Ethics and Guile in a Series of Persian rewritings of the *Pañcatantra* Fables

Odile Schürch
Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University, Montreal
August 2018

A thesis submitted to McGill University
in partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Arts

© Odile Schürch 2018

Table of Contents

Abstract

In this thesis, I offer new insights into the study of the *Pañcatantra* cycle of stories of ancient Indian origin, through a focus on the tension between the Indian and the Islamic discourses on ethics and guile envisaged as complementary concepts. I choose to combine Genette's intertextual theory with Jauss's aesthetics of reception in order to better frame these two concepts of ethics and guile in their textual, psychological and socio-political contexts. Related to ethical awareness and guile, the literary and the psychological mechanisms of wonder (*taʿajjub*) will be studied. To this effect, I will show that wonder plays both a central and strategic role in the metaphorical usage of ethics and guile in order to convey political opinions, for its intrinsic links with the heart (*qalb*) and intellect or intelligence (*ʿaql*).

The latter section of this thesis will illustrate the tension between ethics and guile in a close intertextual analysis of a few fables chosen in two of the *Pañcatantra*'s Persian rewritings: Ḥusayn Vāʿiz-i Kāshifī's 15th-century *Anvār-i Suhaylī*, derived from Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's 8th-century Arabic version, and Khāliqdād ʿAbbāsī's 16th-century *Pañcākhyāna*, a direct translation of Pūrṇabhadra's Sanskrit text dated to the 12th century. I will demonstrate that the genre of "Mirror for Princes" is a pertinent choice to show how the tension between ethics and guile can be dissolved in those two parent versions and allows us to see what is to be expected to remain or not of this *nīti* secular tradition, still visible in ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*, in Kāshefī's *Anvār*, but also what might have filtered or not from Islamicate *akhlāq* tradition in ʿAbbāsī's text.

Résumé

Cette thèse offre une nouvelle perspective dans l'étude des fables du *Pañcatantra* originaires de l'Inde ancienne, par le biais d'une attention spécifique portée sur la tension entre les discours indien et islamique sur l'éthique et la ruse envisagés en tant que concepts complémentaires. Je choisis la théorie de Genette sur l'intertextualité en la combinant à celle de Jauss sur l'esthétique de la réception, dans le but de mieux cerner ces deux concepts d'éthique et de ruse dans leurs contextes textuel, psychologique et socio-politique. En lien avec l'éthique et la ruse, les mécanismes littéraires et psychologiques de l'émerveillement (*taʿajjub*) seront étudiés. A cet effet, je mettrai en évidence le rôle à la fois central et stratégique de l'émerveillement dans l'usage métaphorique de l'éthique et la ruse à des fins de transmission d'opinions politiques, de par ses liens intrinsèques avec le coeur (*qalb*) et l'intellect, ou l'intelligence (*ʿaql*).

La dernière partie de cette thèse illustrera la tension entre l'éthique et la ruse à travers une analyse intertextuelle approfondie de quelques fables choisies dans deux réécritures du *Pañcatantra*, à savoir: l'*Anvār-i Suhaylī* de Ḥusayn Vāʿiz-i Kāshifī's datant du 15ème siècle, issue de la version arabe du 8ème siècle composée par Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, et celle du *Pañcākhyāna* de Khāliqdād ʿAbbāsī datant du 16ème siècle, traduction directe du texte sanskrit de Pūrṇabhadra remontant au 12ème siècle. Je démontrerai que le genre du "Miroir des Princes" est un choix pertinent pour montrer comment la tension entre l'éthique et la ruse peut être dissoute dans ces deux versions parentes, et nous permet d'entrevoir ce qui est susceptible de perdurer de cette tradition laïque du *nīti*, encore visible dans le *Pañcākhyāna* de ʿAbbāsī, dans l'*Anvār* de Kāshifī, mais également ce qui aurait pu filtrer ou non de la tradition de l'éthique islamique dans le texte de ʿAbbāsī.

Notes on Transliteration

This thesis employs transliterated words mostly from Persian, but also from Arabic and to a lesser extent from Sanskrit and Hindi. Those words, including proper names, are transliterated into italicized roman characters with diacritics, following the Library of Congress (LOC) system and Romanization tables.

However, terms that are found in the English dictionary are kept in their commonly accepted form, e.g., Quran, Sharia, Shiite, Naqshbandi Sufism, vizier, Sultan or Brahman.

Acknowledgements

Firstly I would like to thank my two supervisors, Prof. Pasha Mohamad Khan and Prof. Prashant Keshavmurthy, for their constructive comments and guidance throughout the completion of this thesis, which I started in challenging conditions while working for the International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan.

Secondly, to my Professors of languages, Pouneh Shabani-Jadidi here at McGill, who made me love Persian language, literature and culture, as well as in Geneva, Charles Genequand, Marguerite Gavillet Matar and the late Souha Bachour Maleh, who taught me classical and modern Arabic language and literature, as well as Danielle Feller, who gave me the patience and discipline to start learning Sanskrit, I address my sincere gratitude.

And thirdly a warm thank you to Ghazaleh Ghanavizchian from the Institute of Islamic Studies Library, who helped me fine-tuning my understanding of some expressions used in Kāshefī's *Anvār* and ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna,* Jennifer Garland at the Rare Books Section, who facilitated my access and work on Kāshefī's version and Adina Sigartau, Administrative and Student Affairs Coordinator, who provided me with fantastic support since the beginning of my studies at the Institute until the very end.

Of my colleagues at McGill, I would like to thank Geneviève Mercier-Dalphond and Osama Eshera for their advice in English language as well as their precious encouragements.

Finally to my dearest friends Emma Wynn in Switzerland, Janet Zadra in Vancouver, Lorraine Dumont and Charles Mackay in Montreal, as well as to my Afghan colleagues and families in Mazar and Kabul, who have been an endless source of support, strength and inspiration, a very special *tashakkur*.

I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my late father, Jean Schürch, who gave me the passion to read and listen to fables between and beyond the lines, to learn languages and to approach the world in a critical but mostly humble and respectful way.

Introduction

Would it be possible for the tension between ethics and guile encountered in the ancient Indian secular political *nīti* tradition and that in Islamicate *akhlāq* to be dissolved and, if so, under which conditions? Considering ethics and guile as complementary concepts creates a subtle tension, less obvious than if they were regarded as simply opposite to one another. But why would one choose to study those two concepts through fables of the late medieval and early modern periods in the Islamicate world? These are the questions that I intend to answer. Admitting that relationships between history, politics, religion and language are mutable is a necessary prerequisite in this thesis, whose underlying objective is to highlight potentially immutable characteristics of human nature and pave creative ways to navigate a constant changing socio-political environment.

It is widely agreed among scholars that the Arabic version of the *Pañcatantra*, composed by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ in the 8th century, marks a more ethical tendency compared to previous versions. Most arguments sustaining this point of view are based on the chapter of "Dimnah's Trial", which was composed and added by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ himself in order to bring back some sense of justice to its Sanskrit hypotext. Some scholars such as Christine van Ruymbeke have recently challenged this opinion.[1] In this thesis, I propose to look at ethics and guile as complementary aspects, as illustrated in a close analysis of two fables chosen in the following Persian versions of the *Pañcatantra*: Ḥusayn Vāʿiz-i Kāshifī's 15th century *Anvār-i Suhaylī*, derived from Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's version, and Khāliqdād ʿAbbāsī's 16th century *Pañcākhyāna*, which is a direct translation of Pūrṇabhadra's Sanskrit version dated 12th century. We shall also see what of ancient Indian secular *nīti*, which is very much present in ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* is left in Kāshifī's *Anvār-i Suhaylī*.

[1] "Dimna's *Apologia* in Kāshefī' *Anvār-e Suhaylī*" Christine van Ruymbeke, 2016.

Van Ruymbeke's work on the *Anvār* and de Blois's study of Burzūyeh's voyage have been a great source of inspiration for me in comparing the fables in question using the intertextual theoretical framework elaborated by Genette as well as Jauss's theory of the aesthetics of reception. In the field of linguistics and comparative literature, I have also used London's research on frank speech in allegorical discourse, as well as Marroun's reflection on "transmimesis", Olivelle's research on the presence of animals in Indian literature and culture and Schimmel's study on the role of animals in the Islamicate world. I have given a great deal of attention to Rao and Subrahmanyam's study of *nīti* in early and pre-modern Indian regimes, as well as to Subtelny's knowledge of the Timurids and Kāshefī's works and environment. Truschke, Carl Ernst and Alam have contributed to my understanding of the socio-cultural links between the Timurids and the Mughals.

A significant constraint, but motivating challenge for me, was to write this thesis in English as a second language. Besides Persian, my modest knowledge of Arabic and Sanskrit has nevertheless significantly helped me in this work. I had no choice but to go through various versions and hypotexts of the *Pañcatantra* in those languages, in order to verify some data and shed light on the various socio-linguistic contexts of Kāshefī's *Anvār* and ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna,* considering those two books as unique works, but still part of the open and complex system of this widely circulated cycle of stories.

This thesis comprises five chapters. The first chapter, on the central thesis, argument and methodology, explains the core theme and the main argument defended, and includes a literature survey. This chapter is aimed at providing a clear theoretical framework. In the second chapter, on the presentation of the corpus of texts, Kāshifī and ʿAbbāsī's books, editions and translations are presented, highlighting the specificities of each work. I have translated the fables myself with

the help of Wollaston's valuable translation only for Kāshefī's version.[2] In chapter three, on sociopolitical context and intellectual activity in Timurid Herat and Mughal India, the various contexts pertaining to the specific historical periods in which those texts were created are examined and the relationship between politics, knowledge and language explored. Chapter four, on the tension between ethics and guile, tackles theories of ethics and guile in the ancient Indian tradition and in the Islamicate literary one. The sensation of wonder, *taʿajjub,* is scrutinized in relation to the usage of ethics and guile with the objective of providing with a clearer insight into the reception of those works. Then the concern of veracity is put face-to-face with the rhetoric of frank speech and allegorical means of persuasion through the use of talking animals. Chapter five, which presents a close intertextual analysis of two fables, first investigates Kāshefī's *Anvār* and ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* in their structure, content and form. A thorough comparative study of two chosen fables follows. Ethics and guile are indeed located at different levels, neither of which can be bypassed: socio-political and literary, but also textual, that is the other stories in each version, which directly surround and lead to those two fables. The last section on outcomes and avenues for further research, concludes this thesis with its main results and proposes to broaden the scope of the study of ethics and guile from classical comparative literature to other fields of study, such as political sciences and pedagogy.

Finally, I wish this thesis to answer academic standards and to be both meaningful and enjoyable to read.

[2] I will be referring to the original texts with the name of the author followed by the one of the main editor, or translator (e.g. Kāshefī/Ouseley; Kāshefī/Wollaston; ʿAbbāsī/Chand).

Chapter One: Central thesis, arguments and methodology

Central thesis and arguments

In what new forms did concepts of ethics and guile appear in the Persian translations of the *Pañcatantra* during the reign of the Timurid Sultan Ḥusayn Bāyqarā of Herat (1469-1506) and the Mughal Emperor Akbar (1556-1605)? What makes it particularly engaging to study those concepts between the late medieval and early modern periods in those areas and textual series? Why not choose the genre of romance to address ethics and guile? As Meisami suggests: "the romance explores the relationship between love and justice and specifically the role of love as the source of that wisdom which leads both to justice and to universal harmony" (Meisami 182-183). Also Ṭūsī's preference for love over law is one of the theoretical inspirations for the persistence and flourishing of the romance genre in Persian.

The question of genre is important because the genre assigned to a text helps to determine its possible usages. But how do we navigate the myriad genre designations given that the literary tradition dealing with moral concepts and advice on the art of governance has been referred to as "Mirror for Princes" in Medieval Christian Europe, *Śāstra* and more precisely *Nītiśāstra* or political treatise in India, *Andarz Nameh* in Persia or *ḥikāyat* and *akhlāq* in the rest of the Islamicate world? My thesis will investigate the concepts of ethics and guile, and their potentially tense relation to one another, from an etic point of view (Harris, 1976). Ethics and guile are envisaged as complementary aspects, rather than as separate ones or irrevocably contrary to each other.

The use of ethics and guile by political actors is an integral aspect of the social nature of political governance and is depicted strikingly in advice literature. It is however important to clarify what is meant by ethics (*akhlāq*) and guile (*kayd*) in this thesis. On one hand, *akhlāq*

refers to desirable character traits exemplified by divine qualities such as mercy, justice, compassion and forgiveness. Commonly speaking, *akhlāq* or normative discourses on ethics allow the expression of political theory (Subtelny, 1997). Pre-Mongol texts such as the *Qābūs-nāmah* of Kay Kāvus, the *Siyāsat-nāmah* of Niẓām al-Mulk, *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk* of al-Ghazālī, and later on the *Akhlāq-i Muḥsinī* and *Futuwwat-nāmah-i Sulṭānī* of Kāshifī (largely influenced by the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* of Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī) suggest that *akhlāq* can be transmitted via *naṣīhat* or *andarz* (practical advice), and codified in compendia of *adab* (proper conduct regulated by codes and customs). But there is another distinction to be taken into account between those texts, which is the realist versus idealist political advice literature. Epic, romance and *akhlāq* tended to be realist, while *siyāsat* (e.g. Niẓām al-Mulk's *Siyāsat-nāmah*), Sharia or Quran- and Hadith-based advice and Neoplatonic political advice (e.g. Al-Fārābī, Ibn ʿArabī and the Akbarian tradition including Bedil) tended to be idealist.

On the other hand, *kayd* can be defined as "a whole range of dishonest or deceitful behavior" (Clinton, 1999). This definition invites us to consider various aspects of discursive and social contexts at the origin of the use of *kayd.* A crucial element is that guile is not inherently right or wrong, "sometimes it is positive, sometimes negative, at times divine" (Milani 181). Can we therefore assume that political actors could be guileful while nevertheless being ethical? As concluded in the first chapter of Saʿdī's *Gulistān*, can a white lie not be preferable to a destructive truth? Why not go even further and admit that "wonderful lies" can have another significant added value, which is "to please the aesthetic sense, arouse pleasure and advice without being oppressively homiletic" (Khan 530 - 531). Beyond the use and perception of either *akhlāq* or *kayd,* what matters most for me is the intention or sincerity, whether of the characters involved in the stories, the author, or the reading public, taking into account their respective

social contexts. I strongly believe that it is only by looking into the intention in a specific context, mainly socio-political but also personal, that we can have a better understanding of the very nature of either ethics or guile.

I argue that the tension between ethics and guile encountered in Indian secular political *nīti* tradition and Islamicate *akhlāq* can be dissolved provided that we assume the literary phenomenon of transcultural mimesis (Marroun, 2011) and the implications of wonder, commonly called *taʿajjub* (or *ehsās-i shegeftī*) in Medieval Islamic narrative discourse, which are at stake.

There is no doubt that since its composition, the *Pañcatantra* has been an object of desire and appropriation through mimesis. French theorists of the 1960s and 1970s like Deleuze label those reproductions as examples of simulacrum, "a copy without a single original" (Marroun 517), while Ricoeur insists that "mimesis is not a copy: *Mimesis* is *poiesis*, that is, construction, creation" (534), involving peritexts as well. Furthermore, a simulacrum would constitute a void image of the model that still produces an "effect of resemblance" via an internalization of dissimilarities (533). In the case of the *Pañcatantra* cycle of stories, this mimesis is obviously accompanied by transmission of culture, a transculturation, hence the symbiotic term of "transmimesis" of Marroun (512). This process is far from being a passive one and requires quite active and pro-active interventions (e.g. the many stories added or omitted by different copyists and authors).

I will demonstrate that the effect of surprise or wonder induced by a metaphorical use of ethics or guile in order to convey political views, finds its source of persuasion firstly in the heart *(qalb)*, before being deciphered by the intellect (*ʿaql*). *Taʿajjub* will be examined in order to unveil its implications for reception-aesthetics studies and the history of the genre as well as its

intrinsic and complex relations with ethics and guile. *Taʿajjub* lies at the intersection of numerous fields of studies such as philology, sociology, anthropology and religious studies in addition to literature and psychology. Scholars like Stallknecht (1971) have justly insisted on the important links between psychology and comparative literature, history of ideas, and arts. In this strategic position, *taʿajjub* positively contributes to an inclusive approach, and presents itself as a natural link between art and literature. The sensation of *taʿajjub* will also be scrutinized in order to gain a deeper understanding of some of its literary and psychological mechanisms and seductive effects. However, while art and literature create the space to explore and discuss the wondrous between ethical awareness and vicious tactical guile, we should remain realistic on the possibility of conceptualizing and profoundly understanding *taʿajjub*, due to its intimate relation with *qalb*. Doubts and uncertainty are indisputably close companions of an author or reader dealing with such issues. One should therefore make room for those doubts with the desire or courage to cohabit with them, rather than nourishing the fallacious hope of dissolving them.

The two Persian versions of *Pañcatantra* texts that will be the objects of my case study are: Ḥusayn Vāʿiz-i Kāshifī's 15th century *Anvār-i Suhaylī* and Khāliqdād ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* dating from the 16th century. I contend that these texts are useful for exploring the concepts of ethics and guile as imagined in Timurid Herat and Mughal India, not only because of their allegorization of political governance, but essentially for their unique connectivity to India in an age of royal absolutism and mystical rationalism. The *Anvār-i Suhaylī* is acknowledged as a masterpiece of Persian rhetorical prose, and has recently been brought back to light by current scholars like Christine Van Ruymbeke (2016). Her earlier defense of the *Anvār-i Suhaylī*'s literary value is an elegant illustration of intertextuality's approach through a translation within the same language, showing the importance of how socio-political aspects relate to the form and

content of literary texts (2003). The *Anvār-i Suhaylī* is derived from Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's 8th century Arabic version, while the *Pañcākhyāna* is a direct translation of Pūrṇabhadra's Sanskrit version, dated 12th century. Nine to ten centuries passed since the first journey of this text from India to Persia through Burzūyeh in the 6th century, until the *Anvār-i Suhaylī* and the *Pañcākhyāna* were composed. A study of those two Persian versions illustrates a return to Indian soil in a completely new socio-political environment and highlights the significant impact of Indian *nīti* tradition on those texts.

Throughout her book *Culture and Encounters* (2016), Truschke offers an original view on how the Mughal rulers chose to build their political identity by weaving together culture and power and not simply by restricting literature to supporting political ambitions (24 - 25). She defends an interesting argument in favor of a self-identification process of Mughal rulers as Indian kings, rather than of a legitimization of their political authority (Keshavmurthy, 2017). As we will see, this argument can or even should nevertheless be nuanced. The influence of linguistic, religious and social factors respectively on the *Anvār-i Suhaylī* and the *Pañcākhyāna* also renders this encounter particularly attractive. Moreover, the popularity of the *Anvār-i Suhaylī* might not only have made the *Pañcākhyāna* conceivable, but doing so, it also bestowed a new positioning of the Jain Sanskrit version within the *Pañcatantra* cycle of stories. In addition, those texts interestingly represent samples of indirect and direct translations. This aspect is of particular interest for its implication on both the perception of the content and narrative style pertaining to ethics and guile.

The central theme and focus of this thesis is thus a complementary combination of socio-political and religious circumstances in the specific eras under study and of psychological factors related to the sources and impacts of the use of ethics and guile.

According to Ghālib, "certain pairs of genres are different yet non-conflictual, such as romance and the ethical manual (*akhlāq*)" (Khan 531), or texts on political ethics dealing with moral concepts and advice on the art of governance for rulers, in opposition with other incompatible pairs like history and romance, in addition to the fact that intellect would favour history and heart the romance. One knows that these dichotomies need to be nuanced and that one has to constantly mediate between several regions of the mind and the heart without forgetting that "in their hearts they (the intellectual men) will attest to the tastefulness and delightfulness of romances and tales" (530).

Regarding the term "Mirror for Princes", it has to be recalled that it is a Medieval European one derived from Latin *Speculum regis/principis* or *regale*, works that offer advice to rulers at that time. Later on, it is the Persian traditions of kingship that gave an important stimulus to the growth of this genre in Islamic literature. Moreover, one could not talk about fable *per se* before the infiltration of Persian culture under the Abbasid period. Meisami argues in her *Classical Persian Courtly Poetry* that the romance *maṯnavī* (Gorgānī, Niẓāmī), was one of four ethical genres or "Mirrors for Princes", the others being the epic *maṯnavī*, the *qaṣīda* and *ghazal*. In this case study, not only are the designation and scope of "Mirrors for Princes" still being debated today among scholars in the West, including Christine Van Ruymbeke, defending the necessity and relevance of analyzing non-western traditions in this field, but also its categorization as a literary genre. The question of purpose and content *versus* form, as prerequisite conditions for its existence has raised controversy. Claims, such as the indecipherability of generic classes, the essentialism of the study of genre or even its inability to guide the interpretation of a text, have also been addressed. Cohen (1986) has convincingly countered those latter discredits by assuming that classifications are empirical and that they first

respond to historical, social, and aesthetic purposes. He describes genres as interconnected "open systems" (210). One could even call them "open polyphonic systems" remembering the "multivocal" aspect of texts developed by Orsini, who uses this term in its Bakhtinian sense. This conception of genres sets forth new perspectives to defend the study of genre and its intrinsic links with history. As Blaydes states: "advice literature" is "a genre of political writing" (3), thus sustaining Cohen's thought. The important historical aspects of genre also ease the transition towards reception studies as developed in the twentieth century and further shaped by translational theories, cultural studies, and intertextuality.

Extensive research, starting with Edgerton in his "The Panchatantra Reconstructed" (1924), which he refers to as a "Mirror for Princes" text, and Hertel (1912), has been and is still being pursued to find out how reliable or close any given version would be to an *Ur-Pañcatantra*. This "original" hypotext[3], hypothetically composed in Sanskrit, and the first Pahlavi version are both lost. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's 8th century version is the one that gave rise to most rewritings and reinterpretations. The trend in recent studies has been to consider each version for its own literary value. In this respect, comparisons between various versions of *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* with regard to form and content (Van Ruymbeke, 2003), or intertextual analysis within one version (Marroum, 2011), have already been the subject of abundant research. The same goes for the salience of ethics or guile in Persian literature (Clinton and Milani, 1999). We can find indications of ethics and guile in studies of *Pañcatantra* and *Kalīlah wa Dimnah*, but mostly integrated among broader topics, such as the description of the human condition in this corpus of fables, an unequivocal designation of its genre as a "political science

[3] See p. 18: "Hypotext" is a term used by Gerard Genette in his theory of intertextuality and more specifically to what he calls "hypertextuality", referring to a prior text that reappears in the present one: "toute relation unissant un texte B (hypertexte) à un texte antérieur A (hypotexte) sur lequel il se greffe d'une manière qui n'est pas celle du commentaire" (Genette, "Palimpsestes", 13).

treatise" in which politics and ethics are intrinsically linked (Audebert, 1999), or the consequences of the use of direct or indirect speech on the so called "frankness" of the content (London, 2008). Concepts of ethics and guile, however, as main objects of study within diverse versions of the *Pañcatantra*, have not yet received any significant attention. The distinction between ethics and guile matters for its crucial effects on the reception of the *Pañcatantra* at different levels: personal, social and political.

Methodology

I will examine the texts from an intertextual perspective, as initiated by the structuralist and post-structuralist school. Intertextuality's history and concepts have significantly contributed to broaden the scope of discourse on political ethics analysis in comparative literature. I chose to focus on the approaches of Bakhtin and Genette, who have generated a convincing theoretical framework in order to study between the lines of the text and of the book itself.

