KANT'S POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE CONCEPT OF TELEOLOGY

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will show that the philosophy of nature and science that Kant sets out requires the concept of teleology, the premise of the systematic (and so, designed) structure of the universe. And teleology, employed in this domain, drives us to the idea of the supersensible, of a ground of the world, but cannot provide a richer understanding of the supersensible other than to describe it as a vague "something". To arrive at a fuller conception, we must turn to moral philosophy, where the hope for the highest good is established as a necessary element of the moral will. This hope requires that we postulate a moral world Designer. Moral and natural teleology can be seen, therefore, as complementary in that the moral side yields a determinate concept of the supersensible basis of nature, while the natural dimension provides us with tangible evidence for the existence of such a being. The historical-political philosophy unites these two arguments. On the one hand, only a wise, moral designer would arrange the course of history so as to produce a good state for man, and, on the other, natural teleology first gives us an indication that the world as a whole, and so possibly the appearance of freedom within it, is designed. The idea of a moral God, linking both nature and practical freedom, provides a bridge, if ultimately a problematic one, between the realms of nature and morality. Thus Kant's political philosophy is the expression of a number of central themes of his philosophical work -- teleology, nature and freedom, and theology. Its problems, far from being mere marginalia, are central to his philosophical edifice and insofar as it shows the powerful practical (moral) interests that guided him, it may help to correct that modern opinion according to which the heart of Kant's endeavours is contained in the first half of the Critique of Pure Reason. For just as an understanding of his political essays demands that we see their roots in the primary themes of the strictly philosophical writings, so too can the unity of those themes, and the direction in which Kant thought that they led, best be seen in those essays in which they converge.

RESUME

Cette thèse a pour but de montrer que la philosophie de la nature et de la science proposée par Kant exige l'introduction du concept de la téléologie, et de poser comme prémisse que l'univers a une structure systématique et donc calculée. Par ailleurs, la téléologie, telle qu'elle est utilisée dans ce domaine, nous conduit au concept du supra-sensible, d'un fondement du monde, mais tout en étant incapable de nous fournir une compréhension très enrichissante du supra-sensible si ce n'est en le décrivant comme "quelque chose" de vague. Si nous voulons arriver à mieux comprendre ce concept, nous devons nous tourner vers la philosophie morale qui considère l'espoir du bien suprême comme un élément nécessaire de la volonté morale. Cet espoir exige que nous posions l'existence d'un Créateur du monde moral. Ainsi, téléologie morale et téléologie naturelle deviennent complémentaires: l'aspect moral nous propose un concept déterminé de la base supra-sensible de la nature alors que la dimension naturelle nous donne la preuve tangible de l'existence d'un tel être. La philosophie historique/politique réunit ces deux arguments. D'une part, seul un créateur sage et moral agencerait le cours de l'histoire de façon à offrir un Etat juste à l'homme et d'autre part, la téléologie naturelle nous donne d'abord une indication que le monde dans son ensemble, et peut-être aussi l'apparence de liberté qu'on y trouve, a été conçu. L'idée d'un Dieu moral, qui allie la nature et la liberté pratique, nous fournit un pont entre le royaume de la nature et celui de la moralité, même si ce pont est en définitive problématique. Ainsi, la philosophie politique de Kant devient l'expression d'une série de thèmes qui sont au centre de son oeuvre philosophique -- téléologie, nature et liberté, théologie. Loin d'être purement marginaux, les problèmes qu'il pose forment la base même de son édifice philosophique. Dans la mesure où son oeuvre exprime les intérêts pratiques (moraux) puissants qui l'ont guidé, elle peut contribuer à rectifier l'idée courante selon laquelle Kant a concentré ses efforts sur la première moitié de sa Critique de la raison pure. En effet, tout comme nous devons, pour comprendre ses essais politiques, rechercher leurs racines dans les premiers thèmes de ses écrits purement philosophiques, nous pourrons mieux saisir l'unité de ces thèmes et leur orientation en nous reportant aux essais qui en sont précisément la synthèse.

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Es ist überhaupt nichts schwerer, als die Kantischen Ideen deutlich darzustellen.

Fichte

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> Newton first saw order and regularity combined with great simplicity where before him disorder coupled with diversity were to be found. And since then, the planets run on a geometrical course.
>
> Rousseau first discovered among the multitude of forms assumed by man, man's deeply hidden nature and the concealed law by the observation of which providence is justified ... God is justified by Newton and Rousseau and more than ever is Pope's thesis true.
>
> Kant, Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen

Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in the port city of Konigsberg, north east Prussia (now Kaliningrad, USSR), and died there in 1804. The biography of his life is singularly uninteresting. Nevertheless, in those eighty years Kant had an impact upon philosophy, the extent of which can no longer be disputed. Indeed, one commentator has written that the student of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason must see all philosophy prior to Kant as a mere preparation for him and all subsequent work as a response to his work. Though we would be wise to doubt the tacit claim made in this statement, it is true to say that Kant's thought is of the highest importance to the history of philosophy.

The centerpiece of his philosophical endeavour was the three Critiques, that of Pure Reason, of Practical Reason and of Judgment. In addition, he completed a number of small, but important texts: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, and others.

However, as a result of developments in philosophy as a whole, and in Anglo-American philosophy in particular, we now think of Kant primarily in terms of the Critique of Pure Reason. Or, to be more precise, we see his contribution as resting in certain sections of the first half of that work. He appears to us, that is to say, as the author of those pages the reading of which has been likened, by one of his greatest English commentators, to the crossing of the Great Sahara Desert. And since, as Fichte teaches, philosophical tastes and character are linked, we are not surprised to discover in Kant's slight biography a character so dry, so mechanical, that clocks in Konigsberg were set by his daily walks. That this understanding of Kant is founded upon a failure to appreciate the unity of the three Critiques -- a failure whose source seems to lie in the partial appropriation and 'updating' of Kant -- is one of the central, if implicit, themes of this thesis.

This truncated view of Kant has, I believe, affected his position in the tradition of political philosophy. Because he is taken as the author of one question -- "What can I know?" -- rather than the three he in fact asked (the other two being, "What ought I to do?" and "What may I hope for?") we see him as an epistemologist and for this reason, of perhaps only oblique importance to political philosophy. One source of this misunderstanding is that the current judgment of what is of interest in Kant (i.e. the first half of the First Critique) has been all too readily accepted. The essays that he wrote in his later years on history, politics and anthropology are considered to be marginalia both with respect to Kant's critical system and to the tradition in general. The latter attitude could not be adequately dealt with in a master's thesis. But I think that I can show that these essays are central to Kant's philosophical edifice and, in so doing, to at least indicate the need to re-examine the political thought of one of the greatest of modern philosophers.

Kant belongs to a now dead tradition in which philosophical and political concerns were intimately linked. To fully understand the

sort of thought that this conception of political philosophy produced, one has first to situate the political or historical essays in the larger philosophical system. For a variety of reasons, some of which were mentioned above, Kant's political essays have, for the most part, been seen as peripheral and inconsequential -- in short, not really related to his philosophical concerns. To see the distortion that this view might produce, one need only consider an attempt to interpret Aristotle's Politics without reference to the Ethics, Metaphysics or the Organon, or Plato's Republic without presenting it in its connection to the other dialogues.

The general problem, then, examined in this thesis is that of the relationship between Kant's historical/political works and his philosophical system. My aim, in the broad sense, is to show that these writings cannot be fully appreciated if they are seen as unrelated to the three Critiques. Thus, I argue that these essays depend for their themes and arguments on underlying philosophical problems, often not made explicit in them. The other side of this same approach is to show that the political writings contain, albeit in a popularized form, reflections which make a positive contribution to the development of what appeared, at first sight, to be narrowly philosophical issues. Briefly, therefore, I analyze these essays with two purposes in mind: on the one hand, to show that they represent the conclusion of certain central themes in Kantian philosophy and that, consequently, to understand them it is necessary to establish this connection. On the other hand, I maintain that the works in question provide important insights into the relationship between the three Critiques and thus into the heart of Kant's theoretical endeavour.

The specific aim of the thesis is to understand those of Kant's essays which are of direct interest to political theorists. But since an exposition can be cast in many forms, it is necessary here to state the way in which I develop the themes just stated, or, in other words, to outline my methodology.

To consider Kant's works in their totality would be, and indeed has been, the task of lifetimes and of many volumes. Any attempt to encompass even most of the central ideas in so short a piece of research as this would be immodest, not to say misguided. But to pick up and follow one important strand of thought appears to be almost possible -- and this is what I intend to do. And, in accordance with the prevailing orthodoxy on Kant, the thesis begins 'at the beginning', that is, with the First Critique. It will show, I hope, how the concept of experience elaborated there not only allows for, but in certain respects, needs what Kant terms regulative ideas, the systematizing ideas of reason and, in particular, that of teleology. Having shown the possibility of a teleological conception of nature for Kant, I go on to argue for its necessity in specific sorts of experience (inductive thought and hence science in general, and a number of scientific disciplines, for example, biology). Then, following Kant's own directives on this topic, the thesis will show how the moral need of teleology leads to the idea of a Supreme Designer; how, in other words, teleology passes into theology and, in turn, how the moral argument for teleology lends support to the use made of that concept in the natural domain. Teleology, it will be maintained, bridges the gap between the natural and moral worlds, the First and Second Critiques. Finally, I will show how this bridging endeavour decisively shapes Kant's philosophy of history and politics and how that particular philosophical concern reflects Kant's attempt to show that faith and knowledge need not necessarily conflict. In short, we will follow the evolution of one idea and attempt to reconstruct that development in a way faithful to the author's intention.

There is a considerable body of secondary literature on Kant in English, French and German. Most of the English commentators have focused on the Critique of Pure Reason, though there do exist a number of first rate interpretations of Kant's moral philosophy. It is fair to say that the European tradition of Kant-commentary has given greater weight to his moral and political writings.

Since my concern is with Kant's concept of teleology, the text in

which that idea is discussed -- the Critique of Judgment -- is naturally of the first importance to me. There are only two works in English which deal principally with this Critique, those of H. W. Cassirer and J. D. McFarland; the former comments on the Critique as a whole, the latter touches only the concept of teleology. Both of these texts are, in my opinion, inadequate and I have not used either extensively for my thesis. Smaller still is the literature on Kant's political philosophy, although here, fortunately, some of the commentaries are excellent. Hans Saner's book, translated from the German, is intriguing though not directly related to my own work. However, William Galston's fine study of Kant's historical philosophy does contain chapters that are of immediate interest to me, and that I have benefited from. Two other sources deserve to be mentioned: Emil Fackenheim's essay in Kant-Studien on the philosophy of history, and Lucien Goldmann's imaginative synopsis of Kantian philosophy. Despland's work on Kant's religious and historical philosophy touches topics similar to those covered in this thesis. However, much of his argument and his conclusions differ substantially from mine, and his treatment of them is, in my view, somewhat superficial. In any event, this thesis was conceived and executed independently of his book.

The status of English-language Kant scholarship, then, depends very much on what one's interests are in Kant. For those doing research on the First Critique, the secondary literature is virtually inexhaustible. There has also been sufficient work done on his moral philosophy, but on the Third Critique and the idea of teleology in particular, the commentaries are sparse, and the same is true of Kant's political thought. Hence, my thesis or parts of it cover more or less 'virgin territory'.

CHAPTER II

KANT'S CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE

The first section of this thesis has a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, its central purpose is to serve as an introduction to the role of teleological explanation in Kant's works. Its narrower aim -- which is actually the vehicle of the first -- is to explicate the concept of experience, particularly as it is set out in the First and Third Critiques. The two goals, however, are not distinct, for, as will be seen, a complete understanding of Kant's concept of experience necessarily involves a recognition of the place that reason, in its "projective" activity, holds in the making of experience. And this recognition, in turn, is a preliminary to grasping the significance of teleological explanation in Kant.

Given the immediate aim of the chapter (to explicate Kant's notion of experience), it will be recognized that the appropriate method is to 'back off' from a line-by-line analysis of the text and attempt to get some sense of the broad movement of Kant's argument. For, as Heidegger tells us, "Every seeking is guided beforehand by what is sought,"[1] and in a somewhat more banal way than might have been intended in that maxim, it is true of this section of the thesis as well. What I am saying, here, is that given the immense intricacy of Kant's writings and the elaborate architecture that connects one component to the next, any attempt to arrive at an 'over-view' of a central concept is bound to achieve its aim at the cost of glossing over some of the subtleties and range of argument, as presented in the text. Thus, in order to realize the purpose of this section, I have had to 'shape' the inquiry that precedes it -- shape it, that is, by setting out the minimal structure of Kant's

analysis, by pruning away all but what is absolutely required in order to convey the movement of his thought.

The structure of this section is relatively simple. It proceeds through the "three-fold synthesis" of the Transcendental Analytic, but focuses particularly upon the role of the categories in the construction of experience -- through an examination of the Second Analogy. The chapter then moves from the categories and the understanding in general to a discussion of the function of reason, as set out in the "Appendix to the Dialectic", and the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. For the most part, the chapter is concerned with explication, but, as will become apparent to the reader, some rather contentious interpretations are offered, particularly in the case of the Second Analogy, but also in certain sections on the Dialectic.

It is tempting, perhaps, for the student reading the Critique of Pure Reason to believe that Kant's concept of experience is exhausted in the sections on the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Deduction and the Analogies. Equally attractive is the idea that these same sections were intended to establish the possibility of a natural science. However, in the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, Kant distinguishes between "experience in general as a system under transcendental laws of the understanding" and "experience as ... a system of potential empirical knowledge."[2] This distinction corresponds, in turn, to that between the "mere unity of nature under the transcendental laws" or categories and the "complete systematic union of its [nature's]appearances" -- or the "order of nature". These passages would seem to suggest that we are justified in being sceptical of any claim that Kant considered the Transcendental Analytic alone to be a sufficient ground for science. Expressed in more positive terms, the above excerpts appear to indicate that experience for Kant is ordered on a number of levels.

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[1]Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 24.

[2]Kant, First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, trans. James Haden (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1965), p. 14.

The purpose of this section, therefore, is to examine these levels of experience and to show the development from the most "primitive" or rudimentary ordering of nature -- through the pure forms of intuition, space and time -- to the systematizing of reason in the Dialectic as the precondition for empirical science. The heart of the argument will be that the Analytic sets out the possibility of nature not as an object for scientific inquiry -- not, that is, as a universe of (empirical) laws -- but rather as an objective happening, a possible experience. Given the limits, then, of the understanding and pure intuition in "preparing" nature for scientific activity, it will be maintained that reason, in its legitimate regulative employment, transforms nature into an order, a systematic, interconnected whole allowing for potential empirical knowledge. The structure of the chapter will thus be centered around the fundamental distinction between experience under transcendental laws alone (yielding, as I hope to be able to show, singular, contingent objective events) and systematized experience, or science (resulting in an order of nature and empirical lawfulness generally).

In the Prolegomena, Kant asks, "How is nature itself possible?" This question, he continues, should be broken down into two components: (1) "How is nature in the material sense ... as to intuition possible?" and (2) "How is nature possible in the formal sense, as the totality of rules under which all appearances must come ...?"[3] The first problem is treated in the Aesthetic, while the second is dealt with in the Analytic and thus it is to these two sections which we will first turn.

The capacity for "receiving representations" Kant terms sensibility and the pure form of that sensibility is pure intuition or a priori sensibility. It is only through sensibility that objects are given to us.[4]

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[3]Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, with an introduction by Lewis White Beck (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1950), p. 65.

[4]Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 65-66.

Space, then, is a "necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuition. It [is] . . . the condition of the possibility of appearances."[5] This form of all appearances is given prior to all actual perceptions and thus has its "seat in the subject only, as the formal character of the subject, in virtue of which, in being affected by objects, it obtains immediate representation [intuition] ."[6] Similarly, time is not an empirical concept, but is itself necessary and a priori. "In it alone," Kant writes, "is the actuality of appearances possible at all."[7] In short, time is that necessary form of sensibility which, like space, is part of the "constructive apparatus of the subject.", While for the purposes of this chapter, no detailed study of the doctrines of inner and outer sense is required, we need only note that the matter of sensation exists in space and time as the result of an a priori function of the subject, as an "aspect of the mind." However, the mere act of bringing the matter of sensation into a spatio-temporal dimension is only the first step in raising that matter of sensation to knowledge for just as "concepts without intuition are blind", so our representations require more than a simple spatio-temporal ordering. In other words, appearances as existing in space and time, before their ordering by the imagination and categories, are "subject to no law of connection."[8] Kant himself provides us with a useful schematic representation of the three-fold process involved in making (simple) experience possible: (1) the "synopsis of the manifold through sense"; (2) the "synthesis of the manifold through imagination" and, finally, (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception.[9] The first of the above stages, however, should not be mistaken for mere receptivity for, as Kant points out in the "A" Deduction version of a similar schemata, "spontaneity is the ground of this three-fold synthesis."[10] Having previously discussed the minimal conditions for receptivity, we are now free to proceed with an examination of the components involved in bringing an object to concepts.

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[5]Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 68.

[6]Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[7]Ibid., p. 75.

[8]Ibid., p. 173.

[9]Ibid., p. 127.

[10]Ibid., p. 130.

Kant asserts that the "combination of the manifold" can never occur through the senses alone, for combination requires an "act of the spontaneity of the faculty of representation or understanding."[11] But combination or synthesis is not a single act -- rather, it involves two distinct syntheses: (A) the "figurative" synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition through the imagination and, (B) combination through the understanding or categories.[12] Now, as Paton points out,[13] the synthesis of the imagination consists of two related functions, corresponding to the first two stages of the three-fold process, or in the somewhat more detailed analysis of the "A" Deduction, the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction. The former of the two related functions applies directly to intuition and involves the "taking up" of given sense impressions into empirical consciousness. Through apprehension of sense impressions we acquire sense-perception.[14] The manifold, Kant says, must "be run through and held together. This is the synthesis of apprehension."[15] However, this apprehension could not "produce an image and a connection of the impressions" unless a preceding perception was reinstated -- and this is the reproductive faculty of the imagination.[16] In short, experience presupposes the reproductability of appearances.[17] Thus, in order for the manifold to be run through and held together -- that is to say, in order for there to be apprehension -- there must also be reproduction or memory. Apprehension, then, and reproduction are "inseparably bound up." So far we have considered imagination only in its reproductive or empirical role, as one step in the process leading to our "knowledge of the phenomenal world."[18] In the "A" Deduction however, Kant maintains a distinction between imagination as it functions empirically in the reproduction of intuition and transcendental imagination. The division between productive

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[11] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 151.

[12] Ibid., pp. 164-65.

[13] H. J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936), p. 355.

[14] Cf. Paton, p. 359.

[15] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 131.

[16] Ibid., p. 144.

[17] Ibid., p. 133.

[18] Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 141.

and reproductive imagination (transcendental/empirical) and the relationship between the two, ranks as one of the more obscure sections of the Critique, and as the primary focus of this chapter is not on this problem, it would not be fruitful to pursue it at any length. Having said this, the argument does seem to occupy an important place in the first version of the Deduction, and therefore in the following passages I will attempt a brief summary of Kant's analysis.

The empirical ground for reproduction, that which makes it (reproduction) something more than merely accidental, Kant terms "association".[19] But this ground is "subjective and empirical" and therefore "antecedent to all empirical laws of the imagination," there must be an objective ground "upon which rests the necessity of a law that extends to all appearances."[20] This objective ground is termed the affinity of all appearances. Affinity, in turn, is the product or consequence of the imagination in its transcendental employment.[21] It is the faculty of transcendental imagination which makes the "affinity of appearances, reproduction and experience itself possible."[22] Viewed from a somewhat different perspective, transcendental imagination supplies the necessary synthesis which is presupposed by the "faculty of pure apperception" which brings this synthesis to synthetic unity.[23] Here we can see that the productive imagination occupies much the same position (a mediating factor between understanding and intuition) as does its empirical counterpart, although in the transcendental case, imagination is the 'middle factor' between the a priori of the manifold[24] and the original unity of apperception. In conclusion, then, the productive imagination supplies the objective ground for the empirical employment of the faculties. "Transcendental synthesis" in Wolff's words "is performed on the manifold of pure intuition and its outcome is the objective phenomenal world."[25] Weldon's

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[19] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 144.

[20] Ibid., p. 145.

[21] Ibid., pp. 145-46.

[22] Ibid., p. 146.

[23] Ibid., p. 142.

[24] Or the pure manifold; see Critique of Pure Reason, p. 143.

[25] Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, p. 141.

account of this doctrine makes it somewhat more intelligible:

> The non-empirical object 'affects' the non-empirical self . . . ; the non-empirical self performs the synthetic activity which transforms the result of this 'affection' into the complex of empirical self and empirical object . . . ; the empirical object causes empirical sensation in the empirical self. [26]

On the empirical level, therefore, the imagination allows for the reproduction of intuitions thus making possible a coherent experience under concepts. The transcendental imagination, on the other hand, makes objects possible in some more ultimate sense and may be seen as supplying the ontological foundation which guarantees orderly experience.[27] But even this level of synthesis (that of the imagination in general) does not yield concepts and thus the function of bringing the synthesis of imagination to concepts belongs to the understanding.[28] What precisely is lacking in this synthesis, Kant makes explicit in the Second Analogy where he states that, "connection . . . is here the product of a synthetic faculty of imagination which determines inner sense. But imagination can connect these two states in two ways, so that either the one or the other precedes in time."[29] In other words, the second "stage" of the threefold synthesis produces only a "subjective time-order" -- a succession, but one not in any way determined in its order.[30] The sequence, insofar as it has been synthesized by the imagination is thus without a rule-determined (independent of the subject) objective order.

Now experience, Kant writes, "consists in the synthetical connection of phenomena (perceptions) in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Hence, the pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must be subsumed."[31] These pure concepts are, of course, the categories which "determine the object in respect of one of

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[26] T. D. Weldon, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 253.

[27] It is important to note that the above analysis of imagination refers to the discussion of that "faculty" given in the "A" version of the Deduction. The two-level terminology and the notion that objectivity is to be seen in terms of affinity, etc. are omitted, to the best of my knowledge, in the remainder of the Critique.

[28] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 112.

[29] Ibid., pp. 218-19.

[30] Ibid., p. 226.

[31] Prolegomena, p. 52.

the logical functions of the judgement." The categories, then, are the rules, the time-determinations which render the subjective order of perceptions objective. On a still more general plane, the categories are, as it were, the instruments for bringing the manifold given in a sensible intuition to the synthetic unity of apperception.[32] Without such combination in one consciousness, Kant asserts, they could not be prefaced by the "I think" and in the absence of the "I think", representations would be impossible or meaningless.[33] This self-consciousness of myself as "identical in respect of the manifold of representations"[34] -- that is, the consciousness of these representations as belonging to me -- is the condition of all knowledge and every intuition which is to "become an object for me."[35] Thus, as Buchdahl notes, "In its broadest aspect . . . this notion of possible experience refers us to the 'synthetic necessary unity of apperception'."[36] Here, then, we have examined the role of spontaneity in the 'generation' of experience, focusing exclusively on the 'constructive', subject-given function -- or, to use Buchdahl's term, the element of "injection" -- while omitting any discussion of the mutual dependence of the given and apperception (and the categories).

Kant concludes both the "A" and "B" versions of the Deduction in a similar manner: the understanding is the "lawgiver of nature."[37] By means of the categories, Kant concludes, we prescribe laws to nature and even make it possible.[38] The question which this argument leaves undecided is that of the relationship between the categories, as universal laws of nature and particular or empirical laws. In the "A" Deduction, for example,

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[32] Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 160-61.

[33] Ibid., pp. 152-53.

[34] Ibid., p. 155.

[35] Ibid., p. 156.

[36] Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), p. 489.

[37] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 148.

[38] It should be kept in mind, however, that terms such as "laws" and "nature" are problematical and play, as will be shown further on in this essay, a double role.

Kant states that "empirical laws, as such, can never derive their origin from pure understanding . . . But all empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of the understanding."[39] The second edition Deduction, on the other hand, asserts that "special laws . . . cannot in their character be derived from the categories, although they are one and all subject to them."[40] The "A" version leaves one wondering what it means for empirical laws to be "special determinations" of the categories while in the same moment not "deriving their origin" from those same categories. Furthermore, we have to decide the significance of the fact that all mention of "special determinations" is dropped from the "B" Deduction. Granted, then, that the categories are universal laws -- in the sense that they are the necessary conditions of any experience whatsoever -- in what relation do they stand to the general and specific laws of nature, the empirical laws of natural science? Is there a "straight deductive path" from the former to the latter? Or, is there yet another "injection" into experience required in order to make empirical science possible? In more general terms, therefore, the question that is being asked here is whether the understanding supplies both the necessary and sufficient conditions of all experience (contingent and lawful) or is there required a further ingredient in order to render nature "lawlike" and experience scientific? In the following section of the chapter the category of causality will be examined (through the Second Analogy) in an effort to determine to what extent, if any, the categories enable us to speak of nature as lawful, in the empirical sense (required by science) of that term.

The principle of the Analogies, Kant says, is that "experience is only possible through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" or, expressed in a manner which indicates the continuity of the Deduction, Schematism and Analogies: "All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another in time."[41] The central contention of the proof (for this

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[39] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 148.

[40] Ibid., p. 173.

