

**The Role of Literati in  
Military Action during the Ming- Qing Transition Period**

YIMIN ZHANG

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

McGill University  
Montreal, Quebec  
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of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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## **Abstract**

This dissertation explores the interaction between literati and various social forces in east China in the mid-seventeenth century by focusing on their military performance. Based on a wide range of sources, the study focuses on about twenty literati, most of whom have never been previously researched from a military history perspective. It examines the diversity and complexity of Chinese literati as they pursued power over and within local society, paying special attention to the interrelation between them (literati and society). It argues that Chinese literati in this time period had much less aptitude in changing China than has been previously thought. Both individual and group case studies show that they mainly focused on the realization of an ideal goal, but were unwilling or ill-equipped to adapt themselves to changing conditions as well as environments. This study also indicates that the local military forces as well as ordinary peasants generally played a more crucial role than the literati; the latter's superior position could only be realized in times of peace. That civil and military officials affected each other in fact is an expression of a larger relationship between the central government and its own military forces or with certain local forces. Finally, this study concludes that Chinese literati as a whole had no idea how to integrate and lead the other social forces to reach an ideal goal in that specific time period.



## Résumé

Cette dissertation étudie les interactions entre les lettrés et les différentes forces sociales présentes dans l'est de la Chine au milieu du dix-septième siècle, en se concentrant sur leur activité militaire. Basée sur un large éventail de sources primaire, l'étude se concentre sur une vingtaine de lettrés dont la plupart n'ont jamais été étudiés auparavant. La thèse étudie particulièrement la relation que les lettrés entretenaient avec la société dans leur recherche de pouvoir et de contrôle sur la société locale. Elle soutient que les lettrés chinois avaient beaucoup moins d'aptitudes à influencer le destin de la Chine que ce qui a cru auparavant. Les études de cas, individuelles et collectives, démontrent que dans leur recherche d'un objectif idéal, ils étaient mal-préparés ou n'avaient pas la volonté de s'adapter à des conditions et à un environnement changeants. À travers une comparaison entre différentes régions, cette étude démontre aussi que les forces militaires locales et les paysans ordinaires jouaient un rôle plus crucial et important que les lettrés, l'influence des paysans n'étant ressentie que durant les périodes de paix. L'influence mutuelle des *Wen* (civils) et des *Wu* (militaires) est l'expression d'une corrélation plus large entre le gouvernement central et sa propre force militaire ou certaines forces locales. Finalement, les lettrés chinois en tant que groupe n'avaient aucune idée de la façon d'intégrer et de diriger les autres forces sociales pour atteindre un but idéal.

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## Chinese Weights and Measures

### Itinerary Measures

1 <i>li</i>	1821.15 feet	0.555 kilometers
1 <i>chi</i>	14.1 inches	35.814 centimeters

### Area

1 <i>mu</i>	0.16 acres	0.064 hectares
1 <i>qing</i>	16.16 acres	6.539 hectares

### Weight

1 <i>liang</i> (tael)	1.327 ounces	37.62 grams
1 <i>jin</i> (catty)	1.33 pounds	603.277 grams
1 <i>dan</i> (picul)	133.33 pounds	60.477 kilograms
1 <i>shi</i> (stone)	160 pounds	72.574 kilograms

### Volume

1 <i>sheng</i>	1.87 pints	1.031 liters
1 <i>dou</i>	2.34 gallons	10.31 liters

## Abbreviations for primary sources and gazetteers

- GGZBCK *Gugong zhenben congkan* 故宮珍本叢刊. Gugong bowuyuan 故宮博物院 ed. Haikou: Hainan 海南, 2001.
- GGZBCK (A) - *Anhui fuzhouxian zhi* 安徽府州縣誌 8 vols.
- GGZBCK (J) - *Jiangsu fuzhouxian zhi* 江蘇府州縣誌 5 vols.
- GGZBCK (S) - *Shandong fuzhouxian zhi* 山東府州縣誌 2 vols.
- GGZBCK (Z) - *Zhejiang fuzhouxian zhi* 浙江府州縣誌 9 vols.
- MDGBFZX *Ming dai guben fangzhi xuan*. 明代孤本方志選 12 vols. Guojia tushuguan difangzhi he jiapu wenxian zhongxin ed. 國家圖書館地方誌和家譜文獻中心. Beijing: Zhonghua quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin 中華全國圖書館文獻縮微複制中心, 2000.
- MMNMQYSL *Ming mo nongmin qiyi shiliao* 明末農民起義史料. Zheng Tianting 鄭天挺 ed. Beijing: Zhonghua 中華, 1957.
- MMQCSLXK *Ming mo Qing chu shiliao xuankan* 明末清初史料選刊. Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji 浙江古籍, reprinted, 1987.
- MQDA *Ming Qing dang'an* 明清檔案. 66 vols. Zhang Weiren 張偉仁 et al. ed. Taipei: Lianjing 聯經, 1986-1987.
- MQSL *Ming Qing shiliao* 明清史料. 100 vols. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo 中央研究院歷史語言研究所 ed., 1930- 1975.
- MSLLZ *Ming shilu leizuan* 明實錄類纂. Li Guoxiang 李國詳 et al. ed. Wuhan: Wuhan 武漢, 1993-1995.
- MSLLZ- JSSLJ *Ming shilu leizuan-junshi shiliao juan* 明實錄類纂- 軍事史料卷.
- MSLLZ- SDSLJ *Ming shilu leizuan -Shandong shiliao juan* 明實錄類纂-山東史料卷
- MSLLZ- AHSLJ *Ming shilu leizuan Anhui shiliao juan* 明實錄類纂-安徽史料卷.
- MSLLZ- ZJSHJ *Ming shilu leizuan- Zhejiang Shanghai juan* 明實錄類纂 -浙江上海卷.
- MWH *Ming wenhai* 明文海. Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 ed. Beijing: Zhonghua 中華. Reprinted, 1987.

- NMSL BZ *Nan Ming shiliao (bazhong)* 南明史料 (八種). Nanjing: Jiangsu guji 江蘇古籍. Reprinted, 1985.
- QDGBFZX *Qing dai guben fangzhi xuan* 清代孤本方志選. 60 vols. Guojia tushuguan fenguan 國家圖書館分館 ed. Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju 線裝書局, 2001.
- QDSLBJCK. *Qingdai shiliao biji congan* 清代史料筆記叢刊. Beijing: Zhonghua 中華, 1985-1989.
- QSL *Qing shilu* 清實錄. Zhonghua 中華. Reprinted, 1985.
- RBCZGHJDSZCK- *Riben cang Zhongguo hanjian difangzhi congan* 日本藏中國罕見地方誌叢刊, 5 vols. Shumu wenxian 書目文獻出版社 ed. Beijing: Shumu wenxian 書目文獻, 1990.
- SKJHSCK *Siku jinhuishu congan* 四庫禁毀書叢刊. Siku jinhuishu congan bianzuan weiyuanhui 四庫禁毀書叢刊編纂委員會, ed. 311 vols. Beijing: Beijing, 1997-2000.
- SKWSSJK *Siku weishoushu jikan* 四庫未收書輯刊. *Siku weishoushu jikan bianzuan weiyuanhui* 四庫未收書輯刊編纂委員會, ed. 300 vols. Beijing: Beijing 北京, 2000.
- TYGCMDFZXK *Tianyige cang Ming dai fangzhi xuankan* 天一閣藏明代方志選刊. Fan Shen 樊深 et al, ed. 20 vols. Taibei: Xinwenfeng 新文豐, 1985.
- TYGCMDFZXK XB *Tianyige cang Ming dai fangzhi xuankan xubian* 天一閣藏明代方志選刊續編. 70 vols. Shanghai shudian 上海書店 ed. Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1990.
- XXSKQS *Xuxiu siku quanshu* 續修四庫全書. Xuxiu siku quanshu bianji weiyuanhui 續修四庫全書編輯委員會 ed. 1800 vols. Shanghai: Shanghai guji 上海古籍, 1994-2002.
- YMSLBJCK *Yuan Ming shiliao biji congan* 元明史料筆記叢刊. Zhonghua shuju 中華書局 ed. Beijing: Zhonghua 中華, 1981-1985.
- ZGDFZJC *Zhongguo difangzhi jicheng* 中國地方誌集成. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe 江蘇古籍出版社 et.al, Jiangsu guji 江蘇古籍, 1991-2004.



- ZGDFZJC (A) *Anhui fuxian zhiji* 安徽府縣誌輯, 63 vols. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji, 1991-2004.
- ZGDFZJC (J) *Jiangsu fuxian zhiji* 江蘇府縣誌輯, 68 vols. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji, 1991-2004.
- ZGDFZJC (S) *Shandong fuxian zhiji* 山東府縣誌輯, 95 vols. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji, 1991-2004.
- ZGDFZJC (Z) *Zhejiang fuxian zhiji* 浙江府縣誌輯, 68 vols. Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 上海書店, 1993.
- ZGMCDAZH *Zhongguo Ming chao dang'an zonghui* 中國明朝檔案總匯. *Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan, Liaoningsheng dang'an guan* 中國第一歷史檔案館, 遼寧省檔案館 ed. 101 vols. Nanning: Guangxi shifan daxue 廣西師範大學, 2001.
- ZGYSJC *Zhongguo yeshi jicheng* 中國野史集成, 50 vols. *Zhongguo yeshi jicheng bianzuan weiyuanhui* 中國野史集成編纂委員會 ed. Chengdu: Bashu 巴蜀, 1993.
- ZGYSJC XB *Zhongguo yeshi jicheng xubian* 中國野史集成續編. 30 vols. *Zhongguo yeshi jicheng bianji weiyuanhui* 中國野史集成編纂委員會 ed. Chengdu: Bashu 巴蜀. 1993.
- ZGFZCS -HBDF (Shandong) *Zhongguo fangzhi congshu -Huabei difang* 中國方志叢書-華北地方, 70 vols. Taipei: Chengwen 成文. Reprinted, 1968.
- ZGBSJC *Zhongguo bingshu jicheng* 中國兵書集成, *Zhongguo bingshu jicheng bianzuan weiyuanhui* 中國兵書集成編纂委員會 ed, 50 vols. Beijing and Shenyang: Liaoshen 遼沈 and Jiefangjun 解放軍, 1987-95.

## Introduction

### I: 1. Why Literati?

#### — A Sociohistorical Perspective on the Study of Military History in Late Imperial China

The survival and continuity of Chinese civilization were dependent on many factors including military institutions and practices.<sup>1</sup> However, in practice, Confucian-Mencian thought has usually been deemed as representative of traditional Chinese culture while Sunzi 孫子 has been ignored. This tendency is so prevalent that most people are unable to distinguish Mencius from Confucius in terms of their military thought: Confucius pays some attention to military affairs while Mencius does not.<sup>2</sup> When scholars have engaged in political, economic, social, or cultural historical studies of certain periods, they have naturally tended to limit their attention to their own areas of research and expertise. For instance, R. Bin Wong emphasizes the distinctively broad moral and educational ambitions of the Chinese imperial state. He argues that the late imperial Chinese state placed greatest importance on efforts to maintain control through extensive commitments to education, morality, and material well-being.<sup>3</sup> However, it is essential that we remember that it was only through war, and especially through decisive military campaigns, that various social strata could play a role in

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<sup>1</sup> For instance, military factors were deemed as China's contributions to today's world by John K. Fairbank. See John K. Fairbank, "Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience", in *Chinese Ways in Warfare*, ed. Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Needham and Robin D.S. Yates, "Military Technology", in *Science and Civilisation in China*, volume 5, part VI, 30. Chinese version, 中國科學技術史 (Beijing: Kexue and Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2002), 72. Also see, Han Yude 韓玉德, "Kongzi yu junlü zhishi" 孔子與軍旅之事, *Wen shi zhe* 2 (1986), 73. The latest study shows that Kongzi was not only proud of his physical prowess, but also his military strategies. See Gao Peihua 高培華, "Lun Kongzi de junshi caineng" 論孔子的軍事才能, *Guangming ribao*, March 2, 2006.

<sup>3</sup> R. Bin Wong, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 92-99.

deciding their fate. Thus, it is not surprising that the new emperors and their closest colleagues always began as military leaders.

According to Joanna Waley-Cohen, the neglect of Chinese military history is due partly to the relative unpopularity of military history in the Western academy today and partly to the relative lack of prestige that scholars have accorded military affairs in China, both in relation to civil affairs and in comparison with the military histories of Europe and the United States.<sup>4</sup> However, over the last two decades this condition has seen gradual improvement. Both historians in China and Sinologists in the West have begun to shed light on the various fields of Chinese military history. Numerous primary and secondary materials have been published in Chinese. While research remains weak in many areas, historians from both the Mainland and Taiwan have published many books and articles, focusing on general military history as well as some specialized topics such as the detailed aspects of a single campaign, the biographies of historical figures, military science and technology, classical military theory, logistics, institutional development and evolution, as well as, more recently, so-called “strategic culture” (*zhanlue wenhua* 戰略文化).<sup>5</sup>

In the Western world, several leading historians have begun to examine this field. Among these, special attention should be paid to Kuhn’s milestone book.<sup>6</sup> The description and analysis that he provides is truly momentous for focusing not only on military factors, but also shedding light on aspects of social history, such as local organizations and local relations with state power. He identifies the control of local

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<sup>4</sup> Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Civil –Military Relations in Imperial China: Introduction,” *War and Society* 18.2 (2000), 1-7.

<sup>5</sup> For example, Gong Yuzhen 宮玉陣, *Zhongguo zhanlue wenhua jixi* 中國戰略文化解析 (Beijing: Junshi kexue, 2002); Jin Yuguo 金玉國, *Zhongguo zhanshu shi* 中國戰術史 (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 2003). It is impossible to list all the data here because there are at least several hundred papers and several dozen books published in Chinese every year. Only the related materials will be cited in this dissertation.

<sup>6</sup> Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China – Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

military forces as a key component of local-elite power in late imperial China. Unfortunately, the book's significance is weakened by its narrow temporal focus (1796-1864) and limited regional coverage, an emphasis on Central and South China. Due to these limitations, there is no information on whether or how the gentry faced military challenges arising from ethnic conflict, both from the so-called "barbarians" of the frontiers and the Westerners from overseas. Furthermore, we are not told how militia leadership functioned within a specific local force— how, for example, this leadership was related to the establishment, maintenance, or expansion of local power. Most importantly, we only are informed about the military behaviour of the local gentry while there is little information on the attitudes and actions of the ordinary people toward this kind of militarization.

Despite these limitations, Kuhn's path-breaking study of militarization served as a foundation upon which other scholars have continued to build. In 2000, Hans Van de Ven listed more than ten publications as examples.<sup>7</sup> Lately, this list has grown even longer, and there has been an increase in the breadth of fields being explored. For instance, Xue Yu's dissertation has even explored the role of Chinese monks in the struggle against Japan.<sup>8</sup>

Basically, these works share similar tendencies with the Chinese publications mentioned above: they concentrate on a single campaign, military activities of some historical figures, or the logistics service. However, one aspect that needs to be emphasized here is that, from a geographic perspective, the Western studies have focused mainly on peripheral areas such as the southwestern and northwestern frontier areas.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Hans Van de Ven, ed. *Warfare in Chinese History*, "Introduction," (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2000), 1. Colin Robert Green's dissertation entitled *The Spirit of the Military (Junren Hun): The Tradition and its Revival in the Republican Period* (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia, 2003) also mentions some developments in relevant research.

<sup>8</sup> Yu Xue, *Buddhism, War, and Nationalism: Chinese Monks in the Struggle against Japan, 1931-1945*. Ph. D. diss., The University of Iowa, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> At least more than three dozen books and articles were published since the 1980s concerning these aspects. The latest one is Peter G. Perdue's *China Marches West: the Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). For southwestern area, the typical

Most recently, David Robinson<sup>10</sup> and Roger V. Des Forges<sup>11</sup> have been successful in shifting our attention to inland China. Des Forges provides a general survey of Henanese history in the Late Ming while Robinson's study examines the role of illicit armed violence in the social order of the late Ming in North China, around Beijing, and explores how the central government sought to regulate violence. His study reminds us that "specific patterns of violence must be sought in the particulars of local society".<sup>12</sup>

This dissertation belongs to the field of military history, but is not absolutely limited to this scope. Because studies of varied fields related to political, economic, social, and cultural history have been pursued in great depth over the last several decades, my first concern is to combine some of the achievements from these fields with current research developments in military history. My intention is to contribute not only to military history studies but also social-economic history more broadly. To reach this high standard, the most important prerequisite is how to set the research objective as well as its background and environment of time and region.

I have chosen to focus on the Ming-Qing transition period.<sup>13</sup> More precisely, the period covered in my dissertation is from the Chongzhen reign 崇禎 (1628-1644) of

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book is Robert D Jenks's *Insurgency and Social Disorder in Guizhou: the "Miao" Rebellion, 1854-1873* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994).

<sup>10</sup> David Robinson, *Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven: Rebellion and the Economy of Violence in Mid-Ming China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001).

<sup>11</sup> Roger V. Des Forges, *Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History: Northeast Henan in the Fall of the Ming* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), xvi-xvii (Preface).

<sup>12</sup> Robinson, 166-67.

<sup>13</sup> Academics in both China and abroad have ascribed different meanings and time criteria to the term "Ming-Qing transition," see He Guanbiao's 何冠彪 conclusive introduction about this study and the concept of so-called "shi dafu 士大夫" in the first chapter of his book entitled *Sheng yu si: Mingji shidafu de jueze 生與死, 明際士大夫的抉擇* (Taipei: Lianjing, 1997). Also see Lynn Struve, *The Southern Ming, 1644-1662* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) "Preface". And also see Chen-main Wang's book entitled *The Life and Career of Hung Ch'eng-Ch'ou (1593-1665)* (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 1999), "Introduction" and the reference cited therein.

the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) to the Shunzhi reign 順治 (1644-1661) of the Qing dynasty (1636-1911). These several decades witnessed political upheaval, continuous internal and external military activity, peasant rebellion, economic collapse, and cultural crisis. In the end, the Qing established itself as the most successful of the conquest dynasties of non-Chinese origin. Although “the scattered, fragmentary, and otherwise highly problematical condition of the all-too-voluminous source materials”<sup>14</sup> have brought many difficulties, studies of various aspects of this period have increased in number and quality in China and abroad over the past decades. During this period of extreme disorder, different regimes and their armies, and varied social forces and strata engaged with each other and negotiated their relationships. Therefore, it provides an excellent opportunity to undertake a military historical analysis of various events and historical figures. Many kinds of military conflict took place— both ethnic conflicts and various military actions among the Chinese themselves, such as the wars between the Southern Ming government and rebelling peasants (and, of course, the conflicts between internal factions of both groups); the conflicts between local gentry and the Ming or the southern Ming as well as the Qing governments; and the actions of warlords, local military forces, and ordinary people. All of these enable us to undertake a broad analysis of the characteristics of different social forces in times of rapid historical change.

Thus, this analysis of the Ming- Qing transition raises important questions about larger historical issues concerning the nature of late imperial Chinese society and China’s transition to a modern society. During the preparation of this dissertation, several important issues have come to my attention:

1. As early as the mid 1980s, Joseph P. McDermott keenly realized that “future studies of local society in late imperial China should question the assumption of past treatments of the gentry as a single class maintaining internal harmony in its concerted

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<sup>14</sup> Struve (1984), xiii (preface).

control of the countryside.”<sup>15</sup> Thirty years later, scholars still have not taken up this challenge. Since most scholars mainly focus on social, cultural as well as economic history studies,<sup>16</sup> their publications go even further in the opposite direction. For instance, Timothy Brook’s admirable research suggests that the state-society relationship in late imperial China was undergoing a significant shift, and he emphasizes a separation of state and society.<sup>17</sup>

Shifting attention to military history enables me to draw a completely different conclusion.

This dissertation will argue that a “public sphere” or “civil society” cannot be proven to exist in the most important region of China, and that it is impossible to separate society from state during wartime. The local elite had to choose between compromise and resistance. Their survival often depended on their choice, not their own capacities and forces. No member of the local elite could cope adequately with the crises caused by government (including both Qing and Ming or the Southern Ming) and rebellious peasants or tenants simultaneously. Through the examination and comparison of a large number of case studies in Shandong (see Chapter 1), Huaibei (see Chapter 2), Jiangnan (see Chapter 3) and Zhejiang (see Chapter 4), I argue that, by themselves, the local gentry were not able to play a crucial role in military affairs in many of these areas. In contrast, it was the other local military units, mainly composed of the lowest social strata, who controlled or decided the destiny of local society. Whether or how to integrate these local forces thus became the essential problem for those aiming to gain political control.

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<sup>15</sup> Joseph P. McDermott, “Bondservants in the Taihu Basin during the Late Ming: A Case of Mistaken Identities,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 40.4 (1981), 692-93.

<sup>16</sup> The relevant studies since the 1990s, in fact, have not yet touched important information related to the real relationship between the central government and local society, and the various social forces in late imperial China. See Frederic Wakeman, “The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture,” *Modern China* 19.2 (1993), 108-38. Comparatively, modern Chinese military history has achieved certain developments in this aspect, such as Diana Lary’s study about the soldiers and warlords. See Diana Lary, *Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 1911-1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

<sup>17</sup> Timothy Brook, *Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late- Ming China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 311-30.

2. From a political perspective, Confucian legitimacy and the so-called *hua yi zhi bian* 華夷之辨 (distinction between Chinese and barbarian) may have been the two most important concepts for Chinese literati. But, when they had to choose between these two concepts, which one was the primary concern? Their military behaviour will show that the literati who had become officials preferred the former, while the “non-official literati” often preferred the latter. From the northern plain area to the east coast region, from the mountainous border to the riverine communities, the varying cases studies will show that many literati shifted their most important identities according to the changing state of affairs. Apart from the above difference, these two sorts of literati also share the same tendency. Yet, for those official literati who felt the heavy burdens of social and political obligation and joined in resistance movements, their decision to value personal integrity or political expediency also meant a choice between death or survival. Most of them naturally tended to choose the latter (survival). For concrete reasons of some high ranking Chinese scholar-officials who changed their political allegiance, usually they tended to find a way to get rid of the shame of being a traitor. In this case, they naturally attributed their surrender to present the best chance of serving China and its people in a time of national crisis; their hope was to let the others believe that they were motivated “by an overriding concern for the welfare of China and its people.” Obviously, the other motives such as the desire to survive were covered up under these explanations and emphasis.<sup>18</sup>

3. Civil affairs (*Wenshi* 文事) and military affairs (*Wushi* 武事) theoretically played an equal role in the imperial central government, but what was the real relationship between *Wen* and *Wu*? Vivid descriptions from primary data remind us that in order to examine this relationship we must distinguish between times of peace and times of war rather than applying an abstract concept of the relationship between

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<sup>18</sup> Wang’s relevant study only emphasized this aspect while it ignored the latter. See Wang Chen-main, 244-52.



them. Lynn A. Struve has claimed that role changes between Ming scholar-officials and military commanders “were unthinkable.”<sup>19</sup> In fact, this phenomenon did exist. I shall argue that, in practice, *Wen* and *Wu* were the means by which the central government, local authorities and private military forces negotiated their relationship, and, it was military commanders, not civil officials, who played the crucial role in deciding the destiny of local societies. Although it is not often very clear to us today, it would appear that warlordism was a frequent phenomenon.

4. Without paying equal attention to both foreign invasion and internal rebellions, as we mentioned above, the previous local history studies have usually focused on the triangular power relationship involving the government, the local elite, and dispersed communities of commoners. From the the local elite’s perspective, this kind of research has meant that it is unclear how they handled the simultaneous pressure of both the government from the top and the people from the bottom, and, from foreigners. Kuhn’s book focuses on peasant rebellion and Wakeman’s first book looks primarily at the foreigner invasion,<sup>20</sup> but neither deals adequately with the question of how local elites responded to these challenges. This study will show that most literati and local elite as well as ordinary people always kept as their primary concern their survival during the crisis. Whether or not the resistance movement would occur and its scale if it did were entirely dependent on the management and control of the various levels of government, as well as the attitude and actions of the common people.

Each of these four issues will be developed more fully over the course of my dissertation.

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<sup>19</sup> Lynn A. Struve, *The Southern Ming 1644-1662* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), 6.

<sup>20</sup> Frederic Jr. Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

The broad scope of this study of the Ming-Qing transition means that a reliance on previous research has been essential.<sup>21</sup> In addition to the abundance of data in Chinese (see below), Wakeman's two volumes not only vividly recapture the sweep of this period but also offer a penetrating analysis.<sup>22</sup> Struve's book focuses on native Chinese resistance to the Manchu invasion and helps us to understand why and how the resistance failed as a whole.<sup>23</sup>

To engage in this sort of broad exploration, it is important to find a way that will bring together the various factors that were involved in military and social history, as well as some knowledge of political history concerning this complicated period. In this dissertation, the literati, and specifically their military actions and role in the process of war, will be the primary concern. There is no need to reiterate the importance of literati (*wenren* 文人)<sup>24</sup> in pre-modern Chinese society. The official examination system provides a clear criterion to define the concept of literati—they were the holders of official degrees conferred by the imperial government, ideally by virtue of their having passed examinations in the Confucian classics. The sale of examination degrees did not

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<sup>21</sup> Neither the Ming nor Qing should be treated as a whole in terms of military history. During the entire Ming dynasty, there were a total of 579 different wars. In addition to the threats from the northern border, there was the plundering of and conflicts with Japanese pirates, and peasant rebellions. In addition to the traditional "cold weapons," modern European firearms such as cannons also began to demonstrate their decisive power on the battlefield. Both attack and defence technology reached a high level of accomplishment. Furthermore, as mentioned below, many relevant military research papers and books have been published, especially on late Ming times. See Fan Zhongyi 範中義, "Ming dai junshi sixiang jianlun" 明代軍事思想簡論, *Lishi yanjiu* 5 (1996), 91-104.

<sup>22</sup> Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).

<sup>23</sup> For example, she keenly indicates that "in the Southern Ming effective statesmanship and generalship seldom appeared in the same men, and statesmen and generals seldom were in accord." See Struve (1984), 194.

<sup>24</sup> I am in basic agreement with Benjamin A. Elman's concept of the literati, i.e., those members of the Chinese gentry who, through a demonstration of their literary qualifications in the civil service examinations, maintained their status as Confucians (*ru* 儒) in the elite class of imperial China. See "Explanatory Notes" in his book entitled *Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: the Changzhou School of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). In this dissertation, "literati" refers to Han Chinese who received the higher degrees (*juren* 舉人 and *jinshi* 進士) on the civil service examinations. In Chinese these are referred to as *wen ren* 文人, and must be distinguished from the so-called *shiren* 士人 which refers to all degree holders. In Qing times, the latter term most often referred to the *shengyuan* 生員 degree holder. Also see Chen Baoliang 陳寶良, "Ming dai shengyuan xinlun" 明代生員新論, *Shixue jikan* 3 (2001), 38-43.

become common until the end of Qing. On the basis of their degrees they were given the power to become high level officials managing and controlling all of imperial China. Literati should not be confused with the “gentry” and “elite.” However, we should keep in mind that the non-official literati usually belonged within the scope of the gentry (*shenshi* 紳士).<sup>25</sup>

Unlike their English counterparts, the Chinese gentry had no military power; they also had no direct control over the peasants. This status has been described as “having empty fists” (赤手空拳). Naturally, academics over the past decades have focused on their cultural, ideological, political, or even economic and daily lives.<sup>26</sup> Facing the limitations in the field of military and political affairs, as mentioned above, in times of extreme turmoil the gentry were forced to find their own ways to engage in defense actions, if they did not want to be turncoats or remain silent, and if they wanted to stay alive. At the same time, because of the degrees they held and their connections with the various levels of authority as well as with the common people, whatever they did, their behavior was undoubtedly related in complex ways to social structure, military personnel such as military officials and soldiers, and to the ongoing processes of the

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<sup>25</sup> In the past decades, studies of “gentry” and “local elite” have comprised one of the greatest developments in the research of Chinese social history. Early work on their definition was done by Ho Ping-ti in his book entitled *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). For the entire process of research, see Timothy Brook, “The Historiography of Gentry Studies” in *Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late-Ming China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 5-15. Also see Joseph W. Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin, eds., *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), “Introduction” and “Concluding Remarks”. And, Ch’u Tungtsu’s 瞿同祖 book entitled *Local Government in China under the Qing* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 169-72. His book not only provides the definition of gentry, but also argues that a distinction existed between gentry and literati.

Japanese scholars have also made a great contribution to this field. See Linda Grove and Christian Daniels, eds. *State and Society in China: Japanese Perspectives on Ming-Qing Social and Economic History* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984). See also Liu Junwen 劉俊文 ed., *Riben xuezhe yanjiu Zhongguoshi lunzhu xuanyi* 日本學者研究中國史論著選譯 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1993), vol.2. Especially, Shigeta Atsushi’s 重田徳 paper entitled “Zhongguo shehui gouzao de tezhi yu shidafu wenti” 中國社會構造的特質與士大夫的問題 and “Xiangshen zhipei de chengli yu jiegou” 鄉紳支配的成立與結構, 199-247, as well as Danjo Hiroshi 檀上 寛, “Ming Qing xiangshen lun” 明清鄉紳論, 453-83.

<sup>26</sup> On this aspect, see Timothy Brook, *The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

war. Therefore, an examination of their military actions can serve as a shortcut to an exploration of how the various military forces and society affected each other. It is for these reasons that I consider why and how the literati organized and joined military action in the Ming-Qing transition period in this dissertation.

## I: 2. The Nature of the Literati during the Ming-Qing Transition Period

While theoretically open to all, the civil service competition in fact excluded most of the population. Based on Elman, during the last empire only 1.6 to 1.9 percent of the total population achieved literati status by obtaining examination degrees.<sup>27</sup> The *shengyuan* 生員 degree was roughly proportional to the population of each county. Those who received this degree were technically only “government students,” and therefore not qualified for official appointment. It was the provincial *juren* 舉人 degree which qualified one for official position. The quotas for this degree were province-wide, but certainly not evenly distributed across the province. There was a wide gulf between the *juren/jinshi* degrees and the *shengyuan*, both in terms of access to office and in prestige. This is why Ho Ping-ti eliminated holders of the *shengyuan* degree from the ranks of the elite.<sup>28</sup> For the same reason, this dissertation does not cover the *shengyuan* holders.

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<sup>27</sup> Benjamin A. Elman, “The Social Roles of Literati in Early to Mid-Ch’ing”, in The Ch’ing Empire to 1800, part one. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, eds., *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), vol. 9, 362.

Military examinations (*wuju* 武舉) need to be mentioned here. Elman’s book touches briefly on the subject, but only in relation to the Qing. “At various times, military examinations were offered on the analogy of the civil ones, the subjects of which were the military classics combined with tests of strength, horsemanship, archery, and so on.” See Benjamin A. Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China* (University of California Press, 2000), 222. According to Xu Yougen 許友根, over the course of the Ming dynasty, there were several thousand military *jinshi* and *juren*. Most of these could only fill lower military positions. The Chongzhen Emperor once personally appointed a military *zhuangyuan* 狀元, but only nominated him as vice-regional commander 副總兵. From about 1640 to the end of the Ming dynasty, almost nobody registered for this examination. See Xu Yougen, *Wuju zhidu shilue* 武舉制度史略 (Suzhou: Shuzhou daxue, 1997), 60.

<sup>28</sup> Ho, chapter 1.

According to Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613-1682), in late Ming times the total number of *shengyuan* had reached 500,000<sup>29</sup>, about a 17-fold increase over the early Ming. Only about 3.3% of the *shengyuan* moved on to obtain a *juren* degree.<sup>30</sup> The term *juren* means an “established man” or “elevated man.” It indicates that its recipient was established both academically and officially; whether or not he was rewarded with an immediate office is immaterial.

The following data provide a picture of the condition of *juren* in Shandong province entering the seventeenth century:<sup>31</sup>

Year	No. of <i>juren</i>	Becoming officials		Becoming <i>jinshi</i>	
		No.	%	No.	%
1600	76	25	33	33	43
1624	87	15	17	33	38
1642	90	17	19	41	46

(Figure 1)

Since the bureaucracy was, in fact, quite small in size in relation to the overall population as well as all those literati, there were fewer posts available than there were degree-holders qualified to fill them. Those who could not get the chance or did not want to become officials could live as local gentry. During the mid-Ming, a powerful movement for intellectual emancipation was inaugurated by the statesman and general Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529). Wang’s emphasis on intuitive knowledge and the unity of knowledge and conduct encouraged people to engage in whatever they

<sup>29</sup> Gu Yanwu, *Tinglin wenji* 亭林文集, juan 1, in XXSKQS 1402, 77.

<sup>30</sup> Liu Xiaodong 劉曉東, “Keju weiji yu wan Ming shiren de fenhua” 科舉危機與晚明士人社會的分化, *Shandong daxue xuebao* 2 (2002), 103-08.

<sup>31</sup> From Elman (2000), 666.

liked, instead of single-mindedly pursuing an official position. Because the core of his philosophy was the belief that intuitive knowledge was latent in every man, the implication was that everybody had the potential to achieve enlightenment and reach sagehood. With this kind of knowledge, this theory attracted many literati from the early period of the sixteenth century. With the addition of opportunities brought by economic and commercial development, the literati gradually enhanced their capacities for pursuing various activities other than focusing on the civil examinations. This shift enabled many literati to play an increasingly active role in local society, undertaking duties related to charity, road and bridge building, etc. However, some also played a negative role through their interference in local affairs, or illegal activities. In the early period of the Wanli 萬曆 reign (1573-1619), the emperor criticized the behavior of these corrupt literati (士) and ordered that they be punished harshly for their frequent breaking of the law.<sup>32</sup>

Despite these exceptions, the primary concern for most degree holders was attaining an official position. Due to the limited number of positions available, many were forced to find other ways to fulfill their dreams. When Li Zicheng's 李自成 (1606-1645) peasant armies entered Shandong Province, at least twelve *jinshi* and *juren*, mostly from Shanxi 山西, joined and helped these troops establish their own local governments.<sup>33</sup> Importantly, those who had already become officials found that realizing their own ideals or following Wang Yangming's theories was far from simple: since the economic and political resources derived from the authority of the Ming dynasty, and ultimately the emperor, they had no choice but to offer their obedience.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Li Guoxiang 李國祥 ed., *Ming shilu leizuan* 明實錄類纂 - *Anhui shiliao juan* 安徽史料卷 (Wuhan: Wuhan, 1994), 1062.

<sup>33</sup> See Li Jixian 李濟賢, "Li Zicheng qiyijun zai Shandong" 李自成起義軍在山東, in *Zhongguo nongmin zhanzhengshi luncong bianji weiyuanhui* ed. *Zhongguo nongmin zhanzhengshi luncong* 中國農民戰爭史論叢 (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin, 1982), 4: 514-19.

<sup>34</sup> A vivid and complete description of the behavior of officials can be found in R. Huang's book. See Ray Huang, *1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), especially chapter four, "A World without Zhang Juzheng," 75-103. Although

Wu Han 吳晗 (1919-1969) used four characters to summarize the lives of many officials: *jiao* 驕, *she* 奢, *yin* 淫, and *yi* 逸 (lordly, luxury-loving, loose-living, and idle).<sup>35</sup> The most famous political phenomenon in the late Ming period was the development of and conflicts caused by cliques among officials. For instance, the friction between the Donglin 東林 and Zhedang 浙黨 factions was one of the major causes of the loss of the Sarhu 薩爾滸 campaign (in April 1619). This decisive battle with the Manchus was lost largely because the Zhedang faction controlled the court, and, they did not pay enough attention to the powerful Manchu military machine.<sup>36</sup> We will see this kind of political struggle sometimes directly cause the failure of anti-Qing resistance movement.

Establishing the legitimacy of government, in effect, the government that would ensure the maintenance of their status, was always a primary concern. For example,

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his study concentrates on the highest officials of the empire, the middle and lower level officials basically followed the same model.

<sup>35</sup> Wu Han 吳晗, "Wan Ming shihuan jieji de shenghuo" 晚明仕宦階級的生活, in Li Hua 李華 and Su Shuangbi 蘇雙碧 ed., *Wu Han shilunji* 吳晗史論集 (Beijing: Guanming ribaoshe, 1987), 214-22. John Thomas Meskill also provides some detailed sources concerning of Jiangnan gentry's daily lives. See Meskill, *Gentlemanly Interests and Wealth - in the Yangzi Delta* (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 1994), 175-78. Also see Timothy Brook, 1998.

Accompanying the emergence and expansion of wealthy classes, there was a stratification of the gentry in late Ming times. It was no longer accurate to imagine a unified gentry with hegemony over a locale's affairs. The Confucian order of gentry, peasants, artisans, and merchants was divorced from social reality. In order to improve or maintain their local position, the gentry had to rely on land acquisition, marriage, commerce, and other strategies. Relevant studies are too numerous to list here, but for a concise description and analysis, see Yu Yingshi 余英時, "Ming Qing zhuanbian shiqi shehui yu wenhua de zhuanbian" 明清變遷時期社會與文化的轉變, in *Zhongguo lishi zhuanxing shiqi de zhishi fenzi* 中國歷史轉型時期的知識份子 (Taiwan: Lianjing, 1992), 35-42.

<sup>36</sup> Ma Chujian 馬楚堅, *Ming Qing bianzheng yu zhiluan* 明清邊政與治亂 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 1994), 167. Also also Ray Huang, "The Liao -tung Campaign of 1619," *Oriens Extremus* 28 (1981): 30-54. For studies of the Donglin clique, see Charles O. Hucker, "The Tung-lin Movement of the Late Ming Period," in J.K. Fairbank, ed., *Chinese Thought and Institutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 132-62. See also Wang Tianyu 王天有, *Wan Ming Donglin dang yi* 晚明東林黨議 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1991).

Among these studies, Hucker's study provides interesting data about military officials who became engaged in the Donglin's political struggle: among 32 military officials, only one identified and belonged to Donglin, the other 31 belonged to the opposite side. We will discuss this phenomenon in Chapter Four.

The most recent western study of the Donglin party is John Dardess, *Blood and History in China: The Donglin Faction and its Repression, 1620-1627* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).

Ray Huang indicated that those silk-robed officials in the capital only cared about the matter of succession in comparison with crises at the frontiers as well as peasant rebellions.<sup>37</sup>

The common gentry discussed above, as well as the ordinary people, were accustomed to their peaceful daily lives in the late Ming. In the Jiangnan area, neither peasant rebellions nor the Manchu invasion could disturb the carnival atmosphere. According to one description, literati and other local elite, as well as the ordinary people in Fengqiao 楓橋, Suzhou 蘇州 looked “crazy.” In Wujiang 吳江 city, people held their carnival despite knowing of the fall of Beijing in the early summer of 1644, and they provided beautiful decorations that had never been seen before.<sup>38</sup>

Charles O. Hucker indicates that the literati as a whole in the late Ming did not pay enough attention to social, economic, and military affairs.<sup>39</sup> However, the latest studies showed that the Ming literati gradually began to pay attention to military affairs and martial arts.<sup>40</sup> These studies are basically derived from the fact that many comprehensive military manuals were produced after the mid-Ming.<sup>41</sup> According to them, these publications “gave descriptions and illustrations of weapons, walls, ships,

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<sup>37</sup> R. Huang (1981), 86.

<sup>38</sup> Wu Han, 336-37.

<sup>39</sup> Hucker (1957).

<sup>40</sup> For example, Xiang Yunnan 向燕南, “Ming dai bianfang shidi de boxing” 明代邊防史地的勃興, *Beijing shifan daxue xuebao* 1 (2000), 127-43. See also Chen Baoliang 陳寶良, “Wan Ming de shangwu jingsheng” 晚明的尚武精神, *Mingshi yanjiu* 1 (1991), 248-59. Another detailed analysis is by Lin Kunhui 林坤輝, “Ming dai bingxue changxing de lishi kaocha” 明代兵學昌明的歷史考察, *Ming shi yanjiu zhuan* 13 (2002), 73-107.

<sup>41</sup> Xu Baolin 許保林 provided further detailed information about these publications. Xu’s conclusion raised two important questions: most of the Ming military publications emphasized defense, not attack; they concentrated on the practical factors such as training, technical equipment including both “cold” weapons and fire arms while ignoring the exploration of theory. See Xu Baolin, *Zhongguo bingshu tonglan* 中國兵書通覽 (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 2002), 59.



tactical formations, and the like, along with instructions on how to organize and lead an army, all explained with the help of more recent historical examples.”<sup>42</sup>

Although we cannot, on the basis of this evidence, conclude that the literati as a whole had already engaged in or was interested in writing something about military affairs, and there is no reason to believe that the general tendency for literati to ignore military affairs had changed dramatically since that time, these phenomena did exist. In addition to the fact of the rapid increase in literati and limited number of available official posts which forced many to shift their interests to other careers, there is another factor that should be emphasized: the above shift coincided with economic and commercial development. These developments stimulated fundamental changes in the Chinese society and also brought cultural prosperity, i.e., literature, arts, the building and decoration of gardens, food and drinking culture, and, of course, more and more publications concerning military affairs.<sup>43</sup>

With these conditions, it should not surprise us that there were many new types of publications. And, in fact, the novelty spread beyond writing to a new ideal: the pursuit of *Wen Wu quan cai* 文武全才 (good at both civil and military affairs) became the goal for most literati, although *wu* remained subordinate and only a very few people would have met this goal. During the Ming, especially the late Ming, some concepts such as *xia* 俠 (knight errant) were accepted among both highly educated literati and illiterate farm boys, among influential statesmen and rebel leaders. As Robinson has indicated, “...it is abundantly clear that many young elite males were fascinated by

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<sup>42</sup> Dreyer, 11.

<sup>43</sup> Wakeman quotes from some writings by Fang Yizhi and Gu Yanwu and describes their activities as follows: “The ideal man of culture in the late Ming was skillful in lyric poetry, metrics, prose writing, songs, music, calligraphy, painting, stone engraving, dice playing, staging theatricals, telling stories, playing the flute and drums, as so forth.” See Wakeman, 1985, vol.1, 644-45. Xia Xiancun’s 夏咸淳 book entitled *Wan Ming shifeng yu wenxue* 晚明士風與文學 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1994) also provided more detailed information about these aspects.

martial arts, assiduously practicing swordplay and enthusiastically discussing military strategy and famous battles.”<sup>44</sup>

Xu Guangqi 徐光啓 (1562- 1633) may be deemed an ideal representative of late Ming literati. He served as Grand Secretary of the empire, led an astronomical reform, translated Western scientific books, renovated the army, compiled an important treatise on agriculture, and was a Christian convert. Moreover, he also introduced a series of innovations to traditional Chinese society: new mathematics (Euclid’s *Elements*), new astronomical knowledge, a new religion, new military technology and – though less conspicuously so – agricultural experiments. He even planned to go to Macau to hire “foreign soldiers” (*yangbing* 洋兵) in order to expel the Manchu invaders.<sup>45</sup> However, beyond these plans we have no idea what concrete military actions he would have taken because he died before the fall of Beijing and Jiangnan, his hometown, present-day Shanghai. However, his colleagues and fellow townsmen will help us to understand how many literati performed on the battlefield.

While Xu Guangqi had a wide range of interests and expertise, there was little guarantee that other Ming literati who passed the examinations would have similarly broad competence. The path through the examination system was mainly determined by a candidate’s ability to compose the eight-legged style essays with quotations from the *Four Books* and *Five Classics* 四書五經 that were expected in the first session of the examinations. In reality, these essays became a “useless form of empty words.”<sup>46</sup> After they were appointed as officials, they had to learn many things from the beginning.

Except for the very beginning and end of the Ming dynasty, the status of civil officials was always above that of military commanders. As Huang puts it, “the

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<sup>44</sup> Robinson, 171.

<sup>45</sup> Catherine Jami et al., *Statecraft and Intellectual Renewal in Late Ming China: The Cross-Cultural Synthesis of Xu Guangqi (1562-1633)* (Brill, 2001), 1. Also see Wang Chongmin 王重民 ed., *Xu Guangqi ji* 徐光啓集 (Taipei: Mingwen, 1986), 15-16.

<sup>46</sup> Elman (2000), 218-19.

dynasty's Civil Service had gained maturity roughly within the hundred years from the mid-fifteenth century to the mid-sixteenth century. During the same period, the prestige of army officers had sunk to the lowest level."<sup>47</sup>

In most cases, civil officials had no expertise or even basic knowledge of military affairs. Unfortunately, the Ming armies they controlled and managed had already reached their nadir by late Ming times. Scholars have extensively described and analyzed the military weakness that lay behind the failure of the Ming dynasty. For example, Ray Huang's series of books and articles, Frederic Wakeman Jr.'s work on the Manchu's "great enterprise," and so on. It would be too long to acknowledge all these relevant studies, and, at least both Huang and Wakeman's studies mentioned above have already provided us detailed analysis, there is no need to reiterate those factors concerning how and why the Ming army and its *Wei Suo* 衛所 system declined and deteriorated.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, this is why we do not need to mention these sorts of information when we discuss the certain areas later on in this dissertation. Suffice it to say that the Ming dynasty and its higher level civil officials were unable to deal effectively with a military crisis.

Charles O. Hucker used a case study to provide vivid description of the means used by a provincial commander to suppress marauders on the seacoast south of the Yangzi delta in 1556. The Supreme Commander Hu Zongxian 胡宗憲 (?- 1565), a "political general," was in charge in Zhejiang that year. Having few resources to count upon, he used "... imperial prestige, offers of pardon, patronizing friendship, subornation of colleagues, poisoned wine, moral principles, false intelligence, procrastination, beautiful women, solemn and fair promises, bribery, banquets, threats, intimidation, lies, cajolery, assassination, and deployment of troops to undo his opponents. It is a masterpiece of dirty work far beyond the unsophisticated capacity of a mere military

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<sup>47</sup> R. Huang (1981), 158.

<sup>48</sup> R. Huang (1970), 39- 62; (1981), 160- 61.

man, and shows why warfare in this particular Chinese style deserves more serious study.” He observes that both Hu and his subordinate commanders demonstrated a high degree of flexibility in meeting the shifts of circumstance; they showed responsibility, initiative, and caution all at once.<sup>49</sup>

Hu is known to history as a capable and ruthless official. Obviously, not everybody was as smart or lucky as him. What Chinese literati faced in the 1640s was not merely small bands of pirates on the coast. The coming of the Manchus was accompanied by a powerful military machine including cavalry, effective bureaucracies (because they adopted and copied some Chinese ways) and also a certain pretence of legitimacy such as fighting against Li Zicheng. In addition to the Manchus, the peasants in the north and central plain area were also creating big problems. There was no clear course of action for literati in the face of these concurrent threats.

One prerequisite for analyzing the choices made by literati is to divide the literati into two groups: official literati and non-official literati. Being official, those literati tended to be turncoats. In the conflict between their duty as officials of the state and their private interests, it was almost inevitable that the latter would win out. The higher their rank, the greater their tendency to protect their dignity; the richer their property, the less they desired to change the status quo. As we will see, only a tiny minority of officials refused offers from the Qing government. According to the Chinese bureaucratic tradition, officials could not be on duty in their hometowns. The primary concern of this policy was to maintain administrative effectiveness, but its unintended consequence was that officials lacked the main motive for organizing the defenses of the places they served. This is one reason why so many Ming officials left positions without hesitation when the Manchu army or rebels arrived.

The resistance movements of many cities, such as Jiangyin 江陰 in Jiangnan area we will mention later on, were led by officials who had returned from other areas. Shi Kefa’s 史可法 (1601-1645) original duty also was not at Yangzhou 揚州. What we

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<sup>49</sup> In John K. Fairbank, 23; also see Marilyn Fitzpatrick, “Local Interests and the Anti-Pirate Administration in China’s South-east 1555-1565,” in *Ch’ing-shi wen-t’i*, 4. 2 (1979), 1-50.

should bear in mind is that if an official returned to his hometown after retirement, he was usually deemed as a member of non-official literati.

Measures implemented by the Qing took advantage of the tendency of the official literati to behave in the way noted above. After taking Beijing, the Qing understood that China could not be ruled from horseback. It tried to get the cooperation and understanding of all social strata. For example, they arranged the funeral of the Chongzhen emperor in order to garner sympathy; they used and promoted former Ming officials; and they remitted taxes to attract the ordinary people. All the measures they adopted enabled different levels of Chinese officials to simply find a way to survive themselves while keeping a certain dignity. During the government's transition period in China, aside from staying alive, the primary concern was always maintaining legitimacy, the so-called *Dao* (way).<sup>50</sup>

Essentially, what the Chinese official literati identified with was authority itself. Being officials always enjoyed huge advantages in comparison with those common people as well as the others. Yet, to hold and keep this authority naturally became their primary concern, regardless of where it came from. The case of Tongcheng 桐城 County (in present-day Anhui) provides us with a vivid picture of how they put local or family interests and the maintenance of their positions and prestige above the abstract notion of loyalty to a fallen dynasty or to a few outward symbols of Chinese cultural identity. Since the new regime tried to refrain from sweeping attempts to alter the local status quo and to maintain through the examination system the same channels of social advancement as had the Ming, these so-called elite decided to accept the Qing without too much heart-searching.<sup>51</sup>

Wakeman uses the performance of Han officials during the pacification of Wu Sangui's 吳三桂 (1612-1678) rebellion to demonstrate that Chinese literati readily

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<sup>50</sup> Needham and Yates, 46-49.

<sup>51</sup> Hilary J. Beattie, "The Alternative to Resistance: The Case of T'ung-ch'eng, Anhwei," in Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr., eds., *From Ming to Ch'ing, Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 269-70.

shifted their loyalties- after only a little more than a decade, they were already loyal to the Qing.<sup>52</sup> This thesis will show that many Chinese officials required only several hours to make such a big decision between loyalty and treachery.

However, a form of ethnic identity did exist. In the process of dynastic transition, the distinction between Chinese and barbarian (*hua yi zhi bian*) also played a crucial role. When official literati became involved in an alien government, they chose either to ignore this aspect or to find another pretence for their shifting loyalties- the existence of so-called “virtue” (*de* 德), another even more abstract concept. According to this concept, any people of good virtue could govern the world, regardless of their ethnic background.

The performance of non-official literati is another story. Except for those few literati who really cared little about changes in the political environment, most of these literati were deeply concerned about *hua yi zhi bian*. Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610-95) can serve as an example. He said:

Even the bandits and thieves may manage China, because they still belong to Chinese.<sup>53</sup>

According to Huang, if barbarians controlled the empire, Chinese people would not only lose legitimacy, but also the moral basis for social order represented by *Sangang wuchang* 三綱五常.<sup>54</sup> The whole process of the literati’s resistance movement will show us that these non-official literati, numbering far more than the officials, played a

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<sup>52</sup> Wakeman, “Romantics, Stories, and Martyrs in the Seventeenth – Century China,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, 18.4 (1984), 647-56.

<sup>53</sup> Quoted from Li Mingyou 李明友, *Yiben wanshu- Huang Zongxi de zhexue yu zhexue shiguan* 一本萬殊－黃宗羲的哲學與哲學史觀 (Beijing: Renmin, 1994), 266.

<sup>54</sup> The Three Mainstays are: the relationship of ruler/minister, parent/child, and husband/wife; the Five Moral Relations are as follows: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity.

much more important role in the resistance movement. One thing we should mention at the outset is that these people did not have the leeway enjoyed by officials- resisting the invasion also meant protecting their homes and property. Based on Chen Zilong's 陳子龍 (1608-1647) observation, it is impossible to expect officials to join the defense of the communities in which they served because they were lacking a sense of responsibility.<sup>55</sup> That is, there were dual motives for resistance. One arose from abstract concerns such as legitimacy, ideals, and the conflict between Chinese and non-Chinese. The other was linked to the practical benefits to be gained by resistance. Only after realizing that the Qing would bring them peaceful lives were most of these literati willing to withdraw from the resistance, or, to go further and cooperate with Qing.

There was little hope that the literati's resistance would be successful. Realizing the inevitability of their fate, some of them committed suicide in order to sacrifice their lives for the empire (*xunguo* 殉國). This often occurred after the loss of a battle or even before a war took place. During wartime, loyalty (*zhong* 忠) and filial piety (*xiao* 孝) were two difficult choices that could not be avoided, and nobody could make an easy decision.<sup>56</sup> This is also one of the reasons for later divisions among the resistance camp.

What was the situation faced by those who intended to launch or join the resistance movement? First, it was impossible for them to be an ordinary soldier on the battlefield. They could join an army as an advisor, staff officer, coordinator, or liaison between the various forces. Alternatively, they could take on responsibility for some specific matter such as financial accounts. However, this dissertation will focus primarily on those who served as military commanders.

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<sup>55</sup> Chen Zilong, "Laiyang Libu Songgong xunjie jishi" 萊陽吏部宋公殉節紀事, *Anyatang gao* 安雅堂稿, juan 8, in XXSKQS 1388, 21.

<sup>56</sup> For detailed information concerning their loyalty and filial piety, see He Kuanbiao, 40-44.

Skillful military commanders are often graced with innate abilities or genius. Classical military theorists in both China and the West such as Sunzi, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Jomini articulated similar principles important for understanding the role of the military leader: temperament, battle environment, the intuition of the leader, and so on.<sup>57</sup> Of course, it is unrealistic to expect that these literati would be effective in all these capacities. It was necessary that they be able to mobilize the masses and organize their own troops to become real commanders. The question is how was this to be done? Why would the masses follow them? What was the relationship between local military forces and the Ming and Southern Ming's regular armies? If the literati's military forces are seen as one side of a quadrangle, how do they connect with and affect the other three sides - the Ming or the Southern Ming, Manchu-Qing, and the local rebel forces composed primarily of peasants? The answers to and issues surrounding these questions will be at the core of this dissertation.

Based on European history, Clausewitz indicated that, before the nineteenth century, war was only an affair for the government. In Chinese military history, apart from some mercenary armies, it is also very hard to find cases to certify that war could gain popular support, although Sunzi's theory is particularly sensitive to the problem of losing popular support in prolonged wars.<sup>58</sup>

Theoretically, mobilizing the masses, and especially the peasants in China, was not very difficult because they were not bound to the soil- they were neither serfs nor slaves. They could change to other occupations and manage their own affairs if they wanted to. But in reality they belonged to a static class with little opportunity for upward social mobility. For example, they had neither the necessary capital nor expertise to become merchants. In a chapter entitled "The Masses," Des Forges shows us the various attitudes of the outlaws towards the officials, the elite, and the masses in Henan during the 1640s. Because of hunger and the ravages of the plague, most of the masses in

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<sup>57</sup> Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 255-72.

<sup>58</sup> Handel, 119.



northeast Henan were mobilized to join the rebellion, "... some of the masses may have taken refuge in pockets of relative peace in the countryside, towns, and cities of the region. Others may have simply disappeared through death or flight. Whereas the majority spoke with their bodies and voted with their feet by rising in revolts, a minority- of farmers, workers, women, and servants- may have remained silent because their conditions were better, or worse."<sup>59</sup>

The rebels' mobilization measures should be differentiated from those of the literati. For example, the literati could not simply copy the way which was used by those rebels such as "killing the wealthy and aiding the poor." However, it was also possible for literati to find their own ways to mobilize the masses. The early seventeenth century suffered from a "general crisis": climatic cooling that reduced agricultural yields, revenue shortfalls, political strife, social disruptions, economic dislocations, monetary instability, and epidemic disease were all rampant.<sup>60</sup> Cao Shuji 曹樹基 indicates that in addition to the extreme drought, North China also suffered from the plague during this period. Within one year (1643-1644), Beijing's population was reduced by 40%. When the Manchu invasion occurred, the Ming dynasty in fact already had little available manpower.<sup>61</sup>

Based on these conditions, feeding the people actually became the most important factor for mobilization. However, this aspect was not fully understood until the 1940s by Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893-1976).<sup>62</sup> For the literati of the Ming-Qing transition it was already too late.

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<sup>59</sup> Des Forges, 198-203.

<sup>60</sup> Lynn A. Struve, ed.: trans., *Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm – China in Tiger's Jaws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 2. Also see S.A.M. Adshead, "The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China," *Asian Profile* 1.2 (1973), 271-80.

<sup>61</sup> [http://www.xys.org/xys/ebooks/others/history/ancient/ming\\_miawang.txt](http://www.xys.org/xys/ebooks/others/history/ancient/ming_miawang.txt), 9/1/01.

<sup>62</sup> Zhang Yimin 張益民, "Ershi niandaihou de Zhongguo zhengzhi liliang zhi zhenghe" 二十年代後的中國政治力量之整合, *Nanjing daxue xuebao* 2 (1992), 148-55, 180.

There were also problems when literati managed to engage in military actions against the Qing. This participation, as Wakeman puts it, “exposed members of the gentry to certain kinds of political and moral compromise, inasmuch as loyalists resisted central authority, they were easily confused with rebels. At the same time, they attracted the very kinds of disorderly elements into their ranks that members of the gentry most feared. Time and again, loyalist literati found themselves in the midst of a band of men whose social values they hardly shared, and whose choice of means they could not condone.”<sup>63</sup>

Since most of the literati chose surrender or silence, and few of them went so far as to commit suicide, we should keep in mind that there are only a few people who can be included in the research scope of this dissertation. However, it is their lives which help us understand why and how the Chinese literati were always unable to affect China’s destiny- they only deserved to survive as literati. One can not rely on them to do more - to play a decisive role in Chinese history, especially, during those crucial transition periods.

### **I: 3. Region Selection and Military History Studies**

Probably, only from an ideological perspective can late imperial China be deemed as a united culture, and, as a whole because Confucian legitimacy was accepted in various areas and through different social strata. Apart from this, a study must first select a representative geographical area. One should also make it clear to what extent the chosen area can be considered representative of the broader empire. Peter K. Bol has examined the local identity of the Jinhua 金華 area of Zhejiang Province 浙江省 in the late Ming. He suggests that local identity as a collective product easily serves the pursuit of collective interests. According to his observation, this Jinhua case reminds us

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<sup>63</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 600-01.

“that local identity discourse was understood to exist in relation to the national, and that the (re)construction of local identity was intended to be a means both of transforming local society and of increasing the locale’s participation in national life.”<sup>64</sup>

Indeed, this conclusion is suitable for Jinhua, but to what extent was this true of the entire empire? Only when we are sure the area we choose is representative can we know that an individual case study is useful for understanding similar situations in other parts of China, or at least that this case has value in a study of the entire empire.

Among all the approaches to the use of data in generalizing about variations over time and space, the most influential in Chinese studies is that of G. William Skinner. He divides China into eight macroregions and defines them by drainage basins, choosing boundaries that generally follow watersheds and the crests of mountain ranges, and that cut the great river systems into regions on the basis of transport efficiency and trade flow. Gradually, Skinner and others have used criteria such as population density to subdivide macroregions further into inner core, outer core, inner periphery, and outer periphery and so on. Based on the above, this system has been introduced into other fields of Chinese studies, such as political studies.<sup>65</sup> Because of his emphasis on the different characteristics and independence of various regions, his systematic studies and publications have enabled many Western scholars to engage in studies of certain specific region (s) without needing to treat China as a whole.<sup>66</sup> For instance, Schoppa’s

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<sup>64</sup> Peter K. Bol, “The ‘Localist Turn’ and ‘Local Identity’ in Later Imperial China,” *Late Imperial China* 24. 2 (2003), 41-42.

<sup>65</sup> Gilbert Rozman, *Population and Marketing Settlements in Qing China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 9-10.

<sup>66</sup> G. William Skinner, “Marketing Systems and Regional Economies: Their Structure and Development”, paper presented for the Symposium on Social and Economic History in China from the Song Dynasty to 1900. Beijing, Oct.26- Nov.1, 1980, 43-44.

study about gentry activities in modern Zhejiang,<sup>67</sup> and Susan Naquin's study of the Shandong uprising cite the influence of Skinner's model.<sup>68</sup>

It is important that we consider the suitability of his theory in the study of military history. Hans Van de Ven has already reminded us that "... China needs to be mapped in a different way from what would be suitable in the case of economic or political history. If macro-regions are important for economic history, and provincial and country boundaries for political history, then garrisons, frontier regions, lines of communications, centers of political and ritual significance, areas with key economic resources, as well as local populations with supposed martial qualities are more important for military geography."<sup>69</sup>

When we accept Skinner's important reminder of the difference between region and "regioned system," we have to bear in mind that his analysis focused exclusively on economic and geographical aspects.<sup>70</sup> As for other aspects, more recent research has questioned the suitability of Skinner's model. For instance, Esherick argues that "there are several respects in which North China fails to fit neatly into Skinner's model," and he suggests that we "shall have to look for other sources of local variation beyond regional cores and peripheries and shift our unit of analysis."<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Keith Schoppa, *Elites and Political Change: Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1982).

<sup>68</sup> Susan Naquin, *Shantung Rebellion: The Wanglung Uprising of 1774* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

<sup>69</sup> Van de Ven, 29.

<sup>70</sup> Paul A. Cohen has indicated this shortcoming in chapter four of his distinguished book entitled *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

<sup>71</sup> Joseph W. Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 3-7. The *Journal of Asian Studies* has published series of papers to discuss Skinner's work and theory. See "The Spatial Approach to Chinese History: A Test," 45.4 (1986), 721-43; and the replies from Skinner, 48.1 (1989), 90-99, 100-13; also see 49.2 (1990), 344-46.

On the other hand, Skinner's theories have not received any attention from scholars in China until quite recently.<sup>72</sup> We should realize that the language barrier is not the primary reason. From the perspective of economic or social history, if a few Chinese scholars pay attention to the scope of the entire empire, they generally intend to focus on the so-called "united national market system."<sup>73</sup> As for local history, the related studies usually come from those local scholars who belong to the corresponding academy of social science 社會社科院 or local universities and colleges. In this condition, focusing on his or her hometown while ignoring the rest of other regions becomes the general tendency.

In terms of military and political history, I want to point out that the factors Skinner emphasizes are exactly those which the Chinese central government wanted to prohibit over the past centuries. From the Qin 秦 (221-206 B.C.) to the Song 宋 (960-1279), the divisions of Chinese administrative areas basically accorded with watersheds and the crests of mountain ranges. However, the Yuan's (1271-1368) policy was a milestone in the development of political divisions. Since the Mongolian population numbered only about two million, they took special measures to prevent each Chinese province's antagonism toward the central government. To achieve this, they depended on certain geographical features: merging Henan and Hebei in order that the Yellow River not be used as a barrier; using the same reason to merge Jiangnan and Jiangbei, eastern Zhejiang and western Zhejiang, Hunan and Hubei considering, respectively, the factors of the Yangzi River, Qiantang River 錢塘江 and Dongting Lake 洞庭湖.<sup>74</sup> These strategic considerations even included the plains area. For

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<sup>72</sup> In the "preface" of Chinese version of his 1977 book, Skinner admitted this aspect. See Ye Guangting 葉光庭 et al, trans., *Zhonghua diguo wanqi de chengshi* 中華帝國晚期的城市 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2000).

<sup>73</sup> Wu Chengming 吳承明, *Zhongguo zibenzhuyi yu guonei shichang* 中國資本主義與國內市場 (Beijing: Zhongguo kexue jishu, 1983). The concise and systematic study is from: Li Bozhong 李伯重, "Zhongguo quanguo shichang de xingcheng 中國全國市場的形勢, 1500—1840 年," *Qinghua daxue xuebao* 4 (1999): 48-54.

<sup>74</sup> Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-1857) paid special attention to this aspect. See his *Sheng Wuji* 聖武記 (*Chronicle of Imperial Military Campaigns*) Guweitang 古微堂 edition. Also see Zhao Xiding 趙希鼎,

instance, Xuzhou 徐州, a key city connecting northern and southern China, is deemed as the southern gate of Shandong province, but it has been historically excluded from this province. Until the twentieth century, all central governments basically copied the Yuan model.

In this dissertation, I have selected Shandong, Nanzhili 南直隸<sup>75</sup> and Zhejiang as the focus of my research (see Map 1). Not only are these provinces connected to each other geographically, they are also the most economically and culturally advanced region of China. Only if this area was controlled, could the central government effectively administer the entire empire. Shandong province, particularly its western part, may be deemed as representative of the north China plain.<sup>76</sup> Due to reasons such as social structure, geography, and cultural background, this plain and the Jiangnan area have been decisive regions for the conquest of China since the thirteenth century.<sup>77</sup>

Among all recorded historical figures (*lishi renwu* 歷史人物) of the Ming dynasty, 44.61% came from these three provinces.<sup>78</sup> Elman's statistics provide the total number of *jinshi* from this area from 1572 to 1644.

Nanzhili	1366
Zhejiang Province	1046

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“Qing dai gesheng de zhengzhi zhidu” 清代各省的政治制度, *Lishi yanjiu* 3 (1980), 153-64. For a general overview of the provinces of the whole country, see Gu Yanwu, *Tianxia jinguo libingshu* 天下郡國利病書. Another very important book also should be mentioned here is *Dushi fangyu jiyao* 讀史方輿紀要, written by Gu Zuyu 顧祖輿 (1631-1692).

<sup>75</sup> This name was changed to Jiangnan Province 江南省 by Qing in 1645. Seven years later, in 1662, this Jiangnan Province was separated into two provinces- present Jiangsu 江蘇 and Anhui 安徽.

<sup>76</sup> Des Forges has analyzed the role that Zhongyuan (the central plain) played in the long history of China. See Des Forges 2003, 312-13.

<sup>77</sup> For the reasons why this area played such crucial role in the military and political history of China, my own forthcoming paper entitled “From Khubilai to Mao Zedong: The Grand Military Strategy of Conquering China since the Thirteenth Century” (unpublished paper) will try to provide a detailed analysis.

<sup>78</sup> Anonymous, “Lishi renwu yu dili de guanxi” 歷史人物與地理的關係, *Dongfang zazhi* 20. 5 (1923), 125-33.

Figure 2

Geographically, the plain is bounded by the border of Shandong and Beizhili 北直隸 in the north, the Taihang Mountains 太行山 in the west, and the Huai River drainage basin 淮河流域 to the south. Flat land, cereal agriculture, dense population, and impoverished villages are common characteristics of this region. Although the vagaries of weather left this region prone to recurrent natural disasters, the plains have long been one of China's key agricultural regions.


Between the North China Plain and the Yangzi delta is the drainage basin of the Huai River. This area is often defined as limited to the northern parts of Anhui and Jiangsu provinces, or northern Anhui alone. We have cogent reasons for treating the entire area as a coherent socioeconomic unit because the terrain is basically similar, a common language was spoken, and the same crops as northern China were grown throughout the region.

Nanzhili and northern Zhejiang together comprised the nation's economically and culturally most advanced region. It was a core rice-producing area and a national center for the production of silk, cotton, and tea as well. It was a main source of state revenue, both from the land tax and the grain tribute system.

In the following chapters, we will see that various conflicts arose not only among governments, ethnic groups, local social forces, soldiers, peasants, citizens, and regular army units that had been brought in from different areas, but also between regular troops and volunteer auxiliaries. We will also examine whether, and to what extent, the topographical features and other social and economic characteristics affected the military actions of all these different groups.

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<sup>79</sup> Elman (2000), 696. All the literati I have selected and analyzed in the present study are included in these figures.