Intertextuality is a flexible concept used beyond literary works, reflecting various "visions of society and human relations" (Allen 5). Because of this wide use, and subsequent misuse, this term should be reframed and clearly explained here. Kristeva is the one who created this word in the late 1960s transitional period between structuralism and post-structuralism, or between "scientific rigour" and "methodological stability" and "subjectivity" and "pleasure" (3). Her study of Bakthin's work, and more specifically the concept of dialogism, contributed to the notion of intertextuality, adding a crucial aspect which was missing beforehand, meaning the specific cultural and social contexts in which utterances occur. In this approach, utterance is a key word to consider, as it helps and "captures the human-centered and socially specific aspect of language" (16), in a certain historical moment. The choice of utterance is also determined by

the addressee, “the words we select in any specific situation have an ‘otherness’ about them: they belong to specific speech genres” as Bakhtin would have named them (20). However, even though the use and meaning of utterances are unique, they depend on anterior patterns of meaning common to both the addressee and the addresser. Lexemes are never just their author’s because the author uses them in ways conditioned by their prior usage, which also conditions the reception of lexemes. Language is social before it is individual and thus paves the way to the readers horizons of expectations (Jauss, 1978).

Genette’s theory of textual meaning and the relationship between the readers and the texts appears to differ from post-structuralist thought. Genette contends a more definite and stable position with regards to literary texts. He states, referring back to de Saussure: “literary ‘production’ is a *parole*, in the Saussurean sense, a series of partially autonomous and unpredictable individual acts; but the ‘consumption’ of this literature by society is a *langue*” (Allen 93). If the non-originality of a text or its non-uniqueness is common to both thoughts, the scope of the text’s relations to other works is, in Genette’s approach, restricted to the field of literature only, seen as a self-sufficient system. However, to the contrary of Barthes for example, Genette reintegrates the crucial aspects of the author’s status and intention, through what he coins as the “voice”, meaning the relationships between both *narrating* and *narrative* and *narrating* and *story*, or in other words here between the two narrators/authors and the worlds of fables and political ethics. The other advantage of Genette’s theory is that his views on what is commonly called intertextuality, but which he refers to as transtextuality in his study *Architexts*, provides a useful categorization of five types of transtextual relations, including concrete criteria for analyzing and comparing texts (Genette, 1982): intertextuality, which in Genette’s new wording is reduced to the co-presence between two or more texts, or the presence of a text within

another one. It therefore requires the reader's perception of the relations between one text and anterior or posterior ones; paratextuality, consisting in peritexts, such as chapter titles, prefaces and notes, and epitexts, such as reviews and critics. This reflects the text's circumstances and intentions; metatextuality, meaning the text is a commentary of another one; hypertextuality, or any relation between a given text B (hypertext) to an anterior text A (hypotext), which does not involve that text B is a commentary of text A. It involves different types of transformations such as amplification, reduction or a more direct one, imitation; finally, architextuality, representing types of discourses or genres. Those obviously permeable categories help delineate the literary process, which permits or precludes the reader from relating to the psychological dimensions of *taʿajjub,* and thus to decipher the obvious and wondrous facets of the use of ethics and guile.

This transtextual framework will also allow us to move outward from the texts themselves to their horizons of expectations in order to understand the social and historical contexts and changes surrounding the two versions and to structure the argument pertaining to the use and reception of guile and ethics and their influence on the literary genre as well as on the reading public. More precisely in light of the above, the genre or architextuality (Genette 2004) of the text is determined by the readers' horizons of expectations and the hypotexts to which they have been exposed in the past. The explicit invitation to explore those horizons, through aesthetics of reception as developed by Jauss, offers a way to counterbalance some challenges left aside in Genette's theory, namely the absence of a relationship between literary texts and other cultural types of arts and the focus on authorial intention to the detriment of the reader's role in producing the meaning of a text. It will also serve as a complementary methodological framework to Genette's, rightly conciliating both synchronic and diachronic approaches.

Horizons of expectation of the readers rely on the prior experience of the genre, the form and thematic of other known works, and the opposition of an imaginary world and the daily reality or life experience, meaning between fiction and reality and the ongoing related concern for authenticity and truth.

A work can be seen as a response to a question and interpretation requires one to decipher the question to which the text answers. The fact that a work survives is itself a proof of reception. Extra literary factors like the social milieu will direct the aesthetic interest of different categories of readers. The link between literature and the reader lies in ethics as well as sensitivity, as an incentive to moral reflection through an aesthetic perception. In front of an unusual aesthetic form, the reader might be confronted by questions to which the state or religious ethics failed to provide the answer. The ethical component of the social function of a work should be apprehended by the aesthetic of reception in terms of questions and answers, problems and solutions. The aesthetic experience of reception implies some emotional disposition and subjective impressions, but this perception is guided and determined by signs, which can be described in textual linguistic terms. Literature too has its own relatively stable syntax, a system of elements such as genres, expression modes and styles as opposed to a more variable world of symbols and metaphors.

However this is not enough to understand the experience of reception of a work. We have to know the prior horizons of a work in order to evaluate its effect of surprise, scandal or conformity to the public's expectation. *Effect* and *reception* have to be differentiated: the *effect* is determined by the work itself as per its genre and its links with the past, whereas the *reception* or the effect it actually has, depends on the active reader's interpretative competence. There is a gap between the work and its horizons of expectations, which can either be sensed as a source of

pleasure or surprise, or provoke perplexity. From an aesthetic of reception point of view, this gap represents the very artistic character of the literary work itself. This gap encompasses a diachronic movement of the reception of literary works through time, viewed from a system of synchronic literary and moral norms and values in a specific period of time.

The genre in its relation between a given text with anterior ones depends on a process of modification of horizon, a variation or correction showing openness in its structure, while a reproduction reveals its frontiers. It is important to recall that a reproduction of a former work is not only a mimesis but a dialectic/dialogic means to create and transform the perception. Historicity of literature consists of three aspects: diachronic, through the reception of a work through a period of time; synchronic, meaning the system of literature at a certain time and the successions of synchronic systems, or chain of receptions (a synchronic cut necessarily implies other synchronic ones in other periods of time, diachronically anterior or posterior); and the link between the intrinsic evolution of literature and general history itself. It thus manifests itself at the very intersection of diachronic and synchronic movements. Jauss reconciles literary theory with its historical dimension and emphasizes the importance of the functional and dynamic relations not only between the authors and their works but also the readers.

Finally, the two short narratives that will be analyzed in order to exemplify those methodological concepts are the following: "The Story of the Elephant, the Hare and the Moon" and "The Story of the Brahman and the Ichneumon/The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air". The first fable only depicts animals whereas the second presents human characters as main actors, an exception being made for the ichneumon. This is a change of perspective worth exploring more deeply in relation to the central theme of this thesis. Both narratives are present in Kāshifī and ʿAbbāsī's versions. A deeper look at the texts not only

reveals differences in the titles of those cycle of stories, like the *Pañcatantra* in India, rewritten under the title *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* in the Arab world and then *Anvār-i Suhaylī* in Timurid Herat and *Pañcākhyāna* in Mughal Lahore, but also various positioning of the narratives within the texts, thus exemplifying the specificities of the milieu, and the choices of the different authors.

The concepts of dialogism and polyphony (Bakhtin/Holquist, 2004), referring to the dependence of utterances upon previous discourses or voices and their reception by others, will also be used to analyze intertextual relations involving the specific roles of talking, thinking, or feeling animals. The animals act as symbolic signifiers. More precisely, the manipulation of animals in literary imagery eases the communication between humans, thanks to the symbolic messages animals are thus able to convey. Philological research, confined in a romantic conception of purely natural poetry and naïve animal tale, could not fail to grasp the didactic meaning of the analogy between animals and humans. Even a naïve reader of one of these *Pañcatantra* versions knows that the animal tales bear moralistic lessons. I strongly defend the necessity of looking at those texts in their original languages. This and the effort of translating them, are valuable aspects of positivist philology which should not be neglected: "a discipline with a decidedly moralizing stance, a somewhat devotional sanctimoniousness", which "aims for the scientific study of texts, of the meanings of their words and sentences, of the referents to which the text belongs" (Al-Azmeh 134-135); those referents being historical, cultural, social, legal or religious.

Chapter Two: Presentation of the corpus of texts: editions and translations

The historical and political factors at the origin of the circulation of the *Pañcatantra* cycle of stories from Persia back to India have been tackled earlier when discussing the choice of the two Persian versions, Kāshifī's *Anvār-i Suhaylī* and ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*. Those external aspects will be further developed in the next chapter. Here we shall address a more specific question: why among other prominent Persian rewritings of the *Pañcatantra* even within the same period of time or context, should we choose those two versions in particular to investigate the tension between ethics and guile? In other words, why should we select Kāshifī's version and not Abū l-Maʿālī's, for example, and why ʿAbbāsī's translation and not Abū l-Faḍl's text? The arguments of ancestry and lack of scholarship will be left aside from the start: ancestry cannot be an argument for chosing Kāshifī and ʿAbbāsī's versions over respectively Abū l-Maʿālī and Abū l-Faḍl's ones as both latter ones chronologically precede them. And the lack of scholarship, mostly with regards to ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*, cannot be of any justification to produce such scholarship.

If some philological aspects are obviously at stake and have to be taken into account, the main point under scrutiny here will emphasize the ethical implications for the reception of those texts that they allow us to unveil. I argue that the Indian reception of Kāshifī and ʿAbbāsī's versions are the coming together of two traditions of non-religious courtly ethics that had already come together in the pre-Islamic period and that the popularity in India of Kāshifī's version conferred a new positioning of the Jain Sanskrit version through ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*. I am choosing those two texts because they are parent texts for many versions and because they are important for Indian literary culture from where the *Pañcatantra* originates and key for understanding the Indian reception of Persian adaptations of Indian ethical literature.

For the sake of clarity, I will first present the chosen versions in the light of their respective *locus* and role within the broader structure of the constellation of the many *Pañcatantra* rewritings, and then the editions and translations chosen. Finally reasons behind the selection of the two fables within those versions will be more thoroughly explained. I voluntarily choose not to go into the details of the listing and the complex synchronic and diachronic convolutions of all the known versions. Scholars have abundantly described those facts in the attempt to draw a genealogy as precise and reliable as possible of the *Pañcatantra* cycle of stories. I opt instead to focus on its Persian versions only.

The most common Indian title of this book, *Pañcatantra*, means "five books" or "five chapters". They constitute the kernel of all its descendants. Out of this primary Sanskrit version, Burzūyeh, a Persian physician working at the court of the Sasanian King Khusraw I (531-579), compiled a first Middle Persian version. He named it *Kalilag wa Dimnag* or *Karīrak ud Damanak* after the two jackals, the main protagonists of the first book of the *Pañcatantra*. Although this version is lost, we can have a fairly good idea of what it looked like thanks to two of its direct translations, namely the Old Syriac and the Arabic ones, still partially available today. The Old Syriac version is dated 6th century, meaning shortly after the Middle Persian and still in the pre-Islamic period, and was written by a Persian monk named Bud (or Bod). The only manuscript of this version dates back to the 16th century and was first published by Bickell in Germany three centuries later. The Arabic one, *Kalīlah wa Dimnah,* was composed in the 8th century by the renowned author Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ of Persian origin and is the text from which most subsequent versions derive, including the Persian ones which interest us here. Therefore it is more correct to say that the versions we have access to today are derived from the one of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, than to state that they faithfully reflect it. The oldest manuscript is dated to the 13th

century, five hundred years after its composition. This manuscript was first published in Paris in the early 19th century by Silvestre de Sacy. It consisted of fifteen stories, which can be divided into two groups (de Blois, 1990): ten stories found in the Old Syriac one, therefore most probably coming from their common source, the Middle Persian version, and five present in the Arabic version and most of its descendants, but not in the Old Syriac one, thus coming from other ulterior non-Indian sources. What is important to note for now is that among the first group of ten stories, five correspond to the five chapters of the *Pañcatantra*, while among the five stories of the second group, the famous story of the "Investigation of Dimnah's Conduct" appears in the Arabic version and all others derived from it, and has nothing to do with the *Pañcatantra,* although it directly follows the first chapter "the Lion and the Ox". In the Sanskrit version of the *Pañcatantra* the title of this chapter, *Mitra-bheda*, or the "disunity/discrimination of friends", clearly announces its purpose: it tells or rather teaches how to break alliances and friendships with the objective to promote one's own interests. The personage representing this type of behavior is the crafty and unscrupulous jackal *Damanaka*, who ruins the friendship between the Lion and the Ox, without even being summoned for his actions. It thus appears that someone, and most probably Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, thought it should not be the case and decided to bring back some ethics to the story. This Arabic text of *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* has been translated a number of times back into Persian starting from the 10th century onwards; the oldest version is mentioned in Firdawsī's *Shāhnāmah*. The Samanid vizier Balʿamī sponsored it and although it is lost, it served as a basis for its versification by Rūdakī in the same century.

Then, in the 12th century, appears one of the most famous Persian versions, *Kitāb Kalīla wa Dimna,* translated from Arabic by Abū l-Maʿālī Naṣr Allāh Munshi. Its mixture of rhetorical prose and Arabic and Persian poetry renders its style close to the one of the *Pañcatantra.* Also,

its improvement of elaborated rhymed prose (*naṯr-e musajja'*) into gilded over-embellished one (*naṯr-e maṣnū'*) had a significant impact on Persian prose literature. Contemporary to Abū l-Maʿālī's version is the one of al-Bukhārī, *Dastānhāye Bidpay*, dedicated to the *Atabeg* of Mawṣil, Abū l-Muẓaffar Ghāzī ibn Zangī ibn Aq Sunqur. However, it did not reach the fame of the text of Abū l-Maʿālī, because of its straightforward and simpler narrative style. Abū l-Maʿālī's version is itself the source of several other Persian rewritings: a metrical composition by Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd al-Ṭūsī Qānīʿi (13th century), but mostly the *Anvār-i Suhaylī* by Ḥusayn Vāʿiz-i Kāshifī (end of 15th century) and the *ʿIyār-i Dānish* by Abū l-Faḍl (end of 16th century).

Kāshifī was born in Sabzvār in the Province of Bayhaq in the 1420s. He was a prolific author, compiler, preacher and popularizer, who spent some time in Nishapur and Mashad before settling at the Timurid Herat court of Sultan Ḥusayn Mirzā Bāyqarā of Khurāsān (1469-1506). He dedicated his book to Aḥmad Suhaylī, Bāyqarā's vizier. *Suhayl* is also the name of the Canopus star in Arabic and it will remain the master signifier in all translations of this version into European, Turkish, Asian and mostly Indian languages.[4] In fact the *Anvār-i Suhaylī* 's circulation and success lie in the Indian cultural milieu rather than a strictly Iranian one.

As far as Abū l-Faḍl's version is concerned, the Great Mughal of India Akbar (1556-1605) commissioned it, saying he wanted a less pretentious and more concise version of Kāshifī's work. This version was later on translated into Urdu and other Indian languages under the title of *Khirad Afrōz*. Akbar wanted a version directly translated from Sanskrit and as close as possible to it. In order to fulfill this task, he assigned Khāliqdād ʿAbbāsī, a scholar at the court.

We know very little about ʿAbbāsī's life. He was from Lahore and later on translated other works for Jahangir as well. The exact date of his translation of *Pañcantantra* is difficult to

[4] Interestingly, when Masīh Pānipati in the early 17th century retold Vālmiki's *Rāmāyaṇa* in Persian maṯnavī form, he rendered the sage *Agastya* (the Sanskrit name for the Canopus star) as *Suhayl*.

assert, but it was certainly after Abū l-Faḍl's in 1588. ʿAbbāsī used the *Pañcākhyānaka* or *Pañcākhyāna*, a version of a Jain monk named Pūrṇabhadra, who had composed it in the 12th century during Vikrama era (1199 CE), for a certain Śrī-Soma, minister at the court. In 1848 Kosegarten called this version *textus ornatior* in reference to its additional developments (21 stories) compared to the *textus simplicior* of a former Jain monk, shorter than that of Pūrṇabhadra, who amplified it (Edgerton, 1924). He did not only use versions of the *textus simplicior*, but also of the *Tantrākhyāyika* as well as other versions of the *Pañcatantra* unfortunately lost. However, according to Hertel (1912), no other recension as well preserved as this one would have reached us today.

The description of the location of these two versions in the history of the *Pañcatantra*'s rewritings, shows that the Persian versions not only are among the oldest ones but also constitute the ones that gave birth to its most famous descendants.

Among the texts of closer interest here, namely Abū l-Maʿālī, Kāshifī, Abū l-Faḍl and ʿAbbāsī's versions, they all have been subject to different criticism, reviews and comments. Philological or literary arguments could easily be defended in favor of one or the other of those texts. As above mentioned, Abū l-Maʿālī's text stands on the summit of reputation, remaining a model for its literary values, and numerous manuscripts are still found and studied around the world. Modern Persian critics and European Persianists suggest that Abū l-Maʿālī's jeweled, over-embellished text was far more elegant, natural and even economical than Kāshifī's one. They even disregard Kāshifī's style qualifying it as bombastic and inflated. However, it is important to note that as shown by its wide circulation, Kāshifī's text received an enthusiastic acclaim in the whole Persian-speaking world, from the court of the Ottomans in the west to that of the Mughals in the east. The *Anvār-i Suhaylī* can rightfully be considered *de facto* as one of

the most significant and influential recastings of the *Pañcatantra*. We have to wait until the end of 19th century to find it slowly rehabilitated among the Persian classics, thanks to scholars such as Wollaston and Eastwick. In the same period of time, Saʿdī's *Gulistān* and the *Anvār* were both part of the Persian examination in the Indian Civil Service.

It is also worth looking into Kāshifī's *muqaddama*, where he explains that he obeyed Suhaylī, who ordered him to compose a new version of *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* free of strange idioms *(gharāyeb-i lughāt)*, obscure expressions *('ibārāt-i maghluqa)* and excessive use of metaphors and allegories of various kinds *(mubālagha dar isti'ārāt wa tashbīhāt-i mutafarriqa)*, as well as of Quranic references and Arabic citations. However, his text is not free from Arabic expressions as he kept "some verses and traditions needful to be mentioned (*ba'ẕī āyāt wa aḥ ādīs̲-i ẓarūrī al-z̲ikr wa ās̲ar wa ams̲āl-i mashhūre)* as well as some Persian poetry (*ash'ār-i fārsī*).[5]

He also clearly expresses that his intentions and his additions or excisions were aimed to readjust and beautify the style of the older versions, as well as to simplify and clarify the meaning of those tales in order to render the kernel, the moral lessons of the fables, more readily accessible and intelligible.[6] He acknowledges his debt towards his sources, mainly Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and Abū l-Maʿālī's versions, before showing some distance and creativity towards them, but also, as we will see, offering a unique awareness of *Pañcatantra* and of some philosophical and ethical issues of his time. Having said this, it was common for medieval Persian authors to decry previous works, while boasting about their own compositions.

Now between Abū l-Faḍl's *ʿIyār-i Dānish* and ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*, one major asset here is the fact that the latter is a direct translation from a later Sanskrit version. This choice is

[5] Kāshefī/Ouseley 8 and 10; Wollaston 7 and 10.
[6] Kāshefī/Ouseley 9; Wollaston 9.

indicative of Akbar's own wish and taste, but also more generally of Mughal interest in Sanskrit literature, language, culture and ethics. Additionally, Abū l-Faḍl's version is not only a retelling of the *Anvār-i Suhaylī*, but it was combined with the *Hitopadeśa*, composed by Nārāyaṇa between 800 and 1373. Interestingly, the representative of the second main Southern source leading to the origin of the *Pañcatantra*, called the *Southern Pañcatantra,* served as a basis for the *Hitopadeśa*, whereas the *Tantrākhyāyika*, prototype of the first source, the North-Western Kashmiri one, is one of the main inspirations for Pūrṇabhadra's version. I deem this philological fact ethically significant because the *Hitopadeśa* is itself largely inspired by the Indian *Pañcatantra*, which emphasizes its political message in the more specifically Indian *nīti* tradition rather than Islamic ethical discourse.

In the preface of his text, ʿAbbāsī explains how Akbar ordered him to make a translation from the Sanskrit original. Akbar was not happy with any of the previous translations, including Abū l-Faḍl's *ʿIyār-i Dānish*, reproaching them to be too far from the original in terms of order of stories, additions, omissions and excess of Arabic words and phrases. ʿAbbāsī also mentions that his aim was to translate the text in the simplest form of prose, informal and free of eloquent expressions (*be fārsi-i sāde bī ta'mul wa takalluf az 'ibārat-pardāzi wa sukhan-sāzi),*[7] making it, just as Kāshifī did, understandable for non-scholarly persons, therefore avoiding excessive use of Arabic and rather keeping a great number of Sanskrit or Hindi words instead. ʿAbbāsī's translation shows an excellent command of simple Persian, not only as a writer but also as a translator. We will see through concrete examples in chapter five to what extent his syntactical structures are straightforward, his expression clear and his style unambiguous and easily accessible. ʿAbbāsī also remained as faithful and literal with respect to Pūrṇabhadra's text, not only with respect to syntax and genre, but also lexemes. In his *Pañcākhyāna*, he kept the Sanskrit

[7] ʿAbbāsī/Chand 5.

titles of the five chapters, although those titles are missing in the Persian manuscript and even the Indian version would not have had any titles at the origin and might have been added by Hertel. ʿAbbāsī conserved most of the Sanskrit names of the protagonists as well as the names of Indian Gods like *Candra* and *Indra*, to the contrary of other Persian rewritings in which they were either absent or replaced by their Persian equivalents. But why did ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* fall into oblivion? As we will see, his text might have been a draft and thus not have had the chance to be presented to Akbar, nor promoted by him.

What is important to remember here are the ethical stakes in the fact that the five chapters of the *Pañcatantra* are still present in both chosen texts, although with different titles, order and content from one another as we shall see in chapter five. We will examine those structural changes and see whether they affect or not the reception of those texts and, if yes, how. So far we can say that both versions subordinate animals to humans in their ethics with respect to an anthropocentrism imposed by the genre rather than by their ethical traditions.

Regarding the edition of the *Anvār-i Suhaylī,* a large number of them are available, but only a few do meet scholarly standards. Among the latter, I have chosen the following well-known one: J.W.J Ouseley's edition (Hertford, 1851). As for the edition of the *Pañcākhyāna* chosen here, it dates back to 1973 and is simply the only existing one to my knowledge. It is also based on the one and only manuscript still preserved today at the Delhi National Museum.

Finally with regards to the reading and translation of the fables and parts of the prefaces and introductions of the two chosen versions, I have mainly benefited from the help of Wollaston's 1877 valuable translation of the *Anvār-i Suhaylī,* and to a lesser extent of Eastwick's 1854 one as well, and of my own knowledge of Persian only with regards to ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* as no translation of that version has been published to date.

One should also draw attention to the most commonly used word in the two versions to present the texts: *ḥikāyat* meaning "story". *Ḥikāyat* can be used to tell anecdotes with a moralistic meaning, in a sometimes allegorical way if, by "allegory", we mean a text that conveys a meaning other than its plain sense like Jāmi in his *maṯnavī, ḥikāyat bar sabīl-i tamṯīl*, but sometimes not, as in Sa'dī's *Gulistān*. *Qiṣṣa,* or tale, would either refer to something ordinary that happened, with a positive ending or to something fantastic or hyperbolic. I have therefore voluntarily chosen to use the term "fable" besides "story" in English because of its established use for a kind of story where non-human animals are assigned human speech, and interestingly enough, fable comes from the Latin root *Fabula* meaning speech. We shall see whether those semantic distinctions affect their reception in terms of aesthetics of reception and ethics, and if yes in what way.

Concerning the choice of the fables, which will be analysed in this thesis, I choose to focus on stories belonging to the five original Indian chapters of the *Pañcatantra* in order to see to what extent they can contribute to help us understand how the *nīti* characteristic of the Indian *Pañcatantra* paved its way into the more ethical precepts of Islamicate advice literature.

