and making reports on some.

Fainsod's remarks on the human frailty of the Party members were borne out again by the evidence of the behaviour of many people from Kalinin, who indulged in drink, promiscuity, corruption, abuse of power, and other misconduct as Party members<sup>213</sup>. Abundant examples of this have already been noticed. In 1951, A.S. Mezit, the

<sup>211</sup>As it was similarly impossible for the Central Committee to control every action of the obkom; See Fainsod, *How...*, pp.327/328.

<sup>212</sup>Testimony of M.A. Smirnov. Ivan V. Karasev agrees in his description of the room for manoeuvring of the postwar kolkhoz chair in Pskov oblast' (Karasev, pp.306/307).

<sup>213</sup>Fainsod, *How...*, p.200. In the eighteen months of 1963 and the first half of 1964, 42.5% of the exclusions in the Party organization of Leningrad were connected with overindulgence in drinking (Vakzer, "Personal'nye...", p.99). Vakzer noticed as well that in the 1950s already many Party members in Leningrad, who were employed in distribution agencies, were involved in the "second (shady) economy" (*tenerain ekonomika*) (Vakzer, "Personal'nye...", p.101).

raikom secretary of Kaliazin raion, was dismissed for his drinking, womanizing, and behaviour in general as a benevolent small-time dictator of his realm<sup>214</sup>. His attitude led to an atmosphere of licentiousness in the kolkhozy of the raion. At the amalgamation of 1950, all kolkhozniks of Kaliazin raion were given an advance in vodka to celebrate the occasion. In the MTS, the Komsomol, and even the MGB, all were involved in drinking bouts on a regular basis<sup>215</sup>. The MGB had used the laxity of the first secretary of the raion to become involved with ex-convicts and former prisoners of war.

The number of twelve voting delegates for the Kalinin oblast' at the Nineteenth Party Congress more or less conformed to the ratio of one delegate per 5,000 members that seems to have been the rule<sup>216</sup>. If the oblast' population at this time was about 1.6 million, the amount of Party members per 1,000 people was low (34.69) in comparison to the robustness of the Moscow or Leningrad Party, but certainly on a par with many of the other RSFSR oblasts<sup>217</sup>.

On certain occasions, determined by the Central Committee, the lesser gods within the Party leadership of the Kalinin oblast' were permitted to find fault in previously designated members of the obkomburo. The criticism of Konovalov by the Central Committee representative Storozhev in July 1951 has been described. In his wake, a long list of lower Party bosses of the Kalinin oblast' further

<sup>214</sup>Pako, 147/5/429, II.173-179.

<sup>215</sup>The Komsomol raikom secretary Smirnov had even been assaulting women when he was drunk (Pako, 147/5/421, I.178).

<sup>216</sup>See Fainsod, *How...*, p.234, Table 9, and compare to Appendix III.

<sup>217</sup>That is, if one uses for the calculation an estimate of 55,500 for the full Party membership; if the military members are added (which would give a total membership 61,282) the ratio is higher (38.30) (See Table 35 and Appendix III).

demolished the stature of Konovalov. One of them was the secretary of the Party committee of the railroad-car factory, Baranov, who was rewarded for his efforts with a promotion to secretary of the Kalinin gorkom and to the obkomburo soon after<sup>218</sup>. Baranov's scathing lambasting probably originated from the Central Committee, because it was unthinkable that a relative low-life like himself would be allowed to pan the present obkom leadership in the following way:

All the comrades know that when the decision of the Central Committee of the party came down on the dismissal of his duties of the first secretary of the obkom, comrade Vorontsov, many of the obkom members made one after the other an appearance and said that, you see, they had already noticed for a long while the great errors --the suppression of criticism and so on--, they beat themselves on the chest with their fist, and promised to remedy the situation. But quite a while has gone by, and once more large errors are noticed in the work of the party obkomburo. We had two members of the obkomburo, who appeared here, the comrades Cherkasov and Vakhmistrov, and they said, too, that they noticed large errors made by comrade Konovalov, but they did not tell us what they tried to do to prevent them from being made.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>218</sup>See Appendix III; Baranov was born in 1912 in Tver', and had studied at a Leningrad technical-industrial institute; in 1941 he had become Party member. In 1949 he became the Party secretary of the railroad-car factory, after working for a while as the head of one of its workshops. He had apparently been promoted directly after the purge at the factory, as he already was Party secretary of the works in February 1949 at the seventh Party conference, which took place immediately after the "discovery" of the case (For this case, see VI.2; Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.100). Perhaps he had even been (one of) the person(s), who drew the attention of the MGB and the Party to the case in the first place. At the end of the July 1951 Plenum, he was appointed head of the obkom department of machine-building on recommendation of Kiselev (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.184).

<sup>219</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.77. Compare also to Fainsod's remarks on criticism (see Fainsod, *How...*, pp.182/183). A.S. Efremov became Party member in 1952. He described this reprobation as "criticism, measured out in doses" (*dozirovannaia kritika*), "...this you may criticize, that is not permitted [to be critical about]" (testimony of A.S. Efremov in the survey). N.N. Panova described the orchestration of this kind of criticism: "Even our 'stars', our best weavers, could criticize in the best of



Baranov then also predicted that obkom secretaries Shatalin and Borisov, who were still to appear, would behave in the same way<sup>220</sup>. He blamed the mistakes that had been made on the lack of criticism from below, a trend which was filtering through to the higher Party organs, as well as on the scarce appearances of the higher Party leaders of the obkom and of the gor- and raikoms in the primary Party organizations. This latter criticism was standard form at the time, and was devoid of any meaning<sup>221</sup>. The Party leadership had such a plethora of business to deal with, that this kind of intimate involvement with the lower Party organizations was practically out of the question<sup>222</sup>. Much moaning and groaning in July 1951 of Konovalov's tenure at the head of the Party organization focussed on the enormous amount of papers the obkom

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cases something from the tribune [only] for the sake of appearances, and then their speeches were written for them, and corrected in the party committee [of the factory]" (testimony of N.N. Panova in the survey).

<sup>220</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, ll. 77/78.

<sup>221</sup>In fact, in March 1951, at the eighth oblast' Party conference, Konovalov himself lashed out at people who suppressed criticism from below, a number of whom had been dismissed after Vorontsov's ouster (Pako, 147/5/2, l.19). As V.G. Gavrilov remarked in the survey, when asked if he sometimes criticized the policy of the authorities: "We were not permitted [to criticize] higher politics, but concerning local trifles all was possible, we both swore at the [local] leadership and silently fulfilled any kind of stupidity as, probably, it always used to be, and always will be" (testimony of V.G. Gavrilov in the survey).

<sup>222</sup>Z.M. Vinogradova, who was the chair of a kolkhoz in the Vyshnii Volochek raion during the last few years before the first amalgamation of 1950, described her ambiguous relationship with higher authorities as follows: "We had many authorities above us, whoever wanted ordered the kolkhozy around, but the most important was, of course, the raikom. But it would be sinful to complain about the raikom secretaries. Even if they happened to demand something stupid from us, then they were mostly ordered to do this from above and we knew that. For example, once in 1949 or 1950 we had already sown potatoes; they called me in and gave me the task of sowing another thirty hectares. But we did not have anymore seedlings, nor did we have land [to sow with potatoes] left. However, in order not to let them down, we gave them some kind of written statement [on their presumed extra sowing]. After all, who of the oblast' [committee] would come to measure our land?" (testimony of Z.M. Vinogradova in the survey).

apparatus generated, something which Soviet critics in hindsight would call the "cardinal failings born of the Stalin cult, red tape, inflated staffs."<sup>223</sup>

It is interesting that at the same meeting, the Party secretary of the "Proletarka" textile works, Voevodina, harshly reprehended oblispolkom chair Sadovnikov to no avail, for the latter would be allowed to carry on in his function<sup>224</sup>. Sadovnikov, as Voevodina pointed out, was just as much responsible for the languishing state of the economy as Konovalov. Had Sadovnikov not been heading the oblispolkom at the time of Vorontsov's ousting? Had he not, consequently, failed to draw the right conclusions from that episode --that things had to change in a radical way in order to improve matters? Konovalov was a newcomer to the oblast', while Sadovnikov had been part of its leadership since the war years. He had been one of the leaders of the oblispolkom since December 1946, so in a way Voevodina's criticism was right: why get rid of Konovalov, while leaving Sadovnikov in place<sup>225</sup>? She tongue-lashed Sadovnikov for managing affairs through the Party organization, instead of the oblispolkom and raion soviet executive committees. Interestingly, she even was daring enough to say:

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<sup>223</sup>A. Samsonov et al.(eds.), A Short History of the USSR: Part II, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965, p.264. Obkom secretaries Vakhmistrov and Shatalin criticized the inordinate amount of paper-pushing involved in obkom work (Pako, 147/5/10, 11.60, 112/113).

<sup>224</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 11.118-120. Central Committee representative Storozhev discussed briefly Sadovnikov's position at the end of the July 1951 plenum, but for no apparent reason asked the obkom members to give him another chance and give him more support in the future (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.185).

<sup>225</sup>See Appendix III.

Comrades, at an earlier plenum comrade Vorontsov was dismissed owing to a decision of the Central Committee. That, comrades, was unforgivable in our eyes, as we lost our worker, who had been reared by our party organization.<sup>226</sup>

It is a mystery why Sadovnikov was allowed to remain, but most likely he was protected by someone higher up in the Party. Not surprisingly, Voevodina was not reelected as a full member of the obkom at the next oblast' Party conference in September 1952<sup>227</sup>.

Kononov tried to save himself (perhaps literally, although more likely his Party career) by attacking his obkomburo colleagues in his final speech in July 1951 in front of the plenum of the obkom of the Kalinin Party organization<sup>228</sup>. He added:

The criticism of the errors and shortcomings in the work of the obkomburo of the party, in my personal work, expressed in the decision of the Central Committee, in the report of comrade Storozhev, and in the speeches of the party obkom members, is for me a great school, the lessons of which I will diligently study and not commit [them anymore] in any kind of work that the Central Committee of the party will oblige me to do.<sup>229</sup>

It is no wonder that the atmosphere within the Party would still sporadically relapse into the hysterical mood of 1937-1938. It certainly was not an unmitigated pleasure to be a Party member, as one was under much closer scrutiny than people outside the Party<sup>230</sup>. Between January 1945 and January 1949, the level of exclusions

<sup>226</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.120.

<sup>227</sup>As was indicated by a comparison of the records of Pako, 147/5/1, 1.28 and 147/5/283, 11.347-350.

<sup>228</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 11.128-131.

<sup>229</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.131.

<sup>230</sup>Apart from that, the workload for professional Party workers was extraordinarily heavy (testimony of N.G. Timofeeva in the survey).

was still rather high: roughly 10%<sup>231</sup>. In order to improve the sense of security within the Party somewhat, at a discussion in 1952 of the new Party Statute that was to be accepted at the 19th Party Congress, one person proposed to make it a rule to have members excluded who slandered honest people<sup>232</sup>. Nevertheless, Party membership aided one's career: it was a necessity for those with ambitions<sup>233</sup>.

While in reality the Party controlled the state, the government of the oblast' was formally led by the oblispolkom<sup>234</sup>. Similar committees comprised the official government at raion and town levels. The lowest level of the government was formed by the rural and urban district soviets' executive.

In some ways the post-revolutionary executive committees of the soviets at a provincial and raion level were similar to, and politically as powerless as, the pre-revolutionary *zemstva*. The village soviet had taken over many administrative tasks of the

<sup>231</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.23ob. and 1.26. On January 1, 1949, there were 60,592 full members and candidates. In the period 5,749 members and candidates had been excluded, 1,576 of whom had been involved in the embezzlement of kolkhoz property, 1,184 for having become alienated (*otryt*) from the Party, 398 for having lived on occupied territory, and 84 for having been involved in religious rites and the like. The growth between early 1945 and early 1949 had been enormous: from 28,667 to 60,952 Communists. Many of these were war veterans, who were not always the most exemplary Communists, for 2,393 (41.6%) of those excluded between 1945 and 1949 had become a Communist in 1943 and 1944. In 1948, 2,361 members had been excluded (about 4%) (Pako, 147/4/1551, 11.67/68). In 1949 and 1950 an additional 2,681 would be excluded (see Table 37).

<sup>232</sup>Pako, 147/5/328, 1.124.

<sup>233</sup>A.F. Antonov was asked by the head of the organizational otel of the Udoml'ia raikom to become a member. He was told that if he wanted to get anywhere in life, and not remain a kolkhoz brigadier forever, he should join the Party. Antonov declined (testimony of A.F. Antonov in the survey).

<sup>234</sup>Compare to Fainsod, *How...*, pp.337/339. "...[the Communist Party] was not, and never had been, a political party in the true sense of the word but a mechanism for controlling the state" (Pipes, "1917...", p.79).

*skhod*, which had possessed large discretionary powers in the local affairs of the village until collectivization<sup>235</sup>.

How little independent the government was from the Party can be gathered from the information that 312 of 596 delegates at the ninth oblast' Party conference were deputies of the oblast', town, raion, and rural soviets, indicating a substantial overlap of Party and government leadership functions<sup>236</sup>. In early 1951, there were in all 15,896 deputies of local soviets in the Kalinin oblast'<sup>237</sup>. The oblast' soviet had 142 deputies.

Although this organization of Party and government was elaborate, it did not result in a cogent governmental system. Oblast' departments of the Party and oblispolkom, as well as lower levels of Party and government, needed to be constantly supervised in order to attain a measure of efficiency. Kiselev complained in September 1952 that the obkom had been neglecting the control over the state-

<sup>235</sup>See I.6 and II.1. The term *skhod* for the village meeting remained in use, but the authority of the *skhod* was much reduced after collectivization. It seems that after Stalin's death an effort was undertaken to revive the *skhod* (Zelenin, *Obshchestvenno...*, pp.141/142). It had, however, lost most of its power of decision in local matters. Instead, even after 1953, it functioned as another "transmission belt," with the task of organizing the execution of decisions made by higher authorities. The meetings of the *skhod* were called by the ispolkoms of the rural soviets.

<sup>236</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.121. Another example of the overlapping of Party and government were the elections for the soviets. In February 1946, the USSR Supreme Soviet delegates elected for the Kalinin oblast' were I.P. Boitsov, A.V. Simonov, A.M. Vasil'ev, E.I. Rybakova, M.P. Volkova, M.M. Gromov, A.D. Krutikov and M.M. Pereslegin; V.P. Potemkin was elected to the Soviet of Nationalities. Some of these delegates were token workers or kolkhozniks, the rest Party leaders (PP 7959/Feb 15, 1945, p.1; compare to Appendix III). See also Fainsod, *How...*, pp.324-326. Not only the obkom, but also the MVD/MGB, the procuracy, Gosplan, the Ministry of State Control, and other ministries controlled the activities of the oblispolkom (see Fainsod, *How...*, p.329 and pp.338/339). As Djilas remarked about the role of the Party in governmental affairs: "The Communist Party, including the professional party bureaucracy, stands above the regulations and behind every single one of the state's acts." (Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*. New York: Praeger, 1957, p.35).

<sup>237</sup>See Table 9.

and economic apparatus with regards to the execution of decisions of the Party and USSR government<sup>238</sup>. People engaged excessively in paper-pushing, and a vast amount of rather superficial decisions were made by the authorities in the oblast'. He added angrily:

'The absence of high exactingness towards cadres and towards execution [of decisions] seriously enfeebled party and state discipline in oblast' and raion organizations and led to a situation, in which the party raikoms in many cases ignored the obkom, did not follow its directives, nor presented reports on the execution of its decisions.<sup>239</sup>

Apart from outright exclusion, one of the ways to discipline Party members for unsatisfactory behaviour was to give them warnings, reprimands, or penalties, which could or could not be noted down on their Party membership card. However, if too many Communists were reprimanded, the effect was obviously watered down. Quite a few local Party bosses resorted too often to these kind of actions, according to Kiselev in 1952<sup>240</sup>. Thus in seven raions, more than 22% of the Party membership had been penalized.

Next to Party and government stood the security organs. Their first and traditional duty, since revolutionary and civil war days, was to investigate alleged "anti-Soviet" elements, spies, saboteurs, wreckers, and so on. This original task was more or less the terrain of the NKGB-MGB after the split of the security organs during the war. As NKVD head Pavlov pointed out to the sixth Party conference of the Kalinin oblast' in January 1945, the NKVD-MVD was engaged in anti-aircraft defense in the war; prophylactic work against fires;

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<sup>238</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.124.

<sup>239</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.124.

<sup>240</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.132.

construction; the fight against the neglect and homelessness of children; the maintenance and security of prisoners' camps; the labour deployment of convicts and prisoners of war; together with Party and soviet organizations, ensuring and assisting the execution of political and economic measures; and still more fields<sup>241</sup>. Pavlov was hard put to find any area of the economy, or social and political activity, in which the NKVD organs did not play a "positive" role

The organs were assisted by informers, some of whom, out of a sense of duty and loyalty to the system, helped the organs voluntarily, while others were "recruited" (*{za}verbovat'* is the infinitive used for this practice) by the organs<sup>242</sup>. The NKVD tried to recruit A.S. Efremov, when he was army-signaller and took care of mail in his unit, but he refused<sup>243</sup>. Similarly the security organs tried to enlist N.D. Eliseev after the war, in 1951, as an informer<sup>244</sup>.

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<sup>241</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, I.89. N.A. Zabelin was told by a MVD officer in 1951 that he was appointed as director of secondary school No.19, located in the "closed" airforce suburb of Kalinin, Migalovo (testimony of N.A. Zabelin in the survey).

<sup>242</sup>S.S. Sergeev was denounced by his own brother to the NKVD after the war; he was accused of having served in the German *Polizei*. Apparently the brother wanted to have the parental home all for himself. Sergeev was soon released by the NKVD, which apparently did not take sanctions against the brother either (testimony of S.S. Sergeev in the survey). Compare as well to the information network in Moscow ("Moskva voennaia," p.101).

<sup>243</sup>Testimony of A.S. Efremov in the survey. The organs did check the mail that he handled, which is no surprise to us, because of the arrest of Solzhenitsyn. He also saw an officer who was beaten by the Chekists until he bled in the "special branch" (*osobyi otdel*) of the NKVD. Before the war his neighbour was arrested as a result of a denunciation that was sent to the raion authorities (testimony of A.S. Efremov in the survey).

<sup>244</sup>Testimony of N.D. Eliseev in the survey; Eliseev might have confused the MVD with the MGB here. N.V. Akhova of Konakovo was recruited, too, to write reports on the mood and situation in the direction of her factory. She maintained that she did not write anything, and that the organs let her alone further (testimony of N.V. Akhova in the survey). The testimony of the three, who were honest enough to admit their (forced) involvement with the security organs, proves the point of Valentin Turchin: "A society was created where information was closed, and its blooming, its take-off took place in the last years of Stalin's life. Hundreds of thousands of informers followed every word of

Out of fear, he dared not decline. He maintained during his interview that he informed the security organs of not having noticed anything suspicious at the locomotive depot where he worked. One and a half years later he was called in by the MVD headquarters in Kalinin, and scolded by an MVD major for his inactivity and lack of vigilance. Gradually the organs started to leave him alone.

The relationship between the local branches of the MVD and MGB and the Party is difficult to assess from the records<sup>245</sup>. There is at least one occasion when the oblast' MVD head, Pavlov, appealed to his superior to make the obkomburo withdraw a reprimand<sup>246</sup>. He had received the reprimand for unauthorized actions with respect to prisoners of war. On another occasion it seems as if the obkomburo had the authority to oblige the MVD head to follow its orders<sup>247</sup>. However, in early 1948 the obkom complained to V.D. Nikitin, a functionary of the Direction of Cadres of the Central Committee, that the MVD paid no heed to the established order of changing and appointing cadres which were officially part of the obkom

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its citizens" (Valentin Turchin, *Inertsia Strakha*. New York: Izdatel'stvo "Khronika", 1977, p.21). Compare also to Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag*, III-IV, p.636.

<sup>245</sup>The observation of M.A. Smirnov in this respect seems to be all too true: "At that time the leaders [locally, in the towns, raions and villages, of the factories, and rural soviets], as a matter of fact, as part of their function, were free-lance (*vneshtatnye*) collaborators of the [security] organs and were obliged to give any kind of information" (testimony of M.A. Smirnov in the survey).

<sup>246</sup>In May 1946, MVD minister S. Kruglov supported Pavlov in his decision to remove 900 prisoners of war from work on different industrial projects in the oblast', and assign them to the construction of a highway under the auspices of the USSR MVD (see Pako, 147/4/66, 1.197). At first, Pavlov was reprimanded by the obkomburo for this, but Kruglov demanded that the obkomburo remove the reprimand from Pavlov's record. This the buro apparently did, considering the fact that the reprimand would not be mentioned when an obkom secretary wrote a few years later a biography of Pavlov.

<sup>247</sup>See VI.4.



*nomenklatura*<sup>248</sup>. Without the agreement of the obkom, MVD workers were often called away and appointed to positions in other oblasts, while others were appointed, who had compromised themselves in their former function. More will be said about the activities of the organs below<sup>249</sup>.

Separate from the Party, the government, MGB, and MVD, stood the army. By 1947, it appears there still existed an oblast' military commissariat (*Obivoenkom*), and at the raion level there were raion military commissariats (*raivoenkom*)<sup>250</sup>. Formally, they were partially subject to the authority of the obkom; in 1947 first secretary Vorontsov had the MGB carry out a background check on all functionaries of the military commissariats in the oblast'. The army itself must have been rather conspicuous in the town of Kalinin: units of infantry, the military academy "Molotov" (that educated cadres for the Army Service Corps), the Fifty-Sixth airforce division, another army school, a communication unit, and other units were stationed in the town in 1948<sup>251</sup>.

#### V.4 The Mixed Record of the Komsomol

Fainsod has pointed out that the Komsomol was neither exclusively composed of youthful fanatics, nor of passive good-for-nothings<sup>252</sup>. Already in my first four chapters, repeated criticism of

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<sup>248</sup>Pako, 147/4/1125, 1.79.

<sup>249</sup>See particularly VI.2, VI.3, and VI.4.

<sup>250</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, II.155-160.

<sup>251</sup>Pako, 147/4/1125, 1.77ob.

<sup>252</sup>Fainsod, *How...*, p.241.

the Komsomol and their members has been noticed. After its virtual eclipse in the war years, the Komsomol bolstered from 66,000 members in 1946 to 128,000 members in 1954<sup>253</sup>. In August 1951 the oblast' Komsomol newspaper began to be published, for the first time since its discontinuation at the beginning of the war<sup>254</sup>. The growth of the Komsomol in the Kalinin oblast' kept apace with that in the USSR as a whole, where the total membership was 9.3 million in March 1949, and more than 16 million in August 1952<sup>255</sup>. In 1947, of the conscripts of the birth year 1929 who were tested for military service, 12.2% in the oblast' boasted Komsomol membership<sup>256</sup>. However, in many rural raions the membership did not surpass 10% among the conscripts<sup>257</sup>. In the years 1949 and 1950, the Komsomol increased its membership in the Kalinin oblast' to more than 100,000 members<sup>258</sup>. The Komsomol had become by the early 1950s "...an all-embracing mass organization of Soviet youth rather than an elite category second only to the Party."<sup>259</sup>

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<sup>253</sup>Ocherki, p.553. According to its secretary Smirnov, it had 72,000 members in early 1948, 77,000 in early 1949, and, according to its secretary Beliakova, it had 108,000 members in July 1951 (Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.21, 147/4/1495, 1.77ob. and 147/5/10, 1.71).

<sup>254</sup>Zare navstrechu. ocherki istorii Kalininskoi oblastnoi organizatsii VLKSM, Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1968, p.295.

<sup>255</sup>Fainsod, How..., p.248.

<sup>256</sup>Pako, 147/4/1391, 1.5.

<sup>257</sup>In Bezhet'sk, Kashin, Krasnyi Kholm, Maksatikha, Molokovo, Nerl', Novokarel', Ovinishche, Orsha, Rameshki, Sandovo, Spirovo raions in the eastern part of the oblast' and in Kalinin rural raion, Lukovnikovo, Vysoko, Esenovichi, Emelianovo, Staritsa, and Turginovo raions in the formerly occupied part of the oblast'.

<sup>258</sup>On January 1, 1951, a total of 101,530 Komsomols was counted in the oblast, of whom in 1949 and 1950, 56,401 had been accepted as new members of the youth organization; at the same time the actual growth was 24,647, which shows a high level of attrition among the membership. (Pako, 147/5/173, 1.5).

<sup>259</sup>Fainsod, How..., p.249.

Nevertheless, even in the last three years of Stalin's life the membership of the Komsomol was far more widespread among urban youth than among the rural young<sup>260</sup>. Until 1947, the Komsomol experienced difficulty maintaining itself in certain areas. In Brusovo raion, merely sixteen Komsomols out of a total membership of 1,000 were engaged in a form of political study in 1946, and the organization as a whole was thought to be in danger of collapse because of the members' high rate of departure<sup>261</sup>. In 1947, Komsomol organizations existed in 108 of the 303 kolkhozy of the Kalinin rural raion<sup>262</sup>. At the end of 1947, there were no Komsomol organizations in almost half of the kolkhozy of the Kalinin oblast<sup>263</sup>.

On the collective farms the popularity of the Komsomol remained less than desired:

In a majority of the cases [of Komsomol cells at collective farms] a minority of kolkhoz youth is a Komsomol member. Every month the number of kolkhozniks who enter the Komsomol decreases; every month the number of kolkhoz organizations which have not accepted more youth to their ranks increases. When compared to the numbers of entry of young kolkhozniks into the Komsomol in 1949, then those numbers in this year have decreased in several different months roughly by two to three times.<sup>264</sup>

Thus Komsomol secretary Beliakova lamented the situation in July 1951. However, she apparently was not aware that a negative influence could be traced to the exodus of the rural youth, to which

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<sup>260</sup>See Table 27.

<sup>261</sup>Pako, 147/4/18, 1.10.

<sup>262</sup>Zelenin, *Obshchestvenno...*, p.149.

<sup>263</sup>Ibid., p.154.

<sup>264</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.71; halfway 1948 on a total of 7,382 kolkhozy, only 2,974 had Komsomol organizations (Pako, 147/4/1096, 1.6).

more attention will be given VII.3. In 1952 the kolkhoznik's membership of the Komsomol fell by another 3,000<sup>265</sup>. The members themselves were sometimes less than enthusiastic about the Komsomol as well, since 12% to 13% failed to pay their membership fee on a regular basis in 1951<sup>266</sup>. In 1949, even leading Komsomol members engaged in religious practices, having their children christened, visiting churches, and so on<sup>267</sup>.

The Komsomol's postwar transformation from elite to mass organization for the Soviet youth did not happen without difficulty. The Party organizations were unable to provide necessary supervision, because of which some of the Komsomol organizations were left to fend for themselves<sup>268</sup>. As a result, some of the oblast' youth fell under the influence of "backward elements," violated labour discipline, and behaved in other unworthy ways.

Even when there was sufficient supervision in theory, the political consciousness of those leaders was questionable. In 1948, the oblast' first secretary of the Komsomol met with the second Komsomol raikom secretary of the Ovinishche raion<sup>269</sup>. He found out that she was "illiterate" in matters of theory and history of the Party, and was of the opinion that Churchill --who at this point was a major villain in the eyes of the Party, since he had shown himself

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<sup>265</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.118.

<sup>266</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.72.

<sup>267</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.77ob.

<sup>268</sup>As was the complaint of Konovalov in March 1951 (Pako, 147/5/2, 11.22).

<sup>269</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.21. In 1948 obkom secretary Parfenov maintained that up to 40% of the Komsomol membership did not pay its fees on a regular basis (Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.21ob.).

a "warmonger" at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946-- had died long ago<sup>270</sup>. More surprising was the apparent existence from 1947 until 1953 of the "Union of the Eastern Branch," a group of Komsomol secretaries of the raions located east of the October Railroad in the oblast<sup>271</sup>. Some of the "presidents" of this informal organization had subsequently been promoted to the Party apparatus. The group met in Kalinin in the restaurants "Seliger" or "Volga," and new members paid a fee which financed dinners with subsequent drinking bouts. In the report on the group by Kiselev to an obkom plenum, it was hinted that young female Komsomol secretaries had been "used." Kiselev cited the example of this "union" to warn against *gruppovshchina* (group forming) and the formation of "cliques" or "families."

In early 1953 an obkom plenum convened to discuss the Komsomol's unsatisfactory state of affairs<sup>272</sup>. In Kimry, in an *obshchezhitie* for young workers, drinking bouts were taking place, card games played (which apparently was illegal), and hooliganism occurred<sup>273</sup>. Similar disturbances occurred in the *obshchezhitie* of the cotton-fibre *kombinat* of Vyshnyi Volochek and in other places. The key word at the obkom meeting was *rotozeistvo* ("heedlessness"). The Party organization had been negligent about the supervision of the Komsomol and the non-Komsomol youth, who could

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<sup>270</sup>Stalwart Communist G.V. Lubov still maintained in the summer of 1992 that Churchill had proven himself the warmonger with his speech in Fulton, and that war could have broken out at any time, because the West intended to attack the Communist bloc at the opportune moment (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey). Churchill's speech in Fulton, Missouri, in which he described the Iron Curtain that divided Europe, was published on March 12, 1946, in *Proletarskaia Pravda* (PP 7976/ March 12, 1946, p.4).

<sup>271</sup>Pako, 147/5/660, 11.93/94.

<sup>272</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.109ff.

<sup>273</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.131; probably card games for money were intended here.

be fertile ground for the "enemy activities of spies and wreckers."<sup>274</sup> In Kalinin, 21,000 young people belonged to the Komsomol, but their political and general education was often mediocre<sup>275</sup>. Only 3,500 of them had completed secondary school or more. As a result, "amoral deeds" transpired, such as violations of labour and state discipline, as well as the observation of religious ceremonies. 'The oblast' prosecutor, Gerasimenko, complained about the large incidence of youth among suspects in criminal court cases<sup>276</sup>. Most crimes, according to Gerasimenko, were committed under the influence of copious amounts of alcohol, often consumed on religious holidays. In Kalinin, a group of secondary school students had even beaten up a teacher<sup>277</sup>. The perfidious influence of kulaks was still discerned in 1953, when the Komsomol Pavlova tried to organize a petition in her village to return the confiscated house of her dekulakized in-laws<sup>278</sup>.

The Komsomol was also obliged to supervise the activities of the "Young Pioneers" organization, that was for children below the age of fourteen, somewhat similar to our Boy and Girl Scouts (plus Cubs and Brownies). In 1948, 100,060 children belonged to a Pioneer group in the oblast<sup>279</sup>.

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<sup>274</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.139.

<sup>275</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.144.

<sup>276</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.147. 1,830 people younger than twenty-six had been convicted by the oblast' courts during 1952. More than 80% of these accused were between eighteen and twenty-six years old. Hooliganism and theft each made up more than 40% of the crimes committed by the youth. Twenty-eight had been convicted of premeditated murder. Almost 15% of the 1,830 were Komsomol members.

<sup>277</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.148.

<sup>278</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.201.

<sup>279</sup>Pako, 147/4/1126, 1.5.

On the surface, the Komsomol promised an ability to organize the best of the youth in all of society in a monolithic unity of aspiring Communists. In practice, however, the organization had to deal with continuous stream of impediments to its efforts to educate and discipline the young people into obedient, vigilant, and enthusiastic subjects of the Soviet state. Because of the Komsomol's exceptional flourishing after the war, it became even less possible to control the ideological orthodoxy of all its members. The provincial youth engaged in the usual pursuits of young people in a modern society, some of which trespassed into the realm of crime. What the authorities saw as misbehaviour of the young was perpetrated both by those inside and outside the Komsomol of the Kalinin oblast'.

## CHAPTER VI: PARTY AND PEOPLE

### VI.1 The Political Consciousness of the Population

The most successful element of political propaganda was Soviet patriotism during and after the war<sup>1</sup>. Many of the survey respondents were tremendously proud after the war that Hitler's Germany had been defeated and that the Soviet Union had become the only other superpower next to the United States<sup>2</sup>. After 1945 the USA, and to a lesser extent "the West" as a whole --to which Yugoslavia was added in 1948-- replaced Nazi Germany as the USSR's new mortal enemy<sup>3</sup>. Many of the pre-1930 generation still think today that full employment, free healthcare, and free education were unrivalled achievements, unique to the Soviet Union<sup>4</sup>. The quality of healthcare, or the fees for

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<sup>1</sup>Zubkova comments: "...the character of the war itself --patriotic, liberating, justified-- supposed a unity of society ( the *narod* and the authorities) for the solution of the general national problem: the resistance against the enemy" (Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia...(1945-1946)," p.7) According to R. Stites: "Nationalism, homeland, Russian history, lore, legend, and classical culture underlay the whole experience --in film and all the popular arts. The war so deeply popularized and legitimized these that they survived the renewed onslaught of Marxist ideology in the postwar period" (Stites, Russian Popular Culture, p.115).

<sup>2</sup>E.g., the testimonies of V.P. Sazhko, L.S. Solov'eva, I.V. Ratataev, A.E. Malysheva, A.V. Zhuravleva, K.P. Novikov, E.V. Baranova, I.I. Tiaglov, A.A. Kondrashov, M.A. Golubeva, P.A. Kashinov, N.A. Zabelin, V.E. Tsvetkov, S.S. Sergeev, A.S. Efremov, V.K. Stepanov, V.I. Gaganova, V.F. Akimova, S.M. Volkov, A.N. Ivanova, N.P. Golubev (II), A.E. Vakhmistrov, A.E. Smirnov, V.P. Krylov, N.A. Arkhangel'skii, N.A. Smirnov, N.V. Kurganova in the survey. Fourteen of these people, or their spouses, joined the Communist Party at some point in time, twelve did not.

<sup>3</sup>Djilas gave a perceptive explanation for the inherent need of the Communist state for "enemies": "Founded by force and violence, in constant conflict with its people, the Communist state, even if there are no external reasons, must be militaristic. The cult of force, especially military force, is nowhere so prevalent as in Communist countries. Militarism is the internal basic need of the new class; it is one of the forces which make possible the new class's existence, strength, and privileges" (Djilas, The New Class, p.95).

<sup>4</sup>E.g., the testimonies of V.P. Sazhko, Z.I. Simkina, A.N. Akhov, G.V. Lubov, L.S. Solov'eva, V.S. Serov, K.F. Tsareva, L.V. Vedernikova, K.P. Novikov, Z.V. Drozdova, M.A. Golubeva, E.N. Ratnikova, D.V. Balashov, N.S. Loshkarev, A.S. Efremov, A.V. Zelentsev, A.E. Smirnov, M.A.



secondary education reintroduced by Stalin, were conveniently forgotten. During the postwar period, most must have been ignorant of --or must have closed their eyes when they encountered it-- the beggary in Kalinin and the hidden unemployment in Kashin<sup>5</sup>. Crime did not exist under Stalin for many of the respondents, although, in fact, the remembered "order" did not exist, as the statistics on crime indicate<sup>6</sup>.

These "positive aspects" of postwar society forged a certain amount of loyalty among the Soviet citizens. Perhaps they made them accept other less pleasant aspects of their lives, which simultaneously resulted from Communist policy. However, most of the survey respondents were a long way from being zealous, politically conscious --in the Marxian sense-- adherents of the ideology of the Communist Party under Stalin. In fact, most of the respondents' praise was for the social benefits introduced by the Party and government. They illustrate in a splendid way that the working class was only able to develop a "trade-union consciousness," as Lenin had already maintained in 1902<sup>7</sup>.

At the end of 1946 an obkom plenum discussed the state of affairs in the Kalinin oblast' in the field of ideology<sup>8</sup>. The discussion

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Smirnov, N.A. Arkhangel'skii, T.A. Novikova in the survey. Of these twenty, sixteen, or their spouses, were at one time or other members of the Communist Party.

<sup>5</sup>See VI.2 and VIII.2.

<sup>6</sup>See VI.3; e.g. the testimonies of A.N. Akhov, V.S. Serov, A.E. Mulysheva, A.I. Ryzhakova, T.E. Volodina, A.V. Kruglova, M.S. Kul'menina, N.N. Golubeva, N.A. Zabelin, V.I. Gaganova, O.M. Riabova, V.G. Gavrilov in the survey. The spouses of eight of them, or they themselves, were Communists at some point in time; four never were candidate or full member of the Party.

<sup>7</sup> "The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc." (V.I. Lenin, "What is to be Done?," in: V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 5 (May 1901-February 1902, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973, pp.347-528, p.375). Compare as well to Martin Malia, "A Fatal Logic," in: The National Interest, No.31, Spring 1993, pp.80-90, p.88.

<sup>8</sup>Pako, 147/4/18,11.3 ff.

was probably called forth by Zhdanov's attack on "unprincipled and apolitical" attitudes toward the quality of ideological work within the Communist Party<sup>9</sup>. This attack had been a result of the Central Committee's displeasure with the Leningrad journals Zvezda and Leningrad. The opening report at the plenum was given by A.K. Kalachev, at the time obkom secretary responsible for agitation and propaganda. He criticized the general lack of vigilance and political ignorance that was rampant in the oblast'. His lambasting was a personal last stand, inasmuch as he was ordered to go back to school to study Marxism-Leninism only a few months later<sup>10</sup>. Following this, he became the head of the faculty for the study of the basics of Marxism-Leninism at the oblast' Party school in 1948. This undoubtedly meant a relegation for Kalachev, who was until March 1947 a full member of the obkomburo.

The large majority of Kalinin oblast's Party organization consisted of relatively new members. One wonders how much they became well versed in the ideological foundation of their society, when taught about their Party's history in the following way:

What, for example, can come out of the sessions of the evening party school of the gorkom of Torzhok. At one of these sessions our workers [of the obkom otel of agitation and propaganda] were present. The session was conducted by comrade Afanas'eva. The theme of the session --the seventh chapter of the Short Course of the history of the *VKP(b)*. The session was conducted by the following method: the teacher phrased questions-"What did the workers want?" The students

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<sup>9</sup>Pako 147/4/18, 1.10ob. For Zhdanov's ideological offensive, see Heller, Nekrich, pp.488/489. Zhdanov's speech on the journals Zvezda and Leningrad was published in Proletarskaia Pravda on September 22, 1946 (PP 8114/Sep 22, 1946, pp.2/3).

<sup>10</sup>See Appendix III. The fact that this person, who was supposedly the most senior authority in these matters in the oblast', was sent back to school to study Marxism-Leninism might be exemplary for the low level of political education in the oblast'.

answered as a choir: "Freedom". "What did the peasants need?[sic] The students shouted: "Freedom". "Could the tsarist government satisfy the workers and peasants?" The students answered: "No."<sup>11</sup>

Kalachev added to his complaints an admonition to the propagandists: they had better be capable of explaining to the population the temporary nature of the difficulties that were plaguing the country at the end of 1946. These problems were connected with the harvest failure in a large part of the country<sup>12</sup>. Elections were soon to be held for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. To make the population willingly go to the ballot and vote for the one candidate in their district, the propagandists should be able to diffuse the image of a government and Party continuously concerned about the well-being of the Soviet citizens. Many of the agitators apparently were not up to this task, and were often apprehensive about confronting the voters and answering their questions.

On December 30, 1946, obkom secretary Veselov reported to Ignat'ev, the vice-head of the Central Committee's Direction of the control of Party organs, on the political mood of the population in connection with meetings that had been held for the upcoming RSFSR elections in early 1947<sup>13</sup>. Considering the low level of education of the majority of the population, and even of some of the Party

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<sup>11</sup>Pako 147/4/18, 1.10ob. And this problem was all the more urgent, because half of the secretaries of Party cells were people who had joined the Party since 1944, according to the head of the *orginstruktor* otel of the obkom (Pako, 147/4/18, 1.25). The instructors with the raikoms, who were supposed to supervise the ideological education, were often engaged full-time in economic work as plenipotentiaries. Within the raikoms the ideological work was supposed to be supervised by the second secretary, who often was not up to the task either (Pako, 147/4/18, 1.25ob and 26ob.).

<sup>12</sup>Pako, 147/4/18, 1.11.

<sup>13</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 11.269-271. From the evidence in the archives of the Kalinin Party organization, I tend to agree with Fainsod's idea about the function of the elections for the different level of soviets as a form of national mobilization (Fainsod, *How...*, p.323).

propagandists, it does not come as a surprise that some of the questions that the Party *agitprop* activists had to answer showed a high level of ignorance<sup>14</sup>. Others, however, were quite perceptive.

Veselov gave some examples in his report:

- ...2. Can one elect a priest to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet?
- ...8. Will the course of the foreign policy of the USA change in connection with the victory of the Republicans in the senatorial elections?
- ...14. Do we receive at the moment, and if so, then from which countries, grain?
- 15. Do we receive at the moment goods from the Western zone of Germany?
- 16. How could it happen that in France the socialists at the election got less votes than the communists, but that the former lead the government?<sup>15</sup>

These questions show that to a certain extent the Party succeeded with its propaganda about the evil machinations of the capitalist West. The interest in foreign events (although undoubtedly in some cases just a result of plain curiosity) shows that people were genuinely concerned about the threat of, and the developments inside, the "enemy camp." Therefore part of the explanation for the Soviet citizens' acceptance of hardships rendered by the regime's policies can

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<sup>14</sup>See IV.2 and above. In 1948, two rural schoolteachers could not tell which position Stalin occupied in the government (Pako, 147/4/1095, l. 10ob.). One of them thought, erroneously, that he was chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and had heard nothing at all about Zhdanov! This stands in rather stark contrast to the preciousness of Zhdanov for the collective memory of the toilers of the Kalinin oblast', professed by the obkomburo after Zhdanov's death in a telegram sent to Moscow on September 1, 1948 (Pako, 147/4/1126, ll.55/56). It seems likely that, before he died, hardly anyone outside the obkom membership in the 1940s even realised that Zhdanov had begun his career as a revolutionary in Tver'.

<sup>15</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, l.271. The question about grain was caused by the dire circumstances of the winter of 1946-1947 (compare to I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha, golod 1946-1947 godov," in: *Istoriia SSSR*, 4, 1991, pp.3-19, p.16). Similar questions were fielded when Central Committee plenipotentiaries visited other provinces of the Union around 1947 (see Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia...(1945-1952)," p.83).

perhaps be found in the successfully created image of mortally dangerous foreign enemies, which struck a chord in the minds of the people<sup>16</sup>. The experience of the real horrors of the Second World War made many want to avoid a recurrence of war at any price.

Then Veselov noted in his report to Ignat'ev that many toilers had asked for improvements of public works<sup>17</sup>. In Kalinin, people wanted to know the cause of the irregular operation of the public bathhouses and the frequent lack of hot water there. Others demanded to know which measures were taken to combat hooliganism, speculation, and theft. Complaints were uttered about the irregular availability of goods in the shops, and so on. In rural eastern raions people wanted to know if localities would be better provided with bread in 1947.

These electoral meetings seemed to be almost the only platform on which the population could openly voice their grievances<sup>18</sup>. In the

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<sup>16</sup>Other elements of the explanation of the postwar conformism are the control of the population by the security organs and, perhaps reinforced by the enormous fatigue after the war was over, the willingness to believe in fairy tales, such as the belief in the reality of the radiant future of Communist society (see Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia... (1945-1946)," pp.10/11 and 13/14). Soon after 1945, the latter belief came into conflict with the harsh realities of postwar life.

<sup>17</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.271.

<sup>18</sup>Compare Fainsod, *How...*, p.324. In the survey, almost all respondents said that they refrained from openly uttering criticism if they disagreed with something, unless it was a matter that strictly had to do with work (testimony of A.V. Zelentsev, S.M. Volkov, P.M. Shepelev, Z.M. Vinogradova in the survey) Even this was not without danger, according to N.A. Arkhangel'skii, who endangered himself at the institute where he worked by questioning the readiness of his fellow teachers, and their lack of trust in the students. He kept his job (testimony of N.A. Arkhangel'skii in the survey). A similar case is that of N.S. Kokorin, who criticized the teaching at the military academy where he studied; he was forced to leave the army (testimony of N.S. Kokorin in the survey). Often people did criticize and blame local leaders, but hardly anyone opened their mouth to attack the policy of the Party leaders and central government in Moscow (testimony of A.N. Ivanova in the survey). Many respondents could remember people who were jailed after the war for anti-Soviet agitation, i.e. telling sarcastic anecdotes about the powers-that-be, or cursing the leadership in a moment of carelessness (testimony of N.K. Chernomortsev, A.V. Zelentsev, A.N. Ivanova, A.E. Vakhmistrov, N.A. Kotov in the survey). The mother of M.M. Kozenkova-Pavlova barely escaped arrest after she spoke out against Stalin after the war. A young Komsomol member wanted to denounce her to the authorities and told her so openly. Pavlova senior was spared

case of individual complaints, some people turned to writing letters to the Party, or, in the case of the non-Party members, to their districts' delegates at the different levels of soviets.

At the electoral meetings, the Party promised to improve matters and that was that, at least formally. That the situation actually ameliorated is doubtful. The whole exercise seemed to be conducted to keep up the pretense of meaningful elections. Thus the candidates for the Bloc of Bolsheviks and Party-less made electoral promises about improvements. The electorate was ostentatiously offered the opportunity to hold their candidate accountable or vote for another candidate at the next elections if he (or she) would not keep their promises. However, in fact, at the next elections the same candidate would again be the only candidate, for the candidates were not selected by the general public, but by the Party. Veselov's report to Ignat'ev shows that the electoral gatherings were at the same time a means for the Party to determine the mood among the populace.

The toilers would also have the opportunity to express their grievances at lectures by the propagandists. In 1948, some asked if a Party Congress would be held soon<sup>19</sup>. One can deduce from the fact that others asked when another price reduction for foodstuffs would be implemented that the Soviet workers quite often realised that the regular increase of their wages had not translated into more purchasing

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the denunciation after the village's elderly people talked the "vigilant" Komsomol member out of it (testimony of M.M. Kozenkova-Pavlova in the survey). Nadezhda A. Smirnova knew moments of internal disagreement with the policy of the authorities, but did not even dare to criticize local leaders, as she feared the authorities (*vlast*) in general (testimony of Nadezhda A. Smirnova in the survey). Her attitude was the same as that of L.M. Gaponenko (testimony of L.M. Gaponenko in the survey).

<sup>19</sup>Pako, 147/4/1126, 1.108ob.

power<sup>20</sup>. They also wondered about increases in the price of railroad tickets and electricity. Even more telling were questions about the reason for the high taxation of the peasantry.

In 1949 in Udoml'ia raion, somewhat of a rural backwater at this time, the *partkabinet* (Party "educational centre") of the raion was acquainted with some rather perceptive questions from the Party rank-and-file for its agitators<sup>21</sup>. Some wondered why one could not buy any ploughs or harrows if the industrial production had surpassed the 1940 level by 18%. Others wondered if the dictatorship of the proletariat would still be necessary in the transition of socialism to Communism, and if the people's democracies also were governed by a dictatorship of the proletariat. Another even wanted to find out how the Palestinian problems would be decided.

In late 1950 or early 1951, elections were held for the local soviets for the second time after the war. The number of agitators involved in the *agitprop* work for this event is staggering: 54,612<sup>22</sup>. In

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<sup>20</sup>Pako, 147/4/1126, 1.108ob. This kind of question was asked not only about foodstuffs in general, but also about specific products, such as bread, and about the prices of other consumers' goods, such as shoes, cloth, and clothes.

<sup>21</sup>Pako, 147/4/1703, 1.34. Abramov paints a picture of how the lectures that were given on the kolkhozy could be disrupted by the smarter kolkhozniks (Fyodor Abramov, The New Life. A Day on a Collective Farm, New York: Grove Press Inc., 1963, pp.60-62). The low quality of the lectures and of the lecturers has already been commented on here above (see above and IV.2).

<sup>22</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, II.14/15. The report on the election preparations is once more to S.D. Ignat'ev, who had become by January 1951 the head of the Central Committee Department of Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol Organs. In 1946, Simonov, the head of the oblispolkom, had explained in the oblast' newspaper after his election to the Supreme Soviet, what achievements had been attained by Soviet power (PP 7960/Feb 17, 1946). Simonov mentioned literacy, the increase of the harvest yield, industrialization, the constant care for the Soviet mothers and children, child benefits, health care, pensions for the elderly, pensions for invalids and those who had lost a breadwinning relative in the war, and credits for the construction of houses. His message, although published after the 1946 elections, was essentially similar to that of the election propagandists in other years, with its stress on all real and imagined improvements that Soviet power had brought.

the countryside they were distributed by a method of allocating one agitator for every ten households, while in the towns the agitators were assigned separate floors or full apartment buildings, depending on their size. In all, according to Konovalov in his report to S.D. Ignat'ev -- because of whom Konovalov might have been exaggerating, since it was a report to the Central Committee--, 1,098,500 people attended lectures and reports on the significance of the elections. In fact, more people attended these lectures and meetings than voted in the end, for only 1,078,256 people cast a ballot for the candidates for the oblast' soviet<sup>23</sup>. The event of the elections themselves offered a holiday, and many of the voters lined up in front of the election bureaus even before they opened<sup>24</sup>. Older people were transported by automobiles and carts to the polling station. At these stations (located either in the buildings of the local soviet or in the club of the kolkhoz, factory, or townquarters), concerts were held, groups of amateur artists performed, and films were shown in rooms adjacent to those, in which the voters' booths were placed.

Konovalov's report on the elections paints a happy picture which is probably not entirely false<sup>25</sup>. However, it was left unsaid how much the mood improved because of the overabundant intake of alcohol<sup>26</sup>. In

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<sup>23</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.21.

<sup>24</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 11.17/18.

<sup>25</sup>A.M. Afanas'ev, a former professional Party worker, remembers that the elections were accompanied by great parties in Udoml'ia, on a par with the religious holidays that continued to be observed (testimony of A.M. Afanas'ev in the survey). It shows how some of the more agreeable aspects of the "New Life," blended into more traditional habits.

<sup>26</sup>When obkom secretary Zimin wrote a report a few months later to the Central Committee on the RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections that had taken place, he did refer to certain less happy events (Pako, 147/5/36, 11.70/71): in the Lukovnikovo raion, e.g., a group of drunken soldiers of an army detachment started a fight in which nine villagers were wounded with knives, one of whom subsequently died of his injuries.



fact, Konovalov declined to report anything negative at all. His account was also silent on the fact that the voters were possibly stimulated in their enthusiasm about the election because of the reception of a sum of money for their participation<sup>27</sup>.

The electoral participation for any level of soviets was basically 100% of those who had the right to vote. When in early 1951 elections took place for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, only six people in the oblast' were reported to have refused to participate: one couple refused on grounds of their faith as Old Believers, a family of three were Evangelicals, and the sixth person was an officer's widow, who lived off the pension she received for her deceased husband<sup>28</sup>.

In May 1951, the Communists at the lower levels in the raions were acquainted with two secret letters, one of which emanated from the Central Committee alone, the other one from the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers combined<sup>29</sup>. In closed sessions the Party members discussed the contents. Provocative questions were asked by the rank-and-file Communists of Bezhet'sk raion, such as:

1. In which way can one make all private plots of equal size for all kolkhozniks?

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<sup>27</sup>Several informants in Tver' confirmed this practice to me in the summer of 1992, which is also described in Abramov (Abramov, *The New Life*..., pp.41-43). Nadezhda A. Smirnova said about the parties in the village: "Easter and the elections for the soviets were especially celebrated. These [the parties for the soviet elections] were aided by the means for their celebration that were given to the kolkhozy and enterprises" (testimony of Nadezhda A. Smirnova in the survey).

<sup>28</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.71.

<sup>29</sup>Pako, 147/5/34, 1.3; the Central Committee letter was titled "*O zdachakh kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva v svyazi s ukrepleniem melkikh kolkhozov*", the letter of Party and government combined "*Ob antigosudarstvennykh deistviakh byvshego rukovodstva Ministerstva sel'skokhoziaistvennogo mashinostroeniia SSSR*," indicating that a purge had been or was conducted within the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building.

2. Why did several kolkhozy become weaker after the amalgamation?...

11. Why did the Central Committee of the *VKP(b)* not correct comrade Khrushchev immediately for the errors that he committed in his article on the questions of the amalgamation of the kolkhozy?<sup>30</sup>

In these questions a kind of impatience seems to be expressed with the actions of the Party's leadership and the leaders themselves. The first two questions indicate a sense that some of the Party's recent measures had been unrealistic, that they had been made without sufficient consultation with the lower levels of the hierarchy. In the case of the Khrushchev article, which undoubtedly must have been the one in *Pravda* on the creation of "agrotowns," a feeling of perplexity can be discerned<sup>31</sup>. The Party leadership had shown for years nothing but an appearance of monolithic unity. The fact that a difference of opinion had risen between the leaders, played out partially in the forum of the national newspaper, must have shocked the Communists. After all, what would the population's reaction be to this exposure of fallibility of a Politburo member? Why was Khrushchev not cautioned earlier, even before his article was published?

In 1952, political meetings took place to discuss the directives for the Nineteenth Party Congress, the fifth Five Year Plan, and the new Party statute. The toilers of the oblast' again came forward with sometimes rather ingenuous questions, which must have disturbed the authorities:

1. Which new machines will be assigned to agriculture?

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<sup>30</sup>Pako, 147/5/34, 1.3.

<sup>31</sup>See Heller/Nekrich, p.474. Mark Frankland describes the controversy that had arisen as a result of Khrushchev's proposals (Mark Frankland, *Khrushchev*, New York: Stein and Day, 1967 (1966), pp.84/85).

2. How much will be designated for the defensive needs of the country?...

8. How can one understand the increase of wages when at the same time retail prices are to be lowered no less than 35%?<sup>32</sup>

Apart from these questions, more critical utterances were also heard in the discussions. The kolkhoznik Popov, not a Party member, stated, at a political meeting on the projects that were to be dealt with by the Nineteenth Party congress, that he was taxed for 1,150 rubles, but that his plot was barely large enough to take care of the needs of his wife and himself<sup>33</sup>. He could not derive enough income from it to pay these taxes, when at the same time he was receiving virtually nothing for his *trudodni*. How was he then to understand the promise in the project for the Five Year Plan of increased affluence for the kolkhozniks? Others wondered why kolkhozniks were not entitled to trips to sanatoria<sup>34</sup>. Was one to pay for secondary education, when it would become obligatory in the country?

In 1949 there were about 90,000 radios in the Kalinin oblast', distributed among apartments of workers, clubs, red corners (*krasnye ugolki*) and in village reading rooms (*izbi-chital'nye*)<sup>35</sup>. This more modern means of communication did not reach every household; again, the situation in the countryside was probably the least satisfactory<sup>36</sup>.

<sup>32</sup>Pako, 147/5/328, 11.58. The report is to N. Pegov, the head of the Central Committee Department for Party, Trade Union and Komsomol organs (See Pako, 147/5/328, 1.55). The Fifth Five Year Plan, meanwhile, had already started more than one and a half year earlier, on January 1, 1951.

<sup>33</sup>Pako, 147/5/328, 1.89.

<sup>34</sup>Pako, 147/5/328, 1.92.

<sup>35</sup> Bloknot Agitatora, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia Pravda," 1949, No.5, p.44.

<sup>36</sup>In the village of M.M. Kozenkova-Pavlova, there was at the time neither radio nor electricity (testimony of M.M. Kozenkova-Pavlova in the survey). In 1961, in the village of A.K. Sumugina, in Rameshki raion, when she left her native village for good, neither electricity, nor radio had made their appearance (testimony of A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva in the survey). See also Table 2 and Chapter VII.

In June 1949, in slightly more than four hundred kolkhozy (out of more than 7,000!), in 360 rural soviets, in nineteen sovkhozy, and in thirty-eight MTS, radios transmitted Muscovite and local broadcasts<sup>37</sup>. It is doubtful that the newspaper press filled the gap, since so many of the oblast' inhabitants were still semiliterate. Furthermore, the radio did present its dangerous possibilities. It could pick up broadcasts from foreign stations: the oblast' committee of the trade union of workers and employees at MTS and agricultural organs complained in April 1951 about the widespread practice of listening to the "slander" of foreign radio stations in kolkhozy and at technical institutes<sup>38</sup>.

In March 1951, there were fifty-six newspapers published in the oblast', with a total edition of 256,000 copies<sup>39</sup>. Concomitantly, several of the All-Union papers published in Moscow were distributed in the oblast'<sup>40</sup>. Certainly an impressive number, but no paper appeared daily, and even the largest one, Proletarskaia Pravda, was only four to

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<sup>37</sup> Bloknot Agitatora, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia Pravda," 1949, No.6, p.31. As at the November 1949 obkom plenum, Ul'ianov, head of the oblast' committee for "radiofication" said: "This is an indicator of the very low cultural level of the oblast'" (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.26). In February 1949, 464 out of 7,500 kolkhozy were said to have radios, and only 250 had electricity (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.91). This shows the very slow progress of the electrification of the countryside, because in March 1946, sixty-nine kolkhozy (1% of the total) had electricity (PP 7978, March 15, 1946, p.2). In three years only 180-odd more had been either connected to the oblast' electricity network or had started to operate their own hydro-powered generators.

<sup>38</sup> Gako [the State Archive of the Tver' oblast'], fond 2913, opis' 1, e.khr. 28, 1.33 and 1.36 [from here, references to records of this archive will be abbreviated in the following way: Gako, 2913/1/28, 1.33 and 36]. In the the agricultural tekhnikum (technical institute) of Krasnyi Kholm students listened to the "Voice of America". This practice was still alive in 1953, when even in the town of Kalinin at the "Gastronom" office employees collectively listened to the "anti-soviet broadcasts of the American and English radio" (Pako, 147/5/662, 1.78).

<sup>39</sup> Pako, 147/5/2, 1.29.

<sup>40</sup> Although particularly during and in the first years after the war the quantity of these papers was not sufficient, because of which newspaper windows were used to display these papers (Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.51ob.).

six pages long<sup>41</sup>. In order to get an impression of the artificiality of the oblast' newspaper, the editorial plan of Proletarskaia Pravda for November and December 1946 is reproduced in an appendix to this dissertation<sup>42</sup>. The plan was discussed and ratified by the obkomburo. Editor Iuzhakov was present at the discussions, since he was candidate member of the obkom by virtue of his position. It is obvious that the paper had almost exclusively the purpose of serving as a propagandistic weapon. In the plan, hardly anything was left to spontaneity. When considering the fact that the paper was never longer than four pages in 1945-1946, this is all the more clear. The word "newspaper" appears to be actually a misnomer, as the concept of news was interpreted rather differently than is common in the Western world today. News was what the obkomburo had determined *a priori* to be news, not some unpredictable event which might happen in the future<sup>43</sup>. This preconceived program for the paper sometimes led to rather unfortunate mistakes. In 1949, a correspondent for the paper reported on the exemplary labour of the kolkhoznitsa Ol'ga Zheleznova. She,

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<sup>41</sup>In 1948 Proletarskaia Pravda appeared in Kalinin about four to five times a week, five other urban papers in the other towns three times, and all the other papers only once or twice a week (Pako, 147/4/1126, II.48-49ob.). There was also, since August 1951, a Komsomol paper published in the oblast', called Stalinskaia Molodezh' (Pako, 147/5/659, I.136; see above). In 1952 Proletarskaia Pravda started to appear six times a week, twenty-seven of the raion newspapers began to appear twice instead of once a week, and six raion papers appeared four times a week (Pako, 147/5/283, I.139). In January 1945, one oblast', five urban and forty-one raion newspapers were published, with a total edition of 226,000 copies per week (PP 7677/Jan 14, 1945, p.3; see p. 341). In January 1945, 48,500 copies per edition were printed of Proletarskaia Pravda (PP 7686/Jan 28, 1945, p.2 for example).

<sup>42</sup>See Appendix II.

<sup>43</sup>Certain exceptional circumstances were allowed to upset the preconceived plan of reporting. For example, when beloved native M.I. Kalinin died in June 1946, two issues of Proletarskaia Pravda were almost exclusively dedicated to the life and works of the deceased Soviet president (PP 8036/June 5, 1946, and PP 8037/June 6, 1946).

however, was not working at her kolkhoz anymore at the time of the publication of the item, for she had been sentenced three years earlier to eight years of imprisonment<sup>44</sup>.

Apart from its propagandistic value, the paper also functioned as an aide to the security organs and judiciary. In 1952, Kalininskaia Pravda reported compromising material on a number of people who were guilty of various abuses<sup>45</sup>. According to its proud editor, tens of people had been prosecuted within the Party or by the courts on the basis of the paper's materials<sup>46</sup>. Because of the publication's exemplary vigilance, more than one hundred people had lost their jobs and 4,000 had been punished in other ways.

In 1951, one library was supposed to serve on average more than three rural soviets in the countryside<sup>47</sup>. This meant that in quite a few villages people were unable to enjoy the use of a library. Few books were sold; few newspapers read in the countryside. Films were shown irregularly, and the quality of the copies was poor: they often broke, there was no sound, and so on. In some rural clubs people watched the same film over and over again<sup>48</sup>. Even in October 1953, almost one third

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<sup>44</sup>Pako, 147/4/1934, 1.70.

<sup>45</sup>In February 1952 Proletarskaia Pravda was renamed Kalininskaia Pravda (Bol'shaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, Tom XIX, p.434).

<sup>46</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.98.

<sup>47</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 11.105-107. The oblast' had 9,972 settlements and probably approximately 1,000 rural soviets in 1953 (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.161, Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., p.7). For every thirty villages or hamlets, consequently, there was one library.

<sup>48</sup>One wonders if the kolkhozniks really minded the poor projection of films such as "The Battle of Stalingrad," "The Young Guard," or "The Fall of Berlin," which were universally distributed. Perhaps anything was better than nothing at all in this respect. The selection of 1946 for a kolkhoz "film festival" seems even less appealing: "Socialist Animal Husbandry," "Fertilization and Harvest," "For a High Harvest of Potatoes," "The Vitamin," were some of the titles offered (PP 8082/Aug 9, 1946, p.4). Fictional films were also announced, but their titles were not mentioned in the paper.

of the villages and hamlets of the oblast' did not have much of an opportunity to see any films<sup>49</sup>.

The heads of village reading rooms and rural clubs were often not qualified enough to impress the peasants with their erudition. In 1951, for example, 135 had enjoyed only four to five grades of school and more than four hundred others were inexperienced, having been on the job for less than a year<sup>50</sup>. Many of the clubs were in a shambles, and unheated in the winter<sup>51</sup>.

Amateur companies engaged in fine arts were reasonably popular, for there were more than 1,850 in January 1951<sup>52</sup>. This translates into an approximate average of one group per amalgamated kolkhoz. It is rather doubtful that these groups did anything to enrich political consciousness: they performed drama and comedy, folk dancing, or as a music ensemble. By virtue of their nature, the repertoire was often largely nonideological. Involvement in sports and physical education in this period was encouraged for strictly utilitarian reasons: it prepared the toilers for labour and army service, and educated them in patriotism<sup>53</sup>.

The cultural efforts had a very limited impact on the popular culture, at least in the countryside<sup>54</sup>. Beliakova, a Komsomol leader, grumbled in January 1951:

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<sup>49</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.161. In 1951, 93 stationary and 288 mobile film projectors operated in the Kalinin oblast' (Pako, 147/5/7, 1.95).

<sup>50</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.109.

<sup>51</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.119.

<sup>52</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.107. It is likely that some amalgamated kolkhozy enjoyed more than one company, while others had none.

<sup>53</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.109.

<sup>54</sup>It appears that even in the centre of Kalinin in 1949 the youth did not have the opportunity to visit a club, and in summertime were hanging out in the town's park at night

At the moment the youth still visits and organizes with relish their own parties and is seldom in the village reading rooms. The youth know Soviet songs but poorly, and often sing *chastushki* (ditties), which were sung by their fathers and grandfathers; they do not participate in the efforts of the collectives for amateur arts, in sports; nor are they engaged in physical education. In their leisure time, particularly in winter, the youth are often left to their own devices. We still encounter facts of the observance of religious ceremonies, the celebration of religious holidays, which are often accompanied by disturbances.<sup>55</sup>

In early 1948 an obkom plenum rededicated itself to the situation of ideological work in the Party organization, as a further consequence of Zhdanov's ideological offensive<sup>56</sup>. A secondary school teacher was criticized for maintaining that Mayakovsky's *Weltanschauung* and work had been influenced by Cervantes<sup>57</sup>. Lecturers at the Pedagogical Institute of Kalinin had perpetrated mistakes in their teaching of the history of the Soviet Union. Others at the same institute had kowtowed to the West in articles on Merimée's appreciation of Pushkin, and on Gorky and Western European literature<sup>58</sup>. An actor of the oblast' drama theatre, Veitsler, had had even the gall to declare that political literacy would not improve his acting.

In early 1949, at the seventh oblast' Party conference, an Honoured Artist of the Russian Republic (*zasluzhennyi artist Respubliki*), a delegate obviously representing the toilers in culture, took the floor. He, a certain Lobanov, knocked the contents of the films

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(Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.26). Here they were exposed to the perfidious influence of drunks, and witnessed fights (including some involving knives).

<sup>55</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.117.

<sup>56</sup>See Heller, Nekrich, pp.488-492; Pako, 147/4/1095, II.1ff.

<sup>57</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.11.

<sup>58</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.37.



shown in the town of Kalinin<sup>59</sup>. Lobanov had been astounded by the criticism of the vice-secretary of the Party committee of the railroad car works at the recently held Party conference of the town of Kalinin. The vice-secretary had blamed the cultural club "Metallist" of the factory for showing too many foreign films. However, as Lobanov pointed out, the Party committee itself was supposed to supervise the club.

Films were very popular at the time in Kalinin because many of the town raion or factory clubs went far beyond the established norm: instead of offering the legal minimum of two sessions a day, for at least eighteen days per month, many showed films four times a day, twenty-four days per month<sup>60</sup>. The office for films in the oblast was offering a wide selection, to Lobanov's dismay. The leaders of "Metallist" had discovered that an attractive title drew a larger crowd, and thus brought in more money. In 1948 and 1949, the movie "The Count of Monte Christo" was screened twelve times in the club owing to its large popularity. According to Lobanov, the whole town was covered with posters to announce the film. Much to his irritation, he even had spotted a placard on his own drama theatre. They were creating competition with his theatre! The "Count" was a resounding success; meanwhile, "Metallist" had not even bothered to show a recently made documentary on the life of V.I. Lenin, although the film office had several copies in stock<sup>61</sup>.

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<sup>59</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.70.

<sup>60</sup>Not surprisingly, the USSR Council of Ministers had interfered in this matter as well, by issuing at some point a decree that established these norms (Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.70).

<sup>61</sup>At the same meeting the obkom secretary of agitation and propaganda, Moiseev, added that "Metallist" only had 528 people in all attending the six showings of the film "Michurin."

Lobanov was annoyed with the popularity of the films shown in "Metallist." He seemed here to have attempted to apply the concept of ideological vigilance to make the club offer less appealing fare, perhaps as a means to get his own theatre filled. Although an actor, he apparently also served as the Party's ideological watchdog of the cultural scene in Kalinin. It should be noticed, too, that Lobanov's criticism was especially aimed at the railroad-car factory, where not long before the conference something of a political "case" had been discovered<sup>62</sup>.

The heavy hand of socialist-realist literary criticism also came down upon the local literati. In 1947, a local literary magazine published its first issue and was exposed to strong criticism by the obkom, that had based itself on Zhdanov's attack on the journals Zvezda and Leningrad.<sup>63</sup> In an article in 1948 in the second issue of Rodnoi Krai, A. Parfenov, the obkom secretary responsible for agitation and propaganda, panned the first issue. He stated guidelines for the ideological and literary contents of future contributions to the annual publication:

The obkom further noticed that a number of the contributions, printed in the first issue of the almanac, were of a low ideological-political and creative level, did not conform to the demands of the Central Committee of the *VKP(b)* on Soviet literature. It is required to serve the education of the people, to serve the strengthening of their moral and political unity. These contributions were severely criticized. The poor supervision of the editors of the almanac over the authors was pointed out, as

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while the foreign movie "The Eighth Round" had attracted 2,742 customers in six sessions (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.91).

<sup>62</sup>See VI.2.

<sup>63</sup>A. Parfenov, "Shire razvernut' literaturnoe dvizhenie," in: Rodnoi krai. Literatur'nyi al'manakh, No.2, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia Pravda," 1948, pp.3-8, pp.4/5.

well as the low artistic quality of the literary material that had been printed in the almanac. In its first issue the reflection of the fundamental theme of today, the example of the selfless labour of Soviet people, fighting for the fulfillment of the postwar Stalinist Five Year Plan, could not be found; the life of the oblast' in the light of the current tasks was not represented.<sup>64</sup>

However, obkom secretary Siriapin noticed in March 1948 that the second issue contained many mistakes similar to those plaguing the first one<sup>65</sup>.

The Party itself had undergone a transformation during the war years: in January 1948, 80% of its membership had become Communist during or after the war<sup>66</sup>. The political reliability of some of these new recruits was sometimes suspect and the older cadres were apparently at times a little overzealous in trying to discipline them:

In a number of town and raion party organizations, the opinion has been diffused that anti-party behaviour and party exclusions apply to that part of the communists, who have arrived from the Soviet Army, in which they entered the party, and on whom no demands were made, and thus, we, so to say, now have to sort them out, and "put things in order." Above all, this is an injurious anti-bolshevik theory, which does not conform to reality. With this "theory" several comrades try to hide their own shortcomings with respect to the recruitment by the party, and the education of young communists.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>Parfenov, p.6.

<sup>65</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.37.

<sup>66</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.6ob. In the USSR as a whole the party experienced a profound transformation of its membership (see Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Stalin: Order through Terror (A History of the Soviet Union 1917-1953, Volume Two), London and New York: Longman, 1981, pp.165/166). The number was slightly less according to Petrov, head of the obkom *orgotdel*, who said at the same meeting that 47,000 out of a total of 61,000 had become Communist during or after the war (Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.29).

<sup>67</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.6ob.

The education of Communists was supposed to take the following course in 1948: the first stage was the political school (*politshkola*)<sup>68</sup>. This was to be followed by the study of the History of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course. After this came a study of the Short Course together with selected works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism; then one would enter the evening Party school, and, finally, political education would be completed by study at the university of Marxism-Leninism.

By 1951, the system of Party education had become relatively sophisticated. There were three evening universities for the study of Marxism-Leninism, sixty-nine town and raion evening Party schools, 432 circles for the advanced study of the Short Course, and 1,566 for the basic study of the same book, 576 study circles engaged in the study of the biographies of Lenin and Stalin, and 1,350 political schools<sup>69</sup>. More than 10,000 Communists independently studied

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<sup>68</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.8ob. In late 1946, still around one fifth of the 55,000-odd Communists did not partake in any form of political education, which rather disturbed the obkom (Pako, 147/4/18, 11.7/8). There was all the more reason to worry, because the Central Committee had not long before issued a decree on the necessity of the inclusion of all Communists in the system of political education. Apart from this large number of Communists who did not even formally study, there were many who merely formally participated in some form of political study (several oblispolkom and obkom workers were even thrown out of the correspondence department of the oblast' Higher Party School in 1946). In late 1946 still many Communists were forced to study on their own, since there were not enough study circles and schools. The supervision of these political autodidacts was sorely inadequate, if one has to believe the words of the propaganda secretary of the obkom, Kalachev. In 1946 the Central Committee made it obligatory to organize twice a year ten-day (or longer) seminars in political education for raikom and gorkom secretaries (Pako, 147/4/18, 1.8ob.).

<sup>69</sup>As reported by Vakhmistrov to M.A. Suslov in July 1951 (Pako, 147/5/35, 11.11-12). Political schools were small affairs with a two-year curriculum of the study of Marxism-Leninism. In 1950-51, 655 operated under the auspices of primary Party cells at collective farms (Pako, 147/5/35, 1.15) The evening schools were for leading Party, soviet, and Komsomol *aktiv* and secretaries of primary Party cells (Pako, 147/5/35, 1.19); they offered a ten-month program in 1946, in which the students had once a week a four-hour class --in theory, although practice often led to neglect of its curriculum in the raions, because the students were too busy with other, mainly agricultural, matters (Pako,

Marxist-Leninist theory. 95% of the 60,000-odd Communists were engaged in some form of Party education, together with 6,750 Komsomols and 16,270 non-party *aktiv*.

In 1951, there were nine full-time and twenty-five part-time lecturers of the obkom<sup>70</sup>. The latter were employed as teachers at the Pedagogical Institute, the oblast' Party school, or were employees of the obkom *apparats*. In the academic year 1950-51 the lecturers presented a total of 491 lectures<sup>71</sup>. The rai- and gorkoms had an additional 756 part-time lecturers at their service.

In December 1946, several obkom members (Zhgutov, Nizov'ev, Ivanov) were reprimanded at an obkom plenum for failing to pick up their copies of the first two tomes of Stalin's collected works, that had been waiting for them since June<sup>72</sup>. In the following years the Short Course would be diligently studied. It is unlikely that people completely grasped its essential message on dialectical and historical materialism explained in Chapter Four of the book -- supposedly written by Stalin<sup>73</sup>. In 1952, propagandists in the raions of Mednoe and Krasnyi Kholm fully omitted the study of this part, and others

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147/4/18, 1.9). The evening universities were located in Kalinin --which had opened in 1943 (Pako, 147/4/18, 1.9)--, Vyshnii Volochek, and Kimry, and had about 1,000 students, 80% of whom were Communists (Pako, 147/5/35, 1.19). Among the students hardly any genuine workers or peasants were to be found, as about half of them were leading Party, soviet, Komsomol, and trade union workers, and the rest mainly engineers, technicians, teachers, and doctors (Pako, 147/5/35, 11.19/20).

<sup>70</sup>Pako, 147/5/35, 1.23.

<sup>71</sup>31% were on the history of the Communist Party, 10% on philosophy, 13% on political economy, 8.5% on questions of Communist upbringing and Soviet patriotism, and 36% on the international situation and the current moment (Pako, 147/5/35, 1.23).

<sup>72</sup>Pako, 147/4/18, 1.8. Around June 1946, about 60,000 copies of the Short Course were made available for unrestricted sale in the oblast' (PP 8073, July 27, 1946, p.3).

<sup>73</sup>Short Course, pp.105-131.

committed many errors in trying to explain the passages<sup>74</sup>. The low education level of the large majority of the population and of a large amount of the Communists prevented the propagandists from successfully explaining the theoretical basis of Soviet society to the *narod*.

In February 1953, the obkom once more felt obliged to criticize the incidence of the observance of varied religious practices among the membership of the Communist Party<sup>75</sup>. Some had icons, others had their children christened. It thus seems that, while the level of indoctrination of the Communists was on the surface very impressive, it was extremely difficult to eradicate root and branch old customs and ways of thinking and forge a genuine atheistic, Communist, Soviet mentality<sup>76</sup>.

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<sup>74</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.134. In early 1953 in Sonkovo raion, a propagandist of a MTS limited himself to reading aloud an article of the oblast' newspaper to his Party cell in a mechanical, monotonous way, and the phrase "that is to say" (*tak skazat'*) was added to every line (Pako, 147/5/659, 1.72). The audience, according to Smirnov --the obkom's vice-head of the otel of agitation and propaganda, who gave the example-- had enjoyed only the lowest general education, and was therefore unable to understand the avalanche of foreign words and difficult expressions that the propagandist used. The latter himself did not understand what he said either, according to Smirnov.

<sup>75</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 11.45 and 1.69 for example. For more on religion, see VI.2.

<sup>76</sup>Although it seems unbelievable, some Party members still had not learned their lesson from the experience of the Ezhovshchina. The naiveté of A.M. Afanas'ev is surprising: he joined the Party as a conscript in 1940, when he was twenty years old. About two years after his demobilization he began to work in the raikom of Udoml'ia in 1944. He asked the head of the local MVD how he could find out about the fate of his father-in-law, who had been arrested in collectivization. He was told to forget about it and not to speak to the MVD chief about it. The next day a raikom secretary admonished Afanas'ev for conducting "unhealthy conversations," and warned that one could not work in the raikom with such an attitude. Afanas'ev repented and promised to better himself (testimony of A.M. Afanas'ev in the survey). N.D. Eliseev's answers to the survey seemed to be quite frank; thus there is no reason not to believe him when he said that he never believed in Communism --he laughed at Khrushchev's promises at the end of the 1950s-- , but he joined the Party nevertheless in 1956, after thirteen years in the Komsomol. He believed in Stalin. Today he appreciates the abundant food he was able to buy under the Communist system --he was part of the "workers' aristocracy" as a locomotive engineer-- , but criticizes the many injustices of the time. Furthermore, people had confidence, in his opinion, in what the future would bring, which he believes has been lost today (testimony of N.D. Eliseev in the survey). It

## VI.2 Party versus People

The constant control the obkomburo was exercising over the oblispolkom, gorkoms, gorispolkoms, raikoms, raiispolkoms, factories, institutions, Party cells, raions, and the inhabitants of the oblast' in general, is both proof of the lack of popularity of the Communists' ideals, and of the authorities' distrust of the population<sup>77</sup>. In order to gain an idea of the worries of the obkomburo, some of the topics of their discussions in the spring and summer of 1945 (from the end of April until the end of July) will follow here. It should be noticed that

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seems that Eliseev believed in the possibility of a better life for the country by following socialist policies, but was realistic enough to consider the creation of a communist paradise a millenarian idea. The most curious former Communist Party member in the survey was the cobbler V.F. Nepriaev. In 1943, he joined the Party with the rest of his batallion, but did not believe in Communism or in the Communists. Politics he considered to be a dirty business. He even mentioned that the soldiers at the front sometimes shot the most zealous Communists (the careerists, as Nepriaev called them), often officers, in the back of the head during an attack. He felt that there was not only a war going on against the Germans, but also within the ranks of the Red Army. A cousin of his was sent to Kolyma in the war for the theft of a little bit of grain, and died there. Nepriaev failed to see the justice of this for, in his opinion, a famine existed in the countryside during the war. He welcomed Stalin's death, who he felt to be a cannibal. Nepriaev had seen the early results of collectivization and the destruction of the life of the peasantry, for which he would never forgive the Communists and Stalin. He stated that all the crying that he saw go on around him at Stalin's death (see IX.1), was on command, and was similar to the reaction of the population in a fascist state (testimony of V.F. Nepriaev). In comparison to the other respondents, Nepriaev was unusually bitter about the Soviet past, but, concomitantly, seemed to be one of the more perceptive people in the survey, even if he had only enjoyed four years of general education in his life. He was in the Communist Party merely because it was the thing to do for the front-line soldiers before going into battle.

<sup>77</sup>In 1950, N.A. Arkhangel'skii studied at an agricultural institute in Moscow. All those who had lived on German-occupied territory had to leave, when Voroshilov travelled to his dacha along the road where the institute was located. Arkhangel'skii was almost arrested in Kalinin because he walked around in a coat, that had been made over from a German-army coat, which he had brought back from Germany (testimony of N.A. Arkhangel'skii in the survey). See also the emergence of a conformist attitude among the population as a result of the purges as described by Tucker (Tucker, Stalin in Power, pp.549/550).

this record is a fairly typical document of the activities of the highest leadership of the oblast' Party organization.

The buro focussed, among other things, on the following practices:

1. 'The neglect in supervising the hog herds and pig breeding, leading to losses and squandering of hogs, by the raikom secretaries of Kalinin, Esenovichi, Kirov, Krasnyi Kholm, Zavidovo, Ovinishche, Maksatikha, Brusovo, Lesnoe, Emel'ianovo, and Vyshnii Volochek raions.
2. The secretary for cadres of the town of Torzhok was dismissed for failing to halt the fluctuation of the labour force in the local industry, through which production norms were not fulfilled.
3. Notwithstanding the examination of 60,000 cases between January 1944 and April 1945, the judiciary in the oblast' was operating badly, since innocents were being convicted, while crime flourished. The real criminals came away with very mild sentences.
4. The prisoners of war and Soviet convicts were not being deployed in an efficient way in the oblast' economy.
5. The results of the industrial and factory schools remained below expectations, due to the incompetence of the head of the oblast' direction for labour reserves, Stuchalkin.
6. The direction of the oblast's oil provisioning was in a state of disarray because of the high incidence of drunkenness, the existence of "familyness" (*semeistvennost'*), and so on, for which its director Tsvetkov carried the responsibility.
7. The Ostashkov raikom failed in reviving its raion from the destruction of the war.



8. The drunken misbehaviour of M.P. Kornilov, raikom secretary of Vysoko raion, at the Kalinin railroad station.
9. The mismanagement of affairs by the raion committee of Bologoe.
10. The drinking bouts that were taking place at several factories in Kimry, in which the local Party brass participated.
11. The errors that were being made by the Oktiabr' raikom in the town of Kalinin.
12. The inadequate care for invalids, and the misbehaviour of the latter.
13. The poor operations of the MTS in Rameshki raion.
14. The failures of the Kozlovo raikom with respect to agriculture.
15. The shortcomings of the Komsomol of Vyshnii Volochek.
16. The lack of improvement of the economic performance of Lesnoe raion.
17. The fact that some older children had not received obligatory primary education within the school system of the oblast'.
18. The inadequate supply of construction materials within the oblast'.
19. The failure of some of the oblast' sovkhozy.<sup>78</sup>

This constitutes quite an impressive list for a period of only three months, and it should be noticed that these were not all the subjects dealt with at the buro's sessions. The obkomburo was clearly concerned with almost every aspect of life in the oblast'. There was a bias towards economic matters, which leads again to the conclusion that the buro itself was judged by the degree of successful economic performance of the oblast'<sup>79</sup>. The buro looked into matters in a very

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<sup>78</sup>Pako, 147/3/2701, 11.1-269.

<sup>79</sup>Compare to Fainsod, *How...*, p. 204. As Fainsod eloquently put it: "In the Soviet Book of Acts, much is forgiven success, but nothing is forgiven failure" (Fainsod, *How...*, p.353).

detailed manner. The amount of criticism, warnings, admonishments, and the like as a result of these discussions is proof that the buro perceived a lack of cooperation among the population. One can deduce that the highest leadership of the oblast' did not deem the lower levels in the Party organization and government fit to take care of matters on their own<sup>80</sup>. And indeed, it seems that, as soon as attention from the authorities temporarily slackened, people took the opportunity to misbehave --at least in the eyes of the buro members. People became inebriated, committed fraud with ration cards, slaughtered pigs without permission, the lower ranks abused their authority, and so on<sup>81</sup>. As Djilas wrote:

The state is not merely an instrument of tyranny; society as well as the executive bodies of the state machine are in a continuous and lively opposition to the oligarchy, which aspires to reduce this opposition by naked force.<sup>82</sup>

One kolkhoz chairman, a Communist, stated in 1946, that he would rather spend time in jail than give grain to the state, for he did not want to leave his kolkhozniks without any<sup>83</sup>. A forester, Boikov, was fired, after the oblast' newspapers had received letters complaining about his abusive behaviour on the job<sup>84</sup>. He was systematically drunk at work, felled trees and sold them off for vodka,

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<sup>80</sup>"The simplicity of this mechanism originates from the fact that one party alone, the Communist Party, is the backbone of the entire political, economic and ideological activity. The entire public life is at a standstill or moves ahead, falls behind or turns around according to what happens in the party forums." (Djilas, *The New Class*, p.71).

<sup>81</sup>Compare to Fainsod, *How...*, p.351. For example, in the first three months of 1947, the militia, on orders of the obkomburo, carried out operations to combat fraud with ration cards, for which 290 people were arrested in that period, although against only fifty-one of them criminal proceedings were instituted (Pako, 147/4/984, 1.36).

<sup>82</sup>Djilas, *The New Class*, p.87.

<sup>83</sup>Pako, 147/4/18, 1.6ob. This was not unique in this year (I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.8)

<sup>84</sup>pp 7966/Feb 26, 1946, p.3.

let cattle graze in the forest area that he supervised, and illegally cultivated hayfields in the woods.

It seems that an ongoing battle was waged between life (the people), which tried to reassert itself, whenever and wherever possible, and stultifying discipline (maintained by the Party and more particularly its obkomburo)<sup>85</sup>. The behaviour of one ethnic group especially disturbed the obkom: the Romany (gypsies). In 1948 the secretary for propaganda of the obkom, Parfenov, expressed his annoyance with their wandering ways. Allegedly, they posed as artists, but in reality engaged in theft, and, perhaps worse still, did not have passports<sup>86</sup>. Some of the Party's lack of trust of the peasantry was a consequence of the belief in the essential petty bourgeois quality of the peasants that was a tenet of Marxist theory, and was part and parcel of Lenin's political philosophy<sup>87</sup>. In spite of the legal equality of workers and peasants proclaimed by the 1936 Constitution, distrust of the peasantry permeated the Communist Party. This is probably one of the causes for the repeated threat of force against undisciplined peasants after 1945, as expressed for example in the resolutions of September 1946, of the Central Committee Plenum of February 1947, and subsequent measures emanating from the Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, and from lower Party and government organs, such as the obkomburo of Kalinin oblast'. Even today the intelligentsia has difficulties coming to terms with the

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<sup>85</sup>On the abyss between the *narod* and *vlad*, see Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia atmosfera posle voyny (1948-1952)," in: *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, 9, 1992, pp. 79-88, p.79.

<sup>86</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.12/12ob.

<sup>87</sup>See e.g. Moshe Lewin, *Lenin's Last Struggle*, London: Pluto Press, 1975, pp.22-29 or pp.111/112, and Maksim Gor'kii, *Nesvoevremennye mysli. Rasskazy*, Moskva: Sovremennik, 1991, pp.86, 88/89.

perceived "uncultured" ways of the *narod*. A good example of this is the article by A.N. Sakharov in *Kommunist* in 1991<sup>88</sup>.

The dichotomy between Party and people should not be overexaggerated: the population itself denounced people guilty of abuses to the authorities. As well, a measure of genuine enthusiasm among the population to rebuild the fatherland after the war and perhaps build socialism was present<sup>89</sup>. However, this enthusiasm would rapidly decline after 1945, when any genuine improvements in the quality of life failed to occur.

At the same time, it is ahistorical to maintain that the experience of the war generated the idea of freedom among the Soviet-

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<sup>88</sup>A.N. Sakharov, "Revolutsionnyi...". Nevertheless, this article provides an extremely interesting theoretical interpretation of the historical development of the Soviet Union and deserves attention. His analysis of the wholehearted participation of the semiliterate masses in the butchery can be read as an addition to Hannah Arendt's analysis of the psychological mechanism that made people kill their fellow human beings in an unprecedented way during the twentieth century (Arendt, p.337). Contrasting A.N. Sakharov's ideas is the opinion of N.P. Poletika, which seems to me somewhat closer to the truth (N.P. Poletika, *Vidennoe i perezhitoe (Iz vospominanii)*, Israel, 1982: Biblioteka-Altia, pp.406/407). Poletika describes how the mechanism of fear worked in the USSR by way of the utterances of a protagonist of a play by A. Afinogenov, staged in Leningrad in 1931. According to his view, 80% of the population, composed of all social strata, lived by fear (for the loss of their private cow, for a new purge of the Party ranks, for an accusation of sabotage etc.). The other 20% engaged wholeheartedly in the system, because of the opportunities for upward social mobility that it offered. They became morally degenerate or even lost their minds by their participation in the events. His idea of the role of fear was echoed to a certain extent by Robert Tucker: "State terror is triadic. One element of the triad is a political leadership determined to use terror for its purposes. The second is a minority chosen for victimization in so frightful a form that a third element, a far larger body of people, seeing what can happen to the victims, will be motivated to fulfill the leadership's purpose, which may be to render it quiescent or, alternatively, to induce it to take actions that it otherwise would not be disposed to take" (Tucker, p.174).

<sup>89</sup>This enthusiasm is for instance described by Volkogonov; it remained largely restricted to the urban population (D.A. Volkogonov, *Triumf i tragediia. I.V. Stalin. Politicheskii portret*, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Agentstva pechaty Novosti, 1989, Kniga 1, Chast' 2, p. 70, pp.179-183 and Kniga II, Chast'II, p.20). Obviously, less scrupulous people tried to use the system for their personal advancement and supported the politics of the regime for that reason. It is impossible, in my opinion, to assign these kinds of people to some layer of society, as Iu. Igritskii tried, when he proposed that the collaborators and careerists came from the "lumpen-erized" (*lumpenizirovannnye*) strata of society (Iu. I. Igritskii, "Snova o totalitarizme," in: *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 1, 1993, pp.3-17, p.15).

Russian population, as a recent observer proposes<sup>90</sup>. She opines that the desire for freedom smoldered for the next forty years underneath the conformist veneer of society and finally erupted around 1988-1989. This seems fully mistaken, for Yeltsin and Gorbachev, for example, were boys of fourteen in 1945. Undoubtedly, they had not yet acquired any awareness of the absence of freedom around them. Nevertheless, a desire to pursue one's own interests instead of those of the collective never seems to have disappeared in the Soviet Union during its entire history. Immediately after the war, these interests among the population were almost exclusively of an economic character. The trials and tribulations of the 1930s and the war induced the large majority to crave initially for nothing more than an existence in which one could feed oneself and one's family adequately and in peace<sup>91</sup>.

The obkomburo and lower Party committees sometimes did come to the defense of those who were unable to fend for themselves or lived in squalor<sup>92</sup>. In October 1945, for instance, a member of the obkom apparatus, a certain Artiushkevich, admonished the Likhoslavl' raikom secretary Fochenkov as follows:

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<sup>90</sup>See Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia...(1945-1946)," pp.5/6 for this hypothesis.

<sup>91</sup>Compare to Lorenz, p.291.

<sup>92</sup>As in the case of Boikov, when the editors of Proletarskaja Pravda brought the letters describing the abuses of the forester to the attention of the authorities, who investigated the accusations and fired Boikov (PP 7966/Feb 26, 1946, p.3). Vasily Grossman described the pathological state of mind that Stalin's repressions created among the population at large and its superficially contradictory nature, as follows: "The divinity, the faultlessness, of the immortal state, it now turned out, had not only crushed the individual human being, but had also defended him, comforted him in his weakness, shielded him and provided justification for his insignificance. The state had taken on its own iron shoulders the entire weight of responsibility; it had freed individual human beings from any qualms of conscience" (Vasily Grossman, Forever Flowing, London: Collins Harvill, 1986(1973) (Original: Possev Verlag 1970, Russian: Vse Teche), p. 31).

An inspection by the Plenipotentiary of the *KPK* [Party Control Commission] under the CC of the *VKP/b/* for the Kalinin oblast' has established that in your raion in the kolkhoz "Krupskaia" the family of Mikhailova --with five children from four to thirteen years, the oldest son sick with acute anaemia-- lives in difficult material circumstances. A statement on aid [for them] did not arrive in the raion; she is illiterate, no one keeps an eye on the family and help is not given; the family of Medvedeva T.F. has three young children, the oldest daughter is an invalid, struck by paralysis. They are materially badly provided for, no inspection took place and help was not extended, and the chairman of the kolkhoz even refused to give straw for the repair of the roof [of their house]. Not receiving necessary help as well is the family of Vasil'eva O.V. of the town of Likhoslavl', her husband and two sons died at the front, she has in her keep two children, one of whom is ill with tuberculosis; Grapatkina Z.V., who has five children; and others.

In the raion, there are twenty-seven pupils of school-going age of soldiers' families who do not visit elementary school. [E.g] Two children of Abramov from the kolkhoz "Krasnoe Lukino," the daughter of Ezheva, of Pareva, from the village of Rychkovo, and others.

Already in 1944 in the kolkhoz "Krasnyi Vyshkovets" for the family of the Red Army soldier Fedorov, who has five young children, the kolkhoz transported straw for the roof of their house, but until today the roof is not closed. There was no help given for the repair of the houses of the families of soldiers of the same kolkhoz --the families of Alekseeva, Makarova, Iurzina. In the town of Likhoslavl' out of 172 apartments, that needed repair, only twenty-six were repaired on Sept. 10.

In the raion 1,436 petitions and statements of families of soldiers were made, out of them 122 statements have not been investigated and not even answered. Stepanova D.S. out of the village Ladonikh has three children, the supply of the family with material goods is poor.<sup>93</sup>

And so on; although this shows some genuine humanitarian concern for these citizens, this impression should be qualified for a number of reasons. Likhoslavl' raion was close to the oblast' capital,

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<sup>93</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, l. 199

and situated along the October Railroad; the scrutiny of this area was probably untypically severe. It is doubtful that the obkom kept such a close eye on the more remote areas of the oblast' territory. Apart from that, it had been not so much the obkom itself that had discovered this situation, but the plenipotentiary of the Party Control Commission, who on other occasions also operated as a watchdog over the activities (or lack thereof) of the oblast' leadership. The plenipotentiary was the instigator of warnings by the obkom, delivered to the secretaries of other raions on similar injustices within their fiefs in October 1945<sup>94</sup>. Moreover, these letters seem to be almost solely concerned with the families of soldiers, who had fought (and often died) at the front ... although it could be argued that almost every family had one or more relatives fighting at the front during the war.

On November 22, 1945, the obkom secretariat received a reply of raikom secretary Churkin of Likhoslavl' raion, in which some of the accusations were denied or proven to be false<sup>95</sup>. In addition, a survey was described to have taken place in the raion among 6,270 soldiers' families about their material circumstances. The suffering families had been receiving all kinds of support recently, according to Churkin.

The opposition between Party and people was mitigated as well by the fact that the Party recruited its members from among the

<sup>94</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, ll.200-209. Raions scolded were Kirov raion, 'Tsentrul'nyi, Oktiabr', and Proletarskii raions of Kalinin town, and apparently also Ostashkov raion, of which the raikom secretary Orlov reacted in a letter to the obkom secretariat of November 4, 1945 (Pako, 147/3/2759, l.209).

<sup>95</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, ll.210-211. The number of soldiers counted in this raion is quite impressive; in 1950 (January 1) 16,289 people lived in the collective farms of the Likhoslavl' raion (Pako, 147/5/906, l.3). The raion centre had had 2,958 inhabitants in 1926 (Vershinskii, Zolotarev, pp.8/9); thus an estimate of a total population of between 25 to 30 thousand in 1946 is not unreasonable. If that estimate would be correct, than at least one in five of the raion inhabitants served in the Red Army during the war.

population<sup>96</sup>. Many Party members at lower levels identified probably much more with their own community than with the Party itself. After all, the education of many people in positions of responsibility at the local level was not very high<sup>97</sup>. One needed some sophistication to see through the propaganda and to establish what actually was meant by the double-talk emanating from higher up. The attitude of the people, from among whom these Party members were selected, did not immediately change when they entered the Party. Typical might be the following anecdote:

The head of the raion [Sonkovo] office of flax procurements, comrade Tsvetkov, was dispatched in March 1946 to report on the speech of comrade Stalin of February 9, 1946, to the kolkhoz "March 8" of the Sheldomezhskii rural soviet. In the kolkhoz he was told that the report had already been given there. Tsvetkov did not give the report and instead asked at a kolkhoz meeting if they could sell him a cow, and a cow was sold to him for 750 rubles.<sup>98</sup>

Neither Tsvetkov, nor the kolkhozniks were overly enthusiastic about Stalin's speech, it seems<sup>99</sup>. Since he was there, Tsvetkov decided

<sup>96</sup>See Table 36 for the distribution of Party membership among different occupations.

<sup>97</sup>In 1946, the *nomenklatura* of the raikom of Sonkovo, a rural area, consisted of 514 positions. 399 or 80% of the workers in these positions had primary or unfinished secondary education (i.e. about five or six years of school) (Pako, 147/4/57, 1.56ob.). Not all people in *nomenklaturnye* positions were, of course, Party members, and certainly not at lower levels. On January 1, 1952, when the Party was probably larger than in 1946 in this raion, Sonkovo raion had 887 Communists (see Table 38). Compare also Tables 39 and 41 for the comparatively base level of education of the higher levels of the Party in the oblast'.

<sup>98</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, 1.56ob. See Table 37 as well: it shows again that Communists were not above common human vice.

<sup>99</sup>This is, moreover, one of the most important ones after the war: the (in)famous pre-election speech at the occasion of the elections for the Supreme Soviet in 1946, in which Stalin explains the victory of the war as the consequence of his (or the Party's) farsighted policies in the 1930s (see Robert V. Daniels (ed.), A Documentary History of Communism: Volume II, New York: Vintage Books, 1960, pp.142-151).



to take the opportunity to find out if he could buy a cow, a more pressing matter for him at the time. It is possible that both the kolkhoz and Tsvetkov actually perpetrated something illegal, too, as it seems likely that Tsvetkov was not eligible to have a cow. Perhaps the kolkhoz was squandering some of the collective's cattle. This all, combined with the lack of proper awe for Stalin's utterances, must have infuriated the loftier Party cadres.

In February 1947, a Central Committee plenum, one of the very few held after the war, dedicated itself to sorting out the problematic situation of agriculture --perhaps as a consequence of the famine<sup>100</sup>. Its resolutions called upon the provinces to bring the disorganization and illegalities within the collective farms to an end.

To illustrate the results of the Plenum's resolutions and to give a more general image of the profile of kolkhoz chairs and reasons for their dismissals, an analysis will here be made of the turnover of kolkhoz directors in 1947 in Molokovo raion<sup>101</sup>. The raion was located in the north-east and had escaped German occupation. In January 1947,

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<sup>100</sup>See, for example, Samsonov, A Short History, p. 256; on the famine a.o. Heller, Nekrich, p.468; Vorontsov said in March 1947: "You know from the decisions [of the February 1947 Plenum] of the Central Committee of the VKPP that in 1946 a severe drought occurred in a significant area of the European part of the USSR, which has had a strong impact on the agriculture of our country, and the total yield of the grain harvest in the country was substantially less than in 1945" (Pako, 147/4/528, 1.13).

<sup>101</sup>For an idea of the situation of the kolkhoz directors in general, see Table 23. In the immediate postwar period in the whole of the Union annually one third of the kolkhoz chairs were changed (Sovetskaia derevnia.... p.141). From 1947 onwards, in connection with the February Plenum, efforts were undertaken to improve the competence of the kolkhoz chairs by appointing better educated persons. In 1947, a somewhat higher frequency of replacements ensued because of this, although even a Soviet publication had to admit that the turnover continued at a similarly high level after 1947 as well (Sovetskaia derevnia.... p.141). However, part of the high incidence of replacement of kolkhoz directors was a consequence of the extreme scarcities and high level of deliveries of 1946, which led some to resist the demands of the state (I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.8; see Chapter V as well). The latter ended up in court.

the first secretary of the raikom, Burilov, had been dismissed for his lack of activity in improving the results of animal husbandry and a general poor economic performance by his raion<sup>102</sup>. At the annual general meetings of the collective farms in February and March 1947, fifty-one chairs were released from their duties, after which an additional twelve were forced to resign during the remainder of the year<sup>103</sup>. Thus in 1947 alone, sixty-three chairs were changed out of a total of 205 collective farms<sup>104</sup>. The most frequent reason for dismissing a chair was poor leadership over the collective farm (seventeen times)<sup>105</sup>. There were nine cases of directors who were criminally prosecuted, and eight cases of kolkhoz directors who were not even a member of the collective farm they had been leading as well as of people who left the job due to illness. Seven times chairs stepped down due to their own personal request, and another seven had never been elected by the general meeting of the kolkhoz. Four were transferred or promoted, two were accused of irregularities, but escaped prosecution for the time being, and one died. Most fired chairs had been only working as such for less than five years, and twenty-eight had started working after December 1944.

Both before and after the changes of 1947, not many collective farms were led by women (thirteen before and four after), although a

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<sup>102</sup>pp 8204, Jan 29, 1947, p.1.

<sup>103</sup>Pako, 147/4/429,II. 27-30.

<sup>104</sup>See Table 13.

<sup>105</sup>The calculation here is my own, according to Pako, 147/4/429,II. 27-30; Z.M. Vinogradova, who chaired a kolkhoz in Vyshnii Volochek raion in the late 1940s, was aware of the danger of arrest for kolkhoz chairs. She added that the work load of a chair was so enormous that one always neglected something, and that reasons could be found at any time to be less than fully satisfied with the operation of a kolkhoz. She said that God had mercy upon her, for she was never arrested (testimony of Z.M. Vinogradova in the survey).

trend to exclude women from the kolkhozy's leadership is perceptible. Certainly, this had to do with the fact that women were reverting to the lower positions they had occupied before the war. Initially, women were less often chairs in Molokovo raion than in other areas, because this raion had not been occupied by the Germans. Probably some of the disabled or older men who stayed behind took over from those who had left for the front. In some of the raions of the liberated area, hardly any males returned after 1945, because of which there was no alternative but to elect a woman. The move to exclude women in Molokovo raion was somewhat counterproductive perhaps, since none of them belonged to those who had been under criminal investigation. Four of the seven chairs who left on their own request were women, sometimes doing so because of "family circumstances." One suspects that the standard double burden of rearing children and taking care of the household, combined with the leadership over the collective farm was an overwhelming prospect for some of them.

The return of the demobilized soldiers is obvious from the fact that, of the sixty-three replacements, nine were army veterans. The rest (fifty-four) comprised former brigadiers, rank-and-file kolkhozniks, and so on. There were twenty Communists among the new kolkhoz leaders, which reveals the Party's fragile popularity in the countryside. Only five had more than more than four grades of education. No common denominator with respect to the age of the new chairs can be discerned. Ten had been born before 1900, seventeen had been born in 1917 or later.

It seems doubtful that the new chairs would perform much better than their predecessors, judging from these numbers. Only a minority

could boast Party membership, so that it can be doubted that they would remedy matters out of their enthusiasm for the cause. Their education and work experience supplied no reason for expecting a more rational organization of the agricultural production process. It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the whole exercise was aimed at showing the vigilance of the Party and government in their supervision of agriculture. Poor leadership would not be tolerated, and gross abuses would be handled by the courts. The question is, how much the authorities themselves imagined that these actions would improve agriculture. Did it make a difference that led to the relatively promising agricultural results in 1948 and 1949 in the Kalinin oblast? Probably not, for the favourable weather seems to have been primarily responsible for these successes<sup>106</sup>.

The limitations of the above described changing of the guard are suggested in a record noting the consistent violations of the 1935 *Ustav* of agriculture artels in the oblast' during 1949 and 1950<sup>107</sup>. In these two years, according to the representative of the Council of Kolkhoz Affairs, 18,285 cases had been uncovered of use of kolkhoz lands for aims other than collective farming, 8.4 million rubles of kolkhoz money and 2,351 heads of cattle had been embezzled, 1,700,000 kilograms of crops, and 158,000 litres of milk had been stolen and squandered.

In June 1948, an obkom plenum met to discuss the widespread habit of "private farming," i.e. of those peasants who had almost completely withdrawn from participation in the socialist sector of

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<sup>106</sup>See VIII.3.

<sup>107</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 1.149.

agriculture<sup>108</sup>. The plenipotentiary of the Ministry of Procurements of the Kalinin oblast', Zobnin, said:

...several kolkhozniks turned their private plot into their basic source of income. One needs to say that these facts are clearly illustrated in the deliveries of grain by the households of kolkhozniks from their private plots. The taxation for grain deliveries of the kolkhoz households increases every year. Thus in 1945, 28,676 households with a sown area of 2,569 hectares were liable to tax for grain deliveries; in 1946 this number increased to 45,361 households with a sown area of 3,657 hectares, and in 1947 the taxation reached 49,920 households with a sown area of 5,432 hectares of grain crops. To the raions with the largest number of taxed households belong: the Kirov raion, in which 5,979 households are taxed for cereals, in Lukovnikovo raion 4,563 households, in Molokovo raion 4,500 households, in Novotorzhok raion 3,683 households, and in Rzhev raion 3,580 households.<sup>109</sup>

This indicates that in 1947 almost 50,000 households had more or less turned exclusively to private farming, and were engaged in growing grain on their extremely small, private plots. Considering the fact that there were about 260,000 kolkhoz households at the time, apparently 20% of the kolkhozniks in the oblast' preferred working for themselves to working on the kolkhoz in 1947, no matter how grim the odds were<sup>110</sup>.

*Edinolichniki* (individual peasants), together with kolkhozniks, were warned to have a valid permit to trade on the kolkhoz markets of Kalinin in September 1946 in Proletarskaia Pravda<sup>111</sup>. It is wrong to consider these almost 50,000 kolkhozniks' families as part of the *edinolichniki*. The term used for the former in a Soviet publication is

<sup>108</sup>Pako, 147/4/1096, I.2, 147/4/1097, I.4 and II.14ob./15.

<sup>109</sup>Pako, 147/4/1097, II.14ob./15.

<sup>110</sup>See Table 14.

<sup>111</sup>PP 8109/Sep 15, 1946, p.4.

*okolokolkhoznoe naselenie* (semi-kolkhoz population is perhaps a translation which comes close)<sup>112</sup>. They had been probably excluded from the kolkhoz for not having worked the required minimum of *trudodni* at some point, or for simply refusing in general to work for the collective farm<sup>113</sup>. In 1950 1.9% of the membership of the USSR kolkhozy did not take part at all in the kolkhoz production<sup>114</sup>. The measures taken against these people by the authorities or by the kolkhozy varied. Many raion authorities could ill afford to punish them too harshly for either their refusal to work in socialist agriculture or their poor performance on the kolkhoz. They might generate necessary crops and livestock products --on their private plots, or even as a result of their limited involvement in the socialized sector-- which could help fulfill the procurement plans. Kolkhoz authorities might hope to lure them into assisting with kolkhoz work, and perhaps even persuade them to return to the kolkhoz<sup>115</sup>. It was self-defeating to have more than a few scapegoats juridically persecuted, because they would be definitively lost as potential work hands when convicted to a camp or jail sentence. This might explain, for instance, the limited amount of people exiled on the basis of the Supreme Soviet decree of June 2, 1948<sup>116</sup>.

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<sup>112</sup>*Sovetskaja derevnia*.... p.195.

<sup>113</sup>See *Sovetskaja derevnia*.... p.196, which mentions that from 1946-1950 annually 3% of the kolkhozniks was excluded for this reason.

<sup>114</sup>*Sovetskaja derevnia*.... p.199.

<sup>115</sup>Compare to I.M. Volkov, "Kolkhozy SSSR v gody chetvertoi piatiletki (1946-1950 gg.)." *Razvitie sel'skogo khoziaistva SSSR v poslevoennye gody (1946-1970 gg.)*. Moskva: "Nauka", 1972, pp. 41-71, p.61.

<sup>116</sup>See VIII.3. The desperate efforts of chairman Anany Yegorovich Mysovsky to find assistance for the haying on the "New Life" kolkhoz illustrate the difficulties in trying to make people participate in kolkhoz work (See Abramov, *The New Life*). As a result of the labour scarcity in the countryside, the threat of sanctions remained mostly without effect;

In Udoml'ia raion in early 1949, twenty-six *khutory* (farmsteads separated from kolkhoz villages) were counted, some of which consisted of several households<sup>117</sup>. A total of 106 households existed in *khutory*, while more than 6,000 households lived on the more than two hundred kolkhozy in the raion<sup>118</sup>. It seems that the *khutor* households had not been involved in kolkhoz farming. Some of them had resettled in the kolkhoz villages, perhaps under pressure of the authorities. These households probably should be considered as distinct from those of the kolkhozniks who more or less had discontinued to work for their collective farms.

Therefore the proliferation of individual farming at the time in the Kalinin oblast' seems to have been very substantial. The existence of the *khutory* indicates that agriculture in the Kalinin oblast' was still not completely collectivized in 1949<sup>119</sup>.

A rather blatant example of the unpopularity of agricultural work can be seen in the behaviour of three Communists, two kolkhozniks and a tractor driver, who (without permission from their collective farm or Party cell) left their work on the kolkhoz or MTS and went to seek

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attitude on certain occasions. Therefore a balance was sought between doing as little as possible within the socialized sector and avoiding undue interest from the authorities.

<sup>117</sup>Pako, 147/4/1703, 1.24. The term *khutor* is rather vague here: it is not impossible that it here only means peasant' houses not located in the kolkhoz village. Its occupants could have still participated in kolkhoz labour, but some might have been *edinolichniki*. How many of the latter might have belonged to the few who had persisted in their resistance to be collectivized, and how many had been excluded from the kolkhoz at some point after collectivization is not clear.

<sup>118</sup>See Table 13. Between July 1946 and early 1949 the rural population and the number of kolkhozy was on the rise in general (see Table 14).

<sup>119</sup>That is, if *khutor* means a farmstead of a household engaged in individual farming, which is by no means certain. In 1940, 96.7% of all peasant households in the oblast' had been collectivized, according to the Brezhnevite version of the history of the oblast' Party organization (Ocherki, p.443).

employment in Rzhev in early 1948<sup>120</sup>. At the moment their activities were brought to the obkom's attention, they had been hired by the MVD and were working at the camp point No. 104 in Rzhev, although none of the three had the required papers.