[41] Ibid., p. 208.

principle) is that in pre-categorical experience "perceptions come together only in accidental order, so that no necessity determining their connection is or can be revealed in the perceptions themselves."[42] However, Kant continues, "Experience is a knowledge of objects through perceptions" and thus "the relation [involved] in the manifold has to be represented in experience . . . as it exists objectively in time."[43] Now as time itself cannot be perceived, the "determination of the existence of objects in time" can occur only in the relation of those objects to time in general and "therefore only through concepts which connect them a priori."[44] Following this, Kant hastily (and perhaps, as Wolff claims, unconvincingly[45]) concludes the proof by showing that the connecting concepts, being a priori, contain necessity and thus, experience has been shown to be possible only through a "representation of necessary connection of perception."

The rules referred to in the general Principle of the Analogies are of three types, corresponding to the three modes of time: duration, succession and coexistence. In this chapter we shall concern ourselves solely with succession in time, or causality. The Second Analogy, then, seeks to prove that "All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect."[46] The proof begins with the idea, already set out in the Principle of the Analogies, that perceptions without a rule governing them can be arranged so that either one or the other precedes in time. That is to say, the objective relation of appearances cannot be arrived at through perception alone.[47] What is being alluded to here is the distinction between the subjective time-order (or mere mental contents, to use Wolff's term) and an objective time-order (or the order of the manifold qua representation). For the contents of the mind to be members of an objective order, independent of the subject, they or their relation to one another must be thought as necessary and necessity, as was

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[42] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 209.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Wolff, p. 245.

[46] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 218.

[47] Ibid., p. 219.

noted before, is not to be found in the world of perception but rather in the pure concepts of the understanding. Hence objective experience which demands that we be able to distinguish one set of appearances "from every other apprehension,"[48] a demand that in turn requires an objective succession of appearances, is subject to an "underlying rule which compels us to observe this order."[49] In other words, without a rule, all succession would be subjective, a mere play of representations "relating to no object."[50] Thus, for there to be experience, the sequence must be determined in the object.[51] This determined sequence demands that, given the antecedent, the consequent must necessarily follow according to a rule. It has been shown therefore that the law of cause and effect -- that the "preceding time necessarily determines the succeding"[52] -- subjects our representations to a law, to an objective time-order which gives to these representations their objective status. In short, Kant's claim is that the categories are a necessary component of experience.

Having concluded an outline of Kant's argument in the Second Analogy, we may now return to the question posed earlier in this chapter -- in what relation do the categories stand to the empirical laws of nature? Are the latter simply instances of the former or do the categories establish nothing more nor less than the possibility of the phenomenal object?

This problem, reduced to the terms of the Second Analogy, can be stated thus: "What is the relation between the Principle of Causality and the special causal laws, the laws of nature?"[53] Buchdahl suggests a number of possible interpretations of the Analogy, which would result in different

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[48] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 220. [49] Ibid., p. 224.

[50] Ibid., p. 222.

[51] "The object is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension." Ibid., p. 220.

[52] Ibid., p. 225.

[53] Gerd Buchdahl, "Causality, Causal Laws and Scientific Theory in the Philosophy of Kant," The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (May 1965 - February 1966):189. In the following section of the chapter much of the analysis is informed by Gerd Buchdahl's work on the meaning of the Second Analogy.

responses to the above questions. The two central ones are: (1) an interpretation which would hold that the "causal grip" on phenomena, as established in the Analogy, is weak. This approach maintains that "causality is a condition of objective experience in general."[54] The necessity involved in it holds "for 'experience' and hence 'contingent' judgements in general."[55] Now this view is not identical with the assertion that nature is lawlike in general. That is to say "the causal principle is not a principle which can be employed as a major premiss, and whose instances are causal laws."[56] (2) A second possible approach, based on B165 of the Deduction, where the principle of causality seems to show that nature in general (though not in its specifics) is lawlike, would appear to favour a somewhat "stronger grip" of the category on phonemena. The first interpretation then, holds that the category is the precondition for any experience, contingent or lawful, but that its domain extends no further than simple objective experience -- the category does not constitute nature as a universe of empirical law. The second interpretation, on the other hand, asserts that the category does indeed guarantee empirical lawfulness, even though no specific laws can be derived from it. What is at stake in these two alternatives, of course, is more than a limited interpretation of the Second Analogy. The underlying issue is the relation between the categories and science -- the whole group of questions which were set out at the beginning of this chapter. Clearly, the answers to those questions will depend in large measure upon whether one accepts the "strong" or "weak" account of the Analogy.

It will be recalled that in the Analogy Kant was concerned to show how, to use his own example, the cognition of a ship moving downstream was possible. Now, as Buchdahl notes (and as I have pointed out earlier in this chapter), perception, the "sensory content", cannot contain in Kant's view the objectivity of time-succession. Indeed, it is the subject

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[54] Buchdahl, "Causality, Causal Laws and Scientific Theory in the Philosophy of Kant", p. 189.

[55] Ibid., pp. 189-90.

[56] Ibid., p. 190.

itself which places the "perception in time."[57] Still, despite the fact that the perception is placed in time by the subject, the analysis of the statement "A is followed by B" has not yet been completed. In order for the pre-categorized ordering A'B' to become the objective sequence A-B, a further step is required. A'B' will have to be determined in a necessary way, independently of the subject. As this necessary determination cannot be given in perception (qua a posteriori sensory content), but rather, requires a concept, we may conclude that A'B' becomes A-B "by adding to the former a conceptual determination; by regarding A'B' as determined by the causal relation."[58] The argument, then, is that A,B is an objective succession, not necessarily a causal one. This is to say that it is A'B' and not A-B in the Second Analogy that is related under the "concept of causal succession."[59] It will be seen, of course, that this is the "weak" interpretation of the Analogy -- the category yields only the object, not the lawfulness pertaining to relations between objects. Given the ambiguity of Kant's text itself on this point, it is legitimate to ask whether his argument requires (as opposed to merely allowing for) the "weak" interpretation, as against the "strong" one. Plainly, the "experiential sequence" must be absolutely contingent "since anything more could not be 'given' experientially and would hence not be unproblematical -- with the consequential destruction of the transcendental argument."[60] In other words, the causal concept is an essential ingredient in any empirical contingent state of affairs. The causal concept, therefore, which brings the subjective sequence A'B' to the objective state A-B says nothing about some causal relation holding between A and B -- the irreversibility established by the Analogy does not say that the objective sequence A-B is irreversible, but rather that the perceptions A', B' are tied down in a determinate way.[61]

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[57] Buchdahl, "Causality, Causal Laws and Scientific Theory in the Philosophy of Kant," p. 194.

[58] Ibid., p. 195.

[59] Ibid., p. 196.

[60] Gerd Buchdahl, "The Conception of Lawlikeness in Kant's Philosophy of Science," Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, ed. Lewis White Beck (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1970), p. 153.

[61] Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, p. 650.

The understanding demands, therefore, that we view the sequence of events as contingent, a demand which would suggest that the necessity (irreversibility of sequence) argued for in the Analogy is not between the objective, phenomenal events A and B (not, in other words, a necessary causal relation). It is, on the contrary, the anchoring of what would otherwise be a merely accidental, subjective sequence in an objective time-order -- an anchoring which makes the category of causality, employed in the field of the understanding, a logical ingredient of any objective event, even those which are singular, wholly contingent happenings. Thus, while specific empirical laws must be formulated in accordance with the category of causality (as a precondition of any experience whatsoever), that principle of causation cannot be seen as providing a support for these laws qua laws. It follows from the above that "the concept of causality exhausts its validational strength in providing the notion of a sequence of states of things, as part of 'nature' in the sense defined previously [an aggregate of individual things]. Such sequences . . . are entirely contingent . . . Whether they are instances of lawlike successions, and thus exhibit empirical lawlikeness, is a separate question."[62] Hence, there is a distinction between transcendental and empirical lawfulness,[63] and while the former is the necessary condition of any objective experience, ordinary or scientific, its domain does not extend beyond the simple phenomenal object. That there is an order of nature, a systematic and "lawlike" interconnection of phenomena -- or, in different words, that experience can be a system -- the deduction of the categories cannot establish. For there to be empirical lawfulness and science, there is required more than the categories alone can establish.[64]

By way of a brief review, then, we have seen that the concept of experience, while somewhat vague in Kant's works, can nevertheless be said

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[62] Gerd Buchdahl, "The Relation between 'Understanding' and 'Reason' in the Architectonic of Kant's Philosophy," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series 67 (1966-1967), p. 214.

[63] Kant, First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, p. 9.

[64] For similar views on the limitations of the categories, see J. D. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), pp. 7-8; George Schrader, "The Status of Teleological Judgment in the Critical Philosophy," Kant-Studien 45 (1953), p. 211; Nathan Rotenstreich,

to have two distinct levels. While both require the transcendental laws as a necessary condition, those laws are sufficient only for the constitution of the phenomenal object, the contingent singular event. Thus, the second level, or scientific experience (experience as a system) requires an additional 'injection'. There is therefore a hiatus between the claims of the Analytic -- of the understanding -- and the requirements of science, a gap that we must now explore.

The heart of this transition from the one level of experience to the other, from everyday experience to science, is to be found in the concept of systematization. It is Kant's argument that "systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge."[65] This seemingly straight-forward assertion contains an element of ambiguity, however, for Kant does not make it clear precisely what he means by "ordinary knowledge." I would like to suggest that by ordinary knowledge, Kant means simply the world of objective perception, and that thus systematization is required in two related areas, the more fundamental one being the possibility of our speaking of empirical lawfulness at all, the textually more prominent one being the systematic interrelation of particular laws. The first area, then, demands that a sequence of events, if it is to be spoken of as lawful, must be placed within a systematic body of knowledge.[66] The second area simply states the need of science to show its particular laws as related to one another, producing thereby experience as a system. It will be clear to the reader that if the analysis of the Second Analogy is correct, and if Kant has not committed a gross error, then the hiatus between the understanding and empirical science needs more than merely an argument for the interconnection of special laws in order to be spanned. Indeed, given the limitations of the categories, the second area (system of laws) necessarily presupposes the first -- the possibility of lawfulness

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Experience and its Systematization; Studies in Kant (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 96, 98.

[65] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 653.

[66] Cf. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, p. 9.

in the empirical case. Now, without anticipating the following interpretation of the Appendix to the Dialectic, it can be said that reason, in its regulative function, which is responsible for the drive to systematization, is also, by the same token, responsible for introducing empirical lawfulness. Kant writes:

> The aggregate of particular experiences has to be regarded as a system, for without this assumption total coherence under laws, i.e., the empirical unity of them, cannot come about. [67]

Here we can see an intimation of the mutual dependence of the two principles -- lawfulness and systematicity. While this argument remains to be developed, it may be said that the systematic activity of reason provides not only for the connections between laws, but for lawfulness as well -- where only those uniformities which can be made part of a system of laws will be considered as lawful.[68] In short, therefore, I hope to be able to show in the following sections that reason establishes connections between laws and thus is crucial in the development of scientific thought (as systematic and not everyday) and that simultaneously, it allows us to speak of empirical lawfulness as such.

Dialectic, Kant says, is a logic of illusion, an illusion which arises from the fact that "there are fundamental rules and maxims for the employment of our reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human knowledge), and that these have all the appearance of being objective principles. We therefore take the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts which is to the advantage of our understanding for an objective necessity in the determination of things-in-themselves."[69] A careful reading of this passage reveals that it is not the "rules and maxims" themselves which give rise to illusion, but rather, their employment. Thus, the ideas of reason become transcendent (that is to say, beyond all possible experience) when "they are taken for concepts of real

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[67] Kant, First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, p. 10.

[68] Buchdahl, "The Relation between 'Understanding' and 'Reason'," p. 217.

[69] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 229.

things."[70] According to Kant, however, a naturally-given power or faculty must have a correct employment which, in the case of the transcendental ideas, means their immanent use. Reason's empirical or immanent employment, then, does not create concepts of objects (which presumably would be the reification of ideas) but rather, it stands in immediate relation only to the understanding, whose concepts it orders.[71]

Reason, Kant argues, has a natural tendency towards absolute totality.[72] That absolute totality, in turn, requires that we trace back the series of conditions to the unconditioned, to that which is the "uncaused cause", the last point of the series. Now while this goal remains just that -- something to be strived towards -- reason, through its endless search for the highest principle, prescribes a rule for the understanding.[73] Reason, in other words, when confronted with an empirical fact (or, to use Kant's term, "a mode of knowledge supplied by the understanding"[74]), seeks the "principle from which it can be deduced."[75] Thus reason, in pursuing its goal, takes what is given to it by the understanding and transforms it from a mere aggregate of events into a system "according to necessary laws."[76] Reason's attitude is one of systematization, which means, for Kant, to exhibit the connection of parts "in conformity with a single principle."[77] It is the heart of Kant's argument, therefore, that the unity which concepts have is derived from reason's attempt to obtain "the totality in various series."[78] Moreover, this same drive towards totality results not simply in the unity of concepts, but in their extension, as reason seeks ever higher principles.

Now in the preceding analysis, reason is seen as uniting what is presented to it by the understanding and in this central fact about reason,

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[70] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 532.

[71] Ibid., p. 533.

[72] Ibid., p. 386.

[73] Ibid., pp. 454-55.

[74] Ibid., p. 556.

[75] McFarland, Teleology, p. 25.

[76] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 534.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid., p. 533.

we can grasp the analogy between it and the understanding. That is, just as sensibility is an object for the understanding, so too is the understanding an "object for reason."[79] But, Kant continues, "the acts of the understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility, undetermined: just as the unity of reason is in itself undetermined, as regards the conditions under which, and the extent to which, the understanding ought to combine its concepts in systematic fashion."[80] The analogy of the schemata of sensibility in the field of reason is the idea of reason -- the "maximum in the division and unification of the knowledge of the understanding under one principle." However, it is in the nature of an analogy that it reveals, not only similarities, but differences as well. Thus, in the present case the "application of the concepts of the understanding to the schema of reason does not yield knowledge of the object itself . . . but only a rule or principle for the systematic unity of all employment of the understanding."[81] Reason, therefore, is employed hypothetically and does not attempt to extend our knowledge "to more objects than experience can give,"[82] but rather aims simply at the "systematic unity of the knowledge of the understanding." This systematic unity, "prescribed by reason," is a logical principle,[83] concerned not with ideas of objects but with the unity of concepts alone. That reason provides a projected unity, a regulative idea and not a constitutive one, is the positive result of the dialectic. In other words, reason is here shown in its useful role (as systematizing), a role which has been determined by showing the boundaries beyond which reason cannot pass and, in particular, that boundary which separates the ideas of reason employed in a manner which claims to determine objects (constitutive) from the regulative, ordering function of the same ideas.

As these are a priori ideas, they require in order to be established a solid foundation, a transcendental deduction. In the case of the categories, the core of the deduction involved demonstrating that the categories were the indispensible preconditions of any experience whatsoever. Now, with the

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[79] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 546.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid., pp. 546-47.

[82] Ibid., p. 550.

[83] Ibid., p. 535.

ideas of reason, such a deduction is clearly impossible, for whatever lawfulness they "introduce" into experience, we can be certain that it is not constitutive of experience as such, in the same sort of way as the categories are. Therefore, a different sort of deduction will be required for them, a deduction which we shall now briefly examine.

Kant begins the deduction by distinguishing between objects given absolutely and those given in the idea. The concepts involved in the former "are employed to determine the object," while for the latter "no object . . . is directly given."[84] That is to say that the objective reality of objects in the idea does not consist in "referring directly to an object." It is only, as we have noted before, a schema intended to realize the systematic unity of the empirical employment of reason. In short, an object in the idea does not tell us how objects are actually constituted, but rather guides our empirical research as if the objects of experience were somehow derived from the object in the idea. The ideas, therefore, "contribute to the extension of empirical knowledge" and are never in a "position to run counter to it."[85] With the above Kant concludes the deduction, an argument which asserts that the ideas, considered as regulative (object in the idea, not the object absolutely), extend empirical knowledge, without in any way running counter to it. As our purpose here is simply to establish what Kant is saying, it would serve no useful end to attempt to determine whether or not this is a legitimate deduction, in the broad sense of that term as used to describe the deduction of the categories.[86] We can thus, I believe, consider our 'thumb-nail sketch' of the Appendix to be complete, and turn in the final section of this chapter to an examination of what precisely the ideas of reason contribute to the transcendental argument that the Analytic left out.

It is a central contention of the First Critique that what is discovered empirically can never be anything more than contingent, and thus can never yield necessity.[87] It follows from this that no amount of inductive

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[84] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 550. [85] Ibid.

[86] Cf. Ibid., p. 121.

[87] For a general statement of this, see Critique of Pure Reason, p. 139.

reasoning can give necessity to empirical laws. Thus, Kant states, that "the particular (empirical) laws of nature . . . [are] from the human point of view contingent."[88] And again in the same Introduction, "These [laws], as empirical, may be contingent from the point of view of our understanding."[89] However, having said this, it is Kant's argument that we have to think these laws as necessary:

> These rules [the "particular rules of nature"] must be thought by it [the understanding] as laws (i.e. as necessary) for otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature, although their necessity can never be cognized or comprehended.[90]

In other words, assuming that empirical uniformities, in order to be something more than mere constant conjunction, require necessity, and given that this necessity is not empirically discoverable, Kant claims that we have to think these empirical laws as necessary. Why do we have to think them as necessary? Because otherwise they would not "constitute an order of nature." Now, implicit in the introduction of this new term, "order of nature", is the distinction between it and the notion of simple "nature". The latter refers to the unproblematic world of ordinary, objective experience -- a world whose necessary and sufficient conditions are set out in the Analytic of the First Critique. The term is thus used to denote:

> . . . all objects of experience; (B) the existence of these objects considered -- qua existence -- determined according to universal ('transcendental') laws; (C) more specifically: simply this conformity to law of all objects of experience.[91]

Contrasted with this, there is the order of nature "according to its particular rules."[92] The same concept is also described in the First Introduction as "experience as a system" or "experience as an empirical system."[93] The order of nature, therefore, as the systematic interconnection of empirical laws, is that unity ascribed to nature by reason (or, in the language of the Third Critique, reflective judgment) in its quest for

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[88] Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1974), p. 20.

[89] Ibid., p. 16.

[90] Ibid., p. 21.

[91] Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, p. 499.

[92] Cf. Critique of Judgment, p. 23.

[93] First Introduction, pp. 14-15.

totality "under a single principle." In short, behind the term "order of nature", we find that notion of a "projective"[94] or regulative unity set out in the Critique. Here, then, are the first tentative links between lawfulness on the empirical level and the systematizing activity of reason. That is, it is reason's demand that we think nature as a system, as an order of nature, a demand which presupposes, in Kant's mind, that we think empirical uniformities as necessary or lawful. Specifically, there is exhibited here the dependence of the principles, one upon the other, for while without the demand for an order of nature, no lawfulness would be required, without the thinking of that lawfulness, not order of nature, no system, would be possible. Analogously with the case of the categories, therefore, we "inject" necessity into what would otherwise remain a mere constant conjuction and, through this process, produce that lawfulness which experience as a system requires. In other words, we have seen that while reason, in its systematizing activity, uses certain maxims (e.g. parsimony -- "no leap in the manifold of forms") to reduce and connect a seemingly infinite number and variety of empirical laws, this very act of systematizing is in some way linked to the possibility of empirical lawfulness as such. What remains to be shown in greater detail, is the way in which reason in its regulative function first makes possible the existence of empirical laws.

It has already been noted that necessity is introduced into empirical uniformities as a result of reason's demand for an order of nature and thus, in an indirect sort of way, the raison d'être of lawlikeness is closely bound up with the need to have systematized experience. However, an even stronger claim can be made about the relationship between law and system: that "without this activity of reason there would be no systematic connection of laws and hence no sense in ascribing to the contingent rules of nature any lawlike necessity."[95] What is being argued for here is a somewhat stronger and more clearly defined relationship between law and

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[94] Critique of Pure Reason, p. 535.

[95] Buchdahl, "Causality, Causal Laws and Scientific Theory in the Philosophy of Kant," p. 202.

system. For instead of describing that relationship in terms of reason's demands, there is the suggestion that only such uniformities as can be placed within a scientific theory -- a system of laws -- can themselves be referred to as laws. Now while the direct textual evidence for this assertion is scarce, there are a number of interesting hints, particularly in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment which would point to its accuracy. For example, Kant writes:

> These laws, as empirical, may be contingent from the point of view of our understanding; and yet, if they are to be called laws (as the concept of nature requires) they must be regarded as necessary in virtue of a principle of the unity of the manifold, though it be unknown to us.[96]

Again, on page 20 of the same Introduction, it is claimed that:

> This transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature . . . represents the peculiar way in which we must proceed in reflection upon objects of nature in reference to a thoroughly connected experience.[97]

Or, somewhat more explicitly, "so must the judgment . . . think of nature in respect of the latter [i.e. empirical laws] according to a principle of purposiveness."[98] Finally, the understanding

> . . . must, in order to trace out these empirical so-called laws, place at the basis of all reflection upon objects an a priori principle, viz. that a cognizable order of nature is possible in accordance with these laws.[99]

The first quote from the Critique of Judgment (page 16) is revealing for it implies as Buchdahl points out, that without the "principle of the unity of the manifold" (where unity of the manifold means, given the context, a system of empirical laws and not a manifold of perceptions) -- that is, the "idea of a system" -- "we have no reason to postulate any lawlikeness whatsoever."[100] Thus, only those uniformities as can be embraced within a system of laws can be considered as laws.[101] The two passages from page 20 of the Critique of Judgment also suggest that empirical laws are inseparable

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[96] Critique of Judgment, p. 16.

[97] Ibid., p. 20.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid., p. 21.

[100] Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, p. 518.

[101] Buchdahl notes that this view has been expressed in some more recent work:

from the idea of a system, a notion expressed still more succinctly in a previously quoted section of the First Introduction:

> Yet particular experience which is thoroughly coherent under invariable principles, demands this systematic connection of empirical laws as well, whereby it becomes possible for judgment to subsume the particular under the universal. . . . Hence the aggregate of particular experiences has to be regarded as a system, for without this assumption total coherence under laws, i.e. the empirical unity of them, cannot come about. [102]

The final quote, taken from page 21 of the Critique of Judgment hints at the mutual dependence of empirical laws and the idea of a system. On the one hand, we necessarily presuppose this idea in order to obtain the concept of empirical lawlikeness, while on the other hand, the very idea (of a system) is possible only in accordance with these laws. Again, we find a similar approach put forward in the First Introduction:

> It [i.e. the formal teleology of nature] gives a principle for judging nature and investigating it in search of the general laws of particular experiences, according to which we must posit them [the general laws] to bring out that systematic connection needful for coherent experience, and which we have an a priori ground for assuming. [103]

Here we are told that systematic order is "brought out" of the positing of general laws, while in the preceding quote from the First Introduction, it was maintained that the idea of a system is a necessary presupposition for the formulation of laws. Thus, as Buchdahl notes,

> The thought of lawlikeness drives us to construct theories; and without the dynamic of reason in its constructive employment, the concept of law would not be defined.[104] To think the empirical uniformities as laws entails and in turn presupposes the systematic activity of reason.[105]

In the preceding analysis, it has been shown, I belive, that strong, if not conclusive evidence exists for the argument that: (A) the introduction of necessity into what would otherwise be simple constant conjunctions, and

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cf. R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation. A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science (Cambridge: University Press, 1953), pp. 300-3; Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), pp. 59-62.

[102] First Introduction, pp. 9-10.

[103] Ibid., p. 10.

[104] Cf. Critique of Judgment, pp. 19-20.

[105] Buchdahl, "The Relation between 'Understanding' and 'Reason'," p. 217.

thus their transformation into law, is closely bound up with reason's demand for "experience as a system" or the "order of nature"; and (B) that experience as a system refers not merely to the connection between given empirical laws, but that such a system is the precondition for empirical lawfulness as such in the sense that "only those putative uniformities which can be so fitted [into a system] will be regarded as laws."[106] And finally, (C) a general conclusion resulting from the entire discussion of the Dialectic and the Third Critique: that the order of nature as a "universe of law" and experience as a system, or in other words, scientific activity, are born not out of the categories alone (although they are certainly the ultimate precondition) but rather out of the projective, systematizing activity of reason.

In conclusion, therefore, I have attempted in this chapter to set out the meaning of Kant's concept of experience as it is presented in the First and Third Critiques. This part concerned itself only with experience in the most rudimentary meaning of that term -- that is, the experiencing of the given, of objects. Yet even this basic sense was itself further narrowed, so that the central aim of the chapter was to establish the essential conditions of any experience whatsoever, contingent or lawful, and secondly, to show what was required over and above those essential conditions, in order to produce experience as a system, or science. The analysis proceeded through Kant's "three-fold synthesis" but focused primarily upon the significance of categories, particularly in the account given of them in the Second Analogy. There it was argued that Kant had not committed, as Strawson maintains, an error of "numbing grossness." For, it was seen that the Analogy was designed to yield nothing more nor less than objective, contingent experience, and not a proof of empirical laws of causation. The latter -- that is, empirical lawfulness in general, and the notion of a lawfully ordered nature -- includes, as does all experience, contingent or lawlike, the categorical ingredient, but requires in addition the regulative activity of reason in its systematizing function. In short, the elements in the "scientific experience" of the world are

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[106] Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, p. 505.

not exhausted in the Transcendental Deduction, but rather the 'list' is only completed when the Dialectic -- specifically, reason in its legitimate employment -- is taken into account. And the importance of reason for experience is centered around the need for a certain type of systematic experience. The idea of a system of nature hints at the presence of design and of a teleology of nature, and in the next chapter of the thesis we will turn to this topic.