In the first three chapters of the *Pañcatantra* we find strategies developed in the *Arthaśāstra* such as the ones on peace, war, fleeing, expectation, alliance and double-crossing. Guile and espionage play an important role in the management of delicate situations. The first fable, "The Story of the Elephant, the Hare and the Moon" belongs to the third chapter, *Kākolukīyam,* or "The war of Raven and Owls", which encourages the use of guile to overcome one's enemy, especially when the latter is stronger. The lesson is to carefully choose one's ministers and advisers. As we will see, the above-mentioned strategies are clearly illustrated in the fable. The fourth and fifth chapters of the *Pañcatantra* rather simply put human beings on

stage caught by their destiny. The fifth chapter, *Aparīkṣita-kārakam*, or "The inconsiderate conduct", warns against hasty and reckless action that one shall later on regret. As mentioned earlier, human beings are the main actors in "The Story of the Holy Man and the Ichneumon/The Brahman who builds Castles in the Air". The beginning of the first chapter in both versions starts in the human world before animals take over. The authors might have wished to bring the reader back from the uncanny world of animals into the human realm.

The embedding of the stories in both versions differs. This variation of structure, and the presence of certain stories in one version and not the other show differences in terms of content. Nevertheless the five chapters keep the same central themes. More differences of structure and content in the two chosen versions will be presented in the analysis of the fables in chapter five, whenever relevant to the central theme of this study.

Chapter Three: Socio-political context and intellectual activity in Timurid Herat and Mughal India

Sultan Ḥusayn Bāyqarā (1469-1506) was one of the last rulers of the Timurid dynasty (1370-1506). Under his reign, the Turko-Mongolian nomadic empire based on steppe principles had transformed itself into an agrarian sedentary Perso-Islamic power with a society depending on irrigated agriculture, commerce and taxation system. Those social factors created the need for a more rationalized form of government. The introduction of Perso-Islamic modes of chancellery administration in turn influenced the evolution of Timurid government. This bureaucratic tradition dates back pre-Islamic Sasanian Iran. A look into the chancellery culture in the Perso-Islamic Herat court not only helps us figure out the sociopolitical and literary activities prevailing at that time, but also some key factors including the development of the agrarian economy through the Islamic institution of the pious endowment, and the use of shrines as agro-management enterprises, like for example in Mazar-i Sharif. Bāyqarā was a famous ruler for his interest in agriculture and more precisely hydro-agriculture. This agricultural management was clearly expressed within advice literature written under Timurid patronage, like in the agricultural manual, *Ershād al-zerā'a*, completed in Herat in 1515.

Although unprepared to rule a sedentary society until Khurāsān's conquest, Bāyqarā appointed competent professionals to major administrative positions. The society included a military elite, "the men of the sword" (*ahl al-sayf*), usually of Turkic background and keen to maintain their traditional sources of income at the expense of the state treasury, and a bureaucratic class, "the men of the pen" (*ahl al-qalam*), secretaries, tax officials, heads of finance, mostly of Persian background and seeking to instill centralizing reforms. The main difference between those two groups was that the former aspired to take over the kingdom and

empty the Sultan's treasury, whereas the latter never yearned for power and was rather the one filling up the treasury. The most important role of the *ahl al-qalam* was to preserve medieval and classical Persian poetry, literature and culture, and also to produce works on history, medicine, jurisprudence or ethics. The time of the Timurid court in Herat is known as the most literate of all periods in medieval Islamic Central Asian history. There were more than twenty poets who grew famous under the reign of Bāyqarā. He patronized the arts and literature because he perceived cultural prestige as a necessary correlative to political power. Persian remained the predominant language for poetry, literature and historiography, but Turkic still managed to develop thanks to Bāyqarā's friend and adviser Mir 'Ali Sher Navāʿī, the famous man of letters and father of Chaghatay literature. The intellectual milieu in Herat was indeed a product of the cultural symbiosis of Persian and Turkic-speaking people.

The Timurids in particular seem to have focused on political ethics, diplomacy, courtly literary and artistic rhetoric and poetry. The interest in political ethics might well have been triggered by the societal tension between those Persian *ahl al-qalam* and those Turkic *ahl al-sayf* categories on the one hand, and the need to contain those strained relations on the other hand. The majority of literary works in those various fields mainly consisted in imitations or commentaries, or "critical editions" of important texts such as Ferdowsi's *Shahnāmah* or the *Dīvān* of Ḥāfeẓ. The same is true of the literary tradition of the science of epistolary composition (*'ilm al-inshā*), aimed at instructing court secretaries or scribes (*kātibs*) and stylists (*munshīs*), on protocol associated with *adab*.[8] But *inshā* also allowed creativity with rhetorical and rhyming devices. Among the bureaucrats, literati and polymaths in the court of Bāyqarā, Kāshifī was known as the author of at least forty works, all written in Persian, most of them patronized by

[8] By the 17th century, *munshī*s were already recognized in Northern India as professional and politically influential writers, while *karaṇam*s, their counterpart in Central and Southern India emerged (Rao & Subrahmanyam 416).

members of the Timurid court of Herat, starting with Mīr ʻAli Sher Navāʻi and the Sultan Bāyqarā himself. Kāshifī's rhetorical style was in line with the literary context of the Timurid court, characterized by a florid literary criticism (Van Ruymbeke, 2003). He played a significant role with his "Treasure House of *Inshā*" (*Makhzan al-inshā*). Modern scholars would rather acknowledge Kāshifī's talent for works such as the *Anvār-i Suhaylī* or for his famous treatise on ethics and statecraft, the *Akhlāq-i Muḥsinī*. However, his contemporaries gave him a high rank in Timurid literary history and his *Makhzan al-inshā* served as a reference for scribes and secretaries in Herat and other Timurid centers. It also gives an elaborate insight of a model of Timurid society including three specific classes, through its epistolary components organized according to the ranks and professions of Perso-Islamic hierarchical society of that time, including rulers at its top. It is to be noted that Kāshifī places the bureaucratic class of *ahl al-qalam* in the same class as kings, sultans and amirs, religious classes being relegated to the second one, just before the merchants. The Turco-Mongol elite is not even mentioned as part of those classes, but significantly enough we find references to offices that we can associate with this elite only far into the manuscript. Kāshifī also used the genre of *inshā* to disseminate prose and Persian poetical works of various writers like Niẓāmī and Saʻdī. He equated the importance of writing with that of speech, stating that writing is a means for preserving the customs and literary works of learned men and wise people.

Akhlāq-i Muḥsinī rightly holds a significant place among other major works of post-Mongol advice literature. It is meaningful here to mention the importance given to the Persian concept of a hierarchical social order subject to the principle of justice (*ʻadālat*) and regulated by the Sharia. In this work, Kāshifī presents not three, like in the *Makhzan al-inshā*, but four essential classes of human beings, all subjects of kings. He compares those classes to the four

elements: The military, or *ahl al-sayf*, are associated with fire; the bureaucrats and administrators, or *ahl al-qalam*, are assimilated to air; the merchants and artisans, are linked with water; and the peasants and agriculturalists, are viewed as earth. He even goes further comparing those four classes to the four human humors, mentioning that in case one of those would take over the others, this would cause an unbalance (Subtelny, 2003). Two points are important to note here: the comparison between external or environmental factors and internal physiological ones, and the necessity of harmony between them. To the social hierarchy corresponds a hierarchy of needs, which in my opinion is at the basis of a social ethical conscience.

The ruler is considered as an absolute monarch, who is capable of maintaining *'adālat* through coercive and punitive capacity or *siyāsat*. But according to Kāshifī, there are two types of *siyāsat*: a personal one, which allows us to improve one's own moral character, and one of others, which includes the ruler's ethical stance. Therefore, the main prerequisite for the maintenance of justice is a centralized state on the ancient Persian model, legitimated by Islamic law. The most prominent example of such an ethical ruler is Khusraw Nūshīrwān known as "the just ruler", under whose reign the first known version of the *Pañcatantra* was brought back from India upon his vizier Buzurgmihr's advice, and translated into Middle Persian.

If we look more closely at Ḥusayn Vāʿiz-i Kāshifī's name, we discover two indications about the author, one social, *Vāʿiz*, "the preacher", and one more personal *Kāshifī* "the discloser". Unveiler of what exactly, we do not know for sure; it might refer to his ability at interpreting and explaining sources or a sign of an intrinsic part of learned culture in the Perso-Islamic world in that period of time, or finally his connection to the Naqshbandi Sufi order, which played a major role in the late medieval Iranian society. This Sufi order dominated the socio-religious and to some extent the political life of Timurid Herat, capital of Khurāsān.

Kāshifī shared close ties with ʻAbd-al-Raḥmān Jāmi, a prominent Naqshbandi mystic and author of Persian literature and poetry. Jāmi benefited from his privileged relation with Sultan Bāyqarā. Kāshifī's religious orientation is still the subject of controversy, but he gave sermons in Herat's major religious venues, appointed as a "preacher" and sheikh of a Sufi lodge.

In his *Futuwwat-nāmah-i Sulṭānī,* a treatise on spiritual chivalry, we can also find an obvious link between Sufism, *taṣawwuf*, and *futuwwat*. Even if the latter concept corresponds to the ideal moral character and *adab* or "proper conduct" for the artisans and craft guilds, this epitome is also associated with the spiritual one of manliness, or *jawānmardī*, and with no less than the manifestation of the divine reality itself. The entire material world is seen as a metaphor, *taṣawwuf* consisting of "the elegance of symbolism and the beauty of meaning" (Loewen 549) and an invitation to explore what is deemed to be either moral or guileful.

Now if we look at the Timurid bequests, beyond the universal acclaim for the cultural florescence under Sultan Bāyqarā, we can identify three groups of main legatees, who selected elements of Timurid civilization that suited their own political tradition, ethics and cultural preferences: the Mughal emperors of India, true Timurids, who embraced Timurid legitimacy and consciously presided over a Timurid renaissance; the Uzbek and Ottoman States; and the non-Timurid and modern Afghan states although in a more diffuse and ephemeral way. We shall concentrate on the first ones here, surprisingly under-emphasized by historians in the case of Mughal India, compared to historians of the Uzbeks (Subtelny, 1997).

Bābur was a Turkic Prince from Ferghana, a descendant of Timur. Early in the 16th century, he invaded Kābulistān and twenty years later Hindūstān, in order to establish the Mughal Empire in Delhi in (1526 -1857). This Empire greatly developed and was consolidated under the reign of Akbar. At the time ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* was written in the late 16th

century, Akbar had started his thirteenth year of campaign against the Uzbeks, annexing Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. During this period he spent most of his time in Lahore, with many Brahmans and Jain intellectuals invited to his court.

We know that Mughal *inshā* writers would continue to consult Kāshifī's work, as seen in a letter from the Safavid court to Akbar in 1591. In this letter, after a praise of the Mughal Emperor, starts a long section in Arabic and Persian prose assembled according to a list of "model *intitulatios*" (Mitchell 498) such as the ones presented by Kāshifī in various parts of his treatise. Persian was the adopted language of the Mughal court and elite. It was spread despite the close contacts with Hindu nobility especially during the reign of Akbar (1556-1605), when the Hindu clerical class constituted most of the civil bureaucracy. The numerous references to Perso-Islamic historical figures in Mughal correspondence suggest that Persian culture remained crucial as a tool of self-understanding for those Indian Timurid rulers.

Akbar showed a strong and proven interest in literature and religion, equally discussing with Shiite scholars, Sufi dervishes, Hindus, Jains, Parsis and Christians, rather than trying to dominate any of those religious groups via some pure Islamic creed. He used a mixture of symbols and ideas to formulate his personal beliefs in a divine monotheism predominantly derived from various Sufi sources. This eclectic attitude towards other religions, as well as Akbar's favorite slogan *ṣulḥ-i kull*, commonly translated as "peace with all", would go in favor of the common belief that tolerance was for him both a personal and political policy. This romantic conception deserves to be enriched in light of the political context of the Mughal elite's relation with the Sanskrit intellectuals as well as "Akbar's vision of royal authority as transcending multiple religious traditions" (Truschke 209). *Ṣulḥ-i kull* as "universal peace" (Azfar Moin 287) or "universal civility" (Kinra, 2014) discloses an appropriate and realistic

everyday altruistic attitude toward all cultures and religious traditions, which was instilled into Mughal life in the 17th century.

The reasons for those interactions lie in the imperial program devised by Akbar aimed at reducing intellectual provincialism and linguistic divisiveness within the empire and at refocusing all religious trends onto the supreme authority of the emperor. Truschke argues that the interest in Sanskrit texts responded to a need for self-identification of the Mughals as Indian kings, rather than one of justification or even legitimization for their political power (Truschke, 2016).[9] I would say that this self-identification was also a way, either ethical or guileful, to reinforce their power. Akbar was known to hold a library of some twenty-four thousand manuscripts. In addition to sponsoring books of art, poetry and history, he launched a wide program of translation from Sanskrit, Arabic, Turkish and Latin into Persian. This movement encompasses four main categories of texts translated from Indian languages into Arabic and Persian: 1) early Arabic and Persian translations on practical arts and sciences under the Abbasid caliphate (9 and 10th centuries); 2) Persian translations of epics with political significance from the time of Akbar; 3) Persian translations of metaphysical and mystical texts from the time of Akbar's great-grandson Dara Shukuh, 4) Persian translations of works on Hindu ritual and law commissioned by the British colonial officials (Ernst, 2003).

The first three categories include translations done for Muslim patrons and do not relate to the modern concept of religion. Akbar's translation movement had a social-political function within the intercultural polyglot policy of the court, enhancing interactions among Hindus and Muslims in a language common to all at court. The sponsorship of the translation of Sanskrit texts was part of a broader significant literary activity of his reign. This of course participated in

[9] The Abbasid dynasty constitutes a more explicit example of power legitimization, integrating the Sasanian culture through a vast translation movement, including Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ Arabic version of *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* (Marroun, 2011).

the construction of Akbar's political authority and specific political identity. It is the combination of culture and power, which offered the Mughals the opportunity to act in truly imperial ways (Truschke, 2016). The Mughals thoroughly controlled the access to royal texts through a "top-down system", which significantly influenced the translations from Sanskrit. In other words, "they did not seek popular legitimation through their interest in Indian tales but rather grounded their sovereignty in an elite culture of limited access" (203 - 214). They borrowed transformative ideas from Sanskrit culture that corresponded to their literary and courtly ethical values already existing in the Persianate world. If aesthetics and politics are considered as interwoven concepts, we can see some nuance in the way they find themselves intertwined in the two contexts under study. Arts and literature perceived as a complementary asset to political power in the case of Timurid Herat differ from a "self-identification" and "self-understanding" process like the one of the Mughals. I contend that this distinction should be dealt with in the same complementary perspective as ethics and guile to explain any decision and action taken. We will see in chapter five whether this latter distinction influenced or did not influence the tension between ethics and guile examined in those periods of time, through Kāshifī's *Anvār-i Suhaylī* and Khāliqdād ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna.*

From the perspective of translation, as Persian was not necessarily the Mughals' primary language and Akbar was in addition to that known to be illiterate, they had the tendency to move towards the simplicity of language. Notably, the Mughals did not identify their inability to comprehend Sanskrit as a major hurdle to engaging with this tradition may be because they expected to see in it only what they already knew from *akhlāq* and other Islamic discourses. In the same way Sanskrit literati did not see Sanskrit-Persian bilingualism as a necessary prerequisite for cross-cultural interactions. They appointed a number of scholars of Persian

ignorant of Sanskrit but assisted by Sanskrit literati. Therefore, from a literary point of view, the translation process involved a large amount of oral explanation in vernacular Hindi prior to the composition in Persian. There were exceptions to this lack of linguistic competence. Abū l-Faḍl would have striven to teach Sanskrit technical discourse to Persianate readers, but he would have stopped short of explaining Sanskrit grammar. In chapter two, I was cautious in writing that ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* is a direct translation "from a Sanskrit version". While this is true, we do not hold any proof of ʿAbbāsī's knowledge and mastery of Sanskrit and its grammar. He might have gone through an oral Hindi translation (we do occasionally find Hindi words in his text). However, I would be in favor of thinking that he was at least as good as Abū l-Faḍl, given that his version shows a rather accurate literal translation of the Sanskrit version and that he also revised the Persian translation of the Sanskrit *Kathāsaritsāgara*.

Among the first translations of this movement, we can mention Badā'ūnī's rendition of didactic tales from Sanskrit by a pundit, followed by the one of the *Bābur-nāmah* from Turkish into Persian by ʿAbd-al-Raḥīm Khān-i Khānān, the romance of *Nala and Damayanti*, the religious text of *Atharva Veda* and famous epic works such as the *Mahābhārata* by Naqib Khan (1584) and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Although some authors did not agree with the Mughals about "the potency of intergrating Islamicate and Sanskrit ideas" (Truschke 226) (e.g. Badā'ūnī who refused to write the preface in the *Rāmāyaṇa*), the high number of translations of epics commissioned by the Mughals indicates the importance that they gave to the political posture of their dynasty. We can here recall that the *Pañcatantra* and the *Hitopadeśa* had been translated into middle Persian during the Sasanian period. When they were later on rendered into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, they were primarily valued for their political significance in Arabic literature. As Truschke rightly points out "those works had been part of the Indo-Islamic culture far before the advent of

Mughal rule" (216 - 217). Akbar himself entitled the Persian translation of the *Mahābhārata* as the *Razmnāmah,* or the "Book of War" underlying its martial epic character rather than its religious one. It is interesting to further examine Akbar's minister Abū l-Faḍl's justifications for the translation of the *Mahābhārata* in its introduction. First of all, he perceived Akbar's role through the prism of Neoplatonic metaphysics and the Sufi doctrine of the Perfect Man. The main objectives for this translation were to reduce sectarian tensions between Hindus and Muslims and to provide ethical guidance for rulers through past history.

It has to be concluded and admitted that the exploration of those historical and political external factors cannot be separated from more personal and even mystical aspects, whether pertaining to the rulers, the authors or the reading public in those two different periods of time. Thus, while they contribute to distance ourselves from politics, they will allow us to disclose the links between the two chosen texts.

Chapter Four: Tension between ethics and guile

Part One: Secular, religious and social factors in the Pañcatantra cycle of stories

Various fields such as politics, sociology, religion and philosophy participate in the content of the fables and contribute to our understanding of the origin of certain references to either ethics or guile that would otherwise remain unnoticed. The secular and religious ethical aspects have first to be considered in those works, whether in the ancient Indian tradition or in the later Islamicate world, because of their different complex links to ethics and justice, and the importance those links confer for the understanding of the various factors and conditions behind the intentions in the usage or not of ethics.

The *Pañcatantra* is for sure the most important source of stories for *Kalīlah wa Dimnah*. We are now aware of some of its significant structural changes, which already occurred in its Middle Persian reconstruction and then in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's. But how much of the Indian *nīti* tradition, meaning pre-colonial Indian literature on the art and business of politics, as characteristic to the *Pañcatantra*, can we expect to remain in the two versions under study in this thesis? If most scholars agree on that fact that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* marks the beginning of a more ethical and moral tendency in this cycle of stories, then what is the scope of this moral shift on its still assumed label as "treatise of political science"? The answers to those questions will give us a better idea of what is special not only about this cycle of stories itself in relation to ethics and guile, but also about its Indian origins. First, in order to understand this hypothetical ethical move, we must examine the social and political model prevalent under Hindu royalty at the time of composition of the *Pañcatantra*, as it varies in certain aspects from the model of the later Islamicate period, which saw the emergence of its Arabic and Persian offspring.

To state that ethics and politics are as inseparable as thought and action, or heart and mind, might seem obvious, but also far too simplistic. Terms and concepts like *śāstra*, *nīti, artha* and *dharma* have to be clarified and their original meaning addressed in the light of *akhlāq* (ethics) and *siyāsat* (understood as a juridical social and political management) in the Islamicate world.

In the ancient Indian tradition, debates on kingship formed the context to discuss the ideal template for the *puruṣārtha*s, or "the ends of man",[10] consisting of three such ends in intimate interconnection with each other: *artha* or power in all its ethical and political ramifications; *kāma* or pleasure in all its aesthetic, erotic and literary extensions; and *dharma* or "righteous conduct" (Rao & Subrahmanyam 398). The two notions of interest here are *artha* and *dharma.* However, one should keep in mind that those "*puruṣārtha*s had taken on the character of "common sense" by the medieval period and that the *Kāmandakīyanītisāra* or Kāmandaka's *Nītisāra*, another important source of the *Pañcatantra* composed sometime in the Gupta period of the 4th century BC, "locates the whole purpose of the polity in its enabling the realization of the three ends of man".[11]

The *Pañcatantra* is itself considered as a *śāstra* in the Indian tradition, meaning a scientific treatise and even more precisely as a *nītiśāstra* or political science treatise. However, it has to be recalled that the concept of *śāstra* refers to a "dual aspect of science" implying both a discipline and a treatise.[12] The Sanskrit-English Monier-Williams dictionary gives us the following information: *Artha* means "aim, purpose", but also as it is more relevant here, "advantage, use, utility". As for *nīti,* we find "guidance, management", but also "conduct (right, wise, moral), prudence, political wisdom or science and moral philosophy". Generally speaking,

[10] Pollok "The Ends of Man at the End of Premodernity" 11.
[11] Ibid 10-11.
[12] Olivelle "A Dharma Reader" 13.

artha would rather be linked with intelligence, mundane interest, profit and wealth, including practical knowledge of secular politics referring to *nīti*. Even though royalty can be considered as a divine institution, its secularization indeed prevails (Rao & Subrahmanyam, 2008). This usage of *nīti* dates back to the most famous representatives of such *nītiśāstra* texts, meaning the *Arthaśāstra* attributed to Kauṭilya, minister of the King Candragupta Maurya (322 - 298 BC). This text, composed slightly before Kāmandaka's *Nītisāra,* has been entirely preserved. Primarily written in prose, the *Arthaśāstra* is however not aphoristic in its form. It offers dense and precise data on the administration of the state, economy, conduct of war and the six strategies mentioned in chapter two, which we find in the first three books of the *Pañcatantra*.[13]

Regarding the concept of *dharma* as of Manu's *Dharmaśāstra* (200 BC-200 CE), it induces a proper behavior, thus embracing a strong normative aspect. The underlying concept of justice reminds us of the meaning of *daṇḍa*, the stick, meaning the punishment or rather the power to punish, which in turn recalls the concept of *siyāsat*. The king would be the one defending *dharma*, the order of the world. Order and power are one thing, and for a king one way of maintaining order is to reward or punish. *Dharma* can thus be understood as law, but a law "rendered from above" (399) with the aim of maintaining the strict and immutable social order of the *varṇa*, or castes, and of gender roles; a law far from any idea of consensus or notion of advice. However the reason why *dharma* was considered unsuitable for moral pedagogical purposes was because it was too much linked with the particularities of Indian religion and its rituals, which was not the case of the mainly "this-wordly" or *laukika* oriented *nīti* texts (403). It is indeed an "umbrella concept" that gathers customs, rules, rights, laws as well as religious and ethical norms.[14]

[13] See p. 30.
[14] Olivelle "A Dharma Reader" 8.

If we agree that the *Pañcatantra* is mainly a textbook of *arthaśāstra* in its content, aspects of *dharma* obviously also appear in it: balance, social equilibrium and political order are key elements, and we also find some explicit references to *dharma,* such as the four *varṇas*: the *Brāhmaṇa* or Brahman, the *Kṣatriya* or Princes and warriors, the *Vaiśya* or merchants and the *Śūdra* or artisans and farmers. Likewise, Kāmandaka's *Nītisāra* dedicated a whole section on how to preserve the caste order. Kings belong to the second class, which is inferior to the one of the Brahmans. But the king has a privileged relationship with his personal Brahman, or *purohita*, the one "placed before him" in the same way that thought should precede action (Audebert 299). We can find a reminiscence of this function in the Arabic and Syriac versions, in the fables starting with a question of the king to the philosopher, thus acting as a *purohita*, in order to receive his insightful advice on some issue. It is interesting to note that in the *Anvār-i Suhaylī*, the philosopher is still called Brahman. Nevertheless, among the three most represented *jāti*, or groups of hereditary specialists, in the *Pañcatantra*, meaning Brahmans, merchants and weavers, the Brahmans are the ones most criticized for their avidity and cupidity.

