

**THE NORTH AMERICAN SQUADRON OF THE ROYAL NAVY,  
1807-1815**

by Marc Drolet

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Department of History  
McGill University  
Montreal, Canada

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## ABSTRACT

This study explores the role of the Royal Navy's North American Squadron in protecting Britain's colonies and trade in North America from 1807 to 1815. The squadron had its origins in the war of 1739-48, when it became clear that a fleet based on the eastern Atlantic or the West Indies could not adequately support operations in the North American theatre. The British naval establishment, however, even when North America was the principle theatre of war, never developed as strong an attachment to the North American Squadron as it did to its fleets in the West Indies or other theatres. It was, with a few notable exceptions, generally treated as one of the lesser commands of the Royal Navy, and rarely received more than secondary consideration from the Admiralty. This was especially true during the Napoleonic Wars, in which the North American station was viewed as one of the 'quiet' stations, especially when compared to the more active stations in the West Indies.

England's main priority was in defeating France, and she was willing to achieve this at the expense of antagonizing the United States, leading to an unnecessary war with them in 1812. Yet even when faced with a new war in North America, the needs of the squadron were considered of secondary importance to the war in Europe, and several months passed before sizable reinforcements were sent to the North American theatre. Even when the war in Europe ended in 1814, the British leaders continued to treat North America as a secondary theatre. Their efforts to gain victory were at best half-hearted, and the government was more interested in demobilizing the navy to cut costs than in defeating the United States.

The War of 1812 brought little glory to England or the Royal Navy, and there was much criticism in the way the conflict was fought after the war. The inability of England's leaders to correctly read the situation in the United States or to understand the American threat led them to send forces inadequate to wage more than a limited war in North America. Despite this, the performance of the North American Squadron in this period was far more commendable than has generally been acknowledged, especially in light of the handicaps set upon it. This work will give a detailed description of the operations of the squadron, to give a better understanding of its role in this period.

## **Résumé**

Notre étude trace le rôle de la marine britannique en Amérique du Nord entre 1807 et 1815. L'origine de la flotte remonte à la guerre de 1739-48, quand c'était devenu évident que les flottes dans le secteur de l'est Atlantique ou dans les Antilles n'étaient pas capables de supporter des opérations en Amérique du Nord. Mais cette flotte était rarement considérée comme une des flottes importantes dans la marine britannique. Ceci était le cas durant la guerre contre Napoléon, quand la flotte américaine protégeait un secteur perçu comme tranquille comparativement à la flotte antillaise, elle plus active.

La victoire contre la France était la grande priorité de l'Angleterre durant cette époque. Elle était prête à faire n'importe quoi pour réussir, mais s'engagea tout de même dans une guerre inutile contre les États-Unis en 1812. Même avec le début de cette nouvelle guerre, le secteur de l'Amérique du Nord continuait d'être traité comme un secteur secondaire comparé à l'Europe, qui continuait à recevoir la majorité des vaisseaux et des soldats de l'Angleterre. Et même quand la guerre avec la France se termina en 1814, le gouvernement Anglais était plus préoccupé à couper le budget militaire, pour réduire ses dépenses, qu'il ne l'était d'assurer la victoire contre les États-Unis.

La guerre de 1812 a produit peu de gloire pour la marine britannique. Le gouvernement et l'amirauté de l'Angleterre ont été incapables de comprendre les conditions dans le secteur américain, et ont envoyés suffisamment de forces que pour combattre une guerre limitée. Désormais, la performance de la flotte de l'Amérique du Nord était plus un succès qu'on avait imaginé, même quand elle était traité comme un secteur secondaire. Cette oeuvre va décrire les opérations de la flotte pour mieux comprendre ses responsabilités durant cette époque.

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
The subject of my thesis required me to travel to various overseas archives and libraries, and I was fortunate to have received generous help from several individuals. Tim and Gillian Hughes were invaluable for helping me at the Public Records Archives in London. He made sure to send me several key documents that were crucial to the writing of this work. My journey to Bermuda and research in the government archives was greatly facilitated by Nan Godet. She was extremely helpful in helping me to conduct my research, and made sure to send me several documents after leaving the island paradise. I also owe a large debt of gratitude to Laurence Marcoult and Allison Dunn in enabling me to research key French naval documents from the Archives Nationales in Paris. I would finally like to thank Dan Conlin,

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
Finally, I must give thanks for the financial and emotional support I have received from my family and friends throughout these many years. They were always there to see me through the darker times when it seemed that this dissertation would never get done. To all of these people I dedicate this work.

**Map 1: Bases of the War of 1812**




Source: Brian Lavery, *Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organization 1793-1815* (London, 1989), 289

Map 2: The Northeastern Theatre




Source: John Bartlet Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain* (New Haven, Conn., 1945), 74

**Map 3: The Chesapeake Theatre**



Source: Donald, G. Shomette, *Flotilla: Battle for the Patuxent* (Solomons, Md., 1981), 7

**Map 4: The New Orleans Theatre**



Source: Wilburt S. Brown, *The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814-1815: A Critical Review of Strategy and Tactics at New Orleans*. (University, Ala., 1969), 20

## INTRODUCTION

My interest in the subject presented in this study began years ago with two fairly innocent questions regarding the cause of the War of 1812. The Royal Navy's continued practice of searching American ships at sea and impressing American seamen to serve on board their warships were the central issues that divided Great Britain and the United States. Relations between the two nations further deteriorated following the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair in 1807, in which the British man-of-war HMS *Leopard* fired upon the frigate USS *Chesapeake* near the American coast. At the time of this incident Britain was locked in a mortal struggle with France, the dominant power of Europe. But if Britain and the United States were not at war in 1807, then what were British warships doing off the American coast? Also, why would the British risk a war with the United States when their fortunes against France were at their lowest? It was in the pursuit of answers to these questions that led me to write this work.

For the British North Americans, especially in Upper and Lower Canada, the War of 1812 was a glorious defense against the invading American armies bent on conquering the British colony. For Americans, it was a triumphant naval conflict in which their small navy repeatedly humbled the Royal Navy, the undisputed mistress of the seas. British views were less clear cut. British merchants were certainly happy to see the end of the war that had resulted in substantial losses to British trade, and the Treaty of Ghent, signed on December 24, 1814 reflected the desire to accept the status quo antebellum rather than continue what was seen as an unnecessary war.

For its part, the Royal Navy has been given little credit in its performance against the Americans. After having repeatedly vanquished the European navies, the British

developed a tradition of victory that was unmatched by any navy in history. However, as Theodore Roosevelt pointed out, this made the British sailors “overweeningly self-confident, and caused him to pay little regard to manoeuvring or even to gunnery.”<sup>1</sup> The Royal Navy appeared unable to defeat an opponent whose navy was roughly one-fifth the size of the Danish fleet. The early defeats suffered by his Majesty’s ships in the War of 1812 have been viewed as a well-deserved comeuppance that was needed to kick them out of their arrogance. The American naval victories in this war would eclipse those of the British in the public’s imagination, solidifying the idea that the Royal Navy came out of the conflict as second best.<sup>2</sup>

The subject of the war at sea during the War of 1812 has been examined exhaustively by countless historians, including William James, Theodore Roosevelt, C.S. Forester, and Alfred Thayer Mahan to name just a few.<sup>3</sup> It seemed quite daunting to find a new aspect of this conflict that has not already been covered. However, there has been a tendency to generalize the role of the Royal Navy during this conflict. This is not surprising, as the American war occurred while the British were still engaged with the French, and they had to balance their needs in North America with the needs of other theatres. Yet each of the squadrons the Royal Navy had in service during this era differed from one another in terms of their roles and responsibilities. Each were designed to protect British interests throughout the globe, but the level of importance of these interests was the key factor in determining just how much of a presence the navy would

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<sup>1</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812* (Annapolis, Md, 1987), 48-49

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 49; C.J. Bartlett, *Great Britain and Sea Power 1815-1853* (Oxford, 1963), 14-15

<sup>3</sup> C.S. Forester, *The Age of Fighting Sail* (Garden City, N.Y., 1956); William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV*, 6 vols. (London, 1847); Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power In Its Relations to the War of 1812*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1905)



have in a given region. For example, the Channel Fleet, responsible for the defence of the British Isles, was always given top priority over all other considerations. The West Indies and the Mediterranean were also key sectors where the British needed to maintain a strong naval presence to protect their interests, but the realities of both sectors were markedly different from one another. Geography, the weather, and the political and commercial interests of Britain and her rivals meant that naval operations in both theatres were bound to be different. This would prove equally true of the North American Squadron.

The role of the North American Squadron both prior to and during this conflict is the purpose of this work. This work will examine the squadron's role not only in the War of 1812, when it was most heavily involved, but also in the years leading up to it. The squadron performed important duties during the period prior to the American war that has received little notice, as it was overshadowed by the Anglo-French naval conflict in other theatres. It will also discuss some of the squadron's previous history, to provide context for analysis. Apart from the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, it is necessary to discuss its role in previous wars fought on the North American continent during the 18<sup>th</sup> Century. The War of the Austrian Succession, the Seven Years' War, and the American Revolution all differed from one another in terms of scale and scope, how they were fought, and what the specific war aims were, and the role of the squadron adapted to each conflict as circumstances dictated. Whether the British were defending their territory, attempting to put down a rebellion, or trying to conquer another nation's lands, it is important to note the similarities and differences of the earlier conflicts to explain the actions that occurred in the latter war.

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This work will examine the numerous minor and major operations involving the North American Squadron, not simply as a chronicle of events, nor even as the kind of narrative we have from James Fenimore Cooper or William Laird Clowes, nor a rehash of Roosevelt's history of naval operations in the war, or of Mahan's superb (yet dated) volumes on the War of 1812.<sup>4</sup> Instead, it is intended to make an assessment on the overall effectiveness of the squadron's day-to-day operations. It will focus on the role it played in protecting British trade, conducting amphibious operations and blockade, as well as examine the personalities of the key figures who planned the course of British strategy, and the men who tried to implement the plans.

This study is divided into the following chapters. The first chapter gives an encapsulated history of the North American Squadron prior to 1807. It gives an account of the creation of the squadron during the War of the Austrian Succession, thanks in large part to the efforts of Captain Sir Peter Warren. During the next conflict, the Seven Years War, England's focus shifted to the conquest of New France, and the squadron played a key role in the capture of Louisbourg and Quebec. Yet once the French threat was removed from North America, the squadron was used to hunt down American smugglers and to enforce the highly unpopular commerce laws the mother country was imposing upon the colonies, which made the men on those ships highly unpopular with the American colonists. Once the American Revolution began, British naval superiority in American waters did little to bring the colonies back in line, while their temporary loss of control of the waters in the Chesapeake guaranteed their final defeat in this conflict. This chapter also includes the relationship of Britain, France and the United States during the

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<sup>4</sup> William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to 1900*, 7 vols., (London, 1897-1903); James Fenimore Cooper, *The History of the Navy of the United States of America* (Delmar, N.Y., 1988)

Wars of the French Revolution up to 1807, as well as the establishment of the squadron's naval bases at Halifax and Bermuda.

The second chapter begins with the events in the Chesapeake and the subsequent *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair. Much of the chapter is devoted to the aftermath of this incident, with a strong emphasis on the diplomacy between the three nations. Apart from the squadron's naval operations, the chapter also examines its two commanders, Sir George Berkeley and Sir John Borlase Warren. It shows Warren's enthusiasm for building a more suitable naval base for the squadron in Bermuda, where it remained for six months every year. The chapter also delves into the day-to-day activities of the ships on the station, including what the crews on board his Majesty's ships had to endure. It further examines the response to the American embargo, and how the squadron helped ensure that American foodstuffs continued to reach the British. Finally, it ends with the Martinique campaign, a joint venture between the North American Squadron and the Leeward Islands Squadron in 1809 to eliminate one of the four remaining islands held by France in the West Indies.

The third chapter begins with the repeal of the Embargo Act and the introduction of the Non-Intercourse Act. It also highlights the start of a little-known rivalry between Warren and the commander of the Leeward Islands Squadron, Sir Alexander Cochrane. Their rivalry would last several years and do little to enhance their reputations. Despite its unparalleled success during this period, the Royal Navy was not without officers who put vanity before duty. Much of this chapter again deals with the diplomatic activity on both sides of the Atlantic and the naval operations on the station. It describes incidents that have received very little attention from historians. The chapter also includes the

arrival of Warren's replacement, Sir Herbert Sawyer the Younger, whose biography was most difficult to piece together. Finally, the chapter ends on the eve of the American declaration of war, with the squadron ill-informed and ill-prepared to meet the new threat.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the first year of the War of 1812. It depicts the squadron's early struggles against the American Navy and the throng of privateers that attacked British trade. It recounts the Admiralty's slow reaction to this threat, and its subsequent decision to unite the North American, Jamaica and Leeward Islands squadrons into a single command, with Warren as its commander. The chapter gives particular detail to the relationship between Warren and the Lords of the Admiralty, which can only be described as difficult. The chapter continues with the start of the British campaign in the Chesapeake in 1813 that would bring the war directly to the Americans, and his success would transform the Chesapeake into a British lake. Finally, the chapter ends on June 1, 1813, a date that can be considered as a turning point in the naval war. The victory by the frigate HMS *Shannon* over USS *Chesapeake*, along with the neutralizing of two American frigates at New London, are almost symbolic in showing how the pendulum had swung in favor of the British.

The fifth chapter shows how the British began to turn the tide against the Americans, describing their raids all along the American coast. It also shows how the Admiralty finally gave up on Warren, and opted to replace him with someone who might be able to deliver the victory they sought over the Americans.

The sixth chapter deals with the last phase of the war, when the war in Europe came to an end, and the British were free to begin large-scale offensive operations against the United States under the command of the aggressive Sir Alexander Cochrane. Yet

instead of sending an overwhelming force to deal with the Americans, the British government and the Admiralty sent only enough forces for them to mount limited offensives in this theatre, as they were anxious to begin demobilization to bring down expenses that resulted in a soaring debt. The chapter describes the offensive operations in the Chesapeake, culminating with the capture of Washington and the setback at Baltimore, the successful Maine campaign, and the disastrous New Orleans campaign. While falling short of overall success, it does show that when the war ended, the strategic initiative was firmly in British hands.

The concluding chapter deals with the aftermath of the War of 1812, and the general disappointment on the part of many Britons as to how the war was handled. Many felt that the navy had not avenged its early defeats to the Americans, a view that was magnified following additional American naval successes after the peace treaty was signed. It reveals how the disappointment that the Royal Navy had not utterly defeated the American Navy, as it had done to the other European navies, was equated with failure. By concentrating on what was not achieved, the verdict of history has failed to account for what the squadron in fact did achieve. It is the purpose of this study to help rectify this error.

## CHAPTER 1: ORIGINS AND ROLE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN SQUADRON 1744-1807

“Whosoever commands the sea,” wrote Sir Walter Raleigh, “Commands trade. Whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.”<sup>1</sup> The sea has been the guardian of Britain’s destiny for most of its history. It has stood as both the first and last line of defense for the island nation, and has also been the main source of her wealth. British commercial trade was able to reap enormous profits, which in turn allowed them to continue to finance their war efforts and maintain their naval superiority. Through the symbiosis of naval strength and commercial trade, Britain was secure from the dangers of invasion that confronted the other continental powers of Europe, and its wealth enabled it to become the dominant power of the 19th Century.

Unlike the rest of Europe, it was the navy and not the army that Britain depended upon for its survival against rival powers. It was the ships under Drake and Howard that stopped the mighty Spanish Tercios from setting foot on English soil in 1588. Two centuries later, it was Nelson’s ships that stood between Napoleon’s Grande Armee and final victory. Even in 1940 during the Battle of Britain, it was necessary for the Luftwaffe to defeat the Royal Air Force and obtain complete air supremacy over the shores of southern England to prevent the Royal Navy from being able to disrupt a German cross-channel invasion. Although the victory rightfully belonged to the pilots of the R.A.F., it would have been meaningless if Britain did not also have naval superiority.

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1. David Howarth, ed., *The Men of War* (Alexandria, Va, 1978), 6

The navy could also be used as a most formidable offensive weapon. Britain's naval dominance enabled her to protect her colonies and trade, but also allowed her to strike back against the shores of her enemies, as well as their own colonies and commercial shipping. The Royal Navy gave the British a free hand in the 18th and 19th Centuries to expand and consolidate their empire. The navy may have been one link in the creation of empire, but it was definitely the central link.

After the Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century, England became the primary commercial power of Europe. The wealth from her trade allowed her to wage a different type of war than her continental rivals. Instead of raising large armies, the British used their wealth to finance their allies into sending their own armies to fight against the common enemy, while they in turn used their fleets to harass enemy trade, blockade their ports, and invade their isolated and vulnerable overseas colonies. The war with France between 1793 to 1815 offers numerous examples of this. England was able to finance coalition after coalition against the French, while the Royal Navy looked after the French fleets and those of her allies, striking at their overseas colonies and trade. Although this alone was not enough to bring France to her knees, it did pave the way for eventual victory.

Both England and her colonies were dependant on the Royal Navy for protection, and had to ensure that this arm remained strong. The wooden sailships of the Napoleonic Era needed only the power of the wind for propulsion, but could only stay out at sea as long as their supplies permitted. It was necessary to have naval bases throughout the world for the Royal Navy. Wherever the British had a colony or a vested commercial interest, the navy would ensure its presence was felt. This had the

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dual benefit of enabling ships on distant stations to be supplied regularly, as well as showing the flag to the British subjects, that the navy was always ready to defend their lives and property.<sup>2</sup>

The Royal Navy had several squadrons and fleets protecting British interests around the globe. These forces were controlled from London by the Board of Admiralty. The Admiralty was headed by the First Lord of the Admiralty, a member of the Cabinet who was sometimes (but not necessarily) a senior Admiral. In fact, of the ten First Lords who held office between 1793 and 1815, only St. Vincent and Barham were professional naval officers, while the rest were politicians.<sup>3</sup> The Admiralty Board also consisted of five or six junior members, sometimes referred to as Junior Lords, and half of these were naval officers, as well as staff of around fifty to sixty men. This staff was headed by the First and Second Secretaries, who wielded considerable power and influence. They were responsible for seeing that the Admiralty Board's orders and instructions were carried out, and on minor issues they could give their own instructions without having to refer to the Board.<sup>4</sup> The Board met every day (including Christmas) to discuss numerous issues regarding fleet and ship dispositions, the appointment and promotion of officers, as well as all manner of administrative details. In 1805, Lord Barham felt the existing structure was becoming too unwieldy,

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<sup>2</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London, 1976), Chapters 1-3

<sup>3</sup> Nicholas Blake and Richard Lawrence, *The Illustrated Companion to Nelson's Navy* (London, 1999), 8-9; Brian Lavery, *Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organization 1793-1815* (London, 1989), 21-22; N.A.M. Rodger, *The Admiralty* (Lavenham, UK., 1979), 69, and *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (Annapolis, Md., 1986), 30. John Jervis, the Earl of St. Vincent, was First Lord from 1801 to 1804, and Charles Middleton, Lord Barham, was First Lord from 1805 to 1806

<sup>4</sup> Blake and Lawrence, *Illustrated Companion to Nelson's Navy*, 8-9; Lavery, *Nelson's Navy*, 22; Rodger, *Wooden World*, 31-33 Unlike the politicians, the two Secretaries held onto their posts for decades. John



and brought about changes that gave particular responsibilities to the Naval Lords, while the Civil Lords were to handle the routine administration work.<sup>5</sup>

The Admiralty would have money voted to it every year by Parliament, and would decide what class of ships and how many of them would be ordered constructed. The actual details of construction was left to a subsidiary board, the Navy Board, which was responsible for all technical and financial aspects of the Royal Navy. It ran the dockyards and was responsible for procuring all of the Navy's stores and equipment. The Navy Board also had jurisdiction over the Sick and Hurt Board, which was responsible for the ships' surgeons and the naval hospitals; the Transport Board, which was responsible for hiring ships to carry troops and supplies for both the army and the navy, as well as for the care of prisoners-of-war; and the Victualling Board, which was responsible for supplying ships with food and drink, and for appointing the ships' pursers.<sup>6</sup> There was also the Ordnance Board, which was responsible for the testing, development and manufacturing of ordnance for both the army and the navy. It supplied the ships with gunners, equipment and ammunition, but unlike the other boards, it was an independent body and not directly responsible to the

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Wilson Croker was First Secretary from 1809 to 1830, while the John Barrow remained Second Secretary from 1804 to 1845

<sup>5</sup> Blake and Lawrence, *Illustrated Companion to Nelson's Navy*, 9; Rodger, *Admiralty*, 86-88; David Syrett, *Shipping and the American War 1775-83* (London, 1970), 1-3. As Syrett points out, the British administrative system had been placed under considerable strain during the American Revolution. For example, the Navy Board, which was responsible for arranging the transports and and storeships required to implement Cabinet's military programs, was unable to act until the Cabinet had acted. This meant that it often took weeks, and months, before a decision reached by the Cabinet could be translated into action by the Navy Board.

<sup>6</sup> Blake and Lawrence, *Illustrated Companion to Nelson's Navy*, 10-11; Lavery, *Nelson's Navy*, 23; Rodger, *Wooden World*, 33-36

Admiralty.<sup>7</sup> While men like Nelson, Collingwood and Howe won the great naval battles for the Royal navy during this era, it was the nameless clerks and administrators that saw to its growth and maintenance, and ensured that the sword they held remained sharp.

In the era before the telegraph and steamships, communications between the Admiralty and the foreign stations were anything but rapid. Even in home waters, orders sent by the Admiralty could take weeks to respond to and even longer before a reply was returned. This meant that orders sent from London could become obsolete due to significant changes in the theatre. For the British, the most painful example of this occurred with the Battle of New Orleans in 1815, the biggest defeat they suffered in the War of 1812. The defeat was itself bad enough, but the fact that so many lives were lost weeks after the Treaty of Ghent was signed made it an even harder pill to swallow. The Admirals on distant stations were given a certain degree of freedom in commanding their forces, though always under the Admiralty's scrutiny. As such, the men who commanded the distant stations usually had to rely on their well-honed instincts to divine the Admiralty's intentions and to guide them to the correct course of action.

During the Age of Nelson, the single most important artery of the British Empire was the North Atlantic. The trade routes between England, North America and the West Indies were the lifelines for England's commerce. After the English Channel, the security of the North Atlantic was the single most important task of the Royal Navy. The British had several naval squadrons to defend their colonies and shipping in this

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

region. These included the Jamaica Squadron, the Leeward Island Squadron, the Newfoundland Squadron, and the North American Squadron.<sup>8</sup> The first two squadrons protected Britain's West Indian colonies, and would see considerable action in the wars against France and Spain. By contrast, the northern squadrons saw far less action during this period. The Newfoundland Squadron's main concern was to protect the British Atlantic convoys, the fisheries, and to watch over the small French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. As a result, it would remain the smallest of the four squadrons. As for the North American Squadron, its strength and responsibilities would fluctuate considerably during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries as the strategic picture in this region became radically different for the British with the diminishment of the French threat and the rise of the new American threat.<sup>9</sup> It should also be noted that unlike the other three squadrons, the North American Squadron would operate from two main bases separated by hundreds of miles at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century. Halifax would be the squadron's home from June to November, and would sail down to Bermuda between December and May.<sup>10</sup> It was far easier for the squadron's ships to operate in the more temperate climate of Bermuda during the winter months than in

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<sup>8</sup> Lavery, *Nelson's Navy*, 245; Peter Le Fevre and Richard Harding, *Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century* (London, 2000), 182-184. Other fleets also played a part in the defence of the British colonies in North America and the West Indies. The Western Squadron, developed by Admiral Anson in 1745-1746, was an integral part of the defence of both the British Isles and the colonies. This merged the main fleets in home waters into a single unit that cruised to Western Approaches to the English Channel, and was responsible for watching over the French fleet at Brest. Anson was undoubtedly motivated to create it following the failure to prevent the escape of the Brest fleet to Canada in 1746. As Anson later put it, 'The best defence for our colonies, as well as our coasts, is to have a squadron always to the westward as may in all probability keep the French in port or give them battle with advantage if they come out.'

<sup>9</sup> Lavery, *Nelson's Navy*, 245-250

<sup>10</sup> Jack Arnell, *Bermuda's Early Naval History: the Decision to Establish a Permanent Base* (Bermuda, 1975), 52-53, 77-78

Halifax, whose waters proved quite difficult to navigate. It would also prove easier for the squadron to operate in its designated zone, stretching from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Spanish Florida (the largest area to cover of the four squadrons in the Western Hemisphere), by having the two bases to operate from.<sup>11</sup>

The rivalry between France and England in the New World began almost as soon as the two nations established their colonies. In 1613, Governor Thomas Dale of Virginia sent a single ship with sixty soldiers and sailors to attack the French settlement at Port Royal in Acadia, a sparsely populated colony that had been settled in 1604. The British colonists easily destroyed the colony, and convinced the French to abandon their plans to further colonize the region.<sup>12</sup> The rivalry between British and French colonies would mirror that of the home countries during the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, with both sides launching numerous raiding parties on one another. In 1654, the leaders of Massachusetts sent Major Robert Sedgewick to lead an expedition to capture Port Royal, despite the fact that both France and England are at peace. France would not reclaim possession of Nova Scotia until 1670.<sup>13</sup> In 1689, the War of the League of Augsburg broke out, and became the first true colonial war in North America. Port Royal again fell to the British in 1690, and the following year they made the first of what would prove to be several attempts to capture the capital of New France, Quebec. Sir William Phips sailed in August with a fleet of thirty-one ships and 1300 militiamen to capture the French bastion, and arrived at their destination nine weeks later.

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<sup>11</sup> Public Archives of Canada (PAC), MG 12, Admiralty 128/660, 48

<sup>12</sup> E.H. Jenkins, *A History of the French Navy : From Its Beginnings to the Present Day* (London, 1973), 31; Mark Zuehlke and C. Stuart Daniel, *The Canadian Military Atlas : The Nation's Battlefields from the French and Indian Wars to Kosovo* (Toronto, 2001), 8

<sup>13</sup> George A. Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg* (Orono, Maine, 1967), xv.

However, the British attack floundered, and Phips left for New England by mid-October.<sup>14</sup>

Following the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, which restored France's lost colonies to her, another European war broke out in 1701, the War of the Spanish Succession. France and England were once again on opposite sides. The French proved victorious in Hudson, but Port Royal was again taken by the British in 1710. More importantly, Marlborough's victories over the French in Europe enabled the British to increase their possessions on the American continent. At the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Britain increased its position in North America by acquiring the Hudson Bay region and the Nova Scotia peninsula, though France still controlled Isle Royale (Cape Breton Island).<sup>15</sup> The French grasped that they needed to build a strong fortress on Isle Royale to prevent it from being captured as easily as Port Royal was in the previous conflicts. In the decades following the signing of this treaty, the French consolidated their position with the construction of the fortress at Louisbourg.<sup>16</sup> In stark contrast to this, the British did very little, and made no serious attempts to colonize Nova Scotia.<sup>17</sup> There was also little interest from the other American colonies to settle this region, as there was little enthusiasm in living so close to the hostile

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<sup>14</sup> Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic : The Maritime Struggle for North America* (Toronto, 1950), 71-76; Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg*, xv; Zuehlke and Daniel, *The Canadian Military Atlas*, 13-14

<sup>15</sup> John Bartlet Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle : The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain* (New Haven, Conn., 1945), 28; Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg*, xv

<sup>16</sup> Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg*, xvi-xvii

<sup>17</sup> Julian Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine, eds, *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century*, (Leicester, UK 1988), 130-132

Acadians and Micmacs.<sup>18</sup> The only real interest they had in the region was the fishing station at Canso, on the Northeastern tip of the peninsula, which was dominated by New England fishermen.<sup>19</sup> The Treaty of Utrecht also hadn't properly defined the line separating the French and British territories, so both governments were quick to lay claim to the fishing grounds. In 1716, the government of Massachusetts asked the Royal Navy to send a warship to Canso to make sure that no French fishing ships were found there.<sup>20</sup> This was followed two years later when the station ship HMS *Squirrel* (20) went in and captured or destroyed several French fishing ships found at Canso, bringing in his captures to be condemned by the Vice-Admiralty Court in Boston.<sup>21</sup> Despite French protests and similar retaliations, the Royal Navy would continue to send a warship every summer to Canso to catch any unsuspecting French ships.<sup>22</sup>

Although the British government held little interest in developing Nova Scotia, some officers in the Royal Navy saw considerable potential in the region. In 1732, Captain Thomas Durrell conducted a survey of the Nova Scotia coast from Canso to Annapolis Royale, and informed the Admiralty of the excellent harbor at Chebucto,

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<sup>18</sup> George A. Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations 1630 to 1784* (Montreal-London, 1973), 125

<sup>19</sup> William Alexander Binny Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766' (Ph.D. diss., Queen's University, 1973), 8-9; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 103-104, 116-119; Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 132; Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 126

<sup>20</sup> Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 132-133

<sup>21</sup> Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 14-17; Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 133; Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 126-127

<sup>22</sup> Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 19; Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 133

the future site of Halifax.<sup>23</sup> In 1739, Captain Peter Warren also wrote to the Admiralty that the British should attempt a settlement at Port La Have or Chebucto in order to better protect their fisheries at Canso.<sup>24</sup> However, the Admiralty's focus in the 1730's lay further south, and established a colony in Georgia to watch over Spanish activities in Florida.<sup>25</sup>

War broke out between England and Spain in October, 1739, which subsequently became known as the War of Jenkin's Ear. The Royal Navy had nine warships stationed along the North American coast from Newfoundland to South Carolina, while the main British squadron in the western hemisphere was stationed in Jamaica, consisting of six ships-of-the-line, two 50-gun ships, two frigates and four sloops.<sup>26</sup> It

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<sup>23</sup> Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 39-40

<sup>24</sup> Captain Peter Warren to Josiah Burchett, July 9, 1739, Julian Gwyn, ed., *The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752* (London, 1975), 12; Julian Gwyn, *The Enterprising Admiral: The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren* (Montreal and London, 1974), 7-26; Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 132; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, s.v. 'Sir Peter Warren'. Sir Peter Warren was born in Warrenstown, Ireland in 1703 or 1704, and entered the Navy in 1716 as an ordinary seaman, under the protection of his maternal uncle, Admiral Matthew Aylmer. His rise in the navy was quite spectacular, as he rose from midshipman in 1719, lieutenant in 1723, and finally to post captain in 1727, thanks largely to the influence of his uncle's son-in-law, Admiral Sir John Norris. He spent most of his career in North America and the West Indies, and established strong ties within American colonial society. He married Susannah DeLancey, sister of the lieutenant-governor of New York in 1731, and by 1739 he was placed in command of all of the Navy's station ships at Boston, New York and Charleston. When the war with Spain began in 1739, he participated in the failed attempt to capture St Augustine the following year. It was his suggestion to the Admiralty in 1742 to have the North American station ships winter in the West Indies. He was later promoted to commodore and appointed to command the newly formed Leeward Islands Squadron. This squadron established an impressive reputation for capturing enemy ships, resulting in considerable prize money for the men on this station. Warren's greatest success came in 1745, when he successfully captured the major French fortress at Louisbourg, resulting in his promotion to rear-admiral, as well as being made the first British governor of Cape Breton. Placed in command of the Western Squadron in 1747, he later served with Admiral George Anson against the French at the Battle of Cape Ortegal in May, and after their victory he was promoted to vice-admiral. The end of the war in 1748 brought an end to his active naval career, and he turned his energies to politics, and was elected to parliament. His successes during the war netted him more than £126,000 in prize money, the second highest amount next to Anson's, and invested a considerable amount of his wealth in America. He died from violent fever in Dublin on July 29, 1752.

<sup>25</sup> Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 133.

<sup>26</sup> H.W. Richmond, *The Navy in the War of 1739-48*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1920), 1:261. The British warships on the station consisted of one 50-gun ship, two frigates, and six sloops.

was understandable that most of the British ships were concentrated in the West Indies, as trade revenues from these islands were worth £1,300,000 a year to the British.<sup>27</sup> Although the Jamaica Squadron assumed the main burden of defending British interests from Spanish attacks, it would not do so alone. In the fall of 1739, the Admiralty ordered most of the station ships along the North American coast to assemble in Georgia, to be placed under the command of Captain Vincent Pearce.<sup>28</sup> They arrived there the following April to assist Colonel James Oglethorpe in his assault on the Spanish settlement at St. Augustine in Florida. Pearce and Oglethorpe arrived near the settlement on June 1, and agreed to remain there until July 5. However, despite information that confirmed the weakness of the Spanish defenses, the two British commanders were quite loath to risk their forces. The leadership of Pearce and Oglethorpe could be described as unimaginative and lethargic, and the British withdrew from the region on July 5, and the ships returned to their assigned stations.<sup>29</sup>

Despite the failure at St. Augustine, the British did reap some benefits from it. Captain Warren (who commanded the *Squirrel* during the attack) gained considerable appreciation for the needs of amphibious warfare, and how to best utilise land and naval forces, which would come in handy later in the war. In 1742, Warren wrote a report to the Admiralty on what to do with the station ships along the American coast.

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 2:191

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 1:50-51. The ships on the North American station at this time were HMS *Hector* (40), *Flamborough* (20), *Tartar* (20), *Phoenix* (20), *Shoreham* (20), *Squirrel* (20), *Wolf* (12), and *Spence* (10)

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.; William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy : A History from the Earliest Times to the Present*, 7 vols. (London, 1897-1903), 3:269-270



He suggested that these ships be formed into a new squadron that would sail down to the Carribean during the the winter months, and return to their regular stations in North America during the spring.<sup>30</sup> For this to work, it would be necessary for the station ships to correspond with each other regularly, and require close co-operation with the colonial governments. To facilitate this, he further suggested that the ships' captains be appointed by the crown to each of the colonial councils. Naturally, he suggested that he be placed in command of this new squadron.<sup>31</sup>

Warren's request for the creation of a new North American squadron came at a propitious time, as a renewal of war between Britain and France seemed likely. The Admiralty took his suggestions, and appointed him to command the newly formed Leeward Islands Squadron. They also asked him to elaborate on plans for attacking the French colonies and shipping in North America.<sup>32</sup> This must have pleased Warren, who was a firm advocate on the conquest of New France, which would give England a complete monopoly of the fisheries and fur trade in North America, as well as giving them an unmatched source for naval stores.<sup>33</sup>

War finally broke out between England and France in 1744, and Nova Scotia became a major theatre of operations. Warren urged the Admiralty to send him enough ships to seize both Louisbourg and Quebec, the two key French bastions on the

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<sup>30</sup> Warren to Thomas Corbett, March 20, 1742, *Warren Papers*, 26-28; Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 134; Richmond, *Navy in the War of 1739-48*, 3:276-278

<sup>31</sup> Ibid

<sup>32</sup> Corbett to Warren, Sept. 23, 1743, *Warren Papers*, 32-33; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 38, 46-47; Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 134-135. Another influential factor in the Admiralty's decision was the lobbying of the Board of Trade by colonial agents, eager to remove the French threat from North America.

<sup>33</sup> Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 135

continent.<sup>34</sup> They in turn appointed him to command the new North American Squadron, and was given command of all British warships north of Carolina, and could even use some of the Newfoundland station's ships if necessary. He received these orders while commanding the Leeward Island Squadron, and sailed up to take over his new command in the spring of 1745.<sup>35</sup> The French were able to get the jump on the British by sending their ships out from Louisbourg to seize Canso, and afterwards they sailed to Annapolis Royale. Louisbourg privateers also did much disruption of colonial trade during the first months of the war. By the end of the year, three French privateers succeeded in capturing thirty-six British merchantmen, and almost succeeded in paralysing New England trade.<sup>36</sup>

Another key figure who was concerned with the security of Nova Scotia was the governor of Massachusetts, William Shirley. He was appointed governor in 1741, and was a strong advocate for driving the French out of North America entirely.<sup>37</sup> He believed that the best way to defend Massachusetts was to keep Nova Scotia in British

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<sup>34</sup> From the British perspective, the war is known as the War of Jenkins Ear during the Spanish phase from 1739-43, and King George's War with the war with France from 1744-48.

<sup>35</sup> Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 135

<sup>36</sup> Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 138-139

<sup>37</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'William Shirley'; Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 136-137. William Shirley was born in Sussex in 1694. He emigrated to Boston in 1731, and rose quickly in colonial politics. In 1740, he took part in raising troops for Lord Cathcart's expedition to Carthagen, and was appointed as governor of Massachusetts the following year. His most famous exploit was in planning the expedition against Louisbourg in 1745, and was rewarded with a regimental commission in the regular army. He left Massachusetts for England in 1749, and was sent to France to help negotiate with the French government about the boundary between Canada and New England. He returned to Boston in 1753, and was instrumental in pressing the British government to begin operations designed to expel the french from North America. In 1755, he was given command of the troops to be used against Niagara, but the expedition proved a failure. Following General Braddock's death that same year, he was made commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America, but was replaced by Lord Loudoun the following year. He later became governor of the Bahamas, and resigned this post in 1770. He retired to Massachusetts, where he died on March 24, 1770.

hands, and wanted Massachusetts troops to defend Annapolis Royale.<sup>38</sup> Shirley saw to it that they supplied most of the men and equipment to defend this base, and even began preparations to launch an attack against Louisbourg.<sup>39</sup> The Massachusetts Assembly raised £27,000 for the expedition, allowing them to recruit nearly 4000 troops, as well as a naval force of eighteen privateers and small vessels, and eighty transports to carry the colonial army to its target.<sup>40</sup> They were later joined by Warren's squadron from the West Indies, and began the siege of Louisbourg on April, 30, 1745.<sup>41</sup> With no hope of receiving reinforcements from the sea (thanks to Warren's blockade), the great bastion fell on June 28.<sup>42</sup> The success of this operation was due largely to the close co-operation between the Royal Navy and the colonial ships and troops, and from the weakness of the French Navy, which was unable to properly supply their bastion.<sup>43</sup>

Unfortunately for the British, the capture of Louisbourg would prove to be the high water mark of the British offensive against the French in North America. Warren was replaced as the North American Squadron's commander by Commodore Charles

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<sup>38</sup> Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 137

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 137-156; Richmond, *Navy in the War of 1739-48*, 2:200-203

<sup>40</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:110, 113; Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 157-163

<sup>41</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:113-115; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 55, 62; Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 165. Warren's squadron consisted of HMS *Superb* (64), *Launceston* (44), and *Mermaid* (44), and later received the *Princess Mary* (64), *Sunderland* (60), *Canterbury* (58), *Chester* (50), *Eltham* (44), *Hector* (44) and *Lark* (44).

<sup>42</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:114-115; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 57-90; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 116-127; Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg*, 77-152, and *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 163-165; Richmond, *Navy in the War of 1739-48*, 2:203-216.

<sup>43</sup> Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 59-60, 86-88; Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg*, 151, and *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 175. Douglas argues that relations between the British and colonial officers, between the professional and amateur officers, were not always cordial. He claims that the New Englanders felt that Warren and his officers took more credit for the capture of Louisbourg than they deserved.

Knowles, who felt it was useless for the British to hold onto Louisbourg unless they were willing to station a permanent squadron there.<sup>44</sup> Worse still, while preparations were made to attack Quebec in 1746, the fleet that was supposed to help escort the expedition never left England, and most of the North American Squadron's available ships were being constantly reassigned to other fleets and not replaced.<sup>45</sup> The French attempted to make up for the loss of their fortress by sending a fleet of ten ships-of-the-line, three frigates, three fireships, two bomb-vessels and sixty transports, under the command of Admiral d'Anville, carrying 3500 troops to recapture Louisbourg in

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<sup>44</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Sir Charles Knowles'; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 135-136, 165-166; Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 136. Sir Charles Knowles was born sometime between 1697 and 1704, and entered the Royal Navy in 1718 as a captain's servant. After serving five years on board the frigate *Lyme*, he was promoted to lieutenant in 1730, and served on board HMS *Lion* in the West Indies. He was promoted again in 1732 to commander of the frigate *Southampton*, and was later posted to the *Diamond* in the West Indies in 1736. He joined in Admiral Vernon's attack on Porto Bello at the start of the War of Jenkins' Ear. He was responsible for the capture of the town of Chagres in 1740, and also took part in the expedition against Cartagena in 1741, where he served as the surveyor and engineer of the fleet. Despite the failure at Cartagena, Knowles was appointed to command the 70-gun ship *Suffolk* in 1742, and commanded a squadron that attacked the Spanish settlements on the Caracas coast, though this too was beaten off by the Spaniards. In 1743, he was promoted to commodore, and hoisted his broad pennant in the *Superbe*, and served as second-in-command of the Jamaica Squadron from 1743 to 1745. He returned briefly to England in 1745, then was sent out to Louisbourg in 1746 to serve as governor of the former French fortress. He was promoted to rear-admiral of the white and made commander-in-chief of the Jamaica Squadron on July 15, 1747. He attempted to capture Santiago in Cuba in 1748, but this also met failure, for which he blamed Captain Dent, the commander of the Jamaica Squadron prior to Knowles' arrival. Knowles then cruised off Havana in the hopes of intercepting a Spanish fleet, and fought an unsatisfying action against a fleet of seven Spanish ships on October 1, 1748. One Spanish ship was captured and another one was destroyed, but Knowles was quite unhappy with the performance of several of his captains. Knowles faced a court-martial in 1749 over his accusations against his captains, and was acquitted, though he did fight a duel against one of his former captains shortly after the trial. In 1752, he was appointed governor of Jamaica, and was promoted to vice-admiral in 1755, and served as Sir Edward Hawke's second-in-command in the failed expedition against Rochefort in 1757, for which he was assigned part of the blame. In response to this he wrote a pamphlet about the expedition, but this only served to antagonize the government against him, which effectively ended his active career in the navy. He was promoted to full admiral in 1760, was created a baronet and promoted to rear-admiral of Great-Britain in 1765. He resigned this position in 1770 after accepting a command in the Russian Navy, which was at war with Turkey, and remained there until 1774. He then returned to England, and died on December 9, 1777.

<sup>45</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:116-117; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 131; Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 136. The projected attack was intended to be a two-pronged offensive, with colonial troops moving up from Lake Champlain to take Montreal, while Warren's ships would escort General St. Clair's army from Louisbourg to Quebec.

the fall of 1746.<sup>46</sup> Despite the absence any significant British naval force, the French expedition was doomed by severe storms that dispersed the fleet and sank a number of ships, while scurvy and an epidemic of smallpox on board the French ships cost the lives of nearly 3000 men.<sup>47</sup> Yet the presence of d'Anville's fleet was sufficient to scuttle the plans to capture Quebec.

Ironically, France would ultimately regain possession of its bastion without firing a single shot. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which ended the war in 1748, resulted in the British exchanging it to the French, while in return they were given back Madras (which they lost in 1746), as well as having the French withdraw from the Low Countries.<sup>48</sup> Considering the gains France made in Europe, many French historians called the treaty a stupid and disastrous settlement.<sup>49</sup> Mahan stated the position of the two antagonists by writing that France was forced to give up her conquests for want of a navy, and England saved her position by her sea power, though she failed to use it to the best advantage.<sup>50</sup> One of the main arguments that favored the exchange was that the British control of Isle Royale was tenuous at best, as the Acadian population and Micmac Indians in the region regarded their new occupiers with considerable hostility.<sup>51</sup> Without seeing any benefit in holding Isle Royale, the British returned it to their owners, and Warren's plans for the conquest of New France were put on hold.

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<sup>46</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:116-117; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 116-130; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 132-134; Jenkins, *History of the French Navy*, 113-114

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Richmond, *Navy in the War of 1739-48*, 3:241-243

<sup>49</sup> Jenkins, *History of the French Navy*, 140

<sup>50</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea power Upon History 1660-1783* (London, 1892), 280

<sup>51</sup> Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 136

It must have been especially disheartening for the American colonists to learn that Louisbourg would be handed back to the French. One wonders if the seeds of colonial discontent towards the mother country did not originate from this; at the very least, it certainly inflamed them. The French bastion could not have been taken without the support of the New England troops and ships, and now they were forced to accept that the home government, thousands of miles away across the Atlantic, was willing to give it back. Certainly, the Americans had every right to be upset with this turn of events. Yet the truth was that the colonies at this time were little better than bargaining chips to be traded at the peace talks. England was far more concerned with the French occupation of Holland than it was in the conquest of Isle Royale. As long as the British government remained focused on the activities on the European continent, the colonies would continue to receive secondary priority.

One positive action taken by the British after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was that, unlike the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, they finally took notice of Nova Scotia. They followed the advice offered by Warren a decade earlier and decided to set up a new colony at Chebucto in 1749, and would be named Halifax. It was named in honor of George Montague, 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Halifax, the President of the Board of Trade and Plantations who was instrumental in the founding of the city.<sup>52</sup> But while it seemed that Halifax was built primarily as a counterbalance to Louisbourg, this was not the case. The evidence concerning the founding of the city has been shown to suggest that the Admiralty had no intention of maintaining a strong naval presence at

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<sup>52</sup> Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 168-172; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 142; Thomas Raddall, *Halifax, Warden of the North* (Toronto, 1948), 20-30

Halifax, and sought to avoid a clash with the French in this region. In fact, before the start of the next war, the British relied more upon the locale Sea Militia for the naval defense of the colony than on the navy.<sup>53</sup>

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle confirmed that England's strategic focus was still centred on Europe. This peace was little more than a truce, as less than a decade after the treaty was signed, Britain and France were again at war. In Europe, it was known as the Seven Years' War, and lasted from 1756 to 1763, but the American phase, known as the French and Indian Wars, actually began in 1755. This conflict would be considerably different than the previous European conflicts. From the European point of view, the most noticeable difference was the change of traditional alliances, as two of the continent's most bitter rivals, France and Austria, fought together against Frederick the Great's Prussia. Russia would also join the anti-Prussian coalition, and England would drop its traditional support of Austria and ally itself with Prussia. Yet apart from this, there was another important difference between this war and the War of the Austrian Succession, namely that England's primary goal was not in maintaining some continental balance, but to conquer its enemies' colonies. They would support their continental allies with money and some troops, pinning down their enemies' resources, while concentrating their main efforts against the vulnerable overseas colonies. It was a strategy that would reap enormous rewards for the British.

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<sup>53</sup> William Alexander Binny Douglas, 'The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749-1755 : A Comment on Naval Policy', *Canadian Historical Review* 47 (1966), 22-23, and 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 171-172 and 182-193. Douglas argues that Halifax was designed primarily to help keep control over the sparsely settled coastal regions by maintaining a careful watch from the sea. The ships of the Sea Militia were commanded by men who not by naval officers, but who performed the same functions, such as escorting convoys, and were paid almost the same wages as their equivalent ranks in the Royal Navy. One of the most important virtues of Halifax was that it is an ice-free port, giving it an important advantage over Louisbourg.

France's decision to build three forts in the Ohio Valley in 1753, effectively barring the American colonists from the region, led to the start of an undeclared war between the British and the French in North America.<sup>54</sup> The Duke of Newcastle was primarily interested in stopping the French expansion in the American west without starting a new war with France. England responded to the French encroachments by sending two regiments of regular troops to America under the command of General Edward Braddock.<sup>55</sup> The French in turn responded to this by assembling a fleet of twenty-five ships-of-the-line under the command of Admiral Dubois de la Motte at Brest to help transport 3000 troops to Canada.<sup>56</sup> When they received word of this, the British government further upped the ante by sending a fleet under Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen, consisting of eleven ships-of-the-line and several smaller ships.<sup>57</sup> Boscawen was given precise orders to defend the British colonies and to

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<sup>54</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3: 139; Julian Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War : A Study in Combined Strategy*, 2 vols., (London, 1907), 1:10-15; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 154; Zuehlke and Daniel, *Canadian Military Atlas*, 21

<sup>55</sup> Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War : The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York, 2000), 68-70; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:139; Corbett, *Seven Years' War*, 1:16; W.J. Eccles, *The French in North America 1500-1783* (East Lansing, N.J., 1998), 203-204; Guy Fregault, *Canada : The War of the Conquest* (Toronto, 1969), 70-71; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 158

<sup>56</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3 :140; Eccles, *The French in North America*, 204; Fregault, *War of the Conquest*, 77-78; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 158; Jenkins, *History of the French Navy*, 119-120; Robert Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow : The Saga of the French and Indian Wars* (Toronto, 1999), 277-278. Nine of the French capital ships returned to Brest, while an additional four ships-of-the-line and two frigates were detached to Louisbourg.

<sup>57</sup> *Dictionary of Canadian Biography 1741-1770*, s.v. 'Edward Boscawen'. Edward Boscawen was born on August 19, 1711 in Surrey, England, and entered the navy as a volunteer on board the *Superb* in 1726. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1732, and given command of the sloop *Leopard* in 1737. He was stationed in the West Indies in 1739 when war broke out with Spain, and he distinguished himself at the sieges of Porto Bello and Cartagena. He left the West Indies in 1742, and was promoted to rear-admiral of the blue in 1747, following the victory over the French fleet at Cape Finisterre in May. He was later appointed to command the expedition to the East Indies later that year, although the siege of Pondicherry in 1748 proved a failure. He remained in England from 1750 to 1755, during which time he served on the Board of Admiralty. In February, 1755, he was promoted to vice-admiral of the blue and given secret instructions to intercept and destroy all French reinforcements heading to Canada. Unfortunately, he failed



intercept all French ships carrying warlike stores and troops to North America.<sup>58</sup> He was to lie in wait of the French fleet off Newfoundland, and once he had defeated the French he was to return with his fleet to England, while leaving behind enough ships to guarantee British superiority over the French naval forces in North America.<sup>59</sup>

Though Newcastle did not want to start a full-scale war with France over North America, he was essentially manoeuvred by the Duke of Cumberland, Lord Halifax, Sir Henry Fox and Sir William Pitt into expanding the proposed campaign in North America. British government devised a four-pronged offensive that would: 1) capture Fort Duquesne and the western French outposts; 2) move up from Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario and capture Fort Niagara; 3) capture the French forts along Lake Champlain; 4) capture Fort Beausejour in the Bay of Fundy.<sup>60</sup> This new aggressive attitude was markedly different from other conflicts, in which colonial wars were mere subsidiaries of the main European wars. The British were now pursuing the policy so

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to stop the bulk of the French fleet, and he had to take his own fleet to Halifax following the outbreak of typhoid on board his ships. During his stay, he was influential in the decision to oust the Acadians from their settlements later that year. When he returned to England, he was made commander-in-chief, Portsmouth, and had to sign the order for the execution of Admiral Byng, following the loss of Minorca. Though a member of Newcastle's cabinet, he was the only member of the Board of Admiralty to remain in office following the resignation of the Newcastle government in 1756. Pitt chose him to lead the naval forces that would attack Louisbourg in 1758, and he worked quite well with General Amherst in achieving the surrender of the French fortress on July 26. He left North America for the Western Squadron and the Mediterranean, and commanded the fleet that destroyed the French fleet at Lagos Bay in 1759. By this point he was worn out by continuous sea service, and contracted a fever in December, 1760, and died on January 11, 1761, survived by his wife and five children.

<sup>58</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3 :140-141; Corbett, *Seven Years' War*, 1 :39-45; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 158-159; Jenkins, *History of the French Navy*, 119-120

<sup>59</sup> Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London, 1911), 51, and *Seven Years' War*, 1 :39-44; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 213; James L. Stokesbury, *Navy and Empire* (New York, 1983), 138. In addition to Boscawen's orders to stop the French reinforcements from reaching Canada,, Admiral Hawke was ordered to attack French merchant ships off the French coast, resulting in the capture of 300 French merchantmen and 8000 seamen in six months. The loss of so many skilled seamen seriously hampered the effectiveness of the French Navy at the outset of the war.

<sup>60</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 68-70; Corbett, *Seven Years' War*, 1 :25-26; Eccles, *The French in North America*, 203; Fregault, *War of the Conquest*, 88-89.

strenuously advocated by Sir Peter Warren, to oust the French from North America. The key ingredients to this was keeping France occupied on the continent, by subsidizing Prussia and Hanover's armies to fight the French coalition, and to bottle up the French fleets in their ports, enabling the British to have complete control of the sea lanes. This combination would effectively prevent the French from reinforcing their colonies, thereby leaving them completely isolated and at the mercy of the British.

Another important factor that aided England in this war was the question of leadership, both at the political and military level. Dropping Austria as an ally in favor of Prussia brought England the services of the greatest general of his age, Frederick the Great, as well as Ferdinand of Brunswick, who were able to repeatedly defeat the armies of the anti-British/Prussian coalition, and prevented France from being able to send substantial reinforcements to Canada. But the British would prove most fortunate later in the war when they would be led by William Pitt. Pitt's energy and vision ensured a revival of England's fortunes after several reverses in the early part of the war. He would prove the strongest proponent of directing England's energies towards America and India, and would help refurbish and reorganize the Royal Navy into the dominant naval force on the high seas.<sup>61</sup>

Boscawen beat De la Motte in the race to the New World, and positioned his fleet, reinforced by six ships-of-the-line and one frigate under the command of Rear-

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<sup>61</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 214-215; Richard Middleton, *The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years' War 1757-1762* (Cambridge, UK and New York, 1985), 45-46, 105. Pitt would also prove fortunate in his appointments of Admiral George Anson as First Lord of the Admiralty and General Sir George Ligonier as head of the army. The combination of Pitt-Anson-Ligonier would prove to be a most effective team with regards to cooperation between the government, the army and the navy.

Admiral Francis Holburne, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, where he awaited for the French to arrive. Unfortunately, a thick fog allowed all but two of the French ships to elude the British and deliver their cargoes to Louisbourg and Quebec. Boscawen's only success occurred when the two French warships *Alcide* (64) and *Lys* (64) were approached by the British on June 8, and promptly captured, along with eight companies of infantry.<sup>62</sup> This pre-emptive strike against the French did not fit in with the style of warfare of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, but it did show to what ends the British were willing to go to achieve their aims. Yet by failing to stop De la Motte's fleet, Boscawen unwittingly set in motion events that would transform Halifax into a major naval base. He was supposed to return with his fleet to England as soon as possible, but an outbreak of typhoid aboard his ships forced him to stay in Halifax. The presence of Boscawen's fleet transformed Halifax from a struggling port to a thriving one. Throughout the summer of 1755, there were rarely fewer than ten men of war in port, and the presence of approximately 8000 seamen effectively doubled the population of Nova Scotia. Yet the main problem the navy encountered with so many ships in port was that Halifax had never been required to provide facilities for more than two ships-of-the-line and a few smaller vessels at a time. The presence of Boscawen's fleet in Halifax 1755 did not immediately alter the admiralty's attitude into transforming into a major naval base, but the seed was effectively planted.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3 :141; Corbett, *Seven Years' War*, 1 :53-55; Fregault, *War of the Conquest*, 90-91; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 159; Jenkins, *History of the French Navy*, 119-120; Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow*, 278. The *Lys* was pierced for 64 guns, but carried only 22 when she was captured.

<sup>63</sup> Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 221-227, 235, 240-241. Though the Admiralty was not interested yet in developing a careening wharf, but thanks to the capture of Louisbourg in 1745, Halifax inherited the rudiments of an administration upon which naval commanders could build the apparatus of a naval station, such as the Court of the Vice-Admiralty, Collector of Customs, and Port Captain.

The British plans for a quick conquest of Canada fell remarkably short, culminating with the destruction of Braddock's army outside of Fort Dusquesne in July, 1755. The British had the unfortunate onus of the aggressor without any significant gains to show for it. The only real success the British achieved in this period was in Acadia, where an expedition of 2000 troops in thirty-four transports left Massachusetts for Fort Beausejour, and was able to capture it after a siege of eleven days.<sup>64</sup> This left the British complete control of the Nova Scotia peninsula, but resulted in one of the less glorious episodes in British history. If there were any doubts that this was a war of conquest, they were quickly dispelled when Governor Charles Lawrence ordered the immediate expulsion of all French Acadians in the fall of 1755. Yet the blame for this early example of ethnic-cleansing must be shared with Boscawen. Before Lawrence made his final decision to remove them, he referred the final decision to Boscawen and his second-in-command, Rear-Admiral Savage Mostyn, for final approval. Boscawen, like Warren before him, preferred to have no population at all to one which he could not trust. With Boscawen's approval, Lawrence went ahead with the expulsion, and between 6000 to 7000 Acadians were forcibly removed, an act immortalized in Longfellow's epic poem "Evangeline".<sup>65</sup>

After months of fighting in North America, war was officially declared between Britain and France on May 18, 1756. Despite the previous year's failures, the British still intended to strike the French forces in Canada. Lord Loudoun replaced William

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<sup>64</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 94-112; Eccles, *French in North America*, 205-207; Gwyn, 'Royal Navy in North America', 138;

<sup>65</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 112-114; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 228-234; Fregault, *War of the Conquest*, 164-200; Zuehlke and Daniel, *Canadian Military Atlas*, 25

Shirley as commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America, and saw Quebec as the key to the French defenses in North America. However, before the British could begin to plan for an assault on Quebec, they would have to again deal with Louisbourg.<sup>66</sup> Recapturing this bastion a second time must have been most galling to the American colonists, and some undoubtedly wondered if it would be used once again as a bargaining chip at the peace talks.

At the start of 1756, the Royal Navy had a force of four ships-of-the-line, four 50-gun ships, one sloop, three brigs and four smaller vessels in Halifax.<sup>67</sup> The bulk of the navy's strength remained concentrated in the West Indies, but it was reckoned that the force at Halifax was sufficiently strong to deal with the French naval forces stationed at Louisbourg, which numbered only two ships-of-the-line and two frigates.<sup>68</sup> However, as in previous wars, the French would receive considerable help from their small privateers, and scored numerous victories against British shipping.<sup>69</sup>

On July 26, 1756, four ships of the North American Squadron, consisting of HMS *Grafton* (70), *Nottingham* (60), frigates *Hornet* and *Jamaica*, encountered a detachment of the Brest Fleet, *Le Héros* (74), *L'Illustre* (64), frigates *La Sirène* (36) and *La Licorne* (30). The French ships were charged with delivering vital supplies to Louisbourg.<sup>70</sup> The two small squadrons fought a series of indecisive actions against

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<sup>66</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 130-132, 143-145; Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 139

<sup>67</sup> R. Beatson, *Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain 1727-1783*, 6 vols. (London, 1790-1804), 1:95-99

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

<sup>69</sup> Captain I. Schomberg, *An Historical Summary of Naval Maritime Events*, 5 vols. (London, 1802), 1:275

<sup>70</sup> René Chartrand, *Louisbourg 1758 : Wolfe's First Siege* (Oxford, 2000), 18; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 246-248. Commodore Charles Holmes commanded the British ships, while Commodore Beausseier commanded the French squadron.

one another over several days, until both sides went back to their respective ports to make repairs.<sup>71</sup> As for the rest of the British war effort, it proved no better than the previous year. Not only did Fort Oswego fall in the American theatre, but the British also suffered the humiliating loss of Minorca. Admiral Byng's failure to lift the siege of the island resulted in a court-martial, which found him guilty and led to his execution.<sup>72</sup> This was followed by the fall of Newcastle's ministry in November, 1756, and led to the formation of the Newcastle-Pitt ministry the following June, which saw Newcastle return as First Lord of the Treasury, while Pitt became Southern Secretary. In essence, Pitt became the Minister of Measures, while Newcastle was the Minister of Money. This arrangement allowed Pitt to formulate his own policy on how to best manage the war.<sup>73</sup>

Some members of the British government wondered whether the fortress could be bypassed, and instead make a direct assault on Quebec in 1757. However, Pitt insisted that Louisbourg must be captured before any assault be made against Quebec, and gave instructions to Lord Loudoun to accomplish this task.<sup>74</sup> Vice-Admiral Francis Holburne's fleet of fifteen ships-of-the-line, two 50-gun ships, sixteen cruisers, two bombships and one fireship was sent to Halifax, along with fourteen battalions of Regular troops, plus a detachment of Royal Artillery and Colonial Rangers, with the

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 170-171; Stokesbury, *Navy and Empire*, 138-139

<sup>73</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 174-177, 211-214; Middleton, *The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry*, 1-17; Stokesbury, *Navy and Empire*, 140-141. Pitt was helped by the disgrace of the Duke of Cumberland, the second son of George II who, after surrendering the Hanoverian army to the French in September, 1757, resigned all his military offices.

<sup>74</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3 :167-168; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 164

aim of capturing Louisbourg.<sup>75</sup> Unfortunately, this fleet didn't arrive in Halifax until July, at which time the French had also received substantial reinforcements. By the end of June, the French had eighteen ships-of-the-line and five frigates at Louisbourg, giving them parity with the British.<sup>76</sup> Holburne was not willing to risk the safety of the army transports, which carried more than 14,000 men, while the French fleet remained strong in numbers. Holburne spent a month trying to lure De la Motte's fleet out, sailing just out of range of Louisbourg's guns, but neither side pressed for an attack, resulting in the withdrawal of the British fleet to Halifax by the end of September.<sup>77</sup>

The failure to capture Louisbourg in 1757 resulted in another major development in the transformation of Halifax into a major naval base. Pitt informed the Admiralty that he wanted eight ships-of-the-line to spend the winter of 1757-58 in Halifax, so that they could be used as early as possible against Louisbourg the following spring.

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<sup>75</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:167-168; Corbett, *Seven Years' War*, 1:169; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 1771-1800*, s.v. 'Francis Holburne'. Francis Holburne was born in 1704, and entered the Royal Navy in 1720 as a volunteer on board the *St. Albans*. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1727, and rose to the rank of captain in 1739, after which he received command of the frigate *Dolphin*. He served in home waters and in the West Indies during the War of the Austrian Succession, and was promoted to commodore and made commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands Squadron at the end of the war. He returned to England in 1752, and promoted to rear-admiral of the blue in 1755. He sailed to North America to reinforce Boscawen's fleet that same year at the start of the war in North America. He served in the Western Squadron in 1756, and was a member of the court-martial of Admiral Byng that same year. He was promoted to vice-admiral of the Blue in 1757, and sailed with a large fleet intended to capture the fortress of Louisbourg. Unfortunately, Holburne's fleet delayed departure until May, and the French succeeded in sending a large fleet to defend the fortress before the British arrived in July. Holburne returned to England with his fleet at the end of the year, and was made commander-in-chief of Portsmouth shortly after his arrival. He was promoted to admiral of the blue in 1767, then to admiral of the white in 1770, and finally to rear-admiral of Great Britain. He served as one of the Lords of the Admiralty from 1770 to 1771, and died on July 15, 1771.

<sup>76</sup> Chartrand, *Louisbourg 1758*, 18-22; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:167-168; Corbett, *Seven Years' War*, 1:169; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 266-267. The French ships came primarily from the Brest and Toulon Squadrons, and were placed under the command of Admiral De la Motte.

<sup>77</sup> Chartrand, *Louisbourg 1758*, 22-23; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:168-169; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 271-274, 284-289

They also informed Holburne that he was to find the best place in Halifax to make a careening wharf. Holburne grudgingly let eight ships-of-the-line and one sloop remain in Halifax for the winter, but left the details for the careening wharf to Commodore Alexander Colvill, who commanded the ships in Halifax following Holburne's departure in November.<sup>78</sup> Though the winter proved too harsh to have the wharf prepared in time, Colvill got much accomplished, and began naval operations against French shipping by the end of March, 1758.<sup>79</sup> Most important was the decision on the part of the British government that Halifax would become a permanent naval base, and would occupy central role was to help supporting army and navy operations from the sea. This made it necessary to build a dockyard, which would be completed in 1760. Thus it was that the failures of Boscawen in 1755 and Holburne in 1757 helped transform Halifax into a major bastion for the empire.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 1741-1770*, s.v. 'Alexander Colvill'. Alexander Colvill, 7<sup>th</sup> Baron Colvill, was born on February 28, 1717 (old style) in Scotland. He entered the navy as a volunteer per order (equivalent to a modern naval cadet) in 1732, and served on board HMS *Lime* in 1733. He became a midshipman in 1735, and was promoted to lieutenant in 1739. He served in the West Indies during the War of Jenkins' Ear, and took part in the sieges of Porto Bello and Cartagena. He received his first command in 1743 when he was posted to the fireship *Terrible* in the Mediterranean. The following year he was given command of the sloop *Leopard*, and in the four years he commanded this ship he captured and destroyed a considerable number of enemy vessels, for which he received £5000 in prize money. He commanded the station ship *Success* in New England from 1749 to 1752, and on his return to England in 1753 he was made captain of the 70-gun ship *Northumberland*, which he would command for the next nine years. In 1755, he sailed with Boscawen's fleet to North America to try to intercept De la Motte's fleet, and returned to North America with Holburne's fleet in 1757. At the end of the year, he was promoted to commodore and assumed the duties of commander-in-chief of the North American Squadron, and took an active part in transforming Halifax into a proper naval base for the station. He participated in the sieges of Louisbourg in 1758 and Quebec in 1759, and deserves much credit for the relief of Quebec in 1760 while it was under siege from land forces. He remained on the North American station until 1762, and was promoted to rear-admiral of the white following his return to England. After a brief term as port admiral in Plymouth in January, 1763, he returned to take command of the North American Squadron in June, though with much reluctance. He remained there until 1766, and ended his active career in the navy on his return to England. He died on May 21, 1770.

<sup>79</sup> Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 292-301

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 292-299, 338-339, 356-357, 378-382; Barry J. Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea: The British Navy, New England and the Maritime Provinces of Canada' (master's thesis, University of Maine, 1971), 18;



The setbacks of 1757, which included the surrender of Fort William Henry, ultimately cost Loudoun his job, and was replaced by Major-General James Abercromby. At Halifax, a new team was also put in charge of the Louisbourg operation, led by Admiral Boscawen and Major-General Amherst.<sup>81</sup> Boscawen was already regarded as one of the navy's best tacticians, while Amherst was given his first command of an army. However, the two men would work remarkably well together in the upcoming operation against Louisbourg. It certainly did not hurt that the British held a considerable numerical advantage over the French; Boscawen's fleet numbered forty-one warships (including twenty-three ships-of-the-line) against ten French warships (including five ships-of-the-line), and Amherst could field nearly 15,000 men against 4000 troops the French had at Louisbourg.<sup>82</sup> Unlike the previous years, the French Navy was to be contained in European waters by the Western Squadron, which would keep the French fleets bottled up at Brest, Rochefort and Toulon. The British blockade of their coast would make it impossible for the French to send sizable reinforcements to their colonies, while leaving the British free to roam the sea lanes with impunity.<sup>83</sup>

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Charles Roche, 'Dockyard Reminiscences', *Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society* 18 (1914), 59-67; and Charles H. Stubbings, 'Dockyard Memoranda 1894', *Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society* 12 (1908), 103-109. The Admiralty ordered the establishment of a dockyard in Halifax on January 30, 1758; decision as to where to build the dockyard was made by Rear-Admiral Philip Durell, who decided on Gorham's Point on November 20, 1758. Durell bought the land from Joseph Goreham on December 22, 1758 for £60, and a grant for additional land was given by Governor Lawrence on February 7, 1759.

<sup>81</sup> Chartrand, *Louisbourg 1758*, 24-26, 28-29

<sup>82</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 250-256; Chartrand, *Louisbourg 1758*, 39-41; Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 313-323; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 172. Exact figures for the British forces range between 12,000 to 15,000 men.

<sup>83</sup> Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 169

On June 8, 1758, General Wolfe landed his division at Cormorandiere Cove, and began a siege that would last seven weeks. As was the case in 1745, the French had little chance of holding out without reinforcements from the sea, and capitulated on July 27.<sup>84</sup> Once again, naval supremacy was the key to the British victory. In the three previous years, the French Navy had been able to send a large fleet and sufficient troops and provisions to defend Louisbourg. Once the fortress was cut off from the mother country, its fate was sealed. And though it was too late in the season to prepare for an attack on Quebec, the road was open for an assault the following year. Before the season was over, the British conducted a series of raids around Gaspé and the French settlements in what is now New Brunswick. They destroyed more than 250 fishing vessels in the Gaspé, finished the removal of the Acadians from Ile St. Jean, and attacked the French settlements at Miramichi and St. Anne's (modern-day Fredericton). Wolfe found this type of warfare quite deplorable, stating that "it added nothing to the reputation of British arms."<sup>85</sup> Yet this form of warfare would become more acceptable to the British in future wars in North America.

With the destruction of Fort Frontenac and Fort Duquesne in the west, and with Louisbourg in British hands, the war in America had finally turned in favor of the British. The close British blockade of the French coast prevented all but a few warships and supply ships to reach the French colonies. The commander of the French army in Canada, the Marquis de Montcalm, had no more than 15,000 troops to call upon to defend Canada, whereas the British and American colonists could easily field

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<sup>84</sup> Chartrand, *Louisbourg 1758*, 43-84; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3 :182-183; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 171-172

<sup>85</sup> Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 329-333; Zuehlke and Daniel, *Canadian Military Atlas*, 35

50,000 Regular and Militia troops.<sup>86</sup> The British plan for 1759 was to use this advantage against the French in another multi-prong offensive, with the decisive campaign aimed at Quebec. However, neither Amherst nor Boscawen would participate in this operation; Amherst would head west and direct operations in that theatre, while Boscawen would command the Western Squadron and win a decisive victory over the French fleet at Lagos.<sup>87</sup> In their place for the attack on Quebec would be Wolfe and Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders.<sup>88</sup> Montcalm strongly urged for diversionary raids to be conducted against Virginia and the Carolinas to draw away some of the enemy's strength from Canadian border, and warned that if this was not

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<sup>86</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 236; Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow*, 271; Zuehlke and Daniel, *Canadian Military Atlas*, 35 The British had a decisive advantage in calling up reinforcements from the colonies, which had a population of 1,250,000, whereas the French population in North America numbered only 80,000.

<sup>87</sup> Chartrand, *Louisbourg 1758*, 25, 29; Jenkins, *History of the French Navy*, 130-131; Zuehlke and Daniel, *Canadian Military Atlas*, 40

<sup>88</sup> *Dictionary of Canadian Biography 1771-1800*, s.v. 'Charles Saunders'. Sir Charles Saunders was born in 1715, and entered the navy in 1727 under the patronage of a relative. He was appointed first lieutenant of the *Centurion*, Commodore Anson's flagship, in 1739, and took part in his circumnavigation of the globe from 1740 to 1744. Saunders sailed a sloop around Cape Horn and captured several Spanish ships in the Pacific, and was made post-captain on his return to England. He commanded the ship-of-the-line *Gloucester* in 1746, and captured a Spanish treasure ship that year which gave him £40,000 in prize money. He later took command of the *Yarmouth*, and was present at the Battle of Cape Ortegal in 1747, in which he captured two enemy ships. He went into politics after the war, became an MP for Hedon in Yorkshire in 1754. Thanks to Anson's influence, he was appointed that same year as treasurer of Greenwich Hospital, and the following December he became comptroller of the navy. With the start of the Seven Years' War, he was promoted to rear-admiral of the blue, and appointed as Hawke's second-in-command in the Mediterranean, and later took command of this fleet when Hawke returned to England. He was unable to stop the escape of the French fleet in 1757, which was able to reach Louisbourg and prevent the British from capturing the fortress. He served a brief stint in the Channel fleet, and was sent to command the fleet that transported Wolfe's army to Quebec in 1759. After some difficulties, the French fortress fell in September, 1759. After this he returned to the Mediterranean for the remainder of the war, and was able to capture another Spanish treasure ship in 1762, bringing him an additional £65,000 in prize money. He was knighted in 1761, and after the war retired from active service to serve in parliament. He was appointed first lord of the admiralty in 1766, but resigned after a few months due to a conflict with Pitt. He died in London on December 7, 1775.

achieved, and unless the British committed serious errors, Canada would fall in the coming campaign.<sup>89</sup>

Wolfe and Saunders arrived off Quebec on June 26, 1759, with a fleet of forty-three warships and eighty transports, carrying more than 22,000 troops, sailors and marines.<sup>90</sup> Montcalm had 15,000 men to defend the capital, but the quality of some of his troops varied considerably. After a siege that lasted almost three months, Wolfe was able to successfully land nearly 5000 troops onto the Plains of Abraham on September 13. Both Wolfe and Montcalm were killed in the subsequent battle, and losses on both sides were roughly equal, but the bulk of the French army escaped to Montreal, leaving Quebec to surrender to the British on September 18.<sup>91</sup> The following year saw an attempt by a French army under the Chevalier Gaston de Levis to reclaim the city before the British could send reinforcements by sea, resulting in a second battle near Quebec.<sup>92</sup> Levis forced the British back into the city, but was unable to recapture it, and retreated back to Montreal. Amherst started another three-pronged offensive against the French in 1760, resulting in Governor Vaudreuil's surrender on September 8, 1760.<sup>93</sup> Though Pitt was removed from office in 1761, it was thanks to his strategy that the British ended the war as the only truly victorious power. The Royal Navy's complete domination of the seas allowed the British to seize not just

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<sup>89</sup> Corbett, *Seven Years' War*, 1 :413

<sup>90</sup> Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 344-368; Clowes, 3 :205-206; Zuehlke and Daniel, *Canadian Military Atlas*, 40

<sup>91</sup> Zuehlke and Daniel, *Canadian Military Atlas*, 40-41. Both the British and French lost over 600 men killed, wounded and missing.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 41-42. Levis's army numbered over 7000 men, while the British army under General James Murray had only 3000 men.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 42-43

Canada, but also the French colonies of Senegal, Guadeloupe, Dominica and Martinique, as well as the Spanish colonies in Cuba and the Philipines, following their belated entry into the war against England in 1761. Following the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, England completely expelled France as a colonial power in North America, and solidified their gains in the West Indies and India. Admiral Warren's dream became reality, albeit a decade after his death. Yet the sweet taste of victory would soon become quite bitter for the British, as Count Vergennes accurately prophesied to them, "Delivered from a neighbor they have always feared, your other colonies will soon discover that they stand no longer in need of your protection. You will call on them to contribute toward supporting the burden which they have helped to bring on you, they will answer you by shaking off all dependence."<sup>94</sup> The accuracy of this warning would soon be revealed.

Halifax' primary role in the latter part of the Seven Years' War was to support the army and the navy in the offensive operations against Louisbourg and Quebec. This necessitated the creation of a dockyard in Halifax, but this was not ready until 1760, at which point the French threat in North America was ended.<sup>95</sup> But while it might have appeared that Halifax' role as a naval base might well have ended once the war came to a close in 1763, the opposite happened. Though it was intended to reduce the navy after the war (as was the custom after every conflict), The Admiralty proposed on January 5, 1763 to increase the establishment in North America from six

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<sup>94</sup> Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow*, 365

<sup>95</sup> Douglas, 'Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy', 297

ships and 1410 men to eleven ships and nine sloops with 2350 men.<sup>96</sup> According to an earlier report endorsed by General Amherst, it was suggested that Halifax become, “a repository of sea and land service stores for a fleet and an army, with proper arsenals for their preservation and a garrison sufficient for their defence in time of war, from three to five thousand men, which can afford to send small detachments to other parts of the province or even to the continent if occasion should require.”<sup>97</sup> In addition, Halifax was chosen as the site for the Superior Vice-Admiralty Court for all of North America in 1763, to serve as an upper court over the provincial Admiralty Courts in the colonies.<sup>98</sup> However, this arrangement didn’t last long, and it was decided to have four regional courts instead. The court in Halifax would be responsible for Quebec, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, while Boston, Philadelphia and Charleston would have jurisdiction over the remaining colonies.<sup>99</sup>

It might appear that the need to strengthen the military and naval establishment in Halifax anticipated the beginning of troubles between England and her colonies. In fact, the British had barely any time to savor their triumph when trouble began to brew from the colonies. Though they had emerged triumphant in the Seven Years’ War, the British emerged with a debt that soared to more than £130,000,000.<sup>100</sup> The British government attempted to alleviate this financial burden by passing some of the cost

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<sup>96</sup> Admiralty to Egremont, January 5, 1763, *Ibid.*, 356

<sup>97</sup> As quoted in Douglas, ‘Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy’, 357. Douglas notes that the report did not refer specifically to the American colonies, but ‘to one’s own dominions’.

<sup>98</sup> Carl Ubbelohde, *The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1960), 53

<sup>99</sup> Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History: England’s Commercial and Colonial Policy*, 4 vols. (New Haven, Conn., 1964), 4 :271

<sup>100</sup> Zuehlke and Daniel, *Canadian Military Atlas*, 46

onto the colonies by passing laws such as the Stamp Act and the Townshend Acts. The North American Squadron was transformed into a coast guard to help enforce the new trade laws and hunt down smugglers. This service proved highly unpopular with both the American colonists and the men who served in the squadron, many of whom had strong ties to the colonies.<sup>101</sup> It was not uncommon for some officers to look the other way and accept bribes rather than to enforce these laws. Those that did not look the other way soon discovered how difficult it was to enforce unpopular laws. In the first place, large ships-of-the-line and frigates were ill-suited in trying to hunt down smugglers. The American coastline was marked by countless small rivers and inlets that were ideal for small, shallow-draft vessels to hide in, where the larger British warships could not pursue. What the British needed in America were more sloops, brigs, schooners and cutters, the ideal craft to pursue smugglers. In these waters, it was not the large ships-of-the-line that were the key vessels, but the smaller cruisers. After the Seven Years' War ended, only about 60% of the warships on the North American station were small cruisers, too few to make a dent in the smuggling trade.<sup>102</sup> During the War of 1812, several requests would again be made to the Admiralty to obtain small warships for service along the American coast, and as shall be shown, their response would be slow to the station's needs. As for the American colonists, their attitude the the land and naval forces that had defended them against the French bubbled with hostility, which erupted into open conflict in 1775, threatening all that Britain had just recently acquired.

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<sup>101</sup> Gwyn, 'The Royal Navy in North America', 141-142

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 143

If the Seven Years' War can be considered a sequel to the War of the Austrian Succession, then the American Revolution was a definite sequel to the Seven Years War. At no time in their history was France more determined to engage in a war of revenge than after it signed the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Not even after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 did France set about with so much zeal to avenge its losses from the previous war.<sup>103</sup> Under the guidance of Choiseul, the French naval secretary, the French Navy was transformed into an effective tool to fight the Royal Navy on the high seas. It was made perfectly clear that the main reason for France's defeat was due to the delapidated state of its navy, rendering her unable to challenge the Royal Navy or to send aid to their overseas colonies.<sup>104</sup> The French Navy would rise from the ashes of the Seven Years' War and play a crucial role in the upcoming war between England and its wayward colonies.

The American Revolution was unlike any war that the modern European nations had fought up to that point. The first two wars described were clearly conflicts between European powers that spread to North America. In the War of the Austrian Succession, the North American theatre was a secondary front, and treated as such by England's willingness to give back Louisbourg to the French in exchange for losses in other theatres. In the Seven Years' War, England regarded North America as the main theatre of operations, but the conflict was still one between European powers. This was not the situation the British faced in 1775, as they were faced with a war against their hitherto loyal subjects. For the Americans, the conflict evolved into a war for

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<sup>103</sup> Jenkins, *History of the French Navy*, 144

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 142-150



independence, while the British tried to use military force to bring the colonies back in line. Another important departure from previous wars was that while the Seven Years' War can be considered a popular war with the British leaders and the population, this new war was the exact opposite. It was a war that, ultimately, England would have no idea on how to fight. The tactics that had proven so successful in the last war would prove almost entirely ineffective against the Americans. Even the possibility of a military victory could not have guaranteed an end to England's problems with the colonies; as Pitt remarked, "You may ravage- you cannot conquer; if you conquer them, then what? You cannot make them respect you."<sup>105</sup>

Another important difference that England faced in this war was that for the first time in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, it faced an opponent with no battle fleet or an identifiable weak spot. Both France and Spain's overseas colonies were little more than potential hostages for the British to grab in the last war due to their naval domination, but this was a weakness that they could not exploit against the Americans. This conflict would effectively show that there are limitations to naval power when it was applied to political movements such as the American Revolution. The Royal Navy was able to land their armies anywhere along the American coast and bombard the coastal towns with impunity, but this brought the British no closer to victory. Moreover, they had to fight the colonies without any substantial ally on the North American continent, and had to rely entirely upon itself to provide troops and supplies, which had to be carried across the Atlantic, to fight the colonies. In short, England was fighting a continental conflict without the benefit of a Prussia or Austria to help them in their struggle.

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<sup>105</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 115

The Royal Navy was expected to blockade the American coast, stop the flow of supplies of munitions from reaching the rebels, and support army operations, while at the same time maintain England's two-power standard in Europe. But despite the apparent overwhelming advantage the navy had over the Americans at sea, it was one that proved illusory. Following the last war, the British again followed their standard practice of laying up the bulk of their navy to save on expenses. Lord North's ministry was more preoccupied with reducing the debt than in maintaining the fleet, and between 1771 and 1775, the number of seamen and marines in the Royal Navy dropped from 40,000 to 18,000 men.<sup>106</sup> Even after the war started in 1775, the Admiralty was slow to mobilize the navy, and a good number of their ships were laid up in 'Rotten Row', consumed from dry rot and covered from toadstools after years of neglect.<sup>107</sup> What would prove equally damaging in the coming war was that the few ships that were being built in England were primarily ships-of-the-line, which led to a grave shortage of vessels such as frigates and sloops, which were crucial for coastal operations and for escorting convoys.<sup>108</sup> But the efforts to mobilize the navy were inadvertently sabotaged by the failure to truly understand the scope of the American threat. Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Palliser, who was responsible for the transport and victualling of the British armies, wrote a memorandum in July, 1775, in which he stated that all the navy required to effectively blockade the American coast from

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<sup>106</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3:327; David Syrett, *The Royal Navy in European Waters During the American Revolutionary War* (Columbia, S.C., 1998), 10-11

<sup>107</sup> G.J. Marcus, *The Naval History of England: The Formative Centuries* (London, 1961), 422-423

<sup>108</sup> Syrett, *Shipping and the American War*, 154

Boston to Florida was fifty warships.<sup>109</sup> This was grossly underestimating the size of the American naval threat, as the colonies were quite successful in transforming their merchant ships into privateers, which did considerable damage to British trade not only in American waters, but in European waters as well.<sup>110</sup> Not only would the Royal Navy have a hard time dealing with this threat, it would also be hampered in their efforts to keep the British armies in America properly supplied.<sup>111</sup>

France's entry into the war following the surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga in 1777, marked a major turning point in the war. Unlike the previous European conflicts, England was completely unable to secure a single ally on the continent to fight on her side. This left France free of any continental commitments, leaving her free to devote its resources entirely on the American front. She was later joined by Spain and Holland, transforming the war into a major European conflict.

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<sup>109</sup> Memorandum, July 1775, G.R. Barnes and J.H. Owen, eds., *The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1771-1782*, 4 vols. (London, 1932), 1:64-66; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 1771-1800*, s.v. 'Sir Hugh Palliser'. Sir Hugh Palliser was born in February 22, 1722/23, and entered the navy at age 11 on board the *Aldborough*, commanded by his uncle. He was promoted lieutenant in 1741, and was made captain of HMS *Captain* during the War of the Austrian Succession. During the Seven Years' War, he participated in the blockade of the French ports, and took part in Holburne's expedition to Louisbourg in 1757 and at the siege of Quebec in 1759. He was promoted to commodore and made governor of Newfoundland in 1764, where he remained until 1768. He served as comptroller of the navy from 1770 to 1775, during which time he was created a baronet in 1773 and elected to parliament in 1774, and promoted to rear-admiral in 1775. As one of the Lords of the Admiralty, he was responsible for arranging the transports and victuallers for the British armies. He was prominent in organizing the relief expedition that lifted the siege of Quebec in 1776, and was appointed lieutenant-general of the marines that same year. Promoted to vice-admiral in 1778, he was third in command of the Home Fleet under Admiral Keppel, and participated in the battle against the French fleet at Ushant in July, 1778. A misunderstanding (or disagreement) on tactics resulted in an indecisive engagement, and both admirals faced court-martials that divided the navy. When Keppel was exonerated, an exultant London mob celebrated by burning down Palliser's house. Even though Palliser was also acquitted, he was forced to resign his offices and his seat in Parliament. He returned to Parliament in 1780, and was promoted to full admiral in 1787, even though his active career ended a decade earlier. He died on March 19, 1796.

<sup>110</sup> David Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters 1775-1783* (Aldershot, UK, 1989), 27, 90

<sup>111</sup> The definitive studies on the efforts of the Royal Navy to supply the British army in America are David Syrett's *Shipping and the American War*, and R. Arthur Bowler's *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 1775-1783* (Princeton, N.J., 1975).

England had previously counted on France being too occupied on the European continent to be able to devote much attention to other theatres. Suddenly, the shoe was on the other foot, with England facing the prospect of war not just in America and its other colonies, but also the very real threat of invasion. The end result was that England would attempt to defend everywhere, and her lack of preparation for such a conflict would cost her. In fact, while the loss of the American colonies would prove a devastating defeat for the British, when one considers the odds they faced, it could have been far worse, though this had more to do with the bungling on the part of their enemies.

At the time the first battles at Lexington and Concord occurred in the spring of 1775, the North American Squadron under Rear-Admiral Samuel Graves numbered some thirty warships, though this would be increased to fifty-one by the end of the year.<sup>112</sup> A large portion of the squadron was concentrated at Boston in order to aid General Gage's forces stationed there. But the British soon faced the problem of American privateers, which began to attack British merchant ships and caused enormous losses. Yet in a decision that hamstrung British naval activities, the Royal

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<sup>112</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Samuel Graves'; Robert Gardiner, ed, *Navies and the American Revolution* (Annapolis, Md., 1996), 15. Samuel Graves was born on April 17, 1713. The date in which he entered the navy is unknown, but he was made a lieutenant in 1739, and served in the expedition to Cartagena. He was promoted to command the sloop *Bonetta* in 1743, and remained in the West Indies for the course of the war. In the Seven Years' War, he took part in Hawke's expedition to Basques Roads in 1757 and at Quiberon Bay in 1759. He was promoted to rear-admiral in 1762, then to vice-admiral in 1770. He 1774, he was made commander-in-chief of the North American station, and was present in Boston at the start of the American Revolution. This proved a thankless task, as he had few resources or instructions on how to deal with the situation, and received much of the blame back home for the state of affairs in America. He was superseded from his command by Howe in 1776, and returned to England the following year. Despite this, he was promoted to admiral of the blue in 1778, and to admiral of the white in 1782. He died on March 8, 1787. His first cousin was Admiral Thomas Graves, who would also have misfortune in the American war.

Navy's captains were instructed not to molest colonial shipping in return.<sup>113</sup> This was a clear example of the type of decisions that were made that were at cross-purposes with achieving victory. The British government was caught between a policy of trying to appease the colonies and trying to crush them on the battlefield. They were divided on which policy to pursue, and this indecision would prove an enormous blunder.<sup>114</sup>

Equally frustrating to the British were the actions of the French, who were ostensibly neutral at this time. Their actions clearly showed a growing belligerent attitude towards the British. American privateers were soon able to operate from French ports, where they could obtain fresh supplies and crews, as well as disposing of their captures.<sup>115</sup> While England and France were at peace, the Royal Navy could not blockade the French ports and prevent American privateers from slipping in and out as they pleased. Another even more troubling problem was the fact that the French were sending the rebel armies the bulk of their weapons and ammunition, and it has been estimated that 90% of the gunpowder available to the American forces in 1777 had come from abroad, thanks to neutral merchant ships and American blockade runners.<sup>116</sup> The British were faced with a two-fold problem of not having enough ships to fully blockade the American coast to prevent the flow of arms and munitions reaching the rebel armies, nor could they stop this flow at the source and blockade the coast of those who were supplying them without risking war.

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<sup>113</sup> Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 194-195

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 195

<sup>115</sup> Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 63-64

<sup>116</sup> Piers Mackesy, *The War for America 1775-1783* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 98-99

Unable to spare ships to intercept the American raiders at sea, the British resorted to attacking their bases of operations. On October 8, 1775, Graves ordered Lieutenant Henry 'Mad' Howat to take four ships with orders to chastize the towns of Cape Ann, Marblehead, Salem, Newburyport, Portsmouth, Ipswich, Saco, Machias and Falmouth.<sup>117</sup> On October 15, Howat promptly ordered the destruction of Falmouth, and left the town ablaze.<sup>118</sup> The same fate awaited Norfolk the following January, when it was also bombarded by British warships. These attacks were regarded as barbaric by the Americans and by a number of Englishmen back home. Yet there was also room for some chivalry in this conflict. In February, 1776, Captain Hyde-Parker observed that General Charles Lee's army was entering New York, and opted to refrain from firing upon it for fear of hitting civilians, and chose instead to withdraw.<sup>119</sup>

The American invasion of Canada in the fall of 1775 came very close to capturing Quebec.<sup>120</sup> The city was besieged until the following May, when the navy was able to deliver enough reinforcements to force the Americans to retreat back to Lake Champlain. Despite their failure to capture Quebec, the Americans succeeded in dividing the British forces by forcing them to send a large army to Canada. The British would also undertake to send large forces to the southern colonies to aid the supposed

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<sup>117</sup> Gardiner, *American Revolution*, 37; Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 7-8. The four vessels under Mowat's command were HMS *Canceaux*, *Halifax*, *Symmetry*, and *Spitfire*.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 15-16

<sup>120</sup> Gardiner, *American Revolution*, 28-29; Mackesy, *The War for America*, 79-80. Quebec was virtually defenceless before the approach of Benedict Arnold's forces, until Colonel Allan Maclean marched into the city with a regiment of 400 men, just ahead of Arnold's column.

large flocks of Loyalists, which ultimately proved a waste of resources. By not being able to concentrate their forces in the regions that needed to be controlled, the British position was further weakened.

Attacks from American privateers continued to rise, but it would be incorrect to claim the Royal Navy was doing little in return. In fact, between March and December, 1776, they captured 140 American ships and recovered another twenty-six British vessels.<sup>121</sup> Unfortunately, this had little impact on the Americans. Admiral Richard Howe and his brother, General William Howe, believed that the key to solving the privateer problem was to seize the key American ports and cities, maintain an effective blockade, and destroy the Continental Army in the field.<sup>122</sup> To accomplish this, they

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<sup>121</sup> Mackesy, *The War for America*, 100

<sup>122</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Richard Howe'; Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 69. Richard Howe was born on March 8, 1726, second son of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Viscount Howe. He entered the navy in 1739, and took part in Anson's circumnavigation of the globe in 1740, but the ship he was on was forced to return to England in 1742. He was made a lieutenant in 1745, and made commander of the sloop *Baltimore* before the year was out. He saw considerable action in the war, and was severely wounded in 1746 in action against French privateers. He continued to be actively employed after the war, and was made captain of the *Dunkirk* in Boscawen's expedition to North America in 1755, in which he captured the 64-gun French ship *Alcide*. He again saw much action in this war, include Hawke's victory at Quiberon Bay in 1759. He even found time to enter politics, and was elected to parliament as a member for Dartmouth in 1757, which he represented until 1782, when he was called to the upper house. The death of his elder brother at Ticonderoga in 1758 made him 4<sup>th</sup> Viscount Howe, and was promoted to commodore in 1761, and made flag-captain for Prince Edward, the Duke of York and rear-admiral, in 1762. After the war, he accepted a seat at the Admiralty, and resigned this after his promotion to rear-admiral in 1770. In December, 1775, he was promoted to vice-admiral, and appointed commander-in-chief in North America. He was more interested in achieving a reconciliation with the Americans than in achieving a military victory, but he nevertheless pressed on with the expedition to New York in 1776, along with his brother William, who commanded the land forces. The New York campaign nearly destroyed Washington's army, but the Howes were unable to deliver the coup-de-grace. Despite occupying both New York and Philadelphia, the Howes could not achieve a military victory to bring the Americans to the table, and the situation only worsened after France declared war in 1778. He returned to England in 1778, and promoted to vice-admiral of the red, but withdrew from active service until the fall of Lord North's government in 1782, in which he was promoted to admiral of the blue and made commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, and was responsible for the relief of Gibraltar later that year. At the start of 1783, Howe was appointed first lord of the Admiralty, and though replaced by Admiral Keppel in April, he was reinstated to this post in December, and held it until 1788. In 1792, he was appointed vice-admiral of England, and took command of the Channel fleet at the start of the next war with France in 1793. The next year saw his most famous victory over Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse at the Glorious First of June. He was appointed admiral of the fleet in 1796, and took part in the negotiations with the mutinous crews at Spithead in the mutinies of 1797, and

would need far more substantial naval reinforcements from England. The success of the blockade depended on additional ships; the squadron had a total of sixty-seven warships the spring of 1776, but of these, fifteen were either on convoy duty or delivering dispatches, while another eight were helping in army operations, leaving only forty-four available for blockade duty, below even Palliser's estimates for a successful blockade.<sup>123</sup> The situation worsened following Howe's invasion of New York, which required the use of thirty-six warships to assist the army with its landings, leaving only seventeen warships to guard the American coastline.<sup>124</sup> It is no surprise that American privateers had such an easy time breaking out into the Atlantic. It was a problem that would be repeated in the War of 1812.

