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THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONALIZING CANADIAN STATE IN A GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 1896-1911

by

Geraint B. Osborne

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the relationship between geopolitics and the emergence of a "nationalizing Canadian state" at the beginning of the twentieth century. Previous constitutional approaches and economic accounts are not sufficient to explain the emergence of a nationalizing Canadian state. All of these have been insightful, but like economic accounts of nationalism they ignore the larger realm of geopolitics. The literature on state formation has demonstrated that many factors stimulate state formation, but perhaps no other is as important as geopolitics. Geopolitics is concerned with diplomacy, arms, and territory. Such things are seldom discussed when writing about Canada. Canadians dislike being perceived as a military people. Yet geopolitical events have been central to the development of a distinct nationalizing Canadian state. During this period Canadian state elites took steps to gain further control of diplomacy, develop the military arm of the state so as to protect its sovereignty, and consolidate its territory. Additionally, all of these developments increased the scope of the state's functions. Moreover, under the leadership of Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier, the liberal nature of its regime meant that the national identity that began to develop had strong leanings towards civic nationalism. This thesis will attempt to integrate a sociological theory of nation-state building with the already established literature on the geopolitical relations between Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. Through the application of historical sociology, it illustrates the validity of exploring Canadian nation and state building in a geopolitical context and adds to the literature on state formation.

RESUME

Cette thèse se consacre à la relation entre la géopolitique et l'émergence d'un "Etat canadien nationalisateur" au début du XXième siècle. Les approches constitutionnelles et les analyses économiques antérieures ne semblent pas expliquer entièrement l'émergence de cet "Etat canadien nationalisateur". Ces travaux nous aident toutefois à mieux la comprendre, mais tout comme les analyses économiques du nationalisme, elles ignorent l'impact géopolitique. La littérature sur la formation de l'Etat a démontré que plusieurs facteurs y contribuent, mais aucun autre n'apparaît aussi important que la géopolitique. Celle-ci étudie l'interaction entre la diplomatie, l'armement et le territoire. On ne discute que très peu de ces aspects dans les ouvrages traitant du Canada. Il est généralement accepté que les Canadiens n'aiment pas être perçus comme un peuple militaire, cependant les événements géopolitiques ont joué un rôle prépondérant dans le développement d'un "Etat canadien nationalisateur" distinct. Durant cette période, l'élite du gouvernement canadien s'est affairée à acquérir un meilleur contrôle de la diplomatie et à développer l'aspect militaire de l'Etat pour protéger sa souveraineté et pour consolider son territoire. De plus, tous ces développements ont permis un élargissement des fonctions de l'Etat. Sous le leadership du premier ministre Wilfrid Laurier, la nature libérale du régime impliquait que l'identité nationale qui se développait possédait une grande tendance envers le nationalisme civique. Cette thèse tentera d'intégrer la théorie sociologique de la formation "nation-Etat" avec la littérature décrivant les relations diplomatiques entre le Canada, la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis. Grâce à l'utilisation de la sociologie historique cette thèse tentera de justifier l'étude du développement de la nation et de l'Etat canadien dans son contexte géopolitique et s'inscrit ainsi dans la littérature traitant de la formation de l'Etat.

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This thesis could not have been completed without the contributions of many people and institutions. From the Department of Sociology I was very fortunate to have Professors John A. Hall and Steve Rytina as thesis supervisors. Their patience, advice, interest, and confidence in my ability is very much appreciated. I am also grateful to Professor Desmond Morton of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada for his insights and suggestions.

Generous funding received from the Robert and Mary Stanfield Fellowship was also crucial to the completion of research during the summer months. A McGill Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research Grant made possible a trip to the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association's, 29th Annual Meeting at the University of Calgary, where I was able to present earlier versions of several chapters. Funding from the Centre of Canadian Studies at the University of Edinburgh allowed a similar trip to present at their 20th Anniversary Conference on Imperial Canada 1867-1917.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the secretaries of the Sociology Department for all their help in making the bureaucratic procedures a little easier to handle and a lot easier to laugh at. Similarly, the staff at the National Archives of Canada and the National Library of Canada were extremely helpful in advising how best to navigate their sometimes perplexing environment.

Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their faith and input during the last four years. In particular, to the Bernard family for making their home my home during my stay in Ottawa to work at the National Archives - merci beaucoup. A special thanks goes to Nathalie for all the emotional support that makes such endeavours a great deal easier to handle, especially during those times when I wasn't quite sure what I was doing.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE AND INTENT

The aim of this thesis is two-fold. First, it demonstrates how the changing geopolitical environment influenced the shape of Canadian state formation at the turn of the twentieth century. Second, it argues that this process of state building had specific consequences for an emerging Canadian national identity that was necessarily civic in nature. Rather than an exploration of popular expressions of nationalism, this thesis is a study of the state initiatives that helped promote Canadian autonomy and national identity. As such, it uses Brubaker's "nationalizing state" - an unfinished state with an ethnoculturally heterogeneous population - to refer to the Canadian state and nation during this time period.[1]

Canadian historians have extensively studied the Laurier years commenting on the economic, political, and military developments. Sociologists, however, have not. The preponderance of new literature on nationalism has paid little attention to Britain's former settlement colonies. These cases, with perhaps the exception of Ireland, do not conform to the patterns of nationalism in Europe, Africa, or South East Asia. These settlement colonies were loyal to the Empire but demanded that this loyalty should not imply subordination of their rights as free societies to determine their own destinies. They sought to reconcile the contradictory principles of nationalism and independence. As such, a sociological analysis of these cases, particularly Canada, can tell us much about state formation and its consequences for

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[1]Rogers Brubaker, **Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 63 and pp. 79-83.

national identity. This sociological analysis centres around two broad themes.

The first theme concerns the renewed interest in nationalism which has prompted thinkers to inquire about the processes of nation building. What has come out of this discussion is a theoretical dichotomy. One side of the argument stresses the historical experiences and memory of the people or nation while the other stresses the role of the state in the creation of national identity so as to strengthen the emerging nation-state. Nation-building is seen as a corollary of state building. This thesis positions itself within the latter strand of reasoning, although it recognizes the contribution of unmitigated history.

This being the case, this study will incorporate the formation of the Canadian nationalizing state in the context of Michael Mann's work on states, war, capitalism, and social power. For Mann, nineteenth century military power was subsumed into the "modern state," while capitalism continued to dramatically change the economy, thus making economic and political power sources of primary importance.[2] Ideological forces, particularly religion, were declining in their power significance and giving way to such modern ideologies concerning class and nations as liberalism, socialism, and nationalism. In accordance with Mann's work on the rise of classes and nations, this thesis demonstrates that the emergence of a modern Canadian nationalizing state was shaped by both economic and political power sources. Political power refers to state power. Domestically, states are "territorially centralized"; externally, states are concerned with geopolitics. Geopolitics is a particular concern in this thesis. It argues that Britain's withdrawal from empire and

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[2]Michael Mann, **The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and nation-States, 1760-1914**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 1.

the renewed commitment of the United States to its "Manifest Destiny" of continental hegemony, had a significant impact on Canadian state-building.

This leads to the second general theme of this thesis. As Hall has argued, "it is possible to occasionally distinguish moments in which one or other power source is the leading one, and when it sets the pace for others."[3] This thesis incorporates the work of Canadian historians who have attempted to explain how Canada as a nation-state came into existence. While their early focus has been primarily on constitutional and economic factors, this thesis argues that the geopolitical and military changes at the turn of the century greatly influenced the emergence of a distinct Canadian state. While economic factors were important they were in no way exclusive or primary. As such, it emphasizes the geopolitical and military developments that added impetus to the growth of the Canadian nationalizing state.

In sum, this thesis examines how the combined pressures of Britain's withdrawal from Empire and America's growing continentalism contributed to the formation of the Canadian nationalizing state. If one is to locate the emergence of a truly "Canadian" nationalizing state it is necessary to understand how different sources of social power interrelated in such a way that it made it possible to speak of a distinct Canadian state apparatus, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs. One of the traditional and salient features of a distinct nation-state is the assertion of an independent foreign policy and the associated development of an independent military force to defend the integrity of borders and, when necessary, the implementation of foreign policy

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[3]John A. Hall, **Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West**, London: Penguin, 1985, p. 22.

beyond those borders.[4]

With the intent of this thesis outlined, the remainder of it will be organized in seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature concerning states, nation-states, nation-building, and nationalism. Chapter Three will describe the specifics of the historical sociological approach that underpins this study. It reviews the scope and variance in existing historiography, emphasizing that more attention must be directed towards the geopolitical particularities of the time and the Laurier administration's overriding concerns with political autonomy and national unity. The next three chapters deal with the specific changes in the Canadian state as a result of its altered geopolitical situation. Chapter Four will examine the growth of Canada's treaty-making powers that was aided by the results of the Alaska boundary dispute. The development of Canadian military autonomy within an imperial context is the focus of Chapter Five. Chapter Six will review the measures taken to consolidate Canadian territory as well as the specific administrative elements that enable the state to better penetrate society. Chapter Seven examines the emergence of state initiatives that encouraged a distinct Canadian identity. Finally, Chapter Eight will generalize the conclusions.

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[4]Kalevi Holsti, **Peace and war: armed conflicts and international order, 1648-1989**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 NATIONS, STATES, AND NATIONALISM

The nation-state has become the norm for social organization. Its emergence has been the process of sorting out the territorial rights of communities in such a way that the possession of national property is legitimized. It is the devolution of empire, a renunciation of any rights to the territory from the outside. The community is slowly absolved of empire and members begin to consider themselves to be members of the same nation.[1] Nationality becomes the symbolic elaboration of the community's identity. If we are to understand the passage of a state into a nation-state and the consequences it has for national identity, it is necessary first to consider the origins of nationalism.

Much of the debate concerning the vast literature on nationalism centres around the idea of what constitutes a nation. Traditionally, a nation consists of a people, sharing a common language, inhabiting a fixed territory, with common customs and traditions, which may have become sufficiently conscious to take on the aspect of law, and who recognize common interests and a common need for a single system of rule. Definitions seem to agree that nations exist when a culture is *shared* by a given social group, but some would add that members of the social group must *recognize* each other as belonging to that culture.[2]

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[1]Istvan Hont, "The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: 'Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State' in Historical Perspective," **Political Studies**, XLII, 1994, p. 172.

[2]Boyd C. Shafer, **Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths**, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972; Ernest Gellner, **Nations and Nationalism**, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 7; and, Anthony Smith, **Nations and Nationalism**

For "primordialists," nation-states are just the modern political manifestations of cultures whose historical experiences are deeply embedded in the past. Yet romantic notions of nations existing in our primordial past underestimate the fluidity of cultural identity and overestimate the degree to which people would have been aware of such an identity. "Perennialists," such as Anthony Smith, adopt a less romantic version of the origins of nationalism, and stress the importance of understanding the genealogy of nationalism. Smith's modern nations are distinctive communities, consisting of distinctive features such as consolidated territory, common myths and history, a mass culture, an integrated economy, common legal rights and responsibilities and, most importantly, a claim to sovereignty. "Ethnies," on the other hand, were xenophobic, scattered, had no political consciousness, were economically localized, and were characterized by religious, legal, and class divisions. For Smith, the differences between the modern nation and the ethnie are of degree rather than kind, the historical record illustrates the existence of many such ethnic polities, and such ethnic identities are historically durable despite conquests and immigration.[3] The fundamental idea that modern nationalism is informed or shaped by pre-modern ethnies is undeniable, however, the extent of the authenticity of such ethnies can be questioned.

Clearly, nations are fluid; always changing, constantly redefining their cultural character and reflecting the influences of state designs that are deeply imbedded in their national identity and memory. National memory is shared by

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in a Global Era, New York: New York University Press, 1995, pp. 56-57.

[3]Anthony Smith, **National Identity**, London: Penguin, 1991, Chapter Two and his **Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, Chapter Three.

people who have never seen or heard of one another, yet who regard themselves as having a common history and heritage. It builds collective pride and purpose, but in so doing stresses distinctions between us and them. The notion of national identity depends on the idea of memory since the sense of sameness is sustained by remembering. Often, new memories require forgetting, a process Benedict Anderson describes as collective amnesia.[4] Indeed, it is important to note that since identities and memories are subjective representations of reality, they inevitably change over time. As political and social constructs, the relationship between identity and memory is historical, and therefore, both are subject to manipulation.[5]

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[4]Benedict Anderson, **Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism**, London: Verso, 1991, Chapter 11.

[5]John Gillis, "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship," in John Gillis, ed., **Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 3-5. For detailed discussions of social memory and identity see, Roy Wagner, **The Invention of Culture**, New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, 1975; E.J. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger eds., **The Invention of Tradition**, Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1984; Paul Connerton, **How Societies Remember**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; James Clifford, **The Predicament of Culture**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Wilbur Zelinsky, **Nation into State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism**, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988; Peter Sahlins, **Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989; Christopher Shaw and Malcolm Chase, **The Imagined Past: History and Nostalgia**, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989; James Fentress and Chris Wickham, **Social Memory**, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992; Jacques Le Goff, **History and Memory**, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Clamon, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992; Pierre Nora, **Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past: Conflicts and Divisions**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; David Lowenthal, **Possessed By The Past: The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History**, New York: Free Press, 1996; and Lyn Spillman, **Nation and Commemoration: Creating national identities in the United States and Australia**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

The idea that national identities and memories are constructed and reconstructed is not new. "Getting its history wrong is crucial for the creation of a nation," Renan comforted French nationalists in 1882.[6] More recently, Wagner argues that culture, which is an essential ingredient in the formation of national identities, does not have a fundamental character nor do they exist as natural objects within orderly temporal and spatial boundaries.[7] Hobsbawm and his collaborators discussed how national identities were constructed from "above" during the late nineteenth century.[8] Lowenthal has argued that the cult of heritage, through the use of exclusion, bias, error and mystification, not only consolidates history into a generalized past, but actually "improves the past to suit present needs."[9] This "predicament of culture" poses problems to nationalists who believe that identity is naturally given and not a symbolic construction of their own imagining.[10]

Up until the middle of the eighteenth century the idea of a people recognizing that they belong to a "nation" was inconceivable. Indeed, prior to the late nineteenth century, there was no state "bureaucracy of memory." The cultivation of a national identity required a way in which these local memories could be tied together to create a larger past identifiable to all. With the emergence of nation-states, elite memory - in the form of archives, monuments, holidays,

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[6]J.E. Renan, "What is a nation?" [1882], in Homi K. Bhabha, ed., **Nation and Narration**, London, 1990, pp. 8-22.

[7]Wagner, **The Invention of Culture.**

[8]E.J. Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions" in Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., **The Invention of Tradition**, pp. 263-80.

[9]Lowenthal, **Possessed By The Past...**, pp. 142-143.

[10]Clifford, **The Predicament of Culture.**

and commemorations - created a linear account of all that had happened in the past. In "nationalizing the landscape," state elites not only created a shared heritage or identity for new generations, but laid the foundations for a perfected nation-state on a "should have been past."[11] Indeed, "elite time colonized and helped construct the boundaries of territories that we have come to call nations."[12] National identity is the expression of a national consciousness that has been consolidated within the political framework of a centralized state.[13] In essence, before nationalism can exist, a national identity has to be constructed by the state.

Moreover, "modernists" have argued that nationalism requires adequate modern mass media to facilitate communication between its members. Ernest Gellner, elaborating on the work of Karl Deutsch,[14] is perhaps the best known of the modernists. There are two important points that can be drawn from his work. First, he argues that nations are not natural entities in which people are inevitable members, but that they are social constructions. For him, modern people "do not in general become nationalists from sentimentality,...they become nationalists through genuine, objective, practical necessity, however obscurely recognised."[15] A shared culture becomes an indispensable feature of a modern social system. In particular, nationalism is viewed as a product of social and industrial modernization. For him, the industrializing state creates nationalism in order to achieve the homogeneous

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[11]Zelinsky, **Nation into State...**, Chapter Five.

[12]Gillis, "Memory and Identity," p. 6.

[13]Sahlins, **Boundaries...**, p. 7.

[14]See among other works, Karl Deutsch, **Nationalism and Social Communication**, New York: MIT Press, 1966.

[15]Ernest Gellner, **Thought and Change**, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p. 160.

society the state requires to prosper:

> Nations, as a natural God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is a reality.[16]

Drawing on the work of Weber, Gellner's essential argument is that as agrarian society evolved into an industrialized one, the need increased for a citizenry that was literate, mobile, spoke a common language and held the same cultural values. Industrialized society is complex and requires a generically educated population that can move to perform functions necessary for the economy to operate successfully. Given the commitment to industrial society and to productive systems based on cumulative science and technology, no state can do without extensive division of labour, mobility, and innovation. These characteristics require a citizenry that has suitable rationalizing, orderly, efficient attitudes toward life. Nationalism, it appears, is the functional prerequisite for industrialization and modernity.

The second point to be drawn from Gellner is the importance of "blocked social mobility." Nationalism becomes divisive because of the "uneven diffusion" of industrialization or modernization. The uneven impact of the consecutive waves of industrialization and modernization creates a distinctive stratified society not conferred by custom, which is not easily politically regulated, but which is relieved by the possible option of "national" secession. The intelligentsia share cultural traits with a working class experiencing a series of humiliations in urban environments and discrimination in labour markets. The intelligentsia

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[16]Gellner, **Nations and Nationalism**, pp. 48-49.

provide the backbone for nationalist movements, especially when they experience blocked social mobility. Subsequently, they will seek to establish their own nation-state if they are not assimilated or treated fairly. Rather than an natural awakening to national distinctiveness, Gellner argues that nationalism "invents nations where they do not exist - but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if...these are purely negative."[17]

Therefore, national conflict is rooted in cultural heterogeneity, competition between differently or similarly educated peoples, and inequalities in access to political power. Conflict is most likely to occur "where ethnic (cultural or other diacritical marks) are visible and accentuate the differences in educational access and power", and "above all, when they inhibit the free flow of personnel across the loose lines of social stratification."[18] In sum, nationalist frictions are best explained by blocked social mobility tied to ethnic markers.

Gellner's work would influence the vast majority of materialist theories of nationalism, although their analyses emphasize the role of capitalism in producing "uneven development" and eroding traditional society with its religious legitimacy. In so doing, the transition to capitalism simultaneously creates discontent among significant elements of the population as well as the means and opportunities for new modes of communication, particularly print capitalism. Subsequently, intellectuals promote national awareness by not only exploring a culture, but selectively constructing symbols from the past to elicit new meanings. They thereby create a mass national movement that rallies

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[17]Gellner, **Thought and Change**, p. 168.

[18]Gellner, **Nations and Nationalism**, p. 96.

around an "imagined community."[19]

There are several criticisms that can be made of these materialist approaches to nationalism. Gellner's work has been described as being "single-minded economic functionalism."[20] For instance, with uneven development and core-periphery models of nationalism in mind, Hutchinson explains that a general explanation of the economic exploitation of peripheries or of relative deprivation is not valid "because movements for autonomy in Europe can begin amongst relatively wealthy populations such as the Basques and Catalans."[21] Similarly, Nairn has demonstrated that many nationalist conflicts, such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, "seem to go on reoccurring in predominantly rural situations."[22] Breuilly also criticizes economic explanations, arguing that nationalism "is too complex and varied to be understood as a

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[19]The literature associated with these ideas would include, Anderson, **Imagined Communities**, 1991; Michael Hecter, **Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975; Miroslav Hroch, **Social Preconditions of Nation Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations**, (trans. by Ben Fowkes) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; Eric Hobsbawm, **Nations and Nationalism since 1780**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; and, Tom Nairn, **The Break-up of Britain**, London: New Left Books, 1977.

[20]Perry Anderson, "Science, politics, disenchantment," in John A. Hall, and I., Jarvie, eds., **Transition to Modernity**, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992, p. 207. For a thorough review of Gellner's work on nationalism see, Brendan O'Leary, "On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism," in John A. Hall and I. Jarvie, eds., **The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner**, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996.

[21]John Hutchinson, **Modern Nationalism**, Fontana: London, 1994, p. 150.

[22]Tom Nairn, "The Curse of Rurality: Defects of Modernization Theory" in (forthcoming.)

reaction to a particular type of economic relationship or disparity which then triggers off counter-nationalisms from the dominating or more advanced societies."[23] Similarly, Mann argues that the historical evidence suggests that nationalism predates industrialization.[24] Nationalists themselves were largely unconcerned about classes or capitalism or industrialism. Mann points out that nationalism arose right across Europe amid different levels of capitalist and industrial development and that it is incorrect to "believe that nationalism is reducible to these forces."[25] The fundamental problem with Hroch's work is that he says little about the transition from cultural to political nationalism.[26] Moreover, he does little to explain nationalist movements in which there is no impetus by cultural intellectuals. While Gellner locates nationalism in the era of industrial society, he makes little effort to reconstruct the sequences, timing, or interdependence of the diverse surges of nation making.

Most importantly, materialist approaches limit their analysis of the state by focusing solely on its economic interests. It is usually given a secondary role as an ally of capitalist industrialism. But this ignores the fact that states, in addition to their interest in economics, have an interest in their geopolitical position of which importance is placed on deploying a monopoly over the means of violence and

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[23]John Breuilly, **Nationalism and the State**, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, p. 414.

[24]Michael Mann, "The emergence of modern European nationalism" in John A. Hall and Ian Jarvie, eds., **Transition to Modernity**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

[25]Michael Mann, **Sources of Social Power: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 244.

[26]John A., Hall, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained", **Daedalus**, Vol. 122, No. 3, 1993, p. 10.

coercion. The state certainly looks inwards to its national society, but it also looks outwards to other national societies. Indeed, its behaviour in one area is often explained by its activities in the other. Such prominence requires that the state be given central attention.

2.2 A STATE-CENTRED APPROACH

Previous explanations of nationalism pay too little attention to the role of the state in generating nationalism, or of the degree to which prior state-development creates a frame of national aspiration. In addition to being the most complex level of political system in the world, the modern state is also the most powerful. While not all states exhibit the same degree of internal cohesiveness, if they are to survive, they generally demand and receive the primary allegiance of their citizens. The state is the most involved form of political association and it profoundly affects almost every aspect of human enterprise.

Breuilly was one of the first to bring the state back into the analysis of nationalism. He argues that it is impossible to provide a general theory of nationalism as it is a form of politics shaped by the structure of the state system, used to pursue specific interests. Nationalism is a structural product of the modern state. It bridges the gap between the political and the apolitical, between state and society, by depicting the nation simultaneously as both a political and a cultural entity. For Breuilly, nationalism is fundamentally,

> ...above and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is principally about control of the state. The central task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power.[27]

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[27]Breuilly, **Nationalism and the State**, p. 1.

Despite his emphasis on separatism, Breuilly's emphasis on understanding nationalism as a form of politics grounded in a political context in which the modern state is the central structure has tremendous implications for understanding state-led nationalism. Unfortunately, Breuilly is vague in his analysis of the state. Nowhere does he attempt to detail what actually constitutes the state and how it wields its power over society. The literature that "brings the state back in" has considerable significance for discussions of nation-states and nationalism.[28]

There have been numerous theories of state formation that emphasize alternative factors. Some of the more prominent include Anderson's interest in the modes of economic production, Huntington's focus on internal political dynamics, Wallerstein's emphasis on the world system, Olson's work on collective rational choice, or Rokkan's analysis of geographic or cultural factors.[29] This literature is rich and

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[28]The "return of the state" literature began with Charles Tilly, ed., **The Formation of National States in Western Europe**, 1975, and Theda Skocpol's **States and Social Revolution**, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1979. It gained momentum with the work of Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., **Bringing the State Back In**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; John A. Hall, ed., **States in History**, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; John A. Hall, ed., **The State**, London: Routledge, 1993; Edward W. Lehman, "The Theory of the State Versus the State of the Theory", **American Sociological Review**, 53, 1988, pp. 818-821, and Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh "Comparative Perspective on the State", **Annual Review of Sociology**, 17, 1991, pp. 523-549. The work of Gianfranco Poggi is also useful. See his **The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978 and **The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.

[29]Perry Anderson, **Lineages of the Absolutist State**, London: Verso Press, 1979; Samuel Huntington, **Political Order in Changing Societies**, New Have: Yale, 1968; Immanuel Wallerstein, **The Modern World System**, 3 vols., New York: Academic Press, 1974-1988; Mancur Olson, **The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social**

generalizes across many locales and eras, although there is no agreement on all the conditions that stimulated state formation.

The statist approach which has grown from the insights of these theories focuses on the economic and political expansion of the state in a geopolitical environment. Statist explanations focus on how the nation was imposed and built from the centre outward forcing the integration of local identities and territory. National identity becomes the expression of cultural unity and national consciousness consolidated within the territorial reach of the centralized state. Where they differ is that state centred theories see the *geopolitical rivalry* between states as the *key impetus* for integration, rather than the economic and social demands for industrial modernization.

In contemporary discourse, the term state conveys a dual meaning, though the distinction between the two senses is often overlooked. First, in the traditional and vernacular usage, the state entails both a sovereign government and the geographically bounded territory, society, and population over which it controls. It consists of what Halliday refers to as "the national-territorial totality" or that which is indicated on a map.[30]

Second, in the contemporary "return of the state" school, the state is seen as "an apparatus of power," a set of institutions such as the central government, the armed forces, the regulatory and police agencies, whose most important functions involve the use of force to control territory and

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Rigidities, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982; and Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State-Formation and Nation-Building," in Charles Tilly, ed., **The Formation of National States in Western Europe**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

[30]Frank Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda", **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, 16, 1987, p. 217.

maintain internal order. This conception of the state is largely Germanic in origin, with its roots in the writing of Max Weber and Otto Hintze who focus on two distinctive elements in the history of the state; violence and territoriality.

Weber defined the state as "a compulsory association which organizes domination" and argued that its principal characteristic was its monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory.[31] Weber and Hintze emphasize how nation-states are in embattled relations with other nation-states rather than with armed segments of their own population. Weber saw geopolitics as the decisive feature in the creation and mobilization of political power.[32] Hintze stressed that states were primarily organized by "the structure of social classes" and "the external ordering of...states - their position to each other and their overall position in the world."[33] The term geopolitics has been in use for about a century, entering our lexicon precisely at the time Weber and Hintze were writing. Basically, geopolitics conceives geographical location as an important, and perhaps, major determinant of political identity, political thought, and political action, and sees nations as organisms struggling with each other for the occupancy of space.[34]

Several theorists have discussed the central role of geopolitics in the formation of states. Charles Tilly has

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[31]Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., **From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology**, Oxford University Press: New York, 1964, pp. 77-82.

[32]Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schulter, **Max Weber's Vision of History**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.

[33]Felix Gilbert, ed., **Historical Essays of Otto Hintze**, Oxford University Press: New York, 1975.

[34]Geopolitics will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

demonstrated that the Western European modern state has won out over other political rivals and has became the norm across Europe.[35] Tilly especially isolates geopolitical competition and the policies of elites as being the fundamental reasons for the rise of the state.[36] Theda Skocpol echoed these ideas by arguing that conflict between nations and the subsequent struggles between social classes at home, have a dramatic impact on the organization and power of states. The "shape" of the state is deeply rooted in the history of external events and conditions.[37] Anthony Giddens, building on the work of Michael Howard, argued that "it was war, and preparations for war, that provided the most potent energizing stimulus for the concentration of administrative resources and fiscal reorganization that characterized the rise of absolutism."[38]

Perhaps the most ambitious and comprehensive attempt to construct a coherent theory of the state that includes its territorial and coercive dimensions is that of Michael Mann. He concerns himself with the "despotic" power - the capacity

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[35]Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State Making," in Tilly, **The Formation of National States in Western Europe**, 1975. According to Tilly, this was due to Western Europe's isolated geopolitical position, its relative cultural homogeneity, its wealth through urbanization and trade, its social divisions of class, a decentralized political structure, and the perceived military and social superiority of the modern, centralized state, once it appeared.

[36]By elites, Tilly is referring to absolute monarchs and their ministers and generals who succeeded in defeating rival centres of power within and warding off external threats, so as to create a compact, centralized and fairly homogeneous state able to take advantage of the technological revolution sweeping Europe.

[37]Skocpol, **States and Social Revolutions...**

[38]Anthony Giddens, **The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, p. 112, and Michael Howard, **War in European History**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 55.

to dominate by physical force - and "infrastructural" power - the more subtle capacity to influence, shape and organize society by administrative means.[39] Mann provides a widely endorsed institutional definition of the state that is influenced greatly by Weber. For Mann,

> ...the state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force.[40]

Such a definition places emphasis on four particularities of states: diplomacy; arms; territory; and, state capacity. The latter involves elite persons, parties and institutions located at the centre and throughout state territories. In addition, states have geopolitical concerns because they inhabit a world of competing states.

The question of who determines state policy and initiatives is one of considerable debate. Borrowing from class, pluralist, and elitist theory, Mann argues that nineteenth century states are "polymorphous power networks" in that they consist of many diverse organized actors who determine domestic and foreign policy. Mann accepts the assertion of class theorists that modern states are capitalist and that politics are often dominated by class struggle. However, he rejects the notion that the capitalist class is "ultimately determining." Mann accepts pluralism's recognition of "multiple power actors, multiple state functions," and a move toward democracy and representation, although he rejects

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[39]For more detail see Mann, **The Sources of Social Power. Vol 2...**, Chapter Three. This is very similar to the work of Giddens, **The Nation-State and Violence**, Chapter Seven. He uses the terms "repressive" and "administrative" to convey the same functions.

[40]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power. Vol 2...**, p. 55.

any notion that views democracy as ultimately decisive. Mann agrees with elitists that central state personnel may constitute autonomous power actors. However, because Mann views states as more "muddled and less systematic" than these theories, he introduces "institutional statism" to his analysis. As such, he stresses that in order to understand states and appreciate their impact on societies it is necessary to detail their institutional particularities.[41] In nineteenth century capitalist states, domestic policy was dominated more by capitalism, representation, and national centralization; foreign policy remained more insulated and dominated by statesmen, military castes, nationalist parties, and pressure groups.

Nevertheless, the decision-making of state elites reflected both domestic and foreign concerns. This is similar to Robert Putnam's contention that previous theories on domestic and foreign politics have been lacking in that they overemphasize domestic or international politics.[42] For him, it is pointless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse, when both situations are clearly evident. Building on the work of Peter Katzenstein and Stephen Krasner, which focuses on "structural factors," Putnam offers an approach which recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and

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[41]This is similar to the contention that the state must be studied as a process of rule rather than a distinct set of institutions, organizations, buildings, and bureaux in the hands of one class for the domination of another. See P. Abrams, "Notes on the difficulty of studying the state," **Journal of Historical Sociology**, Vol. 1, 1989, pp. 58-59.

[42]Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games", **International Organization**, 42, 3, 1988, pp. 427-460.

international imperatives simultaneously.[43]

Putnam uses a two-level game analogy to describe international negotiations. At the national level, domestic groups pursuing their interests pressure the government to create favourable policies, and politicians maintain power by building coalitions among these groups. At the international level, national governments attempt to maximize their own ability to appease domestic pressures, while minimizing the detrimental consequences of foreign developments. Statesmen cannot ignore either of these games as long as their countries remain interdependent and sovereign.[44] Each national political leader is in the awkward position of playing both games with the realization that moves towards victory in one may signal defeat in the other. Such an approach recognizes that although statesmen are crucial in determining policy, they must be sensitive to classes, nationalist parties, and pressure groups who can mobilize opinion on the domestic front. Mann's focus on "institutional statism" is consistent with this approach.

With states and geopolitics in mind, Mann offers a "politically-driven" history of the emergence and development of nationalism in Europe.[45] Like Breuilly, he argues that nations and nationalism must be understood as a response to the modern state and consequently rejects the primordialist view as well as materialist explanations. In keeping with his earlier work, Mann views nations emerging "as all four sources

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[43]Peter Katzenstein, **Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe**, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1985; Stephen Krasner, **Structural Conflict**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

[44]Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics...," p. 434.

[45]Michael Mann, "A Political Theory of Nationalism and Its Excesses", in Sukumar Periwal, ed., **Notions of Nationalism**, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995.

of social power entwined."[46] He identifies five phases in which nationalism was developed: two proto-national phases (the religious and commercial-statist) and three national phases consisting of the militarist, the industrialist and the modernist.

The "protonationalist" phases arose in the "premodern" era and both are concerned with the emergence of discursive literacy, since "if ideologies are to spread they must be organized through specific channels of communication."[47] Literacy, promoted first by Protestantism and the Counter-Reformation and later by commercial capitalism and state modernization, provided the necessary infrastructure for culture to be more broadly shared. The expansion of literacy was promoted by business contracts, accounts and marketing methods, government records, army drill manuals, and coffee house discussions.[48] These two protonational processes eventually solidified local and regional communities.

In so doing, they made the advent of nations and nationalism possible as they took form during three phases which Mann labels militarist, industrial, and modernist. Out of these three phases, three different types of nations and nationalisms would emerge, differing in their size vis-à-vis

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[46]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power. Vol 2...**, p. 250. The four sources of social power referred to are ideological, economic, military, and political.

[47]Mann, "A Political Theory of Nationalism...," p. 45. This is similar to Anderson's discussion of print capitalism and McLuhan's assertion that books created a specialized way of thinking that led to the founding of nations. Indeed, national awareness is dependent upon a shared symbolic system capable of exchanging national imaginings. See Anderson, **Imagined Communities**, 1991, and Marshall McLuhan, **The Gutenburg Galaxy**, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1962.

[48]Mann, "A Political Theory of Nationalism...", p. 45, Mann, **The Sources of Social Power...Vol. 2**, pp. 215-6, Mann, "The emergence of modern European nationalism," pp. 162, 144, 147-150.

existing states and whether they were mobilized democratically or by authoritarian regimes.

According to Mann, British and French nations were coterminous with existing states as such the nation became state-reinforcing. In the Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires, nations proved smaller than state boundaries and they became state subverting. In the case of Germany and Italy, "nations" outnumbered the existing state. As such, the nation developed a state-creating role but as one state succeeded in encompassing the others, the nation then became state-reinforcing.[49] To understand why these nations developed in these varied forms, Mann argues that we must examine the role of the state in each of the three phases. The modernist phase occurs after the First World War and is beyond the scope of this thesis. As the militarist and industrial phases are of particular importance to this thesis, they will be examined in more detail.

i. Militarist Phase

In his examination of the militarist phase, Mann is essentially building on Tilly's classic axiom that "wars made states and states made war."[50] The resulting effect of the wars of the eighteenth century was the promotion of nationalism in the sense of popular identification with state goals and in the sense of resistance to demands for uniformity and cultural and linguistic integration. In particular, war became a homogenizing experience, as military personnel potentially represented the entire nation and even the civilian population endured common deprivations and

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[49]Mann, "A Political Theory of Nationalism...," p. 46.

[50]Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State Making," p. 42.

responsibilities.[51]

Essentially, during war states not only become more organized, more rational, more centralized in their war making efforts, but also in exerting power and authority in general.[52] This has a tremendous unifying effect that further integrates state and society. Porter too builds on Tilly's axiom when he argues that "the quickest way to make a nation is to make an army."[53] So does Gastony when he argues that between 1789 and 1945 national armies were looked upon with increasing reverence as "heroic protector[s] of the nation."[54] Moreover, national propaganda, educational programs, and national policies of modern states, reinforced military developments and further harnessed the greater collective power of nation-states. As such, nationalism developed in parallel with the rise of modern warfare and the modern state; from the beginning it was closely and

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[51]Charles Tilly, **Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992**, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992, p. 63 and p. 116.

[52]For instance, England under Cromwell was allegedly a republic, but in reality it was a military government permeated by military values and ordered by theocracy. Nevertheless, the revolution against Charles I and the Civil War that followed were the breeding ground for modern English nationalism. Garrisoned throughout the country and divested of aristocratic preference, the New Model Army became the most powerful and most modern organization in England, with a clear command structure, merit promotion, regular pay, uniforms and a national basis for recruitment. After their eventual restoration, the Stuarts inherited a more efficient taxation system, a rationalized administration, and the beginnings of a standing army organized along continental lines. The army that had destroyed the English monarchy had now become the main foundation of its national strength. See Bruce Porter, **War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics**, New York: Free Press, 1994, p. 82.

[53]Porter, **War and the Rise of the State...**, p. 18.

[54]Endre Gastony **The Ordeals of Nationalism in Modern Europe, 1789-1945**, Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992, pp. 101-135.

inextricably intertwined with both."[55] Mann elaborates on these ideas. Beginning in the sixteenth century, with the pressures of revolutionary military advances and continuing into the constant wars of the eighteenth century, the state's military activities began to affect the social realm.
This rise in military strength was echoed throughout western Europe. As Mann indicates, in 1700, European states increased their expenditures from around five percent of GNP in peacetime and 10 percent in wartime to 15-25 percent in 1760 and 25-35 percent in 1810. Virtually all the increases went to financing wars. During this militarist phase, states began to tax and conscript their subjects, while also attempting to enthuse in them an essential loyalty to the state. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the continuing fiscal-military pressures of geopolitical rivalry intensified the process. These rivalries were becoming increasingly more important to the lives of the people as taxpayers and as combatants. Subjects of the state began to demand political citizenship for "the people" and "the nation."[56]

With the Napoleonic Wars, the concept of the nation - and with it nationalism - was carried to all parts of Europe. In the turmoil that ensued, ancient principalities disappeared, modern states developed, nation-states emerged, and national passions were aroused. Nationalism emerged as a means to enhance state power over the individual. With that, nationalism entered the age of "realpolitik."[57] Policy was

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[55]Porter, **War and the Rise of the State...**, p. 122. An advanced sense of nationalism is displayed in Niccolo Machiavelli's **The Art of War**, New York: Da Capo, 1990, Book One, in his appeal for the formation of a national army, free of all mercenary influence, to liberate Italy from the invasion of foreign powers.

[56]Mann, "A Political Theory of Nationalism...", pp. 47-48.

[57]Hans Kohn, **Nationalism: Its Meaning and History**, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1965. pp. 54-64.

based on power and self-interest.

The Napoleonic Wars accounted for much of the state growth in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They absorbed between 31 to 43 percent of Britain's GNP, while the armed forces absorbed more than five percent of the population. This rivalry came to dominate politics, and politicise social life in Britain, "at least those with discursive literacy." This in turn meant that "nationalist sentiment focused on the British-French contrast which was becoming widely and overtly expressed."[58] As Colley has demonstrated, francophobia became a unifying factor, as "war with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into confrontation with an obviously hostile Other and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it." Therefore, nationalism became an "unusually fervent ideology" in that it synthesized patriotism, racism, and militarism. It became a unifying ideology contrasting "us" versus "them."[59]

Similarly, Mann argues that for Prussia, defeat at Jena in 1806, encouraged the first significant top-down, state-created national identity, producing a concept of "Germany" which would become more unitary and state-reinforcing.[60] Certainly, the Napoleonic wars motivated Herder's belief in a

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[58]Mann, "The emergence of modern European nationalism" pp. 162, 151, 153.

[59]Linda Colley, **Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, pp 5-6. Colley's work places primacy on the long succession of wars between Britain and France. While her assertion that "Protestantism lay at the core of British national identity," (p. 369) is questionable, her belief that British culture is "used to fighting and has largely defined itself through fighting" (p. 9) is quite undeniable. See also her earlier "Whose Nation? Class and National Consciousness in Britain, 1750-1830" in **Past and Present**, 13, 1986, pp. 97-117.

[60]Mann, "A Political Theory of Nationalism...," p. 51.

German *Volksgeist* and Fichte's aggressive chauvinistic nationalism that emphasized common language and education as key to national strength.[61]

For Mann, the militarist phase produced "state-reinforcing," "state-subverting," and "state-creating" nations. In state-reinforcing nations, such as Britain and France, the linguistic community was safely located within the state's territory and the emerging political nation aligned itself within state boundaries. In the pluralist Austrian, Russian, and Turkish empires, state-subverting nationalisms were much more likely due to their numerous languages, religions, and provinces. Reformers within these domains sought to strengthen regional political autonomies against the central state.[62] Had the Habsburgs, Romanovs, or the Ottomans dismantled their absolutism and developed some form of federalism, their domains may have survived. In Prussia-Germany, a state-creating nationalism was evident in that to defeat the French it was necessary to combine national sentiments to loyalty to a strong semi-authoritarian state. The industrialism of the mid-to-late nineteenth century would intensify all these forms of nationalism.

ii. Industrialist Phase

By the late nineteenth century, during the industrial phase, nationalism became more passionate and aggressive under the pressures of industrial capitalism. Nationalism became a general European movement in the nineteenth century, a century in which European civilization dominated and shaped the world. The "prophets" of nationalism, such as Mill, Acton, Michelet, Mazzini, Treitschke, and Dostoevsky, expressed and influenced the ideas of nationalism. Some of them placed emphasis on

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[61]Kohn, **Nationalism**..., pp. 30-32 and p. 36.

[62]Mann, "A Political Theory of Nationalism...," pp. 46-47.

civic dimensions of nationalism, while others expressed ethnic or cultural elements. The five great powers - England, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia - looked for the justification of their national heritage. By reinterpreting their past, nations strove to glorify themselves, giving aim, purpose, and mission to their position in the geopolitical world. Between the years 1848 and 1878 nationalism was characterized by war and diplomacy. Italy achieved unification in 1859 and Germany in 1871. The United States began to confirm its status of nation after its Civil War (1861-65). In 1876, nationalism erupted in the Balkans as Slav populations began to assert their independence from Turkey. By 1878, the Congress of Berlin had declared Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro independent states.[63]

While it is true that "nationalism" and "statism" are distinct phenomena, it is equally true that the nineteenth century was a period of growing "nation-statism." In the first half, the ideas of the established national culture and the imposition of its values on ethnic or cultural minorities with the body politic was considered essential.[64] Nationalism changed from liberal humanitarianism to aggressive exclusivism. Increasingly, the hegemony of the dominant national culture was strengthened by the power of the nation-state. Now national hegemony was seen to be an essential requirement of the nation-state. As Mommsen argues, assimilation of minority groups into the dominant national culture became crucial as the homogeneity of the nation-state

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[63]Edward H. Carr, **Nationalism and After**, London: Macmillan, 1965; and, Hans Kohn, **Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism**, London: Collier Books, 1966.

[64]Wolfgang Mommsen, "The Varieties of the Nation State in Modern History: Liberal, Imperialist, Fascist and Contemporary Notions of Nation and Nationality," in Michael Mann, ed., **The Rise and Decline of the Nation State**, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 215.

was considered an essential precondition of the strength of the nation-state in its struggle against rival states.[65]

This meant that the infrastructural powers or capabilities of states became increasingly important not only in homogenizing the population but in nationalizing its human and material resources.[66] In contrast to the despotic power of autonomously acting state elites distributing resources throughout civil society, infrastructural power refers to the institutional abilities of a central state to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions. Social life is coordinated by state infrastructures which penetrate its territories. However, while increasing the overall power of the state, infrastructural powers also increase the power of civil society over the state. As such, Mann argues that, the power of the state is not about state elites exercising power over society, but rather, "a tightening state-society relation, caging social relations over the national rather than the local-regional or trans-national terrain, thus politicizing and geopoliticizing far more of social life than had earlier states."[67]

By "penetrating its territories with both law and administration," modern states "added routine, formalized, rationalized institutions of wider scope over citizens and territories."[68] This increased the power of state. The increase in infrastructural power contributed to the development of nation-states, as states increased their control over its territories and people, and as civil society

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[65]Mommsen, "The Varieties of the Nation State..." p. 215.

[66]This is not too dissimilar to Gellner's argument, although it differs greatly with regards to the impetus that drives infrastructural growth as well as its scope.

[67]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2...**, p. 61.

[68]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2...**, p. 57.

increased its influence in state affairs. This combination increased citizen identity with the nation-state, as nation-states looked towards their citizens for military use. Nations advanced as the notion of popular sovereignty exploded in three particular ways: national organizations grew at the expense of local/regional organizations; citizens came to regard national interests as conflicting with other nations; and, the nationalist core was drawn from civilian and military cadre employment.[69]

Additionally, state functions were modernized and rapidly expanded. State modernization involves increases in the size of the state, the scope of its functions, in administrative bureaucratization, and in political representation.[70] From the late nineteenth century on, state expenditures grew, as did civil society. As such, the increase in the "scope" of the state is of particular interest. State functions changed from their focus on military concerns to civilian ones. The principal areas of such growth involved education, transport, and communication. Mann identifies these areas as "infrastructural state functions," which enabled states to extend their material and symbolic communications throughout their territories.[71] As infrastructural power increased, states increasingly penetrated social life in such sectors as education - which became "officially nationalistic" - post offices, and railways.[72] Civil society became more dependent on, and more involved in, state activities. Economic and demographic growth led to increased bureaucratization, both at the civil and military level. As Mann demonstrates, for the

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[69]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2...**, pp. 731-734.

[70]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2...**, p. 358.

[71]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2...**, p. 380.

[72]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2...**, p. 586.

first time states performed major civilian functions:

> These centred on communications systems needed by an industrial society - canals, roads, post offices, railways, telegraph and, most significantly schools. By the 1800s expenditures on these was rivalling military expenses, by the 1900s they exceeded them. These infrastructures enhanced the density of social interaction - but being largely confined within the state's territories the subtly "naturalized" social life. During the twentieth century, welfare and fiscal policies redistributed resources between regions, age-groups and classes, reducing inequalities and further solidifying the nation.[73]

But there was also an increase in state intervention in the economy as well as a notable move towards providing forms of social welfare. This required detailed information about its citizens. Giddens points to the increase in official state statistics, such as "births, marriages and deaths; statistics pertaining to residence, ethnic background and occupation," and what became known as "moral statistics, relating to suicide, delinquency, divorce and so on."[74] In addition, Gidden's has argued that improved communications contributed to the consolidation "of the administrative unity of the nation-state."[75]

The increase in state capacity also included a growth in the personnel of the civil and military bureaucracies. The

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[73]Mann, "A Political Theory of Nationalism," p. 54. For Brubaker, this is exactly how "nationhood as a political and cultural form is institutionalized" by states acting within the state system. Rogers Brubaker, **Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 16-22.

[74]Giddens, **The Nation-State and Violence**, p. 180.

[75]Giddens, **The Nation-State and Violence**, pp. 172-173. In a similar fashion, Innis had argued that, "Large-scale organization implies a solution of problems of space in terms of administrative efficiency and of problems of time in terms of continuity." See Harold Innis, **Empire and Communications**, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950, pp. 215-216.

domestic and geopolitical functions of the military changed during the nineteenth century. Depending on the danger posed, the state could maintain domestic order through passive negotiations, policing, paramilitary force, and military repression. As states' infrastructural power grew, their dependence on military repression lessened and was reduced to being directed at ethnic, regional and religious minorities. The military became more focused on geopolitical concerns.[76]

The military faced processes of bureaucratization, professionalization, and democratization. Directed by the state, militaries became more centralized and autonomous. Not only did armies grow in size, but they also became more professional as military academies were formed and discipline became more codified. Most importantly, armies became more "national" as modern states began to recruit their citizens and foster mass loyalty in their militaries. This corresponds with Eugene Weber's discussion of how military service forced peasants to learn French commands, read French signs and manuals, and temporarily leave their traditional communities to be introduced to the modern world of the nation-state.[77]

In the later stages of the development of nationalism, Mann believes it possible to isolate two primary sources of social power: the economic and the military. Rather than seeking merely an economic link, Mann prefers to associate nationalism with geopolitics. European states in Europe fight each other and in order to do so effectively they must tax the

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[76]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 2...**, p. 403-412.

[77]Eugene Weber, **Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. Most rural and small-town dwellers within France did not consider themselves members of a French nation in 1870 and that many retained this view until World War One. Transportation and education, as "agencies of change," transformed France and was strengthened by the addition of universal military service.

people to get money. As such, they must gain the support of the people through glorifying their country and diminishing other countries. Similarly, democracy and nationalism are similar in that centralization requires group consensus.

In sum, rather than conceiving the emergence of nationalism and the nation as a cultural expression or an economic necessity for a nation state, political explanations of nationalism illustrate the importance of the modern state system and geopolitics on the emergence of nation-states. For Mann, geopolitical and military influences on society have been considerable but neglected in sociological theory and he argues that, "Sociologists are prone to forget that evolution is usually geopolitically assisted."[78] Nationalism developed in response to the development of the modern state. The argument is that state building initiatives are crucial to the shaping of nationalism. State-building effects nationalism. Differences between existing nation-states are seen to be a considerable extent the product of earlier forms of state formation. The state could try to unify the nation-state by building on the values of one ethnic or cultural group or it could attempt to focus more on political values. Simply put, regimes matter.

iii. Regime Type

This distinction between types of state strategies and the consequences they have for nationalism has allowed for the distinction between "ethnic" and "civic" nationalism. If the American Revolution gave birth to the idea that nations could be organized around political rights, it was the French Revolution that determined that these political rights could only be won by common patriotic enthusiasm and an aroused national will. The French Revolution stressed that the duty

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[78]Michael Mann, "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship", **Sociology**, Vol. 21, 1987, p. 352.

and dignity of citizens lay in political activity and their fulfilment in complete union with their nation-state.[79]

Bryant argues that the concepts of civil society and "civility" are key to the type of nationalism that develops with a nation. If a state recognizes that individuals, informal groups and formal institutions have the right to pursue their interests and ideals independent of the state, then a healthy civic nation is more likely to be evident. Civic nations may be pluralist or assimilationist, in that they focus on the formation of one or more particular ethnic groups. They also extend their citizenship to all who permanently and lawfully reside within their territory, and who merge with the national imagining, or at least avoid contesting it. On the other hand, ethnic nations relate citizenship and full participation in society to ethnicity and descent. They may develop civil societies but these are exclusive to those of the desired ethnie. There is a rejection of pluralism and open suspicion of difference.[80]

This degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness is key to understanding many secession movements. Secession is strongly related to the presence or absence of a liberal political regime.[81] As Hirschman has asserted, where people have a

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[79]This idea is central to Rousseau's notion of a "civic religion" in which the citizens' love of their homeland would encourage good citizenship, strengthen the state, and create a true political community.

[80]Christopher Bryant, "Civic Nations, Civil Society, Civil Religion", in John Hall, ed., **Civil Society**, London: Polity Press, 1996, pp. 145.

[81]This idea is similar to the Kantian argument that while liberal democracies wage wars against authoritarian states, they are remarkably disinclined to wage wars against one another. See Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall...Are Freer Countries More Pacific?" **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, 27, 1984, pp. 617-48; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 80, 1986, pp. 1151-69; and David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists:

voice, they tend not to demand exit.[82] In other words, the likelihood of secession varies with the advantages of political inclusion in liberal institutions. The central idea is that liberalism works against secession and "softens" nationalism.[83] This has certainly been the case in Europe where various types of devolution have resulted in greater harmony and cooperation between national identities.[84]

Yael Tamir has argued that liberalism "with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection, and choice," and nationalism "with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty, and solidarity," may be able to accommodate one another.[85]

Democratic States and War," **American Political Science Review**, 86, 1992, pp. 24-37.

[82]Albert Hirschman, **Exit, Voice, and Loyalty**, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

[83]See John A. Hall "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained", **Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences**, Volume 122, Number 3, 1993, pp. 1-28; and Hudson Meadwell, "Breaking the Mould? Quebec Independence and Secession in the Developed West," in Sukumar Periwal, ed., **Notions of Nationalism**, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1996, pp. 127-161. There have been few successful seccessionist movements from liberal nation states; Norway from Sweden 1905 and Iceland from Denmark in 1918.

[84]Despite Chechnya, Russia has been successful by offering its fourteen non-Russian republics measures of self-rule. Germany has given power to its sixteen *Lander* (states) including the five eastern ones after the Berlin Wall came down. Since the 1980s, France has created twenty two new mainland regions with budgets of their own. Corsica has been pacified with a mixture of subsidy and devolution while moves towards giving more official recognition to non-French languages, such as Breton, are being made. After Franco's death in 1975, Spain has given more power to seventeen new regions and extra power to Basques and Catalans. More recently, Scotland and Wales have voted for more self-governing powers. See, "Devolution can be salvation," **The Economist**, Vol. 344, No. 8035, September 20th, 1997, pp. 53-55.

[85]Yael Tamir, **Liberal Nationalism**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Liberalism should recognize the right of individuals to choose their communal affiliations, while nationalists should recognize that individuals can choose from more than one form of communal association and still have their rights protected by the state. This idea of finding a middle ground between individualism and nationalism, a form of communitarianism, is exactly what theorists such as Kymlicka and Taylor have been attempting to construct.[86]

The idea of overlapping membership and cooperation is crucial to "consociational democracy."[87] The term "consociational" has been used to describe a pattern of political life in which political elites of distinct social groups succeed in establishing a viable pluralistic state by a process of mutual tolerance and accommodation. It refers to the process of building a new political society in which deliberate compromises by elites carefully circumscribe and limit the extent to which political power can be wielded.

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[86]Will Kymlicka, **Liberalism, Community and Culture**, Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1989; Kymlica, **Multicultural Citizenship**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; Charles Taylor, **Reconciling the solitudes: essays on Canadian federalism and nationalism**, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-University Press, 1993.

[87]See David Apter **The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism**, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1961; Arend Lijphart "Typologies of Democratic Systems," **Comparative Political Studies**, No. 1, 1968, pp. 3-44, and "Consociational Democracy," **World Politics**, Vol. 21, 1968-69, pp. 207-25. With regards to Canadian consociationalism see S.J.R. Noel, "Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism," in Kennith McRae, **Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies**, McClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1974. Donald Smiley, "French-English Relations in Canada and Consociational Democracy," in Milton Esman, ed, **Ethnic Conflict in the Western World**, Ithica, Cornell University Press, 1988; S.J.R. Noel, "Canadian Responses to Ethnic Conflict: Consociationalism, federalism, and control," in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., **The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts**, London: Routledge, 1995.

Lijphart argues that consociational democracy should be seen as a result of "deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation," undertaken by leaders of rival subcultures. As such, he defines consociational democracy as "government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy." Implicit in this reasoning is the idea that some political societies develop such sharp cleavages that only the "deliberate joint effort by the elites [can] stabilize the system."[88]

Lijphart details the conditions necessary for the development of a successful consociational democracy. First, the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures. Second, they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures. Third, elites share a commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. Finally, the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation. Consociationalism, therefore, is not a response to cultural divides, but why such divides rarely became exaggerated and possibly violent.

Consociational democracy should be perceived as the establishment of a permanent mode of dialogue or communication created to maintain political unity. It is the practical application of Hirschman's "voice" which encourages political debate rather than the violent expressions of "exit" that characterizes other multi-cultural polities. Federalism - a type of territorial division of power that may be used to accommodate ethnic differences - is often the preferred consociational device.[89] As such, an overriding civic

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[88]Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," p. 212.

[89]Murray Forsyth, ed., **Federalism and Nationalism**, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1989.

nationalism is usually associated with federal nation-states.

2.3 SUMMARY

There are three important conclusions that can be drawn from this literature review. First, it demonstrates that any analysis of nation building and nationalism must focus on politics, especially the central role of the state. Nationalism did not create the nation-state; rather, the process of nation-state formation generated nationalism. Moreover, while several social groups may influence state foreign policy, state elites played a central role in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Second, it acknowledges the importance of geopolitics in nation-state formation in the Western world. Third, it stresses that the type of state or regime has a specific impact on the character of nation-state initiatives and its subsequent nationalism.

This thesis does not attempt to diminish all of the advances made by other theorists. Rather it tries to understand the formation of a Canadian nationalizing state by going beyond the debate between ethnicist theory and modernist theory and utilizes a "neo-Weberian hybrid."[90] That is, the idea of a national consciousness being created by shared historical experiences is incorporated with the idea that the state, in response to geopolitical forces, is able to actualize the full potential of the national consciousness through specific state policies and actions. Clearly, nation-state formation involves many factors. This literature review has argued that the state and geopolitics must be included in any examination of nation-state formation. Nation-state building is a two-dimensional process. Driven by the geopolitical environment, states centralize their authority

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[90]John Comaroff and Paul Stern "New perspectives on nationalism and war," **Theory and Society**, 23, 1994, pp. 35-45.

and consolidate their territory leading the people within the territory to identify with the state. Through state initiated national infrastructures, the people come to identify with one another. In turn, the state builds upon this growing cultural or national identity to enhance its appeal to the people, thereby increasing its strength. State strategies aimed at caging material and human resources influence national identity, especially whether it becomes based on civic or ethnic principles of nationalism.

The advantages that the Canadian case offers is that the development of a national sentiment was up against two formidable barriers. First, the population of the territory was not united by any sort of dominant cultural heritage or shared ethnicity. Indeed, in the case of Quebec, language and religion complicated the emergence of any shared Canadian ethnic nationality. Especially when this was exacerbated by the historical experience of conquest. Similarly, English-speaking Canada shared a language and common cultural roots with the United States, an adjacent rival state. Although the latter was often considered a potential enemy. If Gellner is to be believed, it raises the question as to why Canada was not absorbed by the United States, especially when they shared the same language, were industrializing at roughly the same time, and, therefore, had shared interests in transportation linkages, resource development, and market economies. Second, state formation was complicated by intense territorial vulnerability. Rapid and absolute autonomy ran the risk of geopolitical suicide. Canadian state elites did not want to antagonize the United States, nor did they want to be perceived as being overly unprotected. All-out war would not "make" the Canadian state; it would destroy it. So the institutions tempered by intense military competition would not immediately emerge. Accordingly, the fundamental question is why anything - political or social - emerged at all. Using an historical sociological methodology, this thesis will seek

to stress the specific dimensions of Canadian state formation and its consequences for national identity.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODS

3.1 HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

This study of the *changing* geopolitical order and the consequences it had for the formation of the Canadian nationalizing state is informed by an historical sociological approach. Simply put, historical sociology uses primary and secondary historical sources to study the past to find out how societies work and change. Historical sociology has gained much acceptance as a viable means of sociological inquiry over the last thirty years, although its development as a field of inquiry is at least two hundred years old.[1] Nevertheless, despite this pedigree, there has been much disagreement over whether or not historical sociology constitutes a distinct discipline and the usefulness and validity of it has been questioned.

Traditionally, history has been thought of as the study of the past and sociology the study of the present. Indeed, Goldthorpe has questioned the overall relevance of history to sociology, claiming that the dichotomy between them is too

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[1]Smith describes two "waves" in historical sociology. The first wave began in Britain and France with the work of Montesquieu, Hume, Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim and Weber and ended in the late 1920s. It was driven by the need to make sense of contemporary events such as the Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, the Enlightenment, industrialization, the American democratic experiment, and the complexities of nationalism that was expanding across Europe. The second wave began in the post-World War Two period which was also driven by the need to understand contemporary events, particularly the emergence of fascism. See Dennis Smith, **The Rise of Historical Sociology**, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.

distinct for them to merge.[2] Certainly, some sociologists are "non-historical" in the sense that conceptually they consider neither the time dimension of social life, nor the historical nature of social structure. Similarly, some historians are "non-sociological" in the sense that they do not conceptualize the general properties of processes and structures, nor their relationships to acts and events.[3]

However, most historical sociologists would argue that, in terms of their fundamental preoccupations, history and sociology have always been the same thing.[4] Generally, both have the same objective - the study of people and their social and physical environment, of the effects of people on these environments and of the environments on people. Therefore, the object of the study is the same: to increase people's understanding of their environments.

S.D. Clark argued that sociologists "cannot become students of change without becoming historians. It is only by looking at what has happened to societies of the past, and over time, that the sociologist can derive the data on which to build his principles of social change."[5] He added, the sociologist "must become a sociological historian [but, in so doing] does not become a different kind of sociologist."[6]

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[2]John Goldthorpe, "The Relevance of History to Sociology", in Bulmer, M., ed., **Sociological Research Methods**, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books, 1977, pp. 162-174.

[3]Smith, **The Rise of Historical Sociology**, p. 3.

[4]The prominent works being, Philip Abrams, **Historical Sociology**, New York: Cornell University Press, 1982; Theda Skocpol, ed., **Vision and Method in Historical Sociology**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; and Smith, **The Rise of Historical Sociology**.

[5]S.D. Clark, **The Developing Canadian Community**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, p. 282.

[6]Clark, **The Developing Canadian Community**, p. 313.

Consequently, the historical detail of past Canadian social change would make the teaching of sociological concepts and theories less abstract.[7] In order to be sociologically significant, sociological studies using history should inform the process of social change, explain how societies came to be what they are, and inform sociological theories.[8]

Certainly, historical sociology presents a viable methodological framework for understanding the many forces at play in the formation of nation-states and national identities. C. Wright Mills regularly insisted on the inseparability of history and sociology arguing that, to be useful, sociological theories must be historically and culturally specific. In other words, sociologists must always consider the historical factors which have led to the present-day society.[9] Indeed, as Hall has argued, "the crucial test of the significance of historical sociology is its ability to improve the understanding of its own national society."[10]

Historical sociology is carried out by historians and

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[7]S.D Clark, "Sociology and Canadian Social History", **The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science**, Vol. V, 1939, pp. 348-357.

[8]Clark criticized Dawson for just giving an historical account. Ironically, Clark's own work has been described as sociologically informed social and economic history rather than historical sociology. Clark's work would have been strengthened had he attempted to use his findings to inform sociology rather than just our understanding of Canadian society. Nevertheless, his holistic analysis and his emphasis on doing historically informed sociology, have contributed much to a sociology that studies Canadian society. For more information on Clark, see Harry Hiller, **S.D. Clark and the Development of Canadian Sociology**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982.

[9]C. Wright Mills, **The Sociological Imagination**, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 145.

[10]John A. Hall, "They do things differently there, or, the contribution of British historical sociology," **The British Journal of Sociology**, 40, 4, 1989, p. 557.

sociologists who investigate the mutual interpenetration of past and present, events and processes, action and structure. Both seek to understand human agency in terms of the process of social structuring, and both see that process chronologically. Sociology must be concerned with the sequence of events, because that is how structuring happens. History must be theoretical, because that is how structuring is understood.[11] Sociologists must recognize that everything comprising social reality came out of the past or has historical roots. Historians must recognize that it is not enough to study individuals as makers of history. Individuals themselves are products of their society. History is a social process, in which individuals are engaged as social beings. The social world is essentially historical and, therefore, all sociological explanation is necessarily historical. Therefore, historical sociology solves the distinctive problem of agency by recognizing that history and society are made by constant purposeful individual action and that individual action is made by history and society.[12]

Giddens' structuration theory demonstrates this interplay between individuals and society, although he discusses it in terms of a synthesis of agency and structure. For him, the structural properties of social systems provide the means by which people act and they are also the outcomes of these

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[11]Abrams, **Historical Sociology**, pp. xv-xviii.

[12]In sociology, the distinctive problem of agency is bound up in "the two sociologies": one of action and the other of social structure. Some sociologists argue that structures cannot be seen as determining people's actions and emphasis should be placed on the way that individuals create the world around them. Other sociologists argue the contrary position that it is social structures which determine the actions and characteristics of individuals. The examination of historical structures, how they relate to events, actions, and beliefs and how they have been studied by social scientists, has been elaborated in Christopher Lloyd's **The Structures of History**, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.

actions. As such, structuration is a process in time.[13] This corresponds with Skocpol who argues that sociological research on historical problems may be research about the past or it may be research on processes of change over time that have relevance to contemporary issues. Skocpol views historical sociology as a continuing tradition of research devoted to understanding the nature and effects of large-scale structures and fundamental processes of change.[14]

Indeed, historical sociology's greatest strength is the study of past societies, especially the social change within these past societies. Not only do such data provide the social researcher with the best, and often the only, opportunity to study and understand the past, but they also contribute to an understanding of social change. Because of the commitment and cost involved, social scientists rarely conduct longitudinal surveys or do field research over long spans of time. The analysis of available historical data, therefore, is well suited to studies of social and cultural change.

There are additional advantages in using historical data. For instance, historical data in the form of existing survey data, government statistics, and ethnographies provide the opportunity to study problems cross-nationally. Historical studies are inexpensive when compared to surveys, interviews, and participant observation. A major problem in much social research is reactive measurement: changes in behaviour that occur because of subjects' awareness that they are being studied or observed. Much available data are non-reactive. There is simply no reasonable connection between a researcher's use of the material and the producer's knowledge of such use. Historical evidence has a sense of social

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[13]Anthony Giddens, **The Constitution of Society**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

[14]Theda Skocpol, "Sociology's Historical Imagination" in Skocpol, ed., **Vision and Method...**, 1984.

totality - it is a product grounded in a certain society and in a certain time. Evidence compiled or gathered by sociologists, however, is limited to the setting of study or what is referred to as the "curious behaviorism" of the research situation.[15] Finally, while most sociologists borrow archival methods from historians and use historians' work as "secondary sources" of evidence, such historical techniques and evidence can readily be combined with other methods of gathering and analysing evidence about the social world.

The criticism of historical sociology is two-fold ranging from accusations of inappropriate methodology to questions concerning the quality of the data and the problem of selection bias. For instance, Adler was concerned with the selective nature of historical evidence while others, such as Nichols, Burawoy, and Kiser and Hechter have taken issue with the comparative method that is often used in historical sociology.[16] More recently, Goldthorpe has renewed his attack on the "uses of history in sociology." For him, "history and sociology differ perhaps consequentially most in the nature of the evidence on which they rely, and that this difference has

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[15]Mills, **The Sociological Imagination**, p. 70. Mills was referring specifically to bias in the interview setting, yet bias is a consideration in most interactive qualitative research.

[16]F. Adler, "The Basic Difficulty of Historical Sociology" **The Sociological Quarterly**, Vol. 2, No. 1., 1961, pp. 3-20; E. Nichols, "Skocpol on Revolution:Comparative Analysis vs. Historical Conjuncture", **Comparative Social Research**, Vol. 9., 1986, pp. 163-186; M. Burawoy, "Two Methods in search of science: Skocpol versus Trotsky", **Theory and Society**, Vol. 18, 1989, pp. 759-805; and, E. Kiser, and M. Hechter, "The Role of general Theory in Comparative-historical Sociology", **American Journal of Sociology**, Vol. 97, No. 1, 1991, pp. 1-30. In particular, they take issue with Skocpol's work on states and revolutions, arguing that it is too abstract and leads to vague generalizations.

major implications for the use of history in sociology."[17] Essentially, Goldthorpe argues that "relics" (historical evidence) are finite and incomplete and subsequently, "there are things about the past that never can be known simply because the relics that would have been essential to knowing did not in fact survive." While Goldthorpe agrees that sociologists can never "escape from history," he maintains that they should be "aware of the historical settings and the limits that their analyses will necessarily possess."[18] Historians are certainly aware of this dilemma. As Desmond Morton asserts, "it is a great fallacy to assume that the *Weltanschauung* of another age is easily recognizable to us." For him, this complexity makes any sort of systematic analysis

> useless as either an analytical or a predictive device. It is the feature that makes history an art, not a science. It is why historicists, be they clergymen, philosophers, or sociologists, seem so consistently indifferent to the complex and often condradictory reality of sources, skimming the rooftops to identify patterns, and ignoring the reality beneath the shingles.[19]

These concerns seem to suggest that historians are less scientific because the degree of proof which can be established is not as strong as in the physical sciences. But, as Evans-Pritchard argued, "when will people get it into their heads that the conscientious historian...is no less systematic, exacting and critical in his research than a chemist or biologist, that it is not in method that social science differs from physical science but in the nature of the

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[17]John Goldthorpe, "The uses of history in sociology: reflections on some recent tendencies," **British Journal of Sociology**, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1991, p. 219.

[18]Goldthorpe, "The uses of history...," pp. 213 and 225.

[19]Desmond Morton, Director of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada, personal communication with the author, October 14, 1997.

phenomena they study."[20] Moreover, as Mann contends, the collection of data is never unproblematic because "sociologists of the present cannot go out and create whatever data they like."[21] Traditional sociological studies of the present rely on secondary sources such as public opinion polls, voting records, government agencies, and data packages that face their own problems with incompleteness and some institutions may remain closed.