Map 1. China in the Mid-Seventeenth Century (based on Struve [1993], 5)

In general, nearly all areas of China during the Ming-Qing transition period witnessed large-scale military clashes between the various forces mentioned above. Indeed, we have to pay attention to the regional variations of these clashes. Robinson's study "has attempted to show those specific patterns of violence must be sought in the particulars of local society," because they could "provide another revealing historical perspective from which to view Chinese society."<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that China must also be analyzed from a macro perspective, in other words, we have to treat it as a whole.

<sup>80</sup> Robinson, 166-67.



By using Qi Jiguang's 戚繼光 (1528-1588) career in Yiwu 義烏 County as an example, Thomas G. Nimick indicates that the way in which that army was recruited and the impact of that recruitment on the local area exemplify the extent to which developments in local society could shape regional and national events, and the extent to which the actions of centrally appointed officials could affect local society in the Ming period.<sup>81</sup> If we focus only on this very special case while ignoring the general condition of rest of the empire, his conclusion makes sense. However, a careful examination of Yiwu County's social background (in Chapter Four) will allow us to see that his conclusion is not universally valid.

Faced with the extremely tumultuous conditions of the Ming-Qing transition period, it is obvious that there was no fixed pattern or set of rules governing behavior across the empire. The essential prerequisite for choosing Shandong, Nanzhili and Zhejiang is that this area not only had its own traits, but most importantly, it had an effect on the entire empire. Only by examining an influential region like this can we expect a study to help us understand the complexity of Chinese history while also paying attention to its existence as an entirety.

Let us now turn to the abundant data.

#### **I: 4. Source Material, Methodology and Theory**

The basic impression one gets when examining all the available data from the Ming-Qing transition period is ambivalence. On the one hand, there is an abundance of primary of historical records as well as secondary research, and this combination of different and complementary source materials make it possible to engage in a specific and detailed topical study. On the other hand, the data is often far from ideal for the purposes of analysis or comparison. This is especially true for the objects of this

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<sup>81</sup> Thomas G. Nimick (1995).

dissertation. For example, there were rare government records regarding the Ming army's deployment, garrison numbers, equipment as well as logistic supplies during the 1640s in the areas chosen by this dissertation. And, because of these reasons, those related secondary materials have basically focused on the mid, especially, early Ming times.<sup>82</sup>

To compensate for some of these problems, I make use of a wide range of materials from many different kinds of sources. These can be divided into four principal types of materials.

First is the data from the different levels of administration of the Ming and Qing governments. Usually this data has been preserved as archives. Despite some biases and other shortcomings, these sources enable us to see relevant issues and people from the perspective of the government. For certain periods, they are crucial to the analysis. For example, a prisoner's confession from the Qing government archives is the only way to discover the real connection between the Ming loyalists at sea and the rural society of the coastal area of Zhejiang during the 1650s. The memorials from local officials to the emperor usually included reliable information, but we have to pay attention to the problem of exaggerating achievements during peace time and overstating casualties on the battlefield in time of war. In order to emphasize their merit, local officials naturally tended to exaggerate their achievements. The Qing emperors not only realized these common traits among the all levels of bureaucracy, but also took measures to punish this sort of behaviour.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> The typical study about these aspects was Wang Yuquan's 王毓銓 book entitled *Ming dai de juntun* 明代的軍屯 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1965). Another kind of very important and valuable material was military encyclopedia published in Ming times, most of them were collected in ZGBSJC - Zhongguo bingshu jicheng 中國兵書集成. Unfortunately, they were basically not relevant for this study because of various reasons, see page 40 and notes therein.

<sup>83</sup> For instance, in June of 1659, after the Ming loyalists' northern expedition was defeated, the reports of victory roused the Shunzhi Emperor's great indignation for they were totally inaccurate- commanders at the front often used words such as countless (wu suan 無算) to enumerate the casualties of the war. He asked the Board of War to convict those who did this for "the crime of cheating the

As for the documents issued by the government, one with origins at the top level is the *The Veritable Records* (*shilu* 實錄) which supplemented the imperially authorized account. These records contain the most important imperial edicts and provincial officials' memorials. But we still need to deal carefully with this data. Gu Cheng indicates that some Qing documents were first written in Manchu, and then translated into Chinese for the purpose of writing the *shilu* and so on, a lot of mistakes appeared during this process.<sup>84</sup> Another point that should be mentioned at the outset is that regulations, laws, policies, and orders related to military affairs changed often and differed substantially between the early and late Ming. The early Qing policy basically followed the former Ming, except its Banner army system. Academics in both China and abroad have focused their studies on the early - mid Ming times. Apart from the reasons mentioned above, another reason was that precise and detailed information is in the *Ming huiyao* 明會要.<sup>85</sup> Timothy Brook has realized this situation. In addition, he also indicates the other characteristics of official sources such as the difference in terminologies used in different provinces and regions. This is why he ignored most of the *huidian*-style (會典) prescriptive regulations and relied instead on records of actual administration in local gazetteers.<sup>86</sup>

The second group of sources are those which Struve calls "the most credible sources." These are those sources "written by men who actually observed the events they describe, or who conducted conscientious inquiries soon after such events

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emperor and falsely claiming credit" 罔上冒功之罪. *Qing shilu* 清實錄 3- *Shizu shilu* 世祖實錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua, repr. 1985), juan 126, 126.

<sup>84</sup> Gu Cheng 顧成, *Nan Ming shi* 南明史 (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian, 1997), 204.

<sup>85</sup> The most recent and complete study is by Zhang Dexin 張德信, *Ming chao dianzhang zhidu* 明朝典章制度 (Changchun: Jilin wenshi), 2002.

<sup>86</sup> Timothy Brook, "The Spatial Structure of Ming Local Administration," *Late Imperial China* 6.1 (1985), 1-55.

occurred.”<sup>87</sup> I accept her assessment of these materials and try my best to make use of this data. However, we also should not accept without question that these materials are the “most credible.” One of the most famous non-official literati, Huang Zongxi, witnessed and joined the military resistance in eastern Zhejiang. According to Struve’s criteria, Huang’s descriptions such as *Xing chaolu* 行朝錄, *Hongguang shilu chao* 弘光實錄鈔, and *Haiwai tongku ji* 海外慟哭記), can be deemed as basic primary materials. However, recent studies have certified that these sources “usually come from prejudice, and add his own tastes,” furthermore, as Gu Cheng indicates, lots of descriptions are full of oxymora, lies thus make serious difficulties when we use them...<sup>88</sup> This sort of data needs to be examined very carefully. Since the writers of these materials “observed the events they describe,” if we simply take them without checking, we can be led astray.

In contrast, family letters, diaries, manuscripts, and poetry should be treated as primary materials. In most cases, this data enables us to understand the deepest sentiments of the authors at that time. For example, as we will see in Chapter Two, nobody doubts the authenticity of Shi Kefa’s letter sent to his family members, and the same can be said of the letters of Jin Sheng 金升 (1589-1645). In addition, examining and using these sources will enable us to harmonize the nature of individual literati’s personalities with their actions. This aspect is exactly what previous studies have left relatively untouched. As for the value of their collected writings, it depends on the editor or publisher, and we will discuss these later.

The third kind of data is from gazetteers or local histories such as genealogies. Generally speaking, this sort of material, especially county gazetteers (*xianzhi*) is the only way to gain access to detailed accounts of local affairs.

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<sup>87</sup> Struve 1984, “preface,” xiv.

<sup>88</sup> Gu Cheng, 164, 280 as well as 300.

For example, from *Wuxian zhi* 吳縣志, we know that, in the year 1640 in this Jiangnan county, there were a total of 190 soldiers drawn from local residents who came from various units of the Ming government on hand. They owned eighteen sorts of weapons including both cold (such as spears and broadswords) and fire arms (such as muskets) as well as the raw materials for producing gunpowder.<sup>89</sup>

James W. Tong's book is based on a statistical analysis of gazetteers. Since the quality and quantity of gazetteers varied widely during the Ming according to time and place, his book also needs to be examined very carefully. For example, he suggests that "the later gazetteers have often faithfully recorded data from earlier editions. Since much of the information was recorded without comment or copied without change from earlier editions, these gazetteers can, for some purposes, be treated as primary sources for data originally published centuries before. For other purposes, however, these histories must be treated as secondary sources."<sup>90</sup>

Gazetteers do contain detailed information on local events, as he concludes. Records relevant to my present study usually belong to the categories entitled *bingshi* or *bingge* (兵事, 兵革). In terms of these materials, Tong's discovery sharply contrasts with my own observations. According to him, "it would be ideal if both a late Ming (1600-1644) and an early Qing (1644-1700) edition were available; the late Ming edition would contain socioeconomic data (e.g., taxation, population, troop deployment) drawn from county archives before they were destroyed by inter-dynastic violence, and the early Qing edition would contain accounts of late Ming violence."<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> *Chongzhen Wuxian zhi* 崇禎吳縣志, juan 18, Bingfang 兵防 2 (This gazetteer was edited during the Chongzhen reign [1628-1644]), quoted from *Tianyige Ming dai fangzhi xuankan xubian* 天一閣藏明代方志選刊續編 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1990), 465-66.

<sup>90</sup> James W. Tong, *Disorder under Heaven: Collective Violence in the Ming Dynasty* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 36-42.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

Within all the gazetteers I have examined, detailed descriptions of the wars or conflicts between the Han Chinese and Manchu armies or Qing government later in the seventeenth century are very infrequent. His conclusion only appears valid in relation to the late Ming rebellions. In terms of literati resistance movements, I cannot be as optimistic as Tong. The reason is simple: the gazetteers' compilers in East China of this period were all Chinese (a few higher ranking Manchu officials were sometimes responsible for compiling, but only in name). If the relevant contents were written in detail, this would mean a "confession" of guilt (for resisting) and would undoubtedly bring on repression and punishment. On the other hand, if they treated the resistance figures as negative figures, then how could those compilers face their peers or the local people? In fact, the relevant materials in the gazetteers were usually composed after the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1735-1796), and most are directly copied from other secondary materials such as *Nanjiang yishi* 南疆逸史.<sup>92</sup>

Similar problems often apply to genealogies. Since these sources are now very easy to access in the world's major Chinese-language library collections, more and more scholars have begun to use them. These genealogies play a crucial role in the study of social and economic history. For instance, Harrell points out that the "earlier preliminary studies have told us that a genealogy that provides birth dates for about 80% of the people recorded and death dates for about 50% can be quite useful in estimating the fertility and mortality rates of its subject population."<sup>93</sup> But the use of genealogies in military history is more problematic. It is important that we do not exaggerate their function. As Ho indicated, "the clan system was never uniformly well developed or evenly distributed geographically. It is well known that the clan system

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<sup>92</sup> The doubtful authenticity of source material in local gazetteers is also important to keep in mind for studies of social and economic history. For instance, millet and wheat were the most important food crops, along with sorghum (gaoliang 高粱), beans, and barley. But it is very hard to know precisely the amounts produced, or to gain a complete survey of the land, because the compilers tended to underreport the amount of land to avoid increases in the tax quota of a given district.

<sup>93</sup> Stevan Harrell, ed., *Chinese Historical Microdemography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 94.

was most highly developed in the two southernmost coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, well organized and widely distributed in the lower and central Yangzi provinces, somewhat underdeveloped and thinly distributed in a number of northern provinces.”<sup>94</sup>

Furthermore, my impression of genealogies concurs with a general survey made by Ted A. Telford. He states that genealogies “include information only for those individuals who were ritually significant ... they would appear to be quite useless for historical demographic studies.”<sup>95</sup>

Generally speaking, the longer the genealogies are, and thus the broader scope of time they cover is, the less useful their data becomes in the study of military history. Mainly because of the catastrophes caused by long term warfare, the genealogies could not have survived in the North China Plain. In the Yangzi delta area, there are lots of arguments among academics about the performance of clans over a long time frame. Hilary Beattie’s study of Tongcheng is based on both gazetteers and genealogies. She successfully draws conclusions about the persistence of genealogies in one part of Anhui. However, this kind of case study has a strong tendency to focus on the social elite while ignoring the ordinary people. In terms of military history, another important shortcoming is the fact that all of these genealogies were edited in the seventeenth century. Exactly like the shortcomings of gazetteers mentioned above, these kinds of genealogies cannot be expected to provide substantial material on anti-Qing military action.

The more one examines the sources, the more one becomes convinced of the complexity of their utilization. For periods of extreme turmoil, such as the Ming-Qing transition, it is impossible to rely on only one or a limited number of sources to produce a study. This dissertation will argue that genealogies do not provide very useful source material for the study of the literati resistance movement. Due to factors mentioned

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<sup>94</sup> Ho, 210-11.

<sup>95</sup> Ted A. Telford, “Survey of Social Demographic Data in Chinese Genealogies,” *Late Imperial China* 7. 2 (1986), 118-47.

above, we are short of these records and, most importantly, as we will show in Chapter Four, the fact that military actions related to consanguinity almost always took place among family members (father and son, or among brothers), and seldom extended to the scope of the entire clan.

The last type of data I use in the dissertation are secondary materials. Struve's book provides a useful introduction to these materials.<sup>96</sup> Generally speaking, there are two trends to which special attention must be paid. The first is what we might call the "official factor." What is evident in the sources for Ming history, "as in all Chinese history is that the historians often seek to edify their readers, to draw a moral by exalting the virtuous and condemning the wicked. Often in their zeal they paint their heroes as perfect, leaving out all their shortcomings. Their narrations thus become one-sided and to form a fair judgment, one has to read the opposite side of the story if it can be found. Again, it is quite common for historians to write only about what they consider 'great events', leaving aside many things that we should be interested in nowadays."<sup>97</sup>

The second trend can be referred to as the "private factor." According to a famous early Qing historian, Quan Zuwang 全祖望 (1705-1755), the biographies of Ming martyrs written after 1644 are unbelievable in most cases.<sup>98</sup> As mentioned before, late Ming scholars demonstrated their various abilities and tastes, including the writing of the history of their own times. These publications are filled with personal points of view which must be examined very carefully. This is especially true for those sources which come from the so-called *yeshi* 野史 ("Wild" histories). Needless to say, most of

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<sup>96</sup> Lynn A. Struve, *The Ming-Qing Conflict, 1619- 1683 – A Historiography and Source Guide* (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies), 1998.

<sup>97</sup> Albert Chan, *The Glory and Fall of the Ming Dynasty* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), "Introduction," xix. See also, On- Cho Ng, "Private Historiography of the Late Ming: Some Notes on Five Works," *Ming Studies* 18 (Spring 1984), 46-68.

<sup>98</sup> Quan Zuwang, *Jiejiting jiwaibian* 鮚埼亭集外編, juan 48, in XXSKQS 1430, 267. As for the materials about Quan Zuwang and his works, see Struve, 1998, 54-59.



these abound with historical fiction—"thematic truth encrusted with imaginative, often fabulous details."<sup>99</sup> However, some of these histories still provide certain true descriptions that we may check with those present in the primary materials.<sup>100</sup>

Besides all the above, another category, military encyclopedias published in the Ming and Qing times are also available concerning some background knowledge.<sup>101</sup>

By judiciously exploring all these materials, I will be able to undertake a multi-faceted exploration of the role literati played in military action. However, it is important that we examine the methodology and theory that will be applied to analyses of these sources. In comparison with Chinese-language studies, "English language writers are sensitive to contemporary methodological discourse, and discuss issues dealing with paradigms of geographical organization, economic interpretations, and incipient imperialism. They tend to be more analytical but ... offer less descriptive detail."<sup>102</sup>

My own general impression basically tallies with Johnson's observation. Paying more attention to analytical or theoretical models sometimes helps us to formulate explanations and answers to general questions. Especially since the mid-1980s, in addition to the remarkable depth of scholarship in Chinese primary sources and

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<sup>99</sup> See Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "Localism and Loyalism during the Ch'ing Conquest of Kiangnan: The Tragedy of Chiang-yin," in Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Carolyn Grant ed., *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 57; Since the 1990s, most of the available *yeshi* have been compiled and published in a collection entitled *Zhongguo yeshi jicheng* 中國野史集成 (Chengdu: Bashu, 1993) 50 vols; *Zhongguo yeshi jicheng xubian* 中國野史集成續編 (Chengdu: Bashu, 2000), 30 vols. The contents of this series, in fact, exceed the scope of *yeshi*; some of them really are primary materials.

<sup>100</sup> This is especially true in Chapter Four below. Practically, it is impossible to rely on just one source to analyze the Zhejiang literati's resistance movement.

<sup>101</sup> So far as I know, the most important collected data is *Zhongguo bingshu jicheng* 中國兵書集成, (Collected Chinese military writings). Unfortunately it is not very useful for this dissertation, albeit it provides broad knowledge and background information about late Ming military history. For instance, it contains no records about military actions concerning the Ming loyalists' resistance in the Ming-Qing transition period. See *Zhongguo bingshu jicheng bianji weiyuanhui*, ed. *Zhongguo bingshu jicheng* (Liaoshen shushe and Jiefangjun, 1987-95), 50 vols.

<sup>102</sup> Linda Cooke Johnson, ed., *Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China* (Ithaca: State University of New York Press, 1993), "Preface".

meticulously detailed case studies, models, paradigms, and theories have been created for or adapted to Chinese studies. Unfortunately, few of these have received general approval among the scholars of late imperial China or modern China. Instead, we are deeply impressed by some criticisms about them. For example, Chun does an admirable job pointing out the limitations of structural-functionalism in approaching Chinese lineage organization.<sup>103</sup> Roger V. Des Forges has become increasingly skeptical about the utility of the three paradigms of Modernization theory, Marxism, Imperial China that have long dominated the study of Chinese history and continue to inform many accounts of the Ming-Qing period. He also argues that although the various “post-” theories (postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism) as well as feminism are “valuable in dissolving the unsubstantiated certainties of more orthodox Marxists and modernizationists,” some of these theories go too far.<sup>104</sup>

Johnston has aroused interest with his “*parabellum*” theory.<sup>105</sup> On the basis of both classic Chinese military texts and the whole history of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), he concludes that there are two Chinese strategic cultures, one is idealized or symbolic, which invokes principles of harmony and the avoidance of open conflict. Another one is operational. In dealing with security threats, imperial China has presented two faces based on these two cultures. The conclusions reached in his book have attracted much attention from people engaged in general contemporary military and political studies. However, historians of specific periods have challenged his theory.

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<sup>103</sup> Allen Chun, “The Lineage –Village Complex in Southeastern China - A Long Footnote in the Anthropology of Kinship,” in *Current Anthropology* 37.3 (1996), 429-40, along with the comments from critics and his replies, 440-50.

<sup>104</sup> Roger V. Des Forges (2003), 314-15. A remarkable work should be mentioned here in relation to American historical writing on Chinese history prior to the 1980s, Paul A. Cohen’s *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

<sup>105</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Perdue, for example, not only successfully challenged Johnston's theory, but also showed us "that Qing strategy was radically different from Ming."<sup>106</sup>

While Johnston's theory and explanation are beyond my current research, as mentioned above, his book mainly focuses on early and mid- Ming time, rarely touching those military affairs entering the seventeenth century. It is clearly not suitable for the period and region I selected. Moreover, the Ming dynasty lasted more than two and half centuries (as long as the United States' national history), and its military history witnessed great changes in almost every aspect.<sup>107</sup> If somebody chooses to undertake a study with a topic such as "the grand global military strategy" of the United States, it is hard to imagine that George Washington and George W. Bush could be treated together, and that these two presidents could be imagined as adopting the same policies toward the rest of the world.

Theories such as Marxist discussions of class struggle, those that offer perspectives on state-society relations, the relevance of Skinner's theory of macroregions, and the "civil society" debate deriving from the work of Habermas, peasant rebellions and popular protests, and about millenarian movements and revolutionary organizations and so on do provide a certain amount of help in understanding Chinese social, political, and military history. However, their use is limited.<sup>108</sup> The fact is, the complicated differences that exist within the huge territory of China provide numerous opportunities for various theories to find evidence for their applicability and suitability. Moreover, the abundance of primary and second-hand materials, as mentioned above, are characterized by ambiguity: it is not very difficult to collect data, but there is a shortage of systematic and reliable

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<sup>106</sup> Peter G. Perdue, "Culture, History, and Imperial Chinese Strategy: Legacies of the Qing Conquests," in Van de Ven, 261.

<sup>107</sup> Roger V. Des Forges, 150-54.

<sup>108</sup> There is no need to list all their contents here. However, at least the following materials may help us to make a general survey about those important studies: Daniel Little, *Understanding Peasant China: Case Studies in the Philosophy of Social Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); See also Cohen, 1981, as well as Wakeman, 1998.

resources. These conditions often allow researchers to be successful in case studies because they can easily find what they need, while ignoring other material intentionally or unintentionally. In other words, any theory with universal ambitions should be questioned at the outset. Quite frankly, the tendency and desire to generate theories in the West may be effective and beneficial. However, in the field of China studies it has gradually become a game played by a few people: it starts with somebody who creates (or even copies) some theories on the basis of limited sources, and then, someone else naturally voices his or her opinion based on their own specific materials. During this process, every player gets what he or she wants: the publication lists become longer and longer, but the questions and problems still remain.

No statement about Chinese history can be made with absolute certainty. In contrast, a “problem oriented” approach may lead us to some concrete answers. Through the various case studies from the different regions, we may systematically compare and find certain generality as well as particularity, and avoid the tendency of only focusing on isolated cases while ignoring the whole and vice versa.

This dissertation begins with the fall of Shandong, and continues through a series of wars and ethnic conflicts between Chinese and Manchus in Lianghuai 兩淮 and Jiangnan 江南. It concludes around 1659 with the final defeat of the Ming loyalists in eastern Zhejiang. The question of why and how the literati of these areas organized and joined military actions is the point from which my research has proceeded. Through a brief related comparison of the economic, political, as well as social structural changes within the region, and by a comparison of many kinds of military actions — fighting against the Manchu invasion; defending against rebellions of peasants in the north and tenants or serfs in the Yangzi delta; conflicts among the different groups — I shall try to find the various characteristics and patterns of the literati’s changing military behavior. Moreover, I will try to ground their military actions firmly in time, space, and

the environment by dividing them into several groups and categories in order to shed light on the complexity of Chinese military history.

There are three aspects that need to be specifically emphasized at the outset. First, as mentioned above, in order to find characteristics and patterns of the literati's changing military behavior, I shall attempt to ground the military actions of the literati firmly in time, space, and environment. To reach this ideal goal, a brief and general examination of economic, political, social structure, and even topographical features of certain regions is absolutely necessary because this background knowledge is crucial for a more meaningful comparative study between the experiences of different areas. **However, to mention all this information within a single paper is impossible, and, unnecessary. Since the previous studies about these aspects have been pursued in great depth — as mentioned at the beginning, only those directly related to military action will be mentioned and quoted.**

Second, this study only focuses on the literati's military actions; it cannot cover or even touch any other areas such as philosophy or literature. From the military perspective, my research mainly explores the literati's actions, not what they said or the suggestions they raised. In fact, there are “countless” reasonable policy suggestions, plans, and advice, many of which are even still available.<sup>109</sup> But, few of them were

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<sup>109</sup> Xie Guozhen 謝國楨, *Nan Ming shilue* 南明史略 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1957), 51. Generally speaking, paper work was the strong suit of Chinese officials and literati. They were good at making suggestions and plans, but less capable when it came to action. Sometimes they could offer apparently valuable advice, but practically speaking, their proposals seldom met any real needs. For instance, after Beijing fell, a man named Peng Shiheng 彭時亨 (dates unknown) made a special report entitled *Zhilu yi* 制虜議, he strongly suggested the use of “battle wagons 戰車, basically a huge two-wheeled mule cart. Since he was from Jiangnan area, it seems that he did not know that this sort of weapon had already been used by Qi Jiguang 戚繼光 (1528-1587) several decades earlier. See *Zhongxing shilu* 中興實錄 in NMSL BZ, 681-82.

The late imperial Chinese governments shared this tendency. They were good at policy making, and the promulgation of laws and orders, but it is difficult to know how these were carried out and what their effects were, especially during tumultuous periods like the Ming-Qing transition. The typical example is the *baojia* 保甲 system (mutual-responsibility units). We find great amounts of information on *baojia* in the various sorts of records (including the official archives), but we have no way to explore how or to what extent this system affected the government and local community. The records focus on why the *baojia* system should be implemented, suggestions, policies, as well as some statistic on *baojia* numbers. In contrast to the abstract descriptions of its achievement such as *chengxiao zhuoran* 成效卓

discussed or adopted at the time, let alone carried out. Based on this criterion, **only those who really appeared on the battlefield are included in the scope of my research.** For some very important figures such as Gu Yanwu, though he is very famous for his ideas as well as his remarkable relevant military publications such as *Jun zhilun* 軍制論 and *Xingshi lun* 形勢論,<sup>110</sup> since there are no detailed and credible records showing when and how he joined the resistance movement, there is no way to explore his military action. Another very important figure is Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582-1664). His career demonstrated the complexity of literati behaviour: he went to Yangzhou in the spring of 1643 to plan anti-Qing military strategies, but he surrendered to the Qing one year later. After suffering a mixture of shame and pride under the Qing authorities, he finally participated in the resistance movement starting from the winter of 1646. But all of his actions were limited to aspects such as “rewarding the army” (*gaoshi* 犒師), counterespionage (*cefan* 策反), and some liaison work between various resistance forces.<sup>111</sup>

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然 (remarkable success), the criticisms usually provide concrete and detailed analysis. For example, *The Jiangpu xianzhi* 江浦縣志 deemed the *baojia* as *xuwen* 虛文 (empty paper); *The Huoshan xianzhi* 霍山縣志 criticized local official runners and common people for cheating each other. See *Wanli Jiangpu xianzhi* (萬曆) 江浦縣志, juan 10, Bingfangzhi 兵防志, TYGCMDFZXK XB 7; *Guangxu Huoshan xianzhi* (光緒) 霍山縣志, juan 14, Bingfangzhi minfang 兵防志民防, in ZGDFZJC— (A) 13, 269. Essentially, *baojia* was an enforced administrative system. Whether or not it could be successfully carried out totally depended on its relationship with that the local community’s existing social forces such as clans and gentry. As we will see, no single thing can change rural Chinese society unless it brings with it certain benefits. There are many studies of *baojia* during the Ming. For the early Qing *baojia* system, see the following sources: Xiao Yishan 蕭一山, *Qingdai tongshi* 清代通史, vol. 1, 631-38; also see Wakeman (1985), vol.2, 708-12.

<sup>110</sup> These two papers were published in 1645. In “Junzhi lun”, he examined the evolution of the Ming military system but did not provide any suggestions for improving it. See *Tinglin wenji*, juan 6, 亭林文集, in XXSKQS 1402. In “Xinshi lun”, he explored the various destinies of eight dynasties (Wu 吳, DongJin 東晉, Song 宋, Qi 齊, Liang 梁, Chen 陳, Nan Tang 南唐, Nan Song 南宋) which had their capital in Nanjing. He considered taking advantage of the geographic factors in order to gain a balance between defence and attack. See *Tinglin wenji*, juan 6, XXSKQS 1402, 127-28.

<sup>111</sup> QDRWZG, A, vol. 6 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1991), 210-24.

Third, some literati did become involved in military action, but their activities took place outside the geographic scope of this dissertation. For this reason, two very important literati, Hong Chengchou 洪承疇 (1593-1665)<sup>112</sup> and Yang Sichang 楊嗣昌 (1588-1641)<sup>113</sup> are excluded. Furthermore, the Manchu's perspective is given less attention because Wang's penetrating work has already provided a revealing exposition of Manchu strategic thinking, military tactics, and statecraft concerns in their conquest of China.<sup>114</sup>

**What I want to explore is the literati's performance as a whole in military action.** To be concrete, this dissertation will concentrate on the following figures selected from among several dozen literati with *juren* and *jinshi* degrees:<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Hong was a *jinshi* of 1616. He was the governor-general of northeastern Zhili and Liaodong 薊遼總督 of the Ming dynasty before he surrendered to the Manchus. In 1645, he was sent to Nanjing by the Qing dynasty with the title of Pacifier of Jiangnan 招撫江南. In 1656, he was promoted to Grand Secretary and Commander-in-chief 經略大學士. Frankly, Wang Chen-main concludes with an idealistic description of Huang's career, that is, Huang's primary motive for being a turncoat probably came from his concern for the survival of the people, see also page 7 and notes therein.

<sup>113</sup> Yang Sichang 楊嗣昌, *jinshi* of 1610. As Grand Secretary and Minister of War, he enjoyed the emperor's confidence for a long time, but finally committed suicide in Huguang because of his failure in fighting against the peasant rebellions.

<sup>114</sup> Frederick W. Mote, "Preface" for Wang's book on Hong Chengchou.

<sup>115</sup> Sources from: Arthur W. Hummel, edited, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (1644-1912), vol.1 (Washington DC: The Library of Congress, 1943); Xu Bingyi 徐秉義, *Ming mo zhonglie jishi* 明末忠烈紀實, in *Ming mo Qing chu shiliao xuankan* 明末清初史料選刊 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, repr., 1987); Wen Ruilin 溫睿臨, "yishi xusi kao" 繹史恤謚考 in *Nanjiang yishi* 南疆繹史, ZGYSJC, 36; Xie Zhengguang 謝正光, Fan Jinmin 范金民 ed., *Ming Yimin lu huiji* 明遺民錄匯輯 (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue, 1995); Qu Dajun 屈大均, *Huang Ming sichao chengren lu* 皇明四朝成仁錄, in SKJHSCK, Shibu 50.

Table: Individual Literati Involved in Military Action

Name	Place of birth	Degree and year	The highest official title from Ming or South Ming
Chen Qianfu 陳潛夫 (1610-1646)	Zhejiang Qiantang 浙江錢塘	juren 1636	Judge of Kaifeng, Vice Minister of the Court of Judicial Review and Inspector of the Circuit of Jiangxi 開封推官大理寺少卿兼江西道禦史
Chen Zilong 陳子龍 (1608-1647)	Nanzhili Songjiang 南直隸松江	jinshi 1637	The Right Vice-Minister of the Board of the War and Academician Reader-in-waiting of the Hanlin Academy 兵部右侍郎兼翰林院侍讀學士
He Gang 何剛 (?-1645)	Nanzhili Songjiang 南直隸松江	jinshi 1630	Vice-Director of the Department of Operation of the Board of the War 兵部職方司員外郎
Hou Tongceng 侯峒曾 (1591-1645)	Nanzhili Jiading 南直隸嘉定	jinshi 1625	Left Vice-Commissioner of the Office of Transmission 通政使司左通政
Huang Chunyao 黃淳耀 (1605-1645)	Nanzhili Jiading 南直隸嘉定	jinshi 1643	
Huang Daozhou 黃道周 (1585-1646)	Fujian Zhangpu 福建漳浦	jinshi 1622	Army-supervisor, Junior Mentor, Grand Secretary, Minister of the Board of War, Minister of Ministry of Personnel 督師少傅大學士吏兵二部尚書
Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610-1695)	Zhejiang Yuyao 浙江余姚		Left Vice-Censor-in-Chief of the Censorate 督察院左副都禦史
Jin Sheng 金聲 (1598-1645)	Nanzhili Xiuning 南直隸休寧	jinshi 1628	The Right Vice- Minister of the Board of the War, Right Censor-in-Chief of the Censorate 兵部右侍郎右僉都禦史
Ling Jiong 凌駟 (?-1645)	Nanzhili Shexian	jinshi 1643	Regional Inspector 巡按禦史



	南直隸歙縣		
Lu Zhengfei 路振飛 (?-1649)	Shanxi Quzhou 山西曲周	jinshi 1625	Grand Coordinator of Huaiyang 淮揚巡撫
Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578-1645)	Zhejiang Shanyin 浙江山陰	jinshi 1601	Left Censor-in-Chief of the Censorate 都察院左都禦史
Qi Biaoja 祁彪佳 (1602-45)	Zhejiang Shanyin 浙江山陰	jinshi 1622	Right Censor-in-Chief of the Censorate 都察院右僉都禦史
Qian Suyue 錢肅樂 (1606-1648)	Zhejiang Yinxian 浙江鄞縣	jinshi 1625	Grand Secretary, Minister of the Ministry of Rites 大學士兼禮部尚書
Shi Kefa 史可法 (1602-1645)	Henan Xiangfu 河南祥符	jinshi 1628	Army-supervisor, Grand Mentor, Grand Secretary, Minister of the Board of War 督師太傅大學士兵部尚書
Sun Jiaji 孫嘉績 (1604-1646)	Zhejiang Yuyao 浙江余姚	jinshi 1637	The Vice- Minister of the Board of the War, Right Censor-in-Chief of the Censorate 兵部侍郎右僉都禦史
Wu Yi 吳易 (?-1646)	Nanzhili Wujiang 南直隸吳江	jinshi 1637	Minister of the Board of War 兵部尚書
Xiong Rulin 熊汝霖 (?-1648)	Zhejiang Yuyao 浙江余姚	jinshi 1625	Chief Grand Secretary, Minister of the Board of War 東閣大學士兼兵部尚書
Yan Ermei 閻爾梅 (1603-1679)	Nanzhili Peixian 南直隸沛縣	juren 1630	
Zhang Huangyan 張煌言 (1620-1664)	Zhejiang Yinxian 浙江鄞縣	juren 1624	Chief Grand Secretary, Minister of the Board of War 東閣大學士兼兵部尚書
Zhang Guowei 張國維	Zhejiang Dongyang	jinshi 1622	Army-supervisor, Junior Mentor, Grand Secretary, Minister of the Board of War

(1595-1646)	浙江東陽		督師少傅大學士兵部尚書
Zheng Yuanxun 鄭元勳 (1604-1645)	Nanzhili Shexian 南直隸歙縣	jinshi 1643	
Zhu Dadian 朱大典 (?-1646)	Zhejiang Jinhua 浙江金華	jinshi 1616	Chief Grand Secretary, Minister of the Board of War 東閣大學士兼兵部尚書

In the light of my discussion of the reasons for choosing the regional focus of my dissertation, I shall start with the Shandong area.

# Chapter 1

## Literati in Shandong

Shandong Province has played an extremely important role in the past millennium of Chinese military history since the Grand Canal was opened as the main route for traffic and tribute grain transfer between the south and north, as it passed through the western part of the province. With the other waterways and the connecting roads, this province became a coherent region, geographically, economically, and culturally.

Entering the province from the north at Dezhou 德州, there was an imperial highway west of Jinan 濟南 which ran north to south. After the Qing armies captured Beijing in the early summer of 1644, they followed this road due south several months later. Since the main force was pounding the rebel bandits in the Central Plains, prince-general Dodo 多鐸 (1614-1649) did not lead his powerful cavalry to merge with those Qing armies from the north at Xuzhou until the early spring of 1645. The Qing army took this city in early May. Ten days later, they reached the outskirts of Yangzhou 揚州.

Three centuries later, in 1948, Lin Biao 林彪 (1907-1971) followed the footsteps of Dorgon 多爾袞 (1612-1651) to enter into north China from Manchuria. Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 (1904-1997) and Liu Bochong 劉伯承 (1892-1986) as well as Chen Yi 陳毅 (1901-1972) deployed their powerful armies in the south part of Shandong. The Chinese Communist Party exactly copied the above model and successfully defeated the main forces of the Nationalist armies.



Map 2 (Based on Wakeman 1985, vol.1, 307)

Generally speaking, previous military history studies about this province usually focused on geographic, topographical or transportation aspects.<sup>1</sup> During this specific

<sup>1</sup> For example, Anon., "Lishi renwu yu dili de guanxi" 歷史人物與地理的關係, *Dongfang zazhi* 20.5 (March, 1923), 125-33. Rao Shengwen 饒勝文, "Qipan xing Zhongguo junshi dili geju" 棋盤型中國軍事地理格局, in <http://www.omnitalk.com/miliarch/messages/2703.html>. 2005. Gu Yanwu, *Tianxia junguo libingshu* 天下郡國利病書, in XXSKQS 595-97. Gu Zuyu 顧祖輿, *Dushi fangyu jiyao* 讀史方輿紀要, in XXSKQS 600-09. Zhao Xiding 趙希鼎, "Qing dai gesheng de zhengzhi zhidu" 清代各省的政治制度, *Lishi yanjiu* 3 (1980), 153-64. Leif Littrup, *Subbureaucratic Government in Ming Times: A Study of Shandong Province in the Sixteenth Century* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981). Philip C. C. Huang, *Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985). I

time of the Ming- Qing transition period, what I want to emphasize is the manpower resources – the most important prerequisite for the war itself. Only by doing so can we expect to understand why and how wars could be supported. To reach this goal, we must explore the specific social structures of the province.

### **1: 1. The special status of Shandong in military history**

Ming Shandong had almost the same area as it does today, about 150,000 sq. kilometers. There were 6 prefectures, 15 sub-prefectures, 89 counties, and they only changed very little in the early Qing. By 1578, the population was 5,664,099, and the number of households was 1,372,260. Throughout the Shunzhi reign (1644-1661) of the Qing, the population increased to about 6,480,000.<sup>2</sup>

In the vast rural areas, especially in the west part of Shandong, most village families to some extent produced for the market as individual units. From this perspective, the village was more a neighborhood of separate peasant families pursuing their individual interests than a solidary collectivity. This preponderance of owner-cultivators made for a greater presence of the state, and thus tended to contribute to a fuller articulation of a village political organization to cope with state demands. Moreover, the low level of social stratification and rarity of elite members in rural lineages also meant the absence of elaborate and powerful kinship groupings such as those in the lower Yangzi or the Pearl River delta.<sup>3</sup>

Accompanied with economic and commercial development, the sixteenth century is generally regarded as the time when elite influence over local communities began to accelerate. This coincided with the growing tendency to establish institutionalized

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Songgyu, "Shantung in the Shun-chih Reign: The Establishment of Local Control and the Gentry Response", trans. Joshua A. Fogel, *Ch'ing-shih wen- t'i*, 4.4 (Dec.1980), 1-34, (part one) and 4.5 (June 1981), 1-31(part two). Joseph W. Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

<sup>2</sup> An Zuozhang 安作璋 ed., *Shandong tong shi - Ming Qing Juan* 山東通史-明清卷 (Jinan: Shandong renmin, 1994), 173-77.

<sup>3</sup> Philip Huang (1985), 29; Also see Joseph W. Esherick (1987), 1-37.

lineages which could perpetuate the power of certain families. The sources consulted by Leif Littrup have not revealed much information on the creation of such lineages in Shandong and their possible influence. His detailed study of sub-county administration in sixteenth century Shandong observes that he went looking for the growth of local gentry power that other scholars have noted for the late Ming, including the increasing interest among wealthy gentry in building lineages as a means of perpetuating the power of their families. Eventually, he concludes that there was not much evidence of gentry lineage-building in Shandong.<sup>4</sup>

For the government, its encouragement of a smallholder economy at the expense of big estates is not surprising. Smallholders, after all, were a more accessible source of tax revenue than powerful big estate owners, and they were also far less politically threatening.<sup>5</sup>

However, Shandong people also had another tendency: they usually fled to other places where they could feed their stomachs during time of famine or suffering from high taxes. An early Qing edict also provided another clue to understand this tendency:

Because families often had many sons and little land, “the people of Shandong easily left their homes without a second thought.” In the worst cases, whole villages would take to the road to beg –carrying entire families, men, women and children with them. This long-established pattern of migration and mobility was an important aspect in the social structure of northwest Shandong villages. With people constantly moving in and out, villages were much more heterogeneous.<sup>6</sup>

The above characteristics, especially the tendency of ordinary people to easily and frequently migrate, provide ample opportunities for the varying political and military forces to mobilize them for military purposes. They also enabled the central governments to know that only by controlling this area could they manage the entire empire effectively. For instance, at the end of 1948, the Communist effort at

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<sup>4</sup> Littrup, 32.

<sup>5</sup> P. Huang (1985), 86.

<sup>6</sup> Esherick, 1987, 27. Even in the 1970s, I myself still witnessed this kind of mobility during the winter and spring seasons.

mobilizing upward of 2 million peasants in the Xuzhou area to provide logistical support was directed by Deng Xiaoping.<sup>7</sup>

The situation was no different for the Manchus. Dorgon, the prince regent clearly realized that this province is the “gate” and “throat” of Beijing.<sup>8</sup> Within six months after taking Beijing, he sent Pacification Commissioner (*Zhaofu* 招撫) Wang Aoyong 王鼐永, Grand Coordinator (*Xunfu* 巡撫) Fang Dayou 方大猷 and Chen Jin 陳錦 as well as Director-General of the Grand Canal (*Hedu* 河督) Yang Fangxing 楊方興 and others to be on duty in this province. He also sent the powerful Manchu armies to the province in order to face the challenges from both the remnants of the Ming armies and the rebellious peasants operating there. Based on the specific study of Chen Feng 陳鋒, in the early period of Shunzhi reign, the total number of soldiers of the Manchu army was about 23,000. At the end of Shunzhi reign, there were about 20,000.<sup>9</sup>

For those Manchu armies, due to simple and special dietary customs, they usually had no worries about logistics: every soldier could feed himself for about three months.<sup>10</sup> In fact, the Manchus invaded Shandong three times before the Ming decline; each of these attacks saw Shandong suffering great damage. The scattered Ming garrisons could not face the forces of the powerful Manchu cavalry.<sup>11</sup>

The Qing also realized that the financial health of the regime mainly depended upon clearing the roads (as well as the Grand Canal) through Shandong so that grain could be transported along them, and securing communications through this area so that merchants and goods could travel safely. If the dynasty adopted a policy of “soothing” (*zhaofu*) the populace by awarding amnesties, then its financial needs would be met.

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<sup>7</sup> Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 508.

<sup>8</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao bingbian*, vol.5, 468.

<sup>9</sup> Chen Feng 陳鋒, *Qing dai junfei yanjiu* 清代軍費研究 (Wuhan: Wuhan Daxue, 1992), 92-94.

<sup>10</sup> Yang Shicong 楊士聰, *Jiashen hezhen lue* 甲申核真略 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, repr. 1985), 52.

<sup>11</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao yibian*, vol.6, 525. See also “Introduction” part of this dissertation, pages 17-18 and the notes therein.

Considering all these aspects, the Qing urgently needed help and cooperation from the Shandong elite. Dorgon asked that those civil officials who already worked for the Qing should “quickly make known the names of those of unusual talent and magnanimous virtue who have sunk into retirement, so that provision may be made for their recruitment.” As Wakeman states, “one of the first to respond to Dorgon’s invitation for the names of local collaborators was the new governor of Shandong, Wang Aoyong, who also held the honorary post of Vice- President of Revenue.”

Wang was from Shandong himself; he even encouraged local literati to accept the new dynasty; and on Aug. 13, 1644, he submitted an initial list of thirty-nine names of Shandong notables. Other nominations were also sent forward at this time by other officials. Dorgon accepted most of these recommendations. And he also rewarded the Shandong landlords as an entire group by accepting Wang Aoyong’s recommendation that the province’s taxes be momentarily “forgiven”; and during the following year, 1645, the tax burden be lightened for a longer period of time.<sup>12</sup>

Wakeman also indicated that the majority of collaborators at that time were neither unemployed poets nor the literati from the south. Most of the fifty prominent officials who joined the Qing government in 1644 and whose biographies are recorded in the 18<sup>th</sup>- century compilation *Erchenzhuan* 貳臣傳 (Biographies of twice-serving ministers) were administrators in the capital. And, during the Chongzhen reign, roughly three-quarters of the ministerial officials came from the north. This reversal in the ratio between northerners and southerners mainly resulted from the large number of Shandong adherents: of all the *Erchen* surrendering in 1644, one-quarter was from this province. “It was Shandong that led by far in offering civilian support to staff the new Qing government in Beijing.”<sup>13</sup> The sudden prominence of Shandong men in the early Qing was partly due to the early pacification of their province, and partly to the ready identification of local elites with dynastic law and order in rebellious areas.

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<sup>12</sup> Wakeman, 1985, vol. 1, 437-38, 424.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.



Now, the real condition of the various social strata in the province before the arrival of the Manchus becomes the key to understand the reaction of the Shandong literati and the other gentry to the new Qing government.

From I Songgyu's research, we know the process by which the Manchus conquered and controlled the Shandong area, and what the response from the local gentry was. It shows that the peasant bands posed an immense threat to the ruling structure of the landlords and gentry, thus forcing them to organize local militia and bravoes and to devise measures for self-protection in order to survive the crisis. The gentry hoped to preserve and secure their existing advantages under the Qing, and by fulfilling these expectations the Qing won the acquiescence and support of the gentry. By investigating the showdown in Shandong province between gentry authority and local bandits, the surrender or resistance of the gentry to Li Zicheng regime, the process by which the gentry surrendered to the Qing, and the measures taken by the Qing toward them, his paper fills a scholarly void answering such questions as under what circumstances was help from Qing power requested by local militia groups seeking to protect themselves in the face of local bandit forces? Or, how did the gentry oppose bandits and establish their local power under the Qing? His conclusion is that the Qing's "success was attained by balancing three elements: state authority, peasant resistance, and the gentry's 'special interests.'"<sup>14</sup>

However, since the author's study only focused on the Jining 濟寧 area, it could not cover the very complicated conditions of the entire province, especially the big difference between this area and the rest of Shandong. Furthermore, there are some limitations within the primary materials. For example, works such as *Dingsi xiaoji* 定思小記<sup>15</sup> and other relevant data have not been used.

Both Wakeman and Littrup's studies share the same tendency of overstating the cooperation of the Ming officials, literati and other local gentry with the Qing. We

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<sup>14</sup> I Songgyu, "Shantung in the Shun-chih Reign: The Establishment of Local Control and the Gentry Response", trans. Joshua A. Fogel, *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i*, 4. 4 (Dec.1980), 1-34 (part one) and 4.5 (June 1981), 1-31 (part two).

<sup>15</sup> Written by Liu Shangyou 劉尚友 who witnessed the events he describes. See *Dingsi xiaoji*, in *Jiashen hezhen lue* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, repr.1985).

have to admit that, compared to southerners (*Nanren* 南人), the northerners (*Beiren* 北人) and especially Shandong people did have a tendency to cooperate with the Manchus rather easily. Other than the reasons mentioned by Wakeman above, it is also related to customs and even the language factors. However, his emphasis on the “high degree of violent class conflict in the province” before the Manchus arrived did shed light on conditions in the province. Comparing the resistance movements that took place in the Jiangnan and east Zhejiang later on, this observation would inspire us to examine the characteristic of local ethnic consciousness.

The reasons that made previous scholars ignore the complicated responses of the Shandong people in the face of the Manchu invasion are because they mostly focused on the southwest and the border areas of the province. For example, Leif Littrup’s study, I Songgyū’s excellent research on the Qing’s local control and the response from the gentry and Satō Fumitoshi’s 佐藤文俊 study on Li Qingshan’s 李青山 rebellion are examples among many others.<sup>16</sup>

In fact, the eastern part of Shandong also provides us a chance to study different facets of the Shandong literati. The Jiaodong peninsula 膠東半島 was “a world of military personnel.” By the latter stages of the Hongwu reign (1368-1398), there were 9 *Wei* and 3 *So*, or a total of 53,760 military officials and soldiers, plus their family members. The overall number reached about 160,000. The land was not fertile, and local residents had a tendency to move out, and the more they moved, the higher the population of the military residents was.<sup>17</sup>

By the end of 1642, the Manchu cavalry had encircled and attacked Weixian 濰縣 (now named Weifang 濰坊) City for a whole week. The Regional Inspector of Shandong (山東巡按), Chen Changyan 陳昌言, and his colleagues received full cooperation from the local gentry and the civilians. The Manchus had to withdraw their

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<sup>16</sup> See I Songgyū and Satō Fumitoshi 佐藤文俊, “Dozoku Ri Seizan no ran ni tsuite – Minmatsu Kahoku nōmin hanran no ichi keitai” 土賊李青山の亂について – 明末華北農民反亂の一形態, *Tōyō gakuho* 53.3-4 (1971), 117-63.

<sup>17</sup> Cao Shuji 曹樹基, *Zhongguo yiminshi – Ming dai* 中國移民史-明代 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin, 1997), 198-201.

army even though they caused the city wall to collapse.<sup>18</sup> Several months later, the Manchu army reached Laizhou 萊州 City. There, the defending Ming army, got help from various forces: retired officials such as a former minister (*Shangshu* 尚書) donated 4,000 taels of silver, a Grand Secretary (*Daxueshi* 大學士) donated 3,000 taels of silver; some *juren* and *shengyuan* also joined the defense — firing cannon, attacking the enemy, and so on.<sup>19</sup>

Basically, by about 1647, the Qing had reached its first goal in the establishment and consolidation of its authority in Shandong. To mobilize for war, in the early period of the Qing's rule Regent Dorgon ordered that the former Ming local civil and military administrative units should “prepare food and forage for the coming of the Manchu army. As for the officials and ordinary people, whether they used to serve Li Zicheng or not, if they surrender to the Qing they may get the relevant benefits.”<sup>20</sup> However, these instances did not mean that the Qing were able to enjoy a peaceful life from then on.

## 1: 2. Facing the Challenges: the Various Facets of Literati

The general historical background of that period is that the majority of the population of Shandong was always caught in a precarious balance between a full stomach and famine. The area was constantly subjected to natural calamities such as floods, droughts, locusts, or pests, which endangered the balance between food production and the size of the population. Each district and sub-prefecture reported such calamities at intervals of only a few years, and few if any of the districts avoided famine at least

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<sup>18</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao yibian*, vol.5, 485-86.

<sup>19</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao xinbian*, vol.10, 952- 53.

<sup>20</sup> Zheng Tianting 鄭天挺, *Ming mo nongmin qi yi shiliao* 明末農民起義史料 (Beijing, Zhonghua, 1957), 514.

once during the years span from 1550 to 1660.<sup>21</sup> In 1641, a famous literatus Zuo Maodi 左懋弟 (1601-1645) witnessed the catastrophe of drought: “the dead are everywhere along the roads” between Jinan and Yanzhou 兗州. It was said that about 40% of the population lost their lives.<sup>22</sup> This crisis of survival made the various social forces try to find their own ways to meet the challenges. In the following sections of this chapter we shall concentrate on the literati’s military as well as their political activities. For the convenience of analysis, I would like to classify these social forces into specific elements such as the Ming government, the rebellious peasants as well as the southern Ming regime, and finally, most importantly, the Manchu authorities. Using the changing political environment as clue, I shall first explore the military performance of the literati and their representatives – civil officials in the face of the Manchu invasion.

By the end of sixteenth century, the Ming army had a total of about 56,000 officials and soldiers in Shandong, plus 3,000 soldiers responsible for the protection of the transportation of tribute grain.<sup>23</sup> Basically, they only had very poor training and equipment. For instance, one soldier might get 6 *dou* of rice every month in Dezhou. This amount could have fed him for about half a month, but if paid in its cash equivalent of 0.18 tael of silver a month, it could only purchase 3 days worth of grain.<sup>24</sup>

With this army, there was no hope to rely on them to engage in the various military actions. Entering the seventeenth century, the first severe damage to the province came from the mutiny of Kong Youde 孔有德. This rebellion was finally pacified in the early part of 1633. It lasted two years and affected 2 prefectures and more than 10 counties. A witness to the mutiny describes that, from Laizhou to the east,

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<sup>21</sup> Littrup, 20-22.

<sup>22</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao yibian*, vol. 10, 943.

<sup>23</sup> MSLLZ- JSSLJ, 1197.

<sup>24</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao yibian*, vol.4, 308.

an area of almost 300 *li* was destroyed and more than 100,000 people were killed.<sup>25</sup> From both *Pingpan ji* 平叛記 and *Chongzhen changbian* 崇禎長編<sup>26</sup> we have detailed records about the whole process, and there is no need to repeat them here. By this time, most of the Ming army had enjoyed more than two centuries of peaceful life. Its highest commander even took a sedan chair into the battlefield during the process of the pacification of the mutiny.<sup>27</sup>

Another threat was from peasant rebellion, especially religious rebellion. During Ming times, there were more than twenty religious rebellions that took place in Shandong. In the Chongzhen reign, a total of five violent religious incidents took place throughout the whole empire, of which three were in this province. Among them, the biggest one was Xu Hongru's 許鴻儒 rebellion in 1622.<sup>28</sup>

Xu's rebellion lasted 161 days from May 3 until October 16, 1622, when he was captured, and resulted in the occupation of two county cities, Teng 滕 and Zou 鄒 counties for more than 100 days. Based on one source from *Ming shilu*, we know how a typical high ranking civil official treated the rebellion.

When the rebellious army of the White Lotus sect 白蓮教 reached its apex, Yu Dacheng 余大成, the Grand Coordinator of Shandong, did nothing but try to have the leader of the rebellion become his "sworn brother", and help him to apply for a rank of nobility. Yu even exaggerated his achievement before the rebels had entered the border.

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<sup>25</sup> MSLZ- SDSLJ, 423.

<sup>26</sup> Both of them are in ZGYSJC 28.

<sup>27</sup> *Pingpan ji*, in ZGYSJC 28, 502. After the expulsion of the remnants of the Mongol forces from the north and the northeast, there followed two-and-a half centuries of relatively stable rule. The Ming only was briefly challenged in the borders, and suffered from Japanese pirates, who occasionally ravaged the coasts in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but they were no threat to Ming rule.

<sup>28</sup> For these aspects, at least the following studies should be mentioned: Daniel L. Overmyer, *Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 73-108; Susan Naquin, *Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 63-66; 267-69, and sources cited therein. Also see Wang Jing 王靜, "Ming dai minjian zongjiao fan zhengfu huodong de zhuzhong biaoxian yu tezheng" 明代民間宗教反政府活動的諸種表現與特征, *Nankai xuebao* 2 (1987), 28-36; Hu Yiya 胡一雅, "Ming dai houqi Bailianjiao qiyi" 明代後期白蓮教起義, in *Zhongguo nongmin zhanzheng shi yanjiuhui*, ed., *Zhongguo nongmin zhanzheng shi yanjiu jikan* 中國農民戰爭史研究集刊 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1982), vol.2, 81-90.

When the rebels finally came to Cao Zhou 曹州 and the adjacent areas, they met no resistance, and the official armies could not expel them. For several months, what this Grand Coordinator did was just to let his subordinates report the “merit” (功) in order to avoid the consequences of damages caused by the war. When the rebellious sect retreated, the official armies chased in name, but in fact they “just liked to see them off”. Yu Dacheng kept this secret. As a Buddhist disciple, he emphasized “the prohibition of killing” (戒殺), what he knew was “to close his gate and read sutra” (閉門誦經).<sup>29</sup>

At the end of 1622, Xu’s main force was surrounded by government troops in Tengxian, and Xu finally was taken to Beijing and executed in the market place.

Both Xu’s army and other traditional types of peasant rebellious armies in this area were called local bandits and local pirates (*tuzei* 土賊 and *tukou* 土寇) in the official documents. Although the Ming’s military forces sometimes could meet their challenges, such as capturing Xu, they could not respond adequately to Li Zicheng’s powerful rebellious army.

Li’s military potential increased relatively steadily and attained its apex in 1644. But his armies subsequently suffered a precipitous decline when opposed by the Manchu Banner army. Li Zicheng occupied Beijing in the spring. Because his regime had no regular source of income, he had to pay more attention to *zhuixiang* 追餉 - getting illicit money to help pay for the army. For the Shandong area, he designated a few armies to gain control over the population in certain specific strategic locations, and also sent his civil officials to Shandong to try to manage the area.

Faced with these new conditions, many Ming local officials chose to surrender, including some of Confucius’s descendents. The Qufu 曲阜 hereditary Magistrate Kong Zhenkan 孔貞堪 even contributed 10 horses and 1,000 taels of silver, and sent staff to welcome Li’s officials in Linqing 臨清, and knelt before them when they got to Qufu. Li’s officials also reached the eastern part of the province such as Qingzhou 青

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<sup>29</sup> MSLZ- SDSLJ, 583-84.

州, Laizhou 萊州 and Dengzhou 登州. Since Li's regime did not have enough officials to send, some appointed officials (many of whom were literati possessing the *shengyuan* degree and who came from the Shanxi area) went on duty only with very few staff or even alone.<sup>30</sup> In fact, Li's local officials had to focus primarily on the getting "illicit money" and in the meantime had to ignore the management of local affairs.

Based on Parsons's study, the Achilles heel of the late Ming rebel movement was its failure to translate military power into political power in the form of solid administrative structures. Some literati and other elite later joined the rebels but had no real opportunity to influence rebel policy at the earlier stage. The rebels showed very little interest in deliberately seeking their support, and there are only a few instances known when they attempted to persuade captured members of the local literati and other gentry to join them. They were insignificant numerically, and many gave only half-hearted support at best; with a few exceptions, none of them ever attained a position of real power and influence. The rebels remained unreconciled with them.<sup>31</sup>

Li's few armies in Shandong also had no suitable training and they were short on discipline. This stimulated a "united resistance" from the Ming government, most of the local gentry, and even from the so-called "Southern Ming" later on. When the Qing joined these struggles against Li, his regime became even weaker.

After the Qing established its rule in Shandong, their deepest worry came from what I call "the integrating forces" which included the gentry, many of whom did not cooperate with the Qing, peasant rebels (both local predators and roving bandits), and elements of the Southern Ming regime mentioned below. The Qing could easily defeat any one of them on its own, but it had to prevent the combination of the above

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<sup>30</sup> All the above materials are from *Zhongguo nongmin zhanzhengshi luncong bianji weiyuanhui ed., Zhongguo nongmin zhanzheng shi luncong* 中國農民戰爭史論叢 (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin, 1982), vol.4, 514-19.

<sup>31</sup> James Bunyan Parsons, *The Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1969), 206-16.

different forces into one. Xie Guozhen lists more than twenty peasant rebellions against the Manchu conquerors, some of them such as those of Yuqi 於七, Xieqian 謝遷, and Renqi 任七 lasted for several years.<sup>32</sup> In *Ming Qing shiliao*, *Qing shilu* and other primary sources, we can find a lot of data about how the Qing army united with the local officials and gentry to fight against the peasant rebellions.

Turning now to the Southern Ming government, let us see whether or not this government provided any help to the resistance against the Manchus in the Shandong area.

In mid-June of 1644, the Ming Prince Fu 福王 was picked by some Ming officials and generals to ascend the throne in Nanjing, and the following year was declared to be the first year of the Hongguang 弘光 Reign. This is the so-called Southern Ming regime. Scholarship in the West has not paid enough attention to the relationship between this reign and Shandong. Usually the Southern Ming regime is deemed to have been “powerless” to do anything in the province and the rest of north China.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, Chinese scholars have criticized the Southern Ming regime because it was short of “strategic vision” and lacked confidence to affect Shandong and to organize an effective defense against the Qing.<sup>34</sup>

Facing the threat from peasant rebellions and the Manchu invasion, the Shandong literati and the other gentry tried to get in touch with the Southern Ming. After the Ming lost control in Shandong, it is said that the local village braves and militias were more than 100,000 in this area, but both the Grand Coordinator of Shandong and Denglai were in the Huai'an area 淮安 of Nanzhili. The Southern Ming several times pressed them to return to their duties in Shandong, but received no answer.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Xie Guozhen 謝國楨, *Nan Ming shi lue* 南明史略 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1957), 103.

<sup>33</sup> I Songgyu, Part one, 15.

<sup>34</sup> Gu Cheng 顧誠, *Nan Ming shi* 南明史 (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian, 1997), 94-101.

<sup>35</sup> Li Qing 李青, *Nandulu* 南渡錄, juan 4, in NMSL BZ, 314.



According to archival sources, some high officials such as the Grand Coordinator and the Regional Commander (*zongbing* 總兵) of the Southern Ming regime only sent a few people to enter into those regions of Shandong where there was no Qing army to engage in some propaganda activities.<sup>36</sup>

On April 17, 1644, Ming officials, including a Censor (*yushi* 禦史), a Judge (*tuiguan* 推官) and the local gentry, organized to repel Li's regime in Dezhou. They killed his local officials such as Defense Commissioner (*fangyushi* 防禦史) and Prefectural Governor of Dengzhou (*Dengzhou Mu* 登州牧) and elected a member of the Ming imperial clan as Prince of Ji (*Ji wang* 濟王). This Dezhou Incident was the turning point for Li's rule in Shandong because it triggered a series of rebellions in more than forty prefectures and counties in the province.

In Laiyang 萊陽, “the thieves and the bandits were everywhere.” After the Ming magistrate fled, Li's magistrate also had to leave his office. The local gentry Song Huang 宋璜 sent his cavalry to Wendeng 文登 and killed Li's official. A *shengyuan* named Yang Wei 楊威 from Zhaoyuan 招遠 who secretly accepted a title from the Southern Ming as Vice-Regional Commander, led more than one thousand people and occupied the county city.<sup>37</sup>

According to Liu Zeqing 劉擇清 (1603-1648), the Ming General Commander of Shandong, this *shengyuan*'s name was Yang Sigun 楊嗣袞, who changed his name to “Wei” (威, literally “authority” in Chinese) to express his resentment at both the peasant rebellion and the Manchu invasion. He also gave up his career as a *shengyuan* in order to pursue a military career 棄文就武. The Board of War let him attach himself to Liu Zeqing. One year later, Liu sent him to the east coast of Shandong to organize *xiangyong* 鄉勇. He hired and trained more than one thousand local militia, “becoming a powerful army.”<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Gu Cheng, 98.

<sup>37</sup> *Laiyang xianzhi* 萊陽縣志 (Minguo 民國), last chapter, fuji·Bing ge 附記·兵革, np., nd.

<sup>38</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao yibian*, vol.6, 540. For *xiangyong* and rest of other local forces, see page 68 of this chapter and notes therein.

Many of these local militia units, especially those in northwestern Shandong, had already been mobilized to fight against the peasant regime. However, in fact, they could not get any assistance from the Southern Ming regime. The eminent scholar-official Xie Sheng 謝升 (*jinsi* 1607) was not favorably disposed toward the Nanjing regime. Appalled by Li Zicheng's depredations and impressed by the Manchus' transformation into a host of virtuous avengers, Xie Sheng joined with more than forty other leading members of the Shandong gentry and sent a representative to Beijing to get in touch with the Qing government. Their coming coincided with the Qing's urgent demands to secure the province, and so it was natural that they formed an alliance.

We also have many cases that show some of the Shandong literati keeping their dignity and refusing to serve the aliens. Yang Shichong 楊士聰, the author of *Jiashen hezhen lue* publicly refused to serve the Qing:

I would like to live in the hills and woods till my death (終老山林), and to be hermit of the Qing. Fish in the water and birds in the sky, each one may find its suitable way to live.<sup>39</sup>

Another example is Zheng Xingqiao 鄭興僑 (*juren* 1636). He joined the resistance movement to fight against the peasant rebellion, trying to protect the transportation line of the Grand Canal. After the Manchu army occupied Shandong province, he fled to the South with his family members. Later on, he joined Shi Kefa's Yangzhou resistance, and fled to Hangzhou after the fall of Yangzhou. He steadfastly refused to serve the Qing.<sup>40</sup>

Generally, the attitude of these Ming literati and other gentry toward Li's regime was not uniform. Some of them chose to cooperate with it in order to survive. When Li's army pursued *zhuixiang*, they began to try to fight against this peasant regime: they killed and expelled Li's officials and tried to resume Ming authority. Faced with the Qing, the attitude they had was even more contradictory. In fact, the Qing knew

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<sup>39</sup> Yang Shichong 楊士聰, 54-55.

<sup>40</sup> He Lingxiu 何齡修, "Shi Kefa Yangzhou dushi qijian de mufu renwu" 史可法揚州督師期間的幕府人物, *Yanjing xuebao*, New series, 4 (1998), 73.

and understood what they thought and what they had done. Although deserters “living in the woods and hills” were offered amnesty in return for reporting to their former unit, it was evidently not altogether easy to bring unruly Ming military units under central control. An edict from the Qing prince-regent dated September 17, 1644, reads:

Many of the local military personnel who surrendered are like rabbits suspiciously looking two ways at once. Seeing the shape of things, they pretend to tender their allegiance, but still harbor misgivings. These kinds of people are merely seeking [an opportunity] to commit crimes. Even though they have obvious merits, it is still hard for them to redeem themselves. From now on, only those who are truly able to painfully correct their former faults and who can keep their word will have the same rank as before. As for ignorant and mean people, whether they took advantage of disorder to commit rape, or in fear of punishment turned into outlaws, they too will be forgiven their former crimes. They are permitted to renew themselves, return to their native places, and enjoy their occupations. But if they are obdurate and irreclaimable, then we must decisively kill and exterminate them, and not be lenient.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, others surrendered; while yet others had no choice but to accept alien rule. A few of them even engaged in military activities against the Qing and were executed. For the rest of the chapter, I will focus on these types of people.

The four months from the Dezhou Incident to the Qing’s pacification of Shandong in August 1644 provide us with enough evidence to analyze the performance of the local military forces.

The rural society of late-Ming witnessed a boom in agricultural production as well as significant changes in the social order and social structure. In order to keep public order, the Ming dynasty took a variety of measures. Especially, it inherited the *Lijia* 里

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<sup>41</sup> Quoted from Wakeman, 1985, vol.1, 417-18.

甲 and *Baojia* 保甲 systems. These two systems were created for a static society, and in this respect they must be regarded as a considerable achievement of the early Ming bureaucracy. However, there are no primary materials which show that these kinds of local administrative units played any role in the Ming- Qing transition period in this province. Littrup's book did provide some information about both *baojia* and *xiangyue* 鄉約, but it seems that there are no actual methods which allow us to measure the *baojia* system and its implementation. "They did not enforce a uniform system."<sup>42</sup>

From the perspective of military affairs, the local military forces are very complicated in their names and organizational structures. "We read, for instance, in an account of the defense of Zhangqiu against rebels in 1647 that the government forces consisted of : (1) regular garrison troops under army captains; (2) yamen police commanded by a constable (*bu*), who also led a contingent of "housemen" (*jiading*); (3) the personal housemen of the prefect (at that moment Prefect Chen led his personal housemen to block off the street entrance); (4) the personal housemen of a former Ming soldier and local magnate (the Ming Captain Yu Dahai and others commanded their housemen); village militia (*xiangbing*) specially assembled to defend the city, and led by local gentry (*xiangshen*)."<sup>43</sup>

In general terms, the *Great Ming Code* (*Da Ming lü* 大明律) lists the items of the military arms which were prohibited to be privately possessed. Other relevant laws included prohibitions against the private sale of military equipment and war horses. But in the late Ming times, most officials took it for granted that most households possessed such weapons as cudgels, bows and arrows, knives, spears, and swords. They wanted to take advantage of the widespread presence of arms in society to strengthen local security. Thanks to previous studies, we know some facts about them,

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<sup>42</sup> Almost all the studies about the *baojia* system have focused on the mid- and early Ming, and no concrete research available in the Ming-Qing transition time. See, Littrup, 160-70; John R. Watt, *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), chapters, 8-10; for a Chinese book, see Wen Juntian 聞鈞天, *Zhongguo baojia zhidu* 中國保甲制度 (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1935), 171-272; Also see Zhu Shaohou 朱紹侯 et al., *Zhongguo gudai zhi'an zhidu shi* 中國古代治安制度史 (Zhengzhou: Henan daxue, 1994), 605-32, 715-43. For more information, see also page 44 of this dissertation.