The growing belligerency of the French and Spanish governments, as well as reports stating that they were secretly mobilizing their fleets, meant that the British had to keep a sufficient force in home waters. Lord Sandwich, the First Lord of the Admiralty, refused to surrender the two-power standard in European waters by sending ships to America.<sup>125</sup> Thus, even before France entered the war, the British were cornered into the trap of fighting a two-front war, which hampered their operations against the colonies. The weakness of the British blockade even allowed the newly-formed Continental Navy to mount its own operations against the British. A squadron of seven small warships under Commodore Esek Hopkins was able to sail unmolested

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thanks to his assurances, the fleet was able to put to sea soon after. This was his last active service, and he died on August 5, 1799.

<sup>123</sup> Mackesy, *The War for America*, 100

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 64-65, 69-70, 90



from the Delaware and conduct a raid on the British supply base at New Providence in February, 1776, and returned with a large supply of artillery and ammunition for their army.<sup>126</sup> Other American squadrons were also able to escape undetected, raising concerns among the British that perhaps their forces were too thinly spread.

The decision to aid the Loyalists in the southern colonies highlighted the difficulties by which the British were trying wage the war. The British intended to send five regiments from Ireland to North Carolina, which were to arrive at their destination at the start of 1776. Instead, numerous difficulties occurred while trying to assemble the transports and escorts, and even the weather seemed to work against them. It was not until May that this army arrived off Cape Fear. However, it proved too late to help the Loyalists, who were crushed at the Battle of Moore's Bridge on February 27, 1776.<sup>127</sup> There was no real reason to continue with the southern expedition, but General Henry Clinton and Commodore Peter Parker decided to take this force and attempt to capture Charleston. They began their operation to take the city on June 9, but Clinton soon lost heart when his troops became immobilized on Long Island (Isle of Palms). There was little actual cooperation between Clinton and Parker, and the latter chose to force his way into Charleston Harbor on June 28 with two 50-gun ships, three 28-gun frigates, one 20-gun sloop, and two bombships.<sup>128</sup> The British suffered heavily, and were forced to burn one of their frigates to avoid

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<sup>126</sup> Gardiner, *American Revolution*, 37-38

<sup>127</sup> Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 35-36

<sup>128</sup> Gardiner, *American Revolution*, 42-45; Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 38

Despite achieving some success in the New York campaign, the British were unable to deliver the coup de grace against the Continental Army in 1776. The following year would prove to be the turning point in the war. Instead of planning a coordinated effort to defeat the American forces, the British opted for two separate and uncoordinated attacks. General Burgoyne's army would move down from Canada into New York, while the Howes planned for a large amphibious operation to take their forces into the Chesapeake and capture Philadelphia.<sup>130</sup> Apart from diverting the British resources, neither army would be able to support the other if it got into trouble. This is exactly what happened to Burgoyne, who surrendered his army after the Battle of Saratoga on October 17, 1777. Even the occupation of Philadelphia, the largest city in the colonies and the seat of the Continental Congress, proved a hollow victory for the Howes, as it brought the British no closer to victory. Unlike the capture of Vienna or Paris, there was no single city in the colonies whose fall would result in the cessation of their will to resist. The best description of the American colonies was that the British were not fighting a single foe, but rather thirteen different foes, a multi-headed hydra which could survive the loss of several of its heads and still be able to fight.

Following France's entry into the war in 1778, the weakness of the British position proved so serious that they sent Lord Carlisle to New York to help negotiate with American representatives, who was instructed to offer them their independence in exchange for a few minor concessions. However, with the arrival of French warships and army units in America, they had no need to accept any terms of total

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<sup>130</sup> Gardiner, *American Revolution*, 20; Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 72-87

independence, without any strings attached.<sup>131</sup> This forced the British to keep sending additional forces to America and further weakening their resources.

If the British had learned anything from the disasters of 1777, they did not show it. General Henry Clinton replaced Howe as the army's commander, and opted to disperse his forces to various parts of the colonies rather than concentrating them, and relied on the navy to defend them and transport them and their supplies.<sup>132</sup> This only further added to the navy's burdens, which was stretched to the breaking point. In fact, the detachment of ships to the West Indies, coupled with the losses and wear and tear on ships due to continuous service, the Royal Navy was weakened to the point that it had barely enough ships to defend its enclaves in New York and Rhode Island.<sup>133</sup> This might have been bearable for the British if they had had inspired leadership, but that was something which they were woefully lacking in this conflict. Admiral Howe may have been one of the best tacticians in the Royal Navy, but he had shown much reticence in waging an aggressive war with the colonies. In fact, he seemed more interested in reaching a true reconciliation between England and the colonies than in winning a decisive military action. This inability on the part of the Howes to wage a

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<sup>131</sup> Gardiner, *American Revolution*, 77

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.; Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 115-116.

<sup>133</sup> Syrett, 115-116. The dispersal of forces included sending 5000 troops and seven warships to attack St. Lucia, with an additional 3000 troops leaving New York for Pensacola and St. Augustine, leaving Clinton's army with only 13,000 troops, leaving it too weak to conduct any meaningful offensive operations. The navy was in similar straits, as it had few ships available to defend the British forces in New York and Rhode Island and cover the army's amphibious operations. Syrett claims that the Admiralty quickly perceived the seeming unimportance of the North American Squadron, and that New York became a dumping ground for unwanted and incompetent admirals who distinguished themselves primarily by quarreling with Clinton.

war of annihilation against the colonies doomed the British efforts in this theatre.<sup>134</sup> But if the Howes can be forgiven for their unwillingness to wage total war, other commanders do not get off as easily. Instead of willingly aiding each other in a common cause, the squadron commanders in the Western Hemisphere spent more time quarreling with one another over matters of authority.<sup>135</sup> Admiral Rodney wrote to Lord Germain on December 22, 1780 that much of the acrimony between the commanders could be solved if there was, "But one commander-in-chief, by land or sea, responsible for the war both in America and every part of the West Indies. All difficulties would then be removed and no officer presume to judge whether he was or was not to obey the orders of a superior officer because he was not in sight of a superior flag and had a commission as commander-in-chief upon a particular station."<sup>136</sup> The idea of a single theatre commander for North America and the West Indies would not occur in this war, but would remain in the Admiralty's mind for the next war against the Americans.

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<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 44-45

<sup>135</sup> Kenneth Breen, 'Divided Command: The West Indies and North America 1780-1781', Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine, eds., *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century* (Leicester, UK, 1988), 192-196. When Rodney came to support Arbuthnot's squadron, which seemed threatened by De Guichen's fleet, the two men wasted no time in arguing over matters of seniority, the right to promote officers and where to station ships. Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, the commander of the North American Squadron, wrote to the Admiralty that Rodney was using his seniority to alter his squadron's ship dispositions, and in appointing and promoting officers during his stay in North American waters. Rodney in turn claimed that what really upset Arbuthnot was in losing the commander-in-chief's share of prize money to him. The Admiralty ultimately sided with Rodney in the dispute, but when Admiral Digby was sent to take over the North American Squadron in 1781, Sandwich warned Rodney against doing as he did with Arbuthnot. Rodney also did not get along with Admiral Peter Parker, commander of the Jamaica Squadron, after the latter's unwillingness to assist the ships of the Leeward Islands Squadron in the fall of 1780, which had suffered considerable damage due to a hurricane. Rodney made many unreasonable demands on Parker to use the Jamaica facilities to fix his ships, and resulted in another flurry of letters between themselves and to the Admiralty.

<sup>136</sup> Rodney to Germain, December 22, 1780, Ibid., 192

Indies would not occur in this war, but would remain in the Admiralty's mind for the next war against the Americans.

The Royal Navy's inability to prevent De Grasse's fleet of twenty-six ships-of-the-line, one 50-gun ship and seven frigates from reaching the Chesapeake at the end of August, 1781, allowed the French to cut off Cornwallis' link to the sea at Yorktown.<sup>137</sup> The British were in the same position the French were during the sieges of Louisbourg, trapped by sea and by land. Cornwallis' only hope was for reinforcements to arrive by sea, which could not happen until the naval blockade was lifted. A British fleet of nineteen ships-of-the-line and one 50-gun ship under Admiral Thomas Graves attempted to break the French blockade, and the two fleets fought an inconclusive action on September 5, 1781.<sup>138</sup> Graves' inability to reach Cornwallis ensured the latter's surrender on October 19, 1781. The British defeat at Yorktown guaranteed the independence of the colonies, but the war was far from over for the British. Rodney would obtain some measure of satisfaction over De Grasse at the Battle of the Saintes on April 12, 1782, and even managed to capture the French admiral and his flagship.<sup>139</sup> In the final analysis, the British were able to stave off

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<sup>137</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3 :495-502; Gardiner, *American Revolution*, 111-116; Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 191

<sup>138</sup> *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 1801-1820*, s.v. 'Thomas Graves'; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 3 :495-502; Gardiner, *American Revolution*, 116-117; Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters*, 194-199. Thomas Graves was born on October 23, 1725, and entered the navy in 1739. He took part in the expedition to Cartagena in 1741, and promoted to lieutenant in 1743. He was promoted to captain in 1755, and saw much action in the Seven Years' war. In 1761, he was appointed governor and commander in chief of the Newfoundland station, and stayed there until 1764. During the American Revolution, he saw service in the Channel and in the West Indies, and became commander-in-chief of the North American Squadron in 1781. He was unable to break the French blockade in the Chesapeake, resulting in Cornwallis' surrender in October. Promoted to vice-admiral of the blue in 1787, he was Howe's second-in-command of the Channel fleet when war broke out in 1793, and defeated three French warships at the battle of the 'Glorious First of June' in 1794. This marked the end of his active sea career, and he died on February 9, 1802.

<sup>139</sup> Gardiner, *American Revolution*, 126-127

complete defeat in every theatre but America, a most remarkable achievement considering the odds they faced.

The conquest of Canada made England the only real victor in the Seven Years' War, and now the loss of the thirteen colonies made it the only defeated power in the American Revolution. It is safe to say that France had gotten her revenge of England for the loss of its own colonies on the North American continent. The reasons for England's defeat were numerous, not the least of which was that she had never fought a colonial war until that point, and her people were divided on how to wage war against its former subjects. Also, Lord North's ministry must be held responsible for having weakened the Royal Navy in an attempt to reduce England's expenses, as well as being slow to mobilize the navy. It can also be said that the Admiralty did not have a true grasp on the situation in North America, leading to difficulties in blockading the American coast, supplying the army adequately and supporting amphibious operations. The British war effort was also not helped by the strife within the navy, as well as the general lack of cooperation between the army and the navy. Finally, the lack of allies on the European continent allowed England's rivals to concentrate their efforts against her, which helped immeasurably to ensure her defeat in America. The loss of the colonies was a costly defeat, and England learned that she could not afford to stand as isolated as she was in this conflict. She made sure that if she went to war again, she would have allies on her side. But while this lesson was well absorbed, it seemed the British chose to ignore other ones. In fact, as shall be shown in the opening phases of the War of 1812, it appeared that the Admiralty still did not fully grasp the needs and

realities of the North American station, leading it to repeat many of the mistakes it made during the American revolution.

The loss of the American colonies meant that Nova Scotia was the only English-speaking colony on the continent to keep its ties with the mother country.<sup>140</sup> The war had proven a boon to the city's economy, and the city became the focus for the Loyalists fleeing from America following the British defeat in 1783. The American victory resulted in further increasing the strategic importance of both Halifax and its naval base, as Britain faced a new rival on the North American continent. It also increased the strategic value of another of Britain's colonies, Bermuda. Unlike Halifax, Bermuda was one of Britain's oldest colonies. It was settled by the British in 1614 under the name of Somers Island (named after Sir George Somers, who landed in Bermuda in 1609).<sup>141</sup> Bermuda was mainly a small, unprofitable colony whose only real importance to Britain for most of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries was for its exports of salt and onions.<sup>142</sup> However, it was the only island the British held between Halifax and the Bahamas, and despite being 600 miles off the Carolinas, it would eventually serve England's needs for a new naval base in North American waters.

On February 1, 1793, following the execution of King Louis XVI, Britain and France were once again at war. This began more than two decades of warfare between the two nations. The bulk of France's overseas holdings rested in the West Indies,

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<sup>140</sup> For an examination of the role played by Nova Scotia during the American Revolution, see John Bartlet Brebner, *The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony During the Revolutionary Years* (New York, 1937), p.291-314, 352-353; Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 222-251, and *Revolution Rejected 1775-1776* (Scarborough, Ont., 1968), 13-54

<sup>141</sup> Euphemia Young Bell and Associates, *Beautiful Bermuda: The Bermuda Blue Books* (New York and Bermuda, 1946), 98-106

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid*, 106-107

which meant that the Royal Navy would again devote the bulk of its strength to this region. As a result, there were few warships available for the northern squadrons.<sup>143</sup> The Newfoundland Squadron continued to watch over St. Pierre and Miquelon until the two islands were captured in 1795, but would continue to provide protection for the Atlantic convoys.<sup>144</sup> The Jamaica Squadron would have its hands full with French corsairs from Haiti, which were later joined by Spanish raiders from Cuba after Spain became allied to France in 1796.<sup>145</sup> The Leeward Islands Squadron would prove the busiest of the four squadrons, watching over the important French bastions Guadeloupe and Martinique.<sup>146</sup> For these two squadrons, there was very little difference in this war than in the previous wars with France and Spain. As for the North American Squadron, its main task was to protect the coastline of the Maritime provinces, the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of St. Lawrence from French commerce raiders, and help patrol the southern Atlantic coast as far (and sometimes beyond) the Chesapeake in order to intercept enemy ships operating out of American ports.<sup>147</sup> Since the station saw considerably less activity than the southern squadrons, its size

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<sup>143</sup> G. J. Marcus, *The Age of Nelson : The Royal Navy 1793-1815* (New York, 1971), 111. France's main colonies were Haiti, Guadeloupe, and Martinique, all of which served as important privateer bases throughout the war.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid, 110

<sup>145</sup> Will and Ariel Durant, *The Age of Napoleon : A History of European Civilization from 1789 to 1815* (New York, 1975), 519-520

<sup>146</sup> Marcus, *The Age of Nelson*, 109-110

<sup>147</sup> Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 221-222



would correspond accordingly.<sup>148</sup> Because of this, the squadron would often find itself hard pressed to perform its tasks.<sup>149</sup>

In the early stages of the war, French privateers had some measure of success against British commercial shipping.<sup>150</sup> The passage of the Convoy Act of 1793 (followed by the Convoy Compulsory Act in 1798) helped alleviate some of the problems caused by enemy commerce raiders, as they were the most effective way of negating the menace of the *guerre-de-course*.<sup>151</sup> While France had no naval bases within the North American Squadron's jurisdiction, there was still a large number of raiders attacking British shipping in northern waters, which managed to do considerable damage against New Brunswick trade.<sup>152</sup> This was due primarily to the fact that French ships could take refuge and operate from American ports, where

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<sup>148</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 4 :197-198; Lavery, *Nelson's Navy*, 247. When the war began in 1793, the Leeward Islands Squadron numbered only two 50-gun ships and six smaller vessels; the Jamaica Squadron had one 50-gun ship and nine smaller vessels; and the North American and Newfoundland squadrons could muster only one 50-gun ship and four smaller vessels. By 1795, the Leeward Islands Squadron had eight ships-of-the-line, ten frigates, and nine sloops and brigs; the Jamaica Squadron had three ships-of-the-line, nine frigates, and eight sloops and brigs; the North American Squadron had three ships-of-the-line, seven frigates, and two sloops; the Newfoundland Squadron had only two sloops.

<sup>149</sup> Vice-Admiral George Murray to Evan Nepean, July 15, 1796, PAC, MG 12, Admiralty 1, Volume 493 (henceforth shown as Adm.1/493); Vice Admiral George Vandeput to Captain Mowat, May 5, 1797, Adm.1/494; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 4 :554; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 222-223. The squadron was apparently not designed to cope with the presence of a large French naval force, and Murray was informed that in times of emergency he could only hope that the West Indies squadrons might speedily reinforce him if French ships escaped them. Another standing order was that if British ships on this station found themselves outnumbered, they were to return immediately to Halifax.

Vice-Admiral George Murray was appointed commander of the North American Squadron in 1794. Oddly enough, there was another George Murray in the Royal Navy at this time who was also promoted to vice-admiral, and it is this officer's entry that is found in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

<sup>150</sup> Lieutenant Peter Heriot Watson, 'The Impact of the Navy on the History of Nova Scotia 1749-1819' (master's thesis, Acadia University, 1957), 53; Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire*, 2 vols. (London, 1898), 2 :226. Though the French did have continued success against British merchant ships throughout the conflict, British losses did not exceed by more than 2.5 % of their total commerce. Even then, the losses were partially made up from captured enemy ships taken by the Royal Navy and British privateers.

<sup>151</sup> Marcus, *Age of Nelson*, 116

French agents often purchased American-built ships and fitted them out as privateers.<sup>153</sup> This was particularly aggravating for the merchants in the Maritime provinces, and led the Admiralty to authorize the North American Squadron to mount an effective blockade of the American coast from Boston to the Carolinas.<sup>154</sup> Though further taxing the squadron's resources, they were able to lessen the damage done by these raiders.

The main problem facing the British in maintaining their blockade at this time was that they had no major dockyards between Halifax and the West Indies. Sailing into Halifax during the winter months was ill-advised, and the West Indian ports held the specter of malaria and yellow fever, resulting in severe depletions of crews while the ships were being refitted.<sup>155</sup> It was at this time that the Admiralty began to seriously consider Bermuda as a potential base for the squadron during the winter. Vice-Admiral George Murray, commander of the squadron from 1794 to 1796, was an ardent supporter of this endeavor, and had many reasons for supporting the proposal to transform the island into a major naval base. In the aftermath of the American Revolution, Lieutenant Thomas Hurd was ordered to make an extensive survey of the reefs around Bermuda, a task that would take him fourteen years to finish.<sup>156</sup> Murray

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<sup>152</sup> Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 223

<sup>153</sup> Arnell, *Bermuda's Early Naval History*, 53

<sup>154</sup> Ibid

<sup>155</sup> Ibid

<sup>156</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Thomas Hurd'; Lieutenant-Commander Ian Stranack, *The Andrew and the Onion : The Story of the Royal Navy in Bermuda 1795-1975* (Bermuda, 1978), 3. Thomas Hurd was born in 1757, and after serving on the North American and Newfoundland stations, he was promoted to lieutenant in 1777. After the American Revolution, he carried out the first exact survey of Bermuda. In 1795, he was promoted to captain, and by 1808, he was appointed to the post of hydrographer to the Admiralty. He died on April 29, 1823.

became aware of Hurd's work while blockading the American coast during the winter of 1793-94, and was sufficiently impressed that he began to consider using the island as a potential rendezvous for his squadron.<sup>157</sup> He was not alone in appreciating the value of the island; Major Andrew Durnford of the Corps of Royal Engineers on Bermuda wrote in 1793 that,

The recent evacuations of the French from St. Domingo to North America, the many prizes brought here by a few privateers only corroborates the above fact that if a naval force was stationed here, the communication between the United States of America and the West Indies would be greatly interrupted, if not totally cut off.<sup>158</sup>

Murray sent Captain Penrose of the frigate HMS *Cleopatra* (32) in 1795 to make further enquiries about the island's potential use, and he returned with a most positive report.<sup>159</sup> It convinced Murray the island was ideal for the squadron's needs. Unfortunately, he suffered a stroke on October 22, 1796, that left him unable to speak, and was forced to resign his command.<sup>160</sup> His successors were less enthusiastic about using the island as a winter base, and as a result little progress was made.<sup>161</sup> It was only after the arrival of Vice-Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell as commander of the squadron in 1802 that Bermuda was again used as its winter base.<sup>162</sup> The strategic

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<sup>157</sup> Arnell, 'Bermuda's Early Naval History', 77

<sup>158</sup> Major Andrew Durnford to Henry Dundas, November 24, 1793, 'The Dundas Papers', *The Bermuda Historical Quarterly* 4 (1968), 121

<sup>159</sup> Arnell, *Bermuda's Early Naval History*, 77

<sup>160</sup> Ibid

<sup>161</sup> Ibid

<sup>162</sup> Ibid

value of the island was summed up by the Lord Grenville, the First Lord of the Admiralty, when he stated,

The value (of Bermuda) is known to both France and America. Therefore it is desirable that no time be lost in giving adequate security to it, while it is still ours.... To secure this great naval station is an object of much national importance.<sup>163</sup>

The Admiralty finally turned its energies towards building a new Gibraltar of the West, and events along the American coast would soon prove the wisdom of this move.

The signing of the Jay's Treaty in 1794 by the British and American governments did far more than the British blockade to curb the activities of French raiders operating in American waters.<sup>164</sup> The French government was greatly angered by the treaty. They considered it a violation of the treaty they signed with the Americans in 1778, and as well an act of betrayal from their ally, and subsequently led to the start of the Quasi-War between France and the United States in 1798.<sup>165</sup> Yet even as American and French warships began to fight each other on the open seas, the British continued to have their ships operate off the coast of the United States.<sup>166</sup> Their presence would grow intolerable for the Americans, and would continue to help further deteriorate relations between the two states.

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<sup>163</sup> Barry Gough, 'Bermuda, Naval Base of the Early Pax Britannica : Origins, Strategy and Construction', *The Bermuda Journal of Archaeology and Maritime History* 5 (1993), 137

<sup>164</sup> For a full account of the Jay Treaty, see Samuel F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty : A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy* (New Haven, Conn., 1962)

<sup>165</sup> Michael A. Palmer, *Stoddert's War : Naval Operations During the Quasi-War With France 1798-1801* (Columbia, S.C., 1990), 4

<sup>166</sup> Arnell, 'Bermuda's Early Naval History', 77

The first phase of the war against France came to an end with the Peace of Amiens in 1802. The North American Squadron enjoyed some measure of success, as attested by the 149 prizes sent to Halifax alone between 1793 and 1802.<sup>167</sup> The peace proved merely an interlude, and the war commenced again in earnest in 1803. The resumption of hostilities meant that the waters around North America and the West Indies were once again teeming with French light squadrons and privateers. Between 1803 and 1804, Guadeloupe alone fitted out nearly thirty privateers, and seized more than 100 British merchant ships.<sup>168</sup> This forced the Admiralty to again shift the bulk of its warships to the West Indies. However, more than a few French raiders continued to scour the North Atlantic and the waters around Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The end of the Quasi-War between the French and Americans meant that French warships and privateers were once again able to use American ports to refit and replenish themselves. One of the more notable engagements involving the squadron occurred on February 23, 1805, when HMS *Leander* (50) captured the French frigate *Ville-de-Milan* (40) and recaptured the frigate *Cleopatra*, which had been captured by the French frigate a week earlier. The *Milan* was added to the Royal Navy's roster and become a most welcome addition to the North American Squadron.<sup>169</sup>

The escape of the French fleet from Brest on December 13, 1805 began a series of events that would have enormous repercussions for both Anglo-American relations

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<sup>167</sup> List of ships brought into Halifax can be found in PAC, RG 8, IV, 17-27

<sup>168</sup> List of ships captured compiled from Archives Nationales de la France, Prises et Prisonnier de Guerre, FF2/112

<sup>169</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5 :357-359; William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV*, 6 vols. (London, 1847), 4 :124-129

and for the North American station. The Brest fleet was divided into two squadrons, with Vice-Admiral Leissegues in command of five ships-of-the-line, two frigates and one corvette, while the second squadron under Rear-Admiral Willaumez consisted of six ships-of-the-line, two frigates and two corvettes.<sup>170</sup> Leissegues took his squadron to San Domingo, where it was completely destroyed following the British attack on Haiti on February 6, 1806.<sup>171</sup> Willaumez' squadron cruised around the West Indies for most of the year while being chased by two British squadrons.<sup>172</sup> A severe gale on August 18 scattered most of his ships, and forced many to seek a safe haven to make necessary repairs.<sup>173</sup> One of his 74-gun ships, the *Impetueux*, was attempting to enter the Chesapeake on September 14 when she was intercepted by HMS *Belleisle* (74), *Bellona* (74), and the frigate *Melampus* (36) off Cape Henry in Virginia. The French ship sighted her pursuers and made straight for land. Admiral Strachan chose to violate American neutrality and boarded the grounded vessel, setting her ablaze.<sup>174</sup> This flagrant breach of their neutrality would not soon be forgotten by the American government.

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<sup>170</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5 :184; James, *The Naval History of Great Britain*, 4 :184-185

<sup>171</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5 :188-193; James, *The Naval History of Great Britain*, 4 :190-199

<sup>172</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5 :185, 193-196; James, *The Naval History of Great Britain*, 4 :202-210. One squadron under Rear-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane consisted of the 74-gun ships *Northumberland*, *Elephant*, *Canada*, 64-gun ship *Agamemnon*, frigates *Ethalion*, *Seine*, *Galatea* and *Circe*, plus several smaller craft, while the second squadron under Rear-Admiral Sir Richard John Strachan consisted of the 80-gun ship *Caesar*, 74-gun ships *Terrible*, *Triumph*, *Bellona*, *Belleisle*, *Audacious* and *Montagu*, and frigates *Melampus* and *Decade*. The *Melampus* was serving in the North American Squadron at the time, and was lent to Strachan in order to pursue the French squadron.

<sup>173</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5 :195; James, *The Naval History of Great Britain*, 4 :210

<sup>174</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5 :196; James, *The Naval History of Great Britain*, 4 :210-211

The British became aware that three other ships from Willaumez' squadron had already arrived in the Chesapeake. On September 8, 1806, word reached Halifax that two French 74-gun ships, the *Éole* and *Patriote*, and the 40-gun frigate *La Cybèle* were at Annapolis, Maryland.<sup>175</sup> The three warships had suffered severe damage from the August storm, and went to the Chesapeake to make repairs. Their presence in American waters made it necessary for Vice-Admiral George Berkeley, commander of the North American Squadron, to send a strong detachment to watch over them and prevent their escape.<sup>176</sup> This force would spend the entire winter of 1806-07 guarding the entrance of the Chesapeake. Ironically, the mere presence of these French warships in the Chesapeake would ultimately cost the British more than any French naval victory.

With British ships closely watching the Chesapeake, it didn't take long for Anglo-American relations to deteriorate further. Yet at the heart of the growing tensions between Britain and the United States was a large measure of self-interest.

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<sup>175</sup> Spencer T. Tucker and Frank T. Reuter, *Injured Honor : The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, June 22, 1807* (Annapolis, Md., 1996), 67-68. A fourth ship, *La Valereuse*, escaped to the Delaware.

<sup>176</sup> James, *The Naval History of Great Britain*, 4 :211; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, s.v. 'George Cranfield Berkeley'. Sir George Cranfield Berkeley was born on August 10, 1853, and entered the Royal Navy at the age of 13 on board the yacht *Mary*, under the flag of his cousin Rear-Admiral Keppel. He later served on the *Guernsey* under Hugh Palliser, and was promoted to lieutenant in 1774. After a brief attempt at politics, he returned to the navy and served on board Keppel's flagship at the Battle of Ushant in 1778. Keppel appointed him to command the fireship *Firebrand* later that year, and from there he was sent to command the sloop *Fairy* on the Newfoundland Station, where he captured nine American privateers. He was unemployed for six years after the American war, and in 1789 was given command of the 74-gun *Magnificent*. He also served until 1795 as surveyor-general of the ordnance. With the start of the war in 1793 he was given command of the *Marlborough*, which was heavily engaged during the Battle of the Glorious First of June in 1794. He was severely wounded during the battle, and unable to resume command. He would later win a major lawsuit in 1804 against a newspaper that stated he exhibited signs of cowardice during the battle. After he recovered from his wounds he was later given command of the *Formidable*, and promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1799. He was promoted to Vice-Admiral in 1805 and appointed to command the North American Squadron the following year. His handling of the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair led to his being recalled to England in 1808, but was soon appointed to command the Portuguese Station later that year. He would retain command of this station until 1812, when he retired from active service. He died on February 25, 1818.

Great Britain was the world's largest commercial power, and was constantly wary of potential competitors. By using its merchant ships to transport the produce of the French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies back to Europe (and through the British blockade), American trade was able to increase by thirty-fold between 1794 and 1807.<sup>177</sup> Because of the war in Europe, The United States merchant fleet had become the neutral carrier of the world's produce. Worse still for the British, the Americans were able to undercut British exports in the West Indies, which fell by 50% between 1802 and 1806.<sup>178</sup> The Americans also had an enormous advantage over the British in their shipbuilding industry, which could produce large quantities of inexpensive merchant ships. This was due primarily to the cheap cost of their timber, which they had in abundance.<sup>179</sup> Meanwhile, the British were largely dependent on Baltic timber to build their ships, which enabled the American merchant marine to further undercut the British as deep-sea carriers.<sup>180</sup>

The British response to this American encroachment on what they perceived as their domain was to invoke the 'Rule of 1756', which stated that no ship in time of war could engage in direct trade forbidden to it in time of peace.<sup>181</sup> Prior to the war, only French ships were permitted to trade with French colonies, but once the war started in

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<sup>177</sup> Robert Gardiner (ed.), *The Naval War of 1812* (London, 1998), 9, 18. American exports also rose from \$20 million in 1792 to over \$100 million in 1807.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, 9

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>181</sup> Francis F. Beirne, *The War of 1812* (New York, 1949), 17-18; Reginald Horsman, *The Causes of the War of 1812* (New York, 1962), 19



1793 the French government extended this right to the United States.<sup>182</sup> In 1800, the American merchant ship *Polly* was stopped by the Royal Navy for having traded with the French. The *Polly* picked up a cargo from a French colony, stopped at an American port, unloaded her cargo and reloaded it before proceeding to Europe. In this manner, the American ship was not involved in direct trade, and was therefore not breaking the 'Rule of 1756'.<sup>183</sup> British merchants were greatly angered by the ruling, and five years later had an opportunity to redress the issue. The American merchant ship *Essex* was seized by the Royal Navy for trading with the French in circumstances identical to the *Polly*. However, Judge William Scott (who had rendered the decision in the *Polly* case) declared that the *Essex* was engaged in direct trade with France and her colonies, regardless of having first stopped at an American port. From that point onward, any American ship caught trading with the French would be subject to immediate seizure and confiscation.<sup>184</sup> The validity of the "Rule of 1756" would be one of the main trouble spots in Anglo-American diplomacy.

The issues of impressment and right of search were two other major issues dividing Britain and the United States. The British believed in the doctrine of 'indelible allegiance', that the native-born subject of a state cannot, without the consent of that state, change his nationality nor relinquish his obligation to it.<sup>185</sup> As such, they felt they had the right to retrieve their citizens from foreign ships whether in

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<sup>182</sup> Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812*, 18

<sup>183</sup> Beirne, *The War of 1812*, 18; Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States 1805-1812* (Berkeley, Cal., 1963), 75-76

<sup>184</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 18; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 76-81

<sup>185</sup> Michael Lewis, *A Social History of the Royal Navy 1793-1815* (London, 1960), 435; James Fulton Zimmerman, *The Impressment of American Seamen* (Port Washington, N.Y., 1925), 116

a British port or on the high seas. On the other hand, the Americans believed in the doctrine of 'voluntary expatriation', that after proper qualifications had been fulfilled, a person formally accepted by another state had changed his nationality entirely and permanently, and therefore held no allegiance to any other state.<sup>186</sup> They refused to surrender the rights of their flag to allow British warships to seize their citizens on board their ships.<sup>187</sup> President Jefferson considered the issue of impressment of the highest importance, and would not discuss the repeal of the Non-Importation Act until a compromise was reached.<sup>188</sup> The British feared that if they could not search and impress their seamen from American ships, they would become floating asylums for deserters from the Royal Navy.<sup>189</sup> Any navy forced to use press gangs to man its vessels was bound to have more than its fair share of deserters, but in England it was of almost epidemic proportions. Many deserters sought refuge on American ships, where life was much more humane and the pay was much better.<sup>190</sup> With the growing need for manpower, many Royal Navy captains resorted to outright kidnapping of foreigners just to fill their own ship complements.<sup>191</sup> Mahan described the British situation as such:

That much of Great Britain's action was unjustifiable, and at times even monstrous, regarded in itself alone, must be admitted; but we shall ill comprehend the

<sup>186</sup> Lewis, *Social History*, 435

<sup>187</sup> Madison to Monroe, March 6, 1806, *American State Papers: Foreign Relations* 3 :99-101

<sup>188</sup> Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 17, 1806, *Ibid.* 3 :120. The Non-Importation Act was passed by Congress on March 25, 1806.

<sup>189</sup> Zimmerman, *Impressment of American Seamen*, 119

<sup>190</sup> Henry E. Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates* (Alexandria, Va, 1979), 62-63

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

necessity of preparation for war, if we neglect to note the pressure of emergency, of deadly peril, upon a state or if we fail to recognize that traditional habits of thought constitute with nations, as with individuals, a compulsive moral force which an opponent can only control by the display of adequate physical power. Such to the British people was the conviction of their right and need to compel the service of their native seamen, wherever found on the high seas.<sup>192</sup>

A report from the American Secretary of State on March 5, 1806, showed that at least 913 of the seamen were impressed from their ships were American.<sup>193</sup> One senior official even went so far as to confess that,

I believe many of (the impressed seamen) are British subjects; but I presume that all of them were impressed from American vessels, and by far the greater proportion are American citizens who, from various causes, have been deprived of their certificates, and who, from their peculiar situation, have been unable to obtain proof from America.<sup>194</sup>

As far as the Admiralty was concerned, their view was that,

The principle that a man declaring himself to belong to a foreign state should, upon assertion that merely, and without direct or very strong circumstantial proof, be suffered to leave the service, would be productive of the most dangerous consequence to his Majesty's Navy.<sup>195</sup>

In essence, both sides had very strong opinions over the issue. For the Americans, it was a simple matter of the British using their navy to stop the American merchant marine to satisfy their own merchants, who did not want the competition. As far as the British were concerned, they were in a war for survival, a war to liberate

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<sup>192</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power In Its Relations to the War of 1812*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1905), 1 :viii

<sup>193</sup> Reginald Horsman, *The War of 1812* (New York, 1969), 7; Lewis, *Social History*, 437-439; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1 :128. The exact number of seamen taken by the Royal Navy from American ships is unknown, and has been estimated by various sources as anywhere from a few thousand to 50,000. Michael Lewis believes that the figures between 1803 and 1812 is probably between 8400 and 10,000. Horsman describes that when war broke in 1812, the British agreed to treat 2500 of their seamen as prisoners of war.

<sup>194</sup> As quoted in Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:128

Europe from Bonaparte's tyranny, and as such were within their rights to stop anyone who might be helping the French. They saw the American merchants as greedy opportunists who would gladly trade with anyone, regardless of the cause they stood for. In any case, the United States was caught firmly between two warring factions, as both Britain and France seized hundreds of their merchant ships between 1803 and 1806.<sup>196</sup> But because Britain was seen as the chief aggressor (mainly because it was their warships that dominated the sea lanes), the United States responded in 1806 with the Non-Importation Act, which prohibited the import of specific British goods such as cloth made of hemp or flax, glass, and beer into the United States. The act was passed in the spring, but was not to take effect until November, to give the British a chance to receive the news of it and perhaps bring them to the bargaining table.<sup>197</sup>

The two sides did eventually come to a compromise later in 1806, which saw the British willing to give up the right of impressment, while the Americans would pass a law making it illegal for their captains to take in deserters from the Royal Navy.<sup>198</sup> They also promised to return all deserters upon arrival in each other's respective territories. Unfortunately, the plan was crushed by the Admiralty, which categorically opposed any plan that required them to give up the right of impressment.<sup>199</sup> With the issue unresolved, Jefferson refused to approve the Treaty of Commerce and

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid., 1:126-127

<sup>196</sup> Gardiner, *War of 1812*, 19; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 72. During this period, the British captured or detained 528 American vessels, while the French stopped another 206. French seizures would increase even more after the Berlin and Milan Decrees were introduced, and result in their taking 307 American vessels, whereas British seizures during the same period dropped to 389 American ships.

<sup>197</sup> Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 112

<sup>198</sup> Zimmerman, *Impressment of American Seamen*, 119

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., 120

Navigation signed on December 31, 1806.<sup>200</sup> The deadlock between the two sides continued.

The American people were outraged and horrified by the depredations committed by the British ships on their vessels, but were unable to do anything but express indignation. The United States Navy had several fine warships, particularly the 44-gun frigates that would cause the British no end of grief later on, but in terms of size their fleet was negligible.<sup>201</sup> The Adams administration had plans to build a sufficiently large navy, but these were derailed by the Jefferson government, which opposed to the idea. They were more inclined towards debt reduction and lower taxes, and preferred to build a large fleet of inexpensive coastal gunboats that would be used to guard their ports.<sup>202</sup> Because of this short-sighted view, the Americans would have fewer than twenty ocean-going warships in 1807. The United States Navy acquitted itself quite well during the The Quasi-War with France and again in the war with the Barbary Pirates from 1802 to 1804, but it was held in small esteem by the Royal Navy.<sup>203</sup>

By 1806, the Royal Navy had 600 warships on the active list, and needed about 120,000 seamen and marines to man these ships.<sup>204</sup> In order to obtain the men they

<sup>200</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:133

<sup>201</sup> James Fenimore Cooper, *History of the Navy of the United States of America* (Delmer, N.Y., 1988), 149; Gruppe, *The Frigates*, 22-24, 33. The three 44-Gun frigates of this class were the *Constitution*, *United States* (both built in 1798) and *President* (built in 1800), and had eight smaller frigates also in service.

<sup>202</sup> Cooper, *History of the Navy of the United States*, 147-149; Craig L. Symonds, *Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States 1785-1827* (Newark, N.J., 1980), 66-104; Tucker and Reuter, *Injured Honor*, 47

<sup>203</sup> Gruppe, *The Frigates*, 27-29, 41-62

<sup>204</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5 :9-10

needed to crew their ships, the press gangs were often sent out in force. The brutality of the press gangs was well known throughout the British Empire. In Halifax, Reverend Dr. Robert Stanser, the rector of St. Paul's Church, found himself dragged aboard by one of the press gangs. He was lucky enough to be released once his identity was established, but the majority of others captured by the press gangs would not be as fortunate.<sup>205</sup> Tensions between civilian and naval authorities increased during Admiral Mitchell's tenure as commander of the squadron, and Haligonians held him responsible for the riot of 1805. When his squadron arrived in Halifax, Mitchell demanded that the assembly grant him a warrant to allow the use of press gangs for a period of six months. Governor Wentworth quickly intervened, claiming that because of the losses incurred during the war and the demands placed on their merchant ships, the province faced a severe manpower shortage.<sup>206</sup> Mitchell complained that deserters from his ships were often harbored and concealed by local citizens, and needed an extended press warrant to fill up his crews.<sup>207</sup> The governor countered that the manpower available at the time could only meet half the crew demands of a single sloop.<sup>208</sup> Moreover, he was in no hurry to have the press gangs roam the streets, as they had a tendency of attracting trouble with the populace. On May 6, 1805, the

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<sup>205</sup> Gruppe, *The Frigates*, 63

<sup>206</sup> Dr. T.B. Akins, *History of Halifax City* (Belleville, Ont., 1973), 138; Brian C. Cuthbertson, *The Loyalist Governor : Biography of Sir John Wentworth* (Halifax, N.S., 1983); Beamish Murdoch, *A History of Nova Scotia or Acadie*, 3 vols. (Halifax, N.S., 1867), 3 :241-242; Sir John Wentworth (1737-1820) was lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia from 1792 to 1808.

<sup>207</sup> Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, 3 :241

<sup>208</sup> Akins, *History of Halifax City*, 137

assembly granted Mitchell a press warrant for only fourteen days, which did not sit well with the admiral.<sup>209</sup>

Mitchell did not bother to hide his dislike of Governor Wentworth. His marriage to the daughter of Richard Uniacke, the Advocate-General of the Vice-Admiralty Court, made him a formidable opponent to the autocratic governor.<sup>210</sup> In October, Mitchell permitted the *Cleopatra* to send out a press gang to fill up its crew without having bothered to get a warrant from Wentworth or the assembly. Things quickly fell out of hand; an angry mob attacked the *Cleopatra's* marines, and a riot ensued. Before order was restored, one man was killed and many more were wounded, and the houses and properties along the docks suffered considerable damage.<sup>211</sup> Wentworth was livid on hearing of Mitchell's actions, and placed the blame for the riot squarely on his shoulders. He saw to it that Mitchell was prosecuted for having allowed the use of the press gangs without the civilian authority's permission.<sup>212</sup>

As a way of enticing recruits to join the navy, Wentworth placed £500 as bounties to encourage seamen to enlist in the newly constructed sloop HMS *Halifax* (16) in 1806.<sup>213</sup> It was hoped that the offer of more lucrative bounties would satisfy the navy's need for additional manpower and make press gangs unnecessary. Mitchell's successor, Vice-Admiral Sir George Berkeley, also tried to get local citizens to turn in

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<sup>209</sup> Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, 3 :241

<sup>210</sup> Raddall, *Warden of the North*, 143

<sup>211</sup> Akins, *History of Halifax City*, 137-138; Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, 3 :244-245

<sup>212</sup> Akins, *History of Halifax City*, 138; Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, 3 :245-247

<sup>213</sup> Walter Ronald Copp, 'Nova Scotia and the War of 1812' (master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 1935), 79; Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, 3 :248. On November 8, 1807, a Royal Proclamation was issued authorizing the granting of bounties to further entice seamen into the ranks of the Royal Navy.

deserters, and offered rewards of up to three guineas (or sixty-three shillings) for the capture of any deserter.<sup>214</sup> Yet even with these enticements, the captains on the North American station continued to resort to kidnapping unfortunate individuals on board neutral vessels, especially those from the United States. It was common knowledge that many of those who deserted fled to American ships, and British captains did not hesitate to stop and search them. In fact, the Admiralty's policy was that any man born before 1783, when Britain recognized American independence, was technically still a British subject, and could thus be legally impressed.<sup>215</sup> The Americans strongly opposed this, but the British continued with it.

The actions by some of the squadron's ships only served to exacerbate the situation. On April 25, 1806, the *Leander* fired a shot at the American merchant ship *Richard*, resulting in the death of one of her crewmen. She was stationed off New York Harbor with the frigate HMS *Cambrian* (40) and sloop HMS *Driver* (18), and had stopped several vessels outside the harbor to search for contraband. The British ships usually fired a shot across the bows of the ships they intended to search to make them stop. On this day the *Richard* did not heave to after the warning shot, and so the *Leander* fired a second shot directly at the sloop. This wound up killing John Pierce, the captain's brother, and the *Richard* turned right back into the harbor. Pierce's body was paraded in the streets of New York, and anti-British sentiment rose to new heights.<sup>216</sup> Their indignation was further heightened when a court of inquiry later

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<sup>214</sup> Henry Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam : A History of the Island from 1794 to 1901*, 2 vols. (London, 1973), 1 :285

<sup>215</sup> Gruppe, *The Frigates*, 63

<sup>216</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 14 :119-120; Tucker and Reuter, *Injured Honor*, 52-53; Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam*, 1:286-287



exonerated Captain Whitby, the *Leander*'s commander, for this unfortunate incident.<sup>217</sup>

The American government responded on May 3 by banning the three British warships, as well as the *Cleopatra*, from ever entering any American port.<sup>218</sup>

With the war raging in Europe, the British did not pay much attention to American grievances. Their naval victory at Trafalgar ended the immediate threat of a French invasion, but Napoleon's victories at Austerlitz, Ulm, and Jena shattered Britain's allies, and ensured France's continued domination of the continent. Until the French could be defeated in Europe, the threat of an invasion of England would always remain. However, Napoleon decided to strike back at Britain by turning his energies against the main source of her strength, namely her commerce. Rather than try to wrest control of the seas from the Royal Navy, the French would launch a dual offensive against British trade, unleashing swarms of privateers onto the sea lanes and set up a counter-blockade on the continent to bring about England's economic ruin.<sup>219</sup> Ironically, one of the unforeseen dividends of this plan was that it would strain Anglo-American relations even further.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 14 :119-120; Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam*, 1 :287. Though acquitted, Whitby was not reemployed by the Royal Navy until 1809.

<sup>218</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5 :382; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 4 :236; *Naval Chronicle* 14 :119-120

<sup>219</sup> Marcus, *Age of Nelson*, 295

<sup>220</sup> Robert Greenhalgh Albion, *Forests and Sea Power : The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy 1652-1862* (Hamden, Conn., 1965), 346-358; Julian Gwyn, 'The Halifax Naval Yard and Mast Contractors', *The Northern Mariner* 10 (October, 2001) 4 :1-25. One of the unexpected consequences of Napoleon's edicts was a major windfall for the Maritimes, and particularly Halifax. The British wound up turning towards the Maritimes as an alternate source of timber, which led to a boom in the region's economy.

Napoleon began his offensive against British commerce with the Berlin Decree of 1806, designed to completely shut out English trade from the continent.<sup>221</sup> In essence, it put the British Empire under blockade, and any ship caught doing business with the British would be subject to immediate seizure. Vessels would not be allowed to sail to any British port, and British goods were forbidden to enter the European market. The Continental System, as it became known, was theoretically quite innovative. An economic collapse of Britain would serve just as well as any military victory. It was further strengthened following the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit by Czar Alexander I and Napoleon on July 8, 1807, bringing Russia into the French fold. Soon, most of Europe closed its ports to British vessels.<sup>222</sup> This was potentially quite devastating for both Britain and her navy, since they imported the majority of their timber and naval stores from the Baltic.<sup>223</sup> Denying the British access to this region posed a far greater threat to them than from any of the European fleets.

The British government countered Napoleon's edict with an Order-in-Council issued on January 7, 1807, forbidding all vessels from entering French-controlled ports. As a result, the Royal Navy stepped up its blockade of the European ports, and even sent a fleet into the Baltic to ensure that the flow of supplies from this region was not interrupted.<sup>224</sup> The main victim in this power play of rival blockades was the United States. As a neutral power, the Americans felt it was their right to trade with

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<sup>221</sup> Mahan, *French Revolution*, 2 :271-274

<sup>222</sup> Ibid, 2 :274

<sup>223</sup> Albion, *Forests and Sea Power*, 335-339

<sup>224</sup> Marcus, *Age of Nelson*, 324-330

anyone they chose, and their merchant ships would be caught in the middle between the two warring powers.

The Order-in-Council was a severe means of coercion on the part of the British. Not only was it intended to negate the effects of the Continental System, its success would also put the most of the world's commercial trade under direct British control. With the Royal Navy controlling the seas, there was little anyone could do against it. They would force neutral ships to enter their ports and pay a fee for a license, and they in turn would receive forged documents regarding their destination and previous port of call, enabling them to bypass the Continental System. The ships would also be encouraged to sell their cargoes directly to the British, who would then re-export them at a substantial profit. It is true that Britain was fighting for its survival, but these tactics were every bit as coercive as those used by Napoleon.<sup>225</sup>

Tensions between the United States and England would reach a boiling point in 1807 over Britain's policies of impressment and searching of neutral vessels.<sup>226</sup> The Order-in-Council would be strictly enforced, leading to even more serious abuses by British captains against neutral shipping. The Jefferson government widely condemned Britain's right of search policy, but could bring little pressure to bear on them. The British government justified the zeal of their policies by claiming that they were fighting for their very survival against the French, but this argument held little conviction for many Americans. Some of them believed that the British would only

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<sup>225</sup> Mahan, *French Revolution*, 2 :275-276, *War of 1812*, 1:150-152

<sup>226</sup> J.C.A. Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War : Politics, Diplomacy and Warfare in the Early American Republic 1783-1830* (Princeton, N.J., 1983),20-21. The Americans sent James Monroe to London to meet with William Pinkney in order to come to address the issues of impressment, right of search and the Non-Importation Act.

respond to their grievances through the use of force, and they began to seriously consider open conflict with them. They started to look north towards Canada, perceived by many as the soft-underbelly of the British Empire. In retrospect, it seemed that an incident between Britain and the United States was unavoidable, yet many chose to ignore the warning signs. Ironically, Governor Wentworth wrote to Lord Castlereagh a few weeks before the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair that his province was in a state of entire peace.<sup>227</sup> He would soon see that his optimism was misplaced.

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<sup>227</sup> Wentworth to Castlereagh, June 3, 1807, Public Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS), RG 1, 54 :168

## CHAPTER 2: FROM THE CHESAPEAKE TO MARTINIQUE 1807-1809

The *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair was the catalyst that set Britain and the United States down the path to war. The two nations were still trying to find a diplomatic compromise over their outstanding issues, including the Royal Navy's policies of impressment and 'right of search' at the time the incident occurred. It quickly fanned the flames of war to the point of ignition. The last thing the British government needed at the time was to be forced into a war to defend their overseas colonies, as the fortunes of war in Europe still favored the French. In the United States, the public and many politicians were clamoring for war. Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic tried to find an acceptable face-saving solution to present to their respective governments without looking weak before their political opponents.

There is a certain amount of irony that this incident was unwittingly caused by the French Navy. The squadron maintained its vigil in the Chesapeake during the winter of 1806-1807, as the British could ill afford to have the *Patriote*, *Éole* and *La Cybèle* roaming unmolested around American waters. Vice-Admiral Berkeley left Captain J.E. Douglas with a force sufficient to handle the three French warships should they try to escape, which included the 74-gun ships HMS *Bellona* and *Triumph* (both recently added to his command), as well as the frigate *Melampus* and sloop *Halifax*.<sup>1</sup> This again left Berkeley with few ships for convoy duty or to patrol the northern waters, but he felt it was a necessary risk. He had only five ships in Nova Scotia at the start of spring, the 50-

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<sup>1</sup> William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV*, 6 vols. (London, 1847), 4:327

gun ship HMS *Leopard*, sloop *Observateur* (16), schooners *Porgey* (4), *Bream* (4) and *Mullet* (4).<sup>2</sup> The remaining ships were either in Bermuda, escorting convoys or delivering dispatches to other stations. Despite having few ships available, the blockade of the Chesapeake would continue.

While protecting their charges from enemy raiders, the convoy escorts would often discover that nature was a more dangerous adversary. On February 19, while escorting a convoy to the West Indies, the sloop HMS *Busy* (18) foundered during a severe storm and went down with her entire crew.<sup>3</sup> Her loss would be partially offset by the addition of the brig *Plumper* (10), which was built in Halifax and commissioned later in May.<sup>4</sup>

Further south, the sloop *Driver* (18) was sent to deliver dispatches to the West Indies during the spring, and along the way she captured the Spanish packet sloop *Ranger* off Florida on April 20.<sup>5</sup> She then proceeded to Charleston, South Carolina after receiving word that Spanish agents had purchased another schooner they intended to fit out as a privateer. However, as soon as she arrived there, the *Driver* was immediately ordered by the city's mayor to leave American waters.<sup>6</sup> She was still under the ban imposed from the previous year forbidding her from entering any U.S. port.<sup>7</sup> The British sloop left Charleston, and made her way to join the blockading squadron in the Chesapeake in June.

<sup>2</sup> Berkeley to William Marsden, May 15, 1807, Adm.1/497, 134-135

<sup>3</sup> Berkeley to Marsden, May 5, 1807, Adm.1/497, 137-138

<sup>4</sup> Berkeley to Marsden, May 18, 1807, Adm.1/497, 140-141

<sup>5</sup> Berkeley to Marsden, May 4, 1807, Adm.1/497, 132-133

<sup>6</sup> Berkeley to Marsden, May 31, 1807, Adm.1/497, 158-159

<sup>7</sup> William Clowes, *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present*, 7 vols. (London, 1897-1903), 5:382; James, 4:236; *Naval Chronicle* 17:119-120

Ironically, it was here she found the purchased Spanish privateer, named *El Boladora* (1), and the *Driver* was able to capture her near Cape Henry on June 12 with little difficulty. The Spanish privateer was commanded by Robert Ross, an American pirate who was responsible for the murder of the entire crew of the British merchant brig *Esther* two year earlier. Ross had also plundered several American ships during the last two years, and was brought back to Halifax shortly after his capture to stand trial for his crimes.<sup>8</sup>

While the French warships had shown no intention of leaving the safety of the Chesapeake, Berkeley was growing more apprehensive. He was most troubled by the fact that his blockading ships were in dire need of refitting. Berkeley disliked the idea of weakening Douglas' force, and was worried the French would send a squadron to rescue their trapped warships.<sup>9</sup> He knew that they would not hesitate to attack a weakened British force in neutral waters.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, he finally decided to withdraw the *Bellona* to Halifax for a refit, and replaced her with one of his few available ships, the *Leopard*.<sup>11</sup>

The Americans found the continued presence of Douglas' ships off the Virginia coast quite intolerable, and saw it as another in the growing list of offenses committed by the Royal Navy against them. No sooner had the British warships arrived off Hampton Roads than they began to stop and search the ships entering and leaving the area. The American government issued their grievances to David Erskine, the British Minister in Washington, who in turn used it as a means of discussing the subject of British deserters

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<sup>8</sup> Captain William Love to Berkeley, June 12, 1807, *Naval Chronicle* 24:308-309

<sup>9</sup> Berkeley to Marsden, May 16, 1807, Adm.1/497, 138

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Berkeley to Marsden, June 10, 1807, Adm.1/497, 169-170

hiding out in the United States.<sup>12</sup> Erskine had written to Secretary of State James Madison regarding an incident the previous year involving the British sloop HMS *Bermuda* (18). The ship had taken the American merchant ship *Cincinnati* as a prize late in 1806, claiming that she was smuggling contraband. Although the truth of this claim was somewhat in doubt, the *Bermuda*'s captain sent a prize crew to take control of the merchant ship. However, most of the prize crew mutinied, and the ship escaped to New England.<sup>13</sup> When he heard of the incident, Erskine demanded the immediate return of the mutinous deserters.<sup>14</sup> Madison promptly wrote back, decrying the illegal nature of the British seizure of the American vessel. He made the point that Jay's Treaty was quite clear that unless the deserters were accused of murder or forgery, the United States was not liable to turn them over to the British.<sup>15</sup> Madison also brought up the matter of the British squadron in the Hampton Roads, stating that:

The collector of Norfolk has lately transmitted a copy of a letter from Captain Douglas of (HMS) *Bellona*, to the British consul of that place, on the subject of certain American citizens detained on board British ships of war lying in the harbors of Virginia; in which letter he refuses to discharge them without particular orders to that effect from the British Admiral at Halifax, and undertakes to assign for a reason the neglect to surrender the British seamen who are the subject of your letter. You will, doubtless, sir, see in its true light so extraordinary: and I assure myself that the efficacy of your interposition will relieve the government of the United States from the painful steps which may otherwise become indispensable for maintaining the rights of citizens suffering illegal violence within the very harbors of their own country.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Antony Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', *Mariner's Mirror* 39 (1953), 244

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 244-245

<sup>14</sup> David Erskine to James Madison, January 4, 1807, United Kingdom, Public Records Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 5/52

<sup>15</sup> Madison to Erskine, January 7, 1807, PRO, FO 5/52

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*



When Erskine and Madison finally met later in January, both stood firmly to their positions. Erskine said his government would not release the American citizens it was holding unless they surrendered the *Bermuda's* deserters, while Madison refused to have his country bullied by the British.<sup>17</sup> It was at this point that the matter of British deserters would take on a whole new significance.

On January 4, 1807, the same day that Erskine wrote to Madison about the deserters from the *Bermuda*, three men from the frigate *Melampus* escaped into a small boat and proceeded to American soil.<sup>18</sup> When the three men, William Ware, Daniel Martin and John Strachan, were questioned by American authorities, they claimed to be American citizens and that they had been illegally impressed into the Royal Navy.<sup>19</sup> The British did not deny that the men had been born in the United States, but claimed that they had volunteered to serve in their navy, and had not been impressed into service.<sup>20</sup> Captain Douglas went ashore to meet with American representatives in Norfolk to demand their return, but was denied.<sup>21</sup> The issue would be handled by Erskine in Washington and Colonel Hamilton, the British consul in Norfolk. In the meantime the deserters were seen by their former shipmates wearing American army uniforms, which no doubt rankled the British officers.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', 245

<sup>18</sup> Rear-Admiral H.F. Pullen, *The Shannon and the Chesapeake* (Toronto, 1970), 9-10; Spencer T. Tucker and Frank T. Reuter, *Injured Honor : The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, June 22, 1807* (Annapolis, Md., 1996), 70-72

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 10; Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', 249

<sup>21</sup> Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', 245-246

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

Despite increased tensions between the two sides, the British squadron continued to use American facilities to keep their ships properly supplied. This only served to exacerbate matters. The supply-ship HMS *Chichester* arrived in the Chesapeake in January, and went to the Gosport Naval Yard to make a few repairs.<sup>23</sup> While she was being refitted, the American commander at Fort Nelson led an armed party to board and search the vessel for American deserters. Captain Stopford had little recourse but to allow his vessel to be searched. The boarding party forcibly removed three British-born sailors from the ship, and even arrested one of the *Chichester*'s midshipmen.<sup>24</sup> The Americans later released the three 'deserters', but it was clear that this was a simple case of retaliation against the British.<sup>25</sup>

Matters soon became even more complicated. On March 7, 1807, five men from the sloop *Halifax* incited a mutiny and escaped to the American shore.<sup>26</sup> According to the British accounts, the deserters were later seen parading in the streets of Norfolk, flaunting their freedom.<sup>27</sup> Colonel Hamilton went to Captain Stephen Decatur and demanded the immediate return of the mutineers along with the other deserters, which also included two other men from the British merchant ship *Herald*.<sup>28</sup> Hamilton was successful in the return

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<sup>23</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 4:326-327; Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', 246

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. The midshipman, Mr. Brookes, was arrested after commenting to the American commandant, Captain Saunders, that "It was not right to give up their deserters, when they would not give up ours."

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 10

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> James, 4: 327; Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', 246

of the *Herald*'s deserters, but got nowhere with the others.<sup>29</sup> He tried to get assistance from the mayor of Norfolk, but also to no avail.<sup>30</sup> The *Halifax*' commander, Captain Townshend, decided to go to Norfolk to persuade the deserters to return to duty. He later claimed that Jenkin Ratford was abusive towards him, and was prevented from speaking to the others.<sup>31</sup>

The Americans stated that they had no intention of releasing the deserters to the British for the simple reason that they believed that the men had been illegally impressed into the Royal Navy. As far as they were concerned, they were American citizens, and therefore could serve in their own navy. While this was true for Ware, Martin, and Strachan, it was certainly not the case for the others.<sup>32</sup> The Americans then foolishly decided to turn down the British requests without offering any further explanation. Insult was added to insult to injury when four of the deserters enlisted to serve on board the frigate USS *Chesapeake* (38), flying the pendant of Commodore James Barron and scheduled to leave for the Mediterranean in June.<sup>33</sup> The situation was entirely unacceptable to the British.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 4:328; Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', 246

<sup>31</sup> Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', 247

<sup>32</sup> Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 10; Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', 249

<sup>33</sup> *American National Biography*, s.v. 'James Barron'; Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 10; Steel, 'More Light on the *Chesapeake*', 247; Paul B. Watson, *The Tragic Career of Commodore James Barron* (New York, 1942). James Barron was born in Virginia in 1769, and entered on board his father's ship in the Virginia service at age 12. He was commissioned lieutenant in 1798, and appointed to the frigate *United States*. He received his captain's commission in 1799, and was flag-captain during the war with Tripoli. While in command of the frigate *Chesapeake* in 1807, his ship was fired upon by the British warship *Leopard*, and he was subsequently made a scapegoat for what was perceived as a national humiliation. A court-martial found him guilty of negligence in not preparing his ship for the possibility of a hostile encounter, and was sentenced to a five-year suspension without pay. He went to Europe, and did not return to America until after the War of 1812 ended. He blamed Stephen Decatur, who was present at the court-

Berkeley, in constant contact with the squadron and with Hamilton throughout the entire affair, was greatly angered when he heard that the subsequent Americans had not only refused to return men who were known deserters from the Royal Navy, but allowed them to enlist in the United States Navy. On June 1, 1807, he issued the proclamation that led directly to the incident:

Whereas many seamen, subjects of his Britannic Majesty, and serving in his ships and vessels as per margin (*Belleisle, Bellona, Triumph, Halifax, Chichester* and cutter *HMS Zenobia*), while at anchor in the Chesapeake, deserted and entered on board the United States frigate called the *Chesapeake*, and openly paraded the streets of Norfolk in sight of their officers, under the American flag, protected by the magistrates of the town and the recruiting officers belonging to the above -mentioned American frigate, which magistrates and naval officers refused giving them up, although demanded by his Britannic Majesty's consul, as well as the captains of the ships from which the said men had deserted.

The captains and commanders of his Majesty's ships and vessels under my command are therefore hereby required to and directed, in case of meeting with the American frigate the *Chesapeake* at sea, and without the limits of the United States, to show to the captain of her this order, and to require to search his ship for the deserters from the before mentioned ships, and to proceed and search for the same; and if a similar demand should be made by the American, he is permitted to search for any deserters from their service, according to the customs and usage of civilized nations, on terms of peace and amity with each other.<sup>34</sup>

Berkeley sent the *Leopard* (Captain Salisbury Price Humphreys) to join the rest of the squadron in Hampton Roads, armed with these instructions. It should be noted that Berkeley did not specify in this order the possible use of force to bring the deserters back, but his comments after the incident suggest that he wanted the deserters back at all costs.

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martial, for ruining his career, and mortally wounded him in a duel in March, 1820. Barron died on April 21, 1851.

<sup>34</sup> Berkeley's Proclamation of June 1, 1807, *Naval Chronicle* 18:117-118

The *Leopard* arrived in the Hampton Roads on June 21, and Humphreys gave a copy of Berkeley's order to the captains of the other ships in the squadron.<sup>35</sup> As to the status of the French warships, Humphreys was informed by Colonel Hamilton that the *Patriote* and *Cybèlle* were ready to depart, while the *Éole* was reported to have been dismantled (this last was untrue).<sup>36</sup> Tensions in the region had not dissipated, and had been further heightened after the *Driver's* capture of the *El Boladora* on June 12.<sup>37</sup> The *Chesapeake* was still at Norfolk, finishing its preparations for its cruise to the Mediterranean. Had Barron departed a few days earlier, the entire unfortunate incident might have been averted. On June 22, the day after the *Leopard* arrived, the *Chesapeake* set sail for the Mediterranean, and was immediately spotted by the British ships, which promptly set off after her. The chasing ships had closed to within hailing range of the American frigate by mid-afternoon, and demanded to send one of their officers to present Barron a copy of Berkeley's orders. Lieutenant John Meade went aboard the American vessel and read the order. Barron simply claimed that there were no deserters on board his ship, and refused to have his ship searched.<sup>38</sup>

Humphreys continued to insist on searching the American vessel, while Barron gave either evasive answers or simply refused to reply. His patience sorely tested, he ordered his gunners to fire a warning shot across the *Chesapeake's* bows. The American ship was not cleared for action, and this would be the American Navy's main charge against

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<sup>35</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 4:329; Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 11

<sup>36</sup> Colonel Hamilton to Berkeley, June 6, 1807, Adm.1/497, 191-192

<sup>37</sup> Berkeley to Captain Marsden, June 19, 1807, Adm.1/497, 188-189

<sup>38</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 6:18; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 4:329

Barron and Captain Gordon in their subsequent court-martial. Barron continued to give evasive answers, while British observers claimed that this was merely a delaying tactic to gain the Americans time to prepare their guns. At 4:30 p.m. the *Leopard* fired a full broadside at the *Chesapeake*. Barron said he would send a boat to the British warship to discuss the issue, but it was again perceived as another delaying tactic. The *Leopard* fired two more salvos, striking the American ship twenty-one times, killing three men and wounding another eighteen.<sup>39</sup> The *Chesapeake* got off only one shot, fired by a live coal taken from the galley fire, which did no damage. Humphreys sent a boarding party to the damaged ship, and ordered the entire crew of the American frigate assembled. Barron offered to surrender his ship, but was declined by Humphreys, who was satisfied with the return of the deserters. The four men were taken back to the *Leopard*, while the Americans returned back to the Hampton Roads.<sup>40</sup>

The *Bellona* brought the prisoners back to Halifax in August on board the *Bellona*. Ratford was to be tried apart from the other three prisoners, as he was also charged with mutiny and contempt as well as desertion.<sup>41</sup> The court was formed by Berkeley and convened on August 26 on the bridge of the *Belleisle*. Such was its importance that Berkeley requested the commander of the Leeward Islands Squadron, Rear Admiral of the

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<sup>39</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 6:18; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 4:331

<sup>40</sup> Henry E. Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates* (Alexandria, Va., 1979), 65, 159-160; Tucker and Reuter, *Injured Honor*, 1-17. Barron would face a court-martial following the incident. At the trial, Captain Stephen Decatur stated that he had been unwise to have left his ship completely unprepared to fight, and that a more courageous man would not have hauled down his colors. Barron said that it was the responsibility of the ship's captain, Charles Gordon, to have ensured the frigate was cleared for action. The court found Barron guilty and dismissed him from the service for five years. He would hold Decatur personally responsible for the verdict that cost him his career, and ultimately killed Decatur in a duel on March 22, 1820.

<sup>41</sup> Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 13

White, the Honorable Sir Alexander Cochrane, to be the court's president.<sup>42</sup> Six other captains who had served in the blockade of the Chesapeake also attended the trial.<sup>43</sup> It was a short affair; Ratford, charged with mutiny and contempt as well as desertion, could not offer up any defense, and the court quickly pronounced him guilty. Judge Baskie, the officiating judge, declared:

Having heard the evidence in support of the charges, as also what the prisoner had to offer in his defense, and most maturely and deliberately weighed and considered the whole, is of the opinion that the charges, have been proved, and do therefore, adjudge the said Jenkin Ratford to be hung by the neck until he is dead, at the yard arm, of such one of His Majesty's ships and at such time as the Commander in Chief at this place shall direct- And the said Jenkin Ratford is hereby sentenced accordingly.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Alexander Cochrane'; Alexander Cochrane, *The Fighting Cochranes* (London, 1983); Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 13-15; James Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain: Consisting of Historical Memoirs of Those Officers of the British Navy Who Distinguished Themselves During the Reign of His Majesty George III*, 4 vols. (Boston, 1972), 2:435-449. Sir Alexander Cochrane was born April 22, 1758, the younger son of Thomas Cochrane, 8<sup>th</sup> Earl of Dundonald. He entered the navy at an early age, and promoted to lieutenant in 1778. After being wounded in a battle off Martinique in 1780, he was promoted to commander, and later advanced to post rank in 1782. He remained on half-pay for most of the decade, and finally received an appointment to command the frigate *Hind* in 1790. During the early phase of the war with France, he achieved numerous successes against enemy privateers. He was transferred to the North American station on board the frigate *Thetis*, where he later assisted in the capture of two large French frigates *en flûte*. Despite his duties at sea, he was elected M.P. for the borough of Stirling in 1800, and would keep his seat until he was defeated in the election of 1806. With the resumption of the war in 1803, he was appointed to command of the squadron off Ferol, and promoted to rear-admiral in 1804. He chased the French squadron under Admiral Missiessy all the way from the Mediterranean to the West Indies in 1805, and ordered to take command of the Leeward Islands Squadron in 1806. He was promoted to vice-admiral in 1809, and following the capture of Guadeloupe in 1810, he was appointed to be its governor. He was given command of the North American Squadron in 1814, which he would retain until the end of the American war. He returned to England, and not employed again until 1821, when he was named commander-in-chief at Plymouth. He died on January 26, 1832.

<sup>43</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 18:335-342; Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 13-15; The members of the court included Captains F. Pickmore (HMS *Ramillies*), W.C. Fahie (*Ethalion*), J.E. Douglas (*Bellona*), Edward Hawker (*Melampus*), P. Beaver (*Acasta*), and N.D. Cochrane (*Belleisle*). James Baskie, Berkeley's secretary, was the officiating judge for the trial.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

Berkeley wasted no time in carrying out the sentence. A stage was quickly set up on board the *Halifax*, and on Monday, August 31, 1807 Jenkin Ratford was hanged.<sup>45</sup>

The trial of William Ware, Daniel Martin, and John Strachan, charged only with desertion, began on September 8, 1807.<sup>46</sup> The court was composed of the same men from the first trial, with the exception of Captain Hawker of the *Melampus*, from whose vessel the three men escaped.<sup>47</sup> Like Ratford, they also could offer little in terms of a defense for their actions, but several officers from the *Melampus* were willing to testify on their behalf as to their excellent conduct prior to having deserted.<sup>48</sup> The court took this under consideration, and announced that all three would receive five hundred lashes from the dreaded cat o'nine tails in front of the fleet, the customary punishment for the times.<sup>49</sup> They were once again fortunate, as Berkeley reviewed the evidence and decided to pardon them.<sup>50</sup> Martin and Strachan would be returned five years later to the *Chesapeake* not far from where they had been taken, but unfortunately William Ware died shortly after the trial, and would justify American grievances.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 16-17

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 17

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*; *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Edward Hawker'. Edward Hawker was born in 1782, and joined the navy at age 11. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1796, and given command of the cutter *Swift* in 1803. The following year he was advanced to post rank and transferred to the West Indies station on board the *Theseus*, flagship of Rear-Admiral Dacres. He later commanded the *Tartar* and *Melampus* on the North American station until 1812, when he was transferred to the Newfoundland Squadron. He was advanced to rear-admiral in 1837, vice-admiral in 1847, and reached full admiral in 1853. He died on June 8, 1860.

<sup>48</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 4:333; Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 18

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*



Reaction to the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair caused emotions to run high on both sides of the Atlantic. Americans from every part of the nation decried it as an unprovoked act of aggression by one sovereign nation unto another.<sup>52</sup> Politicians from both parties demanded revenge, and Jefferson even admitted that he had the issue of peace or war in his hands.<sup>53</sup> The Mayor of New York stated on July 2, 1807,

Having received, with the most lively indignation, authentic information that on (June) 22 and attack, unwarranted by the usages of nations, and in violation of our national rights, was made off the Capes of Virginia, on the United States frigate *Chesapeake*, Commodore Barron, by his Britannic Majesty's armed ship the *Leopard*, Captain Humphreys, the citizens of New York, assembled in general meeting, deem it to be their duty to express their opinions on this fresh outrage offered to their national sovereignty by the navy of Great Britain.

Resolved, that it is, and has been the policy of our government, and the wish, because it is the interest of our citizens, to be of peace with all the world.

Resolved, that although we cherish peace with the greatest sincerity, yet we hold ourselves ready, at the call of our government, to resist all infringements of our national rights, and violations of our national honor.

Resolved, that we consider the dastardly and unprovoked attack made upon the United States armed ship *Chesapeake*, by his Britannic Majesty's ship *Leopard*, to be a violation of our national rights, as atrocious as it is unprecedented."

Resolved, that we are determined to maintain the rights and dignity of our country with our lives and fortunes, and that we will support our government in whatever measures it may deem necessary to adopt, in the present crisis of affairs.<sup>54</sup>

On June 29, a committee at Norfolk passed a resolution prohibiting the entry of the British warships to that port. This led Captain Humphreys to write a letter that only further antagonized the American citizens. He wrote to Richard Lee, the Mayor of Norfolk, that in preventing the entry of all British ships to Norfolk, they would be cutting off communications with Colonel Hamilton, and thus prevented him from discharging his

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<sup>52</sup> Francis F. Beirne, *The War of 1812* (New York, 1949), 35

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 18:118-119

duties. He stated that if the ban was not lifted, he would stop every vessel entering or leaving Norfolk.<sup>55</sup> Lee wrote back the following day

I have received your menacing letter of yesterday. The day on which this answer is written, ought of itself to prove to the subjects of your sovereign, that the American people are not to be intimidated by menace, or induced to adopt any measures, except by a sense of their perfect propriety....We do not seek hostility, nor shall we avoid it. We are prepared for the worst you may attempt, and will do whatever shall be judged proper to repel force, whenever your efforts shall render our acts necessary.<sup>56</sup>

Ironically, Congress had already passed a proclamation on July 2 prohibiting the entry of all British warships from American ports, and ordered the immediate departure of all British warships currently in American waters. He also forbade Americans from having any dealings with British warships or their crews, or to furnish them with supplies.<sup>57</sup>

In England, the prevailing attitude was that the Americans brought the incident down upon themselves by not turning over the deserters. An editorial in the *Naval Chronicle* stated:

I do not pretend to say that we may not, in this instance, have been in the wrong; because there is nothing authentic upon the subject; nor am I prepared to say that our right of search policy in all cases extends to ships of war; but of this I am certain, that if laws of nations do not allow you to search for deserters in a friend's territory, neither do they allow that friend to inveigle away your troops or your seamen; to do which is an act of hostility, and I ask for no better proof of inveigling, that the enlisting and the refusing to give up such troops or seamen.

The fault of our officers upon that station has been excessive forbearance. We have suffered greatly from our tameness towards those states. Our commanders (with some few exceptions) have discovered the feelings of traders to America. The insults and injuries they have endured were disgraceful. The Americans are like the worst sort of women:

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<sup>55</sup> Douglas to Richard Lee, July 3, 1807, Ibid., 122-123

<sup>56</sup> Richard Lee to Douglas, July 4, 1807, Ibid., 123-124

<sup>57</sup> Proclamation of July 2, 1807 by Thomas Jefferson, Ibid., 121-122; Tucker and Reuter, *Injured Honor*, 126

they will set up a terrible outcry. They will beat Admiral Berkeley in lungs; but, if we keep a firm foot, they will soon listen to reason.<sup>58</sup>

George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, was among those who grasped the potential calamity of the situation. It was one thing to board a merchant vessel, but to board a warship was something entirely different. This was a direct insult to that nation, and could justify a declaration of war.<sup>59</sup> British politicians believed that the United States would not go to war over the issues of impressment and right of search, but could not guarantee the same over an attack on one of their warships.<sup>60</sup>

Reaction to the *Chesapeake-Leopard* affair also caused much concern for the citizens of Nova Scotia. Governor Wentworth had devoted considerable energy to foster good relations with the Americans, but now saw all his efforts slip away. He informed the council in July that there was a strong probability of war breaking out between Britain and the United States.<sup>61</sup> The reaction of American citizens towards Nova Scotia merchants was described as not far from hostile.<sup>62</sup> Wentworth's relations with Berkeley were anything but cordial prior to the *Chesapeake-Leopard* incident, but now they were downright hostile. The governor was horrified when he received word that instead of offering an apology to pacify the Americans, Berkeley openly stated that he was in favor of attacking them before they could prepare for war. He believed that the best way to

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<sup>58</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 18:129; Tucker and Reuter, *Injured Honor*, 66. The *Chesapeake* was in fact not the first U.S. warship by the British during this period; on June 12, 1805, the U.S. Navy *Gunboat* #6 was stopped off Cadiz by blockading British warships. Three of the American ship's crew claimed to be British citizens, and went to the British warships.

<sup>59</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 36

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Minutes of the Executive Council, July 14, 1807, PANS, RG 1, 214:201

<sup>62</sup> Governor Wentworth to Lord Castlereagh, July 14, 1807, PANS, RG 1, 54:184-185

avoid an American attack, which he viewed as unavoidable, was to take his fleet and ‘Copenhagen’ New York and other major harbors on the Atlantic coast.<sup>63</sup> He wrote that he wanted to cut up the sinews of their maritime strength, “which will otherwise be employed against our trade in the most hurtful ways.”<sup>64</sup> When Canning received word of this message, he saw that Berkeley’s continued presence as commander of the North American Station was causing more harm than the British could afford.<sup>65</sup> England had run out of allies in Europe in 1807, and could ill afford to start a conflict with the United States. In an effort to appease the American government, both Berkeley and Humphreys would be ordered home before the year was over.<sup>66</sup>

Canning was also quite upset when he received word of Jefferson’s ban to exclude all British warships from entering the United States.<sup>67</sup> Monroe had hoped that the incident might enable the two sides to resume their talks over impressment and right of search, but Canning stated that he was not interested in it.<sup>68</sup> He informed Monroe that he found it unacceptable that President Jefferson issued his proclamation without having waited for the British to respond to the incident.<sup>69</sup> Monroe was instructed to demand a complete

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<sup>63</sup> Berkeley to Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, August 17, 1807, Adm.1/497, 271-272. This is in reference to the Nelson’s attack on the Danish fleet at Copenhagen in 1801, a preemptive strike to was made to prevent its falling into Napoleon’s hands, despite the fact that Denmark was neutral.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Henry Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam: A History of the Island from 1784 to 1901*, 2 vols. (London, 1973), 1:288-289

<sup>66</sup> Tucker and Reuter, *Injured Honor*, 129-130

<sup>67</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 37

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

disavowal of both Berkeley's actions and of the policy of impressment.<sup>70</sup> Even had Canning been agreeable to these terms, which he wasn't, it would have been impossible for him to get his government to accept it. As a result, the threat of war continued to loom over both nations.

The deciding factor that ultimately prevented the American government from declaring war in 1807 was that the United States was simply not prepared for war. The army numbered only a few thousand, while their navy had only a handful of sloops and frigates.<sup>71</sup> Although the North American Squadron was a relatively small force compared to some of the other squadrons in the Royal Navy, it was practically equal in size to the entire United States Navy. The Americans had fewer than twenty ocean-going warships available, while the rest of the navy consisted primarily of gunboats, useful only for defense. President Jefferson was forced to come up with something that would force the British government to allow Americans to trade without fear of harassment. The solution he came up with would surprise many.

The desertions from the ships in the Chesapeake were symptoms of an epidemic that confronted the Royal Navy in this era. While England depended upon the Royal Navy for survival, a large portion of those who served aboard his Majesty's ships saw it as a prison sentence. The seamen suffered through harsh living conditions that would tempt many to desert. They endured floggings, were paid very low wages, and had to eat food that was often completely rotten. Yet the biggest deterrent from joining the navy was

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 37-38

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 35

the duration of service, which could last for years without end.<sup>72</sup> Although there was no shortage of would-be officers, there were numerous problems with recruitment for the lower ranks. One unfortunate seaman even described that the dread of a ship of war was second only to a French prison.<sup>73</sup> In some cases, convicts were often given the chance to serve in the navy or go to jail, and many preferred the latter as the lesser of two evils.<sup>74</sup> The navy sometimes eliminated this choice by sending the press gangs directly to the jails to obtain new 'recruits'.<sup>75</sup> As Brian Lavery writes,

The seamen had all the disadvantages of long-term service, but none of the advantages of belonging permanently to an organization. They often lost rank on transfer from one ship to another, and their back pay sometimes took years to catch up with them. Shore leave was solely at the discretion of the captain, and was not guaranteed to any seaman. Even while awaiting transfer from one ship to another, or while their ship was in dry-dock, the seamen were not allowed ashore, but accommodated in hulks.<sup>76</sup>

It is estimated that roughly three-quarters of the crews on board the Royal Navy's ships in 1812 had been obtained through impressment. It is thus hardly surprising that there was a high rate of desertion. Even Wellington, who was no soft hand when it came to discipline, once remarked to a Royal Navy captain, "Sir, I would not command an army

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<sup>72</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power In Its Relations to the War of 1812*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1905), 1:131. Admiral Cochrane even stated, "The duration of the term of service in his Majesty's Navy is absolutely without limitation."

<sup>73</sup> Brian Lavery, *Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organization 1793-1815* (London, 1989), 117

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 124-125

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 117

on the same terms you do your ship for the Crown of England. I have not seen a smile on the face of any individual since I have been on board her.”<sup>77</sup>

Manpower shortages would remain the Royal Navy’s greatest problem throughout the entire war. Even the offer of more generous enlistment bounties did not entice large numbers of would-be seamen. As barbaric as they were, the press gangs were seen as the only possible alternative to ensure that the navy had enough men for its ships. If the Age of Nelson can be considered the golden age of the Royal Navy, the press gangs certainly did their best to tarnish its romantic image.

The unfortunate sailors pressed into service would sometimes find themselves at the mercy of exceptionally cruel officers. Such was the case of Robert Jeffery, a sailor serving on the privateer schooner *Lord Nelson* during the summer of 1807. While the ship was in Falmouth, he was taken by a press gang from the brig HMS *Recruit* (18). The sloop sailed for North America and the West Indies later that year, where Jeffery was discovered to have taken two quarts of beer without permission. Captain Lake’s punishment for this offense was to maroon him on Sombrero Island (in the Leeward Islands), a small desolate island incapable of sustaining any life. The only source of food Jeffery found were limpets he picked off some rocks. He remained there for nine days until the American schooner *Adams* found him. He was brought to Marblehead, and eventually returned Halifax, where he recounted his tale to the senior officials. Captain Lake faced a court martial in 1808 for his actions, and was subsequently cashiered from the service. Jeffery was more fortunate, as Vice-Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, Berkeley’s replacement as

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<sup>77</sup> Wade Glendon Dudley, ‘Without Some Risk: A Reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815’ (Ph.D diss., University of Alabama, 1999), 75-76; C.S. Forester, *The Age of Fighting Sail: The Story of the Naval War of 1812* (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), 129-130

commander of the North American Squadron, ordered him to be returned to England. He was taken back by the schooner HMS *Thistle* (10), and discharged from the Royal Navy on September 21, 1810.<sup>78</sup>

Although Berkeley tried to find other means of filling the crews of his ships, he had no qualms in using press gangs to man his ships. Like Mitchell, he sometimes did not bother to legally obtain press warrants from the government.<sup>79</sup> After the riot in 1805, the men in Halifax learned to be wary of the approach of the press gangs, and were ready to fight back if necessary. In the end, Wentworth proved powerless to do anything about it, as the press gangs frequently went beyond Halifax harbor in search of hapless souls to fill their ships.<sup>80</sup>

Although the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair occupied most of the attention on the North American station, the squadron was still busy, and was employed on the unpopular task of searching for smugglers, particularly in the Bay of Fundy. Berkeley sent the *Porgey* to this region, where she seized the American schooners *Naseby* and *Harmony* on July 6 near Moose Island in Maine.<sup>81</sup> The *Porgey*'s commander informed Berkeley that one of the main problems they faced in chasing smugglers was the complicity of British and American customs officials in maintaining this illegal practice. He even accused New

<sup>78</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 24:303-309, 491-492

<sup>79</sup> Vice-Admiral John Borlase Warren to William Wellesley Pole, November 29, 1809, Adm.1/500, 8; T.B. Akins, *History of Halifax City* (Belleville, Ont., 1973), 137-138. Civilian authorities often did their best to prevent the press gangs from gathering unfortunate sailors. Admiral Warren wrote in 1809 that officials in Saint John, New Brunswick, impeded the press gangs whenever they had the chance.

<sup>80</sup> Thomas Raddall, *Halifax, Warden of the North* (Toronto, 1948), 143

<sup>81</sup> Berkeley to Marsden, August 14, 1807, Adm.1/497, 256-259



Brunswick customs officers of being in partnership with the smugglers. Berkeley's only solution in 1807 was to order more ships to patrol these waters.<sup>82</sup>

Berkeley was also quite concerned over American preparations for war. He received word early in September from the sloop HMS *Nimrod* (18) that nine American gunboats were reported to have departed from Portland to New York, to bolster the latter's defenses.<sup>83</sup> This convinced Berkeley, who noted that the Americans were serious about war. Admiral Cochrane, who came to Halifax to preside over the trial of the Chesapeake deserters, shared Berkeley's sentiment, and left for Barbados on September 15 in order to prepare his own station for war.<sup>84</sup> Everyone waited anxiously to see what the Americans would do next.

While the British proceeded with their military preparations, other events were transpiring across the Atlantic. Napoleon decided in October to reverse his position regarding American shipping with regards to the Berlin Decree. American ships were supposed to be excluded from its provisions, but on October 7, 1807, the French foreign minister announced that they were to be included. Britain responded by passing another Order-in-Council on November 11 that reasserted the blockade of all French-controlled ports and the countries that excluded British shipping. It did allow for neutral ships to

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Berkeley to Pole, September 3, 1807, Adm.1/497, 326; *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'William Wellesley-Pole'. William Wellesley-Pole, 3<sup>rd</sup> Earl of Mornington and 1<sup>st</sup> Baron Maryborough, was born on May 20, 1763, and entered the Irish parliament in 1783 as a member for Trim. He moved to the British parliament in 1790, representing East Looe from 1790 to 1801, and then for Queen's County from 1801 to 1821. The Tories resumed power in 1806, and the following year he was named first secretary of the Admiralty. Two years later, he was appointed as chief secretary for Ireland. He remained active in politics until 1823, and died on February 22, 1745.

<sup>84</sup> Berkeley to Pole, September 15, 1807, Adm.1/497, 349

carry their cargoes from enemy ports to any British port upon payment of duties.<sup>85</sup> Napoleon then responded to this with the Milan Decree of December 17, 1807. It further reinforced the previous provisions of the Berlin Decree, and stated that any neutral ship that entered a British port and paid duty would be considered as British property and subject to immediate seizure.<sup>86</sup> This would most certainly include American merchant ships.<sup>87</sup> Caught as they were between the decrees from both sides, it would be difficult not to feel some sympathy for the plight of American merchants

Ironically, the British Order-in-Council and the Milan Decree would have little impact on the United States. On December 22, 1807, President Jefferson finally unveiled his plan to get the attentions of the two warring groups. He stated that because of the unprovoked attacks on American vessels by British and French warships and privateers, he would issue a trade embargo against them. British and French ships would not be permitted to sail into American harbors, nor would any American ships be was allowed to trade with them.<sup>88</sup> Jefferson's move was not greeted with much enthusiasm, and in fact pleased very few people. When the Embargo Act was announced, it did cause some concern for the British, who were very much in need of American supplies and foodstuffs.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 38-39

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire*, 2 vols. (London, 1898) 2: 290-291

<sup>88</sup> Mahan, *French Revolution*, 2:282-283, and *War of 1812*, 1:182-183

<sup>89</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 42-43

With Britain and France enforcing their respective measures, the United States had very little room to maneuver. If the Americans agreed to the British terms, they would be surrendering their own sovereignty to another nation, and giving tacit consent to the depredations committed by the Royal Navy against their shipping. Furthermore, it would leave them open to attacks by French raiders. On the other hand, if they chose to follow the French decrees, they would give the British a completely legitimate excuse to plunder American merchant ships. In both cases, the American merchant fleet stood to lose considerably, and forced the Jefferson government to seek a third option.

The embargo was viewed by many New England merchants as a threat to their main source of income. It is estimated that it put 55,000 seamen out of work, and an additional 100,000 jobs were lost in related industries.<sup>90</sup> While American merchant ships were forbidden to set sail for a British port, it was not uncommon for their ships to occasionally sail into Halifax due to bad weather or to make emergency repairs. A system was soon set up in which instead of the ships sailing directly to the major ports, they would rendezvous at predetermined spots away from prying eyes, where goods would be readily exchanged. Moose Island, situated at the mouth of the Bay of Fundy, became the central point in the northern sector, while Amelia Island, situated on the Florida border, would become a major smuggling base in the south.<sup>91</sup> During the summer, the assemblies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick authorized the entry of neutral ships to their ports, an

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<sup>90</sup> Robert Gardiner, ed., *The Naval War of 1812* (London, 1998), 20

<sup>91</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 43

act aimed directly at New England merchants.<sup>92</sup> Ships from the Maritime provinces would deliver cargoes of fish, molasses, gypsum, coffee, tea and other staples from the West Indies and England to New England merchant ships, and in return would receive timber, cotton, flour and other foodstuffs. The success of the smuggling trade is evident by the fact that the number of registered coastal boats in New England rose by more than thirty per cent after the Embargo Act was passed.<sup>93</sup> Wentworth was able to declare to the Colonial Office:

The embargo imposed in the United States of America in December last, has not produced any evil or even inconvenience to this province. We have an abundance of provisions for our own consumption of all sorts. The naval and military establishments employed here are plentifully furnished with good beef, mutton, pork, veal, and poultry and a variety of vegetables, fish, butter and cheese. A large supply is now preparing to export to the Windward Islands for the use of the navy and army.<sup>94</sup>

Throughout the furious diplomatic activity, the North American Squadron continued in its duties. By the beginning of November, Berkeley finished his squadron's dispositions for winter months. The *Nimrod*, *Driver*, *Chichester* and *Mullet* would escort convoys to the West Indies and to England, while the *Cleopatra*, *Porgey*, sloop *Squirrel* (24), and cutter *Vesta* (4) were to remain in the Maritimes and patrol the Bay of Fundy.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Gerald S. Graham, *Sea Power and British North America 1783-1820: A Study in British Colonial Policy* (New York, 1968), 199

<sup>93</sup> John D. Forbes, 'Boston Smuggling 1807-1815', *American Neptune* 10 (June, 1950), 144-155; Robin Higham, 'The Port of Boston and the Embargo of 1807-1809' in *American Neptune* 16 (July, 1956), 197-210

<sup>94</sup> Wentworth to Colonial Office, March 28, 1808, G.F. Butler, 'Commercial Relations of Nova Scotia' (master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 1934), 13; Graham, *Sea Power*, 201 The volume of goods entering and leaving Nova Scotia rose dramatically in 1808, and the province posted an increase of £3000 in its trade revenues for the year.

<sup>95</sup> Berkeley to Pole, December 11, 1807, Adm.1/497, 486; Berkeley to Pole, December 19, 1807, Adm.1/497, 493

Berkeley also intended to maintain the blockade of the Chesapeake throughout the winter. The blockading squadron had undergone several changes during the last months of the year. The *Bellona* relieved the *Triumph* (under the command of Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy, Nelson's flag-captain at Trafalgar) on September 17, permitting the latter to return to Halifax for a refit.<sup>96</sup> The frigate *Aeolus* (32) was in turn sent from Halifax on October 3 to relieve the *Leopard*, and the arrival of the frigate *Horatio* (38) to the squadron enabled Berkeley to send her to replace the frigate *Milan* on December 4. The *Triumph* was ordered to return to the Chesapeake on December 12 to replace the *Bellona*, while the latter returned to Bermuda.<sup>97</sup>

The squadron went through what can only be described as a string of bad luck following the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair. On September 26, the sloop HMS *Indian* (18) was badly damaged in a storm while escorting two schooners from Newfoundland to

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<sup>96</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Thomas Masterman Hardy'. Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy was born in Dorsetshire on April 5, 1769. He entered the navy in 1781 on board the brig *Helena*, but left the following year to pursue his studies. He returned to the navy in 1790, and promoted to lieutenant three years later while serving in the Mediterranean. It is believed that he first encountered Nelson while stationed off Genoa on board the frigate *Meleager*. He left with Captain George Cockburn for the frigate *Minerve* in 1796, and remained on board after Nelson hoisted his broad pendant on the ship later that year. After the *Minerve* captured the Spanish ship *Sabina*, he was himself later captured when a Spanish squadron recaptured the ship. Despite losing the ship, Nelson had high praise for the way he handled the engagement, and was soon returned to the *Minerve* during a prisoner exchange. He was with Nelson at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent a few weeks later, and the following year led an attack in the Bay of Santa Cruz that resulted in the capture of the French brig *Mutine*. For his success, Lord St. Vincent promoted him to command the captured brig. Hardy later followed Nelson at the Battle of the Nile (1799), Copenhagen (1801), and Trafalgar (1805), where he served as captain on board Nelson's flagship *Victory*. The triumph led to his being made a baronet, and he was then transferred to the North American station the following year. Here he met Anne Louisa Emily Berkeley, daughter of Admiral Sir George Berkeley, commander of the North American Squadron. He would later marry her in Halifax in December, 1807. He left for Lisbon in 1809 to serve as commander of this station, and stayed there for the next three years. He returned to North America in 1812 to command the ships operating off Long Island, and would remain there until the end of the war in 1815. He later served as commander-in-chief of the South American station from 1819 to 1823, and promoted to rear-admiral in 1825. He was appointed as first sea lord in 1830, and promoted to vice-admiral in 1837. He died on September 20, 1839.

<sup>97</sup> Berkeley to Pole, January 2, 1808, Adm.1/498, 5-6

Barbados, and required major repairs.<sup>98</sup> Yet this was a minor annoyance compared to what followed in the Chesapeake. The blockade of the French warships would prove to be an immense source of frustration for the British. On September 21, the French had fitted out a small privateer (using some of the *Patriote*'s crew to man it) that was able to break through the blockade and escape undetected by the British. A small American force tried to pursue it, but the French ship was able to elude them.<sup>99</sup>

Far more embarrassing for the blockading squadron was the escape of *La Cybèle* on October 25. The French frigate was able to use a thick fog to mask its escape from the Chesapeake, much to Captain Douglas' chagrin.<sup>100</sup> This left the *Patriote* as the last active French warship in the region, and Douglas was determined that this prize would not escape (the *Éole* was put up for sale and eventually broken up in American shipyards).<sup>101</sup> Unfortunately, circumstances would dictate otherwise.

Berkeley got his own dose of bad news at the end of the year. He received word from the Admiralty on November 27 that he was to be replaced as commander of the North American Squadron.<sup>102</sup> They felt a change of leadership was necessary, and ordered Berkeley to return home.<sup>103</sup> His earlier comments about launching a first strike against the

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<sup>98</sup> Berkeley to Pole, October 23, 1807, Adm.1/497, 428

<sup>99</sup> Berkeley to Pole, September 21, 1807, Adm.1/497, 364

<sup>100</sup> Berkeley to Pole, January 2, 1808, Adm.1/498, 5-6

<sup>101</sup> Phineas Bond to Warren, June 6, 1808, Adm.1/498, 273

<sup>102</sup> Berkeley to Pole, January 20, 1808, Adm.1/498, 49-50

<sup>103</sup> W.B. MacNutt, *New Brunswick: A History 1784-1867* (Toronto, 1963), 113-134; Beamish Murdoch, *A History of Nova Scotia or Acadie*, 3 vols. (Halifax, N.S., 1867), 278. The British government also sent Major-General Hunter to serve as President of the New Brunswick Council and Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost as lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia.