In December 1947, when the ration-card system was abolished and a monetary reform implemented, some less scrupulous Party members used their foreknowledge of the upcoming changes to make a handsome profit for themselves<sup>121</sup>. The head of a rural soviet, together with the head of the village general store, the secretary of the Party organization, and two other Communists illegally bought ten crates of vodka in a shop with old money, and thus caused the state to loose 15,000 rubles in the transaction. According to the oblast' state prosecutor, this case was far from unique.

Just as in industry, in agriculture people engaged in lying about the fulfillment of production plans, as was noticed in September 1951<sup>122</sup>. Others concealed cattle from the state<sup>123</sup>.

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<sup>120</sup>Pako, 147/4/1132, 1.3.

<sup>121</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.40. According to Chapman: "The abolition of rationing was accompanied by the Currency Reform of December 1947, in which cash holdings were exchanged at the rate of ten old rubles for one new ruble and savings deposits and bonds were exchanged at more favorable rates. This served to reduce the inflationary pressure represented by large hoards of cash accumulated during the war, mainly by peasants. The cash that urban workers and employees couldn't spend in state shops mostly found its way to the collective farm market and hence to the peasants' mattresses" (Chapman, p.24). In the light of all the evidence of the lack of money among the peasants, both before and after December 1947, the "hoards of cash" were probably less than expected by the regime. One telling example of the sometimes unthwarted solidarity of the peasantry vis-à-vis the authorities is related by N.P. Golubev (II). His wife, Valentina Ivanovna, was responsible for the distribution of products for the ration cards in the village store of the Sorokinskii rural soviet in the village of Soroki in the rural raion of Vyshnii Volochek among those eligible. She was always very strictly checked for any irregularities. Once she had no bread left to distribute among a part of the people who possessed ration cards for it. The Golubevs feared that Valentina Ivanovna might be held responsible, but the villagers collected the amount of ration cards that corresponded to the amount of bread that she had distributed and handed them to her (testimony of N.P. Golubev (II) in the survey).

<sup>122</sup>Pako, 147/5/11, 1.65. For industry see VIII.1.



In 1950 the Party decided to amalgamate the kolkhozy to increase the efficiency of the collective farms<sup>124</sup>. Supposedly,

[the] unification of the small kolkhozy was conducted on the basis of strict voluntariness, through the organization of widespread explanatory labour among the kolkhozniks, and with the utmost support for the initiative by the kolkhozniks themselves. Leading party and soviet workers and agricultural specialists were sent into the countryside to carry out the organizational work for the amalgamation; they explained to the kolkhozniks everywhere the superiority of large collective farms over small ones, and aided with the unification of the kolkhozy<sup>125</sup>.

The scenario, described above by the first obkom secretary, strongly resembles that of collectivization. There was doubtlessly less resistance than in the 1929-1934 period, inasmuch as the kolkhozniks did not stand to lose from this transformation of agriculture in the same way<sup>126</sup>. The worst part of the process was the threat of having to

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<sup>123</sup>Pako, 147/5/11, 1.65.

<sup>124</sup>See Table 24.

<sup>125</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.4. See the table on the early results of the amalgamation; amalgamation began in the early months of 1950 (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., pp. 306/307). The Central Committee felt obliged to interfere in the process when it seemed to progress haphazardly and without preparation or organization. It issued a resolution on May 30, 1950, which gave guidelines for the process. This resolution of the Central Committee was called "*Ob ukruplenii melkikh kolkhozov i zaduchukh partiinykh organizatsii v etom dele*" (*Ocherki*, p.539). After this, amalgamation acquired massive proportions (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., pp. 306-309). The impact this consolidation was particularly profound in the oblasts of the Central Region, where before the kolkhozy had been quite small. It seems that the timing of amalgamation, in the middle of the agricultural year, was ill-chosen. In comparison with collectivization, amalgamation took place at a more inopportune moment in the year.

<sup>126</sup>The kolkhozy were until 1950 based on the villages that existed before collectivization (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., p. 303). Karasev notices that the amalgamation further increased the alienation from the land, because the land of the amalgamated kolkhoz no longer corresponded to that of the former *obshchina* village (Karasev, p.305). In his opinion, this was one of the most important causes for the increased abandonment of the village for the town. His opinion is corroborated by that of the kolkhoz bookkeeper N.F. Alekseev (testimony of N.F. Alekseev in the survey). L.S. Solov'eva-Ratataeva confirmed this point of view as well (testimony of L.S. Solov'eva-Ratataeva in the survey). Z.M. Vinogradova, who was before amalgamation the chair of a kolkhoz, after which she was relegated to lead a sector of an amalgamated kolkhoz, knew that a chair in the village of Bakhmar was arrested

abandon the ancestral village for a central kolkhoz centre<sup>127</sup>. After the criticism of Khrushchev's proposals for the creation of "agrotowns," this plan was shelved however<sup>128</sup>. The amalgamation received a hostile reception from the economically more prosperous kolkhozy, who saw no advantages in a unification with their weaker counterparts<sup>129</sup>. In the end, what was called "mass-political work" led to unanimous endorsements of the unification in most collective farms<sup>130</sup>.

Before the amalgamation of the kolkhozy, party organizations were preponderant, created according to territorial principle. They united the communists of one rural soviet. But in 1951 primary party organizations had been created in 73% of the oblast' kolkhozy.<sup>131</sup>

Although the presence of the Party on the farms became more conspicuous, the results did not improve after 1950<sup>132</sup>. On the contrary,

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in 1950 for opposing the merger of his kolkhoz with other kolkhozy. She did not know what happened to him (testimony of Z.M. Vinogradova in the survey).

<sup>127</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.18.

<sup>128</sup>Anokhina and Shmeleva indicated that, even after two rounds of amalgamation, the enlarged kolkhozy still consisted of a conglomerate of small villages in the early 1960s (Anokhina, Shmeleva, p. 80).

<sup>129</sup>Pako, 147/4/2055, 1.28, *Sovetskaya derevnia*..., p.309. N.F. Alekseev said: "This [amalgamation] destroyed a strongly cohesive economic unit, in which people lived close to each other and knew each other well and therefore worked better. During the amalgamation matters got so far, that village rose against village --the village of Soroki against that of Bor'kovo" (testimony of N.F. Alekseev in the survey).

<sup>130</sup>Pako, 147/4/2055, 1.28. See Table 24 and 25 as well. How much force, or the threat of it, played a role here remains hard to assess, but the resilience of the peasantry to preserve their old kolkhoz was probably much less than the resistance against the abandonment of private farms in the collectivization period. Obviously, the kolkhozy of the 1940s meant much less to the peasants than the privately owned farm of the 1920s. One is hard-pressed to find any sign of real resistance against the amalgamation in the records. The absence of resistance, meanwhile, was an outcome as well of the constant bullying and oppression of the peasantry by the Communists since 1929.

<sup>131</sup>Korytkov, *Kalininskoe selo*..., p.45.

<sup>132</sup>Fainsod indicates the increase of direct Party control over the kolkhozy (Fainsod, *How*..., p.235); he seems to have been right to stress the importance of this aspect for the conduct of the amalgamation (see Pako, 147/4/2055, 1.38). The average size of the collective farms increased from 35 hearths and 49 able-bodied workers to 130 hearths with 190 farm hands. The amount of land per kolkhoz swelled from 213 to 818 hectares on average (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.49). Although this was a significant increase in the size of the collective

many of the enlarged kolkhozy and their chairs were in a state of confusion after the amalgamation. In theory, perhaps, the consolidation "was a highly effective measure"; in practice it was not, at least, not in the Kalinin oblast'<sup>133</sup>. Initially the productive output decreased in many of the unified kolkhozy. Many local authorities, kolkhoz chairs, and kolkhozniks were confused about the standardization of private plots that was concomitant with the amalgamation, others about the resettlement of the kolkhoz livestock of several former kolkhoz villages in one or two kolkhoz centres, which led to large congestion of cattle in sheltered places in these centres and the cattle's resultant death<sup>134</sup>. On the bright side, some of the newly appointed kolkhoz chairs were agricultural specialists, who had previously worked in the raion centres or in the towns<sup>135</sup>.

Belov, chairman of the successful kolkhoz "Krasnyi Putilovets" of the Kashin raion, explained in September 1952 that it was impossible for the secretary of the Party organization of an amalgamated kolkhoz to ensure adequate political education<sup>136</sup>. In the first place, his kolkhoz

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farms in the Kalinin oblast', they remained smaller than in the Soviet Union as a whole, in which in 1949 the average kolkhoz had 80 households and after amalgamation 165 (*Sovetskaia derevnia*..., p.112). In addition, the average kolkhoz household (around 3.0 persons in 1947-1952) in the Kalinin oblast' was smaller than in the USSR in general (3.5 in 1950) (*Sovetskaia derevnia*..., p.112 and Table 14). Another reason for the amalgamation was probably the desire to cut costs by having less administrative-executive personnel on the payrolls of the collective farms. In Udoml'ia raion the administrative staff of the kolkhozy fell from 1,093 in early 1950 to 702 in the second half of 1950 (Pako, 147/4/2055, l.26). This translated into a decrease of *trudodni* paid to the staff in the kolkhozy of the raion, from 24,500 to 17,600. Thus in theory, it seemed that a very cheap way had been found to free more *trudodni* for the pay of the kolkhozniks, who as a result would be incited to work harder.

<sup>133</sup>Samsonov, *A Short History*, p.257. *Sovetskaia derevnia*..., p.141 and pp.311-313, too, seems to imply that the amalgamation was an improvement, but only on the longer term.

<sup>134</sup>Pako, 147/5/104, ll.12-15, 14, 16-18, 27, 29.

<sup>135</sup>*Sovetskaia derevnia*..., p.141.

<sup>136</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, l.224.

now consisted of 180 households distributed over seven villages. Secondly, in Belov's own kolkhoz, the secretary was mainly occupied with agricultural work, and had to take care of her old mother and her two children as well. Therefore the political work was not well organized. Belov urged upon the delegates of the ninth Party conference to release the Party secretaries on the kolkhozy from kolkhoz labour and have them concentrate solely on political work. Confusion also ruled for a while in the Party's raion organizations that, in the eyes of the obkom, chose incompetent and sometimes even earlier penalized candidates to become kolkhoz chairs in 1950<sup>137</sup>. A high frequency of replacement of failing kolkhoz directors ensued, but the agricultural results in 1950, 1951, and 1952 were worse than in 1949<sup>138</sup>. In September 1951, several chairs fell victim to a campaign against the squandering of cattle, for which they were harshly reprimanded<sup>139</sup>. At the same time, others were reported to have neglected their kolkhoz livestock because of enthusiastic participation in a religious holiday<sup>140</sup>.

How little impressed the kolkhozniks were with the threat of sanctions, and how difficult it was to coerce them into cooperating with the authorities, can be derived from the following description of the situation in one particular kolkhoz in 1951. The collective farm was visited as part of a tour of the countryside by a vice-chair of the

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<sup>137</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 11.8-10.

<sup>138</sup>In a report to Malenkov, Konovalov already complained in January 1951 about the too frequent replacement of chairs in certain areas (Pako, 147/5/36, 1.10). After Konovalov's ouster, his successor Kiselev still reported in October 1951 to Malenkov that drunkenness, theft, and squandering of public (kolkhoz or state) property continued, notwithstanding the fact that more than 70% of the chairs were Communists (Pako, 147/5/35, 11.118-124).

<sup>139</sup>See below in this chapter.

<sup>140</sup>Pako, 147/5/11, 1.46.

oblispolkom and a Central Committee representative. The former reported:

What especially appalled me was the fact that work began one and a half hours after the obligatory time, and, moreover, that it was not the milkmaids who appeared and who had been officially assigned to the cows, but two old women who replaced their granddaughters; they had enjoyed themselves at a party the night before and slept in.

Furthermore, what startled us at this livestock farm was the fact that the cattle stood in a place, where the filth was so bad that, one could say without exaggeration, when the cows lay down, only their horns and heads were visible, since all the rest was submerged in the dirt.<sup>141</sup>

The superior efficiency of the organization of Soviet society, because of its guidance by the planned economy and the "science" of Marxism-Leninism, is hard to maintain today after the "collapse" of Communism in Russia and the USSR with it. However, Stalinism has not lost its appeal for everyone. The nostalgia today for Stalin's times among certain groups and individuals might seem strange, when, for example, in 1951 the first secretary of the gorkom of Vyshnii Volochek, the second town of the oblast', complained about the regular formation of bread queues in front of shops<sup>142</sup>. Apart from that, he felt obliged to mention the absence of *kul'ttovary* ('cultural supplies', being office equipment, musical instruments, and so on, used for cultural or educational activities) and motorbikes. All were in strong demand in his town. In his opinion the internal retail trade system in the oblast' should dramatically improve. Is it not evident that the problem of distribution within a planned economy, which was as large as that of

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<sup>141</sup>Pako, 147/5/11, 1.52.

<sup>142</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.67.

the Soviet Union, plagued the USSR during the whole period of its existence, and not only in the times of Brezhnev or Gorbachev?

As an example of the disorganization and generally discontented mood among the rural population, a detailed account of the collapse of a kolkhoz in Novokarel' raion during and after the war is added as an appendix<sup>143</sup>. The account was written by an MGB employee, who described the operation of the kolkhoz as part of a report on the general state of agriculture in this raion, often singled out for its flagging agricultural performance<sup>144</sup>. The "Traktor" kolkhoz was one of at least fifteen "backward" collective farms in 1946 in the raion. In a way the poor operation of the "Traktor" kolkhoz should not come as a surprise: the same report notes that the chair of the rural soviet, under whose supervision "Traktor" fell, engaged in a drinking bout for several consecutive days in October 1946 on a neighbouring kolkhoz<sup>145</sup>. During his stay, he persuaded a female kolkhoz worker to dally with him in the kolkhoz barn. However, the two were rudely interrupted by a group of teenagers who had discovered them. They whipped his bare behind with twigs. Although the incident may be comical to us, it must have been extremely unsettling to the MGB and Party to find a soviet chairman thus misbehaving, particularly because he gave a very negative example to the village youth<sup>146</sup>.

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<sup>143</sup>See Appendix IV.

<sup>144</sup>The full report can be found in Pako, 147/4/519, II.12-32.

<sup>145</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, 1.26.

<sup>146</sup>After all, if this was not the case, why report the incident? It also is one of the few occasions when the subject of sex is mentioned in the archives. Part of the embarrassment of the authorities was perhaps a result of the prudishness about sex that seemed to be the norm at the time, at least among Party members. Alexandra Kollontai's activities, during and directly after the 1917 revolution, must have seemed revolting to them. Alena Heitlinger has tried to put the sexual mores of Stalinist society into perspective with the help of the work of Wilhelm Reich (Alena Heitlinger, Women and State Socialism: Sex Inequality in the

Another instance of the rural folk's unwillingness to cooperate with the authorities was the partial failure of the migration of inhabitants of the eastern raions to the depopulated western raions. In all, in 1948 and 1949, 1,016 households (4,147 people) were transferred to the west of the oblast<sup>147</sup>. However, five raions sent less than 10% of their quota of households westward<sup>148</sup>. Soon people began to return east, because in raions such as Rzhev, Vysoko, and Molodoi 'Tud, the new settlers were placed in unfinished houses or even --in Rzhev-- in apartments.

One disgruntled urban observer, the Party secretary of the railroad-car works, remarked in July 1951 on the kolkhozniks' deliberate undermining of collectivized agriculture<sup>149</sup>. Baranov claimed that, while the townspeople went in one direction in order to aid the kolkhozniks with harvesting, the kolkhozniks went the opposite direction. They carried baskets and bags full with goods to the kolkhoz market of Kalinin. Baranov's remarks are a typical example of the Party's ongoing suspicion of the peasantry.

At this meeting of July 1951, the oblast' prosecutor, Gerasimenko, expressed a similar wariness about the peasantry's character<sup>150</sup>. He was inclined to look for criminal causes of society's

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Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1979, pp.21-23). She points out that any reference to sex disappeared in the 1930s from fiction, cinema, theatre, and education. This silence about sex is indeed reflected in the almost complete absence of any reference to the subject in the 'Tver' archives. N.A. Zabelin, eighty-nine years old, remembered in the summer of 1992 how in the early years after the 1917 revolution the students discussed the subject of sex at the institute where he studied. Finally, today, seventy years later, Zabelin noticed erotica and sex being once more publicly discussed in Russia (testimony of N.A. Zabelin in the survey).

<sup>147</sup>Pako, 147/4/1560, 1.31.

<sup>148</sup>Kashin, Lesnoe, Molokovo, Sandovo, and Bezhetsk raions.

<sup>149</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.81.

<sup>150</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.167.

difficulties as a consequence of his profession. It appears that he thought the kolkhozniks to have criminal inclinations that were above average:

We have in many kolkhozy in a number of raions of the oblast' the most crude violations of the Statute of agricultural artels; particularly widespread are the following violations of the agricultural artel' Statute: the embezzlement of money in the kolkhozy, the removal and squandering of kolkhoz property, the seizure of kolkhoz lands, the wrong expenditure of *trudodni*, the violation of the democratic principle in the management of the kolkhozy, the large indebtedness of the kolkhozy, the criminal treatment of draught animals and of the labour force in the kolkhozy, and the failure to fulfill the minimum of *trudodni* by the kolkhozniks. For these violations in 1950, criminal proceedings against 1,694 kolkhozniks were instituted, and in the first half-year of this year against another 414, in all against 2,008 people.<sup>151</sup>

Apparently 160 chairpersons of the collective farms in those eighteen months had fallen under criminal investigation<sup>152</sup>.

The exodus from the countryside, that will be described in VII.3, was another sign of the population's efforts to avoid the crushing load with which the state had burdened them. In October 1953, one obkom member observed that every kolkhoznik tried to evade taxation of the private plot by sending away all able-bodied members of his family to work on the side<sup>153</sup>. Some went as far as to send away their seventeen-year-old daughters to work as nannies.

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<sup>151</sup>Ibid.

<sup>152</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.167. On a later occasion in the same year, Gerasimenko stated that 2.4% (380) of kolkhoz chairs --his calculations are somewhat flawed as he seems to have used the total of pre-amalgamation kolkhozy (about 7500) to establish this percentage-- had been convicted of wrongdoings by the courts, and 3.3% (200 of the total of roughly 2,000) in the first eight or nine months of 1951 (Pako, 147/5/11, 1.151).

<sup>153</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.128.



It all depends on one's perspective. When one takes into account that the peasantry nearly starved to death, one cannot but understand these "anti-Soviet" attitudes<sup>154</sup>. The Communists' horribly perverse morality --something is only good if it is for the good of the Party -- is exemplified by the condemnation of the "criminal attitude" of the peasantry by the likes of Baranov or Gerasimenko.

In the survey, the respondents often grumbled about the additional burden of the obligatory state loans. The loans amounted to an extra taxation for the population, which led to a further reduction of income. As a result, particularly in the countryside, the population remained precariously close to subsistence levels. M.V. Kornetova, a rural soviet secretary, had to agitate for the subscription to these loans as part of her work<sup>155</sup>. She noted that widows with children gave their last for the resurrection of the country, be it out of fear, be it out of conviction. N.V. Kurganova said that she was not impressed by the demeanour of employees of the security organs, when she encountered them at the subscription to the loans:

I didn't like them: fat mugs, holding onto their pistols; we were probably frightened. We subscribed, granted, although not out of fear, but because it was necessary.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>154</sup>See VIII.3 as well.

<sup>155</sup>Testimony of M.V. Kornetova in the survey.

<sup>156</sup>Testimony of N.V. Kurganova in the survey. Her testimony is corroborated by V.G. Gavrilov, who remembered that, at the end of the war, a raikom worker and a NKVD plenipotentiary appeared in their village (both Kurganova and Gavrilov lived in Kotlovan in Udoml'ia raion) to make people subscribe to the state loan. They kept all the locals an entire night in an office, while playing with their pistols. They searched the houses and made an inventory of the possessions of those who refused to subscribe, and threatened them (testimony of V.G. Gavrilov in the survey).

The Party had given Russian Orthodoxy and other religious cults some leeway during the war<sup>157</sup>. In 1944, twelve Orthodox churches had been allowed to open in the oblast', in 1945 sixteen, in 1946 seven, and in 1947 four<sup>158</sup>. However, 175 petitions for permission to open a church had been rejected in those four years. A few years after the war, probably at the time when the ideological offensive of the *Zhdanovshchina* was warming up in late 1946 and in 1947, the authorities' tolerance for religion sharply declined. In only year, 1947, ninety-four requests were made to inaugurate a church, and in the first three months of 1948 an additional thirty-eight<sup>159</sup>. Only four groups of petitioners were granted permission in 1947, which was the last year that new churches arose in the Kalinin oblast' during Stalin's lifetime.

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<sup>157</sup>The earlier crude methods of the effort to stamp out religion might have had, at least temporarily, some success. The destruction of the churches, as the milkmaid N.V. Kurganova and the tractor operator and kolkhoznitsa M.A. Sysoeva remarked, made it difficult to preserve one's beliefs (testimony of N.V. Kurganova and M.A. Sysoeva in the survey). After all, in trying to remain a believer, one had to rely on one's own devices and imagination, based on memory or the authority of an older relative, without a priest's guidance and the communal participation in religious rites in a church, Bibles or icons. It is quite possible that many of those who "lost" their religion were facilitated in doing so, because of the absence of any physical manifestation of the church (the testimony of K.R. Fedorova in the survey seemed to be a case in point). M.S. Kul'menina describes her renunciation of Orthodox religion as follows: "My parents were religious; in their life religion had a very significant meaning. Even when the churches were destroyed and faith was not encouraged (at work, socially) they still observed fasting and prayed and read religious books. I am only today returning to religion, for school and the Komsomol not only tore me away from God, but also because unpleasant things threatened [if one was religious within the school or Komsomol]. We received regularly in the Komsomol committee information from the raikom about people who baptized, who married in the church, and we had to penalize them to the extent of excluding them from the Komsomol" (testimony of M.S. Kul'menina in the survey). N.N. Panova was baptized, but somehow lost her religion, when she moved from the countryside to Kalinin (testimony of N.N. Panova in the survey). M.V. Bakhtina was so strongly influenced by the very strict piety of her mother that she never lost her faith (testimony of M.V. Bakhtina).

<sup>158</sup>Pako, 147/4/1125, ll.126-128ob.

<sup>159</sup>Pako, 147/4/1125, l.127ob.

In 1947, ninety-seven churches were still active in the oblast', but their number had declined to seventy-two by 1951<sup>160</sup>.

Concomitantly, the petitions for the opening of new churches had dwindled from ninety-four or ninety-five in 1947 to twenty-five in 1950 and eleven in the first half of 1951. The popularity of the Orthodox religion did not necessarily recede with the drop in the churches' number or the ebbing of petitions. In 1947, hundreds of signatures could be found on many petitions for the permission to start a church. All other indicators point at a continued allegiance to the Church among a substantial part of the population. More likely, most believers understood that further petitioning was useless --and perhaps dangerous-- after 1947, and resigned themselves to some sarrogate for church services. The Party did not like it, but the believers' resilience was tenacious.

Sometimes sects flourished, as in the case of the Baptists-Evangelists, who had hardly been present in Kalinin before the war<sup>161</sup>.

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<sup>160</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.107. Before 1944, officially fifty-eight churches functioned in the oblast' (Pako, 147/4/1125, 11.126-128ob.). The largest density of churches was in Kashin raion, where ten churches operated in 1947, followed by the Ovinishche and Kimry raions with six each in 1947, Udoml'ia and Molokovo raions with five each, and Novotorzhok, Maksatikha, Kesova Gora, Kaliazin, Zavidovo, Bologoe, and Brusovo raions with four each. Therefore, churches were predominantly found east of the October railroad, in the area that had not been occupied by the Germans and was --even traditionally-- more densely populated. Of the 175 requests refused from 1944 to 1947, thirteen were from Novotorzhok raion, ten from Sandovo raion, eight from Maksatikha, seven from Bezhetsk and Novokarel', six from Molokovo, Kirovo, and Firovo raions and five from Rameshki raion. Since four petitions each originated in Vysoko and Esenovichi raions and six in Kirovo raion, it appears that the German presence did not terribly influence the devoutness of the population.

<sup>161</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.259. The MGB chief, Dekushenko, thought that the Baptists were an entirely new phenomenon, but they were present in 1929, albeit in small numbers (*Tverskoi tseentr...*, p. 11). Dekushenko hoped that this sect would be prohibited, and that their building could be taken away from them. The plenipotentiary for religious affairs of the oblispolkom, Deguzov, had been too lenient in the eyes of the MGB head. He had even allowed a mass christening in the river T'mak in Kalinin, in which Baptists from other oblasts had joined in as well. In January 1950, mass baptisms of youth were reported in

In the 1950s the "True Orthodox Church" appeared in the Kalinin oblast'<sup>162</sup>. At a certain point, around 1952, this religious organization was active in eight raions, had followers in forty-seven settlements, and operated eleven illegal churches. Dekushenko, the head of the MGB, described the scene in 1952:

Even the leaders of this organization themselves said that large-scale anti-soviet work went on behind its religious cover. At secret meetings, the participants called on all kind of resistance to the measures of Soviet power, such as declining to work in the kolkhozy or only working to keep up the private plot, not subscribing to state loans, not paying taxes, crossing out the ballots the candidates of the bloc of communists and partyless at the time of elections for the soviets, and spreading diverse slander against the leaders of our party and the Soviet state.<sup>163</sup>

Presumably, the organization had been exposed before September 1952, and, at that time, had been at least temporarily defeated<sup>164</sup>.

In the 1950s, the Kalinin Party organization seems to have been particularly rattled by the fact that the observance of religious holidays in the countryside was detrimental to the economic results:

It has been established that, in the raions of the Kalinin oblast', a majority of the kolkhoz peasantry celebrates several religious holidays in the course of the year. The celebration of religious holidays is accompanied by the mass scale absence of kolkhozniks from their labour in the course of two to three days. Because of the religious holidays, every kolkhoz by the most sober calculation loses three to three and a half thousand man-days on average. Many holidays take place at the height of the

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Ves'egonsk raion, and a group of sixty Baptists had acquired influence in Ostashkov (Pako, 147/4/1934, 1.13).

<sup>162</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.261 and 1.331.

<sup>163</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.261.

<sup>164</sup>For the tenacity of this organization (and of the True Orthodox Christians, a similar group) see, for example, W.C. Fletcher, The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917-1970. London, N.Y.: Oxford UP, 1971, pp.180-229.

agricultural labour season; because of this they incur a huge material loss to agriculture, lower the pace of work, and lead to a significant loss of the harvest. The celebration of the holidays by the kolkhozniks cannot be considered a result of their religiosity, inasmuch as lately the influence of the church and the clergymen has markedly decreased.<sup>165</sup>

This observation came in July 1951 from a very authoritative source: the head of the agitation and propaganda department of the obkom. He did not gain very much from stating these facts, for part of the responsibility for the persistent popularity of holidays could be laid on the doorstep of his own department. Therefore it seems safe to believe his words, and one suspects that the situation was even more damning. Indeed, in 1952, a kolkhoz chairman in Zavidovo raion warned the directors of the industrial enterprises of the district at a raion Party conference to stop attending the celebration of religious holidays in the kolkhozy, for this disrupted farming even more<sup>166</sup>. Thus the observance of these holidays was not a custom surviving only among rural folk, but was still popular even among people employed in industry around this time. Even the presumed watchdog of political vigilance in the countryside, the vice-director of the MTS for political affairs, indulged in the celebration of these holidays in 1952<sup>167</sup>. Inhabitants of Kalinin itself made forays into the countryside to

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<sup>165</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.106. More than a year later a similar complaint was expressed by Kiselev and a rather appalled metal worker, Ivanov, in front of the ninth oblast' Party conference (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.139 and 1.220). Ivanov spent a few days in August 1952 in the countryside near Kalinin (in Mednoe raion) and witnessed the celebration of the Feast of the Assumption of the Virgin: flax and wheat were burning in the sun, while the villagers distilled *sumogon*, which started two days before the actual celebration, and then fêted for four consecutive days. In the survey, professional Party worker Afanas'ev remembered with relish the great parties on religious holidays (testimony of A.M. Afanas'ev in the survey).

<sup>166</sup>Pako, 147/5/183, 11.235/236. The factory managers apparently drove by car into the countryside; at the conference, the kolkhoz director threatened to file a complaint with the Central Committee.

<sup>167</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.158; as was the case in Emel'ianovo raion in 1952.

participate in these feasts<sup>168</sup>. In 1952 and 1953, young workers of the "Vagzhanov" factory of Kalinin visited their ancestral village to celebrate religious holidays under the pretense --and with the help of a telegram to make matters look genuine-- of having to bury some relative or to care for a sick family member<sup>169</sup>.

Usually, the solution was sought in stepping up atheist propaganda by the authorities<sup>170</sup>. Part of their concern about religious holidays was the accompanying high incidence of crime. This will be described below in the section on crime<sup>171</sup>. The widespread celebration of traditional holidays cannot be seen automatically as a sign of rampant faith<sup>172</sup>. Some people took a very practical view of these matters. T.A. Novikova married in 1936 and was blessed with six children<sup>173</sup>. She considered herself to be devout and baptised her first children, but when her husband became a Party member, she declined to baptise her last two children because this was not allowed of Party members. As a Komsomol and subsequently as a Party member, Z.M. Vinogradova was not permitted to believe in God<sup>174</sup>. However, she feared sometimes that God might exist and that he would punish her for her sins. Thus she did not attend church, but now and then she prayed

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<sup>168</sup>Pako, 147/5/183, II.235/236.

<sup>169</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, I.158.

<sup>170</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, I.107. Never seems the realization to have dawned upon anyone that some of the greatest minds in human history had struggled to prove or disprove the existence of a supreme being, without ever coming to a satisfactory conclusion, and that it was thus a little more complicated than stubbornly describing the evolution to prevent a person from believing in the presence of such a being.

<sup>171</sup>See VI.3.

<sup>172</sup>V.P. Krylov and his wife partook in the celebration of religious holidays, but neither he or his wife thought about God. At Easter, he never went to work at the brick factory in which he was employed between 1947 and 1951 (testimony of V.P. Krylov in the survey).

<sup>173</sup>Testimony of T.A. Novikova in the survey.

<sup>174</sup>Testimony of Z.M. Vinogradova in the survey.

furtively at home for the safety of her husband, who was killed at the front during the war, and for the health of her only child. L.V. Egorova was all her life a scutcher at a flax factory<sup>175</sup>. She never believed in God for, in her opinion, if he had existed, he would not have allowed such injustice.

Although in the Kalinin oblast' the main support for the Communist Party came from urban dwellers, who made up the largest share of the Party membership, even in the towns the enthusiasm for the regime was often less than desired by the authorities. In September 1952, a head of a factory workshop in Kashin tried to analyse the persistent presence of "capitalist survivals":

It is well known among many of the comrade delegates here present that the town of Kashin in the past was a town of merchants, a town of churches, of priests, of speculators, of whoever you want, and the remnants of capitalism in the minds of the people manifest themselves here more clearly. The struggle with these relics demands a huge effort of strength from all the party organizations of our raion. The struggle with the survivals of capitalism would be made significantly easier through the development of industry in the town of Kashin, but until now industry has developed very poorly in Kashin. The present enterprises in the town cannot absorb the quantity of work hands and rather large numbers of this labour force are not involved in socially useful work and often lead a parasitical way of life.<sup>176</sup>

The discovery of actual "enemies" of the Soviet state was rare after the war<sup>177</sup>. It seems to be true that far fewer arrests for

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<sup>175</sup>Testimony of L.V. Egorova in the survey.

<sup>176</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, II.38/39.

<sup>177</sup>As Conquest notes: "In the years which remained of Stalin's rule after the Purges, the all-out mass terror was no longer necessary" (Conquest, The Great Terror, p.447). V.P. Pimenova knew of one blacksmith who, in 1950, shouted something anti-Communist when he was drunk in Udoml'ia. He disappeared and was never seen again. However, it was no

political reasons happened after the war than before it<sup>178</sup>. After May 1945, the authorities could ill afford another depletion of the already paltry labour force in the Kalinin oblast'. Reactions probably became quite lax in this respect, which led to an admonition from the head of the MGB at the eighth Party conference in March 1951<sup>179</sup>. He warned his audience of flippant people in Kalinin and the rest of the oblast', for their talk could reach the ears of such people as American or British military attachés. The oblast' was not off-limits to foreigners, after all. These people spoke fine Russian, and could obtain from foreign-printed itineraries and the like exact information of tram stops for the factories in town. These itineraries were very accurate, according to the speaker, because the Germans had temporarily occupied the town. Indeed, the security organs had not long before arrested a "re-emigrant", who had returned to the USSR in 1947. This man got involved with a woman who had been convicted and had served time as a prisoner. Although the MGB chief tried to prove that an intricate

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comparison with the 1930s, when many were arrested, particularly in the de-kulakization period (testimony of V.P. Pimenova in the survey). N.A. Kotov's opinion was similar to that of Pimenova (testimony of N.A. Kotov in the survey). Their statements were corroborated by those of A.M. Afanas'ev, who, too, knew of only one case: a schoolteacher who had been arrested for accidentally breaking of the glass in front of a portrait of Stalin. The teacher received a sentence of approximately three years for her unintentional offense. Before the war, arrests were much more common in Afanas'ev's opinion (testimony of A.M. Afanas'ev in the survey). D.A. Dukinin noticed that "...almost all men died in the war, and the women were apolitical" (testimony of D.A. Dukinin in the survey). The father of L.S. Solov'eva-Ratataeva, S.I. Solov'ev, a Party member, was arrested in 1950 and detained for twenty-four hours, but then released (testimony of L.S. Solov'eva-Ratataeva in the survey). N.A. Akhov knew of an arrest in Konakovo of the female worker Kozura, who worked probably in the porcelain factory in the town (testimony of N.A. Akhov in the survey). The evidence for the Kalinin oblast' confirms on the whole Fainsod's impression of selective, as opposed to mass scale, arrests after the war: it kept the population in a sufficient state of fright for misbehaving and falling into the hands of the security organs (Fainsod, *How...*, p.378).

<sup>178</sup>G.V. Lubov observed that before the war in Konakovo arrests took place, but after his return from the army in 1948 at his factory no worker was arrested (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey).

<sup>179</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, ll.142-146.



espionage scheme was involved, one gets the impression that the man was merely disappointed with life in the Soviet Union, wanting to leave and take the woman with him. She did not want "to betray" the Motherland, however, and killed herself because the man, according to her alleged suicide letter, was an enemy of the Soviet state.

Did the concern expressed by the MGB head help increase "vigilance"? It did not cause a recurrence of the spy mania that had been part of the Great Purge. Once again, for purely economic reasons, the Kalinin oblast' could not sustain another wave of massive arrests after the war, which leads to the conclusion that the observation of many survey respondents about the absence of large-scale arrests must have been close to the truth.

Some people had apparently been so traumatized by the events of 1937 and 1938 that they lost all perspective. The director of school No.6 --which had a ten-year curriculum-- in Kalinin broke down in front of one of the ninth-grade classes in 1947<sup>180</sup>. In the classroom, he accused the unruly and often absent pupils of counterrevolution, that they deserved to be shot. After all, in the director's opinion, workers were shot when they were absent without permission from their jobs in the factories. To this he added that the security organs needed to take care of matters among the ninth graders.

Within the Party ranks, sporadically someone was uncovered who had hidden his or her prohibitive kulak, bourgeois, or clerical ancestry<sup>181</sup>. A former third secretary of the raikom of Sonkovo, V.A.

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<sup>180</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, II.113/114.

<sup>181</sup>Pako, 147/5/214a, I.30. An example is the case of the oblast' Party school student A.I. Skibin, formerly head of the raiispolkom of the Kalinin raion, who concealed from the Party

Rachkov, who at the time worked for the inspection of the Ministry of Procurements of the same raion, was checked in 1947 by the MGB<sup>182</sup>. It appeared that his brother was sentenced to execution in early 1938 by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court on the basis of the infamous Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code<sup>183</sup>. Ostensibly, this caused Rachkov to lose his position as raikom secretary in 1937. He was relegated to head the raion milk-procurement organization from 1937-1942. How far this brother affected Rachkov's losing his job again in 1947, or even being arrested, is unclear from the record.

Some army deserters were arrested, as well as a few outright Nazi collaborators, and, occasionally, sanctions were taken against someone who had spoken out against certain sacred cows of the regime<sup>184</sup>. One biology teacher, Tret'iakov, was thrown out of the Party and was dispossessed of his work at the Pedagogical Institute of Kalinin in 1952 for accusing I.P. Pavlov of having been unprincipled, and a Bukharinite to boot<sup>185</sup>. Tret'iakov called Pavlov's theories of minor importance. He was also reported to have completely ignored the significance of Michurinite biology in his course on zoology. On another occasion, two teenagers damaged with some kind of a slingshot --

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the de-kulakization of his parents in the Kursk area in 1930, after which his family had been banished to the North (Pako, 147/4/519, 1.271).

<sup>182</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, 11.9/10.

<sup>183</sup>The execution sentence is in the record abbreviated to *V/MN* which stands for *Vyshnii Mera Nakazaniia* i.e. capital punishment (Pako, 147/4/519, 1.9).

<sup>184</sup>See IV.2 for the Nazi collaborators. According to the oblast' MVD head, Grebchenko, in 1953, one Akhmetov, born on the Crimean peninsula, and an active collaborator with German occupiers, was discovered at the railroad-car factory (Pako, 147/5/662, 1.78). He had supposedly been recruited in Germany in June 1945 by the Americans, and had been sent into the Soviet Union to commit subversive acts.

<sup>185</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.135.

apparently deliberately-- a portrait of Stalin hanging in the building of their industrial school<sup>186</sup>.

Sometimes the obkom fretted about the activities of ex-convicts. In 1950, the engineer Kruzhkov, formerly convicted for political crimes, had been made a consultant for a study group on foreign policy<sup>187</sup>. This was deemed an erroneous move. Another ex-convict definitely was --perhaps he had only become so during his extensive period in labour camps-- an enemy of the Soviet state. V.E. Komissarov had worked from 1942 through 1946 as the chair of the rural soviet of Tolmachi<sup>188</sup>. Although he had been twice sentenced to labour camps in 1931 and in 1933, and had received another additional term in 1935, he surprisingly managed to be appointed to the position of chair of a rural soviet, i.e. head of the local administration for several villages. Notwithstanding, or more precisely due to, the eight years he had been serving in the camp system, he repeatedly advised kolkhozniks to leave the collective farms, and undermined the labour discipline on the kolkhozy with his opinions about the Soviet state and collective farming.

A somewhat similar case was presented by the head of the MVD, Grebchenko, in 1953<sup>189</sup>. This case had religious overtones. A former émigré, one Svetozarov, once an active opponent of the Soviet regime abroad, returned in 1947 to Russia, after having matriculated from a theological institute in Paris. He was appointed Archimandrite and worked near Ostashkov for a while, where he and another priest

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<sup>186</sup>Pako, 147/5/341, 1.66: one of them was even a Komsomol member.

<sup>187</sup>Pako, 147/5/214a, 1.30.

<sup>188</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, 1.27.

<sup>189</sup>Pako, 147/5/662, 1.78.

allegedly set up an anti-Soviet organization of Orthodox priests. They were accused of using religious sentiments to spread a defeatist attitude about the unavoidable outbreak of a war between the USSR and the USA, and the demise of the Soviet Union as a consequence. The priests had maintained contacts with similar clerical groups in Rostov, Kislovodsk, Noginsk, and Velikie Luki, according to the MVD representative. Both were sentenced to be executed; the sentences were commuted into twenty-five years of imprisonment<sup>190</sup>.

In 1950, the political allegiance of the labour force at one of Kalinin's electrostations was considered doubtful, since perhaps half of the employees had lived on German-occupied territory, and probably a few had actively collaborated<sup>191</sup>.

From a "case" forged against the leadership of perhaps the oblast's most important factory, the railroad-car works, the impression is created that political vigilance was at a very low ebb even in 1949. The *Zhdanovshchina* and succeeding ideological offensives had already led in to an atmosphere resembling the Great Purge other places in the Soviet Union<sup>192</sup>. The audacity of this factory's leadership seems to indicate that some people, at least, had come to the conclusion that the purges of the 1930s were nothing but a bad dream.

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<sup>190</sup>The gravity of the sentence is rather astonishing because they were apparently convicted after Stalin's death.

<sup>191</sup>Pako, 147/5/214a, 1.30.

<sup>192</sup>E.g. Heller, Nekrich, pp.487-492 and pp.498/499. One of the survey respondents mentioned other arrests that took place in 1949. M.S. Kul'menina worked in the trade union committee of the oblast' direction of trade. The heads of the cadre departments of her direction and of the oblast' organization of consumers' cooperations (*oblpotrebsoiuz*) were apparently arrested almost simultaneously, and no one knew what happened to them or for what reason they had been arrested (testimony of M.S. Kul'menina). Perhaps these arrests and those at the railroad car factory indicate indeed a tightening of the reins in general (see below).

From the records, it appears that the direction and the Party organization of the factory had deemed it safe to hire quite a few political ex-convicts --predominantly according to the paragraphs of the infamous Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR-- for responsible positions<sup>193</sup>. Conceivably, the case came to light when an investigation was conducted within the Party organization of the works which attempted to establish the reason for the exceptionally high rate of Party exclusions of the factory's workers and employees by the gorkom of Kalinin<sup>194</sup>. According to a Party investigation, the factory's Party committee appeared to be little involved in the supervision of the factory's Party membership. It had failed to properly investigate people who had been recommended for promotion within the factory. The head of the labour and wages department of the factory, one Redel'man, had thus been promoted to his position, for which he apparently was not qualified on the basis of his conviction as an English spy in the past<sup>195</sup>. Egorov, a deputy head of the car-assembly workshop, and Veinert, an engineer, had been erroneously trusted with important positions within

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<sup>193</sup>Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.7. It was rather frustrating for the present author to discover that the speech of the MGB chief at the seventh Party conference of 1949 was not entered in the type-written version of the *stenogramma* of this meeting (see the two copies of this *stenogramma* Pako, 147/4/1495 and 147/4/1496, 1.74). According to V.A. Feoktistov, the current director of the archival centre in Tver', in which today the archive of the former Communist Party is kept, the MGB had at times the authority to forbid the Party to have speeches of its representatives entered in the records. From a later speech at the conference in 1949, by the raion secretary of Likhoslavl' raion, Leonov, it became clear that one Levina had been dismissed at the railroad-car works, because she had been exiled from Moscow by a decision of a special troika (*osobais troika*) in 1937 (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.99). Levina's name had apparently been mentioned by MGB head Kovalev in his speech, to which Leonov referred. After her dismissal, according to Leonov, one Sergeev, of the oblast' direction of agriculture, had recommended Levina as agronomist to the head of a MTS in Likhoslavl' raion, although Levina had no agricultural education whatsoever. The situation at the railroad car factory had therefore apparently been part of Kovalev's speech.

<sup>194</sup>Pako, 147/4/1817, 11.6/7. Or it could have been a result of the diligence of the MGB, for reasons described below.

<sup>195</sup>Pako, 147/4/1817, 11.8-15.

the factory, for they had been convicted in the past as counterrevolutionaries.

In the end, the MGB was asked to conduct a more thorough investigation. This investigation established that an extraordinarily high amount of workers and employees, 406 in all, possessed a criminal record, and that six others had been convicted of political crimes. Apart from these, another 220 people at the works were repatriates, fifteen of whom occupied leading posts. Redel'man, according to the MGB, was born in Odessa, had the "wrong" kind of ancestry --his family had been merchants--, and had been an "active member of an illegal counterrevolutionary Jewish nationalist organization, whose labour had been conducted along directives of English espionage organs."<sup>196</sup> Upon his release from the camps in 1946, Redel'man approached factory director M.I. Rumiantsev, who did not see any problems with hiring the former convict, although he was told by Redel'man about the camp sentence<sup>197</sup>.

On the contrary, Redel'man and Rumiantsev became friends, and Redel'man was allowed to use the factory's trucks to transport construction materials to his dacha near Moscow. Redel'man became a frequent guest at Rumiantsev's. For example, he and other factory employees were invited by the director when he would celebrate the Soviet holidays in his apartment. At these parties unlimited amounts of alcohol were consumed, which had been actually designated for use in the factory for technical purposes. Redel'man, with the help of Rumiantsev and Party committee secretary Ionov, received the

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<sup>196</sup>Pako, 147/4/1817, 1.8.

<sup>197</sup>Pako, 147/4/1817, 11.8-15.

necessary papers to reside in Kalinin, something which was prohibited, even if he had served his time<sup>198</sup>. To the amazement of the MGB employees who wrote the report on the situation at the factory, Ionov and Rumiantsev also attempted to have Redel'man's conviction overturned.

Veinert had been convicted twice: in 1932 as a member of a Menshevik youth organization, and in 1937 for handing over "espionage facts to a foreign spy."<sup>199</sup> In 1947, he arrived in Kalinin after his release from the camps. Rumiantsev, according to the report, had pity on the ex-convict, gave him employment, and arranged an apartment and furniture for him in Kalinin. Veinert apparently lacked the necessary qualifications for his job. Rumiantsev also managed to arrange for a passport for his new engineer. However, Veinert had not counted on the MGB's surveillance. The Chekists established that he continued his counterrevolutionary activities and arrested him<sup>200</sup>.

A fellow former convict, a certain Kharon, who had accompanied Veinert on his first visit with Rumiantsev, had also received a passport thanks to the director, after which Kharon had disappeared. Egorov's story was similar to Veinert's, including his final arrest by the MGB. Rumiantsev's position was further compromised because he had hired his cousin, Dunaeva, at the factory. In the war, her husband had

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<sup>198</sup>This also proves that Rybakov probably wrote the truth, when he indicated in his novel *Fear*, that Kalinin became a town where residence was restricted in 1937 (see Rybakov, *Fear*, p.680).

<sup>199</sup>Pako, 147/4/1817, 1.10.

<sup>200</sup>In the MGB report Veinert is quoted as saying in one of his "counterrevolutionary" conversations: "We have very few solid people such as Mikhail Ivanovich [Rumiantsev]. He hired us and gave us refuge, ignoring the fact that we had served ten years, moreover, for counterrevolution." (Pako, 147/4/1817, 1.10). The present researcher can only agree with Veinert's opinion of Rumiantsev.

officialated as the vice-burgomaster of Rzhev and deputy head of the *Polizei* there. The MGB found furthermore seven other very suspicious individuals employed in prominent positions in the factory. They had lived on German territory, had served time in Soviet camps, were kulak children, or were frequently drunk, or were ex-POW's, or had combined several of these negative traits<sup>201</sup>.

Apart from the responsibility for the high number of politically unreliable elements at the works, Rumiantsev was also accused by the MGB of embezzlement and fraud. He had used the factory's money for his own purposes, such as the acquisition of furniture for his office and for that of the factory's head engineer, Morozov. Motorcycles, bought on behalf of the factory, had not been given to the sports' club of the works, but had been distributed among prominent employees. Rumiantsev himself had appropriated the launch that was purchased for the same reason. The director also had kept for years an airplane at the factory, which was not used, and yet was expensive in maintenance.

On the whole, the fraudulent abuses of Rumiantsev seem to be rather trivial, and would never been held against him, were it not for the fact that he had lost the Party's trust because of his liberal hiring policy. The whole case might actually have been cooked up by the MGB, in order to prove to higher authorities that the organs in the Kalinin oblast' had not lost any of their vigilance. In 1949 the "Leningrad case" was discovered, and it could very well be that local MGB departments

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<sup>201</sup>Redel'man, Veinert, and another of the twelve mentioned by name in the MGB report were Jewish, as well as possibly Kharon. However, it would be difficult to defend solely on the basis of this case the manifestation of state-sponsored anti-semitism in the Kalinin oblast', since all others were Russian, most of whom were deemed to suspicious because of their ancestry of "former" people, kulaks, pomeshchiks, tsarist police, merchants. One was said to have even fought as an officer of the White Armies during the Civil War.



all over the Union felt obliged to prove their *raison d'être*. They may have tried to preempt any accusations of having become too complacent. It was a rather convenient case to trump up, with a few Jews, a few ex-convicts, and a few descendants of --or even actual-- "former" people, represented among the suspicious elements. How many were arrested of the twelve is unclear, although the crimes of some might have been rather trivial even for Soviet standards of the time. In hindsight, although the former convicts had served their time, they were still labelled as enemies, who had "...elbowed their way up at the factory to head some of the factory's departments."<sup>202</sup>

As a result of their political and economic failings, the factory's director Rumiantsev, the secretary of the Party's factory committee Ionov, and the chairman of the factory committee, Osipov, were dismissed by a decision of the obkom<sup>203</sup>.

Although the incidence of arrests was less brisk than in the years 1936-1938, this did not translate into a real relaxation of the pressure exerted upon the population by the Party, government, and the ever-watchful security organs<sup>204</sup>. In the survey, many told of cases in which

<sup>202</sup>Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.7. The official dismissal of both director Rumiantsev and the head bookkeeper of the railroad car works, at least formally, was done by a Collegium of the Ministry of Transport Machine Building on February 14, 1949 (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.101/101ob.). Rumiantsev was listed in April 1949 in the account of the *nomenklaturnye* workers in the oblast', as having been dismissed for the "dulling of political vigilance" (*zu prituplenie politicheskoi bditel'nosti*) (Pako, 147/4/1887, 1.89). He was then ordered to be at the disposal of the Ministry of Transport Machine Building, which could mean anything. Therefore, it is not necessarily a given that he was arrested.

<sup>203</sup>Pako, 147/4/1817, 1.7. Ionov would be subsequently first assigned work at a lower level, but was excluded from the Party on the orders of Vorontsov and Zimin during 1949 (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.7). According to one of the speakers at the obkom plenum that officially dismissed Vorontsov at the end of 1949, the exclusion was unjustified.

<sup>204</sup>Some respondents in the survey noted that they did not distinguish between these, as did M.A. Sysoeva; they were all "leadership" (*nachal'stvo*) or "authorities" (*vlasy*) (testimony of M.A. Sysoeva in the survey). It should be pointed out that the Party and government workers often were just as much involved in terrorizing the population as the security

the MVD-MGB after the war tried to force people to denounce their colleagues at work<sup>205</sup>. Respondents mentioned the fear for their own arrest, and for that of their relatives<sup>206</sup>. Some respondents admitted to knowledge of the existence of the camp system, especially those who had spent some time outside their native surroundings, or were not native to the 'I'ver' province. M.V. Kurganova was confronted with the Kolyma camp system when her husband served in Magadan in the MVD troops between 1951 and 1954<sup>207</sup>. At the time, she seems to have never given much thought to the life of the countless convicts around her, even though she had some female convicts working for her as housekeepers. The faithful Party man N.S. Kokorin, who today has still not lost his faith in socialism, was nevertheless appalled when he was confronted with the camps' existence at the time of his military service during the war in the Far East:

...I encountered by accident a large cemetery in a forest, where they had buried "campers;" on several of the graves there was not even an inscription or cross....It seemed then ominous to remember the words of Kaganovich on the radio, that we had mobilised for the construction of the *BAM* railroad three people per square meter.<sup>208</sup>

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organs: collectivization, the confiscation of icons and Bibles in 1937/1938, the forced subscription to state loans are a few cases in point. Consequently, it is no surprise that the people could not discern between them.

<sup>205</sup>Testimony of T.A. Novikova in the survey; her husband, for example, was asked to write a denunciation of the bookkeeper at the lumber company where he worked. He refused, but it did not matter, because the bookkeeper was arrested regardless.

<sup>206</sup>Testimony of T.A. Novikova in the survey.

<sup>207</sup>Testimony of M.V. Kurganova in the survey.

<sup>208</sup>Testimony of N.S. Kokorin in the survey.

In this way it became clear to Kokorin that the NKVD and NKGB were not organs for the defense of the people and the state, but of their oppression<sup>209</sup>.

### VI.3 Crime and Punishment

Already in August 1944, the obkomburo felt it imperative to order the *militsiia* (regular police) to organize a campaign against the growing incidence of crime in the oblast', particularly in the towns<sup>210</sup>. Daily, the militsiia was patrolling afflicted urban areas, and in Kalinin the town market was under close surveillance<sup>211</sup>. Frequent checks of identification papers took place in the provincial capital. Particularly conscripts and juveniles perpetrated crimes. Because of the militsiia's offensive, the crime rate dropped in the oblast' from 2,757 registered cases in the third quarter of 1944 to 1,876 cases in the first quarter of 1945.

Nevertheless, in June 1945 the NKVD organized a special ten-day operation against banditry in the oblast'<sup>212</sup>. Soldiers and citizens were

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<sup>209</sup>Testimony of N.S. Kokorin in the survey. See VI.4 for a further description of the people's awareness of the camp system.

<sup>210</sup>Pako, 147/3/2748, 1.260.

<sup>211</sup>Pako, 147/3/2748, 11.262-264. The veteran militsiia man I.M. Solov'ev, who joined the force after his demobilization from the army in early 1946, remembered that in the postwar years criminals of all kinds were active in Kalinin (B. Badeev, "Istoki truda i podviga," pp.16-27, in: *Kazhdyi mig nacheku. Ocherki o militsii*, Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1987, p.19). In the first postwar years "organized crime" incurred large material losses in the oblast' (ibid., p.23). His account was confirmed by another *militsioner* in the same book (L.Popova, "Ekspertiza pokazala...", pp.102-113, in: *Kazhdyi mig...*, p.105).

<sup>212</sup>Pako, 147/3/2749, 11.86/87. In December 1944 a similar operation had been undertaken, for which 2,208 people were used: militsiia officers, NKVD employees, members of destruction battalions, regular army soldiers, Party and soviet aktiv, and auxiliary militsiia. They managed to arrest 786 people (Pako, 147/3/2748, 1.10-11). In

scrutinized in settlements and towns within a radius of five to six kilometers from railroads and paved roads. Certain more remote settlements and forests were inspected, in which bandits, deserters, and other "criminal elements" were rumoured to roam. The operation led to the arrest of 2,458 people: bandits, deserters from the army and defensive industries, draft dodgers, "criminal elements," escapees from POW camps, "special" camps, and prisons (including prisoners' transports), speculators, and homeless and neglected children. In all 368 firearms were confiscated, 357 grenades and thirty-seven knives and daggers.

In the months of September, October, and November 1945, sixty-four local people were arrested in the town of Kalinin for "speculation."<sup>213</sup> Four of these were engaged in selling off rye which they had illegally procured from a kolkhoz chairman in Molokovo raion. The rye was sold for "speculative" prices on the *bazar* of Kalinin. Another seventy-nine were arrested, who were not inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast'. Some of these people bought spare parts, tools, and electrical appliances in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, or Kharkov and tried to sell them on the market of Kalinin. Several of the "speculators" had been offering soap for inflated prices. The militsiia had to admit that the arrests had not resulted in a cessation of speculation. It was also noticed that

...in the town of Kalinin reside very many people who are not paying any taxes and work nowhere, while they engage in

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March 1945, another ten-day operation had been staged against criminals, spies, bandits, and deserters (Pako, 147/3/2748, 1.106-107). At that time no less than 6,123 persons took part in the operation; 3,902 people were arrested.

<sup>213</sup>Pako, 147/3/2749, 11.278-285.

various forms of trade, such as in finished dresses, footwear, agricultural products, and other consumers' goods.<sup>214</sup>

In other words, the "second" economy tried to profit from the usual shortages, a phenomenon which is much more well known of the days of Brezhnev and *Zastoi*

In November 1945, the local NKVD had to report to Boitsov that, in spite of all the efforts since August 1944, the crime rate in the first nine months of 1945 had been disturbingly high<sup>215</sup>. The incidence of *khuliganstvo* and theft had actually grown in comparison with the first nine months of 1944. According to the report, even war invalids engaged in crime when unable to find work. Measures such as increased patrols, regular checks of documents and passports, and stronger discipline within the *militsiia*, were announced to Boitsov by NKVD head Pavlov<sup>216</sup>. Furthermore, Pavlov advised Boitsov to oblige the oblast' courts and procuracy to speed up their examination of cases, to end their "liberal" attitude towards criminals, and to systematically conduct show trials (*pokazatel'nye protsessy*) at enterprises and army units. Newspapers and radio were to report on the sentences of criminals for theft, hooliganism, and other crimes by courts and tribunals. The judicial practices of the 1920s and 1930s had not been forgotten by the NKVD chief. More security guards for storages, warehouses, and so on were suggested as well, and janitors were to be obliged to lock the doors of their apartment buildings at night.

The reports of the *militsiia*, procuracy, and courts to the obkom secretariat focus predominantly on curbing the crime rate in the

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<sup>214</sup>Pako, 147/3/2749, 1.284.

<sup>215</sup>Pako, 147/3/2479, 11.301/302.

<sup>216</sup>Pakc, 147/3/2479, 11.303-306.

oblast', i.e. on crime prevention. The guardians of the law did not attempt to justify their *raison d'être* differently, by boasting about the staggering number of arrests they had made and cases they had handled. Even the law of June 4, 1947, against the theft of state and public property, did not lead to a marked increase in people prosecuted<sup>217</sup>. Militsiia, MVD, MGB, courts and procuracy were consistently busy in any event, for the amount of arrests remained at a substantial level.

In the first half of 1949, the people's courts of the oblast' examined 12,873 suspects in court, 10,698 of whom were convicted<sup>218</sup>. In the second half of 1949, they examined 11,069 individuals, 10,790 of whom were convicted. In the first quarter of 1950, out of 5,969 people examined in the courts, 4,975 were convicted<sup>219</sup>.

Around 1950, the indiscriminate institution of criminal proceedings against violators of labour discipline disturbed the obkom<sup>220</sup>. The obkom tried as well to halt the harsh treatment of those who were thought to have shirked from joining the usual mobilization of citizens to aid with agricultural work<sup>221</sup>. The obkom's complaints about the zeal of gorkoms, raikoms, factory and institute directors in bringing people to court for discipline violations may have lowered the amount of those who were put on trial. Still the number of people processed by the courts was quite substantial in early 1950, as can be

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<sup>217</sup>See above for this law and VIII.3.

<sup>218</sup>Pako, 147/4/2297, II.1/2. It is clear from these numbers that few (at most, around one in five) of the accused in court escaped conviction.

<sup>219</sup>Pako, 147/4/2297, I.19.

<sup>220</sup>Pako, 147/4/2297, II.9, 52/53. The basis for these was the infamous Decree of June 26, 1940 (see also Heller, Nekrich, p.321).

<sup>221</sup>Pako, 147/4/2297, II.9, 52/53. The basis for this was a decree of April 15, 1942.

seen from the numbers for the first quarter. More than one in every hundred citizens of the oblast' was sentenced by a court during 1949, and the figures for 1950 do not indicate a real drop in the number of those convicted<sup>222</sup>.

By early 1951, the MGB head of the oblast' noticed that 80% of those prosecuted for crimes were young people (*molodezh'*), of whom 94% were first-time offenders<sup>223</sup>. He described some of the young criminals, and the failure of education to mold them into decent Soviet citizens:

It wasn't, for instance, the result of a decent upbringing by their parents which caused, for example, the son of the state prosecutor of Turginovo raion, Khokhlov, or the son of the member of the oblast' courts, Andreev, to become thieves.

Speaking about upbringing, I cannot ignore, for instance, the following fact: in the Tsentral'nyi raion of the town of Kalinin the elementary school No. 2 is located, one of the better schools of the raion. However, along with the normal (I mean with regards to the age of the children) grades, this school has been enlarged by grades of elder pupils (*pererostki*) coming from all the town's raions, and there are adolescents [among them] who have spent time in labour colonies. Although there is for these grades a separate entrance to the building, they are mixing with other grades. The pupils of these grades smoke, swear, and some even walk around with Finnish knives. To establish order at the lessons sometimes a militsiia officer is invited.<sup>224</sup>

As a result recently two nine-year olds had been wounded by a teenager who wanted to have their toys<sup>225</sup>.

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<sup>222</sup>In 1949, in all 21,388 people were convicted by these courts; the population of the oblast' was around 1.6 million (see Table 2 and VII.1).

<sup>223</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 1.145.

<sup>224</sup>Ibid.

<sup>225</sup>Ibid.

Often homeless (*besprizornye*) or uncared for (*beznadzornye*) children were perpetrators of crimes<sup>226</sup>. In 1951 and the first three months of 1952, more than 2,100 of these children were detained in the oblast' by the MVD; they ended up in the orphanages described here below.

Stalin's rule had not been able to eradicate crime<sup>227</sup>. In October 1946, the exclusion of several Party members who had been criminally prosecuted by the courts is confirmed by the obkomburo --in fact first secretary Boitsov. Jail or camp terms were meted out in odd proportions around this time, if one compares it to the relation of crime and punishment which is customary today in the Western world<sup>228</sup>. A rural baker in Krasnyi Kholm raion was sentenced to two

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<sup>226</sup>Pako, 147/5/341, 1.72. Compare to Conquest: "The old criminal underworld of Tsarist Russia, which since the Time of Troubles had developed as an extraordinary milieu with its own dialect and its own law, had been greatly reinforced, and its character much modified, by the tumults of the Civil War and the famine of the early 1920s. Already then, the *besprizornye*, the homeless orphan children assembling in gangs and living by their wits, had become a problem. Collectivization and other social experiments disrupted millions more families and provided large reinforcements to these now maturing criminals" (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.313). The war further seems to have increased the *besprizornye* *Beznadzornyi* "...a youth largely unsupervised by parents or other adult guardians..." (Alan Ball, "The Roots of *Bezprizornost'* in Soviet Russia's First Decade," in: *Slavic Review*, Volume 51, No.2, Summer 1992, pp.247-270, p.265). The following statement of Ball applies as well to the postwar period: "Meanwhile, behind the veil of official optimism, forsaken juveniles proliferated in the early 1930s" (Ball, p.269).

<sup>227</sup>As Volkogonov also discovered (Volkogonov, *Kniga II*, Chast' 2, p.60).

<sup>228</sup>It is doubtful that the law June 4, 1947, brought considerably more uniformity in the sentencing; in Brusovo raion in 1948, two employees of a milk factory, who had sold off milk and dairy products on the side to the value of 5,645 rubles, received three years, while at the same factory two others earned ten and seven years for the same crime, but for the higher profit of 24,391 rubles (Gako, 2321/6/69, 1.7; for the penalties introduced by the decree of June 4, 1947, Fainsod, *How...*, p.346). In Bologoe raion, two people were given twenty years for the theft of butter of a value of 7,116.40 rubles (Gako, 2321/6/69, 1.16). Sentences were in general severe, even before the June 4, 1947, decree. In February 1947, one Emel'ianov was sentenced to one year for misbehaviour (vandalism, smoking, interrupting the tram service) in the tram (PP 8209/Feb 5, 1947, p.4). Two gang leaders were sentenced to be executed for the robberies and murder perpetrated by their bands (PP 8208, Feb 4, 1947, p.4). After the June 1947 decree some received extremely long sentences: five people received each from ten to fifteen years of corrective labour camp for the theft of thirty-three kilograms of onions from a kolkhoz (PP



years of imprisonment in July 1946 for the theft of ten loaves of bread; in the same raion and month, a kolkhoznik who was convicted of manslaughter in a brawl between youth received eight years<sup>229</sup>. If one was as unfortunate to commit an illegal act and be caught for it when employed by the railroads, the sentence could be very severe, for the railroads were part of the domain of the MVD/MGB. Thus in May 1946, one Lavrov was sentenced to three years of imprisonment for becoming intoxicated at work and stealing 2.5 litres of wine<sup>230</sup>.

One woman was officially excluded from the Party in October 1946, although already in October 1942 a "Special Board" (*OSO: Osobyie soveshchanië*) had sentenced her to eight years of corrective labour camp for living in occupied Kalinin in 1941<sup>231</sup>. Her harsh sentence make the tactics of I.G. Tsvetkov, as described in IV.2, understandable.

Armed robberies were not yet a thing of the past, and even Communists were not above it, as the case of V.A. Grechin showed<sup>232</sup>. In March 1946, he was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment for the crime.

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8348, Aug 20, 1947, p.4). The incidence of crime does not seem to have gone down after the June 4, 1947, decree, judging from the criminal statistics for 1949. Rittersporn has pointed out that the equally harsh law of August 7, 1932, could still be used and, as will be seen VIII.3, it was applied in the Kalinin oblast' before June 4, 1947 (Rittersporn, pp. 274-277; see also Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.21 on the law of August 7, 1932). The decree of June 4, 1947, and that of June 9, 1947, seem to have functioned as a kind of warning to the population and to the bureaucracy that crimes against public and private property would be treated in the same way as before the war (for the decree of June 9, 1947, Fainsod, *How...*, p.346).

<sup>229</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, ll.606 and 612; the brawl erupted during a typical occasion of "strolling" (*guliun'e*), a custom still thriving in the Tver' of today --in 1992, fights occasionally occurred as well during *guliune*

<sup>230</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, l.630.

<sup>231</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, l.632.

<sup>232</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, l.653.

In October 1946, members were excluded by the Party for criminal activities, such as theft, fraud, squandering of goods, hooliganism (*khuliganstvo*: drunkenness, vandalism, involvement in brawls), repeated loss of one's membership card, and just plain non-involvement in the Party organization. In the last two cases no criminal prosecution usually followed; for the other offences hardly anyone escaped being brought to trial. While this record only concerns cases for part of the year of 1946, it contained literally dozens of cases of Party members who had been found guilty of criminal activities<sup>233</sup>. It must have been unsettling for the raion Party leaders --and for Boitsov-- to find out that so many of their Communists were not the intended role models for their environment. Party membership may have inspired a sense of invulnerability in some of them, allowing them unbridled abuses of their privileges. Notwithstanding this, the occurrence of illegal activities perpetrated by Party members must have been a reflection of the substantial presence of crime in the oblast'.

The crime rate seems to have reduced in 1946 compared to 1945, but in the first three months of 1946 still 1,358 crimes were registered by the MVD in the oblast'<sup>234</sup>. In the first quarter of 1948, 1,096 cases of all manners of crime combined were listed by the MVD in a report to the obkom; in the second quarter there were 1,036, and in

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<sup>233</sup>The record of these cases is longer than 200 pages in the former Party archive, with no more than two or three pages per case (Pako, 147/4/57, ll.475-679).

<sup>234</sup>Pako, 147/4/1002, l.14. These numbers are much lower than the numbers of 1949 and early 1950, because the MVD reports of 1946 did not register all of the cases that were examined by the courts. It may be that they made a distinction between criminal deeds registered by the public, and (planned) criminal activities discovered by their own investigations.

the third quarter 943<sup>235</sup>. The evidence for the considerable scale of criminal activity is supported by the fact that in 1948 the authorities decide to bolster the size of the militia by creating auxiliary police in the countryside<sup>236</sup>. Its 11,000 members were organized in brigades and had to battle *samogon* distillation and hooliganism, as well as protect the harvest in the fields and gathered crops. The size of this auxiliary army is impressive, but the effectiveness of its presence must have been extremely limited, as no trace can be found in records after June 1948. The recruits were probably villagers, who cannot have been particularly keen on having their peers prosecuted by the state for such offenses. Conceivably, this auxiliary militia soon quietly disbanded after its inception. Still the size of the auxiliary *militiionery* brigades indicates that the authorities believed crime to be rampant.

In 1953, oblast' prosecutor Gerasimenko tried to analyse crime among youth in the oblast'<sup>237</sup>. He came to the conclusion that violence mostly occurred under the influence of alcohol, particularly enjoyed on

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<sup>235</sup>Pako, 147/4/1132, 11.85/86 and Pako, 147/4/1133, 11.14/15. In the first two quarters of 1948 combined, twenty-nine robberies were registered, in nine of which a victim was murdered. Twenty-six people were murdered in addition to those nine; 719 burglaries had been reported in the first six months of 1948, fifty five cases of the theft of cattle and fifty cases of "impudent forms of hooliganism" (*derzkie formy khuliganstva*). Apart from that, the MVD had investigated some areas where economic crime was suspected, and 1,358 cases were registered of speculation, the embezzlement of socialist property, and of other similar crimes. In the third quarter 529 cases of economic crime were investigated, and 414 of other forms of crime registered. Of the latter, twenty-five involved murder, fourteen robberies, 319 burglaries, fourteen cattle theft and forty three hooliganism. It was noticed as well that 62% of burglaries took place in the countryside. It does not seem to have dawned upon the MVD employees who reported to the obkom that that meant in fact that relatively more burglaries occurred in the towns, for still more than 62% of the population was rural. Of the registered cases of non-economic crime about 70% were solved.

<sup>236</sup>Pako, 147/4/1097, 1.21ob.

<sup>237</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.147.

religious holidays, but that theft and burglaries were mainly committed by those who did not have a regular job. He also reported a case of gang rape of an underaged teenager committed by six secondary school pupils in a rural area<sup>238</sup>. In the town of Bezhetsk in eleven months of 1952, 276 "neglected" (*beznadzornye*) children had been detained, some of whom were the children of Party and soviet workers<sup>239</sup>.

Apart from Party members engaging in criminal activities, the employees of the state procuracy, the MVD, and the militsiia, which was part of the MVD, were involved in corruption<sup>240</sup>. Malenkov received in 1946 an anonymous letter from "a group of toilers of the town of Kalinin" and sent it on to Boitsov, ordering him to investigate and take appropriate measures if necessary. In the letter, even the assistant state prosecutor of the oblast', Grigor'ev, was accused of accepting bribes from speculators and criminals. When the obkom secretariat received a report in 1947 on the state of affairs within the MVD in 1946, it was rife with cases of corruption, abuse of power, theft, and drunkenness among MVD functionaries everywhere in the oblast'<sup>241</sup>. In 1952, a group of MVD bosses in the oblast' fell under suspicion of "famifyness," collective drinking bouts, and abuses of power as a result of an anonymous letter<sup>242</sup>. An investigation was conducted, and Ivan

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<sup>238</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, I.148.

<sup>239</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, II. 149/150.

<sup>240</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, II.119-123.

<sup>241</sup>Pako, 147/4/735, II.129-143. Thirty MVD employees were excluded from the Communist Party between January 1946 and February 1947: eleven for hooliganism and morally reprehensible behaviour, thirteen for drunkenness and the violation of labour discipline, and five for abuses of power, taking bribes, and misappropriation of funds (Pako, 147/4/735, I.138).

<sup>242</sup>Pako, 147/5/341, II.165-168.

Serov, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, was informed that, on the whole, the accusations were baseless, although the head of the corrective labour colonies of the oblast', Fedosenko, indulged rather too often in drink with some of the other MVD functionaries.

Before its abolition at the end of 1947, many instances of fraud had been uncovered with the ration-card system. In 1944, some shop employees had reentered ration cards for bread into circulation, although these were supposed to be immediately burned after having been used the first time<sup>243</sup>. In October 1946, fifty-two people were under investigation<sup>244</sup>. In November of the same year in the larger towns of the oblast', an all-out examination of the passports and house books of the urban population was conducted to combat ration-coupon fraud<sup>245</sup>.

The occurrence of drunken brawls had galled the Party already during the war. However, they remained a fact of life. In Rzhev raion in January 1946, four youths started a scuffle at a meeting for the upcoming Supreme Soviet elections, they ripped up a poster, broke a lamp and two windows, and beat up war invalid Perlov and his daughter<sup>246</sup>. Their most glaring deed was, however, the fact that they made a portrait of Stalin tumble from the wall. In 1948, the head of the

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<sup>243</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.72ob.

<sup>244</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.244ob.

<sup>245</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.246ob. The famine that raged in other parts of the USSR may have made the authorities more anxious about wasting rations on non-eligible people.

<sup>246</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, 1.14.

militiia of the oblast' expressed his disapproval of recognized religious holidays and the ensuing fights in the countryside<sup>247</sup>.

The brawls were often provoked by the copious consumption of alcohol at holidays, weddings, and so on. The state monopoly on vodka distillation was an old Russian tradition; the peasants' custom (now on the collective farms) to distill their own hard liquor was less ancient. Since the 1910s, peasants attempted to avoid paying for state alcohol, to make a profit, or to manufacture a surrogate for the vodka that was not always available in sufficient amounts everywhere, by distilling their *samogon*<sup>248</sup>. The custom survived into the 1940s. In June 1948, the head of the oblast' militiia, Krylov, fulminated that much grain was squandered in the oblast'<sup>249</sup>. In his opinion, the problem was linked to the illegal distillation of alcohol (*samogonovarenie*) among the kolkhozniks. Incomplete figures for the months of March, April, and May 1948 showed that the militiia had instituted criminal proceedings against 267 moonshiners (*samogonshchik*). Some kolkhoz chairs personally supervised these practices, allowing grain to be used for the distillation of alcohol. Excessive drinking would remain a problem in the Kalinin oblast'. In 1960, Todorskii and Arbatov stated in an article about Ves'egonsk raion:

<sup>247</sup>Pako, 147/4/1097, 1.21ob. In the summer months of 1948, eleven murders were a result of fights that broke out among youth during the celebration of religious holidays (Pako, 147/4/1133, 1.15).

<sup>248</sup>See 1.6. In 1925 the distillation of vodka with a 40% alcohol content was officially allowed, but only by state enterprises (T.P. Korzhikhina, "J. Stepankii, "Iz istorii obshchestvennykh organizatsii," in: V.S. Lel'chuk (ed.), *Istoriki sporiat. Trinadtsat' besed*. Moskva: Politizdat, 1988, pp.406-431, pp.422-424). Although after 1925 for a number of years anti-alcoholism campaigns were conducted, by 1932 these offensives came to an end when the "Society for the Fight against Alcoholism" was dissolved.

<sup>249</sup>Pako, 147/4/1097, 1.21.

Fewer successes have been achieved in the fight with alcoholism. Also here some progress has been made, not only in comparison to pre-revolutionary times, but also to recent years. But the incidence of drunkenness, nevertheless, is still considerable.<sup>250</sup>

In March 1951, the head of the MGB, Dekushenko, added to the numerous official complaints about the continued observance of religious holidays in the countryside<sup>251</sup>. He stated that two thirds of all homicides in the countryside took place during their celebration. In other words, not so much had changed since the 1920s!<sup>252</sup> One and a half years later Dekushenko provided numbers about acts of "hooliganism" in the countryside: in the first eight months of 1952, 43% of them had occurred during religious holidays<sup>253</sup>. The population still seemed to settle scores on these occasions for, in 1952, all of the ten murders resulting from brawls, and all forty-nine cases of heavy bodily injuries as a result of fights, happened while celebrating religious holidays<sup>254</sup>. Although the character of the crimes in the countryside in the early 1950s mirrored that of the 1920s, the occurrence of these crimes had fallen significantly compared to the registered crime rate in the 1920s, even if the rural population was much smaller by 1952 than in 1924-1927<sup>255</sup>.

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<sup>250</sup>A. Todorskii, Iu. Arbatov, "Bol'shoe v malom," in: *Kommunist*, 5, 1960, pp.45-59 [from here Todorskii, Arbatov, II], p.55.

<sup>251</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 1.143. Half a year later first obkom secretary Kiselev echoed the complaint of the frequent occurrence of brawls, drunkenness, and the like at celebrations of holidays on the religious calendar (Pako, 147/5/11, 1.174).

<sup>252</sup>Compare to I.6.

<sup>253</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.260. These were only the registered cases, of course.

<sup>254</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.260. Of course, these were, again, only the registered cases.

Against 472 people criminal proceedings were instituted, seventy of whom were Komsomols and twelve Communists in the first eight months of 1952.

<sup>255</sup>Compare Altrichter, pp.257-261, Tabellen XLIV and XLV, and Table 2.

After the war, the NKVD remained engaged in the search and arrest of deserters and of those who evaded army service. In the last three months of 1945, the NKVD and the destroyers' battalions conducted thirty-seven operations to trace deserters in the oblast<sup>256</sup>. In this period forty-four were found, while another eighty-seven remained on the loose. Many of these were roaming around the oblast' armed, and committed burglaries and robberies to survive.

The MVD was active as well in maintaining order during spring sowing and harvesting. In the spring of 1946, the MVD departments in the raions reported to the obkom that criminal proceedings had been instituted against fifty-four individuals for theft of grain or kerosene, or irresponsible agricultural labour management, which usually referred to drunkenness of a particular kolkhoz chair or brigadier<sup>257</sup>.

At the same time MVD employees were engaged in "prophylactic" work. The focus in the spring of 1946 was on the condition of storage buildings on collective farms and MTS<sup>258</sup>. After a thorough inspection, the MVD concluded that the guards of these buildings were generally too old for their task. For this reason, sixty-five of them were dismissed by the Party and soviet organs in the raions. Twelve more kolkhoz guards were under criminal investigation. The labour of the MVD required for this checkup was nothing short of prolific: 4,576 kolkhozy were visited and seventy-five MTS!

Although this gives the impression of a staggering amount of control, in reality the population could often evade the heavy-handed

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<sup>256</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, 11.15/16.

<sup>257</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, 1.187.

<sup>258</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, 1.193.



legal organs of socialism. In September 1952, Kiselev said that the quality of investigative work performed by the courts and militia was poor, and that numerous crimes remained undetected<sup>259</sup>. Corruption and drunkenness among MVD employees were not uncommon, which led in one case to a situation in which three inebriated militia men were guarded by their captives<sup>260</sup>. In 1949 and 1950, an investigator of the procuracy of Udoml'ia raion, Motorin, was reported to the obkom by a raikom secretary<sup>261</sup>. Motorin's behaviour perhaps best demonstrates how little had changed in the conduct of a representative of the authorities since the 1920s:

I deem it necessary to bring to your attention the unparty-like behaviour and the deeds of a criminal character of the investigator of the procuracy of the Udoml'ia raion c[omrade] MOTORIN F.S.

At a priestly holiday (christmas) in the village of Glinovka this person was a guest at the place of citizen Arkhipov. First he began to drink, praised the good quality of the *samogon* and continued to drink. Then he began to break the tableware and to bother the wife of Arkhipov, because of which Arkhipov gave him several slaps on the face and he was thrown out with a black eye.

Having become intoxicated, MOTORIN galloped on a horse through a closed bar and broke it, but using his position, he proposed to c. Kalugin, a railroad foreman, to annul the report that had been drawn up and to let the case, so to say, die down.

When MOTORIN was in Kotlovan, on an assignment, he made the acquaintance of the citizen SKVORTSOVA (who was an acquaintance of the former prosecutor Baranov), began to visit her often, engaged in drinking bouts, slept with her; then lost his

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<sup>259</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, l.195. He admitted that, in spite of the fall of the overall number of crime in 1952, there had been a growth of hooliganism, speculation, and alcohol distillation.

<sup>260</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, l.113. In September 1952, Kiselev complained about the fact that oblast' *prokuror* Gerasimenko failed to take action against the drunken, corrupt, and abusive "people's investigator" Luk'ianov, lately of Bezhetsk and Zavidovo raions. In the end the obkom had to interfere in order to get Luk'ianov dismissed, after which criminal proceedings were instituted against him (Pako, 147/5/283, l.196).

<sup>261</sup>Pako, 147/4/2055, l.4.

horse when he was drunk and started a raucus, for which he was thrown out of the house.

In the rural soviet of Mushiro, MOTORIN engaged in a quality control of *samogon*, welcomed the good *samogon*, polished off the bad one; he became drunk and went up to the apartment of a female teacher, where he created a scandal.

In the village Kurovo of the rural soviet of Bykovskii he drank for two consecutive days at a religious holiday (Egor's day), visited the homes and extorted fare, went drunk to Ivanova Valentina, slept there and bothered the mother, while Ivanova worked as a bookkeeper of the lumber office of the lumber enterprise "Obimesttop"; she embezzled 5,000 rubles,...and MOTORIN did not institute proceedings against her.<sup>262</sup>

In 1951, a raikom secretary was accused by the head of the MGB of having a superior relationship with criminals than with the militsiia officers, which undoubtedly meant that the observance of the law on his territory was far from strict<sup>263</sup>. In January 1951, Shiklomanov, the secretary of the Novokarel' raion, said that the judiciary worked so ploddingly that it led to the neglect of investigations, and that as a consequence all purloiners of kolkhoz' property remained unharmed<sup>264</sup>. In 1950, on every single kolkhoz of his fief, embezzlement and theft of socialist property took place, but no one had been held responsible by the judiciary.

Another "crime" harshly dealt with was the violation of labour discipline at the workplace, for which severe penalties had been instated since June 1940<sup>265</sup>. These laws were modified in July 1951, when apparently special "comrades' courts" (*tovarishcheskie sudy*)

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<sup>262</sup>Pako, 147/4/2055, 1.4. Compare to Altrichter's description of the behaviour of the militsiia in the 1920s (Altrichter, p.103ff.).

<sup>263</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 11.144/145. In 1949, several MGB employees were discovered to have relatives who had been sentenced for political reasons to corrective labour camp terms (Pako, 147/4/1574, 1.2ob.).

<sup>264</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.68.

<sup>265</sup>See, e.g., Chapman, pp.178/179.

were fashioned<sup>266</sup>. The officials presiding over these courts were elected by and from among workers and employees of the institutions and enterprises in the oblast'. Its members were supposed to deal with their peers' violations of labour discipline. 'Trials in these comrades' courts were intended to impart an educative value, something of which Soviet legal practice was rather fond. Whether this meant in fact a waning in the level of severity in dealing with absenteeism is uncertain<sup>267</sup>. However, already by early 1952 these comrades' courts were said not to function at all at certain factories<sup>268</sup>. Because of this, the labour discipline seemed to falter. Only in 1956 were the laws of June 1940 fully abolished<sup>269</sup>.

The state procuracy in the oblast' had more than two hundred employees in 1947; the main office was in Kalinin, thirty-seven people worked in the oblast' procuracy *apparata*<sup>270</sup>. Below the oblast' procuracy, in the towns and raions, fifty-four raion and town *prokurory* were found, most of whom were assisted by one of the forty-six assistant prosecutors and by the seventy-two "people's investigators" (*narsledovately*). The relationship between the security organs and the procuracy was described by V.E. Tsvetkov, who was a member of the Kalinin oblast' court from 1947-1949, deputy chairman of the oblast'

<sup>266</sup>Pako, 147/5/35, 11.88-90. The resolution of the Supreme Soviet on the establishment of these courts was of July 14, 1951.

<sup>267</sup>Chapman maintained that it did (Chapman, p.179).

<sup>268</sup>Pako, 147/5/328, 1.2. Nevertheless, at the "Vagzhanov" textile factory after twenty-five days of January 1952 already 119 violations were registered, while for the first half year of 1951, 362 cases in total had been registered. This means that at least the detection of the violations temporarily improved. The comrades' courts were probably not conducive to an improvement of the atmosphere on the factory floors.

<sup>269</sup>See Chapman, p.179.

<sup>270</sup>Pako, 147/4/1001, 1.108. On the organization of the procuracy, see Fainsod, *How...*, p.317.

court from 1949-1951, and from 1951 to 1956 the head of the direction of the RSFSR Ministry of Justice with the oblispolkom<sup>271</sup>.

T'svetkov said:

I knew the penal system and its politics firsthand. I participated in open and closed meetings in the NKVD and MVD. I was acquainted with the directives of those organs. The direct practice of judge and prosecutor gave food for thought.

The Stalinist period of punitive policy of our state could not but call forth internal protests against its unjustified cruelty, its fight with the so-called enemies of the people.

A rather large faith in the force of coercion ruled at the time. Two decrees of 1947—"The strengthening of the protection of the personal property of the citizens", and the decree of June 4, 1947 "On the strengthening of the criminal responsibility for the theft of state and public property", established the most severe penalty: up to twenty-five years of camp.<sup>272</sup>

T'svetkov added that the oblast' court sometimes dealt with "political" cases<sup>273</sup>. The courts handled about twenty to thirty such cases per year after the war. He remembered how once the court had gathered in Bezhetsk to judge the case of an eighteen-year-old invalid, who had defamed Stalin at a beer stall. The court returned the case for further investigation, not convinced that the suspect was an actual counterrevolutionary. MVD-oblast' head Grebchenko resolved to have the matter dealt with by the "Special Board" (*OSO: Osoby soveshchanie*) under the MVD: it gave the boy five years of camp<sup>274</sup>.

<sup>271</sup>Testimony of V.E.Tsvetkov in the survey; he went on to chair the oblast' court from 1956 to 1965, and was state prosecutor of the oblast' from 1965-1983. See also Fainsod, *How...*, p.345, on the relationship between procuracy and MVD-MGB.

<sup>272</sup>Testimony of V.E.Tsvetkov in the survey. "No law prescribes that the judiciary and prosecutors should be controlled by the secret police and the party committee, but they are" (Djilas, *The New Class*, p.71).

<sup>273</sup>Testimony of V.E.Tsvetkov in the survey.

<sup>274</sup>Tsvetkov's memory is not fully accurate, because the Special Boards after the war fell under the authority of the MGB (see below or e.g.: Ol'ga Adamova-Sliozberg, "Put'," in:

Most criminal cases in court were handled in the oblast by the so-called "people's courts", headed by a people's judge (*naryud*), assisted by "people's assessors" (*narodnye zasedateli*)<sup>275</sup>. These were elected at regular intervals. The group of eighty-two judges elected in December 1951 had all had a certain measure of legal education, and were without exception Communists or Komsomols<sup>276</sup>. There were more than 6,000 assessors, 44.5% of whom were Communists<sup>277</sup>. The elections of these functionaries were accompanied by a holiday, similar to those for the soviets.

The comparatively infrequent occurrence of political crime has already been noticed. However, the institution of the Military Tribunal of the MVD troops functioned after the war as well<sup>278</sup>. This court dealt with those who had betrayed the Motherland in the war, and with certain cases of theft of socialist property. In addition, it was involved in inspections of the labour discipline at enterprises of the defense industry, where its activities around 1945 and 1946 had reduced the unauthorized departure of workers from the factories (something which was actually called "desertion" (*dezertirstvo*)).

In 1947, a quarrel flared up between the chairman of the Military Tribunal, I.R. Starilov, and his deputy, one A.A. Kuznetsov<sup>279</sup>. Kuznetsov,

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*Dodnes' tiagoteet. Vypusk I. Zapiski vashei sovremenitsy*, Moskva: Sovetskii pisatel', 1989, pp.6-123, p.122). Grebchenko, however, was indeed the head of the oblast' MVD around 1952-1953.

<sup>275</sup>For instance Pako, 147/5/35, ll.91-95; see Fainsod, *How...*, p.317, on the organization of the judicial system.

<sup>276</sup>Pako, 147/5/35, l.93.

<sup>277</sup>Pako, 147/5/35, l.94.

<sup>278</sup>E.g. Pako, 147/4/1002, ll.13/14, where the biography of I.R. Starilov --see IV.2-- can be found.

<sup>279</sup>Pako, 147/4/1002, ll.226-228.

according to the report of the MVD inspector who looked into the matter, had been too rude in the courtroom with suspects. At times, he trumped up accusations of minor offenses to unreasonable convictions for counterrevolutionary crimes. Kuznetsov was released from his duties in June 1947, after he had unjustifiably sentenced a certain Makarov to the death penalty on the basis of a paragraph of Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

Apart from the Military Tribunal of the MVD for the oblast', the railroads had a Military Tribunal, too, although under the wing of the Ministry of Justice: in the second half of 1947 this Tribunal convicted 493 people, eighty of whom were either Communists or Komsomols<sup>280</sup>. One ticket conductor, a Komsomol, was slapped with two years for taking a bribe from two passengers who did not have a valid ticket<sup>281</sup>.

A myriad of legal organs stretched out their tentacles in the Kalinin oblast' after the war: (auxiliary) militsiia, MVD, MGB, the procuracy, the *OSO*, the Military Tribunals, the regular courts and the "comrades' courts." It is impossible to assess precisely their effectiveness in preventing and solving crime. Undoubtedly, as Judge 'Tsvetkov's anecdote underlines, these organs meddled in each others' territory.

I could not establish the exact extent of crime, nor the number of arrests or convictions handled by the manifold organs for the entire period. However, the numbers unearthed indicate large activity among the servants of the judiciary after the war. The more than 26,000 convictions of 1949 and the first months of 1950 by the people's courts

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<sup>280</sup>Pako, 147/4/1404, 1.2.

<sup>281</sup>Pako, 147/4/1404, 1.4.

indicate both the presence of a high level of popular defiance of the authorities in the oblast' and the merciless practice of the law. 'Then it should not be forgotten that the *OSO* and Military Tribunals must have sentenced even more people in these fifteen months. It could very well be that the number of convictions rose in 1949: the MVD figures on crime for 1948 indicate a much lower level of arrest<sup>282</sup>. However, the latter included only a sampling of all people who appeared in court.

In the final analysis, it seems justified to propose that approximately 1% of the population of the oblast' was convicted annually by the courts. This translates into 8% of the oblast' population, around 125,000 people, who were convicted by the courts between 1945 and 1953. This is an astoundingly high number, even if not all of them were sentenced to jail or camp terms.

#### VI.4 The Isles of Kalinin in the GULag Archipelago

In 1943, after an abortive attempt to split the People's Commissariat in two in 1941, the NKVD was divided into the NKGB and the NKVD, of which the former dedicated itself to activities which are usually in the West associated with the operation of a security organ<sup>283</sup>. The *OSO* (*Osoboe soveshchanie*) and the Military Tribunals fell

<sup>282</sup>Compare to the article of Zubkova (Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia...(1948-1952), "). Unfortunately, her impressions are not supported by any reference to sources, so that the truth her argument remains doubtful.

<sup>283</sup>See Fainsod, *How...*, p.378 and Iakovlev, B., pri uchastii A. Burtsova, *Kontsentratsionnye lageri SSSR*, Miunkhen/Munich: Institut po izucheniiu istorii i kul'tury SSSR, 1955, p.22. The competence of both NKVD/MVD and NKGB/MGB seems to have sometimes overlapped and is difficult to assess (which is exemplified by the fact that the activities of both for a long while after 1943 were the responsibility of Beria in the Politburo); the fact that the MGB chief was always a full member of the obkomburo after the war leads one to think that it was more authoritative than the MVD. The MVD was more

from that point onwards under the responsibility of the NKGB-MGB<sup>284</sup>. The MVD supervised the operation of the camp system.

In the West, just after Stalin's death, only two or three camps were known to be in existence in the Kalinin oblast': one in Kashin (no. 240), another one near Ostashkov (no. 41) around Lake Seliger, both engaging in wood procurements<sup>285</sup>. Furthermore, on "...one of the islands of Lake Seliger a camp for specialists is located, directly under the wing of Moscow; here earlier an experimental station for missiles was located."<sup>286</sup>

The latter camps of Ostashkov, in which the Polish officers were interned in 1939 and 1940, were recognized before in this account<sup>287</sup>. However, many more camps operated on the oblast' territory. By 1945, camp labour had become fully integrated in the oblast' economy.

Recently a permanent exhibition in the Tver' museum of *kraevedenie* has opened on the Stalinist terror of 1929-1953<sup>288</sup>. Most of the exhibition is based on eyewitness information, with a little bit of documentary help from the archives of the Soviet judiciary and the former Party archive of the oblast'. Upon the inauguration of the exhibition, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was still in power and the latter archive was reluctant to divulge any overly

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involved with administrative and economic matters, including the administration of the POW camps and corrective labour colonies, and with crimes of a non-political nature, often handled by the *militsiia* (the "normal" police), which was subordinate to it. The MGB, on the other hand, was engaged in the control over the political orthodoxy of the Party and government, and in the recording of the political mood of the population at large.

<sup>284</sup>Iakovlev, p.22.

<sup>285</sup>Iakovlev, pp. 125/126 and 156/157.

<sup>286</sup>Iakovlev, p.157.

<sup>287</sup>See III.2.

<sup>288</sup>That is, in the *Tverskoi kraevedcheskii muzei* (which can be translated as Tver' Museum of Local Lore), on the (former?) Ploshchad' Revoliutsiia in the town of Tver'.



compromising records. The KGB either was not approached at the time, or categorically refused to cooperate. The exhibition provides details on the orphanages built for children of enemies of the people (*detskie priemniki raspredelitel'sk*), which operated in five different locations in the oblast' (and in Toropets, between 1945 and 1953, not located in the Kalinin oblast'). Jails were found in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s in Ves'egonsk, Krasnyi Kholm, Bezhet'sk, Kashin, Zubtsov, Rzhev, Torzhok, Vyshnii Volochek, Ostashkov, and Kalinin. There were *ispravitel'no-trudovye kolonii* in the east and south-east of the oblast' in Kesova Gora --confirmed in the records (No.2)<sup>289</sup>--, Kaliazin --confirmed by the records (No.6)<sup>290</sup>--, Kimry, Belyi Gorodok (near Kimry), Konakovo --one we have seen before (No.14)--, Redkino; Kalinin --confirmed by the records (No.12)<sup>291</sup>--, Vasil'evskii Mokh (a peat bog settlement near Kalinin), Emel'ianovo (near Kalinin); in the south-west in Staritsa, Zubtsov, and Rzhev --confirmed by the records (no.15)<sup>292</sup>--; in Torzhok. In the north a cluster in and around Vyshnii Volochek existed, in the town itself --confirmed by the records (No.5)<sup>293</sup>--, and in Osechenka, Akademicheskoe --confirmed by the records<sup>294</sup>--, Leont'ev, Lykoshino --confirmed by the records (no.3)<sup>295</sup>--, Berezaika, and Guziatino; in the

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<sup>289</sup>Pako, 147/4/1001, 1.92. The numbers of the colonies given here are the ones they carried around March 1948, as given in Pako, 147/4/1131, 1.14ob. That list was not complete since there were eleven corrective labour camps and four camp points on March 1, 1948. The location of some of these fifteen was not described in the report. Compare to the maps as well

<sup>290</sup>Pako, 147/4/1002, 1.46.

<sup>291</sup>Pako, 147/4/1131, 1.14ob.

<sup>292</sup>Ibid.

<sup>293</sup>Ibid.

<sup>294</sup>Pako, 147/4/1002, 1.46.

<sup>295</sup>Pako, 147/5/341, 1.115 and 147/4/67, 1.93. This camp still functioned in June 1952.

west in Ostashkov --confirmed by the records<sup>296</sup>-- and in Selizharovo (the raion centre of Kirov raion) --confirmed by the records (no.9)<sup>297</sup> near Ostashkov. Furthermore, the exhibition also notices the presence of *doma mladentsa* (youth detention centres, presumably) in two of these colonies, both located within the cluster of Vyshnii Volochek, one in the town itself, and one in Lykoshino.

As large as the number seems, it should be noticed that these corrective labour colonies were allegedly for convicts with a sentence of no more than two years, although some of the research in the archives seems to deny this claim<sup>298</sup>. At least some of these camps contained convicts who were serving longer terms. One of those convicts was Lev Kopelev, who served time in a camp located close to the Volga near Kimry<sup>299</sup>. Many of the inmates described by Kopelev were more criminal than political convicts<sup>300</sup>. This emphasises another problem of interpretation of the above summing up: were all these colonies intended for political convicts<sup>301</sup>? How many of the camps were for criminals, even though it should be remembered that people were criminally convicted for offenses which at any other time and place would be considered either too trivial to prosecute or being of a

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<sup>296</sup>Pako, 147/4/1131, 1.2.

<sup>297</sup>Pako, 147/4/1131, 1.14.

<sup>298</sup>Iakovlev, p.60; see below.

<sup>299</sup>See Lev Kopelev, *Khranit' vechno*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ardis, 1975, p.589 and p.611. The chapter is named after the settlement where the camps were located: "Bol'shaia Volga." The village was transferred from Kalinin oblast' to Moscow oblast' in 1956. Bol'shaia Volga is almost adjacent to the town of Dubna in Moscow oblast'.

<sup>300</sup>See Kopelev, *Khranit'*, pp.585-613.

<sup>301</sup>Apparently in 1948 the infamous "special regime camps" were created for political prisoners, according to Volkogonov (Volkogonov, *Kniga II, chast' 2*, p.39). None of these could be discovered by the present author on the territory of the Kalinin oblast'.

political nature<sup>302</sup>? This carries some importance, inasmuch as many sentenced criminals in Russia serve their time in work camps in our own days. This seems to be considered a normal state of affairs, even in the "democratic" Russia of Boris Yeltsin. It would thus be somewhat odd to lament the fact that under Stalin criminals were confined in such camps which are yet found everywhere. Nor is it clear from the exhibition in 'Tver' when these different colonies exactly existed, and if the camps for German POW's after World War II were included among the above number of camps.

Politically, according to the same exhibition, in the 1955-1987 period 1,980 people were rehabilitated, and in the 1988-1989 period 15,244; in all 17,224 were therefore officially "illegally repressed."<sup>303</sup> This seems certainly not to include all political convicts, when we learn that in early 1938 in a period of six weeks 2,000 "... former kulaks, criminals and active anti-soviet elements..." were to be repressed in the Kalinin oblast', although once more the ambiguous term "criminals" was used in this document<sup>304</sup>. The account below will evidence the surprisingly extensive proliferation of the camp system in the Kalinin oblast' as shown by the exhibition in 'Tver' to be indeed a fact. In how far all the details in the exhibition were correct is more difficult to establish.

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<sup>302</sup>Conquest believes that criminal convicts in the camps were a small minority: "The percentage of "criminals" was around 10 to 15 percent, but the majority of these were the petty embezzler type, rather than *urkas* proper, who were seldom more than 5 percent of a camp total" (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p. 313).

<sup>303</sup>The first number of 1,980 rehabilitations is startlingly small. According to one source in the 1953-1957 period, 600,000 people in the whole of the USSR were rehabilitated (Iu. Borisov, "Politicheskaja...", p.296).

<sup>304</sup>Gevorkian, p.19.

In early 1947, the MVD of the Kalinin oblast' had fifteen corrective labour camps and camp sectors for prisoners of war and interned people under its auspices<sup>305</sup>. In 1947, the camp personnel numbered at least 1,299, for in one record this is the sum of officers, administrators, technicians, and guards who were engaged in the study of Marxism-Leninism<sup>306</sup>.

From 1944 or 1945 onwards, the camp population received a very welcome addition of German and Eastern European prisoners of war<sup>307</sup>. The influx of POW's was all the more important since the oblast' was plagued by an enormous shortage of labour. The camp population relieved some of the extraordinary pressure on the small labour force of the oblast'. The inmates were used for a variety of objects during the postwar revival process<sup>308</sup>. One of the more elaborate reports on the deployment of convicts and POW's, found in the former Party archive of the Kalinin Party organization, is a discussion in the obkomburo on the insufferable situation within the camps and, consequentially, the less than pleasing economic performance of the

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<sup>305</sup>Pako, 147/4/735, 1.131. The organization of camps within GULag was as follows: in a district it was headed by the direction of camps (camp group) (*upravlenie lagerem*), made up of camp sectors/departments (*otdeleniia lageria*) which were divided into camp points (*lagernye punkty*) which finally were divided into camp parts (*lagernye uchastki*) (Iakovlev, p.54).

<sup>306</sup>Pako, 147/4/1001, 1.131. 135 of the 1,299 were officers, 311 administrators-technicians, and 853 guards. In June 1949, the number of employees of the MGB (which was not engaged with the the overseeing of camps etc., but more with the investigation of politically suspicious people and of certain economic crimes, that is, enforcing the political conformity of the Party and the population) was 603 (Pako, 147/5/1574).

<sup>307</sup>In Kalinin oblast', apart from Germans, who formed the large majority of the POW's judging by the amount of Germans who were convicted by the Military Tribunal in 1947 (78 out of 92), there were at least Hungarians as well (8) and Rumanians (6) in these camps (Pako, 147/4/1404, 1.14).

<sup>308</sup>See Table 47.

inmates in their delegated projects<sup>309</sup>. Although some concern was expressed about the inmates' well-being, the impression is created that this solicitude stemmed solely from an irritation with the withering of economic results. The report and resolutions that follow it were made in the second half of May 1945:

The obkomburo has established that the leaders of a number of industrial enterprises, construction organizations, the heads of camp directions, and of camp sectors of the NKVD, act with an intolerable indifference towards the deployment of workers of the special contingents and POW's. A review established that the head of the construction of the Novo-Tveretskii canal, comrade Kazberov, the director of the railroad-car construction plant, c. Rumiantsev, of plant No. 10, c. Diev, of the Kamen paper mill, com. Nikandrov, and also the heads of the camp directions of camp No. 140, c. Kabanov, of camp No. 126, c. Dediulin, of camp No. 41, c. Zhuravleva, and the heads of the camp sectors manage very poorly the organization of the labour of the special contingents and the POW's, who are working at industrial enterprises and construction objects; they are not always given daily roster tasks; the workers in a number of cases work *en masse*, not organized in workers' brigades and links, and within the brigade no one is assigned to be responsible for the necessary fulfillment of work. There is not a strict order of the workday, nor obligatory labour discipline, nor do the workers know their output norms, because of which they do not work with intensity and have a very low labour productivity; the average productivity of labour in the month of April 1945 being in the POW camps 82.8%, and in some enterprises (the leather factory of Ostashkov, the construction of the Novo-Tveretskii canal, the plant No. 10 in Redkino, OSMU-4) the labour productivity fluctuated within the range of 60-75%.

The low labour productivity of the POW's and special contingents is also caused by the fact that the heads of the camp sectors tolerate a frequent change and transfer of workers from one workshop to another, not offering them the opportunity to study the production process.

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<sup>309</sup>Pako, 147/3/2701, ll. 66ob./68.

The heads of the camp branches and the directors of the enterprises analyse their contingent poorly with regards to its specializations and, as a result, specialists are not always used in the right way (lathe operators, metal workers, carpenters, etc.). The lack of fulfillment by the camp sectors of the agreed norm for the supply of industrial enterprises and building objects with work hands is a large shortcoming in the use of the special contingents and of the POW's; a number of occasions were discovered by the review, when camp branches used a significant part of the contingent for supplementary work for the service of the camps. ...

Until now a business contact between the heads of the camp sectors and the leaders of industrial enterprises and construction objects has not been established for the organization of the deployment of labour forces; after concluding an agreement, the economic managers have little concern for the creation of normal, sanitary living conditions for the labour contingent, badly provide them with special clothes, necessary bed linen, living space and fuel.

The oblast' NKVD direction loosened the control over the camp operations to use POW's and special contingents within the economy of the oblast' to the utmost.<sup>310</sup>

NKVD chief Pavlov was reprimanded by the obkom: one is almost deceived here by the pretension that the NKVD was subordinate to the obkom<sup>311</sup>. The document continues with resolutions to improve the situation: under point 1, Pavlov and the camp heads were obliged to maximalize the labour capacity of POW's and the special contingents<sup>312</sup>. Point 3 states:

... To oblige the leaders of economic organizations, in whose enterprises camp labour is being used, to guarantee the execution of agreements with the camp sectors; to create for the labour of the special contingents and the POW's minimally

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<sup>310</sup>Pako, 147/3/2701, 11.67/67ob. Here Rumiantsev of the railroad-car factory is once more encountered (see VI.2). "Special contingent" was a term used for a group of prisoners (Lev Kopelev, Ease My Sorrows. A Memoir. New York, Toronto: Random House, 1983, p.133).

<sup>311</sup>See V.3.

<sup>312</sup>Pako, 147/3/2701, 11.67ob./68.

[!?] required living and sanitary conditions (special dress, bed linen, living space and extra food for the overfulfillment of output norms).<sup>313</sup>

Point 4 emphasised the obligation of the responsible authorities to hunt for specialists and skilled workers among the POW's and other convicts<sup>314</sup>. The resolutions then suggest:

5. 'To recommend to the heads of the camp directions, and of camp sectors, and to the managers of economic organizations, to guarantee the preparation of the camps for the winter period, to pay special attention to the procurement of fuel and building materials for the winter.

6. 'To recommend to com. Pavlov to organize in June 1945 a separate sanitary camp for the weakened contingent of POW's. To fully use the contingents of light work for the tasks of preparing consumer goods, of shoe repairing, and of repairing clothing.

7. To oblige the heads of the camp directions and camp sectors to disallow the special contingent and the POW's not to go to work because of insufficiency or absence of guards; to oblige c. Pavlov to examine the question about the possibility to assign the guards' units of the NKVD to the heads of the camp sectors.<sup>315</sup>

Resolution no. 8 obliged Pavlov to continue to maximize the amount of labour he could extract from the inmates<sup>316</sup>. Under point 9, the raikoms were asked as well to exercise control over the prisoners' work, and to aid the camps in organizing "subsidiary economic activities" and the selection of necessary cadres<sup>317</sup>.

The obkomburo routinely tried to solve the problems of some economic areas with the help of the prisoners of war or Soviet

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<sup>313</sup>Ibid., 1.68.

<sup>314</sup>Ibid.

<sup>315</sup>Ibid.

<sup>316</sup>Ibid.

<sup>317</sup>Ibid.

convicts<sup>318</sup>. For example, in July 1945, it was gladdened by Pavlov's promise to organize a camp in the town of Bologoe for a special contingent<sup>319</sup>. The *zeks* could aid with the reconstruction work taking place in the town, that had been heavily bombed during the war. Around August 1, 1945, the obkom ordered the vice-director of the NKVD, Ryzhikov, to assign one hundred convicts of a special contingent to help with construction taking place at the sovkhos "Krasnoarmeets" of the Kalinin raion<sup>320</sup>. In 1946, Ryzhikov was blamed by an obkom instructor of the cadre department for only assigning fifteen convicts to the sovkhos, which continued to be in a deplorable state<sup>321</sup>. A month later, Pavlov was asked if he could reassign 150 prisoners of war to work in a glass factory near Vyshnii Volochek<sup>322</sup>. At the same time, he was requested to find out whether he could dispatch sixty others to work in a peat bog. Pavlov was ordered by the obkom to dispatch regularly a group of POW's to assist in the lumber department of a glass factory in Firovo raion for the autumn and winter of 1945-1946<sup>323</sup>. In July 1946, Boitsov requested deputy prime minister Beria for an additional assignment of 3,000 POW's for the accelerated rebuilding Kalinin, Rzhev, Bologoe, and Torzhok<sup>324</sup>. He was answered by MVD chief Kruglov

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<sup>318</sup>See for a brief discussion of the economic importance of the GULag for the Soviet economy for example Gordon, Klopov, pp. 101-103. It should be noted that after the war the Kalinin oblast' was in need of exactly the kind of labour for which convicts were often used: in the province, lumbering and (re-)construction were prominent after May 1945.

<sup>319</sup>Pako, 147/3/2701, 1.100ob.

<sup>320</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.6ob.

<sup>321</sup>Pako, 147/4/420, 1.12ob. Free sovkhos residents lived with two to three families in one apartment; in most apartments there were no windows, and some residents did not have clothes or shoes. It makes one wonder how much better life was outside the camps after the war, particularly in the countryside.

<sup>322</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 11. 93/93ob.

<sup>323</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 11. 245/245ob.

<sup>324</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.174ob.



in August 1946: only 1,085 would be dispatched to the Kalinin oblast'<sup>325</sup>.

When Pavlov was up for promotion, the obkom secretary, who wrote his biography --presumably for higher authorities-- , noted, among other things, that during his tenure as NKVD/MVD head of the Kalinin oblast' Pavlov had bettered the quality of productive work performed by camp inmates, improving their regimen<sup>326</sup>. Consequently, neither does the satisfaction of an MVD employee surprise one, when he reported that the economic plan was fulfilled by 110.5% by the labour colonies in 1946<sup>327</sup>.

Camp No.41 in early 1945 was one of the two camps holding prisoners of war in the oblast', the other one being No.216 near Vyshnii Volochek<sup>328</sup>. Oblast' NKVD head Pavlov reported to Boitsov that both camps had a combined population of 11,102 POW's in early 1945, which had swollen to 18,242 on July 1, 1945. The NKVD notified the obkom around May 1945 that the oblast' would receive an additional number of POW's, which would augment the number to almost 50,000. The oblast' NKVD department began to organize six new camp directions to accommodate these newcomers<sup>329</sup>. The NKVD, however, did not keep its promise: by October 1, 1945, 22,719 POW's had arrived, after which the shipment to the Kalinin oblast' was discontinued for the remainder of the year.

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<sup>325</sup>Pako, 147/4/67, 1.41.

<sup>326</sup>Pako, 147/4/1002, 1.10.

<sup>327</sup>Pako, 147/4/1002, 1.15.

<sup>328</sup>Pako, 147/4/92, 1.1. See Table 47.

<sup>329</sup>No.290 in the town of Kuvshino, No.293 in Bezhet'sk town, No.295 in the town of Konakovo, No. 309 in Bologoe raion (at the station Guziatino), and in Kalinin itself Nos. 384 and 395.