<sup>43</sup> Wakeman, 1985, vol.1, 433.

such as the similarities and differences between the military forces in the various areas, and their organizations, and even some of their economic backgrounds.<sup>44</sup> For example, it is clear that “*minzhuang*” 民壯 was one kind of local militarized force controlled by the government in the late Ming times, while “*xiangbing*” 鄉兵 was only controlled by the local gentry or other elite such as merchants. Those *Xiangbing* were involved in militia training during the winter, after autumn crops had been harvested and before spring agricultural activities had begun. They had only one function, which was to provide protection for local society. There was no relation with the local government. And, we also know that the soldier’s pay and provisions in the *minzhuang* had no guarantee. As for the “*xiangbing*”, it was usually composed by “*baojia*” and “*tuanlian*” 團練. Sometimes, *xiangyong* 鄉勇 or *yi Yong* 義勇 are also called “*Tuanlian*.” There were big differences between regions, and the leaders of the forces also have different names depending on the region. For instance, we may find some titles like “*lianrong*” 練總, “*tuanzhang*” 團長, or “*baozhang*” 保長.<sup>45</sup>

Littrup’s study shows that “the key to the eventual consolidation of Qing control over Shandong was the interlocking of this system of personally-led militia with officially supplied and appointed regular troops under the command of the central government.” These militiamen were organized into individual brigades (*ying* 營), and further assembled into “families” (*jia* 家) of eighty to one hundred soldiers under their own militia commander (*lianrong*). As “house-men” (*jiading* 家丁) they were personally loyal to the local lords and magnates who fed and clothed them. This semi-feudal relationship was actually nurtured by the civil authorities: the governor himself provided funds to pay the personal troops “under the banner” (*biaoxia* 標下) of each

<sup>44</sup> Chen Baoliang 陳保良, “Ming dai de minbing yu xiangbing” 明代的民兵與鄉兵, *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* 1 (1994), 82-92; Wu Han 吳晗, “Ming dai de junbing” 明代的軍兵, in *Dengxia ji* 燈下集 (Beijing: Sanlian, 1961); Liang Fangzhong 梁方仲, “Ming dai de minbing” 明代的民兵, *Liang Fangzhong jingji shi wenji bubian*, 梁方仲經濟史文集補編 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji, 1984); Li Guangtao 李光濤, *Ming Qing shi lunji* 明清史論集 (Taiwan: Shangwu, 1971).

<sup>45</sup> For these kinds of local forces, see notes mentioned above. Esherick’s description about the local military forces of Shandong in the late- nineteenth century is also relevant here: Landlords would organize local militia, but they would also expect their tenants to join in the protection of the locality. Unlike the late Ming period, villages became very tight-knit communities now, well-fortified against outside threats, and typically subject to the absolute rule of some leading family. See Esherick (1987), 23.

commander. The same principle of personal loyalty as well as the official recognition of individual units of “housemen under the banner” of a commander was extended to higher-level military units. At the prefectural level, there were assemblages of troops known generally as guards units (*zhen* 鎮). And, in addition to the large contingent of personally-commanded housemen under the local gentry, there were also housemen under regular Qing officials. Moreover, the personal forces of local gentry could be transferred from one district to another as the need arose. What came to be called “skilled braves” (*yi* 勇) by the governor in his reports to Beijing thus became a major force behind Qing rule.<sup>46</sup>

The local gentry's armies could easily cooperate with those of the government if they faced a common threat from rebels. In the spring of 1641, The Regional Inspector of Shandong (山東巡按), Li Jingu 李近古, complained that he had a very few soldiers to pacify the rebellion in the southwest of the province along the Yellow River. Since there was no help from Beijing, he had to ask for assistance from the local gentry. To cooperate with him, twenty local gentry led their own forces, numbering more than two thousand family forces (*qinding* 親丁) to help and they killed “countless” rebels.<sup>47</sup>

This kind of local force also could be used to meet the Manchu invasion. In 1642, a member of the gentry “mustered four hundred able-bodied tenants to make up a family militia and got together fifty draft horses and donkeys with carts and enough weapons and firearms to arm everyone.” To counter roaming rebels, he and other gentry raised a cavalry force and another four thousand men from the private militias of the great families of the region to drive them back.<sup>48</sup> But when the Manchu army controlled the province, none of these men could get support from the Southern Ming. In fact, their resistance to the Manchu invasion lasted only until August. Under the

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<sup>46</sup> Littrup, 30-32.

<sup>47</sup> Zheng Tianting, 328.

<sup>48</sup> Timothy Brook, *The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 241-43.

program of amnesty and enlistment developed by Fang Dayou most of them had to surrender to the Qing.<sup>49</sup>

Under this new authority, these local forces found they could easily get help from the government in the pacification of the bandits in the southwest region of Shandong. Early in the Shunzhi reign, a large number of bandits tried to attack Zouxian City. The Grand Coordinator ordered the nearby regions of Qufu 曲阜, Tengxian 滕縣 and Dongping 東平 to provide aid. These three counties provided two hundred cavalymen in total; the general director of militia (*lianzong* 練總) of Zouxian provided more than eight hundred infantrymen. All of them were well trained and could be deployed right away. The Qing gave them three hundred taels of silver for logistical support and sent one official to each unit (*ying*) to supervise them.<sup>50</sup>

### 1: 3. Literati and Local Military Forces

For both local elite and the local military forces, the primary concern was to gain or ensure security in order to protect their interests and privileges. Some of them did not even care about the issue of ethnicity when they were facing attack from the Manchus.

When the Manchu army planned its attack against Gaotang, all the gentry were afraid of it. By that time, the tribute silver of Jiangxi province happened to be passing by, so they forced the Subprefectural Magistrate (*Zhizhou* 知州) to give this silver to the Manchus, a total of 100,000 taels, and therefore the Manchus did not attack the city.<sup>51</sup>

Based on their personal experience, some Ming officials paid attention to the local forces, and they assumed that the Southern Ming might use them against both Qing

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<sup>49</sup> Fogel's English translation was confused about this name, and Wakeman's quotation also did not indicate this mistake (Wakeman, 1985, vol.1, 433); instead of "xian" 獻, "you" 猷 is correct.

<sup>50</sup> Xie Guozhen 謝國楨, *Qing chu nongmin qiye ziliao ziluo* 清初農民起義資料 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1957), 79.

<sup>51</sup> Li Qing 李青, *Sanyuan biji* 三垣筆記 (Beijing: Zhonghua, repr, 1982), 15.

and Li Zicheng's peasant regime.<sup>52</sup> After the Qing occupied Beijing, a Ming official named Zhang Yi 張怡 left the city and fled to the south, and described what he saw and heard along the road:

Entering the border of Dezhou, the village braves united. They use “exterminate the bandit and support the Ming” as their slogan; everywhere it is same. When I got to Jinan, there were several thousands belonging to a “Hui army” who united. The army was in good order and their equipment was reasonably good. They blocked the river and checked every passing boat along the bank; the road also was blocked by earth; cavalry could not pass by. Even the ordinary people also took suitable measures to fortify the defense. All of them were looking forward to the army's coming from the Southern Ming. When meeting with the people who came from the South, they always wanted to hear news about Shi Kefa (as Minister of the Board of War of the Southern Ming, Shi was the highest military official in the Jiangbei area) and his army. Were we to use them now, great achievements would be realized.<sup>53</sup>

A man named Ding Yaokang 丁耀亢 (1599-1669) witnessed the military conflicts in the coastal area of Shandong. He also issued this kind of suggestion:

Now the big clans usually have their own military forces to protect themselves, what they need is the status. Supposing we provide some blank certificates of appointment and let them join the army, we may gather several thousands immediately.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Even now some Chinese scholars still insist that it could have happened, see Gu Cheng, chapter 3.

<sup>53</sup> Gu Cheng, 95.

<sup>54</sup> Ding Yaokang 丁耀亢, “Chujie jilue 出劫紀略,” in *Ming shi ziliao congkan* 明史資料叢刊 2 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin, repr., 1982), 154-56. Eventually, those local forces did get three thousand militia later on. They were disbanded after the Manchus consolidated their rule.



Another personal experience shows us that Shandong was facing a very complicated political and military situation. In his book *Jiashen hezhen lue*, Yang Shicong, another Ming official who left Beijing on June 5, 1644, provides a lot of vivid and detailed information about what happened along the road to the south.

By mid-July of 1644, he had arrived at Jining City. The local militia leader Li Yunhe 李允和 and others came to see him and asked him to be their leader. He replied that the Qing official in Tianjin had asked him to be on duty there, but he refused to do so. "If I am on duty here, I will come into conflict with the Qing in every respect. This will make them angry and they will send an army to suppress the region." Furthermore, "I did not obey the Qing's rule and decided to go South; the main purpose is to call on our new Ming emperor." Had he just stayed there, and became a Qing official, how would he be any different than those others (who were "turncoats")?

Jining City used to have a basic defense system. After the arrival of Li Zicheng's army, the local Ming officials surrendered. On May 12<sup>th</sup>, the Jining gentry Pan Shiliang 潘士良 and others could no longer tolerate Li's policies that required them, for example, to "donate silver," and so they asked a Hui army to enter into the city. This army captured and killed Li's officials and generals. The leader of the Hui army was named Yang Pu 楊璞, and he appointed the local administrative officials and appointed himself as a Vice-Regional Commander. Furthermore, according to the agreement with the army, the local gentry promised to give them a suitable monetary reward. Because they could not pay it on time, General Yang led his troops to force Pan to deliver the money. Thereafter, Pan lost his powers and influence and could not bestir himself again. General Yang also could not cooperate with his own colleagues. On June 24, another leader named Mi Jizhong 米繼中 killed Yang and his entire family. Mi also appointed himself as Vice-Regional Commander, and nobody could now question his authority. Since this time, he did not care about the local gentry or their interests.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Yang, 46-47.

All of the above shows us a much more complicated situation than any revealed in other sources. For one thing, the local leaders, including both the officials and the gentry, only considered how to administer the local society. If anything were to happen that might disturb the peace of local society, they chose to avoid it. When the Li Zicheng peasant regime came, most Ming local officials not only obeyed its rule, but also actively co-operated with it. The most important point to note is that the data illustrates the real relationship between the local elite and the other local social forces. Unlike in South China or the Jiangnan area (as we mentioned in the first part of this chapter), in Shandong province and most parts of the north China plain, the local gentry in fact could not control rural society, and most especially, local military forces. What they wanted from the local military forces was for them to pacify the peasant rebellions, but the local military forces, of course, had their own agenda: getting power and money from the local society and gentry, and they did not care where or from whom these benefits came. Since this kind of “independent force” also played a crucial role in Shandong society, scholars both in China and abroad in ignoring them have in fact left a gap in their description of the conditions of the time.

As mentioned above, Littrup’s study only focused on the Jining area, and he claimed that “the local militia was under the command of the district magistrates and intimately connected to the civil subbureaucratic government system,” and because of that, “we can hardly regard it as part of an independent military hierarchy.”<sup>56</sup>

Findings from my own research about these local forces compel me to strongly disagree with his conclusions. The above data already showed that the local government, in fact, could not completely control the military forces. We have enough materials to show that these local forces not only played their own crucial role in rural society, but sometimes might have even gone further if they collaborated with the local literati or other elite groups.

To assure their survival and their own interests, the local literati and other gentry also might unite and co-operate with any forces, or they might oppose and resist any other forces from the outside. These local gentry and the local militia could act

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<sup>56</sup> Littrup, 30-32.

independently, but they might also unite. For example, in mid-October of 1647, a *juren* degree holder named Lu Shen 路伸 ordered his own militia to co-operate with the bandit Wang Hongxiang 王弘襄, creating an organization of about three thousand men which proceeded to occupy the county town of Tangyi 堂邑.<sup>57</sup>

The Ming central government used to have nothing to do with the local gentry, while Li's peasant regime had no time to demonstrate its power. At the beginning of the Qing, there were almost no changes in these conditions. In the spring of 1647, the Shunzhi emperor had to admit that at the present time some local officials and their relatives, clan members, old and evil gentry had brought great harm to the ordinary people. Usually they seized property and land (from the people). They not only bullied and humiliated the people, but also refused to pay tax to the government. The local government was afraid of them, thus the ordinary people had to pay (for them), so that the rich became even richer and the poor people even poorer. The bad habits of the former Ming were still in existence.<sup>58</sup>

Some independent local military forces belonged to the peasants. Most ordinary peasants engaged in their rebellions simply as a result of the harsh conditions of their lives, such as famine and so-called "exploitation" by landlords or officials. Since the basic living conditions were always their primary concern, they cared little about where the real authority of rural society came from, or who controlled it most of the time. These ordinary people might support or oppose any forces; their actions depended on whether or not someone or some forces could provide the means that they needed to survive. This is why they might simply select either rebellion or surrender.

In 1640, there was a local predator Ma Yingshi 馬應試 in the southwest of Shandong who began as a thief and organized more than 10,000 people. Within five years he had surrendered to the Ming regime six times, and had also become Li

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<sup>57</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao bingbian*, vol. 7, 645-46.

<sup>58</sup> *Qing shilu* 清實錄 3, ce 3, *Shizu shilu* 世祖實錄, juan 31 (Beijing: Zhonghua, repr., 1985), 255.

Zicheng's official. He plundered Yuncheng 鄆城, Juye 巨野 and the rest of the region of southwest Shandong: "...the ignorant people all enrolled in his force."<sup>59</sup>

Ma was not the only one. Another peasant rebel leader called Li Qingshan 李青山 was even more famous. It is said that he and his brother "did not consider money to be important, and they liked to get in touch with rascals." So they had many followers.<sup>60</sup> He also switched between surrender and rebellion quite often.

The most important group of peasant rebels came from the Manjia Dong 滿家洞 area, along the north-south highway in Yanzhou prefecture and alongside the Grand Canal in Jiexiang 嘉祥. The confederations of peasants were loosely allied, and acted under leaders who ruled the countryside as they wished. Neither the local gentry nor the Ming or Qing government could control them. They did not stop their resistance against the Qing until 1655.<sup>61</sup>

If the local literati who possessed a "good reputation" suffered from poverty, they might provide some help. If somebody was grievously wronged, they would retaliate for him. From the point of view of the peasants, the literati deserved to be respected because they were "*you xue wen* 有學問 (they are men of learning)." In some cases, the peasant forces even integrated with the literati. One of Yu Qi's staff secretaries was a famous poet from Laiyang. A clan head from Haiyang 海陽 also joined his action to fight against the Qing. The Elm Forest Army (*Yuyuanjun* 榆園軍) of the southwestern region mobilized thousands of people to fight against the Ming, and later to resist the Qing. Many of them were famine victims who joined the army out of desperation. Their actions devastated much of the surrounding countryside, and came to an end only when a Yellow River flood left them with no place to flee to. In the latter period of their existence, Ye Tingxiu 葉廷秀, a disciple of the very famous Confucian literatus, Liu Zongzhou, came to join this army. He also connected with another famous poet of

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<sup>59</sup> Zheng Tianting 鄭天挺, *Ming mo nongmin qiyi shiliao* 明末農民起義史料 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1957), 475, and *Ming Qing shiliao xinbian*, vol. 7, 613.

<sup>60</sup> *Ming shi ziliao congkan* 2, 40 (from "pishuo", vol. 2, "Li Qingshan").

<sup>61</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 431-32.

this area Yan Ermei 閻爾梅 (1603-1679) to get his help in organizing a more effective resistance against the Qing.<sup>62</sup>

Since the PRC was founded in 1949, the role of peasant rebellions has received more attention in China for more than three decades, and this role was deemed as the “motive” for history development. Whether we agree or not with this statement, the attitudes and the actions of the ordinary peasants and their own local forces really were the most important factors. It is they who decided the real fate of rural society. In addition, it was they who were always there, and they always fought against war, turmoil, and famine itself and their rebellions were also the result of their sufferings. Meanwhile, they did not care who the leader in name of rural society was. For this specific period, previous studies either emphasized the “united control” of the Manchu – Han elites and landlords, such as the studies from Mainland China, or the role of local gentry, such as Leif Littrup’s analysis mentioned above, and also Timothy Brook’s book on the gentry of Late Ming times.<sup>63</sup> As Brook indicated, Kuhn’s 1970 study of local militarization during the Taiping Rebellion revealed the process by which the local gentry came to be involved in overseeing local administration in formal, rather than the previously informal, ways. The gentry’s enhanced power stemmed originally from military service but spread to many other areas of local management, with the result that they came to share public authority with the local magistrates in ways that were to last through the Republican period. “Other China scholars, notably Keith Schoppa and Mary Rankin, followed Kuhn’s lead,” shift the focus from militarization to the full range of political and economic functions, even dubbing them “the local managerial public sphere.”<sup>64</sup> Esherick’s study goes even further: the sparse gentry presence in the west of Shandong Province resulted in “a particular proclivity for heterodox activity”, thus arose “the origins of the Boxer

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<sup>62</sup> Xie (1957b), 11.

<sup>63</sup> Brook (1998), 252-53.

<sup>64</sup> Timothy Brook, *Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late- Ming China* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), 25.

Uprising.”<sup>65</sup> But real conditions were more complicated than were previously imagined. In September of 1644, the Qing governor Fang Dayu said “*fan shou fu difang ji yi xing wen bu ruo mianshang*” 凡收撫地方機宜行文不若面商,<sup>66</sup> which means, “consulting personally is better than official communication for all matters related to the local pacification and its incorporation into our own force.” We have to consider these complex factors.

The crux of Chinese rural society, or even the entire country’s final fate depended on whether or not there was a certain political force which could integrate and lead the other forces, especially the far more numerous peasants.

Traditionally, the rebellious peasants always “wiped out the evil households.” This is why they could get the support of the ordinary people. From the perspective of the local gentry, since these kinds of disturbances took place often and in fact in most cases no help could be expected from the government, either in the Ming or in the Qing later on, they had to organize their own military forces to defend themselves. For the area where there were no topographical advantages, they usually built “*tuzhai*” 土寨 with earth to defend themselves in the plains area.<sup>67</sup> This tendency became more and more prevalent up until the twentieth century. Elizabeth Perry shows that the Red Spears of the North China plain in the 1920s was a movement of dispersed village communities that took up arms to protect themselves from different forces, including the Japanese invasion. Usually these kinds of “purely self-defense organizations” only fought when their homes were threatened.<sup>68</sup>

For their survival, the primary concern of the local forces, regardless which social strata they belonged to, was always to keep or enlarge their own influence in every aspect. This is why we find numerous examples of local military leaders becoming turncoats. The most famous one in the Ming-Qing transition is General Liu Zeqing,

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<sup>65</sup> Esherick (1987), 36-37.

<sup>66</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao bing bian*, vol.5, 436.

<sup>67</sup> Li Wenzhi 李文治, *Wan Ming liukou* 晚明流寇 (Taipei: Shihuo, repr., 1983), 209.

<sup>68</sup> Elizabeth Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China 1845-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 152-207. Also see P. Huang (1985), 30.

the General Commander of Shandong. Liu was born in Caozhou 曹州, Shandong province. He always tried to find a suitable official position and benefits from the Ming dynasty, the Southern Ming Reign, and the Qing government. Entering the twentieth century, General Wu Huawen 吳化文 (1904-1963) is another even more famous example. He first betrayed his boss Feng Yuxiang 馮玉祥 (1882-1948) in the warlord period in order to get help from Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石 (1887-1975), and then he surrendered to the Japanese as a traitor, and then turned back to Jiang again. Finally he became a general of the People's Liberation Army under the control of the Communist Party of China, and led his 35<sup>th</sup> Army to occupy Nanjing -- Jiang's capital in April of 1949. He might join with or oppose any of the above forces based on his need at the time.

#### 1: 4. Rebel or Qing: Who Was the Primary Enemy?

It is not very easy from the perspective of military action to make a brief conclusion about the behavior of the Shandong literati or the behavior of the local elite in other areas. Faced with various threats and crises, they responded in different ways.

Fortunately, a *jinshi* from Huizhou 徽州 of Nanzhili - Ling Jiong 凌駟, provides us with a vivid example to examine how a typical Confucian literatus faced the challenges from both peasant rebellions and the "barbarian" invasion. At first, he deemed the peasants as the most important threat, while treating the Manchu army as an outside force which could be cooperated with to fight against the rebels. When he began to realize the Manchu's real threat, it was too late and he had no choice but to sacrifice his life.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Gu Cheng also used Ling Jiong as example to emphasize the oscillation of the Ming officials when faced with the Manchu army, but he condemned them for being "busy without purpose" (瞎忙)- since they did not collaborate with peasant army to fight against the Manchu army "(Gu Cheng, 96).

Based on the materials available now, we may explore his activities starting from the time he received his *jinshi* degree in 1643, until his death in March 1645.

Ling Jiong's initial official position was director of *Zhifangsi* of the Board of War (兵部職方司主事).<sup>70</sup> He was sent to Shanxi 山西 to supervise an army led by Li Jiantai 李建泰. When Li Zicheng's peasant army occupied that province and most parts of Beizhili, Li Jiantai surrendered to the peasant army, but Ling Jiong insisted on fighting against the rebellion. In the battle of Zhending 真定 city, it is said he was hit by six arrows and was cut by swords six times. Finally he fell down close to a well; the rebels thought he was dead.<sup>71</sup> He spent three months totally recovering from serious wounds.

After this battle he went to Linqing in Shandong. With the other local elite, he organized military action to try to expel Li Zicheng's army. There were approximately several hundred people under his control. They successfully arrested Li's general Wang Huangji 王皇極, and announced that what the rebels relied on was only "false righteousness and empty reputation" (*jiayi xusheng* 假義虛聲). Usually, these rebels simply claimed to exempt taxes and tended to exaggerate their forces. A lot of people welcomed these rebels, but finally they suffered from what they did: these rebels levied money from both officials and merchants, everybody suffered from severe punishment; the rebellious generals and soldiers raped women, regardless whatever they were widows or underaged; "their local officials had only one duty, that was to get money from worthy households."<sup>72</sup>

Since Ling raised up his flag fighting with the rebels, a lot of local forces came to join him from both the areas of Shandong and Hebei. In his *Ming mo zhonglie jishi* 明末忠烈紀實, Xu Bingyi provided not very clear and basically wrong information about Ling's initial logistical support. He claimed that Ling "using the money from

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<sup>70</sup> He was thus responsible for maintenance of military maps, the manning of frontier fortifications and signal systems, functions performed by the Board of War.

<sup>71</sup> Zhang Dai 張岱, *Shikui shu* 石匱書 Juan 33, Ling Jiong liezhuan 凌炯列傳, in XXSKQS 320, 600-01.

<sup>72</sup> Ji Liuqi 計六奇, *Ming ji nanlue* 明季南略, juan 8, In ZGYSJC 36, 567.



merchants,” conscripted three thousand men, deployed local *xiangyong*, and managed the 州 (*Zhou*) administrative affairs.<sup>73</sup> On this matter, the description from *Jiashen hezhenlue* offered us a clear clue that not only lets us know where his money came from, but also provides a clear picture that shows us how the variety of local forces, including Ming officials, local gentry, and military forces, as well as the Li Zicheng’s rebellious army, affected each other.

Ling’s money was not from merchants. Initially, the rebel army did not reach Jining. Director-General of Grand Canal Huang Xixian 黃希憲 wanted to send the army pay to the South, but he worried the local gentry and braves might cause trouble, so he decided to divide this money into three parts (in order to reduce the potential loss): one for officials and their staffs; one for local gentry; and the third for local military forces (*yingbing*). But in fact the local gentry only owned this money in name. The officials and their staffs kept all of the funds in their own hands. When the rebels came, they knew about this money and tried to get it. Because of the possibility of severe punishment, both civil and military officials, such as Prefect of sub-prefecture 知州 Zhu Guang 朱光, had to give the money back and the others being afraid of the “bandits”, also had to provide compensation. In all, the rebels managed to acquire 130,000 taels of silver, and carried this money by boat to Dongchang 東昌. However, they had no time to use it. After they fled, this money stayed at Dongchang. Ling Jiong and the other gentry used this money to recruit General Zhang Guoxun 張國勳 and his rebellious army.

“The Dongchang gentry in fact paid nothing.”<sup>74</sup> Ling Jiong and his army took Linqing and Jining cities on the same day. By this time he asked the Southern Ming to reoccupy Shandong in order to reunite the south and north. What we have to notice is that he simultaneously tried to get in touch with the new government – the Qing.

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<sup>73</sup> Xu Bingyi 徐秉義, *Ming mo Qing chu shiliao xuankan* 明末清初史料選刊 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, 1987), juan 12, 217-18.

<sup>74</sup> Yang, 52.

In July of 1644, the Qing army took Dongchang and Ling Jiong fled to Daming 大名. On August 2, Wang Aoyong recommended Ling Jiong to the Qing. According to Wang, Ling Jiong had great capacities, could handle anything, and he knew how to adapt to varying conditions. Two weeks later, Dorgon appointed Ling Jiong as “Palace Steward of the Board of War (*bingke jishizhong*)” 兵科給事中.<sup>75</sup> By the end of August, Ling Jiong sent a memorial to the Qing government to request support, and also mentioned his plan for pacifying north China. (Ironically, he used the Qing’s reign title— Shunzhi meanwhile he kept using his Ming seal):

I exhausted my heart concerning the Shandong matter. This province is just like the head while Hebei is the feet, and Henan is the abdomen. Without a head, one would be numb; without feet, lame; but without an abdomen, one would be nothing at all. To put these areas in order, we must pacify Shandong first, then Hebei, and later Henan... But my soldiers have no pay since the outset. Through borrowing from merchants and other measures I was able to take, we reluctantly supported the army for both May and June, but we do not know how to manage in the future. The soldiers will leave if there is no pay; no soldier means the arrival of the rebels; our greater concern is that we do not know what will happen.

Finally, he asked the Qing not to change the Ming’s old policy so that the soldiers and army pay might have suitable resources.<sup>76</sup>

At the same time, Ling Jiong still kept in touch with the southern Ming. On Sept. 11, the Southern Ming regime ordered him to connect with “the gentry and *righteous people* 義士 of Henan and Beizhili.”

Ling Jiong left us a very important memorial in which we may examine his original thinking about his concrete balance between the Qing and the Southern Ming.

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<sup>75</sup> Gu Cheng, 96.

<sup>76</sup> Zhongguo Renmin daxue lishixi and Zhong guo di yi lishi dang’anguan ed. *Qing dai nongmin zhanzhengshi ziliao xuanbian* 清代農民戰爭史資料選編 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, 1984), book 1 (B), 46.

In this memorial sent to the Southern Ming. In the middle of September, he admitted that he was only a schoolboy (書生) and he was not familiar with military affairs. Since he could not sacrifice his life on the death of the former Chongzhen emperor and the Ming dynasty, he just wanted to organize a righteous army (*yishi* 義師) to fight against the rebels. However, what he relied on during this process was neither soldiers nor grain. He claimed that what he could rely on was only loyalism and righteousness.

Now the rebels are still at the apex of their power, while the Qing army gradually closes in us. I have sent a letter to a minister of Qing government... Our current plan may let me have some authority to communicate with the Qing, and to collaborate with them to pacify the rebels. However, the West expedition (to fight against peasants) is only in name, the reality is to prevent the Qing's invasion. After the pacification of the rebels, our dynasty would become stronger; then, gradually, we may find suitable ways to handle everything. If we fought against the Qing right now, we would not have enough military forces to do so, or, even worse, we would give up this friendly Manchu force and let these Manchu force become foes. In case they (the rebels and the Qing) connect with each other and attack the South, then disaster would come to the Jianghuai 江淮 area. My own plan would do it this way. I am a southerner. If I only consider my own reputation and official rank, I could survive in the South. But I am afraid that if I move to the south, we would lose all the land north of the Yellow River. The reason I stay here is just to provide a base in order to reoccupy Hebei and Jinan 畿南 (now the southern part of Hebei province). Depending on Shandong, we may have Jinan, and may then have Hebei. Linqing is the hinge of Jinan and Hebei. Now (the Southern Ming) spends all its money to guard the Huai River. We would rather use this money to defend Shandong. I supplicate Your Majesty to choose a minister who can carry out your orders, and link up with the North in order to prevent future troubles. He also needs to comfort everywhere in Shandong to consolidate the people's heart 以固人心.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> ZGYSJC 36, 567-68.

Ling Jiong did not know that the Southern Ming had already sent Chen Hongfan 陳洪範 to be an ambassador to the Qing government by this time. “Not one soldier was sent to save Shandong.”<sup>78</sup>

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of September, he began to use the Qing’s title *Zhao fu Henan dengchu bing ke jishizhong* (Palace Steward of the Board of War who is responsible for Soothing Henan and Other Places 招撫河南等處兵科給事中). Meanwhile, he never forgot to send military reports to the Southern Ming. By this time, The Southern Ming promoted him as Censor (*yushi*) and Inspector of Shandong (*Xunan Shandong* 巡按山東), and gave him three hundred blank certificates of appointment for mobilizing the local forces.<sup>79</sup> Two months later, he went to Nanjing and his title became Investigating Censor (*jiancha yushi* 檢察禦史).

Apart from Shandong, he also was ordered to inspect Henan as well as to control the local military forces of this province. After the Qing army occupied the entire Shandong area and most of the north China plain, Ling Jiong began to realize that there was no hope to recover the lost land by depending on the regular Ming army. He had to shift his attention to the local forces. In a memorial sent to the Southern Ming, he said that he had already made agreements with the leaders of each *zhai*.<sup>80</sup> According to this plan, those *zhai* were supposed to defend their own areas. Moreover, if one *zhai* were defeated, the rest of them would come together to assist it. Since all the soldiers were ordinary peasants who had no regular training and they were short of equipment, Ling Jiong and the others thought that they would use the Yellow River as a frontier, and they planned to rely on any natural or topographical condition they could.

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<sup>78</sup> ZGYSJC 36, 567-68. This peace mission was headed by Zuo Maodi, Governor of Nanjing under the Hongguang Emperor. For detailed information, see Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 405-13; also see Gu Cheng, 111-20.

<sup>79</sup> NMSL BZ, 464.

<sup>80</sup> For more information about this kind of local force, see page 68 of this chapter.

However, the Hongguang Emperor could not provide any practical help for Ling's plan. What he could do was to let the Board of War and the Board of Personnel give Ling Jiong more than one hundred blank certificates for future use.<sup>81</sup>

By early in the following year, 1645, Ling Jiong went to Henan. When his old mother saw him off, Ling Jiong wept. He told his mother that he could not devote himself to both Emperor and mother simultaneously. In March, Ling Jiong led his army and staff to Guide 歸德 city (also in Henan). Several weeks later, the Manchu army encircled the city with the cooperation of Chinese armies led by the former generals of Li Zicheng. Since Ling Jiong refused to surrender, the prince of Yu -Dodo 豫王多鐸, the highest commander of the Qing army ordered that Ling Jiong be captured alive, otherwise the whole city would be destroyed.

We have two different views about the following developments. One is from Xu Bingyi who described that Ling realized his devotion would cause the death of the ordinary people; in that case he would like to sacrifice himself for pursuing "great righteousness". Based on this description, it is Ling Jiong who decided to see Dodo first. The prince of Yu treated him with wine and other presents but he refused to accept. At that specific time, Ling left us a poem. One sentence admitted that he had suffered all the hardships but finally in vain (艱難歷盡總徒然). Before his execution, he also left a letter to Dodo. In that letter, he said that his family has benefited from the kindness of Ming for generations. To sacrifice for it was his form of righteousness and he had already done it. However, he pretended believe that the Qing's coming was to free the Ming from the rebellion of Li Zicheng. He wished that the Qing "not go against your original friendly relationship with us." Finally, he suggested that the Yangzi River should be the frontier of Ming and Qing.

It seemed that the prince Yu was moved by the letter. He ordered him to be buried. All the officials, staff, as well as the ordinary people of the city wept for his death. The

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<sup>81</sup> Xu Bingyi, juan 12, 217-18.

southern Ming posthumously appointed him as Vice-minister of the Board of War. After his death, “no one planned to reoccupy Shandong.”<sup>82</sup>

The descriptions above from Xu Bingyi show some doubts or mistakes. For one thing, among the higher officials of the Southern Ming, whether they had the real power and authority or not in reality, some of them did suggest reoccupying Shandong. For instance, in the spring of 1645, the Governor-general of Shandong Wang Yongji 王永吉, who was appointed by the Southern Ming, sent spies to reconnoiter north China and knew that “all the Manchu’s powerful cavalry went to the West to expel Li Zicheng, Beizhili as well as Shandong are all void.” He strongly suggested recovering this province.<sup>83</sup>

Most importantly, why and how did Ling Jiong decide to see the highest commander of the Qing- prince Yu? What was his motive? The answer provided by Xu shows that he went to see Dodo on his own initiative, it was done on his own free will and according to his own conscience. But the following two primary data<sup>84</sup> do provide us another story:

According to Huang Zongxi, the Manchu army stated that if Ling Jiong would not surrender, they would destroy the city. Thus, all the officials, generals, staff and the ordinary people of the city forced Ling Jiong to surrender.<sup>85</sup>

Based on Zhang Dai’s description, the Manchu army laid siege to the city; Ling Jiong wanted to fight to the death. But all the civil and military officials made no response. Ling Jiong had to admit that the people’s hearts were broken, and that there was nothing to do now.<sup>86</sup>

It is pretty clear now that Xu’s book exaggerated Ling Jiong’s honorable action and words. In fact, the only one ideal possibility for the Southern Ming was as Zhang

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Gu Cheng, 137-38.

<sup>84</sup> These materials were written soon after the events occurred. In contrast, Xu Bingyi finished his book in 1694.

<sup>85</sup> Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, *Hongguang shilu chao* 弘光實錄鈔, juan 4, in NMSL BZ, 71.

<sup>86</sup> Zhang Dai, juan 33, Ling Jiong liezhuan, in XXSKQS 320, 600-02.

Dai predicted: since the Manchu army had not yet turned to the East, the Southern Ming could have sent an army to the North to collaborate with Ling Jiong, “to control Cangzhou 滄州 and Dezhou in the far northern part and occupy Xuzhou as well as Yanzhou, then nobody could imagine what would have happened. Alas! Ling Jiong is dead, there is no man (who may rescue the country) now.”<sup>87</sup>

Following the Manchu army’s attack, we turn to the Jiangbei area, to examine what happened there.

### 1: 5. Summary

Shandong’s prominent position in Chinese military history derives not only from its geographical location and the factor of the Grand Canal, but also, more importantly, from its abundant human resources. Faced with the turmoil resulting from both the governmental transition and peasant rebellions, Shandong literati and the other local elite had no hope to continue their previous dominance of the local communities. Apart from compromise and obedience, their military actions not only had no way to challenge the various government authorities, but also they lost the campaigns for control of rural society in the competition with the local military units which were mainly composed of lower social strata. After the Qing took Beijing, Chinese literati represented by Ling Jiong apparently had no means of handling the crisis of both invasion of aliens and rebellions from peasants, meanwhile keeping their loyalty to the Ming throne. Their tragedies were directly caused by triple pressures: no concrete financial as well as other supplies from the southern Ming government, no cooperation from their peers, and finally, no support or even understanding from the numerous common people.

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter Two

### From Plains to Mountainous Area- Literati in Nanzhili

#### 2: 1. The Local Forces in Huaibei

After it took Shandong and the other areas of the northern plains, the powerful Manchu army began to launch attacks against Huaibei.

Broadly defined, this is a sizable geographical area to the north of the Huai River, from its source in central Henan to the Yellow Sea. More narrowly conceived, it refers to the northernmost parts of Nanzhili. There is little variation in terrain, and a common language is spoken throughout. Few regions in China can claim a legacy of collective violence more ancient or continuous than here. Occupying the lowland between the Huai and Yellow Rivers,<sup>1</sup> it is in the heart of China's so-called flood and famine region, an area noted for the harshness of both its geography and people. Huaibei was also the site of the first great popular revolt in Chinese history, the uprising of Chen Sheng 陳勝 in 209 BC against the oppressive Qin (221- 207 BC) dynasty.

Generally speaking, the people of this area have been characterized as proud, unruly and fond of making trouble. In the late Yuan dynasty (1277-1367) it provided hundreds of thousands of soldiers for the Red Turban Army 紅巾軍 which eventually overthrew the dynasty. Elizabeth Perry suggests that the "explanation for the persisting violence lies in the strategic geopolitical situation of the region. Forming a demarcation between South and North China, Huaibei constituted a natural battlefield for contenders for national power. Thus it is hardly surprising that over the centuries the area should have been the site of many a military confrontation. The destruction wrought by repeated battles in turn undermined the possibility of sustained economic development, leaving the inhabitants of Huaibei to the mercy of the unbridled natural elements."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> During this period, the Yellow River flowed to the south of Shandong and joined with the Huai River at a point west of Huai'an 淮安 (see Map 3).

<sup>2</sup> Elizabeth J. Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 10-18.



During the Ming, in terms of administration, this area was under the control of the Grand Coordinator of Fengyang (鳳陽巡撫). The successive high ranking officers clearly realized the characteristics of the area, both the social conditions and the nature of local people mentioned above, and they had to pay special attention to the controlling of the people and their communities.

For those local people, some elite even controlled militias. Since these private military retainers were not directly controlled by the government, their presence threatened to undermine the dynasty's monopoly of force. However, the Ming government looked at these militia as a potential military force available for future crises.

In early 1517, the assistant Regional Commander of northwest Anhui was charged with "maintaining military retainers without authority to vaunt his power and prestige." This officer and his band of several hundred retainers, who had performed service on behalf of the throne during the pacification of a peasant rebellion, had become a source of worry to local civil officials. Instead of disbanding his army after the pacification, he had used military power to advance his local interests. His men seized lands, forcibly converted people's grave lots into agricultural fields and orchards, and established illegal toll stations along well-traveled highways. Although the officer and his men were a potent challenge to local civil authorities, the emperor chose not to press the issue, noting that the officer had already retired.<sup>3</sup>

A datum from the *Ming shilu* indicates that in the early period of the Wanli reign (1572-1620), the Censor-in-Chief of Fengyang used to look for "great households" (*jushi* 巨室) and try to get their help to solve the problem. Finally, he hired a total of 300 men to form a local militia. This local militia was given the name "*yiying*" 義勇, and took as its main responsibility the pacification of thieves. The Grand Coordinator promised that if this militia achieved merit, its members would be promoted. Later on, this army successfully arrested some thieves, and its leaders were promoted to the rank of Squad Leader (*bazong* 把總). The Board of War approved of his plan, noting that those who had once been thieves themselves now were used to pacify other thieves.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Robinson, 89.

<sup>4</sup> MSLLZ- AHSLJ, 864.

In 1626, the Grand Coordinator Su Maoxiang 蘇茂相 submitted a memorial requesting the use of men from the Huaibei area. According to his description, the people of Huaibei were honest and powerful, and had already shown their worth as his own bodyguards and military officials. However, because of the recent dismissal of many Ming armies, these men were unable to receive promotion. According to his judgment, “if they were not the pillars of the country anymore, they would become braves.” His request ultimately received no answer from Beijing.<sup>5</sup>

Generally speaking, the Ming government allowed for a certain degree of local elite military control, especially during the pacification of peasant rebellions.

In 1635, there were “three big bandits” (san da kou 三大寇) around Xuzhou City. These three bandits, Cheng Jikong 程繼孔, Wang Daoshan 王道善, and Zhang Fangzao 張方造, occupied Xiao county 蕭縣 and burned down the northern part of Xuzhou city. Traffic was totally blocked for several hundred kilometers around this city. Since they already threatened the government, the Ming army came to besiege them during the summer of 1643. On July 23, the Ming army destroyed Wu Jiaji 吳家集, the headquarters of Zhang Fangzao, and killed several thousand bandits. Cheng Jikong pretended to surrender. However, when the Ming government wanted to transfer his forces to other areas, he refused to go. By the end of the year, 5,000 Ming soldiers from southeast Suzhou 宿州 and 3,000 soldiers from northwest Xiao county had gathered outside of Xuzhou city. With the cooperation of the local militia – *yiying* – the bandits were defeated and Cheng was arrested.<sup>6</sup>

The Ming government’s long term toleration of local militia forces in this region, as we mentioned above, meant that there were not enough soldiers available to handle a series of crises. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1635, the Ming government was forced to redeploy some armies from Shandong to Huaibei. As mentioned in the first chapter,

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 895. As we mentioned in the Introduction, the inland *Wei-Suo* system practically collapsed in the period of the last several decades of the Ming. Mainly because of financial problems, members of the inland Ming army were either dismissed or transferred.

<sup>6</sup> Xie Guozhen 謝國楨, *Ming mo nongmin qiyi shiliao xuanbian* 明末農民起義史料選編 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin, 1981), 197-98.

Shandong Province also suffered from the threats of peasants, in this case, the Grand Coordinator of Shandong Li Zi (李咨) complained to the Board of War:

Originally Shandong soldiers were not used by the other provinces. Every district is supposed to defend itself; some districts have as many as 2,000 soldiers, while others have only several hundred. Within the province, when armies are redeployed to certain places other places will be emptied ... The western part of Cao County and the eastern part of Shan county along the Yellow River cover a total of more than one thousand *li*, and there are more than one hundred ferries. The defense of the eastern part will mean the loss of the west and vice versa. How many armies are enough? Furthermore, Fengyang has its own two *Yamen* 衙門: Regency 留守 and Grand Defender 鎮守, and each has its own army and supply. Huai'an and other areas nearby are important places, and also have powerful armies. Other areas such as Xuzhou, Suzhou 宿州, Luzhou 廬州 [present day Hefei 合肥], Yangzhou, Langshan 狼山, Guazhou 瓜州, Yizhen 儀真, Tai 泰州, Yancheng 鹽城, Miaowan 廟灣, Yongsheng 永生, everywhere has its own forces. These places face the Yangzi River or the sea, and have no other alarms [from the north] - it's very easy to call them together. Why not use armies that are close while seeking what is far away [*she ji tu yuan* 舍近圖遠]? Since Shandong province has often been asked to offer [the army and supplies], I am wondering whether this province belongs to the Ming court. Now Li Zicheng's rebels are going to the east. Huaibei and Xuzhou are close to Shandong province, the threat to Shandong is not less than that to Huaibei and Xuzhou. To increase the armies in Huaibei and Xuzhou by two thousand is not enough; can we imagine that Shandong province has surplus armies? What surprised me is that those armies were deployed to Huaibei and Xuzhou, but they still get the supplies from Shandong province. The result is that Huaibei may use the armies with no worries about logistics, while Shandong will have to pay everything but will have no armies to use.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao xinbian*, vol. 2, 178.

The arrival of the armies from Shandong brought a lot of trouble because of their failure to cooperate with local people and armies. By the end of 1643, the Grand Coordinator of Shandong Qiu Zude 丘祖德 sent a memorial report:

Administratively, the Yellow River's defense of Shandong is from the location of Qing Huaguan 青華觀 to the east where it connects with Feng 豐, Pei 沛 and Dang 湯 counties [belonging to Nanzhili]. Usually we send Yanzhou's *xiangbing* and others soldiers from Qingzhou and Laizhou to defend this area. Recently, because of poverty and disruptions in rural society, there have been no *xiangbing* to send. Furthermore, the soldiers and the ordinary people could not cooperate . . . The Xuzhou people consider them as enemies, and they are eager to expel them. For this purpose [to expel the Shandong army] they will do whatever they can. The Shandong army cannot stay there anymore.<sup>8</sup>

Among local military forces, it is not easy to clearly distinguish which belonged to the local elite and which were controlled by peasants; their political attitudes were also blurred.

After the Southern Ming regime was established, local officials and gentry had troubles with the armies from the Southern Ming in the border area between Shandong and Nanzhili. Those armies and the local forces were supposed to unite together to fight against the Manchu invasion. However, when the Southern Ming army reached a small city called Suqian 宿遷 and camped in the outskirts, the magistrate sent a *shengyuan* accusing them of three things: not repaying their obligations to the Ming court in Beijing (不報恩), failing to seek vengeance for the death of the Ming emperor, and failing to protect the locals. Later on, several groups of cavalry tried to enter the city, but were shot by residents. Suddenly, all the Southern Ming army entered the city. The residents and the men who wore military uniforms fought and killed each other. Soldiers plundered goods worth more than 10,000 taels of silver.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao xinbian*, vol.10, 996.

<sup>9</sup> *Jiashen hezhen lue*, 79.

In the southeastern part of Suqian, the region of Huaiyin 淮陰 played a crucial role in grain transfer from the south to north since the opening of the Grand Canal. In the early Ming there were two *Wei* and several *So* covering this area. Exactly like the other areas we mentioned above, this kind of military registration system had also broken down here, and the Ming had few means through which to exert local control. As one official document indicated: “Suppose that battles would have taken place, there would have been no soldiers to use.”<sup>10</sup>

In the city of Huai'an 淮安, there were more than 10,000 military officials and soldiers, including 2,000 soldiers trained for defense duties. Up to the mid-Ming, in fact, only very few soldiers were on duty. The Ming authorities depended on a force of only about 580 *minbing* from the adjacent countryside who were “always defeated when they met an enemy.”<sup>11</sup> After Xu Hongru's rebellion broke out in Shandong, the Ming government tried to set up 570 military officials and soldiers to defend Qing Hekou 清河□, a town at the gates of Huai'an. However, the Ming government could not afford to pay for logistical expenses, and so had to discuss relevant issues with the local gentry.<sup>12</sup>

Like the Ming government, the Qing authorities also realized the importance of the Huaibei area. In his secret memorial report, Wang Aoyong not only mentioned the importance of the area, but also discussed how it might be conquered:

Jiangbei is the area which must be conquered. All the cities subordinate to Xuzhou and Huaibei are across the Yellow River, we should control them first . . . For our current tactic, let some important officials move to settle in Cao county and Shan

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<sup>10</sup> *Wanli Huai'an fuzhi* 萬曆 淮安府志, juan 7, Bingwei zhi 兵衛志, in TYGCMDFZXX XB 8.

<sup>11</sup> *Qianlong Huai'an fuzhi* 乾隆 淮安府志, juan 16, Bingrong 兵戎, XXSKQS 700, Shibu Dili lei 史部地理類, 797.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

county along the Yellow River to control Xuzhou and Huaiyin in order to plan for future attacks.<sup>13</sup>

Within the entire Huaibei area, the Qing army did not meet any effective resistance. According to a report sent by a Qing general, the Qing army arrived in Pi Zhou 邳州 on May 21, 1645. The next day, they reached Suqian. The southern Ming army fled away, allowing the local inhabitants to be easily subjugated. On May 23, the local gentry and common people of Suining 睢寧 surrendered to the Qing forces. When the Qing army arrived at Taoyuan 桃源 county on May 24, the southern Ming official had already fled, and the remaining officials led the local people to welcome the Qing army.

Only in Qinghe 清河 county did the army meet with resistance. But these scattered skirmishes could not halt the Qing army's advances. When they reached Huai'an, "all the gentry welcomed them."<sup>14</sup> Liu Zeqing fled along with his army. "The gentry, military personnel and residents treated the Qing army with wine and oxen, welcoming their coming."<sup>15</sup>


In the face of the above dramatic changes, it is important that we consider the questions of how Huaibei's literati survived and why they acted in the ways they did. The story of Yan Ermei provides us the first clue to lead us toward the answers.

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<sup>13</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao bingbian*, vol. 5, 405.

<sup>14</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao jiabian*, vol. 2, 114.

<sup>15</sup> *Qianlong Huai'an fuzhi* 乾隆淮安府志, juan 16, Bingrong 兵戎, XXSKQS 700, 96-97.



(Map 3. The Qing attack on Huaibei and Jiangbei, reprinted from Struve 1984, 52.)

## 2: 2. A Lonely Loyalist from Pei County

Yan Ermei was born in Pei County of Nanzhili in 1603. He was awarded the *juren* degree at the age of twenty-seven, by which time he had already published a book of poems. In the 1620s to 30s, he traveled and lived in many places such as Nanjing, Huaiyang, Jiangyin as well as Hangzhou in Zhejiang province. However, in 1641, growing social turmoil drove him back to the relatively secure haven of Huai'an. Later on, he returned to the north, settling briefly in Shandong before traveling to an even more remote frontier area. He finally died at home in poverty in 1679. His travels had carried him back and forth across the Yellow River many times, and he was thus able to develop close friends both in the north and south. His travels also had brought him to Beijing several times.

Yan Ermei has been ignored by Chinese historians mainly because of the role he played in pacifying peasant rebellions. In Western scholarship, Wakeman has provided an idealized description of his personal righteousness and activities: “For patriotic loyalists like him, the obligation to repay the country was even more compelling than the responsibilities of looking after one’s immediate relatives or friends, even though observing this higher duty might mean ‘turning against the lineage’ (*ni zu* 逆族) . . .” Wakeman also argues that Yan placed loyalist commitment above compromise, and the individual’s conscience above social consensus. The epitome of such absolute sincerity was the traditional knight errant, whose integrity represented the ultimate form of *li* (propriety 禮). The knight errant’s scrupulous adherence to “sincerity” (*cheng* 誠) – his personal sense of right and wrong – ideally took precedence over all other sentiments. As Wakeman puts it, “the central notions of *li* are respect and confidence. If pushed to the extreme, it even means killing (for the sake of one’s belief).”<sup>16</sup>

Because of the limited amount of materials he used, especially data about Yan’s later years, Wakeman’s description is insufficient. In fact, Yan lost his dignity in his later years when he was arrested, thrown into jail, and forced to beg to be spared from execution. In the last years of his life, his unyielding integrity was no longer evident. His begging to be spared execution by the Qing provoked sharp criticism by the other scholars of his time.<sup>17</sup>

Below, I will begin by describing and analyzing Yan’s early military career, before moving on to explore his military actions against the Manchus. Finally, from the perspective of military mobilization, I will use this case study to shed light on how social structure, military actions, and historical figures affected each other.

Based on scattered materials, we only can trace his main activities. In 1640, Yan helped to organize and train an army of 3,000 local peasants. This army was intended to deal with peasant rebellions on the border of Shandong and Nanzhili. As he became increasingly aware of the Ming’s loss of control over the empire, he sold his belongings and family property to raise money for the purchase of weapons and the organization of

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<sup>16</sup> Wakeman (1985), 516-17.

<sup>17</sup> He Lingxiu, 26.



local peasants into a small army. This army numbered about 1,000 soldiers. Yan trained them personally. Unfortunately, we have no more detailed data available to analyze what happened to that army of 3,000, what was the relationship between this group and his own 1,000 soldiers.

In 1644, fishermen from Weishan Lake engaged in uprisings under the leadership of Liu Xuan 劉玄, and began to besiege Pei City. Yan led his militia to assist the official army. Liu's peasant army was forced to retreat, purposefully leaving behind large amounts of cash and goods to distract the official armies and other village militias. In this way, Liu's army managed to escape largely intact. However, Yan insisted on leading his own militia to cut off the retreat of Liu's army. The subsequent battle with Liu led to the absolute defeat of Yan's army and the destruction of his home.<sup>18</sup>

When Yan heard the news of the Chongzhen Emperor's death, he refused to eat for seven days. At that time, the Yu Yuan Army in Shandong sent its representative Ye Tingxiu to invite him to join them in an administrative role. Yan offered no definite answer to the request. After Li Zicheng's peasant army occupied most of north China, Wu Su 武燾, a *jinshi* from Shaanxi 陝西 province, received the title Defense Commissioner (*fangyushi* 防禦使) from Li Zicheng's peasant regime. When he passed through Suqian 宿遷, the city was already under the control of Dong Xueli 董學禮, another peasant general. Dong treated Wu for a couple of days, and let him use his army to go to Pei Xian. Since Wu borrowed this army from Dong, he claimed that his army reached about 200,000 in number and would occupy the whole of the Huaiyin area.

Without any resistance, Wu Su got all the registration data such as the lists of civil and military personnel from local Ming officials and he asked them to welcome his coming.

All the Ming military commanders fled to Huai'an. However, Yan Ermei refused to listen to Wu Su's order. Later on, when Wu Su came to Xuzhou, the leader of a local

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<sup>18</sup> All the data about Yan's early career are from Qing shi Bianweihui ed., *Qing dai renwu zhuangao* 清代人物傳稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1984), part 1, vol.1, 211-22.

peasant rebellion, Cheng Jikong, offered to accompany and protect him. With Cheng's assistance, Wu Su led his army into Pei City where he arrested Yan Ermei.<sup>19</sup>

Yan himself provides us a vivid description of this tumultuous period:

Previously, I lived in the countryside. I did not believe that Beijing was occupied when I heard this news the first time. I thought that Beijing had a solid defense system, how could it be occupied so easily? Furthermore, there are a lot of councilors and different levels of local government officials in the south and north, how could it be that there was no one who mourned for the emperor and sent armies to save him? These words must be the false, instigating, and misleading words of the rebels.<sup>20</sup>

On April 15, 1644, some Ming officials from Beijing fled to the south along the Grand Canal. However, those people, as well as most of the local Pei officials, literati and local gentry went to the outskirts of the city to express their welcome to Wu Su.

Yan refused to do so. He believed that although the peasant rebels had already set up an administrative system, they had insufficient military forces under their control. Furthermore, Yan felt that the best approach was to remind them of loyalty and righteousness:

If they [those people who welcomed Wu, as well as Wu himself] show repentance, we may use them. Otherwise, since there are not so many rebels here, we may kill them. Dedicated to the service of Ming, we have no regret.<sup>21</sup>

On May 6, Yan wrote a letter to Wu Su, but the letter evidently prompted little in the way of repentance. Wu carried out his plans such as seizing the official seal in Pei County. Moreover, he paid his respects to the Temple of Confucius in order to find another way to

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<sup>19</sup> Peng Yisun provided wrong information about this process- in fact, Yan was not killed. See *Ping Kouzhi* 平寇志, 255-56.

<sup>20</sup> Yan Ermei 閻爾梅, *Baitashanren wenji* 白奎山人文集, XXSKQS 1394, Jibu bieji lei 集部 別集類, 551.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 553.

gain the respect of the local literati. Wu also set up administrative and judicial systems, and trained his army for the defense of the Yellow River. On May 12, Wu began a one-week tour of inspection in Feng County 豐縣. When they heard the news of the defeat of Li Zicheng (by the Qing army), Wu and the other rebel leaders had to flee.<sup>22</sup>

The actions of literati and local elites such as Yan were much the same as their counterparts in Shandong: they killed and expelled Li's officials and tried to resume Ming authority. Yet, their attitudes toward the Qing were often very contradictory: some of them surrendered; some of them saw no option but to accept alien rule; some demonstrated a heroic loyalty to the fallen Ming and readiness for self-sacrifice; many officials committed suicide rather than surrender to their barbarian conquerors; and a very few of them even engaged in military activities against the Qing. Yan Ermei belongs to this final category. For those like Yan, loyalist commitment was beyond compromise, the individual's conscience was above social consensus and the obligation to repay the country was the primary concern. Both family members and friends could be neglected for this larger cause.

Yan Ermei's writings show a well-developed knowledge of military affairs. Although, we still do not know how Yan acquired his military knowledge. For instance, one of his articles entitled "Liu Kouyi" 流寇議 mentioned why literati could not command the Ming army. Based on his observation, those literati who supervised armies, and those who were born in areas close to the frontier were probably used to seeing fighting, but still never joined the battle physically. As for those who were born and grew up in the south, they could not even recognize the different types of weapons. How could you expect them to join or command in warfare?

The changing battle arrays, glittering knife-edges, arrows like rain . . . witnessing death or life; could you expect them to have imperturbability? All they could do was close the city gate, simply giving up the suburbs and the rest of the area.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 555.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 517.

He realized that the main forces of Li Zicheng's peasant armies were from the northwest, and they were proud of their use of cavalry. To deal with these powerful military forces, he suggested using infantry and providing them special training with falchion and spear. However, his plan was never carried out. Ultimately, his ideas were founded on the assumed presence of good training, courage, strict command, and a willingness to sacrifice one's life. None of these conditions was present at that time.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to his writings on military affairs mentioned above, his concrete military actions are also worth examining. He hoped to arouse the Southern Ming troops to engage in a northern expedition. On February 12, 1645, he was invited to become a private secretary of Shi Kefa, the highest military official of the Southern Ming in the Jiangbei area. During Yan's interview with Shi Kefa on February 15, 1645, Yan agreed to join the secretariat, but insisted that Shi should move a portion of his army into Henan and encourage the growth of resistance movements there. According to him, most of the former Ming armies in the north remained loyal to the Ming. On the other hand, the Qing could not gather its armies right away. If the Southern Ming army embarked on a long march to fight against the Qing in the north, they would be joined by former Ming armies.<sup>25</sup>

In December 1644, the Manchu cavalry began to probe the Southern Ming defenses. Hearing that many officials and gentry members in Henan province had joined the Manchus, and knowing that former Ming officers were treated with respect by the Qing government when they did surrender, Xu Dingguo 許定國, a former peasant general, offered to surrender his forty to fifty thousand troops in exchange for amnesty. One month later, Shi Kefa ordered Gao Jie 高傑, one of Li Zicheng's former generals, to recover the area around Guide 歸德 and Kaifeng 開封.

Gao had thirteen Regional Commanders under his command, and his army included a large cavalry which was considered the most powerful force within Li Zicheng's army. Since Xu had already surrendered to the Qing, Gao's coming forced him to make a choice. Several days later, he suddenly trapped and killed Gao and his bodyguards. After hearing

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 522.

<sup>25</sup> Xiao Yishan 蕭一山, *Qing dai tongshi* 清代通史 (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1927), vol.1, 303.

this news, Shi realized that the Central Plains could not be taken. But he still hoped to keep Gao's force of forty thousand men, which was the best of all the armies north of the Yangzi River, together as a unified command. Yan encouraged Shi Kefa to use this opportunity to control of Gao's army strictly, but he received no answer from Shi.<sup>26</sup>

What Yan had in mind, on the one hand, was persuading local magnates who were undecided to remain loyal to the Southern Ming; and, on the other, linking up with a confederation including even the bandit-loyalists in Shandong such as Yu Yuan Army. Now, Yan and Ye Tingxiu and others were hoping to link up with them, foment a popular uprising across the Yellow River, and then together with these "righteous soldiers" recover the Central Plain. Yan did not describe all of these plans in detail during his meeting with Shi, but he did spell out both his own strategy for a northern expedition and his strong ideas about how to carry out these plans.

In a letter to Shi Kefa, he wrote:

When the bandit armies seized the capital, there was no ruler left in the Central Plain and spurious officials occupied local posts. All that I could do then was bide my time..., and aware that I myself was too weak to strike back alone. Therefore, I petitioned my superiors of each and every office, asking that a punitive expedition be sent north and that at the same time we mobilize the tens of thousands of loyal and daring gentlemen of the area north of the river to form an imperial vanguard ahead of the main force pledged to wreak vengeance on the enemies of our former emperor and to recover our ancestral territories.<sup>27</sup>

However, Shi totally rejected Yan's demands, not only because he lacked the real power to implement these demands, but also because he had his own considerations, which will be discussed below. Shortly after this, Yan was ordered to move west into Henan and there to join the Southern Ming army, forming a light defensive line against the Manchu army in case the Manchus decided to turn south. Yan did set off to the west, following the Southern Ming's order, but on March 6, 1645, before reaching the front, he

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<sup>26</sup> QDRWZG, part 1, vol.1, 214. Shi's condition will be discussed in the following part.

<sup>27</sup> Quoted from Wakeman (1985), vol. 1, 514.

decided that the mission was hopeless and turned back. He was thus in the Huaibei area when the Manchus finally launched their attack upon Shi's headquarters in Yangzhou. Shi finally roughly settled his plan of defense.<sup>28</sup> On April 25, Yangzhou fell into the hands of the Manchu armies, and the famous massacre occurred.

By this time, Yan Ermei was at Luzhou in central Jiangbei. Later on, he wrote a poem entitled *Xi Yangzhou* (惜揚州). In the preface we learn why Shi Kefa insisted on returning to Yangzhou. Yan points out that "because the people who surround Shi Kefa are from the South" all their homes and property are in the South, so they have no intention to pursue a northern expedition. In this same poem, he also wrote:

The revered Shi supervised Ming armies entered into Peng Cheng 彭城 (Xuzhou),

史公督師入彭城

Righteous persons from both the Yellow and Huai Rivers welcomed him with wine

兩河義士壺漿迎

Such people's hearts are providential

人心如此即天意

To order the armies to launch the Western or Northern expedition

命將西征或北征.....

What a sorrow the barbarian cavalry crossed the Yellow River

傷哉胡騎渡河南

They murdered the people everywhere but in Yangzhou the most<sup>29</sup>

殺人惟獨揚州多

After leaving Shi, Yan personally led some local military forces to fight against the Manchu invasion. When the Qing army entered Huai'an city, Yan led his militia in an attack, but was defeated. The Qing army summoned Yan to surrender, but Yan refused to do so, saying:

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<sup>28</sup> Yan Ermei, XXSKQS 1394, 524.

<sup>29</sup> Yan Ermei, XXSKQS 1394, 498.

How can you imagine a real man who would act as a slave

豈有丈夫臣異類

I feel ashamed to change Chinese dress into barbarian robes

羞于華夏改胡裝

Indeed, Yan had a certain degree of military experience in the pacification of peasant rebellions, but this time he had no hope that any cooperation could be procured from the local residents. The local people feared his actions would cause retaliation from the Manchu army, and they refused to cooperate with his loyalist army. Finally, Yan had to admit that he was uncertain about how to proceed.<sup>30</sup>

In the process of organizing opposition to the Qing, Yan also played a role as liaison among anti-Manchu armies from different regions, such as the righteous armies from Jiangnan that will be discussed in Chapter Three. He frequently adopted the guise of a monk, naming himself “Taodong monk” 蹈東和尚. He and others were hoping to unite all the anti-Manchu forces, including the Shandong bandit-loyalists mentioned above. After uniting these forces, they planned to foment a popular uprising across the Yellow River, and then together with these “righteous soldiers” recover the Central Plain. In the process, he was arrested several times by the Manchus, but was finally successful in escaping. After 1652, he embarked again on travels in north China. Eventually, he returned home to Pei Xian in 1673, dying six years later.

Why were Yan Ermei’s military actions ultimately unsuccessful?

In 1662, Yan had a chance to visit Shi Kefa’s former camp in Xuzhou. Standing before that place, he said:

Alas, Shi Kefa does not deserve to be discussed. If he had taken my suggestion, how would he have lost his life?<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> *Qing dai renwu zhuangao*, part 1, vol. 1, 211-21.

Is this true? Could his plans for expeditions to the west or north have succeeded?

To explore Yan Ermei's failure in military affairs, there is no need to reiterate military factors from the Manchu's perspective. As we briefly mentioned in Chapter One, previous studies have already extensively covered factors such as the use of cavalry, military training, logistics, and so on. What I want to argue here is that the structure of rural society in this area proved unsuitable for literati like Yan Ermei who hoped to engage in military actions.

As I mentioned in regards to Shandong, to assure their survival and the protection of their own interests, the local elite might unite and co-operate with any forces, including local bandits, or they might oppose and resist any other forces from the outside. Since basic living conditions were always their primary concern, they cared little about where the real authority and control over rural society came from. They might support or oppose any forces. Their actions depended on whether or not someone or some forces could provide the means that they needed to survive. Yan's area of activity was located on the border of Shandong and Nanzhili. Here the social structure and other characteristics were similar to that of Shandong. Yan realized that the most important action he could take was to mobilize the masses. He also realized that most ordinary peasants took part in rebellions simply because of the harsh conditions of their lives, such as famine or the exploitation of landlords and officials. With this in mind, he felt that if ordinary people realized the benefits of a Ming government, they were certain to join in defending the city and following orders.<sup>32</sup>

Yan also remained convinced that the sense of loyalty and righteousness of the entire dynasty's progeny had not been extirpated in the area north of the river. According to him, a bold stroke, a decisive act, could still mobilize this sentiment:

The people's emotions can be aroused . . . The martial heroes of the empire may be few indeed, but the common mass is numerous. First there must be people to lead

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<sup>32</sup> Yan Ermei, XXSKQS 1394, 521.



them. Only then will those who are easily swayed by outside influences rise in response to what they see and feel.<sup>33</sup>

The problem was how to mobilize these common people.

In the fall of 1644, he asked a representative from the Southern Ming to implement a policy of tax reduction in order to benefit the peasants; however, he received no answer.

Regardless of the suggestions or plans he made, neither he nor the forces he led and relied on were able to mobilize an anti-Manchu “united line.” This is why Yan Ermei could not carry out his military actions in the Huaibei area.

Yan Ermei is a representative of those few Chinese literati who engaged in military actions in order to save the Ming in Huaibei area. Their many different tactics all proved ultimately unsuccessful; their tragic destiny was decided by the time and environment. To be more concrete, they were not successful in finding ways to integrate the numerous peasants into their military plans. However, Yan Ermei’s career alone is not sufficient to prove these judgments and conclusions. The following Yangzhou Campaign and its related military activities provide us with several different perspectives from which to analyze the place of literati during the war. The war included ethnic conflicts and contradictions between gentry and ordinary citizens, as well as various military actions, such as the wars between the government and rebellious peasants.

### **2: 3. Literati Group Military Action in Jiangbei**

Literally, Jiangbei means north of the Yangzi River. Specifically, the area lies between Xuzhou and the north bank of the Yangzi River. Yangzhou city is the largest commercial and cultural center in the area. However, in late imperial China this city was generally considered culturally a part of Jiangnan. Though it was not actually “south of the river,” it shared the social and cultural characteristics of Jiangnan and had enjoyed a similar degree of economic prosperity since the Sui dynasty (581-618). During the Ming and

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<sup>33</sup> Quoted from Wakeman, (1985), vol.1, 514.

much of the Qing, this city owed much of its economic prosperity to the salt monopoly.<sup>34</sup> Since the city had enjoyed a long peace since the early Ming, its residents tended to focus on the pursuit of prosperity while ignoring coastal military defense. From a military perspective, although Gu Yanwu's book provides detailed information about Ming garrisons in Yangzhou, such as the weapons they used, and places troops were stationed,<sup>35</sup> there is nothing related to this current study because the *Wei* and *Suo* system had already practically collapsed by the seventeenth century. Even in the mid-sixteenth century, the unwallled market towns around the Grand Canal suffered from prolonged and repeated pirate attacks. Most of the attacks took place from 1554 until the defeat of Xu Hai 徐海 in August, 1556. In 1555, several hundred Japanese pirates reached Yangzhou city, killing people, looting, and burning houses. In all, several thousand people were killed by the sword or drowned.

Since this city, like much of Jiangbei, was characterized more by ease and luxury than military involvement, the Ming government had to redeploy its army from other locations such as Xuzhou, or even transfer some soldiers from the northern frontiers in order to defend it. Among them, soldiers from areas such as Yiwu and Dongyang 東陽 of Zhejiang province were acclaimed for their courage and skill in fighting.<sup>36</sup>

Some soldiers who were skilled at naval fighting were also transferred to Yangzhou in order to protect transportation along the Yangzi River.