United States showed him to be the wrong man to hold such a sensitive position. He remained on the station until the arrival of his replacement, Vice-Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren.<sup>104</sup>

Early in December, Douglas' squadron faced a major problem. It was discovered that the supply of water for his three ships (*Bellona*, *Milan* and *Aeolus*) was nearly depleted. He could not remain on station without fresh water, and knew that he would get no supplies from the Americans. Douglas understood the risk of leaving the region unattended, but ultimately decided that it was necessary to go to Bermuda before his ships ran out of water. On December 9, he took his squadron and departed for the island.<sup>105</sup> With no British ships guarding the Chesapeake, the *Patriote* was able to leave completely unmolested after being confined in American waters for more than a year.

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<sup>104</sup> Captain Walter Vernon Anson, *The Life of Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren* (London, 1914); *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, s.v. 'John Borlase Warren'; Ralfe, *Naval Biography of Great Britain*, 2:302-310. Sir John Borlase Warren was born on September 2, 1753 in Stapleford, Nottinghamshire. He entered the navy as an able seaman in 1771 on board the *Marlborough*, but his service was interrupted while he attended Emmanuel College. He was elected to parliament for Marlow in 1774, and received his M.A. from Cambridge in 1776. He also assumed the baronetcy in 1775 that had been extinct since the death of his grandfather. The threat of war with France compelled him to return to the navy in 1777. Though he started his naval career comparatively late, he more than made up for lost time. He served on the North American station for two years, and was promoted to lieutenant in July, 1778, and then made commander of the sloop *Helena* in 1779, and finally promoted to captain in April, 1781. Following the end of the war in 1783, he would remain unemployed from the navy until 1793, when he was given command of the frigate *Flora*. He was particularly active on the Brest station, where his squadron captured or destroyed 220 enemy vessels over the next four years. His victory in 1798 over the French squadron off Ireland led to the collapse of the French invasion of that island, and was rewarded with a promotion to rear-admiral. He was later sent to the Mediterranean and then to St. Petersburg in 1802, where he served as British ambassador for the next four years. Despite his absence from active naval duty, he was promoted to vice-admiral in 1805, and replaced Admiral Berkeley as commander of the North American squadron in 1808. He was promoted to full admiral in 1810, and returned to England in 1811. He returned to command the combined North American and West Indies Squadron in 1812, but his constant demand for more ships on his station, as well as the navy's inability to achieve a decisive victory over the Americans led to his recall in 1814. After his final return to England, he saw no further service in the navy. He died on February 27, 1822.

<sup>105</sup> Captain Douglas to Berkeley, December 27, 1807, Adm.1/498, 7

Berkeley was quite surprised to find Douglas' ships when he arrived in Bermuda on January 2, 1808.<sup>106</sup> The *Horatio* arrived in the Chesapeake to relieve the *Milan* on December 17, but when Captain Scott discovered the absence of Douglas' ships and the escape of the *Patriote*, he also decided to sail for Bermuda.<sup>107</sup> The *Triumph* and *Statira* arrived a few weeks later, but their commanders chose to remain in the Chesapeake until they received further orders.<sup>108</sup> Thus, after more than a year of blockading the Chesapeake, Berkeley's squadron allowed one French ship-of-the-line and one frigate to slip through their fingers. The only solace that could be found was that at least the *Éole* would never sail again. However, considering the political damage the three warships inflicted on Anglo-American relations, only their complete destruction would have satisfied the British. It can be said that the *Patriote*, *Éole* and *La Cybèle* rendered an invaluable service for France without having fired a single shot. The escape of the French ships was a very bitter pill for the British to swallow, and a most unfortunate note for Berkeley to end his tenure as commander-in-chief of the North American squadron.<sup>109</sup>

When Warren assumed command of the North American squadron early in 1808, he took over a force of twenty-five warships, most of which were scattered throughout the Atlantic. He arrived with his flagship HMS *Swiftsure* (74) at Bermuda in February, where he found the *Milan*, *Aeolus*, *Bermuda*, *Driver*, the schooners *Cuttle* (4) and *Chub* (4), and

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<sup>106</sup> Berkeley to Pole, January 2, 1808, Adm.1/498, 5-6

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Berkeley to Pole, January 16, 1808, Adm.1/498, 9

<sup>109</sup> Brian C. Cuthbertson, *The Loyalist Governor: Biography of Sir John Wentworth* (Halifax, N.S., 1983), 136. The Nova Scotia Assembly met in December to offer Berkeley a gift of £100 for his services on the station, which Wentworth tried to prevent.



receiving-ship *Tourterelle*.<sup>110</sup> He also expected the return of the schooner *Bream* (4) from Barbados, where she was completing repairs.<sup>111</sup> The *Melampus*, *Horatio*, *Indian* and *Columbine* were on convoy duty and ordered to cruise for several weeks in search of enemy ships, while the sloop *Observateur* (18) was ordered to the Portuguese island of Madeira by Berkeley to see if it was in British possession.<sup>112</sup> Warren also had the *Bellona*, *Squirrel*, sloop *Emulous* (18) and brig *Plumper* (10) completing their refits in Halifax, while the *Cleopatra*, *Vesta* and *Porgey* continued to patrol the Bay of Fundy.<sup>113</sup> He could also expect to add two new sloops to his command within the year, the *Atalante* (18) and *Martin* (18), both of which were being built in Bermuda.<sup>114</sup> As for Berkeley, he sailed back to England with the *Leopard*, along with the *Triumph* and schooner *Tang* (4).<sup>115</sup>

The squadron was further reinforced during the spring of 1808. The frigate *Penelope* (36) and sloop *Banterer* (22) were given orders in March to remain under Warren's command after they escorted their convoy to Bermuda.<sup>116</sup> The sloop *Carnation* (18) was also sent ordered to join the squadron in Halifax.<sup>117</sup> In May, Warren received the

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<sup>110</sup> Berkeley to Warren, February 27, 1808, Adm.1/498, 121-122

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. Berkeley believed that the embargo could jeopardize their ability to keep Bermuda supplied, and wanted to see if Madeira could be used to supply the island.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.; Warren to Pole, October 28, 1808, Adm.1/498, 378-380. Like his predecessors, Warren was also forced to send out the press gangs to fill his ships' complements. Between June and October, 1808, he issued sixty-six press warrants for thirty-two different warships under his command.

<sup>116</sup> Warren to Pole, March 28, 1808, Adm.1/498, 163

<sup>117</sup> Warren to Pole, March 28, 1808, Adm.1/498, 172

frigate *Latona* (38) and sloop *Ferret* (18), as well as the completed *Atalante*.<sup>118</sup> These reinforcements were much welcomed by Warren, who remained very concerned about the situation in the Bay of Fundy. Captain Douglas reported on May 24 of the arrival of the sloop USS *Wasp* (18) and two armed cutters in Passamaquoddy Bay, and that the Americans were also going to send up the sloop USS *Hornet* (18) and three additional gunboats to the region.<sup>119</sup> Even with the embargo, it was clear that the threat of war still lingered in the air.

The squadron enjoyed mixed blessings throughout 1808. On the night of April 5, after escorting Admiral Berkeley to Fayal, the *Observateur* came under attack from an unknown vessel. The ship was later identified as the British privateer *Juliana*, a powerful privateer armed with eighteen guns. The privateer mistook the *Observateur* for a French privateer, and opened fire on her. The fight was quickly ended once they discovered they were firing on a British warship, but the encounter cost the sloop one killed and one wounded, while the privateer suffered two wounded. The *Observateur* was able to repair its damage and proceed to Madeira.<sup>120</sup>

The squadron during this time was also at this time engaged against Spanish ships. While lying off Puerto Rico on April 25, the *Melampus* and *Carnation* sent out a small raiding force to capture an armed Spanish schooner at anchor. They succeeded in capturing the ship, but as they attempted to take the prize away, the ship grounded. They came under heavy fire from the shore and from other nearby ships, and were forced to

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<sup>118</sup> Warren to Pole, May 27, 1808, Adm.1/498, 233. The *Latona* remained on the North American station for only a short period, and sailed for the Leeward Islands Squadron later that year.

<sup>119</sup> Douglas to Pole, May 24, 1808, Adm.1/498, 231

leave the grounded ship. The raiding party thus had nothing to show for their efforts, all at a cost seven killed and five wounded.<sup>121</sup> However, the *Melampus* and *Carnation* had better success later on and captured three other Spanish ships.<sup>122</sup>

As a final postscript to the Chesapeake saga, the British consul in Philadelphia was able to report that the French privateer *La Supérieure* had left the city on May 26, with a large portion of the *Éole*'s former crew, and was headed for San Domingo. As there were no British warships in the region to block her, she was able to leave the port unmolested.<sup>123</sup> A week later, the *Bermuda* was wrecked on her namesake island on June 2 and became a total loss. The one bright note was that the *Indian* and *Columbine* were nearby, and were able to rescue the entire crew without any casualties.<sup>124</sup>

The squadron's fortunes improved somewhat following the loss of the *Bermuda*. On June 8, the frigate *Penelope* captured the French letter-of-marque schooner *Le Voltigeur* (2), laden with cocoa and indigo.<sup>125</sup> The following week she assisted the *Ferret* in capturing the Spanish felucca *N.S. Del Carmen*, (also known as the *El Manoso*).<sup>126</sup> The frigate HMS *Guerrière* (38), a recent arrival on the North American

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<sup>120</sup> Captain Hickey to Warren, April 6 1808, Adm.1/498, 248-249

<sup>121</sup> Captain Edward Hawker to Warren, July 1, 1808, Adm.1/498, 285

<sup>122</sup> Warren to Pole, July 20, 1808, Adm.1/498, p.293-295. The two ships captured the felucca *Astrim*, schooner *Todulapio*, and sloop *San Josef*.

<sup>123</sup> Bond to Warren, June 6, 1808, Adm.1/498, 273

<sup>124</sup> Warren to Pole, June 17, 1808, Adm.1/498, 270

<sup>125</sup> Captain John Dick to Warren, June 8, 1808, Adm.1/498, 276

<sup>126</sup> Dick to Warren, June 17, 1808, Adm.1/498, 281

station, captured the privateer cutter *Peraty* (12) on July 17.<sup>127</sup> This was a particularly satisfying prize for the British, as the *Peraty* was the former HMS *Barbara* (10), captured by the privateer *General Ernouf* (14) in the West Indies the previous year.<sup>128</sup> Finally, the *Indian* (18) captured the French privateer schooner *Jeune Estelle* (4) in August as it left St. Mary's River for Martinique.<sup>129</sup>

Tensions between the United States and Britain continued to mount during the summer of 1808. On July 10, a British schooner was forced to anchor on the American side of Passamaquoddy Bay, and was detained by the sloop USS *Wasp* as a suspected smuggling ship.<sup>130</sup> When he heard this, Warren ordered the *Plumper* to escort all other British merchant ships in the region, to deter the Americans from attempting to seize any other British ships.<sup>131</sup> The merchant ship was eventually released, but this latest incident compelled Warren to ask the Admiralty for additional reinforcements, especially in small cruisers. He wanted an additional four to six brigs, half of which would be used to patrol the Bay of Fundy and watch over American warship, while the other half would be stationed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and be used to escort convoys to New Brunswick.<sup>132</sup>

British warships continued to intercept neutral ships during the first six months of Warren's tenure as commander of the North American Squadron. In March, the *Horatio*

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<sup>127</sup> Pole to Warren, September 14, 1808, Adm.2/932, 30; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:551. The *Peraty* was purchased into the Royal Navy shortly after being recaptured, and once again reverted to HMS *Barbara*.

<sup>128</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:402-403

<sup>129</sup> C.B. Norman, *The Corsairs of France* (London, 1887), 446

<sup>130</sup> Warren to Pole, July 23, 1808, Adm.1/498, 296-297

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

detained the Swedish ship *Sophia Magdalena* and American ship *Bordeaux*, though both were later released.<sup>133</sup> The schooner *Mullet* also had a very busy time with American merchant ships during this period, and captured four vessels in as many months.<sup>134</sup> The *Banterer* was even more effective, capturing five American ships during the year and assisted the *Mullet* in taking another ship before her career was ended in October.<sup>135</sup> The Royal Navy was certainly doing its part in keeping American ships off the seas than the embargo.

In August, the North American station received word that hostilities between Spain and England had ceased, and that they were now allied in the struggle against France. Napoleon's attempt to install his brother Joseph as King of Spain earlier that year led to the beginning of the Spanish revolt that summer. French armies crossed into Spain, and King Ferdinand was forced to flee into exile.<sup>136</sup> For the British, the timing of this revolt was excellent. It enabled them to send their armies to fight the French on the continent, but of equal importance was the fact that a large hole had been opened in the Continental System. The treaty with Spain gave the British merchants access to the entire Spanish Empire, which would more than make up for any losses suffered by the American

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<sup>133</sup> Warren to Pole, July 20, 1808, Adm.1/498, 293-295. The *Horatio* also recaptured the English brig *Catherine* during this period. The *Swiftsure* would also recapture the English schooner *Friends* during the spring of 1808.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. The ships captured were the brig *Columbia*, schooner *Eliza*, ships *Thames* and *Charlotte*.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. The ships captured were the *Elena*, *Izette*, *Laurel*, *Lenora*, and *Mary*. The *Banterer* assisted the *Mullet* in capturing the *Charlotte*.

<sup>136</sup> Will and Ariel Durant, *The Age of Napoleon: A History of European Civilization from 1789 to 1815* (New York, 1975), 535-537

embargo.<sup>137</sup> British goods could now find their way freely into Spain and Portugal, as well as their colonies in South America and the West Indies.<sup>138</sup> This scenario was something the American government did not anticipate. American merchants were forced to watch from the sidelines, and clamored for their government to allow their ships back onto the sea-lanes.<sup>139</sup> As shall be shown later, the war in Spain would also have a direct effect on the activities on the North American station.

Fresh from the incident between the *Observateur* and the *Juliana*, another of the squadron's ships was involved in an altercation with British privateers. While sailing near Bermuda on August 20, the *Bellona* was approached by two vessels that opened fire on her. The two ships were the letters-of-marque *Charles* and *Richard and Mary*. Fortunately, the two raiders quickly realized their mistake and no casualties were suffered.<sup>140</sup> Needless to say, these incidents did little to endear British privateers in the eyes of the Royal Navy. It was bad enough to be competing against them for prize money, but to be attacked by them was definitely adding insult to injury.

At the end of September, Warren arranged the disposition of his ships for the coming winter season. He received the frigate HMS *Hussar* (38) in August, but she was only intended to replace the *Guerrière*, which had been ordered to go to the Jamaica

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<sup>137</sup> Warren to Pole, September 16, 1808, Adm.1/498, 336; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:191-193; Marcus, *Age of Nelson*, 321. The cessation of hostilities between Spain and Britain was a most happy occurrence for the eighty-one Spanish prisoners in Halifax, who were escorted by the *Cuttle* to Havana on September 16.

<sup>138</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 44

<sup>139</sup> Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America* (Toronto, 1950), 241-242

<sup>140</sup> Douglas to Warren, August 28, 1808, Adm.1/498, 337-338

Squadron.<sup>141</sup> With the *Bellona* on her way back to England, Warren asked to keep the *Guerrière* under his command.<sup>142</sup> The Admiralty refused, but did compensate by sending the 50-gun ship *Centurion* and sloop *Eurydicea* (24) to Halifax in September.<sup>143</sup> However, the *Centurion* was used only as a convalescence ship, with a crew of only thirty-six men on board.<sup>144</sup> As for his request for small escort ships, Warren was pleased to see the construction order for six three-masted schooners to be built in Bermuda.<sup>145</sup> These would greatly ease the squadron's need for small dispatch vessels and convoy escorts. As it turned out, Bermuda proved even more useful than simply being a winter base for the squadron. The construction of small schooners and sloops from this island helped immeasurably in enabling the squadron to escort convoys and deliver dispatches, as well as hunting down enemy ships and smugglers hiding out in shallow rivers and inlets too shallow for the larger ships to sail in. The lack of small warships had been one of the main deficiencies of the Royal Navy in this sector prior to and during the American Revolution, and the Bermuda shipbuilders did their best to provide the navy with these small yet invaluable vessels.

Warren's need for additional ships was also due in part for the upcoming assault on the French Island of Martinique. The British were preparing to seize the remaining French islands in the West Indies, and Warren was to escort Prevost's division to Barbados at the

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<sup>141</sup> Warren to Pole, October 5, 1808, Adm.1/498, 352

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Warren to Pole, September 29, 1808, Adm.1/498, 350; John Barrow to Warren, November 17, 1808, Adm.2/932, 34. The *Hussar* was also ordered to proceed to Jamaica later that year.

<sup>144</sup> Barrow to Warren, November 30, 1808, Adm.2/932, 35

<sup>145</sup> Warren to Pole, October 6, 1808, Adm.1/498, 354

end of the year, along with several of ships that would stay behind to participate in the expedition against the island.<sup>146</sup> The governor's reorganization of the province's defenses and militia was progressing quite well, and by the end of the year he would have twenty-six battalions of fully trained militia to defend the province.<sup>147</sup> He felt confident enough to send to Barbados the bulk of the 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 23<sup>rd</sup> Regiments that arrived with him, which along with auxiliaries totaled to more than three thousand men.<sup>148</sup> Taking the bulk of his regular troops might have seemed like a gamble, but Prevost had taken precautions. He had earlier sent John Howe to the United States to ascertain whether or not the Americans would begin hostilities. Howe had traveled to New York, Washington and Norfolk during the year, gathering intelligence on American military preparations, and satisfied the governor that they were not ready to begin a war with the British. With this information, Prevost and Warren could make their plans for the Martinique expedition.<sup>149</sup>

Though the threat of hostilities had diminished somewhat, the Americans began to harass British shipping in retaliation for the Royal Navy's continued policy of searching their vessels. On October 11, the packet HMS *Lord Hobart* was detained by the USS

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<sup>146</sup> *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, s.v. 'George Prevost'; T. Cadell, *The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost* (London, 1823); James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 5:266-267. Sir George Prevost was born on May 19, 1767, and was commissioned an ensign in 1779 in the army. Promoted to captain in 1783, he later showed much skill during the early phase of the war with France. He was promoted to brigadier at 31, and showed great ability as an administrator while serving as governor of St. Lucia. After the resumption of the war in 1803, he returned to the West Indies, where he took part in the capture of Dominica and Martinique. He was promoted to major-general in 1805 and lieutenant-general in 1808, the same year he was appointed as lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia. He later served as governor-general of British North America in 1811, but his performance during the War of 1812 left a blemish on his military career. He died on January 5, 1816.

<sup>147</sup> Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, 3:284-286

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 3:278

<sup>149</sup> Akins, *History of Halifax City*, 143; Raddall, *Warden of the North*, 148



*Chesapeake* as it was leaving New York over a trivial matter that did little to ease tensions on both sides.<sup>150</sup> On October 22, the merchant ship *Eliza* was stopped by an American gunboat at Passamaquoddy after coming close to being wrecked on nearby rocks. Since the ship was forced to anchor within American waters, she was approached and boarded by the gunboat as a suspected smuggling ship.<sup>151</sup> Neither ship was held for very long, but these incidents did little to decrease the acrimony on both sides.

Despite these events, the North American Squadron was still involved in a real war on the high seas. On October 3, the sloop *Carnation* encountered the French sloop *La Palinure* (16) off Martinique. The Royal Navy won most of its single-ship engagements against the French Navy during this era, but this was one of the rare exceptions. In the report filed after the battle, it was revealed that following the death of Captain Gregory and the wounding of the First and Second Lieutenants, the *Palinure*'s crew was able to board the British sloop. Some of the *Carnation*'s crew tried to fight back, but the French were able to capture her. The *Carnation* suffered eight killed and thirty wounded (fifteen of which would die from their wounds).<sup>152</sup> A court-martial acquitted Lieutenant Dickers for the loss of the ship, but thirty-eight of the sloop's crewmen would be exiled to New South Wales.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Captain Alex Hamilton to Warren, October 24, 1808, Adm.1/498, 376-377

<sup>151</sup> Captain R. Ramsay to Warren, October 26, 1808, Adm.1/498, 394-395

<sup>152</sup> Barrow to Warren, March 25, 1809, Adm.2/932, 49; Captain Edward Pelham Brenton, *The Naval History of Great Britain from 1783 to 1836*, 2 vols. (London, 1837), 2:254; James, 5:42. Brenton assigns most of the blame for the loss of the ship to the ship's master and sergeant of marines.

<sup>153</sup> Warren to Pole, April 8, 1809, Adm.1/499, 90; W.P. Gossett, *The Lost Ships of the Royal Navy* (London/New York, 1986), 66-67

Three days after the loss of the *Carnation*, the sloop *Ferret* came upon the privateer schooner *La Bécune* (3), and after a four-hour chase was able to capture her with little difficulty.<sup>154</sup> This was followed by another unfortunate loss for the squadron at the end of the month. On October 29, while escorting the last convoy of the year from Quebec to England, the sloop *Banterer* was wrecked between Port Neuf and Pointe Mille in the St. Lawrence and became a total loss.<sup>155</sup> A court-martial was held against Captain Sheppard and the crew on January 30, 1809, which acquitted everyone except for Lieutenant McCurdy, who was found guilty of neglect and dismissed from the navy.<sup>156</sup>

On November 9, the sloop *Emulous* found itself in combat against a 30-gun French corvette. Despite severe damage to its sails and rigging, the *Emulous* was able to beat back the larger vessel and inflict heavy damage on her. Though she had acquitted herself quite well in the battle, the action cost the British sloop ten killed and twelve wounded.<sup>157</sup>

By the beginning of December, the squadron was ready to escort Prevost and his army to Barbados. Warren took his flagship *Swiftsure* in advance to Bermuda on December 1, while the *Penelope*, *Aeolus*, *Eurydice*, *Columbine*, and *Cuttle* escorted the transports carrying the three regiments to Barbados.<sup>158</sup> He left the *Milan*, *Centurion*, and *Observateur* under Captain Laurie in Halifax for the winter, while the *Plumper* would

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<sup>154</sup> Captain R. Wales to Warren, October 27, 1808, Adm.1/499, 20; Barrow to Warren, March 13, 1809, Adm.2/932, 46. *La Bécune* made only one capture during her ten-day cruise.

<sup>155</sup> Warren to Pole, January 4, 1809, Adm.1/499, 13; Barrow to Warren, March 25, 1809, Adm.2/932, 49

<sup>156</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 22:53-54

<sup>157</sup> Captain G. Sturpart to Warren, November 9, 1808, Adm.1/498, 419-420

<sup>158</sup> Warren to Pole, November 29, 1808, Adm.1/498, 412

remain in New Brunswick.<sup>159</sup> The remaining ships in the squadron were either on convoy duty or heading straight for Bermuda for the winter.

The invasion of Martinique began on January 30, 1809, and the end of February the French garrison surrendered.<sup>160</sup> Warren's ships scored more than a few successes against the French during the operation. On January 31, the *Cleopatra*, *Aeolus* and *Recruit* were sent to the upper part of Fort Royal Bay to cut off the French retreat. On sighting their approach, the French set fire to the frigate *Amphitrite* (44) along with several other merchant ships in the harbor.<sup>161</sup>

On January 16, after sailing down to participate in the Martinique campaign, the *Melampus* came upon the French brig *Le Colibri* (16) while she was cruising north of Barbuda. The brig had sailed from Cherbourg, and during her passage captured the British merchant brigs *Hannibal* and *Priscilla*.<sup>162</sup> After a short exchange of fire, the *Colibri* surrendered, having suffered three killed and twelve wounded.<sup>163</sup> The captured brig was purchased into the Royal Navy, and would have a very successful career on the North American station.

The *Cleopatra* took part in another notable action on January 22. She was accompanying the frigate *Jason* (38) and sloop *Hazard* (18) (both belonging to the Leeward Islands Squadron) when they encountered the 40-gun French frigate *Topaze*. The

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> For a full account of the fall of Martinique, see Colonel H. De Poyen, *La Guerre des Antilles 1793-1815* (Paris, 1896), 338-377; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 5:206-209; *Naval Chronicle* 21:317-333

<sup>161</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 21:317-318

<sup>162</sup> Hawker to Warren, January 29, 1809, Adm.1/499, 25

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.; Brenton, *Nava History*, 2:254

French ship had only recently sailed from Brest and was sailing for Cayenne.<sup>164</sup> Captain Samuel Pechell, the *Cleopatra*'s commander, pursued her for several hours, and was well ahead of the other two British ships. She was able to engage the *Topaze* around 4:30 p.m. at a range of two hundred yards. For forty minutes Pechell's ship single-handedly pummeled the larger French warship while receiving very little damage in return. When the other two ships arrived on the scene at 5:10 p.m., the French ship quickly hauled down its colors. Neither the *Hazard* nor the *Jason* suffered any casualties, while the *Cleopatra* lost only one seaman killed and one wounded, with only moderate damage to its rigging. The *Topaze* herself lost twelve killed and fourteen wounded out of a crew of 430 officers and men.<sup>165</sup> The ship was repaired and added to the Royal Navy HMS *Alcmene* (there was another HMS *Topaze* in service in the Royal Navy).<sup>166</sup>

Other ships in the squadron also enjoyed successes during the winter season. The sloop *Halifax* began the New Year by capturing the French privateer sloop *Port Louis* (4) on January 3. The British sloop later captured the French privateer schooner *La Caroline* (8) on March 15 as she was sailing from Guadeloupe. While accompanying the *Ferret*, the *Hussar* also captured the French merchant schooner *Jeune Rose* on March 15, and captured the schooner *La Rivale* nine days later.<sup>167</sup> The *Hussar* capped off her success capturing the French letter-of-marque schooner *Le Douguay-Trouin* (4) on March 27.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 21, 318-320; James, *Naval History of Great Brenton*, 5:148-149

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>166</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Brenton*, 5:149

<sup>167</sup> Warren to Pole, March 29, 1809, Adm.1/499, 80-81

<sup>168</sup> Captain Robert Lloyd to Warren, March 27, 1809, Adm.1/499, 93

The schooner *Thistle* added to the squadron's tally by also capturing the French sloop *La Fortune* (14) on the same day.<sup>169</sup>

One battle took place in February that would have considerable repercussions for the North American and Leeward Islands Squadrons. The issue of prize ownership and jurisdiction would become the subject of a heated debate following a battle on February 10, 1809, between the *Horatio* and the 40-gun French frigate *Junon*. The *Junon* had been chased for two days by the frigate *Latona* and two small sloops, the *Asp* (16) and the *Superieuse* (14). At 12:50 p.m., the *Horatio* came into view of the large French ship and began to engage her. The *Junon* was clearly getting the better of the engagement, and dealt a fearful punishment to the *Horatio*. The British frigate had sailed in company with the sloop *Driver*, but the latter had fallen far behind. Things were still going the *Junon*'s way until the original pursuit force of *Latona* and *Superieuse* caught up to the action. By 3:40 p.m., the French frigate was forced to haul down her colors. There was much damage on both sides, as the casualties reflect: the *Horatio* lost seven killed and 26 wounded (including Captain George Scott), and the other vessels combined lost another six wounded. On board the French ship, the carnage was far worse: out of a crew of 323 officers and men, the *Junon* lost 130 killed and wounded, a testament to the courage of her crew.<sup>170</sup> With the surrender of the French garrison at the end of February, the ships under Warren's command returned to Bermuda, along with their prizes.

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Scott to Warren, Feb. 19, 1809, Adm. 1/499, 36-37; Brenton, *Naval History*, 2:266-267; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 5:150-153

In the wake of the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair, the strained relations between England and the United States deteriorated to what could be called a Cold War. The Americans had very real grievances against the British, but had few means to put pressure on them. The British, on the other hand, were so focused on the war in Europe that they could be accused of myopia in their attitudes towards outside nations. The coercive measures that the Royal Navy enforced were aimed at hurting France; if another nation got hurt, so be it. The British government gambled that the United States would not go to war, and in this they were correct. However, this was due primarily to the weakened state of the American military and naval forces, as the anger they felt towards the British, especially after the failure of the embargo, only grew. The only measure the British government took to appease the Americans was to remove Berkeley and Price from the North American station. By the time they woke up to the seriousness of the American threat, it would be too late.

As for the North American Squadron, it continued to perform its duties of searching for enemy vessels, protecting trade, watching out for smugglers, and even sent some of its ships to take part in the liquidation of the last French naval bases in the Western Hemisphere. But Berkeley's tenure as commander of the squadron was marked by some noticeable failures. Not only had his squadron allowed two of the three French warships in the Chesapeake to escape, but the continued presence British warships off the American coast led to the encounter between the *Chesapeake* and the *Leopard*. Berkeley was even ready to embroil England in a war with the United States at a time when her fortunes against France were at their lowest. Under the command of John Borlase Warren, the situation calmed down somewhat, though relations between England and the United

States were far from normal. But despite their cavalier attitude towards the Americans, the start of the Peninsular War in Spain would make the British more dependent than ever on American goods. In fact, as shall be shown later, it would become apparent that, in the eyes of the British government, the single most important duty of the North American Squadron was to ensure the flow of American supplies to the British did not stop.

### CHAPTER 3: FROM THE NON-INTERCOURSE ACT TO THE EVE OF WAR 1809-1812

Shortly before Jefferson ended his second term as President, Congress repealed the Embargo Act and replaced it with a new law, the Non-Intercourse Act, allowing American merchants to trade with any nation except for Britain, France and their respective colonies. Like the previous embargo, any vessel caught trading with either of the two warring nations would be subject to immediate seizure.<sup>1</sup> The main difference between the two laws was that the Non-Intercourse Act allowed American shipping back onto the seas. American merchants would once again be able to compete with British shipping, which had benefited from having a virtual monopoly over the Spanish market.<sup>2</sup> This act would be a farewell gift from Jefferson to James Madison, who was sworn in as the fourth President of the United States in March, 1809. He would inherit the same problems of his predecessor, as the outstanding issues between Britain and the United States were still far from resolved. The saber rattling would continue in earnest during Mr. Madison's tenure, leaving residents on the North American station still very nervous over the prospects of war.

If the British expected the Madison administration to be less antagonistic towards them, they were quickly disappointed. Madison was even more anti-British than his predecessor. He had been one of the main proponents of the embargo, and its failure only increased his anger towards Britain.<sup>3</sup> British warships continued to hover around the

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<sup>1</sup> Reginald Horsman, *Causes of the War of 1812* (New York, 1962), 142-143; Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States 1805-1812* (Berkeley, Cal., 1963), 231-232

<sup>2</sup> Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 168-169

<sup>3</sup> J.C.A. Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy and Warfare in the Early American Republic 1783-1830* (Princeton, N.J., 1983), 20-25



American coastline, stopping any vessel they saw fit and continued the practice of impressing seamen from American ships to fill their own depleted crews. Madison placed a great deal of hope that the Non-Intercourse Act would succeed where the Embargo Act failed. The basic strategy remained the same, to bring sufficient pressure to bare against Britain and France that would get them to allow American ships to traverse the seas without fear of attack from either nation's ships. Allowing American shipping to once again roam the oceans proved a far more sensible policy than Jefferson's bill. However, Madison ignored the same fatal flaw of the previous law. Its main problem was that there was little the American government could do to stop the vast smuggling trade that had sprung up in response to it. American merchants both in northern and southern states would continue their illicit dealings with British merchants, simply because Britain was America's most important commercial client. As long as both sides needed goods from one another, the smuggling bases at Moose Island and Amelia Island would continue strong.<sup>4</sup>

The Non-Intercourse Act also stated that if either Britain or France repealed their respective legislation regarding American trade, the American government would in turn resume normal trade relations with that country. This led to an embarrassing faux pas for the British by their Ambassador in Washington, David Erskine. After a series of meetings with American officials, he informed the President that the British government would be willing to repeal the Orders-in-Council as far as they affected American trade.<sup>5</sup> Madison was understandably jubilant, and it was announced on April 19 that the United States

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<sup>4</sup> Eli F. Hecksher, *The Continental System* (Oxford, 1922), 137-138

<sup>5</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 23:63; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 209-212

would resume normal trade relations.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, the celebration proved short-lived. Canning was greatly angered that Erskine had ignored his earlier instructions, and the British government chose to not ratify his agreement with the American Secretary of State Robert Smith.<sup>7</sup> The ambassador had apparently exceeded his powers when he informed Madison of the withdrawal of the Orders-in-Council, and was promptly recalled back to England. He was replaced by William Jackson, who informed President Madison that the British government would not drop a single clause from the Orders-in-Council.<sup>8</sup> The jubilation that Madison felt was replaced by a deep anger from having his victory taken away in such a manner. The American government tried to use the Erskine blunder as a means of getting the British back to the negotiating table, but found them as intractable as ever. Reluctantly, Madison was forced to announce a renewal of the Non-Intercourse Act as of August 9, 1809.<sup>9</sup>

This was the state of affairs on the North American station during the early months of 1809. While Prevost was in Martinique, Warren took the opportunity to oversee the growth of the naval base in Bermuda. Not since Admiral Murray had any officer on the station taken such an avid interest in this little island bastion. Work progressed steadily on the dockyards on Ireland Island, which would be completed later that year. Warren also

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<sup>6</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 23:63

<sup>7</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 21:429; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 212-213

<sup>8</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 23:64; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 220-221

<sup>9</sup> Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 219

ordered the renovation of a new home on Mount Wyndham that he intended to use as a permanent residence for all future squadron commanders.<sup>10</sup>

The early months of 1809 had proven quite bountiful for the ships in the North American squadron. The end of the Martinique campaign brought the North American Squadron one frigate (*Junon*), one corvette (*Colibri*), four privateers (*La Caroline*, *La Fortune*, *Port Louis* and *Douguay-Trouin*) and four merchant ships (*Junon*, *Jenny*, *La Jeune Rose* and *La Rivale*).<sup>11</sup> These were all brought into Bermuda and condemned by the prize court. This brought in a great deal of money for the capturing ships, even after the court deducted unusually high fees for the condemned ships.<sup>12</sup> Yet despite these successes, rumblings of discontent threatened to mar the success of Warren's squadron. He was notified that Captain Scott, of the *Horatio* had filed charges against Commander Claridge of the *Driver*. Scott accused Claridge of dereliction during the pursuit of the *Junon*, and wanted a court martial convened.<sup>13</sup> The capture of the French frigate brought an even bigger headache for Warren, as it would cause considerable trouble between himself and Admiral Cochrane. After the *Junon* was brought to Bermuda, Cochrane immediately wrote a letter of complaint to the Admiralty. In his report, he claimed that the *Junon* had officially struck to the *Latona* (which, coincidentally, was attached to his own squadron), and as the action took place well within what he believed to be his

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<sup>10</sup> Lieutenant-Commander Ian Stranack, *The Andrew and the Onions: The Story of the Royal Navy in Bermuda, 1795-1975* (Bermuda, 1978) 99; Henry Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam: A History of the Island From 1784 to 1901*, 2 vols. (London, 1973), 1:296-298

<sup>11</sup> Warren to Pole, May 25, 1809, Adm.1/499, 108

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. Warren complained that the legal fees charged by the Vice-Admiralty Court in Bermuda were quite exorbitant.

<sup>13</sup> Capt. Scott to Warren, March 9, 1809, Adm.1/499, 89

jurisdiction, the prize should have been brought back to Barbados.<sup>14</sup> Almost as an afterthought, he also charged Captain Jospeh Conn of the *Swiftsure* for refusing to join his squadron, and Captain Hawker of the *Melampus* for disobeying his order to assist in the pursuit of the *Junon*.<sup>15</sup>

Warren immediately came to the defense of his captains. Of the four ships involved in the capture of the *Junon*, he wrote that the *Horatio* had borne the brunt of the French ship's attack, and was responsible for the *Junon*'s surrender. Lieutenant Jean-Léon Emeric, who replaced Captain Rousseau as the *Junon*'s senior officer when the latter was wounded, corroborated this in his account of the battle. He refused to surrender the French frigate except to any ship other than the *Horatio*, which he claimed did nearly all the damage to his ship.<sup>16</sup> To be fair, much of the credit also belonged to the *Superieuse*, which arrived in time to aid the *Horatio* when the latter was taking a fearsome beating from the French ship. As for the *Latona*, she had barely fired her guns when the French frigate surrendered, and her only claim to the prize was that she was nearest to the French frigate when her flag was struck.<sup>17</sup> Warren wrote that his captain was more than justified in bringing the prize back to Bermuda. The *Junon* was repaired and eventually brought back to Halifax as a new and powerful addition to Warren's squadron. It was an insult Cochrane would not soon forget.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Warren to Pole, March 16, 1809, Adm.1/499, 53-56

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.; E.P. Brenton, *The Naval History of Great Britain 1783-1836*, 2 vols. (London, 1837) 2:267. Brenton, who was closely associated with Cochrane, stated in his account that had it not been for the *Latona*, the *Junon* would not have been captured.

<sup>18</sup> Richard Hill, *The Prizes of War: The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars* (London, 1998), 106, 217; Michael Lewis, *A Social History of the Navy 1793-1815* (London, 1960), 299. Cochrane's zeal in

As for the officers Cochrane had charged with disobedience, the first involved the captain of Warren's own flagship. Warren also wrote that he had given orders Captain Hawker to return immediately to Bermuda after escorting a convoy to Barbados.<sup>19</sup> Thus, he had not disobeyed Cochrane's order, but instead following another that took precedence. The Admiralty reached its decision over the issue on May 1, declaring that,

Under the circumstances in which Sir Alex Cochrane stood at the time that he issued the order which was delivered to Captain Conn of the *Swiftsure*, their lordships are of the opinion that the Rear Admiral was called upon to take every means in his power to strengthen his squadron, and my Lords are surprised that Captain Conn did not feel it to have been his duty on receiving Sir Alex Cochrane's order to join in the *Swiftsure* without delay; but it does not appear to their Lordships that Captain Conn's conduct arose from any intentional disobedience of Sir Alex Cochrane's orders, but from what Captain Conn conceived to be a sense of duty to the superior officer whose flag was usually found by the ship that under his command, my Lords are pleased to overlook his error without any further animadversions.

I am further commanded to acquaint you that they have directed Sir Alex Cochrane to order a court martial upon Captain Hawker of the *Melampus*, as the charge preferred against him by the Rear Admiral, and that from the peculiar circumstances in which Captain Hawker was placed at the time he received Rear Admiral Sir Alex Cochrane's orders, Their Lordships are pleased not to disapprove of Captain Scott's proceedings in returning with the *Horatio* to Bermuda or in retaining the *Latona* until he had refitted the (*Junon*).<sup>20</sup>

The Admiralty decided to remove the *Melampus* from Warren's squadron at the end of April, and it would be almost a year before she returned to Bermuda.<sup>21</sup> Yet this incident must have struck a familiar chord within the Admiralty. The prospect of

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pursuing the matter of the ownership of the *Junon* probably had something to do with the prize money involved. After the sale of the ship and her cargo, the prize court in Bermuda put her worth at approximately £35000. Cochrane would have been entitled to a one-twelfth share, which would have given him more than £2900. The monthly pay for a rear-admiral in the Royal Navy was £49, which meant that Cochrane lost out on the equivalent of five years pay. This is not an altogether unfair assessment, as Lord St. Vincent himself described the Cochranes as "mad, romantic, money-getting and not truth telling." Lord Keith simply described him as "a crackhead, unsafe man."

<sup>19</sup> Warren to Pole, March 16, Adm.1/499, 53-56

<sup>20</sup> Pole to Warren, May 1, 1809, Adm.2/932, 55-58

<sup>21</sup> Barrow to Warren, April 29, 1809, Adm.2/932, 55

squabbling squadron commanders in the North American waters, a sector which could erupt into open warfare between the England and the United States at any moment, could seriously hamper the navy's operations. The memories of the lack of cooperation between the squadron commanders in 1780-81 that contributed considerably to the defeat at Yorktown were still fresh, and the behavior of Cochrane and Warren towards one another brought to mind that of two of their predecessors, Rodney and Arbuthnot. While France remained England's only opponent in the region, such problems could be dismissed, but it would undoubtedly play an important part in the Admiralty's decision to unite its three squadrons into a single command in 1812. As for the present issue, the Admiralty's siding with Warren over the ownership of the *Junon* started a rivalry between the two admirals that would last for years.

Warren left Bermuda on May 19, and arrived back in Halifax five days later with the *Swiftsure*, *Horatio*, *Hussar*, *Junon*, *Squirrel*, *Colibri*, *Martin*, *Columbine*, *Caroline*, and *Douguay-Trouin*.<sup>22</sup> One of the more pressing problems he faced on his return was a shortage of available crews, particularly for the newly captured ships. He temporarily solved this problem by further reducing the *Centurion*'s complement and distributing the extra men to the *Junon* and *Colibri*.<sup>23</sup> He also faced the problem of ensuring the safety of merchant ships bringing much needed supplies to the British forces in Spain and Portugal. Because of the Peninsular War, foodstuffs from America had become even more important to the British war effort. Warren decided the best way to prevent needless shipping losses was to further enforce the convoy acts, making it mandatory for all

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<sup>22</sup> Warren to Pole, May 25, 1809, Adm.1/499, 100

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 101

merchant ships to sail in convoys.<sup>24</sup> The majority of British shipping losses from French raiders came from ships that sailed independently.<sup>25</sup> However, Warren's action upset many shipowners because the main problem with convoys was that they were slow. Ships carrying foodstuffs ran the risk of their cargoes spoiling if they were not delivered quickly, which would cost shipowners more than losing their ships to enemy vessels. Nevertheless, Warren made sure that the Convoy Compulsory Act was strictly enforced, and by doing this he deprived ship owners of insurance coverage for ships sailing independently. Any ship caught on the seas unescorted or without a proper license (which had to be obtained from the Vice-Admiralty Court) would face severe fines.<sup>26</sup> The only exceptions were for ships involved in local trade between nearby coastal towns. All other ships sailing to the United States, the West Indies or Europe would have to sail in convoys.<sup>27</sup> Adding further discomfort for the ship owners was the fact that if a ship failed to sail in the last winter convoy (usually at the end of November), it would have to wait until the following spring for the first convoy of the year.<sup>28</sup> If it happened to be carrying foodstuffs, it meant either the total loss of cargo or it would be forced to sell it at a considerable loss while in port. It was no accident that the best customers for these cargoes were usually local military units or the navy.<sup>29</sup> It isn't surprising that many merchants chose to send their ships to sea without insurance than to sail in convoy.

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<sup>24</sup> Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America*, (Toronto, 1950), 233

<sup>25</sup> G.J. Marcus, *The Age of Nelson: The Royal Navy 1793-1815* (New York, 1971), 402-405

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 235

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

One such convoy resulted in the most notable action involving Warren's ships during the summer, the battle between the sloop HMS *Bonne Citoyenne* (20) and the French razée-frigate *La Furieuse* (20) on July 6, 1809. The French ship, under the command of Captain La Marant Ker Daniel, sailed from the Guadeloupe for France on June 15.<sup>30</sup> She was carrying a large cargo of sugar and a detachment of the 6<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the line when she spotted a British convoy. The *Bonne Citoyenne*, under the command of Captain William Mounsey, had left from Spithead on June 18 with the convoy for Quebec.<sup>31</sup> On July 5, the British sloop noticed a suspicious sail astern and went to investigate. When she got closer, she spotted *La Furieuse* attempting to capture a large merchantman. Despite the French ship's greater size, Mounsey ordered his ship to pursue her. He was fortunate that he was facing only a razée and not a true 40-gun frigate.<sup>32</sup> In order to accommodate her cargo and extra troops, the *Furieuse* carried only twenty cannons, making her a fair match for the British sloop.<sup>33</sup>

The *Bonne Citoyenne* pursued the *Furieuse* until she had caught up with her at 9:00 a.m. on July 6. The two ships fought a furious action that lasted seven hours. Mounsey

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<sup>30</sup> Mounsey to Warren, August 1, 1809, *Naval Chronicle* 22:346-348; Brenton, *Naval History*, 2:257-258. Brenton mistakenly writes that the action took on August 6.

<sup>31</sup> James Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain: Consisting of Historical Memoirs of Those Officers of the British Navy Who Distinguished Themselves During the Reign of His Majesty George III*, 4 vols. (Boston, 1972), 4:313-317. William Mounsey entered the Royal Navy in 1780, and immediately saw action in the American Revolution. He was promoted lieutenant a few years later, and was serving in the Mediterranean at the start of the war in 1793. He took part in the reduction of San Fiorenzo, Calvi and Bastia, and was promoted to the command of the sloop *Rosario* after the Peace of Amiens in 1802. He spent the next few years on the Irish and West Indian stations, and in 1806 was appointed to command the sloop *Bonne Citoyenne*. It was in this ship that he captured the French razée-frigate *La Furieuse* in 1809. After capturing the ship he became its commander, and served in the Mediterranean fleet until 1814, when he was sent to the North American station, and later took part in the Castine expedition.

<sup>32</sup> Dean King, John B. Hattendorff and J. Worth Estes, *A Sea of Words: A Lexicon and Companion for Patrick O'Brian's Seafaring Tales* (New York, 1995), 358

<sup>33</sup> Mounsey to Warren, August 1, 1809, *Naval Chronicle* 22:346-348; Brenton, *Naval History*, 2:257-258



acknowledged that his ship fired no less than 129 broadsides at his opponent, and had lost the use of three guns due to overheating. However, it was enough to compel Captain Daniel to strike his ship's flag. Despite the furious battle, the *Bonne Citoyenne* suffered only one killed and five wounded. The *Furieuse* was less fortunate, as her crew suffered thirty-five killed and thirty-seven wounded.<sup>34</sup> The frigate was severely damaged and it took weeks for the British sloop to tow her back to Halifax, where they finally arrived on September 1. After being repaired, the *Furieuse* entered Royal Navy as a 36-gun frigate. As for Captain Mounsey, the Admiralty rewarded him by naming him as the first commander of HMS *Furieuse*.<sup>35</sup>

Warren spent considerable time presiding over trials in Halifax during the second half of 1809. The level of dissatisfaction from sailors serving in the squadron had not improved much since the *Chesapeake-Leopard* incident. Haligonians received word of another mutiny that had taken place in the waters off Nova Scotia. On August 1, 1809, the sloop HMS *Columbine*(18) was sailing off St. Andrews when six men from her crew (a boatswain, two marines and three seamen) attempted to incite a riot aboard the ship.<sup>36</sup> The mutiny was quickly put down, and the six mutineers were arrested. They were brought back to Halifax at the beginning of September, and Warren once again assembled his court to try them. Captain Bradshaw, commander of the *Columbine*, was determined to have the men charged with mutiny, knowing full well that a guilty verdict meant the death sentence. As expected, all six men were quickly found guilty and sentenced to be

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> T.B. Akins, *History of Halifax City* (Belleville, Ont., 1973), 144

executed. As a warning to any potential mutineers, Warren ordered an example be made of them. On September 18, all six men were hung from the yardarm of the *Columbine*, and their bodies were brought to Maugher's Beach on McNab Island. They were then hung up in chains from the gibbets so that everyone could see them rot away.<sup>37</sup>

While few Haligonians were shocked by the *Columbine* mutiny, the following month would bring a trial that would astonish the city. This was the trial of Edward and Margaret Jordan, who were charged with committing piracy on the high seas. Jordan, his wife and four children booked passage on board the small schooner *Three Sisters*, which he had recently sold to Jonathan and John Tremain. Jordan had built the ship, but had been forced to sell it to the Tremains in order to cover his debts.<sup>38</sup> The only others on board the schooner were Captain John Stairs (whose brother William Stairs had been president of the Union Bank in Halifax), first mate John Kelly, and seamen Thomas Heath and Benjamin Matthews.<sup>39</sup> According to later testimony, on the morning of September 13, 1809, Jordan got a hold of a pair of pistols and two axes, and proceeded to kill both Heath and Matthews, and came close to killing Captain Stairs.<sup>40</sup> The Halifax Gazette reported that Jordan's wife was a willing participant in the whole affair, stating that,

Jordan's wife, a fit companion for so base a monster, attacked (Captain Stairs) with a boat hook which he parried with his arm, and after much exertion disengaged himself, and seizing one of the hatches, jumped into the sea.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Akins, *History of Halifax City*, 144; Beamish Murdoch, *A History of Nova Scotia or Acadie*, 3 vols. (Halifax, 1867) 3:298

<sup>38</sup> Akins, *History of Halifax City*, 144-145

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> *Halifax Gazette*, October 16, 1809

Stairs was left to die at sea, but was picked up four hours later by the American fishing ship *Eliza Stoddard*.<sup>42</sup> Jordan then proceeded to the Bay of Bulls, intending to take the ship to Ireland, but never got the chance. Stairs arrived a few days later in Boston and told of his harrowing ordeal, and it wasn't long before word reached Halifax.<sup>43</sup> A warrant was placed for the arrest of Jordan, his wife, and First Mate John Kelly. All three were eventually apprehended and returned them to Halifax to stand trial. The Jordans were brought before a special court on November 15, and it was decided that Kelly would be tried separately at a later date.<sup>44</sup> The case caused such a commotion and was so unheard of that both Prevost and Warren chose to sit among the judges who presided over the trial.<sup>45</sup> The one major absentee from the trial was Alexander Croke, head of the Vice-Admiralty Court. He had demanded to be president of the court and to have a veto, but was denied these requests.<sup>46</sup> Because of his vanity, he chose to sit out the city's most famous trial that year.

The trial itself took only two days, and not surprisingly Jordan was found guilty of murder and piracy.<sup>47</sup> Despite Tremain's testimony of her complicity, for which she was vilified in the press, Jordan's wife was acquitted.<sup>48</sup> She was later able to take her family

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<sup>42</sup> Akins, *History of Halifax City*, 145

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

and go back to Ireland. As for Kelly, he too was found guilty at his trial, but was later pardoned.<sup>49</sup> His role in the affair has never been made clear. He claimed that he was forced by the Jordans to do their bidding, but denied having taken part in the deaths of Heath and Matthews. Stairs could neither confirm nor deny this, despite the near-certainty that Jordan needed the help of at least one member of the crew in obtaining the weapons to commit his crimes. Since there was no conclusive proof that he had taken an active part, Kelly was set free.<sup>50</sup> Jordan's body, after his execution on November 23 at a beach near Freshwater Bridge, was later chained up on Point Pleasant near the Kissing Bridge.<sup>51</sup>

The Admiralty's main focus towards the end of the year was on the capture of the last major French island in the West Indies, Guadeloupe. The responsibility for the naval support again fell to Cochrane's Leeward Islands Squadron. Warren would not have to escort troops to Barbados as he did for the Martinique campaign, but would once again find himself locking horns with Cochrane. The animosity between the two squadron commanders would again spill over to the ships under their respective commands and result in one needless tragedy for the Royal Navy.

In September, 1809, a hurricane struck the Leeward Islands, resulting in several of Cochrane's ships being severely damaged.<sup>52</sup> It was crucial for the success of the Guadeloupe campaign that his ships be repaired as quickly as possible. In order to expedite their repairs, Cochrane decided to send a number of his ships to be repaired and

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 146

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 145

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Warren to Pole, November 4, 1809, Adm.1/499, 249

refitted in Halifax.<sup>53</sup> This was a reasonable request, one that Warren would surely not have objected over. However, Warren was not informed of Cochrane's intentions before he arrived in Halifax with HMS *Pompée* (80), frigate *Thetis* (38), sloops *Cherub* (18), *Star* (18), *Savage* (16), *Julia* (16), and brig *St. Pierre* (14).<sup>54</sup> The refit of these ships meant that repairs to Warren's own ships, many of which were also in very bad shape, would have to be delayed until Cochrane's ships were fixed up. The situation was quite reminiscent of when Rodney used the Jamaica facilities to fix up his own ships, and his behavior led to much animosity between himself and Admiral Parker, the Jamaica Squadron commander.<sup>55</sup> Cochrane's high-handedness certainly ruffled Warren's feathers, and only added to their personal animosity. Warren had been making arrangements for the disposition of the squadron for the winter, and wanted to sail for Bermuda at the end of November to help expedite the establishment of the new dockyard.<sup>56</sup> Because of Cochrane's arrival, he would be forced to leave behind several ships in Halifax during the winter.

Warren left for Bermuda on November 29, with the *Swiftsure*, *Aeolus*, *Indian*, *Thistle*, *Vesta* and *Bream*.<sup>57</sup> He left behind the *Eurydice*, *Furieuse*, *Plumper* and four smaller schooners in Halifax, while the *Columbine* and *Driver* were to escort the last

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<sup>53</sup> Cochrane to Warren, October 26, 1809, Adm.1/499, 253-254

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 255

<sup>55</sup> Kenneth Breen, 'Divided Command: The West Indies and North America 1780-1781', Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine, eds, *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century*, (Leicester, UK 1988), 194-196

<sup>56</sup> Warren to Pole, October 6, Adm.1/499, 215; Lieutenant-Commander Ian Stranack, *The Andrew and the Onions: The Story of the Royal Navy in Bermuda 1795-1975* (Bermuda, 1978), 6. The Admiralty purchased Ireland Island on October 21, 1809, at a cost of £42,000.

<sup>57</sup> Warren to Barrow, December 15, 1809, Adm.1/500, 10

convoys of the season to England.<sup>58</sup> Warren wrote to the Admiralty about his displeasure that the repairs for three of Cochrane's smaller cruisers (the *Star*, *St. Pierre* and *Julia*) took precedence over his own frigates.<sup>59</sup> He was particularly annoyed over the status of the *Melampus*. Despite having dropped the charges against Captain Hawker in August, Cochrane informed Warren that he intended to keep the frigate for the Guadeloupe campaign, and would later take several more of Warren's ships into his command during the winter.<sup>60</sup> In November, while escorting a convoy to the West Indies, the brig *Plumper* was ordered by Cochrane to join his ships at Guadeloupe without even notifying Warren of his intentions.<sup>61</sup> He gave similar instructions to the frigate *Junon* and sloop *Observateur*, which also had little choice but to comply with Cochrane's orders. Warren sent off another angry letter to the Admiralty, claiming that Cochrane's actions were threatening the security of his own station.<sup>62</sup> The Leeward Islands commander's reply was that he received word that a French fleet of two ships-of-the-line, several frigates and between sixteen to eighteen corvettes were on their way to relieve Guadeloupe, and that he would need every ships available to meet this threat (no such fleet was ever sent).<sup>63</sup>

The decision to keep the *Melampus* for the Guadeloupe campaign did yield some good fortune for Hawker and his crew. On December 13, 1809, the British frigate found

<sup>58</sup> Warren to Pole, , November 27, 1809, Adm.1/500, 7

<sup>59</sup> Warren to Pole, November 4, 1809, Adm.1/499, 249-250

<sup>60</sup> Cochrane to Warren, December 27, 1809, Adm.1/500, 22; Barrow to Cochrane, September 28, 1809, Adm.2/932, 70. The Admiralty had removed the *Melampus* from Cochrane's command in September.

<sup>61</sup> Warren to Croker, January 18, 1810, Adm.1/500, 18-19.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Cochrane to Warren, December 27, 1809, Adm.1/500, 22

the French corvette *Béarnais* (16) as it was trying to reach Guadeloupe. It had sailed from Bayonne a few weeks earlier with provisions for the besieged island, but immediately turned away when it spotted Hawker's ship. The *Melampus* chased the corvette for twenty-eight hours, and after a brief action the *Béarnais* struck her colors. The British suffered only two slightly wounded, while the French lost one killed and several more wounded.<sup>64</sup> The *Béarnais* was found to be a very fine ship and was eventually added to the Royal Navy as HMS *Curieux*.<sup>65</sup>

The *Melampus*' success was quickly overshadowed by a most unfortunate loss to Warren's squadron. On December 13, the same day Hawker found the *Béarnais*, the *Junon* and *Observateur* spotted four large sails while patrolling east of Antigua. The *Junon*'s commander, Captain Shortland, closed the distance to the four ships to within a quarter mile, and saw that they were all flying Spanish colors. When his ship got close enough, the four ships hoisted French colors and immediately opened fire on the British frigate. The ships were in fact the French frigates *Renommée* (40) and *Clorinde* (40), and the razée-frigates *Loire* (20) and *Seine* (20).<sup>66</sup> The two British ships were hopelessly outnumbered, but the French ships chose to ignore the *Observateur* and concentrated on the *Junon*. Captain Shortland and his crew put up a brave struggle in order to allow the sloop to escape, and fought on for another half-hour before surrendering. Out of a crew of

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<sup>64</sup> Hawker to Cochrane, December 14, 1809, *Naval Chronicle* 23:167; William Laird Clowes, *A History of the Royal Navy From Earliest Times to the Present*, 7 vols. (London, 1897-1903), 5:448; William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain From the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV*, 6 vols (London, 1847) 5:186

<sup>65</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:448; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 5:186

<sup>66</sup> Cochrane to Croker, December 25, 1809, *Naval Chronicle* 23:168; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:446-447; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 5:186-191. Lieutenant George Vernon's account of the battle can be found in Dean King and John Hattendorff's *Every Man Will Do His Duty: An Anthology of Firsthand Accounts from the Age of Nelson 1793-1815* (New York, 1997), 255-260

224 officers and men, the *Junon* lost twenty killed and forty wounded, more than a quarter of her complement.<sup>67</sup> Captain Shortland was himself wounded five times, and died of his wounds on Guadeloupe on January 21, 1810.<sup>68</sup> French casualties amounted to twenty-one killed and eighteen wounded.<sup>69</sup> The British frigate put up such a fight that the French were unable to reclaim their former vessel. Her hull was completely shattered, and was promptly set ablaze by her captors.<sup>70</sup> It is somewhat ironic that she was lost not far from where she had been captured only ten months earlier. A court martial was held on February 19, 1810, against Lieutenant Decker, who had given the order for the ship to strike her colors after Shortland was wounded. They found that both he and the crew of the *Junon* had fought most bravely against overwhelming odds, and acquitted him.<sup>71</sup>

The *Melampus* had an opportunity to avenge the loss of the *Junon* the following January. She was sailing with the 74-gun ship *Alfred*, frigates *Blonde* (38), *Castor* (32) and *Thetis* (all belonging to the Leeward Islands Squadron) in pursuit of another 40-gun French frigate, the *Néreide*, while the latter was attempting to bring supplies into Guadeloupe. The *Melampus* led the pursuit, but unfortunately the *Néreide* proved too swift. The French ship was able to stay out of gun range for two days before finally losing her pursuers.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 23:345-346

<sup>72</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:450; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 5:226-229. The *Néreide*'s respite proved short, as she was captured by the sloops HMS *Rainbow* and *Avon* on February 14, 1810



Another one of Warren's ships had better luck against the enemy a few weeks later. The frigate *Horatio* was cruising near Isle-de-France on February 21, 1810, when she spotted what appeared to be another 40-gun frigate. The ship was the *Nécessité*, another razée-frigate being used as a supply ship, and on this day she carried only twenty-six cannon.<sup>73</sup> Converting their fine frigates to serve as armed merchantmen showed just how desperate the French were at this time to supply their islands. The action lasted only one hour, with the *Nécessité* hauling down forced to surrender. Fortunately, neither side suffered any casualties, and Captain Scott and his crew were able to get another sizable share of prize money from their new capture.<sup>74</sup> In a span of twelve months, the *Horatio* had captured two large French frigates, earning for her and her crew a fine reputation in the fleet.

Not every action in North American waters involved French or Spanish vessels. This was shown in an action that occurred on February 11, 1810 off Bermuda. The engagement was a rarity in these waters in that the British opponent was a Dutch man-of-war. The brig HMS *Thistle* was sailing southeast of Bermuda when she encountered the Dutch schooner *Havik* (10). The Dutch ship had sailed all the way from Batavia with Rear Admiral Armand-Adrien Bruyskes, the former governor of the colony, to New York with a valuable cargo of calico.<sup>75</sup> Lieutenant Peter Procter, the *Thistle*'s commander, pursued her for most of the day, but was only able to engage her at nightfall. The *Havik* tried her best to evade the British ship, but by 9:45 p.m. she had taken too much damage

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<sup>73</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:451; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 5:231

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Lieutenant Procter to Warren, February 11, 1810, *Naval Chronicle* 23:514-515; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:450-451; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 5:225-226

and had to haul down her colors. Casualties for both ships were almost identical, with the *Thistle* losing one man killed and six wounded, while the *Havik* suffered one killed and seven wounded, including Admiral Bruyskes. Although the *Thistle's* 18-pounder guns were more powerful than the Dutch ship's six 4-pounder and four 2-pounder guns, Procter lost the use of three of his guns at the start of the battle, which greatly reduced his ship's effectiveness. Admiral Warren was suitably impressed by Procter's performance, and promoted him to the rank of commander for his victory.<sup>76</sup>

The antagonism between Warren and Cochrane further escalated in February over the issue of the appointment of Captain G. P. Monke as acting commander of the frigate *Statira*. Monke had taken command following the death of the ship's previous commander, Captain Boys, during the fall of 1809, as he was taking the frigate to join Cochrane's squadron for the assault on Guadeloupe.<sup>77</sup> The *Statira* remained on this station for several months, but on February 10, 1810, and without any warning, Cochrane removed Monke as the ship's captain, and replaced him with Captain Patterson, formerly of the sloop *Star*.<sup>78</sup> Cochrane's argument was that Warren had had no right to fill the captain's vacancy following Boys' death, as the *Statira* was nominally under his command. Monke in turn claimed that Captain Boys died before he reached the limits of Cochrane's jurisdiction, and that Warren did not fill the vacancy, but only appointed him to act as commander until the Admiralty made its own decision. Nevertheless, Cochrane was adamant that Patterson be made commander of the ship. Monke wrote,

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Captain Monke to Warren , March 9, 1810, Adm.1/500, 101-103

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

Thus sir, you will at once perceive the unnecessary concealment of the real intention of Sir Alexander Cochrane, who so far from giving me the smallest reason to suspect that he meant to supercede me when I first joined him, congratulated me on my having arrived in time to partake in the most active service of the expedition against Guadeloupe, and exactly one week after he sent me in the *Statira* to relieve the *Melampus*; so continuing me in the command of the ship until he had the advantage of stating, as he imagined, his claim to the vacancy (opened) by Captain Boys' death.<sup>79</sup>

The issue might have been settled more amicably after Lord Mulgrave sent a letter to Cochrane informing him that Monke would instead be appointed to command the frigate *Castor* (32).<sup>80</sup> For reasons known only to him, Cochrane prevented Monke from taking over command of this ship by ordering him to return to Bermuda on the *Melampus* at the end of February. Monke did not hide his displeasure, and in his letter to Warren he claimed that that Cochrane's actions were nothing more than retribution against the admiral, claiming that,

It is evident to my mind that I am sacrificed, in this instance, as the victim of (Cochrane's) ill will towards you, in consequence of the support you received from the Admiralty Board relative to your appointment of officers to the *Junon* in 1809.

Being thus thrown out of all active employment, I anxiously await your commands for my guidance; and I have to further request, sir, that in stating to the Admiralty the flagrant injustice I have experienced from the conduct of Sir Alexander Cochrane, you will likewise be pleased to inform the board that this is the third time within the space of nine months I have been compelled to traverse the Atlantic in the humiliating character of a passenger.<sup>81</sup>

Cochrane's behavior in this affair did him no credit. He clearly viewed the Admiralty's siding against him in the *Junon* affair as an affront that needed to be repaid, and went out of his way to do so. It was bad enough that he ordered Warren's ships about

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

without informing their commander, but his actions towards Hawker and Monke revealed a truly vindictive officer who put pride above duty.

Despite the problems with Cochrane, Warren had a very productive stay in Bermuda during the winter. He was very pleased with the progress of the naval base on Ireland Island. For the dockyard to be able to accommodate two ships-of-the-line and six frigates as he envisioned, Warren ordered the construction of an arsenal and supporting warehouses for victualling.<sup>82</sup> The Bermuda Legislature provided £1000 from the powder fund, and work soon started on twenty-one stone buildings that would serve as warehouses.<sup>83</sup> The Admiralty knew that Warren could not remain in Bermuda to supervise the construction for the entire year, and appointed Commodore Andrew Fitzherbert Evans for this task.<sup>84</sup>

After the fall of Guadeloupe in March, 1810, even the Leeward Islands and Jamaica Squadrons saw a dramatic decline in enemy activity.<sup>85</sup> The systematic conquest of all of their overseas colonies left the French only capable of concentrating their war against British commerce in European waters. It was a virtual repeat of the success the British achieved during the Seven Years War, as their naval supremacy left the French islands

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<sup>82</sup> Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam*, 1:293

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 1:294

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 1:294-296; Barrow to Warren, April 12, 1809, Adm.2/932, 50-52. Evans served under Captain Hurd years earlier when he conducted his survey of the island, and had extensive knowledge of the area. Evans proved a good choice, but he had his work cut out for him. He soon discovered that Bermuda contractors were more than happy to overcharge for work and materials, and that many of the native laborers walked off the job after only a few days work. He solved the latter problem by making sure that those who left were never again to be employed to work on the dockyard. Despite other problems, the work on the base progressed to his satisfaction. By the beginning of the next year, nine buildings were finished (three for the headquarters and six for the clerks), and a careening pit for a 74-gun ship was dug on the island's cove.

<sup>85</sup> For a full account of the Guadeloupe campaign, see Colonel H. De Poyen, *Les Guerres des Antilles de 1793 à 1815* (Paris, 1896), 378-412

completely at England's mercy, allowing the British to scoop them up almost at their leisure. The French raiders proved successful against British merchant ships in the English Channel and surrounding waters, which resulted in the additional capture of hundreds of British ships.<sup>86</sup> But without an adequate base of operations such as Martinique or Guadeloupe, it proved very difficult for French ships to operate for long in North American waters. It did not mean a complete end to French attacks, but after 1810 they were more of a nuisance rather than real a threat to British shipping in this region.<sup>87</sup>

Although the French naval menace declined noticeably after the fall of Guadeloupe, relations between England and the United States remained a source of discomfort. By the beginning of 1810, President Madison was forced to accept that the Non-Intercourse Act was having little impact on Britain and France's aggression against American commerce. Though he believed his outrage was justified, Madison knew he was powerless to do anything about it. Worse yet, the influx of British goods continued to pour into the United States, while American exports continued to suffer, which might have been worse had it not been for the smuggling trade. Millions of dollars of taxable dollars were being denied to the government at a time when the American economy could ill afford such losses. A year after its inception, Madison had to admit that the Non-Intercourse Act proved no more successful than the Embargo Act.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Marcus, *The Age of Nelson*, 404; C.B Norman, *The Corsairs of France* (London, 1887), 453. French privateers captured 1089 English merchant ships between 1811 and 1812.

<sup>87</sup> Archives Nationales de la France, Marine Series FF2/127. At least ten French privateers operated from American ports between 1811 and 1812. These were *L'Adèle*, *Le Duc de Dantzick*, *La Comète*, *La Venus*, *La Rose*, *Le Diligent*, *L'Éléonore*, *L'Invincible*, *La Bayonnaise*, *Le Jules César* and *Le Rodeur*.

<sup>88</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 50

The American government tried yet another tact in their attempts to put economic pressure on Britain and France. Neither government had been the least impressed by the last two acts, so a new proposal was brought forward by Congressman Macon to the President. On May 1, 1810, Congress passed Macon's Bill #2. It immediately ended the embargoes against France and Britain, but offered a new incentive to get them to drop their oppressive decrees. It stated that the first nation to drop its decrees before March 3, 1811, the Americans would renew the Non-Intercourse Act against the second party.<sup>89</sup> Like the other two schemes, this one also looked good on paper, but again had a major flaw. The United States' trade with France was insignificant compared to its trade with Great Britain. France could easily decide to drop its laws without feeling any effect, while driving another wedge between British and American relations. Indeed, Napoleon would find a way not only to achieve this but also pervert the new Bill and make the American government look extremely foolish in the process.

The decision to lift sanctions was greeted with a mixture of joy and relief on both sides. For those involved in the smuggling trade, the last two years had been a period of immense profit, and a number of merchants made vast fortunes in the process.<sup>90</sup> Now, most merchant ships could now safely enter any American or British port with fear of being seized, and for the first time in years, England and the United States would enjoy normal commercial relations. This was especially important to the British, as the war in Spain was making her more dependent than ever on American foodstuffs. Beginning in 1808, the British government permitted American merchants to trade directly with

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Thomas Raddall, *Halifax, Warden of the North* (Toronto, 1948), 147

Portugal. In 1808 and 1809, American flour shipments to Spain and Portugal rose from 70,000 barrels to 105,000 barrels. With the elimination of restrictions, American grain shipments to the Peninsula would double to 232,000 barrels in 1810, and rose to an astounding 835,000 barrels in 1811.<sup>91</sup> Wellington's success in the Peninsular War was crucial to the British government, and American grain was crucial to Wellington's ability to wage an effective campaign. It should have been obvious that the best way to ensure the safe delivery of American foodstuffs was for England to settle its issues with the United States, but even on this subject, Wellington himself was not willing to appease the Americans at the expense of England's maritime policies.<sup>92</sup>

Although French attacks on British shipping in the North American and the West Indies lessened considerably in 1810, there were still a few raiders prowling the seas. On April 22, 1810, the frigate *Cleopatra* and sloop *Atalante* combined to capture the privateer brig *Jeune Esther*. Though she was pierced for eighteen guns she carried only four when she was boarded.<sup>93</sup> A month later, the *Melampus* and *Driver* captured the large privateer *Fantôme* (20) on May 28.<sup>94</sup> She was immediately purchased into Warren's squadron as HMS *Fantôme* (18). The absence of French warships and privateers became more noticeable, and naval activity in the Western Hemisphere dropped considerably from previous years. The British were now in complete control of the waters around North America and the West Indies.

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<sup>91</sup> W. Freeman Galpin, 'The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula, 1810-1814', *American Historical Review* 28 (1922), 24-25; Charles Oman, *Wellington's Army 1809-1814* (London, 1913); G.E. Watson, 'The United States and the Peninsular War', *The Historical Journal* 19, #4 (1976), 869-871

<sup>92</sup> Watson, 'The United States and the Peninsular War', 63

<sup>93</sup> Captain Pechell to Warren, April 22, 1810, Adm.1/500, 73

<sup>94</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 24:331

During the spring of 1810, Warren sent the sloops *Emulous* and *Gorée* (18) to Amelia Island to provide protection for British merchant ships in the region. The Spanish governor of the island was particularly grateful for the arrival of the two ships. He received reports of a possible attack by expelled French forces on St. Augustine supported by American gunboats.<sup>95</sup> The attack never took place, and Governor Lopez believed it was due to the presence of the two British warships.<sup>96</sup> The British would continue to maintain a naval presence around the area not only to protect the smuggling operations in the region, but also to watch over any potential American incursions.<sup>97</sup>

In June, Warren received word that he was to help arrange the transport of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Regiments from Nova Scotia to Lisbon to join Wellesley's army.<sup>98</sup> Warren's health at this point was beginning to fail him, and he had written to the Admiralty the previous month to be allowed to return to England.<sup>99</sup> His term as commander of the North American Squadron would be up in October, and he wanted to sail to England after transporting the regiments to Portugal.<sup>100</sup> The Admiralty granted his request, but

<sup>95</sup> Governor Lopez to Captain Byng, July 28, 1810, Adm.1/500, 166

<sup>96</sup> Lopez to Byng, July 28, 1810, Adm.1/500, 166; Beirne, *War of 1812*, 24, 81-82; Charlton W. Tebeau, *A History of Florida* (Coral Gables, Fla, 1971), 104-105. Monroe had tried to purchase East Florida from Spain in 1805 but was unsuccessful. The citizens of West Florida, most of who were of American and British descent, declared the territory to be an independent state during the summer of 1810. The United States government responded by claiming the region to be part of the Louisiana Purchase, and sent troops to enforce the acquisition.

<sup>97</sup> Warren to Croker, August 17, 1810, Adm.1/500, 164; *Naval Chronicle* 24:252. Tensions in the region remained high, and on June 24, 1810, the brig HMS *Moselle* (20) fired on the American brig USS *Vixen* (14) near the Bahamas. Captain Boyce had been informed that two French privateers had recently were fitting out in U.S. ports, and claimed that as he could not distinguish American colors from French colors, believed the *Vixen* to have been one of them.

<sup>98</sup> Warren to Croker, June 22, 1810, Adm.1/500, 84

<sup>99</sup> Warren to Croker, May 4, 1810, Adm.1/500, 89

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*



ironically he would remain in Nova Scotia until the end of the year.<sup>101</sup> He detached the *Swiftsure*, *Milan*, *Martin*, *Ferret*, sloop *Harpy* (20), troopships *Diadem* and *Regulous* and an additional transport to carry the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Regiments to Wellington in Portugal during the summer.<sup>102</sup> The ships returned to Halifax at the start of October, but the *Diadem* and *Regulous* sailed back to Lisbon on October 12 with the 23<sup>rd</sup> Regiment.<sup>103</sup> Warren made the preparations for the winter transfer to Bermuda, and assigned the *Observateur* and *Fantôme* to escort the last convoys of the season to England.<sup>104</sup> He also informed the Admiralty in December stating his intention to sail with the *Swiftsure* and sloop *Little Belt* (18) as soon as the weather was more favorable.<sup>105</sup> By that point they had already sent his successor to replace him. The man they chose had served on this station decades earlier, and whose father had commanded the very same squadron: Rear-Admiral Sir Herbert Sawyer the Younger.<sup>106</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Barrow to Warren, July 14, 1810, Adm.2/932, 96

<sup>102</sup> Warren to Croker, October 3, 1810, Adm.1/500, 222

<sup>103</sup> Warren to Croker, October 13, 1810, Adm.1/500, 235

<sup>104</sup> Warren to Croker, October 30, 1810, Adm.1/500, 241

<sup>105</sup> Warren to Croker, December 20, 1810, Adm.1/500, 262. The *Little Belt* arrived on the station in September.

<sup>106</sup> Barrow to Warren, October 9, 1810, Adm.2/932, 103-104; PRO, Adm.6/88; PRO, Adm.9/1, 44; David Syrett and R.L. Dinardo, eds., *Commissioned Sea Officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815* (London, 1994), 396. Sawyer entered the Royal Navy in 1776, and served for the next seven years on the North American and West Indian stations. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1783, and was named commander of the sloop *Porcupine* in 1787. He was captain of the *Amphion* on the Newfoundland station when the war started in 1793, and returned to England two years later, where he would serve for the next fifteen years. He was promoted to rear-admiral in 1807, and three years later was appointed commander of the North American Squadron. He was promoted to vice-admiral in 1811, and was replaced as commander of the North American Squadron shortly after the start of the War of 1812. He was then sent to command the Irish station until the end of the war in 1815. His active career ended after this, although he was promoted to full admiral in 1825. He died on November 13, 1833.

Warren's first tenure as commander of the North American squadron can be rated a success. When it was announced that he would be leaving for England, the Bermuda legislature gave him a vote of thanks and announced that a schooner would be named after him.<sup>107</sup> Warren had proven himself a less antagonistic commander than Berkeley, who had been more than willing to start a war with the United States. While he did not directly contribute anything that led to an easing in American hostility towards the British, the very least that can be said was that there were no calamitous repeats of the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair on his watch. The ships under his command also scored numerous victories over French warships and privateers, and had contributed to the capture of the last two major French bases in the West Indies, Martinique and Guadeloupe. Also, despite the Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts, the squadron was able to ensure that American merchant ships could safely smuggle foodstuffs and other goods to and from the Bay of Fundy and Amelia Island. This was of paramount importance to the British, as they were able to make sure that American grain found its way to other British colonies and to Wellesley's army in Spain. Although these achievements do not resemble anything close to a great naval victory, they nevertheless reflect quite admirably for both the squadron and its commander.

The main problem with Warren is that he does not stand out when compared to the other admirals in this golden age of the Royal Navy. The North American Squadron at this time was for the most part the repository of the second-rates, the 'also-rans', men who were competent but colorless and who failed to capture the public imagination. The Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the Channel Fleets were led by Jervis, Collingwood, Saumarez, and Nelson, while the North American Squadron had men like Mitchell,

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<sup>107</sup> Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam*, 1:297

Berkeley, Warren, and Sawyer, whose names are not included in the pantheon of British naval heroes. Certainly, the Admiralty wanted its very best to command the most important stations. Overall, with so many naval heroes sharing the stage at the same time, there seemed little room for those who performed their duties with quiet competence, who got the job done without any of the glory. Whether the officers commanding the less active theatres would have achieved heroic results elsewhere is something that could be debated. The fact is, they were sent to the quiet theatres, where great victories were not to be had, and as a result they tend to be overlooked. Warren's second tenure would raise controversy that overshadowed his earlier achievements, but those achievements deserve to be acknowledged.

Warren's replacement would not fare any better. Rear Admiral Sir Herbert Sawyer the Elder had commanded the squadron a quarter century earlier, and now it was his son's turn.<sup>108</sup> The North American Squadron would be the younger Sawyer's first major command. He was informed of his appointment by the Admiralty on October 16, 1810, and sailed to Bermuda the following month.<sup>109</sup> When he arrived there, he decided against living in Warren's Admiralty House. He got the Bermuda Assembly to give him £150 to live on St. John's Hill House on Ireland Island in order to have a better view of the progress on the dockyard.<sup>110</sup> When he first saw the installations, he was less than optimistic. He wrote to the Admiralty that the island's defenses could not stand up to a serious attack, that there were too few troops available, and that the shore defenses were

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<sup>108</sup> Barry Judson Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea: The British Navy, New England and the Maritime Provinces of Canada (master's thesis, University of Maine, 1971), 25. Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer the Elder was commander of the North American Squadron from 1785-1788.

<sup>109</sup> Sawyer to Croker, October 20, 1810, Adm.1/500, 201-202

<sup>110</sup> Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam*, 1:297-298

woefully inadequate.<sup>111</sup> He ordered that there be at least one frigate and a few sloops to guard the island's passages at all times, and saw to it that Ireland Island's defenses were brought up to eighteen artillery pieces.<sup>112</sup>

Like his predecessor, Sawyer felt that the squadron was too small for its current tasks, even with the decrease in attacks from French privateers. The squadron's official numbers on January 1, 1811, stood at one 74-gun ship, five frigates, nine sloops, four brigs, four schooners, and two receiving ships.<sup>113</sup> He firmly believed in continuing Warren's policy of doing as little as possible to antagonize the Americans, and wanted to avoid similar incidents like the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair. Unfortunately, Sawyer was barely settled in his new command when he would find himself embroiled in another incident that would once again reignite the threat of war between the United States and Britain.

The period of normal trading between the United States and Britain came to an end shortly after Sawyer took command of the squadron. On February 2, 1811, the United States reintroduced the Non-Intercourse Act against Britain.<sup>114</sup> Napoleon brought this about by writing a draft for the benefit of the American ambassador stating that France would revoke the Berlin and Milan Decrees against American trade.<sup>115</sup> The reintroduction

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 1:297

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Adm.8/99, January 1, 1811.

<sup>114</sup> Frank A. Updyke, *The Diplomacy of the War of 1812* (Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1965), 116.

<sup>115</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 50-51; Ulane Bonnel, *La France, les États-Unis et la Guerre de Course 1797-1815* (Paris: 1961); Mahan, *Sea Power In Its Relations to the War of 1812*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1905), 1:235-236, 267-268; Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 244-245; Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, 28-29; Updyke, *Diplomacy of the War of 1812*, 113-114. This was the completion of a masterful stroke of diplomacy on the part of Napoleon, whose maneuvers completely baffled Madison and his cabinet. When he had gotten word of Macon's Bill

of the Non-Intercourse Act in 1811 against Britain meant the resumption of the smuggling trade.<sup>116</sup> However, it proved a tough year for the merchants on the North American station. The United States held a much tighter grip in containing American smugglers from dealing with the British.<sup>117</sup>

While the economic situation on the North American station became bleaker following the re-introduction of the Non-Intercourse Act, another event soon put such concerns by the wayside. On April 24, 1811, the frigate *Guerrière* was sailing off New York when she boarded the brig *Spitfire* to search for deserters. Captain Samuel Pechell ordered the impressment of one seaman, John Deguyo, claiming that he was deserter

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early in 1810, he saw a most profitable opportunity for France. The French government passed the Decree of Rambouillet on March 23, 1810, but had the law dated to show that it had gone into effect on May 20, 1809, the same day the Non-Intercourse Act became law. This allowed them to sell the American ships he had seized following the Bayonne Decree. More importantly, by repealing the Berlin and Milan Decrees, France was apparently adhering to the Macon Bill. The American Ambassador to France, John Armstrong, wrote to Madison confirming that the French Emperor in revoking its decrees, which meant that since Britain had not revoked its Orders-in-Council, the United States would have no choice but to once again impose the Non-Intercourse Act against the British. However, despite the repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, Napoleon specified nothing about the Bayonne or Rambouillet Decrees, which also prohibited American trading with Britain. The American government had not been specific enough when it passed Macon's Bill, and France could thus claim to have fulfilled its end of the agreement while in reality had surrendered nothing. The end result was that Napoleon had used American laws to further alienate Britain and the United States and make a very tidy profit. On November 2, 1810, Madison declared that the Non-Intercourse Act be reapplied to Britain, and would go into affect three months later.

<sup>116</sup> G.F. Butler, 'Commercial Relations of Nova Scotia and the United States 1783-1830' (master's thesis, Dalhousie University, 1934), 19-22

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.; Bermuda Archives, Custom Records of Ships Entering, C/9-4,5; PRO, Colonial Office, New Brunswick Shipping Returns 1808-1811, 193/1, 193/2. The loss of trade for British merchants in the North American station proved most alarming. Bermuda records show that while eighty-one vessels entered its port in 1810, only twenty-one would do so in 1811, dropping imports by more than seventy-five per cent. The results were nearly as bad for the island's exports, which were down by almost fifty per cent in 1811. Halifax records show that not one American ship stopped into its ports that year, although this was partially offset by a marked increase in ships entering from St. John, New Brunswick. American and British shipping accounted for sixty ships entering Halifax in 1810, but the absence of American shipping the following year dropped this total to twenty-six. New Brunswick shipping was the only bright spot, as the number of vessels clearing its ports for Halifax jumped from forty-seven in 1810 to eighty in 1811. American exports were still finding their way across the Maine border into New Brunswick, ensuring that Nova Scotians were not deprived of American supplies. However, Nova Scotia's exports fell sharply that year; fifty-five ships had sailed for Britain and the West Indies in 1810, but only six vessels were sent for all of 1811. With fewer enemy ships being brought to the prize courts, it proved a lean year for the station's economy.

from the Royal Navy (Deguyo was in fact an American citizen).<sup>118</sup> A few days later, Pechell boarded two other American merchant ships, and impressed two more Americans to serve in the Royal Navy.<sup>119</sup> All three men would eventually be released back to the United States three months later, but the damage was done.<sup>120</sup> No simple apology would suffice this time. When he received word of the *Guerrière*, President Madison ordered Commodore John Rodgers to leave Annapolis with instructions to pursue the British ship and return with the impressed American citizens.<sup>121</sup> The American sentiment was clear, and Rodgers was given total discretion on how to retrieve the captives.

Rodgers sailed with the powerful 44-gun frigate USS *President*, which along with her two sister-ships *Constitution* and *United States* formed the core of the small American Navy. These ships represented the epitome of strength and speed, and were among the most formidable frigates in the world. Rodgers sailed on May 12, and the next day encountered a brig whose captain informed him that the *Guerrière* was seen cruising off Cape Henry.<sup>122</sup> This information would unfortunately prove incorrect. The British frigate was in fact cruising off South Carolina, but it was the only information that Rodgers had available. For two days the *President* sailed around the waters off Cape Henry, when she spotted a warship on May 16. This was not the frigate *Guerrière*, but rather the sloop *Little Belt*, under the command of Captain Arthur Batt Bingham. He had been ordered by

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<sup>118</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:7-8

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

Sawyer to go deliver dispatches to Captain Pechell off Charleston. If he did not meet the frigate in the vicinity, he was to,

Stand to the northwards, and use your utmost endeavors to join him off the Capes of Virginia, or off New York; and, in the event of not meeting the *Guerrière*, you will cruise as long as your provisions of water will last, and then repair to Halifax for further orders. You are to pay due regard to protecting the trade of his Majesty's subjects, and the capture or destruction of the ships of the enemy. You are to be particularly careful not to give any just cause of offence to the government or subjects of the United States of America; and to give very particular orders to this effect to the officers you may have occasion to send on board ships under the American flag. You are not to anchor in any of the American ports but in case of absolute necessity, but then put to sea again as soon as possible.<sup>123</sup>

One cannot help but sympathize with Bingham for what was about to happen. Pechell was doing precisely what Sawyer wanted to avoid, yet it was the *Little Belt* that would pay the price. As for the *Guerrière*, she would soon enough have her own encounter with an American 44-gun frigate.

The *President* began closing on the *Little Belt* in order to ascertain what ship she was. Rodgers wrote on his approach at about 7:20 p.m.,

She at the same time hoisted an ensign or flag at her mizzen peak, but it was too dark for me to discover what nation it represented; now for the first time her broad side was presented to our view, but night had so far progressed, that although' her appearance indicated she was a Frigate, I was unable to determine her actual force.<sup>124</sup>

He knew he was approaching a British warship, but was uncertain whether she was the *Guerrière*. At 8:15 p.m., the two ships were only one and a half miles apart. Bingham wrote in his log,

He came within hail, I hailed and asked what ship she was, he repeated my questions. I again hailed and asked what ship she was: he again repeated my words and

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<sup>123</sup> Sawyer to Captain Arthur Batt Bingham, April 19, 1811, *Naval Chronicle* 26: 84

<sup>124</sup> Commodore John Rodgers to Paul Hamilton, May 23, 1811, William S. Dudley, ed., *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1985), 1:45-49

returned fired a broadside, which I instantly returned, the action then became general and continued for three quarters of an hour.<sup>125</sup>

Rodgers' account of what happened also agree that both he and Bingham and were calling out to find out each other's identity, but wrote,

Having asked the first question, and of course considering myself entitled by the common rules of politeness to the first answer, after a pause of fifteen or twenty seconds, I reiterated my first enquiry of 'What ship is that?' and before I had time to take the trumpet from my mouth, was answered by a shot that cut off one of our Maintopmast breast back stay's and went into our Main Mast, at this instant Captain Henry Caldwell (of Marines) who was standing very near to me on the gangway having observed 'Sir, she has fired at us' caused me on the gangway to pause for a moment just as I was in the act of giving an order to fire a shot in return.....When the first shot fired was fired, being under the impression that it might have possibly have proceeded from accident and without orders of the commander, I had determined at that moment to fire only a single shot in return, but the immediate repetition of the previous unprovoked outrage, induced me to believe that the insult was premeditated.....I accordingly with that degree of repugnance incident to feeling equally determined neither to be the aggressor, or to suffer the Flag of my country to be insulted with impunity; gave a general order to fire; the effect of which in four to six minutes as near as I can judge, having produced a partial silence of his guns, I gave the order to cease fire.<sup>126</sup>

Both Bingham and Rodgers had called out to each other, but weather that day was extremely windy, and it made it very difficult for either side to hear what the other was saying. Bingham later admitted that he ordered his guns to be loaded with double-shot, and Rodgers also ordered his gun crews to prepare for action. With the two vessels only eighty yards apart, Bingham claimed in his report that when he called out again to know which ship he was addressing, a gun was heard being fired. Both sides claimed the other had fired the first shot, and a second shot was heard being fired a few seconds later. It is

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<sup>125</sup> Bingham to Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer, May 21, 1811, *Ibid.*, 1:41-43

<sup>126</sup> Rodgers to Hamilton, May 23, 1811, *Ibid.*, 1:45-49



impossible to know exactly which side fired first, as both captains swore that the other fired first.<sup>127</sup>

Although the *Little Belt* was completely outclassed by the American frigate, Bingham had no choice but to return fire, as he believed the *President* had fired first. No one is certain how long the fight lasted; Bingham stated it lasted forty-five minutes, while American officers claimed it was only fifteen to twenty minutes.<sup>128</sup> The British sloop's rigging was badly damaged and had fallen off, which prevented her guns from being able to fire. Seeing the damaged state of his opponent, Rodgers ordered his ship to stop firing. The *Little Belt* took a fearful punishment, suffering extensive damage to her hull and masts. She lost eleven men killed and another twenty-one wounded out of a crew of 121 officers and men.<sup>129</sup> By contrast, the *President* suffered only one seaman wounded and only slight damage to the ship.<sup>130</sup> Rodgers then hailed the crippled ship and asked if the ship had struck her colors, to which Bingham defiantly replied that she had not.

The following day, the *President* looked as if she was ready to renew the fight, but Rodgers instead sent a boat to the British sloop. Lieutenant John Orde Creighton, the *President's* first officer, presented Rodgers' message to Bingham. He stated that he regretted the action, particularly when he saw how inferior in strength the British ship was compared to his own.<sup>131</sup> Creighton asked why Bingham ordered his ship to fire on

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<sup>127</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6: 9-10. James asserts that the two guns were most likely fired by accident, as neither captain had reason to start a battle at that point.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Rodgers to Hamilton, May 23, 1811, Dudley, *Naval War of 1812*, 1:45-49

the *President*, and the British captain angrily denied in having fired the first shot.<sup>132</sup> Rodgers must have believed the sincerity of Bingham's denial, and offered to take the battered ship to the nearest American port to make repairs.<sup>133</sup> However, Bingham refused, and the *Little Belt* proceeded north to Halifax, where she arrived on May 28.<sup>134</sup>

News of the incident spread quickly across the Atlantic. Although Commodore Rodgers declared the incident an unfortunate one, many Americans openly rejoiced when they received the news. For years, British warships had harassed American shipping, and now an American warship had finally fought back. The only real regret shown was that the *President's* target was a small sloop and not the *Guerrière*. Rodgers was brought before a court of inquiry when he returned to port to answer for the engagement. The court's president, Commodore Stephen Decatur, declared Rodgers to have acted appropriately in response to having been fired upon first by the *Little Belt*, and acquitted Rodgers of any wrongdoing.<sup>135</sup> Despite the American government's apologies for what they termed an unfortunate accident, there was considerable rejoicing in having partially avenged the many wrongs inflicted upon the United States by the Royal Navy.<sup>136</sup>

While the Americans cheered Rodgers' actions, the British were understandably outraged by the incident. In their view, this was simply retaliation for the *Chesapeake*-

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<sup>132</sup> Bingham to Sawyer, May 21, 1811, *Ibid.*, 1:41-43

<sup>133</sup> Rodgers to Hamilton, May 23, 1811, *Ibid.*, 1:45-49

<sup>134</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:11

<sup>135</sup> Transcript of the court proceedings are found in *Naval Chronicle* 26:423-426

<sup>136</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 26:488-489. One American newspaper captured the popular sentiment by printing a poem entitled 'Rodgers and Decatur: Tit for Tat; or the *Chesapeake* paid for in British blood!'

*Leopard* incident. One letter from a man called Britannicus in the Quebec Mercury stated:

To the renowned John Rodgers, Captain of the Frigate *President*, Commodore in the United States of America, and Conqueror of the *Little Belt*

Great and Valiant sir- The respect which the generous and brave bear to the courage of an enemy, and to the candor and veracity of a gentleman, will readily suggest an excuse for my addressing you, after your late glorious exploit. To whom are the love and admiration of the illustrious of all nations due in a higher degree than to Commodore Rodgers, commander of the naval forces of a great maritime power, for his conquest of the *Little Belt*?

Sir, I approach you, as my ancestors did the druids of old, with sacred dread and silent wonder! Your country confers no hereditary titles for the most distinguished services; but why should not the present and future times record your fame by the name and addition of *Little Belt* Rodgers?

You were ordered to attack an enemy of equal force with your own; but with prudence even surpassing your valor (knowing like Sir John Falstaff that the better part of valor is discretion!) you chose to attack a vessel of force about a third of the size of your own. Magnanimous crew! Thrice valiant commodore! You can say more than Caesar: I came, I did not see (for it was night-time, and the enemy was so small that she could scarcely be seen in the day), I conquered!

Great Sir, if ever another pious Aeneas should, some hundred years hence revisit the shades below, may he find you occupied in bellowing the vaunts of your country, and in cracking the ---- of your enemies. Most renowned hero! Farewell!<sup>137</sup>

The British press relished in describing how the mighty American frigate fired on a ship less than half of its size, and were greatly angered over Rodgers' acquittal. They also supported Bingham's statement that it was the *President* that had fired the first shot.<sup>138</sup> They sneered at Rodgers' report that declared the whole incident as an accident, and demanded vengeance for the blood of the *Little Belt*'s crewmen.<sup>139</sup> There is little doubt that Rodgers would have used force against the *Guerrière* had her captain refused to hand

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid., 205-206

<sup>138</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 55. The *London Gazette* describes, 'We have now the word of honor of Captain Bingham that the firing was commenced by Rodgers; and who will put the veracity of an American captain in competition with that of an honorable British officer?'

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 54

over the impressed American sailors. With this incident, the war clouds that had loomed since the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair appeared even closer.