Historians are faced with missing and contrasting evidence, but this does not render the entire intellectual inquiry useless.[22] As Bryant argues, historical studies contain "reportage" and "interpretation" and sociologists can be empirical by analysing and comparing different interpretations of the same reportage.[23] Similarly, Mouzelis argues science is a process. Historians offer different accounts of reality and a debate ensues. Such a debate is central to historical sociology. It is a debate over evidence and the subsequent communication by scholars that helps the sociologist determine which secondary source to use. Mouzelis stresses that, "if there are no available relics to settle a dispute, the solution is not to reject the whole theoretical project, but simply to stress the inadequacy of the available

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[20]Evans-Pritchard, cited in Arthur Marwick, **The Nature of History**, London: Macmillan, 1970, p. 103.

[21]Michael Mann, "In praise of macro-sociology" a reply to Goldthorpe", **British Journal of Sociology**, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1994, pp. 37-54.

[22]For a discussion on the theory of history and the role of the historian see E.H. Carr, **What is History**, London: Penguin, 1987; Marwick, **The Nature of History**; and Lawrence Stone, **The Past and the Present Revisited**, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.

[23]J. Bryant, "Evidence and explanation in history and sociology: critical reflections on Goldthorpe's critique of historical sociology," **British Journal of Sociology**, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1994, pp. 3-19.

evidence and the necessity, if possible, to improve it."[24]

Indeed, Platt, Scott, and more recently Lustick, have addressed these issues and have developed ways in which the accuracy of documents can be determined.[25] Reworking Platt's concerns with primary sources, Scott has developed four quality control criteria, consisting of authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. Using this criteria it is possible for historical sociologists to determine the "genuineness" of a document; whether it is free from error; whether the evidence is typical of its kind, and, if not, to determine the extent to which its untypicality is known; and whether the evidence is clear and comprehensible. Most of the primary documents used in this research originate from the National Archives of Canada. With the exception of determining meaning, the documents have already been subjected to this control criteria by historians and archivists who organize the material and make it more readily accessible to the public.

Lustick's main concern is not with primary sources, but with the use of secondary sources. He encourages the historically minded social scientists "to direct explicit and systematic attention to historiography and to demonstrate self-consciousness in the selection of source material and in the construction of stylized background narratives."[26] He forwards four strategies for exploring the multiplicity of

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[24]N. Mouzelis, "In Defence of 'Grand' Historical Sociology," **British Journal of Sociology**, 45, 1, 1994, p. 34.

[25]Jennifer Platt, "Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research: 1 and 2," **Sociological Review**, 29, 1, 1981, pp. 31-66; John Scott, **A Matter of Evidence: Documentary Sources in Social Research**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990; and, Ian Lustick, "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias", **American Political Science Review**, 90, 3, 1996, pp. 605-618.

[26]Lustick, "History, Historiography,...," p. 614.

partially inconsistent historical monographs.

The first is to acknowledge the scope of historiography at the beginning of the study, identifying the particular approach of historiography whose work is most convincing, and show its distinctive theoretic commitments and biases. In so doing, readers would be made aware of the boundaries of the claims made in the study. Second, when there is variance in the historiography, the researcher should note that other partially conflicting accounts are available in other sources and not simply label harmonious accounts as "excellent," "impressive," or "powerful." Certainly, the richer and longer the historiographical tradition involved, the more confidence a researcher could have in presuming that the narratives reflect a normal distribution of implicit theoretical commitments. Third, researchers can construct a background narrative from the claims made by different historians despite their approach from different archival sources and theories. This "triangulation" corroborates evidence although it may be difficult to incorporate all existing sources. Finally, when confronted with a variety of historical accounts inconsistent to propositions under examination, researchers might choose to share the qualitative judgements that led to choices of particular sources for constructing different parts of the background narrative. For instance, discursive footnotes could be used to alert the reader to alternative versions and briefly explain the reasoning that led to the rejection of these accounts. This demonstrates an awareness of alternative views and builds confidence in the readers' minds that selection bias has been confronted.[27]

In light of these concerns, before constructing a narrative background emphasizing the role of geopolitics and state elites in the formation of a Canadian nationalizing state, it is first necessary to briefly review the scope and

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[27]Lustick, "History, Historiography,...," pp. 615-616.

variance in the historiography of Canadian nation and state formation. These studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of the various political, economic, military, and ideological forces at play in imperial Canada. The thesis will demonstrate how this literature informs the state-centred approach which contributes to the understanding of the formation of the Canadian nationalizing state.

3.2 THE CANADIAN CASE

i. Traditional Interpretations

An examination of Canadian national development is certainly not a new endeavour in Canadian social science. Carl Berger was undoubtedly correct when he stated that,

> One of the most persistent strands in Canadian historical literature since the First World War has been the concentration on Canadian national history and nationality. Historians have not only attempted to explain how Canada as a nation-state came into existence but have isolated the common patterns that affected the country as a whole.[28]

These accounts have focused on the rise of self-government, and the interplay of resources, geography, and government policy. While all of these have added to the understanding of Canadian national history, on their own, none of them adequately explain the rise of a distinct Canadian nationalizing state.[29]

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[28]Carl Berger, **The Writing of Canadian History**, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 259.

[29]For a detailed Canadian historiography, see J.M.S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History," **Canadian Historical Review**, 35, 1, 1954, pp. 1-21. Berger, **The Writing of Canadian History...**; Marlene Shore, "'Remember the Future': The Canadian Historical Review and the Discipline of History, 1920-95," **Canadian Historical Review**, 76, 3, 1995, pp. 410-463; and, Doug Owram, "Narrow Circles: The Historiography of Recent Canadian Historiography", **National History: A Canadian Journal of Enquiry and Opinion**, Volume 1, No. 1, 1997, pp. 5-21.

The "constitutional school," which includes the work of George Wrong, W.P.M. Kennedy, Chester Martin and W.S. Wallace, chronicled the development of self-government and demonstrated that a society distinct from that of Britain had evolved, one which insisted on an official recognition of its autonomy. This thesis shares the assertions made by historians of Canada's rise to self-government that "after the territorial 'rounding off' of the dominion there began to grow up a national emotion."[30] Moreover, it shares their belief that there was room for more than one type of national feeling in the state.[31] However, unlike these theorists, this thesis sees the development of Canada's autonomy not as a harmonious exercise in imperial relations, but rather a process of sometimes chaotic negotiations aimed at determining the bounds of political power and national belongings. With the exception of J.W. Dafoe, O.D. Skeleton, and J.S. Ewart, many historians overemphasized the role of British policy and assigned a less active role to Canadian statesmen.[32] Moreover, their lack of realism in dealing with politics included an ineffective examination of how the geopolitical context influenced state formation and contributed to a distinct national identity.

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[30]The primary works would include, W.P.M Kennedy, **The Constitution of Canada**, London: Humphrey Milford, 1922; W.S. Wallace, "The Growth of Canadian National Feeling," **Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. 1, 1920, pp. 136-165; and, Chester Martin, **Empire and Commonwealth**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929.

[31]W.P.M. Kennedy, "Nationalism and Self-Determination," **Canadian Historical Review**, 2, 1921, pp. 6-10.

[32]See J.W. Dafoe, **Laurier, a Study in Canadian Politics**, Toronto: 1922 and **Canada: An American Nation**, New York: Cornell University Press, 1935; O.D. Skelton, **Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, 2 Volumes, Toronto: 1921; and, on Ewart see David M.L. Far, "John S. Ewart," in R.L., McDougall, ed., **Our Living Tradition. Second and Third Series**, Toronto, 1959; and D.L. Cole, "John S. Ewart and Canadian Nationalism," **Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers**, 1969, pp. 62-73.

Additionally, these accounts did not examine the role of economic forces in the development of a Canadian nationalizing state.

An examination of economic forces was central to what can be summarily described as the "frontier" or old political economy school. It was influenced by the work of Frank Underhill, Arthur Lower, and A.S. Morton.[33] They argued that the uniqueness of Canada was derived from a combination of North American frontierism and European influenced government and culture. From this work came three schools of thought. The first is the "staples" approach which is usually associated with the work of W.A. Mackintosh, and Harold Innis.[34] This approach detailed how basic commodities, and associated trade relations and technical conditions of production, provided the central dynamic of Canadian history. The export of natural resources, or staples, had a pervasive impact on the economy as well as on the social and political systems. The "Laurentian" approach is usually associated with the work of Donald Creighton which rests on the idea that Canada took shape along the St. Lawrence water route and its connections across the continent.[35] It focused on the role of commercial centres in the east in processing the resources of the frontier and contributing to the development of the country.

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[33]For examples of their early work see, Frank Underhill, "The Development of National Political Parties in Canada," **Canadian Historical Review**, 16, 4, 1935; A.R.M. Lower, "The Assault on the Laurentian Barrier," **Canadian Historical Review**, 10, 1929; and A.S. Morton, and Chester Martin, **History of Prairie Settlement and Dominion Lands Policy**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1938.

[34]For an example of their approaches see, W.A. Mackintosh, "Economic Factors in Canadian History, **Canadian Historical Review**, 4, 1923, pp. 12-25; and Harold Innis, **The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.

[35]Donald Creighton, **The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850**, Toronto: Ryerson, 1937.

Finally, incorporating both the staples approach and this concern for commercial centres, J.M.S. Careless put forward the "metropolitanism" approach. He believed that the metropolis was the organizing centre of business, politics, and culture, and that it influenced the development of the hinterlands. Canada could only be understood when the relationship of cities with their hinterlands and each other were explored in depth. It is worth noting that sociologists, such as Carl Dawson, R.D. McKenzie, and S.D. Clark were influenced by both of these schools. For them, government policies and growing cities were essential in controlling surrounding regions as the nation expanded and accounted for differences in the Canadian and American frontier experience.[36]

All the versions of the old political economy identified the state as a key institution managing the forces unleashed by industrialism, especially in mediating Canada's economic relations within the international system and in restructuring domestic arrangements to avoid economic regional disparity. Yet the old political economy did not isolate the state as a field of study and, therefore, neglected to detail the larger geopolitical concerns that often guide state policy.[37] However, some did centre their analysis on the role of the state. For Fowke, the state had to transform the "British North American Territories of the mid-nineteenth century into

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[36]For a detailed examination of the history of Canadian sociology see Marlene Shore, **The Science of Social Redemption: McGill, the Chicago School, and the Origins of Social Research in Canada**, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1987: and Robert Brym with Bonnie Fox, **From Culture to Power: The Sociology of English Canada**, Oxford University Press: Toronto, 1989.

[37]G.P. de T. Glazebrook often argued for more political history that would study Canada and its international relations. See his "Canada and Foreign Affairs," **Canadian Historical Review**, 21, 1940; and "In Defence of Political History," **Canadian Historical Review**, 31, 1950.

a political and economic unit" and in doing so made itself the most prominent instrument for the creation of a national economy.[38] The state's initiatives, as seen as in the National Policy, united the various fractions of capital around development and exploitation of the wheat staple of the western hinterlands, as an investment frontier.

These ideas are captured more effectively by Hugh Aitken's phrase "defensive expansionism," which he uses to describe the national policies from 1867 to 1940. According to Aitken, the Canadian government continuously exercised political power to stimulate and direct the course of economic development in Canada. Rather than practising direct intervention, the state lent its authority and financial resources to certain private business corporations which became the "chosen instruments" for the advancement of national economic policy.[39] This was largely a result of the fact that Canada industrialized late and had created an undiversified economic system based upon the exploitation of staples. Such an economy limited capital accumulation and made sustained economic growth difficult. It was not until the establishment of the western wheat market at the turn of the century that Canada was able to expand its diversification.

Nevertheless, the rapid growth of the American economy prompted Aitken's "defensive expansionism" in Canada. The state is seen as central to inducing economic growth and defending Canada's economic space in order to contain the "imperialist" American economy and preserve "a distinct political sovereignty over the territory north of the present international boundary." In promoting either the old staples

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[38]V.C. Fowke, "The National Policy - Old and new," **Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science**, 18: 3, 1952, p. 8.

[39]Hugh Aitken, "Government and Business in Canada: An Interpretation," **Business History Review**, 38: 1, 1964, p. 5.

and the new staples of hydroelectricity, pulp and paper, or oil and natural gas, the functions of the state were consistent:

> The role of the state in Canadian development has been that of facilitating the production and export of these staple products. This has involved two major functions: planning and to some extent financing the improvements of the internal transport system; and maintaining pressure on other governments to secure more favourable terms for the marketing of Canadian exports....Each phase of expansion in Canada has been a tactical move designed to forestall, counteract, or restrain the northward extension of American economic and political influence. Primary responsibility for maintaining and strengthening this policy of defensive expansionism has fallen on the state.[40]

Aitken's account of Canadian "defensive expansionism" saw staples as greatly contributing to the development of a nation-state. Fear of American absorption motivated the government to concern itself with strategic economic planning. As Aitken puts it, "The tactics of Canadian economic development have been a matter of private business. To find a strategy and see that it is implemented has been the responsibility of government."[41]

Similarly, for S.D. Clark, the national policy was crucial in perpetuating a Canadian social system that differed from that of the United States. Clark's work was influenced by the "staples approach" although he was less concerned with economic factors, than with sociological issues such as religious sectarianism, protest movements, and urban and rural poverty in Canada. In Clark's analysis, Canadian development has been essentially bureaucratic-elitist because the

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[40]Aitken, "Defensive Expansionism: The State and Economic Growth In Canada," in W.T. Easterbrook, and M.H. Watkins, **Approaches to Canadian Economic History**, Ottawa: Carleton University Press: Ottawa, 1988, pp. 220-221.

[41]Aitken, "Government and Business in Canada...," p. 8.

geography of Canada required "large-scale bureaucratic forms of organization and wide intervention by the state." American development, on the other hand has been based more on individual enterprise.[42] Indeed, as Clark explains:

> The claims to the interior of the continent were staked out not by advancing frontiersman, acting on their own, but by advancing armies and police forces, large corporate economic enterprises and ecclesiastical organizations, supported by the state.[43]

The implementation of such strategies led to very large public investments, encouraged centralization of power and brought political leadership into an alliance with influential business groups. In other words, the state served a functional role by acting in the interest of the dominant elites who in turn contributed to the building of a "new nation" within the shifting conditions of imperial relations and American expansionism. Clark almost anticipated Mann in his discussion of the increasing role of the state in nineteenth century societies. For Clark, frontier expansion and population growth

> made necessary the extension of institutional controls and often their establishment beyond customary boundaries. Since institutions are essentially a body of trained functionaries performing specialized services, organization had to be widened and personnel enlarged if the needs of growing populations were to be adequately served.[44]

For Clark, much of this increased state control stemmed from fear of a "vulnerable Canadian frontier" being absorbed by its southern neighbour.[45]

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[42]Clark, **The Developing Canadian Community**, p. 233.

[43]Clark, **The Developing Canadian Community**, p. 214.

[44]Clark, **The Developing Canadian Community**, p. 4.

[45]Clark, **The Developing Canadian Community**, pp. 188-191.

Clearly the state was key in the development of economic policies that contributed to nation-building. Yet as strong as the old political economy's arguments are, especially Aitken's defensive expansionism and Clark's "hard" frontier, these approaches could be strengthened. They may have been correct in assuming that the Canadian frontier experience helped define the Canadian identity and that much of this stemmed from a certain degree of anti-Americanism. But Aitken's assertion that this was economically motivated and found expression in the concerted efforts of a Canadian business class is lacking. Indeed, a more detailed account of geopolitical pressures and subsequent state formation would strengthen the work of Aitken and Clark.

The "new political economy" approach that emerged in the 1970s drew upon the work of Innis, and the marxism of Ralph Miliband and Nico Poulantzas, and criticized these earlier theorists for underplaying the role of economic imperialism and the role of capitalist classes.[46] In particular, they argued that, historically, Canada has always been a dependent colony, first of France, then Britain, and now the United States, and that the Canadian state has created a favourable climate for capitalism to flourish.

Yet, the new political economy reduces the state to a simple political institution controlled by the capitalist

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[46]See Raplh Miliband, **The State in Capitalist Society**, London: Fontana, 1969. The primary works concerning Canada in this area include, Tom Naylor, "The rise and fall of the third commercial empire of the St. Lawrence," in G. Teeple, ed., **Capitalism and the National Question in Canada**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972; pp. 1-41; **The History of Canadian Business, 1867-1914**, 2 Volumes, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975; Wallace Clement, **The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975; Leo Panitch, ed., **The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977; and Wallace Clement and Glen Williams, eds., **The New Canadian Political Economy**, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989.

classes to further their interests. The available evidence fails to support this theory. First, it fails to recognize the distinctive nature of the Canadian state and its involvement with capitalism. On one level, there are important political and ideological cleavages between corporate leaders and state officials. The Liberal party has been in power for most of the twentieth century, yet it has rarely been overwhelmingly supported by the corporate elite, which appears to be mainly Conservative and more right-wing than their state counterparts. Moreover, a systematic analysis of people who held both corporate and state positions at some time demonstrates that the level of interlocking between corporations and the state was not significant enough to suggest direct domination of the state.[47]

Second, the state operates at two levels; the federal and the provincial. It reflects the multinational character of Canadian society and its geographic and cultural diversity, as well as the unevenly developed economies of the various regions. Certainly Marxism allows for the interests of capitalist to be fractured, yet in Canada this becomes more complicated because of the different levels of government. Small capitalists would often ally themselves with provincial governments while big capitalists would ally themselves with the federal government. As such, the state did not always work hand in hand with capitalists. Rather, the government found it necessary to place restraints on business when the direction of growth favoured by market and profit considerations appeared inconsistent with Canadian national interests. This was particularly true of transportation policy where the state could not reconcile its defensive needs with the commercial needs of big business.[48]

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[47]Brym with Fox, **From Culture to Power...**, p. 83.

[48]See Aitken, "Government and Business in Canada...," pp. 4-21.

Even when infused with the "structural" ideas of Poulantzas,[49] the new political economy is limited because it fails to recognize that capitalism's "need" to perpetuate capitalist class relations is no more than a desire on the part of the people who benefit from those relations to have these conditions continue. Moreover, structural Marxists incorrectly interpret the reforms associated with the growth of the welfare state as merely legitimizing the existing social order. Rather, such reforms eventually lead to a redistribution of income and increase economic and social advantages throughout all social classes.[50]

Nevertheless, class differences did exist, and the state did have an interest in managing industrial relations and promoting capitalism. But it is important to understand that the relative autonomy of the state determines the actual relationship between social classes and the state. Certainly, state officials have an occupational interest in not offending any class or group to such an extent that they jeopardize their position. More importantly, state policies and institutions are essentially durable legal resolutions arising out of historically specific circumstances. These circumstances often involve matters that go beyond just the interests of the capitalist class and often involve the survival of society as a whole.

This focus on the role of capitalism has been part of the move away from Canadian national history which has taken place over the last thirty years and has resulted in the disintegration of Canadian history as a unified discipline. In particular, Bliss refers to "the loss of interest in studying

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[49]Nicos Poulantzas, **Political Power and Social Classes**, T., O'Hagab, trans., London: New Left Books, 1975. For the Canadian application see, Tom Traves, **The State and Enterprise: Canadian Manufacturers and the Federal Government, 1917-1931**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.

[50]Brym with Fox, **From Culture to Power**, pp. 85-86.

the evolution of a national community" by Canadian historians. The cause of this disintegration has been the "privatization" of the historical approach. Privatization refers to the twin processes by which Canadian history has at once moved from political history towards the exploration of social history and moved from being written for the public to being written for the academic audience. It is usually located in the late 1960s when Careless wrote that the diversity of Canadian society meant that there was no need to be "hung up on the plot of nation-building."[51] Rather the focus should be on studying our regional, class, ethnic and other identities. As a result, Canadian historians, with a few exceptions such as the prolific J.L Granatstein and Desmond Morton,[52] began to study "almost anything but Canada."[53]

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[51]J.M.S. Careless, "'Limited Identities' in Canada," **Canadian Historical Review**, 50, 1969, 1-10. Careless borrowed the term from Ramsay Cook, "Canadian Centennial Celebrations," **International Journal**, 22, 1967, pp. 659-663. With the publication of John Porter's **The Vertical Mosaic** (1965), some historians argued for an abandonment of national history. See Margaret Prang and Arthur Lower, "Sociology and History," **Canadian Historical Review**, 47, 1966, pp. 156-161. Prang argued that Porter's work confirmed the need for detailed work on social structure, ethnicity, labour, religion, and the social consequences of migration, all of which gravitated towards regional and local themes. See Shore, "'Remember the Future'...," p. 435-436.

[52]For their collaborated work, see Desmond Morton, and J.L., Granatstein, **Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914-1919**, Toronto: Lester and Orpen Denny's, 1989; and their **A Nation Forged In Fire: Canadians and the Second World War**, Toronto: Lester and Orpen Denny's, 1989.

[53]Michael Bliss, "Privatizing the Mind: The Sundering of Canadian History, the Sundering of Canada," **Journal of Canadian Studies**, 26, 4, 1991, p. 9. These thoughts have been echoed by Desmond Morten and J.L. Granatstein. In his 1979 presidential address to the Canadian Historical Association, Morton stated that, "If historians in the nineteenth century served consciously as the ideologists of national unification, our own historians of class, region, and ethnicity appear implicitly dedicated to disintegration, fostering a sense of

Bliss extends his disintegration argument to include an explanation for the "sundering of Canadians' consciousness of themselves as a people."[54] Ultimately, Bliss is not calling for a return to a biased nationalistic approach to history, but a balanced appreciation of the political origins of Canada that includes those "limited identities" who were excluded from the old history. More recently, Owram has called for a "broad synthesis, of the nation, of the region, or of the sub-discipline that can provide a common touchstone for all historians."[55] In an attempt at achieving this, this thesis endorses a return to "Canadian national history," but seeks to strengthen it by infusing it with the theoretical insights of a state-centred political sociology, particularly in the context of geopolitics and nation-building. It stresses the importance of states to nation building yet recognizes that there are other social forces that contribute to the process. These social forces cannot escape the political realm that gives them their shape.

States inhabit an inter-state system fluctuating between war and peace. Geopolitical considerations must be considered in any analysis of the state. As discussed previously,

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difference and grievance wholly disproportionate to any realistic hope of rectification." Cited in Bliss, "Privatizing the Mind...," p. 15. More recently, Granatstein has argued that Canaians know so little about their past because of the subdividing of Canadian history into micro-histories. Good history "is not myth or chauvanism,...rather history and nationalism are about understanding this country's past, and how the past has made our present, and is shaping our future" (J.L. Granatstein, **Who Killed Canadian History?**, Toronto: Harper Collins, 1998: 17).

[54]Bliss, "Privatizing the Mind...," p. 14.

[55]Owram, "Narrow Circles: The Historiography of Recent Canadian Historiography", p. 17. It is important to note that the primary mandate of this journal is to "fill the void" in terms of the lack of studies that have concerned themselves with the historical roots of modern Canada and its consequences for national identity.

geopolitics stimulates much state formation, especially the consolidation and economic development of territory. This relates to how "nationhood is institutionalized" in Brubaker's terms,[56] and is precisely what Mann's "infrastructural power" and Giddens' "administrative power" of the state accomplish. Mann argues that these infrastructural powers extend the collective power of the state because social life is increasingly coordinated through state institutions. In so doing, they "cage" more social relations within their national boundaries and consequently increase national and geopolitical collective powers. Mann concludes that the "power" of the state, therefore, concerns the tightening of state-society relations, "caging social relations over the national rather than the local-regional or transnational terrain, thus politicizing and geopoliticizing far more of social life than had earlier states."[57] The Canadian state, like most states in the late nineteenth century, began to concern itself with the administration of many sectors of social life, especially the western provinces that were just beginning to be settled.[58] Much of the nation building that occurred in the nineteenth century, during Mann's militarist and industrialist phases, was driven by geopolitics. Economic factors were important to the growth of the Canadian state, however, they were driven or complemented by geopolitical forces.

ii. The Geopolitical Context

No discussion of the development of the Canadian nation-state can ignore the effects of what J.B. Brebner has called the "North American Triangle," the trilateral relationship

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[56]Brubaker, **Nationalism Reframed...**, pp. 15-16 and 23-54.

[57]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power...Vol. 1**, p. 59 and 61.

[58]Much of the extensive literature on the development of the Canadian North-West will be discussed in Chapter Six.

between Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.[59] For most of the nineteenth century, Britain and America had a long record of hostility. Two Anglo-American wars had created a bitter legacy leading many Americans to believe that Britain was their primary enemy. Until the final decade of the nineteenth century, Britain was the other major power in the Western Hemisphere. Its continual relationship with Canada combined with having indisputably the world's most powerful navy, made them a major obstacle to United State's expansionism.

But this began to change as indicated by the post-Civil War increase in industrial strength and the rapid increase in western settlement. This growing confidence was also reflected by the Chicago's World Fair in 1893. The United States Navy displayed perfect models of its new "Great White Fleet," consisting of the first American battleships that had been authorized three years earlier. The fleet represented national achievement and honour, and in this sense symbolized the amazing growth in recent years of patriotic organizations such as the "Daughters of the American Revolution," the "Naval Order of the United States," and the "United States Daughters

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[59]The complicated position of Canada between two world powers has been discussed greatly by historians, the most prominent being, J.B. Brebner, **North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain**, Toronto, 1945; Charles Tansill, **Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943; C.S. Campbell, **Anglo-American Understanding 1898-1903**, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1957; Norman Penlington, **Canada and Imperialism 1896-1899**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965; L.M. Gelber, **The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898-1906**, Hamden: Anchor, 1966; Kennith Bourne, **Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; Richard A. Preston, **The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977; and Walter LaFeber, **The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

of 1812."[60] Moreover, guided by A.T Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, there emerged a more assertive diplomacy emphasizing an American-style rhetoric of *Weltpolitik*.[61]

It must be recognized that the geopolitical ideas of Fredrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Alfred Mahan, and Halford Mackinder dominated military thinking at the turn of the century, particularly in Britain and the United States.[62] Statesmen were making decisions in a political climate that accepted and acknowledged these concepts. This geopolitical backdrop contributed to the character of nationalism and the formation of nation-states. An aggressive nationalism emerged, based on the bond between people and their country. Its misconstrued Darwinian influences stressed the importance of "the survival of the fittest" in which governments were responsible for insuring the survival of the state.

Consequently, the view of conflicts between nation-states changed. People no longer viewed war as a result of diplomatic breakdown, but rather, as an "inevitable and constructive consequence of the eternal struggle between nations and civilizations."[63] This new militarism stressed social cohesion, nationalism, patriotism, and moral-cultural

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[60]LaFeber, **The Cambridge History...**, p. 114.

[61]Paul Kennedy, **The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers**, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 246.

[62]See F., Ratzel "The laws of the spatial growth of states," in R.E. Kasperson and J.V. Minghi, eds., **The Structure of Political Geography**, Chicago: Aldine, 1969; R. Kjellén's **The State as Organism**, Stockholm, 1916; A. Mahan's **The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783**, Boston: Little, Brown, 1895; and, H. Mackinder's "The Geographical Pivot of History" **Geographical Journal**, Vol. 23, 1904, pp. 421-444.

[63]Kalevi Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 161.

improvement. Armed with these images, the problem for decision-makers became not necessarily how to avoid war but rather how to choose the appropriate time and place. In a scheme where international relations are viewed as a struggle for social, economic, and cultural supremacy and expansion, then compromise, conflict resolution, and moderation were seen by some states to be weaknesses.[64] This mood of simple patriotism and national solidarity would demonstrate how far the socialists and other opponents of World War One had overestimated the strength of internationalist feelings and underestimated the seductive power of nationalism.[65] There is little doubt that "imperialism, racism and militarism" reigned supreme and often contributed to the spread of nationalism and the attention given to geopolitics.[66]

Not surprisingly, therefore, Mahan and to some extent Brooks Adams, the geopolitical historian, concluded that the nation's growing productivity demanded that either the surplus of goods be consumed at home through detested "socialist" measures, or else the goods find markets across the new "frontier" of the seas. Moving into foreign markets, however, raised the probability of conflict that could escalate to war. In Mahan's view, such war was a natural and inevitable result of industrial success in an increasingly closed world.[67]

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[64]Holsti, **Peace and War...**, pp. 161-162.

[65]As Isiah Berlin argues, the major blind-spot for all types of rationalists, liberals and socialists has been the success of nationalism. Isiah Berlin, **The Crooked Timbre of Humanity**, London: Fontana, 1991.

[66]Michael Howard, "Empire, Race, and War in pre-1914 Britain," in H., Jones, et al., eds., **History and Imagination: Essays in honour of H.R. Trevor-Roper**, London: Duckworth, 1981, p. 340.

[67]LaFeber, **The Cambridge History...**, p. 117. For another account of Mahan, see Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," Peter Paret, ed., **Makers of Modern Strategy**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Mahan had specific prescriptions for foreign policy that satisfied the "jingoistic nationalism" of Lodge and Roosevelt.[68] He advocated that the United States should occupy the Hawaiian Islands, take control of the Caribbean, and build a canal to link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. President Theodore Roosevelt's administration used several of Mahan's suggestions as the basis of its foreign policy and improved the geopolitical position of the United States. The 1895 revolt against Spain in Cuba prompted the expansionists to extend Mahan's vision to include the Philippines, calling for an expeditionary force to plant the stars and stripes on Filipino soil. Such an aggressive foreign policy coincided with Lodge's belief that "readiness, preparation, and courage mean honor and peace."[69] British policy was also influenced by Mahan, particularly the Colonial and Imperial conferences which sought to improve the defence of the Empire through colonial contributions to naval defence.

However, Britain's century-long supremacy in New World affairs was rapidly giving way to American superiority. The historic turn can be pinpointed: a series of confrontations between the two powers during 1894-6 in which London gave way on every occasion. These included the American use of gunboat diplomacy in breaking the British-backed rebels' hold of the Rio de Janeiro harbour in 1893; the American support of Nicaraguan autonomy in 1894; and most importantly, the Venezuelan crisis of 1895.

The roots of the Venezuela crisis lay a half century earlier when London laid claim to disputed territory between British Guiana and Venezuela. The problem lay dormant until

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[68]For more detail on the account of Mahan's influence on American foreign policy, see William Widenor, **Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 86-93.

[69]Widenor, **Henry Lodge...**, p. 42.

the 1890s when it appeared Britain was beginning to assume it controlled the territory and Venezuela brought the issue before the Cleveland administration. By this time, Americans were highly sensitive to British ambitions in the hemisphere and the European imperialists' carving up of other southern continents. The Americans demanded that the Monroe Doctrine be honoured. "I do hope there will not be any back down among our people," Theodore Roosevelt wrote Lodge. "I don't care whether our sea coast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada."[70] According to Preston, "American planning for war at the time of the Venezuela crisis had thus gone much further than that of Britain and Canada, and it aimed at anticipatory action, or preemptive strike, to forestall a long war that the United States would win in the end..."[71]

The results of these episodes were profound. The United States had stood up to the world's greatest power three times and had won three times. American diplomats defined the issues in large terms: In Brazil the issue was preserving a major turn toward United States goods and ideology; in Nicaragua it was who would control a strategic point of global importance; in Venezuela the issues were who would define the Monroe Doctrine, and who would control one of the continent's great commercial waterways.[72] Moreover, it indicated to Lodge that the geopolitical position of the United States had been improved by the development of a "well-settled foreign policy."[73]

From the 1890s on, America emerged as the world's greatest and most competitive player in the marketplace.

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[70]LaFeber, **The Cambridge History...**, pp. 124-25.

[71]Preston, **The Defence of the Undefended Border...**, p. 150.

[72]LaFeber, **The Cambridge History...**, p. 125.

[73]Widenor, **Henry Lodge...**, p. 136.

Britain's proportion of world trade had declined from 18.5 percent in 1897 to 14.1 percent in 1912 and during the same period the United States surpassed Britain in relative labour production.[74] It also became one of the more expansionist nations of its time. It claimed victory in the Spanish-American War (1898) bringing the Philippines and Cuba under its influence, annexed Hawaii, participated militarily in China during the Boxer Rebellion (1900), helped Panama successfully revolt against Columbia in 1903, and attended its first meeting of the great European powers in the Algeciras Conference of 1906. These years are pivotal in understanding how the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which ruled out foreign interference in Latin American affairs, became the Monroe Doctrine of 1912, which justified unilateral United States intervention in those affairs.[75]

The greatest achievement of American foreign policy came with their proposal to build the Panama canal. The Spanish War had indicated the importance of sea-power in American strategy. Some means of inter-oceanic communication was necessary in order that the divided American naval forces could be transferred on short notice from the Atlantic to the Pacific or vis versa. The United States was in fact extending the Monroe Doctrine to include Central America, the sphere of the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. The Panama canal would play a pivotal role, becoming a strategic and economic link unifying American interests in the Pacific and the Orient with those in the Atlantic and Central and South America. In many ways, the United State's renewed commitment to manifest destiny was tantamount to Ratzel's *lebensraum*.

Nevertheless, the British agreed to the American proposal

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[74]David Lake, **Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939**, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 120.

[75]LaFeber, **The Cambridge History...**, p. 60.

with the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901. Suffering setbacks in the South African War, Britain agreed to revise the Clayton-Bulwer treaty so that the United States might build a canal on its own terms. After the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Britain seemed to give way on a number of issues at the expense of Canadian interests, especially the Alaska Boundary decision. As will be discussed later, Canada's dissatisfaction with this would contribute greatly to a move towards diplomatic independence. Indeed, the turn of the century marked a great transition period in Anglo-American relations in that Canadian interests were sacrificed by British statesmen for the sake of Anglo-American understanding. Britain consistently backed down because they simply could not afford to take on the Americans, particularly when they were faced with more pressing geopolitical concerns elsewhere. Indeed, this period of "new imperialism," heralded in new challenges to British global hegemony and was driven by the general doctrines of the times. While there is a great deal of debate on the extent of British decline during this period, it is clear that the British state was much concerned by these new imperial challenges.[76]

By the late nineteenth century, Britain's interest in Empire was renewed by a number of significant developments in global geopolitics. Even the 1889 Naval Defence Act, which had sought to maintain British naval supremacy by ensuring that it had twice as many battleships as its two closest rivals, was not enough to allow Britain to be strong everywhere. In 1892 a Russian squadron had sailed through the Bosphorus and joined the French Mediterranean fleet to confirm their new alliance

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[76]For the specifics of the over-extension thesis see Kennedy, **The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers**, and Patrick O'Brien, "The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism", **Past and Present**, 120, 1988. Hall contests their findings because of their reliance on conversion into a single currency. See John A. Hall "The Weary Titan? Arms and Empire, 1870-1913," in Hall, J., ed., **Coercion and Consent: Studies on the Modern State**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.

forcing Joseph Chamberlain to announce that the Royal Navy had ceased to control the Mediterranean. This endangered the Suez Canal and consequently India, Britain's most valuable imperial possession.[77] Similarly, British influence in China was curtailed by the collapse of China in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War and the rise of Japan as an imperial power. Indeed, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of January 1902 was a significant turning point in that it demonstrated that Britain could no longer be considered as the exclusive power in the Far East.[78]

But it was the rise of Germany that seemed to concern Britain the most. Tremendous industrial growth combined with the tenuous results of the Bismark's *Realpolitik* led Germany to follow the expansionist path followed by other powerful states. The decision by the Kaiser and his advisors to build a large navy and turn Germany into a world power clearly marked the end of Bismark's influence. The first Navy Law in 1897 heralded in the new era of *Weltpolitik*. By casting Britain as the villain in the colonial drama, Bismark had persuaded the German public that a world wide empire was desirable and that German claims had been thwarted by the British Empire. The creation of the German navy, merely 400 miles from Britain's coastline, meant that the North Sea had become, in effect, a vulnerable imperial frontier.[79]

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[77]Lawrence James, **The Rise and Fall of the British Empire**, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, pp. 213-214.

[78]James, **The Rise and Fall of the British Empire**, pp. 241-243. For a more detailed discussion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, see Ian Nish, **The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of the Two Island Empires**, London: London University Press The Atholene Press, 1966; and, Ian Nish, **Alliance in Decline: A Styudy in Anglo-Japanese Relations**, London: London University Press The Atholene Press, 1972.

[79]Robert Massie, **Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War**, New York: Random House, 1991; Jan Morris, **Fisher's Face**, London: Viking, 1995; and Hans-Ulrich

To counter these threats Britain, under the guidance of Admiral Fisher, developed two general strategies. The first was a change in foreign policy. In addition to the Japanese alliance, Britain agreed to an *entente cordiale* with France in 1904, and an Anglo-Russian Convention of August 1907. But the most significant move was the gradual move to ally themselves with the United States. Fisher was not even willing to defend Canada against the United States and hoped for American-Canadian tariff reciprocity, a cause of Canadian anti-Empire liberalism.[80] Britain was thereby avoiding a war with fellow Anglo-Saxons and remaining better prepared to fight elsewhere. A potential enemy was transformed into a needed friend. As noted by Henry Adams at the time, "the sudden appearance of Germany as the grizzly terror...frightened England into America's arms..."[81] The second strategy was to seek an imperial federation of its colonies and dominions and to increase their contributions to the military defence of the empire. These demands and the entire changing geopolitical environment would have important consequences for the process of Canadian state formation in the hands of Canadian state elites.

iii. Canadian State Elites

Mann's claim that nineteenth century foreign policy remained more insulated and dominated by statesmen, military castes, nationalist parties, and pressure groups fits the Canadian case with some slight modifications.[82] While Canada

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Wehler, **The German Empire, 1871-1918**, Leamington Spa: Berg, 1985.

[80]Avner Offer, **The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 254.

[81]Henry Adams, **The Education of Henry Adams; An Autobiography**, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918, pp. 362-363.

[82]Mann, **Sources of Social Power...Vol. 2**, pp. 69-75.

had no military caste in the true sense of the term, those Canadian imperialists who demanded closer ties with the British Empire fulfilled a similar role.[83] Similarly, while there was no country-wide Canadian nationalist party, the Quebec Nationalist movement under Bourassa, certainly voiced their concerns for an independent Canada and a retreat from British imperialism. In terms of pressure groups, significant demands were being made by farmers, especially in the West, who demanded reciprocity with the United States and disapproved of Canada's naval policies; labourers, who began to organize as industrialism grew; and those in British Columbia who were concerned with Asian immigrants. While some of these groups made demands on the state and influenced foreign policy, it was statesmen themselves who had the most significant impact.

Therefore, this thesis explores the activities of state elites, and the consequences their actions had for Canadian state formation and an emerging Canadian national identity. Canada has produced thinkers who have reflected seriously and acted wisely on problems concerning national survival. To understand Canada, it is not enough to examine those who created Confederation, but also those who perpetuated it. It is necessary to explore our national consciousness by exploring the minds of the politicians who did most to make us what we are. Michael Bliss has argued that historians have demonstrated "a declining interest in politics" which is regrettable as "governments are our most powerful institutions." Bliss is correct in stating that "Canadians do not think about the historical evolution of their political and constitutional system, they do not seem to know about it and many of them, including intellectuals and politicians, and

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[83]See Carl Berger, **The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970, especially Chapter 10.

even historians, do not seem to care."[84]

Certainly, starting in the 1950s, political biography became one of Canadian history's overriding concerns.[85] However, these studies have focused more on individuals and their immediate institutional settings and less on the larger structural forces that guide their actions. While P.B. Waite is correct when he argues that individuals "make the forces, movements, trends" of which all of history consists,[86] from an historical sociological viewpoint, understanding individuals *and* their structural positions is important because it clearly illustrates the convergence between "agency and structure." For instance, geopolitical competition has structured state policy, stimulated social forces, and influenced the organization of society. But just as important has been the role of human agency. As Hall has put it, "Actors matter quite as much as structure in these circumstances because they are 'macro-actors', differing from most of us in having behind them great structural forces."[87]

Following this lead, this study will examine the impact

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[84]Michael Bliss, **Right Honourable Men: The Descent of Canadian Politics from Macdonald to Mulroney**, Toronto: Harper Collins, 1994, pp. xiv-xv.

[85]Berger, **The Writing of Canadian History**, p. 261. For a discussion of Canadian biography, see Donald Swainson, "Trends in Canadian Biography: Recent Historical Writing," **Queen's Quarterly**, Volume 87, No. 3, 1980, pp. 413-429; and P.B. Waite, "Invading Privacies: Biography as History," **Dalhousie Review**, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1990, pp. 479-495.

[86]Waite, "Invading Privacies...," p. 493. He goes on to argue (p. 495) that "Biography is not in the periphery of history; it is in the middle of it, in the midst of that multitudinous past that history represents. It catches men and women in process....It is thus at the core of history; one individual existence, one instance of the way history happens; of the way also, be it asserted despite Tolstoy, that individuals often make history happen."

[87]John A. Hall, **International Orders**, Cambridge: Polity, 1996, p. 28.

of several Canadian statesmen, Canadian civil servants, and British representatives, especially the governor generals and the general officers commanding the militia. The most significant figure in this study is Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada. This work uses Laurier as a peg on which to hang general Canadian political history and a number of arguments about the evolution of the Canadian state. As Bliss has argued, "Prime Ministers of Canada, are...the most powerful people in the country. Their decisions will have more influence on the Canadian people's lives than any other Canadian's actions."[88] A central thrust of this thesis is that the Laurier administration had a powerful role in moving Canadian politics from a British colonial system to a autonomous North American democracy.

It is undeniable that Laurier was a great influence during this period. He was the solitary master of his administration and there is no evidence to suggest that Laurier shared the leadership with any other cabinet minister. In Canadian political scholarship, the myth persists that most successful Prime Ministers shared, or appeared to share, power with a leading colleague who represented the other language and religious group. Thus, it is common to read of the partnerships of Baldwin-Lafontaine, Macdonald-Cartier, King-Lapointe, and St. Laurent-Howe. All available evidence points to the conclusion that Laurier exercised a substantial amount of decision-making power.[89] No other member of the cabinet was able to exercise a veto over any policy upon which the Prime Minister had determined. When serious conflict broke out within the cabinet, Laurier's insistence of being master of

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[88]Bliss, **Right Honourable Men...**, p. xv-xvi.

[89]Laurier clashed with Tarte, minister of Public Works, in 1902; Blair, the minister of Railways and Canals in 1903; land Sifton minister of Interior Affairs, in 1905. All resigned.

his own house required the resignation of the dissident minister. Laurier was one of the key agents with enough structural power to influence decision-making in the realm of nation-state formation. As such, Laurier is the key member of the state elite and his thoughts and policies are central to understanding the political decision making that guided the formation of the Canadian national state.

Fortunately, the historiographic record concerning Laurier during his life and times is lengthy and quite consistent.[90] However, there seems to be some debate on whether or not he was an imperialist or a nationalist. However, such polemics can be misleading. Laurier was playing a version of Putnam's complicated two-level game. His most significant political problem was to counter the integrating policies of British imperialism on grounds which were acceptable to Canadians as a whole. This presented no difficulty as far as French Canada was concerned, but with English-speaking Canada it did. Laurier was politically astute in recognizing this fact and in circumventing it without greatly impairing his own popularity, and without dividing

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[90]The essential work on Laurier includes, O.D. Skelton, **Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, 2 Vols., Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1921; John Dafoe, **Laurier: A Study**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1922; Joseph Schull, **Laurier: The First Canadian**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1965; Barbara Robertson, **Sir Wilfrid Laurier: The Great Conciliator**, Kingston: Quarry Press, 1971; H. Blair Neatby, **Laurier and a Liberal Quebec**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973; and, Laurier LaPierre, **Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Romance of Canada**, Stoddart, 1996. Theses concerning Laurier are numerous. The most informative include, Robert Clark, **The Making of the Laurier Ministry, 1896-1911**, University of Ottawa, 1969; James Colvin, **Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Imperial Problem, 1896-1906**, University of London, 1954; Jack MacLeod, **The Political Thought of Sir Wilfrid Laurier: A Study in Canadian Party Leadership**, University of Toronto, Political Science Department, 1965; and, Strand, Wilson, **The Canadianism of Sir Wilfrid Laurier: A Study of his Liberalism and Nationalism From 1871 to 1911**, George Peabody School for Teachers, Division of Social Science, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1967.

the two main elements of Canadian people. He was successful because he was able to associate his anti-imperialist policy with that of Canadian nationalism to such an extent that his own deep-rooted antipathy to imperial integration was often misconstrued and underestimated.[91] Certainly, Minto and Grey were constantly confused by the rhetoric of "nationalists who were imperialists, nationalists who sounded like imperialists, and nationalists who both were and sounded like anti-imperialists."[92]

Paving the way for Canada's eventual independence was certainly Laurier's long-term goal. In April of 1892, he argued in the House of Commons that Canada's status as a colony was a great obstacle to national development, and declared that "complete independence" should be "the supreme goal."[93] This was a remarkable, and quite dangerous assertion for a party leader to express, even when softened by his belief that independence would be a process of slow degrees. Laurier's concern with Canada's devolution from empire and its territorial jurisdiction corresponds with Hont's discussion of nation-state formation as the process of sorting out the territorial rights of communities in such a way that ownership of national property is legitimized.

Just as revealing is Lemieux's correspondence with Laurier on the subject of independence. With the national Liberal convention approaching, Lemieux felt that independence

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[91]Laurier's adoption of two seemingly opposing roles are, as Erving Goffman reminds us, deliberate and often found in everyday life. His role changing was a conscious strategy to appease imperial and national audiences alike, all the while strengthening Canadian autonomy. See Erving Goffman, **The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life**, New York: Anchor Books, 1959.

[92]Paul Stevens and John Saywell, eds., **Lord Minto's Canadian Papers**, 2 Volumes, Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1981, Volume 1, p. xiv.

[93]House of Commons Debates, April 7, 1892, pp. 1136-1146.

should head the Liberal program. Laurier agreed and admitted he thought of it often. The position of colony was an obstacle to the development of the country, suffocating initiative and subordinating all aspirations to considerations of British interests. Railways, immigration, preferential tariff, which was "introduced exclusively on Canadian grounds," was meant to benefit Canada, not the entire British Empire."[94] Yet, Laurier would suppress his desire for independence until English-Canadians as well as French-Canadians could accept the idea of independence. Its realization was still "very distant."[95] Instead, Laurier worked in more subtle ways for a nation which would be practically independent, in fact if not in word. Interestingly, it is during this period that Laurier began referring to Canada as a "nation."

This corresponded to the ideas of "liberal nationalist" academics - who would later become public servants - whose underlying concern was with establishing "constitutional autonomy and/or continental economic alignment."[96] For instance, Adam Shortt condemned schemes for imperial economic or political integration, yet defended a concept of "spiritual empire." He saw Canada's international status as "evolving from subordination to autonomy and that the voluntary ties of the British nations would continue to define Canada's international status and national character." Moreover, since Canada possessed a responsible democratic government, it was essential that Canada be free to control its own external and internal affairs. By doing so, Shortt believed that Canadians

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[94]Laurier to G.W. Ross, Oct. 6, 1903, Laurier Papers.

[95]Laurier to Lemieux, Dec. 1, 1892, Lemieux papers. Quoted in Neatby, **Laurier and a Liberal Quebec**, p. 102.

[96]B. Ferguson, **Remaking Liberalism: The Intellectual Legacy of Adam Short, O.D. Skelton, W.C. Clark and W.A. Mackintosh, 1890-1925**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1994, p. xiii.

would not only better their economy but also give them a better sense of national and social life.[97] O.D. Skelton had similar views and believed that distinct Canadian interests demanded that Canada have control over its foreign affairs. Moreover, he argued that Canada's distinct national and international interests had influenced her national identity. For Skelton, one characteristic of this national identity was liberalism which had distinguished Canada's national development from that of other nations. For these intellectuals, if distinctive interests and the autonomy of Canada were established, then considerable attention would have to be focused on the role of government in reflecting those interests and furthering that autonomy.[98]

While Laurier shared many of these views, his goal of Canadian independence was tempered by a realistic recognition of the duality of nationalisms in Canada. He recognized that moving too quickly to independence would antagonize British Canadians and threaten the fragile unity of the nation. Similarly, any move towards closer independence would antagonize French-Canadians. As such he would develop a political program based upon "independence by slow degrees." An analysis of Laurier's experience and thought reveals that by the time he took office, he had developed a clear concept of national unity, a firm belief in federalism, and a comprehensive prescription for an emergent Canadian nationalism. Laurier's attempts to resolve the problems and crises of Canada according to liberal principles and, at the same time, to build a nation capable of ruling itself resulted in his Canadianism.

His Canadianism was grounded in a liberal nationalism that protected individual rights, especially the rights of

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[97]Ferguson, **Remaking Liberalism...**, pp. 80-82.

[98]See B. Ferguson, **Remaking Liberalism...**, pp. 87-90.

individuals to choose their cultural affiliations.[99] Canada should be a nation diverse in its origins and retaining all its diverse traditions, but united to a national ideal which all held as a common aspiration. Nationalism and liberalism thus worked together, for Laurier's nationalism meant the maximum practical amount of liberty or freedom from Britain as well as the maximum practical amount of freedom for the provinces from federal interference. As Laurier said,..."Canada is a nation. Canada is free and freedom is its nationality."[100] This was Laurier's Canadianism: a liberal nationalism which avoided extremes, and a nation-minded liberalism that used mediation and compromise in its search for what was best, not for a part, but for the whole of Canada.

Laurier's Canadianism stemmed from many sources. First, he had been raised in the context of a somewhat conciliatory French-Canadian nationalism. While the Union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1841 did not create harmony between the cultural groups, the spirit of compromise exemplified by Lafontaine and Cartier re-established some degree of co-operation between the two nations. Indeed, it is during this time that consociationalism was most clearly evident. The following years saw a prosperous Canadian economy as well as the establishment of a strong French-Canadian cultural tradition and the growing recognition of liberalism that "infused new life into a traditional culture" facing possible extinction.[101]

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[99]See Chapter Two on liberal or civic nationalism.

[100]Georges Bellerive, ed., **Orateurs canadiens-francais en Angleterre, en Ecosse et en Irlande, conférences ét discours**, Quebec: Impr. Le Soleil, 1912, pp. 33-34.

[101]Mason Wade, **The French Canadians, 1760-1967**, Volume One, Toronto: Macmillan, 1968, p. 220. While being dated, Wade's work remains useful although it relies heavily on Robert Rumilly's forty-one volume **Histoire de la province de**

Second, his radical surroundings and associations of his youth in Montreal at first tended to make him strongly French-Canadian. Yet, his bilingual education, and his growing admiration for British political ideals broadened his early views with an affection for British liberty and justice. It lead him to see the necessity of accepting confederation and embracing a more inclusive nationalism. Laurier, a French-Canadian, chose British evolutionary liberalism as the workable model for Canadian liberalism. His emphasis on the individual's right to act politically as he wished appealed to the French-Canadian as well as to the English-Canadian. As a form of ideological power, Laurier's liberal nationalism contributed to the principles by which he was to lead Canada. Compromise and conciliation were thus indispensable for making a nation.[102] His aversion to ethnic or national cleavages was motivated by the desire to avoid the violence of the Riel Rebellion and the American Civil War.[103]

Abraham Lincoln was a statesman who won Laurier's high esteem. Unlike some Canadians who sympathised with the southern Confederacy, as did the British government, Laurier believed that Canada and the Empire should have supported Lincoln's position and the cause of the northern states. In 1889, Laurier delivered a lecture on Lincoln in which he commended the qualities of the American president and translated the Gettysburg Address into French, for he thought its theme of a united nation dedicated to liberty and equality contained an important message which his French-Canadian compatriots should take to heart: "Never, since the brilliant days of Pericles, has the human voice spoken with such

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Québec, 1940-69.

[102]House of Commons Debates, April 23, 1902, p. 3334.

[103]For an account of the American Civil War as a war between two nations see Edward Thomas, **The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865**, New York: Harper, 1979.

nobility and pride....This important lesson teaches us to do our duty without fear, without weakness, without harshness, without biterness, and to never give up on the homeland.[104] It was Lincoln's determination to preserve the Union at all costs which impressed Laurier most. Certainly, the two men shared the same objective. Laurier's overriding concern was also national unity and in a letter detailing his conception of the role of a statesmen, he observed that he too sometimes had to resort to accommodations and compromises to achieve his end:

> Remember this, that in politics, the question seldom arises to do the ideal right. The best that is generally to be expected is to attain a certain object, and for the accomplishment of this object, many things have to be submitted to which, if rigorously investigated, could not be approved of....My object is to consolidate Confederation, and to bring our people, long estranged from each other, gradually to become a nation. This is the supreme issue. Everything else is subordinate to that idea.[105]

The influence of Laurier's early associations in New Glasgow, the interactions with the British settlers in the Townships, his enduring interest in the classics of liberalism, greatly contributed to his sympathies with English speaking Canada. His political sense told him that their emotional attachment to Britain would impede any radical move towards independence. His sympathy with his own culture never lessened, but he came to believe that their future lay not in isolation, nor in assimilation, but in full and open partnership with their fellow Canadians. Laurier detailed his

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[104]"Conférence sur Lincoln" at Montreal, 5 Oct. 1889, in Alfred DeCelles, **Discours de Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, Montréal: Librarie Beauchemin, Vol. 1, 1920, pp. 34-37. Author's translation.

[105]Laurier to W. Gregory, 11 Nov. 1904, Laurier Papers and Willison Papers, MG30 D29, Vol. 24, Folder 179d, pp. 18061-18062.

double heritage at a speech before a banquet held in his honour in Paris. "I love the France that gave us life; I love the England that gave us liberty, but the first place in my heart is for Canada, my home and native land."[106] For Laurier, this double allegiance was compatible with a civic nationalism based on liberalism.

Indeed, there runs through each of Laurier's major speeches on liberalism in 1877 and 1894 a common thread of beliefs: that the Canadian federal Constitution is good, that liberty is essential, and that national unity is greatly desirable.[107] He was a passionate liberal who attempted to construct a liberal nationalism in Canada that was years before its time. Indeed, it can be argued that Laurier's thought is of particular relevance since he was the earliest prime minister who cannot be easily labelled "English-Canadian" or "French-Canadian," but who deserves the unhyphenated title of "the first Canadian." An examination of Laurier's ideas demonstrates that Sir Wilfrid was a passionate exponent of an inclusive Canadian liberal nationalism, that he was as patriotic to French Canada and as resolute a nationalist as Henri Bourassa, and that his ideas were crucial to the national identity that would emerge in Canada. Works mentioning liberalism and nationalism in Canada may be common.[108] However, no work traces Laurier's ideas in an

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[106]Quoted in R., Tanghe, **Laurier: Architect of Canadian Unity**, Montreal: Harvest House, 1966, p. 37.

[107]"Political Liberalism," delivered on June 26th, 1877 in Quebec City can be found in Barthe, **Wilfrid Laurier on the Platform, 1871-1890**, 1890. The speech at Quebec City, Jan 4, 1894 is reprinted in the **Globe**, Jan 20, 1894, pp. 5-6.

[108]Both Frank Underhill and Arthur Lower were interested in liberalism in Canada. See Underhill's **In Search of Canadian Liberalism**, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1960, and Lower's **This Most Famous Stream**, Toronto: Longmans, 1954. An examination of the deep roots and immobility of liberalism in new societies, or "fragment cultures," which have escaped the

attempt to analyze his contribution to liberalism and nationalism within Canada or to liberalism and nationalism in general.[109] Frank Underhill traced liberalism in Canada, but admitted that did not deal specifically with Laurier, the "greatest of all Canadian liberals."[110]

By the 1896 election campaign, Laurier had established a political philosophy and had an idea of the institutional devices necessary to promote and maintain national unity: first, national political parties would cut across ethnic divisions and include representatives of both English and French; second, a decentralist approach to federalism would stress provincial rights and provincial autonomy; third domestic and foreign (including Imperial) policies would be acceptable to moderate opinion in both English and French groups. While French, English and immigrant Canadians brought with them different customs and cultural traditions, Laurier hoped that it would be Canadian political institutions and

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feudal tradition and extremism of Europe, can be found in Louis Hartz, **The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia**, New York: Brace and World: New York, 1964. The rise of liberalism in Canada was also one of the central themes in the political biographies of H. Blair Neatby and Ramsay Cook. See Neatby's **Laurier and a Liberal Quebec...**, and his **William Lyon Mackenzie King, Volume II, 1924-1932: The Lonely Heights**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976. See Cook's **The Politics of John W. Dafoe and the Free Press**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. For a more recent example, see Ferguson, **Remaking Liberalism....**, Chapter Three in particular.

[109]For a recent account see, R., Knopff, "The Triumph of Liberalism in Canada: Laurier on Representation and Party Government", **Journal of Canadian Studies**, 26, 2, 1991. Laurier was instrumental in Quebec's shift in allegiance from the federal Conservatives to the Liberals, a period deemed one of the most significant developments in Canadian political history. See H. Blair Neatby and John T. Saywell, "Chapleau and the Conservative Party in Quebec," **Canadian Historical Review**, 37, 1956, pp. 1-22.

[110]Underhill, **In Search of Canadian Liberalism**, p. xiii.

practices that bound the different cultural elements together. In particular, consistent with his thoughts on liberal nationalism, he believed that federalism would best suit the Canadian condition.

The 1896 election heralded a profound political change for Canada. It was the only instance in seven general elections in which the Laurier-led liberals obtained a majority in the province of Ontario. This in itself was evidence of the difficulty which confronted Laurier throughout his career - the need to appease Ontario and to convey to its people that his purpose was not alien to their wishes. Quebec gave 49 of its 65 seats to a native son. Wilfrid Laurier became the first French-Canadian prime minister of Canada and his hegemony in the Liberal hierarchy by 1896 was unquestionable. To afford himself the greatest latitude to exercise political leadership, he purposefully selected the office of President of the Privy Council rather than a more time consuming portfolio. The excess of talented political manpower removed any real need of his doing otherwise. His most pressing task was to organize the cabinet to maximize its competence and durability.

Laurier had recognized the importance of organization at the first national Liberal convention in Ottawa in 1893. Here he pointed out the pragmatic route away from the electoral experience of 1891: "It is not enough to have good principles; we must have organization also. Principles without organization may lose, but organization without principles may often win."[111] Oliver Mowat, Premier of Ontario, was appointed as Minister of Justice to counter the accusation that the Laurier administration was anti-British. Perhaps to influence eastern voters, W.S. Fielding, the separatist premier of Nova Scotia, was appointed Minister of Finance. To capture western votes, Clifford Sifton, the powerful Attorney

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[111]Schull, **Laurier: The First Canadian**, pp. 269-70.

General of Manitoba and avid anti-imperialist, was appointed Minister of the Interior. French Canadians would also play an important role in the government. After the South African War, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, who accompanied Laurier to the Colonial and Imperial Conferences, would always remain French; first J.R.F. Prefontaine then L.P. Brodeur. Other notable French Canadians were Israel Tarte and Rodolphe Lemieux who advocated independence. In this way, for fifteen years Laurier shaped Canadian social, economic and political development. This era was a period of prosperity and national development, particularly when compared to the periodic depressions between 1873 and 1896. It was also an era of drastic geopolitical change that would exacerbate cultural tensions within Canada and threaten the national unity that was the central concern in the Laurier administration.

3.4 SUMMARY

Having established the rationale for an historical sociological methodology, this thesis argues that previous constitutional approaches and economic accounts are not sufficient to explain the emergence of a nationalizing Canadian state. All of these have been insightful, but like economic accounts of nationalism they ignore the larger realm of geopolitics. While some recognized the centralizing pressures exerted by the presence of an expansionist United States, they perceived it solely in commercial terms. But it is economic power and political power that were central to nation-states at this time. Both are central to geopolitical survival. This thesis approaches Canadian state and nation formation from a statist perspective, arguing that geopolitical rivalry encouraged state elites to consolidate ideological, economic, military, and political power so as to ensure their survival as a political entity. The application of a state-centred approach to the Canadian case advances both social theory and our understanding of Canadian state and

nation formation.

The main thrust of this thesis suggests that the Canadian state began to increase its responsibilities and the scope of its functions at the beginning of the twentieth century because of a change in the geopolitical environment. The years between the 1895 Venezuela Crisis and subsequent Hays-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 would mark the end of British dominance in North America and the beginning of American supremacy. There would be a growing awareness, especially after the Alaska Boundary Award, of the fact that improved Anglo-American relations were to the detriment of Canadian interests. For Canadian statesmen, this meant that British diplomacy could no longer be relied upon to protect Canadian interests. Similarly, after the South African War, Canadian statesmen were wary of Britain's call for closer imperial ties and "the vortex of European militarism" that motivated it. The primary consequence of this geopolitical context and its associated pressures was a growing recognition by leading Canadian statesmen for the development of Canadian diplomatic and military autonomy. This corresponds with Gellner's account of blocked social mobility in that Canadian state elites were increasingly dissatisfied with British influence in diplomacy and military affairs and took actions to rid themselves of British authority. The most efficient way to do this was to increase the responsibilities of the Canadian state while maintaining support of a "symbolic imperialism." But in doing this, the Canadian state had to be careful to protect its own interests while not disrupting national unity.

It is important to remember that just as the state impacts on the society it seeks to regulate, so too does the society impact on the state. The idea that Canadian statesmen were operating within a changing geopolitical context, corresponds with historical sociology's emphasis on structure and agency. The actions of Canadian statesmen, who held tremendous structural power, were influenced by the structure

of the domestic and geopolitical environment. Moreover, with the work of Mann and Putnam in mind, it is important to remember that domestic and international politics often coincide. Laurier and his colleagues were actually playing a much more complicated three-level game in which the stakes were the survival of a bi-cultural Canada.

Apart from these foreign matters, there were also domestic matters which correspond to Mann's discussion of how capitalism, representation, and national centralization dominated domestic policy. National centralization was at the heart of the National Policies. First, significant railway building was conducted to tie the state together leading to the doubling of Canada's railway mileage with the construction of two more transcontinentals - the Canadian Northern and the Grand Trunk Pacific. Moreover, this allowed for the settling of the Prairie provinces with immigrants and the establishment of the wheat economy. This in turn aided mineral development including the Yukon gold rush and more valuable mineral discoveries in the Canadian Shield. All of this had a profound effect on Canada's industrial growth and the strengthening of capitalism in Canada. While representation in terms of voting was not on the agenda, the rights of French-Canadians and immigrant populations were a pressing concern. Of these the most important subjects were religion, particularly in the cases of Manitoba Schools in 1897 and the North West Schools in 1905, and the problem of Asian immigration.

However, there was an additional domestic level. This was the maintenance of national unity which received significant consideration. These domestic concerns could not be separated from external affairs. Most British Canadians favoured closer imperial ties and would not support initiatives that weakened links with the mother country. As the first French-Canadian prime minister, Laurier was the first prime minister to recognize and sympathize with the duality of nationalisms in Canada and actually attempt to create a nation-state built

upon the principles of a civic or liberal nationalism. In this regard, this work follows that of Breuilly, Mann, and Hall in that "the patterning underlying different types of nationalism is political rather than social."[112] Such an approach seeks to integrate old and recent Canadian historiography by emphasizing the symbiotic relationship between the history of the "nation" and the history of "limited" identities.

The crucial indicator of an independent nation-state is that there is no external assertion of power over that state's territory. The development and exercise of political and military sources of social power are crucial indicators of a state's existence. A state must be able to protect the integrity of its borders through the control of its own military forces and treaty-making powers. Due to geopolitical changes, the Canadian state began to exercise its power in foreign affairs. It did so by resisting the centralizing powers of the British empire, by increasing its control of its own "despotic power," and by developing its own diplomatic powers and military institutions. In addition, it increased its "infrastructural power" over its territory and laid the foundations for an emerging national consciousness. This growing assertion of autonomy, coupled with territorial consolidation and development of the economy and infrastructure, contributed to the people's identity with the state and each other. The following chapters detail the growth of the Canadian state in the fundamentally important areas of diplomacy, arms, and territorial consolidation.

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[112]John A. Hall, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained", **Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences**, Volume 122, Number 3, 1993, p. 1.

CHAPTER FOUR

DIPLOMACY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the traditional and salient features of an independent state is the assertion of an independent foreign policy. The evolution of Canadian self-government has been well documented, yet it has not emphasized enough the role of Canadian statesmen and their interpretation of the geopolitical situation. They played an active role in securing more political power, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. They consequently contributed to the devolution of empire and furthered the renunciation of external rights to control foreign policy. Since Canadian territory occupied a buffer region between Britain and the United States, the problem elites faced was twofold. Complete withdrawal of the Empire would increase its geopolitical vulnerability to the United States. Yet, unquestioning acquiescence to the Imperial project would continue to sacrifice the interests of the Canadian state and its citizens. The most viable solution lay somewhere in the form of a compromise, but it would have to be initiated by Canadian statesmen.

i. Towards an Independent Canadian Foreign Policy

In international law, the British Empire was a single sovereign state. Canada, as a colony and later a Dominion, had no independent status or sovereignty of its own under international law. Rather, it had relations with other states, only as part of the empire. Although the Canadian Parliament controlled its domestic policy, they had no official voice in making foreign policy. Foreign relations were conducted for the entire empire by the Foreign Office in London, and the British diplomatic service and British consular officers distributed around the globe.

Since Confederation, the governor general had served as Britain's representative at Ottawa. While deferring to the wishes of the Canadian Prime Minister in all domestic matters, they served as the human link in the imperial chain with regards to matters of foreign policy. In effect, the prime minister was seen as the head of government while the governor general the head of state. Predictably, there were frequent problems as there were disagreements over the actual role of the governor general in guiding the policy of the Canadian state, particularly when it concerned the military. Dealing directly with the British Colonial Secretaries, the governor generals became key figures in the diplomatic relations between Canada and Britain. He consulted with Canadian cabinet ministers on external issues, but he alone was responsible for making recommendations to the Colonial Office. Not surprisingly, the foreign minister was free to ignore Canadian opinion while formulating the policy for the empire. This was seen as necessary because of the weakness of the colonies.[1]

As such, it has traditionally been argued that Canada's emergence as an independent power in the international community occurred during the years immediately after the First World War. First, there was the resolution adopted at the Imperial War Conference of 1917 which endorsed the principle of the dominions having "an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations." Second, Canada's signing of the 1919 Versailles Treaty served as a reminder of Canada's new international status. Finally, by 1931, the Statute of Westminster gave formal legal effect to principle stated in the Imperial Conference of 1926 that the dominions "are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect

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[1]John Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs, Vol. 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946**, Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990, pp. 7-8.

of their domestic or external affairs...."[2]

However, emphasis of these important developments ignores the earlier hard-won precedents achieved by Canadian statesmen. Indeed, Canadian control over diplomacy had to overcome many obstacles. Initially, Britain learned little from the American Revolution. The loss of the thirteen colonies was interpreted as a result of weak political control, and the Peace of Paris of 1781 was followed by a general tightening of restrictions on the remaining areas under British rule. The French Revolution and the subsequent violence only strengthened these restrictions.

Although the Canadian rebellions of 1837 were easily repressed, it signified to Britain a misunderstanding in its handling of British North America. Colonials complained that British representatives could not understand or deal with local problems and, usually unintentionally, their decisions contributed to poor administration. While Lord Durham's investigation was cut short, his report is perhaps the most important document on British imperial policy in the nineteenth century. The core principle of the Durham Report was responsible government which aimed at producing an empire based on free consent. Once responsible government was accepted, Confederation was soon to follow.

After the 1841 Act of Union, distrust of British diplomacy continued as a result of the unfavourable settlements of the 1842 New Brunswick-Maine boundary dispute and the 1846 Oregon boundary dispute. There developed a strong feeling among Canadians that British representatives neglected, if not deliberately sacrificed, vital Canadian interests for the sake of British or imperial interests in

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[2]H. Gordon Skilling, **Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy**, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1945.

political negotiations.[3] Confederation did not solve the problem as the British North America Act did not touch directly upon the subject of treaty-making in Canada. The assumption in 1867 was that the treaty-making power would continue to be Britain's responsibility. For this reason, the only provision of the Act referring to treaties was section 132, which related not to the actual *making* of treaties, but to their *implementation* within Canada.[4]

Therefore, as of 1867, the capacity to negotiate treaties on behalf of Canada, as distinguished from the power to implement them through legislation, existed exclusively in Britain. Even though Lord Carnarvon had noted as early as 1870 that, "Our relations to Canada have been, and are, political rather than colonial," the British Foreign Office guarded the diplomatic unity of the British Empire. Indeed, the channel of communications between Canada and the rest of the world flowed through London. However, throughout the late nineteenth century there was a growing move towards autonomy, including the right for Canada to make its own treaties. It began with Canadian participation in international treaties affecting Canada, most notably the Washington Treaty of 1871, which prime minister John A. Macdonald attended as a British representative.