De Blois claims that the *Pañcatantra* "is not a book about morality (*dharma*) and is a decidedly amoral work" (15), which teaches that the trickster wins and emphasizes the necessity of deceit and treachery in politics and in life in general. I would nuance this assertion agreeing with Rao & Subrahmanyam on the fact that "the *Pañcatantra* was not a "book of morals"; it was and is a book on statecraft, taught by means of animals" (420); and the doctrine taught in the *Pañcatantra* is largely tinged with Machiavellian ethics free of religious morality. Again, we can also find a chapter in Kāmandaka's *Nītisāra* focusing on feigning and other trickery a king must resort to against his enemy.

However, there is no fundamental judgment on absolute goodness or evil in the Hindu fables. The actions are retold as they happened; guile and intelligence are praised, regardless of a good or a bad action. According to Hertel (1912), the word *tantra* itself in this context means trick or *Klugheitsfall*, a case of cleverness. We have seen that the first four *tantra*s illustrate the usefulness of cleverness and deceit whereas the fifth one demonstrates the consequences of letting oneself be carried away by passion.

Now as a matter of fact all stories present in both the old Syriac version and the descendants of the Arabic version belong to the field of *arthaśāstra* and share a common utilitarian, pragmatic and secular approach to the problems of life. As we know Muslim advisers and viziers still struggled on how to advise rulers on matters of governance that would keep them away from theological controversies (Rao & Subrahmanyam, 2008). But it has to be recalled that in Indo-Islamic pre-Mongol texts such as Kay Kāvus *Qābūs-nāmah*, Firdawsi's *Shāhnāmah* or Gorgānī's *Vīs u Rāmīn,* as well as post Mongol ones, "Mirrors for Princes" texts commonly share a non-theological image of kingship.

Let us examine further how Ibn al Muqaffaʿ's *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* would mark the beginning of another type of doctrine characterizing the cycle of stories, the one of uprightness. The text would actually be used for didactic purposes based on Islamic morality.[15] The first sign of this shift that justifies or reinforces this hypothesis is the chapter on the investigation of Dimnah's conduct known as "Dimnah's Trial", which Ibn al Muqaffaʿ would have created in order to restore some morality in the story or at least mitigate its deemed amoral character. Dimnah is punished according to Islamic ethics. We saw in chapter one that *akhlāq,* mainly translated by ethics, can be transmitted via practical advice, and codified in compendia of *adab*

[15] Van Ruymbeke "Kashifi's Forgotten Masterpiece: Why Rediscover the Anvār-i Suhaylī" 572.

or proper conduct, regulated by codes and customs and sanctioned by *siyāsat*.[16] In his introduction to *The Polished Mirror* (2018), Zargar offers a further insight on *akhlāq*, defining it as the "science of refining ones character traits", pointing out that those traits form the basis of the science of ethics. We also saw in chapter three the comparison Kāshifī makes between the four human humors and the social classes in terms of the balance, which is necessary in order to function properly.[17] Similarly, Zargar shows that all ethics, whether secular or religious, bears a "humoral substructure", implying that the balance between bodily humors is the basis to achieve the ultimate mystical perfection of the soul.

After having clarified those important secular and religious concepts, we have to explore some central transcultural aspects, which can influence, explain or justify the use of either ethics or guile, namely, the relation towards fate on the one hand and free will on the other and the predominant role of intelligence, which I will challenge later on in this section.

In the Indian context, destiny would be bound to astrological and karmic forces. While it is birth rather than education, which will determine behaviors, *karma*, related to the cycle of rebirths, will depend on the qualities or flaws accumulated in the previous life. For example, having a son was said to have a good *karma*, as this is shown in the second fable, "The Story of the Brahman and the Ichneumon." But the *Pañcatantra* clearly defends the priority of human effort over fate in order to gain success in the future. Hares are a good example of that in the first fable, "The Story of the Elephant, the Hare and the Moon."

In the Islamicate context, the two forces at stake are defined as *qadar*, destiny and *'aql,* intelligence or wisdom, implying the aim to maintain social hierarchy and political order, which cannot be conceived without a ruler, or a king, who appears as indispensable to preserve social

[16] See p. 10.
[17] See p. 35.

order. To adopt a moral value implies a consensual hierarchy of ideas, and this ethical hierarchy is necessary to social life and order. But hierarchy and power are not always inseparable as intelligence prevails in some cases. Intelligence also means the capacity to use and reinvent guile. Therefore a good king trusts intelligent advisers, as their intelligence reflects on him. So even if they might appear incapable, childish and vain at times, the importance lies in the intelligence of their advisers. In this absolutist conception of power, one has to admit that a king cannot govern alone. The role of advisers and the choice of envoys are predominant and limit the king's excessive absolutism, while compensating for all his flaws. But in my opinion, intelligence as such is not sufficient and has to be completed by *ra'y*, meaning an opinion, a vision based on experience, on a rational analysis of situations which allows to plan, invent and act, and by a constant vigilance in all circumstances. *'Aql* therefore means intelligence oriented towards action. The *Arthaśāstra* itself insists on the fact that politics is about knowing how to act according to circumstances**,** which have been rationally analyzed. In the *Pañcatantra* and *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* many protagonists are in danger of death and intelligence is the main means of survival. But sometimes *qadar* takes over and everything is already predetermined. Most stories start in an idealistic situation, which deteriorates, and eventually end up with a tragic outcome as in the case of the second above-mentioned fable. Whether by the devotee in Kāshefī's *Anvār-i Suhaylī* or by the Brahman's wife in ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*, the faithful weasel ends up being unjustly killed. In both contexts the responsibility of the actors is put forth, as each act obviously bears some inevitable consequences.

I would like to address here another side of intelligence, which I deem more constructive. I am of the opinion that intelligence does not necessary imply an absolute freedom of choice (*ikhtiyār*)*,* because of the complexity of human relationships and the instability of human

condition itself. In other words, feelings can vary according to certain paradigms such as a given specific situation, the person's character, complex social network and personal choices. Among several feelings, envy is an important one to consider here, as it will also appear in the second fable under study. Envy can be responsible for disorder and violence. But then what are the specific ways to avoid violence in the *Pañcatantra* and *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* if any? With no surprise, the first one is intelligence, whose objective is to annihilate the causes of violence, which are resentment and bitterness leading to revenge, in which case the only way out for the wise is to flee. Intelligence is thus rather a way to avoid violence than to stop it. The *Pañcatantra* can also be considered a treatise on non-violence, or more precisely on ways to avoid violence. A second means is renunciation. Devotees are said to be capable of love because they got rid of their envies. But they are, just as their Brahman counterparts, often described with unflattering characteristics such as stupidity or greed. The idea is to fight against excess of worldly goods, against avidity or cupidity, and not so much against having some goods as such. If the ideal Brahman is to give up all forms of desire, we find moderation in everything including asceticism in the *Pañcatantra* and *Kalīlah wa Dimnah*. This concept of moderation is in accordance with Naqshbandi Sufism,[18] or with the generous (*karīm*) and benevolent man of the world (*ṣāḥib al-dunyā*), like the philosopher who accepts to teach a tyrannical king (Audebert 311). It thus refers to an intelligent man for whom one good action makes him forget all the bad ones, a man who would not abandon his friends even at the cost of his own life, a man who prefers death to servitude, a man without fears, which reminds us of the weasel's character in the second fable.

If we consider ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*, we see that it remains quite faithful to the *Pañcatantra* in the sense that intelligence under all its forms triumphs over everything, and that

[18] See p. 54-55 for more details on Naqshbandi Sufism.

both Indian traditions and politics are being preserved. As for Kāshefī's *Anvār-i Suhaylī*, we know that it is a descendant of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's version, and it is clearly dominated by Islamicate *akhlāqs* but it is certainly not deprived of pragmatism, as we shall see in the closed intertextual analysis of the two fables.

Part Two: Ethics and Guile in the Islamicate tradition and literature

When we look into ethics, whether in the Islamicate tradition or more specifically in the *Pañcatantra* cycle of stories, it seems natural to first refer to qualities, whether personal or divine, such as fairness, indulgence and empathy. However I chose to address guile, its inseparable component, in the first place to ease the transition towards ethics. To my knowledge there is no such work directly intended to tackle *kayd* in the Islamicate tradition and literature, but rather indirectly by introducing us to guileful personages in a more subtle way, like in Firdawsī's *Shāhnāmah,* or Niẓāmī's second *maṯnavī Khusraw u Shīrīn*, in which one can find references made to *Kalīlah wa Dimnah*. But isn't that indirect way inherent to guile itself? Aren't the frontiers between subtle and cunning narrow? We shall see in the last section of this chapter how this indirect aspect can echo an indirect but frank speech.

In order to further explore the place of the tension between ethics and guile in the Islamicate literature and social contexts, I opt to first examine the possible impact on the *Anvār-i Suhaylī* of the two above-mentioned texts, the *Shāhnāmah* and *Khusraw u Shīrīn*, but also of Saʿdī's *Gulistān* and Jalāl-al-Dīn Rūmī's *Maṯnavīye maʿnawī*, which present political and socio-ethical values through entertaining and edifying tales. Then, we shall look into Kāshefī's *Futuwwat-nāmah-i Sulṭānī* as an eloquent source of example of virtues promoted in his time, as well into the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* of Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in order to investigate its potential influence

on other significant post-Mongol texts of Kāshifī like the *Akhlāq-i Muḥsinī*. This focus on Kāshefī's works is a deliberate one, in order to get a deeper knowledge about him as a person and as a writer in his specific social context. Moreover, this insight will be fruitful in view of the comparison between his *Anvār-i Suhaylī* and the *Pañcākhyāna* in the next chapter.

In Firdawsī's *Shāhnāmah,* although guile is ubiquitous, it remains as central and as promoted as honesty and truth. It is also named a large number of times and through various expressions or words such as *chārah, jādūy* or *afsūn*. Despite the fact that most of the heroes in the *Shāhnāmah* including Rustam himself do not hesitate to use deception and dissimulation at some point, not all do, like Siyavash. However it turns out to be problematic as he is thus unable to defend himself from the ones who practice it. Guile appears to be one weapon among others although quite a unique and specific one. In the form of lies and deceit, it can be used as a trick to overcome a stronger enemy as an essential weapon to survive. But while martial power will fill an opponent with admiration, guile will incite him to anger and insults. This is why a hero will not take pride in the use of guile as a skill. However intentions play a major role in its use. It can be a way to avoid confrontation or to show respect or even prove self-sacrifice. Therefore the moral values of all forms of guile in the *Shāhnāmah* are neither inherently admirable nor fundamentally reprehensible. How we perceive it depends on the context and on our own perspective, whether from an actor or a reader's choice and point of view. In its divine significance, there would be at least thirty-four uses of the Arabic root K.Y.D in the Quran, a number of them referring to God's actions (Milani, 1999).

When it comes to the use of guile, gender is apparently not an issue. In the *Shāhnāmah* men and women equally use it to achieve their goals. Rustam kills his own son out of guile rather

than of manliness.[19] Sudabah's wifely virtue does not keep her from using deceit, when she tries to seduce her stepson Siyavash and once found out and unsuccessful, plots against him. But guile is still unlikely to be perceived as a masculine characteristic and therefore more frequently associated with femininity in classical Islamic literature. In the frame story of *The Thousand and One Nights*, the two mythic kings come to the conclusion that even the jinn are powerless before womanly guile (Milani, 1999).

In Niẓāmī's second *maṯnavī*, after Khusraw receives some scientific and metaphysic teaching from his vizier Buzurg-Umīd, mistaking knowledge for wisdom, Shīrīn is the one stepping in and guilefully asking the vizier to provide her as well with some wisdom and comment on some passages from *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* stories for them and thus carefully steering Khusraw away from his failed attempt through science, without wounding his ego. Niẓāmī might have mainly used the Persian version by Naṣr Allāh Munshī, but he also had access to the versified version of Rūdakī, the prose one of Bukhārī and the metrical one from al-Ṭūsī Qāniʿī. Nevertheless, his purpose here was mainly to show a literary tour-de-force using parody (Van Ruymbeke 2011). Niẓāmī presents forty tales followed by their *nukta*s, or lessons, with no logical progression, but with a recurrent theme being the one of deceit, presented as useful but potentially dangerous as it can backfire on its user. However, sincerity is also defended as an important virtue in order to be saved from enemies.

However guile's archetype is definitely the Nanny, a major figure in most love stories of classical Persian literature such as the above-mentioned *Khusraw u Shīrīn* or even other romances like *Iskandar Nāmah*. Not only does she mediate between the lovers, but between the text and its audience (Milani, 1999). The Nanny is also more interested in resolving conflicts peacefully rather than ending in violent outcomes. In that sense, she is wise rather than sly and

[19] See p. 54 for the concept of manliness, *jawānmardī*.

enables and protects rather than cheats. She reminds us of the thin boundary between truth and artifice. Those aspects will be worth exploring with regard to the role of the weasel in the second fable.

Saʿdī composed the *Gulistān* in 1258 CE following the Mongol invasion. Some critics see it as a sum of Machiavellian precepts, while some others as a treatise of practical ethics. Saʿdī intended to give advice, *naṣīḥat* to kings and viziers, and he did so through parables, *amṯāl*, tales, *ḥikāyāt* and reports about the conduct of the kings in the past. But his main concerns revolved around pragmatic situational ethics, values of the social milieu and personal integrity, rather than religious theories from the *madrasa*. He had a strong sympathy towards the vulnerable and the oppressed, and he shared deep truths in fierce words, which were likely to make an impression on his reading public. Saʿdī's influence spread as widely as rapidly in Ottoman Turkey, India as early as the 15th century, where it became, together with the *Anvār-i Suhaylī,* one of the primary texts of Persian instruction for officials of British India at Fort William College at the beginning of 19th century. It is almost certain that Kāshefī knew Saʿdī's *Gulistān.* However the latter's influence on the *Anvār-i Suhaylī* may rather lie in its precise, simple and elegant language and prose, rather than in its deep psychological insight. It has to be remembered that the *Gulistān* substituted Naṣr Allāh Munshī's *Kalīlah wa Dimnah*, one of Kāshefī's indubitable sources, as the apogee of Persian prose and epistolary style. I would rather argue that Saʿdī was the one influenced by *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* stories in its content, skillfully combining ethics and guile, as illustrated in the moral of the first story of *Gulistān*'s first chapter *"On the Conduct of Kings":* "Better a white lie that is constructive than a truth unleashing what's destructive", which is witnessed at the end of the first fable. Telling the truth with bad intent is worse than all the lies one can invent. Once again the intention as well as a thoughtful

dosage between efficient exercise of power based on self-interest and moral authority founded on human altruism, are what matters.

In his *Maṯnavīye maʿnawī* Rūmī borrows characters and plots from *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* to illustrate the focus of this book, the fight against the *nafs*, or carnal self. Doing this he asserts that he will make manifest the real significance and mystical teachings of the fables. For example, he states that one should not look at others with one's evil self for one will only see the reflection of one's own and consider them as enemies as if the mirror was responsible for the ugly face that appears in it (Van Ruymbecke, 2013). Rūmī probably uses the same sources of *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* as Niẓāmī did. But Rūmī's main innovation seems to appear in his remarkable wit of the added dialogues and in his exaggeration of some particular traits, which can for example result in caricatures of some of frightened animals in front of the newly wise, but still cruel, lion.

Now with regard more specifically to ethical virtue promoted in Kāshefī's social context, as illustrated in chapter three, we can find a whole range of literature, which peritexts give a clear indication on the content dealing with ethics. The *Shāhnāmah* itself abounds of Iranian virtues of *jawānmardī* or manliness. Rustam is a typical *jawānmard*, heroic warrior, courageous, honest and generous. *Fatā* in Arabic refers to this kind of ideal hero of pre-Islamic period. Perso-Islamic culture has shaped a second model of heroism, bringing together ancient Persian and Arabo-Islamic ideals, influenced by the increasing dominance of Sufism (*taṣawwuf*).

The fourth caliph and first Shiite imam was also the first model of *futuwwa*, or *futuwwat* in Persian, meaning an exemplary warrior fighting against his own *nafs* or soul. The literature on *futuwwat* is unsurprisingly rather extensive. The most comprehensible work dedicated to it, *Futuwwat-nāmah-i Sulṭānī*, is attributed to Kāshefī himself. Beyond a sum of rules and customs,

it also shows how much Naqshbandi Sufism and *mardānagī*, manliness, were intrinsically linked and regulated every aspect of late medieval Timurid Herat society. Kāshefī's work is above all an esoteric commentary on the spiritual meaning of one's daily activities in society. It appeals to the ideal of spiritual *jawānmardī*: "be inwardly right with God and externally right with people" (Loewen 547). Sufi masters in Kāshefī's time were mainly preoccupied with the harmonization of *ṣūrat*, outward form, and *bāṭin*, inward meaning, which recalls Rūmī's own preoccupations. In the *futuwwat*, this tension is expressed through *adab*, proper conduct, being the reflection of *khulq*, noble character, both able to destroy that carnal soul. *Adab* implies a constant *shiddat*, discipline of self-control and moderation. The achievement of sincere humility and genuine altruism towards others is a proof of victory over on one's own *nafs* and ego. But the Naqshbandi concept of detachment is rather a disinterest in the desires of the carnal soul than a pure rejection of material goods. Naqshbandī tradition shows a strong disdain for asceticism, potentially leading to pride. During the 15th century in Herat, some members of the intellectual class made their livings as professional mystics, disregarding physical labor. At the same time, Kāshefī also noticed a lack of proper conduct among artisans. He proposed a metaphoric interpretation of profession, as a spiritual way to find the mystical path and thus encouraged the working class to show proper behavior. What was important for the artisan was not his mastery of his tools but his personal conduct. In Timurid Khurāsān, *maʿraka* had become a common term for describing an arena of public entertainment, where the performers, whether storytellers, juggler or magician, exhibited his skills. As a *fatā*, the performer had also to bring others into a spiritual state and win their hearts "for if hearts are not won over by the master of the arena, his work is not complete" (Loewen 566). In a similar way as for the artisans, the aim of a spiritual champion was not winning over others but over his own ego, showing humility and proper and ethical conduct.

Therefore, on the one hand he had to destroy his ego and remain selfless in every aspect of life, and on the other hand, he had to express this selflessness through scrupulous and constant proper conduct. What if this both exteriorized and self-centered behavior could reflect the dialectical relationship between ethics and guile? What if the tension between ethics and guile could also find its harmony in Sufi mysticism? In the same way that, according to Ibn ʻArabi, there would be one reality with two aspects, "the essence (*ḥaqq)* which was the unknowable One Being, and the world of phenomena (*khalq),* which had a multiplicity of forms, and which was but a mirror or shadow of that One Pure Being" (Loewen 548).

While political advice texts from the pre-Mongol period glean their content from ancient Iranian tradition set into an Islamic framework, the post-Mongol "Mirrors for Princes" would be based on Aristotelian concepts of state and society (Subtelny, 2003). A predominant example of this is the *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* of Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (1236 CE). It presents some key ethical concepts based on Aristotelian ideas and goals, such as perfection and morality. God puts the ruler in charge over the others; therefore his ethical qualities must be irreproachable. The desirable ethical virtues for a ruler are not illustrated by philosophical arguments, which was not the primary objective of those kinds of works, but rather by practical and concrete anecdotes, prophetic traditions and maxims that are as entertaining as instructive. Ṭūsī dedicates a whole chapter in his *Akhlāq* on love as an affect that binds people together and leads them into harmony with each other, thus rendering the coercive force of law unnecessary.

The virtue of *ʻadālat,* justice, is the one regulating all others, with respect to Islamic law and thus equals to absolute wisdom. Justice has to be understood here not as a legal abstraction, but as a concrete balance in the structure of society, involving what Ṭūsī calls *muʻāvanat* or mutual aid, announcing the Mughal redefinition of Sharia (Alam, 1997). Justice becomes a

regulating force, ensuring the stability of the society, which would otherwise be threatened by man's natural disposition to dominate and impose his rights upon others. Hence, the necessity of absolutism that constitutes "the basis of all medieval Islamic political discourse according to Aziz Al-Azmeh".[20]

In his *Akhlāq-i Muḥsinī*, Kāshifī integrates those Nasirean concepts adding many citations of Rūmī, as well as tales from pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. Among other qualities he emphasizes on *ikhlāṣ* sincerity, *ṣabr* patience, *'afv* forgiveness, *ḥilm* clemency, *sakhāvat* generosity and *tavāẓu' va iḥtirām* humility and reverence for a ruler, but also on the importance of *mashvarat va tadbīr*, taking advice and planning, *shajāʿat* or bravery, *ḥazm va dūr-andīshī* prudence and foresight, *firāsat* judging character by physionogmy and *kitmān-i asrār* keeping secrets. Rulers need trustworthy people acting like "eyes and ears" in order to maintain the order: a military commander, a vizier, a *ḥākim* and a head of intelligence. Therefore the *Akhlāq-i Muḥsinī* contains the *asrār-i ḥikmat*, the secrets of wisdom and some valuable verities on the conduct of men of state. Interestingly, the *Akhlāq-i Muḥsinī* seems to have been more appreciated in the Persian cultural context of the Mughal Empire, where it exerted a profound impact on the development of Indo-Persian "Mirrors", than in the Iranian milieu of its provenance or the later Shiite Safavids. And this might well have contributed to render ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* more possible under Akbar's reign.

In this section we have seen various literary techniques to manipulate a common source or hypotext, but also to give a specific place to the theme of either ethics or guile, depending on the objective of the author. I contend that that theme finds its place in the discursive speech of each work and the use of *taʿajjub* related to it, as we shall see hereafter.

[20] In Subtelny "A Late Medieval Persian Summa on Ethics, Kashifi's Akhlāq-i Muḥsinī" 605.

Part Three: Implication of taʿajjub in the tension between ethics and guile

The main attention so far has been given to the importance of *ʻaql*, intelligence, as a binary component in the use of ethics and guile. We have seen how much the intention matters in its usage. But why and how do ethics and guile work on their addressees if not by the seductive effect of wonder, *taʿajjub* or *ehsās-i shegeftī*? In that field, I argue that not only *ʻaql* is involved, but also equally *qalb*, or *dil*, the heart. "*Dil* is a term used in Islamic mysticism referring to the organ of perception and self-realization and Persian writers on *futuwwat* use *dil* in this technical meaning" (Loewen 552).

There is an important ongoing concern for authenticity and truth reflected in the tension between the fictive and the real in the so-called genre of "*ʻajāʾib*" or "marvel writing",[21] or *mirabilia* in its closest Latin equivalent in Medieval European literature. This concern sheds light on the important consequence of "reader-acceptance" and more importantly the "reader-identification". Marvel has to stick to possibilities as the readers need to feel that the stories they read belong to the universe they live in (Tallis 139), in order to be able to identify themselves to the characters beyond the lines. But one can reasonably admit that *taʿajjub* does not only or necessarily apply to marvelous and impossible stories, but can also be found in some historical texts and we should remember al-Qazwīnī's thought that a lifetime is anyway too short to verify all those marvelous possibilities,[22] whatever the text or genre they belong to. Therefore, I argue that the use of talking and feeling animals in fables as incentive to transmit wonder works first and foremost because of the aesthetic pleasure it creates, activated by surprise and suspicion. As al-Fārābī would have stated, "aesthetic pleasure transcends the question of both value and authenticity" (Zadeh 31) or with Aristotle, that "the act of wondering is itself a source of

[21] Zadeh "Mapping Frontiers Across Medieval Islam" 7.
[22] Zadeh "The Wiles of Creation" 33.

pleasure" (30) or finally with Tallis, that this sudden "defamiliarization" of the familiar, has a liberating effect at the origin of literary delight" (Tallis 11).