CHAPTER III

SCIENCE, PURPOSIVENESS AND THEOLOGY

> A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity?
>
> Aristotle, Physics 198b

In the preceding section of this thesis, we saw that systematic experience, or science, requires, in addition to the categories of the understanding, the ideas of reason. There we spoke in general terms of the systematizing activity of reason and of the prerequisites for a certain sort of experience. Now we will have to be more specific. In the following paragraphs, I will argue that the need for the ideas of reason (as Kant calls them in the First Critique) arises from the demands made by inductive thought and secondly, that Kant equates "systematic unity" with a purposive or teleological ordering.

In order for us to be able to find concepts for given empirical intuitions, we have to assume, Kant believes, that there is a regularity in nature, that there is a systematic unity underlying the seemingly infinite multitude of empirical facts with which we are presented. Thus, the classification of natural things into specific forms and the ability to detect "generally harmonious forms" presupposes "that nature has observed in its empirical laws a certain economy . . . and this presupposition must precede all comparison, being an a priori principle of judgment."[1] Induction depends on the assumption of a unity in nature, and without such an assumption we could not meaningfully investigate nature.[2] What precisely is this principle? "[The] essential principle of judgment is: Nature specifies its universal laws to empirical laws according to the form of a logical system, for the purpose of judgment."[3] Kant

maintains that this "essential principle" leads us to the concept of purposiveness because that unity whose existence depends on the "antecedent representation of it" is the highest form of unity.[4] Now purposiveness in Kant's terminology, is identical with teleology so that judgments as to purposiveness are, in fact, teleological judgments.[5] Thus we can say that without the concept of teleology induction would be impossible. It is important to note here that Kant, in the Appendix to the First Critique, and the two Introductions to the Third Critique, is not offering a teleological explanation of natural objects. It is quite possible, as McFarland point out,[6] that within the argument as set out in the Introduction, purposive statements would never enter into our system of laws. In other words, that system would be one of mechanical laws, where only the systematization itself would be seen as purposive. For there to be a system of mechanical laws, we must assume that nature is purposive for our knowledge. Thus, while teleological explanation is not employed here to explain particular events, or series of occurrences, it is said to be the underpinning for the explanation, according to mechanical laws, of those events. Later, we will discover that this use of the concept of teleology is linked to the actual observation of purposive "happenings" in nature.

In short, then, Kant seems to use the terms "systematic unity" and a "purposive arrangement of nature" interchangeably.[7] The systematizing activity of reason, therefore, consists principally of the application of

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[1]Kant, First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, p. 18.

[2]Cf. Nathan Rotenstreich, Experience and Its Systematization, p. 108; J. D. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology, pp. 77, 87.

[3]Kant, First Introduction, p. 20.

[4]Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 560.

[5]Kant, First Introduction, p. 37.

[6]McFarland, Teleology, p. 90.

[7]Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, p. 520.

the principle of reflective judgment (which, for the purposes of this paper, we will understand as being synonymous with the "idea of reason" or regulative idea) to the problems raised by the demands of induction -- that of an order and regularity in nature. The substance of this principle has already been indicated -- that is, teleology. However, before examining the concept of purposiveness in greater detail, it is first necessary to stop momentarily and attempt to determine the precise status which Kant wants to give to the idea of teleology.

Perhaps the best place to begin such an examination is with Kant's critique of what he refers to as the physico-theological argument. For there we can see, I would suggest, the 'shift' that Kant wants to introduce into the concept of teleology. Physico-theology "is the endeavour of reason to infer the supreme cause of nature and its properties from the purpose of nature."[8] Physico-theology is thus, in point of fact, a physico-teleology designed to show the existence of God. The central points of this argument are as follows: (1) the world exhibits 'clear signs' of an order in accordance with a determinate purpose. Moreover, without such a purpose "the whole universe must sink into the abyss of nothingness."[9] Therefore, (2) we have to assume a purposiveness. But this purposiveness is "alien to the things of the world" which could not have come into that co-operation on their own. They must have been designed by an ordering rational being.[10] There must be, then, a wise, intelligent and free cause. Kant makes it quite clear that he is more sympathetic to this sort of argument -- which he terms "wholesome" and "useful" -- than to other proofs for the existence of God. Indeed, this approach offers certain advantages for, according to Kant, it aids us in reason's demand for a parsimony of principles, it is not self-contradictory, nor is it ever completely contradicted by experience. Finally, it suggests ends and purposes which could aid us in our investigation of nature.[11] Now further on we will deal

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[8] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 286.

[9] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 519.

[10] Ibid., p. 521.

[11] Ibid., p. 519.

with the theological difficulties that this argument fails to solve, but for the moment, there is one central point of interest to be discussed. And that point is that Kant does not reject the teleological approach as such but rather he objects only to the formulation of the physico-theological claim. Though we do acknowledge the procedure, Kant writes, "we still cannot approve the claims which this mode of argument would fain advance to apodeictic certainty."[12] Specifically, of course, the claim that Kant wants to reject is that concerning the proof of God's existence. But in rejecting the dogmatic assertions of the physico-theological argument, Kant wants to jettison neither the concept of teleology nor that of an intelligent Author. What Kant does, then, is to effect a change in the status of these concepts. Can we assume, he asks, the existence of a wise and omnipotent God? "Undoubtedly we may; and not only may, but must, do so."[13] Now the claim that is being made here is that, "It is only in relation to the systematic and purposive ordering of the world, which . . . we are constrained to presuppose, that we have thought this unknown being by analogy . . ."[14] This idea, therefore, of a designing cause outside of the series of natural causes has meaning insofar as it is related to the "employment of our reason."[15] In other words, both the concept of purposiveness and its corollary -- the designing Being -- are necessary ingredients for certain forms of experience. But they are employed only on the condition that we ascribe to them no absolute and objective validity. Their necessity lies in the fact that specific activities could not be conducted unless they were presupposed. Thus their necessity pertains not to the object of which they claim to speak, but rather the employment of our reason. That is to say, they are regulative, and not constitutive of experience. In the First Introduction, Kant again sets out and clarifies this 'shift'. The concept of purposiveness he says there, is the "foundation of no theory," nor does it entail knowledge of objects.[16] Teleological judgment is never anything more

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[12] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 520.

[13] Ibid., p. 566.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Note that in the Critique of Judgment, Kant will argue that the purposive ordering of the world requires only a designing Being -- a "supersensible something" as he terms it. The proof of the existence of a moral deity will be left up to the ethico-theological argument.

than reflective.[17] From this it follows that its necessity is 'subjective' which is to say that while nature is possible without it, specific forms of explanation would not be available to us were it not for these concepts.[18] Here we see the heart of Kant's shift in emphasis. The teleological argument is not rejected in the First Critique, indeed it is described as necessary. Rather, the claim that the idea speaks to the absolute objectivity of its object is disputed. In the place of that claim, Kant wants to relate the concept of teleology and a supreme designer, to the demands of our reason, to subjective necessity. As Buchdahl writes,

> This is the very core of Kant's method: the 'critical restraint', or the insulation of the basic key-concepts of traditional philosophy and natural theology from an ontological anchorage which, in Kant's eyes, does not actually have . . . any such foundations either in systematic . . . or in elementary experience.[19]

This means that Kant's objection to the physico-theological argument is based upon his belief that that approach has reified -- or made ontological claims -- for the ideas whereas in fact, those ideas have only subjective validity. Teleological explanation is thereby "removed" from its non-existent ontological foundation and made free for its proper employment as a regulative idea.

The preceding analysis has shown that the central principle underlying the "order of nature" is that of a purposive arrangement. It has been argued, moreover, that this principle is the precondition of systematic experience in general and of inductive thought in particular. Finally, the status of the concept of teleology was determined. We noted earlier in this chapter that Kant, in the Dialectic of the First Critique and the Introductions to the Third Critique, speaks of purposiveness only in the sense of a systematic unity of empirical mechanical laws. However, in the Analytic of Teleological Judgment, Kant is concerned primarily with organic

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[16] Kant, First Introduction, p. 11.

[17] Ibid., p. 43.

[18] Cf. Ibid., pp. 44, 47.

[19] Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. The Classical Origins, Descartes to Kant, p. 527.

purposiveness -- that is, the teleological explanation of particular natural objects. The question can be legitimately asked, therefore, as to the relationship between these two arguments. The answer to this Kant never makes entirely clear, but despite this, we can suggest one possible solution. Any system points to a "prior idea" and thus to an intelligent cause.[20] Systems of mechanical laws, indicate, though they do not prove, the existence of a designing cause. But organisms too are systems, inexplicable by mere mechanical laws and thus they as well would seem to point to a rational cause. In other words, both sorts of system -- that of empirical laws and that of organized beings -- require that we think their possibility as one based on design, or prior idea. Now with this as a link, uniting the Introductions and the Analytic of the Critique of Judgment, we are prepared to examine Kant's concept of purposiveness in greater detail.

Kant begins the Analytic by suggesting a distinction between the type of purposiveness to be discussed in this section and that examined in the Introduction. That is, he distinguishes between objective and subjective purposiveness. We have good reason to assume, Kant writes, "subjective purposiveness in nature, in its particular laws, in reference to its comprehensibility by human judgment and to the possibility of the connection of particular experiences in a system."[21] When we employ this sort of subjective purposiveness the "representation of things" is 'something in ourselves' and thus "can be quite well thought a priori."[22] Objective purposiveness, on the other hand, considers only the 'things of nature' and seeks the evidence for this purposiveness in the experience of nature. This form of purposiveness is the only sort of explanation available to us when we are concerned with certain types of natural objects i.e. organisms. Kant, in the Analytic, is interested only in this latter meaning of purposiveness.

Now objective purposivenss itself must be further subdivided for

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[20] Cf. McFarland's argument in Kant's Concept of Teleology, pp. 76-77.

[21] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 205. [22] Ibid.

it has what Kant terms both its material and its formal aspects. To illustrate this distinction, Kant uses the example of a geometrical figure. Any such figure, he argues, exhibits a "manifold, objective purposiveness" as, for example, "in reference to their usefulness for the solution of several problems by a single principle."[23] The purposiveness embodied in geometrical figures Kant refers to as "intellectual" or "formal". By this he means that they can only be conceived of as incorporating purposiveness in general "without any (definite) purpose being assumed as its basis, and consequently without teleology being needed for it."[24] It is intellectual purposiveness, therefore, because I 'introduce the purposiveness' -- it is not the object which indicates to me the presence of a purposive organization. So while the figure exhibits design and has a number of possible uses -- is purposive in general -- it requires no purpose as its ground.[25] To see the distinction that Kant wants to make here, contrast our explanation of the useful, designed geometrical figure with that of a flower's pollen. Kant's claim is that to understand the latter completely, the explanandum has to be coupled with an "in order to" clause, eg. 'pollen exists in order to reproduce the particular plant species.'[26] Without the "in order to" component such phenomena, those of a teleological sort, would be inexplicable. But in the case of the geometrical figure, no clause of this kind is required, though indeed, the figure may lend itself to a variety of "in order to" clauses.

If, on the other hand, I happen across a neatly arranged flower-bed -- a grouping of things external to myself -- I cannot derive them a priori -- "after a rule of my own." They must be "given empirically" in order to be known, and so cannot be a mere representation of mine. This is "real" or "material" purposiveness, and it requires the concept of a purpose. Perhaps the same idea can best be expressed in this way: on a fundamental level, my experience of the garden can only make sense to me if I think it as an object whose possibility presupposes a concept, a concept of an end or

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[23]Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 208. [24]Ibid., p. 210.

[25]Ibid.

[26]For an interesting account of the grammar of teleological judgments, see Andrew Woodfield, Teleology (Cambridge: The University Press, 1976).

purpose. That is, I can only account for its existence through the use of teleology. So, to be somewhat more precise about Kant's interest in the Critique, we may say that he wants to analyse not simply objective purposiveness, but material objective purposes. And the outstanding example of such purposivenss is, for Kant, organic beings.

In judgments of material purposivenss, the mind is led to that concept by experience. And this occurs "only when we have to judge of a relation of cause to effect which we find ourselves able to apprehend as legitimate only by presupposing the idea of the effect of the causality of the cause as the fundamental condition, in the cause, of the possibility of the effect."[27] Now this effect, Kant continues, may be of two sorts. On the one hand, the effect may be seen "directly as an art product." Or, on the other hand, it can be regarded simply as material "for the art of other possible natural beings." The latter is termed relative purposiveness, and the former, inner purposiveness. Relative purposiveness, then, concerns the utility of some object for another natural being -- "one thing serves another as a means to a purpose."[28] From the notion of relative purposiveness, we can see that for this utility to be judged an "external purpose of nature" it must be demonstrated that the end for which this object has been established as a means, must itself be a natural purpose. Thus, to use Kant's example, we can see that in certain cold countries circumstances have combined as if designed for man's benefit. The snow helps to protect his crops, marine animals yield oil, sea currents supply wood and so forth. But, Kant says, "We do not see why, generally, men must live there at all."[29] We cannot determine, in other words, whether or not man's presence in these areas is a purpose of nature. And failing this, how are we able to say that the snow, currents, reindeer, etc., have been placed there in order to serve man? Relative purposiveness, therefore, has two related characteristics. The first is that such objects

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[27]Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 213. [28]Ibid., p. 274.

[29]Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 215.

are not "purposes in their own right" -- they are only contingently connected to this purposiveness.[30] This is the case because they are judged to be purposive only with respect to some other object. In addition, if we are to speak of relative purposiveness it is not sufficient to determine the utility of the object in question. Rather, we must show that the natural object which it serves is a purpose of nature as well. But "mere contemplation of nature" can never make it wholly certain whether a given object is an end of nature. All the effects of such purposes are, in other words, only contingently purposive and so those means themselves are contingent.[31] Thus, while relative purposiveness may hint at natural purposes, it justifies "no absolute teleological judgment." This is to say that the external relation holding between means and ends can only be judged as being hypothetically purposive. Clearly, then, this is not the best place to begin one's search for signs of a designed nature, though, as will be shown further on, the discovery of organized beings "compels" the assumption of a designed whole of nature, and this, in turn, lends support to the "relative" type of teleological explanation. Now given that the contingency of relative purposiveness was bound up with the fact that this form of purposivenss did not inhere in one object, but in the relations between objects, it might be reasonable to assume that if we can find an object which is purposive in itself -- an "absolute purpose" -- a step towards this more solid foundation will have been taken.

That sort of object which is purposive in itself, Kant terms a "natural purpose". A natural purpose is "both cause and effect of itself."[32] Now in order to understand what Kant means in this rather terse definition, it might be useful to contrast it, as he does, to "products of art" on the one hand and effective causality on the other. The classic example of an "art product" is the watch and its designer. "In this case [i.e. that of a watch] the producing cause of the parts and of their form is not contained in the nature (of the material) but is external to it in a being which can

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[30] Cf. McFarland, Teleology, pp. 99, 112; Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 214.

[31] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 224.

[32] Ibid., p. 217.

produce effects according to ideas . . ."[33] If we employ the analogy of art to explain organisms (or, natural purposes), we attribute, Kant believes, too little to those purposes. For this analogy suggests an artificer external to the object, and thus, ". . . only the concept of such an object . . . could contain the causality for such an effect."[34] Natural purposes, however, function without the causality of concepts, though as we shall see momentarily, Kant never entirely discards the notion of a non-human designer for the understanding of organisms. The central point, then, in the contrast between natural purposes and products of art is that while the latter are directly dependent on the causality of concepts, the former appear to be self-subsistent. What self-subsistence means can perhaps best be illustrated by introducing the second half of our contrast -- that between the peculiar form of causality embodied in organisms and effective causality. Effective causality is a "connection constituting an ever progressive series (of causes and effects), and things which as effects presuppose others as causes cannot be reciprocally at the same time causes of these."[35] But, Kant claims, we can imagine another sort of causal combination, a combination which is both progressive and regressive. Here, the effect may, "with equal propriety," be the "cause of that of which it is an effect." In other words, in a combination of "final causes," there is a reciprocal relationship of cause and effect. This contrast between effective and final causality enables us to see what Kant means when he speaks of the self-subsistence of organisms. On the one hand, an organized being is not a mere art product owing its production and reproduction to an external cause. On the other hand, it is not simply a moment in a "one-directional" -- a progressive -- causal order. The organism belongs to a progressive/regressive causal combination -- it is, as Kant says, ". . . an organized and self-organizing being . . . an organized being is then not a mere machine, for that has merely moving power, but it possesses in itself formative power of a self-propagating kind."[36] Organisms, in other words, present us with a radically different type of system. They are amenable neither to mechanical nor to 'artistic' explanation. A body is to be described as having a natural purpose if it

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[33] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 220.

[34] Ibid., p. 217.

[35] Ibid., p. 219.

[36] Ibid., pp. 220-21.

"produces a whole through its own causality," in which every part is reciprocally ends and means, and in which nothing is in vain. Moreover, a natural purpose is one which exists without the "causality of the concepts of rational beings external to itself." Now, as McFarland points out, this claim raises some difficulties for Kant. For, as we noted before, all systems appear to demand a designer. But here, Kant is asserting that organisms are natural purposes precisely because they do not depend on an a priori idea. Is it possible, therefore, for Kant to entirely eliminate notions of intention from his discussion of organisms? And if he disposes with the idea of design, or intention, how can he deal with what organisms "are to be"?

> What they (i.e. organisms) are to be seems to determine in some way the lines along which their parts develop; and, as it stands, this feature of organisms appears to have been an utter mystery to Kant. [37]

Kant responds to this difficulty in the following manner:

> For a body . . . which is to be judged in itself . . . as a natural purpose, it is requisite that its parts mutually depend upon one another both as to their form and their combination and so produce a whole by their own causality, while conversely the concept of the whole may be regarded as its cause according to a principle (in a being possessing a causality according to concepts . . .). [38]

The sense of this passage may become somewhat clearer if we recall that a few lines prior to the above quotation, Kant states that the "idea of the whole" is not the cause of the combination of the parts -- "for then it would be an artificial product" -- but rather, this idea is the "ground of cognition, for him who is judging it." These two statements, taken together, yield the conclusion that Kant, in order to solve the difficulties raised above, has to employ the concept of a designer, albeit on the regulative level -- "the concept of the whole may be regarded as its cause." The only option available to him, McFarland observes, was "to appeal to a possible intention in the mind of a possible being" who designs organisms.[39] Organisms, then, differ from 'artistic systems' in that design and intention are not central to the explanation of them.[40] They resemble the latter,

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[37] McFarland, Teleology, p. 106.

[38] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 220.

[39] McFarland, Teleology, p. 106.

[40] Despite this solution, difficulties still remain in Kant's argument. For,

however, inasmuch as they require at least the possibility of a designer for their possibility. Whatever the problems involved with this solution, it is clear that Kant saw it as the only reasonable answer to the difficulties raised by a future whole which determines the actions of presently existing parts. Now before discussing the implications of organic teleology for other uses of teleology, it is first necessary to examine the import of Kant's arguments on natural purposes for the explanation of nature.

The obvious conclusion of the preceding analysis is that certain sorts of natural objects -- organized beings -- cannot be explained in purely mechanical terms. "It is indeed quite certain that we cannot adequately cognize, much less explain, organized beings and their internal possibility according to mere mechanical principles of nature."[41] There will never be, Kant claims, a Newton who can make comprehensible to us a blade of grass without employing the idea of design. Consequently, in respect to such objects, mechanical explanation must be made subordinate to the teleological.[42] So here we find that the impression given in the First Critique -- that the world can be investigated using only mechanical principles -- is inaccurate. The idea of purpose is necessary on at least two levels: the first being that of a system of empirical laws and a unified nature discussed in the Introduction and the second being that of organisms. Mechanical concepts, in short, are not "exhaustive of our experience of the world."[43] The investigation of nature in general, then, requires that we presuppose a design, and biological investigations, in particular, depend on teleology. Indeed,

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as will be noted further on in this chapter, the idea of a designing architect is said by Kant to underlie all purposive explanations. However, when one wants to use the notion of purposiveness in natural science -- for the explanation of natural products -- we must cleanse it of every theological idea. This difficulty could well reflect the "middle ground" which teleology occupies in Kant's system -- it is, properly speaking, neither a part of natural science nor of theology, yet it is involved with both. We may conclude by saying that while explanation through design ultimately depends on the idea of a designer, when we employ that sort of explanation in specific fields, and in order to gain a limited comprehension of certain objects, it is legitimate to consider that design as originating in nature.

[41] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 248. [42] Ibid.

[43] McFarland, Teleology, p. 135.

in the latter, it is difficult to see in what sense teleological ideas are not constitutive, rather than regulative. Certain objects are only possible when understood teleologically[44] and thus, though Kant never suggests this himself, ideas of purpose seem to play a role not unlike that of the categories.[45] The question which naturally arises at this point is whether or not there is a conflict involved in the use of two distinct modes of explanation. Or, more succinctly, does the introduction of the notion of design violate the Newtonian, mechanical universe which Kant allegedly set out in the Critique of Pure Reason?

As Buchdahl notes, Newton himself was aware of purposive explanation though he never attempted to resolve the apparent contradiction between mechanical and teleological analysis.[46] Kant on the hand is intent upon resolving it. The determinant, or constitutive, judgment, Kant says, does not have to find principles for itself -- rather, it merely subsumes things under given universal laws. It has no autonomy, and so is in no danger of encountering an antinomy of its own. The reflective judgment however has to discover principles, or maxims, for itself and between these maxims conflict can arise.[47] The two maxims which seem to contradict one another are the following:

> All production of material things is possible according to merely mechanical laws; [and] Some production of material things is not possible according to merely mechanical laws.[48]

The wording of these propositions is important for Kant's solution. For they claim to speak of the objects themselves -- they claim, in other words, to be constitutive. If we rephrase these maxims so that they now concern how we must judge nature, the conflict, Kant claims, disappears. The rephrasing of the propositions then, amounts to saying that "I must always reflect" according to one or the other of the propositions. The mechanical

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[44] It should be noted, however, that natural purposes as products of nature demand some element of mechanical explanation without which they would not be natural. Cf. Critique of Judgment, p. 271.

[45] This point is made by George Schrader, "The Status of Teleological Judgment in the Critical Philosophy," Kant-Studien 45 (1953): 226.

[46] Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, p. 485; Newton, Optiks, Question 31.

and teleological standpoints can coexist so long as they are taken to be regulative statements. Neither maxim takes absolute precedence over the other, although Kant maintains that we must first exhaust the possibilities of mechanical explanation before resorting to a purposive approach. But once these limits have been reached, we should make use of the teleological analysis. This is not to say that natural purposes are not possible in accordance with mechanical principles, for that would be a constitutive assertion, but rather we say that for human reason, such natural purposes demand that we view them according to a system of purposes.[49] The solution to the antinomy which Kant puts forward here will, of course, be recognized as being a typically Kantian move. That is, we take propositions, apparently in conflict, and demonstrate that that conflict resides not in the substance of the assertion as such, but in the sort of claim that it pretends to make. We reveal the compatibility of the maxims by freeing them from 'their' supposed ontological (constitutive) foundations. A second solution to the antinomy, and one which we can only briefly mention here, is the idea of a supersensible substrate. ". . .[I]t is at least possible," Kant writes, "to consider the material world as mere phenomenon and to think as its substrate something like a thing in itself."[50] In this "supersensible real ground for nature," teleology and mechanism do not conflict. The ground for their compatibility, then, resides in neither of the maxims but in a transcendant, indeterminate concept of the supersensible.[51] The fact that they have this common ground indicates, however, nothing more that the compatibility of the propositions. When we come to judge nature, both are kept distinct -- they cannot be employed to explain the same object. The supersensible substrate, then, which provides the common ground is the intelligent cause -- a regulative and indeterminate idea introduced to allow for a teleological vocabulary which Kant considers necessary. That this approach is also a classical Kantian response may be seen by comparing it with the solution to the Third Antinomy in the First Critique. It will be recalled that there, part of Kant's answer consisted in showing that the conflict could be solved if we did not treat appearances as absolute,

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[47]Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 232-33.

[48]Ibid., p. 234.

[49]Ibid., p. 235.

[50]Ibid., p. 257.

[51]Ibid., p. 263.

but rather recognized their "intelligible ground."[52] The contradiction between freedom and causality -- and that between teleology and mechanism -- is shown to be illusory through a demonstration that the conflict arises only when we forget about the possiblity of a supersensible ground uniting them. Therefore, it appears that Kant wants to offer two solutions to the Antinomy: one, the placing of both purposive and mechanical forms of explanation on the regulative plane, and the other, the postulating of a (regulative) supersensible substrate uniting the two. Which solution is uppermost in Kant's mind is difficult to determine. However, we shall see further on in this thesis that the indeterminate idea of such a substrate comes to be of increasing importance for the teleological standpoint.