While Macdonald always hoped that Canada would remain within the framework of the British Empire, he was

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[3]Glazebrook, **Canadian External Relations**, p. 108; A.G. Dewey, **Dominions and Diplomacy: The Canadian Contribution**, Volume 1, London: Longmans, 1929, pp. 187-191.

[4]Act 132 of the 1867 British North America Act reads: The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries. See H.McD. Clokie, **Canadian Government and Politics**, London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1945, p. 302.

disillusioned to find that the British representatives used Canadian interests as a pawn in negotiating with the United States. As he observed,

> I must say that I am greatly disappointed at the course taken by the British Commissioners. They seem to have only one thing in their minds - that is, to go home to England with a treaty in their pockets, settling everything, no matter at what cost to Canada.

Even after the establishment of a High Commissioner in London, the British system of representation was increasingly revealed to be inadequate, especially in the areas of immigration and trade. Nothing was done to improve the British diplomatic service so as to make it more sensitive to Canadian needs. In theory, all British subjects could enter the British diplomatic service. In practice, Canadians, or those acquainted with Canadian conditions, were seldomly appointed to the Foreign Office or to positions of representation abroad.[5]

This was not surprising for Canadians, since British diplomacy was seen by Britain to be a mechanism for the defence of the interests of the United Kingdom. In the five special investigations of the diplomatic service conducted between 1861 and 1914, the ability of the service to meet the needs of the empire in general was not even considered. The reports do not refer to Canada, or the other British colonies, and even the critics of the diplomatic service gave little or no attention to its relationship with the Dominions. Moreover, an examination of British consular officers revealed their inefficiency in promoting trade prior to the First World War. No wonder Canadians became increasingly dissatisfied with

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[5]Skilling, **Canadian Representation Abroad**, p. xii. Established in 1880 to represent Canada's needs with regards to relations with Britain, the High Commissioner was the first Canadian representative abroad with quasi-diplomatic status.

British representation of Canadian interests.[6]

Nationalists in Canada began to demand greater Canadian control over Canadian affairs. Edward Blake, leader of the Liberal Party, was neither a British imperialist nor an annexationist, but cared only for the promotion of Canadian interests. He and his "Canada First" Party devoted themselves to the cultivation of the national spirit. They called for an end to the aberration of "a Government, the freest, perhaps the most democratic in the world, with reference to local and domestic matters," but in its foreign relations had "no more voice than the people of Japan."[7] For Blake, the sheer geographical size of Canada and the extent of its material wealth, meant that the Canadian government deserved increased treaty-making powers and the British government should have to accept the advice of Canadian statesmen in matters of Canadian concern.[8]

By 1892, as leader of the oppositional Liberal party, Laurier continued the case for further Canadian autonomy in foreign policy, particularly commercial policy and dealings with the United States. Laurier did not believe that Canada would remain a colony. Its growing population, its constitution, its self government, and especially its "interests which are separate and distinct" from those of the Empire, meant that "complete independence" would remain "as the supreme goal" for many Canadians.[9] Laurier wanted to reform Canada's "inferior" colonial citizenship by breaking "away from the old rusty chains of parental rule" and claiming

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[6]Skilling, **Canadian Representation Abroad**, p. xiii.

[7]John Galbraith, **The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951, p. 19.

[8]House of Commons Debates, 1882, 21 April, pp. 1068-1075. Hereafter cited as Debates.

[9]Debates, 7 April, 1882, pp. 1136-37.

the right of "negotiating our own treaties." Clearly, Canada had "advanced in progress." in that its "wants and requirements" were "no longer confined within the borders of [its] territories. Laurier further demanded that the Canadian state "have larger powers" so as to acquire "fields abroad....for our energy and enterprise."[10]

For Laurier, the most significant reason for this expansion of treaty-making powers was the fact that Canadian "interests are so much at variance with the interests of Great Britain..." Moreover, the record of British diplomacy was one "of failure, and of surrender and sacrifice" particularly along Canada's lake frontier, its Oregon territories, and the State of Maine's intrusion into Canadian territory. This being the case, Laurier reiterated that "the interests of Canada should be dealt with by the Canadian people and not by English diplomats," and that it would be preferable to have a Canadian Tory negotiate a treaty for Canada than an English Liberal.[11] By no means did Laurier want to imply that such a move would entail violence:

> There is not a country on the face of the earth which ever achieved its independence, except at the cost of blood and war and enmity with the parent state. I hold out to my fellow countrymen the idea of independence, but, whenever the day comes, it must come by the consent of both countries, and we shall continue to keep the good feeling and good-will of the motherland. If we are true to our record, we will again exhibit to the world the unique, the unprecedented example of a nation achieving its independence by slow degrees.[12]

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[10]Debates, 7 April, 1892, pp. 1141-42.

[11]Debates, 7 April, 1892, pp. 1143-44. Shortly after this, in 1893, Sir Charles Tupper, as the Canadian representative, brought negotiations with France to a successful conclusion, the British Ambassador playing a symbolic part in the discussions. The use of Canadian representatives in this fashion would be increased by Laurier.

[12]Debates, 7 April, 1892, pp. 1141-42.

In light of this growing assertiveness, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon, prepared a circular despatch in 1895 on commercial treaties. He firmly rejected the proposal for giving the Colonies "the power of negotiating treaties for themselves without reference to Her Majesty's Government." Such negotiations, he insisted, must be conducted by the British representative at the capital of the country with which the colony wished to negotiate. The British diplomat could be assisted by a colonial delegate "either as a second plenipotentiary or in a subordinate capacity." If an agreement were concluded, it would require the approval of both Britain and the colony concerned with the former, if necessary, overriding the wishes of the latter in it chosen role as guardian of "the common interests of the Empire." The Ripon orders would eventually be swept away by Canada when the Laurier government introduced a tariff bill that directly violated the instructions of the colonial secretary.

As it was, the diplomatic process produced inconvenient delays. Secretary of State, Elihu Root (1905-09), once explained why negotiations with Canada might take six months:

> I would make some propositions to the British Ambassador here. He would send it to the Foreign Office in London, the Foreign Office would send it to the Colonial Office would send it to the government at Ottawa....Finally, Sir Wilfrid Laurier would find some time to pay attention to it.[13]

This condition of "imperfectly developed sovereignty" did not halt Canadian statesmen from relentlessly guarding their country's interests. They became skilful at playing off the United States and Britain against each other in an attempt to

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[13]F. Soward, **The Department of External Affairs and Canadian Autonomy, 1899-1939**, Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1961, p. 3.

secure satisfactory terms on such questions as tariff rates and fishery rights. In 1897, Lord Salisbury, in a conversation with the United States Ambassador, compared Canada to a "coquettish girl with two suitors." John Hay replied sarcastically that "a closer analogy would be to call her a married flirt, ready to betray John Bull on any occasion but holding him responsible for all her follies!"[14]

Nevertheless, Canadian autonomy demanded that a Canadian state take a more active role in determining foreign policy. This included making its own decisions in terms of imperial commitment and military design, but also in relations with its closest neighbour, the United States. At the 1897 Colonial Conference, Laurier had told Chamberlain that the Americans were "peculiar people" and disliked the way they handled their international relations. To achieve better relations with them, particularly since Canadian territorial issues were the chief source of friction, Laurier suggested that a Canadian attaché should be attached to the British embassy.[15] Nothing came of the suggestion, yet struggles over jurisdictions and territorial boundaries continued to contribute to the formation of a nationalizing Canadian state. Canada was a "frontier" society whose "boundaries" were still in the process of being established. In the process of determining the political context of its territorial reach, the Canadian state was forging a social context that was neither British nor American. Increasingly, the Canadian state started to take a more active role in treaty-making, particularly when it involved boundary decisions with the United States. This would require not only more control in diplomatic negotiations, but the proper information concerning boundaries. To this end,

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[14]Soward, **The Department of External Affairs...**, pp. 3-4.

[15]Richard Preston, **The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America 1867-1939**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1977, p. 137.

Canadian statesmen had already been actively engaged in acquiring the appropriate documents. Officials from the Department of the Interior were sent to Britain "for the purpose of completing [Canadian] copies of the maps of the boundary between Canada and the United States." They were considered crucial for Canada "to maintain the boundaries in good order and to prevent our territory from being infringed upon by the United States."[16] Their fears were soon realized.

ii. The Price of British Diplomacy

British willingness to put the interests of the United States ahead of Canada was clearly illustrated in the resolution of the Alaskan boundary dispute. The crisis started in 1896 after prospectors found gold in the Klondike region of Canada. This event sparked the Klondike Gold Rush, causing a massive influx of people from around the globe. The favoured route was across the Alaska panhandle at the towns of Skagway and Dyea, over the mountains at Chilkoot or White Pass, and then down the Yukon River to Dawson. What became problematic was deciding who actually had sovereignty over the ports of entry. The citizens of Skagway and Dyea considered themselves Americans in American territory, but the Canadian state thought differently.

When the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, it inherited the Russian position on the boundary, first defined in the 1825 Anglo-Russian treaty. The United States claimed a continuous stretch of coastline, unbroken by the deep fiords of the region. Canada demanded control of the heads of certain inlets, especially the Lynn Canal, which left harbours in Canadian territory, and gave Canadian control over

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[16]A.M Brugess Deputy Minister of the Interior to Sir Donald Smith, High Commissioner for Canada. A letter of introduction for Mr. J. Johnston, the Geographer of the Department of the Interior 29 May, 1896, RG25, Vol. 96, and Vol. 98, June-August 1898, NAC.

the important waterways to the gold territory. The Canadian state could not consent to the removal of gold by American miners, and the United States could not yield territory that it had held for thirty years. As such it became a territorial issue and a point of national honour.[17]

According to Minto, Laurier believed that it was the lack of accurate information that made it "impossible to be aware of Americans settling there (Pyramid Harbour Alaska) as they had done." Further, Laurier considered the dispute so "grave....that if allowed to continue [it] may lead to bloodshed."[18] Chamberlain acknowledged that Britain's position in the initial negotiations was "not a very strong one," due mostly to British "neglect of Canada in past years."[19] Moreover, he believed that "Canadians have suffered very much by having no proper representation of their case in the papers, or otherwise, in this country."[20]

In March 1898, rather than rely on the British for diplomatic pressure, Laurier proposed a conference in which the two sides would attempt to resolve both the Alaska boundary and the Bearing Sea fur seal dispute. The Americans accepted and the Joint High Commission met to discuss these issues, among others, in August 1898 in Quebec. In 1899, the American High Commissioners were willing to give Canada access to the sea on the Alaskan coast and a port under Canadian jurisdiction. The sovereignty of the territory transferred to

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[17]See John Munro, ed., **The Alaska Boundary Dispute**, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970; Norman Penlington, **The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal**, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972.

[18]Minutes on meeting with Laurier, 23 May, 1899, Minto Papers, MG27, II, B I, Vol. 14, C-3114, NAC. Cited hereafter as Minto Papers.

[19]Chamberlain to Minto, 8 May, 1899, Minto Papers.

[20]Chamberlain to Minto, 4 July, 1899, Minto Papers.

Canada would remain with the United States. According to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, America would not permit its coastline to be broken "with another Halifax or Esquimault."[21]

The negotiations eventually failed and the problem was referred to an international tribunal, consisting of three American and two Canadian members, all of whom were quite openly partisan. The sixth member was Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England. The boundary dispute would remain a point of contention until October, 1903. Lord Alverstone originally supported the Canadian case. However, he switched to support the American claim for a boundary running behind the heads of the inlets and agreed to the equal distribution of four islands at the mouth of the Portland Canal. It has been suggested that his switch had much to do with the warming of Anglo-American relations discussed previously. During the negotiations, President Roosevelt threatened to "get ugly" with Canada if necessary and moved troops to reinforce his commitment to the American position. For Tansil, "the British Government resented these Rooseveltian tactics, but the changing scene on the stage of world politics made Lord Landsdowne give the President the leading role in this drama of Anglo-American relations."[22] Indeed, the realities of the decision were grounded in geopolitical diplomacy. Among the great powers, only the United States advocated British actions in the South African war. In 1901, by surrendering her right to a Panama canal in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, Britain had accepted American dominance in North America waters on both sides of the continent. British patronage was clearly illustrated in a letter from Lord Pauncefote to Lord

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[21]Cited in L.M. Gelber, **The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898-1906**, Hamden: Anchor, 1966, p. 43.

[22]Charles Tansil, **Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943, p. 235.



THE ALASKA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

Salisbury, "America seems to be our only friend just now and it would be unfortunate to quarrel with her."[23] There would be no war over an Alaska boundary since Britain did not want to risk losing one of its few allies and it was clear that Canadians were certainly not prepared for it.[24]

Canadian statesmen were anxious about the Panama canal which would inevitably affect the maritime approach to its Pacific coast. Western Canada had just began a period of extensive development, increasing the importance of British Columbian ports. Canadian statesmen were concerned about possible risks to sea-borne traffic to and from their Pacific ports should sovereignty of the Panama canal be given freely to the United States. Canadians wanted to share in the control of the project and Laurier approved of a plan for the United States, Britain, and Canada to cooperate and construct the canal. Moreover, Canadians wanted Britain to abstain from supporting the American canal project until the Alaska boundary had been settled.[25] But Joseph Chamberlain informed the Canadian government of the negative effects upon Anglo-American relations if Great Britain refused to sign the Hay-Pauncefote draft convention which granted the United States permission to build the Panama canal. It "would be regarded as an affront to the United States Government and would tend to shake the position of the President, whose friendly attitude is in the present condition of public affairs of great importance."[26]

Not surprisingly, therefore, Laurier held suspicions that

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[23]C.S. Campbell, **Anglo-American Understanding 1898-1903**, John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1957, p. 190.

[24]Desmond Morton, **Canada and War: A Military and Political History**, Toronto: Butterworths, 1981, p. 45. Penlington, **The Alaska Boundary Dispute...**, pp. 91-102.

[25]Gelber, **The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship...**, p. 43.

[26]Chamberlain to Minto, 30 January, 1900, Minto Papers.

the verdict would go against Canada. He believed that, "If we are thrown over by the Chief Justice, he will give the last blow to British diplomacy in Canada."[27] When Alverstone switched his vote, Clifford Sifton, Laurier's Minister of the Interior, told Laurier that the verdict was "wholly unsatisfactory" as the two islands assigned to the United States commanded the entrance to the Portland Channel and destroyed the "strategic value" of the other two. The two islands, Laurier replied, were transferred to the United States by no justifiable interpretation of the Anglo-Russian Treaty: "It is one of those concessions which have made British diplomacy odious to Canadian people, and it will have most lamentable effect. Our Commissioners ought to protest in most vigorous terms."[28]

Sifton had been assigned the position of British "Agent" to attend the Tribunal under the Hay-Herbert convention. The treaty called for each side to select three impartial jurists, who would decide by majority vote, the questions put before them. Sifton observed the proceedings in London and was annoyed with how the British authorities forced the convention through, as if to simply appease the Americans. In a letter to John W. Dafoe, editor of Sifton's **Manitoba Press**, Sifton explained his position:

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[27]Laurier to Sifton, 8 October, 1903, Sifton Papers, MG27, II, D15, vol. 275, NAC. Hereafter cited as Sifton Papers.

[28]Correspondence cited in John Dafoe, **Clifford Sifton in Relation to his Times**, Macmillan: Toronto, 1931, p. 233. Sir Clifford Sifton represented the House of Commons from 1896 to 1911. From 1896 to 1905 he was minister of the interior. During these years he prosecuted a vigorous immigration policy which resulted in populating the vacant Canadian west. He resigned in 1905 because of disagreement with Laurier over the educational clauses of the Acts which created the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. In 1909 he was appointed chairman of the Canadian Conservation Commission which he held until 1918. In 1911 he opposed the proposals of Laurier for reciprocity with the United States and withdrew from parliament and the Liberal party.

> As you have no doubt already sized up the matter, the British Government deliberately decided about a year ago to sacrifice our interests at any cost, for the sake of pleasing the United States. All their proceedings since that time were for the sake of inveigling us into a position from which we could not retire. I am bound to say that we have been pretty easy prey, but the result would probably have been the same in any event, as it simply gets down to a very narrow question. The United States would not recede, and England would not take any chances of a quarrel.
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> It is however, the most cold-blooded case of absolutely giving away our interests, without even giving us the excuse of saying we have had a fight for it, which I know of, and I do not see any reason why the Canadian press should not make itself extremely plain upon the subject. My view, in watching the diplomacy of Great Britain as affecting Canada for six years, is that it may just as well be decided in advance that practically whatever the United States demands from England will be conceded in the long run, and the Canadian people might as well make up their minds to that right now.[29]

In the opinion of Dafoe, the decision left Sifton "essentially nationalist in spirit and outlook."[30] It certainly did not better his relations with Governor-General Minto, with whom he had clashed consistently since 1900 over issues such as, reciprocity, management of the Yukon gold fields, Queen Victoria's funeral, and the South African War.[31] Even Joseph Pope, who considered himself a loyal British subject, believed Lord Alverstone had "behaved badly" and his "scurvy trick" had "robbed [Canada] of much of the advantage."[32]

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[29]Dafoe, **Clifford Sifton...**, pp. 221-222.

[30]Dafoe, **Clifford Sifton...**, p. 212.

[31]For more detail on these events see chapters ten and eleven in Carman Miller, **The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto: The Education of a Viceroy**, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980.

[32]Maurice Pope, **Public Servant: The Memoirs of Sir Joseph Pope**, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 152 and 299.

The Americans had the tighter case, and with Alverstone supporting it, the tribunal rejected Canada's arguments and granted most of the United States' claims. With hindsight, the final decision was not necessarily unfair, as Canada did not have to give up as much land as might be expected and did gain control of Wales and Pearse islands by the Portland Canal. In addition, evidence suggests that Laurier was willing to concede to the United States wishes because of Newfoundland's interest in negotiating reciprocity with the American government. Laurier probably believed that such an arrangement would lead to the assimilation of Newfoundland into the United States, rather than bringing it into Confederation. Such an outcome would have profound geopolitical consequences for Canada, and consequently, Laurier relinquished his strong stance in order to prevent a Newfoundland-United States agreement when it reached the Foreign Office.[33] Nevertheless, it is necessary to appreciate how Canadians responded at that particular time.

In protest, the Canadian judges refused to sign the award. Irritated at the decision, Laurier asserted that Canada's lack of treaty-making power made it difficult to maintain its rights internationally. However, he took no immediate action other than to suggest a need for the revision in treaty-making rights. On October 23rd, 1903, the Award was discussed in the House of Commons in a debate that highlighted Laurier's classic summary of the problem:

> I have often regretted...that we are living beside a great neighbour who...is very grasping in their national acts, and who are determined upon every occasion to get the best in any agreement which they make. I have often regretted also that while they are a great and powerful nation, we are only a small colony, a growing colony, but still a

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[33]Campbell, **Anglo-American Understanding...**, Chapter 12, and R.C. Brown, and R. Cook, **Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974, pp. 46-47.

> colony....The difficulty as I conceive it to be, is that so long as Canada remains a dependency of the British Crown, the present powers we have are not sufficient for the maintenance of our rights. It is important that we ask the British Parliament for more extensive powers, so that, if ever we have to deal with matters of a similar nature again we shall deal with them in our own fashion and according to the best light that we have.[34]

This statement concerned Lord Minto who was aware of "open talk of 'separation' and other headstrong proposals" in Canada and recognized that Laurier's "arrangement would really mean independence."[35] Moreover, for Minto, the reaction to the Alaskan Boundary award illustrated that "[t]he dominant feeling in Canada is that of a rising young nationality, not of an imperial dependency - Canadian not Imperial interests are her first thought, and I fear that in her youthful self-confidence she is at present incapable of realizing their mutual existence."[36] Joseph Raymond Prefontaine, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, at a banquet at Laval University, in the presence of Laurier, stated that negotiators appointed by Britain had not proved to be useful allies of their Canadian associates. He added that, in future, Canada should negotiate with foreign states without the presence of "embarrassing third parties....Canada is a young nation, but has learned enough by experience to understand her own interests better

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[34]Debates, 23 October, 1903, p. 14814.

[35]Minto to Lyttleton, 25 October 1903, Minto Papers.

[36]Minto to Chamberlain, Secret, 9 March, 1903, Minto Papers. For more details of Minto's assessment of the Canadian reaction to the award, see Stevens P., and John Saywell, eds., **Lord Minto's Canadian Papers**, 2 Volumes, The Champlain Society: Toronto, 1981, Volume II, pp. 347-377. What is clear from these pages is that Canadians perceived the decision as strategically disastrous for Canada and contributed to their assertion that their interests had been sacrificed for the sake of United States friendship.

than others of more advanced age."[37]

The Alaskan Boundary Award was a crucial turning point in Sifton's thinking about Canada's role in the British Empire. Sifton became irritated at Canada's powerless colonial position, the appeasing British attitude, and American territorial aggressiveness. Sifton wrote,

> It is beyond a question that the cold blooded and somewhat supercilious conduct of our English friends has had a profound effect upon Canadian opinion....I regard it as out of the question that the representatives of Canada as it exists today will be content to do business in the way in which it has been done, and...a somewhat radical readjustment will be required before a great while. I do not see why the aspirations of the young men of Canada for independence should be either suppressed or ridiculed. There are many countries much less strong in population and resources who find no difficulty in managing their own affairs.[38]

Similarly, in a speech to the Ottawa Club in December, he spoke of the need to improve Canadian defences because in future Britain could not be relied upon. To John W. Dafoe, editor of the **Winnipeg Free Press**, he added that this was the only way to avoid being annexed to the United States. "The Yankees have simply got a lust for power, territory & expenditure & they are going to be the biggest bully the world has ever seen." He told Professor Adam Short, of Queen's University, that the Canadian state had to become self-reliant in its negotiations. In essence, Sifton believed that Canada could not count on Britain and that the connection with the mother country should become much more informal so that Canadian growth would not be constricted.

The suggestion that Canada establish direct relations

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[37]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1903, p. 328.

[38]Sifton to A.M. Peterson, 13 November, 1903, Sifton Papers. Also cited in Dafoe, **Clifford Sifton**, pp. 239-40 and Hall, **Clifford Sifton**, p. 123.

with the United States was supported by American statesmen. The United States Consul General in Ottawa reported that "Canada should, in the future, insist upon the exclusive management of all international questions which relate exclusively to Canada, without British interference or control."[39] Prominent Canadians agreed. Bourassa declared that Canada should learn from the experience and future dealings should be conducted directly with the American Government through the Canadian agent in Washington, rather than through British statesmen.[40] Robert Borden argued belatedly that only Canadians should have been appointed to the tribunal.[41]

Canadians had been furious over the Alaska decision, not only at the triumph of American forcefulness but at British complacency. Anti-British feeling erupted in Canada. While most comments were restrained, there were exceptions. Mayor Neelands of Vancouver declared he "would not be surprised if it resulted in a strong and widespread movement looking toward the establishment of Canadian independence." The **Windsor Record** announced that the sentiments favouring an independent commonwealth were gaining ground and seemed "to be our ultimate destiny." On October 27, the New **Glasgow Eastern Chronicle** denounced Lord Alverstone's conduct and continued, "For a number of years British statesmen would have been glad if Canada would cease to be dependent upon them. In fact, they cannot see Canada for the United States. Our view then, is that Canada should take herself out of the way." On October 29, the **St. John Globe** declared that "there is little doubt that this Alaskan Award business will considerably advance a

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[39]Quoted in John Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs: The Early Years, 1909-1946**, Vol. 1, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-University Press, 1990, p. 25.

[40]Debates, 23 October, 1903, p. 14787.

[41]Debates, 23 October, 1903, pp. 14794-95.

feeling towards Canadian independence." On November 18, it repeated its concern: "As we grow in numbers, in strength, and in wealth, the more surely we will go our own way, simply because it is our way....Independence is an absolute result of giving Colonies freedom of Government." The **Halifax Chronicle** of October 29, declared that there were now only two courses open for Canada-complete independence within the Empire subject only to the Sovereign, or assumption of the status of an independent nation.[42]

On December 9, the **London Daily Mail** interviewed Laurier who said that the Dominion was unanimous in demanding the right of making her own treaties in order that such an incident as the Alaskan Award should never recur. Had this been the case earlier, and in connection with the appointment of American partisan Commissioners, "we would have at once put our foot down in protest," and he believed the result would have been very different:

> There are today nearly six million people who believe with passionate conviction that they have the right to determine the course of matters relating to their commerce and their boundaries. Moreover, we have convincing proof that the existing system is persistently, fatally, hostile to Canadian interests.

The **Windsor Record** of October 29, stated its belief that "to obtain the treaty-making power Canada must become a nation and hoist her own flag." The **Eastern Chronicle** (November 6) echoed similar sentiments: "If Canada wants the treaty-making power it means she wants Independence." Others such as the **Toronto Globe** saw the request as meaning "only larger independence within the Empire" by having Canadians "chosen by the Canadian Government" representing "His Majesty."

At the Canadian Club banquet in Ottawa on January 18

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[42]The above newspaper commentary are cited in **The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1903.

Laurier referred to independence: "There are two policies before us. There is a policy of concentration and there is the policy of what we will call decentralization or rather local autonomy." The **Vancouver World** of July 28th stated that,

> The Premier of Canada is received in Europe with nearly all the honours accorded a visiting Sovereign. Our right to control our military affairs has again been conceded, and no more will an Imperial officer come to this country with the idea that he can dictate our military policy. We are now forming the nucleus of a Canadian Navy. A logical step, which will be taken sooner or later, is the assumption of the Treaty-making power, subject, of course to the Imperial veto.[43]

Meanwhile, the work of the Canadian Nationalist League in 1903 was complemented in the Province of Quebec by the establishment on March 6th, 1904, of a Sunday journal in Montreal called **Le Nationaliste**. "Absolute autonomy" for Canada and keen opposition to Imperialism, or Colonial aid to the Empire, constituted the platform. Bourassa made the announcement that:

> Neither anti-Briticism not anti-Imperialism is our êraison-d'otre. We have drawn from a wider thought....This thought is the creation of a national spirit that may distinguish us among peoples of the world; this sentiment, the love of the soil that our ancestors would never have imbued with their blood if they had believed that one day, instead of bearing a sovereign people and bringing forth, the fruits of liberty, it would dissolve ingloriously into an Empire whose colonies, like those of ancient Rome, would exist only to furnish their Mother-land with treasure and blood.

It is conceivable that much of this domestic concern over the disadvantages of imperialism influenced Laurier's thinking, and to a certain extent Canada's growing national consciousness. Indeed, a contemporary observer of colonial nationalism noted that "according to popular phraseology,

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[43]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1903, p. 328.

Canada is not a colony, but "the Dominion"; and her people are not colonists upon England's estate, but the Canadian nation occupying its own territory." For him, while Canadian nationalism was largely a result of anxiety towards "the hostile ambitions of the United States", and "the racial particularism of Quebec", Canada could not hope to further her national ambitions so long as her foreign affairs and defence remained in the hands of Britain.[44]

Canadian anger gradually subsided, although suspicions of the United States provoked by the award may have contributed to Canada's rejection of free trade in the 1911 reciprocity election. Nevertheless, the Alaska settlement promoted better understanding between the United States and Britain, an understanding that would work to Britain's advantage in the First World War. Certainly, the Alaska Boundary Award, just like the South African War would, drew attention to the lack of autonomy in external affairs, and to the complications which would arise from that condition.

It demonstrated the importance of asking the British Parliament for greater power so that Canadian statesmen could take a more active role in protecting Canadian interests. Therefore, during the following years, it is possible to point to several important indicators of growing Canadian autonomy in external affairs and treaty-making. Overall, there was evidence of increasing Canadian initiative in international relations, especially those dealing with the United States. In addition, Canadian representatives were used to secure economic treaties and immigration agreements. Each of these will now be discussed in greater detail.

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[44]Richard Jebb, **Studies in Colonial Nationalism**, London: E.A. Arnold, 1905, p. 2.

4.2 EXPANSION OF TREATY-MAKING POWERS

i. Commercial Policy

The commercial policy of the Canadian Liberal party in the late nineteenth century had two primary objectives: a trade agreement with the United States on the basis of reciprocal free trade or low-tariffs, and freedom to negotiate commercial treaties independently of Britain.[45] Before Confederation, and in the first decade after it, the standard procedure governing commercial treaties was to include the colonies in British treaties of commerce. Many of these treaties obligated Canada to give most-favoured-nation treatment to the countries concerned. This included a treaty with Belgium in 1862, and with the German *Zollverein* of 1865. In 1877, the British government proposed that self-governing colonies should be notified of a pending commercial treaty and given the option of adhering to it or being explicitly excluded. The adoption of this principle allowed the Canadian government a new freedom of action which it took advantage. For instance, between 1881 and 1882, the Canadian government declined to be included in treaties with Egypt, Ecuador, Rumania, and Serbia, but agreed to a treaty with Morocco that had limited obligations.[46]

Despite this new approval principle, Canada still did not have the power to conclude treaties by its own authority and relied on the official recognition by Imperial authorities. Furthermore, there was some indignation felt by key Canadian statesmen over treaties negotiated with foreign countries by

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[45]See James Colvin "Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the British Preferential Tariff System," in Carl Berger, ed., **Imperial Relations in the Age of Laurier**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969; and James Clovin, **Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Imperial Problem, 1896-1906**, PhD Thesis, University of London, 1954.

[46]Glazebrook, **A History of Canadian External Relations**, pp. 146-148.

Britain on behalf of Canada - such as the Belgian and German commercial treaties. Blake's Liberals sought to free Canada from these treaties and he was supported by Laurier.[47] Because Britain had always "sacrificed the interests of Canada," Laurier believed that,

> Our duty is to Canada and not to England....And so I insist...that in all these matters it is for any self-governing country to look to its own interests first, last, and always....Let the Parliament of Great Britain attend to the business of Great Britain as the Parliament of Canada will attend to the business of Canada.[48]

Moreover, reciprocity was becoming increasingly more important to the Liberals. They believed that reciprocity would benefit the Canadian economy and offered an economic force to counteract the excessive influence exercised by Great Britain in the political sphere. Certainly, Laurier was adamantly opposed to British influence in Canadian affairs, and often declared that his ambition was to further the autonomy of Canadian commercial policy.[49]

As leader of the opposition, Laurier reminded the government that there was no place for sentiment in commerce: "I am ready any day, whether I am charged with annexation or not, to take a Yankee dollar in preference to an English shilling.[50] This was accentuated two years later when he told a Boston audience, "...that if the interests of Canada and the interests of Britain should at any time, as they may be, opposed to one another, then you will know where I am to be

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[47]Debates, 18 February, 1889, pp. 172-193.

[48]Debates, 30 September, 1891, pp. 6315-6316.

[49]Debates, 30 September, 1891, p. 6315; and, 7 April, 1892, pp. 1142-1143.

[50]Debates, 7 April, 1892, p. 1144.

found - I will be found hostile to Britain."[51]

Similarly, Sir Richard Cartwright, who Laurier picked as Minister of Trade and Commerce, asserted that the Canadians owed Britain nothing in terms of commerce. For him, the British market was not the best market, but rather "a second-rate and second best market; and the only true and really valuable market is the market which extends for 3,000 miles along our southern border."[52] Cartwright had the opportunity to discuss Canada's commercial position, with regards to the United States and Britain, with Joseph Chamberlain. Chamberlain was not opposed to a general tariff reduction,

> But if on the contrary the Canadian government proposes to put the mother country at a distinct disadvantage, I think that very strong feelings would be excited on the subject....It seems to me a step, and a very great one, toward political separation, and you cannot expect any assistance from the mother country to such a policy.[53]

Laurier had to wait. Conditions in the United States were uncertain after its presidential election and there was increasing evidence that Canadian public opinion was more in favour of an extension of trade with Britain. With the American Dingley Bill of 1897, the Liberals had to abandon their plans and continue their policy of protection until 1911.[54]

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[51]Debates, 23 April, 1894, p. 1859.

[52]Debates, 14 February, 1883, pp. 708-718; 28 March, 1894, p. 328.

[53]Quoted in Colvin, **Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Imperial Problem**, p. 59.

[54]The Dingley Bill reflected the new concern of the United States with expansion into European markets. It raised the tariff on dutiable imports by 6.4 percent and on all imports by 5.7 percent. See David Lake, **Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939**, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 125-131.

The government's 1897 Tariff Bill, with its imperial preference, had several aims.[55] First, by conferring the preference upon Britain while applying the general tariff to the United States, the Canadian government was actually in the process of exerting pressure on the latter. Second, it was politically sound in terms of domestic politics, in that it was extremely popular with Canadians. Third, without seeming disloyal, it enabled the state to strike for commercial freedom. The Liberals had long sought to free Canada from the all-embracing treaties negotiated by the British foreign office.

The Tariff Bill provided that if any state gave to Canadian products tariff preference as favourable as that granted by Canada to the state with which the dominion had reciprocal tariff concessions, then Canada could reduce the duties on that country's products. The Conservative opposition attacked the tariff as being contrary to the imperial constitution. Sir Charles Tupper denounced the commercial policy of the government as "nothing short of a declaration of independence, an insult rather than a compliment, an absurd scheme."[56]

But Britain did not share these views because they were the immediate beneficiary. When W.S. Fielding, the Minister of Finance, submitted his budget speech in 1897 he had announced that Canada would apply a general tariff to the United States while giving preference to Britain.[57] At the 1897 Colonial Conference, with this new commercial policy in hand, Laurier

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[55]Debates, 22 April, 1897, pp. 1107-10.

[56]Debates, 25 May, 1897, pp. 2850-2861.

[57]This would be a principal component of the National Policy which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. W.S. Fielding, had been the Liberal premier of Nova Scotia from 1884 to 1896. He became minister of finance in the Federal government, a position he held from 1896 to 1911.

satisfied the imperial sentiment in Canada by presenting himself as a sponsor of imperial commercial unity. However, such a policy violated the Belgian and German treaties with Britain. Chamberlain was impressed with Laurier's proposal, thinking that it would encourage the other colonial premiers to follow Canada's lead. At the conclusion of the conference, Belgium and Germany were informed by a somewhat embarrassed Britain that their commercial treaties would be terminated.[58]

Not surprisingly, the Belgium and German governments were annoyed and surprised that a colony was able to dictate, however subtly, the trade relations of the Mother Country. The **London Daily Mail** reported the occasion in a more positive light, stating that "a politician of our New World has been recognized as the equal of the great men of the Old Country."[59] By 1899, the British government was forced to agree that all imperial commercial treaties to which the self-governing colonies adhered should contain a clause allowing them separately to denounce such treaties. It thus conceded them the right of "contracting out" to supplement the right of "contracting in," which they had already acquired.

The Canadian state made further moves towards autonomy in treating-making after the South African War and the contentious Alaskan Boundary Award. It began to take advantage of the presence of foreign consular representatives from Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy, by holding discussions that skirted British channels. The appointments of foreign consuls were made by their home governments, and were subsequently approved by the Foreign Office without prior consultation with the Canadian state. Britain did not recognize such appointments as being of a genuine diplomatic nature. Nonetheless, the presence of such consuls made it

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[58]Brown and Cook, **Canada, 1896-1921**, p. 21.

[59]Cited in Schull, **Laurier**, p. 357.

inevitable that the Canadian state would eventually initiate negotiations and subsequently give official recognition to the consuls. Britain had made it clear that such negotiations were a violation of their sovereignty over foreign affairs. Lord Minto, Lord Grey, and British officials in the Foreign Office, complained about the lack of consideration. British authorities argued that Canada was giving foreign consuls virtual diplomatic status, a move that threatened the diplomatic unity of the empire, in that it gave recognition to Canada's growing independence.[60]

However, Laurier observed that the settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute demonstrated that the Canadian state's demand for greater treaty-making power in territorial and commercial affairs was "right, just and should be granted."[61] In 1907, Laurier informed the British government of Canada's desire to secure a new commercial treaty with France. The British Ambassador in Paris was told by Sir Edward Grey that it would be "more practical" to leave the negotiations to "Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his Minister of Finance." An important precedent had been established.[62] At the conclusion of the 1907 Imperial Conference, L.P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, went to Paris with Fielding, to negotiate the first treaty ever made by Canadians with a

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[60]R.A. Shields, "Imperial Policy and the Role of Foreign Consuls in Canada, 1870-1911," **Dalhousie Review**, Vol. 59, No. 4, 1980, pp. 715-747.

[61]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 26.

[62]The change of government in Britain may have contributed to these developments. In December 1905, A.J. Balfour, the Conservative Prime Minister resigned and the Liberals took over under Sir Henry Campball-Bannerman. In his first speech as Prime Minister he stated that he meant to follow a milder foreign policy. In 1906 the Liberals were elected on a classic Liberal platform of peace and cutting military spending. See Robert Massie, **Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War**, New York: Random House, 1991, p. 640.

foreign power. Canadian representatives negotiated a commercial treaty with France without intervention by the British ambassador, although he signed the treaty with them. The Imperial government retained the power to grant authority to the negotiator. A few weeks later, Laurier detailed the reasoning behind these dramatic changes in a speech to the Canadian Manufacturer's Association in Toronto. He pointed out that the diplomatic relations of Canada with other countries,

> ...carried on by British diplomats, are not so successful as we have thought they ought to be. We have long harboured the opinion in this country that those diplomatic relations would be better carried out if they were in our own hands....in affairs of State (men) do better when the heart is engaged in the business.... We have suffered on the Atlantic; we have suffered on the Pacific; we have suffered on the Great Lakes; we have suffered wherever there has been a question discussed between British diplomats and foreign diplomats, and we have come at last to the opinion on this point that in our relations with foreign countries it would be better to attend to our business ourselves. It has long and long been the desire...of the Canadian people that we should be entrusted with the negotiation of our own treaties, especially in regard to commerce....the time has come when Canadian interests are intrusted to Canadians, and just within the last week a treaty has been concluded with France, a treaty which appeals to Canada alone, and which has been negotiated by Canadians alone.[63]

For others, these commercial treaties were just another step on the road to complete independence. J.S. Ewart, Ottawa lawyer and Canadian nationalist, had been appointed to aid Aylesworth, the Minister of Justice, in preparing Canada's Fishery Case for the Hague Tribunal. He saw the growing Canadian autonomy in external affairs as a means of avoiding British interference and limiting the possibility of being

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[63]**The British Empire Review**, November 1907, Speech given to the Canadian Manufacturer's Association in Toronto on September 26. Copy in Brodeur Papers, MG27, NAC.

drawn into British conflicts:

> Canada has thrown off her Colonial clothes. She has arrived at maturity. She is intelligent enough to manage her own affairs. Her interests are too vast to be entrusted to any care but her own, and we cannot pledge ourselves to obey all marching orders....I have asked over and over again for the name, not of a ship, or of a regiment, but of a single British soldier who ever fought - I don't say died or bled - in a Canadian quarrel. There never was such a soldier. On the other hand Canada has fought two foolish wars with the United States on British account.[64]

To circumvent the need for future imperial authorization, the Laurier government began to increase its interactions and arrangements with foreign consuls at Ottawa, which were confirmed by action of the Canadian Parliament without being called treaties. In this way, all reference to the imperial authority was avoided. Such agreements were made with Germany and Italy in 1910, and the ill-fated reciprocity agreement with the United States in 1911 was also proposed in this form.[65] Such agreements bothered Britain and they hoped that future deals would "assume the form of a contract between the King and the head of State in question...."[66] Nevertheless, for Laurier, these developments were consistent with Canada's growth "as a nation." Canada's progress towards independence was marked by the fact that foreign consuls actually carried out "diplomatic duties" as charged by their respective governments.[67] The Canadian state had entered a new phase of diplomatic autonomy in commercial affairs.

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[64]Quoted in **Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1909, pp. 160-161.

[65]Galbraith, **The Establishment of Canadian...**, pp. 37-38.

[66]Crewe to Grey, 30 March, 1910, Grey Papers, MG27, C1361, 16, 268, 4300-31, NAC. Hereafter cited as Grey Papers.

[67]R.A. Shields, "Imperial Policy...," p. 742.

ii. Immigration Policy

In addition to commercial treaties, the Canadian government began to take an active role in immigration policy. Peopling a country rich in undeveloped resources and sparse in population was an urgent requirement for Canada. While Canada had established an Agency of Immigration in London by 1868, they still relied heavily on British representatives. British ambassadors and consuls were not in the position to provide an active and aggressive propaganda for emigration to Canada. They had little or no knowledge of Canada, nor of its needs. Similarly, they had either little interest in promoting emigration, or were cautiously avoiding supporting one Dominion over the other. By 1877, Emigration Agents were firmly established in Europe in Antwerp and Paris, and in the United States in Detroit and Duluth. Their main function was to distribute immigration literature. These agents were not recognized by other governments as having any diplomatic status, and could not claim the privileges traditionally granted under international law. In practice, however, the Canadian emigration agent often acted for Canada like consuls of other countries.[68]

Canadian involvement with immigration policies greatly increased with the perceived "Yellow Peril" associated with emigration from Far Eastern countries. The more active role of Canadian statesmen in immigration concerns contributed towards developing an autonomous Canadian foreign policy. As a result of the government's new immigration policies, there was a great influx of non-British immigrants. Opposition to them quickly surfaced, particularly in British Columbia which was experiencing growing discontent over immigration from China,

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[68]Skilling, **Canadian Representation Abroad**, pp. 2-6.

Japan, and India, which culminated in race riots in 1907.[69] Many Canadians agreed with R.B Bennett, who told a British Columbia audience in 1907, that "British Columbia must remain a white man's country."[70] Similarly, French-Canadian nationalists were concerned with the great influx of immigrants who seemed to adopt English-Canadian ways. Bourassa referred to them as, "the scum of all nations" who have "nothing in common with us in history, nothing in common with us in blood, nothing in common with us in education or economics, nothing in common with us in national sentiment." He concluded with the warning that, "before twenty years are over...they will be masters of the country and the two races that have formed the Canadian people will be swamped by these intruders."[71]

French-Canadians were concerned with protecting their cultural distinctiveness, and were interested in settling the West with French-Canadians.[72] British-Canadians exhibited a "nativist" concern for protecting "democratic institutions" and maintaining British traditions. This was manifested in several ways. For many contemporary religious, social, and political reformers, "social gospel" informed by psychology,

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[69]See Patricia E. Roy, **A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914**, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989; and W.P. Ward, **White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press: 1990.

[70]Quoted in C.P., Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, 1867-1921**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, p. 117.

[71]Debates, 9 April, 1907, pp. 6182-6184 and similar statements between pp. 6185-6186. These comments are consistent with Bourassa's earlier views. See House of Commons Debates, 1 May, 1906, pp. 2442-2444.

[72]Bourassa refered to the French Canadian as "the best défricheur or pioneer, in the world." House of Commons Debates, July 26, 1899, p. 8539.

genetics, and sociology, constituted a commitment to social change and national progress. A genuine crusade to "Canadianize" immigrants, was mounted under the numerous banners of "social gospel", "moral reform", "social redemption" and "social purity."[73] The campaign combined a general fervour of a "muscular christianity", the social philanthropy of the middle classes, and the political policy of the state.

Canadian statesmen were dispatched to negotiate with the foreign countries concerned in the hopes of coming to some sort of arrangement. Dealing with Japan was already difficult since it was in alliance with Britain. Britain's substantial trade with China, the security of Hong Kong, India, Ceylon, Malaya, and Australia, all came to rest on the understanding with Japan. This was another conflict of interest with Britain that induced the Canadian state into a foreign policy of their own and added to their emerging independent nationality.

The Canadian state's interest in maintaining diplomatic relations with Japan was twofold. First, there was a genuine concern with the impact of "Asiatic" immigration on the integrity of Canadian territory. After defeating Russia in 1905, Japan had demonstrated that it was "the rising Power in the Far East" and its territorial ambitions had to be

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[73]There is a significant literature on this topic. See Ramsay Cook, **The Regenerators: Social Criticism in Late Nineteenth Century English Canada**, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1985; Marlene Shore, **The Science of Social Redemption: McGill and the Chicago School**, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1987; Angus McLaren, **Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945**, McClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1990; Mariana Valverde, **The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925**, McCelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1991; and, A. Mills, **Fool for Christ: The Political Thought of J.S. Woodsworth**, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1991.

considered.[74] Because of their closer proximity to Japan, the similar concerns of Australia and New Zealand were intensified. They did not put much faith in the British alliance with Japan arguing that if Britain ever became engaged in a war, Japan would seize the opportunity to attack Australia and possible British Columbia, which already had a large Japanese immigrant community.[75] A Liberal MP for British Columbia wrote to Laurier warning him that the "Province will be Asiatic" and that it would be impossible to keep the country "White" and "Liberal" unless "the Japs are peremptorily told that they must carry out their understanding with your environment." Laurier replied that the government was restrained from complete exclusion because the Japanese had "adopted European civilization, has shown that he can whip European soldiers, has a navy equal man for man to the best afloat, and will not submit to be kicked and treated with contempt, as his brother from China still meekly submits to."[76] Now that Japan was established as a Great Power, Asian exclusion and anti-oriental prejudice could work to unsettle the global balance of power.

For Governor General Grey, "the consideration of what steps shall be taken by H.M. Canadian Government to defend the coasts of British Columbia against possible Japanese aggression appears to me to be a duty which can no longer be shirked." He further informed Laurier as to the advice he gave Joseph Pope, Under-Secretary of State, before his departure to Japan:

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[74]Lemieux's speech to House of Commons, Lemieux Papers, MG27, II, D10, vol.9, 1059, NAC. Herafter cited as Lemieux Papers.

[75]Lawrence James, **The Rise and Fall of the British Empire**, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, pp. 340-341.

[76]R.G. Macpherson to Laurier, 20 August, 1907; Laurier to Macpherson, 27 August, 1907, Laurier Papers.

> The standing invitation which our rich unoccupied islands offer to the Japs to come in and occupy them, is the nightmare which haunts my dreams and I shall be glad if on your return you can submit to the Govt. a report as to the nature and gravity of this danger, which in my opinion is the real danger menacing the future peace and well-being of Canada.[77]

This was echoed by the **Literary Digest**, which wrote,

> The importance of her Pacific coast to Canada seems to be dawning on that country, and the Government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier is determined to maintain it as a white and not a yellow man's territory. The ocean that separates her from the Asiatic far East must be a pathway of commerce to the Dominion and not an avenue of invasion, we are told.[78]

The Canadian state's second concern was with developing commercial links with Japan, and in 1907 the British Parliament approved the application to Canada of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of commerce and navigation negotiated in 1894 and 1895.[79] According to Mackenzie King, Laurier insisted that trade with the Orient was not compatible with racial discrimination and was one reason why the government followed one of the most moderate policies of restriction.[80] Laurier informed the Colonial office that the Government had decided to send the Minister of Labour to Tokyo. He was to discuss with the Japanese government and the British Ambassador measures for averting anti-Japanese riots which had recently occurred in Vancouver. The post-master general, Rodolphe Lemieux and Joseph Pope, were put in charge of the resulting satisfactory conversations in which a "gentlemen's agreement"

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[77]Grey to Laurier, 20 December, 1907, Grey Papers.

[78]**The Literary Digest**, 1908, p. 221, copy in Lemieux Papers.

[79]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 26.

[80]Mackenzie King's Diaries, 28 January, 1908, G 2183, NAC.

was reached whereby the Japanese themselves would limit emigration to Canada.[81] In Lemieux's final report to the government, he acknowledged the territorial concerns:

> ...with an Anglo-Saxon community like ours, where democratic institutions prevail, the introduction in large numbers of alien races inherently ignorant of the most elementary principles of self-government, can not but by itself be inimical to the best interests of Canada. One must bear in mind that there are now over 25,000 Asiatics in British Columbia, practically all of whom are adults. There are not 75,000 white male adults in the province. So that, if today every fourth man in that province competing for a living is an Asiatic, are not the reasons for effectual restriction far more compelling than one would at first imagine? Those orientals belong to a civilization developed through centuries, along lines totally and radically divergent from ours. There is a well nigh impassable gulf between the two....British Columbians object to a vast alien Colony, exclusive, inscrutable, unassimilative...which gradually by the mere pressure of numbers may undermine the very foundations of *their province*. They have to safeguard the future and the distinctiveness of their race and civilization, and in their passionate and unalterable conviction, they cannot be protected unless the free ingress of Orientals is restricted and regulated. As in every Anglo-Saxon community, there exists a deep-seated popular determination to exclude from even the sparsely-settled territories, the concentrated masses of the Orient.[82]

In 1908, Mackenzie King was dispatched to Washington as the representative of the Laurier government to discuss with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Root a cooperative policy with regard to Japanese immigration. It marked the

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[81]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, pp. 26-27. Rodolphe Lemieux was solicitor-general of Canada from 1904 to 1906 and postmaster-general from 1906 to 1911.

[82]Confidential Report by the Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux, K.C., Minister of Labour, of His Mission to Japan on the subject of the influx of oriental labourers into the province of British Columbia, 1908, Lemieux Papers. Italics in original.

increasing importance attached by the Canadian government to being actively involved in affairs concerning Canada. The same year, King was also sent to London, to discuss Indian immigration with the British authorities. From London, King went on to Shanghai to represent Canada in the International Opium Conference being held there. During his trip he discussed immigration with the government of India. After detailing why Canada was unsuitable to Indians, the government of India passed the Indian Emigration Act that reduced emigration. The Canadian government imposed a condition that emigrants should pay $200 and only travel by continuous voyage from their country of origin. Indian immigration lessened to almost nothing.[83] After Shanghai, King proceeded to Peking for similar discussions with the Chinese government which amounted to little. Canada continued to limit Chinese immigration by means of a $500 head tax.

King's negotiations differed greatly from the "hostile methods" of the Americans. According to Grey, Roosevelt was a "madman to indulge in provocative talk which may end in a war with Japan, at a time when that wonderful little people are in the flowering period of their highest patriotism."[84] For James Bryce, British Ambassador in Washington, it was "an immense blessing" that Canada had "settled so well with Japan."[85] He also believed that King's actions were "quite correct" and that he had "conducted the whole of a somewhat delicate affair with the propriety and tact. He is a man of real ability who will, I predict, be valuable as well as

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[83]Glazebrook, **A History of Canadian External Relations**, p. 210. W.L. Mackenzie King, grandson of William Lyon Mackenzie, became Canada's first deputy minister of labour in 1900. In 1909, entered politics on Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier's advice where upon he became Canada's first minister of labour.

[84]Grey to Bryce, 31 January, 1908, Grey Papers.

[85]Bryce to Grey, 4 February, 1908, Grey Papers.

successful in the public service."[86]

However, it was in the negotiations with Japan that Canadian statesmen realized the inefficiency of the diplomatic system, one in which they were solely reliant on British officials. Lemieux found the experience difficult because of the lack of information. He informed Sir Louis Jetté, Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec and former member of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal, that

> ...it is sadly obvious that we have not, in Canada, followed the negotiations closely enough. We could have - in the beginning - obtained Concessions and all we did was to acknowledge to have received the advantageous propositions that we were being offered! We absolutely lack in tradition and correctness....I could obtain in Ottawa only bits of documents and letters that refer to this treaty. In contrast, we must see how perfect are the Records of the F.O. in London....[87]

To achieve these ends Lemieux wrote to Lord Grey to see if it was possible for the Canadian government to obtain the complete series of the correspondence of the 1894 treaty, "as it contains some important despatches concerning Canada's attitude in the matter."[88] Much to the indignation of the Canadian government, Grey refused, and Lemieux forwarded the refusal to Pope for his comments. Pope was disgusted. He saw it as a sign of Canada's "lack of system," and noted that had Canada acted earlier "we should not have to ask anybody for these papers today, for we should have them ourselves."[89]

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[86]Bryce to Grey, 1 February, 1908, Grey Papers.

[87]Lemieux to Sir Louis Jetté, 4 December, 1907, Lemieux Papers.

[88]Lemieux, to Sir Edward Grey, 13 December, 1907, Lemieux Papers, Vol. 5, 534, and reply 11 February, 1908, Lemieux Papers, Vol. 7, 888, NAC.

[89]Pope to Lemieux, 24 February, 1908, Lemieux Papers, NAC, 977.

Lemieux became another of Pope's allies in his quest for further Canadian autonomy in external affairs.

Similarly, King's early diplomatic experiences led him to critically question the imperial connection and to consider more Canadian independence. For King, British statesmen had difficulty appreciating what self-government entailed.

> There is in England a real governing class, in the sense that it seeks to control and guide the national interests both in England and in the dominions beyond. The English mind has been long trained in this way of looking at the world that I can see wherein it will be many years before it will ever come fully to appreciate what self-government means.[90]

Moreover, King saw,

> ...the essential need of Canada shaping her policy from a national view-point. Let her remain a part of the empire for the good of our own people; let her demand a position of equality with that of every other unit. Let her cease to think in colonial terms and to act in any way as with a colonial status. Let her become a nation or other nations will rob her of this right.[91]

This included having Canadian representatives in the capitals of Asia rather than relying on British representatives. Almost anticipating Gellner's notion of blocked social mobility, King criticized the British for their domination of the best jobs:

> As a corrective to a good deal of the talk about Canada contributing cash and dreadnoughts, I think it would be well for someone to ask in the House of Commons how many positions are held in the British navy, army, British consular and diplomatic service and civil service abroad by Canadians.[92]

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[90]Mackenzie King's diary cited in R.M. Dawson, **William Lyon Mackenzie King, Vol. 1, 1874-1923**, London, Methuen, 1959, p. 168.

[91]King's Diaries, 4 March, 1909, G2215, folder 553, NAC.

[92]King's Diaries, 24-30 April, 1909, G2215, folder, 714, NAC.

During his election campaign in 1908, Laurier summed up the important consequences of Canada's broadening foreign affairs:

> We have been twelve years in office and these years will be remembered in the history of Canada. In them Canada has been lifted from the humble position of a colony to that of a nation. In 1896 Canada was a mere colony, hardly known in the United States or Europe. In 1908 Canada has become a star to which is directed the gaze of the civilized world. That is what we have done.[93]

For the editor of the **Canadian Annual Review**, such a statement was justified in that "Canadian relations with foreign countries assumed a phase of very distinct and rather peculiar importance during 1907..." Indeed, in Canadian-American relations, potentially important precedents were being established.

iii. Canadian-American Relations

The 1898 Joint High Commission had been organized to settle a heavy agenda of outstanding items between Canada and the United States. It had foundered on the issue of the Alaska boundary. Displeased with Britain's lack of consideration of Canada's national interests, Canadian ministers attributed such indifferent treatment to their country's "colonial" status and were determined that Canada would have more say in diplomatic matters. This would be evident in the years, 1905-1911 when a considerable transformation in Canadian-American relations occurred.[94] While Laurier was the principal Canadian politician to become deeply involved in the negotiations, the newly appointed governor general, Lord Grey,

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[93]Skelton, **Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, Vol. 2, p. 107.

[94]Peter Neary, "Grey, Bryce, and the Settlement of Canadian-American Differences, 1905-1911", **Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. XLIX, No. 4., 1968, p. 357.

and James Bryce, Britain's ambassador to the United States, played equally important roles.[95] While Bryce was also to serve as Canada's "ambassador" to the United States, Laurier and the Canadian press remained somewhat skeptical.[96] Bryce may have been judged too harshly. In a letter to Grey he wrote

> I quite understand and sympathize with Sir Wilfrid's feeling. The Americans behaved very badly....They bring little chivalry, little delicacy, into these matters. All is not merely bargaining, but taking advantage of every opening....No doubt we could make better bargains if Canada were as populous and rich as the U.S., because the U.S. newspapers and masses would be less arrogant. But that also is a fact. No use ignoring it. Lord Salisbury's surrender in the Venezuela affair of 1895 was more humiliating than any thing done regarding Canada at any time.[97]

Nevertheless, Lord Grey and Bryce regarded the solving of Canadian-American differences as their key role. Both recognized that Canada was a likely region from which possible quarrels could arise to jeopardize the recent Anglo-Amercian rapprochement. While there were a number of issues to be solved, of particular importance was the Boundary Waters Treaty which subsequently led to the establishment of the binational organization known as the International Joint Commission.

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[95]F.A. Coghlan, "James Bryce and the Establishment of the Department of External Affairs," **Canadian Historical Association Paper**, 1968; Alvin Gluek, "Pilgrimages to Ottawa: Canadian-American Diplomacy, 1903-13," **Canadian Historical Association Paper**, 1968; and Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs...**, Vol. 1.

[96]The Ottawa **Free Press** (25 March, 1907), claimed that Bryce's "nomination was but the prelude to a sacrifice of Canadian interests." Before introducing Bryce to a Canada Club audience in Ottawa, Laurier reminded them that Bryce's predecessors had given the Amercians a lot of Canadian territory, including large sections of Alaska. Cited in Gluek, "Pilgrimages to Ottawa...," pp. 79-80.

[97]Bryce to Grey, Dec 28, 1907, Grey Papers.

To a certain extent, the history of the relations between the United States and Canada is the record of two nations sharing the natural resources of most of North America. However, over-emphasizing peaceful cooperation may convey the impression that these relations have been friendly. In reality, the sharing of the continent has often involved not the cooperative development and utilization of resources, but intense competition for them. In the early period of North American history, when boundaries were ill-defined, the rivalry for natural resources often caused open conflict. But overt competition did not end with the delimitation of boundaries, for some resources continued to be accessible to everyone. Running water complicated boundary issues and became a frequent subject of controversy in Canadian-American diplomacy, particularly at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was during this period that the question of using the waters along the Canadian-American boundary for industrial and agricultural purposes was addressed.

The first manifestation of this concern was the International Waterways Commission of 1905, a Canadian-American body that arose out of resolutions originally passed at the Irrigation Congresses in Denver, Colorado (1894), and Albuquerque, New Mexico (1895). While it only had an investigatory function in regard to border lake and river waters, it demonstrated the change of Canada's role in the international arena and the assumption by her of the care of her own interests.[98]

Despite the value of the Commission's recommendations, the gradual growth of competition for the waters of the lakes and rivers that straddle or cross the United States-Canada border, lessened its impact. In the regions bordering the

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[98]Glazebrook, **A History of Canada's External Relations**, p. 239; Skilling, **Canadian Representation Abroad**, p. 191; Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict**, pp. 108-109; and Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 20.

international boundary, the insatiable demand for an indispensable staple of energy-hungry industry followed the advent of mass production, mass transportation, and modern technology. Hydro-electric power generation, was becoming crucial for national economic development. In addition, the industrial use of water posed serious threats. The recognition of pollution was limited to physical or organic waste. Water levels in rivers and lakes could be reduced or even dried up completely if lakes and rivers were diverted for industrial or agricultural purposes. An especially bitter conflict involved lake and river traffic navigation. By the turn of the century there was no body of international law to govern the use of these Canadian-American waters and relations between the two states threatened to worsen. Not surprisingly, therefore, the most important agreement was the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 which was the first important break in the old indirect system of representation.[99]

The negotiations and final outcome of the treaty contributed to the good faith between Canada and the United States and allowed for the settlement of the previously discussed disputes. Indeed, the sharpest difference of outlook between the statesmen of the two countries regarding boundary waters concerned the preservation and development of common water resources. The Canadian-American experience in resource development differed. In Canada the controlling influence of the state had often followed or even preceeded the footsteps of the frontiersman. In the United States, resource

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[99]See C., Chacko, **The International Joint Commission between the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada**, New York, 1932; N., Dreisziger, **The International Joint Commission of the United States and Canada, 1895-1920: A Study in Canadian-American Relations**, PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1974; and, N., Dreisziger, "Dreams and Disappointments," in Spencer, R., et al., **The International Joint Commission Seventy Years On**, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1981.

development was more likely to be left entirely to private enterprise. It was the Canadian state which insisted on general principles for the control and regulation of water uses along the international boundary. In Canada, national transportation routes, such as the seaway was planned to be, were matters of national concern.

Laurier's intense interest in this treaty is an illustration of the general desire to protect Canada's national interest. His worries over the long-term consequences of certain articles no doubt stemmed from a genuine feeling of nationalism. Laurier had been involved in the decision-making process on boundary waters ever since 1902 when Congress called for the creation of the International Waterways Commission (IWC). That Laurier attached significant importance to the boundary waters question is suggested by the fact that a mention of the IWC's establishment was the only reference to relations with the United States in the Throne Speech of early 1905.[100] Nevertheless, progress was limited because of the poor state of diplomatic relations between Canada and United States. Laurier and his chief adviser on American matters, A.B. Aylesworth the Minister of Justice, still distrusted the United States because of the 1903 Alaskan Boundary award.[101] For example, in a letter to Laurier warning him of American interests in the French islands south of Newfoundland, Aylesworth referred to Lodge as

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[100]Debates, 12 January, 1905, pp. 6-7.

[101]Laurier convinced Aylesworth, who had represented Canada during the Alaska dispute, to enter politics in 1905, first becoming Postmaster General and then Minister of Justice eight months later. Laurier had complete trust in Aylesworth as they shared common opinions on the most important issues of the day, especially Canadian-American relations, imperialism, and a general disillusionment with British diplomacy. See P.D. Stevens, "Laurier, Aylesworth, And the Decline of the Liberal Party in Ontario," **Canadian Historical Association**, Historical Papers, 1968, pp. 96-97.

> an exceedingly crafty politician, ambitious to be prominent in the public eye in his own country, and identified with territorial aggrandizement in any quarter where opportunity might occur, and animated always with a feeling of entire hostility to Great Britain.[102]

Lord Grey informed Laurier of his wish to see "first rank men" appointed.[103] In 1905, Laurier appointed George C. Gibbons as chairman of the Canadian side who would eventually became the chief Canadian negotiator in the treaty discussions. His success lay partly in his firmness as a diplomat and partly in his ability to get along with Laurier.[104] After reviewing the problem Gibbons recommended a treaty arrangement between the two countries. But it was not until 1907 that Gibbons was able to visit Washington to engage in substantial talks. In spite of Laurier's distrust of the Americans, Gibbons was optimistic about the prospects for an early settlement. While in Washington, Gibbons was frustrated by the fact that he could not talk directly with Secretary of State Root, and instead had to negotiate through Bryce, the newly appointed British ambassador.[105] It was not until Gibbons second trip to Washington, in the summer of 1908 when Bryce was away, that he was able to make any progress. Root

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[102]Aylesworth to Laurier, 23 November, 1903, Laurier Papers.

[103]Grey to Lyttleton, 9 January, 1905, Grey Papers.

[104]Dreisziger, "Dreams and Disappointments", p. 16. For additional information on Gibbons see, Alan Gibbons, "Sir George Gibbons and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909," **Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. 34, 1953; and Harriet Whitney, "Sir George Gibbons, Canadian Diplomat, and the Boundary Waters Treaty," **Inland Seas**, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1973. Whitney's work addresses inaccuracies in Alan Gibbons' work, and argues that Bryce's position as British Ambassador has often been overlooked, therefore, devaluing the role played by Gibbons in negotiating the agreement.

[105]Gibbons to Laurier, 8 January, 1908, Gibbons Papers, MG 30, E71, NAC. Hereafter, cited as Gibbons Papers.

was angered by the allegations that "the American people had always overeached [Canada] heretofore and were lying in wait to do so again."[106] For Gibbons, such comments were indicative of the fact that the United States had "to recognize the existence of another power on this continent having equal rights" which had "joint control of the Great Lakes system for all time to come."[107] During these talks, the creation of a commission was suggested. It was to serve as a "little Hague" for boundary waters issues, and whose jurisdiction would be extended ultimately to "almost every kind of question" or perhaps to "all questions" between Canada and the United States.[108] Undoubtedly, Gibbons' view that the final contract would be a step towards nationhood for Canada, pleased Laurier.[109]

As things progressed Laurier believed that such a institution "would be the greatest benefit ever bestowed on Canada during the last fifteen years."[110] Gibbons explained to Laurier that the importance of the treaty lay in the fact that it would enable Canadians to deal "directly" with the Americans in matters "peculiarly our own." He also thought that the "machinery of a permanent board" would be a great improvement on the "old system of arbitration," and that the acceptance of general principles meant a "tremendous advantage to Canada."[111]

The draft treaty was finally drawn up by Gibbons and his American counterpart, George Clinton. London made some

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[106]Gibbons to Laurier, 6 July, 1908, Gibbons Papers.

[107]Gibbons to Laurier, 9 July, 1908, Gibbons Papers.

[108]Howard to Gibbons, 26 July, 1908, Gibbons Papers.

[109]Gibbons to Laurier, 25 August, 1908, Gibbons Papers.

[110]Laurier to Gibbons, 28 August 1908, Laurier Papers.

[111]Gibbons to Laurier, 16 December 1908, Laurier Papers.

objections, the complaints originating in the Colonial Office. Imperial authorities were dismayed that the draft, "in effect," treated Canada as a "sovereign state," and that the proposed agreement was between the United States and Canada rather than the United States and Britain. The arbitration clause of the treaty, complained one official, had "no parallel in a foreign treaty" and violated the basic principle that the Empire was "one juridic person." The Colonial Office's specific objections were conveyed to Bryce, by Foreign Secretary Grey, along with the suggested revisions which designated Britain as the treaty-making party and not Canada. These were forwarded to Ottawa where they were eventually endorsed.[112] To initiate radical departures in the making of foreign treaties does not seem to have been the aim of the Laurier government, although the British did limit themselves to a symbolic role. The very fact that a draft of a treaty could treat Canada as a sovereign power, and advance to the final stages of negotiations without detection, illustrates the thinking of the Canadian state elites involved in the discussions, and their view of Britain's role in the conduct of Canadian-American relations.

Laurier was having doubts in the spring of 1909 because of some minor modifications made by the American senate. But Gibbons and Aylesworth defended the treaty, and Aylesworth even added a plea for its acceptance "as a fair and just international agreement in which the interests of Canada have been kept in view and honourably conserved."[113]

The Ontario Provincial Government had problems with the American Senate's rider which they felt gave up too much to American interests in the Lake Superior and Niagara area. In Canada, the Liberal Senate leader, Ross, also attacked Laurier

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[112]Bryce to Earl Grey, 6 January, 1909, Grey Papers.

[113]Confidential Memorandum by Aylesworth, 27 May 1909, Laurier Papers Vol. 790, NAC.

on these grounds saying that it "would not serve Canada's interests."[114] Laurier was worried that the Opposition might make something of this and did his best to calm matters in the House of Commons and in a letter to Ross. In the House he reminded the Opposition that a treaty is "a matter of negotiation" and "in order to get a treaty at all you have to give a little more perhaps than you think you should give otherwise."[115] To Ross he replied that treaties involved "giving and taking on either side" and "there will always be some interests in either country which are displeased." He admitted that the treaty might have given more to the Americans at Niagara Falls than they were entitled to," but argued that this was unavoidable as "they are strong and we are weak." Stressing that Canada had always been short-changed by the United States in the past, Laurier said it was the "first time" that Canada had "anything like a fair treaty..." At the end of his letter Laurier appealed to Ross' imperial sentiments. He said that he attached a great importance to the friendship of the United States, "not only for Canada but for Great Britain. If it be true that there is trouble brewing between Great Britain and Germany, all the more reason exists why we should keep this matter well in view."[116]

It is unlikely that Laurier had attached as great importance to the friendship of the United States for Britain as he had claimed. Rather, he was likely trying to disarm an English-Canadian imperialist. Certainly, Laurier was upset at Gibbons for Article II which he felt gave away Canada's right to protest American diversions of international waters.[117] While the British representatives attempted to put Laurier at

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[114]Ross to Laurier, 17 June 1909, Laurier Papers.

[115]Debates, 14 May, 1909, p. 6639.

[116]Laurier to Ross, 18 June, 1909, Laurier Papers.