I would like to scrutinize the concrete, physical, intervention of wonder on *'aql* and *qalb* through the prism of Sanskrit pre-modern aesthetic theory reinforced by modern neuropsychology inputs, in order to unveil its intrinsic and complex relations with either ethical or guileful awareness.

First, if the word *taʿajjub* is commonly used in Arabic or Persian Medieval Islamic discourse, what does it exactly mean? This word is the *maṣdar* of the fifth form derived from the Arabic root *'ajaba.* The fifth form constitutes a reflexive aspect of the second emphatic one. *Taʿajjub* thus refers to astonishment, wonder, interjection and exclamation, while the adjective *'ajīb* applies to the extraordinary, strange, surprising (synonym of *gharīb*), marvelous, inconceivable. But there is an additional meaning to the fifth form, which implies the idea of seducing someone, possibly indicating an underlying or subconscious intention of the author for using *taʿajjub*. In his efforts to describe emotions linked with astonishment, Mottahedeh mentions al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī's explanation of it: "*ʿajab* and *taʿajjub* are states which come to a person at the time of that person's ignorance of the *sabab* (cause) of something", adding an important subsequent aspect by Gorgānī, which is "the change of *nafs* (spirit and soul) through something the cause of which is unknown and goes out of the ordinary" (30). Zadeh also mentions the Muʿtazilī theologian Abū l-Ḥasan al-Rummānī, according to whom the more obscure the *sabab*, the greater wonder would be.[23] Regarding the definition of *gharīb*, one can recall the following one by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī: "one says of anything separated away, that it is *gharīb*, and of anything which is not similar to its species (*jins*) that it is *gharīb*" (Mottahedeh 31). In the Persian translation of *taʿajjub, ehsās-i shegeftī,* we find *ehsās,* which meaning covers

[23] Zadeh "Magic, Marvel, and Miracle in Early Islamic Thought" 245.

feeling, sentiment, sensation and emotion, and *shegeftī* both wonder and surprise, but we also find the phrase *angusht-i taʿajjub*, referring to the conventional gesture of wonderment which is to bite the finger, which "translates the bizarre and uncanny through the power of gesture".[24]

Let us now look beyond those definitions and turn to the second question: what is *taʿajjub,* a feeling, an emotion, or sensation? Although most modern theories would not make any distinction between those terms, I argue that their respective specificities and meaning are worth being further deciphered. They offer different ways of understanding the nature of *taʿajjub* and its role in literary works, which is worth paying special attention to. In his *Nāṭyaśāstra* (200 BC - 200 CE), Bharata Muni had presented eight *rasa*s*,* though commonly referred to as the *Navarasa*[25], among which *adbhuta* corresponds to wonder and amazement, whereas *vismaya,* or surprise, would be its *sthāyibhāva* (Subramanian 2). *Adbhuta rasa* and related critical concepts such as *camatkāra* or *camatkṛti* (astonishment, surprise) (Pollock, 2016), were long regarded as central aesthetic categories among other dominant emotions such as love, pathos and heroism. Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita in the 14th century, followed by Jagannātha Paṇḍita in the 17th century, were the first ones to excerpt that emotion from its ancillary position and grant it a central role, Nārāyaṇa even stating that it would be "the only sentiment there is" (Subramanian 191). He based this elevation of wonder on the fact that surprise, the basic ingredient for all the *rasa*s, is "purveyed by the wonder" (3), which is part of all aesthetic experiences. For example, the transposition on animals of human weaknesses in the *Pañcatantra* creates what is called *pratibha* in pre-modern emotion theory, or unusualness, freshness and novelty, capable of removing the filter of usualness. *Pratibha* would then evoke the sense of surprise linked with joy or humour, anger or sorrow; and surprise would in turn cause wonder. One can therefore argue in

[24] Zadeh "Mapping Frontiers across Medieval Islam" 7.
[25] *Shantam*, the ninth *rasa*, meaning peace, was added at a later stage.

favor of wonder as a sensation and not as a feeling. Surprise seems to expand the mind and facilitate a transfer of experience from the author to the reader, opening the way to the heart for wonder. This process would somehow paradoxically help to secure the attention, or the concentration of the reader. However, modern neuropsychology shows that this can only occur provided two conditions: not too much stimulation around, plus the right dosage of surprise. More precisely, if a new stimulus is either totally unrelated or totally related and similar to an already existing schema, made out of all sorts of marvelous hypotexts, the system would become indifferent to it. But this is more complex, as the brain would not so willingly get rid of a new stimulus. A fresh state of awareness, still provided a reasonable amount of surprise, would render a new schema possible, or if not, at least create an extension of an old one. Then, as a result of this sudden unfamiliarity, the sensation of wonder would appear and initiate a phase of assimilation. During this phase, wonder would intensify the vibrations of the sentiment it will be associated with, and before that sentiment *per se* can be experienced, using literary stratagems like suspense, curiosity, *ṣabr*, or patience, and irony. In order to clarify the distinction between sensation and sentiment, one can say that while wonder depends on unfamiliarity, sentiments, like love and pathos, rely on familiarity in the sense that, despite all unfamiliar forms that love can take, the features such sentiment display relate to an already inscribed schema. In this perspective, guile and ethical awareness can be the direct consequences of the sentiments linked with *taʿajjub*.

Tallis states that wonder is thus a passive sensation, inducing "a state of cognitive grace" (10) and therefore impossible to cultivate. I disagree with this statement and argue that wonder can and even should have an active side. If wonder, through its surprise component, creates a passive expansion of our imagination it then helps us to actively consider all kinds of

possibilities and connections and to diligently value our personal response to a text, as well as its political nature. There is a direct link between the aesthetics of reception and ethics. We can go up to saying that "even in the face of an uncanny reality",[26] an enhanced and conscious effort to examine other points of views even contrary to ours, whether expressed through the mouth of animals or not, can open the door to empathy towards other human beings. Obviously one can find many evil people in world history, who have had a keen appreciation for fiction and either did not show any empathy, or used it to do bad. But if it is used for good purposes, empathy can in turn help undermining dualisms or binary logics, and ultimately eradicating fear. Fear could be "a moral wrong and a vice to wonder's virtue" if fear leads to cruelty (Kearns 106), which, as we will see, is not the case in the two fables where *taʿajjub* and fear appear like a natural combination motivated by survival rather than cruelty. An active capacity of wonder enables us recognize, through inquiry and curiosity, what is harmful. And "without the harmful, the vile and the lowly, there could be no way of knowing the good".[27] Taking into account that the opposition of virtue and vice is not equivalent to the distinction between ethics and guile that are not considered here as opposite, intention is once again at stake. The harm caused by a coward or a tyrant might be the same, but the intention, the desire to cause pain, might be different between the two. I believe that understanding this latter mechanism, considering that to understand does not mean to agree with another protagonist of a story or in life, can at least allow us to recognize a potential for positive and respectful attitudes to flourish instead of negative ones.

In this section I have tried to show the complexity of *taʿajjub* as an important factor influencing not only the usage of either ethics or guile, but also their reception and potential impacts on the reader.

[26] Zadeh "The Wiles of Creation" 24.
[27] Zadeh "Mapping Frontiers across Medieval Islam" 4.

Part Four: The use of animals in allegorical discursive context of the ancient Indian and Islamicate traditions

The literary benefit of wonder can now be applied to the *Pañcatantra, Kalīlah wa Dimnah*'s renowned hypotext. The guise of wonder and entertainment is there in order to touch the heart as stated in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's own preface and transcultural appropriation of the text.

Here I intend to confront the concern of veracity with the rhetoric of frank speech and allegorical means of persuasion through the use of talking animals.

The significance of the marvelous, the literary means to create it and the way to imagine animals' behaviors and characters, before even having them think or even talk, differ between cultural and religious contexts that produce and receive them. We can admit that animals do not talk as human do, as this is what ultimately differentiates us. In the 10th and 11th centuries, the *Ikhwān al-Ṣafā* already clearly expressed that although animals were granted with marvelous talents and abilities, the human being remained superior to them, as he was the *ḥayawan nāṭiq*, the "speaking animal endowed with logical thinking" (Schimmel 6). But as Zadeh rightly expresses "we need not to do so at the expense of understanding the conceptual frameworks that made such stories meaningful".[28] Generally speaking the literalness of supernatural phenomena in the Quran like *jinn,* angels and talking birds were not questioned in the pre-modern Islamic world. Figurative animal themes appear in ancient Arabic poetry, but we know that the specific genre of *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* was unknown to its first readers in the Islamicate world and seems to have inaugurated the tradition of fable and bestiaries in Arabic literature. We shall here concentrate on the Indian context at the origin of the *Pañcatantra* cycles of stories.

[28] Zadeh "Mapping Frontiers across Medieval Islam" 6.

In the ancient Indian tradition, the earliest use of animals in literature appears in the *Ṛg-Veda* as similes, metaphors. But we also find thinking and talking animals in the *Upaniṣads* or Buddhist *Jātakas*, and epics such as the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. What is interesting is that a particular characteristic was singled out to define a specific animal and become part of its proper nature (*svabhāva*).[29] Other distinctions were made between domestic and wild animals, or between prey and predator. Those associations play a central role in animal fables. The author of the *Pañcatantra* himself might have borrowed some stories from the *Jātakas* or the *Mahābhārata*, which were already used in a didactic way. But it is in the *Pañcatantra* that "the linguistic abilities of animals" (18) are explicitly addressed for the first time. The presence of animals with human feelings and intentions finds its most significant expression in the *avatāras* or incarnations of *Viṣṇu*. Parallel to gods becoming animals, all the gods also have their animal mounts, which also have divine characteristics. But the most significant cultural and religious belief that is connected to animal anthropomorphism goes back to the theory of transmigration or rebirth in India. But the type of animal in which the person is reborn depends on the actions and sins in the previous life. So here is another classification of animals differentiating the desirable ones, mostly farm animals, from the undesirable ones like the worms. So if humans can become animals, then it becomes logical that animals can endorse human roles and even speak.

But why choose animals as incentive to wonder in the usage of either ethics or guile? What is special about animals? If "there must be something that talking animals achieve that cannot be accomplished by simply human talk or direct discourse" (15), what is it? Despite an ongoing controversy reflected explicitly even in the *Pañcatantra*, innate natural differences, rather than education, tend to determine the potential behaviors of individuals. In other words, innate nature (*svabhāva*), which goes together with innate predispositions and duties

[29] Olivelle "Talking Animals: Explorations in an Indian Literary Genre" 15.

(*svadharma*), ultimately overcomes them. Hence the natural enmities between some species, like the snake and the weasel in our second fable. Just as human society functions under the conditions of social equilibrium based on the *varṇa,* animals will live in harmony if species keep up with their distinct roles. The main characteristic of Indian fables involves talking animals and animal interactions will become a mirror of human ones. The Islamic ethical texts using animal fables will retain this social status quo although declined in a slightly different way, as we will see in the intertextual analysis of the two fables. One can recall here the importance of animals in the Islamicate tradition starting with the Quran teaching mankind that creation of God praises Him and acknowledges His power. *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* was not the only book of animal fables as the Sufis themselves, like Suhrawardī in the 12th century CE, took over this genre. Metaphors were also widely used in the *Maqāmāt al-Ḥarīrī* in the same period of time (Schimmel, 2003).

Animals allow authors and translators to talk freely. The purpose of Viṣṇuśarman, the presumed author of the Sanskrit *Pañcantantra*,[30] in using animal voices in his text was to address some quite unflattering remarks to future kings and challenge contemporaries' views on politics and introduce new ideas without taking too many risks involved by direct speech. The same goes for the subsequent authors like Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ himself, Kāshefī and most probably ʿAbbāsī as well, who would rather call themselves translators or re-tellers of stories than authors in order to avoid reprisal or persecution. The mechanism of translation enables the translator to share more private, indirect speech in a public setting, as the speech is not his own, but borrowed from another source. Translation thus serves as a bridge between private and public life, where a public audience can learn from a story that was guilefully designed to be private. Moreover, the story overcomes its personal intention, as it becomes an allegory for common experiences shared by others.

[30] See p.76.

This proves that indirect rhetorical speech through allegory and metaphors can be not only frank, but also quite efficient in terms of means of persuasion. But this can only work provided that we accept the 14th century definition of frank as "sincere and genuine" although contrary to the common opinion defended by Foucault, who assumes that a political frank speech belonging to the public sphere must by definition be a direct one (London 189-190). But how come could we assume that using a direct speech would be the condition of being frank? But let us be clear, frank speech here doesn't refer to the ancient Greek concept of *parrhēsia* meaning "telling all" and even "willing to say everything", which is rather risky. We know that someone can share his views without speaking in the first person and I would add by using another being as a mirror, a being who will eventually also talk in the third person in order to describe his or her opinions explicitly. One should not forget here the effect of embedded stories and parables, which force us to enter multiple worlds. The advisers often themselves use allegories to encourage the readers to think critically about a situation that might resemble their own. Moreover each author presents a clear dialogic intertextual intention in his introduction, mentioning the fact of having been asked to produce this text, a text that is not originally his. Indirect speech is also more suitable to achieve pedagogical effects, which would be impossible otherwise in all political contexts that concern us here.

This metaphorical way to transmit political views enables the reader, seized by the sensation of wonder, to relate to the protagonists, whether in the shape of animals or not, like in the case of the second fable and the moral on patience and careful deliberation prior to any action. This is an important point as one could think that going back to the realm of humans in the fifth book of the *Pañcantantra* might annihilate the effect of wonder and surprise, as if wonder would cease with knowledge, or what we think to be true, which is not the case.

Knowledge is not the aim of wonder, but it participates in it. This identification through shared imagined experiences will engender empathy and compassion, which in turn makes it more likely for the reader to learn the heart of the story, whether ethical or guileful**.** For me identification goes together with mimesis, meaning that individuals will not simply reproduce reality through this artistic representation but also and more importantly the desire of the fictional others who thus become models and mediators. To go back to the importance of showing patience in the second fable, or rather the consequences in the absence of it, should the readers be the future kings, and should they be convinced that patience is an important virtue, they will be more likely not only to apply it but also to value it. Therefore, frank and indirect speech can provide guidance and even work as a vehicle for social and political reforms.

Like the four genres of courtly poetry, the *qaṣīda*, the epic *maṯnavī*, the romance *maṯnavī* and the *ghazal* (Meisami, 1987), the fables of *Pañcatantra* and *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* question our views on the relation between direct speech and political expression. They not only show that sharing genuine political opinions is possible in indirect ways that can influence authorities, but also suggest that indirect expression can help mediate power dynamics between speakers and listeners, actors and readers. Indirect speech appeals to pay a special attention to outer and inner meaning of the text and requires the ability and the active will to grasp its significance beyond the manifest text. The fable's role in both the ancient Indian and Islamicate traditions might therefore just be a stratagem to capture the reader's attention.

Chapter Five: Close intertextual analysis of two fables

A close intertextual analysis of two fables in Kāshifī's *Anvār-i Suhaylī* and ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*'s versions will be conducted with the following four objectives: (a) discuss the effect of the different structures and elements of peritexts in the two versions on the perception of the reader; (b) highlight the variations in style and allegorical speech, including gender ones, and their socio-political impacts in the use and reception of ethics and guile; (c) show the place of the central theme of ethics and guile in both texts in relation to *ʻaql* and *qalb* through the sensation of *taʿajjub*; and (d) demonstrate how Islamicate *akhlāq* reconciles both secular *nīti* and religion-abiding aspects of *dharma* in the ancient Indian tradition.

The common aim is to reveal not only the various saliences of ethics and guile in the two versions, but also their diverse orientations in the two fables notwithstanding the version we are dealing with. By orientation, I mean here internal within the story or external towards the reader.

With regards to Kāshifī's text, as mentioned earlier the English translation refers to Wollaston's one and I used my own knowledge of Persian regarding ʿAbbāsī's text. I have nevertheless allowed myself a few comments or precision at times regarding Wollaston translation. Transliterated passages or words are mentioned whenever deemed necessary to emphasize a point or anchor the meaning in its original version and language, or simply to highlight the beauty of the chosen words, style or syntactic choices.

We already saw in chapter two the contexts and the various reasons and intentions of Kāshefī and ʿAbbāsī for rewriting their respective hypotexts. In this chapter, we will come back in more details to their prefaces and introductions, as those peritexts prove insightful in terms of use of ethics and guile, even before entering the wonderful world of this cycle of stories

illustrated in the two fables. They will also help clarify the implicit and actual authors and readers of those fables.

It should be recalled here that Kāshifī's version is an indirect translation, at least four stages away from its Sanskrit hypotext, compared to ʿAbbāsī's one, which is a direct translation from Sanskrit. This has consequences not only on their personal stance on the texts in terms of content and narrative style, but also on the reader's perception including their patrons' recognition of their works.

For the sake of documenting and explaining the sources of differences of content and structure between the two versions, various hypotexts of the two versions under study will be referred to when looking at them first individually. The hypotexts of Kāshifī's *Anvār* will be Abū l-Maʿālī and Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* and the one of the ʿAbbāsī's translation, Pūrṇabhadra's *Pañcākhyāna.* Kāshifī's *Anvār-i Suhaylī* and ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* will then be compared to eachother, the former considered as the latter's hypotext.

Part One: The books' content and structure

Kāshefī and ʿAbbāsī's prefaces

The least one can say with regard to Kāshefī's preface is that neither Wollaston nor Eastwick encourage the reader to even pay attention to it. Wollaston taxes it as "a composition as dull and insipid as can well be imagined" (xviii) and Eastwick goes up to qualifying it as "a turgid specimen of the obscure and repulsive preludes with which Persian writers think fit to commence their compositions" (ix). I propose to look at it from a different angle: the interest here will be to see how both authors already induced or not an ethical or guileful tone at this

stage and also how they themselves might have used guile in order to protect themselves from a potential reprimand on behalf of their respective patrons.

Kāshefī respects the model, which prevailed at that time for such composition. He starts with a praise to Allah and his Prophet Muhammad, and uses frequent Arabic quotations including from the Quran. This first part tinged with religion also seems to sustain Kāshefī's approach on good advice: "It has been said that good advice is a universal discourse, from which each listener can derive benefit, according to his ability and power: witness the teaching of the Quran". He interestingly links "subtle wisdom" or subtle intelligence (*'aql-i nukte paīvand)* to the heart: "by wisdom the heart can accomplish its object" (*be ḥikmat kām-i dil ḥāṣil tavān kard*). He emphasizes the intention behind giving good advice, which must reflect "pure kindness and consideration".[31] Kāshefi then retells the origin and journey of this book, at each step carefully providing more details on its addressees and its possible use and benefit. For example, as far as ancient India is concerned, he states that: "the wise may derive profit from perusing it, while the ignorant may read it for amusement and relaxation".[32] And then regarding Persia under the reign of Khusraw Nūshīrwān, he mentions a book containing "whatever concerns monarchs in regard to government and caution, and of service to rulers of the land, (and) relative to the observance of the regulations of sovereignty".[33] When he finally comes to his own period of time, situation and direct patron, Suhaylī, he goes into more details but he also ostensibly shows extra caution and humility in the task that he has been ordered to perform. This might be part of the literary codes and custom as well, but it is still worthy of special attention here: Kāshefi first praises the Sultan, then Suhaylī's "guileless heart" (*dil-i bī ghel*), and ability to grasp the "universal benefit to mankind and widespread advantage to individuals, both high

[31] Wollaston 3-4; Kāshefī/Ouseley 3-4.
[32] Ibid 5; 5.
[33] Ibid 6; 6.

and low [*khāṣ va ʻavām*, special and common]" that this book contains. The wording he uses to present himself may seem exceedingly pompous and emphatic to today's reader, but here again this was the appropriate tone to adopt in that time and circumstances: Suhaylī "issued his exalted command that this most humble servant without capacity (*īn kamīne-i bī istiṭāʻat*), this contemptible atom of but small intellectual store, Ḥusayn bin ʻAlī al-Wāʻiẓ, surnamed al-Kāshefī (may exalted God assist him with His hidden kindness), should be bold enough (*jurʼat namūde*), to clothe the aforesaid work in new garments".[34] Only then does he start expressing himself in the first person: "after praying for success and asking permission, I busied myself in this matter",[35] insisting on the aspect of "practical wisdom" of this book. He specifies that this practical wisdom would be divided into a personal one implying an individual "correction of manners" (*tahzib-i akhlāq*), and a broader one linked to the world at large, first at the "family level" (*tadbīr-i manāzil*) and then at "city or country level" (*siyāsat-i mudun*).[36] Then he refers to himself back in the third person, saying that while accomplishing his tasks, should "he deem himself the target for the arrows of reproach (*hadaf-i sahām-i malāmat*)", he would convey the proverb: "He who is commanded will be excused (*al-māmūr maʻzūr,* in Arabic)". He quotes some poetic verses in the first person, among which: "I am ashamed of my imperfect production" but "the merit-discerning eye is free from guile *(ʻayb*)".[37] It is interesting to note that Wollaston has translated both *ghel* and *ʻayb* as guile. If *ghel* bears a connotation of animosity, envy and deceit, *ʻayb* rather means fault or imperfection, as if it was contrary to *aklhāq*, which, as we have seen is not the case in this study, where the tension between ethics and guile envisages those two concepts as complementary ones. Finally the only permission Kāshefī allows himself to take and

[34] Ibid 8-9; 9.
[35] Ibid 9; 9.
[36] Ibid 10; 10.
[37] Ibid 10; 10.

that he assumes is the one of choosing and using some proverbs and anecdotes whenever deemed necessary in order to ease the flow of the chapters at his own discretion. A good example of this is already shown in his own introduction to the *Anvār,* which is described hereafter in the next section.[38]

ʿAbbāsī's preface offers a striking contrast with Kāshefī's one in terms of style rather than content *per se*. It is rather his simple and factual style, which actually renders his preface shorter than Kāshefī's one. Just as Kāshefī did, ʿAbbāsī also recalls the journey of the *Pañcākhyāna* since its Indian origins starting directly with Nūshīrwān the Just who sent his physician Burzūyeh to India to try and bring back the *Pañcākhyāna* in order to translate it into Pahlavi. He mentions that the *Pañcākhyāna* and Burzūyeh's *Karataka Damanaka* are one and the same book. He praises Burzūyeh's knowledge, his mastery of Persian and Indian languages and describes his return to the court in more details than Kāshefī did, mentioning Burzūyeh's humility, at least materialistically, as he did not want any reward except that Buzurgmihr write his biography at the beginning of the book. What does he say about Kāshefī? When he reaches Kāshefī's version, he mentions that because Abū l-Maʿālī's version was so full of Arabic verses and "words very difficult to understand" (*lughāt-i dūr az fahm bisyār dāsht*),[39] Kāshefī was ordered by the Amīr Suhaylī to compose a version in a clearer style as well as to proceed to some changes accordingly. He then, just as Kāshefī did in respect with the literary codes prevailing at that time, praises at length King Akbar's qualities. After this, he explains that Akbar was not satisfied with the two last versions of Abū l-Maʿālī and Kāshefī, too difficult to understand and containing too many Arabic words, even Kāshefī's one. This is why he ordered Abū l-Faḍl, who had composed the *Akbar Nameh,* to rewrite those versions, in a text, which he entitled *ʿIyār-i*

[38] See p.75.
[39] ʿAbbāsī/Chand 3.