For the moment, suffice it to say that to the extent that teleology is employed by the natural sciences, it makes no mention of the supersensible. Experience provides us with evidence of natural purposes but not of intention. The design which we perceive in nature is to be attributed, therefore, to nature itself and not to a Supreme Architect.[53] Thus, for the internal principles of natural science, the concept of the supersensible is not to be employed. Now while it is fairly clear what sort of purposive standpoint is to be adopted by the person investigating nature, it is not entirely plain in what relationship this viewpoint stands to natural science. In other words, is teleology -- purged of all religious overtones -- to become an integral part of scientific inquiry, or will it always remain on the "outside" as it were, directing investigation but never itself gaining the status of a principle of physical science? We have previously noted that the idea of design is essential for scientific activity -- that is, for the possibility of a unified body of empirical laws and, more fundamentally, for induction. It has also been shown that teleology is necessary for the understanding of certain natural forms, organisms. This is to say that for the science of biology, teleology is required:

> . . . [The] dissections of plants and animals, in order to investigate their structure and to find out the reasons, why and for what

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[52] Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 466-67.

[53] Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 229-30.

> end such parts, . . . and just such an internal form have been given them, assume as indisputably necessary the maxim that nothing in such a creature is vain. . . ." [54]

Kant adds to this statement the assertion that biologists can as little do without this teleological principle as can "universal natural science" do without the idea that nothing happens by chance. This would seem to support Schrader's claim, referred to earlier, that the concept of teleology is made, in certain fields, to occupy a position similar to that which the categories hold for nature in general. However, despite the importance that Kant appears to be granting to teleology in the above quote, there can be no doubt that, in his mind, it is still regulative. Indeed, in that same passage, he describes it as a "guiding thread" -- a term which, as we shall see momentarily, he uses when he wants to distinguish teleology from natural science. The fact, then, that teleology remains regulative provides us with a clue as to the relationship between the physical sciences and teleology. Natural science, Kant writes, "needs determinant and not merely reflective principles in order to supply objective grounds for natural effects."[55] Teleology, therefore, cannot belong to the "doctrine of natural science." Moreover, teleology does not extend our knowledge of nature. Nothing is gained, Kant believes, for the "theory of nature," by regarding nature as purposive. To speak of nature in teleological terms is a useful and, in some cases, seemingly necessary ("seemingly" because we can never rule out the possibility of mechanical explanation, even of organisms), but this talk remains nothing more than description "drawn up in accordance with a particular guiding thread."[56] Having said this, we should be wary of minimizing the role of teleology in Kant's understanding of science. Teleology is necessary for the reasons described above, though this necessity is not of the same order as that pertaining to the categories. In the latter case, nature would not be possible without the categories while in the former, certain types of thought depend on our presuming this principle. The direction of Kant's writings on teleology, far from being intended to reduce its importance, is, on the contrary, designed to set it on a solid foundation. Such a

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[54] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 223. [55] Ibid., p. 266.

[56] Ibid.

founding means, for Kant, the "critical purging" of our conceptions. This in turn means that the domains of natural science and purposive explanation, while they cooperate with one another, must nevertheless be kept distinct. The failure to maintain these boundaries leads, as Kant had shown in the Dialectic to the First Critique, to dialectical illusion. The relationship then between science and teleology -- as described by Kant -- should not be seen as an attempt to reduce the significance of teleology, but rather as an effort to demonstrate its limits. And these limits are that it is a methodological, regulative principle for the investigation of nature. In the preceding pages we have set out Kant's concept of teleology as it coexists with scientific activity. We have seen that it is a necessary principle for induction, for a unified system of laws and for biology. But there is more than this to his idea of teleology. We began by discussing teleology and science, and we shall conclude this section by showing how that natural teleology impels us towards religious and moral thought. That this thesis should take that path is, of course, no accident, for Kant imself saw teleology as a possible bridge between the theoretical and practical spheres, between the phenomenal and supersensible. But this latter aspect will have to wait until the next section.

Organized beings, given that their possibility can only be conceived according to the principles of teleology, provide, Kant believes, objective reality to the concept of a purpose of nature.[57] But natural purposes point to more than the objective reality of purposiveness. They provide evidence that the whole of nature has been teleologically organized. ". . . [This] concept (of natural purposes) leads necessarily to the idea of collective nature as a system in accordance with the rule of purposes, to which idea all the mechanisms of nature must be subordinated."[58] The "principle of reason" which is employed when speaking of the purposiveness of the whole of nature is that everything in nature is "good for something"; nothing is in vain in it. Thus, through the evidence provided by organisms "we are justified, nay called upon, to expect of it [nature] and its laws nothing that is not purposive on the whole."[59] Now the principle which Kant is

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[57]Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 222. [58]Ibid., p. 225.

[59]Ibid., p. 226.

introducing here is different from that used in the investigation of organisms. And the sense of this difference is captured in the phrase "good for something." We have returned, in other words, to the idea of external or relative purposiveness. As was noted earlier in this section, external purposiveness is hypothetical for Kant -- it gives no basis for an absolute teleological judgment. This is so because although we may believe that some object is a means for another object, we are not entitled to describe that first object as being relatively purposeful unless the object to which it is of use is an objective purpose of nature. In short, Kant's argument is set out in the following manner: we know with certainty of internal or natural purposes, of purposiveness in the parts of nature. And since it would be unreasonable to acknowledge the purposiveness of the parts, but not of the whole of nature, we are forced to assume the purposiveness of the whole.[60] Nothing, according to this view, is in vain in nature; everything has its use, is good for something. That is, relative teleology is a legitimate and necessary form of explanation, and it derives its strength, not so much from the direct evidence for it, as from the circuitous reasoning, that what is true of the parts must be true of the whole.

Nevertheless in order for relative teleology to be more firmly grounded, the previously mentioned difficulty will have to be solved: nature can never reveal a simple object as the end of a process of relative purposiveness precisely because we can never say with certainty that that object itself is a purpose of nature. How can we say, to refer back to Kant's example quoted above, that the inhabitants of Lapland, who are apparently served by the naturally-provided abundance of animals and driftwood, are placed there purposefully? Experience could certainly not provide any proof for this. And if we cannot speak of their being there as an objective purpose, what reason do we have to describe the driftwood and animals as relative purposes? That abundance would have been there had the region been totally empty and the fact that men had the good fortune to chance upon such an area can hardly be taken as evidence for the designedness (in a relative

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[60] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 225; Cf. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," On History, ed. & trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1974), p. 20.

sense) of the products to be found there. Thus, Kant argues that for the assertion that a thing is a purpose of nature "we require, not merely the concept of a possible purpose, but the knowledge of the final purpose (scopus) of nature."[61] A final purpose, Kant defines as "that purpose which needs no other as the condition of its possibility."[62] Such a purpose, because it is not conditioned, cannot be found in nature. There is nothing in the sensible world which is not conditioned and so, if there is a final purpose, it will not be found in the unending series of cause and effect which constitutes nature. Thus, our teleological knowledge based on the observation of nature will not be sufficient to provide us with an idea of the final purpose of creation. Nature, qua sensible domain, does not contain final purposes and so "this requires a reference of such knowledge [of final purposes] to something supersensible . . . for the purpose of (the existence of) nature must itself be sought beyond nature."[63] Natural purposes, then, compel us to seek the ground for the collective unity of nature which in turn demands that we determine the final purpose of creation. Scientific inquiry ultimately compels us to search for the supersensible ground of nature. From genera, and the external uniformity of the world, a clue is given to us as to the ultimate design at work in it.[64] Now the final purpose is not man qua sensible being, but rather man as a moral agent. However, man's practical freedom is not within the scope of physico-teleology and so the discussion of it, as it relates to final purposes, will be reserved for the following chapter. It is important, though, to note that the teleological investigation of nature leads us to (and in the case of the supersensible, also presupposes) the ideas of final purpose and the supersensible. The former it cannot provide at all, but nevertheless, it requires it. The latter always remains indeterminate, when we restrict outselves to nature. It impels us towards these ends, and gives us hints about them, but it can go no further. Physico-teleology is a propaedeutic to, and a useful companion for, ethico-theology, but they should never be confused with one another.[65]

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[61] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 225.

[62] Ibid., p. 284.

[63] Ibid., p. 225; Cf. Ibid., p. 276.

[64] Ibid., p. 237.

[65] Ibid., p. 292.

While the significance of the supersensible (God) for the teleological argument will only become clear when we examine Kant's teaching on ethico-theology, it is necessary, at this point, to return to the problem of the relationship between physical teleology and theology. For though Kant does not wholly dispense with the idea of a designer -- indeed, despite the argument concerning organisms, the notion of a Supreme Architect is never dropped -- he believes that natural teleology, though it suggests the existence of God, has no place in theology, nor is it adequate for the proof requirements of the latter.

In our account of Kant's objections to physico-theology, in the First Critique, we saw that he referred to the idea of God as something which we must assume as a regulative device. A more detailed, though fundamentally similar, argument is presented in the Critique of Judgment. Kant writes, "We can place at the basis of the possibility of these natural purposes nothing else than an intelligent Being."[66] Underlying natural purposes there must be a supreme intelligent cause, existing outside of nature.[67] Here we are not judging as to the truth or falsity of the proposition that a "being acting according to design" lies at the basis of nature. Rather, we are maintaining that, given the constitution of our faculties, we must judge nature according to that principle. But now if the teleology of nature leads us this far -- to the regulative idea of a Supreme Architect -- why is natural theology merely a "wholesome illusion"? Kant's response is that if by deity we mean nothing more than simply "an intelligent being thought by us, of which there may be one or more" and if we do not hesitate to arbitrarily supply what is deficient in that 'proof', then we may grant the possibility of a natural theology.[68] In other words, the data and principles for determining this supreme cause are derived from experience, and no property of that cause can be determined (by natural teleology) using principles other than those obtained in experience. With the data supplied to us in experience, ". . . nothing remains [of the Deity] but the concept of a supersensible something which contains the

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[66]Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 248. [67]Ibid., p. 265.

[68]Ibid., p. 288.

ultimate ground of the world of sense, but which does not furnish any knowledge . . . of its inner constitution."[69] This supreme designer might, as Kant argues, be without wisdom and its effects could be attributed to the necessity of its own nature. (Kant probably has Spinoza's concept of "Substance" in mind here.) Hence, physical teleology is not adequate to the concept of a wise, moral God.[70] The purposiveness that we discover in nature impels us to a theology inasmuch as it indicates a supersensible ground for nature, but it cannot produce one. That this is the case is evident, for Kant, in the fact that nature can never reveal the "inner characteristics" of this Architect. We are only capable of thinking -- within our experience of nature -- a "supersensible something," indeterminate in its qualities. There is, however, the possibility of an objective proof of a Deity's existence, though this proof is not developed in the course of physico-teleological inquiry but rather in the examination of final purposes and moral activity. This proof, therefore, will be discussed in the following section. For the time being, it is sufficient to note that natural theology pushes us towards theology, though ultimately its arguments are deficient, requiring final confirmation from outside sources.

In conclusion, then, we have seen that the Third Critique makes clear the role that the ideas of reason are to play in Kant's system. Far from being convenient fictions, the regulative principles -- and in particular that of teleology -- are crucial features of four areas of thought, of which only the latter two concern us here: as the foundation for inductive thought, in formal purposiveness (for example, geometry), in the biological sciences, and finally in the explanation of the whole. The direction of Kant's argument only becomes clear when we recognize the connection between these last two areas -- natural purposes and nature as a collective unity. This is turn leads us to the concept of final purposes. In the concept of final purposes -- which is required for the purposiveness of nature as a whole -- we are driven towards the idea of a supersensible

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[69] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 318.

[70] Ibid., pp. 329, 290.

ground, different from the vague "supersensible something" demanded by natural teleology, but, still, linked to it. The internal logic, as it were, of science leads us beyond nature to theology.

CHAPTER IV

THINGS OF FAITH

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant spoke of reason's search for a "systematic self-subsistent whole," and of its natural drive to find a firm footing beyond the bounds of experience.[1] It was this desire, of course, which when dogmatically pursued, led to the antinomies, whose resolution consisted, as Kant commented in the Second Critique, in showing that the supersensible could be thought without coming into conflict with the claims of experience.[2] Not only is the supersensible, the concepts of freedom, immortality and God, something which reason naturally desires but it is, in fact, the ultimate aim of all metaphysics.[3] One might say that reason, in its end, is profoundly practical. In this part of the thesis then, we are interested in Kant's concept of the supersensible, in the "things of faith" and particularly in the supersensible basis of the unity of nature and freedom.[4] And of special significance to us will be the way in which this "supersensible basis" is the source of hope. Such an inquiry is suggested in the quote presented at the beginning of the thesis. Design in nature and morality point to God's existence and thus to a morally-ordered universe which gives us reason to share Pope's optimism about the world.

The two previous chapters of this thesis attempted to show the progression, in Kant's analysis, from the most rudimentary elements of experience through systematic experience or science to teleology. In the discussion of the latter concept, it was noted that here reason seeks to lead us beyond experience to the supersensible and that while teleology allows for or even needs[5] a "supersensible something" it is incapable of a more fruitful exploration of that realm. Physical teleology, that is

to say, requires that we determine the original ground of the purposes

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[1]Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 629-30.

[2]Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), pp. 3, 6.

[3]Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 631; Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 325.

[4]Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 12.

[5]Note the change in emphasis between this formulation and that found in certain passages in the First Critique. In parts of that latter work, the "Canon" for example, thought to be of early composition, the role of the supersensible and particularly, the idea of an intelligent author is said to be of little importance: "In respect of all three [i.e. the supersensible ideas] the merely speculative interest of reason is very small . . ." (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 631). On the other hand, different passages, perhaps of a later date, suggest a strong interest: "The speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of a supreme reason." (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 560; emphasis in the original). In his more mature writings -- What is Orientation in Thinking? and the Third Critique -- the importance of this idea is stated in firm and unequivocal language. Reason has a positive need for the concept of an Author in order to fully comprehend design in nature (see What is Orientation in Thinking? trans. Lewis White Beck in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, ed. Lewis White Beck [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949], p. 298; Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 292). This change in emphasis may be seen in the greater significance granted to the teleological understanding of nature, both as a whole and in specific organized beings, in the later works. In the Critique of Pure Reason, this sort of explanation is largely absent or is only briefly touched upon (cf. the section therein on physico-theology, pp. 642-43, and pp. 559-61. The last reference, though brief, is quite suggestive of the type of arguments that will appear in the Critique of Judgment.), whereas in the Third Critique, it gains a status which, on occasion, appears to equal that of mechanical causality (Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 234-45). The purpose of this chapter, it should be remembered, is not to chart any such change in Kant's thought, though I suspect that a change of the sort indicated did occur. To establish with certainty the direction and extent of this development would be extremely difficult, as many of the ideas which, in the critical period, emerge fully only in the late essays, were part of Kant's pre-critical philosophical work -- for example, the idea of teleology in Considerations on Optimism and The Only Possible Ground for the Demonstration of the Existence of God. Thus, the question as to whether they were simply omitted in the early critical writings, in favour of more urgent concerns, or, for a time actually rejected, is one beyond the scope of this thesis.

of nature, but it itself is capable of supplying us with only a defective representation of that ground[6] -- defective, as was noted earlier, precisely because the theoretical investigation of nature can never make known to us the final purpose of creation. We have, however, in setting out the argument in this fashion, followed what Kant believes to be the natural course of reason, not only because the limits of experience are defined working, as it were, from within but also because physico-teleology is the reasonable propaedeutic to moral theology:

> The former (physico-teleology) naturally precedes the latter (moral theology). For if we wish to infer a world cause teleologically from the things in the world, purposes of nature must first be given, for which we afterward have to seek a final purpose and for this the principle of the causality of this supreme cause.[7]

In conclusion, then, we are led by reason to the boundaries of experience. But boundaries presuppose a space enclosing and outside of that one confined place. A boundary therefore is ". . . something positive, which belongs to that which lies within as well as to the space that lies without the given content."[8]

Now this space which "lies without", the supersensible realm, is an area of "impenetrable darkness" and thus the problem becomes one of discovering an adequate guide to it and a measure of certainty with reference to what is encountered within it. If, for example, one finds oneself in a darkened room, the location of the contents of which are already known to oneself, one can, using the position of those objects and one's subjective sense of left and right, orient oneself in that room. Without this subjective sense, the darkness would indeed remain impenetrable.[9] Similarly,

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[6] Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 289-90.

[7] Ibid., p. 287. This does not mean, though, that the moral proof of God's existence requires physical teleology. On the contrary, the moral argument is both stronger than that from design in nature, and self-sufficient. Kant goes so far as to suggest that our knowledge of the purposes of nature requires that we assume man as the final purpose of nature, and thus, the existence of a moral Author (cf. Critique of Judgment, p. 296). But it will be shown further on in this thesis that they complement and support one another.

[8] Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Revised Carus Translation (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1950), p. 109; Cf. Ibid., pp. 101-2.

orientation in thinking, which is the activity of reason seeking to extend itself beyond all possible experience, employs for that purpose a subjective principle of reason, a felt need of reason. And this is necessarily the case, since in that realm, reason has available to it neither objects of intuition nor "definite maxims according to objective grounds of knowledge."[10] Thus, reason's assent in this realm is determined strictly by the subjective principle. This sort of judgment -- the right of reason to assume something which it can never know -- is, Kant says, a rational belief, a thing of faith.[11] But this is not to say that its assent is in any way inferior to cognition, nor is it merely opinion for while a rational belief or postulate can never become knowledge, "opinion can finally become knowledge through gradual supplementation by more grounds of the same kind."[12] It remains to be decided then in what precisely this "felt need of reason" consists.

Many supersensible things can be thought, Kant writes, for which reason feels no need whatsoever. But in the case of some supersensible concepts, for example, the idea of God, there is a definite requirement to assume it. And this need is twofold: on the one hand, theoretical and on the other, practical. The former need, having been discussed at some length in the previous chapters, can only be briefly reiterated here: without presupposing an intelligent author, no comprehensible ground for the manifest design and order of nature is possible.[13] Thus, while, we could never prove that such design would be impossible without an author, this subjective ground is sufficient for the assumption of his Being. But in the case of practical reason, the need is far clearer and more certain. Here the need "is unconditional; we are compelled to presuppose the existence of God not just if we wish to judge but because we must

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[9] Kant, What is Orientation in Thinking?, p. 295. [10] Ibid., p. 296.

[11] Ibid., p. 300; Idem, Critique of Judgment, p. 321.

[12] Idem, What is Orientation in Thinking?, p. 300.

[13] Ibid., p. 298.

judge."[14] We must, that is, adopt the idea of God because the possibility of the highest good, which is required by the moral law, demands it. This latter employment of the idea of God is its use as a postulate. And postulates, in Kant's account, have a higher status than hypotheses, i.e. "opinion based on subjective grounds sufficient to assert, because one could not expect any ground besides a subjective one for explaining given effects, and yet reason still needs some ground of explanation."[15]

Thus, the most fruitful line of inquiry into the supersensible will be that which is guided by the practical need of reason. And this is so, not only because of the intensity of the practical need, but also because, as we shall see momentarily, of the certainty of its starting point. That is to say, both the theoretical and practical need for the concept of God begin with things known to us, with the familiar objects in Kant's image of the darkened room. Theoretical reason begins with the requirements of science in general (for the systematic connection of laws) and natural phenomena seemingly explicable only through the use of teleological principles.

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[14] Kant, Orientation in Thinking, p. 298. Notice that in this passage, Kant adds no qualification to the certainty that arises out of practical need. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant appears to reduce the difference between the theoretical and practical need: "But, as with every other purposive thing in nature, it [our reason] still cannot prove that it [the highest good which subjectively requires the idea of God] is impossible according to universal laws of nature (only), i.e. show this by objectively sufficient reasons." (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 150).

[15] Idem, Orientation in Thinking, p. 300. Kant, in the Second Critique, describes the concept of God, in its use according to a theoretical need, as a "most reasonable opinion for us men" (Critique of Practical Reason, p. 147). These descriptions of the idea of a Deity as "mere opinion" are somewhat difficult to bring into line with the Third Critique, where teleological explanation is held to be impossible without the concept, albeit an indeterminate one, of an intelligent Author. It might be argued though no completely satisfactory evidence could be adduced for this point, that these works (Orientation in Thinking and the Second Critique) show the movement of Kant's thought away from the neglect of natural teleology and its corollaries in the First Critique and towards the importance granted to that concept in the last Critique. Another possibility is that when Kant describes the idea of God, arising from a natural teleology alone, as a mere "reasonable opinion" he is employing, not the vague supersensible something which teleology does require, but rather the notion of a moral Author. If that were the case, it would indeed be correct, given the hiatus between physico-teleology and theology, to describe the idea of a

Practical reason, on the other hand, begins with the rudimentary facts of moral life known to all men. The difference between these two starting points, then, is that while we know those "rudimentary facts" with a simple and incontrovertible certainty, design cannot be so readily assented to. For, as Kant argued in the Third Critique, though there appear to be phenomena which can be explained in no other way than according to design, we can never entirely exclude the possibility that they might ultimately be governed by mechanical laws, which at the moment are unknown to us. Needless to say, this last statement captures some of the ambiguity of the concept of teleology in the Critique of Judgment. While mechanical investigation alone could never suffice, even for the study of Kant's famous "blade of grass", while that is, the possibility of certain types of phenomena demand teleology (in this case, the latter comes to have something of the status of a category), nevertheless, mechanical explanation always has a certain priority for Kant, even to the extent that what seem to be organized, i.e. designed beings -- and indeed has to be so thought in the biological and taxinomic sciences -- must allow for some possible ultimate mechanical interpretation. Despite the difficulties in determining Kant's meaning in the last Critique, it is clear that for him the "facts" of designed beings are held with less certainty than those of moral law. Hence, the practical path is the one to be followed in seeking that firm footing beyond the bounds of ordinary experience.

Now the key to this approach is the concept of freedom. For, as Kant notes in the Critique of Practical Reason, the other postulates, i.e. God and the immortality of the soul, attach themselves to the idea of freedom, and in so doing, are shown to be possible.[16] Therefore, in order to understand how a moral theology is possible for Kant, one must begin with the concept of freedom for it is through the certainty that we have concerning this idea that the other supersensible objects take on meaning. But Kant's

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moral God, based on natural evidence, as nothing more than reasonable speculation.

[16] Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 3; Cf. Idem, Critique of Judgment, pp. 326-7, where this connection is made particularly clear.

concern with the idea is twofold; on the one hand to show the possibility of freedom and on the other, to demonstrate its necessity. The latter argument belongs, properly speaking, to the practical sphere and is naturally preceded by the question of the mere possiblity of the postulate. That is, the denial of transcendental freedom would involve the elimination of practical freedom.[17] Putting aside for the moment then, Kant's proof of the necessity of freedom, we will turn to his analysis of the possibility of transcendental freedom.

The question that Kant is speaking to in the First Critique is: how is freedom possible at all and how can it exist alongside the universality of the natural law of causality?[18] And freedom, in the context of the Third Antinomy, means not the "will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses," or submission to self-given law, but rather the power of beginning a state spontaneously, or in the cosmological language of the Antinomies, the question of the origins of the world.[19] Briefly, Kant sets his argument out in the following manner. The thesis of the Third Antinomy states that, "Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which appearances of the world can one and all be observed. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is another causality, that of freedom."[20] The antithesis adopts the position that there is no freedom and that "everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with the laws of nature."[21] The proof of the thesis proceeds in this manner: take the argument of the antithesis that everything is subject to natural laws and search for the consequences of such an analysis. If that view is granted, everything must have a preceding state, but that state, in turn, must be something which has taken place, and that requires, therefore a state preceding itself. Thus, there will always be only a relative and never a first beginning. However, the law of nature is just this, Kant writes, "That nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined a priori."[22] The key to Kant's argument in the thesis is to be

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[17]Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 465. [18]Ibid., p. 466.

[19]Ibid., p. 413. [20]Ibid., p. 409. [21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid., p. 410.

found in the phrase "sufficiently determined a priori." Although the precise significance of that phrase is the subject of some debate, the point that Kant is trying to make is fairly clear: this cause "must require no further explanation,"[23] which amounts to saying that it is not to be found among natural causes. As in the case of the Antinomies as a whole, the source of the thesis-argument is in dispute. Beck maintains that it is derived from the Aristotelian-Thomistic proof of the "impossibility of an infinite series of causes and hence of the necessity of a first cause."[24] Al-Azm, on the other hand, sees in the thesis an expression of the Clarke-Newton postulate of two types of causality as against a Leibnizian idea of universal determinism.[25] The difference between the two interpretations, besides the historical dispute, is centered around the problem as to whether or not the Antinomies in general and the Third in particular are cosmological in the sense that Kant claims they are. Beck, in emphasizing the moral dimension of the Antinomy, would appear to view it as being concerned more with moral problems than with cosmological ones. Al-Azm, however, tends to see the argument, both in terms of its substance and its origins, as primarily cosmological and only derivatively, as a moral question.[26] Though Al-Azm's point is certainly well taken, Kant's emphasis in his Observation on the Antinomy and in the Second Critique on the link between transcendental and practical freedom would seem to point to a moral interest at the heart of the Third Antinomy.