[117]Grey to Bryce, 3 May 1909, Grey Papers.

ease, he was well aware that it was in their own personal interest that the treaty succeed. After further problems arose over Article VI concerning St. Mary and Milk Rivers in the west, Laurier sought the council of Aylesworth who had experience in international law.[118]

But even as the excitement over these articles subsided, new tensions were arising. Due to their commitment to an expanded naval force, the Americans were beginning to rearm their vessels on the Great Lakes for training purposes. This was in violation of the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817.[119] The Canadians had been allowing the United States navy to use Canadian canals as long as they dismantled their guns. In 1909, eight American vessels designated for militia training had already passed through the Canadian canal system, and five of these vessels were armed after they appeared on the Great Lakes. Because there had been no official protest by the Canadian state, the Americans did not think that another vessel, the *U.S.S. Nashville*, would be problematic. Certainly, the Canadian government granted approval for the *Nashville* to pass unarmed through the Canadian canal system, but what annoyed Canadian statesmen was that the Americans rearmed the vessel without waiting for official permission from Canada. As such, Laurier rejected the American request and insisted that Britain inform the United States to adhere strictly to the

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[118]On Aylesworth reactions, see Aylesworth to Gibbons, 16 April 1909, Gibbons Papers, Vol. 6, Earl Grey to Gibbons, 17 April 1909, Gibbons Papers.

[119]According to the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, each state was permitted to maintain on the Lakes a "naval force" totalling four vessels, each displacing no more than 100 tons and armed with one 18-pound cannon each. See Alvin Gluek, "The Invisible Revision of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, 1898-1914," **Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1979; and Paul Andrews, **Limits of Coexistence: The U.S.S. Nashville and The Presence of Armed American Naval Training Vessels on the Great Lakes**, M.A. Thesis, Department of History, McGill University, Montreal, 1981.

terms of the 1817 Agreement.[120]

The Americans rearmed the *Nashville* and by August the Canadian press had taken a keen interest in the issue. The Department of Militia and Defence had dispatched C.F. Hamilton, a captain in the Corps of Guides and Ottawa correspondent for the **Toronto News**, to observe American naval activities on the Great Lakes. In an official report he recounted the number and size of the ships, and noted that the *Nashville* had been rearmed.[121] This was repeated in the **Toronto News** with the alarmist addition that the "Americans were being trained for war purposes, in warships, on the frontier which the Rush-Bagot Treaty Convention is supposed to keep clear of war vessels, big-guns and the apparatus for fighting." The editor added, "It does not necessarily follow that these vessels, and the thousand men upon them, are specifically intended for use in Canada...But if Canada and the United States should quarrel - and they are two countries, not one country, and have interests which differ and may clash - this naval militia force and these warships would be uncommonly useful to the Americans."[122]

The British authorities reminded Laurier that any severe Canadian reaction might cause Washington to reconsider the whole Rush-Bagot arrangement. Laurier concurred that he "lived in fear and trembling all the time" knowing that the Americans could tear up the treaty with only six months notice.[123] Nevertheless, Laurier's concerns persuaded Bryce to approach President Taft to reiterate the Canadian contention that the rearming should not have taken place without the "express

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[120]Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, 6 July, 1909, Foster Papers, Vol. 42, NAC. Cited in Andrews, p. 63.

[121]Gluek, "The Invisible Revision..." p. 479.

[122]The **Toronto New**, 17 August, 1909.

[123]Laurier to Bryce, 25 August, 1909, Laurier Papers.

authorization" of the Canadian state.[124] Laurier was under attack by the Conservatives who were attempting to convince Canadians that the Americans had broken a formal treaty and were militarizing the Great Lakes, when in reality it was an agreement and the vessels were there merely for training purposes.[125] Taft sympathized with Laurier and not wanting to antagonize the Canadian people and increase their suspicions, he agreed "to discontinue requests for the presence of warships in excess of the Rush-Bagot limit..."[126]

Despite these altercations, and after much further negotiation, the Boundary Waters Treaty was at last ratified on May 5, 1910. After an initial reluctance by the Americans, the Canadians convinced them of the desirability of fixed and fair principles applied by a permanent commission. From Laurier's reactions, it can be assumed that the proposed treaty embodied most of the Canadian expectations. Three were of particular importance.

First, the proposed international commission would *not* have a single British representative but would consist of

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[124]Bryce to Edward Grey, November 17, 1909. FO414/215, PRO, cited in Andrews, **Limits of Coexistence...**, p. 136.

[125]Debates, 16 November, 1909, p. 103 and November 17, 1909, pp. 132-133 and 135-136. The Conservatives renewed their attack in 1911, demanding that Canadians were "entitled to be informed as to the exact condition with regard to American warships or training ships on the Great Lakes...and what [Canada's] situation will be to the maintenance of armed vessles upon the Great Lakes." See Debates, 4 April, 1911, pp. 6611-6612.

[126]Bryce to Laurier, 17 November, 1909, Laurier Papers, Vol. 598, NAC. In March of 1911, the Canadian state gave the Americans permission to replace the *Nashville* with the *Dubuque* which would be rearmed after it had passed through Canadian canals. The truth of the matter was that the Canadians could do nothing against American vessels, especially since there were no Canadian armed vessels on the Great Lakes, and they surely realized that the Americans were building their own canals and would soon no longer require Canadian canals.

three American and three Canadian representatives. The two states would agree to refer to it all questions relating to waters that straddled or crossed the international boundary. Second, it placed a supra-national institution in charge of a wide range of boundary and cross-boundary matters including navigation improvements and fishing. This aspect appealed to Laurier and his advisers, who saw the Americans as aggressors and wanted to see legal restraints imposed upon them. Third, one treaty would solve many problems which Laurier and Gibbons believed would be more effective than pitting their small nation-state time and again against more powerful American interests. Canada had negotiated a good bargain. As an emerging national state with a much smaller population than the United States, its industrialization was proceeding at a slower rate. Yet the treaty gave Canada equal rights in the Great Lakes and rivers flowing along and across the boundary.[127]

Earl Grey, described the treaty as "uncommonly good" as it solved many outstanding Canadian-American problems and furthered friendly relations between Britain and the United States. The latter aspect is significant in that the British, other than being one of the signatories to the treaty, had no part in the institution which was its principal product - the International Joint Commission. For the first time in the world a permanent international commission governed boundary waters. It has been celebrated as a highly effective mechanism for regulating and resolving the trans-border problems which principally involved water resources and which inevitably arose between two sovereign nations sharing both a continent and a frontier of continental dimension. The United States had finally reconciled itself to the existence of Canada as a large and permanent fact of continental politics and economics. Traditionally the Canadians had been wary of joint

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[127]Whitney, "Sir George Gibbons...", p. 108.

institutions, but now embraced a joint institution that was imaginatively designed to protect Canadian interests.[128] Most importantly, the International Joint Commission (IJC) was the first institution that sought successfully to provide Canada with protection in dealing with a powerful neighbour which could not avoid being overwhelming, no matter how good its intentions. By January 1912, the IJC had its first meeting in Washington. The American chairman, Tawney, referred to the Commission as a "medium for direct and constant" communications between the two nations, and commended Britain for accepting Canada's ability to conduct "her own foreign relations with the United States."[129] British officials resented this inference.[130]

It is important to note how the Boundary Waters Treaty further enhanced the autonomy of the Canadian state. First, although it was signed in the traditional manner by the British Ambassador in Washington, it was negotiated entirely by a Canadian representative and, more significant, the Commission which it installed was under complete Canadian control. It became a major component of Canada's external relations in that the Boundary Waters Treaty was transferred from British to Canadian hands.[131] Second, the treaty was largely a product of Canadian initiative. As Stacey concludes, the Boundary Waters Treaty was chiefly formed by Canadian ideas which were sustained "in the face of considerable

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[128]J. Holmes, "The IJC and Canada-United States Relations", in Spencer, **The International Joint Commission Seventy Years On**, p. 4.

[129]Quoted in Dreisziger, **The International Joint Commission...**, p. 258.

[130]Casgrain to Borden, 11 January 1912, Borden Papers.

[131]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 28.

American opposition."[132] Its permanent results were probably the most important of the whole series as the International Joint Commission continues to exist to the present day. It has a considerable record of useful work and appears to be playing a valuable part in contemporary Canadian-American border relations.

The IJC was responsible for solving conflicts between American and Canada in the area of boundary waters. As a symbol of Canadian-American friendship, it helped reinforce the general impression in North America that relations between the two countries were changing for the better.[133] During the negotiations that led to its formation, eight other different treaties and agreements had been concluded, no doubt made easier by the growing good relations between the two governments.

In 1908, treaties were made for the final demarcation boundary between Canada and the United States, for the regulation of the fisheries in their inland contiguous waters, for the reciprocal rights between them with regard to both the conveyance of prisoners and to wreckage and salvage operations. The boundary demarcation agreement, in particular, finally realized a definitive demarcation and marking of the entire Canadian-American boundary, except for the Great Lakes region.[134] The Inland Fisheries Treaty was an important step forward in the development of international cooperation to conserve national resources. Edward Prince, the Canadian representative, took his orders from L.P. Brodeur, the Minister of Marine Fisheries. Brodeur made it clear that he felt that it was the Americans who were endangering the fish

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[132]Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict**, p. 113.

[133]Borden to Root, 16 August 1927, Borden Papers.

[134]Peter Neary, "Grey, Bryce, and the Settlement of Canadian-American Differences, 1905-1911," **Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. XLIX, No. 4, 1968, p. 371.

resources and reminded Prince not to give away control over anything that was already Canadian.[135]

In the early months of 1910 negotiations were conducted concerning the location of the boundary in Passamaquoddy Bay along the Maine coast, as well as the question of pelagic sealing.[136] The Passamaquoddy Bay dispute was solved through compromise.[137] However, pelagic sealing was a more complicated matter because it also involved Japan and Russia. While Grey and Bryce, and later Sir Joseph Pope, were crucial in these negotiations, Laurier made the final decisions. Pope's experience as an aide to the Joint High Commission made him suspicious of the United States. He worried that if the seals were not as endangered as Washington claimed, then the Canadian government would look foolish for having surrendered

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[135]Nothing has caused more tensions in American-Canadian relations than disputes over fishery rights. Beginning with the Treaty of Paris in 1783, Americans and their northern neighbours argued over access to the productive fishery off the coast of Newfoundland. For a detailed account of the Inland Fisheries Treaty see John L.K. Dorsey, **Diplomats and Vertebrates: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era**, PhD Thesis, Yale University, 1994, Chapter Two. Louis Philippe Brodeur, the son of a rebel of 1837, became minister of inland revenue in the Laurier government in 1904, and in 1906 minister of marine and fisheries. He was one of the representatives of Canada at the Imperial Conferences of 1907 and 1911, and in 1910 he introduced the bill which created the Canadian navy.

[136]After the United States had acquired Alaska, it began to argue that Canadian pelagic sealers were damaging American property. For a detailed account see Dorsey, **Diplomats and Vertebrates...**, Section II. In addition, see Thomas Bailey, "The North Pacific Sealing Convention of 1911," **Pacific Historical Review**, vol. 4, no. 1, 1935, pp. 1-14.

[137]A.C., Gluek, "The Passamaquoddy Bay Treaty, 1910: A Diplomatic Sideshow in Canadian-American Relations," **Canadian Historical Review**, XLVII, 1966, pp. 1-21.

its rights to a natural resource.[138] On Pope's advice, Laurier refused to agree to a Conference until the compensation for Canadian sealers who had been forced to abandon the hunt since 1893 had been settled.[139] In 1911 Laurier accepted a cash advance of $200,000 from the Americans and later that year the four powers concerned met at a conference and agreed to ban pelagic sealing in the North Pacific for a period of fifteen years.[140]

It is interesting to note that with this improvement in Canadian-American relations came a renewed interest in reciprocity. Laurier had long believed that reciprocity would be advantageous to Canada, but he also wanted to preserve harmonious relations with the United States. Since Canada and the United States had finally "cleaned the slate" of all pressing issues, Laurier treated the reciprocity proposal with courtesy and respect, especially since the Americans had initiated the proposition. As Grey informed Bryce, "the necessity of saving the face of the United States government will have to be borne in mind."[141] In January 1911, the Liberals presented the reciprocity agreement to Parliament. Conservatives saw it as another Laurier affront to the imperial connection and Canadian independence. Such anxieties were strengthened by comments made by American statesmen who believed reciprocity would lead "to the day when the American flag will float over every square-foot of the British-North

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[138]Pope to Secretary of State Charles Murphy, October 1909, Records of the Department of External Affairs, Record Group 25, Vol. 25, Vol. 1093, File 31.

[139]Pope to Laurier, 29 November, RG25, Vol. 1093, File 31.

[140]Neary, "Grey, Bryce, and the Settlement..., pp. 378-379.

[141]Grey to Bryce, 5 January, 1911, Grey Papers.

American possessions clear to the North Pole."[142]

Against such ideas, Laurier argued that the exchange of natural products with the United States would not change preference with Britain which exported manufactured goods to Canada. Nor would reciprocity threaten Canada's nationality. Canada was already "far advanced" as a nation. Canada was not separated from the motherland as was America, but had become increasingly devoted to her institutions and its "national entity as a people" and all that constituted their "national home." Laurier envisioned two peoples living side by side in mutual confidence and harmony and "with no other rivalry than a generous emulation in commerce and the arts of peace."[143] To a confirmed imperialist, Laurier argued that reciprocity "will lead to added prosperity and may I ask you to point to me a single country which when prosperous and happy ever led to change its allegiance. Prosperity everywhere confirms loyalty."[144]

Despite the formation of the Canadian national state, despite the economic growth, and despite all the progress made in relations with the United States, reciprocity was a key issue that led to the Laurier government's downfall. Nevertheless, seen in a wider perspective, this period clearly marks a new departure in Canadian-American relations. After the Alaskan affair Canada had greater freedom in her relations with the United States. More importantly, the Canadian state was able to bargain more effectively with the United States than it had ever done before, coming out of major negotiations with a fair and equal bargain. The treaty demonstrated that the Canadian state was ready, willing, and able to uphold its

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[142]Champ Clark, Speaker-designate of the House of Representatives, quoted in Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict...**, p. 147.

[143]Debates, 7 March, 1911, p. 4770.

[144]Laurier to Graham, 6 February, 1911, Laurier Papers.

own interests in diplomatic affairs. That it would continue to do so became evident with the creation of its own Department of External Affairs.

iv. Department of External Affairs

In light of the difficulties in negotiating with the United States, it was recognized that a Canadian Department of External Affairs was needed.[145] There were, however, earlier calls for its creation. It was a Western Conservative, Sanford Evans, who advocated the creation of a Department of External Affairs. He had first suggested this in his book **The Canadian Contingents**, published during the South African War.[146] The difficulties encountered by James Bryce during his attempts at solving the difficulties between Canada and the United States, led him to urge Lord Grey to suggest the creation of a foreign affairs department to Laurier.[147] For Grey, the International Joint Commission negotiations had demonstrated

> ...once more the frightful inconvenience of not having in Ottawa a Department of External Affairs....the loss of time, which this constant breaking the chain of negotiations and then trying to rivet the sundered links afresh involves, is so great that really nothing seems so urgent as to

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[145]See Glazebrook, **A History of Canadian External Relations**, 1950; James Eayrs, "The Origins of Canada's Department of External Affairs," **Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science**, 25, 2, 1959, pp. 109-128; F., Soward, **The Department of External Affairs and Canadian Autonomy**, 1961; and, Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs Volume One**, 1990.

[146]W. Sanford Evans, **The Canadian Contingents and Canadian Imperialism**, London, 1901, cited by Soward, **The Department of External Affairs and Canadian Autonomy**, p. 5.

[147]For example, Bryce to Grey, 19 May, 1908; Bryce to Grey, 10 August, Grey Papers. On Grey's and Bryce's roles, see Coghlan, "James Bryce and the Establishment of the Department of External Affairs," and Gluek, "Pilgrimages to Ottawa: Canadian-American Diplomacy."

create at once the needed department.[148]

In Washington, Bryce claimed that three quarters of his embassy's work concerned Canada. Bryce felt Canada badly needed "a sort of foreign office," and raised the matter with Laurier and the governor-general in February 1908. Bryce hoped that the head of the new department would occasionally consult the ambassador in Washington and that Canadian specialists would be sent there whenever necessary, "not merely to assist the Embassy but also to satisfy the Canadians that their cases are being fully stated and competently argued."[149] However, nothing serious would be done until 1909, under the guidance of Joseph Pope, Under Secretary of State since 1896, veteran of the Alaskan Boundary Dispute, and Lemieux's aid in Japan.

Pope was generally suspicious of the United States and his experience taught him that Canada had to prepare to fend itself in case Britain could not. Although Pope referred to himself as a Canadian, he disliked the distinction that he was not British. He was very loyal to Britain and did not like the idea of complete Canadian independence:

> [H]ow are we going to get on when every member claims an equal status with the rest; where each Dominion shall have an army and navy, and not only an army and navy, but also a diplomacy of its own? To my way of thinking such an Empire is an impossibility....I do not want any change in the present relations between the Dominion and the Mother Country....The present suits me very well.[150]

It is ironic that a man so opposed to complete independence was responsible for important changes in its eventual

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[148]Grey to Bryce, 11 May, 1908, Grey Papers.

[149]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 32.

[150]Joseph Pope to Maurice Pope, 16 September, 1925, cited in Pope, **Public Servant**, p. 295.

evolution. Much of Pope's influence stemmed from his earlier experiences in external matters.

Pope understood the complexities and weaknesses in the system for handling correspondence among departments and with the governor-general. In particular, the Alaska boundary issue revealed many of the problems involved. While preparing the Canadian case, Pope found himself without the proper information: "You may be surprised at my requests for what are elementary papers," he warned John Anderson of the Colonial office. "Alaska matters have always been referred to the Minister of the Interior, and though I say it with bated breath, never properly dealt with. We sadly lack system here."[151] After the proceedings of the tribunal, Sifton was shocked to learn that Canada had no specific storage system for the accumulated papers. Pope was to be the unofficial keeper of whatever Canadian records these international negotiations required. Since he anticipated more such negotiations and wanted to avoid further confusion, he attempted to improve the system and recommended the creation of a full government department responsible for Canada's external affairs.[152] The importance of the international negotiations of the previous two decades, Pope suggested to Laurier in 1904, demanded that records be kept in a department "charged with all the matters of a quasi-diplomatic character."[153]

However, no serious action was pursued. Perhaps there was doubt about public support once the first reaction to the Alaska boundary award was past. It may have been a result of the lack of civil servants experienced in diplomacy. But the

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[151]Pope to Anderson, 10 July, 1899, Pope Papers.

[152]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 29.

[153]Pope to Laurier, 27 December, 1904, Laurier Papers.

most convincing explanation is perhaps that offered by O.D. Skeleton:

> Nothing was more foreign to Sir Wilfrid's ruling bias than to urge any policy on a general and theoretical ground; not until a concrete issue arose would the demand for wider powers be renewed. When the occasion did arise, in the Waterways treaty with the United States, in the trade conversations with European powers, in the immigration negotiations with Japan, Canada's control over foreign affairs was to be quietly, undogmatically but surely and steadily advanced.[154]

Pope's involvement with the Civil Service Commission in 1907 gave him the opportunity to submit an official request. Laurier did not ignore the problems of the civil service as a whole, which had suffered a decline in the quality of entrants since 1882. Laurier became less tolerant of lax administration, and he was under growing pressure to make improvements at all levels: attacks on patronage were features of the opposition's campaigns in the elections of 1904 and 1908 and of its criticisms of the government for various scandals in the parliamentary sessions of 1906, 1907, and 1908. As such, the government in 1907 appointed a royal commission to study the civil service. The hearings of this commission provided the opportunity for Pope to work on creating a department of external affairs. Pope wrote a lengthy memorandum to the commissioners in which he illustrated the need for "a more systematic mode of dealing with what I may term, for want of a better phrase, the external affairs of the Dominion."[155] Only L.P. Brodeur

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[154]Skelton, **Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, Vol. 2, p. 160.

[155]"Memorandum for Consideration of the Civil Service Commissioners, 25 May, 1907," Civil Service Commission 1908: Minutes of Evidence, I, p. 48, **Sessional Papers of Canada**, XLII, No. 15, 1907-1908, cited in Eayrs, "The Origins of Canada's Department of External Affairs," p. 15 and Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 31.

replied, saying that he was "very favourably impressed with your arguments and they are exactly in accord with my own views."[156]

Pope suggested that a new department, headed by the Secretary of State, should be established so that all dispatches could be handled by a staff trained in diplomatic matters. This would be deemed satisfactory by Bryce who admitted that the Colonial Office had initially been "uneasy" about the development of a department of external affairs, "lest it should relax the connection with the C.O. and F.O., but they now appear to see that it is indispensable, and that in the form not of a separate Ministerial Department but of a secretariat attached to the Prime Minister it need not do any harm."[157]

Pope's eventual bill for a Department of External Affairs would be altered by Allen Aylesworth, Minister of Justice, and who became the primary influence on Laurier in the creation of the department. Aylesworth altered the bill so as to bypass all imperial connections and influence, particularly that of the Governor-General. When the External Affairs bill was introduced in Parliament, Aylesworth defended his actions on the grounds that it had become a necessity that one man should be responsible for foreign affairs.[158]

Pope objected to giving the secretary the power to "conduct all official communications" with other governments because it implied that Canada could carry on direct negotiations which would diminish the imperial relationship. Grey too resented the clause, which he regarded as "an improper attempt to shelve the Governor General." Facing

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[156]Brodeur to Pope, 21 October, 1907, Under Secretary of State: Semi-Official Correspondence, folder 191, NAC.

[157]Bryce to Grey, 22 April, 1909, Grey Papers.

[158]Debates, 4 March, 1909, pp. 1991-96.

criticism from the Governor-General and Pope, the government insisted that no constitutional change was intended. For them, the creation of the department of external affairs was intended to improve the efficiency of Canada's government, and not necessarily to assert its independence in international affairs. Nevertheless, Laurier and Aylesworth no doubt were aware that it could facilitate the latter objective, a prospect that they would have welcomed.[159]

On March 4, 1909, the Secretary of State, Charles Murphy, proposed that the House of Commons consider creation of a Department of External Affairs. Murphy, asserted that the government's aim was merely "an improvement in the administration of that class of public affairs which related to matters other than those of purely internal concern." This was reinforced by Laurier who said,

> We have attained such development as a nation that in order to deal with these matters, we must have a department for the purpose. It is not intended it shall be a very numerous department, a very heavy department....But I think it is essential that we should have this department by itself, with nothing else to do but to give their special attention and all their attention, to these matters alone.

During the debate with the opposition, Laurier insisted that foreign affairs were becoming so important that they necessitated "special machinery" for the Canadian state. "All governments have found it necessary to have a department whose only business shall be to deal with relations with foreign countries," he argued, "and in our judgement Canada has reached a period in her history when we should follow the example of other countries in that respect."[160]

The Toronto **Mail and Empire**, did not see the department

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[159]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 36.

[160]Debates, 4 March, 1909, pp. 1978-2008.

as a step toward Canadian nationhood and therefore expressed no objection to its collecting and collating documents. The enthusiastic reception given by the **Montreal Daily Star** and the **Regina Morning Leader** was in marked contrast, for they did regard the department as an instrument of self-reliance. The **Star** commented that,

> ...business is bound to grow as our external relations become more ramified and important"....it is only a question in any case until we shall have to get not only a department but a Minister to deal with it. Then there is the effect upon our people of calling their attention strikingly to the fact that this country has far reaching 'external relations'. We are far too prone to take a parish view of our responsibilities and we cannot have the fact brought home to us too forcibly that we are in touch with the world.[161]

The **Toronto Globe** editorial of February 22 significantly entitled "Verging on Nationhood," essentially echoed Laurier's belief in independence by slow degrees:

> The direction and progress of national evolution thus indicated may be too fast for some, and not fast enough for others, but there need be no mistake about either the fact of our progress or its direction. The answer to those who are impatient for "Independence" is that our direction is that way, but that it is, on the whole, better that it should be so slow as to attract little attention, and to cause no irritation.[162]

Official foreign observers in Canada realized the constitutional implications of the legislation. The French consul general in Montreal, Joseph de Loynes, saw the creation of the department as Canada asserting its "indépendance diplomatique." In Washington, a report from the United States consul general in Ottawa, J.G. Foster, stated that

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[161]The above sources are all cited in Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 39.

[162]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1909, p. 161.

> It is a step toward an international relation of Canada to foreign powers....The right of Canada to negotiate treaties directly with foreign states has been discussed in the Canadian Parliament, and talked of in London, as a solution to the difficulties growing out of the present dilatory conduct of even trifling matters through the Circumlocution Office in London.[163]

The bill establishing the Department of External Affairs received royal assent on May 19 and took effect on June 1, 1909. For Senator J.V. Ellis, of St. John, New Brunswick, it was not a "wild inference" to see the moves made by the Canadian state in external affairs as a larger movement "in the direction of Independence." He believed Canada to be "more useful to the Mother Country as a friendly ally, which she must ever be, than as a Colonial dependent. Canada is on the verge of Independence now."[164] For J.S. Ewart, these developments meant that there was no,

> ...desire for closer political relations with the United Kingdom as may have been seen by observation of every change in those relations since 1896. Many episodes have occurred. Everyone of them has been an affirmation of Canada's unflinching and inflexible determination to pursue her traditional progress toward complete self-government.[165]

Despite such expectations, the staff assigned to deal with Canada's external affairs would not be large. The Department of the Interior had 642 employees in Ottawa in 1909, but many other departments were very small. Trade and Commerce had a total headquarters staff of 25, Secretary of State before had only 123, of whom 30 were located outside the capital. The staff of External Affairs was initially limited

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[163]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, pp. 39-40.

[164]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1909, p. 163.

[165]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1910, p. 118.

to an institution of three to five persons.[166]

One of Pope's first priorities was to study how the British Foreign Office functioned and to compile as complete a set of records as possible. This included the official recognition of Canada's French and British roots: "I am naturally desirous to carry the date of our beginning as far back as possible and I do not see why I should not start with...the Commission to Jacques Cartier from Philippe Chabot, Admiral of France, dated 30 October, 1534."[167] Shortly after, Pope was delegated to be the Canadian participant in negotiations on the subject of pelagic sealing in Washington involving Britain, the United States, Japan and Russia. Pope was the most active person, since it was Canadian interests that required protection. His success in securing the concessions desired by Canada earned him warm praise from Grey, who nominated Pope for a knighthood. Pope's new department was also responsible for preparations for the Imperial Conference of 1911, such as the circulation of correspondence and the arrangements for the compilation of confidential prints. External relations figured prominently in the campaign of 1911, but the department had no involvement in the two issues that arose: Canada's naval policy, and reciprocity with the United States.[168]

The Canadian Department of External Affairs was a unique experiment. The Australian department of the same name was not a counterpart. It had some responsibilities not possessed by the Canadian, most notably for relations between the central government and the Australian states. However, its overseas

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[166]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 45.

[167]Pope to H.P. Biggar, 25 October, 1910, cited in Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 52.

[168]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, pp. 53-56.

links were more limited, being confined mainly to the imperial channel with London. Although a Department of External Affairs was established in New Zealand in 1919, the purpose was mainly to administer the League of Nations mandate over Samoa. A Department of External Affairs was not established in the Union of South Africa until 1927. By contrast, from 1909 the government of Canada had the means not only to enhance its efficiency in handling external relations but also to increase its authority over them as the opportunity arose.[169]

However, it did not guarantee complete freedom from British interference. For instance, on Grey's request, Bryce continued to correspond with Grey "with the view of preventing the office of Governor General drifting into a subordinate and undignified position," and believing that such a course was "most likely to advance business and to secure imperial interests. The Governor General ought to know all that is passing..."[170] Nevertheless, the department promoted administrative efficiency and enhanced the possibility of greater Canadian autonomy in international affairs. Canada had its own Department of External Affairs which would contribute greatly to raising "Canada from the rank of a small country to that of a Middle Power."[171]

4.3 SUMMARY

The expansion of diplomatic powers was consistent with Laurier's views of federalism in general. He was a firm believer in federalism and argued that self-government throughout the British empire was the most efficient way to

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[169]Hilliker, **Canada's Department of External Affairs**, p. 42.

[170]Grey to Bryce, 2 June, 1909, and Bryce to Grey, 10 June, 1909, Grey Papers.

[171]Eayrs, "The Origins of Canada's Department of External Affairs", p. 128.

maintain its unity. He had always found it ironic that the Parliament of Britain, the mother of Parliaments, should be encumbered by the discussion of relatively local problems of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. The same parliamentarians debated national and international issues of peace and war one day, and the next they turned to consider the regional and local problems in Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. This unitary system was innefficient, and to Laurier it seemed inevitable that the British Parliament would some day adopt a federal arrangement to divide local from national affairs.[172]

For this reason, it is not surprising to discover that Laurier was an ardent sympathizer with Home Rule in Ireland. In 1910, at the Ottawa Canadian Club, with the Irish representative in attendance, Laurier noted,

> We are all ardent Home Rulers here. When Great Britain accorded Canada the autonomy she now enjoys she did a very generous act as years before the new Dominion had been in a state of rebellion against her....her trust converted Canadians to a deep loyalty for her. Why should she not trust Ireland in the same manner. Centuries of oppression had embittered the Irishman, but this feeling would not survive a moment if full justice were done to him. Erin today was the only dark spot in the British Empire....I hope the time is not far distant when Imperial and local Parliaments will be established.[173]

But in addition to claiming the right to determine domestic policy, Laurier and leaders of other Dominions were beginning to make a case for the right to determine some foreign policy. At the Imperial Conference of 1911, on the initiative of

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[172]Alfred De Celles, **Discours de Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, 2 Volumes, Librarie Beauchemin: Montreal, 1920, Vol. I, p. 78.

[173]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1910, p. 64. Laurier consistently disagreed with the claim that the granting of Home Rule would lead to separation. He gave Canada as an example of successful self-government. See Malcolm to Laurier and Laurier to Malcolm, 14 and 25 December, 1910, Laurier Papers, NAC, MG26 G, V655, C897, pp. 178142-48.

Australia, the Dominions formally protested Britain's signing of the Declaration of London without their consent. Their demand for consultation in foreign policy was met by the British government when it agreed to consult the Dominions before the next conference. Britain demonstrated its good faith by submitting to the conference the important question of renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Its approval marked the first time a political treaty had been accepted by each of the Dominion governments before its ratification by Britain.

Clearly, these state initiatives had a profound influence on the development of an independent foreign policy. The Alaska Boundary Dispute reminded Canadian statesmen of the need to develop their own means of conducting foreign policy, especially when concerned with the United States. To insure good relations, the Canadian state insisted on participation in the negotiation of political treaties with the United States. Even though Grey and Bryce played an active and crucial role in the various Canadian-American agreements, they did so at their own initiative, and not under the guidance of Britain.

In addition to playing an active role in negotiating international treaties and agreements, Canadian statesmen were sent as representatives to other international activities. It is accepted that an integral part of a new nation's official independence is its recognition in the international community. The Canadian government began to send national representatives everywhere. Israel Tarte was so taken with projecting Canadian prestige at the Canadian display at Paris in 1900, a display which won a prize for its cold storage preservation of farm products, that Chamberlain complained that Tarte evidently assumed "that Canada should practically be regarded in France as almost an independent French

Republic."[174] A representative of Canada was sent by the Government to attend the ceremonies associated with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia.[175] Canadian spokesmen were sent to the Shanghai opium trade conference and to the organizational meeting of the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome. At the latter, a Canadian representative was elected to high office.[176] Canada was beginning to be known internationally and Laurier hoped that the Interparliamentary Union for Peace to be held in 1909 in Ottawa, would give the world a better conception of Canada.[177] On November 3, 1910, Lemieux, now the Postmaster General of Canada, was sent to represent Canada at the inauguration of the South African Union.[178]

Once again, Canadian statesmen had to be wary of the domestic political situation. They had to dampen any move towards autonomy lest it upset those British Canadians with imperial sentiments. Likewise, they had to assure French Canadians that Canada was not simply following the imperial lead and was making moves towards autonomy. To this end, it is interesting to note that Laurier, Brodeur, and Lemieux produced a pamphlet to be circulated throughout Quebec prior to the 1911 election. The aim of the pamphlet was to make French-Canadians more aware of the initiatives Canadian statesmen had made towards freeing Canada from its imperial ties. It emphasized Laurier's conduct during the colonial

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[174]Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Minto, 31 May, 1900, Minto Papers.

[175]Debates, 23 May, 1901, p. 5961.

[176]Debates, 20 January, 1909, p. 11.

[177]Debates, 20 July, 1908, pp. 1358-82.

[178]Lemieux, Rodolphe, **Speech Delivered By the Honourable Rodolphe Lemieux, K.C. Postmaster General of Canada On The Occasion of The Inauguration of the South African Union,** Federal Press Agency: Ottawa, 1910.

conferences and how he had opposed imperial federation, refused contributing to an imperial navy, had increased the role of French-Canadians in the government, and had maintained that Britain recognise the principle of Dominion autonomy. In addition, it highlighted Laurier's initiative in renouncing the treaties with Germany and Belgium, Brodeur's part in negotiating a commercial treaty with France, and Lemieux's role in Japan. The Japan mission in particular was heralded as a significant move towards autonomy in that negotiations were between two independent nations. This was just another indication of its movement toward functional independence. For these French-Canadian statesmen in particular, all of these initiatives in foreign policy demonstrated the growing autonomy of the Canadian state. "They are acquired points in the life of a nation, of a young nation that will only be respected by having a sober, rational and loyal usage of its most complete autonomy."[179]

Being a weak state occupying a buffer zone between two strong states, Canada's solution to its geopolitical conundrum was to profess loudly to a commitment to "symbolic imperialism" while quietly initiating the diplomatic changes necessary for attaining more political power in foreign affairs. At the core of the expansion of Canadian diplomacy was a belief that the Canadian state was better informed to make negotiations for Canadians than British advisors and representatives. To this end, Canadian statesmen became more actively involved in diplomatic negotiations with other states, especially with their closest neighbour, the United States. Additionally, representatives of the Canadian state were sent abroad on various diplomatic duties so as to gain world acceptance as an autonomous power. Yet diplomatic

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[179]Sir Wilfrid Laurier, L'Honorable L.P. Brodeur and L'Honorable R. Lemieux, **La Conquête De L'Autonomie Plénière Du Canada**, Ottawa, 1910.

autonomy is not enough. A state must also have the ability to protect its policies through the force of arms. As it will be argued in the following chapter, the South African War demonstrated to Canadian state elites the necessity of having control over its own military forces, especially in determining when and where they were to be deployed.

CHAPTER FIVE

ARMS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The ultimate authority of the state rests in its ability to use military power when necessary. According to Mann, military power is the social organization of force. This organization of military power is usually shaped to provide sufficient force to carry out the foreign policy of the state. The modern state derived historically from the organizational demands of warfare. Certainly, war has formative and disintegrative effects for states and their societies. War destroys weak states, and makes strong states even stronger, particularly their armed forces. While continental Europe is the classical example of this, pre-confederation Canadian history attests to this too. New France, after having conquered the indigenous population, was itself conquered by Britain. British loyalists soon found themselves on the losing side of the American War of Independence and confined to British North America. In both cases, the "founding nations" had experienced the bitter taste of defeat and the consequences it had for their political and social organization. In many ways, war has shaped Canadian society from the beginning.

The War of 1812 may have provided Canadians with the erroneous belief that they would always be able to defeat American expansionism, but in reality, war with a late-eighteenth century United States would have been geopolitical suicide. As relations with the United States improved, the military threat subsided. Canada, it would seem, would not require a large full-time standing army. Moreover, it still felt that it could depend on Britain's navy. But as the geopolitical balance in the western hemisphere began to sway towards the advantage of the United States, it became obvious

that Britain could do little to protect Canada against any American aggression.

Any Canadian or British attempt to bolster the armed forces defending Canadian territory could have been construed as a sign of aggression by the United States and would have harmed the warming relations between the two states. It could have led to a war that the United States would ultimately win. After the Venezuela Crisis and the Alaska Boundary Dispute, Laurier and other state elites faced the dilemma that Britain could no longer be relied on to counter the United States. They realized that the best way to ensure good relations was for the Canadian state to be actively involved in all future negotiations. As such, Canadian-American confrontation became diplomatic, economic, and cultural, rather than military. Simultaneously, however, Britain was demanding that Canada contribute financially to the Royal Navy, and reorganize its armed forces so that they would be easily integrated with the British imperial forces. The dilemma for a weak Canadian state occupying a region where two hegemons agreed to a truce, was two-fold. First, it wanted to avoid large financial contributions to Britain on the grounds that an autonomous Canadian state would be responsible for its own armed forces. Second, it simultaneously did not want to appear to be too weak or too strong in the eyes of the United States. Moreover, there were those in Canada, especially in Quebec and in rural Canada, that wanted to avoid the European example of large standing armies and constant warfare. Autonomous military power was destined to be a gradual process.

i. Moves Towards Military Autonomy

Encouraged by Britain, the move towards growing Canadian military autonomy was first established soon after Confederation when George Etienne Cartier introduced his Militia Bill in 1868. He told the Canadian House of Commons that,

> ...three indispensable elements constitute a nation - population, territory, and the sea. But the crown of the edifice - also indispensable - is military force. No people can lay claim to the title of a nation if it does not possess a military element - the means of defence.[1]

Essentially, for Cartier, if a state wished to claim mastery in the conduct of its own affairs, it must possess armed strength and control it. This was the first time that Canada, as a new state, suggested that it have complete control over its own military forces as it possessed over its local political and economic matters. The possibility of requiring British reinforcements led to the colonial strategy of accepting British instruction. This alliance of sorts would eventual challenge Canadian political authority and lead to profound changes.

Canada's security hinged on her relations with the United States. The emergence of a strong United States after the Civil War and the Fenian raids of 1866 and 1870, simultaneously united Canada and created a need for British military presence to counter these threats originating from the United States. Yet, British forces could also serve to antagonize the Fenians or America as a whole. Nevertheless, as Anglo-American relations improved, there was less need for the British military presence. British naval and military withdrawals and improvement of these Anglo-American relations coincided with the Dominion's advancing autonomy.[2] Although

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[1]John Boyd, **Sir George Etienne Cartier: His Life and Times: A Political History of Canada from 1814 to 1874**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1914, p. 291. Quoted in Richard Preston, **Canada and "Imperial Defence": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defence Organization, 1867-1919**, Durham: Duke University Press, 1967, p. 55.

[2]For an examination of this period see, C.P. Stacey, **Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871: A Study in the Practice of Responsible Government**, London: Longmans, Green, 1936.

Canada faced no immediate military task, the continued existence of the militia was in its usefulness as a means of providing "aid to the civil power."[3] The militia were called out by various local municipalities to settle such things as,

> ...a lumberman's brawl in Pembroke; an affray during a hanging in St. Andrew's, New Brunswick; a reign of terror by railway navvies in the area of Tamworth, Ontario; an attempt to cut wood on Crown property surrounding the forts of Levis, Quebec; the escape of a convict in Quebec City; the kidnap of a girl in Roberval, Quebec, by members of a visiting circus.[4]

Between 1895 and 1914, the militia were called out 28 times for a total period of 1303 days. Interestingly, most of these occasions of aid to the civil power involved a labour strike.[5]

The most serious military threat to the nationalizing Canadian state came in 1885 with the Riel Rebellion, or Northwest Campaign.[6] The Canadian state put 8,000 Canadian militia in the field at a cost of four and a half million dollars to defeat Riel's Métis uprising. Just as the American Civil War and, though to a lesser extent, the Mormon

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[3]Desmond Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867-1914," **The Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. LI, No. 4, 1970, pp. 407-425.

[4]J.B. Pariseau, quoted in Gwyn Dyer, and T., Viljoen, **The Defence of Canada: In the Arms of the Empire, 1760-1939**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990, p. 148.

[5]Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power...," p. 423. Labour unrest will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.

[6]The Riel Rebellions have been examined extensively. The classic work is perhaps George F.G. Stanley's, **The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960. Stanley's subsequent work attempted to popularize the thesis that the Métis were a "New Nation" struggling for independence. For a more recent account see, Thomas Flanagan, **Louis "David" Riel: Prophet of the New World**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, and Bob Beal and Rod Macleod, **Prairie Fire: The 1885 North-West Rebellion**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984.

experience had threatened the American Union, this internal uprising was the first crisis of Canadian Confederation. The suppression of Riel in 1885 by Canadian militia, rather than by British regulars, signalled the first assertion of the Canadian state's monopoly on violence. As Morton contends, "the Canadian militia had met its first real test and it had passed with apparent brilliance."[7]

A rethinking of Indian policy was essential, particularly with the Métis of the North-West Territories. The treaties of the 1870s had been made with the belief that Indians on reservations would become self-supporting and independent. However, by the late 1890s they still depended upon government aid. Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior, under which the Department of Indian Affairs was run, decided that Indian self-sufficiency would only come about with increased education and grants of land on which they could farm. To this end, the government created Indian Treaty 8. For Sifton, Indian Treaty 8 of 1899 was a success in that its goal was "to pacify and keep pacified the North-West Territories" and to avoid "having an Indian trouble on our hands, the very slightest of which would cost us two or three times the amount of scrip we issue."[8] Rather than an expression of humanitarian concern for the Indians, the treaty was a pragmatic strategy aimed at avoiding a potentially violent clash between cultures.[9] Nonetheless, by the turn of the century, Canada's

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[7]Desmond Morton, **Canada and War: A Military and Political History**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981, p. 26. Had the Canadians been unsuccessful it is more than likely that the British would have been asked for assistance.

[8]Debates, 14 July, 1899, p. 7513.

[9]The strategy of conflict management followed by the Canadian state, with regards to its relations with the aboriginal peoples, best fits the control model discussed in S.J.R., Noel's "Canadian responses to ethnic conflict: Consociationalism, federalism, and control," in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., **The Politics of Ethnic Conflict**

indigenous people began to stabilize after years of decline.

In addition to the militia, the state could also rely on the North West Mounted Police.[10] Traditionally, Canadians have explained their frontier experience as a consequence of a specific ideology, while Americans have viewed the less violent Canadian frontier experience as a consequence of delayed settlement. Yet, it must be recognized that defence played a crucial role. Prime minister Macdonald was suspicious of the United States. "I would be quite willing, personally, to leave that whole country a wilderness for the next half-century, but I fear if Englishmen do not go there, Yankees will...."[11]

Beginning in 1873 as a small, temporary organization whose activities were confined to the North West Territories, by the end of the First World War the Mounted Police had emerged as a permanent body with nation-wide obligations.[12] The Mounties became the most important arm of the state in its administration of the Northwest. They helped supervise local Indian affairs, delivered mail service, established

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Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 50-55.

[10]See, R.G. Macleod, **The North-West Mounted Police**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976.

[11]Cited by Desmond Morton, "Cavalry or Police: Keeping the Peace on Adjacent Frontiers, 1870-1900," **Journal of Canadian Studies**, Volume 12, 1977, pp. 27-37. For additional information, see S.W. Horall, "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Mounted Police for the Northwest Territories," **Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. 53, 1972. For a dated yet detailed treatment of defence considerations in Canada's policy in the Northwest, see C.P. Stacey's, "The Military Aspect of Canada's Winning of the West, 1870-1885," **Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. 21, 1940, pp. 1-24.

[12]R.G., Macleod, **The North West Mounted Police**, Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Booklets, 1978, p. 3. The North West Mounted Police became the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 1919.

meteorological records and crop reports, issued relief supplies, acted as claim recorders, and maintained law and order in both criminal and civil realms. This last element was especially important because any disorder on the Canadian side of the frontier could have prompted an invasion by the United States to protect people on its side of the border.[13] While the North West Mounted Police were used extensively between 1873 and 1885, by 1895 its numbers had been reduced to 750. In their 1896 election campaign, the Liberals declared that they were committed to dismantling the force. However, a number of events combined to alter the new government's attitude, particularly the renewed fear of an Indian uprising in the Northwest Territories motivated by Cree frustrations on the reservations.

The discovery of gold in the Yukon in 1895 was another important development for the survival of the Mounted Police, as well as the Canadian Permanent Force. The region became overrun by American miners, almost all of whom carried a personal firearm. They soon accounted for eighty percent of the Yukon Territory's population. This prompted the Commissioner for the Territory, Major J.M. Walsh, to inform his Minister that the district was "in the hands of a foreign element" that could easily "take possession."[14] While there was never any question of the United States' government plotting annexation, other events hinted at America's renewed commitment to manifest destiny. Indeed, the departure of the troops from Ottawa in 1898 occurred during Admiral Dewey's attack on a Spanish naval squadron in Manila Bay, the opening battle of the Spanish-American War. The dispatchment of the

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[13]Morton, "Cavalry or Police...."

[14]Quoted in Brereton Greenhous, **Guarding the Goldfields: The Story of the Yukon Field Force**, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1987, pp. 7-8; and Ian McCulloch, "Yukon Field Force, 1898-1900," **The Beaver: Exploring Canada's History**, Vol. 77, No. 5, 1997, pp. 4-12.

Yukon Field Force, made up of 203 volunteers from the Permanent Force, asserted Canadian sovereignty and supported the North West Mounted Police previously sent to maintain law and order. The Field Force did little more than fight fires, guard bullion stores, and maintain itself in a hostile environment. Nevertheless, these were the first troops to serve in Canada's Northern Territories and they did much to further the integrity of Canada's Permanent Force.[15]

By 1903, a series of detachments had been stretched north from Edmonton as far as Fort Resolution on Great Slave Lake. In that year, Charles Constantine who had established operations in the Yukon, was ordered north to the remote Hudson's Bay post at Fort McPherson, near the mouth of the Mackenzie. Fort McPherson was the most accessible position from which to supervise the American whalers who operated from Herschell Island. In 1904, the region was regularly patrolled, the most important being the annual Dawson-McPherson patrol linking the new area with the Yukon. Coinciding with the establishment of the Mackenzie posts, Superintendent John Douglas Moodie launched operations of the force in the eastern Arctic. Patrols from the Fullerton post secured a large semi-circular area stretching from Repulse Bay in the north to Baker Lake in the west and Churchill in the south. The western and eastern Arctic regions were linked and the barren lands east of Great Slave Lake explored in 1908-9. The obvious importance of the North West Mounted Police's expanding northern role in the establishment of Canadian sovereignty, provided both the Laurier and Borden administrations with a major justification for the existence of the force in the period 1900-1914.[16]

Yet, while Canada was taking care of its own internal

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[15]Greenhous, **Guarding the Goldfields**, pp. 8-9.

[16]Macleod, **The North-West Mounted Police**, 1978, p. 17.

military affairs, Britain still regarded Canada as a colony whose full resources could be called upon to contribute to the support of empire. Nowhere was this more evident than in the constant problems that arose between the Canadian government and the Governor General and the General Officer Commanding the Militia. Both were British imperialists who were so concerned with tightening the military bonds between Britain and Canada, that they often disregarded Canadian principles of self-government. Moreover, the General Officer Commanding the Militia was attempting to enforce a separation of civil and military authority which was customary in Britain but only a legal theory in Canada. These problems led Canadians to believe that the power and the responsibility to develop their own military policies should reside within Canada. Therefore, the Canadian state battled to preserve and maintain its growing military autonomy on two fronts; the functioning of the militia at home, and its resistance to any schemes for closer Imperial federation in the empire at large. In particular, the Colonial and Imperial Conferences between 1887 and 1911, and the South African War of 1899-1902, would be problematic for Canadian defence autonomy.

5.2 COLONIAL DEPENDENCY

i. The New Imperialism

The Colonial Conference of 1887, the year of the Golden Jubilee of Queen Victoria, was the first time representatives of the mother country and the self-governing colonies assembled in London under the Presidency of the new Colonial Secretary, Sir Henry Holland, to discuss "mutual problems." However, the British government was careful not to give the impression that they were seeking the colonies' advice in Imperial matters. To them, according to a contemporary observer, it was only an informal and isolated "meeting of

vassals with their overlord."[17] Moreover, even though the Government was careful not to antagonize colonial representatives, their insistence that the Conference be called "Colonial" and not "Imperial" demonstrated that there was no real understanding of the strength and significance of Dominion nationalism. Dominion representatives were of the opinion that they should have an equal voice in imperial affairs. Indeed, as early as 1880, Sir John Colomb had recognized that the problem of imperial defence was one of cost and taxes, and since "taxes cannot be separated from representation, we are at once brought face to face with the naked fact that imperial representation lies at the root of the problem of imperial defence."[18]

The aim of the conference was vague with a general belief that the security of the empire would be enhanced if each part assumed its full responsibility, particularly in the sphere of naval defence. The British government wanted the colonies to contribute financially to the navy but simultaneously insisted on absolute control. For the Canadian state, naval defence was not the chief priority and it claimed that Canada's best contribution to imperial defence was the development of its internal resources, particularly the building of the Transnational Railway linking the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.[19]

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[17]Richard Jebb, **The Imperial Conference: A History and Study**, Volume I, London: Longmans, Green, 1911, p. 12. More recent accounts of imperial defence include Preston, **Canada and "Imperial Defence"...**; J.E., Kendle, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organization**, London: Longamns, Green, 1967; and, John Gooch, "Great Britain and the Defence of Canada, 1896-1914," **The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History**, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1975.

[18]J., Colomb, **The Defence of Great and Greater Britain**, London: Edward Stanford, 1880, p. 10.

[19]Preston, **Canada and "Imperial Defence"**, p. 105.

While federation had not been on the Conference agenda, most of the delegates paid lip-service to the idea of closer imperial union but managed to reveal the growing colonial discontent with existing relations. For instance, Alfred Deakin, the head of the delegation from the Australian Colony of Victoria, launched into a forceful criticism of the Imperial Government. Deakin was to play a prominent role in the evolution of the conference system and already by 1887 his politics were a curious blend of nationalism and imperialism. He desired neither independence nor organic union, but a strong Australia within a viable imperial framework. However, it was as an exponent of colonial nationalism that he made his mark on the conference of 1887.[20]

The 1887 conference provided a unique experiment in imperial cooperation, however, both Mr. Goschen and Mr. Chamberlain dampened any enthusiasm for a second conference. Few M.P.s appreciated its value. Some of them doubted whether it would be possible "a second time to draw first-rate colonials to this country."[21] Nevertheless, the conference became the "parent of a long progeniture" although no plans were made for further meetings and another would not be held until 1897.

Gladstone had refused to summon a conference in the intervening years and in November 1893, the Imperial Federation League was officially dissolved. In Canada, an ardent core of imperialists in Toronto decided in 1893 not to dissolve the Canadian Imperial Federation League but to carry on the struggle for imperial union. Three years later, the Toronto group supported the foundation of a London based

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[20]Kendle, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences...**, pp. 9-10.

[21]Quoted in Gwen Neuendorff, **Studies in the Evolution of Dominion Status: The Governor-Generalship of Canada and the Development of Canadian Nationalism**, London, 1942, p. 370.

British Empire League. A conference was held in Ottawa in 1894 at which three of the self-governing colonies were present, Lord Jersey attending on behalf of Britain. Discussions focused on trade and communications, but imperial organization was not mentioned. The principle of "one colony one vote" was established and the conference itself demonstrated that colonial cooperation was still possible.[22]

When Joseph Chamberlain assumed office as Colonial Secretary on July 1, 1895, closer union of the British Empire was no longer a mere dream but became practical politics. Chamberlain, who was to become "the High Priest of Empire," brought to the Colonial Office a well-defined imperialist creed. As a firm believer in the Anglo-Saxon "race," he was dedicated to imperial union.[23] Consolidation of some form - political, military, or economical - seemed essential if Britain was to hold her own geopolitically with Germany, the United States, and Japan.

The Diamond Jubilee of 1897 gave Chamberlain his first substantial opportunity to further the cause of closer union. The Premiers of the self-governing colonies were invited to attend the ceremonies and also an informal discussion of important questions of imperial interest. Chamberlain was well aware that the speed with which closer union of the Empire was approached depended entirely upon the feelings within the colonies. Most importantly, he asserted that there was a real necessity for improved machinery of consultation between Britain and the self-governing colonies, and suggested "a great council of Empire."

However, Chamberlain's plans to strengthen Imperial defence and his hopes for an imperial *Zollverein* (economic union) had been ruined by the unwillingness of the Premiers,

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[22]Kendle, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences...**, p. 18.

[23]Kendle, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences...**, pp. 20-21.

particularly Laurier, to commit themselves. Laurier was the most prominent of the statesmen, not only because Canada was the first self-governing colony, but also because of Canada's recent extension of a preference to British goods. He was opposed to any change in existing political relations, but he often spoke so ambiguously on the subject during the Conference that Richard Seddon, Premier of New Zealand, was led to believe that the Canadian Premier desired closer union as much as he and Edward Braddon of Tasmania.[24] In a series of interviews and speeches, the Canadian Premier expressed affection for Britain, and enthusiasm for the imperial tie, in terms which convinced the British press that he was "as ardent an imperialist as Mr Chamberlain." Much of this ambiguity was a result of Laurier's unique vision. In 1897, he told an audience in England, that though Canadians were still called colonists, they were proud to proclaim themselves a nation. The two words, colony and nation, had never before been associated with the same state.[25] Laurier's deliberate ambiguity was largely a result of the fact that he did not want to disrupt national unity in Canada. He was well aware that there were two opposing voices in Canada that held conflicting views on closer imperial relations. Moreover, future decision-making in the realm of imperial relations would be hampered by the inappropriate and unconstitutional behaviour of Governor-General Lord Minto and Colonel Edward Hutton, the new "general officer commanding" of the Canadian Militia. Nowhere was this more evident than in the question of Canadian involvement in the South African War.

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[24]Kendle, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences...**, p. 28.

[25]Speech at Liverpool, in G., Bellerive, ed., **Orateurs canadiens-francais en Angleterre, en Ecosse et en Irlande, coférénces et disours**, Quebec: Impr. Le Soleil, 1912, p. 12.

ii. The South African War, 1899-1902

After his appointment by Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia, Hutton sought a "National Army" for Canada that would be able to take the field on its own and be immune from partisan political influences. Hutton's objective may have been in improving the Canadian militia and not helping imperial manpower needs, but the approaching war in South Africa gave him new priorities in Canada.[26] Governor General Minto and Hutton were appalled by Lieutenant-colonel Sam Hughes' plan for a private contingent because Chamberlain wanted official Canadian support. It would give Laurier an excuse to do nothing. Hutton had drafted a proposed organization for a small Canadian contingent of infantry, mounted rifles and artillery, numbering about 1,200 men. This news was cabled to the Colonial Office and was subsequently leaked to the London press expressing "high appreciation of signal exhibition of patriotic spirit of people of Canada shown by offers to serve in South Africa."[27] The following day this was reported in the Canadian press causing an emotional public outburst for participation in the war.

The response of Laurier's government was crucial. By the summer of 1899, the Canadian House of Commons unanimously supported the British case in South Africa. While Chamberlain did not believe that colonial troops would be needed, he was seeking a symbolic demonstration of colonial support. The Laurier government would not immediately oblige on the grounds that developing the country was their first priority. However, the Canadian public was not like-minded. Indeed, the majority

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[26]For more detail see Desmond Morton, **Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970, Chap. 7, and Morton, **Canada and War**, p. 37.

[27]Cited in Peter Stevens, and J.T. Saywell, eds., **Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, 1898-1900**, 2 Volumes, Toronto: T.H Best, Volume 1, 1981, p. x1.

of British-Canadians clearly supported Canadian involvement in the South African conflict. But it is possible to distinguish between two strands of reasoning: those who simply wanted to contribute to the maintenance of the British Empire; and those who saw it as "an opportunity to rid Canada of its irksome colonial status and gain influence and responsibility within the imperial community."[28] This second strand of thought sought to give Canada a say in the imperial decision making, "thereby extending rather than reducing Canadian autonomy."[29]

Indeed, as Carl Berger notes, there was a movement from above, as certain influential figures in Canadian society attempted to exploit the fact that Canada remained within the British Empire.[30] For these influential Canadians whatever imperialism meant, it did not mean British domination, but rather, an opportunity for Canada to participate in, and perhaps even play a leading role in, expansion. As such, imperialism was one form of Canadian nationalism.[31] As Berger

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[28]Carman Miller, **Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War 1899-1902**, Montreal and Kingston: Canadian War Museum and McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993, p. 19.

[29]Miller, **Painting the Map Red**, p. 19.

[30]These included the militia colonel, George Taylor Denison III; the Principal of Queen's University, George Munro Grant; the headmaster of Upper Canada College, Sir George Robert Parkin; the economics professor and humorist, Stephen Leacock; and the literary periodical editor, Sir Andrew Macphail. For more detail, see Carl Berger, **The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970.

[31]Cole disagrees with Berger on this point and prefers to label Canadian imperialism as a variety of Britannic nationalism. See Douglas Cole, "Canada's "nationalistic" imperialists," **Journal of Canadian Studies**, 1971, pp. 44-49. Others share this criticism of Berger's limited elaboration of the terms imperialism and nationalism. See Graham Clark, "Imperialism and Nationalism in Revisionalist Historiography: A Critique of Some Recent Trends," **Journal of Canadian Studies**, Vol. 17, 1982, pp. 91-99.

argues, "their sense of nationality was grounded upon a definite conception of Canada's past, her national character, and her mission in the future, and at heart was a yearning for significance and a desire to obliterate the stigma of colonialism."[32]

The British Canadian minority opposed to the war were typically liberals, "opposed to the new imperialism, big government, big business, standing armies, and taxation."[33] In many ways they agreed with Laurier in that they did not understand why Canada should waste its resources in South Africa when their own national development was far from complete. French Canada was apathetic or hostile to the new imperialism and could not understand why Canada should contribute to British attempts to consolidate her empire. As Henri Bourassa constantly reminded his audience, "Nous Canadiens-Français, nous n'appartenons qu'à un pays, le Canada."[34] The Quebec newspaper, **La Patrie**, announced in 1901 that "We are Canadians before all, and above all. All our patriotism, all our love, all our aspirations, all our memories, all our soul attaches us to the Canadian land, to this ancestral soil where our fathers sleep: it is our only fatherland."[35] As such, French Canada insisted on its loyalty to the British Empire, a responsibility that included defending only that portion of the Empire that was their homeland - Canada.

Minto seemingly threatened the government to commit

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[32]Berger, **The Sense of Power...**, p. 259.

[33]Miller, **Painting the Map Red...**, p. 22.

[34]"We French-Canadians belong to only one country, Canada." **La Presse**, 14 Oct. 1899, cited in Miller, **Painting the Map Red**, p. 27.

[35]Robert Brown and Ramsay Cook, **Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1974, p. 163.

troops by reminding Laurier that negotiations over the Alaska Boundary were still in progress. Minto suggested that not to offer troops,

> ...may be taken perhaps to indicate a certain want of loyalty here, which would be all the more unfortunate at a time when we are relying a good deal upon the Imperial support in the Alaska question and in view also of Canada always having to rely to a great extent in any foreign complication on the sympathies and support of the British public.[36]

Laurier's administration became divided over the issue. Some were angered by the fact that a British general dared to interfere with a Canadian member of Parliament. Others, particularly those from Ontario, were strongly in favour of sending an official contingent, fully equipped and paid for by Canada. Some, such as Clifford Sifton and W.S. Fielding, Minister of Finance, were not committed to either position. Laurier sought a compromise, conceding that the Canadian government would equip and transport Canadian volunteers. In terms of military expenditures, Canada paid only for the equipping and transporting of its troops to South Africa. Thereafter, the British assumed financial responsibility which led to Canadian soldiers being paid less than their British counterparts. The total cost to Canada for its direct contribution was under three million dollars. But more importantly, the Militia Department and Lord Minto insisted that they fight as a unit, not as auxiliaries to British

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[36]Minto to Laurier, 13 October, 1899, Laurier Papers. One argument put forward by Laurier to Minto against sending troops to South Africa was "the possibility of their being required in connection with Alaska." See Minto to Chamberlain, July 25, 1899, cited in Stevens and Saywell, **Lord Minto's Canadian Papers**, Vol 1., p. 107.

regiments.[37] This included their own distinctive equipment and uniforms, including a helmet badge displaying an imperial crown superimposed on a maple leaf with the word "CANADA" marked clearly below the crown.[38] The Canadian contingent, an infantry regiment divided into two battalions, each with four companies, was commanded by Colonel Otter who also demanded that his unit be kept together.[39]

Bourassa accused Laurier of not getting the approval of the people of Canada and of setting a precedent which would commit Canada to any other British war in the future. Laurier reminded Bourassa that it was in fact public opinion that had led to the sending of a Canadian contingent. Moreover, adhering to his overriding concern for national unity, Laurier added that had the government refused, "a most dangerous agitation would have arisen -an agitation which, according to all human probability would have ended in a cleavage in the population of this country upon racial lines. A greater calamity could never take place in Canada."[40]

The South African War was arguably Canada's first real

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[37]Carman Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911," **The Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1969, pp. 280-281; Desmond Morton, "Colonel Otter and the First Canadian Contingent in South Africa, 1899-1900," in Michael Cross and Robert Bothwell, eds., **Policy By Other Means**, Toronto: Clarke-Irwin, 1972, pp. 98-99; and Desmond Morton, "Canada's First Expeditionary Force: The Canadian Contingent in South Africa, 1899-1900," **Canadian Defence Quarterly**, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1986, p. 42.

[38]Miller, **Painting the Map Red**, Chapters Three and Four.

[39]Desmond Morton, **The Canadian General: Sir William Otter**, Toronto: Hakkert, 1974; "Colonel Otter and the First Canadian Contingent in South Africa, 1899-1900," in Michael Cross and Robert Bothwell, **Policy By Other Means**, Toronto: Clarke-Irwin, 1972; "Canada's First Expeditionary Force: The Canadian Contingent in South Africa, 1899-1900, **Canadian Defence Quarterly**, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1986.

[40]Debates, 13 March 13, 1900, pp. 1837-1842.

venture into foreign affairs. Yet Canada's participation in the South African War did not lead to the tightening of the Imperial tie which Chamberlain, Lord Minto and Hutton strongly desired, and which Laurier and some of his cabinet opposed. It did have meaningful consequences for both the strengthening of the Canadian state, and the formation of a national identity for those Canadians who followed the progress of Canadian troops in South Africa.

When Lord Roberts congratulated the Canadians for their "most dashing advance" in forcing the surrender of General Cronje and his Boers at Paardeberg, there were great displays of pride and jubilation in Canada. The Dominion seemed to have achieved military significance in the maintenance of Empire. As Laurier announced in the House of Commons shortly after the battle of Paardeberg, "is there a man whose bosom did not swell with pride...the pride of the consciousness that day the fact had been revealed to the world that a new power had arisen in the west."[41] Indeed, Paardeberg was the first major overseas engagement ever fought by officially recognized Canadian soldiers. In it they suffered over 130 casualties including thirty-four killed.[42] So overwhelmed with jubilation, the Canadian government immediately decided to make up the difference between British and Canadian pay scales.[43]

The South African War contributed to the growing autonomy of the state, particularly in the realm of military power. First, in face of the growing national pride, Laurier sought to regain political ground lost due to the government's reluctant decision to become involved in the war. Indeed, his declaration to the Canadian parliament served to remind people

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[41]Debates, 13 March, 1900, p. 1848

[42]Miller, **Painting the Map Red**, p. 98.

[43]Debates, 27 February, 1900, pp. 1013.

of Canadian autonomy in military affairs:

> What we have done, we have done...in the plenitude, in the majesty of our colonial independence...I claim for Canada this, that in future, Canada shall be at liberty to act or not to act, to interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she pleases, and that she shall reserve for herself the right to judge as she pleases, and that she shall reserve for herself the right to judge whether or not there is cause for her to act.[44]

Second, the war had significant impact on the military in that it strengthened the Canadian militia. As Miller asserts, "No Canadian institution benefited more from the war than the Canadian militia." Miller details how during and after the war the Canadian militia and its minister, supported by the House of Common's militia lobby, used the war and its "lessons" to increase militia estimates, enlarge its dimensions to one hundred thousand men, increase arms production, and generally overhaul the entire system. For Miller, "In the decade following the Boer War the Canadian militia came closer to becoming a self-contained army than ever before."[45]

Finally, the "Hutton Affair" as it has become known, had demonstrated the unwillingness of Lord Minto and General Hutton to recognize that the British General Officer Commanding and the Governor-General, were not imperial officers. Rather, the former was a servant of the government of Canada, and the latter was a constitutional monarch. This was certainly made clear in the attacks on Minto made by John Dafoe, the editor of the **Manitoba Free Press**. For Dafoe, Minto "regarded himself less as a governor-general than as Imperial Commissioner charged with the vague and shadowy powers which go with that office; and Sir Wilfrid had, in consequence, to

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[44]Cited in George Stanley, **Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1960, p. 288.

[45]Miller, **Painting the Map Red**, pp. 438-439.

instruct him on more than one occasion that Canada was still a self-governing country and not a military satrapy."[46]

Relations between Borden and Hutton deteriorated for several reasons. To begin with, Hutton had a genuine dislike of the "vacillating Laurier Government with their ill disguised French and pro-Boer sentiments" as well as French-Canadians like Bourassa and Tarte. He longed for the day when

> ...an Australian Army [would] land in Vancouver, a British Army at Quebec, and a South African Army at St. John, N.B., who together will force the French Canadian of the future to for ever hold his peace, should his efforts to force the tricolour upon Canada make such efforts necessary.[47]

Moreover, Hutton was disobedient, gave indiscreet speeches and interviews, thought he could dictate to his Minister, and above all cut the Minister off from contact with the military staff by giving secret orders. As such, the Canadian government risked opposition criticism and dismissed Hutton, defending their actions on constitutional grounds. It was argued that they could not "for a moment yield to claims which practically would make the General the controller of the policy of the Government in Militia's matters."[48] Laurier wrote to Lord Strathcona, the Canadian High Commissioner, arguing that Hutton's actions stemmed from his "assumption that being an officer of the Imperial Army, he was superior to the Minister of Militia, that he was the supreme authority in

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[46]John Dafoe, **Laurier: A Study**, Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1922, p. 78. The **Manitoba Free Press** was owned by Clifford Sifton, Laurier's Minister of the Interior, which meant that Dafoe became knowledgable about many of the cabinet's discussions.

[47]Hutton to Minto, 10 January, 1902, Minto Papers.

[48]Cited in Morton, **Ministers and Generals**, p. 165.

the Department, and that the Minister was his subordinate."[49] Only Minto's intervention saved a scandal, as Hutton was subsequently given orders to report to South Africa.

With Hutton's departure in 1902, Canada began to think about placing a Canadian in charge of the militia. Indeed, the Minister of Militia announced in the House of Commons that "the time has come when we should enlarge the field from which we draw our commanding officers...we...should be able to put a Canadian officer in that position if we choose."[50] Moves toward this goal would be made with the Militia Bill of 1904.

Canadian participation in the South African War was an important step towards independence and nationhood and the recognition of Canadian nationality by the world at large. It raised the question of Canada's involvement in British wars which did not imperil either her own safety or her economic well-being. Laurier's compromise of authorizing volunteers to be dispatched to South Africa allowed him to maintain his assertion that it was the prerogative of the Canadian state to judge for whether or not Canada should become an active participant in British wars. In so doing, Laurier claimed that in the South African crisis Canada had acted "in the full exercise of our sovereign power."

While the South African War advanced simultaneously the concepts of imperial collaboration and of colonial nationalism, it demonstrated that Canadian national unity could be strongly tested by the imperial connection. It increased Laurier's desire for Canada to stay clear of any tightening of the connection. The war had proved that his views on imperial relations were those of Quebec rather than of Ontario. In spite of the setback which he had suffered

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[49]Laurier to Strathcona, 22 February, 1900, Laurier Papers, Vol. 751, Reel C1171, NAC. Herafter cited as Laurier Papers.

[50]Cited in Stanely, **Canada's Soldiers**, p. 294.

during the war, he was able to face Chamberlain with more resolution and confidence at the conference of 1902 than he had in 1897. Whereas in 1897 he had professed interest and support for Chamberlain's schemes - postponing rather than rejecting their execution - in 1902 he would be much more forceful in his rejection of such schemes. This was the result of his new-found assurance, of resentment arising from the South African War, of a closer alignment with Quebec, and of an intensification of his original antipathy towards imperialism.

As such, both the South African War and the Alaskan boundary dispute had serious implications for Canadian defence autonomy. First, they strengthened Laurier's resolve to resist imperial consolidation at further colonial and imperial conferences. Second, they led not only to the control over naval bases but also to the creation of the Militia Bill and a strengthening of the Canadian armed forces. Third, with the commencement of the European naval race, Canada would decide to establish a Canadian navy.