Dānish. ʿAbbāsī does not fail to praise his predecessor, saying Abū l-Faḍl was so talented that other knowledgeable persons could not even find the words to describe his work. He explains that Akbar had already had many Indian books translated into Persian, and because this particular book had been translated so many times, from one language to the other, many significant changes had occurred and given that Akbar himself had "close to a thousand Burzūyeh" (*qurb-i hazār Burzūyeh*) at his service in his court, it was deemed better to have it translated directly from Sanskrit. Akbar ordered that all items "wet and dry" *(khoshk o tar*) of this book should be translated so that any difference, either additions or omissions in the versions since the original, would become clear; and he assigned ʿAbbāsī to this task. The latter also uses the third person to present and talk about himself with a similar degree of humility to Kāshefī: "My name came out to have the pleasure to do this task, (me), the lowest person on earth Muṣṭafa Khaliqdād ʿAbbāsī (*qarʻe-i dawlat-i īn khidmat be nām wāpistarīn bande-hāye īn dargāhi*, *Muṣṭafa Khaliqdād ʿAbbāsī*),[40] but he does not take any additional measure to protect himself as Kāshefī did. I contend that this is due to two factors: first ʿAbbāsī had a very clear and well-defined task: to translate the Sanskrit version "word by word" (*lafẓā bāl lafẓ)* and in simple and informal Farsi with no ornate expressions or speeches, and therefore to perform, unlike all his predecessors to the exception of Burzūyeh, a direct translation from Sanskrit. This somehow preserved him from a potentially dangerous overexposure to his patron. The second factor is that Akbar ordered this version as part of a general translation movement from Sanskrit with a different objective than Sultan Bāyqarā at the time of Kāshefī, meaning: a process of self-identification with his subjects, demonstrating a certain tolerance and openness towards them, and not a simple wish or bold strategy aimed at controlling and imposing them his rules.[41]

[40] ʿAbbāsī/Chand 5.
[41] See p. 38.

Towards the end, ʿAbbāsī also explains that his work will be submitted to Akbar, who will have to evaluate it and compare it to previous versions, which might again indicate that this was just a first draft.[42] However, this might also just be part of the protocol and respect shown to Akbar, as he was known to be illiterate, and an indirect way meaning that Akbar would have other literati from the court to evaluate his version. Finally, although ʿAbbāsī finishes his preface by mentioning the name of Allah, he does not open it by praising Him and his Prophet, nor mention any citation from the Quran in it. He also does not insist on the inner qualities of the book itself such as wisdom or good advice, but rather focuses on its literary ones linked to the various authors and translators along its journey. The words ethics or guile never appear explicitly or implicitly in contrast with Kāshefī's version.

Content, titles and location of the fables

Kāshifī's *Anvār-i Suhaylī* includes 14 chapters excluding his preface and the introduction of the book itself, compared to 15 in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and Abū l-Maʿālī's *Kalīlah wa Dimnah*. He claims that he kept the same arrangement as the Sage of Hind did, only taking off two chapters alleging that they were not part of the original of the book.[43] After looking at Abū l-Maʿālī's version, I assume that by those two chapters, he refers to the ones in Abū l-Maʿālī's introduction and by original of the book, to the version Burzūyeh had had access to, for the following reasons: Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and Abū l-Maʿālī's introductions comprise 3 chapters each, although with significant differences in each version, none of which, as we shall see, appear in Pūrṇabhadra's *Pañcākhyāna* and ʿAbbāsī's subsequent translation of it. Kāshefī did not mention Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's own "Exposé du Livre", nor the chapter written by the hand of Buzurgmihr

[42] See p.29.
[43] Kāshefī/Ouseley 10; Wollaston 9.

Bakhtigan, both present in Abū l-Maʿālī's version. This plus Kāshefī's instructions to rewrite a text without too many Arabic expressions and words, show that the distance he took from the various texts he had access to, might also reveal an intention to render his version closer to its Indian hypotext, while keeping it in accordance with an Islamicate environment and tradition.

After his preface commented on earlier, Kāshefī includes an introduction recasting the story of the Brahman Bīdpāī and the King of Hind Dābishlīm embedded in a frame story staging a famous King of Persia and his minister. Kāshefī kept the same discursive set up in the rest of his book as the one introduced in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's version and all its offspring, meaning a conversation between the Sage Bīdpāī and the King Dābishlīm. Both Abū l-Maʿālī and Kāshefī kept the Sanskrit word Brahman to refer to Bīdpāī, appearing at the beginning of the chapters as we will see with the second fable, whereas Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ used the word philosopher instead. But he uses devotee (*pārsā*) or holy man (*zāhid*) in the stories, whereas ʿAbbāsī uses Brahman within the stories as well. The origin of the names of Bīdpāī and Dābishlīm is subject to controversy but most agree that they would be of Sanskrit origin.[44]

As for ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*, it includes 5 chapters just as its Sanskrit hypotext, Pūrnabhadra's version, and would seem much shorter than Kāshefī's version at the first glance. But it has to be kept in mind that only Kāshefī's first six, maximum seven chapters, would have been borrowed from the Sanskrit, meaning 81 to 84 stories for 83 in ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna,* so that we face a similar number of stories of Sanskrit origin.[45] It is to be noted that Pūrṇabhadra's text comprises 21 additional stories not present in earlier editions of the *Pañcatantra* and which, as we saw earlier in chapter two, served as a justification for Kosegarten to call it *textus*

[44] For details on those possible origins, see Benfey (1859), Renou/Lancereau (1965) and de Blois (1990).
[45] For details on correspondences between the stories in Persian and Sanskrit see Eastwick, preface (1854 xi-xiii).

ornatior.[46] Also, in ʿAbbāsī's fifth chapter, we can read some information on Indian music, which is not found in the Sanskrit text.

With regard to ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna*'s introduction, it is very faithful to the *Kathāmukha* of its Sanskrit hypotext, and has indeed nothing to do with ulterior introductions, including Kāshefī's one. It tells the story of the eighty years old Brahman Viṣṇuśarman, who is asked by the King of Mahilāropya, Amaraśakti, to give a proper instruction and education to his three sons, who to his great despair would be interested in everything except in politics. Viṣṇuśarman intends to do this in six months. The introduction ends with a brief description of each chapter composed by Viṣṇuśarman and a *subhāṣita* dedicated to the God Indra: "The one who will read and practice this book will never be conquered even by Indra, the Lord of Heavens" *(īn kitābī ast ke har kas bekhwanād, wa ān rā kār bandad, Indra ke rāja-yi ʻālam-i havāst, bar vai ghālib natavānad shod)*.[47] Those personages, Viṣṇuśarman and the three Princes, are never mentioned again in the *Tantrākhyāyika* or in ʿAbbāsī's translation. They sometimes appear in other recensions at the beginning of the books in order to introduce them, but the end of the fifth book does not tell us what became of them.

There is an important difference in terms of narrative set up between Kāshefī and ʿAbbāsī's versions. The latter is no longer a transcript of an oral conversation between Bīdpāī answering to Dābishlīm's questions, but a text written by Viṣṇuśarman for the Princes. This also has in my opinion another significant impact on the reception of the book, not only on the implicit and real readers, but also on Kāshefī and ʿAbbāsī's own perception of the texts.[48] An exchange between a Sage and a King is more likely to look as if Kāshefī himself could be the Sage's mirror giving advice to the Sultan, this being reinforced by the very delicate task he was

[46] See p.26.
[47] ʿAbbāsī/Chand 9.
[48] See p.69.

assigned to with regards to his predecessor's version in terms of form and content. Whereas ʿAbbāsī, given his direct word-by-word translation, takes a more indirect risk of reprimand from his patron, linked with the quality of his translation rather than its content. Bīdpāī and Viṣṇuśarman are rather the ones directly at risk, which is one of the main reasons why talking and feeling animals are put on stage, that is to lower the risks of potential punishment.

Interestingly, ʿAbbāsī concludes his translation saying: "Here ends the *Pañcatantra*, also called *Pañcākhyāna nītīśāstra,* comprising five stories. It is full of stories and poems of sweet-speaking poets and written by Viṣṇuśarman, *nītīśāstra* for the kings, but also profitable to other persons". So only at the very end, does he specify the *nīti* nature of this book. Is it to bring back some pragmatism? One must admit that there is a kind of parody in the fact that Viṣṇuśarman teaches the secrets of statecraft to the three dull-witted Princes through animal fables to make it easier for them to understand, whereas Bīdpāī appears like a Sage, who provides the King with all sorts of "more serious" or diplomatic ethical advice. According to me, this is just another trick to orient the reader towards an apparently more ethical stand from the start, although, as far as kings are concerned, their image is equally unflattering in both versions.

Given the differences in titles at all paratextual levels, books, chapters and stories in the various versions, we have no choice but to come back to them, for the sake of clarity and consistency. Titles matter as they can bear messages that can influence the reader in one direction or another. This illustrates the difficulties different authors, translators and editors must have faced with respect to either the quality or the number of hypotexts available to them or not, and the need to bring clarity. Not only is this need justified, but it also shows how much each of those versions or translations bear the specific seal of his author, at least of the titles of the books, however faithful to his hypotext he claims to be or not. For the versions of concern here,

we have seen that Kāshifī dedicated his version to his patron entitling it upon his name, *Anwār-i Suhaylī*, the Lights of Suhayl, or the Lights of Canopus, and no more the name of the two Jackals, *Kalīlah wa Dimnah*, since Burzūyeh's translation, *Karataka* and *Damanaka*. As for ʿAbbāsī, the situation is rather simple. The fact that he kept the same title only proves his faithful engagement with the word-by-word translation of his hypotext, Pūrṇabhadra's *Pancākhyāna.* The title *Pañcatantra,* which appears to be original, was not used in all subsequent recensions. Some appear under the titles of *Tantrākhyāyika* (Kashmir) or *Pancākhyānaka*, *ākhyāyika* and *ākhyānaka* meaning "little story". The frequent occurrence of those words suggests that they might have been part of the original title. Only the Jain versions do not include the word *tantra*. They rather use the compound of *Panca* and *ākhyāna* or *ākhyānaka*, as in Pūrṇabhadra's book.

What about the titles of chapters and stories? According to Benfey (1859), the Indian version had no titles and they were added at a later stage in order to facilitate the reading. With regard to the chosen versions here, as for ʿAbbāsī's translation the situation is clear: the titles were missing in the Persian manuscript but have been added by the editors following Hertel's ones, or on the basis of the content of the stories.[49] Regarding Kāshefī's *Anvār* one should be cautious with those titles, as it is not clear who included them and when. Nor do Ouseley, Wollaston or Eastwick mention anything on this matter. Also, there are some discrepancies between the versions and translations regarding the titles of the stories, at times missing to show the embedded ones. But while some titles bring clarity, some unveil an ethical or a guileful intention, like for example in Kāshefī's version. Let us examine the chapters and fables concerned in this thesis in order to illustrate those points:

Kāshefī: Chapter 4: "In Explanation of Attentively Regarding the Circumstances of our Enemies and Not Being Secure as to Their Stratagems and Machinations"; Story 4: "The Story of the

[49] ʿAbbāsī/Chand/Abidi/Naini: Editors preface 10.

Clever Hare: In Illustration of the Advantage of Securing a Skillful Leader"(Kāshefī/Eastwick 1854), or "The Hare Who Constituted Herself an Ambassador from the Moon" (Kāshefī/Wollaston 1877).

Chapter 6: "On the Calamitous Results of Precipitation and the Injuriousness of Haste"; Story 2: "The Story of the Holy Man, Who, through Precipitation, Stained His Hands with the Innocent Blood of an Ichneumon that Had Saved the Life of His Child from a Serpent", followed by "The Story of the Devotee Who Split the Jar of Honey and Oil Illustrating the proverb 'Do Not Count Your Chickens before They Are Hatched'"(Kāshefī/Eastwick 1854), or "The Devotee Who Rashly Destroyed the Weasel Who Had Saved His Own Child's Life", followed by "The Holy Man, Who when Building Castles in the Air, Broke the Pitcher Containing His Stock of Honey and Oil" (Kāshefī/Wollaston 1877).[50]

ʿAbbāsī: Chapter 3: *Kākolukīya* the "Crows and the Owls" in Sanskrit, or *dastān zāg o būm*, meaning "The Story of the Crows and the Owls"; story 3: "The Story of the Elephant, the Hare and the Moon". One reads *mār,* the snake in the edition, but I consider it as a typing mistake for *māh*, the Moon, as there is no snake whatsoever is this story, but the Moon plays a crucial role instead.

Chapter 5: *Aparīkṣita-kāritā* from Sanskrit, although it would be more correct to say *Aparīkṣita-kārakam*, the inconsiderate behavior, or *kardan-i kār bī ta'mmul wa ziyān-zadagī*, meaning "to act without consideration and be hurt by the damage caused"; story 2: "The Story of the Brahman's Wife and the Weasel" and story 8/5: "The Story of *Sōmasharmā*'s Father (in Sanskrit *Somaśarmā*)" (ʿAbbāsī/Chand 1984).

[50] Only the titles of the main chapters appear in Ouseley edition.

In order to avoid such side effects and remain consistent in my study of the *Pañcatantra*, I chose to keep the most neutral titles, meaning: "The Story of the Elephant, the Hare and the Moon" and "The Story of the Brahman and the Ichneumon" (voluntarily omitting here the adjective "faithful" to qualify the ichneumon or weasel), and "The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air", found in the Sanskrit editions (Hertel 1908), which I used in my former Thesis.[51]

Beyond those considerations on content and paratexts, let us have a closer look into the locations of the two fables in both versions. This fact is meaningful to better understand the textual context of the fables, rather than to search more deeply why they do not necessarily appear in the same chapters in those various versions. In the *Anvār*, the first fable, "The Story of the Elephant, the Hare and the Moon" is embedded in the frame story of "The Birds elect a King" depicting the origins of the dispute between the Crows and the Owls. "The Cat as Judge between the Partridge and the Hare" follows it.[52] This location is the same than in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and Abū l-Maʿālī's books, but also Pūrṇabhadra's *Pañcākhyāna* and ʿAbbāsī's text. This also proves that this fable has maintained a stable location throughout the circulation of this book of fables. This is not the case of the second fable, "The Story of the Brahman and the Ichneumon/The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air". In the *Anvār* it is directly embedded in the frame story depicting the devotee who desperately wants a woman and a son. The fable includes and even starts with "The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air" and is followed by "The Story of the King and his Hawk". If this is the same as in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and Abū l-Maʿālī's books, it is not the case in Pūrṇabhadra's *Pañcākhyāna* and ʿAbbāsī's translation, where "The Story of the Brahman and the Ichneumon" is the first story

[51] L'Histoire de *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* depuis l*e Pañcatantra* illustrée par une étude comparative de deux fables en Sanskrit et en arabe (Schürch Odile, Mémoire de Licence, Université de Genève, 2005).
[52] The Partridge was a Nightingale in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ version, but a Partridge in the Sanskrit one.

embedded in the frame story of "The Barber who killed the Monks", ("The Story of the Merchant and the Barber" inʿAbbāsī's translation), which is followed by another frame story, "The Four Treasure Seekers", in which "The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air" ("The Story of *Sōmasharmā*'s Father" in ʿAbbāsī's translation) is itself later on embedded.

This being said, the second fable, "The Story of the Brahman and the Ichneumon/The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air", always appears in the second chapter after the one including the first fable. So the original logic or idea to finish the book with human actors rather than animals remains.

If the embedded style of the stories prevails in both versions as it did in their respective hypotexts, we will see how those differences of embeddings from one version to another affect or not the reader's reception of the texts, especially with regard to the second fable. What we can say for now is that the general central themes of the concerned chapters are preserved, meaning how to preserve oneself from the enemy's trickeries in the first one and the necessity of carefully thinking before talking or acting in the second one.

Part Two: The two fables: use and reception of ethics and guile exemplified

A few external factors pertaining to the perception of animals in ancient India and Islamicate world will be presented first for each of the fables. A brief summary of the fables will follow only aimed at this stage to present the common plots and facts between Kāshefī and ʿAbbāsī' versions to the reader with no further details. In the case of the first fable, I will proceed with a comparison scene after scene between both versions, with a main focus on differences that call on either ethics or/and guile linked with content and form. The approach will have to differ for the second fable given the too different embeddings and localizations, and the fact that we

deal with one single fable in Kāshefī's version, but actually two in ʿAbbāsī's. The summary in this case will aim at giving a general idea of the plots of both stories separately, leaving other differences aside at that stage, including the variations between the protagonists, which will be unveiled in the comparison between both versions.

The main highlights of the fables in the two versions in terms of ethics and guile will be put forth, before a conclusion on the contrasts and links between the fables themselves beyond the variations between the versions closes this chapter.

The Story of the Elephant, the Hare and the Moon

External factors

The elephants in ancient India were considered as noble, proud and powerful, but also paradoxically docile and impulsive at times (Olivelle, 1999). In the Islamicate tradition the elephant is very present, not to mention the *Sūrah al-fīl*. But the elephant was also seen as dark and dangerous creatures and used in war. An example of this can be found in one of the introductory chapters of *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* retelling the war between Alexander the Great and an Indian King. Another aspect of the elephants however prevailed. They were considered as "beasts of burden", and Persian poets invented the image of "the elephant's dream", the dream of one's native land (Schimmel, 2003). As for the Hare, it would be generally considered as intelligent, cunning and capable of overcoming their enemies even the stronger than them. We also saw the Buddhist *Jātaka* about the hares and the moon.

Summary

In both versions, the Crow is the one telling this story to the birds, who are in the process of electing their King.

1. The story narrates a severe drought that happened in the country of the Elephants. They had to go and complain about it to their King, who ordered that water should be searched in all directions. **2.** The Elephants found an abundant spring called the "Fountain of the Moon". The King and all his subjects went there, without noticing that Hares had settled down in the outskirts of that spring. The Elephants walked on them killing many of them on their way. **3.** The Hares who had survived went to their King to ask for protection and justice. The King of Hares listened to them and one of them was sent as a special envoy to talk to the King of Elephants. **4.** The Hare spoke to him from some height and presented himself as an envoy of the Moon. The King of Elephants listened to his message and the Hare started his speech on behalf of the Moon. The Moon was quite angry about the Elephants' recent behavior and blamed them for their ignorance of the consequences of their physical strength, and the fact that they had rendered the water of its spring turbid. The Moon threatened the King of Elephants through the mouth of the Hare saying that should the King not obey its recommendations, he would simply die. **5.** The King of Elephants went to the spring with the Hare. He saw the Moon reflected on its surface. When he plunged his trunk in the water to perform his adoration, he saw the Moon quite agitated and got scared. He finished his adoration as quickly as possible and agreed to never come back afterwards.

The Crow ends the story by justifying why he told the birds this story and introduces the next one, "The Partridge and Quail in the hands of a fasting Cat" to emphasize his message, to which the birds responded: "How was this?" *(īn che gūne būde ast?)*

Comparison of the fable between Kāshefī and ʿAbbāsī's versions[53]

1. This part is essentially descriptive, but one should not forget that it indicates the beginning of a guileful example on behalf of the Crow in order to convince the birds not to elect an Owl. One should also not minimize the quality of those introductory descriptions in both versions. Their purpose is not only to present the story, but also to capture the attention of the reader from the start. This is itself an element of literary guile. ʿAbbāsī's version is slightly more dramatic as he mentions that the elephants severely suffered form thirst, and that some young ones were close to death, while some others even died. In both versions, Kāshefī and ʿAbbāsī use a human plural for the elephants and hares *–ān* and not *–hā,* but *–ān* is actually common for animate including trees. What is less common is the pronoun used to refer to them individually, *ū* and not *īn* or *ān,* which reinforce the humanely correlation they bear. However, this might also be more common in classical texts. Also Kāshefī uses the Persian word *pīl* for elephants, whereas ʿAbbāsī uses *fīl*, which is a more common word also used in Arabic to the contrary of *pīl*. Other than this, we can note that Kāshefī's version does not give the name of the King of Elephants and locates them in the Island of Zīrbād, whereas ʿAbbāsī translated the name of the King of Elephants, *Cahār Dandān,* from the Sanskrit *Caturdanta*, meaning "the four toothed", and placed them in the jungle. **2.** Here, ʿAbbāsī kept the Hindi/Sanskrit name of the Lake, *Candra-Sāra,* the Lake of the Moon, whereas Kāshefī uses its Persian translation *Chashmeh-i-Māh, chashmeh* meaning spring or source and not lake. Persian has no gender marking, but Wollaston gives a feminine gender to the Hares in his translation. This point will be commented in the next section. **3.** In Kāshefī's text, the Hares went straight together to their King. They first praised his qualities and recalled his duties: "a just King should be the protector of the oppressed (*panāh-i maẓlūmān*), and aider of the destitute (*dastgīr-i maḥrūmān*)"; every monarch occupies

[53] See Kāshefī/Ouseley 268-274 ; Wollaston 242-247 and ʿAbbāsī/Chand 256-259.

his throne "with the view to administrating justice/for the sake of giving justice (*az bahr-i dād dādanist*), not of living with pleasure", imploring him to act accordingly following the massacre perpetrated by the Elephants. The King listens and asks for "whoever is intelligent among them" (*har ke dar miyān-i shomā kiyāsatī dārad*; *kiyāsatī* meaning as well ingenuity and sagacity), to present himself in order to take his advice. And he even adds: "for to put our intentions into execution before deliberation has taken place is not the nature of wise prosperous persons". The important point to note here is that the King of Hares first and foremost calls on intelligence and ingenuity. At this moment a "sharp-witted" (*tīz hūshī*) Hare named Bihrūz[54] "in whose complete wisdom, perfect understanding, clear intellect (*ṣafā-yī ẕahn*) and sound deliberation men (*mardum*) used to place confidence, saw that the King took this matter to heart" he addressed him directly with humility. He even suggested that the King might deem appropriate that an officer accompanies him. To which the King said that he totally trusted him and that he did not have "his rectitude, integrity, straightforwardness and honesty" (*dar sadād wa āmānat wa rāstī wa diyānat*). Then follows a long tirade on some very specific characteristics of an envoy such as the fact that he is "the King's tongue" (*zabān-i ū bāshad*), and represents his "excellent judgment" (*ḥusn-i ikhtiyār*) and "perfect experience" (*kamāl-i mardshenāsī*) and that he should be "the wisest of his race (*dānātarīn-i qawm bāshad*), "the most eloquent amongst them in language" *(faṣīḥtarīn-i īshān dar aqwāl)* and "the most perfect in conduct" *(kāmaltarīn-i īshān dar af'āl),* taking Ẕū'lqarnain (Alexander the Great) as an example. And then comes pure guilefulness when he starts describing further the specificities of the discourse of such an envoy: "The sword of the tongue like a sharp dagger (*tīgh-zabān mānand-i shamshīr-i ābdār*), should be employed with keenness and severity", but "every word, from the appearance of which roughness is understood, must in the end be withdrawn with kindness and politeness (*be narmī*

[54] "good day" (Wollaston 1877).

wa luṭf)", "by the way of solace and consolation (*az rū-yi uns wa sulūt*, *uns* also meaning empathy), he must conclude with friendly expression and captivating (or pleasant) sayings" (*be ḥarfī mehrāngīz wa nukte-yi dil-āvīz)*. And then eventually Bihrūz sets up for his travel to the King of Elephants.

In ʿAbbāsī's text, the approach is different, much more pragmatic and somehow less subtle. The Hares first gather together and agree that they should "think about a stratagem" (*tadbīrī bāyad angīkht*), to keep the Elephants from coming back. Then one of them speaks out, reassures the others, saying they should trust him "because Brahma gave him His blessing" (or prayed for him) and therefore the Elephants will not come back. In ʿAbbāsī's version the Hare does not have a name, but is referred to as "*īlchī*", meaning envoy, ambassador. He did not take the Sanskrit name *Vijaya* meaning "Victory". Having heard his speech, the King of Hares confirms that he has not any doubt about it and explains the reasons for it. He praises the Hare's knowledge of etiquette, who knows how to behave in all circumstances, and "who speaks with perfection and moderation" (*nīk gūyi kam gūyi ke sukhan rā durust wa pākīze gūyad*), adding that when the Elephants will see the "rightness of his reasoning" (*kāmil rāy*) they will know his own as well, as one says: "after seeing the envoy or letter of an unknown King, I know whether this King is intelligent or not (*dāneshwarī wa bī dāneshī*)". And "If you go there, it will be just the same as if I went there myself" (*wa chūn to mīravī hamān ast ke man khod mīravam)*. And so the Hare leaves to go and talk to the King of Elephants.