In 1946, still some of the Poles who had been interned after the Soviet takeover in 1939 were in (one of) the camp(s) near Ostashkov, No. 41<sup>330</sup>. Pavlov informed Boitsov that, on January 1, 1946, 1,375 interned Poles remained, who were now subject either to transport to Poland or to transfer to camps of interned foreigners in other oblasts.

Only to have it reconfirmed in October 1946, the MVD worker G.G. Gladkikh appealed a Party reprimand for his too intimate relation with the Pole Iurgel', and for behaviour unbecoming of a Party member and MVD functionary<sup>331</sup>. Iurgel' was an inmate of Camp No. 41. As head of this camp's special department, Gladkikh took Iurgel' and his sister to the theatre and visited an alehouse with them. With a car belonging to the camp, he brought them to the railway station on May 30, 1946. Here Gladkikh bought them tickets for a railway journey --probably for their return to Poland. Unfortunately, he encountered the head of the camp, Dobrinskii, at the station, upon which Gladkikh made a scene and began to abuse Dobrinskii verbally, accusing the latter of contact with foreign countries and anti-Soviet behaviour. Obviously, Gladkikh's tactics were aimed at distracting attention from his own foreign contacts, whom he was just seeing off at the platform.

Apart from all this, on another occasion Gladkikh had given his subordinate, the labour inspector Rybak, a blow during worktime. After these events, Gladkikh was transferred to camp No. 384 in Kalinin and worked there as head of the registration department. This case shows an unexpected manifestation of empathy in one of the functionaries of the GULag system. Gladkikh obviously hit it off with Iurgel', and was

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<sup>330</sup>Pako, 147/4/92, 1.1.

<sup>331</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, 11.682/682ob.

willing to undertake rather hazardous actions to spend time with his friend, and helped him to return home. Perhaps it says something about the benevolent attitude of some of the authorities to those Poles who had escaped execution in 1940. It is, on the other hand, undoubtedly a fairly unusual case, both with respect to the treatment of the Poles and to the relation between inmates and camp functionaries.

'The oblast' NKVD was rather careless about the health of the POW's. When a camp in Bezhetsk had to be set up in the winter of 1945, the three hundred POW's transported there were quickly incapable of proceeding with their work because of the extraordinarily miserable living conditions<sup>332</sup>. In the Bezhetsk camp on January 1, 1946, only just over half of the inmates could work<sup>333</sup>. It might be that many of the interned foreigners and prisoners of war could leave for home towards the end of the 1940s, but at least some of them were to stay for much longer, because they had been sentenced to camp or jail terms for crimes committed in their POW camp<sup>334</sup>. In the year 1947, in total ninety-two POW's were convicted, and almost half of them were slapped with sentences of more than ten years of confinement in camps or jails.

In 1946, the productivity of the prisoners of war and the Soviet inmates of the labour colonies was noteworthy, if one has to believe a MVD report of January 1947<sup>335</sup>. The value of production of the colonies added up to 13.5 million rubles, and of the POW's camps 46.7 million

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<sup>332</sup>Pako, 147/3/2749, 1.10.

<sup>333</sup>Pako, 147/4/92, 1.2.

<sup>334</sup>See e.g. Pako, 147/4/1404, 11.9-15. One was sentenced to the death penalty, another to twenty-five years, forty to sentences ranging from ten to twenty-five years, eleven to sentences from five to ten years, and thirty-seven to sentences from one to five years.

<sup>335</sup>Pako, 147/4/1002, 11.14/15.

rubles. If in 1946 the total monthly industrial production of the oblast' was worth thirty million rubles, it is obvious how substantially the forced labour contributed to the economy<sup>336</sup>.

There are less data to be found on the camps for Soviet citizens than on those for prisoners of war, although their fate sometimes appears in the records alongside that of the prisoners of war<sup>337</sup>. On the whole, the demographic reports from the head of the militsiia to the first obkom secretary for the period do not furnish the death rate among prisoners. The only apparent exception is a report of June 1945 which noticed that at least ten convicts perished in Vyshnyi Volochek<sup>338</sup>. At the end of 1945, Boitsov received a report from the substitute *prokuror*, Nazarov, about the revision of certain cases of "counterrevolutionary crime."<sup>339</sup> In eight of them, the accused had been convicted as traitors of the Motherland, four were cases of those who had been allegedly aiding and abetting the enemy, and nine other revised cases were of people accused of counterrevolutionary agitation. None of the twenty-one people were judged in the end to deserve a retrial. The few cases quoted in the report were all of individuals who had collaborated with the Germans.

In March 1946, Fedosenko, the head of the oblast' corrective labour camps of the NKVD, reported to Boitsov that the food supply of

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<sup>336</sup> Compare to Table 30.

<sup>337</sup> And it is fully unclear how many of the convicts were incarcerated for political crimes, and how many for other crimes. According to V.E. 'Tsvetkov, those who were convicted of political crime by the oblast' courts were sent to Vladimir and the North (testimony of V.E. Tsvetkov in the survey). This does not necessarily indicate that all inmates of the labour camps in the Kalinin oblast' were "criminals," as Kopelev's case proves and as N.A. Zabelin noticed in 1951 (testimony of N.A. Zabelin in the survey; see below). Political convicts could have been transported from other areas to the Kalinin oblast'.

<sup>338</sup> Pako, 147/3/2749, ll.92/92ob.

<sup>339</sup> Pako, 147/3/2479, ll.316/317.

both guards and convicts of the camps had been deficient since the beginning of the year<sup>340</sup>. Fish and vegetable oil did not reach the camps. 'The absence of these foodstuffs in the older colonies of the oblast', and the additional shortage of vegetables in the recently created camps, had led to a strong deterioration of the health of the *zakliuchennye* <sup>341</sup>. Fedosenko warned:

With the onset of spring it is not impossible that a wave of epidemic diseases and an increase in the mortality of the convicts will occur. Apart from the absence of the above indicated products, at this time with the poor condition of the roads, there are no possibilities for their delivery to the children's colony of Ostashkov, to the Kesova Gora colony, to the glass factory of Borisovo, and to a number of other colonies.<sup>342</sup>

Fedosenko petitioned Boitsov to give aid in order to avoid these impending disasters.

A cautious estimate would propose a population of about 20,000 inmates in the corrective labour colonies of the Kalinin oblast' in 1946, which would be diminished in the following two years by at least roughly 15,000 who were transferred to camps outside the oblast' on the order of the USSR MVD<sup>343</sup>. The decrease was mourned by Vorontsov in a letter of August 1948 to A.A. Kuznetsov, for it had delayed

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<sup>340</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, 1.105. Fedosenko demonstrated remarkable staying power for the times in which he was living: in May 1952, he still was the head of the MVD camp system (Pako, 147/5/341, 1.91).

<sup>341</sup>Pako, 147/4/66, 1.106.

<sup>342</sup>Ibid.

<sup>343</sup>Pako, 147/4/1126, 1.34. In a document of 1948, a long list of camp points and colonies was given, including those of prisoners of war (Pako, 147/4/1133, 1.2/2ob.). At this time many Soviet convicts and POW's were taken off their work on the construction of industrial projects, and many were transferred outside the oblast'. The camp near Konakovo, which had helped to reconstruct the porcelain factory, was closed in July 1948; camp No.15 near Rzhev was dismantled as well in July 1948. The POW camp of the cotton fibre *kombinat* of Vyshnyi Volochek was dissolved in April 1948, and so on. Towards the end of 1948, the camp population greatly diminished in many of the camps that remained in operation.

completion of several construction projects in the oblast'. By August 1948, 5,000 people remained in the colonies, of whom at least 1,000 were employed by the local MVD for their own particular purposes of consumer-good production and agricultural labour.

A report of April 1948 gives an impression of the MVD camp system in the oblast<sup>344</sup>. On March 1, 1948, there were eleven corrective labour colonies, four separate camp points, one children's labour colony, and one transfer prison. The combined population of these amounted to 10,037: 7,083 of whom were men, and 2,954 women. Almost half (4,750) served a sentence of less than three years, one fifth (2,046) of three to five years, 30% (3,071) from five to ten years, and only ninety-nine served sentences of more than ten years<sup>345</sup>. The report painted a picture of life in the camps in early 1948:

Apart from that, the circumstances of confinement of the convicts have a strong impact on the production work. In a number of colonies the convicts are badly provided with clothing. In the separate camp point No. 101 of the town of Torzhok, out of 792 convicts, 638 have blankets, 335 sheets, 226 pillowcases; out of 440 men, 314 have an undershirt, 291 have drawers, and none of the convicts has towels.

The situation in this camp point is extremely bad with respect to footwear, which in general consists of patched up summer shoes; as a result instances of frostbitten feet occur. The feet of the convict Murav'ev froze when he wore torn up canvas boots and worked outside on December 24, 1947; because of this he was unable to work for an extended period of time. The feet of the convict Novozentsev, born in 1930, froze during work on January 4, 1948, after which he spent a long time to recover.

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<sup>344</sup>Pako, 147/4/1131, 11.14-15.

<sup>345</sup>This information undermines the idea of Iakovlev that in ITK (*ispravitel'no-trudovii koloniia*) in general convicts with a sentence of up to two years were held (see B. Iakovlev, p. 60).

In the camp point No.104 /of the town of Rzhev/, several convicts do not have a change of underwear and after a bath dress again in dirty underwear, because of which a number of convicts have gotten lice.

In colony No.6 of the town of Kaliazin, in the course of December and January, a situation of overpopulation existed, when instead of 550, 830 people were detained there; owing to this not all convicts could be provided with bed linen. The convicts had to sleep with two people to one bunk. The overclothes of the convicts were only provided for by 43%, felt boots by 23%, and leather footwear by 35%. This all led to the occurrence of lice among the convicts.

...thus, colony No. 5 of the town of Vyshnii Volochek has a birthing house, in which women are held in confinement who have newborn infants; serious shortcomings occur here, which lead to a large mortality among the babies.

In the course of 1947, of the 360 children in the colony 105 died, which counts up to 26% [sic]. The death of the children resulted from the following causes: 37% died of pneumonia, of dysentery 16.5%, of diphtheria 16.5%, of dyspepsia 12.5%, of tuberculosis 16%. Of those, 13.3% were children younger than a month, 35.7% from one to three months, from three to six months 30.4%, from six to twelve months 14.3%, and from one to two years 3%.<sup>346</sup>

By June 1951, the economy of the Kalinin oblast' was still being partially resurrected with the help of convicts of the corrective labour colonies<sup>347</sup>. Apparently, Soviet convicts were deployed both in Vyshnii Volochek, at the "Proletarskii avangard" textile factory, and in Kalinin at "Proletarka." To the dismay of Konovalov, the direction of the USSR MVD GULag had commanded the local MVD to stop the convicts' work on those reconstruction projects, and to transfer them to areas outside the oblast'. Both the MVD minister S.N. Kruglov, and A.N. Kosygin, minister of light industry at this time, were asked by Konovalov to

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<sup>346</sup>Pako, 147/4/1131, ll.14-15.

<sup>347</sup>Pako, 147/5/38, l.1.

leave at least 1,300 convicts working at the textile factories<sup>348</sup>. In April 1952, the security was reported to be deficient of convicts of camp sector No. 1, who were building a wood-working factory<sup>349</sup>. The camp's fences, watchtowers, and warning zone were in a neglected state, and the convicts readily mixed at work with the free labourers at the project.

Although at first glance the camp system in the Kalinin oblast' seems have operated smoothly, and perhaps better than many other parts of society, a closer inspection of the documents conjures up a impression of organizational chaos similar to other areas. Drunkenness, weak labour discipline, slipshod camp utilities, and so on, beleaguered the efficient use of convict labour<sup>350</sup>. Sometimes this led to massive escapes, as apparently happened in 1946 at colony No.12.

The occurrence of "familyness" among MVD workers was no different from other branches of government and Party. In 1948, among the employees of the GULag and of the direction of industrial construction at construction object No.833, twelve people were found who had worked before with the MVD head of the project, one Lepilov, in Kuibyshev<sup>351</sup>. Lepilov had even managed to transfer from Kuibyshev some convicts who were appreciated for their skills! The Lepilov "clique" was involved in embezzlement and other abuses, in which they covered for each other.

The NKVD-MVD had the orphanages within the oblast' under its supervision as well. In January 1945, the oblast' NKVD directly

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<sup>348</sup>Pako, 147/5/38, ll. 1/2.

<sup>349</sup>Pako, 147/5/341, l.38.

<sup>350</sup>Pako, 147/5/341, l.166.

<sup>351</sup>Pako, 147/4/1125, ll.149-153.



administered six "child reception and distribution" centres (*detskíe priemniki-raspredelitel'i*) and one colony for juvenile delinquents<sup>352</sup>. At that moment, 330 children were detained in those seven institutions. However, in 1944 alone, 6,302 children had spent some time in one of them, and since the beginning of the war more than 13,000 neglected and homeless children had been processed.

After the war, many of the orphans' parents had perished in the war, although some certainly were children of parents serving camp sentences<sup>353</sup>. Directly after the war, these orphanages were frequently left to languish. Around September 1, 1945, the situation in some had been brought to the attention of the obkomburo that voiced its displeasure<sup>354</sup>. The fuel stock for the coming winter was not being amassed, food inadequately provided, supervision poor, and medical care lacking. In the 11'in orphanage of Kimry, cases of typhoid had occurred, and no bandages, iodide, and the like were available. The children were not being taught elementary knowledge of hygiene or about prevention of illness. Children of the second orphanage of Ostashkov were roaming in the neighbouring countryside, stealing potatoes and vegetables from kolkhoz lands. Others there were making baskets and selling them to local inhabitants. Here apparently the obkomburo saw a task for the Komsomol. It was obliged to exert stronger control over the orphans, partially by reinvigorating the Pioneers' organizations, that were moribund in many of the orphanages.

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<sup>352</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.59ob.

<sup>353</sup>In 1949, there were sixty-eight orphanages in the oblast', with about 6,000 orphans; in addition to those, 3,500 children were living with foster families (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.73). The total number of orphans in the oblast' orphanages was 4,182 on January 1, 1952 (Pako, 147/5/341, 1.57).

<sup>354</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, II. 98ob-101.

In 1946, Boitsov confirmed the earlier exclusion by the raikom of Ostashkov of the director of the aforementioned orphanage<sup>355</sup>. The ex-director had disappeared by the time he was excluded, following his dismissal or voluntary departure in 1945. A description of the director's unworthy behaviour was part of the report on his exclusion received by Boitsov:

...Buchnev used to be drunk and started fights in front of the the children at the time of his work as head of orphanage No.2, he squandered and appropriated products intended for the nourishment of the children. He completely ignored the condition of the *obshchezhitie* of the orphanage, as a consequence of which the children fell ill and fled the orphanage.<sup>356</sup>

In April 1952, the USSR Council of Ministers felt obliged to issue a decree to attempt to bring the proliferation of homeless children in the RSFSR to a halt<sup>357</sup>. Commissions were to be set up under the authority of town and raion soviets to accommodate orphans. However, by early 1953, many of these committees did not function at all in the Kalinin oblast'; some raions had not even bothered to create them in the first place. Instead the militsiia, without much zeal, was engaged in trying to supervise these children. In the special orphanage of Kamen' (perhaps one for children whose parents had been "repressed" or for juvenile delinquents), hooliganism was a frequent occurrence, schoolwork neglected, attempts to escape many.

The respondents in the survey often stated that they had not been aware of the camp system for political prisoners in the USSR, or that

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<sup>355</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, 1.505.

<sup>356</sup>Ibid.

<sup>357</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.149. The title of the decree, issued on April 8, 1952, was "*O merakh likvidatsii detskoi besprizornosti v RSFSR*".

they had only heard some rumours about it. Hardly anyone referred to the fact that corrective labour colonies actually existed within their own province. Only a few, most of whom had travelled outside the oblast' at the time or saw a relative arrested, admitted to knowing more about the camps<sup>358</sup>. Faulty memory and the repression of unpleasant facts in human memory might be at work here, because in July 1945, for example, the NKVD *OITK* (granted, only represented by its abbreviation) advertised for an economic specialist in the oblast' newspaper<sup>359</sup>. N.A. Zabelin, who was more knowledgeable than most in

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<sup>358</sup>N.D. Eliseev did not know about the camp system, but together with his fellow workers at the railroad depot sent on letters that were thrown out of trains that transported prisoners (testimony of N.D. Eliseev in the survey). A.N. Nikolaev saw his father return from ten years of camp (testimony of A.N. Nikolaev in the survey). Several respondents from Konakovo raion remembered the convicts working at the construction of the Moskva-Volga canal in the 1930s (testimony of L.S. Solov'eva-Ratataeva, I.A. Rulev, N.V. Akhova, N.A. Akhov, L.P. Pliashnikova in the survey; see III.2). M.V. Kornetova lived in Magadan, where her husband served in the MVD troops (testimony of M.V. Kornetova in the survey). Kh.I. Leibovich, an army officer, served for a while in the Far East, where "...there was not one large town without camps in the neighbourhood" (testimony of Kh.I. Leibovich in the survey). P.A. Kashinov worked for some time in the Far East, where he helped to build Komsomolsk on the Amur. He saw many political prisoners and exiles there (testimony of P.A. Kashinov in the survey). In contrast to Tiaglov and Kondrashov, who obviously lied when they maintained not to have known anything about labour camps when they were raion and gorkom secretaries in the 1940s and early 1950s, the veteran Party member A.V. Kruglova, who became a Communist in 1939, although she gave few interesting answers, did admit to having known about camps for "enemies of the people" [a term, which she put in brackets herself, she was one of the few who filled out the survey herself]. She added that she was every day unsure if she would be going home at night (testimony of A.V. Kruglova, I.I. Tiaglov and A.A. Kondrashov in the survey). Tiaglov and Kondrashov strike one as the Soviet counterparts to the Nazi bureaucrats after the second World War, trying to save their necks --or conscience!-- by denying any knowledge about the concentration camps: "*Wir haben es nicht gewußt!*" One of the anonymous respondents worked one month after the war in a camp, which was all he could take. He did not want to describe what all went on there, because "now we know everything already [about them]". The things he saw in the camp were worse than anything he saw in the war --and he had fought at Stalingrad. He still today finds it hard to believe that Stalin himself wrote his signature on documents ordering the execution of people (testimony of NN {questionnaire No.42} in the survey).

<sup>359</sup>pp 7801/ July 10, 1945, p.2; (*OITK*= *Oblastnye Ispravitel'nie Trudovye Kolonii*). Of course, the inhabitants could be under the impression that only criminals were held in these camps. These kind of camps for criminal convicts still exist in Russia today. Still, it seems worthwhile to quote Solzhenitsyn in this respect: "The permanent lie becomes the only safe form of existence, in the same way as betrayal. Every wag of the tongue can be overheard by someone, every facial expression observed by someone. Therefore every word, if it does not

the survey because of his age and his activities with the local society of *kraevedy* (students of local history, geography and folklore), knew of a camp on the territory of the *kombinat* "Proletarka" in Kalinin, and noticed that the hamlet Peremerki near Kalinin was one big camp<sup>360</sup>. He argued that the town of Kalinin was not only resurrected by its inhabitants, but also by convicts and POW's. His observations are indeed corroborated by archival evidence.

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have to be a direct lie, is nonetheless obliged not to contradict the general, common lie. There exists a collection of ready-made phrases, of labels, a selection of ready-made lies" (Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag*, III-IV, p.646). It seems that the survival of this particular trait might have played a role in the denial by many respondents of having had knowledge of the system of corrective labour camps. Compare also to Turchin: "Definitely, many did not know, of course, because they did not want to, they were afraid to know. There existed something of a not-agreed-upon-agreement between government and citizens: the powers that be created an informational barrier, and the citizens were happy, that they could not but be unable 'to know'" (Turchin, *Inertsia Strakha*, p.21).

<sup>360</sup>Testimony of N.A. Zabelin in the survey; he also witnessed the school of which he had been appointed director in 1951 being built by convicts in the "closed" suburb of Migalovo. He added that there were inmates among the *zeks* who had been convicted on the basis of the "political" articles of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

## CHAPTER VII: DEMOGRAPHY

The following chapters will attempt to explore the lives of the population at large in the Kalinin oblast' between roughly 1945 and 1953, as opposed to the machinations of the authorities and the population's reactions to it, which have been described thus far. However, it would be wrong to conclude that daily life took place autonomously and was allowed to unfold without interference by the authorities. The state (or Party-state as some will have it) and society were intertwined in manifold and intricate ways in Stalin's Russia. It would be artificial to try to unravel the two and describe each separately. Every inhabitant of the oblast' was consistently forced to make compromises with the Party, the government, and the security organs, virtually every day<sup>1</sup>. No one could ever afford to forget about the ever watchful authorities. When a religious holiday was celebrated in the countryside, the villagers had to hope that the local authorities would look upon it benevolently or, at least, view it as a necessary evil, allowed only if the villagers worked as hard as possible to fulfill the procurement plans.

Someone could attempt to add something to his or her meagre income by some form of domestic production (such as sweater knitting, dressmaking, shoe repairing, carpentry, and the like), thus exploiting the constant scarcity of consumers' goods. But it would expose oneself to the constant danger of denunciation by an envious or politically

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<sup>1</sup>"For the Party-state of communism was not a static affair, nor did it ever succeed in realizing fully its aspiration to total control over, or displacement of, society. Since such total control is impossible, the Leninist regime was constantly at war with the recalcitrant reality of Russian society" (Malia, p.89).

zealous neighbour, or, perhaps closer to the truth, of the authorities suddenly deciding, due to some kind of whim, to take action against those who worked on the side. Even if someone had been always toeing the line, never straying from correct political, social, and economic behaviour, there was the possibility of being called in for questioning by the organs. Even arrests were arbitrary at times. Some were invited to show their loyalty by working as informers for the organs, an offer which could not be refused. Sometimes one was selected by the organs, sometimes one was denounced (even by one's relatives), sometimes one could be made culpable for acts (or the absence thereof) about which one was either unaware or unable to affect. The following may generate an image of life proceeding independently from the wishes and orders of the authorities<sup>2</sup>. However, it should be stressed, *in extremis* that Big Brother was watching, or thought to be watching, everywhere, all the time.

### VII.1 Population Losses

It is impossible to assess the exact population loss of the Kalinin oblast' as a result of the war. The geographical boundaries of the oblast' and consequently the size of the population varied widely at different times. Apart from that, there are no precise population statistics for the USSR for the period 1939-1959, and the numbers for

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<sup>2</sup>Recently, Iu. Igritskii remarked rightfully that the regime might indeed have aimed for total control over society, but that this was unattainable in practice (Igritskii, "Snova...", p.11). Small pockets of life remained outside of the control of the authorities, such as the family, certain habits and traditions, crime, and the innermost thoughts of the people.

1939 are very questionable<sup>3</sup>. Nevertheless, a maximum of 320,000 deaths related to the war seems to be reasonable<sup>4</sup>.

There are two reports from Boitsov, one to A.A. Kuznetsov, the other to N. Voznesensky and A.A. Kuznetsov, of early May 1946, in which Boitsov mentions population numbers for the oblast<sup>5</sup>. According to his figures, in the seven years since 1939 the oblast' population --of the post-August 1944 size-- had shrunk by more than 550,000, or 25%; over 460,000 fewer people (29%) lived in the countryside in March 1946 in comparison with 1939. Perhaps around 50,000 people, who were still in the Red Army in May 1946, could be added to the oblast' population number of 1.6 million that Boitsov gives<sup>6</sup>. Boitsov's numbers are mystifying because a maximum of 320,000 inhabitants of the oblast' died during the war<sup>7</sup>. Did around a quarter million fail to return from evacuation after March 1943? One is inclined to seriously doubt the accuracy of his numbers for 1939, 1946, or for both years combined, since on January 1, 1947, after an annual growth of the total population by perhaps 10,000 in 1946, the kolkhoz population was

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<sup>3</sup>See III.2.

<sup>4</sup>See IV.2.

<sup>5</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.132 and 1.135; see Table 2. These numbers are also mentioned in *Ocherki*, pp.530 and 531, which probably used the same source as I did (this is impossible to establish, since the Party archive's records have been reorganized and renumbered since *Ocherki* was written). See V.3 for more on the reports. Compare to the numbers for the USSR as given by I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.4.

<sup>6</sup>By March 1948, two years later, most of the war veterans had been demobilized, numbering around 93,000 to 94,000 (see Table 8 and Chapter III). If I may venture an estimate here -- based on Tables 2,3, and 14 mainly--, then on January 1, 1947, the population was composed of roughly 500,000 town dwellers --including those who lived in the smaller towns--, 780,000 people living on collective farms, 50,000 soldiers, and at least 250,000 to 300,000 others, most of whom were officially rural residents. The last group is difficult to place, but all statistical sources agree on its presence in the countryside (see below). Therefore the total population of the oblast' would amount to 1.6 to 1.7 million on January 1, 1947.

<sup>7</sup>See IV.2.

215,000 smaller than on January 1, 1941 (a drop of 22%, and thus far less than the plummet of 29% of the rural population that Boitsov had referred to in the report)<sup>8</sup>.

One Soviet source discerns a decrease from 2,668,000 in 1926 to 2,489,200 in 1939 for the 1967-territory<sup>9</sup>. When translated into the dimensions of the post-1945/pre-1956 oblast', one would expect a population in 1939 which was not larger than 2,000,000. However, Boitsov mentioned a bustling population of 2,169,800 in 1939. Again, Boitsov's figures seem suspect. In fact, if one compares the drop in the number of inhabitants of the Soviet statistical handbooks for the "smaller" oblast' between 1926 and 1939, with the recently published population numbers in Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia for the "larger" Kalinin oblast' for 1926 and 1937, there is reason to be very suspicious of Boitsov's numbers for 1939<sup>10</sup>. According to the figures of the information given by Poliakov et al in 1990, the population of the "largest" oblast' fell by more than 265,000 between December 1926 and January 1937, or by 7.7%<sup>11</sup>. Now the population decline of the "larger" 1967-territory between 1926 and 1939 (approximately 178,000) amounted to 6.7% (according to a calculation based on Soviet statistics)<sup>12</sup>. In a calculation based on the numbers provided by

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<sup>8</sup>Compare Tables 5 and 14. Since the kolkhoz population on January 1, 1947, must have been just below 50% of the total oblast' population, the natural growth of the kolkhoz population cannot have been more than 5,000 in 1946, and the drop of the kolkhoz population remains at 22% between January 1941 and January 1946.

<sup>9</sup>See Table 2; i.e. Kalininskaia Oblast' za 50 let..., pp.11/12.

<sup>10</sup>See Poliakov et al., "Polveka...", [I], p.16.

<sup>11</sup>This is the oblast' in its largest incarnation of 1935-1944, almost two-thirds larger than the guberniia of 1926 or the oblast' after August 1944 (compare to Table 1).

<sup>12</sup>See Table 1 and Table 2. It should be pointed out that the Soviet source (Kalininskaia oblast' za 50 let..., p.12) is blatantly wrong about the date of the 1939 census: it states that



contemporary sources on the 1926 census and Boitsov's numbers for 1939 that were given in the report (approximately 142,000, because the oblast' after 1945 --the size of which Boitsov probably used in his reckoning-- was roughly 2,000 square kilometers larger in size than in 1926)<sup>13</sup>, the population drop amounted to 6.3% for the same period.

The trend that is evident in Poliakov's numbers leads one to expect a further dip in the population in 1937 and 1938, since the population had precipitated consistently in the 1930s, a result of collectivization and the exodus of the population of Kalinin oblast' to the areas that experienced a rapid level of industrialization after 1929<sup>14</sup>. The total drop for the ten-year period from late 1926 to early 1937 amounted to 7.7%; therefore the annual average drop to 0.77% for the territory of the "largest" oblast' (1935-1944 size). If one would dismiss the fact that the annual rate of the population loss increased as a consequence of the purges of 1937-1938, one would expect as a result the oblast' population to be approximately 9.2% smaller in early 1939<sup>15</sup>.

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this census was held in December 1939. In fact, this census took place in January 1939 (see Poliakov et al., "Polveka...", [II], p. 49).

<sup>13</sup>The territory was 3% smaller in 1926 than in 1946 (see Table 1). Thus it seems to be a reasonable estimate to propose that in 1936 on the 1926-territory 3% less people lived than given in Boitsov's numbers for 1939. Therefore in 1939, according to Boitsov's numbers, approximately 2.1 million people lived on the territory of the 1926-guberniia (see Table 2). Following Boitsov's figures, the population of that territory fell by 142,000 between 1926 and 1939.

<sup>14</sup>See Poliakov et al., "Polveka...", [I], p. 11.

<sup>15</sup>At least, because there are indications that the population actually increased until 1929, and the average annual drop after 1929 must have been higher in fact (see Altrichter, Tabelle VI, p.205). The largest plummet probably occurred in the 1929-1933 period, because of collectivization and because of the absence of the passport regimentation, but the introduction of the latter seems to have been hardly an impediment for the migration to the towns, if one has to judge by the evidence on the postwar exodus from the countryside (see below).

This was, however, far from the case for the areas calculated above: the decline here was either 6.3% or 6.7% between late 1926 and early 1939. One reason for this discrepancy may owe to the fact that the territory that would be separated in 1944 was largely agricultural: one would expect a higher level of emigration and victims of "dekulakization" than in the more industrialized region that remained part of the Kalinin oblast'. Some of the towns of the latter area might have received some of the rural immigrants, who thus remained a sector of the oblast' population in the 1930s.

Therefore the drop in the smaller oblast' (1944-1956 size) may have been less between 1926 and 1939 than in the territory of the 1935-1944 oblast'. At the same time, it would be wrong to expect too much of a difference in the population plummet of the "separated" western part and the eastern "rump" that continued as the Kalinin oblast' after August 1944: even the "smaller" oblast' had by 1946 still more than twice as many rural as urban dwellers. The "smaller" oblast' can certainly not be defined as a centre of industry, a fact which exerted a very strong "pull" on its own rural population to leave the collective farm and join the labour force of, for example Tver', Rzhev, or Vyshnii Volochek in the 1930s. Instead of this, many of the rural migrants departed for Moscow, Leningrad, or the industrial cities of the Urals.

If the trend did continue for the oblast' of the 1935-1944 size, and the drop in population numbers amounted to 9.2% by 1939, then in absolute numbers the population decrease would have come up to around

321,000 between 1926-1939<sup>16</sup>. We saw before, when following Boitsov's numbers, that the drop for the 1926-guberniia territory in absolute numbers was 142,000. Therefore in this calculation the western territory, separated from Kalinin oblast' in August 1944, would lose in the period 1926-1939 179,000 people to migration, collectivization, et cetera. If one compares the population of the 1926-guberniia with the population of the Kalinin oblast' territory of 1935-1944, then the population of this western part amounted to 1,245,600 in 1926<sup>17</sup>. The population loss in the area (that was to be separated in 1944) during the years 1926-1939 would have been 14.4% according to this calculation. It seems unlikely that the western area, that would become part of the Velikie Luki and Pskov oblasts in 1944, would have relinquished proportionally more than double the amount the "rump" lost in the 1930s.

The impact of the purges would lead one to believe that the population losses were higher than 0.77% annually in 1937 and 1938. After all, it has been pointed out that, between 1935 and 1937 in the countryside alone of the Kalinin oblast', more than 2% of the people were arrested<sup>18</sup>. Therefore it becomes even less likely that the 6.3% or 6.7% losses of population between 1926 and 1939 in the "smaller" oblasts are correct.

Now if one, instead, assumes that Boitsov in fact described the loss of population of the smaller oblast' between January 1937 and 1946 in his report of 1946, the discrepancy is less between the drop of

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<sup>16</sup>See Poliakov et al., "Polveka...", [I], p. 16.

<sup>17</sup>Compare Poliakov et al., "Polveka...", [I], p. 16 to Table 2.

<sup>18</sup>See III.2.

the "largest" oblast' and the smaller oblast': the annual average between late 1926 and early 1937 for the 1935-1944-territory is 0.77% and for the 1926-territory 0.63%, instead of 0.77% and 0.53%. Conquest has recently reiterated that the census figures published in 1939, on which the Soviet statistical handbook must have based itself, were faked<sup>19</sup>. Millions were added who existed "only on paper." That leads one to conclude, first of all, that the drop noted by the Soviet statistical handbook for the period 1926-1939 was probably larger than the near 180,000 for the territory of the 1967-oblast'<sup>20</sup>. It is, moreover, very plausible as well that Boitsov's report assigned a substantial number of the losses due to the "Great Purge" to the losses sustained in the Second World War by the oblast'. He might have done this deliberately. If this was the case, it can be explained as an appeal for some clemency towards his domain from the central leadership by exaggerating the war losses through adding the losses due to the Great Purge. However, it might be that he used, perfectly legitimately, the falsified numbers for the province of the 1939 census.

The number of 1.6 million for 1946 was not too far removed from the correct figure, as will be seen from a different calculation here below and from another report of 1951 on the population numbers of the oblast' to the Central Committee. It reinforces the idea that the numbers used for 1939 were misleading, which is not surprising considering the strange history of the census held in this year<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup>Conquest, "Academe...", p. 95.

<sup>20</sup>I.e. Kalininskaia oblast' za 50 let..., p. 12.

<sup>21</sup>See III.2 and above.

One can try to calculate the oblast's population oblast' in a different way. In 1946-1948 around 92,000 children were born and survived childbirth; roughly 400,000 children up to fourteen years old lived within the oblast' borders in early 1949<sup>22</sup>. The actual amount of births from 1946 to 1948, including those infants who died before reaching the age of one, was probably around 100,000<sup>23</sup>. Consequently, the annual average amount of births was roughly 33,000 during these three years. The natality for these years was around twenty per 1,000 inhabitants<sup>24</sup>. In this calculation, too, the population of the oblast' would amount to around 1,650,000 in early 1949<sup>25</sup>.

This last number is repeated in a letter of June 21, 1951, from first secretary Konovalov, written just before his disgrace, to Central Committee secretary Malenkov<sup>26</sup>. The intention of the letter's author

<sup>22</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.57. More than 250,000 of whom lived on collective farms (see Table 14).

<sup>23</sup>When the mortality of newborns is taken as being 10%, which conforms to the numbers given in the same report--in 1946 8.8 per 100 newborn babies died, in 1947 13.8%, and in 1948 9.0% (see Table 5).

<sup>24</sup>Table 5: for 1946 the birthrate was 20.2 per thousand, for 1947 21.4 per thousand, and for 1948 19.4 per thousand inhabitants.

<sup>25</sup>That is by dividing 33,000 by 20 and multiplying this by 1,000. In 1948, according to the report, 32,000 children were born that survived (Pako, 147/4/1549, 1. 57); an additional 3,000 might have been born who died at or soon after birth --although, of course, some of the newly born would still succumb to an illness before their first birthday. Thus the total births were around 35,000 in 1948, when the average natality was 19.4 per 1000. This would produce a total population in 1949 of 1,800,000. This number seems rather high, when the kolkhoz population in January 1950 was 825,500 (Pako, 147/5/906, 1.2) and the population of the larger towns was estimated to be around 435,000. More than 500,000 people would have had to live in smaller towns, raion centres, and urban type settlements, or not be kolkhoz members, but still living in villages. Below it will be argued that the number of the latter group was probably closer to 300,000.

<sup>26</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, II. 135/136. If we follow Konovalov's numbers and combine it with the numbers on the kolkhoz households of Table 14, then the total population of roughly 1.6 million, would have consisted of 550,000 who lived in urban communities, and almost 770,000 who were members of the collective farms or their dependents. That would leave about 300,000 unaccounted for, the same 300,000 which seem hard to place in 1946 or 1956. Kerblay describes the increase of the proportion of rural dwellers that were not employed in agriculture: "En 1923 la population non agricole vivant à la campagne dépassait

was to have the oblast' promoted to the "first category" (presumably of oblasts) of salaries and staff, from the "second category" to which it had belonged since 1935. In other words, Konovalov attempted to request more funds from the Central Committee, at least for the Party organization of the Kalinin oblast', and perhaps for its government and economy, too. As part of his argument, Konovalov stated that on January 1, 1951, the oblast' had more than 1.6 million inhabitants, of whom 551,000 were urban dwellers<sup>27</sup>.

Compared to the population number of 1926, when the size of Tver' guberniia was even 3% smaller than that of the Kalinin oblast' of the 1940s, the plummet is stunning: twenty years later the oblast' had 650,000 inhabitants fewer<sup>28</sup>. A certain part of this decline owed to the continued migration of inhabitants to places outside the oblast' borders, even after the introduction of internal passports. One sixth of the population had perhaps perished in the war, but besides that enormous decrease, there is a distinct drop in population numbers as well between 1926 and 1939<sup>29</sup>. Within these years, the population had

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de près de 6% le total de population urbaine de l'URSS à l'époque; en 1955 on peut estimer que plus de 30% de la population classée aujourd'hui comme rurale n'est pas liée à l'agriculture" (Kerblay, p.329, footnote 1).

Konovalov was, of course, aided or hindered in this by the fact that there had not been an All-Union census since 1939 and most of the data of that census had been suppressed. One could suspect that perhaps fewer people lived in the oblast' than the local Party chief actually thought in June 1951, or that he even deliberately was engaged in exaggerating the population in order to extract more means from Moscow. In other words, Konovalov would have been trying to emulate Gogol's Chichikov! It is unclear how people like Boitsov or Konovalov arrived at their population numbers. Guesswork no doubt played its part.

<sup>27</sup>The way the number is written in the letter means that the oblast' had more than 1,600,000, but less than 1,700,000 inhabitants. If compared to Boitsov's numbers for 1939, it is clear that by then the urban population was back to its prewar and pre-purge size.

<sup>28</sup>See Table 2.

<sup>29</sup>On population losses in the war, see IV.2. One sixth of the inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' would have been killed in the war, if one estimates that 320,000 died (which is a reasonable estimate for the deaths in the war), and the total population (of the smaller

diminished by more than 140,000<sup>30</sup>. In 1928, the number of peasants' households in 'Iver' guberniia in the countryside had been 429,579, when the average household had 5.1 members: so the peasant population was around 2,190,000<sup>31</sup>. Although quite a few people were counted as rural dwellers, who were not kolkhoz members, the number of kolkhoz households by 1941 was only 275,900, with a total population of 999,000<sup>32</sup>. According to these numbers, in thirteen years the number of people who worked as agricultural producers and their dependents in the oblast' would have precipitated by more than one million!

The fall in size of the average household is also remarkable for such a short timespan: from 5.1 in 1928 to 3.6 in 1941. There is little doubt that the population of the guberniia-oblast' toppled by at least 650,000 between 1926 and 1946, since the figures for both years could be verified.

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oblast') had been around 1.9 million in 1941 (see above, and IV.2). Some of the population losses during the war were due to the evacuation of inhabitants to the East. Boitsov mentions in the letter of May 1946 cited above the evacuation of 30,000 young people in 1942, for example (Pako, 147/4/63, 1.132 and see V.3).

<sup>30</sup>It is impossible to estimate how much of this drop was caused by migration, and how much by "unnatural deaths"; the natural growth in the 1930s probably was not very high if in 1940 the natality per 1,000 inhabitants was only 3.3 higher than the mortality (see Table 5; in 1940 the birthrate was 24.4 per 1,000 and the deathrate 21.1 per 1,000, while 22.1 children died of every 100 born). The mortality for 1940 was so high --as high as it would be in the war year 1944!--, that the present author thought of a possible confusion of 1941 with 1940, but since the year 1940 is twice repeated in the document, while no numbers for 1941 are given, the numbers are most likely right. After all, it was probably impossible to give any numbers on birth- and death rates for 1941, when the oblast' was in a state of utter chaos in the second half of the year.

If the growth per 1,000 inhabitants was 3.3 in 1940, then the absolute population growth in the oblast' --if for the sake of convenience Boitsov's numbers for 1939 are applied in the calculation-- in that year was slightly more than 7,000. The natural growth from 1926-1937, if there was any, should of course be added to the loss of the more than 140,000 mentioned here. In contrast to the 1930s, the natural population growth in the period 1926-1929 was probably quite high (see Altrichter, p.68). Therefore, the population loss between 1926 and 1937 must have been higher than 140,000.

<sup>31</sup>Altrichter, Tabelle VI, p.205.

<sup>32</sup>See Table 14.

It is very doubtful that almost all of the loss of 550,000 was sustained during the war, as Boitsov maintains in May 1946. The losses during the war were due to war-related deaths and the natural decline of the population (320,000), as well as to the departure of inhabitants because of the evacuation, army service, and so on. But the losses due to the latter factor cannot have been close to 250,000: the inhabitants of the more populated area of the oblast' did not evacuate in large numbers, or probably returned soon after the Nazi retreat<sup>33</sup>. Almost all of the mobilized soldiers flocked home after demobilization, if they survived the war, or are accounted for among the number of military deaths.

Three causes for the prewar population decline are discernible: industrialization and the migration of rural dwellers to the industrializing towns outside the oblast'; collectivization (dekulakization); and the Great Purge. If one estimates the losses until 1937 as a result of the first two factors at 140,000, then -- apart from the 320,000 deaths during the war-- a decline of about 200,000 took place between January 1937 and May 1946, due to migration, wartime evacuation, and the Great Purge. In this calculation, the natural growth of the population between 1926 and 1946 has not been taken into account. It appears from the postwar numbers that this growth was more or less lost to the yearly emigration to places outside the oblast': in 1956 or 1959 there were probably as many residents of the Kalinin oblast' as in 1946 or 1951<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>33</sup>See Lorenz, *Sozialgeschichte*, p.287 for the re-evacuation.

<sup>34</sup>An estimate for April 1956 in a statistical handbook for the total oblast' population was 1.6 million (*Narodnoe Khoziaistvo*, p.6). In 1959, according to the Census, Kalinin oblast', which had grown about 25% in size with a number of sparsely populated raions in 1957,



In the postwar period, the rural population was largest around 1948-1949 --at which time the wartime soldiers had all been demobilized<sup>35</sup>. Then the kolkhoz population fell short by more than 150,000 souls (approximately 15%) of the figure of January 1, 1941. One source estimates an approximate loss in the largest oblast' towns of 40,000 between 1939 and 1950 (therefore amounting to a loss of less than 10%)<sup>36</sup>.

The estimate of 941,500, which a Soviet publication gives for the rural population in April 1956, seems on the surface hard to reconcile with the fact that in 1952 (according to another, probably more reliable, source) less than 700,000 people were living in households on collective farms<sup>37</sup>. Some 300,000 people in that case would have been

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had 1.8 million inhabitants (see Tables 1 and 2; see also V.3 for Boitsov's letter of May 1946 on the emigration).

<sup>35</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 11.1/2. In the USSR as a whole, the kolkhoz population had fallen by 18% in late 1944 in comparison with 1940, and the able-bodied workers on the collective farms even by 38% (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*.... p.42). Male kolkhoz workers had decreased from 14.6 million in 1940 to 5.1 million at the end of 1945, i.e. by 2.9 times. By late 1945 in the USSR, the number of adult and underaged (teenagers between twelve and sixteen in this case) kolkhozniks, who actually worked on the collective farms, was still 18.7% less than in 1940, in spite of the arrival of the first two waves of demobilized soldiers (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*.... p.44).

<sup>36</sup>*Kalininskaia oblast' za 50 let*.... p.13. Nelidovo was not a part of the oblast between 1944 and 1957. The towns of Kalinin, Bezhetsk, Bologoe, Vyshnii Volochek, Kashin, Kimry, Konakovo, Ostashkov, Rzhev, and Torzhok had according to a census of December 1939 476,500 inhabitants; according to the estimate made in this publication, in 1950 they combined for a total of 435,300; this number confirms more or less Boitsov's of 1946. The share of urban inhabitants in the oblast' rose from 27% in 1939, to 30% in 1946, and 44% in 1959; in the USSR as a whole, it rose from 33% in January 1940, to 40% in 1951 (see Table 2; *Sovetskaiia derevnia*.... p.106).

<sup>37</sup>Compare *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo*.... p.6 with Table 14. *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo*.... p.25 indicates a supposed number of kolkhoz households of 216,949 on January 1, 1957 --that is more than 26,000 less than on January 1, 1952. If the household size --as was shown above-- was on average three persons, then about 650,000 people were living on kolkhozy in early 1957. It is rather curious, but probably true, that an additional 300,000 people lived among them, who did not work or live in the kolkhozy --certainly if only 8,500 people worked in 1956 on the oblast' sovkhozy (*Narodnoe Khoziaistvo*.... p.54). The number of 941,500 for April 1956 was an estimate that was probably somewhat off because the statistician(s) may have only looked at the results of the last Census of 1939, held eighteen

living in 1956 in the countryside without residing on collective farms. It is rather surprising to find that almost one third of the people who lived in the countryside after the war did not participate in the collective farm system. Between 1945 and 1953, only a few worked on state farms. Aside from them, there were craftsmen, such as construction workers, cobblers, and the like. Others had full-time jobs in the lumber, brick, or peat industry, while still others probably were permanent MTS, transport, services, government, and administration workers. Their dependents, and here and there some pensioners, should be added in order to fully comprehend the existence of such a large non-kolkhoz group of rural dwellers.

In the kolkhozy, the population decline was 151,500 (15%) between 1941 and 1949, in the last year of which the postwar collective farm population was at its peak<sup>38</sup>. After 1949, the number of people living in the countryside started to drop once more. The number of people working in the economy outside the kolkhozy in September 1950 was almost the same number working in these occupations in September 1940<sup>39</sup>. However, according to official numbers on January 1, 1951, 230,000 fewer people lived in the kolkhozy compared to

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years earlier and probably false! The number might have been partially an extrapolation on the basis of the results of that Census or, perhaps, on the basis of the 1926 Census. A substantial increase in size occurred in 1957, when nine raions were added to the oblast', so that it increased by 17,100 km<sup>2</sup>. Thus in 1959 it was about 25% larger in size than in 1956--., but the Census of January 1959 counted only 200,000 people more than the estimate for April 1956 (Compare to *Kalininskaia oblast' za 50 let...*, pp.11/12). It seems to be true that many lived in the countryside without being kolkhozniks (Kerblay, p.329, footnote 1; see above): the workers in certain industries that were rurally based, some rural artisans, and there was an extraordinary number of small bureaucrats and government officials living there, particularly in the raion centres (see as well Abramov, p.69 and pp.70-72). The brick factory in Diagilovo near Udoml'ia was an example of one of the rurally based factories (testimony of V.P. Krylov and M.A. Smirnov in the survey).

<sup>38</sup>See Table 14.

<sup>39</sup>See Table 33.

January 1, 1941, and there were 160,000 adult and 27,500 teenage able-bodied workers fewer. The total labour population --apart perhaps from full-time Party workers who have not been accounted for in the statistical sources-- was in early 1941 about 940,000, but in early 1951 only about 744,000<sup>40</sup>. The loss of labour had virtually been completely sustained by the collective farms.

In late 1950, women formed 57.7% of the non-kolkhoz work force; by January 1, 1951, women represented 68.5% of the work force of able-bodied adults on the collective farms. In January 1941, women had already formed a startling 62.0% of the able-bodied adult work force on the kolkhozy!<sup>41</sup>. This number makes one wonder even more why so few women acquired leading positions within the highest Party and government levels of the oblast' during or after the war.

The average annual natality between January 1946 and January 1949 was slightly above 30,000<sup>42</sup>. The annual natural growth can be calculated from the numbers given in Table 5, and must have been roughly 10,000 per year. It is likely that the natural growth of the population was higher after 1948, because the worst postwar deprivations (particularly emphasised in 1946 and 1947) were finally over. In April 1956, if we are to accept the estimate of one statistical handbook, the same number of people lived in the oblast' as in 1946. This shows the level of migration in a period when there was not much of a loss due to "Unnatural Deaths" as in the pre-1946 period. The

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<sup>40</sup>That is, if the labour population on January 1, 1941, was composed of 351,000 workers and employees and 590,000 teenage and adult kolkhozniks, and on January 1, 1951, of 348,000 workers and employees and 396,000 kolkhozniks (see Tables 14 and 33).

<sup>41</sup>See Tables 14, 33 and 34. In the USSR in 1950, 56% of the total population was female (see Ryan, Prentice, Table 1.7, p.13).

<sup>42</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.57.

surplus resulting from natural growth disappeared through emigration, a process that has continued until our time, when the oblast' --although of a larger size than in April 1956-- still contains 1.6 million inhabitants<sup>43</sup>.

In spite of the above estimates, for lack of trustworthy statistics, it is impossible to reconstruct conclusively the exact population movement in the oblast' for the period 1926-1959<sup>44</sup>. It is therefore also unrealizable to assess the precise causes of the population losses. From 1929 onwards, the collectivization, the purges, and the war led to innumerable "Unnatural Deaths."<sup>45</sup> The deprivations of the 1930s probably caused a dramatic plunge in the natural growth rate of the population at that time as well<sup>46</sup>. After the war, the migration of locals to areas outside the oblast' continued to deplete the populace of the 'Tver' province, as it had done since perhaps the 1850s and still does even today: it caused the total number of inhabitants to remain from 1946 onwards virtually stagnant for the next forty-five years.

## VII.2 Population Growth and Health

In the 19th century the 'Tver' guberniia had a very high child mortality, even in comparison with the neighbouring guberniias of

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<sup>43</sup>See Tables 2 and 4.

<sup>44</sup>For reasons of convenience 1.6 million --which was probably not too far from the actual number of the oblast' population-- is considered to be the population between 1945-1953.

<sup>45</sup>A term used by a dissident who, as a resident of Kalinin in the 1970s, tried to establish the extent of the demographic consequences of Stalin's policies for the USSR (Iosif G. Dyadkin, Unnatural Deaths in the USSR, 1928-1954. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983).

<sup>46</sup>As was expressed in the decrease of the average household size in the countryside.

Novgorod and Pskov<sup>47</sup>. During the years from 1887 through 1891, on average 344 per 1,000 newborn children died as infants annually. The mortality in the guberniia in general was 40.1 per 1,000 annually in the years 1860-1869, 36.3 in 1895, and 38 in 1901. As is clear from the numbers in the table, during the immediate postwar years the death rate of newborns was by comparison significantly lower<sup>48</sup>. Although the statistics are incomplete, the average percentage of infant deaths constituted roughly 10% of the number of births in 1945-1947, a plummet of more than three times, even in the economically tormented postwar period<sup>49</sup>. On the other hand, twenty-two per hundred children died before reaching the age of one in 1940<sup>50</sup>. This indicates an improvement in healthcare with respect to babies in the Kalinin oblast' in the war and postwar years<sup>51</sup>.

<sup>47</sup>See G.S. Mazanov, N.A. Frolova, "Zdravookhranenie Tverskoi gubernii-Kalininskoi oblasti za 50 let Sovetskoi vlasti," in Zdravookhranenie Kalininskoi oblasti za 50 let. Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1967, pp.5-24, p.6. In Novgorod guberniia the child mortality was in this period annually 326 per 1,000; in Pskov guberniia 287 per 1,000; in Russia as a whole 269 per 1,000.

<sup>48</sup>See Table 5.

<sup>49</sup>See Tables 5 and 6. Table 6 is based on reports of the head of the militsiia of the oblast' to the first obkom secretary on the monthly population movement. In the 1980s the mortality rate of children before one year old per 1,000 newborn would be approximately five times lower in the RSFSR and more than four times the USSR than in the immediate post-war period in the Kalinin oblast' (see Soiuznye respubliki, p.50):

Mortality of children before the age of one per 1,000 newborns.

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
RSFSR	20.7	19.3	19.4	18.9	17.8	17.4
USSR	26.0	25.4	25.4	24.7	22.7	21.8

<sup>50</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.67; MGB chief Dekushenko noticed in 1951 that, in 1950, the mortality of children up to one year old had fallen by 3.8 times in comparison to 1940 (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.146).

<sup>51</sup>Already in 1943, the death rate of newborns had fallen to 17.9 per 100, and reached 9.9 per 100 in 1945 (see Table 5). Nevertheless I.A. Rulov lost a daughter in a birthing house (*roddom*) in the early 1950s to pneumonia (testimony of I.A. Rulov in the survey). One of the unintentional consequences of the Second World War was an improvement of healthcare - as in the West too-, owing to the discovery of penicillin and other advances.

Abortion had been illegal in the USSR since 1936 (only to become legal once more in 1955)<sup>52</sup>. As everywhere at different times and in different places, the prohibition of abortion did not stop women from having them. The head of the oblast' health department, Lapchenko, reported in early 1949 to first secretary Vorontsov that, in 1947, 3,681 abortions had been performed, and that in 1948 the number had more than doubled and reached 7,802<sup>53</sup>. The figure must have disturbed Lapchenko and Vorontsov, since the same report mentions a total number of newborns up to one year old in the oblast' of about 34,000<sup>54</sup>. The actual number of abortions was probably even higher, for it seems unlikely that all abortions would be uncovered by the health department. Lapchenko noted that the incidence of abortions was particularly high in the larger towns but, although he did not suggest this in his report, it is likely that many abortions performed in the countryside escaped the authorities' attention<sup>55</sup>. In order to combat the high level of abortions, the oblispolkom had instructed the lower soviets to organize special committees, composed of trade union and social organizations' representatives. In 1947, a female doctor was put on trial for performing abortions<sup>56</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup>E.g.: Kurganoff, p.140 or Mazanov, Frolova, "Zdravookhranenie...", p.12. The decree on the prohibition of abortion was issued by the Central Executive Committee and the Sovnarkom of the USSR on June 27, 1936. In 1955 a decree of the Supreme Soviet was issued by which once more abortions were allowed (A.I. Lagutiaeva, "Razvitie rodovspomozheniia v Kalininskoi oblasti," pp.66-72, in *Zdravookhranenie...* p.71).

<sup>53</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.56.

<sup>54</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.57. In 1948 there were 400,000 children younger than fourteen in the oblast', and 23% was younger than three-years-old. Therefore around 8.5% of the 400,000, or 34,000, was younger than one.

<sup>55</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.56. In all likelihood, Lapchenko did not want to give Vorontsov the idea that his department was incompetent in these matters.

<sup>56</sup>Pako, 147/4/1413, 1.83ob.

Russians are often quite prudish about their sex life; at least, in the survey the subject of abortion was hardly ever mentioned. Once or twice someone mentioned that it had been prohibited at the time. However, many respondents, male and female, expressed that they would have liked to have had more children<sup>57</sup>. Some pointed to the difficult life at the time, when asked why they did not have or want more children. Quite a few women and men mentioned unspecified "health reasons" of the wife of a couple as the reason for not being able to have more children. It is not inconceivable to conclude that some women's reproductive organs were actually damaged during illegal abortions at this time. For, according to the above numbers, at least one in five pregnancies was illegally terminated in 1948<sup>58</sup>.

Altrichter describes two cases of the murder of newborn babies by their mother in the 1920s<sup>59</sup>. In August 1946, a kolkhoz accountant was excluded from the Party and sentenced to five years of imprisonment for infanticide<sup>60</sup>. The frequency of this practice is unclear, although in this case it is surely remarkable that the accountant was a full member of the Communist Party. This act must have been resorted to in desperation, and one can only guess at the

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<sup>57</sup>E.g. the testimonies of V.P. Krylov, V.I. Gaganova, V.F. Akimova, O.M. Riabova, A.V. Zelentsov, S.M. Volkov, N.I. Komarov, A.N. Ivanova, N.P. Golubev (I), Z.M. Vinogradova, V.F. Nepriaev, N.N. Osipova-Kozlova, N.N. Golubeva, F.K. Romashova, M.N. Nadyseva (whose infant son died in the difficult 1941-1942 period), P.A. Kushinov, Kh.I. Leibovich, N.A. Zabelin, V.E. Tsvetkov, A.A. Kondrashov, N.D. Eliseev, A.N. Nikolaev, A.S. Lukovkin, N.S. Loshkarev, L.V. Vedernikova, M.I. Potemkina, M.I. Veselova, E.V. Baranova, S.V. Kudriashov, T.E. Volodina, E.S. Shirogenkova, G.V. Lubov, Z.I. Simkina, L.P. Felkova D.A. Dikushin, A.V. Skobeleva, N.A. Smirnova (who had a stillborn child) and M.A. Smirnov in the survey.

<sup>58</sup>The first wife of V.F. Nepriaev died in 1927 due to a badly performed abortion (testimony of V.F. Nepriaev in the survey); see Chapter I. More general explanations for the fall in birthrate after the war are given by V.I. Kozlov (V.I. Kozlov, "Dinamika...", p.9).

<sup>59</sup>Altrichter, p.126.

<sup>60</sup>Pako, 147/4/57, 1.542.

motive of the mother, be it mental instability, the fear of being ostracized by her community, or the fear of being unable to provide for the child. It does, however, show the survival of certain practices which Communism had not been able to eradicate.

The head of the oblast' health department, Lapchenko, stated in a report to Vorontsov in 1949 the priorities of his department in the Fourth Five Year Plan: "...[the] steady increase of the natural growth of the population, b/ the decrease of infant mortality..." were two of them<sup>61</sup>.

In early 1949, Vorontsov received Lapchenko's report on the population movement in the oblast' between 1940 and 1948, from which the above quote is taken. The document is part of a record that is called Materials on the execution of the obkomburo of the V/KZ(b) on the improvement of the medical service of the population of the oblast'<sup>62</sup>. During the war, from 1942 to 1945, even without the losses that ensued from native sons falling at the battlefield and the victims of Nazi crimes, the oblast' experienced a reduction of its population due to a surplus of deaths over births<sup>63</sup>. Particularly 1942 and 1943 were dismal years, when, if we take the population residing in the oblast' (not away at the front, etc.) as 1.5 million, the natural population decrease would have been around 25,000 to 30,000 annually. The death rate of newborn children came close to that of the 'Iver' guberniia in the 19th century, when in 1942 more than twenty-eight newborns per hundred died --in fact, the infant death rate in that year in the oblast'

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<sup>61</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.42.

<sup>62</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, the report on the population can be found on ll. 42-70. See Tables 5 and 7.

<sup>63</sup>It is safe to assume that in 1941 there was a population loss as well.



was higher than the annual rate for the whole of Russia in the five-year period from 1887-1891!

It is relatively surprising that the overall mortality of the winter of 1945-1946 surpassed once more the natality, while 1945 supposedly was a good agricultural year for the oblast<sup>64</sup>. The seasonal fluctuations in Table 6 are logical: the mortality was the highest in March, when winter reached an end and the reserves in the countryside were becoming scant.

Although the mortality, both overall and for newborn children, was significantly higher in 1947 than in 1946 or 1948, its numbers are still in fact lower than the numbers for 1940<sup>65</sup>. The quality of medical care may have improved during the war, so that less people died on average after 1944 than during 1941-1944, even in a year of deprivation such as 1947. The connection between the economic situation in 1947 and the flagging birthrate was actually made in the report of Lapchenko to Vorontsov of 1949:

...the fall in births began in the second half of 1947, in connection with the economic peculiarities of 1946, and reached a minimum in April-May 1948, and then the curve of the quantity of births rises, but the general annual total did not reach the level of 1947.<sup>66</sup>

Indeed, the peak of births in the early postwar period seems to have been reached in August 1946, when the natality was almost twice as high as in May 1948<sup>67</sup>. Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate

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<sup>64</sup>See Table 6.

<sup>65</sup>See Table 5.

<sup>66</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.67.

<sup>67</sup>See Table 6. Nevertheless, in the first postwar years the birthrate for the oblast' was less than half of that of the USSR as a whole in 1928 (44.3 per 1,000), and also far less than in the 1930s in the Soviet Union in general (e.g. in 1930: 41.2 per 1,000; in 1935: 31.6 per

the demographic numbers between November 1946 and June 1947, which makes it difficult to assess the impact of the drought of 1946 on population numbers in the Kalinin oblast<sup>68</sup>.

The mortality of 1947 was higher than that of 1948, which confirms the existence of economic hardships<sup>69</sup>. It also caused the postponed effect of a drop in the birthrates. Child mortality was high in July, August, and September 1947, a confirmation of the difficult circumstances that were connected with the drought of 1946<sup>70</sup>. The

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1,000; in 1938: 38.7 per 1,000) (Gordon, Klopov, Footnote 1, p.162). In the Kalinin oblast', the birthrate was for 1946 20.2 per thousand, for 1947 21.4 per thousand, and for 1948 19.4 per thousand inhabitants (see Table 5).

<sup>68</sup>It is perhaps telling that no figures for that period could be unearthed. Someone, somewhere along the line, be it in the obkom *apparats*, be it in the former Party archive, might have tried to discard them, or entered them in some file that specifically dealt with the consequences of the serious economic situation. I was also unable to find further demographical numbers for the period after November 1948. I.M. Volkov experienced similar problems with regards to the sources about the drought when he prepared for an article on its precise extent a few years ago (I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.3). "In the documents of these times --materials of local Soviets, party organizations, among which different calculation materials sent to central organs, the difficulties that were experienced by the kolkhoz, the raion, the oblast', the republic, as a rule, were played down. With respect to the very poor situation of the population, malnutrition, famine and illnesses connected with it, data, being especially secret, are not mentioned in the documents.... Little can the researcher find in materials of medicine and health-care statistics. They are not complete, in them are only facts given about doctors' and hospital institutes, which did not envelop a large part of the rural population, who on top of that seldom turned to these institutes for aid. Apart from that, not without grounds it was noticed at the plenum of the scientific-medical sanitary-statistical commission of the Ministry of Healthcare of the USSR (December 1946), that considerable smoothing over was perpetrated in the accounts of the medical institutions, with respect to the severity of the situation, and to downplaying of the extent of illness" (ibid.). Apparently, the authorities in Moscow declined the suggestion to investigate the exact extent of sickness among the population in 1947, because of which precise data about the famine remained unknown there (I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.3). V.F. Zima confirms Volkov's opinion that some of the statistics sent to Moscow are rather suspect (V.F. Zima, "Golod v Rossii 1946-1947 godov," in: *Otechestvennaia istoria*, 1, 1993, pp.35-52, p.44).

<sup>69</sup>See Table 6. Although the effects of the drought probably were less severe in the Kalinin oblast' than in more southern areas, the overall situation in the Soviet Union caused hardships here as well (see I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.4 and p.7; see also Zima, p.41). Zima maintains that the rural population in the Kalinin oblast' declined as a consequence of the high mortality in 1947 (Zima, p.42).

<sup>70</sup>See Tables 5 and 6; both the inadequate nutrition of the mother during pregnancy and the scarcities of the pre-harvest period could have been responsible for this phenomenon. In the

total amount of deaths in 1947 for the summer months of June until September was always higher than 2,000, while in the summers of 1945, 1946, and 1948 consistently and considerably less than 2,000 died monthly. The explanation for the growth in absolute numbers of the death rate in the months from July 1946 onwards, compared to the same period the year before, can only be the devastation of the drought that struck the Soviet Union, although it is unsure to what extent the aridity afflicted the Kalinin oblast<sup>71</sup>. There is a report on the instance of epidemical diseases in 1947 and 1948, where it appears actually that the number of epidemic patients in 1947 was significantly lower than in 1948<sup>72</sup>. Unless there was an epidemic of an untitled disease, it cannot be maintained that the cause of this significant proportional and absolute rise of child mortality and the slight increase of the overall mortality was some rampant outbreak of disease<sup>73</sup>.

Another, far less likely, explanation for the rise in mortality in 1947 might stem from the return of demobilized soldiers, some of whom might have been enfeebled because of injuries sustained in fighting. Although the reports do not explicitly mention this, there is no doubt that the deaths of oblast' inhabitants in the army are not accounted for in the demographic numbers.

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USSR as a whole the infant mortality increased by 81%, which was more than in the Kalinin oblast' (Zima, p.42; compare to Table 5).

<sup>71</sup>Lapchenko referred to "...economic peculiarities of 1946,...", which told on the birthrate in the second half of 1947, and led to a low point in births in April/May of 1948 (see above; Pako, 147/4/1549, l. 67). The mortality rate was also higher in 1947 in comparison with 1946 or 1948 (see Table 5). However, there is no indication of large-scale starvation in 1947 in the records. In March 1947, Vorontsov spoke of a drought that had touched large parts of European part of the USSR in 1946, but he did not seem to imply that the Kalinin oblast' had been exposed to it (Pako, 147/4/528, l.13).

<sup>72</sup>See Table 7.

<sup>73</sup>See Table 5.

The abrupt influence of the law that rendered divorces so much more difficult in 1944 is reflected in Table 4. The effect of the postwar euphoria, and of the return of the Red Army soldiers home can be seen in the rise of marriages from May 1945 onwards<sup>74</sup>. Interestingly, although probably quite logically, the marriage rate is the highest in the winter of 1945/1946. This may indicate the continued popularity of the traditional time for weddings in the countryside --and perhaps even in the towns, where many people had partially grown up in the countryside-- as was noticed by Altrichter<sup>75</sup>. After Stalin's collectivization as well, the wintertime saw fewer economic activities in the village.

There is an interesting phenomenon noticeable in the demographic results for 1948, when Lapchenko's report to Vorontsov specified which towns and raions had higher mortalities overall and for newborn children<sup>76</sup>. The death rate was generally higher in the part of the oblast' that had escaped German occupation, than in areas which had been occupied<sup>77</sup>. The same is true for infant mortality.

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<sup>74</sup>See Table 6. Since divorce had become extraordinarily difficult, it seemed somewhat redundant when, in March 1951, the MGB head Dekushenko rejoiced over the fact that the number of divorces had fallen by 2.5 times in 1950 in comparison with 1940 (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.146). The number of registered weddings in 1950 was 1.5 times as high as in 1940.

<sup>75</sup>Altrichter, p. 64.

<sup>76</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 11. 67/68.

<sup>77</sup>A higher general mortality than the average of 13.1 per 1,000 was recorded for the towns of Vyshnii Volochek, Torzhok, Kimry, Bologoe, and Bezhetsk; however, in formerly occupied Kalinin and Rzhev, the mortality was lower than the oblast' average. The formerly occupied raions in which the average was higher were those of Ostashkov, Emel'ianovo, and Vysoko; Mednoe and Kalinin raions, although certainly in German hands in November 1941, were not mentioned in Karelinov's report on the raions on which the heaviest damage was inflicted by the war (see Table 10); in these two raions as well, the average was slightly higher than in the entire oblast'. However, in twenty-one of the non-occupied raions the average was higher. The average mortality for newborns was in all towns of the oblast', except for Bologoe, higher than 9 per 100, the oblast' average for 1948. Again, however, the rate in the town of Rzhev, completely destroyed in the war, was only 0.5% higher than

It is dangerous to draw too far-reaching conclusions on the basis of these demographic numbers, but it may be proposed that life in the formerly occupied areas was somewhat better than in the east. On the one hand --in order to give them a chance to recuperate from the war devastation-- all kinds of dispensation from payments were granted, in particular from rural taxation; a lower level of plan and procurement targets was established for these areas. As a consequence, the workers and peasants in these areas might have been materially slightly better provided for than those in the eastern part of the oblast', which is then expressed in the lower mortality of the west.

On the other hand, it could be that, in the temporarily occupied areas, many physically weaker inhabitants had succumbed to the exceptional hardships during the war. Those who survived were, comparatively, physically stronger than the inhabitants of the eastern areas. Hence the lower overall mortality in the western raions.

The majority of the births in the countryside took place traditionally at home. After the war, most births were assisted by official midwives (*akusherka*), thanks to which the involvement of "ignorant old women" (*nevezhestvennye babki*) had been reduced to almost zero<sup>78</sup>. In 1940, merely 67.7% of the births in rural locations were assisted by official midwives, but already by 1945 the proportion had escalated to 91.6%<sup>79</sup>. By 1948, only 4.5% of home births were

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the oblast' average, and much lower than in Kimry, Vyshnii Volochek, or Torzhok. Only Ostashkov and Zubtsov rural raions had an above average of deaths of newborns among the formerly occupied territories, while eleven non-occupied raions were above the average.

<sup>78</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.56.

<sup>79</sup>These numbers refer only to the first half year 1940, 1945, and 1948; the ameliorated medical supervision was probably another cause of the decrease in infant mortality.

unsupervised. Meanwhile in urban areas, all births were administered by official medical personnel.

Apart from abortions and child mortality, the oblast' health department in 1949 was concerned with diminishing the incidence of tuberculosis, infectious diseases, and illnesses of the metabolism and blood-circulation systems<sup>80</sup>. Cases of typhoid and malaria were still regularly found in the oblast'. Malaria, however, seems to have been on the way to extermination<sup>81</sup>. A large prophylactic program between 1948 and 1953 curbed the incidence of this disease from more than 8,000 cases in 1948 to thirty-three cases in 1953.

Lapchenko's report promised that syphilis and other venereal diseases would soon be fully liquidated. However, in certain areas syphilis had recently increased. The disease had also worried Boitsov immediately after the war<sup>82</sup>. The health-care department was then led by one D. Fedotov, who reported the following to Boitsov:

Through written and oral evidence from the raion of Olenino, it has been established that a substantial number of cases of venereal disease are found here, largely among the repatriated citizens.<sup>83</sup>

On July 30, 1945, there were fifty-two cases of syphilis (thirty-five of which were in the fatal third stage), and seventeen cases of

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<sup>80</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.42.

<sup>81</sup>A.P. Korzhenevskaja, A.A. Lebedeva, N.P. Nikiforov, "Likvidatsiia zaboлеваemosti maliariei v Kalininskoi oblasti," in: *Zdravookhranenie Kalininskoi oblasti za 50 let*. Moskva: Moskovskii rabochii, 1967, pp. 113-117, p.116. Their numbers were confirmed by those of Lapchenko in the report on which the table on the cases of epidemic diseases in the Kalinin oblast' is based (see Table 7).

<sup>82</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, II.172-174.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., 1.172.

gonorrhea in this raion<sup>84</sup>. In an additional report it was noticed that there were quite a few more cases in reality, inasmuch as not all who had returned from the German camps had undergone medical examinations. The war had significantly aggravated the incidence of venereal disease among the population, but subsequently the number of cases of syphilis treated in the hospitals ebbed from 1,991 in 1946 to 782 in 1948<sup>85</sup>. Cases of gonorrhea also decreased from 1,469 in 1946 to 843 in 1948.

Cases of infectious diseases had decreased in absolute numbers between 1940 and 1948<sup>86</sup>. If Smirnov's numbers are to be trusted, then

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<sup>84</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, 1.172-174. It is hard to believe that some of these advanced cases could have been contracted in German camps, as there are normally very long periods between the manifestation of the different stages of the disease. Some must have been infected before June 1941.

<sup>85</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.54.

<sup>86</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 11.61/62; see Table 7. It is likely that the infection with contagious diseases was not as lethal as before the First World War. In 1913, almost 700 people died in the guberniia of diseases such as measles, typhoid, smallpox, scarlet fever, whooping cough, diphtheria, and so on (V.S. Smirnov, "Bor'ba s infektsiiami v Kalininskoi oblasti," pp.35-40; in *Zdravookhranenie...*, p.36). Smirnov noted, too, that many of these infections were not registered before the Revolution, as the peasants were often treated by "natural healers" or "wise women," practising traditional folk medicine (Smirnov, "Bor'ba...", p.35). It should be pointed out that 1940 was also a difficult year for the USSR, because of the war with Finland (Zima, p.41). The war led to an insufficient supply of foodstuffs, a decrease of the birthrate and an increase of mortality, according to Zima. In the Great Patriotic War the figures for registered cases of contagious diseases increased in Kalinin oblast' (Smirnov, "Bor'ba...", pp.37 and 39): in 1942 roughly seven in 1,000 inhabitants had spotted fever, two in 1,000 diphtheria, five in 1,000 malaria, three in 1,000 measles. In 1935, 0.3 per 1,000, in 1940, 0.1 per 1,000 had had spotted fever, and respectively 0.9 and 1.4 diphtheria, and 1.8 and 7.9 malaria. In 1944, 1.3 had spotted fever of 1,000 inhabitants, 0.7 diphtheria, ten malaria, and eight measles. In 1945 0.8 had spotted fever, 0.3 diphtheria, 3.9 malaria, and 2.3 measles. If one estimates the oblast' population at 1.6 million in 1947 and 1948, then in 1947, 0.7 cases of spotted fever among 1,000 inhabitants were diagnosed and 0.2 cases in 1948, in 1947, 4.6 cases of measles and in 1948, 6.9 cases, in 1947, 0.2 cases of diphtheria and in 1948, 0.3 cases, and 6.6 cases of malaria in 1947 and 5.2 in 1948 (see Table 7). The incidence of spotted fever declined therefore after a peak in the beginning of the war to prewar levels. Diphtheria fell during the war to a level that was far lower than before the war and remained there after the war. Malaria only increased after 1935, and started initially to decrease slowly, and then rapidly, after 1947 approximately (as Smirnov noted, the rise in infection with malaria had been a consequence of the construction of a dam near Kimry and the creation of the Muscovian Sea (*Mostovskoe more*), a lake in the south of the oblast' --a result of the

Lapchenko had taken into account the diminished size of the oblast' in 1948 in comparison to 1940<sup>87</sup>. Smirnov may have used the figure of approximately 2.1 million for 1940, because then his weighed numbers on spotted fever, diphtheria, and malaria for 1940 would correspond roughly to the absolute numbers of Lapchenko for the same year if the population was of this size<sup>88</sup>. But the oblast' in 1948 had a population of around 1.6 million<sup>89</sup>. If one takes this decrease in population numbers into account, the incidence of particularly dysentery and diphtheria had certainly fallen by 1948, and the incidence of typhoid and malaria was decreasing as well, though more gradually<sup>90</sup>. However, the occurrence of spotted fever, scarlet fever, and measles was far more frequent than before the war. The increased incidence of spotted fever had apparently begun in 1942 and, only in the summer and autumn of 1948, it began to near its prewar level. This rise was obviously aggravated by the ravages of the war and perhaps the wretched economic circumstances of 1946-1947<sup>91</sup>. This was more or less admitted by Lapchenko, who indicated that, after repeated discussions

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construction of the Moskva-Volga Canal in 1935-1937 (Smirnov, "Bor'ba...", p.37)). Measles are mainly contracted by children, which might explain the somewhat irregular pattern of development of the disease. Smirnov's numbers and those of Table 7 should be treated with caution, since not all cases of diseases were registered (I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.3). One recent article notices a distinctive increase of spotted fever in 1947 in the Kalinin oblast', which is somewhat confirmed by the numbers of Table 7 (Zima, p. 40). Nevertheless, the registered cases of spotted fever in 1947 were much less in number than those of 1942 or 1944 or even 1945. Therefore Zima's reference to the Kalinin oblast' as an area that was particularly severely plagued by typhus in 1947 is perhaps unwarranted.

<sup>87</sup>That is, both used Boitsov' numbers of May 1946 (see VII.1).

<sup>88</sup>Smirnov noted 9 cases of spotted fever per 100,000 inhabitants, Lapchenko 204 in absolute numbers, 138 cases of diphtheria per 100,000 (Lapchenko 2,884), and 786 cases of malaria per 100,000 (Lapchenko 16,976) (Smirnov, "Bor'ba...", p.37).

<sup>89</sup>See Table 2.

<sup>90</sup>See Table 7.

<sup>91</sup>See above.



in 1947 and 1948 in the oblispolkom about the disease, measures had been taken to remedy the sanitary conditions in Kalinin, Rzhev, Torzhok, in Kimry raion, and in other raion centres. Public baths and wash houses had been repaired and reopened, and the hygiene of a number of communal apartments (*obshchezhitie*) had improved because of recent repairs. From this it can be deduced that the authorities had not been able to restore fully the prewar public utilities by 1948. Urban dwellers had in the spring of 1948 taken part in a campaign to clean their towns<sup>92</sup>.

In early 1949 the health department was aware of the utilitarian purpose of its task to strengthen the population's health, as it professed to fight for the minimization of job absenteeism for health reasons<sup>93</sup>. Similarly, the utmost effort was made to reintroduce war invalids into the work force. Control was to be exerted over the observance of sanitary and hygienic rules in all sectors of the economy. Although the prewar network of hospitals and clinics had been fully restored by early 1949, health-care institutions still fell short of the required norms, particularly in the formerly occupied areas<sup>94</sup>. Apart from that, even in September 1951 in certain raions, doctors had to perform surgery by the light of kerosene lamps, as there was no

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<sup>92</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.62.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., 1.42.

<sup>94</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 1.44. The veterinarian Nadezhda A. Smirnova was forced to treat people as well as animals, for the hospital was far away from the village where she was stationed (testimony of Nadezhda A. Smirnova in the survey). "Deliveries happened in maternity hospitals, but [the incidence of] child mortality, in fact, did not change in comparison with the 1920s: in 1940 it was even higher, than in 1926. A definitive step forward happened only at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s thanks to the appearance of antibiotics" (Gordon, Klopov, p.96).

electricity available yet in their area<sup>95</sup>! In 1953 in Rzhev raion, men, women, and children had to share the one available room in a hospital<sup>96</sup>.

The health department controlled the hygienic situation of the workers in the lumber and peat industries more strictly than in other branches of the economy. Since a significant amount of the labour force was composed of migrants, the threat of spotted fever had nevertheless not yet been eradicated there.

The dismal state of sanitary conditions in the towns was underlined in the report of 1949 to Vorontsov, when Lapchenko tried to explain the high frequency of intestinal diseases: typhoid fever, intestinal infections, and dysentery<sup>97</sup>. 60% of these cases occurred in the larger cities of the oblast', especially in Kalinin, Vyshnii Volochek, and Bezhetsk. In these last two towns, there was no good supply of drinking water. A general lack of sewerage added to the problems, and urban sanitation was badly organized. The lack of a good water supply led to an outbreak of typhoid fever in Bezhetsk and Vyshnii Volochek in 1948.

Among other diseases mentioned by Lapchenko, brucellosis should be noted<sup>98</sup>. It started to plague the livestock of the oblast' around 1945, sometimes contaminating human beings. In 1948, nineteen cases were registered.

The registered infections with epidemic diseases in 1949 can be followed in reports of Lapchenko to the head of the RSFSR anti-

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<sup>95</sup>Pako, 147/5/105, 1.24.

<sup>96</sup>Pako, 147/5/662, 1.69.

<sup>97</sup>Pako, 147/4/1549, 11. 62/63.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., 1.64.

epidemical direction, led by M.D. Shampanov<sup>99</sup>. These reports confirm Lapchenko's observation that typhoid fever and dysentery mainly occurred in the larger towns; for every ten-day period in 1949 reported on by Lapchenko, a minimum of a dozen cases of dysentery and always some cases of typhoid fever were registered in the town of Kalinin. Dysentery in the oblast' capital spread increasingly in the summer, and was at its peak in September, when more than forty cases for every ten-day period were recorded. While spotted and typhoid fever infections were restricted to singular cases in every ten-day period in 1949, dysentery presented a more serious dilemma. From July to September 1949, Torzhok was visited by a less virulent form of a disease under the name of dysentery, although it was not lethal in contrast to the more usual form of dysentery. 915 people fell ill, and 515 of them had to be hospitalized. This was the only instance of an outbreak of a real epidemic in 1949 in these reports.

General deprivation probably led to the fact that, in the early years of Stalinist industrialization of 1933 and 1934, the children in the town of Kalinin were smaller and weighed less than their Muscovite counterparts<sup>100</sup>. Moscow was, until recently, always better provided with goods in comparison to other locales in the former USSR, which may partially explain the discrepancy between the two groups at the time. But already by 1961 Kalinin's children matched the Muscovites in size, which seems to indicate improved nutrition of the children at least in the Khrushchev years. In comparison with the generation of

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<sup>99</sup>Ibid., II.71-179.

<sup>100</sup>V.V. Smolenskaia, "Uluchshenie fizicheskogo razvitiia detei g. Kalinina i Kalininskoi oblasti za gody Sovetskoi vlasti," pp.262ff., in: *Zdravookhranenie*..., p.267.

1933-1934, the children in the oblast' capital had gained substantially in average length and weight in 1961<sup>101</sup>. There are no data on the physical characteristics of children during or after the war, but because of other information about the standard of living it seems justified to assume that the children of the years 1945-1953 were only slightly bigger, if at all, than their counterparts of the early 1930s<sup>102</sup>.

No statistics on the average life span of the inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' could be found for the period, but it is probably true that those who had survived the war lived on average longer than their prewar peers, particularly because of the improved healthcare<sup>103</sup>.

### VII.3 Migration and Urbanization

Between 1941 and 1947 the collective farms lost 15,600 households and 214,200 people<sup>104</sup>. The depletion of able-bodied males was particularly pronounced, as their share fell by 47%. The impact of the war is obvious. In a letter written in May 1946, I.P. Boitsov asked

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<sup>101</sup>Smolenskaia, pp.263 and 265, Table 2. The average size of the thorax increased as well. Eight-year-old boys and girls were 5.5 centimeters taller in 1961 than in 1933-1934, 2.5 to 3 kilograms heavier and were about 1.4 centimeters broader; ten-year-olds were 10 centimeters taller, weighed 5 to 5.5 kilograms more and were 1 centimeter (for boys) or 2.38 centimeters (for girls) broader on average; thirteen-year-olds were 12-13 centimeters taller, 8.5 kilograms (for boys) or 10 kilograms (for girls) heavier, and had a thorax that was 5.2 centimeters wider in the case of boys, and 6.2 centimeters in the case of girls.

<sup>102</sup>See VII.3, VIII.2, and VIII.3 for example.

<sup>103</sup>See Gordon, Klopov, pp.113/114. There is a considerable gap between the average life span of men and women of the war generation (eighteen or older in 1945) in the USSR, who reached the age of sixty at the latest by 1987 (V.I. Kozlov, "Dinamika...", p.4). The average age of death of men in 1989 was sixty-five, of women almost seventy-four. The average life span of both men and women in the USSR at the end of the 1980s was at least five years shorter than in Western Europe.

<sup>104</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.1.

Central Committee secretary A.A. Kuznetsov and Gosplan head N. Voznesensky to except the Kalinin oblast' from further draining of its labour force<sup>105</sup>. He first described the losses incurred by the war, and then went on to plead his cause as follows:

'The labour force in the oblast' has sharply decreased, because of the departure in 1942 of more than 30,000 youth of the age of fourteen to fifteen from the raions through which the front line ran, to eastern areas of the country, and also because of the succeeding annual departure of youth from the oblast' as a consequence of the recruitment for *FZO* schools.

As a result of this [including the wartime population loss] a strained situation with respect to the labour force has occurred in agriculture.

According to calculations of the planning organizations of the oblast' for this year's period of harvest work in the oblast' agriculture, there will be an average shortage of 15% of workers, and in certain raions these shortages will reach 50%, and this in a situation when the sown area of the collective farms in the oblast' has only reached 88.7% of the prewar level.

The oblast' still stands before huge resurrection and construction labour as part of the Fourth Five Year Plan, in particular: the resurrection and reconstruction of the Kalinin railroad-car factory, the resurrection of the enterprises of the textile industry, the construction of a very large factory of artificial fibres, the construction of the Bezhetsk factory of agricultural machinery, the completion of the "Ekskavator" factory, the resurrection of the communal housing in the town of Kalinin, and so on.

In agreement with the resolutions of the government and the instructions of the Committee for the Registration and Distribution of the Labour Force under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, only for the second quarter of the current year 14,170 people are to be sent to industrial enterprises, transport, and construction work in the oblast', on the basis of the organized recruitment, resettlement, and labour obligations.

Notwithstanding the huge shortage of work hands in agriculture and the large demands for workers of industrial

<sup>105</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.132 and 1.135.

enterprises and construction organizations of the oblast', the depletion of the labour force of the oblast' continues.

In 1945, 6,156 people departed, in the first quarter of 1946, 1,000 people were made to leave, and the quota established for the second quarter of 1946 is 2,170.

Furthermore, in the second quarter of the current year, 200 households are to migrate to Sakhalin as a consequence of a resolution of the government.

This all aggravates even more the shortage of work hands.

Because of the difficulties that have risen with respect to the labour force, which will increase with the further development of the resurrection and construction labour, the obkom of the *VKP(b)* asks to free the oblast' further from the removal of work hands, including that of youth on the basis of recruitment in *FZO* schools outside the oblast'.<sup>106</sup>

A better illustration of the tremendous difficulties that ensued from the population decrease is difficult to find<sup>107</sup>.

The egress from the countryside to the city continued after the war. Particularly from the end of the 1940s (probably 1949) onwards, the number of kolkhoz households quickly dropped<sup>108</sup>. The kolkhozniks

<sup>106</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.132. Apart from the households that were to be transferred to Sakhalin in 1946, already in 1945 150 kolkhoz households had been moved to Karelia, another newly acquired territory of the Soviet Union (Pako, 147/3/2701, 1.202/203). These kind of moves were made attractive by offering larger private plots of land (in Karelia from 0.6 to 1 hectare per household), payments in cash, and freedom from taxation (in Karelia freedom from taxation for the years 1946-1948 was offered).

<sup>107</sup>In 1948, 600,000 kolkhozniks in the USSR were recruited for work in industry, one million worked in various seasonal occupations (logging, peatwinning) and an additional million were recruited into the "State Labour Reserves" (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., p.109; on the "State Labour Reserves," see Heller, Nekrich, p.321; Fainsod, *How...*, pp.348/349).

<sup>108</sup>See Table 14. Table 13 indicates about 1,300 households more in July 1946 than on January 1, 1949, while between 1946 and 1949 the population in the kolkhozy grew with the return of demobilized soldiers. They returned most of the time to already existing households, and did not set up one on their own. Perhaps an exodus had occurred in the difficult period of the fall, winter, and spring of 1946/1947 (On July 1, 1946, there seem to have been 5,000 households more in the collective farms than half a year later, on January 1, 1947; compare to I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.15, and Zima, p.43). However, the most likely explanation is a mistake in the arithmetic of one of the sources. Compare also Karasev, p.307: in Pskov oblast' lived 162,000 able-bodied kolkhozniks in 1947; there were only 99,000 left at the end of 1953. The postwar exodus was an "All-Union" phenomenon, according to a Soviet publication on agriculture in the immediate postwar period (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., p.47 and pp.108/109).

mainly left to work in state enterprises and organizations<sup>109</sup>. The situation was so somber that, in the early 1950s, some of the Party's observers noticed a surplus of labour available in the towns, while hardly any young able-bodied people could be found on the collective farms<sup>110</sup>. In January 1952, there were 20,700 fewer households (7.8%) in comparison with the situation at the end of 1948; worse still, the number of people fit to work had fallen by 85,600, or by 22.4% in three years<sup>111</sup>. Although in absolute numbers more women departed (50,400 or 19.6%), relatively more males flocked to the towns (35,100 or 28.1%). The 1953 report on this alarming development in agriculture listed specifically ten raions as suffering substantial losses in 1951; the geographic location of the raions seems not to be of much importance, as losses were sustained by the northern raion of Bologoe, the eastern raion of Kashin, the western raions of Olenino and Rzhev, and the raions of Likhoslavl' and Kalinin, which are more or less located in the middle of the oblast<sup>112</sup>. One has to conclude, therefore, that

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<sup>109</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.1.

<sup>110</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.271. See also the remarks on the town of Kashin in VI.2. The speaker exaggerated somewhat about the size of this un- or underemployed labour force, in that he considered housewives --of whom there cannot have been too many, since only a few families could afford to live off one income-- to be part of them. However, it was true that a significant amount of people engaged in all kinds of work outside the official economy. They are described by the same speaker as: "... people, of the so to say free professions, hanging about without any business at the market or around the market" (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.272). This opinion was shared by another speaker, the raikom secretary of Likhoslavl' raion, Pontiakov, at the same Party meeting (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.295).

<sup>111</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.2.

<sup>112</sup>The other raions were those of Vysoko, Kushalino, Novotorzhok, and Rameshki; the latter three are also in the middle and Vysoko is in the west. Then again, in September 1951, the raikom secretary of Mednoe noticed that he lost many of his cadres and of the population at large to nearby Kalinin, as did the neighbouring Kushalino raion (Pako, 147/5/11, 11.147/148). The gorkom secretary Volkonskii of the town of Torzhok warned in September 1952 that, after in 1951 the number of kolkhozniks in the Torzhok rural raion had fallen by 1,500, soon no kolkhozniks would be left of the 7,000 still living on the collective farms of the Novotorzhok raion (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.289). In Likhoslavl' raion the kolkhoz

these raions were cited merely because they were typical. The same development was taking place in the other rural areas. The tremendous egress seems not have been caused by a "pull" from the towns, or as a consequence of the war; people tried *everywhere* to escape from rural areas, once more evidence of the miserable existence in the countryside<sup>113</sup>. The direction taken by the migrants was dependent on the location of their kolkhoz: in the north of the oblast' most departed for Leningrad and its surrounding oblast', in the southern part people chose to go to Kalinin and other industrially developed centres within the southern parts of the oblast'<sup>114</sup>.

In early 1953, the obkom apparently ordered an honest report on the situation in the countryside and the causes for the continuing massive exodus; the commission entrusted with this task, besides coming up with the above migration numbers, decided to examine the

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population had decreased from 7,338 in 1947 to 4,048 in 1952, according to its first secretary in September 1952 (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.296).

<sup>113</sup>The anthropologists Anokhina and Shmeleva noticed, though, that the departure was not always everywhere similarly strongly developed in this period. They suggest that the likelihood of migration was dependent on two contingencies: the level of material well-being of the kolkhoz, and the distance to an urban centre (Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.65). According to a statement of 1951 of the raikom secretary of Kirov raion, Pontiakov, the same as the one above, even Communists had been leaving on their own initiative (Pako, 147/5/105, 1.38). Thus not only everywhere, but also virtually everyone tried to escape from the miserable existence on the kolkhoz. One phenomenon that was particular to the Kalinin oblast' might have facilitated the departure for the kolkhozniks: the tradition of *otkhodnichestvo*. In October 1953, Kiselev complained about the lack of action of local authorities towards those who left their kolkhozy to work somewhere in a non-agricultural occupation (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.195). A.E. Vakhmistrov hoped for an improvement in his life after the war, but the countryside continued to be "strangled" by the authorities, and all who could left (testimony of A.E. Vakhmistrov in the survey). V.K. Stepanov, who worked after his demobilization from the army as a MTS tractorist in his native raion of Maksatikha, left for Leningrad to study to be a train machinist, after he had heard that at the professional school for machinists in Leningrad one received clothes, food, and a stipend. This was far preferable over the difficult life he led in the countryside. He added that there were no prospects whatsoever for a normal existence in the countryside (testimony of V.K. Stepanov in the survey).

<sup>114</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.66; and probably to Moscow oblast' too, if they had the chance.



cases of the Likhoslavl' and Kirov raions more closely<sup>115</sup>. The commission's investigation of the two raions took place in November-December 1952, thus before Stalin's death, and after the Nineteenth Party Congress, when Malenkov had announced that the grain problem in the USSR had been solved. In Likhoslavl' raion, stretching along the October Railroad, the number of households between January 1, 1950, and November 1, 1952, dropped by 8.9%, but more telling was the plunge in population numbers, 25.1%, and of able-bodied workers, 30.6%<sup>116</sup>. Kirov raion, in the west, was located further away from the industrial artery of the oblast' along the October Railroad, but had experienced a similar reduction, for 15.2% of the households of the raion had left, 30.3% of the population, and 29.2% of the able-bodied workers. Over the same period in both raions, the number of members of kolkhoz *arteli*, who worked in organizations and enterprises instead of on farms, had doubled<sup>117</sup>. Relatively, when compared to the waning labour force of adult able-bodied workers, their share had tripled! More disturbing still for the authorities must have been the fact that, of the physically fit adults and teenagers who left the collective farms, around a third left without permission of the kolkhoz general meeting and the raion militsiia<sup>118</sup>. The latter issued the necessary certificates of leave and

<sup>115</sup>The report is to be found in Pako, 147/5/906, 11.1-18; compare to the maps.

<sup>116</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.3.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., 1.4 In Likhoslavl' raion the number grew from 442 (total kolkhoz population 16,829; adults able to work 6,202 --thus the 442 formed around 7% of the adult work force) in January 1950, to 869 in November 1952 (respectively 12,186; 4,299; about 20%), and in Kirov raion from 354 (25,920; 10,658; around 3%) to 736 (18,090; 7,531; almost 10%). Likhoslavl' raion had thirty-two kolkhozy in 1952, twenty-seven of which had Party organizations, with a total of 271 Communists; apart from that still four territorial Party organizations existed, which combined for a total of forty-four members and candidates (Pako, 147/5/426, 1.102).

<sup>118</sup>In the thirty-four months from January 1950 to November 1952, of 3,076 able-bodied people, starting from the age of twelve, in Likhoslavl' raion, 963 or 31%, left

passports. Further enquiry established that most able-bodied people who legally or illegally left in this period, had in the first place started to work for raion or oblast' organizations or enterprises<sup>119</sup>. Secondly, they had been called up by the army. Thirdly, they had disappeared to unknown destinations. Fourthly, some had begun to study, and then had left the oblast', or married --apparently sometimes a valid reason to leave one's kolkhoz and raion. Fifthly, others had been working as hired labourers --cattle herders, carpenters, and nannies are mentioned as examples of this (apparently, one could escape the kolkhoz sometimes as a nanny, whose work in that case was deemed more essential to the socialist reconstruction than work on the understaffed collective farm). Others had been arrested. Finally, some had died.

Many kolkhozniks illegally received their papers from the executive of their farm, when their cases had not been discussed at a general meeting of the kolkhoz members<sup>120</sup>. Furthermore, quite a few enterprises and organizations were engaged in the practice of hiring kolkhozniks who did not have their papers. An example was given of one peat-digging enterprise in Likhoslavl' raion, where in 1951 and 1952 more than 10% of the hired kolkhozniks lacked the obligatory certificate by which their kolkhoz allowed them to work outside the

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*samovol'no* (unauthorized); in Kirov raion these numbers were respectively 4,079 and 1,440 or 35%.

<sup>119</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.5. According to these statistics, very few people in both raions in those nearly three years had been arrested: in Likhoslavl' raion 80, in Kirov raion 103, that is, compared to the total able-bodied population --above 12 years old-- of respectively 7,240 and 12,911 on January 1, 1950, respectively 1.1% and 0.8%. If these numbers are correct, and there is not much reason to doubt them, then the arrests in the early 1950s in the countryside were considerably lower than the percentage in for example 1935-1937; compare to III.2, VI.2, and VI.3.

<sup>120</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 11.5/6.

collective farm<sup>121</sup>. This peat enterprise even recruited kolkhozniks who lacked permission to leave their farm. Some of the recruits came from as far away as Olenino or Kashin raions. The direction of the peat works was apparently plagued by the common evil of labour shortage. The illegal hiring by industrial managers was also noticed in a speech of the raikom secretary of the Kalinin rural raion in March 1951<sup>122</sup>. He added that kolkhozniks who had acquaintances or family in Kalinin managed to receive permission --thanks to their relatives or friends-- to build a house upon a plot of land in the town. At one point at the kolkhoz "Pobeda" in the middle of the night six trucks arrived, were then loaded with one of the kolkhozniks' possessions, and departed into the darkness. The following morning the brigadier wanted to give the work roster to the kolkhoznik, but neither he, nor his property were to be found.

The personal --and perhaps desperate-- initiatives of kolkhozniks come clearly to the fore in the following quote:

Members of a kolkhoz, who have been called up for the Soviet army or have left with the purpose of study, as a rule, do not return to their kolkhozy after demobilisation or the completion of their studies. A large number of kolkhozniks have moved to the raion centres or settlements in recent years and have brought their houses to these places. Many of them do not

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<sup>121</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1. 6. Interestingly enough, according to Anokhina and Shmeleva, after the war, many women went via the labour selection (*orgnabai*) to work in the peat enterprises in the summer months in order to earn money for a dowry (see Anokhina, Shmeleva, p. 67), another remnant of the past that survived! In general, both lumber and peat industries worked with a large contingent of seasonal workers: in the winter of 1948 the lumber industry of Maksatikha raion had 859 permanent workers and 3,200 seasonal workers, most of whom were kolkhozniks (Pako, 147/4/1125, 1.129).

<sup>122</sup>At the eighth oblast' Party conference (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.125).

have permanent employment, engage in private farming, artisanry, and take refuge in seasonal and temporary jobs.<sup>123</sup>

Those who remained living on their collective farm often failed to comply with the duties obliged of a kolkhoznik, for "...they work in local cooperative enterprises and do not take part in the socialized farming of the kolkhozy."<sup>124</sup>

Many of the roughly 10,000 kolkhozniks, who were annually selected through the recruiting system of labour forces for seasonal work in the forest and peat industries, failed to return to their farms. With the help of the passports they received at their temporary workplace, they tried to fare on their own, and made their families join them.

An important reason for this flight from the kolkhozy was the extremely low pay for the *trudoden*, as even the commission that produced the report of early 1953 had to admit. There was no standard for remuneration by *trudoden*. Its value depended on the economic performance of each kolkhoz, the extremely stingy price paid by the state for the obligatory deliveries, and the tasks performed by the kolkhoznik on the kolkhoz (a brigadier earned more than an ordinary brigade member, for example)<sup>125</sup>. In general, it is obvious that little of

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<sup>123</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.7. In 1951, after his three years of army service, N.A. Kotov did not return to his native village in the raion of Novotorzhok, where he had worked before on the kolkhoz. He began to work as metal worker on the cottonfibre *kombinat* "Proletarka" (testimony of N.A. Kotov in the survey).

<sup>124</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.7.

<sup>125</sup>Apparently, the *apparat* of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture hoped in 1946 that at the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-1950), the average kolkhoznik would be able to receive five kilograms of grain at least per *trudoden* (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., p.61). Even a Brezhnevite account had to admit that these estimates were completely out of touch with the real situation of Soviet agriculture (*ibid.*). The procurement prices of grain, potatoes, and other products that had to be delivered to the state as part of the obligatory deliveries were far below the cost-price of the production of these crops (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., pp.268/269).

the total income of the kolkhozy was given as remuneration to the kolkhozniks, both in money and in kind<sup>126</sup>. In 1949 and 1951 on average less than a quarter of a collective farm's cash income was distributed among its members; in 1950 it was almost one third. In 1949 the average kolkhoznik received payment out of almost one third of the total grain harvest, while in the subsequent two years the kolkhozniks were apportioned less than a quarter of grain production. Considering the overall low income of the kolkhozy, this cannot have made the work in the socialized sector of the collective farm very popular.

How little all this was per person can be calculated: the annual average amount of *trudodni* earned by each household in certain years is known; in 1950 this amount was 504, and in 1953 only 473<sup>127</sup>. There is information in the report on the average remuneration of one *trudoden'*: in 1951 on average per *trudoden'* the kolkhoznik received 85 kopecks, 765 grams of cereals harvested on his or her own kolkhoz, 704 grams

<sup>126</sup>See Table 22. In February 1946, N. Gur'ianov, the head of the kolkhoz organizational department of the agricultural department of the oblispolkom, described in Proletarskaia Pravda how the income of a kolkhoz was supposed to be distributed --according to the 1935 *Ustav* (PP 7962/Feb 20, 1946, p.2; on the *Ustav* see II.1). The annual accounts were made up around February of each year, when the payments for the delivered produce to the state had been received and the loan installments had been paid off; the MTS had been paid for their assistance; the necessary seeds for the upcoming spring sowing had been set aside; part of the grain and flax stock, in addition to the spring seeds, had been stored in reserve in case of calamities; crops for fodder had been subtracted; hired hands (some of those helped with harvesting, cattle herds) had been paid; and money had been deposited in the "indivisible fund" of the collective farm, which had to provide funds for the purchase of new equipment, tools, and cattle. After the subtraction of all this, produce in kind and some money was supposed to be available for the settling of the accounts of the individual kolkhozniks for the *trudodni* they had worked in the preceding year. On the height of the obligatory deliveries to the state and the payment of the MTS by the kolkhozy, see Sovetskaia derevnia..., p.263ff.

<sup>127</sup>See Tables 12 and 14. In 1949, the average amount of *trudodni* per able-bodied peasant was 301, in 1950, 325, according to a report on the state of the economy in the oblast', written just before the plenum that would release Konovalov from his duties in July 1951 (Pako, 147/5/36, I.112). In the USSR as a whole the average amount of *trudodni* earned per kolkhoznik was 250 in 1945; 239 in 1946 (although in areas where the drought did not hit as hard, such as the Kalinin oblast', the amount actually rose); and 243 in 1947 (Sovetskaia derevnia..., pp.193/194).

of potatoes and vegetables, and 777 grams of hay and straw and, in addition, the kolkhozniks were allotted 225 grams of wheat, received for delivered flax<sup>128</sup>. If a household worked on average 500 *trudodni* per year, which is a reasonable assumption provided the above numbers for 1950 and 1953 are correct, it thus received in 1951: 425 rubles, 382.5 kilograms of grain, 352 kilograms of potatoes and vegetables, and 388.5 kilograms of hay and straw, plus 112.5 kilograms of wheat. The average household size in 1951 was three. The average income for each household member, living on a kolkhoz, for work in the socialized sector of the collective farm in 1951 consequently amounted to 141.7 rubles, 127.5 kilograms of grain, 117.3 kilograms of potatoes and

<sup>128</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, II.2 and 7/8; compare to *Sovetskaja derevnia*..., p. 457, Table 68, which shows that in the whole of the Non-Black Earth Central Region in 1950 the money income of the *trudoden'* was even less on average (38 kopecks). Part of this income was withheld for the wheat; see Pako, 147/5/906, I.9. According to a report from Konovalov to Malenkov, in 1950 at the advanced kolkhoz "Komintern" of the Kalinin raion per *trudoden'* one ruble, 2,000 grams of grain, 6,000 grams of potatoes, 1,600 grams of vegetables and 1,000 grams of fodder were paid, i.e. double the amount of grain, ten times the amount of potatoes and vegetables, but little more money or fodder than the average of 1951 (Pako, 147/5/36, I.6). The small amount of fodder was probably a reflection of the generally difficult situation with fodder crops of the oblast', which often was referred to as one of the major causes for the decline in the amount of livestock. Although on average a kolkhoznik in 1949 made less *trudodni* than in 1950 (respectively 301 and 325, see above), he/she received much more in kind per *trudoden'* (Pako, 147/5/36, I.113). These numbers are roughly confirmed in a speech by the oblast' representative of the Council for Kolkhoz Affairs, Tarasov, who said that in 1949 the kolkhoznik received on average 1,300 grams of grain per *trudoden'* and in 1950, according to preliminary figures, 600 grams (Pako, 147/5/2, I.147):

	cereals (grams)	potatoes. (grams)	vegetables (grams)	hay/straw (grams)	money (rubles)
1949	1,369	1,208	109	1,354	0.83
1950	792	692	81	672	1.13

In 1951 the remuneration of the *trudoden'* was almost the same as in 1950. It should be noticed that most of the grain consisted of rye, barley, and oats (Leont'eva, pp.28-33.). Perhaps it is useful to point out that in the 1940s convicts in labour camps received 600 grams of bread if they fulfilled their work norms, which was, together with the broth with some cabbage leaves or beets in it, the one or two teaspoonfuls of butter or vegetable oil they were served, and a bit of *kusha* hardly enough to survive on (E.g. Adamova-Sliozberg, "Put'," p.64 and p.82). The kolkhozniks therefore received hardly any more than this almost starvation quotient of the labour camps.

vegetables, 129.5 kilograms of hay and straw, and 37.5 kilograms of wheat. This translates into 39 kopecks, 349 grams of grain, 321 grams of potatoes and vegetables, 355 grams of hay and straw, and 103 grams of wheat per day<sup>129</sup>. It should be remembered here that quite a large portion of the grain, mainly oats and barley, was used to feed the cattle. The remuneration of the *trudoden'* was also characterized as low in the commission's report of early 1953<sup>130</sup>.

Certainly, these are averages, and the report pointed out that there were many kolkhozniks who received even less than this. However, from the above numbers, it can be deduced that for work in collective farming the average kolkhoznik was meted out less than the minimum on which an adult can survive. 36% of all kolkhozniks in 1950 received fewer than 500 grams per *trudoden'*<sup>131</sup>. If he or she would have to rely on these earnings for their basic diet and feeding of their livestock, aggrieved malnutrition would certainly ensue and the cattle would probably perish. Of course, the kolkhozniks were not supposed to bank only on the wages paid to them in return for their work in the

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<sup>129</sup>Compare to the official rations in the Kolyma camps in the 1940s as given by Conquest: for 100% fulfillment of the norm the convict received 800 grams of bread per day, or perhaps 930 grams (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, pp. 327 and 333/334). For less than 70% fulfillment they were allotted no more than 500 grams. Conquest says about this last rate: "This was just above starvation level; any further reduction to 300 grams (as a punitive measure) meant certain death" (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.327). The bread ration was complemented by some soup, 100 grams of salt fish, and 60 grams of groats (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, pp.333/334). In December 1941, in besieged Leningrad the starvation level of rationing for workers was maximally 350 grams of bread per day.

<sup>130</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.9.

<sup>131</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.113. Seven kolkhozy apparently did not give any grain per *trudoden'*, while seventy-nine did not pay any money for the *trudodni*. As M.M. Golovnova remarked, if one would have been forced to live only from the remuneration of the *trudodni*, everybody would have died from starvation within a year (testimony of M.M. Golovnova in the survey). Her fellow milkmaid, A.E. Malysheva, described the payment for the *trudodni* as a "glass of water" (testimony of A.E. Malysheva in the survey).

collective sector. The straw and hay payment was provided to help them feed their personal cattle, and most of the potatoes grown remained in the possession of the kolkhozniks<sup>132</sup>. Furthermore, the year 1951 seems to have been a miserable one agriculturally, through which the *trudoden*' average was perhaps lower than usual --incidentally, the potato harvest was especially middling in this year<sup>133</sup>. One of the problems with the concomitant cultivation of potatoes and flax is the fact that their harvest time coincides<sup>134</sup>. In many cases, it is likely that flax was neglected in favour of potatoes, which could feed the kolkhozniks' family. The mobilization of urban dwellers for potato harvesting was aimed at solving this dilemma.

Nevertheless, at any time during this period, the private plots had to provide the kolkhozniks and the Soviet population with the main bulk of their vegetables, as well as with meat, milk, and eggs<sup>135</sup>. The kolkhozniks tried to sell off part of this produce on the market, but the additional real income from this had also fallen since tax increases in August 1948<sup>136</sup>.

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<sup>132</sup>See Zh.A. Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture, pp.143/144.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid., p.154.

<sup>134</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p. 45.

<sup>135</sup>See Zh. Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture, p.155. In 1940, the socialized sector of kolkhozy and sovkhozy in the USSR only produced 28% of the meat, 23% of the milk, and 61% of the wool in the Union; in 1948, 17% of the milk, 25% of the meat and 7% of the eggs; in 1950, 33% of the meat, 25% of the milk and 79% of the wool; and in 1951, 29% of the milk and 39% of the meat (Sovetskaiia derevnia..., p.246 and pp.259/260). In the five-year period 1981-1985 the average share of the production of personal plots in the total agricultural production was still 24.2% for the RSFSR and 26.0% for the USSR, according to Soviet sources; the personal cattle in this period on average put out 30% of the total production of meat in the RSFSR, and 32% of that of the USSR; for milk the respective figures were 26% for the RSFSR, and 29% for the USSR; for eggs, respectively 24% and 30%; and for wool 20% and 24% (see Soiuznye respubliki, pp. 161 and 172).

<sup>136</sup>Zh. Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture, pp.155/156; Sovetskaiia derevnia..., pp.294/295. A.E. Malysheva remembered that she paid the following tax in kind from her plot: 320 litres



How dolorous the situation actually was can be gathered from additional information in the report. In 1950, the kolkhozniks received less than 500 grams of grain per *trudoden'* in 36% of all kolkhozy of the oblast'; in 1951, this was the case in 17.6% of all kolkhozy<sup>137</sup>. In 1950, 44% of all kolkhozy paid less than 60 kopecks per *trudoden'*, and in 1951, even 62.4% (1,186 of a total of 1,900). It is clear that a whopping number of kolkhozniks received less than the already extremely base level of pay calculated above. On top of that, it appears that in 1950 no wheat was paid out. The next year witnessed the addition of wheat to the remuneration in 82% of all kolkhozy. In both years, in less than half of all kolkhozy, potatoes were part of wages; vegetables supplemented the pay in 1950 on only 13% of the farms, and in 1951 on only 8%. Neither hay, nor (particularly) straw, were paid everywhere<sup>138</sup>. In comparison, the *trudoden'* in Torzhok raion valued 5.0 rubles in 1954, and 7.54 rubles in 1955, although by then cash remuneration began to substitute for some of the payment in kind<sup>139</sup>.