The government in London felt that with relations between the two nations deteriorating rapidly, they would need to further bolster the defense of their colonies. They sent Sir James Cockburn (brother of Sir George Cockburn, who would soon make a name for himself on the station) to serve as Bermuda's new governor, and he helped Evans speed up work on the new dockyard. He also went ahead and ordered the construction of additional sloops and schooners from the island's shipbuilders.<sup>140</sup> These were especially needed following another unfortunate loss to the squadron during the winter. While patrolling off Sandy Hook on March 6, the schooner *Thistle* was wrecked on nearby rocks during a storm, and suffered heavy casualties.

The British government also decided to send Lieutenant-General Sir John Coape Sherbrooke was sent to replace Prevost as lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia.<sup>141</sup> If war was declared, they wanted to be sure that an experienced officer would be on hand to command. Sherbrooke would take an avid interest in the naval defense of his station, and had no qualms in voicing his opinions to Sawyer. The only disappointment was that there

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<sup>140</sup> Euphemia Young Bell and associates, *Beautiful Bermuda: The Bermuda Blue Books* (New York and Bermuda, 1946), 142; Fredercick P. Scmitt, "A Listing of Naval Ships built in Bermuda", *The Bermuda Historical Quarterly* 18, #2 (1961), 49-56; Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam*, 1:274. The Bermuda shipyards would build a total of six sloops, eight cutters and twenty-four schooners for the Royal Navy between 1806 and 1812.

<sup>141</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. Sir John Coape Sherbrooke; Raddall, *Warden of the North*, 151-152. Sherbrooke was born in 1764, and commissioned as an ensign in the army in 1780. He gained much fame and prominence during the Peninsular War, where he served as Wellesley's second-in-command. He left Spain in 1810 because of his health, and after being promoted to lieutenant-general the following year, he was sent to replace Prevost as governor of Nova Scotia. He later participated in the Castine expedition in 1814, and after the war was named Governor-in-Chief and Captain-General of Canada. He was forced to resign following a paralytic stroke in 1818, and died on February 14, 1830.

would be no additional naval reinforcements sent to the squadron during the immediate future.<sup>142</sup>

Fortunately, the rest of the year went by without any similar incidents. Sawyer attempted some damage control by ordering the return of the three sailors taken by the *Guerrière* earlier that spring.<sup>143</sup> The only recorded action with enemy warships occurred on July 7, when the *Emulous* captured the French privateer brig *L'Adèle* and recaptured the Portuguese brig *Ceres* off Charleston. The French raider was pierced for sixteen cannons but carried only two on the day of the engagement, and did not put up much of a fight.<sup>144</sup>

The following month, the sloop HMS *Tartarus* (20) became involved in what could have escalated into another serious incident. On August 20, while delivering dispatches to Ambassador Foster in Norfolk, she intercepted the American schooner *Severn* and ship *Orion* as they neared the port. The two vessels were found to be in violation of the Orders-in-Council (the *Orion* was in fact a former French ship), and were brought back to Halifax, where they were condemned as legitimate prizes.<sup>145</sup> It was fortunate that in the aftermath of the *President-Little Belt* affair that there were no major repercussions from this action. The Admiralty remained concerned that another incident between British and American warships could lead to war, and ordered Sawyer to ensure that this would not happen.<sup>146</sup> Sawyer would issue an order to his captains to not come within fifteen leagues

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<sup>142</sup> Sawyer to Croker, October 5, 1811, Adm.1/501, 249

<sup>143</sup> Sawyer to Colonel Barclay, June 25, 1811, *Naval Chronicle* 26:195-196.

<sup>144</sup> Captain William Mulcaster to Sawyer, July 30, 1811, Adm.1/501, 222

<sup>145</sup> Captain Pasco to Sawyer, January 19, 1812, Adm.1/502, 67-68

<sup>146</sup> Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea', 43

of the American coast, and that they were forbidden to board any American ship regardless of cause.<sup>147</sup> This order would cause repercussions for the squadron the following year.

During the fall of 1811, Sawyer prepared for the transfer of the bulk of the squadron to Bermuda. He was pleased to receive word that he had been promoted on August 1 to the rank of Vice-Admiral of the Blue, the same rank his father held when he commanded the squadron.<sup>148</sup> He planned on sending the *Melampus* back to England with one of the convoys at the end of the year, so she could receive a proper refit. This must have been most welcome news to her crew, as they had not received any pay for almost six years.<sup>149</sup> On November 19, Sawyer sailed for Bermuda with his flagship *Africa* (64), frigate *Spartan* (38) and sloop *Atalante*, and arrived there on November 30.<sup>150</sup> The *Belvedira* also arrived at the island on the same day following a short cruise, joining the *Guerrière*, *Colibri* and *Plumper*, which had arrived at the island earlier in November.<sup>151</sup> This left the *Aeolus*, *Indian*, *Tartarus*, *Emulous*, *Gorée*, *Bream*, brig *Juniper* (8), schooners *Cuttle* and *Chub* back in Halifax, although most of these were merely finishing their refits before proceeding to their winter stations.<sup>152</sup> All remaining vessels, except for the *Aeolus*, would

<sup>147</sup> Sawyer to Mulcaster, January 25, 1812, Adm.1/502, 25-26. Despite attempts to avoid antagonizing the Americans, the squadron seized thirteen American merchant ships during 1811, the highest total since 1808. See Appendix A for a list of the ships captured.

<sup>148</sup> Sawyer to Croker, October 17, 1811, Adm.1/501, 260

<sup>149</sup> Sawyer to Croker, November 11, 1811, Adm.1/501, 263

<sup>150</sup> Sawyer to Croker, January 9, 1812, Adm.1/501, 20-21

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

sail for Bermuda in December.<sup>153</sup> She remained in Halifax until relieved by the *Tartarus*, which in turn was replaced by the *Atalante* in February.<sup>154</sup>

Sherbrooke was displeased about the disposition of Sawyer's squadron during the winter, and was worried that there would be only one warship to defend the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia coastline.<sup>155</sup> He wrote to Liverpool stating that if war broke out with the United States, there would be little chance of a successful defense from an attack by an American squadron while the bulk of Sawyer's ships were in Bermuda.<sup>156</sup> He urged for more reinforcements, pointing out that the United States had over two thousand fishing schooners operating between Newburyport and Cape Cod that could be used as privateers.<sup>157</sup> However, Sherbrooke had no better luck in getting reinforcements from London than Sawyer.<sup>158</sup>

The *President-Little Belt* incident was followed by a period of furious diplomatic activity. The new British minister in Washington, Augustus Reed Foster, tried his best to smooth over relations between the two sides, but had not been given any instructions from London regarding the issues of impressment and right of search. The British demanded reparations for the *Little Belt*, while the Americans refused to even discuss the matter until the British paid reparations for the *Chesapeake*.<sup>159</sup> Foster had been able to

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, 3:326

<sup>155</sup> Sherbrooke to Liverpool, April 22, 1812, PANS, RG 1, 59: 37

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, 3:326

<sup>158</sup> Lohnes, *The War of 1812 at Sea*, 41

<sup>159</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:255

arrange a settlement over the status of the two remaining seamen taken from the *Chesapeake* later in November, but this was still too little to satisfy the War Hawks.<sup>160</sup>

Although it did not seem apparent to the American government, the demands for England to drop its Orders-in-Council were about to come true in 1812. British merchants had been equally vocal in their anger towards this law as the merchants from the United States. On June 23, 1812, they were able to bring enough pressure on the Liverpool government to get them to finally revoke the Orders-in Council.<sup>161</sup> No longer would American ships be subjected to the constant scrutiny of British warships on the high seas, and could sail to any port on the continent without having to first stop off in England. Unfortunately for them it was too little, too late, as the patience of the American government had finally worn out.

The attitude of congress regarding the British offenses had taken a much harder line since 1810. That year saw the election of a group of about sixty congressmen from the southern and western American states that became known as the War Hawks. They firmly believed that the only way Britain would ever heed their demands was by a show of force. Apart from the questions of impressment and right of search, the War Hawks were convinced that British agents in Canada instigated the recent Indian attacks in Indiana (culminating in Governor William Henry Harrison's victory at Tippecanoe).<sup>162</sup> Canada was long perceived as the soft underbelly of the British Empire, and many were openly advocating it. Its conquest would not only bring the British to the negotiating table with

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

<sup>161</sup> Updyke, *Diplomacy of the War of 1812*, 139

<sup>162</sup> Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, 184-187



regards to the naval questions, but also prevent further Indian attacks on American settlements in the west.<sup>163</sup>

One of the first concrete signs that showed that war was imminent occurred on April 4, 1812, when the United States issued a 90-day embargo against Britain and her colonies. The Royal Navy at this time could best be described as a naval superpower, and their hundreds of warships could easily have scooped up the American merchant fleet on the sea lanes. The only way to protect American merchant ships was to remove them from the seas. American trade would suffer in the short run (after all, the Americans believed it was going to be a short war), but once the war was over, the bottled-up merchant ships would be free to roam the seas again. Yet they would soon discover that not everything would go according to their plans; it would be three years before the American merchant marine was able to return to the sea lanes in force.

Many New Englanders saw the new embargo as an overture to war.<sup>164</sup> The mood of many of them was captured by a resolution passed by the Rhode Island Assembly on April 7, known as the Providence Resolutions. It stated that while both Britain and France had passed laws that violated the neutral rights of the United States, France had acted first with the Berlin Decree,

And still persists in capturing, and burning our vessels on the high seas; and in robbing, imprisoning, and insulting our citizens; yet all these atrocities have been either palliated, or excused; while every effort has been made to excite the prejudices and animosities of the people against Great Britain. British vessels are excluded from our harbors; and our citizens are forbidden to import goods of the growth and manufacture of Britain and her dependencies; at the same time that French privateers are suffered to refit in American ports; and French goods are received, and protected by our government.

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 127

Dreadful are these consequences of war; but more dreadful will await us. A war with England will bring us into alliance with France. This alliance would make the last page of our history as a nation. All horrors of war might be endured; but who can endure to become a slave? If we are allied to that putrid pestilence of tyranny; our laws, freedom, independence, national name and glory, are blotted out from the memory of man; If Bonaparte sends to this country, ships, and French soldiers, and French generals, we shall like Holland, and Italy, and Switzerland, and every other country where this scourge of nations has been permitted to set his foot.<sup>165</sup>

But as the Federalists were not in power, they could do little besides show their disdain. On June 1, citing a slew of British offenses against the sovereignty of the United States, President Madison asked congress to vote on a declaration of war.<sup>166</sup> He stated four reasons for this: impressment, the illegal blockades, the Orders-in-Council, and the allegations that British agents had been responsible for renewed Indian warfare on the Northwest frontier over the winter of 1811-1812.<sup>167</sup> After the vote was passed in both Congress and the Senate, the United States formally declared war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812.<sup>168</sup>

Many historians have disputed that the reasons for war were as simple as those listed by Madison. More than a few Americans openly stated their desire to conquer and annex Canada, and this was the main objective at the start of the war. However, some of them believed that the United States was simply waging a war of conquest, and one opinion wrote:

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<sup>165</sup> Providence Resolutions, April 7, 1812, Dudley, ed., *Naval War of 1812*, 1:69-72

<sup>166</sup> Dudley, ed., *Naval War of 1812*, 1:130-134

<sup>167</sup> Madison to Jefferson, April 24, 1812, Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, 99-100, 110. The question of the validity of France's claim to have repealed its own oppressive laws was brought to light on March 23, when it was announced that French frigates had burned two American merchant ships heading for Spain. The French reply was that their anti-neutral decrees would be repealed when the United States forced the British to respect its rights.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

You have declared war, it was said, for two principal alleged reasons: one, the general policy of the British government, formulated in the successive Orders-in-Council, to the unjustifiable injury and violation of American commerce; the other, the impressment of seamen from American merchant ships. What have Canada and the Canadians to do with either? If war you must, carry on your war upon the ocean, the scene of your avowed wrongs, and the seat of your adversary's prosperity, and do not embroil these innocent regions and people in the common ruin which, without adequate cause, you are bringing upon your own countrymen, and upon the only nation that now upholds the freedom of mankind against the oppressor of our race, that incarnation of all despotism- Napoleon.<sup>169</sup>

Most historians have stuck to the traditional theories on the cause of war, that it was either a land grab on the part of the Americans or a means to redress wrongs committed by the British. Mahan stated that the origins of the war were to be found in "the principles governing commercial, colonial and naval policy, accepted almost universally prior to the French Revolution."<sup>170</sup> Other historians such as Margaret Latimer, Julius Pratt and George Rogers Taylor cite the chief causes of the war as being Britain's violation of American rights on the high seas and impressment of her seamen; the incitement and arming of Indians on the American frontier; American annexationists ambitions for Florida and Canada; the belief that England was responsible for the economic depression of the American South; and the accumulated British insults to American honor.<sup>171</sup> Donald Hickey even theorized that the war was started by the Republican Party as a means of consolidating its power.<sup>172</sup> There was certainly something self-serving in the American

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<sup>169</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:292

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 1:1

<sup>171</sup> Wade Dudley, 'Without Some Risk: A Reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815' (Ph.D. diss, University of Alabama, 1999), 2; Faye Kert, *Research in Maritime History #11- Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812* (St. John's, Nfld, 1997), 11-12; Margaret K. Latimer, 'South Carolina- A Protagonist of the War of 1812', *American Historical Review* 61 (November, 1956), 914-929; George R. Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812", *Journal of Political Economy* 39 (September, 1931), 471-505.

<sup>172</sup> Donald Hickey, *The War of 1812: The Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana, Ill., 1989).

government's decision to blame the British for attacks on their shipping while ignoring similar attacks committed by the French. The answer is quite simply that while the United States could hurt England, she could do little to France. The British had colonies in North America that could be attacked by the Americans; the French did not. British ships roamed the seas freely and in large numbers, while few French ships could be found outside of French ports. Declaring war on France in 1812 would have had the same impact as declaring war on Prussia. In any case, England had committed more transgressions against the United States than France, so it was just as well for the Americans that they could offer several targets for attack. Despite all these reasons, the Americans must have believed that with England fully committed in the war against Napoleon, their chances of victory were certainly good.<sup>173</sup>

Ironically, the War Hawks proved themselves an enormous liability for the American Navy. While plans were being made to increase the size of the regular army and the militia, the government refused to appropriate funds to increase the size of its navy. Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton wanted to begin construction of twelve 74-gun ships-of-the-line and twenty frigates, which he believed would give the United States Navy a decisive advantage over the four small British squadrons in North America and the West Indies.<sup>174</sup> It was understood that while Britain was still locked in its death struggle with France, it would not be able to spare many ships to send to North America. The French Navy still continued to grow in size, and though their battle fleets were content for the most part to stay penned up in their ports after Trafalgar, their existence

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<sup>173</sup> For a detailed account of French attacks on American shipping during this period, see Bonnel, *La France, les États-Unis et la Guerre de Course*.

forced the Royal Navy to keep the lion's share of its ships assigned to blockade duty.<sup>175</sup> So long as France continued to dominate Europe, the Americans would only have to face a small fraction of Britain's strength. With the fleet Hamilton envisioned, The United States Navy would hold a decisive edge over the British in the waters around North America. Unfortunately for Hamilton, the War Hawks were opposed to the idea of enlarging the navy. They remained suspicious about having a large permanent navy, which they viewed as an expensive luxury. The representatives for the western states in congress also had no interest of having government funds given to the eastern states without receiving any benefits for themselves.<sup>176</sup> For the price of one 74-gun ship-of-the-line, it was possible to fit out a score of small coastal gunboats, which were easier to maintain.<sup>177</sup> Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin issued a budget for the building of Hamilton's fleet, but was voted down.<sup>178</sup> He tried to get the government to approve the construction of three 44-gun frigates, which was considerably less than what he had asked, but this too was rejected in the Senate by a vote of sixty-two to fifty-nine.<sup>179</sup> One can only imagine the sheer havoc that might have been wrought had these senators not been so shortsighted. It was instead decided to place all of their naval hopes on a large fleet of small gunboats, whose effectiveness would soon be tested. A handful of frigates would soon bring about much grief to a navy that reigned supreme in every corner of the

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<sup>174</sup> Hamilton to Langdon Cheeves, December 3, 1811, Dudley, ed., *Naval War of 1812*, 1:53-59

<sup>175</sup> Richard Glover, "The French Fleet 1807-1814: Britain's Problem and Madison's Opportunity", *Journal of Modern History* 40 (September 1967), 235-241

<sup>176</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:260

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Dudley, ed., *Naval War of 1812*, 1:50-52

globe, but with the fleet envisioned by Hamilton, the damage could have been far worse.<sup>180</sup>

While the politicians continued their talks, Sawyer's squadron continued its assigned tasks. At the end of March, he received word that a French squadron composed of five frigates and one sloop were spotted near Antigua, and ordered the *Shannon* and *Guerrière* to search for them.<sup>181</sup> Poor weather delayed their departure until April 4, and after a two-week search they returned to Bermuda.<sup>182</sup> The *Colibri* was sent to St. Mary's River in April to protect the Spanish inhabitants around St. Augustine from an insurrection by rebel forces, which were supposedly being aided by the Americans.<sup>183</sup> General George Matthews was sent to organize a revolution in the Spanish territory as a prelude to American annexation, and had been given verbal orders to this from Madison. He crossed into Florida with a small force of seventy men, supported by five American gunboats.<sup>184</sup> He demanded Governor Estrada, to surrender St. Augustine, but the governor refused to meet with Matthews. British ships in the region brought supplies to the city, which further strengthened Estrada's resolve to hold out.<sup>185</sup> Once Matthews' activities were revealed in Congress, Madison had little choice but to repudiate his

<sup>180</sup> For a full account of the American naval policy debate, see Craig L. Symonds, *Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States 1785-1827* (Newark, N.J., 1980), 105-170

<sup>181</sup> Sawyer to Croker, April 30, 1812, Adm.1/502, 93-94

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> Sawyer to Croker, May 26, 1812, Adm.1/502, 96

<sup>184</sup> Rembert W. Patrick, *Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border 1810-1815* (Athens, Ga, 1954), 120-122; Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, 98-99; Tebeau, *History of Florida*, 104-105

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

actions.<sup>186</sup> The *Colibri* stayed to watch for any activity by American ships until the end of April, when she was relieved by two ships from the Jamaica squadron, the frigate *Southampton* (32) and sloop *Sappho* (18).<sup>187</sup> She then proceeded to New Providence, and returned to Bermuda on May 5.<sup>188</sup> She later grounded on a shoal near Murray's anchorage, and was sent to Halifax on May 17 to be refitted.<sup>189</sup>

The first warning Sawyer received of any impending conflict with the United States occurred in May, when he received word of the new American embargo, and that the frigate *President* and eighteen gunboats were on their way to the Bay of Fundy to enforce it.<sup>190</sup> This was followed by a letter sent by the Admiralty on May 9 to the commanders North American and West Indies stations, which stated that in the event of war, the squadrons were directed to attack and destroy all ships belonging to the United States. However, the same message also warned them to avoid taking any action until the Americans formally declared war.<sup>191</sup> This mixed message must have confounded Sawyer, but his actions in June were those of a man who did not believe that Britain and the United States were on the brink of war, and his squadron's disposition reflected this. He left Bermuda on June 11 with the *Africa* and *Tartarus*, and arrived in Halifax eleven days later. There he found the *Indian*, *Plumper*, *Bream* and *Julia*, although the last ship was in very poor shape. He left the *Emulous*, *Gorée* and *Cuttle* behind at Bermuda, while the

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> Sawyer to Croker, June 10, 1812, Adm.1/502, 110-111

<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>190</sup> Sawyer to Croker, May 31, 1812, Adm.1/502, 109

<sup>191</sup> Admiralty to the Commanders of Newfoundland, Halifax, Jamaica and Leeward Islands Stations, May, 9, 1812, Adm.2/163; Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 106-107; Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic*, 247

*Guerrière* and *Shannon* were still at sea, and were not expected back until the middle of June. The *Aeolus*, *Belvedira*, *Atalante* and *Recruit* arrived in Bermuda a few days after the *Africa* left for Halifax, and each would sail separately for Nova Scotia in the days that followed. The rest of the ships in the squadron were performing their usual duties. Sawyer even ordered the *Bream* to sail for Boston on June 23 to deliver dispatches, a full week after war had been declared.<sup>192</sup> Four days later, the *Belvedira*'s arrived in Halifax with damaged sails and rigging, announcing for all to see that the United States and Great Britain were at war.

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<sup>192</sup> Sawyer to Croker, June 25, 1812, Adm.1/502, 108.



## CHAPTER 4: ON THE DEFENSIVE 1812-1813

Mahan pointed out that, had England been able to avert the War of 1812, the triumph of British diplomacy would have been unqualified.<sup>1</sup> The last thing the British government needed or wanted at this time was to be embroiled in a war with the United States. Wellington's successes in the Peninsular War and the start of the war between France and Russia was definitely good news for them, but the bulk of Britain's military and naval strength was still committed to the European conflict, leaving few resources available to defend her colonies.<sup>2</sup> Most of the ships in the Royal Navy were committed to the European theatre, while the few troops available were shipped off to reinforce Wellington's army in Spain. Few people on either side of the border expected Canada to withstand a full-scale American invasion. Jefferson remarked that "the acquisition of Canada this year (1812) as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching."<sup>3</sup> At the outset, it seemed any hope the British colonists in Canada had rested in the belief that the Royal Navy would quickly blockade the American ports and force an early settlement. But despite the rising tensions between the two nations, the Admiralty had not prepared any actual plans in the event of an American declaration of war. The behavior of the Royal Navy in the first six months of the war could best be described as reactive, and the initiative rested firmly in American hands. It was hardly a coincidence that the United States Navy scored its most famous successes against the Royal Navy during this period.

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<sup>1</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power In Its Relations to the War of 1812*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1905), 1:267-276

<sup>2</sup> Adm.8/100, July 1, 1812. At the time of the declaration of war, there were 103 ships-of-the-line in the Royal Navy. The four squadrons in North America and the West Indies had only three of these, while the Mediterranean Fleet alone had twenty-nine ships-of-the-line.

<sup>3</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:291

Yet if the British could be excused for their lack of preparation due to their inability to read American government's intentions correctly, the same could not be said for the Americans. Few nations ever entered a conflict as ill prepared as the United States was in 1812. The indictment is all the more damning considering that they were the aggressor. In many ways, the United States' situation in 1812 does bear some resemblance to Italy in 1940; both nations began what they believed would be a short war against England, but their initial military defeats, coupled with their lack of preparation for war, led them into a drawn out and costly conflict.

As noted in Chapter 1, The War of 1812 was the fourth major conflict fought in North America since the mid-18<sup>th</sup> Century. In the first half of the century, the Anglo-French colonial rivalry, buttressed by British and French commercial and fishing interests, played itself out in North America. The nature of imperialism changed in the second half of the century when the territorial imperative began to govern policy. As shown previous chapters, the Newcastle Administration was prepared to negotiate the return of Louisbourg to France in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which infuriated the American colonists. In the Seven Years' War, for the first time, Britain gave full attention to the defeat of France in North America, and France gave up its few acres of snow for more profitable acquisitions in the West Indies. But in the next war that followed, England faced off against its former colonies in America. In this conflict, the British were divided on how to deal with the American situation, and ill-prepared to fight the first modern colonial war. Furthermore, unlike the two earlier wars, not only was England forced to fight its former allies, but also faced a France that was not encumbered by a continental conflict.

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The War of 1812 caught the British in a most precarious situation in North America. In terms of geography, they occupied a position almost identical to that of New France in the Seven Years War. Both the French in 1756 and British in 1812 were embroiled in a larger continental conflict and could devote few resources to aid their beleaguered colonies. Also, just as the American colonies advocated the conquest of Canada in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> Century, so too were many Americans advocating the same thing in 1812. However, there were numerous differences between the 1756 and 1812 models. In the first scenario, the British had complete control of the seas, while the French were rarely able to leave their ports in strength to help their colonies. But in the second scenario, at no time during the War of 1812 was England cut off from its colonies or prevented from sending aid to them. Had the United States built up an effective ocean-sailing navy, and been able to stop the British from interfering in North America as the French had been during the Seven Years War, the situation would have been far different. As a result, while the British were almost leisurely in their conquest of Canada (for which they needed five years to accomplish), the Americans counted on winning a quick war before the British could send large reinforcements to that theatre. Though they had no way of knowing this at the start of the war, time would prove a factor that worked against the United States. Within two years of the war's beginning in 1812, Napoleon would go from master of Europe to exile on Elba, leaving the British free to devote all of their resources to the American theatre. And if there were some division about fighting the Americans in 1775, there would be none in 1814.

Another important factor that weighed against the American was that unlike the conquest of Canada in the Seven Years War, the United States was very much divided on declaring war against England in 1812. Worse still, this division was a geographical one, as

the war proved highly unpopular in New England. The hostility of New Englanders would hamper American military operations, and forced them to concentrating their efforts along Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. In 1775, an American army was able to march into Canada and reach the walls of Quebec before it was stopped, but there was to be no repeat of this in 1812. In fact, at no time during the war would the Americans be able to seriously threaten the eastern provinces by land or by sea. Thus, while the British used a multi-prong attack to conquer Canada, thereby splitting up the French forces, the Americans concentrated on a much narrower theatre, making it easier for the British to defend their colonies in 1812 than it was for the French in 1759.

Few men in the Royal Navy felt any cause for worry from the small upstart Yankee Navy. In terms of quantity, the United States Navy ranked well below the European navies. In the spring of 1812, the American Navy consisted of three 44-gun frigates (*Constitution*, *President*, and *United States*), three 38-gun frigates (*Congress*, *Constellation*, and *Chesapeake*), the 36-gun frigate *New York*, the 32-gun frigate *Essex*, three 28-gun corvettes (*Adams*, *Boston*, and *John Adams*), two 18-gun sloops (*Hornet* and *Wasp*), three 16-gun brigs (*Argus*, *Siren*, and *Oneida*), three 14-gun brigs (*Vixen*, *Nautilus*, and *Enterprise*), and the 12-gun brig *Viper*.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, there were 165 gunboats to defend the American coastline, but their combat worth would prove quite low.<sup>5</sup> Far more disturbing for them, some of their ships had been allowed to fall into such a state of disrepair that they were unable to participate in the war. The *John Adams* would have to be completely rebuilt after

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<sup>4</sup> Howard I. Chapelle, *History of the American Sailing Navy* (New York, 1949), chapters 4-5; James Fenimore Cooper, *The History of the Navy of the United States of America* (Delmar, N.Y., 1988), 241.

<sup>5</sup> Chapelle, *American Sailing Navy*, 190-198; Benson J. Lossing, *The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812* (New York, 1868), 231; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:291, 295; Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918* (Princeton, 1939), 58-61

the war, while the *Boston* and *New York* were condemned as hulks.<sup>6</sup> Yet having a small navy did afford the Americans one advantage over the British. While the Royal Navy had long been forced to resort to outright kidnapping to fill its ships with men, the smaller United States Navy was actually forced to turn men away. The only requirement needed to enter the Royal Navy was to be able to stand on one's legs, but the Americans would only accept experienced sailors for their warships. This meant that at the center of the United States Navy was a corps of men who were experts at their work, who were paid well, and who endured living conditions on board their ships that the Royal Navy might consider luxurious. What the United States Navy was lacked in quantity, it tended to make up in quality.<sup>7</sup>

Against the twenty ocean-going warships in the United States Navy, the four combined Royal Navy squadrons could summon eighty-three warships, giving them a nominal superiority of four-to-one. These consisted of one 74-gun and two 64-gun ships-of-the-line, one 50-gun ship, fifteen frigates, thirty-six sloops, and twenty-eight brigs and smaller vessels.<sup>8</sup> Admiral Sawyer's squadron alone consisted of twenty-five warships, including the HMS *Africa* (64); frigates *Guerrière* (38), *Spartan* (38), *Shannon* (38), *Belvedira* (36), and *Aeolus* (32); sloops *Tartarus* (20), *Emulous* (18), *Atalante* (18), *Indian* (18), *Recruit* (18), *Gorée* (18), *Morgiana* (18), *Rattler* (18), *Sylph* (18), *Martin* (18), and *Colibri* (16);

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<sup>6</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812* (Annapolis, Md., 1987), 67. The brig *Oneida* was stationed on Lake Ontario, reducing the effective strength of the American fleet on the Atlantic to sixteen warships.

<sup>7</sup> Christopher McKee, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815* (Annapolis, Md., 1991)

<sup>8</sup> Adm.8/100, July 1, 1812. The Leeward Islands Squadron had one ship-of-the-line, three frigates, fifteen sloops, four brigs, and four schooners; the Jamaica Squadron had one ship-of-the-line, four frigates, eleven sloops, two brigs, and one receiving ship; the Newfoundland Squadron had one 50-gun ship, three frigates, six sloops, one cutter, and one schooner.

brigs *Plumper* (10) and *Juniper* (8); schooners *Paz* (10), *Chub* (4), *Cuttle* (4), and *Bream* (4); and station ships *Centurion* and *Ruby*.<sup>9</sup> Yet while this force alone appeared capable of handling the American Navy, Sawyer would soon be in dire need of additional reinforcements once the real naval menace became apparent.

One major disadvantage Sawyer faced at the start of the war was that most of the ships on the North American station were scattered, whereas the bulk of the American warships were stationed between in Boston, New York and Norfolk.<sup>10</sup> Despite the message from the Admiralty of May 9, Sawyer claimed that he had been given no clear indication that war was imminent. He also stated that he would never have ordered the *Africa* and *Aeolus* to Madeira in March had he suspected the possibility of war breaking out between the two nations.<sup>11</sup> Certainly, news of the embargo alone should have given Sawyer some grasp of the mood of the Madison administration. His excuse that he was unaware that the Americans were serious about war shows a commander who was grossly out of touch with the reality of the times. But the blame does not lie solely on his shoulders; despite the Admiralty's warning in May, they had prepared no contingency plans in the event of an American declaration of war.<sup>12</sup> Their Lordships insistence on avoiding another entanglement with the Americans after the *President-Little Belt* affair left Sawyer with few alternatives other than keeping his ships away from the American coast altogether. This

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Sawyer to Croker, April 9, 1812, Adm.1/502, 88-89

<sup>11</sup> Sawyer to Croker, July 18, 1812, Adm.1/502, 188-189

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.; William Laird Clowes, *A History of the Royal Navy From Earliest Times to the Present*, 7 vols. (London, 1897-1903), 6:3-4. The main members of the Board of Admiralty when the war of 1812 started were Lord Melville (first lord of the admiralty), John Wilson Croker (first secretary of the admiralty), John Barrow (second secretary of the admiralty), George Rose (treasurer of the navy), and Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Bouldon Thompson (comptroller of the navy).

prevented the squadron from obtaining hard information as to the dispersion of the American warships when war started. Rodgers and Decatur were thus able to break out into the Atlantic completely unobserved from British eyes.<sup>13</sup>

The question as to why the British didn't use their numerical advantage and simply overwhelm the Americans is one that merits further attention. In the first place, the four-to-one advantage the squadrons held over the United States Navy existed only on paper. Dozens of ships were needed for escort duty or to deliver dispatches, and several more were laid up for refitting. This put the squadron in very much the same situation it faced in 1775. Also, a shortage of shipwrights and naval stores at Bermuda winter meant that many of the ships in the squadron had to go without a proper refit during the winter, and would arrive in Halifax in a very poor state.<sup>14</sup> This left few ships available to even consider mounting a blockade. And while the United States did not have a fleet-in-being, the same could not be said of France. The French still maintained a formidable navy even after Trafalgar, forcing the Royal Navy to continue to commit the bulk of its ships to blockade the French coast and ports.<sup>15</sup> Memories of 1781 were still fresh, and the last thing the British needed was for a large French fleet to operate out of the United States, which could inflict considerable damage against them. Until the French threat was subdued, the North

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<sup>13</sup> Barry Judson Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea: The British Navy, New England and the Maritime Provinces of Canada' (master's thesis, University of Maine, 1971), 43

<sup>14</sup> Sawyer to Croker, April 30, 1812, Adm.1/502, 93-94

<sup>15</sup> Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America* (Toronto, 1950), 247

American theatre would remain a secondary priority, and would force Sawyer's squadron to fight a more limited war than it might have preferred.<sup>16</sup>

There were other factors that impeded the initial performance of the Royal Navy in 1812. From the Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico, the American coastline measured close to 1900 miles, which was relatively equal to the European coastline from Spain to the Baltic. After having fought numerous wars against the European powers since the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, the Royal Navy had become quite familiar with the geography of the European coast. It also helped that it was so close to England itself. However, the same could not be said of the American coastline. While the British had in their possession recent and accurate charts of the French coast, which was crucial for their blockade, most of the American charts were at least thirty years out of date, and had not been updated since the American Revolution.<sup>17</sup> This made it very risky for British warships to operate off the American coast, and by the end of the war, more British warships would be wrecked on uncharted rocks, sandbars and reefs along this coast than would be lost in combat against the Americans. For the Americans, local knowledge of their shores gave their warships and privateers a major advantage in evading the ships of His Majesty's Navy.

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<sup>16</sup> C.S. Forester, *The Age of Fighting Sail: The Story of the Naval War of 1812* (New York, 1956), 133; Jan Glede, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860* (Stockholm, 1993), 375-389 The fear of French involvement in the American war turned out to be empty. One of the few men to grasp that France would do nothing to aid the United States was Wellington, who claimed in 1812 that, 'If Bonaparte is wise, and has money, he will send out a large fleet. He has no money, however, and he must have found before now that a fleet cannot be equipped and maintained, as he maintains his armies, by requisitions on the unfortunate country which is made the seat of war.' Nevertheless, there was some basis for the British fears. Jan Glede has shown that French shipbuilding continued to build a large number of ships-of-the-line even after Trafalgar, and the number of these vessels they had on hand rose from 129 in 1805 to 179 in 1815. He also points out that the French Navy did not turn to large-scale guerre-de-course as an alternative to battle-fleet strategy, as their construction of frigates, the ideal warships for trade warfare, was given second priority to the ships-of-the-line. Because of this, the North American Squadron would continue to 'look to its rear' for signs of a French battle-fleet until France's defeat in 1814.

<sup>17</sup> Wade Dudley, 'Without Some Risk: A Reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815' (Ph.D. diss., University of Alabama, 1999), 99-100



Apart from the major Atlantic seaports, there were countless small inlets along the American coast that were ideal for shallow-draft privateers to hide in. Heavier-draft ships-of-the-line and frigates of the Royal Navy could pursue them only so far, and the only way they could engage them was to send out their long boats filled with marines to seek their targets.<sup>18</sup> As the war progressed, these amphibious operations would become standard practice for the British. However, they were very risky affairs, and not every operation was a success.

Given that the United States Navy could muster so few vessels, it might appear that the eighty-three warships in North American waters were enough to meet British naval objectives. In European waters, however, the British fleets charged with blockading the French and Dutch coasts could muster 169 warships, of which a quarter were ships-of-the-line. The Royal Navy was unable to prevent severe losses to merchant shipping (if one also includes the Mediterranean fleet, which was responsible for watching over France's southern coast, we can add another ninety warships to the total, including twenty-nine ships-of-the-line).<sup>19</sup> With three times as many ships available in European waters to watch over them, French raiders were still busy plundering British merchant ships. During 1812, the British lost 475 merchant ships to French warships and privateers, a clear indication that no blockade was foolproof.<sup>20</sup> Remembering that American privateer activity during the American Revolution had caused considerable damage to British trade, which should have

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Brian Lavery, *Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organization 1793-1815* (London, 1989), 245-248. In home waters, the Royal Navy consisted of the Channel fleet, the North Sea Fleet, and the Irish and Channel Islands squadrons.

<sup>20</sup> C.B. Norman, *The Corsairs of France* (London, 1887), 453

given the British some indication as to what to expect from these raiders, it should therefore have come as no surprise to the Admiralty when the Americans enjoyed considerable success against British trade during the first phase of the war. Yet it was not until February, 1813 that the Admiralty sent enough warships for a partial blockade of the American coast.<sup>21</sup>

The time taken to send dispatches across the Atlantic also proved to be a problem. There was a failure in the Admiralty to fully understand conditions in the American theatre, and a lack of mutual confidence between the Board of Admiralty and the officers commanding the North American Squadron. As will be shown, the Admiralty was slow to

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<sup>21</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 253-286; C.B. Norman, *The Corsairs of France* (London, 1887), 442-453; Richard Woodman, *The Victory of Sea Power: Winning the Napoleonic War 1806-1814* (London, 1998), 75-85. In his study on the effectiveness of the British blockade during the War of 1812, Wade Dudley compares this blockade to the British blockades of the French coast from 1793-1802 and 1803-1814. He cites that the most effective blockade occurred when the British employed the close blockade of the French ports, which confined the French fleet and provided better protection for British merchant ships, while the inability on the part of the Admiralty to send enough ships to North America, and the operations the squadron mounted against the American coast resulted in the Royal Navy's failure to mount a solid blockade against the United States, which would have been far more effective in protecting British trade. Yet there are some flaws in Dudley's research. In the first place, despite having far more ships in home waters and better ports to repair and refit their ships, the Royal Navy's blockade of the French coast was less a success than he describes. Though the French fleet was effectively contained, French privateers waged a fairly aggressive campaign against British trade. British merchant ship losses from 1804 to 1814 were as follows: 387 (1804), 507 (1805), 519 (1806), 559 (1807), 469 (1808), 571 (1809), 619 (1810), 470 (1811), 475 (1812), 371 (1813), 145 (1814). The biggest decline in British losses, apart from the last year of the war, occurred from 1810 to 1811, but this had less to do with the effectiveness of the blockade of the French coast than with the elimination of France's overseas bases in the East and West Indies after 1810. Norman's study shows that between 1804 and 1807, the bulk of French privateers captured or destroyed occurred in either the East Indies or West Indies, while losses in European waters were less than half (between 1804 to 1807, seventy-six French privateers were lost in the East and West Indies, while only thirty-six privateers were lost in European waters). Beginning in 1808, just as the Royal Navy began operations to reduce France's overseas bases, French privateer losses in European waters began overtake those in the colonies (twenty-two privateers lost in Europe, fourteen lost in the East and West Indies), signifying a decrease in privateer activity in those regions. By 1810, when British shipping losses were at their highest, French privateer losses occurred almost exclusively in European waters (twenty-nine privateers lost in European waters, five lost in the East and West Indies combined). We can therefore assume that the bulk of British shipping losses occurred in European waters. Thus, as France lost all of her overseas colonies, French privateer activity as a whole declined, as did British shipping losses. The elimination of these bases was a greater factor in the protection of British trade than their blockade against the French. Even with a large part of her navy committed to the blockade of the French coast, French privateers continued to wage an effective *guerre-de-course* against England right up to the end of the war. By 1812, the Royal Navy was already stretched to the limit, and if it could not implement a wooden wall to contain the French privateers in Europe, there was little hope that it could do the same in America.

appreciate the American naval threat, frequently sent conflicting orders, and in attempting to simplify problems would create a whole set of new ones.<sup>22</sup>

Just as they had done during the American Revolution, the United States pursued a *guerre-de-course* on the high seas during the present conflict. As was the case in 1775, they did not have an effective fleet to challenge the British for supremacy in their own waters, which forced them to rely on commerce raiding, and succeeded in doing considerable damage to British trade around the world. Historians have glorified the exploits of the American frigates in their victories in the early part of the war, but the primary threat would come from the hundreds of small privately-owned brigs, schooners and sloops that roamed the seas like angry wasps in search of British merchant ships. It was a threat the Royal Navy would have a hard time handling.

While American raiders were sent out to inflict as much damage to British trade as possible, the defense of their ports was left to the gunboats. Although the gunboats would prove to be inadequate to protect the American shores, the success of American commerce raiders would force the Royal Navy to devote more ships to serve as convoy escorts, or to be used to chase after raiders still at sea. The more ships assigned to these tasks meant fewer ships would be available to blockade the American coast. Yet by not having enough ships to blockade the coast, more American raiders could escape to the seas. As a result, at no time during the war would the British be able to implement a complete blockade of the American coast.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 95-96

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 124-125

Despite the advantages of being able to deliver the first strike against the British, there was considerable debate as to how the United States Navy could best be used. The senior American naval officers were divided as to the best way to use their ships. Commodore John Rodgers wanted to keep the fleet together as a single squadron (naturally, with himself as its commander), to immediately sail after war had been declared in order to catch any isolated British warship on the high seas before news of the war declaration reached Halifax.<sup>24</sup> The other two senior officers, Stephen Decatur and William Bainbridge, were opposed to this, and instead wanted the American ships to be split off individually or in pairs, and concentrate on British merchant shipping. They believed it was not worth risking the American fleet if caught by a larger British force. If the British caught one or two American ships, the loss would be far easier to bear.<sup>25</sup> A temporary solution was devised in which Decatur and Rodgers would each command a squadron of cruisers.<sup>26</sup> When the war started in June, only the frigates *President*, *United States*, and *Congress*, sloop *Hornet* and brig *Argus* were available for immediate operations.<sup>27</sup> Decatur and Rodgers left New York with the five warships on June 21, completely undetected from the British.<sup>28</sup> Their immediate target was a convoy of over one hundred merchant ships that left Jamaica for

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<sup>24</sup> Linda Maloney, 'The War of 1812: What Role for Sea Power', Kenneth J. Hagan, ed., *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1978* (Westport, Conn., 1978), 46-47

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 87-88

<sup>28</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:314, 322; Charles Oscar Paullin, *Commodore John Rodgers: Captain, Commodore and Senior Officer of the American Navy, 1773-1838*, (Cleveland, Oh., 1910), 246-248; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 87-88. Rodgers commanded the *President* and *Argus*, while Decatur commanded the *United States*, *Congress* and *Argus*. The frigate *Essex* was also under Rodgers' command, but was undergoing a refit and would miss the initial sortie.

England four weeks earlier.<sup>29</sup> Their aim was to inflict as much damage as possible against British shipping, and this convoy would be a good start. They also hoped that it would also draw off British warships away from their coast and prevent them from implementing a close blockade.<sup>30</sup>

The convoy that Rodgers and Decatur targeted had left Jamaica on May 20, escorted only by the frigate HMS *Thalia* (36) and the sloop *Reindeer* (18).<sup>31</sup> Rodgers received word of its location on June 23 from an American brig that had spotted it four days previous heading east, and promptly set out to intercept it.<sup>32</sup> However, a large sail was spotted later that day off Nantucket, and he ordered the squadron to investigate. The ship turned out to be the frigate *Belvedira*. She had been in the region searching for the French privateer *Marengo*, which was reported to be in the area.<sup>33</sup> Captain Richard Byron, the *Belvedira*'s commander, received no official word of that war had been declared, and tried to signal the American ships when they got within six miles of his ship. When he did not receive a reply he ordered his ship to turn away, for fear that the ships turned out to be French. After hoisting the *Belvedira*'s colors, Rodgers' ships did the same. Under normal circumstances, Byron might have met with the American ships, but he was wise not to do so this day. He encountered a New York pilot-boat a few days earlier, whose captain informed him that the

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<sup>29</sup> Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 87-88

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV*, 6 vols. (London, 1847), 6:80

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Sawyer to Croker, June 12, 1812, Adm.1/502, 148; Captain Richard Byron to Sawyer, June 27, 1812, William S. Dudley, ed., *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1985-1992), 157-160; Forester, *Age of Fighting Sail*, 29-33; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:81; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:323; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 88-91. Mahan mistakenly refers to the *Belvedira* as a 32-gun frigate.

United States and England were at war.<sup>34</sup> Byron dismissed the information, but with five American warships bearing down on him with in haste, he had little doubt that their intent was to attack his ship. In any case, he wanted to avoid another incident like the *Little Belt*.<sup>35</sup>

For fifteen hours the American ships chased the *Belvedira*, but only the *President* got close enough to fire at her. The British ship was hit several times, but she also gave as well as she received. Her crew skillfully maneuvered her away from the American ships, which gave up the chase at midnight. Byron's ship suffered two killed and twenty-two wounded, while the *President* lost four killed and eighteen wounded, including Commodore Rodgers.<sup>36</sup> On June 27, the *Belvedira* arrived in Halifax, and her damaged appearance was the first evidence to show that a state of war existed between the United States and Britain.<sup>37</sup>

The attack on the *Belvedira* caused a considerable stir in Halifax, but Sawyer was not prepared to believe that the United States and Britain were at war. Following her escape

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:83

<sup>37</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:84; Edgar Stanton Maclay, *A History of American Privateers* (New York/London, 1924), 226-228; Henry Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam: A History of the Island From 1784 to 1901*, 2 vols. (London, 1973), 302-303. The *Belvedira* was not the only ship that found out about the declaration of war the hard way. The small Bermuda-built schooner HMS *Whiting* (4) was lying at anchor off Hampton Roads on July 8, having sent some dispatches to Washington, when she was approached a small vessel. This was the American privateer *Dash* (1) out of Baltimore. As soon as the *Dash* approached the British schooner, her captain ordered the *Whiting* to surrender. The *Whiting*'s crew was unaware that war had been declared, and although they outgunned the privateer, the ship was not cleared for action. Seeing no alternative, Lieutenant Maxcey, the *Whiting*'s commander, ordered the ship's colors struck down. However, the *Dash*'s captain felt that capturing a ship before its crew knew that war had broken out was most unsportsman-like. In a most chivalrous manner he decided to let the *Whiting* go free, minus those of her crew that wanted to remain in America. Maxcey quickly departed for England, but would not reach her final destination; on August 22, the French privateer *Diligent* found the *Whiting*, and for the second time in as many months Maxcey was again forced to surrender his ship. Unlike the Americans, the French opted to keep their prize. Another British dispatch boat, HMS *Bloodhound*, was seized in the Chesapeake around the same time by the American privateer-schooner *Cora* (8), and also released.

from the American squadron, the *Belvedira* happened upon three American merchant ships, the *Fortune*, *Malcolm*, and *Pickering*, and took them as prizes of war.<sup>38</sup> Unfortunately, Sawyer ordered all three ships released. Even after he received Byron's report, he was still not convinced that war had been declared, and chose to follow his earlier orders to avoid any entanglements with the Americans. He believed the attack on Byron's ship might have been another misunderstanding.<sup>39</sup> One can only imagine the dismay by the *Belvedira*'s crew after having narrowly escaping capture only to stand by helplessly as three perfectly good prizes were released. Sawyer decided to resolve the matter by sending the *Colibri* to New York on June 28 in order to receive an official explanation for Rodgers' actions.<sup>40</sup> She arrived off Hook Island on July 9, and Captain Thompson went ashore to meet with the American representatives. He was presented not only with a copy of the declaration of war, but also with Ambassador Foster and the British consul, Colonel Barclay, who would be returning to Halifax. On July 12, the *Colibri* set sail for Halifax with the proof Sawyer needed that the *Belvedira* incident was no misunderstanding.<sup>41</sup> But by this time Sawyer had made up his mind that the United States and Britain were at war, and prepared his squadron accordingly.

The Jamaica convoy that Rodgers and Decatur were searching for arrived safely in England on August 23.<sup>42</sup> In fact, their squadrons yielded no more than seven merchant

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<sup>38</sup> Sawyer to Croker, June 28, 1812, Adm.1/502, 148-149

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.; Augustus Foster to Sawyer, June 15, 1812, Adm.1/502, 143-144. Augustus Foster, the British Minister in Washington, wrote to Sawyer on June 15 that the Senate would carry the vote to declare war, but Sawyer didn't receive it until it was too late.

<sup>40</sup> Sawyer to Croker, July 5, 1812, Adm.1/502, 144-145

<sup>41</sup> Sawyer to Croker, July 21, 1812, Adm.1/502, 197-199

<sup>42</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:84

ships and one recaptured American vessel after two months at sea.<sup>43</sup> More ominous for the British was the activity of American privateers. It was reported that there were at least sixty-five American privateers and letters-of-marque at sea on July 15, with scores more ready to sail from American ports.<sup>44</sup> As was the case during the American Revolution, the Americans were quick to adapt a large number of their merchant ships into a veritable horde of small, lightly armed privateers that would make their presence felt to the British.

There were additional factors that impeded Sawyer's ability to use his squadron to inflict damage against the Americans. In fact, one can discern just how important the war in America was to the authorities in London by the orders sent to Sawyer in July. He was informed by Anthony St. John Baker (secretary to Andrew Allen, the British Consul in Boston) that despite the fact that the two nations were at war, it was of paramount importance that there be no interruption to the flow of American supplies to the British.<sup>45</sup> Sawyer wrote back to Allen stating,

Sir, I have fully considered that part of your letter (of July 18) which relates to the means of ensuing a constant supply of flour and other dry provisions to Spain, Portugal and the West Indies, and being aware of the importance of the subject, concur in the proposition you have made. I shall therefore give directions to the commanders of his Majesty's squadron under my command, not to molest American vessels unarmed and so laden 'bona fide' bound to Portuguese or Spanish ports, whose papers shall be accompanied with a certificate copy of this letter under your consular seal.<sup>46</sup>

Baker issued 180 licenses to ships bearing Portuguese, Swedish, Spanish, and American colors, and ordered Sawyer to make sure his squadron did not interfere with or

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Maclay, *History of American Privateers*, 226

<sup>45</sup> Sawyer to Croker, July 18, 1812, Adm.1/502, 195

<sup>46</sup> Sawyer to Allen, August 5, 1812, Dudley, ed., *Naval War of 1812*, 1:491-492.



cause these vessels to be detained.<sup>47</sup> Wellington's campaign in Spain became quite dependent on American grain; shipments of flour to Spain and Portugal jumped from 232,000 barrels in 1810 to 940,000 in 1812.<sup>48</sup> Success in Spain was paramount to all other considerations, even the defense of Canada; in 1812, Wellington continued to receive good quality infantry regiments from England, while there were only six and one-half regular British infantry regiments stationed in Canada.<sup>49</sup> But the issue of the licensed trade not only confirmed that the North American theatre would remain a secondary theatre for England, but only added to the Sawyer's burdens. Hundreds of potential prizes were permitted to sail perfectly safe from British warships. American warships and privateers were free to attack any ship flying the Union Jack, while Sawyer's ships would have to sit by and allow hundreds of American ships to sail unmolested.

The squadron's captains were soon shown the consequences of disregarding the order; Sawyer reprimanded Lieutenant Jones of the schooner HMS *Alpha* for having seized the American schooner *Zodiac* in August, despite the fact that she had a valid license.<sup>50</sup> It must be noted that this did not stop some of the less scrupulous captains from trying to extort

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid.; Foster to Sawyer, July 22, 1812, Adm.1/502, 200; Michael J. Crawford, 'The Navy's Campaign against the Licensed Trade in the War of 1812', *The American Neptune* 46, (1986), 165-172; W. Freeman Galpin, 'The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula, 1810-1814', *American Historical Review* 28 (1922), 24-44; G.E. Watson, 'The United States and the Peninsular War, 1808-1812', *The Historical Journal* 19 (1976), 857-876 Galpin noted that as many as 500 licenses had been issued by September 1, 1812.

<sup>48</sup> Galpin, 'Grain Trade', 25; Watson, 'Peninsular War', 870. Watson also notes that of the 2100 ships that entered the port of Lisbon in 1811, 797 were American and 817 were British, which shows how important American shipments were to the British war effort.

<sup>49</sup> Charles Oman, *Wellington's Army* (London, 1913), 178-194, 333-342; Watson, 'Peninsular War', 874

<sup>50</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 24, 1812, Adm.1/502, 244

money from these vessels.<sup>51</sup> The situation became more aggravating later on when it was revealed that many of the licenses the merchant ships were carrying were in fact forged documents.<sup>52</sup> Sawyer's ships would certainly have scored far more successes were it not for the order, and his record might have reflected better.

Sawyer sent the *Rattler* to Bermuda on June 29 to increase in the island's defense, and ordered the *Indian* to the Bay of Fundy two days later to protect local shipping.<sup>53</sup> The *Shannon* and *Aeolus* arrived at Halifax on July 2 after spending weeks fruitlessly searching for a French frigate squadron.<sup>54</sup> The *Guerrière* would have sailed from Bermuda on June 26, but she needed to be supplied with water, and would remain at the island a while longer.<sup>55</sup> When the two frigates arrived, Sawyer ordered Captain Philip Broke of the *Shannon* to take his ship plus the *Africa*, *Aeolus*, and *Belvedira* to search for the American frigate squadron.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Dudley, ed., *The Naval War of 1812*, 1:491; William A. Fairburne, *Merchant Sail*, 6 vols. (Center Lovell, Me, 1945-1955), 2:837-845; Samuel E. Morrison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts 1783-1860* (Boston and New York, 1921), 205-206

<sup>52</sup> Warren to Croker, October 19, 1812, Adm.1/502, 328

<sup>53</sup> Sawyer to Croker, July 5, 1812, Adm.1/502, 144-145

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography 1836-1850*, s.v. 'Philip Broke'; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, s.v. 'Philip Broke'; James Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain: Consisting of Historical Memoirs of Those Officers of the British Navy Who Distinguished Themselves During the Reign of His Majesty George III*, 4 vols. (reprint of 1828 edition, Boston, 1972), 270-291. Sir Philip Bowes Vere Broke was born on September 9, 1776 near Ipswich. He entered the Royal Naval Academy at Portsmouth Dockyard in 1788, and appointed as a midshipman to the sloop *Bulldog* four years later. He was stationed in the Mediterranean during the early phase of the war, and was promoted to Lieutenant in 1795. He returned to England after the Battle of Cape St. Vincent in 1797, and given command of the brig *Falcon* in 1799. He was promoted to post rank in 1801, but would remain unemployed until 1805, when he took command of the frigate *Druid*. The following year he was given command of the ship that would make him famous, the frigate *Shannon*. He stayed in home waters until 1811, when the *Shannon* was transferred to the North American Squadron. His victory in 1813 over the American frigate *Chesapeake* garnered him a measure of immortality in the annals of the Royal Navy, but the wounds he suffered from the battle terminated his active career. He was made a baronet after his victory, and eventually promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1830. He died on January 2, 1841.

Sawyer dispatched the fast merchant brig *Margaret* to Jamaica and the schooner *Hunter* to Newfoundland on July 2 to inform their respective squadron commanders of the events of the last few weeks.<sup>57</sup> He also asked them if they could spare additional ships to help protect the shores of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.<sup>58</sup> Unfortunately, both stations were equally hard pressed for ships, and would not be able to spare any ships for the time being.<sup>59</sup> Sawyer also ordered the *Julia* to England on July 4 to inform the government of the American declaration of war, as well as to get the major refit she needed.<sup>60</sup> Following the departure of Broke's squadron, the *Juniper* arrived in Halifax on July 5 with Mr. Hamilton on board, who had been ordered to leave American soil.<sup>61</sup> The *Spartan* arrived in Halifax from Quebec City on July 9, but with the departure of Broke's division Sawyer chose to keep her behind to bolster the port's defenses.<sup>62</sup> He also ordered the *Centurion* to be used as a guard ship, and had her fitted with fifty cannon, which brought her back to her former glory.<sup>63</sup>

Broke's division did not have to wait long before meeting the enemy. On July 6, his squadron encountered the small brig *Minerva* and sent a prize crew to take her into

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<sup>57</sup> Sawyer to Croker, July 4, 1812, Adm.1/502, 144-149. The Jamaica Squadron was commanded by Vice-Admiral Stirling, while the Newfoundland Squadron was commanded by Admiral Sir J.T. Duckworth.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Sawyer to Croker, July 18, 1812, Adm.1/502, 191-194

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

Halifax.<sup>64</sup> They captured another brig two days later, and came across the *Guerrière* on her way to Halifax.<sup>65</sup> Broke added the frigate to his squadron, giving him command of four of the squadron's five frigates. On July 11, his squadron captured the merchant ship *Oroonoko*, and also sent her into Halifax.<sup>66</sup> He learned from her captain that Rodgers' squadron was heading towards Newfoundland to disrupt the British-West Indies trade.<sup>67</sup> Broke decided to head there as well, but before sailing north he was able to draw first blood against the American Navy. On July 16, his ships caught sight of the brig USS *Nautilus* off Nantucket. The British squadron quickly overtook her, and forced her commander to surrender.<sup>68</sup> The *Nautilus* was purchased into to the North American Squadron, and within a few weeks would be patrolling the waters of the Bay of Fundy in search of privateers.<sup>69</sup> However, Broke's squadron would shortly find itself robbed of a victory that would end up costing the British more than they could imagine.

The third of the 44-gun frigates, USS *Constitution*, finished refitting in the Chesapeake and set sail on July 5 under the command of Captain Isaac Hull.<sup>70</sup> On July 16, Hull's

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<sup>64</sup> Sawyer to Croker, July 21, 1812, Adm.1/502, 197-199

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Faye Margaret Kert, *Research in Maritime History #11- Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812* (St. John's, Nfld, 1997), 160

<sup>67</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:92

<sup>68</sup> Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 95

<sup>69</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 29, 1812, Adm.1/502, 258

<sup>70</sup> Captain Isaac Hull to Secretary of the Navy Hamilton, July 21, 1812, Dudley, ed., *Naval War of 1812*, 161-165; *American National Biography*, s.v. 'Isaac Hull'; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 6:32-34; Henry E. Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates* (Alexandria, Va, 1979), 81-82; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6: 92-93; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 95-100. Isaac Hull was born on March 9, 1773, and joined his father at a young age in sailing ventures to the West Indies. After losing several ships to French privateers in the 1790's, he was able to obtain a commission of lieutenant in the United States Navy, thanks to the influence of his uncle, William Hull. He served on the frigate *Constitution* during the Quasi-War with France, and was promoted to command the schooner *Enterprize* in 1803. He later participated in the attacks against Tripoli, and was

lookouts sighted five ships on the horizon, and naturally believed them to be Rodgers' ships.<sup>71</sup> As he approached the nearest vessel later that evening, he made a recognition signal to the ship. When no signal was given back to him, he began to think that he might have stumbled across an enemy ship. He discovered the following morning that Broke's entire squadron was chasing his ship. There was little wind out that morning, and Hull did everything he could to break away from the British warships. He ordered his boats to try and tow the ship out of the trap. When Broke saw this, he ordered his ships to do the same. Just as the *Shannon* got within gun range, a fresh breeze sprang up that enabled Hull's ship to gain a comfortable lead away from her. When the winds died down again, the *Shannon* was again able to get within firing range with her bow-chasers.<sup>72</sup>

Hull ingeniously used all of his spare rope, bent it to the cables, dropped a small anchor half a mile ahead, and was able to warp his ship along to open the distance between the *Shannon* and his ship. Broke soon recognized what was happening, and set about to do the same. Hull continued to do everything to lighten his ship, and even got rid of the ship's entire water supply. He must have been quite pleased that the ship's bottom completely had been re-coppered and her ballast increased back in April, as it undoubtedly saved his ship.<sup>73</sup> For three days and nights the contest continued, with rowers on both sides nearing the end of their tethers, praying for any signs of a breeze that would decide race's outcome. Finally,

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promoted to master commandant in 1804 and to captain in 1806. Hull supervised the construction of gunboats in Long Island sound and the Chesapeake from 1806 to 1809, and subsequently commanded the frigates *Chesapeake*, *President*, and then to the *Constitution* in 1810. After escaping Broke's squadron at the start of the War of 1812, he destroyed the British frigate *Guerrière* in August, which made him a national hero. He remained in the navy until 1823, but returned to command the Mediterranean Squadron from 1839 to 1841. He died on February 13, 1843.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

after a squall on July 19, the *Constitution* was safely away from Broke's ships.<sup>74</sup> Hull's success in escaping certain capture reflected the highest order of seamanship for both him and his crew. The action with the *Constitution* should have been a signal to the British that although they were few in numbers, the United States Navy rated high in the quality of its ships and crews.

The initial sorties by the British and American frigate squadrons were in many ways similar. Like Rodgers and Decatur, Broke's initial cruise can be considered something of a disappointment. He captured only ten ships (two more than the American squadron during the same period), and had also seen an opportunity to capture an enemy frigate disappear.<sup>75</sup> Yet while Broke was out at sea, the small brigs and sloops in the rest of the squadron were not standing idle. In fact, they were more than holding their own against the large number of enemy raiders and scored numerous successes themselves.

Sawyer received a report from the *Paz* on July 20 informing him that the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Bay of Fundy were swarming with American privateers, and that a number of British merchant ships were lost.<sup>76</sup> He had sent the *Spartan*, *Indian* and *Plumper* to the Bay of Fundy, followed by the frigate *Maidstone* (36) a few days later.<sup>77</sup> The four ships helped escort a convoy of more than one hundred merchant ships from Saint Johns without

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Kert, *Prize and Prejudice*, 160-165

<sup>76</sup> Sawyer to Croker, July 21, 1812, Adm.1/502, 197-203. Sawyer also wrote that he didn't have enough ships available to protect the merchant ships in Saint John, which he described as being under blockade from the American raiders.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. The *Maidstone* arrived in Halifax on July 17.

any losses.<sup>78</sup> The *Spartan* then sailed off and joined the *Emulous* further south in attacking American shipping, and her captain was able to report the capture of several enemy ships the region in July.<sup>79</sup>

Reinforcements slowly began to trickle into Halifax in July. The sloop HMS *Ringdove* (18) arrived from the Leeward Islands on July 10, and was immediately pressed into service.<sup>80</sup> Sawyer also received the frigates *Acasta* (40) from Lisbon on July 26 and *Statira* (38) from Barbados on August 1, giving him a comfortable numerical edge over the American navy in these ships.<sup>81</sup> This was more than sufficient compensation for losing the services of the *Atalante* at the end of the month, which returned to England with Augustus Foster on board.<sup>82</sup>

Other sloops and brigs on the squadron also enjoyed some measure of success against American raiders and merchantmen. Particularly lucky was the *Emulous*, which left Halifax a few days after Broke's division, and went on to capture six merchant ships between July 11 and July 18.<sup>83</sup> She then joined the *Spartan* in apprehending two more ships before returning to Halifax.<sup>84</sup> She sailed again at the end of the July, and captured the large 14-gun

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. The four ships would capture five privateers, four American merchant ships, and the recapture of two British ships. They would also destroy an additional privateer as well. See Appendix A for the list of ships captured.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 7, 1812, Adm.1/502, 243-244

<sup>82</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 28:167. Foster was brought back to England, while his secretary, Mr. Baker, would remain in the United States to act as the British agent regarding prisoners of war.

<sup>83</sup> Kert, *Prize and Prejudice*, 160-161

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

privateer brig *Gossamer* on July 30 and another merchant ship the following day.<sup>85</sup> However, her luck ran out on August 2, when she was blown onto the rocks near Sable Island while in the company of the *Colibri*. The *Colibri* made several attempts get the grounded sloop off, but was unsuccessful. The one bright spot was that she was able to rescue the *Emulous*' entire crew without any loss.<sup>86</sup> It was a most unfortunate end for such a fine vessel, but Sawyer saw to it that the name *Emulous* would remain on the squadron's rolls. He had the captured brig *Nautilus* purchased and officially renamed her as HMS *Emulous*.<sup>87</sup> She would carry her predecessor's tradition by bringing in five more prizes to Halifax in August.<sup>88</sup>

The Bermuda-built sloops also showed their worth on the station. The *Atalante* caught only one prize during the summer of 1812 before being sent to England, but the *Ringdove* was more fortunate, capturing three American merchant ships and recapturing two British merchantmen.<sup>89</sup> Even the small schooner *Chub* brought in four prizes during the summer before she was wrecked on August 14, two miles off the Sambro lighthouse near Halifax.<sup>90</sup> It seemed that the waters around Nova Scotia were proving more lethal to British warships than the American Navy.

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<sup>85</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 2, 1812, *Naval Chronicle* 28:256

<sup>86</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 5, 1812, Adm.1/502, 233-234. The *Colibri* was herself lost the following year in similar circumstances.

<sup>87</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 29, 1812, Adm.1/502, 258

<sup>88</sup> Kert, *Prize and Prejudice*, 162-164

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. The *Ringdove* captured the brig *Enterprise*, ships *Magnet* and *Four Sisters*, and recaptured the British brig *Hesper* and schooner *Rover* between July 7 and July 20.

<sup>90</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 25, 1812, Adm.1/502, 246-248; Kert, *Prize and Prejudice*, 161-163. The *Chub* recaptured the British brigs *Ann* and *Grace*, schooners *Eliza* and *Union Lass* between July 18 and August 10.



Following her return from New York, the *Colibri* began her career as a most successful privateer hunter. She started her cruise in mid-July, recapturing two British merchant ships seized earlier by American privateers, and on July 23 captured the 6-gun privateer sloop *Gleaner* off Cape Sable.<sup>91</sup> Three days later she came upon a much larger prey, the 14-gun privateer *Catherine*. Although not much superior to the privateer, the *Colibri* was able to compel the American raider to surrender, and brought her back to Halifax.<sup>92</sup> She returned to sea shortly after, but came back to Halifax following the wreck of the *Emulous*, whose crew she rescued.<sup>93</sup> She went out again that month and was able to capture another four American privateers and one merchant ship over the next three weeks.<sup>94</sup>

Sawyer sent a number of ships to sweep the waters around the Maritimes and New England. The *Acasta* made only one capture in July, but it was a very noticeable prize. On July 24, she spotted the 16-gun privateer brig *Curlew* in the Bay of Fundy. The privateer tried to flee, but could not escape the *Acasta*, and was forced to surrender. She was brought into Halifax, where she was added to the Nova Scotia provincial marine.<sup>95</sup>

The *Maidstone* and *Spartan* returned to the Bay of Fundy on August 1, where they spotted two small privateers in a small creek. They set off after them, and destroyed the two ships after their crews' escape.<sup>96</sup> Two days later, they came upon a veritable nest of privateers. They were able to capture the revenue cutter *Commodore Barry* (6) and

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<sup>91</sup> Kert, *Prize and Prejudice*, 162. The ships recaptured were the sloop *Gleaner* and ship *Fanny*.

<sup>92</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 2, 1812, *Naval Chronicle* 28:256

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Kert, *Prize and Prejudice*, 162-164. The *Colibri* captured the privateer schooner *Regulator* and merchant ship *Monk* by herself, and assisted in the capture of the privateer schooners *Dolphin*, *Polly*, and *Buckskin*.

<sup>95</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 2, 1812, Adm.1/502, 228-229

<sup>96</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 26, 1812, Adm.1/502, 246

privateer schooner *Madison* (2), and set fire to the privateer schooners *Olive* (2) and *Spence* (2).<sup>97</sup> Before the month was over, they would also capture the brig *John* and burn the privateer schooner *Dolphin* (the latter assisted by the *Colibri* and *Indian*), ending the careers of seven privateers in one month.<sup>98</sup>

Sawyer further augmented the patrols in the Bay of Fundy during the second week of August, and dispatched the *Acasta*, *Statira*, and *Colibri*, to the region.<sup>99</sup> The *Acasta* brought in two American schooners (the *Betsy* and *Patriot*) during the last week of August, while the *Statira* captured the American merchantman *Merchant* and recaptured five British vessels (brigs *Russell*, *Adeline*, and *Prince of Asturias*, and ships *William* and *Nancy*) between August 17 and August 30.<sup>100</sup>

Sawyer was able to send more of his ships out on similar cruises as he continued to receive reinforcements in August. These included the frigate HMS *Nymphe* (38) and tender *Hope*. Both ships enjoyed a successful month on their new station. The *Nymphe* arrived in Halifax on August 16, and proceeded on a two-week cruise that brought her five American merchant ships.<sup>101</sup> The *Hope*, though only a small tender, made an impressive entrance into Halifax when she came in with the six-gun privateer schooner *Lewis* in tow on August 14.<sup>102</sup> She then proceeded to Boston under a flag of truce to bring dispatches to Mr.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid. This was one week before the *Shannon* and *Colibri* captured another privateer schooner named *Dolphin*.

<sup>99</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 25, 1812, Adm.1/502, 246-248

<sup>100</sup> Kert, *Prize and Prejudice*, 164-165

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. The five ships captured were the *Honestas*, *Jane*, *Merchant*, *Geogianna*, and *Doris*. The last three were taken on August 28.

<sup>102</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 25, 1812, Adm.1/502, 246-248

Barker.<sup>103</sup> The sloop *Morgiana* returned from having escorted a convoy to Barbados, and also had a good month. She would capture the American ship *Bolina* and brig *Prudence*, and recapture the British brigs *Sally* and *Union* between August 10 and 14.

Despite the successes achieved by Sawyer's ships, the Americans were having greater success at sea. Between June and September, *Niles' Register* reported that American warships and privateers were responsible for the capture or destruction of 190 British ships, including three warships, in all theatres.<sup>104</sup> On August 13, the Royal Navy lost its first warship to the American Navy when the sloop HMS *Alert* (16) was captured off Newfoundland by the frigate USS *Essex* (32).<sup>105</sup> During the same period, Sawyer's squadron brought in fifty-eight American merchant ships, two American warships, recaptured another thirty-two British merchant ships, as well as ending the careers of twenty-five American privateers.<sup>106</sup> This represented a loss ratio of more than twenty-five per cent of the American privateers operating during the summer of 1812. Yet despite this figure, the privateer menace continued to grow. During the American Revolution, the Royal Navy captured hundreds of American raiders, but was unable to firmly clamp down on this threat. This was a situation that was to be repeated in this war. However, the British failure to arrest this menace should not be considered as a failure on the part of the men and ships of the North American Squadron. Stretched resources and poor planning on the part of the

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:394-395. Figures tabulated from the issue of *Niles' Register* between August and October.

<sup>105</sup> Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 93-94. The *Essex* would return to New York on September 7 after capturing ten prizes.

<sup>106</sup> Sawyer to Croker, August 26, 1812, Adm.1/502, 248-249. Half of the privateers were captured in the Bay of Fundy or off Cape Sable.

Admiralty must shoulder the blame for the losses in merchant ships. The men who served in this squadron had shown themselves that they still knew how to do their jobs properly, and that the Royal Navy had not gone soft after Trafalgar. Unfortunately, reports soon came of a battle that would do immense damage to the reputation of both Sawyer's squadron and the entire Royal Navy.

On August 19, the frigate *Guerrière*, under the command of Captain James R. Dacres, was on her way back to Halifax for a refit, having left Broke's division twelve days earlier.<sup>107</sup> Dacres' ship was 300 miles from her destination when she came into contact with a lone vessel. This was the frigate USS *Constitution*, the same vessel that had escaped from Broke's division the previous month. After a cruising for most of July and August the American frigate had only four prizes to her credit, but Hull saw the chance to pit his ship against a British frigate.<sup>108</sup> Dacres was equally anxious to take on the American frigate, and ordered a message to be hoisted on his topsails that read "This is not the *Little Belt*".<sup>109</sup> Both ships maneuvered for several hours before the *Guerrière* found herself in a favorable position to open fire on the American frigate at around 5:00 p.m. Dacres had no doubt that his ship would be victorious, and his crew's morale was quite high. He even permitted ten impressed American sailors to take shelter from the battle rather than be forced to fight their countrymen.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Captain James Dacres to Sawyer, September 7, 1812, Adm.1/502, 270-272

<sup>108</sup> Captain James Dacres to Sawyer, September 7, 1812, Adm.1/502, 270-272; Forester, *The Age of Fighting Sail*, 59-68; Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 83-84, 88-89; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 100-105

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

Although the *Guerrière* had maneuvered quite skillfully, the same could not be said of her gunners. During the initial bombardment, the British frigate did little damage to 'Old Ironsides', which held its own fire until nearly 6:00 p.m. When the *Constitution* did open fire, she completely devastated her opponent. For the next forty minutes, Hull's ship maintained a furious cannonade against the *Guerrière*, which lost all her masts. The British frigate suffered numerous casualties, including Dacres himself, who was hit by a musket ball in the back.<sup>111</sup> By comparison, the *Constitution* had very few casualties and apart from some cut-up rigging was in near-perfect condition. Dacres was forced to strike his flag. Hull showed that his skill as a captain was matched by his chivalry. He saw to it that the *Guerrière*'s wounded were immediately treated by his surgeons. When the badly wounded Dacres tried to tender his sword to Hull (whom he had met several times before the war), Hull refused, stating, "No, no. I will not take the sword from one who knows so well how to use it."<sup>112</sup>

The battle was over, and the upstart American Navy had won a most decisive victory over the Royal Navy. There was instant jubilation throughout the United States when word came of Isaac Hull's victory (this would be short-lived, once the news arrived that his uncle, General William Hull, had surrendered Detroit and an entire American army to General Isaac Brock's outnumbered army).<sup>113</sup> The British only felt shock and anger, and the sentiment of most Englishmen was probably reflected in this editorial from the London Times:

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 89

<sup>113</sup> For an account of the debacle in Upper Canada, see Henry Adams, *The War Of 1812*, (New York, 1999), 1-23; Francis F. Beirne, *The War of 1812* (New York, 1949) 96-108; J. Mackay Hitsman, *The Incredible War of 1812* (Toronto, 1968), 65-82

It is not merely that an English frigate has been taken, after what we are free to express, may be called a brave resistance, but that it has been taken by a new enemy, an enemy unaccustomed to such triumphs, likely to be rendered insolent and confident by them.<sup>114</sup>

After years of countless victories over the French, Spanish, Dutch, Russian, and Danish fleets, every citizen within the British Empire firmly believed in their navy's invincibility. Yet within a few months of the start of the American war, the British press that had glorified the exploits of Nelson, Collingwood, Saumarez, St. Vincent and Howe would be writing about the major deficiencies in the Royal Navy. Another editorial in the *Naval Chronicle* stated,

The capture of one of our stoutest frigates, the *Guerrière*, by a single opponent of the same class of ship.... Disasters of this kind are so rare in our naval annals, that it is not to be wondered at if such a result of a single-ship action, fought under such peculiar circumstances, should have so aroused a more than common feeling. The character of the service is so far compromised by it, that we feel ourselves called upon to contribute our humble endeavors to make this event better understood than it seems hitherto to have been. An English frigate, rated 38 guns, should undoubtedly (barring extraordinary accidents) cope successfully with a 44-gun ship of any nation.<sup>115</sup>

The performance of the British and American frigates during the War of 1812 has been debated over exhaustively since the war ended two centuries ago, and there is very little new information to add to it. British citizens were left to wonder how one of their mighty frigates could have lost to any foreign warship, but the answer is quite simple: the *Constitution* was a larger and more powerful vessel than the *Guerrière*, and her crew had proven more efficient.<sup>116</sup> In terms of gunfire alone, the American frigate's armament was

<sup>114</sup> Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 92

<sup>115</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 28:343-344

<sup>116</sup> Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 28-29. The British were given an early indication of the quality of the American frigates in 1799, when Captain Parker of the frigate HMS *Santa Margareta* challenged Captain Nicholson of the *Constitution* to a race in the West Indies. He wagered a cask of Madeira wine to prove that no American

significantly heavier than that of her opponent. Although officially rated as a 44-gun frigate, the American frigate actually mounted twenty-four carronades, thirty 24-pounders, and one 18-pounder bow-chaser, for a total of fifty-five guns.<sup>117</sup> The *Guerrière* was rated as a 38-gun frigate, but mounted sixteen carronades, thirty 18-pounder cannon, and two long nines for a total of forty-eight guns, but the weight of her broadside was significantly less than of the American frigate.<sup>118</sup> The *Constitution* also had a crew significant advantage in manpower, as her crew far outnumbered that of the *Guerrière*.<sup>119</sup> The British frigate herself was also not in peak on the day of battle, and the main reason she was detached from Broke's group was so she could return to Halifax for a much needed refit.<sup>120</sup>

No one could deny that the crew of the British frigate fought valiantly; the ship suffered twenty-one killed and fifty-seven wounded, more than thirty per cent of her crew, before her flag was struck. American casualties numbered only seven killed and seven wounded,

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ship could out-sail a British ship. To his surprise, the American frigate decisively defeated the British ship, and Parker sent a cask of wine to Nicholson.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 85-87; Keith S. Dent, 'The British Navy and the Anglo-American War of 1812 to 1815' (master's thesis, University of Leeds, 1949), 448; Forester, *Age of Fighting Sail*, 64; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:94; Jack Mahon, *The War of 1812* (Gainesville, Fla, 1972), 57-59; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 105. James and Dent claim that the weight of broadside for the *Constitution* was 744 pounds, while the *Guerrière*'s was only 540 pounds, while Forester, Mahon and Roosevelt list the broadside weight of the two ships as 684 pounds for the *Constitution* and 556 pounds for the *Guerrière*.

<sup>118</sup> Dent, 'The British Navy', 448;

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.; Forester, *Age of Fighting Sail*, 64; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:94; Mahon, *The War of 1812*, 57-58; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 105. Most agree that the *Constitution* had a crew of more than 450 men, while the British frigate had roughly 270 men.

<sup>120</sup> Robert Gardiner, ed., *The Naval War of 1812* (London, 1998), 40-42. The *Guerrière* was a former French frigate captured in 1806 by HMS *Blanche*, and like most French frigates, she was lightly constructed and was not able to stand up too well to the hammering the *Constitution* gave her. Also, in January, 1812, the Navy Board's report on her material state, which was done on every ship to estimate their remaining lifespan, listed her's as six months. It thus seems that even had she not fought the *Constitution*, her days of active service were numbered.

which was a better reflection of British gunnery that day.<sup>121</sup> The Royal Navy had proven itself superior to every navy in Europe during the last twenty years, and had always shown its superiority from the outset. This was something that they would not be able to claim against the Americans, who would indeed grow more insolent towards the Royal Navy before the year was out. Isaac Hull had accomplished what only a handful of other captains had done by defeating a British frigate in single-combat. Much to the Royal Navy's chagrin, he would not be the last.

The punishment the *Guerrière* absorbed from Hull's cannons, as well as her poor condition prior to the battle, deprived the Americans from being able to take her in as a prize. The day after the battle it was observed that the British frigate's hull was taking in water, and Hull ordered her to be burnt. The *Guerrière*'s crew was transferred to the *Constitution*, and the ship subsequently destroyed.<sup>122</sup> The United States Navy could certainly have used another frigate, and the British could at least take some solace that the American Navy was not further strengthened from this defeat.<sup>123</sup> In the end, it can be said that Dacres and his crew fought bravely, but the *Constitution* was clearly more than equal to his ship. These facts were taken into account at Dacres' court-martial following his return to Halifax in September, along with the rest of his crew.<sup>124</sup> The trial vindicated the actions of both the captain and crew of the *Guerrière*, and all were honorably acquitted.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 448; Forester, *Age Fighting Sail*, 67-68; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:94; Mahon, *War of 1812*, 57-59; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 106. Mahon lists British casualties as thirteen killed and sixty-two wounded, while Roosevelt puts the figures at twenty-three killed and seven wounded.

<sup>122</sup> Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 90

<sup>123</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 28:381-382

<sup>124</sup> Sawyer to Croker, October 2, 1812, Adm.1/502, 302-303

<sup>125</sup> Sawyer to Croker, September 17, 1812, Adm.1/502, 265; Sawyer to Croker, October 2, 1812, Adm.1/502, 302-303; Gardiner, *War of 1812*, 42; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:334-335; Mahon, *War of 1812*, 59. The court



The *Constitution*'s victory also reinforced Decatur's view on how the few American warships should be used. Instead of concentrating them into larger squadrons, as Rodgers suggested, the American cruisers would be sent out individually or in pairs. This would force the Royal Navy to disperse its ships to distant waters to protect British shipping against raiders like the USS *Essex*, which would devastate the British whaling fleet in the Pacific.<sup>126</sup>

Even before they had heard of the *Guerrière*'s defeat, the Admiralty decided to make major changes to the command structure of their squadrons in the North American theatre. They were very much displeased with Sawyer's performance and blamed him for the squadron's initial lack of preparedness in dealing with the American commerce raiders.<sup>127</sup> There had been some discussion about unifying the North American, Leeward Islands and Jamaica Squadrons into a single command to eliminate the problems of overlapping jurisdictions.<sup>128</sup> It was believed that a single squadron would be more effective and efficient in utilizing available ships and resources. This was an idea that Rodney suggested to Lord Germain in 1780, and the Admiralty decided to put the theory to test in 1812 by uniting the three squadrons into the new North American and West Indies Squadron.<sup>129</sup> The Newfoundland Squadron remained autonomous, and would continue to be responsible for

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concurred that the defective state of the *Guerrière*'s masts was the main cause of her loss. Dacres himself was less than charitable regarding the fighting qualities of his opponent, claiming that his defeat was due more to luck than any other factor, and looked forward to engaging Hull's ship with the same officers and crew under his command in a frigate of similar force to the *Guerrière*. Sawyer went even further, claiming that two-thirds of the *Constitution*'s crew were Englishmen "held by force to uncongenial duty."

<sup>126</sup> Maloney, 'What Role for Sea Power', 47-48

<sup>127</sup> Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea', 94

<sup>128</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:387

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

all convoys crossing the Atlantic.<sup>130</sup> Each of the former squadrons (to be referred henceforth as districts) would have a port admiral responsible for administrative duties, but the final authority would rest with the theatre commander. The Admiralty also decided to replace Sawyer and send a full Admiral to take command. They wanted was someone who was both an experienced fleet commander and an able diplomat, who might be able to expedite a quick settlement with the United States. The man chosen seemed ideal for this task: Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren.<sup>131</sup>

Warren appeared to be the right man to take over the North American and West Indies station. Having left the North American theatre only two years earlier, he was quite familiar with the region. Yet the Admiralty looked more towards his skills as a diplomat rather than a sailor, and wanted him to make a peace settlement to the American government.<sup>132</sup> He received his orders from them in August and shifted his flag to the 74-gun HMS *San Domingo*.<sup>133</sup> He specifically asked for the schooners *Vesta* and *Mackerel* to join him on the journey to North America, stating that their commanders had considerable knowledge and experience on this station.<sup>134</sup> Warren also requested from the Admiralty that,

In the event of it being considered necessary for the future prosecution of the war; to harrass the coast and destroy the trade and maritime resources of America; I should consider it of great importance, in order to enable the squadron under my command to act with promptitude and effect; that a number of mortars should be conveyed to Nova Scotia; of such a calibre as to serve in transports or prize vessels fitted for the occasion together with others of a smaller and lighter construction, to be made use in the boats and galleys,

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<sup>130</sup> Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea', 95

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:387-390

<sup>133</sup> Warren to Croker, August 10, 1812, Adm.1/502, 168

<sup>134</sup> Warren to Croker, August 11, 1812, Adm.1/502, 171-178. The Admiralty also ordered the frigate HMS *Junon* (38) and sloop *Fawn* (22) to sail with him.

which may be navigated in creeks and shoal water. Such a description of artillery, together with a large proportion of congreve rockets, would prove of infinite advantage, whenever it might be required of His Majesty's service.<sup>135</sup>

One can see that Warren was already thinking about the amphibious operations that would shape the British offensive in 1813, and wanted to have a sufficient number of small ships for those operations. He received orders to sail for North America on August 12, and left two days later.<sup>136</sup>

Warren's command of the expanded North American and West Indies Squadron would be far more difficult than his previous tenure on this station. The idea of unifying the North American, Leeward Islands and Jamaica squadrons might have appeared sound to their Lordships in London, but it would instead prove to be an unwieldy and cumbersome arrangement that would plague Warren for the next eighteen months. They believed that a single command would enable him to use the resources from the three squadrons more adequately, to allocate the combined resources where they were most needed. The main problem was the question of the distance between the stations. Warren's command stretched from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico. And just as it took weeks or even months for messages to sail back and forth across the Atlantic, so too would be the case with sending messages between Nova Scotia and Jamaica. In the era of rapid communications, a centralized command is a necessity, but in the age of sail, messages between stations were received only as quickly as the wind would permit. Command of the North American squadron would have been a sufficient burden for Warren, but to look after the administrative details of all three squadrons would prove too much.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Warren to Croker, August 7, 1812, Adm.1/502, 180

<sup>136</sup> Warren to Croker, August 13, 1812, Adm.1/502, 179

<sup>137</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 140-141

Another problem that would add to Warren's burden was his own relations with the Lords of the Admiralty. Their first orders to him were somewhat contradictory; they wanted him to attack and destroy the commerce of the United States, but at the same time he was to exercise all possible forbearance in order to negotiate a truce with the Americans.<sup>138</sup> These conflicting orders would make Warren's task most difficult, and would set the tone of his dealings with the Admiralty.

Though the Admiralty thought little of Sawyer's service as commander of the North American Squadron, the citizens on the station showed far more appreciation for him. One Halifax newspaper wrote,

His Majesty's consul, the merchants and other inhabitants of Halifax cannot allow you to depart from Nova Scotia without expressing the satisfaction they have experienced during your command of his Majesty's naval forces on this station. Your polite and ready attention to the desires of his Majesty's subjects, to protect and promote the commerce of this and their neighboring provinces have been duly appreciated, and demand our sincere acknowledgements. And it is no less incumbent on us to bear testimony of your zeal and unceasing exertions in directing the efforts of his Majesty's ships to repel the unprovoked and unexpected hostilities commenced by the government of America against his Majesty's subjects, and which have been conspicuously manifested in the protection of our trade, and the numerous captures of the armed cruisers of the enemy. With sentiments of unfeigned esteem and respect, we wish you a pleasant passage home, and the approbation from our Sovereign, which is the highest and most grateful reward for honorable and faithful service.<sup>139</sup>

Warren arrived in Halifax on September 26, and Sawyer immediately turned over command to him.<sup>140</sup> Sawyer asked to return to England as soon as it was possible, and Warren replied that he would send him back in the *Africa* with the next convoy in

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., 114, 140-141; Leslie Gardiner, *The British Admiralty* (Edinburgh, 1968), 222

<sup>139</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 29:277

<sup>140</sup> Sawyer to Croker, October 7, 1812, Adm.1/502, 309-310

November.<sup>141</sup> Warren's return to the North American station came when everything seemed to be going wrong. American privateers were on the rampage, and Sherbrooke even ordered Nova Scotia's defenses to be bolstered in anticipation of an American invasion.<sup>142</sup>

On September 30, Warren sent the frigate *Junon* to bring a letter to James Monroe, the American Secretary of State, proposing an immediate cessation of hostilities.<sup>143</sup> Monroe replied that Britain had to give up its practice of impressment before the United States would agree to any cease-fire. Warren had hoped that the repeal of the Orders-in-Council would have been sufficient to bring about a truce, but was not given any instructions regarding impressment. They both wrote several letters during the month, but no progress was made. Warren prepared for a long campaign, but kept the door open to negotiations until he was ordered by the Admiralty to stop the following spring.<sup>144</sup>

Warren issued a proclamation on October 5 that offered an unconditional pardon to all British subjects who deserted or fled to the enemy, provided they returned immediately to duty.<sup>145</sup> He also wanted to issue letters-of-marque to send out his own privateers to hunt American shipping, but the Admiralty dragged its feet on the issue.<sup>146</sup> It wasn't until October 13 that they authorized him to do it, and issued an order for general reprisals

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<sup>141</sup> Warren to Croker, November 4, 1812, Adm.1/502, 398

<sup>142</sup> Governor Sherbrooke to Lord Liverpool, July 4, 1812, PANS, RG 1, 59:49

<sup>143</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:560; Dent, 'British Navy', 151. The new *Junon* was the former French 40-gun frigate *Bellone*, captured in the Mauritius on December 6, 1810.

<sup>144</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 144; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 1:391-392

<sup>145</sup> Proclamation of October 5, 1812 by Admiral Warren, *Naval Chronicle* 28:420

<sup>146</sup> George E.E. Nichols, "Notes on Nova Scotia Privateers", *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collection* 13 (Halifax, N.S., 1908), 131. Sherbrooke issued privateer commissions before getting permission from London. He got around the issue by claiming that they would be used against French commerce.

against the United States.<sup>147</sup> Even then only two Nova Scotia privateers would be fitted out in 1812.<sup>148</sup> It must have seemed galling to many of the merchants in the Maritime provinces to see New England privateers inflicting heavy losses on British commerce, while their own government took its time to decided whether they could do the same to American shipping. Warren was also put in a bind by complying with Sherbrooke's request to issue more licenses to American ships willing to defy their own government.<sup>149</sup> Like Sawyer, he was informed that the flow of American foodstuffs to both the colonies and to Wellington's army was of paramount importance. For the time being, New England merchants had the best of both worlds. They could either attack British trade as privateers, or obtain licenses from them and trade freely in the knowledge that they were safe from the Royal Navy.

Warren was very much concerned about the status of the ships under his command. Through a combination of disease and desertion, there were not enough men to crew the ships, and still not enough provisions and stores at either Halifax or Bermuda to keep the ships in proper fighting condition. At one point, he claimed that his frigates could not go out to sea for lack of bread, and had barely enough provisions for five frigates.<sup>150</sup> He wrote that the situation would deteriorate with the arrival of additional reinforcements, of which he was informed would include three frigates, two sloops, two brigs and two schooners.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 129; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 2:9

<sup>148</sup> Kert, *Prize and Prejudice*, 211; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 2:9. The Admiralty ordered general reprisals on October 13 when they realized that the repeal of the Orders-in-Council would not induce the Americans to a truce as was hoped. The two Nova Scotia privateers were the *Caledonian* (14) and *Liverpool Packet* (5). New Brunswick sent out three privateers in 1812, the *General Smyth*, *Union* (1), and *Sir John Sherbrooke* (10)

<sup>149</sup> Warren to Croker, October 18, 1812, Adm.1/502, 327.

<sup>150</sup> Warren to Commissioners for Victualling, November 2, 1812, Adm.1/502, 372-373

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

He also mentioned that the fighting quality of many vessels was also suspect; Sawyer's flagship, the *Africa*, was in such a state of disrepair that when she brought him back to England later that year she was decommissioned.<sup>152</sup> Several other vessels were also approaching a similar state due to long periods at sea, further hampering the squadron's ability to operate.

Yet despite these problems, Warren initially was full of confidence as to the outcome of the war. He wrote to Lord Melville, the First Lord of the Admiralty, describing a plan to ease the pressure in Canada and in Spanish Florida. He wanted the naval forces on the Great Lakes reinforced, and saw enormous value in capturing New Orleans, which would cut off all trade from the Mississippi River. He also wanted to assemble a 'flying army' to conduct large-scale raids against Charleston, Savannah, New York, and up the Delaware and the Chesapeake, and have a force capable of blockading every port along the American coast.<sup>153</sup> However, Melville's reply quickly put an end to these ambitious plans. Though he would soon receive additional reinforcements, they would be too few for such an undertaking.<sup>154</sup>

Things continued to go poorly for the squadron on the high seas for the British. The 12-gun brig HMS *Laura* (recently transferred from Jamaica to the North American Squadron)

<sup>152</sup> Warren to Croker, October 18, 1812, Adm.1/502, 343-344

<sup>153</sup> Warren to Lord Melville, November 18, 1812, National Maritime Museum, John Borlase Warren Papers, LBK/2; Roger Morriss, *Cockburn and the Royal Navy in Transition: Admiral Sir George Cockburn 1772-1853* (Columbia, S.C., 1997), 87-88

<sup>154</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Robert Saunders Dundas'; Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 88. Robert Saunders Dundas, 2<sup>nd</sup> Viscount Melville (1771-1851) was born in 1771, and was elected to parliament as an m.p. for Rye in 1796. He made a name for himself with his speeches in 1805 and 1806, in which he defended his father, and was later impeached for malversation in his office as treasurer of the navy. He was sworn into the privy council in 1807, and accepted a seat in the Duke of Portland's cabinet that same year. He later became first lord of the admiralty in 1812, a position he would hold until 1827, and again from 1828 to 1830, after which he retired from political life. He died on June 10, 1851.

was cruising off the Delaware on September 8, and captured an American brig. As she was about to take possession of her prize, the French privateer *Diligent* (15) came on the scene and engaged the British brig.<sup>155</sup> While the *Laura* might have been able to handle the privateer under normal circumstances, she was severely undermanned on this day, with only forty-one men compared to ninety-seven on board the French raider.<sup>156</sup> Like the *Constitution-Guerrière* battle, it was another example of a smaller, undermanned ship taking on a larger, more heavily armed opponent. The *Laura* fought valiantly, but her casualties soon mounted. Her commander, Lieutenant Hunter, and one remaining midshipman were badly wounded, forcing an ordinary seaman to surrender the ship.<sup>157</sup> The *Laura* suffered fifteen killed and wounded, while the *Diligent* suffered nineteen casualties.<sup>158</sup> She was taken to Philadelphia, and added to the growing number of raiders to fight the British. Her crew was eventually sent back in a prisoner exchange, and a court martial later acquitted Lieutenant Hunter and his crew, with the exception of one seaman, James Cooper, who was sentenced to death for having surrendered the ship without permission.<sup>159</sup>

While losses in battle were to be expected, the majority of ship losses were the result of storms or poor navigation. The sloop HMS *Magnet* (16) was lost in the North Atlantic on

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<sup>155</sup> Warren to Croker, October 4, 1812, Adm.1/503, 11-12; Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:515; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:139

<sup>156</sup> Ibid. The *Laura* was undermanned due to having sent part of her crew to take back three prizes she had captured earlier.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.