To continue, then, the Antithesis of this Antinomy claims that there is no freedom for everything occurs in accordance with the law of nature. The proof of the antithesis proceeds in much the same way as that of the thesis. That is, it asks us to adopt the argument that there is freedom, the power of spontaneously beginning a series, and then seeks

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[23] Jonathan Bennet, Kant's Dialectic (Cambridge: University Press, 1974), p. 184.

[24] Lewis White Beck, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 66.

[25] Sadik Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 87, 94-95.

to show that such a claim would violate the unity of experience.[27] Thus the conflict here is one between transcendental freedom on the one hand and what Kant terms transcendental physiocracy on the other. The solution to the conflict between thesis and antithesis is accomplished by showing that a heterogeneous condition "not itself part of the series, but purely intelligible can be allowed."[28] In the dynamical Antinomies, therefore, the completely conditioned is bound up with an empirically unconditioned and non-sensible condition, and consequently, the possibility of a resolution satisfying both understanding and reason is allowed. The two types of causality coexist and, indeed, can be found in the same event. And the reason that the antithesis was incapable of grasping this possibility was that it asserted the absolute reality of appearances: ". . . for if appearances were things-in-themselves, and space and time the forms of existence of things-in-themselves, the conditions would always be members of the same series as the conditioned."[29] However, if appearances are taken as representations, they must have grounds which are not appearances. "The effects of such an intelligible cause appear and accordingly, can be determined through appearances, but its causality is not so determined."[30] Thus, the effect is in space and time and is, for that reason, subject to the laws of natural causality while the cause of the effect stands outside of the series and so is free. The same event, in other words, may be viewed as free with respect to its intelligible cause while, regarded as appearance, it is subject to causal laws.

Now, plainly reason has a practical interest in the thesis-argument, or in some resolution of the conflict which would allow for freedom.[31] And indeed, though the Antinomy has its origins in a cosmological problem, its significance for moral life is made clear by Kant in his Commentary on its solution. Nevertheless, this proof of the possibility of freedom is

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[26] Al-Azm, Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, pp. 86, 89.

[27] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 410. [28] Ibid., p. 463.

[29] Ibid., p. 466. [30] Ibid., p. 467. [31] Ibid., p. 424.

not a practical one, which is to say, that this possibility is not arrived at through an analysis of man's capacity to act through freely given laws. But, for Kant, this means that freedom's reality -- or even its possibility -- remains, given the sort of proof employed in the First Critique, problematic. It is problematic, from the point of view of that Critique, because freedom itself can never be exhibited in any possible experience, and its possibility as an efficient cause in the world of sense cannot be comprehended, nor, for that matter, do we know it immediately.[32] Thus, what has been accomplished in the Critique is not even the demonstration of the possiblity of freedom:

> What we have alone been able to show, and what we have alone been concerned to show, is that this antinomy rests on a sheer illusion, and that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature.[33]

While it is true, then, to say that without the possibility of transcendental freedom, the moral law or practical freedom, would be impossible as well, it is also the case that the reality of freedom cannot be established by speculative reason alone. That reality, Kant believes, can be confirmed solely by the pure practical faculty of reason.[34]

We discover therefore that the concept of freedom has reality not in the elaborate cosmological arguments of the First Critique, but rather in that sort of everyday experience common to the philosopher and his servant alike. This everyday experience is the way in which we construct maxims for the will. For in giving maxims to the will, we become immediately conscious of the moral law. "[Since] reason exhibits it [the moral law] as a ground of determination which is completely independent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous condition, it is the moral law which leads directly to the concept of freedom."[35] In short, the objective reality of the pure, or free will, is given in the moral law which we know immediately. Or, in other words, the moral law expresses the autonomy of practical reason, and this autonomy in turn, is the condition for the formation of maxims.[36] Now here

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[32]Cf. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 127; Idem, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 29, 97.

[33]Idem, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 479; emphasis in original.

[34]Idem, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 3, 6. [35]Ibid., p. 29.

there is an apparent circularity in Kant's argument. According to the first assertion, we know of freedom through the moral law while in the other, the moral law requires freedom as its precondition. But in Kant's view, there is no contradiction here. Freedom, he says, is indeed the ratio essendi of the moral law for if there was no freedom, the moral law would certainly be impossible. Thus, in the order of efficient causes, we assume that we are free so that "we may conceive ourselves to be under the moral law."[37] However, the moral law is also the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, since without the thought of that law, "we would never have been justified in assuming anything like freedom."[38]

Hence, freedom is a postulate, something which as an efficient cause in the world of sense we cannot comprehend, but which we are compelled to assume by the moral law which postulates it.[39] And this moral law is not itself a postulate but, on the contrary, a law -- a law which, although it can never be proven through the "exertion of theoretical or empirically supported reason," is nevertheless firmly grounded.[40] Freedom now no longer means simply an uncaused cause, or the power of spontaneously beginning a series; rather, it signifies autonomy, or the capacity of the will to give the law to itself.[41] To be more precise, freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply one another. In the concept of practical freedom, then, derived from our knowledge of duty and required for the latter, objective reality is given to the unconditioned as a cause, where by unconditioned we mean that the maxims formulated by the will are determined in conformity with universal practical reason, and not by sensuous needs or natural laws. Since the idea of the highest good, as set out in the Dialectic of the Second Critique presupposes, for an understanding of its intricacies, an account of the basis of moral acts, we must now turn to that basis, though, of course, a full account of Kant's moral philosophy would be beyond the scope of this thesis.

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[36]Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 33-34.

[37]Idem, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 118.

[38]Idem, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 4n.

[39]Ibid., p. 97.

As was noted above, the moral law and freedom reciprocally imply one another. Now for a perfectly good or holy will virtuous acts would come of themselves and not require a command. But for men, exposed to "subjective limitations and obstacles" imperatives are necessary which express the relationship between the objective laws and the subjective imperfection of the will.[42] And the relation of the will to "this law is one of dependence under the name of 'obligation'. This term implies a constraint to an action . . . Such an action is called duty."[43] Therefore, for men to act morally, possessed as they are of wills which are less than holy, is to act from duty. But what sort of command is it that binds us morally? Some imperatives determine the will with regard to a desired effect and prescribe the means to that end -- these Kant terms hypothetical or conditional imperatives.[44] In those imperatives which command the will to seek a subjective end, the desire for the object precedes the principle, the matter or end of the imperative antedates the form of the imperative itself. And because they are merely subjective, lacking for that reason, universality and necessity, they cannot be the basis of law but rather only of rules of prudence.[45] The moral worth of a maxim, then, is not to be found in its matter -- its purpose or end -- but in its form alone, abstracted from all matter.

> But besides the latter [i.e. the matter of the law] there is nothing in a law except the legislative form. Therefore, the legislative form, insofar as it is contained in the maxim, is the only thing which can constitute a determining ground of the (free) will.[46]

In short, no end, neither subjective desire nor the matter of the law itself, can determine the will. From this it follows that to allow the will to be guided by ends -- even such noble ones as man's perfection or

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[40]Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 137, 48.

[41]Ibid., pp. 28-29; Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 108, 114.

[42]Kant, Groundwork, pp. 81, 65. [43]Idem, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 32.

[44]Idem, Groundwork, p. 82; Critique of Practical Reason, p. 18.

[45]Idem, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 19ff; Groundwork, p. 84.

[46]Idem, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 29; Groundwork, pp. 67-68.

universal ones as in the case of happiness -- is to act heteronomously. The sole sufficient ground, Kant writes, is the form of the law "which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its giving universal law";[47] i.e. the categorical imperative. The preceding summary, is, of course, simply a statement of the deontological character of moral life for Kant and the relationship between that position and his concepts of autonomy and heteronomy. Nevertheless, to merely reiterate this widely held view would not be adequate, for it is not correct to say that Kant's account of morality dispenses entirely with ends and the 'matter' of moral life. The idea of ends enters into Kant's analysis, I would argue, in two ways: on the one hand, an end contained within morality itself and, on the other, one which evolves synthetically out of morality, but which requires additional support from the outside, as it were. We will begin with a discussion of the former sort of end.

Practical principles are formal, Kant maintains, only if they abstract from all subjective ends.[48] These are ends that a rational being arbitrarily adopts as effects of his action. They are relative, he continues, "for it is solely their relation to special characteristics in the subject's power of appetition which gives them their value."[49] Their relativeness also establishes, for reasons previously noted, their inability to serve as law. But if there were an objective end, then it could serve as a ground for a possible categorical imperative. And the only such end is that of man as an end-in-himself;[50] man as a being whose maxims are fit to make universal law. Now this end is peculiar, not only in its objectivity, but inasmuch as it is not a produced end, or effect, but is rather self-existent. Since it is self-existent, its possibility is not in question (and thus it is not something about whose production we are concerned) and so it is to be conceived negatively -- "as an end against which we should never act."[51] This end, then, differs from others in that

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[47] Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 66. [48] Idem, Groundwork, pp. 67-68.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., p. 104; Cf. Kant, The Metaphysic of Morals, Part II - The Doctrine of Virtue, trans. Mary T. Gregor (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 55-56.

neither its production nor its possibility is at issue. It is simply a standard against which we can measure our conduct.

The formulation of the categorical imperative based on this end leads, in turn, to the section on the Kingdom of Ends. Attached to man's ability to make universal law, his "dignity above all mere things of nature," is the necessity of viewing himself as a legislator in the Kingdom of Ends, a world of rational beings adhering to maxims prescribed by the categorical imperative. However, for such a Kingdom to come into existence, the cooperation of nature and of one's fellow men would be required. Here, then, possibility is a question, since this Kingdom is not self-existent. Yet its intrinsic worth does not inhere in its possibility or in the likelihood of its coming into being.[52] Kant raises the problem of its possibility and then denies the importance of the question, arguing in effect, that the idea is an imperative which commands us to act as if we were members of such a Kingdom. Consequently, the bare possibility of the idea is sufficient, since its purpose is fulfilled in moral acts and not in its own actualization. We shall see momentarily that Kant has another, and 'stronger', conception of possibility linked this time to the prospect of the idea coming into being in this world.[53]

In the preceding sketch, I have tried to set out certain key features of Kant's moral philosophy: the notion of duty, of freedom and heteronomy, the deontological side of Kant's argument and his concern with ends. The last few lines have focused on the question of the possibility of ends as raised in the Groundwork. This approach seemed the most reasonable since it illuminates the difference, or one of the central differences, between the latter work and the Dialectic of the Second Critique. Though this difference will only become clear in the following paragraphs, it might be helpful to outline it now.

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[51] Kant, Groundwork, p. 105.

[52] Ibid., pp. 106-7.

[53] One might draw a rough analogy between the function of the Kingdom of Ends vis-ă-vis moral life and Plato's republic in speech. Cf. Republic 592B. For a discussion of this distinction between meagre and rich conceptions of possibility, see Aristotle, Metaphysics 1019b 23-34: "The possible, then, in one sense . . . means that which is not of necessity false; in one, that which is true; in one that which may be true."

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant discusses three postulates: freedom (in the Analytic), and God and the immortality of the soul (in the Dialectic). The postulates of God and immortality are explicitly bound up with the possibility of an end which morality gives rise to. Indeed, the concluding half of the Critique is wholly concerned with possibility. But in the Groundwork, though postulates per se are not mentioned, only the concept of freedom holds a significant place -- God and the soul being mentioned only infrequently and then not as a major addition to the account of moral life based on freedom. The absence of these two postulates or of their equivalent reveals, I would suggest, a fundamental difference between the two works, a difference centered around the question of possibility. I am not, however, asserting here that Kant changed his views from one text to the other in this regard. Rather, it seems to be the case that he is addressing different problems in each work. Morality, in its strict sense, "lies in the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will,"[54] and here the possible effect of the action is of no consequence. Thus, in the formulations of the categorical imperative given in the Groundwork, and particularly in the lines on the Kingdom of Ends, the importance of possibility is reduced in favour of intrinsic worth and dignity. Now, in the Critique of Pure Reason, which contains an argument similar to that of the Dialectic of the Second Critique, we find a passage virtually identical in wording to that in the Groundwork, Chapter Two.[55] In the latter work, this passage quickly puts aside the question of possibility in order to resume its discussion of autonomy, whereas in the First Critique that same piece of writing serves as an introduction to six pages devoted to possibility. What precisely is the difference between these two texts? The part of the First Critique in which these lines occur is an attempt to answer the third of Kant's three questions: "What may I hope for?"[56] This

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[54] Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 107.

[55] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, from midway down page 638ff. Compare to the Groundwork, midway down page 106 through to the top of page 107.

[56] Later a fourth, "What is man?", was added. Cf. Kant, "Letter to C. F. Staudlin, May 4, 1793," Philosophical Correspondence 1759-1799, ed. & trans. A. Zweig (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970), p. 205.

question, Kant says, is both practical and theoretical, that is, it involves both our being worthy of the highest good and the hope, or possibility of that happiness. And because hope cannot be analytically derived from simple obedience to the moral law, the answer has to go beyond the narrow limits of what I ought to do. Both the Idea of a Kingdom of Ends and the concept of the summum bonum (in the passage from the Critique of Pure Reason just referred to) then, are concerned with possibility. But because of their different purposes, the notions of possibility that they employ are divergent. The Idea of a Kingdom of Ends is designed not as a source of hope, but rather as a measure of our actions, or as something which prescribes duties for us. As such it must be possible since, were it to be impossible, the actions demanded in accordance with it would be, at least, problematic, and perhaps themselves impossible. This is the meaning of the formula "ought implies can."[57] The possibility that it refers to is possibility in the most meagre sense of that term, one which amounts to nothing more, in fact, than the absence of a proof of impossibility. And the burden of this proof rests with those who would seek to deny the Idea.[58] Thus, Kant writes,

> Pure reason . . . contains . . . in that practical employment which is also moral, principles of the possibility of experience, namely, of such actions as, in accordance with moral precepts, might be met with in the history of mankind. [59]

Clearly possibility here does not mean probability, the likelihood or even the feasibility of a certain sort of state coming into existence, but rather the mere possibility of experience, that such a situation might conceivably be met with in the course of events. This definition says no more than that an action which could not be met with, or in other words, an action that is impossible, cannot reasonably be commanded of us, and so cannot be a duty. The meaning of possibility described here is wholly sufficient for the purposes of duty. No "hints" from nature, no inquiry into design is needed or undertaken to shore up duty. And it is this understanding of possibility that Kant speaks of in relation to the Kingdom

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[57] Note, though, that no formulation this neat is to be found in Kant's works.

[58] Kant, On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory but It Won't Work in Practice, trans. E. B. Ashton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974), p. 77.

of Ends. The concept of the summum bonum, on the other hand, has two distinct purposes: one paralleling that of the Kingdom of Ends, while the other differs fundamentally from it. The former is the idea of the highest good as a guide, a source of duty which tells us to act in such a fashion as to become worthy of it. Worthiness alone is at issue here, and so the sort of possibility appropriate to it would be of the rudimentary type just elaborated. However, the summum bonum is also that for which we hope and as an object of hope we need to find greater assurance of its feasibility than the simple absence of a proof of impossibility. What precisely this difference amounts to can be seen in the passage from the Bemerkungen quoted at the beginning of this thesis. Insofar as morality in the strict sense, i.e. duty is concerned, Rousseau or moral life stand alone and do not require Newton. The need for the proof of order in the universe that Newton gives presents itself only when what is sought is the optimism or hope of Pope's thesis. Both of the purposes of the highest good find their support in the postulates; the first because without the postulates the idea of the summum bonum would be impossible, while the latter purpose, starting from the same postulate links it to a teleological argument, and thereby gives us cause for hope. The principal aim of the former use of the highest good is to further morality, and without the postulates -- that is, if they were shown to be false -- the moral law would remain, though not its end.[60] In other words, the "loss" of the postulates would not directly threaten moral life, though in the absence of a moral end, compliance with duty would become still more difficult. On the other hand, if it were conclusively demonstrated that there was no moral designer of the universe, uniting nature and freedom, happiness and virtue, hope would become a mere "sweet dream." But to see how this argument develops we will now follow Kant in his analysis of the summum bonum.

As we have noted previously, there can be, in Kant's view, no incentive for moral acts other than the law itself. Morality stands in need of no end preceding the determination of the will. Now some critics amongst Kant's contemporaries had taken this to mean that Kant renounced all ends,

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[59] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 637. Emphasis in the original.

[60] Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 309-10.

and particularly the end of happiness.[61] And indeed, Kant did assert that ethics as a science teaches only how we are to be worthy of happiness. However, it has already been shown that Kant does leave room for ends, though in the Groundwork their role, as distinct from the law itself, is somewhat ambiguous. But in the later works, the Second Critique, On the Old Saw, and Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, a clear sort of end attached to morality is established.

While it is true that the only legitimate incentive is the law itself, this does not preclude the possibility of an end arising as the "sum of inevitable consequences of maxims."[62] Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of this end -- the highest good -- it is necessary to indicate the need of practical reason which demands that we assume the possibility of the summum bonum. Now the pure will does not merely allow for such an end, it positively requires it.

> And yet it is one of the inescapable limitations of man and of his faculty of practical reason . . . to have regard, in every action, to the consequence thereof, in order to discover therein what could serve him as an end. 63

Or, to phrase this argument in stronger terms, without an end there cannot be any will at all since a determination of the will "cannot be followed by no effect whatsoever."[64] Thus, for the simple act of willing an end is required, an end which given Kant's account of moral life outlined in the preceding paragraphs, cannot serve as an incentive. Clearly the idea of an end which is not an incentive is problematic and as Beck points out, this part of Kant's analysis poses serious difficulties.[65] For although it is not happiness but the moral law that is the ground determining the will, happiness as a component of the highest good, inasmuch as it is in proportion to virtue, or the supreme condition of the highest good, and the idea of its possibility can also determine the will.[66] Since textual obscurities prevent a definitive solution to this problem, only a probable answer can be given here: and that is, that

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[61] Cf. Garve's criticism quoted by Kant in On the Old Saw, pp. 46-48.

[62] Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Greene & Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 4.

[63] Ibid., p. 6fn. [64] Cf. On the Old Saw, pp. 46-47fn.; Religion, p. 4.

for Kant simple duty always retains its supreme position over the summum bonum -- we are commanded to act in certain ways and nothing, not even the impossibility of the highest good, would relieve us of that duty. The highest good, which, in part, concerns worthiness and virtue is fit to guide the will, but cannot itself be the incentive to obedience. Though this recasting excludes Kant's more forceful statement that the summum bonum may determine the will, it seems to be the only formulation which would be consistent with the demands of autonomy.

So far, only one need for an end has been put forward, that of practical reason's concern with its objects and effects. But another, less frequently observed need also appears in Kant's writings. As Kant writes:

> Take a man who, honouring the moral law, allows the thought to occur to him (he can scarcely avoid doing so) of what sort of world he would create, under the guidance of practical reason . . . a world into which, moreover, he would place himself as a member. He would not merely make the choice which is determined by that moral idea of the highest good . . . he would also will that (such) a world should by all means come into existence. [67]

And if the virtuous man rejects the condition whereby the highest good might come into being, and hence that end itself, if, that is to say, he denies the existence of God, he must see himself as thrown into a purposeless world of "deceit, violence and envy" leading ultimately into that "open grave", the "purposeless chaos of matter from which they were drawn." Thus if he is

> . . . not to weaken the respect with which the moral law immediately inspires him, by assuming the nothingness of the single, ideal, final purpose . . . he must, as he well can, . . . assume the being of a moral author of the world . . . God. [68]

We find Kant speaking here, then, of another type of need, that of moral men who seek a harmony between their virtue and the rewards, or happiness

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[65] L. W. Beck, A Commentary, p. 242.

[66] Cf. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 114, 134.

[67] Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 5.

[68] Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 303-4. For a similar argument, see Ibid., pp. 309-10. By removing the beginning and concluding lines of

granted them. Without the assumption of such a harmony, only despair can follow and with it comes the possible weakening of the moral will. For this reason, Kant includes the highest good, the object of our hope, in his moral catechism.[69] Two different sources contribute, therefore, to Kant's attempt to arrive at one end -- the perfect good. On the one hand, the strictly philosophical question of the relation between willing and ends (though here too it is man's "inescapable limitations" which lead him to seek an end in addition to duty) and on the other hand, a need couched not in philosophical language, but in expressions of fear, fear of the 'abyss' which a denial of the summum bonum and its conditions would entail. Having described the origins of this need, we may now turn to a more detailed analysis of the highest good and its postulates.

We must hope, Kant believes, for an outcome in this world or in the next in accordance with the moral law and this hope is at the heart of the highest good. This in itself suggests that Kant is moving beyond the limits of the strictly moral; for what is at issue here is not simply virtue, or worthiness, but the perfect good, the union of virtue and happiness.[70] Happiness is "the condition of a rational being in the world, in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will"[71] and which contains only what nature can supply for us.[72] Virtue and happiness together constitute the entire object of practical reason. But happiness is empirically conditioned, whereas worthiness is unconditioned. This combination, therefore, can only be synthetic for the highest good is "a proposition which goes beyond the concept of duties in this world and adds a consequence (an effect) thereof which is not contained in the moral laws and therefore cannot be

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the above quote, Silber misrepresents Kant's intention in it. See J. Silber, "Kant on the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent," Philosophical Review 68 (October 1959):470-1. Silber does show that he understands Kant's arguments as presented in this passage, making his distortion of them all the more curious.

[69] Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 153-56.

[70] Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 114.

[71] Ibid., p. 129.

[72] Kant, On the Old Saw, p. 50.

evolved out of them analytically."[73] It is precisely in the synthetic nature of the summum bonum that difficulties occur.

Kant sets out the antinomy in this manner. Because the highest good is a synthetic proposition, and because it is a practical proposition, i.e. one that has to be possible through action, one of its two elements -- worthiness and happiness -- must be the cause and the other an effect. Hence, it would seem that either "the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue" or the "maxims of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness."[74] Now, plainly the former is absolutely impossible, for it violates that autonomy which is the basis of virtue, the supreme and unconditioned condition of the highest good. The latter is false as well, since the relation of cause and effect in the natural realm, to which happiness belongs, is subject not to moral law but rather to the laws of nature. Apparently, then, the highest good is impossible and thus because the striving for that end is a part of the moral law, it too must be impossible.

The solution to the antinomy consists in showing that the second of the two alternatives stated above is only partially wrong. It is wrong, Kant argues, inasmuch as it sees the moral disposition "as the form of causality in the world of sense."[75] The highest good may, therefore, be possible, but the causality which produces it cannot have its basis in our moral life. In other words, the relation between the intention of morality and happiness, embodied in the idea of the summum bonum, is possible, not as a result of a direct causal relation between the former and the latter, but rather as mediated by a moral author of nature. The highest good is thus practically possible in the more meagre definition of possibility, as an end which can serve as a measure for our conduct and which prescribes moral behaviour. The same postulate, used for a different purpose, will, as we shall see, allow for a fuller conception of possibility, that bound up with hope. But as the one side of this end (the empirical) is not within our power at all, and the

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[73] Kant, Religion, p. 6fn.; cf. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 115, 117.

[74] Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 117-18.

[75] Ibid., p. 119.

other part needing still further support, we are compelled to assume the postulates.[76] Which is to say that it is necessary for us following from the moral law, which is a law and not a postulate, to adopt such beliefs as constitute the condition of morality.[77] The postulates are theoretical propositions which, because of a subjective need of morality[78] to assume them, allow theoretical reason to do the same.[79]

The moral law, in giving rise to its complete object, the highest good, makes necessary two postulates: the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. The problem, to which the first of these is the solution, is as follows. In a will striving to achieve the highest good, the complete fitness of that will to the moral law is the supreme condition of the summum bonum. Complete fitness, however, is holiness, a state not to be attained by men who are, as Kant had frequently pointed out, heteronomous. Holiness can, for this reason, only be found in an endless progress which demands a soul. Though the existence of the soul is not as such, demonstrable it is an inseparable corollary of an a priori law.[80] Now while there are difficulties in this postulate, one of which we shall take up shortly, it would be useful to first conclude our account of the postulates. Happiness, the second element of the highest good, can only be assumed, Kant writes, "on the supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to the effect." In brief, happiness, the highest derivative good (derivative, because it depends on the higher element, i.e. moral worthiness and because it is empirically conditioned) is the harmony of nature and freedom. There is no ground for this harmony in morality, nor is it likely that the laws of nature could supply it.[81] The

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[76]Kant, On the Old Saw, p. 46.

[77]Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 137, 148; Beck, A Commentary, pp. 261-2.

[78]Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 120, 150. [79]Ibid., p. 139.

[80]Ibid., pp. 126-27. Notice that in the Canon of the First Critique, a section thought to be among the earliest composed parts of that work, the postulate is not one of the immortality of the soul but of a future world. Kant argues here that there is no connection, apparent to us, between worthiness and happiness in the world of sense and so, that hoped for realm must be a future one (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 639).