However, military supplies could not be guaranteed. The Ming government had to levy a special tax for military purposes in addition to the common agriculture and labor taxes. In order to meet the huge expense spent on the northern frontiers as well as the

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<sup>34</sup> Thomas A. Metzger, "The Organizational Capabilities of the Ch'ing State in the Field of Commerce: the Liang-huai Salt Monopoly, 1740-1840," in W.E. Willmott, ed., *Economic Organization in Chinese Society*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 9-45. It is impossible to list the countless studies related to Yangzhou, for example, Antonia Finnane, *Speaking of Yangzhou: a Chinese City, 1550-1850* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Wang Zhenzhong 王振中, *Ming Qing Huishang yu Huaiyang shehui bianqian* 明清徽商與淮揚社會變遷 (Beijing: Sanlian, 1996); see also Tobie Meyer-Fong, *Building Culture in Early Qing Yangzhou* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

<sup>35</sup> Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, TXJGLBS, vol.12, Yang 揚, Bingfang kao 兵防考, see XXSKQS 596, 221-23.

<sup>36</sup> The majority of ordinary soldiers of Qi Jiguang's famous army were also from this area. See R. Huang (1981), 156-88; also see Thomas G. Nimick, "Ch'i Chi-Kuang and I-wu County," *Ming Studies* 34 (1995), 17-26.

pacification of peasant rebellions across northern China, a policy of increased taxation was carried out in the east and southeast coastal areas until the end of the Ming.<sup>37</sup> As for the few local armies, they gradually posed big problems for the Ming government because some soldiers connected with the powerful local gentry coerced their generals to address their special needs, and none could question them. Faced with review (by the government), these soldiers tended to hire some people to replace them. Furthermore, the arrogant soldiers from Zhejiang frequently refused to cooperate with the local armies, and bothered local residents.<sup>38</sup>

As in Shandong, for some people and local military forces, their primary concerns had little to do with the perception of ethnic conflict, but were focused on the possibility of gaining some material benefit. When Japanese pirates came,

Some of the wicked Chinese people benefited from their bribes, and often had connections with them. A man named Gu Biao 顧表 who was from Tongzhou 通州, was very cunning and even guided the pirates. For these reasons, the pirates were able to occupy the important traffic points and understand the actual conditions of the Ming garrison.<sup>39</sup>

These aspects of the social and military background of Jiangbei before the Manchu invasion indicate that the Ming and Southern Ming could expect little military support in this area. Whatever the Ming government had done, and regardless of the motives and behavior of Ming officials, there were simply insufficient military social resources to engage in an effective resistance against the Manchu invaders. We can first focus on the literati who played the role of military staff.

Like Yan Ermei, many literati entered into Shi Kefa's camp to demonstrate their abilities and loyalties. Since Shi was the highest southern Ming official who took care

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<sup>37</sup> TXJGLBS, ce 9, Feng Ning Hui 鳳寧徽 XXSKQS 596, 105.

<sup>38</sup> XXSKQS 596, 223.

<sup>39</sup> Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉, *Ming shi* 明史 (Beijing: Zhonghua, repr., 1999) (vol.199, Biography of Zheng Xiao 鄭曉傳), 3514.

Jiangbei's defenses after Beijing's fall, this group of literati surrounding Shi provides us a good opportunity to explore their actions and characteristics as a whole. Fortunately, a paper published recently by He Xiuling not only sheds light on the behavior of this group, but also provides a vivid example of how to explore other characteristics of these literati.<sup>40</sup>

Beginning in 1425, the Ming government began to allow higher ranking military officials, especially those who had done service on the northern frontier, to employ staff officers to help with paperwork. In addition to the copying of manuscripts, these literati also participated in military planning and strategizing.<sup>41</sup> Entering the sixteenth century, it was common for high officials in the capitals (both Beijing and Nanjing) and in the other provinces to have private scholars acting as their private secretaries and advisors. For instance, Hu Zongxian is known to history as the capable, ruthless official who ended the pirate invasions into the interior of the country and who engineered the capture of the notorious pirate leader. He is also remembered for the brilliance of the literary gentlemen he collected in his headquarters, or *mufu* 幕府,<sup>42</sup> to serve as military advisors and secretaries. He was described in the gazetteer of the district as a man who paid attention to large questions and did not concern himself with details. From detailed reports coming in from all over the province, Hu was able to see how pressures from localities seeking protection had fragmented the available military forces and weakened the ability of the regional administration to marshal its resources against the pirates. Finally, he used a variety of strategies to defeat the pirates.<sup>43</sup>

Staff officers filled two different roles during the late Ming: some worked within formal administrative agencies under the direct control of the Ming government. Most, however, were in the employ of high-ranking officials. For most staff officers, their main

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<sup>40</sup> He Xiuling, part 1 and part 2.

<sup>41</sup> Zheng Xiao 鄭曉, *Jinyan* 今言, juan 2, YMSLBICK 136, 81.

<sup>42</sup> The concept of "*mufu*" has various meanings in different periods of Chinese history. By the time of the Ming-Qing transition, it may be deemed as the tent from which the higher officials on duty at the frontier or administrative office governed.

<sup>43</sup> Marilyn Fitzpatrick, "Local Interests and the Anti-Pirate Administration in China's South-east 1555-1565", in *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i*, 4.2 (1979), 1-50; John K. Fairbank, 23; see also pages 18-19 of this dissertation.

jobs included document management, assisting their employers in devising strategies, and reviewing or composing literary works for the purpose of entertainment. The number of staff officers hired by an official was dependent on his budget or personal financial capacity. The Ming government allowed high ranking civil and military officials who worked outside the capital area to possess blank certificates in case they needed to hire someone. In the Southern Ming, due to financial limitation, more blank certificates were issued.

Shi Kefa was in possession of this kind of blank certificate. His headquarters at Yangzhou had attracted ardent loyalists from among the gentry of Jiangnan. Most of his personal staff, however, was recruited later when he fought in the area of present-day Anhui in the early 1640s.

After reaching Yangzhou in May of 1644, Shi announced the formation of a special secretariat, the Lixian guan 禮賢館 (Bureau Which is Courteous to the Worthy) and sent out summons to the scholars of the region. Ying Tingji 應廷吉, a *jinshi* degree holder (1627) from Yin County 鄞縣 in Zhejiang was responsible for the care of these literati. Ying had served as magistrate of Tangshan 湯山, and when Shi came to Yangzhou, was serving as the *Tuiguan* of Huai'an Prefecture 淮安府. He was said to be skilled in astrology as well as divination, and relied on these abilities to predict the outcome of military actions.<sup>44</sup>

Under the management of Ying Tingji, the Lixian guan enrolled a total of two hundred literati in the first several months. Shi Kefa provided them with monthly subsidies and treated them very well. When he got a little bit of wine, he would even invite them to drink together. Most importantly, he used his blank certificates to appoint these literati as local civil officials. After the Qing army entered Yangzhou city, he advised these people to flee with him for their lives. In the end, nineteen followed Shi to join the Southern Ming.

Among them, about two-thirds were from Nanzhili. Twenty four had received their *jinshi* or *juren* degrees, and only four of them later surrendered to the Qing. He Lingxiu

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<sup>44</sup> Wen Ruilin, in ZGYSJC 35, 220-21.

provides two reasons to explain why so many of these literati were from Nanzhili. The first is simply because Shi Kefa was familiar with them. Although Shi himself was from the north, he had had little contact with people from the north since being appointed to the Military Defense Circuit of Chitai 池太兵備道 (located in Chizhou 池州, on the south shore of Yangzi, now in Anhui Province) in 1635. Following this appointment, he had spent several years as Military Defense Circuit of Anlu (Anqing and Luzhou 安慶廬州), Grand Coordinator of An, Lu, Chi, and Tai 安廬池太巡撫, Grand Coordinator of Fengyang, Director-general of Grain Transport 漕運總督兼鳳陽巡, and finally the Director of the Board of War in Nanjing.

The second reason offered by He is that many of the literati from the South had a “strong desire to restore the Ming.”<sup>45</sup> However, from the above discussion of Yan Ermei’s critics, we know this judgment needs to be considered: it is they who tried to persuade Shi Kefa to retreat to Yangzhou; it was also they who refused to consider engaging in battles in northern China, because of their local interests in the south.

The motives of the literati who became Shi’s staff officers are not easily classified, but we can be sure that most had already made the decision to dedicate themselves to the Ming. We cannot, therefore, compare these men with those who never considered sacrificing their lives for the Ming, or those who did not care about ethnic conflicts. Nonetheless, the following can be taken as broadly representative of the fates of these literati:

He Gang 何剛: sacrificed his life for the Ming like Shi Kefa;

Wu Yi 吳易: fled from Yangzhou city, but later dedicated his life to the Ming;

Ying Tingji and Yan Ermei: become vagrants (*yimin* 遺民);

Hou Fangyu 侯方域: surrendered to the Qing.

Most of these staff officers were really military specialists who were proud of their skills in training, strategy, tactics, and logistics. Unlike those who specialized in other fields such as literature or poetry, these military experts joined Shi Kefa because they

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<sup>45</sup> He, part 2, 31.

really wished to lead the attempt to recover the Central Plains. They placed their hopes in the possibility that Shi Kefa would be able to integrate or lead the resistance, and that the ordinary people and local militias of north China would rise up in response to their military action in the Jiangbei area. Two figures, He Gang 何剛 and Lu Zhenfei 路振飛, are representative of these officers.

He Gang received his *juren* degree in 1630 in Songjiang 松江 (present-day Shanghai). Following this, he spent much of his time in Jiaxing 嘉興 where he became acquainted with a number of other talented literati. Around 1640, he began to realize the great turbulence was imminent as a result of peasant rebellions and ethnic conflicts. Speaking to his disciple, Xu Du 許都 from Dongyang in Zhejiang, he said: “The place you reside in is proud of its strong soldiers, please pay attention to the conscription and training of soldiers for future use.”<sup>46</sup>

In the spring of 1644, He Gang sent a memorial to recommend Xu Du. He praised Xu for his loyalty, filial nature, and abilities in military strategy and tactics. In this memorial, he asked the Hongguang emperor to use Xu to mobilize the people from the Prefectures of Hui 徽 and Wu 婺 (present-day south part of Anhui). He himself offered to serve as liaison to communicate between them. Given Qi Jiguang’s training and managing methods, this army could be expected to fight on the battlefield within about one year.<sup>47</sup>

He’s endeavors received full cooperation from Palace Steward (*Jishi zhong* 給事中) Chen Zilong (we will mention him in Chapter Three) and a few other Jiangnan literati.

In the very early period of the Southern Ming, Chen made several suggestions about how to defend the Yangzi River. He emphasized the importance of waterborne forces (*shuishì* 水師) and strongly recommended the building of ocean-going boats for use in the near future. He recommended that He Gang be employed to train this special force. These suggestions were finally accepted by the Southern Ming court. Several months

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<sup>46</sup> For Xu Du incident, see Jerry Dennerline, “Hsu Tu and the Lesson of Nanking: Political Integration and the Local Defense in Chiang-nan, 1634-1645.” In Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. ed. *From Ming to Ching – Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 91-132; Pan Xinhui 潘星輝, “Ming ji Dongyang minbian kaolun” 明季東陽民變考論, in Zhu Chengru 朱誠如 and Wang Tianyou 王天有 ed., *Ming Qing lun cong* 明清論叢 (Beijing: Zijincheng, 1999), vol.1, 349-65.

<sup>47</sup> He did not know Xu had been killed by this time. See Xu Bingyi, juan 12, 197.

later, He established his own army, to which he gave the name *Zhong Guanying* of Songjiang 松江忠貫營. Unfortunately there are no further materials available about this army: its size, as well as its military effectiveness, are unknown.

He did demonstrate his capacities for military training. For example, he was said to have combined the use of grace and awe in controlling his soldiers (恩威並用); he also treated soldiers as his own sons and disciples. After only two months, his army was well trained and ready for deployment. As a result of this success, He was promoted to the position of Vice Director of the Department of Operation (*zhifangsi yuanwailang* 職方司員外郎). However, He remained dissatisfied with his achievements. Facing the disorder of the Southern Ming, he sent a memorial urging that Prince Fu not be indulgent in leisure or improper in routine courtesy. He wrote:

What we demand is a search for genius within the entire world; let people with wisdom make decisions, honest and clean people handle financial matters, and brave men fight on the battlefield.

Furthermore, He also suggested that “the court should give honor to those who have practical capacities, rather than those who only know how to compose poems or papers.”

Obviously, He realized that heroes could come from the grassroots of society. This sort of memorial represents a clear tendency among late Ming literati who had already realized and tried to avoid the side effects of the eight-legged style essays with quotations from the classics. Instead of abstract discussions on the nature of the heart-mind 心性, they began to pursue practical policies.

Unfortunately, his appeal received no response. Disappointed with the Court at Nanjing, he decided to go to Shi Kefa's camp and allow his army to be placed under Shi's control. Shi gave He Gang, along with Qin Shiqi 秦士奇 and Shi Fengyi 施風儀, the control and command of his entire Yangzhou army. He's military plan and activities included the occupation of Baiyanghe 白洋河 (present Yanghe town 洋河鎮, located in Siyang 泗陽 county of Jiangsu Province), and the oversight of logistical problems such as



grain transportation. In addition to these responsibilities, he traveled frequently between Songjiang and Yangzhou to take care of his own army.

At the time of the Manchu siege of Yangzhou, He Gang led his army back to this city, and decided to devote himself to the resistance.<sup>48</sup> Shi Kefa, realizing that there was no hope in winning the battle, said to He Gang: “You should attempt to summon additional troops to help us, rather than staying here and losing your life.”

He replied: “Now the people’s hearts are scattered, who will echo us? For this country, for the people who know me very well, I deserve to die.”

After the fall of Yangzhou, He hanged himself.<sup>49</sup>

Lu Zhengfei provides us another example to explore their military actions.

Lu was born in Quzhou 曲周, Shanxi Province and passed his *jinsshi* degree in 1625. As a prominent civil official, he was noted for his integrity and courage, and for gaining expertise in military affairs. He had been engaged in a variety of administrative and military capacities before the fall of the Ming dynasty. In 1631, he became a Censor; in 1635, he was appointed as Regional Inspector of Fujian 巡按福建 where he pacified the pirates in the coastal area; in autumn of 1643 he was promoted to Right Censor-in-chief (*Youqian duyushi* 右僉都禦史) and was named Viceroy in charge of the Huaiyang area, as well as the Grand Inspector of Grain Transportation 右僉都禦史總督漕運巡撫淮揚.

Entering 1644, he had adopted a number of methods to fight against the peasant rebellions. In January, he sent seventeen generals to deploy armies along the Yellow River. By providing some subsistence materials, he mobilized a local militia numbering more than 200,000 men. In the spring, Lu tried to rally the populace, and assigned officials under his charge. They were given responsibility for the defense of different parts of Huai’an city. By this time, there were seventy-two wards (*fang* 坊) in the city, and each of them “assembled righteous troops” to be drilled by two *shengyuan*, one of whom was given the title of ward chief (*fangzhang* 坊長). These local troops were to be used for night patrols in the city. However, this sort of militarization was incomplete:

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<sup>48</sup> All the above quoted from He, part 1, 182.

<sup>49</sup> Xu Bingyi, juan 12, 198.

there was no registration, no formal training, and no certain pay. The members came from local families, each of which was to provide anywhere from one to five men. All of them were volunteers, and were expected to provide their own weapons and sustenance. These militias were intended to secure the local community. However, one of the major results was that local residents were prevented from fleeing the city.<sup>50</sup>

Lu himself encouraged the recruitment of local militia. During the weeks after the fall of Beijing, he rallied the local gentry and summoned them and the ordinary people to join the resistance against the coming peasant rebels. A parade was held in which a *Juren* named Tang Tiaoding 湯調鼎 and several others dressed up in military uniform. Finally, Lu gave out about 4000 *dan* of grain to the residents of city. With the support of his soldiers, he ordered the beheading of “spurious officials” (*wei guan* 偽官, sent by Li Zicheng’s peasant regime).<sup>51</sup> He even made a special announcement that any one able to capture a “spurious official” would receive an award of 2,000 taels of silver. Later, he led his army to recover Xuzhou. In cooperation with Lu, some Ming loyalists from Yancheng 鹽城 captured and killed the rebel general Dong Xueli 董學禮 and thirteen other rebel officers.<sup>52</sup>

Huai’an was thus turned into a haven for Ming loyalists, and especially for officials and nobles fleeing from the north. Lu’s work in this city impressed Shi Kefa. Following Li Zicheng’s entrance into the Central Plains, most civil and military officers had surrendered. Only this city was successful in uniting both officials and ordinary people to defend itself. Their military action not only expelled the rebels, but also prevented other rebels from invading. Furthermore, they recovered Suqian and other places. Jiangnan thus had a brief period of peace.

“Why did the people of Huai’an dare to do so?”

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<sup>50</sup> *Huaicheng jishi* 淮城紀事, in ZGYSJC 29, 473-74. Wakeman’s description emphasizes that it is Lu himself who organized or mobilized the militia, see Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 330. In fact, Lu only used the existing local militia, he did not “devise”. Wakeman’s data are based on the *Ming ji beilue* and *Jiayi shi’an*. Compared to those two sources, *Huaicheng jishi* provides more first hand and detailed description.

<sup>51</sup> Ji Liuqi, *Ming ji nanlue* 明季南略, juan 3, in ZGYSJC 36, 478-79.

<sup>52</sup> Peng Yisun, 255-56.

According to Shi Kefa, “it is just because the local official inspired them.”<sup>53</sup>

Nevertheless, some of Lu’s actions in the Huai’an area were criticized by Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578-1641), a prestigious scholar and philosopher referred to by many literati as an heir of the “righteous scholars” of the Chongzhen period. Liu sent a special memorial to the court to condemn Lu Zhenfei:

The most important matter for regret is that although Lu himself remains to defend the city, his family members and house-hold are on a boat, preparing to flee anytime. Undoubtedly this action is inspiring others to flee. Thus we heard that Liu Zeqing and others also let their family members reside in Jiangnan, not Jiangbei. All of them deserve to put to death.<sup>54</sup>

After this memorial was sent, Liu Zongzhou delivered a further series of scathing memorials to the court. In these memorials he lambasted not only certain hereditary military nobles for interfering in civil affairs, but also eunuchs and political opportunists. As a representative of the literati, Liu even urged that Ma Shiyong 馬士英 (1591-1646), the most powerful man of the Southern Ming, be sent immediately back to Fengyang, and that “if any generals do not follow orders, they immediately should be dealt with according to the great laws of the court.”<sup>55</sup>

Liu Zongzhou did not realize that the world was changing. Hereditary military nobles and defense commanders had become thoroughly politicized during the time of the Southern Ming. According to Struve, military leaders, the defense commanders in particular, began to indict court officials and memorialize the throne on political matters without inhibition. For instance, several military men violently attacked the Minister of Personnel Zhang Shenyan 張慎言, criticizing him for appointing only civil officials to

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<sup>53</sup> Shi Kefa 史可法, *Shi zhongzhengong ji* 史忠正公集, juan 1, in XXSKQS 1387, 178.

<sup>54</sup> Li Qing, *Nan dudu*, juan 1, in NMSL BZ, 169.

<sup>55</sup> Struve (1984), 27.

posts, thereby neglecting military men. Among these military men, attitudes toward the relationship between *Wen* and *Wu* were changing. Whereas traditionally they had been subordinated to civil officials, they now “wanted the civil officials to live up to their side” because it was they who allowed Prince Fu to become emperor.<sup>56</sup> Since Liu’s remarks touched on this very sensitive topic of the relationship between *Wen* and *Wu*, he tried to make it very clear. From his perspective, those military officials who served outside of the capital would not been allowed to review court politics, and they would not be permitted to appointed civil officials.<sup>57</sup>

Among the military officials, Liu Zeqing was attacked severely by Liu Zongzhou. As we mentioned in Chapter One, Liu Zeqing had once served as regional commander of the major Ming garrison in Shandong. When the Chongzhen Emperor asked him to join his other generals in a march upon Beijing to rescue the court from Li Zicheng, Liu had ignored the order and instead had turned south, plundering his way through Linqing and reaching Fengyang, where his men reportedly killed many of the local population.<sup>58</sup>

Liu was appointed to take charge of the eleven prefectures and counties of the Huai’an and Haizhou region, with responsibility for recovering Shandong. He would be garrisoned at Huai’an. This raises a question: how would Lu Zhenfei and local residents treat Liu and his notorious armies? Although Lu greeted refugees and any other sort of people from the north warmly, neither he nor the residents of Huai’an had any intention of accepting the armies of Liu Zeqing. Lu’s tragedy is that he had no guarantee of help from the court of the Southern Ming; finally, he became a victim of political struggles in

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<sup>56</sup> Struve (1984), 22.

<sup>57</sup> Li Qing, *Nandu lu* 南渡錄, juan 2, in NMSL BZ, 205.

<sup>58</sup> See Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 327. Liu’s actions, together with the others, indicate that these generals in fact had already become warlords by this time. Whatever the measures taken, the Ming government had lost control of its own armies, let alone the lower local military forces such as *xiangbing*. We will mention this tendency in Chapter Four. To the best of my knowledge, the best study about the rise of private armies is a paper entitled “Ming dai mubing zhi jianlun” 明代募兵制簡論 by Li Du 李渡, *Wen Shizhe* 2 (1986), 62-68. This paper listed a lot of instances to certify that the Ming court, even the Chongzhen emperor himself, could not command his Regional Commanders. In this Jiangbei area, the typical example is Zhang Tianlu 張天祿 (1599-1659). As a Regional Commander, he refused to follow the emperor Chongzhen’s order in February of 1644. In the spring of 1645, Shi Kefa ordered him to provide assistance for defending Yangzhou, but he made an opposite decision: to surrender to the Qing, and led his army to pacify the anti-Qing rebellions. See QDRWZG, part 1, vol.2, 186-87.

the court. He was removed from power by Ma Shiying so that Ma could use his favored general Tian Yang 田仰. Lu lost his position and died several years later in south China.<sup>59</sup>

After Lu's departure, Liu Zeqing and Tian Yang occupied the city but did nothing in preparation for the coming Qing invasion. All the righteous people 義士 were scattered, and their armies had absolutely no rule or discipline. When they were asked how to prepare the resistance, Liu answered:

I am here in support of Prince Fu. This city is the place for letting me take a break. If something were to happen, I would go to Jiangnan to choose a good place.<sup>60</sup>

However, faced with Liu Zongzhou's sharp criticism, Liu Zeqing launched a counterattack. He declared that "the world of the [Ming] ancestors had been completely ruined by white-faced students 白麵書生." For this reason, he suggested to the Southern Ming court that it was necessary to terminate the civil service examinations.<sup>61</sup>

Neither Liu Zongzhou nor Liu Zeqing could finally reach their goals because this relationship of *Wen* and *Wu* was too sensitive to resolve (as we will explore in Chapter Four). The Hongguang emperor admonished all parties saying:

This contention between *Wen* and *Wu* grows more severe day by day . . . if this fire-and water [relation] is not resolved, and spears and shields are turned and raised [internally] then affairs of the world will deteriorate insufferably. Moreover, what kind of ruler do you think I am [to countenance this]?<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Previous studies paid special attention to the political struggles among the Southern Ming, especially of the roles Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng played. See Gu Cheng, Chapters Two, Three as well as Five; Struve (1984), 22-28; and Wakeman (1985), vol.1, Chapters Five and Seven.

<sup>60</sup> Wen Bing 文秉, *Jiayi shi'an* 甲乙事案, in NMSL BZ, 464.

<sup>61</sup> Struve (1984), 22.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

As a prominent civil official who had considerable experience in military affairs, Shi Kefa had a crucial understanding of the situation. Literati could say whatever they like, but they had little understanding of actions and effects. Fighting against the bandits and protecting the people would bring about countless hardships which those “white-faced students” could not be expected to bear.<sup>63</sup> In contrast, for military figures, it was Shi who initiated plans to give the leading generals unprecedented freedom in managing their armies. As Minister of War and Grand Adjutant, “Shi has been prompt to submit plans to reorganize and strengthen the lower Yangzi defense system and the Nanjing imperial guard, which was changed to conform to the Beijing pattern. Shi proposed that certain powerful and recently ennobled generals, with their semiprivate armies, constitute four defense commands (四鎮), which would radiate northward and westward from Nanjing.”<sup>64</sup>

In the spring of 1644, several Ming generals led their armies into the Huai River valley from the north. Others had already been in this area for a couple of years. Apart from Gao Jie and Liu Zeqing mentioned above, Huang Degong 黃得功 was made Regional Commander of Fengyang in 1641, and was later garrisoned in Luzhou. Liu Liangzuo 劉良佐, a former bandit from Beizhili who later joined the imperial army, was also in the Fengyang area with his own army, said to number 100,000 troops.<sup>65</sup>

Each of the four generals was ordered to garrison particular key cities and to command forces fixed at thirty thousand troops, called *Sizhen* 四鎮. Unfortunately, all of these powerful generals became deeply involved in political actions. Ma Shiying, the Fengyang Viceroy, had carefully cultivated their support, and it was they who united to decide to let the Prince of Fu become the new ruler of the Southern Ming, giving him control over all the affairs of the court. Shi was only Minister of War; the real power was held by Ma Shiying and his close friend Ruan Dacheng 阮大鍼 (1587-1646). Residing in Jiangnan, the primary concern of Ma and Ruan was to consolidate the court as a whole. Preparation for resistance against the Manchus and recovery of lost land from rebellious

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<sup>63</sup> Shi Kefa, *Shi zhongzhenggongji* 史忠正公集, juan 1, in XXSKQS 1387, 176.

<sup>64</sup> Struve (1984), 23-24.

<sup>65</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol. 1, 327.

peasants were not their only concerns. Under these circumstances, the staff members from Shi Kefa's Lixian guan, as well as Shi himself, had no hope to carry out their military plans effectively in order to defend the Jiangbei area.

All the above has shown the variety of literati and their military actions in the Huaibei area. Although some, such as Yan Ermei, personally appeared on the battlefield, and others, such as Lu Zhenfei and Shi Kefa, devoted themselves to the Ming court in a variety of ways, none of them able to reach their final goals of fighting against the peasant rebels and resisting the Manchu invasion. However, we still have another example which will show us how some literati tried to play a role between the warlords and the ordinary people. I will examine this example below.

During the summer of 1644, Gao Jie led his army to the Huaibei area. His army received a notorious reputation for looting and other undisciplined action. It is said that some soldiers from this army had more than ten attendants, including wives, concubines, and servants.<sup>66</sup> Gao Jie was in many ways the most capable of the warlords north of the Yangzi. His armies filled the inhabitants of Xuzhou and Huai'an with terror. He first took Xuzhou city without any resistance. But when his army moved south to Huai'an and Yangzhou cities, the local leaders and residents had already become vigorously engaged in local defense measures, because they knew that Gao's army was prone to loot cities rather than defend them. Gao's army finally had no choice but to live off the countryside. A censor sent the following report about this condition:

At places like Yangzhou, Linhuai 臨淮 and Luhe 六和,<sup>67</sup> the people and the soldiers are at total odds with each other. Military discipline is almost non-existent, and now the soldiers have become even more perverse. The soldiers and local peoples are separated by a wall: the people regarding the troops as bandits, the troops regarding the people as rebels; and there is fighting on all sides for no reason at all.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Feng Menglong 馮夢龍, *Jiashen jishi* 甲申紀事, Yangzhou bianlue 揚州變略 5, in ZGYSJC 30, 217.

<sup>67</sup> This place should not be read as "Liuhe".

<sup>68</sup> Quoted from Wakeman, 1985, vol.1, 351.

In the whole area of Jiangbei, “everywhere soldier and civilians are in conflict . . . If suddenly the real bandits should arrive, the people surely will be taken by surprise and run away rather than defending their locales. This truly is the greatest worry of the present day.”<sup>69</sup>

In early June, 1645, Gao had garrisoned his soldiers outside Yangzhou’s wall. Despite the large sums of money bestowed upon Gao by the concerned residents of that wealthy city, he still placed the city under siege and permitted his men to plunder the suburbs at will.

At this time, a new *jinshi* (1643), Zheng Yuanxun 鄭元勳, arrived to mediate the quarrels among this army and the local community. Zheng was born in She County 歙縣 of Nanzhili, in present-day Anhui Province, but had been a resident of Yangzhou for some time. He was familiar with both Liu Zeqing and Gao Jie. After Gao’s army arrived, he welcomed them with sheep and wine. He and Gao even became sworn brothers. Gao told Zheng that his only purpose now was to settle his family members here in preparation for his future career. Zheng promised to let his family members enter and reside in the city, and conveyed this news to *Taishou* 太守 Ma Minglu 馬鳴騷,<sup>70</sup> the highest official of Yangzhou city at that time. What happened next was entirely unexpected to Zheng: Ma simply refused this request, and all the gentry and ordinary people made known their intent to defend the city to prevent Gao’s looting.<sup>71</sup>

Yangzhou had long been proud of its wealth. The city was filled with wealthy merchants engaged in the salt and timber trades. Depending on their support, all the streets and lanes were blocked with paling, the city wall was consolidated, and channels

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<sup>69</sup> Quoted from Struve (1984), 24-25.

<sup>70</sup> By this time the term *Taishou* was a common quasi-official or unofficial reference to a Prefect such as *Zhizhou*, *Zhifu*.

<sup>71</sup> Wakeman describes the process as follows: “When Governor sent a member of the local gentry to Gao’s camp to mediate the crisis, and when that person reported back with the suggestion that Gao be allowed to enter, the envoy was beaten to death by a mob and the Yangzhou garrison mutinied, forcing the governor to flee for his life.” See Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 351. In fact, voluntarily Zheng wanted to mediate; he not was sent by the governor or any one else.



were deepened. Since Gao's army lacked the ability to attack the city, they garrisoned in the suburbs where they killed and wounded countless people. Within the city, some people seized the opportunity to break the law. After hearing of what had happened in Yangzhou, Grand Coordinator Huang Jiarui 黃家瑞 came to try to resolve the disputes. Huang summoned the relevant officials, as well as local gentry to discuss the situation. Meanwhile, the ordinary people and soldiers stood around and listened.

Zheng Yuanxun asked: "what kinds of troubles have been caused by General Gao? Why did you not let him in?"

The audience began to clamor and answered: "Corpses are everywhere in the suburb, can you say there has been no harm?"

Zheng replied: "Some of them killed each other; General Gao does not deserve to be scolded for everything."

The noises grew even louder after his words. One who was injured showed his wounds and said: "Can you say I did this to myself?"

Everybody was furious. They believed that Zheng belonged to Gao and said: "There is no hope to defend this city without killing this man."

Zheng was killed immediately by some soldiers.<sup>72</sup>

As a typical *wenren* who had just been awarded his *Jinshi* degree, Zheng Yuanxun did not understand his own times or the feelings of the people. It is obvious that he overestimated his own capacities for mediating the conflicts between armies and local people. In the end, his words triggered public anger and caused him to lose his life. However, local officials also had no idea about how to handle these incidents between enraged residents and the warlord soldiers encamped outside the city. This event shows us that literati or local gentry were often unable to ensure their own survival, let alone affect others.

After the people's refusal to welcome his armies into Yangzhou and their killing of his friend Zheng Yuanxun, Gao Jie became enraged. He launched repeated attacks, but

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<sup>72</sup> *Jiashen jishi* 甲申記事, Yangzhou bianlue 揚州變略 5. In ZGYSJC 30, 217-18.

remained unable to occupy the city. In the midst of the attacks, Shi Kefa arrived and attempted to persuade him to give up on his attempts to avenge Zheng's death by attacking Yangzhou and killing Ma Minglu. Shi pointed out to Gao that Ma could not easily control his underlings or the ordinary people and soldiers; and secondly, that he was an official of the Ming court.

Shi Kefa failed to transform Gao's army into a useful instrument for future battles with the Qing. Instead, he spent more than a month trying his best to persuade Gao. Shi Kefa's attempts to influence Gao by personal example met with little success. Instead, his concessions to Gao, such as allowing Gao to be the first to read official documents from Nanjing, caused him to lose the respect of the people of Yangzhou, as well as the commanders.

Eventually, Gao convinced Shi to send an impeachment order to punish Ma Minglu. Shi's order accused Ma of obduracy and shirking of responsibility. Following Shi's impeachment, Ma Minglu was arrested and those who killed Zheng Yuanxun were beheaded or beaten to death in the market.<sup>73</sup> Yangzhou city became an isolated city, the residents were unable to maintain the defenses, and the rich families and merchants all fled.<sup>74</sup>

## **2: 4. Before the Massacre of Yangzhou**

Shi Kefa came originally from Henan and passed his *jinshi* in 1628. He was one of those rare civil officials who also demonstrated talent for military organization and strategy.

In 1635, Shi Kefa became an assistant delegate (*fushi* 副使) of Lu Xiangsheng 盧象升, a famous civil official who was appointed as Grand Coordinator of the provinces of Henan, Shandong, Huguang, and Sichuan. Shi was responsible for overseeing the towns of Chizhou 池州 and Anqing 安慶, and for preventing Li Zicheng's rebel armies from crossing the Yangzi River. Shi Kefa commanded only eight hundred troops. In the

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<sup>73</sup> Ji Liuqi, B, juan 3, ZGYSJC 36, 472.

<sup>74</sup> Feng Menglong, in ZGYSJC 30, 217-18.

following several years, major rebel armies from north China such as the Muslim Lao Huihui 老回回 often pressured the area for which he was responsible. In the summer of 1637, he was appointed governor of Anqing and charged with protecting present central Anhui. Faced with ten thousand rebel troops, Shi managed to drive back their attack. By the end of this year, his headquarters at Qianshan 潛山 was besieged by two peasant rebels, Xiao Yuanying 小袁營 and Guo Tianxing 過天星. Shi failed to hold his defense; many of his armies were lost while he himself nearly drowned before being rescued by one of his men.<sup>75</sup>

Early in 1638, several major rebels attacked Tongcheng, a city lying immediately to the north of the Yangzi in south-central Anhui. The rebels met Shi's army in battle about 10 *li* outside that city in the western suburb. This time Shi Kefa and his army received full cooperation from the local governments and residents. Since his army was besieged by rebel cavalry from the north, and was running out of food, the Magistrate of Tongcheng asked for help from residents of the city. Each family was asked to provide cooked food for the Ming armies. The local county government's support was not limited to this; they also provided torches to allow the soldiers to see during the night. With this local assistance, the Ming armies successfully expelled the rebels.<sup>76</sup>

During these battles, Shi won the loyalty of his men and the respect of his officers. His military achievement soon attracted the attention of the emperor. In 1639, Shi was assigned to defend the province of Shandong against Manchu raiders from the north. In securing the western frontier of Shandong, his first concern was to pacify the peasant rebels. What we should mention here is that Shi Kefa demonstrated a willingness and ability to pay attention to the complexities of local society and local administrative systems. In addition to the above examples, several of his writings provide clues in this regard. In a letter entitled *Reply to Huizhou Gentry* (複徽州紳士), he expressed the view that "unity is strength;" with the cooperation of the Ming government, local gentry, and

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<sup>75</sup> Dai Tianyou 戴田有, *Jieyilu* 子遺錄, ZGYSJC 30, 85.

<sup>76</sup> Wang Wenyao 王雯耀, *Quantong jilue* 全桐紀略, in SKWSSJK, part 2-21, 333.

ordinary people “it would be easy to pacify the bandits.”<sup>77</sup> In an article entitled “To those Officers, Gentry and Civilians who are Martyred”, written in the winter of 1642, he states,

I recall the previous years when I resisted rebels in Anqing and Luzhou, wherever I went, all the gentry and common people welcomed me in the suburbs as well as along the roads, the scholar-bureaucrats waited for me at their homes . . . alas, the time is different now.<sup>78</sup>

After three years of mourning for his mother’s death, he was made Vice-Minister of Finance and supreme commander in charge of grain transport from Nanjing to Beijing, as well as Grand Coordinator of the Huai’an area. In 1643, he was named Minister of War, in Nanjing.

In the winter of that year, military conditions worsened everywhere. He had tried to make preparations for the relief of Beijing. He tried to rally his troops, swore an oath with them to ‘succor the King’ (勤王), and proceeded to head north. Before receiving word that the capital had fallen, his army actually had crossed the Yangzi River at Pukou. Shi along with many others appealed to all the leaders to defend the South. They not only sought the allegiance of the Ming generals whose armies lay between Yangzi River and the Shun regime in the north, but also tried to go to Huai River valley in search of “righteous braves.”

As Minister of War, Shi Kefa in fact could not play his actual role in the court of the Southern Ming. Since Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng strictly controlled the court, he had no choice but to establish his headquarters at Yangzhou. From here he was able to coordinate all the defense armies in the Jiangbei area, particularly the *Sizhen* armies. According to the policy, each of these armies was supposed to be kept under control by his personal surveillance. At this time, the Southern Ming government had to support a large military force. During the winter of 1644 to 1645, when its armies were most numerous, it is said that there were over one million soldiers under Southern Ming

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<sup>77</sup> Shi Kefa, *Shi Zhongzhengong ji* 史忠正公集, juan 2, in XXSKQS, 1387, 195.

<sup>78</sup> *Lujiang xianzhi* 廬江縣志, juan 15, GGZBCK (A), book 7, 71.

command.<sup>79</sup> Most of the armies were largely dependent upon the Nanjing government for logistical support and soldiers' salaries. The combined military and civil expenses amounted to about 10,000,000 taels per year. For those garrisoned in the Jiangbei area, the Nanjing government was pledged to provide 2.4 million taels of silver each year, but supplies and weapons were to come from local taxes. The individual generals were to be given authorization to impose taxes at their own will, as well as to exploit abandoned land, engage in mining, and assess commercial tariffs. A special policy was implemented to encourage the recovery of territory: if a general rescued a city from rebel hands, he would be given control of that city under those same rules.

In the process of planning the defense of Yangzhou, Shi Kefa was faced with countless challenges. The first difficulty, mentioned above, was financial. After the Manchu army took over Suqian, Shi tried to plan a counterattack. He estimated that the attack would require approximately 300,000 taels of silver. To meet the demands, he and others sent a request for funds to Nanjing. The answer from both the Board of Revenue 戶部 and the Board of Works 工部 read:

The time is different now, with only half of the empire; people have already exhausted their capacities.

In total the court was short of about 2.25 million taels for military affairs, and the Board of Revenue only had a little more than 1,000 taels in hand.<sup>80</sup>

When combined with the fact that Yangzhou was under the administration of Gao Jie after the Zheng Yuanxun Incident, this refusal from the Board of Revenue meant that Shi had no way to carry out his planned action. Eventually, Shi appointed a man to sell rice and beans, hoping in this way to make enough money to cover the expenses. But this attempt also met with failure as the money went to the individuals involved in the business, rather than to Shi's official agency. Shi next shifted his attention to *Tuntian* 屯

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<sup>79</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 393; see also Struve (1984), 8.

<sup>80</sup> All the above from *Nandu lu* 南渡錄, juan 4. In NMSL BZ, 285.

田 - letting his armies open up wasteland and grow food grain. But, this venture too met with no success.<sup>81</sup>

The second challenge was related to politics and personnel. After the fall of the northern capital, some high officials who had not committed suicide out of devotion for the Ming dynasty or surrendered to Li Zicheng's regime, made their way to Nanjing. Shi Kefa made a suggestion for using these officials: "All officials originally registered in the north should be ordered to present themselves to the Ministries of Personnel and War to register their names to be selected for appointment. Otherwise, we will destroy their hopes of returning to the south."<sup>82</sup> The problem is that what they brought from Beijing was not only their wisdom and administrative experience, but also red tape and the related corrupt political atmosphere. Since Shi Kefa was responsible to the Board of War, he understood this very well:

Recently I read memorials written by some chancellors; what they know is only asking for more military forces, rather than thorough consideration of how to pay the relevant fees. Can you find in this world soldiers who do not need to eat, and horses that do not need to feed?

He also complained about the literati who cared for nothing but official degrees and reputations. They were proud only of argumentation or disputation rather than engaging in industry or business. He wrote,

When faced with matters related to money and grain, they would say that only the lower level officials should handle concrete administrative matters. For military affairs, they would say that it is a troubling matter, and that you should not bother us. All their energies and spirit were used up in acting as officials; nobody wanted to do

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<sup>81</sup> Ying Tinji 應廷吉, *Qing linxie* 青燐屑, part 1, in ZGYSJC 33, 83.

<sup>82</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 381.

anything to deal with the logistical demands of the country.<sup>83</sup>

In a memorial sent to Nanjing, he wrote:

Now, in the Jiangbei area there are four *fan* (*Zhen*), army supervisors, Xunfu and Xun'an, special officers for *Tuntian* as well as viceroys; altogether too many officials. However, they did not bring any benefits when the rebels and Manchus invaded . . .

Since a variety of officials from different agencies were in this city, he found that "Social intercourse produces many conflicts; both prefecture and county are bothered. Now two official positions for managing salt have been created. Both may exploit the merchants, thus making them lose their capital; in this case how can we levy taxes?"<sup>84</sup>

The relations between civil officials and the various *Zhen* military warlords brought even worse effects. Shi Kefa's helplessness and embarrassment in this regard was expressed in one of his memorials. According to Shi, both civil and military officials shared responsibilities for the death of the Chongzhen emperor and the fall of Beijing:

Of course civil officials hurt the Ming a lot, but could you say all the military officials are loyal? Countless officials surrendered to the bandits; are they all civil officials? In the past several years there has been no clear way for an official career. The problem lies in narrowly partisan factional struggles.<sup>85</sup>

The conflicts between political factions and civil and military officials reached a zenith in the spring of 1645. At that time, the force of Zuo Liangyu 左良玉 (1599-1645), another Zongbing garrisoned in the Huguang area and dissatisfied with Ma and Ruan, began to attack to the east along the Yangzi River. In order to hold back Zuo's army,

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<sup>83</sup> All the above materials are from Li Qing 李青, *Nandu lu* 南渡錄, juan 2. In NMSL BZ, 210.

<sup>84</sup> Wen Bing 文秉, *Jiayi shi'an* 甲乙事案, part 2, in NMSL BZ, 542.

<sup>85</sup> Shi Kefa, *Shi Zhongzhengong ji* 史忠正公集, juan 1. In XXSKQS 1387, 171.

there was no choice but to withdraw armies from the Jiangbei area, and thus weaken the Southern Ming's defenses against the Manchus. Faced with this situation, the ministers of the Southern Ming court were divided. Some ministers insisted that the Manchu threat was of primary concern, that it was better to let the Jiangbei armies stay in their original location. The Hongguang Emperor himself agreed with this argument. However, Ma Shiying, the holder of real power in the court feared the Qing far less than Zuo. "We together, ruler and minister," declared Ma, "would rather die at the hands of the Qing than not die and fall into the hands of Zuo Liangyu." He believed that it would be possible to negotiate with the Qing army, but were Zuo's army to occupy Nanjing, there would be no way to proceed. Finally, he ordered forces to interpose themselves between Zuo's army and Nanjing along the Yangzi River.<sup>86</sup>

Shi Kefa immediately voiced his opposition, saying:

.... Along the Yangzi River we have a large number of armies that will be sufficient to fight against Zuo; ... we have enough evidence to show that the Qing will invade. If we give up the defense, there would be no fortifications in the Jiangbei area ... I really do not know why (Ma) Shiying is beclouded to such a degree.<sup>87</sup>

Shi thought that the main Ming armies should be deployed in the Jiangbei area, to control the Huai River and defend against the Manchu army. He was also pleading for reinforcements to bolster the defenses of Yangzhou. But finally, Ma Shiying not only refused this request, but also tried to order Liu Zeqing's troops back from the Yellow River front where they were holding the line of defense against the Qing, in order to strengthen the barrier between Zuo Liangyu and the Southern Ming court.

On May 2, Shi was formally ordered to come back across the river, and the Ming general reluctantly complied. He had to divide his army and led the main force toward Nanjing in preparation for repelling Zuo Liangyu.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Li Qing, *Sanyuan biji* 三垣筆記, 140.

<sup>87</sup> *Shi Zhongzhengong ji* 史忠正公集, vol.1, in XXSKQS 1387, 185.

<sup>88</sup> Finally, Zuo's force was halted and the entire army later surrendered to the Qing, thus posing a serious long-term threat to the Southern Ming.



Looking briefly at Qing movements since the end of 1644, one commander named Haoge 豪格 had moved south from Jining, taking both Haizhou 海州 on the coast and Suqian near the junction of the Grand Canal. On the western front, Dodo 多鐸 had led his army to attack the southern bank of the Yellow River from Mengjin 孟津. Although the Manchu offensive was delayed for a while by remnants of Li Zicheng's armies in Henan, they quickly readjusted their troop deployments. From early April 1645, Haoge pressed his attack from the east, while Dodo began to lead his army in three columns toward Guide. From Guide, Dodo sent one group down the Fei River 淝水 towards Linhuai, another along the right bank of the Fei River to Xuyi 盱眙, and a third along the northern side of the Yellow River through Xuzhou toward Huai'an.<sup>89</sup>

Shi Kefa's original plan was to prepare a coordinated defense and offense. The first step was to reinforce the loyalists' armies at Xuzhou in order to keep alive the hope of an ultimate recovery farther to the north. He therefore marched out of Yangzhou, moving his army up to the foot of Lake Hongze 洪澤湖. Unfortunately, he was short of soldiers and financial resources that might have made his plan successful. For instance, from Suqian to Shuanggou 雙溝, a distance of about 180 to 190 *li*, no force was deployed. Along the Huai River, the total number of troops was said to be about 60,000, but there was no pay for new recruits, nor was there any attempt to undertake further training.<sup>90</sup>

Finally Shi decided to retreat with his army to Xuyu.<sup>91</sup> Since Xuyu had already fallen to the Qing before Shi's coming, he had no choice but drop back, withdrawing all of his 30,000 men to defend Yangzhou. Although Shi had personally addressed his troops,

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<sup>89</sup> The Manchu army which came from Shandong area is not shown in a map in Struve's book (1984), 52 (see Map 3). In fact, the Chinese sources clearly mention it, for example, *Nanjiang yishi*, ZGYSJC 35, 215.

<sup>90</sup> Li Qing, B, juan 4, in NMSL BZ, 319.

<sup>91</sup> Xuyu 盱眙- these two Chinese characters should not be read as "Yutai" as Wakeman does. Wakeman (1985), vol. 1, 545.

telling them that “each should shoulder the responsibility for himself and not trouble the citizens,” very few followed his order.<sup>92</sup>

Yangzhou now became the Southern Ming court’s last line of defense north of the Yangzi River. Under Shi Kefa’s leadership, this city was the first to resist the Qing armies and the first city where the Qing army met sustained military resistance. And, perhaps because the Manchus wished to set a clear example for the rest of the Yangzi delta cities, a general massacre of the city was ordered and continued for more than ten days. Within this city, Shi Kefa assembled a force of thirty thousand men inside the wall, crowding them among urban residents and refugees. Tactically, he rushed to reinforce the city’s walls, installing gunnery platforms and foreign-style cannon on the ramparts, but he was unable to do much else. This was due in part to the fact that this city was dominated by the so-called elite, merchants and entrepreneurs, most of whom were “parasitic” forces who could not be expected to protect the city. In fact, many chose to flee rather than remain to defend the city.

Shi Kefa finally realized that his defense of Yangzhou had no chance of success. In a letter to his family members, he wrote:

The Northern (Qing) troops surrounded the Yangzhou city wall on the 18<sup>th</sup> but have not yet attacked. In any case, the people have already lost heart, and the situation cannot be saved. Sooner or later I must die . . . life is of no use anyway. I write no further; my heart is rent to pieces.<sup>93</sup>

In fact, Shi Kefa’s dilemma began at the outset of his Yangzhou mission. There were two enemies in front of him: both peasant rebels and the Manchu forces. During the whole course of his Jiangbei military career, the rebels, rather than the Manchu invaders,

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<sup>92</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 548.

<sup>93</sup> Edited and translated by Struve, *Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm – China in Tiger’s Jaws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 31-32.

were clearly uppermost in his mind, because he had spent the previous sixteen years fighting internal rebellion.<sup>94</sup>

However, he had little experience fighting against an external invasion. Faced with a rebel attack, he knew how to go about mobilizing the local community, including the various social strata such as officials, gentry, and ordinary residents. But fighting against the Manchu invasion was another matter. His authority over the armies of Jiangbei was really only nominal, only a few staff officers, such as He Gang, followed him in fighting to the death. Most of his time was actually spent on the road between the Yangzi and Huai Rivers (走江又走淮) trying to harmonize and intercede in conflicts between the various warlords. For his efforts, he was given the mocking title of female matchmaker (*meipo* 媒婆). His style of leadership belonged to that of typical scholar-officials; with the increasing militarization of the area, this approach became even less effective. As mentioned before, after Gao Jie was killed by Xu Dingguo, and Gao's armies surrendered to the Qing, Yan Ermei suggested that he incorporate rebel armies into his own force. However, from Shi Kefa's point of view, Yan's suggestions were simply unimaginable. Regardless of the suitability of such ideas, they did not accord with the principles of an imperial minister. Yan Ermei had to leave him behind, and Shi paid for his conservatism with his life.

Other incidents show that Shi Kefa did not have a great capacity to deal with complicated military situation. Before the Yangzhou massacre, the Manchu's invasion from the north and Zuo Liangyu's attack along the Yangzi River took place simultaneously. Apart from an expression of consternation, Shi Kefa had no definite ideas about how to handle such an emergency. For example, within one day Shi issued three successive and contradictory orders for the deployment of the Southern Ming army quartered at Gaoyou 高郵. In the morning he ordered them to go to Pukou 浦口 to defend against Zuo's coming; at noon, he ordered all his armies to return to Yangzhou and wait for another order; in the afternoon, he sent a third order stating that Xuyu was in danger, and that each army should come to Tianchang 天長 for future deployment. His head of staff, Ying Tingji, witnessed this behavior and commented that Shi had lost his

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<sup>94</sup> *Shi Zhongzhenggong ji* 史忠正公集, juan 1, in XXSKQS 1387, 173.

mind (方寸亂矣). The distance was altogether about one thousand *li*, with limited supplies, how could the army be redeployed three times in one day?<sup>95</sup>

On May 20, Qing armies poured into Yangzhou city. Shi was captured after attempting suicide, and then he was executed for refusing to submit. After the Yangzhou massacre, the Qing army continued preparations to cross the Yangzi River. According to one report sent by Dodo, there were a total of twenty-three *zongbing* as well as infantry and cavalry numbering about 238,300 who surrendered in the Jiangbei area.<sup>96</sup> What we should bear in mind is that the reason for the Ming armies' surrender was not only their poor quality, bad training, or lack of battle effectiveness. For instance, the armies of *zongbing* Li Chengdong 李成棟 and Jin Shenhuan 金聲桓 played an even more important role than that of the Manchu armies during later campaigns of pacification in South China. For most of the former Ming generals, their primary concern was the pursuit of actual benefits. Since Beijing had already fallen, and the Southern Ming could not provide what they needed, joining the Qing thus became their ideal choice.

Before shifting to the Jiangnan area, following the Qing army's route, we must consider the western part of Nanzhili. For one thing, it geographically covers all present-day Anhui, for another, this area (including both sides of the Yangzi River) deserves to be examined because of its specific local military forces, social structure, as well as the military behavior of its literati.

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<sup>95</sup> Ying Tingji, in ZGYSJC 33, 85.

<sup>96</sup> QSL – Shizu shilu 世祖實錄, juan 17.

## 2: 5. “Pedantic” and “Absurd”: Anti- Qing Resistance in a Mountainous Area

The local military forces in the west part of Nanzhili had a long history, with some of them such as the *Shanshui zhai* 山水寨 traceable back to the Song Dynasty.<sup>97</sup> These forces still existed at the end of the Ming Dynasty. In Taihe county 太和, the forces were comprised of ordinary peasants, some *shengyuan*, and others who had some knowledge of military affairs. Since all the members were common local residents, one could not expect these forces to fight on the battlefield, but they were sufficient to defend their local areas.<sup>98</sup>

In the southern part of this area, local forces either built walled towns (*zhai*) for defending the community, or simply used geographical advantages such as cliffs and a mountain range to create a fortress. In the plains, the walled towns had long been the center of ruling class power in the countryside, designed both for the safety of life and the storage of accumulated property. “The first principle in defending it is to clear the surrounding countryside by bringing everything movable within the walls. Outside should be only bare fields, poisoned wells, and a clear glacis for defensive fire. Inside should be stocks of food and other supplies far superior to what the enemy can laboriously bring up to sustain his siege. The besieged definitely have the advantage.”<sup>99</sup>

In mountainous areas, these fortified villages were referred to as *bao* 堡. An example from Huoshan 霍山 shows that due to the narrow pass and cliffs as well as a mountain range, they were able to protect themselves from rebels.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> *Luzhou fuzhi* 廬州府志, juan 22, in XXSKQS 652, 606. For general information about this sort of local force, see He Ruo 何若 “Ming mo de shanzhai yibing” 明末的山寨義兵, *Da Zhong* 5 (1944), 116-28. See also Li Wenzhi 李文治, “Ming mo de zhaibao yu yijun” 明末的寨堡與義軍, *Wenshi zazhi* 3: 7-8 (1943), 29-37; Wang Xiande 王賢德 “Minmatsu dōran ki ni okeru gōson bōei” 明末動亂斯における鄉村防衛, *Meiji shi kenkyū* 2 (1975), 26-49.

<sup>98</sup> Wu Shiji 吳世濟, *Taihe xian yukou shimo* 太和縣禦寇始末, part 2, 79.

<sup>99</sup> See John K. Fairbank, 20.

<sup>100</sup> (Guangxu 光緒) *Huoshan xianzhi* 霍山縣志, juan 14, in ZGDFZJC (A), Anhui 13, 282-83. This book provided wrong information about the origin of *shanzhai*. In fact, it did not originate with Shi Kefa.

By April 1644, the Ming court simply had no more available forces. With great reluctance, an edict was issued authorizing the formation of militia on a nationwide scale. The Chongzhen emperor admitted the need for local military forces. According to his edict, the residents of *tuzhai* 土寨 and others had no choice but to mobilize the masses and protect themselves from bandits.

This special edict wants to pardon whatever you have done before. However, if you can capture and kill rebellious officials, you may be granted an official position; if you are able to arrest bandits, you will receive a reward... Those who can recover a fallen city will receive a promotion. As for the rest of soldiers from the *shanzhai*, they should be organized as *xiangyong*, and they should be given oxen and seeds in order to cultivate the barren lands....<sup>101</sup>

This policy could not be carried out because Beijing fell two months later. However, the different levels of the Ming government did have some specific policies in these areas in the preceding years. For example, some records related to the *baojia* system are available for Taihe County. This system had not been carried out before 1634, but had been carried out ever since. All the residents of the city were organized into a *baojia* system: 10 families into one *jia*, with each *jia* taking turns patrolling the city at night. The suburbs and countryside copied this method in organizing their own *baojia* system. In the past, the local gentry generally did not participate in the *baojia* system, because theoretically they were to be protected by the common people of their community. But now the county government encouraged them to let their family members join the *baojia*.<sup>102</sup>

Ming local governments often struggled to resolve financial problems. For example, the most powerful weapons for protecting a city were “firearms and gun powder” 火藥火

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<sup>101</sup> Peng Yishun, juan 6, 132-33.

<sup>102</sup> Unfortunately, there is no further record to show the results of this special endeavor. Wu Shiji 吳世濟, part 2, 90.

器。 They relied on these to achieve victory, but often lacked both materials and people with the skills required to produce them.<sup>103</sup>

In 1635, Taihe County announced a policy to apportion soldiers according to *li* (里):

Our county now has thirty five *li*, each *li* has ten *pai* 排, each *pai* should dispatch a man who must be strong and acquainted with military affairs. Their food, clothing, and equipment should be provided by the government; in total we may get three hundred and fifty men . . . Let professional military staff act as the heads of each unit.<sup>104</sup>

The other counties of this area adopted roughly the same policy. Large counties organized about 500 to 600 men, medium-sized counties about 300 to 400, and small counties about 200 to 300. The rates of pay also differed according to the size of the county.<sup>105</sup> However, this conscription policy was only carried out for about one or two years. In June of 1636, the highest official of the Ming government in the Jiangbei area, Zhang Guowei, produced two documents. The first document indicated that one infantryman should be limited to a salary of only 0.3 taels of silver every month. The order for recruiting soldiers had been issued more than two months earlier, but only a very few people were recruited. Since the rebels were so violent, Zhang Guowei said: "Who would want to get such little pay in compensation for his life? This is why conscription is so difficult."<sup>106</sup> Another document talked about the defense of Luhe city. This city was located on a plain, and there were no geographic advantages to rely on for defense. "It requires an official army for protection, but nobody wants to be recruited."<sup>107</sup>

On the other hand, the peasant rebels were also equipped with poor weapons. At the end of 1634, the Magistrate of Taihe witnessed the real conditions of the rebel armies.

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 61 and 73.

<sup>104</sup> Wu Shiji, 99.

<sup>105</sup> Zhang Guowei 張國維, *Fuwu sucao* 撫吳疏草, in SSJHSCK shi 史 39, 315-16.

<sup>106</sup> Zhang Guowei, 333.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 355.

Based on his description, we learn that the bandits had no firearms or gunpowder, their arrivals and departures looked like the playing of games. According to false information, there were eighty thousand bandits coming, but when they arrived there were only about two thousand, including about five hundred women and children. Real fighters did not even reach two thousand.

This county had no resident soldiers, so the magistrate had to conscript fifty-three men to defend five gates of the city, in addition to some *shengyuan* and *baojia* who were already in the city. Surprisingly, this force finally repelled the bandits.<sup>108</sup>

Even the powerful, well-equipped rebel armies were often prevented from using their military advantages because of geographical differences: they were well-practiced in tactics such as cavalry attacks in the north China plains,<sup>109</sup> but here the land was mostly mountainous. For instance, on the border between Yingshan 英山 and Taihe, the mountain range was so high that even birds were unable to cross, let alone the rebel cavalry. In the spring of 1635, the peasants tried to attack here, but finally had no choice but to withdraw.<sup>110</sup>

Due to administrative, financial, and military shortcomings, the Ming government had lost control in this western part of Nanzhili by the 1640s. The local rebels were accompanied by a large number of bandits belonging mostly to peasant leader Zhang Xianzhong 張獻忠. Faced with these challenges, the Ming government had to adopt a policy of “appeasement”. For ordinary people, there was no certain “moral model” (向來全無固志) to follow. The choice of whether to surrender and join the rebels or to continue under the government’s control was totally dependent on changing circumstances; most important of all was survival.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Wu Shiji, 74-75.

<sup>109</sup> Zhang Guowei, 315-16.

<sup>110</sup> Zhang Guowei, 106-08.

<sup>111</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao xinbian*, vol.10, 971-72.



The actual social situation of this area is too complicated to describe in sufficient detail. All the social forces affected each other in various ways. The following data provide some examples of this complexity.

In the two years of 1640 and 1641, Shucheng county 舒城縣, lost countless people to starvation caused by locusts and drought. At the same time, General Kong Tingxun 孔廷訓 and his soldiers were garrisoned in the city. Since both his soldiers and the local farmers suffered from severe famine, conflicts took place over the harvesting of wheat. Both soldiers and farmers tried to engage in lawsuits. However, the final judgment favored the local farmers. The soldiers accused the local officials and gentry of showing partiality to the farmers. A soldier named Zhang Hushan 張虎山 was angered by the court's judgment and led several other soldiers to join with the bandits who were in Huo Mountain 霍山. The bandits were very happy about their coming; but they could not trust them completely. The bandits ordered these soldiers to attack the city in order to test whether they really wanted to cooperate with them. When the soldiers showed that their loyalties really lay with the bandits, the bandits decided to join with these soldiers and besiege the city.

General Kong lost control of the situation. First, he came to the city wall and cried out to the defenders to open the door "because I still have a lot of soldiers who did not surrender [to the bandits]." But nobody in the city believed him; they responded by firing at him with a gun. His soldiers witnessed the situation and said in one voice: "Let's attack to occupy this city so that we may share the benefits (大家受用)." General Kong could do nothing.

Two days later, on April 3, 1642, the city fell.

This was also the date of the *fukao* 府考 (Prefectural Examinations). Luzhou was only about forty miles away from Shuchen. A *shengyuan* took this news to the Prefect of the Prefecture (*Zhifu*) Zheng Luxiang 鄭履詳. Based on the record,

...although Zheng has a *jinshi* degree, he knows nothing about current social and political affairs; his only concern is minor benefits (惟見小利). When he heard the news, he looked like a puppet, apart from trembling, he had nothing to say.

The other residents of Luzhou also turned a deaf ear to this news because everybody was more concerned with passing this exam than with the fact that Shucheng city was occupied by bandits.<sup>112</sup>

This material reminds us of several things: the triangular relationships between local government, ordinary farmers and residents, and the local army; the problems faced by the head of the local army in controlling his own army;<sup>113</sup> the shifting identities of bandits and soldiers; the literati's primary concern with civil examinations, a concern that led to an ignorance of the real changes of their own time; and, as mentioned in the "Introduction" of this thesis, the literati's inability to handle the complicated situations of the late Ming.

However, the above data do not provide information about the roles played by local gentry. Fortunately, the case study of Tongcheng 桐城 can serve as a useful supplement.

The most important primary source for Tongcheng local history is *Jieyi lu* 子遺錄, written by Dai Tianyou 戴田友. In this document, Dai claims to have written down everything that he had seen and heard of happenings in his hometown. According to his description, in the past many literati had become officials through civil examinations in the Ming dynasty. These scholar-bureaucrats were generally virtuous. Thus, usually the ordinary people were not afraid of official agencies and respected the literati. In the seventeenth century, the situation had changed: old and well-known families all pursued wanton and luxurious lives. Their children and even their slaves frequently broke the law. Their behavior finally triggered a peasant rebellion led by Huang Wending 黃文鼎 and

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<sup>112</sup> Yu Ruizhi 餘瑞紫, *Liuzei Zhang Xianzhong xian Luzhou ji* 流賊張獻忠陷廬州紀, in ZZYSJC 29, 687-88.

<sup>113</sup> Generally speaking, the Ming government had no idea how to command its army in this area. In terms of local *xiangbing* and other military forces, some higher officials wanted to let the generals who came from the frontiers command them, because the bandits were afraid of this sort of general, while others, such as Zhang Guowei, insisted on letting the general who came from the South lead local military forces, because frontier generals would not be familiar with the customs and social conditions of the Yangzi area. See Zhang Guowei, 234-35.

Wang Guohua 汪國華 in the summer of 1634. They burnt down the rich families' houses and looted their money.<sup>114</sup> Although this rebellion was pacified within a short period, the social fabric was impacted.

What happened following this rebellion has been discussed in detail by Hilary J. Beattie.<sup>115</sup> Beattie's study provides evidence to indicate that the social fabric of the county was so strongly woven by the end of the Ming dynasty that not even violent disturbances were able to tear it apart or change the course of social development in any really fundamental way. Further, she demonstrates that the social order in the Ming and early Qing was becoming stabilized and developing resilience against outside shocks and disturbances. The Tongcheng elite undertook a number of measures to ensure this sort of stability. They used political influence to obtain the provincial government's support for their localities, sent some of their families off to safety in other areas, defused local unrest with concessions or gifts, mobilized local militia defense corps, and took tough action against their own deviant members. When discussing responses to the Manchu invasion, the author differentiates between officials and the so-called gentry-elite. Officials, who might have been expected to demonstrate strong loyalties to the Ming government, by no means exhibited a marked desire to resist alien rule. On the contrary, this key social group seems to have made successful efforts to minimize the effects of this traumatic period by cooperating with rather than defying the new regime.<sup>116</sup>

I would argue with her conclusions for a number of reasons. For one thing, it is not easy to distinguish between the three social strata of official, gentry elite, and literati. These groups were usually mixed together, and played different roles in different environments. Secondly, according to Ming law, officials were not allowed to serve in their hometowns; this is why they usually left their offices before the arrival of the Qing. However, if officials returned to their hometown after retirement, they were deemed to be

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<sup>114</sup> Dai Tianyou, in ZZYSJC 30, 79-81.

<sup>115</sup> Hilary J. Beattie, "The Alternative to Resistance: The Case of T'ung-ch'eng, Anhwei," in Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. eds., *From Ming to Ch'ing, Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 239-76.

<sup>116</sup> Beattie, 241-43.

“gentry” and did not belong to officialdom any more. In contrast, the motives of local gentry are understandable: not only from a political or idealistic perspective, but also from the fact that their interests coincided with defending their property. Only after they realized the Qing would bring them peaceful lives would they end their resistance or go further and cooperate with the Qing. Generally speaking, “pure” literati are in the middle between local officials and gentry, thus, they tended to identify with either officials or local gentry.

Beattie’s studies are based on both gazetteers and a large number of genealogies compiled by lineages, both of which were finished in the seventeenth century.<sup>117</sup> However, her uses of these sources raise further questions: since most information is gathered from these sources, there is a strong tendency to focus on the higher social strata, while ignoring the lower levels of society. Another important shortcoming is contained in sources themselves, as I indicated in the Introduction: all of them were edited in the seventeenth century and thus could not be expected to provide sufficient materials for a description of anti-Manchu military action.<sup>118</sup>

Fortunately, the career of a *jinshi* named Jin Sheng 金聲 from Huizhou Prefecture 徽州府 provides us further clues with which to analyze this sort of characteristic. This prefecture, located in the southwest part of Nanzhili, was proud of its developed culture. In Ming times it produced a total of 298 *juren*, and in Qing times, 698. In terms of *jinshi* degree holders, 392 were produced during the Ming (1.55 percent of the imperial total), and 226 in the Qing (0.86 percent of the total).<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Beattie, 242-43.

<sup>118</sup> In the late 1770s, the Qianlong emperor started to call for the absolute standard of loyalty to one’s state, see Struve, *The Ming- Qing Conflict, 1619-1683, A Historiography and Source Guide* (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 1998), 63-64.

<sup>119</sup> Wu Ren’an 吳仁安, *Ming Qing Jiangnan wangzhu yu shehui jingji wenhua* 明清江南望族與社會經濟文化 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 2001), 81-110. Ye Xian’en 葉顯恩, *Ming Qing Huizhou nongcun shehui yu dianpu zhi* 明清徽州農村社會與佃僕制 (Hefei: Anhui renmin, 1983).

Jin Sheng received his *jinshi* degree in 1628 and later became a Member of the Hanlin Academy. It is said that he was not only good at economic and financial activities, but also skilled in military strategy, an area in which he had practical experience.