5.3 TOWARDS MILITARY AUTONOMY

i. Resistance to Imperial Consolidation

Laurier's aversion to tighter imperial ties was made more obvious at the 1902 Conference. Chamberlain's speeches at the Conference, especially his famous reference to Britain as "a weary Titan, carrying an orb too large for its fate," made it clear that he favoured Imperial Federation as a means to limit the burdens of Empire.[51] Many regarded the Dominions primarily as a source of military manpower, a potential sharer of the national debt, and a potentially increased market for British goods. Essentially, the idea was to commit the

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[51]Maurice Ollivier, ed., **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937**, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954, pp. 151-154.

colonies to a share in the responsibilities and expenses of Empire, while leaving to Britain the essential control of foreign policy. Needless to say, the Dominion governments, particularly Canada, had a different idea of their purpose in the world and were accordingly suspicious about Imperial Federation.

For instance, Clifford Sifton, believed that rather than direct contributions to imperial defence the Canadian state should "make expenditures that would be upon her own territory and under her own control."[52] He also felt that Chamberlain's proposals were "thoroughly impracticable and quite inconsistent with the logical development of our theory of self-government."[53] Canada's Governor-General, Lord Minto, believed that Britain's direction of the South African War and the experience of the Canadian forces involved in it, had created in Canada an "extreme sensitiveness" to "anything like the mildest Imperial advice." He warned that Canadian nationalism was on the rise, and that there was a growing desire for "independence."[54]

It is not surprising that, in response to Chamberlain's invitation, Laurier asserted that the "military defences" of Britain and the self-governing colonies could not be the subject of "common action." Instead, defence matters should be left to the discretion and direction of the "different governments of empire."[55] Nevertheless, on the eve of the conference, the British Secretary of State for War, St. John Broderick, endorsed the concept of imperial defence

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[52]Sifton to Hamar Greenwood, 22 October, 1903, Sifton Papers.

[53]Sifton to Sydney Fisher, October 22, 1903, Sifton Papers.

[54]Minto to Peter Elliot, 30 November, 1901, Minto Papers.

[55]Laurier to Chamberlain, undated, Laurier Papers.

centralization. Frederick Borden, Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence, warned Laurier that Broderick was seeking to commit Canada to "something definite" on the defence issue. Borden emphasized that he was "entirely against Canadian assistance of either men or money to foreign wars" in which Britain might be involved.[56] Such comments clearly indicated the reluctance of the Canadian state to increase Canada's defence contributions to the Empire or allow their armed forces to be directly controlled by Britain.

Before the conference, Laurier told the Canadian Parliament that relations with Britain remained perfectly satisfactory and that he contemplated no change:

> It would be the most suicidal policy that could be devised for Canada to enter the vortex in which the nations of Europe, England included, are engaged at the present time, and which compels them to maintain great military armaments.

He added that the resources of the Canadian budget ought to be devoted not to military expenditure but to public works, the construction of railroads and harbours, and the economic development of the country: "Canada has done more for the defence of the British Empire by the construction of the Intercolonial Railroad and the Canadian Pacific Railroad than she could have done by spending that money on military armaments."[57] Indeed, in a conversation with Minto, Laurier suggested that these "strategic railways" be considered as examples of "the good service Canada had rendered to the Empire."[58] It is not surprising that Laurier was adamant that at the conference he would only discuss "what part Canada is

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[56]Borden to Laurier, 2 July, 1902, Laurier Papers. Sir Frederick Borden, was minister of the militia from 1896 to 1911.

[57]Debates, 15 April, 1902, p. 2741.

[58]Minto memo of interview with Laurier, 28 January, 1902, Minto Papers.

prepared to take in her own defence, what share of the burden must fall upon us as being responsible for the safety of the land in which we were born and to which we owe our allegiance."[59] Similarly, he wrote to Willison that,

> I am not disposed to go into military expenditures any more than we have done in the past. There is a movement on foot to bring the Colonies into the vortex of expenditure which Great Britain's situation make incumbent on her. The principal item of expenditure in Great Britain's Budget is land and marine armaments; the principal item of Canada's Budget is public works, and we have yet so much to do in that line to divert any portion of that expenditure to throw it into armaments would seem to me like a suicide.[60]

In addition to asserting that Canada was already contributing through its own national development, Laurier asserted Canadian autonomy by organizing a conference of his own with the Australian and New Zealand premiers. He had recommended to Barton and Seddon that, while the self-governing colonies were represented at the Coronation of Edward VII, a convention should be held in London between the three colonies to discuss trade relations, particularly preferences, a Pacific Cable, and subsidized steamers.[61]

At the 1897 Conference, Laurier had voiced approval for a "general plan" regarding military matters. However, his sanction of the Ross Rifle marked a radical departure from the policy which he himself had previously supported and became

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[59]Debates, 12 May, 1902, p. 4726.

[60]Laurier to Willison, 14 April, 1902, Willison Papers, MG30D29 Vol. 24, Folder 179C, p. 17976, NAC. On June 12, he writes to Willison, that Canada "can easily, both from the political and financial point of view, relieve England of any expenditure of a military character in Canada. We can attend to that part ourselves."

[61]Laurier to Seddon and Barton, 7 December, 1901 and Laurier to Seddon, 20 December, 1901, Laurier Papers.

another "manifestation of military nationalism."[62] Initially, in the 1860s, Canada's militia received British weapons and equipment, but thereafter, the Canadian state was on its own. When Canada entered the South African War, it found itself in desperate need of modern rifles. The old militia Sniders and Martini-Henrys could not compete with the weapons of the better equipped Boers. Early in 1900, Borden asked English military manufacturers to produce 15,000 Lee-Enfields for Canada. They declined arguing that top priority had to be given to British needs in South Africa. Borden was also unable to persuade British firms to establish factories in Canada. Borden was left with three choices. To wait upon Britain for surplus weaponry was a wholly unsatisfactory course. Yet it was too expensive for Canada to build her own rifle factory. This left no alternative but to get private enterprise to do the job. As such, in March 1902, the government signed a contract with Sir Charles Ross calling for the manufacture of 12,000 rifles during 1903, and whatever requirements the country would have thereafter.[63]

National sentiment favoured the government's decision. By promoting political equality within the empire, Laurier's administration had been gradually strengthening Canadian autonomy. Borden explained that should the British Navy lose its advantage at sea, Canada would be in great danger because shipping of arms would be curtailed. Therefore, Canada was simply fulfilling its patriotic duty and national destiny. There would be no more rifle shortages. Laurier maintained that a national arm meant utilizing Canadian human and material resources to meet Canadian needs. The logic of his

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[62]Desmond Morton, **A Military History of Canada**, Edmonton: Hurtig, 1990, p. 118.

[63]R., Phillips, and Jerome Knap, **Sir Charles Ross and his Rifle**, Museum Restoration Service: Ottawa, 1969, pp. 10-11.

argument had wide popular appeal.[64] Like it or not, British imperial authorities had to reckon with a subtle yet firmly manifest national pride.

The Ross rifle was not as efficient in the field as the Lee-Enfield but this was not the main reason for British opposition. Rather, the Canadian initiative went against military uniformity of the empire. The British War and Colonial offices told Canada to abandon the Ross and manufacture the Lee-Enfield "in the interest of uniformity and efficiency." Forgotten, however, was Borden's mission of a few years earlier. The more the British criticized the rifle, the more Canadians, like Borden and Colonel Sam Hughes, defended it. The Ross rifle, became a point of controversy in Canadian politics because of its unreliability. But it also became an issue in Empire politics as the government's decision to adopt and manufacture a Canadian rifle illustrated its unwillingness to cooperate. It strained imperial relations between the two countries until World War One.[65]

The South African crisis had impressed upon Laurier two facts: the difficulty of preventing Canada's participation in imperial wars, and the need of a reason for doing so. His insistence that Canada should henceforth act independently militarily, his preference for a local navy, and the adoption of a unique weapon were patently compatible features of a program making for independent military practice. All of these developments indicated his growing indifference to imperial unity.

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[64]Phillips, R., **The Ross Rifle Story: A Historical Appraisal of the Ross Rifle**, Sydney, N.S.: John A. Chadwick, 1984, p. 28.

[65]Phillips, and Knap, **Sir Charles Ross and his Rifle**, p. 16. The story of the Ross Rifle is complex. For another account see, A.F. Duguid, **Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-19**, General Series, vol. I, **Chronicle, August 1914-September, 1915-Appendices**, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1938.

As such, at the 1902 Colonial Conference Laurier began to utter his celebrated "everlasting no," rejecting all proposals for Imperial centralization. Laurier and his ministers said that they had "the strongest desire to carry out their defence schemes in co-operation with the Imperial authorities...so far as this is consistent with the principle of local self-government, which has proved so great a factor in the promotion of Imperial unity."[66] Autonomy remained the keystone of Canadian policy, as several Canadian statesmen emphasized that imperial centralization would entail "an important departure from the principle of Colonial self-Government." As such, they were "obliged to withhold their assent to the propositions of the Admiralty and the War Office."[67]

All the premiers of the self-governing colonies followed Canada's lead and deliberately avoided discussing the political relations of the empire. Initially, a few of the premiers, particularly Laurier, even proved hesitant to commit themselves to colonial conferences held at fixed intervals. It was finally agreed that colonial conferences should be held "as far as practicable, at intervals not exceeding four years".[68] Chamberlain viewed the Canadian government as the leading villain for "doing less than any other part of the Empire for its own defence and for the general maintenance of imperial interests." More importantly, he went on to observe that the Laurier administration was significantly moving towards independent control of its armed forces, and there was

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[66]Memorandum by the Canadian Ministers Concerning Defence", **Sessional papers**, Canada, House of Commons, 1903, No. 29A: 82.

[67]Quoted in R., Shields, "Wilfrid Laurier and Canadian Defence Autonomy, 1902-1911," **Dalhousie Review**, Vol. 63, No. 2, 1983, p. 301.

[68]Ollivier, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, pp. 185-186.

"no indication" that imperial warnings on the issue were "likely" to sway them.[69]

Similarly, Governor-General Minto recognized the significance of Canada's policies. For him, the strongest influence at work within the Canadian public was a movement towards independence, as well as a resentment of anything that smacked of "imperial interference." The conference made it clear that the Canadian state was determined to have its "own army and...own fleet." Canada's forces would assist Britain only if the Canadian public agreed that such an offer be made.[70]

Initially, Minto's concern for the empire blinded him to the realities of Canadian politics and he repeatedly refused to comprehend that self-government meant Canadian control over its armed forces and its defence policy. Yet, by the time Minto left Canada, he described the determination of Canadian statesmen to control their own armed forces as symptomatic of the growing pains "of a Young nationality." Besides desiring "their own navy," Minto sensed that Canadians believed a Canadian army would be able "to teach the British army a thing or two" and under no circumstance would the public ever permit that force to be absorbed into an "imperial pool." Minto accepted these initiatives of Canadian statesmen as "natural" and a consequence "of the growing feeling that Canada must get out of leading strings."[71] However, what form this "Canadian national independence" would take eluded him as well as the British imperial authorities.

At a Dominion Day banquet, shortly after the 1902 Conference, Laurier referred to the British Empire as a

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[69]Chamberlain to Deninson, 6 April, 1903, cited in Shields, "Wilfrid Laurier and Canadian Defence Autonomy...", p. 299.

[70]Minto to Peter Elliot, 1 March, 1903, Minto Papers.

[71]Minto to Peter Elliot, 1 March, 1903, Minto Papers.

"galaxy of independent nations" and reminded the audience that "there is not in Canada at the present moment a single British soldier to maintain British supremacy - moreover it is Canadian soldiers who are to-day garrisoning Halifax."[72]

Conservative opposition leader Robert Borden and Frederick Monk, the Conservative member for the Jacques Cartier district, criticized the Laurier administration for its lack of initiative at the conference.[73] However, on the issue of Canadian defence autonomy, the Laurier administration received support from Sir Charles Tupper, who had been prime minister in the previous Conservative administration. Tupper supported Laurier's stand against financial contributions to the British imperial navy.[74] More remarkable, the Laurier administration received unexpected support from Henri Bourassa. He maintained that the 1902 Conference had been the means of clearing "the delusive clouds" that had been raised by the 1897 Conference and the South African War.[75] Laurier's aversion to increased military and naval costs and centralized defence planning in London was to become a central feature of his subsequent administrations.

ii. Strengthening Canadian Military Power

To support Canada's anti-imperial federation stance, the Laurier administration had to make practical moves towards developing its own military power. Twice, between 1896 and 1899, the Canadian state had required the use of military force. The Yukon Field Force and the South African Contingents

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[72]**Canadian Gazette**, July 3, 1902.

[73]Debates, 13 March, 1903, pp. 23-39 (Borden) and pp. 55-67 (Monk).

[74]Tupper to Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper, 3 January, 1903, Tupper Papers, Vol. XII, NAC.

[75]Debates, 13 March, 1903, pp. 75-89.

had increased the significance of the Militia Department and the need for its development. The Canadian statesman in charge of this was Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia. Borden had two general aims. The first was to create a self-contained citizen army. The second was to acquire a larger degree of Canadian military autonomy from Britain while contributing in some degree to imperial defence.[76]

To create a self-contained citizen army, Borden followed closely the reports of Hutton and Lord Dundonald, the new British officer commanding the militia, as well as the recommendations of the Canada Defence Committee and the Esher Report. Minto warned Dundonald of the "great difficulty" of his new position. He suggested that Borden's authority "over purely military matters" had been extended more "than can ever have been intended" and had made the position of General Officer Commanding nothing more than that of a "chief clerk."[77]

Dundonald would prove to be as difficult as Hutton, having hostile feelings towards Borden and Laurier, whom he not only "hated" but wished to cause "all the harm he could."[78] Like his predecessor, the new general craved popularity and displayed a taste for public relations. His public speeches attracted much attention and alarmed the government because of their bellicosity. For Bourassa, differences between Dundonald's public views and the government's statements were a result of the fact that, as a British officer commanding the Canadian militia, Dundonald

> ...has no intentions of becoming one of our own, and does not come here to take his responsibility

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[76]See Carman Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden...," p. 274.

[77]Minto to Dundonald, 26 March, 1902, Minto Papers.

[78]Notes of meeting with Lord Dundonald, 10 June, 1904, Minto Papers.

> as a Canadian officer. He comes here to introduce into the military organization of Canada such reforms as may be pointed out by the head of the War Office in the mother country.

Borden replied that although Dundonald was "an imperial officer, that fact does not give him any additional power or authority in this country." Similarly, Laurier reminded the House that "If the General Commanding the Militia has advice to tender, it is not his right - I say it deliberately - to offer advice to the public, but it is his duty to offer it to the minister, and for that policy the minister shall be responsible."[79]

Borden's bill was deferred to 1904 so that he could attend the new Committee of Imperial Defence in London. In Britain, the South African War had prompted desperately needed reforms, including the elimination of the historic appointment of commander-in-chief and the innovation of an Army Council of senior political and military figures. Borden believed the idea was a solution to his problems. He would be advised directly by a number of senior officers and civil officials. A new post of inspector-general would replace Dundonald.[80]

However, this would prove unnecessary. Despite warnings from Lord Minto, the British general made himself more politically offensive to the government. On June 3, 1904, at a banquet of Montreal militia officers, he criticized the Minister of Agriculture for interfering in the selection of officers for a new militia cavalry regiment. Government ministers soon disputed the charges in the House. Laurier contributed to the Tory complaints when, making a error in translation, he referred to the British general as a foreigner when he meant stranger. By June 10, Dundonald had been dismissed and a month later the War Office ordered his return

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[79]Debates, 5 May, 1903, pp. 2403, 2406, and 2421.

[80]Morton, **Canada and War**, p. 46.

to England.[81]

Lord Minto and the General Officers Commanding aided the professionalization of the Canadian military in that they sought to reduce political patronage, increase the quality of Canadian officers and their training, and generally rebuild the existing militia into a modern Canadian national army.[82] However, the constant clashes over constitutional jurisdiction with Borden inevitably led to the Canadianization and improved autonomy of the military through the implementation of the 1904 Militia Act. It had three profound impacts.

First, the "Dundonald Incident," like the "Hutton Affair," was important for Canadian defence autonomy because of its significant constitutional importance. On July 11, 1904, even before Lord Dundonald had left Canada, Sir Frederick Borden introduced the amendment to the Militia Bill creating the Militia Council: "I think I may say without fear of contradiction that the system which has been in existence in this country since Confederation has not worked well."[83] This view was shared by W.S. Fielding, the Minister of Finance, who thought it was "a deplorable fact that very few of the military officers who come to us from the Old Country have the capability for understanding and appreciating the spirit of Canadian institutions."[84] Fielding was even more direct to Chamberlain when he explained how Canadian expenditures on defence must be spent by the Ministers responsible to the Parliament of Canada, and that British military advisors who continued "to be dictators" would be

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[81]Morton, **Canada and War**, p. 46.

[82]S. Harris, **Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988. In particular, see chapter four, "Politics, planning and the staff, 1898-1911," pp. 62-81.

[83]Debates, 11 July, 1904, p. 6367.

[84]Fielding to A.G. Jones, 4 June, 1904, Fielding Papers.

sent home.[85] Sir John Anderson, the civilian Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, accepted the Canadian government's actions, as they were simply "putting their feet down" and correctly insisting upon "ministerial responsibility and control."[86]

As such, Borden decreased British influence and increased the control of the Canadian state over military matters. His revision of the Militia Act removed the inequalities between Canadian militiamen and their British counterparts.[87] Canadian officers would now hold the same seniority as British officers of the same rank instead of being automatically junior. Canadians would become eligible for the post of General Officer Commanding. Borden reminded the House that Canadian sacrifices in the South African War entitled her "to appoint one of her own sons to the command of her militia" thereby removing "that invidious reflection upon the capacity of Canadian officers" that remained in our statutes."[88] For him, "the sooner we get the experience and learn to govern ourselves in this respect, the better it will be for this country. This is one means by which we propose to acquire that experience."[89] A passage delegating royal authority over the militia to the Governor-General would be eliminated. Governor-Generals would no longer have a legal claim to involve

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[85]Fielding to Chamberlain, 10 August, 1904, Fielding Papers.

[86]Harris, **Canadian Brass**, p. 68.

[87]See Borden's first reading of the Militia Act in Debates, 17 March, 1904, pp. 205-206.

[88]Debates, 22 March, 1904, pp. 288-289.

[89]Debates, 22 March, 1904, p. 294.

themselves in Canadian military affairs.[90]

The new Militia Act solved another prejudice. Under the old law, in time of war, the British officer at Halifax, regardless of rank, commanded all British and Canadian troops in Canada. The new act simply stated that the General Officer Commanding the Canadian militia was to command Canadian troops without distinction between peace and war. This guaranteed that Canadian soldiers would be led by a Canadian officer in war as well as in peace.[91] The "Canadianization" of other important posts was carried out. After meeting with Laurier several times, Rear-Admiral Kingsmill, a Canadian, retired from imperial service to start a new career in Canada by heading up the Fisheries Protection Service in 1908.[92]

Borden also insisted that Canada create its own General Staff, from which he would select officers to form the Canadian section of a larger Imperial General Staff.[93] In 1909, General Otter, a veteran of the North-West Rebellion and the South African War, was the first Canadian appointed as the Canadian Chief of the General Staff (CGS).[94] Canadian staff officers would always be responsible to the Canadian state

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[90]Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden...," p. 277; Desmond Morton, **Canada and War: A Military and Political History**, Toronto: Butterworths, 1981, p. 46.

[91]Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden...," p. 277.

[92]Michael Hadley and Roger Sarty, **Tin-pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders 1880-1918**, Montreal\Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, p. 19.

[93]The resulting Militia Council was comprised of the Minister of the Militia, the Deputy Minister, the accountant of the Department, and the four heads of the staff - the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and the Master-General of the Ordnance.

[94]Britain had unfounded concerns about Otter's nationalist sentiments and even condemned him as a "separatist" when he postponed organizing a Canadian section for an imperial staff. See Harris, **Canadian Brass**, p. 77.

through his Department of Militia.[95] Therefore, his Act determined that the Crown in Canada should act, not upon the advice of the British General Officer Commanding or the British War Office, but upon the advice of the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence. Organization of the militia was not to remain in the hands of the General Officer Commanding, but was to be controlled by the Canadian parliament and the people of Canada. There would be no doubt that the Canadian state was supreme.

Conforming to Gellner's and Anderson's discussion of blocked social mobility,[96] Borden saw the old laws as discriminating against Canadians and fought against the opposition of the Governor-General. For Minto, even though he recognized that the Canadian government sought to remove "a slur on the capabilities of Canadian officers", this move was little short of treason for "it seems to me culpable to give up an iota of any military control we possess."[97] As far as he was concerned, Canadians were unsuitable to command the force and the post would go to "some utterly incompetent public favourite or political supporter."[98] A Liberal representative applauded Borden's reforms, questioning why the Canadian state should "accept as commander of our forces some gentleman from the English regular army utterly incompetent for the post." He recalled how the imperial "severance" that started the American Revolution was caused more by "the way British gentlemen treated colonial gentlemen...than any question of the duty on tea." He concluded that, "If we are to continue our close connection with the motherland, it must be

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[95]Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden...," p. 280.

[96]See Gellner, **Thought and Change**, pp. 166-168 and Anderson, **Imagined Communities**, pp. 56-57.

[97]Minto to Brodrick, 10 April, 1903, Minto Papers.

[98]Minto to Landsdowne, 27 December, 1903, Minto Papers.

on terms of equality."[99]

The second impact of Borden's Militia Act was the creation of a national army commanded by Canadians and functioning independently in North America. Ironically, this was accomplished by implementing many of Dundonald's reforms. In particular, Borden created a Medical Corps, an Army Service Corps, a Corps of Engineers, an Ordnance Corps, Signal Corps, Pay Corps, and Guide Corps. Many have argued that Borden's initiatives not only modernized the Canadian militia but created Canada's first self-contained army.[100] As such, the Canadian government entered a new era of military expenditures that would become the greatest peacetime expansion of Canada's military forces. Military expenditures more than tripled between 1896 and 1911. Prior to 1904 - not counting the Riel Rebellion and the Boer War - defence expenditures had remained at around $1.5 million. Starting in 1904, defence expenditures would increase to $4.2 million (5.5 percent of the total Federal government expenditure) and increase to $9.7 million in 1911, accounting for 7.1 percent of total Federal government expenditures which amounted to $136 million.[101] These figures do not include the Department of Public Works expenditures which were closely associated with the militia. The militia depended upon that department for the provision of its barracks, drill halls, armouries, rifle ranges and other structures of that kind.[102] The inclusion of expenditures of

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[99]Debates, 25 March, 1904, p. 495.

[100]Miller "Sir Frederick William Borden...," p. 275.

[101]M.C., Urquhart, and K.A.H., Buckley, eds., **Historical Statistics of Canada**, Toronto: Macmillan: Toronto, 1965, pp. 200-203. This data only accounts for federal expenditure and does not include provincial or municipal data.

[102]Capt. Ernest Chambers, **The Canadian Militia and The Public Works Department: A History of the Origin and Development of the Force And Something About the Assistance Rendered By the Public Works Department**, Montreal: Fresco,

Public Works, Transportation, Communication and the Fisheries Department would increase these numbers considerably. There was also an astonishing expansion of the cadet system.[103]

The establishment of a citizen army was more difficult due to the indifference and complacency of the Canadian people and government. The improvement in American relations, the increase in economic prosperity, and the traditional faith in the British navy meant that few Canadians saw a need for a large Canadian citizen army. As such, Borden looked towards the Swiss model. The plan called for a force of 100,000 part-time soldiers, two-thirds of whom were to be non-uniformed civilian men and, in some cases, women. The remaining third would have to serve in annual camps for further training and instruction in organizational and administrative aspects of warfare. Such a plan necessitated the government constructing rifle ranges across the country. Government grants, rifles, and ammunition were distributed to privately constructed ranges.[104]

Similarly, Borden pushed Canadian military autonomy by urging that Canada take control of the British garrisons at Halifax and Esquimalt. Certainly, Borden's actions were motivated by a desire to relieve British troops of the responsibility of Canadian defence. The prospects of conflict with the United States had diminished, reducing Halifax's strategic containment role. However, it still remained the base from which British warships maintained a watch over the valuable Newfoundland fishery. Moreover, with the development of the Canadian transcontinental railway in the 1880s, Halifax became a terminus in a global British Empire transportation

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1907, p. 116.

[103]Desmond Morton, "The Cadet Movement in the Moment of Canadian Militarism, 1909-1914," **Journal of Canadian Studies**, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1978.

[104]Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden...," pp. 276-277.

route, or "all-red route," joining the Atlantic with the Pacific. It was decided to withdraw the British garrisons from Halifax and to transfer the authority of the naval establishment at Esquimalt from Britain to Canada. This was done despite Minto's warning that it would only further Canada's "ultimate independence" and that the only way to stop such a movement would be for Britain to make it clear that Canada's armed forces would serve "only under Imperial command" and not under the guidance of Ottawa.[105]

However, as discussed earlier, by 1902 the British government had decided that British security required a policy of peace with the United States at almost any price. A natural consequence was the reduction of British naval forces in North American waters and the abandonment of British naval bases in Canada. In addition, the Admiralty strongly supported the Anglo-Japanese alliance which served a similar purpose. On October 21, 1904, Admiral Sir John Fisher became First Sea Lord at the Admiralty and launched a programme of naval reforms.[106] From the Canadian viewpoint, the most important changes were the abolition of the Esquimalt based Pacific Squadron, and the Halifax based North America and West Indies Squadron. The result was the withdrawal of the British garrisons from the Canadian fortified ports. The British authorities had been hinting for some time that they would be

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[105]Minto, quoted in Shields, "Wilfrid Laurier and Canadian Defence Autonomy," p. 303. Minto insisted that the issue could not "be dealt with on Naval and Military grounds alone," and that "its effect on the sentiment of the people of the Dominion in relation to their connection with the Motherland requires to be fully recognized." See Minto to Lyttelton, 18 June, 1904, Minto Papers.

[106]C.P. Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, 1867-1921**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, p. 125.

glad to have Canada provide garrisons for their protection.[107]

Seeing the opportunity, the Canadian government pushed for early and complete control of the naval bases. It was represented in the Dominion as a suitable Canadian contribution to imperial defence and a natural assumption of national responsibilities. The militia was increased to provide over 1,000 regulars at Halifax and a maintenance force of 150 at Esquimalt contributing to the increase in militia expenditures. Canada's concern about the "Yellow Peril" also served as an additional incentive for continuing the maintenance of Esquimalt.[108] On November 4, 1905, the main body of the British garrison returned to Britain signifying a major development in Canadian nationhood. It was the end of a British military presence in Canada. The garrisons, especially the large one at Halifax, like the reorganization of the militia, constituted a symbol of statehood. It did not mean serious preparation for mobilization against an American invasion, but rather, served as a reminder that Canada was a distinct state whose distinctiveness derived in no small part from its free and willing membership in the world's greatest empire.

A nationalistic editor of a Liberal newspaper linked the withdrawal of the British presence with the Alaska boundary dispute when he argued, "When has Canada ever been protected by the Motherland against American aggression or American cheatery - which is all that the Dominion, so far as its

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[107]Britain had come to the conclusion that Halifax could not be defended in a war with the United States, a fact that was not conveyed to the Canadian government. See Samuel Wells, "British strategic withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere, 1904-1911," **Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1968; and Gooch, "Great Britain and the Defence of Canada..."

[108]Richard Preston, **The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977, p. 156.

external relations are concerned, has to fear or contend against?"[109] The **Manitoba Free Press** congratulated the Laurier Government upon refusing to give up a single shred of Canadian self-governing powers and described the Government's motto as being "millions for defence but not a cent for tribute." The **Halifax Chronicle** declared the action to be "another long though peculiarly unostentatious step in the direction of a complete Canadian nationhood." The **Toronto Globe** took the ground that "While this new departure is on the one hand obviously a long step toward fuller autonomy, it is on the other hand, and just as obviously, a means of indefinitely strengthening the tie which binds Canada to the Empire."[110] For a contemporary government approved chronicler, the "wholesome military spirit" which was permeating "the loyal and patriotic population of Canada in" was "unquestionably one of the most valuable assets of this great country."[111] Leading Québécois nationalists applauded the departure of the British units on Canadian soil and the clear advance of Canadian military autonomy.[112]

Indeed, Canada had completed a significant step towards complete independence, they were militarily on their own in their own continent for the first time. As Morton contends, a significant factor in the departure of British forces had been the realization that Britain had no effective influence on Canadian defence policy. Indeed, it took the experience of

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[109]Hadley, and Satry, **Tin-pots and Pirate Ships...**, p. 16.

[110]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1905, p. 462.

[111]Chambers, **The Canadian Militia and The Public Works Department**, p. 7.

[112]B. Gough, and R., Sarty, "Sailors and Soldiers: The Royal Navy, the Canadian Forces, and the Defence of Atlantic Canada, 1890-1918," in Hadley, M., Huebert, R., and F., Crickard, eds., **A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996, p. 118.

eight officers over thirty years to demonstrate that Canadians would not accept imperial policies simply because they were channelled through their own military commander. The fact that between 1874 and 1904 the generals were outsiders seems to have made it easier for Canadian ministers to arouse national antagonism against them.[113]

Despite all of Borden's initiatives, the Canadian state did not see their burgeoning autonomy as being anti-imperial. To Borden the clash of imperial obligation with Canadian interest posed no problem. Canadian interests always claimed his prior allegiance but this did not mean that the Canadian state and its military forces would not cooperate with Britain. What this cooperation would consist of would be established by Canadian statesmen at subsequent imperial conferences.[114]

It fell to Minto's successor, Earl Grey, to attempt to persuade the Canadian state of the merits of increased Canadian contributions to the empire's defence needs, and the necessity of placing Canada's armed forces under unilateral British control. The urgency of this was heightened by the increasing military ambitions of Germany. The second Supplementary Naval Estimates Bill of 1906 marked an important turning point in German imperialism. The German Empire now turned to the building of dreadnoughts which not only rendered all existing battleships obsolete, but also produced an escalation in the Anglo-German naval arms race.[115] To compensate Britain sought financial contributions from its former colonies who had other ideas.

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[113]Morton, **Ministers and Generals**, p. 197.

[114]Miller, "Sir Frederick William Borden...," pp. 280-281.

[115]Hans-Ulrich Wehler, **The German Empire, 1871-1918**, Leamington Spa: Berg, 1985, p. 168.

iii. Towards a Canadian Navy

Laurier asserted the autonomy of the Canadian state when he stated its intention to establish a Canadian navy rather than donating to the imperial war chest. Following the 1902 conference, Raymond Prefontaine, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, together with his Commander of Marine Services, Osprey George Valentine Spain, took steps to implement the government's intentions. The Canadian Government Ship (CGS) *Canada* was purchased in 1904 as the newest and largest of the Fisheries Protection vessels. In the same year a bill, entitled "An Act Constituting the Naval Militia of Canada," was prepared by OGV Spain for first reading, along with a proposal to establish a Canadian naval military academy.[116]

Indeed, the years immediately before the 1907 Conference were critical in terms of imperial relations and in their influence on Canadian nationalism. While imperial federation was abandoned, some closer unionists, such as Alfred Lyttelton and the Pollock Committee, continued to focus their energies on improving imperial organization. Yet, Laurier remained opposed to any form of undue centralization, and rather favoured "putting a drag on the wheel of evolution."[117] Still, the imperial Conferences of 1907, 1909, and 1911, gave Britain more opportunities to put forward their plans of imperial organization that revolved around the central concern of naval defence.

But Laurier would not be persuaded. Clearly, he was wary of upsetting French-Canada, and also realized that any contribution to imperialism would check the Canadian state's growing autonomy. This was all the more clear after the Alaska

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[116]N., Brodeur, "LP Brodeur and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy" in Boutilier, J., ed., **RCN in Retrospect 1910-1968**, University of British Columbia Press: Vancouver, 1982, p. 16.

[117]Grey to Lyttelton, 8 May, 1905, Grey Papers.

Boundary dispute which demonstrated where the British stood politically on the issue of Canadian-American relations. Throughout these conferences, the Laurier administration demonstrated its reluctance on both *symbolic* and *practical* levels.

On the symbolic level, in response to Lyttelton's November 1905 proposal for an imperial commission, Laurier and his cabinet firmly asserted that any change in the title or status of the Colonial Conference should originate and emanate from that body itself. They resented the suggestion that the name of the conference be changed to Imperial Council. A conference implied "a more or less unconventional gathering for informal discussion of public questions...possessing no faculty or power of binding action." Whereas, the term "Council" signified a more formal gathering which might eventually overstep the autonomous legislative and administrative powers of the self-governing colonies. The Canadians believed the title "Imperial Conference" to be more appropriate and that relations between London and Ottawa "in the future as in the past" would continue to be conducted "under ministerial responsibility."[118] Laurier was subtly implying that it was the Canadian government that would control its armed forces and defence policies.

Before and during the conference, Laurier argued that the conferences, "a representation of all the self-governing Governments," keep their present composition "without any more power than they have at the present time."[119] Indeed, the Prime Minister of Australia, Alfred Deakin, said that after seeing Laurier's dispatch, "We accepted the term "Imperial

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[118]Laurier to Cote, 19 April, 1907, Laurier Papers.

[119]Ollivier, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, Vol. 1, pp. 229-232.

Conference" instead of Imperial Council."[120] Another assertion of autonomy was Laurier's request to "drop the word 'Colonies' and try [to] invent something which would strike the imagination more" and which would "be taken to mean self-governing Colonies." As such, after the 1907 Conference, the term Dominion, first used in the British North America Act, was officially adopted.[121] This was a demand for recognition of status that had evolved beyond that of the simple possessions of an imperial mother country.

In terms of practical military and naval initiatives that would strengthen imperial defence, Laurier relied upon the insights of Borden, Minister of Militia, and L.P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries.[122] Brodeur, who replaced Lafontaine, shared many of Laurier's views, being a party loyalist who was also closely bound to the mainstream of French-Canadian nationalism.[123] He was described as "a thorough Canadian" and "next to Sir Wilfrid Laurier...the most able son of Quebec." Brodeur too believed that any arrangement between the "mother country" and the "daughter states" must be based upon the recognition of the full autonomy of the self-

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[120]Quoted in Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict**, p. 80.

[121]Ollivier, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, Volume 1, pp. 237-38.

[122]Laurier had also wanted William Fielding, the Minister of Finance, to be present for the entire proceedings. However, Elgin refused. Fielding was offended by his lower status, commenting that he had no desire to "dance attendence at a London Hotel waiting for a bell to ring him into the Councils of Conference." Governor General Grey endeavoured to stroke down Fielding's "ruffled plumes." See Grey to Laurier, 7 January, 1907, Grey to Fielding, 1 March, 1907, Grey Papers, NAC.

[123]Hadley, and Sarty, **Tin-pots and Pirate Ships**, p. 17.

governing Dominions.[124]

Borden argued that the Canadian people had "only one desire, that is to prepare in every possible way for the full protection of our own territory." He reminded representatives that Canada had demonstrated responsibility in maintaining naval bases at Esquimalt and Halifax, had reorganized their militia, and had proven its loyalty in the South African War. He remarked that Canada would not subscribe to the creation of an Imperial Force to serve abroad as it would have a "derogatory and unfavourable effect" on its militia.[125] In addition, L.P Brodeur maintained that the purchase of the vessel *Canada*, combined with the Fisheries Protection Fleet and the proposed Naval Militia and Academy, certainly provided the Canadian state with the "nucleus of a navy." This belief was shared by contemporary statesmen. For the head of the Fisheries Protection Service,

> The Cruiser Canada...was sent on a training cruise to the West Indies, carrying a large number of young fishermen as recruits; this according to the late Minister's idea, was proposed to be the beginning of the Naval Militia. On the return of this ship from her instructional cruise, the men who had already been trained were distributed amongst the other ships; fresh men taken on; and instruction continued. The material that we have in the Canadian Naval Militia is probably the best in the world.[126]

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[124]Canadian Naval Defence, certain reports in regarding Types and Costs of Construction, United States Navy, Argentine and Brazilian Navies. Respectfully Compiled and Submitted to the Honourable L.P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries of Canada, by H.B. Jayne, Proprietor of "Pacific Marine Review," Ottawa, June 9th, 1909. In Brodeur Papers.

[125]Ollivier, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, Vol. 1, pp. 245-247.

[126]Memorandum from OGV Spain to the deputy minister Goudreau of Marine and Fisheries, 28 January, 1907, Brodeur Papers.

In light of these developments, Brodeur claimed that the expenditures Canada made for the Fisheries Protection Service be considered as naval expenditures. Ever since the Venezuelan boundary dispute in 1895, Laurier had favoured the upgrading of the Canadian Fisheries Protection Service (FPS) to include a coastal naval militia designed to protect the Great Lakes and defend the coasts against American and European raiders.[127] Indeed, by 1904 the Department of Marine and Fisheries was the largest department in the Canadian government. Its responsibilities were numerous:

> Sea-coast and Inland Fisheries, Trinity Houses, Trinity Boards, Decayed Pilots' Funds, Beacons, Buoys, Lights and Lighthouses and their maintenance, Harbours, Ports, Piers, Wharfs, Steamers and Vessels belonging to the Government of Canada, harbour commissioners, harbour masters, classification of vessels, examination and granting of certificates of masters and mates, and others in the merchant service, shipping masters and shipping officers, inspection of steamboats and boards of steamboat inspection, enquiries into causes of shipwrecks, establishment, regulation and maintenance of marine and seamen's hospitals and care of distressed seamen, and generally such matters as they refer to the marine and navigation of Canada.[128]

The responsibilities were expanded in the same year when the government decided to make the Department of Marine and Fisheries responsible for the St. Lawrence ship channel - previously administered by the Department of Public Works - and for the exercise of sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic.[129] In order to discharge its marine responsibilities

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[127]Graeme Tweedie, "The Roots of the Royal Canadian Navy: Sovereignty versus Nationalism, 1812-1910," in Hadley, et al., **A Nation's Navy**, pp. 91-101.

[128]T. Appleton, **Usque ad Mare: A History of the Canadian Coast Guard and Marine Services**, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969, p. 31.

[129]This will be discussed in the following chapter.

the Department of Marine and Fisheries operated a fisheries protection fleet consisting of eight armed cruisers and a marine fleet consisting of six icebreakers and some eighteen other vessels over eighty feet in length.[130] Between 1891 and 1906 Canada purchased these fourteen vessels at an initial price of approximately $1.5 million and an annual maintenance of $422,000. In addition, the department operated thirteen Marconi marine radio stations on the east coast of Canada, which were also costing "a great deal of money." The extent of its fisheries responsibilities can be deduced from the fact that nearly 83,000 persons were engaged in fishing in 1905 and total fisheries employment was 114,000 or 5.2 percent of the overall labour force.[131]

As such, Brodeur considered these responsibilities not just a Canadian obligation but an imperial one, because Britain had made a treaty with the United States "without, of course, the consent of Canada." He stated that Canada was becoming increasingly concerned with protecting the rights of Canadian fishermen in the Great Lakes and protecting the lakes from American invasion. Brodeur noted further contributions such as a Canadian Naval Militia and a naval cruiser "which is manned entirely by Canadian seamen." He concluded by pointing out the obvious contribution taking over Halifax and Esquimault Dockyards.[132] Laurier echoed these sentiments when he turned down suggestions that the Dominions make naval contributions, arguing once again that "we have too much to

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[130]Brodeur, "LP Brodeur and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy", p. 15.

[131]Brodeur, "LP Brodeur and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy," p. 16.

[132]Proceedings of the 1907 Conference, 23 April, 1907, Fifth Day, Naval Defence, Brodeur Papers.

do" in terms of developing the infrastructure of a new nation.[133]

In sum, Laurier had stated that the Conference was one between "government and governments" and that if imperial relations were to remain favourable, then "the principle that every community knows best what does for itself" must be recognized.[134] As such, Laurier implied a distinction between "mother country" and the "self-governing colonies" and the legitimacy of their autonomy. He still maintained that Canada was satisfied with the way matters stood in imperial political relations and he was unwilling to concede that additional continuity was needed between conference meetings.[135] In his words,

> Nothing could be more detrimental to the existence of the British Empire than to force upon any part of it, even for the general good, a system which would be detrimental locally, or might be believed to be detrimental locally. For my part, I have no hesitation at all in resenting any attempt to force upon the Canadian people anything which the Canadian people would not believe in, even for the broad idea of doing good to the whole Empire. I think that the best way of serving the whole is, by allowing every part to serve and recognize its own immediate interests.[136]

Indeed, much of what Laurier was implying has been captured neatly under the concept of "defensive expansionism" which will be discussed in the following chapter. For others, such as J.S. Ewart, a Liberal lawyer in Ottawa and a devoted Canadian nationalist, empire defence schemes would never

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[133]Ollivier, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, Vol. 1, p. 321.

[134]Ollivier, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, Vol. 1, p. 227.

[135]Debates, 25 March, 1906-7, pp. 5260-5284 and pp. 5525-5553.

[136]Sessional Papers, 1907, No. 58, p. 418.

transpire since Canada would never place her own forces at the disposal of any government but her own. As Ewart saw it, the Canadian state alone would decide which treaties and wars it would be bound to:

> The conclusions at which we have arrived enable us to forecast with some confidence the political future of Canada. For we now know...that it is not to be found in Imperial Federation; we believe that it is not to be found in junction with the United States; and the only other future possible is independence. Independence, however, by no means involves deposition of our King. Edward VII is as much the King of Canada as of England, and Canadian independence of the Colonial Office no more involves his deposition here than elsewhere. Independence means merely control of our own affairs....Very rapidly, moreover, are we being educated to the recognition of our position as defined by the proceedings of the Conferences. Even our Foreign relations are falling into our hands, and a Trade treaty with France, negotiated by our own men, followed immediately by a most successful diplomatic mission to Japan, has probably put an end to the record of British management of our Foreign affairs.[137]

Nevertheless, Canadian defence autonomy would be complicated by certain global geopolitical developments. The growing unrest caused by Germany's startling naval advance, initiated by the third Supplementary Naval Estimates Bill of 1908, and the corresponding decline in British superiority, was officially revealed in March 1909 by the British Government. Britain was forced to withdraw vessels from the Pacific for redeployment in European waters. Japan had gained its recognition as a world power by defeating Russia in 1905 during the battle of Tsushima. In addition to gaining territory in China and Korea, Japan began to expand its fleet. This created a renewed demand in imperial relations. Suddenly,

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[137]Speech at the Canadian Club of St. John, February 7th, 1907, cited in the **Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1908, p. 582.

it seemed necessary for Britain and the Dominions to reach both a quick and consistent understanding on all matters of defence and foreign policy.

Canada was inevitably drawn into the growing naval race, forcing the Canadian Parliament to seriously confront the problem of naval defence. Clearly, Canada was not immediately threatened by the increase in European military tensions. However, Germany's naval attachés were paying a great deal of attention to the naval developments in Canada, particularly Laurier's stance on Canada's involvement in Britain's naval wars.[138] Similarly, senior officers in the Department of Militia and Defence, such as Colonel Willoughby Gwatkin, felt that some recent German immigrants to Canada were "secret agents" who were "'getting busy' in Canada."[139] While the immediacy of the German threat was certainly slim, Canada would certainly have been involved in a British-German conflict by the very nature of its ideological, economic, military, and political relationships with Britain. It was because of this that Canadian statesmen were simultaneously trying to clearly define these relationships and their consequences, as well as develop as much autonomy as possible for Canada.

Britain decided to acknowledge the Dominion's desire for greater autonomy and channel this energy into a strategic response. As the conference was obviously inadequate for the purpose, alternative means of continuous communication were soon being advocated. The solution most favourably received called for the replacement of the conference by the Committee of Imperial Defence.[140] It was hoped that representatives of

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[138]Hadley and Sarty, **Tin-pots and Pirate Ships**, Chapters 2 & 3.

[139]Hadley and Sarty, **Tin-pots and Pirate Ships**, pp. 50-52.

[140]Kendle, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, p. 185.

the Dominion could reach some agreement with Britain with regards to naval defence. In Canada, statesmen began to debate what action Canada should take.

George E. Foster, a leading member of the opposition, argued that Canada "should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden" in the "protection of her exposed coastline and great seaports." Foster's combined the national with the imperial theme. He spoke of the empire as "the great-hearted mother who has given birth to the young nations that circle the globe," mothered them, and shown their people the path towards "better civilization." At the same time he envisioned Canada has having an increasingly important position in world affairs. "Her ship of state is launched on the world's waters, it is open to every storm, it is exposed to every danger. She cannot escape the common burden, she cannot neglect the common duty, she cannot ignore the common responsibility."[141]

Laurier responded to Foster immediately, arguing that consultation with Britain was necessary because "the naval supremacy of Great Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the empire and the peace of the world." However, "after having organized a plan, we should carry it out in Canada with our own resources and out of our own money."

The leader of the opposition, R. L. Borden, followed Laurier. He too spoke with nationalistic undertones reminding the House that "a national status implies national responsibility." He said that on the matter of naval defence he was "entirely at one" with Laurier: "I am entirely of the opinion...that the proper line upon which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a Canadian naval force of our own."

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[141]Debates, 29 March, 1909, p. 3511. The debate is also cited in Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict**, pp. 127-131.

Nevertheless, both parties would become deeply divided on the naval issue. The divisions originated in French Canada, where very few people favoured Canada's involvement in naval defence, and where many were hostile to a contribution to a Canadian service. French Quebec was crucial in both parties' calculations. It was the major stronghold of Laurier's political power and it was obvious that the naval question offered possibilities for reducing his authority there. Even English-speaking Canada was divided: the rural voter was less enthusiastic than the city voter about naval defence, as he was about imperialism, and in many cases people who did favour the idea preferred a contribution to the Royal Navy over the prospect of creating a Canadian fleet. Indeed, the Canadian Militia might be allowed to take over the local responsibilities of defence on land, but it was difficult for colonial thinkers to envision setting up a Canadian navy. The only navy many could envision was the British navy. Such thought led some Canadians, including Laurier, to believe that the German naval threat was exaggerated because Germany had no great naval tradition and navies could not be created in a limited time.

On August 19, 1909, the Dominion representatives attended a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) at which the conference resolutions were approved. Borden made it clear to the British authorities that Canadian defence autonomy was not negotiable. He noted that,

> ...one of the first duties of a young nation is to defend itself. My country, at any rate, does not feel that we are going to pay anybody or hire anybody to do that which we ought to do ourselves, so long as we are able to do it. That, I think, fairly expresses the aspirations of the Canadian people....strategy must take a second place to

Constitutional Government.[142]

Further efforts were made to improve the naval and military cooperation between Great Britain and the Dominions. Perhaps the 1909 Conference's most solid achievement was agreement, with respect to land forces, on the principle of maintaining general uniformity throughout the Empire in organization, training, and equipment. Borden understood,

> that local defence and Imperial defence are very largely one and the same thing...the moment attack is made upon Canadian territory by any other nation, then at once Canada becomes the scene, the theatre of war in which immediately the Empire is interested, and Imperial troops would be necessary.

Borden further suggested that Canada may co-operate with imperial forces in a war abroad, but argued that Canada's autonomy and freedom of action must be fully protected:

> Parliament can alone decide whether we will take any part in that war,....If...we maintain forces which are organized on a common principle and in cooperation and in coordination with those of Great Britain, then we are ready, if we see fit, to take part in any war in which the Empire is interested. That is the whole point, that we shall be ready if we wish to take part; but we are not bound to take part if we do not wish to do so. We shall be able if we desire it...[143]

The British Admiralty urged the colonial representatives to supply ships of the line to the British navy, but the Canadian representatives refused. Laurier agreed with his experts in naval and military affairs, Borden and Brodeur, that the Admiralty's proposals were unacceptable. Laurier was relieved that his representatives were able to evade any formal commitment of the use of Canadian ships for imperial

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[142]Secret: Naval and Military Defence Proceedings of the Imperial Conference of Naval and Military Defence, July 1909, p. 68, copy in Brodeur Papers.

[143]Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict**, pp. 132-33.

defence, and was satisfied that "Jingoist" sentiment had suffered a setback.[144]

The correspondence between Brodeur and Laurier reveals that there was a behind-the-scenes "gentleman's agreement" at the conference respecting Canadian naval policy.[145] Reginald McKenna, the First Lord of the Admiralty, abandoned the pursuit of naval contributions where Canada was concerned. He agreed to a Canadian navy, but only on the condition that the Canadian government would have to bear the public responsibility for opposing the British government and the Admiralty. Laurier's reply to Brodeur's letter demonstrates that he accurately realized the political implications:

> I just received your letter and the memoirs of the program adopted at the conference. Paragraph II will cause us some small troubles, i.e. that the Tories will use it to accuse us of having blocked the Admiralty. But I must add that this attack does not scare me in the least.[146]

Canadian opinion was divided on the question of Imperial defence in 1909 much as it had been in 1899, and Laurier once again sought a position that would not antagonize Canadian national unity.

Brodeur reported that Laurier's emphasis at the 1902 Imperial Conference on Canada's naval autonomy had been effective. For instance, all the Dominions supported the idea of local Defence Committees, although Australia, Canada and South Africa emphasized that the Dominions should decide how the new bodies were to be constituted.[147] Additionally, the

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[144]Laurier to Brodeur, 16 August and 26 August, 1909, Laurier Papers.

[145]Brodeur to Laurier, 26 August, 1909, Brodeur Papers.

[146]Laurier to Brodeur, 4 September, 1909, Brodeur Papers, author's translation.

[147]Kendle, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, p. 197.

long controversy between cash contributions to an Imperial Navy and the establishment of Dominion navies was finally resolved. Submitting to the growing national consciousness of the Dominions, the British Government accepted the principle of local navies. Brodeur attributed these developments to Laurier's previous policies.[148] The end result was that the Canadian response would be to devise a moderate policy of avoiding direct contributions to the British navy, and to create for the first time a Canadian naval force. When Brodeur returned to Quebec he announced that "Canada must have a navy of her own... Our ships we shall have to build and I am convinced that we shall be able to with our own men, our own materials and on our own soil."[149]

The public response was mixed. Some found a Canadian navy an important indicator of its growing national strength. For instance, in a Canadian Club speech, Frederick Hamilton, an Ottawa correspondent of the **Toronto News**, declared that "I am an Imperialist because I was born one" but "I am a Nationalist. I don't want Canada to be part of England." For him Canada was "proceeding at present with the development of a distinctly Canadian national type" and he wanted to see "my nation develop into an alliance with, not subjection to, Great Britain." This required that Canada "not trust to others to defend it" and have its own "armed force" as it is "one of the indispensable equipments of a nation."[150]

Similarly, in the prize essay of the Toronto branch of the Navy League in Canada, the winner alluded to the fact that the "undisputed present national status of Canada" required a navy as it "is an essential part of a well balanced national

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[148]Brodeur to Laurier, 10 August, 1909, Laurier Papers.

[149]**Canadian Annual Review**, 1909, p. 88.

[150]"Coastal Defence of Canada" reported in **Orillia Picket**, January 4, 1908, copy in Brodeur Papers.

equipment." Moreover, Canada "must hold up her head among the nations whose peer she proclaims herself to be, pointing to those twin guarantees of her efficiency - an army and a navy."[151]

However, some portions of the Canadian public, notably French Canadians and farmers, differed from the official state position. Many sent letters to Laurier asking that he "attain the will of the people" first rather than "forcing" it on them. Some of the letters demonstrated a genuine vision of Canada as a distinct nation-state. One individual thought the money should be devoted to celebrating,

> the completion of Canada's Century of peace, and display before the world the freedom, contentment, prosperity and marvellous development it has insured for her. In the beginning of her era of power let her not lose her head and cut her throat. The policy of peace that has made her great can surely keep her great.[152]

Another echoed similar sentiments, reminding Laurier that,

> The forefathers of many of us, even those of pronounced British origin came to this country to escape [the] conditions...soon to be prevalent here if we undertake to copy all the ways of Europe....We who have lived very peaceably amongst the French people for nearly thirty years have come to realize what an advantage it must be for a country to contain people of different nationalities and we have hoped that Quebec would some day save us from blundering into some inevitable error to please those who wish us to do everything as they do it in England.

Moreover, for this correspondent, aversion to militarism was an important difference between Europe and Canada and urged

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[151]Copy in Brodeur Papers.

[152]Edgar Zavitz to Laurier, 15 November, 1909, Laurier Papers.

Laurier to "let that difference remain."[153] Another said that to follow the English lead in the naval build up was "to be more British than the Britons," while another asked why the government should "entail a burden on this young country....Let Britain clean up her house instead of trying to shift the burden on to the colonials. Canadians are tired about hearing of our duty to Britain."[154]

Professor J.G. Hume of Toronto University wrote an open letter to Laurier declaring that "the great majority of the labouring classes and the vast majority of the farmers are opposed to both a contribution to Imperial Defence or to the construction of a Canadian Navy." Professor J.F. McCurdy from Toronto University summed up these sentiments in an open letter to Laurier on November 12 in which he argued that the issue of defence "should be Canada's [since] patriotism is better than loyalty," [especially when] "expenditures upon war vessels to please English and Canadian agitators would ruin Canada financially" [and since] "Canada's mission is one of peace and goodwill...England's enemies need not and should not be Canada's."[155] Later at a meeting of the Canadian Peace and Arbitration Society on June 14, McCurdy described the Empire as "largely an abstraction" and declared that "just as soon as you begin to fight for a mere abstraction you go wrong."[156] Professor J. Marshal of Queen's University in the September issue of **Queen's Quarterly** argued that Canada owed Britain nothing and money spent on defence was taken away from

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[153]Herbert Bowles to Laurier, 25 November, 1909, Laurier Papers.

[154]Prof. James Gibson to Laurier, 15 November, 1909 and Ludgater to Laurier, 26 November, 1909, Laurier Papers.

[155]J.G. Hume and J.F. McCurdy quoted in the **Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1909, pp. 111-112.

[156]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1909, pp. 111-112.

Education and the betterment of the working classes: "We have not needed protection. The only wars we have ever been afflicted with were not of our own but Britain's making. Even rampant Canadian Imperialists sometimes say that Britain's statesmen have often been less careful to secure Canada's rights than to avoid offending the United States."[157]

As in 1897, Laurier regretted the necessity of expenditure on armaments, but accepted such costs as the price of living in an imperfect world. He told all of the above correspondents, "I can assure you that I am no more in sympathy than you are with militarism in any form, but the question of defense is one which cannot be altogether overlooked. It is the penalty of becoming a nation which all nations have to bear and which, in course of time, I hope they may dispense with." To Professor Gibson, he prophetically added,

> The Government will be attacked from Quebec and attacked from Ontario on opposite grounds. In this contest, the last of all those with which I have had to deal all my life, I hope I can rely upon the opinion and support of moderate men both in Ontario and Quebec, and if I fail, I will gladly pass over to better hands the responsibility of administrating the diversified elements, classes, races and creeds which compose our country.[158]

In the end, the Laurier government designed the Naval Act with safeguards against Canadian participation in other wars like South Africa, and Laurier could point to them with assurances of the security of Canadian defence autonomy. The Naval Act was placed before Parliament on January 12, 1910, when the Prime Minister introduced the Naval Service Bill. It made legal provision for a naval service which would include a naval college for the training of officers. Laurier

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[157]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1909, pp. 111-112.

[158]Laurier to Gibson, 18 November, 1909, Laurier Papers.

explained that it was proposed to implement the larger of the two schemes put forward by the Admiralty, involving a force of five light cruisers and six destroyers. Under normal conditions the new service would be as much under Canadian control as the militia; but in case of an emergency the navy could be put "at the disposal of His Majesty." Laurier emphasized that such action would not be automatic. He took his stand, as Borden had in London, on the principle that Parliament would decide what part if any Canada would take in an imperial war. Moving the second reading of the bill on February 3, he said, "The position which we take is that it is for the parliament of Canada, which created this navy, to say when and where it shall go to war". Laurier went on to add that,

> If England is at war we are at war and liable to attack. I do not say that we shall always be attacked, neither do I say that we would take part in all the wars of England. That is a matter that must be determined by circumstances, upon which the Canadian parliament will have to pronounce and will have to decide in its own best judgment.[159]

The Bill was a needed compromise that allowed more freedom of movement in Canadian diplomatic and imperial affairs than had any alternative proposed by Conservatives or Nationalists.

Debate ensued with some seeing the Navy Act as an important step towards nationhood. According to the **Halifax Chronicle**,

> The time having come for Canada to make a start with the Naval defences of her own coasts, it is essential to its development that the force should be a Canadian one under the absolute control of the Canadian people. It is no less essential, in our judgement, that the ships shall be built in Canada, for we believe we have now the opportunity to lay the foundations and presently to establish a great ship-building industry; for the construction of not only our own Navy, but of a fleet of merchant-men,

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[159]Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict**, pp. 134-135.

> which in years to come will carry the sea-borne commerce of the Dominion.

And on Feb 4th,

> The policy of the Government in creating a new Canadian Navy to act in co-operation with the Imperial fleet, is in accordance with the recommendations of the Admiralty, is based upon the sound principle of responsible government and is a great forward step in the evolution of Imperial unity.

The **Toronto Star** of June 23 said, "The real meaning of the provision in the Canadian Navy Act is that the British Government must take the Canadian Government into its confidence, and that the public opinion of Canada expressed in Parliament and elsewhere must be considered. That is reasonable." The Toronto **Weekly Sun** (February 9) declared the issue to be one of Imperialism versus Independence:

> By linking our forces with those of a world-wide power, we to that extent surrender control over those forces; by pledging ourselves as we certainly do in the policy now before Parliament to a possible part in any and all of Britain's wars we make not only our external but in a large measure our internal affairs, as well, subject to the control of a Government which is not responsible to our own people. A Dominion which has hereto, while nominally a part of the Empire, in reality maintained a separate existence, which has pursued its own course undisturbed by European or other quarrels, will hereafter find its attention constantly diverted by these quarrels and its freedom of action at home restricted by its enforced part therein. Lastly, instead of our safety being made greater we shall incur dangers that do not now exist. Standing alone we are absolutely safe against aggression from any quarter outside of the United States.[160]

The Conservative's decision to oppose the Laurier naval

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[160]All above news reportage quoted in the **Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1910, pp. 173-181.

policy was fateful. It was the beginning of a train of events which led them to power. On the other hand it also had the ultimate effect of preventing Canada from making any material addition to the collective naval strength of the Empire, either through a Canadian force or contribution. In early February, the Conservatives moved an amendment opposing Laurier's plan, requiring that "no permanent policy" should be undertaken "until it has been submitted to the people and has received their approval," and proposing that Canada offer the imperial authorities immediately "as a free and loyal contribution" a sum sufficient to provide two dreadnoughts.[161]

In April, Mr. Olivar Asselin, a Nationalist, issued a pamphlet which saw the issue as independence versus imperialism:

> If we are expected, under the proposed Imperial defence system, to shoulder all the liabilities of nationhood, why should we continue to drag the fetters of colonialism? Why should we not in our external relations look for that consideration which is the lot of all independent states, however small, and let that proud spirit which the full enjoyment of nationhood can alone beget impel us to great deeds?

He summarized the aims of their nationalism as being "the upbuilding of a Canadian nation" through the preservation of autonomy in relations with the Mother Country, the safeguarding of Provincial autonomy, the settlement of the country to strengthen Canadian nationhood, and the adoption by the Federal and Provincial governments of economic and social laws that protect Canada's natural resources.[162]

The views of Bourassa were reported in the **New York Herald** (October 9). He declared that the principle of self-

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[161]Stacey, **Canada and the Age of Conflict**, pp. 135-136.

[162]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1910, p. 186.

government and decentralization in the Empire must prevail also in military defence:

> We want for Canada the largest measure of autonomy compatible with the maintenance of British connection. We ask for no radical change in that respect; but should change be necessary, we think it should be in the direction of Independence, Canada remaining a friendly ally of Great Britain, rather than toward Imperialism or annexation to the United States.[163]

Laurier was already in serious trouble in Quebec. Bourassa, no longer a member in the House of Commons, had decided to make the naval question an anti-Laurier issue. In 1910, he founded the newspaper **Le Devoir** which gave him an effective mouthpiece, and at once he became very influential in nationalist and clerical circles.[164] In its editorials and elsewhere Bourassa struck out against Laurier, stating that such a capitulation to imperialism would result in Canada being drawn into British wars around the globe: "It is the most complete backward step Canada has made in half a century. It is the gravest blow our autonomy has suffered since the origin of responsible government."[165]

When the vote was taken on March 9, only eighteen members voted against Laurier and in due course the Naval Service Bill became law. The Naval Act of 1910 was passed by Parliament after a long and intense debate. In his naval speech, Laurier

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[163]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1910, p. 191.

[164]The original platform of the paper was quite similar to the Laurier administration's aims: the complete autonomy of Canada, loyalty to British ideals, and to Great Britain as the historic ruler of Canada, provincial autonomy, minority rights throughout Canada, and bilingual public services and laws, See Casey Murrow, **Henri Bourassa and French-Canadian Nationalism: Opposition to Empire**, Montreal: Harvest House, 1968, p. 63.

[165]**Le Devoir**, January 17, 1909, quoted in Mason Wade, **The French Canadians, 1760-1967**, 2 Volumes, Toronto: Macmillan, 1968, Volume 1, p. 568.

stated that he did "not pretend to be an Imperialist. Neither do I pretend to be an anti-Imperialist. I am a Canadian, first and last and all the time." Moreover, he reminded people that British "policy is centralization; our policy is autonomy."[166]

He felt that those who preferred financial contributions rather than building a Canadian navy were supporting imperial centralization while the Liberal policy was furthering "autonomy." He recalled Lord Durham's prescription for colonial loyalty which included giving "the colonies the same rights and privileges and powers as are exercised by British men in their own islands, the power to govern themselves according to their own rules and notions." He reminded the House that Canadian interests had been looked after "by irresponsible ministers in Downing street" and that the idea of a financial contribution "smacks too much of tribute to be acceptable by British communities. The true conception of the British empire is the conception of new, growing, strong and wealthy nations, each one developing itself on the line of its own needs and conditions..."

Laurier pointed to common sense geopolitics when he defended his statement that "when England is at war, we are at war," by reminding Parliament that it was merely a consequence of international affairs in which allies share common enemies. Moreover, he insisted that Canada be able "to strike the enemy before the enemy strikes us" as in the case of Japan's attack on Russia in 1904.[167] In conclusion, he reminded members of parliament of Canada's growth as a nation:

> Why do we ask Parliament to vote for this naval service? It is simply because it is a necessity of our condition and the status we have reached as a nation. Do these gentlemen forget that...the

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[166]Debates, 8 March, 1910, p. 2959.

[167]Debates, 8 March, 1910, p. 2969.

> revenue of Canada is today $100,000,000, and the population over 7,000,000? Do they forget that our country extends from one ocean to the other, and from the American boundary to the Arctic ocean, not on the map only but in actual and ever-increasing settlements? Do they forget that there are growing up on the Pacific coast, cities fast approaching in strength and wealth, eastern cities,...Do they forget that we are going to build a railway from the interior to Hudson Bay? Do they forget that we have gold mines under the Arctic circle? Do they forget that Canada is expanding like a young giant, simply from the pressure of the blood in its young veins? Are we to be told under such circumstances that we do not require a naval service? Why Sir, you might just as well tell the people of Montreal, with their half million population, that they do not need any police protection....we must advance, we cannot remain stationary. We must advance. To remain stationary in this age is to retrograde; we must advance.[168]

Defending himself against French-Canadian nationalistes, Laurier gave a speech at the Monument National in Montreal on October 30, 1910. Laurier argued that his naval policy, far from being a capitulation to Imperial interests, was the logical result of having resisted demands for Imperial centralization. It was a continuation of the Canadian policy of retaining control over her own forces. Whereas Bourassa called Canada a colonial dependency, Laurier insisted that Canada was to all intents and purposes an independent nation:

> We have opened a new path, we became a nation, without rupture of the colonial link. Look for a country or a colony that obtained the right to have a responsible government for its own people. You will not find any. It is only in the British Empire that it is found, and it is Canada that was the pioneer in this new politics.[169]

He opposed war, but if war broke out and Britain were

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[168]Debates, 8 March, 1910, pp. 2975-2979.

[169]In Alfred DeCelles, **Discours de Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, 2 volumes, Montreal: Librairie Beauchemin, Vol. 2, 1920, p. 166. author's translation.

threatened, he believed Canada ought to aid the Empire: "We are not forced to take part in any war, I declare nevertheless that if there were wars... I believe that we should help England with all our strengths."[170] Similarly, when addressing the Ontario Club in Toronto, Laurier noted that while Canada was "under the suzerainty of the King of England, he had "no more rights over us than are allowed him by our own Canadian parliament." He added, as if answering Renan, "If this is not a nation, when then is a nation?"[171]

Much of this was echoed by Brodeur, who now added Minister of the Navy to his portfolio, in his address of welcome to the officers and seamen of the HMCS *Niobe* on its arrival at Halifax on October 21, 1910. Brodeur supported a symbolic empire by arguing that a Canadian navy demonstrated Canadian "readiness to do our fair share in the upbuilding of Empire." But he also stated that it marked "a dawning epoch of self-reliance" that had profound implications for the development of Canadian autonomy and "national greatness." A Canadian navy was important for the protection of Canadian territory and commerce but it had other implications. The "first Canadian cruiser" under the command of an officer "born in this country" was "an event of historical importance." He added,

> To-day the first training ship of our navy ploughs Canadian waters. Occasions such as this are few in the story of any country, and especially of a young nation like Canada. They are like golden milestones set at intervals along the pathway of our progress and development....

The development Brodeur hinted at was growing Canadian autonomy. He reminded his audience that Britain had recently

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[170]DeCelles, **Discours de Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, Vol. 2, p. 192, author's translation.

[171]Laurier quoted in John W., Dafoe, **Laurier: Study in Canadian Politics**, p. 54.

consented to giving Canada more treaty-making powers, particularly in commercial treaties. For him, it was "certainly the acme of political liberty, it is the finest example of national autonomy that the world can present today." But he stressed that "Without the powers necessary for the exercise of that autonomy, it would become a mere fiction..."[172]

Yet there is evidence to suggest that Canadian autonomy in naval affairs was not readily accepted by the British authorities. The extensive correspondence between Lord Grey and Brodeur suggests that the Admiralty was reluctant to give Canada full sovereignty over her own warships.[173] The Canadian White Ensign, a white ensign with a green maple leaf centred on the cross of St. George, was not accepted by the Admiralty. Moreover, the Colonial Office and the Admiralty refused to allow *Niobe* and *Rainbow* to steam beyond the three-mile territorial limit until the whole question of the "status of Dominion navies" was resolved, a question which was to be a key issue in the 1911 Imperial Conference on Defence.[174] Brodeur was clearly confused and irritated as evident in a letter to Lord Grey:

> When it was decided at the Conference of 1909 that a Canadian Navy should be established, I thought that this Navy would be permitted to go outside territorial waters....If they had told me at that time that the existence of the Navy should depend on some restrictions of that kind, I would certainly have never favoured its establishment in the country....Now they state that we cannot go

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[172]Brodeur, L.P. "Address of welcome to Officers and ship's company of HMCS NIOBE On Arrival at Halifax, N.S.", October 21, 1910, Brodeur Papers.

[173]There are over thirty separate letters, memoranda, and messages between Grey, Brodeur and the colonial secretary between 26 October, 1910 and 16 March 1911, Brodeur Papers.

[174]Brodeur, "LP Brodeur and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy," p. 28.

> outside the territorial waters without passing automatically under their own rules and regulations.
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> I do not see why they would not trust Canada in the management and control of her Navy. Do they fear some illegal acts on our part? We have had for years and years a Fisheries Protection Service which has come constantly into contact with foreign vessels. We have seized some of those vessels at different intervals, but we never did anything which brought the Imperial Authorities into serious difficulties.[175]

The Imperial Conference of 1911 met at the Foreign Office and was the first to be held under the terms of the 1907 constitutional resolution. Laurier's participation in the conference was minimal. His opinions, still unchanged since 1897, were well known to his fellow prime ministers and Fisher's request that Laurier "give the lead" was pointless. Laurier reiterated his opinion "that if there was one principle upon which the British Empire can live, and ought to live, it is Imperial unity based upon local autonomy." Although there was virtually no discussion of defence, Laurier managed to discourage any suggestion that hinted at the use of Canadian military forces by Britain. In maintaining that the United Kingdom need not consult the Dominions in all foreign affairs, Laurier was yet again establishing autonomy for the Dominions. "We have taken the position in Canada that we do not think we are bound to take part in every war, and that our fleet may not be called upon in all cases."[176]

Laurier referred to the Crimean war in which Canada took no part. Canada was "just as much at peace" as if she "had never been a British colony." Laurier strengthened his theme of passive belligerency with reference to the Napoleonic wars. Between 1796 to 1815, Canada was "as much at peace" as if

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[175]Brodeur to Grey, 16 March, 1911, Brodeur Papers.