The private plot and livestock had to come to the rescue for the naked survival of the kolkhoznik<sup>140</sup>. Unfortunately, even they yielded

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of milk, 40 kilo's of meat, 240 kilo's of potatoes, and 40 eggs per year. She also had to pay a tax for not having children (testimony of A.E. Malysheva in the survey).

<sup>137</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.8.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid.; in 1950, hay was given in only 34% of the total amount of kolkhozy; in 1951, in 70%; for straw the corresponding percentages were 29% and 16%.

<sup>139</sup>Pako, 147/6/8, 1.80. Torzhok raion was mentioned as a positive example, performing better than most raions (Pako, 147/6/8, 1.128).

<sup>140</sup>And perhaps of the Soviet population in general, particularly with respect to livestock products and potatoes (Kerblay, p.182). Altrichter remarks that even in the late 1950s the kolkhoz household derived more than 90% of most of its basic foodstuffs from the private plot and cattle: this was the case with vegetables, potatoes, fruit, milk, eggs, and meat (Altrichter, p.196). Even the February 1947 Plenum could not ignore the importance of the "private sector" for Soviet agriculture, and took measures to help kolkhozniks who had difficulty to resurrect or maintain their personal plot and cattle (Sovetskaia derevnia..., pp.253/254). Later that year, in August, credits were announced by the Council of

less in the early 1950s than before<sup>141</sup>. Compared to 1949, the kolkhozniks received less hay and straw for their private cattle, because the production of fodder crops decreased markedly in 1950 and 1951, while the socialized cattle herds of the kolkhozy grew<sup>142</sup>. Apparently, the allocation of hayfields among kolkhozniks for the feeding of their own cattle was even discontinued in 1950 and 1951<sup>143</sup>. Thus the lack of fodder led to a significant decrease in the number of private livestock<sup>144</sup>. As is pointed out by the ominous report of early 1953, the number of kolkhozniks' households without a private cow increased from 34.8% in 1949 to 44.8% in 1950, fell in 1951 to 43.4%, but increased once more during 1952 to 47.5%<sup>145</sup>. Table 18 shows an ancillary drop in hogs and sheep, although a few more personal goats were probably to be found on the average kolkhoz at the beginning of 1953.

Next to the low value of the *trudoden'* and the fall in the number of personal cattle, the third reason given in the report for the departure of kolkhozniks was the fact that the kolkhozniks were also

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Ministers for those individual kolkhozniks who were without a cow and wanted to buy one. However, these measures seem to have remained without much effect.

<sup>141</sup>And before the amount of personal cattle per household had also not been all that large. Vorontsov noticed, in March 1947, that on average per 100 kolkhoz households the kolkhozniks had 178 heads of livestock (Pako, 147/4/528, 1.6ob.); that is not even two heads of cows, pigs, sheep, or goats combined per household.

<sup>142</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.11. In 1949, 163,600 tons had been distributed among the kolkhozniks as remuneration for the *trudodni*; in 1950, 79,500 tons; and in 1951, 91,500 tons.

<sup>143</sup>According to M. V. Bakhtina, as a result several kolkhozniks tried to mow hay in swamps and clearings in the forests (testimony of M. V. Bakhtina in the survey).

<sup>144</sup>See Table 18. In October 1953, Kiselev mentioned the decrease of the personal cattle as a main cause for the exodus from the countryside (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.11). See VIII.3 as well.

<sup>145</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.11; according to Kiselev in October 1953, 46.6% had a personal cow in January 1953 (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.11).

denied credit for the construction and renovation of buildings -- stables, sheds, and the like, but also including repairs of their homes<sup>146</sup>. Thus their houses and their shelters for their cattle and its feed fell into decay.

The fourth element of the explanation given by the commission's report of 1953 for the egress was specific to the attitude of rural youth<sup>147</sup>. They left to avoid the poorly paid work in the logging enterprises; the young kolkhozniks were carelessly trained for this heavy kind of work, particularly the girls. As a consequence, their productivity was shabby, and its pay so picayune that it was not even enough to cover the cost of food and clothes. Another source of dissatisfaction among the young could be traced to the low level of cultural amenities (radio, libraries, newspapers) in the villages, especially in more remote areas<sup>148</sup>. Many young people strove to become educated in a field which had nothing to do with work on the kolkhozy and --it is once more pointed out in the report-- the remuneration with *trudodni*<sup>149</sup>. Young girls attempted to leave collective farms as well, for most of their male peers were leaving for service in the army or studies.

The report further --and this comment is stunning proof of the total collapse of the villages' social fabric and the alienation caused by collectivization and the amalgamation of 1950-- noticed that there was an absence of obligatory, sustained aid by the kolkhozy of kolkhozniks in case of illness, when people lost their ability to work,

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<sup>146</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.12.

<sup>147</sup>Ibid., 1.12.

<sup>148</sup>This was confirmed by Anokhina, Shmeleva, p. 66. See VIII.3 and IX.2 as well.

<sup>149</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, 1.12.

and in old age<sup>150</sup>. The only people who were supported on a regular basis by the kolkhozy were pregnant and nursing women. The special social-aid foundation created on the kolkhozy --limited to funds the equivalent of 2% of the total annual kolkhoz production-- nowhere possessed sufficient assets.

The sixth and last reason the report indicated for the abandonment of the collective farms was the differential taxation of private plots. Workers and employees, who lived in rural localities or especially in workers' settlements and towns, paid fewer taxes than kolkhozniks<sup>151</sup>. Even though the plot of a worker or employee was usually smaller, they disposed of more produce after taxes than a kolkhoznik. Hence the latter's private plot and cattle were not enough to make ends meet, when the value of the *trudoden*' was as low as it often was on many of the collective farms.

Many kolkhoz households, composed of aging members and one or two able-bodied, try to send off the able-bodied members of their families, in order to attain a lowering of their agricultural taxes and of the tax on bachelors, and are thus contributing to the departure from the kolkhozy.<sup>152</sup>

The report is startling in its honesty; in none of the other records of the Stalinist period that I investigated in 'I'ver' could such a blunt account of the plight of the countryside be found. Since quite a few of the problems cited were taken on by Malenkov and Khrushchev in 1953, it would seem logical that the report dated from after Stalin's death. In fact, it does not, for the commission was ordered to investigate in the

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<sup>150</sup>Ibid., II.12/13.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid., I.13.

<sup>152</sup>Ibid., I.13.

autumn of 1952. A hand-written date gives February 10, 1953, as the time of its completion<sup>153</sup>. First secretary V.I. Kiselev, to whom (as well as to the chairman of the oblispolkom A.I. Sadovnikov) the report is addressed, penned a note on the first page of the report on March 10, 1953, in which he asked S.N. Shatalin and G.A. Demirskii, both senior obkom members, to work out proposals on the basis of the report which could be introduced at an obkomburo session<sup>154</sup>. Perhaps Kiselev only saw fit to act upon the report after Stalin had died, and maybe only after deliberations with his superiors in Moscow about it. It leads one to wonder whether this report, and perhaps similar ones made in other USSR territories, might have been a guideline for some of the reforms in agricultural policy that were introduced in 1953.

The investigation could have been commissioned by the Kalinin obkom alone. After all, farming continued to spiral downwards after Konovalov's removal. Kiselev might have been worried that he would be punished for its failure in the same way as his predecessors had been. There are indications that the Party leadership of the oblast' was already aware earlier that an inordinate amount of kolkhozniks abandoned their collective farms<sup>155</sup>. This was obviously a cause for great concern, for in the first postwar years there had been a labour shortage in the countryside, too. This scarcity had been used as an explanation or excuse for mediocre economic yields in agriculture.

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<sup>153</sup>Ibid., I.18.

<sup>154</sup>Ibid., I.1; see Appendix III.

<sup>155</sup>Fokin, head of the Party-, Trade Union-, and Komsomol department of the obkom, stated, in July 1951, that in previous years the number of Party members and candidates had fallen by 1,700 in the countryside (Pako, 147/5/10, I.141). Quite a few cases had occurred of Communists who stopped working on the collective farms and disappeared without permission to diverse towns.

However, in 1953, it was impossible to blame the consequences of the war for poor agricultural results. It seemed unavoidable that agriculture would perform poorly economically in future years if the exodus continued: much of its production still demanded intensive manual labour.

For Kiselev it must have been a matter of life and death to bring the exodus to a halt; experience must have told him that his competence would be predominantly judged by the Central Committee on the basis of the oblast's agricultural results. Industry was not all that vital in the Kalinin oblast' and the larger factories were partially the responsibility of Central Ministries in Moscow. In contrast, farming was the almost exclusive domain of the oblast' Party organization: its leadership would be assessed according to the successful procurement of flax, livestock produce, and potatoes.

It remains a mystery, however, what Kiselev and the obkomburo could have done with regards to upgrading the remuneration of *trudoden*, abating taxes, and so on. These matters were decided in Moscow, and not in Kalinin. Following this logic, it is virtually impossible that the local leadership commissioned the investigation. Kiselev could have tried to make his case in Moscow, but in Stalin's lifetime there seems to have been no question of a likelihood that the Party might consider better pay for the kolkhozniks. Naturally, Kiselev, who had worked before in the Central Committee apparatus, must have been aware of the inexorable stance on that issue.

However, there is a more likely explanation for the report. Perhaps someone in the Presidium had decided, at or after the Nineteenth Party Congress, to seriously reconsider the Party's

agricultural policy. Stalin, according to some sources, may have been incapacitated in the last months of his life and, if that was the case, someone might have risked taking the initiative to find out what was truly amiss with cultivation in the Soviet Union<sup>156</sup>. Similar investigations may have been conducted in other provinces, for the quandary was not limited to the Kalinin oblast' alone<sup>157</sup>. The reports of these investigations would then have provided the basis for the reforms introduced after Stalin's death.

However that may be, the commission in Kalinin came up with a series of recommendations to bridle the depletion of the countryside<sup>158</sup>. Many of those echo recommendations of earlier Party gatherings in the immediate postwar period, such as the proposal to increase the control over the actions of the kolkhoz executive and the raion militsiia by the raiispolkom. Careful observation of the rules on departure of individuals and families from the kolkhozy should prevail. Passports were not to be handed out to those leaving their collective farms for temporary employment elsewhere or for study purposes. The raiispolkoms should check organizations and enterprises in their fief on the hiring of kolkhozniks. It was further suggested to release kolkhozniks from obligations to work in the lumber and peat industries. It was advised to transfer handicraft cooperatives from the villages to urban localities when they did not use local raw materials. Kolkhozniks would in this way become available to return to their ordained

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<sup>156</sup>Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, pp.529 and 570/571. Molotov denied that there was anything wrong with Stalin's health just before his death (Sto sorok besed..., p.327).

<sup>157</sup>Again, compare to Karasev, p.307.

<sup>158</sup>Pako, 147/5/906, ll.14-18.

occupation as collective farm workers. In the urban localities, family members of workers and employees --apparently some of whom were unemployed-- could take over the labour in the cooperatives from the kolkhozniks. The commission emphasised the importance of an enhanced operation of the MTS. This could be achieved through better pay, education, and the like. More agricultural schools in the countryside could be organized to prepare rural youth for work in the MTS. In the consolidated kolkhozy the same standard should be used for the size of private plots, according to the report. Within many collective farms, the kolkhozniks of one village possessed larger or smaller plots than those of the other villages. Finally, only in the tenth recommendation, the commission urged an increase of the remuneration of the *trudoden*. This is an indication that, at the time the report was written, the commissioners may have known that, in spite of their emphasis on the important link between the low value of the *trudoden* and the kolkhozniks' migration, it was not very realistic to expect the Party deciding on a substantial wage increase. Indeed, this had never before been done, since the kolkhozniks' living conditions had never truly concerned the Party. This explains why they only placed their advice to increase the value of the *trudoden* somewhere down the list of recommendations.

The commissioners further advised to increase the prices for livestock products and crops within the procurement system; to trade bread, sugar, and vegetable oil for the kolkhozy's dairy products at the same, higher exchange rate that was being applied to the trade of these three basic staples for kolkhoz flax; to pay the kolkhozy in money and kind in advance for the procurement of flax in the first half of the year;



to instruct the kolkhozy to pay their kolkhozniks either monthly or quarterly an advance proportionate to their *trudodni* --out of the advance the kolkhoz received for the upcoming flax procurements, and out of the income it derived from dairy deliveries. The commission also suggested to increase the variety of products that the kolkhozy received in exchange for their deliveries. Petrol and lubricating oil for trucks and engines were mentioned in this respect, as well as building materials, bags(!), rope, and harnesses for draught animals.

It appears that for the first time, in the case of the proposed advances, plans were suggested to guarantee the income of the collective farmers more or less, without it being susceptible to wide seasonal fluctuations. Most kolkhozniks were only paid once a year for their labour, that is, if there were any remaining funds to pay them. This remunerative method had been designed to force the kolkhozniks to work their utmost during the year. According to this logic, they would attempt to collect the highest amount of *trudodni* possible. The value of the *trudoden'* remained a mystery until the annual accounts were calculated. It is not inconceivable, as the commissioners apparently tried to point out, that many a peasant had had enough of this kind of insecurity, and accordingly decided to leave by whatever means it took.

Taxes on private plots, another recommendation argued, should be brought in line, so that kolkhozniks would not have to pay more than others. A final solution to this problem was perhaps found by Khrushchev when he prohibited non-agricultural workers from owning either plots of land or cattle. The commissioners also proposed to lower the kolkhozniks' taxes on personal cows and potatoes.

Long-term credit should be offered by the state and more aid given by the kolkhozy to kolkhozniks who wanted to renovate their houses or other buildings for personal use. The kolkhozniks should be paid with 10% to 15% of the total kolkhoz harvest of hay and straw (from 1949 to 1951, always less than 10% had been set aside for this purpose), according to the *trudodni* they had earned<sup>159</sup>. More mechanization, an enhanced supply of goods, better cultural facilities, and so on were added to the list of recommendations, items which had come up time and again before in the Party's discussions on agriculture.

On the longer term, the reforms recommended by the report and the subsequent enactment of some proved to be futile. The exodus from the countryside seemed only to gather in strength and momentum in the next decades, so that today less than half of the population lives in the villages compared to that of 1959<sup>160</sup>. The reduction of the rural population had begun in the 19th century in 'I'ver' guberniia with the migration of country folk, perhaps by route of seasonal work, to the guberniia's industrializing towns and to Moscow and St. Petersburg. The process burgeoned in the 1930s. The disruption of old ties to the village --and the abolition of the incentive of being able to enjoy of the fruits of one's own hard labour in farming and prosper to a certain extent!-- caused by collectivization made it unattractive to remain "behind." The traditional rural economy was destroyed in the 1930s. People's frame of reference widened, and the young started to scorn the

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<sup>159</sup>See Table 22.

<sup>160</sup>See Table 2. The borders from 1959 to 1991 of the oblast' underwent but minimal changes. In the RSFSR the proportion of urban dwellers rose from 33% in 1939 to 74% in 1989 (V.I. Kozlov, "Dinamika...", p.6). In absolute numbers, the amount of rural dwellers in the RSFSR was more than halved between 1926 and 1989 (ibid., Table 2, p.7).

lives of their parents. The war aggravated the process, as it brought many soldiers at the front, and women in the rear --who adopted the jobs the recruits relinquished on the tractor, but just as much in urban industry-- into contact with the world outside the village. After the war, not many returned to stay to their ancestral villages. Every year a fresh group of young men left the village for the army, many of whom never returned home to the arduous life consisting of hardly anything more (and sometimes even less) than the very basics of survival. Other young people went to study in a more largely populated centre and decided to stay on, after comparing their village subsistence with their current living conditions in the raion centre, workers' settlement, or town. Life proved more bearable by any criteria in (semi-)urban surroundings.

Stalin despised peasants and, as a result of his policies, he seems to have succeeded in bequeathing this disdainful attitude to his subjects, even to the peasants themselves. Dignified labour and lives could only be obtained in urban surroundings in the eyes of many of those who grew up in the countryside from the 1930s onwards.

Another cogent reason for the failure to bring the trek to the towns to a halt was undoubtedly the geographical location of the Kalinin oblast'. On the one hand, the climate did inhibit the success of agriculture here to a certain extent. The soil is not as potentially capable of plentiful harvests as that of the lands towards the south of Moscow, in the Ukraine, and in the Central Black Earth Region. There is perhaps too much precipitation and the winters are inordinately long. Above, it has been described how, before 1929, many country dwellers had to find an additional source of income to augment the negligible

returns from agriculture. Still, an equally disadvantageous climate can be found in the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan or Alberta, for example. Here farmers have been able to arrive at remarkable agricultural results. It is consequently rather facile to blame the disappointing yields solely on the weather --as critics of Konovalov pointed out at the time of his removal<sup>161</sup>.

On the other hand, another geographical specificity of the Kalinin oblast'-Tver' guberniia was conducive to the exodus: its location in between Moscow and St. Petersburg. The social-economic attraction of the two largest Russian cities has beckoned at least since the founding of St. Petersburg. The railroad provided an easy link to both cities, and an escape route for many natives since its opening. An almost uninterrupted stream of immigrants has flowed from the territories of Tver' to Moscow and St. Petersburg in the last 130 years.

Notwithstanding Solzhenitsyn's hope for Russia to return to the land in the North-East, a development in this direction seems impossible today, if the people of Tver' guberniia are to be taken as an example. Russians have grown far too accustomed to the urban (granted, rather slight when compared to urban life in some Western countries) conveniences and luxuries of televisions, paved roads, stereo equipment, telephones, a choice of shops, and so forth.

#### **VII.4 The Geographical Distribution of the Oblast' Population and Economy**

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<sup>161</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.33; in this case it was Kalinin gorkom secretary Cherkasov, who was out for the kill. "On peut donc conclure que les conditions naturelles ne suffisent pas à expliquer les résultats médiocres de l'agriculture soviétique" (Kerblay, p.233).

In earlier chapters the distribution of the population in the 'Tver' guberniia and Kalinin oblast' before the war has been described. The population density was markedly higher along the October Railroad and in the south-eastern area of the oblast', that comprised the more industrialized regions. The war reinforced this distribution through the thinning of the population of the western part by the evacuation, army service, and killing and deportation of civilians during the German occupation. As a result of the infertile quality and scarcity of farmland, because of the preponderance of swamps and forests, traditionally the countryside of the north-west of the oblast' was less densely inhabited<sup>162</sup>. The south and south-east were more thickly peopled, particularly in the areas where flax was grown.

By 1960, the population density in rural areas had plummeted by more than three times in comparison with 1914, and was 9.4 persons per square kilometer<sup>163</sup>.

The causes for the industrial underdevelopment and low population density of the western half of the oblast' went back much further than World War II. Partially it was a consequence of a conjunctural development since the beginning of the 18th century, when places like Vyshnii Volochek, 'Tver', and Torzhok were postal and waterway stations along the route from Moscow to St. Petersburg. The opening of Russia's first railroad reinforced their prominence in the guberniia.

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<sup>162</sup>Tsentralnyi Raion, p.143.

<sup>163</sup>Ibid., p.529 and p.531.

Thus at the end of the 1950s, the largest concentration of urban dwellers and industrial workers --in both cases more than 50%-- continued to be located along the October Railroad in the oblast'<sup>164</sup>. Along this route the entire cotton-fibre industry of the oblast' could be found, its chemical, rubber-asbestos, polygraphical industries, almost all glass factories, as well as a large share of the machine building, of the construction-material industry, of the peat exploitation, and of the knitted-wear and garment industries. Along the railroad the towns of Bologoe, Vyshnii Volochek, Likhoslavl', and Kalinin were located, plus a number of so-called "urban-type settlements," such as Spirovo, Izoplit, Novo-Zavidovo, Redkino, and Kalashnikovo. The factories for the primary processing of flax were exceptional by their distribution throughout the territory of the oblast'<sup>165</sup>.

By 1960, the oblast' economy was quite integrated in the planned economy of the USSR<sup>166</sup>: coal was imported from Moscow oblast', chemical fertilizers from Moscow and Leningrad oblasts, salt from the Donetsk area, sugar from the Ukraine, cotton (fibre) from Central Asia, rye and grain (!) from the Ukraine, the Trans-Ural region, the lower and middle Volga areas, and the Altai region. Wood was exported to Moscow and Moscow oblast'; potatoes, vegetables, butter, and strong-horned cattle were shipped to Leningrad and Murmansk oblasts, milk to Moscow. Flax was transported to factories around the Central Region. Industrial products ended up everywhere in the Soviet Union, although

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<sup>164</sup>Ibid., p.533.

<sup>165</sup>Ibid., p.534; concentrations of this industry were found particular in and around Rzhev and Bezhetsk.

<sup>166</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.540. See T. 32.

the bulk of the production -- such as footwear, clothing, and underwear-- was destined for Moscow.

## CHAPTER VIII: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

### VIII.1 The Checkered Recovery of Industry

Still in early 1949, fewer workers (122,000) were employed in the factories than in 1940 (more than 160,000)<sup>1</sup>. In roughly five years, since 1944, the industrial work force in the oblast' industry had only increased by 18,000. Industry suffered after the war from the absence of qualified cadres. Those with genuine expertise had been largely exterminated in the 1930s, and many of the more responsible functions were performed by "practicians."<sup>2</sup> Although the level of education of the industrial specialists slowly ameliorated after the war as a consequence of the influx of young graduates from technical schools, apparently even by 1951 almost a third of engineers and technicians in Kalinin had no specialized education<sup>3</sup>.

The industry of the Kalinin oblast' received a share of the confiscated German industrial machinery and equipment after the war. Yet, the worth of these goods for the revival of the economy was almost imperceptible<sup>4</sup>. In October 1946, the secretary of the Party committee of the town of Bologoe complained that, although all factories in the town could use these "trophy goods", only three had

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<sup>1</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.16. It is likely that this report included the workers of Velikie Luki for 1940. In 1944, 104,000 blue-collar workers were working in industry.

<sup>2</sup>See Danilov a.o., "NEP...", pp.187/188.

<sup>3</sup>See Tables 42 and 46.

<sup>4</sup>As Molotov said: "After the war we took reparations, but it was small fry. Then those reparations were old equipment, the equipment itself had become obsolete. But we had no choice. This rather small relief we had to use as well" (*Sto sorok besed...*, p.87).



received some equipment<sup>5</sup>. On the whole, these capital goods were not used very efficiently. A report of the gorkom of Vyshnii Volochek illustrates the quandaries with the confiscated machinery -- in this case for a new wood-processing plant:

On the day of the inspection, the majority of the equipment was standing under the open sky. The complexity of the equipment is still completely unintelligible, for no one knows the technology involved in the new production process. The only thing that has been established is that it does not operate by steam power. The question of where the factory is going to be built has not been decided.<sup>6</sup>

In Kamen raion, prisoners of war unloaded "trophy" machinery; there as well dilemmas were encountered with the storage of the reparation goods<sup>7</sup>. Some of these spoils of war were American-made. In the town of Rzhev, an American steam-powered electro-station had been assembled in 1946 for a butter factory, which also had received two American vehicles (presumably trucks)<sup>8</sup>. Perhaps these were still leftovers from Lend-Lease.

Until Stalin's death, the textile industry, both in Kalinin and in Vyshnii Volochek, was unable to recover from the destruction it had undergone during the war. The factories of Vyshnii Volochek had escaped occupation, but had been the target of German bombing at least in 1941 and 1942. In October 1945, the obkomburo expressed its disapproval of the situation in both towns<sup>9</sup>. The "Proletarka" factory in Kalinin, a former source of pride for the oblast' Party organization, was

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<sup>5</sup>Pako, 147/4/79, I.1.

<sup>6</sup>Pako, 147/4/79, I.3.

<sup>7</sup>Pako, 147/4/79, I.6.

<sup>8</sup>Pako, 147/4/79, I.9.

<sup>9</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, II.246-247.

suffering from shoddily operated food canteens. Here not enough cooking gear, sewerage, and water were available. Lavatories and corridors were extremely dirty, doors and windows broken, and the whole factory was in dire need of whitewashing. In 1945, the stock of wood and peat for the upcoming winter was far from sufficient in all textile enterprises of Vyshnii Volochek and Kalinin. Workers, housed in boarding houses and barracks near the factories, were living in an unhygienic milieu. The pathological atmosphere within the Party comes again to light, when one of the remedies offered was the organization of a socialist competition movement among the residents "...for a more sanitary keeping of their rooms..."<sup>10</sup>

The industrial performance of the oblast' industries in January 1946 was summed up in a report by the vice-plenipotentiary of Gosplan in the oblast', V. Vakhrov<sup>11</sup>. The report may have been provoked by the preparations for the Fourth Five Year Plan.

The numbers on the factories and cooperatives presented in the report are not definitive, but they give an impression of the diversity of the economic results of industry. At the same time, the complicated bureaucratic structure of industry is shown: some industry was under

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<sup>10</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, l. 246ob.

<sup>11</sup>See Table 30. The list is certainly not complete, for there is evidence of the existence of an aircraft factory ("Factory No.1 of the Ministry of Aircraft Industry"): in October 1946 Boitsov confirmed F.P. Voznesenskii as its head engineer (Pako, 147/4/57, ll.182/183 and 191/192). This kind of factory of the defense industry is hardly ever mentioned in any record, probably because their operations were run --most likely under MVD or MGB authority-- fully outside the competence of the oblast' Party organization. Boitsov's confirmation is only a formality. In how far this factory might be equated with the project at Lake Seliger Iakovlev refers to is unclear (See Iakovlev, Kontsentratsionnye lageri, p.157). In another record, there is mention of factory No.491 of the Ministry of Aircraft Industry; Boitsov wrote a request in March 1946 to Malenkov and Beria if this factory could be transferred to the competence of the Ministry of Machine Building (Pako, 147/4/63, ll.94/95).

the authority of the Central Union administration, others under that of the RSFSR, some were under the wing of the oblast' government, some under that of raions of the oblast', and, finally, there were industrial cooperatives, which enjoyed formally the most independence, but were still subject to fulfilling a plan<sup>12</sup>. To further complicate matters, at all these levels, a distinction was made between the enterprises of the industrial People's Commissariats and those of nonindustrial People's Commissariats. Plus, all of the People's Commissariats had to comply with instructions issued by Gosplan, headed by a Politburo member, Voznesensky. Gosplan developed the production plans according to the economic guidelines set by the Central Committee, its Secretariat, and the Politburo --or a few members of the latter. It is impossible to establish which unit within these overlapping disparate administrative levels was more important for the daily operations of the factories, and was responsible for the more essential decisions of the separate factories.

It is rather curious that some small factories, such as the Ostashkov leather plant, were apparently under the direct authority of the USSR government. One can only guess at the motive for this, when a similarly sized enterprise within the same branch of industry, the "Krasnaia Zvezda" footwear factory of Kimry, fell under the authority of the RSFSR government. A bureaucratic chaos seems to have been forged through overzealous and uncoordinated organization. Already at

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<sup>12</sup>Compare also Fainsod, *How...*, p.195, on the issue of the "all-union significance" of certain factories. On the organization of Soviet factories, see Fainsod, *How...*, pp.425-429, and for example N.P. Eroshkin, L.M. Ovrutskii, A.M. Podshchekoldin, "Biurokratizm-tormoz perestroiki," in: V.S. Lei'chuk(ed.), *Istoriki sporiat. Trinadtsat' besed*. Moskva: Politizdat, 1988, pp.432-460, pp.441-443.

this time, the average factory director must have been swimming in an amazing sea of red tape, a phenomenon which is more well known of the last twenty-five odd years of the existence of the Soviet Union. 'The necessity of middlemen (*tolkachi*) seems perfectly understandable<sup>13</sup>.

'The value of the production output of the different factories and enterprises is hard to interpret as well: not all the factories that are usually paraded out as fine examples of socialist industry in the official Soviet historiography on the oblast', such as the textile factories of Vyshnii Volochek, seem to have been of large economic significance in early 1946<sup>14</sup>. Interestingly, taken together, the manufacturing cooperatives boasted the highest economic value within the oblast'. 'This indicates the persistence of the economic importance of the small craftsmanship after the war. According to its raikom secretary, Fochenkov, the population of Nerl' raion in 1947 was still predominantly employed as artisans, producing footwear<sup>15</sup>. The agricultural performance of the raion came second place for its inhabitants and therefore was less than satisfactory; "speculation" -- presumably by the shoemakers themselves with their produce-- was widespread.

The railroad-car construction factory of Kalinin demonstrated the highest value of production as a single factory. The plan had projected the factory that produced rubber soles for footwear to follow it in output value; yet, that factory fell far short of those production targets. Thus, the production of a confectionary factory in Kalinin

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<sup>13</sup>See Fainsod, *How...*, p.437.

<sup>14</sup>See Table 30.

<sup>15</sup>Pako, 147/4/528, 1.42ob.

surpassed it in value, placing second overall. This latter factory is almost completely ignored in all Soviet literature encountered by the present researcher<sup>16</sup>! The largest textile works in the oblast' were those of the *kombinat* of Kalinin, in which cotton fibres were spun and woven. The metal-works plant of "May 1," which most likely still engaged in the production of casts and similar items for defensive purposes, was the fifth largest single factory of the oblast'<sup>17</sup>. The bread factories and the *koopinsoiuz* (the organization of invalids' cooperatives) more or less matched in value the output of "May 1" and the *kombinat*, and surpassed that of the largest glass factory, "Krasnyi Mai."<sup>18</sup>

The production of the oblast's large-scale industry, in other words, was not very impressive after the war, when only the railroad-car factory and the confectionary factory were conspicuous for the value of their output. The economic results of most other factories were rather insignificant. Their economic performance did not prove the supposed superiority of rationalized large factory production over the small-scale production of the industrial cooperative.

The two larger factories of heavy industry --the railroad-car works and "May 1"-- of Kalinin managed to meet plan targets in January 1946, which is a logical consequence of the Soviet state's constant higher investment in heavy industry<sup>19</sup>. The glass factories and the

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<sup>16</sup>Apparently, it was a new factory, built after the war (see *Ocherki*, p.527).

<sup>17</sup>See *Ocherki*, p.237, for its name change and the kind of goods it produced in 1920.

<sup>18</sup>However, the output of the war invalids' cooperatives was said in 1949 to have consistently failed to meet the plan from 1945 to 1949 (*Pako*, 147/4/1501, 1.10).

<sup>19</sup>See Table 30. N.A. Voznesensky states that, in 1940, the USSR spent 32.5% of its budget on defense; in 1944, 52%; and in 1946 still 23.9% (*Voznesenskii, Voennaia ekonomika*, p.179).

confectionary factory surpassed their plans significantly, but the bread factories fell far short of the targets, as did most of the textile factories. The more independent cooperatives, however, overfulfilled their plans in general, which perhaps can serve as an argument for the economic importance of personal initiative and responsibility.

The overall industrial gains brightened after 1945, and the industrial plans for the oblast' in 1946, 1947, and 1948 were effectuated<sup>20</sup>. By early 1949, the level of output in industry approached the 1940 level. However, light industry lagged behind; its production level was only at 64.7% in early 1949 in comparison with its results of 1940.

By September 1952, the production results in industry were on the whole more gladdening to the Party<sup>21</sup>. Meanwhile, particularly the local industry, that fell under the responsibility of the oblast' government, showed disappointing results, while the larger enterprises were meeting their plan targets<sup>22</sup>.

One practice in which industrial managers and foremen of workshops engaged was the exaggeration of the plan fulfillment. Many enterprises informed the government of a higher amount of plan fulfillment than in fact was reached. Furthermore, on behalf of their

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<sup>20</sup>Pako, 147/4/1501, ll.6/7. The industrial output in both state and cooperative industries grew steadily in those years. By 1956, the textile industry in the oblast' still produced less than before the war; only 50% of the plan of the cotton-fibre works was fulfilled (A.P. Luk'ianova, "Vosstanovlenie i razvitie khlopchatobumazhnoi promyshlennosti Kalininskoi oblasti v poslevoennyi period (1945-1955gg.)." in: Iz proshlogo i nastoiashchego Kalininskoi oblasti(istoriko-kraevedcheskii sbornik), vyp. I, Moscow: "Moskovskii rabochii," 1965, pp.287-304, p.292 and p.294).

<sup>21</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, ll.173/174.

<sup>22</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, ll.175/176. The peat, wood-processing, and cheese industries performed poorly, as did the industrial cooperatives. The bread factories, which were under the auspices of the RSFSR government, were again not effectuating their plans.

workers, some foremen entered in the books labour never performed. In August 1946, the obkom was forced to take a resolution condemning this practice, after which the abuse briefly subsided<sup>23</sup>. However, in the prestigious railroad-car construction factory, this habit remained common in the months after.

The quality of the production presented a different impediment. This aspect was not completely ignored, but, in contrast to what Stalin and his cronies seemed to think, quantity in industry did not automatically equal quality<sup>24</sup>. Something of a mania existed to fulfill the plan, whether the goods were defective or not.

At the larger factories in the oblast', the Party was very well represented<sup>25</sup>. It therefore seems unlikely that the absence of enthusiasm to fulfill the norm was much of a cause for the less than brilliant performance of certain industrial sectors. At the same time, it would be erroneous to believe that every Communist was a zealous and diligent worker.

A great hindrance to a satisfactory economic performance in industry was the dearth of investment<sup>26</sup>. The industry of the Kalinin

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<sup>23</sup>Pako, 147/4/79, 1.4 and 1.10 for example. Fainsod has summed up some of the manifold problems that were encountered by the different levels of management in the Soviet factories (Fainsod, *How...*, p.428).

<sup>24</sup>Mertsalov, "Stalinizm...", p.402. Also compare to the remarks about the production of defective goods in the 1930s by Rittersporn (Rittersporn, p.33). Complaints about inferior quality and the inability to fulfill the planned assortment of goods in light industry were uttered in a report on the performance of this industrial branch in early 1949 (Pako, 147/4/1501, 11.17/18).

<sup>25</sup>In early 1949, the railroad-car construction works had 847 Communists, and formed the largest Party organization at a factory in the oblast'. The textile factory "Proletarka" in Kalinin had 582 Communists, and the cotton-fibre *kombinat* in Vyshnii Volochek, 560 (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.58).

<sup>26</sup>In March 1951, obkom secretary Zimin stated that a request to the Central Committee for funding of the construction of public utilities for the factory "Parizhskaia Kommuna" had been rejected by the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Pako, 147/5/8, 1.4). During the war, because of the high demand for armaments, the state had concentrated its investments

oblast' was not vitally important to the Soviet Union. Only the railroad car factory and the machine-building industry --including the defense industry that fell outside the competence of the obkomburo-- were of larger significance to Moscow<sup>27</sup>. In some ways, the priority of armaments and defense in the former Soviet Union was a continuation of the military traditions of Muscovite and Imperial Russia; in this respect, there is a parallel with the history of Prussia-Germany and particularly between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. The language of discourse within the Party itself and in the Party's propaganda was heavily laced with military terminology and metaphors ("struggle," "battle," "front," "offensive," "mobilization," et cetera). It seems that not many historians have investigated the influence of tradition of the Russian militarized state on the preoccupation with defense and the rather paranoid fear of internal and external enemies that was such a distinct feature of Soviet history. The idea of the urgent necessity of industrialization among the Bolsheviks in the 1920s was a result of the perception among the leadership that the USSR needed to create a more

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period velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg.). Moskva: "Mysl", 1965, pp.66-69 and p.197). This led to a higher production level of heavy industry in the years from 1941 to 1945 in comparison with 1940, and at the same time a lower production in the USSR of light industry, which only stood at 59% of its prewar level in 1945. A Soviet publication of 1978 noted that, in 1946, 24% of the USSR budget was spent on defense; in 1947, 18.3%; and in 1950, 20% (Sovetskaiia derevnia... p.26). In actual fact, the share of the defensive industries in the state's investments may have been even higher. See as well Fainsod's remark on the extraordinarily difficult situation of the directors of light and consumer goods industries (Fainsod, How..., p.436; see also Voznesenskii, pp.179 and pp.181/182). Voznesensky stated that the first priority for the recovery of the USSR's economy was the reconstruction of heavy industry and transport (Voznesenskii, pp.181/182). Vollogodskii maintains that Stalin's first priority was the development of heavy industry in 1943. Stalin's second priority was that the priority of the state's investments would be in heavy industry (Vollogodskii, Krugozor, chapt. 2, p.16).

<sup>27</sup>See Table 31 for the small proportion of gross production by heavy industry in the oblast' production of 1959, and Table 32 for the more important industrial items manufactured in the Kalinin oblast' in 1955.



modern military defense --in which respect it followed the pre-Revolutionary precedent of the focus on defense of Russian politics (although it is certainly true that some of the preoccupation with defense in the USSR was due to the Bolsheviks' experience of the Civil War). Military reasons can be seen as perhaps the prime cause of the introduction of the Five Year Plans<sup>28</sup>. This subject undoubtedly deserves more research, as William Odom has recently pointed out as well<sup>29</sup>.

'The textile factories had to compete with those of Ivanovo-Voznesensk and the Moscow oblast', and leather and shoemaking was found as well in many other places in the Soviet Union. Instead of investments, other means were applied to induce industry to operate more profitably. These means included: maximizing the use of confiscated German equipment; saving on expenditure of raw materials, fuel, and electricity --which was called *ekonomika* (thriftiness/economy); and to reduce waste output<sup>30</sup>.

In June 1951, the obkom reported to the Central Committee on the industrial situation in the oblast<sup>31</sup>. In general, industry regularly met

<sup>28</sup>Compare to Fainsod, *How...*, pp.403/404.

<sup>29</sup>William Odom, "The Pluralist Image," in: *The National Interest*, No.31, Spring 1993, pp.99-108, p.105.

<sup>30</sup>See *Bloknot Agitatora*, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia Pravda," 1948, No.3, p.43, states "...to use every kopeck with intelligence, to economize on every minute." Also in Pako, 147/4/1501, ll.14/15, much stress was laid on accumulation of means by economizing on costs within the enterprise. N.A. Kotov began to work as a metal worker on the cotton-fibre *kombinat* "Proletarka" in 1951. He described the labour conditions at the plant as follows: "But the affairs were badly organized: all work was done by hand, without specific machinery. It happened that one had to drag iron oneself"(testimony of N.A. Kotov in the survey). The last comment was confirmed by P.A. Samarova, a weaver at the same works, who said that, during the resurrection of the plant after the war, one had to drag cast iron and bricks for the reconstruction of the factory by hand (testimony of P.A. Samarova in the survey).

<sup>31</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, ll.115-118.

the targets set by economic plans<sup>32</sup>. However, the report said that no meaningful progress was made in the resurrection and construction of a number of enterprises. These included in particular factories of the more prominent industrial branches of cotton-fibre textiles, primary flax treatment, locally produced construction materials, and agricultural machinery<sup>33</sup>. All textile factories were lagging behind the level of 1941. The thwarted revival of the textile sector was exemplified by the cotton-spinning and weaving factory "Proletarka" of Kalinin. Here, the spinning shop's turnout was at 25.8% of the prewar level, and in weaving only at 15.8%<sup>34</sup>. Neither did the railroad-car construction factory meet the plan targets during the the first months of 1951, because of a recent introduction of railroad passenger cars into the production line, according to the report<sup>35</sup>.

In 1949 and 1950, both peat-digging and lumber industries failed to effectuate the plans as well<sup>36</sup>. In the lumber industry, most work was done manually until 1947-48. Since then, some aspects of production had been mechanized, but they were apparently insufficient to fulfill the production plan for any of the years from 1949 to 1952. Meanwhile the forests had been consistently thinning out in recent

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<sup>32</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, I.117.

<sup>33</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, I.116; in the USSR as a whole, the production of cotton textiles and leather footwear was still lower in 1950 than in 1940 (see Gordon, Klopov, *Tablitsa I*, p.62).

<sup>34</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, I.116. On January 1, 1951, the capacity of the textile enterprises of the town of Kalinin in spinning was only 45% of the prewar level, and in weaving 22%.

<sup>35</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, I.118.

<sup>36</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, II.41/42. Vorontsov had complained about the widespread failure of the lumberjacks to fulfill their daily norms in early 1949. Another problem was the clear-cutting of forests at this time (Pako, 147/4/1495, II.18ob./19). Peat and lumber industries only started to give satisfactory production results after Stalin's death, when large parts of the production process were mechanized (*Ocherki*, pp.554-557).

decades, for the planned tree planting had not been taking place. Much of the work in the forest industry was done by seasonally hired *kolkhozniks*, which sometimes led to their absence at the time of spring sowing, therefore hampering its successful conduct<sup>37</sup>.

Notwithstanding the enormous labour shortage, hidden unemployment apparently existed in the smaller town of Kashin in 1952<sup>38</sup>.

The trade unions manifested little importance after the war. This is underlined by the complaint of the head of the oblast' trade unions in 1951 that, since 1948, the obkom had not once bothered to heed the opinion of the oblast' trade union council about any question whatsoever<sup>39</sup>. The unions strictly focussed on the administration of social insurance for their membership and increasing labour productivity. They did not bargain about the levels of wages, benefits, and insurance of their constituents. These matters were stipulated by the state alone, after which the unions rubber-stamped the governmental measures. Probably because the first Party secretary of the obkom was being dismissed, the head of the oblast' trade union council was courageous enough at the end of 1949 to complain that wages in the oblast' were paid in general with a delay of ten to fifteen days, and in some small enterprises sometimes not for months<sup>40</sup>. This

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<sup>37</sup>As in Kamen raion in 1949 (Pako, 147/4/1495, II. 50/50ob.).

<sup>38</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, I.39; see VI.2.

<sup>39</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, I.135. The unions had a total of 295,000 members; 4,500 trade union organizations existed in March 1951 (Pako, 147/5/2, I.22 and I.155). About 40,000 were members of the railroad trade union in 1951, which, despite its size, was completely ignored by the higher authorities in the oblast' as well (Pako, 147/5/2, I.152). Compare also to Fainsod, *How...* p.350 and pp.432-436 and Conquest, *The Great Terror*, p.21.

<sup>40</sup>Pako, 147/4/1512, I.13. The same complaint could be heard in Tver' in the summer of 1992.

is almost the only example of a trade union representative more or less directly criticizing a shortcoming of the workers' employer, the state. The state social insurance system compensated workers and employees since the 1930s for

...loss of pay during temporary inability to work because of illness, accident, pregnancy, and childbirth; for pensions in case of prolonged or permanent disability and in old age; funeral benefits; pensions to the dependent survivors of deceased workers...<sup>41</sup>

Mothers of large families received benefits since 1936<sup>42</sup>.

The working week outside agriculture was on average forty-eight hours long since 1940, although during the war, because of the extensive labour shortages, people worked more<sup>43</sup>. These forty-eight hours were spread out over six eight-hour working days, the week including one day off.

Wage levels are not fully clear, but the few indicators found seem to confirm the numbers given by Chapman in 1963. The annual salary in 1952 of an employee of a raion planburo was 8,280 rubles per year, which is slightly more than Chapman's average salary for wage earners and salaried employees outside agriculture for the same year (8,250

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<sup>41</sup>Chapman, p.122.

<sup>42</sup>Chapman, p.127. The level of these benefits varied, since the law in this respect, introduced in 1936, was changed in 1944 and 1947.

<sup>43</sup>Chapman, p.114. During the war, the workweek was not limited. According to G.V. Lubov, the legal workweek after the war consisted of six workdays of eight hours in industry. Directly after the war, he often worked on Sundays, because he was a mechanic, and was able to repair the equipment at factory in Konakovo where he was employed. Instead he got a day off in the middle of the week (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey). N.N. Panova started to work as a weaver in Kalinin in 1946 or 1947; she often worked on her days off, in particular at the end of the quarter and year, when it was necessary to fulfill the plan and the direction of the factory had to report on the fulfillment. She said that the work load was never the same, for in addition stoppages occurred from the interrupted arrival of raw materials, or breakdowns of the looms (testimony of N.N. Panova in the survey).

rubles)<sup>44</sup>. Her numbers seem to be confirmed by Zima: in 1948, the average monthly wage of a factory worker was 70 rubles--i.e. 700 rubles per month, which was five to ten times more than the cash income of kolkhozniks<sup>45</sup>. For a book, journal, and newspaper vendor in a raion centre in the countryside, the annual wage was 4,920 rubles, far below Chapman's average, but not unexpected for this kind of job which demands little physical effort or skill<sup>46</sup>.

Workers in small local industries earned an average of 2,227 rubles annually in 1945; 2,806 rubles in 1946; 3,715 rubles in 1947; and 4,101 rubles in 1948. Members of producers' cooperatives saw their average annual wage increase from 2,118 rubles in 1945 to 3,156 rubles in 1948<sup>47</sup>. A railroad worker, N.D. Eliseev, received 1,200 to 1,300 rubles per month around 1950, i.e. around 15,000 rubles per year; his colleague A.N. Nikolaev received between 1,500 and 1,700 rubles per month as a locomotive engineer in the early 1950s<sup>48</sup>. Both were part of the labour aristocracy at the time. A metal worker with the tram depot of Kalinin, N.S. Loshkarev, only received around 600 rubles per month during this same period<sup>49</sup>. The textile workers O.M. Korobova and T.A. Poliakova received monthly 700 rubles<sup>50</sup>. The wage level given by the survey respondents is not always typical, for many of the

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<sup>44</sup>Pako, 147/5/342, 1.23, Chapman, Table 13, p.109.

<sup>45</sup>Zima, p.49; Zima has translated the wages into the value of the new ruble that was introduced under Khrushchev, worth 10% of the old ruble in use during the 1940s and 1950s.

<sup>46</sup>Pako, 147/5/342, 1.23.

<sup>47</sup>Pako, 147/4/1501, II.13/14.

<sup>48</sup>Testimony of N.D. Eliseev and A.N. Nikolaev in the survey.

<sup>49</sup>Testimony of N.S. Loshkarev in the survey.

<sup>50</sup>Korobova seems as well to have translated her wage, as more did in the survey, in the rubles of the value of after 1961; testimony of O.M. Korobova and T.A. Poliakova in the survey.

respondents could not remember them very well, as Korobova's case shows, and some of them only began to work around 1950, when wages were probably rising and higher than directly after the war. According to N.A. Zabelin, the monthly wage of a secondary schoolteacher in the period 1945-1953 was 80 rubles --i.e. 800 rubles<sup>51</sup>. Thus a teacher would earn a gross income of 9,600 rubles per year, above Chapman's average. Primary schoolteachers must have earned less, for in the countryside many supplemented their incomes by cultivating a private plot<sup>52</sup>.

There is only scattered evidence on the labour conditions in industry. One of the worst occupations must have been that of a labourer at the peat enterprises. In the middle of 1947, the oblast' MGB registered and reported around sixty negative remarks and complaints among the peat diggers about their working conditions<sup>53</sup>. In one of the enterprises, workers were fleeing everyday to escape from the harsh labour. In VIII.5, the arduous circumstances for women and men in the peat and lumber industries will be described further.

The working conditions in the textile factories were far from pleasant. At times, temperatures reached more than thirty degrees Celsius, with an air humidity of 85%<sup>54</sup>. Fans did not operate. Some older women, officially disabled because of tuberculosis or arthritis but still deemed fit enough to work, were assigned chores in the decrepit and damp basements of the factories. Sometimes they had to sit with

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<sup>51</sup>testimony of N.A. Zabelin in the survey.

<sup>52</sup>See VIII.6.

<sup>53</sup>Pako, 147/4/519, II.212-216.

<sup>54</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, I.53.

their feet immersed in water during work. The incidence of absenteeism due to illness was high<sup>55</sup>.

Because of the mania of fulfilling economic plans in the factories, a peculiar rhythm of labour had been forged, which is illustrated by the following statement of March 1951:

...at the factory for automobile garage equipment in Bezhet'sk, work is organized according to the principle --if one can describe it as such-- [that] the first ten days of the month are lethargy, the second ten are loosening up, and the third ten are storming (*shтурм*). As a rule, at this factory at the end of every month the workers of the assembly workshop work overtime, and at the beginning of the month they rest for lack of work.<sup>56</sup>

Despite the laws prohibiting workers from leaving their jobs without authorization from their superiors, the fluctuation of the labour force continued to afflict industry in 1952<sup>57</sup>.

All these shortcomings in industry led to a continuation after the war of the much smaller industrial production per capita in the Soviet Union than in Western Europe and North America<sup>58</sup>.

## VIII.2 Life in the Towns

Towards 1951, life in Kalinin had largely returned to the situation of before the war. In that year the available housing space

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<sup>55</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, II.54/55.

<sup>56</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, I.156.

<sup>57</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, I.181. See Heller, Nekrich, p.321, for the description of the laws that prohibited the free movement of workers.

<sup>58</sup>Gordon, Klopov, pp.65/66.

within the city was 12.3% higher than in 1940<sup>59</sup>. It is difficult to assess whether this actually translated into more living space per person disponible, as the town's population size is unknown at this time<sup>60</sup>. It seems likely that the number of inhabitants was close to that of 1939, so that indeed slightly more housing space per person had become available<sup>61</sup>. However, it is impossible that more than five square meters per inhabitant could have been procurable<sup>62</sup>. In 1953, the Party secretary of the "Vagzhanova" factory complained about the inadequate housing conditions of many young female workers at her factory, who had rented space in private homes<sup>63</sup>. In these homes they had to live often in a corner of a room, and were unable to do homework

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<sup>59</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.119.

<sup>60</sup>At an obkom plenum in February 1953 the population number in the town was given as 220,000 (Pako, 147/5/659, 1.15), slightly more than in 1939 (see Table 3).

<sup>61</sup>When one compares the number of 1939 to the estimate for 1956 and the population in 1959 (see III.1, and Table 3). See Table 43 as well.

<sup>62</sup>See III.1. According to Chapman, the average urban dwelling space per person in the USSR was 4.0 square meters in 1944, 5.2 square meters in 1948, 4.9 square meters in 1952, and 5.0 meters in 1954 (Chapman, p.26). The drop between 1948 and 1952 was probably the result of the influx of rural inhabitants into the towns that was noticed above. Kiselev and Sadovnikov reported in November 1951 to Malenkov: "The pace of the construction of housing seriously lags behind the growing demands of the population of the towns" (Pako, 147/5/35, 1.135). The lack of sufficient housing had been one of the criticisms of the Central Committee in October 1948; the worst situation in 1949 had been in Torzhok, Rzhev, and Bologoe (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.20ob.). After N.S. Loshkarev was demobilized from the army, he and his mother first lived in an apartment together with other people. In 1948 his mother received her own room of ten square meters, whereto Loshkarev with his bride moved as well, and where their two children were born. Only in 1957 did they receive an apartment of seventeen square meters for themselves (testimony of A.S. Loshkarev in the survey). A.S. Lukovkin lived with his mother, wife, and daughter in a room of eleven square meters after his return from the camps (testimony of A.S. Lukovkin in the survey). Many industrial workers lived in barracks nearby their factory, as did the worker of the "Proletarka" kombinat T.A. Poliakova, and the textile worker F.K. Romashova (testimony of T.A. Poliakova and F.K. Romashova in the survey). See Gordon, Klopov, pp.110/111, for the abominable housing circumstances in urban areas.

<sup>63</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.158.



for the workers' youth school, because the landlord demanded that the light be turned off at a certain time at night<sup>64</sup>.

Heating in the larger towns was provided by the burning of wood or peat<sup>65</sup>. It is rather remarkable that, in 1948, still more than half of this fuel consisted of wood.

In 1951, the electricity network was reported as still growing, which indicates that not yet all enjoyed its use<sup>66</sup>. Nor had this been the case before the war<sup>67</sup>. In the same year, the tramlines, as well as the city's sewage and waterworks had been completely restored to the pre-1941 situation<sup>68</sup>. But the public utilities must have been far from adequate, since Kiselev and Sadovnikov petitioned Malenkov in November 1951 for a resolution to be issued by the USSR Council of Ministers that would order large investments in the telephone network, housing, the tram system, and for a sports stadium<sup>69</sup>.

The situation in some of the other towns was even worse in 1951<sup>70</sup>. The amount of living space and the municipal services in Rzhev

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<sup>64</sup>A.M. Afanas'ev, who lived all his life in Udoml'ia, commented that the ancestral wooden house in which he lived in 1992 had its disadvantages and demanded a lot of maintenance, but still believed that his house was preferable to an urban apartment (testimony of A.M. Afanas'ev in the survey). The present author cannot but agree after having lived in several Soviet-built apartments in Moscow and Tver'.

<sup>65</sup>Pako, 147/4/1501, 1.21. That is the heating of cultural and social institutes, offices, and the homes of the population.

<sup>66</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.119.

<sup>67</sup>See III.1.

<sup>68</sup>However, in November 1951, Malenkov was told: "The demands of the populace are not being met in respect to the waterworks and sewage, the provision of services and utilities, the repairs of housing, and so on, make scant progress..." (Pako, 147/5/35, 1.135).

<sup>69</sup>Pako, 147/5/35, 11.137-141.

<sup>70</sup>Compare as well to VII.2. It might be, however, that in the semi-rural, recently urbanized settlements, such as Konakovo, the situation was better than in older towns such as Rzhev, Torzhok, or Bologoe. G.V. Lubov lived with his parents in Konakovo until his marriage at the age of twenty-six, after which he and his wife were able to move into a house of their own, which was bequeathed to them (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey). Perhaps the overpopulation in these smaller settlements was less than in the larger towns,

and Torzhok had yet to attain prewar levels<sup>71</sup>. In 1949, each inhabitant of the town of Rzhev had on average three square meters of living space<sup>72</sup>. In the same year, many of its schools had to work in three shifts due to the lack of buildings. Rzhev had merely half of the amount of housing, schools, hospitals, clinics, and daycares in 1951 in comparison with 1940<sup>73</sup>. In Bologoe in 1952, more than 270 families of railroad workers were in dire need of housing<sup>74</sup>. They lived in kitchens and hallways in spite of repeated pleas in 1951 and 1952 to come to the aid of these families. Even though the war had been officially over for seven years, no new apartment buildings had been built in the town, that had sustained severe damage from shelling and bombardments.

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and the accessibility to locally found raw materials --especially wood--, necessary for the construction of houses, was better in settlements the size of Konakovo (which probably had about 10,000 inhabitants during this period, see Table 3). Lubov's case is, on the other hand, probably not exemplary, since most town dwellers were relative newcomers in most towns, and did not have relatives from whom they could inherit a house or apartment. In comparison, N.V. Akhova lived in Konakovo in a communal one-room apartment of her porcelain factory with six people on eleven square meters (testimony of N.V. Akhova in the survey). After the war, L.V. Egorova lived with her mother, a factory worker, in factory barracks in Vyshnii Volochek. Only in 1956, after her second marriage, did she move to her husband's apartment (testimony of L.V. Egorova in the survey). E.S. Shirogenkova, a weaver, also lived in the factory barracks of one of the textile works in Kalinin. She got her own apartment only in 1972 (testimony of E.S. Shirogenkova in the survey). E.V. Baranova, a spinner of one of Kalinin's textile plants, lived with her husband and daughter in a communal apartment of twelve square meters (testimony of E.V. Baranova in the survey). T.F. Krivova lived after the war with six people in a room of twelve square meters (testimony of T.F. Krivova in the survey). A.A. Kondrashov, a member of the Party elite of the oblast', was one of the few in the survey who believed, not surprisingly, that he had always been well provided with decent housing (testimony of A.A. Kondrashov in the survey).

<sup>71</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.119. See Table 43. In 1952 in Kimry, at one factory 250 m<sup>2</sup> factory housing space was available for 700 workers, and at another 40 m<sup>2</sup> for 400 workers (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.240). There was no kindergarten for either factory, both of which mainly employed women. Thus, it was noted, the labour force at the factories was very instable.

<sup>72</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.44.

<sup>73</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 1.76.

<sup>74</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.25.

In 1952, no municipal waterworks or sewage existed in Kashin, and in Kimry, the people had to use either the polluted water of the Volga or water from primitive wells for most household purposes<sup>75</sup>. The bridges over the river were in a dilapidated state, and the cobblestoned roads fell apart. There was not one asphalt sidewalk, and the municipal public works department lacked the means for any new projects and even for the maintenance of the existing municipal utilities<sup>76</sup>.

In smaller settlements in the immediate surroundings of a number of towns, there was neither electricity or sufficient water fountains. In settlements, as in the "workers' settlements" (*rabochie poselki*), the assortment of goods in the shops was often small, with shortages of essential products occurring regularly<sup>77</sup>.

Today quite a few Russians censure the appearance of beggars on the streets in recent years, something which supposedly was unheard of earlier, when the Soviet Union still existed. Perhaps there were few indigents in Brezhnev's time. However, beggars went around the streets of Kalinin during Stalin's years. In 1951, Mishchenko, of the Molotov military academy located in the centre of Kalinin, remarked:

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<sup>75</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.39 and 1.240.

<sup>76</sup>A.A. Kondrashov stated that, when he started to work in the obkom in 1959 under first secretary N.G. Korytkov, there was no asphalt road in any of the smaller towns, which Korytkov organized during his long tenure during the 1960s. Neither were there radios in the countryside in 1959, according to Kondrashov; again Korytkov was responsible for their diffusion. Korytkov, too, succeeded in building many more bridges in Kalinin, through which town three different rivers flow (the Tvertsa, the T'mak, and the Volga) (testimony of A.A. Kondrashov in the survey). Unwittingly, Kondrashov showed us the primitive state of affairs in some areas of infrastructure in the oblast' before 1959. In contrast to Kondrashov, the kolkhoz bookkeeper and sometimes chairman D.A. Dukinin could not appreciate Korytkov very much. Dukinin was of the opinion that Korytkov was a bit of a fool and that he ruled by "administrative methods" (testimony of D.A. Dukinin in the survey).

<sup>77</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 11.120/121.

If the secretaries of the raikom, gorkom, and obkom would take a walk along the streets of the oblast' centre, then they would notice that almost on every street corner some kind of beggar is sitting. It gives the impression that the centre of the town of Kalinin is beggarly. Citizens of the countries of the people's democracies study at the Molotov Academy. There is one indigent near the post office, who without fail seeks them out and begs. They will go home and relate that the town of Kalinin is full of beggars.<sup>78</sup>

Municipal services in the raion centre of Maksatikha were in a desolate state in 1952: the public bath had crumbled, the primary school building had burned down, after which the school had closed, and there was no electrical light<sup>79</sup>.

Although the education network in the oblast' worked reasonably smoothly by 1951, still some school-age children did not attend classes<sup>80</sup>.

The health-care situation in the oblast' has already been described<sup>81</sup>. In 1951, in the formerly occupied raions medical offices and clinics were sometimes couched in private dwellings, and as a rule had to allow for a less than desired sanitary standard<sup>82</sup>. Several hospitals had not yet been rebuilt by that year, notably the oblast' hospital in Kalinin and the urban hospitals of Rzhev and Staritsa. Furthermore, a paucity of medical doctors (more than eight hundred) was reported to the Central Committee in June 1951<sup>83</sup>.

During the greater part of the 1930s, and in the postwar period as well (let alone the period of the war itself), the

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<sup>78</sup>Pako, 147/5/105, 1.85.

<sup>79</sup>Pako, 147/5/433, 1.34.

<sup>80</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.120; see VIII.6.

<sup>81</sup>See VII.2.

<sup>82</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.120.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., 1.120.

purchasing power of wages was clearly lower than in the second half of the 1920s.<sup>84</sup>

Although the retail prices were regularly lowered after 1945, the eternal Soviet problem of scanty amounts and variety of goods in the shops also plagued the Kalinin oblast<sup>85</sup>. In the winter of and spring of 1946-1947 the bread ration was extremely low as a result of the drought<sup>86</sup>. At the end of 1947, ration cards were abolished, but except for a brief period of an abundance of goods, the same shortages quickly recurred<sup>87</sup>. Privations of sugar, flour, meat, lard and butter, tinned food, and more goods often cropped up both in town and country in 1951<sup>88</sup>. Just as much as in later times, the rudeness of the customer

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<sup>84</sup>Gordon, Klopov, p.99. Curiously, in the 1930s many of the contemporaries applauded the announcement of wage increases by Stalin as a sign of the improvement of the standard of living, without any effort to compare their situation to the pre-1929 period, nor trying to establish if an actual increase in real wages occurred by looking at the level of price increases (Gordon, Klopov, pp.99/100). The same ploy seems to have worked in the postwar period, when prices were regularly lowered, without resulting in an increase in purchasing power.

<sup>85</sup>Pako, 147/5/328, 11.15-17. On April 1, 1952, the fifth or sixth postwar lowering of prices occurred. Chapman has pointed out that this probably did not mean much of an increase in real wages, certainly not in the 1940s, and perhaps only slightly so in the early 1950s (Chapman, pp. 165-175; as well, on the price reductions, Chapman, p.50). G.V. Lubov, very much of a supporter of the regime, noticed that he and his family complained about the slow pace of the price reductions (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey).

<sup>86</sup>I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.11.

<sup>87</sup>Ocherki, pp.541/542. The Fourth Five Year Plan, accepted on March 12, 1946 by the Supreme Soviet, had deemed it feasible to have the ration coupons abolished by the end of 1946 (*Sovetskaja derevnia*... pp.61/62). Particularly the famine of 1946-1947 forced this decision to be postponed for another year. Ration cards were only given to urban dwellers and employees in the countryside, not to the kolkhozniks. N.A. Arkhangel'skii was probably correct when he stated that the most important aspect of the abolition of rationing was its political effect (testimony of N.A. Arkhangel'skii in the survey). His opinion was underlined by that of N.N. Panova, a weaver, who believed that the abolition was a means to pretend to the outside world that everything was going well in the USSR. She added that shortages continued to happen up until our own days (testimony of N.N. Panova in the survey).

<sup>88</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.121. In 1952, a similar complaint was repeated by oblast' trade union leader Zubov (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.246). He noticed that in every town regular shortages of essential products were taking place. Many industrial workers were able to receive food products in special stalls on the premises of their factory. Railroad workers, for example, were able to buy additional sugar, sausages, and bread there (testimony of A.N.

services was deplored, in 1951 even by the first obkom secretary<sup>89</sup>. In 1952, during an inspection of sixty-five retail stores, it was found that, in forty-three of the shops, customers were cheated by being given short weights or short measures, or by mistakes in tallying up the bill<sup>90</sup>. Bread queues occurred in 1951 in Vyshnii Volochek<sup>91</sup>. Much was stolen and squandered in the retail trade network of the oblast'. Transportation for the internal trade network was also far from suitable in 1951. The direction for local trade had 120 motor vehicles and 162 horses at its disposal, whereas before the war it had disposed of 204 motor vehicles and 297 horses<sup>92</sup>. In 1951, the consumers' cooperatives possessed fewer cars, trucks, and horses than in 1941. Goods such as bicycles and radios were distributed very unevenly: at some point in 1950-51, for example, a single shop received 720 radios, while the direction of local trade received merely 380<sup>93</sup>.

The results of the failing distribution network in the oblast' were angrily summed up by a delegate at the ninth Party conference, who

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Nikolaev in the survey). Nevertheless, the diet of Soviet citizens in 1940 or 1950 had not improved over that of the inhabitants of Imperial Russia in 1913 (Gordon, Klopov, p.105).

<sup>89</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.121. The phrase that is used here is: "*Nizkaia kul'tura v obsluzhivanii pokupatelei...*".

<sup>90</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.246. Apparently against none of the cheating sales persons criminal proceedings were instituted.

<sup>91</sup>Pako, 147/5/105, 1.65. The local boss, Matveev, returned to the theme of shortages in September 1952, when he complained that no sausages had been available for three months that year in his town, and the quantity of herring and cheese on average per day had been no more than fifty-five kilo's of each over the same period (Pako, 147/5/283, 1. 216). He added that no problem afflicting his town, that had been discussed on the eighth Party conference, had been solved by the time of the ninth Party conference (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.217). The dilemma was an old one, because already in July 1946, shortages in Vyshnii Volochek had been so widespread, that *Proletarskaia Pravda* had dedicated an article to it, although the focus of the article was not on the foodstuffs -- at the time still rationed--, but on household goods (PP 8059/July 7, 1946, p.3).

<sup>92</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 11.139/140.

<sup>93</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1. 139.

more or less represented the contemporary opinion of the workers, for he was not working in any *nomenklatura* job:

A little about trade. Try to obtain yeast, or bay leaf, when you dare. Nothing of the kind you will find, and the speculators are selling them at every spot. Is it possible that the trade organizations cannot organize the sale of bay leaves? Or do you think that it's not convenient for your financial plan? It is, however, useful for the working class and the toiling intelligentsia because they overpay the speculators for these things; and one fails to understand how the organs of the arm of the law can overlook this in such a slipshod manner, as if they do not know what the speculators demand for a bay leaf.

There, comrade Kiselev, you reported that the organs of the militia and justice operate poorly. Let's grab these hucksters, these permanent residents of the market, and send them there, to the kolkhozy (Applause).<sup>94</sup>

Many town dwellers tried to make up for the absence of an adequate variety of goods by cultivating a private plot on the outskirts of the towns<sup>95</sup>. In Kalinin in 1951, 14,656 households owned such a plot

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<sup>94</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.221.

<sup>95</sup>In this respect many of the new recruits to the urban work force, natives of the countryside, had certain advantages over those who had lived for generations in the towns. If they were lucky enough to be allowed to cultivate a garden plot, the former could use their rural experience to derive a nice yield of crops and of livestock from the plot. The possession of a plot probably perpetuated certain rural habits among these workers. G.V. Lubov, his wife, and his parents, although all employed in the small town of Konakovo in factories or urban offices, continuously kept up a private plot, for they possessed a sufficiently large yard near their house during this period. Konakovo was a recently urbanized village, which retained many rural traits. Although Lubov was and is a staunch supporter of the Communist regime, he admits that the double income he and his wife had in these years was insufficient to provide adequately for his family of three. The private plot came to their rescue. The produce satisfied the family's demand for potatoes, cabbage, cucumbers, tomatoes and carrots. They also kept chickens and pigs (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey). Even a well paid workers like N.D. Eliseev, who worked at the railroads repairing locomotives, continued to cultivate a private plot and raised some piglets. He sold the meat from these in Moscow, because the prices on the market were much higher there (testimony of N.D. Eliseev in the survey).

but, due to the taxation on the produce of these plots, the number had fallen to approximately 10,000 by 1953<sup>96</sup>.

Only in the early 1950s did the real wages of workers and employees generally start to surpass the level of 1937, and only after Stalin's death did they reach the level of the later 1920s<sup>97</sup>. By far the largest share of the family's income had to be spent on foodstuffs<sup>98</sup>. In comparison to most industrialized countries at the time, in the 1950s "...the position of the Soviet worker, relative to the workers in most of these countries, was still worse than it was in 1928."<sup>99</sup>

Furthermore, by the 1950s both adults of an urban household were obliged to work in order to guarantee a sufficient income for the home<sup>100</sup>. And even then, as in the case of L.V. Vedernikova, a

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<sup>96</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 11.167/168. Moreover, in 1951 blue and white-collar workers had 1,909 cows for private use, the number of which also fell to 1,252 in 1953.

<sup>97</sup>Chapman, p.144, Table 21, and p.145, Table 22, and pp.147/148 for the interpretation of the numbers in the table. On the average, real wages were still at a very low level in 1948. It should be noted, too, that these calculations were somewhat suspect, as Chapman indicated herself: "The widely divergent measures of the extent of the decline in real wages since 1928 and the conflicting answers as to the level of real wages in 1954 in comparison with 1928 emphasize the difficulties of comparing standards of living in very different periods or places" (Chapman, p.150). However, she is quite convinced of the accuracy of the comparison between 1937 and later years; the evidence indicates that in the towns of the Kalinin oblast' between 1937 and 1953 the life of workers and employees hardly improved, nor did real wages increase (see Chapman, pp.150-152).

<sup>98</sup>Gordon, Klopov, p.104.

<sup>99</sup>Chapman, p.177.

<sup>100</sup>Chapman, p.178. Only army officers, who received a package with foodstuffs every month, could sometimes afford to live on one income with their families (testimonies of V.Ia. Semiachko and Kh. I. Leibovich in the survey). Leibovich had to pay a steep rent (and perhaps tuition fees), half of his income, when he studied directly after the war in the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. His wife might have worked as well at that time as a stenographer. Similar packages were distributed among all military and Party leaders (*Sto sorok besed...*, p. 517). Their contents probably were dependent on the importance of the receiver, but the highest leaders received large sums of money. In retirement, Molotov noted that the leadership knew for a fact that the miserly wages of 60-odd --i.e. 600 per month at the time-- rubles were not enough (*Sto sorok besed...*, p.264). In the eyes of the Politburo, no possibilities existed to increase them, for all means had to be dedicated to the defense against the imperialist threat.



bookkeeper, and her husband, who worked for DOSAAF and its predecessors, the double income did not suffice<sup>101</sup>. She had to supplement their income by doing odd jobs on her days off, and he, an inveterate fisher, added his catch to their meals. She did not even take her holidays because she would be paid cash compensation, another welcome addition to their income. A.I. Ryzhakova received a pension for her daughter of 350 rubles, because her husband was killed in the army; yet, as a nurse, she still needed to work one and a half shifts to make ends meet, to work on holidays, and to call upon relatives to help her out<sup>102</sup>. E.V. Baranova, a textile worker, supplemented the income of her family by knitting and selling her knitted wear<sup>103</sup>. T.A. Poliakova and F.K. Romashova, also textile workers, toiled on their days off in the factory in order to augment their income<sup>104</sup>. Poliakova did the laundry and ironing for the direction of her factory. Others could rely on the produce of a private plot to garnish their income.

Young males all had to undergo medical tests for conscription. After the war, the usual army service for recruits amounted to three years. The army was an important and convenient means for creating conformity among the male part of Soviet youth. Before joining the army, a boy could escape most indoctrination by avoiding politics. This was probably not all that hard to do in the countryside, and was

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<sup>101</sup>Testimony of L.V. Vedernikova in the survey.

<sup>102</sup>Testimony of A.I. Ryzhakova in the survey; it is not clear if this pension was the monthly or yearly sum Ryzhakova received; the account of L.P. Felkova, who received a pension of 68 rubles for her deceased husband and had two children, leads one to think that this was the yearly total (testimony of L.P. Felkova in the survey). It could be, however, that Felkova refers to the yearly total in the post-1961 value of the currency.

<sup>103</sup>Testimony of E.V. Baranova in the survey. The carpenter P.A. Kashinov, who was a member of a construction cooperative, worked with his brigade in his spare time, building privately commissioned wooden houses (testimony of P.A. Kashinov in the survey).

<sup>104</sup>Testimonies of T.A. Poliakova and F.K. Romashova in the survey.

possible in the towns as well without much harm. However, military service would make an obedient and acquiescent Soviet citizen out of him<sup>105</sup>. Apart from the army itself, there were also "voluntary" organizations for the defense of the Motherland, the most important of which was *DOSAAF* (*Vsesoiuznoe dobrovol'noe obshchestvo sodeistviia armii, aviatsii i flotu*)<sup>106</sup>. *DOSAAF* possessed of buildings used for paramilitary exercises and equipment storage, and had shooting ranges and training grounds<sup>107</sup>. 57,335 members in the Kalinin oblast' in the autumn of 1951 belonged to *DOSAAF*<sup>108</sup>.

One is rather astonished by the complaint in 1951 about the operation of a Baptist Church in Kalinin, in which Pioneers attended services because their own organization did not offer sufficient activities<sup>109</sup>. In the oblast' hospital for tuberculosis patients, religious rites were illegally performed by Orthodox priests, aided by a nurse

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<sup>105</sup>See Fainsod, *How...*, pp.410-413. This is of course not specific to the Soviet Union under Stalin. In any country where conscription existed and exists, the recruits have to undergo a certain amount of pressure in the army to conform to certain rules and standards, some of which are necessary for military reasons. Others are applied to forge a certain loyal type of citizen out of the conscript, for which one can suggest political reasons. But the level of political indoctrination in Stalin's army was incomparably higher than in other countries at the time. The fondness for the recruitment into the Party of those who served or had served in the army, particularly during the war, might have been again a consequence of the authorities' extraordinary appreciation of military culture. This had been a Russian tradition long before Bolshevik times. It also could explain, apart from other anti-female attitudes that existed, why far fewer women entered the Party. Women did not experience the school of military discipline. Therefore they were imagined to be, either consciously or not, less subservient than men who had discharged their army service. Women's absence in military service also resulted in their being less "one of the boys."

<sup>106</sup>E.g. Pako, 147/5/35, 1.103. In the second half of 1951 the separate organizations (*DOSARM*, *DOSAV* and *DOSFLOT*) for the support of army, of the air force, and of the navy had merged (Pako, 147/5/37, 1.85).

<sup>107</sup>Pako, 147/5/35, 1.104.

<sup>108</sup>Pako, 147/5/37, 1.85.

<sup>109</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 1.144.

who had been brought up in a convent. Religious devotion, meanwhile, was gradually dwindling in the towns<sup>110</sup>.

In principle, the leisure time of factory workers and employees was distributed evenly during the year<sup>111</sup>. The pace of work was different in agriculture, and the peasants followed more closely their traditional rhythm of life. Although less so than before collectivization, the winter was still a more tranquil time. After the harvest, the kolkhozniks were often recruited for work in wood procurements, and had to treat flax at home<sup>112</sup>. The peasants also stubbornly continued to observe religious holidays, and these amounted to their time at play<sup>113</sup>. In their case, the modern concept of leisure only became diffused in the time of the reforms after Stalin's death, when, for example, actual paid holidays were introduced<sup>114</sup>. Before

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<sup>110</sup>See VI.2 as well.

<sup>111</sup>See also Fainsod, *How...* p.318. Obviously, urban inhabitants were obliged to work overtime at their enterprises (either because the factory or institution forced them to do so, or on their own initiative, to enhance their income). Some of them spent a large amount of their spare time on their plots. Much time was lost by having to queue up at the stores as well; women were understood to discharge of most household tasks (see VIII.5).

<sup>112</sup>Before collectivization, flax was not cultivated by all peasants, although the cultivation of the crop rose during the 1920s (Altrichter, pp.77/78). After collectivization, almost every kolkhoz had been forced to cultivate the crop. The sown area of flax amplified from 12% in 1927/28 of the total sown area in Tver' guberniia, to 17% in 1937 in the Kalinin oblast', and was between 14 to 15% in the years 1946-1952 (Altrichter, p.78; *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo*, pp.32/33). M.A. Sysoeva, A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva, Z.M. Vinogradova and A.E. Vakhmistrov confirmed that one had more opportunity to relax during the winter in the countryside (testimony of the same in the survey). M.M. Kozenkova added that one still had work in the winter, with the treatment and transport of flax to the factory, and in the wood procurements (testimony of M.M. Kozenkova in the survey).

<sup>113</sup>As in the case of T.A. Novikova in Udoml'ia raion (testimony of T.A. Novikova in the survey); V.G. Gavrilov, a Party member since 1947, stated that the days off in the summer were only those on which the religious holidays were celebrated on the kolkhoz (testimony of V.G. Gavrilov in the survey).

<sup>114</sup>It should be noticed here that the peasantry in the 1940s sometimes did have different pastimes --at least, if they had the time for it-- than their ancestors, one of which was reading (as did V.P. Pimenova; testimony of V.P. Pimenova in the survey). After all, by 1945 the large majority had profited from some sort of education, while twenty years earlier still more than half of the adult population had been illiterate (Altrichter, p.47).

1953, the attitude towards work in the countryside remained predominantly preindustrial: a clear division between leisure and work time was not made, the rhythm of activities determined rather by the religious calendar and the seasons.

In urban areas some indulged in their spare time by participating in amateur music and drama groups, reading library books, visiting the theatre and cinema, attending concerts, and being involved in sports<sup>115</sup>. Others used their free moments in a way which resembled the habits of rural dwellers: elaborate dinners with plenty of food and drink with family and friends (*zastol'e*), or strolling around the town when young. Some, as was noticed before, owned a private plot, and spent much of their free time tending to their crops and livestock. The older crowd preserved the rural habit of sitting around on benches outside the apartment building or barracks --instead of the peasant's house-- in the evenings, savouring gossip about all and sundry. Most spent their spare time combining a variety these options.

The urban inhabitants earned a real annual vacation of varying length, depending on one's job. Only a few, and they were all part of the Party's elite, managed to make a holiday trip outside the borders of the oblast<sup>116</sup>. In the survey, not surprisingly, more of the urban residents, and in particular those who had joined the Party, expressed satisfaction with the possibilities to recharge their batteries during

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<sup>115</sup>As did G.V. Lubov, who was undoubtedly more than most conscious of "cultured" ways of spending one's time. Nevertheless, he, too, liked the *zastol'e* type of gathering (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey).

<sup>116</sup>Nevertheless, professional Party workers had to work extremely hard, from early in the morning until late at night (testimony of A.M. Afanas'ev and A.A. Kondrashov). The ones higher up on the ladder were entitled to an annual trip to a spa, as Kondrashov was (testimony of A.A. Kondrashov in the survey).

leisure and holiday time<sup>117</sup>. However, quite a few factory workers noticed that they often had to work on their days off, when equipment had to be repaired, or the plan had to be met<sup>118</sup>. In the end, life in the towns was probably only marginally more endurable than in the countryside<sup>119</sup>. The queues in front of the shops, the lack of a diverse assortment of goods, the inadequate diet, the poorly insulated apartments or rooms, and the forced cohabitation with others in the communal apartments led to an exceptionally high level of stress. Some, the weaker ones, turned to the bottle as a result.

### VIII.3 The Failure of Socialist Agriculture

As is well known, the building of communism aims to eliminate the essential distinctions between town and countryside.<sup>120</sup>

The newspaper Proletarskaia Pravda gave in July 1945 an example of a kolkhoz where agricultural labour, in this case at harvest time, was organized in a most rational and efficient way<sup>121</sup>. The kolkhoz had two *zven'ia* each made up of twelve women. Winter grains had been sown on fifty-one hectares of the kolkhoz land, spring grains on fifty-nine hectares, flax on thirty-six hectares, and potatoes on sixteen and a half hectares. During the harvesting of these crops, fifteen hectares

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<sup>117</sup>Again G.V. Lubov's satisfaction might be considered typical (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey).

<sup>118</sup>Testimony of A.V. Zelentsev, S.M. Volkov, N.I. Komarov, N.A. Kotov in the survey.

<sup>119</sup>Gordon, Klopov, p.114.

<sup>120</sup>Todorskii, Arbatov, II, p.57.

<sup>121</sup>pp 7802, July 11, 1945, p.2. The article described the organization of the harvest at the kolkhoz "Krasnoe Trosukhino" of the Kalinin rural raion of the oblast'.

of fallow [sic] were to be ploughed, and fifty-five hectares were to be planted with winter cereals. In order to aid with the harvest, fifteen more kolkhoz members (the bookkeeper, the chair, the storage keeper, some livestock herders and some milkmaids) were enlisted and an additional thirty-six people were found in the neighbourhood: twenty-three school children and thirteen elderly kolkhoz members. In this way, seventy-five people were potentially able to aid with the harvest. These seventy-five were still deemed as being too few, so that the kolkhoz requested a nearby orphanage to lend another twenty teenagers.

When daily tasks were distributed, twenty-eight people were assigned to harvest with sickles, and thirty-eight received lighter tasks, such as pulling seed vessels from flax stalks, and so on. Not all orphans, school children, and elderly were employed every day. Twenty horses were available to serve as draught power, and carts were deployed for the transport of the harvested crops. Two MTS tractors were hired, one to pull a threshing machine, the other to aid in sowing winter grains and ploughing the land for the following spring sowing. It seems that the conduct of the harvest of this kolkhoz was a success -- that is, if it actually happened at this kolkhoz in this way, because the newspaper was primarily a means of propaganda<sup>122</sup>. If all collective farms would have been able to organize themselves as well as this one, with the same kind of glowing outcome, the crop cultivation and harvest yield of the Kalinin oblast' would have been an outstanding example, ripe for emulation in the Soviet Union.

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<sup>122</sup>See VI.1 and Appendix II.

Somehow this was not the case during the later years of Stalin's life. Several of the problems that plagued agriculture have been mentioned already, and several more will be described in the following pages in order to explain why "socialist" agriculture in the Kalinin oblast' remained a constant source of anxiety for the local authorities and why it was often ignored as much as possible by the peasants themselves. One of the dilemmas can be found immediately in the above description: the shortage of work hands, which was emphasised by the preponderance of manual labour on the kolkhozy.

Although statistical handbooks claim that agriculture was collectivized for 100% in 1945, there is proof that this was not entirely the case<sup>123</sup>. The term "collectivized" is confusing, for consistently every year some *artel'* members were excluded from collective farms for failing to discharge their obligations. They tried then to survive on their own little plot of land that was heavily taxed by the state. It might be true that by 1945 all of the peasantry of the Kalinin oblast' had belonged to a collective farm at some point in time. It is, however, a mistake to conclude that, at any point in time after the war, every individual of the rural population who engaged in agriculture was a member of a sovkhos or kolkhoz, or worked for the MTS and procurement organizations.

Furthermore, it should be stressed once more that, in spite of all kind of legislation against employment in nonagricultural occupations in the countryside, many rural inhabitants shunned the collective

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<sup>123</sup> Kalininskaia oblast' za 50 let..., p.59 claimed that all land and all peasants' households were collectivized in 1945. However, see VI.2 for a qualification of that level of collectivization.

farms. They worked, for example, in rurally located factories, in industrial cooperatives, or for the government<sup>124</sup>.

In July 1945, the obkomburo expressed its dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the raion of Kozlovo, east of Vyshnii Volochek, a raion which had been spared German occupation<sup>125</sup>. In some kolkhozy there, the kolkhozniks did not start their workday on the collective farm early enough, and enjoyed long breaks for lunch. The result was that, in 1944, out of 217 organized production links (*zven'ia*) only 130 survived until the end of the agricultural season. Only five received additional payment for deliveries of state procurements above the obligatory norms. Horses and other livestock under the authority of the collective farms were neglected, and many perished as a result. Worse still was the fact that many kolkhozniks had acquired an illegal pair of cows for personal use, had stopped with kolkhoz work, and had taken up private farming. In Kozlovo raion, 195 private farms used kolkhoz land and kolkhoz pastures for their cattle and somehow were not being taxed! Not surprisingly, the obkomburo urged upon the raion authorities severe measures to bring these practices to an end. These instances of "civil disobedience" were not unique for Kozlovo raion<sup>126</sup>. The large amount of private farms shows that more than ten years after collectivization a defiant spirit was still alive among many peasants.

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<sup>124</sup>See VII.1.

<sup>125</sup>Pako, 147/3/2701, II.224/225.

<sup>126</sup>See VI.2 In Soviet jargon, this behaviour was dubbed "anti-Soviet". At the same time similar phenomena were noticed in Ostashkov raion, for instance (Pako, 147/3/2701, II.132-133ob.). In August 1945, grain was distributed among the kolkhozniks of the Novokarel' raion instead of being delivered to the state (Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.30). A few weeks later the same practice was condemned in the Novokarel', Kaliazin, Nerl', Likhoslavl', Goritskii, and Esenovichi raions (Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.55ob.).



A substantial number of collective farmers had more or less withdrawn from the kolkhoz, and focussed exclusively on their private plot<sup>127</sup>. In the formerly occupied raions, the plot size was just large enough to allow for a subsistence level of existence by way of cultivating cereals, technical crops, and tending to one's private livestock. In order to force the kolkhozniks to return to work in the socialized sector of agriculture, the raikom secretary of Zubtsov raion, Drozdov, recommended in 1946 that either the legal size of the plot be halved, or the sowing of grain and technical crops on private plots be prohibited by the government<sup>128</sup>.

After repeated warnings, the three local leaders who were responsible for the grain deliveries of Novokarel' raion, raikom secretary Andreev, raiispolkom chair Mukhin, and the raion plenipotentiary of the People's Commissariat of Procurements, Tumanov, were penalized in September 1945 by the obkomburo for failing to organize the delivery of the recently harvested grain to the state on schedule<sup>129</sup>. Seventy-eight of 102 collective farms in the raion did not meet the deadline for grain deliveries. The obkomburo concluded that this was a result of anti-Soviet and criminal attitudes of a number of kolkhoz chairs, some of whom were engaged in selling off grain on the side. Others, however, might have been less driven by an anti-Soviet attitude, but were hindered in their efforts to deliver

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<sup>127</sup>Pako, 147/4/18, 1.41. The maximum size of a private plot was half a hectare in most of the Kalinin oblast'.

<sup>128</sup>Pako, 147/4/18, 1.41.

<sup>129</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, ll. 161ob./162ob. The raion of Staritsa was cautioned at the same time as well. The three remained for the moment in their functions. Somewhat later in September, the obkomburo once more noticed "an anti-governmental mood of primary Party organization leaders, and of kolkhoz and sovkhos directors" (Pako, 147/3/2702, ll. 178ob.)

their quota on time because of a high moisture of the cereals. Yet, the obkomburo was unwilling to allow for causes other than human failure for the less than satisfactory result of the raion's grain deliveries.

Another expression of the endurance of the peasantry's patient resistance to the regime was the continued disappearance of livestock, something which kept bothering the obkom after the war. In August 1945, obkom and oblispolkom took a resolution to condemn the practice of squandering cattle on the side<sup>130</sup>. This habit had acquired extensive proportions because, in July of the same year, the number of strong-horned cattle in the oblast' fell by 11,863 heads, of which only 3,000 were delivered to the state as part of meat procurements. The other cattle was squandered. In this case, the raions cited were in the eastern, non-occupied area<sup>131</sup>. Some raions went as far as to sell off, or slaughter for their own consumption, oxen which were supposed to substitute for the absent draught power of either horses or tractors. This latter practice occurred more particularly in areas which had suffered damage in the war, and were thus more in need of oxen<sup>132</sup>. In September 1945, part of the problem was blamed on the disorganization that appeared to prevail within the oblast' and raion offices of the cattle procurement organization (*Zagotiskoi*)<sup>133</sup>.

In the areas located further away from the industrial artery along the October Railroad and in the south-east, the lack of enthusiasm for

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<sup>130</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.88.

<sup>131</sup>The raions of Molokovo, with 1,505 heads, Bezhetsk, with 1,169 heads, Kashin with 1,153 heads, Brusovo (653), Maksatikha (589), and Vyshnii Volochek (259) were named as the main culprits.

<sup>132</sup>Here the raions of Rzhev, in which the number of draught oxen decreased by 120 in July 1945, Lukovnikovo (101), Kalinin (47), Konakovo (45), and Bologoe (42) were mentioned.

<sup>133</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 1. 186.

the socialist sector was perhaps greater because these parts often did not receive their fair share of consumer goods. In 1945, the *glubinnye raiony* suffered from a paucity of engines --particularly of importance for their Machine Tractor Stations--, glass, salt, kerosene, soap, matches, sugar, and so on<sup>134</sup>. Often the bases of the *sel'khozsnabzhenie* were accused of theft and squandering of these goods and of mismanagement, but the distinct impression is created that the failure lay within the organization of the distribution system in general<sup>135</sup>. In one case at least, a kolkhoz in Turginovo raion discontinued its milk deliveries to the state because of the continuous absence of kerosene in the *sel'po* shop<sup>136</sup>.

Agriculture failed to provide for the industrial labour force, owing to either poor planning or too much of it. The confusion that ensued from this with regards to deliveries and distribution of agricultural produce, and the failure of collective farming itself to turn into a hugely successful part of the economy, made the authorities resign to certain concessions<sup>137</sup>. During the war, many organizations,

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<sup>134</sup>See, e.g., Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.62-62ob.

<sup>135</sup>The *sel'khozsnabzhenie* was an oblast' office responsible for the distribution of goods among the collective farms, with local departments in the raions. The same problem was once more subject of discussions in the obkomburo, somewhat later in September 1945 (Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.185ob.-187ob.). At this time the supply was deficient of at least the raions of Molokovo, Rameshki, Kesova Gora, and Lesnoe, all in the east and north-east of the oblast'. Flax deliveries were not being encouraged because of insufficient delivery of goods in return, according to information in September 1945 (Pako, 147/3/2702, 11. 187ob./188).

<sup>136</sup>Pako, 147/3/2702, 1.186ob.

<sup>137</sup>One Soviet publication of the Brezhnev period had to admit that agriculture in early 1946 in all sectors lagged far behind prewar production levels; in some areas the level of production was as low as in the early 1930s (*Sovetskaja derevnia...*, p.55). Thus tacitly it is admitted that agriculture, and in particular the socialized part, had to start in early 1946 virtually anew on the road to rationalization and mechanization that was commenced with collectivization. The parallel is all the more striking if one takes into account that there was a famine in 1946/1947, which seems to be a repetition of the 1932/1933 famine. The kolkhozniks relied mainly on their efforts on the private plot for their income,

enterprises, and factories had been allowed to have their own subsidiary state and collective farms (the obkom itself had one in Avvakumovo, just north-east of Kalinin)<sup>138</sup>. Regular supply of essential foodstuffs for the labour force of the enterprise or organization was more or less guaranteed through a combination of the produce from the subsidiary farm and the goods provided by the distribution system.

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and tried to do as little as they could get away with in the socialized sector. The *trudodni* were so little appreciated --undoubtedly because of their pitiful remuneration-- that they were handed out to all kinds of individuals, who were legally not entitled to them, such as construction workers, employees of rural soviets, or mail carriers (*Sovetskaja derevnia...*, p.66/67 and p.174). This is probably the key to the explanation of the disciplinary measures of the September 19, 1946 Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution, and the Central Committee Plenum's resolutions of February 1947. On the basis of records preserved in the state archive of Tver' oblast', it would be possible to describe the financial and economic operation of kolkhozy over a period of time in certain raions of the Kalinin oblast' (Gako, fond 2692, Opisi 1-51 on the Kalinin rural raion for example; also, Gako, 2520/2/8, 2520/23/3, 2520/47/28,31,34, 2520/48/6). A reading of these kinds of records by the present writer proved to be of limited interest for the research of this thesis, because many of the documents were either too specific or vague. Furthermore, time constraints made it impossible to conduct a rigorous investigation of these records. According to the inspector of the archival department of the Kalinin oblispolkom, O.G. Leont'eva, in 1990, one can find in these records: "...kolkhozniks' books in which the *trudodni* are calculated (*trudovye knizhki*), account books in which the personal accounts of the kolkhozniks are settled (*litsevye scheta*), account books listing the amount of wages in kind and in money and their relative weight, account books on the assignment and fulfillment of the procurement deliveries, [and] protocols of general meetings of the kolkhoz' membership..." (Leont'eva, p.28). She noticed that many records of the kolkhozy had been subsequently destroyed because the value of these kind of records was not acknowledged by archivists and government workers (Leont'eva, p.31). Leont'eva cited some aspects of kolkhoz life that could be described on the basis of these records: e.g. the amount of *trudodni* awarded to the members of the collective farm, which was dependent on the job they performed. She does not seem to have been aware that the peasants were often not paid any, or very few, *trudodni* when they had not fulfilled their labour norms. Of course, the value of the *trudodni* on the kolkhoz was dependent on the income paid by the state for the delivered produce; Fainsod explains the manner in which *trudodni* were awarded (Fainsod, *How...*, pp.461/462). Leont'eva's description was confirmed in the records of the former Communist Party that were used for the research of this dissertation. The Party's records were often far more explicit. They gave a much clearer picture of the situation and problems of agriculture, and of the kolkhozniks in the oblast' during the period (an example is the report on the decrease of the number of able-bodied workers in the collective farms and its repercussions on the oblast' agriculture to Kiselev of early 1953, which has been used in VII.3 (Pako, 147/5/906, ll.1-18)).

<sup>138</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, ll.77/78 is an example of a discussion on these farms. The financial-economic accounts of the sovkhos of Avvakumovo can be traced back in the Pako archives through the inventories of fond 147, opis 3, 4, and 5, for example.

Despite the obvious significance these subsidiary farms had, they were not always in the best condition. In July 1945, the situation of the sovkhoz "Brednevo" in Turginovo raion had become intolerable in the eyes of a vice-secretary of the obkom, Zakharov, who had the responsibility for the retail-trade and public-catering organizations<sup>139</sup>. He reported to Vorontsov and Boitsov that the food canteen and the housing barracks of the farm were infested with cockroaches and other insects, and that ten families lived in one communal room. They had no bedding, and there were hardly any pillows or mattresses. He went on:

In the *obshchezhitie* there were no chairs, stools, buckets, no laundry tub, and those who took home a lunch from the food canteen, ate sitting on their bunks, holding their bowl on their knees. The clothes of these families were rags in fact, and a number of them did not have any footwear.<sup>140</sup>

Recently, matters there and in other subsidiary farms had improved, through disinfection, the construction of separate rooms, and the distribution of furniture and shoes<sup>141</sup>.

Even post-1953 Soviet publications do not try to deny that the situation of agriculture in the immediate postwar period was close to desperate<sup>142</sup>. The somewhat eclectic description below will suffice to

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<sup>139</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, ll.77/78.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., ll.77ob.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., l.78.

<sup>142</sup>See e.g. I.M. Volkov, "Kolkhozy SSSR...", pp. 52, 59-61, and 64, or Samsonov, A short History..., pp.256/257 or Sovetskaia derevnia... lu. V. Arutiunian admitted in 1961 that the agricultural production of the territory of the USSR of the pre-1939 borders until 1953 did not reach the level of agricultural production in the years 1926-1929 (lu. V. Arutiunian, "Osobennosti i znachenie novogo etapa razvitiia sel'skogo khoziaistva SSSR, " pp.392-426, in: Istoriia krest'ianstva i kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva v SSSR. Materialy nauchnoi sessii, sostoiavsheisia 18-21 aprelia 1961 g. v Moskve. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo

illustrate how similar problems recurred every year in the agriculture of the Kalinin oblast'. Grain growing, flax cultivation, and animal husbandry were never able to achieve satisfactory results for more than two years consecutively between 1945 and 1953.

In 1946, animal husbandry proved to be deficient: very few milkmaids or herdsmen received extra payment for overfulfilling the plan for breeding and milking in the early part of the year<sup>143</sup>. Apart from that, herds of all sorts of livestock and poultry of the socialist sector of the collective farms dwindled in 1946<sup>144</sup>.

In October 1946, Boitsov explained to Central Committee secretary Patolichev why the grain procurements did not proceed satisfactorily<sup>145</sup>. The main problems were attributed to inclement weather and the simultaneous task of the potato picking. The latter had begun earlier in order to avoid the loss incurred by the late potato harvesting the year before. On October 1, 1946, only 1,213 kolkhozy out of a total of 7,032 had effectuated the plan for grain procurements, and 3,023 had not even met by this date the 65% of total deliveries as required by the plan. "Wrecking" could not be blamed: only at 174 collective farms had cases of grain squandering been uncovered. In

Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1963, p.404). The average grain yield per hectare in 1925/1926 was 8.5 tsester, and in 1949-1953 7.7 tsester (Arutiunian, p.406).

<sup>143</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, II.52/53. 13% of milkmaids, 6% of cowbreeders, and 2% of horse breeders received additional income.

<sup>144</sup>See Table 20. The amount of poultry was in the oblast' on January 1, 1946, 220,625, and one year later 190,436 (Pako, 147/4/528, I.6ob.). The largest loss of the cattle herds was sustained in more remote areas (Pako, 147/4/528, II.6ob.17): the raions of Brusovo, Goritskii, Kesova Gora, Kozlovo, Krasnyi Kholm, Nerl', Novokarel', Ovinischche, Sandovo, Sonkovo, and Turginovo. One cause was the "squandering" of the socialized cattle, that is, the selling of cattle on the side or the unauthorized slaughtering of it for personal consumption. However, the Party often exaggerated the extent of this practice.

<sup>145</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, I. 215. Patolichev, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich were supervising the grain deliveries in the Ukraine in the autumn of 1946 (I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.7).

order to ensure sufficient assistance for the harvesting and procurements, 62,000 people had been sent into the countryside in the preceding weeks, and trucks had been mobilized as well in the towns to aid with the agricultural work<sup>146</sup>. The successful acquittal of the obligations of the cereal deliveries to the state led to the diminishing of the grain share available for the distribution among the kolkhozniks as reward for their *trudodni*<sup>147</sup>. In one in twenty kolkhozy, no grain at all was distributed in early 1947 in the Kalinin oblast<sup>148</sup>. In others, only 15% of the amount delivered to the state was distributed among the kolkhozniks. Therefore, even in the Kalinin oblast', where the actual drought had not occurred to the same damaging extent that it had in other areas, malnutrition and even starvation may have ensued.

Instead of trying to improve agricultural performance by way of a better remuneration of the labour of the kolkhozniks, the Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers decided in September 1946 to issue a resolution which tried to reallocate the means available within the kolkhozy<sup>149</sup>. In the Central Committee's opinion,

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<sup>146</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, I. 223. In the end, the mobilization of the population to aid with the grain procurements proved successful and the oblast' exceeded the plan --it delivered 104.7% (*Sovetskaia derevnia...*, pp.273/274; I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.9). However, part of the deliveries consisted of seeds required for spring sowing (I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.8). Shortages of work hands at harvest time were not unique to Soviet times; compare this remark of G.T. Robinson: "It is in the very nature of the highly specialized grain-production of Russia, that for brief periods it demanded whole armies of extra plowmen and especially of harvesters..." (Robinson, p.105).

<sup>147</sup>I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.8.

<sup>148</sup>Ibid., p.9.

<sup>149</sup>See *Sovetskaia derevnia*, p. 68. Apart from this measure, two decrees were issued by the same authorities in the autumn of 1946 that sought to protect the grain deliveries to the state (I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.10). As in industry, potentially a large amount of authorities on different levels in the state and Party hierarchies could interfere with agriculture. The most important measures were naturally taken by the Central Committee and its Secretariat, sometimes in combination with the Council of Ministers. Apart from that, some decrees were issued by the Supreme Soviet. The measures of these higher organs

many *trudodni* were awarded to individuals who were not directly engaged in farming, and orders were now given to cut them off from these additional sources of income. The resolution also condemned the misappropriation of kolkhoz lands: the use of these lands for private purposes above the legally allowed norms by kolkhozniks or members of the kolkhoz executive, the use of kolkhoz land by local authorities, and so on<sup>150</sup>. As a supplement to this resolution, the obkom and oblispolkom in Kalinin reiterated its contents in a joint resolution of September 19, 1946<sup>151</sup>. The resolutions seemed in fact to have been a sign to start to crack down on the limited amount of freedom agriculture allowed during the war. For example, in the autumn of 1946, at meetings of the

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were complemented and adapted for the local circumstances by measures of the obkom (buro) or its secretariat, which also issued their own decrees. Measures specific to a raion could be issued by the raikoms. Administratively, the lowest level of authority was the executive of the kolkhoz itself (or its general meeting), and, by way of the raion department (*otdel*) of agriculture of the raispolkom, the oblast' department of agriculture of the oblispolkom, and the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture, the highest level was the USSR Ministry of Agriculture (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., pp.144-147). Together with the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, other Ministries (of the sovkhozy, of the procurements of agricultural production, and temporarily between 1945 and 1947 of technical crops and of animal husbandry) and Gosplan top-functionaries were part of a Council of Ministers *buro* for agriculture after the war. All could separately take measures that concerned agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture was organized in many different branches. From October 1946, a Council for Kolkhoz Affairs under the USSR Council of Ministers began to function, which prepared projects of law and made recommendations to the Council of Ministers, had the power to issue directions and instructions about the operation of the kolkhozy, and investigated requests and suggestions that emanated from the kolkhozy. In this Council of Kolkhoz Affairs, some token grass-roots kolkhoz workers had a seat, but the show was run by Politburo member Andreev, Central Committee secretary Patolichev, and Orgburo member V.M. Andrianov (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., p.149; of course, until Andreev's disappearance in the early 1950s from the highest Party level; Fainsod, *How*..., p.454). Even a Soviet publication has to admit that all these different levels of decision making, and the frequent reorganization of these organs, led to duplication and was not very conducive to the improvement of agriculture during these years (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., p.146 and p.151).

<sup>150</sup>Examples of these practices in the Kalinin oblast' can be found in Pako, 147/3/1966, II.263ob. In December 1946, S.A. Veselov reported to an obkom plenum that, in 47% of all the collective farms of the oblast', occasions of the improper use of kolkhoz land had been registered in the fall of 1946 (Pako, 147/4/18, I.34).

<sup>151</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, II.311/312.



Party *aktiv* of the Kashin, Konakovo, Mednoe, Emel'ianovo, Bologoe, and Tebleski raions, the oblast' and raion courts and procuracy were criticized for being too lenient towards violations of the kolkhoz *Ustav*<sup>152</sup>. Firefighters, mail carriers, and others lost the additional remuneration of the few *trudodni*. The *trudodni* of others were whittled down. The situation in the raion of Nerl' illustrates the abuse of power in which local authorities had engaged before the resolutions:

At the meeting of the party *aktiv* in Nerl' raion, the director of the food *kombinat*, comrade Kuznetsov, spoke about the fact that many leading workers of the raion had been involved in extorting the kolkhozy; thus the *Upolminzag* [raion plenipotentiary of the Ministry of Procurements], comrade Petushkov, took without paying 3,000 tons of potatoes of the kolkhoz "Krasnyi Pakhar"; the head of the MGB, comrade Rozanov, bought a cow for 1,080 rubles. The former raikom secretary comrade Martynov and the head of the raion agricultural department Bashinov took each a suckling pig without paying. The prosecutor Dmitriev placed his horse on the lands of the kolkhoz "Niva" to have it graze there.

*Upolminzag* comrade Petushkov pointed to the fact that last year prosecutor Dmitriev mowed hay, and sold it in the spring for market prices. The head of the ispolkom department for mobilization, comrade Baranov, took without paying a sheep from the kolkhoz "Michurin" in 1945.<sup>153</sup>

Recriminations were ricocheting everywhere, and the local Party organizations were once more engaged in a frenzy of denunciations, reminiscent of the years 1937 and 1938. If the Central Committee wanted to achieve a stricter discipline in the countryside by this resolution, after the complacency of the war years, it certainly seems

<sup>152</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, II.311/312. For the *Ustav*, see II.1.

<sup>153</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, I. 311ob.

to have succeeded<sup>154</sup>. In Lukovnikovo raion the discussions on the resolution showed the existence of two factions within the raikomburo<sup>155</sup>. The MGB chief, Severov, was pitted against the chair of the raiispolkom, Iamshchikov, accusing the latter of allowing people to come off scot-free with criminal negligence and trumping up the books. Iamshchikov admitted that Severov's criticism was justified, but wanted to bring the criticism before the upcoming Party conference of the raion. Iamshchikov is probably to be equated with the person of the same name who can be found in the records of the second oblast' Party conference in June 1937, who failed to get elected as candidate obkom member<sup>156</sup>. Hence he must have become rather nervous because of Severov's accusations, for he had witnessed the avalanche of arrests, perpetrated among Party leaders by the NKVD in the purges.

At the end of October 1946, Boitsov was able to notify Zhdanov that 4,397 hectares of land, previously misappropriated, had been returned to the collective farms<sup>157</sup>. More than 1,000 people, who were not involved in agricultural production, had been taken off the payroll of the kolkhozy. Furthermore, the remuneration of kolkhoz administrative and executive staff had been pared down. By March 1947, 59,230 cases in 4,095 kolkhozy (out of a total of 7,003 that had

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<sup>154</sup>Similar examples of Party meetings were described in Zubtsov, Tebleskii, Sonkovo, Kashin, and Konakovo raions (Pako, 147/3/2759, 11.311/312).

<sup>155</sup>Pako, 147/3/2759, 1.312.

<sup>156</sup>See Pako, 147/1/527, 1.198. Iamshchikov lasted most likely until 1950, when he was finally dismissed, apparently, because he had allowed some of the kolkhozy in his raion to distribute grain among themselves before fulfilling the plan of the state procurements (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.146; also 147/5/2, 1.16). Severov shared the common opinion among Party members that the kolkhozniks deliberately sabotaged the grain deliveries, and that as a consequence they had caused more than a thousand tons of grain to rot in Lukovnikovo raion. This mistrustful attitude we saw before expressed in the statements of Boranov and Gerasimenko in July 1951 (see VI.2).

<sup>157</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, 1.235ob.

been inspected) had been registered of the use of kolkhoz land for purposes other than the socialist sector of agriculture<sup>158</sup>. There was a discontinuation of payment of *trudodni* to the incumbents of 1,892 superfluous staff positions at the kolkhozy and to 5,224 people, who were on kolkhoz payrolls, but did not work on the collective farms. Furthermore, a large number of *trudodni* had been saved which used to be paid to administrative and service staff. Their earnings were deemed to have been too excessive. These cutbacks streamlined 1,645,800 *trudodni* for the year 1946 compared to 1945<sup>159</sup>. Following tried custom, many of the kolkhoz chairs were held responsible: in 1946, 2,287 (32.4% of the total of 7,059) were replaced and, at the annual general meetings of early 1947, another 1,483 (23.3% of the total of 6,364 where these meetings had been held)<sup>160</sup>. Additional hardships descended upon those rural dwellers who were not members of the collective farms, for almost all of them lost their rights to ration cards in this autumn<sup>161</sup>.

However, the effect of the resolutions of September 1946 was temporary at best. In March 1952 an inspection was carried out in the oblast' in which widespread violations of the September 1946

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<sup>158</sup>Pako, 147/4/528, 1.10. The personal plots had been illegally increased by 5,737 hectares in total through these abuses. Not all collective farms had undergone inspection, as the total number of them was approximately 7,060 at this time.

<sup>159</sup>Which seems an impressive number by its sheer size; however, it must have been only around 1% of the total amount of *trudodni* that the oblast' generated every year (See Table 12).

<sup>160</sup>Pako, 147/4/528, 1.11ob. These numbers were repeated by obkom secretary Shatalin in early 1949 (Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.93ob.). Shatalin added that on the whole in 1947 2,356 chairs were changed (32.5%) and 1,365 (18%) in 1948. The number, however, rose again in 1949, when in the first two months already about 1,000 were replaced. See also VI.2 on the chairs in Molokovo raion in 1947.

<sup>161</sup>I. M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p. 12.

resolutions were discovered<sup>162</sup>. It was found that 5,772 hectares of kolkhoz land were used for aims other than the collective farming for which they had been designated. 1,334 heads of cattle, 554,200 kilograms of grain, 554,000 kilo's of potatoes, and 417,500 litres of milk had been squandered. Everywhere money had been embezzled as well.

Boitsov reported around the same time, in the early autumn of 1946, to Zhdanov on the actions that the obkom had undertaken as a consequence of an Orgburo resolution of September 4, 1946<sup>163</sup>. The resolution dealt with malpractice in butter making and milk procurements. The Orgburo resolution was a follow-up of an earlier decree of the Sovmin and the Central Committee on the same issue. Apparently, suspicion arose that employees of procurement organs and kolkhoz chairs engaged in decreasing the fat contents of milk (e.g. by diluting the milk), in order to sell off some of the milk, or butter made from the milk fat, on the side. It is likely that this campaign was soon ignored, when the grain deliveries became a more pressing subject for the authorities. Perhaps because of this, two years later, at the end of

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<sup>162</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, II.159/160. The worst abuses had occurred in the Olenino, Rzhev, Lukovnikovo, Kirovo, Emel'ianovo, Likhoslavl', Mednoe, Konakovo, Firovo, Spirovo, Novokarel', and Sonkovo raions. The inspection was probably the result of a Central Committee resolution of March 22, 1952, titled "*O merakh po obespecheniiu provedeniia v zhizn' direktiv Partii i Pravitel'stva v dele bor'by s rastuskivaniem obshchestvennogo dobra v kolkhozakh*".

<sup>163</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, II.236/236ob. The resolution "*O khode vyrabotki zhivotnogo masla dlia zakladki v gosudarstvennyi fond piatiletki i zagotovki moloka na 1946 god v Kaliminskoi oblasti*," was of September 4, 1946. It is interesting that before this the oblast' newspapers had reported in July 1946 about two Party members in the state apparatus of Krasnyi Kholm raion, who had committed fraud with milk and dairy goods (PP 8063/July 13, 1946, p.1). They had been excluded from the Party and were awaiting trial. On August 30, 1946, *Proletarskaia Pravda* announced that the two had been sentenced to five and two years respectively (PP 8097/Aug 30, 1946, p.4). The Orgburo resolution was probably a result of the occurrence of these kind of embezzlements.

1948, the oblast' procuracy was once more involved in an oblast'-wide operation to eradicate the same fraud<sup>164</sup>. This time the focus fell more on employees of milk factories and the procurement organization. In November 1948, the report of the prosecutor of Rzhev raion carried the following significant statement:

Secondly, the network of milk factories is insufficiently provided with weighing equipment, which besides giving opportunity for theft, can also result in someone being investigated without grounds for it. In the case of the raions that have suffered from the German occupation, the milk factories have not been rebuilt, and are located in adapted surroundings, where weighing equipment is absent.<sup>165</sup>

The report of Sonkovo raion noticed similarly that a natural variation occurred in the fat contents of milk in different seasons, and that the length of storage might influence changes in the fat contents as well<sup>166</sup>.