Basically, he was opposed to war itself, because he had his own opinion about warfare which he felt consisted of assembling men who were not righteous, and holding weapons while engaging in killing people. Gradually, he realized that the Ming had already entered its nadir in the early seventeenth century for a variety of reasons. For instance, the court talked only about clever tricks and strategy but cared little about their practical use. As for generals, if they could not lead their soldiers into battle, how could they expect them to achieve victory? In ancient times, famous generals could bury more than ten thousand prisoners alive in a night, and act as though nothing happened. But now, according to Jin, they could not dare to eliminate even a few people because of their fear of causing rebellion.<sup>120</sup>

In 1635, he was called to organize and train *tuanlian* and *yiying* in Shandong province as *qianshi* 僉事. However, we have no relevant records concerning the result of his endeavors. Due to his skill in military affairs, he was appointed as *yushi* 禦史 to supervise the Ming armies around Beijing city. While there, he walked a distance of more than twenty *li* and inspected several camps, and also heard the news about the battlefield from some refugees. All the news made him deeply saddened. According to his opinion, since the Ming armies still had more than several tens of thousands of soldiers, the right way to go about defending was to try to find which road the Manchu army would use. Each general should occupy his own camp and deploy his armies, paying attention to communication and to the use of various strategies. However, he clearly realized that what the Ming armies had actually done was in contrast to the above measures, and he understood these generals' difficulties:

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<sup>120</sup> Quoted from Wu Jingxian 吳景賢, "Jin Zhengxi zhi kang Qing yundong" 金正希之抗清運動, *Xunfeng*, 5.1 (1935), 1- 27.

I saw several battalions of soldiers who had no shelters or quilts despite the bitter cold weather; also, they could not fill their stomachs.<sup>121</sup>

Since the general conditions of both the military and Ming finances were worsening, Jin Sheng's endeavors finally achieved nothing. In the end, he returned to his hometown of Xiuning 休寧, offering the excuse of illness.

Xiuning and its neighboring county, Shexian 歙縣, shared the same social background: a dense population and a shortage of farmland because the mountainous landscape was not suitable for farming. According to Jin Sheng's observations,

.... within these two counties only about twenty to thirty percent of the people own property or businesses, while seventy to eighty percent of the people are unemployed. This percentage is certainly one of the highest among the entire Ming Empire. Furthermore, these two counties suffered from inflation. Given these economic factors, these two counties are among the most dangerous places in the empire.

According to Jin, the primary concern of this area should be to find some way to let everybody have something to do.<sup>122</sup> Based on this consideration, he tried to devise certain social reform programs. However, none of them moved far beyond the stage of suggestion making. Other programs he suggested included a change in the tax collection system intended to punish official corruption, and the training of local young people to maintain social order and protect Huizhou from disturbances caused by thieves. His endeavors received a certain amount of help from Jiang Tianyi 江天一, another *juren* degree holder from the Huizhou area.<sup>123</sup>

In June of 1645, the Qing government sent officials to the Huizhou area. All the Ming local officials either fled or surrendered while most of the local gentry expressed their welcome. Meanwhile, the original social fabric was becoming even less intact. For

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<sup>121</sup> Jin Sheng, *Jin Zhengxi xiansheng wenji jilue* 金正希先生文集輯略, in SKJHSCK, Jibu 50, 476-77.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, 523.

<sup>123</sup> Xu Bingyi, 328-29.

instance, Huizhou's slaves organized twelve *zhai*, asked their housemasters to return their covenants and burned them if they felt dissatisfied. These slaves said: "The Emperor has changed; housemasters should become slaves and serve us." Hosts and servants called each other brothers in order to show equal status. Ordinary households were afraid of this condition and so organized their own groups, a total of seventy-two *she* 社. Rich families provided money and grain for these organizations. What they wanted to do was to protect local society from attack or disturbance caused by peasants or serfs, not the coming threat from the Qing.

Jin Sheng joined these actions.<sup>124</sup>

There were two motives at the outset for Jin Sheng's military action. One was his desire to maintain social order in the Huizhou area. However, as we will see, his primary concern was to resist the Manchu invasion. This is the most important reason why he finally lost support from the ordinary people of his hometown.

In order to express his determination to fight against the Qing, he began by killing the new government's envoy and then summoned the local gentry and literati. They swore under the portrait of Gao Huangdi 高皇帝 (Zhu Yuanzhang):

Those who kill barbarians deserve a reward, those who surrender deserve to be killed.  
殺虜者昌, 降虜者亡.

Jin Sheng's reputation and his former status enabled him to attract a lot of followers. Some Ming loyalists from other areas also responded to his call, including: Wu Yingqi 吳應箕 from Jiande 建德; Two *shengyuan*, Wu Hanchao 吳漢超 and Yi Minxing 尹民興, from Jingxian 涇縣; Wu Yuan 吳源 from Guangde 廣德;

Gradually, Jin Sheng was able to summon about eight hundred soldiers. In order to collect money for military pay, he sold his own clothes, personal wares as well as utensils

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<sup>124</sup> Ji Liuqi, B, juan 9, in ZGYSJC 36, 594.

for a total of about two thousand taels of silver. Some resources were also given by the merchants of Huizhou.

At this time, the former Shandong *Xunfu* Qiu Zude 邱祖德, accompanied by two *juren*, Qian Wenlong 錢文龍 and Zhu Shengma 朱生麻, also mobilized their own local army (named *Qi Jiajun* 七家軍) and expressed their intention to follow the orders of Jin Sheng.

Jin Sheng continued to undertake preparations for the coming fight. What he needed were propitious circumstances to begin action. A few months later, the Qing issued its hair-cutting edict, angering many people. Jin Sheng decided to take this chance to call together a variety of anti-Qing forces.

In the following several months he demonstrated his military capacity in both command and management. Under his leadership, *Juren* Wang Guan 汪觀 was responsible for logistics, and his brothers Jin Jing 金經 and Jing Wei 金維 were responsible for conscription. He led some soldiers to defend the pass in order to resist the invasion of the Qing cavalry.

The campaign for recovering Xiuning city involved a number of different armies simultaneously. First of all, Jin Sheng ordered his brother Jin Lu 金輅 to lead soldiers to recover the city and force the Qing official to flee. Meanwhile, he ordered general Huang Geng 黃庚 and magistrate Hu Mingfu 胡鳴復 to lead about two thousand soldiers to join the attack. However, Jin Sheng did not forget the need for backup support: he appointed Fu Xing 福星 and his one thousand-man army to reside in the city to handle any unexpected emergencies. Another Ming loyalist, Wen Huang 溫璜, the *Tuiguan* of Huizhou, had also joined with Jin Sheng's resistance, and he voluntarily played a role in the defense of Huizhou city. Among all the above armies, Jin Sheng himself played the role as general liaison, and took on responsibility for all logistics.

In the process of resistance, Jin Sheng placed his main forces in Jixi 績溪 and seven other important passes around the county. He knew that the Qing army's attack on Huizhou depended first on its control of Jixi. There were a total of thirteen battles, with both sides suffering from roughly the same number of casualties. Jin Sheng and his



comrades gradually recovered several cities such as Jingde 旌德, Ningguo 甯國, Jingxian 涇縣 and Xuancheng 宣城. Finally, Jin Sheng and his army exhausted all of their resources. Wu Yinqi and many others died on the battlefield, Jin Sheng and his few remaining forces persisted for three more months. At the end of September, former Ming *Yushi* Huang Shu 黃澍 from Huizhou led some Qing armies with the pretense of providing help for the defense of Jixi city. Because they wore the Ming style of clothing, nobody questioned their coming; Jixi was easily occupied by the Qing.<sup>125</sup>

Jin Sheng tried different ways to get some help from the outside, especially from the remnants of the Ming court. The Hongguang reign had appointed him as Left Censor-in-chief (*Zuo qian du yushi* 左僉都禦史), but he had refused duty because of his distaste for the factional conflicts at court. During the summer of 1645, he could not get any help from the remnants of the Ming court such as the Lu regime 魯王 in Zhejiang. Finally, he decided to support the Longwu 隆武 regime in Fujian. Under the Longwu, Jin Sheng received his highest rank as Vice-Minister of the Board of War and Right Censor-in-chief, as well as general manager of military affairs for Nanzhili (*Bingbu you silang jian duchayuan you qiandu yushi, zongli Nanzhi zhudao junwu* 兵部右侍郎兼都察院右僉都禦史,總理南直諸道軍務).

However, these ranks could not provide actual help on the battlefield. Jin Sheng organized a resistance movement, but the majority of ordinary Huizhou people and local gentry did not sympathize with his attempts. Some gentry said: “One man is loyal (to the Ming), and ten thousand people suffer disaster because of his behavior.” Meanwhile other gentry said: “Surrender will allow survival, but resistance may bring damage to all your relatives.” As for the common people, nobody wanted to fight when they heard these words. When Jin Sheng realized the real conditions of Huizhou, he told his friends:

....the people of Huizhou did not want to fight against the Qing, I forced them to do so. Since we lost the battles, I cannot leave them alone. I would like to be prisoner in order to allow the people to survive.

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<sup>125</sup> All the above materials are from Xie Guozhen (1957a), 124-25; Wu Jingxian; Jin Sheng, SKJHSCK, jibu 50.

He also told his officials and generals that “the people of Huizhou are not familiar with warfare, what I want to do is protect our land and wait for the Ming army to recover the lost land. Since we have no capacities to do so, I deserve to die; there is no use for you to follow me. You should simply find your own way for the future.”<sup>126</sup>

It was Zhang Tianlu 張天騷, the Qing army’s commander, who finally captured Jin Sheng. Jin told him: “Killing me and my brothers is enough because we forced the Huizhou people to fight against the Qing. You are also Chinese, be sure not to kill the ordinary people.” Zhang answered: “I am afraid that Huizhou people do not believe what you said.” Jin wrote a note to announce his will, and the Huizhou territory was left in peace.<sup>127</sup>

Finally Jin and his close friends were executed in Nanjing. When Jin Sheng was sent under escort to this city, it had already been half a year since the fall of the Ming, but Jin and Jiang Tianyi insisted on wearing Ming style clothing. All who saw them along the road felt surprised.

Before we finish this account of Huizhou’s anti-Qing military actions, another historical figure, Grand Secretary Huang Daozhou, should be mentioned. He provides us a wonderful example of how typical literati demonstrated their military knowledge and capacity on the actual battlefield. As a leader of the Donglin political faction, he had achieved national prominence. Huang Daozhou had not only read many military books, he had also written notes and criticism on some of them. But all his endeavors were little more than idle theorizing. He had never had a chance to command an army on the battlefield. When presented with the opportunity for actual military command, he overrated both his abilities and the degree of general anti-Qing sentiment in the empire.

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<sup>126</sup> All the above data are quoted from Wu Jingxian.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

In order to provide assistance for Huizhou's resistance, Huang Daozhou, sixty years old at the time, mobilized about 3,000 soldiers in Fujian and led them north on July 22, 1645. But all his armies were lacking in training and equipment, and supplies were only sufficient for about one month, with only about 4,500 taels for provisions and expenses. No sources show that he received the service of any regular troops or officers or any logistical support from the Ministry of War. However, Huang thought that, because of his good name among the people, sufficient men and supplies would come to him along the way, and that he probably would be able to strike directly at Nanjing within a month's time. He believed that he could easily mobilize and conscript enough soldiers after his army entered Zhejiang and Jiangxi Provinces. According to Huang's estimation, the following local armies would be sure to join him because of his reputation: Zhang Guowei and his 4,000 *xiangbing* in Jinhua 金華, Yongkang 永康, Dongyang 東陽 and Yiwu; the former Ming armies of about 1,800 soldiers trained by the *Zhifu* 知府 of Jinhua, Wang Li 王禮; the former Ming army of about 1,200 soldiers trained by Magistrate Zhu Mingshi 朱名世 of Yongkang 永康; and the 2,000 *yibing* conscripted by a *juren* named Gong Guangsheng 龔廣生 and several others. Huang believed that all the above military forces had equipped themselves and waited his order. He felt that he could command them, just like a man's head directs his hands and feet.<sup>128</sup>

Huang did enjoy a certain reputation for his learning. But this reputation was evidently of little use when it came to preparations for war. In the end, none of the above forces joined him. In order to conscript more soldiers, Huang finally had no choice but to sell his calligraphy, and fill some blank certificates to appoint local officials.

At its largest, Huang's army totaled about 9,000 soldiers, but most of these had no previous military experience. However, within Huang's army there was a famous military figure who was to play a crucial role in pacifying the south-east coast and recovering Taiwan, Shi Lang 施郎(1621-1696, his name later changed to 施琅). Shi was well aware of the fact that Huang's army would be unable to reach its goal, and suggested that Huang demobilize this army. Instead of using this army to fight, he advised Huang to deploy

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<sup>128</sup> Zhang Dao shao nan 張道少南, *Lin'an xunzhiji* 臨安旬制記, juan 1, in ZZYSJC 33, 199-200.

some Ming armies in the southern part of Jiangxi, Huguang 湖廣, Guangdong, and Guangxi. Huang totally ignored his suggestions.<sup>129</sup>

Arriving in the area of Quzhou 衢州, on the border of Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces, Huang was unable to get assistance from local governments and communities. He finally had to take the risk to enter the Huizhou area. At this time Huang received a letter from one of his students, the magistrate of Wuyuan 婺源, who had already become a turncoat. The letter urged Huang to lead his army into a deep valley; Huang simply trusted him and did it. By the end of December, all his armies were surrounded by Qing armies. More than one thousand of Huang's soldiers were killed, and he was arrested.

Only when he was captured, did Huang realize that his army had in fact almost met Jin Sheng's army, for there was only one mountain between these two anti-Qing armies.

Huang was captured at Wuyuan in early February of 1646. Like Jin Sheng, Huang was also executed in Nanjing city with several of his loyal aides two months later.

Let me finish this chapter with Zhang Dai's frank comments concerning what both Jin Sheng and Huang Daozhou had done:

Huang was a righteous man but pedantic, while Jin Sheng was a person of unusual ability but absurd. They were intellectuals 書生, and neither of them was familiar with military affairs. Therefore, they could not be expected to be successful on the battlefield.<sup>130</sup>

The resistance of these two famous figures coincided with the military action of Jiangnan literati. More and more literati were involved in a series of campaigns in this the most economically and culturally advanced region of the empire. Their performance goes

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<sup>129</sup> Gu Cheng, 292-94.

<sup>130</sup> Zhang Dai, *Shi kuishu houji* 石匱書後集, juan 37, in XXSKQS 320, 632.

even further than that of the Shandong literati: they not only pursued individual and group military action, but also tried to enlarge the anti-Qing camp by mobilizing and integrating the regular Ming armies, including those who belonged to the Qing army.

## **2: 6. Summary**

This chapter has shown that literati devoted themselves to the Ming court in a variety of ways in Huaibei and the southwest part Nanzhili. Some of them personally appeared on the battlefield; some of them played the role of staff officers; others achieved certain results in defending the area but finally became victims of political struggles. Local gentry, such as Zheng Yuanxun, were often unable to ensure their own survival, let alone affect others. Righteous men, like Huang Daozhou, had pedantic behavior that caused more people to lose their lives. Shi Kefa and Jin Sheng's behavior and destiny represented the helplessness and embarrassment of typical scholar-officials during wartime. Although they knew how to go about mobilizing various strata of the local community to face rebel attack, they had little experience or ability in fighting against an external invasion from the Qing. Unfortunately, these two threats took place at the same time - they had no way to cope with them simultaneously. Apart from the concrete reasons, such as a lack of financial support as well as an absence of cooperation among the various forces, their final tragedies resulted mainly from their inability to integrate and lead the ordinary people.

## Chapter 3

### Literati and the Resistance Movement in Jiangnan

#### 3: 1. The Ming Dynasty and Jiangnan: The Military Perspective

By June 1, 1645, mixed Manchu and Chinese Qing armies had crossed the Yangzi under the cover of a dawn fog and begun their march on Nanjing. The Hongguang emperor immediately decided to flee with a small number of officials as well as the empress and a few servants. Half a month later, Dodo led his army into the city.

Historically, the Yangzi has been referred to as a “natural moat” (*tianqian* 天塹), but, in reality, it presented little real barrier. If the defenders of Jiangnan lost control of the Jiangbei area, the river would be easily crossed. Xu Fuyuan 徐孚遠 (1599-1665), a *juren* of 1642, explains the reasons in an essay entitled *Jiangfang* 江防. According to him, the loss of Jiangbei meant sharing geographic advantages with the enemy from the north. Furthermore, the north shore of Yangzi, dotted with numerous harbors, branching streams, and reed marshes, provide enough space for concealing an army. There was no way to defend the Yangzi and no hope for the protection of Nanjing city.<sup>1</sup>

Yangzhou's fall left the Yangzi completely exposed to the Qing army. In fact, the Ming's Yangzi defenses had not received adequate attention since the fifteenth century, and, by the early sixteenth century, the defenses were in no condition to repel the attacks of a powerful and well-organized army. For example, on April 1, 1534, a report from the Board of War listed the problems related to the defense of the Yangzi.

According to this report:

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted from Gu Yanwu, *Tianxia junguo libingshu* 天下郡國利病書, ce 8, Jiangning lu'an 江甯廬安, in XXSKQS 596, *Shibu dili lei* 史部地理類, 58-61.

More and more officers and soldiers have fled . . . along the Yangzi, those soldiers are not accustomed to fighting on the water; there are no forces that can be used for defending [the Yangzi] and arresting [bandits].<sup>2</sup>

Furthermore, the defenses of Nanjing city were woefully inadequate. Statistics compiled in mid-September, 1621, reveal that a camp named Xin Jiangying 新江營 which had originally held 15,280 officers and soldiers had been reduced to only 5,200, while warships had decreased from 300 to 160.<sup>3</sup> Until the Hongguang reign, along more than a thousand *li* of Yangzi, there were only about 7,000 officers and soldiers. Moreover, they could not get any supplies or pay.<sup>4</sup> It is not surprising, then, that during their crossing of the Yangzi, the Qing army did not meet any challenges from the Ming forces. After taking Nanjing, the most prosperous area of China became an easy target.

Geographically, Jiangnan is usually identified as a major component of the lower Yangzi macro region. It includes an elaborate network of rivers, canals, and lakes that link the Yangzi River and the Grand Canal. Through these two very important water ways, the area links north and south China to the middle and upper Yangzi regions. Basically, Jiangnan covers a large area encompassing most of the modern provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang. During the Ming, most of this area was called Nanzhili; in the early Qing, Jiangnan became the name of a specific province that was subsequently divided into the modern-day provinces of Jiangsu and Anhui.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> (Ming) *Shizong shilu* 世宗實錄, juan 160, in MSLZ -AHSLJ, 844.

<sup>3</sup> (Ming) *Xizong shilu* 熹宗實錄, juan 13, in MSLZ- AHSLJ, 884.

<sup>4</sup> *Jiashen jishi* 甲申紀事, juan 9, ZGYSJC 30, 271.

<sup>5</sup> The definition of Jiangnan is more complicated. See "The Lower Yangzi Connection", in Benjamin A. Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 8-13. Also see "Preface" of *Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China*, edited by Linda Cooke Johnson (Albany: NY, State University of New York Press, 1993). For Chinese and Japanese scholars' definitions of this term, see Feng Xianliang 馮賢亮, *Ming Qing Jiangnan diqu de huanjing biandong yu shehui kongzhi* 明清江南地區的環境變動與社會控制 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 2002), 1-10. Another term "*Wuzhong*" "吳中" also needs to be mentioned here. See Li Jinshu 林金樹, "Ming chu Wuzhong diqu shehui jingji zhuangkuang chutan" 明初吳中地區社會經濟狀況初探, in *Zhongguo shekeyuan lishi yanjiusuo Ming shi yanjiushi ed., Ming shi yanjiu luncong* 明史研究論叢 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin, 1981), vol. 2, 197-219.

The settlement of this area benefited from a combination of natural advantages and human action. Since the eighth century, these included a large-scale southward migration of educated northern Chinese, an unrivaled network for water-borne transportation, a convenient irrigation system, and the dissemination of early-ripening rice. Added to these were the area's naturally warm climate, fertile soil, and abundant rainfall, all of which were ideal for agricultural development.

These factors helped to make this area the most economically and culturally advanced within the entire empire.

From geographical perspective, the largest province in the empire was Huguang. It had a total of fifteen prefectures 府, nineteen sub-prefectures 州, and one hundred and seventeen counties. However, the total amount of taxes and grain it paid to the central government did not surpass that of Suzhou 蘇州 prefecture in Jiangnan. By the end of the fourteenth century, the farmland of Huguang accounted for 25% of the total for the entire empire, but its taxes and grain comprised only 8% of the total amount gathered; meanwhile, the farmland of Suzhou prefecture accounted for only 1% of the total, but its tax and grain accounted for 9.5%, a level of production that was twenty six times that of Huguang.<sup>6</sup>

Since the beginning of its economic development, Jiangnan was given special attention by the central government. During the Yuan Dynasty (1260-1368), the Mongols generally treated the Jiangnan elite very well. Mongol military officers often had close relationships with local elites and big families (*hao jia* 豪家). Regardless of the upheavals in north China, the economy of Jiangnan maintained its rapid development, attracting more and more educated and wealthy people as immigrants. The war between Zhu Yuanzhang and Zhang Shicheng 張士誠 (1321-1367) at the end of the Yuan did not have a great effect on the pace of development because most

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<sup>6</sup> Lin Jinshu 林金樹, "Lun Ming dai SuSong erfu de zhongfu wenti" 試論明代蘇松二府的重賦問題, in Zhongguo shekeyuan lishi yanjiusuo Ming shi yanjiu shi ed., *Ming shi yanjiu luncong* (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin, 1982), vol. 1, 101.



Jiangnan cities simply changed their flags, and the local elites joined the Ming. Furthermore, Zhu's army was generally well-trained and disciplined.<sup>7</sup>

Despite its development, the area was not highly militarized. This characteristic may have been related to the topographical features noted earlier. The fact that the area was crisscrossed with rivers, rivulets, lakes, and ponds meant that, in most circumstances, traffic was completely dependent on boats or ships. This is indicated by the fact that every family, even the most impoverished, had to own a boat. The simplest boats, named *Jiansou* 箭艘, *Qiangchuan* 槍船, or *Qiang Huazi* 槍劃子, could usually hold three or four people and be handled by children as young as eight. Rich families sometimes owned several hundred boats or ships; some of the bigger ones required thirty people for operation, and could be loaded with about 100 *dan* 石 of grain.<sup>8</sup> The presence of so much water made it impossible to deploy large armies or to provide the logistical support necessary for decisive military campaigns, and yet naval warfare was possible.

In the summer of 1645, a Jiangnan *ju ren*, Sun Zhaokui 孫兆奎, decided to cooperate with several others in the fight against the Qing army. He was said to be talented in military strategy, the training of soldiers, and the management of financial affairs. Over the course of about ten days, he organized an army of approximately three thousand men. This action served to trigger the Jiangnan resistance movement. The army he organized was one of the most powerful in the anti-Qing struggle, and had frequent success in battles against the Qing thanks to its use of firearms such as muskets (*huoqiang* 火槍).<sup>9</sup>

After Sun Zhaokui was captured, he refused to surrender to the Qing. The following is a conversation he had with an anonymous person:

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<sup>7</sup> *Suzhou fuzhi* 蘇州府志 (1823), juan 108, Renwu 人物. Also see Zheng Kecheng, 62-64.

<sup>8</sup> Xie Zhengguang 謝正光 and Fan Jinmin 范金民 ed., *Ming yiminlu huiji* 明遺民錄匯輯 (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue, 1995), 185-90.

<sup>9</sup> *Xu Ming jishi benmo* 續明紀事本末, juan 15, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 107.

‘What Jiangnan relies on is fighting on water, and yet the Qing army has already penetrated into this area. It has taken and used the advantages of both lakes and mountains, and it has occupied all the important forts. [In this case] boats and ships cannot demonstrate their advantages; and even marvelous wisdom cannot reach their goals. With general conditions like this, how do you intend to do something?’ Sun Zhaokui answered: ‘How can I not know that Jiangnan does not decide this country’s destiny? The war is already here, forcing yourself to resist it is the sort of behavior that corresponds to a stroll in front of cavalry or playing with weapons in the bottom of a well. What I despise is that the Ming has cultivated its literati for more than three hundred years. However, now you see only a very few ministers in both Nanjing and Beijing who have chosen to die for moral integrity, and we have heard no righteous voices. I intend to sacrifice myself for this country in order to inspire the righteous people and shame the craven. With this choice I will certainly live up to the great benefit the Ming has given to me for several generations, meanwhile I will realize my own great will. As for success or failure, there is nothing to do but put it in the hands of destiny.’<sup>10</sup>

Sun’s speech indicates that literati of the late Ming time knew that the Jiangnan area could not play a crucial role in military actions due to the absence of any natural defenses apart from the waterways that made the movement of cavalry and artillery inconvenient. Sun was killed in Nanjing at the age of thirty-nine. His army remained together for about three months (from June until August 22, 1645).<sup>11</sup>

Regardless of social status, few people in Jiangnan chose to be involved in military affairs. According to Chen Zilong’s observation, neither rural militia nor *baojia* conscription was workable in the Jiangnan area. He felt that the *baojia* system would work only if the inequalities in society were leveled out. Chen also believed that the rural militia, an institution born in the northern plains, was completely inapplicable to

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<sup>10</sup> Wen Ruilin 温睿临, *Nan Jiang yishi* 南疆繹史, liezhuan 列傳, juan 22; (kanben 勘本) juan 28, in ZGYSJC 35, 406.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 408.

this region. He suggested that, because of the commercialization of the Yangzi delta, people mingled mainly in market towns and failed to develop ties of solidarity with their immediate neighbors. Moreover, because agriculture was so labor-intensive in the south, people did not have the time or inclination to practice martial arts. Finally, Jiangnan people did not possess horses or weapons, or the strength to use them. He conceded that the times might force the gentry to raise militia in Jiangnan, but he feared that these would easily degenerate into vigilante groups, as, indeed, was often to be the case. "Thus, anyone who says that they wish to arouse *xiangbing* (village troops) in Jiangnan," Chen concluded, "is indeed misguided." Unlike Jiangnan, north China was characterized by both a much more contiguous landscape, and a stronger tradition of village community. People clustered in villages that were not congruent with kinship units, and so had developed a much stronger tradition of self-help and village defense. Furthermore, they were much more accustomed to handling weapons and horses, and could easily be led to form *xiangbing* in defense of their locales.<sup>12</sup>

However, in certain parts of Jiangnan some *xiangbing* really were organized. For instance, when the Qing army entered into the Jiading area, numerous types of military groups and local defense corps were formed in village after village in the countryside as the resistance to haircutting spread (see below). In terms of social customs, the appearance of *xiangbing* in Jiangnan area is not strange. In 1626, based on the Regional Inspector of Zhili and Investigating Censor's (*xun'an Zhili jiancha yushi* 巡按直隸監察禦史) observations, the Jiangnan people were, by custom, flippant and easily incited. They were also easy to gather together. When they told each other of new and strange things, they often gathered into factions, and, they blindly followed others.<sup>13</sup>

We will see that the role they played in the future battles, in fact, verifies Chen Zilong's observations.

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<sup>12</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 376.

<sup>13</sup> Ye Dehui 葉德輝, *Xu Xun'an jietie* 徐巡按揭帖, in ZGYSJC 27, 476.

The weakness of the military in this area was also related to the fact that the Ming local government had paid little attention to military affairs. The decline of military power had already, in fact, allowed for extensive attacks from Japanese pirates in the sixteenth century. When these raids first began, the Japanese pirates were able to come and go without serious military confrontation or resistance and many prosperous market towns suffered severe losses. By the mid-sixteenth century, in one incident, a band of pirates, reportedly only fifty or seventy men, was bold enough to maraud inland on a route that encircled the southern capital, which had a garrison boasting, at least on paper, 120,000 men.<sup>14</sup>

In the face of these raids, the Ming Jiangnan government had taken various measures to cope with the crisis. In the Prefecture of Songjiang, a total of 3,000 soldiers were conscripted to defend the east shore. However, this number decreased gradually, and by the end of the Ming, only 270 soldiers remained. These soldiers, divided into two camps of land and sea, generally came from certain big families (*hao jia* 豪家), and had inadequate skills and training. Thus, their existence did not contribute much to the maintenance of law and order.<sup>15</sup>

This situation was only worsened by the fact that the area around Lake Tai came under the jurisdiction of three, often non-cooperative, authorities belonging to the provinces of Zhejiang and the imperial authority in Nanzhili. In addition to the vast lake, countless waterways, and marshes which made this area a perfect haven for bandits of all sorts there were no local authorities who could bring the area under direct control.<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, no government could ignore the area. This was due not only to its economic resources, but also to the fact that it functioned as an important commercial concourse of southeast, east, and north China. In his recent study, James Shih takes the

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<sup>14</sup> R. Huang (1981), 159.

<sup>15</sup> Riben cang Zhongguo hanjian difangzhi congkan 日本藏中國罕見地方志叢刊, *Chongzhen Songjiang fuzhi* 崇禎松江府志, juan 25, bingfang 兵防, ce A (Beijing: Shumu wenxian, 1990), 643.

<sup>16</sup> For example, Shen Shixing's 申時行 "Hufang gongsu ji" 湖防公署記 (written in around 1638) provided detailed information about this aspect. See *Chongzhen Wuxianzhi* 崇禎吳縣志, juan 12 (2), in *Tianyige cang Ming dai fangzhi xuankan xubian* 天一閣藏明代方志選刊續編 (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian, 1990), 137-38.

total number of military personnel stationed in the area as directly proportional to public security.

### **Military Personnel in Wujiang County**

Date	officers (N)	soldiers (N)	total
1560	3	45	48
1569	16	219	235
1628-44	1	400	401
1645-1726	17	831	848
1745	20	617	637

(Figure 3)

On this basis, he concludes that the Lake Tai area was more secure during the Qing than the Ming. The number of military personnel only increased significantly after the establishment of the Manchu regime. For instance, in Wujiang County, the total number of military personnel doubled. These personnel were distributed evenly among strategic locations in the county, thus ensuring the security of market residents and business activities.<sup>17</sup> Shih also mentions that the original duties of the military guards and battalions in the lower Yangzi region were changed – instead of being charged with maintaining public order, they became responsible for the shipment of grain tribute from the lower Yangzi to national granaries.

Early Manchu rulers, with the help of numerous Chinese literati, clearly realized that they were aliens whose prolonged and successful rule depended on their understanding of the situation throughout China. As we mentioned before, in north China they achieved great success, especially in terms of social control. Every effort was made to secure the services of those Chinese who had established themselves officially, socially, and academically before the change of dynasty. The successes of these efforts ensured that the old social order remained basically intact. Even though

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<sup>17</sup> James C. Shih, *Chinese Rural Society in Transition, A Case Study of the Lake Tai Area, 1368-1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 73-74.

Jiangnan presented an entirely different situation for the Manchu rulers, they quickly demonstrated their abilities in restoring order, bringing peace to the masses, and continuing the former system of government unchanged. These success came about despite the fact that their plans for conquering this area were made under extremely tumultuous conditions, and, furthermore, that they had not heard of the establishment of the Hongguang regime.<sup>18</sup>

From a special edict issued by Dorgon, we can understand why the Ming Jiangnan officials, both *Wen* and *Wu*, surrendered to this “righteous force,” and why most of the ordinary people did not choose to resist the Qing’s arrival. This edict begins by blaming the southern officials for their bad performance, pointing out that when the Ming Chongzhen Emperor found himself in difficulty and the reigning house was destroyed,

Your southern ministers did not send a single soldier, nor loose a single arrow, nor look a single bandit in the face. Instead, they hid in their holes like rats. That was the first crime.

Then, when our armies entered to exterminate the roving bandits who fled westward, even before you in the south had received definite news from the capital, and without a last [imperial] testament [to name an heir], you dared to set the Prince of Fu [upon the throne]. That was the second crime.

The roving bandits are your worst enemies. Yet you did not think to subdue and punish them. Rather, all your generals crowded together, jostling each other [to be the first] to ravage the good folk, to rebel capriciously and declare hostilities [upon each other]. That was the third crime.

It is these three crimes that have created universal anger in the empire, and that cannot be condoned by the law of the land, I have thus solemnly accepted the Mandate of Heaven, and so arrayed the *six armies* to subdue and punish the guilty. All civil and military officials in each locale who take the lead in surrendering their towns and territories will be meritoriously advanced one degree in rank. Those

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<sup>18</sup> See Li Ge 李格, “Qing chu guanyu duoqu Jiangnan diqu de zhanlue juece jiqi bianhua” 清初關於奪取江南地區的戰略決策及其變化, in *Qishi luncong* (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1991), vol. 8, 131-42.

who obstinately [deny] the Mandate and do not submit will be massacred and their wives and children taken prisoner. If the Prince of Fu can repent his earlier faults and surrender before our army, then we should forgive his former crimes and treat him like all the other Ming dynastic princes. All those ministers in whom the Prince of Fu personally confided but who soon realized that they must reform and tender allegiance [to the Qing] will also in turn be considered for promotion and employment.<sup>19</sup>

For the ordinary people, the Qing decreased their levies and exempted them from all the extra taxes imposed under the Ming.<sup>20</sup>

Because of the success of these endeavors, the Jiangnan area came under the control of the Qing army within about half a year. Most of the open, land-based resistance in southern Nanzhili was quashed by early December 1645. According to the report sent by Dodo on December 17:

We captured the Prince of Fu, Zhu Yousong, and in succession defeated enemy naval and land forces, cavalry and infantry, in over one hundred and fifty engagements. Jiangnan and Zhejiang are completely pacified. We accepted the surrender of 244 civil and military officials, and 317,000 cavalymen and infantrymen.<sup>21</sup>

Entering 1646, the Qing army set up four headquarters in Nanjing, Suzhou, Hangzhou, and the Zhejiang coastal area in order to garrison the whole of Jiangnan. The Manchu army, totaling about 70,000 men, was given the task of defending important

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<sup>19</sup> Quoted from Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 582-83.

<sup>20</sup> QSL, ce 3- *Shizhu shilu* 世祖實錄, 154-56.

<sup>21</sup> Quoted from Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 674.

cities such as Nanjing,<sup>22</sup> as well as several smaller cities. For instance, 1,000 cavalymen and infantrymen were deployed to Changzhou 常州 city.<sup>23</sup>

Most of the Qing army was comprised of soldiers from the Southern Ming army who had surrendered. After Dodo took Nanjing, it is said that a total of 23 brigade commanders, 47 lieutenant commanders, 86 battalion commanders, and 238,000 troops surrendered.<sup>24</sup> Regardless of the ethnic difference between Manchu and Chinese (Han), all of the Qing army in Jiangnan was required to change from battlefield troops to an occupation force. In most cases, this transition appears to have been successful.

Ordinary peasants and most city residents, despite having to bear some of the heaviest taxes and levies in the empire, did not rebel. The absence of large scale peasant rebellions can be attributed to several factors: for one thing, it was obviously related to the development of spinning and weaving as well as other household sideline production. Unlike peasants from northern China, they could easily find way to make a living. For another, a very high ratio of Jiangnan farmland belonged to officials. This meant that there were fewer specific landlords and other social elite to become the targets of rebels, the rebellions were scattered, and the local authorities could suppress them separately.<sup>25</sup>

For local elite and literati, economic and commercial development reduced the attraction of an official career. This opened the way for greater social stratification. As Wakeman puts it, “a more dynamic interaction of elites could be expected in which gentry and other families competed with one another to improve or maintain their local position through land acquisition, marriage, commerce, and the official

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<sup>22</sup> Chen Feng 陳鋒, *Qing dai junfei yanjiu* 清代軍費研究 (Wuhan: Wuhan daxue, 1992), 92-94.

<sup>23</sup> Gugong buowuyuan ed., *Gugong zhenben congkan* 故宮珍本叢刊 - *Jiangsu fuzhouxian zhi* 江蘇府州縣志 (Haikou: Hainan 2001), ce 4, *Wujing xianzhi* 武進縣志, juan 2, bingfang 兵防, 66.

<sup>24</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 592.

<sup>25</sup> Lin Jinshu, 114 -18. On this aspect, the most important study is Wang Peng's 王鵬 paper entitled “Li Zicheng lingdao de Ming mo nongminjun weihe budao Jiangnan” 李自成領導的明末農民軍為何不到江南. *Zhongguo nongmin zhanzhengshi yanjiuhui* ed., *Zhongguo nongmin zhanzhengshi yanjiu jikan* 中國農民戰爭史研究集刊 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1982), 2: 114-22.



examinations.”<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, many of these families knew how to cope with alien rule, because their forefathers had had similar experiences under the Mongols. In the past several decades, academics in China and abroad have emphasized the Ming literati’s inheritance from Song literati, generally with an emphasis on the areas of culture and social organization (kinship).<sup>27</sup> However, some research also indicates that many Jiangnan literati imitated the Mongols’ language, dress, hairstyle, and eating customs. Some even went so far as to change their surnames in order to serve as officials under the Mongols. According to Zheng Kecheng, “all inherited customs from the Song had vanished.” He goes on to note that after the founding of the Ming, it took about one century to resume the old Chinese fashions.<sup>28</sup>

The summer of 1645 marked the apex of Jiangnan’s resistance against the Qing army. However, the gentry had actually already begun to get in touch with the Qing in order to ensure their later survival.<sup>29</sup>

In the first stages of their conquest of Jiangnan, the Qing government did what they could to pacify the area by reducing local resistance. At this time, Hong Chengchou was Dodo’s chief lieutenant. He bore the grandiose title of Grand Secretary, Tutor to the Heir Apparent, President of the Board of War, Right Assistant Supervising Censor of the Metropolitan Censorate, and Grand Military Coordinator for the Pacification of the Province of Jiangnan and for the Regulation of Military Rations, a title that was given him after he had been presumed gloriously dead in battle on the northern frontier. Wakeman writes that “one way of relieving his shame, while effectively carrying out his mission to pacify Jiangnan by ‘inviting and soothing’ (*zhaofu*) the province into submission, was to widen the policy of admitting former Ming officials into the Qing government. After he reached Nanjing, Hong repeatedly recommended former Ming

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<sup>26</sup> For more information about the life and alternative careers of the Jiangnan elite in late Ming times, see Wakeman (1985), vol. 1, 604-39. The preface of this dissertation also mentions some important aspects.

<sup>27</sup> See Patricia Ebrey and James L. Watson, ed. *Kinship Organization in Late Imperial China 1000- 1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

<sup>28</sup> Zheng Kecheng, 16.

<sup>29</sup> Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, *Hongguang shilu chao* 弘光實錄鈔, juan 4, in ZGYSJC 32, 697.

officials for office under the Qing, explaining to the court that, without their help, he could not pacify the region. Hong believed that the appointment of former Ming officials both to the central government and as magistrates in their native provinces would increase the density of administrative control, and prevent military incidents from occurring.”<sup>30</sup>

In order to placate the locals, the Qing also had to overcome the deep impression of the Yangzhou massacre on all the people. The Qing deemed this tragedy and the violence to be a result of resistance. Thus, they claimed that they

... had no choice but to do it. If [the Ming] officers and civilians, the military staff and local residents want to pursue resistance rather than surrender, Yangzhou city serves as a mirror. All human beings are born of heaven and earth, for those people who disobey the mandate of heaven, the appropriate way is to commit suicide. How can they implicate ordinary people's lives in this trouble?<sup>31</sup>

In many cases the initial motive for the resistance of the Jiangnan literati was not ethnic prejudice; instead, it was because local officers (mostly Chinese) sent by the Qing put these literati to shame and caused them to lose their dignity.<sup>32</sup>

The hair-cutting decree in 1645 was the last straw which triggered a series of resistance movements in the Jiangnan area. From the Manchus' perspective, the command not only brought about the physical resemblance of rulers and subjects, it also provided a perfect test of loyalty. The command began to be carried out in April of 1644 after the Qing took over Shan Hai Pass 山海關. Since this decree had already been the cause of severe resistance in north China, Dodo had once considered suspending the haircutting order in the rest of the area. He suggested shaving the

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<sup>30</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 643.

<sup>31</sup> Wen Bing 文秉, *Lie Huang xiaoshi- Jiangnan wenjian lu* 烈皇小識 - 江南聞見錄, in ZGYSJC 33, 114.

<sup>32</sup> For more information, see Guo Songyi 郭松義, “Jiangnan dizhu jieji yu Qing chu zhongyang jiquan de maodun jiqi fazhan he bianhua” 江南地主階級與清初中央集權的矛盾及其發展和變化, in *Qingshi luncong* (Beijing: Zhonghua 1979), vol.1, 121-37.

military but not the civilians. But now, one year later, he ordered that all Chinese, soldiers and civilians alike, shave their foreheads and plait their hair in a tribal queue like the Manchus.

From the perspective of Chinese officers and literati this was a great humiliation. The usual Ming style was for men's hair to be left long and tied in a knot worn on top of the head; cutting one's hair was a degradation of one's dignity.<sup>33</sup> As Wakeman indicates, this decree

....also enraged common folk, who viewed the loss of their hair as tantamount to the loss of their manhood. When the new policy was announced, time and again demagogues aroused peasant mobs by telling them that if they cut their hair they would lose their wives . . . It represented a betrayal of Han masculinity . . .

Consequently, the rulers' effort to make Manchus and Han one unified 'body' initially had the effect of unifying upper-and lower-class natives in central and south China against the interlopers. The conflict between superior and inferior was momentarily overridden; and for once the aristocracy of the mind above, and the masses of Jiangnan below, stood together –even against the many elders, merchants, and retired officials in between who wished to accept the Qing offer of peaceful collaboration. And just as towns and cities had surrendered so amenable days and weeks before, so did their inhabitants now rise against the new government.<sup>34</sup>

The haircutting decree indeed stirred anger among the people. Among the angriest were degree-holders, former officials, and incumbent local officials who had been displaced by the Qing. Resistance in southern Nanzhili began in late July and early August in those districts of Changzhou and Suzhou that first received this decree – Jiangyin, Jiading, Kunshan, and Songjiang. In these areas, the district yamens were vacated, and many magistrates fled their posts. However, previous studies, both in

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<sup>33</sup> For instance, *The Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing)* in its opening chapter contains the lines, "our torso, limbs, hair, and skin we receive from our fathers and mothers; we must not destroy or damage them. That is the beginning of filial piety."

<sup>34</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 650.

China and abroad, have overemphasized the role of this decree in inciting people to rebellion. The resentment and rage was undoubtedly true and needed to be expressed, but going to battle to sacrifice one's life does not seem a likely response. Instead, it should be argued that military actions against the Manchus were joint actions which involved forces from various social strata. Each of these had their own considerations.

After this decree was issued, the commoners of Jiangnan began to panic. In a place named Chen Hu 陳湖, a peasant rebel leader took this opportunity to induce more people to join him. A contemporary description tells us that

....the rural inhabitants became more fearful. At the same time, the runners from both prefecture and county relied on the power of the Qing army to demand several times more food than before. Thus all the farmers intended to be rebels . . . The uprising spread everywhere. All they did was looting.<sup>35</sup>

A few remnants of the Ming army, such as Wang Fei 王蜚 and his soldiers had no further plans for resistance but simply arrested the people who shaved their heads, and plundered every village they passed by. When the Qing army arrived, they fled.<sup>36</sup>

An article entitled "*Luqiao jiwen*" 鹿樵紀聞, written at the time of the decree, provides detailed analysis of the Jiangnan literati and Ming officers' real motives for opposing the haircutting:

The changing of institutions is not an easy thing even in peaceful times, let alone in a period of dynastic transition. The establishment of the Qing dynasty accords with the wills of both heaven and human beings. When the decree of haircutting was issued, foolish rebellions occurred in the Southeast. Although all of them used the name of restoration (of the Ming), in fact most of them are of two minds. Clothes and caps may be changed easily. However, if the hair was shaved, those people could not be fickle and freakish any more. This is why rebellions occurred in

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<sup>35</sup> Gu Yanwu, *Sheng'an benji* 聖安本紀 6, in ZGYSJC 32, 657-58.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 661.

swarms after the new decree was promulgated. Could everybody really want to restore old institutions; could every household care about the death of the Ming emperor?<sup>37</sup>

To analyze the impact of this decree, we have to distinguish the different reactions of rural and urban areas. In many of the cities, the local literati and other elite had collaborated with the new government, and quickly took power with the help of Qing magistrates. However, these urban leaders found themselves losing control of the countryside after obeying the order to shave their heads. As one source indicated:

After those of us in the city cut our hair, it was only the country folk who continued as before. Those who had hair did not visit the city. Those who had shaved their hair did not go into the countryside. If they were seen, they were in either case killed. The countryside and the city were blocked off from each other.<sup>38</sup>

The conditions in the villages became even more chaotic as those inhabitants who had complied with their headmens' orders to cut their hair turned against villagers whose hair had been kept long. This kind of turbulence, often coinciding with existing conflicts between the various social strata and military forces, gave the Jiangnan literati an opportunity to demonstrate their characteristics and abilities. Below, we will examine the military forces in rural society, and, on this basis, explore the role played by the Jiangnan literati.

### **3: 2. The Nature of the Resistance Forces**

Facing the invasion of the Qing's mixed Manchu and Chinese army, none of the Jiangnan forces would have been able to organize effective resistance, even if they had

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<sup>37</sup> Anon. (falsely attributed to Wu Weiye 吳偉業), *Luqiao jiwen- Jiading zhi tu* 鹿樵紀聞- 嘉定之屠, Juan A. (Taipei: Guangwen, 1964).

<sup>38</sup> Quoted from Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 651.

really wanted to do so. Since the normal Ming military forces, both land and naval, had collapsed, there was no way to expect them to mobilize armed resistance. Among very scattered forces, some very disjointed and ad hoc resistance did occur, but generally the organized resistance by the Ming armies vanished. As for the civil officials and local elites, many chose surrender as the most certain way to guarantee their survival. There was virtually no cooperation between civil forces and the former Ming armies; instead, their relationship was usually characterized by conflict. Had they managed to achieve unity, a much more effective resistance could have been expected. Despite the general failure, there were some distinguished literati such as Chen Zilong and Zhang Huangyan who not only managed to gain a certain degree of coordination between the different forces, as we will mention below, but also managed to gain some success in their anti-Qing goals.

Judging from history, the Jiangnan literati and the other local elite did have the ability to demonstrate their political power when necessary. In the past, they had been successful at integrating other social strata to fight for their own economic benefits. For example, during the 1620s, there had been cooperation between lower classes and some 'righteous gentry' who were united against the Ming government in the common defense of urban privileges such as tax cutting. In 1626, the famous Suzhou riot took place. "Members of the gentry consciously sought to perpetuate this unity as tensions between upper and lower classes sharpened during the second quarter of the 17<sup>th</sup> century."<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, some elite families in Jiangnan were keenly aware of the need to maintain the solidarity of primary associations like kinship groups, as well as to draw together higher and lower orders by organizing villages and districts through public charities, other types of groups that provided welfare for social dependents, and, of course, self-defense organizations.

Since they had demonstrated an ability to use their capacities in the realms of economics, politics, and social welfare, it seems reasonable that they could also organize their own military or semi-military force. Changes in the social structure of Jiangnan would have provided them enough human resources had they been able to do

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<sup>39</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 628-29.

so.<sup>40</sup> Up to the late Ming, rich Jiangnan families had already used their fortunes and civic contributions to raise private or semiprivate forces. In most cases, these forces were also supplemented by volunteers. This phenomenon relates to the unique social structure of the Jiangnan area. One of the most important features of the structure was subordination (*guifu* or *guishu* 歸附, 歸屬). Many who were impoverished or engaged in menial labor chose to be legally or illegally subordinated to the rich and privileged. These bondservants came from various backgrounds: many had fled their fixed hereditary occupations as soldiers and artisans, or they had been bandits, gamblers, or debtors. In addition, the breakdown in the sixteenth century of the early Ming government's system of village organization (such as the *lijia* system) also forced impoverished peasants into servitude. Under the system of *toukao* 投靠 (surrendering oneself in order to rely upon the protection of a gentry family), personal subordination became even more pronounced. If a peasant could not pay his taxes, he could turn over his tax indemnity as well as his property rights to a member of the newly ascendant local gentry whose degree status exempted him from paying taxes. Some powerful gentry with official status could even remove that land from the government's tax rolls. According to the estimate of Gu Yanwu, "In many cases there were up to one thousand people" who entered into this subordinate position in one family.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> For the comprehensive studies about the social structure in late Ming Jiangnan and social subordination, class conflicts and so on, see Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 604-46. The most important concise study about the social structure of early Ming rural society in Jiangnan is that by Mi Chu Wiens. She provides a description of the function of *Liangzhang* 糧長, *lizhang* 裏長 and *jiashou* 甲首. She shows that the relatively wealthy locals were incorporated into the government machinery, assuming the responsibility of transferring local produce and resources to the government. Besides these personnel, other government appointees in charge of community services also were incorporated into the *lijia* organizations; for example, village elders (*li lao ren* 裏老人) and others also assumed the responsibility of supervising farming. See Mi Chu Wiens, "Changes in the Fiscal and Rural Control Systems in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," *Ming Studies* 3 (1976): 53-69. As for the studies of local administrative units such as *lijia*, there is no unanimous conclusion among scholars from China and Japan, because this sort of study is not limited to the administrative field (it also relates to the financial system such as tax and corvée). See Luan Chengxian 樂成顯, "Ming dai lijia bianzhi yuanze yu tubao huafen" 明代裏甲編制原則與圖保劃分, *Shixue jikan* 4 (1997): 200-25.

<sup>41</sup> See Wu Dange 伍丹戈, "Ming dai shenjin dizhu de fazhan" 明代紳衿地主的發展, in *Mingshi yanjiu luncong* 明史研究論叢 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin, 1983), vol. 2, 9-26. See also Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 617-23 and the notes therein.

The relationship between these subordinates and their hosts was complicated. Generally speaking, the local elite were able to control or live in harmony with the local people. However, the general emphasis on “class struggle” in Chinese scholarship over the last decades has prompted several case studies of serf revolt and peasant or household servant uprisings. Those involved in these conflicts would attack their masters’ houses, demand the return of their contracts of indenture, and seize food supplies. In the countryside of Taicang, some subordinates even had their own organization called the Black Dragon Society (*Wulong hui* 烏龍會). Apart from bondservants, most of the membership was composed of marketplace vendors. However, many members were also soldiers from the remnants of the Ming army. As looting and violence spread, disorder spread even to the cities. In the end, it was only with help from the Qing army that the rich families were able to put down the Black Dragon Society by arresting and fining its leaders.<sup>42</sup> As far as I know, there is not enough data to show that Jiangnan literati or any other local elites mobilized their own subordinates to fight against the Qing. Except for the riots mentioned above, most social conflicts arose from among the peasants. For example, according to records from the early Qing, a man named Barefoot Zhang San (*Chijiao Zhang San* 赤腳張三) attacked the city of Yixing 宜興 where he looted and burned the property of rich families while treating the poor fairly.<sup>43</sup>

One report sent to the Board of War by Zhang Guowei on April 1, 1638, showed that the Jiangnan peasants’ rebellion had reached a new stage in the late Ming. The report contained a description of rebellion in Liyang 溧陽 in which we learn that a bandit chief named Zhu Guozhu 朱國助, a robber for about twenty years, had organized several hundred rebels and appeared in the border area of Nanzhili and Zhejiang where they publicly killed the people and burned the houses. The report also includes a notification which was issued on November 25, 1642, by Zhu. It reads:

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<sup>42</sup> For more information about *Wulong hui*, see Xie Guozhen, *Ming mo nongmin qiyi shiliao xuanbian* 明末農民起義史料選編 (Fuzhou: Fujian, 1981), 234-40.

<sup>43</sup> Xie Guozhen, *Qing chu nongmin qiyi ziliao jilu* 清初農民起義資料輯錄 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1957), 18-19.



I have witnessed the poor people working hard in the fields during the summer. However, they still can not avoid hunger and cold. When they suffer from frustration, they have no way to express themselves. Thus I choose the 24<sup>th</sup> of the twelfth month as the date for organizing a parade. If you are fortunate to join me, riches and honors will come, and your resentment and grudges will be redressed immediately. Those rich families who assist us with grain should expect to get protection. Those who submit will survive, while those who resist shall perish . . . currently the best place for our people is Xintang Village 新塘村 where grain and pickled tofu is stored for several years' use and the solid building could garrison several tens of thousands of people. This is to arouse all of you: for those who are with us in heart in order to obtain wealth and honors, as well as those who want to redress injustice, please come on that day to conclude a treaty of alliance. Now I list five disciplines as follows. One who disobeys any one of them will be executed: those who retreat in the battlefield; those who bungle matters and leak secrets; those who slay ordinary people with no excuse; those who catch our spies; those who surrender to the government and resist our troops.<sup>44</sup>

The Ming army led by Zhang Guowei finally pacified Zhu Guozhu and his followers. A few years later, neither the peasant rebels nor the Ming army could be relied upon to fight against the Qing army. What the Jiangnan literati could be expected to use in the resistance movement were, rather, *outlaw elements*, which included remnants of the large roving-rebel armies, local bandit and pirate groups, and other armed, illegal organizations such as underground gangs. Dependence on these sorts of forces immediately resulted in a series of troubles for the literati. For one thing, these forces had no way to effectively resist the powerful Qing regular army; for another, as mentioned before, the various groups of people had different ambitions in mind. Thus, their action became a double-edged sword for the literati. Not surprisingly, the literati always had an ambivalent attitude toward these rebels: they hoped to use them as a tool

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<sup>44</sup> Zhang Guowei 張國維, "Qi Liyang dadao su" 擒溧陽大盜疏. In *Fu Wu shucao* 撫吳疏草, SKJHSCK, Shi 39, 550-52.

to organize resistance, but also felt anxious that they could damage their existing status and benefits. After several months of observation and consideration, most Jiangnan literati found that the Qing government provided the best hope for bringing about social order and the maintenance of their previous lives. Thus, it was the rich men from Lake Tai who arrested Barefoot Zhang San and allowed him to be executed by the Qing.<sup>45</sup>

However, apart from their consideration of outlaw elements, Jiangnan literati also tried to organize their own armies to pursue resistance. For instance, during the summer of 1645, in Jiaxing 嘉興, a member of the gentry named Tu Xiangmei 屠象美, told the residents of 24 *fang* who resided inside and outside the city that every family should choose one member to join the army. If some families refuse to do so, the soldiers would loot their property and post a note reading “*tao min*” (people who fled) on the door in order to confiscate the house.’ Within several days they mobilized more than thirty thousand people. There were no general(s) and also no discipline for controlling them. What they held was only cudgels, or bamboo sticks bound with a little bit of iron. They wore hemp cloth, basically bare, and their shoes were straw sandals . . . This disorderly band made an uproar, and looked to be playing games. Their daily needs and provisions relied totally on the gentry and big families from their own *fang*.<sup>46</sup>

It is obviously not an easy thing to organize militias. In 1635, Chen Zilong provided a detailed analysis of the reasons for this difficulty:

The Jiangnan people are not familiar with military affairs. [Because of] the heavy burden of taxes and corvée, they are extremely poor. Furthermore, the customs of Jiangnan people are scattered and they are not used to socializing. They not only have no time to do such things, but also have no intention to satisfy this kind of request . . . The critics also want to let the recommended gentry and rich families

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<sup>45</sup> Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定, “Ming dai de shidafu he minzhong” 明代蘇松的士大夫和民眾, in Liu Junwen chief ed. 劉俊文, *Riben xuezhe yanjiu Zhongguo shi lunzhu xuanyi* 日本學者研究中國史論著選譯 (Beijing: zhonghua, 1993), vol. 6, 258-60.

<sup>46</sup> Nanyuan xiaoke 南園嘯客 ed., *Pingwu shilue* 平吳事略, in ZGYSJC 33, 181.

train their own militia. I thought it was a good idea. However, this method is not suitable. For the army, what we need is to use it as a united force, to let them keep the drilling and bayonet fighting in order. Moreover, let the soldiers and their generals know each other. Now the primary concern of gentry is not official affairs, meanwhile the rich people are afraid of handling more business. Only a few people have responded to the request. Among those few people, most only train a little more than ten soldiers. If one day there is an incident, can you simply organize several families' soldiers and use them? As for the regular soldiers of prefectures and counties, for the most part half of them are old and weak.<sup>47</sup>

Nevertheless, many militias were organized in the summer of 1645. Because of the arrival of the Manchus, much had changed. In the area of Changshu 常熟, after the news of the city's fall reached the countryside, a local militia was organized. Many wrapped their heads with a piece of white cloth to signify their membership in the local militia – these were the so-called white-head soldiers (*baitou bing* 白頭兵).<sup>48</sup> Their weapons consisted only of cudgels and bamboo sticks. They called on everybody to join them. If somebody refused to do so, they would threaten to destroy his family.<sup>49</sup>

Only a few of these local militia belonged to Jiangnan literati. They had successfully mobilized some social forces to fight against the Qing army between 1645 and 1647. It might have been theoretically possible for them to bring all classes together in a collective effort to defend their homes, property, and hair, however, with no certain funds and other resources to sponsor those local militias, it proved practically impossible to organize and even more difficult to maintain a powerful military force. The uncertainty of funding is indicated in the price of rice in the mid-1640s in the Jiangnan area which fluctuated widely between various regions. In 1647, each *dan* 石 of

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<sup>47</sup> Chen Zilong, *An'yatang gao* 安雅堂稿, juan 17, in XXSKQS 1388, 182-83.

<sup>48</sup> The term of *Baitou bing* was used by many sorts of Jiangnan local militias. For detailed sources, see the quotation in Pan Xinghui's paper, 361.

<sup>49</sup> Guo Songyi, 126.

rice was worth 4 tael of silver in the Songjiang area.<sup>50</sup> Currently available sources show that there is no way to analyze the capabilities of Jiangnan literati in terms of military mobilization because of the shortage of data.

From the Qing side, government documents related to Jiangnan routinely refer to all sorts of anti-Qing activities as simply “banditry” or “robbery.” Of course, the primary purpose of the Qing was to debase the resistance, but could the Jiangnan literati, the so-called loyalists, really be distinguished from the outlaw elements? Wakeman points out that, “in fact, it was quite common for a loyalist scholar ‘leading’ a resistance movement suddenly to become aware that the men he had gathered were really no more than outlaws, living off of the people, looting because they had no other way of getting supplies. When Yang Tingshu 楊廷樞 was asked by the Lake Tai loyalists to join their uprising, he asked them how they would get their supplies. ‘From the people,’ they responded. ‘In that case,’ Yang said, ‘you are bandits. What has that to do with righteousness (*yi*)?’”<sup>51</sup>

Facing dynastic change, and the prospect of an alien government, the elite could not easily make decisions. In Jiading 嘉定, all residents of the city were obedient to the new magistrate Zhang Weixi 張維熙 appointed by the Qing in the early summer of 1645. A few weeks later, Wu Zhikui 吳志葵, a general from the remnant Ming army led his soldiers to the east suburb. He ordered some people to go to the city, and told the residents, “you should not forget your own former ruler. Now the anti-Qing armies have already decided to rise up immediately. You also should mobilize *xiangyong* here in order to respond to them.” Because of general Wu’s propaganda, most of the residents lost their minds. Magistrate Zhang fled first after Wu’s coming. When he returned to

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<sup>50</sup> Chen Feng, 352.

<sup>51</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 603. After Yang was arrested, there was an interesting conversation between Governor Tu Guobao 土國寶 and him. Tu asked: “Do you want to pursue insurgence?” Yang answered: “No, I do not. As a subject of emperor, if the kingdom perishes, I would perish too; if the kingdom survives, I would live with it. Now the kingdom has already perished, what should I do except choose death?” He was killed in Wujiang 吳江. See *Pingwu shilue*, in ZGYSJC 33, 180.

the city several weeks later, he called on all the gentry, trying to get their cooperation. However, this time nobody responded to him.<sup>52</sup>

As for local militia (generally called *xiangbing* in the Jiangnan area), in most cases the Jiangnan literati had no idea how to lead or force them to pursue a resistance movement. Generally speaking, the primary purpose for sponsoring *xiangbing* was to protect their land, and to cope with the extreme disturbances that were common during the dynastic transition. Regardless of class contradictions, numerous peasant and ordinary residents of cities also shared this intention. One scholar named Yao Tinglin 姚廷遴 witnessed the real conditions around the Shanghai area; he provides us firsthand records with vivid descriptions of how the commoners faced the coming of the Qing army. We do not need to detail the confused events of the second half of 1645 as Yao Tinglin recounts them. During this time many places around Shanghai changed hands again and again, with all the attending disturbance and massacres. However, here is a brief description provided by Pierre-Etienne Will:

As a result of this instability the local inhabitants no longer knew what to do: as Yao claims to have seen by himself around Zhoupu, whenever the Qing army approached every household in the towns and villages would paste pieces of yellow paper on their doors with the characters '*da qing shunmin*' (obedient subjects of the Great Qing) written on, but would tear them down as soon as the loyalist rebellion seemed to get the upper hand. Only to paste them again when the Qing troops were supposed to come back. In the end the Qing order prevailed, of course, and every Chinese man had to pass through the agonizing process of shaving his head to demonstrate his loyalty. Yao Tinglin's testimony on this is only one among many others, but he adds the interesting notion that people made up their minds to do it. Rather than going into hiding, once they realized that they needed to be around in order to protect their properties.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Luqiao jiwen A- Jiading zhi tu.

<sup>53</sup> Pierre-Etienne Will, "Coming of Age in Shanghai during the Ming-Qing Transition, Yao Tinglin's Record of the Successive Years." *Gujin lunheng* 4.6 (2000), 15-39. See Yao Tinglin 姚廷遴, *Linian ji* 歷年記 in *Qing dai riji huichao* 清代日記匯抄 (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin, 1982), 39-168.

The general condition of Jiangnan shows us that this area was not only less militarized, but also less politicized. Impacts from outside, including ethnic conquest such as the arrival of Manchus, had little effect on its basic social structure, let alone social behavior and customs. In June of 1646, only several months after the Qing pacified Jiangnan, Tu Guobao, Governor of Jiangnan, had discovered the real condition of local *xiangbing* while leading the Qing armies' pacification. His report sent to Beijing provides a description:

I thought that the reason we organize *xiangbing* is to protect storehouses and [to do surveillance of] prisoners. For those belonging to the prefecture, the prefecture controls them; for those belonging to the county, the county controls them. Just like arms use fingers, it is very easy to manage them. What is unexpected is that these *xiangbing* cooperated with the runners of Yamen only to take perfunctory actions to cope with government. For instance, the officials from Qingpu of Shanghai 上海青浦 could not discover [this secret]. When they performed roll call, less than half of the members appeared. And those who attended were either too old or too weak to use. I am very surprised [about this phenomenon] because I only know that to decrease the number of officials means to save administrative fees, it is really beyond imagination that the people may take another's place by assuming their name.<sup>54</sup>

In most cases, it is clear that Jiangnan *xiangbing* were not interested in following the Ming loyalists. In the Jiashan 嘉善 area, the son of Ming Grand Academician 大學士 Qian Shisheng 錢士升 organized a troop to fight against the Qing during the summer of 1645. However, his army lacked discipline and made trouble for the local people. He was supposed to lead his army to the battlefield, but when they passed by

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<sup>54</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao yibian*, vol. 1, 16.

Shengze 盛澤, a prosperous commercial town, the local *xiangbing* blocked their way and killed him.

In Yixing, two *juren* degree holders, Ge Lin 葛麟 and Lu Xiangguan 盧象觀, worked together to mobilize a “righteous army” 義兵. This army attacked Qingpu 青浦 in cooperation with other anti-Qing forces. After losing the campaign, the remaining soldiers selected Ge Lin as marshal. Ge led them by boat to Lake Tai where they met with another “righteous army” led by *langzhong* 郎中 (Director) Wang Qisheng 王期升. The joining of their forces undoubtedly increased their power, but Wang proved to have little aptitude for military affairs, and lacked the ability to control the army. His subordinates routinely looted the homes of people living in the area. Because of their suffering at the hands of the righteous army, local residents asked the Qing army to attack and burn their boats and ships. Wang was forced to flee.<sup>55</sup>

In Jiaxing, militiamen were conscripted from individual households. Since social disorder spread rapidly through the villages of the prefecture, urban residents managed to kill Ming loyalists inside the city walls and defended their own gates when the anti-Qing army attacked.<sup>56</sup>

Exploring the relationships between the various *xiangbing* may help us to understand the characteristics of Jiangnan’s local militia. The following example, describing the situation of a *shengyuan* named Zhi Yi 支益, is taken from Jiading.

Zhi used to be Shi Kefa’s staff officer. After Yangzhou fell, he returned to his hometown. In early August, 1645, he organized a group of *xiangbing* in the Shigang 石岡 area. By this time many villages had organized their own *xiangbing*, some places in Jiading County called them *yibing* (righteous soldiers). Since some were jealous of Zhi Yi’s reputation as well as his wealth, he was incriminated for the illegal possession of Shi Kefa’s military supplies, worth a total of about 5,000 taels of silver. According to He Xiuling’s description, “the masses wanted to get this money for military pay and

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<sup>55</sup> Xu Zi 徐鼎, *Xiaotian jizhuan* 小腆紀傳, juan 46, Liezhuan 39, yishi 義師 1. *Taiwan wenwu congkan* (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1963), no.138, 469.

<sup>56</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 652.

provisions for the *yibing*, so they went to attack him, moving like thunder. Five family members from three generations were killed by beheading.”<sup>57</sup>

Existing data provides information on a few special cases of well-organized and effective *xiangbing* from communities isolated by Lake Tai. For instance, there is a description of a place named Moli 莫麗 island, which is 40 *li* in circumference. According to Deng Ruozheng 鄭若曾, the population is dense and all of them are engaged in commercial activities. When they are alarmed about a bandit invasion, they all come [to fight]. They are able to defend themselves even without help from the official army.<sup>58</sup>

However, since these few forces were from the isolated communities of Lake Tai, they could not be expected to play a crucial role in the resistance movement of Jiangnan.

While the above examples indicate a general unwillingness among the *xiangbing* to become involved in the anti-Qing movement, there were some who joined the resistance under the leadership of various sorts of elite. The following section will examine their performance and relationships with the Jiangnan literati.

### 3: 3. Jiangnan Literati and Military Action

During the summer of 1645, there were several instances of well-organized resistance in the Jiangnan area that are relevant to my topic. The first of these took place in Kunshan 昆山. The resistance here shows how a local officer, Yang Yongyan 楊永言, the former Magistrate, and several others joined together to train loyalist militia units, and how their resistance gained the support of several local elite including the famous scholar Gu Yanwu and the poet Gui Zhuang 歸莊.

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<sup>57</sup>Quoted from He Xiuling, 21.

<sup>58</sup> Deng Ruozheng 鄭若曾, “Xi Dongting yizhai suo” 西洞庭營寨說, in *Chongzhen Wuxianzhi* 崇禎吳縣志, juan 18, bingfang 兵防 2, TYGCMDFZXX XB, 458-60.