[176]Ollivier, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, Vol. 2, pp. 140-145.

"annexed to the United States." His subtle point was that Britain could indeed be engaged in hostilities while her Canadian dependency, though a co-belligerent, remained "practically at peace."[177]

During a meeting with the Admiralty to discuss the applicability of the British Naval Act to Dominion forces, Brodeur furthered the concept of Canadian defence autonomy by making it clear that the Canadian state would legislate "independently of Britain." Indicative of Brodeur's determination to maintain Canadian control was his emphasis on distinctions where the uniforms of the naval forces were concerned. While lost on the flag, the buttons on Canadian uniforms would feature the maple leaf rather than the laurel leaf of the Royal Navy.[178]

Ultimately, the British government had to recognize that the "naval forces and services" of Canada and Australia would remain "exclusively under the control of their respective Governments." The imperial government also noted that even if Dominion naval units were to be placed at the disposal of the Admiralty during time of war, such forces would only come under British command when they had been made available "by the Dominion authorities" concerned.[179]

As such, the Imperial Conference of 1911 reassured Laurier's concept of the Empire as an association of independent states. By 1911, the Dominion prime ministers had grown more sensitive to possible infringements of their newly-won status. Far from being a body which examined differences in order "to see if they could be composed or compromised," as

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[177]Laurier quoted in Shields, "Wilfrid Laurier and Canadian Defence Autonomy, p. 314.

[178]Shields, "Wilfrid Laurier and Canadian Defence Autonomy", p. 316.

[179]Shields, "Wilfrid Laurier and Canadian Defence Autonomy," p. 316.

Lord Crewe had earlier suggested, the Imperial Conference of 1911 merely accentuated them and revealed how difficult they would be to resolve. Lack of interest in any form of Imperial Federation or cooperation had fatal consequences for finding satisfactory solutions to the ever important problems of defence and foreign policy.[180] Yet Canadian defence autonomy had been secured and furthered. The Attorney-General for New Zealand recognized the position Laurier was taking for Canada. For him, even though it did not amount to a move for separation, "...Canadian nationalism is beginning to resent even the appearance - the constitutional forms - of a subordination to the mother country."[181]

The Laurier administration's compromises may have furthered Canadian defence autonomy, but unfortunately pacified neither French or British Canadians. It severely reduced support in Quebec, and ultimately contributed to the Liberal's defeat in 1911. The navy survived, although it would enter World War I with only two warships, the *Rainbow* and *Niobe*. In 1912, Prime Minister Borden did not repeal the Naval Act and made an "emergency" bill granting thirty five million dollars outright to Britain to build three dreadnoughts. The government that Bourassa had helped put in office took an imperialistic step that Laurier would never had condoned as Prime Minister.

5.4 SUMMARY

After his defeat in 1911, Laurier was still satisfied with the general course of events since 1897. Pressure toward Imperial centralization had been successfully resisted, and Canadian autonomy maintained. Invoking appropriate nautical imagery, he claimed,

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[180]Kendle, **The Colonial and Imperial Conferences**, p. 184.

[181]Quoted in Dafoe, **Laurier: Study in Canadian Politics**, p. 54.

> There has been some tacking, there have been unexpected tides and currents, but we are making, in my opinion, rapid and definite progress. At least as we look back upon it, the course seems steady. We are making for a harbour which was not the harbour I foresaw twenty five years ago, but it is a good harbour. It will not be the end. Exactly what the next course will be I cannot tell, but I think I know the general bearing and I am content.[182]

Perhaps it was Minto who most accurately guessed what this "general bearing" was when he wrote of Laurier's attempts to reconcile Quebec with the rest of Canada. For him, Laurier was "devoid of the British feeling for a united Empire" which "has no sentimental attraction for him" and "a closer connection with the old country [Laurier] would consider from the utility point of view and nothing more." He assumed that Laurier's actions were more likely aimed at "the welding together of a Canadian nation than of forming part of a great Empire and though he has never actually said so to me, I suspect that he dreams of Canadian independence in some future age."[183]

Indeed, during Laurier's reign the Canadian state was successful in acquiring a greater degree of autonomy over its armed forces and, if not a complete renunciation of the British prerogative, at least laying the foundations for how Canadian military power would be utilized with regards to the imperial connection. During the turn of the century, Canadian state elites were facing a changing geopolitical environment. As a weak state, they perceived its interests to be vulnerable to British and American diplomacy. Similarly, as illustrated with the South African War, their imperial connection was seen as a potentially dangerous internal problem that could disrupt national unity. The difficulty arose from the fact that most

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[182]Skeleton, **Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, p. 109.

[183]Minto to Chamberlain, Private, 14 April, 1900, Minto Papers.

British Canadians and French Canadians disagreed on imperial matters. Rather than the already complicated two-level game suggested by Putnam and Mann, Laurier was faced with a three-level game: one international two domestic.

Canadian state elites did not want to seem too vulnerable or too aggressive to either Britain or the United States. So what accounts for the emergence of the Canadian armed forces is not a full-blown war or preparation for war, but a compromise made by a weak state occupying a region where two hegemons had agreed to a truce. State elites re-evaluated Canada's military requirements and responsibilities and found it essential to increase their control over military power. This entailed two developments. First, they increased military autonomy by avoiding military commitments and financial contributions to imperial federation, and expressed to Britain that it would be the responsibility of the Canadian state to decide when and where its military forces would be deployed. Second, they started implementing the practical policies and building the necessary military infrastructures a truly national armed forces would require. This was accomplished through the reorganization of the Canadian Militia, resumption of control over important naval bases, and the creation of an independent Canadian navy. While military autonomy was necessary, this did not mean a complete withdrawal from imperial commitments. A gradual withdrawal from military commitments to Britain furthered state autonomy, yet still supported the empire symbolically. However, this would have to be accomplished without exacerbating British and French Canadian nationalisms, or aggravating the United States which had its own geopolitical ambitions. While the British were very interested in alleviating their military burdens, they clearly wanted to control the speed and nature of such changes. The period between the years 1897 and 1911 was crucial in sorting out Canadian military rights and increasing its autonomy. Prior to this period, military autonomy had been

slow to develop.

Although it had been difficult, another important element in furthering state autonomy had been achieved. Rather than give in to pressures from either of the two domestic voices, the Canadian state followed a national policy that aimed at reaching a compromise. The Canadian state would not simply follow Britain's wishes, nor would it ignore its emerging international status and become isolationalist. For the sake of the development of a nationalizing Canadian state, it would act as an ally to Britain, taking on its own military responsibilities. While taking over naval bases and creating its own army and navy were crucial in this regard, so too was the extension and development of its territorial integrity, the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

TERRITORY

6.1 INTRODUCTION

While an important aspect of a state's autonomy consists of fashioning its own independent foreign policy and controlling its armed forces, so too is the ability to consolidate and control its own territory. The previous chapter detailed how the Canadian state made significant moves towards military autonomy. This is an essential characteristic of any independent state. But state sovereignty is also territorial. As such, the ability of a state to consolidate and maintain the "territorially demarcated area" over which it governs is an equally important indicator of stateness.[1] This consolidation process has two essential requirements. Most importantly, there has to be a legitimate claim to the territory. Beyond traditional international recognition of borders and boundaries, a state's territorial claim is far more justified when its people occupy the territory in question. The second requirement involves the necessary growth in the state's capacity to administratively penetrate the territory, with what Mann calls "infrastructural state functions." While the nationalizing of these infrastructures and resources differed from state to state in the nineteenth century, their fundamental similarity lay in their ability to extend material and symbolic communications throughout their

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[1]Fixed and delimited territorial boundaries did not occur until well into the eighteenth century. The first surveyed lineal boundary in Europe was recorded in a treaty in 1718. See Anthony Giddens, **The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, p. 90.

territories.[2]

States have always simultaneously pursued wealth and national power. Economic resources are clearly necessary for national power.[3] Certainly, the Laurier administration wished to settle and develop the West which would have the reciprocal effect of promoting industrial growth in the East and generally modernizing the entire Canadian economy. But this thesis makes a further, less acknowledged claim. It seeks to go beyond the traditional accounts of economic development and the formation of a multicultural West by suggesting that the political exercise of filling empty places on the map with people - the occupation of territory - is clearly an important geopolitical imperative that cannot be ignored. Population, like territory, resources, and the degree of cohesiveness of a society, is an important fundamental support of any political system. Reviewing Canadian newspapers prior to the Alaska Boundary decision, the **Canadian Military Gazette** asked, "How are the people of Canada, with a population of six millions, to provide any adequate defence for a frontier of 4,000 miles"[4] Faced with more country than people, the state was confronted with the expediency of establishing a population to strengthen their legal claims to the territory. In accordance with Ratzel's laws of state growth,[5] then in

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[2]Michael Mann, **The Sources of Social Power: The rise of classes and nation-States, 1760-1914**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, Chapter 11. See Chapter 2 of this thesis for more detail.

[3]Robert Gilpin, **The Political Economy of International Relations**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

[4]Cited in Richard Preston, **The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America 1867-1939**, Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1977, p. 177. Four thousand miles is approximately 6440 kilometres.

[5]Friedrich Ratzel, "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States," in R.E. Kasperson and J.V. Minghi, eds., **The Structure of Political Geography**, Aldine: Chicago, 1969.

vogue, contemporary Canadian state elites were assuring the state's claim to its own *lebensraum*, although it was not compelled to do so by any natural expansion of the population. Rather, state elites were geopolitically driven by their concern with their expansionist southern neighbour. As such, the Canadian state developed several nation-building policies and in so doing increased its infrastructural reach.[6]

Indeed, during the years between 1895 and 1911, the Canadian state engaged in territorial consolidation and economic development under the mandate of a "National Policy." Sir John A. Macdonald's administration had been sensitive to the goals of the "expansionist movement" which had begun to make itself felt in the mid-nineteenth century. As it broadened in the 1860s it gained support from many ardent Canadian nationalists who advocated the acquisition of the territory to withstand hostile pressures from the south. Moreover, the Red River rebellion of 1869-70 and the Riel Rebellion of 1885, demonstrated the need for state control and administration of its expanding territory.[7] The "Macdonald-Laurier" National Policy generally refers to the continuing policies undertaken by the Canadian state to consolidate its north-western territory and establish and maintain a national

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[6]These ideas are not usually associated with Canada. Just as the people in Canada's military history are usually perceived as being "unmilitary," so too is its expansionism. Aitken's "defensive expansionism" could almost be considered an "apologetic expansionism" in that it seems only to have been driven by its concern with American continentalism.

[7]For an account of the early years of the expansionist movement, see Doug Owram, **Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856-1900**, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1980. Owram argues that by the Laurier years, expansionism as a movement was long dead, yet agrees that it helped shape the state's territorial expansion. My contention is that in response to a changing geopolitical environment it had become a concentrated state strategy, a Canadian equivalent of the American Manifest Destiny.

economy that was both integrated and autonomous. Specifically, it refers to three interrelated National Policies: western settlement and immigration; transcontinental railways; and, protective tariffs for economic development. As such, the "Macdonald-Laurier" National Policy was a continuation of the aims of Confederation in that the Canadian state continued the transformation of the former British North American territories into a viable political and economic unit.[8]

"Defensive expansionism" was exactly what Laurier had been referring to during the Colonial and Imperial Conferences. He demanded that the British authorities see these national policies as a contribution to Imperial Defence and a geopolitical necessity. Moreover, defensive expansionism had further implications in that these national policies became crucial to Canadian nationhood. As Brown has argued, Canadian nationalism could not be based on appeals to common language, a common history, or a common cultural tradition. Consequently, a "political nationalism was employed, expressed in terms of tariffs and railways."[9]

Therefore, nation building required that the state carry out several tasks. First, it had to consolidate Canadian territory, which consisted of settling the west and officially claiming the Arctic. In order to settle the west and strengthen the economy, it had to continue the National Policy of railways, immigration, and tariffs. Second, these tasks would have profound implications for the expansion of the state. In order to further infrastructural initiatives, it had to increase its capacity to penetrate society more effectively. All of this required significant state building.

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[8]Macdonald-Laurier linkage is taken from Donald Smiley, "Canada and the Quest for a National Policy," **Canadian Journal of Political Science**, No 1, 1975, pp. 40-60.

[9]Brown, R.C., "The nationalism of the national policy," in Peter Russell, **Nationalism in Canada**, Toronto: McGraw-Hill: Toronto, 1966, p. 162.

6.2 CONSOLIDATING THE WEST

The settling of the Canadian west is a familiar and well-documented story. Confederation in 1867 marked the end of the mercantilist era and the beginning of a modern economy that would slowly grow throughout the nineteenth century.[10] Key to this growth was the National Policy of Macdonald's Conservative government which expressed nineteenth century urges toward economic nationalism. Its central elements consisted of a protective tariff and the settlement of the west through the implementation of transcontinental railroad and immigration policies.[11] The Liberal party decided to continue the National Policy and these elements would be the main framework within which Canadian economic growth took place between 1867 and 1913.

i. Tariffs

The aim of tariffs - custom duties on imports, or less commonly, exports - is generally to protect home industries from foreign competition, though it may be merely to provide revenue. They allow domestic producers to sell their products unencumbered by low-cost foreign competition. Less productive countries have a strong incentive to adopt an extensive policy of protection designed to stimulate fledgling industries.

With the world's largest industrial power to the south, it was inevitable that Canada's programme of industrial development would include tariffs to protect its infant industries. Prior to 1870, Canada had retained a relatively

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[10]In the nineteenth century, geopolitics began to involve economics. The doctrines of totality in war began to be applied to the national economy. Countries that did not enjoy a guaranteed security and prosperity began to reject laissez-faire economics and in its place, moved toward policies that furthered self-sufficiency.

[11]E. Eden and M., Molot, "Canada's National Policies: Reflections on 125 Years," **Canadian Public Policy**, XIX, no. 3, 1993, pp. 232-251.

liberal economic policy. However, with the 1873 international financial crash and the decrease in the demand for manufactured goods, Canada followed the rising tide of world-wide protectionism.

Tariffs were still the major source of federal government funds and even as late as 1908-12 they accounted for 59 per cent of all federal government receipts.[12] Developing the West in 1879 meant increased government activity which required greater revenues. But three other reasons were forwarded at this time. First, regional interests in the Maritime provinces had to be appeased. Second, there was a strong and growing business support for high tariffs, especially as the possibility of reciprocity grew remote. Third, it would check the southward immigration flow by providing permanent employment opportunities.[13] The National Policy tariff was also successful in attracting foreign savings and led to the establishment of American branch plants in Canada.[14]

In 1879, general tariff increases were raised from 17.5 percent to 20 percent while duties were restored on a range of agricultural products. Coal and coke, iron and steel, machinery, hardware, and textiles were also given special protection. Election of Laurier's Liberal government in 1896 did not spell the end of industrial protectionism, although a broad British preferential system was re-established in 1897.

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[12]William Marr and Donald Patterson, **Canada: An Economic History**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1980.

[13]Marr and Patterson, **Canada: An Economic History**, pp. 377-78.

[14]It could be argued that American branch plants undermined the Canadian imperative of territorial consolidation, in that they resembled "Trojan Horses" that could weaken the nationalizing Canadian state from within. However, the fact that Canada remains intact despite branch plants and free trade suggests that it is politics, not solely economics, that are important to a nation-state's integrity.

Effective in 1898, products from Britain and British colonies faced duties 25 percent lower than those on imports from all other nations.[15]

Rather than viewing the preference given to British goods by the Liberal budget of 1897 as simply a gesture of imperial servitude, it should be stressed that the policy actually stimulated the increase in the east-west flow of trade in Canada, through Canadian ports which in turn increased state revenue. Until the First World War, the Canadian state financed its operations from indirect taxes, customs duties, and excise taxes. Revenue in the form of indirect taxes from custom import duties increased from 19.4 million dollars in 1896 to 85 million in 1911.[16] As mentioned in a previous chapter, complications created by the most-favoured-nation clause in British treaties with Germany and Belgium were eliminated by the termination of those treaties in 1898. Consequently, the unconditional British preference became a permanent part of Liberal tariff policy: "It was a low-tariff measure which harmonized with the National Policy."[17]

While Britain was given a preference, protectionism was aimed at the Americans. The American tariff had remained high since 1897. Disenchantment with the prohibitive Dingley tariff of 1897 and with what was considered American intransigence in failing to reach some type of reciprocal trade agreement in 1898, fostered the growth of economic nationalism. The return of prosperity, the beginning of large-scale western settlement, and the antagonistic imperialism of the United

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[15]Kenneth Nowrie and Douglas Owram, **A History of the Canadian Economy**, Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991, pp. 313-314.

[16]M. Urquhart and K. Buckley, eds., **Historical Statistics of Canada**, 1965, Toronto: Macmillian, 1965. p. 198.

[17]W.L. Morton, **The Kingdom of Canada: A General History From the Earliest of Times**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963, p. 395.

States, as expressed in the dispute with Britain over the Venezuelan and Alaskan boundaries, heightened the sense of Canadian nationalism. Since the United States was the traditional continental threat to a separate Canadian state, tariffs were a natural nationalistic manifestation. Israel Tarte, Minister of Public Works, felt that it was his duty to argue for increased protection as the answer to American brashness. The credo he proclaimed was "Canada for Canadians" and the challenge he issued: "Outbuild the Americans in canals, harbours, ships; build a tariff wall as high as Dingley's."[18] Essentially, Tarte was motivated by a conviction that the government's development of transportation facilities alone was inadequate. This programme, he believed, had to be complemented by a strong tariff policy to encourage the expansion of the nation's economic potential. "We have only to stand by ourselves also to see our industries develop, so as to be as independent as a nation can be of any foreign nation."[19] Returning from the 1902 Colonial conference Laurier called for Tarte's resignation because he had violated the constitutional practice of prior cabinet consultation and solidarity.

In 1909, following the Republican victory of 1908, the tariff was raised even higher by the Payne-Aldrich Act. During the Liberal reign, Canada would increase its imports from the United States, despite several geopolitical tensions, from 46.7 percent of total imports in 1891 to 60.9 percent in 1911. Conversely, exports to the United States would decrease from 42.6 percent in 1891 to 38 percent in 1911. The final stage in the development of Canadian commercial policy began in 1910 when the idea of a reciprocal trading arrangement with the

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[18]Quoted in Skelton, **Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, Vol II, p. 74.

[19]Debates, 10 March, 1902, pp. 936-940.

United States was broached once again.[20] Ultimately, it would be defeated and put an end to the Liberal party rule.

Growth in specific individual sectors, such as textiles, iron and steel and agricultural-machinery products, benefitted from tariffs, but were also aided by the increase in demand stimulated by prairie settlement. In the end, tariffs may have strengthened the Canadian economy but it was immigration and railroads that certainly provided the state with a population and a means to convey them to a frontier that needed bolstering.

ii. Transportation and Communication

Clearly, railway development in Canada was tied to the economic concerns of its business class. But while economic growth is significant to national power, states have additional concerns that at times are more urgent. The Canadian state would strive to unify and integrate its vast territory and to guard chiefly against the "pull" of the United States. In the face of a marked north-south continental bias and a powerful west-east and English-French sectionalism, it would create extensive patterns of interaction that would stretch the width of the country. In particular, the state would need to subsidize or construct transcontinental railways and communication systems. The primary purpose of the Canadian state, "was to achieve a separate political existence on the North American continent. The prime function of the Canadian Pacific Railway was to assist in this effort - to help in the building of the national economy and national society."[21]

The development of railways in Canada has been associated

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[20]Nowrie and Owram, **A History of the Canadian Economy**, pp. 312-314.

[21]Donald Creighton cited in Gerald Friesen, **The Canadian Prairies: A History**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, p. 171.

with economic growth and the settling of the country, particularly the West.[22] But tied into this was the *realpolitik* concern for having an adequate means of integrating the nation so as to provide for communications and defence. In the context of late nineteenth century military strategy, this was an extremely valid argument. Indeed, the coming of the railway to Europe and North America was to exert an important influence on military strategy. Countries that had a highly developed system of rail communications gained important and possible decisive advantages in war.[23]

Railways were simultaneously integral to Canadian and imperial defence. During the Colonial and Imperial Conferences Laurier had consistently maintained this point; in terms of imperial strategy, the Canadian railway provided the final link for the "all-red route" between the British Isles and Australasia, an alternative to routes via the Suez corridor or the Cape of Good Hope to India and the Eastern seas upon which

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[22]On the Canadian Pacific Railway see, H.A. Innis, **A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1923/73; James B. Hedges, **The Federal Railway Land Subsidy Policy of Canada**, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934; G.P. Glazebrook, **A History of Transportation in Canada Volume 2, National Economy, 1867-1936**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964; W. Kaye Lamb, **The Canadian Pacific Railway**, New York: Macmillan, 1977; and John A. Eagle, **The Canadian Pacific Railway and the Development of Western Canada, 1896-1914**, Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989.

[23]Nowhere was the success of rail more evident than in Prussia where the railway became a major means of welding a nation out of many parts. By the late nineteenth century, Prussia possessed a comprehensive railway and mobilization system which, under the guidance of Field Marshal von Moltke and the Prussian General Staff, was used with great success against the Austrians and French. See Hajo Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff," in Peter Paret, ed., **Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 281-295.

the Empire's existence depended.[24] In terms of Canadian defence, a Toronto Branch of the Navy League and Captain Arthur Lee of the Royal Military College recommended that, in the event of war with the United States, torpedo-boats should be brought by rail from Halifax to the St. Lawrence.[25]

The United States' construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad in the 1860s had already threatened the sovereignty of the Canadian frontier, but it was the first Riel Rebellion that demonstrated to the Canadian state the difficulty in transporting troops across its vast territory. Initially, it was thought that the American rail system could be used to get as far as Minnesota. But this was rejected as it was thought that it would be seen as an admission that Canada could only control the Prairies with permission from the United States. Moreover, the Americans would not tolerate British troops on American soil or waters. But it was agreed to send supplies through the American canals. The American's let one ship through but detained the **Chicora** which had been a blockade runner in the Civil War. While the issue was eventually settled, Canadian vulnerability had been revealed. Many Canadians retained the notion that Canadian nationhood required a Canadian-controlled water route to the Prairies. For the Toronto **Globe**

> It is quite plain...that the Dominion of Canada cannot allow the Americans to have exclusive control of the means of water communication between the great lakes of Huron and Superior, when they have shown themselves animated by so unneighbourly a spirit....As it is the construction of a Canadian canal is a necessity and ought to be conducted as soon as the necessary Parliamentary sanction can be

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[24]B. Gough, and R. Sarty, "Sailors and Soldiers: The Royal Navy, the Canadian Forces, and the Defence of Atlantic Canada, 1890-1918," in M. Hadley, Huebert, R., and F., Crickard, eds., **A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996, p. 113.

[25]Preston, **The Defence of the Undefended Border**, p. 127.

secured.[26]

Similarly, the St. Catherines **Constitutional** offered this view

> Of all Governments within the pale of civilization, the Yankee Republic is one of the most uncertain to deal with, and is the most devoid of dignity in its administration.... It was this one idea of shameless desire to rob us of the north west that dictated this policy in preventing the Chicora from going through their canal....Their conduct in this matter should teach us another lesson of not expecting favours at their hands and it also tells us that we should have a canal of our own at Sault Ste. Marie built this season.[27]

The **Chicora** incident did not rupture Canadian-American relations but it did have a substantial impact on the thinking of those concerned with defence and transportation policies. The security of Canada's vast western territory demanded that a canal be built to complete an all-Canadian water route. However, the demanding physical environment of Canada interfered with capital formation and required more than private wealth to ensure its development. As such, the Canadian state was compelled to assume an active role in the investment field, particularly in the extension of railways, canals, roads, and other transportation equipment.[28]

Similarly, the 1885 Riel rebellion helped the Canadian Pacific Railway by demonstrating how essential the railway was

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[26]**Globe**, Toronto, May 13, 1870, cited in Brian Osborne and Donald Swainson, **The Sault Ste. Marie Canal: A Chapter in the History of Great Lakes Transport**, Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1986, pp. 35-36.

[27]**Constitutional**, St. Catherines, May 19, 1870, cited in Osborne and Swainson, **The Sault Ste. Marie Canal**, p. 36.

[28]Kenneth Buckley, "Capital Formation in Canada, 1896-1930" in Easterbrook, W.T., and Watkins, M.H., eds., **Approaches to Canadian Economic History**, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1984: p. 170. For more detail see Kenneth Buckley, **Capital Formation, 1896-1930**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955.

to the nation's existence. Construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway had begun immediately in 1880 and was completed in 1885, largely due to the vast government subsidies, such as $25 million and 25 million acres of land, that underwrote it.[29] The conflict motivated Parliament to pass the final loans which brought the east and west lines together. It became understood by both the Conservative government and the CPR Company that they were mutually interdependent.

These developments were not lost to Canada and Laurier. After 1896, Laurier's government continued to support the Canadian Pacific and justified it in 1899 by Canada's position beside such a fast-growing and enormously wealthy nation to the south. To "keep up the race with them," the Government had to assist those Canadians eager to develop the country's resources with their energy and capital. While one railway was presently enough, Laurier made it clear the Government eventually sought to develop the country as quickly as possible with Government aid according to the wishes of Parliament.[30] Moreover, during the South African War, Laurier wrote to a Liberal editor in Ontario contending that railway construction was an important contribution to Imperial defence:

> We have a great deal to do in this country to develop it to its legitimate expansion. Military expenditure is of such a character that you never know where it will end. I am not disposed to favour it. We have done more in favour of Imperial defence in building the Intercolonial and the Canadian Pacific, than if we maintained an army in the field in those last twenty years.[31]

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[29]Norrie and Owram, **A History of the Canadian Economy**, pp. 307-309.

[30]Debates, 3 August, 1899, pp. 9367-72.

[31]Laurier, quoted in Morton, **Canada and War: A Military and Political History**, Toronto: Butterworths, 1981, pp. 38-39.

Indeed, one contemporary observer noted that imperial interests had dramatically changed in the Pacific making Canadian railways a vital necessity. For him,

> The rise of Japan, the projected Panama Canal, with the situation of New Zealand and Australia, all point to this; and the trans-continental lines which now bring the Pacific shore and the food-supplies of the West within almost ten days of England are strategically of great value.[32]

As such, Liberal policy was founded on developing east-west, all-Canadian trade and on the need of transportation for national development. Simultaneously, there was a desire to provide competition for the CPR which would stimulate development and lower the costs of transportation. The economic prosperity of the west had created a serious economic need for a second transcontinental line.

In 1902, Clifford Sifton believed that the increase in Canadian economic production had far outstripped the capacity of transportation facilities. In his opinion, while he personally had settled the west with his immigration policies, he deplored the fact that the Government had done nothing substantial with regards to railways that would physically bind the country together. Sifton had a clear vision of the national role of transportation. Using a biological metaphor not dissimilar to the geopolitical thought of Ratzel, he told a Winnipeg audience that "Canada is a national entity. Canada is an organism, and you cannot develop a single part of an organism satisfactorily. Each and all parts must contribute to the vitality of the whole." The growth of the West and its connection to the rest of Canada via railways, would "send a flood of new blood from one end of this great country to the

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[32]Major-General C.W. Robinson, **Canada and Canadian Defence**, Toronto: Mussen, 1910, p. 134.

other, through every artery of commerce."[33] To this end, he prepared a memorandum for Laurier, in which he stated that American railway competition had to be countered by making the Canadian route the cheapest and easiest.[34] He urged Laurier to "take hold of the railway as a national project, put it under a strong commission, and push it through."[35]

Two railway companies were eager to get involved; the Grand Trunk (GT) and the Canadian Northern (CN).[36] Sifton agreed with the Minister of Railways and Canals, A.G. Blair, that the government should "require" the two companies to co-operate, the former building a line from Quebec to Port Arthur, and the latter from the Lakehead to the Pacific at Port Simpson. Laurier called the owners together and, having failed to achieve a compromise, agreed to charter both companies. Laurier probably gave way because, in light of the economic boom, he believed that Canada could use the additional line. "We cannot wait," Laurier claimed, "because at this moment there is a transformation going on in the conditions of our national life which it would be folly to

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[33]David Hall, **Clifford Sifton Volume I: The Young Napoleon, 1861-1900**, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981, p. 82.

[34]"Memorandum on the subject of a Commission to be appointed for the purpose of making a report on the general subject of Transportation, February 12, 1903, NAC Sifton Papers Vol. 250, pp. 70245-52.

[35]Sifton to Laurier, 21 February, 1904, Laurier Papers.

[36]For a detailed analysis see, T.D. Regehr, **The Canadian Northern Railway: Pioneer Road of the Northern Prairies, 1895-1918**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1976; the corporately sponsored, G.R. Stevens, **Canadian National Railways, Volume 1: Sixty Years of Tria and Error, 1836-1896**, and **Volume 2: Towards the Inevitable, 1896-1922**, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1960 and 1962.

ignore and a crime to overlook."[37]

The "National Transcontinental Railway" bill of 1903 aimed at aiding the Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern was very similar to Macdonald's earlier combination of public and private enterprise. Laurier maintained "that a railway to extend from the shores of the Atlantic ocean to the shores of the Pacific ocean, and to be, every inch of it, on Canadian soil, is a national as well as commercial necessity" and was "a corollary of our status as a nation." He likened the project to previous railway developments that he saw as essential to nation-building. For him, it was crucial in bringing

> ...all parts of our country together to act in unison and beat with the same heart. This new railway will be another link in that chain of union. It will not only open territory hitherto idle and unprofitable; it will not only force Canadian trade into Canadian channels; it will not only promote citizenship between old Canada and new Canada but it will secure us our commercial independence, and it will for ever make us free from the bondage of the bonding privilege.[38]

While Blair had resigned over the great expense of the scheme, Fielding, the minister of Finance, joined Sifton in defending it. Fielding expressed how an "all-Canadian" railroad "from ocean to ocean" would be primarily a commercial success, but it would also be strategically located so "that it will have an advantage from a military point of view" which "is always worthy of serious consideration." In addition, he argued that it would establish greater lines of communication that were important for drawing the people of the provinces closer

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[37]Debates, **Speech of Laurier on the Transcontinental Railway: A Link Uniting Provinces on Canadian Soil**, Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, July 30, 1903, pp. 1-23.

[38]Debates, **Speech of Laurier on the Transcontinental Railway...** pp. 22-23.

together and enabling them to understand each other better.[39] Sifton defended it on emotional nationalistic grounds. He argued that it would "prevent the life-blood being sucked" from Canadians "by the efforts which are being made to take the traffic to the south. It is true we cannot change the geography of our country, but we can fight against its disadvantages, and to some extent overcome them." In such prosperous times he believed that Canada must "push forward to accomplish the successful completion of this great national enterprise."[40]

The huge task of a national northern line leading to Canadian ports on Atlantic and Pacific expressed the nationalist spirit of the day. The railway policy of the Laurier government was the ultimate expression of Canadian national purpose, blending politics with the building of infrastructures. There was nothing like it in the past. Not even the American-built Union Pacific. In this instance, Canada had out-done its American instructors.[41] By 1910, Canada had 30,000 miles of railway and the greatest railway mileage to population ratio in the world.[42] The Canadian Northern, with the Canadian Pacific and Grand Trunk Pacific, made three transcontinental railways in Canada. Federal government expenditure on Transportation and Communication increased from $16-million or 38.1 percent of total Federal government expenditure in 1895 to $63-million or 46.3 percent

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[39]Debates, 26 May, 1904, pp. 13-15.

[40]Debates, 6 April, 1904, pp. 794-824.

[41]W.L. Morton, **The Kingdom of Canada**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963, p. 402.

[42]Robinson, **Canada and Canadian Defence**, p. 127.

of total government expenditure in 1911.[43] Estimates of the private rate of return for the CPR in its first decade of operations indicated that the project was unprofitable from a commercial point of view, and therefore, government subsidies were a necessary endeavour. An analysis of the subsidies, however, showed them to be clearly excessive, in that they seem to have been greater than needed to raise the private rate of return to the "normal" level. In this regard, the Canadian government often pursued policies that sought national political and economic unity at the expense of "commercial advantage."[44]

In addition to railways, the Canadian government was responsible for two other key communication developments which reflected the growth in infrastructural state functions. The first was the growth of the Canadian postal service and the second was the expansion of the telegraph.

In 1851 Britain relinquished control of the Canadian postal system to several provinces. The Post Office Act of 1867 affirmed this authority for the new Confederation and recognized the relationship between the provision of postal

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[43]Urquhart and Buckley, **Historical Statistics of Canada**, pp. 201-202. These are outlays of the Department of Transport, Department of Public Works, and the Post Office Department.

[44]W. George, "Rates of Return in Railway Investment and Implications for Government Subsidization of the Canadian Pacific Railroad: Some Preliminary Results" **Canadian Journal of Economics**, I, 1968, pp. 740-762. J. Dales, "Some Historical and Theoretical Comment on Canada's National Policies", **Queen's Quarterly**, LXXI, 1964, pp. 297-316. Both cited in G. Porter, "Recent Trends in Canadian Business and Economic History," in G. Porter, and R. Cuff, eds., **Enterprise and Development: Essays in Canadian Business and Economic History**, Toronto: Hakkert, 1973, pp. 3-19. By 1911, neither of the new railways was finished and both were in financial trouble. Prime Minister Borden eventually took them over as major components of the publicly owned and operated Canadian National Railways system. The most recent work on the CNR is Donald MacKay, **The People's Railway: A History of Canadian National**, Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1992.


CANADA
Prince Rupert
Vancouver
Edmonton
Calgary
Prince Albert
Saskatoon
The Pas
Mt. Dauphin
Regina
Winnipeg
Port Arthur
Fort William
Sudbury
Toronto
Hamilton
Windsor
Ottawa
Montreal
Quebec
Moncton
Saint John
Halifax
Yarmouth
Port aux Basques
St. John's
MAIN RAILWAY LINES
Canadian Pacific
Canadian Northern
Grand Trunk
Other lines
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services and the development of the economy. But during the latter part of the nineteenth century, immigration and the related demand for long-distance linkages, the need to integrate new areas of frontier settlement, and demands for improved communications in commerce, industry, and public services, influenced the development of a Canadian "mass" or "public" communications system.[45]

As such, between Confederation and the outbreak of World War One, Canada's national postal system came to be characterized by increases in the number of post offices, miles of mail routes, and volume of material carried; the expansion of the system into new areas of settlement; and, a greater diversity of services. Much of this expansion would occur during the Laurier years, motivated in particular by William Mulock, the Postmaster-General described as the "best administrator in the cabinet."[46] He was largely responsible for furthering the initiative that subordinated the profit motive of the postal service to goals of national development and fostering immigration and commerce.

Between 1869 and 1902 the Canadian Post Office experienced deficits, but these were deemed acceptable because post offices were seen as a "convenience for the people" and "not established for the purpose of providing revenue."[47] This essential Canadian philosophy furthered national development and contributed to the fostering of immigration and international commerce. Indeed, an efficient and cheap postal service with multiple daily deliveries became a vital

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[45]Brian Osborne and Robert Pike, "From 'Cornerstone of Canada's Social Structure' to Self-Sufficiency: The Transformation of the Canadian Postal Service, 1852-1987," **Canadian Journal of Communications**, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1988, p. 2.

[46]Joseph Schull, **Laurier: The First Canadian**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1965, p. 339.

[47]Debates, 4 February, 1884, p. 91.

feature in social and economic development in many countries during the second half of the nineteenth century. Canadian settlers in particular faced considerable isolation and the postal system was expected to afford the means of extending civilization. As William Smith contends, "In a new country, a postal system was expected to afford the means of extending civilization, and to advance with equal step with settlement, whereas in a long settled country, the postal system followed the train of civilization."[48] As such, the number of post offices in Canada climbed from 8,832 in 1895 to 13,324 in 1911, the pieces of first class mail rose from 131.6 million in 1895 to 553.5 million in 1911, and the gross postal revenues increased from $3,815 in 1895 to $12,213 in 1911.[49] Between 1900 and 1915, annual surpluses were reported.

Mulock wanted not only to lower internal postal charges, but also campaigned for lower letter rates to Britain. In order to convince the British government that cheaper postal rates were a necessity, the Canadian Postmaster General suggested that correspondence to possible British emigrants may influence their decision to come to Canada rather than the United States: "Surely it is in the interest of Great Britain that their surplus population would settle in Canada rather than under a foreign flag?"[50] While Mulock argued that cheaper rates to Britain would foster imperial unity, he also recognized that Canada's rural communities required a postal service that would provide them a link with the rest of the country and assist in the development of an integrated

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[48]William Smith, **The History of the Post Office in British North America**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920, p. 264.

[49]Urquhart and Buckley, **Historical Statistics**, pp. 555-558.

[50]Coulter, on behalf of Mulock to Walpole, RG3, Records of the Post Office, Vol. 2749/5, 31 December, 1987, NAC.

nationalizing state. The Canadian state lowered internal postal charges, and by 1897 rates to Britain were also lowered. The "Imperial Penny Postage" initiated in 1898 set a uniform preferential letter rate of two cents between all participating components of the Empire.[51]

Another facility which also reflected the reach of the state was the Post Office Savings Bank, which, developed in 1868, was designed to promote "thrift" among the people of "low and moderate incomes." It was hoped that this would allow people to save money so that in times of need they would not have to rely on the state for assistance. By 1911, there were 1151 Savings Banks across the Dominion with total deposits amounting to over $43 million.[52]

Closely linked to railways was the development of the electric telegraph. Certainly, by the end of the nineteenth century, the spread of the telegraph had already significantly altered communications in Canada. In Canada, like Europe and the United States, it had the potential of enhancing military power by allowing the coordination of large-scale military movements whose mobility had been increased by railways. The military importance of the telegraph, as it related to railroads, was neatly summarized by Sir Sandford Fleming in 1862. He felt that the telegraph contributed the "concentration of military power" which "could be brought to bear...on any point threatened with invasion."[53] This

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[51]Robert Pike, "Creating the 'All-Red Line": Canada's Role in Imperial Communications, Circa, 1890-1902," Paper presented at the **Annual Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States**, Seattle, November 15-19, 1995, pp. 8-18.

[52]Post Master General, **Annual Report**, 1911, Appendix E5.

[53]Sir Stanford Fleming, "Practical Observations on the Construction line of Railway from Canada to the Pacific Ocean," in **Overland Route to British Columbia**, Chewit: Toronto, 1862, p. 91.

certainly proved to be true during the Riel Rebellion. For one observer, former Saskatchewan premier James T. Anderson, "The Rebellion cost the country about seven millions of dollars, but without the telegraph, it would have cost many times that sum, while the loss of life would have been infinitely greater." Indeed, he insisted that the "two most important milestones in the history of the west were the coming of the Mounted Police and the building of the Government Telegraph line."[54] The telegraph accelerated instructions from the east, while the Mounted Police enforced compliance in the west.

The telegraph had a tremendous impact on the structure of information flows. It encouraged the centralization of control of news gathering and dissemination, while allowing the periphery closer contact with the centre.[55] Since the Yukon existed at the margins of Canadian territory, state support of the telegraph was favoured. Favouring the idea, Israel Tarte reminded Laurier "that in many countries of the world, the telegraph lines are, as much as possible, under the control of governments."[56] As such, between 1898 and 1904, the state expended $1.2 million to build, maintain, and operate 1,685 miles of telegraph in Northern British Columbia and the Yukon Territory. When the Dominion Telegraph System was completed in 1901, it brought the Yukon Territory into immediate and direct communication with Ottawa and under the direct administrative

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[54]J. Stuart Macdonald, **The Dominion Telegraph**, Canadian North-West Historical Society: Battleford, 1930, pp. 35 and 6. For more information see Desmond Morton and Reginald Roy, eds., **Telegrams of the Northwest Campaign**, Toronto: Champlain Society, 1972.

[55]Peter Goheen, "The Changing bias of inter-urban communications in nineteenth-century Canada, **Journal of Historical Geography**, 16, 2, 1990, pp. 177-196.

[56]Tarte to Laurier, 15 December 1899, Laurier Papers.

control of the state.[57]

The telegraph was too expensive to be used by the average citizen on a daily basis so it was primarily used for official and business correspondence. In particular, the telegraph encouraged the growth and spread of newspapers across Canada which allowed Canadians to read what was happening across the country. Businessmen in urban centres especially benefited from the increase in more detailed and more accurate financial news. Moreover, the Pacific Cable linked Canada to Australia in 1902, and subsequently allowed for an "all red imperial line" of interlinked telegraph stations situated on British dominions and territories around the globe.[58] Perhaps a subtle indication of the telegraph's contribution to national integration is apparent in a telegram sent to Laurier on July 1st, 1910, that read, "Canadian residents in Shanghai send greetings on Dominion Day."[59]

It is worth noting that the state demonstrated an interest in regulating the telephone industry. W.F. Maclean, a member of Parliament and strong nationalist was among the first to suggest that the government "nationalize" the telephone. He was supported by Muclock who could not see "why it is not as much the duty of the state to take charge of the telephone as it is to conduct the postal service." Mulock's chief adviser, Francis Dagger believed that the government had the right to intervene because of the complaints about "high rates" and the "lack of rural interconnection." In 1906, the Laurier government revised the Railway Act giving responsibility to the Board of Railway Commissioners for Canada to oversee specified activities falling within federal

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[57]M. Zaslow, **The Opening of the Canadian North**, Toronto: MacClelland and Stewart, 1971, p. 107.

[58]Pike, "Creating the 'All-Red Line...," p. 1.

[59]Craig to Laurier, Laurier to Craig, 30 June and 1 July, 1910, Laurier Papers.

jurisdiction.[60]

Thus, railways and communications generated patterns of interaction and allowed the state to penetrate its territory for effective administration.[61] Laurier's railway building has always been criticized since it cost much more than originally expected and would remain unprofitable.[62] Nevertheless, the railway would benefit provinces from British Columbia to New Scotia simply because it passed through them, bringing and carrying away the products of an industrializing nation-state. It would contribute to national pride by the magnitude of its vision and further unite the loosely combined assortment of provinces. It would allow Canadian transportation to become more independent of American railways farther south. It was one of Laurier's most impressive steps toward both physical and spiritual building of a nation. Similarly, postal services and the telegraph integrated all Canadians, but especially those in the West, by giving them the means to communicate with other Canadians across a wide expanse. Clearly, the development of railroads and communication networks were certainly crucial for economic and political unity, especially as they related to territorial consolidation. Both were responsible for the distribution of new Canadians who were transported to the empty spaces on the map, integrated into the nationalizing state, and encouraged to transform the frontier into "Canadian" territory using Canadian manufactured goods.

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[60]Robert E. Babe, **Telecommunications in Canada**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 92-94, 95, 96, and 114.

[61]Harold, A. Innis, **Empire and Communications**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.

[62]Glazebrook, **A History of Transportation in Canada Volume 2**, pp. 170-176.

iii. Immigration

Another essential component of the National Policy was the strategy of settling the west by attracting immigrants from Europe and the United States.[63] In 1879, immigrant arrivals totalled 40,492, but peaked in 1883 at 133,624. These numbers would fall to 16,835 in 1896 but Clifford Sifton, in charge of the Department of the Interior, introduced new aggressive measures to increase immigration in order to settle the west. Sifton's appointment symbolized a determined new nationalism that was determined to encourage "an active role for the state in shaping society and in coming to terms with the needs of a modern developing country."[64] Sifton was convinced that Canadian prosperity hinged upon Western settlement and the moving of products to the seaboard "through exclusively Canadian channels." This required a national policy of tariffs, immigration and transportation.[65] It should also be remembered that Sifton was to some degree anti-British and his experience with the Alaska Boundary dispute from 1897 to 1903 increased his suspicion of American expansionism. For him, a settled western Canada was essential to offset American advances, and to contribute to the

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[63]See J.B. Hedges, **Building the Canadian West**, New York, 1939; A.S. Morton and Chester Martin, **History of Prairie Settlement and Dominion Lands Policy**, Toronto, 1938; Harold Troper, **Only Farmers Need Apply: Official Canadian Government Encouragement of Immigration to the United States, 1896-1911**, Toronto: Griffin, 1972; Carl Berger and Ramsay Cook, eds., **The West and the Nation, Essays in Honour of W.L. Morton**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976; Gerald Friesen, **The Canadian Prairies: A History**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984; and, Valerie Knowles, **Strangers at our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-1990**, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992.

[64]Hall, **Clifford Sifton...**, p. 121. Hall also views Sifton as "the strongest apostle of nationalism in the cabinet." See p. 124.

[65]Sifton to Fitzpatrick, 18 December, 1902, Sifton Papers.

formation of Canada as a modern nation-state. Interestingly, the maintenance of Old World identities was initially encouraged because it was thought that they would discourage the spread of American influence.[66]

By 1896, the American frontier was closed and the Canadian prairies became "the last, best west," the last frontier of North American agriculture. Sifton exploited this fact by removing several obstacles hindering settlement, and by encouraging the government to take an active role in settling the west. First, administration of lands policy under the Dominion Lands Act of 1872 was simplified and centralized in Ottawa, thereby retaining and extending the state's control over freeing up the prairie settlement. Efforts were also made by federal government scientists and technicians to develop the irrigation potential of the drier areas, and to promote ranching and forestry operations.[67] Railways were pressured to patent land owed to them in order to free up the remainder for homesteading.

Second, Sifton created the North Atlantic Trading Company to spread information about Canada throughout Europe and arrange for immigrants to travel to new homes in the west. Expenditures on advertising and promotion rose significantly, and the effort to attract European settlers, in addition to those in Britain and the United States, was one way in which Sifton's immigration policy differed from that of the Macdonald government. Sifton believed that the best pioneers for the Canadian West were not urban industrial workers, but hardy farmers. In his words, "I think a stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat, born on the soil, whose forefathers have been farmers for generations, with a stout wife and a half-dozen

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[66]Clark, **The Developing Canadian Community**, pp. 195-196.

[67]For account of the ranching experience see, David Breen, **The Canadian Prairie West and the Ranching Frontier, 1874-1924**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.

children, is good quality."[68]

Recruitment activity was conducted "in the field" through agents stationed in Canada's overseas offices. The individuals who were assigned the task of carrying out the Department's mission abroad were the immigration agents. Their task was to stimulate immigration and encourage the selection of Canada as the place of settlement.[69] In addition to federal agents, there were also provincial agents and non-departmental agents employed by transportation companies, such as Canadian Pacific and Canadian National Railways, and privately-owned Canadian shipping companies, all of whom were engaged in attracting immigrants to Canada. They faced competition from other "settler nations", particularly the United States and Australia, who were circulating their own propaganda.

The agents "tramped the countryside" distributing posters, pamphlets, literature, and giving lectures that promoted the benefits of Canadian life. One agent candidly compared their role to that of missionaries, stating that "our agents would be equipped as missionaries of Canada, carrying propaganda to the smallest town and the remotest hamlet."[70] These propaganda techniques were the most advanced devices of their time. The Canadian government "welded the essence of the immigration policy to contemporary techniques of business-promotion, management, and advertising know-how - each tempered by a keen awareness of political reality."[71] Sifton readily acknowledged that his department was in essence

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[68]Quoted in Ramsay Cook, et al. **Canada: A Modern Study**, Toronto: Clark and Irwin, 1963. p. 158.

[69]G. Skilling, **Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy**, Toronto: Ryerson, 1945, p. 2.

[70]Department of Immigration and Colonization, **Annual Report**, 1922, p. 25.

[71]Troper, **Only Farmers Need Apply**, p. 7.

selling Canada like "any commodity," and that "as soon as you stop advertising and missionary work the movement is going to stop."[72]

Lectures using lantern slides were particularly effective as they were also seen as a form of mass entertainment that would draw large rural crowds of between 800 and 1,200 people.[73] These lectures dealt with farming in Canada, historic sites, national parks, and Canadian beauty spots. Special attention was given to dispel popular images of Canada as an untamed frontier wilderness filled with "ice" and "Indians," and portray it as a pastoral countryside suitable for "civilized" populations.[74]

The Canadian government placed advertisements in American farm journals and rural newspapers emphasizing the benefits of the Canadian west. Newspaper editors were offered free trips to the prairies with the hope that they would return home and provide free publicity for Canada. The Department of the Interior also issued numerous pamphlets, such as **The Last Best West, The Wondrous West** and **Five Thousand Facts about Canada**, which detailed the advantages of settling in Canada.[75]

While there is some debate over the immigration results,[76] state initiatives were, nevertheless, responsible

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[72]Knowles, **Strangers at our Gates** p. 61.

[73]RG76, Records of the Immigration Branch, Vol. 49, File 1945, Part 1, Letter from H. Hickman to J.G. Colmer, Esq., 22 March, 1892.

[74]Ellen Scheinberg, "Projecting images of the nation: The immigration program and its use of lantern slides," **The Archivist**, NAC, No. 111, 1996, pp. 13-24.

[75]R.C. Brown and Ramsay Cook, **Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974, p. 67.

[76]Historians have forwarded the "displacement thesis" to suggest that immigration results were disappointing. This is usually associated with the work of R.H. Coats, "Canada" in W.F. Wilcox, ed., **International Migration**, N.B.E.R.: New York,

for the overall increase in immigration and its ethnic composition. During these years, immigration increased from some 16,835 people in 1896, to an all-time high of 400,870 in 1913. Indeed, the Sifton-Laurier immigration policy introduced some 2.9 million immigrants to a Canada that had a total population of only 7.9 million in 1914.[77] In particular, the population of the west had increased. In 1895, only 66,000 people lived in the vast Northwest Territories between Manitoba and British Columbia. By 1905, the number leaped to 400,000 people, confirming the power of Sifton's immigration policy. Moreover, 60 million acres had been available through purchase and, therefore, provided funds to pay for railways, schools, swamp drainage, and military service.[78]

By 1897 the Territories had been given responsible government, but their growth in population inevitably brought demands for provincial status. In 1905 the Laurier administration created two new provinces, Saskatchewan and Alberta. The **Globe** referred to the occasion as "another great epoch in the history of Canada," and one of Laurier's "greatest efforts in his lifetime." Laurier noted how Canadian western expansionism differed from the United States in that, "Our institutions in our own northwest have been developed by gradual stages so as to insure at all times among these new communities law and order, and, restraints and safeguards of the highest civilization." In so doing, he explained how the admission of the new provinces "into the Canadian family of Provinces," consolidated the country, ended British Columbia's

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Volume 1, 1931, pp. 357-79; R.H. Coats and M.C. MacLean, **The American-Born in Canada**, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1943; and R.M. Lower, "The Case Against Immigration," **Queen's Quarterly**, Volume 37, 1930, pp. 557-74.

[77]Urquhart and Buckley, **Historical Statistics of Canada**, pp. 14 and 23.

[78]Friesen, **The Canadian Prairies**, p. 184.

isolation, and ensured that sovereignty over the new territories was firmly established.[79]

6.3 CONSOLIDATING THE YUKON AND THE ARCTIC

The first lasting contact in the Arctic was made by fur traders of the Hudson Bay Company, in the 1840s, pushing westwards from the Mackenzie River system. By the late nineteenth century, gold prospectors in growing numbers pushed northwards from the Cassiar and Omineca Mountains of northern British Columbia. Several centres of gold mining developed, often for only a brief period. The gold rush began in 1896 when gold was discovered on Bonanza Creek, a tributary of the Klondike. Thousands of gold seekers attempted to try their luck and many attempted an all-American route to avoid Canadian government regulations. Dawson, named after the Canadian government geologist George M. Dawson, grew into existence to serve the influx. In 1898 it grew into the largest Canadian city west of Winnipeg and was immediately separated from the Northwest Territories to form its own territory and the following year a territorial government was formed. Dawson was made the capital and a well integrated transportation system was established throughout the territory.

The Yukon Territory provides an impressive example of the Canadian's state ability to assimilate the people of the region and to guarantee the Canadian identity of the community. As mentioned previously, the government decided to dispatch the Yukon Field Force to assert Canadian sovereignty and support the North West Mounted Police already stationed there. In addition, the territory was granted local representation and the territorial council was given authority to levy new local taxes. Over the next few years, the council

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[79]Laurier's February 21 speech in the House of Commons, reprinted in the **Globe**, February, 22, 1905, p. 1 and 8.

acquired its own territorial civil service to coordinate schools, hospitals, and other social services. Their activities produced a distinctive socio-political pattern in the Yukon that was grounded on state centred philosophy that contrasted sharply with that of the United States. The Canadian state directed the development of the territory in the context of a national interest, rather than a local one. Indeed, the administration of the Yukon was in the hands of an appointed civil service who owed their positions not to local elections but to the federal government, and were, therefore, less influenced by local pressures.[80]

Similar measures were taken to secure the sovereignty of the Arctic. Despite the presence of whalers and explorers, the Arctic was essentially unclaimed territory at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1880 Canada took possession of the Arctic archipelago, primarily to prevent the Americans from staking a claim. As Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald warned, "when England had abandoned that country and Canada was so faint-hearted as not to take possession of it, the Americans would be only too glad of the opportunity, and would hoist the American flag and take possession of the territory."[81] It was not until 1895, however, that the unorganized territories were divided into the districts of Ungava, Yukon, Mackenzie, and Franklin, the latter including the Arctic islands. This move demonstrated Canada's increasing interest in securing its sovereignty in the Arctic.

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[80]See Clark, **The Developing Canadian Community**, Chapter Five; and Morris Zaslow, **The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870-1914**, MacClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1971, Chapter Six.

[81]Quoted in D., Francis, **Discovery of the North: The Exploration of Canada's Arctic**, Hurtig Publishers: Edmonton, 1986, p. 196. For an earlier account of Canada's Northern expansion see, Morris Zaslow, **The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870-1914**, MacClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1971, Chapter Eleven.

This interest was furthered when the Canadian west proved itself to be a fertile wheat-producing region. The Hudson Bay route was viewed as a possible transportation link between the interior and the North Atlantic shipping lanes. In the summer of 1897, the Scottish whaleship *Diana* was leased by the Canadian government to investigate ice and weather conditions in Hudson Strait. The expedition surveyed hundreds of kilometres of coastline on both sides of the passage, confirmed that the open season extended well into October and, most importantly in terms of sovereignty, landed on Baffin Island at a whaling station, hoisted the Union Jack, and declared the "Baffin's Land with all the territories, islands, and dependencies adjacent to it," part of Canada. This was the first time any portion of the Arctic was claimed by an official representative of the federal government.[82]

The outcome of the Alaska Boundary Dispute and the presence of American whalers made Canadian leaders suspicious of American intentions in the Arctic. In addition to depleting the whale stocks, custom duties were not being collected on the significant trading between natives and whalers, much to the disadvantage of the Hudson's Bay Company.[83] But most importantly, Canadian statesmen feared that the American government might use the presence of their whalers as an excuse to contest Canadian sovereignty. Sifton, for instance, believed that the American presence made it "necessary for this Government to take immediate steps to establish such posts as may be necessary for the assertion of its authority, over the territory."[84] In particular, Sifton was concerned with American whalers on Herschell Island at the mouth of the

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[82]Francis, **Discovery of the North**, p. 197.

[83]Bell to Sifton, RG45, Records of the Geological Survey, Vol. 107, pp. 395-96.

[84]Quoted in Hall, **Clifford Sifton Vol. I**, p. 125.

Mackenzie whose presence threatened another boundary dispute, "unless decisive action" was taken immediately.[85]

On May 13, 1903, W.F. Maclean, a Conservative M.P., urged the government to assert its supremacy over Hudson Bay and rename it the "Canadian Sea."[86] Similarly, Senator W.C. Edwards, in a letter to Prime Minister Laurier, warned that,

> They [the United States] are south of us for the entire width of the country, they block our natural and best possible outlet to the Atlantic; they skirt us for hundreds of miles on the Pacific and control the entrance to a vast portion of our territory, and the next move if we do not look sharply after our interests, will be to surround us on the North.[87]

Laurier informed Edwards that moves towards protecting Canadian sovereignty had been made in the form of establishing North West Mounted Police posts and he further proposed that Canada "should send a cruiser to patrol the waters and plant our flag at every point."[88] Laurier defended the plan to contribute $100,000 to finance an Arctic expedition to ensure Canadian sovereignty:

> There is not only the material prosperity of a nation to be considered; there is also the moral elevation, the sentiment, the enthusiasm - all these go to make up a nation, and no nation can exist unless it proves itself to possess these qualities...if a son of Canada were to plant the flag of his country at the north pole, if he were to achieve what so many brave men have struggled in vain to achieve, there is not a Canadian heart that would not beat with pride at the thought of it. Canada would be only too bold to purchase at a

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[85]Sifton to Smart, March 31, 1903, Sifton Papers.

[86]Zalsow, **The Opening of the Canadian North**, p. 262.

[87]Edwards to Laurier, Oct. 28, 1903, Laurier Papers.

[88]Laurier to Edwards, Oct. 29, 1903, Laurier Papers.

small cost such a glory.[89]

For Minto, Laurier was "generally anxious" about,

> ...the evident wish of the U.S to acquire further territory on the North American continent. He referred to the expeditions recently sent by Canada to the mouth of the Mackenzie River and to Hudson Bay, and expressed his apprehension lest the Americans should establish posts on what is undoubtedly Canadian territory in the far North, but on which it was quite possible American posts might exist for some years without anybody being acquainted with their existence, and that subsequently claims of possession might be put forward for such territory by the U.S. It is with the view of meeting such action that the above expeditions have been despatched, and it is intended in future to exact customs duties on any foreigners trading with the natives in these northern seas. He expects that notwithstanding Canada's action will be represented as a grievance by American whalers and traders in Washington....[90]

Rather than annoying the Americans with direct assertion, Laurier positioned a two-man detachment of North-West Mounted Police on Herschel Island in 1903, to maintain law and order, to collect customs fees on trade goods imported from the United States, and to control the liquor trade with the Inuit.[91]

In addition, a geological expedition was sent out on the sailing vessel *Neptune* to land a six-man police detachment on the west coast of Hudson Bay. The orders given to the Mounted Police granted them the authority to patrol, explore, and establish "the authority of the Government of Canada." Moreover, they were specifically instructed to "communicate as

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[89]Debates, 1 May, 1902, pp. 3978-79.

[90]Minto's minutes of conversation with Laurier, December 3, 1903, Minto Papers, MG27, II, B I, Volume 2, C3113, pp. 55-59, NAC.

[91]Francis, **Discovery of the North**, p. 200.

widely as possible the fact that you are there as the representative of the Canadian government to administer and enforce Canadian laws, and that a patrol vessel will visit the districts annually or more frequently."[92] After spending the winter frozen in the ice, the *Neptune* left Hudson Bay in the summer of 1904.[93] It cruised north up Davis Strait to the Baffin Bay whaling grounds. The expedition landed on Ellesmere and North Somerset islands, planted a flag and left behind a proclamation claiming the area for Canada.[94] This served notice to the Americans that Canada was not willing to surrender the Arctic territory by default. These actions met the suggestions of W.F. King, chief astronomer, who argued that "Canada's title to some of the northern islands [was] imperfect" and warned the government about the threat posed by "nationals" of other lands. "Though these are private adventurers, unauthorized by their government, the fact of their presence indicates the advisability of action by the Government of Canada towards asserting unequivocally their jurisdictions in these regions."[95] Laurier echoed these concerns in the House of Commons when he said, "At the present time there are whalers and fishermen of different nations cruising those waters and unless we take active steps to assert...that these lands belong to Canada, we may perhaps

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[92]RCMP Papers, RG18 A1, Vol. 293, file 236-05, Part I, NAC.

[93]The voyage is detailed in A.P. Low, **Cruise of the 'Neptune', 1903-04**, Government Printing Bureau: Ottawa, 1906.

[94]Note how similar this ceremonial flag planting and proclamation of sovereignty over bewildered indigenous populations is to what other powers were doing during the "new imperialism." See L., James, **The Rise and Fall of the British Empire**, St. New York: Martin's Press, 1996; and T., Pakenham, T., **The Scramble for Africa: The White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876-1912**, New York: Random House, 1991.

[95]Zaslow, **The Opening of the Canadian North**, p. 264.

find ourselves later on in the face of serious complications."[96] To this end, Laurier announced that another vessel was being dispatched to the area.

Between 1904 and 1911, the vessel *Arctic* made four voyages north during which duties and licence fees from foreign vessels were collected, unmarked coastlines were charted, activities of traders and fishermen were monitored and unclaimed islands were annexed to Canada, such as Banks and Victoria islands in 1909. Bernier, Captain of the *Arctic*, stated to the Empire Club that it was the duty of Canadians "to make Canada now while we can" and "put our flag on the farthest island." He described his taking possession of Bank Land when he informed the Inuit "that they had become Canadians and, therefore, were subject to our laws." He displayed a picture of Laurier and told them that Laurier "holds in his hand...everything that belongs to Canada; whatever he says goes; if his Government says we are going to do a thing it is done, because he has the power."[97] On Confederation Day, July 1st, 1909, at Winter Harbour, a plaque was unveiled overlooking the harbour, declaring that every island in the archipelago all the way to the North Pole belonged to Canada. Pleased with the effect of the symbolic flag-waving, the government cancelled the Arctic patrols, preferring instead to support scientific and anthropological projects[98]

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[96]Debates, July 29, 1904, p. 7969.

[97]Captain J.E. Bernier, "The Arctic Regions of Canada," in J. Castell Hopkins, **Empire Club Speechs**, Worwick Rutter, 1910, pp. 67-76. The voyages are also described in J.E. Bernier, **Master Mariner and Arctic Explorer**, Ottawa: Le Droit, 1939.

[98]Francis, **Discovery of the North**, pp. 202-204.

6.4 ADMINISTRATING THE TERRITORY

In addition to establishing sovereignty over its territory, the Canadian state took on a variety of more differentiated functions in order to effectively penetrate the territories with law and administration. Resources, labour, and education, all took on new dimensions and required new state initiatives for their continued development. Between 1895 and 1911 the total number of federal government officials almost doubled, increasing from 4,189 to 8,330. In the same period, total government expenditures more than tripled, increasing from $42-million to $136-million.[99] As a percentage of the gross national product this amounts to an increase from roughly 25 percent to 33 percent.

As the Canadian West and Arctic were brought under the control of the state, there was a parallel move to establish an inventory of all the resources available within this territorially demarcated area. Similarly, with the establishment of a modern economy, stimulated by the geopolitically driven National Policy, there was an increase in organized labour activity. While the state now had a reorganized militia to subdue labour unrest, there was a move to find more peaceful ways to adjudicate such disputes. Finally, with the arrival of so many new Canadians from a myriad of cultures, the state was faced with growing concerns of how these people would be best "Canadianized." Education, controlled at the provincial level, became a viable solution. Each of these will be examined in more detail.

i. Resources

Certainly, the Canadian-American negotiations, which resulted in the International Joint Commission, demonstrated

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[99]Urquhart, M., and K., Buckley, eds., **Historical Statistics of Canada**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1965, pp. 621-623 and 202.

the importance states' placed on controlling their natural resources. The Canadian state followed the pattern of most late nineteenth century states in the tightening of control over its natural resources. Indeed, it has been argued that science helped imperialism reshape non-European environments in the image of Europe, and by so doing, became an important component in the grid of military, political, economic, and cultural domination.[100] The marshalling of empirical information helped rationalize a state's administration of distant territories. Moreover, the state's interest in resource management with its obvious contribution to economic power, corresponds with its overall accumulation of information and is typical of its surveillance techniques or infrastructural state functions.[101] For Canada, this meant increased funding of the Geological Survey, the creation of new state institutions, such as the formation of a Department of Mines, and state involvement in the promotion of conservation programmes.

a. The Geological Survey and the Department of Mines

As the traditional school of political economists argued, much of Canada's development into a modern state has revolved around the development of its natural resources. In the nineteenth century, the discovery of these reources relied heavily on scientific exploration. The early role of science in the development of Canada has been examined by Susan Zeller. She has argued that creating a "new nationality," based upon common interests rather than common culture, out of several colonial peoples dispersed over a vast territory,

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[100]Robert Stafford, "Geological surveys, mineral discoveries, and British Expansionism, 1835-1871," **The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History**, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1984, p. 23.

[101]See Giddens, **Nation-State and Violence**, pp. 14-15; and Mann, **Sources of Social Power Volume 2**, pp. 380, 467-469.

began to appear feasible only in the light of the scientific progress of the age. Scientific identification, inventory, and mapmaking gave form to the idea of a transcontinental national existence and gave Canadians a sense of direction, stability, and certainty for the future.[102] No other state institution can claim a better record in this area than the Geological Survey. Since its founding in 1842, the Geological Survey of Canada, as the first scientific arm of the state, has played a key role in the development of Canada.

In its early years, the Survey began the systematic mapping of a vast country and was the "first arm of the federal government to make an appearance in its unsettled territories." In many cases these would be the first white men to been seen by the indigenous inhabitants. Their work was invaluable in providing the state with topographical information that aided the state in exercising its sovereignty, in drawing attention to natural resources and in forming policies that would contribute to their management. The Geological Survey of Canada constantly contributed to the nation building process. By searching for workable deposits of coal and other industrial and agricultural minerals, they hoped to make Canada a viable economic entity. This inventory of information dictated the shape and extent which such a viable Canadian entity would have to take.[103] In addition, through its reports, articles, lectures, museum exhibits, and presence at international conferences, it played an important role in making Canada better known to the world. Overall, the Geological Survey was fundamental in assisting a small colony

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[102]Susan Zeller, **Inventing Canada: Early Victorian Science and the Idea of a Transcontinental Nation**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987, pp. 8-9.

[103]Zeller, **Inventing Canada...**, p. 110.

to develop into a nationalizing state.[104]

The role of the Geological Survey gained particular significance during the Laurier Years. It provided assistance in three crucial areas: providing information on natural resources, especially those related to the mining industry, mapping the territory, and in preserving and showcasing Canada's natural history to its citizens and the rest of the world.

In his report of 1896, Director G.W. Dawson explained how the Survey "is the only organization under the Dominion Government occupied with anything of the character of a general mapping of the country as a whole." His successor, Robert Bell described the Survey as "a most useful institution for the general progress of the country" as they not only explored the unsettled areas but mapped out "the principal part of what is known as the topography of Canada."[105] Bell argued that much of the earlier topographical work completed at the end of the nineteenth century had "enabled our public men to judge of the feasibility of the undertaking" of the Grand Trunk Pacific railway in 1902.[106]

Mapping the territory had become an urgent need, especially since the Alaskan Boundary Dispute. Canada had then been at a disadvantage because of its inadequate information concerning the accurate location of boundaries and settlements. It was at this time that there was an increase in detailed mapping of previously explored areas and in the number of reconnaissance expeditions, especially in the Arctic. Under Bell's guidance, there was a increase from 13 to

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[104]Morris Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks: The Story of the Geological Survey of Canada, 1842-1972**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1975, pp. 3-4.

[105]cited in Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, pp. 151-152.

[106]Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, p. 155.

31 parties in 1901.[107] By 1912, there were 44 field operations, ranging from the western boundary of the Yukon Territory to Lunenburg County Nova Scotia, and representing every geological region of Canada. They included broad reconnaissances, areal surveys, detailed mapping, and investigations of economic minerals.[108] As discussed previously, the Arctic explorations were more than just scientific explorations. These patrols served to establish permanent police posts for law enforcement and customs collection and reaffirmed Canada's presence and sovereignty in the last frontier, the islands of Canada's Arctic.

These explorations and detailed mappings served another important purpose. In his reports of 1904 and 1905, Bell argued that the discovery of mineral deposits by the Survey had contributed to the increase in mining at the turn of the century.[109] The addition of numerous railways meant that the resources discovered by the Survey became accessible to development for the first time. The rise of a powerful mining industry brought demands for new kinds of state assistance and leadership. In 1902, a leading member of the Canadian Mining Institute argued that the government had a role in supporting the mining industry and suggested something similar to the American equivalent. In 1906 another member criticized the Survey with regards to its economic role for not keeping pace "with the growing requirements of the mining industry." He further suggested that the government become involved "in the development of the mineral resources of our country." As such, by 1907 the Survey became a department of government and became a branch in the newly-established Department of

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[107]Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, p. 209.