The accent is put on intelligence as well, but also on contemplation and exactitude in the speech without the details we find in Kāshefīs version. No special tricks are expressed (e.g. to be harsh but gentle at the end). Also the Hare in ʿAbbāsī's version seems in appearance more self-confident than in Kāshefī's. He directly endorses the role of the envoy already with the

Elephants, even before talking to the King of Hares himself, placing himself under Brahma's benediction, whereas Bihrūz takes a lot more precaution and detours to approach the King of Hares. **4.** In Kāshefī's version, Bihrūz maintains a cautious attitude while approaching the King of Elephants, well aware of the risks he is taking for his life due to the Elephants's "superiority and grandeur" (*az ghāyat-i nakhvat wa ʻaẓmat; ghāyat-i nakhvat* litteraly meaning "extreme selfishness, arrogance"). Nevertheless, he himself points out that "they would have no design against me, or there is no issue with me being close to them" (*harchand az jānib-i īshān qaṣdī naravad*). So he cautiously decides to climb on some height and from there directly hails the King of Elephants, saying that the Moon sends him, and that "no crime should be imputed to an envoy, whatever he says or hears". He then praises not only the Moon's grandeur, but also its capacity to punish should one dare ploting against it. This is voluntarily and guilefully vague enough for the King of Elephants to be surprised and want to know more. Bihrūz continues his speech on behalf of the Moon, describing the pride of self-sufficient animals, who deem themselves superior to others, but then guilefully avoiding to describe explicitly the disaster perpetrated against his fellow Hares, but rather redirecting attention to the fact that the Elephants have rendered the Moon's water murky. To be noted that the Moon is also humanized and referred to with the pronoun "*ū*" and not *īn* or *ān*. Bihrūz adds that all this is transmitted by the Moon due to its "excess of kindness" (*az ghāyat-i karam*), but still clearly threatens the King of Elephants in case of disrespect towards its words. He even adds that in case of any doubt he should come and see it by the Lake and then be convinced to never come back again. All "this astonishes the King of Elephants" (*az īn ḥadiṯ ʻajab āmad*).

In ʿAbbāsī's version again the approach is quite different: at first the Hare shows a similar prudence in his mission, because of the physical superiority of the Elephants: "an

elephant kills only by touching" (*fīl be mujarrad-i dast rasānīdani ādamī rā mīkushad*). He also chooses to climb on some height to address the King of Elephants. A description of the Elephant, his impressive stature and trumpeting, his trunk looking as a python, adds a contrasting element to the risks that the Hare is taking. There is no such description in Kāshefī's version. But to the contrary of Bihrūz, the Hare here starts to politely salute the King of Elephants and asks him how he is doing. The King of Elephants asks in return who he is and the Hare first simply answers: "I am an envoy" (*īlchī am*). And only when the King asks whose envoy he is, does he introduce himself as an envoy of the Moon. He only starts transmitting his message when the King of Elephants invites him to do so. The Hare similarly points out that as an envoy, he should not be harmed whatsoever. He recites his message in verses, such as: "the one who acts without distinguishing his own strength and that of enemies, will attract adversity on himself" (*kasī ke quwwat-i khod wa ghanīm rā nā sanjīde khwāhad ke kār konad, dar-i bī-dawlatī bar khod gushāde bāshad*). He then directly, on behalf of the Moon, describes the disaster the Elephants provoked, namely the damage done to its Lake "famous by its name" (*be nām-e man shuhrat dārad*) and to the Hare and his people who were living there, "the Hare who is always with me" (*khargūsh ke hamīshe bā man bāshad*), meaning under its protection. The Moon also indirectly challenges the King of Elephants through the Hare with direct and straightforward questions, asking why he behaved in such way, making the Lake's water murky, and why such destruction of the Hares took place. And then he also asks the King if he is ignorant that the Moon is also known under the name of *Śaśānka*, meaning "close to the Hares" (*khargūsh dar kenār*, or companion of the Hare, or in Sanskrit, "the one who bears the mark of a Hare/*Śaśa*"). Although the editors explain that the Hindus take the marks on the Moon as hares, they do not tell about a possible origin of this belief, which would come from a Buddhist *Jātaka*:

In another life, Śākyamuni was a Hare and became friend with a fox and a monkey. One day Indra came under the guise of a beggar asking for food. The monkey and the fox both found some food but not the Hare. The Hare sacrificed himself in the fire instead and Indra sent him on the moon to thank him for his sacrifice. (Benfey 1859)

We do not know whether ʿAbbāsī was aware or not of this *Jātaka*, but he for sure remained faithful to his hypotext mentioning the name *Śaśānka* and its broad meaning. And the Hare ends his speech with a similar degree of threats in case of disrespect towards the Moon. But the style is here as well more direct and less polished with over-politeness and ornate expressions. The King of Elephants had "his heart tormented" (*dilash dar iẓṭirāb uftāde*) and even after "reflecting for a long time" (*laḥẓe-hāyi dar khod furū raft*), he is fully convinced and admits his fault even before he reaches the Lake of the Moon (to the contrary of Kāshefī's version in which the Elephant is first surprised and goes to the Lake to verify the Hare's message). Here the King of Elephants tells the Hare, that he will not create any harm again and asks the Hare to show him the way to the Lake so that he can present his excuses to the Moon directly. The Hare skillfully asks him to come alone with him to see the Moon. **5.** In Kāshefī's version, the King of Elephants, seized by surprise/wonder and fear, goes to the Lake of the Moon and indeed sees the Moon's shape reflected in the water. Bihrūz traps him and invites him to perform his adoration "hoping that the Moon, moved by compassion" would be satisfied. So the King of Elephants pursues his adoration and the expected effect occurs. He associated the fact that his trunk created the agitation of the water with the Moon becoming angry, assimilating the latter to the former. He prostrated himself and promised the Moon and Bihrūz that he and other elephants would never come back. Bihrūz came back victorious to the King of Hares, recalling

the meaning of its Sanskrit name *Vijaya*. His stratagem (*ḥileh*, also meaning ruse and deceit), indeed allowed the avoidance of a greater disaster. And the Crow continues with his story.

In ʿAbbāsī's version the King of Elephants decides to go to the lake at his own initiative. The Hare shows him the Moon and all the stars shining around it. And again it is the King who decides to make his ablution and prostrate to the Moon after that. And off he throws his trunk into the water, and sees a thousand Moons and stars. The Hare jumps and tells the King that he made the Moon angry now. But the King did not get it and asked why? So the Hare has to explain that it is because he put his trunk into the Moon's water. Only then does the King realize, apologize and request the Hare to prove his brotherhood to him by speaking well of him to the Moon, and make it pleased with him by announcing that he will never come back, nor the other Elephants. The story ends up here, with the Crow explaining why he told the birds this story and then introducing the following one.

Main highlights between the two versions

Are ethics and/or guile present in the two versions and if yes, how and to which degree in each of them?

I propose to look at the content first. It seems rather easy and natural to conclude that guile largely prevails in both versions given what we know about the Hare's speech and behavior. But isn't there any ethics at all? Points of view and intentions must be looked at. We can assume that both the King of Elephants and the King of Hares show some ethical concerns at least for their own people. They both listened to the complaints of their subjects and tried to act upon good advice. This is especially true for the King of Hares, but even the King of Elephants was looking for a solution to save his people from the dreadful consequences of the draught.

Nowhere does it show that the Elephants had the deliberate intention to kill the Hares. In terms of content we can agree that there is some homogeneity between the two versions as the results are basically similar.

It seems that there is more to say with regards to the form. We have seen some concrete linguistic tricks to humanize the animals, such as the allegorical use of the pronoun *ū*. Also in Kāshefī's version, we do not find external descriptions of elephants as we do in ʿAbbāsī's one although in a much more concise way, not to say allusive at times, compared to its Sanskrit hypotext, where we have a very detailed and charming picture of the Elephants taking their bath in the "Lake of the Moon". But this more aesthetic and ornate approach only contributes to more literary pleasure for the reader. It does not take him back from the fictive environment, but rather adds marvel in it. We have seen a number of elements suggesting that ʿAbbāsī's version might have only been a draft: his mentions in his preface that Akbar will have to read and evaluate his text; his use of Hindi words or omission of some of the Sanskrit names of the protagonist; the fact that he did not include, especially in this fable, the description of several scenes such as the one just above mentioned on the Elephants taking their bath. This being said, one can notice a difference in the style of the speech of the Hare to the King of Elephants. In Kāshefī's version, despite the harshness and straightforwardness of its content until the end, the extra politeness we specifically find in this version contributes in my opinion to guilefully render it much more acceptable and actually much more convincing to the interlocutor in the long term. Thus there is a part of guile in the décor just as in the use of animals for the authors, implicit and real, which contributes to a frank but indirect speech aimed at protecting them from persecution from their patrons in addition to presenting themselves as translators only, which is at least very clear in ʿAbbāsī's case.

The reminiscence of the feminine gender of Bihrūz in Wollaston's translation of Kāshefī's version is worth considering, as this is also the case of the Arabic version of al-Marṣafī (1912), but not in the Sanskrit text. Wollaston does not mention the reason. It might have been his own choice with regards to the tendency to associate guile more with women at this time as a negative trait or he might have simply taken it from the Arabic hypotext.

Therefore, no version appears to be more or less ethical than the other in terms of content and results. Should style bear a ethical or a guileful component, as I believe it does in terms of approach of the other self, then the Hare in Kāshefī's version would appear even less ethical than in ʿAbbāsī's version.

The Story of the Braham and the Ichneumon/The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air

External factors

The weasel is a famous animal in India, with a well-defined character: wild and domestic at once, known for its natural enmity against snakes, an enmity of birth that is irremediable. In the Islamicate tradition, the weasel does not benefit from the same reputation and is perceived as a cunning thief, and rather known for its enmity against rats. This might explain the greater distance between the weasel and human beings in Kāshefī's version. The snake was revered already in ancient India representing life and death and associated with Viṣṇu, Śiva and Indra who rides an elephant called Nagendra, the Lord of the Snakes. In the Islamicate world, the snake is both disliked and feared, "the embodiment of evil" (Schimmel, 2003) although desired for its eyes.

Summary

The Story of the Brahman and the Ichneumon

A Brahman/devotee had a wife who gave birth to a son. The devotee who had been expecting this moment for a long time was at the height of happiness and contentment, projecting a marvelous future on his son. One day, his wife wanted to go and take a bath. She entrusted him to take care of the baby. But she had just gone out, that the devotee too left the house to deal with some business. He confided the baby to a weasel, who used to live along with them. When the devotee left, a large snake approached the cradle, but the weasel attacked it and killed it, breaking it into pieces. The weasel came out in the direction of the first parent who was returning home, but when the latter saw the weasel covered with blood running to him/her, he/she did not think twice and killed it. When he/she entered the house and saw his/her son resting safely in the cradle with the dead snake besides him, the parent was taken by immense regret and started lamenting, realizing his/her action. The other parent came back but in all cases, the husband was the one blamed for what happened, because of his endless greed.

The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air

A Brahman/devotee was living close to a merchant who was acquiring lots of gains with the selling of goods. He had decided to fulfill the daily needs of the devotee to thank him for his time and precious company. As time passed, the devotee placed the rest of those goods in a pitcher that he placed over his bed. One day he was looking at the pitcher and started thinking about all what he could acquire by selling its content. And what he would do with this money, starting with a couple of goats and ending up with herds of animals and lots of money. He would then buy a house and get a wife and have a son to whom he would teach good manners. But as

his son might sometimes be disobedient, he might have to give some corrections to him or his mother. And while he was thinking so, he took his stick and hit the air, reaching the pitcher, which broke, and the devotee was covered all over with its contents.

Comparison of the fable between Kāshefī and ʿAbbāsī's versions[55]

Kāshefī's version offers the opportunity to see how a chapter opens with the King Dābishlīm asking questions to the Brahman Bīdpāī, and in this case asking a story about someone acting hastily in his tasks, without deliberation and reflection. The Brahman mentions that the most praiseworthy qualities God conferred to mankind are the "ornament of kindness and the virtue of sedateness", and that "hastiness has no connection with men of wisdom". Among many histories and anecdotes he would have to illustrate such a case, the Brahman chooses the story of the devotee, who killed the innocent weasel. And the King asks: "How was that?" (*che gūne būde ast ān*?)"

The first story of the chapter introduces the devotee, who is looking for a wife and asks for advice from other devotees. The questions go from what kind of woman he should elect, basically one who would love him and give him numerous offspring, to more detailed ones concerning the ideal age, between ten and twenty, and the beauty, better to have an ugly but virtuous woman than the opposite, having both resembling "light upon light". It happened that the devotee was lucky enough to not only get a beautiful wife but also of perfect nature. After some time he started being impatient to have an offspring. His prayers were finally answered and his wife became pregnant. The devotee immediately started figuring out the best future possible for his son and his own offspring, when his wife interrupted him and brought him back to reality and common sense. She stated that she had not even given birth yet, and if she even did, it might

[55] See Kāshefī/Ouseley 348-352 ; Wollaston 316-320 and ʿAbbāsī/Chand 361-362 and 381-382.

be a girl and the baby might not necessarily have the chance to grow up and live, and added that her husband's words made her remember the story of the "Holy man who split honey and oil upon his face and hair", to which the devotee answered: "*che gūne būde ast ān*?"

We saw that in Kāshefī's version, "The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air" precedes and includes "The Story of the Braham and the Ichneumon". The story tells about the merchant, who had decided to provide the holy man with daily needs of honey and oil as a sign of gratefulness towards his exemplary life style and "guileless heart" (*dil-i bighel*) and for his own reputation as well. Wollaston here again translates *ghel* as guile.[56] I do agree that guile fits better here, in the sense that this holy man does seem to be granted with enough intelligence (*'aql*) to be able to use a minimum of guile. The details on the holy man's dream about what all he could acquire with those deeds are not relevant here. The increasing graduation of those imaginary acquisitions until he gets a house, a wife and a son, however, indicates the high level of his greed, which leaves no doubt in both versions. In Kāshefī's version, the holy man thinks of correcting his own disobedient son when he kicks the pitcher and gets the honey and oil all spread over his body. And his wife explains why she told him this story. The devotee acquiesces and welcomes this advice. Then the day came when the devotee's wife gave birth to a son. The devotee was so enchanted by his son's beauty that without surprise, he started fantasizing about a grandiloquent future for him. And here comes the story about the weasel here above summarized. What is important to mention is that the weasel is here referred to with a human pronoun *ū* like the other animal beings in the first fable, and Wollaston attributes it a masculine gender referring to it as "he". In Kāshefī's version the devotee "would not have had the choice to refuse, or be late, to leave the house" (*be hīch no' darān tā'khīrī mumkin nabūd*). It is thanks to "the blessing of the weasel's protection" *(be barakat-i muhāfaẓate-i ū)* that the baby remained

[56] See p. 71.

safe. Then it is the devotee who returns home first and when he sees the weasel "wallowing in blood" (*dar khūn ghalṭīde)*, he is taken by the "flame of anger" *(shu'le-yi ghaẓab)* in his heart and "the smoke of rashness" *(mushta'al gashte dūd-i sabuksārī)* in his brain, and "his reason, owing to the darkness of the smoke of precipitation" *('aql-i ū az tīragī dukhān-i khafat)*, and wrongly kills the weasel. When he realizes his terrible mistake, "the smoke of regret issued from his heart" *(dūd-i ḥasrat)* catches him and he starts lamenting and beating his chest out of pain and remorse. There follows a long lament of grief and self-blaming in which he actually reflects on his being too "empathic and fond" (*usn wa ulfat*) of his son as an explanation for his hastiness in not thinking twice and impulsively killing the weasel, the "defender" (*pāsbān*) of his house and "protector" (*negahbān)* of his son. His wife came in as well and once she grasped what had happened, she immediately blamed him: "I never knew you thus unkind" *(torā hargez nadānestam bedīn nāmehrbānī-hā)*, loading him with heavy reproaches until the devotee asks her to stop. She finally agrees as "no benefit will accrue from reproach*"(hālā az malāmat hīch fāide hāṣel nīst),* concluding that he is in fact far from being the only person who fell into the miserable trap of a lack of consideration and unfounded hastiness. She mentions the King who killed his own hawk, thus introducing the following story, and her husband asks: "*che gūne būde ast ān?*"

In this version the devotee clearly bears the whole responsibility and blame, although it is explicitely mentioned that he was obliged to leave, which only lessens but certainly does not take off his responsibility. This idea of having been compelled to leave is also found in Ibn al-Muqaffa''s Arabic version.

In ʿAbbāsī's translation, the situation is very different. The reader is taken into "The Story of the Brahman and the Ichneumon" by some judges at the end of the first frame story of

"The Merchant and the Barber" and not by the wife of the devotee, which changes the gender point of view. The barber had wrongly killed some beggars thinking they would turn into gold, a scene he had witnessed at the merchant's house, but without carefully examining its exact circumstances. The judges, who sentence him, claim that one should not act without a thorough examination, just like the Brahman's wife because of the weasel. To which the Merchant responds: "*che gūne būde ast?"*

ʿAbbāsī here keeps the exact Sanskrit name of the Brahman, *Devaśarmā* ("he whose refuge is God"). But then it is specified that his wife gave birth not only to a son but also to a weasel, educating and feeding both of them with her milk. However, she thought that the weasel might cause some damage to her son, without specifying why in ʿAbbāsī's text (because it belongs to a "malevolent species" in the Sanskrit one: *duṣṭajāti*). She simply "did not trust it" (*iʻtimād bar ān nemī kard*). Therefore, when she leaves to look for some water, she specifically asks: "the baby should be protected from the weasel" (*wāqif bāshad ke īn ṭifl rā az īn rāsū āsībī narasad*). We can note *en passant* thatʿAbbāsī uses the Arabic word *ṭifl* for child instead of *bacheh, kūdak, farzand or pesar*, just as in the case of *fīl* in the first fable). The devotee leaves to go begging of his own choice, and is not summoned by a King's envoy like in Kāshefī's version. Then when the snake approaches the cradle, the weasel sees it as its "natural enemy" (*rāsū ke bā ṭabʻ dushman-i mār ast*). After it kills the snake and goes outside to show his great effort, its mouth full of blood, it is the Brahman's wife who comes back home first and taken "by the sadness in her heart" (*az ghusṣe-yi dilash*), "without any consideration" (*bī ta'amul*) kills it with the pitcher of water that she brought back. The Brahman's wife is then the one lamenting and crying over her terrible act. But when the Brahman comes back, she still blames him for what happened, as he did not respect her words, and just went out "wandering around to beg" (*gadāyī*

kardan; *gadā* as an adjective meaning greedy), causing the death of their child (*farzand*; *farzand* could be either feminine or masculine). Then the Brahman's wife finishes with a saying: "one should not be too greedy and avid, but one should not renounce to desire, a wheel (Cakra) turns over the head of the one who is dominated by greediness and avidity" (*ḥirṣ wa ṭam'-i besyār nabāyyad kard, bī ṭam' ham natavān būd. Che az ḥirṣ wa ṭam'-i besyār Cakra dar sar-i ṭāmi' mīgardad"*), thus introducing the following story of "The Four Treasure Seekers", which will be the frame story of the following ones.

We have to read five stories before reaching "The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air", following the one of "The Weaver *Mantahar*" (*Mantharaka* in Sanskrit), who actually lost his life out of greed and avidity. The main protagonist of the story of the "Four Treasure Seekers", the Brahman with the Cakra wheel over his head, tells his companion that anyone who pictures himself in some unrealistic plan, will remain white just as the father of *Sōmasharmā*, to which the companion asks in return: "*che gūne būde ast?"*

In ʿAbbāsī's version, the story tells that a Brahman named *Kṛpaṇa*, meaning greedy (*Svabhāvakṛpaṇa*, greedy by nature in Sanskrit), had placed a pitcher with the rest of flour that he was receiving from begging and that he had not eaten. The content of the pitcher has changed but it is rather the word used by ʿAbbāsī, which is interesting here: *talqān,* means flour but also a mix of ingredients, liver and almonds, that some of ascetics of India used to eat.[57] Like in Kāshefī's version, but with slight differences concerning the items and animals he would get out of the selling of the pitcher's content, he goes on up to imagining that the son he would eventually have and name *Sōmasharmā* (a Sanskrit name *Somaśarmā* meaning "he whose refuge is *Soma*"), would one day be crawling towards the horses, while *Kṛpaṇa* would then tell his wife "take your son" *(īn ṭifl rā bar gir),* but busy with home duties, she would not hear her husband's

[57] Borhan-i Qate', 1651.

saying and he would then have to kick her. And while thinking so, he hits the pitcher, which breaks, and he finds himself all white covered with flour.

The Brahman in the frame story repeats to his companion that he told him this story, as anyone who imagines unrealistic plans will be laughed at. His companion agrees and recites the following saying: "Anyone acting out of greed without considering its detriment will fall into disgrace like the King Candra" (*kasi ke az ḥirṣ shuruʿ dar kari konad wa ziyān kārī ān rā mulaḥaẓe nanamāyad, hāl-i ū be faẓīḥat keshad*). And the Brahman with the wheel over his head asked: "*che gūne būde ast*?"

Main highlights between the two versions

In terms of content and structure, the very different embeddings between both versions of the concerned fables here, "The Brahman and the Ichneumon" and "The Brahman who builds Castles in the Air", actually changes the narrator's point of view and the reader's reception, which becomes a male one in ʿAbbāsī's version through various male protagonists, versus a female one in Kāshefī's text, namely the devotee's wife.

The world depicted in the *Pañcatantra* in nearly exclusively a man's world and women, when they appear, are generally not granted a very positive image. This is rather obvious in the *Pañcākhyāna*'s second fable with some variations between the two versions: In Kāshefi's version, it is the Brahman's wife, who tells and introduces the story. She holds a more prominent and slightly more positive role than in ʿAbbāsī's. Of course the advice of the devotee on the choice of women preceding the fable somehow negatively alters the image of women, but it still remains slightly less worse than in ʿAbbāsī's version. In this latter version, although it is the Brahman's wife who kills the weasel, she still blames her husband for it, and it is still her who is

supposed to receive the kick of her husband, even if only in his dreams. The fact that women do not generally hold a central role in the stories also reflects a social reality and possible reminiscence of the bad opinion of women in both contexts and traditions of ancient India and Islamicate world since the Abbasids, and especially whenever feminine guile is perceived as negative as mentioned earlier in the first fable regarding the hare's gender. Those differences are the most striking ones between both versions, showing linguistic guile towards the reader, but not internally to the story itself.

But another difference appears with regards to the weasel and the snake, which concerns content and form at once. Although the main actors are human beings in this fable, animals still play an important role. No physical description of the weasel is given in both versions, but Kāshefī's version focuses on its qualities such as trust and courage in repelling noxious and vicious animals, whereas ʿAbbāsī's one rather mentions the lack of trust towards the weasel despite its great faithfulness at the end. The snake approaching the cradle is described in more details in Kāshefī's version, making it very visible and threatening "large, dart-natured armor-clad, fierce-angered, hatred-seeking, like the letter Alif" (*mārī buzurg, nīze ṣifat jūshane pūsh wa tīz-khashm kīne-kūsh mānande alifī)*, adding stylistic suspense to the story and for the reader, while ʿAbbāsī merely specifies the natural enmity between the weasel and the snake. In this version, the tension between birth constraints and education comes to light again. Although the weasel would not be trustworthy (due to its nature as we know from the Sanskrit hypotext), the fact that the mother educated it (*tarbīb mīkard*) visibly made it a very generous and faithful companion.