After the Qing army had crossed the Yangzi and issued the haircutting decree, Yang Yongyan, who is said to have been a skilled horseman and archer from Henan, secretly conscripted several other warriors to assist him in his plans for resistance. His plan also gained some support among the social elite in Kunshan. None realized that the Qing army would arrive in the city so quickly. In early July, 1645, the Qing army began to attack the city. After a short battle with the local *xiangbing*, the Qing army took the city on July 6. All the local militia scattered. There are no materials to indicating whether the ordinary people of Kunshan supported the resistance movement or not. In any case, the loyalists' defense only held out for three days. "Those who were conscripted before, now fled secretly". Gu Yanwu's two younger brothers were killed in the massacre.<sup>59</sup> A second example of resistance was in Jiangyin city, where the Qing forces were held at bay for almost three months. When the city fell more than seventy thousand people were killed in a bloody massacre.<sup>60</sup>

A third example, the Jiading resistance, provides the best case for an exploration of the *xiangbing*'s military performance and relation to the literati. Existing materials contain descriptions of the behavior of the *xiangbing*, including both positive and negative examples; and there is evidence showing that the Jiading literati as a group demonstrated their abilities in organizing the defense of the city. Hou Tongzheng 侯峒曾 (1591-1645) was born in Jiading and awarded the *jinshi* degree in 1625. Hou had served at the Boards of War and Personnel in Nanjing, and as military intendant in northern Zhejiang where, in 1643, he was credited with putting down a mutiny of grain transport troops and preparing Zhejiang's defenses against the incursions by Zuo Liangyu's rebellious troops. After Nanjing fell into the hands of the Qing, he returned to the countryside of Jiading. At the beginning of June, 1645, he promised to join the

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<sup>59</sup> Wakeman indicated that "Gu Yanwu also escaped" (Wakeman [1985], vol.1, 654). In fact, Gu went to countryside to visit his mother as the attack happened. He had not joined the resistance action. See Zhou Kezhen 周可真, *Gu Yanwu nianpu* 顧炎武年譜 (Suzhou: Suzhou daxue, 1998), 82.

<sup>60</sup> During this campaign we finally have found an example of a *Wu Juren* 武舉人, Wang Gonglue 王公略, who defended the East gate of Jiangyin city. However, no more information was provided about his performance. See Gu Cheng, 234. For Jiangyin's resistance, also see Lan Jiadu 賴家度, "1645 nian Jiangyin renmin de kang-Qing douzheng" 1645 年江陰人民的抗清鬥爭, in Li Guangbi 李光壁 ed., *Ming Qing shi luncong* (Wuhan: Hubei renmin, 1957), 195-214.

defense of Jiading city and became the leader of the local gentry and *xiangbing*. By mid-June, he was joined by his close friend, *jinshi* Huang Chunyao 黃淳耀 (1605-1645) and Huang's younger brother.

After the Jiading uprising, the Qing Regional Commander of Wusong 吳淞總兵 (the former Ming Regional Commander of Xuzhou), Li Chengdong 李成棟, led his army in an attempt to quash the uprising. Hou and Huang relied on the *xiangbing* to deter the Qing attack. The Qing army suffered large numbers of casualties. For instance, in the battle of June 14 in the Dongguan 東關 area, 83 soldiers were killed and more than 40 warships loaded with looted treasures were burned. General Li's younger brother was also killed on the battlefield.

As for the *xiangbing*, most of the available data provide a positive description of their performance. Despite their lack of formal training, they were surprisingly successful in fighting and attacking the Qing army. Though they were ultimately unable to defeat the enemy, they never surrendered.<sup>61</sup> Different areas close to this city organized their own *xiangbing*: from the southeast side, a village called Wang Jia Zhuang 王家莊 organized 700 *xiangbing*; in the south, about 1000 *xiangbing* came from a town named Shigangzhen 石崗鎮, and about 2000 from the town of Nanxiangzhen 南翔鎮; adjacent areas such as Luodian 羅店 and Waigang 外港 also mobilized their own *xiangbing*.<sup>62</sup> Some came from up to 50 or 60 *li* away, leaving behind their fields and bringing their own weapons and food.<sup>63</sup> However, many of these who came did not fight at all. Because they were not paid, most never proceeded further than the suburbs of the city, where they stopped or simply disappeared.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Han Tan 韓茨, *Man Qing yeshi wubian* 滿清野史五編, 12<sup>th</sup> zhong (種), *Man Qing ruguan baozheng zhiyi* 滿清入關暴政之一, in ZGYSJC 33, 91-92.

<sup>62</sup> QDRWZG -A, vol.2, 257.

<sup>63</sup> Same as note 61.

<sup>64</sup> Yang Kuan 楊寬, "1645 nian Jiading renmin de kang-Qing douzheng" 一六四五年嘉定人民的抗清鬥爭, in Li Guangbi 李光壁 ed., *Ming Qing shi luncong*, 215-25. Also see Zhu Zisu 朱子素, *Jiading xian yiyong jishi* 嘉定縣乙酉紀事, in ZGYSJC 33, 183-90.

If we look at the earlier history of the defense of Jiading city, the important role of *xiangbing* can be traced back to several decades prior to the arrival of the Qing. In all of these cases, pay played a crucial role in determining their participation. During the Wanli reign, the local government asked each *li* to send one *minzhuang*. A total of 668 were sent. After the threat from Japanese pirates disappeared, this number decreased by half, each person who remained receiving a pay of 0.02 tael of silver each day. However, most of these were not the registered militia from the outlying *li*. Those registered in the militia hired city residents or people living close to the city to act as substitutes. These arrangements were usually conducted unofficially. In some cases, these replacements used excuses, such as the need to prepare weapons or armor, to procure wages of up to 30 taels of silver per year. As one source points out, in order to receive their pay the hired men went to the countryside to collect it themselves.<sup>65</sup>

The same custom continued to exist at the time of the resistance against the Qing. When Hou and Huang prepared their plans for the defense of the city, they had to pay special attention to this aspect. Their plan, called *Aihu chuding fa* 挨戶出丁法, expected that every household would contribute one man. They divided all the households into one of three levels. Those at the upper level not only had to contribute at least one man, but also were expected to provide him with the necessary food and clothing, and contribute extra fees for public service; those at the middle level were to provide several men with their own food and clothing; low level families had to contribute one man with food and clothing, but were compensated at a rate of 0.6 taels of silver per day. Those who fought bravely were promised an extra reward: an initial reward of two bolts of white cloth, followed by a pay raise of 0.2 taels of silver a day.<sup>66</sup>

Jiading's resistance proved to be the most effective of all loyalist endeavors in the Jiangnan area, and Huang and Hou really did show their abilities in organizing the city's defense. In addition to the logistical arrangements mentioned above, they also

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<sup>65</sup> *Wanli Jiading xianzhi* 萬曆嘉定縣志, juan 7, tianfu 田賦.

<sup>66</sup> QDRWZG – A, vol.2, 252-61.

drew up detailed plans for the distribution of materials (stone, bricks, wood, earth, etc.) that were used to strengthen the city gates.<sup>67</sup>

Unfortunately, their administrative and military abilities had no effect outside the city. In the countryside, rural Jiading County was in a virtual state of anarchy. Since none of those leading the defense of the city had direct contact with *xiangbing* in the suburbs, there was no way to manage or coordinate the various forces. Some of these *xiangbing* may have reached the city, but many simply scattered or fled. *Jiading tuchengji* 嘉定屠城記 provides a detailed description of how the *xiangbing* fought in the battlefield. We learn that on July 1, 1645, all the *xiangbing* from various directions gathered to the east of a bridge called Zhuanqiao 磚橋. It is said there were more than a hundred thousand people; most of these were merely a nuisance because they crowded together and had no idea how to deploy for fighting. The well-trained Qing armies always divided their armies into right and left wings, a kind of battle formations that was called *xie 'aochen* 蟹螯陣 (the crab claw formation) by the *xiangbing* because they had no knowledge about it before. At early stages of a battle, the Qing army would usually send the cavalry to scatter or challenge the enemy. The *xiangbing* could offer no effective response to the cavalry charges. In the face of the charge, we are told that all the local forces collapsed immediately, “runners did not know what they were doing; they were killed by stepping on each other.”<sup>68</sup> Four days later, the city fell to the Qing army.

After the fall of the city, Huang Chunyao hanged himself and Hou Tongzeng drowned with his sons and servants. Numerous commoners and local gentry also died in the resistance that made Jiading a landmark of loyalism. For twelve hours the carnage continued, until the river was clogged with corpses. About twenty thousand people were killed.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Quoted from Gu Cheng, 238-39.

<sup>69</sup> *Ming mo zhonglie jishi* 明末忠烈紀實, juan 16, 317-18. See also Jerry Dennerline, “Hsu Tu and the Lesson of Nanking: Political Integration and the Local Defense in Chiang-nan, 1634-1645”, in Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. ed., *From Ming to Ching – Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth – century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 115.

A lack of training and discipline as well as poor equipment is the most obvious reasons for the defeat of the *xiangbing*. However, the literati who led the defense also proved incapable of integrating the various groups of *xiangbing*, although they did show their abilities in defending the city itself. Besides these fatal shortcomings, they had very poor intelligence about the Qing forces in the area. As Hou Tongzeng said, “we still have no way of knowing the enemy’s situation now. It is honestly up to the Buddha. It depends mostly on the enemy, and that means riding a tiger – you can’t get off in the middle of the ride.”<sup>70</sup>

The Jiading tragedy indicated that neither literati nor *xiangbing* could play a crucial role in the resistance movement. Yet, apart from these two groups there were very few forces available to fight against the Qing occupation. The other important source of ready recruits for the resistance was the bandit populations of Jiangnan area, most of them active in the Lake Tai and surrounding areas. Before the fall of the Ming, most of the marsh bandits had been engaged in kidnapping wealthy members of the gentry for ransom. In the process, they acquired a knowledge of local geography and landforms that would give them a distinct advantage over the invaders. Furthermore, because most of them were skillful lake fishermen, their fishing boats could easily be converted for military uses. The question was, could the Jiangnan literati integrate and lead these forces? The example of Wan Shouqi 萬壽祺 (1603- 1652, *Juren* of 1630) will help to answer this question.

Although Wan was born in Xuzhou and died in poverty in Huai’an (Jiangbei), most of his political and anti-Qing military activities took place in the Jiangnan area. Prior to the arrival of the Qing, he had demonstrated his skills in organization: he acted as co-organizer of a convention in 1630 that attracted numerous attendees from among the Jiangnan literati; more than 2,500 papers were presented at this convention (sounds like an academic conference today). With the arrival of the Qing, his attention shifted to military matters. At the end of 1644, he mobilized and recruited several groups of *xiangbing*. Moreover, he also got in touch with the former bandits of Lake Tai. Most

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<sup>70</sup> Cited from Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 667-68.

importantly, he made a special effort to establish contacts with the anti-Qing forces that were in the Jiangbei area, especially Yan Ermei and his peers in Huai'an city.<sup>71</sup> At least three leaders, along with their *xiangbing* or militias, joined his coordinated action in Jiangnan. They were: *xiangbing* from the Lake Chen 陳湖 area led by Shen Zibing 沈自炳, *xiangbing* from Lake Mao 淖湖 led by Chen Zilong and Shen Youlong 沈猶龍 (*jinshi* of 1616), and Wu Yi's 吳易 (*jinshi* of 1643) militia from Li Ze 笠澤.

In June of 1645, Wan Shouqi and the above literati as well as some former bandits and rebellious peasants from Lake Tai jointly agreed to and planned a resistance effort. Yan Ermei also heard the news and made plans to lead his few militias to ambush the Qing army in Huai'an city (in the Jiangbei area). However, when the city's rich gentry heard of Yan's plans, they feared retaliation by the Qing and leaked Yan's plan to the Qing. Yan had no choice but to flee. The joint resistance in Jiangnan lasted about three months. Most of the leaders lost their lives on the battlefield. Wan was arrested and later escaped. When his parents heard of his arrest, they committed suicide by sinking their ship in the middle of Lake Tai.

In reality, this joint action was joint only in name. There are no records showing how the disparate groups were knitted together, what kinds of logistical measures were taken, or how they assisted each other or cooperated in attacks against the Qing. It is clear that Wan Shouqi could not have been in direct command of any of the above forces, especially of those composed of rebellious peasants and bandits.<sup>72</sup>

Another potential force for the anti-Qing resistance was the former Ming regular army. However, only a very few Jiangnan literati attempted to gain their services in the resistance. I will examine the case of one of these, Chen Zilong, in the following section.

The former Ming navy did not suffer too many casualties after the Qing army crossed the Yangzi. Some of them were garrisoned at Chongming Island 崇明 under the leadership of the Wusong garrison Commander Wu Zhikui 吳志葵, who had sailed to

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<sup>71</sup> Yan was one of his closest friends for they were born in the same city, Xuzhou, in same year (1603); they were also awarded the *Juren* degree in the same year (1630). See QDRWZG- A, vol.1, 215.

<sup>72</sup> See QDRWZG- A, vol.1, 215.

Chongming when Nanjing fell. Given the fact that most of the Ming armies had been defeated or scattered during the summer of 1645, his navy became of central importance for both the Qing and the Jiangnan resistance forces. In fact, Wu had already tried to make contact with the court of the Prince of Lu 魯王 and other loyalist centers in Zhejiang to express his willingness to help restore the Ming.<sup>73</sup> Furthermore, when Jiading's defense was in danger, Hou Tongcheng and Huang Chunyao begged assistance from Wu Zhikui, and he sent 700 soldiers to provide help. However, they were defeated in their first conflict with the Qing army, and simply withdrew from the city.<sup>74</sup>

Wu Zhikui's army totaled about ten thousand troops. The joint resistance of the Jiangnan literati inspired him to move his sailors and marines from the sea to Lake Mao. At this time, one of his former teachers, Xia Yunyi 夏允彝 (*jinshi* of 1637), and his son, the famous young poet Xia Wanchun 夏完淳 (1631-1647), came to join him and served as liaison officers. They intended to take Suzhou city first to isolate the Qing army at Hangzhou, and then to besiege Nanjing in order to recover the whole of Jiangnan.<sup>75</sup> In the process of preparation, Chen Zilong tried to convince Wu to do his bidding (Chen was a teacher of Xia Wanchun). According to Chen, the narrow confines of the Jiangnan waterways would be disadvantageous for their big warships. If this army simply entered the inland waterways of Jiangnan, the "vessels and armies would be all heading in a single direction and spread over more than twenty *li*; the head and tail of the column will not respond to each other and they will inevitably be defeated...." Unfortunately, his suggestion did not affect general Wu's action. On the Qing side, as Chen predicted, the infantry and cavalry troops used light craft as well as fireboats to fight against Wu's army. The Qing forces' effective counter-attack coincided with high winds that struck Wu's fleet. In the end, his navy suffered an overwhelming defeat.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Zhu Yihai 朱以海 (1609-1662) assumed the title of Regent in the early fall of 1645.

<sup>74</sup> Xu Bingyi, *juan* 16, 317-18.

<sup>75</sup> QDRWZG – A, vol. 2, 240.

<sup>76</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 669 -70.

The attack of General Wu's regular Ming army brought Jiangnan resistance to its apex during the summer of 1645. According to Wen Ruilin, there were a total of more than 100,000 militiamen in Jiangnan at this time; these militias were supported by groups as varied as merchants, monks, and Taoists. However, because they had been organized within a very short period of time, they were lacking in weapons, and financial resources. When they attacked Suzhou city, they discovered that the capacity of the Qing army's defense was much stronger than they had imagined. The garrisoned armies had sufficient logistical supplies, and could rely on the protection of a very solid city wall. Furthermore, they forced the city residents who already shaved their heads to join the city's defense. Finally, Wu's army was defeated in the Panmen 盤門 area of the city.<sup>77</sup>

The army led by Wu and his literati staff members was in a state of disunity. After this failure, Wu lost control of the army, and he was later captured and killed in Nanjing. All of the cooperating armies intended to flee. Xia Yunyi cried as he begged them to stay with the resistance.<sup>78</sup> This was not the first time that Xia Yunyi had encountered such a hopeless and embarrassing situation. Several years earlier, after hearing that rebellious peasants had already occupied most of north China, he wrote letters to forty gentry households asking them to donate money and organize local militia to succor the emperor. He received no positive response, and only succeeded in inspiring the contempt of the gentry.<sup>79</sup>

Wakeman provides his comments on the failure of the Jiangnan resistance in the summer of 1645: "The ethnic alliance of upper and lower classes against the Manchu's haircutting order was already sundered, and the gentry of Jiangnan were too socially alienated from its own subordinates to hold out for much longer alone."<sup>80</sup>

I want to argue that examining the gentry as a unified group is insufficient. To understand the tragedy that befell the Jiangnan literati and gentry, we must explore the

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<sup>77</sup> *Nanjiang yishi* 南疆逸史, liezhuan 列傳, juan 19, ZGYSJC 35, 386.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> QDRWZG- A, vol.2, 239.

<sup>80</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 673.



relationship between the few “radicals” and the more moderate majority. The more examples we examine the clearer it becomes that the few people who insist on the pursuit of pure and abstract goals cannot be successful, at least in the early stages, because they are always a tiny minority within the ocean of the real world.

The summer of 1645 was a turning point for both the Qing and the Jiangnan resistance movement. Each side knew that they would have to reorganize their forces to deal with later conflicts. The period leading up to the spring of 1647 seemed, to some loyalists, to present another opportunity to achieve their goals.

The Songjiang Military Commander 松江提督, Wu Shengzhao 吳勝兆, had decided to turn against the Qing army. His important staff officers came from Jiangnan and many had close relationships with Chen Zilong. They worked together to get in touch with the Southern Ming’s navy garrisoned in the Zhoushan archipelago and led by General Huang Binqing 黃斌卿. Huang himself subsequently agreed to support a naval expedition north to coincide with the uprising. They hoped to join together on May 20, 1647, and then to make plans for further attacks.

Wu Shengzhao carried out his plans according to schedule. He assembled his soldiers in front of the city’s walls, and swore an oath to join the Southern Ming armada to overthrow the Qing dynasty. However, the things that happened later were beyond his control. While Wu, like most of his force, was from north China, many of the new subordinates and soldiers were local people who had only become his followers in recent months. Wu had great difficulty controlling these locals: those who had surrendered and joined his forces wanted to be given superior treatment because they were locals; those who had never formally surrendered to Wu did not care about his authority at all. The lack of cooperation between Wu’s northern soldiers and the local militia caused major problems in Wu’s army.<sup>81</sup> As plans for the uprising were made, news about it became common knowledge among the people of Songjiang city. Two days before the uprising was scheduled to begin, the Qing army led by Tu Guobao already knew of the imminent invasion. The failure to preserve the element of surprise became one of the crucial factors in the failure of Wu’s mutiny.

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<sup>81</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Xingchao lu* 5 - *Zhoushan xingfei* 行朝錄之五-舟山興廢, in ZGYSJC 32, 246-47.

In the end, although he occupied the city for several days and killed some Qing officers, Wu could not rely on his own army. Furthermore, more than two hundred Southern Ming warships that were to have supported him were swept across the mouth of the Yangzi by a typhoon; nearly all of the smaller vessels and about half of the ships were destroyed. Those soldiers who managed to straggle ashore were either killed by Qing warriors with swords and crossbows or captured. A few days later, some of his subordinates decided to turn back to the Qing – they captured Wu Shengzhao and sent him to the Qing army in an attempt to guarantee their own survival. Wu was later killed in Nanjing.<sup>82</sup>

There was a man who had joined both of the above military actions of Wu Zhikui and Wu Shengzhao against the Qing army – Chen Zilong. A thorough examination of his military career may provide us a more complete picture of how the loyal Jiangnan literati demonstrated their abilities in military affairs such as strategy, training, mobilizing the masses, launching campaigns, integrating forces, and providing logistics. More importantly, exploring his military as well as administrative career may help us to understand how military, political, and social factors combined to ensure that the Ming dynasty would not survive.

### **3: 4. Political Factions and Military Action**

In early June of 1647, Chen Zilong was captured by the Qing army. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of the same month, he took the opportunity of the negligence of the Qing guards to drown himself. His last several months were spent in attempts to coordinate the various anti-Qing forces, especially planning the mutiny of Wu Shengzhao. After doing all that he could to rescue the Ming dynasty, he finally sacrificed his life. While still young, Chen Zilong had already made it clear that his intent was not to become a pure scholar.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> 顧成, 454-62; Wakeman 1985, vol. 2, 743-48.

<sup>83</sup> For example, in a poem written on his 25<sup>th</sup> birthday, he expressed this kind of meaning. See Chen Zilong, *Chen Zilong shiji* 陳子龍詩集 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1983), juan 13, 414.

During the 1630s, his activities showed a desire to change the current state of affairs. He not only helped to compile the *Huang Ming jingshi wenbian* 皇明經世文編, a collection in five hundred *juan* of essays and memorials on political and economic issues, but also edited Xu Guangqi's *Nongzheng quanshu* 農政全書, a major work on agricultural administration. In the political realm, Chen and several young men such as Xia Yunyi and Xu Fuyuan of the prefecture formed a society, called *Jishe* 幾社, that served as a forum for scholarly discussion. They followed the model of the *Fushe* 復社, a similar society in Suzhou. Their original discussions dealt mainly with literature, learning, and morals; later, they became more interested in the topic of political reform. As it became increasingly evident that the Ming central government lacked the power to maintain order within the empire and to hold back the Manchus in the north, members of the *Jishe* turned their attention to questions of military defense.<sup>84</sup>

As we quoted before, Chen Zilong demonstrated a wide military knowledge and capacity in some of his writings. However, his bookish approach was also everywhere exposed. Some of his goals, practically speaking, were unattainable because what he described rarely occurred in the 1630s and 40s. For instance, an article written in 1636 discussed how civil officials could control a self-important, fierce, and untrained army:

Therefore, the elegant and capable civil official must open his heart to get in touch with generals in order to use them. In peacetime, establish connections and contracts with them, during wartime, we may expect to get news of their entering into our administrative area for they will send good runners to tell us the date they are coming; in this case we may cope with them easily.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> For a related study of the *Fushe*, see William S. Atwell, "From Education to Politics: the *Fushe*," in Wm. Theodore de Bary and the Conference on Seventeenth-Century Chinese Thought, eds., *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975), 333-67. Also see John Thomas Meskill, *Gentlemanly Interests and Wealth on the Yangzi Delta* (Association for Asian Studies, 1994). Dennerline's book also provides detailed information and analysis. Jerry Dennerline, *The Chia-ting Loyalists: Confucian Leadership and Social Change in Seventeenth-Century China* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981).

<sup>85</sup> An'yatang gao 安雅堂稿, *juan* 11, in XXSKQS 1388, 81-82.

However, his strategic perspective on military affairs is evident in a suggestion sent to Beijing in the summer of 1641. He thought that by this time the two most important regions in the empire were Shandong and Jingxiang 荆襄 (Jingzhou and Xiangyang, located in present day Hubei). For geographic and political reasons, controlling these two regions usually resulted in the ability to conquer the entire empire. Since Li Zicheng's army had already conquered Xiangyang 襄陽, Chen's view was that they could not defend that city but would plan either to attack the Central Plains by crossing the Han River or attack Jingzhou due south in order to occupy east China.<sup>86</sup> One year later, Li Zicheng's action verified his prediction – Li and his followers established their government at Dashun 大順 in Xi'an and took Beijing several months later.

Based on the failure of the Ming army in pacifying the peasant armies of Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong in north and central China, Chen Zilong realized that neither the conventional regular army nor existing local militias would suffice for the defense of Jiangnan. In the late 1630s, he began promoting an empire-wide militia movement. Along with other members of the *Jishe*, he sought to persuade the Chongzhen Emperor to sanction the formation of new kinds of local militia under the leadership of gentry throughout China. With these new militias and bureaucratic leaders, they felt they would be better able to coordinate guerrilla warfare in the future.<sup>87</sup>

Because of the particular geographical conditions of the Jiangnan area, Chen made the following suggestions: "Fishermen would be recruited for river and lake patrols, since much of Jiangnan's banditry originated among the lake people and the fishermen were accustomed to fighting. This new police force would be professional, paid by commuted conscription levies and fishing taxes. It would be coordinated by military officials of the province, and it would serve both as a defense against rebel incursions and as a means of local control. Moreover, it would function independently of both the local elite and the yamen functionaries."<sup>88</sup> However, his proposal reveals a dilemma about how to control local militias. Like many of his contemporaries, he called for the

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<sup>86</sup> An'ya tang gao 安雅堂稿, juan 17, in XXSKQS 1388, 195.

<sup>87</sup> Dennerline (1979), 125.

<sup>88</sup> Dennerline (1979), 114.

establishment of local defense systems such as the *baojia*. According to him, this kind of social unit “does not disturb the people and does not drain their resources. It embodies the old system in a new method; its implementation has many merits. Once disorder is upon them, the people will understand the hardship they must bear and each will try to save himself. Only then can the people themselves organize their rural militia. But if we hope to organize in advance, we can only do so by letting the government administer the organization and not by depending on the people.”<sup>89</sup>

In 1640, he was appointed as prefectural judge in Shaoxing 紹興府, soon after he was appointed to serve as acting county magistrate of Chuji 諸暨 (紹興府推官兼攝諸暨知縣) in northern Zhejiang. This position allowed him an opportunity to put into practice some of his ideas. The success of his actions showed him to be one of the very few Jiangnan literati of the Ming-Qing transition who were adept in military affairs. During his tenure, apart from administrative affairs, he also supervised the building of forts and city walls, the manufacture of cannons, and the storing of gunpowder. Within a period of only two years, he twice led mixed local militia and regular armies to pacify peasant rebellions. By 1642, there were more than one thousand soldiers under his banner marching to the mountainous Suichang 遂昌 area to join the Ming armies in a coordinated military suppression organized by the provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi. Despite suffering casualties at approximately the same rate as those rebels in the border areas of these two provinces, the armies under his direction and supervision finally forced the rebels to surrender by cutting off their supply lines.<sup>90</sup>

Entering into 1644, an incident occurred which unsettled the military preparations and endeavors of Chen Zilong and his friends – the Xu Du Incident. As far as we know there is no direct detailed data about Xu Du himself. We know only that he was a prefectural student from Dongyang of Jinhua prefecture in northern Zhejiang. His reputation was established through his prowess in martial arts and his righteous actions. On the basis of these characteristics he attracted a group of young men as followers. As we mentioned in Chapter Two, after Xu Du took He Gang’s advice to train a unit of

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> QDRWZG- A, vol.4, 378.

fighting men in order to defend Jiangnan, he pieced together an army in his hometown and the surrounding districts. It is said that, by the fall of 1643, this army numbered in the tens of thousands. Because various social strata were involved and the organization extended throughout the prefecture, local officials and some rich families became afraid. At the end of 1643, they accused Xu of plotting a rebellion and began to suppress his army. Xu now had no choice but to begin an uprising.

The current Dongyang magistrate was related to Zuo Guangxian 左光先 by marriage. Zuo was the younger brother of Zuo Guangdou 左光鬥, the Donglin martyr, and was serving as the provincial inspector of Zhejiang 浙江巡按. Coincidentally, the governorship was temporarily vacant, so it was Zuo who was forced to deal with the uprising. He dispatched the governor's brigade to Jinhua but was defeated by Xu's well trained and locally-popular troops. Meanwhile, Chen Zilong and his troops successfully forced Xu Du out of the area of Dongyang and into the nearby hills. On December 29, Chen's army killed more than 300 rebellious members of Xu's militia, and captured more than 50.<sup>91</sup> However, since Xu's troops now held an advantageous position in the rugged and steep mountains, Chen decided to negotiate an end to the crisis. He rode into the hills alone to discuss the matter with Xu and promised him amnesty if he surrendered. Xu ordered the rebels to disband, and led sixty of his followers to surrender to the official army. Chen accompanied the captured rebels to Hangzhou, but was unable to save Xu's life. Chen did not seem to realize that, as a Ming official, he had no right to promise amnesty. Soon after their arrival, Zuo Guangxian ordered the execution of all of these rebels without trial.<sup>92</sup>

In fact, Chen and Xu had known each other quite well before the uprising. He met Xu through Xu Fuyuan's recommendation when he was serving as prefecture judge in Shaoxing, and he was impressed by Xu's abilities in military affairs. He even praised Xu as the "backbone" (幹城) of the country and recommended him several times.<sup>93</sup> Thus, Chen Zilong was involved in the affair on two different levels – both personally

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<sup>91</sup> See Pan Xinghui, 355.

<sup>92</sup> Xu Bingyi, juan 16, 352-53.

<sup>93</sup> QDRWZG -A, vol.4, 379.

and officially. Because of his inability to save Xu from execution, his reputation on a personal level suffered great damage. After Xu Du was executed, Xu Fuyuan directed the blame at Chen Zilong. According to him, since Chen wronged Xu Du, nobody would be willing to befriend him later on (天下誰復敢交子龍哉).

Since late Ming times, the concept of *yi* (righteousness) played a crucial role in the daily lives of Chinese literati. For fear of a loss of reputation among their peers, these men would devote much effort to its pursuit. This is apparent not only through the descriptions in novels like *Sanguo yanyi* 三國演義 (Romance of the Three Kingdoms) and *Shuihu zhuan* 水滸傳 (Water Margin), but also in the lives of historical characters such as Yan Ermei and Gu Yanwu. Without this common concern and identification, how could they have survived for so many years in north China following the Ming demise? Zhao Lisheng's study helps us to understand that their travel fees and supplies were provided from all of the scholars' households they passed by. If any of these scholars refused to do so, he would be looked down upon.<sup>94</sup>

As a lower level Ming official, Chen Zilong really did not have enough authority to give this kind of amnesty. As Dennerline states, "by 1644, he had already become enmeshed in a variety of privately organized military and logistic operations which increased his effectiveness as a leader but compromised his position as an agent of bureaucratic control."<sup>95</sup>

In the militarization of local society, the attitudes of various levels of officials played essential roles. If possible, they relied on private organization and popular action. But, could these forces be strictly controlled? Dennerline uses the case of Xu Du to analyze these ambivalences. He shows that there was a shift in the "focus of historical discussion from loyalism and the personalities of famous men to the problems of local leadership and political integration." He also indicates that the Jiangnan literati, represented by the Donglin faction, were "a large elite nexus of bureaucrats with a

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<sup>94</sup> Zhao Lisheng 趙儷生, "Qing chu Ming yimin benzou huodong shiji kaolue" 清初明遺民奔走活動事蹟考略, in *Zhao Lisheng shixue lunzhu zixuan ji* 趙儷生史學論著自選集 (Jinan: Shandong daxue, 1996), 301.

<sup>95</sup> Dennerline (1979), 114-15.

special interest in securing order throughout the several prefectures which divided their native land.” He shows that the Xu Du affair called into question the integration of bureaucratic politics and local power, and that “political fragmentation was related to a hiatus in the structure of local power.”<sup>96</sup>

However, his analysis does not pay enough attention to Xu Du’s troops. His article focuses instead on what the literati and high ranking officials said and what they intended to do. He supplies no data to verify whether their military plans were carried out or not, nor does he examine the results of this action. Paper work was the strong suit of Chinese officials and literati, but action was often another story. For the Xu Du case, it is not enough to only know that this was a local, private force organized by one of the local elite. More important is to examine why Xu Du proved unable to control his own troops.

After Xu’s initial organization of the troops, some of his subordinates, led by Yin Dou 應門, discussed how to get more equipment:

If we want to do great things, a cudgel will not be enough; we need powerful weapons. Most stored weapons are in the arsenal of Xuanping County 宣平縣.

Since this is a small county without preparations, [if] we go suddenly to take those weapons, we would be successful.

Yin, leading more than 100 soldiers, crept into the county at night. But, they met an unexpectedly vigorous defense. Xuanping residents fought them with firearms such as muskets (*niaotong* 鳥銃) and killed Yin Dou.<sup>97</sup>

No data is available to show that Xu Du was involved in killing the wealthy and aiding the poor. In fact, he seems to have been very careful to maintain social order. One evidence of this is the considerable amount of time he spent building his “Palace of Loyalty and Righteousness” (*Zhongyifu* 忠義府). He expected that the government

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<sup>96</sup> Dennerline (1979), 124-25.

<sup>97</sup> *Kangxi Dongyang xianzhi* 康熙東陽新志, juan 4, *Zhifangzhi* 職方志, *zhiluan* 治亂.



authorities would allow him to demonstrate his abilities in defending the state and society since the regular Ming army could not be relied upon anymore. If he really wanted to pursue an uprising, it would have been very easy for him because he was capable of mobilizing a peasant rebellion in Jinhua and surrounding areas - this was an indication of the resentment of local commoners over heavy taxes and corrupt officials. In the first two weeks of this uprising, his troops had already reached into tens of thousands people. However, all his actions showed his ambivalent position between the Ming government and society. As a typical member of the local elite, he really wanted to find new ways to render services to his hometown as well as the Ming state. In other words, his intentions coincided with Chen Zilong and other literati, such as the members of *Jishe*. Although Xu Du had only a *shengyuan* degree, he was proud of his special abilities in military affairs and the control of local society. Chen Zilong and other members of the *Jishe* who witnessed the decline of the Ming Empire and the collapse of the Jiangnan military and administrative systems began to shift their focus to newly available forces such as those raised by Xu.

This is why Xu Du and the *Jishe* members knew each other before the incident, and why Chen decided to mediate the conflict. Their cooperation can be seen as evidence of local forces combining with upper social strata to voice, through military action, the discontent of local society. Chen Zilong's pacification and guarantee left Xu Du with no choice but to surrender. It seems that Chen succeeded in the first step of his endeavor. However, it is apparent that Chen was not representative of other Ming officials.

After the Xu Du revolt, Chen's troops were suddenly faced with challenges from other local forces such as militia and local gentry. Furthermore, his actions conflicted with the local authorities. As mentioned above, Zuo Guangxian was the highest ranking official involved in the matter. Although he was an important figure in the Donglin Party and he and Chen Zilong had known each other quite well, he still ordered the execution of Xu and his subordinates.<sup>98</sup> Of course we may assume that Zuo made his decision based on his marriage relation with the Magistrate, as mentioned above, but the real reason is more complicated.

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<sup>98</sup> Pan Xinghui 潘星輝, "Ming ji Dongyang minbian kaolun" 明季東陽民變考論, in Zhu Chengru 朱誠如 and Wang Tianyou 王天有 ed., *Ming Qing luncong*, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zijincheng, 1999), 355.

In fact, most Zhejiang provincial authorities in the Xu Du affair advocated harsh punishments for the rebels when Chen Zilong proposed his amnesty. For example, Hou Tongzeng supported Zuo Guangxian's action in the case. Qi Biaoja as well as his teacher Liu Zongzhou also did so. From their perspective, "had Xu Du gone unpunished, they believed, Ming control of Jiangnan would have been lost. No matter how sympathetic other restorationists may have been to Chen Zilong's plan, they knew that private military action and restoration were an explosive mix."<sup>99</sup> Among them, Qi Biaoja (1602- 1645, *jinshi* of 1622) was proud of both his administrative and military experience. As Governor of Susong, he not only asked Zuo to repress Xu Du, but also tried to enforce the *baojia* system in order to strengthen local defense measures. During the summer of 1645, he captured and executed several rebels immediately after he pacified the revolt of servants. After the Qing army took Hangzhou, he refused to cooperate and drowned himself.<sup>100</sup>

Nevertheless, Chen Zilong was promoted to the position of Palace Steward (*Jishi zhong* 給事中) of the Minister of War as reward for the pacification of Xu Du. To express his regret for Xu and to protest against Zuo's rejection of amnesty, he refused active duty.<sup>101</sup>

After the fall of Beijing, Chen went to Nanjing to try to help to save the Southern Ming. Because of the lessons he gained from the Xu Du incident, he shifted attention to the upper levels of society. During his service in the Ministry of War at Nanjing, he took partial responsibility for the defense of Nanjing. This job provided him a chance to make a number of suggestions directly to the Hongguang emperor concerning how to defend the Yangzi River. He emphasized the importance of waterborne forces (*shuishi* 水師) and strongly recommended the building of ocean-going boats for use in the near future. On his recommendation, as we mentioned in Chapter Two, He Gang was employed to train a special force named *Zhong Guanying*. Chen also suggested deploying troops in the Lianghuai area in order to consolidate the defense. "These

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<sup>99</sup> Dennerline (1979), 122.

<sup>100</sup> *Xiaodian jizhuan*, juan 15, liezhuan 8, 177-78; also see Xu Bingyi, 373-75.

<sup>101</sup> *Xiaodian jizhuan*, juan 41, liezhuan 34, 412.

included the recruitment of more armies by first selecting generals who would themselves enroll stouthearted villagers from the areas under their command.”<sup>102</sup>

Unfortunately, Chen Zilong was once again witness to the corruption of the Southern Ming court. The factional politics even involved the Xu Du incident because some of Xu’s followers had continued to militate for action after the fall of Beijing. The manipulation of the Hongguang court by Ma and Ruan forced Chen to give up his post in the Ministry of War and return home to Songjiang three months later.<sup>103</sup>

In developing their plans to fight against the Qing army, Chen Zilong and other members of the *Jishe* began to get in touch with the gentry and former Ming officials in his hometown. On August 1, he rallied his townsmen to attack and kill the local Qing official and take over the city. One source provides a vivid description of the preparations for the revolt. Most importantly, it hints that this revolt only involved a few local gentry. According to this source, when Chen Zilong, Xia Yunyi, and other scholar-bureaucrats (*Shidafu* 士大夫) returned to Songjiang,

...some young people of Songjiang who resented the pacification of the Qing came to tell [them] everyday about the commoners who could not tolerate [the Qing’s rule] . . . Zilong was moved by the news. He went to discuss strategy with Yunyi. Yunyi said: ‘The things [of resistance] cannot succeed, but the pursuit of righteousness cannot be terminated.’ Only then did Chen Zilong take his suggestion. [Xu] Fuyuan and his followers were very happy when they heard this news, so they started to deploy the youngsters who were not peaceful, the revolt would have its day.<sup>104</sup>

After Songjiang fell on September 22, Chen Zilong and the others fled the city. At the beginning of the following year, he was appointed by the Prince of Lu in Shaoxing as Minister of the Board of War, and by the Prince of Tang in Fuzhou as Left Vice-

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<sup>102</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol. 1, 373-74; see also *Nandu lu* 南渡錄, juan 2, in NMSL BZ, 198.

<sup>103</sup> Struve (1984), 41.

<sup>104</sup> Song Yuanwen 宋輓文, “Yunjian bingshi” 雲間兵事, in *Dongcun jishi* 東村記事, quoted from Guo Songyi. See also Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 666.

Minister of the Board of War as well as Left Censor-in-Chief (*Bingbu zuosilang zuodu yushi* 兵部左侍郎左都禦史). In the early summer of 1646, he saw the Prince of Lu in eastern Zhejiang. Since he was very familiar with the military and political situation of the regions of the northern Qiantang River, he finally decided to return to Songjiang. By this time, most of the Jiangnan area had fallen to the Qing, so he had to take a circuitous route.

Chen Zilong was now very careful in joining or cooperating with local forces. For example, although he accepted the post of Censorial Military Commissioner (*Jianjun yushi* 監軍禦史) under Shen Youlong, a commander of several thousand partisans, he, in fact, did not place much faith in the fighting ability of these hastily recruited troops, because he found that the troops were composed of “city folk” without adequate military supplies and training.<sup>105</sup>

In his military planning, Chen began to emphasize two factors. The first was the role of the local gentry. He felt the key to victory lay in the use of his network of gentry contacts throughout Jiangnan to coordinate a regional uprising. “He and Xia Yunyi first mobilized the nucleus of friends around them who constituted the original Jishe circle, such as Xu Fuyuan. Then, through these friends, other fellow literati were contacted; more and more people might be involved later on.”<sup>106</sup> The second factor was the potential assistance from the loyalist navies at Chongming Island. He believed that these regular armies were one of the most promising resources for the resistance movement in Jiangnan. This explains why, after the failure of Wu Zhikui, he immediately joined Wu Shengzhao’s conspiracy in April of 1647.

The Qing’s greatest worry was a resistance movement composed of Jiangnan literati, the Southern Ming regime, and former Ming military and officials. After Wu Shengzhao’s mutiny, Qing military and police authorities began to search for the key figures behind the revolt, and soon settled upon the name of Chen Zilong as a leading conspirator, even though he was only “an intermediary between Wu Shengzhao and the

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<sup>105</sup> Quoted from Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 667.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

Lu court,” and on the periphery of the Songjiang mutiny.<sup>107</sup> Altogether, nearly one thousand scholars were captured and killed by the Qing. By the end of the summer of 1647, most of the resistance forces in Jiangnan had been pacified, and the Qing began to consolidate its rule in the Jiangnan area.

Xu Bingyi used the comment *Wangmen touzhi* 望門投止 to describe Chen Zilong’s actions in support of the resistance movement. The phrase means “try to use any sorts of forces or means to reach certain goals.”<sup>108</sup> Chen Zilong indeed had done his best to devote himself to the restoration of the Ming Empire, but his main focus had been on the upper social strata and the existing armed forces, regardless of whether they were from the Ming government, local society, or even the Qing side. The following case of Wu Yi provides us with another example of a Jiangnan literatus who began by mobilizing and leading local forces to pacify bandits and peasant rebellions, and then shifted to fight against the Qing invasion.

### 3: 5. When a Civil Official Becomes a General

In the fall and early winter of 1645, Chen Zilong lived in Jiashan and the area surrounding Lake Tai. At this time, another resistance army led by Wu Yi 吳易 became the most powerful anti-Qing force in Jiangnan. This army soon got in touch with gentry loyalists who had survived the Songjiang uprising, especially the eminent leader Chen Zilong.

The Prince of Lu ordered Chen to join and supervise Wu Yi’s “righteous army”. Accompanied by a few disciples, Chen came to join Wu’s *mufu* and become one of his staff officers. However, as Wakeman indicated, he soon became disenchanted with both their quarters and the prospects of Wu Yi leading a successful war against the Qing. One of his disciples gives some hint of the reasons why they soon left this army:

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<sup>107</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.2, 751-52. See also Zhu Dongrun 朱東潤, *Chen Zilong jiqi shidai* 陳子龍及其時代 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1984), 300.

<sup>108</sup> Xu Bingyi, vol.12, 197-98.

Changxing [Wu Yi] is one of the heroes of our age, but in my view his strategy tends to underestimate the enemy. Besides, all his secretaries 幕客 [or staff officers] are frivolous and his generals only pursue robbing and plundering. [Although] his army assembled plenty of members, since they have not been put in order, how could they be deemed a righteous army? <sup>109</sup>

Chen Zilong did have some suggestions and plans for the organization of *xiangbing*, but he did not have any experience in commanding or even getting in touch with this sort of local force. In Wu Yi's troops, he saw much that was far from his ideal of what local forces should be. Unfortunately, Chen Zilong did not realize that Wu Yi's anti-Qing resistance forces had been among the most effective in Jiangnan. <sup>110</sup>

Wu Yi was born in Wujiang County; he was awarded the *jinshi* degree in 1643. He was famous in his hometown not only for his writing and poetry, but also for his abilities in military affairs, his physical agility, and his spiritual boldness. He was also known as a devotee of the martial arts and noted for his strength and skill at swimming. He edited a book entitled *Fuqiang yaolan* 富強要覽 in 1643 after receiving his *jinshi* degree; another four articles were collected as *Huifu Zhongxing moyi* 恢復中興末議 and sent to Shi Kefa who was responsible for Yangzhou's defense. All of these works were focused on current military, political, and economic affairs. It is said that Shi Kefa was deeply touched by Wu's papers, and he immediately appointed Wu as secretary in the Bureau of Operations of the Board of War (*bingbu zhifangsi zhushi* 兵部職方司主

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<sup>109</sup> Chen Zilong, *Zhong Zhongyu quanji* 陳忠裕全集, Nianpu 年譜 (B), 4, printed in 1803. Unfortunately, Wakeman's translation made a crucial mistake, and he relied on this misunderstanding to make another wrong conclusion later on – those *yishi* look down upon literati. “幕客皆輕薄之士” cannot be translated “(he) had recruited retainers who look down upon learned scholars” as he did. Moreover, “其又爲長蕩乎” also cannot be translated “they remain a dissolute bunch altogether”. Changdang 長蕩 is a place name where Wu launched his *yishi*. Wakeman (1985), vol.2, 726.

<sup>110</sup> There are numerous of specialists who were involved in Wu Yi's *Mufu*. Apart from Chen Zilong and his disciples, Chen Qubing 陳去病 listed more than thirty staff officers as well as secretaries and provided more detailed information. Quoted from Xie Zhengguang and Fan Jinmin, 193.

事).<sup>111</sup> He was later sent back to the Jiangnan area by Shi Kefa to raise funds for military rations. It was thanks to this mission that he was not killed with Shi and his followers in the fall of Yangzhou.

Wu Yi's practical military action began with skirmishes with pirates and rebels of the Lake Tai area. He used his family's own properties to hire and equip two thousand militiamen to defend his native village at the eastern end of Lake Tai. However, as soon as Wujiang city fell to the Qing, he summoned several dozen people to capture and kill the officers who had surrendered to the Qing. By then it had become very clear that the Qing armies were preparing to take over all of Jiangnan. He began to contact friends among the local gentry. The most famous of these was Sun Zhaokui (mentioned above). Since Sun was skilled in military training and strategy, Wu soon established a close relationship with him, and even named his troops the Sun Wu Army 孫吳軍. Within one day three hundred men had joined them, and by the third day a thousand people had been assembled. They set up a military camp by the side of Lake Tai at Changbai Pond 長白蕩.

Wu's army was commonly known as the "White Headed Army" (*baitou jun* 白頭軍) because of the white cloths that his soldiers wrapped around their heads. Sun Zhaokui helped him to add large numbers of bandits and other sorts of local militia such as *xiangbing* to these original troops. His army soon became a mixed group led by literati. The incorporation of these other forces was one of the important characteristics of Wu Yi's military action.

These local armed forces included bandits, such as the subordinates of Barefoot Zhang San. However, the most important were the forces led by Shen Pan 沈潘 and Li Jiucheng 李九成. Their arrival helped to turn Wu's forces into the most powerful literati-led resistance forces in Jiangnan.

Shen Pan was the leader of Songjiang's bandits. He and his 1,400 followers had done much looting in this area. Because the local gentry were afraid of his threat, they wrote a letter to Wu asking for his help. While Wu Yi did not have enough force to

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<sup>111</sup> Xie and Fan, 186.

ensure victory, he finally captured Shen with a “stratagem” (ji 計) and incorporated his troops, including 70 warships.<sup>112</sup>

It is not clear what kind of stratagem he used to pacify Shen Pan’s bandit force, but the case of Li Jiucheng provides more details of what may have been a similar process. Li was a bandit leader from Zhejiang. Under the pretense of uprising, he led his rebels with about 1,000 boats and ships in widescale plundering. Wu Yin hoped to incorporate Li’s subordinates into his own troops; to achieve this goal, he would have been willing to kill Li. Some worried that this kind of fighting would damage the harmony among the Jiangnan forces in the face of the coming Qing invasion. However, Sun Zhaokui supported Wu:

What we are engaging in is just like slicing a whale with a little knife and fighting a tiger with bare hands. Only with this kind of righteousness could we expect to summon the people. If we tolerate their looting and burning, then all the people will be our foes. That means we would have been defeated by ourselves before the coming of enemy.<sup>113</sup>

Li’s troops were eventually ambushed by Wu Yi through a strategy involving Wu’s pretended cooperation.

The local gentry also joined Wu’s efforts. One of these, Shen Zhizheng 沈之征, was a famous scholar in Songjiang. Shortly before his death, he prepared 1,000 ships for use in the struggle against the Qing. When Wu organized his troops, Shen’s two younger brothers not only provided all these vessels to Wu, but also brought another 500 boats called *jiansou* 箭艘 to the harbor at Lanxi 爛溪.

Since the Qing army’s greatest strength lay in its cavalry, they were severely hampered in certain areas of Jiangnan. The Qing forces were frequently attacked by water; in these cases, their lack of competent sailors left them ill-equipped to restrain the resistance movement. In contrast, Wu Yi’s troops were primarily composed of

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<sup>112</sup> Ji Liuqi (B), juan 9, in ZGYSJC 36, 598.

<sup>113</sup> Xie and Fan, 188.



fishermen, pirates, some peasants from the lakeshore, and a small remnant from the former Ming navy. Their effective resistance often caused the Qing army severe casualties.

The following is an example of the strategies that were used to defeat the Qing on the water.

Wu Yi scattered those of his soldiers who were good at swimming among the local peasants. When the Qing armies looked for sailors to sail their ships, all these scattered people came together. When they sailed these ships into the middle of the water, they let the ships sink and drowned countless (溺死無算) enemies.<sup>114</sup>

As the following story indicates, the long banks were also used to the advantage of the local resistance forces. One day a *Beile* 貝勒 led a group of Qing soldiers past a place named Bace 八測. Wu let Sun Zhaokui and others use muskets to attack them. Because the bank was long and high, the Qing's cavalry did not have the agility to turn their heads; furthermore, they did not use firearms. Finally, this small group was defeated because the arrows they shot were absorbed by either boards or straw men.<sup>115</sup>

Wu Yi not only had direct control over numerous troops of his own, he was also able to cooperate with other local forces such as rebels and *xiangbing*. For instance, there were several thousand *xiangbing* in the border areas of Wujiang, Qingpu 青浦, and Jiashan 嘉善. Among the groups who submitted to Wu's command was one led by Zhou Rui 周瑞, a man skilled in the use of firearms such as muskets and cannon. On March 23, 1646, Tu Guobao, the Qing Governor of Suzhou, ordered General Wang Maogong 汪茂功 to pacify this rebellious local militia. Three days later, it is said that

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<sup>114</sup> Xu Zi, juan 46, liezhuan 39, Yishi 義師 1, 463.

<sup>115</sup> Xie and Fan, 187. See also Wang Youdian 汪有典, *Qian Ming zhongyi biezhuàn* 前明忠義別傳, juan 23, SKWSSJK 1, ji- 19, 242-47.

about 2,000 Qing soldiers were killed by Zhou's army in the Fenhu 汾湖 area. This victory forced the Qing to enforce martial law in Suzhou city.<sup>116</sup>

Wu Yi gradually came to control the entire east shore of Lake Tai and he organized his armies into formal banners, cut seals, and even appointed his own regular officials. His growing eminence was recognized by the Lu regime, and he was enfeoffed as Earl of Changxing 長興伯.

Wu Yi's successful military actions coincided with the resistance movements of other Jiangnan elite; in fact they usually joined together to launch attacks. Their activities meant that one of the Qing's most important transportation lines – from Nanjing to Hangzhou – was cut off. Governor Tu Guobao soon realized the very real threat from Wu Yi and his army, a threat not only to the security of all Jiangnan, but also to other areas such as Zhejiang where they had contacts with Southern Ming armies. In early 1646, Tu decided to build his own marine force, stating that “the thing of greatest importance is to train 2,000 sailors.” The pay of these sailors was set at 6 *dou* of rice per month and 0.02 tael of silver for non-staple food.<sup>117</sup>

The well-trained Qing armies and their guaranteed pay were in sharp contrast with many of the resistance forces. The failure of their joint attack on Suzhou was a watershed in the Jiangnan resistance movement. Following this, the anti-Qing forces were once again scattered. Wu Yi led his remaining followers and fled into the marshland of Lake Tai to regroup. Later on, he had allied his own forces with another small army, and, together, they established at Changbai Pond the nucleus of a new loyalist confederation. On March 2, 1646, they emerged from the confines of the lake and took over Wujiang again, killed the magistrate and pillaged the district.<sup>118</sup>

Wu still wanted to do more. He planned to attack the city of Jiashan in order to break through the Qing cordon encircling Lake Tai. The city at this time was said to be

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<sup>116</sup> This number is from Xie and Fan, 190. Undoubtedly it is exaggerated. One primary source indicated that the total casualties of the Qing army during this campaign were 215. See *Ming Qing shiliao yibian*, vol. 1, 15. This report to the Qing Emperor sent by Tu Guobao also verified that the Qing's casualties were mainly caused by firearms. See also *Zhouzhuang zhenzhi* 周莊鎮志, in XXSKQS 717, *Shibu dili lei* 史部地理類, 121.

<sup>117</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao yibian*, vol.1, 15.

<sup>118</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol. 2, 726-27.

poorly defended. In the end, the magistrate of Jiashan ambushed Wu by luring him with the false promise of a coordinated uprising. The Qing soldiers seized Wu easily and sent him to Hangzhou. On July 15, 1646, Wu was executed.

After the death of Wu Yi, Xia Wanchun appraised him only as a secretary or government clerk – he was not qualified to be a general or marshal.<sup>119</sup> Xia seems to have expected too much of Wu Yi. Wu did have clear abilities in military affairs, and showed an organizational aptitude in drawing up concrete plans for systems of social control such as the *baojia*. In terms of the latter, he thought that the implementation of the system would help to realize the following goals: training *xiangyong*, prohibiting thieves, defending the city, ensuring taxes and corvée, and reducing the number of lawsuits. In this way, he believed that disorder could be interdicted and turbulence pacified.<sup>120</sup>

However, he never had a chance to carry out even the most preliminary plans before the arrival of the Manchus; and, during his time as Shi Kefa's staff officer, he never appeared on the battlefield. In Jiangnan, he focused on the integration of the various local rebel forces and militias, as well as the units that had been brought in from different areas. But he had no way to ensure the strict control of these mixed troops. In other word, he emphasized the numerical expansion of his forces while ignoring questions of quality and training. Within the city of Wu County, many people joined his uprising as "righteous soldiers" in the early stages, and the gentry households treated these people with wine and feasting. But none proved capable of effectively resisting the Qing army's attack later on. Most of them simply scattered in the face of their superior opponent.<sup>121</sup>

With help from Sun Zhaokui and others, his troops occasionally fought with success against the Qing army, but, in many cases, the opposite was true. A source from the gazetteer *Zhouzhuang zhenzhi* 周莊鎮志 indicates that since the Qing army faced challenges from the Southern Ming in eastern Zhejiang, many Jiangnan people could

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<sup>119</sup> QDRWZG- A, vol. 2, 240.

<sup>120</sup> Li Yuqiu 李聿求, *Luzhi chungiu* 魯之春秋, juan 12, ZGYSJCXB 25, 503.

<sup>121</sup> *Zhouzhuang zhenzhi*, in XXSKQS 717, 121.

not decide what to do next. Wu Yi often sent his troops to attack the Qing army as they passed by. However, “all his armies are mobs; they can not be expected to be used”. Standing on the top of a pagoda, Governor Tu Guobao one day witnessed these armies, and, laughing, commented how easy it would be to overcome these forces with his cavalry. On August 21, Tu sent his troops to attack and destroy the central camp of Wu Yi; more than 1,000 of Wu’s soldiers were killed and drowned.<sup>122</sup>

Wu fled, and, along with him, one of the most powerful local resistance troops. Generally, their activities were mainly along the northern shore of Tai Lake. Due south across this lake is the area of Zhejiang, an area which provides us with a chance to examine certain unprecedented phenomena. For instance, we can consider whether, how, and to what extent the remnant Ming forces from the sea and inland social forces affected each other. Moreover, the military action of Zhejiang literati also involved some very important factors like the role of lineage in military history as well as the relationship between *Wen* and *Wu*. These conditions make it possible to write a general survey about these two crucial issues in both social history and military history.

### 3: 6. Summary

Although the Jiangnan area basically was less militarized and politicized, military actions against the Qing still involved various social strata and local forces. In certain aspects Jiangnan official literati went even further than their peers in Jiangbei: they successfully shifted to a fight against the Qing invasion with local forces which they had originally mobilized for pacifying bandits and peasant rebellions. However, although they had been successful at integrating other social strata to fight for their economic and commercial benefits in times of relative peace, their organization of anti-Qing military action was not so effective. A few of them did show some ability in organizing the defense of cities, but the vast rural area was another story. Moreover, while a few of them had direct control of troops, and could even cooperate with local forces from other areas, most Jiangnan

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

literati focused on the upper social strata and the existing armed forces, regardless of whether they were from the Ming government, local society, or even the Qing side. We noted that Jiangnan literati joined together with the former Ming armies to launch attacks, but the result of this cooperation was weakened by the actual influence of the literati themselves. Neither they nor the local forces could play a crucial role. Previous studies have called into question the integration of bureaucratic politics and local power, but, since they only paid attention to local elite and officials, they left unanswered the question of how both controlled local military forces. Although some local forces wanted to combine with those of the upper social strata to give substance to their intention to save the Ming, they had no way to escape from dual predicaments: the conflicts with local authorities, and the shortage of capacities to control those rebellious peasants. The local literati occupied an ambivalent position between the Ming state and society, — there was no hope to reach the goal of integrating bureaucratic politics and local power. In one word, the burden of knitting together disparate groups was too heavy to bear for the Jiangnan literati. Furthermore, they had no way to take appropriate military measures, such as developing an effective system of logistics and supplies to maintain their force, let alone retain strict control of them.

## Chapter 4

### Land and Sea: the Final Fate of the Literati's Military Action

#### 4: 1. Individual Uprisings and United Military Action

The resistance in the Zhejiang area, lasting from 1645 to 1664, was the longest in all of China. In the summer of 1645, this area suffered from extreme drought. With the fall of the water level of the Qiantang River, Manchu troops were able to cross on horseback. Within four days, Prince Bolo led the Qing cavalry across the river, reaching Hangzhou in mid-July. Several Qing armies converged in the area on July 17, but the main target of their attack shifted to the border of Zhejiang and Jiangxi, from whence they intended to penetrate into Fujian. One year later, they successfully suppressed the loyalist movement in that province.

During this time, uprisings against Qing armies spread quickly in the southeast of China.<sup>1</sup> Two Southern Ming courts were established separately but almost simultaneously in eastern Zhejiang and Fujian. The Prince of Lu, Zhu Yihai 朱以海 (1618-1654), had been assigned to reside in the Taizhou area of Zhejiang but was soon moved to Shaoxing, mainly by some Zhejiang officials, where he assumed the title of Regent (Jianguo 監國). Meanwhile, the Prince of Tang 唐王, Zhu Yujian 朱聿鍵 (1602-1645), announced his intention to become the next regent in Fujian on July 10, 1645. As will become clear, these two courts did not have authority to lead or even join with the resistance.<sup>2</sup>

The few Ming armies in Zhejiang could not be expected to pursue resistance. Since the 1620s, they had often been underpaid. According to a report sent to the Board of War

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<sup>1</sup> In the Zhejiang area, the series of wars along the Qiantang River were called “Hua Jiang zhiyi 畫江之役” in Chinese records.

<sup>2</sup> For detailed information about these two courts and the other political factors, see Struve (1984), 76-77; Gucheng, 266-67.

by Governor Lu Wanxue 陸完學 in 1635, the military allocation for Zhejiang was short more than 424,000 taels of silver from 1621 till 1630.<sup>3</sup> Beginning in the early spring of 1645, remnant Ming armies fled to Zhejiang from Southern Zhili and other places. They used any possible means—including plundering, apportioning (from the Southern Ming), or even cheating—to supply themselves. Their actions were a catastrophe for the people of Zhejiang.<sup>4</sup>

One of the Southern Ming armies on the banks of the Qiantang was commanded by Fang Guo'an 方國安, a former Regional Commander from eastern Zhejiang. In the early summer of 1646, his force fell back in chaos to Shaoxing where it soon collapsed completely. Fang and all his subordinates surrendered to the Qing. Wang Zhiren 王之仁, from Baoding 保定 in Bei Zhili, was a Regional Commander garrisoned at Dinghai 定海. In comparison to Fang's, Wang's army was quite well disciplined. However, they had never supported each other, and their defense ultimately failed. Wang and his family members drowned themselves.<sup>5</sup> Within a very short period, all the Ming regulars along the river were scattered and Shaoxing succumbed with little resistance. Regent Lu fled by sea to Zhoushan Island 舟山.

After the Qing army entered the Zhejiang area, one of the province's famous scholars, Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578-1645, a *jinshi* of 1601 from Shanyin 山陰), serving at the time as Left Censor-in-Chief (*Zuo duyushi* 左都禦史), wanted his students, such as Qi Biaoja, to organize a resistance movement to defend Hangzhou. According to Liu, the Zhejiang area could rely on certain geographic advantages for its defense. He felt that as long as the people's hearts were calm, the loyalists could train an army and mobilize soldiers to defend the city; after this army was prepared, the entire empire would benefit.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Bi Ziyang 畢自嚴, *Duozhi zouyi* 度支奏議, Zhejiangsi 浙江司, juan 1, in XXSKQS 488, Sibuzhaoling zouyilei 史部詔令奏議類, 190-91.

<sup>4</sup> Li Qing (B), juan 6, in NMSL BZ, 361.

<sup>5</sup> Shao Tingcai 邵廷采, *Dongnan jishi* 東南紀事, juan 6, 222, in ZGYSJC 32.

<sup>6</sup> QDRWZG – A, juan 2, 225.

Shortly after learning that Hangzhou had fallen into the hands of the Qing, and that the main local officials of Shaoxing had surrendered to the Qing, going so far as to welcome the Qing army's coming with gifts, he decided to go on a hunger strike. His last few words not only explain this decision, but also express his hope for the younger generations:

Of course I have realized that to make plans would be better than to sacrifice my life. However, I think I am too old to bear the burden.<sup>7</sup>

Liu's example did inspire Zhejiang literati to resist. Soon after, Zhang Guowei of Dongyang 東陽, another higher ranking Ming official, dedicated himself to the anti-Qing movement. Zhang had earned his *jinshi* in 1622, after which he served in various places including Guangdong and Beijing. As a high ranking official (Governor of Yingtian 應天, Vice-Minister of the Board of Works 工部右侍郎), he was not only proud of his administrative capacities and irrigation work (he edited a book entitled *Sanwu Shuili quanshu* 三吳水利全書 in thirty volumes), but was also confident in his abilities to undertake the pacification of peasant rebellions. He had successfully suppressed Li Qingshan's rebellion in the Shandong area. In 1642, he was promoted to Minister of the Board of War but was soon impeached and imprisoned because he had failed to stop the Manchu invasion. In the spring of 1644, he was released. Keeping his original title, he went to Jiangnan and Zhejiang to conscript troops for future use. However, due to the conflicts of political factions, he was not able to cooperate with Ma Shiyong during the reign of Prince Fu in Nanjing and returned to Dongyang later in the year. After the Qing army's entrance into the province, Regent Lu immediately appointed him Minister of the Board of War and Chief Grand Secretary (Bingbu shangshu dongge daxueshi 兵部尚書東閣大學士).<sup>8</sup> At the earliest stage of the resistance in Zhejiang, he raised up an army in his hometown and deployed these soldiers at Changhetou 長河頭 to defend the Qiantang.

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<sup>7</sup> Quoted from Gu Cheng, 231-33.

<sup>8</sup> Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 246-47. See also Li Yuqiu 李 聿求, *Luzhi chunqiu* 魯之春秋, juan 3, 435, in ZGYSJC XB 25.



While we have a few brief mentions of this deployment, including descriptions of their building of fortifications along the river, there is no information on the number of soldiers that were mobilized, let alone their performance on the battlefield. When the Qing army occupied Yiwu 義烏, Zhang realized there was no hope to do more. Prostrating to the South, he said he had already done what he could, and drowned himself.<sup>9</sup>

Chen Qianfu 陳潛夫 from Renhe 仁和 county, another famous *juren* (1636), also chose to commit suicide along with his family after losing all hope in the possibility of successful resistance. Chen's career was similar to Zhang Guowei's in many respects. While serving in Hunan, he had gained experience working with local military forces in the pacification of peasant rebellions. After hearing of the establishment of a new Ming regime in Nanjing, he insisted to the Hongguang Emperor that the Southern Ming forces should not abandon a single inch of territory in Shandong and Henan. Enumerating the hundreds of *zhai* in Henan, he assured the emperor that the *haojia* 豪家 (magnates) could link their camps together and guide imperial troops through their region against the enemy to the north. He travelled to Henan where he strove to knit together the many *zhai* of the Henanese magnates into a loyalist defense line. The *zhai* headmen and magnates acclaimed his endeavors. Unfortunately, as Wakeman points out, "his plan was smashed by the political faction of the Southern Ming, and he was even thrown in jail ... The loyalty of the magnates was subsequently altogether lost."<sup>10</sup> After Prince Lu established his authority in eastern Zhejiang, Chen was appointed as Vice-Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud (*taipushi shaoqing* 太僕寺少卿). Later on, all loyalist armies in western Zhejiang were under his surveillance. He conscripted 300 soldiers to serve as his own force and provided them with weapons and other supplies from his own funds. This small force joined more than twenty campaigns during the resistance.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 246-47.

<sup>10</sup> Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 371; 525-26.

<sup>11</sup> Wang Youdian 汪有典, *Qian Ming zhongyi biezhuàn* 前明忠義別傳, juan 22, in SKWSSJK 1 ji- 19, 241-42; also see Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 248.

In addition to the stories of Zhang and Chen, the individual and group activities of four *jinshi*, Sun Jiaji 孫嘉績, Xiong Rulin 熊汝霖, Zhu Dadian 朱大典, Qian Suyue 錢肅樂, from the Zhejiang area provide us with a relatively complete picture of the resistance movement along the Qiantang River. However, primary records and secondary studies only mention their individual actions separately, and do not attempt any kind of synthesis. In the following section, I will begin with a brief review of their individual backgrounds before knitting together and analyzing their cooperative military actions.

Sun Jiaji, from Yuyao county 余姚, was the first to become actively involved in the resistance movement. After being awarded the *jinshi* degree in 1637, he worked in both Beijing and Nanjing. While in Beijing, he had gained relevant experience as an official at the Board of War. In June, 1646, faced with the arrival of the Qing army, the Magistrate of Yuyao fled. The Instructor of the Confucian School (*jiayu* 教諭) of the county offered the land and population registration lists to the Qing, and because of this, he was appointed as the new magistrate. Cooperating with the Qing, this new magistrate conscripted 300 people to build roads to facilitate the movement of the Qing army's logistical supplies. Sun agitated among these men, convincing them to join him in an uprising. He led this new army against the county city and killed the magistrate. His sudden attack helped to trigger a wide range of resistance in the Zhejiang area. Eventually, several thousand people joined his army.<sup>12</sup>

Sun Jiaji was not alone in Yuyao County. Xiong Rulin, a *jinshi* of 1631, also played an important role in Zhejiang's resistance movement. When the Qing army entered the province, he had several hundred of soldiers in hand. He was not satisfied to merely pursue a policy of defense. Without seeking any assistance, he led this army across the river to garrison the Qiaosi 喬司 area, from where he attempted to attack Haining 海寧 city. It is said that ten thousand people welcomed his army into this city, but no other righteous armies or famous literati answered his calls for local assistance. At this time, many gentry from Hangzhou had fled to this area, but none were willing to take on the responsibility of defending the city. They were touched by Xiong's plea for resistance,

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<sup>12</sup> Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 245-46; Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 196-99.

but were not ready to make any immediate decisions. Finally, a *jinshi* named Yu Yuanliang 俞元良 from Haining city promised to offer his services. Xiong Rulin used this city as the base for his planned resistance. He placed Yu in charge of logistics, while Jiang Guozhu 薑國柱, a former Commander (*zhihui* 指揮), was made responsible for military affairs. Xiong also successfully increased his troops by annexing another local force led by Chen Wanliang 陳萬良. Chen owned a *zhai* in eastern Zhejiang, but he received Xiong's command without hesitation.<sup>13</sup> While Xiong's army, called *xiongbing* 熊兵 during the early period of the Zhejiang resistance movement, was certainly small (the exact number of soldiers is unknown), the army was always deployed as the vanguard on the battlefield; and when it was defeated, it quickly reorganized, refusing to be frustrated.<sup>14</sup>

In Jinhua 金華, Zhu Dadian (*jinshi* of 1616) mobilized about 3,000 soldiers in the spring of 1644 after hearing of the fall of Beijing. His main motive appears to have been the redemption of his reputation for "extreme corruption and cruel action".<sup>15</sup> He served for many years in Shandong and Jiangbei as Governor and Vice-Minister of the Board of War. He accumulated considerable military experience through his involvement in the pacification of Kong Youde's mutiny and various peasant rebellions. After Li Zicheng took Beijing, he met Liu Zongzhou and Xiong Rulin in Hangzhou to discuss how to "succor the King 勤王." Zhu led his newly conscripted army to Nanjing, but, his Zhejiang background made him a victim of political factions. The officials of the Board of Personnel refused to accept him, and his troops were not officially listed. Finally, with the help of Ma Shiyong, his army was listed as part of the Capital Troop (*jingying* 京營), and Zhu was given the position of Minister of the Board of War. He later returned to his hometown where he organized an army, composed primarily of veterans, to defend

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<sup>13</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183-92.