[81]Cf. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 128-29. The qualification "nor

possibility of such a connection, therefore, can only rest with the "supersensuous without", a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature,[82] i.e. God. The postulate of the highest derived good, then, is also the postulate of the existence of God and so through the concept of the highest good, morality leads to religion, and the pure idea of that supersensible being acquires greater certainty.[83]

The problem which needs to be raised here is this: the postulate of the immortality of the soul is said to be necessary because the perfection of the will, or holiness, is not possible in the world of sense.[84] The implications of the argument would seem to be that the highest good is the union of complete virtue and complete happiness, a union that could only take place in a world to come. This is what Beck terms Kant's "maximal" concept of the highest good.[85] However, there is a second formulation of the postulate of God and happiness which points to the latter being, not perfect happiness as a result of holiness, but rather happiness in proportion to virtue, which is possible in the world of appearances. Thus, Kant describes the highest good as "virtue and happiness together . . . and happiness in exact proportion to morality."[86] Expressed in this way, the postulate of immortality, which is concerned with perfection, is not required and seemingly happiness is possible in the sensible world.[87] This version of the argument Beck calls the "minimal" or juridical conception of the summum bonum. Now which formulation Kant gives precedence to in this work is, given the obscurities of the text, impossible to determine. Passages can be found to support both sides, but there is, to my knowledge no definitive utterance by

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is it likely" should be noted. As in the case of the teleological argument in general, Kant maintains that it is always at least possible that what appears to be explainable through design alone, could be understood as something that happens "in the course of nature" (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 150).

[82] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 124, 129-30.

[83] Idem, Critique of Judgment, p. 295; Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 638-39.

[84] Idem, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 126-27.

[85] Beck, A Commentary, pp. 268-29. Beck's commentary on this specific problem was helpful. However, he does not refer to, or only mentions in passing, what I take to be the strong evidence of the Third Critique in favour of the minimal or juridical conception of the highest good.

Kant himself. Nevertheless, this may be one of those rare instances in which Kant's occasional lack of clarity can help us in illuminating the direction of his thought. For Kant here is answering the question "What may I hope for?" and this hope may be of two sorts, the proportionate union of happiness and virtue in this world or the highest good in a future world. Now, while Kant has given up the naive optimism of Considerations on Optimism, he is plainly not willing to concede that this world is a "purposeless chaos" in which no such harmony can be found. Hence we find the ambiguity, of lingering doubts about the summum bonum, about its actualization (and not merely its possibility) in this world coupled with a lack of readiness to dispense with that view in favour of an afterlife alone. This ambiguity is captured in Kant's phrase "in this life or another."[88]

Though it is impossible to determine whether, in general, Kant preferred one formulation over the other, a case can be made, I believe, that Kant in the Third Critique gave priority to the minimal conception. There an afterlife is hardly spoken of and, indeed, the postulate of immortality only appears in the concluding section of the book, and then only as a part of a discussion of the postulates as a whole.[89] Although it may sometimes be worthwhile to be wary of argumentum ex silentio, the omission here of reference to immortality is significant. For, as we stated above, this postulate is linked to the maximal interpretation of the highest good. Its absence, then, ought to compel us to examine the Third Critique's discussion of the unity of virtue and happiness more closely. Bearing in mind, that the purpose of the latter half of the Critique is to demonstrate a harmony between nature and freedom, a purpose which, it seems to me, can only be made intelligible on the assumption of a 'this-worldly' summum bonum, we may proceed with a brief discussion of a number of selections from that work.[90]

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[86]Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 115. [87]Ibid., p. 119.

[88]Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 640. In the First Critique, though, Kant definitely favours the "future world" view.

[89]Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 321, 325, 326.

[90]The reader will, I hope, forgive the prolixity of these citations. But as Beck points out, many commentators on Kant have found that they can find no better way to express Kant's meaning than to use his own words (Beck, A Commentary, p. 4).

> But this moral teleology [Kant writes] concerns us as beings of the world. . . . This moral teleology, then, has to do with the reference of our own causality to purposes and even to a final purpose that we must aim at in the world, as well as the reciprocal reference of the world to that moral purpose and the external possibility of its accomplishment. . . . [I]t compels our rational judgment to go beyond the world and seek an intelligent supreme principle for that reference of nature to the moral in us. . . .[91]

In a footnote, two pages further on in the text, Kant indicates what this reference of nature to morality means:

> This harmonizes completely with the judgment of human reason reflecting morally upon the course of the world. We believe that we perceive in the case of the wicked the traces of a wise purposive reference, if we only see that the wanton criminal does not die before he has undergone the deserved punishments of his misdeeds. . . . [O]ur good or bad behaviour depends on ourselves; we regard it the highest wisdom in the government of the world to ordain for the first, opportunity, and for both their consequences, in accordance with moral laws. In the latter properly consists the glory of God. . . .[92, 93]

These passages, considered in the context of the teleological argument and in the absence of the idea of a world after death, tend to suggest that

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[91] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 298.

[92] Ibid., p. 300fn. The footnote on the preceding page (p. 301) speaks of happiness in proportion to morality, i.e. the minimal conception.

[93] But to see the continuing ambiguity, consider the following passage:

> "As soon as men begin to reflect upon right and wrong -- at a time when, quite indifferent as to the purposiveness of nature, they avail themselves of it without thinking anything more of it than that it is the accustomed course of nature -- this judgement is inevitable, viz. that the issue cannot be the same, whether a man has behaved fairly or falsely, with equity or with violence, even though up to his life's end, as far as can be seen, he has met with no happiness for his virtues, no punishment for his vices. It is as if they perceived a voice within [saying] that the issue must be different. And so there must lie hidden in them a representation . . . of something after which they feel themselves bound to strive, with which such a result would not agree -- with which, if they looked upon the course of the world as the only order of things, they could not harmonize that inner purposive determination of their minds. Now they might represent in various rude fashions the way

Kant inclines towards the minimal concept of the highest good as put forward in the Third Critique.

We have seen in the preceding pages the need of practical reason which leads us beyond the question of what I ought to do, to the problem of what I may expect, or hope for, if I make myself worthy. It has also been observed that the latter question -- that of hope -- beginning with the moral law, which is known to us in the form of duty, and the idea of freedom which it requires that we assume, finds its support and starting point in the postulates prescribed by the moral law.

> Now we have in the moral law [Kant writes] which enjoins on us in a practical point of view the application of our powers to the accomplishment of this final purpose, a ground for assuming its possibility and practicality and consequently too (because without the concurrence of nature with a condition not in our power, its accomplishment would be impossible) a nature of things harmonious with it. Hence we have a moral ground for thinking in a world also a final purpose of creation. [94]

In this passage we can see the link that the postulates create between the two sorts of possibility. The opening lines and the parenthetical remark set out the minimal conditions necessary for the moral end. The moral law commands us to do what is within our power towards that end, i.e. to make ourselves worthy of it. But this command requires that we assume the existence of God as the cause mediating between nature and freedom, since without this assumption, the moral end would be impossible. However, the moral obligation that we feel to adopt the postulate strictly on the basis of the demand for the bare possibility of the summum bonum, also leads us to "think" a final purpose in the world. From the moral point of view, that thought is made necessary by the further thought that without it the highest good would be impossible. This thought, then, originally introduced to meet the minimal

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> in which such an irregularity could be adjusted (an irregularity . . . . revolting to the human mind) . . . But they could never think any other principle of the possibility of the unification of nature with its inner ethical laws than a supreme cause governing the world according to moral laws" (Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 309-10).

[94] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 306.

requirements of the moral end suggests to us the notion that perhaps this idea may be something more than the mere guarantee of the absence of impossibility. It prompts us to consider, in other words, that nature may indeed have a final purpose. Morality suggests to us that our hopes may be well-founded. This suggestion, or thought, takes us beyond the limits of the "ought" and the sort of possibility required for it. What this extension entails will be seen in the following paragraphs, but suffice it to say that it involves the natural teleological argument. By way of a conclusion, then, to this section we can say that ethico-theology provides a certain and determinate conception of God, a conception that physico-teleology pointed towards but was unable to produce. The practical argument, that is, in exhibiting a moral and just world-governor, completes an analysis that began with the contemplation of organized beings and of the harmony of scientific laws.

Now the connection between the natural teleological and practical arguments goes beyond the simple determination of the idea of a Supreme Author. It will be recalled from the previous section of this thesis that the teleology of nature requires but cannot offer a final purpose of nature.[95] And it is incapable of providing knowledge of the final purpose precisely because that purpose, in order to be final, must be unconditioned, which is to say, it must not need any other purpose as the condition of its possibility.[96] Now moral teleology, which has to do both with our own causality according to purposes and with the final purpose qt which we must aim in the world, also requires that the world have a final purpose so that objectivity may be added to the "subjective reality of the final purpose (of rational beings)"[97] that is, the summum bonum. Minimal possibility, therefore, is not adequate, so we turn to nature for greater certainty -- a certainty demanded not by the narrow moral argument but rather by the search for hope. Physical purposiveness is of "great importance" for the practical reality of the idea, since they introduce theoretical reality, or objectivity, to what would otherwise remain only a 'subjective' final purpose.[98] Thus, we see that while the

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[95] Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 225.

[96] Ibid., pp. 284-85.

[97] Ibid., p. 304.

[98] Ibid., p. 307.

moral argument for a harmony between nature and virtue leads us to the subjective assumption of a final purpose in the world, it cannot yield objective evidence for it. This latter task is undertaken by the teleological investigation of nature, though, natural teleology cannot supply the final purpose itself, but rather simply makes it necessary.

To continue, one part of the highest good -- happiness -- is empirically conditioned and so, for this concept to have objective theoretical reality, we must assume that the world has a "reciprocal reference" to our moral purposes, or, what amounts to the same thing, we must believe that the world has a final purpose -- since if it has such a final purpose, Kant maintains, it must harmonize with the moral purpose.[99] Therefore, moral and natural teleology alike require that we know the final purpose of nature. From the point of view of morality it is necessary in order to have "a rational ground for holding that nature must harmonize" with our desire for happiness, that man be the final purpose. By "man" we understand not man in his happiness -- which is a conditioned or derivative good -- but as a moral being. Only in his moral life, only where he determines his purposes according to law, is he unconditioned.[100] This last quality also makes man as a moral being the final purpose of the teleology of nature because, though nature is incapable of producing the unconditioned, the practical freedom which we know we possess, establishes man as unconditioned. Thus, only in man do we have grounds for seeing in the world, a whole "connected according to purposes."[101] Both sorts of teleology, then, find satisfaction here. Moral teleology, which is compelled to assume the cooperation of nature, has to assume that man is the final purpose of creation, for only on that assumption is the coincidence of nature and virtue (happiness) possible. It finds admirable confirmation of its expectation in the design it perceives in nature. Natural teleology, on the other hand, also requires a final purpose but one which it cannot yield. And this form of explanation finds its completion in man as a moral being. The possibility is held out of a cooperation of nature with freedom, a harmony whose

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[99] Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 304; cf. Ibid., p. 298.

[100] Ibid., pp. 285, 286.

[101] Ibid., p. 294.

possibility is based on a supersensible ground of the combination of the two -- a supreme, moral Architect of the world. Thus, in the concept of a final end, of a highest good, the "objective practical reality of the union of purposiveness arising from freedom with the purposiveness of nature" is granted.[102]

Perhaps the best way to come to the heart of the matter here is to discuss Kant's "Fragments of a Moral Catechism" in the Metaphysic of Morals, Part II. These passages, which consist of a dialogue between a teacher and pupil, begin with the pupil agreeing that what he wants in life is happiness. The central section of the Catechism is worth quoting at length:

> (6) Teacher: So a man's fulfillment of his duty is the universal and sole condition of his worthiness to be happy.
>
> (7) Teacher: But even if we are conscious of a good and active will in us, by virtue of which we consider ourselves worthy . . . of happiness, can we base on this the sure hope of participating in happiness?
>
> Pupil: No, not merely on this. For it is not always within our power to make ourselves happy, and the course of nature does not of itself conform with merit . . . . So our happiness always remains a mere wish which cannot become a hope unless some other power is added.
>
> (8) Teacher: Has reason, in fact, grounds for admitting the reality of such a power, which apportions happiness according to man's merit or guilt -- a power ordering the whole of nature . . . ?
>
> Pupil: Yes. For we see in the works of nature . . . a wisdom so widespread and profound that we can explain it to ourselves only by the ineffably great act of a creator of the world . . .[103]

Now to grasp the sense of these lines, one must keep in mind that they are intended as an example of a moral education. Hence the dialogue is between a teacher and a pupil and not between two philosophers. We may expect, then, that while the passage embodies a crucial element in Kant's moral philosophy, it nevertheless telescopes or omits altogether important philosophical distinctions in order to create an edifying tale for the moral improvement of men. If we approach this section remembering the context in which the ideas are

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[102] Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 5.

[103] Kant, The Metaphysic of Morals, Part II, pp. 155-56.

presented, we may avoid Beck's error of asserting, on the basis of the "Fragments" that Kant now argued for the existence of God employing "simply and purely" the notion of design in nature.[104] A number of points in this selection are of interest to us. One is the division between the summum bonum as a source of duty and as an object of hope. The former commands us to make ourselves worthy of happiness and hence is synonymous with the command to do one's duty.[105] The latter requires that in addition to the "subjective reality" of the final purpose for ourselves (the highest good), objective evidence be found for its possibility. And such "hints" are provided us by the design that we see in nature. But equally important for the theme of this thesis is the intriguing concurrence of natural and moral purposiveness, a harmony which, I have maintained, is a principal feature of Kant's later practical works. What Kant has done in the "Catechism" is to state the argument from design as if it alone were sufficient proof of God's existence. The reason for this has already been suggested and that is that the "wholesome illusion" of physico-theology, easily grasped by the meanest intelligence is salutary, and so has a legitimate place in a piece of pedagogical writing. Kant has thus omitted the moral proof, which, though stronger philosophically, might be of less educational value. Nevertheless, the reference to natural purposes is a genuine (if slightly obscured) part of Kant's analysis. For while such purposes can never yield a fully developed idea of a Supreme Being, they do exhibit design and so lend additional support to our hope that the highest good is, or could be, actual. The fear that even virtuous men have, according to Kant, of a purposeless world, of a repugnant irregularity between worth and reward, is allayed and the enervating effect of that fear avoided. And it is allayed, in part, because of the postulates but also because we find in the purposiveness of nature evidence of the actual workings of a world Governor, whose attributes (which we know from the postulates) must include those of morality and justice. What in the Groundwork, and to an extent in the Second Critique, remained a wish, an idea with

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[104] Beck, A Commentary, p. 276.

[105] See particularly the first part of the dialogue (not quoted above): "I ought not to lie, no matter how great the benefits to myself and my friend might be. Lying is base and makes a man unworthy of happiness. Here we find an unconditional necessitation . . . It is called a duty." (Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 155, emphasis in the original).

subjective reality alone designed solely to promote respect for duty, now becomes a hope which we value, not simply as a wish that can help as a moral guide but rather as something which can actually be brought into existence, a state which it is reasonable to expect.

Probably the most striking way in which this movement of Kant's thought is exhibited is his use of the concept of teleology: from the passing reference to it in the Groundwork to its status as part of the postulates, a thing of faith in the narrow sense (a wish, the mere possibility of which is sufficient as contrasted with an expectation) and finally to the union of natural and moral purposiveness in the Third Critique and the Metaphysic of Morals, where actualization becomes a central concern.

Kant had written, in the Critique of Pure Reason, that the assumption of God, freedom and immortality was not possible "unless at the same time speculative reason be deprived of its pretensions to transcendent insight."[106] Any extension of this sort would transform what was at heart an object beyond experience into an appearance and would thus make it subject to the rules governing all appearances, a step which defeats the very purpose behind the practically motivated attempt to gain knowledge of the supersensible.[107] In the famous wording of the First Critique, Kant had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith. This statement can, in turn, be related to the notion of boundaries discussed at the beginning of this essay. The critical 'purging' of metaphysics denies to theoretical reason knowledge of the supersensible. In so doing, it preserves the integrity of the realm of appearances. But more than this, it sets the boundary of that domain thereby creating a 'space' for the things of faith. Briefly, then, we may say that a salient feature of Kant's critical endeavour is to describe the limits of theoretical knowledge. However, contrary to what is commonly understood about this effort, its purpose is not simply to secure the phenomenal world and its science, but also to allow for the possibility of the end of all metaphysics (including metaphysics as a science), the supersensible ideas of God, freedom and immortality.

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[106] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 31.

[107] Cf. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 104.

By illuminating the limits of theoretical knowledge, the critical philosophy demonstrates that these ideas can be held without contradiction, though a full determination of them can evolve only from a practical investigation. If this point is granted, it gives us cause to reconsider the role of teleology in Kant's philosophy.

It was mentioned previously that, for Kant, there are two paths which lead us to the supersensible. The one begins with the order and purposiveness we detect in nature and the designer that such an arrangement seems to require. The other proceeds from the moral law, the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, through freedom and the highest good to a moral author of the world. Thus, while the latter approach is more certain than the former, both lead to what seems to be, in Kant's mind, the ultimate supersensible object -- God. That is, both natural and moral teleology compel us towards religion. And these two guides are based on a teleological argument, natural and moral. Furthermore, they are both involved, as we have shown, in the question, "What may I hope for?". In this question, then, and in the teleological response to it -- a response which demonstrates that there is a tendency on the part of each sort of teleology to seek aid or confirmation from the other -- we find encompassed some of the central problems of the supersensible and hence of metaphysics as a whole. Perhaps we may be justified, therefore, in suggesting that to relegate teleology to a narrow range of otherwise unexplainable natural phenomena and to an obscure section of Kant's moral philosophy, is, in fact, to violate Kant's own understanding of hiw work. And, finally, because the two types of approach merge in the idea of a moral designer, who is the supersensible ground of the unity of nature and practical freedom, those two spheres, originally separated in order to preserve their respective fields, are proven to be in harmony. Since creation is, in Kant's view, profoundly moral at its root, Pope's thesis is indeed shown to be correct.

CHAPTER V

KANT ON THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY

> German idealistic philosophy claimed to have restored, and more than restored, the high level of classical political philosophy while fighting against the debasement caused by the first wave of modernity. But to say nothing of the replacement of Virtue by Freedom, the political philosophy belonging to the second wave of modernity is inseparable from philosophy of history, and there is no philosophy of history in classical political philosophy. For what is the meaning of the philosophy of history? Philosophy of history shows the essential necessity of the actualization of the right order.
>
> Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy?

The preceding chapters of this thesis argued for the assertion that the question "What may I hope for?" is central to Kant's later writings. In addition to this, we maintained that teleology was a crucial element in Kant's solution to the problem. And that claim in turn led us to suggest that Kant has two related, but distinct purposes in mind. To present them in a somewhat starker form than they appear in Kant's works themselves, one line of reasoning focuses simply on worthiness, while the other is concerned with actualization. The former demands that we fulfill the condition of the highest good which is within our power, i.e. to act in a manner consonant with the moral law. Since our attention is to be turned towards worthiness, the question of possibility remains a question concerned only with possibility in the minimal sense discussed earlier, and not with the possibility of a reasonable expectation. On the other hand, the second approach while, of

course, never denying the centrality of worthiness (in relation to which happiness is only a derivative good) seeks to establish the harmony of nature and freedom in a morally-ordered universe so as to 'raise' the level of hope from simple possibility (where what is commanded cannot be impossible) to a sort of possibility in which the probability of the highest good's being or coming into being is combined with the rudimentary possibility. Needless to say, we are assuming here that what is hoped for is the 'minimal' conception of the highest good. However, it has also been pointed out that Kant holds a maximal idea of the summum bonum, where the object of hope is a future world, and the immortality of the soul. Having previously discussed these two forms of hope, we may proceed to the question at hand: do the two conceptions just mentioned exhaust the sources of hope for Kant, or is there yet a third type?

Now I would like to suggest that there is indeed a third element in Kant's understanding of hope -- and that is his philosophy of history and politics, the two of which are intimately related in his argument. Speaking in broad terms, the purpose of this chapter will be to show that the historical/political essays are, in fact, a part of Kant's conception of hope and, furthermore, to show in what way they differ from or complement the idea of the highest good. And because we have seen an increasing importance being granted to what I have described as a "stronger" form of possibility in connection with the doctrine of the summum bonum, we will want to determine whether this is a feature of the writings now under consideration as well. It will be argued that a solution to this last-mentioned problem is crucial for an understanding of these works. For it has been maintained[1] that a central characteristic of the break between classical and modern political philosophy is the lowering of the level of political discourse in the modern period. In other words, modern political thought, in rejecting what might loosely be termed classical idealism, sought to lower what it took to be unrealizable goals and in so doing, to increase the chance of actualization of the lower standards. Thus, Machiavelli writes,

> But my intention being to write something useful for whoever understands it, it seemed to me more appropriate to pursue the effectual

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[1] Cf. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1974), p. 178.

> truth of the matter rather than its imagined one. And many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in reality . . . Putting aside, then, the imagined things concerning a prince . . .[2]

For this reason among others, Machiavelli and Hobbes after him claimed to have founded a new political science based, in part, on the rejection of the classics and the tradition of political idealism in general. Within that tradition, the approach whereby a city was constructed in speech, the best city, which then became the standard against which all actual cities were to be measured and which was to guide us in our understanding of the limits of political things, was held to be particularly untenable by modern political philosophy. Kant, on the other hand, does not claim either to have founded or to be a part of the new political science. On the contrary, he recognized that, for example, Plato has been attacked for his "visionary perfection," a perfection which his critics assert can only thrive in the "brain of an idle thinker." But far from accepting this criticism, Kant maintains that "nothing . . . can be more injurious, or more unworthy of a philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to so-called adverse experience . . . Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done."[3] The origin of things in the moral and natural spheres from Ideas gives Plato's teaching, according to Kant, "peculiar merits" and those merits are most plainly visible in regard to the "principles of morality, legislation, and religion." Hence in the political domain,

> This perfect state may never, indeed, come into being; none the less this does not effect the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal organization of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype.[4]

Statements such as these would seem to place Kant in a tradition according to which the low is best understood in terms of the high, the earthly city in the light of the Beautiful City, even though there may ultimately be an

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[2]Machiavelli, The Prince, Bilingual Edition, trans. M. Musa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 127.

[3]Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 312-13.

[4]Ibid., p. 312. For a critical statement on Plato, see among others, Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. M.J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 21n.

unbridgeable gap between the two. To test that claim, then, will be one of the purposes of this chapter. Perhaps the best way to approach these problems is to begin directly with a short review of Kant's conception of politics, a review which, naturally, given the limits of space and purpose here, cannot hope to be more than a tolerably accurate sketch.

A civil constitution, Kant states, is a relation of free men subject to coercion, subject that is to "public juridical laws."[5] And the notion of public juridical law is the basis of all three phases of constitutional development that Kant describes: civil, international and world citizenship.[6] Clearly such a formulation is too scanty for our needs here. We must, therefore, without undue prolixity, discuss Kant's concept of law and its relationahip to freedom. From there his idea of the state of nature and the original contract -- and, ultimately, the concept of a republican constitution -- will become more visible.

The most fundamental distinctions for Kant's philosophy of law are those between jurisprudence and ethics, and between private and public law. Now the heart of the distinction between jurispurdence and ethics consists, according to Kant, not so much in differing duties (though, indeed, some ethical duties, eg. those pertaining to oneself, cannot be juridical) but rather in the different legislation and incentive appropriate to each. Both sorts of law -- juridical and ethical -- have a common root in the generic term moral law, or laws of freedom, where by freedom is understood not merely the negative freedom of independence from the mechanism of nature but also the "capacity of pure reason to be of itself practical."[7] The laws of freedom may be directed either to one's external acts alone or to the internal and external together. The former type of law is juridical,

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[5]Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 87; Kant, On the Old Saw, p. 58.

[6]Kant,"Perpetual Peace," On History, ed. L. W. Beck (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1963), p. 111.

[7]Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice [The Metaphysics of Morals, Part I], trans. J. Ladd (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1965), p. 13.

the latter, ethical. Agreement with the first sort constitutes legality, with the second, virtue. To draw this argument out in greater detail, we may say that legislation of every kind consists of two elements -- a law that makes an action a duty and an "incentive that subjectively links the ground determining will to this action with the representation of the law."[8] As has previously been shown, the only ground fit to determine the pure will morally is duty itself and thus any external legislation, be it constraining or "inviting" debases the character of the act from a moral point of view. Hence, morality can never be the subject of external legislation.[9] Juridical laws, on the other hand, do stem from an external source and bind the 'outer' actions of the person (not his intent or motive) through the incentive of pathological constraints, i.e. coercion and not duty.[10]

Law, then, is the product of freedom as it applies to external relations among men, and it consists in the limitation of each man's freedom to the point where it becomes compatible with the freedom of everyone.[11] And public law is the "totality of external laws" which produce a juridical condition. External or public law is, in short, the foundation of a juridical-civil state and because it requires the general reciprocal use of coercion consistent with freedom for its possibility, it can only come into being in a civil state. This last statement introduces the other side of the distinction that we mentioned above, between a juridical condition of public law and private law which holds in a state of nature. In the state of nature, there is no coercive authority and hence no public law, nor, for that reason, does justice in the strict sense exist in that state.[12] Rather, there exists only private law, a condition of violence and "brutish freedom." The state of nature is a state of violence and evil, and one

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[8] Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 18.

[9] A possible exception to this rule, an exception which implies the coincidence of external legislation and duty, is to be found in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, and will be examined further on in this chapter.

[10] Cf. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, pp. 18-20, 26, 45.

[11] Ibid., pp. 43-44, 75; Idem, On the Old Saw, pp. 57-58.