October 16 along with her entire crew.<sup>160</sup> Far more serious was the loss of HMS *Barbados* (28) on September 28.<sup>161</sup> She was escorting a convoy from Bermuda to New Brunswick, when she and two merchant ships were wrecked off Sable Island.<sup>162</sup> As a result, Warren charged Captain Huskisson, the *Barbados*' commander, with negligence for the loss of his ship.<sup>163</sup> It was bad enough to have lost the ship, but she also went down with the payroll for the Halifax dockyard, which was estimated at £60,000 in specie.<sup>164</sup> In two months, the Nova Scotia shoreline had cost the navy the services of one corvette, two sloops and one cutter. Worse still, they were lost on shores familiar to the British ships. This was boded ill for the British when they would attempt to blockade the American coast, where the dangers to their ships would be even greater.

The frigate *Nymphe* returned to Halifax on October 12, and her captain reported that he had seen Rodgers' squadron near the Grand Banks.<sup>165</sup> Warren believed that they meant to disrupt the convoys going to England, and ordered Broke to take the frigates *Shannon*, *Nymphe*, *Tenedos* and brig *Curlew* to this region.<sup>166</sup> They found no sign of the frigate squadron, although the *Shannon* did capture the privateer schooner *Wiley Renard* on October 11. This notorious privateer had three days earlier pillaged the home of Francis

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<sup>160</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:554.

<sup>161</sup> The *Barbados* belonged at this time to the Leeward Islands Squadron.

<sup>162</sup> Warren to Croker, October 5, 1812, Adm.1/502, 303-304

<sup>163</sup> Warren to Croker, October 14, 1812, Adm.1/502, 331

<sup>164</sup> Beamish Murdoch, *A History of Nova Scotia or Acadie*, 3 vols. (Halifax, N.S., 1867), 3:332

<sup>165</sup> Warren to Croker, October 18, 1812, Adm.1/502, 343-344

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*

Clements on Sheep Island. They took his livestock, abused his wife, and then killed him.<sup>167</sup> The *Shannon* also brought an end to the career of the large privateer brig *Thorn* (18) on October 21.<sup>168</sup> Four days earlier, the *Maidstone* captured another large privateer, the brig *Rapid* (14) on Saint Georges Bank.<sup>169</sup> Yet despite increasing pressure from British warships, large numbers of privateers continued to roam the North Atlantic.

Although the menace of the American privateers was the chief source of Warren's anxieties, the American Navy continued to make bigger headlines. On October 18, while escorting a convoy of fourteen ships from Honduras to England, the brig HMS *Frolic* (18) was engaged and defeated by the sloop USS *Wasp* (18).<sup>170</sup> However, this defeat was negated by the arrival of HMS *Poictiers* (74) on the scene later that day. She forced the *Wasp* to surrender and recaptured the *Frolic*.<sup>171</sup> The *Wasp* would later be purchased and added to the Royal Navy as HMS *Loup Cervier*.<sup>172</sup> Nevertheless, it was hard to disguise the fact that the Royal Navy had lost yet another single-ship battle. It was a situation would get worse before it got better.

Before the end of the year the Royal Navy would suffer two more humiliating defeats to the American Navy that would send ripples across the Atlantic. Questions would spring forth about serious defects in the Royal Navy, especially in its leadership. They would

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<sup>167</sup> Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea', 84-85; Murdoch, *History of Nova Scotia*, 3:333. The crew of the *Wiley Renard* was brought back to Halifax to stand trial for piracy and murder.

<sup>168</sup> Captain Philip Broke to Warren, October 21, 1812, Adm.1/502, 359

<sup>169</sup> Captain George Burdette to Warren, October 17, 1812, Adm.1/502, 395

<sup>170</sup> Captain Beresford to Warren, October 18, 1812, Adm.1/502, 339-342; Forester, *Age of Fighting Sail*, 101-103; Mahon, *War of 1812*, 59-60; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 111-117. The *Frolic* belonged to the Jamaica Squadron at the time of her encounter with the *Wasp*.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Warren to Croker, February 26, 1913, Adm.1/503, 101

focus primarily on the man in charge of His Majesty's squadrons in the New World, and wonder how an upstart navy could embarrass the mightiest fleet the world had ever known. On October 18, the frigate USS *United States* (44) defeated the British frigate HMS *Macedonian* (38). She was able to return to port with her prize, which subsequently became USS *Macedonian*.<sup>173</sup> If this was not bad enough, the year ended with second single-ship victory for the *Constitution*, this time over the frigate HMS *Java* (44) on December 26.<sup>174</sup> Like the *Guerrière*, the *Java* was too heavily damaged to be saved, and was destroyed.<sup>175</sup> Because of this, the *Constitution*'s crew was again deprived of a large amount of prize money. Nevertheless, the loss of three British frigates in four months, all in single-ship combat, sent shock waves back to England. The Admiralty was convinced that their 38-gun frigates simply did not have the firepower necessary to take on these 'Super-Frigates' and plans were made at the end of the year to cut down three of their 74-gun ships and convert them into 58-gun fourth-rates.<sup>176</sup>

On the heels of the frigate defeats came more disturbing news. Captain James Lawrence, commander of the sloop USS *Hornet* (18), issued a challenge on December 13 to the sloop *Bonne Citoyenne* to meet it in single-combat, and was refused.<sup>177</sup> An American sloop of equal strength would wind up blockading the same ship that had shown no

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<sup>173</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:113-125; *Naval Chronicle* 29:77-79; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 118-124

<sup>174</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:126-139; *Naval Chronicle* 29:212-213; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 129-137

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Robert Gardiner, *Frigates of the Napoleonic Wars* (Annapolis, Md, 2000), 48-50

<sup>177</sup> Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 127-129. Greene offered a variety of reasons for not engaging the *Hornet*. He claimed that his ship was carrying a cargo of £500,000 in specie, and that if his ship defeated the *Hornet*, he was not certain that the *Constitution* (which had sailed with Lawrence's ship) would not in turn capture her.

hesitation engaging a French frigate three years earlier.<sup>178</sup> Overall, it was indeed a dark time for the Royal Navy. One editorial in the *Naval Chronicle* wrote,

The loss of our ships is a national disgrace, not an individual one. It is not the brave captain, who fights his ship under every disadvantage, that will receive censure, when every circumstance is inquired into, and investigated minutely; but it is those men who are at the head of the government, and those who have the regulating of naval affairs, that the opprobrium will be cast upon.... If our largest class of frigates, such as the *Lavinia*, *Cambrian*, *Undaunted*, *Acbar*, *Indefatigable*, *Endymion*, *Unite*, and *Acasta*, all of which carry or are capable of carrying twenty-four pounders on their main decks, were fitted out with an additional complement of men and sent out to the American coast, as a flying squadron, under the command of an enterprising officer, we should very soon hear of the capture of the American squadron.<sup>179</sup>

Another wrote in the *London Evening Star*:

Is Great Britain to be driven from the proud eminence, which the blood her sons has attained for her by a piece of stripped bunting flying at the mastheads of a few fir-built frigates, manned by a handful of bastards and outlaws?<sup>180</sup>

Opposition newspapers in London accused the Admiralty of neglect and incompetence, while others still claimed that the American victories were due to the fact that most of the American crews were British! Whatever the reason, they were in agreement that the navy had to find a solution to the problem, and quickly.

Some historians have claimed that after Trafalgar, the Royal Navy fell into a state of complacency over their naval supremacy, and the small upstart American Navy gave them a well-deserved comeuppance.<sup>181</sup> Graham Marcus records that,

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.; The *Hornet* blockaded the *Bonne Citoyenne* until January 24, 1813, when the 74-gun HMS *Montagu* arrived at San Salvador.

<sup>179</sup> *Naval Chronicle*. 29:12-13

<sup>180</sup> *Niles' Register*, December 26, 1812, 3:371

<sup>181</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 47-48, 151-152; Forester, *Age of Fighting Sail*, 39-46. The question of the deterioration in quality for the Royal Navy has always proven a perplexing one. Forester claims that the Royal Navy had fallen into complacency, and both he and Dudley claim that the reduction of gunnery drill after Trafalgar deteriorated the fighting efficiency of the navy. Forester also claims that gunnery drill was far more

In the decade of almost continuous warfare against the French Republic and Empire, which had opened with Nelson's engagement with *Ça Ira* and culminated in the victory at Trafalgar, Great Britain had arrived at the highest pinnacle of her naval glory. To the world-famed fleet actions of Howe, Jervis, Duncan and Nelson was to be added the triumphant outcome of hundreds of minor and single-ship engagements. The result was that British sea-officers in general had tended to become complacent and overconfident, and the skill of their guns had markedly declined.<sup>182</sup>

After a twenty years of continuous victories, the Royal Navy's defeats in 1812 came as a rude shock to the British people. The seriousness of the situation prompted Warren to make further demands on the Admiralty for more ships. The purchase of a few captured enemy privateers did ease some of the burden for his lighter units, but he needed more to meet the hordes of American raiders on the seas.<sup>183</sup> The Admiralty slowly began to pull ships from other stations, and between October and December they would send three 74-gun ships-of-the-line, one 50-gun ship, seven frigates and three sloops to the North American and West Indies station.<sup>184</sup> Of these, the North American district would receive only two of the 74-gun ships. HMS *Victorious* arrived at Bermuda on November 20, and HMS *Ramillies* arrived there on December 13, while the remaining ships were sent to the Jamaica and Leeward Islands districts.<sup>185</sup>

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important in the American Navy, which is true. Nevertheless, it would be seem difficult to make a general claim that the Royal Navy as a whole had 'lost its touch' after a few engagements with the American Navy. The Royal Navy's victories against the European Navies may have been won cheap, but there is little doubt that the size advantage of the American frigates was the determining factor in their victories. Also, as previously stated, the advantages of a small navy gave the Americans the means to employ only experienced seamen, whereas the standards in the Royal Navy were far less demanding. However, it is difficult to accept Forester's view that after the war with the Barbary pirates (almost a decade earlier), the American Navy had had enough experience of actual war; by contrast, the bulk of the ships on the North American station were comprised of officers and crews that had seen far more combat during the last decade than the Americans.

<sup>182</sup> G.J. Marcus, *The Age of Nelson: The Royal Navy 1793-1815* (New York, 1971), 459

<sup>183</sup> Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea', 100-102

<sup>184</sup> List of ships sailing for North America and the West Indies beginning October 1, 1812, Adm.1/503, 15

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

Initially, this did little to ease Warren's situation. He complained that many of the new arrivals were in wretched condition following their journey across the Atlantic, and would need considerable repair and refitting before they could be used.<sup>186</sup> On the same day the *Constitution* defeated the *Java*, Warren sent a letter to the Admiralty, claiming that,

I have already stated the diminution this squadron has undergone prior to my arrival here, and the inadequacy of the forces in the present state of the war, to counteract the enterprises of the enemy on the American coast and in the West Indies.

I consider it my duty to acquaint their Lordships that the ships of war belonging to the American government are of a very large class, and although denominated frigates, are constructed to carry 24-pounders on their main deck, with another complete tier of guns along the quarter deck, gangway and forecastle, and manned with four hundred and twenty to upwards of five hundred prime seamen and gunners, which from the superiority in sailing and the number of riflemen and musketry, give them a manifest advantage over any of our frigates.

I have endeavored by keeping two frigates and a sloop-of-war together as divisions, to obviate as much as possible these difficulties, but the force under my orders is so extremely small, the extent of coast very considerable, and with many convoys to furnish, it is impracticable to cut off the enemy's resources or to repress the disorder and pillage which actually exists in a very alarming degree, and will continue both on the coast of British America and in the West Indies.

The swarms of privateers and letters-of-marque, their numbers now amounting to six hundred, and the crews of several having landed at points on the coast of Nova Scotia and in the Leeward Islands, and cut out of the harbors some vessels, render it too necessary immediately to send out a strong addition of ships, as well as light gun-brigs for the Nova Scotia district, Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, or the trade must inevitably suffer, if not be utterly ruined and destroyed.<sup>187</sup>

Warren felt that he needed at least six or seven additional frigates to be sent to his theatre, as well as extra sloops and brigs to catch the small fast raiders that often hid in rivers too shallow for his larger ships to pursue.<sup>188</sup> The success of these small raiders was becoming quite alarming; Warren sent a copy of a Boston paper that listed the names of

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<sup>186</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 125; James Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House: Admiral Sir George Cockburn 1772-1853* (Emsworth, UK, 1987), 145

<sup>187</sup> Warren to Croker, December 29, Adm.1/503, 49-50

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

156 British merchant ships brought into that port alone between June 18 and November 5.<sup>189</sup> In return, the ships operating in the North American district captured only six privateers during the last two months of 1812, including the schooner *Snapper* (10) by HMS *Maidstone* and *Acasta* on November 3; the schooner *Joseph and Mary* (4) by the *Narcissus* on November 25; the schooner *Teazer* (1) by the *San Domingo* in December; the schooner *Revenge* by the *Paz* on December 4; the brig *Tulip* by the *Atalante* on December 12; and the brig *Herald* (10) by *Poictiers* on December 25.<sup>190</sup> This was small compensation for the damage the American corsairs were inflicting on British trade.

Feeling the pressure back home, the Admiralty quickly began to show its impatience with the way Warren was handling his command, as was revealed in Croker's letter of January 9, 1813,

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty had hoped that the great force placed at your disposal as stated in my letter of November 18 would have enabled you to obtain the most decided advantage over the enemy.... In this expectation their Lordships have been hitherto disappointed, and though they hope that the measures you have taken for the employment of your forces may have already been attended with success.

It is of the highest importance to the character and interests of the country that the naval force of the enemy should be quickly and completely disposed of. Their Lordships therefore have thought themselves justified at this moment in withdrawing ships from other important services, for the purpose of placing under your command a force with which you cannot fail to bring the naval war to a termination, either by the capture of the American national vessels or by strictly blockading them in their own waters.

For this purpose, H.M. ships named in the margin (74-gun ships *La Hogue*, *Valiant*, *Sceptre*, and *Plantagenet*) are ordered to proceed to join you, in addition to the six sail of the line already under your orders. Such addition will also be made to your force in frigates and sloops as will place thirty of the former and fifty of the latter at your disposal.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Warren to Croker, November 5, 1812, Adm.1/503, 24-25; Mahon, *War of 1812*, 110. Mahon claims that in a period of four months American privateers were responsible for capturing 219 British merchant ships.

<sup>190</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 29:80, 83, and 247. The squadron also captured twenty-six American merchant ships and recaptured another five British ships during the same period. See Appendix A for the list of ships captured.

<sup>191</sup> Croker to Warren, January 9, 1813, Adm.2/1375, 365-373

It was again evident in their subsequent reply to his letter of December 29, when Croker wrote,

I am commanded to observe that my Lords never doubted that the privateers of the enemy would become extremely numerous, as most, if not all, of their commercial marine would probably be diverted to privateering; but they were convinced of the impracticability of the remedy for this evil which you seem to propose, namely the meeting them with an equal number of ships. The only measures which with an attention to economy, and any reasonable prospect of success can be opposed to the enemy's privateering system are those of blockading their ports, and of not permitting our trade to proceed without protection; and for the execution of these purposes the force under your command will, no doubt, by judicious arrangement be found adequate.

My Lords cannot but hope that the reports which you state of swarms of American privateers being at sea must be in a great degree exaggerated; as they cannot suppose that you have left the principle ports of the American coast so unguarded as to permit such multitudes of privateers to escape in and out unmolested; and their Lordships are quite sure that by preventing our merchant ships from running and by carefully blockading the principle ports of the trade of privateering will be made so hazardous and expensive that its objects will be in most instances frustrated; and that of course the general system will be very considerably checked.<sup>192</sup>

The Admiralty was putting Warren in a most difficult position. They believed that the combined strength of the North American and West Indies Squadron would have been enough to both blockade the American coast and protect British trade, but apparently this was not the case. They gave him barely enough time to get settled in his new command before they began to criticize his handling of the situation. Warren also received criticism from other corners. Canning criticized his apparent preference to negotiate with the Americans rather than fight them, despite the fact that it had been one of his original orders from the Admiralty.<sup>193</sup> The Earl of Danley went so far as to propose a full-scale enquiry into the navy's failure to handle the American threat in May, but his motion in the House of

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<sup>192</sup> Croker to Warren, February 10, 1813, Adm.2/1376, 73-87

<sup>193</sup> *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Series 1, vol. 23 (1812), cols. 642-645.



Lords was defeated.<sup>194</sup> The Admiralty also added insult to injury to the men of the squadron when they made it clear to Warren on that his frigates were not to engage in single combat with the American 44-gun frigates.<sup>195</sup> They believed that,

The larger class of American ships, which though they may be called frigates, are of a size, complement, and weight of metal much beyond (the 38-gun 18-pounder British frigates), and more resembling line-of-battle-ships.

In the event one of His Majesty's frigates under your orders falling in with one of these ships, her captain should endeavor, in the first instance, to secure the retreat of His Majesty's ships, but if he finds that he has advantage in sailing, he should endeavor to maneuver, and keep company with her, without coming to action, in the hope of falling in with some others of His Majesty's ships with whose assistance the enemy might be attacked with some reasonable hope of success.<sup>196</sup>

In retrospect this seemed a wise course of action, as the American 44-gun frigates were indeed far superior to the standard British 38-gun frigate. Caution was the watchword on the American station, with little chance for glory.

This order was an immense blow to the pride of the Royal Navy, and gave the appearance that the American victories paralyzed the Royal Navy. However, the men in the squadron had a different opinion. A rumor was spread throughout the squadron that no British vessel would dare meet up with an American ship on equal terms. When the crews of the frigate *Orpheus* (36) and sloop *Atalante* heard it, they signed a petition to show that

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<sup>194</sup> Mahon, *War of 1812*, 110

<sup>195</sup> Croker to Warren February 10, 1813, Adm.2/1376, 73-87; Louis J. Jennings, ed., *The Croker Papers: The Correspondence and Diaries of the Late Right Honourable John Wilson Croker, LL.D., F.R.S., Secretary to the Admiralty from 1809 to 1830* (New York, 1884), 40. The Admiralty also ordered that British frigates were not to engage American frigates unless accompanied by a ship-of-the-line.

John Wilson Croker was born in 1780, and entered politics in 1806, and became first secretary of the admiralty in 1809. He would hold this position for the remainder of the wars with France and the United States, and after a brief defeat in 1818, he returned to parliament in 1819, and remained there until 1832. A noted essayist of his day, he died on August 10, 1857.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

they would more than willing to take on any warship in the American Navy.<sup>197</sup> Unfortunately, despite such sentiments the squadron had little to show for its efforts.

The loss of the *Guerrière*, *Macedonian*, and *Java* were certainly impressive victories for the American Navy, but apart from their propaganda value they had little strategic impact on the course of the war. Far more serious was the menace of the privateers. By the end of October, *Niles' Register* reported that New York had fitted out twenty-six privateers totaling 212 guns, while Baltimore had launched another forty-two raiders with a total of 330 guns.<sup>198</sup> The latter port was also in the process of launching another ten large schooners to add to its fleet of raiders.<sup>199</sup> It is no exaggeration to say that by the end of the year, Baltimore's privateer fleet was more powerful than the entire United States Navy, and was showing far greater results.

Reinforcements slowly began to trickle into the American theatre. In addition to the *Plantagenet*, *La Hogue*, *Valiant* and *Sceptre*, Warren would also receive the 74-gun ships *Marlborough*, *Dragon*, and *Cumberland*, the frigates *Seahorse* (38), *Surprise* (38), *Sybill* (38), *Syren* (32) and *Minerva*, and sloop *Peacock* (18).<sup>200</sup> The arrival of these reinforcements was quite timely, as Warren was receiving word that a squadron of three French frigates had sailed for the United States in November.<sup>201</sup> Although the information turned out to be false, the British remained wary that France would send its warships to aid

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<sup>197</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 29:195-196

<sup>198</sup> *Niles' Register*, October 24, 1812, 3:120

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>200</sup> *Naval Chronicle*. 28:508

<sup>201</sup> Warren to Croker, January 3, 1813, Adm.1/503, 65

the Americans; the memory of the defeat at the Virginia Capes in 1781 had not dissipated in the Royal Navy.

On November 27, 1812, the Admiralty sent orders to Warren to begin “a rigorous commercial blockade” against American shipping in the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, and informed the neutral European nations that the United States coast was under blockade.<sup>202</sup> In reality, the blockade would not become official until the following February, but Warren anticipated the order and sent the *Poictiers*, *Maidstone*, *Acasta* and *Aeolus* to scout the entrances of the Delaware River and the Chesapeake in October.<sup>203</sup> The Chesapeake region in particular would hold Warren’s interest, and would become the focal point of Britain’s offense against the United States for most of the war. Perhaps on some level it was a means of atoning for Admiral Graves’ failure at the Battle of the Chesapeake on September 5, 1781, which sealed the fate of Cornwallis’ army at Yorktown.<sup>204</sup> Yet although he was the one who initiated the offensive in the Chesapeake, Warren would receive little credit for it. One of the 74-gun ships he received was HMS *Marlborough*, which carried the flag of the man who more than anyone else would come to represent the entire Royal Navy in the War of 1812: Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Croker to Warren, November 27, 1812, Adm.2/1375, 276-278; Dudley, “Without Some Risk”, 126; Forester, *Age of Fighting Sail*, 134; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 2:9

<sup>203</sup> Warren to Croker, November 5, 1812, Adm.1/502, 401

<sup>204</sup> Robert Gardiner, *Navies and the American Revolution*, (London, 1996), 114-117

<sup>205</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. ‘George Cockburn’; Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*; Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain*, 3:257-307. Sir George Cockburn was born in 1772, and entered the navy as a captain’s servant at age 9 on board the frigate *Resource*. He achieved the rank of lieutenant on January 2, 1793, four weeks before war broke out with France. He served on board the *Victory*, Lord Hood’s flagship at Toulon, and in October was promoted to command the sloop *Speedy*. He was later appointed to command the frigate *Minerve* in 1796, on which Nelson later hoisted his broad pendant. The *Minerve* captured the Spanish frigate *Sabina* off Cartagena in December of 1796, and was present at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent two months later, though he did not participate in the engagement. The *Minerve* remained in the Mediterranean until the Peace of Amiens in 1802. With the resumption of the war in

Warren left Halifax on December 7, and sailed to Bermuda with the *San Domingo*, *Junon*, *Statira*, and sloop *Wanderer*, along with a small convoy of one transport and three merchant ships.<sup>206</sup> Along the journey they captured the privateer *Teazer* (2), but missed a similar opportunity with the brig USS *Argus* (16) a few days later.<sup>207</sup> Warren also ordered Broke to take the *Shannon*, *Nymphe*, *Tenedos*, and *Curlew* to escort a valuable convoy of mast ships from New Brunswick and escort them to about 150 leagues beyond the Grand Banks.<sup>208</sup> However, before leaving Halifax he was informed of yet another loss to the fleet. This was the brig *Plumper*, wrecked off the New Brunswick coast on December 5, yet another victim of the elements instead of enemy action.<sup>209</sup> The ship went down with more than £70000 in specie, and only seventeen men were rescued.<sup>210</sup> Warren also had to endure problems from his officers. In December, Captain John Evans of the sloop *Martin* went

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1803, Cockburn was given command of the *Phaeton*, and sent to the East Indies, where he would remain until 1808. He was then transferred to the *Pompee* in the West Indies, and participated in the expedition against Martinique in 1809. He later returned to Europe, where he was given command of a flotilla of gunboats and bomb-vessels in the Walcheren expedition. He was most helpful in covering the retreat of the British forces from this debacle. He tried his hand at diplomacy, serving as a commissioner to help mediate between Spain and her South American colonies in 1811, and returned to England in August, 1812, with a promotion to rear-admiral. He hoisted his flag on the *Marlborough*, and departed for the North American station at the end of the year, where he would remain until the end of the War of 1812. He conducted numerous raids along the American coast between 1813 and 1815, culminating with the capture of Washington D.C. in 1814. He returned to England after the war, and given a most interesting assignment. Following napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo, Cockburn was assigned to act as governor and commander-in-chief of the St. Helena station, which was a fancy way of describing him as Napoleon's warden. He remained at the island for only one year, and promoted to vice-admiral in 1819. He served as junior lord of the admiralty between 1818 and 1830, and also sat in Parliament as an M.P. in the 1820's and 1830's. He was given command of the North American and West Indies Squadron in 1832, where he would remain until 1836. He was promoted to full admiral in 1837, and served as First Sea Lord between 1841 and 1846. He reached the rank of admiral-of-the-leet in 1851, a few months before his death on February 26, 1852.

<sup>206</sup> Warren to Croker, December 28, 1812, Adm.1/503, 41-42

<sup>207</sup> Warren to Croker, February 20, 1813, Adm.1/503, 94-98

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Godfrey to Warren, December 7, 1812, Adm.1/503, 70-73

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

berserk and ordered his marines to fire on the townspeople of Sydney, Nova Scotia. This nearly brought the town's garrison into conflict with the marines, who wisely disobeyed their captain long enough for him to be restrained<sup>211</sup>

Warren arrived at Bermuda on December 21, where he awaited the arrival of additional reinforcements. The *Dragon* arrived there on January 4, 1813, and he sent her with the *Statira* and *Colibri* to New York, hoping that they would catch the American frigate squadron returning through Long Island Sound.<sup>212</sup> They found no signs of the frigates, and proceeded to the Delaware, where they were joined by the *Belvedira*.<sup>213</sup> After a few days in this area they proceeded to Lynnhaven Bay, at the mouth of the Chesapeake, where on February 6, a proclamation was made that the Chesapeake and Delaware were officially under blockade.<sup>214</sup>

The blockade was one of the Royal Navy's most important duties during this era. In his research on the role of the blockade in the War of 1812, Wade Dudley defines three general types of blockade: 1) the military blockade; 2) the economic blockade; and 3) the tactical blockade.<sup>215</sup> The military blockade was further subdivided into two categories, the distant and close blockades. The distant blockade would have the enemy ports watched over by light units of the fleet, and these would report to the main fleet once the enemy fleet had sailed out in force. The biggest disadvantage was that the enemy fleet would have ample

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<sup>211</sup> Barry J. Lohnes, 'British Naval Problems at Halifax during the War of 1812', *Mariner's Mirror* 59, (1973), 325

<sup>212</sup> Warren to Croker, February 20, 1813, Adm.1/503, 94-98

<sup>213</sup> Ibid.

<sup>214</sup> Proclamation of February 6, 1813 by Admiral Warren, Adm.1/503, 107-114

<sup>215</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 41-44

time to break out before the opposing fleet could intercept it.<sup>216</sup> With the close blockade, elements of the main fleet would cruise near the enemy port and be ready to intercept if the enemy fleet attempted to break out. However, the problem here was the constant exposure to the elements, which could reduce the ships' sailing abilities after several months at sea, as well as placing the ships at risk near the enemy's coast, which was often more lethal a foe than the enemy fleet.<sup>217</sup> To counter these risks, the Royal Navy developed the echeloned military blockade. The enemy port would be watched by the small brigs and sloops, which would gather intelligence and intercept small vessels that tried to enter or leave the enemy port. If the enemy fleet attempted to break out, the light forces would relay the information to the inshore squadron, which formed a second line of defense. The ships of the inshore squadron would stay within signal distance of the light units of the first line, and would be composed of larger ships (usually frigates and the occasional third-rates) capable of delaying the enemy force long enough for their own main fleet to arrive.<sup>218</sup> The third line was itself the main fleet, which would stay in contact with the inshore squadron. This was the system the British used to blockade the ports of Brest, Toulon and Cadiz.<sup>219</sup> For smaller enemy ports such as Ostend, Calais and Ferol, the Royal Navy opted for the close (or linear) blockade. As for the American naval threat, the British opted to use the close blockade, mainly because the United States did not have a strong battle fleet that would warrant the need for an echeloned blockade.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid, 42-43

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., 44

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

As opposed to the military blockade, the economic (or commercial) blockade was designed to help one's own trade while attacking the enemy's economy. According to Dudley, a military blockade allowed neutral trade to enter an enemy port, so long as the ships did not transport contraband. On the other hand, an economic blockade completely shut down the enemy's ports to all neutral shipping. This would not only hurt the enemy's economy, but also isolate their overseas colonies and prevent them from being supplied by neutral ships.<sup>221</sup> In terms of both the military and economic blockades of the United States, the British would come up short in trying to implement them. During the entire War of 1812, the Royal Navy would be unable to fully blockade the American coast, simply because it did not have enough ships to do the job. Dudley argues that instead of sending ships to conduct punitive raids in the Chesapeake, which he believes accomplished little, the British would have been better served had they tried to tighten their blockade.<sup>222</sup> On much of the American coast, the British blockade amounted to little more than a paper blockade, and hundreds of small, fast privateers were able to break out into the Atlantic with ease. With regards to the economic blockade, as previously stated, the needs of other theatres superceded the desire to hurt the American economy. The British were in dire need of American foodstuffs to feed their colonies and Wellington's army in Spain. It is for this reason that hundreds of licensed American ships were permitted to sail out of New England, and why this region would not be officially blockaded until 1814, when the war with France was over.

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<sup>221</sup> Ibid., 45

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

The Admiralty sent its orders to Cockburn on October 31, 1812 to take his flagship to Bermuda, where he arrived on January 17.<sup>223</sup> Following his arrival, Warren ordered him to take the *Marlborough*, *Poictiers*, *Victorious*, *Narcissus*, *Acasta*, *Fantôme* and *Paz* to join the ships blockading the Delaware and the Chesapeake.<sup>224</sup> The energetic and aggressive Cockburn would prove more than willing to taking the war to the enemy. If Warren was criticized for lacking offensive spirit, then it can be said that Cockburn had it in abundance.<sup>225</sup> He was a firm believer that the only way to show the Americans the folly for having declared war on England was to bottle up their ports, raid their towns and eliminate their shipping and commercial trade. Additionally, the Admiralty sent Captain Henry Hotham to serve as Warren's fleet captain, to help with Warren's administrative duties, as he himself had not designated one.<sup>226</sup> The position of fleet captain, as with any chief of staff, was usually given to someone who had served a long time with the fleet commander, but this would not be the case between Warren and Hotham.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Croker to Cockburn, October 31, 1812, Library of Congress (LC), Cockburn Papers, container 14; Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 87; Mahon, *War of 1812*, 110

<sup>224</sup> Warren to Croker, February 20, 1813, Adm.1/503, 94-98.

<sup>225</sup> Warren to Croker, February 26, 1813, Adm.1/503, 119. Warren believed that the war could be prosecuted more efficiently if his command was split up into its three original squadrons, and asked the Admiralty to only command the North American squadron. It would be another year before the Admiralty agreed to split up the squadron, but Warren would not be around to benefit from it.

<sup>226</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Henry Hotham'; Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain*, 3:240-251. Sir Henry Hotham was born on February 17, 1777, and entered the navy in 1790 on board the *Princess Royal*, which carried his uncle's flag. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1794, and with his uncle's help was promoted to command the sloop *La Fleche* in 1795. He served in the Mediterranean until 1798, and spent the following three years on the frigate *Imortalite* in the Bay of Biscay. With the resumption of the war in 1803, he served along French and Spanish coasts until 1813, when he was sent to the North American station. Admiral Cochrane promoted him to flag rank in 1814, and he remained on the station until the end of the war. He was a lord of the admiralty from 1818 to 1822, and again from 1828 to 1830. He became vice-admiral in 1825, and later appointed commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. He died on April 19, 1833.

<sup>227</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 134. Dudley implies that Hotham was sent by Melville to act as a spy, to report on what was really going on in the North American theatre. There is evidence that there was a secret correspondence between the two men, but the actual letters Hotham sent to Melville have yet to be discovered, and thus we have no idea what Hotham may or may not have said about Warren.



Warren's plans for the disposition of his ships on the North American coast was as follows:

- 1) Blockade of the Chesapeake: *Marlborough*, *Victorious*, *Maidstone*, *Junon*, *Laurenstinus* and a tender.
- 2) Blockade of the Delaware: *Poictiers*, *Narcissus* and *Paz*
- 3) Off New York: *Dragon* and one other vessel
- 4) Off Nantucket, Block Island and Montauk Point: *Belvedira* and *Acasta*
- 5) Bay of Fundy: *Rattler*, *Emulous*, *Nova Scotia*, *Bream* and *Herring*
- 6) Nova Scotia: *Shannon*, *Tenedos* and *Nymphe*
- 7) Charleston, Beaufort, Ocracoke, and Roanoke: *Aeolus* and *Sophie*
- 8) Savannah and St. Augustine: *Viper*<sup>228</sup>

In addition, the *San Domingo*, *Ramillies*, *Statira*, *Orpheus*, *Colibri* and an additional tender would be used to relieve the ships in the Delaware and the Chesapeake.<sup>229</sup> Warren also planned to send a sufficient force to watch over Rhode Island and Boston in March, as the weather would be mild enough on those stations for his ships to operate.<sup>230</sup> However, the Admiralty showed some concern when they received word of the disposition of his ships:

On the details of your proposed distribution, my Lords command me to state that their opinion that in each separate squadron which you may form, there should be one line-of-battle ship at least; but as your measures must necessarily depend on the state and disposal of the enemy's ships, and on many considerations which cannot be anticipated, they must leave to your own judgement and discretion the appropriation of your force and the measures which it may be right to adopt in counteraction of the enemy's views.<sup>231</sup>

The planned attacks in the Chesapeake in 1813 were part of the general defensive strategy laid out by the British government. Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State for War

<sup>228</sup> Warren to Croker, March 28, 1813, Dudley, ed., *Naval War of 1812*, 2:80-81

<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

<sup>231</sup> Croker to Warren, March 20, 1813, Adm.2/1376, 341-367

and Colonies, believed that the attacks in this region would compel the Americans to withdraw their forces from Canada to defend their capital.<sup>232</sup> The Chesapeake was also where most of the American privateers were originating from, and a tight blockade of this region could only help England in the war against these raiders. But before Cockburn took over the Chesapeake command, the four frigates already stationed there (*Belvedira*, *Junon*, *Statira* and *Maidstone*), under the command of Captain Richard Byron, had already begun to take the war to the Americans.<sup>233</sup> Since most of his larger vessels could not navigate the small rivers and inlets in the Chesapeake, Byron sent out the ships' long boats filled with marines to conduct raids all over the coastline. With this form of amphibious warfare, they raided small towns and villages, captured small isolated ships and provisions for their own ships. The raids would further evolve under Cockburn's leadership into a most effective offensive weapon. Byron inaugurated the campaign on February 8, 1813, when he sent nine long boats from his frigates to chase after the small armed schooner *Lottery* (6). In the ensuing fight, the British lost one killed and five wounded, while the *Lottery* suffered nineteen casualties out of her crew of thirty-eight.<sup>234</sup> On February 14, they captured the letter-of-marque *Cora* as she entered the bay, returning from Bordeaux with a large cargo of wine, brandy and silk.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> Christopher T. George, *Terror on the Chesapeake: the War of 1812 on the Bay* (Shippensburg, Pa, 2000), 7

<sup>233</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 145

<sup>234</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 29:250

<sup>235</sup> Captain George Burdette to Warren February 14, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 29:343-344. Though pierced for sixteen guns, she carried only eight cannons when she was taken.

The North American district enjoyed a few other successes early in 1813. On January 9, the *Poictiers* and *Acasta* captured the privateer schooner *High Flyer* (5).<sup>236</sup> The schooner was returning from the West Indies, where she had made several captures. The *Narcissus* brought in the privateer schooner *Shepherd* (4) after a chase of more than fifteen hours off Cape St. Blare on January 4.<sup>237</sup> She made an even impressive capture two weeks later when she captured the brig USS *Viper* (12) off Havana on January 17.<sup>238</sup> This vessel would be purchased by the navy early in March and renamed HMS *Mohawk*.<sup>239</sup>

The sloop *Peruvian* (18) was sailing seventy-nine miles west of Sombrero Island when she spotted the privateer ship *John* (16) on February 6. The American raider tried to escape, and was able to engage the British sloop with her after guns. However, the *Peruvian* was able to get within close range, and after a few volleys from her bow guns and small arms from her marines, the raider surrendered.<sup>240</sup> In addition, the frigate *Aeolus* and sloop *Sophie* (18) captured six American merchantmen between February 5 and March 2.<sup>241</sup> Overall, the squadron captured or destroyed 109 American ships in the first three months of 1813.

By the middle of February, Warren felt confident enough to start taking the war to the enemy's shores. Yet this was not going to be a repeat of previous offensives from the

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<sup>236</sup> Captain Beresford to Warren, January 9, Adm.1/503, 139

<sup>237</sup> Captain Richard Lumley to Warren, January 5, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 29:343

<sup>238</sup> Lumley to Warren, January 17, 1813, Adm.1/503, 140. The *Viper* had been cruising around Cuba for seven weeks, but had made no captures.

<sup>239</sup> Warren to Croker March 4, 1813, Adm.1/503, 170. The crew of the *Gorée*, which was judged to be totally defective, would man the *Loup Cervier*. She would end up serving as a prison ship.

<sup>240</sup> Captain George Kipping to Warren, February 6, 1813, Adm.1/503, 141. According to her log taken after her capture, the *John* had reportedly made twenty captures during her career.

<sup>241</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 29:506. The vessels captured were the *Resolution*, *Eliza*, *Rose*, *Jacob Getting*, and *Elizabeth*, while the sixth ship, the *Federal Jack*, was destroyed. They also captured the Spanish merchantman *La Anna* on March 9, and sent her off to Bermuda.

earlier wars. The most important difference was that unlike the three wars previously mentioned, the British were fighting a defensive action in 1813. The attacks in the Chesapeake were part of a general defensive strategy, and the raids were designed primarily to harass and discomfort the enemy. The essence of Warren's plan was to do exactly what the French Navy had been unable to do for Montcalm in 1759, that is to launch an attack along the American coast in order to relieve the pressure on Canada. The Royal Navy's supremacy in 1759 made it impossible for French forces to accomplish this task. However, the Royal Navy's undisputed command of the seas allowed it to do just that in 1813. Whether the British would succeed in accomplishing the goals was another matter, but at least they were free to try.

On February 15, 1813, Warren issued the following orders to Cockburn, instructing him that he was:

- 1) To blockade the ports and river harbors in the Bay of Chesapeake and of the River Delaware in the most strict and rigorous manner according to the usage's of war acknowledged and allowed in similar cases.
  - 2) To capture and destroy trade and shipping off Baltimore and particularly in the Potomac, York, Rappahannock and James Rivers.
  - 3) To obtain intelligence of the number of gunboats and state of the enemy's ships operating in the Chesapeake and elsewhere.
  - 4) To procure pilots, taking Black men if necessary for all Chesapeake rivers, the Delaware and Long Island Sound, endeavoring also to discover a place near the Chesapeake where the squadron can complete its water and its boats protected.
  - 5) To ascertain the situation affecting the frigate USS *Constellation* and the best means of capturing her; also the defenses and troops in the vicinity of the place and to report any additional force required.
  - 6) To detach a force to blockade the Delaware but 'care to be taken for ships not to remain at anchor a moment longer than is necessary for accomplishing the particular object so as to subject the ships to an attack from gunboats, fire vessels or Fulton's machines.'
  - 7) To allocate a small force to cut off trade in and out of Long Island Sound.
  - 8) To maintain constant communication with the ships at their several stations so that they can be united in the event of a superior enemy force appearing.
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- 9) To hold as little communication as possible with American inhabitants of the coast, pilots or others 'in order to avoid corruption, seduction, or the seeds of sedition being sown.'
- 10) To collect prizes and send them in proper convoy to Bermuda, prize crews of captured ships being then returned to their proper ships.<sup>242</sup>

Cockburn arrived in the Chesapeake with his squadron on March 3, 1813. The weather was extremely harsh at this time of the year, and many of the ships had a rough time navigating. Cockburn saw to it that during a particularly violent gale, every man who kept watch aboard his flagship received an extra gill of wine on top of their normal rum ration.<sup>243</sup> On the other hand, he did not hesitate to punish misconduct. On August 20, 1813, a court-martial found seaman Pat Halliday of the *Mohawk* guilty of deserting to the enemy, and was sentenced to be hanged.<sup>244</sup> The following day, another seaman in Cockburn's squadron, John Allen of the *Barrosa*, was also found guilty of deserting to the enemy, and sentenced to receive four hundred lashes.<sup>245</sup> Such a punishment would often result in death, but the proximity of the American coast was often too tempting for sailors to resist, and many were willing to risk death to escape life in the Royal Navy. But Cockburn did not tolerate misconduct from his officers either. On April 7, 1813, Cockburn assembled a court-martial to try Lieutenant Henry Harrison of the *Statira*, who was charged with neglect of duty and contempt to his captain. Harrison was found guilty, but instead of facing the lash, his punishment was to be dismissed from the *Statira* and be placed at the bottom of the list

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<sup>242</sup> Warren to Cockburn, February 15, 1813, Library of Congress (LC), Cockburn Papers, Container 14

<sup>243</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 146

<sup>244</sup> Log book of HMS *Sceptre*, August 20, 1813, LC, Cockburn Papers, Container 6

<sup>245</sup> Log book of HMS *Sceptre*, August 21, 1813, LC, Cockburn Papers, Container 6

was a most tempting target, and the British had already tried in February to capture her, but all they accomplished was to send the frigate further up the river out of the reach of the British marines.<sup>255</sup> Cockburn continued to try to breach the defenses at the mouth of the river to get at her. The American defenders hampered his plans by sinking three merchant ships at the entrance of the river channel.<sup>256</sup>

On March 23, Cockburn launched a night attack with two divisions of long boats (two of the boats mounting congreve rockets) to get to the *Constellation*, located five miles up the Elizabeth River.<sup>257</sup> However, the weather turned against them, as they were unable to get within range of the frigate before dawn. Alerted in time, the *Constellation* promptly sailed further up the river, once again denying the British their prize. They were somewhat compensated for their efforts with the capture of two pilot schooners by his boats near Cape Henry, which were used as tenders by the squadron.<sup>258</sup>

Cockburn urged Warren to write to Governor Horsford in Bermuda to send a full regiment to aid them in further land attacks.<sup>259</sup> He was very interested in the prospects of an assault on Baltimore, and wrote that with enough men the entire Chesapeake would be at

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<sup>255</sup> Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 89-91

<sup>256</sup> Cockburn to Warren, March 23, 1813, Library of Congress, Cockburn Papers, Container 14; Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 89-91; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 147-148

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

<sup>259</sup> Warren to Croker, May 28, 1813, in *Naval Chronicle* 30:162-163; Euphemia Young Bell and associates, *Beautiful Bermuda: The Bermuda Blue Books* (New York and Bermuda, 1946), 142. Horsford replaced Cockburn as governor of Bermuda on July 4, 1812, and would remain there until July 24, 1814. He agreed to Warren's request for additional troops, and sent a detachment of the Colonial Corps and Royal Artillery to the Chesapeake squadron.

their mercy.<sup>260</sup> As it turned out, the British government had already ordered the 103<sup>rd</sup> Regiment and two battalions of Royal Marines to be sent to Bermuda to aid Warren and Cockburn in conducting larger raids in the Chesapeake.<sup>261</sup>

Though most of Warren's attention was fixed on the Chesapeake, the rest of the forces on the North American district were also active. The *Curlew* captured the large letter-of-marque *Volante* (14) on March 26.<sup>262</sup> The *Narcissus* continued her success against American armed raiders. On March 29, she captured the privateer brig *Revenge* (12), the third armed vessel she captured in as many months.<sup>263</sup> The *Rattler* and *Bream* also succeeded on capturing five schooners loaded with lumber on the Medomak River in Maine on March 31.<sup>264</sup> Yet these victories were offset by the news of yet another British defeat at the hands of the American Navy, as the sloop USS *Hornet* captured the brig HMS *Peacock* (18) near British Guyana on February 24. The British brig suffered eight killed and thirty wounded, while the American ship suffered only three casualties.<sup>265</sup>

On April 1, 1813, Warren and Cockburn entered the Chesapeake with their respective flagships (along with the *Maidstone*, *Statira*, *Mohawk*, *Fantôme* and *Highflyer*) to scout around Annapolis, leaving the rest of the squadron in the vicinity of Hampton Roads.<sup>266</sup> They spotted a force of five armed ships on the Rappahannock River on April 3, and

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<sup>260</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 148

<sup>261</sup> Ibid.

<sup>262</sup> Captain Head to Warren, March 26, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:171-172. The *Volante* was pierced for twenty-two guns.

<sup>263</sup> Lumley to Warren, March 30, 1813, in *Naval Chronicle* 29:502

<sup>264</sup> Lohnes, 'War of 1812 at Sea', 143

<sup>265</sup> Mahon, *War of 1812*, 123; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 167-170

<sup>266</sup> Warren to Croker, April 20, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 29:501; Mahon, *War of 1812*, 112

quickly pursued them. Unable to follow any further with their larger ships, they sent out four boats with 105 marines to pursue the fleeing vessels.<sup>267</sup> These were able to reach four of the American ships by dawn the next morning. These were the privateers *Arab* (7), *Lynx* (6), *Racer* (6), and *Dolphin* (12).<sup>268</sup> When the British boats began their approach on the ships, they found the defenders more than ready to greet them, and a fierce battle took place. Despite being outgunned and outnumbered, Lieutenant Puckinghorne's marines were able to capture all four ships at a cost of only two killed and eleven wounded (including Puckinghorne).<sup>269</sup> American casualties numbered six killed and ten wounded.<sup>270</sup> The *Racer* and *Lynx* would later be purchased into the Royal Navy as the 14-gun schooners HMS *Shelburne* (ex-*Racer*) and HMS *Musquedobit* (ex-*Lynx*).<sup>271</sup> Puckinghorne's performance was highly praised by both Warren and Cockburn, but because the ships he captured were deemed only as small privateers, it took fourteen months before he received his due credit from the Admiralty and a promotion to commander.<sup>272</sup>

Following this encounter, Warren ordered Cockburn to take his squadron (along with the newly captured ships) to do further reconnaissance up the Chesapeake. He was given specific orders to cut off all enemy supplies, destroy foundries, stores, and any public

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<sup>267</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:225-226; *Naval Chronicle* 29:506. The squadron also captured the merchant ship *Atlas* on April 3.

<sup>268</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:225-226; Puckinghorne to Warren, April 3, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 29:501-502, 506. James spells Puckinghorne's name as Polkinghorne. His boats also destroyed the merchant schooners *Virginia*, *Sisters*, *Rover* and sloop *Victory* in the Rappahannock.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>270</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:225-226

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>272</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:225-226; Warren to Croker, April 20, 1813, Adm.1/503, 239-240



buildings.<sup>273</sup> With only 400 men from the squadron's naval brigade, any attack on the larger cities like Baltimore, Washington or Annapolis was strictly out of the question. Warren would have liked to have attempted an assault on Baltimore, but decided it was too risky. He feared that if an attack was launched and beaten back, his ships might not have enough men to fend off against an enemy attack.<sup>274</sup> Nevertheless, Cockburn went forward with his task, and was determined to do as much damage as possible.

The British did not have everything their own way in the Chesapeake. On April 11, the *Victorious* sent four of her boats with seventy marines, under the command of Lieutenant William Gibbons, to capture an American letter-of-marque schooner that had been seen earlier. The raider grounded on Willowby Shoal, and the marines were able to take possession of her. Unfortunately, the weather hindered their efforts to get the schooner off the shoal. Gibbons was informed of the approach of a large body of militia, forcing the marines to return to their boats. They ran under Point Comfort, where they were ambushed by 120 men from two small gunboats armed with four guns. With no chance of escape, Gibbons was forced to surrender.<sup>275</sup> The marines were fortunate that they would only have to spend a short time in captivity. The American government offered an exchange of prisoners, and was prepared to send two cartels from Philadelphia and Alexandria to Jamaica and Barbados.<sup>276</sup> Warren agreed to return three hundred American prisoners from

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<sup>273</sup> Warren to Croker, May 28, 1813, Adm.1/503, 278-280

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

<sup>275</sup> Lieutenant Gibbons to Captain John Talbot, April 12, 1813, Adm.1/503, 252-254

<sup>276</sup> Warren to Croker, May 27, 1813, Adm.1/503, 276-277

the two islands in exchange for a similar number of British prisoners.<sup>277</sup> The Americans at first balked at his counterproposal, but later grudgingly accepted.<sup>278</sup>

Cockburn proceeded up the Elk River to Frenchtown on April 29, where he sent his force of 400 troops in thirteen barges and boats, escorted by the captured tenders, to assault the town.<sup>279</sup> The town was defended by a single battery of six cannon, plus a small militia detachment, which promptly took flight once the British marines landed.<sup>280</sup> They immediately seized and destroyed the battery, the stores and the wharf, along with five small merchant ships in the harbor. This was achieved at the cost of a single British marine killed.<sup>281</sup>

Cockburn then proceeded to Havre-de-Grace on May 3, sending out nineteen barges to attack the town.<sup>282</sup> Its defenses were marginally stronger than those at Frenchtown (two batteries plus militia), but the results were the same. The militia opened fire on the barges, and again retreated after the British landed. Unfortunately for the town, some of its citizens decided to fire on the marines, which prompted Cockburn to teach the villagers a harsh lesson. He ordered the town put to the flame, and nearly two-thirds of Havre-de-Grace's buildings were destroyed. Cockburn saw this as fit punishment against the townspeople for

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<sup>277</sup> Ibid. Warren especially wanted the return of the crews of the *Macedonian* and *Peacock*.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid.

<sup>279</sup> Cockburn to Warren, April 29, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:163-164; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:225-226

<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

<sup>282</sup> Cockburn to Warren May 3, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:164-166; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:225-226

having fired on his troops.<sup>283</sup> The Americans in turn viewed it as an unspeakable act of barbarity (despite the fact that they had committed similar outrages in Upper Canada), and Cockburn's name soon became the most hated in America. However, he did show some measure of mercy. After meeting with the town's citizens, he relented in releasing the prisoners his troops had taken.<sup>284</sup> He then capped off his day by personally leading a detachment to a canon factory at Principio. His force destroyed the factory (which had twenty-eight long-32-pounder cannon ready to be shipped) as well as its protecting battery. Overall, the raid had accomplished the destruction of fifty-one guns.<sup>285</sup>

Cockburn sailed three days later up the Sassafras River towards the twin towns of Georgetown and Fredericktown.<sup>286</sup> Instead of simply assaulting the towns, he sent ahead some American to inform its citizens not to offer any resistance, and that the British were only interested in public buildings and shipping. If none of the townspeople attacked his marines, Cockburn promised not to touch any private property.<sup>287</sup> However, as the British barges approached, the local militia tried to ambush them. This gave Cockburn all the reason he needed for what followed. With the exception of a single house, all the buildings in the two towns were set ablaze, along with four merchant ships.<sup>288</sup> Though undeniably brutal, these harsh measures had the desired effect (it is striking to note that when the Royal Navy bombarded the towns of Falmouth and Norfolk in 1775, there was as much dismay

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<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

<sup>286</sup> Cockburn to Warren May 6, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:166-168

<sup>287</sup> Ibid.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid.

back in England over these tactics as there was in the colonies. But in 1813, the British were far less charitable towards the Americans, and much more willing to employ such measures). After leaving the two towns, Cockburn's forces proceeded to Charlestown, and its citizens wisely chose not to erect any defenses. As a result, he magnanimously paid the town full value for the supplies his men took back to the ships.<sup>289</sup>

Cockburn then proceeded south to rejoin Warren on May 7, having successfully raided four towns, destroyed nine merchant ships, numerous stores and supplies, and fifty-one artillery pieces at a cost of one killed and five wounded. His success was a perfect example of concentrating one's forces against several weak positions. The American militia in the region could have easily outnumbered him, but the mobility of Cockburn's ships prevented their concentration at any given place. The raids vindicated Warren's theory of a flying army able to strike anywhere it wanted. The Chesapeake would remain littered with small, weakly defended positions that the British could easily overcome. With these raids, Cockburn had indeed brought the war to America, a fact that Theodore Roosevelt acknowledged a century later in the strongest terms.<sup>290</sup>

One of the consequences of Cockburn's raids was the influx of a large number of runaway slaves from the region. He was especially glad to receive them, as their

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<sup>289</sup> Ibid.

<sup>290</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 6:71. In the chapter on the War of 1812 in Clowes' history, Theodore Roosevelt places particular blame on the American government for not having properly prepared for the defense of its shores. He writes "There can be no doubt, however, of the discredit attaching to the Americans for their conduct. A people which lets its shores be insulted with impunity incurs, if not greater blame, at least greater contempt, than the people which does the plundering. If here and there Cockburn burned a hamlet or two which he ought to have spared, his offence was really small when compared with the national disgrace brought on the American name by the supineness shown by the people of the threatened neighborhoods. They did nothing effectively of any kind for their own defense. Indeed, for the most part they did nothing at all, except gather bodies of militia whenever there was an alarm, and so kept the inhabitants constantly worried and harassed by always calling to arms, and yet merely providing almost worthless defenders."

knowledge of the local terrain was invaluable for his amphibious operations. The desertions became increasingly alarming to the Americans, so much so that Colonel Addison of the 27<sup>th</sup> Regiment asked Cockburn on June 7 if he could speak to the slaves to try to convince them to return to their homes, which Cockburn permitted. Addison warned the slaves that all those who refused to go back to their masters would lose all of their belongings left behind. Not a single slave chose to return with him.<sup>291</sup> However, just as the slaves were attempting to reach British warships to gain freedom, British sailors continued to desert from these same vessels to attain their own freedom. Cockburn frequently needed fresh water and provisions for his ships, and could obtain these supplies in the Chesapeake. Unfortunately, it was not uncommon for the men who were sent ashore to obtain these to not return, despite the knowledge of the punishment that awaited them if they were ever recaptured.<sup>292</sup> Clearly, freedom was a very subjective term.

The ships on the North American station had achieved a number of successes during the spring of 1813. Apart from Cockburn's raids in the region, the boats of the *Narcissus* and *Spartan* captured the privateer schooner *Vesta* on May 16 as the raider tried to break through the blockade in the Chesapeake.<sup>293</sup> On the Long Island station, the frigate *Orpheus* discovered the letter-of-marque ship *Wampoe* (8) off Block Island on April 28.<sup>294</sup> There was little wind, so Captain Pigot sent off a small force of marines in one of the ship's boats to cut her off. Despite coming under heavy fire, the boat succeeded in luring the *Wampoe* onto some rocks three miles up the West River. Pigot sent additional boats to help capture

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<sup>291</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 156

<sup>292</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 49-50

<sup>293</sup> Warren to Croker, May 16, 1813, Adm.1/503, 299

<sup>294</sup> Pigot to Hardy, April 29, 1813, Adm.1/503, 314

the raider, while the *Wampoe*'s crew quickly departed the grounded ship. The marines were able to capture her, but could not get her off the rocks, and were forced to set her on fire. The *Orpheus* suffered only one casualty, Lieutenant Collins, who died of his wounds the following day.<sup>295</sup> She would later destroy another raider, the privateer *Holkar* (20), off Rhode Island on May 11.<sup>296</sup>

Further north on the Boston station, the frigate *Nymphe* proved herself to be quite successful against enemy raiders.<sup>297</sup> She captured the privateer brig *Vivid* on April 20, the brig *Montgomery* (12) on May 5, and capped off her run with the schooner *Juliana Smith* (3) on May 16.<sup>298</sup> The frigates *Shannon* and *Tenedos* recaptured the privateer *Invincible* (16), a ship that had a most remarkable career.<sup>299</sup> She began her career as the French privateer *L'Invincible Napoleon* (16), and was captured by brig HMS *Mutine* (16) near Jamaica on April 9.<sup>300</sup> As the *Invincible*, she was recaptured a few weeks later by the

<sup>295</sup> Ibid.

<sup>296</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 30:168

<sup>297</sup> Lohnes, 'War of 1812 at Sea', 131. Warren ordered a partial blockade of Boston and Cape Cod to curtail the activities of New England privateers in March, 1813.

<sup>298</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Thomas Capel'; Captain F. P. Epworth to Captain T.B. Capel, April 21, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:242; Epworth to Capel, May 10, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:242; Epworth to Capel, May 20, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:242. Sir Thomas Bladen Capel was born August 25, 1776, the youngest son of the 4<sup>th</sup> Earl of Essex. He entered the navy in 1792, and served on the Newfoundland and Home stations before obtaining rank of lieutenant in 1797. He served on board the *Vanguard*, Nelson's flagship at the Battle of the Nile in 1799, and was later given command of the brig *Mutine*. Following his return to England, he was appointed to command the frigate *Arab*, and served during the next five years in the West Indies and Mediterranean. He commanded the frigate *Phoebe* at Trafalgar (1805), where his actions helped save the captured French ship *Swiftsure* during the storm that sank most of the prizes seized in the battle. He returned to the Mediterranean in the *Endymion*, and was present when Admiral Duckworth forced the passage through the Dardanelles in 1807. He was appointed to the 74-gun *La Hogue* in 1812 and sent to the North American station, where he would remain until the end of the war. He was promoted to rear-admiral in 1825, and commanded the East Indies station from 1834 to 1837, where he was promoted to vice-admiral before returning to England. He was promoted to full Admiral in 1847, and died on March 4, 1853.

<sup>299</sup> Captain Phillip Broke to Capel, May 16, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:242.

<sup>300</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:525

American privateer brig *Alexander* (18), and finally recaptured for the third time by the *Shannon* and *Tenedos* off Boston on May 16.<sup>301</sup> The *Alexander* was herself captured on May 19 by the *Rattler* and *Bream* off Kennebunk.<sup>302</sup> The *Tenedos* and *Curlew* captured the 4-gun schooner privateer *Enterprise* (pierced for eight guns) on May 24.<sup>303</sup> In addition, the squadron would capture or destroy ninety-two American merchant ships in April and May.

If there was truly a date that symbolized the turning point of the naval war between Great Britain and the United States, it must be June 1, 1813. Two events occurred off the American coast that not only redeemed the Royal Navy in the eyes of British citizens but also had significant impact on the course of the war at sea. The first of these involved the division watching over Long Island. During the first half of 1813, the ships in this sector scored fewer successes than the other divisions along the American coast, but were no less active. Warren ordered the blockade extended up to New York on May 26, ensuring the continued presence of British warships for the remainder of the war.<sup>304</sup> The main part of the division consisted of the 74-gun ships *Ramillies* and *Valiant*, and the frigates *Acasta*, *Orpheus* and *Loire* (38).<sup>305</sup> It saw the return to the North American station of one of the Royal Navy's most famous captains, Thomas Masterman Hardy, who was in command of the *Ramillies*. Their main duty was to watch over the frigates *United States* and

<sup>301</sup> Broke to Capel, May 16, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:242

<sup>302</sup> Captain James Alexander Gordon to Capel, May 20, 1813, Adm.1/503, 364; Lieutenant Hale to Warren, June 11, 1813, Adm.1/504, 108. The *Rattler*'s boats also destroyed a small 2-gun privateer in the Bay of Fundy on June 2, while the *Bream* captured the privateer sloop *Wasp* (2) on June 9. As for the *Alexander*, she was returning to Salem after a ten-week cruise, and made seven captures before she was captured.

<sup>303</sup> Captain Hyde-Parker to Capel, May 24, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:243

<sup>304</sup> Morriss, *Cockburn and the Royal Navy*, 93

<sup>305</sup> Captain Robert Dudley Oliver to Warren, June 13, 1813, Adm.1/504, 113-114

*Macedonian*, under the command of Stephen Decatur. They didn't have long to wait; on May 24, the two American frigates slipped out of New York through Long Island Sound, and made it as far as New London before being detected by Hardy's ships on May 29.<sup>306</sup> Captain Decatur waited for an opportunity to break out, and did so on June 1, sailing with the two frigates and the sloop *Hornet* (which was already at New London when he arrived). Hardy split up his squadron into two smaller divisions, with himself controlling the *Ramillies*, *Loire*, and *Orpheus*, while Captain Oliver commanded the *Valiant* and *Acasta*.<sup>307</sup> Neither Hardy nor Oliver wanted the responsibility of allowing the two frigates to be loosed upon the seas, and kept a close vigil over any movement. Oliver caught sight of Decatur's squadron and promptly chased it back into New London. Decatur opted to take his ships back to the safety of New York, and both frigates would remain bottled up for the rest of the war.<sup>308</sup> Their crews would later be transferred for duty on the Great Lakes, where they would be more gainfully employed.

Despite the successes achieved during the spring, public confidence in the Royal Navy was not restored until word came of another battle between British and American frigates. Early in the spring of 1813, Warren sent the *Shannon* and *Tenedos* to patrol the waters around Boston. It was discovered that no fewer than three American frigates, the

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<sup>306</sup> Ibid.

<sup>307</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Robert Dudley Oliver'. Robert Dudley Oliver was born October 31, 1766, and entered the navy at age 13. He became a lieutenant in 1793 on board the *Active*, and became commander of the French *Revolutionnaire* after her capture in 1794. He served throughout the next decade in the Home, Mediterranean and North American stations, and arrived a day late in the *Melpomene* to take part in the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. He served on the French coast from 1806 to 1813, when he was transferred to the North American station. He remained there until July 1814, when he resigned his command. He saw no further service, though by virtue of seniority he was promoted to rear-admiral in 1819, vice-admiral in 1830, and full admiral in 1841. He died near Dublin on September 1, 1850.

<sup>308</sup> Oliver to Warren, June 13, 1813, Adm.1/504, 113-114



*Constitution*, *President* and *Congress* were in port.<sup>309</sup> They were joined April 18 by the frigate *Chesapeake*, which managed to slip into Boston undetected.<sup>310</sup> In this one harbor lay the bulk of the American Navy. This was more than the two British frigates could have handled, but fortunately were joined soon after by the *Valiant* and *La Hogue*.<sup>311</sup> Overall command of the division was transferred to Oliver of the *Valiant*, but the ship stayed on the station for only a few weeks.<sup>312</sup> Captain Capel of *La Hogue* tried to make the blockade as effective as possible, using the *Shannon* and *Tenedos* as an inshore squadron to watch for signs of movement by the American frigates.<sup>313</sup> Bad weather rolled in on April 30, and the poor visibility forced the two frigates to move away from their station. Taking advantage of the thick fog, the *President* and *Congress* were able to escape during the night.<sup>314</sup> This left only the *Constitution* and the *Chesapeake* in the harbor, and the British captains were determined to keep them bottled up.

Early in May, Captain James Lawrence received orders to take command of the *Chesapeake* and to sail her into the Gulf of St. Lawrence to attack British shipping in the area.<sup>315</sup> Lawrence waited while his ship was being refitted and provisioned, but was

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<sup>309</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:196

<sup>310</sup> Ibid.

<sup>311</sup> Dent, 'The British Navy', 212

<sup>312</sup> Ibid. Warren ordered Oliver to take his ship to help blockade New York.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid., 212-213

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., 212-213; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 2:126-130. The *President* sailed to the North Sea and returned to Boston in September, and captured twelve British prizes of little value. The *Congress* sailed for the Cape Verde Islands, and made only three captures in eight months before returning to Portsmouth in December.

<sup>315</sup> *American National Biography*, s.v. 'James Lawrence'; Dent, 'The British Navy', 213; Forester, *Age of Fighting Sail*, 161. James Lawrence was born on October 1, 1781, and entered the United States Navy as a midshipman in 1798. He served in the West Indies during the Quasi-War with France, and commissioned second lieutenant in 1802. He distinguished himself in the war against Tripoli in 1804, and later promoted to command gunboat *No. 6*. In 1810, he was promoted to master commandant and given command of the sloop

anxious for an opportunity to escape the *Shannon* and *Tenedos*. On May 25, it was discovered that only the *Shannon* was watching the harbor.<sup>316</sup> Lawrence must have reasoned that his chances of escape were as good as they would get, and on June 1, 1813, he took his ship out of the harbor, and discovered Captain Phillip Bowes Vere Broke and the *Shannon* waiting for him.

Broke did everything he could to lure the *Chesapeake* to his ship. On May 25, Broke sent a letter to Captain Hyde-Parker of the *Tenedos*, stating that,

“Sir, Having every reason to expect that the American frigate *Chesapeake* will sail from Boston in a few days, and thinking there is more chance of her being intercepted by our frigates cruising separately than if they keep together, I have to direct that during the absence of the Hon. Captain Capel, the senior officer, you will proceed to and cruise the range lately occupied by *La Hogue*, vis., from Cape Sable to the latitude of 42.10 N., to watch for the *Chesapeake*, should she pass by the *Shannon* in night-time or thick weather. You are to take an opportunity, in such winds as you think least likely to favor the enemy’s escape, to procure water enough to last out your provisions at Shelburne, or any other port which you may find most convenient, joining the *Shannon*, off Boston, on the 14<sup>th</sup> June, unless otherwise ordered by the senior officer.”<sup>317</sup>

Broke believed that the *Chesapeake* was the only ship in Boston that was ready for sea, and that she was not likely to come out if there were two Royal Navy cruisers waiting for here. He even sent a personal letter to Lawrence on the day of battle to challenge the *Chesapeake*, thus giving the appearance that Lawrence had accepted the duel.<sup>318</sup> However, Lawrence did not receive the letter in time, in which Broke gave complete details as to his

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*Hornet*, and cruised in company of the *Constitution* during the latter’s cruise off Brazil in 1812. He sank the British sloop *Peacock* before returning to Boston, and was given command of the frigate *Chesapeake* in May, 1813. He was mortally wounded following his ship’s defeat to the British frigate *Shannon* on June 1, 1813, and died on June 4.

<sup>316</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:197

<sup>317</sup> J.G. Brighton, *Admiral Sir P.V.B. Broke, K.C.B. etc.; A Memoirs* (London, 1866), 156-157; Rear-Admiral H.F. Pullen, *The Shannon and the Chesapeake* (Toronto/Montreal, 1970), 48-49

<sup>318</sup> A copy of Broke’s challenge can be found in *Naval Chronicle* 30:413-414, and Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 53-54

ship's crew and armament. But for Lawrence, the mere presence of the *Shannon* in Boston Harbor was enough to get the *Chesapeake* under sail.<sup>319</sup>

On paper, the fight between the *Shannon* and *Chesapeake* was probably the most even of the four frigate fights. Both ships were rated as 38-gun frigates, but as was the case in the other frigate actions, they carried far more than thirty-eight guns.<sup>320</sup> Yet when it came to comparing the crews, there was little doubt as to which ship was superior. The “*Shannons*” had been together for years, while Lawrence had barely any time to work out his new crew.<sup>321</sup> The majority of the men on Broke's ship had been together with him since he took command in 1806, and he drilled his men into one of the finest crews in the entire Royal Navy.<sup>322</sup> As a gunnery enthusiast, he regularly practiced firing exercises, and his crew soon achieved an extraordinarily high degree of proficiency. Broke had the ship's cannons fitted with gunlocks and sights, which was quite revolutionary at this time. During target practices, he would also give a pound of his own tobacco to the first gunners to hit their target.<sup>323</sup> In any case, both captains got their crews prepared for battle.

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<sup>319</sup> Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 55

<sup>320</sup> Dent, ‘The British Navy’, 448; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 179. Dent and Roosevelt agree that the *Shannon* carried fifty-two cannon and carronades. Dent gives the *Chesapeake* forty nine guns, while Roosevelt claims carried fifty. Dent also notes that despite this, the *Chesapeake*'s broadside was still greater than the *Shannon*'s, 590 pounds to the latter's 550 pounds, while Roosevelt puts the weight of the *Chesapeake*'s broadside at only 542 pounds.

<sup>321</sup> Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 135. Lawrence was supposed to have been given command of the *Constitution*, and was somewhat dismayed that he was instead given the *Chesapeake*, which he considered an unlucky ship. He tried to get reassigned, but never got a reply from the Secretary of the Navy.

<sup>322</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 6:76-78

<sup>323</sup> Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 135; David Lyon, *Sea Battles in Close Up: The Age of Nelson* (Annapolis, Md., 1996), 165-167

The battle between the two frigates lasted only fifteen minutes.<sup>324</sup> The *Shannon* was able to outmaneuver her opponent, and after a series of withering broadsides was able to board and capture the *Chesapeake*. The victory did not come cheap, as casualties on both sides were quite heavy.<sup>325</sup> This included both captains; Broke suffered a severe wound to the head that would end his active career in the Royal Navy, and would continue to plague his health for the next twenty-eight years of his life.<sup>326</sup> Lawrence suffered worst, as he died of his wounds four days later, repeating the words that would become a battle-cry for the United States Navy, "Don't give up the ship!"<sup>327</sup> Many of the American prisoners were somewhat uncooperative, and wound up being manacled with the handcuffs they had

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<sup>324</sup> Pullen, *Shannon and the Chesapeake*, 41-63, 80-115; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 179-191; C.H.J. Snider, *The Glorious Shannon's Old Blue Duster and Other Faded Flags of Fadeless Fame* (Toronto, 1923), 3-40

<sup>325</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:205; Mahon, *War of 1812*, 123-124; Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, 184-185. According to James, the American frigate suffered fifty-six killed and eighty-five wounded, while Broke's ship suffered thirty-four killed and forty-three wounded. Mahon claims the *Chesapeake* suffered seventy killed and one hundred wounded, while the *Shannon* lost twenty-four killed and fifty-nine wounded. Roosevelt puts the figures at *Chesapeake*'s casualties at sixty-one killed and mortally wounded and eighty-five wounded, while the *Shannon* lost thirty-three killed and fifty wounded. The majority of the British casualties came during the boarding phase of the action.

<sup>326</sup> Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 138-139

<sup>327</sup> *Dictionary of Canadian Biography 1891-1900*, s.v. 'Provost Wallis'; J.G. Brighton, *Admiral of the Fleet Sir Provo W.P. Wallis, G.C.B., etc.: A Memoirs*, 2 vols. (London, 1892); Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 138. One of the officers on board the *Shannon* was Lieutenant Provost Wallis, who took command of the ship after Broke was wounded and the First Lieutenant was killed. He was born in Halifax on April 12, 1791, and entered the navy on board the frigate *Cleopatra* in October, 1804. He was on board this ship when the French frigate *Ville de Milan* captured her the following year. Fortunately, the *Milan* was herself captured the following week by the British 50-gun ship *Leander*. Wallis later served on board the *Milan*, and promoted to lieutenant on the brig *Curieux* in 1808. This ship was wrecked off Guadeloupe in 1809, and after serving on board various ships during the next three years, he was appointed to the *Shannon* in 1812. After her victory over the *Chesapeake*, he was promoted to commander of the sloop *Snipe* early in 1814. He was advanced to post rank in 1819, and served through various stations during his fifty-year naval career, including being Queen Victoria's naval aide-de-camp between 1847 to 1851. He was promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1851, and again to Vice-Admiral in 1857, and saw no further service after this. He was made full Admiral in 1863, and reached the rank of Admiral-of-the-Fleet in 1877. On his 100<sup>th</sup> birthday in 1891, he received congratulations from throughout the empire, including the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Edinburgh, the Mayor of Halifax, and the captain and crew of the *Shannon*. He died on February 13, 1892.

expected to use on the *Shannon*'s crew.<sup>328</sup> It seemed that overconfidence was not confined solely to the British.

Nineteen years after Lord Howe's victory over Villaret-Joyeuse, the British would celebrate another Glorious First of June. The *Shannon* returned to Halifax with her prize on June 6, and received a most tumultuous welcome when she entered the port. Three American frigates were essentially neutralized for the duration of the war, a significant portion of their naval strength. The capture of the *Chesapeake* brought the British an equally valuable prize, a set of the United States Navy's signal books. The Admiralty would provide copies of the American signals to its cruisers less than six weeks later.<sup>329</sup> Far more important to the English people was that Broke and his '*Shannon*' had shown the world that the Royal Navy had not gone soft since Trafalgar. In fact, to many Englishmen this was the most important victory since that famous battle, and the church bells rang throughout the English countryside to proclaim the *Shannon*'s triumph.<sup>330</sup> If anything, the battle proved that the British were as adept at playing the propaganda game as the Americans. Even had the *Chesapeake* defeated the *Shannon*, the strategic picture would not have altered. The only real benefit of this victory was its impact on British morale, allowing them to finally gloat over the Americans.

Far more important in regards to the war itself is that while American raiders were still causing considerable damage to British trade, the American merchant fleet remained

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<sup>328</sup> *Dictionary of Canadian Biography 1891-1900*, s.v. 'Provost Wallis'

<sup>329</sup> Admiralty to Captain Charles Paget, July 10, 1813, Adm.2/1377, 145-148

<sup>330</sup> Gruppe, ed., *The Frigates*, 139

neutralized in its ports.<sup>331</sup> This cost the United States millions of dollars of revenue desperately needed by Madison's government.<sup>332</sup> The Royal Navy would attempt to tighten its stranglehold on the American coast, and while it would not be glorious as the *Shannon's* victory, it would pay much higher dividends.

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<sup>331</sup> Gardiner, *War of 1812*, 77; Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 227-231. In September, 1813, there were 245 American vessels laid up in Boston alone. Gardiner states that of forty-four vessels cleared from Boston in December, 1813, only five were American ships, as insurance premiums had risen to 50% for American ships. Gardiner also states that because of the war, the United States lost its status as neutral carrier of the world. Dudley, on the other hand, argues that the coastal American trade, while diminished, remained substantial throughout the war. His view is that while American trade was for the most part neutralized, it was not eliminated, and would allow for the American merchant fleet to return in force after the war.

<sup>332</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 227. Between 1812 and 1814, American imports dropped from \$77 million to \$13 million, while their exports during the same period dropped from \$39 million to \$7 million. However, the figures for 1815 show an increase to \$113 million in imports and \$53 million for exports.

## CHAPTER 5: TURNING THE TIDE 1813-1814

The strategic situation in 1813 changed dramatically for the British. It seemed that after almost twenty years of fighting against the rest of Europe, the tide had finally turned against France. The invasion of Russia destroyed most of Napoleon's Grande Armée, and this catastrophe allowed Austria and Prussia to again take up arms against the French armies. Wellington's Peninsular War also helped to further bleed French troops that were desperately needed on other battlefields. Now that the war had shifted against France, the British could afford to send more forces to the North American theatre. The United States government knew that as long as Britain and France were locked in their mortal struggle, the British would be unable to give much aid to their colonies. With the very real prospect of a French defeat, American fortunes became very grim.

Just as the American naval successes of 1812 had embarrassed the British, so too had the British victories in Upper Canada. They had dispelled the notion of an easy conquest of Canada, but American land and naval forces enjoyed more success the following year in their efforts in Upper Canada, and events in that theatre would play an unexpected role in naval operations on the North American station. On April 27, 1813, Commodore Isaac Chaucey landed his army of 1700 men near York, and all of the public buildings in the provincial capital of Upper Canada were set ablaze.<sup>1</sup> British and Canadian citizens were outraged by this barbarous act, and even the American commanders

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<sup>1</sup> Francis F. Beirne, *The War of 1812* (New York, 1949), 158-167; Robert Malcomson, *Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812-1814* (Toronto, 1998), 103-108

denounced the behavior of their troops as indefensible.<sup>2</sup> However, these were the same tactics that Cockburn was using in the Chesapeake, thus depriving either side of the moral high ground. The main difference was symbolic; Cockburn's targets were small hamlets, while the Americans torched the capital of a British colony. In time, the Americans would come to pay dearly for this act. The Admiralty had already decided to take over jurisdiction of the Provincial Marine on the Great Lakes from the army, and appointed in March Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo and Captain Robert Barclay to command the naval forces on Lake Ontario and Lake Erie respectively.<sup>3</sup> The Admiralty's decision meant that Warren would be responsible for another theatre, which only added to his burden. He agreed to send 350 men from his own squadron to the Great Lakes, which he took from several of his ships.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, reinforcements for his own depleted ships were slow to arrive, forcing him to lose the services of several ships for lengthy periods. This was further exacerbated during the summer after he received repeated requests for additional seamen from Prevost and Yeo.<sup>5</sup>

Although pleased with the *Shannon's* victory, the Admiralty remained displeased with Warren's overall performance. American privateers, which had evaded Warren's blockade, continued making their presence felt in the waters around the British Isles, as

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<sup>2</sup> Beirne, *The War of 1812*, 160

<sup>3</sup> Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Yeo, March 19, 1813, William S. Dudley, *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1985-1992), 2:435-436; Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power In Its Relations to the War of 1812*, 2 vols., (Boston, 1905) 2:28; Malcomson, *Lords of the Lake* 119-123

<sup>4</sup> Malcomson, *Lords of the Lake*, 62

<sup>5</sup> Governor Prevost to Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, June 20, 1813, Adm1/504, 142-143; Warren to John Wilson Croker, September 22, 1813, Adm.1/504, 159. Warren was only able to send another 200 men by using the entire crew of the sloop *Indian*, and would later send the crew of the *Wasp* to serve on Lake Champlain in September.



they had the benefit of being able to operate out of French ports.<sup>6</sup> Their Lordships were also very critical of Warren for allowing the frigates *President* and *Congress* to escape from Boston in April, and censured him for it.<sup>7</sup> In return, he continued to ask for more men and more ships, which caused them to grow more impatient with him. The public's patience was also growing thin with the lack of progress against the Americans, and one editorial in the *Naval Chronicle* stated:

We were in the hopes, ere this, to have announced the capture of the American Navy; and, as our commander-in-chief on that station has sufficient force to effect so desirable an object, we trust, before another month elapses, to lay before our readers what we conceive ought long since to have happened.<sup>8</sup>

Nor was the Admiralty too pleased with some of Warren's subordinates. The Admiralty decided to assign a Port Admiral to each of the three former squadrons to help Warren manage things more smoothly, and chose Rear-Admiral Edward Griffith to fill this position for the Halifax sector.<sup>9</sup> Griffith received his orders from the Admiralty on May

<sup>6</sup> Edgar Stanton Maclay, *A History of American Privateers* (New York, 1924), 275, 350

<sup>7</sup> Croker to Warren, June 17, 1813, Adm.2/1380, 196-197

<sup>8</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 29:497; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 2:151

<sup>9</sup> James Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain: Consisting of Historical Memoirs of Those Officers of the British Navy Who Distinguished Themselves During the Reign of His Majesty George III*, 4 vols. (Boston, 1972) 3:164-167. Sir Edward Griffith Colpoys entered the navy in 1778 on board the *Royal George*. He was promoted to lieutenant at the end of the American Revolution, and managed to stay on the active list throughout the interwar period. With the start of the war in 1793, he was appointed to the *Boyne*, flagship of Sir John Jervis, and sailed with him to the West Indies. The next year he was promoted to commander, and within a month he reached post rank and given command of the *Undaunted*. He served during the next twenty years in the Home and Mediterranean stations, and was promoted to rear-admiral in 1812. In 1813 he was assigned as port admiral of Halifax, where he would remain for the next four years. His tenure in Halifax was highlighted by the Castine expedition in 1814, resulting in the capture of most of the coast of Maine. After the war he succeeded Cochrane as commander of the North American Squadron in 1815, which he held until 1817. He was re-appointed to the North American station again in 1819, and following his promotion to vice-admiral he returned to England for good in 1821. After the death of his uncle, Admiral Sir John Colpoys, he obtained the right to adopt and bear the name of Colpoys.

27, 1813 to sail with his flagship HMS *Majestic* (56) to North America.<sup>10</sup> He left with a convoy of 108 ships heading for Newfoundland in June, and along the voyage got his first taste of the American conflict.<sup>11</sup> On June 20, the *Majestic* captured the privateer brig *Ulysses* (14) while it was attempting to capture one of the ships in the convoy (two merchant ships would be lost to privateers on the passage to Newfoundland).<sup>12</sup> After escorting the convoy to Newfoundland, the *Majestic*, *Thistle*, store-ship *Abundance* and two other merchant ships continued on to Halifax, where they arrived on August 6.<sup>13</sup> As port admiral he intended to stay permanently in Halifax, and transferred his flag to the *Centurion*.<sup>14</sup> For the remainder of the war, he would manage all naval operations in New England and the Maritimes. It must have been something of a surprise to him to receive a rather scathing letter from Croker, written on July 9, where he was blamed for not maintaining an adequate force of ships to watch over the ports in his sector. If anything, the letter to Griffith shows to some degree how out of touch the Admiralty was with the situation, as he was already facing criticism before he had a chance to take up his duties! They even blamed Captain Capel of *La Hogue* for the escape of American ships that occurred during the *Shannon-Chesapeake* battle.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Rear-Admiral Edward Griffith to John Barrow, May 28, 1813, Adm.1/503, 262

<sup>11</sup> Griffith to Croker, August 10, 1813, Adm.1/503, 415-416

<sup>12</sup> Griffith to Croker, August 10, 1813, Adm.1/503, 415-416; Griffith to Croker, August 18, 1813, Adm.1/504, 51. Of particular interest to Griffith was a letter taken from the *Ulysses*, written by the French consul at Charleston to the French Minister of Exterior Relations.

<sup>13</sup> Griffith to Croker, August 10, 1813, Adm.1/503, 415-416

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Croker to Griffith, July 9, 1813, Adm.2/1377, 140-142; Wade Dudley, "Without Some Risk: A Reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815" (Ph.D. diss., University of Alabama, 1999), 152-153

Despite these criticisms, the squadron enjoyed other successes along the northeastern coast. The letter-of-marque *Porcupine* (20) was captured 100 miles south of Cape Sable on June 10 by the *Valiant*, *Acasta* and *Wasp* (18).<sup>16</sup> *La Hogue* chased the *Young Teazer* (12) into Lunenburg Bay on June 26, and sent her boats to capture her.<sup>17</sup> The privateer's crew set the ship on fire to prevent capture, but the vessel blew up before everyone could escape, resulting in the death of thirty of her crew.<sup>18</sup>

The frigate *Nymphe* continued her remarkable career as a privateer hunter during the summer of 1813. On her return to Halifax on June 29, she spotted the privateer schooner *Thomas* off Port North. She chased the schooner for thirty-four hours before finally catching up to her the next day and forcing her surrender.<sup>19</sup> Later that summer, she assisted the *Curlew's* boats in the capture of another raider, the letter-of-marque schooner *Paragon* off Cape Cod.<sup>20</sup> After chasing the schooner for eight hours on August 13, the two British warships sent out their boats filled with marines to capture her, and succeeded with little difficulty. The *Paragon* was a very fine vessel, and Captain Epworth considered her one of the finest ships he had ever seen.<sup>21</sup>

Another factor that helped turn the tide of the naval war against the United States was the presence of British privateers, particularly those from Nova Scotia. It is estimated

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<sup>16</sup> Captain Robert Dudley Oliver to Warren, June 10, 1813, Adm.1/504, 10. The *Wasp* arrived on the station a few weeks earlier.

<sup>17</sup> Oliver to Warren, June 28, 1813, Adm.1/504, 133

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. Only eight of the *Young Teazer's* crew made it to shore.

<sup>19</sup> Captain Epworth to Captain Thomas Capel, July 6, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 30:356. The *Thomas* had been out for six weeks, but had not made any captures.

<sup>20</sup> Epworth to Warren, August 15, 1813, Adm.1/504, 156. The *Paragon* was pierced for sixteen cannons, but had only four on board when she was captured.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

that these raiders brought into Halifax about one-third of all captured American ships during the War of 1812. Yet instead of gratitude in helping to fight the Americans, most men serving in the navy were considerably resentful of their presence. Whereas it was necessary to force men to serve on board his Majesty's ships, there was no shortage of volunteers to serve on board a privateer. Most men in the navy saw them as competitors rather than allies in the war at sea, especially with regards to prize money. This led to more than a few entanglements between the two sides on the issue of prize ownership. One such incident occurred on April 23, 1813, after the privateer *Crown* captured the American merchant ship *Sibue* ten miles southwest of Cape Sable. No sooner had she captured her than the sloop *Atalante* appeared, and her captain ordered his own prize crew to be placed on board. Captain Jennings, the *Crown*'s captain, was understandably upset over Captain Hickey's decision to simply take over his prize, and moreover after Hickey insisted that he reveal all the information regarding the capture of the ship, in order to claim sole credit for the *Sibue*'s capture. When Jennings refused, Hickey threatened to impress his crew if he did not comply. Ultimately, Hickey seized the prize and two members of the *Crown*'s crew, and returned to Halifax. After listening to both captains' accounts, the Vice-Admiralty Court decided to credit the capture of the *Sibue* to both ships. After she was sold, both ships received £2531 in prize money.<sup>22</sup>

The American warships on the New York/Long Island station might have been penned in by the British blockade, but that did not stop the Americans from trying other tactics against the British warships. Congress passed a law in March that became known

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<sup>22</sup> For a full account of this incident, see C.H.J. Snider, *Under the Red Flag: Privateers of the Maritime Provinces of Canada During the War of 1812* (Toronto, 1927), 99-111

as the 'Torpedo Act', which stated that the government would pay a bounty to anyone who sank a British warship. The bounty would amount to half the value of the destroyed vessel, plus half the value of the ship's guns, cargo, tackle and apparel.<sup>23</sup> This led to several attempts to destroy the British warships blockading the coast. On June 25, the schooner *Eagle* sailed out to sink HMS *Ramillies* while the British ship was lying off Fisher's Island.<sup>24</sup> She was loaded with gunpowder and sent to blow up by a time fuse. It was hoped that the *Ramillies* would be alongside the schooner while trying to take her in as a prize. The *Eagle* blew up before she could reach her target, but wound up killing eleven men from the British warship sent out to board her.<sup>25</sup> Warren was furious when he heard of the attack. He wrote to the Admiralty about,

The melancholy event of the loss of a most gallant officer (Lieutenant John Geddes) and ten brave seamen by a diabolical and cowardly contrivance of the enemy; indeed, the daily attempts practiced by Commodore Decatur and the Americans against the valuable Sir Thomas Hardy and the ships under his orders now blockading the enemy's frigates in the port of New London by means of torpedoes, fire vessels and other infernal machines are beyond conception.<sup>26</sup>

The Americans would make a second attempt to blow up the *Ramillies* the following month through the efforts of one of the pioneers of naval shipbuilding, Robert Fulton. The father of the steamboat also designed a submersible craft, the genesis of the submarine, and had one ready to be used against the British.<sup>27</sup> While the *Ramillies* was lying at anchor

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<sup>23</sup> Dudley, ed, *The Naval War of 1812*, 2:160

<sup>24</sup> Warren to Croker, July 22, 1813, Adm.1/504, 26

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 32:503-504. The British had heard of Fulton's torpedoes as early as 1810. He was hired by their government to use experimental torpedoes against the French at Boulogne, for which he was paid £15,000. The experiment failed, and Fulton returned to the United States. The American government showed great interest in his inventions, and was given another chance to prove the usefulness of his inventions.

off New London, the small submersible slid under Hardy's ship and tried to attach a torpedo under her hull. However, the torpedo's screw broke off, and the effort miscarried. The submersible was discovered, and Hardy ordered his ships from that point onward to keep under way at all time.<sup>28</sup> Yet while the men of this age considered this attack as a most disreputable form of warfare, Fulton's inventions would be recognized as an important step in the evolution of naval warfare.

Despite these attacks on his ships, Oliver and Hardy continued their raids against American shipping. On September 6, the *Acasta* and *Atalante* were sent to scour Long Island Sound. The two ships were quite successful, capturing or destroying fifteen small coastal vessels.<sup>29</sup> They had an opportunity to inflict even greater damage on September 9 when they spotted twenty-three schooners and two ketches near Sandy Point, and immediately set off after them. Unfortunately, their prey proved too swift, and were able to make it safely back to port.<sup>30</sup> Although these attacks were less damaging to the Americans than the British might have liked, they nevertheless helped maintain Britain's naval ascendancy in these waters. With barely a half-dozen ships under his command at any one time, Hardy completely dominated the most important port in the Western Hemisphere. Though church bells would not ring for this achievement as they did for Broke's victory, it was an impressive achievement.

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<sup>28</sup> Keith S. Dent, 'The British Navy and the Anglo-American War of 1812 to 1815 (master's thesis, University of Leeds, 1949), 232-233; *Naval Chronicle* 30:403. The Americans would also use torpedoes against the 74-gun HMS *Plantagenet* and *Victorious* in the Chesapeake, but also failed.

<sup>29</sup> Oliver to Warren, September 12, 1813, Adm.1/504, 180

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

Though there were no major American warships in the Delaware, it was the outlet for the city of Philadelphia. Cockburn assigned the frigates *Statira*, *Spartan* and sloop *Martin* to this region at the end of May, with Captain Stackpole of the *Statira* as senior officer.<sup>31</sup> The Delaware turned into a most profitable region for commerce raiding. On May 29, Captain Senhouse (of the *Martin*) took his ship and four boats from the two frigates to sweep some of the small rivers and creeks in the region, and captured four merchant ships between May 30 and June 1.<sup>32</sup> Stackpole's division enjoyed further success when they captured or destroyed another twenty-four ships between June 2 and June 13.<sup>33</sup> However, there was considerable tension between the two frigate captains. After sweeping the Delaware, Stackpole ordered Captain Brenton (of the *Spartan*) to go back to Halifax with some of the ships they captured.<sup>34</sup> In a letter he wrote to Cockburn, Stackpole claimed that Brenton had treated him with utter contempt and had gone out of his way to throw obstacles for the operations in the region, including disobeying his direct orders.<sup>35</sup> He wanted Brenton to face a court martial, and Brenton was more than happy to satisfy his request.<sup>36</sup> However, the *Spartan* was ordered to return to England with a

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<sup>31</sup> Captain Stackpole to Rear-Admiral George Cockburn, June 3, 1813, Adm.1/506, 75-76; *Naval Chronicle* 29:386-387. The *Poictiers* bombarded the town of Lewiston in the Delaware in March, 1813.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. See Appendix A for list of ships captured

<sup>33</sup> Stackpole to Cockburn, June 19, 1813, Adm.1/506, 77-79

<sup>34</sup> Stackpole to Cockburn, June 28, 1813, Adm.1/506, 82-83

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. Curiously, Brenton makes little mention of the war in the Delaware in his own history.

<sup>36</sup> Brenton to Warren, July 13, 1813, Adm.1/506, 84

convoy in July, and left before Warren got word of the incident. As a result, no court martial ever took place.<sup>37</sup>

Further south, Warren left the Chesapeake on May 17 with the *San Domingo*, *Dragon*, *Maidstone* and a fleet of prize ships that he intended to send to Halifax and Bermuda.<sup>38</sup> Despite his overwhelming naval superiority in the Chesapeake, Warren was hamstrung by the fact that his larger vessels could not operate in the shallow rivers that permeated the region, where most of the local trade was concentrated. Many of these tributaries were also well defended, and this put his smaller ships at considerable risk if they ventured too far. His aim was to have his 'flying army' of between 2000 to 3000 men land at any point in the region, and be superior to any force the Americans could muster in three days (sixty-eight hours).<sup>39</sup> In essence, what he wanted to achieve was what Cockburn was already doing, only a much larger scale.

When he arrived in Bermuda on May 26, Warren was pleased to find that the troopships HMS *Diadem*, *Diomedé*, *Romulus*, *Fox*, *Success*, *Nemesis* and packet ship *Mariner* waiting for him.<sup>40</sup> They brought with them a large contingent of troops, including two battalions of Royal Marines (1800 men), two companies of the 102<sup>nd</sup> Regiment (300 men), the Royal Marines Artillery (250 men), and a detachment of the Canadian Chasseurs (300 men). The force totaled 2650 men and was under the command of Major-

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<sup>37</sup> Warren to Barrow, June 3, 1814, Adm.1/506, 74; *Naval Chronicle* 32:411-412. Stackpole was noted for his short temper, and would later fight a duel with one of his officers in Jamaica on April 28, 1814.

<sup>38</sup> Warren to Croker, May 31, 1813, Adm.1/503, 286

<sup>39</sup> Roger Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy in Transition: Admiral Sir George Cockburn* (Columbia, S.C., 1997), 93

<sup>40</sup> Warren to Croker, May 31, 1813, Adm.1/503, 286



General Sir Sidney Beckwith.<sup>41</sup> The Canadian Chasseurs were a special unit of former French prisoners-of-war who were recruited into British service.<sup>42</sup> With these reinforcements, Warren felt that he was strong enough to make an assault on both Norfolk and the USS *Constellation*, and he returned to the Chesapeake on June 1 to commence large-scale operations.<sup>43</sup>

Prior to Warren's return, there were a few skirmishes between American and British naval units in the Chesapeake. The *Victorious* nearly met her end on June 5 when a torpedo was found near her, which fortunately did not detonate.<sup>44</sup> Like Warren, this form of attack aroused enormous indignation from Cockburn.<sup>45</sup> On June 12, the frigate *Narcissus* sent out a raiding party of forty marines to capture the 6-gun schooner USS *Surveyor*, which was anchored in the York River.<sup>46</sup> The boats failed to achieve surprise, and the *Surveyor* opened fire as they approached. The marines pressed on, and overcame the ship by sheer weight of numbers. The marines lost three killed and six wounded, while the schooner suffered five wounded.<sup>47</sup> This added another fine small vessel to the growing British fleet in the Chesapeake.

Far more serious for Cockburn was an incident that occurred on June 20, when he came close to losing one of his frigates. The *Junon* was lying becalmed in Hampton

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<sup>41</sup> William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain From the Declaration of War by France to the Accession of George IV*, 6 vols. (London, 1847), 6:231

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Cockburn to Warren, June 16, 1813, Adm.1/504, 16

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 203

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. The marines attacked with forty men, while the schooner had a crew of only sixteen men.