The whole issue, therefore, seems to have been rather trivial, and perhaps the suspicion was even groundless --for the above reasons. Nevertheless, several kolkhoz chairs had been held responsible in 1946, i.e. given warnings, dismissed, and in some cases prosecuted by the judiciary.

On June 4, 1947, the infamous law on criminal responsibility for the theft of state and public property was decreed by the USSR Supreme Soviet<sup>167</sup>. It would substantially increase the penalties for this type of

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<sup>164</sup>See Gako, 2321/6/69, ll. 1,4, 7, 8.

<sup>165</sup>Gako, 2321/6/69, 1.33.

<sup>166</sup>Ibid., 1.35.

<sup>167</sup>The decree was called "*Ob ugovnoi otvestvennosti za khishchenye gosudarstvennogo i obshchestvennogo imushchestva*" and dated June 4, 1947 (Gako, 2321/6/69, 1.7; see also I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.16). Compare to VI.3. On this law Rittersporn, p.274. It does not seem that the new decrees of 1947, which are described by Rittersporn, led to the same

offense. As a result, some of the offenders in the dairy industry were slammed with extremely harsh sentences in 1948. The foreman Stepanov and his wife had allegedly embezzled 1,139 kilograms of milk products, for which they had received 24,391 rubles. They were sentenced to ten and seven years of imprisonment, respectively. In the same year of 1948, more workers in milk factories and procurement organizations were brought to trial<sup>168</sup>.

The investigation into the supposed fraud with dairy products is but another example of the distrust the Party and government still harboured for the peasantry, and for the population in general, in 1946-1948. The authorities always seemed to be under the impression that they were being deceived and shortchanged by the kolkhozy. The only resulting line of action was to penalize the peasants even more harshly for their alleged abuses. It is wrong to conclude that the kolkhozniks were never involved in such fraudulent practices, because undoubtedly they quite often were. Sometimes they were cheating out of dire necessity; at other times they hoped to outsmart the authorities and live at a better than subsistence level. The point here is, of course,

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avalanche of arrests that had plagued the 1930s (See Boitsov's account at the third Party conference on the enormous wave of arrests in 1935-1937 in III.2, and the arrests during collectivization in II.1; Rittersporn, pp. 274-277). There is evidence that after the war, before the proclamation of this law, sometimes sentences were meted out according to the equally harsh criteria of the law of August 7, 1932. In 1946, on the basis of this law a factory worker received the death penalty and his three collaborators ten years of imprisonment for the theft of products of a total value of 31,800 rubles from shops in Kalinin (PP 8062, July 12, 1946, p.4; it confirms Rittersporn's impression of the continued application of this law after the war {Rittersporn, p.274}). It is noteworthy that the trial against the four apparently took place in the workers' club of the factory where the main culprit was employed. Therefore it seems that in this instance as well the educative value of the showtrial was being appreciated by the authorities. See also VI.2 and VI.3.

<sup>168</sup>The procuracy seemed to have caught in almost every raion a few embezzlers (Gako, 2321/6/69, 1-58); not all were punished as harshly as the Stepanovs, but some received even longer sentences (as in Bologoe, where two people were put on trial for the theft of butter and were convicted to twenty years of corrective labour camp).

that the agricultural policy of the Party and Soviet government was responsible for the continued failure of farming, and had provoked the peasantry's and others' latent, and sometimes overt, resentment. This then translated into efforts to deceive the authorities, as illustrated above. The alienation resulting from collectivization and the extraordinary tribute exacted through the procurement and taxation systems remained structural impediments, hindering any substantial improvement in agriculture until Stalin's death. Harsh legal sanctions did not make the slightest difference.

In 1950, the oblast' kolkhozy derived only 12% of their total income from the sale of non-flax crops, in 1953 only 6%<sup>169</sup>. Most cereals were delivered for nominal prices to the state, and the rest distributed among the kolkhozniks. The low price paid by the state for grain crops comes clearly to the fore in these numbers.

Although the agricultural year of 1946 was a desperate one in the Kalinin oblast', the area was spared a famine<sup>170</sup>. In a telegram sent from Leningrad to Zhdanov in Moscow in October 1946, traces of the difficulties in agriculture are noticeable, that would lead to

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<sup>169</sup>See Table 12.

<sup>170</sup>At least, in the documents one encounters rarely anything that could be proof of the existence of a real famine. If the demographical numbers are correct (see Tables 5 and 6), then one has to conclude that there was large scarcity, but no mass starvation. The scarcity was probably caused by intense pressure to fulfill the procurement plan for the oblast', which succeeded with respect to grain (*Sovetskaia derevnia...*, pp.273/274; on the famine see a.o. Volkogonov, *Kniga II*, chast'2, p.31). As a result, not much grain remained with the kolkhozy to be distributed among the kolkhozniks. It all depends on one's perception, of course. Some of the respondents refer to the consumption of grasses and goosefoot immediately after the war in order to avoid starvation; a few of them explicitly point to the last months of 1946, and first months of 1947 (testimony of N.V. Kurganova, V.P. Pimenova, A.M. Afanas'ev, M.A. Smirnov, E.A. Smirnov, I.I. Tiaglov in the survey). Even in the towns, the shortages were sharply felt in 1947 (testimony of M.A. Golubeva in the survey). Their testimony is supported by information given in the article of I.M. Volkov of 1991 (I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.14).

widespread starvation and even cannibalism, especially in the Ukraine<sup>171</sup>. The Leningrad Party committee complained in the telegram that the vegetable and potato deliveries to the city fell far short of the plan targets. Zhdanov forwarded copies of this telegram on to the Party bosses of the Ukraine (Khrushchev), Gor'kii, Velikie Luki, Pskov, Vologda, and Iaroslavl' oblasts, and to Boitsov in Kalinin. The performance of the Kalinin oblast' was marginally better than the others, even though it had procured only 42.2% of the planned deliveries to Leningrad.

It is surprising that Boitsov was so appreciated that he was promoted to first secretary of the Stavropol krai just a few weeks later<sup>172</sup>. On the other hand, one must recall that Gorbachev's and Khrushchev's less than successful episodes in Moscow, as Party leaders responsible for agriculture under Brezhnev and Stalin, did not prevent them from becoming first (general) secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They demonstrated other merits, because of which they avoided punishment. Boitsov must have possessed such redeeming qualities as well: he had proven himself a faithful executor of Party orders in the 1930s, and had led the oblast' organization through the war. Another reason why Boitsov escaped blame for the disappointing yields in agriculture might have been the miserable results of agriculture overall, particularly in 1946. In any event, in the case of

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<sup>171</sup>Pako, 147/4/63, ll.232/233. See I.M. Volkov, "Zasukha...", p.7.

<sup>172</sup>See Table 15 as well, which seems to indicate that the oblast' was not performing particularly well in the field of procurements in comparison with 1945. The level of fulfilling of the procurement plan of many agricultural products was similar to or even below that of 1945; it is doubtful that the plan was met for many kinds of production, although it was apparently for grain (see above). The report was dated October 23, 1946; Boitsov left somewhere in November for Stavropol (Kal. Obl. Org. KPSS, pp.447/448).



the Leningrad procurements, his oblast' still outshone the others mentioned in the telegram.

The largest share of milk production generally came from individual kolkhozniks' cows, rather than from the kolkhoz herds<sup>173</sup>. The plans called for a high level of milk production by the socialized herds which would surpass by far the production of the kolkhozniks' private cattle. However, these plans were never met in Stalin's lifetime. The private cattle's output remained consistently higher. On August 15, 1946, Molodoi Tud raion was criticized in a report for fulfilling the procurement plan for August 1 by a mere 34.5%<sup>174</sup>. However, the individual kolkhozniks had performed much better, by delivering 42.8% of their required norm on that date, while the kolkhozy only did so for 29.8%. The plan envisioned the kolkhozy delivering almost 1.7 times as much milk as the individual kolkhozniks, while in actual fact the collective farms did not even manage to deliver 1.2 times as much.

The same report explained the lack of success of the Molodoi Tud raion in milk deliveries by pointing to the insufficient growth of the livestock<sup>175</sup>. On July 1, 1946, the raion had not met the plan for strong-horned cattle, sheep, pigs, and fowl, although it is unclear why the number of chickens or hogs was supposed to influence milk production.

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<sup>173</sup>It is remarkable that the absolute number of personal cattle of the kolkhozniks declined only a little between 1941 and 1946 in the USSR (*Soverskaia derevnia...*, p.52). In the Union as a whole in 1945 80% of cows and 58% of pigs were privately owned by the kolkhozniks (*ibid.*, p.53). This livestock provided 82% of all milk and 61% of all meat produced in the USSR. In 1953, the personal livestock of the kolkhozniks in the USSR produced 65% of the milk, 82% of eggs, 55% of meat, and the private plot of the kolkhozniks 40% of potatoes and vegetables of the total kolkhoz production --socialized and private sector combined-- in the country (Iu. V. Arutunian, "Osobennosti...", *Tablitsa 9*, p.419). Grain and fodder crops, as well as wool, were mainly produced by the socialized sector of the kolkhozy.

<sup>174</sup>Pako, 147/4/420, 11.23/24.

<sup>175</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.23.

The fulfillment of the plan was hampered by the fact that some collective farms owned only one or two cows, and some even none at all. The state was shortchanged by several kolkhozy, as in the case of the kolkhoz "Krasnaia Borisovka" that only had one cow<sup>176</sup>. It only produced 353 litres of milk instead of the planned 982; 160 litres were used to feed a calf, the kolkhozniks divided 153 litres among themselves for their own nourishment, and the state received 40 litres in all.

The only official postwar Central Committee Plenum before the convocation of the Nineteenth Party Congress took place in February 1947, and seems to have dealt predominantly with agriculture<sup>177</sup>. As soon as this plenum had issued its resolutions on measures to improve agricultural performance, a plenum of the Kalinin obkom convened<sup>178</sup>. As was customary, many of the directors of the kolkhozy were replaced in 1947 and 1948, in the hope that this would lead to superior

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<sup>176</sup>Ibid., 1.23ob.

<sup>177</sup>It is not impossible that the convocation of the Plenum was connected with the development of the famine (see Heller and Nekrich, pp.468/469, who indicate that the height of the famine was probably in the winter and early spring of 1947). For a brief and rather biased summary of matters that were dealt with by the Plenum ("Plenary Session"): Samsonov, *A Short History*..., pp.256/257. There were, however, some "organizational matters" with which the Central Committee Plenum dealt (Pako, 147/4/528, 1.2): Donskii lost his membership for "not being able to fulfill the duties of a Central Committee member," Shakhurin had been convicted by the Military Tribunal of the USSR Supreme Court and lost his membership; the candidates Zhukov, Maiskii, Dubrovskii, Kachalin, and Cherevichenko lost their membership as well, for they had been unable to discharge their responsibilities as candidate members in a satisfactory way. Stalin was released from his duties as Minister of Defense and succeeded by Bulganin; and Voznesensky became full Politburo member.

<sup>178</sup>Pako, 147/4/526, title page; the CC-plenum resolutions were titled "*O merakh pod'ema sel'skogo khoziaistva v poslevoennyi period*". The obkom plenum took place on March 14 and 15, 1947.

results<sup>179</sup>. Quite a few of the returned soldiers were now appointed to chair a kolkhoz.

The year 1947 would not be much brighter for agriculture than 1946, because there was no possibility to receive extra seeds from the state for those kolkhozy, that had ended up with a shortage of them for spring sowing<sup>180</sup>. Vorontsov became quite annoyed in 1947 when he noticed that, on some kolkhozy, seeds for spring sowing were used for alcohol distillation and for other purposes than for sowing.

In 1948, the Soviet leadership believed that it had found an easy panacea for agricultural improvement with the "defeat" of the genetic theory of Weismann-Morgan in biology. This "defeat," inspired by T.E. Lysenko, would not lead to any exceptional successes in crop tillage and animal husbandry. The agitators on behalf of the Party were informed of the "triumph" of Michurin in the following way in early 1949 --by Bloknot Agitatora, the publication in existence since 1947 to help the local propagandists spread the word of the superiority of Communism:

In 1948 the knockout blow was delivered to the idealist Veismanistic-Morganistic direction in biology; rejecting the teaching of Michurin on the transfer of acquired properties to succeeding generations of crops and animals, it was a huge hindrance for the development of the theory and practice of socialist crop tillage and animal husbandry. The victory of the Michurinist science was a victory of Marxism-Leninism and its materialistic dialectics.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>179</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.15ob.; in 1947 2,359 were changed (about one third), in 1948 1,365 (more than one sixth).

<sup>180</sup>Pako, 147/4/528, 1.14.

<sup>181</sup>Bloknot Agitatora, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia Pravda," 1949, No.1, pp.22/23; the edition of the monthly (later published every fortnight) was 7,500 in 1948 (see, e.g., Bloknot Agitatora, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia Pravda," 1948, No.1); by January 1951, the journal

Could this be comprehensible to the average propagandist? Would he or she be able to explain it to the kolkhozniks? Enough has already been said about their inadequate education: most did not understand.

In March 1948, the head of the obkom department for livestock, Zhuravlev, was daring enough to put the oblast's livestock situation in a historical perspective before an obkom plenum. He compared the livestock numbers with its figures in the Tver' guberniia before collectivization<sup>182</sup>. Zhuravlev stated that the oblast' had in 1947 only 33% of the number of horses of 1916, and only 24% of the number of 1928. In 1916, he noted, the guberniia had had 741,000 heads of strong-horned cattle, in 1928, 890,000, but personal and kolkhoz cattle together amounted only to 602,000 in 1947<sup>183</sup>. A similar decrease had occurred in the sheep and hog herds<sup>184</sup>. Whether the obkomburo

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came out in an edition of 16,000 (see, e.g., Bloknot Agitatora, Kalinin: "Proletarskaia Pravda," 1951, No.1).

<sup>182</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.57ob.

<sup>183</sup>And this was said, although the kolkhoz herds of horses, strong-horned cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs had perhaps all increased in 1947 (according to data for the first ten months of 1947, which might be deceiving, since in November it was often customary to slaughter in order to save fodder for the other animals that were stabled in the winter; see the table here below, based on Pako, 147/4/921, 1.111; for the habit of slaughtering in the autumn, see Kerblay, p.341). The number of heads of the socialized herds that had died on the farms in 1947 was much less than in 1946, although still higher than in 1945, as can be seen from the following table:

The death of livestock in the socialized sector of the oblast' kolkhozy (Pako, 147/4/921, 1.111):

	horses	str. hrnd. ctl.	sheep & goats	hogs
1/1/44-1/1/45	14,800	18,700	80,900	18,400
1/1/45-1/1/46	10,700	17,700	42,500	17,500
1/1/46-1/1/47	12,200	31,300	88,200	21,400
1/1/47-1/1/47	11,100	17,800	66,100	16,900

Again, the impression of hardships in 1946 and perhaps the early months of 1947 can be suspected, since it is remarkable that the death rate among the socialized cattle is lower in 1945 than in 10 months of 1947, except in the case of hogs. The causes for the animals' death are not mentioned; neglect, malnutrition, infections, and so on can be suggested. See also Table 17.

<sup>184</sup>For sheep, the numbers were: 1916- 985,000; 1928- 1,737,000; January 1, 1948- 712,000; for hogs: 1916- 146,000; 1928- 233,000; January 1, 1948-

members were grateful for his candour is unclear, but it cannot have been a secret to most obkom members that animal husbandry lagged behind the level of the 1920s<sup>185</sup>. However, there is a difference between knowing some inconvenient reality and stating it openly. After all, the minutes of the meeting would end up in Moscow in the Central Committee Secretariat. They could be used by the Central Committee to criticize the Kalinin leadership, including Zhuravlev himself, who probably thought that the Central Committee was already aware of this unpleasant truth about the livestock.

The first --and perhaps only-- buoyant postwar year in agriculture was 1948, when all the obligatory state deliveries were apparently met, even for flax<sup>186</sup>. For grain, milk, meat, and flax, the deliveries surpassed those of 1940. Vorontsov noticed proudly at the seventh Party conference in February 1949 that the oblast' had effectuated for the first time in twelve years the flax procurement plan. Some kolkhozniks were paid extremely well for their *trudodni*<sup>187</sup>.

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111,000 (Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.57ob.). Altrichter's numbers for 1916 and 1928 are higher for the number of bovines, but smaller for the number of goats and pigs, yet the downward trend seems to be confirmed by his work (Altrichter, Tabelle X, p.209). See Table 17 as well.

<sup>185</sup>Zhuravlev seems to have been relegated in the autumn at the reorganization of the obkom, when he was not selected to head an otdel; he was, however, re-elected in 1949 to the obkom (See Appendix III).

<sup>186</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.8. Unfortunately for the kolkhozniks, the norms for one *trudoden'* were increased in April 1948 (*Sovetskaia derevnia...*, p.169). It is therefore likely that the income they derived from the *trudodni* did not increase very much (they did receive more per *trudoden'* in 1948, but were awarded a smaller number of *trudodni*). The yield of potatoes was particularly high in these years: in the USSR the annual average yield in the Fourth Five Year Plan was only reached again in the Eighth Five Year Plan in the second half of the 1960s (*Sovetskaia derevnia...*, p.240). Only a quarter of the total potato harvest in 1950 was grown in the socialized sector of agriculture, while this had been one third in 1940. The private plots of the kolkhozniks, workers, and employees produced the large majority of the crop.

<sup>187</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.8ob. The kolkhoz "Moriak" was one of those in which the kolkhozniks performed extremely well (testimony of A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva in the survey). However, in many of the smaller kolkhozy of the oblast' --90% of those who could

The weakest sector of agriculture remained animal husbandry, for the livestock development plan was only met for sheep<sup>188</sup>. Despite this, on the whole, remarkable success in 1948, there were apparently still more than eight hundred --i.e. more than 10%-- backward kolkhozy in the oblast<sup>189</sup>.

In spite of the intensive and extensive cultivation of cereals, no significant harvests resulted that made a great difference for the income of the collective and state farmers:

The causes of this [i.e. of the small grain harvests] need to be sought, along with the shortage of fertilizers (above all of manure), in the poor supply of quality seeds (the seed-growing labour in the oblast' has diminished in recent years), in a mistaken system of farming, [and] a badly timed sowing, harvesting.<sup>190</sup>

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only field one brigade for crop cultivation-- , *trudodni* were subtracted one year later for failing to meet the increased labour norms for harvesting in 1949 (Sovetskaia derevnia..., p.173). In comparison with other flax growing areas in the USSR (e.g. Belorussia, Smolensk oblast') the Kalinin oblast' did relatively well between 1947 and 1950; compared to the the Central Region in these years, where the yield was on average 160 kilograms per hectare; in Kalinin oblast', the yield was on average 200 kilograms per hectare (*ibid.*, pp. 237/238). See also Table 16: 1948 and 1949 stand out as exceptionally good years for flax cultivation.

<sup>188</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.11ob. Nevertheless, the number of farm animals on January 1, 1950 --that is after the good years 1948 and 1949-- was probably the highest for the entire 1945-1953 period (see Table 17). Table 16 shows that the average production of wool, eggs, and milk was by comparison much higher in 1948 and 1949 than in other years.

<sup>189</sup>Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.14. Often used, this term "backward" (*otstaiushchie*) is rather vague. It means kolkhozy, in which the agricultural production, or, to be more precise, the obligatory state deliveries for different products consistently failed to meet the required norms, as laid down by the annual plans. This plan could and would vary from kolkhoz to kolkhoz and from year to year. The cause for this "backwardness" was invariably seen in a lack of labour discipline, the violation of the 1935 kolkhoz Statute, poorly organized labour (particularly by the kolkhoz chair), and a too frequent change of kolkhoz chairs.

<sup>190</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.537. Still 50.0% of the sown area was under grain crops in 1950, 13.8% under flax, 10.3% under potatoes, and 25.9% under fodder crops (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., p.28/29). The cultivation of grain crops during the whole period from 1945 to 1953 was done on roughly the same amount of land in the oblast' (between a minimum of 637,300 hectares, reached in 1947, and a maximum of 687,900 hectares, reached in 1948) (Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., p.26/27). Until the spring of 1953 the area sown with flax was on the increase yearly: in 1945, 153,600 hectares was sown with flax and in 1952, 184,100 hectares. In 1953, the area sown with flax, decreased to 169,400

The more remote raions continued to miss out on the distribution of equipment that was intended to ameliorate agriculture. In 1951 the raion centre of Kozlovo still had no electricity, and the local authorities were using kerosene lamps for illumination<sup>191</sup>. The MTS representatives of the raion regularly arrived in Kalinin, when all new machinery had been already sold to raions nearer to the oblast' capital. The kolkhozniks of Kozlovo raion missed out on their share of concentrated fodder or agricultural equipment at the nearest railroad station, because these products had already been sold to peasants on closer-by farms.

The weakness of the collective farms after the war is illustrated by a statement of Konovalov in January 1951. He noted that, before the amalgamation, around 85% (6,700) of the total of kolkhozy possessed less than one hundred heads of strong-horned cattle, and 70% had less than twenty horses<sup>192</sup>. Somewhat later in the same speech he gave some more detailed numbers. Before the consolidation, 7,500 kolkhozy had existed in the oblast', with an average of thirty-five hearths, forty-nine able-bodied workers, sixty-two heads of bovines, seventeen horses, twenty-two pigs, seventy sheep, and 410 fowl<sup>193</sup>.

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hectares. Potatoes and vegetables were grown on an amount of land between 135,000 and 150,000 hectares approximately during the whole period. By 1950 the area sown with fodder crops had surpassed the level of 1937 and was 341,500 hectares. In subsequent years (until 1956 at least) the sown area of fodder crops remained on the rise. In 1965 Leonid Ivanov stated that the soil of the northern area of the oblast' was little conducive to grain cultivation (Leonid Ivanov, "Snova...", p.189).

<sup>191</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 1.81.

<sup>192</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.3a.

<sup>193</sup>Pako, 147/5/7, 1.4. He combined here personal and kolkhoz livestock. The average size of the kolkhozy of the Kalinin oblast' was much smaller than of the Soviet Union in general, which was around eighty homesteads per kolkhoz in 1949 (*Soverskaia derevnia*.... p.112). The three-year development plan for livestock of April 1949 called for the smaller kolkhozy (with less than 500 hectares of land) of the Central Region to have, by 1953, in the socialized part of the farm eighty heads of strong-horned cattle, fifty-five to seventy-

After the relative prosperity of 1948 and 1949, the problems in agriculture returned with a vengeance in the early 1950s<sup>194</sup>. Part of the problem was disastrous weather, which plagued the oblast' in 1950, probably in 1951, and certainly in 1952 and 1953<sup>195</sup>. Many of the aspects of amalgamation have been described previously, and the whole affair seems to have been a miserable failure at least on the short term<sup>196</sup>. In theory, the idea of the merger of the small kolkhozy in the Kalinin oblast' was not an illogical idea, but neither had the idea of collectivization been. In practice, similar to collectivization, the kolkhozniks were given no choice: their kolkhoz could not refuse to join the united collective farm. At Party conferences and the general meetings of the collective farms at the beginning of 1951, it turned out that --undoubtedly as a result of the careless timing and preparation of the consolidation, although this was left unspoken-- the harvest had

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five sheep and goats, 65-120 pigs, and 750-900 poultry. Most of the cattle mentioned here by Konovalov was personally owned by the individual kolkhozniks. See Table 24 for an overview of the effect of the amalgamation on collective farming in the Kalinin oblast'.

<sup>194</sup>The representative of the Council for Kolkhoz Affairs of the USSR government, Tarasov, stated in 1951 that 1949 was a much more successful year than 1950 for agriculture in the oblast' (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.147). This is confirmed by the statement of Kiselev in October 1950 that the livestock herd in the postwar period was at its largest on January 1, 1950 (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.17).

<sup>195</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.6 and Pako, 147/5/663, 1.76: in 1952 and 1953, the problem was an extraordinarily high amount of rain. In general the Soviet Union experienced severe winters in 1949/1950 and 1950/1951 (*Sovetskaia derevnia*.... p.252).

<sup>196</sup>See VI.2 and Table 24. The amalgamation was officially begun after a Central Committee resolution of May 30, 1950 (see Samsonov, *A short History*...., p.408). It was all the more a failure because, up to 1949, the oblast' had been a "foremost" (*peredovnia*) one with respect to the grain deliveries to the state, as the head of the oblast' office of the Grain Procurements (*Zagotzernch*) said in November 1949 (Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.19). This statement was probably true, because he said it at the obkom plenum that condemned Vorontsov, and there was no reason to hide embarrassing truths to keep up appearances on such occasions. As a result of the amalgamation in 1953, there were 9,772 villages and hamlets, united in 1,909 kolkhozy and some forty-odd sovkhhozy (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.161). The idea of amalgamation, however, was certainly not just a whim of the Central Committee: already in 1946 a raikom secretary of the Kalinin oblast' suggested the unification of several kolkhozy into one in his sparsely populated, formerly occupied territory (Pako, 147/4/18, 1.41).



been disorganized in 1950, and many crops and wild grass had been left unreaped on the land<sup>197</sup>. Kolkhoz chairs had already been frequently replaced, and there seems to have been a flurry of confusion about the mergers for a long time. In January 1951, Konovalov reported to Malenkov:

In a majority of the collective farms after their merger the crop-tillage brigades have retained their former size, the number of them, as a consequence of the amalgamation, only shrank by 8%; the inequality in the distribution of land, work hands, draught power, and equipment among brigades has continued. Because of this, in several amalgamated kolkhozy, agricultural labour is unorganized, and the fulfillment of state plans and tasks is delayed.<sup>198</sup>

Another reorganization of the agricultural production process, which is hinted at by Konovalov's first remark on the lack of growth of the crop brigades, was the general replacement of the smaller link (*zveno*) by the larger brigade in most forms of crop tillage in 1950<sup>199</sup>. A notable exception was flax production, where the *zven'ia* were retained as the most efficient organization of the preponderantly manual labour. The flax yield remained disappointing, and notwithstanding the grandiose three-year development plan for animal husbandry, the number of livestock in the Kalinin oblast' actually

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<sup>197</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 1.147. The amalgamation drive was particularly ill scheduled, for it was in full force during the summer, as obkom secretary Konovalov admitted in between the lines, in January 1951 (Pako, 147/5/7, 11.6/7).

<sup>198</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.11.

<sup>199</sup>And there are indications that the brigades themselves were to increase in size from twenty-thirty kolkhozniks to fifty-sixty (Pako, 147/5/7, 1.16); see *Sovetskaia derevnia*..., p.170). The general replacement of the *zveno* system was the beginning of the demise of Andreev, who had been its principal adherent (see Fainsod, *How...*, p.456). Fainsod indicates a possible political connection between the attack on the preponderance of the *zven'ia* and the amalgamation (*ibid.*, pp.456/457). Both the small link and the small kolkhoz were seen as impediments to a more efficient and mechanized agriculture, and both hindered a firmer control over the countryside.

seemed to decrease<sup>200</sup>. Obkom secretary Shatalin admitted in July 1951 that the resolution of the Central Committee of October 4, 1948, on the Kalinin oblast' had not led to any progress<sup>201</sup>. It had called for both the amplification of all crop yields, flax in particular, and the growth of the livestock and its productivity. The harvest results since 1948 had in fact shown a steady decline, and a menacing situation had arisen with respect to the fulfillment of the three-year plan for animal husbandry. The plans for the procurement of agricultural produce in 1950 was not actualized for any important product<sup>202</sup>.

The representative of the Council for Kolkhozaffairs described in 1951 the general situation on the roughly 25% of kolkhozy that had been classified as "backward" (*otstaiushchie*):

And do you know, comrades, what kind of life they lead in the backward kolkhozy, what the kolkhozniks receive as

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<sup>200</sup>See VII.3 for the exodus of the kolkhozniks. Even a Soviet publication of 1965 admits that the three-year plan was a "dismal failure" (see Samsonov, A Short History..., p.264; see also Sovetskaiia derevnia..., p.257ff.; the plan was announced in a joint USSR Council of Ministers and Central Committee decree on April 18, 1949). By 1953 livestock had decreased significantly, except for horses (see Table 17). The head of the Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol otel of the obkom, Fokin, stated in July 1951 that 1949 was a poor year in crop tillage, 1950 had been worse, and that again the spring sowing in 1951 had gone extremely badly (Pako, 147/5/10, l.140). Concomitantly, animal husbandry was in a shoddy state. Flax was often not treated quickly enough, and much of the harvest went to waste because of a lack of work hands for the processing procedure. Mechanization could have been a remedy for this problem, but was hardly expanding in the field of flax production between 1945 and 1953 (Sovetskaiia derevnia..., p.237).

<sup>201</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, l.110. Kolkhoz monetary income in 1950 was derived predominantly from the sale to the state of flax (46%) and of livestock products (28%); for 1953 these numbers were respectively 42% and 39% (See Table 12).

<sup>202</sup>93% of the plan for the delivery of flax to the state, 75% of planned grain deliveries, 88.7% of planned meat deliveries, 90.6% of planned milk deliveries, and 86.5% of planned wool deliveries had been procured in 1950 (Pako, 147/5/36, l.108). In certain areas much of the harvest was lost through the absence of adequate storage (Pako, 147/5/662, l.68). The evidence in the Party archives for the postwar results repudiate the opinion of Leont'eva that meat and milk deliveries on the whole were met by the collective farms in the postwar period (see Leont'eva, p.31).

remuneration for their labour? They receive very little products and money and live exclusively off their personal plots.<sup>203</sup>

The results of flax production remained disappointing, not in the least because the first treatment of the flax after harvesting was predominantly performed by hand in many raions: in Sandovo raion 90% was done manually in 1951<sup>204</sup>. Although biologically the capacity for growing flax in the Kalinin oblast' was vast, according to the director of the All-Union Institute of Flax in the summer of 1951, and yields of 400 kilograms and more per hectare should have been possible, the actual deliveries to the state did not surpass 200 kilograms per hectare on the whole<sup>205</sup>. Since the collective farms were extremely poorly mechanized, the flax was not harvested when it should, and the flax straws not laid out on time, resulting in a delay of the first treatment of the flax. Another problem was the coincidence of the sowing of winter grains, the delivery of grains to the state, and the harvest time of grains and flax. As much as animal husbandry, flax seemed to suffer from adverse natural circumstances. In his opening report at the ninth oblast' Party conference, Kiselev noticed that weeds choking up flax seed continued to greatly hinder flax cultivation<sup>206</sup>. One of the solutions which he suggested was chemical applications to destroy the weeds. The flax was also damaged by fungi.

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<sup>203</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.46.

<sup>204</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.57. In order to mechanize flax cultivation, a factory for agricultural machinery and equipment was built in Bezhetsk (*Bezhetsksel'mush*) in 1946 (*Tsentral'nyi Raion*, p.563; Pako, 147/5/663, 1.184). It was to produce machines that would mechanize the labour-intensive flax cultivation but, in the first few years after it went into operation, it did not seem to have influenced flax production in any meaningful way.

<sup>205</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.137.

<sup>206</sup>Pako, 147/5/183, 1.20.

Lack of fodder was a main cause of the decline of livestock numbers. Because of the paucity of fodder, according to the representative of the Council for Kolkhoz Affairs for the Kalinin oblast' in 1951, the loss of animals even continued in July<sup>207</sup>! Furthermore, a massive intestinal-worm infection was discovered among the oblast' cattle in 1950<sup>208</sup>. 364,000 heads of strong-horned cattle and more than 400,000 sheep were treated in 1950 for this affliction. In all, the livestock losses amounted to 7.4% of strong-horned cattle, 12.4% of pigs, and 20.1% of sheep in 1950<sup>209</sup>. In 1951, additional problems were noticed with the provision of sufficient watering places for the kolkhoz animals<sup>210</sup>. Also, wolves were sometimes blamed for missing sheep<sup>211</sup>. In 1952, one of the vice-chairs of the oblispolkom reported on an analysis made by livestock specialists on the continued loss<sup>212</sup>. Particularly chickens had died in previous months. The number of fowl had fallen by 37% in the oblast' during the first eight months of 1952. The main reasons for the dwindling livestock were, according to this

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<sup>207</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.43. Already a few months earlier he had spoken of a "catastrophical" decline in the number of cattle in many of the kolkhozy (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.147). In early 1948 the main cause --apart from the oblique reference to "squandering"-- for the disappointing growth of the cattle herd had been found in the absence of improvement of meadows and pastures, which often either had turned into swamps, or on which trees and bushes had grown (Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.57ob.; compare to Chapter IX). In 1949 and 1950 in the USSR the demand for fodder surpassed the supply (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., p. 258).

<sup>208</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.107.

<sup>209</sup>This is probably the loss among the socialized herds, because it was impossible for the agricultural statisticians of the oblast' to find out the exact loss of the personal cattle among the kolkhozniks (for instance, Pako, 147/4/921, 1.111 does not give the death rate among the kolkhozniks' cattle for 1946). Of the socialized herds, 10% of the horses died in the dismal agricultural year of 1946, 6% of the strong-horned cattle, 8% of the hogs, and 16% of the sheep (calculated on the basis of Tables 20 and 21). Table 17 shows the tremendous drop in the amount of cattle between 1950 and 1953.

<sup>210</sup>Pako, 147/5/11, 11.54/55.

<sup>211</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.72.

<sup>212</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 11.232/233.

analysis, lack of maintenance of the herds and the incomplete fodder diet given to the animals. It was not so much the worm infection, and so on, which had caused the cattle to perish in 1952, but erroneous and incomplete foddering. This had emaciated and caused half the deaths of the bovines, chickens, and hogs. Furthermore, 20% of perished strong-horned cattle, 15% of the pigs, and almost 30% of the fowl had died because of diseases of the respiratory organs. In the view of the authorities, this could only be blamed on inadequate shelter and absence of care for the animals, and therefore on the anti-Soviet attitude of many kolkhozniks.

The central authorities did not accept that a decline in the livestock was a consequence of natural causes<sup>213</sup>. Although deliberate unauthorized slaughter and selling off of kolkhoz animals did certainly occur in the Kalinin oblast', it seems more likely that the greatest reasons for deteriorating livestock lay elsewhere<sup>214</sup>. Be that as it may,

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<sup>213</sup> Before the Central Committee and Council of Ministers sent their letter on the responsibility of human error for the loss of cattle, a telegram, signed by Stalin personally, arrived in the Special Sector of the Kalinin obkom around July 1, 1951 (Pako, 147/5/37, 11.47-49). In the telegram Stalin expressed his displeasure with the progress in the oblast' of the three-year development plan for livestock. Could this be another example of Stalin's fondness of holding other people responsible for the failures of his regime? Considering the date of the telegram, one wonders how much Stalin's wrath, incurred by this poor showing of the Kalinin oblast', was decisive in sealing the fate of Kononov, who was dismissed but a few weeks after. The opinion of the Soviet leaders about the loss of cattle was probably quite accurately worded by vice-ispolkom chair Shcheplikov in 1951: "An analysis of the causes of the loss shows that the cattle does not die as the result of some kind of illness, but almost exclusively because of mismanagement, because at many kolkhoz' cattle farms not even the most elementary arrangement of herding, protecting, and feeding of cattle exists. The preservation of manure is impossibly filthy; the congestion and draughts in the animal shelters, the absence of feeding troughs, and of permanent cadres --those are the scourges of public animal husbandry" (Pako, 147/5/11, 1.51) As noticed in other places, the kolkhozniks were in general less than eager about the tasks that the state had in mind for them (compare also Rittersporn's remarks {Rittersporn, p.55} or Abramov's description of the attitude of the collective farmers in Fyodor Abramov, *The New Life*).

<sup>214</sup> The oblast' state prosecutor, Gerasimenko, described several of these cases at the obkom plenum of September 1951 (Pako, 147/5/11, 11.42-44). He gave the example of three chairs who were convicted to long sentences of corrective labour for failing to supply the

the USSR government and the Central Committee issued in September 1951 a resolution which ordered an end to the squandering of animals<sup>215</sup>. As usual, Moscow had come to the conclusion that the "enemies" of the kolkhozy must have been responsible for the lack of success in animal husbandry<sup>216</sup>. However, the decline of the cattle continued in 1951 and 1952<sup>217</sup>.

In 1951, animal husbandry was suffering from a lack of fodder crops and stables<sup>218</sup>. Apparently the quality of the planted and wild grass had deteriorated in comparison to 1950. In a report to Malenkov in June 1951, the prohibitive natural obstacles for the cultivation and harvesting of hay and the use of land as meadows were described as a cause for the inadequate supply of fodder in the oblast':

The oblast' disposes of a large quantity of hayfields and meadowlands; however, many of these lands have turned into swamps, and shrubbery and woods have grown on them. Their productivity is extremely low. This situation of the natural

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cattle of their farms with fodder, as well as for theft, embezzlement, etc. It should be pointed out that the expenditure of animals annually was extremely high among the socialized herds; in 1946 almost half of all strong-horned cattle, 75% of the hogs, and 45% of sheep of these herds was sold, slaughtered, or died (see Table 21). This enormous expense sometimes might have interfered with the buildup of a stable permanent livestock. In 1946, most of strong-horned cattle was either slaughtered and consumed on the kolkhoz or procured by the state; most of the hogs sold to consumers' cooperatives or on the markets; and most of the mutton and lamb eaten by the kolkhozniks, although more sheep and lambs perished than were consumed.

<sup>215</sup>The resolution was dated September 3, 1951, and called: "*O merakh po ustraneniui nedostatkov v uchete pogolov'ia skotu i obespecheniui sokhrannosti zhivotnovodstva v kolkhozakh*" (Pako, 147/5/11, 1.15).

<sup>216</sup>The term "enemies" is used in this respect by Sadovnikov at an obkom plenum of September 1951, for example (Pako, 147/5/11, 1.15).

<sup>217</sup>According to Kiselev in September 1952, the number of horses, strong-horned cattle, pigs, sheep, and fowl had been in an uninterrupted decline since early 1950. The annual losses amounted to 5-7% of all horses, 5-10% of all strong-horned cattle, 8-10% of all pigs, 14-24% of all sheep (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.153). See Table 17 for a confirmation of Kiselev's words.

<sup>218</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.58. In July 1953 some of the animals were still kept in shelters made of branches and straw (Pako, 147/5/662, 1.68).

fodder-crop lands is a fundamental cause for the large diffusion of the worm infections among the livestock, especially among sheep.<sup>219</sup>

Construction brigades were engaged in building adequate shelter for the livestock, but kolkhozniks who were assigned to work in these brigades could not be deployed in harvesting<sup>220</sup>. Additional difficulties were brought about by the usual lack of construction materials: in Torzhok raion there were none to be had in 1951.

In the final analysis, infections, privations of shelter and fodder, neglect, and the like cannot explain why in the 1940s and 1950s the peasantry was incapable of keeping an amount of animals on the collective farms and in personal use that would be equal at least to the number of livestock that had been tended to on the small and relatively primitive farms in the 1920s<sup>221</sup>. What everyone omitted to mention with respect to the continued disappointing results in animal husbandry during Stalin's lifetime was finally admitted in October 1953: the taxation and work load were so enormous for the kolkhozniks that they lacked the time and incentive to take care of even their private livestock<sup>222</sup>. Hence many restricted themselves to keeping merely one goat, for which the taxation was lower. Meanwhile, the low pay for the *trudoden'* and the small amount of *trudodai* with which the kolkhozniks were remunerated failed to inspire them to caring for the socialized livestock adequately.

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<sup>219</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, ll.123/124.

<sup>220</sup>Ibid., ll.123/124.

<sup>221</sup>Compare to these words written by Bol'shakov in 1924: "...in general, in the area of animal husbandry everything proceeds well and no threatening phenomena can be discerned" (Bol'shakov, p.7)

<sup>222</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, l.117 and l.128. See also the description of Abramov of the kolkhozniks' difficulty to provide for their private cows (Abramov, pp.99/100).

The work ethic of the kolkhozniks failed to be stimulated by abstract incentives. In the more remote areas the population was not even treated to films, lectures, reports, pamphlets, slogans, and newspaper windows<sup>223</sup>. It is doubtful that these methods were still capable of enthusing people, inciting them to break their backs for the good of the cause. Were they ever very effective? If one considers the abundant evidence of the general mood of apathy that reigned in the countryside immediately after collectivization, the answer must be a resounding no.

It is therefore not surprising that in September 1946, February 1947, May-June 1947, and again in 1948, the Party and state reverted to the threat of force by the introduction of more severe disciplinary measures for those not meeting their standard norm or cheating the authorities in other ways<sup>224</sup>. In the summer of 1948, as a result of the

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<sup>223</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.62. A varied arsenal of propagandistic means was used, but the "moral" stimuli did not result in noticeable improvements (*Sovetskaiia derevnia*..., pp.178-192, describes the socialist emulation movements that were launched to stimulate agricultural production). As the report on the exodus from the countryside described shows --see VII.3--, only in late 1952 were the authorities finally prepared to capitulate to the idea that production would only increase if more material stimuli were offered.

<sup>224</sup>On June 2, 1948, a Supreme Soviet decree was issued: "*O vyselenii v otдалennye raiony Sovetskogo Soiuzu lits, zlostno ukloniavshchikhsia ot trudovoi deiatel'nosti v sel'skom khoziaistve i vedushikh antiobshchestvennykh, parazicheskii obraz zhizni*", which was further explained by a confidential letter of the next day written by the Central Committee and Council of Ministers combined (Pako, 147/4/1125, 1.157). It was obviously aimed at people who more or less had turned their backs on the work in the socialized sector of agriculture, although not being either able, or willing, or allowed, to leave the collective farms and thus formally remaining members. In 1952, the Central Committee reiterated its warnings about the squandering of kolkhoz property in a resolution of March 22, titled "*O merakh po obespecheniu provedeniia v zhizni' direktiv Partii i Pravitel'stva v dele bor'by s rustaskivaniem obshchestvennogo dobra v kolkhozakh*". As Fainsod remarked: "The history of Soviet agricultural policy in the post-World War II period is essentially a record of tightening control over all kolkhoz activities" (Fainsod, *How*..., p.453). In the light of the measures of 1946 and 1947, both in the field of ideology and in that of agriculture, it is mistaken to suggest that "1948 brought an end to the postwar hesitations of the leadership about the choice of a "soft" or "harsh" course (Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia...(1948-1952)," p.79)." The leadership does not seem to have doubted that it would follow a harsh line at any time after the war.



decree of June 2, 1948, some kolkhozniks were exiled for their refusal to work honestly in socialist production, by kolkhoz meetings which were staged to discuss the new governmental decree. This decree was directed at improving the performance of the collective farms by again trying to muster labour discipline by the threat of force<sup>225</sup>. As a result, only a few were punished for their shirking from their socialist responsibilities, while most others pretended to become fully involved in the socialized branch of agriculture. When, at the end of 1948, the head of the agricultural department of the obkom reported on the measures taken on the basis of the decree of June 2, 1948, merely fifty-eight people were reported to have been exiled<sup>226</sup>. 1,369 households had joined a kolkhoz as a result of the decree<sup>227</sup>.

In any event, it is hard to work when one does not even have bread, as was the case in the raions of Vyshnii Volochek and Esenovichi in the summer of 1951, according to the head of the Party organization of the town of Vyshnii Volochek, Matveev<sup>228</sup>.

Another problem gnawing at agricultural produce was the lack of adequate transport for the procurements, particularly in the more remote areas. In the Esenovichi raion in the second half of 1952, the plenipotentiary for the Ministry of Procurements asked the obkom for additional horses to transport the state deliveries; only the office for

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<sup>225</sup>Pako, 147/4/1125, 1.158ob./159.

<sup>226</sup>Pako, 147/4/1413, 1.2. By August 1948, apparently thirty had been exiled and three dependents chose to join them (Bugai, p.46).

<sup>227</sup>Pako, 147/4/1413, 1.13. In July 1953, the raion secretary of Staritsa, Kutuzov, admitted that the decree had been ignored soon after its issue (Pako, 147/5/662, 1.52).

<sup>228</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.65.

milk deliveries of the raion possessed two motor vehicles<sup>229</sup>. The slipshod state of the roads in most rural areas complicated agricultural transportation further. Many kolkhozes were completely isolated from the outside world for long periods in spring and autumn<sup>230</sup>. Farming production was lost because of the late arrival of harvested crops at the delivery points, and machinery could not be deployed for sowing or reaping.

The deployment of town dwellers at harvest time had become the rule after the war, because the kolkhozniks could not cope with the exceptional amount of work in that period of the farming year<sup>231</sup>. In 1947, between 42,000 and 54,000 inhabitants of towns, workers' settlements, and raion centres were helping daily with gathering crops<sup>232</sup>. In 1950, the obkom even ordered too many people into the countryside in certain areas: on one day in October, the town of Vyshnii Volochek was obliged to transport by car 10,000 people into rural regions, about one sixth of its population<sup>233</sup>. Factories had to interrupt

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<sup>229</sup>Pako, 147/5/433, l.121. The grain, flax, and livestock raw material offices of the raion had no motorized means of transport. The poor state of the roads was a problem that continued to afflict agriculture in the early 1960s (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnikh...", pp.198/199).

<sup>230</sup>Kerblay, p.257 and pp.289-308.

<sup>231</sup>In II.1 it has been described how inhabitants of the town of Kimry aided harvesting already in 1931. Towns and factories had engaged in *shes'vo* ("patronage") over collective farms and MTS in the countryside since the 1930s. This patronage translated into furnishing the countryside with spare parts, repairs, and new equipment and tools, and help at harvest time. The value of this latter practice was rather limited, as gorkom secretary Baranov of Kalinin admitted in 1953, for it had not led to any fundamental improvement of kolkhoz operations (Pako, 147/5/663, l.166). G.V. Lubov noticed that he and his fellow workers helped with all kinds of work in the surrounding collective farms: haying, grain harvesting, and potato picking (testimony of G.V. Lubov in the survey).

<sup>232</sup>Pako, 147/4/1097, l.8. In 1945 50,000 blue- and white-collar workers had pitched in with harvesting (*Ocherki*, p.532). See above for the deployment of urban dwellers in 1946.

<sup>233</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, l.66. Matveev's criticism was echoed by Baranov at the same plenum (Pako, 147/5/10, l.81); a few months earlier, another urban raion secretary had claimed

the production of certain workshops. The necessity for the extreme mobilization of town dwellers in 1950 at harvest time was undoubtedly one of the consequences of the disorganization within the collective farms after amalgamation.

Meanwhile, as Matveev, the gorkom secretary of Vyshnii Volochek, underlined, the effect on the kolkhozniks of this help was negative<sup>234</sup>. Townspeople were already beginning to assist in the sowing and weeding. However, on the same occasion the raikom secretary of Zubtsov, Tychinin, claimed that the aid of the town dwellers was essential: Zubtsov raion had to plant a larger area than before the war, but its labour force was much smaller because of the havoc created by the German occupation<sup>235</sup>.

The obkom saw a partial solution to the labour shortage in farming by relying gradually more on the assistance of the urban population. However, their prolonged absence from the towns did have a negative effect on the performance of industry. In trying to maintain a balance between agriculture and industry, Konovalov, who was responsible for the obkom's orders, had failed in the eyes of Matveev. Matveev's criticism of 1951 was part of the operation to make Konovalov the scapegoat for many failures beleaguering the oblast'.

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that on certain days in October 1950 Kalinin had sent up to 20,000 workers and employees into the countryside to aid with harvesting (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.160). Already in November 1949, Zubov, head of the oblast' trade union council, had spoken in the same vein (Pako, 147/4/1512, 11.20/20ob.).

<sup>234</sup>As one raion secretary maintained in March 1951, it made the kolkhozniks complacent and lazy, since they were assured of the assistance of the urban population (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.160).

<sup>235</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 11.115-117.

In July 1951, Karelinov was still the head of the oblast' agricultural department<sup>236</sup>. At the same plenum that condemned Konovalov, Karelinov offered some rather startling examples of the authorities' lack of concern for agricultural specialists. It triggers further doubts about the Party's self-proclaimed efforts to remedy farming matters. The head of the office for fodder crops, Stepaniskii, lived with his family in a room of ten square meters, while the head of the oblast' office for Russian dandelions (*kok-sagyz*) lived in an apartment twelve kilometers from the town of Kalinin. A young specialist, who had just graduated from the Leningrad Veterinary Institute, was severely hindered in his work at the veterinarian laboratory that had finally opened in Bezhetsk, for a family, who had nothing to do with the laboratory work, was housed in the laboratory. Other specialists were often not being paid.

Another problem which caused farming to stagnate was the inadequate mechanization of its production process, which was only slowly gaining momentum after the war: in 1950, 73% of spring plowing, and 88% of autumn plowing was mechanized<sup>237</sup>. Sowing of

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<sup>236</sup>See IV.2 and Appendix III for Karelinov. Pako, 147/5/10, ll.92-94. The neglect of the specialists (agronomists, livestock specialists) was all the more harmful, because they were so few. One agronomist in the Central Region, which included Kalinin oblast', was responsible for an average of twelve kolkhozy around 1950 (*Sovetskaia derevnia...*, p.139).

<sup>237</sup>*Narodnoe Khoziaistvo...*, p.57. Compared to the numbers for 1940, machine-driven spring ploughing had increased by 26% and autumn ploughing by 43% on the total amount of ploughing --there are no data on the level of mechanization in 1945-1949 for the entire oblast'. When more machinery began to become available in Khrushchev's times, it proved to be a mixed blessing. In Udoml'ia raion, for example, the sowing by tractor-driven ploughs could not be deployed, because the terrain had many hillocks, and the soil was riddled with stones (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", p.176). Harvest combines could not be used often as well, because of stones and irregular elevation of the soil (*ibid.*, p.177). Non-mechanized ploughing did not reach further than a depth of fifteen centimeters approximately, but tractor ploughing, which went much deeper, encountered many more deeply located stones, and had to be frequently interrupted because of this (*ibid.*, p.178). In the early 1960s,

summer and winter crops was still far from full-scale mechanization in this year, when only 13% of summer crops was planted by machines, and 23% of winter crops. Harvest combines hardly played any role yet in the gathering of flax, potatoes, or cereals: less than 10% of all three categories was harvested by combines in 1950.

In 1953, the level of mechanization of farm work had markedly advanced, for ploughing was almost fully mechanized, and the mechanization in the other categories mentioned above had multiplied by approximately three to six times. The combine harvesting of grain crops had even grown by more than nine times --in 1953, 44% of grain crops was harvested by combines. Only potatoes were still planted and gathered manually for more than 90%, which is a logical consequence of the fact that a large amount of that crop was sown by kolkhozniks on their private plots. Some of these numbers on mechanization in 1953 might have been deliberately exaggerated, since the source for them is a statistical handbook published under Khrushchev, which possibly tried to portray the positive changes under Stalin's successor in an overly positive light.

The grand propaganda about the superiority of Soviet agriculture, thanks to its efficient organization in collective farms and ingenuous use of machinery and staff located at the strategically distributed MTS, was mere window dressing<sup>238</sup>. Beneath the surface scores of

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manual labour was deployed to clear the soil of these stones (ibid., p.179). See as well Leonid Ivanov, "Snova...", p.209.

<sup>238</sup>More than half of the kolkhozy of the USSR had a smithery in 1945, because of the extensive use of horses as draught animals and the necessity to rely on many simple tools in the production process: the MTS machinery was unable to provide assistance with the majority of agricultural tasks (*Sovetskaia derevnia...*, p.89). "Rural mechanization did not have so much an all-encompassing, but more a chiselled character; it only occurred in

quandaries were encountered. At the end of 1947, most of the tractors in use in the oblast' were still pre-1935 models<sup>239</sup>. Thirty-one of the MTS at that time owned all together 124 decrepit trucks for the transport of agricultural produce. The trucks were second-hand army equipment, and not even suitable enough for repair anymore. Shortages of ploughs, harrows, cultivators, and threshers were general at the MTS. The capacity of the MTS machinery was often less than impressive, as was pointed out in II.1.

In June 1951, the Central Committee was told that the overall level of mechanization of farm work in the oblast' did not surpass 30%<sup>240</sup>. Especially harvesting was carried out manually. The causes for the low level of mechanization were varied. In the first place, much of the agricultural labour was done by hand, due to the absence in general of equipment and machinery<sup>241</sup>. Secondly, there was a chronic deficit of

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separate operations, and a overwhelming part of the kolkhozniks worked as before by hand" (Gordon, Klopov, p.70).

<sup>239</sup>Pako, 147/4/1125, 1.3ob. This problem was also noticed in 1978 in a Soviet publication (*Sovetskaia derevnia*..., pp.36-38). Furthermore, even the tractors turned out by the factories at the time were too much standardized and consequently could not be adapted to varying circumstances of the terrain and kind of production for which they were supposed to be used (ibid., p.39). Apart from that they used much more petrol than foreign tractors (ibid., pp.78/79). A high number of newly produced agricultural machinery turned out to be defective (ibid., p.80). See IX.1 and IX.2 as well.

<sup>240</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.109. By 1950 in the area of Torzhok, one of the local MTS was still not as well equipped as before the war (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.164). In all, according to the oblispolkom chairman Sadovnikov, there were 5% more tractors in early 1951 in the entire oblast', than before the war (Pako, 147/5/2, 1.171). In early 1947, the oblast' had had only 2,238 tractors, while before the war there had been 3,360 (Pako, 147/4/528, 1.3ob.). In neighbouring Iaroslavl' oblast', by 1950 the prewar level of technology had yet to be reached (*Sovetskaia derevnia*..., p.83). The number of 30% given to the Central Committee more or less confirms the above numbers for 1950; therefore it is even more remarkable --and doubtful-- that the mechanization of agricultural production had so much increased by 1953.

<sup>241</sup>The director of the All-Union Flax Institute in Torzhok underlined this fact in July 1951 at an obkom plenum: "It is no secret for all of us, that the kolkhozy in the Kalinin oblast' harvest grain crops frequently by hand: with scythes and sickles" (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.137).

spare parts for the available machinery. Often the plans for repairing tractors and combines, which took place during winter, were badly fulfilled, owing to this absence of spare parts in the MTS<sup>242</sup>. In June 1951, only thirty MTS had the use of electricity on their premises<sup>243</sup>. As well, much of the MTS machinery was by that time between twelve to fifteen years old. Finally there was a lack of adequate garages, the mechanics' housing was poor in general, and there were few clubs for the MTS workers<sup>244</sup>.

The kolkhozniks were supposed to provide room and board for the MTS workers, when the latter helped the collective farms to do their ploughing, sowing, or harvesting<sup>245</sup>. However, some of the collective farms were less than accommodating, probably because they hardly had the means to furnish the MTS employees with anything. In 1949, for example, in Bologoe raion tractor drivers had to spend the night in barns, sheds, and similar shelters, and received food irregularly<sup>246</sup>. The full-time MTS employees were also housed shabbily on their bases after the completion of the agricultural year. They had to repair and maintain tractors and other machinery in unheated garages, were not housed in apartments near the MTS, and had still not been paid by the kolkhozy by January of the next year.

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<sup>242</sup>As Karelinov complained in July 1951 (Pako, 147/5/10, 1.95).

<sup>243</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, 1.110.

<sup>244</sup>As a result, many permanent MTS workers left the stations and tried to find work in other, non-agricultural branches of the economy, where they were often welcomed because of their skills in operating machinery (*Sovetskaja derevnia*..., pp.130/131).

<sup>245</sup>A large number of MTS operators were seasonally employed kolkhozniks (*Sovetskaja derevnia*..., pp.127/128).

<sup>246</sup>Pako, 147/41934, 1.89.

The existence of overlapping authorities, as in industry proper, created havoc for the MTS. In 1947, the director of the Pervomaiskii MTS of the raion of Molodoi Tud was to be fired because of theft and other abuses (drunkenness, absence from work)<sup>247</sup>. However, it took years of haggling between the raikom and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the actual arrest of the director, before the Ministry gave its final permission to dismiss the director in 1951. Many a time the lack of competent technical workers in agriculture forced the obkom to transfer misbehaving MTS workers, instead of dismissing them<sup>248</sup>. In 1951, in Molodoi Tud raion, for two and a half years there had not been a senior livestock technician, and the raion was suffering from a long-term absence of veterinarians.

Fainsod argues that the MTS served the additional purpose of political control over the rural population by way of their political departments<sup>249</sup>. The February Plenum of the Central Committee of 1947 introduced a vice-director for political affairs with the MTS<sup>250</sup>. This political dimension of the MTS was unable to influence or change the attitude of the peasantry towards a more enthusiastic participation in socialized farming.

From a work written at the end of the 1960s by the first obkom secretary of the Kalinin oblast', Korytkov, an insight can be gained into

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<sup>247</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.103.

<sup>248</sup>Ibid., 1.103.

<sup>249</sup>Fainsod, How..., p.454.

<sup>250</sup>See, for example, Pako, 147/5/2, 1.172 and Zelenin, Obshchestvenno..., p.42. The function was abolished by the September Plenum of the Central Committee in 1953 (Zelenin, Obshchestvenno..., p. 58). According to R.F. Miller, the MTS *politotdel* returned between 1949 and 1952 (Robert F. Miller, "The *Politotdel*: A Lesson from the Past," pp.475-496, in Slavic Review, Volume XXV, No.3, September 1966, p.477).



the working day of the kolkhozniks of the kolkhoz "Ul'ianova-Lenina", who participated in a sociological survey<sup>251</sup>. According to secretary Korytkov, it appeared from its results that:

...it seems that daily the kolkhoznik is directly occupied with the socialized production for eight to nine hours, with domestic work and the cultivation of the private plot for six to seven hours; in other words only slightly less time is spent with the latter than with work for the collective farm.

...it appeared that the kolkhozniks spent annually 14,000 man days for the procurement of firewood, washing of clothes, and shopping in the village shop; this is as much as 10% of the time spent in the agricultural production process.<sup>252</sup>

Although it is dangerous to project the results of a sociological survey which took place in the 1960s upon the situation of the 1940s, the priorities in the life of the kolkhozniks cannot have changed fundamentally in the intermediate period. The realization of the plan for the socialized part of agriculture was important to them, for they wanted to avoid sanctions for failing to meet the ordained obligations (although of course the penalties for failing to comply with the plan were much less harsh in the 1960s than in the 1940s; perhaps the positive stimuli of higher procurement prices in the 1960s also played a role in inciting the kolkhozniks to work at least eight hours per day in the socialized sector). Probably in order to provide for a standard of living above strictly survival, they almost put in another workday tending to their private plots and their household; the latter task, except for chopping firewood, was almost completely performed by the women. A grueling life it must have been, even in the 1960s, without

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<sup>251</sup>N. Korytkov, Kommunist. Khoziaistvo. Reforma. Moskva: "Moskovskii rabochii," 1969.

<sup>252</sup>Ibid., p.65.

any leisure time, except maybe at some intervals during winter. This description of a kolkhoz in the 1960s leads one to conclude that, during the 1940s and early 1950s, it must have been necessary to work fifteen hours a day as well. But then it must have been barely enough to avoid starvation. Apart from that, under Stalin, the kolkhozniks did not enjoy many of the social rights of the Soviet citizen constitutionally proclaimed in 1936. They did not have annual holidays, were not paid when ill, did not benefit from maternity leaves, nor did they receive pensions<sup>253</sup>.

It cannot be denied that the physical outlook of the villages in the province changed after collectivization. However, it seems that the following quote is somewhat overstating the positive achievements of Soviet power in the countryside; apart from that, although it described the situation seven years after Stalin's demise, many of the mentioned modernities had appeared after 1953:

Beautiful buildings of clubs, schools, daycares, and kindergartens have appeared. At the outskirts of the village are farmyards and silo towers. A third of the kolkhozy has electric light and uses electricity partly for productive ends. All kolkhozy have telephones and radios.<sup>254</sup>

This last piece of information should be somewhat qualified, because another Soviet source stated that 90% of all rural localities in the oblast' had a radio in 1962. It might be true that all kolkhozy had radios by the early 1960s, but considering that several small villages composed one kolkhoz, some people were only able to listen to the radio

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<sup>253</sup>Gordon, Klopov, p.86.

<sup>254</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.526.

if they visited the kolkhoz centre<sup>255</sup>. Apart from that, it is probably correct that all kolkhozy had the use of telephones by this time; it should be remembered, nevertheless, that this does not mean that every village might have had one, and hardly any kolkhozniks had a private telephone<sup>256</sup>.

Socialist agriculture in Stalin's time was a miserable failure<sup>257</sup>. The private efforts of the kolkhozniks had to make up for its shortcomings as best as possible<sup>258</sup>. The extent of private farming in

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<sup>255</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.319.

<sup>256</sup>See Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.320.

<sup>257</sup>Which was apparently at least partially admitted in the Central Committee resolution of March 22, 1952 (see above). During the war, the share of the private plots in grain production in the Soviet Union as a whole ranged from 12% to 19%; in potatoes their share rose from 65% to 75% (*Soverskaia derevnia*..., p.51). "The increase of production, so characteristic for industry, failed to happen in the agrarian economy both in the 1930s and in the 1940s/1950s" (Gordon, Klopov, p.69). "[Collectivization] needs to be recognized as an economic and social catastrophe" (Gordon, Klopov, p.77). Also see Gordon, Klopov, pp.73/74 and *Tablitsa 5*, p.75. At least until the middle of the 1950s, the production of the personal plots in Central Russia equalled that of the socialized sector, and was the main source of peasants' income and for their personal consumption (M.A. Beznin, "Krest'ianskaia bazarnaia trgovlia v nechernozem'e v 50-e-pervoi polovine 60-x godov," in: *Istoriia SSSR*, 1, 1991, pp. 69-85, p.69). In the survey, only one kolkhoznitsa, A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva, was very satisfied with her life on the kolkhoz, notwithstanding the near dekulakization of her father (the de-kulakization was avoided due to his son, who was a Party member). Her kolkhoz, "Moriak," was located in the raion of Rameshki. After the war, in which she lost her husband, she worked in an exemplary field-crop brigade. The brigade always surpassed the obligatory work norms. The kolkhoz was a "millionair," which paid well for the *trudodni*. She lived together with her mother-in-law in a house after the war. Between the two of them, they tended to the private plot, and were sometimes able to harvest in the fall 9,000 rubles worth of crops and livestock products to sell on the market (testimony of A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva in the survey).

<sup>258</sup>In the first place, to feed oneself and one's dependents. If there was anything left after taxes, some of the produce was sold off on urban markets, some to consumers' cooperatives. The private plot's produce was heavily taxed by the state, particularly through obligatory procurements, so that little was left to be sold on the market (see Lorenz, p.208). Apart from intensive exploitation of the private plot, parents sometimes helped out. Other families had at least one member working as itinerant artisan or worker/employee in the towns. Some urban inhabitants tried to aid their rural relatives as best as they could by bringing them foodstuffs, manufactured goods, or money. A few were "lucky" enough to receive a pension for a husband who had been killed in the war; however, in one case (that of L.P. Felkova), the pension was not more than 68 rubles per month for three people, far from enough to survive in a decent way. Some relief was brought by regular forays into the woods to collect berries and mushrooms. It should be noticed that even many of the rural "elite"

1948 has already been described in VI.2. Kiselev sketched the situation in 1952 in front of the delegates of the ninth oblast' Party conference:

In a number of raions of our oblast', as a result of the fact that the party raikoms conduct fully inadequately political work in the collective farms, a trend towards private property has begun to gain force among the kolkhozniks; this is harmful for the collective-farm system, and this incurs great loss to the socialist farming of the kolkhozy. The trend expresses itself in an extraordinary, exaggerated preference for the private plot to the detriment of socialist farming, as well as in the government-condemned, anti-kolkhoz practice of distribution of monetary income and income in kind by the kolkhozy, when a significant part of the means is divided among the kolkhozy for the *trudodni*, while at the same time little is assigned to the development of the socialist farming of the kolkhozy.<sup>259</sup>

In the raion of Lukovnikovo, many kolkhozniks had draught animals, transport means, and other implements of production in private use, Kiselev continued<sup>260</sup>. The collective farms of the Kalinin oblast' had received very little cash income in previous years because

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(teachers, government employees, MTS workers, professional Party workers, etc.) were forced to cultivate a private plot in order to make ends meet, and that some urban dwellers were supplementing their diet and saving on expenses by cultivating a plot. Even raion Party secretary Tiaglov's family had a garden and a pig (According to, e.g., the testimony of G.V. Lubov, M.V. Kornetova, I.V. Ratataev, V.S. Serov, A.E. Malysheva, M.M. Golovnova, P.N. Bashilova, T.I. Bol'shakova, L.P. Felkova, A.V. Zhuravleva, V.V. Karpov, T.F. Krivova, M.I. Potemkina, M.I. Veselova, I.I. Tiaglov, N.N. Osipova-Kozlova, N.P. Golubev (I), N.P. Golubev (II), Z.M. Vinogradova, A.V. Skobeleva, N.G. Timofeeva, V.P. Pimenova in the survey). V.G. Gavrilov of Udoml'ia raion, a Party member since 1947, said in the summer of 1992 that, in the past as well as today, it would have been impossible to survive without the private plot and livestock (testimony of V.G. Gavrilov in the survey). It is interesting that M.A. Smirnov, who became the father of three children between 1947 and 1953, regretted that life had been too difficult to have more. He explained that in the countryside large families lived the best kind of life (testimony of M.A. Smirnov in the survey, his words were echoed by A.E. Smirnov —testimony of A.E. Smirnov in the survey). His opinion strikes one as rather pre-industrial, although he was too young to have a very clear memory of the time before collectivization (he was born in 1919). Altrichter describes how the households of larger families in the countryside in the 1920s were indeed often somewhat better off than the smaller households (Altrichter, pp.83/84; see also Kerblay, pp.43/44).

<sup>259</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.162.

<sup>260</sup>Ibid., II.162-165.

of the small harvest yields, flax procurements, and productivity of animal husbandry. Furthermore, large losses had occurred in crop tillage and the number of livestock had markedly decreased. The pathetic development of horticulture, beekeeping, and so on were responsible as well for the negligible sums of money received by the collective farms. Lately, many kolkhozy had fallen into an enormous debt with the state because of loans and deferred payments of obligations. The indivisible funds in more than one third of all kolkhozy had shrunk in 1951 by an average of 40,000 rubles per kolkhoz. In 1951, more than 9,000 able-bodied adult kolkhozniks failed to work the legal minimum of *trudodni*, and more than 2,500 did not even work one *trudoden*. Kiselev gave an example of a kolkhoz in Likhoslavl' raion, in which every day only between 100 and 115 chose to work in the socialized sector out of the 270 individuals who should have. In some collective farms, kolkhozniks were paid irrespective of the number of *trudodni* they had worked<sup>261</sup>.

In numerous kolkhozy in September 1952 no communal shelter for animals or equipment storage were available<sup>262</sup>. Hence the horses, carts, ploughs, harnesses, and the like were kept on the plots of the kolkhozniks in their private stables and storage sheds. As a result, many used these for their own designs and projects.

Similarly, Kiselev noticed at the conference that kolkhozy still engaged in hiring herders, carpenters, et cetera<sup>263</sup>. Sometimes people were even hired to do regular agricultural work. In 1952, 4,500 herders

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<sup>261</sup>A practice which was already common in 1947 and 1948 (Pako, 147/4/526, 1.3 and 147/4/1096, 1.3).

<sup>262</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 11.162-165.

<sup>263</sup>Ibid., 11.162-165.

were hired on the side out of a total of 13,600 who were tending to the kolkhoz livestock. Kiselev added that, since the amalgamation of two years before, already 45% of the kolkhoz chairs had been replaced<sup>264</sup>.

The situation caused the central government to issue once more a resolution condemning the violations of the kolkhoz Statute in November 1952<sup>265</sup>. Notwithstanding the uninterrupted stream of measures from above, 1952 would be an extremely wretched year for agriculture in the Kalinin oblast'. Only three of 1,900 kolkhozy were honoured by the obkomburo for the full discharge of all obligations<sup>266</sup>. Even the otherwise exemplary Bezhetsk raion was unable to effectuate all preconditions and obligations to be eligible for praise of the obkom and oblispolkom, usually expressed by awarding the order of the Red Banner.

It is remarkable that the best performing agricultural area before the revolution, in Stalin's time, and after 1953, remained the eastern area of the province: the Bezhetsk raion and the raions surrounding it<sup>267</sup>. A Soviet source remarked that, at the end of the 18th century, the size of the ploughed area there was hardly smaller than in 1960<sup>268</sup>. One of the reasons for the intensive tillage stemmed from the congenial soil conditions in this area. In the swampy areas of the west and north-

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<sup>264</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.167.

<sup>265</sup>Pako, 147/5/429, 1.250; this resolution, issued by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was titled "*O grubykh narusheniakh Ustava sel'khozarteli v kolkhozakh Kalininskoi oblasti*".

<sup>266</sup>Pako, 147/5/660, 1.99.

<sup>267</sup>See *Tsentral'nyi Raion*, p.558-560.

<sup>268</sup>*Ibid.*, p.560.

west, tractor labour was hindered by hillocks, a moist soil consistency, and stones in the deeper layers of the soil<sup>269</sup>.

Before 1960 at least, Soviet power had not been able to improve the soil in the other, less fertile lands of the oblast' countryside. It shows how limited the possibilities were for the Communists with respect to the planned improvement of agriculture before the 1960s. If market forces would have been allowed to play their role in a similar way as during the modernization and industrialization of Western Europe in an earlier time, it is plausible that large stretches of formerly tilled farm land in the province would have been abandoned. The yields, due to the adverse conditions of climate and soil, would be too low to rationalize farming in these areas. The peasants residing in areas of excessive humidity and poor soil would have left the countryside and moved to the cities, while the few viable agricultural areas --such as the Bezhet'sk region-- might have prospered. This, of course, amounts to pure speculation, and the developments in the countryside in the 1920s as described above seem to deny the likelihood of such an outcome<sup>270</sup>. Many peasants seemed to have been

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<sup>269</sup>Tsentralnyi Raion, p.535; Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", pp.176/177.

<sup>270</sup>Klaus Mehnert noticed in the 1950s that, if an effort would be undertaken by the regime to return to the pre-1929 situation in the countryside, it would be probably in vain: "Most of the rural population no longer have any clear recollection of an independent peasantry. I have talked to many peasants, and I have no doubt whatever that what they long for is less compulsion in the *kolkhozes*, more land of their own, higher prices for their produce, and an easing of the pressure of plans and quotas. But whether they would really like to see the whole of the agricultural land divided again into smallholdings among the individual *kolkhozniki* seems doubtful. There are, of course, some peasants with initiative who dream of land and a farm of their own. But the younger ones, who have acquired technical knowledge as tractor drivers, threshers, zoologists, and mechanics are not moved by any such urge. If they were given land of their own, they would probably want to cultivate it with collectively owned mechanics. In the villages there is no solidarity of ideas and purpose which, if Bolshevism collapsed, could put forward a clear-cut alternative" (Mehnert, The Anatomy..., p.267). The last lines seem prophetic in light of the current lack of success to privatize land and split up the collective and state farms, to which the peasants themselves are often

quite satisfied with their existence just above subsistence level during NEP, not at all worried about the idea that their farm might be less than feasible in economic terms, or that there may have been far more attractive livelihoods to be gained outside their village<sup>271</sup>.

However, what is clear from the example of Bezhetsk raion is the futility of collectivization with respect to improving agricultural results. Thirty years after collectivization, the geographical pattern of agriculture in the oblast' was essentially the same as before 1929. The authorities had been unable to rationalize agriculture. It continued to flourish in areas where, because of advantageous natural circumstances, it already had been doing well before 1917<sup>272</sup>. The paucity of success on the agricultural front since the October Revolution undoubtedly had also been caused after 1929 by the pitiful remuneration of the kolkhozniks. The performance of the subsidized agriculture of Brezhnev's time --particularly around 1980-- seems to indicate that collective farming would not necessarily thrive even with adequate pay.

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opposed. Mehnert's remarks prove that Stalinist collectivization had been successful in one way: even the memory of the traditional farming had become virtually extinct by the 1950s.  
<sup>271</sup>Notice also the predictions about this in the 1920s among Soviet rural scholars: "On the basis of their examination, in 1925 the Organization-Production scholars declared that the unique properties of the family farm to which they had earlier drawn attention would permit the small-scale farm to withstand the process of rural capitalization; indeed, they asserted, over time there would take place a marked transfer of lands from capitalist to family farming. The implications of this position were clear: the Soviet rural sector would not evolve to capitalism, but would for the foreseeable future remain dependent upon the small commodity producer" ( Susan Gross Solomon, "Rural Scholars and Cultural Revolution," in Sheila Fitzpatrick(ed.), Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978, pp.129-153, p.139).

<sup>272</sup>In the 1960s it began to dawn upon the authorities that perhaps agriculture would benefit from specialization. Kolkhoz director E.A. Petrov is quoted as stating that only dairy farming and flax cultivation could be really profitable under the natural circumstances of the northern Kalinin oblast' (Leonid Ivanov, "Snova...", p.189).



The failure of Soviet agriculture in the Kalinin oblast' --and no doubt in other areas of the USSR-- is highlighted by the incredible amount of time and energy spent, or rather wasted, by local authorities --from the first secretary of the obkom to the simple rural activist-- to improve farming, without ever being able to achieve any noticeable progress. The oblast' Party archive is packed with material witnessing the Party's concern with agriculture. It remained, however, unable to introduce any structural improvement.

Until 1953, as a result of the dire agricultural circumstances, the basic diet of the kolkhozniks remained similar to that of the pre-Revolutionary peasantry, and was below the level of peasants' consumption in the later 1920s<sup>273</sup>. The consumption of cereals dropped after collectivization, for which a larger portion of potatoes substituted in the diet. Before 1917, the peasants produced on average roughly 78% of the foodstuffs they consumed themselves; even by the 1960s not much had changed: about 20% to 22% of food consumed was purchased externally, on the market<sup>274</sup>. At least until 1953, the private plot was cultivated essentially for one's own alimentation and not for sale of the produce on the market<sup>275</sup>.

#### VIII.4 The Soviet Intelligentsia

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<sup>273</sup>Kerblay, p.333, Table I, and p.334. Moreover, urban workers purchased on the kolkhoz markets in the early 1950s more than 50% of the foodstuffs that were eaten by their families (Beznin, p.72). In Rzhev in 1953, 84% of the food sold on the kolkhoz markets were products from the private plots of the kolkhozniks, and only 16% products from the socialized sector of the farms.

<sup>274</sup>Kerblay, pp.337/338.

<sup>275</sup>Kerblay, p.340.

Society's elite was formed by a group corresponding to the "New Class" of Djilas, or the "Nomenklatura" of Voslensky<sup>276</sup>. The members of this elite were members of the Communist Party who held positions of leadership within the Party, the government, and the economy<sup>277</sup>. Their outlook on life and their position in society have been discussed in other places in this dissertation. Boitsov, Vorontsov, Baranov, Gerasimenko, Sadovnikov, Kiselev have been some of the more conspicuous representatives in previous pages. This group was distinct from the "intelligentsia", although several members of the "New Class" could also be considered part of the Soviet intelligentsia<sup>278</sup>. The "New

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<sup>276</sup>Djilas, The New Class. M.S. Voslensky, Nomenklatura: the Soviet Ruling Class. Garden City, N.Y.: Double Day, 1984. The appearance of the works of, for instance, Fainsod and Djilas in the 1950s is perhaps an indication of the stabilization of the Soviet system after 1945, because of which a definitive elite within society became perceptible and could be described (Djilas, The New Class; Fainsod, How...). It is hardly conceivable that similar works could have been written directly after the 1930s when, as a result of the continuous purges, membership of the ruling stratum was for most very temporary. The culmination of this process happened under Brezhnev, when it became exceedingly difficult for upstarts to join the elite.

<sup>277</sup>"This is not to say that the new party and the new class are identical. The party, however, is the core of that class, and its base. It is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to define the limits of the new class and to identify its members. The new class may be said to be made up of those who have special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold" (Djilas, The New Class, p.39).

<sup>278</sup>See Tables 39, 41, and 42. Soviet intelligentsia: "The stratum of society, professionally occupied with intellectual work" (L.V. Ivanova (ed.), Soverskaia Intelligentsiia. Slovar'-spravochnik. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1987, p.50). "In a socialist society an intelligentsia of a new type is formed. Its specifics are entirely defined by the nature of socialist society..." (ibid., pp.50/51). In 1947, 9.8% of the Party members had higher or incomplete higher education (ibid., p.52). On the whole people with higher, incomplete higher and specialized secondary schooling are considered to be part of this group (e.g. ibid., p.196). Engineers, *tekhniki* (technicians), agronomists, cattle specialists, veterinarians, economists, planners, statisticians, lawyers, commodity experts, doctors and intermediate medical personnel, university graduates, teachers, librarians, artists, army officers and cultural workers were considered to be part of this group (ibid., pp.26, p.113, 197/198, 215). It also included the *rydizheatsy*: practitioners who had been promoted to a responsible position at a factory, etc., without having the required education for this position (ibid., pp.36/37). The proportion of this group became gradually smaller among specialists and managers in the course of Soviet history, particularly after Stalin's death (ibid., p.37). Fitzpatrick has noticed that the term "intelligentsia" regained a positive connotation in Stalin's speech to the extraordinary Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets in

Class" was the Communist elite who enjoyed privileges and perquisites as a consequence of their investiture with leading positions<sup>279</sup>. At every lower step of the ladder of the Party hierarchy the benefits became smaller; the rank-and-file member hardly enjoyed more privileges than his non-Party peers. The elite can be equated with the *nomenklatura* of the obkom, numbering between 3,000 and 3,500 people in all<sup>280</sup>. The elite within this elite was formed by the incumbents of positions in the oblast' belonging to the *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee: the members of the obkomburo, the heads of the obkom *otdely*, the executive of the oblast' Party school, gorkom secretaries of Kalinin, the first secretaries of the other towns, first raikom secretaries, lower gor- and raikom secretaries, the executive of the

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November 1936, after "intelligent" had been a pejorative word in Soviet discourse in particular in the early 1930s: "In the first place, Stalin identified the intelligentsia as one of the three basic corporate entities of Soviet society, the others being the working class and the peasantry. Although he spoke of the three groups as having equal rights, it was not long before Soviet public and popular usage arranged them in the natural hierarchical order [a vague term], with the intelligentsia at the top. In the second place, 'the intelligentsia' as it was now defined was a much broader group than it had been earlier, including not only the old intelligentsia and the newly risen *rydvizhentsy* but also, remarkably, the entire corpus of Communist administrative and managerial cadres. ...The word 'intelligentsia' had unmistakably become a Soviet synonym for 'elite' " (Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front*, p.15). This last conclusion, however, is unmistakably wrong: the elite consisted of the higher professional Party workers and the Communist administrative and managerial cadres exclusively. Many people who were classified as belonging to the "intelligentsia," because of their profession, such as teachers, doctors, etc., were not part of the elite. They did not enjoy any of the privileges that the Communist elite enjoyed, and their wages sometimes were below those of the average factory workers. They enjoyed less prestige in society than the workers, at least until Stalin's death.

<sup>279</sup>The benefits that the elite derived from their position and their outlook on life are described by Tucker: "And as higher or up-and-coming party-state functionaries, why should they doubt that this system was indeed the socialist one that Stalin had proclaimed it to be, that socialism was a form of society in which a bureaucratic centralized state took charge of everything, and that those in authority, themselves included, had every right to the special shops, special dining rooms, special clinics, and special rest homes that served them and their families? Since most were of peasant or worker origin, it was natural for them to think of the late-1930s Russia as the worker-peasant state that it officially claimed to be, although they themselves were no longer members of either of these classes" (Tucker, p.547).

<sup>280</sup>See V.1.

oblispolkom and the chairs of gor- and raiispolkoms, the Komsomol obkomburo, the head of the oblast' Trade Unions, the head of the office of Glavlit for the oblast', the local correspondents of TASS, Pravda, and Izvestiia, the head of the oblast' radio, the higher functionaries of the oblast' MVD, MGB, and procuracy, the directors of the larger factories and sometimes their main engineers, the director and departmental heads of the Pedagogical Institute of Kalinin, and so on, were all appointed by the Central Committee<sup>281</sup>.

Intelligentsia was rather a grand term to describe some of the technical workers in the town of Kalinin, of whom, in February 1951, 27.2% had not followed any special professional education, and were "practical workers" (*praktiki*)<sup>282</sup>. This latter group was becoming extinct, as can be seen from the table --none of them was a Komsomol member-- which indicates that they were from an older age group. In 1951 in the town of Kalinin, more than 4,100 inhabitants were considered to belong to the professional group of engineers and technical workers by the Party. They were classified as part of the intelligentsia<sup>283</sup>. Roughly one third of them was Communist, and an additional 10% Komsomol members. Medical workers and teachers also composed part of the intelligentsia, both numbering about 1,400 persons<sup>284</sup>. The contingent of Communists and Komsomols was already smaller among the teachers (respectively 24% and 11%), and even smaller in the case of the medical workers (respectively 11% and 5%).

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<sup>281</sup>See Pako, 147/4/1887, II.67-263.

<sup>282</sup>Pako, 147/5/214a, I.5. See Table 42.

<sup>283</sup>Pako, 147/5/214a, I.1.

<sup>284</sup>I.e. if one includes the category "scientific workers" of the table as part of the group of teachers; see Pako, 147/5/214a, I.1.

Life was arduous for the teachers. They did not share the same prestige and privileges of those leading Party and government workers, who comprised the Central Committee's *nomenklatura*. One school director lived in 1951 inside the schoolbuilding in one room which was noisy and smelly<sup>285</sup>. Six of the school's teachers did not have housing at all and shared a room with their landlords.

### VIII.5 Women

The work force in many branches of industry, but especially in textile production, where they had been traditionally numerous, was more than half comprised by women after the war. In the cotton-fibre *kombinat* of Vyshnyi Volochek in 1949 of the 6,764 workers, 4,683 were women<sup>286</sup>.

During the war, the number of female Party members had more than doubled proportionally: from 22.2% of the total amount of Communists to 45.2% in 1944<sup>287</sup>. This was a consequence, according to first secretary Boitsov in 1945, of the important role women were assuming in all economic and government activities during the war. However, a simple calculation indicates that, in fact, the absolute number of women in the Party was hardly higher in 1944 than in 1940<sup>288</sup>. Out of necessity, the economic significance of women's work

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<sup>285</sup>Pako, 147/5/214a, 1.31.

<sup>286</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.51.

<sup>287</sup>Pako, 147/3/2679, 1.15. It proved to be a temporary anomaly: in 1927, 16.8% of all members was female, in 1937, 23.8%; in 1947 it had fallen again to 28.1%; and in 1957 the relative share of women among the Party members was about the same, 28.3%; only in the 1960s the number of women surpasses 30% again; see *Ocherki, prilozhenie I*, p.694.

<sup>288</sup>11,161 in 1940, 12,650 in 1944; in 1947 the number was 15,781.

hardly diminished after the war because of the enormous losses among the male population<sup>289</sup>. It was not, however, deemed necessary to have them more or less proportionally represented in the Party. Before the war, hardly any women had been involved in the heavy labour of logging and timber rafting, but during the war 90% of these tasks were executed by women<sup>290</sup>. After the war, some men did return to this industry, but a substantial part of the work was still carried out by women. In 1949, the Presidium of the Soviet Trade Unions called upon lumber enterprises to release women from felling trees, manually transporting timber, and other similarly heavy tasks in the forest industry<sup>291</sup>. Despite these guidelines, thereafter women were still engaged in loading timber. The labour conditions were so poor that in the winter, which constituted the lumbering season, of 1948-1949, seven women in the oblast' were killed by falling trees<sup>292</sup>.

A similar situation existed in the peat industry, in which 17,000 women were engaged part- or full-time in 1949<sup>293</sup>. Apparently, around 30% of them performed heavy labour at times. The managers of the peat industry did not desire this situation, but it was impossible to avoid, for there was still a dearth of men. It was suggested that

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<sup>289</sup>In 1950 in the whole of the Soviet Union, more than 56% of the population was female (See Ryan, Social Trends, Table 1.7, p.13). In the Soviet Union in 1939, 52% of the agricultural labour force was female; this percentage rose to 71% in 1943, and 80% of the adult labour force in agriculture by 1945 were women (Chadaev, Ekonomika SSSR..., p.111; Sovetskaiia derevnia..., p.36). After the war, women formed the large majority of the work force in both agriculture and industry of the Kalinin oblast' (see Tables 14 and 34). In the USSR as a whole by the 1950s, as many men as women were part of the labour force (Gordon, Klopov, p.85).

<sup>290</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.22.

<sup>291</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.22; the decision was dated February 11, 1949.

<sup>292</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.23.

<sup>293</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 11.39-41.

mechanization might help. However, in both branches of industry, labour conditions would only start to ameliorate after Stalin's death thanks to the introduction of machinery<sup>294</sup>.

Contrary to what Fainsod thought in 1955, the rôle of women within the government and Party seems, at least for the Kalinin oblast', to have diminished after a brief period of relative prominence before and during the war<sup>295</sup>. In June 1937, eleven out of eighty-six obkom members had been women, in July 1938, twelve out of fifty-eight<sup>296</sup>. In 1945, only three out of seventy-three members of the obkom were women, and by September 1952, only ten out of ninety-three were females<sup>297</sup>. In July 1951, the first raikom secretary of Orshinskii raion, Belikova, pointed out that she was appointed to her leading position only after the Central Committee had started to exert pressure to appoint more women in higher positions in the Party<sup>298</sup>.

In January 1943, 20% of the kolchoz chairs were women, compared to 9% before June 1941<sup>299</sup>. Later in 1943, 2,229 out of 7,942 kolchoz directorships were held by women, or 28%<sup>300</sup>. This rise of women to managerial positions in the countryside was remarkably restricted; at the same time in 1943, 1,042 of the 7,942 kolchoz chairs

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<sup>294</sup>See Ocherki, pp.554-557. It seems that, at least in the peat industry, some women may have had some respite from the heavy work through the import of seasonal workers from the Mordvi and Bashkir ASSR's, and from some other oblasts.

<sup>295</sup>Fainsod, How..., pp. 235/236. Before the war some women were quickly promoted as a result of the decimation of the Party ranks in the purges.

<sup>296</sup>Pako, 147/1/554, 1.9.

<sup>297</sup>See Appendix III and Pako, 147/5/283, 11.347-350.

<sup>298</sup>Pako, 14/5/10, 1.82.

<sup>299</sup>Moscow, 17/43/742, 1.10.

<sup>300</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.73ob.

were war invalids<sup>301</sup>. These men seemed to have been preferred to women. The survival of older prejudices against women were likely to have been of influence here.

A rather telling example of men's attitude towards women is embedded in the remarks in 1949 of an obkom member about the behaviour of Party leaders' wives<sup>302</sup>. He grieved the fact that these women were not involved in any kind of useful occupation, their idleness rendering them philistines, who compromised their husbands. He accused them of having become petty bourgeois, solely interested in the material perks and privileges of their husbands' post. He hoped that:

...our responsible workers [will] put their spouses in [their] place in such a way that they will not compromise them and that they will be good helpers; that they will behave themselves in the way that a communist's and important worker's wife should.<sup>303</sup>

It is obvious from these words that the idea of gender equality as pled by Marx and Engels was not properly understood or accepted among the oblast' elite, of which the speaker was a representative. Women had to avoid being petty bourgeois, but they were also told how to comport themselves fittingly. At the same time, among many married couples, it was a mark of prestige when the husband was able to keep his wife at home. Even today, many Russian women would rather remain at home than sweep streets, work at the conveyor belt, or even teach children,

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<sup>301</sup>Moscow, 17/44/546, 1.73ob. The relative share of women among the kolkhoz chairs was, at the same time, higher than in the USSR as a whole, where at the end of 1944, 11.8% of all chairs were occupied by women, the percentage of whom already decreasing to 8.1% by late 1945 (*Soverskaia derevnia*.... p.42 and p.47). A similar decrease was noticeable in other responsible positions in the collective farms, such as brigadier, bookkeeper, and head of the livestock sector.

<sup>302</sup>Pako, 147/4/1512, 1.27.

<sup>303</sup>Ibid., 1.27.



because of the low remuneration and often demanding physical labour involved<sup>304</sup>. From the above complaint about their behaviour, it is clear that wives of leading obkom members were able to stay at home. The number of housewives (*domokhoziaiki*) in the towns was tongue-lashed at other moments as well. In October 1953, a kolkhoz chairman stated that it was unfair that country women, even if they had a number of children or were quite old, had to perform heavy physical labour, inasmuch as many women, sometimes educated as agricultural specialists --for which the state had paid-- preferred to be housewives, in some cases even without children<sup>305</sup>.

In opposition to these male voices, one could cite the remarks of the raion secretary of the Zavolzh'e raion of Kalinin, Astashina, in early 1949, at the seventh Party conference<sup>306</sup>. At this point, an effort was made to pay more attention to the plight of women in the oblast'. Judging from women's weak presence in the leadership during the 1950s, their equal status was subsequently more emphasised, but their position in practice would not change fundamentally<sup>307</sup>. Astashina's

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<sup>304</sup>An expression of which can be found in the substantial popularity today of organizations in Russia that try to find Western, and in particular American, husbands for Russian women. These women seem to think that they will be quite happy by "just" being a housewife (see, for example, Francine du Plessix Gray, *Soviet Women: Walking the Tightrope*. New York: Doubleday, 1989, pp.7/8).

<sup>305</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, l.115. The unpopularity of work in the countryside among agricultural specialists is understandable when one considers the living circumstances of some of them: see VIII.3. Already in 1950, Khrushchev had complained about the unwillingness of many of the graduates of the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy to work in their profession (Fainsod, *How...*, p.474).

<sup>306</sup>Pako, 147/4/195, ll.42ob./43. Astashina was appointed third secretary --that is "secretary for cadres"-- of the Oktiabr' raion of Kalinin when it was formed at the end of the war (PP 7671/Jan 3, 1945, p.2).

<sup>307</sup>"In the family the rôles of men and women changed only very slowly. The problem of the double burden arose, which laid the family on the shoulders of the women. A situation was created, and continues to exist until this day, in which the woman works in the economy as much as the man of the family; moreover she has to do the fundamental part of domestic

comments do show a certain awareness among women of the injustice of the meagre representation of women in positions of power, perhaps evidence that the tradition of Perovskaia, Zasulich, Figner, Krupskaia, and Kollontai had not been forgotten by all. Apparently, in early 1949 only three women were first raikom secretaries in the oblast'; none were chair of a raiispolkom; no obkom department was headed by a woman; and there was no female secretary of the gorkom of Kalinin. Hence, Astashina's comment:

I will mention three figures for our raion. In our schools work 237 teachers, 200 of whom are women. 49 people work as doctors, 36 of them are women. Of secondary-educated medical personnel there are 151, 128 of whom are women. At the railroad passenger-car works, 40.6% of the work force is female. Of the 146 women who are part of the engineering and technical staff, 24 work in leading positions. This indicates that women are seldom promoted to leading work.

The party's oblast' committee does not instruct the party's raikoms to improve the work with women and to promote women to leading work.

The report of comrade Vorontsov [who had given the report on the situation of the oblast' and its Party organization earlier at the same meeting] is an example of the fact that the oblast' committee pays poor attention to this problem, since he said literally two words about women. But in my opinion women in our Kalinin oblast' are not the last spoke in the wheel. Women are remembered on March 8 [International Women's Day, a

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work, hardly facilitated by time-saving household devices" (Gordon, Klopov, p.85). Gordon and Klopov have formulated a faulty opinion when they conclude that the basis has been laid for women's full emancipation in society as a result of the fact that, in Soviet times, millions of women were liberated from the old constraints that had limited them to an existence in the kitchen previously (Gordon, Klopov, p.85). In pre-Soviet times, the great majority of the population lived in the countryside: women were often as much involved in the farming as men. Even in the towns women worked in the factories before 1917. Furthermore, the basis might have been laid for women's equality as a result of their participation in the production process in the USSR, but somehow this equality never came about, in the same way that it did not before the October Revolution. Evidently, more is necessary than mere changes in economic position in order to achieve women's social equality.

holiday in the USSR], and then forgotten again. On March 8, they are elected to a presidium, a few women are mentioned who have been promoted to leading party work and are the best production workers; after this, they are again forgotten for the remainder of the year...

We have them [women who are capable to fulfill responsible positions], but no effort is undertaken for their benefit. They try to get rid of a woman who has been promoted...

We also have other occasions of women who are kept at one and the same position in the party organization for ten to twelve years and are never promoted further...

Thus at the party conference of the town of Kalinin, women were entered onto the list of those who wanted to speak; only one did. At the beginning of this oblast' party conference, we have elected the leading committees of the conference. Women were not in the mandate commission, nor in the secretariat, nor in the editorial committee.<sup>308</sup>

Astashina then explained that the Party should pay attention to the fact that women in higher positions had to deal with peculiar problems<sup>309</sup>. They had the additional responsibility of rearing several children --which was the case for all the female raion secretaries at the time. Because of these extra burdens, their life was much more complicated than that of men in similar posts.

Some of the more perceptive local leaders understood that this widespread discrimination against women, be it conscious or not, was self-defeating. Astashina's remarks seem to have exerted some effect because, in the course of 1949, the situation of women in the oblast' was discussed at several levels. On July 17, 1949, a group of at least sixteen leading female Party workers of the town of Kalinin met to

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<sup>308</sup>Pako, 147/4/195, 11.42ob./43; at plenums and conferences, speakers had to announce beforehand if they wanted to make a speech; due to time constraints, there were always far more people on the list than appeared before the delegates in the end; often those who were deemed to be less important were not allowed to speak as a result.

<sup>309</sup>Pako, 147/4/195, 1.43ob.

exchange views on women's position; Astashina was among them<sup>310</sup>. The complaints were similar to those already voiced at the Party conference by Astashina, although some went into more detail. Lebedeva lamented the early hour (five o'clock in the afternoon) that the day cares were closing. She found it unfair that no one seemed to allow time for women to complete "female household tasks." She did not even seem to be able to imagine that men could also do some of these chores<sup>311</sup>. Voevodina presented a more radical perspective: she wondered why it was that, after the war, so many women were banished to make way for men; for women had proven themselves to be equal to the task, indeed, so much so that they actually had served better than many men in the same positions<sup>312</sup>.

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<sup>310</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.1ff. The others were the vice-head of the obkom department of agitation and propaganda, Golikova; Kuznetsova, who was the vice-head of the obkom department of Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol organizations; Ginsburg, a raikom secretary of the Tsentral'nyi raion; Volkova, a raikom secretary of the Novopromyshlennyi raion; Vishniakova, vice-chair of the raiispolkom of Tsentral'nyi raion; Nemkova, the secretary of the Party buro of the weaving factory; Makarova, the secretary of the Party buro of a spinning factory; Bobrova, the Party secretary of the "Volodarskii" sewing factory; Voevodina, the secretary of the Party committee of the cotton-fibre *kombinat*; Lebedeva and Chernysheva, Party secretaries of the Proletarskii raion; Tiugina, whose occupation is unknown; and Gribova, Ivanova, and Ushkova, *instruktory* of the obkom. One of Golikova's tasks within the obkom apparatus, at least in 1949, seems to have been to mediate the situation of women, although she was officially a worker concerned with agitation and propaganda (she reported, for instance, the inadequate number of kindergarten in Vyshnii Volochek and Kalinin; Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.9-11ob.).

<sup>311</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.3. Commenting on the femininity of these household tasks, Nadezhda A. Smirnova, a former veterinarian, noticed that, besides her extremely demanding job, she also had to look after her animals, private plot, and household. She estimated that women worked about twice as much as men (testimony of Nadezhda A. Smirnova in the survey). The "benefits" for women of the economic transformation under Stalin are underlined in the following statement of Barbara Alpern Engel: "Since the 1930s, women have shouldered the burden of full-time, waged labor while continuing to do almost all housework without labor-saving devices" (Engel, p.319).

<sup>312</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.4. Bobrova agreed that men were promoted solely because of their army rank, notwithstanding the fact that they often worked extremely poorly (Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.6).

Astashina elaborated on her earlier criticisms<sup>313</sup>. She noticed that pregnant women were sometimes forced to work at night, and made to carry loads of forty to fifty kilograms; as a result many had to abandon their work. She also grieved the fact that women were coming to her to seek help because their boyfriends had left them upon discovering that they had become prospective fathers. Bobrova had read in the paper that a special women's department for work among women had been created in the Ukraine<sup>314</sup>. This she thought to be a very good idea, apparently unaware of the previously ubiquitous existence of departments of the *Zhenotdel* in the USSR.

Women who had lost their husbands during the war, and who had lost their homes through the German attack on and temporary occupation of Kalinin, often experienced difficulties in securing a decent apartment<sup>315</sup>. Newly completed apartments were first given to families composed of men, women, and children, and not so quickly to women alone with children. Thus Ginsburg, present at the discussion in July 1949, had been already living for four years in one room with another woman. The latter was not related to her, and Ginsburg was said to be suffering in silence. Another woman apparently lived with eight people in an apartment of sixteen square meters. In a different record of 1949, some women were described as living in similar

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<sup>313</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.5.

<sup>314</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.6. See 1.5 and Heitlinger, pp.57-63, and p.109, for a discussion of the creation and dissolution of the *Zhenotdel*. It had been abolished in 1930 (Barbara Evans Clements, "The Utopianism of the Zhenotdel," in: *Slavic Review*, Volume 51, Number 3, Fall 1992, pp.485-496, p.495).

<sup>315</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.6.

circumstances in Vyshnii Volochek<sup>316</sup>. Often they could not afford to send their children to the expensive day cares.

Day cares were supposed to liberate women from their traditional rôles, allowing them to join the work force<sup>317</sup>. However, despite the fact that the large majority of young mothers worked, the day-care facilities in the seven largest towns in the oblast' were not very extensive: there was room for between 7% and 20% of all children in each town<sup>318</sup>. In rural areas very few day cares were available<sup>319</sup>. Here relatives took care of the children, although the rural elite might have had a nanny<sup>320</sup>.

In any event, even in the larger towns many day cares were not fully occupied in 1948<sup>321</sup>. The reasons for this phenomenon can be first sought in the fact that, in 1948, the day-care fees had been increased, causing some women to take their children out of the day-care centres. In addition, some children transferred to kindergartens; other children

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<sup>316</sup>Ibid., 1.56.

<sup>317</sup>Heitlinger, p.108 and p.114.

<sup>318</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.26. Neither were they in the USSR as a whole, when less than 10% of all children of the age group attended day cares (Gordon, Klopov, p.88).

<sup>319</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.24. In each of 17 rural raions, there was at most one day-care facility in 1949.

<sup>320</sup>Testimony of M.V. Kornetova in the survey. She was the head of a rural soviet until 1951, and her husband was perhaps an MVD employee at the time (from 1951-1954 she lived with her husband in Magadan, who served there in the MVD). The head of production and subsequent director of the porcelain factory of Konakovo, V.P. Sazhko, was able to have a housekeeper look after his two children in the period (testimony of V.P. Sazhko in the survey). The household of A.A. Morozova was in a similar position as the Sazhko family (testimony of A.A. Morozova in the survey). The rank and file, such as V.P. Pimenova, were helped by mothers or mothers-in-law (testimony of V.P. Pimenova in the survey). However, the testimony of the regular kolkhoznitsa M.V. Chesnokova, who gave birth to eight children between 1931 and 1951, indicates that at times in the countryside really large families also had a nanny (testimony of M.V. Chesnokova in the survey).

<sup>321</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 11.26/27. At the end of 1948 in Kalinin, Vyshnii Volochek, Rzhev, Bologoe, Bezhet'sk, Kimry, and Torzhok, the occupancy rate of available places in day-care centres was 74.5%.

were reared at home because their mother had stopped working. Of course, many women preferred their children to be brought up by a relative, in most cases by a grandmother<sup>322</sup>.

On July 22, 1949, the obkom issued a resolution on the situation of women and ordained some measures to improve women's fate in the oblast'<sup>323</sup>. After the resolution, several measures were taken at the workplace to improve the labour conditions of women<sup>324</sup>. Some shops in the larger towns remained open in the evenings. The number of consultation points for women was increased, because of which women had more opportunity to visit a doctor for specifically female questions and ailments. Factory workers could have medical checkups. However, it seems that the rural raikoms were taking the obkom resolution less seriously<sup>325</sup>. Several did not undertake any actions to advance matters. Furthermore, nowhere in the oblast' had authorities made a genuine effort by January 1950 to ensure the promotion of more women to leading work. The female obkom instructor, who reported in January 1950 to the obkom on the effect of the resolution of July 22, 1949, concluded that control of the execution of the resolution should be continued, and that obkom instructors should step up their supervision on these issues<sup>326</sup>.

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<sup>322</sup>As was the case with the children of E.N. Ratnikova and her husband, who worked respectively as a nurse and officer in the army, and of the schoolteacher N.N. Golubeva and her husband (testimony of E.N. Ratnikova and N.N. Golubeva in the survey).

<sup>323</sup>Pako, 147/4/1977, 1.6; the resolution was called "*O sostoianii i merakh uluchsheniakh raboty sredi zhenshchin*".

<sup>324</sup>Pako, 147/4/1977, 1.7/8.

<sup>325</sup>Ibid., 1.9.

<sup>326</sup>Ibid., 1.10.

In 1950, more detailed reports on women's working situation were made by urban and raion Party committees<sup>327</sup>. In general, most of the measures designed to alleviate women's working conditions and status were restricted by the productive exigencies of industry and agriculture. Here and there, women with young children were relieved from night shifts; more facilities for personal hygiene were created at industrial enterprises, more medical checkups conducted. Female workers were also attending lectures on menstruation, abortion (always cast in a negative light), cancer, and children's diseases. The reports often tried to stress the successful fulfillment of tasks set by socialist emulation, and singled out women who had conformed to Stakhanovite work norms. However, most raikoms reported that women were hardly promoted to leading positions. The records leave the distinct impression that, particularly in rural areas, only lip service was paid to the professed improvement of the position of women<sup>328</sup>.

In September 1951, the male chair of the raiispolkom of Zubtsov bemoaned the disappearance of all-female tractor brigades after the war<sup>329</sup>. He deemed this development to be counterproductive, since so few men were left on the collective farms, and since women had proven themselves to be equal to the tasks involved as tractor drivers during and directly after the war.

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<sup>327</sup>Ibid., II.18-34.

<sup>328</sup>As for example in the report of the Tebleshki raikom (Pako, 147/4/1977, II.34-345ob.)

<sup>329</sup>Pako, 147/5/11, 1.118. In the whole of the USSR the amount of women among tractor drivers plummeted from 55% in 1943, to 17.4% in 1946, and to 5% on January 1, 1949 (*Sovetskaia derevnia*.... p.120).



In the countryside most women relied on the assistance of their own or their husband's mother for taking care of small children<sup>330</sup>. When one lacked such relatives, the situation could become extraordinarily difficult. In 1949, one such case of a woman with three children came to the attention of the obkom<sup>331</sup>. The woman, Zhukova, was ill and could not take care of her children. They went around hungry, barefoot, and badly dressed. She possessed only one goat. Her house had no windows, the stove had fallen apart, the floor had collapsed in some places, and she had neither enough beds or bedding. The oldest children did not attend school because they had no clothes or shoes, and the youngest one had rickets. Rather strangely, the kolkhoz executive seemed to have been not at all concerned about the situation in which Zhukova lived.

The case of Zhukova is certainly not typical for the life of the majority of the kolkhoz women, although very many had no choice but to bring up their children on their own after the war. It does show what kind of abject poverty did exist in the oblast' at times after the war. The rather inhumane attitude of the leadership of the kolkhoz and the kolkhozniks themselves towards their neighbour here is perhaps proof of the dissolution of the social fabric of precollectivization times. It can be proposed that in the past the village would have tried to support the needy, such as Zhukova and her family. An explanation for the indifferent behaviour of Zhukova's fellow villagers is not ventured in

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<sup>330</sup>E.g. the testimony of M.A. Syssoeva, Nadezhda A. Smirnova, Z.M. Vinogradova, N.F. Alekseev --whose family was not strictly rural, as his wife was a weaver in Vyshnii Volochek--, A.S. Efremov, P.N. Bashilova, I.V. Ratataev, and A.F. Antonov in the survey. M.M. Kozenkova-Pavlova had no one to help her look after the children, and thus took them with her when she worked in the fields (testimony of M.M. Kozenkova in the survey).

<sup>331</sup>Pako, 147/4/1814, 1.62.

the report. It could be that the other villagers' burdens were enormous as well. Thus, ostensibly, out of sheer necessity the kolkhozniks had decided to ignore her. After all, someone who did not work on the kolkhoz did not contribute to meeting the extremely high delivery quotas. The income of the kolkhoz was dependent on the quotas. The obligatory labour for the *trudodni*, the cultivation of private plot, and the care for personal cattle, might have been so consuming, that none had time to worry about poor Zhukova.

A rather strange incident demonstrates again the rather prudish mentality prevailing in Stalin's Russia. In 1949, a male employee of the raion procuracy of Udoml'ia accused a schoolteacher of having a lesbian relationship with the school director<sup>332</sup>. He claimed to have compelling evidence for this. The prosecutor was of the opinion that the director was a "hermaphrodite." According to him, she had become the talk of the town, and her behaviour had a pernicious influence on the school's pupils. After the prosecutor had called in the schoolteacher for questioning, the first raion secretary, the veteran Party worker Glazunova, became very upset with the prosecutor. She summoned him to her office and, according to the prosecutor, called him a scoundrel (*svoloch*) and a spineless creature (*sopliak*). He received a severe reprimand from her. It is unclear how the affair ended for the schoolteacher and the director. At least the prosecutor asked for a

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<sup>332</sup>Pako, 147/4/1703, 1.103-104ob. Male homosexuality was outlawed in 1934 in the Soviet Union, while lesbianism was never officially made illegal (Heitinger, p.21; also Tatyana Mamonova (ed.), Women and Russia, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, p.135). Men who were convicted for homosexuality got jail terms, while women were sent to psychiatric hospitals, according to Mamonova (Tatyana Mamonova, Russian Women's Studies: Essays on Sexism in Soviet Culture, London: Pergamon Press, 1989, p.131, and Mamonova, Women and Russia, p.135). Mamonova's claim about the occurrence of lesbianism after the war is highly plausible, as this example perhaps shows (Mamonova, Women and Russia, p. 130).

transfer after this incident, while Glazunova continued to lead the raion Party committee.

### VIII.6 Education

The mediocre level of general education has already been noticed at several points before<sup>333</sup>. Only in September 1949, the seven-year curriculum became obligatory; as can be seen from the tables, most of the kolkhoz chairs in the 1940s only benefited from a primary education, which usually meant four years, sometimes six years of schooling<sup>334</sup>. Most of the elite of the oblast', formed almost exclusively by Party members, could not boast of a superior education<sup>335</sup>. However, towards the end of Stalin's life, the level of education was definitely

<sup>333</sup>Iu. Borisov indicated that just before the war still 20% of the total population of the USSR was illiterate (Iu. Borisov, "Stalin: Chelovek i Simvol....", p.487). See also Tables 23, 24, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46.

<sup>334</sup>See Table 23. See Pako, 147/4/1495, 1.72ob. on the introduction of the seven-year curriculum for the school year 1949-1950. On August 14, 1930, four years of obligatory primary education had been introduced (Kerblay, p.353). G. Pomerants saw the key to the unrivalled cruelty of Stalinist times in this "semi-education" of the masses, who no longer were restrained by the norms and values of traditional society when their existence was uprooted after the revolutions of 1917. The masses had not yet been socialized adequately -- through sufficient education-- into cultured citizens of modern industrial society (G. Pomerants, "O roli oblika lichnosti v zhizni istoricheskogo kollektiva. Diskussionnoe vystuplenie v institute filosofii," in *Grani*, 67(1968), pp.134-143, pp.137-140). Pomerants maintains that Soviet society under Stalin was the result of this "lack of culture" and older traditions of boorishness and lackeying, which found their roots in the time of the Tatar yoke. Although Pomerants exaggerates, the hysteric gatherings that called for the death of the accused at the show trials, or the enthusiastic cruelty in the collectivization of the Party activists seem to confirm the unsophisticated receptiveness among many Soviet citizens towards the manipulative propaganda from above. In the same way, A.N. Sakharov saw the essence of the events in Stalin's lifetime in the revenge exacted from the rich and intelligent by the "half-cultured, philistine, poor, and even lowest people" for centuries of oppression (A.N. Sakharov, "Revoliutsionnyi totalitarizm....", pp.63/64). The experience of Nazi-Germany, however, proves that "[on] peut être instruit et totalement amoral" (Kerblay, p.370).