[12] Idem, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 36.

which the individual is soon forced to leave.[13] But the transition from such a condition into a law-governed society is not made necessary, Kant maintains, on the basis of experience alone. "The necessity," he writes, "of public lawful coercion does not rest on a fact but on an a priori Idea of reason."[14] This argument leads Kant to call the demand that, if men find themselves in one another's company, they ought to abandon that fearful state for a juridical situation, a postulate of public law which "comes out of private law in the state of nature."[15] Now the act by which this change from private to public law is effected is the original contract. The social contract is the "coalition of every particular and private will into a common public for the purposes of purely legal legislation."[16] Speaking in the most general terms, this contract preserves, under the coercive power of the commonwealth, man's only original right -- freedom, and its corollary, innate equality.[17] Moreover, it provides the foundation for publicity, the transcendental formula of public law which connects legislation to morality. According to this formula, an action relating to other men is unjust if it is inconsistent with publicity.[18]

Now the original contract is not an historical fact, nor are we required to assume that a pact of this sort was actually drawn up. On the contrary, it is an Idea of reason "obligating every lawmaker to frame his laws so that they might have come from the united will of an entire people."[19]

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[13] Cf. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," On History, pp. 18, 19.

[14] Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 76. [15] Ibid., p. 71.

[16] Kant, On the Old Saw, p. 65.

[17] Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, pp. 43-44.

[18] Cf. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," pp. 129-30. Kant's argument is that, for example, revolution is unjust because a clause permitting the people to 'stand above' the sovereign could not publicly be included in the original contract. For were it to be so included, either the ruler would in fact agree not to be the ruler or the state simply could not exist. Cf., Idem, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, pp. 86, 140-41; On the Old Saw, pp. 71-73.

[19] Kant, On the Old Saw, p. 19.

In short, it is an Idea which enables us to conceive the legitimacy of the state.[20] And not only is the basis of any civil society to be understood in terms of a practically valid Idea, but investigation into the historical origins of that society is, at least, futile and, quite possibly, dangerous. Thus Kant, like Burke, suggests that a curtain be drawn across the actual founding of states.[21] Kant, acting on this advice, avoids the discussion of founding with one exception. In the essay on "Perpetual Peace", Kant alludes to the problem of the founder. There he states that the difficulty for the first legislator, who "must supervene upon the variety of particular volitions" in order to establish the whole, is that he must at once be a man prepared to use violence against the "horde of savages" and yet hold a noble end, a constitution in accord with the natural rights of men.[22] Kant, perhaps lacking in Machiavelli's occasional and startling forthrightness and being without the latter's "fine Italian hand," does not show us what a solution to this difficulty would entail. Nevertheless, that Kant's formulation has its source in Machiavelli can be seen by a comparison between the passage from "Perpetual Peace" just referred to and the Discourses, Book One, Chapter Eighteen.[23] A second instance of the idea of founding, not this time of a political commonwealth but rather of an ethical commonwealth, is to be seen in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Here again the problem is one of uniting individual wills[24] in a commonwealth where they must be both free (ethical) and subject to public law (hence the ethico-civil state). It will be apparent that this arrangement of the problem is reminiscent of Rousseau's concept of the Legislator.[25] Kant's argument states that the solution to the difficulty posed by a law whose only incentive can be duty and which yet must be public, i.e. commanded externally, is the notion of a "people under God" in whom true duties are at the same time His commands.[26] In this manner, ethical

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[20]Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 80. [21]Ibid., pp. 84, 111.

[22]Kant, "Perpetual Peace," pp. 118-19; see "Idea for a Universal History," page 7, where Kant describes this problem as being impossible to solve.

[23]Machiavelli, The Discourses, trans. L.J. Walker, ed. Bernard Crick (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 163.

[24]See also in this regard, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 638, and Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 106.

freedom and unity coexist, under a common legislator. That Kant, for the strictly political concept of founding, appeals to a foundation not unlike that of Machiavelli, while speaking of the ethical, non-political state in Rousseauian terms, may suggest to us something of his understanding of politics. While we will return to this statement later, for the moment we must acknowledge that the direction of Kant's analysis is towards the Idea of an original contract, and not an examination of founding.

As we have seen, the original pact is the underpinning of civil society. The Idea of the original contract, which incorporates the right of freedom and equality, and publicity, under a common coercive force, serves as a guide to all constitutions. But does it point to any specific type of constitution, or merely to law-governed society in general? Kant responds to this question by distinguishing, in the first instance, between the letter and the spirit of the original contract. To the letter of the pact there corresponds the form of the state established by long tradition and custom. However, to the spirit belongs the "obligation of the constituted authority to make the type of government conform to this Idea" and consequently, to bring about the changes necessary to that end.[27] The sole constitution which fully agrees with that Idea is a republican one, for it is only in a republican constitution that freedom can be the underlying principle. The republican form of government is composed of three principles: the <u>freedom</u> of its members (as men), the "<u>dependence</u> of all upon a common legislator" (as subjects), and finally, their <u>equality</u> (as citizens). These three principles, it will be recalled, are at the core of the original contract -- that is, freedom and equality under a universal constraining force.[28] In other words, only where there is juridical freedom, where obedience is given only to those laws capable of being consented to by the people, and hence only where there is a representative government in which

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[25]Jean-Jacques Rousseau, <u>Du Contrat Sociale</u>, Book II, Chapter 7.

[26]Kant, <u>Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone</u>, pp. 89-91.

[27]Kant, <u>Metaphysical Elements</u>, p. 112.

[28]Kant, "Perpetual Peace," pp. 93-94.

the laws are autonomous (thus, the separation of the legislative and executive branches) can that state be said to agree with the spirit of the Idea of an original contract.[29] Other systems, Kant says, have only distinct moral persons as sovereigns. Therefore, the

> Idea of a constitution in harmony with the natural right of man, one namely in which the citizens obedient to the law, besides being united, ought also to be legislative, lies at the basis of all political forms . . .[it] signifies a Platonic Ideal (respublica noumenon) . . . the eternal norm for all civil organization in general.[30]

We will want to return to this passage later. But for the moment, suffice it to say that, for Kant, a republican constitution is the Idea towards which all governments have a duty to work, and it is the end of all public law. We have seen, then, that the juridical civil state is distinguished from moral life in general and the ethical commonwealth in particular, and that they have a common root in the laws of freedom. Furthermore, we have followed Kant in his distinction between the juridical situation and the state of nature and in his analysis of the basis of public law in the Idea of an original contract. A pact which, in turn, leads us to the only sort of constitution fully in harmony with it, i.e. a republican one. In brief, the evolution of the first type of public law -- civil law -- has been traced. We are now in a position, therefore, to present a short examination of the two subsequent phases -- that law which holds between nations, and finally world citizenship.

Universal peace, Kant writes, is through the establishment of a republican constitution, the ultimate purpose of all law[31] and a duty acknowledged by the human soul.[32] The internal constitution of a state appropriate to that end is a republican one, for only such an arrangement,

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[29] Cf. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," pp. 93n, 95, 97; Idem, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, pp. 78, 113.

[30] Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" On History, p. 150. See, Idem, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 312.

[31] Kant, Metaphysical Elements, p. 128.

[32] Kant, "An Old Question", pp. 146-47.

requiring the consent of its citizens -- the principal victims of war and the bearers of the financial burden of a peacetime army -- is less likely to lead to war. But because a state of peace does not exist naturally among nations, it must be created.[33] Indeed, states are originally in a non-juridical condition, a situation of war with one another where all property and rights are merely provisional. States, then, like men find themselves in a destitute condition until the time comes when they submit themselves to public law. They are, as it were, oppressed with the same evil which confronted the individual in the state of nature and as he was required to abandon it, so too are they.[34] For a binding law to be established concerning the relation of states, without which there remains only private law and war, a federation must be formed whose sole purpose is the maintenance of peace.[35] In other words, because states like individuals injure each other by their simple co-existence outside of a juridical condition, they are obliged to quit it for a league of nations. However, it should be noted that this obligation is of a different order than that which applied to individuals. This is to say that whereas individuals can be the subject of compulsion in the move from the state of nature to lawful society, the former, since they have an internal constitution, have "outgrown" coercion.[36] Hence, there must come into being a federation of states, based on a voluntary coalition. Kant, in the later essay On the Old Saw, describes two paths to eternal peace: the one, a cosmopolitan constitution and the other, the federation just discussed. Though Kant is less than expansive in this regard, a cosmopolitan constitution seems to be a single, universal state under one head, as opposed to a federation. Kant could be taken to mean in this work that a cosmopolitan constitution is preferable to a federation, but that it also holds greater dangers, as evidenced in the tendency of overly large states to degenerate into despotisms.[37] Thus, a

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[33] Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 92.

[34] Kant, Metaphysical Elements, p. 116; Cf. Idem, On the Old Saw, pp. 78-79, and "Idea for a Universal History," p. 19.

[35] Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 133. [36] Ibid., p. 100.

[37] Kant, On the Old Saw, pp. 78-79. Cf. Idem, "Perpetual Peace," p. 113.

federation under law, and not a single sovereign, is, if not the most desirable option, at least the safest and most feasible way to perpetual peace. The third phase of public law -- world citizenship -- occupies a small place in Kant's concerns and so need only be briefly mentioned here. The law of world citizenship -- a "supplement" to civil and international law -- states that men have the right, when they arrive in a foreign country, not to be treated as an enemy.[38] Their right consists in nothing more than that of the freedom to associate with others and to a "temporary sojourn." Here, then, we have all three phases of public law and their basis in the original contract and the state of nature.

So far we have discussed only the crucial detail of Kant's political philosophy. Now this detail forms the substance, or core, of the Kantian Idea of a constitution, of his account of the respublica noumenon. This Idea, as is clear from the passage quoted earlier in the thesis,[39] is in "harmony with the natural right of man" and with the republican constitution. And the political association "conceived in conformity with it" is a Platonic Ideal, an eternal norm for all societies. In the concept, then, of public law and of the constitutions, national and international which emerge from it, Kant presents his vision of the Republic, a vision which, in the form of the Idea, completes the analogy between the Platonic and Kantian notion of politics (or more precisely of their respect understanding of the best approach to political things) made by Kant himself. I would like to argue that Kant's formulation of the Idea, and the use of that Idea which is the basis of its specific manner of formulation, differs radically from that of Plato. It will be asserted further on that the heart of this difference can be traced to a tension in Kant's political though (paralleling that of the dual role of the highest good in his moral philosophy -- as norm and guide, and as hope) between the Idea as an eternal, a measure of actual regimes which is, itself, a "pattern written in the heavens" on the one hand, and a source of hope, whose existence on earth is possible or even probable

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[38]Kant, "Perpetual Peace," pp. 102, 105.

[39]Kant, "An Old Question," p. 150.

on the other. However, before we examine the problem at length, it might be helpful to discover a "key" to this difficulty.

Perhaps the single most striking fact about Kant's political thought is that in Kant's writings virtue is hardly mentioned. Indeed, precisely the difference between an ethical community of men and a political, or juridical one, is that whereas in the former virtue is the "unique principle of union," in the latter it is not.[40] The juridical commonwealth is concerned solely with the legality of actions and in it all men are in an ethical state of nature.[41] Thus, progress towards a republican constitution leads not to virtue, but to an increase in legality.[42] That Kant would hold such a position is already evident from his distinction between juridical and ethical law. Ethical law, we recall, cannot be introduced through external pressure of any sort. But in addition to this, the argument also has its source in Kant's conception of evil in man. To reduce a rather intricate analysis, the detail of which need not concern us here, to its essentials, we can say that Kant saw evil, at least in the later works, as a permanent quality in human nature.[43] Man is, in Kant's view, "crooked wood" -- profoundly and unalterably corrupted by evil.[44] For this reason, the "sanguine hopes" of eudaemonism, the belief in the constant moral improvement of mankind, are untenable.[45]

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[40] Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 86. [41] Ibid., p. 90.

[42] Kant, "An Old Question," p. 151. [43] Cf. Kant, Religion, pp. 26-27.

[44] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. [illegible] Idem, Religion, p. 92.

[45] Kant, "An Old Question," p. 140. Cf. Leo Strauss' statement on classical political philosophy: "It is free from all fanaticism because it knows that evil cannot be eradicated and therefore that one's expectations from politics must be moderate. The spirit which animates it may be described as serenity or sublime sobriety" (Strauss, "What is Political Philosophy?", What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies [New York: Free Press, 1959], p. 28). But this task was accomplished by showing the distance between the actual, or actualizable, regimes and the simply best regime, that which exists in speech alone. Kant's argument shares this hostility to immoderate political expectations, but this view evolves in a way radically distinct from the classics. (1) Its purpose is not, as such, to know the limits of political things, but to provide for hope. Hence, (2) it has no need of an elaboration of that sort of regime, which, in providing

Politics, then, has precious little to do with virtue. It is an activity fit for a "nation of devils," and, thus, its central problem is to so arrange the public conduct of self-interested and evil individuals that their actions will be the same as if they were not ill-intentioned.[46] Politics is simply the art of using the mechanisms of nature for controlling men in their public life.[47] Insofar as it has anything whatsoever to do with virtue, it is only that the latter ought to exert an influence on politics; the serpent, to use Kant's image, must be tempered by the dove. What is intriguing here is not so much Kant's understanding of politics but rather the fact that the "eternal norm" is formulated in accordance with it. The Idea, that is to say, is constructed so as to provide a guide for a nation of devils seeking to constitute a state. And such a guide must be, in Kant's argument, in fundamental harmony with the possibilities available to these devils. To construct a city in speech around virtue, say, instead of peace and law would be to surpass the limits of one's material and hence would invite the mockery of the practical man and politicians.[48] This fear of mockery, of being shown to be a mere dreamer of "sweet dreams" is a theme repeated in Kant's political essays and is the basis of his concern with the relation between theory and practice.[49] In order to avoid the derisive laughter of the politician, one is best advised to shape one's constitution in thought in a manner becoming devils and not saints. The Idea is not that of an ethical commonwealth, but of an external, coercive order made necessary by the desire of men to absent themselves from any universal law. Or, to say much the same thing in different words, one should lower the level of one's criterion so as to bring it into line

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a contrast with realizable ones, would point to those limits. In short, political discourse is no longer about the good regime, but about the realizable regime. Though both Kant and the classical tradition can be said to share a somewhat similar understanding of the limits of politics, they differ fundamentally on the nature of political philosophy, and the manner in which political things can best be grasped.

[46] Kant, "Perpetual Peace," pp. 111-12.

[47] Ibid., p. 119.

[48] Kant, "An Old Question," p. 151: "[W]e must not hope for too much from men in their progress toward the better lest we fall prey with good reason to the mockery of the politician who would willingly take the hope of man as the dreaming of a distraught mind."

[49] Cf. Kant, Introductory paragraph to "Perpetual Peace," pp. 85, 112; "An Old Question," p. 151; On the Old Saw, pp. 42-3.

with what is possible. Socrates, we remember, was also confronted with the mockery of the citizens when he spoke of the Republic. To their laughter he answered:

> But, I suppose, when it became clear to those who used these practices that to uncover all such things is better than to hide them, then what was ridiculous to the eyes disappeared in the light of what's best as revealed in speeches. And this showed that he is empty who believes anything is ridiculous other than the bad . . . or, again, he who looks seriously to any standard of beauty he sets up other than the good. [50]

For, Plato, then, the radical distinction between what truly is and that which comes into being and passes away does not weaken the former with respect to the latter. On the contrary, the city in speech is the measure of actual regimes, or the guide to the understanding of the limits of political things, for exactly the reason that only it can claim to be in the fullest sense. What is laughable is not the use of such a city as a criterion, but rather the employment of anything less. The laughter is the derision poured on philosophy by the inhabitants of the cave and, for Socrates, it simply points to the need for philosophy and for grasping the difference between politics and philosophy, a difference which, in turn, requires philosophy for its recognition. Kant's Idea of a republican constitution, on the other hand, is designed to eliminate from political activity considerations other than those centered around public law and the end which that law establishes, i.e. peace. Political maxims, therefore, are not to be determined "heteronomously" -- based, that is, upon a desire for happiness or the popular welfare -- but are to be derived from the pure concepts of duty and right.[51] The respublica noumenon that Kant sets out is eminently practical; practical in the sense that it has been framed not within the terms of discourse about the good, or what is simply best, but rather within the boundaries described by actual political matters. Thus the problem which it attempts to solve, is not the creation (or impossibility) of that city which is truly the most just, but of a city which could be populated by devils, or wholly ordinary men. Reading Kant we are reminded of Machiavelli's image of the river and its constraining

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[50] Plato Republic 452 D-E.

[51] Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 127.

dikes. We are faced with men, who, if opportunity permitted them, would satisfy their desires and passions at the expense of others and ultimately, of course, at the expense of a stable society. The political problem is to so arrange their desires, through institutions, law and customs, that they will neither want, nor have the ability, to do damage. For Kant this difficulty does not allow for purely pragmatic solutions, but only such solutions as are compatible with man's only right -- freedom within universal law -- and the end of all law, peace. Nevertheless, the Idea has been formulated in a manner designed to make it harmonious with the limited end of politics and with its "corrupt material." In short, it is an Idea, the construction of which, one may expect, has been carried out in the light of the possibility of its coming into being. If the latter is true, Kant's purpose would differ fundamentally from Plato's and so, naturally, would its theoretical outcome. Kant would share in this case concerns that might be characterized as typical of modern political thought after Machiavelli.

We have seen, then, that Kant's Idea of a republican constitution is one concerned, at least in part, with possibility. Further evidence for this point can be found in the fact that Kant's political thought, centered around this Idea, is closely linked to a speculative philosophy of history. One may assume that an Idea whose only function is to serve as a measure or guide -- take; for example, the concept of the Kingdom of Ends -- would not stand in need of a supporting philosophy of history, of the sort that Kant provides. Clearly, the last statement coupled with the preceding analysis, leads us to doubt the veracity of the equation of the Kantian Idea of a constitution with that of Plato's Republic. And this doubt occurs because Kant's formulation suggests an interest in actualization. But let us begin with the question as to why Kant would have this interest or concern.

It was noted in the previous section of the thesis that the concept of the summum bonum has a dual role: on the one hand, it requires us, regardless of the possibility of its coming into being, to act in accordance with it. That is, we are required to make ourselves worthy of it, whether or not its possibility can be proven, or even shown to be feasible,

so long as its impossibility cannot be conclusively demonstrated. However, the highest good is also a source of hope. And it can be the object of hope only to the extent that its possibility is allowed for and thus we search for traces of design in nature which would point to a Moral Author of the world, sufficient to guarantee at least the reasonable hope for happiness in proportion to virtue. A similar tension exists, I would suggest, in the notion of the Idea of a constitution between that Idea as a measure and as something for which we hope.[52] Here this tension results in a move away from the purely normative function of the Idea towards hope and consequently towards possibility. It tends, then, to lower the level of the substance of the Idea so as to make it an object of hope, an object the realization of which is the concern of the speculative analysis of history.

Therefore, on the one side, the Idea is simply a measure, and one which sets out the duties of the sovereign in governing. Thus, Kant writes that even if we cannot prove that something exists, we may still hypothetically accept the conjecture of it, if there is an interest in adopting the conjecture. Now if this interest is one derived from a moral end, duty requires us to adopt the conjecture as a maxim. However, while duty demands that we seek this end,

> . . .[I]t is evident that . . . it does not require us to conjecture . . . the feasibility of the end in the sense in which such a conjecture is a purely theoretical judgment . . . What duty requires is that we act in accordance with the Idea of such an end, even if there is not the slightest theoretical possibility that it is feasible, as long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated either.[53]

In other words, this Idea so long as it cannot be shown to be impossible (in Kant's account duty cannot command the impossible) is to guide the practice

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[52] However, it should be noted that Fackenheim is correct in maintaining that Kant's philosophy of history and politics is not simply a corollary to the teaching on the summum bonum (Emil Fackenheim, "Kant's Concept of History," Kant-Studien 48 [1957]: 392). The most basic difference between the two, of course, is that while the latter depends on and emphasizes virtue and worthiness, the former never seeks to rise above the mechanism of nature operative in the desires and passions of men. Nevertheless, both are concerned with the problem of hope, and both attempt to satisfy the need we feel for a "consoling view of the world" through the use of teleological arguments.

[53] Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, pp. 127-28.

of statesmen and citizens as though a truly republican constitution and perpetual peace existed. All that is required of the Idea is the negative condition[54] that it not be proven impossible. Clearly, it does not follow from this that we have to actually think its possibility; on the contrary, it suffices merely that we do not believe it to be impossible. Similar formulations, it will be recalled, are to be found in the concept of the highest good. There, to the extent that the summum bonum does nothing more than prescribe conduct, it is sufficient simply that we are not able to prove conclusively its impossibility. This, then, is what we may term the 'Platonic' side of Kant's Idea -- the side, that is, which Kant saw as being similar to Plato's Republic.[55] But as in the case of the highest good, there is also a 'second version', a version concerned with hope and therefore with actualization.

Man is oppressed, Kant states, by what appear to be hopeless evils,[56] and the continued presence of evil causes him to doubt the benevolence of the Divine Author. From this point of view, history is seen as a never-ending tragedy, or a farcical game:

> To watch this tragedy for a while may perhaps be touching and instructive, but eventually the curtain has to fall. For in the long run the tragedy becomes a farce, and though the actors, fools that they are, do not tire of it, the spectators will. . . . But in real life to pile vice upon countless vice . . . just so that some day there will be plenty to punish, would be repugnant . . . even to the morality of a wise creator and governor of the world.[57]

Kant's concern here is for the spectators, for those surveying the course of history. To see in history nothing but a series of half-comical, half-tragic, but inevitably futile attempts on the part of mankind to improve

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[54]The demonstration of which must rest with its opponents (Kant, On the Old Saw, p. 77).

[55]While this formulation is adequate for the purposes at hand, it will be shown later that the strict relationship between duty and impossibility described in the Second Critique, and summarized above, changes somewhat in the constitutional Idea. Kant, it will be argued, seems to suggest that something more is required for the Idea than the mere lack of a proof of its impossibility.

[56]Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," On History, pp. 66, 68.

itself, would sap the spectator's courage, weaken his faith in Providence, and remove from his heart the desire to work for the common good.[58] For this reason it is an unacceptable proposal that humanity is not advancing towards a better state, that history is either stagnant or regressive.[59] Equally unacceptable is the notion that blind chance rules over our affairs since if this were the case, the world would be a "hell of evils."[60] To secure hope and faith, the philosopher must provide what amounts to a theodicy. He must decide, if there is a plan concealed in the seemingly "idiotic order of things" or, to give the narrower definition of his task, the philosopher in the guise of the historian must determine what Providence or nature has done to further the end which "man's reason makes his duty."[61] The end being referred to here is, of course, perpetual peace and the type of internal constitution which favours it, and through such a state, to allow for the unbridled development of man's capacities.[62] That a condition of peace, law and freedom will ultimately supercede the present chaos and violence is what men must hope for and Kant, in his philosophy of history, provides the basis for this hope.

The study of history, Kant writes, is concerned with narrating the appearances of freedom. But the appearances of freedom, like all appearances, are subject to universal natural law.[63] And as nature in the narrow sense is not an idiotic, chaotic ordering of things, so too we may expect that the appearances of freedom in the world will exhibit a regular movement. History is possible, therefore, only on the "fundamental premise" which it shares with nature proper, of the "systematic structure of the cosmos."[64]

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[57] Kant, On the Old Saw, pp. 76-77.

[58] Cf. Kant, On the Old Saw, p. 77.

[59] Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 128; Idem, "An Old Question," p. 141.

[60] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," p. 20.

[61] Ibid., p. 12; Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 111.

[62] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 23; Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 281-82.

[63] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 11; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 471, 474, 477.

[64] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 22.

Thus, just as systematic, inductive thought or science requires that we adopt as our fundamental premise the orderliness of the world, so does the philosophy of history demand that we view nature as a system. Hence the first thesis of Kant's understanding of history is a teleological one. All capacities, he states, are destined to evolve to their natural end. To deny this would be to deny the teleological principle of nature, the idea of a lawful course of nature.[65] History is possible, then, only if there is an order among the appearances of freedom. But nature has previously been shown to be systematic and lawful and therefore, these appearances being in the same domain as those of nature in general, may reasonably be assumed to have a plan or order to them. In short, history and inductive thought rely on the same premise, that of the order and lawfulness of the cosmos. A second argument, stemming also from the notion ofnatural teleology, repeats the claim of the Third Critique, that if there is purposiveness in the parts, there must be a purpose for the whole as well. Since we know of the teleology of natural things, it is plausible or indeed necessary, to determine the ultimate purpose of nature -- in this case, the evolution of mankind towards a republican constitution and perpetual peace.[66] It is little wonder therefore that, given the root of Kant's philosophy of history in the teleology of nature, he provides us with evidence of this sort of teleology, taken from or later used in the Critique of Judgment. One example of this was mentioned above -- i.e. that nature does nothing in vain -- and another is to be seen in the Lapland images of "Perpetual Peace". In these passages Kant merely reiterates the physical evidence -- for example, driftwood in the Arctic -- for a wise designer of the world.[67]

The central premise, then, of history is the presence of an order or plan in the course of appearances which constitute history. Now whereas a history of bees, say, would present no problems to the philosopher nor yet a history of wholly rational citizens living according to a self-given

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[65] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," pp. 12-13.