One common point is that in both fables and versions one must admit that Brahmans and devotees look more like greedy personages rather than examples of good conduct or

renouncement of all kinds of desire. There is an aspect of an anti-Brahman pamphlet in the *Pañcatantra*, Brahmans being subject to criticism or sarcasm in the fables where a human being's presence prevails. In "The Story of the Brahman and the Ichneumon", the Brahman does not hesitate to leave, whether under pressure or not, his son to go begging and in "The Story of the Brahman who builds Castles in the Air", it is the envy of acquiring goods which provokes the Brahman s dreams and loss. As far as religious elements are concerned, we can note that the name of Allah only appears once in Kāshefī's text, in an Arabic citation: *mā ṣabrak illā billāhi*, that Wollaston translated as "you have no patience save from God", you cannot get patience but from Allah. No mention of Allah or any God at all appears in ʿAbbāsī's version here.

In terms of style now, the same linguistic tricks as in "The Story of the Elephant, the Hare and the Moon" are used to humanize animals. Wollaston gives the weasel a masculine gender in his translation. Given the highly ethical and heroic behavior of the weasel, this might not be totally hazardous, thinking of *jawānmardī* features prevailing in Kāshefī's time. In ʿAbbāsī's text, we find *farzand*, which could be either feminine or masculine, but the Sanskrit version clearly specifies that the weasel was a son (*putra*) and not a daughter.

How do those variations in content and form between the two versions, interfere with either ethics or guile? The most striking ethical character is the one of the weasel. Of course the weasel must also show some tactical guile in order to approach the snake and kill it on time. Its unfair death moves the reader not only because it is unjust but also because we can relate to it through its linguistic humanization. The reader feels sorrow towards such a brave being, which ends up killed despite his irreproachable behavior. This tragic end also unveils the possibility of being killed despite good services provided by any subject at the court of the King or Sultan for example. And this is common to both versions.

The tension between birth and education more visible in ʿAbbāsī's version would obviously be subject to a discussion around ethics and prejudice for today's reader, still depending on his cultural and educational background.

Finally, Kāshefī's version tends to focus on hastiness and ʿAbbāsī's one on greed as reasons for disastrous results. One can wonder whether precipitateness and lack of consideration prove an absence of ethics. I believe that lack of ethics is rather a potential result than a reason for irrational hastiness even if in this case excess of envy can be perceived as an unethical behavior. But as it is concluded in ʿAbbāsī's version, everything is a matter of measure and moderation. Being greedy differs from being patient or not, which would come from God only according to Kāshefī's version and could be subject to another debate.

Part Three: Conclusion

Now that we grasped the variations between similar stories in the two versions with regards to ethics and guile, let us consider the variations between the fables themselves with the same focus.

The dosage of ethics and guile varies in both fables. This is due to their content but also as we saw to the different narrative style of the two authors concerned here, Kāshefī and ʿAbbāsī. The contrast is particularly revealing between Kāshefī very ornate style in his preface as well as in the fables and ʿAbbāsī's much more sober one in his preface and definitely simpler in his translation. ʿAbbāsī also ostensibly avoids excessive use of Arabic. The words we find are the commonly used ones in Persian. However greatly faithful he was towards his hypotext, he still pondered the metaphors we find in the Sanskrit text, mainly in the first fable, may be in order not to confuse the reader in its perception of the target meaning. Here we shall keep those

differences aside and focus on the different orientation of ethics and guile between the two fables. In the first fable of "The Elephant, the Hare and the Moon", the use of guile through *'aql* is more obvious than in the second one, "The Brahman and the Ichneumon/The Brahman who builds Castles in the Air", in which ethics tends to prevails. Through those fables we witness that *'aql* appeared as an intelligence oriented towards action, whereas *qalb* as another type of intelligence oriented towards reflection, sensation and feeling.

In the first fable, the attention is driven towards the envoy in both versions although his qualities are there to reflect on the ones of the King. Still we mostly see the importance of the choice of those envoys and of the use of cunning and intelligence (*'aql*) to overcome one's enemies in appearance more powerful. This aspect might be even more explicitly and pragmatically expressed in ʿAbbāsī's version, which reminds one of the *nīti* tradition and the fact that the art of politics is mainly to know how to rationally navigate circumstances at all times. The orientation of guile in this fable is both internal (towards the King of Elephants) and external (towards the reader). The Hare knew very well how to trap the King of Elephants. It is particularly striking in ʿAbbāsī's version to see how easy this was for the Hare, who had to deploy even less efforts than in Kāshefī's one to trap the King in his trick. This means that being skillful or guileful also implies the capacity to put oneself in others' situations and to understand the world, and to be able to anticipate others' reactions. And this in turns basically appeals to the capacity of empathy linked to the usage of wonder as a convincing and guileful tool in this case. In both versions the King of Elephants looks like pitiful, brainless and naïve, the King in ʿAbbāsī's version even calling for brotherhood between him and the Hare. One can hardly contest those points, but it has to be mentioned that Elephants do not seem to have any bad

intentions. They rather bear the consequences of their natural, physical dispositions. This said, the King of Hares does not look any better. What would he do without the advice of his envoy?

On one side we have a hare and on the other a weasel, which both save their people at the end of the day, one through the use of guile and the other of ethics, even before instinct, notably towards the snake. In both cases a sensation of *ta'ajjub* operates on the actors of the stories as well as on the reader. But the feeling of *gharīb* linked to their animal *jins* and their capacity of talking or feeling is not enough to evoke this sensation. It is rather the reader's self-identification to the various and fine degrees of tactical guile and ethical awareness, which creates it. In the first fable, it is very obvious that *ta'ajjub* comes from the surprise and fear of the King of Elephants. As a consequence of guile, it somehow acts as the symptom of the power of *'aql*. Power is often assimilated to physical strength as a principle. The hare does not deviate from this principle as he chooses to address the King of Elephants from a height and evokes a superior instance, the Moon, to support his arguments, which works rather well. As we saw in the *Shāhnāmah* in chapter four, guile in the form of deceit can be a scheme to defeat a stronger enemy.[58] The difference here is that guile is not perceived as such by the King of Elephants, so that he does not become angry at the Hare. Here guile is a quality instigating some kind of admiration or inspiration to the reader. Using guile, the Hare saves his people without harming the enemies, for whom the reader keeps the hope that they would still be able to find some water elsewhere.

In the second fable, we are immediately moved by the genuine qualities of the weasel, which appeals to the heart as much as a high sense of ethics. The fact that the weasel was raised like a son somehow compensates, in the process of identification of the reader, for its inability to talk. It is the protector and the savor of another being, furthermore a human one, and one

[58] See p.51

forgives and even thanks him for killing the snake, often considered as a natural enemy. Therefore, the guile is essentially externally oriented towards the readers via its ethical content.

There is another interesting link between the fables, with regards to the importance of thinking carefully before acting. In the first fable, the King of Hares in Kāshefī's version mentions that: "to put our intentions into execution before deliberation has taken place is not the nature of wise prosperous persons". Later on the King of Elephants in ʿAbbāsī's version takes some time to reflect before deciding to go to the Lake of the Moon (*laḥẓe-hā-yi dar khod furū raft*). In the case of the King of Hares this is linked to the need of elaborating a proper strategy and in the case of the King of Elephants to the induced fear of avoiding further disaster, but in both cases avidity does not interfere.

There is also one crucial aspect, or rather another external guileful trick, which remains stable in all versions and concerns the textual context of the fables: the verse or proverb placed to introduce them is often just obscure enough to make it first impossible to understand. This awakens the curiosity of the reader, implicit and real, who spontaneously internalizes the common answer to this allusion: "*īn che gūne būde ast*?" ("*kayfa kāna z̲ālika*?" in Arabic and "*katham etat*" in Sanskrit). That means that whatever fable the reader picks, he is caught to read, if not what precedes it, at the very least what follows it.

Conclusion: outcomes and avenues for further research

We have witnessed that rewriting, or translating political ethics texts, does not only occur between different languages, but also within the same language in different periods of time and, more importantly, between human beings and according to the author and the reader's choices, constraints and own self, socially unconscious or not.

In this thesis, I have tried to rehabilitate guile as a complementary aspect of ethics. In this perspective, we have seen that traces of a secular *nīti* tradition are still clearly visible in Kāshefī's *Anwār-i Suhaylī,* even if they are somewhat blurred by an elaborate and florid style. Rather than a moralistic kernel, I would argue for a quite pragmatic one, mirrored by the reconciliation between *nīti* and *akhlāq*, as well as guile and ethics. Those fables were able to elegantly transmit this complex human insight throughout the centuries, cultures and politics, whether through a self-identification process or using arts as a strategy to legitimize one's power.

Therefore, despite the multiple changes in the form and even content, what remained constant in the *Pañcatantra*'s circulation lies in its transmimetic nature, its kaleidoscopic pragmatic kernel and its purpose to "preserve the memory of the kings" (Meisami in Marroun 527) through intertextual dialogism.

Ta'ajjub and aesthetic pleasure are shared aspects in all fables and refer to content as well as form. Both fables equally demonstrated the central role of *taʿajjub* in the reception of ethics or guile and their reflection on either *qalb* or *ʿaql* and contributed to the understanding of frankness in indirect speech. It was concluded that *ra'y* might be the most realistic way to show that the essence of ethics and guile is a continuous process of self-redefinition.

While it is always interesting to wonder about the various uses of words, stories and fables were here similarly able to put wonder on stage and in that sense capable of expressing the

collective unconscious of the audience and readership. We have seen concrete examples in the two fables, which show how much intention is at stake in this process, and how important it is to examine each reality according to a plurality of points of view. Likewise each rewriting of the *Pañcatantra* should be studied with such an open approach.

The exposure to fables offers a privileged aesthetic experience capable of enhancing our rational, emotive and perceptive faculties through imagination. Once we begin imagining, questioning and learning through metaphors, we allow emotions, reason, feelings and intellect to take hold of one another and inform each other: "through the act of being astonished, humankind begins to philosophize" according to Aristotle.[59] And it is the imagination that allows empathy and enables ethical or guileful responses. If wonder is thus a valid part of our knowledge experiences, allegorical discourse also reminds us of the essential communicative function of fables, which ultimately unveils how we treat others and how we want to be treated.

This being said, I believe that there are many areas for further research on ethics and guile in the *Pañcatantra* beyond the field of comparative literature, such as political science, education, philosophy, Sufism and medicine, thinking of Zargar's contribution to the fascinating links between ethics and human humors, and neuropsychology on the zones in the brain activated by either guile or ethics, just to name a few of them. Variations between verstions with regard to gender could also be further studied. Focusing here on the field of comparative literature and philology, I would say that ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* deserves more attention, starting with a full translation of it into a language other than Persian. Admittedly, ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* is definitely a far more easily accessible book to students of Persian language and literature at an early stage of learning, compared to the *Anvār*, which requires a more advanced

[59] Zadeh "Magic, Marvel, and Miracle in Early Islamic Thought" 245.

level. A comparative study could also be pursued between ʿAbbāsī's *Pañcākhyāna* and Abū l-Faḍlʿ*Iyār-i Dānish* published in Urdu. This latter version is a simplified one of Kāshefī's text, perhaps rendering it closer in style to ʿAbbāsī's version and leaving even more room to *nīti* traces. Finally, but not exhaustively, the Arabic *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* manuscript, dated to the 17th century and held in the Rare Books Collection at McGill University, could be the object of another thesis in the light of prior comparative researches in this cycle of stories.

In his wrongly disregarded preface, Kāshefī beautifully mentions that until this book reached Khusraw Nūshīrwān, it used to be like a pearl of Badakhshān, hiding its face "from the bottom of the mine save after a thousand agonies" (*chūn laʿal-i badakhshān az ṣamīm-i kān juz be hezār khūn-i jegar chahre na namūdī*).[60] I only wish this pearl to remain visible for the sake of more humanity is this world and be carefully shared and studied among faculties and departments.

ʿAbbāsī concluded himself on behalf of the savants: "anyone who reads this book will go to Paradise" (*kasānīke be muṭālaʿe īn kitāb mī pardāzand be behesht khwāhand raft*)[61], or as nuanced by one of my Afghan colleagues in Mazar: "anyone who studies this book, will manage better in life."

In all cases, I am grateful to Kāshefī and ʻAbbasī for their courage, effort and generosity which have allowed us to access their unique and remarkable recasting and translation of the *Pañcatantra*.

[60] Kaāshefiī/Ouseley 6; Wollaston 6.
[61] ʿAbbāsī/Chand 393-394.

Bibliography

Al-Azmeh, Aziz. *Islams and Modernities*. London: Verso, 2009.

Alam, Muzaffar. "State Building under the Mughals: Religion, Culture and Politics." *Cahiers d'Asie centrale,* No. 3-4 (1997): 105-128.

Allen, Graham. *Intertextuality*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.

Audebert, Claude France. "La condition humaine d'après Kalila wa Dimna." *C.F Arabica,* Vol. 46, No. 3 (1999): 287-312.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004.

Bassnett, Susan. *Comparative Literature: A Critical Introduction.* Oxford UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.

Benfey, Theodor. *Pantshcatantra, fünf Bücher indisher Fabeln, Märchen and Erzählungen.* Leipzig: Brodhaus, 1859.

Benouniche, Leïla. *Le Kalila et Dimna de Genève: histoire d'un recueil de fables illustré.* Genève: Slatkine, 1995.

Blaydes, Lisa, Justin Grimmer and Alison McQueen. *Mirrors for Princes and Sultans: Advice on the Art of Governance in the Medieval Christian and Islamic Worlds.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014.

Clinton, Jerome W. "The Uses of Guile in the Shāhnāmah." *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 32, No. 2 (1999): 223-230.

Cohen, Ralph. "History and Genre." *New Literary History,* Vol. 17, No. 2 (1986): 203–218.

Darling, Linda T. "Mirrors for Princes in Europe and the Middle East: A case of Historiographical Incommensurability." In *East Meets West in the Middle Ages and Early*

Modern Times: Transcultural experiences in the premodern world. Ed. Albrecht Classen. Boston: De Gruyten, 2013 (Chap I).

de Blois, François. *Burzōy's voyage to India and the Origin of the Book of Kalīlah wa Dimnah.* London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1990 (Chap VII).

Eastwick, Edward B. *Anwār i-Suhaylī, or the Lights of Canopus, Rendered into Persian by Husayn Vaʿiz-i Kashifi.* 1st ed. 1854, Hertford: Elibron Classics, 2005.

Edgerton, Franklin. *The Panchatantra Reconstructed, Volume 2, Introduction and Translation.* New Heaven Connecticut USA: American Oriental Society, 1924.

Ernst, Carl. W. "Muslim Studies of Hinduism? A Reconsideration of Arabic and Persian Translations from Indian Languages." *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 36, No. 2 (2003): 173-195.

Genette, Gérard. "Introduction à l'Architexte." In *Fiction et Diction*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2004.

---. *Narrative Discourse: An Essay on Method.* New York: Cornell University Press, 1983.

---. *Palimpsestes.* Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1982.

---. *Seuils.* Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1987.

Harris, Marvin. "History and Significance of the Emic/Etic Distinction". *Annual Review of Anthropology,* Vol. 5 (1976): 329-350.

Hertel, Johannes. *The Panchatantra, a Collection of ancient Hindu Tales in its recension, called Panchakhyanaka, and dated 1199 C.E, of the Jaina Monk Pūrnabhadra*, Vol 11. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harward University Press, 1908.

---. *The Panchatantra Text of Pūrnabhadra, critical introduction and list of variants,* Vol. 12. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harward University Press, 1912.

Ḥusayn Vā'iẓ Kāshifī Bayhaqī. *Kitāb-i Anvār-i Suhaylī; or, Lights of Canopus, being the Persian version of the fables of Bīdpāī.* Ed. Ouseley Joseph Walker. Hertford: East-India Co., 1851.

Ibn al-Muqaffa'. *Kalīla wa Dimna*. Preface by Muhammad al-Marṣafī 1912, Beyrouth: Librairie du Liban, 1994

Jameson, Fredric. *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic.* Act. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1981.

Jauss, Hans Robert. *Pour une esthétique de la réception*. Trans. Claude Maillard. Paris: Gallimard, 1978.

Kāmandaka. *Kāmandakīya Nītisāra, or The Elements of Polity.* Calcutta: Ed. Dutt, Manmatha Nath, 1896.

Kearns, Laura-Lee. "Subjects of Wonders: Toward an Aesthetics, Ethics, and Pedagogy of Wonder." *The Journal of Aesthetic Education,* Vol. 49, No. 1 (2015): 98-119.

Keshavmurthy, Prashant. Review of *Culture of Encounters: Sanskrit at the Mughal Court*, by Truschke, Audrey. *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 49, No. 2 (2017): 349-352.

Khan, Pasha M. "Marvellous Histories: Reading the Shahnamah in India." *Indian Economic & Social History Review,* Vol. 49, No. 4 (2012): 527-556.

Khawam, René R. *Le pouvoir et les intellectuels, ou les aventures de Kalīla et Dimna.* Paris: Editions G. -P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1985.

Kinra, Rajeev. "Handling Diversity with Absolute Civility: The Global Historical Legacy of Mughal Sulh-i Kull." *The Medieval History Journal,* Vol. 16 (2) (2014): 251-295.

Lancereau, Edouard. *Pañcatantra.* Paris: Gallimard, 1965.

Lefevere, André. *Translating Literature: Practice and Theory in a Comparative Literature Context.* New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1992.

Loewen, Arley: "Proper Conduct (Adab) Is Everything: The Futuwwat-nāmah-I Sulṭānī of Husayn Va'iz-I Khashifi." *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 36, No. 4 (2003): 543-570.

London, Jennifer. "How to do things with fables: Ibn al-Muqaffa's frank speech in stories from *Kalīla wa Dimna*." *History of Political Thoughts,* Vol. 29, No. 2 (2008): 189-212.

Marroum, Marianne. "Kalila wa Dimna: Inception, Appropriation, and Transmimesis." *Comparativve Literature Studies,* Vol. 48, No. 4 (2011): 512-540.

Meisami Scott, Julie. *Medieval Persian Court Poetry.* Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Milani, Farzaneh. "The Mediatory Guile of the Nanny in Persian Romance." *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 32, No. 2 (1999): 181-201.

Mitchell, Colin Paul. "To Preserve and Protect: Husayn Va'iz-i Kashifi and Perso-Islamic Chancellery Culture." *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 36, No. 4 (2003): 485-507.

Moin, A. Azfar. *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam.* New York, Chichester West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Mottahedeh Roy. "Ajā'ib in the Thousand and One Nights." In Richard G. Hovannisian and Georges Sabagh (eds.), *The Thousand and One Nights in Arabic Literature and Society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1997): 29-39.

Muṣṭafá Khāliqdād Hāshimī 'Abbāsī. *Pancākhyāna.* Tehran: Iqbāl, 1984.

Naṣr Allāh Munshī. *Tarjumah-'i Kalīlah va Dimnah.*Tihrān: Dānishgāh-i Ṭihrān, 1343 [1964 or 1965].

Olivelle, Patrick. *A Dharma Reader: Classical Indian Law.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.

---. *The Pañcatantra, The Book of India's Folk Wisdom.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

---. "Talking Animals: Explorations in an Indian Literary Genre." *Religions of South Asia,* No. 7 (2013): 14-26.

Pollock, Sheldon. "The Ends of Man at the End of Premodernity." *Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences,* (2005): 1-100.

---. *A Rasa Reader: Classical Indian Aesthetics.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.

Rao, Velcheru Narayanan and Sanjay Subrahmanyam. "An Elegy For Nīti: Politics as a Secular Discursive Field in the Indian Old Régime." *Common Knowledge, Duke University Press,* No. 14 (3) (2008): 396-423.

Rue, Loyal. *By the Grace of Guile: The Role of Deception in Natural History and Human Affairs.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Sela, Ron and Scott C. Levi. "Nizam al-Mulk: A Mirror for Princes" and "Qabus-nama: A Different Mirror for Princes." *Indiana University Press,* (2009): 92-100.

Schimmel, Annemarie. *Islam and The Wonders of Creation: The Animal Kingdom.* London: Al-Furqān Islamic Heritage Foundation, 2003.

Stallknecht, Newton P and Frenz Horst. *Comparative Literature: Method & Perspective.* Carbondale, Southern Illinois: University Press, 1971.

Subramanian, A.V. *The Aesthetics of Wonder, New Findings in Sanskrit Alaṅkāraśāstra.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.

Subtelny, Maria.E. "Husayn Va'iz-i Khashifi: Polymath, Popularizer, and Preserver." *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 36, No. 4 (2003): 463-467.

---. “A Late Medieval Persian Summa on Ethics: Kashifī’s Akhlāq-i Muḥsinī.” *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 36, No. 4 (2003): 601-614.

---. “To Preserve and Protect: Husayn Va’iz Kashifi and Perso-Islamic Chancellery Culture”. *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 36, No. 4 (2003): 485-507.

---. *Timurid in Transition: Turko-Persian Politics and Acculturation in Medieval Iran.* Leiden: Brill, 2007.

---. “The Timurid Legacy: A Reaffirmation and a Reassessment.” *Cahiers d’Asie Centrale,* No. 3-4 (1997): 9-19.

Tallis, Raymond. *In Defence of Wonder and other Philosophical Reflections.* Durham, UK: Acumen, 2012.

Todorov, Tzvetan. *Genres in Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Tötösy de Zepetneck, Steven and Tutun Mukherjee. *Companion to Comparative Literature, World Literature, and Comparative Cultural Studies.* New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Truschke, Audrey. *Culture of Encounters: Sanskrit at the Mughal Court.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.

Urvoy, Dominique. *Les penseurs libres dans l’Islam Classique.* Paris: Albin Michel, 1996.

Vadet, Jean-Claude. *Les idées morales dans l’Islam.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.

Van Ruymbeke, Christine. “Dimna’s Apologia in Kāshefī’s Anvār-e Suhaylī. Morality’s Place in the Corrupt Trial of a Rhetorical and Dialectical Genius.” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* Vol. 26 (2016): 549-583.

---. “The Kalīla wa Dimna and Rūmī: ‘That was the Husk and This Is the Kernel.” *Mawlana Rumi Review,* No. 4 (2013): 85-105.

---. *Kashefi’s Anvar-e Sohayli: Rewriting Kalila wa-Dimna in Timurid Herat.* Leiden: Brill, 2016.

---. “Kashefi’s Forgotten Masterpiece: Why Rediscover the Anvār-i Suhaylī.” *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2003): 571-588

---. “Murder in the Forest: Celebrating Rewritings and Misreadings of the Kalila-Dimna Tale of The Lion and the Hare.” *Studia Iranica*, Vol. 41 (2012): 203-254.

---. “What is it that Khusraw learns from the Kalīla-Dimna stories? A Key to the Treasure of the Hakim : Artistic and Humanistic Aspects of Niyami Ganjavi’s Khamsa.” *Leiden University Press,* (2011): 145-166.

Von Franz, Marie-Louise. *Interpretation of Fairy Tales.* Irving, Texas: Spring Publications, 1978.

Wollaston, Arthur N. *The Anwār-i-suhailī; or, Lights of Canopus, commonly known as Kalīlah and Damnah.* London: W.H.Allen & Col, 1877.

Zadeh, Travis. “Magic, Marvel and Miracle in Early Islamic Thought.” *Cambridge University Press,* (2015): 235-267.

---. *Mapping Frontiers Across Medieval Islam: Geography, Translation, and the ‘Abbāsid Empire.* New York: I.B.Tauris, 2011.

---. “The Wiles of Creation: Philosophy, Fiction, and the ‘Ajā’ib Tradition.” *Middle Eastern Literatures,* Vol. 13, No. 1 (2010): 21-48.

Zargar, Cyrus Ali. *The Polished Mirror: Storytelling and the Pursuit of Virtue in Islamic Philosophy and Sufism.* London: Oneworld Publications, 2018.