<sup>335</sup>Compare the situation on January 1, 1952, of the 1,467 leading workers, and the education of the delegates to the ninth oblast' Party conference with that of those in early 1945 (See Appendix III and Table 39).

much higher than in the immediate postwar period. Although it is probably true that the quality of education deteriorated after the October Revolution, the quantity of general education certainly increased, albeit only after the 1920s<sup>336</sup>. After 1929, hardly any children did not receive at least the basic four years of general schooling.

However, in the oblast' in 1947, when 16,555 young males, born in 1929, underwent medical and aptitude tests in order to establish whether they were fit for army service, forty-three still turned out to be illiterate, and 1,094 semiliterate, i.e. having had no more than three years of school<sup>337</sup>. The war might have partially interfered with their education. But in a subsequent report in the same record, the military commissar of the oblast', Cherniak, concluded that the lack of literacy among the 1928 levy had been predominantly caused by inadequate control and supervision of school attendance and of the schoolwork of those who did attend<sup>338</sup>. His observation may be close to the truth,

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<sup>336</sup>See Tables 44-46. Natal'ia A. Smirnova, born in 1913, never enjoyed any education and remained illiterate (testimony of Natal'ia A. Smirnova in the survey). So did M.K. Chesnokova, born in 1912 (testimony of M.K. Chesnokova in the survey). A.G. Murtsovkina and F.K. Romashova had two years of *likbez* (*likvidatsiia bezgramotnosti*, i.e. education for illiterate adults), although they wanted to have more education (testimony of A.G. Murtsovkina and F.K. Romashova in the survey). Gordon and Klopov indicate that in the countryside at least in this respect collectivization might have had a beneficial effect (Gordon, Klopov, p.91). It was much easier to control school attendance through the *kolkhozy* than before. The peasantry, much less interested after collectivization in optimal production from socialized lands and cattle, may have seen less necessity for their offspring to aid in agricultural work (Gordon, Klopov, p.92). Nevertheless, the amount of education the population enjoyed was small: In 1939, 90% of the population, and in 1959, 64% of the population had enjoyed merely primary education (Gordon, Klopov, p.97).

<sup>337</sup>Pako, 147/41391, II.3-5. 86 had only one grade, 293 two grades, and 715 three grades. Thus 6.9% of young males born in 1929 did not receive the basic, obligatory, education.

<sup>338</sup>Pako, 147/41391, I.11.

since quite a few of the semiliterates came from the eastern parts of the oblast' that never submitted to German occupation<sup>339</sup>.

Not surprisingly, the incidence of illiteracy and semiliteracy was more frequent in the countryside than in the towns. Considering the traditional lower attendance of girls at schools in the countryside, the amount of semiliterates and illiterates among the oblast' youth in the 1940s might have been close to 10% of the total<sup>340</sup>. Around 1970 a sociological survey was conducted in the countryside of Kalinin oblast' under the auspices of Iu.V. Arutiunian<sup>341</sup>. It appeared that in the smallest and medium-sized villages of the province, most members of the agricultural labour force had enjoyed between four to five years of education. In the larger villages the picture was slightly better, for most of the inhabitants had profited from more than six years of schooling, although even there the average was still less than seven years. Considering the average age of the labour force of Arutiunian's respondents, which was in all villages between forty and forty-seven, it is clear how low the instructional level was of many who had grown

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<sup>339</sup>Pako, 147/4/1391, II.5. Besides, most of the boys of the 1929 levy should have been already close to the completion of the fourth grade by June 1941. Eight illiterates and thirty-nine semiliterates were from Nerl' raion (16% of all conscripts of this raion); five illiterates and thirty-seven semiliterates from Sandovo raion (12%); one illiterate and thirty-nine semiliterates from Sonkovo raion (16%); three illiterates and forty-five semiliterates from Krasnyi Kholm raion (15%); two illiterates and thirty-nine semiliterates from Kashin raion (11%); forty-four semiliterates from Tebleski raion (17%). 23% of all conscripts of Kushalino raion was semiliterate (thirty-six out of 157)! The formerly occupied raions of Rzhev and Olenino were the only western raions where the number of semiliterates was substantial --taking into account the smaller populace of these areas--, respectively forty-three and thirty-five, although only one illiterate was counted in Rzhev raion (6% of all conscripts were either illiterate or semiliterate in Rzhev raion; 10% in Olenino raion). In the four raions of the town of Kalinin, the total was one illiterate and twenty-one semiliterates, that is, a quite small proportion.

<sup>340</sup>See I.5 and I.6 on the attendance of peasant girls at schools during the 1920s.

<sup>341</sup>Iu.V. Arutjunjan, La structure sociale de la population rurale de L'U.R.S.S. Traduction et présentation Yves Perret-Gentil. Paris: I.S.M.E.A., 1979 (Cahiers I.S.M.E.A. Economies et Sociétés 13, 1979) (Russian original, 1971), pp.206/207.

up during the time of Stalin<sup>342</sup>. Obviously, a significant amount of the better educated had left the villages and migrated to towns, but those who stayed behind of the rural dwellers schooled in the 1930s and 1940s had benefited from four to six and a half years of education on the whole.

However, the value of learning was certainly recognized in 1992 by almost all of the rural respondents of the survey, even if they had not enjoyed much of it themselves<sup>343</sup>. Obviously, their appreciation of education might have swelled since Stalinist times, but it is likely that even in the 1940s and early 1950s their ideas were quite different from those of their parents, if the latter had grown up before the revolution<sup>344</sup>.

Already before the introduction of the obligatory seven-year curriculum, many children were attending at least seven years of

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<sup>342</sup>Ibid., p.207.

<sup>343</sup>"No aspect of Soviet society received more warm and spontaneous support than did the system of Soviet education. ...Only the system of free medical care came close to it in popularity" (Alex Inkeles, Raymond A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen. Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961, p.132).

A.F. Antonov had two years of general education and later took some courses in land surveying. He lamented his lack of education, and tried to do everything to have his children study (testimony of A.F. Antonov in the survey). M.A. Sysoeva, P.A. Kashinov, A.Z. Zhuravleva, T.I. Bol'shakova, and V.P. Pimenova similarly regretted their inadequate education of only four years; so did P.N. Bashilova, who had three years of primary school, and A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva, who had only two years of education (testimony of M.A. Sysoeva, P.A. Kashinov, V.P. Pimenova, A.V. Zhuravleva, T.I. Bol'shakova, P.N. Bashilova, A.K. Sumugina-Shepeleva in the survey). K.R. Fedorova enjoyed four years of primary education plus one year of study at a school for rural youth, which she felt was inadequate (testimony of K.R. Fedorova in the survey). N.N. Osipova-Kozlova had three years of primary education and regretted not having been able to receive more education (testimony of N.N. Osipova-Kozlova in the survey). One of the few who did not regret his rather limited education (of two years) was A.E. Vakhmistrov, who attended school around 1920. He learned to read, count, and write in those two years, which he felt was enough for him at the time; there were few in his village who enjoyed more education (testimony of A.E. Vakhmistrov in the survey). He was, of course, of a generation who grew up before collectivization.

<sup>344</sup>See Altrichter's description of the inimical attitude towards the schools of many of the peasants in the 1920s (Altrichter, p.171).

school, although more so in urban areas than in rural localities<sup>345</sup>. In 1949-1950 more than 30,000 pupils doubled a grade, i.e. more than 10% of all school children<sup>346</sup>. In the countryside, particularly, many of the children doubled grades. After the war the number of truant children decreased: in the year 1946-1947, 3,548 children of school age did not attend grades one to four; in 1947-1948, 1,717<sup>347</sup>. In certain cases, schools had to aid children by giving them meals, shoes, and clothes. The quality of tutelage is difficult to assess, but it is clear from the sources that the children were instilled with a large quantity of patriotism<sup>348</sup>. One secondary-school pupil in the remote district of Lesnoe wrote in an essay:

We survived many scarcities and difficulties, many bitter losses and serious sacrifices. And we know: our future is not a smooth road, but a prickly and difficult path, but at the same time we --the Soviet people-- do not fear any scarcities and difficulties, and they do not stop us. All my strength and knowledge I will give to you, my Motherland! And when it is necessary, I will find the strength in myself to give you my life as well! To give one's life to the Motherland, to the people: that is the greatest happiness.<sup>349</sup>

In rural locales the quality of education was often hampered by shoddy maintenance of the school building<sup>350</sup>. In 1948, it was noted

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<sup>345</sup>Kiselev remarked, in his closing speech before an obkom plenum in October 1953, that the education in the towns was much better than in the countryside, a reason for many agricultural specialists to seek employment in the towns and have their children educated there (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.196).

<sup>346</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 1.32.

<sup>347</sup>Pako, 147/4/1126, 1.1.

<sup>348</sup>Ibid., 1.3ob.

<sup>349</sup>Pako, 147/4/1126, 1.3ob. The themes for these kind of essays were, for example, "What is happiness?" "Does one have to dream?" "My most beloved hero," or "A memorable day in my life."

<sup>350</sup>And not only by that. V.P. Krylov attended four grades of primary school in the war years in Udoml'ia raion. At the time he did not get enough to eat, and at school there were no notebooks, so that the pupils wrote on newspapers sometimes, between the printed lines

that it was too cold in many schools, and school furniture was lacking<sup>351</sup>. Glass was found in only one third of the windows, blackboards were broken, and the lighting (electrical or the far more prevalent kerosene lamps) was insufficient. All of that led to rather modest educative results and even tampered with children's physical development.

The village teachers in the countryside functioned as the "transmission belt" of the culture of the outside world to the village children<sup>352</sup>. Nevertheless, their qualifications were noticeably lower than those of urban teachers even in 1959 and 1960. Their isolation in many rural areas and the time they spent taking care of their personal plots hindered them from updating their skills<sup>353</sup>.

The most renowned seat of higher learning was the Pedagogical Institute of Kalinin. However, the life of its faculty was not easy after the war. According to the director of the institute, Polianskii, about sixty lecturers were living in students' dormitories in communal apartments (*obshchezhitie*)<sup>354</sup>. This housing was apparently so poor that many of the best teachers left the institute in 1950 and 1951, because they had never seen "such a poor attitude towards scientific cadres."<sup>355</sup> Polianskii compared the situation to that in Kursk and Voronezh, where the teaching staff had received apartments long

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(testimony of V.P. Krylov in the survey). Of course, after the war matters must have improved somewhat.

<sup>351</sup>Pako, 147/4/1126, 1.11.

<sup>352</sup>Kerblay, p.355.

<sup>353</sup>Todorskii, Arbatov, II, p.58.

<sup>354</sup>Pako, 147/5/10, 1.52.

<sup>355</sup>Ibid., 1.52.



before<sup>356</sup>. In 1946 and 1947, six apartments had been promised to the Pedagogical Institute, but five years later only three had been provided.

One suspects, once more, that the oblast' government probably had had to deal with a dearth of means. The housing situation of the institute lecturers was simply not a priority. It is noteworthy that, in 1992, a professor of the State University of Tver', the successor to the Pedagogical Institute, was living with his wife, a music schoolteacher in Tver', and two children, in a two-room apartment of perhaps twenty-five square meters. The walls and doors on the inside seemed to have been made from a kind of carton. Not much improvement had been made in the forty-odd years after Polianskii's complaints.

The education of many young people in the towns after the war was meant to be enhanced by the system of industrial schools (*remeslennye uchilishcha*) and factory (*FZO*) schools, which taught certain technical skills to be used in the factories. The effectiveness of these institutions is questionable. It was reported in 1952, that:

...the labour production discipline of young workers, who have entered the *FZO* schools of the town of Kalinin, is characterized by the following facts: at No.7 of the light industry system, in the Proletarskii raion of the town of Kalinin, in 1951 alone, fifty graduates quit their jobs without authorization, and in the first quarter of 1952, another thirteen out of the 116 that were in the program. These sixty-three people were convicted by a people's judge. Here unauthorized departure of *FZO* schools' graduates out of the light industry training system was 54.3%.<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>356</sup>Ibid., 1.53.

<sup>357</sup>Pako, 147/5/341, 1.67. In 1940, jail sentences were introduced for students of trade schools, railroad colleges, and *FZO* schools for violations of the school discipline and the unauthorized departure from the school (Gordon, Klopov, Footnote 2, p.127).

## CHAPTER IX: AFTERMATH

### IX.1 A New Mentality?

The transition of Soviet society to a modern urban and industrial culture did not occur in the years of the first Five Year Plans, [but] it took place two to three decades later.<sup>1</sup>

Communist principles,...if one looks at them in a simple way, are the principles of a highly educated, honest, advanced person, are the love for the socialist Motherland, friendship, comradeship, humanity, honesty, love for socialist labour, and a whole number of great qualities, that are understood by each. An education bringing forward these traits, these great qualities, is the most important part of communist education... But why under socialism have until now the survivals of capitalism not yet been eliminated? When giving an answer to this question, the agitator will explain that the survivals of the past in the mind of the people could not immediately be eliminated, because, in the first place, as was noticed by comrade Stalin, the mentality of the people lags behind in its development from their economic circumstances, and that's why the survival of bourgeois opinions has remained in the heads of the people and will remain, although in the economy capitalism has already been liquidated. Second, because "the capitalist encirclement still exists, that tries to enliven and support the survivals of capitalism in the economy and in the minds of the people in the USSR; against which we Bolsheviks need to keep our powder dry." (I.Stalin)...

The agitator notices that, in its most extreme form, the survivals of capitalism often appear in facts of loafing, speculation, hooliganism, swindling, and the theft of public property. Furthermore one has to underline that Lenin wrote with anger about cheats and plunderers as well as about those who shirk from work, as about parasites, who were fed by capitalism, and the main enemies of socialism. Why did Lenin call for a merciless reckoning with these enemies of socialism? Because

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<sup>1</sup>Gordon, Klopov, p.97.

public property is the basis of a socialist, communist system and those who assault it are enemies of the people...

There are still often moments when backward people reason as follows: "to work as little, and to earn as much as possible."

Those people forget that they do not work for capitalists and landowners, but for themselves, for their own toiling people...

In a discussion one should also not pass over survivals of capitalism, which are coming to the fore in efforts of backward kolkhozniks to engage in their own private plot to the detriment of the public, collective-farm economy. The agitator needs to explain to his audience that the happiness of the kolkhozniks does not depend on the private plot, but on the growth and strengthening of the public economy, and should underline this with concrete facts and examples.

After that, it is necessary to turn the attention of the audience to that most vivid survival, formed by religious prejudices and rites. One of these rites is the celebration in the countryside of religious holidays. This custom causes large losses to the collective farms and the kolkhozniks themselves. If only one hundred people "celebrate" for one day at the time of haying, then that translates into the loss of an amount of hay, enough to feed in the course of the winter no less than thirty cows, and the loss of one hundred people even for just one day on a religious holiday at harvest time leads to the loss of no less than 600-800 *put* of grain.

The agitator, together with his audience, needs to calculate clearly, economically, the losses incurred by the celebration of religious holidays, so that the kolkhoznik-listeners themselves see the necessity to abstain from these backward habits.

The agitator needs to underline that communism is built on [social] science, and that religion is an enemy of science, that religious survivals hinder the building of communism. The majority of soviet people have liberated themselves already long ago from religious prejudices, and the task is to make all people understand their harm, and make them reject them.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>V. Zozulina, "Kak provesti besedu na temu: 'O bor'be s perezhitkami kapitalizma v soznanii liudei'," in Bloknot Agitatora, 1952, No.13, pp.27-38, pp.29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. This seems to be the same Zozulina who barely escaped the purges in 1937 (see Appendix III and III.2), which might explain her enthusiastic explanation of the capitalist encirclement and the machinations of the enemy. Although she eluded the purges, her mind was transformed. The style is very simple and quite repetitive and reminds one of Stalin's "seminary" or "canonical" style. It indicates the rather limited intellectual capacities of the average agitator for which the article was written.

From admonishments such as these --the date of this particular piece is the summer of 1952--, it is obvious that the Communists even just before Stalin's death were often less than content with the mentality of the population, particularly in the countryside<sup>3</sup>. The peasantry's resilience in trying to maintain certain elements of their traditions was a source for consistent Communist censure. To counter it, the regime flaunted collectivized agriculture as a superior organization of agricultural production. Yet in 1948 Sadovnikov, vice-chair of the oblispolkom at the time, thus described the kolkhoz "Dimitrov" of the raion of Novotorzhok:

The harvest yields in this kolkhoz are minimal, and systematically the plan for the development of the socialist livestock is not fulfilled. In the course of the last six years no money has been paid, and in the course of the last four years between 105 and 390 grams of grain per *trudoden* have been distributed.

An inspection carried out here established that the main causes for the backwardness of this kolkhoz are the most crude violations of the Statute for rural artels. The law on the use of the land is criminally violated. The squandering of hayfields takes place. To the detriment of the kolkhoz, fifteen households that are not members of the collective farm are maintaining themselves by using pastures, hay- and woodlands for free. The democratic basis of the direction of rural artels is brutally violated. In the fifteen years of the existence of the kolkhoz, the chair has been changed seventeen times, moreover three times in 1947 alone, and two of the directors were not members of the kolkhoz. Those sorrowful leaders only pulled apart the kolkhoz property.

Unfortunately, similar kolkhozy also exist in other raions.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>The edition of Bloknot Agitatora, which was published every two weeks from that point onwards, was substantial: around 16,000 copies.

<sup>4</sup>Pako, 147/4/1095, 1.69ob.

At the time of Khrushchev's tenure as first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, two female anthropologists, L.A. Anokhina and M.N. Shmeleva, decided to research the life of the kolkhozniks in the Kalinin oblast<sup>5</sup>. They have left us with an interesting depiction of country life as it tried to recover from the trials and tribulations of the Stalin era. Their account is probably not entirely exemplary for the situation of the countryside in the Kalinin oblast', as they focussed on four raions on the eastern border, traditionally more prosperous than the areas to the west of it (particularly Bezhet'sk raion)<sup>6</sup>. Thus, a more rosy picture emerges from their account than if they would have included some western areas in their research. In the opinion of the authors:

The concrete material of the different chapters of the book show graphically how, in the years of Soviet power, the old disappeared out of all aspects of life of the Kalinin countryside, connected as it was with traditional tasks of the population, with heavy, little productive, manual labour, with the patriarchal foundations of the family, and how in the peasants' existence the new was firmly established, a result of the building of socialism and further changes....<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, *Kul'tura*....

<sup>6</sup>See also Kerblay's criticism of their choice of these particular raions (Bezhet'sk, Kashin, Krasnyi Kholm, and Ves'egonsk) (Kerblay, p.394).

<sup>7</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.5. Kerblay arrived at a quite different estimate of the change of the countryside in Soviet times, and argued that the peasantry's ethics had remained largely similar to that of their ancestors (Kerblay, p.268). He adds that they were very well capable of deceiving outsiders, of which Anokhina and Shmeleva may serve as an example here: "Sans doute les progrès de l'instruction ont élargi considérablement le champ des représentations du paysan et son information politique, mais l'éthique qui inspire les comportements quotidiens reste encore imprégnée d'acceptation d'un ordre naturel et immuable qui l'aide à supporter avec courage les épreuves, de compassion pour les déshérités, de suspicion envers tout ce qui est étranger au village (ainsi le mariage hors des relations connues) qui peut se muer en dissimulation" (Kerblay, p.268). A positive picture of the changes in Soviet times of the north-eastern raion of Ves'egonsk, which resembles the optimism of Anokhina and Shmeleva, can be found in A. Todorskii, lu. Arbatov, "Bol'shoe v

Perhaps they had some right to discern something of a positive change in the collective farms of the Kalinin oblast'. However, as it has been argued above, most of these glowing developments had only occurred very recently in many of the kolkhozy, that is, after the death of Stalin<sup>8</sup>.

In the early 1960s, the flax harvest and first treatment of flax stalks constituted a task performed predominantly by women, just as before collectivization<sup>9</sup>. Men were engaged in ploughing, sowing, and loading of crops, but only sporadically dealt with the flax processing, mainly in their capacity as mechanics. The traditional gender specific labour division with respect to flax had apparently survived until the 1960s.

As the *obshchina* village before it, many kolkhozy had craftsmen who provided auxiliary trades, essential for the life of the collective

malom," in: *Kommunist*, 4, 1960, pp. 27-37 [from here Todorskii, Arbatov, I], and Todorskii, Arbatov, II. Todorskii and Arbatov had to admit, however, that the "prosperity" had been a development which was predominantly due to the reforms of the "historic" September 1953 Central Committee Plenum (Todorskii, Arbatov, I, pp.31/32). The numbers quoted in the first article, if they are true, show a staggering increase in the agricultural production of the Ves'egonsk raion between 1953 and 1959. The harvest of flax, potatoes, and grain had more than doubled, as well as the production of milk and the sale of strong-horned cattle.

<sup>8</sup>Iu.V. Arutiunian hinted at this in 1961, when he noticed a sharp rise in demand for sugar and industrial products between 1950 and 1957 in the countryside (Arutiunian, "Osobennosti...", p.425). See IX.2 as well. "...[P]recisely in the 1930s and 1940s for the first time in the history of our country, the technical possibility arose to give not only certain parts of the population, but the large majority of the people access to mass culture" (Gordon, Klopov, p.89). I agree that the technical possibility became available, but, in practice in Stalin's time, as was pointed out above, many rural dwellers --probably many more than half of them-- were only superficially acquainted with films, radio, and newspapers, if at all. In fact, Klopov and Gordon admit a few pages later that: "[in] general the Soviet Union remained in the course of all the 1930s and 1940s a country, in which the rural population formed the majority (two thirds of the population at the end of the 1930s and three fifths at the end of the 1940s), dwelling in houses, in which more than half of them had no electric light, and an overwhelming part was not equipped with even the simplest radio-receivers." (Gordon, Klopov, p.97). Compare as well to Todorskii, Arbatov, I and Todorskii, Arbatov, II.

<sup>9</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.42.

farmer and farm: there were blacksmiths, woodworkers, harness and saddle makers, and millers<sup>10</sup>.

Some kolkhozniks performed additional work related to the natural environment of their farm: logging in woody areas and fishing where there were lakes<sup>11</sup>. Some special fish farms had actually been organized in the oblast', probably already in the 1930s.

The building of houses, stables, and the like was still a task for the kolkhozniks themselves around 1960<sup>12</sup>. Sometimes brigades of construction workers were formed in order to improve the coordination of building. In recent years, "construction cadres" had relieved the kolkhozy of the necessity to hire so-called *shabashniki*, who were itinerant kolkhozniks or urban dwellers offering their artisanal services<sup>13</sup>. Still in 1958, many kolkhozy were apparently less than successful in forming their own construction cadres and had hired these semi-private entrepreneurs instead. The *shabashniki* covered their ways by organizing their own cooperatives. In the middle of the 1960s, many collective farms were obliged to rely on private middlemen to provide them with spare parts and construction

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p.53.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p.53.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p.54.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p.57. In 1951, the raikom secretary Mozhaev, of Goritsy raion, complained about the unauthorized departure of many rural artisans of his raion, some of whom even joined construction brigades in the town of Kalinin (Pako, 147/5/11, ll.73/74). The tradition of itinerant artisanship seemed to be impossible to eradicate. In 1953 there were still enough *shubushniki* around to merit criticism from a kolkhoz chair (Pako, 147/5/663, l.115). One survey respondent, who lost a limb during the war in 1941, and was thus officially an invalid, went back to work at a furniture factory after his return from the front. Even with his severe handicap, he managed to do some carpentry, for which he often was paid with vodka, *samogon*, or food. Before the war he had engaged in "*shubushka*" work. He noted that one worked from early in the morning until late at night on these jobs. When he was hired by the state he worked no more than the legal norm --often eight hours (testimony of S.V. Kudriashov in the survey). Compare as well to Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", p.180.

materials, which were in short supply through the official distribution network of the state<sup>14</sup>. The paucity of spare parts had existed since the early days of collective farming<sup>15</sup>.

The busiest period for the kolkhozniks continued to be the period from April until November<sup>16</sup>. Most agricultural tasks were divided along gender lines, similar to flax cultivation: ploughing, sowing, working with machines were male domains, while women applied fertilizer to the land, pulled flax, and so on. Only in haying and siloing did the sexes work side by side. One feature of existence on the collective farm was somewhat understated in the ethnographers' reports: the general sustained absence of males in the countryside. This deficiency had emerged in the time of the large-scale *orkhodnichestvo* before 1917, and was reinforced after 1929, and particularly after 1941. Women had been forced to assume many tasks that may have comprised the male territory in former times.

In wintertime, workdays were limited to about six hours: the main occupations consisted of the care for private and kolkhoz cattle, some construction, fertilizer shipments back to farms, lumbering, and seed sorting for the next spring sowing period<sup>17</sup>. The person the worst off was the proverbial milkmaid --milking was always done by a woman-- who had to rise at five in the morning, and was still occupied with the cattle at eight or nine at night, although her work knew long

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<sup>14</sup>Leonid Ivanov, "Litsom...", p.203.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p.204.

<sup>16</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.57. At spring sowing, haying, and harvesting activity reached its peak. As was shown above, at harvest time non-kolkhozniks were engaged in helping to gather crops.

<sup>17</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.60.



interruptions<sup>18</sup>. These interruptions were used by the women to wash, cook, clean, and take care of the children, if they had any<sup>19</sup>. As before, most of the milking was done manually in 1960.

Women were basically dealing with all aspects of animal husbandry on the kolkhoz, while men's only contribution may have been transporting fodder, removing dung, keeping a watch at night, and sometimes tending horses.

What was grown on the personal plot in 1960 was mainly consumed by the family, and consequently remained the main source for its nutrition<sup>20</sup>. Little in general was sold on the town markets or via state and cooperative procurement organizations. The burden of keeping a private plot was especially heavy for families in which no older people lived. In the spring and summertime, these families had to spend several additional hours on their plot and with their animals, during lunchtime and after the long workday on the kolkhoz.

The size of the village had not changed much since the 1920s, as noted. Even the two amalgamation periods did not lead to the formation of larger villages by the early 1960s. The average enlarged collective farm at this time consisted of ten to twenty small villages, located within a circle with a radius of fifteen to twenty kilometers<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup>The length of the milkmaid's workday was confirmed in the survey by some of the respondents, who had worked as such (e.g. testimony of N.V. Kurganova in the survey). Kurganova became very embittered: "Is that a life? We did not have a passport, we did not get vacation. Our whole life we walked in rubber boots, otherwise you would sink away at the farm. That is *katorga* not life" (testimony of N.V. Kurganova in the survey).

<sup>19</sup>A.V. Skobeleva asked the kolkhoz if she could become a milkmaid after the birth of her children in the late 1940s. In spite of the hard work, the job had the advantage of allowing one to stay in the village, tending to the cattle, without having to go too far away into the fields as a member of a crop brigade (testimony of A.V. Skobeleva in the survey).

<sup>20</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.76/77.

<sup>21</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.80. According to Karasev, the first amalgamation led to a weakening of the community ties among the peasants (Karasev, pp.306/307). He argues

Collectivization had resulted in a relocation of stables and barns away from the direct vicinity of houses<sup>22</sup>. Even more than thirty years after the beginning of collectivization, the amenities and comforts of modern life had reached the village only sparingly. The roads were almost all unpaved, and in the spring and autumn the connection between villages was sometimes impeded through the fact that the roads turned into mud<sup>23</sup>. In 1952, the remote raion of Lesnoe had neither a pharmacy, nor a bus connection with the railroad that was more than seventy kilometers away<sup>24</sup>. Water came from wells, hauled by traditional winches in most villages, less often with a sweep<sup>25</sup>. Only very recently had water fountains begun to appear. Most villages had artificial ponds, which originally were created for fire-prevention purposes, and were used as drinking water for the livestock<sup>26</sup>. These ponds had previously supplied the villagers with potable water, as well as a source for swimming and doing the laundry. However, until more recent times, the ponds were not kept very clean. One is hard put to identify the precise period to which the authors refer, but it is likely that this lack of a sense of hygiene was still common during the 1940s and early 1950s.

By the early 1960s, electricity had still not become universally available in the countryside (Lenin would have turned over in his

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convincingly that, in some ways, until 1950 the collectivism of the *obshchina* lived on in the kolkhoz.

<sup>22</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.84.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p.84. No roads were paved in Lesnoe raion in 1952 (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.116). See VIII.3 as well.

<sup>24</sup>Pako, 147/5/283, 1.116.

<sup>25</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.84.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p.85.

grave)<sup>27</sup>. The first televisions made their appearance in the middle of the 1960s<sup>28</sup>.

In precollectivization times, the countryside knew different larger villages located along the major roads<sup>29</sup>. Here the church, a grain barn, a public or merchants' building for the manufacture of butter, a shop, and sometimes a school or tavern, could be found. The appearance of these rural centres had changed since collectivization: in the 1930s and 1940s two-storey houses were built for the kolkhoz administration<sup>30</sup>. In such a house, the chair and bookkeeper would keep their office, mail was received and sorted, and the kolkhoz radio was located. In summertime in some regions, day care was organized and housed in this building. In more recent times separate post offices, clubs, and banks had started to appear --probably only after Stalin's death. In the period directly after collectivization, many kolkhoz directions and rural soviets moved into the houses of dekulakized peasants. The houses assumed a distinct physical appearance:

This kind of *izba* looked externally distinct from the others by its larger size, signboard, pamphlets on the walls, the absence of a courtyard, and the presence of tethers for the horses in front of the window.<sup>31</sup>

Another typical feature of the larger villages in the post-collectivization period was the "club," in which films were shown,

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p.87. See as well Leonid Ivanov's description of the countryside in Udmu't'iia raion in the early 1960s (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh..."). In 1962 only three of twenty-nine kolkhozy of this raion had electricity (ibid., p.175).

<sup>28</sup>Leonid Ivanov, "Litsom...", p.206.

<sup>29</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.88.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp.88/89.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p.89.

lectures given, discussions and meetings held<sup>32</sup>. Even in pre-Revolutionary times, the village school had made its debut in the larger settlements; for a long while after 1917, these primary schools with their four-year curriculum were generally located in an ordinary peasant house, the communities lacking the means to build separate school buildings<sup>33</sup>.

By 1960, the exterior of houses in the eastern regions of the oblast' resembled their past appearance<sup>34</sup>. Many --perhaps 35% to 40%-- of them had been built between 1900 and 1917<sup>35</sup>.

Although officially life had become modernized in the 1960s, the Soviet anthropologists who studied the countryside at this time had to admit that outwardly at least not much had changed<sup>36</sup>. With respect to living space, the lot of the kolkhoznik had only improved because of the smaller average size of the family. The roofed courtyard was still ubiquitous, but had been whittled in size, for the peasant's personal plot and cattle had been severely curtailed by the authorities<sup>37</sup>.

Compared to the 1920s, the peasants' houses were not very different internally<sup>38</sup>. The stove maintained its customary central place, and the number of rooms was roughly the same. Even the hallowed icon corner

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<sup>32</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.92. In October 1953, Obratsov, head of the obkom otdel' of culture (a post-Stalin creation) gave a rather deprecatory estimate of these clubs: "...seldom do you encounter an exhibition, which, in an interesting and convincing way, explains the methods of advanced kolkhozniks, who have attained great results in crop cultivation, in livestock production, or of mechanizers of agriculture, etc. In many a village one can listen to a lecture about any theme but an agricultural one" (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.158).

<sup>33</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.93.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p.98.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p.98.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p.119.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p.122.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., pp.122-124.

was encountered frequently, yet in the early 1960s often accompanied by portraits of the current political leaders<sup>39</sup>. The ethnographers noticed a plethora of artifacts --reproductions, statuettes, little boxes-- exhibited in the kolkhozniks' houses, which were in their eyes of the most tasteless kitsch<sup>40</sup>. One has to question the superior finesse of the anthropologists, but their disgust reveals the persistent cultural rift between countryside and city.

The sense of hygiene had improved in Soviet times, and was especially strongly developed among young women<sup>41</sup>. It goes without saying that solely women managed the household. The extensive contact with relatives in the towns had exerted a beneficial influence on the awareness of both esthetics and hygiene<sup>42</sup>. Dress had become considerably more urban, and only older women went around in their traditional sarafan, with waistband and headdress<sup>43</sup>. However, the beginnings of such changes could already be perceived during the pre-Soviet era. Around 1900, clothes made at home from flax canvas in the southern areas of the guberniia gave way to garments bought on the market, while the flax production itself was completely sold on the market by peasants<sup>44</sup>. In the northern areas the customary sewing of clothes from flax for personal use continued for a longer while. Men's fashion had become much more urbanized than that of the women<sup>45</sup>. Perhaps the traditional desire of the *otkhodniki* to blend in with the

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 126.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 128.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 129/130.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 132.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 132/133.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 141.

townsfolk played an important role here. Apparently, the first item the itinerant and seasonal workers had often bought from their first wages was an urban costume.

The change in fashion became more pronounced after collectivization, when everywhere the habit of domestic tailoring began to disappear<sup>46</sup>. The typical country boots made of braided bark (*lapti*) survived longer, and were still being worn in the 1960s at haying, harvesting, and so on. During the war, the shortage of cloth forced people to return to fabricating domestic clothes with wool. Women even began to wear trousers, and children the clothes of the grownups, for there was nothing else available. Although materials were not produced locally any more, around 1960 women sewed --often aided by a sewing machine--, producing a variety of garments, especially dresses<sup>47</sup>.

In the early 1960s, the kolkhozniks were able to appreciate a reasonably varied diet, but this was a very recent development, as is obvious from the following remark:

A beneficial influence on the diet of the rural population was also exerted by the increase of the monetary part of the *trudoden*, and the introduction of cash remuneration for the kolkhozniks' labour. The prevalence of the pay of the *trudodni* by payment in kind over that by money led to an accumulation in the kolkhoz' households of a surplus of grain, potatoes, horticultural crops, and even milk. These had to be sold in order to acquire the means for the purchase of other, similarly essential products.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p.146.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., pp.152/153.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp.163/164; or more appropriately, most of this surplus was relinquished to the state as taxes.

In general, the composition of the kolkhoznik's meals seemed to have changed less than any other element of the material peasant culture<sup>49</sup>. The tenacity of traditional taste and habits was still strong in this area, since elderly women often prepared the meals. On the whole the diet in the countryside was still more coarse than in the towns, because rural taste had not yet been accustomed to delicacies available in urban areas by 1960<sup>50</sup>. How far the country folk had been forced by the absence of any more sophisticated products in the village store to maintain a more traditional diet than their counterparts in the towns was not described by Soviet ethnographers in the 1960s. As late as 1951, there were frequent absences of essential goods, such as salt, kerosene, sugar, flour, tinned food, and so on, in many of the country shops<sup>51</sup>. Although the diet was deficient at times, healthcare had improved, or, to be more precise, the sense of hygiene and prophylactic medical knowledge had dramatically progressed since the 1920s. Thus, infant mortality had rapidly declined and the health of the rural populace in general had enhanced<sup>52</sup>.

The size of the average kolkhoznik family had tapered to three or four members by 1960 and, as before, most families consisted of two generations<sup>53</sup>. As a consequence of the war and earlier tribulations, many widows lived in the countryside, who by the early 1960s had

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p.164. Compare to Kerblay, pp.333-341.

<sup>50</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.167.

<sup>51</sup>Pako, 147/5/36, ll.120/121.

<sup>52</sup>Chapman, p.132. She adds that the quality of healthcare itself was undoubtedly better in the towns than in the countryside (ibid., pp.136/137). The average life expectancy had also dramatically increased in the same period (ibid. p.131).

<sup>53</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, Tablitsa 6, p. 184.

reached the age of forty or older<sup>54</sup>. By then, young married couples were universally allowed to leave the parental home upon their wedding; nevertheless, it was expected that at least one son should stay at home to assist his parents<sup>55</sup>.

Even after roughly forty-five years of Soviet power, girls were fretting over their dowry, although land could no longer be part of it<sup>56</sup>. The importance of the dowry had diminished in the 1930s and 1940s<sup>57</sup>. In those decades, there had been nothing to save for a dot in the countryside on the whole, but the custom began to make a comeback in the 1950s. In Khrushchev's time, marriage was concluded for romantic reasons, and the husband and wife would often share the same level of education and interests<sup>58</sup>. Perhaps because of an enduring or renewed popularity in the 1950s, by the early 1960s the traditional rural wedding was the most prevalent way to celebrate nuptials, despite the rivalry of the so-called "Komsomol" wedding<sup>59</sup>. Weddings were held most frequently in wintertime, and the festivities spread out over several days.

On the surface, the figures on legal responsibility within the family indicate that patriarchal attitudes had changed<sup>60</sup>. In practice, men remained the head of a household almost everywhere, whenever

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<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p.185.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., pp.186/187.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p.193.

<sup>57</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.224/225. The authors maintain that, in the 1920s and 1930s, the level of material well-being was not high enough to save much for a dowry, but Altrichter points at a relatively high standard of living in the 1920s. It has been shown above how miserable the existence in the countryside was under Stalin, so that I have offered a slightly adjusted chronology for this phenomenon.

<sup>58</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.192.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp.227-231.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p.189.



they were present. In the age group above forty, more women headed the household, but younger kolkhozniks did not show themselves to be less traditional than their ancestors in the 1920s: in most families the male of the couple was still considered to be the ruler<sup>61</sup>. Husbands had sometimes taken over certain aspects of household work from their wives, such as hauling water from the village pump, or chopping wood for the stove, but the overwhelming bulk of it --cooking, cleaning, and washing-- remained part of women's domain<sup>62</sup>. This is no surprise, for a similarly unequal division of tasks can be found in many Western farmers' households today.

By 1960, childhood had become recognized as a distinct period of human development, and parents spent much attention, time, and energy on their children's education<sup>63</sup>. Still, at a young age children were often introduced to certain tasks in the household and on the private plot. The older ones were frequently obliged to take care of their younger sisters and brothers.

In the winter the work load diminished as much in the 1960s as it had in the 1920s<sup>64</sup>. The fate of women, however, was worse than that of men, as the former were understood to complete regular household tasks. Milkmaids and herders were allotted the worst position, since they had to tend the livestock early in the morning and again before going to bed. They hardly were able to see a movie or visit with friends or relatives. Around 1970, rural women, because of both their generally lower level of education and their busier lives, read far fewer papers

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p.189.

<sup>62</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.191.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., pp.202-204.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p.211/212.

and other literature, listened less to the radio, and watched less movies and television than rural males<sup>65</sup>. The lower the skills of an agricultural worker, the more she or he would have to moonlight on the private plot or with one's children<sup>66</sup>. Once more, so it seems, women were at a disadvantage, having less genuine leisure time.

Even by 1960, the traditional rural holidays still survived along side official Soviet holidays<sup>67</sup>. Superstitious ceremonies continued to be observed:

Sometimes when moving into a new house an old habit is observed: to push a cat or a rooster into the room as its first inhabitant. On the whole, mainly the elderly remember the significance of this magic act of the past, clearly intended to ward off danger from the people who lived there before, and the majority of the kolkhozniks perceives this tradition only as a good joke.<sup>68</sup>

Of the traditional religious rites, especially the burial was performed as before: the Psalter was read and prayers were intoned by older people<sup>69</sup>. Since most of the time priests could or would not be summoned to assist with a burial, older women --so-called "single nuns" (*monashki-odinokie*)-- filled in. This was done "in exchange for money," the Soviet source hastens to add in order to stress the vile nature of the devout<sup>70</sup>. The customs of remembering the dead in prayers at the cemetery and taking a meal at the gravestone were practised,

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<sup>65</sup>Arutjunjan, *La Structure...*, p.240, Tableau 51.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p.238, Tableau 49.

<sup>67</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.219.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., pp.220/221.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p.221.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., footnote 22, p.221.

but only by elderly women in the authors' opinion<sup>71</sup>. These researchers contradict themselves to a certain extent, as when they mention that, although most people did not observe the strict Orthodox rites anymore, many believed in the existence of a higher being or force who guides humanity<sup>72</sup>. Accordingly, Anokhina and Shmeleva warn against the survival of religion, and the harmful influence it could exert<sup>73</sup>. Interestingly enough, it seems that Old Believer communities had been more tenacious in preserving their beliefs after 1917 than the Russian Orthodox<sup>74</sup>. In some cases, the Soviet authorities seemed to have forsaken their battle to eradicate every remnant of the Orthodox past in the countryside: *maslenitsa* (Shrovetide), a traditional Russian holiday, had been renamed the Holiday of the Russian Winter, and thus continued to be celebrated<sup>75</sup>.

One obkom member gave a fair estimate at the eighth Party conference of the "survival" of certain religious and social habits in the countryside:

Along with the general religious holidays, and there are plenty on the old calendar, every village has its own patron saint's day and that's why today in one kolkhoz they celebrate the Feast of the Protection, in another Nikola, in the third Ekaterina, Georgii and so on. ...Moreover they celebrate, as a rule, several days on end. Thus, for example, in Olenino raion at the height of the flax deliveries, in the kolkhoz "Pamiat' Il'icha" in Pokrov, comrade Kirpichnikov and I discovered that the whole kolkhoz

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<sup>71</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.221. It is rather doubtful that only elderly women at the time were engaging in this, as today many Russians continue to observe this tradition.

<sup>72</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.314.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p.314.

<sup>74</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.269. It is unclear whether these communities managed to endure until the 1960s; it is, however, not unlikely, since they had a tradition of survival at times of persecution by the authorities.

<sup>75</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.306.

was carousing for six days on end. In the kolkhoz "Stalin" they were on their fourth day, and so on. Many kolkhoz chairs and secretaries of party organizations do not only not resist this, but are fully involved in these survivals. Religious holidays are not just some kind of abstract relic consigned to the past in the minds of the people --they are a serious obstacle to kolkhoz production.<sup>76</sup>

In a formal sense, the holidays in Khrushchev's time contained some new elements. They would commence with a meeting of the collective in which the results of professed socialist emulation were announced, the best workers complimented, those who had received orders or medals cited, and the leaders hailed<sup>77</sup>. Nevertheless, probably just as much as before, the main celebrations were spent drinking, dancing, eating, and the like.

Considering the fact that only about ten years prior people had still been half-starving in the countryside and fleeing by the thousands because of the wretched situation, it was certainly an exaggeration to propose that "...already long ago the former isolation of the village and the spiritual backwardness of the peasants have faded into the past."<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 11.122/123.

<sup>77</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.308.

<sup>78</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.345. Still, after Stalin's death the "smoldering resentment" of the kolkhoznik, about which Fainsod comments, had probably diminished, because of the increase in prices paid for agricultural produce (Fainsod, *How...*, p.442). Some of Khrushchev's reforms were not appreciated, such as the introduction of corn cultivation and a second round of amalgamation, but under Brezhnev the peasant would quietly begin to lead a more decent existence. Part of that would be the tacit acceptance by the authorities of a measure of freedom for the peasantry to pursue private efforts to augment their income. Gradually between 1953 and today, the very disadvantaged position of the Soviet peasant improved, although the peasantry has yet to reach a level of agricultural production that will guarantee the countries of the former Soviet Union a reliable basis for the nutrition of their population. The chasm between town and countryside remained gaping enough for most of the younger kolkhozniks to try to leave the collective farm or state farm for urban localities under Brezhnev (Kerblay, pp.249/250).

Despite social change and the improvement of the standard of living, under Khrushchev agriculture operated unsatisfactorily<sup>79</sup>. Among other things, mechanization was deemed to be still insufficient in 1960, particularly electrification, the labour shortage in the countryside continued, and too little attention was paid to specific local circumstances in planning. On January 1, 1959, only 29% of all kolkhozy in the oblast' had electricity<sup>80</sup>. Large tracts of kolkhoz lands often were half under water; in 1961 it was estimated that perhaps 25% of all arable land had turned into swamps<sup>81</sup>.

The level of mechanization in 1960 was almost 90% for grain harvesting, and 100% for the ploughing in autumn and spring; it was 72.5% for flax sowing, but for pulling flax only 30.5%, and for potato planting and gathering only 13.4% and 8.4% respectively<sup>82</sup>. Several aspects of agricultural work were still carried out manually, for instance the raking together of flax.

In flax cultivation, the harvest results remained markedly better in the traditional flax-growing areas of the east --in 1960 around 400 kilograms per hectare on average--, than in the western part of the oblast' --from 200 to 250 kilograms on average per hectare<sup>83</sup>.

Had the existence of the average kolkhoznik come to approach the life of the Soviet urban dweller in the early 1960s, as Marxism-

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<sup>79</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.531.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., p.535.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p.536.

<sup>82</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.535. A later source does not fully agree with these numbers and places them at a slightly higher level for certain areas around this time (Kalininskaja oblast' za 50 let..., p.63).

<sup>83</sup>Tsentral'nyi Raion, p.537.

Leninism had predicted<sup>84</sup>? The continued migration from the countryside after 1960, although perhaps partially caused by increased mechanization of farm work, seems to indicate otherwise. At least in the minds of many kolkhozniks, their lot was inferior to life in the towns, notwithstanding the fact that "...the press, radio, cinema, mail, telegraph, telephone connect any faraway village with the whole country, bringing daily the latest news."<sup>85</sup>

This impression is confirmed by Arutiunian's research of the lives of the rural dwellers in the Kalinin oblast' around 1970. Widespread dissatisfaction was expressed by Arutiunian's respondents with both work and life in general in the countryside<sup>86</sup>. More than half of the unskilled manual labourers preferred to do other work. The number of field labourers, livestock workers, skilled manual workers, mechanics and machinery operators, and white-collar workers in the countryside of the Kalinin oblast' who desired to move to the towns was almost twice as large as in Krasnodar krai, where agriculture was flourishing in comparison<sup>87</sup>. Only among the rural intelligentsia was the proportion of those longing to settle in towns roughly equal for both territories. This does not mean that this more educated group was

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<sup>84</sup>This was one of the promises that were supposed to materialise in a socialist society (see Kerblay, p.231 and pp.273/274). Djilas remarked about it in 1957: "It was believed that the differences between cities and villages, between intellectual and physical labor, would slowly disappear; instead these differences have increased" (Djilas, The New Class, p.37). Although definitely the life of the peasantry had acquired some traits that were signs of a certain degree of urbanization of their existence, at the same time urban life had "ruralized" too, because of the enormous influx of peasants into the towns (see Gordon, Klopov, p.133).

<sup>85</sup>Anokhina, Shmeleva, p.345. The attraction of the towns led to the desertion of many of the villages in the Kalinin oblast after 1960 (Kerblay, p.249). In Brezhnev's time, 25% of peasants' households consisted of one person.

<sup>86</sup>Arutiunjan, La Structure..., Tableau 75, pp.320/321.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p.345.

satisfied with its existence in the countryside: between one in four and one in three of them wanted to relocate in the towns.

The family remained a stronghold of private life on which the Soviet regime had little encroached. It remained the most important formative element in the socialization of the rural, as well as the urban, child, although less so in the latter's case, because there were more diverse influential forces outside the realm of the family in the towns. According to Kerblay, the survival of the family had been the sole cause of the persistence of a redeeming morality in Soviet society, without which people would have turned into amoral creatures:

Tant que cette fragile frontière [between the authorities and the family] restera inviolée, nous pouvons espérer que la bonté, la compassion, la tolérance, ces valeurs qui donnent à une société des véritables caractéristiques humaines, ne s'éteindront pas.<sup>88</sup>

Perhaps the case of Pavlik Morozov proves Kerblay right: indeed, when the authorities had tried to destroy even the safe haven of the family, as they attempted in the 1930s, children had at times turned into unscrupulous monsters.

Therefore, in the final analysis, it may be argued that Soviet collective farmers remained quintessentially peasants even by the 1960s: the family household remained the central focus of their life; their culture was decidedly distinct from urban Soviet culture; they enjoyed little prestige or status within Soviet society; and the bulk of their output was procured by the authorities<sup>89</sup>. Similar to the existence

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<sup>88</sup>Kerblay, p.371.

<sup>89</sup>Compare to Jackson's definition (Jackson, p.273; see 1.5).

of the precollectivization Russian peasant, the kolkhoznik's life was fundamentally determined by an unrelenting preoccupation with agriculture. More than thirty years after the onset of collectivization, Soviet Communism had not changed the essential quality of the peasants' reality.

## IX.2 The End

Stalin's cult probably reached its apogee, if one is to judge from the evidence for the Kalinin oblast', at the Nineteenth Party Congress and the period directly after it. A sign of this were what some of the voters added in February 1953 to their voting ballots of the elections for the local soviets at that time<sup>90</sup>. It should be noticed that all such matter quoted here is from the raions of Kalinin town. This may give an exaggerated picture of the enthusiasm felt for Stalin. The wish of one person for "our father" to live on for many years did not come true. Another, one Drozdov, who apparently was unconcerned about the secrecy of his ballot, wrote a poem on it, and signed his name underneath:

February 22/I vote for you/for the beloved maker/friend and  
father Stalin  
For friend and father Stalin/the first fighter for peace/helmsman  
of communism/loved by all the world  
Loved by all the world/no other happiness for us/[than] STALIN  
in our town's soviet/more happiness does not exist!

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<sup>90</sup>Pako, 147/5/764, II.119-128.



More happiness does not exist/children sing about Stalin  
too/songs are sung everywhere on earth/Stalin hears all in the  
Kremlin

In the Kremlin Stalin hears all/he goes to all the lands/the people  
with Stalinist labour/build the house of communism

They build the house of communism/it is seen by all the  
world/for the beloved leader/our people will always go!

On the Sunday in February/all come to the election/that will be  
on a radiant day/and for our dearest Stalin we will put in the  
ballot.<sup>91</sup>

Doggerel such as this may have inspired Aleksandr Zinoviev<sup>92</sup>. The ballots carried no political weight whatsoever, but they were used to complain about certain wrongs, and it appears that, although Stalin's personal prestige had reached an all-time high in the Kalinin oblast', the quality of life for many people was still far from satisfactory<sup>93</sup>. Someone complained about the presence of a mere three public baths in the whole of Kalinin, with its population of 250,000! Others demanded that the tax on childless women(!) be abolished. One voter was bold enough to point out that thousands were living in "insufferable circumstances," which another one illustrated by writing that she, a

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<sup>91</sup>Pako, 147/5/764, I.124. In Russian it waxes much more jolly, as follows: "22 fevralia, golosuiu za tebia, za liubimogo tvortsa, druga Stalina otsa. Druga Stalina otsa, pervogo za mir bortsu, kommunizma rulevogo, vsemu miru dorogogo. Vsemu miru dorogogo, schast'iu net u nas drugogo, STALIN v nashem gorsovere, schast'iu bol'she net na svete! Schast'iu bol'she net na svete, poiut o Staline i deti, pesn' poiut na vsei zemle, Stalin slyshit vsekh v Kremle. Stalin slyshit vsekh v Kremle, khodit on po vsei zemle, narod Stalinskim trudom, stroit kommunizma dom. Stroit kommunizma dom, vsemu miru viden on, za liubimogo vozhdia, nash narod idet vseгда! V den' voskrenyi-fevralia, vse pridet na vybora, eto budet v svetlyi den', i za Stalina rodanogo my opustim biulleten."

<sup>92</sup>Compare to Aleksandr Zinoviev, The Yawning Heights, p.525 for example, or to the same author's, Gomo sovetikus. Moi dom-moia chuzhbina. Moskva: Proizvodstvenno-izdatel'skoe predpriiatie "KOR-INF", 1991, pp.101/102.

<sup>93</sup>Pako, 147/5/764, II.121-128. It did take courage and a certain independence of mind to write something critical on the ballot. Courage, because, for instance, one ballot in the Proletarskii raion, which was deemed to have anti-Soviet remarks, had been sent on to the MGB. In Novopromyshlennyi raion, the obkomburo was reported, 366 voters had written something on their ballots, 352 of whom had written something positive. Only fourteen had dared to write a complaint or criticism on the sheet. Nevertheless, it does surprise one to a certain extent that there were still people writing critical remarks on their voting forms.

widow, lived with her seven-year-old son and five others in a room of fourteen square meters, and had to sleep on the floor. Still another voter requested the construction of a water pump, and many more lambasted the absence of goods in the shops. One town dweller addressed candidate Kiselev directly, asking him to pay attention to the poor condition of the kolkhozy in the oblast'. On one form a voter had indicated his or her support for the abolition of serfdom in the collective farms!

While one voter requested paving and illumination for a street in town, another condemned the extra premium army officers received, which he wanted abolished, for he felt that their wives could thus afford to live as parasites and did not have to work. Here and there people scribbled anti-Semitic remarks on their ballots, but not to the extent that one can really discern a wave of anti-Semitism having taken hold of the oblast' on the basis of these ballots<sup>94</sup>.

Stalin's death was grieved by many in the Kalinin oblast', judging from the survey<sup>95</sup>. Many cried, and many were afraid of a future without

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<sup>94</sup>In the Zavolzhe raion, for example, four persons had entered an anti-semitic remark on their sheet, the worst of which was the request to banish all Jews to Kolyma, which not only is proof of an anti-Semitic attitude, but probably also of knowledge about the particular hardships suffered at the time in Kolyma (Pako, 147/5/764, 1.127).

<sup>95</sup>E.g. the testimony of G.V. Lubov, A.A. Kondrashov, T.A. Novikova, M.A. Golubeva, V.Ia. Semiachko, O.I. Bykova, V.I. Gaganova, V.F. Akimova, (Party members themselves or their spouses), A.V. Skobeieva, I.P. Metlin, A.E. Vakhmistrov, and E.V. Baranova in the survey. Kondrashov was still an unrepentant Party man in the summer of 1992: in different places he criticized both "Perestroika" and Khrushchev, and, to a lesser extent, Brezhnev, who used to hunt with his entourage in the Zavidovo raion. Instead of the Communist Party, which had been put on trial for its role in the coup of August 1991 and for other accusations, he wanted to see Gorbachev on trial (testimony of A.A. Kondrashov in the survey). Not surprisingly, Tiaglov, too, had little appreciation for some of Khrushchev's policies, in particular the sowing of corn, ordained in the later 1950s (testimony of I.I. Tiaglov in the survey). A.I. Ryzhakova was in Moscow at the time of Stalin's burial, and was almost crushed in the mêlée of mourners who tried to attend it (testimony of A.I. Ryzhakova in the survey). L.P. Felkova went to Moscow, when she heard that Stalin was gravely ill; she did not manage to see him lay in state (testimony of L.P. Felkova in the survey).

their beloved helmsman to lead them<sup>96</sup>. In the countryside the reaction was often different from the towns, perhaps because Stalin seemed

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<sup>96</sup>Testimony of G.V. Lubov and V.G. Gavrilo in the survey, for example; one dissenting testimony was that of Ninel' Sergeevna Smirnova, who hoped that the death of Stalin would lead to fundamental change. She realized that, after Khrushchev's ouster, her hopes had been in vain. The renewed repression of opposing voices under Brezhnev was brought home very clearly to her in 1972, when she was joined in the workplace, a print for children's literature, by two dissidents who had been exiled to Kalinin: Petr Iakir and Viktor Krasin. Smirnova, named after Lenin, had seen both her parents arrested in 1937 in Leningrad, had lived in an orphanage for children of "enemies of the people," but was in the end able to finish her studies at the polygraphic institute in Moscow in 1954, at the age of 32 (testimony of N.S. Smirnova in the survey). Her lack of enthusiasm for Stalin, to put it mildly, is understandable. Similarly, A.N. Nikolaev said that he began to hate Stalin after his father returned from the camps, after having served a ten-year term. He hoped for a renewal of life in Russia, when Stalin died (testimony of A.N. Nikolaev in the survey). The nostalgia for the orderly times among many of the respondents is rather curious (see Appendix I). It is not true that crime did not exist, as many maintained in the survey (testimony of A.V. Skobeleva, E.A. Golubev, V.G. Gavrilo, N.A. Smirnov, N.V. Kurganova, O.M. Riabova, N.A. Akhov in the survey). Although it might be correct that the incidence of theft perpetrated by fellow citizens was much less, one could argue that for the countryside at least the officially sanctioned theft by the state of the agricultural production of the peasants was far worse under Stalin than the "crime" of today. Not many, however, had come to this conclusion. The statement of N.V. Kurganova, that under Stalin old people were respected, is also rather suspect (testimony of N.V. Kurganova in the survey). One has to qualify again, and presume that she means respected by their fellow citizens, and not by the state, for the government did not find it necessary to provide a pension for the elderly in the countryside, where Kurganova lived. The frustration with the confused situation today made many of the respondents long for the days of certainty under Stalin. How strong the view of life, which they had acquired under Stalin, remained with some can perhaps be best understood in the light of the remarks of A.V. Zelentsev, a metal worker and sometimes welder of Vyshnii Volochek: "Thus after the war I had to be treated in hospital on several occasions,...all was free. And now even to receive a certificate [probably for a prescription] in the polyclinic, you have to pay money. They need to shoot them all!" (testimony of A.V. Zelentsev in the survey). Zelentsev was never a Party member. D.A. Volkogonov tried to explain Stalin's popularity, which he attributed to Stalin's skills as a politician, the successful portrayal as an faultless leader by propaganda, and the religious-political tradition of the Russian people (who always had believed in a superhuman Tsar, the representative of God on earth [a myth that was perhaps a consequence of the Byzantine tradition of caesaropapism]), as well as the general level of ignorance among the Soviet people (Volkogonov, *Kniga II*, chast' 2, pp.21/22 and p.35). A. Portelli gives a thought provoking interpretation for the allegiance of Italian Communist Party members to their leadership, which might apply to a certain extent, too, to the popularity of Stalin among the CPSU-membership and the Soviet population, even if they had suffered as a result of his policies: "The leadership plays, in uchronic tales, a role similar to that of mediators in Claude Levi-Strauss's structural interpretation of myths: two-faced creatures that hold together conflicting but equally necessary presuppositions. In this case, the contradiction - we, the makers of history, must be right, and yet history is wrong-- is explained through the agency of individuals who are *with* us and stand *for* us (in the party, which they represent) but are not *of* us (not members of the working class in terms of status, power, education, language, life-style, and sometimes income: as Androsciani says, *we* rent, *they*

more remote to the kolkhozniks<sup>97</sup>. In addition, his name was probably equated with the system that so ruthlessly exploited their labour. Propaganda had made less of an impression on the kolkhozniks than on the town dwellers. In the villages, the bombardment with Communist slogans was impaired by the absence of radios and newspapers, the lower level of literacy, and the rareness of visits by *agitprop* activists.

Approximately a week before Stalin's death the obkom met in full session to discuss the decisions of the Nineteenth Party Congress, Stalin's speech at the Congress, Stalin's recently published "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," and the improvement of the Party's supervision over the Komsomol<sup>98</sup>. The outstanding careerist Baranov was given the honour of opening the plenum. His vigilance would have pleased Stalin:

We are obliged to make sure that ideological work will not be conducted absentmindedly and passively, but with principle, and that it will be directed at the merciless struggle with

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own). The ambivalent, internal/external position of the leadership keeps it all in the family, and yet saves the family from guilt and blame. Allegiance to the party was not based (as outside critics often claimed) on a mythic faith in its infallibility, but rather on the ability to shift its failures to the sphere of myth." (Portelli, *The Death...*, p.114). Uchronia is a term used in science-fiction criticism meaning "...that amazing theme in which the author imagines what would have happened if a certain historical event had not taken place...", or the representation of "...an alternative present, a sort of parallel universe in which the different unfolding of a historical event had radically altered the universe as we know it..." (Portelli, *The Death...*, pp.99/100). Further: "The word itself is coined after "utopia," replacing the Greek *topos* (place) with *chronos* (time): utopia is a nowhere place, uchronia a "nowhen" event" (Portelli, *The Death...*, p.100).

<sup>97</sup>E.g. the testimony of P.N. Bashilova, who scolded Stalin and held him responsible for the terrible life she was living. Nevertheless, she seemed to have joined the kolkhoz in 1929 voluntarily (testimony of P.N. Bashilova in the survey). A.E. Malysheva remembered how she sang: "Thank you Stalin, you made me a lady, and I am a horse, too, and a bull, a peasant woman and a muzhik." (*"Spasibo, Stalinu, Sdelal iz menia baryniu, Ia-i loshad', ia-i byk, Ia-i baba, i-muzhik"*). She hoped that his death would bring the extraordinarily high taxes to an end (testimony of A.E. Malysheva).

<sup>98</sup>Pako, 147/5/659, 1.4.

bourgeois ideology and its penetration into our sciences, literature, art, and at the overcoming of the remnants of capitalism in the consciousness of the people, against loafers and lazybones, squanderers of public property, against bureaucrats, violators of state discipline and other sick phenomena in our life, against persons fawning upon the corrupted, reactionary bourgeois culture, the capitalist way of life, against nationalist and cosmopolitan perversions, against apoliticality and lack of ideas in literature, art, and the sciences. To attain this, all ideological work will be dedicated to the education of the Soviet people and, in particular, to that of the youth, [so that it] will become cultured and broadly educated, bright and firm, and, in the spirit of the communist attitude to labour and public property, of proletarian internationalism, and of dedication to the cause of communism, will not shirk its responsibilities.<sup>99</sup>

In April 1953, at the next obkom plenum, Kiselev spoke about a mood of decadence prevailing among certain groups of young people in Vyshnii Volochek, which had led to the suicides of students and young workers, including some Communists among the latter<sup>100</sup>. At this meeting six weeks after Stalin's death, in general little could be sensed of the recent changing of the guard in Moscow. The Party organization of the militsiia of Bezhetsk was criticized in the opening speech for accepting a man into their ranks, who had been excluded in 1937 for his ties with counterrevolutionary elements, and who had spent the entire war in German POW camps<sup>101</sup>.

The obkomburo showed itself to be thoroughly out of tune when, immediately after the demise of the Generalissimus, it tried to rename the Novopromyshlennyi raion of Kalinin as the "Stalin raion"<sup>102</sup>. This proposal was soon quietly shelved.

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<sup>99</sup>Ibid., I.7.

<sup>100</sup>Pako, 147/5/660, 1.93.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., II.10/11.

<sup>102</sup>Pako, 147/5/673, 1.47.

In Kalinin oblast', too, the partial amnesty for criminal convicts led to an increase in the level of crime in the oblast'<sup>103</sup>. Gerasimenko, state prosecutor for the Kalinin oblast', and Shkurin, the head of the oblast' militsiia, were fired for their insufficient activity with respect to fighting this rise of crime. MVD chief Grebchenko noticed, before the enlarged obkom plenum of July 1953, that the crime rate increased from month to month, acquiring a massive character, particularly in rural localities<sup>104</sup>. Whether this was solely the consequence of the amnesty for criminal convicts was not explained by the MVD boss. Another speaker at the same meeting, a factory director, did describe the emergence of a mood of fear among his workers to go alone to work at night, because some of them had been repeatedly mugged<sup>105</sup>.

In July 1953, an enlarged full session of the obkom convened to discuss the recent fall of Beria<sup>106</sup>. The discussion reveals that certainly at this moment the Party was still very much under the influence of the established paranoia about infiltration of enemies into its ranks<sup>107</sup>. However, the first mild criticism emerged here about exaggerated attention to the role of "heroes" in history teaching and in the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism, and a "cult of the

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<sup>103</sup>Pako, 147/5/662, 1.11. For this decree, see V.F. Nekrasov, "Final (Po materialam sudebnogo protsesssa)," in: *Beria: Konets kar'ery*. Moskva: Politizdat, 1991, pp.381-415, pp.404-406.

<sup>104</sup>Pako, 147/5/662, 1.80.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., 1.86.

<sup>106</sup>Pako, 147/5/662, 11.5-96. Apart from the obkom membership, the candidates and members of the gorkom of Kalinin were present, and 746 other Party *aktiv*.

<sup>107</sup>Baranov compared Beria to Trotsky and Zinoviev, and noticed that the Party's history was rather full of "adventurist" attempts of enemies on the Party and the Soviet people (Pako, 147/5/662, 1.21).

personality."<sup>108</sup> Beria, the meeting was told, had been a foreign agent from the time he started his political career in Baku<sup>109</sup>. According to the version the Kalinin elite heard, he had used the MVD for anti-Soviet activities against the Party and the government, and was responsible for the destruction of the intimate friendship of Molotov and Voroshilov with Stalin. Kiselev informed the audience that Stalin's wish to augment the material incentives for the kolkhozniks, by way of increasing procurement prices of potatoes and vegetables, had been repeatedly sabotaged by Beria. Beria had surreptitiously maintained contacts with the Yugoslav bandits Tito and Rankovic, as well.

Kiselev repeated Malenkov's demand for the genuine observance of a collective leadership within the Party at all levels of its hierarchy<sup>110</sup>. The Party, according to Kiselev, had lost control over the security organs' activities and did not know what they were involved in locally. The MVD had operated in certain areas almost fully independently from the Party: for example, in Kesova Gora raion, it had started to shadow the raikom secretaries, and organized a campaign of anonymous letters which slandered local Party workers<sup>111</sup>. MVD employees were accused of the standard abuse of engaging in drinking bouts<sup>112</sup>. The first Party secretary blamed the raikoms for allowing the

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<sup>108</sup>In the speech of the head of the Pedagogical Institute, Polianskii (Pako, 147/5/662, 11.33/34).

<sup>109</sup>Pako, 147/5/662, 11.6-8.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., 1.9-11.

<sup>111</sup>However, as the gorkom secretary of Vyshnii Volochek, Matveev, remarked, the obkomburo itself appointed and dismissed the local leaders of raion and town departments of the MVD without involving or explaining to the rai- and gorkoms about the reasons for these actions (Pako, 147/5/662, 1.29).

<sup>112</sup>Almost anyone who had fallen out of grace in the 1945-1953 period was accused of this (Vorontsov, Mezit, etc.).

abuses of the MVD, but he must have realized that this accusation was rather disingenuous, particularly after his description of the situation in Kesova Gora raion.

From the subsequent reactions to Kiselev's introductory speech at the plenum, it is clear that many of the participants did not want to dwell too much on the past abuses of the MVD<sup>113</sup>. Instead they described a few cases of laxity of the security organs with respect to crime after Stalin's death. This perhaps could then be attributed to the perfidious influence of the power-hungry imperialist agent at the head of the organs in Moscow. It would, at least for the time being, conveniently divert attention to the question of who had been Beria's promotor in the past. The desire to maintain things as they were can also be discerned in the attempts to put Beria in the category of other enemies of the people, such as Trotsky, Bukharin, and Zinoviev<sup>114</sup>.

In July 1953, the problems in industry in the oblast' were included in the discussions on the evil machinations of Beria and some of his followers in the security organs. More than one third of the enterprises in light, food, cooperative, local, and fuel industry systematically did not fulfill the state plans<sup>115</sup>. The rhythm of production in many enterprises was uneven, and the labour productivity, the quality of goods, and the savings on production costs remained below the established norms. Labour discipline, waste of fuel and electricity, and stoppages continued to plague industry. As was usual in

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<sup>113</sup>One example is the speech of the new MVD chief (Pako, 147/5/662, 11.78-80), another the remarks of factory director Alekhin (Pako, 147/5/662, 1.86). In this way, they foreshadowed the Brezhnevite silence about Stalin's crimes.

<sup>114</sup>By Baranov (Pako, 147/5/662, 1.21) and Polianskii (Pako, 147/5/662, 1.32) for example.

<sup>115</sup>Pako, 147/5/662, 1.12.



this period, construction and the repair of housing and public buildings experienced problems in complying with the plans. In Vyshnii Volochek, the textile industry was irregularly supplied with fuel and electricity, and wages to workers were paid after long delays<sup>116</sup>. In order to get an idea of the deprivations besetting urban dwellers, it is useful to point out that two years later, in 1955, a town resident in the oblast' received on the average 500 grams of meat per month, and scarcities occurred of butter, potatoes, and eggs<sup>117</sup>. It might very well be that this worrisome state of affairs, in fact, still meant an improvement over the choked supply in Stalinist years.

In October 1953, the obkom sat down to discuss the results of the recently held Central Committee plenum on agriculture<sup>118</sup>. Kiselev was still not beyond quoting Stalin in his opening report<sup>119</sup>. He then went on to dissect the sorrowful state of agriculture in the postwar Kalinin oblast'. This situation, of course, had to a large extent been caused by the agricultural policies of the Moscow leadership, especially with respect to the low prices for agricultural produce and taxation of private plots. Kiselev sketched the outstanding dilemmas in farming:

If in 1946 the kolkhozniks owned 175,700 cows of their own, then on January 1, 1953, they had only 108,800 heads, that is 38% less, and the number of kolkhoz households without cows increased from 84,800 to 136,300, which translates into 53.4%

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<sup>116</sup>Ibid., 1.31.

<sup>117</sup>Pako, 147/6/8, 1.123.

<sup>118</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.4ff.

<sup>119</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 11.9-11. Although Kiselev did not dare to make the obvious connection explicit in his speech. The level of investment by the state in agriculture rose by 41% in 1954 compared to the previous year (Iu. V. Arutiunian, "Osobennosti...", p.396). In the years 1951-1953, the capital investments in agriculture were around one fifth of the amount of capital investments in industry, while in the period 1954-1958 they amounted to around one third of those in industry.

of their total number. In the same period the number of hogs, personally owned by the kolkhozniks, fell almost twice, and of sheep almost three times.

Particularly strong was the decrease of private livestock in the raions of Vyshnii Volochek, Kushalino, Zavidovo, Bologoe, Nerl', and Kalinin; moreover in the Kalinin and Zavidovo raions, 75% of the kolkhozniks do not have cows.

These violations of the principle of the just balance between the socialist and personal interests of the kolkhozniks has become a main cause of the fall in number of kolkhoz households and of able-bodied kolkhozniks in many collective farms. Of course, if a kolkhoznik does not receive sufficient income for the *trudodni* and his personal interest in the private plot is also decreased, then he will find the easy way out --he leaves for the town and finds work in [industrial] production. This is especially characteristic for our oblast', where in the last four years the quantity of kolkhoz households fell by 10.7%, and the kolkhoz population by 23.4%, with the number of able-bodied kolkhozniks dropping by 29.5%.

One of the basic causes of the serious backwardness of a number of sectors of agriculture of vital importance is the fully inadequate use of the powerful technology that we have in agriculture. That does very much apply to us. In a majority of the MTS of our oblast' the performance of tractors and combines per shift is still very low; large stoppages of machinery occur; during the important periods of the agricultural year the time necessary to acquit of agricultural tasks [thus] increases. This leads to losses in the end, and an incomplete harvest of crops<sup>120</sup>.

In order to rectify matters, the prices paid in the procurement system for cattle and fowl had been multiplied 5.5 times, for potatoes 2.5 times, for vegetables by an average of 25% to 40%, and for milk and meat twice<sup>121</sup>. The obligatory deliveries to the state of livestock produce for kolkhozniks, workers, and employees with a plot had been "significantly" decreased, as well as the norms for the delivery by

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<sup>120</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.11.

<sup>121</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.13; also V.V. Zhuravlev(ed.), XX S'ezd..., p.109.

collective farms of potatoes and vegetables<sup>122</sup>. In this way, kolkhozy in their entirety and individual kolkhozniks had been given the possibility to keep more of their production. They could vend it for higher prices to the state, consumers' organizations, or at the kolkhoz markets.

Between 1950 and 1953, the absolute number had decreased of all livestock, except horses, while the annual output of cows' milk, sheeps' wool, and chickens' eggs had plummeted drastically<sup>123</sup>. Up to September 1953, the number of cows had dropped further<sup>124</sup>. The cause of the fall in livestock numbers was determined by Kiselev as a lack of supervision by the responsible authorities, poor work by agricultural specialists, and a bored attitude of kolkhoz chairs<sup>125</sup>. This brought about an extremely high level of infertility among cows, ewes, and sows in recent years, as well as a steep mortality of sucklings<sup>126</sup>. Whoever was guilty, nature or man, there was a chronic shortage of fodder for the animals. Kiselev proposed, in October 1953, intensified campaigns for drainage and cleaning of potential meadows and

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<sup>122</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.13. This "significant" is not further specified. Most of the taxation of the private plot had been by way of obligatory delivery to the state of part of the produce (meat, milk, eggs) that plot and livestock yielded (as was noticed by M.M. Kozenkova-Pavlova; testimony of M.M. Kozenkova-Pavlova in the survey). On the taxation of the plot and animals, see Fainsod, *How...*, pp.454/455.

<sup>123</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.18. See Tables 16 and 17. In 1949, one cow produced on average annually 1,139 litres of milk; one sheep 1,640 grams of wool; and one chicken forty-six eggs. In 1952, these numbers were respectively 890 litres; 1,300 grams; and twenty-eight eggs.

<sup>124</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.18. More cows died in the first eight months of 1953 than in the same period of 1952 (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.20).

<sup>125</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.19.

<sup>126</sup>In 1949, per 100 cows 89 calves had been born; in 1950, 80; in 1951, 68; in 1952, 71; and in 8 months of 1953, 68; for sows and piglets these numbers were 1,368 in 1949; 1,000 in 1950; 737 in 1951; 830 in 1952; and for 8 months of 1953 713; for sheep and lambs 164 in 1949; 130 in 1950; 99 in 1951; 118 in 1952, and for 8 months of 1953, 80. In the years 1951 and 1952 the kolkhozy lost every fifth calf, every sixth piglet, and every third lamb that was born.

hayfields; corn (maize) had already been brought to his attention as a possible fodder crop<sup>127</sup>. Other causes of the decrease of the herds were noted by Kiselev as well, including a paucity of cattle barns and stables, habitually mentioned in the postwar period, and the vending of cattle for internal kolkhoz needs (in other words to feed the kolkhozniks or to let them earn a little by the sale)<sup>128</sup>.

Meanwhile, the sovkhozy had managed slightly better, but their profitability had been hindered by the high production costs of meat and wool<sup>129</sup>. The state farms have been almost invisible in the previous account, and for good reason: there were merely forty-four sovkhozy by 1953 in the oblast<sup>130</sup>. They owned about 2% of all bovines, 1.7% of all cows, 14% of all pigs, 0% of sheep, and 1.7% of all horses in the oblast<sup>131</sup>. One of them, the "Molotov" sovkhov of the Torzhok raion, that was supposedly a phenomenal success, was the subject of a book published in 1952<sup>132</sup>. Besides their role as agricultural producers, the few sovkhozy had a very specific task from the beginning of collectivization. They were supposed to serve as a shining example of socialist agricultural production for the kolkhozy<sup>133</sup>. As was noticed in the 1970s by a Soviet publication, a large amount of material on advanced farms was published around 1950, in an effort to stimulate

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<sup>127</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, II.20-22. The introduction of both corn and sugar beets was a failure in the Kalinin oblast' (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnym...", p.191; Leonid Ivanov, "Snova...", pp.202/203).

<sup>128</sup>More than 20% of the total amount of livestock (excluding horses or fowl) was "consumed" by the collective farmers in 1952 (Pako, 147/5/663, I.20).

<sup>129</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, I.29.

<sup>130</sup>Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., p.54.

<sup>131</sup>When comparing the numbers of Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., p.55 and Pako, 147/5/663, I.17.

<sup>132</sup>B.A. Trudoliubov, Sovkhov imeni Molotova. Moskva, 1952.

<sup>133</sup>Trudoliubov, p.3.

agricultural production<sup>134</sup>. The book on the "Molotov" sovkhos was apparently part of this avalanche of propagandistic material. As even the Soviet historians of the 1970s had to admit, these works did not show the complexities of the reconstruction period, and described the agricultural situation by basing themselves on the achievements of a few successful farms<sup>135</sup>. One suspects that the Stakhanov method of exaggeration might have been operating as well.

Notwithstanding better remuneration, the socialist livestock in the oblast' was still mired in a pitiful state by 1956<sup>136</sup>. According to the first secretary of the obkom, Goriachev, the number of sheep in the oblast' had fallen by almost 50% between 1951 and 1956<sup>137</sup>. Bovines and pigs were also not as plentiful as desired<sup>138</sup>. Many kolkhozy engaged in the unauthorized slaughtering of animals for their own fêtes. The solution to the problems in animal husbandry was sought, as usual, in a more intensive and competent supervision over the sector by the Party's representatives in the raions and on the collective farms<sup>139</sup>.

The procurement prices for flax had already been upgraded before Stalin's death<sup>140</sup>. This had led to better results in 1952 than in 1951,

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<sup>134</sup>Sovetskaiia derevnia..., p.5.

<sup>135</sup>Sovetskaiia derevnia..., p.7.

<sup>136</sup>Pako, 147/6/8, 1.123. In 1962, Leonid Ivanov noticed that many collective farms experienced shortages of fodder for their livestock (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", p.186).

<sup>137</sup>He stated that the T'ver' guberniia, in 1916, had 1,700,000 sheep; in 1937, 1,900,000; and on January 1, 1951, 545,000 heads of sheep were counted on the collective farms; in 1953, 500,000; and on January 1, 1956, 280,000 (Pako, 147/6/8, 1.123).

<sup>138</sup>Pako, 147/6/8, 11.123/124.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid., 11.124-127. By 1962, kolkhoz directors continued to complain about the oppressive regulations for their production plans by higher authorities (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", p.189). The regime persisted in looking at personal initiative with suspicion.

<sup>140</sup>In 1949 (Sovetskaiia derevnia..., p.270), and again on April 12, 1952 (Pako, 147/5/283, 1.249). The latter increase was by way of a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers, titled "*O merakh po pod'emiu i'novodstvu*". It seems that the authorities realized

but the flax yields were still smaller than in 1948 and 1949<sup>141</sup>. Kiselev noticed in October 1953 many different impediments hampering a superior result in flax cultivation. Some of them were undoubtedly due to the carelessness of kolkhoz chairs and kolkhozniks, others perhaps to a lack of expertise, to the coincidence of the labour in flax cultivation and harvesting with other agricultural tasks, and to the lack of farm hands for the labour-intensive cultivation of flax<sup>142</sup>.

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that the kolkhozniks would try to avoid flax cultivation as much as possible, if they would be paid as little for it as for grain. Because it was non-edible, the crop as such had less appeal than grain. Part of the latter could at least be used for personal consumption, be it legal or not.

<sup>141</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.30. The yield per hectare of flax fibre was in 1948 and 1949 on average between 235 and 237 kilograms, and in 1952, only 219 kilo's, while the yield of flax seed had decreased three times in 1952 in comparison with 1948 (compare to Table 16. The averages for 1948 and 1949 in the table are slightly higher, which probably has to do with the fact that the crop was measured "standing in the field."). Perhaps this is more proof for the higher competence of Vorontsov when compared to that of his immediate successors. The best results were in Bezhetsk raion in 1952, where 375 kilo per hectare had been collected, while in Orsha and Molodoi Tud raion the yields were less than 100 kilo's per hectare (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.31). The raion of Bezhetsk had by far outstripped the neighbouring raions of Kesova Gora, Krasnyi Kholm, and Kashin. On the whole, it seems that flax yields were low in the western raions (Emel'ianovo, Olenino, Turginovo, Vysoko, and Molodoi Tud for example), which probably was caused by the shortage of work hands in these areas. This particularly took its toll on flax harvesting, which was done predominantly by hand. In other western raions flax was sown far below the plan at spring sowing (Rzhev, Pogoreloe, Kirov, and Lukovnikovo raions) (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.32). The average yield of flax seeds in Udoml'ia and Vyshnii Volochek raions in the early 1960s hovered around 200 kilograms per hectare, which was similar to the yields of 1947-1949 for the whole of the oblast', but better than the average yields for the entire oblast' of 1950 and 1951 (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", p.196; compare to Table 16).

<sup>142</sup>Flax was often planted too late in spring, because the extent of ploughing in the autumn had apparently been insufficient (Pako, 147/5/663, 1.33/34). Problems were noticed with poor quality of seeds, the lack of use of available seed drills, and inadequate use of fertilizers. Lack of weeding was another detrimental factor for flax yields. Furthermore, flax was often harvested too late or the harvesting lasted too long, and as a result the flax was pulled during a protracted period. This led to a delay of threshing and laying out of the flax, and the loss of harvested plants due to rotting. Rotting also occurred when the flax was left too long in the field, or when it was not sufficiently quickly treated after harvesting. Flax cultivation remained a badly operating branch of agriculture until 1954, when procurement prices for the crop went up by 70% (Tsentralnyi Raion, p.219; for a description of the problems of flax cultivation, see also Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", p.196).

Grain growing had reached a grave state in 1953. The yields of oats, rye, and barley were low, and wheat was little cultivated<sup>143</sup>. Here, because of late reaping, much of the harvest was lost, in the same way as with flax<sup>144</sup>.

Similar to cereals and flax, the yields of potatoes and vegetables had waned in the early 1950s<sup>145</sup>. The potato and vegetable harvests were significantly lower in 1950, 1951, and 1952, than in 1940<sup>146</sup>. In 1952, the potato yield per hectare reached only 66% of the 1940 level. The deliveries to the state of vegetables and potatoes had simultaneously decreased, although proportionally less than the total harvest of the crops<sup>147</sup>. In October 1953, it was noticed that the low procurement prices, the exigent level of deliveries assigned to the kolkhozy in raions surrounding towns, and the higher delivery norms for advanced collective farms had caused the kolkhozy to lose interest in increasing production of these crops. The recent increase of

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<sup>143</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.37. Winter rye was in 1962 still the predominant crop in the north of the oblast' (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", p.190).

<sup>144</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.38. This also shows how false the method was of measuring the harvest, while the crops were still standing in the field, which was practised under Stalin. The prospective harvest was always much higher than the actual harvest, and the state deliveries assigned were consequently often far too high for the collective farms (see Sovetskaya Derevnia..., pp.233/234).

<sup>145</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.40.

<sup>146</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.41. In 1952, a slightly better year for potato growing than the previous two years, the total potato harvest of the oblast' amounted to 59.2% of the result in 1940. In the four raions of Kalinin, Vyshnii Volochek, Bezhetsk, and Rzhev, the vegetable harvest was between 13.8 (Rzhev raion) to 54.8% (Kalinin raion) of the 1940 level. These raions had a large share in the cultivation of potatoes and vegetables, due to their proximity to towns, which had a high demand for such crops.

<sup>147</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 11.42/43. In 1940, 21.5% of the oblast' potato harvest was delivered to the state; in 1950, 23%; in 1951, 26%; and in 1952, 22%. For vegetables the proportion for 1940 is unknown, because the total vegetable harvest in 1940 seemed to be unknown, but the deliveries to the state in 1940 had been less than in 1950 and 1951. In 1950, 49% of the total vegetable harvest was procured by the state, in 1951, 79% and in 1952, 96%[!].

procurement prices, the lowering of delivery norms, and certain other benefits that had been awarded to kolkhozy especially involved in growing these crops, were all designed to provide a stimulus for the amplified cultivation of potatoes and vegetables. The lack of incentive was thought to have been key to the prolonged period of potato harvesting and resultant substantial loss<sup>148</sup>.

It is interesting to notice that the raikom secretary of Kimry raion in October 1953 pointed out that a decline of harvest yields at least for cereals and potatoes had begun already after 1937, in which year the results had been better than in 1940<sup>149</sup>.

In 1950, the level of mechanization of farm labour had hardly exceeded that of 1940: only 23.5% of ploughing, sowing, harvesting, threshing (of flax), haying, and siloing was done by the MTS<sup>150</sup>. Here, at least, some improvement was made in 1951 and 1952, when the level of mechanization rose to 35.9% and 43.2%, respectively. In most of the western raions, where the paucity of labour was the most pronounced, the level was higher than the provincial average<sup>151</sup>. Nevertheless, as Kiselev remarked in his concluding speech in October 1953, the time

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<sup>148</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 11.45/46.

<sup>149</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.137. He did not explain why it was that, in 1937, the results were so much better, particularly with respect to grain (in 1937, on average 1,300 kilograms of grain; in 1940, 1,050; in 1952, 620 per hectare), than in 1940. Perhaps the cause can be seen in the somewhat larger number of non-collectivized farmsteads in 1937, but it seems more likely that the relative abundance of work hands in comparison with the post-1945 period may have been the main reason. It remains a matter of pure speculation how much the Great Purge caused the drop between 1937 and 1940. It could be that the Purge induced in fact the exceptionally good harvest of 1937, since everyone was working as hard as possible in order to avoid any suspicion of shirking from one's tasks and thus become subject to the terrible sanctions applied in that year. As well, it is not to be discounted that the secretary simply lied about the good prewar harvests.

<sup>150</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.49. See VIII.3 as well.

<sup>151</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.50; that is, in the Vysoko, Zubisov, Lukovnikovo, Molodoi Tud, Olenino, and Rzhev raions.



when the collective farm could do without horses was still far off<sup>152</sup>. Meanwhile, the MTS were struggling to keep their tractor operators: in the early 1950s, more than 6,000 of them abandoned the stations and many found employment in industry and construction<sup>153</sup>. An ambitious three-year plan was announced in October 1953, for the construction of garages, repair shops, storages, public baths (none of the MTS had these in 1953!), and houses on the MTS<sup>154</sup>. It is likely that this plan was to be, as with most Soviet plans, far from effectuated. This explains why the MTS were finally abolished in 1958<sup>155</sup>. Many of the 101 stations had a staff which was only minimally qualified: twenty-seven directors had less than seven years of general education, fifty-eight of the main engineers had only been trained by way of special courses, a slim 37% of the head agronomists had profited from higher education<sup>156</sup>.

In the autumn of 1953, only 256 out of 1,913 kolkhozy were supplied with electricity, and only twenty-nine of the forty-three sovkhozy<sup>157</sup>. The education of kolkhoz chairs remained deficient, partially because there was only a small pool from which to choose them<sup>158</sup>. As before, many of the kolkhoz lands were utilized for purposes other than the socialized agriculture for which they had been intended<sup>159</sup>. The practice of dispatching plenipotentiaries into the countryside, for which Vorontsov in 1949 had been criticized, was still

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<sup>152</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.194.

<sup>153</sup>Ibid., 1.51.

<sup>154</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.54. One is rather startled by the primitive situation in which the stations still seemed to have been in 1953.

<sup>155</sup>Zel'min *Obshchestvenno...*, p.226; Zhuravlev, *XX s'ezd KPSS...*, pp.125/126.

<sup>156</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.56.

<sup>157</sup>Ibid., 1.54/55.

<sup>158</sup>Ibid., 1.59.

<sup>159</sup>Ibid., 1.63.

common among many raikoms<sup>160</sup>. These plenipotentiaries had broad authority to coax the kolkhozy to deliver their obligatory assignments on schedule. Kiselev had to admit in 1953 that they often lacked adequate qualifications and expertise to advise and assist the collective farm staff to improve their output. It seems safe to conclude that their methods to have the delivery plan fulfilled were mainly those of threats and bullying.

It is beyond doubt that the reforms of September and October 1953 led to an enhancement of the kolkhozniks' work attitude, as was apparently directly noticeable<sup>161</sup>. However, the farming results continued to dismay the Kalinin Party organization, although the remuneration of the kolkhozniks steadily upgraded in the succeeding years<sup>162</sup>. Meanwhile, more restrictions were imposed on the private plot for certain categories of rural and urban dwellers<sup>163</sup>. The kolkhozniks who worked the legal minimum of *trudodni* in 1956 became

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<sup>160</sup>Ibid., 1.65/66. The dispatch of plenipotentiaries was criticized in a Soviet publication of 1978 as a hindrance to the development of "democracy" in the countryside in the immediate postwar period (Zelenin, *Obshchestvenno...*, p.13).

<sup>161</sup>Pako, 147/5/663, 1.118. See also Zhuravlev, *XX s'ezd...*, p.110. They also undoubtedly improved the material well-being of the kolkhozy, as Abramov describes (Abramov, pp.67-69). In 1958, the kolkhozes' income came as before mainly from flax (49% of the total), and strong horned cattle --particularly dairy farming-- (31%) sales (*Tsentrallyi Raion*, p.534). However, in 1955, after the increase of procurement prices after Stalin's death, the total income of all of the kolkhozy of the oblast' was 3.4 times as high as in 1950 (See Table 12). This, while the number of kolkhoz households had decreased in these five years by 33,900 (See Table 12)!

<sup>162</sup>Although the value of the *trudodni* was much higher in 1954 and 1955 (see above), the yield per hectare of grain, the milk production per cow (1,305 litres in 1955), and the production of meat in Torzhok raion were far below plan (Pako, 147/6/8, 1.80). It seems that the success of a collective farm, even in the 1960s, was determined by the availability of farm hands: the larger the labour force, the better the results (Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", p.192).

<sup>163</sup>In 1956, the elderly and single-person households were entitled to no more than 0.25 hectares, rural employees and blue-collar workers to a plot of 0.10 to 0.15 hectares, and teachers to 0.25 hectares (Pako, 147/6/8, 1.88).

eligible for a two-week vacation paid according to the average of one's pay in *trudodni*<sup>164</sup>. Pregnant women at the same time were entitled to a two-month leave. Yet in 1956, horse ploughs were distributed to the collective farms, which indicates the persistence of a low level of mechanization<sup>165</sup>. As a result of the continuation of the "cultural backwardness" (absence of electricity, goods, more sophisticated forms of entertainment) of the collective farms, the low and irregular wages --that remained dependent on farming results in the final analysis--, and the exceptional length of the workday in the countryside compared to that in the towns, the youth continued to move to urban areas in the 1960s<sup>166</sup>.

The first more serious attempt to expose Stalin's orchestration of the many crimes committed against the Soviet population took place in 1956, when Khrushchev took the initiative at the Twentieth Party Congress to deliver a speech on "the cult of the personality"<sup>167</sup>. Several analysts in the West have pointed to the rather dangerous consequences for the regime that were inherent in the delivery of this speech<sup>168</sup>. Khrushchev tried to convince his audience that the mistakes started with the murder of Kirov and that Stalin's crimes had been unable to

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<sup>164</sup>Pako, 147/6/8, 1.88.

<sup>165</sup>Ibid., 1.122.

<sup>166</sup>Leonid Ivanov, "V rodnykh...", p.200; and Leonid Ivanov, "Litsom...", pp.208/209, p.215, p.217 and p.221.

<sup>167</sup>The lead up to this speech and its rather half-baked contents are discussed in a recent publication: Zhuravlev *XX s'ezd* ..., in particular pp. 37-46.

<sup>168</sup>E.g. Djilas: "Feeling itself sufficiently strong to destroy the cult of its creator, or the creator of the system --Stalin-- it simultaneously gave the death blow to its own ideal basis" (Djilas, *The New Class*, p.161); Malia: "...partial recognition of the truth only undermined the system" (Malia, p.90); Odom: "According to totalitarianism's internal logic, the dictator has to sustain a bloody domestic struggle to keep power highly centralized-- *or to risk letting the system decay and eventually collapse* [Odom's italics]" (Odom, p.102).

shake the firm socialist basis of the Soviet state. Although he perhaps managed to persuade himself and some of his listeners that this had been the case, it is obvious from the immediate reactions to the speech in the Kalinin oblast' that the faith of several dedicated Communists and Party sympathizers was shaken to its foundations. In Bologoe, on April 8, 1956, "hooligans" foreshadowed the events of the post-August 1991 USSR by damaging the sculpture of Stalin in one of the town's public gardens<sup>169</sup>.

The speech was read in full or in part to a fairly large audience: in Bologoe, for instance, on April 11, 1956, 159 of the 166 primary Party organizations listened to a reading of the speech, with a combined audience of 2,337 of the 3,108 Party members and candidates<sup>170</sup>. Another 5,500 non-Party members in the town and surrounding raion were also treated to a reading of the speech.

The questions that arose after the reading in the localities of the Kalinin oblast' show both the perplexity among some of the listeners, and the perception of others that Khrushchev's position about the beginning of Stalin's crimes in December 1934 was untenable. Others wondered why Khrushchev and his colleagues had allowed the crimes to happen. Some uttered the usual complaints about the inadequate housing situation, the high prices, and the absence of goods in the shops<sup>171</sup>. Here are some of the questions raised about the cause of the "cult" and its manifestation:

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<sup>169</sup>Pako, 147/5/662, 1.3.

<sup>170</sup>Pako, 147/6/50, II.1-3. The town of Bologoe had about 22,000 inhabitants at the time (see Table 3).

<sup>171</sup>Pako, 147/6/50, II.6, 8, 36.

...What was the aim of the investigations, of the execution of the old Bolsheviks and even of regular partyless people in 1937, because after all at the time the NKVD organs were led by Ezhov, and not by Beria?

...How do matters stand with the names of towns, enterprises, institutions, and kolkhozy which have been named after Stalin?

...Why did the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union not stand up and talk about Stalin's mistakes at the Nineteenth Party Congress?

...What happened to Ezhov?

...Why did only Postyshev have the courage to stand up openly?

...Why does comrade Malenkov remain in the leadership?

...How are the documents preserved about comrades Kedrov, Eikhe, and others? [Something that the Western researcher of today still would like to find out.]

...Will Stalin remain in the Mausoleum?

...Was Stalin really near Rzhev [in the war]?

...How many wives did Stalin have and who were they?

...Why did comrade Khrushchev state, in his conversation with Tito, that "we will not allow the debunking of Stalin," and a short while later he comes out with a report which debunks Stalin? Where is the logic here?

...Why expose this all to the people, better only to have the Central Committee members know it, as now they will say abroad that we do not have unity in the party, no collectivity, what is all this supposed to show?

...Why did Molotov, knowing the true "face" of Stalin, cry at his funeral?

...Why was it difficult for the members of the Politburo to speak out against the cult of the personality of Stalin before Stalin's death? After all, a communist should not be afraid.

...Will it be justified to consider Stalin an enemy of the people?

...Did Stalin exaggerate in respect to the collective farm system?

...What was Stalin's attitude towards Jews?

...Who turned Stalin into a superman?<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>172</sup>Ibid., II.1-3, 6, 8, 18/19. The question on the continued presence of Malenkov among the Party leaders indicates that perhaps Khrushchev's success in the political struggle with

These questions were still rather timid in comparison with some of the conclusions others made after listening to the speech. In Kalinin at the discussions after the reading of the speech, some of the Communists and non-Communists drew the "wrongful" conclusion by accusing the complete Central Committee of involvement in the "cult."<sup>173</sup> One teacher told his colleagues that one should not believe in Soviet power. Another person came to the defense of Stalin by accusing Stalin's comrades in arms of participation in and responsibility for the mistakes made during the "cult."<sup>174</sup> He added to this, rather perceptively, that Khrushchev and Bulganin were also engaging in a "cult" of their own, if one was treated in the cinema to an account of their trips to India, Burma, and Afghanistan.

It would still be a long while before the Russians were allowed to become acquainted with the real extent of Stalin's crimes, the involvement of his cronies, and the political blunders committed between 1929 and 1953. When finally a genuine effort was made in the Soviet Union to come to terms with its history, the system created under Lenin and Stalin, and the Party that had been its guiding light, both collapsed almost immediately.

Perhaps the remarks of the ninety-six year old P.A. Samarova, a former weaver of the kombinat "Proletarka", who had begun her work at this factory in 1908, when it was still known as the Morozov factory, provide a fitting illustration of the fatalistic attitude acquired by many Russians as a result of all the upheavals:

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the other Stalinist leaders was aided by the speech, which was a possible motive for its delivery.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid., I.19.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid., I.39.

I began my life still under the tsar-little father. They say, that life was better then. But I say: for a working person it was also hard to live then. When my husband died [in 1932], good people fed us as if we were orphans. There were more good people then.

I saw the tsar, he came to Tver': reddish, in a soldiers' gray coat, silent. Under the tsar, life for a working person was bad. I remember our factory owners: Ivan Abramovich Morozov and his strict mother Varvara Alekseevna: she was an almsgiver and built a workers' club.

I had to work both under this, and under the other system. Now they start to build some sort of third kind of life.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>175</sup>Testimony of P.A. Samarova in the survey; N.A. Zabelin also saw the Tsar in Tver' in 1915 (testimony of N.A. Zabelin in the survey). Army officer V.Ia. Semiachko echoed these feelings when he quoted his grandfather K.N. Semiachko on the difference between Imperial Russia and the USSR: "Rascals and drunks were neither strong men under the tsar, nor under the Bolsheviks. No one will be equal nor can be so" (testimony of V.Ia. Semiachko in the survey). Another person who could compare was A.G. Murtsovkina (1903), who felt that in 1917 serfdom had been reintroduced. She worked as a "girl Friday", doing odd jobs, much of which was loading and unloading of heavy cargoes, brought by the boats that arrived along the Volga, for instance. She was of the opinion that everything had been better under the Tsar (testimony of A.S. Murtsovkina in the survey). The nostalgia of some people for Stalin's period is surprising. It might indicate the enduring success of the propaganda of the time with some, as in the case of E.V. Baranova, who plainly repeated in the summer of 1992 what used to be written in the paper, said on the radio, and in meetings under Stalin: "When remembering my life, especially in the period from 1945 to 1953, I am of the opinion that then the socialist system was beneficial and satisfactory and life improved with every day" (testimony of E.V. Baranova in the survey). Baranova had never been a Party member.

## CONCLUSION

A very disturbing picture of Soviet life under Stalin emerges from the analysis of the archival material and the many respondents' answers to the survey's questions. Not unexpectedly, there seems no reason to challenge the extremely negative image of the Soviet society between 1929 and 1953 presented by Western specialists (Robert Conquest and Merle Fainsod, in particular), by Soviet dissidents (Roy Medvedev and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn), and, in recent years, by Soviet historians such as V.P. Danilov, I.M. Volkov, A.M. Samsonov, and V.S. Lel'chuk. The first two groups had much less freedom to gather information than the present author enjoyed during 1991 and 1992. Nevertheless, they arrived at an accurate depiction of certain aspects of the horror that was life under Stalin.

Stalin unleashed an extraordinary slew of measures designed to confine or destroy national traditions, and Russians were particularly affected. Collectivization was succeeded by the repressions of the second half of the 1930s, followed by the hardships of the Second World War and the scarcities of the postwar period. Yet the Russian *kolkhoznik* remained essentially a peasant, and the fate of the Russian factory worker under Stalin had not improved over that of his forebears under the Tsars. In an economic sense, Communist achievements were negligible, although their curtailing of freedom (social, economic, political) dwarfed the comparatively superficial control of the *narod* by tsarist bureaucracy.

It appears paradoxical that the Communists' attempted destruction of Russian traditional culture was unable to eradicate



quintessential "remnants of the past." The Russian attitude towards property or the family did not change in any radical way: the peasantry dedicated itself to the cultivation of the private plots; the workers were interested in higher wages, enhanced benefits, and more decent housing. Education was seen as a means to abandon the squalor of life on the collective farm or in the factories. The workers and peasants, in the name of whom the Communists ruled, tried to escape their supposedly superior existence.

After the failed *Velikii Perelom* of the First Five Year Plan, Communists resigned themselves to tolerating some engrained Russian traditions. Owing to threatening economic chaos, they were forced to acknowledge, for example, that it was impossible to eradicate private property and the instinct for personal gain: hence the survival of private plots, hence the enticement offered to the Stakhanovites.

Officially, Soviet citizens were infused with a strong sense of "socialist responsibility." In practice, the Russians made a very clear delineation between public and private property. The first was largely neglected, the second remained utterly precious to them. Despite the tradition of the village commune, the Russian peasant held on to his own possessions with tenacity.

How did this affect the time honoured redistribution of land within the village? It transpires that the Russian peasants were not so much attached to the ownership of a particular plot of land, for the consolidation of rural strips during the 1920s was not met with any perceptible resistance: from the peasant point of view, it was important that each was entitled to the use of an amount of land

consistent with their personal household needs. This land was cultivated by the combined efforts of the household members.

The Communists showed that they had failed to understand this essential quality of the existence of the Russian peasantry when they embarked on the path of all-out collectivization. Stalin and the Communists were under the impression that land or cattle were considered communal property within the village, perhaps partially basing themselves on an erroneous reading of the traditions of the *mir*. A relatively smooth and speedy transition was expected from private to collective farming. Collective farming, however, only gained acceptance over a long period of time, and has never achieved the point at which the private plot could be abandoned.

Nevertheless, traditional Russian life endured enormous changes in recent history. Some of these changes, however, resulted from developments which had commenced long before 1917.

When industrialization first began in the Tver' guberniia during the 1850s and Emancipation allowed the peasantry a degree of free movement, traditional Russian society gradually started to disintegrate as a result. The province's environment was not very conducive to agriculture because of geographical location, poor soil conditions, and frequently overabundant rainfall. Before 1929, the countryside, home to the vast majority of the population, was overpopulated. For that reason many peasants were forced to take up employment on the side, some permanently abandoning farming. Meanwhile, notwithstanding the adverse conditions, most of the peasantry continued to till the soil.

Until 1929, peasant attitudes remained predominantly "pre-modern": they did not elect farming out of a motive for profit, but were interested in safeguarding a level of existence sufficient to answer their basic needs. The idea of producing a surplus which could be sold off on the market seemed largely alien to them.

Therefore, Stolypin's reforms introduced in 1906, that offered capitalist incentives to the peasantry, did not have much of an effect in Tver' guberniia. In the 1917-1920 period, peasants were able to supplement their holdings with the lands of the formerly propertied groups in the countryside. For the peasants, this was the fulfillment of a long-awaited aspiration, as opposed to the consolidation of their plots or the individualization of their farms at which Stolypin's reforms had aimed.

The initial enthusiasm for the New Regime in November 1917 that the Decree on Land had generated quickly evaporated. Grain confiscations led finally to peasants' revolts and the assassination of the authorities' representatives, as in Vyshnii Volochek *uezd*, forcing the Bolshevik regime to reverse its policy and enabling the peasants to resume momentarily the routines of life before 1914.

Meanwhile in the towns, industrial production had decreased during the Civil War. The industrial labour force dwindled as a consequence of factory workers' service in the Red Army or of their return to the ancestral village, while the spread of fatal epidemics diminished the urban population even further.

To a large extent, the advent of NEP meant a return to the pre-World War I situation. An uneasy symbiosis developed in the 1920s between traditional life in the countryside (where 85% of the

population lived) and the ideologized culture of the New Regime, its influence mainly limited to the towns. The contacts between town and country assumed an almost exclusively economic quality. Because of the cautious policy of NEP, a certain level of prosperity in the countryside was achieved, and gradually even industry began to surpass the pre-1914 level. As before 1914, some peasants joined the work force in the towns because a decent livelihood in agriculture was denied to some as a result of overpopulation.

In 1929 and 1930, the Bolsheviks launched a full-scale attack on the peasants' culture and spirit, as well as on what remained of factory workers' independence. Peasants and workers were mobilized in the *Velikii Perelom* in a manner which harked back to the period of War Communism<sup>1</sup>. This time, the regime's motive for social transformation was not to gain a victory in war: rapid economic growth was deemed necessary in order to withstand imperialist attack, which was ever imminent.

At the same time, the authorities' patience had run out with the virtually non-Bolshevized way of life led by the body of society. The assault on traditional society appealed to certain people, some of whom saw a chance for a grandiose revenge for past wrongs inflicted by former exploiters. The latter, however, had become figments of myth rather than sociological reality. Their non-existence caused much suffering. The richer peasants, for example, were generally innocent of any so-called exploitation of the poor and landless peasants, as is exemplified by the fate of Mironov. Urban zealots participated in the

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<sup>1</sup>"...the First Five-Year Plan--which created a permanent, institutionalized War Communism" (Malia, p.89).

offensive, believing in the possible creation of a better world of socialism or communism through the application of ruthless methods.

The regime's power over its subjects grew exceptionally. This probably fueled the activists' conviction about the righteousness of their actions during collectivization. For them, life became distinctly better and gayer around the time of the Seventeenth Party Congress of 1934. The activists initially reaped benefits awarded by the regime for faithfully executing measures ordained from above.

Meanwhile, society shunned cultural non-conformism of any kind, socialist realism being substituted for the experimental efforts of the 1920s. The values and customs that became the norm among the new elite were those of the dilettante, Stalin providing the most outstanding example. The imposition of this culture was a success among the new elite, for its members were generally little educated, usually wholly unsophisticated, and quite intolerant of dissenting behaviour. Zhdanov, Pospelov, Kalinin at the top of the hierarchy, Boitsov, Vorontsov, Parfenov and others at the provincial level --all of whom had lived for long stretches of time in Tver' guberniia/Kalinin oblast'-- were prototypes of this society of *parvenus*.

The regime paused briefly in 1934 in order to assess the effects of the transformation and to account for the obvious failure of the First Five Year Plan. In Tver' guberniia, collectivization and industrialization had provoked a precipitous drop in agricultural productivity and an ancillary stagnation of the level of industrial output. The peasantry struggled desperately to escape the countryside. This exodus was checked by the introduction of the passport regime in late 1932. Five years later, the abominable agricultural situation would

be graphically described during the Great Purge by Mishnaevskii in partial self-accusation. His intention probably was to admit to the shortcomings honestly, thus preempting accusations of covering up the real situation, but this did not save him from arrest.

Stalin *cum suis* decided that success was crippled due to a failure to discipline people rigorously during the initial assault, and at least from early 1935 onwards the central leadership ordered a freshly intensified attack on the population. Boitsov' numbers of 1938 on arrests made in rural areas from 1935 to 1937 offer telling proof of this new offensive. The culmination came in 1937-1938, when it was made clear that everyone was liable for arrest if suspected of independent ideas or tainted by disreputable background or connections. The attrition rate within the Party was astounding during 1937 and 1938. As a result of the Great Purge, in the Party's obkom of December 1938, virtually no one remained from the group of leaders elected to the obkom in June 1937. The NKVD had repeatedly hauled off throngs of obkom members who had served briefly in the provincial leadership during the eighteen months since June 1937. The cruel accusation of Mikhailov, who had allegedly been preparing for a "feudal revolt," is but one example of the cynicism of Stalin's henchmen and of the Great Leader himself, a cruelty which found its clearest expression through the *Ezhovshchina*.

Arrests comprised a standard feature throughout the 1930s, judging by the evidence on the Kalinin oblast'. The apprehension of victims during 1937 and 1938 stood out in relief, because society's more vocal proponents, the Communist elite, were prime targets as well. Psychologically, the *Ezhovshchina* was a triumph for the regime.

After the war, those years served as a grim reminder to anyone who briefly entertained critical ideas about the leadership and its watchdogs, the MGB-MVD. The threat of arrest was always present in the collective conscience<sup>2</sup>.

Before the war, it is likely that the vast number of victims (those imprisoned, exiled, sent to labour camps, or executed outright) in the Tver' province were a result of the collectivization in the 1929-1933 period, followed by those of the years 1937 and 1938, but even in the period between 1934 and 1937 thousands were arrested.

Tentatively, for lack of conclusive evidence --demographic and otherwise--, it might be proposed that the greatest number of "Unnatural Deaths" (around 300,000 out of a population of approximately two million) sustained by the Kalinin oblast' between 1929 and 1953 was formed by those who perished during the Second World War<sup>3</sup>. The continuous redrawing of administrative boundaries of the Tver' province, the partial loss of Party archives during their evacuation to Tiumen, the lack of a reliable census between 1926 and 1959, as well as the perpetual emigration of people from the territory of the oblast'-guberniia, render it impossible to furnish definitive numbers on the relative influence of collectivization, purges,

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<sup>2</sup>Compare to the more specific effect on Soviet society of the existence of the Gulag Archipelago in the opinion of Solzhenitsyn (Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag*. III-IV, pp.632-653). Zubkova's facile conclusions about the population's mood during the postwar period in two recent articles are hardly worth consideration, since they are extremely simplistic and seem to be based on common-sense inferences about human behaviour in general, hindsight, and a limited and eclectic use of sources, which are not accounted for by references (Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia... (1945-1946)," p. 14; and Zubkova, "Obshchestvennaia... (1948-1952)," p.88).

<sup>3</sup>The war was responsible for casualties in the Kalinin oblast' whose number might have surpassed that of the whole of Great Britain (260,000) in World War II (see Walter Laqueur, *Europe since Hitler: The Rebirth of Europe*. Revised edition, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984 (3), p.15).

migration, famine, and war on the province's enormous human loss after 1928. It can only be hoped that full access to essential archives in Russia will produce more reliable numbers on the extent of the slaughter.

For now, Zemskov's, Rittersporn's, Tsaplin's, Sokolov's, Krivosheev's, Volkogonov's, Poliakov's, and others' estimates for the number of inmates in the GULag and the resultant deaths of the purges, collectivization, or the war, remain doubtful. All of these writers base their calculations on a limited amount of sources (those of the TsGAOR or TsGANKH, the Smolensk archive, selective readings of Party and military archives), which are not conclusive. Their reckonings do not explain satisfactorily the demographic losses; moreover, their arithmetic is sometimes faulty, leading to enormous discrepancies among their results. Finally, it is not impossible that some estimates published during the last four years were deliberately kept low for political reasons<sup>4</sup>. Most articles on the subject seem to have been conceived before the attempted coup of August 1991, and many of the writers might have been interested in protecting the reputation of the Communist Party and the wartime General Staff of the Army, or even in protecting themselves against a possible Communist backlash.