Roads, and became the target of fifteen gunboats.<sup>48</sup> The flotilla carried thirty cannons, the majority of which were 24- and 32-pounders, and carried 500 men to be used to board the British frigate.<sup>49</sup> The gunboats made sure to stay out of the broadside arc of her guns, which allowed the frigate the use of her two deck guns. Yet this style of attack by the Americans was nothing new to the British. The use of gunboats against isolated ships was something the Royal Navy had become accustomed to in the Baltic. After having their fleet stolen away by the British at the second battle of Copenhagen, the Danes chose to concentrate on building a large fleet of inexpensive gunboats. These were used quite effectively in the narrow confines of the Sound and the Great Belt, which separated the Baltic from the North Sea. To deal with this threat, the British response was to send their marines into the long boats and attempt to capture the gunboats in hand-to-hand combat. This tactic worked well against the Danes, and would work equally well against the Americans.<sup>50</sup> In this case, the Cassin chose to fire from too great a distance, rendering his attack ineffectual, and for forty-five minutes neither side was able to inflict much damage on the other. A fresh breeze came up which permitted the frigate HMS *Barrosa* (36) and sloop *Laurenstinus* (24) to come to the *Junon*'s aid. The arrival of these ships proved too much for Cassin, who turned his flotilla back to Norfolk.<sup>51</sup>

On June 19, Warren took his fleet of three 74-gun ships, one 64-gun razée, four frigates, and five sloops, tenders and transports towards Craney Island, the first step in his

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<sup>48</sup> Captain Sanders to Cockburn, June 20, 1813, Adm.1/504, 158

<sup>49</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:231-232

<sup>50</sup> Robert Gardiner, ed., *The Naval War of 1812*, 139

<sup>51</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:231-232

assault for Norfolk.<sup>52</sup> He was especially interested in the capture of the frigate *Constellation*. Despite the fact that American privateers were inflicting most of the damage to British trade, the Admiralty made it clear that defeating the American Navy was of the highest importance. The American frigate was perhaps viewed as a caged tiger waiting to be loosed onto the high seas, to wreak havoc on British trade or worse, to further humiliate the Royal Navy. This was something to be avoided at all costs. Yet concentrating so much of his naval strength in the Chesapeake was achieved at the expense of the blockade. The *Constellation* would remain boxed in the Chesapeake for the duration of the war, but countless smaller privateers would break out into the Atlantic because of the absence of British warships in other parts of the American coast.

The Americans defenders around Norfolk knew something was up, and the presence of the *Junon*, *Barrosa* and *Laurenstinus* in the vicinity prompted them to call up 10000 men of the state's militia into Norfolk.<sup>53</sup> With the arrival of the rest of Warren's squadron, they had begun to erect additional defenses to repel the upcoming British attack. Cockburn must have been surprised to find that he would not be directing the attack on Craney Island.<sup>54</sup> Warren instead chose Captain Pechell of the *San Domingo* to lead the attack, as he had been with Warren when the plans were formulated. Considering Cockburn's knowledge of the region, which he had personally ordered surveyed, Warren's decision to let Pechell lead the assault was clearly an error. Cockburn was even forced to shift his flag

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<sup>52</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:232; *Naval Chronicle* 30:182-183

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> James Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House: Admiral Sir George Cockburn 1772-1853* (Emsworth, UK, 1987), 158

from the *Marlborough* to the *Barrosa*, and would be relegated on the sidelines for the coming battle.<sup>55</sup>

Captain Pechell's assault got off to a rather poor start. He chose to start his attack at 11:00 a.m., which was low tide. Both Captain Hanchett of the *Diadem* and Captain Maude of the *Nemesis* were quite vocal in their disapproval of the timing of the assault, but Pechell ordered the attack to continue. The landing force was divided into two divisions, with eighteen boats carrying the 800 men of the first division, while the second division comprised of fifteen boats with 700 men. The first division landed at Pig's Point, but it was soon discovered that an attack from this quarter would be futile, and the troops were reembarked and headed back to the squadron. The second division fared worse; many of the boats grounded on the shoals and mud banks directly in front of the main American batteries guarding Craney Island. The defenders were able to sink two of the boats, while Captain Hanchett ordered the rest to retreat back to their ships. British casualties numbered three dead, sixteen wounded, and sixty-two missing (the majority of these were from the Canadian Chasseurs, and as many as forty of them deserted to the American side after the battle). Warren's first trial for his flying army ended on a most sour note.<sup>56</sup>

Three days following the debacle at Craney Island, Cockburn got his chance to lead the next assault. The target this time was the town of Hampton, situated on the northern bank of Hampton Roads. Cockburn would employ the same tactics that he had used employed successfully in his previous raids in the Chesapeake. He assembled 2000 men, augmented by three companies of marines from the squadron, and organized them into a

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:232-234; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 158-159

single division under General Beckwith. He used the sloop *Mohawk*, as well as several launches and rocket boats to give much closer and more effective bombardment of the shoreline defenses, something that was sorely lacking in the attack on Craney Island. Even more important was the timing of the attack, which he planned for 5:30 a.m. on June 26. This would give the boats the benefits of high tide and darkness to cover their approach, something else that was missing in Pechell's attack. The American defenders had time for only a brief resistance, and both the town and a seven-gun battery quickly fell to the British. Their casualties numbered five dead, thirty-three wounded and ten captured or missing, while the Americans lost seven killed, twelve wounded, and twelve captured or missing.<sup>57</sup>

Cockburn's victory was marred by the actions of the Canadian Chasseurs, who committed widespread acts of pillaging and looting against the town. The Chasseurs took the brunt of the blame for these acts, but doubtless some other British regulars also took part in them. Warren was so appalled by their behavior that he ordered the Chasseurs to return to Bermuda and never be employed again.<sup>58</sup> For Cockburn, the attack on Hampton further sullied his name in the United States, and he was held personally responsible for the looting.<sup>59</sup> The British occupied the town for ten days, long enough to resupply themselves and destroy the American ordinances before returning to their ships.

Despite the success at Hampton, Warren felt that Norfolk could not be taken without substantial reinforcements. It was then decided that Cockburn would take part of the Chesapeake squadron and make an assault on Ocrakoke, North Carolina, which was

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<sup>57</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 205-206; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:234-235

<sup>58</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:235

reputed to be a bustling hive of privateer activity.<sup>60</sup> Cockburn would take his new flagship, the 74-gun HMS *Sceptre*, along with the brig *Conflict* (14), tenders *Highflyer* and *Cockchafer*, and troopships *Romulus*, *Fox*, and *Nemesis*, which carried 500 men of the 103<sup>rd</sup> Regiment.<sup>61</sup> The plan was to put an end to the inland shipping that had risen steadily in the Carolinas following the start of the blockade. It was discovered that the ports of Beaufort and Ocracoke were connected by inland waterways to the Chesapeake, which merchants were using to send their ships in order to evade the blockade.<sup>62</sup> Chesapeake merchants could sell their goods in the Carolinian towns (which were not presently blockaded, due to lack of available ships), and reach neutral shipping lying in the open ports.

Cockburn's ships arrived off Ocracoke on the night of July 12, and he ordered his marines into their boats at 2:00 a.m. to maximize the advantage of surprise.<sup>63</sup> The *Conflict* and two tenders would escort the boats. Because of a heavy swell, the marines approached their target well after sunrise. They were spotted by the American defenders, who were given sufficient time to prepare for the attack.<sup>64</sup> The leading British division under Lieutenant Westphal spotted two large armed ships at anchor, and proceeded towards them. These were the privateer brig *Anaconda* (18) and schooner *Atlas* (10), which opened

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<sup>59</sup> Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 95

<sup>60</sup> Warren to Croker, July 22, 1813, Adm.1/504, 10

<sup>61</sup> Cockburn to Warren , July 12, 1813, Adm.1/504, 11-14

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.; Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 95

<sup>63</sup> Cockburn to Warren , July 12, 1813, Adm.1/504, p.11-14; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:235-236; Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 159-160

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

fire on Westphal's boats once they got in range.<sup>65</sup> Undaunted, the British pressed on and successfully captured the *Anaconda*. Her surrender prompted the *Atlas* to do the same.<sup>66</sup> The remaining boats moved in to occupy the harbor, and by the end of the day the British controlled the towns of Ocracoke, Portsmouth, and Beaufort.<sup>67</sup> Cockburn was determined that there be no repeat of Hampton, and wrote explicitly that any misconduct from any of his men against the civilian populace would result in the severest punishment.<sup>68</sup> Both the marines and the townspeople treated each other with polite civility, without any incident occurring. Cockburn saw to it that all private property was left alone, and only bothered with destroying the stores on the docks.<sup>69</sup> After two days in the region, they sailed back to the Chesapeake with their prizes. Cockburn had wanted to make an attack on the town of New Berne, but reasoned that the American militia would be waiting for him in force, and would not have the element of surprise that was essential in his previous attack.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, it was another impressive raid for Cockburn, who was by now a master of conducting hit and run raids along the American coast.

While Cockburn was off in the Carolinas, Warren's remaining ships in the Chesapeake were also occupied. On July 14, he took the *San Domingo*, *Barrosa*, *Laurenstinus*, *Mohawk*, *Conflict*, *Contest* (14), and tender *Highflyer* to investigate the Potomac. The *Contest* and *Mohawk* were detached to chase two armed vessels, later

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

discovered to be the sloop USS *Scorpion* (12) and schooner USS *Asp* (3), and pursued them into the Yeocomico River.<sup>71</sup> They sent their boats to pursue, and despite a continuous fire by militia units on the riverbank, they were successful in capturing the *Asp*. The operation cost the British two killed and six wounded, while American casualties numbered ten killed and wounded out of a crew of twenty-five.<sup>72</sup> However, they were unable to take the schooner back to their fleet, forcing the marines tried to set the ship ablaze. Their bad luck continued, as the flames were quickly put out, and the Americans were able to salvage the ship.<sup>73</sup>

On July 15, the *Plantagenet* sent one of her boats with eleven men to replenish her water supply. As soon as Lieutenant Dickenson and his men approached the well, fifty American soldiers surprised them. They tried to escape back to their boat, but discovered they were cut off. When they realized that escape was impossible, Dickenson surrendered. British casualties came to three killed and three wounded (including Dickenson).<sup>74</sup>

Warren brought the rest of his ships to Clements Island, where he dropped off a company of Marines to take possession of it. He wanted the island in order to obtain supplies of water and cattle while they were in the Potomac.<sup>75</sup> He detached Captain Shirreff of the *Barrosa* to take the frigates and smaller vessels further up the river to harass the enemy. Warren hoped the raid would create an alarm in the American capitol

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<sup>71</sup> Captain James Ratray to Warren, July 14, 1813, Adm.1/504, 36-37; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:236.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Robert Faussett to Captain Lloyd, July 15, 1813, Adm.1/504, 33

<sup>75</sup> Warren to Croker, July 29, 1813, Adm.1/504, 41-43



and force them to draw more troops for its defense, thereby alleviating the situation on the Canadian border.<sup>76</sup> Unfortunately, the larger frigates could not sail up the river without being greatly lightened, and without them the land force had to be disembarked further from Alexandria than Shirreff would have liked. Nevertheless, after he dropped off 600 men from the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of Royal Marines and the 108<sup>th</sup> Regiment under General Beckwith, their presence forced the Americans to march a large corps of regulars and militia to the Potomac.<sup>77</sup> Shirreff's troops burned a few vessels and took some cattle and sheep, and then re-embarked without suffering any casualties.<sup>78</sup> Although the operation held little military value, the lack of preparation on the part of the Americans to defend their own capitol would be remembered by the British commanders. It was a lesson the Americans would ignore, much to their regret. Warren also continued to map out the Bay region, and came upon two islands he felt would be invaluable as bases. He ordered the occupation of Watts and Kent Islands near Baltimore and Annapolis later in August.<sup>79</sup> They both had an ample supply of water and were an ideal meeting place for captured ships and escaped slaves.<sup>80</sup>

Further north, the *Junon* was sent in to replace the *Spartan* after her departure from the Delaware, and the division conducted additional small raids against local shipping throughout the summer.<sup>81</sup> Though many of these were small ships of little value, their

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Warren to Croker, August 28, 1813, Adm.1/504, 70-72

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:236-238.

losses added to the enemy's continued discomfort of living under a blockade. The station saw little activity from the Americans during the summer with one notable exception. Ironically, the *Junon* witnessed an incident similar to what happened to her in the Chesapeake the previous month. On July 29, the *Martin* ran aground on the outer ridge of Crow's shoal as the tides were receding.<sup>82</sup> She left the sloop stranded until the tides returned later that day. This was a major opportunity for the gunboats guarding the Delaware to engage her, and with the ebbing tide it would be impossible for the *Junon* to come to the sloop's aid. Ten gunboats went after the stricken sloop, and placed themselves in a position outside the sloop's broadside arc.<sup>83</sup> This allowed the *Martin* to reply with only two long-nines from her poop deck. The gunboats fired at the sloop for two hours, but inflicted very little damage on her. The stalemate was broken when Captain Sanders sent forty men from the *Martin* into three long boats, while the *Junon* added another one hundred men into four boats to attack the gunboats. The British succeeded in capturing one of the gunboats at a cost of three killed and four wounded, while American casualties were seven wounded.<sup>84</sup> The other gunboats tried to come to its aid, but in doing so passed the bow of the *Martin*, which could now use some of her broadside cannons, and some even became grounded. This proved too much for them, and they retired back up the Delaware by 5:00 p.m.<sup>85</sup> For their troubles, the British came into possession of one of the gunboats.

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

Most of the prize ships taken in the Chesapeake would be brought to the safety of Bermuda, and its prize court was kept almost as busy as that of Halifax. However, while the island was safe from the enemy, it was not immune to nature's fury. On August 3, Bermuda was hit by a hurricane that had already caused much devastation to Jamaica, Dominica, and the Turks Islands.<sup>86</sup> It destroyed several houses, smashed the wharves and severely damaged the barracks. Worse was its effect on the ships at anchor around the island. There were more than sixty ships in St. George's Harbor, including many American prizes and a recently arrived convoy from England.<sup>87</sup> It was estimated that fifty-eight ships were driven ashore, and total damage to island was put at around £200,000.<sup>88</sup> The only naval units in port at the time were the *Leander* and the frigate *Lacedemonian* (38), and both were badly damaged.<sup>89</sup> The only bright spot was that only one man was reported killed as a result of the hurricane, which was quite remarkable considering the devastation it caused.<sup>90</sup>

Griffith was ordered by Warren to provide enough escorts for the local convoys and to make sure that there were always at least three sloops and a brig in the Bay of Fundy at all times.<sup>91</sup> Unfortunately, as was the case during the previous American war, the squadron was in short supply of small cruisers. This made things especially difficult in the

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<sup>86</sup> Henry Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam: A History of the Island From 1784 to 1901*, 2 vols. (London, 1973), 318-320; W.E. Zuill, "The Hurricane of 1813", *The Bermuda Historical Quarterly* 14, (1957), 17-27

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Warren to Croker, November 20, 1813, Adm.1/504, 279

Chesapeake, as the squadron was in dire need of small ships to navigate the numerous shallow waterways in the region. Warren helped alleviate the problem when he ordered the purchase of several American privateers for service in the navy. Nine former privateers were added to the squadron's roster in 1813. Apart from the already-mentioned HMS *Musquedobit* (ex-*Lynx*) and *Shelburne* (ex-*Racer*), they included the brigs *Nova Scotia* (ex-*Rapid*), *Barbadoes* (ex-*Herald*), schooners *Canso* (ex-*Lottery*), *Pictou* (ex-*Scyren*), *St. Lawrence* (ex-*Atlas*), *Cockchafer* (ex-*Spencer*), and *Highflyer*, which kept her previous name.<sup>92</sup> These ships would prove quite useful in operations in shallow rivers and creeks along the American coast.

The Admiralty continued to show its displeasure with Warren's performance as theatre commander. The escape of the American frigates from Boston in April, his constant demands for additional ships, and his neglect of the Jamaica and Leeward Islands districts led them to decide that he was the wrong man for the position. Their lack of confidence in him was reflected by their decision to send their orders to blockade Boston directly to Griffith instead of him.<sup>93</sup> They also wanted Griffith to issue the orders and instructions to the other blockading divisions.<sup>94</sup> This was an outright attempt by the Admiralty to undermine Warren's authority, and was a clear signal that his days on the station were numbered.

Regardless of his problems with the Admiralty, Warren continued with his duties. He would lose the service of his most famous ship, as the *Shannon* was ordered to return with

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<sup>92</sup> Warren to Croker, October 25, 1813, Adm.1/504, 264

<sup>93</sup> Warren to Croker, September 4, 1813, Adm.1/504, 85-86. As senior officer on the station, Warren felt that the Admiralty should have sent the orders to him instead of Griffith.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

the *Marlborough* to England in the fall of 1813.<sup>95</sup> They would take back 170 men from the Canadian Chasseurs and five stands of colors taken from American militia units in the Chesapeake.<sup>96</sup> Like *Broke*, the *Shannon* would never fight another battle.

Large-scale operations in the Chesapeake were brought to an end early in September by an outbreak of fever in Warren's squadron.<sup>97</sup> On September 6, 1813, Warren withdrew the bulk of his ships to Bermuda and left Captain Barrie of the *Dragon* to command the remaining ships in the Chesapeake.<sup>98</sup> Despite only having a few ships available, Barrie continued to organize raids in the region throughout the fall. On September 22, the sloop *Actaeon* (16) sent a raiding party that destroyed an army barrack in Lynnhaven Bay.<sup>99</sup> Barrie also sent the *Mohawk* and eighty-five marines and sailors in five boats from the *Dragon* and *Lacedemonian* in Chereton and King's Creeks the following day that resulted in the destruction of three merchant ships.<sup>100</sup> The *Dragon* and *Sophie* sent another five boats into St. Mary's River on November 5, and returned with the sloop *Quintessence* and schooners *John* and *Alexandria*.<sup>101</sup> Barrie was also able to report that 120 Black slaves had escaped to his ships, and wrote that the disposition of the Blacks in Virginia and Maryland

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<sup>95</sup> Warren to Croker, September 23, 1813, Adm.1/504, 164, 172

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 162.

<sup>98</sup> Warren to Croker, October 16, 1813, Adm.1/504, 210-211. These would include the frigates *Lacedemonian* and *Armide*, sloops *Sophie*, *Actaeon* and *Mohawk*.

<sup>99</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 31:172; William Laird Clowes, *A History of the Royal Navy From the Earliest Times to the Present*, 7 vols. (London, 1897-1903), 5:543. Robert Barrie was born in 1774, and was commissioned lieutenant in 1795. He rose to commander in 1801, and shortly after to captain in 1802, a rank he would hold until his promotion to rear-admiral in 1837. He saw considerable service in the War of 1812, especially in the Chesapeake campaigns of 1813 and 1814. He died in June, 1841.

<sup>100</sup> Captain Robert Barrie to Warren, November 14, 1813, Adm.1/505, 66-67

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

was very favorable to the British.<sup>102</sup> Between October and December, they captured or destroyed no fewer than sixty-one ships, although most of these were small schooners of less than 100 tons.<sup>103</sup>

Not everything went perfectly for Barrie's ships. On the night of October 19, a severe gale blew in the Chesapeake that dispersed several of his ships. This allowed eight schooners and five privateers to get by the *Lacedemonian* and into the Atlantic.<sup>104</sup> Barrie complained that it was very difficult for his ships to catch these fast clipper ships, an excuse that Warren had previously used with the Admiralty.<sup>105</sup>

There were other actions outside of the Chesapeake for the ships on the North American station during the fall of 1813. The *Emulous* was ordered to proceed to Great Machias Bay in September to hunt for enemy privateers. On September 21, she sent her boats to search the bay, and discovered near Machias a small Chebacco-boat privateer, the *Swiftsure* (2). The raider quickly fled to the shore instead of trying to fight it out. The *Emulous'* marines had no problems capturing her, but could not get the ship off the shore. Unable to return with their prize, they set the *Swiftsure* ablaze.<sup>106</sup>

The *Emulous* teamed up a few weeks later with the *Shelburne* to chase after another privateer, the schooner *Tart* (4). They pursued the schooner up to Moose Island on October 19, where she was protected by the battery guarding the island. Commander Godfrey reasoned that he could not destroy the raider without suffering high casualties, and chose

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> See Appendix A for the list of ships taken by Barrie's force.

<sup>104</sup> Barrie to Warren, November 14, 1813, Adm.1/505, 46-48

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Commander Godfrey to Warren, September 30, 1813, Adm.1/504, 255

to let her go. However, as he departed the area later that day, he discovered two suspicious vessels and quickly went off in pursuit. The fleeing ships grounded on a nearby shore, and after a few volleys of musketry at the approaching British ships, their crews fled. The British marines were unable to get the schooner *Chameleon* (0, armed only with small arms) and schooner *Orion* (1) ungrounded, and were forced to destroy both ships. The two raiders had been out for only three weeks, and had made no captures.<sup>107</sup>

The *Fantôme* made a very nice capture on October 5 when she caught the privateer *Portsmouth Packet* (5) off the Metinicus Islands after an eight-hour chase. This was a most satisfying capture, as she was originally the Halifax privateer *Liverpool Packet*, lost earlier in the year.<sup>108</sup> Further south on the Long Island station, the sloop *Borer* began a cruise around Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard that would prove quite successful. She captured the sloop *Alert* off Nantucket on October 19, and drove another sloop onto the shore west of Cape Page Lighthouse. Captain Coote captured another two sloops and two schooners over the next few days, and would capture and destroy a total of twelve American merchantmen between October 19 and November 5.<sup>109</sup> Coote also paroled twenty-one prisoners taken from the ships before returning with his prizes.<sup>110</sup>

The sloop *Recruit* captured the French letter-of-marque schooner *Inca* (6) off Cape Roman Shoals on November 2, but the schooner later grounded and could not be salvaged. Captain Pechell was fortunately able to save the cargo before setting the schooner on

<sup>107</sup> Godfrey to Warren, October 19, 1813, Adm.1/504, 313

<sup>108</sup> Commander Lawrence to Warren, October 5, 1813, Adm.1/504, 317

<sup>109</sup> Oliver to Griffith, November 13, 1813, Adm.1/504, 370-371

<sup>110</sup> Captain Richard Coote to Oliver, October 22, 1813, Adm.1/504, 342-343

fire.<sup>111</sup> The *Arab* added to the privateer tally by capturing the schooner *Industry* (5) after a six-hour chase off Cape Sambre on November 3.<sup>112</sup> Finally, the *Plantagenet* had a most profitable cruise between September 8 and December 17, which resulted in the capture and destruction of twenty-four American merchant ships.<sup>113</sup>

The squadron did not escape without its own losses during the latter half of 1813. On August 5, while escorting the packet *Princess Charlotte*, the schooner HMS *Dominica* (10) was intercepted off South Carolina by the privateer *Decatur* (7).<sup>114</sup> Although registered as an American ship, the *Decatur* was in fact a French privateer. The *Dominica* had a heavier armament than her adversary, but had only sixty-six men on board, while the French ship had a crew of 120 men.<sup>115</sup> The raider tried twice to board the schooner, and was finally successful on her third attempt. British casualties were enormous: sixty-five men were killed or wounded, compared to only nineteen casualties on the French side.<sup>116</sup> No British warship had ever taken such a high percentage of casualties due to combat during the entire 1793-1815 period.

The squadron suffered another unfortunate loss a few weeks later. On August 22, the veteran *Colibri* grounded on Port Royal Bar in South Carolina, and despite several attempts to get this veteran ship off, she could not be saved. The crew was removed

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<sup>111</sup> Pechell to Warren, November 2, 1813, Adm.1/505, 135

<sup>112</sup> Commander Robert Standly, to Warren, November 3, 1813, Adm.1/505. The *Industry* had sailed two weeks earlier from Marblehead, and had made no captures.

<sup>113</sup> Captain Lloyd to Warren, December 29, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 31:258-259. Most of these were small ships of less than 50 tons. See Appendix A for the list of ships captured.

<sup>114</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:216-217

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.



without any casualties along with all her stores. It was a sad end for a ship that had rendered invaluable service to the squadron, and another reminder of the dangers of the enemy coast.<sup>117</sup>

Two weeks after the loss of the *Colibri*, the squadron suffered another single-ship defeat at the hands of the U.S. Navy. While sailing off Portland on September 5, the brig HMS *Boxer* (14) encountered the brig USS *Enterprise* (12).<sup>118</sup> The American ship had a slightly heavier broadside than the *Boxer*, but carried a crew of 123 men compared to only seventy men on board the British brig. After escaping British patrols off Portsmouth on September 1, (where the Americans were building their first 74-gun ships), she sailed further north to attack British shipping in the area when she encountered the *Boxer*. The duel lasted thirty minutes, and the *Enterprise*'s opening salvo killed all but one of the British brig's officers (the *Boxer*'s opening shot also killed the *Enterprise*'s captain).<sup>119</sup> After losing her maintopmast and foresail yard, the *Boxer* surrendered. She suffered twenty-one casualties to the *Enterprise*'s fourteen killed and wounded.<sup>120</sup> News of yet another single-ship defeat did little for the squadron's reputation. Before the month was over, the squadron would lose another ship to the American Navy, as the tender *Highflyer* ran across the frigate USS *President* on September 8 off Nantucket. With no chance of escape, she was forced to surrender.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Warren to Croker, September 4, 1813, Adm.1/504, 115; Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 163.

<sup>118</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:216-218

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Warren to Croker, October 15, 1813, Adm.1/504, 206-207

The squadron's remaining losses for the year were due either to weather or poor navigation. On September 27, the brig *Bold* (12) was wrecked on Prince Edward Island on her way to Quebec.<sup>122</sup> A month later, the *Laurenstinus* was wrecked on the Silver Keys near the Bahamas on October 22 in a severe gale.<sup>123</sup> Even the *Atalante* became a casualty, as she was caught in a heavy fog off Halifax on November 10, and wrecked on the Sister Rocks on Sambro Island.<sup>124</sup> The only bright spot was that not a single member of her crew was lost. But the most devastating event for the squadron occurred two days after the loss of the *Atalante*. Three months after Bermuda was devastated by a hurricane, another one hit Halifax on November 12. Between fifty and sixty small vessels were blown ashore, including many that were waiting to leave for the November convoy to England.<sup>125</sup> Even worse was the damage inflicted on the warships in port. The *San Domingo*, *Victorious*, *La Hogue*, *Maidstone*, *Nymphe*, *Tenedos*, *Epervier*, *Fantôme*, *Nemesis*, *Shelburne*, *Morgiana* and *Canso* were all badly damaged, and some would be out of action for months.<sup>126</sup> The weather continued to inflict heavy casualties on the Royal Navy, and would remain the chief cause of its ship losses during the entire 1793-1815 period.<sup>127</sup> Although Warren was promised substantial reinforcements, the squadron was very much affected by the temporary loss of these ships. He tried to get additional ships from the Jamaica and

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<sup>122</sup> Warren to Croker, October 19, 1813, Adm.1/504, 216-217

<sup>123</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:554

<sup>124</sup> Warren to Croker, November 17, 1813, Adm.1/504, 353

<sup>125</sup> Warren to Croker, November 13, 1813, Adm.1/504, 351-352

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Michael Lewis, *A Social History of the Navy 1793-1815*, (London, 1960), 390-396. Battle-related losses for the Royal Navy between 1793 and 1815 amounted to only 10% of all ships lost, while the rest were due to navigation errors or the weather.

Leeward Islands districts to help in escorting the convoys, but found these stations were also short of vessels for their own convoys.<sup>128</sup>

As the war progressed, the number of American prisoners on Melville Island near Halifax continued to grow. Even with prisoner exchanges, food shortages in Halifax and overcrowding forced the British to send many of them to England.<sup>129</sup> Griffith came up with a more useful role for some of them for a period of time. He offered employment to American prisoners taken from merchant ships to serve on board British merchant ships sailing to England (this offer was not extended to those who served in the American Navy or on board privateers).<sup>130</sup> Griffith claimed that without these extra hands many of the ships would have been unable to sail. They would be paid regular wages and eventual paroled back to the United States.<sup>131</sup> The offer was taken up by many of the prisoners, and greatly eased the shortage of available sailors in Halifax. However, when the Admiralty got word of this practice, they ordered Griffith to end it.<sup>132</sup> As a result, American prisoners would face either imprisonment on Melville Island or be taken back to England's infamous Dartmoor Prison.<sup>133</sup>

Warren made another proclamation regarding the blockade on November 16, 1813, stating that it would encompass the American coast from Long Island to the Mississippi

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<sup>128</sup> Warren to Croker, December 30, 1813, Adm.1/505, 10

<sup>129</sup> Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea', 165

<sup>130</sup> Griffith to Croker, October 18, 1813, Adm.1/504, 221

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 31:133. In September, the *Regulus* and *Melpomene* would transport 160 American prisoners to England.

River.<sup>134</sup> New England would be permitted to receive neutral ships, but Boston and Portsmouth (where they were each building a 74-gun ship-of-the-line) would continue to be watched over by British warships. The following month would see the United States Congress passed a new embargo act on December 17 that again prohibited American merchant ships from leaving their ports. The main reason for it was not so much in response to the British blockade, but as a means of curtailing American merchants from collaborating with the enemy. William Jones, the American Secretary of the Navy, issued an order on July 29 to arrest any American ship that made contact with the British. This was in response to the activities of New England merchants, but also those in the Chesapeake. Jones wrote,

This intercourse is not only carried on by foreigners, under the specious garb of friendly flags, who convey provisions, water, and succors of all kinds, direct to the fleets and stations of the enemy, with constant intelligence of our naval and military preparations... But the same traffic, intercourse, and intelligence is carried on with great subtlety and treachery by profligate citizens who, in vessels ostensibly navigating our own waters from port to port, find means to convey succors and intelligence to the enemy, and elude the penalty of law.<sup>135</sup>

Like the other embargoes, this one would also fail in its aims, and would be repealed four months later.<sup>136</sup>

Diplomatic overtures continued throughout the winter of 1813-1814. On January 19, Cockburn received a letter from James Monroe asking him to allow safe passage for Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell to proceed to Europe, as they were to begin negotiations

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<sup>134</sup> Full text of proclamation in Adm. 1/504, 278

<sup>135</sup> As quoted in Mahan, *War of 1812*, 2:174

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 2:176

with the British to bring the war to an end.<sup>137</sup> Cockburn had not been given any instructions from his government on this matter, but did not hesitate in granting them passports and a guarantee of safe conduct.

Naval activity did not decrease noticeably during the winter. On December 3, the *Endymion* captured the privateer schooner *Perry* after an eight-hour chase off New London.<sup>138</sup> A week later, while heading to rendezvous with the *Ramillies* in Long Island Sound, the frigate *Loire* spotted the privateer schooner *Rolla* (5) heading east. After a short chase, the *Loire* shot off the head of the schooner's foremast, forcing her to surrender.<sup>139</sup> However, the squadron came close to a major calamity early in the New Year when the *Victorious* grounded on Fisher's Island near New London. She suffered heavy damage before she was able to get off a few days later, and it was most fortunate that no attack was made against her.<sup>140</sup>

The blockade of the American coast made officers in both navies quite anxious to do something to break the tedium. This led to a somewhat bizarre episode on the Long Island station in January, 1814, where the British had the *Ramillies*, frigates *Endymion* and *Statira*, and sloop *Loup Cervier* off New London guarding over the frigates *United States* and *Macedonian*, and sloop *Hornet*.<sup>141</sup> Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy received a challenge from Commodore Stephen Decatur that he would be willing to take his two frigates to fight against the *Endymion* and *Statira*. The British captains relished the idea of

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<sup>137</sup> Monroe to Cockburn, January 19, 1814, Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 163

<sup>138</sup> Captain Hope to Warren, December 4, 1813, *Naval Chronicle* 31:433

<sup>139</sup> Captain Browne to Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy, December 10, 1813, Adm.1/505, 63-64

<sup>140</sup> *Niles' Register*, February 5, 1814, 5:384

<sup>141</sup> Warren to Croker, February 2, 1814, Adm.1/505, 208

taking on the American frigates, if nothing else but to break the monotony of the blockade.<sup>142</sup> Several letters were exchanged, which would pit the *Endymion* against the *United States*, while the *Macedonian* would fight her sister-ship *Statira*.<sup>143</sup> However, Hardy reckoned that the *Endymion* was overmatched by the *United States* (650-pound broadside against the American frigates 780-pound), and refused to allow Captain Hope to fight Decatur's ship.<sup>144</sup> He did give permission for the *Statira* to engage the *Macedonian*, and wrote to Decatur that should the *Macedonian* be victorious, he would allow her to pass through the blockade unmolested.<sup>145</sup> Decatur would not accept these guarantees (much like the captain of the *Bonne Citoyenne* had done the previous year), and the matter was dropped.<sup>146</sup> It should be noted that Jones issued an order a month earlier that American warships were to avoid all unnecessary contact with British cruisers, even when the odds were equal, unless victory could be guaranteed.<sup>147</sup> This was quite similar to the order passed by the Admiralty earlier in 1813 forbidding their frigates to go one-on-one with the American frigates. It seemed that for both American and British leaders, the risk of a naval defeat outweighed all other considerations. Later in May, the *United States* and *Macedonian* would be officially laid up for the rest of the war.<sup>148</sup> One wonders what

<sup>142</sup> Stephen Decatur to Hardy, January 19, 1814, Adm.1/505, 210-211

<sup>143</sup> Warren to Croker, February 2, 1814, Adm.1/505, 208

<sup>144</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 315-318, 448; *Naval Chronicle* 31:447-450

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Linda Maloney, 'The War of 1812: What Role for Sea Power?', Kenneth J. Hagan, *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History 1775-1978* (Westport, Conn. And London, 1978), 55

<sup>148</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 319

would have happened to Hardy had he decided to risk the *Endymion* against the *United States* and lost. It is somewhat surprising that an officer as sensible as Hardy would have risen at all at Decature's bait. He would certainly have been found guilty of going directly against the Admiralty's order forbidding British frigates from engaging an American 44-gun frigate in single-combat. As for Captain Hope (of the *Endymion*), he would have another chance to go against an American 44-gun frigate before the war ended.

The Delaware station was relatively quiet during the winter, but the *Belvedira* provided enjoyed a very nice Christmas by capturing the brig USS *Vixen* (14) on December 25 as she tried to reach Newcastle.<sup>149</sup> The *Niemen* captured the privateer schooner *Bourdeaux Packet* (9) on January 28, 1814, as she was also trying to enter the Delaware.<sup>150</sup> Further north on the New England station, the *Nimrod* bombarded the town of Falmouth, Massachusetts on February 4.<sup>151</sup> From December to February, the squadron would capture or destroy eighty-six American ships on the station.<sup>152</sup>

The squadron's biggest success during the winter came far from the shores of North America. On February 3, while on her way to Madeira, the *Majestic* spotted four sails near the island. These were the French frigates *Terpsichore* (40) and *Atalante* (40), the sloop *San Juan Baptista* (20) and an unnamed brig.<sup>153</sup> The French squadron heavily outgunned Captain Hayes' ship, but he did not hesitate to bring her into action.<sup>154</sup> After pursuing the

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<sup>149</sup> Captain Richard Byron to Warren, January 3, 1814, *Naval Chronicle* 31:258

<sup>150</sup> Captain Pym to Warren, January 28, 1814, Adm.1/505, 268

<sup>151</sup> *Niles' Register*, February 19, 1814, 5:12-13

<sup>152</sup> See Appendix A for a list of ships captured in this period.

<sup>153</sup> Captain John Hayes to Warren, February 5, 1814, Adm.1/505, 303-306

<sup>154</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'John Hayes'. John Hayes was born in 1775, and entered the navy at age 7. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1793, and served during the next seven years in the West Indian,

French ships for most of the day, the *Majestic* was able to engage the *Terpsichore*, the rearmost ship. The *Atalante* did not come to her sister-ship's aid, after two hours of being fired upon by the *Majestic*'s bow guns, the *Terpsichore* struck her flag. She lost three men killed and another six wounded, while the British ship suffered no casualties.<sup>155</sup> Captain Hayes and his crew won a fine victory, but it should be noted that it was a victory under quite different circumstances than those on the American eastern seaboard.

The *Endymion* chased an armed schooner for several hours in Long Island Sound on February 7. Because there was little wind, Captain Hope sent his boats to chase after the vessel, which was revealed to be the fast letter-of-marque schooner *Meteor* (3). Despite a constant fire from the *Meteor*'s crew, the *Endymion*'s marines were able to capture the raider without suffering any casualties.<sup>156</sup> Two days later, after being separated from the *Junon* during a storm, the sloop *Epervier* spotted two suspicious ships south of Cape Sable. The two vessels went off in separate directions, and Captain Wales chased after the larger ship. After a chase of more than five hours, the *Epervier* got in range to use her bow guns. Before she could fire a single shot, her target surrendered, which turned out to be the privateer brig *Alfred* (16).<sup>157</sup> The *San Domingo* captured the letter-of-marque brig *Argus*

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Mediterranean and Channel stations. He was promoted to commander in 1799 while in Jamaica, and advanced to post rank in 1802. He later took part in British operations in Spain and in the Scheldt, and was in charge of the embarkation of British troops after the Battle of Corunna. He was appointed to the command of the frigate *Freya* and took part in the reduction of Guadeloupe in 1810. While attached to the force guarding Basque Roads in 1812, he was able to save his ship, the *Magnificent*, from certain destruction on a reef during a violent gale, and earned for himself the sobriquet 'Magnificent Hayes'. He was appointed to the *Majestic* in 1813, and sent off to the North American station. The next year he captured the French frigate *Terpsichore* off Madeira. And though he took no real part in the battle, it was his squadron that chased down and captured the 44-gun frigate USS *President* at the close of the War of 1812. He was subsequently promoted to commodore in 1830 and to rear-admiral in 1837. He died on January 10, 1838.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Captain Hope to Warren, February 8, 1814, Adm.1/505, 270

<sup>157</sup> Captain Wales to Griffith, February 23, 1814, Adm.1/505, 289



(13) after an eight-hour chase on March 1. She had been searching for a French frigate observed by the *Morgiana* in February, but instead found the American raider on her journey to Havana.<sup>158</sup> Finally, the boats of the *Belvedira*, *Endymion* and *Rattler* chased the privateer *Mars* near Long Island on March 7, resulting in the raiders destruction.<sup>159</sup>

Not surprisingly, the winter season continued to afford many opportunities for American warships to escape through the blockade. The *Majestic* reported that the *Constitution* had escaped from Boston on January 1, 1814, after being held captive for nine months.<sup>160</sup> She added another British warship to her already impressive tally when she captured the schooner *Pictou* on February 13.<sup>161</sup> The corvette *Adams* also managed to get out of the Chesapeake on January 18, and would cruise for seven months before returning to an American port.<sup>162</sup> They were almost joined by the frigate *Constellation*, which tried to break out of the Chesapeake in February. However, before she had any chance to break out, she was chased back into Norfolk by the *Dragon*, *Lacedemonian* and *Armide*.<sup>163</sup>

Well before they received word of the latest breakout of American warships, the Admiralty had had enough of Warren. On November 4, 1813, they decided to divide the

<sup>158</sup> Warren to Croker, February 25, Adm.1/505, 276; Warren to Croker, March 1, 1814, *Naval Chronicle* 31:433

<sup>159</sup> Byron to Warren, March 27, 1814, Adm.1/506, 204-205

<sup>160</sup> Hayes to Warren, January 8, 1814, Adm.1/505, 205-206

<sup>161</sup> Warren to Croker, March 19, 1813, Adm.1/505, 396

<sup>162</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 304. The brigs *Rattlesnake*, *Enterprise* and *Syren* were also at sea during the winter.

<sup>163</sup> Warren to Croker, February 23, 1814, Adm.1/505, 271

North American and West Indies Squadron back to its original three squadrons.<sup>164</sup> They were less than diplomatic in deciding Warren's fate, stating only that the new arrangement would not require a full Admiral on the station.<sup>165</sup> It was undoubtedly the simplest way of removing him without causing too much of a stir. Nevertheless, their underlying motive was clearly to remove him from command.

By the time he was recalled back to England, Warren was 61-years old and well beyond his prime. He did not have the energy to command one squadron, let alone three (plus the command of the Great Lakes as well). Other officers in the squadron were also glad to see him go. They blamed his inaction and indecisiveness as the main cause of the Navy's inability to bring the war to a successful end. Lieutenant Henry Napier of the *Nymphe* went so far as to write,

The conduct of Sir John Warren, since he has commanded on this squadron, has been so very inexplicable that his reasons must be very secret indeed, as there is not a person able to form a conjecture on the subject<sup>166</sup>

Even Cockburn wrote that he disagreed with Warren on how to best prosecute the war.<sup>167</sup> His focus remained on the North American station, and this was at the expense of the Jamaica and Leeward Islands stations.<sup>168</sup> With the number of vessels employed on his station, the Admiralty felt he should have been able to maintain a more effective blockade of the American ports. However, not all of the blame can be laid at his door. He certainly

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<sup>164</sup> Croker to Warren November 4, 1813, Adm.2/1378, 146-151. Rear-Admiral Brown was made commander of the Jamaica Squadron, and Rear-Admiral Laforey was given the Leeward Islands Squadron

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Walter M. Whitehill, ed., *New England Blockaded In 1814: The Journal of Henry Edward Napier, Lieutenant in HMS Nymphe* (Salem, Mass. 1939), 13-14

<sup>167</sup> Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 87-89. Morriss attributes Warren's weak health as the determining factor in his inability to wage a more aggressive campaign.

<sup>168</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 246-251

received little support from the Admiralty, which more often than not added to his burdens. His initial orders from them set the tone for their relationship; on one hand he was ordered to attack and destroy enemy ships without hesitation, while at the same time try to bring about a quick diplomatic resolution to the conflict. When diplomacy failed, Warren was expected to use his fleet to blockade the American coast, hunt down American warships and raiders at sea, protect British merchant ships, and ensure that the flow of American supplies to the British forces in Spain and the rest of the colonies were not interrupted. The Admiralty believed that uniting the North American, Leeward Islands and Jamaica squadrons into a single command would facilitate these tasks, but ironically this only increased Warren's difficulties. On paper, the number of ships under this new command may have appeared sufficient to deal with the American naval threat, but events would indicate otherwise. In the first place, when one deducts the number of ships detached for convoy duty, to deliver dispatches, as well as those laid up for repair and refitting, Warren rarely had more than half of his fleet available for any offensive action. This seems to have escaped the attention of the Lords of the Admiralty, who believed that a fleet of one hundred warships was sufficient for the American theatre. They continued to grow more impatient with Warren with his demands for more ships, while all they received in return was news of American naval victories and of privateers roaming freely across the seas.

In the final analysis, it would seem that little had changed since the American Revolution, in that the Admiralty simply did not appreciate the demands of the North American theatre. A complete blockade of the American coast would have required more warships than were being used to blockade the French coastline. It is true that the United

States did not have a large battle fleet like France, but it did have countless small harbors and inlets that easily accommodated their fleet of privateers. The Admiralty railed over the escape of the American warships through the blockade, but should have been more concerned over the fleet of raiders that ventured onto the high seas without being detected. Even here, they hamstrung Warren (and Sawyer as well) in their efforts by telling them not to interfere with the licensed trade that brought food and supplies to the British colonies and to Wellington's army in Spain. Until the blockade was finally extended to include New England in 1814, scores of privateers from this region had an easy time of escaping into the Atlantic to attack British trade, but until the French threat was eliminated, the Admiralty would only send a small portion of its ships to the American theatre. British resources simply could not allow them to wage two full-scale wars at this time, and the British leaders chose Europe over North America. Even though it is customary to say that the Royal Navy had achieved naval supremacy by this point, the truth was that it was stretched to the breaking point by trying to fulfill its worldwide commitments.

In retrospect, it could be argued that Warren simply did not have the confidence of the Admiralty. They certainly showed bad faith in their dealings with him, such as sending their blockade orders to Griffith certainly helped to further undermine Warren's authority. They even censured him and Cockburn for trying to reopen the avenues of diplomacy in the spring of 1813 with their correspondence with the Russian mediators. All they got for their troubles was a rap on the knuckles. Admirals on distant stations did better when they were in the same mind as the Admiralty, and could anticipate their orders before receiving

them.<sup>169</sup> Warren was rarely on the same wavelength as the Admiralty, nor did he appear to have any close connections to Melville, Croker, Barrow or any other member in the cabinet on his side. Their decision to send Hotham, a man he never served with, to act as his fleet-captain showed a certain indifference in their attitude towards him. In the final analysis, it could be said that Warren did the best he could out of a bad situation. It was certainly not an easy command, and certainly one that would have taxed any commander. Yet when he left, the worst was over for the British. American warships and raiders would continue to harass British trade, but by 1814 it was clear to all that the United States was now on the defensive.

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<sup>169</sup> Captain Warren's decision to aid in the capture of Louisbourg in 1745 is a prime example of this, as he sent his ships to participate in the siege before receiving orders from London, which was in favor of this endeavor.

## CHAPTER 6: ON THE OFFENSIVE, 1814-1815

It must have been a bitter pill for Warren to swallow when he discovered that his successor would be none other than Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane.<sup>1</sup> Griffith would stay on as port admiral of Halifax, and would remain subordinate to the new commander. The Admiralty also decided to extend the North American Squadron's jurisdiction beyond its original boundaries. Previously, the squadron had stretched from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Florida, and would now include the Bahamas, the entire American coastline up to the Mississippi River, and the Gulf of Mexico as far as the Tropic of Cancer.<sup>2</sup> In essence, his command would be the entire American coast. Cochrane would keep his headquarters in Bermuda and focus more on the operations in the Chesapeake and the Gulf, leaving Griffith in command of the activities in the northern sector.

There seemed several good reasons to appoint Cochrane to the North American squadron. Having spent the better part of the last decade as commander of the Leeward Islands squadron, he was somewhat familiar with the North American theatre. Also, unlike his predecessor, Cochrane had a reputation as an aggressive commander, having led several operations against the French colonies in the West Indies. Here was an officer who was known more for his skills in waging war than in diplomacy, which is what the Admiralty wanted. But perhaps his most important asset, as far as the Admiralty was concerned, was due to his well-known anti-American feelings. His hatred of the United

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<sup>1</sup> Croker to Warren, January 25, 1814, ADM.2/933, 96-97

<sup>2</sup> Adm.128/660, 55

States may have been born at Yorktown in 1781, where his brother died.<sup>3</sup> He viewed the Americans as a “whining, canting race, totally lacking in courage, and showed many of the characteristics of the spaniel, which needed to be drubbed into good manners.”<sup>4</sup> Cochrane made it quite clear that he intended to give the Americans a good drubbing.

Cochrane’s contempt for the American people, half of whom he believed could defect back to the British side out of sheer self-interest, seems to have been factored into his plans for the coming year.<sup>5</sup> Shortly after he arrived in Bermuda, he wrote to Melville that with “15,000 of Lord Wellington’s army, I am confident that all the country south west of the Chesapeake might be restored to the dominion of Great Britain.”<sup>6</sup> He was especially interested in the Mississippi region, which would figure prominently in British plans. It would seem that the general attitude in London had changed in 1814; the government were no longer satisfied with simply defending the British colonies, but wanted to achieve more substantial gains. The British goals were outlined by Lord Castlereagh in a letter he wrote Lord Bathurst in 1814, and were as follows:

- 1) The establishment of a new boundary line from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick through northern Maine along the forty-seventh parallel, plus the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay
- 2) That the American-Indian boundary established by the Treaty of Greenville in 1795 be made permanent, with all the Northwest Territory north of the line to be an Indian reserve guaranteed jointly by the two powers, this provision to be a sine qua non of any treaty

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<sup>3</sup> Wade Dudley, ‘Without Some Risk: A reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815 (Ph.D. diss., University of Alabama, 1999), 183; C.S. Forester, *The Age of Fighting Sail: The Story of the Naval War of 1812* (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), 201-202

<sup>4</sup> As quoted in C.J. Bartlett, “Gentlemen versus Democrats: Cultural Prejudice and Military Strategy in Britain in the War of 1812”, *War in History* 1 (July 1994), 153

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane to Melville, March 10, 1814, LC, Cochrane Papers, MS2345; Bartlett, ‘Gentlemen versus Democrats’, 153

- 3) The renewal of Article III of Jay's treaty, whereby navigation rights of all lakes, rivers, and waters of the interior of the continent (except for territory of the Hudson Bay Company) were reciprocal (and specifically stipulating British navigation rights on the Mississippi river)
- 4) The prohibition of United States war vessels on the Great Lakes, and the cession to Canada of Michilimackinac and a strip of east on the Niagara River
- 5) That the international line extend straight to the source of the Mississippi, if a boundary from Lake Superior could not be obtained
- 6) Termination of the American right of fishing in British territorial waters and of drying on British shores
- 7) The Americans not be allowed to incorporate the Floridas with their republic; and the cession of New Orleans to be required in order to insure us the enjoyment of our privileges to navigate the Mississippi; and here it may also be a question, in how far the arrangements made between Spain, France and America, respecting Louisiana, can come into discussion.<sup>7</sup>

The Admiralty also promised to send to the North American theatre eleven ships-of-the-line and razées, fifty-three frigates, and twice that number in sloops, brigs, and other smaller vessels. Of these, Cochrane squadron would keep ten ships-of-the-line, twenty frigates, twenty-five sloops and brigs in Bermuda, while the remaining ships would be divided up between Griffith's command and the Jamaica and Leeward Island squadrons.<sup>8</sup> But while this shows an increase in British strength in North America, and a will for them to improve their position on the continent in 1814, the British government was also at the same time beginning to fall back to traditional post-war policies. The Admiralty would send more ships to this theatre, but it could not be described as an all-out effort to achieve victory. In 1813, the Royal Navy had 140,000 seamen and marines, but this dropped to 90,000 men by July 1814, and would drop down further to 70,000

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<sup>7</sup> A.L Burt, *The United States, Great Britain and British North America, from the revolution to the Establishment of Peace After the War of 1812* (New York, 1961), 350-351; Wilburt S. Brown, *The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814-1815: A Critical Review of Strategy and Tactics at New Orleans* (Alabama, 1969), 21-22

<sup>8</sup> Keith S. Dent, 'The British Navy and the Anglo-American War of 1812 to 1815' (master's thesis, University of Leeds, 1949), 305



men at the start of 1815.<sup>9</sup> This meant that a large number of ships and crews were paid off to cut down on expenses. The prosecution of the war in America would go together with financial retrenchment. Cutting costs to the navy was not unusual in itself, but England traditionally waited to do so until after the signing of a peace treaty. Castlereagh's letter shows that they were interested in making a few inroads into American territory, but they were not attempting to conquer the United States, as they had done to New France in the Seven Years' War. It was limited war with limited resources; instead of diverting men and ships to Europe to blockade the French coast and reinforce Wellington's army, as they had done in 1812 and 1813, the British government was only sending to the North American theatre as much as they felt was needed to accomplish their goals, while at the same time attempt to bring down expenditures. It remained to be seen whether they could achieve these limited goals.<sup>10</sup>

When Cochrane arrived in Bermuda with his flagship HMS *Asia* (74) on March 6, he discovered that the animosity between him and Warren was still very much alive.<sup>11</sup> He expected Warren to turn over command to him immediately, as he had been ordered to do so by the Admiralty, and return to England with the *San Domingo*.<sup>12</sup> However, Warren instead chose to retain command of the squadron for several weeks more until his

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<sup>9</sup> William Laird Clowes, *A History of the Royal Navy from Earliest Times to the Present*, 7 vols (1897-1903), 5:9.

<sup>10</sup> Griffith to Croker, May 1, 1814, Adm.1/506; Cochrane to Croker, April 2, 1814, Adm.1/506. The need for crewmen was a particular concern for Cochrane, as many of his ships were laid up that spring for lack of crews. Griffith had sent 203 men to the Great Lakes, and was only able to do so by depleting the crews of the *Tenedos*, *Jaseur*, *Fantôme*, *Arab*, *Manly*, and *Thistle*. These were laid up in Halifax, while the *Indian* was also lying idle in Quebec because of crew shortages.

<sup>11</sup> Warren to Croker March 7, 1814, Adm.1/505, 309

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 310

departure, leaving Cochrane in complete ignorance as to the state of his new station.<sup>13</sup> Not until March 22 did Warren agree to give him the orders and instructions for the ships in the squadron (Cochrane would claim that he did not receive them until April 1, the day Warren left for England).<sup>14</sup> In any case, Warren's behavior in this matter did him little credit. The fact that the Admiralty had chosen to replace him with Cochrane must have been hard for him to accept, but he was clearly wrong for delaying the transfer of command. As for Cochrane, he wasted no time blaming Warren for the delays in the coming campaign against the Americans.<sup>15</sup>

While he waited in Bermuda, Cochrane made plans for the expansion of the blockade along the American coast. He divided the region under his control into thirteen sectors, and outlined the number of ships he would allocate to his sector.<sup>16</sup> He would require almost one hundred warships alone for the blockade, which was twice the number of ships the North American squadron had available. He figured that with the war in Europe almost over, his request for ships and men would be approved with little difficulty by London, a luxury that Warren did not have.<sup>17</sup>

The Admiralty had originally given orders to Cochrane to allow the licensed trade to continue in New England, as it had since the start of the war. However, on April 25, 1814, this practice came to an end when Cochrane issued a new proclamation that finally

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<sup>13</sup> Cochrane to Croker, March 31, 1814, Adm.1/505, 420-423

<sup>14</sup> Warren to Cochrane, March 22, 1814, Adm.1/505, 424; Cochrane to Croker, April 1, 1814, Adm.1/505, 434

<sup>15</sup> Cochrane to Croker, March 31, 1814, Adm.1/505, 420-423

<sup>16</sup> Cochrane to Croker, March 8, 1814, Adm.1/505, 633

<sup>17</sup> Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 184

extended the blockade to this region.<sup>18</sup> Warren had been unable to do extend it to this region for many reasons, not the least of which was Britain's continued need of foodstuffs from the United States.<sup>19</sup> Cochrane believed he had a more valid reason for including the northern states in the blockade. He was informed that the American government was heavily dependent on neutral trade entering New England to obtain naval stores and supplies for their warships and privateers.<sup>20</sup> He believed that shutting down this outlet would hurt the Americans far more than it would the British. In reality, with the war in Europe over, and with Napoleon's exile to Elba on April 6, 1814, Britain's need for American food and grain for Wellington's army was gone. The citizens of New England would now suffer the same privations as their fellow countrymen further south.

Cochrane wasted little time in establishing the tone of the next phase of the war.

Citing American atrocities committed in Upper Canada, he wrote to Cockburn that,

"You are at perfect liberty as soon as you can muster a sufficient force, to act with the utmost hostility against the shores of the United States. Their government authorize and direct a most destructive war to be carried on against our commerce and we have no means of retaliating but on shore where they must be made to feel in their property what our merchants do in having their ships destroyed, and thereby be taught to know that they are at the mercy of an invading foe. This is now more necessary in order to draw their attention from Canada, where I am told they are sending their whole military force. Their sea port towns laid in ashes and the country invaded will be some sort of retaliation for their savage conduct in Canada, where they have destroyed our towns in the most inclement occasion of the year. It is therefore but just that retaliation be made near to the seat of government from whence these orders are enacted. You may depend upon my most cordial support in whatever you undertake against the enemy."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Cochrane to Croker, April 25, 1814, Adm.1/506, 43

<sup>19</sup> Barry J. Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea: The British Navy, New England and the Maritime Provinces of Canada' (master's thesis, University of Maine, 1971), 174

<sup>20</sup> Cochrane to Croker, April 25, 1814, Adm.1/506, 40-42

<sup>21</sup> Cochrane to Cockburn, April 24, 1814, James Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House: Admiral Sir George Cockburn, 1772-1853* (Emsworth, UK, 1987), 166-167

Cochrane also issued an earlier proclamation on April 2 that would cause considerable consternation among the British. He offered escaped slaves the chance to become free settlers in the British colonies. This was done to encourage recruitment for a new Black Colonial Corps that was being raised. More than 400 slaves that escaped to Tangier Island accepted the \$20 bounty to join the corps, and would see service during the upcoming campaigns.<sup>22</sup> However, this was not an altogether altruistic action on Cochrane's part. While he viewed the American concept of equality for all men to be highly hypocritical with regards to the issue of slavery, his main motivation in encouraging slaves to escape was due primarily to the British manpower shortage. Cochrane felt he did not have enough men to conduct suitable land operations, and was eager to employ as many able-bodied men possible to help the British in their land attacks.<sup>23</sup> In addition, he was also pleased to hear that news of the large number of escaped slaves was causing considerable panic among the Americans in the region of the possibility of a large slave insurrection.<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, only a small percentage of escaped slaves were suited for military service. The rest were shipped off to Halifax, Trinidad or Bermuda, where their prospects of utopia quickly vanished.<sup>25</sup> Commodore Evans wrote that there were many difficulties in integrating the large influx of former

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<sup>22</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 167-168

<sup>23</sup> Donald G. Shomette, *Flotilla: Battle for the Patuxent* (Solomons, Md, 1981), 117

<sup>24</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, May 10, 1814, Roger Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy in Transition: Admiral Sir George Cockburn 1772-1853* (Columbia, S.C., 1997), 98-99; Christopher T. George, *Terror on the Chesapeake: The War of 1812 on the Bay* (Shippensburg, Penn., 2000), 68

<sup>25</sup> Shomette, *Flotilla*, 117-118

slaves at Bermuda, and the only solution he could come up with was to ship them elsewhere. It was not surprising that many of the former slaves willingly returned to their masters.<sup>26</sup>

Cochrane had spent most of the spring making preparations for the summer offensives. He was very distressed over the lack of available seamen, and informed the Admiralty that he needed another 1000 seamen and marines to put his ships in proper fighting order.<sup>27</sup> But while he waited the arrival of reinforcements at Bermuda, other ships in the squadron continued to harass the American shoreline. Captain Barrie led an attack in the Chesapeake on April 7 that resulted in the destruction of a 6-gun schooner, seven light schooners and the merchantman *Diligence*.<sup>28</sup> Far more devastating was Captain Capel's attack on the town of Pettipaug on the Connecticut River two days later. Capel sent 136 marines in six boats from *La Hogue*, *Endymion*, *Maidstone* and *Borer*, which arrived at Pettipaug on April 9. There was only a small militia detachment guarding the town, and after a brief struggle, the marines controlled the wharf. In a few short hours they destroyed no less than twenty-seven ships, equal to nearly 5000 tons of shipping, at a cost of only two killed and two wounded.<sup>29</sup> The attack was a major shock to the town's inhabitants, who began to recognize how vulnerable they were to these attacks. If the Canadian border was supposed to be the soft underbelly of the British Empire, then the Atlantic seaboard could be viewed as America's own weak spot. Worst still, these attacks were just a taste of what the British had in store for them.

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<sup>26</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 167-168

<sup>27</sup> Cochrane to Croker, March 31, 1814, Adm.1/505, 434-435

<sup>28</sup> Cochrane to Croker, May 16, 1814, Adm.1/506, 209-210

<sup>29</sup> Capel to Cochrane, April 13, 1814 Adm.1/506, 274-280

The Boston station remained relatively docile for most of the spring of 1814. Griffith had the frigates *Tenedos* and *Junon* watch over Boston and Plymouth, where the Americans were building two of their 74-gun ships.<sup>30</sup> The only American warship in this sector at the time was the frigate *Congress*, which was laid up due to crew shortages.<sup>31</sup> However, the situation changed considerably when the *Constitution*, returning from her three-month cruise, made her way past the two blockading British ships on April 13.<sup>32</sup> This altered the odds considerably, as the two American frigates were more than a match for two 38-gun British frigates. The *Nymphe* arrived on the scene a week later, but this was only to allow the *Tenedos* to return to Halifax for a refit. It was lucky for them that the *Constitution* was to undergo her own extensive refit in Boston, which would keep her out of action for several weeks.<sup>33</sup> On May 11, the frigates received word that the *Ramillies* would be joining them on the station, giving them a comfortable margin of superiority.<sup>34</sup> Hardy's ship would stay for only a few weeks, and be replaced by the 74-gun *Bulwark*, wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Hotham.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Cochrane to Croker, April 30, 1814, Adm.1/506, 287

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Griffith to Croker, April 30, 1814, Adm.1/506, 287; Dent, 'British Navy', 307-308; William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV*, 6 vols. (London, 1847), 6:328. The *Constitution* arrived in Salem on April 3, after being chased by the *Junon* and *Tenedos*.

<sup>33</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 307-308

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 308-309

<sup>35</sup> Hotham to Melville, November 6, 1813, University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library, Hotham Papers, DDHO 7/2; Dudley, 'Without Some Risk', 167, 185; Dent, 'British Navy', 308-309; Hotham made a request on November 6, 1813 to be removed as Warren's fleet captain, but was not officially replaced until the arrival of Captain Edward Codrington in July, 1814.

There was much concern the completion of the 74-gun USS *Independence* at Portsmouth . During his brief stay off Boston, Hardy had considered an attack on the town to destroy both her and the *Congress*.<sup>36</sup> The city was defended by a few batteries, and their chances of success were quite high. Unfortunately, Hardy left the station before being given a chance to come up with a plan.<sup>37</sup> As there was no one like Cockburn on the station with the daring to come up with such a plan, the matter was dropped. The blockading force would continue to watch over the two frigates, which stayed in port in the wake of further British reinforcements. The *Tenedos* eventually returned on June 15, and the following month would see the arrival of the 74-gun *Spencer* and 50-gun *Leander*.<sup>38</sup> Even if the *Independence* had been completed, it would still pit one line-ship and two frigates against three line-ships and three frigates.

Small naval actions continued throughout the spring of 1814. While patrolling off the Florida Straits on April 20, the *Orpheus* and *Shelburne* encountered the sloop USS *Frolic* (20). The two British ships chased the American sloop for sixty miles before she was finally captured.<sup>39</sup> She would later be added to the Royal Navy as HMS *Florida*.<sup>40</sup> Further north, the *Sophie* captured the privateer schooner *Starks* (2) near Bermuda on April 24.<sup>41</sup> However, these victories were negated by the loss of another single-ship duel

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<sup>36</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 308-309

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 309

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>39</sup> Captain Hugh Pigot to Cochrane, April 25, 1814, Adm.1/506, 213, 225; Cochrane to Croker, May 17, 1814, Adm.1/506, 236. This was the *Frolic*'s first cruise, and she had made several captures after her departure from Boston on February 18.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Captain Nicholas Lockyer to Cochrane, April 30, 1814, Adm.1/506, 208

to the American Navy. While sailing from Bermuda with more than \$118,000 in specie, the sloop *Epervier* encountered the sloop USS *Peacock* (ex-HMS *Peacock*) on April 29. While the two ships were of roughly equal strength, the British ship was manned primarily with invalids from the Halifax Naval Hospital. Moreover, Captain Wales complained that his crew was on the verge of mutiny, but no changes were made to his crew before it left Halifax.<sup>42</sup> After a short fight, the *Epervier* was forced to surrender, with a loss of eight killed and fifteen wounded out of a crew of 117 men, while the *Peacock* suffered only two wounded out of a crew of 185 men.<sup>43</sup> To make matters worse, the schooner HMS *Ballahoo* (4) was captured by the privateer *Perry* (5) on April 29, after grounding on some rocks.<sup>44</sup>

The month of May was a busy one against American privateers. On May 1, while heading towards the Azores, the 74-gun *Severn* and sloop *Surprise* destroyed the privateer schooner *Yankee Lass* (9). She had left Rhode Island three weeks earlier and had made no captures.<sup>45</sup> In the Chesapeake, the *Jaseur's* boats captured the 9-gun privateer schooner *Grecian* on May 2.<sup>46</sup> Boats from the *Maidstone* and *Sylph* assisted the privateer *Liverpool Packet* destroying an American sloop off Black Point River near New

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<sup>42</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:293

<sup>43</sup> Griffith to Croker, June 2, 1814, Adm.1/506, 157-159; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:291-294

<sup>44</sup> Lieutenant Little to Cochrane, September 3, 1814, Adm.1/507, 241

<sup>45</sup> Captain Nourse to Cochrane, May 1, 1814, Adm.1/506, 330

<sup>46</sup> Captain Watts to Cockburn, May 2, 1814, Adm.1/506, 332-333. The *Grecian* was pierced for twenty guns.



London on May 21.<sup>47</sup> The two warships would come under attack the following week from American gunboats, but were able to easily beat them off.<sup>48</sup>

On May 22, the *Majestic*, *Morgiana* and *Dotterel* captured the privateer schooner *Dominica* (4) after a short chase near New Providence. The schooner was formerly HMS *Dominica*, captured on August 5, 1813 by the privateer *Decatur*.<sup>49</sup> On the Delaware station, the *Niemen* discovered three privateers hiding in Little Egg Harbor on May 23. Captain Pym sent all of his boats to capture the three raiders, which were able to achieve surprise in their attack. At a cost of four wounded came back with three prize ships, the privateers *Quiz* (14), *Clara* (4) and *Model* (2).<sup>50</sup> Further north, the *Saturn* captured the privateer schooner *Hussar* (10) off New York on May 25.<sup>51</sup> The *Rifleman* captured the privateer schooner *Diomedé* (5) off Sable Island on May 28, and found forty British prisoners on board the raider.<sup>52</sup> The *Diomedé* had proven an especially successful corsair, having captured or destroyed eleven British merchantmen between April 27 and May 26.<sup>53</sup> On May 30, the *Nimrod* was approached by a brig flying Swedish colors near Rhode Island. The British ship withheld her fire until the brig opened up a cannonade on

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<sup>47</sup> Captain Burdette to Capel, May 21, 1814, Adm.1/507, 29-30

<sup>48</sup> Capel to Captain Paget, May 28, Adm.1/506, 439-440

<sup>49</sup> Captain Hayes to Cochrane, June 11, 1814, Adm.1/506, 336

<sup>50</sup> Captain Pym to Cochrane, May 23, 1814, Adm.1/506, 268

<sup>51</sup> Captain Nash to Cochrane, May 25, 1814, Adm.1/506, 201

<sup>52</sup> Captain Pearce to Cochrane, June 17, 1814, Adm.1/506, 334-336

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

her, but the *Nimrod* was able to force the vessel to run ashore. Captain Mitchell sent out his boats the following day to set her ablaze.<sup>54</sup>

The British began to concentrate on attacking towns along the American coast. On June 11, the *Nymphe* attacked the town of Scituate, north of Cape Cod, causing much damage to it.<sup>55</sup> Three days later, the *Nimrod* joined the *Superbe* (74) in an expedition against Wareham Harbor in Connecticut. Their boats succeeded in destroying seventeen ships (including two pierced for privateer duty), totaling 2522 tons of shipping, along with several warehouses and a cotton factory.<sup>56</sup> The British suffered no casualties in the attack. The following week, the *Maidstone* and *Sylph* launched their own attack up Long Island Sound that resulted in the destruction of a torpedo vessel and twelve other merchant ships.<sup>57</sup>

The squadron suffered one notable loss on June 28 when the troopship *Leopard* met her end after being wrecked on Anticosti Island.<sup>58</sup> This was the same ship that had engaged the *Chesapeake* seven years earlier, and it could be said that she bore much responsibility for the current conflict. She was converted to a troopship in 1811, and was serving in this capacity when she foundered. Fortunately, her entire crew and most of her stores were saved.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Paget to Cochrane, June 4, 1814, Adm.1/506, 433

<sup>55</sup> Lohnes, 'British Navy', 185-186

<sup>56</sup> Paget to Cochrane, June 14, 1814, Adm.1/506, 456-458. See Appendix A for list of ships destroyed.

<sup>57</sup> Burdette to Paget, June 29, 1814, Adm.1/506, 451-454

<sup>58</sup> Cochrane to Croker, August 28, 1814, Adm.1/506, 560; *Naval Chronicle* 33:63

<sup>59</sup> Cochrane to Croker, August 28, 1814, Adm.1/506, 560; *Naval Chronicle* 33:63; David Lyon, *The Sailing Navy List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy- Built, Purchased and Captured, 1688-1860* (London, 1993), 311

While patrolling off Sambro on June 30, the sloop *Martin* sighted the privateer schooner *Snapdragon* (6). After a short chase, the *Martin* succeeded in forcing the schooner to surrender.<sup>60</sup> This was followed on July 11 by the *Leander*'s capture of the brig USS *Rattlesnake* (14) off Shelburne.<sup>61</sup> She would later be sold and fitted out as a privateer by the merchants of Liverpool.<sup>62</sup> The *Niemen* added another privateer to the list by capturing the brig *Henry Gilder* (12) on July 14.<sup>63</sup> However, these victories would be overshadowed by the start of the British offensives in August.

The British ultimately chose to launch four separate offensives against the United States in 1814, and all but one of these would rely on the support of the North American Squadron. The first of Cochrane's offensives would take place, appropriately enough, in the Chesapeake. He could not make firm preparations until he received the troop reinforcements from Wellington's victorious army, but anticipated receiving at least 13,000 of Wellington's veterans on hand.<sup>64</sup> Cockburn would continue with the attacks he conducted the previous year, but on a larger scale and with bigger targets in mind. The attacks in 1813 had been designed to draw American forces away from the Canadian border, and it is fair to say they failed in achieving this. However, they convinced Cockburn that the region was ripe for a large-scale attack in 1814. Barrie himself wrote to Cockburn about this in June, stating that, "Marlborough is near the seat of government. I thought an attack on this town would be a sad annoyance to the enemy and oblige the

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<sup>60</sup> Captain Senhouse to Griffith, June 30, 1814, Adm.1/507, 34

<sup>61</sup> Captain Collier to Griffith, July 11, 1814, Adm.1/507, 36-37

<sup>62</sup> T.B. Akins, *History of Halifax City* (Belleville, Ont., 1973), 163

<sup>63</sup> Pym to Cochrane, July 14, 1814, Adm.1/507, 33

<sup>64</sup> Shomette, *Flotilla*, 149

regulars and militia to try their strength with us, but I was deceived as both the militia and the inhabitants made off to the woods and we were allowed to take quiet possession of a town admirably situated for defense. Here we passed the night without molestation though only 18 miles from Washington.”<sup>65</sup> It was this general weakness in the American defenses that would convince Cockburn what their principle target should be.

The second British offensive in 1814 would be Maine. Cochrane discussed the Maine operation with Sherbrooke and Griffith, and wanted them to make preparations for an assault on the town of Castine.<sup>66</sup> This operation was designed to coincide with the third offensive, Prevost’s planned attack to march his army into New York from Lower Canada.<sup>67</sup> Yet the ultimate prize the British desired in 1814 would prove to be New Orleans, which would be the fourth prong of the British campaign. Cochrane has received the bulk of the credit (and blame) for this venture, and it was certainly the one he was most involved with. Fortescue goes so far as to attribute Cochrane’s lust for prize money as the prime motivator that led the British to New Orleans.<sup>68</sup> While his appetite for prize money was well documented, Fortescue is wrong in stating that Cochrane alone was responsible for choosing the city. In fact, the decision and planning for the subsequent campaign came from the British cabinet, which is confirmed in a report sent to them in January, 1814, on the feasibility of capturing New Orleans.<sup>69</sup> The report stated that the assault on the city could not be done before December, as the summer and fall seasons

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<sup>65</sup> Barrie to Cockburn, June 19, 1814, LC, Cockburn Papers, Container 14

<sup>66</sup> Cochrane to Croker, June 22, 1814, Adm.1/506, 343

<sup>67</sup> Lohnes, ‘The War of 1812 at Sea’, 199-200

<sup>68</sup> J.W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, (London, 1920), 10:150-151

<sup>69</sup> Tim Pickles, *New Orleans 1815: Andrew Jackson Crushes the British* (Oxford, UK, 1993), 10

presented the dangers of hurricanes and yellow fever.<sup>70</sup> This left Cochrane free to prepare for the Chesapeake and Maine campaigns before he shifted towards the Gulf of Mexico.

While Cochrane waited for reinforcements to arrive, the British returned to the Chesapeake to renew their war of terror. Captain Barrie intended to concentrate their efforts in the Patuxent River, which was defended by Commodore Joshua Barney's flotilla (consisting of one sloop and sixteen gunboats).<sup>71</sup> This month-long campaign would partially validate the faith that had been placed in the gunboats in being able to defend the American shores. It began when Barrie took 74-gun *Dragon* and schooner *St. Lawrence* (13) and sailed up the Potomac on May 31. He sent the following day seven boats from the *Albion* and *Dragon*, filled with marines and seamen, to reconnoiter St Jerome's Creek. They spotted twenty-five sails near Cedar Point, and when it was realized that this was Barney's entire flotilla (along with some merchant ships), Barrie was forced to order a hasty retreat. Barney pursued Barrie's boats with all dispatch, but found the *Dragon* bearing down on his force, obliging him to retreat into the Patuxent. A

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> *American National Biography*, s.v. 'Joshua Barney'; Hulbert Footner, *Sailor of fortune: The Life and Adventure of Commodore Barney USN* (Annapolis, Md., 1940). Joshua Barney was born on July 6, 1759, and entered the nascent Continental Navy in 1776 on board the sloop *Hornet*. He took part in Commodore Hopkins attack on the Bahamas that year, and was made a lieutenant before the year was out. He saw considerable action during the American Revolution, and was captured three times by the British. He was nominated as one of the first six captains for the new United States Navy in 1794, but declined the offer, and instead served as a commodore in the French Navy. He returned to the United States in 1802, and tried to enter politics, but was defeated for a seat in congress in 1806 and 1810. He commanded a privateer at the start of the War of 1812, and made a number of captures, worth approximately \$1,500,000. He commanded a squadron of gunboats in the Chesapeake in 1813 and 1814, and when his flotilla was overwhelmed in the British attack against Washington in 1814, he fought with his marines on land, and was captured at the Battle of Bladensburg. He died on December 1, 1818.

small skirmish followed between the *St. Lawrence* and a few of the American gunboats, but Barney was able to escape into the Patuxtent.<sup>72</sup>

Barrie was reinforced by the frigate *Loire* and sloop *Jaseur* on June 6, and felt confident about going after Barney's flotilla. Barrie took the *Loire*, *Jaseur*, *St. Lawrence* and one of the *Dragon*'s tenders and proceeded up the Patuxtent. On June 8, they spotted Barney's ships, which forced him to retreat further up St. Leonard's Creek.<sup>73</sup> Barrie continued sending out his boats to attack shore installations, and decided to go after the American gunboats on June 10. He filled twenty-one barges with 600 to 700 marines and seamen, and sent them along with two schooners (each armed with a 32-pound carronade) and one rocket ship into St. Leonard's Creek. They sighted Barney's ships, and a fierce battle followed. Barney's gunners had the better of the engagement, and forced the British to retreat downstream. The Americans pursued, but found the *Loire* and *St. Lawrence* waiting at the mouth of the creek. The *St. Lawrence* did suffer some damage from the American flotilla, but Barney was again compelled to retreat back upstream.<sup>74</sup>

The failure to destroy Barney's gunboats was becoming quite galling to Barrie. He was able to vent some of his frustration by continuing to conduct raids along the shores of the Patuxtent. On June 13, the frigate *Narcissus* arrived to join his squadron, Barrie launched an attack with 180 marines and 30 men of the Black Colonial Corps on the town

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<sup>72</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, October 1, 1814, *Naval Chronicle* 32:503-507; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 172-173; George, *Terror on the Chesapeake*, 70; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 36-41; Joseph A. Whitehorne, *The Battle for Baltimore 1814* (Baltimore, Md., 1997), 95-98

<sup>73</sup> George, *Terror on the Chesapeake*, 70; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 42-46; Whitehorn, *Battle for Baltimore*, 95-98

<sup>74</sup> Shomette, *Flotilla*, 49-55

of Benedict. They achieved the destruction of a single field piece and one store filled with tobacco.<sup>75</sup> Barrie then proceeded to attack Lower Marlborough, where he destroyed one schooner and all of the town's tobacco stores.<sup>76</sup> The American defenders were once again powerless to resist the British attacks. At every engagement thus far, militia units proved incapable of even slowing down the British attacks. Though the raids themselves did little except to inspire fear among the citizens in the Chesapeake, they proved quite profitable for the British. During the raids he conducted along the Patuxent between June 11 and June 18, Barrie's raiders captured more than 4000 hogsheads of tobacco, valued at \$250,000.<sup>77</sup> If he couldn't win a decisive military victory, Barrie was at least able to console himself financially.

With British warships less than thirty miles from the capital, many official in the city believed that Barney should destroy his flotilla, as its loss might compel the British to move away from Washington. Barney was given the order to do this, but luckily it was rescinded before he had a chance to obey it.<sup>78</sup> Part of the reason for keeping his flotilla intact came after an attack he made on June 26 on the frigates *Loire* and *Narcissus* at the mouth of St. Leonard's Creek. Barney received assistance from a field battery on the riverbank, and succeeded in forcing the British frigates to withdraw from their positions. This attack crippled two of Barney's gunboats, and cost them four killed and seven

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<sup>75</sup> Whitehorn, *Battle for Baltimore*, 95-98

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Shomette, *Flotilla*, 56-61

<sup>78</sup> Whitehorn, *Battle for Baltimore*, 95-98

wounded, while the British claimed to have suffered no casualties.<sup>79</sup> But more importantly, Barney was able to escape the confines of the creek, permitting his flotilla to continue to serve as a blocking force against further British incursions in the Patuxent, and preventing them from gaining access to the heartland of the state. As for Barrie, he was outraged that Barney had been able to escape, but could do little about it. He was relieved of command of the Patuxent squadron shortly after by Captain Nourse of the frigate *Severn*, which arrived at the end of June.<sup>80</sup> Nourse wasted little time when he took over the Patuxent force. On July 2, he sent the *Severn*, *Narcissus* and *Loire* back in Patuxent to mop up any American ships that had been left behind. They launched several boats with 150 marines up St. Leonard's Creek, where they finished off the two crippled gunboats of Barney's flotilla, as well as destroying three other small vessels, and burning down more tobacco stores.<sup>81</sup>

Further north, Captain Hardy began his own preliminaries to the Maine campaign of 1814. On July 5, he took the *Ramillies* and two transports carrying 600 men of the 102<sup>nd</sup> Regiment set sail for Passamaquoddy Bay.<sup>82</sup> The object of the attack was Moose Island, the great bastion of the smuggling trade. Hardy landed his troops on July 11, and easily captured Fort Sullivan at no cost. The fort surrendered eighty-six prisoners and large amounts of weapons, stores and supplies.<sup>83</sup> But unlike other raids along the American

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<sup>79</sup> Shomette, *Flotilla*, 89-101; Whitehorn, *Battle for Baltimore*, 95-98. Barney lost gunboats #137 and 138.

<sup>80</sup> Shomette, *Flotilla*, 102-104

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Hardy to Cochrane, July 12, 1814, Adm.1/507, 16-22. The troops were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pilkington.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.



coast, Moose Island was officially annexed by the British.<sup>84</sup> The British made it quite clear that they were no longer willing to just defend their territory; they wanted to expand it at the Americans' expense.

After completing this mission, Hardy returned to the Long Island station. He took the *Ramillies*, frigate *Pactolus*, brig *Dispatch* and bomb ship *Terror* on August 9 to the small town of Stonington.<sup>85</sup> The town was an important target, as it was heavily involved in manufacturing of torpedoes that had plagued British warships in the region. Hardy's ships bombarded the town, but did only moderate damage to it. In fact, the *Dispatch* was badly damaged by defensive fire, and had to withdraw. British casualties would number about twenty killed and fifty wounded.<sup>86</sup> The only bright spot was that the squadron would not endure any further attacks from torpedoes for the remainder of the war.

Back in the Chesapeake, Cockburn's planned to conduct a joint raid with Captain Nourse's squadron aimed at further destabilizing the American forces in the region, as well as increasing the lining of his own pockets. He intended to use the *Albion*, *Loire*, *Thistle*, *Melpomene* and *Regulus* to conduct a series of diversionary raids along the rivers, inlets, and creeks that linked up with the Potomac. Nourse would take the *Severn*, *Manly*, *Aetna* and *Brune* and conduct similar raids into the Patuxent, and act as a blocking force against Barney's flotilla. Both forces were accompanied by a battalion of marines.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Hardy to Cochrane, July 12, 1814, Adm.1/507, 16-22; Lohnes, 'War of 1812 at Sea', 207. It was reported that two-thirds of the male population willingly swore allegiance to the crown.

<sup>85</sup> Hardy to Hotham, August 12, 1814, Adm.1/507, 26-28

<sup>86</sup> Lohnes, 'The War of 1812 at Sea', 212

<sup>87</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, July 19, 1814, Adm.1/507, 101-102; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 116

Cockburn also wanted to see where the British should concentrate their efforts once the expected troop reinforcements arrived from Europe. There were several potential targets to choose from, including Annapolis, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. After careful consideration, he made his choice on July 17, and selected Washington, and intended to use the town of Benedict to land the army.<sup>88</sup> He explained to Cochrane:

“It is, I am informed, only 44 or 45 miles from Washington and there is a high road between the two places which though hilly is good; it passes through Piscataway, no near to Fort Washington than four miles, which fortification is sixteen miles below the city of Washington, and is the only one the army would have to pass. Therefore most firmly believe that within 48 hours after the arrival in the Patuxent of such a force as you expect, the city of Washington might be possessed without difficulty or opposition of any kind.”<sup>89</sup>

Cockburn believed that from a military perspective, it would be easier to go after the American capital than either Baltimore or Annapolis. He was certain that capturing Washington would cause Madison’s government an immense amount of embarrassment, and would prove quite profitable to the British in terms of loot.<sup>90</sup>

Nourse began his foray into the Patuxent on July 17, when he landed 300 marines and seamen at God’s Grace Point. His force moved four miles inland, and succeeded in destroying several buildings and returned with a large quantity of tobacco.<sup>91</sup> They then proceeded near Benedict on July 20, and were again unopposed when they destroyed another tobacco warehouse. By July 23, Nourse’s ships sailed back down the Patuxent with a sizable amount of tobacco, and had not once been interfered by Barney’s flotilla,

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<sup>88</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, July 17, 1814, Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 101

<sup>89</sup> Cochrane to Croker, July 18, 1814, Adm.1/506, 460-461

<sup>90</sup> Shomette, *Flotilla*, 114-116

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 120-121

which spent most of the time up river at Nottingham.<sup>92</sup> Nourse later sent the *Manly* and two boats to attack a small militia detachment of 300 men near Calvert County on August 1, and again succeeded in capturing a considerable amount of loot.

While Nourse was rampaging in the Patuxent, Cockburn turned his attention to the Potomac. His first target was Leonard's Town, which unlike the other towns on the Potomac was defended by a regiment of regular soldiers (the 30<sup>th</sup> Regiment). However, when Cockburn sent in his battalion of marines and seamen early on July 19, the regulars did no better than did the previous militia units, and evacuated the town at the approach of the British marines. Two schooners were taken, and loaded with a wealth of provisions, flour, tobacco, and other materiel. The bulk of the stores belonging to the 30<sup>th</sup> Regiment were destroyed, along with a number of arms.<sup>93</sup>

Cockburn's force sailed to the town of Nominy the following day, and once again the American militia chose to retreat before the British marines. They took possession of a schooner, which they filled with 135 escaping slaves and some prisoners, along with several cattle, fifty hogsheads of tobacco, and all the stores they could carry before setting fire to the storehouses.<sup>94</sup> The presence of the British squadron in the Chesapeake proved tremendously irritating to slave owners, as thousands of slaves fled to the British ships. Though many of the slaves became disillusioned by their so-called freedom in the

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p.121-123

<sup>93</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, July 19, 1814, Adm.1/507, 101-102; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 126-128

<sup>94</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, July 21, 1814, Adm.1/507, 103-107; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 130-131

British colonies, many were still willing to risk and escape from the so-called land of the free.<sup>95</sup>

Cockburn's raid was accomplishing everything he wanted. He moved up St. Clement's Creek on July 23, where he captured four schooners and set fire to a fifth. His men set fire to one building, but only in retaliation for an attack that was made on Cockburn's own gig.<sup>96</sup> His force sailed up to Machodoc Creek three days later, where they destroyed another six schooners.<sup>97</sup> On July 28, they sailed up the Wicomoco River to Hamburg and Chaptico, where they remained for a few days. They again met no opposition, and left with a considerable quantity of tobacco and supplies for his squadron.<sup>98</sup>

Cockburn's squadron proceeded to Brenton Bay on August 2, and faced their first serious challenge the following day when they sailed down the Potomac to the Yeocomico River. The British landed 500 marines and 200 seamen, and encountered a large body of militia under General Hungerford and General Taylor. Even though they outnumbered the British forces by a considerable margin, the militia was once again put to flight by the advancing British marines. The British pursued them for ten miles, burning several military depots along the way. The Americans tried to make a stand at the town of Kinsale, but after one ineffectual volley they once again took to their heels. The booty left behind was considerable; apart from burning two schooners and destroying several

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<sup>95</sup> Shomette, *Flotilla*, 151. Contrary to the Cochrane and Cockburn's views, Bathurst later ordered General Ross not to do anything that would encourage the slaves to rise up against their masters.

<sup>96</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, July 24, 1814, Adm.1/507, 109; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 131-132

<sup>97</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, July 31, 1814, Adm.1/507, 110-111; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 132-133

<sup>98</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, July 31, 1814, Adm.1/507, 110-111; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 135-136

batteries and storehouses, Cockburn took possession of five additional schooners, one field piece, and large quantities of tobacco, flour, and other supplies, all at a cost of three killed and three wounded.<sup>99</sup>

On August 6, Cockburn's squadron went up the Coan River, where he destroyed another battery and took away three more schooners.<sup>100</sup> They remained here for several days to load up on provisions, and completed their raid on August 11 when they went up to St. Mary's River. After that, Cockburn decided to head back to the mouth of the Potomac.<sup>101</sup> During his month-long campaign, he captured or destroyed twenty-nine ships, had taken huge quantities of provisions (especially tobacco) and arms, and laid waste to several warehouses and depots. More important, he had shown how much in disarray were the American defenses in the region. After he finished up his raiding mission, Cockburn joined up with Admiral Cochrane and General Ross to discuss the upcoming campaign.

Reinforcements had begun to arrive in Bermuda throughout July and August. Commodore Codrington, who replaced Hotham as fleet captain, arrived at the island on July 15 with the frigate HMS *Forth* (40) and packet ship *Erebus*, and was followed a week later by the *Hebrus*, *Pactolus*, and *Princess*.<sup>102</sup> The main body of reinforcements

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<sup>99</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, August 4, 1814, Adm.1/507, 112-116; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 137-138

<sup>100</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, August 8, 1814, Adm.1/507, 117-118; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 138-139

<sup>101</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, August 13, 1814, Adm.1/507, 120-123; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 139-140

<sup>102</sup> Cochrane to Croker, July 23, 1814, Adm.1/507, 492-493; *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Edward Codrington'. Sir Edward Codrington was born in 1770, and entered the navy in 1783. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1793, and served on board Lord Howe's flagship at the Battle of the Glorious First of June (1794). After the battle, he was promoted to command of the fireship *Comet*. He later commanded the *Orion* at Trafalgar, and later participated in the Walcheren expedition in 1809. He was sent to North America in 1814, and promoted to flag rank by Admiral Cochrane later that year. He was later promoted to vice-admiral in 1825, and led the British,

arrived on July 23 with Admiral Malcolm's squadron. It was composed of the *Royal Oak*, *Pomone*, *Menelaus*, *Rover*, bomb ships *Meteor* and *Devastation*, and five transports carrying Major-General Robert Ross' division of veterans from the Peninsular War.<sup>103</sup> Ross and his staff moved to Cochrane's flagship *Tonnant* (80), which he took along with the frigate *Euryalus* to join up with the *Albion* on August 14.<sup>104</sup>

Cockburn forwarded his plan to attack Washington at this meeting, but like Cochrane, he was quite disappointed that barely 4000 troops had been allotted for the Chesapeake campaign.<sup>105</sup> He had been led to believe that Cochrane would be arriving with 20,000 troops, and brought significantly less than he expected.<sup>106</sup> The British government did send a large body of troops to the American continent, but most of it was sent to Lower Canada. Governor Prevost would have 16,000 troops available, of which

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French and Russian squadrons against the Turks at the Battle of Navarino in 1827. He served as an M.P. from 1832 to 1837, and promoted to full admiral in 1839. He died on April 28, 1851.

<sup>103</sup> Cochrane to Croker, August 11, 1814, Adm.1/506, p.550; *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Robert Ross'. Robert Ross was born in 1766, and commissioned as an ensign in 1784. He served in various campaigns during the war with France, and made brevet lieutenant-colonel in 1801. He served with Sir John Moore during the retreat to Corunna, and his regiment, the 20<sup>th</sup> Foot, was heavily engaged during the campaign. He was then sent to join the Walcheren expedition, where two-thirds of his regiment was felled by illness. He returned to Spain as a Brigadier in 1812, and served quite brilliantly under Wellington. He was put in charge of the reinforcements that would be sent to America in 1814, and succeeded in capturing Washington after the Battle of Bladensburgh later in August. He was mortally wounded on September 12, 1814 as his army was moving towards Baltimore.

<sup>104</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:305

<sup>105</sup> George, *Terror on the Chesapeake*, 83; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 179-182. Estimates on the size of the British army at Washington range from 3600 to 4500 men.

<sup>106</sup> Cockburn to Barrie, July 16, 1814, University of Michigan, Clements Library, Barrie Papers; Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 100; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 174. Cochrane himself received news on July 1 that he could expect as many as 30,000 men to be sent to him for the summer campaign.

6000 were from Wellington's army.<sup>107</sup> Another 2000 troops would be diverted to help Admiral Griffith with his operations against Maine.<sup>108</sup> Around Virginia and Maryland, the Americans could muster more than 15,000 militia troops (although only 6000 available to meet the initial British attack), along with 1600 regulars and marines.<sup>109</sup> Instead of having an overwhelming force to use against the Americans, the British commanders in the Chesapeake could expect to be outnumbered by an almost four-to-one margin. This again made Cochrane hesitant about committing to an attack in the region.<sup>110</sup> His intention was to use Ross' troops against New Orleans later that year, and did not want to suffer needless casualties that might force him to postpone or even cancel that attack.<sup>111</sup> He once again suggested the possibility of going north to attack Rhode Island or Portsmouth, New Hampshire.<sup>112</sup>

Lord Bathurst made it clear that Ross' army was not to be involved in any operation that required it to be too far from the fleet. Regardless of where they intended to strike, the British would have to operate and attack a target close to the coast. This appealed to Ross, who was also hesitant in attacking a target so far inland and away from the

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<sup>107</sup> Colonel David G. Fitz-Enz, *The Final Invasion: Plattsburgh, The War of 1812's Most Decisive Battle* (New York, 2001), 67; Fortescue, *British Army*, 10:125. Prevost would use 12,000 men in his invasion of New York.

<sup>108</sup> Fortescue, *British Army*, 10:139

<sup>109</sup> Francis F. Beirne, *The War of 1812*, (New York, 1949), 268-269

<sup>110</sup> Cochrane to Croker, July 18, 1814, Adm.1/506, 460-461; Jack Mahon, *The War of 1812* (Gainesville, Fla., 1972), 254. Upon arriving on the scene on July 18, Cochrane issued orders denouncing American atrocities committed in the towns of Newark, Long Point and St. David's in Canada, and directed his commanders to lay waste to American towns until the United States paid indemnities. James Monroe later wrote that the British did not hold any moral ground regarding atrocities, and cited the River Raisin massacre, the burning of Havre-de-Grace and the subsequent burning of Washington as examples of British barbarity.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 103

squadron.<sup>113</sup> But Cockburn was able to use his powers of persuasion on Cochrane and Ross. For all the discussion about how the indecisive Warren was replaced by the aggressive Cochrane, it was really Cockburn who called the shots in this campaign. He was able to persuade both Ross and Cochrane that it was possible to take Washington with only 4000 troops, and cited the raids he and Nourse had conducted in the Potomac and Patuxent as proof that they could do it.<sup>114</sup> He brought Ross and a small troop detachment to the American shore on August 16 to give him proof he needed. They moved inland for several miles, destroyed a small factory, and returned to the fleet eighteen hours later without encountering any resistance. Ross was finally convinced, and agreed to Cockburn's plan.<sup>115</sup> Earlier that same day, Admiral Malcolm arrived with the remainder of the invasion fleet, and final preparations were made for the assault.<sup>116</sup> It was

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<sup>113</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 179-182; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 149-151

<sup>114</sup> Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 103; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 155-156

<sup>115</sup> Cochrane to Melville, November 24, 1817, University of Michigan, Clements Library, Melville Papers; Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 104; Shomette, *Flotilla*, 156-159. Despite the fact that it was clearly Cockburn's plan, Cochrane later made an issue over the distribution of the prize money three years after the attack on Washington. He stated that General Ross' share amounted to £1774.5.1, while he only received £1513.10.6. Cockburn's share came to £591.8.4, while Malcolm and Codrington each received £302.14. Cochrane claimed that he had been responsible for the planning and execution of the attack, and complained that the army got a larger share of the prize money yet had done less work. As a result, he felt that he deserved a larger share than Ross.