[108]Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, p. 271.

[109]Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, p. 239.

Mines.[110]

For Laurier and Sifton, a primary goal of the new Department was to be "the collection and publication of data regarding the economic minerals of the country, and of the processes and activities connected with their utilization."[111] A significant area of concern for the Survey section of the Department of Mines was with Canada's water resources. During the middle of the Boundary Waters negotiations, Brock argued that "information regarding the distribution and amount of water-power [was] urgently needed." He further believed that water supply in the North-West was crucial for the settlement of the territory and argued for more "systematic work in this field."[112]

Not surprisingly, the Laurier government steadily increased the amounts allotted to the Department of Mines and the Geological Survey. In less than a decade, the money made available to the Survey was more than tripled so that in 1910, the Director was able to report that his department "is being liberally provided with funds for its work." This was perhaps aided by the fact that Brock's own political stance was similar to that of the Laurier government, especially his belief that the advancement of Canada's natural resources would aid in its development as a prosperous nation-state.[113]

The other function of the department was "to maintain a Museum of Geology and Natural History for the purpose of affording a complete and exact knowledge of the geology, mineralogy, and mining resources of Canada." In addition, it was to "collect, classify, and arrange for exhibition in the Victoria Memorial Museum such specimens as are necessary to

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[110]Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, pp. 241-256.

[111]Debates, 12 October, 1903, pp. 13762-13763.

[112]Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, p. 273.

[113]Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, pp. 264-269.

afford a complete and exact knowledge of the geology, mineralogy, palaeontology, ethnology, and fauna and flora of Canada."[114] This preservation of "scientific knowledge of the early history of Canada" was seen as a national concern, especially the collection of records concerning the social, cultural, and political institutions and customs of "the aboriginal peoples of the country."[115] By 1910 Director Brock was able to report that as "a complete natural history museum" its collections surpassed all others making it a "great Canadian Museum" and he foresaw its eventual enlargement into "a world [class] museum."[116]

b. Conservation

The realization that resources were not boundless had by the early 1900s also led to a broad movement in Canada for natural resources conservation. The Canadian state would play a leading role in this movement.[117] There is little evidence to suggest that conservation programs were initiated by prime ministers or cabinet ministers. Rather, civil servants, members and heads of those departments most concerned with conservation matters, greatly influenced the evolution of

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[114]The Mines Act, 1907, Section 8, 7(a).

[115]Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1909, cited in Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, p. 279.

[116]Zaslow, **Reading the Rocks**, p. 268. How this would contribute to a Canadian national identity is discussed in the next chapter.

[117]For a review of the state's initiatives in resource conservation, particularly during Luarier's term in office. see Girard, M., **L'écologisme retrouvé: Essor et déclin de la Commission de la conservation du Canada**, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1994. For an analysis of the origins of the conservation movement, see Janet Foster, **Working for Wildlife: The Beginnings of Preservation in Canada**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978.

state responsibility and state policy.[118] There was much disagreement at the higher levels of government as to which direction state policy should take.

For instance, seeking to avoid direct financial expenditures on resource protection that could antagonize provincial jurisdictions, Laurier supported initiatives that would serve to educate Canadians and encourage sensitive environmental policy.[119] Sifton, on the other hand, believed it was crucial for the federal government to intervene and take over the management of the country's forest, mineral, and fish resources as they were vital to its continued economic survival.[120] In the end, the federal government would establish several commissions and committees which were responsible for developing an inventory of resources and recommending policies for their preservation. This included Canada's involvement in the Inland Fisheries Treaty (1908) and the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention (1911) discussed previously.

In addition, the Canadian state was demonstrating a concern for Canada's forests. The **Report on the Forest Wealth of Canada** (1895) found that the country's forest reserves were not as great as originally thought, and the **Canadian Forestry Journal** in its first issue observed that unrestricted progress had eliminated two thirds of Canada's forests. Businessmen, bankers, and professional groups, campaigned for an end to waste and demanded more efficient use, or "wise-use" of the public lands.[121]

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[118]Foster, **Working for Wildlife**, p. 13.

[119]Laurier to W.J. Taylor, June 3, 1909, Laurier Papers.

[120]Girard, **L'écologisme retrouvé**, p. 29.

[121]H.V. Nelles, **The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines, and Hydro-electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941**, Macmillan: Toronto, 1974, pp. 184-185.

The first state initiative was the Canadian Forestry Convention called by Laurier and convened in Ottawa in 1906. Laurier was going beyond Macdonald's National Policy by taking steps to insure that developing Canada's resources did not mean exploiting them. The Forestry Convention was the first time in North America that a national conference, called by a head of government, had been held to discuss the conservation and wise use of a natural resource. In his opening address, Laurier spoke of the need to create a "large forest domain" that "should belong to the state" which would "repurchase these lands and bring them back to the public domain." Laurier anticipated sustainable development when he lamented that deforestation was "not fair to us who are living, and still less is it fair to the generations to come after us."[122] Following the conference, the state implemented several conservation initiatives. In 1906, it created a Forestry Division within the Department of the Interior and passed the Northwest Game Act which would protect forest reserves through the creation of national parks, such as Jasper National Park (1907) and Buffalo National Park (1908). In 1895, wood products had been a valuable export that accounted for $28,854, but they had almost doubled to $56,295 by 1911.[123]

After the 1908 Governor's Conservation Conference, Canadian Senator William Cameron Edwards, impressed with American initiatives that Laurier had asked him to assess, recommended that the Canadian government immediately take steps to provide for the inventory of such key resources as forests, minerals, coal, and fish.[124] President Theodore

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[122]Laurier, Wilfrid, "The Forests of Canada" **The National Geographic Magazine**, XVII, No. 8, 1906, pp. 504-509.

[123]Urquhart and Buckley, eds., **Historical Statistics of Canada**, p. 337.

[124]W.C. Edwards to Laurier, 23 January, 1909, Laurier Papers.

Roosevelt proposed a North American conference on conservation, arguing that "It is evident that natural resources are not limited by the boundary lines which separate nations, and that the need for conserving them upon this continent is as wide as the area which they exist."[125] Roosevelt invited the governments of Canada, Newfoundland, and Mexico to an international conference in Washington were they would consider conservation of the natural resources of North America without regard to national boundaries. Former Minister of the Interior, Sir Clifford Sifton and Sydney Fisher, Minister of Agriculture, represented Canada. The delegates adopted a mandate that foreshadowed today's pleas for "sustainable development," although their concern can be interpreted as the state increasing its control over the resources of its territory, including its inhabitants. Public Health was deemed a priority because, "we recognize that to accomplish...national efficiency in the highest possible degree...the maintenance and improvement of public health is a first essential."[126] Moreover, rather than let businesses have free reign over the resources, the governments involved suggested that resources "be regarded as public utilities, that their ownership entails specific duties to the public and that...effective measures should be adopted to guard against monopoly."[127]

Canada readily adopted conservationism with both Laurier

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[125]Roosevelt to Grey, Dec. 24, 1908, Records of the Office of the Governor General, Record Group 7, G21, Vol. 224, File 342.

[126]North American Conservation Conference, "Declaration of Principles," Canada, **Sessional Paper No. 90**, 8-9 Edw. VII (1909), fourth paragraph.

[127]Clifford Sifton, "Inaugural Address," in Canada, Commission of Conservation, **Report of the First Annual Meeting. Held at Ottawa, January 18th to 21st**, Ottawa, 1910, p. 8.

and Robert Borden, leader of the Opposition, fully supporting the cause. Borden suggested that conservation and development were consistent with the reasonable use and management of Canada's resources. Accordingly, in 1909 Parliament established a Commission for the Conservation of Natural Resources which would investigate the resource question. The Act proclaimed that the Commission would:

> ...take into consideration all questions which may be brought to its notice relating to the conservation and better utilization of the natural resources of Canada, to make such inventories, collect and disseminate such information, conduct such investigations, inside and outside of Canada and frame such recommendations as seem conducive to the accomplishment of that end.[128]

Therefore, the government had encouraged a commission that would investigate resource concerns but could only make recommendations that were not binding on the government.

This would require information gathering on the extent of Canada's resources in addition to how they were being used. This necessitated seven working committees dealing with Lands, Forests, Waters, Minerals, Fish and Wildlife, Public Health, and Publicity. This was deemed necessary by Dr. James Robertson, head of the Lands committee, who regarded agricultural resources as the chief asset of the people of the Dominion. "The race that can utilize its resources for food becomes a great people."[129] Clearly, this belief lay behind the state's creation of institutions necessary to catalogue and administer the resources within its territory.

ii. Labour

The Canadian state supported and nationalized railways in

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[128]Canada, 8-9 Edw. VII c. 27, "An Act to Establish a Commission for the Conservation of natural Resources," s. 10.

[129]Commission, 1910, p. 42.

order to promote economic and political unity. It inevitably sped up the modernization of the Canadian economy which subsequently led to a growth in labour whose demands the state could not ignore. The economic growth during the "Laurier boom" exacerbated labour conflict in industrial Canada. Indeed, the years of rapid economic growth and social change that ushered in the new century, were years of unprecedented tensions in industrial relations and "a classic period of widespread unrest and violence."[130]

The new industrial growth within a predominantly agrarian economy had profound effects. Industrialism created tensions between the requirements of those sectors of the society and its economy which were industrialized, and those still rooted in preindustrial conditions. New social classes emerged with divergent interests and consequent conflicts and tensions. Moreover, the uneven development of industrialism within Canada, and Canada's continuing location within an international imperialist system, generated multiple regional interests and tensions ranging from conflicts between city and countryside to the dominance of central geographic regions over dependent peripheral ones within the nation state, and to problems of dependency for Canada as a whole when confronted with its position in the international economy.[131]

For most of the nineteenth century, the Canadian trade-

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[130]Stuart Jamieson, **Times of Trouble: labour unrest and industrial conflict in Canada, 1900-66,** Study No, 22, Task Force on Labour Relations: Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968, Chapter 2. For more information, see Martin Robin, **Radical Politics and Canadian Labour, 1880-1930,** Kingston: Queen's University Press, 1968; Eugene Forsey, **The Canadian Labour Movement 1812-1902,** Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, Booklet No. 27, 1974; Irving Abella, **The Canadian Labour Movement 1902-1960,** Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, Booklet No. 28, 1975; and Paul Craven, **An Impartial Umpire: Industrial Relations and the Canadian State, 1900-1911,** Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.

[131]Craven, **An Impartial Umpire,** p. 161.

union movement had been limited by an economic base that relied on primary production and small related manufacturing. While trade unions appeared in Britain and the United States before 1850, inadequate communications networks, the small size of manufacturing and service firms located primarily in the domestic market, and the small and scattered population, limited their spread and acceptance throughout Canada.[132]

However, in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, attitudes began to change with the experience of modern industrialization and its better communications, urbanization, division of labour, the rise of manufacturing and tertiary sectors, foreign influences, and market concentrations of power. The number of non-agricultural workers increased while agricultural workers decreased. The most seriously affected by the growth of big business was the urban working class which turned increasingly to trade unions to protect their interests.

By the end of the century, Canadian workers continued to be organized by two major labour associations. The first was the group of international unions associated with Samuel Gompers' American Federation of Labour (AF of L). The other was the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLC), founded in 1886, which sought to become the national labour centre for Canadian unions. Of approximately 20,000 unionists in Canada in 1900, only about 8,000 were in Canadian unions, the rest being AF of L affiliates. Plagued by a shortage of funds and organizational resources, the TLC did not become a Canadian Federation of Labour, but rather a kind of state federation within the AF of L.[133]

Despite the AF of L's growing dominance, it could not entice all workers. Canadians, sympathetic with British

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[132]Marr and Patterson, **Canada: An Economic History**, p. 205.

[133]Brown, and Cook, **Canada, 1896-1921**, pp. 109-110.

workers seeking the formation of a labour-socialist political movement, had no unified base because such independent political action was opposed by the AF of L. In Quebec, unionists were fearful of American internationalists who might not condone association with the Roman Catholic Church, while in the West, unionists were unimpressed with the business unionism of the internationals. After the 1902 Berlin Convention of the TLC, twenty three organizations, mostly from Quebec, were driven out of the TLC and formed their own Canadian Labour Federation. Therefore, the 1902 decision simultaneously fractured east-west ties of the labour movement and fostered the establishment of an association for Canadian workers.[134] Unionized labour attracted 100,000 members by 1914, but it lacked unity. Therefore, provincial and federal governments faced less opposition from a working class which spoke with a divided voice.

In addition, government actions and policy either diverted labour unrest or actively subverted it. Curtailing industrial unrest was an important aspect of the state's ability to maintain order within its borders. This was particularly true of labour unrest that *threatened* Canada's railway development and related coal industry which were *essential* to Canada's western expansion. Union organizers had a difficult time when faced with employers who often relied on government assistance to put down labour unrest. From 1901 to 1913 there were 14 large strikes across Canada in which riots and mob violence broke out, causing property damage, personal injury, and in two cases deaths. Eleven of these strikes led to the involvement of militia or regular forces.[135]

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[134]Brown and Cook, **Canada, 1896-1921**, p. 114.

[135]Jamieson, **Times of Trouble**, pp. 67-81. Also see Desmond Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867-1914," **The Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. LI, No. 4, 1970, especially pp. 420-423.

Not only was the militia called out on several occasions, but in 1911, Canada's newly acquired secondhand cruiser, The *Rainbow*, helped to suppress a violent strike of street labourers in Prince Rupert.[136] Businessmen obviously supported the government's actions. The President of the Bank of Montreal wrote to Laurier congratulating him on his "prompt action in sending troops to Cape Breton. It is undoubtedly saving riot, bloodshed and much destruction of property, and as we have large interests in that section of the country, we have reason to be thankful."[137]

But government actions were not concerned with policing alone. The creation of a tolerant legal environment was an important factor permitting trade and labour union growth. Rather than constrain or limit union organization, government policy in Canada tended to nurture the growth of trade unions. This was established within the federal system, which gave provincial governments the power to determine the legal terms for most labour organization and collective bargaining. Compared with other countries, the Canadian state responded rapidly to labour demands to create the necessary legal framework.[138] Indeed, following British precedent, in 1872, the Canadian federal government had passed the Trade Unions Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act which declared trade unions legal entities, exempt from criminal conspiracy and strike damages.[139] Provinces also passed legislation designed

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[136]Brown and Cook, **Canada, 1896-1921**, p. 108.

[137]E.S. Clouston to Laurier, 15 July, 1909, Laurier Papers. For a description of the attitudes of businessmen towards unions, see Michael Bliss, **A Living Profit: Studies in the Social History of Canadian Businessmen, 1883-1911**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974.

[138]Marr and Patterson, **Canada: An Economic History**, p. 205.

[139]Marr and Patterson, **Canada: An Economic History**, p. 211.

to speed the settlement of disputes. This established the legal basis of trade unionism and collective bargaining which was important to the growth of Canadian trade unions. Conscious of the industrial development and its associated changes, particularly the growing strength of the trade-union movement, the Liberals established a Department of Labour in 1900. Governor General Grey was so impressed with "the success of Canadian legislation in averting Industrial War" that he suggested that at the 1911 conference, those attending should discuss how these same principles could "be adopted with the object of stopping International War."[140]

William Lyon Mackenzie King dominated the formative period of federal labour policy in the Dominion. He was the principal architect of the new labour policy, its chief theorist and propagandist, and its most prominent executive. He was responsible for developing the new Department of Labour, which was at first supervised by the Post-Master General. From the beginning, he had designs for an independent professional department of government with its own minister.[141]

King was the driving force behind the making of the

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[140]Grey to Crewe, 3 March, 1910, Grey Papers.

[141]Craven, **An Impartial Umpire**, p. 11. For more information on King's role see H.C. Ferns and B. Ostry, **The Age of Mackenzie King: The Rise of a Leader**, Heinemann: London, 1975. King was motivated to pursue politics by Laurier. In 1895 King heard Laurier address a meeting at Massey Hall and noted that "I felt more than inspired with the speaking and feel that my ambition may carry me into political life." Cited in Craven, **An Impartial Umpire**, pp. 60-61. After studying extensively at Toronto, Chicago and Harvard, he ended his formal studies in 1900 to take a position as a civil servant in the Canadian government. King was the only prime minister to ever hold a Ph.D. He was twice offered professorships at Harvard. King recalled how Laurier advised him "not to think of it, that a man with the blood I had in my veins, my talents, etc. had a great future in this country, that I would be lost as a professor, even if I did write books." Cited in Bliss, **Right Honourable Men**, pp. 130-131.

Labour Department. For King, a man driven by a sense of "gospel duty," the Department of Labour had the potential to become an important institution for industrial peace. He believed that industrial conflict had its root in misunderstanding, failures in communications, irrational fears, and the desire of one or another party for personal aggrandizement at the expense of the community. The state's role was directed to subordinating social tension to national unity by clearing up misunderstandings, assist communication, and dispel fear, but occasionally it might have to meet force with force. The more legitimate forms of compulsion, however, were those that would impose the groundwork for the exercise of open communication and reason. Only then would conflict be replaced by equilibrium and secure national unity and prosperity.[142]

Craven contends that King's dual notion of community was the centre-piece of his strategy. The community interest was the interest in capitalist accumulation which meant that the boundaries of the state's role were set by the perceived imperatives of business. King accepted that in any dispute settlement business would be constrained by "what would pay." The state should not infringe on the rights of property directly, although it could contribute to informing public opinion and bringing community pressure to bare on irresponsible businessmen. Equity meant that while employers might unadvisedly refuse to recognize a union they could not interfere with the rights of their workers to join any organization they pleased - a right of citizenship. Equity also referred to "fair wages" with a commitment to the market in allocating prices that ruled out compulsory arbitration.[143] As Craven contends, "to the extent that the

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[142]Craven, **An Impartial Umpire**, pp. 366-67.

[143]Craven, **An Impartial Umpire**, p. 368.

new policy was devised and used to smooth the way for change, and not to obstruct its possibility, King's labour policy was progressive."[144]

In the beginning, the Department of Labour had four principal tasks: the administration of the Fair Wages Resolution and of the Alien Labour Act, the publication of the **Labour Gazette**, and the provision of voluntary conciliation services. In addition, it gathered statistics furthering its adminsitrative and infrastrucutral powers. For instance, between 1901 and 1911 it collected data on more than 1300 strikes, against more than 7100 different employers. During the first decade of the twentieth century the passage into law of the Conciliation Act (1900), the Railway Labour Disputes Act (1903) and the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act or Lemieux Act (1907) helped bring order to the process of collective bargaining.[145] The Industrial Disputes Investigations Act, devised by King, provided for a cooling-off period and conciliation proceedings as the best methods of promoting industrial peace. King had obtained a voluntary agreement between labour and capital to accept the state as society's referee in preserving peaceful economic relations. The government's basic view was that in a free market economy public authorities could set down guide lines, but ultimately public opinion would have to force compliance.[146]

In 1909, Laurier spoke in support of the legislation establishing a separate Department of Labour. He believed views towards the working class had traditionally been "crude" but were changing. Labour had finally "been advanced to the dignity of a class in itself, and quite as important in the

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[144]Craven, **An Impartial Umpire**, p. 157.

[145]Marr and Patterson, **Canada: An Economic History**, p. 211.

[146]Brown and Cook, **Canada: 1896-1921**, p. 122.

economy of society as any other class."[147] King, having stood down from his civil service post, was elected and entered the Cabinet as Canada's first Minister of Labour. The United States did not emulate this until 1913 while Britain's Ministry of Labour was not established until the demands of wartime manpower demanded it in 1916. Throughout the first decade of the century, Canada was the only member of the North Atlantic Triangle to respond fully to labour demands for a cabinet-level department concerned with labour policies.[148]

The working class in Canada remained an insignificant power actor because it was unable to organize itself extensively or politically. There were two reasons for this. First, Canadian unions were divided and failed to form a national organization. Second, the state created a department that operated, or at least was perceived to operate in labour's interest. While collective bargaining symbolized working-class progress, it subdued class antagonisms. The state was viewed as a neutral agency as it had become less coercive and corrupt. Indeed, the Canadian response to early 20th century industrialism contributed to the widespread acceptance of the concept of a "father state," in as much as "Canadians have been traditionally conscious that their society did not run by itself, that its good operation required government intervention, and their frequent fear has been that the state would not act, or not act sufficiently."[149] As such, the Canadian working class continued to support the existing parties, accepting the modest reforms of the Laurier administration, and hoping to

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[147]Debates, 15 May, 1909, pp. 6712.

[148]Craven, **An Impartial Umpire**, p. 360.

[149]H., Pentland, "A Study of the Changing Social, Economic, and Political Background of the Canadian System of Industrial Relations," Ottawa, 1968, p. 163f. Cited by Craven, **An Impartial Umpire**, p. 164.

win better terms at the bargaining table. Unable to organize themselves, Canadian unions became caged by their state boundaries and had little interest in international organization.[150] They became consumed with domestic politics, left foreign policy to statesmen, and confirmed Mann's conclusion that "the nation state was becoming [the] workers' totality."[151]

iii. Education and Eugenics

Traditionally, standardized education has been a key state strategy for assimilating its population. Because education in Canada was built on the principle of unity in diversity, the Canadian educational system became more diverse than those in other countries. In the years immediately following Confederation there were immense differences in schooling across the country. But in time, each provincial Department of Education, which had been given the right to regulate education, began to exert a strong influence towards

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[150]The Winnipeg General Strike was the closest labour came to organizing itself yet it suffered from a lack of planning, religious zeal, and was not radical enough to cope with the political or military implications of their situation. In a response to spiralling postwar inflation and lagging wages in industry, in 1919 there was a wave of strikes, plans for the formation of the One Big Union, and new talk of socialism. The Russian Revolution produced a context for the strike leaders in the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 who spoke of "revolution." But it was never a revolution in the true sense of the word, as the strikers did not seek the violent overthrow of the existing social and political order. Nevertheless, it can be argued that for the first time in Canadian history, a majority was split clearly into two opposing classes. See David Bercuson, **Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial Relations, and the General Strike**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1974.

[151]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power Volume 2**, p. 538.

conformity within each province.[152] This was especially problematic in Alberta and Saskatchewan.

In 1884 the first local school legislation created two denominational school systems under one board of education with autonomous Protestant and Catholic sections. As the Protestant majority grew, legislative and administrative measures by 1892 had transformed denominational schools into a system of state-controlled "national" or public schools, with a few separate schools in which the religious influence became minimal. The issue was revived in 1904-05 during negotiations for provincial autonomy for Alberta and Saskatchewan. Laurier attempted to establish a separate school system and attempted to appeal to Canadians' sense of nationality and religiosity:

> We live by the side of a nation, a great nation, a nation for which I have the greatest admiration, but whose example I would not take in everything, in whose schools for fear that Christian dogmas in which all do not believe might be taught, Christian morals are not taught. When I compare the status of the two nations, when I think about their future, when I observe the social condition of a civil society in each of them and when I observe in this country of ours a total absence of lynchings and an almost total absence of divorces and murders, for my part I thank heaven that we are living in a country where the young children of the land are taught Christian morals and Christian dogmas. Either the American system is wrong or the Canadian system is wrong. For my part I say, and I say it without hesitation. Time will show that we are in the right, and in this instance as in many others, I have an abiding faith in the institutions of my own country.[153]

When attacked by the editor of the **Globe**, Laurier defended his approach, by reminding Willison that Canada was "a difficult

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[152]Manzer, Ronald, **Public Schools and Political Ideas: Canadian Educational Policy in Historical Perspective**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, p. 77

[153]Debates, 21 February, 1905, pp. 1458-59.

country to govern; that there are conflicting elements to reconcile and to harmonize," and that if the rights of minorities were not protected how could the state "reconcile all elements to the supreme goal of national unity?"[154]

Early in 1905, amidst national controversy, Sifton resigned in protest against a vague school clause in the Autonomy Bills. Sifton believed in a national school system controlled by the local government. For him, such a system was needed to "Canadianize" the ethnically diverse west.[155] Deep feelings, especially in Ontario and Quebec severely tested Canadian unity and threatened to split the Liberal party. A compromise clause proposed by Sifton after his resignation was accepted by Laurier to avoid the impending split; the clause, which became part of the new provinces' constitutions, preserved the educational conditions of 1892 as expressed in the territorial school law of 1901.

As such, while the federal government guarded against the abuse of minority rights, no national education pattern existed. However, echoing the Gellnerian argument that industrializing states require standardized technical training, provincial governments became concerned with two issues. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, education began to assume greater importance as it was seen as a way of both meeting the needs of an increasingly industrializing society and a way of Canadianizing the large immigrant population.[156]

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[154]Laurier to Willison, 7 March, 1905, Willison Papers, MG 30, D29, Vol. 24, Folder 179d, pp. 18080-18081, NAC.

[155]Hall, **Clifford Sifton I**, p. 179.

[156]This process differed in Protestant and Catholic schools, especially in terms of the history covered to foster a "national" sentiment. French-Canadian history texts stressed French language, Roman Catholicism and French-Canadian laws and traditions. British-Canadian history books, concentrated on British Canada, British, and Imperial history. Geneviéve

a. Canadianization of Immigrants

While immigration was initially deemed beneficial, there was a growing concern with the number and ethnic constitution of the new immigrants. Immigration came to be questioned by academic theorists and public alike and gave rise not only to the social purity movement, but an overall concern with education. In 1905, James Woodsworth, Ontario-born Methodist minister and social reformer, saw "the public school [as] the most important factor in transforming the foreigners into Canadians."[157] Indeed, for him, not enough emphasis could "be placed upon the work that has been accomplished and may - yes, must be accomplished by our National Schools."[158] Similarly, an article in the **Canadian Magazine** claimed that the "patriotic people of Winnipeg" were "on the defensive in endeavouring to educate and Canadianize the foreign immigrants." Reverend Edmund Oliver warned the Saskatchewan Public Education League of the "balkanization" of Western Canada and asked if Canadians were "to become an homogeneous people' or were they "to repeat the tragic sufferings of polyglot Austria?"[159]

Common schooling was intended to preserve the social structure by shaping the behaviour and attitudes of what were perceived to be potentially dangerous groups; immigrants and the poor. Equally important, Canada, like most nineteenth

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Jain, "Nationalism and Educational Policies in Ontario and Quebec," in Alf Chaiton and Neil Macdonald, eds., **Canadian Schools and Canadian Identity**, Toronto: Gage, 1977, pp. 38-56.

[157]Brown and Cook, **Canada, 1896-1921**, p. 73.

[158]J.S. Woodsworth, **Strangers within Our Gates**, The Social History of Canada series edited by Michael Bliss, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 234.

[159]Cited in Neil Sutherland, **Children in English-Canadian Society: Framing the Twentieth-Century Consensus**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976, p. 211.

century states, needed to establish a print culture if its citizens were going to be able to effectively "imagine" their "national" community. Overall, therefore, the role of education was to provide a literate and skilled population that had a "proper" appreciation and acceptance of their place in society and shared common values and customs, thereby ensuring social stability and national cohesiveness. The struggle for responsible government and the campaign for public education were interesting political movements in the middle of the nineteenth century. Advocates of responsible government had campaigned for public education as an essential part of nation-building.[160]

Egerton Ryerson, a prominent educator, believed that public schools were instruments for shaping what he called "the state of the public mind." For him, "it is on Canadian self-reliance, skill and enterprise - in a word, on Canadian patriotism - that depends Canadian prosperity, elevation and happiness."[161] Teaching such patriotic virtue was the great task of the public schools. As Reverend George Bryce told a meeting of the Royal Society of Canada in 1910: "In these schools the children sing the patriotic songs of Britain and Canada and the reading books are full of patriotic selections. There is no honour more regarded by these young foreigners than to be called Canadians."[162] Historian Arthur Lower was certainly correct in his assertion that the common school was the one agency in the pioneer community that welcomed all children and worked hard to wear down racial differences

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[160]Ronald Manzer, **Public Schools and Political Ideas: Canadian Educational Policy in Historical Perspective**, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1994, p. 79

[161]Alison Prentice, **The School Promoters: Education and Social Class in Mid-nineteenth Century Upper Canada**, Toronto: McCelleand and Stewart, 1977, p. 132.

[162]George Bryce, "The Canadianization of Western Canada," **Proceedings of the Royal Society of Canada**, 1910, pp. 1i-1ii.

"against the common background of the English language and the Canadian tradition." In this way, "within the short space of a generation or so," Canadian society succeeded in recapturing a measure of unity, albeit British and not Canadian.[163]

Such unity in civic education required that public schools be uniform in organization and curriculum. A common program would be followed by all pupils, progressing from lower grades to higher grades, in accordance with externally determined standards and externally administered tests of achievement. As such, public education was expanded to include both elementary and secondary education.[164] The overall result was a increase in school enrolments and the tightening of the provincial government's control over education. Prior to Confederation secondary schools in most provinces had a considerable amount of freedom from external control, particularly in matters of curriculum. But in the latter half of the nineteenth century, provincial departments of education imposed standardized curricula and standardized texts on their secondary schools, and sent around provincial inspectors to make certain that rules and regulations were strictly enforced.[165]

Provincial departments of education in the nineteenth century closely regulated the activities of school boards, setting out procedures for annual school meetings, budget preparation, and grant requests and standards for school site selection, construction, maintenance, and equipment. Departmental regulations also determined who taught school and

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[163]Arthur Lower, **Canadians in the Making**, Toronto: Longmans, 1958, p. 373.

[164]Manzer, **Public Schools and Political Ideas**, p. 77.

[165]R., Stamp, "Evolving Patterns of Education: English-Canada from the 1870s to 1914", in Wilson, et al, **Canadian Education: A History**, Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1970, p. 325.

what they taught. Provincial training colleges educated teachers, and provincial licences were required to teach in public schools. To ensure that young people attended school, provincial legislation set minimum requirements for school attendance. In 1871, for example, Ontario children aged seven to twelve were required to attend school four months a year; by 1921 children eight to sixteen were required to attend elementary school for the full school year. Provincial regulations authorized textbooks and determined courses of study at every level. Provincial inspectors regularly visited schools, observed and questioned pupils and teachers, and reported their findings and recommendations to the provincial superintendent.[166] In his survey of Canadian education at the end of the First World War, Sandiford concluded,

> The course of study throughout any province is remarkably uniform. The department of education takes pride in making it so....subjects outside the official syllabus may not be taught...A few enlightened inspectors permit teachers to fit the course of study to local conditions, but this is the exception and against the rule;...[167]

Under the model of tutelary superintendence, first developed by Ryerson, the educational duties of local school trustees and teachers, and the penalties for failure to perform them, were defined by the central authority. The procedures for informing and regulating local administration succeeded in bringing a large realm of educational activity under central supervision.[168]

While standardized schooling was done primarily on the

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[166]Manzer, **Public Schools and Political Ideas**, p. 89.

[167]Peter Sandiford, "Education in Canada," in Sandiford, P., ed., **Comparative Education: Studies of the Education Systems of Six Modern Nations**, London and Toronto: J.M Dent and Sons, 1918, pp. 364-365.

[168]Manzer, **Public Schools and Political Ideas**, p. 90.

provincial level, at the federal level the government was urged to re-evaluate immigration policies and practices and introduce criteria for the effective selection, absorption, and assimilation of immigrants.[169] Proponents of these views were supported by Frank Oliver, Clifford Sifton's successor as Minister of the Department of the Interior. Concerned that much of the previous immigration threatened to be "a drag on our civilization and progress," Oliver forcefully challenged some of the assumptions of his predecessor:

> We did not go out to that country [the West] simply to produce wheat. We went to build up a nation, a civilization, a social system that we could enjoy, be proud of and transmit to our children; and we resent the idea of having the millstone of this Slav population hung around our necks in our efforts to build up, beautify and improve the country, and so improve the whole of Canada.[170]

It is interesting to note that the concern over immigrants was not only limited to Eastern Europeans. By 1908 about seventy per cent of all deportations were to Britain.[171] It has been argued that "a large number of these people had been shipped to Canada under the auspices of charitable organizations with the intention of shortening British relief rolls."[172] Similarly, the South African War generated a social panic about the poor qualities of British

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[169]On popular attitudes to immigration see Howard Palmer, **Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982; and Howard Palmer, **Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism**, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1975.

[170]Quoted in F., Hawkins, **Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared**, Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1989, p. 8.

[171]M. Timlin, "Canada's Immigration Policy, 1896-1910," **Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science**, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, 1960, p. 523.

[172]Brown and Cook, **Canada 1896-1921**, p. 57.

soldiers and of the mothers who had produced them.[173] As such, English immigrants were seen as inappropriate for settling the hard Canadian west. Signs reading "No English need apply" appeared in the windows of some western employment agencies.[174] An irritated observer complained how English immigrants were "henpecked" and "treated as an undesirable alien race instead of as sons and daughters of the old mother country of which they in Canada are offshoots."[175]

In the opinion of the editor of the **Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs** it seemed "that the average Englishman expected to find in Canada...another England, differing in details but in the main similar and he found, instead, a divergent and diverse nationality more like that of the United States than the United Kingdom...." Canadian farmers "sneered too often at their ignorance of the new ways of a new country and made too little allowance for the infinite difference between the easy-going life of an English farmhand and the strenuous work of a Canadian farm." Similarly, according to the **Victoria Colonist**:

> The Englishman who comes to Canada is handicapped to a certain extent by his training and his traditions. When he goes to the United States he realizes that he is in a foreign country [and] adjusts himself to conditions existing in a foreign country....But in Canada they are different; they do not seem to feel under any obligation to adapt their ideas to their new surroundings. They are ready to recognize that there is an American way of doing things, and a French way and a German way, and any number of other ways of doing things....They have not yet learned that there is a Canadian way, but they are finding it out, and bye

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[173]Marianne Valverde, **The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925**, McClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1991, p. 20.

[174]Brown and Cook, **Canada: 1896-1921**, p. 58.

[175]Letter from W. Morely Alderson to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 October, 1908, RG25, V144 C4/91, NAC.

and bye they will fall in with it with the greatest facility.[176]

The Canadian state made a major shift in its immigration policy in legislation introduced in 1906 and 1910. The new immigration restrictions became increasingly subjective excluding "immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climatic requirements of Canada."[177] The "open-door" began to close, particularly during and after the First World War for those Europeans of Slav origin who conveniently fell into the class of Austro-Hungarian hostilities, or were locked behind the frontier of the Soviet Union. Increasingly, however, controls over the "ideal" population were not only being applied to regulate the quality of incomers, but also in culling out the unwanted by means of forced deportations.[178] In the 1903-1935 period, some 62,001 immigrants were deported from Canada, for such officially stated reasons as "medical causes," "public charge", "criminality" and "other civil causes", which reflected the biological, social, and

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[176]**The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, Annual Review Publishing Company: Toronto, 1907, pp. 292-293.

[177]Section 38, Chapter (c) of the Immigration Act of 1910

[178]Moreover, some influential Canadians advocated the nurturing of the "human stock" by improving the conditions in which people lived. For Dr. Peter H. Bryce, chief medical officer in the Department of Immigration from 1904-1921, "euthenics" was the essential counterpart of "eugenics" with its emphasis upon the improvement of the human condition by producing environments in which individuals and society would thrive. An unabashed critic of the degenerative effects of urban and industrial life, he advocated the therapeutic effect of rural environments and rural ways of life. As Mann has argued, "eugenics was the ideology that most closely linked family breeding to the nation." See Michael Mann, **The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and nation-States, 1760-1914**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 489.

ideological concerns of the day.[179]

b. The "New Education"

The other area where the federal government felt it necessary to intrude was in technical-vocational education. The concern for a modern education system has its roots in the McDonald-Robertson Movement for "new education." At the turn of the century, J.W. Robertson of the Department of Agriculture and William Macdonald a philanthropist and tobacco merchant, argued for manual training, physical education, gardening, nature study, domestic science, consolidated schools, kindergartens, and better methods of training teachers.[180]

Of these, two deserve special attention. The goal of physical education was to produce healthy Canadians and prepare boys for the militia. In accordance with his Militia Bill of 1904, the Minister of the Militia wanted, "not only the bodily development of children of all classes and both sexes" but also that all boys acquire "an elementary knowledge of military drill and rifle practice," so that they could "take part in the defence of their homes and country." To this end, in 1907 the Militia Department began to assist provincial departments of education by providing some drill instruction in schools and courses for interested teachers. In 1909,

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[179]B. Roberts, **Whence They Came: Deportation from Canada, 1900-1935**, Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1988, p. 43; and, Donald Avery, **Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979. The most recent and detailed account of eugenics in Canada is Angus McLaren, **Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990. In addition, see Ian Dowbiggin, "'Keeping This Young Country Sane': C.K. Clarke, Immigration Restriction, and Canadian Psychiatry," **The Canadian Historical Review**, Vol. 76, No. 4, 1995, pp. 598-627.

[180]Sutherland, **Children in English-Canadian Society**, Chapter 12.

Borden established a fund to support physical and military training in the schools so as to introduce "habits of alertness, orderliness, and prompt obedience" and "to bring up the boys to patriotism."[181] The government received $250,000 of aid from Lord Strathcona, who believed that such training would contribute to that "valuable quality known as patriotism."[182] By 1914, six out of nine provinces had signed formal agreements with Ottawa to allow the Militia Department to conduct military training in schools, while two other provinces had implicitly agreed to such arrangements. Even Quebec supported the cadet movement.[183] Bourassa's lieutenant, Armand Lavergne, told the members of the Canadian Military Institute in Toronto, that the cadet service was "most beneficial," in that "it teaches the young men the lesson of patriotism and citizenship and teaches them to have a sane mind in a sound body."[184] By 1910, the Militia Department could report 265 corps enlisting 21,000 members and by 1914, the cadet movement had grown to such an extent that it envolved more than three times as many youngsters as the Boy Scout movement.[185]

The concerns of the cadet movement corresponded with those of the social purity movement who saw urbanization leading to urban poverty. In addition to "Canadianizing" the population, they sought to teach the urban poor how to be

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[181]Sutherland, **Children in English-Canadian Society**, pp. 191-192.

[182]Strathcona to Borden, March 18, RG24, HQC 980, reel 5055. Borden to Strathcona, March 23, 1909, Borden Papers, LB 45, p. 147.

[183]Debates, March 19, 1912, p. 5459.

[184]Cited in Desmond Morton, "The Cadet Movement in the Moment of Canadian Militarism, 1909-1914," **Journal of Canadian Studies**, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1978, p. 64.

[185]Morton, "The Cadet Movement...," pp. 63 and 56.

morally respectable, sexually pure, hard working, healthy in body and mind, and to uphold traditional Christian - and preferably, Protestant - beliefs and values. While the social purity movement was not a "puppet of the state," the state, nonetheless, had an interest in supporting non-state organizations that would co-operate in certain aspects of social policy that would benefit the welfare of the nation.[186]

Manual education aimed at training students for occupational or trade work, preparing them for work in an industrializing society. In 1901, the representatives of the Dominion Trades and Labour Congress, and some Boards of Trade, met Laurier to press for government support and to propose a Ministry of Industrial Education. In 1910, the government appointed a Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Technical Education to enquire into "the needs and present equipment of...Canada respecting industrial training and technical education, and into the systems and methods of technical instruction obtaining in other countries."[187] Certainly business, labour and educational interests had promoted the idea, but it was Mackenzie King who persuaded a reluctant cabinet to venture into territory which was constitutionally reserved to the provinces.[188]

The Commission travelled extensively in Canada, the United States, and Europe, gathering extensive information for both the federal and provincial governments. Its eventual

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[186]Mariana Valverde, **The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925**, McClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1991, pp. 25-27. For more on this topic see fn. 73 in Chapter Four.

[187]Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Technical Education, **Report of the Commissioners**, King's Printer: Ottawa, 1913, Volume 1, p. v.

[188]Sutherland, **Children in English-Canadian Society**, p. 198.

report, presented in 1913, proposed Federal financial support for manual training and for the occupational training of youths and adults, although actual control of these forms of education should be provincial.[189] The findings impressed many, such as the Ontario Department of Education who issued a manual for teachers stating that these changes in education would bring Canada "to the front of nations in industrial progress and in intellectual development." From these proposals, the Technical Education Act was passed in 1919, which allocated ten million dollars to be spent on a matching basis with provincial governments over ten years.[190]

6.5 SUMMARY

The National Policy would eventually frustrate western farmers. In 1910, western Canadian farmers ventured into national politics, demanding the rejection of the protective tariffs. This clashed with the National Policy and with the urban and manufacturing interests. To counter this protest, in 1911 the Laurier administration would forward a reciprocity proposal for mutual tariff reductions between the United States and Canada. This angered British-Canadian imperialists and contributed to Laurier's downfall.

Nevertheless, Canada's National Policy succeeded in establishing an industrial economy in Canada. Because of the tariff it came to reflect the American economy, although on a much smaller scale. Between 1870 and 1915 Canadian manufacturing expanded more than sixfold. The main sectors included iron and steel, engineering, leather, food and drink, transport and clothing, together with the host of goods and services associated with a modern economy. Cities such as

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[189]Johnson, H., **A Brief History of Education of Canadian Education**, McGraw-Hill: Toronto, 1968, pp. 120-121.

[190]Sutherland, **Children in English-Canadian Society**, pp. 237 and 220.

London, Brantford, Hamilton, Toronto, Oshawa, and Montreal became important industrial centres. Canada produced most of its own capital goods and also had a good range of industries to process its many staples.[191] But most importantly, the National Policy had been successful in promoting population growth and internal colonization that secured and legitimized the state's claim to the western territories. Fielding, the Minister of Finance, had indeed been correct when he had argued that "the best way you can help the manufacturers of Canada, is to fill up the prairie regions of Manitoba and the Northwest with a prosperous and contented people, who will be consumers of the manufactured goods of the east..."[192]

In addition to economic prosperity there came a renewal of confidence in Canada's ability and will to maintain a *separate* political posture in North America. This was also reflected in the state's growing concern to secure its Arctic territory before the United States could make any claim to it. As Brown and Cook argue, there was "an increasing awareness... ...of the distinctiveness of Canada and of the desire to protect and enhance the peculiar characteristics of the nation."[193] This awareness was largely a result of the needs and demands of an emerging modern Canadian state with geopolitical and domestic concerns that were part and parcel of the "great age of nationalism." For Brown, the industrialization of Canada meant power, particularly "power to withstand the pressures from the south and power to expand

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[191]For more detail see Marr and Patterson, **Canada: An Economic History**, Macmillan, pp. 379-393; and Norrie and Owram, **A History of the Canadian Economy**, pp. 335-387.

[192]Budget Speech delivered by Fielding on April 16, 1903, p. 22-23, quoted in Fergusson, B., **Mr. Minister of Finance**, Lancelot Press: Windsor, 1971, p. 22.

[193]Brown and Cook, **Canada, 1896-1921...**, p. 28.

and consolidate the Canadian nation."[194]

Indeed, Canadian territorial expansion was more similar to the traditional nation building of strong states in that it was a greater locus of uniform national feeling. Territorial consolidation is a central activity of any state. So too is filling the territory with people, creating the necessary infrastructure for the development of the new territory, and creating the means to record and oversee the development of material resources within the territory. This requires a massive increase in the scope of the state. The principal growth areas of administration during this period were in the sectors of transport and communications, education and labour, and resource inventories. This meant an overall increase in the infrastructural functioning of the state, the nationalizing of certain infrastructures and the early beginnings of what would become the welfare state. In Mann's terms, "the infrastrucutral state nourished the nation-state" by increasingly penetrating social life thereby "diffusing a national sense of identity and community."[195] While there may be disagreement as to the effectiveness of state initiatives in generating a prosperous Canadian economy, there can be no such disagreement with regard to their contribution to the consolidation and administration of the "territorially demarcated area" over which it governs. Similarly, it is not surprising that, "a puritanical obsession with territory, the control of land and space for power" came to be a "central element in English-Canadian nationalism."[196]

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[194]Brown, "The nationalism of the national policy", p. 162.

[195]Mann, **The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 2...**, p. 489 and 747.

[196]Larry Pratt and Matina Karvellas, "Nature and nation: Herder, Myth and Cultural Nationalism in English Canada," **National History**, Volume 1, No. 1, 1997, p. 75.

Canadian territorial expansion met no great opposition. Clearly, the imperial power had no reason to resist infrastructural penetration. While rivalry with the United States was the obvious stimulus to much of this expansionism, the growing harmony between the two states and their citizens meant that the rivalry was not that intense. Therefore, the magnitude of territorial expansion, and the necessary institutional and infrastructural build-up, was the one path to state-building that was unimpeded by the necessity of balancing between the two hegemons. All that remained was the means to promote a Canadian identity to bind citizens to the state and one another.

CHAPTER SEVEN

IDENTITY

7.1 A CANADIAN NATION?

This thesis has focused on the geopolitically driven state initiatives that increased autonomy of the Canadian state. It has emphasized the institutional attributes of state formation, especially those associated with diplomacy, coercion, and the consolidation and administration of territory. What remains, is the discussion of the ideas and myths or the "emotional and sentimental glue" that binds the nation to the state.[1] For Canadian state elites, the problem was one of constructing a memory and national identity that would include British and French Canadians, not to mention the increasing number of immigrant Canadians, all of whom had their own cultural traditions to draw on. If Canada was to become an independent nationalizing state it would have to clearly identify what form its nationhood would take. This challenge is certainly what the Italian nationalist Massino D'azeglio alluded to when he claimed, "Italy is made; now we must make Italians."[2] Laurier had asked a similar question in 1892.

> Where is the national spirit, the national enthusiasm which we ought to have? I vainly ask for it and seek for it through the length and breadth of this country. In every part, from ocean to ocean, I find pride of race and creed, but nowhere pride of the Canadian name, which ought to be supreme and paramount in the breast of every

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[1]Kalevi Holsti, **The State, War, and the State of War**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 45-47.

[2]Cited in C. Seton-Watson, **Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 1870-1925**, London: Methuen, 1967, p. 13.

Canadian.[3]

Yet, Canadians of British descent were begining to be perceived as being inherently different from their British cousins. This was revealed in imperial literature which inaccurately depicted the reality of life, unable to identify with a society rapidly developing its own sense of identity and purpose. Instead they resorted to stereotypical views or themes, including Canada as dutiful Imperial Daughter, the West as "wild and woolly" and full of Indians, or generally as a quaint society in desperate need of manners and refinement. The arrogance, perplexity, bemusement, and admiration contained in this turn-of-the-century writing reflected the fact that a distinct Canadian society had emerged. Canadians were a distinctive people whose news, politics, and social interests were different from those of Britain.[4]

Interestingly, many Canadian soldiers returned from the South African War knowing that they were distinctly different from their British allies. Canadian soldiers were especially averse to the elitist way in which imperial officers treated them. "Londeners are used to it," explained the **Mail and Empire**, "but Canadians are not, nor does the public opinion of this country demand that Canadians become lackeys for English officers. A Canadian trooper is a fighting man, he is not a

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[3]Debates, 7 April, 1892, pp. 1145-1146. Laurier was familiar with the works of Mazzini in college. In 1905 Grey, who had Mazzini's "portrait in the place of honour" in his room, sent Laurier a copy of Mazzini's works, which Laurier looked forward to getting "more acquainted with." See Grey to Laurier, December 20, Laurier to Grey, 21 December, 1905, Grey Papers.

[4]R.G. Moyles, and Doug Owram, **Imperial Dreams and Colonial Realities: British Views of Canada, 1880-1914**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.

soldier."[5] Canadian participation contributed to an emerging Canadian nationalism by reinforcing its egalitarian and democratic emphasis, shaped as much from its New World society as from its British institutional heritage. In many letters to the editor, Canadian soldiers specified the stupidities of British officers and compared their own martial virtues to those of the slum-born British Tommy cowed by "Picadilly aristocrats and wooden soldiers." It continued into a general critique of British society and the imperial mission. Minto saw these letters as an appalling display of self-confidence and a serious danger.[6] As Morton neatly concluded, "Canadians went to the South Africa War as imperialist; they returned for the most part as nationalists."[7]

National identity was further developed because Canadian citizens took an active interest in the conflict.[8] Canadian troops were going to fight for the empire but they were also fighting as a demonstration of Canada's new strength and aspirations. When the first contingents arrived in South Africa their progress and achievements were followed with great pride. The Canadian public glorified the exploits of

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[5]**Mail and Empire**, Toronto, April 3, 1903, cited in Carman Miller, "The Unhappy Warriors: Conflict and Nationality among Canadian Troops during the South African War," **The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History**, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1995, p. 94.

[6]Carman Miller, **The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto: The Education of a Viceroy**, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980, p. 121.

[7]Desmond Morton, **Ministers and Generals**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970. p. 169.

[8]Average English speaking Canadians were far from being a peaceful people in a "peaceable Kingdom." See J., Maroney, **The 'Peaceable Kingdom' Reconsidered: War and Culture in English Canada, 1884-1914**, Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, Queen's University, Kingston, 1996. Maroney argues that British Canadians were avid readers of war news and that this helped define their sense of British nationality.

their forces in battle, ignoring evidence of any shortcomings. In some instances, Canadian contributions to the war were exaggerated, as in the case of school children being told that Britain's early reverses in the war resulted from the fact that the Canadians had not yet arrived.[9]

Laurier was certainly aware that some Canadians were becoming concerned with expressing an emerging Canadian national identity. While in power, he would receive several letters and proposals from concerned citizens who shared his passion for Canadian history and patriotism. While addressing a variety of issues, it is important to note that these letters were usually motivated by the changing geopolitical environment and the possible impact it would have for Canada.

For instance, as early as the first Colonial Conference, Laurier began to receive pleas for a national flag. One letter argued that such an initiative "would appeal to the imagination of the people" and "give the rising generation of our people a flag of which they can be proud, and around which national sentiment can gather year by year." He went on to argue that the traditional ensign was felt to have "no meaning in the eyes of the people and awakes in them no emotions" whereas a truly Canadian flag had an "educational value" and would become a "nationalizing force" like the American flag.[10] Most people looked to the maple leaf as the most appropriate symbol for a Canadian flag since it "is universal in all the Provinces." One passionate spokesman, a member of the Ontario Historical Society, argued that

> ...it has its imperishable glory on the battle fields of the Empire. It embodies the native fervour of the Sons and Daughters of Canada. How well this proved when the wounded Canadian lying on the veldt at Paardeberg touched the maple leaf

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[9]Quoted in W. Stanford Evans, **The Canadian Contingents and Canadian Imperialism**, London, 1901, p. 320.

[10]Dougall to Laurier, 7 May, 1897, Laurier Papers.

> on his helmet and breathed out the words, "If I die it might help this to live." It has attached to it all the spirit of our own people, it is recognized by all other nations as the emblem of our country. It is the true and living Emblem of Canada. May we not ask that it be placed upon our National Ensign?[11]

The County of Wentworth Veteran's Association sought Laurier's help in purchasing and then developing the battlefield of Stoney Creek as a "historical park so that future generations will know where the final struggle took place, which decided the fate of Canada, also where those of our soldiers lie, who fell in that struggle." Laurier contributed some money to what he described as a "patriotic undertaking." The association thanked Laurier for his support which would "urge" them "on to complete the work we have undertaken to preserve the ground where our heroes fell in the struggle to drive the invaders from our land and which made Canada the fair Dominion of which we are so proud."[12]

Laurier himself became honorary president of the Historic Landmark Association, whose object was to "become an Intelligence Department for all Societies and individuals in preserving the great souvenirs of our country's history". In their first publication, also sent to Laurier, the association urged members to,

> ...remember that our business depends on energy inherited and transformed; that warriors, statesmen and divines made Canada Canadian; that all nations decay who fail in arms and art; and that we are now particularly apt to mistake comfort for civilisation....landmarks themselves are signs of

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[11]Barlow Cumberland to Laurier, 15 April, 1902, Laurier Papers. Note how this parallels the decision to put the maple leaf on the buttons of Canadian naval uniforms discussed in Chapter Five.

[12]John Gardner to Laurier, 8 October and 14 October, 1907; Laurier to John Gardner, 11 October, 1907, Laurier Papers.

progress.[13]

On another occasion, Laurier was asked to prevent the removal of the soldier's Cemetery on Papineau Road in Montreal. Lawrence Buchan felt that the place should become a landmark "so that the future generations may look upon it with pride, and the remains of our soldiers being held sacred, will inspire our countrymen with love and respect which is due to those who in this Country have worked to make Canada what it is."[14]

Laurier also received requests demanding his efforts in promoting Canadian autonomy and in furthering national recognition of Dominion Day. One citizen thought a patriotic association should be formed by the government and "having for its object the preservation of Canadian Autonomy and the encouragement of a national spirit."[15] Laurier thought the idea was a good one but felt that it should not come from the government, but from "private members of the party." Another citizen appealed to Laurier's "Canadianism" and "influential position to urge upon the citizens of our land a more public observance of Dominion Day. We are, as the world knows, to be a great nation and yet, Sir, we are doing little to instil into the minds of the people that devotion to our home land that is essential to the building up of a united and patriotic people."[16]

Other Canadians wrote poems and songs to express their patriotic zeal. For one individual, the source of inspiration

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[13]Lieut.-Col. William Wood to Laurier, 13 January, 1908, Laurier Papers.

[14]Lawrence Buchan, Brigdr. General Militia to Laurier, June 1908, Laurier Papers.

[15]Thomas Coveney, Esq. to Laurier, 5 May, 1898, Laurier Papers.

[16]Gordon Marr, Esq. to Laurier 27 June, 1910, Laurier Papers.

for one poem was the fact that "our countrymen covered themselves with glory" in South Africa. He hoped that Laurier might recommend its adoption as a "National Song for the Canadians." The poem makes references to famous generals, such as Montcalm and Brock, and to battlefields like Queenston Heights and Stony Creek. It also alludes to the political nationalism of Canada in that it is described as "the freest land on earth," where "Anglo Saxon, Red man, Celt, Semite, Tuton, Gaul, Are in this home of freedom, equals, brothers all."[17] Similarly, in the National Anthem proposed by Hon. Judge Routhier, entitled "O Canada! Our Dear Ancestral Land!", lines such as "Of diverse race, we'll yet agree\ To make one law our guide!\" or "United as one family,...For Christ and King!, the cry that conquers pride!", are consistent with Laurier's essential concern with national unity.[18]

Patriotic or nationalistic organizations and institutions concerned with Canadian history began to appear throughout Canada. For instance, the annual **Review of Historical Publications Relating to Canada** was founded in 1896 and demonstrated the growing interest in Canadian history.[19] While the first Canadian Club was founded in 1893, it truly flowered as a national institution over the next fifteen years as thirty branches appeared from coast to coast. Their objective was to encourage "the study of the history, literature, and resources of Canada," to further "the

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[17]Timothy Crawley to Laurier, 24 April, 1900, Laurier Papers.

[18]Hon. Judge Routhier to Laurier, 9 November, 1909, Laurier Papers.

[19]This publication was the predecessor of the Canadian Historical Review (1920). See Carl Berger, **The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Writing since 1900**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986, pp. 13-14; and Marlene Shore, "'Remember the Future': The Canadian Historical Review and the Discipline of History, 1920-95," **Canadian Historical Review**, 76, 3, 1995, pp. 411-412.

recognition of native worth and talent," and to foster "a patriotic Canadian sentiment."[20] In 1909, the Association of Canadian Clubs was organized in Montreal which declared that its objective was "to foster Canadian patriotism and to stimulate intelligent citizenship," through frequent meetings and the publication of its official journal, the **Canadian Nation.**[21] Similarly, the goal of the Champlain Society was to publish influential works of Canadian history. Its first publication, Marc Lescarbot's **The History of New France**, was well received by the press. The Toronto **Globe** remarked that "[t]he surest basis of national feeling is found in interest and pride in the past, and the sooner Canadians study and understand the complex movements involved in their origin the better their ambition to be a nation."[22] As Cole suggests, the Champlain Society went beyond traditional academic endeavours, being that it was "equally nationalistic and perhaps patriotic" in its mission to demonstrate that the "country was worth the effort of documenting its history."[23]

Certainly, Laurier realized that political autonomy and simple prosperity would not be enough to fully develop Canada as a nationalizing state. He urged the uses of history, or shared national experience, and the emergence of national heroes as a means of fostering national pride.[24] Laurier was

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[20]Canada Club brochure cited by L. Cole, "Looking Backward, Reaching Forward: The Champlain Society and Documentary Publishing." Paper presented to the Champlain Society, November, 1991.

[21]D. Bercuson, **True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, p. 61.

[22]Toronto **Globe**, 31 October, 1907.

[23]Cole, "Looking Backward, Reaching Forward..."

[24]This was similar to John Stuart Mill's thoughts:

A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nation if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do

convinced that Canada's short but colourful history afforded ample material with which to build a foundation of nationalism. "I am not ignorant of the fact that there can be no nation without national pride, nor am I unaware that in almost all cases national pride is inspired by those tragic events which bring suffering and tears in their train..." But, he argued, national pride may thrive with the experiences of peacetime as well: "Our history under Confederation presents none of the dramatic facts which make us so attached to the past; it has been calm and consequently happy." This, however, was all the more reason to take pride in Canadian history and treasure its traditions: "Peace has also its glories and its heroes. Canada under Confederation has produced men of whom any nation might justly feel proud."[25]

At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, several state elites actively sought to construct a Canadian memory that would encourage a popular national identity which would include British Canadians, French Canadians, and the newly arrived Canadians. Just like moves for more diplomatic and military autonomy had to be framed so as not to antagonize French and British elements, so too would the creation of a national identity. Laurier's liberal nationalism attempted to reconcile the differences between British and French Canadians. Laurier exemplified how,

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not exist between them and others. This feeling of nationality may be generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language and community of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of the causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents, the possession of a national history and consequent community of recollections, collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. See his **Considerations of Representative Government**, Chap. "On Nationality."

[25]Ulric Barthe, **Wilfrid Laurier on the Platform**, Quebec: Turcotte and Ménard, 1890, p. 529.

what sometimes degenerated into a mere tribalism, could be used as the basis of an extremely level-headed patriotism to Canada, and his influence undoubtedly played a large part in the spread of this spirit. His nationalism knew no ethnic boundaries and was driven by the twin principles of tolerance and freedom. To counter the two opposing British and French identities, the Laurier regime put forward a rational liberal nationalism that attempted to evoke an emotional attachment to people, places, and history.[26]

7.2 A LIBERAL NATIONALISM

The roots of Laurier's liberal nationalism can be found in his earliest speeches. Indeed, his valedictorian address at McGill University, his first public address, emphasized the need of reconciling the English and French in Canada...."The French and English races have not always been friends; but I hasten to say it, and I say it to our glory, that race hatreds are finished on Canadian soil. There is no longer any family here but the human family."[27] He concluded by stating that the "mission of the man of law in Canada" should embrace justice, patriotism, and "finally union between the peoples,

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[26]W.L. Morton was one of the first to articulate this idea. See his **The Canadian Identity**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960. For a more recent discussion see Ramsay Cook, "Nation, Identity, Rights: Reflections on W.L Morton's Canadian Identity" **Journal of Canadian Studies**, 29, 2, 1994, pp. 5-18.

[27]Laurier quoted in J.S. Willison, **Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party**, 2 vols., Volume 1, Toronto, 1903, pp. 37-39. Laurier used the term "race" to describe an ethnic or cultural group. However, he usually reserved the term "nation" for Canada as a whole rather than apply it to English or French Canada. He also fell into the semantic confusion using the term nation and nationality loosely in two different senses. "Nation" sometimes implied an ethnic, cultural, sociological entity; occasionally, even in the same sentence, it might also connote a legal, constitutional, political entity.

the secret of the future."[28] This speech is perhaps the first glimpse of Laurier's life-long concern with national unity. He would never cease extolling liberty and justice, patriotism and unity. Many years later, when as Prime Minister he rediscovered this speech, he was surprised to find in it the "identical line of policy" he had applied throughout his political career.[29]

Similarly, his speech on "Political Liberalism," delivered on June 26th, 1877 in Quebec City, illustrates his view of liberalism and the situation of French-Canadians.[30] He argued that his political liberalism was not the European Catholic liberalism which had been condemned by Pope Pius IX. While it was a "melancholy truth" that the French Canadians were a conquered people, Laurier maintained that French Canadians had also made a conquest, "the conquest of liberty": "We are a free people; we are a minority, but we have retained all our rights and all our privileges." The basis of this liberty was the Constitution which was based upon the citizen's right to vote. But if Catholics were not free to choose between the candidates of the Liberals and Conservatives, then the constitution would be irrelevant and there would be no freedom for French Canadians. Free and representative government enabled the different elements, which made up Canada's population, "to unite and form a compact and homogeneous whole, yet leaving to each its character and its autonomy." Canadians could justly be proud that different "races and creeds" could without friction follow their own ways and enjoy equally their liberty.

Indeed, Laurier did not believe that there were only two

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[28]Willison, **Sir Wilfrid Laurier....**, pp. 35-39.

[29]Laurier to Willison, 8 November, 1901, Willison Papers, MG30 D29, Vol 24, Folder 179C, pp. 17960-17969.

[30]This speech can be found in Barthe, **Wilfrid Laurier on the Platform, 1871-1890**, 1890.

separate communities in Canada, the English and French, for he often argued that each province was pluralistic rather than dualistic. Each of the seven provincial communities, he declared in 1885, must be recognized as having diverse interests and guaranteed rights:

> It may be wise or unwise, according to the preferences and predilections of every one, but this is the basis of our Constitution. Our Constitution is based upon diversity....In a country like ours, with a heterogenous population, a separation of powers is absolutely necessary. I go further and say that even to govern a homogeneous people, when that people are scattered over a vast territory, a separation of powers is also necessary.[31]

The fact that elites from both French and English Canada were involved at both the Federal and Provincial levels of government meant that Canadian federalism was, to a large degree, still consociational.

Around the same time, Laurier was also beginning to formulate a comprehensive statement of his concept of unity. The first signs of this were evident in an elaborate metaphor included in a 1886 speech at Toronto that alluded to the confluence of the Ottawa River and the St. Lawrence:

> Below the island of Montreal the water that comes from the north, from the Ottawa, unites with the waters that come from the western lakes, but uniting, they do not mix. They run parallel, separate, distinguishable, and yet are one stream flowing within the same banks, the mighty St. Lawrence...a perfect image of our nation. We may not assimilate, we may not blend, but for all that we are the component parts of the same country. We may be French in our origin....We may be English or Scotch or whatever it may be, but we are Canadians, one in aim and purpose....[32]

Such a view was not held by Honoré Mercier, whose Parti

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[31]Debates, 17 April, 1885, p. 1169.

[32]Barthe, **Wilfrid Laurier on the Platform**, pp. 310-311.

National took power in Quebec in 1887, revealing the strength of politics based on ethnic or cultural nationalism. Over the next four years, British Canadians became wary as Mercier began to act increasingly as if he were leader of an independent state. Conversely, Laurier, who had become leader of the federal Liberal party, also in 1887, attempted to articulate a civic or liberal nationalism. At a picnic held in his honour at Somerset, Quebec, he urged his mainly French Canadian audience not to forget,

> that the limits of our common country are not confined to the province of Quebec, but they extend to all the territory of Canada, and that our country is wherever the British flag waves in America....I ask you to remember this in order to remind you that your duty is simply and, above all, to be Canadians. To be Canadians! That was the object of Confederation..., to bring the different races closer together...[33]

It was always the creation of harmony between the people which was uppermost in Laurier's mind. When passions peaked between the English and French Canadians over the Jesuit Estates Bill in 1889, a motion of disallowance was introduced in Parliament, describing Mercier's intentions as a "danger to the civil and religious liberties of the people of Canada."[34] Some of the most adamant supporters believed that there should be one "race" in Canada. Laurier declared, "Well, which would that race be? Is it the British lion that is to swallow the French lamb, or the French lamb that is to swallow the British lion? There can be more than one race, but there shall be but one nation."[35] Indeed, he was quick to offer an alternative and less parochial identity for French-Canadians to follow. On Saint Jean-Baptiste Day in 1889, he reminded them,

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[33]Barthe, **Wilfrid Laurier on the Platform**, pp. 358-359.

[34]Debates, 26 March, 1889, p. 811

[35]Debates, 28 March, 1889, p. 902.

> We are French-Canadians, but our country is not confined to the territory overshadowed by the citadel of Quebec; our country is Canada, it is the whole of what is covered by the British flag on the American continent...Our fellow countrymen are not only those in whose veins runs the blood of France. They are all those, whatever their race or whatever their language, whom the fortune of war, the chances of fate, or their own choice have brought among us, and who acknowledge the sovereignty of the British crown. As far as I am concerned, and loudly do I proclaim it, those are my fellow countrymen. I am a Canadian....The first place in my heart is for those in whose veins runs the blood of my own veins. Yet I do not hesitate to say that the rights of my fellow-countrymen of different origins are as dear to me, as sacred to me, as the rights of my own race....What I claim for us is an equal share of the sun, of justice, of liberty....I do not want French Canadians to domineer over anyone, nor anyone to domineer over them.... Cannot we believe that in the supreme battle here on the Plains of Abraham, when the fate of arms turned against us, cannot we believe that it entered into the designs of Providence that the two races, enemies up to that time, should henceforth live in peace and harmony?[36]

As such, Laurier was resolutely opposed to any concept of separatism. Pride of one's origins was natural and admirable, but he disdained separatism. He emphasized that the first loyalty must be to Canada as a whole, and condemned proposals for a separate French republic on the banks of the St. Lawrence as "dreams and delusions."[37] When discussing Quebec's position in Confederation, the role of Catholic separate schools, or the rights of French Canadians to use their mother tongue, Laurier always urged tolerance and understanding of the minority, and frequently pointed to Gladstone's generous policy on the Irish question as an example to follow. Just as steps toward Home Rule had furthered Irish loyalty, so would liberal treatment of the

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[36]Barthe, **Wilfrid Laurier on the Platform**, pp. 527-528.

[37]Debates, 17 February, 1890, p. 739.

French minority in Canada result in greater affection for Canadian institutions and assist the cause of national unity.[38]

Laurier revealed this policy of "sunny ways," in 1896, when the Manitoba Schools question came to a head. He advocated a policy that was "generous to the minority" and appealing to all those "who love justice, freedom and toleration." Such a policy contributed to Laurier's victory in 1896. The subsequent Laurier-Greenway compromise settled a dispute that had antagonized French and English Canada for nearly a decade and improved the position of the minority in Manitoba.[39]

Laurier's advocacy of such a strongly pluralistic nationalism echoed the thoughts of Sir George Etienne Cartier. Like Cartier, Laurier's concept of nationalism was essentially political. It was not based, as much of European nationalism was, on a community of language, ethnicity or culture, but on the deliberate subordination of these factors within a new experimental state which could command a higher loyalty: "I believe that whatever a man's origins may be, he has the right to say he is a Canadian above all things."[40] Cartier had appealed in 1865 for the creation of a "new nationality", a "political nationality." The real question, Cartier said, was this: "Shall we be content to remain separate - shall we be content to maintain a mere provincial existence, when, by combining together, we could become a great nation."[41] To Laurier, as to Cartier, national unity did not mean assimilation or amalgamation, but a union of diverse groups in

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[38]Debates, 17 Februaury, 1890, pp. 742-743.

[39]See Blair Neatby, **Laurier and a Liberal Quebec**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973, Chapters Five and Six.

[40]Barthe, **Wilfrid Laurier on the Platform**, p. 460.

[41]Cartier, in Confederation Debates, pp. 59-60.

a common political structure for common ends and the creation of a new, more inclusive, and invigorating national sentiment:

> We are here a nation, or we want to be a nation, composed of the most heterogeneous elements - Protestants and Catholics, English, French, German, Irish, Scotch, every one, let it be remembered, with his prejudices. In each of these conflicting antagonistic elements, however, there is a common spot of patriotism, and the only true policy is that which reaches that common patriotism and makes it vibrate in all, towards a common end and common aspirations.[42]

Canadian nationalism had to be inclusive, not exclusive, and based on mutual understanding of the different communities which would make up the nation. For Laurier,

> The activity and energy of this young nation are frittered away in useless and even dangerous bickerings of race against race and creed against creed. Sir, for this fatal state of things there is but one remedy: it is to elevate the standard, to show to the young and hopeful that there are nobler aims and purposes, that Canada has a future and towards that future steadily to advance with faith never wavering, with enthusiasm never flinching.[43]

Such nationalistic ideas formed a vital part of many speeches by Laurier. Patriotism had to be based "upon the broadest and most generous instincts of human nature."[44]

By 1894, Laurier had developed a political philosophy that would guide him through the turbulent years of imperial relations. The second of his major addresses on Liberalism, the Quebec City speech of 1894, contains an articulate and commanding expression of the Liberal view of Confederation and national unity. It is an appeal for moderation, tolerance, for complete civil and religious freedom, for better understanding

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[42]Debates, 17 February, 1890, p. 739.