Perhaps the only way one can arrive at a reasonable estimate of victims would be by comparing regional case studies (such as this one) and KGB and other central archives in Russia, although quandaries might be encountered similar to those experienced by the present writer.

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<sup>4</sup>Conversely, it may be that certain crimes perpetrated by the Communist regime are or will be exaggerated. Recent events in Moscow could lead to a tilting of the balance towards the other extreme: the Yeltsin government may attempt to enhance its prestige in Russia by portraying the Communists as even worse villains than they actually were.



During the war, the regime managed brilliantly to invoke a brand of nationalism which was dubbed Soviet patriotism. The Nazi attack led to a temporary *rapprochement* between *vlad'* and *narod*. It probably constituted the regime's most glorious moment in all those years in which it had incessantly exploited the ghoulish image of "enemies" preying on and encircling the USSR. Indeed, in 1941 actual deadly foes had materialized. Although the destruction wreaked was enormous in the Kalinin oblast', it was deliberately exaggerated after the war in order to explain the province's plodding recovery.

In the eyes of Communist leaders, the Soviet system had proven its worth during the war by defeating the Nazis. The prewar liquidation of the alleged "potential fifth column" in 1937 and 1938 was now presented as a far-sighted policy. It was not explained, however, why considerable numbers of Soviet citizens had passively observed the arrival of Nazi troops, and why even some Communists had actively collaborated with the "Hitlerites." After the war, oppression was reestablished by the regime.

The provincial leadership was forced to attempt to remedy the postwar state of ruin within the system's limitations. Of course, the thought of economic or political alternatives was strictly prohibited. No creative solutions to problems beleaguering the oblast' during the postwar reconstruction period could have been proposed. Boitsov and his successors were not even able to imagine an alternative outside the rigid structure of Stalin's organization of society. This was a consequence of that peculiar, blindly obedient mentality that had been forged within the Bolshevik Party since the October Revolution itself. The only methods applied to generate successes were those of coercion,

threats, propaganda, and agitation, which not only frightened the average Soviet citizen, but the local leadership as well. In Boitsov's "victory speech" of January 1945, he seems above all to be afraid of appearing complacent. The terrible repressions of the 1930s were a vivid memory for everyone, whether they were the first secretary of the province, such as Boitsov, the chair of the raion executive committee of the soviet, such as Iamshchikov, or a simple toiler, such as many of the survey participants.

The resources allocated to the Kalinin Party organization by Moscow were extremely limited, hence the continued economic failure, that became sharply manifest after 1949. The largest share of responsibility for this failure should be assigned to the leadership of the Communist Party in Moscow and Stalin himself.

Collectivization had failed miserably, and the amalgamation of 1950 further aggravated the poverty and resentment of the peasantry. The authorities' interference by ordering the merger of the small collective farms was probably the main cause for the abysmal agricultural performance from 1950 to 1953. The adverse consequences of amalgamation are obvious when the comparatively positive results of 1948 and 1949 are contrasted to those of the subsequent years. In September 1946, February 1947, June 1947, and June 1948, the Central Committee and Soviet government decreed a slew of predominantly coercive measures to improve Soviet agriculture, which did not exert much positive effect in the Kalinin oblast'. From 1948 to 1952, they reacted by issuing a series of specific resolutions on the Kalinin oblast' which also failed to ameliorate farming. Two first

secretaries of the provincial Party organization were sacrificed within two years, but matters only worsened.

The paradigm of the raion of Molokovo in 1947 demonstrates the mania for perpetually (and ineffectually) replacing kolkhoz chairs. The repeated inspections of milk-fat contents were another futile measure of the authorities.

Private farming survived against all odds: the kolkhozniks excluded by the collective farms struggled on their own minimal plots; more emphatically, the kolkhozniks reaped an enormous share of total agricultural production from their private plots and livestock. Collective farming languished because the imposition of an organizational system was fundamentally alien to the tillers of the soil; as well, the authorities deliberately neglected the welfare of the kolkhozniks. The much heralded mechanization of agriculture failed to materialize: the land was predominantly cultivated with the help of manual equipment, horses, and oxen. Specialization into the two sectors of agricultural production for which the lands of the province were best suited, flax and dairy farming, did not occur. Against all odds, every kolkhoz cultivated cereals on a large scale.

The kolkhozniks were obliged to deliver exorbitant quotas of crops grown within the socialized sector of their farm, for which they were allotted a picayune remuneration mainly in kind (less than 500 grams a day per person in 1951!). In addition, substantial amounts of produce from their personal plots and few private animals, that they had been allowed to retain under the *Ustav* of 1935, were paid as "taxes." As if this were not enough, the forced purchase of obligations for state loans further shaved the kolkhozniks' income. The squalor of

kolkhoz life incited a massive flight from the collective farms during the early 1950s.

The centralized distribution system proved to be unmanagable in practice, and regular widespread privations ensued. The second town of the province, Vyshnii Volochek, experienced a relentless series of shortages of goods, and may serve as an example. In late 1945, there was often no bread in the town; in the early 1950s, bread queues were ubiquitous and other goods were scarce; even by 1955, the average resident only consumed 500 grams of meat per month!

Life in the towns knew many hardships: people were housed in abominable quarters, with no more than five square meters of space per person on the average. Roads and bridges were dilapidated, water supply deficient, sewers decrepit.

The sobering industrial results, similar to those of agriculture, were precipitated by a dearth of investment: machinery had become obsolete, skill was rare, management rarely competent, thanks to insufficient education, paltry remuneration, and the throttling of creative thinking. Wages were so anemic that the families of many factory workers could not survive even on the double income earned by husband and wife. Some were lucky enough to have a private plot at their disposal, others worked on their days off, or tried to augment their income by selling domestic crafts. The boldest ones resorted to theft and embezzlement.

The size of the labour force, drastically reduced in the war, was far too small to execute a successful economic revival after the war. The leadership attempted to deploy prisoners of war and Soviet convicts, but forced labour was hardly efficient. Despite Vorontsov's or

Konovalov's complaints, the contingents were gradually decreased by the MVD so that the limited contribution of coercive labour was cut down even further. However, it is certainly remarkable that the Party and government of the Kalinin oblast' had immediately after the war tens of thousands of POW's and zeks at their disposal, to work on diverse construction projects, in industrial production, and even in agriculture. In March 1948, fifteen camps still operated on provincial territory, in which 10,000 Soviet convicts languished.

In the postwar Kalinin oblast', there is far more proof of a rigid dichotomy between *vlast'* and *narod'* in their interactions, than of a harmonious integration occurring between the two as a result of the opportunities created for social climbing. Only a few million dedicated Communists were necessary to rule Russia under Stalin, who were still considerably more numerous than the quarter million Bolsheviks who reigned Russia in the early days under Lenin<sup>5</sup>.

Prewar society was reconstructed after the war, and the chasm separating *vlast'* and *narod'* was reimposed. Any independent mood, which had sometimes been fostered by the disorganization during the war, was suppressed after 1945 by means of ideological offensives and sporadic political arrests which kept the memory of the horrors of the 1930s alive<sup>6</sup>. Everyone was expected to do their duty and to forsake their human rights in expectation of the millenium.

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<sup>5</sup>Lenin --when he already had decided that the Bolsheviks should take power-- wrote in late September-early October 1917: "Yet we are told that the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party will not be able to govern Russia, govern her in the interests of the poor and against the rich" ("Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?," in: V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.26 (September 1917-February 1918), Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, pp.87-136, p.111).

<sup>6</sup>Certainly, the human capacity to overlook, ignore, or forget certain unpleasant phenomena is immense (see Turchin, Inertsia Strakha, p.21). Some Russians might not have noticed or

Nevertheless, an undercurrent of defiance continued to exist. Youth began to grow restless towards the end of Stalin's life, a mood which was expressed by their inordinate presence in the courts. Some of this rebellious ripple was provoked by the flaws in the system itself, particularly by its economic policy that failed to provide adequately for the Soviet people. The remuneration for the labour of factory workers, employees, and peasants was so dismally low that people engaged in "illegal" economic activities in order to avoid starvation. *Shabashniki*, artisans, and kolkhoz markets substituted as much as possible whenever the system could not provide the required goods and services.

Out of necessity, private enterprise had to be tolerated for the same reason. Yet, sometimes the authorities embodied their displeasure with these activities by arresting the participants. As a result, the provincial courts convicted more than 25,000 people in fifteen months during 1949 and 1950. The number is quite high, but does not even include everyone who was sentenced in this period, particularly those fingered for purely political crimes. They were handled by *OSO* and Military Tribunals. Doubtless some stood trial in the "normal" courts on accusations of political crimes as well, while some accusations of economic crime handled by the oblast' courts were similar to those of sabotage and wrecking so well known from certain show trials of the late 1920s and 1930s. On the whole, the number of

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not wanted to notice or remember the omnipresent activities of the NKVD. It is not impossible that, in the countryside after collectivization, some did not experience any acts of oppression by the authorities, except for prosecution for what would be considered crimes even in the contemporary Western world. And the Great Purge --owing to the highly biased and sparse information about its proceedings-- may have been interpreted, as official propaganda proclaimed, as a just retaliation against culpable troublemakers.

postwar arrests did not surpass those during the 1930s, but it is likely that approximately one in every twenty inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' stood trial between 1945 and 1953.

The scarcities created a situation from which less scrupulous or more daring individuals attempted to make a profit, not only through the sale of domestically produced goods (by use of a sewing machine or the careful tending of an apple tree), but also by outright crime. Particularly in the distribution organs, employees tried to cheat the authorities and vend products on the side, which led to waves of arrests, as was the case with employees of the milk procurement organs in 1948. The higher provincial authorities were sometimes powerless to combat this, for these transgressions eluded their view, which was impeded by a large and cumbersome bureaucracy. Moreover, some individuals within the elite tacitly allowed these activities or even became involved in them; this was perhaps the case with the director of the railroad-car plant, Rumiantsev, and his intimate set of collaborators, or with those who used their foreknowledge of the currency reform of 1947 to skim off a fat profit.

It is impossible to prove conclusively, but, as this study suggests, the roots of the corruption at all levels of society, particularly during Brezhnev's time, can already be unearthed in Stalin's last years. At this time, despite the heavy penalties, many found more or less illegal methods to augment their pitiful wages. A few individuals were apprehended, but the *narod* must have felt intuitively that the authorities could ill afford a new "Great Purge"

because of the tremendous population losses of the 1930s and the war<sup>7</sup>. Therefore, many ran the risk of arrest, a dangerous gamble, as the frequency of arrests in 1949 and 1950 indicate.

Inevitably, economic performance improved markedly by offering people material benefits, and relaxing some of the hard-line ideology emanating from Moscow or Kalinin. Raikom secretary Mezit of Kaliazin seems to have been aware of this when he offered the kolkhozniks vodka for their "voluntary" entrance into the amalgamated farms in his raion in 1950. The Russians' concern seems to have generally focussed on their personal lives, and less so with the construction of some kind of ephemeral Utopia which had been promised to them continuously since 1917<sup>8</sup>.

Propaganda utterly failed to mold Communist, rational, atheistic, modern people out of the inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' during Stalin's lifetime. The regime lacked the technological means for a genuine "total" control of society, even during the grim latter half of the 1930s. Therefore, "remnants of capitalism" clung tenaciously: religious practices were being observed, and, in certain instances, the traditional solidarity of the villagers held out against the authorities, even though the village had now become a collective farm. Religion had been under attack since October 1917, but the regime proved incapable of extinguishing piety and venerable customs. Hallowed tradition outshone coercion and propaganda in many respects. The Russians'

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<sup>7</sup>Conquest argues that the Yezhovshchina was stopped for exactly these strictly demographic reasons (Conquest, *The Great Terror*, pp.433-435).

<sup>8</sup>Compare with Mehnert's observation: "... the concrete desires of the Soviet people are concerned not with a distant past or a distant future, but with the realities and experience of the present" (Mehnert, *The Anatomy...*, p.265). Of course, that only proves that Russians, Ukrainians, etc., are in no way different from other human beings.



ingrained gender relations were modified, but at an unhasting pace; the same can be said about their diet. The youth was more absorbed in *gulf'iane* than in propaganda; the elderly women preferred the evening gossip in front of their *izba* or apartment building to the lecture by the *agitprop* activist. The villages lacked the resources to transform into modern settlements with all the comforts and amenities of twentieth-century urban life at their disposition. Still in the 1960s, they closely resembled the villages of the 1920s. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Russians celebrated in the same way their ancestors had. The fêtes were occasions during which the gray drabness of Soviet daily life was temporarily forgotten.

Poor communications and primitive infrastructure made the authorities resign to a measure of control over the peasants' quotidian life that was weaker than that over the urban inhabitants. The level of literacy was lower in the countryside, fewer newspapers were read, and radio and electricity were often not available, even by 1953. When the collective farm managed to discharge the obligations of procurement plans, its *kolkhozniks* were left alone to a large extent. The private plots were cultivated with intensity, leaving the Russians with hardly any time to try to keep abreast of events in the world outside the village.

The limited tolerance of local initiative allowed since the beginning of the war probably dwindled towards 1950, when people like Rumiantsev, local-boy-made-good Vorontsov and his clan, and Mezit were removed. As a result, the economic performance of the early 1950s, in industry (particularly the textile factories) and in agriculture in general, flagged abysmally in the Kalinin oblast'.

Kononov was quickly removed, making room for Kiselev, who was possibly initially even more of a hard-liner than his predecessor, as a result of Kiselev's "education" in the Central Committee apparatus.

Soon, however, perhaps on instigation from above, Kiselev discovered that matters could not continue as before, specifically in agriculture. It was clear by 1953 that zealous observance of ideological conformity and severe discipline had not yielded brighter economic results. The alternative, of a renewed avalanche of arrests similar to that of 1936-1938 (maybe considered by Stalin during the last year of his life), was an impossible one for the Kalinin oblast', for the population losses sustained during the 1930s and the war had not been compensated by 1953. Far from it, in fact, because the population's size had remained roughly the same in the eight years since the war. The deprivations of the war and postwar period, as well as the extreme tribute exacted from the population, afflicted the health of many and caused a very low natality. Healthcare in general was only very gradually amending.

The Russians were also struggling to recover from the terrible psychological impact of the experience of the years 1929 to 1945. Dekulakization, migration, purges, and the war had reduced the number of inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' by possibly as much as one third in the course of these years. Poverty after 1945 was as vast as in the 1930s, which was expressed in the very small natural growth rate of the population after the war. The Germans could be paraded as the culprits of the hardships after 1945, but, for many of those who could remember NEP, the sacrifices of the 1930s must have seemed incomprehensible. Indeed, by March 1953 --twenty-five years after the

announcement of the First Five Year Plan and ten years after the Nazi retreat from the Kalinin oblast'-- , little progress was discernible in comparison to the 1920s.

Proportionally, the intelligentsia ostensibly comprised the social group that suffered the most after the war from the renewed political repression. Due to the *Zhdanovshchina*, they were under intense scrutiny after the middle of 1946. Furthermore, the regime did not care about the material situation of those who remained outside the Party. Many members of the intelligentsia were paid as little as or less than factory workers, and lived in sordid circumstances; such was the case in the Kalinin province with the teaching staff of the Pedagogical Institute, agricultural specialists, and rural teachers. "Intelligent" was a grand label for many of those who were supposed to belong to the intellectual elite. No more than a few dozen inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' might have enjoyed an education approximating contemporary North American university undergraduate standards. The general level of schooling was extremely base: the reader should perhaps try to imagine how his or her outlook on life would be as an adult after a mere four years of grade school. The majority of the inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' muddled through with such scant tutelage, and the alleged intellectual elite often fared with only a little better.

In official Soviet terms, the "New Class" formed part of the Soviet intelligentsia. The *nomenklaturnye* were the only ones who could savour a certain level of prosperity after the war. Nevertheless, their activities were examined just as minutely as the rest of the intelligentsia; many of the Party elite were victimized if they did not meet the high ideological standards demanded of a Communist.

However, the dismissal of members of the elite from positions of power was more often a consequence of other flaws. For instance, a local leader's removal could be prompted by the inferior economic performance in his territory. There were also rather arbitrary grounds for dismissal: for example, one could fall victim to the system's need for an occasional scapegoat; membership to the wrong "clan" resulted in one's ostracization; and if disliked by too many people in influential positions, harassment might arise for no specific reason at all. In these cases, ideological motives played a minor role. It may be that most dismissals for genuinely ideological reasons stemmed from the work of MGB watchdogs.

The position of women after the war was far from enviable, and in practice did not correspond to the position of socio-economic equality with males that had been intended by the legal liberation of women from male dominance in 1918. It may be that, disproportionately, women had escaped the earlier annihilation and suffering of the male population between 1929 and 1945. However, it does appear that after the war women were worse off than most of the men (except for those who lingered in the GULag). Women performed most of the unskilled and semi-skilled labour of the most plebian jobs, working as milkmaids, rank-and-file collective farmers, weavers, and spinners. Additionally, they had to rear their children and manage the household. Often this was due to the absence of a male, killed during or before the war, in the household, but a husband's presence did little to alleviate the weight of her double or triple burden.

The reader might have been struck by a seemingly excessive stress on the fate of the peasantry in the above account. After all, the

Soviet Union claimed to be a "workers" state, where the party of the industrial proletariat, the Communist Party, held political power. Yet, demographic indicators justify sustained attention to the life of the country dwellers, who formed the majority of the population of Kalinin oblast' even in 1953. Until now, Western specialists have delved little into the life of the *kolkhozniks* under Stalin. This is a rather glaring lacuna for, as Lel'chuk has pointed out, only in the 1960s can one begin to call the USSR an industrialized country<sup>9</sup>. The life of the factory workers, particularly after the war, deserves more study, but it would probably be more revealing to focus on a more industrially developed area which shouldered a more substantial share of heavy industry than Kalinin oblast'<sup>10</sup>.

At times, the cult of Stalin may appear to the reader to have been of minor importance in the postwar Kalinin province. In the archival sources, its presence often remains simply implicit. Nevertheless, the veneration for Stalin reached its apogee after the war, as is witnessed

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<sup>9</sup>V.S. Lel'chuk, "Industrializatsiia...", p.354. Compare as well to Pipes' criticism of the "revisionists," in which he notices the same omission in many works published by this movement (Pipes, "1917...", p.77).

<sup>10</sup>Since August 1991, Western researchers have more opportunities to investigate the fate of the factory workers after the war. It can be hoped that a similar avalanche of publications on the subject of the postwar industrial labour force will appear in the coming years as those that in recent years have appeared on factory workers between 1917 and 1941 (Ward's *Russia's Cotton Workers...* is only one example). Similarly, the destruction of the environment has been little explored in the dissertation. Environmental problems were not recognized as such under Stalin. As a consequence, one can find but only sparse information on the condition of nature in the records. Perhaps the malaria plague resulting from the opening of the *Moskovskoe More* can be approached as an environmental problem created by human beings. The prohibition on the unrestricted felling of trees was a measure aimed at protecting nature. But it was not so much the environment in the Kalinin oblast' under Stalin that suffered: there were hardly any polluting cars, few extremely contaminating factories, little chemical fertilizers, and so on. The human beings who lived in the province were sacrificed instead.

by the reactions to his death described by many survey respondents, as well as the obkom's effort to name an urban district after him.

One of the crucial elements of the Russians' acceptance of the indiscriminate ruthlessness of Stalinist policies might indeed have been linked to the people's inability to compare their contemporary situation with life in a "better" society, which had existed in the past, or which existed synchronously in other countries<sup>11</sup>. Apart from that, some Russians appreciated the few "achievements" of the socialist state: guaranteed employment, universal education, official gender equality, paid holidays, free medical care, and pensions for some. In Stalin's time, most of these social rights were only available for what still was a minority of the population in Kalinin oblast': the urban inhabitants. In the countryside, only a few members of the Party's elite enjoyed them. It is hard to discover many such "positive" elements of Communist rule after the war in the Kalinin oblast'. Undoubtedly, the incessant grooming of Soviet patriotism in the postwar period was another one. The spectre of the "enemy" was jealously preserved, and the USA and the West assumed the role of Hitler Germany. The chimerical threat from the outside may have provided a stimulus to persuade people to sacrifice their health and well-being for the defense of the Motherland, possibly in combination with the promise of a "radiant future" of socialism and communism.

Underneath the "happy few" of the higher Party authorities, society was largely composed of individuals who more or less shared an equal status. In this sense, Soviet society under Stalin might have

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<sup>11</sup>"History, especially of its own --the Communist-- period, does not exist" (Djilas, The New Class, p.136).

appealed to some. There was a sense of social justice, since in fact no one possessed legal rights, all were poor, and everyone had to work to the point of utter physical exhaustion. At least there were few to envy, moreover because the loftier Party members managed to conceal most of the privileges they relished so skillfully.

Towards 1953, economic development in the Kalinin oblast' had come to a standstill. The possibilities for further economic growth without major changes of policy seemed to have been virtually exhausted, because of an almost complete erosion of the Russians' earlier selfless support for the Communists' policies (the only exception to this perhaps being the often unfaltering faith in Stalin himself). Stalin's death was timely, if it is true that he had decided once more on a renewed round of purges of the magnitude of the *Ezhovshchina*. His decease opened the door for the introduction of genuinely positive reforms. The beneficial effect of the reforms of Malenkov and Khrushchev was expressed in renewed economic growth in the Kalinin oblast'; concomitantly the standard of living of its population improved.

One puzzle, obviously, has not been resolved in the above account. Since it is one of the very first on the history of a Soviet province under Stalin, it is too early to classify the events in Tver' province as emblematic for the Soviet Union's or Russian history in this period. Yet, demographic, economic, and military criteria, as well as the universally similar structure of Soviet internal government, suggest that this chronicle is in many respects typical of most Russian provinces.

## TABLES

TABLE 1: The geographical size of the Tver guberniia/Kalinin oblast' in the 20th century

(Based on Kalininskaja oblast' za 50 let v tsifrakh. Statisticheskii sbornik. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Statistika",

1967)

Year	1000s of km <sup>2</sup>	
1913	64.6	
1921	63.7	
1928	63.4	
1935	106.0	
1945	65.8	In 1944, 21 raions and the town of Velikie Luki were separated and given to Velikie Luki oblast' and 3 raions to Pskov oblast'
1956	66.0	In 1956, the rural soviet of Aleksandrovskii and the settlement Bol'shala Voiga were transferred to Moscow oblast'
1958	83.1	In 1957, upon the dissolution of Velikie Luki oblast', the raions of Belyi, Zharkovo, Il'inskii, Leninskii, Nelidovo, Oktabr', Peno, Serezhinskii, Toropets, and the town of Nelidovo became part of the Kalinin oblast'
1960	84.3	In 1958, the Ploskoshskii raion of Pskov oblast' was transferred to Kalinin oblast'; the workers settlement Ivan'kovo became completely a part of Moscow oblast'
1967	84.2	



TABLE 2: The population of Tver' guberniia and Kalinin (Tver') oblast'.

(Based on Kal.obl. za 50 let v tsifrakh, p.12; Kraevedcheskii atlas, p.4; Chislennost' naseleniia soluznikov respublik po gorodskim poseleniim i raionam na 1 ianvaria 1991 g. Statisticheskii sbornik. Moskva: Informatsionno-Izdatel'skii tsentr Goskomstata SSSR, 1991, p.4 and pp.221-225; Ocherki..., pp.530/531; and Pako, 147/4/63, l.132 and l.135)

	total in 1,000s	urban total	rural total	%urban	%rural
1926 (Census of 17/12 1926)	2668.0	324.7	2343.3	12	88
or-1926 borders-*	2241.9	282.0	1959.9	13	87
1939 (Census of 17/12 1939) **	2489.2	609.2	1879.4	24	76
1939***	2169.8	585.5	1584.3	27	73
3/1 1946***	1611.3	488.8	1122.5	30	70
1959 (Census of 15/1 1959)****1	1806.8	787.4	1019.4	44	56
1991(Jan 1)*****	1676.2	1203.2	473.0	71.8	28.2

\*: The numbers of the publication 'Kalinin oblast'...' do not correspond to the numbers of Vershinskii and Zolotarev, or the 'Kraevedcheskii atlas' and we have to assume that the former numbers are for the oblast' in its larger incarnation of 1967 (Vershinskii/Zolotarev, pp.12/13; Kraevedcheskii atlas, p.4; see below).

\*\* : These numbers are highly doubtful, as the total result of this Census for the whole of the USSR was secret at the time the book was written, in which these numbers are to be found ; again, we do not know which borders have been used; furthermore, there was no Census on December 12, 1939, but one in early 1939 (see Conquest, The Great Terror, p.487; and V.Z. Drobizhev, Iu. A. Poliakov, 'Istoricheskaja demografiia-vazhnoe napravlenie nauchnykh issledovanii,' in: {V.S. Lel'chuk(ed.)}, Istoriki sporta.

<sup>1</sup>The capital Kalinin had at this point 261,000 inhabitants (33% of all town dwellers), Vyshnii Volochek 66,400; Rzhev 49,000 or 42,000; Kimry 41,200; Torzhok 34,900; Bologoe 30,300; Bezhetsk 27,000; Ostashkov 19,500; Kashin 16,200; Konakovo-the inundated Kuznetsovo-13,500; Kuvshino 13,500; Kalazhin 11,100; Likhoslavl' 9,500; Krasnomaiskii 8,000; Ves'egonsk 7,000; see Tsentral'nyi Raion, pp.541,550, 555, 558, 563, 564, 567, 569, 571, 573, 577, 580, 583, 584.

Trinadtsat' besed. Moskva: Politizdat, 1988, pp.461-480, p.470; Iu.A. Poliakov et al., "Polveka...." [III], p.49).

\*\*\*: As given by I.P. Boltsov to Voznesenskii and A.A. Kuznetsov in May 1946; the reduction in comparison with the above numbers for 1939 is brought about, because the former included the contemporary population of the territories that were added in 1957 and 1958. Ocherki... mentions the same numbers.

\*\*\*\*: These must be numbers for the oblast' territory of after 1958; for the USSR in 1959, 48% of the population was urban and 52% rural ( Ryan, Prentice, Table 2.1, p.17).

\*\*\*\*\*: Within the borders of 1991, encompassing the town of Tver', consisting of the urban raions of Zavolzh'e, Moskovskii, Proletarskii and Tsentral'nyi and the workers settlement Sakharovo; the towns of Bezhet'sk, Bologoe, Vyshnii Volochek, Kashin, Kimry, Konakovo, Nelldovo, Ostashkov, Rzhev, Torzhok, and Udomlia; Andreapol', Bezhet'sk, Belyi, Bologoe, Ves'egonsk, Vyshnii Volochëk, Zharkovo, Zapadnodvina, Zubtsov, Kalinin, Kallazin, Kashin, Kesovogora, Kimry, Konakovo, Krasnyi Kholm, Kuvshino, Lesnoe, Likhoslavl', Maksatikh, Molokovo, Nelldovo, Olenino, Ostashkov, Peno, Rameshki, Rzhev, Sandovo, Selizharovo, Sonkovo, Spirovo, Startsa, Torzhok, Toropets, Udomlia, and Firovo raions.

TABLE 3: The town population the larger towns in the Kalinin oblast' in the 18th century, 19th century, and in 1926, early 1956, 1959, and on January 1, 1991 (Based on Vershinskii and Zolotarev, Naselenie, pp.8/9; Tsentral'nyi Raion, pp.541,550, 555, 558, 563, 564, 567, 569, 571, 573, 577, 580, 583, 584; Vershinskii, Goroda, pp.10, 11,12, 28, 29, 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 52, 61, 64, 81, 92, 94, 95, 103; Chislennost' naselenia soluznikov respublik po gorodskim poseleniam i raionam na 1 ianvaria 1991 g. Statisticheskii sbornik, Moskva, 1991, pp.221-225; Narodnoe Khoziaistvo..., p.6)

				1926	1956	1959	1991
					(est.)		
Kalinin				108,400	240,000	261,000	455,300
Vyshnii	1780:	1825:	1917:				
Volochek	2,000	7,200	17,800	32,000	60,000	66,400	64,600

TABLE 3

TABLE 3						1926	1956	1959	1991
							(est.)		
Rzhev	1783:	1825:	1858:					49,000 or	
	7,200	9,100	18,500			32,800	42,000	42,000	70,900
Kimry			1891:	1897:	1917:				
			6,000	9,800	13,600	18,500	40,000	41,200	62,000
Torzhok			1860:			1917:			
			16,200			12,800	14,400	32,000	34,900
								50,500	
Bologoe						--	22,000	30,300	35,700
Bezhet'sk	1783:	1825:	1858:	1897:					
	3,100	2,700	5,100	11,000					
						12,800	25,000	27,000	30,500
Ostashkov						12,900			
								19,500	27,000
Kashin	1783:	1825:	1858:	1897:	1917:				
	3,500	4,500	7,500	7,500	9,300	7,800			
								16,200	21,200
Konakovo						3,800			
								13,500	43,000
Kuvshino'vo						4,100			
								13,500	12,300
Kallazin						5,000			
								11,100	15,800
Likhoslavl'						3,000			
								9,500	13,400
Krasnomalskii						--			
								8,000	6,900
Zubtsov	1783:	1825:	1858:	1897:					
	1,100	1,200	3,300	2,900					
						3,300			
									7,900
Staritsa	1780s:			1861:	1897:	1908:	(1936):		
	3,400			5,100	6,300	6,500	6,500		
									9,300
Ves'egonsk						4,000			
								7,000	9,700

TABLE 4: The population of Tver' oblast' on January 1, 1991<sup>2</sup> (Based on Chislennost' naseleniia soluznykh respublik po gorodskim poseleniia i raionam na 1 ianvaria 1991 g. Statisticheskii sbornik.

Moskva: Informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr Goskomstata SSSR, 1991, pp.221-225)

	total(in 1,000s)	urban(in 1,000s)	rural(in 1,000s)
Tver' oblast'	1676.2	1203.2	473.0
Tver' (townsovlet)	459.5	459.5	
of which: Tver' town	455.3	455.3	
Townraions:			
-Zavolzhe	129.9	129.9	
-Moskovskii	132.5	132.5	
-Proletarskii	124.6	124.6	
-Tsentral'nyi	68.3	68.3	
w.s. Sakharovo <sup>3</sup>	4.2	4.2	
Bezhetsk	30.5	30.5	
Bologoe	35.7	35.7	
Vyshnii Volochek	64.6	64.6	
Kashin	21.2	21.2	
Kimry	62.0	62.0	
Konakovo	43.0	43.0	
Nelidovo	30.0	30.0	
Ostashkov	27.0	27.0	

<sup>2</sup>Population of USSR on January 1, 1991, 290,077,000 (66% urban) and of the RSFSR 148,543,000 (74% urban); see Soluznye respubliki. Osnovnye ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye pokazateli. Moskva: Informatsionno-izdatel'skii tsentr Goskomstata SSSR, 1991, p.44. The population of the Tver' oblast grew slightly between 1990 and 1991, by 2,500, thanks to an immigration of 8,000 people; the natural growth of the population was actually negative: -5,500(see: Goskomstat SSSR. Chislennost', estestvennoe dvizhenie i migratsiia naseleniia v 1990g. (statisticheskii biulleten')., Moskva: Informatsionno izdatel'skii tsentr, 1991, pp.22/23). All the growth was due to an increase of the urban population by 5,900: 5,200 coming from migration, and 1,100 through natural growth, while 400 inhabitants were lost to the towns and were added to the countryside in the oblast', due to territorial/administrative changes. The countryside saw both a natural and a migratory decrease of 2,800 and 1,000, respectively.

<sup>3</sup>w.s.= workers' settlement

TABLE 4	total(in 1000s)	urban(in 1,000s)	rural(in 1,000s)
Rzhev	70.9	70.9	
Torzhok	50.5	50.5	
Udomlia	32.4	32.4	
Andreapol' ralon	17.8	9.7	8.1
town of Andreapol'	9.7	9.7	
Bezhet'sk ralon	18.7		18.7
Belyi ralon	10.1	5.3	4.8
town of Belyi	5.5	5.3	
Bologoe ralon	32.7	20.5	12.2
w.s. Berezalka	2.8	2.8	
w.s. Vypolzovo	13.7	13.7	
w.s. Kuzhenkino	4.0	4.0	
Ves'egonsk ralon	19.8	9.7	10.1
town of Ves'egonsk	9.7	9.7	
Vyshnevolotsk ralon	34.7	6.9	27.8
w.s. Krasnomalskil	6.9	6.9	
Zharkovo ralon	10.3	6.5	3.8
w.s. Zharkovskii	6.5	6.5	
Zapadodvina ralon	24.2	14.3	9.9
Zapadnala Dvina tw.	11.5	11.5	
w.s. Starala Toropa	2.8	2.8	
Zubtsov ralon	22.2	7.9	14.3
Zubtsov town	7.9	7.9	
Kallnin ralon	58.1	7.2	50.9
w.s. Vasil'ev. Mokh	3.5	3.5	
w.s. Orsha	2.7	2.7	

TABLE 4	total(in 1000s)	urban	rural
w.s. Sukhoverkovo	1.0	1.0	
Kallazin raion	27.6	15.8	11.8
town of Kallazin	15.8	15.8	
Kashin raion	15.9		15.9
Kesovogorsk. raion	10.3	4.3	6.0
w.s. Kesova Gora	4.3	4.3	
Klimry raion	18.1	3.6	14.5
w.s. Belyi Gorodok	3.6	3.6	
Konakovo raion	54.9	34.6	20.3
w.s. Izoplit	5.3	5.3	
w.s. Kozlovo	4.4	4.4	
w.s. Novozavidovo	8.9	8.9	
w.s. Radchenko	2.6	2.6	
w.s. Redkino	13.4	13.4	
Krasnokholm raion	18.9	8.0	10.9
tw. of Krasnyi Khl.	8.0	8.0	
Kuvshinovo raion	20.4	12.3	8.1
tw. of Kuvshinovo	12.3	12.3	
Lesnoe raion	8.1		8.1
Likhoslavl' raion	33.8	19.0	14.8
tw. of Likhoslavl'	13.4	13.4	
w.s. Kalashnikovo	5.6	5.6	
Maksatikhra raion	24.4	10.3	14.1
w.s. Maksatikhra	10.3	10.3	
Molokovo raion	8.9	2.8	6.1
w.s. Molokovo	2.8	2.8	

TABLE 4	total(in 1000s)	urban(in 1,000s)	rural(in 1,000s)
Nelidovo raion	11.8		11.8
Olenino raion	18.9	5.9	13.0
w.s. Olenino	5.9	5.9	
Peno raion	10.2	6.2	4.0
w.s. Peno	6.2	6.2	
Rameshkli raion	18.1	4.5	13.6
w.s. Rameshkli	4.5	4.5	
Rzhev raion	17.5		17.5
Sandovo raion	12.4	4.6	7.8
w.s. Sandovo	4.6	4.6	
Selizharovo raion	18.1	9.3	8.8
w.s. Selizharovo	7.8	7.8	
w.s. Sellshche	1.5	1.5	
Sonkovo raion	13.6	6.1	7.5
w.s. Sonkovo	6.1	6.1	
Spirovo raion	15.3	6.8	8.5
w.s. Spirovo	6.8	6.8	
Staritsa raion	29.0	9.3	19.7
tw. of Staritsa	9.3	9.3	
Torzhok raion	27.4		27.4
Toropets raion	31.1	17.5	13.6
tw. of Toropets	17.5	17.5	
Udomlia raion	12.3		12.3

TABLE 4	total(In 1000s)	urban(In 1,000s)	rural(In 1,000s)
Firovo raion	14.4	7.0	7.4
w.s. Velikooktiabr'	3.0	3.0	
w.s. Trud	0.7	0.7	
w.s. Firovo	3.3	3.3	

**TABLE 5: Natural population movement in the Kalinin oblast' from 1940 to 1948 (i.e., the deaths as a consequence of acts of war are not taken into account). Based on PAKO, 147/4/1549, 1.67.**

I: average amount of births per 1,000 inhabitants; II: average number of deaths per 1,000 inhabitants; III: average number of children who died of every 100 born

Year	I	II	III
1940	24.4	21.1	22.1
1942	16.5	35.2	28.4
1943	7.6	27.0	17.9
1944	10.1	21.0	12.8
1945	12.5	15.2	9.9
1946	20.2	14.5	8.8
1947	21.4	17.0	13.8
1948	19.4	13.1	9.0

NB: The numbers for 1941 were not given in the account. In 1950, for the whole Soviet Union, the birthrate per 1,000 population was 26.7, and the death rate 9.7; in 1953, these numbers were resp. 25.1 and 9.1 (Ryan, Prentice, Table 4.1, p.38).



**TABLE 6: Births, deaths, marriages, and divorces in the Kalinin oblast' from 1944 to 1948** (Sources: Pako, 147/3/2748, I.15, 46/46ob., 57/57ob., 105ob., 222/22ob., 289/289ob.; Pako, 147/3/2749, II.92/92ob., 136ob./137, II.230/231, II.253/254; Pako 147/4/66, II. 2-3, 83-84, 94-95, 183-184, 198-200; Pako 147/4/67, II. 1-2, 36-38, 49-51, 154-156, 157-159, 191-193, 219-221; PAKO 147/4/1132 82-83, 126-127; Pako 147/4/1133 5-7, 44-45, 53-55).

Month	Births	Deaths	Deaths of children up to 1 year	Marriages	Divorces
11-1943	966	2,951	107	439	69
12-1943	1,014	3,420	115	476	88
01-1944	1,303	3,715	139	559	91
02-1944	1,132	3,619	269	625	111
03-1944	1,290	3,544	168	539	110
04-1944	1,098	3,236	140	540	94
05-1944	1,060	3,008	144	624	105
06-1944	1,238	2,255	108	494	87
07-1944	1,514	2,064	135	582	104
08-1944	1,640	2,198	173	510	-
09-1944	1,473	2,036	195	492	-
10-1944	1,386	2,146	116	436	-
11-1944	1,365(1,373*)	2,033(2,194*)	137	592	1
12-1944	1,398	2,507	130	604	1
01-1945	1,759	2,483	178	738	-
02-1945	1,565	2,605	175	640	1
03-1945	1,818	2,980	215	777	2
04-1945	1,519	2,378	194	444	3
05-1945	1,485	2,115	155	653	6

TABLE 6	Births	Deaths	>1 Year	Marriages	Divorces
06-1945	1,574	1,818	115	709	3
07-1945	1,854	1,538	111	774	3
08-1945	1,783	1,456	136	958	8
09-1945	1,602	1,417	133	1,257	7
10-1945	1,746	1,591	109	1,315	5
11-1945	1,530	1,747	122	1,869	9
12-1945	1,649	2,034	162	1,868	13
01-1946	2,065	2,161	210	2,330	5
02-1946	1,891	2,288	204	2,315	3
03-1946	2,069	2,687	250	1,641	16
04-1946	1,950	2,043	192	1,494	16
05-1946	2,108	1,912	138	1,588	18
06-1946	2,287	1,453	139	1,645	11
07-1946	2,678	1,553	239	1,647	17
08-1946	3,811	1,705	305	1,861	20
09-1946	3,602	1,646	295	1,617	17
10-1946	3,740	1,872	274	1,659	9
11-1946	3,308	1,920	257	2,133	19
06-1947	2,928	2,142	366	1,301	14
07-1947	3,028	2,399	492	1,112	18
08-1947	2,928	2,354	532	1,269	29
09-1947	2,820	2,051	399	1,105	17
11-1947**	2,354	1,890	274	1,958	15
05-1948	1,968	1,852	252	1,343	35
06-1948	2,260	1,501	165	1,313	36
07-1948	2,751	1,426	206	1,193	34

TABLE 6	Births	Deaths	>1 Year	Marriages	Divorces
08-1948	3,058	1,497	214	1,319	25
09-1948	3,032	1,333	195	1,148	35
11-1948*	2,980	1,465	166	1,852	59

\*: (...) according to Pako, 147/3/2748, L15.

\*\* : Unfortunately, I was unable to locate the numbers for October 1947 and October 1948.

TABLE 7: Cases of epidemic diseases in the Kalinin oblast' in 1940, 1947, and 1948

(Based on Pako, 147/4/1549, L61).

	1940	1947	1948
Typhoid/enteric fever ( <i>brishnoi</i> <i>li</i> )	1,098	485	572
Dysentery	8,840	1,167	2,133
Spotted fever (typhus; <i>sypnoi li</i> )	204	1,089	339
Measles	11,074	7,364	10,996
Scarlet fever	2,025	3,059	7,331
Diphtheria	2,884	354	552
Malaria	16,976	10,533	8,267

**TABLE 8: The return of demobilized soldiers to the Kalinin oblast' after the Second World War (Based on a report given by oblast' army commissar Cherniak to P.S. Vorontsov on March 17, 1948; see Pako 147/4/1391, I.2).**

Total demobilized until April 1947 of the USSR Armed Forces	93,000
Birth year of 1925 demobilized in 1948	731
Total demobilized of USSR Armed Forces	93,731
of which: -those who served in the ground forces	77,722
-those who served in the navy	473
-demobilized because of illness	246
-born in 1896 or before	7,837
-unfit for service, but fit for physical work	303
-women	7,150
Out of the demobilized were sent to urban areas	32,915*
and to rural places	61,536*

\*: The total of these two groups combined is 720 more than the total number of demobilized given above.

NB: another report, of January 1948, from the Kalinin obkom to the Central Committee maintains that 95,565 soldiers and NCO's and 12,500 officers had arrived in the oblast (Pako, 147/4/1125, I.77). This report is less detailed and gives the impression of being less trustworthy than the one on which the above numbers are based.

**TABLE 9: The local soviets of the Kalinin oblast' after the elections of December 1950-January 1951 (Based on Pako, 147/5/36, pp.19-21).**

	No. of deputies	% of women	% of non-Party	No. of voters
Oblast' soviet	142	31.7	27.5	1,078,256
Larger town soviets	920	43.5	40.8	275,541
Kalinin districts' soviets	366	49.2	45.9	141,529
Raion soviets	1,433	35.5	31.6	802,084
Rural soviets	12,085	40.6	61.4	683,741
Smaller town soviets	326	39.3	37.7	54,295
Workers' settlements' soviets	624	41.5	44.2	54,250

TABLE 10: The agriculture of the following raions was heavily damaged during the German occupation according to a communication from the head of the oblast' agricultural department (*Ob/zd*), Karelinov, to the obkom sekretariat (PAKO, 147/3/1966, I. 61, Tablitsa 1); the situation in July 1946 in comparison (Pako, 147/3/1966, II.39/39ob.):

RAION	No. of kolkhozy			hearths			able-bodied workers	
	1940	1945	7/46	1940	1945	7/46	1940	1945
Molodol								
Tud	271	175	186	7,715	3,838	4,323	12,125	3,604
Olenino	270	171	180	10,836	7,736	7,834	18,776	6,735
Pogorel'oe	165	129	129	7,502	4,949	4,797	12,723	5,203
Zubtsov	233	168	168	6,556	3,380	3,462	9,270	3,009
Rzhev rai	364	226	232	12,817	8,116	7,733	22,756	11,331
Vysoko	158	116	118	5,859	5,099	5,267	12,356	4,705
Emel'ianovo	153	121	121	4,873	4,108	3,680	7,545	3,900
Kirov	261	257	258	9,854	8,669	8,654	20,277	7,929
Lukovnik-								
ovo	201	171	171	7,203	6,431	6,352	12,942	6,345
Ostashkov	202	167	161	6,558	4,714	5,415	11,520	5,192
Staritsa	270	220	222	9,846	9,274	9,212	17,471	10,839
Turginovo	117	93	94	3,362	2,837	2,992	7,298	2,796
Total	2,665	2,014	2,040	92,981	69,718 (75%)	69,721	165,329	71,588 (43%)

TABLE 11: The loss of cattle during the war and the recovery of the herds of the socialist sector of the kolkhozy of 15 raions, that had undergone German occupation, by January 1, 1947 (Based on Pako, 147/4/921, I.88)

	1/1/41	1/1/42	1/1/47	% of '47 compared to '41
horses	82,700	5,000	14,300	17.4
strong horned cattle	108,300	400	93,400	86.2
of which cows	40,100	300	20,100	50.0
pigs	19,900	-	11,500	57.7
of which sows	3,600	-	4,200	117.0
sheep	94,900	100	81,800	86.2
of which ewes	47,900	-	55,500	116.2

TABLE 12: The kolkhozy of the Kalinin oblast' (Based on: Narodnoe Khoziaistvo p.57)

Year	1940	1950	1953	1955
All kolkhozy	9,016	2,010	1,919	1,978
Households	282,600	254,200	227,900	220,300
Total <i>trudodni</i>	155,800,000	128,100,000	107,900,000	115,900,000
total income				
kolkhozy in rubles	219,700,000	430,000,000	437,200,000	1,443,300,000
of which:				
-for sale of crops	78,600,000	252,100,000	212,500,000	1,119,300,000
-of that being for				
flax crops	---	198,900,000	184,200,000	1,074,200,000
-for sale of				
livestock produce	81,900,000	119,000,000	172,500,000	272,900,000

TABLE 13: The number of kolkhozy and kolkhoz households in the raions of the Kalinin oblast' on July 1, 1946 (According to Pako, 147/3/1966, ll.39/39ob.)

	No. of kolkhozy	<i>dvory</i> (households)
Bezhet'sk	320	10,469
Bologoe	148	4,826
Brusovo	152	5,629
Vysoko	118	5,267
Vyshnii Volochek	157	5,093
Goritsy	132	5,171
Emel'ianovo	121	3,680
Esenovichi	116	3,823
Zavidovo	52	2,480
Zubtsov	168	3,462
Kalinin raion	140	6,025
Kaliazin	219	7,064
Kamen	112	4,261
Kashin	296	10,699
Kesova Gora	146	6,640
Kimry	230	8,688
Kirovo	258	8,654
Kozlovo	90	2,686
Konakovo	59	2,556
Krasnyi Kholm	191	7,654
Kushalino	81	3,509
Lesnoe	115	4,318
Likhoslavl'	175	5,109
Lukovnikovo	171	6,352



TABLE 13

	No. of kolkhozy	<i>dvory</i> (households)
--	-----------------	---------------------------

Maksatlikha	168	7,342
Mednoe	106	4,074
Molodol Tud	186	4,323
Molokovo	205	8,653
Nerl'	112	6,542
Novokarel'	104	3,039
Novotorzhok	203	8,358
Ovinishche	176	7,716
Olenino	180	7,834
Orsha	67	2,691
Ostashkov	161	5,415
Pogoreloe	129	4,797
Rameshki	147	6,995
Rzhev raion	232	7,733
Sandovo	209	10,844
Sonkovo	163	6,361
Spirovo	54	1,966
Staritsa	222	9,212
Tebleshi	87	5,110
Turginovo	94	2,992
Udoml'ia	202	6,229
Firovo	75	2,673
Kolkhozy of Kalinin town:	9	327

Total: 7,058 Kolkhozy with 265,341 households, in 46 raions. This number might have been slightly inflated, as the head of the *orginstruktor* department of the obkom, Petrov, stated that 6,942 kolkhozy were counted at the end of 1946 (Pako, 147/3/1966, I. 45ob.).

TABLE 14: The number of households in the kolkhozy of the Kalinin oblast' between 1941 and 1953 (in 1,000s; on January 1 of each year) (Based on Pako 147/5/906, II.1 and 2 and 11).

	1941	1947	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
no.of house-							
holds	275.9	260.3	264.0	260.1	254.2	243.3	235.2
population in							
them	999.0	784.4	847.5	825.5	768.6	696.3	
of whom able to							
work	498.8	325.9	382.5	368.9	332.6	296.9	
of them:-male	185.6	98.1	125.4	122.4	104.8	90.3	
-female	309.2	227.8	257.1	246.5	227.8	206.7	
able-bodied... <sup>4</sup>	--	--	25.1	25.1	20.4	24.2	
adults... <sup>5</sup>	--	--	137.9	138.4	138.0	138.3	
teenagers	90.9	69.4	67.8	66.1	63.4	63.2	
children until 12							
	--	--	259.3	252.1	234.6	197.9	

NB: In 1940, within the 1944-1957 borders, there were 9,016 collective farms (two of which were fish farms; in 1950, after the first amalgamation, there were 2,010; in 1953, 1,919; and in 1955, 1,978 (See Narodnoe Khozjalstvo..., p.57). By the end of 1955, the number of households in the collective farms had further dropped to 220,300 (*ibid.*).

In 1940, there were 38 sovkhozy in the oblast --1944-1957 borders--, with a total of 5,300 workers and employees; in 1950, there were 49 sovkhozy, with a total of 8,500 workers and employees; in 1953, there were 44 sovkhozy with a total of 8,700 workers and employees (See: Narodnoe Khozjalstvo..., p.54).

<sup>4</sup> ..., and living in kolkhozy, but working in orgs and enterp.

<sup>5</sup> ..., not capable to work and old aged people

TABLE 15: The fulfillment of the agricultural procurement plan in 1945 and 1946 (preliminary) on October 10 of each year, according to a report from the vice-plenipotentiary of the Ministry of Procurements, Mironov, to I.P. Boltsov (Based on Pako, 147/3/2759, 1,229.) *Italics*-produced by other (non-kol- or sovkhoz, presumably) agricultural producers as part of the total. Butter production, according to this report, had almost met its plan target in October 1946 (95.7%).

Product	1945	% of '45 plan fulfilled	1946	% of '46 plan fulfilled
Grain (tons)	71,461 ( <i>4,600</i> )	86.9%	53,411 ( <i>8,062</i> )	57.7%
Potatoes (tons)	25,228	23.7%	50,369	42.5%
Vegetables (tons)	6,399	31.7%	7,587	37.7%
Flax (tons)	173	0.6%	979	3.4%
Flaxseed (tons)	4,492	35.7%	7,320	57.3%
Milk (tons)	65,006 ( <i>2,417</i> )	82.7%	89,191	71.7%
Meat (tons)	8,934 ( <i>17</i> )	73.1%	10,489	72.9%
Eggs- in 1,000s	14,092 ( <i>4,961</i> )	75.3%	13,023 ( <i>1,649</i> )	60.8%
Wool- in 100 kgs	2,010 ( <i>3</i> )	94.4%	1,768	84.0%
Hay (tons)	58,923 ( <i>26,400</i> )	77.1%	66,814 ( <i>8,249</i> )	91.2%
Raw leather:				
-strong; pieces	33,540	79.4%	50,036	166.7%
-medium; pieces	-----	-----	21,113	79.9%
-sheep; pieces	46,753	58.3%	71,186	56.4%
-pig; pieces	2,564	63.5%	12,399	22.1%

**TABLE 16: Agriculture in the Kalinin oblast'; harvest and livestock production results in the period 1947-1951 (Based on Pako, 147/5/906, I.9)**

The average production of agricultural crops of 1 hectare of sown area; in 100s of kilograms

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951
<b>Cereals</b>					
(approx.)	7.9	9.4	8.8	6.6	6.5
<b>Flax: -fibres</b>	1.61	2.46	2.55	1.98	1.61
<b>-seeds</b>	2.12	2.61	2.26	1.31	1.62
<b>Potatoes</b>	74.4	108.1	71.3	65.6	64.6

The production of socialized livestock

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951
<b>Annual milk production of 1 foddered cow (litres)</b>	875	1,124	1,140	956	851
<b>Wool shorn of 1 sheep in the beginning of each year</b>					
(kg.)	1,440	1,700	1,640	1,145	1,070
<b>Eggs, laid by 1 hen, annually</b>	34	48	46	37	27

**TABLE 17: Total number of cattle (in thousands) in the Tver' gubernia and the Kalinin oblast';** the borders here are those of the 'smaller' oblast of approximately 63,000-65,500 square kilometers (Based on Pako, 147/5/663, I.17; the numbers for 1928 are corroborated by Altrichter's in Table X, for 1916 they are higher than Altrichter's (Altrichter, Tabelle X, p.209).)

	strong horned cattle	of which cows	hogs	sheep and goats	horses
1/1 1916	765.3	405.8	77.6	983.4	366.8
1/1/1928	990.8	529.7	187.4	1543.6	480.0
1/1/1941	582.9	342.5	198.3	744.7	249.0
1/1/1945	629.5	266.6	113.9	815.3	106.7
1/1/1950	767.4	356.7	338.0	997.2	140.7
1/1/1953	577.1	317.8	289.3	761.9	168.3

**TABLE 18: Cattle in personal use among the kolkhozniks of the Kalinin oblast';** on January 1st of each year; in 1,000s (Based on Pako, 147/5/906, I.1 and 11; Pako, 147/4/921, I.88ob.; and Narodnoe Khoziaistvo, p.44.)

	1941	1946*	1947	1950	1951	1952	1953
Total households	275.9		260.3	260.1	254.2	243.3	235.2
Strong horned cattle/total	190.6	233.4	215.0	233.3	170.1	155.2	123.5
of which cows	174.6	167.2	175.4	169.6	140.1	137.0	108.8
Hogs	90.5	26.7	22.8	108.2	55.8	57.1	76.6
Sheep	406.1	302.3	234.1	300.2	132.6	115.1	97.6
Goats	14.3	42.6	-	88.6	82.6	97.6	115.0

\*: According to Narodnoe Khoziaistvo, p.44; Pako, 147/4/811 gives numbers that are slightly lower (0-5%) than these.

**TABLE 19: Number of livestock of the public herds of the kolkhozy --not in personal ownership of the kolkhozniks-- in the Kalinin oblast' in 1,000s of animals (Pako, 147/3/2679, l.10)**

Animal	1/1/41	1/1/45	% of growth compared to 1/1/1941	% of plan ful- fillment for 1944
Strong horned cattle	352.3	350.0	102.1% [sic]	105.8%
of which cows	137.2	88.9	64.7%	101.2%
Sheep & goats	276.9	353.1	127.6%	106.8%
of which ewes	126.9	191.9	150.1%	108.7%
Hogs	60.2	65.7	109.0%	102.1%
of which sows	11.9	21.0	176.6%	112.3%

**TABLE 20: Kolkhoz livestock on January 1st of 1941, 1942, 1945, 1946, and 1947 (Based on Pako, 147/3/2679, l.10, 147/4/528, l.6ob., 147/4/921, l.88; and Narodnoe Khoziaistvo, p.44.)**

	1/1/41	1/1/42	1/1/45	1/1/46	1/1/47
Horses	230,800	114,400	-	101,519	99,133
of which foals					10,713
Strong-horned					
cattle	352,300	91,400	350,000	346,362	333,873
of which cows	137,200	41,200	88,900	107,073	101,424
of which oxen	-	-	-	45,364	47,084
Sheep & goats	276,900^	89,400^	353,100	340,983	310,349
of which ewes &					
goats	126,900^	49,000^	191,900	215,023	211,284
Hogs	60,200	16,100	65,700	64,910	62,690
of which sows	11,900	5,900	21,000	23,331	24,302

^: Perhaps sheep only.

TABLE 21: Expenditure of cattle of the socialized farm animals of the kolkhozy of Kalinin oblast' in one year (1946) (Based on Pako, 147/4/921, I.89 and I.111.)

	Horses	Strong- horned cattle	Pigs	Sheep
Died ( <i>palo</i> )	12,211	31,278	21,422	88,155
Sold	1,845	16,844	122,713	39,214
Slaughtered	1,472	48,341	14,316	78,917
Part of state meat deliveries	-	48,108	3,827	17,472
Part of other state deliveries	-	2,999	333	2,342
Issued & sold to kolkhozniks	-	3,995	24,628	6,878
Issued & given to kolkhozniks as part of payment additional labour	-	1,752	2,670	4,657
Killed by "plunderers" ( <i>kh/shchniki</i> )	1,903	2,398	-	14,534
Other expenditure	509	1,903	1,318	5,905
TOTAL	17,993	157,692	191,047	258,128





TABLE 22: The relative distribution of the kolkhoz income, in kind and in money, in the years 1949-1951; B: The distribution of the money income in the kolkhozy (by %).

	1949	1950	1951
Taxes, insurance payments & dues	20.6	18.9	22.1
Clearing off of long-term loans for capital investment	1.4	1.5	2.3
Expenses for productive purposes	28.1	24.0	27.9
Administrative-economic expenses	0.9	0.7	0.9
Additional payments to chairs/vice-chairs & accountants/bookkeepers	3.4	2.9	3.0
Transferred pay into reserves	20.1	19.1	18.8
Expenses for various needs	0.6	0.9	0.4
Designated for payment of <i>trudodni</i>	24.9	32.0	24.6
TOTAL	100	100	100

TABLE 23: The profile of the kolkhoz chairs (Based on Pako, 147/4/1887, II.4/5 and 63/63ob., and I.136.)

Kolkhoz chairs

Date/Total	aged <30	30-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	>50
1/1/45: 6,901						
1/1/46: 6,942*	650	887	1,112	1,114	971	2,194
1/1/47: 7,064						
1/1/48: 7,236*	860	1,158	1,320	1,383	1,007	1,496
1/1/49: 7,437						

\*: The total number of chairs of whom the age is given is 6,928 on January 1, 1946, and 7,232 on January 1, 1948.

Work experience in the function as chairs on January 1 of 1945 and 1946

Date/Total	<6 months	6-12 mos.	1-3 years	3-4 yrs.	4-5yrs.	>5 yrs.
1/1/45: 6,989	464	816	3,608	1,355	-	646
1/1/46: 6,928	746	812	2,621	1,200	857	692

The Party and Komsomol membership among the chairs\*\*

Date	Full member	Candidate	Partyless	Komsomol
1/1/45	1,021	538	5,330	76
1/1/46	1,840 (incl. cand)	see left	5,088	55
1/1/48	2,315	298	4,619	57
1/4/49	2,318	239	4,575	65

\*\* : The totals here used are 6,889 on 1/1/45; 6,928 on 1/1/46; and 7,232 on 1/1/48; for April 1, 1949, the number is 7,422 kolkhoz chairs

TABLE 23

Education of kolkhoz chairs\*\*\*

	complete higher	unfinished higher	complete secondary	unfinished secondary	lower
1/1/46	1	-	64	395	6,468
1/1/48	-	1	124	636	6,471
1/4/49	-	5	104	727	6,416

\*\*\*: The totals here correspond to those of the Party and Komsomol membership; for April 1, 1949, the number is 7,422 kolkhoz chairs.

NB: Out of a total of 7,422 kolkhozy on April 1, 1949, only 674 were led by women (9%)

NBB: Fokin receives a report of an employee from the cadre department of the obkom in September 1949 that, in the first half of 1949, 1,790 (23% of the total) kolkhozy have replaced their directors.

**TABLE 24: The impact of the amalgamation in the summer of 1950 on the composition of kolkhoz chairs and the kolkhoz organization (Based on a report of the Konovalov to Malenkov of January 1951, Pako 147/5/36, ll.1-11.)**

300 people had been sent into the countryside to fortify the quality of agricultural cadres. They were selected among the Party and soviet workers in the oblast; others were agricultural specialists.

-44 of them were veterinarians and agronomists.

-46 had completed the two-year curriculum of the school for leading kolkhoz cadres.

-210 were practical workers, who had extensive experience in kolkhoz work.

-As a result of the amalgamation, according to the report, on January 1, 1951, 64.2% (1,172) of all chairs were Party members or candidates, while 1.1% (21) were Komsomol members.

-The education of the directors had also relatively increased: 7% (125) had secondary or higher education, 5% (90) had special agricultural education, and 21% (384) had incomplete secondary education.

TABLE 24

-A large amount of the former smaller kolkhozy of the period before amalgamation had become vice-chair (1,184), brigadier (1,283) or managed the livestock farm (659) of the merged kolkhozy. Concomitantly, in the last three months of 1950 the ranks of these three groups had been further strengthened by the replacement of 128 vice-chairs, 440 brigadiers, and 204 livestock managers by more experienced workers.

-On January 1, 1951, there was a total of 1,737 vice-chairs, 40% (692) were Communists, and 30 were Komsomol members. 250 of them had more than primary education, 1,487 only primary.

-There was a total of 10,654 brigadiers at this date, 12% (1,267) were Communists, and 504 were Komsomols. 8,428 of them had strictly primary education.

-Only 67 of all the approximately 1,900 chairs were women!

According to information sent to the Central Committee, the amalgamation was still continuing in the winter of 1951; by March 1951, there was a total of 1,956 kolkhozy in the Kalinin oblast', 1,810 of which were kolkhozy composed of more than one pre-summer-1950 kolkhoz (Pako, 147/5/36, l.91). By that time, there were 73 female chairs. Already 348 of the 1956 chairs (17.8%) are dismissed by the general annual meeting of the kolkhozy in the late winter of 1951, according to the same source. In October 1951, 70.5% was Communist (1,344 out of 1,906), but there were still only 79 women working as chairs (Pako, 147/5/35, l.118/119).

A report on the situation on January 1, 1952, notices that instead of only 12.3% (924) of the total of collective farms having a Party organization two years earlier (on 1/1/1950), there are 1,486 (77%) with primary Party organizations (Pako, 147/5/199, l.2).

TABLE 25: Rural Communists in the Kalinin oblast' in the years 1950-1953 (Based on Pako, 147/5/769, II.94/95.)

Date	Size of Party organizations in kolkhozy						
	Total of kolkhoz Party organizations	Number of Communists in these	From 1-5 members	From 6-10 members	From 11-15 members	From 16-25 members	From 26-50 members
4/1/1950	916	4,373	631	255	24	6	-
1/1/1951	1,481	13,536	333	717	287	128	16
1/1/1952	1,486	13,694	346	704	274	146	16
1/1/1953	1,483	12,997	371	723	262	120	7
5/1/1953	1,472 <sup>+</sup>	12,997(?) <sup>+</sup>					

<sup>+</sup>: Out of a total of 1,905 collective farms on May 1, 1953 (i.e. 77%) of collective farms had a primary Party organization; on June 1, 1950, right before the amalgamation, out of a total of slightly more than 7,000 kolkhozy, there were only 916 primary Party organizations according to these documents.

<sup>+</sup>: This seems to be a mere repetition for the number of January 1, 1953; apparently, no new count was made for May 1, 1953; in reality, 10,888 actually worked in some sort of a position on the collective farms.

TABLE 26: The professions of 11,172 kolkhoz-Communists on January 1, 1952, and of 10,728 kolkhoz-Communists on May 1, 1953 (Based on Pako, 147/5/199, I.1 and 147/5/769, I.94)

	1952	1953
Kolkhoz chairs	1,350	1,393 <sup>+</sup>
Kolkhoz vice-chairs	614	611
Heads of <i>tovarnye fermy</i> <sup>*</sup>	744	779
Field & other brigadiers	1,332 <sup>++</sup>	1,247
Team leaders (of <i>zven'ia</i> )		16

TABLE 26 CONT.	1952	1953
Tractor brigadiers & tractor drivers	706	835
Communists engaged in animal husbandry	577	506
Communists engaged in tillage	4,096	3,693
Other kolkhozniks	1,723	1,648
TOTAL	11,172	10,728

^: Of a total of 1,905 chairs; \*\*: Includes *zven'ia*

**TABLE 27: Komsomol membership and profession of Komsomols on the collective farms on May 1, 1953 (Based on Pako, 147/5/769, 1.96.)**

In 1,774 kolkhozy, out of the total of 1,905, there are Komsomol organizations, with a total membership of 22,776, 21,058 of whom work on collective farms. There are 221 Komsomol organizations with 5 or less members; 434 with 6-10 members; 1,027 with 10-25 members; and 97 with 26-50 members.

**Profession**

Kolkhoz chairs	13
Heads of <i>tovarnye fermy</i>	153
Brigadiers of field-crop brigades	668
Team leaders(of <i>zven'ia</i> )	666
Komsomols engaged in animal husbandry	3,325
Komsomols engaged in crop tillage	16,233
Tractor brigadiers, tractor drivers, and MTS mechanizers	1,539

**TABLE 28: Proportional distribution of crops in sown area of Kalinin oblast' in 1958 and 1960 (Based on Tsentralnyj Balon, p.536)**

Crop	1958	1960
Grains	38.8%	35.9%
of which: -wheat	2.0%	1.6%
-rye	16.2%	14.0%
-oats	18.7%	17.8%
Flax	12.1%	11.3%
Potatoes	8.7%	9.1%
Vegetables	0.7%	0.6%
All Fodder crops (incl. multi- annual grasses)	39.7%	43.1%

NB: According to one report to the Central Committee of June 1951 (Pako, 147/5/36, l.136), the collective farms of the Kalinin oblast' had 1,266,000 hectares of area under crops, 182,600 (14.4%) of which was sown with flax.

**TABLE 29: Capital investments by state and cooperative organizations in the economy of the oblast' by % (without kolkhozy) (Based on Kalininskaja oblast' za 50 let..., p.107)**

	% cp. to previous period	% cp. to the period 1918-1928
1918-1928 (without the 4th quarter of 1928)	100	100
First Five Year Plan (From 4th quarter of 1928-1932)	420	420
Second Five Year Plan (1933-1937)	176	730
3 1/2 years of Third Five Year Plan (1938-first half 1941)	85	620
July 1941-1945	78	480
Fourth Five Year Plan	330	1,600
Fifth Five Year Plan	182	2,900

TABLE 30: The fulfillment of the industrial plans in the Kalinin oblast' by total production output in January 1946, according to a report of the vice-plenipotentiary of the State Planning Bureau under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, V. Vakhrov. The production output is expressed in rubles in the value of the years 1926/1927; the numbers are preliminary (Based on Pako, 147/3/2759, II.1-2)

	In 1,000s of rubles		
	Plan	Fulfillment	%
<u>In total for oblast</u>	31,892	30,022	94.1%
<u>For Industrial PC's enterprises</u>	25,216	23,437	92.9%
<u>Of enterprises of USSR subordination</u>	9,479	8,586	90.6%
Among which:			
Railroad car factory	1,900	1,900	100.0%
'May 1' plant	1,050	1,054	100.3%
Rubber sole plant	1,725	1,158	67.2%
Plant No. 10	461	373	80.9%
Plant No. 510	193	128	66.5%
Paper factory	310	395	127.4%
'Velikil Otklavr"-glass factory	395	473	119.7%
The leather plant of Ostashkov	332	86	25.9%
The Rzhev plant for standard houses	107	92	86.1%
<i>Tresty:</i> -Cheese	243	71	29.1%
-Kalinin <i>energo</i>	640	602	94.1%
-Kalinin flax	289	366	126.4%
-Rzhev flax	77	113	145.6%
-Spirits	448	396	88.4%
-Kalinin <i>strolies</i>	256	167	65.7%



TABLE 30	Plan	Fulfillment	Percentage
<u>Of republican subordination:</u>	6,441	5,444	84.5%
of which:			
'Krasnyi Mal' glass factory	765	931	121.6%
Kalinin cotton-fibre <i>kombinat</i>	1,258	1,082	86.0%
The 'Voroshilov' factory	112	79	70.5%
Vyshnii Volochek cottonf. komb.	164	115	70.2%
Mechanical plant 'Proletarka'	386	398	103.0%
<i>Tresty:</i>			
- <i>Rosglavkhleb</i>	1,621	1,087	67.0%
- <i>Kalininles</i>	1,352	934	69.0%
- Meat	540	603	111.6%
<u>Of oblast subordination:</u>	6,481	6,416	99.0%
of which:			
1. Oblast' light industry	4,267	3,689	86.4%
of which:			
- Kallazin sewing	735	462	62.9%
- 'Volodarskii' sew.	530	517	97.5%
- Kalinin knitted wear	281	281	100.0%
- Kimry footw. plant 'Krasnaya Zvezda'	356	371	104.1%
- Kimry sewing fct.	544	445	81.8%
2. Obl. food industry	1,789	2,268	126.7%
- Kalinin confectionary fct.	1,210	1,620	133.8%
- Obl. mill <i>trest</i>	253	305	120.5%
3. Obl. local manufacturing	190	213	111.9%
4. Obl. local fuel industry	110	130	118.0%

TABLE 30	Plan	Fulfillment	Percentage
5. Obl. construction industry	60	52	86.6%
6. Obl. fish <i>rest</i>	64	65	101.7%
<u>Of ralon subordination:</u>	2,816	2,991	106.2%
Ralon industrial <i>kombinaty</i>	2,010	2,139	106.4%
Ralon food <i>kombinaty</i>	500	543	108.5%
Ralon fuel enterprises	306	309	101.2%
<u>The enterprises of non-Industrial PC's</u>	737	333	45.2%
Factory "A.G.O."	500	149	29.8%
Factory "Ekskavator"	200	155	77.5%
"Izoplit" factory	37	29	78.3%
<u>Cooperative industries in the prices of 1932</u>			
	10,420	10,969	105.2%
Manufacturing cooperatives	8,700	9,191	105.6%
<i>Koopinsokuz</i>	1,720	1,778	103.3%
<u>Cooperative industries in the prices of 1926/1927</u>			
	5,939	6,252	105.2%
Manufacturing cooperatives	4,959	5,239	105.6%
<i>Koopinsokuz</i>	980	1,013	103.3%
The industries of the Industrial People's Commissariats together produced:			
Under Union authority:	8,586,000	Under Oblast' authority:	6,416,000
Under RSFSR authority:	5,444,000	Under Ralon authority:	2,991,000
Therefore together:	23,437,000 rubles in all [see beginning of table]		
The industry of the non-Industrial PC enterprises produced 333,000 rubles worth of output, and the cooperative industry, 6,252,000 rubles, and thus the total industrial production of the oblast' industry an output the worth of 30,022,000 rubles for January 1946.			

**TABLE 31: The development of industry in Kalinin oblast' 1913-1960: proportional share of branch in %.** (Based on Tsentralnyi Balon, p.532.)

	1913(by cost of gross production)	1959(by cost of gross production)
Textiles	53%	12.4%
Metalworks/machinebuilding	6%	11.5%
Artificial fibres		new
Artificial leather & rubber		new
Primary processing of flax	by peasants at home	new
Knitted goods & garments		13%

**TABLE 32: Oblast' production in 1955, in proportion to all of USSR production.**

(Based on Tsentralnyi Balon, p.532)

passenger wagons	large share
excavators	10%
cotton weavings	6%(6th in USSR)
window glass	3.6%
leather footwear	2.5%
felt footwear	3.6%
paper	1.8%
peat	5.7%
first processing of flax	20%
oblast'	0.3% territory USSR
population	0.8% USSR total

TABLE 33: The number of workers and employees in the different branches of the economy of the Kalinin oblast'--1944-1957 borders-- and the members of industrial cooperatives in September of the corresponding years in thousands (Based on Narodnoe Khozjaistvo, p.70.)

	1940	1945	1950	1955
Total of workers and employees	351.1	279.6	348.0	412.8
Of whom:				
Industry (Industrial production personnel)	135.0	103.3	142.1	173.7
Construction (Construction & assembly work)	17.6	11.6	18.5	18.8
Sovkhozy & subsidiary agricultural enterprises	11.5	15.9	15.9	14.2
MTS & meadow improvement stations	6.4	2.6	4.5	33.1
Railroad transport	23.6	25.4	21.1	21.6
Water transport	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.4
Automobile, other transport, & cargo labour	11.8	7.2	9.6	14.2
Communications	7.0	5.4	5.8	5.9
Trade, procurements, material-technical provisioning & sales	25.6	15.3	24.1	22.4
Social catering	8.6	8.6	6.8	8.0
Education (schools, scientific & cultural-educational institutes, colleges)	35.5	27.4	31.5	33.6
Healthcare, <i>fizkul'tura</i> , & welfare	16.6	16.3	21.5	23.5
Credit- & insurance institutions	3.2	2.2	2.6	2.5
<i>Apparat</i> of organs of state & economic directions & social organizations	22.9	18.4	17.0	12.5
Further branches (geologic, forest, capital goods repair, etc.)	24.5	18.6	25.4	26.8
Members of cooperative industrial artels	32.9	26.1	19.3	21.3

TABLE 34: The share of women in the non-kolkhoz work force in 1950 and 1955, on October 1st of the corresponding years (Based on Narodnoe Khozjaistvo..., p.70/71.)

	1950 abs. (in 1,000s)	1950% of total labour	1955 abs. (in 1,000s)	1955% of total labour
Total	200.8	57.7	224.6	54.4
Industry	82.1	57.8	98.3	56.6
Construction	6.4	34.9	6.3	33.5
MTS, etc.	1.2	27.3	5.0	15.1
Sovkhozy, etc.	9.6	60.2	8.2	57.5
Transport and communications	15.2	39.8	17.7	41.1
Trade, procurements, etc.	15.2	62.9	15.9	71.2
Public catering	5.9	86.7	7.4	93.3
Education	24.0	76.1	26.0	77.5
Healthcare	18.9	87.9	20.8	88.3
Apparatus & credit inst. etc.	10.9	55.8	8.6	57.5

NB: On January 1, 1945, the share of women in the total amount of workers and employees in the oblast' was 68.3% (Kalininskaja oblast' za 50 let..., p. 121).

TABLE 35: Communist Party membership in Tver' gubernija/ Kalinin Oblast' (on January 1st of each corresponding year) (Based on Očerki, prilozhenie I, pp. 690 and 691.)

Year	Full members	Candidates	Total
1917	150	—	150
1922	3,218	384	3,602
1928	8,236	3,637	11,873
1935	18,477	8,934	27,411
1936	17,013	7,470	24,483
1937	18,931	7,653	26,584
1938	19,236	7,314	25,550

TABLE 35 cont.

Year	Full members	Candidates	Total
1939	20,697	12,160	32,857
1941	34,205	19,811	54,016
1942	12,711	3,325	16,036
1943	14,972	4,311	19,283
1944	18,072	8,232	26,304
1945	20,747	7,920	28,667
1946	32,511	9,604	42,115
1947	45,977	10,183	56,610
1948	51,804	9,738	61,542
1949	53,629	7,323	60,952
1950	54,575	5,285	59,860
1951	55,150	5,577	60,727 <sup>a</sup>
1952	55,337	6,146	61,483
1953	55,753	5,776	61,529
1956	60,670	2,714	63,384
1970	127,784	5,478	133,262

<sup>a</sup>: According to first secretary Konovalov at the 8th oblast' Party conference, 16,281 out of them were women (Pako, 147/5/2, I.7); another report stated that of the full members 42,216 (76.5%) entered the Party during or after the war (Pako, 147/5/199, I.4).

**TABLE 36: Primary Party organizations in the Kalinin oblast' on January 1, 1949, and on January 1, 1951 (Based on Pako, 147/5/199, I.23.)**

Sorts of primary Party organizations	Party organizations		Communists in them	
	1949	1951	1949	1951
Industrial enterprises	395	392	12,095	13,103
Transport and communications ents.	224	246	5,206	5,195
Construction	30	34	582	691
Artels of industrial cooperation	137	140	1,425	1,409
Ents. of municipal economy	—	34	—	592
Trade, procurement & public catering	89	160	1,379	2317
Education/science/cultural institutes & enterprises	207	272	3,127	3,424
Healthcare organizations	87	120	1,027	1,303
Institutions & organs of government, Party, and of economy	782	673	12,338	11,150
Sovkhozy, MTS, MTM	139	151	2,193	2,205
Kolkhozy	1,011	1,481	5,266	13,536
Rural territorial Party organizations	1,056	375	13,359	3,571

**TABLE 37: Exclusions of Communists by the Party organization of the Kalinin oblast' in 1949 and 1950 (Based on Pako, 147/5/199, I.12 and I.26.)**

Of the total of 2,681 (1,865 full members and 996 candidates) excluded for both years, 484 (213 in 1950) were workers, 695 (302 in 1950) kolkhozniks, and 1,682 (708 in 1950) employees. In 1950, 71% of those excluded had joined the party during the war, and 18% in the post war period, and thus only 11% before June 1941.

Cause for exclusion	Number of excluded in '49/'50	% of total amount of excluded	differentiated for 1949*	differentiated for 1950*
For theft, embezzlement & abuses	948	33.0%	488	466
For drunkenness, hooliganism, unworthy way of life	337	11.8%	180	157
For observance of religious rites	150	5.3%		
For losing their Party documents	112	4.0%		
For cessation of payment of Party fees & violations of Party discipline	674**	23.3%	401**	334**
For unauthorized departure from their organization	272	9.5%		
*: as far as possible				

\*\* : apparently a miscalculation in the records

TABLE 38: The Communist Party's membership in the raions of the Kalinin oblast' on January 1, 1952; ethnicity and gender of the membership (Based on Pako, 147/5/177.)

	Members	Cands.	Total	Women/%	Russians	Other
Bezhet'sk	2,052	212	2,264	564/24.9	2,187	24U;15K;19J;8B
Bologoe	2,901	243	3,144	812/25.8	3,012	43U;19B;20J;10K
Brusovo	671	90	761	199/26.1	736	22K
Ves'egonsk	706	126	832	216/26.0	808	18K
Vysoko	430	78	508	121/23.8	497	5K;4U
Vyshnyi V. town	2,352	267	2,619	1,043/39.8	2,481	38U;29J;21B;21K
Vyshnyi V. raion	1,254	157	1,411	354/25.1	1,352	23U
Goritsy	499	72	571	180/31.5	565	
Emel'ianovo	267	45	312	103/33.0	307	5K
Esenovichi	465	38	503	159/31.6	483	12E
Zavolzh'e (Kalinin)	1,963	170	21,33	573/26.9	1,990	48U;33J;28B;20K
Zavidovo	968	119	1,087	266/24.5	1,045	30U
Zubtsov	423	48	471	90/19.1	455	6K
Kalinin gorkom*	84	15	99	37/37.4	96	
Kalinin raion	1,174	101	1,275	283/22.2	1,196	28U;26K
Kallazn	928	113	1,041	298/28.6	1,020	12U
Kamen	1,240	150	1,390	413/29.7	1,354	15U
Kashin	1,386	215	1,601	422/26.4	1,555	11J;10U;9B
Kesova Gora	694	94	788	191/24.2	770	8U;4K
Kimry town	1,495	139	1,634	557/34.1	1,560	24J;20U;10B
Kimry raion	1,257	193	1,450	293/20.2	1360	16J
Kirov	792	103	895	136/15.2	877	8U;5B
Kozlovo	309	37	346	114/32.9	166	175K
Konakovo	776	98	874	338/38.7	844	13U
Krasnyi Kholm	864	89	953	248/26.0	943	
Kushalino	324	46	370	99/26.8	363	7K
Lesnoe	518	72	590	117/19.8	561	22K
Likhoslavl'	1,022	114	1,136	321/28.3	819	291K;9U
Lukovnikovo	489	62	551	116/21.1	544	
Maksatikh'a	1,056	104	1,160	271/23.4	902	251K
Mednoe	537	65	602	197/32.7	584	10K
Molodol Tud	333	56	389	54/13.9	378	
Molokovo	677	118	795	207/26.0	777	15K
Neri'	519	65	584	177/30.3	577	
Novokarel'	382	57	439	111/25.3	99	338K
No'oprom. (Kal.)	1,674	171	1,845	485/26.3	1,684	45J;39U;34K;18B
Ovinishche	406	51	457	99/21.7	345	107K
Oktiabr' (Kal.)	1,798	147	1,945	669/34.4	1,804	40J;38K;37U;12B
Olenino	681	98	779	108/13.9	763	6U
Orsha	295	34	329	90/27.4	326	
Ostashkov	1,395	142	1,537	417/27.1	1,475	16U;15B;11J;8E
Pogoreloe	404	37	441	75/17.0	420	11K;7U



TABLE 38 cont.	Members	Cands.	Total	Women/%	Russians	Other*
Prolet. (Kal.)	1,939	172	2,111	940/44.5	1,999	33J;30U;21K;10B
Rameshki	602	88	690	164/23.8	459	223K
Rzhev town	2,050	169	2,219	538/24.2	2,063	54U;40B;27J;10K;9P
Rzhev rayon	633	72	705	117/16.6	697	
Sandovo	778	104	882	195/22.1	829	41K;7U
Sonkovo	803	84	887	183/20.6	843	29K;7U
Spirovo	633	79	712	217/30.5	635	70K
Staritsa	638	75	713	146/20.5	699	
Tebleshl	471	57	528	119/22.5	509	17K
Torzhok	2,314	335	2,649	732/27.6	2,553	45U;21J;16B
Turginovo	354	43	397	125/31.5	390	
Udomlia	802	104	906	179/19.8	879	14K
Firovo	764	109	873	213/24.4	844	11U;6K;4E
Tsent. (Kal.)	4,096	204	4,300	1,446/33.6	3,932	110J;87U;72K;55B
	55,337	6,146	61,483	16,937	57,411	4,072
				27.5%	93.4%	6.6%
Kalinin town tot.	11,554	879	12,433	4,150/33.4	11,505	261J;242U;187K;123B
					92.5%	and 28T

\*: The largest non-Russian nationalities: U=Ukrainian; K=Karelian; J=Jewish; B=Belorussian; E=Estonian; P=Polish; T=Tatar

The number for the Kalinin gorkom probably refers to those who work permanently in its apparatus

TABLE 39: Leading cadres in the Kalinin oblast' on January 1, 1952 (Based on Pako, 147/5/201)

There was a total of 1,507 functions that were defined as leading work, of which 1,467 were filled.

276 (18.8%) of these positions had been taken by women.

1,427 were filled by Party-candidates (39), or full members (1,388); 40 people who were non-Party members had leading positions, 11 of whom were Komsomols.

a. Time of entry into the Communist Party of the 1,388 full Party members in leading positions

Before 1917	0		
1917-1920	23		
1921-1925	29	1917-1929	163
1926-1929	111		
1930-1934	165		
1935-1938	48	1930-1938	213
1939/1940	277		
1941/1942	204	1939-1945	819
1943-1945	338		
1946 and after	193	post-1945	193

TABLE 39 cont.

b. Age of the 1,467 leading workers of the Kalinin oblast' on January 1, 1952 (The average age was 38.6 at this point)

Older than 50	129
46-50	229
41-45	242
36-40	301
31-35	257
Younger than 30	309

c. Education of the 1,467 leading workers

TOTAL	1,467
With completed higher education	212
of which:	
-Engineers	24
-Agronomists	16
-Other agricultural specialists	6
-Economists	16
-Lawyers	11
-Medical doctors	49
-Ped.institute & university grads.	77
-Grads. of other inst. of high. educ.	13
With incomplete higher education	252
With completed specialized secondary education	282
With completed general secondary education	235
With incomplete secondary education	325
With primary education	161

d. The education of those who have attended special Party educational schools

Complete Higher Party political education	12
-of whom Higher Party school under Central Committee	11
Incomplete higher Party political education	146
-of whom completed the two year program of the oblast', krai and republic Party schools	140
Secondary Party political education	66
-of whom completed the Higher School for Party-organizers under the Central Committee	4
TOTAL	224

TABLE 39 cont.

e. Nationality of leading oblast workers

Russians	1,377
Karelians and Finns	48
Ukrainians	16
Jews	15
Belorussians	7
Latvians	1

2 of a nationality that did not have its own republic within the USSR, and 1 foreigner.

f. Work experience in present function of leading cadres

More than 10 years	100
5-10 years	328
2-5 years	442
1-2 years	249
Less than a year	348
TOTAL	1,467

TABLE 40: The relative distribution of occupations among the working members and candidates in the Communist Party in 1947 and 1957 (See Ocherki, prilozhenie 1, p.695.)

	1947	1957
In branches of material production	69.4%	74.4%
Of which:		
In industry and construction	23.3%	31.5%
In transport and communications	10.6%	10.6%
In agriculture	28.6%	27.7%
In trade, public catering, procurements, material/technical supply & sales	6.9%	4.6%
In unproductive branches:	30.6%	25.6%
Of which:		
In science, education, healthcare & culture	10.6%	12.2%
In state & economic organs of direction, in Party & social organizations apparatus	19.1%	12.1%
In housing, communal economy & in social services	0.9%	1.3%

**TABLE 41: The qualitative composition of leading rayon and urban Party workers, who were part of the *nomenklatura* of the Kalinin oblast' Party committee in early 1945**

(Based on Pako, 147/3/2679, l.18ob.)

	Number	% of total
Total of those who worked in		
rayon- or gorkoms	369	100
of whom were women	96	26
Work experience in function:		
Up to 1 year	107	28.9
From 1 to 3 years	212	57.4
3 years or more	50	13.5
Party membership:		
Since between 1917 and 1925	21	5.7
from 1926 through 1934	142	38.4
from 1935 through 1940	144	39.0
from 1941 through 1944	62	16.8
Education:		
Higher and unfinished higher	57	15.9
Secondary and unfinished secondary	192	52
Primary	120	32.5

NB: The total *nomenklatura* of the oblast' committee was much larger; in 1944 the obkom controlled the appointments of 3,813 people, according to obkom secretary Vorontsov (M., 17/44/546, l. 82ob.). In these positions, 955 women were employed (about 25%).

TABLE 42: The elite of the town of Kalinin on February 1, 1951 (Based on Pako, 147/5/214a, l. 35)

	Commu- nists	Komso- mol	Party-less	Total
Leading Party and soviet cadres	2,251			2,251
Communist workers in lower responsible positions (other than in fine arts, science, teaching, engineering & medicine)	3,491			3,491
Teachers	266	162	803	1,231
Scientific workers	84		86	170
Engineers/technicians with specialized professional education	1,254	425	1,173	2,852
Engineers/technicians without specialized education	368		943	1,311
Artists	45	5	111	161
TOTAL				12,886

TABLE 43: Housing in towns of the Kalinin oblast' in comparison with the living space available in these in 1917 in % (Based on Kalininskaja oblast' za 50 let..., p.115.)

	1940	1960
	cp. to 1917	cp. to 1917
	in %	in %
Total of housing space in towns and workers' settlements (post-1957 borders)	148	290
of which in towns	142	260
Kalinin	137	260
Bezhetsk	106	180
Bologoe	128	350
Vyshnii Volochek	168	240
Kimry	147	220
Rzhev	560*	680
Torzhok	134	190
Kashin	73(!)	120
Konakovo	340	530
Ostashkov	109	160
For urban type settlements-total (post-1957 borders)	370	1400

\*: This number seems rather doubtful

TABLE 44: The school network of the Kalinin oblast' (Based on Narodnoe Khozlaistvo, pp.84-86 and Pako, 147/4/1126, I.1)

General education; percentage of schools, teachers, and pupils in towns and urban type settlements in corresponding school years

(At the beginning of the school year, without 'workers' schools and schools for rural youth)

		'14/'15	'27/'28	'32/'33	'40/'41	'45/'46	'47/'48	'50/'51	'55/'56
ALL	schools	2,361	1,908	2,976	2,686	2,508	2,515	2,517	2,379
		(8%)	(8%)	(5%)	(9%)	(7%)		(8%)	(8%)
SCHOOL	teachers	4,169	4,649	9,522	14,218	12,511		12,795	12,184
		(26%)	(37%)	(21%)	(27%)	(24%)		(31%)	(39%)
TYPES	pupils**	144	155	321	393	277		281	197
		(23%)	(28%)	(18%)	(28%)	(29%)		(36%)	(48%)
Of which:									
PRIM-	schools	2,302	1,815	2,525	1,996	1,955	1,974	1,821	1,676
		(6%)	(5%)	(3%)	(4%)	(3%)		(4%)	(3%)
ARY	teachers	3,419	3,315	5,908	4,790	5,061		3,284	2,144
		(11%)	(16%)	(12%)	(9%)	(10%)		(13%)	(12%)
SCHOOL	pupils**	131	121	219	140	123		78	38
		(16%)	(15%)	(11%)	(11%)	(15%)		(17%)	(18%)
SEVEN	schools	32	48	429	475	414	322	566	490
		(75%)	(58%)	(8%)	(7%)	(8%)		(11%)	(9%)
YEAR	teachers	214	631	2,952	4,851	4,226		5,923	4,236
		(78%)	(81%)	(22%)	(12%)	(15%)		(20%)	(17%)
SCHOOL	pupils**	4	16	87	126	83		121	54
		(75%)	(50%)	(21%)	(13%)	(23%)		(25%)	(26%)

TABLE 44 cont.

		'14/'15	'27/'28	'32/'33	'40/'41	'45/'46	'47/'48	'50/'51	'55/'56
SECOND-	schools	27	23	22	194	137	119	126	201
		(96%)	(91%)	(91%)	(53%)	(47%)		(56%)	(52%)
ARY	teachers	536	664	662	4,468	3,214		3,509	5,649
		(98%)	(97%)	(97%)	(62%)	(58%)		(68%)	(66%)
SCHOOL	pupils**	9	17	15	126	71		81	104
		(100%)	(94%)	(93%)	(63%)	(63%)		(70%)	(70%)
OTHER*	schools	-	22	-	21	2		4	12
			(86%)		(81%)	(50%)		(50%)	(42%)
	teachers	-	39	-	109	10		79	155
			(54%)		(87%)	(30%)		(13%)	(37%)
	pupils**	-	1	-	1	0,1		1	1
			(100%)		(100%)	(0%)		(40%)	(40%)

\*: Those include schools for children who were older than the usual age and were catching up on the education that they had missed, due to external circumstances (e.g. the war); schools for children with disabilities and also special classes with regular schools for older children who were making up for deficiencies, for having missed their obligatory education.

\*\* : In thousands



**TABLE 45: The distribution of the pupils by grades in the general educational school system** (Based on Narodnoe khoziaistvo, p.87 and Pako, 147/4/1125, I.I.) Without the workers' and peasants' youth schools, the schools and grades for the 'over-aged', and schools for disabled children; in 1,000s.

	'40/'41	'45/'46	'47/'48	'50/'51	'55/'56
All pupils	392	277	243	280	196
Of whom:					
in towns and urban type settlements	111	79		100	94
in rural areas	281	198		180	102
Of the total are:					
In grades from 1 up to and including 4	224	205	196	148	94
in urban areas	47	52		45	40
in rural areas	177	153		103	54
In grades from 5 up to and including 7	139	60	44	119	62
in urban areas	46	20		47	27
in rural areas	93	40		72	35
In grades from 8 up to and including 10	29	12	6	13	40
in urban areas	18	7		8	27
in rural areas	11	5		5	13

TABLE 46: The Institutes of specialized secondary and higher learning in the Kalinin oblast' (Based on *Narodnoe Khozjal'stvo*, p.91); at the beginning of the schoolyear

	'14-'15	'27-'28	'33-'34	'40-'41	'45-'46	'50-'51	'55-'56
Institutes of higher learning( <i>вузы</i> )	-	1	3	6	3	4	2
-students in them	-	512	1,320	5,022	3,500	6,190	5,453
-of whom study by correspondence	-	-	-	2,570	1,786	3,291	2,551
Secondary specialized learning inst.	2	7	37	49	41	40	45
-students in them	333	1,010	7,549	11,989	13,609	13,285	21,620
-of whom study by correspondence	-	-	-	1,152	857	856	3,702

Most of the "secondary specialized Institutes" mentioned above were *tekhnikums*, some of which were independent, while others were closely connected with a local factory (the railroad car factory of Kalinin)<sup>6</sup>.

There were also several musical institutes, medical schools, and in Kalinin there was a secondary Party School of the Communist Party. Then there were a few secondary pedagogical institutes, a library school, and some that were schools that taught people aspects of the mechanization of agriculture, finance, planning and bookkeeping, veterinarian studies, and the lumber industry. The two institutes of higher learning in 1955 were the Pedagogical Institute "M.I. Kalinin", today the State University of Tver', and the State Medical Institute of Kalinin.

<sup>6</sup>See *Narodnoe khozjal'stvo*..., pp. 91-94; this account is based on the situation in the study year 1956/1957, but there is no reason to question the fact that most of these institutes already existed by 1950/1951, and even earlier, in 1945/46.

TABLE 47: The number of prisoners of war in four of the camps in the Kalinin oblast' on February 10, 1946, and their distribution in industry and agriculture, and their number in the POW camps on May 20, 1945 (Based on Pako, 147/4/92, 1.9/9ob, and Pako, 147/3/2748, II.220/221.)

	Inmates
Camp No.41 in Ostashkov	
-At the "Kirov" factory	1,759
-At the peat enterprise at Rantsevskoe	826
-At railroad work	463
-At the peat enterprise of the leather factory	1,012 (558 of whom were Polish internees)
-At the Firovo glass factory	418
-At agricultural work	714
<u>TOTAL OF CAMP NO. 41 IN OSTASHKOV</u>	<u>4,634</u>
<u>TOTAL OF CAMP NO. 41 ON MAY, 20 1945</u>	<u>3,242</u>
Camp No.216 in Vyshnii Volochek	
-At the textile <i>kombinat</i> of Vyshnii Volochek	1,452
-At the wood procurements	344
-At the peat enterprise of Osechenskoe	573
-At the peat enterprise of Pashenskoe	332
-At the peat enterprise of Leont'evskoe	671
-At agriculture	284
-For the gorkom of Bologoe	228
-At the glass factory "Krasnyi Mal"	390
-At <i>UVSR</i> 28 {?}	416
-In the camp unit for those recovering from illness	2,837
-At lumbering in Maksatikha raion	68

TABLE 47 cont.

<u>TOTAL OF CAMP NO. 216 IN VYSHNII VOLOCHEK</u>	<u>7,595</u>
<u>TOTAL OF CAMP NO. 216 ON MAY 20, 1945</u>	<u>8,860</u>
Camp No. 384 in Kalinin	
-In the camp unit of 'Mel'stol'	354
-Building a railroad station	1,116
-At the peat enterprise of the Konakovo porcelain fact.	595
-At the factory of the direction of gas/fuel industry	330
-At peat digging in Konakovo	610
<u>TOTAL OF CAMP NO. 384 IN KALININ</u>	<u>3,005</u>
<u>DID NOT YET EXIST IN MAY 1945</u>	
Camp No. 395 in Kalinin	
-Kalinin unit	231
-Vyshnii Volochek unit	101
-Station 'Akademicheskaya' unit	149
-Unit in Malyshev	315
-In the recovery unit of Narachino	396
-At station Khimki	819
-At station Klin	451
-At station Tosno(Tyno)	233
<u>TOTAL OF CAMP NO. 395 IN KALININ</u>	<u>2,695</u>
<u>DID NOT YET EXIST IN MAY 1945</u>	
<u>TOTAL FOR THESE FOUR CAMPS</u>	<u>17,929</u>

In May 1945, three other camps existed: No. 290 in Kuvshinov with 1,680 POW's; No. 295 in Konakovo with 646 POW's; and No. 293 in Bezhetsk with 296 inmates. The total amount of POW's in all five camps was 14,724 on May 20, 1945.

## APPENDIX I

### The survey

The agreement about the survey was made between two Professors of the State University of Tver', Vladimir Glebovich Osipov and Nikolai Nikolaevich Lukovnikov, and this author in November-December 1991. The author was responsible for the questions, which were edited in December 1991 with the help of Professor Andrei Nikolaevich Sakharov of the History Institute of the USSR-Russian Academy of Sciences, and his son, Ignatii Nikolaevich Sakharov, at the time a student in the History Department of Moscow State University. This version of the survey questions was sent through the Department of International Relations of the History Institute to the two professors in Tver' in December 1991. When I returned to Tver' in June 1992, I discussed a further revision of the questions and a profile of the interviewees with Professors Osipov and Lukovnikov; the final version of the questionnaire that was used is the one given below. Professors Osipov and Lukovnikov conducted all the interviews with the 109 respondents. The interviews took place in the months of June, July, and August of 1992. The author is responsible for all the translations of the introduction, questions, and answers in the dissertation. The author, too, carries the full responsibility for the wording of the questions in the survey and is responsible for its copyright. The Russian version of the survey questions and its introduction are hereafter included in this appendix. It should be borne in mind that the interviewers were allowed to exercise discretion with certain questions in order not to offend or upset the respondent. Whenever relatives or spouses were interviewed, this was done separately.

The author strove to have a representative group of respondents in the survey as much as possible, according to criteria of gender, occupation, Party membership, and place of residence; almost all participants who were sought out by the interviewers were born in 1930 or earlier. However, according to strict sociological-statistical standards, the survey is not representative. Many of the answers given by the interviewees were an interesting illustration of the events, and some provided new insights in the life of the average Soviet population in the

Russian province at the time. Although the survey is an interesting source, the author has used the utmost care when introducing information derived from it in the dissertation. As with every source used in this dissertation, it has been treated as a collection of material that should not be used uncritically.

The author would like to thank Professors Sakharov, Osipov, and Lukovnikov and Ignatii Sakharov, as well as the employees of the History Institute in Moscow, and, of course, all the 109 citizens of Tver' oblast', who were willing to take time to answer an extraordinarily long list of questions, that in addition sometimes touched on difficult subjects for them.

History Institute of Russia of the  
Russian Academy of Sciences

SURVEY

"[sic] The spiritual condition [mentality] and the living circumstances of the inhabitants of the Kalinin oblast' in the first postwar years (1945-1953).

The History Institute of Russia of the Russian Academy of Sciences is conducting an investigation in order to establish how the events of the Great Patriotic War, the circumstances of the postwar reconstruction of Central Russia, and the social circumstances in the personal life of the respondents were reflected in the minds of people of the older generation.

The living and working circumstances of the inhabitants of the Kalinin (Tver') oblast' in the postwar period are being researched on the basis of the answers to the questions of eyewitnesses and participants of the events of the first postwar decade.

Your estimates, remembrances, opinions about this complicated, contradictory period in the life of our people, and your personal participation in the resurrection of the country, are of great interest and have historical significance.

We would like to thank you in advance for your help and your participation in scientific-investigative work!

2.

1. Personality of the respondent

1.(1) Last name

First name

Patronymic

1. (2) Time and place of birth (village, raion, town, oblast')

1. (3) Place of residence (in the 1945-1953 period)

(Contemporary address: )

1. (4) Nationality [ethnicity]

1. (5) Work (profession) of closest relatives

(father, mother, husband (wife))

2. Education

2.(6) When did you go to school and in which school(s) did you study?

2.(7) Did you succeed in completing and continuing your education

(in a workers' faculty, evening school, tekhnikum, institute)?

2.(8) Were you satisfied with your possibilities in receiving an education  
and with its quality?2. (9) Did you experience at some time a sense of inadequateness of  
knowledge or of its precariousness?3. Family situation

3. (10) Married, single

3. (11) Last name, first name, patronymic of wife (husband)



3.

- 3. (12) Year of marriage
- 3. (13) Number of children (time and place of their births)
- 3. (14) Did you want more or fewer children?
- 3. (15) Who looked after your children when you were at work? (relatives, educators of preschool institutions, neighbours)
- 3. (16) What significance did religion have in your life and in the life of your family in the period from 1945 through 1953?
- 3. (17) Did you take part in atheist propaganda and other measures of that time?

#### 4. Work

- 4. (18) Your basic profession (specialization)?
- 4. (19) Where did you happen to work before the war and after the war?
- 4. (20) How was your working day before the war?  
During the war, after the war?
- 4. (21) Did you work on Saturdays and Sundays?
- 4. (22) Did you help with harvesting? (if you lived in town?)
- 4. (23) Did you till a private plot?
- 4. (24) How did your relations with comrades at work turn out to be (workers, employees, kolkhozniks)?

4.

4. (25) How did you appreciate your immediate superiors (heads, brigadiers, kolkhoz chairs)?
4. (26) In what year did you stop working?
4. (27) What can you say about your working circumstances, the degree of satisfaction they gave, your "labour fate"?

5. System of providing for one's life

- 5.(28) How and what did you provide for a living and feed your family in that period?
- 5.(29) Do you find that your wage was sufficient for you and your family?
- 5.(30) If not, then which additional sources of income did you create or try to create?
- 5.(31) What was your attitude towards the system of ration cards; what did you think, when they were abolished in December 1947?
- 5.(32) Where did you live? Did you return home after the Great Patriotic War? Did you receive housing? Did you build your house yourself? In which circumstances did you live right after the war?

6. Spare time

6. (33) How did you basically spend your leisure time (books, cinema, sports, games, "dinner parties" [this term is untranslatable; it means sitting at the table, while eating, drinking, talking, singing, etc.]?)?

5.

6. (34) How long were your holidays in the years 1945-1953?
6. (35) Did you stay in sanatoria or in spas at that time?
6. (36) Did you travel outside the oblast' in that period?
6. (37) How do you estimate the possibilities for the recovery of strength and health that you had in that period?

7. The Great Patriotic War and your life

7. (38) What did you do during the war?
- Did you fight in the army (where, when, at which fronts)?
  - What rank did you have?
  - Were you wounded?
  - When were you demobilized?
  - Did you work in the rear?
  - Which decorations do you have?
7. (39) Did you live on temporarily occupied territory, under which circumstances?
7. (40) Did you hope for changes in your life and in the life of the country after the victory over Germany?
- Did your hopes materialize?
7. (41) Did you believe in May 1945 in "the radiant socialist future," "the nearby victory of communism," and what did you do for the fulfillment of the plans of the fourth Five Year Plan?
7. (42) Did you count that it was possible to have a new war with the West after 1945? Did you at some point fear a new war?

6.

8. Politics and political activity

8. (43) Were you a Komsomol, candidate or full member of the *VKP(b)* in the period from 1945 through 1953? If "yes", then when did you become one?
8. (44) Was your wife (husband) a member of the Party or Komsomol?
8. (45) Did you engage in politics (how actively) in that period? If "no", why not?
8. (46) Did you attend political meetings, sessions at work or after work?
8. (47) Did you have moments of internal disagreement with the politics of Party and government?  
If "yes", then did you consider this to be due to mistakes of local Party organs, or a consequence of the errors of the central leadership?
8. (48) Did you voice that disagreement in critical utterances or a polemic with family members, friends, colleagues in a domestic setting?
8. (49) Did you state openly and officially your disagreement or complaints about domestic or foreign policy that was followed at the time? If "yes", then how did the authorities react to this?
8. (50) Did you publicly criticize actual Party members (your leaders, subordinates)? What was the reaction of those who were criticized?

7.

8. (51) What precisely did you criticize?
8. (52) What did you think at the time about the NKVD, MVD, and MGB? Were you acquainted with that system and its cadres through rumours or directly?
8. (53) Did you know of people of your area [town, village, district, etc.] who had been arrested on political grounds? For what and when?
8. (54) Were you aware in this period of the system of camps and jails for political convicts? If "yes", then what [did you know]?
8. (55) Did you fear for your arrest, or the arrest of members of your family, of friends? How much probable were they?
8. (56) How did you react to the death of J.V. Stalin? Did you hope for an improvement in your life or were you afraid of a deterioration?
8. (57) When reminiscing about your life --especially about the period between 1945 and 1953--, what deduction do you make: did the socialist system in the USSR give you satisfaction and use? What was bad in it, and what was good?

Moscow-Tver' 1992

(RUSSIAN VERSION)

Институт истории России Российской  
Академии наук

## А Н К Е Т А

"Духовное состояние и условия жизни жителей  
Калининской области в первые послевоенные  
годы (1945– 1953 г.г.).

Институт истории России Российской Академии наук проводит исследование того, как отражены в сознании людей старшего поколения события Великой Отечественной войны, обстоятельства послевоенного восстановления Центральной России, социальные условия собственной жизни респондентов.

Условия жизни и работы жителей Калининской (Тверской) области в послевоенный период исследуются на основе ответов на вопросы анкеты очевидцев и участников событий первого послевоенного десятилетия.

Ваши оценки, воспоминания, мнения об этом сложном, противоречивом периоде жизни нашего народа и своем личном участии в восстановлении страны представляют большой интерес и имеют историческое значение.

Заранее благодарны Вам за помощь и участие в научно-исследовательской работе!

2.

1. Личность респондента

1. (1) Фамилия

Имя

Отчество

1. (2) Время и место рождения (село, район, город, область)

1. (3) Место проживания (в период с 1945–1953 г.г.)

(Современный адрес: )

1. (4) Национальность

1. (5) Работа (профессия) ближайших родственников

(отца, матери, мужа (жены))

2. Образование

2. (6) Когда Вы учились в школе и в какой (каких)?

2. (7) Удалось ли ее закончить и продолжить свое образование

(на рабфаке, в вечерном школе, техникуме, институте)?

2. (8) Удовлетворены ли Вы своими возможностями в получении образования и его качеством?

2. (9) Испытывали Вы когда-либо ощущение недостаточности знаний или их непрочности?

3. Семейное положение

3. (10) Женат (замужем), холост

3. (11) Ф.И.О. жены (мужа)

3.

- 3. (12) Год вступления в брак
- 3. (13) Наличие детей (время и место их рождения)
- 3. (14) Хотели ли Вы иметь больше или меньше детей?
- 3. (15) Кто присматривал за Вашими детьми, когда Вы были на работе? (родственники, воспитатели дошкольных учреждений, соседи)
- 3. (16) Какое значение имела религия в Вашей жизни и жизни Вашей семьи в период с 1945 по 1953 г.г.?
- 3. (17) Участвовали ли Вы в атеистической пропаганде и других мероприятиях того времени?

#### 4. Работа

- 4. (18) Ваша основная профессия (специальность) ?
- 4. (19) Где Вам пришлось работать до войны и после войны?
- 4. (20) Каким был Ваш рабочий день до войны?  
во время войны, после войны?
- 4. (21) Работали ли Вы по субботам и по воскресеньям?
- 4. (22) Помогали ли убирать урожай? (если жили в городе?)
- 4. (23) Вели ли свое подсобное хозяйство?
- 4. (24) Как складывались Ваши отношения с товарищами по работе (рабочими, служащими, колхозниками) ?



4.

4. (25) Как Вы оцениваете своих непосредственных руководителей (начальниках, бригадиров, председателей колхоза) ?
4. (26) В каком году Вы закончили работать?
4. (27) Что Вы можете сказать об условиях своей работы, удовлетворенности ею, своей трудовой судьбе?

#### 5. Система жизнеобеспечения

5. (28) Как и чем Вы зарабатывали на жизнь и кормили семью в тот период?
5. (29) Считаете ли, что Вашей зарплаты было достаточно для Вас и Вашей семьи?
5. (30) Если нет, то какие дополнительные источники дохода создавали или стремились создать?
5. (31) Как Вы относились к системе продовольственных карточек, что думали, когда она была отменена в декабре 1947 г.?
5. (32) Где Вы жили? Вернулись ли домой после ВОВ? Получили ли жилье? Строили ли дом сами? В каких условиях жили сразу после войны?

#### 6. Отдых

6. (33) Как в основном Вы проводили свободное время (книги, кино, спорт, игра, застолье)?

6. (34) Сколько времени в году длился Ваш отпуск в 1945–1953 г.г.?
6. (35) Отдыхали Вы в доме отдыха и на курортах в это время?
6. (36) Выезжали ли Вы за пределы области в тот период?
6. (37) Как Вы оцениваете возможности для восстановления сил и здоровья, имеющиеся у Вас в тот период?

7. Великая Отечественная война в Вашей жизни

7. (38) Что Вы делали во время войны?
- воевали (где, когда, на каких фронтах)?
  - какой имели чин?
  - были ли ранены?
  - когда демобилизовались?
  - работали в тылу?
  - какие имеет награды?
7. (39) Жили ли на временно оккупированных территориях, в каких условиях?
7. (40) Надеялись ли Вы на изменения в своей жизни и жизни страны после победы над Германией?
- Оправдались ли Ваши надежды?
7. (41) Верили ли Вы в мае 1945 г. в "светлое социалистическое будущее", "скорую победу коммунизма" и что делали для выполнения планов четвертой пятилетки?
7. (42) Считали ли Вы, что возможна новая война с Западом после 1945 года? Боялись ли Вы когда-нибудь новой войны?

8. Политика и политическая деятельность

8. (43) Были ли Вы комсомольцем, кандидатом или членом ВКП(б) в период с 1945 по 1953 г.? Если "да", то когда им стали?

8. (44) Были ли Ваша жена (муж) членами партии или комсомола?
8. (45) Занимались ли Вы политикой (насколько активно) в этот период? Если "нет", то почему?
8. (46) Посещали ли политические собрания (митинги), совещания на работе или после работы?
8. (47) Были ли у Вас моменты внутреннего несогласия с политикой партии и правительства?
- Если "да", то считали ли Вы это ошибками местных партийных органов, или следствием ошибок центрального руководства?
8. (48) Выливалось ли это несогласие в критические высказывания или полемику с членами семьи, друзьями, сослуживцами в домашней обстановке?
8. (49) Заявляли ли Вы открыто и официально о своем несогласии или претензиях к внутренней или внешней политики, проводимой в то время? Если "да", то как реагировала на это власть?
8. (50) Критиковали ли Вы публично конкретных членов партии (своих руководителей, подчиненных)? Какова была реакция критикуемых?
8. (51) Что конкретно Вы критиковали?
8. (52) Что Вы думали тогда о НКВД, МВД и МГБ?
- Знакомы ли Вы были с этой системой и ее кадрами по-наслышке или не посредственно?
8. (53) Известны ли Вам земляки, которые были арестованы по политическим мотивам? За что и когда?
8. (54) Было ли Вам известно в тот период о системе лагерей и

тюрем для политических заключенных? Если "да", то что?