<sup>116</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Pulteney Malcolm'; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 179-182; James Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain: Consisting of Historical Memoirs of Those Officers of the British Navy Who Distinguished Themselves During the Reign of His Majesty George III*, 4 vols. (Boston, 1972) 3:351-361. Sir Pulteney Malcolm was born on February 20, 1768, and entered the navy at age 10 on board the frigate *Sibyl*. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1783, and remained on active duty during the interwar period. He was promoted commander of the *Jack Tar* while serving in the Jamaica Squadron in 1794. He would serve primarily in the Pacific and East Indies during the next decade, until he returned to European waters in 1805 to command the *Donegal*. Though he missed the opportunity to participate at Trafalgar, he did succeed in capturing the Spanish three-decker *El Rayo* on October 23, 1805. He later took part in the attack on San Domingo in 1806, and served in the Channel fleet between 1808 to 1811. He was promoted to rear-admiral in 1813, and escorted General Ross' army from Bourdeaux to the Chesapeake the following year. He was present at the Washington-Baltimore and



On August 24, the British met General Winder's division at Bladensburg. The destruction of Barney's flotilla reinforced Winder's army by 450 sailors, and these would fight most bravely in the coming battle. The total American strength at Bladensburg has been estimated from roughly 5000 to 7000 men. Unfortunately, most of these were militia soldiers, who had done little to defend American soil in the past.<sup>129</sup> Ross' army was also reinforced by a detachment of Cockburn's marines, giving him over 4500 men to face Winder.<sup>130</sup> The bulk of his army was comprised of hardened veterans from the Peninsular War, which would more than offset the numerical advantage the Americans held. The following battle confirmed the advantages of a smaller army of veterans over a larger army of untried recruits. The Battle of Bladensburg was a brief affair, in which less than 1500 troops participated before the American militia units broke and fled before Ross' veterans. In fact, the only American force that fought with any distinction were Barney's marines, who did their best to cover the American retreat.<sup>131</sup> Casualties from the battle ranged 250 to 500 killed and wounded on the British side, while the American figures range from 100 to 200 killed, wounded and taken prisoner, including Commodore Barney, who was wounded and captured during the battle.<sup>132</sup> Cockburn paid the commodore a sincere compliment by claiming that his marines had been the only

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<sup>129</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 279; Anthony S. Pitch, *The Burning of Washington: The British Invasion of 1814* (Annapolis, Md., 1998), 72

<sup>130</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 272; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 179

<sup>131</sup> George, *Terror on the Chesapeake*, 85-104; Pickles, *New Orleans 1815*, 9; Pitch, *The Burning of Washington*, 72

<sup>132</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 330; George, *Terror on the Chesapeake*, 102; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 15; Pitch, *The Burning of Washington*, 85. Barney was promptly paroled by Cockburn.

American troops who put up a fight during the battle.<sup>133</sup> After the battle, Cockburn and Ross entered the American capital. The poor performance of the American troops at Bladensburg seemed to confirm Cochrane's rather poor regard towards them as a whole. However, he would receive a rude shock five months later at New Orleans.

The burning of Washington has taken on mythic proportions in American history. In reality, all Cockburn and Ross did was to only burn public buildings, while leaving private property alone.<sup>134</sup> The sole exception occurred at one house, where American snipers fired from and succeeded in hitting General Ross' horse. When the British troops searched the house and, finding it empty, promptly set it ablaze.<sup>135</sup> Cockburn did try to restrain his men from acting like an army of goths, and ordered seven soldiers flogged for stealing private property during their occupation of the city.<sup>136</sup> The Americans themselves helped destroy part of their city; the commander of the U.S. Navy Yard ordered the installation to be set on fire, to prevent the British from obtaining any supplies, which resulted in the destruction of the *Columbia*, *Argus*, *Boston* and *New York*.<sup>137</sup> However, after only twenty-four hours in the capital, and after one meal in the White House, Cockburn and Ross ordered their forces back to the ships. They were far inside enemy territory and still greatly outnumbered. Caution dictated that they leave lest they be cut off from their supplies. By August 30, Ross' army was back on board the ships,

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<sup>133</sup> Shomette, *Flotilla*, 191

<sup>134</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 13-20

<sup>135</sup> Pickles, *New Orleans 1815*, 10

<sup>136</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 13-20

<sup>137</sup> Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, p.13-20; Dent, 'British Navy', 330-331

exhausted from the long march in the August heat. Nevertheless, his veterans had certainly proven their worth.<sup>138</sup>

The success at Washington was capped by Gordon's raid on Alexandria. They first encountered enemy resistance when they attacked Fort Washington on August 27. The British bombardment caused its garrison to flee, which was fortunate since one of the British bombs detonated the fort's magazine. They took possession of the fort and found twenty-seven heavy-caliber guns, all of which had been spiked by the Americans. Gordon then moved his ships into Alexandria, which had scuttled all of its merchant ships to prevent their falling into British hands. He met the town's citizens under a flag of truce, and ordered not only to have the scuttled ships refloated, but also to reload them with their cargoes. With the burning of the capital fresh in their minds, the citizens of Alexandria complied. This gave Gordon a haul of one gunboat and twenty fully-laden merchant ships.<sup>139</sup>

The Americans may have agreed to Gordon's terms, but they were not willing to let him leave unscathed. They prepared a warm welcome for his squadron when it tried to rejoin Cochrane's main fleet. They put their top men to stop Gordon, including no less impressive a collection than Commodores Rogers, Perry and Porter, each of whom had been responsible for some of the humiliating defeats the British suffered in the war.<sup>140</sup> If the Americans were to salvage some honor from this enterprise, and these were the men to do it. Several batteries were placed by the riversides, which were designed to make Gordon's return passage a veritable gauntlet. Luckily for him, he received early warning

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Gordon to Cochrane, September 9, 1814, Adm.1/507, 153-159

of the Americans intentions. The dispatch ship HMS *Fairy*, sent by Cochrane to reinforce Gordon, had already engaged a five-gun battery and a large body of soldiers on her way to join him in Alexandria. On hearing this, Gordon immediately prepared his squadron to leave the town. Like the journey up, navigating the river proved the greatest obstacle. Several ships grounded, and the squadron came close to disaster on September 4 when the Americans launched an attack by fire ships. Fortunately, they were beaten off by Captain Baker's boats.<sup>141</sup> The ships faced a continuous barrage from the American defenders, but by September 6, they were past the heaviest defenses. They were able to join up with Cochrane in the Chesapeake on September 9.<sup>142</sup> The whole raid cost them seven killed and thirty-five wounded (including Captain Napier of the *Euryalus*).<sup>143</sup>

The other British diversion north of Baltimore was a smaller affair, but it must be noted in that it resulted in the death of one of the Royal Navy's outstanding captain's, Sir Peter Parker.<sup>144</sup> On August 30, he led an expedition of 134 men north of Baltimore (from

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Robert Gardiner, ed., *The Naval War of 1812* (London, 1998), 152

<sup>144</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Peter Parker'. Sir Peter Parker was born in 1785, the son of Vice-Admiral Christopher Parker and grandson of both Admiral Peter Parker and Admiral John Byron. He entered the navy in 1793, and served primarily in home waters and in the West Indies. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1801, and later transferred to the *Victory* in 1803. The following year he was promoted to command the *Weazel*, and it was this ship that first spotted the combined Franco-Spanish fleet leaving Cadiz on October 20, 1805. He signaled this to the *Euryalus*, which in turn brought the news to Nelson's fleet. Though he took no part at Trafalgar, Admiral Collingwood was sufficiently pleased by his dispatch that he promoted him to captain and given command of the frigate *Melpomene*. He served in the Baltic and Mediterranean stations over the next five years, and appointed to the frigate *Menelaus* in 1810. He sailed to the East Indies on his own initiative in 1811, and took part in the reduction of the Mauritius later that year before returning to the Mediterranean. The *Menelaus* was later dispatched to North America in 1814, where Captain Parker met his end during a raid in the Chesapeake on August 30, 1814.

his ships *Menelaus*) to attack a militia encampment of 200 men.<sup>145</sup> When his force landed, the militia promptly dispersed, but Parker impulsively pursued them for several miles into the woods, where they were ambushed. Parker was killed, and total British casualties were forty killed and wounded, while the Americans suffered only three casualties.<sup>146</sup> Parker's death was a tragic and needless loss, and was one of the few times the American militia was actually able to repel a British landing in the Chesapeake. The *Menelaus* would later destroy two sloops and a schooner on their way back to join the main fleet on September 5, but it was a small consolation for their loss.<sup>147</sup>

Overall, the capture of Washington was a major success. At a cost of less than 300 killed and wounded, the British defeated a larger American army, marched into the capital of the United States, captured or destroyed three frigates, one sloop, sixteen gunboats and thirty-four merchant ships.<sup>148</sup> In addition, they destroyed an estimated \$1,500,000 worth of government property, seized 200 cannons, 500 barrels of powder, and 100,000 musket cartridges.<sup>149</sup> When they received the news, the British government was very pleased with the attack on the American capitol. Lord Liverpool declared that "Nothing could have been more complete or brilliant."<sup>150</sup> Croker wrote to Cockburn that it was "An exploit which for moral effect both in America and in England has never been

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<sup>145</sup> Roosevelt, *Naval war of 1812*, 291

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Lieutenant Henry Crease to Cochrane, September 6, 1814, Adm.1/507, 233

<sup>148</sup> Dent, 'British Navy', 331

<sup>149</sup> Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 109

<sup>150</sup> Melville to Cochrane, September 28, 1814, as quoted in Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 109

excelled.”<sup>151</sup> The Washington raid was the culmination of Cockburn’s Chesapeake campaign. With their success here, the British now turned northwards to Baltimore.

On September 6, Cochrane moved his fleet from the Patuxent and proceeded to the Potapscow River. General Ross landed 3000 soldiers and marines at the mouth of the river six days later, while Cochrane sailed further up with the *Severn*, *Euryalus*, *Hebrus*, *Meteor*, *Terror*, *Volcano*, *Aetna*, *Devastation*, and *Erebus*.<sup>152</sup> Their target was Fort McHenry, which guarded the two entrances into Baltimore at Lazaretto Point. The fort was manned by nearly 1000 men and was bristling with heavy weapons.<sup>153</sup> The Americans had also sunk several block ships as an additional precaution, to prevent Cochrane’s fleet from moving directly into the city as Gordon had done in Alexandria. In addition, there were more than 10,000 men guarding the city when the British arrived.<sup>154</sup>

The British operation was plagued with misfortune almost from the outset. They moved five miles inland when they ran into a detachment of Baltimore militia. A small skirmish ensued, resulting with General Ross being mortally wounded.<sup>155</sup> The loss of this respected general filled his troops with much fury, and they swept forward to pursue the Americans. Ross was carried back to the fleet, but he died before he could reach the boats. Colonel Arthur Brooke took command of the British ground troops, and attacked

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<sup>151</sup> Croker to Cockburn, September 30, 1814, University of Michigan, Clements Library, Croker Papers; Hitsman, *Incredible War of 1812*, 244. Not every Englishman praised the burning of the American capitol. One editor wrote, ‘The Cossacks spared Paris, but we spared not the capitol of America. Is it certain, that the destruction of the public edifices for destruction sake alone, a legitimate method of warfare?’

<sup>152</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:320-321

<sup>153</sup> Morris, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 110-114

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

the main American defense line between Middle River and Bear Creek. As at Bladensburg, the British were greatly outnumbered, but were once again able to overcome the green militia soldiers. However, they again suffered heavier losses than their opponents.<sup>156</sup> They moved towards Baltimore the next day, but unlike Washington, the city was heavily defended with extensive breastworks. It would be the navy's turn to carry the main burden against the city.

On September 13, Cochrane's flotilla began the bombardment that would be immortalized by Francis Scott Key in the Star Spangled Banner. Beginning at dawn, the British kept a constant bombardment throughout the day against Fort McHenry, but did little actual damage to it.<sup>157</sup> They continued it well into the evening, until it was apparent to Cochrane that the attack was accomplishing little. He then ordered a night attack on the fort's rear with about 1200 marines and sailors.<sup>158</sup> However, they were unable to find an adequate place to land in the dark, and were forced to send up rockets to get a proper bearing on where to land. This lost them the element of surprise, and the marines found themselves directly in front of the city battery. Soon, every gun that could bear was pouring out against the defenseless barges. The British were fortunate that only one of their barges sank, though they did suffer heavy casualties. The remaining boats headed back to the fleet as fast as they could. With their return, the fleet returned to bombarding the fort.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 110-114; Pack, *The Man Who Burned the White House*, 111. The British admitted to having suffered 41 killed and 261 wounded.

<sup>157</sup> Morriss, *Cockburn and the British Navy*, 110-114.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

The defeat of the barges effectively ended the Battle of Baltimore. Cochrane informed Brooke that he could expect no help from the navy, and that any further attacks on the city would result only in heavier losses. Thus on September 14, Brooke's forces were returned to the British ships.<sup>160</sup> Cochrane took the *Tonnant* and *Surprise* back to Halifax four days later, where he would begin his preparations for his assault on New Orleans. With Cockburn sailing back to Bermuda on September 19, Malcolm was left behind to conduct smaller operations in the Chesapeake.

Although they failed in taking Baltimore, the British actually came close to succeeding. If the 1200 troops had been able to land safely and take Fort McHenry, Baltimore would have been at Cochrane's mercy. Regardless, the Washington-Baltimore campaign was still a substantial one for the British. Yet despite the successful defense of Baltimore, few Americans doubted that the British would not come back and try again. Cochrane withdrew not because the attack was stymied, but because he wanted to prepare for a much more valuable prize, New Orleans. He feared that taking Baltimore would result in heavy casualties that would make it impossible to assault this target.<sup>161</sup>

With Cockburn and Cochrane gone from the Chesapeake, large-scale operations in this region came to an end. Malcolm launched a small attack up the Potomac on October 3, resulting in the destruction of three schooners at a cost of three casualties.<sup>162</sup> On October 14, he took the *Royal Oak*, *Asia*, *Ramillies*, *Dictator* and *Thistle* as well as the remaining troopships and bomb vessels to Negril Bay, Jamaica, to prepare for the New

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 114

<sup>162</sup> Malcolm to Cochrane, October 6, 1814, Adm.1/507, 377-378



Orleans campaign.<sup>163</sup> Captain Barrie, returning from the Maine campaign, was left in charge of the remaining ships in the Chesapeake. He would conduct additional raids in the small creeks in the region in hopes of further disrupting American shipping. He would succeed in capturing another fifty American merchant ships between October and the end of hostilities.

While Cochrane and Cockburn had been creating havoc in the Chesapeake, Rear-Admiral Griffith undertook his own operations in New England. With the blockade extended to the region, the license system that permitted New England merchants to continue trading was brought to an end. For the British, it afforded some strategic opportunities. The conquest and annexation of Maine was perceived as an ideal means of making the Canadian frontier easier to defend than it had been prior to the war. As it stood, the state served as a between the Maritimes and Lower Canada. Hardy's capture of Moose Island on July 11 showed the region to be weakly defended, and could be taken by a determined assault. Maine became the target of the second prong of Britain's counteroffensive of 1814.

Griffith and Sherbrooke would lead the invasion up the coast to the Penobscot River.<sup>164</sup> Their naval forces had been deprived of the services of the *Orpheus*, *La Hogue*, *Chesapeake* and *Indian* in August, as they ordered back to England with the August convoys.<sup>165</sup> Between July 29 and August 15, Griffith would receive the *Dolphin*, *Erne*, *Furieuse*, and *Bacchante* to replace them, plus several transports bringing the 62<sup>nd</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Malcolm to Cochrane, November 9, 1814, Adm.1/508, 9-10

<sup>164</sup> Griffith to Croker, September 9, 1814, Adm.1/507, 130-132; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:329-331

<sup>165</sup> Griffith to Croker August 19, 1814, Adm.1/506, 532-533

Regiment to Halifax.<sup>166</sup> He complained that many of the arriving ships were in greater need of refitting than his own battle-worn ships.<sup>167</sup> Nevertheless, they sailed on August 26 with a fleet consisting of the *Dragon*, *Endymion*, *Bacchante*, *Sylph* and ten transports carrying over 2000 troops.<sup>168</sup> They were later joined on August 31 off the Metinicus Islands by the *Bulwark*, *Tenedos*, *Rifleman*, *Pictou* and *Peruvian*.<sup>169</sup> The original target of the attack was to have been the port of Machias, but Griffith and Sherbrooke received word from Captain Pearce of the *Rifleman* that the corvette USS *Adams* had arrived in the Penobscot River a few days earlier. With this piece of news, the fleet sailed straight for the Penobscot, towards the town of Hamden.<sup>170</sup>

Griffith chose Captain Barrie to launch the attack on the *Adams* and the defenses around Castine.<sup>171</sup> Barrie took the *Peruvian*, *Sylph*, the transport *Harmony* and one of the *Dragon's* tenders to bring 600 troops to their target.<sup>172</sup> Thick fog and the intricate nature of the channel delayed their assault on Hamden until September 3. The town was defended by approximately 1400 militia troops, as well as several well-placed cannons, which opened fire as soon as the British got into range.<sup>173</sup> The British replied with rockets which, and though were not very accurate, were most effective at breaking the

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Cochrane to Croker, , September 2, 1814, Adm.1/506, 614

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.; Lohnes, 'British Navy', 219. The *Adams* returned from her seven-month cruise, and came to the Penobscot River after being damaged on Isle au Haut, situated 30 miles from the river.

<sup>171</sup> Cochrane to Croker, September 2, 1814, Adm.1/506, 614

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

morale of the militia troops. Despite being outnumbered two to one, the British troops easily caused the militia to retreat from their hillside positions. They ran so quickly that the British could not take any prisoners. Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, Captain Morris ordered the *Adams* destroyed.<sup>174</sup> After being penned up in the Chesapeake for most of the war, he must have lamented having brought his ship to this region.

Following the capture of Hamden, the British turned to the main port of Bangor, which surrendered quite readily to the British. Captain Hyde-Parker then took the *Tenedos*, *Bacchante*, *Rifleman*, *Pictou* and two transports carrying detachments of the 29<sup>th</sup> and 60<sup>th</sup> Regiments to capture Machias on September 11.<sup>175</sup> Their arrival prompted General Brewer, the American militia commander of the district, to capitulate.<sup>176</sup> Griffith and Sherbrooke now held half of the Maine coastline under their control, a most valuable bargaining chip for the British delegates at the peace talks in Ghent.<sup>177</sup> Apart from the destruction of the *Adams*, they also captured or destroyed another forty-one American ships.<sup>178</sup> Sherbrooke ordered all male citizens of the occupied territories to take the oath of allegiance to the crown, and three-quarters agreed to this most willingly.<sup>179</sup> It seemed to confirm British attitudes about the loyalty of most Americans towards their country.

With the occupation of the Maine coast, the major operations in the northern waters came to a halt. There was much reason to be pleased with Sherbrooke and Griffith's

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<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Hyde-Parker to Griffith, September 27, 1814, Adm.1/507, 305-306

<sup>176</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 30:77

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

expedition. On his return to Halifax, Griffith was pleased to discover that he had been promoted to Rear-Admiral of the White.<sup>180</sup> The only downside in the conquest was that its long-term benefits would be negated by the British defeats at Lake Champlain on September 11, 1814, which effectively broke the third prong of the British counteroffensive that year. Governor Prevost was severely criticized for ordering his army's retreat back to Canada after the naval defeat on Lake Champlain instead of pressing forward. His decision to turn back turned the American naval victory into a major strategic victory.<sup>181</sup> One wonders what might have happened if the bulk of Wellington's army had been sent instead to the Chesapeake. Nevertheless, the Maine campaign would prove the only one of the four British offensives to accomplish all of its goals in 1814.

While most of the squadron was committed to the major operations, there were still a few skirmishes on the high seas. While patrolling off Savannah on August 22, the sloop HMS *Primrose* observed a schooner leaving the port, and chased her to the Tybee shoals. Unable to get close to her, Commander Phillot sent his boats to destroy the ship, which turned out to be the privateer schooner *Pike* (13). She had sailed down from Philadelphia four months earlier, and had captured or destroyed twenty-five British merchant ships during her career. The *Primrose*'s boats went after her later that evening, and succeeded in destroying her without suffering any casualties.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Griffith to Barlow, September 27, 1814, Adm.1/507, 262

<sup>181</sup> For a full description of the Battle of Lake Champlain, see Fitz-Enz, *The Final Invasion*, 91-170; Hitsman, *The Incredible War of 1812*, 251-261; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:338-348

<sup>182</sup> Commander Phillot to Pechell, August 23, 1814, Adm.1/507, 238

The *Lacedemonian* received information in October about a large convoy of thirty merchant ships sailing from Savannah to St. Mary's, with an escort of only three gunboats. She sailed with all haste to the region, and on October 5 found the convoy passing through St. Andrews Sound near Cumberland Island. Captain Jackson ordered his boats to attack the convoy before it reached the safety of St. Mary's. They succeeded in capturing one of the gunboats and three merchant ships (a fourth merchant ship was sunk), but they were too late to stop the rest of the convoy.<sup>183</sup>

Though there was no grand campaign planned for the New York sector in 1814, the British warships in this region were not any less busy. Admiral Hotham's squadron had a very productive spring and summer season.<sup>184</sup> The nine vessels under his command (*Superb*, *Pomone*, *Saturn*, *Niemen*, *Loire*, *Dispatch*, *Forth*, *Narcissus* and *Nimrod*) would in a six month period capture twenty-one American ships as prizes, destroy another fifty-eight, recapture one British merchant ship, and detain nine foreign vessels that were subsequently released. In addition to these, Hotham's ships captured another thirty-three vessels that were not sent to the prize courts of either Halifax or Bermuda, but which were instead ransomed. Although since 1782 it was illegal for British warships to ransom prizes, there are several instances where this was done in the War of 1812. Ransoming a ship was an alternative to the standard practice of sending captured ships to be adjudged by the prize courts, and had several advantages. It permitted the capturing ships to

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<sup>183</sup> Captain Jackson to Cochrane, October 10, 1814, Adm.1/508, 210-211

<sup>184</sup> Hotham to Melville, November 6, 1813, and March 7, 1814, Hotham Papers, DDHO 7/2. When Hotham asked to be relieved as Warren's fleet captain, he also asked to be allowed to hoist a broad pendant and serve as a junior flag officer in the fleet. He wrote that it was odd that he would have been chosen to serve as Warren's fleet captain, considering that the job was usually given to someone with whom the Admiral would have known for a considerable amount of time, and Hotham pointed out that he had never served with Warren prior to this. In any case, Hotham was put in charge of the ships in the Long Island sector.

conserve their crews by not being forced to send prize crews on board the captured ships, while also not being burdened with enemy prisoners, thus allowing them to stay at sea for longer periods. The ransoming of a prize constituted a binding contract between the owners of the captured ship, the former master of said ship, and the capturing ship itself.<sup>185</sup> The rules of ransoming as follows:

- 1) Several copies of a bill of exchange were drawn up and signed by both parties, and at least one copy was retained by each.
- 2) The Bill of Exchange constituted an order from the former master to the owners of the prize to pay the captor the ransom amount upon presentation of the bill to the owners
- 3) The bill of exchange also constituted a license of safe conduct to the prize from the captor's government, authorizing her to sail to a designated port over a specified route and within a limited time. While sailing within these limits, the prize was immune from further capture by the warships or privateers of the captor's government and its allies.
- 4) A bond was also signed by the former master of the prize, which guaranteed the payment of the bill when presented and, in the event that payment of the bill was refused when presented to the owners, obligated the captain to pay the ransom himself.<sup>186</sup>

For example, one of the ship's in Hotham's squadron, the *Nimrod*, ransomed fourteen American merchant ships between April and July for over \$4000.00.<sup>187</sup> How much of this it actually received is unknown, but it was undoubtedly far more expedient to ransom these ships instead of putting a prize crew on board and send them to Halifax and Bermuda.

At the beginning of the fall season, Hotham ordered Captain Carteret of the *Pomone* to cruise off New Haven at the beginning of October to harass American trade. The frigate captured four small merchant ships on October 1, and used one of these to approach unsuspecting American ships. He succeeded in luring the revenue schooner

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<sup>185</sup> Kert, *Prize and Prejudice*, 126-127; Donald A. Petrie, *The Prize Game: Lawful Looting On the High Seas in the Days of Fighting Sail* (New York, 1999), 19-21

<sup>186</sup> Petrie, *The Prize Game*, 19-21

<sup>187</sup> Hotham to Croker, December 17, 1814, Adm.1/507, 397-398

*Eagle* (6) out of New Haven, which grounded on Negro Head on Long Island on October 13. She was later captured by the boats of the *Narcissus* and *Dispatch*, which arrived to aid the *Pomone*.<sup>188</sup>

The success enjoyed by Hotham's squadron in the Long Island sector led to his decision to temporarily lift the blockade around Nantucket.<sup>189</sup> He was informed by Captain Newton (of the *Nimrod*) that the island was running out of food, and its inhabitants would not be able to survive the coming winter.<sup>190</sup> In the spirit of humanity, Hotham allowed limited trading and fishing rights to bring in much needed supplies to the island.<sup>191</sup> In return, the inhabitants of the island would forfeit paying taxes to the Federal government for the remainder of the war.<sup>192</sup>

The North American squadron did have its share of setbacks during the last phase of the war. The squadron suffered the loss of the sloop *Peacock* off the coast of South Carolina on August 22 with her entire crew. It cost the navy the services of Captain Coote, who led the assault on Pettipaug in June.<sup>193</sup> This was followed on September 26 by a controversial attack against the privateer schooner *General Armstrong* (7). She was observed in Fayal by the *Plantagenet*, frigate *Rota* (38) and sloop *Carnation* (18). American and British accounts widely differ on what followed. As she was lying in a neutral Portuguese port, the Americans claim that Captain Lloyd of the *Plantagenet* sent

<sup>188</sup> Cochrane to Croker, December 28, 1814, Adm.1/508, 258-259

<sup>189</sup> Cochrane to Croker, October 5, 1814, Adm.1/507, 249-251

<sup>190</sup> Captain Newton to Hotham, August 27, 1814, Adm.1/507, 256-258

<sup>191</sup> Cochrane to Croker, October 5, 1814, Adm.1/507, 249-251

<sup>192</sup> Reginald Horsman, *The War of 1812* (New York, 1969), 161-162; Lohnes, 'British Navy', 258

<sup>193</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:555

his boats specifically to attack her, regardless of the neutrality of the waters. Captain Lloyd claimed that that he had sent a boat to determine whether or not she was an American ship. Regardless, the American privateer opened fire on the British, and both sides quickly blamed the other for having broken the neutrality of the port. In subsequent attacks during the night, the British marines met a devastating fire from the *General Armstrong*, which sank two of the British boats and caused heavy casualties on the others. The British were forced to withdraw, and Captain Lloyd planned another attack the following day. However, the Americans spared him the trouble, and set fire to their ship.<sup>194</sup>

This was followed a few weeks later with another disastrous attempt against an American privateer. On October 11, the *Endymion* sent out its boats to capture the notorious raider *Prince-de-Neufchatel* off Nantucket. The American privateer spotted the approach of the *Endymion's* boats, inflicting enormous casualties on them. The marines were forced to give up their attempts after suffering seventeen killed and forty-five wounded, and only a few returned unscathed to the ship.<sup>195</sup> It was a setback that Captain Hope would get a chance to avenge later.

An even bigger calamity occurred on November 24, when a severe storm struck a convoy escorted by the *Fantôme*, *Cuttle* and *Herring* to Halifax. All three vessels met

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<sup>194</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:349-350; Edgar Stanton MaClay, *A History of American Privateers* (New York/London, 1924), 491-502. MaClay claims that British casualties were sixty-three killed and 110 wounded, while James claims that their casualties were only thirty-five killed and eighty-six wounded.

<sup>195</sup> George Coggeshall, *A History of American Privateers and Letters-of-Marque During Our War With England in the Years 1812, 1813, and 1814* (New York, 1861), 241-244; Maclay, *American Privateers*, 377-390. American casualties were thirty-one killed and wounded out of a crew of thirty-seven men.



their end on the rocks near Proshead Harbor with a heavy loss in lives, along with three other ships from the convoy.<sup>196</sup> Griffith was also informed the following month that the *Constitution* escaped from Boston yet again on December 17, and sent the *Leander*, *Newcastle* and *Acasta* to search for her.<sup>197</sup> This news came following a report from a British spy in Boston that the Americans were raising an army of 5000 men to retake Castine, which only increased his anxiety.<sup>198</sup>

Once the Chesapeake campaign was over, Cochrane was free to focus on the New Orleans campaign. As had been agreed back in London in January, the assault on the city would not take place before December, and that the invasion fleet would assemble in Barbados.<sup>199</sup> It was agreed that from this base, the British would a diversionary attack along the Georgia or South Carolina coast, which would hopefully divert American troops from the Gulf coast, and allow Cochrane and the main body of his fleet to grab New Orleans with minimal difficulty.<sup>200</sup> It was a good plan on paper, with a reasonable chance for success, but the British would almost from the very start of this operation be plagued with misfortune.

As part of his preparations, Cochrane was quite interested in native recruitment to help in the coming campaign. In April, he sent Captain Hugh Pigot to the Apalachicola River, situated on the Gulf Coast of Western Florida, to report on whether or not the local

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<sup>196</sup> Griffith to Croker, December 4, 1814, Adm.1/508, 10

<sup>197</sup> Hotham to Croker, December 29, 1814, Adm.1/508, 50-51

<sup>198</sup> Mounsey to Griffith, December 14, 1814, Adm.1/508, 48; Lohnes, 'British Navy', 253. Monroe tried to get the expedition under way, but Governor Strong refused.

<sup>199</sup> Brown, *Amphibious Campaign*, 27, 75-76

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, 76

Creek Indians would be willing to join the British cause against the Americans. Pigot's report showed that several tribes were quite receptive to the idea.<sup>201</sup> Besides, New Orleans, there were two other key cities along the Gulf Coast that interested Cochrane, Mobile and Pensacola. It was deemed essential that these cities be in British control before any attack was made on New Orleans. Despite the fact that Pensacola was still under Spanish control, Cochrane ordered the city to be occupied by British forces in July.<sup>202</sup> He sent a small naval force under Captain Henry Percy, which included the sloops *Hermes*, *Carron*, brigs *Sophie* and *Childers*, to land one hundred marines under the command of Major Edward Nicholls to occupy the town. From here, Nicholls was to help recruit Indians and runaway slaves to join the British colors, and in this he proved quite successful, as hundreds would join.<sup>203</sup>

The next part of the plan was to take the city of Mobile. The Americans had only recently begun to reinforce the city's main defense outpost, Fort Bowyer, which guarded the entrance to Mobile Bay. The British planned to attack early in September, but chose to wait before attacking the fort when Captain Percy sent Captain Nicholas Lockyer and Major Nicholls on September 3 to meet with the Baratarian Pirates under Jean Laffite.<sup>204</sup> In exchange for joining the British to fight against the Americans, they offered Laffite and his pirates amnesty for all past crimes. In reality, Laffite saw the British offer as an ultimatum, which would have meant the surrender of his ships and base to the British. As he undoubtedly saw it, if the British controlled the Gulf Coast, Laffite's days of piracy

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 27

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid. 30-31

would be over. He told Lockyer and Nicholls that he would need two weeks to mull over the proposition, and the two British officers returned to Pensacola to await his reply.<sup>205</sup>

Shortly after Nicholls and Lockyer returned from their meeting with Laffite, Percy ordered an assault on Fort Bowyer. On September 12, Nicholls landed a force of 60 marines and 120 Indians at the rear of the fort, and secured the pass of Bonsecours twenty-seven miles east of the fort. The *Hermes*, *Carron*, *Sophie* and *Childers* began bombarding the fort, which was armed with twenty-eight heavy guns. Because of the shallow waters, Percy's ships could not close in and use their carronades, and thus the bombardment did little real damage to the fort. Disaster struck shortly after the bombardment began when the *Hermes* had her cable cut by a shot from the fort, and was carried away by the strong current. She grounded directly in front of the fort, and came under a withering fire from the American cannons. Unable to get the ship afloat, Captain Percy had the crew removed to the *Sophie*, and set the ship ablaze to prevent her from being captured. As for Nicholls' force, it was also stopped dead in its tracks by the fire from the fort, and he himself lost an eye from the engagement, and both naval and land forces retreated back to Pensacola. The battle cost the British thirty-three killed and forty wounded, while American casualties were only four killed and five wounded.<sup>206</sup> It was a bad start for the British, and would be a small taste of things to come.

The rebuff at Fort Bowyer was bad enough, but on November 7 an American army of 4000 men under Andrew Jackson was able to march in and seize Pensacola. The

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Brown, *Amphibious Campaign*, 44-46; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:356-357; *Naval Chronicle* 33:429. Captain Percy faced a court-martial for the loss of the *Hermes* on January 18, 1815, but was acquitted.

British were powerless to prevent this, and even had to destroy their main stronghold in the region, Fort Barracas, as it lay only fourteen miles from the city and could not be adequately defended.<sup>207</sup> Thus, after four months in the region, the British had nothing to show for their efforts. Not only was Mobile still in American hands, but now they had Pensacola as well. Cochrane counted on holding both cities before beginning his attack on New Orleans, but would have to do without. The British were in a poor position to begin their New Orleans campaign, just as they began to assemble their forces in the Gulf.

According to the original plans for the campaign laid out the previous winter in London, the British were to assemble their forces in Barbados, in order to keep their intended target a secret. However, in the interest of economy, the Admiralty opted to shift the advance base to Jamaica. This would save time, but once the British began to assemble there, it would be impossible for the Americans not to figure out where they would be attacked.<sup>208</sup> Also, Cochrane had recommended the purchase of Dutch schuyts, small shallow-draft sailing boats that were ideal for navigating the coastal waters of Louisiana and West Florida. But the Admiralty instead opted to buy their landing ships in the West Indies, which would prove inadequate for navigating the waters around New Orleans.<sup>209</sup> The British soldiers would pay the price for the Admiralty's fiscal restraints.

Another equally important factor that worked against the British, one that has received little mention, is that up until the War of 1812, they had never attempted a major operation against New Orleans. They had nothing to base their current plans on, no

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<sup>207</sup> Brown, *Amphibious Campaign*, 52-54

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, 75-76, 169-171

previous model to copy. Coupled with their unfamiliarity with the terrain and waterways in this region, the British were placing a considerable amount of faith that everything would proceed smoothly. This would prove to have fatal consequences for them when they got their operation under way.

Malcolm's division of ships arrived in Jamaica on November 9, and he was immediately informed of the death of Rear-Admiral Brown, the Jamaica squadron's commander.<sup>210</sup> Malcolm ordered Hardy to stay behind and function as station commander until Cochrane's arrival.<sup>211</sup> Cochrane himself arrived at Negril Bay on November 25, and as there was no longer a commander of the Jamaica squadron, he decided to take command of its ships for his campaign.<sup>212</sup> He thus had the honor of having commanded three of the four North American and West Indian squadrons.

Cochrane needed to find a suitable assembly point near New Orleans to disembark the land forces. He sailed with his fleet of fifty ships and arrived off Chandeleur Island on December 8, when Captain Edward Troubridge of the *Armide* spotted two small ships in Lake Borgne, which opened fire on the British ships. Cochrane intended to land the army in this area, but would be forced to clear the lake of American warships before he could do so.

On the night of December 12, Captain Lockyer took the brig *Manly* and bomb-ship *Meteor*, and escorted forty-two armed launches filled with 980 marines and seamen towards the American flotilla. The Americans were able to muster five gunboats (each

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Malcolm to Croker, November 9, 1814, Adm.1/508, 9

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Cochrane to Croker, January 24, 1815, Adm.1/508, 305

armed with five to seven guns), the sloop USS *Alligator* (1), and the schooner USS *Seahorse* (1), and placed them under the command of Commodore Daniel Patterson. The British launches rowed more than thirty-six miles to their targets (which were aground), and did not reach them until the morning of December 14. The *Seahorse* was targeted by seven launches, but blew herself up to avoid capture, while the *Alligator* chose instead to surrender. After a furious battle that lasted two hours, the gunboats were also forced to surrender. British casualties numbered seventeen killed and seventy-seven wounded (including Captain Lockyer), while the Americans lost only ten killed, thirty-five wounded and eighty-six captured.<sup>213</sup> The Americans naval presence in the region now consisted solely of the sloop *Louisiana* and gunboat *Carolina*.

Following the battle, the British were given information from American prisoners that greatly overstated the troop strength and defenses in the region, which compelled Cochrane to land the army on the northern reaches of Lake Borgne at Pea Island. This would prove a poor choice, as the island was a most inhospitable piece of property without adequate shelter for the troops. Worse still, the troops had to endure a thirty miles journey in open boats from the fleet to the island while enduring chilling rains. It took six days for the British army to be landed on the island, over which time more than two hundred West Indian troops would die of exposure before even having a chance to fight.<sup>214</sup> The British bad luck seemed to be holding on.

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<sup>213</sup> Lockyer to Cochrane, December 16, 1814, Adm.1/508, 364-366; Brown, *Amphibious Campaign*, 81; Samuel Carter III, *Blaze of Glory: The Fight for New Orleans 1814-1815* (New York, 1971), 119-127; Gardiner, ed., *War of 1812*, 174; James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:357-359

<sup>214</sup> Brown, *Amphibious Campaign*, 81-82

With the help of local Spanish fishermen, Captain Robert Spencer went ahead and scouted the area around Bayou Bienvenue on December 18. He found the area to be undefended, and Cochrane began to move the British army began from Pea Island to a plantation in the bayou owned by General Jacques Villeré on December 22.<sup>215</sup> Because of the shallow waters of the Mississippi delta, the move had to again be accomplished by the fleet's boats. The distance from the fleet to the new landing site was seventy miles, which would make it an almost impossible task to keep the army properly supplied. Andrew Jackson further added to the British troops' discomfort when he launched a night attack on the British landing site on December 23. Aided by the gunboat *Carolina*, the attack was a bloody and confusing affair, and by the time Jackson's forces withdrew, 277 British troops had been killed, wounded or missing, while his own forces suffered 213 casualties.<sup>216</sup>

The British completed their landings on December 24, the same day that saw the arrival of the army commander, Major-General Sir Edward Packenham, to the region. Packenham, a veteran of Wellington's army, had serious doubts about the position of his army. He described his army as being in a bottle, and urged they move to a more suitable location from where to launch their attack. However, several of his officers talked him out of this, and assured him that the American positions could be taken by a single, determined attack.<sup>217</sup> These recommendations were made by men who had been present at Bladensburg, and their opinion on the mettle of the American troops was quite poor. The veterans of the Peninsular War were certain they had nothing to fear from the

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<sup>215</sup> Brown, *Amphibious Campaign*, 89-90; Gardiner, *War of 1812*, 174-179

<sup>216</sup> Brown, *Amphibious Campaign*, 101-104

American rabble, no matter how strong their defenses were. It would seem the gods were preparing to teach the British a most costly lesson for their arrogance.<sup>218</sup>

The attack on December 23 made the British wary of the presence of the remaining American warships in the vicinity. The *Carolina* in particular was adding to the British troops' miseries by firing at their field hospital, and it was deemed imperative to remove this threat.<sup>219</sup> Though they did not have any of their heavy siege artillery available, Packenham's artillery commander, Colonel Alexander Dickson, set up a furnace to fire hot shot at the American ships with their lighter guns. The British artillery opened up their barrage on the two American warships on December 25, and despite firing at extreme ranges, they succeeded in scoring several hits. The *Louisiana* was successfully towed away by long boats out of range of the British guns, but the *Carolina* was less fortunate. Her crew was unable to put her fires out, and the ship had to be abandoned, although they were able to save some of her guns.<sup>220</sup>

Before he would commit to a full-scale attack, Packenham ordered a reconnaissance in force on December 28, to learn the extent of the American defenses. He ordered two brigades, accompanied by light mortars and half of the rocket troop, to attack the American positions. The attack began as planned, and despite coming under a withering fire from the American guns (including those from the *Louisiana*), the British troops

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<sup>217</sup> Pickles, *New Orleans 1815*, 51

<sup>218</sup> Ibid. It has been written that when Cochrane was confronted by Packenham's doubts about the success of mounting a frontal attack on the American defensive positions, he blasted the general by saying "If the army is afraid to face the dirtyshirts, then I will carry the position with my sailors, and the army can bring up my baggage." This comment, however, has never been mentioned by anyone who was present at the battle, and would appear to be one more myth regarding the battle.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid. 52

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.



actually came close to breaking the left wing of Jackson's army. However, at the very moment that a breakthrough seemed imminent, Packenham ordered his troops to withdraw. He stated that he wanted to wait for the arrival of his heavy artillery and additional troops to arrive before launching the decisive attack.<sup>221</sup> Whatever the reason, he was apparently unaware of just how close he came to victory.

After this attack, Jackson was able to use the lull to further reinforce his positions. By December 31, he had seven artillery batteries set up to beat off any British attack.<sup>222</sup> He also had several pits dug up and filled with bales of cotton to enable his guns to fire on firm ground. The terrain in this area was quite sodden, and both American and British guns had a tendency of sinking into this ground after firing a few rounds. This would prove an important advantage for Jackson.<sup>223</sup> As for the British, it seemed the situation was worsening by the day. It was becoming more and more difficult to transport enough guns and ammunition from the fleet, and the cold, wet weather was wreaking havoc on the troops' morale. Their situation did not improve any on January 1, 1815, when Packenham ordered a new attack on the American lines. Dickson began a three-hour artillery barrage, but was forced to stop because his guns had run out of ammunition. It was observed that the bombardment had done little damage to the main American defensive positions on Line Jackson, which compelled Packenham to call off the assault.<sup>224</sup> This only worsened the deteriorating morale of the British troops, while

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<sup>221</sup> Ibid., 52-55

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., 56

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., 57-59

American morale was rising. They had beaten off one attack by Wellington's veterans, and now believed that they had silenced the British artillery (not knowing, of course, that this was accomplished by lack of ammunition, and not from the fire of the American guns).<sup>225</sup>

On January 3, Packenham received two fresh regiments (the 7<sup>th</sup> and 43<sup>rd</sup>), and he and Cochrane devised a new plan to overcome the American defenses. Cochrane suggested that they first assault the American battery on the West Bank, which would not only provide cover for the British left flank, but would also enable them to fire upon the *Louisiana* and on Jackson's right flank.<sup>226</sup> The key to this operation was in getting the British troops across the river quickly enough to accomplish this task. Cochrane came up with the idea of lengthening the Villeré Canal, from where the British troops arrived, until it cut the levee. The British troops could be loaded into boats on the canal, with a dam built behind them. The dam would raise the water level and allow the boats to cross the river with ease. The Royal Engineers began almost immediately to work on this, and the senior commanders wanted it completed by January 6.<sup>227</sup>

Despite their best efforts, it was obvious that the canal would not be completed on time. Packenham intended to send 1200 troops under Colonel Thornton to attack the West Bank battery (comprising of the 85<sup>th</sup> Regiment, the 5<sup>th</sup> West Indian regiment, as well as a detachment of marines and sailors, and two cannons), but had problems with getting enough boats to ferry the men across. Also, the soft ground that was being dug up

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<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid., 61

<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

kept falling back into the canal, which further slowed the work.<sup>228</sup> Nevertheless, the engineers finally finished their work on January 7. With everything ready, forty-one boats began to cross the river after the levee was cut at 9:00 p.m. that night.<sup>229</sup>

The first boats were almost across when once again the British were hit by more misfortune. The dam built by the engineers collapsed, which meant that the British boats would have to be dragged into the river. By 3:00 a.m. on January 8, thirty boats had reached the river, but the British timetable was thrown completely off schedule.<sup>230</sup> Packenham discovered this when he awoke a few hours later and found that less than half of Thornton's troops were on the river. This meant that if he proceeded as planned with the main attack, the West Bank battery would still be in American hands. One of his officers suggested they wait to commence the attack until Thornton had seized the battery, but this would mean the main assault, scheduled for dawn, would be made in full daylight. Packenham counted on achieving surprise on the American positions, and decided to launch the attack at dawn, regardless of Thornton's situation.<sup>231</sup>

As soon as Packenham ordered the attack to begin, everything went wrong.<sup>232</sup> Instead of catching the Americans by surprise, the British redcoats found them waiting with guns loaded. Within a few hours, both Packenham and Major-General Sir Samuel

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<sup>228</sup> Ibid., 62

<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., 63

<sup>231</sup> Ibid.

<sup>232</sup> Beirne, *War of 1812*, 367; Pickles, *New Orleans 1815*, 64. Exact figures for the American and British forces vary according to sources. Jackson's army was reckoned somewhere between 4000 to 6000 men, although probably only 2000 were actually engaged in the battle, while Packenham probably attacked with between 5000 to 6000 men.

Gibbs, who commanded the British right flank, were dead, while the commander of the left flank, Major-General John Keane, was badly wounded. The only major-general to escape harm that day was John Lambert, who commanded the British reserves. Shortly before he died, Packenham ordered Lambert to throw in the reserves, but upon seeing the devastation on the battlefield, Lambert opted not to obey it.<sup>233</sup> This likely prevented the British from suffering an even more grievous defeat. The battle cost the British more than 2000 killed, wounded or captured, whereas American losses totaled no more than seventy-one casualties. Ironically, the only success that day occurred when Colonel Thornton's detachment succeeded in capturing the West Bank battery. By 10:00 a.m., Thornton's troops took the American guns with little difficulty, and forced the American defenders to retreat.<sup>234</sup> However, the victory was too little and too late to affect the main battle. Thornton received orders from Lambert, now the ranking British army commander, to destroy the American guns and withdraw back to the British lines.<sup>235</sup>

From the failed attack on Fort Bowyer to the collapse of the dam on the eve of the attack, it would seem that the British plans in the Gulf were under a curse. However, while they were the victims of bad luck to some degree, the British commanders were equally to blame for the disaster. The inadequate supply route from the fleet to the encampment made things quite difficult for them, but their belief that the American troops would simply flee at the sight of the British redcoats was pure hubris. One could certainly make a claim that the seeds of defeat at New Orleans were firmly planted at

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<sup>233</sup> Pickles, *New Orleans 1815*, 76

<sup>234</sup> Ibid. The American forces on the West Bank numbered about 1000 troops, under the command of Brigadier-General David Morgan.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.

Bladensburg. One can only wonder what might have happened had the dam not collapsed and Thornton's attack had gone off as planned. But the cruelest blow was saved for last. On December 24, 1814, the British and American representatives signed the Treaty of Ghent, which officially ended the War of 1812. It would take weeks for this news to reach the American theatre, but for the survivors of the attack, it was undoubtedly the bitterest pill to swallow.

Thus came to a close the last of the four British offensives in America in 1814. They succeeded in capturing half of the Maine coastline, briefly held the American capital, and captured or destroyed a fortune in American goods and property. On the negative side, they suffered two humiliating defeats at Plattsburg and New Orleans, and suffered a third setback at Baltimore. In sports terms, the British record could be summed up as a win, two losses and a tie. For two years the British had been forced to fight a defensive action while they were occupied in Europe, and when they were finally able to send sufficient forces to deal a crushing blow, they fell wide of the mark. Most agree that Prevost's decision to retreat back to Canada transformed the naval battle on Lake Champlain into a major strategic victory, while the New Orleans campaign was plagued by a combination of poor luck and poor planning on the part of the British. As for Baltimore, it was clear that Cochrane was loath to suffer high casualties when he was expected to use Ross' troops not only in the Chesapeake, but also for the New Orleans attack. In short, as was the case in the last American war, the British stretched themselves too thin to accomplish all their goals. Just as Burgoyne and Howe could not support one another in 1777, neither Cochrane or Prevost could help the other in their respective campaigns in 1814.

Cochrane tried to salvage something from this venture by sending some of his ships up the Mississippi to attack Fort St. Philip the day after the battle. He sent the *Herald*, *Sophia*, along with two bomb-ketches and two tenders, to bombard it while staying out the range of the fort's guns. However, after four days they saw that they were doing little damage to it, and withdrew back to the fleet.<sup>236</sup> Cochrane began embarking the army on January 19, and would sail back to Jamaica at the end of the month.<sup>237</sup> As a postscript to the campaign, Malcolm was able to reclaim some lost prestige for the British when he led an assault against Fort Bowyer on February 12 at Mobile. The fort was captured, and more 400 American prisoners were taken. Though the capture of this fort would ultimately prove as useless as their defeat at New Orleans, it did allow the British to end the campaign on a less inglorious note.<sup>238</sup>

Far away from the Gulf Coast, the North American Squadron had one more opportunity for glory on the high seas. On January 14, 1815, Commodore Decatur left Staten Island with the frigate *President* during a vicious westerly gale. He felt that this offered his ship the best chance to escape through the British blockading ships, which had been forced away from their station by the storm. Unfortunately for him, the British blockade commander, Captain Hayes, believed Decatur would attempt a breakout at precisely that time and use the storm to cover his movements.<sup>239</sup> Worse still, the

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<sup>236</sup> Brown, *Amphibious Campaign*, 160

<sup>237</sup> Cochrane to Croker, January 28, 1815, Adm.1/508, 404-405

<sup>238</sup> Cochrane to Croker, February 14, 1815, Adm.1/508, 535-538. William S. Coker, 'The Last Battle of the War of 1812: New Orleans. No! Fort Bowyer', *The Alabama Historical Quarterly* 43 (1981), 42-63

<sup>239</sup> Hayes to Hotham, January 17, 1815, Adm.1/508, 387-394; W.M.P. Dunne, 'The United States Frigate *President*: The Victor or the Vanquished?', Robert W. Love Jr., Laurie Bogle Brian VanDeMark and Maochun Yu, eds., *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Eleventh Naval History Symposium, October 21-23, 1993* (Annapolis, Md, 2001), 85

*President*'s keel was damaged when she was forced onto a sand bar as she tried to make her escape.<sup>240</sup> At about 5:00 a.m., Hayes spotted Decatur's ship, and pursued her with the *Majestic*, *Endymion*, and *Pomone* (the *Tenedos* hadn't received the signal to pursue).<sup>241</sup> In many ways, the situation was almost identical to that of the *Belvedira* and *Constitution* at the start of the war, with both ships attempting to escape from a pursuing squadron. Unfortunately for Decatur, his ship was able to evade all but Captain Hope's ship, the *Endymion*, which closed in rapidly on her prey.<sup>242</sup> Hope's ship was not one of the light 38-gun frigates armed with 18-pounder cannons that had gone up against the American 44's before, but a 44-gun frigate armed with 24-pounder cannons, which made her a far more suitable match for the powerful American ship than either the *Guerrière* or *Macedonian*. For most of the day, the *President* and *Endymion* fought each other at long range, until around 4:00 p.m., when Hope got his ship close enough to fire a full broadside that caused Decatur's ship considerable damage to her rigging and sails and compelled him to fight it out. By comparison, the *President*'s return fire did very little damage.<sup>243</sup> The two ships continued their duel, with the American ship decidedly having

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<sup>240</sup> Hayes to Hotham, January 17, 1815, Adm.1/508, 387-394; Dunne, 'Victor or the Vanquished?' 84

<sup>241</sup> Hayes to Hotham, January 17, 1815, Adm.1/508, 387-394; Dunne, 'Victor or the Vanquished?' 86

<sup>242</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. 'Henry Hope'. Sir Henry Hope was born in 1787, and entered the navy in 1800 on board the *Kent*, commanded by his cousin Captain W.J. Hope. He later served on the *Swiftsure*, and was taken prisoner when the ship was captured in 1801. He was eventually released and returned to service on the frigate *Leda* in 1804, where he earned his promotion to lieutenant. He was present during the capture of the Cape of Good Hope, and made commander of the sloop *Espoir* in 1806. He served for the next six years in the Mediterranean, until he was given command of the *Endymion* in 1813 and transferred to the North American station. He achieved his greatest success in 1815 with the capture of the 44-gun frigate USS *President*, as the *Endymion* was most responsible for her capture. He was later promoted to rear-admiral in 1846, vice-admiral in 1858, and died on September 23, 1863.

<sup>243</sup> Hayes to Hotham, January 17, 1815, ADM.1/508, p.387-394; Dunne, 87-91

the worst of it. However, the *President*'s gunners did considerable damage to the *Endymion*'s sails and rigging, and also succeeded in destroying all of her small boats, which would prevent Hope from taking possession of the *President*. What followed next has been the subject of much debate. Hope's ship was forced astern of the American frigate after 8:00 p.m. to repair her sails, which had been completely shot away.<sup>244</sup> He later claimed that he stopped to make repairs because he believed that the American frigate had struck her flag.<sup>245</sup> Regardless, it gave Decatur the opportunity to slip away. However, at 11:15 p.m., the *Pomone* arrived on the scene and, believing the *President* was still active, fired a full broadside at her. Decatur surrendered his ship, but insisted on presenting his sword to Hope, to whom he claimed he struck his flag.<sup>246</sup> Three days later, Decatur wrote his account to the Navy Department and claimed that he had defeated the *Endymion* before being forced to surrender.<sup>247</sup> Then on January 30, Decatur again confirmed that he had surrendered to the *Endymion*, probably because he did not want to see any credit given to Captain Lumley of the *Pomone*, who fired the last (and needless) salvo into the beaten American ship.<sup>248</sup> In any case, the action cost the *Endymion* eleven

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<sup>244</sup> Hayes to Hotham, January 17, 1815, Adm.1/508, 387-394; Dunne, 'Victor or the Vanquished?' 91-94

<sup>245</sup> Hayes to Hotham, January 17, 1815, Adm.1/508, 387-394; Dunne, 'Victor or the Vanquished?' 92

<sup>246</sup> Hayes to Hotham, January 17, 1815, Adm.1/508, 387-394; Dunne, 'Victor or the Vanquished?' 93

<sup>247</sup> Dunne, 'Victor or the Vanquished?' 94

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.



killed and fourteen wounded, while the *President* lost thirty-five killed and seventy wounded, a testament to the severe pounding she took.<sup>249</sup>

Although it is true that there were four ships chasing after the *President*, this battle should definitely be considered as a single-frigate action, and could best be declared a draw. By the end of the month, the *President* sailed into Bermuda under British colors, with a reception to match that of the *Chesapeake* entering Halifax Harbor.<sup>250</sup> The arrival coincided with news that a peace treaty had been signed ending the war, which made the celebrations doubly enjoyable.

Though the peace treaty was signed on December 24, 1814, the war would continue on the high seas for another three months. Between October and December, the squadron accounted for fourteen privateers and armed vessels, sixty-six merchant ships, and would recapture another twelve British ships.<sup>251</sup> Yet despite achieving successes like the capture of the *President*, the squadron ended the war on a few sour notes. The sloops *Peacock* and *Hornet* escaped from their confinement in New York on January 22 to make one more foray against British shipping.<sup>252</sup> The *Sylph* was wrecked on Southampton Bar on January 17.<sup>253</sup> The *St. Lawrence* fell to the privateer *Chasseur* (24) on February 26.<sup>254</sup> The squadron also lost one the same day the veteran frigate *Statira*, which met her end on

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<sup>249</sup> Hayes to Hotham, January 17, 1815, Adm.1/508, 387-394; Dunne, 'Victor or the Vanquished?' 92. Dunne claims that the *Endymion* suffered sixteen wounded.

<sup>250</sup> Henry Wilkinson, *Bermuda From Sail to Steam*, 1:350-352

<sup>251</sup> See Appendix A for list of ships captured in this period. This does not include the ships captured by the *Severn* between October 1 and March 25, 1815.

<sup>252</sup> Hotham to Cochrane, February 12, 1815, Adm.1/508, 416

<sup>253</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 33:231-232

<sup>254</sup> Clowes, *History of the Royal Navy*, 5:555

the small island of Ineague off Cuba.<sup>255</sup> Captain Swaine would face a court-martial for the loss of his ship. The court took into account that the small island was not found on any of the published charts, and Swaine could not know of the dangers of its shores. As a result, he was fully acquitted.<sup>256</sup>

It is somewhat fitting that the final operations by the North American Squadron should involve the man who was undoubtedly its ablest commander during the war, Sir George Cockburn. He was supposed to have led the diversionary attack along the Georgia coast designed to lure American forces away from the Gulf. Unfortunately, by the time he began his preparations, it was too late, as the Americans were able to divine the British plans for New Orleans. Nevertheless, he intended to proceed with the operation. He sailed from Port Royal on November 28 to collect the colonial marines, as well as Captain Barrie's division from the Chesapeake, and bring them down to Cumberland Island off the Georgia coast. He had the *Dragon*, *Rota*, *Lacedemonian*, *Severn*, *Hebrus*, *Regulus*, *Ceylon*, *Primrose*, *Terror*, *Devastation*, *Canso* and *Whiting*, along with the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiments of Royal Marines and two companies of the West Indian Regiment.<sup>257</sup> He asked Cochrane for more army troops, but the latter told him he had none to spare, and would have to use his marines to carry the load.<sup>258</sup>

Cockburn's target was the great southern bastion off the American smuggling trade, Amelia Island. Barrie arrived there on January 10, 1815, and led the attack on the fort at

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<sup>255</sup> Cochrane to Croker, April 6, 1815, Adm.1/508, 273

<sup>256</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 33:434-435

<sup>257</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, January 14, 1815, Adm.1/508, 166-173

<sup>258</sup> Brown, *Amphibious Operations*, 171

Point Petre three days later, with over 700 troops and marines.<sup>259</sup> The fort was easily taken, and he moved up to St. Mary on January 14, which also offered no resistance.<sup>260</sup> Cockburn himself only arrived on the scene on January 15, as the *Albion* had been blown off course by a severe gale.<sup>261</sup> He established a base on Cumberland Island, and prepared further incursions up St. Mary's River in February. On of these attacks was beaten back on February 22, costing the British four killed and twenty-five wounded.<sup>262</sup> Undaunted, Cockburn awaited for more troops to arrive to help him go after Savannah, but he received word on February 25 of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent. With this information, Cockburn withdrew his force to Bermuda.<sup>263</sup>

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<sup>259</sup> Cockburn to Cochrane, January 14, 1815, Adm.1/508, 166-173

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

## CONCLUSION

It took several months after the signing of the peace treaty before the news reached all combatants. Ironically, some of the war's more dramatic battles occurred after it was signed. Unfortunately for the British, most of these were American victories. While they could rejoice in having finally succeeded in capturing one of the American 44-gun frigates, the debacle at New Orleans did more than offset its effect. Even at sea the British could not claim the laurels of the war's final battle. On February 20, the *Constitution* encountered the corvette HMS *Cyane* (32) and sloop *Levant* (18). The American frigate succeeded in capturing both vessels.<sup>1</sup> The 50-gun ships *Newcastle*, *Leander*, and frigate *Acasta* arrived on the scene after the battle, and would eventually recapture the *Levant*, but it was still a most embarrassing defeat for the Royal Navy.<sup>2</sup> This was followed on March 23, 1815, with the sloop USS *Hornet* sinking the British sloop *Penguin* (18) off the island of Tristan-d'Acunha.<sup>3</sup>

The treaty itself caused some controversy, as both sides had absolutely nothing to show after more than thirty months of fighting. They both agreed to maintain the *status quo ante bellum*, with the borders remaining intact until future negotiations.

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<sup>1</sup> William Clowes, *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present*, 7 vols. (London, 1897-1903), 6:169-173; William James, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV*, 6 vols. (London, 1847), 5:173, 6:371-373; Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power In Its Relations to the War of 1812*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1905) 2:404-406; Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812*, (Annapolis, Md., 1987), 372-381. There have been various conflicting reports as to the official designation and strength of the *Cyane*. James lists her as a sloop of twenty-six guns, while most other sources describe her as a light frigate or corvette carrying thirty-two guns, making her considerably smaller than the average British 38-gun frigate, which had half as many more guns than the *Cyane*.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. The *Levant* was recaptured at Puerto Rico despite the protection of neutrality.

<sup>3</sup> James, *Naval History of Great Britain*, 6:383-386

Some believed that the British commissioners at Ghent were too lenient in dealing with the Americans. Most Britons considered the United States as the aggressor in the conflict. They tried to conquer Canada and failed, and were completely on the defensive when the war ended. Unfortunately, the British aims outlined by Castlereagh were also not achieved. Thanks to Prevost's setback at Plattsburgh and the failure to capture Baltimore, the British delegates became more cautious. Lord Bathurst ordered them to give up the British demands for Eastern Maine in exchange for the evacuation of Fort Erie and Fort Malden.<sup>4</sup> No less a personage than the Duke of Wellington suggested the government lessen its demands in exchange for an immediate peace.<sup>5</sup> He believed a treaty that left the borders unchanged would serve Britain best in the long run, and he would ultimately be proven correct.<sup>6</sup> Apart from a few war scares in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, Britain and the United States never again resorted to war to settle their disputes. One wonders what might have happened to Anglo-American relations had the British pursued Castlereagh's goals more vigorously. After all, it was Prussia's insistence on keeping Alsace-Lorraine that drove France towards a war of revenge, which it fulfilled forty years later. The commissioners at Ghent prevented either country from feeling humiliated, and laid the groundwork towards a better understanding between the two nations.

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<sup>4</sup> Henry Adams, *A History of the United States During the Administration of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison*, 9 vols. (New York, 1891-1896) 9:33-35

<sup>5</sup> Mahan, *War of 1812*, 2:430-431

<sup>6</sup> A.L. Burt, *The United States, Great Britain and North America: From the Beginning of the Establishment of Peace After the War of 1812* (New York, 1961), 362-363; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 2:430-431

Griffith received word in Halifax of the ratification of the peace treaty from Mr. Baker on February 18, 1815.<sup>7</sup> He immediately dispatched several ships to bring the news to the other squadrons. The *Tamar* was sent to Rio and the Cape of Good Hope, the *Arab* to Barbados and Jamaica, the *Kangaroo* to Gibraltar, and the *Furieuse* to Spithead.<sup>8</sup> He also received a letter from the Admiralty informing him that he was to succeed Cochrane as commander of the North American Squadron.<sup>9</sup> Cochrane later sent word for Griffith to join him in Bermuda at the end of March to assume his new command.<sup>10</sup>

Griffith's squadron would be reduced considerably following the end of the American war. In January, 1815, the North American and Newfoundland Squadrons together had stood at nineteen ships-of-the-line, three 50-gun ships, fifty frigates, twenty-one brigs, thirteen schooners and smaller vessels, and three bomb ships, bringing it to 109 warships of all sizes.<sup>11</sup> By July, this decreased to two ships-of-the-line, three 50-gun ships, thirteen frigates, eleven sloops, ten brigs, one cutter, one bomb ship, and eight schooners and smaller ships, totaling forty-nine ships.<sup>12</sup> The squadron's ships began to depart from the North American station shortly after the ratification of the peace treaty. Hotham left New London with the bulk of his squadron (*Superb*,

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<sup>7</sup> Griffith to Croker, March 15, 1815, Adm.1/508, 473-474

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Cochrane to Croker, March 24, 1815, Adm.1/509, 48-49

<sup>11</sup> *Steele's Original and Correct List of the Royal Navy*, January, 1815, 28. Steel unfortunately did not divide the two squadrons separately, but it can be safely assumed that the bulk of the ships were assigned to the North American Squadron.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 30

*Saturn, Junon, Pactolus, Nimrod, and Dispatch*) on March 11, and arrived at Spithead on March 27.<sup>13</sup> He left behind the *Majestic, Endymion, Forth, Pomone, Narcissus, Tenedos* and their newest addition, HMS *President*, at Bermuda. Following his arrival to the island, Griffith also ordered the *Tenedos, Spencer, Bacchante, Leander, Newcastle* and *Acasta* to return to England.<sup>14</sup> Cockburn departed from North American station around the same time. He sailed with the *Albion, Asia, Havoc* and *Peruvian*, and arrived at Spithead on May 4.<sup>15</sup> As for Cochrane, he left Bermuda on April 23 with the *Tonnant, Menelaus, Bramble, Sophie* and *Anna Maria*, and arrived in England on May 19.<sup>16</sup> Before the year was over, the squadron would be reduced to its pre-1812 size.

Part of the reason for the immediate recall of the North American Squadron's ships was due to the news that Napoleon had escaped from Elba on March 1 and returned triumphantly as Emperor of France. The British were therefore lucky to have signed the Treaty of Ghent when they did, as they could again devote their navy's full strength against the French.<sup>17</sup> Fortunately, this was no interlude like the Peace of Amiens in 1802, as Napoleon's return to power would last until his final defeat at Waterloo on June 18. It is curious to note that 1815 was the last year in which Britain would fight a war against both France and the United States.

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<sup>13</sup> Hotham to Croker, March 27, 1815, Adm.1/508, 446-447

<sup>14</sup> Griffith to Croker, March 27, 1815, Adm.1/509, 74-75

<sup>15</sup> Cockburn to Croker, May 4, 1815, Adm.1/509, 82; *Naval Chronicle*, 33:431

<sup>16</sup> Cochrane to Croker, May 19, 1815, ADM.1/509, 206

<sup>17</sup> *Steele's Original and Correct List*, January 1815, 28, and July 1815, 30. In January 1815, the Royal Navy had 201 warships operating in North America and the West Indies, and 168 warships in European waters. By July, the numbers for North America and the West Indies were 103 warships and 180 in Europe and the Mediterranean, with scores more being refitted and repaired.

Between June 20, 1812 and March 31, 1815, the ships of the North American Squadron captured or destroyed forty-six United States Navy warships and gunboats (as well as one French frigate), 122 privateers and letters-of-marque, and 1043 merchant ships (plus an additional seventy-six neutral vessels), and recaptured 131 British merchant ships. This was achieved at a loss of twenty-one of its warships, although only seven were due to enemy action.<sup>18</sup> These figures prove that the squadron acquitted itself quite well in this conflict. And though the blockade along the American coast was far from complete, its impact on the economy of the Atlantic states was devastating.<sup>19</sup> American warships and privateers did cause considerable damage to British trade, but this was only because British merchant ships were the only ones that could still be found on the high seas.<sup>20</sup> By contrast, the majority of American merchant ships lost to the squadron were found in the small harbors and rivers along their coast. American

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<sup>18</sup> Patrick Crowhurst, *The French War on Trade: Privateering 1793-1815* (Brookfield, Conn., 1989), 31; Mahan, *War of 1812*, 2:220; Jerome R. Garitee, *The Republic's Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812* (Middletown, Conn., 1977), 244; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London, 1976), 140-141; Faye Kert, *Research In Maritime History 11: Prize and Prejudice-Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812* (St. John's, Nfld, 1997), 135-137; Jack Mahon, *The War of 1812* (Gainesville, Fla., 1972), 256, 385. The British claimed to have lost sixteen warships in combat with American ships during the war, and estimates of British merchant ship losses have ranged from 1300 to 2500 ships. By comparison, the British also claimed to have taken thirty-four warships from the United States Navy outside of the Great Lakes, along with 1400 American merchant ships. Jerome Garitee, using figures compiled from *Niles' Register*, calculated that the war cost England an average of thirty-three ships per month, worth \$40 million, or three times the value of American losses. Kennedy estimated that throughout the 1793-1815 period, 11,000 British merchant ships were lost. Although a substantial figure, Crowhurst claims that it represented only 2.5 % of Britain's commercial fleet.

<sup>19</sup> Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana and Chicago, 1989), 229. By contrast, the western American states saw considerable economic growth during the war, and cities such as Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Louisville, Lexington and St. Louis enjoyed a booming prosperity during this period.

<sup>20</sup> Robert Gardiner, ed., *The Naval War of 1812* (London, 1998), 16, 28. The overall impact of the American guerre-de-course on British trade has been the subject of much speculation. In 1811, the British merchant fleet totalled 20,478 ships with a weight of 2,247,000 tons, and British imports and exports were valued at £51 million and £40 million respectively. By 1814, despite considerable losses to both British and French raiders, British shipping grew to 21450 ships with a weight of 2,414,000 tons, and British imports and exports grew to £81 million and £71 million respectively.



raiders proved quite bold in attacking British merchantmen in the English Channel and the Irish Sea, but many of them were able to operate freely out of French ports which, after Napoleon's exile to Elba, were no longer being blockaded by the Royal Navy. None of the American raiders dared to sail up and attack British shipping in the Thames. One would be hard-pressed to find better example of audacity than Captain Gordon's raid on Alexandria in 1814, near the very heart of the American capitol.

Despite this obvious record of success, the North American Squadron and the Royal Navy as a whole received far more criticism than praise for its actions in the War of 1812. It is true that several mistakes were made during the war. Most of the British leaders were blind to the United States' intentions to go to war until it was too late. Sawyer himself might have been able to ascertain their intentions, but was ordered to ensure there was no repeat on the *Chesapeake-Leopard* or *President-Little Belt* incidents, and kept his ships at a safe distance from the American coast. This gave the Americans the freedom to move their warships and privateers at the start of the war without being detected by the Royal Navy, enabling them to inflict considerable damage in the early phase of the war. And while Warren may not have been the best choice to place at the helm of the enlarged squadron, he received little help from the Admiralty. Their decision to unite the North American, Leeward Islands and Jamaica squadrons may have seemed good on paper, but it only created an unwieldy command. They sent Warren conflicting orders, berating him (and Cockburn) for trying to follow his original orders to reach a peaceful settlement, and were quite slow in sending him sufficient reinforcements. Even Cochrane could accuse the Admiralty of interfering with the original plans for the New Orleans campaign. But Warren was also the victim

of circumstances beyond his control. Up until 1814, the squadron had to ensure the continued flow of American supplies to the Maritimes, the West Indies and to Wellington's army in Spain. Hundreds of licensed American ships were allowed to sail without fear of reprisal from British warships. Warren also to contend with the forces of nature, as the two hurricanes that struck Halifax and Bermuda in 1813 caused enormous damage to the two bases. Warren did have the right idea of a "flying army" that could land and attack anywhere in the Chesapeake, but the war in Spain demanded the bulk of the British Army's available manpower, and the number of troops he had available, limited how much damage he could realistically inflict. That the British were able to capture Washington in 1814 with only 4000 troops was more a reflection of incompetence on the part of the American commanders, in their inability to erect proper defenses for their capitol, than of British skill. And although the smaller raids in the region were successful for the most part, they brought little glory to the squadron.

The primary criticism against the Royal Navy was in its performance against American warships. In the first six months of the War of 1812 the navy lost three consecutive frigate duels to the Americans, and would lose another half-dozen engagements between sloops of approximately equal strength. Before the American war it was a rare occurrence for a British ship to come out on the losing end of a single-ship battle, but against the American Navy it was almost the norm. In twelve battles between warships of approximately equal strength, the British would be defeated in all but two of them. To lose to a navy they regarded with nothing but contempt in both quantity and quality was a most severe shock to Britons everywhere. It was almost impossible for British pride to accept that the American ships and their crews were every bit as

good, and sometimes even better than their own. The *Shannon's* victory over the *Chesapeake* was celebrated with almost the same fervor as Trafalgar, and it seemed the entire nation breathed a collective sigh of relief. The American frigate victories in particular should not have come as such a surprise, as it was simply a case of the more powerful American ships defeating weaker opponents. What was especially galling was that in all three battles the British frigates did very little damage in return to the Americans. By the time the war ended, many Britons felt that the Americans had not been paid back for the humiliations inflicted on the Royal Navy. One editorial in the *Naval Chronicle* stated:

The events of the war with America, now perhaps about to close, afford much cause for reflection, none for exultation, to those who are interested in the success and prosperity of their country. Only three years ago we despised this new enemy so much, as to content ourselves with sending out two frigates as a reinforcement, and even when war was declared two line-of-battle ships were deemed amply sufficient, in addition to the very slender force then on the station. How very differently we estimate their strength now, from our having during the last twelve months employed on their shores a force of fifteen to twenty sail of the line, double that number of large frigates, perhaps altogether one hundred sail of men of war, and with all this truly formidable force, commanded by able and experienced officers, it cannot be pretended we have made any great impression on the enemy. It is true their ships have been blockaded in port, but they have waited their opportunity and have obtained it. One of their squadrons at the time I write (is) known to be cruising in the chops of the English Channel.

Fortunately there were several (British) sail of the line and frigates preparing for sea, sent out in quest of this bold and successful enemy with as little delay as possible. I sincerely hope one of these (squadrons) has the good fortune to fall in with (the American squadron), and the glory of conducting them into a British port. We want something of this kind to reconcile the minds of the people and of the navy to the many reverses we have sustained during the American war, and to a termination of it, without our having been able to assert our wonted naval superiority.<sup>21</sup>

This opinion was shared in another editorial:

I cannot say but I have read with much regret the animadversions in the (*Naval Chronicle*) on the American war, in which I am very far from agreeing. And although a

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<sup>21</sup> *Naval Chronicle* 33:221-222

treaty of peace has been signed at Ghent by the commissioners, for the honor of Britain I should not be sorry if the American President or Congress were to refuse the ratification.

Much as I love peace, and might be benefited by its influence, I do not think the present moment the most favorable for the future interests of Great Britain. The present state of naval combats has assumed such an appearance in the eyes of America, and in those of our long and irreconcilable enemies across the Channel, and in those of all enemies of our maritime greatness, that if the impression be not done away, by the hostile vessels being more nearly matched than hitherto, before the cessation of hostilities, it may and most probably will lay the foundation for a future combination to wrest from the British Isles the Trident of the Ocean.<sup>22</sup>

The general impression of the times suggests that most Britons felt the war should have been fought to a more successful resolution. Much of the blame was laid at the Admiralty's door, particularly for their slow reaction to the American threat:

Had but common energy been applied, had the war been conducted with any sort of activity in the beginning of the contest, had but two or three sail of the line been pushed out immediately, with two or three thousand troops, it is not to be denied that the whole of the American men of war might have been destroyed in port. They would have accomplished in 1812 what in 1814 was found impossible with three times that force to attempt.

Unfortunately the time is now past; we must sit down to enjoy the sweets of peace, conscious of having suffered defeat, and lost reputation in an inglorious and unsuccessful war, miserably managed and conducted from beginning to end.<sup>23</sup>

A large part of the disappointment came as a result of the battles fought after the peace treaty was signed. While Britons could cheer over the capture of the *President*, they also had to bear the defeats at New Orleans, the loss of the *Penguin* to the *Hornet*, and the *Cyane* and *Levant's* surrender to the *Constitution*. These were less than glorious notes on which to end a war and only helped cement the idea of failure for the British. Also, the popularity of the navy also suffered with comparisons to the army's successes

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 33:127-128

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 33:224-225

in the last war. Wellington became a more popular hero than Nelson, and his victory of Waterloo was for the army what Trafalgar was for the navy.<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, not only did the British win no Trafalgar against the Americans, their defeats on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain constitute the only fleet battles the Royal Navy lost during the entire 1793-1815 period.

With regards to the British war effort, historians have usually given most of their praise to the British and Canadian defenders of Lower and Upper Canada, with the navy getting little in return. As a result, the armchair admirals have failed to notice the successes the squadron did achieve. Apart from the amphibious operations mounted and ships it captured, it was able to, even with a partial blockade, neutralize American trade during the course of the war, resulting in the crippling of their economy. In his examination of the British blockade of the American coast, Wade Dudley has shown that the Royal Navy could have done more to help their cause by enforcing a much stronger blockade along the American coast, and that operations in the Chesapeake were wasteful. This was beyond the resources of the Royal Navy, as the bulk of its ships were tied down in Europe. But even with three times as many ships available to blockade the French coast, it proved impossible to stop the French privateer menace, which waged an effective *guerre-de-course* right up to the end of the war. American raiders did considerable damage to British trade, although it was nowhere near as devastating as it was during the American Revolution. But the side effects of even this partial blockade came close to bringing about the dissolution of the United States. Madison's embargo of December 1813 was viewed with much hostility in New

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<sup>24</sup> C.J. Bartlett, *Great Britain and Sea Power 1815-1853* (Oxford, 1963), 14-15

England. It was the last straw for many New England Federalists, and the Hartford Convention of 1814 revealed deep divisions in the Union.<sup>25</sup>

The purpose of this work was to give an account of the North American Squadron from the *Chesapeake-Leopard* affair to the end of the War of 1812, to show role it played in the protection of England's colonies and trade during this period. It also showed that this station was of secondary importance to the British government while they were at war with France. After the French threat was ended, the government could have unleashed a mighty force against the United States, but chose to instead economize and begin to cut down on expenses, and opted for a more limited campaign, reaffirming the importance of the station in the grand scheme of things.

This work has also shown the evolution of the squadron from its creation during the War of the Austrian Succession, through the Seven Years' War, the American Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Much of the push for the creation of this squadron came from the American colonists, who lived under the constant shadow of the French threat from Canada. The Seven Years' War was that rare occurrence when the North American station was the primary theatre for England, where she sent the bulk of her resources, and where she won her greatest victory. The North American Squadron became a permanent command during this war, and gave invaluable support to the conquest of Canada. However, during the American Revolution, the squadron's usefulness was seriously hampered, as it was unable to contain American privateer activity or stop the French from helping the colonies in their struggle. Fiscal priorities

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<sup>25</sup> For an account of the Hartford Convention, see J.C.A. Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War : Politics, Diplomacy and Warfare in the Early American Republic 1783-1830* (Princeton, N.J., 1983), 469-483

and a general lack of understanding on the part of the British government on how to deal with a colonial conflict, as well as England's isolation in Europe, resulted in the loss of the thirteen colonies, and presented her with a new potential enemy on the American continent.

The events prior to the War of 1812 show that it may not have been as active as other theatres, but the squadron was far from inactive. Some, like C.S. Forester, have written that the Royal Navy's so-called poor performance during the war was because it fell into a state of complacency over its naval supremacy after Trafalgar.<sup>26</sup> The North American station may not have been active as the Jamaica or Leeward Islands squadrons prior to the War of 1812, but it was far from idle. The blockade of the Chesapeake, the Martinique campaign, and the numerous engagements against French, Spanish and even Dutch warships are a testament to this fact. Yet in the eyes of the British government, its most important role was in ensuring that the flow of supplies, especially foodstuffs, from the United States was not interrupted. This enabled hundreds of American merchant ships from New England to sail in safety, and denied the squadron's ships of countless potential prizes. Without these supplies of food, the success of Wellington's Peninsular War is very much in doubt, and the British leaders made it perfectly clear that this was the primary theatre of England's war.

Though they may have lost more single-ship engagements than the American Navy, and American raiders certainly captured and destroyed more English merchant ships, the fact remains that the North American Squadron was able to turn the tide in favor of the British. They were able to attack the American coast at will, causing

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<sup>26</sup> C.S. Forester, *The Age of Fighting Sail: The Story of the Naval War of 1812* (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), 39-41

considerable damage to American property and morale in the Chesapeake alone. And with the exception of the opening months of the war, during which time they won their three frigate engagements, the American Navy was rarely able to operate at sea in large numbers at any one time. The British may have been repulsed at Baltimore and New Orleans, but the fact remains that the United States was clearly on the defensive by the time the war ended. This is hardly a testament to failure. Yet because the squadron failed to crush the American Navy as Nelson had crushed the fleets of France, Spain and Denmark, and because the peace better reflected a draw than a victory, the stigma of failure was attached to the Royal Navy in this war. In the end, the men who served in the North American Squadron could be proud of their achievements, but received little glory for their efforts.



## APPENDIX A: SHIPS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED BY THE NORTH AMERICAN SQUADRON 1807-1815.

Note: for the column "where sent", it must be noted that many of the captured vessels were released by the Vice-Admiralty Courts in Halifax and Bermuda. The ships listed as "destroyed" covers those vessels whose destruction was brought about as a result of encounters with the ships of the squadron, and include those ships that scuttled themselves. The term "tender" refers to ships that were captured and put into immediate service by the squadron before being sent to a prize court. In the "vessel seized" category, the ships with 'unknown' as names refers either to ships that had no proper names or were destroyed before they could be identified.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Vessel seized (nationality)</u>	<u>Capturing H.M. Ships</u>	<u>Where sent</u>
Jan.21, 1807	Brig MARY (U.S.)	CLEOPATRA	Bermuda
Jan.31, 1807	Ship CALLIOPE (U.S.)	MELAMPUS	Bermuda
Feb.2, 1807	Ship APOLLO (U.S.)	MELAMPUS	Bermuda
Feb.7, 1807	Ship BALTIC (France)	INDIAN	Bermuda
March 5, 1807	Ship DESTINY(U.S.)	BERMUDA	Bermuda
March 11, 1807	Schooner BETSY AND CHARLOTTE	MILAN	Bermuda
April 11, 1807	Brig JOSEPH (U.S.)	INDIAN	Bermuda
April 18, 1807	Ship COLUMBIA PACKET (U.S.)	CLEOPATRA	Bermuda
April 20, 1807	Sloop RANGER (Spain)	DRIVER	Halifax
April 25, 1807	Ship UPSALA (Spain)	BERMUDA	Bermuda
April 30, 1807	Brig JAMES (U.S.)	CLEOPATRA	Bermuda
May 4, 1807	Ship ELIZA (U.S.)	INDIAN	Bermuda
May 7, 1807	Schooner VENUS (U.S.)	SYLVIA	Bermuda
May 8, 1807	Ship THREE BROTHERS (U.S.)	MELAMPUS	Halifax
May 9, 1807	Ship ARGUS (U.S.)	MELAMPUS	Halifax
May 27, 1807	Ship MESSENGER (U.S.)	MELAMPUS	Halifax
May 27, 1807	Brig AUGUSTA (U.S.)	MELAMPUS/BERMUDA	Bermuda
June 11, 1807	Schooner EUTAW (U.S.)	MELAMPUS/BELLONA	Halifax
June 5, 1807	Privateer Schooner EL BOLADORA (Spain)	DRIVER	Halifax
June 19, 1807	Ship ENTERPRIZE (U.S.)	SYLVIA	Halifax
June 23, 1807	Ship WARREN (U.S.)	SYLVIA	Halifax
Dec.7, 1807	Felucca SACRA FAMINA (Spain)	MELAMPUS	Bermuda
1807	Ship ERIN (U.S.)	LEOPARD	Bermuda
1807	Ship AEMON (U.S.)	SQUIRREL	Halifax
1807	Ship AUSTINE (Spain)	MELAMPUS	Halifax
1807	Ship FAIR AMERICAN (U.S.)	MELAMPUS	Halifax
1807	Ship FELICITY (U.S.)	CLEOPATRA	Halifax
1807	Ship FLY (U.S.)	CLEOPATRA	Halifax
1807	Ship HANNAH (U.S.)	MULLET	Halifax
1807	Ship HENRY (U.S.)	MELAMPUS	Halifax
1807	Ship HERO (U.S.)	HALIFAX	Halifax

1807	Ship JANE (U.S.)	SQUIRREL	Halifax
1807	Ship MARGARET K. BAYLEY (U.S.)	LEOPARD	Halifax
1807	Ship ORIENT (U.S.)	SYLVIA/COLUMBINE	Halifax
1807	Ship UNITED STATES (U.S.)	LEOPARD	Halifax
1807	Ship VENILIA (Spain)	CLEOPATRA	Halifax
Jan. 1808	Brig ELIZA (U.S.)	BERMUDA/CUTTLE	Bermuda
Feb. 11, 1808	Brig MATILDA (U.S.)	BERMUDA	Bermuda
March 1, 1808	Ship SOPHIA MAGDALINA (Sweden)	HORATIO	Bermuda
March 11, 1808	Ship BORDEAUX (U.S.)	HORATIO	Bermuda
March 14, 1808	Ship THAMES (U.S.)	MULLET	Bermuda
May 9, 1808	Felucca ASTRIM (Spain)	MELAMPUS/CARNATION	Bermuda
May 10, 1808	Brig COLUMBIA (U.S.)	MULLET	Bermuda
June 8, 1808	Priv. Schooner LE VOLTIGEUR (France)	PENELOPE	Halifax
June 15, 1808	Felucca N.S. DEL CARMEN (Spain)	PENELOPE/FERRET	Halifax
June 19, 1808	Priv. Schooner JEUNE ESTELLE	INDIAN	Bermuda
July 17, 1808	Priv. Cutter PERATY (France)	GUERRIERE	Halifax
Sept. 17, 1808	Schooner MARY (U.S.)	PENELOPE	Bermuda
Oct. 6, 1808	Priv. Schooner LA BECUNE (France)	FERRET	Barbados
Nov. 9, 1808	Schooner MIDDLETON (U.S.)	FERRET	Bermuda
Dec. 16, 1808	Sloop FABRIC (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Bermuda
Dec. 18, 1808	SLoop JANE (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Bermuda
1808	Ship CATHERINE (Brit./Recapture)	HORATIO	Halifax
1808	Ship CHARLOTTE (U.S.)	BANTERER/MULLET	Halifax
1808	Ship ELENA (U.S.)	BANTERER	Halifax
1808	Ship ELEANOR (U.S.)	GUERRIERE	Halifax
1808	Ship IZETTE (U.S.)	BANTERER	Halifax
1808	Ship LAUREL (U.S.)	BANTERER	Halifax
1808	Ship LENORA (U.S.)	BANTERER	Halifax
1808	Ship MARY (U.S.)	BANTERER	Halifax
1808	Ship SPEEDY (U.S.)	AEOLUS	Halifax
1808	Schooner ELIZA (U.S.)	MULLET	Bermuda
1808	Ship CONCEPTION (Portugal)	BERMUDA	Bermuda
1808	Schooner FRIENDS (Brit./Recapture)	SWIFTSURE	Bermuda
1808	Schooner TODULAPIO (Spain)	MELAMPUS/CARNATION	Unknown
1808	Sloop SAN JOSEF (Spain)	MELAMPUS/CARNATION	Unknown
Jan. 3, 1809	Priv. Sloop PORT LOUIS (France)	HALIFAX	Bermuda
Jan. 3, 1809	Ship JUNON (France)	SWIFTSURE/HALIFAX	Bermuda
Jan. 10, 1809	Ship EAST BATHURST (Brit./Recapture)	ATALANTE	Bermuda
Jan. 16, 1809	National Brig LE COLIBRI (France)	MELAMPUS	Bermuda
Jan. 22, 1809	National Frigate TOPAZE (France)	CLEOPATRA	Barbados
Jan. 31, 1809	Schooner JAMES (U.S.)	HORATIO	Bermuda
Feb. 10, 1809	National Frigate JUNON (France)	HORATIO/LATONA	Bermuda
March 15, 1809	Priv. Schooner LA CAROLINE (France)	HALIFAX	Bermuda
March 15, 1809	Schooner JEUNE ROSE (France)	HUSSAR/FERRET	Bermuda
March 20, 1809	Brig SUNDERMANIA	SWIFTSURE/ATALANTE	Bermuda
March 24, 1809	Schooner LA RIVALE (France)	HUSSAR	Bermuda
March 27, 1809	Priv. Sloop LA FORTUNE (France)	THISTLE	Bermuda
March 27, 1809	Priv. Schooner DOUGAY TROUIN (France)	HUSSAR	Bermuda
April 13, 1809	Brig LA JENNY (France)	EURYDICE	Bermuda

July 6, 1809	National Frigate LA FURIEUSE (France)	BONNE CITOYENNE	Halifax
Dec.13, 1809	National Corvette BEARNAIS (France)	MELAMPUS	Barbados
Dec.29, 1809	Brig SUKEY	JUNIPER	Bermuda
1809	Ship AMERICAN (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
1809	Ship SUSQUEHANNAH (U.S.)	SWIFTSURE	Halifax
Jan.4, 1810	Ship TRITON (U.S.)	HALIFAX	Bermuda
Jan.4, 1810	Ship POWHATAN (U.S.)	HALIFAX	Bermuda
Jan.6, 1810	Schooner SAVAGE (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Bermuda
Jan.29, 1810	Schooner FLY (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Bermuda
Jan.31, 1810	Brig CARAVAN (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Bermuda
Feb.11, 1810	National Schooner HAVIK (Holland)	THISTLE	Bermuda
Feb.21, 1810	National Frigate NECESSITE (France)	HORATIO	Barbados
March 27, 1810	Brig GEORGE (U.S.)	OBSERVATEUR	Bermuda
March 29, 1810	Schooner SPITFIRE (U.S.)	EMULOUS/HALIFAX	Bermuda
April 19, 1810	Schooner EXPERIMENT (U.S.)	CLEOPATRA/ATALANTE	Bermuda
April 22, 1810	Priv. Brig LA JEUNE ESTHER (France)	CLEOPATRA/ATALANTE	Halifax
May 28, 1810	Priv. Ship FANTOME (France)	MELAMPUS/DRIVER	Halifax
1810	Ship CATALINE	ATALANTE	Halifax
1810	Ship HEART OF OAK (U.S.)	EURYDICE/HALIFAX	Halifax
1810	Ship LA MERCEDE (France)	DRIVER/ATALANTE	Halifax
1810	Ship PEGU (U.S.)	GUERRIERE	Halifax
Jan. 9, 1811	Brig STEPHEN (Brit., Recapture)	ATALANTE	Bermuda
March 2, 1811	Brig BRUTUS (U.S.)	COLIBRI/JUNIPER	Bermuda
March 25, 1811	Brig N.S. del CONCEICAO (Spain)	HOLLY	Bermuda
April 5, 1811	Brig CATHERINE (Brit. Recapture)	COLIBRI	Bermuda
April 9, 1811	Brig EMPRESSA (Spain)	LITTLE BELT	Bermuda
May 6, 1811	Schooner SALLY (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
July 7, 1811	Priv. Brig L'ADELLE (France)	EMULOUS	Halifax
July 7, 1811	Brig CERES (PORTUGAL)	EMULOUS	Halifax
Aug.20, 1811	Ship ORION (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Halifax
Aug.20, 1811	Schooner SEVERN (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Halifax
Nov.18, 1811	Schooner MAGDALENA Spain)	COLIBRI	Bermuda
Dec.9, 1811	Schooner SALLY (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Bermuda
1811	Ship DOLPHIN (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
1811	Ship LAUREL (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
1811	Ship MAY ANN (U.S.)	SAPPHIRE	Halifax
1811	Ship MATILDA (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
1811	Ship MILO (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
1811	Ship NEW ORLEANS (U.S.)	GUERRIERE	Halifax
1811	Ship SHADOW (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Halifax
1811	Ship THOMAS WILSON (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Halifax
April 5, 1812	Schooner PERT (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
May 16, 1812	Schooner SUSAN (U.S.)	SHANNON	Bermuda
May 1812	Ship GENERAL BLAKE (Spain)	RECRUIT	Bermuda
June 24, 1812	Brig MALCOLM (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
June 25, 1812	Ship FORTUNE (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax

June 26, 1812	Ship PICKERING (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
June, 1812	Brig AERIAL (Sweden)	RECRUIT	Bermuda
July 6, 1812	Brig MINERVA (U.S.)	AFRICA squadron	Halifax
July 7, 1812	Brig ENTERPRIZE (U.S.)	RINGDOVE	Halifax
July 8, 1812	Brig GEORGE (U.S.)	GUERRIERE	Halifax
July 8, 1812	Brig MARY ELIZABETH (U.S.)	INDIAN	Halifax
July 9, 1812	Barque WILLIAM (U.S.)	INDIAN	Halifax
July 10, 1812	Ship MARQUIS DE SOMMELOS (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
July 11, 1812	Ship OROONOKO (U.S.)	AFRICA squadron	Halifax
July 11, 1812	Brig ILLUMINATOR(U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
July 12, 1812	Schooner LIVELY(U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
July 12, 1812	Schooner TRAVELLER(U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
July 13, 1813	Ship MARIA(U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
July 15, 1812	Brig START (BRIT./RECAP.)	ATALANTE/SPARTAN	Halifax
July 15, 1812	Brig BELLEISLE (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
July 16, 1812	Brig CORDELIA (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
July 16, 1812	Brig U.S.S.NAUTILUS	AFRICA squadron	Halifax
July 16, 1812	Priv. Schooner FAIR TRADER (U.S.)	INDIAN	Halifax
July 16, 1812	Priv. Schooner ACTIVE (U.S.)	SPARTAN	Halifax
July 17, 1812	Schooner NIMROD (Brit./Recap)	PAZ	Halifax
July 17, 1812	Brig GEORGE (U.S.)	EMULOUS/SPARTAN	Halifax
July 17, 1812	Priv. Schooner ARGUS (U.S.)	INDIAN	Halifax
July 17, 1812	Brig MARY(U.S.)	SPARTAN	Halifax
July 18, 1812	Schooner HIRAM (U.S.)	EMULOUS/SPARTAN	Halifax
July 18, 1812	Priv. Sloop ACTRESS (U.S.)	SPARTAN	Halifax
July 18, 1812	Ship MAGNET (U.S.)	RINGDOVE	Halifax
July 18, 1812	Schooner MARTHA (Brit./Recap.)	PAZ	Halifax
July 18, 1812	Schooner ELIZA (Brit./Recap.)	CHUBB	Halifax
July 18, 1812	Brig ANN (Brit./Recap)	CHUBB	Halifax
July 18, 1812	Priv. Schooner FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	PLUMPER	Halifax
July 19, 1812	Ship FANNY (Brit./Recap.)	COLIBRI	Halifax
July 19, 1812	Schooner ROVER (Brit./Recap.)	RINGDOVE	Halifax
July 19, 1812	Ship FOUR SISTERS (U.S.)	RINGDOVE	Halifax
July 19, 1812	Priv. Schooner INTENTION (U.S.)	SPARTAN	Destroyed
July 20, 1812	Brig HESPER (Brit./Recap.)	RINGDOVE	Halifax
July 22, 1812	Brig GEORGE (Brit./Recap.)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
July 22, 1812	Ship MARINER (Brit./Recap.)	COLIBRI	Halifax
July 23, 1812	Schooner MARY ANN (Brit./Recap)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
July 23, 1812	Priv. Sloop GLEANER (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Halifax
July 24, 1812	Sloop LAURA (U.S.)	CUTTLE	Bermuda
July 24, 1812	Priv. Brig CURLEW (U.S.)	ACASTA	Halifax
July 26, 1812	Priv. Ship CATHERINE (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Halifax
July 27, 1812	Ship SYMMETRY (U.S.)	RATTLER	Bermuda
July 27, 1812	Ship YORICK (U.S.)	RATTLER	Bermuda
July 30, 1812	Priv. Brig GOSSAMER (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
July 31, 1812	Schooner TRIM (U.S.)	CUTTLE	Bermuda
July 31, 1812	Schooner ELEANOR (U.S.)	AFRICA squadron	Destroyed
July 31, 1812	Schooner PREVOYANTE (Brit./Recap.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
Aug.1, 1812	Ship ZODIAC (U.S.)	ALPHA	Halifax