[66] Ibid., p. 20.

[67] Cf. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," pp. 107n, 109.

plan, the history of men does pose some difficulties. For men act neither entirely from instinct nor with a rational plan.[68] Rather, human affairs are conducted partially on the basis of instinct and, in part, from merely arbitrary freedom. Nevertheless, there must be, in Kant's view, a plan, but one which accounts for man's evolution towards his natural ends in terms of the presence in him of both nature and freedom.

What we are interested in, therefore, is the history of mankind, a history which is peculiar inasmuch as it involves a relationship between nature and freedom, and which, above all, is teleological. Now clearly this last statement sets the problem which Kant will have to solve. For, on the one hand, man's history differs from that of animals precisely because the events which make it up are the appearances of freedom and not of instinct, or nature alone. But on the other hand, this history is teleological, unfolds, that is, according to purposes and means set by nature. Nature has willed, Kant writes, that whatever man achieves shall be the result of his own activity. And in harmony with this edict, nature or Providence[69] employs means compatible with the peculiar character of human history. That is, she achieves her final purpose, the development of man's capacities made possible by a state of peace, through his unsocial sociability, his mutual antagonism in society.[70] Man's selfish inclinations, then, are nature's means and through the diversity of his interests, the vanity and competition, man is led towards a situation of lawful external relations. In this manner (internal) public law arises from internal discord and the threat of war, from the selfish inclination to preserve oneself and not from morality. Similarly, international law which "presupposes the existence of many independent but neighbouring states" as opposed to the unification of states under one sovereign (which

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[68] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 12.

[69] Kant uses the terms "nature" and "Providence" interchangeably, suggesting on occasion that, for modesty's sake, nature is the preferable term, while at other times, stating that the wisdom manifested in history could only be the work of Providence (cf. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 108; On the Old Saw, p. 78).

[70] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 15; Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 112.

would be the "burial ground" of their freedom) is furthered by nature, since she prevents the states from amalgamating by differences of language and religion.[71] Finally, the law of world citizenship is advanced by means of mutual self-interest embodied in the spirit of commerce. Thus each person acting solely on the basis of his own avarice, and in opposition to the interests of others, moves toward a goal unknown to him, but established by nature. War, competition and vanity force him to enter a lawful condition and also arouse his capacities.[72] Hence, we are in error if we see in the lamentable course of history a reproach to Providence. For what may seem evil from the standpoint of the individual will, in the evolution of the race, of mankind, prove beneficial.[73] In brief, the history of man is the working out of nature's plan to bring into being a perfectly constituted state.[74] The success of this progress depends not on us but on the wisdom of the creator[75] and the violence and chaos which are the outstanding traits of history display his work, if viewed in the right way, and not that of an evil spirit. A history of this sort serves as a justification for Providence.[76]

But insofar as the speculative philosophy of history justifies Providence, it gives us hope. It should be emphasized here that the foundation upon which this hope rests is the "invisible hand" of Nature or Providence. And hence its object can only be that which may be furthered by the cooperation of nature, and indeed, without the conscious participation of men in their own improvement. Clearly, then, the hope is not for moral progress, but for the advancement of civilization and ultimately of the free growth of man's natural capacities. Kant does, on occasion, suggest that this last-mentioned development may perhaps lead to the moral improvement of man, though civilization is wholly compatible with an ethical state of nature.

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[71] Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 113.

[72] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 16; Kant, On the Old Saw, p. 80.

[73] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," pp. 11, 16; Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," p. 60.

[74] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 21.

[75] Kant, On the Old Saw, p. 78.

[76] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 25.

However, Kant also put forward the view that no such moral progress is to be expected from civilization.[77] While it is difficult to determine which conclusion ultimately holds sway in Kant's argument, it is possible to state the source of the ambiguity.

There is a considerable distance between the hope for peace brought about by a ruse of nature and the desire of virtuous men for an increase in morality. The former can be grounded in teleological concepts since it is concerned solely with the external form, i.e. legality of actions. The latter, on the other hand, demands not only the conformity of those acts with law, but the proper incentive as well. That is to say, the hope that we are allowed based upon the "fundamental premise of the systematic structure of the cosmos" stops where the cooperation of nature stops and this boundary is set by the autonomy of the truly moral deed. But perhaps, it might be countered, the republican and cosmopolitan society which nature helps to bring into being, while they do not lead directly to moral progress, nevertheless favour morality. The question here, then, is: does a just ordering of man's affairs provide a moral education? Again, no clear and certain answer is possible. But suffice it to say that the sort of law and freedom encountered in the political domain is, at best, doubtful as an educator. The political sense of law is a restraint on freedom, on mere arbitrary freedom, so that the freedom which I have to seek a desired end shall not conflict with the freedom of others.[78] And the incentive to obey this law is not simple respect for duty, but rather the entirely "heteronomous" fear of swift punishment. Little wonder, then, that Kant maintains that insofar as moral improvement has a social dimension at all, it consists not in the actions of the regime but in the establishment of an ethical commonwealth, the visible church, within the political order. Nor, it should be added, can church and regime be united in a sovereign who is also a moral legislator. The outstanding example of such an attempt -- Moses -- is dismissed by Kant as being merely political.[79] Finally Kant's concern in

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[77]Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 284; "Idea for a Universal History," p. 14; "An Old Question Raised Again," pp. 140, 151.

[78]Cf. Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 40.

[79]Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, pp. 116-17.

these later writings with the radical presence of evil in human nature, it could be argued, compounded his pessimism about the possibility of moral improvement.

What I am maintaining, therefore, is that there are a number of lines of reasoning which suggest that progress in virtue is not the object of hope for Kant. One is that the limits of hope are co-extensive with those of the teleological argument, and though the latter points to the cooperation of nature in man's advancement in civilization, it can lead us no further. A second approach suggests that the education in law and freedom that a republic provides to its subjects (even though that education may be more favourable to morality than, say, the life of the citizen in a despotic regime), is because, of the nature of that law and freedom, a doubtful source of virtue. To see this point, one might contrast the notion of law that evolves in the political context and its educational possibilities with the extract from a genuine moral catechism provided by Kant.[80] Furthermore, the rigid separation of juridical and ethical commonwealths, of regime and church, set out in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone and the strict delineation of the tasks appropriate to each, also indicate that political progress is not tied in any firm and direct way to an increase in morality. The last argument presented was that radical evil in man poses an insurmountable barrier to the hopes of eudaemonism.

Kant's philosophy of history and politics is a theodicy and a source of hope. And it fulfills this role not by accounting for evil in the light of an ultimately moral condition but rather by showing that, evil though we are, war is not our permanent lot. The hope, then, is that peace and human dignity will be the end result of our bloody history. The horizon of Kant's political thought is, like that of Hobbes, fear of violent death. And the hope for peace is, in Kant's mind, a real need of men confronted with a history which provides evidence for little else than continued warfare. The fact that Kant sometimes spoke of peace leading to moral improvement does suffice to show that that improvement and not simply peace was foremost in Kant's mind.

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[80] Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 153ff.

Kant's speculative history interprets history in the light of our practical interest in it, that is, it seeks even the "faintest indications" that history works according to a plan conceived by a wise Governor.[81] It is plain, therefore, that the philosophy of history inasmuch as it wants to show the progress of mankind towards the realization of the Idea of a constitution, is bound up with Kant's political thought. However, we have already noted that one way in which the Idea is used is as a measure, a guide which simply prescribes the duties and obligations of rulers. Now we encounter the second employment of the same Idea presented, in this case, in the context of a philosophy of history which points to its actualization and in so doing makes it a source not of duty alone but of hope. It would be a mistake, though, to believe that these two functions are wholly distinct in Kant's account of the Idea. The guarantee of nature, which makes a far stronger claim than the mere absence of a proof of impossibility, is essential to the Idea and thus to our duties with regard to it. Kant writes: "In this manner, nature guarantees perpetual peace by the mechanism of human passions . . . making it our duty towards this end which is not a chimerical one."[82] In another passage, he states:

> It is strange and apparently silly to wish to write a history in accordance with an Idea of how the course of the world must be if it is to lead to certain rational ends. It seems that with such an Idea only a romance could be written. Nevertheless, if one may assume that Nature . . . works not without plan or purpose, this Idea could still be of use.[83]

Notice that in these two excerpts, nature's guarantee is responsible for raising the Idea above the level of a "chimera" or "romance". And that in the first citation, duty is explicitly connected to the progress made certain by nature. One final quote will serve to illustrate this last point: "If it is a duty to make real (even if only through approximation in endless progress) the state of public law and if there is a well-provided hope that this can actually be done, then perpetual peace . . . is not an empty Idea."[84] Here again duty is tied to possibility, without which the Idea which commands certain duties would remain only an "empty idea".

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[81] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 22; "An Old Question," pp. 142, 147; "Perpetual Peace," pp. 108, 114.

[82] Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 114. [83] Kant, "Universal History," p. 24.

[84] Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 135 (emphasis added).

In order for this Idea to be something more than a "sweet dream", the empty idea of an idle thinker, it has to speak of a state which can actually be established. But men are "crooked wood" and from them no advancement in virtue can be expected (for this, Kant says, a new creation would be required). And even if evil were not part of their nature, no guaranteeing force could be found, neither nature nor Providence, which would assure us of their moral progress, for such advancement depends, as Kant pointed out in the Groundwork and the First Critique, on the pure, i.e. autonomous, will. Thus if our hope is to be more than a pleasing fancy, we must not expect too much of men, nor should we look for the origin of progress in mankind itself. The Idea or end must be reduced so that we may reasonably expect it to eventually come into being. In other words, because the Idea does more than dictate duties, because it is also the end for which we hope, we ought to make it "realistic", not so much to avoid the mockery of practical men, as to offer the "spectators" a consoling view of the world. We do not create a city in speech solely to determine the nature and limits of politics, or prescribe duties to the sovereign, but rather we employ an Idea which, while designed in part to fulfil the latter need, is also to be the seat of hope. This last use, I would suggest, sets narrow limits on the Idea, limits derived not from a philosophical analysis of what is simply the best, but boundaries described by what "actually can be done." By lowering the level of political-philosophic discourse, Kant's respublica noumenon offers a "consoling view of the future."[85] Philosophy, he states, is consoling and teaches contentment.[86]

We stated at the beginning of this section that Kant's Idea of a republic differed fundamentally from that of Plato both in use and substance. I have argued in the body of the chapter that this change can be traced to Kant's concern with the possibility of the republic's existence, a concern which originates with the practical interest that men have in historical-political matters. This interest, it was asserted, can be seen in the union

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[85] Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," p. 25.

[86] Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," p. 68.

of the two -- politics and history -- in an analysis that is, at once, a theodicy and a source of hope. The consolation of philosophy that Kant speaks of is the "guiding thread" provided by a speculative history and pointing to a better state in a time to come. It is difficult to imagine a starker contrast and perhaps one more revealing of the differences between Kant and the classical conception of the philosophic life and politics, than to compare Kant's consolation with that of Socrates in the Apology, Aristotle in Book Ten of the Ethics or in the 'popularized version' of the philosophic ideal of life in Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In the final section of this thesis we saw the source of Kant's philosophy of history and politics in his concept of teleology and the issues connected with that idea. With the concluding section, the task established at the outset of the thesis has been fulfilled. And that was to locate one central idea in Kant's works and to trace its evolution -- not, however, in its chronological evolution, eg. the 'earlier' and the 'later' Kant, but rather as that single idea marks a path through the crucial philosophical concerns of his system. Teleology, at its root the notion of design in nature, and secondarily, the question of the origin of that design, has a place -- and perhaps an important place -- in Kant's epistemology and his analysis of the moral will and politics which are the topics of the three Critiques and the historical/political essays. Though the limits of this thesis would not permit discussion of it, teleology is also central to Kantian anthropology and aesthetics.

Now it will be recalled that the purpose of the thesis is two-fold: on the one hand, to show that Kant's political philosophy shares in the same group of issues and problems that dominate his entire philosophical endeavour, and in so doing, to advance the claim that their subject matter is not mere marginalia. And on the other hand, I wanted to argue that the political writings themselves can only be fully understood by relating their themes back to the Critiques. I think that the approach adopted by this thesis, i.e. following the concept of teleology through from the bare assertion of its possibility in the Critique of Pure Reason, to its necessity

In the Third Critique, and from there to its corollaries, the final end of nature and the Moral Designer of the world in the Critique of Practical Reason and the political writings, serves this two-sided purpose well. This path, that of retracing the "natural" course, as it were, of Kant's argument -- building from basic possibility, through the fact of teleology to its corollaries -- makes clear that if we take Kant seriously, i.e. at his word, the problems which decisively shape the political philosophy have their roots in his concept of nature and in his epistemology. But to say that they are rooted in this way is not sufficient, for what is at stake here is not merely the 'parentage' of his idea of politics, but rather the claim that Kant is led -- though perhaps it would be too strong an assertion to say that the 'internal logic' of his argument leads him -- stage by stage from natural teleology to the moral sphere, and finally to history. If, in fact, these propositions can be upheld, then the understanding of Kant's work as a whole, as a single teaching, and hence the unity of the three Critiques would derive support from them. For this, among other reasons, the idea of teleology, present in one form or another in every one of his major writings from the pre-critical period to the last essays at the turn of the century, deserves serious consideration. And insofar as the concept of teleology is seen as important, so too should the philosophy of history and politics -- which reveals one significant use of that idea -- be of interest to us. That this, the more difficult of the two tasks set for the thesis, is intimately related to the second and rather obvious assertion -- that the political philosphy, in order to be fully comprehended, requires an awareness of the origins of its problems in the strictly philosophical works -- can, I think, be taken as demonstrated.

Let me, then, briefly summarize the arguments of the thesis and the conclusions that they lead to. It was maintained that Kant's concept of experience, to the extent that it is based solely upon the understanding and the categories, that is, the analysis of experience that is completed in the Transcendental Deduction, provides only for basic, everyday experience. Indeed, the Deduction sets out the fundamental conditions of any experience whatsoever. But it does not rise above the requirements of experience in general, or simple experience. Now the idea of simple or basic experience

includes the possibility of objective events per se, though not systematic experience. In other words, it is possible, with the account of experience given in the Analytic of the First Critique, to imagine a world of objective events, infinite in number and variety and, in principle, not amenable to classification. Within such a world, ordinary experience might be possible but science would not. Science, the systematic experience of nature, requires, in Kant's view, that natural phenomena be classifiable into genera and species, that nature be 'parsimonious' and that her laws be connected, one to the other. Science is possible, then, only on the assumption -- literally, the supposition -- of a systematic nature: the view that nature is to be thought as if it had been organized so as to make it the object of scientific activity. The hypothesis of the empirical lawfulness of nature (as opposed to its transcendental lawfulness, the basic ingredient in any experience, discussed in the Deduction and the Analogies) is provided by reason. And its employment is legitimate so long as the explanation that it offers is cast in the language of regulative statements, and thus does not claim to speak about the objects themselves, but of the way in which we must view them.

This is roughly the argument as Kant presents it in the Critique of Pure Reason. In fact it establishes little more than the need for some sort of concept of a systematic nature. The detailed conceptual analysis of the problem of system emerges only in the Third Critique. Here "system" is conjoined with "purposiveness" in a broader concept of teleology. Most closely related to the problem as stated above, the possibility of science as such, is Kant's study of the connection between the assumption of a systematic nature and the requirements of inductive thought. Kant maintains that for inductive thought, and so too for science, nature must be viewed as if it were parsimonious, classifiable into genera and species and so forth. And this postulated "system of nature" is bound up with, in Kant's understanding of it, the purposiveness of nature, and thus the fact of its having been designed. However, the analysis of induction does no more than suggest the latter.

Kant now proceeds to show the necessity of teleological explanation to the biological sciences. We are presented, he writes, with a range of phenomena, inexplicable on mechanical principles alone. Phenomena of this sort, which are self-organizing, are teleological -- or rather, have to be so explained -- which is to say that they can only be seen in terms of working towards an end, their own production and reproduction. They are internally teleological (i.e. self-organizing), Kant says, and thus, unlike the famous "watch metaphor" (the watch being wound, continues to function on its own), they can dispense with the idea of a designer. Nevertheless, though the biologist can, and must, examine organized beings teleologically, but without the notion of a designer, the philosopher reflecting on the presence of organization in nature is led, inexorably, to a causality according to concepts, to design, and ultimately to a designer governing the whole. In addition to this, the presence of specific organized systems in nature forces the conclusion that nature as a whole is designed. What this means is that nature is a system of relative purposes, of things that are good for something. Now if we are to know that, say, the presence of marine animals (supplying oil to northern peoples) is not merely a useful coincidence, but rather, a purpose of nature, we would have to know the final purpose of nature, that which is not itself useful in turn. Until we know the final purpose, all seeming (relative) purposiveness remains contingent. But the final purpose, that of which it cannot be asked "What is this for?" must lie outside of nature and so it cannot be supplied by natural teleology. Briefly, then, this is the argument: we know of organized beings explainable only on the basis of teleological principles. But it is only reasonable that what is organized in its parts, is systematic in the whole as well. The organization of the whole can only be one of relative purposes, of non-teleological (not internally organized) beings which are useful for other purposive beings. If we are to be certain that they exist in order to serve others, we must also know that the existence of these others is a purpose of nature -- and this demand leads us along the chain of things useful to other things until, at last, we reach that to which all else is subordinate, and which itself is subordinate to nothing. Such an end, Kant states, must stand outside of nature. Natural teleology takes us to the boundaries of nature,

and points to what is beyond, but cannot provide us with insight into it. Equally the basis of all teleological explanation, the idea of a designer, is demanded by natural teleology which is, however, incapable of moving beyond the idea of a mere "supersensible something." These two theoretical drives indicate that what began as an inquiry into the possibility of science, now moves into the realm of moral philosophy and theology.

The moral-teleological argument begins not with the existence of natural phenomena, but with the fact of man's moral life, and the quality of freedom which renders it possible. The heart of Kant's claim here is that while the moral will cannot be determined by its end, it requires in common with all willing, an end. This end is the summum bonum, the proportional union of virtue and happiness. But since man's faculty of practical reasoning governs nothing save his own actions, i.e., it does not control nature, the second component of the highest good, happiness, which depends on the cooperation of nature, is beyond his powers. In order to make the highest good the end of man's actions and the object of his hope, some power must be found which, ordering nature so as to bring about happiness in proportion to virtue, could establish the possibility of the summum bonum. Without such a hope, moral life would become, if not impossible, then certainly more difficult, and therefore the idea of a moral designer of the world is necessary. However, the summum bonum and its corollary -- teleology -- play a two-fold role in Kant's thought. On the one side, it functions in a manner analogous to that of the categorical imperative: "act so as to make yourself worthy of the highest good." All that is needed here is that bare possibility of the summum bonum be established; that it be shown not to be impossible. But as a support for moral life, as an object of hope, more is required than the mere absence of a proof of impossibility. In both of these cases, Kant employs the concept of teleology. In the former this is done because without the proof of a Supreme Designer the highest good would indeed be impossible, while in the latter case, it is introduced to shore up hope, to transform what otherwise would remain only a wish into something that we can hope for. The teleological concept is the same in both instances, but the use to which it is put differs according to whether Kant is arguing for the minimal (in the

case of the summum bonum as an 'imperative') or the strong (hope) sense of possibility. Typically, though not invariably, the former usage simply posits the concept, then proceeds to a discussion of worthiness; the latter seeks confirmation in the design we perceive in nature.

Moral-teleology, then, fills out the concept of the supersensible basis of nature, by showing the moral character of that ground. It also points to the final end of nature -- man's freedom. And its argument is, in Kant's view, stronger than that from nature since its certainty is known a priori, whereas the teleology of nature could, given advances in science, be replaced by more sophisticated mechanical principles than we now possess. Moral and natural teleology both lead to the concept of the supersensible ground of nature: the former providing a fuller, more certain insight into it, the latter giving admirable empirical confirmation of it in its works. What the moral sort of teleology introduces is the question of hope, of a felt need to believe that the world is not random and chaotic, but that it operates with the wisdom that only a designer could impart to it. This need draws upon both sorts of teleology: upon the moral kind for a proof of the justice of the designer and upon the natural for evidence of his handiwork.

The concept of hope, with its root in teleology, extends beyond the hope for an afterlife and for a proportion between virtue and reward, discussed in the Second Critique. This 'third' sort is the hope for peace and for a law-governed society -- the subject of Kant's historical and political philosophy.

The governing theme of these writings is the Idea of a republican constitution and, with it, the establishment of a league of nations. Kant claims that this Idea is Platonic in inspiration, a "respublica noumenon" independent of any concern with the possibility of its being actualized, and serving as a guide to political behaviour. His political philosophy is primarily concerned with elaborating this notion of a republican constitution; and it is embedded in a philosophy of history which shows how the course of history tends towards the development of such a state. What I

have maintained in this thesis is that, like the concept of the summum bonum, the Idea of a republican constitution has two roles: as an analogue of the categorical imperative, it commands rulers to act as if they were presiding over a republic; as a source of hope, it demonstrates how the teleological process of history will, despite evidence to the contrary, bring about peace and political freedom. In order for the reign of peace and freedom to be the object of hope, it has to be tied to an historical teleology -- the mechanism whereby it will be brought into being. Now unlike the highest good, whose possibility depends as much on our worthiness as it does on the cooperation of nature, history makes no demands on man's morality. Nature does, indeed, so arrange things that what man produces will come of his own efforts, and hence freely, but she pushes or directs him towards her end by means of his "unsocial sociability". The history of wars, bloodshed and tyranny should not, Kant writes, be cause for pessimism; rather when viewed in the right way (as a purposive course of events), it is a source of consolation, for it shows how nature, working through man's evil character, will bring into being an end that is good -- literally, malgré les hommes. Nature can work no changes on the character of man, on this profoundly corrupt "crooked wood", but she can ensure that evil though he is, war is not his permanent lot. The limits of what a natural teleology can produce become, here, the limits of hope -- hope, that is, not for moral betterment but for what is practicable: a "nation of devils" albeit peaceful ones. And the Idea of a republican constitution, linked to the philosophy of history, is set out in such a manner that it can become the end of the historical, teleological process and, thus, become actual. Kant's concern, then, is one of actualization and not, as he had asserted, simply with the ideal "respublica noumenon". Nor is this shift from the analogue of the categorical imperative to the state to be actualized in history merely accidental: in a manner similar to that of his analysis of the summum bonum, Kant is putting philosophy into the service of consolation and the elaboration of a theodicy. His political philosophy, decisively shaped by these two concerns, is a philosophy of hope, based upon the idea of a teleological ordering of nature.

One fundamental insight runs throughout these arguments: the supposition of the systematic structure of the cosmos. This basic claim, first

put forward in an examination of the conditions of scientific activity, at the same time leads beyond the limits of nature, to the source of the systematic structure. The practical, or moral, path both "fills in" the concept of the supersensible substrate of nature and introduces teleology into a different area: the problem of hope. Philosophy is to be a source of hope, of consolation, and this, in Kant's view, is best achieved in the elaboration of a teleological view of the world. One of the ways in which philosophy can be consoling is (again starting from the premise of an ordered universe and its wise designer) by indicating that the course of history is from worse to better. The cost of this edifying tale, this speculative history, is that the claim to a Platonic approach to politics is untenable. In the last analysis, the content of the Idea must be determined by the higher priority that it be a state of affairs that we may reasonably expect, that nature can produce, and thus that we may hope for. Though there are other indications that this is, in fact, a realistic expectation, the basis of hope, here as with the summum bonum, remains the order of the cosmos, and the source of that order. This vision is, at its heart, teleological.

This thesis has, I believe, by showing the importance of teleology for Kant's system in its entirety, and for his political philosophy in particular, succeeded in achieving its two aims. That is, it has demonstrated the connection between Kant's political writings and a single, principal idea that unites the narrowly philosophical works. And, in so doing, it has also made clear that the historical and political essays, because they are informed by problems taken over from earlier works, cannot adequately be grasped without that background.

But I would also suggest that the thesis raises issues which, though beyond its scope, nevertheless are areas worthy of further exploration. One of these is the relationship between nature and freedom, a problem which can be seen throughout Kant's work. The argument in the Third Antinomy seems, at least on the surface, to reconcile nature and freedom by confirming each within its proper boundaries. This is not to say, of course, that their 'harmony' goes any deeper than the belief that on a Kantian account

of nature, freedom is at least possible. A difficulty, to name but one, which arises from this reconciliation is the theory of imputability that it yields. However, what is perhaps more interesting than this is Kant's concern to establish some relationship between nature and freedom beyond their simple compatibility: to find the common ground of both in the supersensible and thus their harmony. Surely, Kant's theory of hope is part of the 'drive' in this direction, but I do not think that it is the entire source. A second area is Kant's concept of reason, and the importance of reason in its practical employment. One part of this problem is his understanding of the nature and purpose of philosophic activity.

This thesis has hinted at the issue, inasmuch as it raised into view Kant's notion of the consoling role of philosophy. That this is one use to which he puts philosophy can be seen throughout the historical-political essays. We may have reason to suspect that Kant is placing philosophy in the service of our practical needs. This use of philosophy and, more generally, his employment of regulative ideas raises questions concerning the status of practical need as a motivating force in the elaboration of Kantian philosophy.

But for all too practical reasons of my own, these and other difficulties could not be explored here.

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