8. (55) Боялись ли Вы своего ареста, или ареста членов Вашей семьи, друзей? Насколько вероятны они были?

8. (56) Как Вы отнеслись к смерти И.В. Сталина?

Надеялись ли на улучшения своей жизни или опасались ухудшения после нее?

8. (57) Вспоминая свою жизнь—особенно период между 1945 и 1953 г.г., какой вывод Вы делаете: принесла ли социалистическая система в СССР Вам удовлетворение и пользу? Что в ней было плохо, что хорошо?

Москва— Тверь 1992 г.

## Survey participants:

1. Ivan Petrovich Metlin (1915) of the town of Tver'
2. Anna Vasil'evna Dorfman (1923) of the town of Tver'
3. Nina Nikolaevna Golubev (1921) of the town of Tver'
4. Nina Nesterovna Osipova (Kozlova)(1930) of the town of Tver'
5. Vasilii Fedorovich Nepriaev (1905) of the town of Tver'
6. Sergei Sergeevich Sergeev (1914) of the town of Tver'
7. Konstantin Pavlovich Novikov (1912) of the town of Tver'
8. Nikolai Sergeevich Loshkarev (1925) of the town of Tver'
9. Mariia Ivanovna Veselova (1918) of the town of Tver'
10. Ninel' [!] Sergeevna Smirnova of the town of Tver'
11. N.N. (1923) of the town of Tver'
12. Zinaida Vladimirovna Drozdova (1930) of the town of Tver'
13. Nina Nikolaevna Panova (1929) of the town of Tver'
14. Tamara Efimovna Volodina (1921) of the town of Tver'
15. Stanislav Vasil'evich Kudrashov (1921) of the town of Tver'
16. Anna Kuz'minishna Sumugina (Shepeleva) (1912) of the town of Tver'
17. Aleksei Sergeevich Lukovkin (1911) of the town of Tver'
18. Ol'ga Mikhailovna Korobova (1916) of the town of Tver'
19. Praskov'ia Arsen'evna Samarova (1896) of the town of Tver'
20. Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kotov (1928) of the town of Tver'
21. Leonid Mikhailovich Gaponenko (1930) of the town of Tver'
22. Mariia Ivanovna Potemkina (1912) of the town of Tver'
23. Antonina Il'inichna Ryzhakova (1921) of the town of Tver'
24. Liudmila Vasil'evna Vedernikova (1922) of the town of Tver'
25. Tat'iana Fedorovna Krivova (1914) of the town of Tver'
26. Anastasiia Vasil'evna Kruglova (1910) of the town of Tver'

27. Evgeniia Stepanovna Shirogenkova (1922) of the town of Tver'
28. Elizaveta Vasil'evna Baranova (1918) of the town of Tver'
29. Petr Arsen'evich Kashinov (1914) of the town of Tver'
30. Klavdiia Romanovna Fedorova (1916) of the town of Tver'
31. Mariia Nikitichna Nadyseva (1915) of the town of Tver'
32. Ekaterina Nikolaevna Ratnikova (1919) of the town of Tver'
33. Vladimir Iakovlevich Semiachko (1922) of the town of Tver'
34. Khaim Itskovich Leibovich (1919) of the town of Tver'
35. Agrafena Georgievna Murtsovkina (1903) of the town of Tver'
36. Faina Kuz'minishna Romashova (1909) of the town of Tver'
37. Tais ia Andreevna Poliakova (1907) of the town of Tver'
38. Mariia Andreevna Golubeva (1916) of the town of Tver'
39. Ivan Ivanovich Tiaglov (1916) of the town of Tver'
40. Nikolai Alekseevich Zabelin (1902) of the town of Tver'
41. Aleksandr Afrikanovich Kondrashov (1911) of the town of Tver'
42. N.N. (1929) of the town of Tver'
43. Roman Ivanovich Peterin (1935) of the town of Tver'
44. Ol'ga Ivanovna Bykova (1922) of the town of Tver'
45. Nikolai Dmitrievich Eliseev (1924) of the town of Tver'
46. Aleksandr Nikolaevich Nikolaev (1925) of the town of Tver'
47. Dmitrii Vasil'evich Balashov (1919) of the town of Tver'
48. Vladimir Emel'ianovich Tsvetkov (1922) of the town of Tver'
49. Vasilii Kirillovich Stepanov (1928) of the town of Tver'
50. Mariia Matveevna Kozenkova (1911), probably of the town of Tver'
51. Anatolii Sergeevich Efremov (1925) of the village Kruplianki, Kalinin raion
52. Nina Vasil'evna Akhova (1919) of the town of Konakovo
53. Aleksandr Nikolaevich Akhov (1917) of the town of Konakovo

54. Ivan Vasil'evich Ratataev (1928) of the town of Konakovo
55. Liudmila Semenovna Solov'eva (1933) of the town of Konakovo
56. Liudmila Pavlovna Pliasnikova (1930) of the town of Konakovo
57. Ivan Andreevich Rulev (1925) of the town of Konakovo
58. Mariia Vasil'evna Kornetova (1917) of the town of Konakovo
59. Vasilii Prokhorovich Sazhko (1913) of the town of Konakovo
60. Antonina Andreevna Morozova (1918) of the town of Konakovo
61. Zinaida Ivanovna Simkina (1919) of the town of Konakovo
62. Gennadii Vladimirovich Lubov (1924) of the town of Konakovo
63. Nikolai Ivanovich Bol'shakov (1907) of the village of Selikhovo, Konakovo raion
64. Tat'iana Ivanovna Bol'shakova (1910) of the village of Selikhovo, Konakovo raion
65. Liubov' Prokof'evna Felkova (1911) of the village of Selikhovo, Konakovo raion
66. Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Dikushkin (1922), village of Selikhovo, Konakovo raion
67. Klavdiia Fedorovna Tsareva (1925) of Konakovo raion
68. Palageia Nikitichna Bashilova (1915) of the village of Mar'ino, Konakovo raion
69. Mariia Konstantinovna Chesnokova (1912) of the village of Mar'ino, Konakovo  
raion
70. Vasilii Sergeevich Serov (1923) of the village of Mar'ino, Konakovo raion
71. Mariia Mikhailovna Golovnova (1903) village of Mar'ino-Pokrovka, Konakovo  
raion
72. Aleksandra Efimovna Malysheva (1929) of the village of Pokrovka, Konakovo  
raion
73. Vasilii Vasil'evich Karpov (1915) of the village of Filimonovo, Konakovo raion
74. Anna Vasil'evna Zhuravleva (1915) of the village of Danilovo, Konakovo raion
75. Nina Vasil'evna Kurganova (1910) of the village of Sidorovo, Udoml'ia raion
76. Vasilii Petrovich Krylov (1933) of the village of Diagilevo, Udoml'ia raion
77. Nikolai Sergeevich Kokorin (1923) of the village of Lediny, Udoml'ia raion

78. Vasilii Gavrilovich Gavrilov (1912) of the village of Kotlovan, Udoml'ia raion
79. Mariia Aleksandrova Sysoeva (1925) of the village of Kotlovan, Udoml'ia raion
80. Valentina Petrovna Pimenova (1915) of the village of Kotlovan, Udoml'ia raion
81. Tat'iana Alekseevna Novikova (1916) of the village of Kotlovan, Udoml'ia raion
82. Antonina Viktorovna Skobeleva (1921) of the village of Vyskodnia, Udoml'ia  
raion
83. Anatolii Fedorovich Antonov (1911) of the village of Vyskodnia, Udoml'ia raion
84. Mariia Vasil'evna Bakhtina (1914) of the village of Morzhovets, Udoml'ia raion
85. Mikhail Aleksandrovich Smirnov (1919) of the village of Morzhovets, Udoml'ia  
raion
86. Nadezhda Alekseevna Smirnova (1919) of the village of Morzhovets, Udoml'ia  
raion
87. Aleksandr Egorovich Smirnov (1911) of the village of Morzhovets, Udoml'ia  
raion
88. Anatolii Egorovich Vakhmistrov (1911) of the village of Morzhovets, Udoml'ia  
raion
89. Nikolai Alekseevich Smirnov (1928) of the town of Udoml'ia
90. Aleksei Mikhailovich Afanas'ev (1920) of the town of Udoml'ia
91. Nikolai Arsen'evich Arkhangel'skii (1924) of the town of Udoml'ia
92. Natal'ia Alekseevna Smirnova (1913) of the town of Udoml'ia
93. Nadezhda Grigor'evna Timofeeva (1916) of the town of Udoml'ia
94. Evgenii Aleksandrovich Golubev (1930) of the town of Udoml'ia
95. Ol'ga Mikhailovna Riabova (1926) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek
96. Liudmila Vasil'evna Egorova (1930) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek
97. Nikolai Konstantinovich Chernomortsev (1912) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek
98. Vera Fedorovna Akimova (1922) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek
99. Valentina Ivanovna Gaganova (1930) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek



100. Sergei Mikhailovich Volkov (1930) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek
101. Petr Mikhailovich Shepelev (1928) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek
102. Nikolai Ivanovich Komarov (1927) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek
103. Aleksandr Vasil'evich Zelentsov (1922) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek
104. Nikolai Petrovich Golubev (1916)(I) of the village of Soroki, Vyshnii Volochek raion
105. Nikolai Fedorovich Alekseev (1917) of the village of Soroki, Vyshnii Volochek raion
106. Nikolai Petrovich Golubev (1923)(II) of the village of Soroki, Vyshnii Volochek raion
107. Zinaida Matveevna Vinogradova (1922), village of Bor'kovo, Vyshnii Volochek raion
108. Anna Neonilovna Ivanova (1916) of the town of Vyshnii Volochek
109. Mariia Stepanovna Kul'menina (1921) of the town of 'Tver'

In all there were 50 or 51 inhabitants of Tver', 1 inhabitant of the Kalinin rural raion, 11 inhabitants of the town --formerly workers' settlement-- of Konakovo, 12 inhabitants of villages in Konakovo raion, 14 inhabitants of villages of Udoml'ia raion and 6 of the town --formerly village-- of Udoml'ia, 10 inhabitants of Vyshnii Volochek, and 4 inhabitants of the rural raion of Vyshnii Volochek in the survey. Thus there were 31 rural dwellers (28%) and 77 town dwellers (71%); one individual could not be placed. This number corresponds almost exactly to the present-day breakdown of Tver' oblast': 71.8% urban and 28.2% rural residents, although in the immediate postwar period, naturally, many more lived in the countryside (Chislennost' naseleniia..., p.4). On January 15, 1959 --the census which comes closest in time to my researched period-- 44% of the oblast' population was urban (Kal.Obl. za 50 let..., p.12); of the present survey -respondents, in 1953, still 45 were living in the countryside, 63 in a

town (58%). Thus there is an excessive representation of urban dwellers in the survey, as there is of Communists, too.

The total population on January 15, 1959, was 1,806,800 (787,400 urban; 1,019,400 rural) (Kal.Obl. za 50 let..., p.12); at the time there were almost 80,000 Communists (Ocherki, prilozhenie 1, p.691), i.e., not even 4.5% of the total oblast' population. In the survey there were 32% Communists who had joined the party before 1953! It should be noticed that, in Soviet history Party membership of people below 30 years of age gradually became less common, so that one can assume that the great majority of those 80,000 in 1959 were people older than 30. Thus, the Party membership among that part of the population surely must have been higher than 4.5% of the total population above 30. It is at the same time obvious that it still must have been far less among that age group than the 32% among the respondents of the survey. These are two reasons to handle the results of the survey with the utmost care; as a consequence of this composition of respondents, many of them were exceedingly critical of the developments in Russia today. The reason for this bias is all too clear, although the situation today is not easy on the whole for pensioners --which was the lot of most of them. In any case, many of the respondents more or less conform to the "*Idealtypus*" of the citizen of former Soviet society in the Communist view --barely literate, but through hard work and undying faith in the Party having made a success of one's life, because socialism had opened the sluices to a sea of opportunities for the common man. Failures have been allotted less space in the survey: some of those unhappy ones, of course, had died during the collectivization, Great Purge, and war. Others later succumbed to the uninhibited intake of alcohol, etc. The average life expectancy in Russia, particularly for males, is extremely low at the moment (64.2 years) (Soiuznye respublik..., p.51) --it seems obvious that some of the more interesting disaffected ones might have been among those who died so young. It would pique one's curiosity to learn the cause for the immoderate longevity of professional Party workers or perhaps

even rank-and-file members --that is, those who survive purges; I think of Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, or Deng Xiao Peng. I.P. Boitsov also apparently died at 91 or 92 in 1988 (*Kalininskaja Oblastnaja Organizatsija...*, p.447). One explanation for the preponderance of Party members in the survey might just be the fact that they are still alive today, while many of their non-Party counterparts have deceased by now.

Nevertheless, the preponderance of Communists and urban dwellers --though certainly not my intention, but due to forces beyond my control, as was the inordinate presence of males in the survey-- made me conclude that the survey would only be useful as a qualified illustration of certain historical events and developments that could be reconstructed from other sources. There is no reason to doubt some of the more graphic stories as told by the interviewees, because the specificity would be hard to make up for anyone, including the interviewers, and the respondents. That is why these accounts have been included sometimes, partially or fully, in the main text.

One of the aspects which confirmed my doubts about the survey's reliability, was the often repeated opinion that, although one was forced to live exceptionally modestly in the period from 1945-1953, at least there was order. Crime at this time did not exist in the memory of many respondents. The records on crime, however, show otherwise. The opinion of the respondents that an inculpable society prevailed under Stalin cannot be sustained by a careful reading of archival records. The explanation for the persistence of this myth should probably be sought in the all too human desire to believe in a lost Golden Age; in the tendency to romanticize one's youth; in sometimes faulty memories; and in the incomprehension of, and dissatisfaction with, the radical changes life had undergone in recent years. The older people who participated in the survey often seemed to be convinced of the omnipresence of crime in today's society, although it might be doubted that at least those who live in the rural parts of Udoml'ia raion and Konakovo raion have indeed been directly confronted with actual acts of crime. The belief in the

upstanding order of Stalinist times probably is also a sign of the regime's successful propaganda at the time --and of the tactic of keeping silent about, for example, the extent of crime in those years. Lastly, many of the Communist respondents were not resigned to the fact that there was nothing positive to be found in the system they had helped to forge and sustain. Among some of them, one finds a steadfast sense of loyalty to the former regime, which sometimes seems to have caused a denial to recognize such menacing elements as the existence of the camp system, of a widespread --although certainly not a universal-- fear of the authorities among the population, and of the very real occurrence of felonies during the Stalin era.

Fear of the authorities was deeply ingrained in some of the respondents. It should be remembered that Soviet citizens in the past often were made to fill out *ankety* for all sorts of reasons by the Party and state. As a result, some respondents were obviously distrustful of this interview and the interviewer and said as little as they could. One respondent claimed a total absence of interest in politics, no political involvement, no knowledge of arrests at the spinning and weaving factory, where she was employed, no inkling of any camps, but still feared her arrest. All her answers were brief. Other respondents preferred to remain anonymous, possibly once more out of alarm that the information they gave could be used against them.

There were 52 males (48%) and 57 females (52%) among the respondents. (This obviously does not correspond to the gender breakdown of the populace in the immediate postwar period.)

Occupational breakdown of the respondents:

RURAL OCCUPATIONS

Kolkhoznik	14
Miller/rank and file kolkhoznik	1
Kolkhoznik/communic. technician	1
Kolkhoznik/brigadier	1

Kolkhoznik/bookkeeper	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Educational/Party worker	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Veterinarian/zootechnician	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Teacher/vet. (hardly residing in province)	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Kolkhoznik/brigadier/kolkhoz sectorhead	2	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Blacksmith/brigadier/chair	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Landsurveyor/bookkeeper/brigadier	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Bookkeeper/chair	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Bookkeeper/head of rural soviet/ Magadan	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Procurement plen./moulder/metalwork.	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Kolkhoznik/MTS worker	1	MTS
Tractor driver/milk factory worker	1	MTS
MTS tractor driver	1	MTS
MTS worker	1	MTS
MTS tract./soldier/Party worker	1	MTS
Raion Party worker	3	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Artel' shoemaker/ sometime kolkhoz hand	1	rural worker/craftsman
Movieoperator/kolkhoznik	1	rural worker/craftsman
Mail carrier	1	
Brick factory head	1	semi-rural, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Kolkhoznik/brick-worker	1	semi-rural
Wood-processing industry worker	1	semi-rural
Teacher/ <i>agitprop</i> worker/paper editor	1	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Teacher	2	rural elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Engineer/tekhnikum teacher	1	semi-rural, "soviet intelligentsiia"
TOTAL		46 rural workers

URBAN (semi-urban, e.g. Konakovo porcelain factory) OCCUPATIONS

Prof. Party worker	2	urban elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Prof. soldier	2	army officers, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Army/NKVD man	1	army officer, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Lawyer/judge	1	urban elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Housewife?/teacher	1	urban employee healthcare/culture, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Teacher	5	urban employees healthcare/culture, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Teacher tekhnikum/ <i>ruz</i> etc.	2	urban employees healthcare/culture, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Medical nurse	2	urban employee healthcare/culture
Director sewing factory	1	urban elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Director/tech. porc. factory	1	urban elite, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Typesetter/engineer-printer	1	specialist, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Tech./engineer-regulator	1	specialist, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Zootech./kindergt. head/ head of <i>ORS</i>	1	specialist; healthcare/culture, "soviet intelligentsiia"
econ. spec. in oblast' trade direction/		
Komsomol	1	specialist, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Student/engineer railroad car constr.	1	specialist, "soviet intelligentsiia"
Weaver/brigadier	1	worker
Weaver	3	workers
Worker of prim. flaxfactory	1	worker
Cleaner at sewing factory/sewer	1	worker
Laundryworker at cottonfibre komb.	1	worker

Spinner	2	worker
Spinner/school/lab/prod. control	1	worker/specialist, "soviet intelligentsia"
Textile(knitted wear)worker	1	worker
Lathe operator/surveyor	1	worker
Lathe operator	1	worker
electrotechnician/welder	1	worker
Moulder	1	worker
Kolkhoznik/surveyor in factory	1	specialist/rural?
Metal worker/welder	1	worker
Metal worker/assistant master	1	worker
Metal worker/instrument maker	1	worker
Machinery mechanic	1	worker
Artel' metal worker	1	artel' worker
Metal worker/ master of mech. tramdept.	1	worker
Railroad repair shop worker	1	worker
Metal worker in railroaddepot/ ex-convict	1	worker
Railroad-depot worker/train driver	1	worker/specialist
Train driver	1	worker/specialist
Kolkhoznik/railroad worker	1	worker
Shoemaker/ techn. head of pack. basis	1	worker/ <i>artel'</i> worker
Carpenter/joiner in furniture komb.	1	worker/ <i>artel'</i> worker
Constr. <i>artel'</i> worker/carpenter	1	<i>artel'</i> worker
Shoemaker/invalid	1	<i>artel'</i> worker
Girl Friday/ "hired hand"	1	worker

Cleaner at psych. hosp/unemploy.?	1	worker
Metal worker/conscript/kolkhoz hand	1	worker
Cook	1	worker
Truck (car) driver	1	worker
Bookkeeper	2	employees, "soviet intelligentsiia"?
Cashier/bookkeeper	1	employee
Student	1	student
TOTAL	63	(semi-) urban workers

As is to be expected in a society that professed to have done away with gender discrimination, women in the occupational breakdown had proportionally more of the menial jobs:

3 were veterinarian/zootecnicians/agronomists, 1 a teacher/newspaper editor, 4 teachers, 1 became only in the war a tractorist. Then there is Valentina Gaganova, who began her professional life as a simple weaver, and subsequently became assistant factory director --a Soviet success story in its purest form!-- and another woman who was a factorydirector/professional Party worker. Another 2 were professional Party workers who served at the level below that of the provincial Party elite; 1 woman led a section of an amalgamated kolkhoz in 1950; a few were bookkeepers or cashiers; 2 became factory surveyors after the war; 2 were nurses; 1 a teacher or housewife; 1 a cook; 1 a type-setter/engineer-printer; 1 an engineer norm-setter; 1 head of a rural soviet who left her job to be with her husband, who had to work in Magadan as a MVD trooper; 1 became a laboratory worker; 1 an economic specialist; and 1 a kolkhozbrigadier.

But 29 women --about half of them-- can be classified as rank-and-file workers/kolkhoz workers.

Of the 14 kolkhozniks *pur sang*, 13 were women, and only 1 was male. The textile industry constituted female territory, while the metal workers were male, as well as all



railroad workers but one. Keep in mind that the best wages at this time were paid in heavy, and not in light, industry.

In the period: \_\_\_\_\_ If not a Communist, then:

Communists	3 4	Asked?	9	One person doubles: refused-
Candidate	1	Spouse	13	but husband was member.
Komsomol	2 3	Spouse asked?	1	
Non-Party	5 1	Post '53 member	8	

Migration of contemporary town dwellers (Tver', Vyshnii Volochek, Udoml'ia, and Konakovo)

Udoml'ia, which only recently --most likely since the opening of the nuclear power station near the settlement in the early 1980s-- has become a town, was an "urban type settlement" until at least 1967, and even in 1957 was still called a village (Narod. Khoziaistvo..., 1957, p.8).

Konakovo was in 1926 still an urban type settlement (Kal.Oblast za 50 let..., 1967, p.13) with 3,800 inhabitants, and had become a town by 1939.

Thus in both cases, sometimes people who had been born there became progressively urbanized, because their village/settlement was urbanizing. Konakovo will be considered as a town, and thus people born there will not be grouped with those who saw their surroundings urbanize; people who moved there from the countryside are counted as having taken part in migration to urban areas.

In Udoml'ia, 1 person saw her native village become a town; 2 people moved to the raion centre from the country before 1953 and witnessed its recent urbanization. After 1953, 3 people moved from the countryside to Udoml'ia.

Of the 10 respondents in Vyshnii Volochek, 5 were born town dwellers, 4 moved to the town from the countryside before 1953, and one came to town from the countryside outside the Tver' guberniia/Kalinin oblast'.

Of the 50 certain inhabitants of Tver' today, 1 was born in a rural area outside the oblast' and came to Kalinin in 1951; 1 came from the oblast' countryside to Kalinin in 1947 and 1 in 1948; 1 came from the oblast' countryside after his army service in 1951 to Kalinin; 1 came via Moscow and the oblast' countryside in 1948 to Kalinin; 1 came from the raion centre of Ves'egonsk to Kalinin in 1947; 1 from the countryside of Leningrad oblast' to Kalinin in 1951; 1, who was born in the countryside of Belarus', came to Kalinin in the 1940s via the town of Briansk; 1 came from rural Kazakhstan to Kalinin before 1945; 1 from Rostov-on-the-Don oblast', and 1 from Kursk oblast' countryside came to Kalinin before 1945; 15 came from the Tver'/Kalinin countryside to the provincial capital before 1945; 6 came after 1953 to Kalinin.

15 were natives of Kalinin; 3 came respectively from the towns of Leningrad, Smolensk, and Mirgorod in Ukraine. Thus out of the 50 respondents in all, who lived in Tver' in 1992, only 18 were born in a town; the other 32 were born in rural areas. 8 moved during the period of 1945-1953 to Kalinin, one of whom had been living in a town (Briansk) before.

Out of 11 present-day citizens of the town of Konakovo, 4 were born in Konakovo/Kuznetsovo, 5 came from the countryside to Konakovo before 1945, 1 almost "ruralized" coming to Konakovo from Leningrad, 1 came after 1953 from the countryside to Konakovo.

One person in the survey, in a village in Konakovo raion, went the other way round: she moved from town to countryside.

In this way, out of 77 urban dwellers in the survey, only 28 were actually born in a town (18 of those lived in Tver', 5 in Vyshnii Volochek, 4 in Konakovo --which at that time, between 1917 and 1930, could hardly be called a town!--, and 1 in the

countryside of Konakovo). This translates into a relative share of 36% of all townspeople in the survey; 64% came from the countryside. How much urbanization was part of Soviet history in the Kalinin oblast'--as was seen already from other sources--one can deduct from the fact that 49 of the 109 respondents in the survey moved to towns --or became urbanized, as in the case of the residents of Udoml'ia-- within their lifetime, which translates into 45%!

The survey was probably representative for the ethnic composition of the Kalinin oblast': 98 Russians participated, 4 Karelians, 3 Jews, 2 Ukrainians, and 2 Belarus'.

## APPENDIX II

### The Schackled Press

The following presents the plan for the work of the newspaper editors of Proletarskaja Pravda for November and December 1946 (based on Pako, 147/4/57, ll. 115-124).

The editorial plan was discussed on October 30, 1946; the material is part of a *delo* of the Special Sector of the oblast' committee of the Party. In this case, the *delo* records the *protokoly* of the sessions of the Buro of the oblast' Party committee, from October 12 until October 30, 1946. Iuzhakov, editor of the paper, was present, not surprisingly, as he was a candidate member of the Buro. The document was signed by the substitute responsible editor, Vernov.

#### (1) The Editorial Plan

*Voprosy orgpartraboty* (Questions of Party organizational work)

*Peredovye* (leading articles, editorials)

1. The commissioning by the Party --a most important form of the education of Communists.
2. Bolshevik intolerance and shortcomings in economic labour.
3. The avant garde rôle of Communists.
4. Rural Communists.
5. To be principled and demanding in Party work.
6. The political education of the youth.
7. The raikom instructor of the Party.

8. To strengthen the Komsomol organization in the kolkhozy by all means.

*Stat'i* (articles)

1. The raikom of Molokovo does not notice the violations of the statutes of the rural economic artels.
2. The work experience of one primary Party organization with the education of young Communists /Similar tale/.
3. The *orginstruktor* department of the Novokarel' raikom.
4. How the raikom of Esenovich draws in members of the raikom and actively participates in work [being done in the raion].
5. The work experience of one Party instructor.
6. The work experience with respect to education of a secretary of a primary Party organization.
7. Again on the erroneous use of the Party-*aktiv* in the raion of Zavidovo.
8. The Partyburo: an organ of collective leadership.
9. On the execution of the resolution of the obkom about the leadership of rural Party organizations by the raikom of Bologoe.
10. On the work of the raikom of Rameshki with kolkhoz cadres.
11. The leadership by a rural raikom of socialist emulation.
12. How the Party organization of the kolkhoz "Zavidovo" fights for the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan of the artel'.
13. The education of kolkhoz cadres /the work experience of the territorial Party organization of the Tebleshkii raion/.
14. The Party organizations are guarding the democratic fundamentals of the kolkhoz.

15. Erroneous education of cadres /on the substitution and duplication of economic and soviet organs/.
16. The avant-garde rôle of Communists in the "Molotov" sovkhoz /Novotorzhok raion/.
17. The activity and self-sufficiency of Communists in the struggle for the Plan /The "Krasnyi Mai" plant in the raion of Vyshnii Volochek/.
18. The education of a Communist attitude towards work.
19. Do not fawn to orders from Communists.
20. A Party organization's care for the living conditions of the toilers.
21. On the leadership of a raikom at the proceedings of Party meetings.
22. The leadership over the work of a raikom *apparatus*
23. Party control of requests and complaints to Soviet institutions on labour conditions.
24. The work experience of one kolkhoz Party organization /similar tale/.
25. The Party organization of a MTS and the education of tractor drivers.
26. The work style of one raikom of the Komsomol.
27. The *Komsomoltsy* of the "Red Army" MTS.
28. On the work of one kolkhoz Komsomol organization where there is no Party organization.
29. Young masters of the *arte*//Similar story on the work of the Komsomol organization of one kolkhoz/.
30. Two organizations -- two examples.

(II) *Voprosy propagandy i ucheby* (Propaganda and study questions)

*Peredovye*

1. On political agitation among the people in their residences.
2. To improve the quality of the work of the political school in the village.
3. On lectures and consultations to help Communists' political self-study.
4. Against the reduction of propaganda work for the Five Year Plan.

*Stat'i*

1. The global-historical meaning of the Great October Socialist Revolution /article by comrade Puzdyrev/.
2. On scientific forecasts/ art. by com. Apresian/.
3. Comrade Stalin about the ideological foundations of the Bolshevik party /Lecture of com. Puadyrev [sic], obkom lecturer of the VKP(b)/.
4. The adaptation and defense by I.V. Stalin of the organizational foundation of the Bolshevik Party/art. by com. Smirnov, obkom lecturer/.
5. On V.I. Lenin's "Two Tactics"/ art. by com. Bokachev, obkom lecturer/.
6. On I.V. Stalin's "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism"/ two articles of Tugarinov of the *Pedinstitut*.
7. From the history of the revolutionary movement in the Tver' guberniia /The first marxists in Tver'. Lecture of com. Shelgunev, obkom lecturer/.
8. Preparation and proceedings of the October Revolution in the Tver guberniia/ article by com. Il'in of the *oblpartarkhiy*.

9. Answers to questions --twice a month.

10. On the worthless work style of the propaganda department of the gorkom of Rzhev/Petrov/.

(as well as several more subjects in the same vein).

### **(III) Agriculture**

Leading articles on how to improve the harvest; on emulation; on cadres; on flax procurements; on the upcoming distribution of the income; on cattle; on MTS; on chairmen; on the strengthening of backward kolkhozy.

#### Articles and sections

local successes and failures; how to improve the rotation of crops; the artel' statutes; electrification; tractor drivers should be prepared for the coming spring; wintertime, a time for cadres to study; better buildings for cattle; etc.

### **(IV) Industry and transport**

#### Leading articles

No *brak* [wastage]; economize with raw materials; fuel and electricity; some exemplary workers

#### Articles

Different *reidy*, i.e. swoops (special assignments) --investigations by groups of journalists of alleged malpractices or grievances: on the rubber-sole factory, the railroad-car factory "Kalinin", on the sewing factory of Kimry, on the factory "Krasnyi Oktiabr", all about bad proceedings in these factories; on *brak* on the saving of energy; on several other badly operating factories; on Stakhanovites and *peredoviki* (advanced workers).

### **(V) *Rabota Sovetov* (The work of the soviets)**



### Leading articles

Workers' complaints and how to handle them; to improve the level of mass-organizational work; on chairmen of the rural soviets; to improve the cadres' ideological-political ideas; on culture in the raion centre.

### Articles

Local examples: frequent mistakes; healthcare; culture (among others the *izby-chital'nye*).

## VI

Letters, the survey of the (other) press

1. Letters and parts of speeches in every edition
2. Survey of the press about the following themes:
  - A. Illumination in the newspaper of Party life
  - B. The problems of animal husbandry
  - V. The paper and local [i.e. small] industry
  - G. The work of the soviets
  - D. Forgotten themes
  - E. About a most important subject /flax/
3. Literary pages
4. Reviews, poems, stories, sketches of local comrades
5. Everyday information on the USSR and on the oblast'.

First obkom secretary Boitsov went along with the above plan (Pako, 147/4/157, ll. 126/127).

## APPENDIX III

The composition of the Kalinin obkom of the  
Communist Party in the years 1937 and 1938 and  
1945-1953.

The following table is based on

Pako, 147/1/525, ll.114,115,251  
147/1/526, ll.49, 52, 66, 79, 83, 93, 211, 213, 215-217,  
218, 225, 226, 229-235  
147/1/527, ll.2-20,23,24,28, 45,69,70,72-78,  
91,92,103-108, 127-130 and 197-201  
147/1/528, ll.2, 60, 69, 71, 72, 81, 83-  
86, 88, 89, 91-93, 114, 120, 122, 124, 125, 129, 130,  
140, 142, 144  
147/1/529, ll. 2-8, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 46-51,  
53, 63, 64  
147/1/554, ll.3, 3ob., 4, 9, 9ob., 95, 96, 109, 120, 121,  
122, 143, 144, 240, 241  
147/1/555, ll.254, 271, 272

Tverskoi tsentr... pp.13-20

Nataliia Gevorkian, "Vstrechnye plany po unichtozheniiu  
sobstvennogo naroda," Moskovskie Novosti, No.25, 21 iunia 1992  
g., pp.18 and 19

Kalygina and Lipshits were two individuals of the local Party leadership who apparently fell victim to an earlier purge; in June 1937, Goliakov called Lipshits and Kalygina Trotskyites, and accused them of trying to purchase people's support. People whose support had been bought by Kalygina and Lipshits, according to Goliakov, were Guzenko, Ivanitskii, Konshin, and Tul'man; all but the first seem to have disappeared already by May 1937: Kalygina's patronymic is Stepanovna, and it seems that she is the same Kalygina described by Roy Medvedev (R. Medvedev, Let History Judge, p.409). Earlier than June 1937, another nest of "wreckers-Trotskyites" had been discovered in the town of Kalinin: the chair of the town soviet, Novikov, aided and abetted them. This group included the vice-chair of the town soviet Gorova, the second vice-chair Afanas'ev, and Krasikov, the head of transport. In the oblispolkom Trotskyites and Rights had already been unmasked as well, and the names of Chlenov, Kopelev, and Gribov --see below-- were given by Goliakov in June 1937. One Mel'nikov, who worked in the oblast' financial department had been arrested by the NKVD, too.

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC <sup>1</sup>	8/6/37	8/6/37 <sup>2</sup>	22/3'38 <sup>3</sup>	6-7 1938 <sup>4</sup>	
K.F.	absent	candidate <sup>6</sup>	cand.		present		
Abramova <sup>5</sup>							
E.E.Alek-	present		member;	head of			1. excl. in
seevskii			el.can.buro	agric.otdel			37/38

<sup>1</sup>These are obkom members, known to have been elected at the second Party Conference of the Kalinin oblast' in early June 1937. Only one year later at the 3rd Party Conference, Boitsov said that 5 out of 11 of the members of the obkomburo, elected after the 2nd PC, had been unmasked and arrested as enemies of the people: Mikhailov, Goliakov, Dombrovskii, Kuzenits, and Pitkovskii. Goliakov described the existence of a whole number of Trotskyite and Right groupings in Kalinin town at the conference of June 1937, led by Lipshits, Guzenko, Gorov, and other enemies of the people. Khramenko, an army commander, announced that Gamarnik had been exposed as an enemy of the people; thanks to the activities of the NKVD "...the army can healthily continue with the affairs for which it exists." He went on to extol the virtues of the re-introduction of political commissars in the army at this time. One Stepynin, the commissar of the 43th division, was removed from the list of candidates for participation in 1928 in the resolution of the Army-Political Academy "N.G. Tolmachev." Delegates tried to connect him with Enov, who was at this academy in 1928; Stepynin's division seems to have been located in the Velikie Luki okrug (bordering Latvia); one army representative suggested that the NKVD should check Stepynin.

<sup>2</sup>As far as known.

<sup>3</sup>It seems that both CC secretary A.A. Andreev and Georgy Malenkov were present at this plenum --perhaps before it, on March 17, 1938, in the case of Andreev, who seems to have been present at a session of secretaries, according to the head of the obkom agricultural otel, Chukhrov, in July 1938. At this point the CC took a decision condemning the errors of the Kalinin obkom and oblispolkom (called "*Ob oshibkakh Kaliniinskogo obkoma VKP(b) i oblispolkoma*"). One of the complaints of the Central Committee seems to have been the slow pace at which enemies of the people were being unmasked, as Chukhrov remarked at the 3rd Party Conference of the oblast'.

<sup>4</sup>The renewal is startling; hardly anyone of the obkom elected only one year earlier returned.

<sup>5</sup>Abramova: full or candidate member of Party obkom in January 1937. Also elected as members of the obkom at the 3rd Party conference were I.V. Stalin and M.I. Kalinin.

<sup>6</sup>The following people failed to receive a majority vote at the 2nd PC in order to be elected as candidates: Minin, Kirillov, Arenkov, Bukharov, Bereznev, Iamshchikov, Venovskii, Kuznetsov, and Sipchenko. Marov --who won a large majority of votes for (365-119)--, Afonin (378-106), Malysheva (259-225), Dorofeev (245-239), Emel'ianov (246-238), and Lazarev (253-231) were also not elected as candidate members, although they had more than half of the votes for their candidature. One Mamaev, until that moment the raispolkom chair of Rzhev, lost his candidature for full member in the pre-election discussions.

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
A.A.						present;	
Abramov						mem.; el.	
						2nd sek	
A.M.	absent		cand/mem				2.excl.in
Amosov							37/38
S.M.						present;	
Antonluk						mem;el.buro	
I.T.	present		cand/mem				
Antropov							
A.I.Aver'-					In March	present;	
lanova					app.	member	
					ralkomsek		
					Prol.raion		
P.K.Aseev	ralkomsek	candidate	cand		present		
D.P.Afino-	ralkomsek	candidate	cand		present		
genov							
N.T. Afonin	ralkomsek	not.elec.	cand		present		
		cand(?)					
P.I.Balaev						present;	
						member	
D.L.	present	candidate	cand				3.ex.in
Bedachev							37/38
V.D.Belov						present;	
						member	

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
I.P.Boltsov					Introd. as member obkom and el. 1 sek	present; mem.; re-el.1 sek	
I.F.Boro- dachev	present	candidate	cand				4.ex.in 37/38
Botev	absent		absent				
A. Brandin	present	speaks as Komsomol sek;repla- ced by Korotlaev	absent				5. excl. In 37/38 (survived camps)
L.F. Bulygin	absent	candidate; connection with enemy Zhadaev	cand				6.ex.in 37/38
G.D. Bulygin					ralkomsek; prob.of Kimry ralkom	present; member	7.ex.in 37/38
R.A. Briskina	otdel-head		member	head of press/publ. otdel			8.ex.in 37/38
F.M. Bulakhov						present; cand	

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
I.A.						present;	
Burlakov						member	
M.A.Bush-						present;	
marina						cand	
Bushuev	present		absent				
P.I.Bykov						present;	
						member	
A.M.						present;	
Vasil'ev						member	
V.V.						present;	
Vasil'ev						member	
S.V.	present	falls RC? <sup>7</sup>	cand/mem				
Vasil' ev							
P.F.						present;	
Venovskii						member	
S.Ia.	absent		cand/mem				
Vershinin							
N.S.					PCC rep?	present;	
Vinogradov						member	
P.K.	absent		member		present		
Vinogradov							

<sup>7</sup>In the case of the election of the new Revision Committee at the 2nd PC, one Gurinov seems to be coopted as a member, while Levin, Veselov, Ushakov, Briukvin, Loshchilov, Glushchenko, and Elenin receive more votes cast against them than for them. For Gusikhin, Vorontsov --noticed here for the first time--, Zarubkin, Vasil'ev (there are two without initials, so we don't know for certain which one), the majority of votes is not large enough.

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3 '38	6-7 1938	
A.I. Volkov						present; member	
A.S. Volkov						present; member	
T.N. Volkov	raikomsek	candidate	cand				9.ex. In 37/38
I.P. Volchenkov	raikomsek; app. sek of Okt. ralon	raikomsek of Oktabr' rai of Kal- in town	member		present	present; mem;el. head of ORPO; el.buro present; cand	10.ex.In 37/38
A.A. Vorob'ev							
Voronin	present		?				
A.Ia. Voronina	absent(?) see above		cand/mem		present		
A.G. Vorontsova						present; member	
G.B. Voskanian	present	elected	member;	editor			11.ex.In 37/38
K.A. Gadbank	present		member;	head of	present		12.ex.In 37/38
P.T. Glazkova	absent		member		present		

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
N.I.	present	Kallnin	member;				13.ex.in
Goliakov		gorkomsek	el.buro				37/38
A.V.Gorlov	present		cand/mem				14.ex.in
							37/38
A.I.	absent		cand/mem		present		
Gormina							
Grinberg	present		absent				
P.D.	present	Excl. 20/5/					15.ex.in
Guzenko		37 <sup>8</sup> ;					37/38
		called					
		enemy					
I.F.Gusev						present;	
						member	
I.F.	absent	candidate/	cand		present;		16.ex.in
Gusikhin		falls RC			under fire;		37/38
					ispolkom		
					meeting to		
					be held to		
					decide on		
					him		
I.S.						present;	
Davydov						member	

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<sup>8</sup>See above footnote 2



	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
Davydova	present	perhaps	absent				
		Party					
		<i>Instruktor</i>					
A.A.	absent		member	vice-			17.ex.In
Deviatkin				oblispolkom			37/38
				chair			
Demina	present		absent				
A.F.	absent		cand/mem				18.ex.In
Denisov							37/38
N.V.	absent		cand/mem		present		
Denisov							
V.R.	present	head of	member;		before		19.ex.In
Dombrov-		obl.NKVD;	el.buro				37/38
skii <sup>9</sup>		chekist					
		since 1920					
Drozdova	present		absent				
Evdok-	absent		absent				
Imova							
I.S.Enov <sup>10</sup>	present						20.ex.In
							37/38

<sup>9</sup>Rabov, Dombrovskii, and Bobkov --a functionary of the judiciary and probably the oblast' *prokuror* mentioned by Boitsov and criticized for his shoddy work in the *prokuratura*-- are appointed around July 1937 as the members of the purging troika by Ezhov (order No.00447).

<sup>10</sup> Zhadaev was mentioned by Rabov in May 1937 as being arrested, together with Lipshits, Kozhelev and Gribov and unnamed others; one Lipshits of the Kalinin railroad is stricken from the list of obkom candidates at the 2nd Party conference in June 1937 on his own request. Lipshits was the director of the Maks Gel'ts factory, and had been

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
K.T.	present		member		present		
Ermolenko							
Ershov	present		absent				
I.I.Efanov						present;	
						member	
I.E.						present;	
Efremov						cand	
Zhadaev <sup>11</sup>	absent	(Dir. Flax-Institute)					21.ex.in
							37/38
I.P.	present		cand/mem		present		22.ex.in
Zhdanov							37/38
Zhukov	absent	Removed by					probably
		2nd PC from					repressed in
		11st; weak in					'37/'38
		collectiv.					
F.E.Zhukov						present;	23.ex.in
						member	37/38
P.M.						present;	
Zver'kova						member	

already executed by June 1937. Gribov --an enemy of the people-- is mentioned at the 3rd Party conference by Boitsov as a member of the oblast' courts, might have been a *prokurov*, who tried to terrorize the kolkhoz and soviet cadres in the countryside. Enov, a member of the obkomburo, probably was a Party secretary of Velikie Luki okrug (and a former army officer/commissar), of which the first Komsomol okruzhkom secretary, one Kaganovskii, is criticized by Brandin in June 1937 for his ties with Enov. Enov was arrested with the assistance of Peskarev and Listengurt before or during a plenum of the okruzhkom. He was officially excluded as counterrevolutionary Trotskyite and enemy of the people on April 29, 1937.

<sup>11</sup>See above footnote 10

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
Ziuz'-	present	elected?;	absent				probably
Iakovenko		commander					purged in
		of army					1937
		<i>korpus</i>					
D.I. Ivanov	absent		member			present;	
						member	
I.Z. Ivanov	present		member		present		
V.I. Ivanov	present	elected	member		present		24.ex.in
	member of						37/38
	okruzhkom						
	of Velkie						
	Luki						
V.F. Ivanov	absent	chair of	absent				25.repres-
		oblispol-					sed in 37/38
		kom					
P.E.	absent		member				26.ex.in
Ivanov <sup>12</sup>							37/38
P.P.						present;	
Izvekov						member	
N.B.	present	candidate	cand				27.ex.in
Ivushkin							37/38

<sup>12</sup>"For the issuing of the recommendation to transfer from candidate to full member the enemy of the people GRAI (SOKOLOV) and passivity with respect to the exposing and unmasking of counterrevolutionary elements: to exclude c. IVANOV P.E. from the membership of the oblast' committee of the *VKP(b)* (Pako 147/1/528,1.125 (4th obkom plenum of September 10-11 1937). In how far we are dealing here with one of the two Sokolovs is not clear.

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
R.A. Illarionov	revkom		member		absent		
T.M. Il'ichev	revkom		cand/mem		present	otdelhead; unclear if he is also member	
Kaganskii	absent		absent				
P.G. Kazakov						present; member	
I.Ia Kalinin	raikomsek	candidate	cand		present	present; mem,el. 3rd sek	28.ex.in 37/38
I.I. Kal'chenko	absent	sek.of Partyburo of border- troops detach- ment	member		present		
N.E. Karmakov						present; member	
N.E. Kapranov	present		member	head of soviet-trade otdel	present	otdelhead; unclear if he is also member	

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3 '38	6-7 1938	
V.F.	otdelhead		member	absent	present		29.ex.in
Karsanov							37/38
Kirillov	absent	not elec.		absent			
A.N.Kirp-						present;	
Ichnikov						cand	
F.G.	present	candidate;	cand	absent			30.ex.in
Klimenko		head of					37/38
		oblast'					
		consumers					
		council					
(I.A.)	present			absent			
Kozlov							
D.E.	absent		cand/mem	absent	present		
Komarov							
E.O.Komis-						present;	
sarova						member	
D.V.						present;	
Kondrat'ev						member	
P.M.Kons-						present;	
tantinov						member	
Koroleva	present	?		absent			
V.S.	absent	Komsomol	member		present		
Korotiaev	worked in	leader; 1					
	CC of	sek instead					
	Komsomol	of Brandin					

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
N(I).V. Kosarev	absent		cand/mem		present		
N.I. Krasnova						present; member	
G.I. Krul'	present	gorkomsek	member;		present		31.ex.in
	worked	of Vyshnii	el.can.buro				37/38
	before as	Volochek					
L.I.Krylov						present; mem;el. cand buro	
S.E.Krysov	raikomsek	candidate	cand				32.ex.in 37/38
M.B. Kuzenits	present		member;				33.ex.in 37/38
(M.V.) Kuznetsov	present	not elec.	absent				
A.E.Kulagin						present; member	
P.P. Kurnaev	absent	elected;	member;		present		
		head of	el.buro				
		okruzhkom					
		of Velikie					
		Luki					
N.N. Lapikov						present; member	

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3 '38	6-7 1938	
A.I.						present;	
Lebedeva						member	
Levin	present	falls RC	absent				
(V.P.)	present		absent				
Lelekov							
R.A.	absent	present;	absent				
Listengurt		apparently					
		earlier					
		aiding with					
		Enov's					
		arrest					
Lunin	present	RC memb					see below
F.I.	absent		cand/mem		present	otdelhead;	
Lysenkov						unclear if he	
						is also	
						member	
V.I. Liashik						present;	
						member	
A.N. Marov	absent		(member?)				34.ex.ln
			later cand				37/38
L.A.	absent		member		present	present;	
Mashkova						member	
(F.S. Mel'nik						present;	
ov) F.S. Mel'						member	
shanov							

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
P.F.	present	candidate	cand				35.ex.in
Mitrakov							37/38
(M.E.)	present	elected	member;	first			36.ex.in
Mikhailov	Earlier CC		el.first sek	secretary			37/38
	<i>Instruktor</i>		(buromem)				
R.N.	present	elected	member;	head of			37.ex.in
Mishna-			el.buro	obl.agric.			37/38
evskii				direction			
I.I.Moiseev						present;	
						cand	
I.A.	raikomsek		member				
Morozov							
L.Ia.	revkom	Probably	member				38.ex.in
Nazarov		oblast					37/38
		<i>prokurorat</i>					
		time of 2nd					
		PC					
Nefedova	present	Active	Raikom-				
		accuser at	sek?				
		2nd PC					
K.A.						present;	
Nikiforov						member	
V.Ia.(V.F.)	raikomsek	candidate	cand		present		
Nikiforov							



	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
N.V.	raikomsek	candidate	cand				39.ex.in
Nikonov							37/38
A.N.						present;	40.ex.in
Nikonov						mem;el.buro	37/38
T.A.Nodel'	absent	Head of obkom school otdel; former member of <i>Bund</i>	cand/mem	head of school, science otdel			
S.A.	raikomsek	candidate	cand		present		
Novichkov							
E.Ia.	present	elected;	member		present;		41.ex.in
Nosovskii		secretary of Bologoe raikom			Bologoe Party leader		37/38
M.M.						present;	
Obraztsov						cand.	
A.A.Ozlpov						present;	
						member	
S.A.	absent		cand/mem	Plenlp.PC/ procurem.	present		
Parshin							
Pavlov	present		absent				

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
I.A.Pere- pelkin						present; mem; el.head agitpropod el;el.cand buro	
G.S.	present	elected;	member;				42.ex.in
Peskarev		obkomsek	el.buro				37/38
M.Ia.	absent		absent;		present	present;	
Petrova			memb			mem;not	
			el.can.buro			elec. buro	
M.F.	present		member;		as enemy		43.ex.in
Pltkovskii			el.buro				37/38
Pozharskii	present		absent				
Polesh- chuk	absent		absent				
P.G.Rabov	present		member;	second	first		44.ex.in
13			el.2nd.sek	secretary	secretary; released		37/38
Rogozh- nikov	present		absent				
D.A.	absent		member				
Rozenko							

<sup>13</sup>See above footnote 10 and the remarks at the end of this table.

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
L.N.Rozova	absent		member				
M.M.					raikomsek	present;	
Romashov						member	
A.S.Savvin						present;	45.ex.
						cand.	in 37/38
M.F.	absent		member		present		
Savel'ev							
A.E.						present;	
Safonov						member	
M.A.Seve-	absent		cand/mem		present		
rova							
Ia(A).S.						present;	
Semenov						member	
M.V.	absent		member				46.ex.
Slonimskii							in 37/38
Sirmals	present		absent				
G.M.						present;	
Smimov						member	
I.K.	present		member				
Smimov							
L.I.	present		absent				
Smimov							
M.I.						present;	
Smimov						member	

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
(N.P.?)	present		absent				
Solomonov							
A.V.	present	of the Maks	absent				
Sokolov		Gel'ts (r.r.)					
		factory in					
		V.L.okrug?					
I.I.Sokolov	absent	of the Maks	absent;				47.
		Gel'ts(r.r.)	apparently				ex.in 37/38
		factory in	member				
		V.L.okrug?					
A.P.						present;	
Staro-						member;	
torzhskii						el.buro	
Starukhin	present		absent				
A.S.Stepan						present;	
ova						member	
E.I.Ste-	present		absent				
panova							
M.A.	absent	partkom sek	cand/mem		present		
Tarasova		in Vyshnii					
		Volochek					
I.P.	raikomsek	candidate	cand				
Telezhkin							

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
V.A.	absent		member	head of			48.ex.in
Tomash-				agltprop			37/38
evlch <sup>14</sup>				otdel			
M.V.Trofimo						present;	
va						mem	
V.M.	absent	candldate	cand;later				49.
Trufanov			full member				ex.in37/38
D.M.	raikomsek		member				50.ex.in
Trushin							37/38
Filatov	present		absent				
I.S.Fillpov						present;	
						member	
V.A.	absent	candidate	cand				
Fin'kova							
S.F.(I) Fokin	present		member		present		
D.V.	present	candldate	cand				
Fomicheva							

<sup>14</sup> "In connection with the fact, that c[omrade] TOMASHEVICH during the whole period of his work in the Kalinin party organization did not wage an active struggle with the enemies of the people -trotskyites, right counterrevolutionaries; did not take any measure to help the party to unmask enemies of the people in the organization of the BSSR [Belorussia], where c.TOMASHEVICH worked in the course of three years in the apparat of the CC of the Belorussian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and in the town committee of Gomel', and also in connection with the fact, that during the time of the heading by c.TOMASHEVICH of the department of party propaganda and agitation of the obkom of the VKP(b) the work of the department did not improve, but, on the contrary deteriorated: to exclude c. TOMASHEVICH from the membership of the oblast' committee of the VKP(b) (Pako 147/1/528, l.125 (4th obkom plenum of September 10-11 1937.

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
A.Ia.Frolov						present;	
						member	
F.I.Frolov						present;	
						member	
E.I.Frolova	present		absent				
I.F.	absent		cand/mem				
Khomich							
A.N. Khramenko	present	speaks on Army "restructuring" <sup>15</sup>	member; el.can.buro				
I.A. Chukanov	present	elected; sek of Opochet- skill okruzhkom	member; el.buro				51. ex.in 37/38
I.F. Chukhnov						present;	
						cand	
P.I. Chukhrov	present		cand/mem		present	otdelhead;	
						unclear if he is also member	
A.A.Shavaleva	absent		cand/mem			present;	
						member	

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<sup>15</sup>See above footnote 2

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
A.A. Shish-						present;	
mareva						member	
K.D.						present;	
Shubochkin						member	
M.V.	absent		cand/mem		present		
Shuvalova							
I.K.	present		absent				
Shevchuk							
M.G.						present;	
Iuzhakov						member	
A.A.Iurov						present;	
						member	
Iamsh-		candid.fr					
chikov		obkommem					
		bership					
		(see(6))					
R.M.	absent		absent				52. ex.
Iarishkin							In 37/38
A.V.					present;		
Guminski					NKVD-head		
Total	62		86(88)		41	59+1)=	
						68	

Thus at least 52 obkom members and candidates were excluded in 37/38.

## The revision committee in 1937/1938 of the Kalinin obkom

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
Arenkov <sup>16</sup>	present	not elec.					
I.A.						present	
Balakirev							
Barsukova	present						
P.A.	raikomsek	elected	present				
Baryshev		revkom					
		member					
N.V. Belov	raikomsek	elected	present				
		revkom					
		member					
Gerasimov	absent						
S.A.	present	elected.	present				
Gorbachev		rev.mem.					
A.A.	absent	coopt.					
Gurlinov		revmemb.					
Eliseev	absent						
Zarubkin	absent	falls RC					
Il'arionov	present		cand/mem				
Il'ichev	present		cand/mem				
Ia.V.Kir-						present	
Iushin							
P.I. Korlavin						present	

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<sup>16</sup>Arenkov: member of revision committee in January 1937 or later.



	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
S.M. Kluev	raikomsek	elected	present				
		revkom					
		member					
F.F. Korolev	absent?	elected	present		present		
		revkom					
		member					
Kudrjav-	absent	not in elec.	absent				
tsev							
D.G. Levash						present	
ev							
A.V. Lunin	obkom	elected	absent				
	member/	revkom					
	candidate	member					
G.G. Ljamin	raikomsek	elected	present				
		revkom					
		member					
S.I.						present	
Musatov							
Nazarov	present	prob.	cand/mem				
		<i>prokuror</i>					
		(see above)					
Nodel'	absent		cand/mem				
M.V. Per-						present	
egudova							

	Plenum	Elect.	1st Plen.	Function	7th Plen	1st Plenum	Fate?
	1-37	2nd PC	8/6/37	8/6/37	22/3'38	6-7 1938	
Petrov	present		Perhaps	Head of			
			same one	obl.office of			
			as Petrova	Statebank?			
I.M.	raikomsek	elected	present				
Petukhov		revkom					
		member					
A.D.	raikomsek	elected					
Rubekin		revkom					
		member					
V.M.						present	
Solov'ev							
Tomling	present						
A.I.	absent	elected	present	head of			
Tsimbler		revkom		obl.financed			
		member		ept.			
G.S.						absent	
Shalonskii							
T.T.						present	
Churakov							
Total	8	11	8		1	8	

Although in the collection in the archive of the former Communist Party the date for the fifth obkom plenum is given as September 5, 1937, it follows in the records after the *protokol* of the plenum of September 10/11, 1937; V.I.Ivanov was made second secretary, for

which he was freed from the duties of third secretary, something he had become at the September plenum, i.e. earlier (Pako, 147/1/528, ll.128-130). Furthermore, the *protokol* calls it the fifth obkom plenum. The plenum does not take place later than October 1937, since in the second *orgvopros* the chairs of the okrug electoral committees --who were in preparation for the upcoming Supreme Soviet elections-- were ordered to organize certain operations before October 15, 1937. Another promotion at this fifth plenum was that of A.Ia. Kalinin, who became third secretary. Il'ichev, Kalinin, and Guminskii were elected into the obkomburo as full members, Aseev was promoted from candidate to full member of the buro. Afonin, V.F. Nikiforov, N.V. Nikonov, Telezhkin, I.Ia. Kalinin [sic], Novichkov, Ivushkin, and Abramova were promoted to full obkom membership from candidate membership, Guminskii (the CC was asked to confirm his cooptation) was coopted as full member. Also present at this meeting were two Komsomol secretaries: I.N.Volkov and A.I.Rodionova.

In January 1938, the sixth obkom plenum was staged, where almost all raikom secretaries, 70 raiispolkom chairs, and 110 MTS and MTM directors took part in the discussion of the question "About the liquidation of the consequences of the wrecking in agriculture and the preparation for the spring sowing of 1938". Also present were Komsomol secretary Volkov and the members of the *partkollegiia* of the Party Control Committee for the Kalinin oblast', Vashkevich and Likhacheva. Part of the resolution taken by this plenum on agriculture went as follows:

"Counterrevolutionary clusters, trotskyite-bukharinite spies, wreckers and diversants, kulak- and other enemy groups, who had incurred, by their base wrecking work, a serious loss to the cause of socialist construction in the Kalinin oblast', have suffered a crushing defeat through the Central Committee of the *VKP(b)*, the obkom of the *VKP(b)*, the organs of the NKVD and the local party organizations of the Kalinin oblast'.

"Using political blindness and carelessness of various party- and soviet organizations, the enemies of the people incurred a great loss to agriculture of the oblast' by way of wrecking planning of sown areas and the disruption of the crop rotation, the muddling of the affairs with seeds, the ignoring of agrotechnique, the collapse of the machine-tractor park in a number of MTS, the disruption and distortion of the party line in the conduct of various kinds of procurements of agricultural products, the distortion of the statute of the agricultural artel, the liquidation of heads of cattle in a number of kolkhozy and sovkhozy and so on.

"The plenum notes that the obkomburo of the *VKP(b)*, the *partkollegiia* of the *KPK* for the Kalinin oblast', the party groups of the oblispolkom, and a number of local party organizations, did not draw all necessary conclusions in order to develop in a Bolshevik manner self-criticism, and to unmask timely enemies of the people, to fully purge the organization of counterrevolutionary, politically alien, and morally corrupt elements, which had forced their way into various levels of the party and soviet apparatus, and to restructure their work towards the mobilization of all strength of the toilers for the fulfillment of the economic and political tasks that stand before the oblast' party organization.

"The disclosed counterrevolutionary wrecking activities of the enemies of the people were a direct consequence of the fact that the organizational and party-mass work in a number of raions was not raised to the level of political tasks and that the decisions of the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the *VKP(b)* and the guidelines of comrade Stalin did not receive the necessary application and introduction in the praxis.

"Precisely this explains the fact that the liquidation of the consequences of wrecking and the preparation of spring sowing in 1938 in the Kalinin oblast' go clearly unsatisfactorily (...).

"The plenum obliges the obkomburo, the okruzhkoms, the gorkoms, and the raikoms of the *VKP(b)* to strengthen the battle for the unmasking and crushing of the enemies of the people. On the basis of developed Bolshevik self-criticism, the party committees need to mobilize all party- and non-party Bolsheviks for an even higher level

of vigilance, FOR THE FASTEST FULFILLMENT OF THE ORDERS OF COMRADE STALIN AND THE DECISIONS OF THE CC OF THE ~~VKP(B)~~ ON THE UPROOTING OF THE REMNANTS OF THE TROTSKYITE-BUKHARINITE GANGS, ON THE PURGING OF OUR OBLAST OF ALL WRECKERS, SPIES AND DIVERSANTS, HIRELINGS OF JAPANESE-GERMAN FASCISM" (Pako, 147/1/529, 11.7/8).

Present as invitees in June 1938 at the last plenum before the third Party conference were NKVD head A.N.Nikonov, caretaker oblispolkom head A.P.Starotorzhskii, Proletarskaia Pravda editor S.M.Antoniuk, and Krylov, Komsomol secretary. These would all join the obkom at the third Party conference. At this plenum, I.Ia.Kalinin was the reporter on obkom exclusions and the like. A.N. Nikonov was arrested by the NKVD towards the end of 1938, which confirms the information on the arrest of the local NKVD leaders at the exhibition on the purges in the Tver' museum of *kraevedenie*

Rabov, Gusikhin, and Ivanov, *de facto* the top three Party leaders of the oblast' for a while, were described at the third Party conference in July 1938 by Boitsov as essentially continuing, willingly or not, the same enemy work as Mikhailov; before Mikhailov's arrest, Rabov apparently communicated at times by telephone with Mikhailov, after the latter's departure, on matters concerning the Kalinin oblast'. All Rabov's closest collaborators had recently been exposed as enemies of the people (e.g., a certain Lebedev is mentioned).

Ivanov's sin had been partially to give too much leeway to "bourgeois-nationalism" in his attitude towards the Karelian minority of the oblast', which "distorted" the Party's policy. At the exhibition in the Tver' museum of Local Lore (*kraevedenie*), there were references to a case against the Karelians in 1938/39 -- specialists were accused of wrecking, and a "Karelian bourgeois-

nationalist, terrorist, counterrevolutionary organization" was uncovered--; see also V. Vinogradov, Karel'skoe "delo", Tver', 1991. At the third PC, Boltsov mentions that all four raikom secretaries of the city of Kalinin turned out to be enemies of the people: Aren'kov, Mitinskii, Rumiantsev, and Karsanov; gorkom secretary Zhdanov had been recently been exposed as well. At the same time, a "nest" of enemies of the people had been unmasked in Bologoe, to which Nosovskii, Treskunov, and Antomonov belonged. They had engaged in baseless accusations of Party and non-Party workers at the "Lunacharskii" factory in Bologoe.

A CC representative, a certain Pugovkin, attended the plenum in late December 1938 --the first after the purge was more or less called off by Stalin and Molotov.

### **The composition of the oblast' committee of the Communist Party of the Kalinin oblast' after 1945**

(Based on Proletarskaia Pravda, No. 11(7679), January 16, 1945; Moscow, 17/43/741, II.1, 109; 17/43/742, II.1 and 58; 17/44/546, II.161, 166ob.; Pako, 147/1/525, II.114, 115, 251; 147/1/526, II.49, 52, 66, 79, 83, 93, 211, 213, 215-217, 218, 225, 226, 229-235; 147/1/527, II.2-20, 23, 24, 28, 45, 69, 70, 72-78, 91, 92, 103-108, 127-130, 197-201; 147/1/528, II.2, 60, 69, 71, 72, 81, 83-86, 88, 89, 91-93, 114, 120, 122, 124, 125, 129, 130, 140, 142, 144; 147/1/529, II. 2-8, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 46-51, 53, 63, 64; 147/1/554, II. 3, 3ob., 4, 9, 9ob., 95, 96, 109, 120, 121, 122, 143, 144, 240, 241; 147/1/555, II.254, 271, 272; 147/4/18, II.1-2ob.; 147/4/526, II.1, 1ob.; 147/4/1125, 1.28; 147/4/1126, 1.33; 147/4/1495, II.120/121; 147/5/283, II. 347-350; 147/5/1, II.28-31; 147/5/2, II.14-16, 19/20, 219; 147/5/8, 1.11; 147/4/519, 1.49; 147/4/1887, 1.70ob.; 147/5/199, II.71-73; 147/4/1495, II.34, 57ob., 58ob.; 147/5/282, II.40/40vv.; 147/5/286, II.3-10; 147/5/10, II.167 and 182; 147/5/429, II.173-179, 219; 147/5/9, II.1-4; 147/5/659, 1.3; 147/5/661, II.126/127).

# The obkom elected at the sixth Party conference in January 1945

NAME	FIRST NOTICED	FUNCTION IN JANUARY 1945
Stalin		
Kalinin		
<u>I.P. Boitsov</u>	appointed March 1938	1st secretary of obkom
<u>P.S. Vorontsov</u>	el. 2nd PC '37; otel head late '38	2nd secretary of obkom
<u>S.A. Veselov</u>	February 1942	3rd secretary of obkom
<u>I.S. Borisov</u>	otel head early '38	Secretary for cadres
<u>A.K. Kalachev</u>	7/43 app. prop. sek <sup>17</sup> and cand. obkomm.	Secretary for propaganda
<u>A.V. Simonov</u>	October 1942 (2nd obkomsek)	Oblispolkom chairman
<u>D.S. Tokarev</u>	NKVD chief early 1939	Oblast' NKGB head
<u>I.N. Zimin</u>	January 1943	Gorkom secretary of Kalinin
<u>V.V. Savel'eva</u>	February 1942	Bezhet'sk raikom secretary
<u>N.P. Zubov</u>	raikomsek 1/37-7/37	Substitute obkomsek for industry
<u>A.F. Glazunova</u>	raikomsek 1/37 and 12/38	Raikomsek of Krasnokholm
<u>B.F. Gan</u>	raikomsek 1/38	Raikomsek of Kashin
<u>V.V. Mochalov</u>	perhaps otel head Oct '38	Substitute obkomsek for textile & light industry
<u>K.V. Petrov</u>		Head of the obkom instructional-organizational department
<u>I.I. Volkov</u>	perhaps obkomm. in 7/38	Kimry raikomsek
<u>K.I. Pontiakov</u>	raikomsek July '38	Kirov raikomsek
<u>A.P. Pavlov</u>	perhaps raikomsek in '37	Substitute obkomsek for timber industry
<u>A.V. Parfenov</u>		Kamen raikomsek
<u>A.I. Sadovnikov</u>		Vice-chairman oblispolkom
<u>A.V. Nikiforov</u>	prob. pres. in '37/'38; 1/43	Vice-obkomsek for machinebuilding industry
<u>V.E. Val'kov</u>		Raikomsek of Tsentral' raion of Kalinin town
<u>A.Ia. Frolov</u>	el. July '38; burp. late '38	Vice-chairman of oblispolkom
<u>V.G. Chizov</u>		Novotorzhok raikomsek
<u>V.V. Vasil'ev</u>	el. July '38; Bologoe gorsek	Substitute obkomsek for transport
<u>M.M. Obrat'sov</u>	el. cand Jul '38	Vice-chairman oblispolkom
<u>I.S. Dezhin</u>	perhaps raikomsek early '37	Rzhev gorkomsek
<u>P.R. Ivanov</u>	raikomsek '37/'38	Raikomsek of Olenino
<u>N.A. Nizov'ev</u>		Vice-chairmen oblispolkom
<u>V.M. Gorbunova</u>	February 1942	Vice-sek of Kalinin gorkom for industry
<u>M.G. Iuzhakov</u>	el. July '38; takes over paper in July 1944	Editor of Prol. Pravda; cand. member buro
<u>V.P. Pavlov</u>		NKVD head; cand member buro
<u>M.V. Bakharev</u>		Staritsa raikomsek
<u>N. Ia. Ko(e?)rbunov</u>	prob. raikomsek late '38	Vyshnii Volochek raikomsek
<u>A.S. Zhuravlev</u>	perhaps raikomsek late '38; 1/43 member; 7/43 livestock sek app.	Deputy obkomsek for livestock
<u>V.M. Pankov</u>		Ostashkov raikomsek

<sup>17</sup>sek is used as abbreviation for secretary.

N.G. Fochenkov		Raikomsek of Sandovo
A.V. Tikhomirov	raikomsek '37	Likhoslavl' raikomsek
V.S. Zhgutov		Oblast' prokuror
A.M. Vasil'ev	el. July '38	Head of the Kalinin railways
S.I. Ermochenkoy		Orshinskii raikomsek
A.I. Filatov	perhaps obkom early '37; raikomsek late '38	Deputy obkomsek for Food industry
D.A. Skvortsov		Sonkovo raikomsek
F.G. Golubev	perhaps Feb. '42; 1/43 one K.P. Golubev	Rzhev raikomsek
P.D. Davydov		head of the "Molotov" military academy
G.G. Smirnov	perhaps obkom July '38 or late '38 raikomsek	Lukovnikovo raikomsek
A.S. Chikurov		Head of the agricultural department of the obkom
F.F. Moseikin		Head of the school department of the obkom
N.I. Ivanov	7/44 obkomsek	<u>Sek of obkom of Komsomol</u>
V.I. Nikiforov	prob. present in '37/'38	Deputy head of cadred department of obkom
V.I. Blagoderov		Raishpolkom chairman of Sandovo
P.A. Gorokhov		Chairman of oblplan
V.V. Podlivaev		Deputy head of obkom agitprop department
I.M. Drozdov		Zubtsov raikomsek
B.V. Afanas'ev	rai/gorsek late '38 prob.	Bologoe gorkomsek
G.P. Karelinov		Head of obl. agricultural department
S.S. Mart'ianov	raikomsek since Jan'38	Neri' raikomsek
A.P. Kutuzov		Esenovich raikomsek
N.A. Fedorov		Tebleshkii raikomsek
M.I. Iazikov		Oblast' military commissar
P.G. Grachev		Chairman of gorispolkom of Kalinin
P.K. Smirnov		Vice-head of Molotov military academy
M.I. Afonin	maybe obkom '37/'38 or raikomsek late '38	MTS director of Krasnokholm
N.I. Ermolov	7/44 head of healthcare	Head of the oblast' health department
I.A. Kholin		Plenipotentiary of Gosplan for the Kalinin oblast'
A.S. Ivanov		Head of the oblast' trade department
V.S. Tumanov		Plenipotentiary of industrial cooperation for Kalinin oblast'
P.S. Shendetsov		Head of the peat trust
Ia.E. Shevelev		Rameshkovskii raikomsek
V.G. Markov		Emel'ianovo raikomsek
I.S. Kalikin		Zavolzhe raikomsek(Kalinin town)
I.I. Moiseev	el. cand. July'38	Vyshnii Volochek gorkomsek
<b>Candidates:</b>		
A.B. Mezit		Kaliazin raikomsek
M.I. Grigor'ev		Gorkomsek of Kalinin
N.A. Ermolaev		Torzhok gorkomsek
S.V. Ovchinnikov		Raikomsek of Novopromyshlennyi raion of Kalinin town
B.N. Petrov		Partkomsek of railroad-car plant
M.I. Smorodin		Raikomsek of Brusovo
N.P. Rulin		Sek of Komsomol obkom
A.I. Burilov		Molokovo raikomsek



P.S. Khokhlova		Mednoe raikomsek
P.A. Lapaev	raikomsek since July '37; 1/43 obkomcand	Sek of partkollegiia obkom
M.N. Zinger		Lesnoe raikomsek
A.I. Belov		Oblast' plenipotentiary of the PC-iat of procurements
M.I. Golikova		Sek Kalinin gorkom for cadres,
M.A. Kasarev		Raikomsek of Pogoreloe
S.G. Dorochenkov	perhaps? pres. in '38; 1/43	Goritskii raikomsek
A.M. Krylov		Vice-head of NKVD, head of militia
N.I. Sytin		Raikomsek of Oktiabr'skii raion of Kal. town
N.I. Gusev		Head of the oblast' committee for the economy
P.T. Pivovarov		Spirovo raikomsek
A.V. Pavlova		Ispolkom chairman of Krasnokholm raisoviet
G.S. Golubev	perhaps Feb. '42; one K.P. Golubev 1/43	Raikomsek of Molodoi Tud
A.N. Matveev		Chairman Vyshnii Volochek raispolkom
A.I. Moiseev	perh. otdelhead late '38	Raikomsek of Kalinin raion
A.I. Popov		Head of communications dep. of oblast'
I.I. Belov	perhaps raikomsek late '38	Raikomsek of Udoml'ia.

Underlined means full members of obkom buro

The fate of the obkom members of 1945 after the sixth Party conference of the oblast'

Name	49	First in Party elite	Subsequent career <sup>19</sup>	War <sup>20</sup>
	18			
<u>I.P. Boitsov</u>	n	appointed March 1938	Transferred late '46	2/42; 1/43
<u>P.S. Vorontsov</u>	y	el. 2nd PC '37; otdel head late '38	Prom. 1 sek late '46; dismissed late '49	2/42; 1/43
<u>S.A. Veselov</u>	n	February 1942	Apparently sent away to study before 1949	2/42; 1/43
<u>I.S. Borisov</u>	y	otdel head early '38	Still in 1952; but in July 1951 relegated to mass-organizational dept. of oblast' trade union ('51 obkomsek)	
<u>A.K. Kalachev</u>	n		Relegated; first studied, in March 1947, then in Aug. 1948 head of faculty of fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism at Obl. Party school	7/43

<sup>18</sup>Full obkom member at 7th Party Conference, February 25-27 1949: 'n' means not a member, 'y' means member.

<sup>19</sup>'51 means: elected as full member at 8th Oblast' Party conference March 28-30 1951; '52 means full member, elected in September 1952 at 9th Oblast' Party conference

<sup>20</sup>War means: were they present at obkom plenums during the war, and if so, when?

A.V. Simonov	n	October '42 (2nd obkomsek)	Reel. oblispolkom chair in Dec'47; Dec 1948 recalled and at disposal of CC (perhaps then given work in other oblast')	11/42; 1/43
D.S. Tokarev	n	NKVD head early 1939	Transferred late '46	2/42; 1/43
L.N. Zimin	y		Transferred to Central Committee apparatus in March 1951	1/43
V.V. Savel'eva	y	February 1942		2/42; 1/43
N.P. Zubov	y	raikomsek 1/37-7/37	Head of obl.trade union '51; still there '52	
A.F. Glazunova	y	raikomsek 1/37 and 12/38	Raikomsek '51/'52/obk	1/43
B.F. Gan	y	raikomsek 1/38		
V.V. Mochalov	y	perhaps otdel head Oct. '38		
K.V. Petrov	y		Head of orgotdel oblispolkom in '51	
I.I. Volkov	y	perhaps obkomm. in 7/38	Removed in wake of Vorontsov's downfall	2/42?
K.I. Pontiakov	y	raikomsek July '38	Raikomsek in '51/obk	2/42; 1/43
A.P. Pavlov	y	perhaps raikomsek in '37		
A.V. Parfenov	y		Promoted to obkom secretary for propaganda in March 1947; also elected in obkomburo	
A.I. Sadovnikov	y		Re-el. vice oblispolkom chair in Dec'47; chair in '51/'52	
A.V. Nikiforov	n	prob. pres. in '37/'38	As gorkomsek of Bologoe removed in wake of Vorontsov's downfall	1/43
V.E. Val'kov	n		El. vice-oblispolkom chair in Dec'47	
A.Ia. Frolov	n	el. July'38; <u>buro</u> late '38		
V.G. Chizov	y		'52 raikomsek/obk. ( <i>not elec. in '51 as a full member</i> )	
V.V. Vasil'ev	y	el. July'38; Bologoe gorsek	Head of transportotdel in '51; '52 vice-chair of oblispolkom	2/42?; 1/43
M.M. Obratsov	y	el. cand Jul'38	el. Dec. '47 vice-oblispolkom chair; vice-chair oblispolkom in '51/'52	in 11/42 lost job as obkomsek for prop. (father); 1/43
I.S. Dezhin	y	perhaps raikomsek early '37	Gorkomsek/obk. '51/'52	
P.R. Ivanov	n	raikomsek '37/'38		
N.A. Nizov'ev	n			
V.M. Gorbunova	y	February 1942	Director of "Voroshilov" factory/obk in '51	2/42; 1/43
M.G. Iuzhakov	n	el. July '38		7/44
V.P. Pavlov	n		Perhaps head of USSR MVD Glavpomstoi (before 1949)	
M.V. Bakharev	n			
N. Ia. Ko(e?)rbunov	y	prob. raikomsek late '38	Raikomsek/obk in '51/'52	
A.S. Zhuravlev	y	perhaps raikomsek late '38		

V.M. Pankov	n		
N.G. Fochenkoy	y		
A.V. Tikhomirov	n	raikomsek '37	Raikomsek/obk in '51/'52
V.S. Zhgutov	n		March 1947 became member of obkomburo; before 1949 transferred to head Tambov procuracy
A.M. Vasil'ev	y	el. July '38	Head of Kal. railroad in '51 2/42?
S.I. Ermochenkoy	n		
A.I. Filatov	y	perhaps obkom early '37; raikomsek late '38	Removed in wake of Vorontsov's downfall
D.A. Skvortsov	y		
F.G. Golubev	y		Raikomsek/obkom. in '51/'52 2/42?; 1/43?
P.D. Davydov	n		
G.G. Smirnov	y	perhaps obkom July '38 or late '38 raikomsek	
A.S. Chikurov	n		
F.F. Moseikin	y		Removed in wake of Vorontsov's downfall
N.I. Ivanov	n		Sent away to study before 1949 7/44
V.I. Nikiforov	y	prob. present in '37/'38	<i>not el. as a full member in '51; el. obk./raikomsek in '52</i>
V.I. Blagoderov	n		
P.A. Gorokhov	y		Elected vice oblispolkomchair in Dec. 1947 elections; still in in '51
V.V. Podlivaev	n		
I.M. Drozdov	y		Gorkomsek/obk in '51
B.V. Afanas'ev	y	rai/gorsek late '38 prob.	Head of railroad pol. dept in '51/'52
G.P. Karelinov	n		Head of obl. agricultural department in '51
S.S. Mart'ianov	n	Raikomsek since Jan'38	2/42; 1/43
A.P. Kutuzov	y		Raikomsek/obk. '51/'52
N.A. Fedorov	y		
M.I. Iazikov	n		
P.G. Grachev	y		Kal. gorispolkom head in '51; oblispolkom sek in '52
P.K. Smirnov	n		
M.I. Afonin	y	maybe obkom '37/'38 or raikomsek late '38	Director Flaxinstitute in '51
N.I. Ermolov	n		7/44
I.A. Kholin	n		
A.S. Ivanov	y		Head of obl. trade dept. in '51
V.S. Tumanov	n		
P.S. Shendetsov	y		Removed in wake of Vorontsov's downfall
Ia.E. Shevelev	y		
V.G. Markov	n		
I.S. Kalikin	n		Raikomsek/obk in '51/'52
I.I. Moiseev	n	el. cand. July'38	2/42?; 1/43
Candidates:			

A.B. Mezit	y		Raikomsek/obk. in '51; in same year(October) disgraced
M.I. Grigor'ev	n		Gorkomsek/obk in '51; head of transportotdel in '52
N.A. Ermolaev	y		Gorkomsek/obk in '51
S.V. Ovchinnikov	y		gorkomsek/obk. in '51
B.N. Petrov	n		
M.I. Smorodin	y		Raikomsek/obk. in '51
N.P. Rulin	n		
A.I. Burilov	n		
P.S. Khokhlova	n		
P.A. Lapuev	n	raikomsek since July '37	1/43
M.N. Zinger	n		
A.I. Belov	n		
M.I. Golikova	n		
M.A. Karasev	y		
S.G. Dorochenkov	n	perhaps? pres. in '38;1/43	1/43
A.M. (L.I.) Krylov	n	February 1942	2/42
N.I. Sytin	y		
N.I. Gusev	y		
P.T. Pivovarov	n		
A.V. Pavlova	n		
G.S. Golubev	n		2/42?;1/43?
A.N. Matveev	y		Gorkomsek/obk. in '51/'52
A.I. Moiseev	y	perh. otdelhead late '38	Head of obkom agitprop in '51/'52 2/42?
A.I. Popov	n		
I.I. Belov	n	perhaps raikomsek late '38	

In December 1946, an obkom plenum met to appoint several people in the obkomburo, because of the earlier departure of several buro members, the most important of whom was first secretary Boitsov. MGB head Tokarev had left, too, as well as MVD-head Pavlov, Komsomol secretary Ivanov, and Iuzhakov of Proletarskaia Pravda. Vorontsov was promoted to the position of first secretary; vice-obkom secretary for transport Vasil'ev, the head of the *orginstruktor otel* Petrov, and vice-chairman of the oblispolkom Sadovnikov were added as full members, while Zhgutov, the oblast' state prosecutor and Karelinov, the head of the oblast' agricultural department, were added as candidate members to the buro.

In September 1952, 93 full members were elected to the obkom, compared to 85 in March 1951. In January 1945, 73 full members had been elected, and in February 1949, 81. In September 1952, 65 of the 85 members of March 1951 were re-elected to the obkom. 20 of those 65 had been transferred to other jobs by then.

The case of P.P. Izvekov --not listed above in the list for 1945-- is interesting: in his own words, he had been already a first raikom secretary in 1936. He was still present at the end of the purge period in 1938, disappeared for the entire war period and a while after, only to return in 1951 and 1952. V.I. Nikiforov's appearances were similar. In 1949 M.V. Shuvalova, and perhaps A.V. Fomicheva (if she is to be equated with D.V. Fomicheva), made a return to the obkom, of which they had been members in 1937 and 1938 until the third Party conference. K.A. Nikiforov also returned to the obkom in 1949, to which he had been elected in July 1938. Shuvalova and K.A. Nikiforov --the latter did not survive the downfall of Vorontsov-- were left out in 1951, but Fomicheva was re-elected in 1951 and 1952. Another special case is that of K.I. Pontiakov: in February 1947, obkom secretary Borisov asked the head of the oblast' MGB, Kovalev, if Pontiakov had been arrested by the NKVD in 1934. Obviously, the records were not available to the obkomburo. Pontiakov apparently was not, as he would be re-elected to the obkom in following years.

In 1952, at the ninth Party conference, twelve delegates for the Nineteenth Party Congress with decisive vote, and one with consultative vote, were elected (Pako, 147/5/286, 1.356). The delegation was led by V.I. Kiselev, who was joined by Sadovnikov,

Baranov, and Shatalin of the buro. The other delegates were the weaver Z.M. Arkhipova of Vyshnii Volochek, who had been elected an obkom member on the recommendation of Kiselev at the oblast' conference; A.N. Belov, another exemplary representative of the workers'-peasant paradise, chairman of the kolkhoz "Krasnyi Putilovets" of Kashin raion; N.D. Bobrova, the secretary of the cotton-fibre kombinat of Kalinin; V.A. Volkova, the raion committee secretary for the Novopromyshlennyi raion of Kalinin; the locally renowned MTS machinist-tractorist I.F. Gagurin; I.M. Drozdov, together with Sadovnikov, the most senior Party leader of the delegates of the Kalinin Party organization, who had been in 1945 already in the obkom, and was currently secretary of the town committee of Bezhetsk; A.I. Pokryshkin, a war hero and army colonel, three times hero of the USSR, elected to the obkom as full member in March 1951, but left out in September 1952; the director of the Savelovo factory I.A. Pankov, also a member of the obkom in 1951 and 1952. Komsomol secretary A.N. Luk'ianov, an obkom member and candidate of the buro, received the consultative vote. This was definitely a group selected to represent the supposed exemplary balance within the Party of Party leaders, workers, and peasants in the Kalinin oblast'.

The *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee in the Kalinin oblast' and partymembership of the Kalinin partorganization, and the administrative organization of the oblast' and its changes, according to a report of April 1, 1949 (Pako, 147/4/1887)

The *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee on April 1, 1949 and recent changes therein (Based on a report from K.A. Fokin, head of the obkom department of Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol organizations to B. Revskii, head of the Central Archive of materials on cadres of the Central Committee of April 22, 1949; Pako, 147/4/1887, 11.67-98; 147/4/1495, 1.34)

Obkom secretaries

1. Pavel Stepanovich Vorontsov; first obkom secretary since December 6, 1946
2. Ivan Nikolaevich Zimin; second obkom secretary, promoted on December 22, 1948, from the position of secretary of the Party committee of the town of Kalinin
3. Sergei Nikolaevich Shatalin, obkom secretary since September 30, 1947; formally coopted into the buro
4. Aleksandr Vasil'evich Parfenov, obkom secretary since January 24, 1947
5. Ivan Semenovich Borisov, obkom secretary since September 1, 1944

The oblast' committee's buro

1. Vorontsov, since March 15, 1940
2. Zimin, since January 15, 1945
3. Shatalin, since December 9, 1947
4. Parfenov, since January 29, 1947
5. Borisov, since January 1, 1945
6. Aleksandr Ivanovich Sadovnikov, chair of the oblispolkom, since December 27, 1946

7. Konstantin Vladimirovich Petrov, secretary of the Kalinin gorkom since December 27, 1946
8. Aleksei Aleksandrovich Mosunov, the editor of Proletarskaia Pravda, since February 27, 1949 [seventh Party Conference]
9. Vasilii Petrovich Smirnov, first secretary of the Komsomol of the Kalinin oblast', since February 27, 1949
10. Aleksei Pavlovich Pavlov, chair of the oblast' trade union soviet, since February 27, 1949
11. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kovalev, MGB director for the Kalinin oblast', since February 27, 1949

Heads of the different obkom departments

1. Otdel for Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol organs: K.A. Fokin, since February 17, 1949 (before this Fokin was the first secretary of the gorkom of Vyshnii Volochek)
2. Otdel for agitation and propaganda: A.I. Moiseev, since November 1, 1948 (Before vice-head of the same otel)
3. Administrative otel: M.I. Presnov, since October 27, 1948 (before vice-head of cadre otel of obkom)
4. Otdel of planning, finance, and trade: B.F. Gan, since December 15, 1948 (before first secretary of Kashin raion)
5. Otdel for heavy industry: E.S. Cherkasov, since October 27, 1948 (before vice-head of industry and transport otel of obkom)
6. Otdel for light industry: S.A. Shcherbakov, since November 12, 1948 (before first secretary of the Zavol'zhe raion of the town of Kalinin)



7. Otdel of machine building: S.F. Korochkin, since November 12, 1948  
(before head of the defense otdel of the obkomi)<sup>21</sup>

8. Transport otdel: V.V. Vasil'ev, since October 27, 1948 (before  
vice-secretary of the obkom for industry and transport)

9. Otdel of agriculture: M.S. Iudin, since June 2, 1948

10. Special sector: A.K. Ivanova, since March 31, 1944

11. Financial and economic sector: A.N. Abrosimov, since March 27,  
1945

Cypher clerks of the obkom: A.K. Kurbatova, since July 16, 1946, and  
L.S. Markova, since November 5, 1947

The Party school of the Kalinin oblast'

Director: V.F. Sobolev, since August 21, 1946

Vice-director of studies: E.A. Tomashevskaja, since August 21, 1946

Head of the faculty for the study of the fundamentals of Marxism-

Leninism: A.K. Kalachev, since August 4, 1948 (before studying)

Head of the history faculty: A.A. Zuborova, since January 25, 1947

Head of the faculty for economic science: B.I. Kashkarov, since  
November 4, 1946

Secretaries of the gorkom of the town of Kalinin

First secretary: P.S. Vorontsov, since December 6, 1946

Second secretary: K.V. Petrov, since February 17, 1949

M.I. Grigor'ev

P.E. Beliakov, since August 5, 1947

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<sup>21</sup>The fact that Korochkin, at the reorganization of the obkom departments, is assigned to this machine-building otdel after having headed the defense department is another reason to suspect that the otdel for machine building might have been concerned with military matters.

D.V. Puzdyrev, since May 31, 1948, before gorkom head of agitation and propaganda

First gorkom secretaries of the other larger towns

Bezhetsk: I.M. Drozdov, since February 6, 1949, before raikom secretary of Zubtsov

Bologoe: K.A. Nikiforov, since March 27, 1949, before first secretary of the raikom of Bologoe raion

Vyshnii Volochek: A.N. Matveev, since February 17, 1949, before gorispolkom chair of Vyshnii Volochek

Kimry: A.A. Kondrashov [a respondent of the survey], since July 28, 1947

Rzhev: I.S. Dezhin, since October 13, 1943

Torzhok: N.A. Ermolaev, since December 25, 1944

There were 49 first raikomseks, and as many raispolkom chairs (all within the CC nomenklatura).

Members of the oblast' government

The chair of the oblispolkom, Sadovnikov, and the vice-chairs Moseikin, Gusev, Obraztsov, and Gorokhov, and the secretary of the oblispolkom, Topunov.

Chair of the Council of Trade Unions

A.V. Pavlov, since November 1, 1948, before studying.

Komsomol

First secretary: V.P. Smirnov, since January 29, 1948

Second secretary: A.P. Beliakova, since October 30, 1946

Secretary for cadres: M.I. Burkov, since January 25, 1949, before the Komsomol first secretary of the town of Bologoe

Propaganda secretary: M.A. Vinogradov, since October 30, 1946

Secretary for schools: M.E. Zvereva, since January 28, 1949, before vice-head of the school department of the Komsomol obkom

Furthermore, Ul'ianov, head of the oblispolkom radio department (since October 18, 1944), the TASS correspondent N.P. Baklin (since August 13, 1944), the head of the oblast' direction for literary and publishing affairs, A.V. Dubaev (since March 11, 1946), the director of the Pedagogical Institute of Kalinin, P.P. Polianskii (since January 20, 1946), the heads of several faculties of the same institute, Pravda correspondent N.I. Popov (since January 1, 1946) and Izvestiia correspondent N.V. Kavskaia (since February 22, 1942), the heads of several enterprises of heavy industry (peat digging, electro stations, the lumber industry, the head of the "May 1" factory) and some of the head engineers in these enterprises) were all subject to appointment or ratification of their appointment by the Central Committee, since their jobs belonged to the nomenklatura of the Central Committee.

Two key players, at least, disappeared from the scene of the Kalinin oblast' between January 1, 1948, and April 1, 1949:

the second obkom secretary D.A. Siriapin (second obkom secretary from March 1947, who had been formally coopted into the buro), who was assigned work in the Central Committee apparatus on December 20, 1948, and one day later A.V. Simonov was officially recalled by the Central Committee<sup>22</sup>. Siriapin's transfer might have been caused by complaints of Vorontsov, who wrote to Malenkov in August 1948

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<sup>22</sup>The impression is strong that, for quite a while previously, he had not worked in the Kalinin oblast', and that Sadovnikov was oblispolkom head *de facto*

that Siriapin was a weak, absent-minded worker, who did not check on the execution of his decisions. He requested to appoint Zimin in Siriapin's place, a suggestion which was apparently followed by the Central Committee a few months later.

Perhaps in this period, too, MVD head M.F. Pavlov was transferred to become substitute head of the USSR MVD *Glavpromstroï* and state prosecutor for the Kalinin oblast' Zhgutov was transferred to Tambov oblast' to work in the same Function.

At the seventh oblast' Party conference at the end of February 1949, the more than 60,000 Communists in the oblast' were represented by the following 369 delegates (Pako, 147/4/1495, 11.57ob.-58ob.):

97 full-time workers of the Party apparat, 85 of the soviets, 63 industrial workers --34 of whom were Stakhanovites--, 7 transport workers, 39 agricultural workers --12 of whom were chairs and 2 brigadiers--, 17 delegates of the Soviet army, 10 full-time Komsomol workers, and 51 workers of different branches of the economy.

165 of the delegates attended for the first time a Party conference of the oblast'. Only 69 were women, 80 had fought in the war in the army, and 28 had fought as partisans.

At the eighth oblast' Party conference, Konovalov noticed in his opening report that:

The obkom members comrades Moseikin and Filatov were dismissed from their leading posts for having compromised themselves previously at work; for unworthy behaviour the comrades Nikiforov, Shendetsov, and Volkov were dismissed...

that the obkomburo of the *VKP(b)* and comrade Vorontsov engaged in an unbolshevik attitude towards the selection of cadres, promoting unverified people and those, who in earlier functions had compromised themselves, to leading posts. The obkom of the *VKP(b)* took measures to correct the errors and shortcomings in the selection of cadres. The obkom of the *VKP(b)* dismissed from their leading posts the comrades Moseikin, Filatov, Shurygin, and several other workers, for having compromised themselves in earlier jobs, and freed a number of responsible workers, since they could not deal with the tasks that they had been assigned, and for unworthy behaviour. (Nikiforov of the gorkom of Bologoe, Volkov of the raikom of Kimry, Bazulev of the Novokarel' raikom, Petrov of the raiispolkom of Brusovo, Filatychev of the raiispolkom of Vysoko, Iamshchikov of the raiispolkom of Lukovnikovo, and others).<sup>23</sup>

Vorontsov is, however, still officially a member of the obkom even in March 1951. At that time he was apparently a student at the Higher Party School (Pako, 147/5/8, 1.11). Shendetsov and his subordinates at the head of the peat trest had abused their power and had been engaged in drinking bouts (Pako, 147/5/2, 11.19/20). Moseikin, if it is the same, which is rather likely, had made his mark, in his function as oblispolkom plenipotentiary, among other things, by threatening to beat up one kolkhoz chairman (Pako, 147/5/105, 1.30).

After the eighth oblast' Party conference, in March 1951, at the first organizational plenum of the obkom, the obkomburo was composed of the obkom secretaries Konovalov, Kiselev, Shatalin, Vakhmistrov, and Borisov, as well as Cherkasov, who was gorkom secretary of the town of Kalinin, Sadovnikov, Dekushenko, the head of the MGB, Simkin, the editor of Proletarskaia Pravda, Zubov, the

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<sup>23</sup>Pako, 147/5/2, 11.14-16.

head of the oblast' trade unions, and Fokin, the head of the Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol organs. Candidates were Beliakova, secretary of the Komsomol, and Demirskii, head of the agricultural department of the obkom. Thus eight people had left the buro in two years (Vorontsov, Zimin, Parfenov, K.V. Petrov, A.P. Pavlov, V.P. Smirnov, Mosunov, and Kovalev).

When the first organizational plenum of the ninth oblast' Party conference convened in September 1952, Kiselev had his team in place: the obkomburo had as full members F.P. Baranov, the gorkomsek of Kalinin; N.P. Zubov, somewhat of a veteran of the trade unions; Kiselev; M.A. Liakishev, the MGB vice-head; N.A. Petrov, the head of the obkom department for Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol organs; Sadovnikov, the oblispolkom chair; K.V. Simkin, editor of "Proletarskaia Pravda", K.A. Fokin, who was a full-fledged obkom secretary by then; and S.N. Shatalin, another obkom secretary, probably the second-in-command within the provincial Party. Komsomol head A.N. Luk'ianov was a candidate buro member; and G.A. Demirskii, the head of the agricultural department of the obkom, was another.

The obkom departments were led by A.I. Moiseev (agitation and propaganda), K.P. Azarov (schools and institutes of higher education), M.I. Presnov (administration), E.S. Cherkasov (heavy industry), M.S. Iudin (planning, finance and trade), S.A. Shcherbakov (light industry), Kh. P. Neshkov (machine building), M.I. Grigor'ev (transport), and Petrov and Demirskii.

Although in the buro only Shatalin and Sadovnikov survived from Vorontsov's group of 1949 (but seven of the eleven of March 1951),

five of the ten otдел heads were still in place three and a half years later; Grigor'ev was transferred from the gorkom of Kalinin, and Fokin promoted into the buro. In 1951, Petrov and Azarov had been raion secretaries; they were subsequently promoted. Simkin, Zubov, and Demirskii were already working at their posts in early 1951. Neshkov, Liakishev, and Luk'ianov were new. The most striking promotion was perhaps that of Baranov: in 1951, he was still the secretary of the railroad-car factory and an obkom member; by September 1952, he was a full buro member, and the secretary of the town committee of Kalinin; he also was chosen to represent the Kalinin Party organization at the Nineteenth Party Congress.

In April 1953, it was announced by Kiselev that MGB head Liakishev had left the obkom. In June 1953, one Zubkov lost his candidate membership of the obkom, after he had been released earlier from his duties as first raikom secretary of Esenovichi raion. The motive for his dismissal had been his excessive indulgence in drink.

The organization and execution of the ninth oblast' Party conference, from September 20-22, 1952

As can be seen from the job stability of the departmental heads of the obkom, the Kalinin Party organization had, despite the rather frequent exchange of its leaders, become something of a well-oiled machine in the way it was run by the autumn of 1952. Most of the obkom members and departmental heads had learned their trade at least partially at lower levels of the Kalinin Party organization, and the Central Committee seems to have often ratified nominations that probably were initialized by the obkom, since many of the departmental heads had been raikom secretaries and the like in the

oblast' during an earlier period. The buro was more of a mixed bunch, although many of the members had acquired by then quite extensive work experience in Kalinin (Kiselev, Baranov, Petrov, Zubov, Sadovnikov, Fokin, Shatalin, and Demirskii). The only wild card, as always, was the MGB-NKGB (and sometimes MVD-NKVD) head for the oblast', who came from outside the province. Only between 1939 and 1946, Tokarev (NKVD/NKGB/MGB) was allowed to stay in place for a longer period. Between the two security ministries, it seems that the NKGB/MGB head assumed a more senior position, because its representative usually had a seat in the buro, while the NKVD/MVD head remained at most a candidate, as in the case of V.P. Pavlov, during and after the war.

The eighth Party conference of March 1951 had 389 delegates with a decisive vote and 43 with a consultative vote. Of the 389, 95 were women, and of the 43 consultative delegates, 13 were women. Out of 432 delegates in all, 248 were employees, 108 workers, and 76 peasants. 146 (34%) delegates actually fought in the army during the war, and 30 (7%) had been partisans.

The ninth Party conference had 512 (or 509, the source contradicts itself) delegates with a decisive vote, and 71 (or 72) delegates with a consultative vote. Each delegate with a decisive vote was elected for every 120 full Party members of the oblast' Party organization, and each delegate with a consultative vote represented 120 candidates of the Communist Party. In this way, officially 61,440 members were represented, and 8,520 candidates, which did not fully conform to the actual membership of about 55,500 at the time, and the roughly 6,000 candidates (see Table 35). However, the



number of members represented at the ninth Party conference was indeed 61,282, and of candidates, 7,130. The difference consisted most likely of the membership among the military personnel, who are apparently in other sources not counted as members of the Kalinin Party organization. 5,670 members of the 61,282 were army personnel in September 1952, and 847 of the 7,130 candidates. Most of the Party members among the military were not stationed permanently in the Kalinin oblast', and were therefore probably not considered to be genuine members of the oblast' Party organization. The army members were represented by 46 delegates with decisive votes and 7 with consultative votes. Some of those 46, apparently, were considered to be engaged in full-time Party work in the following breakdown of the composition of the delegates with decisive vote:

112 (or 120, again the calculation does not match the total amount of 512 in the source) full-time Party workers

109 Employees of soviet and administrative organs

62 Kolkhoz workers, 39 of whom were kolkhoz chairs and vice-chairs, 3 brigadiers of crop brigades, and 7 were heading the livestock department of their collective farm

42 Industrial workers, who were directly employed in production work

39 Agricultural workers (MTS, procurement organizations, sovkhozy)

35 Worked in education, healthcare, science, culture, and the arts

31 Soviet army

30 Managers of industrial, transport, and construction enterprises

- 17 Engineers and other technical specialists
- 15 Agricultural specialists
- 13 Komsomol representatives
- 4 Trade union workers
- 3 Representatives of the printing press

The ninth Party conference was very much a staunchly Russian affair, with 479 Russians (94%), 11 Ukrainians, 10 Karelians, 6 Belorussians, and 6 representatives of other nationalities forming the 512 delegates with a decisive vote<sup>24</sup>. At the eighth Party conference, out of all 432 delegates 404 were Russians (93.5%), 9 Ukrainians, 8 Karelians, 4 Jews, 4 Belorussians, 1 Latvian, 1 Mordvin, and 1 Estonian.

At the ninth Party conference, 282 of the 512 were elected for the first time to a Party conference, which is significant, given the fact that the eighth Party conference had only taken place 18 months before.

The conference must have been the most educated meeting of the Party elite of the Kalinin oblast' since the purges, because 191 (37.5%) of the delegates had more than secondary education, 237

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<sup>24</sup>Again, Fainsod noticed the eclipse of the Jewish element, which in the Kalinin oblast' by September 1952 does not even warrant to be mentioned as a separate nationality at the ninth oblast' Party conference (Fainsod, *How...*, p.237). There were at least 423 Jewish Party members in January 1952, almost exclusively living in the towns, a survival of the tsarist period, when Jews were excluded from engaging in agriculture outside the Pale of Settlement. Those 423 odd already comprised less than 1% of the total Party membership. This is in stark contrast with the prewar, and more particular pre-Purge situation. Although it is hazardous to be too specific here, since names alone can be deceiving (as the very Russian name of the probably Jewish first Party secretary Mikhailov shows), it seems from the names of the obkom members, particularly in 1937, that the Jewish contingent before the war in the Kalinin Party leadership was quite substantial (Nodel' had even been a member of the *Bund*).

(46.5%) completed secondary education, and only 84 (16%) had merely primary education of the 512<sup>25</sup>.

Signs of the ageing process of the Party, which culminated under Brezhnev, are not yet discernible, since 108 (21%; compared to 22% in March 1951, and 20% in 1949) members were not yet thirty-five, 104 (20.5%; 23% in 3/'51; 24% in 2/'49) between thirty-six and forty, 239 (46.5%; 47% in March 1951; 49% in February 1949) between forty-one and fifty, and 61 (12%; 8.5% in March 1951; 7% in February 1949) older than fifty<sup>26</sup>. Thus almost 60% was over forty in 1952, but in 1949, 1951, and 1952, the largest share was that of the group between thirty-six and fifty.

The Party membership was certainly "post-Leninist," since only one had actually joined the Party before 1917; 13 from 1918 to 1923 (2.5%; 14 {3%} in March 1951); 105 between 1924 and 1930 (20.5%; 108 {25%} in March 1951); 186 between 1931 and 1940 (36.5%; 158 {36.5%} in March 1951); 135 between 1941 and 1945 (26.5%; 112 {26%} in March 1951); and 72 after 1945 (14.0%; 40 {9%} in March 1951) --it is still perhaps remarkable that those last 72 already had a decisive vote at the conference less than maximally seven years after their entry into the Party.

170 delegates were women in September 1952, 62 more than at the eighth Party conference, but in proportion (roughly 30%) not many more women were present than in 1951 (when 25% of all delegates was female), although the representation had become gradually

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<sup>25</sup>According to Fainsod, the educational qualifications were on the rise in the USSR in general at this time (Fainsod, How..., p.237).

<sup>26</sup>Fainsod noticed the beginnings of this trend when he compared the age of the delegates of the 18th and 19th Party Congresses (Fainsod, How..., p.238).

better since 1949, when less than 20% of the delegates was female. It is significant that only 9 women were thought to be fit to become a member of the obkom elected at the ninth Party conference.

## APPENDIX IV

**The collapse of the kolkhoz "Traktor"**

of the village of Zhitnikovo, in the administrative zone of the rural soviet of Zabolotski in the raion of Novokarel'

(The following is part of the report of January 15, 1947, from the MGB colonel Maksimov to the head of the MGB for the Kalinin oblast', Kovalev, on the state of agricultural in the Novokarel' raion; Pako, 147/4/519, ll. 15-18).

From 1941 through 1944, a local of the village worked as chair of this kolkhoz, the party member VDOVIN. During his tenure, the kolkhoz chair VDOVIN behaved morally unstable; as a consequence the man fell apart, was rude, a drunk; he had neither organizational talent nor did he know agriculture. As a result of his four years of leadership, the kolkhoz crumbled, and out of the sixty-three households, only twenty-two remained at the collective farm, while forty-one households, which did not see any perspective for the improvement of their lives left the kolkhoz, and moved to the raion centre, the town of Kalinin, or other towns and raions.

In place of the dismissed VDOVIN, DMITRIEV took over, a communist party member, who had been dismissed from his work at the drying factory of the settlement of Tolmachi for systematic drunkenness and abuses at his job in the department of supplies of the factory, who had never worked in agriculture either, nor had any knowledge of it. DMITRIEV worked one year as chair. His arrival in the kolkhoz "Traktor" was followed by systematic drinking bouts, theft, and further decomposition of the kolkhoz. At the end of 1944, he was dismissed, and in his stead the local kolkhoznitsa KRUPOVA was appointed, not a communist, of seredniak ancestry, semi-literate, not having appropriate organizational talents, and not able to rally around her the kolkhoz *aktiv* and all kolkhozniks for the improvement of the kolkhoz labour and the material well-being of the kolkhozniks; in addition, little aid was given to her by the raion soviet and party organizations.

When I met her, KRUPOVA told me: "The kolkhozniks refuse to work; the workers of the livestock sector do not go to work anymore since January 2; and I, together with my daughter, in order to save the cattle from starvation, need to take care of the cattle." She asked me to help free her from chairing the kolkhoz.

KRUPOVA is not capable of discharging her duties adequately. She cannot organize labour, strengthen discipline, and right the situation in the kolkhoz. As long as there will not be an honest, concerned, literate, organizational, and economically capable chair, the kolkhoz will continue to fall apart. [underlined with pencil in the record]

The productive activity of the kolkhoz is characterized by the following data.

In 1946 the twenty-two kolkhoz members worked 7,500

*trudodni*, of whom:

a. the kolkhoz chair	500
b. the bookkeeper	390
v. the storage man ( <i>kladovshchik</i> )	240
g. the watchman( <i>storozh</i> )	154
d. the agrotechnician and mail carrier	444
e. the livestock workers	<u>861</u>
in all	2,744 <i>trudodni</i>

and only 4,756 *trudodni* were earned by all the other kolkhozniks.

On the day of the visit at the kolkhoz no work whatsoever was done. In December a tractor-driven threshing machine for the threshing of clover seeds arrived, but it stood idle for a week and, not having threshed the clover, it was returned, because the kolkhozniks did not come to work.

Maksimov added to this that none of the kolkhozniks had been employed in procuring wood, and that most of the field work done in 1946 was performed by MTS machines and employees. Per *trudoden'* the kolkhozniks received 202 grams of grain in 1946.

The quality of Communist "cadres" is telling: two Party members were complete failures as directors. A testimony to the incompetence of Party and soviet is the ratification or the

appointment of a person as chair, who had misbehaved, and was completely ignorant in matters of agriculture. The kolkhozniks' apathy and antagonistic attitude are clear: it is doubtful if this was solely the result of the activities of their boozing directors. One could deduce that the kolkhozniks left Vdovin in place for so long (or at least did not complain about him), because his presence gave ample opportunity to pursue private interests, or to leave for greener pastures elsewhere. After all, officially one needed the permission of the general meeting of the kolkhoz and its executive to be allowed to leave the collective, which was probably not all that difficult with a pathological drinker as chair.

The remuneration of the kolkhozniks for their work amounted to a pitiful sum in 1946: it is likely --if we cancel out the possibility of payment of *trudodni* to teenagers or outsiders for work on behalf of the kolkhoz (which is probably wrong, because at least the daughter of Krupova helped her mother)-- that the 4,756 *trudodni* were divided by fourteen kolkhozniks, the other eight and their remuneration being listed separately in the report. Thus a rank-and-file member of the *artel'* made 340 *trudodni* per year; for each *trudodni*, he or she received 202 grams of grain, so that per day every kolkhoznik received fewer than 200 grams of grain. From that amount not only the members of the *artel'* themselves, but also their dependents needed to be fed with *kasha* bread, and other flour products. Furthermore, some grain was supposedly used as cattle feed. As it is likely that others, who were not kolkhoz members, received some *trudodni*, the actual remuneration was probably even less.

## ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Tverskoi tsentr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii (Tver'), in which the archive of the provincial organization of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union is preserved. In the text, references to this archive are indicated by the acronym "Pako" (*Partiinyi arkhiv kalininskoi oblasti*).

Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv tverskoi oblasti (Tver'), in which records are kept of the provincial Soviet government, as well as of economic, social, cultural, and related organizations. References to this archive are indicated in the text by the acronym "Gako" (*Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv kalininskoi oblasti*).

Both archives in Tver' correspond to Patricia Grimsted's description of their operation: the collections first divide into *fondy*, which in turn branch into *opisi* (P.K. Grimsted, A Handbook for Archival Research in the USSR, The International Research and Exchanges Board, The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, no place, 1989, pp. 84-101). Within an *opis'*, the content of the *delo* is listed briefly -- sometimes, however, the *opis'* description of a certain *delo* is incomplete or inadequate. One can only find out what a *delo* contains by perusing it oneself. The *delo* contains actual documents. Often, and in the former Communist Party's archive even without exception, the materials are grouped together within the *delo* because they were the responsibility of the same department, or of the same person, as in the case of Gagurin's letters in the State Archive. Thus, the Party Archive categorizes the *delo* according to the different Party obkom departments (*otdely*): there are *delo* of the special sector, the



agricultural *otdel*, the industry and transport *otdel*, the administrative *otdel* and so forth. The location of the *delo* was thus contingent as well on the administrative organization of the obkom departments at a certain time, since the Central Committee frequently reorganized the obkom administration after the war.

Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii, vysshikh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti i organov gosudarstvennogo upravleniia SSSR (Moscow), references to which are indicated as "TsGAOR."

Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izuchenie dokumentov noveishei istorii (Moscow), in which part of the archives of the former CPSU are kept, although the collection is far from complete and many records still are held (sorted out?) in the buildings of the former Central Committee on Staraia Ploshchad' in Moscow and possibly in the Kremlin itself. References to this archive are indicated in the text as "Moscow."

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