<sup>14</sup> Xu Zi, *Xiaodian jizhuan* 小腆紀傳, juan 40, liezhuan 33, 386; Also see *kanben* 勘本, liezhuan 列傳, juan 22, in ZGYSJC 35, 405; Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 252-54.

<sup>15</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 203-07.

Jinhua city. Among the various troops of the time, only his army was deemed as “useful” because of its training and experience in warfare. Most of the others were little better than mobs. This army’s first enemy was not the Qing, but Fang Guo’an’s soldiers, currently garrisoned in the Yanzhou area 嚴州. Instead of focusing on preparations for the Qing invasion, Fang’s troops became jealous of Zhu’s wealth and his well trained forces. While fleeing to the sea from Hangzhou, Fang led his troops in an attack on Jinhua. After plundering the suburbs, he asked the city to pay forty thousand taels of silver. Zhu refused Fang’s demand, and led his troops in a successful attack, defeating Fang’s forces.

Despite his success, this event made Zhu Dadian rethink his plans; he began to pay exclusive attention to the defense of the city. Several months later, Fang surrendered to the Qing and joined them in once again besieging the city. Zhu killed their special envoy and refused surrender. During the three months of the siege, no subordinates betrayed him. On the last day of their defense, Zhu Dadian, along with the Regional Commander and Vice-Regional Commander decided to burn the three-hundred barrels of gunpowder still remaining in the city in order to prevent it from being used by the enemy. These three men lost their lives in the huge explosion, and no remains were found after the battle.

Among all loyalists who sacrificed themselves for the Ming, their story is the most solemn and stirring.<sup>16</sup>

In Yin County 鄞縣, Qian Suyue (*jinshi* of 1637 and former Vice-Director of the Board of Justice- *xingbu yuanwailang* 刑部員外郎) became a leader of all the resistance forces (*mengzhu* 盟主). On June 10, Sun Jiaji sent one of his disciples named Lin Shidui 林時對 to Yin County to mobilize the uprising. In the early stages, Lin and others recommended Xie Sanbin 謝三賓, former Chief Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud (*taipusi qing* 太僕寺卿), as their leader in the resistance because of his previous experience as Army Supervisor (*jianjun* 監軍). Xie firmly refused their request, asking, “Are you not afraid of death?”

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<sup>16</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 203-07; Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 249-50; Li Yuqiu, juan 3, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 440-41.

With no hope of gaining Xie's cooperation, they turned to Qian two days later. Qian's affirmative answer put the city in the hands of a strong Ming loyalist. General Wang Zhiren, leader of an army garrisoned at Dinghai 定海, had already surrendered to the Qing, and kept his original position as Regional Commander. At nearly the same time, he received two opposite requests from Yin County: one from Xie Sanbin who asked Wang's army to suppress the uprising led by Qian, and another from Qian Suyue asking him to join the resistance movement. General Wang promised to cooperate with both of them. On June 15, Wang led his troops to the city. His decision was soon clear: he captured Xie and turned to the side of the resistance. To ensure his survival, Xie promised to donate ten thousand taels of silver. Aside from general Wang's regular army, two battalions of soldiers from the Sea Defense Army 海防道二營 also joined the resistance camp. Together they created an alliance to defend the city of Ningpo (capital of Yin County). Three days later, they sent Zhang Huangyan 張煌言 (1620-1664, *juren* of 1642) as representative to Taizhou to welcome Regent Lu.

The coming of general Wang's regular army did not bring comfort to all the people of the Ningpo area. For one thing, the ordinary people of this area were accustomed to a peaceful life. They had not witnessed warfare since the pacification of pirates in the middle of the sixteenth century. For another, most of the so called righteous armies were either vagrants of the cities or ordinary peasants, both of them short of proper training and equipment. Qian Suyue and his righteous troops were unable to harmonize themselves with the regular army. Further complicating the situation, Qian was involved in complicated political struggles related to the authority of Regent Lu. Because of his sharp criticism of the eunuchs' surveillance, he could not hope to get the understanding or help of the Lu authorities. Within forty days, his troops were without supplies; he had to flee and later died of worry.<sup>17</sup>

Generally speaking, the above *jinshi* began their uprisings separately, but in most cases they engaged in allied military action. The first alliance was between Sun Jiaji and

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<sup>17</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 6, 222; Gu Cheng, 258-59; Wen Ruilin, *liezhuan*, juan 16, in ZGYSJC 35, 350-51; Xu Zi, juan 40, *liezhuan* 33, 389-90.

Xiong Rulin. After Sun Jiaji took the city of Yuyao and killed the new magistrate, more and more people from surrounding areas came to join his camp. He refused to act as the head of the alliance, instead, he recommended Xiong Rulin:

A great affair needs a suitable general. Xiong Rulin has shown unremitting effort in pursuing great goals and he is familiar with military affairs, we should ask him to be our leader.<sup>18</sup>

Coincidentally, Xiong led his troops from Ningpo and the coalition quickly took shape. This united army was called the “Sun-Xiong Army 孫熊兵.” According to the report of Xiong himself, the total number of soldiers was no more than one thousand.<sup>19</sup> Its activities usually centered on Qiaosi 喬司 and its vicinity. In order to effectively control the army, they divided the troops into two battalions, *Right* (Xiong) and *Left* (Sun). During all of their campaigns, Xiong played the role of vanguard while Sun followed him; however, Sun also took care of logistics, even using up his family wealth for the cause.<sup>20</sup>

Gradually, the number of their troops increased, and the so-called “Six Families Army 六家軍” was formed. Among them, Xiong’s army was the strongest, while Zhu Dadian’s troops were proud of their firearms. In order to ensure the effective organization and use of these latter troops, a special battalion was organized called *Huogongying* 火攻營.<sup>21</sup> These righteous troops as well as the Ming regulars led by Fang Guo’an and Wang Zhiren all had experience in battles with the Qing army. Because of the scattered nature

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<sup>18</sup> However, in Xu Bingyi’s description, Sun Jiaji was not familiar with military affairs; he let his army be controlled by both Wang Zhiren and Fang Guo’an. See Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 245-46. Considering of the real condition of Wang and Fan, Xu’s conclusion needs to be questioned, see Gu Cheng, 296.

<sup>19</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183-92.

<sup>20</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 196- 99.

<sup>21</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183- 92; see also juan 6, 225.

of the resources, current scholarship includes only very brief descriptions of the processes.<sup>22</sup>

However, a careful examination of the limited sources allows us to trace the basic course of these resistance movements from the summer of 1646 until the next year, especially their united military actions. By looking at the campaigns which involved the above literati, we will be able to explore the characteristics of their military action.

The scattered anti-Qing battles launched by various Zhejiang forces after the Qing army took Hangzhou ended in rapid defeat. In the middle of August, 1646, all the righteous troops were reassembled around the Haining 海寧 area. The Manchu cavalry now faced a united resistance because the righteous troops were deployed as a line: Xiong Rulin's army in the middle; Sun Jiaji on the east wing; and Qian Suyue leading his force on the west wing. During the course of their campaign, the explosion of several cannons in Sun Jiaji's camp caused massive confusion and the final failure of the righteous troops. Numerous soldiers were drowned or killed while others scrambled onto boats to escape. Arrows like rain hit the area surrounding Xiong Rulin; he tried to do his best to stop the soldiers fleeing, but he had no chance at all. As a scholar and civil official, what he demonstrated was not only courage, but also military capacity. One month later, his troops' performance in the suburbs of Hangzhou won the respect of Wang's regular army. Without any help from other righteous armies, Xiong led his army to Hangzhou to cooperate with Wang. In the early stages, the Qing army's cannons brought great casualties to the allied army. On September 12, it was Wang's army that was the first to flee, having run out of supplies. One week later, Xiong led his troops in a retreat across the Qiantang River. As they were crossing, about six hundred Qing cavalry troops suddenly launched an attack. Standing on a boat, Xiong personally shot arrows. More than ten *Shengyuan* among his troops lost their lives during this battle but the Qing army lost as many as one hundred cavalry troops. Considering that most members of Xiong's army were newly conscripted soldiers and ordinary peasants, the respect they received from the Ming regular armies comes as no surprise.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> For the general conditions of the resistance movement in the Zhejiang area, see Xu Hanzhi 徐涵之, *Zhedong jilue* 浙東紀略, in ZGYSJC 33, 320-30; Gu Cheng, 270-71; see also Struve (1984), 75-94.

<sup>23</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183-92.

After this campaign, the Qing army had to return to Hangzhou. Xiong asked Regent Lu to coordinate the righteous forces while urging Generals Wang and Fang to take this opportunity to launch an attack on the isolated Qing army. According to him, it would be better to send several thousand soldiers to attack Jiaying to cut off the Qing grain transportation line rather than passively defending the Qiantang River. Xiong, Sun Jiaji, Huang Zongxi, and Qian Suyue all shared this opinion.

On the Qing side, it seems that the united threat from these forces had little effect on their overall strategy for controlling Zhejiang. The Hangzhou garrisoned army sent some soldiers to pacify a rebellion led by several students (*shusheng* 書生) in the Pinghu 平湖 area. Qian Suyue asked Regent Lu to send emergency assistance from the sea in order to enable cooperation between eastern and western Zhejiang. Unfortunately, his report was never sent to Regent Lu. We will see, like Prince Fu of Nanjing, Regent Lu was unable to take certain measures because of factors such as political factionalization, conflicts, and contradictions among the military forces.<sup>24</sup>

For the literati of Zhejiang as well as those from other areas, raising an anti-Qing flag proved to be much easier than enlarging or even maintaining the so-called righteous armies. Apart from donations, plundering, and the selling off of family wealth, no concrete records explain how problems of military supply were resolved. One source indicates that Zhang Guowei had a plan to redeem the contributions made by rich households (*fujia* 富家). He encouraged the wealthy families of Dongyang to provide financial support as well as clothes, weapons, and grain. To recompense their endeavors, he used Dongyang's natural resources and local production as deposits. His purpose was "to use local families to support the soldiers who did not flee, the wealthy get goods while the army that is raised gets its food supply." However, we do not know whether this measure was carried out or not, and there is no way to examine its effect.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> See Gu Cheng, 262-65 etc. See also Li Yuqiu, juan 5, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 449; Xu Zi, juan 7, ji 7-  
Jianguo Luwang 監國魯王, 85-87.

<sup>25</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 169-73.



Because of the shortage of supplies, Xiong Rulin had to give up his original plan to meet Wu Yi's troops coming from the Taihu area; instead he led his troops back to Yuyao.

Contradictions between two courts became entangled with a deteriorating resistance. Faced with the Qing's attack, Zhu Dadian and Qian Suyue suggested cooperation with Luwu 隆武, emperor of Fujian, while Xiong Rulin as well as Zhang Guowei opposed this idea.<sup>26</sup>

In May of 1646, both Sun Jiaji and Xiong Rulin realized that there was no hope to do more in the eastern Zhejiang area. They allowed their soldiers to be subordinated to Huang Zongxi and General Wang Zhengzhong 王正中 and then withdrew to Zhoushan Island.<sup>27</sup>

Sun later died (because of grief and illness) at a Taoist temple while Xiong Rulin fled to Fujian along with Regent Lu. However, a warlord named Zheng Cai 鄭彩, who was currently in control of the province, deemed Xiong Rulin to be an obstacle to his dictatorship and cruelly drowned Xiong as well as his youngest son in the sea.<sup>28</sup>

#### 4: 2. How Literati Maintained their Forces of Resistance

The withdrawal of Xiong Rulin and others did not mean the end of resistance movements in the Zhejiang area. As a whole, eastern Zhejiang's resistance lasted until the summer of 1651 when Wang Yi 王翊 (1616-1651), leader of the righteous army, was captured and executed on Siming Mountain 四明山.

Following the pacification of the pirates in the mid-sixteenth century, eastern Zhejiang had enjoyed several decades of peace. Most of the garrisons had shifted their function from defending to grain transportation. In the early Ming, Shaoxing Prefecture

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<sup>26</sup> For concrete reasons, see Xu Zi, juan 40, liezhuan 33, 387-90; Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183-92.

<sup>27</sup> Xu Zi, juan 7, ji 7, 85-87.

<sup>28</sup> Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183-92; Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 252-54.

had three *Wei* and five *Suo*, totaling 22,400 soldiers. However, their numbers decreased gradually.<sup>29</sup>

With the sudden eruption of peasant rebellions in northern China, the Chongzhen Emperor ordered the organization of local military forces such as *tuanlian* and *xiangbing* across the empire in 1636. Zhejiang province generally complied with the edict. Because of the province's rich resources and developed economy, local governments usually provided better treatment for the local forces than was common in northern China. For instance, in Jiaxing County, each *xiangbing* received a salary of 3,000 *wen* a year, and the government provided clothes and weapons. They practiced every month.<sup>30</sup>

Another important characteristic of Zhejiang's resistance movement is the broad range of social forces that participated. In eastern Zhejiang, several Magistrates 知縣 took part in the resistance almost simultaneously:

Wang Yuzao 王玉藻 in Cixi County 慈溪; Zhu Maohua 朱懋華 in Dinghai County; Gu Zhijun 顧之俊 in Fenghua County 奉化; Yuan Zhouzuo 袁州佐 in Yin County; Jiang Xin 薑圻 in Xiangshan County 象山. On behalf of the local government, these officials not only provided help on matters of provision, but also conscripted soldiers.<sup>31</sup>

One of them, Wang Yuzao (*jinsshi* of 1643), went even further. He set an example in administrative affairs for all Zhejiang local officials before the Qing's invasion. After the Qing army took Hangzhou, he organized a righteous army and led it on the battlefield. According to him,

What the Ming relies on to defend itself is only the Qiantang River, we had better attack the Northern army before they cross the river rather than defend against them after, although I am short of capacity, I still want to be the vanguard.

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<sup>29</sup> *Qianlong Shaoxing fuzhi* 乾隆紹興府志 1, juan 21, Wubei zhi 武備志- Bingzhi 兵制, in ZGDFZJC (Z) 39, 527-30.

<sup>30</sup> *Jiaxing xianzhi* 嘉興縣志, juan 15, Bingfang 兵防, in *Zhejiang fu zhoushan zhi* 浙江府州縣志, GGZBCK (Z) ce 4, 300.

<sup>31</sup> Gu Cheng, 260.

He gave up the position of Magistrate, and began to lead the army as part of his duties as Chief Supervising Secretary of the Board of War (*bingke dujishi* 兵科都給事).

However, his actions provoked the jealousy of other righteous armies; furthermore, his criticism of the “timid” and “arrogant” performance of the regular army also made those military officials hate him. When he realized that he would not have any chance to demonstrate his ability in military affairs, he asked to be relieved of his duties. Finally, he died at his hometown, Yangzhou.<sup>32</sup>

The famous scholar Huang Zongxi provides a more substantial opportunity to explore the literati’s military behavior in Zhejiang province. Huang was from Yuyao County. As a well known scholar, his publications are too long to list here, but basically, unlike Wang Yangming who emphasized the idea that “knowledge and conduct are identical” 知行合一, he paid attention to the existing material world, substance (*wu* 物). The essence of his philosophy was an emphasis on practice and experimentation. Based on this, he argued that a man must try to do something useful for the state by active participation rather than avoid duty by withdrawing from society or wasting time in contemplation. His military works such as *Liushu* 留書, *Weisuo* 衛所, and *Daifanglu Bingzhi* 待訪錄 兵制 also covered a wide range of fields. He was particularly critical of one aspect of the Ming military system: namely, the fact that professional military officials and civil officials blamed and looked down on each other. However, his main point was not to elevate the position of professional military officials; rather, he wanted civil officials to have greater power, because it was they who possessed virtue, and they who would be able to really carry out the emperor’s policies.<sup>33</sup>

Huang began to take part in military action with the fall of Hangzhou. He used kinship relationships in his hometown, Huangzhupu 黃竹浦, to mobilize several hundred soldiers called *Shizhongying* 世忠營. His original intention was to participate in anti-Qing military affairs as an ordinary military planner or advisor to provide some

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<sup>32</sup> Xie and Fan, 74-77.

<sup>33</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Ming yi daifang lu* 明夷待訪錄, Bingzhi 兵制 2, 3; in *Huang Zongxi quanji* 黃宗羲全集, ce 1 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, 1985).

suggestions. However, this request was refused because his reputation made it apparent that he deserved more. Finally, he had to accept the position of Director of the Department of Operation of the Board of War 兵部職方主事.<sup>34</sup> In this position, he successfully resolved a conflict between civil and military officials.

In the spring of 1646, a Ming Regional Commander named Chen Wu 陳梧 fled with his scattered soldiers to Yuhang 余杭 from Zhapu 乍浦. Since they plundered everywhere they passed, Chen was killed by the Magistrate of Yuhang, Wang Zhengzhong 王正中 (*jinshi* of 1640).<sup>35</sup> This case became more complicated and sensitive because Wang was the second son of Wang Zhiren. Probably for this reason, Huang carefully established close relations with him. Huang's endeavors were soon rewarded: among the righteous armies in the Zhejiang area, only Huang's could expect to receive military pay from the court of Lu, controlled by the regulars under General Wang. After Chen was killed, the military leaders under Regent Lu asked to punish Wang in order to pacify the rest of Chen's soldiers. It was Huang who strongly disagreed with them, saying:

General Chen is a thief because he took the chance of disorder to do selfish things and deserves to be hated by the people. Zhengzhong defended the territory, protected people for the country, what sort of guilt has he?

Finally, Wang was deemed not guilty by the court.<sup>36</sup>

Joined by Sun Jiaji and the other literati, Huang strongly suggested to General Wang Zhiren that he send the army to western Zhejiang. Apart from this shared opinion, he also suggested that Chongming Island be used for the future counterattack. But none of these

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<sup>34</sup> Xie and Fan, 883.

<sup>35</sup> He died in poverty as hermit later. See Xie and Fan, 70-73.

<sup>36</sup> Xie and Fan, 880- 08; It seems that the latest research by Chinese scholars purposely ignores the close relation between Huang and Wang in order to emphasize Huang's role. See Cao Guoqing 曹國慶, *Kuangshi da ru- Huang Zongxi* 曠世大儒黃宗羲 (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin, 2000), 28.

suggestions was accepted. Later, both Sun Jiaji and Wang Zhengzhong's troops were merged with his own *Shizhongying*, for a total of 3,000 soldiers. All of them took part in the campaigns along the Qiantang River during the summer of 1646.

As mentioned before, Xiong Rulin's withdrawal in 1646 was a fiasco for the anti-Qing alliance. Since autumn of that year, Huang Zongxi and the others had decided to enter into the deep hills around Siming Mountain.

This area is on the border of the counties of Yin, Yuyao, Shangyu 上虞, and Fenghua. Its perimeter is about 800 *li* and the center is called Dalan shan 大嵐山. Depending upon its narrow passes and various geographic advantages, Huang Zongxi intended to establish forts here. About 500 soldiers followed him to the mountains and finally garrisoned at the Zhangxi Temple 杖錫寺. Huang decided to go out secretly to get in touch with Regent Lu. Before leaving, he warned his two subordinates to be familiar with and establish close relationships with the local people. However, things soon got out of control: these soldiers had no supplies but what they got from plundering. Several thousand mountain people 山民 united to launch an attack against these righteous soldiers. In the middle of the night, the temple they had garrisoned as well as camps and forts were destroyed by fire.<sup>37</sup>

Huang's troops were not the only ones occupying this mountainous region. Another force led by Li Changxiang 李長詳 (*jinsi* of 1643 from Dazhou 達州 of Sichuan Province) also established a base here. Li had worked as the Investigating Censor during the Hongguang reign. Regent Lu later ordered him to supervise an army. After Regent Lu fled to Zhoushan, he led his remaining troops to establish forts at Dongshan 東山 in Shangyu County (Zhang Huangyan's activities were in the Pinggang 平岡 area).

At that time forts were everywhere in eastern Zhejiang, they also collected funds everywhere, thus causing the local residents to suffer. Only the three battalions of Changxiang, Zhang Huangyan, and Wang Yi who garrisoned here cultivated the farmland, and did not bother the locals.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Siming shanzhai ji* 四明山寨紀, Xing chao lu- 7 行朝錄之七, in ZGYSJC 32, 250.

<sup>38</sup> Xu Zi, juan 47, *liezhuan* 40 列傳四十, yishi 2 義師二, 485.

Under Li's control, some farmland was tilled by his soldiers. As for the land tilled by local peasants, they only levied a small tax. Rich households were ensured fair treatment, having only to provide suitable labor and levies. Altogether they managed about 280 hills, over several months, it was said that these righteous troops let the mountain people enjoy their peaceful lives, and none of the former petty officials and runners 胥吏 dared to go to the countryside to engage in corruption. Later on, the righteous forces in Siming Mountain even had their own currency called *Daming tongbao qian* 大明通寶錢.<sup>39</sup>

Apart from Li Changxiang, another important figure at Siming Mountain was Wang Yi 王翊. In fact, most of the achievements mentioned above were created by both Li and Wang's troops. In 1649, Regent Lu's court gradually realized the importance of building an alliance between the various *zhai* of eastern Zhejiang. Comparing Wang with the other leaders of local *zhai*, Huang Zongxi acclaimed his power, abilities, and loyalty to the Ming, and suggested that he be given a higher rank of nobility (宜優其爵).<sup>40</sup>

Wang Yi also had close relations with the famous resistance leader and Fu She activist Feng Jingdi 馮京第. In the spring of 1648, Feng led his troops to merge with Wang's force. Although the Qing's attack had set them back for a short period, they worked together with the other righteous forces to rebuild their movement and reasserted control in virtually all of rural Siming and adjacent areas. However, as Struve has indicated, there was no further operational relation "worked out between the Lu court and the various stockade defenders in the hills, moreover, the capacities of the latter were limited by the leadership style of Feng Jingdi, who was personally concerned about statecraft (as were many in 'righteous' circles) and tried to treat his soldiers according to forms and systems appropriate to peaceful times, he behaved in a superior manner, and it

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<sup>39</sup> Xie Guozhen 1957a, 115-16; also see Wen Ruilin- *liezhuan* 列傳, juan 21, in ZGYSJC 35, 399; Xu Bingyi, juan 16, 341-42; Huang Zongxi, *Lujinian* 魯紀年 (A), in ZGYSJC 32, 243.

<sup>40</sup> Wang finally did not get the position he deserved at Regent Lu's court because of Zhang Mingzhen who actually controlled Zhoushan Island. For their relations, see Xie and Fan, 880-88; also see *Siming shanzhai ji*.

was not easy for his men to become close with him. This was a frequent cause of failure.”<sup>41</sup>

What I want to argue here is that in the case of Wang Yi, the main “cause of failure” was neither isolation nor leadership style as Struve suggests. Rather, the failure was due to local military forces, *tuanlian*, which belonged to the mountain people. We will see, these kind of local forces were advocated and sometimes directly conscripted by the Qing authorities.

At least as early as the spring of 1648, He Zhaolong 何兆龍 raised a rebellion in the mountainous area of Yongjia County 永嘉縣 to challenge the current social order. The rebels wrapped their heads in white cloth as symbols of their right to plunder villages and find food supplies at every household they passed by. Their total numbers reached 100,000 and they spread everywhere among the hills and valleys. The Qing army conquered the county but did not have enough force to suppress them completely. However, the rebels’ attacks were often stopped by *xiangbing* of the local communities since their *zhai* always cooperated and supported each other. One year later, this rebellious force established relations with Regent Lu’s court and guided a large numbers of warships from the sea to the interior of the county. The northern part of the county (on the north side of the Qiantang River) was looted everywhere. This time, however, the local *xiangbing*’s defenses coincided with the Qing army’s attack just across the river. This united counterattack forced the “sea pirates” 海寇 to flee.<sup>42</sup>

At the first stage of the pacification of Wang’s righteous army, it was the *tuanlian* which had attacked as a vanguard for the Qing army. The Governor of Zhejiang obviously realized the importance of this sort of force. He “ordered the village people to organize the *tuanlian* in order to defend themselves”. Wang Yi had to withdraw to the Tiantai area. There is no record indicating that the *xiangbing* forces of Siming were aware of concepts such as “righteous army,” “national identity,” or ethnic conflict. They

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<sup>41</sup> Struve (1984), 114.

<sup>42</sup> *Guangxu Yongjia fuzhi* 光緒永嘉府志, juan 8, Wubei 武備- Bingshi 兵事, in XXSKQS 708, Shibū dili 史部地理類, 198.

seem to have been purely interested in self-defense. After this failure, Wang Yi decided to concentrate on the challenges from these forces.

According to his observation, “although the Northern soldiers are powerful, without the *tuanlian*’s role as guides, it is not easy for them to expect to attack us because of the ruggedness of the mountains.” Gradually, he reorganized his remaining troops (about 400 soldiers), and defeated the villages’ *tuanlian*. Within a month, he enlarged his army to more than ten thousand soldiers by absorbing the peoples who were thus subjugated. But most of these new recruits were rascals and people with no fixed profession.<sup>43</sup>

As Wang indicated, without the *tuanlian*’s cooperation, the Qing army was forced to withdraw from the mountains. In the spring of 1649, Wang Yi’s force reached its apex. He took charge of military affairs by dividing all the troops into five battalions (*wuying* 五營); meanwhile, administrative affairs were managed by five departments (*wusi* 五司).<sup>44</sup>

His successful measures meant that the Qing army could not launch an attack immediately against Regent Lu’s court on Zhoushan Island. According to *Lu zhi chungqiu*, entering 1650, the Qing army “considered only Wang Yi’s troop as the real threat.” After Wang refused to surrender, the Qing armies launched a concerted attack on the Siming Mountain as well as other places along the Qiantang River in the fall. Led by General Tian Xiong 田雄, the Qing armies finally encircled Wang’s troops in the Dalan area 大蘭. They continued to use *tuanlian* as guides, and all the peoples from the various *zhai* either surrendered or fled. After consecutive days of fighting, Wang could no longer maintain his defenses.<sup>45</sup>

After the defeat, Wang fled to the sea with only a few guardsmen. In July 1651, the Ming loyalists lost their final base in eastern China, Zhoushan Island. Wang Yi attempted to reenter the Siming Mountains, but all his subordinates had already either died or fled.

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<sup>43</sup> All the above references are from Xu Bingyi, juan 16, 341-42.

<sup>44</sup> Li Yuqiu, juan 18, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 535.

<sup>45</sup> Li Yuqiu, juan 18, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 535-36.



It was the *tuanlian* who finally captured him at Beixi 北溪. He was executed one month later.<sup>46</sup>

The case of Wang Yi and the performance of local *tuanlian* showed that the eastern Zhejiang literati represented by Huang Zongxi had failed to realize their hope of mobilizing the various social forces to pursue the resistance. Since all these forces were either defeated or unavailable, and the former Ming regular army led by Fang Guo'an and others would not accept their command, the only type of forces available was the righteous armies.

Huang provides the most detailed and vivid firsthand description of these forces.<sup>47</sup> Based on his writings, the righteous troops have been described as thieves (zei 賊). He writes:

All the local military forces of that time were composed of ruffians' sons and brothers of the local people. When they heard the righteous flag (義旗) had been raised, they called on each other and congregated together in order to get wealth and dignity. Under the pretense of getting military pay, they go to every rich household of the countryside as well as the city to drink and eat without scruples.

He goes on to describe the actions of the righteous armies in the Siming Mountains:

... all are thieves who stole donkeys and cows; [they] only brought harm to the people. Fathers killed people for revenge while sons pursued plundering.

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<sup>46</sup> Xu Zi, juan 47, liezhuan 40, yishi 2 義師二, 489.

<sup>47</sup> Chinese scholars' recent studies indicate that Huang's own opinions are full of political and private prejudices, even rumors. See Xu Dingbao 徐定寶, *Huang Zongxi pingzhuan* 黃宗羲評傳 (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue, 2002), 82. Also see Gu Cheng, 164-68. However, it seems that there was no need for Huang to do the same regarding local military forces- political and private prejudices were only used to express his frustration (toward the other political factions).

In addition to the righteous army on the land, called *lukou* 陸寇, there were also sea-based forces called *shuikou* 水寇. Like the former, these were also undisciplined and impossible to control effectively. As Huang puts it,

In the daytime they kill people in the market place, and hang the intestines over the gate of the government offices.<sup>48</sup>

After Huang Zongxi lost all his soldiers, he also left for Zhoushan Island. Here he could do nothing but give lectures on ships to his very few followers or study European calendars 羅巴曆法.<sup>49</sup>

Can we expect Zhejiang's loyalist literati to do more?

### 4: 3. The Role of Lineages in Military Action

From at least the mid-Ming, some Zhejiang people, especially those from Yiwu and Dongyang counties, were considered fierce and warlike. This impression can be traced back to mountain people's warlike behavior in the 1550s. Apart from this, the role of the lineage in military action has also drawn special attention. As we mentioned above, Huang Zongxi began his practical military career by organizing his *Shizhongying*, comprised primarily of people connected to him by kinship and from his hometown, Huangzhupu. What I want to argue in this chapter is that the military behaviour of these people from Zhejiang, as well as the concrete role of the lineage, was common to the whole Yangzi delta. However, their importance cannot be overstated.

These characteristics arose in a context in which the official armies 官軍 in Zhejiang were in a state of decline or even collapse. As Minister of the Board of War, Tan Lun 譚綸 (1520-1577) realized that these armies were not only unable to kill thieves, but could

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<sup>48</sup> *Huang Zongxi quanji*, quoted from Zhao Yuan 趙園, *Ming Qing zhiji shidafu yanjiu* 明清之際士大夫研究 (Beijing: Beijing daxue), 1999, 60-64.

<sup>49</sup> Xie and Fan, 880-88.

hardly even defend themselves. He thought that the reason for this was the shortage of soldiers. However, the composers of *Shaoxing fuzhi* argued against his opinion by pointing to the rampant corruption of the existing forces:

... for instance, within the *Wei* and *Suo* of the coastal cities of Ningbo, Shaoxing, Wenzhou and Taizhou, there are no civil residents [all are soldiers]. Houses are closely built like scales; do they not belong to *Wei* and *Suo*? For those who are from the rich families they usually become officials or runners by paying money. The second choice is going out to be a merchant by bribing officials; the other choice is to engage in handicrafts.<sup>50</sup>

Facing the threat of attack from Japanese pirates, the Zhejiang government had no effective army at hand. Therefore, the highest officials such as Governors had to ask for help from other provinces. According to these officials, the fiercest men were the *Tubing* 土兵 or *Langbing* 狼兵 from remote or border areas like Guangdong and Guangxi, and especially the *Qiangbing* 羌兵 from the Songpan 松潘 area, on the border of Sichuan and Tibet.

In June of 1555, the Regional Inspector of Zhili made another request for those soldiers mentioned above to come to Zhejiang. He finally received permission but with some conditions. The Jiajing Emperor 嘉靖 (1507-1566, reigned 1521-1566) realized that the local officials of Jiangnan used these sorts of excuses to avoid disturbing their peaceful lives.

The Emperor said: 'Now many sorts of soldiers like *Tubing* and *Langbing* are sent to Jiangnan. (But) Commissioners-in-chief as well as Governors take the attitude of hesitation. Those enemies can not be put down means these soldiers are actually raised as disaster [become the burden of the local communities]. This is why new thieves follow. Combined they become even more powerful. [You] require the

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<sup>50</sup> *Qianlong Shaoxing fuzhi* 乾隆紹興府志 1, juan 21, Wubeizhi- Bingzhi 武備志, 兵制, in ZGDFZJC (Z) 39, 527-30.

sending of more armies again; the real reason is to postpone [suppression]; do you really have a loyal mind to pacify the thieves? For the moment I agree with what you plan to do; however, if you still waste time and have no merit . . . there will be no pardon for your guilt.<sup>51</sup>

The Emperor was not the only one to be aware of these problems; in fact, it was common knowledge among other high ranking officials in the empire that the soldiers of Zhejiang and Jiangnan were virtually useless. By May of 1556, Shen Liangcai 沈良才, the Right Vice- Minister of the Board of the War and Right Censor-in-Chief of the Censorate (*bingbu yousilang jian duchayuan youqian du yushi* 兵部右侍郎兼都察院右僉都御史), was ordered to go to Zhejiang to pacify Japanese pirates. Before leaving for the province, he asked to transfer 9,000 soldiers from north China:

Three thousand from Henan, including one thousand militia; three thousand from Shaanxi 陝西; three thousand militia from Xuzhou as well as Pizhou 邳州, if this is not enough, the rest of them should be conscripted from the Shandong area.<sup>52</sup>

Some records from *Yongjia xianzhi* also certify that the official army was useless. What this county relied on for defense was a combination of conscripted militias from the county and other people from Yiwu 義烏 and Wuyi 武義 counties. As for pay, they levied a special tax to meet the needs. However, the commanders had only limited knowledge about military affairs. This condition had remained basically unchanged from the mid-sixteenth century until the arrival of the Manchus. Most importantly, according to the editor of this gazetteer, this was a common phenomenon in the entire south-east coastal area.<sup>53</sup> On June 28 of 1644, Xiong Rulin witnessed the Zhejiang armies' extreme

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<sup>51</sup> MSL LZ – ZJSHJ, 1117.

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, 780.

<sup>53</sup> *Yongjia xianzhi* 永嘉縣志, quoted from Gu Yanwu, *Tianxia jinguo libingshu* 天下郡國利病書, ce 22, Zhejiang (B), in XXSKQS 597, Shibu dililei 史部地理類, 99.

disorder and bad discipline on his way from Danyang 丹陽 to Nanjing. At this time the Qing army had already taken all the Jiangbei area and was preparing to launch an attack across the Yangzi River. All the Zhejiang armies were fleeing back to the province. He writes:

I saw their real condition of extreme nervousness, so I may imagine the degree of the Zhejiang armies' fright and I am sure that they have no strong suit at all.<sup>54</sup>

In addition to the very scattered official Ming armies in Zhejiang, the performance of the local military forces also needs to be reexamined. For this purpose, Yiwu County is a typical case from which to begin the discussion. Almost all previous records consider that the so-called warlike characteristics of the people of Yiwu (including other areas in the vicinity such as Dongyang and Yongkang) came from "nature" (tianxing 天性). Based on this characterization, they go on to describe the great bravery of the soldiers.<sup>55</sup>

However, "nature" is a very abstract basis on which to found any description. It is necessary to undertake an examination of the more concrete factors that contributed to this description. One reasonable explanation can be found in the military capabilities that the forces of various local lineages demonstrated in their conflicts with each other. In conflicts between these lineages, people from the mountainous area of Yiwu did often reveal their courage and bravery on the battlefield.

At the end of the 1550s, some merchants from Yongkang County had begun exploiting a mine in the area of Yiwu. This triggered broad scale fighting with the local people, represented particularly by the two major surnames of Chen 陳 and Song 宋. It is said that a total of several thousand people were involved, and that all of them were brave fighters.<sup>56</sup> But, the real scope of this conflict needs to be reconsidered; most importantly,

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<sup>54</sup> Xiong Rulin, *Bushu jianwen su* 補述見聞疏, in ZGYSJC 30, 279-80.

<sup>55</sup> It is too long to list the relevant quotations about this appellation. One of the earlier versions is from *Yiwu xianzhi - Minbingshu* 義烏縣志·民兵書. See Gu Yanwu, *Tianxia jinguo libingshu*, ce 22, Zhejiang (B), in XXSKQS 597, 85-88.

<sup>56</sup> For a detailed description about this conflict, see *Yiwu xianzhi - Kuangfang shu* 義烏縣志·礦防書, in XXSKQS 597, Shibu dili lei, 84-85.

it is necessary to discover what role these lineages actually played. It is difficult to come to any authoritative conclusion because various gazetteer materials differ in their descriptions of the forces that were involved in this conflict. For example, *Shaoxing fuzhi* indicates that it was *xiangbing* (not the lineage organization of Chen and Song) of Yiwu County who defeated the “mine thieves” (*kuangzei* 礦賊). Furthermore, this source also mentions the results of the conflict: only several leaders of the thieves were killed. The *xiangbing* of Yiwu were proud of their skills with the spear (*changqiang* 長槍). As for technology, they had only some private teaching, and a cursory knowledge of military tactics.<sup>57</sup> *Yiwu xianzhi*, quoted by Gu Yanwu, not only indicates that the county began to gain fame for its “pacification of the mine thieves” (剿滅礦賊), but also provides a description of the social background of the county. According to this work, the people had long enjoyed a peaceful life,

Most of them indulged themselves in entertainment. Hearing war drums, they were afraid; seeing war flags and banners, they were scared ... [Since] they lived in an isolated mountainous area, they were obedient to the teaching of the rites and were not familiar with military affairs.<sup>58</sup>

Without Qi Jiguang, this county would not have had the fame it had since the 1560s. Despite the peaceful atmosphere, some mountain people of Yiwu continued to demonstrate their warlike spirit. Looking to bolster defenses against the Japanese pirates, Qi Jiguang's attention was drawn to these warriors. However, it should be mentioned that most ordinary Yiwu people and local officials were not proud of their hometown's militaristic reputation. Because the different levels of officers from the Ming central government as well as other provinces came here for conscription, there were no more strong men to perform agricultural work: “among ten houses, nine are empty” (十室九空). Furthermore, local social customs were changed because of these conditions:

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<sup>57</sup> *Qianlong Shaoxing fuzhi* 1 乾隆 紹興府志, juan 21, Wubeizhi - Bingzhi 武備志, 兵制, in ZGDFZJC (Z) 39, 527-30.

<sup>58</sup> *Yiwu xianzhi* 義烏縣志, in Gu Yanwu, ce 22, Zhejiang (B), XXSKQS 597, 85-88.

Bad young people were not accustomed to cultivating anymore; instead, they became soldiers. [What they are doing is] eating delicious food and wearing good quality clothes in order to be recruited. The Yiwu people suffer greatly from them.<sup>59</sup>

In October, 1559, Qi Jiguang personally conscripted three thousand soldiers in the county. Between 1561 and 1567, he led this troop against the Japanese pirates on the southeast coast. Qi's achievement was based on his successful creation of a model which incorporated many aspects of military affairs. Applying this model, he was able to expel the Japanese pirates. However, this model was clearly adapted to a special historical environment. For example, he gained the strong support of each level of government officials, from central government and provincial government officials such as Tan Lun as well as the Magistrate (知縣) Zhao Dahe 趙大河. The good pay, quick promotion, and extremely rigorous training were important in creating his troops' unique qualities.<sup>60</sup>

All these factors differ sharply from what Xu Du did, as was mentioned in Chapter Three. Based on his thorough examination of Qi's career in Yiwu, Thomas G. Nimick suggests that "the way in which that army was recruited and the impact of that recruitment on the local area exemplify the extent to which developments in local society could shape regional and national events, and the extent to which the actions of centrally appointed officials could affect local society in the Ming period."<sup>61</sup>

If we focus only on what Qi Jiguang did in this county while ignoring the general condition of the whole Jiangnan area and the rest of the empire, Nimick's conclusion

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<sup>59</sup> *Qianlong Shaoxing fuzhi* 1, vol. 21, Wubeizhi- Bingzhi, in ZGDFZJC (Z) 39, 527-30.

<sup>60</sup> Relevant studies about Qi Jiguang and his army are too numerous to list here. The concise description and analysis is from R. Huang. See R. Huang (1981b), 156-88. However, probably because Huang realized the complexity of the social society of Zhejiang, he provided little information about where Qi's conscripted army came from. The other relevant studies that should be mentioned here are as follows: Yan Chongnian 閻崇年 ed., *Qi Jiguang yanjiu lunji* 戚繼光研究論集 (Beijing: Zhishi, 1990); James Millinger, "Ch'i Chi-kuang – A Ming Military Official as Viewed by his Contemporary Civil Officials," *Oriens Extremus*, 20 (1973), 103-17; Thomas G. Nimick, "Ch'i Chi-kuang and I-wu County," *Ming Studies* 34 (1995), 17-29.

<sup>61</sup> Thomas G. Nimick, "Ch'i Chi-kuang and I-wu County," *Ming Studies* 34 (1995), 17-29.

makes sense. However, he undoubtedly exaggerates the universality of this special case. Among his peers, Qi was “a lonely general”; most of the effective methods he created were not suitable for other generals. The subsequent Chinese military history will show us that Qi often existed as model. An increasing number of people tried to follow him in some way, especially in the area of military training; but the results suggest a lack of effectiveness. The only thing we know is that China’s military declined throughout modern history.<sup>62</sup>

Other factors emphasized in his paper also indicate that Nimick’s conclusions can not be applied universally. For instance, he suggests that a common dialect probably made the troops more aware of their common origin and contributed to their cohesion as a fighting force. In addition, the fact that both the veterans and new recruits were from Yiwu meant that the integration of recruits was facilitated by previous personal or clan contacts with the veterans.<sup>63</sup>

Dialect and social customs indeed played a certain role in Chinese military history, and we have other cases that can exemplify this tendency in modern Chinese history. Nevertheless, overstating this factor would lead us to ignore other more important aspects such as social relationships and cultural identity. At the end of December, 1643, Jiang Ruolai 蔣若來, the Brigade Commander of Hangzhou (*Hangzheng youji* 杭城遊擊) and former Regional Commander of Anqing (*Anqing zongbing* 安慶總兵), was ordered to lead his army to pacify Xu Du’s uprising. Considering that most of his subordinates were also from Dongyang, he asked:

You and those thieves are fellow-villagers; today you will find that they are either your relatives or neighbors, can you fight with them? They answered: ‘We can!’

[Based on this situation] they marched on. When those thieves found there were

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<sup>62</sup> Some Chinese military historians have already indicated that Qi’s method does not deserve to be followed “實不足以爲法”. See Wei Rulin 魏汝霖 and Liu Zhongping 劉仲平, *Zhongguo junshi sixiang shi* 中國軍事思想史 (Taipei: Liming, 1979), 434.

<sup>63</sup> Nimick, 1995.



many familiar faces among the official army, they hesitated [to fight]. The official army took the chance to go forward immediately and expelled them.<sup>64</sup>

This source also raises another important factor related to the Jiangnan literati's resistance movement: the role of lineages during the process of military actions. Huang Zongxi did lead some of his lineage members in joining the resistance, as did Huang Chunyao and his sons in Jiangyin, and Xia Yunyi and Xia Wanchun in Songjiang. Was this a common phenomenon among Chinese literati? To what extent did kinship affect military action during this period? Since Chinese local lineages were an important force in stabilizing rural society, the subject of variation within lineage organizations has inspired endless discussion and argument in both anthropological and historical literature. Because Freedman's model could not explain why lineage organization was strongest in regions where centralized political control was weakest and vice versa, more and more specific studies have been undertaken.<sup>65</sup>

It is now generally recognized that there was no uniform process of lineage formation in Chinese society. Based on his study of Changzhou literati in late imperial China, Elman indicates that in the first two centuries of the Ming dynasty "the complex triangular relationships among the imperial state, local gentry, and village peasants had been transformed." By the late Ming, "therefore, those gentry who organized into powerful local lineages were able to fill the power vacuum in local affairs and to maintain political and economic control over rural society." As for imperial power, although it could blunt literati organizations and academies that threatened its absolute hold on central power, the power of local gentry was not challenged.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> "Dongyang fukou jishi" 東陽撫寇記事, quoted from Pan Xinghui, 355.

<sup>65</sup> See Maurice Freedman, *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. (London: London School of Economics. Monographs on Social Anthropology, no. 18, 1958); see also his *Chinese Lineage and Society* (London: Athlone Press, 1966).

<sup>66</sup> Elman, 1990, 16-26. See also Patricia Ebrey, and James L. Watson, ed. *Kinship Organization in Late Imperial China 1000- 1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), "Introduction".

Generally speaking, what Elman draws is an idealized picture of Jiangnan at peace. Since there were no major battles within this area historically, it is difficult, from the perspective of military history, to examine how the different social forces tried to position themselves. However, a limited exploration of this sort of military behavior can still help us to argue against Elman's exaggeration of the function of the lineage. Because lineage organizations were never uniformly well-developed or evenly distributed geographically throughout the empire, the area I examine is limited to the several provinces discussed in this dissertation. Unlike Guangdong and Fujian, provinces with the most developed and well-organized lineage organizations, there were no such powerful local forces in the northern plain area or Shandong province. Because of long term warfare and frequent natural disasters, it was not easy to accumulate wealth. Furthermore, the relative similarity of dialects and social customs facilitated frequent immigration and emigration. Thus, there was no intense relationship among people who shared the same surname (*tongxing* 同姓).

The Jiangnan area is another story. It is a truism among Chinese people that "no wealthy family lasts three generations" (*fu buguo sandai* 富不過三代); this has also been confirmed by several recent studies.<sup>67</sup> On the other hand, while these were certainly exceptional cases, some "big surnames" (*daxing* 大姓) did continue over considerably longer stretches than several generations or even several centuries.<sup>68</sup>

In northern Zhejiang, the existence of lineages was a common phenomenon; however, this does not mean that there were developed lineage organizations. To exaggerate their capacity for social management as well as social integration is not appropriate. The southern part of the province basically corresponds to Fujian province, but is not touched upon here.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Such as Feng Xianliang, 506; also see Fang Zhuyou 方祖猷, *Qing chu Zhedong xuepai luncong* 清初浙東學派論叢 (Taipei: Wan juanlou, 1996), 67.

<sup>68</sup> Liu Xianting 劉獻廷, *Guangyang zaji* 廣陽雜記, juan 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1985), 43; For comments on recent scholarship in this area by Western scholars, such as Hilary Beattie, Jerry Dennerline and William Rowe, see Timothy Brook, "Family Continuity and Cultural Hegemony: The Gentry of Ningbo, 1368-1911," in Esherick and Rankin, 32-33.

<sup>69</sup> See Yu Xinzhong 餘新忠, "Qing qianqi Zhexibei jiceng shehui jingying de jinshen tujing yu shehui liudong" 清前期浙西北基層社會精英的晉身途徑與社會流動, *Nankai xuebao* 4 (2000), 14-21.

Self-defense was a natural choice for these lineage organizations. Fitzpatrick provides a case study of the siege of Tongxiang in northern Zhejiang province that may illustrate the value of influential local lineages in campaigns against Japanese pirates. The main theatre of war in the campaign was the silk districts around the Grand Canal. Some prominent members of the local bureaucratic elite belonged to important lineages in their respective districts. One of them, named Pu Wenqi 璞文启, is described as a local scholar who had undertaken an in-depth study of military strategy. Pu was a resident of the unwallled market town where his lineage had lived for generations. With cooperation from others, this town successfully eradicated the pirates within a few months.<sup>70</sup>

Of course, the defense of a lineage's own benefits or the interests of a local community does not simply correspond to the defense of the country. For centuries, kinship values, such as loyalty and filial piety, were thought to redound to the state, and the central government always encouraged their pursuit, because these moral influences were thought to be beneficial to the state. But, practically speaking, it is very difficult to find an instance that demonstrates how loyalty could be magnified gradually and simply transferred from family to lineage, to local community, and finally to the country. It is especially evident that when people realized the inevitability of the current dynasty's downfall, they prepared to welcome the new rulers. They may have fought against Japanese pirates or some small group of rebels, but their response to the Qing's mixed Manchu and Chinese powerful army was another story.

In light of the distribution of the lineage organizations in east China, there is no need to examine the lineage's role in the resistance movement in Shandong.<sup>71</sup> In the southwest part of Nanzhili, represented by Huizhou, there was extensive lineage organization, but almost no records that trace any lineage's anti-Qing military activities. Actually, the failure of lineages to participate in the resistance was the most important reason for the

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<sup>70</sup> Merrillyn Fitzpatrick, "Local Interests and the Anti-Pirate Administration in China's South-east 1555-1565," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i* 4.2 (1979), 1-50.

<sup>71</sup> It does not mean that no such thing happened within the province. For a very few cases, see An Zuozhang, 73-74.

ultimate failure of Jing Shen and his brothers, the case study we explored in Chapter Two.<sup>72</sup>

In the Jiangnan area, some lineage members were involved in the resistance movement. However, the relevant data about their activities usually provides only abstract and obscure descriptions. For instance, *Sheng'an benji* only offers one sentence to describe the role of lineages in the process of Kunshan's defense: "there are lots of huge lineages 巨族 in Kunshan. All of them devote money and they would like to defend it until death."<sup>73</sup>

It is easy to explain the absence of detailed records from Jiangnan literati—they wanted to remind people that the fact of resistance did exist, but they did not want to provide vivid and detailed materials that might have brought trouble from the Qing side. One prerequisite in exploring the role of lineage in the resistance movement of literati in eastern China is to treat the literati at two levels—as family members and as lineage members. After a thorough examination of their military performance, it appears that the lineage's military action was usually restricted to family members, and rarely extended to the scope of lineage. If somebody pursued resistance, he was deemed a threat to the whole lineage and would have suffered the death penalty. In a report sent by the Assistant Surveillance of the Circuit of Hangzhou and Yanzhou (*Hangyan dao qianshi* 杭嚴道僉事) on January 6, 1655, we learn that a man was killed by other lineage members for his connection with the anti-Qing forces from the sea.<sup>74</sup>

The case of Lu Xiangguan 盧象觀 (*jinshi* of 1643) from Yixing of Jiangnan will provide us with a concrete study of the subtle roles of both literati and the lineages they belonged to. For one thing, it confirms that lineage resistance did exist in a few cases; but most importantly, it shows that it was also because of the lineage that the Jiangnan literati were finally unable to pursue military action.

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<sup>72</sup> See Zhou Zhiyuan 周致元, "Rujia lunli yu Ming dai Huizhouji jinshi" 儒家倫理與明代徽州籍進士, *Anhui daxue xuebao*, 4 (1999), 80-85.

<sup>73</sup> Li Qing, 6, in ZGYSJC 32, 659.

<sup>74</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao dingbian*, vol. 2, 110 (A-B).

Lu Xiangguan's older brother, Lu Xiangsheng 盧象升 (1600-1639), was once the General Governor of Shanxi and Xuanda (*Shanxi Xuanda zongdu* 山西宣大總督); he died in the fighting against the Manchu invasion in Zhending 真定 in 1638. During the summer of 1645, Lu Xiangguan began to revolt in Mao Mountain 茅山 at the southern border of Nanzhili. At the first stage of his uprising, his troops fell into a trap set by the Qing army when they attacked Nanjing according to schedule. He had to return to his hometown to reorganize the remnant of followers that had survived. After the city was occupied by the Qing army, one retired Ming general, Chen Tangong 陳坦公, was recommended to be put in charge of the loyalists' military affairs. Together with Chen, Lu organized several tens of thousands of people into a mob and planned to attack Yixing city. He personally led the vanguard while Chen Tangong, leading the main army, followed him. However, Lu was misguided by the reconnaissance. He thought the city had no defense so he led only about thirty cavalry through the gate. This small army was soon besieged and he was hit by two arrows.

Tangong was greatly surprised [by Lu's action] and said: "The schoolboy is not familiar with military affairs. As the highest commander, how can he be so imprudent?" So he carefully selected three hundred cavalry to provide support.<sup>75</sup>

This campaign thus became the turning point. Moreover, Lu's actions brought his lineage into a dangerous situation. Since the Qing army wanted to destroy Lu's home, some members from his lineage intended to capture him in order to ensure the lineage's survival. This news forced Lu, with about three hundred followers, to flee to Lake Tai. At the end of August, 1645, Lu realized that his actions as a Ming loyalist would not succeed and he drowned himself.

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<sup>75</sup> Ji Liuqi B, juan 9, in ZGYSJC 36, 594-95.

Lu's younger brother, Lu Xiangjin 盧象晉, became a monk after the founding of the Qing dynasty. Altogether, several dozens of his nephews as well as other relatives dedicated their lives to the Ming.<sup>76</sup>

In terms of the lineage's role in military actions, the case of the Lu lineage echoes with the examples of Yin County in eastern Zhejiang. Thanks to Quan Zuwang, this county's relevant sources have been fairly well preserved. Quan appears to have been proud of his hometown's performance in the resistance movement for he named it *Zhongyi zhibang* 忠義之邦 (the home of righteousness and loyalty). In total, more than 60 people died for the resistance.<sup>77</sup>

However, Quan's praise does not challenge the model we established—the literati's lineage as a whole did not exhibit an intention to be involved in the resistance movement and they were prepared to shift national identity at any time.<sup>78</sup> Quan's description provides reliable and detailed information about their resistance, and also brings to light an important characteristic of their military action: usually the literati who came from the same lineage did not appear together on the same battlefield; instead, they chose different ways to devote their lives to the cause. In addition to the case of Zhang Huangyan and his relatives, which we will explore later in this chapter, the most important instance is that of Qian Suyue and his brothers, the so-called *Qian shi sizhong* 錢氏四忠 (the four loyalists of the Qian family). Qian Suyue died in Fujian while his fifth younger brother was also killed in that province. In 1650, his ninth younger brother devoted his life to his

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<sup>76</sup> Some sources said about one hundred, see *Xu Ming jishi benmo* 續明紀事本末, juan 15, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 103; Ji Liuqi (B) indicated about 40-50 people; see Ji Liuqi, juan 9, in ZGYSJC 36, 594-95. For detailed information about his anti-Qing activities, see also Wen Ruilin, *liezhuan* juan 21, in ZGYSJC 35, 396.

<sup>77</sup> Quan Zuwang, "Ji jiashen sanzong ji" 祭甲申三忠記, in *Jieji tingji* 鮎埼亭集, juan 22, XXSKQS 1429, 668.

<sup>78</sup> To protect themselves from pirates and rebels is another story because they realized these threats were temporary. For example, when Li Zicheng's peasant rebellion swept across the North China Plain, one Shengyuan of Yin County named Tu Mujun 杜懋俊 discussed the matter of defending the local community. Those Yin County's literati as well as the other local elite ordered their lineage members to practice the military tactics to ensure self protection, especially patrolling at night. See Quan Zuwang, juan 8, XXSKQS 1429, 30.

hometown. One year later, his seventh younger brother became a madman and died in Kunshan because of the failure of the resistance.<sup>79</sup>

The characteristics of the literati in military affairs, in Yin County, as well as Lu lineage in Jiangnan mentioned above, have also been confirmed by Timothy Brook's study. Focusing on family continuity and cultural hegemony, his study of Yin County shows that the gentry had no interest in military affairs; this included even those whose ancestors were from military families, such as the Wan family 萬家.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, the question of whether continuity was the only concern for these literati and their lineages demands further discussion.

As a whole, the lineages in Jiangnan and Zhejiang showed relatively little effect from the wars and economic dislocation brought on by the fall of the South in the 1640s. In order to survive and reestablish their local preeminence, the lineage leaders had to make the important decision to accede to the new central power.<sup>81</sup>

#### **4: 4. Literati and Triple Pressures: the Southern Ming, Qing and Local Society**

Although the Qing army was able to sweep through all of eastern China with virtually no powerful resistance, it had no navy. All of its previous victories relied too heavily upon its land forces—its cavalry strikes on the field and its use of cannon in attacking cities. Because the literati's resistance movement was defeated in Jiangnan and eastern Zhejiang, the southern navies as well as coastal ports and islands off of Zhejiang and Fujian gradually drew the attention of various forces. Beginning in the fall of 1646, loyalists gathered into these areas, especially the Zhoushan archipelago and Chongming Island, in order to recover their military fortunes and try to cultivate a possible alliance with the scattered forces under the court of Lu.

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<sup>79</sup> For detailed information of this family's anti- Qing activities, see Quan Zuwang, juan 5, in XXSKQS 1429, 493-97.

<sup>80</sup> The family had first risen to prominence through military achievements during the founding of the Ming dynasty in the 1360s. See Timothy Brook (1990), 28-29.

<sup>81</sup> Elman (1990), 49-50.

Off the coast of Zhejiang there is a long sea bank (*haitang* 海塘) which stretches from Wenzhou and Taizhou to Ningbo and Shaoxing, this barrier is accompanied by a long beach. Since there are no ports available within this broad area, the Japanese pirates as well as other sea rovers posed less of a threat to eastern Zhejiang. Instead, their main targets were the areas from Zhapu 乍浦, Qingcun 青村, Nanhui 南匯, Shanghai, Jiading, and Taicang to Changshu 常熟, and Jiangyin as well as Jingjiang 靖江 in Nanzhili where countless rivers connect directly to the sea.<sup>82</sup>

After these threats were ended in the 1560s, the Jiangnan people of the coastal area returned to their peaceful lives, and military affairs were gradually ignored. In July of 1634, Qi Biaojia made his plans for the defense of the Jiangnan area. His report mentioned that all the relevant equipment as well as constructions had become useless, they were “extremely weak” 單弱已極. As for the coastal residents, many were cunning and brave, with a tendency to revolt. He suggested the organization of so-called *yubing* 漁兵 (fisher soldiers) which depended on the method of *baojia* to let fishing vessels work together as separate units. Under the command of *shaoguan* 哨官, they were expected to cooperate with the official army if needed.<sup>83</sup>

Although there are no records of whether his plan was carried out, it shows that the Jiangnan literati had already realized that the fishermen should not be ignored. In the Shaoxing area, these fishermen spent their whole lives half on land and half at sea. Unlike the ordinary people of Zhejiang, these fishermen were proud of their brave spirit as well as their facility with weapons, such as the sharp broadsword they used in fighting. These characteristics drew the local government’s attention to their dual functions: to use

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<sup>82</sup> *Jiaqing Zhili Taicang zhouzhi* 嘉慶直隸太倉州志, juan 24, in XXSKQS 697, 399-400; in those areas, sea defense was always the main concern for the local government since the Japanese pirate attacks. Many local gazetteers list “haifang” 海防 as special category, such as *Jiaqing Songjiang fuzhi* 嘉慶松江府志, juan 33, *Wubeizhi*- Haifang 武備志, in XXSKQS 688, 134.

<sup>83</sup> Qi Biaojia, *Yifen quangao* 宜焚全稿, juan 10, in XXSKQS 492, 549-50. Unfortunately, we have no way to get more information about this *Yubing*; probably it never existed.



them to fight against the enemy while also levying taxes on them to provide for military pay.<sup>84</sup>

The Qing army's rapid conquest meant that nobody was able to demonstrate a capacity to organize and use these forces. However, the series of wars that happened later showed that these fishermen never expressed absolute political loyalties. Instead, they were more concerned with pursuing their own benefit, by trying to find a balance among the various sorts of forces—the loyalist troops, the Qing army, as well as the remnant army of the Southern Ming.

Huang Zongxi made some comments about the strategy of the Southern Ming after the resistance movement was totally defeated. According to him, if the Southern Ming had garrison armies in both Chongming and Zhoushan, then these forces could have responded and supported each other to break down the transportation lines of the Qing army.<sup>85</sup>

What Huang imagined was not a pipe-dream. The anti-Qing forces in both Chongming and Zhoushan Island did have certain available resources. Control of Chongming Island see-sawed after the late 1640s between the Qing army and various anti-Qing forces. For residents of the island, the anti-Qing forces from far away usually brought them benefits such as grains and other goods (because of their desperate poverty they had no need to worry about plundering from the outside), meanwhile the Qing authorities always forced them to participate in the defense. In late 1653, the city of Chongming had been besieged for eight months by loyalist navies led by Zhang Mingzhen.

Entering the spring of the next year, the loyalist armies began to till the farmland surrounding the city. According to archives, starvation meant that most of the local residents (more than eighty percent) had no choice but to accept the rulership of the loyalists. Although the Qing army still controlled a few places, many people had already been starting to get in touch with the loyalists. The few defenders loyal to the Qing finally lost any hope of outside assistance because all the waterways were blocked. As a

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<sup>84</sup> *Qianlong Shaoxing fuzhi* 1 乾隆紹興府志 1, juan 22, *Wubeizhi* - Bingzhi 武備志, 兵制, in ZGDFZJC (Z), 39, 539.

<sup>85</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Zhoushan xingfei* 舟山興廢, ZGYSJC 32, 247.

head of the *tuanlian* reported, all the people suffered greatly from starvation and could not be gathered to be used.<sup>86</sup>

In comparison with the siege of Chongming, the Zhoushan archipelago played an even more important role in the whole resistance movement.<sup>87</sup>

Before the court of Lu moved to Zhoushan, this archipelago area had been controlled by a general named Huang Binqing 黃斌卿 for eight years. Huang was originally from Zhangzhou 漳州 in Fujian, and he was related to Zhang Mingzhen by marriage.

Gradually, his force was enlarged by absorbing various other troops, including Zhang's navy.<sup>88</sup>

Since Huang occupied Zhoushan in 1641, he conscripted all the male residents above the age of fifteen to be either *xiangbing* or regular soldiers. Since most of the farmland in the island belonged to the rich families who resided in the coastal area of Zhejiang, Huang simply confiscated all the land and deemed it official land (*guantian* 官田). However, as more and more remnant Ming soldiers came to the island, the limited resources proved insufficient. In the mid-1640s, a Shengyuan from Chongming named Shen Tingyang 沈廷揚 came to Zhoushan.<sup>89</sup> Shen was well known for his abilities in logistics. Huang took his suggestion and started to levy tax as well as supplies for other military needs based on the amount of farmland. These measures enabled Huang's troops to maintain good discipline, and so they did not bother the local residents too much.<sup>90</sup>

In November of 1649, the Lu court moved to the island. Their coming also marked the end of the restoration in the coastal and inland areas of Zhejiang and Jiangnan.

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<sup>86</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao dingbian*, vol. 1, 94-96.

<sup>87</sup> Zhang Mingzhen finally withdrew his navy several months later; see Gu Cheng, 814-20.

<sup>88</sup> Zhang Mingzhen was a native of Nanjing who received his military *Jinshi* in 1638. At the time of the fall of the Nanjing regime, he held the post of major at a garrison just south of Ningbo. He transferred his loyalty to the Prince of Lu, who made him a general, and later an earl. See *Zhoushan xingfei -xingchaolu* 5 (行朝錄之五) ZGYSJC32, 246. Also see Struve (1984), 113-14; Wakeman (1985), vol. 2, 741-43.

<sup>89</sup> He was executed in 1647 at Nanjing. See Xu Bingyi, 356-57.

<sup>90</sup> Huang committed suicide in October of 1649. For detailed information about Huang, see *Lu zhi chungiu*, juan 10, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 490-91; see also *Zhoushan xingfei*, in ZGYSJC32, 247.

However, from the perspective of the island's defense, they at least enlarged the loyalist force in numbers. The available literature provides scarce and very confused information about this court's practical measures in dealing with resistance movements in the coastal areas after its move to the island. Based on second hand materials, Struve claims that "no operational relation was worked out between the Lu court and the various stockade defenders" in the eastern Zhejiang areas such as Siming Mountain.<sup>91</sup>

After thorough examination of the Qing archives, and especially the confessions from prisoners of the Qing army, I have found some sources that provide concrete and vivid cases showing that the Zhoushan regime not only did connect with and try to affect the coastal area in various ways, but also that the Lu court's activity reached to the lowest level of society in eastern Zhejiang. Unlike the Jiangnan literati represented by Chen Zilong who only paid attention to the counterespionage work of the revolting military officers of the Qing army, they even aimed their efforts at ordinary Qing soldiers.

Wang Wanxun 王完勳 was a local rebel leader whose forces occupied the hills of Yuyao County. A man called Tang Shipin 湯使聘 was kidnapped to be Wang's soldier in early September, 1650. Tang fled from the camp and became a Qing soldier as soon as the Qing army began to conscript. In the Qing camp, he and six other soldiers become close friends (*xiang hou* 相厚). By the end of that year he had also established a close relationship with two *Shengyuan* named Shen Zhitai 沈之泰 and Zou Zishi 鄒子實, both from his hometown. Shen and Zou were officials under the rebel leader Wang Wanxun and they had close contact with Zhoushan. Through Tang Shipin, all the above Qing soldiers received the seal and certification issued by these two *shengyuan*. Tang himself was appointed as Vice General (*fujian* 副將). His father Tang Rixin 湯日新, afraid of what he had done, later burned his certificate. However, his uncle Tang Sheng 湯聖 had become involved in the revolt. Tang Sheng was sent by Tang Shipin to see Wang Wanxun in the mountains and ask to get money as reward and pay. Wang responded:

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<sup>91</sup> Struve (1984), 114.

I need plenty of money to give the soldiers as gratuities for the arrival of the New Year. I would like to go to Zhoushan to see the Prince of Lu. After getting the money, I will give it to him [Tang Shiping].

This case shocked the Qing army greatly; they began to realize that the local Zhejiang soldiers could not be used any more.<sup>92</sup>

Another case from Yuhang County 余杭 also shows contact between Zhoushan and certain social forces of the eastern Zhejiang area. A group of rebels began their revolt between 1647 and 1648 in the areas of Qiantang, Yuhang, and Lin'an 臨安 counties. The leader of the troops, Sheng Yulin 盛玉麟 (also named Sheng Gui 盛貴), demonstrated his capacity in military affairs. He divided his eight hundred soldiers into six battalions and allowed them to supply themselves while only giving the extra "goods" (*wujian* 物件) to him. Since most of the income came from plundering and there was no guaranteed supply, Shen implemented a levy of three *sheng* of rice for each *mou* in those areas he controlled. In 1652, Sheng changed his name to Jiang Si 蔣四. Through a monk who called himself *jianjun* 監軍 (Army-inspecting Censor), this army made a connection with Zhoushan. The rebels asked this monk to let them know how to call on the emperor. With seal and blank certificate in hand, the monk collected more than four hundred taels of silver from Sheng's force.<sup>93</sup>

However, neither Zhoushan nor Chongming finally played a crucial role in the resistance movement. As Zhang Dai indicates, since Zhoushan is much closer to the mainland, it was not suitable for use as the base for reviving the Ming; instead, it was only suitable for taking a breath.<sup>94</sup>

After the Qing army swept the coastal area, they launched an attack to conquer the island. In October of 1651, the main defenses were broken without severe fighting. Thus,

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<sup>92</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao jibian*, vol. 2, 106-108.

<sup>93</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao dingbian*, vol. 2, 110 (A-B).