[43]Debates, 7 April, 1892, p. 1146.

[44]Debates, 29 February, 1892, p. 28.

between the British and French, and for the subordination of religious and sectorial cleavages, so that the Canadian federal union might be more firmly consolidated. Moreover, as it is also the best illustration of his historical perspective on Canadian nationalism, it deserves particular attention.[45]

Laurier began by affirming that "we are before and above all, Canadians; Canadians in the fullest acceptance of the term; Canadians at Quebec, Canadians at Toronto, and Canadians from the shores of the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the famous mountains...of the Pacific...." The aim of the Liberal party was to develop the work of Confederation,"....to draw closer, bind and cement together the different elements scattered over the whole of the face of British North America, and to weld them into one nation." He then spoke of the "political nationality" of George Etienne Cartier's whose aim was to unite Canada "independent of the national origin and religion of individuals" so that the two cultures "work together for their own and the common well-being.[46] Laurier expounded his hopes for Canada's future, and again criticized those who advocated a separate political future for Quebec:

> As far as I am concerned, gentlemen, I want no little republic of San Marino, no principality of Monaco; and although Caesar said that he would rather be the first in a village than the second in Rome, I say that my ambition is to be a citizen of a great country. I look forward to the day when Canada will have a population of thirty million inhabitants, or forty million perhaps, and when its voice will weigh in the destinies of the world. I ask you, gentlemen, of whom the majority are French like myself, is there a single man amongst you who would seriously like to see Canada cut up, who

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[45]Speech at Quebec City, 4 January, 1894 reprinted in the **Globe**, 20 January, 1894, pp. 5-6.

[46]Cartier, from **Parliamentary Debates on the Confederation of the British North American Provinces**, Quebec, 1865, reprinted by the King's Printer, Ottawa, 1951: 60; quoted by Laurier in the **Globe**, 20 January, 1894, p. 5.

> would detach from our patrimony a single portion of what was the patrimony of our ancestors?....No; and for my part, I must say that this country is ours and ours it must remain.

Canada afforded sufficient space for all nationalities, cultures and religions. Freedom provided a bond of unity and Laurier reminded his audience "that if we are separated from our fellow countrymen by language and religion, we are united to them by a bond which is perhaps just as dear - by liberty."

This speech acknowledged that the attempt to develop the new Canadian nationality faced great difficulties, but these difficulties could be overcome. What the country needed above all was "peace, concord, and union" and that union does not imply absorption, and that autonomy does not imply antagonism. "Let us...be true to our double origin, true to the memory and the reverence of the great nation from which we have sprung, and true also to the great nation which has given us freedom." Above all, his nationalism was pluralistic. Heterogeneity was desirable, tyranny of the majority condemned, minority rights respected, and a healthy diversity preserved and encouraged.

Interestingly, nationalists like Bourassa actually shared Laurier's views as to what form this nationalism would take:

> Our nationalism is Canadian nationalism, founded on the duality of cultures and of the particular traditions that this duality implies. The fatherland, for us, is the whole of Canada, that is a federation of distinct cultures and provinces. The nation which we wish to see develop is the Canadian nation, composed of French Canadians and English Canadians. That is of two elements separated by language and religion and by the legal arrangements necessary for the conservation of their respective traditions, but united in a sense of brotherhood, and in an attachment to a common fatherland.[47]

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[47]Cited in Ramsay Cook, **Canada, Quebec, and the Uses of Nationalism**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986, p. 190. On another occasion Bourassa argued that the federal government, rather than supporting British imperialism, had the

Clearly, the question was one of how to create a "common fatherland." In 1907, Henri Bourassa argued that,

> There is Ontario patriotism, Quebec patriotism, or Western patriotism, each based on the hope that it may swallow up the others, but there is no Canadian patriotism and we can have no Canadian nation when we have no Canadian patriotism.[48]

This absence of a Canadian patriotism or nationalism was due to the fact that most popular memory relied on living memories and was essentially local and episodic in character and relied heavily on living memories. Canada needed an official shared history in a time when history was thought to define the social identities of nations. Laurier appreciated that Canada had two pasts and that there was a need to synthesize or reconcile them through the construction of a new history. Therefore, any understanding of an emerging Canadian national identity must go beyond an examination of "the sphere of political decisions" to include the "myths, legends, and symbols" of a "falsified but glorious past...which have always been the invariable by-products of nationalism."[49]

"responsibility of developing Canada," and furthering "that feeling of attachment to one's own country which is the strongest foundation for the development of a nation." See Debates, 15 March, 1904, p. 130.

[48]Cited in George Woodcock, **The Canadians**, Don Mills: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1979, p. 241. Whether or not Bourassa was a French-Canadian or Canadian nationalist is still open to debate. For the various interpretations of his political stance, see Joseph Levitt, "Images of Bourassa," **Journal of Canadian Studies**, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1978. Yet, his consistent rejection of Quebec independence makes it difficult to view him as a French-Canadian nationalist in the true sense of the word.

[49]Carl Berger, "The True North, Strong and Free," in Peter Russel, ed., **Nationalism in Canada**, Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 24.

7.3 INFRASTRUCTURES OF IDENTITY

In terms of developing a truly Canadian national identity, it was because of Canada's great size, small population, and ethnic diversity, that the state began to find itself directly involved in promoting national awareness through the establishment of cultural institutions and the protection of cultural products.[50] Laurier spoke publicly and privately in favour of government support for the arts, believing that "there could ... be no national life without literature, art, and science." He was reported as saying at the unveiling of his official portrait at the parliament buildings, "that sometime he might ask that the walls of the House of Commons might be adorned with scenes of the history of our country, painted by Canadian artists." He also believed that it was necessary to have "more art education and monumentation in our cities and towns." In 1903, at the opening of the annual exhibition of the Royal Academy of Arts, he remarked that "he had been told by the minister of finance that there was now a surplus revenue of thirteen million dollars and he hoped the day would come when a portion of that sum could be devoted to the encouragement of Canadian art."[51]

By the turn of the century, state intervention in

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[50]Earlier initiatives included state support for the Ontario Society of Artists's School of Arts in 1876, the Royal Canadian Academy (1879) and the Royal Society of Canada (1882). In 1880 the National Gallery was created so that it would not only interest the "lover of pictures, but all who have a stake in the growing institutions and general purposes of our country." See Allen Smith, **Canada - An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind**, McGill-Queen's Press: Montreal and Kingston, 1994, pp. 96-97.

[51]Sandra Gwyn, **The Private Capital: Ambition and Love in the Age of Macdonald and Laurier**, Toronto, 1984; cited in Maria Tippett **Making Culture: English-Canadian Institutions and the Arts before the Massey Commission**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 70-72 and especially Chapter Three, "A Mad Desire to Bring About State Control."

cultural products - books, magazines, and papers - took the form of copyright laws, preferential postal rates, and legislated measures to slow the flow of American products into Canada.[52] All of these measures contributed to shaping a home market for Canadian writers and artists.[53] Moreover, as in the rest of the world, it contributed to broadening the base of literacy, so as to have a uniformly trained labour force and an informed and responsible electorate who were aware of such important matters as nation-state building.[54] In 1907, the government established an Advisory Arts Council to assist and advise the minister of public works in the expenditure of public funds for all activities concerning art. Its object was to promote "the growth of a true taste and general interest in

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[52]See George Parker, **The Beginnings of the Book Trade in Canada**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985, Chapters Five and Six in particular.

[53]Smith, **Canada- An American Nation?**, p. 98. In terms of literature, perhaps the most significant and popular writer of the time was Sara Jeannette Duncan. See Clara Thomas, "Canadian social mythologies in Sara Jeanette Duncan's **The Imperialist**," **Journal of Canadian Studies**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1975, pp. 38-49, and; M., Dean, "The Process of Definition: Nationality in Sara Jeannette Duncan's Early International Novels," **Journal of Canadian Studies**, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1985, pp. 132-148. In her international novels, Canadian nationality is founded on the reconciliation of British tradition and American freedom. In addition, by contrasting "us" with "them", Canada is portrayed as an ideal society. This vision of an ideal society was beginning to stimulate the imaginations of Canadian artists. The work of the Toronto Art Students' League, founded in 1886, had "popularized the domestic, vernacular and native Canada that was symbolic of a growing nationalistic spirit." While they were regarded as "the real makers of Canada" it would be the Group of Seven, whose formative years occurred during the Laurier years, that would really bring Canadian art to the fore. See Brian S. Osborne, "Artists and national consciousness," in Alan Baker, and Gideon Biger, eds., **Ideology and Landscape in Historical Perspective**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 240-254.

[54]Parker, **The Beginnings of the Book Trade...**, p. 259.

public Art amongst the people of Canada." In 1910, the National Art Gallery was appointed a full-time curator, Eric Brown, who sought to not only to "preserve standards of great art", but to create a national school of Canadian painting that would be known throughout the country and world. Brown believed the acquisition of great art would enhance the country's prestige, for as he wrote, "No nation can be truly great until it has great art."[55]

In addition to the support of cultural institutions, the state sought to perpetuate a Canadian memory or historical consciousness through the development of several key identity infrastructures. These included the refurbishing of the nation's capital, the preservation of historical records and papers through the creation of a National Archives, and the commemoration of Canadian history and geography through the promotion of Canadian National Parks, and monuments, especially the Plains of Abraham.

i. The Nation's Capital

Capital cities are a distinctive feature of nation-states that attempt to produce, reproduce, and represent "national culture." They are a central component of the nationally organized apparatus - diplomacy, military, territorial administration - which are the logical outcome of nation-states.[56] They fulfil a "sociopolitical role" in that they provide a locale where the citizenry can take part in the shaping of a national discourse. Capital cities also serve as centres for the "production and distribution of public goods and services." Moreover, they have a "symbolic role" in

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[55]Tippett, **Making Culture...**, pp. 81-82.

[56]Anthony King, "Cultural Hegemony and Capital Cities," in John H. Taylor, et al. ed., **Capital Cities: International Perspectives**, Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1993, pp. 251-253.

echoing the norms and values of the population.[57] They are tools in the creation of imagined communities and invented traditions. They "send a message to the nation, affirming its distinctiveness and virtue," but also act as metaphors of unity reflecting the pluralism of the modern state.[58]

Laurier recognized these elements and promised that he would "make the city of Ottawa the centre of the intellectual development of [the] country, and the Washington of the North."[59] In 1899, the federal government organized the Ottawa Improvement Commission and agreed to spend $60,000 per year for twenty years to improve the capital.[60] They hired landscape architect, Frederick Todd, to create a plan. Since "a Capital city belongs to a certain extent to the whole country," he believed that the "general improvements for the Capital must be of a national character" and its development should not "throw discredit on the Nation." As such, he expressed confidence in the future of the capital:

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[57]Gilles Paquet, "Capital Cities as Symbolic Resources," John H. Taylor, et al. ed., **Capital Cities: International Perspectives**, Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1993, p. 271.

[58]John H. Taylor, "City form and capital culture: remaking Ottawa," **Planning Perspectives**, 4, 1989, pp. 79-105. For a general discussion of how the built environment is a central element in the construction of nationalism and systems of power, see Lawrence Vale, **Architecture, Power, and National Identity**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

[59]Laurier quoted in Ken Hillis, "A History of Commissions: Threads of an Ottawa Planning History," **Urban History Review**, Vol. XXI, No. 1, 1992, p. 46.

[60]See Wilfred Eggleston, **The Queen's Choice: A Story of Canada's Capital**, Ottawa: National Capital Commission, 1961; and, William DeGrace, "Canada's Capital 1900-1950: Five Town Planning Visions," **Environments**, 17, 2, 1985, pp. 43-57. This was occurring in the midst of the City Beautiful Movement which included not only architects but also concerned citizens who participated in clean-up campaigns and formed horticultural societies. See Harold Kalman, **A History of Canadian Architecture, Vol. 2**, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 651.

> Not only is Ottawa sure to become the centre of a large and populous district, but the fact that it is the Capital of an immense country whose future greatness is only beginning to unfold, renders it necessary that it shall also be the centre of all those things which are an index of man's highest intellectual attainments, and that it will be a city which will reflect the character of the nation, and the dignity, stability, and good taste of its citizens.[61]

In addition to parks and improved roads, between 1896 and 1913 the following government buildings were erected: A Laboratory at the Experimental Farm, the Dominion Observatory, the Printing Bureau, the Archives Building, the Victoria Memorial Museum, the Royal Canadian Mint, a Fuel Testing Plant, an Instrument Testing Building, the Connaught Building, and a Geodetic Building in connection with the Observatory.[62] While the actual refurbishing would take several decades, it all began under the Laurier administration. Growing responsibility as an independent nation-state required that Ottawa, as Canada's national capital city, supersede the imperial significance of London. The reality of the capital was one of control and order although symbolism was one of distinctiveness and unified national pride.

ii. Securing the Past: The National Archives

If national capitals give recognition to a state's

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[61]Frederick G. Todd, **Preliminary Report to The Ottawa Improvement Commission**, 1903, NAC, File 6885, T-56, pp. 1-6.

[62]Eggleston, **The Queen's Choice...**, p. 160. Hull did not become part of the National Capital Region until 1967, after which government buildings were established there. The strong federal government presence combined with the shift of English-speaking public servants to live in Hull, thereby changing the linguistic and religious composition of that area's population, explains that region's strong anti-separation stance. See Donald C. Rowat, "Ways of Governing Federal Capitals," in John H. Taylor, et al. ed., **Capital Cities: International Perspectives**, Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1993, p. 163.

sovereignty in the present, then national archives give official recognition to a country's past. Nations often require a detailed past if they are to be recognized as a legitimate social and political construct in the international community. The National Archives had been attempting to secure Canadian history since its creation in 1872. However, growing concern over the lack of a uniform system of records keeping prompted the federal government to form a Departmental Commission on Public Records in 1897. As a result of its investigations, the Commission recommended that the activities of the Archives Branch of the Department of Agriculture and the Records branch of the Department of the Secretary of State be centralized in one agency. Little was done until Lord Minto prompted Laurier to accelerate the process arguing that it "would be of the greatest possible value to the history of the Dominion..."[63] By 1903, an Order in council brought together the former functions of the Dominion Archivist and the Keeper of Public Records under one authority. On May 16, 1904 Arthur Doughty, former journalist and librarian, was appointed Dominion Archivist and keeper of Public Records.

Doughty was committed to getting all the provinces interested in preserving and "revising" Canadian history. He believed "that a good understanding between the races would be brought about by this means for much of the ill feeling that exists can be traced to passages in books which are constantly in the hands of our youth."[64] Doughty saw the creation of an Historical Manuscript Commission as a "truly patriotic work for Canada...which would make the people take a real pride in their country." Indeed, he felt that "until people...realize that documents which will illustrate the history of the

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[63]Minto to Laurier, 19 January, 1903, cited in P. Stevens and John Saywell, eds., **Lord Minto's Canadian Papers**, 2 Volumes, Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1981, pp. 249-251.

[64]Doughty to Minto, 28 November, 1904, Minto Papers.

country are worth preserving, we cannot expect them to take any interest in the present or future of the country."[65] By 1906 the first permanent Archives building was opened and Doughty's Historical Manuscripts Commission was implemented in 1907. Composed of five historians, this commission supported the Dominion Archivist in his efforts to develop and establish an archival policy. A Manuscript Division and a National Map Collection were also created. By 1910, the Victoria Memorial Museum was in full operation, showcasing geological findings relating to Canada.

All these developments relate to Anderson's contention that maps and museums shaped the way in which developing nations imagined their domain. For example, the Canadian stamp issued to mark the inauguration of imperial penny postage proudly displayed all the Dominions of the Empire in an imperial red dye. As an example of a map-as-logo, it simultaneously served as a patriotic symbol for Canadian imperialists and a powerful anti-imperial emblem for Canadian nationalists. This demarcating of "an exclusive sovereignty between other sovereignties" with maps combined with a "museumizing imagination" contributed to the classification of what existed within a state's territory and belonged to the nation, and how it defined who they were.[66]

Modern memory is archival as it relies entirely on the materiality of the trace and the immediacy of the recording.[67] There could be no Canadian historiography until the documents and artifacts that gave it substance were collected, sorted, and stored for future use by historians. Like a museum, the archives gives form to a national identity

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[65]Doughty to Minto, 9 December, 1905, Minto Papers.

[66]Anderson, **Imagined Communities**, Chapter Ten.

[67]J. Gillis, "Memory and Identity," in J. Gillis, ed., **Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. p. 15.

by officially recognizing and chronicling all the people, places, and events that have contributed to the Canadian experience. It gives an institutional base to a shared past and contributes to the backward glancing that often characterize nationalism.

iii. Commemorations: People and Places of Memory

Nowhere was the goal of unified national pride more noticeable than in the officially state-designed commemoration of the Plains of Abraham. Commemorations of significant historical events generate a shared national identity by giving memories an official character. Canadians had been commemorating their fallen on a local level since 1886. In both Toronto and Winnipeg, "Decoration Day" became an occasion to remember the sacrifices Canadians had made to preserve their nation. Initially, the event only included the 1866 engagement at Ridgeway with the Fenians. However, by 1903 the event had been magnified to further include veterans of the Northwest Rebellion and the Anglo-Boer War. In speaking of the patriotism of Canadian forefathers who "had so valiantly defended our borders" E.F. Clarke MP, was using the nationalistic rhetoric necessary in promoting a shared national memory.[68] Similarly, the many publicly, corporately, and privately funded South African War plaques and monuments contributed to the "nationalization" of Canadians through the shared celebration of the valour and patriotism of Canadian soldiers. The most interesting suggestion was made by Quebec premier, E.N. Parent. He supported the Canadian Club's campaign to build a national monument and suggested that the Plains of Abraham was the best location because it would "show that at the beginning of the new century the two races of

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[68]Maroney, **The 'Peaceable Kingdom'...**, pp. 367-372.

Canada joined hands and united" to aid the mother country.[69]

As significant as these local commemorations are, it was the involvement of the state in creating national historic sites that had the most profound impact. Although the national historic parks and sites program was founded in 1919, its roots go back almost half a century. Two developments in particular were of significance; the conservation movement and the heritage movement.

The state's commitment to national parks grew out of earlier conservation initiatives (discussed in previous chapter). The national forest reserves were viewed as having recreational as well as economic value. Moreover, the government saw how this recreational value could be translated into a commercial value by promoting tourism. Canada's first national park, Rocky Mountain Park, was established by ordinance in 1885 and by the Dominion Act in 1887. It became the hub for outdoor enthusiasts as did Jasper National Park (1907) and Buffalo National Park (1908). With a desire to create such sites across Canada, but faced with financial constraints, the head of the Dominions Park Branch proposed that a new branch be created, one that would combine the interests of national parks with those of the growing heritage movement. For him Canadian children would then be "gaining the benefit of outdoor recreation" while "at the same time have opportunities of absorbing historical knowledge under conditions that could not fail to make them better Canadians."[70]

The heritage movement in Canada included many local

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[69]Carman Miller, **Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War 1899-1902**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press and the Canadian War Museum, 1993, pp. 433-436.

[70]C.J. Taylor, **Negotiating the Past: The Making of Canada's Historic Parks and Sites**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990, p. 29.

organizations made up of members of the local elite and well educated members of the propertied class. They collaborated through national agencies such as the Royal Society of Canada and the Heritage Landmarks Association which was formed in 1907. The latter defined a landmark as

> ...anything preservable which is essentially connected with the great thoughts and deeds that once stirred our life and still stir our memory. It may be a monument set up by pious hands; a building, a ruin, or a site; a battlefield or fort; a rostrum or a poet's walk; any natural object; any handiwork of man; or even the mere local habitation of a legend or a man.

The organization stressed that

> ...wherever we go, some landmark reminds us who preceded or begat us. Norseman and Basque; Indian of mountain, wood, or plain; French of the old régime; French Canadian as coureur de bois and voyageur, seigneur or simple habitant; British Islander of every kin, United Empire Loyalist, and Anglo-Canadian born and bred; explorer, trader, missionary, priest; soldier and sailor; statesman and orator; and the first promise of author, artist and the man of science - each has left landmarks to tell their story to all who listen understandingly.[71]

These groups had already received some support for the creation of such sites as Lundy's Lane and Stoney Creek Battlefields in Ontario, the commemorations of the Battle of Chateauguay and Fort Chambly in Quebec, and the preservation of Louisbourg in Nova Scotia. Faced with many demands for the official recognition of historic sites and national shrines across the country, it became the responsibility of the state to resolve the conflicting concerns and perspectives into a single program. As a federal agency and one of Canada's largest cultural institutions, it recognized how these

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[71]Copy of the Historic Landmarks Association's first journal. Lieut.-Col. William Wood to Laurier, 13 January, 1908, Laurier Papers.

national historic sites, whether they be national, regional, or local, could serve to inform Canadians of their past and provide a national outlook.[72] The state began to acquire individual sites and shaped the outlook of the program. The preservation of tolerance and diversity was maintained in the state's use of historic sites. Rather than exercising hegemony over dissident outlooks and in an attempt to avoid confrontation, the state encouraged regional interests. There were 353 square miles devoted to National and Historical parks in 1895, but by 1911 the number had increased to 4,028 square miles.[73]

While the official program did not begin until 1919, perhaps the most overt example of "nation" building during the Laurier period was the celebration of Quebec's tercentenary and development of the Plains of Abraham as a National Battlefield Park. Hutchinson has demonstrated that the 1967 centenary celebration in Canada is an example of an "ambitious and self-conscious experiment in nation-building." For Hutchinson, the Canadian celebration is significant because it typifies the attempts made by "immigrant nations" or "New World societies" to glorify their success in building a nation over a vast territory that had a multi-cultural character.[74] However, the tercentenary of the establishment of Quebec City celebrated in 1908 was one of the most marked festivities in Canadian history. It was on a par with the Canadian Centennial in 1967 in that it too generated wide-spread celebrations across the country for months, culminating in historical

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[72]Taylor, **Negotiating the Past**, pp. x, xiv, and 3.

[73]M. Urquhart, and K. Buckley, eds., **Historical Statistics of Canada**, Toronto: Macmillian, 1965, p. 314. For Provincial Parks the increase was from 7,585 to 8,413 square miles.

[74]John Hutchinson, **Modern Nationalism**, London: Fontana, 1994, p. 165. Also see Lyn Spillman, **Nation and Commemoration: Creating national identities in the United States and Australia**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

pageants at Quebec, a sail-past of British warships on the St. Lawrence, and a royal visit by H.R.H The Prince of Wales.[75] Stimulated by the plans of Sir George Garneau, then Mayor of Quebec City, and the enthusiasms of Lord Grey, the Governor-General, a movement began to commemorate the tercentenary of Quebec in some permanent way.[76]

Laurier had previously demonstrated that he was in favour of such commemorations. But, anticipating Anderson's discussion of collective amnesia, was also sensitive to the importance of transcending those aspects of social memory that antagonize national unity. In 1900, he gave a speech to a predominantly British-Canadian gathering at Fort Louisbourg, which for him had been "consecrated by the blood of your forefathers, the English, and my forefathers, the French," and suggested that

> the memory of those conflicts of the last century be forever forgotten, or should they be remembered, let the lesson be that they strove to do their duty to their country. They did their duty; let us do ours whether we be English, Scotch, Irish, or French...It is and shall be my effort and ambition to make of this country a nation in which all the elements shall be united and shall be heard of in future ages.[77]

Grey would later favour the idea of preserving the Louisbourg fortifications, "the Mecca of the Anglo Saxon race on this

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[75]For a full description of the festivities, see Jean Provencher's "The Park of Memories" in J., Mathieu, and Eugene Kedl, eds., **The Plains of Abraham: The Search for the Ideal**, Quebec: Serptentrion, 1993.

[76]Grey was interested in promoting Canadian nationalism, but it was of an imperial variety. He considered the Quebec battlefields proposals "not as proposals affecting provincial or even national interests but as a matter of Imperial concern." See Moyles and Owram, **Imperial Dreams and Colonial Realities...**, p. 108.

[77]Laurier speech cited in Louisbourg Heritage Society, **Heritage Notes**, No. 4, 1994.

side of the Atlantic", which he thought would "satisfy and stimulate national sentiment."[78]

But it was the Plains of Abraham that would really consume Grey. The almost numinous importance of them is explicitly detailed in his letter to King Edward:

> You can imagine the shock felt by the visitor who approaches Quebec for the first time with emotions similar to those felt by the Mahommedan on his first sight of Mecca, when he looks up to the Plains of Abraham, where the destiny of North America was decided, and the foundation of Your Majesty's Self-governing Dominions across the seas was laid, and sees no inspiring monument like the statue of Liberty which by the bounty of France has been placed at the entrance to the harbour of New York, but only a great frowning ugly and abominable gaol!...[79]

Grey strongly believed that "The National Spirit in Canada [was] still very inarticulate," and he hoped that the transformation of the battlefields into some form of memorial would contribute to "the fusing of the two races of the Dominion."[80] He was confident that French-Canadians would support the idea because the idea "originated with the Canadians of French descent," including Laurier, and "because the battle of Ste Foye fought on the Plains in 1760, secured them for all time the full and absolute right to the enjoyment of their own laws, language and religion." He curiously added that he had "discovered only recently" that just as "Englishmen with Norman blood in their veins do not call themselves French Englishmen" so too "Canadians with French pre-conquest blood in their veins dislike to be called French

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[78]Grey to Laurier, 5 August, 1905, Grey papers. Underlining in original.

[79]Grey to King Edward, 21 October, 1907, Grey Papers.

[80]Grey to King, 16 December, 1907, and Grey to Arthur Bigge, 24 June, 1908, Grey Papers.

Canadians. They are Canadians."[81] Yet, Grey felt that in Quebec there was an "undercurrent of a defeated nationality" which he found "pathetic" and did not want to exacerbate.[82]

Certainly, Laurier's enthusiasm was dampened as the preparations increasingly took on an "Imperial character," and were less concerned with commemorating Champlain's voyage.[83] Nationalists like Henri Bourassa shared this view and were suspicious of the intent of the ceremonies. To Goldwin Smith he wrote,

> In my soul, there is not a shadow of a doubt, knowing Lord Grey as I have learned to know him in Ottawa, that he decided, from the beginning, to transform the celebration of the birth of Québec and of French Canada into a grand historic reminder of the Conquest in order to show his imperialist friends in London that the new imperial religion has made progress among French Canadians. His second objective consists of affecting the spirit of French Canadians by rubbing their noses in the notion of imperial grandeur. Very adroitly, he has played on the sensitive cord or the weak spot of our political representatives: their vanity. He has thus managed to bring together a good number of people who never have been and never will be imperialists to take part in this great comedy.[84]

Other nationalists, such as Armand Lavergne who voted in favour of the bill creating the National Battlefields Commission, reminded the government that it was the memory of Champlain that was to be honoured, and not the imperial connection.[85] Eugène Taché, the Quebec architect, gave tribute to the province's French and English roots by

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[81]Grey to Crewe, 4 May, 1908, Grey Papers, underlining in original.

[82]Grey to Bryce, 26 December, 1908, Grey Papers.

[83]Grey to Lyttelton, 3 March, 1908. Grey Papers.

[84]Provencher, "The Park of Memories," p. 247.

[85]Debates, 18 March, 1908, pp. 5209-5210.

inscribing on a medal coined to commemorate the tercentenary the lines: "With the help of God, Champlain's work born under the lilies grew under the roses."[86]

In 1906, these "national battlefields" were covered with factories, a jail, a skating arena, buildings of several religious orders, militia quarters, and private residences. The original intent of Garneau's committee, the Quebec Landmark Commission, was to construct a national museum. However, Laurier favoured the creation of a national park whereby "the story of the battlefields [would be] told to the visitor by the methods of Gettysburg."[87] To this end, Laurier sent Dr. Doughty, Dominion Archivist and Keeper of Public Records, to visit Gettysburg battlefields and copy their methods.[88] In its original report the committee reminded the government how "the shrewd, alert Americans" had already "set apart the Yellowstone and the field of Gettysburg as heirlooms of the state for ever."[89]

The Commission described the site as "the living embodiment of" Canada's "ancestral spirit at the zenith of its aspiration and achievement." Reverence for the past was the "responsibility" and "mark of all great peoples". For instance, "could modern Greece have come into being at all, could Italy have become a nation or Germany an empire, unless there had been Greeks, Italians and Germans who understood the living forces of an inspiring history?"[90]

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[86]Gaston Deschênes, historian at the Library of the National Assembly in Quebec City, cited in "Licenced to remember in Quebec," **Globe and Mail**, 17 March, 1994: A13.

[87]Grey to Laurier, 20 September, 1907, Grey Papers.

[88]Laurier to Grey, 4 October, 1907, Grey Papers.

[89]**First Report of the Quebec Landmark Commission**, Quebec, 1907 NAC, RG90, Vol 1-5, M-1991, p. 41.

[90]**First Report of the Quebec Landmark Commission**, p. 38.

The report argued that all the great nation building projects - the bridging the St. Lawrence at Cap Rouge, building new transcontinental railways, and the settling of the west - was "inherited from the national heroes of the Plains of Abraham." They were considered national heroes because,

> they represented all the dominant elements of Canadian life today. We might call them international with equal truth; for France, the British Empire and the United States all shared alike in glorious victory and in defeat with honour.....Here they set us forever an example of the highest self-sacrifice and discipline. For here was the very crucible in which our several races were tried and tried again in the intense fire of war; tried and not found wanting....and here, on these world-celebrated Heights and Plains of Abraham, they unite us all forever in a single glory and on a single field.[91]

Much of the report was aimed at persuading French Canadians not to view themselves as a conquered people, but as part of a larger Celtic "race."[92] It asserted that "the field, the men, the memories are one - one living, moving and inspiring whole" that served to remind Canadians that the nation had "been deepened by the Celtic blood in our admingled races?" It was strongly reiterated that the battlefield should be preserved by both French and British Canadians because,

> ...they are the very crucible in which our own several races were tried and tried again in the intensest fires of war; tried and not found wanting. If sterling national worth be wrought into heroic moulds only by national discipline, if discipline be always based on the sacrifice of self

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[91]**First Report of the Quebec Landmark Commission**, p. 3.

[92]During the same period in France, similar attempts at constructing a Celtic past were being conducted to aid national unity. See Krzysztof Pomian, "Franks and Gauls," in Pierre Nora, **Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. I: Conflicts and Divisions**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 27-76.

> for the public good, and if the highest of all self-sacrifice be that of life itself; then surely, sterling national worth was wrought for us there, five generations since, by those who followed the different ideals they believed in to the very death. And these well-tried, faithful men are still the best of what we are ourselves. Their blood pulses through our veins; their transmitted energy is ours, though chiefly used in other ways of service to the State; their bright example still shines before us: and here, on these world celebrated Heights and Plains of Abraham, they unite us all for ever in a single glory and on a single field.[93]

On 15 January, 1908 Governor-General Earl Grey spoke at the Canadian Club in Ottawa, reiterating much of the initial plans. For him the battle of Quebec gave birth to the Canadian nation in that,

> Today the inhabitants of the Dominion are neither English nor French. They stand before the world not as English or French, but as Canadian. It is from inspiring standpoint of Canadian nationality that the proposal to celebrate the three hundredth birthday of Canada, by the nationalization of the famous Battlefields of Quebec, should win the enthusiastic support of every patriotic Canadian.[94]

It was decided that the site of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (1759) between Wolfe and Montcalm and the Battle of Ste. Foy (1760) between Levis and Murray should be preserved as a national park. The celebrations began on July 21, 1908, rather than in 1909 which would be the 150th anniversary of Wolfe's victory. The week-long celebrations included eight historical pageants, the most important being the historical re-enactment of the battle requiring 4500 actors and extras, but there were also parades, military reviews, concerts, balls, receptions, regattas, a fireworks display, and symbolic

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[93]**First Report of the Quebec Landmark Commission**, pp. 38-40.

[94]**Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs**, 1908, p. 239.

tree planting.[95] Canada took the opportunity to show off its armed forces, parading some 12,422 troops of its permanent force and militia.[96]

Special notice was taken of the attendence of three particular nations. "The three nations most intimately concerned with the wars of this continent were represented. France which founded Canada, Great Britain which won it on the Plains of Abraham, and the United States of America, which tried to win it from the British and failed."[97] Indeed, there was an overt attempt to recognize Canada's emerging role as an important member of the international community. "In the midst of an era of unprecendented development, the country turns aside to laud its past and unconsciously takes its place among the older peoples of the world."[98]

The official speeches emphasized Canada's founding moment, its subsequent development, and stressed the seemingly successful integration of its two dominant cultures. Certainly, Laurier's greeting to the Prince of Wales echoed these themes:

> Three hundred years ago, almost on this very spot, the heroic Samuel de Champlain laid the foundations of this ancient city, and with admirable constancy and courage, laboured for many years, in the face of privations and hardships inumerable, in the noble work of implanting in the heart of a savage wilderness the blessings of Christianity and civilization. His equally undaunted successors carried on his work after him until at length their prophetic vision was realized, and the grain of mustard seed has grown into a great tree whose branches overshadow the land.....it is fitting that

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[95]Provencher, "The Park of Memories," p. 251.

[96]The **Gazette**, July 25, 1908, p. 1.

[97]The **Gazette**, 21 July, 1908, p. 1. It is interesting that there was no mention of the impact of the American Revolution on the British settling of Canada.

[98]The **Globe**, 20 July, 1908, p. 1.

> the scene of these exploits, and especially the ground upon which Montcalm and Wolfe strove with equal valour for the mastery, should be set apart as a perpetual memorial by English and French Canadians, of the great deeds in which both peoples feel an equal pride.[99]

Mayor Garneau's address was similar:

> Assembled round the monmument of the glorious founder of Canada, our hearts filled with heroic memories of three centuries, the story of which seems more like an epic than a history, the French-Canadians cannot supress an inexpressible feeling of patriotic pride and of gratitude towards the two great nations which have, in turn, presided over their destinies, to their ever beloved France, to whom they they are indebted for their being and their grand traditions, and to England, which has left them free to expand in the full enjoyment of their faith, their language, and their institutions, and has given them a political constitution which is based upon the greatest possible extent of liberty, and is undeniably the finest and most perfect in the world.
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> This sentiment, moreover, must be still further heightened in all Canadians, of every origin, in the presence both of this magnificant display in honour of the immortal Champlain and of this tribute to the young and vigorous nation, which born as if it were yesterday, has expanded with gigantic strides over an area vast enough to contain another empire.[100]

Speeches given by the representatives of France, Britain, the United States, and the other Dominions repeated these themes and pointed to Canada's newly achieved international status. Laurier was "proud" to boast "that Canada is the freest country in the world." He added that "in this country liberty of all kinds, civil and religious liberty, flourish to the highest degree" and that this contributed to eliminating

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[99]**The Gazette**, 23 July, 1908, p. 1.

[100]**The Gazette**, 24 July, 1908, p. 1.

the inferiority of Canada's colonial status.[101] Sir DeVilles, Chief Justice of Cape Colony, speaking on behalf of South Africa, noted how Canada had "shown the way to the constitutional development of the British colonies." Earl Dudley, Governor-General of Australia saw Canada as "an imposing spectacle" in that, "a great assemblage, composed of men of different races and different religious beliefs" were "united by a common love of their native land." For him, "the national edifice of Canada," its foundations deep and its walls strong, "stands as we see it, not for today or tomorrow, but for all time, a glorious and enduring monument to the genius of two great races and the beneficial effect of self-governing institutions." Vice-President Fairbanks, of the United States, spoke of the 5,000 mile undefended border and how Canada and the United States did not "covet the other's territory" but rather "each other's neighbourly esteem."[102]

It was concluded that the festivities celebrated the victor without displeasing the vanquished. The souvenir-book committee believed "that harmony is possible between the two races, French and English, through bringing together of their flags."[103] Bryce regarded Grey's efforts as "a real triumph," especially having completed the celebrations "with no friction or manifestations of latent displeasure on the part of the French-speaking element..."[104]

In 1911 a similar commemoration resulted when a committee of "patriotic Canadians" was formed by E.W. Villeneuve. The "Ancien Commissaire de la Ville de Montréal," wished to commemorate the life and work of Sir George-Etienne Cartier. Cartier had been key in reconciling French Canadians to

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[101]The **Globe**, 27 July, 1908, p. 2.

[102]The **Globe**, 24 July, 1908, p. 1 and p. 2.

[103]Provencher, "The Park of Memories," p. 251.

[104]Bryce to Grey, 10 August, 1908, Grey Papers.

Confederation and in supporting their culture; had been co-premier with Sir John A. Macdonald in the Union parliament of 1857-1862; had promoted the development of Canadian railroads; had negotiated with the Hudson's Bay Company for its cession of lands in Canada's west; had contributed to the creation of Manitoba and British Columbia, and; had been Canada's First Minister of Militia and Defence. Moreover, he advocated a certain degree of anti-Americanism when he expressed the opinion that, "It is necessary to be anti-Yankee...we can and will build up a northern power." From a nationalist's perspective, Cartier had participated in the major developments of a nationalizing Canadian state, especially the melding of the founding "races", territorial expansion and consolidation, and national defence. Not surprisingly, the Federal government donated $20,000 to the memorial fund, provincial governments followed suit, and leading establishment figures and members of the general public contributed to the national subscription list.[105]

Like any commemoration, the Plains of Abraham and the Cartier monument, exemplified a backward-looking nationalism that sought to celebrate or perpetuate the memory of important historical events, ideals, individuals, and social groups. It aimed at not only transmitting communal emotions across space and time, but across cultures that were historically opposed. Canadian elites even propagated their ideas of plurality to other nationalizing states. At the inauguration of the South African Union, Lemieux suggested that the "welding of Briton and Boer into one eduring nationality" was an experiment that could take reassurance in the "one notable precedent of the happy solution of difficulties surrounding the existence of a dual nationality under one flag" - Canada. For Lemieux, "the

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[105]See Brian S. Osborne, "Constructing Landscapes of Power: The George Etienne Cartier Monument, Montreal," Unpublished paper.

nationalization of two peoples" had "been achieved without the elimination of ancestral pride, custom, or language. Yet, it has produced this unusual and unexpected result of Unity of national sentiments, ideals, and ambitions."[106] In this way, the state was contributing to the fabrication of a new Canadian national identity that would be recognized both at home and abroad.

7.4 SUMMARY

In 1907, Samuel Moffett wrote that "the English-speaking Canadians protest that they will never become Americans - they are already Americans without knowing it."[107] For him, communications and the flow of trade bound the two democratic countries together. However, he failed to acknowledge a significant difference between the two. The Canadian state was founded upon, and continued to uphold, principles of linguistic duality, cultural diversity and minority rights which distinguished it fundamentally from the American which protected individual rather than collective liberties. Moffet's error in focusing on cultural rather than political character was recognized by the Australian traveller H.S. Gullet in 1911, who agreed that Canadians might be American in "form," but emphatically denied "that Canada is becoming Americanized in the national sense."[108]

Right up until the turn of the century, Canada had always been a frontier region heavily dependent on state support.

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[106]Lemieux, Rodolphe, **Speech Delivered By the Honourable Rodolphe Lemieux, K.C. Postmaster General of Canada On The Occasion of The Inauguration of the South African Union**, Federal Press Agency: Ottawa, 1910, pp. 5-6 and 10.

[107]Allan Smith, **Canada - An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind**, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1994, pp. 70-71.

[108]Smith, **Canada - An American Nation?**, p. 82.

Canadian sense of difference emerged from the meaningful appropriation of their political dependency. In resistance to authority or in seeking assistance, Canadians came to identify with their state. For Clark, as well as Lipset and Porter, the state controlled frontier, the threat of American expansionism, and the loyalist tradition, all contributed to the formation of a Canadian national identity and its conservative traditions.[109] Clark believed that the metropolitan economic interests of local manufacturers and entrepreneurs were translated into a nationalist ideology which included an acceptance of the role of the state in protecting and expanding the frontiers.[110] George Grant referred to this as a "Conservative Nationalism," while Porter argued that English and French Canadians are "more alike in their conservativism, traditionalism, religiosity, authoritarianism, and elitist values than the spokesmen of

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[109]S.D. Clark, **The Developing Canadian Community**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, pp. 207-242; Martin Lipset, "Value Differences, absolute or relative: the English-speaking democracies." in **The First New Nation: The United States in Historical Perspective**, New York: Basic Books, 1963, pp. 248-273; Lipset, "Revolution and counterrevolution: The United States and Canada," in **Revolution and Counter-revolution**, New York: Basic Books, 1968, pp. 31-63; Lipset, "Radicalism in North America: a comparative view of the party systems in Canada and the United States," **Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada**, Series IV, 14, 1976, pp. 19-55; Lipset, "Canada and the United States: the cultural dimension," in C. Doran and J. Sigler, eds., **Canada and the United States**, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, pp. 109-160, 1985; Lipset, **Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canda**, New York: Routledge, 1990; and John Porter, **The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

[110]Marlene Shore, **The Science of Social Redemption: McGill, the Chicago School, and the Origins of Social Research in Canada**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987, p. 154.

either group are prepared to admit."[111]

Where did these shared experiences and sentiments come from? Opposition to a common enemy has often bound a diverse collection of people into a nation.[112] Certainly, the development of a strong national spirit in Canada was aided by the perceived expansionist aims of the United States, not to mention the memory of 1812, and the Fenian raids.[113] For Governor General Grey, there existed

> ...the consciousness that we in Canada are producing a more strenuous and finer people, and developing a national life along a higher plane. This consciousness will cause Canadians to become more proud every year, I hope not too pharisaically, of their National superiority over the Americans. They have played their game very

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[111]George Grant, **Lament for a Nation**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965, and John Porter, "Canadian Character in the Twentieth Century," **Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, 370, 1967, p. 56. While recent research has suggested that there are growing cultural similarities between Canadians and Americans, they are still significant differences in terms of attitudes towards the state, Canadians favouring more state involvement than Americans. Lipset, **Continental Divide**; Suzanne Peters, **Exploring Canadian Values: A Synthesis Report**, Canadian Policy Research Newtworks: Ottawa, 1995; and Michael Adams, **Sex in the Snow: Canadian Social values at the End of the Millennium**, Toronto: Viking, 1996. Neil Nevitte, "Bringing Values "Back In": Value Change and North American Integration," in Donald Barry, et. al., eds., **Towards a North American Community? Canada, the United States, and Mexico**, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, finds Canadians as being far less reluctant continentalists than is sometimes supposed, although he does not explore attitudes towards government social policy.

[112]A recent example of this is Linda Colley's, **Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. See Chapter Two of this thesis for more detail.

[113]The anti-Americanism element of Canadian nationalism has been most recently explored by J.L. Granatstein's, **Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism**, Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996. For him, Canadians "have come to define themselves not as they were and are, but in contradistinction from that great and grasping neighbour."

> badly. They had their chance of incorporating Canada and lost it....They kicked into Canada a national Spirit.[114]

But with Canada there was a French allegiance to a powerful internal force and a British allegiance to an equally powerful external force. A truly distinct Canadian national identity would take time to develop. In addition, it would have to avoid exasperating French Canadian and British Canadian sentiments while not alarming the United States with an aggressive chauvinistic nationalism that usually emerges against neighbouring nation-states.

Certainly, the prevailing thought that nations were natural social units was enough, with comparatively little in the way of nationalist movements or officially promoted nationalisms, to form a Canadian "national" identity. Yet, as it has been demonstrated above, some measures were taken to build the necessary infrastructures of identity. Besides the support of Canadian cultural products, the Canadian state acted like many other states in promoting nationhood through the commemoration and memorializing of the past. All of these measures had two dimensions: geopolitical relations, and shared national experiences.[115] Claims about position in the world and shared experiences made claims to nationhood plausible. These two dimensions made nationality matter. In the absence of envisaged relations with powerful others, and shared experience, there would have been nothing to celebrate. In their absence there would have been no grammar for discussions of national identity to make sense.

Relations to the rest of the world defined national identity in two ways: the world's recognition confirmed a distinct Canadian identity, and an identification with other

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[114]Grey to Crewe, 8 December, 1909, Grey Papers.

[115]See Spillman, **Nation and Commemoration**, pp. 91-93 and 137-156.

powerful nations, especially Britain, France, and the United States, also strengthened it. The imagined community of the nation was constructed partly in the imagining of the estimation of other nations and identification with other nations. Ideas about the country's place in the world - Laurier always considered the twentieth century to be Canada's century - were very important to elites making the celebrations and were strongly linked to other ideas about what the nation shared.

Shared experiences were also a constitutive part of national identity. Those who spoke of the nation during these celebrations envisioned a shared historical experience of a founding moment and progress since. The founding moment was more relevant to French Canadians, and progress to British Canadians and newly arrived immigrants, but a history of progress since a founding moment was common to all Canadians. Shared collective qualities of the contemporary community were also a constitutive part of the Canadian national identity, especially ideas of what was shared across internal social and political boundaries. Gillis has argued that "democratic societies need to publicize rather than privatize the memories and identities of all groups, so that each may know and respect the other's versions of the past, thereby understanding better what divides as well as unites us."[116] Canadian commemorations during this period were, for the most part, concerned with celebrating its plurality, or at least duality, through the use of such civil spaces.

Such state initiatives were all significant state sponsored activities that contributed to the imagining of a Canadian national identity. The significance of all these actions directed towards creating a Canadian national identity must not be exaggerated. Yet taken together they accomplished what one historian of cultural protection describes as "the

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[116]Gillis, **Commemorations**, p. 20.

first few hesitant and tentative steps" toward using state power to build a national culture.[117] These efforts made by Canadian statesmen exemplified their concern with the deliberate development of a Canadian historical consciousness that would help promote a Canadian nationality that transcended simple "racial" sentiments.

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[117]A.D. Gilbert, "On the Road to New York: The Protective Impulse and the English Canadian Cultural Identity, 1896-1914," **Dalhousie Review**, 58, 1978, p. 412.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CRITICAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

8.1 LAURIER'S CLOSING YEARS

If it is true that diplomacy is the art of letting someone else have your way, Laurier had done this successfully for many years. However, caught between the conflicting demands of imperialists and anti-imperialists, and weakened by the defection of many influential businessmen who opposed Laurier's scheme for reciprocity with the United States, the government fell in the election of September 21, 1911. Laurier continued his political career as leader of the opposition and never relinquished his liberal nationalism. Laurier saw the Ontario government's attempt to limit French language education as a violation of individual rights. He reminded the members that he had never "appealed either to race or to creed," and went on to argue that he had always "endeavoured on every occasion to find a solution by appealing to the consciences of all men who love freedom, justice, and tolerance."[1]

Unfortunately, the regulation remained in force, perhaps because most people were caught up in World War One enthusiasms and in British loyalties. Indeed, the most important political debate Laurier would face during this time was the conscription crisis. At the start of the war, all of Canada, including Quebec, supported the British cause. Even the nationalist Bourassa stated that it was Canada's duty "to contribute within the bounds of her strength and by means which are proper to herself, to the triumph, and especially to

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[1]Debates, 10 May, 1916, pp. 3703.

the endurance, of the combined efforts of France and England."[2] Yet most French Canadians, including Bourassa and Laurier, believed that such a contribution should be voluntary since Canada was not a primary but a secondary belligerent. In a letter Laurier said: "We are not fighting to repel an enemy - we never were threatened by invasion - but we fight to assist in a noble cause."[3] For Laurier, the noble cause was a fight "for freedom against oppression, for democracy against autocracy, for civilization against reversion to that state of barbarism in which the supreme law is the law of might."[4] While Laurier enthusiastically supported the war effort, he would not agree to conscription. Facing a shortage of manpower in 1917, Prime Minister Borden announced the government's intention to introduce a measure authorizing compulsory service. Laurier believed a referendum should be held to "let the people decide"[5] and in that way the war could still be won by "adhering to the principle collectively and individually."[6] Laurier's amendment for a referendum was defeated and the Military Service Act received royal assent on August 29, 1917.

During the following election, Borden offered a coalition government which Laurier refused on the grounds that he would have to accept conscription. Borden won the December 1917 election, but by the summer of 1918, the Liberal party gathered strength. Laurier announced that he was not resigning leadership of the party. His liberal philosophy was still evident in his speeches given the following winter. In an address to the Liberal Association at London, he reminded them

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[2]Cited in Ramsay Cook, et al., **Canada a Modern Study**, Toronto: Clark, Irwin, 1963, p. 191.

[3]Laurier to Rowell, 23 July, 1917, Laurier Papers.

[4]Debates, 10 August, 1914, p. 10.

[5]Laurier to Rowell, 3 June, 1917, Laurier Papers.

[6]Laurier to Rowell, 27 September, 1917, Laurier Papers.

that,

> ...many problems rise before you: problems of race division, problems of creed differences, problems of economic conflict, problems of national duty and national aspiration. Let me tell you that for the solution of these problems you have a safe guide, an unfailing light, if you remember that faith is better than doubt and love is better than hate...Let your souls be ever open to the promptings of faith and the gentle influence of brotherly love. Be adamant against the haughty, be gentle and kind to the weak. Let your aim and purpose, in good report or ill, in victory or defeat, be so to live, so to strive, so to serve as to do your part to raise ever higher the standard of life and of living.[7]

Laurier passed away in February 1919. Prime Minister Borden wrote privately that, "On the whole I think there never has been a more impressive figure in the affairs of our country."[8] Rodolphe Lemieux paid a final tribute to the man who he had shared ideas of Canadian independence:

> By healing the wounds of days gone by and rallying all for the development of our immense resources, he opened a new era, he anticipated the day when he could declare in the presence of his Sovereign: 'Sir, Canada is a nation. The nineteenth century belonged to the United States; but the twentieth century will witness the expansion for Canada.'[9]

Indeed, Laurier had not only strengthened and given legitimacy to the Liberal party,[10] but he had also guided Canada into

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[7]Laurier cited in O.D. Skelton, **Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier**, 2 Volumes, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971, p. 202.

[8]Quoted in Michael Bliss, **Right Honourable Men: The Descent of Canadian Politics from Macdonald to Mulroney**, Toronto: Harper-Collins, 1994, p. 60.

[9]Debates, 25 February, 1919, p. 11.

[10]The Liberals would win the general election in 1921 under Mackenzie King. Since 1900, Canada has been governed by the Liberals for 69 years, and French-Canadians for 42 years.

the twentieth century. The shifts in world geopolitics, especially those influencing North America, combined with the traditional Canadian and Quebec domestic concerns, had created fundamental obstacles and opportunities for the formation of a Canadian state-nation and national identity. While it is impossible to prove that things could have been otherwise, the Laurier state certainly ensured that things did not turn out the way British Imperialists, French-Canadian nationalists, and American expansionists wanted or expected at the time.

9.2 SOCIOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS

Much of the literature concerning the rise of nation-states and nationalism has aimed at answering one specific question: What accounts for the great variation over time and space in the kinds of nation-states that have prevailed? This thesis has followed in this vein, attempting to determine why and how a nationalizing Canadian state emerged at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. As such, this thesis has had a double focus. First, it has sought to demonstrate how the changing geopolitical environment influenced the shape of Canadian state formation. Second, it has argued that this process of state building had specific consequences for an emerging Canadian national identity. The logic being that nationalism is about access to resources, politics, and equality, and much less about identity, language, or ethnicity. It has achieved this by applying the recent literature on states and nationalism to the Canadian case through the use of historical sociology.

Historical sociology is particularly concerned with understanding pivotal changes in society. The Laurier years had a profound influence not only on the formation of the Canadian state, but in the way Canadians would identify with it and each other. This thesis has embraced the school of "old history" of political history in that it has been concerned with events and persons central to the development of Canada

as a nationalizing state. It has focused primarily on the role of statesmen and their actions in securing Canadian autonomy in diplomacy, arms, and territory. But it has also recognized the importance of incorporating those "limited identities" - classes, cultures, regions, and social groups - whose domestic concerns influence the actions of state elites.

Nationalism, among other things, is the sentiment that binds members of a nation to their state. Despite the work of primordialists, it is obvious that nationalism is a modern phenomenon. Modernists who stress the economic foundations of nationalism are certainly correct in assuming that the logic of industrialism contributes to the forces of national consolidation. However, in no way can it be construed as the preeminent force behind nationalism. Geopolitics and war have been the central force motivating the politics of national identity. The recent literature on nationalism has built on the rich literature on state formation. This literature has emphasized the role played by war. War makes states and states make war. But "the ratchet effect" of this process has been the emergence of nation-states. Nationalism is about politics, politics is about power, and power is about geopolitical competition. Previous constitutional approaches and economic accounts are not sufficient to explain the emergence of a nationalizing Canadian state. All of these have been insightful, but like economic accounts of nationalism they ignore the larger realm of geopolitics.

For Canadian state elites, the European-American model of nation-state building was inappropriate for the Canadian situation. This monolithic conquering model usually consisted of a process in which a centralized state establishes a single language, a single religion, a single educational system, and a single culture, all protected and enforced by an all powerful state backed by an equally powerful military apparatus. Canadian state elites did not follow this pattern for three fundamental reasons.

First, Canadian state elites were blessed with a comparatively benign geopolitical environment in which they were positioned between two liberal democracies and hegemons who were on increasingly good diplomatic terms with one other. The nationalizing Canadian state had no immediate hostile neighbour. As such, the intense military conflict which had been such an important factor in the emergence of European nation-states was almost entirely absent in the Canadian case. There was no need to galvanize the population with an aggressive "us" nationalism in order to counter a hostile "them" neighbouring enemy. Any such attempt would have amounted to geopolitical suicide. Its awkward geopolitical environment necessitated continuing relations with Britain. The very concept of geopolitics is almost entirely based on countervailing influences or powers. If a small-to-medium-sized country lives next to a large country, its only hope for a reasonable relationship with its big neighbour is to have other countries as allies to create an effective counterweight.

Second, Canadian state elites faced the necessity of appeasing an internally diverse population. From the 1840s on, Canadian state elites have been considerably ahead of European state elites in terms of creating a functioning, citizen based democracy. From the beginning the Canadian state has been based on the idea of complexity - different regions, different religions, different languages - when European and American states were still banning, eliminating, or homogenizing these elements. As a result it has given Canada an entirely different national experience. Canadian state elites have sought ways to work out how its citizens should live together, how to cooperate, and how to compromise - not in terms of their inidividual interests but in terms of shared ideas of the public good. As such, humanism, tolerance, and reconcilation have been the strategies Canadian state elites have learned for national survival.

Third, there are certain structural factors that make such a model difficult to apply. Canada was too poor, too big geographically, too disparate, too under-populated, and perhaps too northern. As a result Canada's urge to conquer was limited, if not detered, by inadequate resources and an demanding natural environment. It was not only a new society, but a new society inhabiting a new environment. This new environment was completely at odds with the old world experience of conquering an environment with thousands of years of "civilizing" history behind it.

This did not mean that Canadian state elites diverged completely from the monolithic state model. To suggest that Canada has diverted entirely from the traditional nation-state formation experience is both naive and incorrect. Geopolitics did matter. The emergence of a nationalizing Canadian state can be historically located at the cusp of British imperial decline and the rise of American prominence. It was during this period that the reach of the Canadian state grew significantly both domestically and externally. Essentially, Canadian state elites realized that in the face of British decline it had to modernize in order to fend off an increasingly expansionist United States. While outright war with the United States was not a likely occurrence, Canadians remembered that their neighbour to the south had attacked them during the War of 1812-13 and had done nothing to restrain the Fenian Raids in the sixties and seventies. Further, the United States had been unreasonable over the Alaskan award, and disputes over the management of the international fisheries were to be persistent.[11] Finally, Canadians could only be irritated by the expansionist aims of some Americans. These aims took many forms, ranging from the map of 1888 in the **New York World** showing Canada divided into twenty eight American

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[11]Events in 1997 suggest they still have not been resolved.

states,[12] to the premature rejoicing of President Taft over the political union which would follow on the Reciprocity Treaty. Therefore, for many Canadians, geopolitical prudence dictated that the Canadian state had to exercise its own diplomacy, develop its own military arm by which to defend the integrity of its diplomacy and borders, and consolidate its territory through expanding its infrastructural reach. All of this would further a modernizing Canadian economy.

Canadian state elites had discovered that they were better suited to define Canadian interests than Britain, especially when dealing with the United States. The Laurier administration went to great lengths to increase its political power by enlarging its role in diplomacy, especially international treaties, agreements, and conferences. It demanded its voice in the areas of commerce, immigration, the formation of boundaries, and military autonomy. It guaranteed its survival as an independent political entity by amplifying its voice in the international affairs and integrating itself into the international community.

In developing the state's military power, Canadian elites began the process of creating a Canadian army and navy. Since Britain was withdrawing from the western hemisphere, a Canadian army would defend British ports on Canadian soil and reduce British expenditures. Similarly, a Canadian navy was also accepted by Britain, although tighter British control would have been more acceptable. Further, the Laurier administration's evasion of Imperial consolidation set the precedent furthering Canadian military autonomy. The state, in effect, had harnessed the military power associated with an independent nation-state.

While military autonomy was being secured, the Canadian state was simultaneously expanding and transcending its

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[12]G.T Denison, **The Struggle for Imperial Unity**, Toronto, 1909, p. 104.

borders. Like most expanding states in the nineteenth century, Canada was caught up in the geopolitical necessity of securing its territory. It did this by exploring its Arctic territory and settling the West through the creation of national infrastructures such as railways, and the insertion of immigrants. These expeditions and newly arrived "Canadians" secured the state's claim to the territory in question. In addition to securing the territory, it increased its economic power by reaping the benefits of the country's primary resources that fuelled the modernization of its industry.

All of these developments led to the expansion of state activities. In addition to the military and diplomatic institutions, there was an overall increase in the infrastructural functioning of the state as it found it necessary to manage labour disputes, resources, education, transportation and communication. These were all significant for the "caging" of human and material resources and essential in maintaining the state's political, economic, and military power.

Certainly, the first half of the twentieth century brought dramatic and irrevocable changes in the role of government in Canada. Apart from a concern with maintaining national unity and gradually furthering Canadian autonomy, state elites had no overall strategy for state formation. Moreover, state elites did not always agree on the direction state formation should take. Several members of the state elite were either dismissed or induced to resign from the government when their ideas clashed with those of Laurier. Other elites, such as the governor-generals, saw Canadian state formation only in relation to a strengthening of the empire, and their ideas had to be taken with careful consideration. As is often the case, state formation is a messy and complicated process that relies on emulation more

than anything else.[13] Canadian state elites simply reacted to geopolitical changes with the accepted international conventions they had available to them. The new role in international affairs, its military responsibility, the consolidation of its territory, combined with an increase in population and dramatic economic growth required a transformation and modernization of the Canadian state. During Laurier's term in office, he met administrative challenges by creating new departments. Previous chapters have detailed how the actions of Germany, Japan, and the United States, prompted imperial pressures that compelled Laurier to establish Canada's Naval Department in 1910. However, this was consistent with his view of Canadian nationalism. Similarly, the poverty of official records, the dissatisfaction with British management of Canadian foreign policy, as exemplified in the Alaska Boundary settlement, and the achievements of Joseph Pope, resulted in the appearance of the External Affairs Department in 1909. But there were other developments. The increasing industrialization of the country gave rise to the Ministry of Labour in 1900, with separate status in 1909. The natural wealth of the Canadian shield and Rockies propelled the government to introduce the Mines department in 1906. These four new portfolio's were a direct reflection of the character of the period - two of them related to the economic prosperity and two to the growing nationalism in the country.

These precedents established by the Laurier government paved the way for further state growth during and after two world wars. In accordance with the general effect of wars on states, the Canadian experience was typical. The state grew tremendously. In the years between the Laurier election of 1896 and the end of the Second World War there was a dramatic

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[13]John Hall, **States in History**, New York: Basil Blackwell, pp. 164-165.

expansion in the responsibilities and size of the Canadian government at all levels. In its first year in office the total expenditures of the Laurier government were $42 million. The revenues that supported these expenditures were raised primarily by the indirect taxes provided by customs and excise duties, while spending was directed by 14 ministers presiding over a permanent civil service of around 5000 people.[14] However, after two world wars, the budget of the Canadian government had reached $5.2 billion in 1945. Its civil service consisted of 115,908 individuals whose wages were five times as great as the total Dominion budget of 1896.[15]

These are all classic indicators of an independent state. As a result of the growing responsibilities and powers of the Canadian state, there was an increase in the caging of social relations. In particular, there was an increase in the institutional abilities of the state to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions. The state's growing influence in territorial consolidation, military development and external affairs, combined with its interest in facilitating economic growth and developing its infrastructural power, corresponds with Mann's state-centred approach; in a geopolitical environment the political and economic power of states crystallizes and transforms them into nation-states. Just as war can intensify a sense of national identity, so too, but to a lesser degree, can the process of state formation, particularly those elements associated with its military strength. Geopolitics can be a driving force for modernization and central in the creation of the modern nation state as it creates the necessary institutions to function in the international arena.

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[14]**Canadian Sessional Papers**, 1897, Vol. 16a, vi.

[15]M.C. Urquhart, and K. Buckley, eds., **Historical Statistics of Canada**, Toronto: Macmillan, 1965, pp. 202 and 621.

As a peripheral society, far from a weakening centralized authority, the Canadian state began to exert its autonomy more than it ever had before. Certainly growth in the economy and in political autonomy during this period would have occurred in some degree under any leader. However, the rapid pace and nature of the moves towards Canadian autonomy and Canadian nationalism, was strongly influenced by the Laurier administration. Laurier was neither an idealist nor a dogmatist, but a pragmatist. The pragmatic decisions made by the Laurier administration would contribute greatly to the formation of the Canadian state and the promotion of a truly Canadian national identity that would appease the increasingly complex cultural configuration.

This leads to the other focus of the thesis. It has been suggested that this process of state building had specific consequences for an emerging Canadian national identity. These developments in state formation and the consequences they had for imperial disengagement exacerbated the existing "ethnies" and convinced Laurier of the benefits of a liberal nationalism. Indeed, there was no single nation that could be grafted onto the state. Rather, all political action in these areas was couched in a liberal nationalism that would appeal to everyone. Laurier had a genuine sympathy with the aims of British liberalism, but he was not an Imperialist, for he had a profound mistrust of military commitments abroad and an aversion to sacrificing Canadian interests to the interests of the Empire. Laurier constantly insisted that Canada must retain independence in Imperial affairs, and he resisted all attempts to encroach upon the Dominion's autonomy. Above all, he was a nationalist, opposing any policy which might upset the delicate balance of Canada's national duality. Laurier was, as he himself said, neither an Imperialist nor an anti-Imperialist, but a Canadian first, last, and all the time. This was consistent with his earlier beliefs: "If I have to choose between the duty I owe to England and the duty I owe my

native land, I stand by my native land."[16]

If geopolitics help shape domestic politics, the reverse is also true. Domestic policy and foreign policy are entwined. The Laurier regime faced more than a two-level political game. The presence of French and British Canadians created a second domestic level - that of national unity - that had to be incorporated into the political game. Clearly, the Laurier government's concern with the domestic issues of national unity and preserving the federal system could not be separated from the geopolitical pressures of British and American imperialism. To meet these twin concerns, the Laurier administration created Canadian institutions and policies under an overarching liberal doctrine or ideology of civic nationalism. Liberalism ensures that nationalism is authentic. It encourages people to belong to the national community for their own good. It does not enforce membership which would run the risk of insincere belonging or compliance. By not appealing to cultural exclusivity it circumvents the dangerous manifestations of nationalism that lurk in the sometimes historically inaccurate and romantically incurable past.

As Laurier recognized, of necessity, Canadian nationalism had to be heterogeneous, not homogeneous, flexible, not zealously uniform. Laurier chose liberalism as the workable model for Canadian nationalism. His emphasis on the individual's right to act politically as he wished appealed to the French-Canadian as well as to the British-Canadian. As a form of ideological power, Laurier's liberal nationalism contributed to the principles by which he was to lead Canada. Compromise and conciliation were thus indispensable for making a nation.[17]

This was Laurier's Canadianism: a liberal nationalism

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[16]Debates, 5 April, 1888, p. 563.

[17]Debates, 23 April, 1902, p. 3334.

which avoided extremes, a nation-minded liberalism sought to mediate and compromise in its search for what was best not for a part but for the whole of Canada. Laurier loved his French background deeply but for practical reasons put Canada first. Nation building is complex, particularly when the state is confronted with more than one dominant ethnic group. In mediating between two brands of ethnicity, the Canadian state, under the leadership of Laurier, ushered in a national spirit that has described as being "neither French nor British but wholly Canadian in sentiment."[18] While it was a compromise, it was nonetheless "a powerful compromise" that was characterized by moderation and toleration.

Indeed, the nationalism that evolved during the emergence of a nationalizing Canadian state was liberal and not solely based on cultural, ethnic or national characteristics. Liberal nationalism complemented a political system that had an advanced level of "stateness" combined with a relatively low level of "nationness."[19] Liberal nationalism grew out of the consociational process of accommodating a multicultural populace.[20] In this way it can be argued that Canada was one of the first "postmodern" nations.[21] It was postmodern

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[18]W.L. Morton, **The Canadian Identity**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, p. 51.

[19]Gwyn argues that the term state-nation best defines Canada. See Richard Gwyn, **Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian**, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995, pp. 17-19 and 254-267.

[20]A multi-national state - a state governing multiple contiguous regions by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures - does not always assume a liberal state. By state-nation I simply mean to imply a liberal multi-national state.

[21]J. Grimmond, "For Want of Glue," **The Economist**, June 29, 1991. Richard Gwyn (**Nationalism Without Walls**, Chapter 14) refers to others who have alluded to Canada being postmodern: Robert Fulford, "A Post Modern Dominion: The Changing Nature of Canadian Citizenship," in William Kaplan, ed., **Belonging:**

because it broke with past national sentiments that were expressed ethnically. Moreover, unlike the United States but similar to Switzerland and Belgium, Canada's commitment to federalism was based on its desire to accommodate ethnic differences. The Canadian identity was multiple and primarily civic in character. Lacking a unitary national identity, the state gave shape to the Canadian community. At the turn of the century it was predominantly French and British, yet it aspired to something greater than the both of them that would include a myriad of cultures. Canada had a unity in diversity that made it unique. The Canadian state's fusion of liberalism with nationalism influenced the way Canadian nationhood would be institutionalized and surely contributed to a "nationalism without walls."

Nevertheless, the attempts made by some state elites to create a common national identity based on shared experiences is a reminder that broad labels for types of national identities, like "liberal" or "ethnic," do not go very far in helping to understand the many ways communities can be imagined. Certainly an emerging Canadian identity was primarily liberal, yet the "emotional glue" used to secure the many cultural fragments shared many similarities with the imaginings of ethnic nationalisms. There was a conscious effort to induce an emotional memory of a past in which all members of the community had cooperated for the common good of the emerging nation. In addition, state elites hoped that a consequence of this shared "national" experience would be greater recognition in the geopolitical arena by other, more powerful states.

The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993; Stephen Schecter, **Zen and the Art of Post-Modern Canada: Does the Trans-Canada Highway Always Lead to Charlottetown**, Montreal: Robert Davis Publishing, 1993; and Frank Davey, **Post-National Arguments: The Politics of the Anglophone-Canadian Novel Since 1967**, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1993.

In conclusion, Canada has neither adopted nor rejected the normal standard monolithic nation-state experience. It is a non-conforming model of a nation-state because the process of a nationalizing state has been tempered by an understanding of its geopolitical vulnerability and an acceptance of its internal complexity. In sum, the relative "lightness" or benignness of Canadian national sentiment can be considered as a contrary, yet confirming instance of state centered theory.

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MAPS

Both maps can be found in Cook, R., et al. **Canada a Modern Study**, Toronto: Clark, Irwin, 1963, pp. 177 (The Alaska Boundary Dispute) and 162-163 (Main Railway Lines).