<sup>94</sup> Zhang Dai, juan 50, in XXSKQS 320, 706.

the loyalists of both Jiangnan and Zhejiang lost their final base and had to go southward along the coast. Regent Lu was taken to Zheng Chenggong's headquarters in Xiamen and died later because of serious asthma. This defeat also meant that the Southern Ming's hopes for a maritime offensive were dashed.

Countless reasons caused the tragedy. However, I will deal only with one factor from a military perspective. Previously, the limited studies that exist have usually paid attention to the falling out between certain top figures such as Zhang Mingzhen and Huang Bingqing. However, a statistical study based on an examination of the Qing archives reveals an interesting phenomenon: the Zhoushan defense troops were almost all controlled by military officials from northern China. According to the report sent by Qin Shizhen 秦世禎, the Governor of Zhejiang, among a total of twenty-three higher and middle ranking military officials who surrendered to the Qing army, only two did not belong to this category (these were both from the Prefecture of Jinhua 金華府).<sup>95</sup> Likewise, among the ordinary soldiers, it was the northerners who comprised the most powerful defending unit. Finally, it was also they who guided the Qing's attack after they surrendered.<sup>96</sup>

In confrontation with the powerful Qing army, also from the north, it is easy to understand why the court of Lu (its most important officials, both *Wen* and *Wu*, were composed of southern men) could not count on these armies. Until now, as a whole, the literati's resistance movement was defeated in Jiangnan and eastern Zhejiang as well as the Zhoushan archipelago. However, Zhang Huangyan still insisted on his anti-Qing military behaviour.

#### 4: 5. The Ming Loyalists' Last Stand

Like Qian Suyue, Zhang Huangyan also began his resistance action in Yi County, Zhejiang. Zhang was the last of more than forty people in this county who sacrificed

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<sup>95</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao dingbian*, vol. 2, 135 (AB).

<sup>96</sup> Zhang Dai, vol. 52, in *XXSKQS* 320, 713.

themselves for the Ming dynasty. In his childhood, Zhang not only received a traditional Confucian- style education, but also, unlike many others, was introduced to martial arts and *qigong* 氣功 practice. In the mid-1630s, the Ming Dynasty began to pay attention to military affairs because of the threats from both peasant rebellions and the Manchu invasion. When Zhang Huangyan took his *shengyuan* examination in 1636, the authorities of Yi County asked all candidates to take an extra examination in horse riding and arrow shooting. Among all the candidates only Zhang followed the order; all three arrows he shot hit the target (三發三中). He received his *juren* degree in 1642. When Qian Suyue started to revolt in this county, Zhang was the only local elite to respond to his call. As a *juren* degree holder, Zhang's appearance moved Qian to tears. Zhang was immediately appointed as an envoy to welcome the Prince of Lu to Tiantai 天臺. Among the officials in Qian's army, only Zhang Huangyan could handle both military and civil affairs.<sup>97</sup>

In 1647, he supervised Zhang Mingzheng's navy in response to the mutiny of Wu Shengzhao in Jiangnan. Although their fleet's failure was mainly caused by a typhoon, Zhang Huangyan realized that the Southern Ming's navy needed to be trained well, especially in the skills of sailing. After several months, he was even able to direct the drills personally as a steersman on the deep ocean. From 1652, this navy entered into the Yangzi River three times, but never received military cooperation from either the Central Plain or Jiangnan areas. After Zhang Mingzhen died at Zhoushan in January, 1656, this navy came totally under his control.

Entering 1659, the Qing army launched its campaign to conquer Yunnan and Guizhou. Allied with another well-known loyalist, Zheng Chenggong, Zhang Huangyan decided to take this chance to start another northern expedition (*beifa* 北伐). During this process, Zhang took the lead in Zheng's attack. This alliance enabled the Ming loyalists to achieve a degree of organization that their army had never had before. Not only were they thoroughly trained, they also numbered an impressive 100,000 military personnel as well as more than 3,000 warships and service ships, plus equipment such as cannon and

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<sup>97</sup> Li Yuqiu, juan 16, in ZGYSJCXB25, 528.

armor. However, the following campaigns, especially the siege of Nanjing, showed that this army was unable to translate its formidable power into success on the battlefield. Their battle effectiveness was seriously limited by the accompaniment of family members, and their final defeat was ensured by the fact that they did not have horses. Both Zhang and Zheng wanted to undertake a massive campaign in order to win an impressive victory, thereby arousing the Chinese (Han) people out of their lethargy, but, unfortunately, they overplayed their hand. Previous studies of Zheng's failure in Nanjing usually emphasize the factor of the Qing army's return from Guizhou and Huguang in the summer of 1659. In fact, the Qing side had already begun its preparations long before the attack. The archives show that the Qing armies had been reassembled in 1658. We learn, for example, that a large number of troops from Henan, Jiangxi, Shanxi, and Shandong were redeployed in order to defend against attacks from the Southern Ming navies;<sup>98</sup> and in Zhejiang province, the Coast Defense Army 海防兵 was increased to 10,000.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, Zhang Mingzheng's threats over the previous years had made the Qing leadership aware of how to go about defending the mouth of the Yangzi River, a point of access to the Jiangnan area. Not only had garrison forces been strengthened, but a number of additional special measures had been taken. For instance, a long iron cable was stretched across the river.<sup>100</sup>

Zhang Huangyan led his vanguard troops up the Yangzi river after taking Guazhou 瓜州. Shortly after Zhang's advance, Zheng led his main forces to occupy another important city, Zhenjiang. After their short meeting on the Yangzi River at Nanjing, this powerful northern expedition troop was again divided. Zhang took a light naval unit, several thousand soldiers and no more than one hundred warships upstream toward Wuhu

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<sup>98</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao jiabian*, vol. 5, 423.

<sup>99</sup> Chen Feng, 92-94.

<sup>100</sup> Beginning in early May, the Southern Ming army's so-called northern expedition lasted more than three months. In addition to the factors mentioned above, many reasons such as poor intelligence gathering caused their failure. For more information, see a special report sent in September by Lang Tingzuo 郎廷佐—the General Governor of Jiangnan, in *Ming Qing shiliao jiabian*, vol. 5, 456-57; also see Gu Cheng, 939-940; 955-61; Struve (1984), 185-93; Zhang Yu 張玉, "Zheng Chenggong beizheng Nanjing gaishu" 鄭成功北征南京概述, *Lishi dang'an* 2 (1988), 90-96.

in order to prevent the Qing's attack from Jiangxi and Huguang.<sup>101</sup> On July 7, Zhang reached Wuhu and then sent a small number of troops to take the surrounding cities such as Liyang, Chizhou 池州, Heyang 和陽, and Ningguo.<sup>102</sup>

In comparison with the Qing propaganda directed at the Jiangnan area that promised a peaceful life for ordinary people and the maintenance of status for local elites, such as the edict issued by Dorgon, as mentioned in Chapter Three, Zhang Huangyan, usually under the name of Zheng Chenggong, the Prince of Yanping 延平王鄭成功 could only emphasize some abstract doctrines such as *Huayi zhi bian*, in order to claim his legitimacy. However, by the end of more than a decade of Qing control, it was clear that many of their promises had not been kept—the constant wars as well as various smaller conflicts left the Jiangnan people waiting for a brighter future. Zhang's coming brought some of these local people a new hope. Within about two months, four Prefectures 府, three Zhou 州, and twenty four counties 縣 were restored to the Ming. It is recorded that the sight of their clothing, in the style of the former Ming, moved many of the gentry to tears. Zhang's troops were welcomed everywhere, their influence even reached to parts of the Huguang area. Zhang Huangyan considered his successes to be the result of his effective control and the army's thorough training. He pointed out at one point, if “by chance there are some disbanded soldiers who plundered, they were arrested and punished immediately.”<sup>103</sup>

By the end of July, Zheng Chenggong had been defeated in Nanjing by the Qing army. Without notifying Zhang, he began to flee along the Yangzi River. Since he had previously refused Zhang's suggestion to occupy Chongming Island as a base, his fleet had no place to rest and had to return to the south. In late autumn of 1659, they finally arrived back at Xiamen.

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<sup>101</sup> Zhang Huangyan, B.

<sup>102</sup> Xu Bingyi, 384-86.

<sup>103</sup> Zhang Huangyan, B.



For Zhang Huangyan, the loss of Nanjing and Zheng's failure meant that his small navy had no way to retreat. In this case, he sent a message to Zheng imploring him to stay at Zhenjiang:

Winning or losing is very normal for military men. What we depend on now is the hearts of the people. Moreover, we still occupy the upstream area. If you could add about one hundred warships to assist us, it would be possible to reach our goal.<sup>104</sup>

Zhang did not receive any reply from Zheng because he was still fleeing. The Jiangxi and Jiangchu areas 江楚 (present Hubei province) did not know of the latest developments in the Jiangnan area. Many Ming loyalists continued to come to join Zhang's army. He decided to go upstream further, intending to reach Poyang Lake 鄱陽湖. On August 7, they met a Qing navy at Tongling 銅陵. After losing four warships, the Qing fleet intended to escape from the battle at night. However, their use of cannons and hurried movements made Zhang's soldiers think that the Qing army was attempting to raid their camp. Zhang's fleet collapsed within several hours. He led several hundred people to Huoshan Mountain 霍山. Since all the local *zhai* and residents had already surrendered to the Qing, no one welcomed his coming. All his subordinates scattered except one servant and one soldier. After a trek of more than 1,000 kilometers along the border of Nanzhili, these three people finally escaped overland to the southeastern Zhejiang coast half a year later.<sup>105</sup>

Later on, he continued his support of the resistance, and organized a small band of amphibious fighters. He asked Zheng Chenggong not to abandon the mainland to take Taiwan, insisting that if Zheng "would campaign in the North again, 'a million bravoes would join and a thousand locales could be taken in.' When this persuasion failed, Zhang pleaded earnestly several times with Regent Lu to actively take up the banner that Zheng had let fall, giving the Chinese masses one more chance to rise up in response to a Ming

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<sup>104</sup> QDRWZG -A, vol. 2, 275-81.

<sup>105</sup> Quan Zuwang, juan 9, in XXSKQS 1429, 34-35.

rallying cry.”<sup>106</sup> However, the former regent died soon after because of asthma (at the end of 1662), and the Ming dynasty had finally come to an end.

The campaign of 1659 marked the Ming loyalists’ last hope to revive the empire. Their tenacious resistance reached an apex in 1647 with the alliance of Jiangnan literati and Wu Shenzhao. Since the failure of that endeavor, the Southern Ming loyalists realized that the resistance movement on land could not succeed. What they had always expected was a strategy in which the Southern Ming navies would launch an attack by sea to which they could provide assistance. Zheng Chenggong and Zhang Huangyan’s retreat seemed like an epilogue. With the consolidation of Qing rule, they had to find another way to survive.

Zhang Huangyan was captured and killed in 1664. His participation in the resistance movement for nineteen years was likely something of a record. In the course of his participation, he entered into Fujian three times, four times launched attacks along the Yangzi River, and his fleet capsized twice. In his last few years, he refused to surrender several times. Witnessing more and more people acknowledging the legitimacy of the Qing rule, it became obvious to him that to continue the resistance meant only a meaningless loss of lives. After disbanding his small group of soldiers in June 1664, he hoped to spend the rest of his life on an isolated island.<sup>107</sup>

When he was captured in mid-July, he delivered the following words to Zhang Jie 張傑, the Provincial Military Commander of Zhejiang (*Zhejiang tidu* 浙江提督):

When my father died, I could not bury him; when the Ming dynasty fell, I could not save it; I cannot expiate all my crimes even in death. What I expect today is to die soon.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Struve (1984), 193.

<sup>107</sup> In a letter written to the Governor of Zhejiang, he expressed why he had disbanded the troop: to avoid people’s suffering caused by war. See Fang Furen 方福仁, “Shilun Zhang Cangshui” 試論張蒼水, in *Guangming ribao*, Shixue 史學, January 29, 1964. See also Chen Yongming 陳永明, “Lun jindai xuezhe dui Zhang Huangyan de yanjiu” 論近代學者對張煌言的研究, *Journal of Chinese Studies*, 25.1 (1992), 56- 67.

<sup>108</sup> Xu Bingyi, juan 18, 384-86.

Before he was executed in the market on September 7, he composed this poem, it reads:

Both the state and my family have perished, what I can do?

國破家亡欲何之

There are models at this West Lake I need to follow:

西子湖頭有我師

The sun and moon were suspended above Yu Qian's grave,

日月雙懸于氏墓

This disintegrated country makes me always think about Yue Fei's tomb.

乾坤半壁岳家墳<sup>109</sup>

Among all the Chinese literati during the Ming-Qing transition, Zhang set the best example of how to balance both political and personal pursuits. He was a loyalist first, dedicated to the sovereign and country, but he always kept his own moral integrity. By the disbanding of his troops and his brave death, he successfully realized his ideal of maintaining honor and noble character without bringing about the loss of ordinary people's lives. Moreover, as a *wenren*, Zhang Huangyan played his role in the various fields of military affairs: not only had he already demonstrated his unique ability as a young person, he continued in the same way over the nineteen years of his resistance career. Apart from organizing both overland and navy campaigns, he also showed ability in strategic decision making as well as the coordination of the various anti-Qing forces. For instance, he tried to intercede in the conflicts between the court of Lu and the Reign of Longwu at Fujian, albeit without effect. He intended to integrate all forces available

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<sup>109</sup> Zhang Huangyan, *Zhang zhongliegong ji* 張忠烈公集, juan 5, XXSKQS 1388, p. 376. Yu Qian 于謙 (1398-1547) was a statesman and military man born in Hangzhou. He was awarded the *jinshi* degree in 1421. As Minister of War, he successfully defended Beijing against the Oirat. See L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds. *Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 1608-12; Yue Fei 嶽飛 (1103-1142) was a hero from Henan who led the troops to fight against the invasion of the Jin; he was killed by his opponents among the Song court by the end of January, 1142.

regardless of their background, including those of Liu Kongzhao 劉孔昭, one of the warlords of the Southern Ming who used to have severe conflicts with the Donglin literati when they were at the Hongguang court in Nanjing.<sup>110</sup>

When Zhang Huangyan and his comrades were attempting to institute a revival on the southeast coast, the Qing government gradually consolidated its rule over the rest of China.<sup>111</sup>

From Yao Tinglin's memoirs, as mentioned in Chapter Three, we can understand how, and to what extent, the Qing authority was able to mobilize various forces against Zheng and Zhang's northern expedition in Songjiang and adjacent areas in Jiangnan. As a clerk of the local *yamen*, Yao had worked for the Qing for several years before this northern expedition. During this period, he worked as a contractor, with all the opportunities for profit but also with all the risks involved. In 1659, he was moved to the military bureau (*bingfang* 兵房). Faced with Zheng and Zhang's broad ranging raids on the Yangzi and other areas, the response on the Qing side was the frantic mobilization of troops and resources; the state of emergency was to last a long time after Zheng Chenggong was finally defeated and had fled across the ocean. Yao's *Linian ji* recounts in detail how he had to requisition boats, horses, fodder, and other supplies, and deliver them on time if he wished to avoid jail or a beating. In fact he was once even threatened with beheading by a certain Ma, who was provincial commander-in-chief who had happened to stop at the Wusong garrison. Regardless of what happened, it was always the poor who suffered the most because it was their property that was being requisitioned.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Quan Zuwang, juan 9, in XXSKQS 1429, 32-33.

<sup>111</sup> During wartime, the Qing government of course had to face the challenges of military affairs. For example, its military provision needed about 20,000,000 -24,000,000 taels of silver every year after 1656, but its total available income was 19,600,000. See Weng Tongjue 翁同爵, "Liechao bingxiang jilue" 列朝兵餉紀略, in *Huangchao bingzhi kaolue* 皇朝兵制考略, juan 3, XXSKQS 858, 655.

For the case of Zhejiang, when Zheng Chenggong and Zhang Huangyan launched their northern expedition in 1659, this province had a huge budget deficit in the military logistic affairs, especially for the grain supply. See *Ming Qing shiliao jibian*, vol. 5, 477.

On the battlefield, the Qing army was always proud of its powerful cavalry, but those horses from the north were not accustomed with the climate and fodder after they entered into Southeastern China. In 1658, within half year 552 "official horses 官馬" died due to the reasons mentioned above. See *Ming Qing shiliao jibian*, vol. 5, 464.

<sup>112</sup> Pierre-Etienne Will, "Coming of Age in Shanghai during the Ming-Qing Transition, Yao Tinglin's Record of the Successive Years," *Gujin lunheng* 4 (2000), 15-39.

Indeed, the Ming loyalists' last northern expedition achieved great success in the first stage, as marked by the siege of Nanjing, but we have to pay attention to the concrete reasons. The latest studies by Wei Qingyuan show that this navy had special advantages in terms of conscription and financial supply. Apart from fishermen and peasants from the southeast coast area, many of the soldiers were from the "Green Battalion" (*lüying* 綠營) of the Qing army, and some of them were clerks from the Qing *Yamen*. It seems that the only reason they were involved in Zheng's army was because of the higher salaries being offered. For instance, in 1654, Zheng provided four *dou* of white rice plus 0.5 tael of silver every month for each newly conscripted soldier, far more than the ordinary Qing soldier's salary from the Green Battalion. When the yellow recruiting flag was raised, many people came to be conscripted, "like a continuous stream," the former Qing army soldiers even brought their weapons. Zheng's income came mainly from overseas trade, tax collection, and plundering of coastal areas from Fujian to the mouth of the Yangzi River.<sup>113</sup>

These conditions remind us that we should not overstate the role played by a sense of ethnicity during conflicts between the Manchus and the Han Chinese. This navy's coming did arouse a certain ethnic sentiments among some literati, but not all. As Wen Ruilin indicates, because of their fear of the calamity caused by warfare, many of the gentry of eastern Zhejiang as well as other coastal areas had secret communications with the official (Qing) army during these three months. As guides, they led the official army's attack; as residents, they responded to the Qing army's military action. Ming loyalists were subject to arrest or execution.<sup>114</sup>

By early August, most of Zhang's subordinates had been scattered. Considering the long anti-Qing tradition of the Ying and Huo mountainous areas 英霍山區, some people suggested to Zhang that he enter into the hills. On August 17, they reached Yangshan

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<sup>113</sup> Wei Qingyuan 韋慶遠, "Youguan Qing chu jin hai he qian jie de ruogan wenti" 有關清初禁海和遷界的若干問題, in *Ming Qing luncong* (Beijing: Zijincheng, 2002), 3, 189-203.

<sup>114</sup> Wen Ruilin, *liezhuan* 列傳, juan 19.

*Zhai* 陽山寨, on Huo Mountain. This *zhai* was built on the top of the mountain; it was broad enough to allow room for about ten thousand people to reside. Furthermore, it was dotted with springs so there was no worry about water supplies. The local military force led by Chu Liangfu 褚良甫 had already been pacified and surrendered to the Qing army. Originally, he was hesitant, but when he got the news about Zheng's failure in Nanjing, he firmly refused Zhang's entrance.<sup>115</sup> For most ordinary people, the Ming was only an increasingly distant memory. Some of them did offer help or a welcoming attitude when Zhang Huangyan's fleet arrived in July, and Zhang himself was deeply touched by the assistance they provided. However, when he lost his fleet and intended to flee overland, he suddenly found nothing in hand and no followers except one soldier and a servant.<sup>116</sup>

Among the various reasons leading to the failure of Zhang Huangyan, one overlapped with what we have previously studied —the relationship between *Wen* and *Wu*.

#### 4: 6. Summary

The resistance movement of the Zhejiang literati was not only expressed in separate uprisings, but also allied military action. However, the effect of their resistance was reduced because it became tightly entangled with political conflicts as well as contradictions among the two Ming courts and regular Ming armies. The so-called righteous troops cooperated and supported each other in self-defense. This force, together with the local mountain people and fishermen, never expressed absolute certain political loyalties because they were more concerned with pursuing actual benefit, and intended to find a balance among the various sorts of forces. Military action by lineages was usually restricted to members of an individual family and rarely extended to the scope of the whole lineage. The defense of a lineage does not correspond to the defense of local society, let alone the whole empire, because this sort of loyalty cannot be magnified

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<sup>115</sup> Gu Cheng, 961-67.

<sup>116</sup> Zhang Huangyan, B, in ZGYSJC 35, 386; see also Gu Cheng, 961- 67.

gradually and simply to the level of the state, despite what Confucian ideology traditionally claimed. As a whole, the lineages showed relatively little effect from the wars and economic dislocation, and they intended to accede to the new central power, in order to survive and reestablish their local preeminence. The Ming loyalists' last northern expedition reminds us that we should not overstate the role played by a sense of ethnicity during conflicts between the Manchus and the Han Chinese. Finally, Zhang Huangyan's experience of engaging in military action offers us an example of how a Chinese literatus could best engage in military affairs: he must balance both political and personal pursuits; be dedicated to the sovereign and homeland while maintaining moral integrity; and preserving his honor and noble character without bringing about the loss of ordinary people's lives.

## Chapter 5

### Between *Wen* and *Wu*

#### 5: 1 The Role Change: A Reexamination of the Relationship between *Wen* *Wu*

The relationship between *Wen* and *Wu* is generally considered to be one between polar opposites: the *Wen* are associated with culture and refinement in the practice of government and literature, while the *Wu* are connected with warfare and violence.

Edward L. Dreyer provides a typical explanation as follows:

The civil officials have a common upbringing and a strong sense of being the guardians of the moral tradition that is the basis of all civilized society, and this gives them a strong feeling of corporate unity, despite the Confucian preference for moral qualities over technical expertise, the civil officials provided imperial China's nearest equivalent to a professional body, and, despite their frequent financial corruption, their loyalty to Confucianism and to the reigning dynasty was always dependable. Military officers, on the other hand, did not have a selection process that endowed them with a common outlook and common values, and their loyalties in consequence tended to be particularistic, directed to the official or commander who had furthered their careers, rather than to the state as a whole.<sup>1</sup>

Quite frankly, the above conclusion is basically based on imagination. In practice, Chinese emperors usually considered civil officials to be easier to control because, in comparison to military officials, they were not even strong enough to hold a chicken (*shou wu fuji zhili* 手無傳雞之力). Needless to say, Chinese history, as well as military literature has been written by the educated people, so-called *wenren*, thus the contents of historical records have been largely shaped by the needs and interests of civil officials or ordinary literati, and the role they played is always overstated or exaggerated. On the other hand, descriptions of the military commanders are usually limited to their

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<sup>1</sup> Dreyer, 9-10.



“imposing physical presence and courage, horsemanship and personal acquaintance with weapons, good judgment in an actual battlefield situation, and, most important of all, firm maintenance of military discipline.”<sup>2</sup>

Thus, the professional role of the military officer was confined to the actual leadership of his troops on the battlefield. Their lack of literacy is further demonstrated by the fact that there were often civil officials attached to them at different levels to handle their administrative work. They and army supervisors, in a number of dynasties personal servants of the emperor, such as eunuchs, also, of course, served to check the ambitions of the generals by making frequently reports back to the central administrative authorities. Indeed, the general level of education of military officers was much lower than that of their civil counterparts. In fact, most of the military officers were illiterate. For this reason, policy-making and the administrative work required for maintaining the military establishment were taken over by civil officials. These aspects ensured that the military officers had much lower prestige than civil officials in corresponding ranks. These phenomena undoubtedly not only affected the common concerns of literati, for they had no intention to be familiar with military affairs, but also impressed the ordinary people who created a proverb that said: “Just as good iron is not beaten into nails, so a good man is not turned into a soldier.”<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Dreyer, 8.

<sup>3</sup> For the general survey of the relationship between *Wen* and *Wu* in the ancient and imperial China, to the best of my knowledge, the following studies should be paid attention to and cited:

Edward L. Dreyer, “Military Continuities: The PLA and Imperial China”, in William W. Whitson ed, *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 1-10;

Needham and Yates have done another important general survey. The relevant chapter (chapter 30, part B), covers almost all aspects of the classical Chinese military text, military affairs as well as this relationship. See Volume 5, part 6, “Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges” (Chinese version, Beijing and Shanghai: Kexue and Shanghai guji, 2002);

Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War, Classical Strategic Thought* (London: Portland, OR. Frank Cass, 1996), “introduction”;

Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank, eds., *Chinese Ways in Warfare* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974);

Winston W. Lo, “The Self-image of the Chinese Military in Historical Perspective,” *Journal of Asian History* 31.1 (1997), 1-21;

Hong Luxun 洪陸訓, *Junshi zhengzhixue- wen wu guanxi lilun* 軍事政治學 - 文武關係理論 (Taipei, Wunan tushu, 2002). This book focuses on introduction of development of the West studies as well as the contemporary civil and military relations. It seldom mentions the relevant contents of the late imperial China, let alone ancient knowledge;

Wang Houqing 王厚卿 ed., *Zhongguo junshi sixiang lungang* 中國軍事思想論綱 (Beijing: Guofang daxue, 2000);

All of these dominant opinions have been reexamined and challenged in the past decades. In the case of the Ming, based on the above common knowledge as well as some remarks from Ming literati such as Huang Zongxi, Struve states that “stellar careers were not made from martial achievements, and the man who could lead either a campaign or a court conference with equal facility was a very rare anomaly. Although lip service was paid to the principle of integrating *wen* and *wu* in men of elite status, in actuality officials clung to their civil identities. In Ming China there were no Dwight Eisenhowers or Alexander Haigs, or lieutenant colonels who later became governors or mayors, proud to tell constituents of their record in military service. Such role changes were unthinkable for the Ming scholar-official.”<sup>4</sup>

Kenneth Swope’s recent series of studies remind us that Ming military history was actually very complicated. For instance, he notes that, as a civil official, a former censor-in-chief was not only responsible for successful policies, but also appeared in the advancing Ming columns in 1600 as a military official. In one paper, he finds that, contrary to what has long been assumed, the creative combination of civil and military officials in charge of the campaign (the Bozhou Campaign) may have led to their success.<sup>5</sup>

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Wei Ruolin and Liu Zhongping, see mentioned above;

Huang Kuanzhong 黃寬重, “Zhongguo lishishang wuren diwei de zhuanbian” 中國歷史上武人地位的轉變, in *Nan- Song junzheng yu wenxian tan* 南宋軍政與文獻探 (Taipei, Xinwenfeng, 1990), 367- 99;

The Song Dynasty plays a crucial role in changing position of military officials. Usually, this dynasty has been characterized as militarily weak, but Peter Lorge suggests that such a characterization is largely the result of distortions wrought by literati historians of the Song and subsequently. See Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Civil- Military Relations in Imperial China: Introduction”, in *War and Society* 18.2 (2000), 6.

For the Ming period, a concise analysis is by Ray Huang. Using Qi Jiguang as a case study, he not only provides a general survey about this relationship, but also indicated that Qi is a special case in the mid-sixteenth century. “Although his rise to prominence had been the result of the peculiar situation in the middle of the century, he nevertheless owed a great deal of his success to the unreserved support and patronage of a civil official.” Ray Huang (1981b), 174.

Another paper by James Millinger also provides careful examination about this relationship. See “Ch’i Chi-kuang – A Ming Military Official as Viewed by His Contemporary Civil Officials,” *Oriens Extremus*, 20 (1973), 103-117.

<sup>4</sup> Struve (1984), 6.

<sup>5</sup> Kenneth Swope, “Civil-Military Coordination in the Bozhou Campaign of the Wanli Era,” in *War and Society* 18.2 (2000), 49-70.

My own research suggests differences from the views of both Struve and Swope. Role changes between *Wen* and *Wu* (that civil officials could become military officials or vice versa) were claimed “unthinkable” by Struve. However, primary materials show us that these phenomena did exist. February, 1638, witnessed a wide-spread peasant rebellion met by an extremely ineffectual Ming army. Zhang Renxue 張任學, the Regional Inspector of Henan (*Henan xun'an yushi* 河南巡按禦史), asked to change his civil official position to that of a military official. The Chongzhen emperor was touched by this request, and he ordered the Board of War and Personnel as well as the Censorate 都察院 to personally make his new appointment. Since he was not satisfied with Zhang's first position as Army Inspecting Censor also in charge of the affairs of the Regional Commander (*jianjun yushi jian zongbing shi* 監軍禦史兼總兵事), he let Zhang be appointed as the Acting Assistant Commissioner-in-chief as well as the General Regional Commander of Henan (*shu dudu qianshi wei Henan zongbingguan* 署都督僉事爲河南總兵官).<sup>6</sup>

Beginning in July of 1645, the shifting of roles between civil and military officials became even more widespread. There was a special section entitled *Wen wu huyong* 文武互用 (the replacement of civil and military officials) in a book written by Fu Ge 福格 of the Qing dynasty. The author lists more than ten people who changed their roles in this section. Among them, there are four who changed from civil to military officials. Some of them even changed their position twice: civil to military, and back to civil again.<sup>7</sup>

Swope's writings focus on the late period of Wanli reign's (1573-1620). His study is admirable in asserting that “it would be more accurate to say that *Wen* and *Wu* have stood and still stand in a dialectical relationship to one another, and that interchange between the two fields of activity has been much more fluid than had previously been supposed.”<sup>8</sup> Moreover, his works challenge the previous model in which this reign was given a

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<sup>6</sup> Long Wenbing 龍文彬, *Ming huiyao* 明會要, juan 42, Zhiguan 14 職官(Beijing: zhonghua, 1956), 759.

<sup>7</sup> Fu Ge 福格, *Tingyu congkan* 聽雨叢談, juan 1, in *Qing dai shiliao biji congkan* 清代史料筆記叢刊 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1984), 20-21.

<sup>8</sup> Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Civil- Military Relations in Imperial China: Introduction,” in *War and Society* 18.2 (2000), 7.

negative portrayal in military affairs. However, the significance of his case studies is limited by the period he has selected and other matters. For one thing, we do not know whether or how the literati (civil officials) handled either ethnic conflicts on the frontier or the campaigns of fighting with rebels inland. We also do not know, for example, their attitudes and the measures they took when faced by these two threats simultaneously. For another, the example he mentioned above (censor-in-chief) is of a former civil official; what was the role of current officials, such as those mentioned in the above several chapters? Furthermore, while role changes certainly took place, these cannot be ascribed universal significance—this sort of case was so rare that nobody in the court of Chongzhen knew how to appoint Zhang Renxue to a suitable position, as we mentioned above. This reminds us that we also cannot overstate the frequency of the role changing between *Wen* and *Wu*.

Relying upon the latest scholarly research from both abroad and China, including Taiwan, I would like to argue that indicating this kind of “dialectical relationship” is not enough. In one word, the way that civil and military officials affected each other in fact expresses the characteristic of the real relationship between the central government and its own military forces or certain local forces in the whole empire. As the representative of the empire, the emperor usually occupied a neutral position between *Wen* and *Wu*. The military officials always acted out their role as important players in a machine that was dedicated to defense and suppression; however, the role of the civil officials (composed of literati who passed the civil examination) was not designed for commanding or supervising the military officials. There was no abstract relationship between them. In order to examine the essence of this relationship, one important prerequisite must be set: we have to explore it on the basis of concrete historical periods or certain backgrounds as well as situations. Especially, we have to distinguish between wartime and peace.

Previous research, generally based on records from times of peace, has always emphasized the importance of civil officials; a few examinations, such as Swope’s, pay equal attention to both war and peace time and thus shed light offer a balanced view. But it is important that wartime be understood as a completely different situation. Since the empire’s destiny is determined during times of war, my examination of relationships in wartime allows me to propose a conclusion contrary to all previous studies: it is military,

not civil officials, who played the crucial role. The civil officials, of course, fulfilled their duties in times of peace; but does this phenomenon make sense in times of military conflict? Let us use the Ming dynasty, especially the period from 1640s to 1650s, to briefly explore the characteristic of this relationship.

Undoubtedly, the rise and fall of the empire usually took place during times of war. As long as the state was at war, the power and importance of the military officials, especially the leading generals, maintained the prestige of the officer class. When a new regime was born, the dynastic founders usually intended to disband or at least decrease the number of their armies. What they hoped was that the conditions of peace they had achieved could be maintained permanently by good administration and moral example, rather than by force. The civil officials thus began to become involved more and more in military affairs.

As the founder of Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang's background, as well as his close friends from Huaixi 淮西 had few of the merits usually associated with civil officials. In fact, he belittled and hated *Wenren*, especially those from Jiangnan because they used to support his opponent Zhang Shicheng 張士誠. Despite all this, he still wanted to upgrade the position of civil officials after the establishment of the Ming. Due to the strong opposition from his old generals (*xunchen* 勳臣), his first endeavor in 1384 proved unsuccessful. The military officials' superior position was not questioned by those civil officials until the 1390s.<sup>9</sup>

Beginning at this time, the Ming Empire gradually entered into a peaceful period which lasted more than two centuries. The sporadic attacks from steppe and sea did not hurt it fundamentally. During these two centuries, the relationship between *Wen* and *Wu* basically corresponded to what has been revealed in previous studies (such as those of Huang 1981b, and Struve 1984): the civil officials controlled the whole empire politically, economically, culturally, as well as militarily in times of peace. In November, 1567, one source issued in the *Ming Shilu* indicates the condition of that relationship:

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<sup>9</sup> Zheng Kecheng, 62-64; also see Wang Xintong 王心通, "Ming chu de wenwu zhizheng" 明初的文武之爭, *Nankai xuebao* 3 (1993), 75-80.

Some civil officials humiliated generals ... Yet, probably because those generals realized that they were short of professional capacities, they candidly acknowledged their inferiority in order to get the protection [from those civil officials].<sup>10</sup>

When the security problems on the northern frontier began worsening, a lot of people, mostly civil officials, realized that the Ming army's deterioration was partly caused by civil officials' unprofessional interference in military affairs. Also in the mid 1560s, Xu Jie 徐階 (1503-1583), a grand secretary (*neige daxueshi* 內閣大學士), asked the emperor to make a "decisive decision" (爲之一處) to resolve this problem. The answer he received was: "I am afraid it is difficult to let those generals have authority."<sup>11</sup>

Hu Zongxian, as we mentioned before, was himself a *jinshi*. When he was sent to Zhejiang as the Regional Inspector to pacify the Japanese pirates in the late 1550s, he discovered the main reason causing the Ming army's failure in fighting against the pirates: because the civil officials did not go to sea, there was no hope to expect the generals to fight on the ocean.<sup>12</sup>

## 5: 2 Peacetime and Wartime: A Tendency of Warlordism

As a result of economic changes, political abuses, and other factors, the civil officials', and specifically the literati's control over military affairs, began to be called into question. They, of course, still occupied the highest positions, whether in the central government or at the local level, but it is important to consider whether statesmanship and military leadership could appear in the same men, and whether civil and military officials could be in accord.

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<sup>10</sup> *Ming Muzong shilu* 明穆宗實錄, juan 14; Longqing yuannian- November 隆慶元年 (1567) 十一月.

<sup>11</sup> Liu Zhonghua 劉仲華, "Shixi fenquan zhiheng he yiwen zhiwu sixiang dui Ming dai jiubian fangwu tizhi de yingxiang" 試析分權制衡和以文制武思想對明代九邊防務體制的影響, *Ningxia shehui kexue* 6 (1999), 92-96.

<sup>12</sup> *Chongzhen Songjiang fuzhi* 崇禎松江府志, juan 25, ce A (Beijing: Shumu wenxian, 1990), 665.

Indeed, the civil official was above the military commander in peace time; even in war, they were the highest officials on the battlefield, at least in name. However, Chinese military history, on the other hand, exactly like the whole of Chinese history, always reveals its complexity. Despite the nominal superiority of civil officials, both literature and tradition explicitly recognized the desirability of leaving control of the actual operations to the general at the front. This kind of situation is expressed by a proverb which states: *jiang zai wai junming yousuo bushou* 將在外君命有所不受 (the general at the front may reject some orders from the court).

In contrast, as Yan Ermei indicated, civil officials never joined the battle physically, and could often not even recognize the different types of weapons. “Witnessing death or life, can you expect them to be imperturbable? All they can do is to close the city gate, simply giving up the suburbs and the rest of the area.”<sup>13</sup>

As grand secretary and the Minister of the Board of War, Yang Sichang enjoyed the emperor’s confidence for a long time; he finally committed suicide in Huguang in 1641 after his failure to suppress the rebellion of Zhang Xianzhong. He undoubtedly showed his loyalty, but his military action was a dismal failure. Faced with increasing threats from peasant rebellions in the plains area, he showed a great capacity in the field for “mathematics and logic.” He usually listed more than several tens of relevant items (or reasons) when he met with the emperor, and continued his reports without interruption. This unusual behavior was satirized by his peers, who joked that he appeared to be trying to fight the enemy with his mouth (人笑其以口擊賊耳). When the Manchu army broke through the Great Wall and entered into the plains, he continued to make his “daily suggestion.” The Chongzhen emperor finally lost his patience and rebuked him with the following words:

You are in charge of the Board of War. [What you should do is] to strictly supervise the matters of fighting and defending, as well as to glorify the meritorious and impeach the guilty. It is enough for you only to mention the important things. Is it not an encumbrance to make a daily report?

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<sup>13</sup> Yan Ermei, in XXSKQS 1394, 517.

Yang walked out of the court in shame.<sup>14</sup>

Huang Daozhou's activities in the south-west part of Nanzhili, mentioned earlier, can be taken as another example of civil officials' typically bookish behavior. These officials tended to be focused on the realization of an ideal goal, but, meanwhile, did not know how to adapt themselves to changing conditions. For instance, Feng Jingdi always insisted on using the law of the Ming for controlling and managing his mob on Siming Mountain.<sup>15</sup>

Ironically, a successful model of using *wenren* was provided by the peasant rebel leader Zhang Xianzhong. He simply treated them in two ways: killing them or letting them provide suggestions. He was very proud of the success he gained in this way:

Previously when I was in Luzhou, using one *wenren* we could take one city, how can you say they are useless?<sup>16</sup>

Entering the 1640s, the Chongzhen emperor had to gradually shift emphasis to the military officials, because he clearly realized that civil officials were lacking the capacity to protect the court from the attacks launched by both peasant rebels and the Manchus. On the other hand, these military officials took this chance of extreme turmoil to escape from the strict control of the civil officials. In most cases, the civil officials were no longer able to supervise their military counterparts.

In 1641, Li Jingu 李近古 took charge of the pacification of a peasant rebellion in Shandong, serving as the Regional Inspector and Army Inspecting Censor. He

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<sup>14</sup> Sanyuan biji – dianjiao shuoming 三垣筆記 點校說明, in *Yuan ming shiliao biji congkan* 元明史料筆記叢刊 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1982), 5.

<sup>15</sup> Quoted from Zhao Yuan, 60-64.

<sup>16</sup> Ji Liuqi, A, juan 16, in ZGYSJC 36, 174-75.



complained that he had no army in hand. All he could do was “use his tongue” to inspire the troops that belonged to the various prefectures.<sup>17</sup>

Compared to other high ranking civil officials, Li was quite lucky. During the reign of Chongzhen, there were a total of seven general governors 總督, eleven governors 巡撫 as well as numerous other civil officials killed by the emperor for various reasons.<sup>18</sup> In contrast, no high ranking military officials (i.e., those with at least one army in hand, such as *zongbing*) were punished.

This fact shows us that the Chongzhen emperor had practically lost his ability to control and command the military officials. His new measures—to let military officials get full authorization, especially those who had their own personal troops, caused a very serious and unexpected consequence—a tendency towards warlordism. Specifically, the role change of the Regional Commander (*zongbing*) may be taken as an example of this tendency.

At the end of the Ming, many *zongbing* began to conscript their own troops. In order to control and manage their troops, these military commanders had to handle everything from logistics to discipline. These soldiers were connected only to the commanders who provided their food and pay; the court did not command their loyalty. Previously, the most important concern of the Ming military system was the separation of commanders from troops with whom they were familiar. With the policy no longer in effect in the 1640s, what it had been designed to prevent began to take place. The Ming emperor, in fact, could not control his own army anymore.<sup>19</sup>

There are several examples of the Emperor's loss of control as early as the 1630s, and this situation became more common in the 1640s. In 1634, on the battlefield of Liaodong

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<sup>17</sup> *Ming Qing shiliao jiabian*, vol. 1, 29.

<sup>18</sup> Zhang Shizun 張士尊, “Ming dai zongbing shehui diwei de lishi bianqian” 明代總兵社會地位的歷史變遷, *Shenyang shifan xueyuan xuebao* 4 (1998), 23-27.

<sup>19</sup> Fan Zhongyi 範中義, “Lun Ming chao junzhi de yanbian” 論明朝軍制的演變, *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* 2 (1998), 129-39; Li Du 李渡, “Ming dai mubingzhi jianlun” 明代募兵制簡論, *Wenshizhe* 2 (1986), 62-68.

遼東, General Zu Dashou 祖大壽 refused Chongzhen's orders three times.<sup>20</sup> In 1640, General Zuo Liangyu ignored Yang Sicong's command to fight the rebellious army led by Zhang Xianzhong.<sup>21</sup> In February of 1644, the Ming court ordered all armies to go to Beijing to protect the capital (*qinwang* 勤王). But most of the *zongbing* did not respond to this call. From their perspective, since there was no hope to rescue the court, it was better to survive themselves. Therefore, they fled to the South, and later surrendered to the Qing.<sup>22</sup>

To cope with these dual dilemmas from both civil and military officials, Chongzhen eventually preferred to let his armies come under the surveillance of eunuchs. He treated them as representatives of the court (usually under the name of *jianjun* 監軍 or *zhenshou* 鎮守), but their actions show that these eunuchs frequently exceeded the boundaries of their authority. At the early stages, eunuchs were criticized by both civil officials, represented by Liu Zongzhou, and military commanders. Liu's criticism emphasizes some abstract aspects such as interference in military affairs, while the military commanders' dissatisfaction was caused by two concrete factors: a fear of sharing authority and the shame of being subordinate to a eunuch. However, after July of 1636, there were no further objections from the generals. This became understandable later on (except to the emperor himself).

Most of the generals began to realize the special relationship of these people and the emperor; the wisest choice was to treat them well rather than asking that they be expelled. In fact, by doing this they no longer had to worry about achieving victory on the battlefield. With the privileges and protection of the eunuchs, victories could be exaggerated while failures could be covered up. The Chongzhen emperor was cheated until his death; this result was exactly opposite to what he expected.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> *Qing Taizong wen huangdi shilu* 清太宗文皇帝實錄, juan 20.

<sup>21</sup> *Ming tongjian* 明通鑑, juan 87.

<sup>22</sup> QDRWZG- A, vol. 2, 186-87.

<sup>23</sup> See Chao Zhongchen 晁中辰, *Chongzhen zhuan* 崇禎傳 (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu, 1999), 158-59.

### 5: 3 The Southern Ming: *Wu's* Superior Position

In general, this examination of the relationship between *Wen* and *Wu* has shown that the latter were already in a superior position during the last decade of the Ming dynasty; the civil officials in fact had already lost their ability to maintain control.

In the following section, I will turn to the Southern Ming to examine the characteristics of this relationship in the Hongguang regime as well as at the court of Lu in eastern Zhejiang and Zhoushan Island. As mentioned before, because military history has often been ignored, previous studies in this field have naturally emphasized political reasons such as the factional conflicts between Ma, Ruan, and the remnant figures of the Donglin party. What I want to discuss here is a less obvious factor which affected the court of the Southern Ming. The Southern Ming should have and could have adopted a wartime policy of emphasizing the role of military officials. However, opponents of the Ma-Ruan clique always tried to bring the Ming back to the old mid-Ming patterns, when military figures were under the control of civil officials. Considering the fact that most of the military officials surrendered to the Qing army in Northern China in 1644, one report sent to Hongguang suggested that he "let the civil officials hold authority first then use the generals." Hongguang agreed with the advice.<sup>24</sup> The problem was, could he implement the measures necessary to carry it out?

As we mentioned briefly in Chapter Two, this very sensitive topic was touched on by Liu Zongzhou when he was in Nanjing. He sharply criticized the military officials represented by Liu Zeqing for their involvement in civil governance. Backed by support from the others, Liu Zeqing launched a counterattack and referred to the literati as "white-faced schoolboys" (白麵書生).

Standing in the middle of this relationship of "fire and water," the emperor could do nothing except offer weak admonishment.<sup>25</sup> As for the court of Lu, it is estimated that it had a complicated and scarcely coordinated army, totalling more than 200,000 troops at the beginning. This regime, in Struve's words,

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<sup>24</sup> Li Qing (B), juan 2, in NMSL BZ, 214.

<sup>25</sup> For the problems concerning the political background of the conflicts within the court of Lu, see Struve (1984), 93-94.

was not highly structured and, consonant with the general Ming tendency toward decentralization in finance and military supply, no central Ministry of Revenue ever was established.<sup>26</sup>

Given this condition, the question of how to feed the army became a frequently debated topic. Through the competition for resources, the real relationship between *Wen* and *Wu* was no longer ambiguous—military officials clearly began to play the decisive role.

Shortly after Sun Jiaji and Xiong Rulin began to revolt in Zhejiang, Fang Guo'an and Wang Zhiren's troops took control of eastern Zhejiang. Wang's authority spread to a particularly large area because all the garrison leaders were his former subordinates. He was conferred the title of Marquis of Wuning 武甯侯 (Fang's title was Marquis of Zhendong 鎮東侯) by the court of Lu. Facing the arrival of the Qing army, all the resistance forces were divided into two types: *zhengbing* 正兵 (regulars) and *yibing* 義兵 (auxiliaries and volunteers). Since the court of Lu's total income from governmental taxes (about 600,000 taels of silver) obviously could not support both types of troops, the regulars soon suggested a new policy whereby they would be allowed to draw on the governmental tax proceeds of the prefectures in which they were based (specifically, the tax income from Ningbo, Taizhou, and Shaoxing), whereas the righteous forces would be supported by contributions from the districts in which they originated.

According to Dong Shouyu 董守諭 (*juren* of 1624), a secretary of the Board of Revenue in the court, the so-called *yixiang* 義餉 (contributions) could not be expected:

They only exist in name. Feeding the righteous troops with this source is not sustainable. Suppose it were enough, who would manage it? Now I beg that the Board of Revenue be allowed to collect all the tax proceeds; giving pay based on the number of soldiers and feeding them according to the places where they are. With

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<sup>26</sup> Struve (1984), 93-94.

this method it is hopeful that the soldiers may get enough supplies, and the money may also be expected to be received on time.<sup>27</sup>

His plan was rejected by both Fang and Wang. They even refused to accept another compromise suggestion by which the whole of eastern Zhejiang would be divided into several areas, with each army as well as the Board of Revenue receiving tax proceeds from the area under its jurisdiction. The areas were allotted as follows: Shaoxing – the Board of Revenue; Ningbo – Wang Zhiren; Jinhua – Zhu Dadian; the other areas – Fang Guo'an.<sup>28</sup>

The regulars, made up of professional military men, were dissatisfied with every arrangement made by civil officials because they wanted to have all sustenance, monies and materiels for their own needs. In addition to tax proceeds, they were eager to get contributions and other sorts of forced requisitions. In this competition for funds and supplies, the righteous armies led by literati would, of course, be in the inferior position. For civil officials who served in the court of Lu this was a constant threat. The regular army's officials who were responsible for logistics might go to the imperial palace directly to scabble for the *yixiang*.<sup>29</sup>

When Wang Zhiren's demands for "the tax of the fishing boats" (*yuchuanshui* 漁船稅) and other tax sources were refused by civil officials, his soldiers went so far as to bring their weapons to the Board of Revenue, and Dong Shouyu almost lost his life.<sup>30</sup>

Among all the righteous armies in eastern Zhejiang, Qian Suyue's suffered the greatest harm. Its original source of supply was the contributions from both Yin and Fenghua 奉化 counties. Since Fang Guo'an forced these two counties to cut off the supply, Qian's two thousand soldiers had nothing to sustain them for more than forty

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<sup>27</sup> Li Yuqiu, juan 3, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 434.

<sup>28</sup> Huang Zongxi, *lujinian* 魯紀年, juan A, ZGYSJC 32, 243.

<sup>29</sup> Weng Zhou laomin 翁洲老民, *Haidong yishi* 海東逸史, juan 6, 244, in ZGYSJC 33; *Xiaotian jizhuan*, 410.

<sup>30</sup> Xu Zi, juan 41, *liezhuan* 34, 411.

days. Qian “made his indictments several times, but the Prince of Lu could not handle it.”<sup>31</sup>

The literati of eastern Zhejiang had to bear heavier burdens than those in north China or even those in the Jiangnan area during their resistance movements. They not only could not effectively control the righteous troops they organized, such as those on Siming Mountain, but also had no way to deal effectively with the Ming military officials and their regulars with whom they were supposed to cooperate. In reality, the eastern Zhejiang resistance movement seldom witnessed cooperative action between the various righteous troops and regulars. In contrast, “if a civil official had a different opinion, even a little, it would bring him disaster.”<sup>32</sup>

As the case studies have showed, both Xiong Rulin and Qian Suyue lost their lives in conflicts with military officials. In his article entitled *Haiwai tongku ji* 海外慟哭記 (Record of Lament Abroad), Huang Zongxi reveals deep feelings of grief and indignation, helplessness as well as desperation. He really intended to dedicate himself to the revival of the Ming; but faced with military officials, all he could do was discuss some purely academic affairs or European mathematics in the headquarters of the resistance movement on Zhoushan Island.<sup>33</sup>

This fact brings me to a conclusion about the character of the relationship between *Wen* and *Wu*: it was military rather than civil officials who played the decisive role in the turbulence of wartime; the civil officials’ superior position could only be realized in times of peace. This change of roles usually signified the uncertain destiny of a dynasty. Yet, we do have a few figures called “scholarly (or Confucian) generals” (*rujiang* 儒將), men who were able to combine both civil (cultural) and military talents. Their political and military abilities during wartime were often prominent in periods of transition

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<sup>31</sup> Xu Zi, juan 7, ji 7, 85-87; Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 255-57; see also *Xiaotian jizhuan*, juan 40, lie zhuan 33, 391.

<sup>32</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Haiwai tongku ji* 海外慟哭記, ZGYSJC 32, 275-85.

<sup>33</sup> Zhao Yuan, 60-64.

between old and new regimes. In eastern China during the 1650s, Zhang Huangyan may be deemed as the representative of those *rujiang*. Nevertheless, his role in military action did not challenge the basic picture we described above.

#### 5: 4      Summary

Since the military officers had much lower prestige than civil officials in corresponding ranks for a long time in Chinese history, the role of literati played in military action usually has been overstated or exaggerated. This chapter not only explores the role change of *Wen* and *Wu*, but also indicates that the frequency of this change is limited. Practically, there was no abstract relationship between them: civil officials' superior position could only be realized in times of peace. They had in fact already lost their ability to maintain control during the last decade of the Ming dynasty; meanwhile, through the competition for resources, the military officials were already in a superior position. The ways that civil and military officials affected each other in fact reveals the characteristics of the relationship of the central government and its own military forces or certain local forces. Although the emperor usually occupied a neutral position between them, the full authorization of the military officials to manage their armies without civil officials or eunuchs reporting to the central authorities led to the loss of his ability to control his own armies.

## Conclusion

The death of Zhang Huangyan was the final elegy for Ming loyalists in east China. His military actions, as well as those of the more than twenty other literati explored in this dissertation, created a tune which voiced the inevitability of the collapse of the Ming dynasty and the tragedy of Chinese literati in late imperial and even modern times.

From the northern plain to the rivers and marshes of Jiangnan, from the mountainous inland areas to the eastern coastal area and sea, numerous places- both rural and urban- witnessed the extreme turmoil of the Ming-Qing transition. Beginning with a brief examination and comparison of the economic, political, as well as social structural changes within these regions in each chapter, this dissertation has undertaken a preliminary and general exploration of the various military conflicts that arose among governments, ethnic groups, local social forces, soldiers, including those of both regular army units and volunteer auxiliaries, peasants, as well as others from the lower social strata such as serfs, tenants, and common residents of the cities. In addition, the dissertation has also briefly shown that topographical features and other social and economic characteristics were intertwined and mutually influential. This background was the stage on which Chinese literati demonstrated their military abilities.

Whether as individuals or as members of a group, such as Chen Zilong and *Jishe*, many Chinese literati employed all possible measures to save the Ming from decline. Their military actions took place not only on land, but also at sea; not only in rural society, but also in defense of cities. In addition to their organization and mobilization of local forces, as mentioned in Chapter Three, they also tried to make use of the remnants of the Ming army, or to go even further and engage in counterespionage aimed at inspiring the Qing army to revolt. From the perspective of weaponry, they used not only cudgels and bamboo sticks, but also the latest firearms such as muskets and cannon. In terms of the role literati played in these military actions, they could join an army as advisor, staff officer, coordinator, or liaison between the various forces, and, of course, as military commanders.



For the sake of convenience, I would like to classify the “non-official literati” mentioned in the “introduction” into two further categories: “Scholar Literati” (or Pure Literati) and “Gentry Literati.” These two categories, together with Official Literati, comprise the **three groups** examined in this dissertation.

### **Scholar Literati**

This group can be represented by Huang Daozhou. It provides us a wonderful example of how typical, pedantic literati went about demonstrating their military knowledge and capacity on the battlefield. Their common tendencies show that they wanted no deviations from the pattern established in the Ming (and other previous Chinese dynasties) which emphasized Confucian legitimacy, that civil officials be above professional military officials, and so on. Nearly all their endeavors consisted of little more than idle theorizing; they almost never had the chance to command an army on the battlefield. However, when presented with the opportunity for actual military command, they either overrated their own abilities or miscalculated popular sentiments toward the rebellion and the Qing dynasty; they often assumed that all people shared characteristics identical to their own. Finally, they tended to be focused on the realization of an ideal goal, but were unwilling or ill-equipped to adapt themselves to changing conditions.

### **Official Literati**

In the militarization of local society, the attitudes of various levels of officials played an essential role. These officials might have been expected to demonstrate strong loyalties to the Ming government, but in fact they could not. During united military actions against the Manchu invasion (including some campaigns fought along with the rebels), their authority over the Ming armies was, in many cases, only nominal. With the increasing militarization of the period, they neither knew how to effectively control the Ming military officials and regular soldiers with whom they were supposed to cooperate, nor how to deal with local military forces. Shi Kefa suffered from the warlords' interference in Yangzhou, while the literati of eastern Zhejiang were forced to

handle both the regular Ming armies and local military forces such as *tuanlian* simultaneously. In conflicts with military officials, some people such as Xiong Rulin even lost their lives. Generally speaking, when involved in conflicts with military officials in the camp of resistance, all the literati lost their campaigns: Shi Kefa in Yangzhou, Chen Zilong and Xia Yunyi in Jiangnan, as well as Huang Zongxi and others in east Zhejiang. Essentially, the ways in which civil and military officials affected each other is an expression of a larger relationship within the whole empire—namely, the central government's relationship with its own military forces or certain local forces. This is why the contradictions between *Wen* and *Wu* became obvious at the end of the dynasty. There was no abstract relationship between them. Without paying enough attention to military and war history, previous research has emphasized the importance of civil officials, but we should bear in mind that their superior position could only be realized in times of peace.

Further complicating the situation of official literati was their involvement in complex political struggles. Through the exploration of Chen Zilong's military and administrative careers, we can understand how military, political, and social factors combined and affected each other. During wartime, the literati were basically helpless. Between the state and local society, Xu Du has shown us that some lower level literati wanted to find new ways to render services to the throne, and consequently were in an ambivalent position. Their pursuits coincided with the goals of literati such as Chen Zilong: since he and others witnessed the decline of the Ming Empire, they now shifted their focus to newly available forces, such as those raised by Xu. Their cooperation can be seen as evidence of local forces combining with upper social strata. However, Chen's main focus was, in the end, only on the upper social strata and the existing armed forces, regardless of whether they were from the Ming government, local society, or even the Qing side. Finally, none of them could reach their goal.

### **Gentry Literati**

In most cases this group showed no hesitation in fighting for the rebels. Their motives for joining the resistance stemmed not only from the abstract concerns of

political legitimacy, traditional ideals, or the conflict between Chinese and non-Chinese, but also from the fact that their interests coincided with defending their property. Only after realizing that the Qing would bring them peaceful lives, social order, and the maintenance of their previous lives were most of these literati willing to withdraw from the resistance, or, in some cases, to cooperate with the Qing.

The local gentry in wartime lost many of the privileges that they had enjoyed during times of peace. Zheng Yuanxun's overestimation of his capacities for mediating conflicts between armies and local people shows that the gentry literati were often unable to ensure their own survival, let alone affect others; there was little hope that they might compose a so-called civil society. Only a few of these literati were passionate idealists. For these few, their individual consciences were set above social consensus, and their sense of obligation to repay the throne was a primary concern. However, most put local or family interests and the maintenance of their position and prestige far ahead of any abstract notions of loyalty or *Huayi zhi bian*.

Both gentry literati and officials shared the same tendency to consider only how to control or administer society in peace time. During this period of war, many helped to mobilize forces for the purpose of pacifying the rebels and leading the resistance. In this case, raising a flag of protecting their localities and fighting against the Qing's invasion proved to be much easier than enlarging or even maintaining their armies. They, in fact, could not control rural society, and, most especially, the existing local military forces. Without paying equal attention to both foreign invasion and inner rebellions, previous studies have usually focused on the triangular power relationship involving the government, the elite (including literati), and dispersed communities of commoners. They have either emphasized the "united control" (*lianhe tongzhi* 聯合統治) of the Manchu- Han officials and landlords in studies from Mainland China since the 1950s or the role of local gentry in the Western world. Essentially, as I mentioned in Chapter One, all these studies tend to overstate the cooperation between Ming officials,

local elite, and other early Qing leaders.<sup>1</sup> Because of this, it is unclear how the local elite handled the simultaneous pressure of both Han Chinese (including the government and the common people) and foreigners.

The real conditions were more complicated than has been previously imagined. Considering that all military actions are grounded firmly in time, space, environment, and certain cultural traditions, I have used the Qing's attack and the response from the literati as a clue from which to begin my exploration. I think that it is possible to describe the basic trajectory of how literati faced the challenges from both peasant rebellions and the "barbarian" invasion: at first, they deemed the peasants as the most important threat, while treating the Qing army as an outside force with which to cooperate in fighting against the rebels. When they began to realize the real threat posed by the Qing, it was too late, and they had no choice but to capitulate to the Qing or sacrifice their lives for the Ming. Ling Jiong in the northern plain area, Lu Zhenfei and Shi Kefa in Jiangbei, and Zhang Guowei and Qi Biaoqia in Jiangnan and Zhejiang all demonstrated a willingness and ability to pay attention to the complexities of local society and the local administrative system when they were engaging in the pacification of peasant rebellions. In their minds, the rebels, rather than the Qing invaders, were clearly the most dangerous threat. With their personal qualities, they were able to combine both cultural and military talents. Moreover, their military experience in the pacification of peasant rebellions did give them some understanding of how to mobilize the local community. But fighting against the Manchu invasion was another matter.

Due to their emphasis on class conflict, many historians from post-1949 China have blamed the failure of the resistance on their inability to "mobilize the masses." What I have argued in this dissertation is that the resistance movements represented by the literati were involved in processes of mobilization. They did make an effort to include a broad scope of the Chinese population in the resistance movement. Whether or not these movements actually took place and their scale when they did, were entirely dependent on the effectiveness in management and control of the various levels of

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<sup>1</sup> Struve provided a general survey about these research developments; see Struve (1998), 105-17.

government, as well as the attitude and actions of the common people. To put it another way, the scope of the resistance in certain places was inversely proportional to the existing social order. The more powerful the rebels of a certain area, the more peaceful the attitude of the local community toward the arrival of the Qing. In other words, whether or not the resistance occurred did not directly relate to the degree of ethnic consciousness, but rather on the local desire for self-defense. Not realizing this, people may be misled by the numerous Chinese records, as well as current researches, especially those from southern Anhui and eastern Zhejiang which usually were claimed as regions characterized by a strong ethnic consciousness by those authors from these areas. The motives for these authors were simple: for one thing, they wanted to glorify their homelands,<sup>2</sup> for another, regardless of whether they acknowledged it or not, their motives stemmed from their ignorance of the above phenomena, which means, unlike north China, these places had not suffered from long time warfare before the arrival of the Qing.

As Beattie indicated, the Chinese social fabric had already been strongly woven by the Ming-Qing transition period. The existing social order was, in fact, resilient in the face of many kinds of disturbance. Impacts from the outside, even including ethnic conquest, had little effect on basic social structure, let alone social behavior and customs.<sup>3</sup> The case studies of local forces from Liyang in the Jiangnan area, and also Shandong, show us that how different social strata affected each other: the local elite wanted to use the ordinary people to launch anti-Qing action; however, the latter finally united with the Qing army to fight against them. This phenomenon should lead us to reexamine the role of local military forces and their relation to the anti-Qing literati.

Generally, local military forces had no relation with the government. Facing the

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<sup>2</sup> Since only a very few people who are real loyalists in fact, the so called “unyielding integrity” (*buqu de qijie* 不屈的氣節) is one of the highest honors among Chinese. For the cases of southern Anhui and eastern Zhejiang, the typical studies are as follows: Dong Yukui 董郁奎, “Zhang Huangyan yu Zhejiang renwen chuantong” 張煌言與浙江人文傳統, *Zhejiang xuekan* 107.6 (1997), 104-08; Fang Zuyou 方祖猷, *Qing chu Zhedong xuepai luncong* 清初浙東學派論叢 (Taibei: Wanjuanlou, 1996); Zhou Zhiyuan 周致元, “Rujia lunli yu Ming dai Huizhouji jinshi” 儒家倫理與明代徽州籍進士, *Anhui daxue xuebao* 4 (1999), 80-85.

<sup>3</sup> Hilary J. Beattie (1979a), 269-70.

invasion of the Qing, it may have been theoretically possible for Chinese literati and other local elite to bring all the strata together in a collective effort to defend their homeland and property. They did indeed have an ability to use their power in the realms of economics, politics, and social welfare, but they showed much less aptitude in organizing their own military or semi-military forces. Nonetheless, different sorts of forces were mobilized in certain places, as we explored in the chapters above, including existing local forces as well as the newly recruited righteous armies. Could literati integrate and lead these kinds of forces?

Both Yan Ermei and Chen Zilong realized that the most important action they could take was to mobilize the masses, those numerous peasants at the bottom level of the society, but they had no concrete measures to carry this out. In practice, the resistance movement relied primarily on local bandit and pirate groups, and other illegal organizations. This meant that the literati were sometimes able to organize local forces, but an even larger challenge arose from the fact that they had no idea about how to maintain or lead these forces in pursuit of an effective resistance. Apart from donations, plundering, and the selling off of family wealth, there are no specific records explaining how problems of military supply were resolved or what kinds of logistical measures were taken. Also, there are no records showing how the disparate groups were knitted together, and how they assisted each other or cooperated in attacks against the Qing. Only a few were successfully “mobilized,” but mobilization was often only the piecing together of some local forces to fight against the Qing army. Lack of training and discipline, as well as poor equipment were the most obvious reasons for their defeat. For those a few literati who actually led the defense, they also proved incapable of integrating the various groups on which they had to rely.

Wu Yi was relatively successful in mobilizing and leading local forces to pacify bandits and peasant rebellions, and then shifted to fight against the Qing invasion. He focused on the various local rebel forces and militias, as well as the units that had been brought in from different areas. But he had no way to ensure the strict control of these mixed troops. Zhejiang literati like Zhang Guowei provide us with little more than plans for how to resolve the problem of maintaining and integrating the resistance

armies. Unfortunately, we have no way to examine the results of these plans. At the base of the anti-Qing movement, Siming Mountain, preliminary efforts were totally destroyed by the united attack of both Qing forces and local *mingtuan*. In terms of existing social and lineage organizations in Jiangnan and Zhejiang, it is very difficult to find instances that demonstrate how loyalty could be magnified gradually and simply from single man to family, to lineage, to local community. They may have fought against Japanese pirates or some small group of rebels, but their response to the Qing's powerful army was notably unenthusiastic. It appears that military action regarding to consanguinity was usually restricted to members of an individual family, and rarely extended to the entire lineage.

Local military forces might unite and co-operate with any force, including local bandits, or they might oppose and resist any other forces from the outside. Since basic living conditions were always their primary concern, they cared little about who held authority, or who controlled it most of the time. They had their own standard for choosing to support or oppose outside intrusions: it depended entirely on whether or not someone or some forces could provide the means that they needed to survive. Some independent local military forces belonged to the peasants or to other ordinary people such as fishermen or city-dwellers. At other times, these were usually deemed "illegal forces." In most cases there was no clear definition concerning their social background among these forces because the numerous strata of the bottom of the social scale also shared the intention to defend the local area. These sorts of local military forces were usually mixed together with various social strata and so it was difficult to clearly distinguish which belonged to the literati or any other local elite and which were controlled by the common people. Their political attitudes were also blurred.

Furthermore, these kinds of social forces belonged to the local people but were sometimes advocated, encouraged and even conscripted by the local government, including both Ming and Qing authorities. As we have seen, without their cooperation, the Qing army was forced to withdraw from the mountains of eastern Zhejiang. Meanwhile, the literati of this area, represented by Huang Zongxi, failed to realize their

hope of mobilizing the various social forces to pursue the resistance.

Essentially, what the literati and the other elite wanted from the local military forces was the pacification of peasant rebellions, and, later on, resistance against the Manchu invasion. But the local military forces were primarily concerned with ensuring their own benefits. They did not care where or from whom these benefits came. Formally, there were regional variations of violence, but practically this kind of “independent force” always played a crucial role. The attitudes and actions of the ordinary peasants and their own local forces really were the most important factors. It was they who decided the real fate of rural society. In addition, it was they who were always there, and they always fought against war, turmoil, and famine itself. It was these sufferings that resulted in their rebellions. At the same time, they did not pay special attention to who was the nominal leader of rural society. For them, there was no certain “moral model” to follow. When the literati’s anti-Qing military action took place, they feared this type of behavior would cause retaliation from the Qing army, so they simply chose to refuse to cooperate with the loyalist armies. However, their final destiny still hung in the balance; the choice of whether to surrender and join the rebels or to continue under the government’s control was totally dependent on changing circumstances.

In conclusion, the fate of the Ming loyalist literati indicates that Chinese intellectuals had to find another way to demonstrate their abilities to affect military and political affairs. Through their tears, blood, and lives we can know that the crux of China’s destiny depended on the existence of a force able to integrate and lead other forces, especially the far more numerous peasants (as well as their armed groups) into its military plans in order to reach a political goal. That is, there was a need for zealous Chinese literati knowledgeable enough about political and martial arts to integrate and lead the various social forces. Such leaders could not remain limited to the “ivory tower”, but had to venture to the margins of outlawry themselves in order to integrate and lead the others. From this perspective, we can see that there were historical precedents for why and how the Chinese Communist Party took over the Mainland by the end of the 1940s.



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<sup>1</sup> This bibliography does not include all local gazetteers I cited. In the process of preparing this dissertation, I examined a total of 1,010 local gazetteers which were from more than 200 counties. It is impossible to list all of them here. For concrete reasons, see pages 35-37. However, most of them can be found in the sets listed in the "Abbreviations".

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