Aug.1, 1812	Priv. Schooner POLLY (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SPARTAN	Destroyed
Aug.1, 1812	Priv. Schooner MORNING STAR (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SPARTAN	Destroyed
Aug.3, 1812	Rev.Cutter U.S.S. COMMODORE BARRY	MAIDSTONE/SPARTAN	Halifax
Aug.3, 1812	Priv. Schooner MADISON (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SPARTAN	Halifax
Aug.3, 1812	Priv. Schooner OLIVE (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SPARTAN	Destroyed
Aug.3, 1812	Priv. Schooner SPENCE (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SPARTAN	Destroyed
Aug.4, 1812	Ship CONCORDIA (U.S.)	AFRICA squadron	Halifax
Aug.7, 1812	Brig GRACE (Brit./Recap.)	CHUBB	Halifax
Aug.8, 1812	Ship WHITE OAK (U.S.)	RECRUIT	Bermuda
Aug.8, 1812	Ship CANOWA (U.S.)	RECRUIT	Bermuda
Aug.8, 1812	Priv. Schooner BUCKSKIN (U.S.)	STATIRA/COLIBRI	Halifax
Aug.9, 1812	Priv. Schooner PYTHAGORAS (U.S.)	BREAM	Halifax
Aug.10, 1812	Ship BOLINA (U.S.)	MORGIANA	Halifax
Aug.10, 1812	Schooner UNION LASS (Brit./Recap)	CHUBB	Halifax
Aug.10, 1812	Brig SALLY (Brit./Recap)	MORGIANA	Halifax
Aug.11, 1812	Brig MARY (U.S.)	CUTTLE	Bermuda
Aug.11, 1812	Ship SPARROW (U.S.)	RECRUIT	Bermuda
Aug.11, 1812	Ship HENRY (Brit./Recap)	EMULOUS	Halifax
Aug.11, 1812	Priv. Schooner POLLY (U.S.)	ACASTA/COLIBRI	Halifax
Aug.11, 1812	Brig PRUDENCE (U.S.)	MORGIANA	Halifax
Aug.11, 1812	Priv. Schooner REGULATOR (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Halifax
Aug.11, 1812	Ship SALLY (U.S.)	RECRUIT	Bermuda
Aug.13, 1812	Priv. Schooner DOLPHIN (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SPARTAN	Halifax
Aug.13, 1812	Brig JOHN (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
Aug.13, 1812	Ship APOLLO (Brit./Recap)	STATIRA	Halifax
Aug.14, 1812	Brig UNION (Brit./Recap)	MORGIANA	Halifax
Aug.14, 1812	Priv. Schooner LEWIS (U.S.)	HOPE	Halifax
Aug. 16, 1812	Ship UNION (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
Aug.17, 1812	Ship BAINBRIDGE (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
Aug.17, 1812	Ship EASTERN STAR (U.S.)	AFRICA	Halifax
Aug.17, 1812	Ship WILLIAM (Brit./Recap)	STATIRA	Halifax
Aug.17, 1812	Ship NANCY (Brit./Recap)	STATIRA	Halifax
Aug.18, 1812	Brig RUSSEL (Brit./Recap)	STATIRA	Halifax
Au.19, 1812	Ship OSBOURNE (Brit./Recap)	EMULOUS	Halifax
Aug.19, 1812	Brig PHOEBE (U.S.)	AEOLUS/SHANNON	Halifax
Aug.21, 1812	Priv. Schooner DOLPHIN (U.S.)	COLIBRI/SHANNON	Destroyed
Aug.21, 1812	Brig HARE (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
Aug.21, 1812	Priv. Schooner BUNKER HILL (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
Aug.22, 1812	Ship MONSOON (U.S.)	AEOLUS	Halifax
Aug.23, 1812	Brig ADELINE (Brit./Recap)	STATIRA	Halifax
Aug.23, 1812	Ship MONK (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Halifax
Aug.24, 1812	Ship HONESTAS (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
Aug.24, 1812	Brig LEANDER (Brit./Recap)	ATALANTE	Bermuda
Aug.24, 1812	Ship GOSYPIUM (U.S.)	GOREE	Bermuda
Aug.25, 1812	Priv. Sloop SCIENCE (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
Aug.25, 1812	Barque HENRIETTA (Brit./Recap)	EMULOUS	Halifax
Aug.26, 1812	Schooner PATRIOT (U.S.)	ACASTA	Halifax
Aug.27, 1812	Ship JANE (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
Aug.28, 1812	Ship MERCHANT (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
Aug.28, 1812	Ship GEORGIANA (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
Aug.28, 1812	Ship DORIS (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax

Aug.29, 1812	Ship MERCHANT (U.S.)	STATIRA	Halifax
Aug.30, 1812	Schooner BETSY (U.S.)	ACASTA	Halifax
Aug.30, 1812	Brig SOPHIA (U.S.)	PLUMPER	Halifax
Aug.30, 1812	Brig PRINCE OF AUSTRIAS (Brit./Recap)	STATIRA	Halifax
Sept.2, 1812	Schooner STOCKHOLM (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SPARTAN	Halifax
Sept.2, 1812	Ship PLANTER (Brit./Recap)	SHANNON	Halifax
Sept.3, 1812	Brig ARGO (Brit./Recap)	PLUMPER	Halifax
Sept.4, 1812	Ship ARISTOMENES (U.S.)	SHANNON squadron	Halifax
Sept.4, 1812	Ship BRITANNIA (Brit/Recap)	JUNON	Halifax
Sept.5, 1812	Brig HOWE (Brit/Recap)	PLUMPER	Halifax
Sept.6, 1812	Brig HECTOR (Brit./Recap)	PLUMPER	Halifax
Sept.6, 1812	Brig CHARLES FAUCETT (U.S.)	ACASTA/NYMPHE squad	Halifax
Sept.6, 1812	Ship FABIUS (U.S.)	SHANNON	Halifax
Sept.11, 1812	Schooner FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
Sept.11, 1812	Ship WILLIAM (U.S.)	RECRUIT	Bermuda
Sept.12, 1812	Brig AMBITION (U.S.)	MAID./SPARTAN squad	Halifax
Sept.12, 1812	Schooner HIRAM (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
Sept.15, 1812	Brig LYDIA (U.S.)	ORPHEUS	Bermuda
Sept.16, 1812	Schooner SALLY ANN (U.S.)	STATIRA	Halifax
Sept.17, 1812	Schooner RUMNEY (U.S.)	RATTLER	Destroyed
Sept.17, 1812	Ship MELANTHO (U.S.)	MAID./SPARTAN squad	Halifax
Sept.17, 1812	Brig FEDERAL (U.S.)	ACASTA	Halifax
Sept.21, 1812	Ship DIANA (Brit./Recap)	SAN DOMINGO	Halifax
Sept.21, 1812	Ship ABIGAIL (Brit./Recap)	POICTIERS	Halifax
Sept.21, 1812	Schooner SANTA MARIA (U.S.)	RATTLER	Destroyed
Sept.24, 1812	Ship PACKET (U.S.)	ORPHEUS	Halifax
Sept.25, 1812	Brig ARMISTEAD (U.S.)	RATTLER	Destroyed
Sept.26, 1812	Schooner JOSEPH (U.S.)	RATTLER/SAPPHO	Destroyed
Sept.26, 1812	Schooner CITIZEN (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
Sept.27, 1812	Sloop POLLY (U.S.)	RATTLER/SAPPHO	Destroyed
Oct.1, 1812	Brig ELIJAH (U.S.)	AEOLUS/STATIRA	Halifax
Oct.2, 1812	Ship RANGER (U.S.)	GOREE	Bermuda
Oct.2, 1812	Brig FACTOR (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Bermuda
Oct.2, 1812	Brig HERO (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Bermuda
Oct.5, 1812	Brig PITT (Brit./Recap)	NYMPHE	Halifax
Oct.5, 1812	Brig EL RAYO (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
Oct.11, 1812	Priv. Schooner WILEY RENARD (U.S.)	SHANNON	Halifax
Oct.17, 1812	Schooner BLONDE (Brit./Recap)	ACASTA	Halifax
Oct.18, 1812	Priv. Brig RAPID (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SPARTAN	Halifax
Oct.18, 1812	Sloop U.S.S. WASP	POICTIERS	Bermuda
Oct.18, 1812	Brig H.M.S. FROLIC (Recap)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
Oct.19, 1812	Schooner UNION (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
Oct.21, 1812	Priv. Brig THORN (U.S.)	SHANNON squad.	Halifax
Oct.29, 1812	Brig LITTLE WILLIAM (U.S.)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
Nov.3, 1812	Brig FLY (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
Nov.3, 1812	Ship JAMES (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Bermuda
Nov.3, 1812	Brig ISABELLA (U.S.)	CHILDERS	Bermuda
Nov.3, 1812	Priv. Schooner SNAPPER (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE squad.	Bermuda

Nov.3, 1812	Brig FRIENDSHIP (Brit./Recap)	SHANNON squad.	Bermuda
Nov.3, 1812	Brig LOGAN (U.S.)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
Nov.25, 1812	Priv. Schooner JOSEPH AND MARY(U.S)	NARCISSUS	Bermuda
Nov.25, 1812	Brig EXPERIENCE (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Bermuda
Nov.25, 1812	Ship ELIZA (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Bermuda
Nov.25, 1812	Ship REBECCA (U.S.)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
Dec.4, 1812	Priv. Schooner REVENGE (U.S.)	PAZ	Halifax
Dec.11, 1812	Ship NANCY (U.S.)	TARTARUS/CHILDERS	Bermuda
Dec.11, 1812	Schooner FARMER'S FANCY (U.S.)	ACASTA	Bermuda
Dec.11, 1812	Schooner FANNY AND MARIA (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Bermuda
Dec.11, 1812	Schooner BETSY (U.S.)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
Dec.11, 1812	Schooner MORNING STAR (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Bermuda
Dec.11, 1812	Ship CYRUS (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Bermuda
Dec.12, 1812	Priv. Brig TULIP (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
Dec.16, 1812	Sloop MARY ANN (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Dec.16, 1812	Brig ADVENTURE (U.S.)	CHILDERS	Bermuda
Dec.16, 1812	Brig ST. AUGUSTINE (Portugal)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Dec.16, 1812	Schooner ENTERPRIZE (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Bermuda
Dec.16, 1812	Schooner CROWN PRINCE (U.S.)	AEOLUS	Bermuda
Dec.16, 1812	Brig DOLPHIN (U.S.)	NIMROD	Bermuda
Dec.19, 1812	Ship BEDFORD (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Destroyed
Dec.26, 1812	Priv. Brig HERALD (U.S.)	POITCTIERS	Bermuda
Dec.27, 1812	Brig HAZARD (U.S.)	SYLPH	Destroyed
Dec.28, 1812	Schooner LUCY (U.S.)	SYLPH	Destroyed
Dec.1812	Ship PEKING (Brit./Recap)	POICTIERS/ACASTA	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Schooner DELACARLIA (Sweden)	SYLPH	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Sloop WINDWARD PLANTER (Brit./Reca)	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Brig RISING HOPE (U.S.)	WANDERER	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Ship VIRGINIA (U.S.)	JUNON	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Schooner EAGLE (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Brig NOCTON (Brit./Recap)	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Schooner INDEPENDENCE (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Brig LITTLE ARNOLD (Brit.)	SOPHIE	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Brig TRINIDAD (Spain)	SYLPH	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Brig FERNANDO (Spain)	TARTARUS	Bermuda
Dec.1812	Priv. Schooner TEAZER (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Jan.5, 1813	Priv. Schooner SHEPHERD (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Bermuda
Jan.9, 1813	Priv. Schooner HIGH FLYER(U.S.)	POICTIERS/ACASTA	Halifax
Jan.9, 1813	Schooner POLLY MERRICK (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Bermuda
Jan.17, 1813	Schooner TROPIC (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Jan.17, 1813	Schooner SALOMA (U.S.)	TARTARUS	Bermuda
Jan.17, 1813	Schooner LADY HAMILTON (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Jan.17, 1813	Brig CAROLINE (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Jan.17, 1813	Ship LYDIA (U.S.)	POICTIERS/ACASTA	Bermuda
Jan.17, 1813	Ship ELIZA (Brit./Recap)	MAIDSTONE/JUNON	Bermuda
Jan.17, 1813	Schooner GEORGE WASHINGTON(U.S.)	SOPHIE	Bermuda
Jan.17, 1813	Schooner GUSTAF ADOLPH (Sweden)	RAMILLIES/VICTORIOUS	Bermuda
Jan.17, 1813	Brig U.S.S. VIPER	NARCISSUS	Bermuda

Jan.18, 1813	Schooner AMERICAN EAGLE (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Jan.1813	Schooner RHODA (U.S.)	POICTIERS/ACASTA	Bermuda
Jan.1813	Ship REPUBLICAN (Haiti)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Jan.1813	Brig RESOLUTION (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/VICTORIOUS	Bermuda
Jan.1813	Brig SAVANNAH PACKET (U.S.)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
Jan.1813	Brig POLLY (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Jan.1813	Schooner JAMES (U.S.)	JUNON	Bermuda
Jan.1813	Sloop COLUMBIA (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
Jan.1813	Schooner BELLONA (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Feb.1, 1813	Schooner HERKIMER (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Feb.1, 1813	Schooner HOPE (U.S.)	LAURENSTINUS	Bermuda
Feb.1, 1813	Schooner UNITY (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Feb.1, 1813	Schooner ELIZABETH (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Feb.1, 1813	Ship HEBE (Brit./Recap.)	SHANNON/NYPHE	Bermuda
Feb.1, 1813	Brig GOVERNOR ANKERHEIM (Sweden)	RAMILLIES/VICTORIOUS	Bermuda
Feb.1, 1813	Schooner SPENCER (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squadron	Destroyed
Feb.2, 1813	Brig BAROSSA (Brit./Recap.)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
Feb.5, 1813	Ship RESOLUTION (U.S.)	AEOLUS/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Feb.6, 1813	Brig GUBBEN (Sweden)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
Feb.6, 1813	Priv. Ship JOHN (U.S.)	PERUVIAN	Bermuda
Feb.7, 1813	Schooner LUCRETIA (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Destroyed
Feb.7, 1813	Sloop HENRY (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Destroyed
Feb.8, 1813	Schooner HANNAH AND SALLY (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Destroyed
Feb.8, 1813	Priv. Schooner LOTTERY (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
Feb.8, 1813	Schooner PHILIP (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
Feb.10, 1813	Ship ELIZA (U.S.)	AEOLUS/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Feb.10, 1813	Ship ROSE (U.S.)	AEOLUS/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Feb.14, 1813	Priv. Schooner CORA (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
Feb.15, 1813	Schooner SCYRON (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
Feb.17, 1813	Brig GUSTAVIA (U.S.)	CHILDERS	Bermuda
Feb.17, 1813	Brig SARAH (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Halifax
Feb.18, 1813	Ship JACOB GETTING (U.S.)	AEOLUS/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Feb.18, 1813	Ship CISNOS (Spain)	SAN DOMINGO/Dragon	Bermuda
Feb.19, 1813	Sloop ARCTURUS (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
Feb.21, 1813	Brig ELIZABETH (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squadron	Bermuda
Feb.22, 1813	Ship ST.MICHAEL (U.S.)	STATIRA	Bermuda
Feb.23, 1813	Schooner MARINER (U.S.)	STATIRA	Bermuda
Feb.24, 1813	Ship ELIZABETH (U.S.)	AEOLUS/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Feb.24, 1813	Schooner HANNAH (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squadron	Bermuda
Feb.24, 1813	Brig CIOADE DE LISBOA (Portugal)	Chesapeake Squadron	Bermuda
Feb.25, 1813	Schooner THERESA (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Bermuda
Feb.26, 1813	Schooner TRAVELER (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Destroyed
Feb.26, 1813	Schooner FANNY (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Destroyed
Feb.26, 1813	Schooner SYREN (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Cartel
Feb.26, 1813	Sloop SOLON (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Destroyed
Feb.26, 1813	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Cartel
Feb.28, 1813	Brig GUSTAVUS (Sweden)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
Feb.1813	Sloop (unknown)	SAN DOMINGO	Destroyed
Feb.1813	Barque LEANDER (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Destroyed
Feb.1813	Brig HANOSAND (Sweden)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda



Feb. 1813	Schooner MARY (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Destroyed
Feb. 1813	Brig (unknown) (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Destroyed
March 1, 1813	Schooner STOCKHOLM (Sweden)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
March 1, 1813	Schooner SPRING BIRD (U.S.)	STATIRA	Bermuda
March 1, 1813	Ship PORTSMOUTH (U.S.)	MARTIN	Bermuda
March 2, 1813	Ship FEDERAL JACK (U.S.)	AEOLUS/SOPHIE	Destroyed
March 3, 1813	Pilot-Boat ULYSSES (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Tender
March 3, 1813	Pilot-Boat HORNET (U.S.)	DRAGON	Tender
March 3, 1813	Brig TRITON (U.S.)	STATIRA	Bermuda
March 3, 1813	Schooner CHRISTINA (Sweden)	Chesapeake Squad.	Bermuda
March 4, 1813	Schooner BETSY ANN (U.S.)	FANTOME	Destroyed
March 5, 1813	Schooner HARMONY (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Destroyed
March 6, 1813	Brig JANE (U.S.)	STATIRA	Bermuda
March 6, 1813	Brig PRINCEZA (Portugal)	Chesapeake Squad.	Bermuda
March 9, 1813	Ship LA ANNA (Spain)	AEOLUS/SOPHIE	Bermuda
March 9, 1813	Priv. Schooner SYDNEY (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Bermuda
March 9, 1813	Schooner ALBERT (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Bermuda
March 10, 1813	Schooner MARY (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Destroyed
March 10, 1813	Pilot-Boat FLOWING CANN (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Tender
March 10, 1813	Pilot-Boat (unknown) (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Tender
March 10, 1813	Sloop SINCERITY (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
March 12, 1813	Schooner BONA (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
March 13, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Destroyed
March 13, 1813	Schooner LUCY (U.S.)	RATTLER	Halifax
March 14, 1813	Brig COMMERCE (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Destroyed
March 15, 1813	Sloop GEORGE (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Bermuda
March 15, 1813	Brig LOVE AND UNITY (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
March 15, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
March 16, 1813	Schooner RELIEF (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Destroyed
March 16, 1813	Schooner INDEPENDENT (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Destroyed
March 17, 1813	Sloop NANCY (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Destroyed
March 17, 1813	Pilot-Boat DEFIANCE (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Tender
March 18, 1813	Schooner DASH (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
March 18, 1813	Brig MARY BARRETT (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Destroyed
March 18, 1813	Ship GENERAL KNOX (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Destroyed
March 19, 1813	Schooner NIMBLE (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Bermuda
March 19, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	STATIRA	Bermuda
March 19, 1813	Schooner ACCOMODATION (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Destroyed
March 19, 1813	Brig MASSASOIT (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Bermuda
March 19, 1813	Schooner SALLY (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Destroyed
March 19, 1813	Brig ARMISTA (SPAIN)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
March 20, 1813	Schooner NAUTILUS (U.S.)	STATIRA	Bermuda
March 20, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	MOHAWK	Bermuda
March 22, 1813	Schooner AMAZON (U.S.)	Chesapeake Squad.	Bermuda
March 24, 1813	Schooner TYRO (U.S.)	LAURENSTINUS	Bermuda
March 25, 1813	Sloop ALERT (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Bermuda
March 25, 1813	Ship JEFFERSON (U.S.)	ORPHEUS/ATALANTE	Bermuda
March 25, 1813	Sloop REVENUE (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
March 25, 1813	Sloop MARGARET (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Destroyed
March 26, 1813	Priv. Ship VOLANTE (U.S.)	LA HOGUE/VALIANT	Halifax

March 27, 1813	Ship MONTESQUIEU (U.S.)	PAZ	Ransom
March 27, 1813	Schooner FEMALE (U.S.)	COLIBRI/MORGIANA	Bermuda
March 27, 1813	Schooner PENNSYLVANIA (U.S.)	PAZ	Tender
March 28, 1813	Schooner SYREN (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Destroyed
March 29, 1813	Schooner MINERVA (Sweden)	COLIBRI	Providence
March 29, 1813	Ship MADISON (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Destroyed
March 29, 1813	Priv. Brig REVENGE (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Bermuda
March 30, 1813	Schooner FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Destroyed
March 30, 1813	Ship AMERICA (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Destroyed
March 30, 1813	Brig REGINA CHRISTINA (Sweden)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
March 31, 1813	Brig ORION (U.S.)	CHILDERS	Bermuda
March 31, 1813	Ship FRANKLIN (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Halifax
March 31, 1813	Schooner PRESIDENT (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
March 31, 1813	Schooner RISING SUN (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
March 31, 1813	5 Schooners (unknown) (U.S.)	RATTLER/BREAM	Halifax
April 2, 1813	Schooner CENTURION (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
April 2, 1813	Ship FAME (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
April 2, 1813	Schooner LOUISIANA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
April 3, 1813	Schooner OHIO (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
April 3, 1813	Priv. Schooner ARAB (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
April 3, 1813	Priv. Schooner LYNX (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
April 3, 1813	Priv. Schooner RACER (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
April 3, 1813	Priv. Schooner DOLPHIN (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
April 3, 1813	Ship ATLAS (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 4, 1813	Sloop FOX (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Bermuda
April 4, 1813	Priv. Schooner COSSAC (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
April 4, 1813	Sloop TRAVELER (U.S.)	RATTLER	Halifax
April 4, 1813	Schooner VIRGINIA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 4, 1813	Sloop VICTORY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 4, 1813	Schooner ROVER (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 4, 1813	Schooner SISTERS (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 5, 1813	Schooner FAVORITE (U.S.)	VALIANT	Halifax
April 6, 1813	Sloop ROSAMOND (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Destroyed
April 7, 1813	Brig INDUSTRY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
April 7, 1813	Schooner SIDNEY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
April 8, 1813	Schooner SPECIE (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
April 9, 1813	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
April 10, 1813	Sloop PACKET (U.S.)	VALIANT	Halifax
April 10, 1813	Schooner FREEDOM (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Bermuda
April 10, 1813	Schooner AKSOS (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Bermuda
April 10, 1813	Schooner VESTA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 11, 1813	Schooner PILGRIM (U.S.)	PENNSYLVANIA	Tender
April 11, 1813	Schooner EXPEDITION (U.S.)	RATTLER	Halifax
April 11, 1813	Sloop RANDOLPH (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Destroyed
April 11, 1813	Brig CAROLINE (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
April 12, 1813	Brig JENNET (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
April 12, 1813	Schooner FLIGHT (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
April 15, 1813	Schooner FANNY (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Bermuda
April 16, 1813	Brig DISPATCH (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
April 16, 1813	Schooner PLOUGH BOY (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/ORPHEUS	Halifax

April 16, 1813	Schooner PAULINA (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Halifax
April 16, 1813	Schooner PORTSMOUTH (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Providence
April 17, 1813	Ship SALLY (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
April 17, 1813	Sloop JANE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
April 17, 1813	Sloop INTERFERE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 17, 1813	Schooner MARIA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
April 17, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 17, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 17, 1813	Sloop JEFFERSON PACKET (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
April 17, 1813	Sloop JULIANA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Cartel
April 17, 1813	Schooner WILLIAM AND DORCAS (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 17, 1813	Sloop FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
April 17, 1813	Schooner LIBERTY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
April 17, 1813	Brig CILBAO (Portugal)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
April 17, 1813	Schooner ALLIANCE (Portugal)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
April 18, 1813	Schooner BIRD (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
April 19, 1813	Sloop LARK (U.S.)	BREAM	Halifax
April 19, 1813	Ship FRANKLIN (U.S.)	ORPHEUS	Bermuda
April 19, 1813	Ship FLOR DO TEJO (Portugal)	NIMROD	Bermuda
April 20, 1813	Brig ULYSSES (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/ORPHEUS	Halifax
April 20, 1813	Sloop SUSANNAH (U.S.)	BREAM	Halifax
April 20, 1813	Priv. Brig VIVID (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
April 23, 1813	Brig LILAC (U.S.)	ATALANTE	Halifax
April 23, 1813	Brig SIBUE (U.S.)	ATALANTE/CROWN(priv)	Halifax
April 23, 1813	Sloop SEMIRAMIS (U.S.)	BREAM	Halifax
April 24, 1813	Brig SALLY (U.S.)	CURLEW	Halifax
April 26, 1813	Brig CORNELIA (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Bermuda
April 28, 1813	Ship HENRY (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
April 28, 1813	Brig AEOLUS (Brit./Recap)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
April 28, 1813	Schooner BERMUDA (Brit./Recap)	POICTIERS	Tender
April 28, 1813	Priv. Ship WAMPOE (U.S.)	ORPHEUS	Destroyed
April 29, 1813	5 ships (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 30, 1813	Brig HECTOR (Spain)	SPARTAN	Halifax
May 1, 1813	Schooner ELIZA (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Bermuda
May 1, 1813	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Destroyed
May 1, 1813	Schooner SAMPIT (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Destroyed
May 1, 1813	Schooner WINGAW (U.S.)	COLIBRI	Destroyed
May 1, 1813	Sloop JUANA (Spain)	SPARTAN/MARTIN	Halifax
May 1, 1813	Sloop PROVIDENCE (U.S.)	POICTIERS	Bermuda
May 2, 1813	Brig CATHERINE (Brit./Recap)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
May 2, 1813	Priv. Schooner GALLYNIPPEE (U.S.)	RATTLER	Destroyed
May 3, 1813	Sloop HERO (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/ORPHEUS	Destroyed
May 5, 1813	Priv. Brig MONTGOMERY (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
May 5, 1813	Schooner ANN (Brit./Recap)	SHANNON/TENEDOS	Halifax
May 6, 1813	Schooner EMPEROR (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/ORPHEUS	Halifax
May 6, 1813	4 Ships (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 9, 1813	Ship YOUNG PHOENIX (U.S.)	ORPHEUS	Halifax
May 10, 1813	Sloop JULIET (U.S.)	PAZ	Halifax
May 10, 1813	Schooner COLUMBIA (U.S.)	RATTLER	Halifax
May 10, 1813	Sloop FACTOR (U.S.)	POICTIERS	Destroyed

May 11, 1813	Priv. Ship HOLKAR (U.S.)	ORPHEUS	Destroyed
May 11, 1813	Priv. Brig DIOMEDE (U.S.)	LA HOGUE/NYMPHE	Halifax
May 11, 1813	Priv. Schooner JULIANA SMITH (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
May 12, 1813	Ship ACTEON (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Destroyed
May 13, 1813	Schooner SALLY (U.S.)	BREAM	Halifax
May 14, 1813	Brig HIRAM (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
May 15, 1813	Brig RASAS KING (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Destroyed
May 16, 1813	Priv. Schooner VESTA (U.S.)	NARCISSUS/VESTA	Destroyed
May 16, 1813	Brig ANN PACKET (Brit./Recap)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
May 16, 1813	Priv. Corvette L'INVINCIBLE (U.S.)	SHANNON/TENEDOS	Halifax
May 18, 1813	Brig ORION (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
May 18, 1813	Priv. Brig PILGRIM (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
May 18, 1813	Ship DUCK (Brit./Recap)	BOLD	Halifax
May 19, 1813	Brig DOLPHIN (Spain)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
May 19, 1813	Priv. Brig ALEXANDER (U.S.)	RATTLER/BREAM	Halifax
May 19, 1813	Brig PARAGON (Brit./Recap)	SHANNON	Halifax
May 19, 1813	Ship FIDELIA (unknown)	RAMILLIES/ORPHEUS	Halifax
May 20, 1813	Ship FINLAND (Sweden)	MARLBOROUGH	Halifax
May 20, 1813	Brig VOLADOR (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
May 21, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Destroyed
May 21, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Destroyed
May 21, 1813	Schooner FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Destroyed
May 22, 1813	Schooner JOSEPH AND GEORGE (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Destroyed
May 22, 1813	Schooner WILLIAM AND THOMAS (U.S.)	BARROSSA	Tender
May 24, 1813	Schooner POST BOY (U.S.)	SHANNON/TENEDOS	Halifax
May 26, 1813	Brig LUCY (Brit./Recap)	SHANNON	Halifax
May 26, 1813	Sloop BRANCH (U.S.)	BREAM	Halifax
May 27, 1813	Ship CORTES (Spain)	COLIBRI	Providence
May 27, 1813	Brig HARRIET (U.S.)	VICTORIOUS	Destroyed
May 28, 1813	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 29, 1813	Brig ENDEAVOR (Brit./Recap)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
May 30, 1813	Ship ROLLA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
May 30, 1813	Sloop PLOUGH BOY (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
May 30, 1813	Brig COMMERCE (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
May 30, 1813	Brig NOTICIS FELIS (PORTUGAL)	MARLBOROUGH	Bermuda
May 31, 1813	Brig WILLIAM (Brit./Recap)	SHANNON	Halifax
June 1, 1813	Frigate U.S.S. CHESAPEAKE	SHANNON	Halifax
June 1, 1813	Brig KITTY (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 1, 1813	Brig FANNY (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 2, 1813	Sloop SARAH (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 2, 1813	Sloop SALLY (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 4, 1813	Brig CHARLOTTA (Portugal)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 5, 1813	Brig FLOR DE LISBA (Portugal)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 6, 1813	Sloop BETSEY (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 6, 1813	Brig HETTY (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 7, 1813	Schooner BELLA (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 7, 1813	Brig HERO (Brit./Recap)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 7, 1813	Schooner JULIA AND SALLY (U.S.)	JUNON	Halifax
June 8, 1813	Schooner ANN (U.S.)	JUNON	Destroyed
June 8, 1813	Schooner BEATY (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Destroyed

June 9, 1813	Sloop BUTLER (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Bermuda
June 9, 1813	Priv. Sloop WASP (U.S.)	BREAM	Halifax
Jan. 10, 1813	Schooner CARMEN (Spain)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 10, 1813	Priv. Brig PORCUPINE (U.S.)	VALIANT/ACASTA	Halifax
June 11, 1813	Brig EL SAN IAGO (Spain)	MARLBOROUGH	Bermuda
June 12, 1813	Revenue Schooner U.S.S. SURVEYOR	NARCISSUS	Bermuda
June 13, 1813	Sloop MORNING STAR (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 13, 1813	Sloop CAROLINE (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 13, 1813	Ship EMILY (U.S.)	MARLBOROUGH	Bermuda
June 13, 1813	Ship GOVERNOR STRONG (U.S.)	MARLBOROUGH	Bermuda
June 13, 1813	Ship CALEDONIAN (U.S.)	SCEPTRE/LOIRE	Bermuda
June 2-13, 1813	Sloop EXPRESS (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 2-13, 1813	Sloop DISPATCH (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 2-13, 1813	Sloop BETSEY (#2) (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 2-13, 1813	Sloop PRISCILLA (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 2-13, 1813	Sloop Packet GEORGE (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 2-13, 1813	7 Small Coast Vessels (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 14, 1813	Ship ELIZABETH (U.S.)	SCEPTRE	Bermuda
June 14, 1813	Ship STAR (U.S.)	MARLBOROUGH	Halifax
June 15, 1813	Schooner FARMER (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 16, 1813	Ship ALCONA (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Tender
June 16, 1813	Schooner LARK (Brit./Recap)	ROVER/WASP	Halifax
June 16, 1813	Brig CHRISTINA (Brit./Recap)	ROVER/WASP	Halifax
June 16, 1813	Brig ROSCIO (U.S.)	DOVER	Halifax
June 17, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 17, 1813	Schooner GUSTAVA (Sweden)	COLIBRI	Providence
June 18, 1813	Ship CALMAR (U.S.)	SCEPTRE	Destroyed
June 18, 1813	Ship PROTECTRESS (U.S.)	MARLBOROUGH	Halifax
June 18, 1813	Schooner EUNICE (U.S.)	WASP	Halifax
June 22, 1813	Ship AMELIA (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Destroyed
June 22, 1813	Ship LEANDER (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Destroyed
June 22, 1813	Ship GUSTAF (Sweden)	SYLPH	Halifax
June 22, 1813	Brig THOMAS (U.S.)	WASP	Halifax
June 24, 1813	Ship GEORGIANA (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
June 24, 1813	Brig NORTH STAR (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Halifax
June 24, 1813	Ship HERMAN (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
June 24, 1813	Brig MARIA (U.S.)	BOLD	Halifax
June 25, 1813	Schooner CHERUB (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
June 25, 1813	Ship CARL GUSTAFF (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Halifax
June 25, 1813	Schooner WILLING LASS (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
June 25, 1813	Schooner HAMPTON (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Tender
June 25, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 25, 1813	4 Sloops (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 26, 1813	Schooner GOOD INTENT (U.S.)	STATIRA squad.	Destroyed
June 26, 1813	Brig CARNARVON (U.S.)	WOOLWICH	Halifax
June 26, 1813	Brig SANTIAGO (Spain)	WOOLWICH	Halifax
June 27, 1813	Priv. Schooner YOUNG TEAZER (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
June 27, 1813	Schooner LITTLE BILL (U.S.)	LOUP CERVIER	Halifax
June 27, 1813	Schooner REBECCA (U.S.)	BOXER	Halifax
June 28, 1813	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	BOXER	Halifax
June 30, 1813	Brig MINERVA (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax

June 30, 1813	Priv. Schooner THOMAS (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
June 30, 1813	Packet Ship LIVERPOOL (U.S.)	DOVER	Halifax
July 1, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	STATIRA/MARTIN	Destroyed
July 2, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	STATIRA/MARTIN	Destroyed
July 2, 1813	Sloop COMMERCE (U.S.)	STATIRA/MARTIN	Destroyed
July 6, 1813	Schooner TWO BROTHERS (U.S.)	BOXER	Halifax
July 6, 1813	Sloop FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	BOXER/CURLEW	Halifax
July 7, 1813	Schooner SWIFT (U.S.)	CURLEW	Halifax
July 7, 1813	Ship PRUDENTIA (Spain)	RATTLER	Halifax
July 7, 1813	Sloop EUNICE (U.S.)	CURLEW	Halifax
July 8, 1813	Brig FANNY (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
July 8, 1813	Brig SEA FLOWER (Brit./Recap)	FANTOME	Halifax
July 9, 1813	Schooner PRISCILLA (U.S.)	CURLEW	Halifax
July 10, 1813	Ship ROXANNA (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
July 11, 1813	Sloop MENTOR (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
July 11, 1813	Sloop JERUSHA (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
July 11, 1813	Priv. Brig REPUBLICAN (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/NIMROD	Halifax
July 12, 1813	Brig OHIO (U.S.)	MANLY	Halifax
July 12, 1813	Schooner JEFFERSON	BREAM	Halifax
July 13, 1813	Brig ANNA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad	Halifax
July 13, 1813	Priv. Brig ANACONDA (U.S.)	SCEPTRE squad.	Halifax
July 13, 1813	Priv. Schooner ATLAS (U.S.)	SCEPTRE squad.	Tender
July 14, 1813	Schooner BETSEY (U.S.)	BREAM/RATTLER	Halifax
July 14, 1813	Schooner TRITON (U.S.)	BREAM/RATTLER	Halifax
July 14, 1813	Brig MALAREN (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
July 15, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	MOHAWK/CONTEST	Destroyed
July 15, 1813	Schooner FREIGHTER (U.S.)	MOHAWK/CONTEST	Tender
July 17, 1813	Priv. Ship YORKTOWN (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad	Halifax
July 18, 1813	Ship LAVINIA (Brit./Recap)	RECRUIT	Halifax
July 18, 1813	Brig MANCHESTER (Brit./Recap)	Chesapeake squad	Halifax
July 20, 1813	Schooner LIVELY (Brit./Recap)	EPERVIER	Halifax
July 22, 1813	Schooner PROVIDENCE (Brit./Recap)	NYMPHE	Halifax
July 22, 1813	Brig ISABELLA (Spain)	PICTOU	Halifax
July 25, 1813	Sloop FAIR PLAY (U.S.)	BOXER	Halifax
July 27, 1813	Schooner REBECCA (U.S.)	BOXER	Halifax
July 28, 1813	Brig STAMPER (Brit./Recap)	RINGDOVE	Halifax
July 28, 1813	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	BOXER	unknown
July 29, 1813	Sloop MARY (Brit./Recap)	NIMROD	Halifax
July 29, 1813	1 Gunboat (U.S.)	JUNON/MARTIN	unknown
July 31, 1813	Brig FLOR DE TEJO (Spain)	MANLY	Halifax
July 31, 1813	Schooner PORPOISE (U.S.)	RATTLER	Halifax
July 31, 1813	Sloop WILLIAM AND ANN (Brit./Recap)	NIMROD	Halifax
Aug.2, 1813	Ship HOPE (Brit./Recap)	MANLY	Halifax
Aug.3, 1813	Schooner LUISA (U.S.)	MARTIN	Halifax
Aug.3, 1813	Schooner HANNAH (U.S.)	BOXER	Halifax
Aug.4, 1813	Schooner FOUR BROTHERS (Brit./Recap)	EMULOUS	Halifax
Aug.8, 1813	Priv. Sloop WASP (U.S.)	BREAM	Halifax
Aug.12, 1813	Schooner GENNET (U.S.)	NYMPHE/CURLEW	Halifax
Aug.13, 1813	Priv. Schooner PARAGON (U.S.)	NYMPHE/CURLEW	Halifax

Aug.13, 1813	Schooner POLLY (Brit./Recap)	STATIRA	Halifax
Aug.16, 1813	Ship FLOR DEL MAR (Spain)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
Aug.17, 1813	Sloop ENDEAVOR (U.S.)	NYMPHE/CURLEW	Halifax
Aug.18, 1813	Schooner MORNING STAR (U.S.)	NYMPHE/CURLEW	Halifax
Aug.18, 1813	Brig CHANCE (Brit./Recap)	LA HOGUE/TENEDOS	Halifax
Aug.18, 1813	Schooner KING GEORGE (Brit./Recap)	RECRUIT	Halifax
Aug.24, 1813	Schooner MINA (Spain)	STATIRA	Halifax
Aug.25, 1813	Schooner RAVEN (U.S.)	MANLY	Halifax
Aug.26, 1813	Brig ELIZABETH (Brit./Recap)	SHELBURNE	Halifax
Aug.27, 1813	Schooner EUPHEMIA (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Halifax
Aug.28, 1813	Ship HOPE (U.S.)	LOUP CERVIER	Halifax
Aug.29, 1813	Brig MARINER (Brit./Recap)	POICTIERS	Halifax
Aug.31, 1813	Schooner FORTUNE (U.S.)	BOXER	Halifax
Aug.31, 1813	Ship DIVINA PASTORA (Spain)	STATIRA	Halifax
Aug. 1813	Brig ALICIA (U.S.)	LOIRE/MARTIN	unknown
Aug.1813	Ship JANE (U.S.)	LOIRE/MARTIN	unknown
Sept.3, 1813	Ship JERUSALEM (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Halifax
Sept.3, 1813	Brig WATSON (Brit./Recap)	POICTIERS	Halifax
Sept.7, 1813	Sloop ALPHONSO (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Sept.8, 1813	Sloop JOLLY ROBIN (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Sept.8, 1813	Sloop DOLPHIN (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	unknown
Sept.11, 1813	Schooner TORPEDO (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Halifax
Sept.11, 1813	Ship MASSACHUSETTS (U.S.)	CANSO	Halifax
Sept.11, 1813	Brig OCEAN (Brit./Recap)	BORER	Halifax
Sept.11, 1813	Sloop OLIVE BRANCH (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Sept.6-11, 1813	15 small vessels	ACASTA/ATALANTE	Destroyed
Sept.13, 1813	Sloop ELVIRA (U.S.)	ORPHEUS/VALIANT	Halifax
Sept.13, 1813	Schooner MARY (Brit./Recap)	SYLPH	Halifax
Sept.13, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Sept.14, 1813	Ship SANTA CECILIA (Spain)	WASP	Halifax
Sept.15, 1813	Schooner DELIGHT (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Sept.15, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Sept.17, 1813	Schooner QUEEN CHARLOTTE (Brit./Re)	SHANNON	Halifax
Sept.18, 1813	Ship CATALONIA (Spain)	SHANNON	Halifax
Sept.18, 1813	Ship ALLIANCE (Spain)	SHANNON	Halifax
Sept.18, 1813	Schooner LITTLE SISTERS (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA/STATIRA	Halifax
Sept.19, 1813	Brig GAMLA LODELSE (unknown)	HIGH FLYER	Halifax
Sept.20, 1813	Ship ACTIVE (U.S.)	EPERVIER	Halifax
Sept.21, 1813	Priv. Chebacco-boat SWIFTSURE (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Destroyed
Sept.22, 1813	Sloop AMBITION (U.S.)	STATIRA	Halifax
Sept.23, 1813	3 Schooners (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
Sept.24, 1813	Ship VENUS (U.S.)	BORER	Halifax
Sept.25, 1813	Ship RESOLUTION (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Halifax
Sept.26, 1813	Sloop LITTLE BELT (U.S.)	ARMIDE	Destroyed
Sept.26, 1813	Sloop AMBITION (U.S.)	ACTEON	Destroyed
Sept.27, 1813	Brig SHANNON (Brit./Recap)	MANLY	Halifax
Sept.29, 1813	Sloop MARGARET (Brit./Recap)	MARTIN	Halifax
Sept.21-30, 1813	Schooner HALCYON (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Sept.21-30, 1813	Schooner FARMER (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Sept.21-30, 1813	Schooner LIVELY JOHN (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed

Sep.21-30, 1813	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Sept. 1813	Ship SURVEYOR (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Destroyed
Sept. 1813	Ship MONTEZUMA (U.S.)	LA HOGUE/TENEDOS	Halifax
Sept. 1813	Brig EDWARD (U.S.)	FANTOME	Halifax
Oct.1, 1813	Ship ELIZA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad	unknown
Oct.3, 1813	Ship CHARLES (U.S.)	PAZ	Halifax
Oct.5, 1813	Brig MEDEL PADIRA (Portugal)	PAZ/CONFLICT	Halifax
Oct.5, 1813	Priv. Schooner PORTSMOUTH PACKET	FANTOME	Halifax
Oct.11, 1813	Ship CHARLOTTE (U.S.)	COMET	Halifax
Oct.11, 1813	Schooner RICHARD DE STANLEY (U.S.)	PAZ	Halifax
Oct.11, 1813	Brig ATLANTIC (Brit./Recap)	POICTIERS/MAIDSTONE	Halifax
Oct.11, 1813	Ship EMMELINE (Sweden)	RECRUIT	Destroyed
Oct.12, 1813	Priv. Schooner JACK'S DELIGHT (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Oct.14, 1813	Schooner RANDOLPH (U.S.)	PAZ	Halifax
Oct.16, 1813	Ship BALTIC (U.S.)	LA HOGUE	Halifax
Oct.16, 1813	Schooner SALLY (U.S.)	LOIRE/RAMILLIES	Halifax
Oct.19, 1813	Priv. Schooner ORION (U.S.)	EMULOUS/SHELBURNE	Destroyed
Oct.19, 1813	Priv. Schooner CHAMELEON (U.S.)	EMULOUS/SHELBURNE	Destroyed
Oct.19, 1813	Sloop ALERT (U.S.)	BORER	Halifax
Oct.19, 1813	Sloop FAIR AMERICAN (U.S.)	BORER	Destroyed
Oct.20, 1813	Brig DISPATCH (Brit./Recap)	ALBION	Halifax
Oct.20, 1813	Schooner FAIR PLAY (U.S.)	BORER	Destroyed
Oct.20, 1813	Schooner FELICITY (U.S.)	BORER	Destroyed
Oct.20, 1813	Schooner FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	BORER	Tender
Oct.20, 1813	Sloop SARAH (U.S.)	BORER	Tender
Oct.21, 1813	Schooner BETSEY AND JANE (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Halifax
Oct.23, 1813	Sloop ELIZA (U.S.)	ARMIDE	Destroyed
Oct.23, 1813	Schooner CIRCE (U.S.)	ACTEON	Destroyed
Oct.23, 1813	Schooner DOLPHIN (U.S.)	CONFLICT	unknown
Oct.23, 1813	Sloop FOX (U.S.)	BORER	Destroyed
Oct.24, 1813	Sloop LAURA (U.S.)	BORER	Tender
Oct.25, 1813	Schooner LEADER (U.S.)	BORER	Tender
Oct.25, 1813	Brig HOPPETT (U.S.)	EMULOUS	Halifax
Oct.25, 1813	Brig TELEMACHUS (Brit./Recap)	NARCISSUS	Halifax
Oct.27, 1813	Schooner WILLIAM (U.S.)	PAZ	Halifax
Oct.28, 1813	Barque PARIS (Brit./Recap)	RINGDOVE	Halifax
Oct.29, 1813	Brig JOHN AND MARY (Brit./Recap)	LOUP CERVIER	Halifax
Oct.29, 1813	Brig (unknown) (U.S.)	DRAGON/SOPHIE	Destroyed
Oct.30, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	DRAGON/SOPHIE	Destroyed
Oct.30, 1813	Schooner TWO BROTHERS (U.S.)	DRAGON/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Oct.31, 1813	Schooner GARNET (U.S.)	DRAGON/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Oct.31, 1813	Schooner MINERVA (U.S.)	DRAGON/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Nov.2, 1813	Priv. Schooner INCA (France)	RECRUIT	Destroyed
Nov.3, 1813	Sloop SALLY (U.S.)	BORER	Destroyed
Nov.3, 1813	Priv. Schooner INDUSTRY (U.S.)	ARAB	Halifax
Nov.3, 1813	Sloop PEGGY (U.S.)	EPERVIER/FANTOME	Halifax
Nov.3, 1813	Priv. Schooner SPARROW (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Nov.4, 1813	Brig ANN (U.S.)	JASEUR	Halifax



Nov.5, 1813	Sloop NEW YORK (U.S.)	BORER	Halifax
Nov.5, 1813	Sloop ELIZABETH (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Nov.5, 1813	Sloop ALEXANDRIA (U.S.)	DRAGON/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Nov.5, 1813	Schooner JOHN OFGEORGETOWN(U.S.)	DRAGON/SOPHIE	Destroyed
Nov.5, 1813	Sloop QUINTESSENCE (U.S.)	DRAGON/SOPHIE	Bermuda
Nov.7, 1813	Sloop JAMES MADISON (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Nov.7, 1813	Ship LEOPARD (U.S.)	DOTEREL	Unknown
Nov.11, 1813	Sloop HUNTRESS (U.S.)	BORER	Halifax
Nov.12, 1813	Sloop ACTIVE (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Bermuda
Nov.12, 1813	Ship NYMPH (U.S.)	DOTEREL	Unknown
Nov.14, 1813	Brig HUSAREN (U.S.)	JASEUR/NARCISSUS	Halifax
Nov.14, 1813	Schooner HERO (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
Nov.14, 1813	Sloop FRANKLIN (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA/SOPHIE	Halifax
Nov.14, 1813	Schooner GLEANER (U.S.)	ARMIDE	Ransom
Nov.14, 1813	Sloop LIBERTY (U.S.)	ARMIDE	Destroyed
Nov.15, 1813	Sloop LADY WASHINGTON (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Cartel
Nov.15, 1813	Schooner HARMONY (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Nov.16, 1813	Sloop BETSEY (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Nov.17, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Destroyed
Nov.19, 1813	Schooner BEE (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Nov.19, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Destroyed
Nov.21, 1813	Schooner BETSEY (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Bermuda
Nov.21, 1813	Schooner GEORGIANNA (U.S.)	BARROSSA	Unknown
Nov.22, 1813	Schooner REGULATOR (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Nov.22, 1813	Schooner SUKEY (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Nov.24, 1813	Schooner VENUS (Brit./Recap)	RIFLEMAN	Halifax
Nov.27, 1813	Ship DOLPHIN (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Unknown
Nov.27, 1813	Schooner FREDERICKSBURGH (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Bermuda
Nov.27, 1813	Schooner CASER (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Bermuda
Nov.27, 1813	Schooner DOVE (U.S.)	MARTIN	Halifax
Nov.27, 1813	Schooner MARGARET AND MARY (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Nov.27, 1813	Sloop ANNA MARIA (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Nov.29, 1813	Schooner JOHN AND MARY (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Nov.30, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (Spain)	DRAGON	Bermuda
Nov.22-28,1813	Sloop NEW YORK (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Bermuda
Nov.22-28,1813	Schooner PHOEBE (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Bermuda
Nov.22-28,1813	Sloop CAROLINE (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Nov.22-28,1813	Sloop POLLY (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Nov.22-28,1813	Schooner PEGGY (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Nov.22-28,1813	Schooner LUCY AND SALLY (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Nov.22-28,1813	Schooner POOR JACK (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Dec.1,1813	Ship MONTICELLO (U.S.)	ALBION	Unknown
Dec.1,1813	Schooner GENERAL MARION (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/LOIRE	Halifax
Dec.1,1813	Sloop RISING SUN (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/LOIRE	Halifax
Dec.2, 1813	Ship CHILI (U.S.)	NIMROD	Halifax
Dec.2, 1813	Sloop FIVE SISTERS (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Dec.2, 1813	Sloop NEW JERSEY (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Dec.2, 1813	Sloop TWO PETERS (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Dec.3, 1813	Priv. Schooner PERRY (U.S.)	ENDYMION	Bermuda

Dec.3, 1813	Sloop MANHATTAN (U.S.)	NIMROD	Halifax
Dec.3, 1813	Schooner CAROLINE (U.S.)	DRAGON	Bermuda
Dec.4, 1813	Sloop ANN AND ELIZABETH (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/LOIRE	Destroyed
Dec.4, 1813	Ship GARDNER (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/LOIRE	Halifax
Dec.4, 1813	Sloop CATHERINE (U.S.)	MAJESTIC/JUNON	Halifax
Dec.4, 1813	Ship POLICY (Brit./Recap)	RAMILLIES/LOIRE	Halifax
Dec.4, 1813	Schooner BALTIC (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Dec.5, 1813	Schooner UNICORN (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Bermuda
Dec.6, 1813	Sloop JANE (U.S.)	MAJESTIC/JUNON	Halifax
Dec.7, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	ARMIDE	Destroyed
Dec.7, 1813	Schooner REPUBLICAN (U.S.)	DRAGON	Bermuda
Dec.7, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Dec.7, 1813	Ship MARINA (U.S.)	PICTOU	Unknown
Dec.8, 1813	Schooner MARGARET (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Dec.8, 1813	Schooner WEST INDIAN (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/LOIRE	Halifax
Dec.8, 1813	Schooner JULIAN (U.S.)	MARTIN	Halifax
Dec.8, 1813	Ship JOHN AND JAMES (U.S.)	ENDYMION	Unknown
Dec.9, 1813	Ship BROOKHAVEN (U.S.)	ALBION/ORPHEUS	Unknown
Dec.10, 1813	Priv. Schooner ROLLA (U.S.)	RAMILLIES/LOIRE	Halifax
Dec.10, 1813	Schooner BETSEY AND FANNY (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Unknown
Dec.10, 1813	Schooner TEACHER (U.S.)	DRAGON	Bermuda
Dec.11, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Dec.11, 1813	Schooner MARINER (U.S.)	DRAGON	Bermuda
Dec.11, 1813	Schooner ERIE (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Tender
Dec.11, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Dec.11, 1813	Schooner LITTLE AETNA (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Dec.11, 1813	Schooner ANTELOPE (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Dec.11, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	ARMIDE	Destroyed
Dec.12, 1813	2 Schooners (unknown) (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Dec.12, 1813	Schooner LITTLE MARY (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Destroyed
Dec.13, 1813	Sloop EMELINE (U.S.)	STATIRA/VALIANT	Halifax
Dec.14, 1813	Ship POLLY (U.S.)	BORER	Unknown
Dec.14, 1813	Ship ALKINOMAC (U.S.)	RINGDOVE	Unknown
Dec.14, 1813	Schooner NONSUCH (U.S.)	DOTEREL	Bermuda
Dec.15, 1813	Ship UNITED STATES (U.S.)	VALIANT/ACASTA	Unknown
Dec.15, 1813	Ship BETSEY (U.S.)	DOTEREL	Unknown
Dec.15, 1813	Ship STOCKHOLM (Sweden)	NIEMEN	Bermuda
Dec.16, 1813	Priv. Schooner RAPID (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Bermuda
Dec.16, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Destroyed
Dec.16, 1813	Schooner SEA FLOWER (U.S.)	ACTEON	Bermuda
Dec.16, 1813	Sloop SAMSON (U.S.)	ERIE	Destroyed
Dec.17, 1813	Sloop CALMAR (U.S.)	CURLEW	Halifax
Dec.17, 1813	Schooner MARY (U.S.)	PLANTAGENET	Bermuda
Dec.17, 1813	3 small vessels (U.S.)	ACTEON	Destroyed
Dec.18, 1813	Schooner GEORGE (U.S.)	DRAGON	Bermuda
Dec.18, 1813	Schooner MICHAEL AND ELIZA (U.S.)	DRAGON	Bermuda
Dec.18, 1813	Priv. Schooner ATALANTA (U.S.)	DRAGON	Bermuda
Dec.18, 1813	Ship PHOENIX (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Bermuda
Dec.19, 1813	Ship RISING STATES (U.S.)	NIEMEN/JASEUR	Bermuda
Dec.19, 1813	Ship SUKEY (U.S.)	JASEUR	Bermuda
Dec.19, 1813	Schooner MATHEWS (U.S.)	CANSO	Unknown

Dec.19, 1813	Schooner IDALIA (U.S.)	NARCISSUS	Bermuda
Dec.20, 1813	Priv. Schooner TARTAR (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Dec.20, 1813	Schooner EXPRESS (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Dec.20, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Dec.20, 1813	Brig (unknown) (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Dec.23, 1813	Brig GEORGE (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Bermuda
Dec.23, 1813	Brig BETSEY (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Bermuda
Dec.23, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	ARMIDE	Destroyed
Dec.25, 1813	Brig U.S.S. VIXEN	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
Dec.25, 1813	Ship MASSASOIT (U.S.)	FOX	Bermuda
Dec.26, 1813	Ship MARY ANN (U.S.)	SOPHIE/ACTEON	Bermuda
Dec.27, 1813	Ship LYON (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Unknown
Dec.28, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Dec.29, 1813	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Dec.29, 1813	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	DRAGON	Destroyed
Dec.29, 1813	Ship WHIM (U.S.)	RECRUIT	Unknown
Dec.30, 1813	Ship FLOR DE PERMAMBUCO (Spain)	PLANTAGENET	Unknown
Dec.31, 1813	Priv. Schooner PIONEER (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Destroyed
Jan.4, 1814	Schooner GROWLER (U.S.)	RECRUIT	Unknown
Jan.6, 1814	Schooner FRIENDS (U.S.)	ERIE	Destroyed
Jan.9, 1814	Ship MARGARITA (Spain)	WASP	Bermuda
Jan. 28, 1814	Priv. Schooner BOURDEAUX (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Bermuda
Feb.3, 1814	Ship (unknown) (Spain)	RATTLER	Bermuda
Feb.3, 1814	National Frigate TERPSICHORE (France)	MAJESTIC	Bermuda
Feb.5, 1814	Sloop ATALANTA (U.S.)	ENDYMION	Bermuda
Feb.7, 1814	Priv. Schooner METEOR (U.S.)	ENDYMION	Bermuda
Feb.9, 1814	Schooner FLASH (U.S.)	RATTLER	Bermuda
Feb.9, 1814	Priv. Brig ALFRED (U.S.)	JUNON/EPERVIER	Halifax
Feb.17, 1814	Sloop VIPER (U.S.)	RATTLER	Bermuda
Feb.17, 1814	Schooner BONNE FOIRE (France)	ASIA/SUPERB	Bermuda
Feb.17, 1814	Schooner THREE FRIENDS (France)	ASIA/SUPERB	Bermuda
March 1, 1814	Priv.Ship ARGUS (U.S.)	SAN DOMINGO	Bermuda
March 7, 1814	Priv. Ship MARS (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA/ENDYMION	Destroyed
March 16, 1814	Schooner MARGARET (Brit./Recap)	BELVEDIRA/MAIDSTONE	Halifax
March 23, 1814	Brig SAN JOAQUIN (Spain)	ALBION	Halifax
March 28, 1814	Schooner HOLSTEIN (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
March 29, 1814	Schooner ESPERANZA (Spain)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
March 30, 1814	Ship UNION (Brit./Recap)	CURLEW	Halifax
April 2, 1814	Ship NEW ZELANDER (Brit./Recap)	BELVEDIRA	Halifax
April 2, 1814	Ship ESPIONAGE (Spain)	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
April 3, 1814	Sloop SALLY (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
April 3, 1814	Sloop FAIRPLAY (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
April 6, 1814	Schooner LARK (Brit./Recap)	RECRUIT	Bermuda
April 7, 1814	7 Light Schooners (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 7, 1814	Priv. Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April 7, 1814	Ship DILIGENCE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed

April 9, 1814	Brig YOUNG ANACONDA (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Schooner CONNECTICUT (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Schooner EAGLE (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Brig (unknown) (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Schooner FACTOR (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Ship OTAGE (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Ship ATALANTE (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Ship SUPERIOR (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Ship GUARDIAN (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Ship (unknown) (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Ship (unknown) (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Brig FELIX (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Brig CLEOPATRA (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Brig (unknown) (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Schooner HALLON (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Schooner EMBLEM (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Sloop EMERALD (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Sloop MARSHATA (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Sloop NANCY (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Sloop MARS (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Sloop COMET (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Sloop THETIS (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	LA HOGUE squad.	Destroyed
April 9, 1814	Ship PLUTUS (Brit./Recap)	CURLEW	Halifax
April 18, 1814	Schooner SARAH (Sweden)	LA HOGUE squad.	Halifax
April 20, 1814	Sloop U.S.S. FROLIC	ORPHEUS/SHELBURNE	Providence
April 21, 1814	Brig MINERVA (Sweden)	LA HOGUE squad.	Halifax
April 24, 1814	Priv. Schooner STARKS (U.S.)	SOPHIE	Unknown
April 27, 1814	Schooner PILGRIM (U.S.)	BREAM	Halifax
April 30, 1814	Brig HANNAH (Brit./Recap)	MARTIN	Halifax
April, 1814	Schooner WILLIAM AND JAMES (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April, 1814	Sloop DELIGHT (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
April, 1814	Schooner BULL (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
April, 1814	Schooner TRAVELLER (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
April, 1814	Sloop MARY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
April, 1814	Schooner PERSERVERANCE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
May 1, 1814	Priv. Schooner YANKEE LASS (U.S.)	SEVERN/SURPRISE	Destroyed
May 2, 1814	Priv. Schooner GRECIAN (U.S.)	JASEUR	Destroyed
May 4, 1814	Brig MARIA FRANCISCA (Spain)	CURLEW	Halifax
May 9, 1814	Brig DANZIG (Sweden)	FANTOME	Halifax
May 9, 1814	Schooner HOUND (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Unknown
May 11, 1814	Schooner THREE SISTERS (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Destroyed
May 12, 1814	Ship FANNY (Brit./Recap)	SCEPTRE	Unknown
May 12, 1814	Brig CATALONIA (Spain)	SUPERB	Halifax
May 12, 1814	Brig VICTOR (Sweden)	LA HOGUE squad.	Halifax
May 12, 1814	Schooner JAMES PHILIP (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Bermuda

May 13, 1814	Schooner EXPERIMENT (U.S.)	BULWARK	Halifax
May 15, 1814	Sloop AMELIA (U.S.)	BULWARK	Halifax
May 15, 1814	Ship TEJO (Portugal)	LA HOGUE squad.	Halifax
May 15, 1814	Ship PROVIDENTIA (Sweden)	PEACOCK	Bermuda
May 15, 1814	Ship HENDRICK (Russia)	PEACOCK	Bermuda
May 15, 1814	Sloop REVENUE (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
May 17, 1814	Schooner MARY ANN (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 19, 1814	Sloop CANDELAINA (U.S.)	SUPERB	Halifax
May 19, 1814	Ship CLEOPATRA (Spain)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
May 20, 1814	Schooner VOLUNTEER (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 20, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 20, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 21, 1814	Ship (unknown) (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SYLPH	Destroyed
May 22, 1814	Priv. Schooner DOMINICA (U.S.)	MAJESTIC/DOTEREL	Halifax
May 22, 1814	Schooner LEWIS WARRINGTON (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 22, 1814	Schooner JULIA SUMMERS (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 22, 1814	Schooner ALLIGATOR (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 23, 1814	Priv. Schooner QUIZ (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Halifax
May 23, 1814	Priv. Schooner MODEL (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Halifax
May 23, 1814	Priv. Schooner CLARA (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Halifax
May 23, 1814	Schooner JULIANA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 23, 1814	Schooner REAL DANDIE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 24, 1814	Schooner ROVER (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 24, 1814	Sloop POLLY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 24, 1814	Schooner SALLY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 24, 1814	Sloop UNION (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Destroyed
May 24, 1814	Sloop CAMEL (U.S.)	RAMILLIES	Destroyed
May 25, 1814	Priv. Schooner HUSSAR (U.S.)	SATURN	Halifax
May 25, 1814	Brig TWO BROTHERS (Brit./Recap)	MARTIN/CURLEW	Halifax
May 25, 1814	Ship ONTARIO (U.S.)	MARTIN/CURLEW	Halifax
May 26, 1814	Brig THOMAS AND SALLY (Brit./Recap)	MARTIN/CURLEW	Halifax
May 27, 1814	Ship PILGRIM (U.S.)	BREAM	Unknown
May 27, 1814	Ship MARY (Brit./Recap)	MARTIN	Halifax
May 28, 1814	Priv. Schooner DIOMEDE (U.S.)	RIFLEMAN	Halifax
May 28, 1814	Schooner LIVELY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
May 29, 1814	Brig SUCCESS (Brit./Recap)	CHARYBDIS	Halifax
May 31, 1814	Sloop FAME (U.S.)	ENDYMION	Halifax
May 31, 1814	Brig (unknown) (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
June 1, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 3, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 3, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 3, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 3, 1814	Schooner TARTAR (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Destroyed
June 4, 1814	Brig FRANCISCA DE PAULA (Spain)	NIMROD	Halifax
June 4, 1814	Schooner BETSY (U.S.)	RECRUIT	Halifax
June 5, 1814	Schooner MAGDALENA (U.S.)	MARTIN	Halifax
June 6, 1814	Brig HERCULANEUM (Spain)	LA HOGUE/NIMROD	Halifax
June 6, 1814	Sloop INDUSTRY (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Destroyed
June 7, 1814	Sloop FLASH (U.S.)	NIEMEN/SATURN	Halifax
June 14, 1814	Sloop ELEANOR (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom

June 14, 1814	Ship FAIR TRADER (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Brig INDEPENDENT (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Schooner FANCY (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Schooner ELIZABETH (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Sloop WILMINGTON (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Schooner INDUSTRY (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Schooner ARGUS (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Brig WILLIAM RICHMOND (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Schooner NEW STATES (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Sloop PARAGON (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Sloop WILLIAM (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Sloop THOMAS (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Sloop WILLIAM LUCY (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Sloop FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Sloop EXPERIMENT (U.S.)	SUPERB/NIMROD	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Sloop TICKLER (U.S.)	SATURN	Halifax
June 14, 1814	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 14, 1814	Schooner EAGLE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 16, 1814	Brig VOLADOR (Portugal)	LA HOGUE	Bermuda
June 17, 1814	Schooner BROTHERS (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 18, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
June 18, 1814	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
June 19, 1814	Schooner WILLIAM (U.S.)	WASP	Halifax
June 19, 1814	Sloop JOHN (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 19, 1814	Schooner NANCY AND POLLY (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Ransom
June 22, 1814	Sloop SALLY (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
June 22, 1814	Schooner DELESTINES (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Halifax
June 22, 1814	Sloop ALONZO (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Ransom
June 22, 1814	Brig U.S.S. RATTLESNAKE	LEANDER	Halifax
June 23, 1814	Sloop BASHAW (U.S.)	BULWARK	Halifax
June 23, 1814	Brig COMMERCE (Brit./Recap)	SUPERB/MAIDSTONE	Halifax
June 24, 1814	Sloop HUNTER (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Bermuda
June 25, 1814	Schooner ACHILLES (U.S.)	SATURN	Bermuda
June 25, 1814	Priv. Brig LITTLE CATHERINE (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
June 25, 1814	Schooner RESOLUTION (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 25, 1814	Schooner PATRIOT (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 25, 1814	Schooner UNION (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
June 26, 1814	Schooner MINK (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
June 26, 1813	Ship CIUDADE DE LIRA (Spain)	FANTOME/ROVER	St. John, N.B.
June 26, 1814	Torpedo Ship (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SYLPH	Destroyed
June 26, 1814	12 merchant ships (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/SYLPH	Destroyed
June 26, 1814	2 Gunboats (U.S.)	NARCISSUS/LOIRE	Destroyed
June 27, 1814	Schooner HAZARD (U.S.)	BELVEDIRA	Destroyed
June 30, 1814	Priv. Schooner SNAPDRAGON (U.S.)	MARTIN	Halifax
June 1814	Schooner NIGHTHAWK (U.S.)	SUPERB/MAIDSTONE	Halifax
July 1, 1814	Schooner ELIZA (Sweden)	ENDYMION/ARMIDE	Halifax
July 2, 1814	Schooner TWO BROTHERS (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
July 2, 1814	2 Schooners (U.S.)	SEVERN/LOIRE	Destroyed

July 2, 1814	2 Gunboats (U.S.)	SEVERN/LOIRE	Destroyed
July 2, 1814	1 Sloop (U.S.)	SEVERN/LOIRE	Destroyed
July 3, 1814	Schooner ELIZA (U.S.)	RIFLEMAN	Halifax
July 3, 1814	Schooner FLORA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 5, 1814	Schooner BEE (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Halifax
July 7, 1814	Barque ANNETTA CATHARINA (Russia)	ASIA	Bermuda
July 7, 1814	Schooner LARK (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Destroyed
July 7, 1814	Sloop DELIGHT (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
July 8, 1814	Schooner SEA POLLY (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
July 8, 1814	Sloop SALLY (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
July 9, 1814	Schooner EDWARD AND MARY (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
July 10, 1814	Schooner NELLY (Brit./Recap)	BULWARK	Halifax
July 10, 1814	Schooner PRUDENCE (U.S.)	ACASTA	Halifax
July 2-10, 1814	Sloop MORNING STAR (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
July 2-10, 1814	Sloop ROBERT (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
July 2-10, 1814	Sloop ECLIPSE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
July 2-10, 1814	Schooner EMELINE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 2-10, 1814	Schooner MARY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 2-10, 1814	Schooner WILLIAM (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 2-10, 1814	Schooner FAIRY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 11, 1814	Brig ANNA (Brit./Recap)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
July 11, 1814	Schooner THORN (U.S.)	BULWARK	Halifax
July 13, 1814	Priv. Schooner GOVERNOR SHELBY(U.S)	NARCISSUS/SATURN	Halifax
July 13, 1814	Schooner RANGER (U.S.)	SUPERB	Halifax
July 13, 1814	Schooner UNION (U.S.)	RIFLEMAN	Halifax
July 14, 1814	Sloop TICKLE (U.S.)	SATURN	Unknown
July 14, 1814	Ship MARIA FREDERICA (Spain)	SEAHORSE/PERUVIAN	Halifax
July 14, 1814	Priv. Brig HENRY GILDER	NIEMEN	Unknown
July 15, 1814	Ship SIR ALEXANDER BALL (Brit./Recap)	NIEMEN	Halifax
July 16, 1814	Sloop JANE (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
July 16, 1814	Schooner INDUSTRY (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
July 16, 1814	Priv. Schooner STEPHANIE (U.S.)	ACASTA	Halifax
July 17, 1814	2 Schooners (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
July 17, 1814	Ship (unknown) (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
July 17, 1814	Sloop JULIAN (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 18, 1814	Schooner ANTELOPE (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Halifax
July 18, 1814	Schooner BRIZI (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
July 19, 1814	Schooner MARIA (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
July 19, 1814	Sloop ENTERPRIZE (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
July 19, 1814	Sloop DIANA (U.S.)	ACASTA	Halifax
July 19, 1814	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	ASIA	Destroyed
July 19, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 20, 1814	Schooner LEWIN (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
July 20, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
July 20, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	ASIA	Destroyed
July 21, 1814	Brig TYGER (Brit./Recap)	BULWARK	Halifax
July 22, 1814	Schooner ELEGANT (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
July 23, 1814	Sloop FAME (U.S.)	SPENCER/NYMPHE	Halifax
July 23, 1814	Sloop UNITY (U.S.)	ASIA	Halifax
July 23, 1814	Schooner MATILDA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
July 23, 1814	Schooner PROSPERITY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda

July 23, 1814	Schooner UNION (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
July 23, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
July 23, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 24, 1814	Schooner HAZARD (U.S.)	ACASTA	Halifax
July 25, 1814	Schooner CROMAR (U.S.)	ASIA	Destroyed
July 25, 1814	Schooner INDEPENDENCE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 26, 1814	Schooner TRIMMER (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 26, 1814	Schooner FELICITY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 26, 1814	Schooner PAINTING FRIEND (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 26, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 26, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 26, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
July 29, 1814	Schooner MIRA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
July 30, 1814	Schooner THREE FRIENDS (U.S.)	ASIA	Halifax
July, 1814	Sloop DEFIANCE (U.S.)	SUPERB/SYLPH	Halifax
July, 1814	Sloop JANUS (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
Aug. 1, 1814	Schooner DEFIANCE (U.S.)	NYMPHE	Destroyed
Aug. 2, 1814	Schooner DELAWARE (U.S.)	ACASTA/MENELAUS	Halifax
Aug. 2, 1814	Sloop JANE (U.S.)	ACASTA	Halifax
Aug. 2, 1814	Schooner LITTLE TOM (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug. 3, 1814	2 Schooners (unknown)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
Aug. 3, 1814	Schooner LUCRETIA (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug. 3, 1814	Schooner BEGGAR (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug. 3, 1814	Schooner LORENZO (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug. 3, 1814	Schooner ACTIVE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug. 3, 1814	Schooner BETSEY (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug. 3, 1814	Schooner VICTORY (U.S.)	LEANDER	Halifax
Aug. 3, 1814	Schooner HIBERNIA (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Halifax
Aug. 5, 1814	Schooner HORNET (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Aug. 5, 1814	Schooner PEGGY (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Aug. 5, 1814	Brig DALKARLEN (U.S.)	LEANDER	Halifax
Aug. 6, 1814	Schooner JULIAN (U.S.)	BORER	Halifax
Aug. 6, 1814	Sloop EAGLE (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
Aug. 6, 1814	Sloop DOVE (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
Aug. 7, 1814	Schooner OLD CARPENTER (U.S.)	SPENCER	Halifax
Aug. 7, 1814	Brig ENIGHETON (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Halifax
Aug. 7, 1814	Schooner JOHN (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug. 7, 1814	Schooner WILLIAM (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug. 7, 1814	Schooner MARGARET (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug. 8, 1814	Schooner JAMES (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug. 8, 1814	Schooner SAUTER (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug. 8, 1814	Sloop BLOSSOM (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug. 9, 1814	Brig ANITA (U.S.)	LEANDER	Halifax
Aug. 9, 1814	Priv. Brig IDA (U.S.)	NEWCASTLE/ANTELOPE	Halifax
Aug. 10, 1814	Schooner FEDERALIST (U.S.)	RECRUIT	Unknown
Aug. 11, 1814	Sloop EMILY (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug. 11, 1814	Schooner DUSTY MILLER (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Aug. 12, 1814	Schooner TRIO (U.S.)	ASIA	Destroyed
Aug. 12, 1814	Schooner PERSERVERANCE (U.S.)	ASIA	Destroyed
Aug. 14, 1814	Schooner POLLY AND SALLY (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed



Aug.14, 1814	Schooner SALLY JASPER (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Aug.14, 1814	Schooner ELIZA AND MARY (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug.14, 1814	Schooner ABBY ANN (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug.15, 1814	Priv. Schooner HERALD (U.S.)	ENDYMION/ARMIDE	Halifax
Aug.16, 1814	Priv. Ship INVINCIBLE (U.S.)	ENDYMION/ARMIDE	Halifax
Aug.16, 1814	Ship HELEN (Brit./Recap)	WASP	Halifax
Aug.18, 1814	Schooner GOOD INTENT (U.S.)	MENELAUS	Destroyed
Aug.18, 1814	Schooner DROMO (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
Aug.18, 1814	Schooner FINANCIER (U.S.)	SATURN	Destroyed
Aug.18, 1814	Ship JAMES (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug.19, 1814	Ship WANDERER (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Halifax
Aug.19, 1814	Schooner SAILOR'S RIGHTS (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Aug.20, 1814	Ship CONDE DOS ARCOS (Spain)	SUPERB/FORTH	Halifax
Aug.20, 1814	Sloop HESTER (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Aug.20, 1814	Schooner SANTA ANNA (Spain)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug.20, 1814	Schooner RESOLUTION (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Aug.20, 1814	Packet Boat DOLPHIN (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug.21, 1814	Sloop JUDITH (U.S.)	L'ESPOIR	Halifax
Aug.22, 1814	Sloop U.S.S. SCORPION	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
Aug.22, 1814	15 Gunboats (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Destroyed
Aug.22, 1814	1 Gunboat (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug.22, 1814	13 merchant ships (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Bermuda
Aug.22, 1814	Schooner TRIAL (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Aug.22, 1814	Sloop SWALLOW (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Aug.22, 1814	Schooner WILLIAM (U.S.)	L'ESPOIR	Destroyed
Aug.22, 1814	Priv. Schooner PIKE (U.S.)	PRIMROSE	Destroyed
Aug.23, 1814	Brig TAMER (Brit./Recap)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Aug.23, 1814	Schooner HORNET (U.S.)	ASIA/L'ESPOIR	Destroyed
Aug.23, 1814	Sloop PILOT (U.S.)	L'ESPOIR	Destroyed
Aug.23, 1814	Schooner ARNO (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Aug.23, 1814	Sloop JOHN AND JAMES (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Aug.24, 1814	Sloop GRAMPAS (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Aug.24, 1814	Sloop LANDRAIL (Brit./Recap)	WASP	Halifax
Aug.24, 1814	Schooner PEACOCK (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
Aug.24, 1814	Frigate U.S.S. ESSEX	Washington Expedition	Destroyed
Aug.24, 1814	Frigate U.S.S. BOSTON	Washington Expedition	Destroyed
Aug.24, 1814	Frigate U.S.S. NEW YORK	Washington Expedition	Destroyed
Aug.24, 1814	Sloop U.S.S. ARGUS	Washington Expedition	Destroyed
Aug.25, 1814	Schooner PRIMROSE (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Aug.25, 1814	Schooner ENTERPRIZE (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Aug.25, 1814	Whale Boat (unknown) (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Aug.26, 1814	Sloop MARY ANN (U.S.)	L'ESPOIR	Unknown
Aug.28, 1814	Schooner BEE (U.S.)	RIFLEMAN/PERUVIAN	Halifax
Aug.28-29, 1814	Schooner ELIZABETH (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Brig GILPIN (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Sloop HARMONY (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Schooner WICOMOCO (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Ship WILLIAM AND JOHN (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Ship BALTIC TRADER (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Ship MONSOON (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Brig ELDERMAN (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda

Aug.28-29, 1814	Schooner DISPATCH (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Schooner LITTLE ELIZA (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	2 small ships (unknown) (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Brig (unknown) (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Schooner FAIR PLAY (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Sloop LITTLE LADY (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Schooner WILLIAM EATON (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Sloop THAMES (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Schooner REBECCA (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Brig LLOYD (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.28-29, 1814	Gunboat (unknown) (U.S.)	SEAHORSE squad.	Bermuda
Aug.30, 1814	Sloop EAGLE (U.S.)	HAVANNAH	Destroyed
Aug.30, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	HAVANNAH	Destroyed
Aug.30, 1814	Schooner ENTERPRIZE (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Halifax
Aug.31, 1814	Schooner SALLY (U.S.)	POMONE	Destroyed
Aug.31, 1814	Brig CHARLOTTE (Brit./Recap)	WASP	Unknown
Aug. 1814	Schooner ECLIPSE (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
Aug. 1814	Schooner MADISON (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Halifax
Sept.1, 1814	Sloop LIVELY (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Sept.2, 1814	Brig FAVORITE (Brit./Recap)	ALBION	Halifax
Sept.3, 1814	Schooner WILLIAM (U.S.)	ALBION	Halifax
Sept.3, 1814	Sloop LORD WELLINGTON (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Sept.3, 1814	Sloop TRIMMER (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
Sept.3, 1814	Sloop BETSEY (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
Sept.3, 1814	Sloop YOUNG FOX (U.S.)	NIMROD	Ransom
Sept.3, 1814	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Sept.3, 1814	Corvette U.S.S. ADAMS	Maine Expedition	Destroyed
Sept.4, 1814	Schooner TWO BROTHERS (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Halifax
Sept.4, 1814	2 Schooners (unknown) (U.S.)	FORTH	Destroyed
Sept.4, 1814	Schooner IMPORTER (U.S.)	SUPERB	Destroyed
Sept.5, 1814	Schooner MARIA (U.S.)	NIMROD	Halifax
Sept.5, 1814	Schooner JAMES (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Halifax
Sept.5, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	MENELAUS	Bermuda
Sept.5, 1814	2 Sloops (unknown ) (U.S.)	MENELAUS	Destroyed
Sept.6, 1814	Brig ALEXANDER (Brit./Recap)	WASP	Halifax
Sept.7 1814	Schooner GADFLY (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Sept.7 1814	Schooner CORN SHEAF (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Sept.7 1814	Sloop NANCY (U.S.)	FORTH	Destroyed
Sept.7 1814	Ship EL PATRIOTE (Spain)	SUPERB	Halifax
Sept.8, 1814	Schooner FOX (U.S.)	BACCHANTE/TENEDOS	Halifax
Sept.9, 1814	Sloop NIOBE (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Sept.9, 1814	Schooner WILLING MAID (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Sept.9, 1814	Schooner SAILOR'S RESOURCE (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Sept.9, 1814	Schooner TROY (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Sept.9, 1814	Schooner MARTHA (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Sept.9, 1814	Schooner FLY BY NIGHT (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Sept.10, 1814	Schooner BETSEY (U.S.)	ALBION	Halifax
Sept.12, 1814	Schooner HIGHFLYER (U.S.)	LOIRE	Unknown
Sept.13, 1814	Brig NANCY (Brit./Recap)	PYLADES	Halifax

Sept.1-13,1814	Priv. Brig DECATUR (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Destroyed
Sept.1-13,1814	Priv Brig (unknown) (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Destroyed
Sept.1-13,1814	Priv. Ship (unknown) (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Destroyed
Sept.1-13,1814	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Destroyed
Sept.1-13,1814	2 Ships (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Destroyed
Sept.1-13,1814	3 Schooners (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Destroyed
Sept.1-13,1814	Brig.(unknown) (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Destroyed
Sept.1-13,1814	3 Sloops (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Halifax
Sept.1-13,1814	7 Ships (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Halifax
Sept.1-13,1814	14 Schooners (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Halifax
Sept.1-13,1814	6 Brigs (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Halifax
Sept.14, 1814	Brig NANCY (U.S.)	Maine Expedition	Halifax
Sept.14, 1814	Ship VICTORY (Brit./Recap)	Maine Expedition	Halifax
Sept.15, 1814	Brig ENDEAVOR (U.S.)	FORTH	Destroyed
Sept.15, 1814	Schooner CATHY (U.S.)	FORTH	Destroyed
Sept.15, 1814	Ship VESTAL (Brit./Recap)	DRAGON	Halifax
Sept.17, 1814	Sloop BETSEY (U.S.)	SATURN	Halifax
Sept.18, 1814	Brig MARY AND ELIZA (U.S.)	FORTH	Destroyed
Sept.18, 1814	Priv. Schooner DAEDALUS (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Halifax
Sept.18, 1814	Sloop PERSERVERANCE (U.S.)	BACCHANTE	Halifax
Sept.18, 1814	Sloop REGULATOR (U.S.)	NIEMEN	Destroyed
Sept.19, 1814	Ship BETSEY (Brit./Recap)	PYLADES	Halifax
Sept.19, 1814	Schooner LIBERTY (U.S.)	LOIRE	Destroyed
Sept.19, 1814	Schooner NANCY (U.S.)	LOIRE	Destroyed
Sept.19, 1814	Priv.Brig REGENT (U.S.)	FORTH	Destroyed
Sept.21, 1814	Brig ALBION (Brit./Recap)	JASEUR	Halifax
Sept.26, 1814	Schooner GOOD HOPE (U.S.)	LOIRE	Halifax
Sept.26, 1814	Sloop EMPEROR NAPOLEON (U.S.)	LOIRE	Destroyed
Sept.26, 1814	Sloop CONFUSION (U.S.)	LOIRE	Destroyed
Sept.26, 1814	Sloop SALLY (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Sept.26, 1814	Sloop CHAUNCY (U.S.)	POMONE	Unknown
Sept.26, 1814	Sloop HUSSAR (U.S.)	POMONE	Destroyed
Sept.26, 1814	Sloop TWO FRIENDS (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Sept.26, 1814	Sloop NANCY (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Sept.27, 1814	Priv.SchoonGENERAL ARMSTRONG(U.S.)	PLANTAGENET/ROTA	Destroyed
Sept.28, 1814	Schooner SARAH (Brit./Recap)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
Oct.1, 1814	Sloop FAIR AMERICAN (U.S.)	POMONE	Unknown
Oct.1, 1814	Sloop HERALD (U.S.)	POMONE	Unknown
Oct.1, 1814	Sloop ONEIDA (U.S.)	POMONE	Unknown
Oct.1, 1814	Sloop HOPE (U.S.)	POMONE	Unknown
Oct.3, 1814	3 merchant ships (U.S.)	Chesapeake squad.	Unknown
Oct.5, 1814	U.S.S. Gunboat #160	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Oct.5, 1814	3 Ships (unknown) (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Bermuda
Oct.5, 1814	Ship (unknown) (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Destroyed
Oct.7, 1814	Sloop MAID OF THE OAKS (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Oct.11, 1814	Sloop MERCANTILE (U.S.)	POMONE	Ransom
Oct.11, 1814	Brig WILLIAM (Brit./Recap)	ARMIDE/MAIDSTONE	Halifax
Oct.12, 1814	Schooner MARY (Brit./Recap)	WASP	Halifax
Oct.13, 1814	Revenue Schooner U.S.S.EAGLE	POMONE/NARCISSUS	Tender
Oct.16, 1814	Ship TROY (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Bermuda

Oct.18,1814	Schooner SALLY (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Destroyed
Oct.20, 1814	Schooner LITTLE JOHN (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Unknown
Oct.23, 1814	Priv. Schooner HARLEQUIN (U.S.)	BULWARK	Halifax
Oct.26, 1814	Ship AMAZON (Brit./Recap)	BULWARK	Halifax
Oct.30, 1814	Brig HALIFAX PACKET (Brit./Recap)	BULWARK	Halifax
Oct.31, 1814	Priv. Brig BLACK SWAN (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
Oct.31, 1814	Ship MENTOR (Brit./Recap)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
Nov.1, 1814	Priv. Brig MACDONOUGH (U.S.)	BACCHANTE	Halifax
Nov.1, 1814	Schooner RAINBOW (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Destroyed
Nov.2, 1814	Schooner LIVELY (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Destroyed
Nov.3, 1814	Schooner ALERT (U.S.)	TELEGRAPH	Destroyed
Nov.4, 1814	Sloop LIVELY (U.S.)	ST. LAWRENCE	Halifax
Nov.5, 1814	Brig CHARLES (Brit./Recap)	SATURN	Halifax
Nov.5, 1814	Brig THEODORE (Brit./Recap)	SATURN	Halifax
Nov.6, 1814	Sloop HERO (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Halifax
Nov. 7, 1814	Sloop FOUR BROTHERS (U.S.)	TELEGRAPH	Ransom
Nov. 7, 1814	Brig RECOVERY (Brit./Recap)	TELEGRAPH	Bermuda
Nov. 7, 1814	Sloop JOHN (U.S.)	TELEGRAPH	Destroyed
Nov. 7, 1814	Schooner ANN (U.S.)	TELEGRAPH	Destroyed
Nov.8, 1814	Priv.Schooner GENERAL PUTNAM (U.S.)	LEANDER	Halifax
Nov.8, 1814	Sloop (unknown) (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Destroyed
Nov.9, 1814	Brig JANE (Brit./Recap)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
Nov.14, 1814	Priv. Schooner SAUCY JACK JR. (U.S.)	NORTH STAR	Halifax
Nov.16, 1814	Schooner ADVOCATE (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Bermuda
Nov.16, 1814	Sloop FAIR AMERICAN (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Destroyed
Nov.16, 1814	Priv. Schooner SYREN (U.S.)	SPENCER/TELEGRAPH	Destroyed
Nov.19, 1814	Sloop THETIS (U.S.)	MAJESTIC	Destroyed
Nov.21, 1814	Schooner MOREAU (U.S.)	SPENCER	Destroyed
Nov.22, 1814	Sloop LADY WASHINGTON (U.S.)	PACTOLUS	Bermuda
Nov.23, 1814	Ship FAMINA (U.S.)	MAIDSTONE/JUNON	Halifax
Nov.24, 1814	Brig SUPERB (U.S.)	SPENCER	Halifax
Nov.25, 1814	Sloop FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	NIMROD	Destroyed
Nov.25, 1814	Schooner MARY (U.S.)	TELEGRAPH	Bermuda
Nov.25, 1814	Brig AMY (U.S.)	TELEGRAPH	Bermuda
Nov.26, 1814	Brig AMICUS (Brit./Recap)	PACTOLUS	Bermuda
Nov.9-30,1814	Schooner WILLIAM (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Ransom
Nov.9-30,1814	Sloop NANCY (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Ransom
Nov.9-30,1814	Sloop DIANA (U.S.)	LACEDEMONIAN	Ransom
Nov.9-30,1814	Sloop HARRIS (U.S.)	ST. LAWRENCE	Ransom
Nov.9-30,1814	Sloop CATHERINE AND ELIZA (U.S.)	ST. LAWRENCE	Ransom
Nov.9-30,1814	Sloop ELIZA (U.S.)	ST. LAWRENCE	Providence
Nov.9-30,1814	Sloop HERMIT (U.S.)	ST. LAWRENCE	Ransom
Nov.9-30,1814	Schooner MARGARET (U.S.)	ST. LAWRENCE	Ransom
Nov.9-30,1814	Schooner HARRIET AND ANN (U.S.)	ST. LAWRENCE	Ransom
Nov.9-30,1814	Sloop DISCOVERY (U.S.)	ST. LAWRENCE	Destroyed
Nov.9-30,1814	Schooner FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	ST. LAWRENCE	Providence
Dec.3, 1814	Schooner AURORA (U.S.)	COCKCHAFER	Bermuda
Dec.7, 1814	Schooner LARK (Brit./Recap)	MAJESTIC	Bermuda
Dec.8, 1814	Brig LADY PREVOST (Brit./Recap)	NIMROD	Halifax

Dec.9, 1814	Schooner POST BOY (U.S.)	PACTOLUS	Bermuda
Dec.11, 1814	Schooner ROSE (Sweden)	TELEGRAPH	Bermuda
Dec.12, 1814	Ship ADOLPHUS (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Dec.12, 1814	Ship FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Dec.12, 1814	Ship SALLY ANN (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Dec.12, 1814	Ship SAUCY JACK (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Dec.12, 1814	Ship WILLIAM AND HENRY (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Dec.12, 1814	Ship LIBERTY (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Dec.12, 1814	Ship ELIZA (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Bermuda
Dec.12, 1814	Sloop NANCY (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Dec.12, 1814	Schooner MARY (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Bermuda
Dec.14, 1814	Sloop U.S.S. ALLIGATOR	MANLY/METEOR	Bermuda
Dec.14, 1814	Schooner U.S.S. SEAHORSE	MANLY/METEOR	Destroyed
Dec.14, 1814	5 Gunboats (U.S.)	MANLY/METEOR	Bermuda
Dec.18, 1814	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	HERALD	Unknown
Dec.20, 1814	Priv. Schooner BANGOR (U.S.)	SEVERN	Bermuda
Dec.20, 1814	Brig JAVA (U.S.)	COCKCHAFER	Unknown
Dec.21, 1814	Schooner GRETA (Sweden)	TELEGRAPH	Bermuda
Dec.23, 1814	Schooner COMET (U.S.)	SATURN	Bermuda
Dec.24, 1814	Priv. Schooner ARMISTICE (Recap)	JUNON	Halifax
Dec.25, 1814	Ship SALLY (U.S.)	PYLADES	Destroyed
Dec.25, 1814	Ship PARAGON (U.S.)	PYLADES	Destroyed
Dec.28, 1814	Brig NEPTUNE (Sweden)	TELEGRAPH	Bermuda
Dec.28, 1814	Schooner TRIM (U.S.)	TELEGRAPH	Bermuda
Dec.28, 1814	Schooner JOHN (U.S.)	POMONE	Bermuda
Dec.29, 1814	Brig HESSIAN (U.S.)	NIMROD	Bermuda
Dec.29, 1814	Brig FUNCHAL (U.S.)	POMONE	Bermuda
Dec.30, 1814	Schooner MERCURY (U.S.)	POMONE	Bermuda
Dec.31, 1814	Sloop EDWARD (U.S.)	POMONE	Bermuda
Jan.3, 1815	Priv. Brig GUERRIERE (U.S.)	JUNON	Halifax
Jan.5, 1815	Schooner HORIZON (U.S.)	NIMROD	Bermuda
Jan.12, 1815	Schooner ATTEMPT (U.S.)	TELEGRAPH	Bermuda
Jan.15, 1815	Frigate U.S.S. PRESIDENT	MAJESTIC squad.	Bermuda
Jan.19, 1815	Schooner WILLIAM (U.S.)	TELEGRAPH	Bermuda
Jan.22, 1815	Ship BETSEY (U.S.)	PYLADES	Destroyed
Jan.22, 1815	Ship SPEED (U.S.)	PYLADES	Destroyed
Jan.22, 1815	Priv. Schooner TOMAHAWK (U.S.)	BULWARK	Halifax
Jan.24, 1815	Brig JOSEPH AND MARY (U.S.)	BULWARK	Halifax
Jan.25, 1815	Ship EAGLE (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Bermuda
Jan.26, 1815	Sloop AMELIA (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Destroyed
Jan.28, 1815	Schooner INDUSTRY (U.S.)	SATURN	Destroyed
Jan.29, 1815	Sloop FRIENDSHIP (U.S.)	SATURN	Destroyed
Dec.21-Jan.18	Sloop LORD WELLINGTON (Brit./Recap)	DISPATCH	Bermuda
Dec.21-Jan.18	Sloop NEW YORK (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Dec.21-Jan.18	Brig MARY (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Bermuda
Dec.21-Jan.18	Schooner (unknown) (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Unknown
Dec.21-Jan.18	2 Ships (unknown) (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Unknown
Dec.21-Jan.18	Schooner WENDELL (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Destroyed
Dec.21-Jan.18	Brig UNION (U.S.)	DISPATCH	Bermuda

Feb.6, 1815	Sloop AMICUS (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Bermuda
Feb.13, 1815	Sloop POLLY AND NANCY (U.S.)	TENEDOS	Destroyed
Feb.23, 1815	Brig MARGARET (Brit./Recap)	BULWARK	Halifax
Feb.26, 1815	Schooner RHODA (Brit./Recap)	BULWARK	Halifax
March 7, 1815	Brig LEGAL TENDER (Brit./Recap)	SPENCER	Halifax
March 19, 1815	Schooner THISTLE (Brit./Recap)	COSSACK	Halifax
March 26, 1815	Brig LOUISA (Brit./Recap)	MAIDSTONE	Halifax
March 28, 1815	Ship LILY (U.S.)	ASIA	Bermuda
Oct.1-March 25	Schooner SPEADWELL (U.S.)	SEVERN	Bermuda
Oct.1-March 25	Brig MAYFLOWER (U.S.)	SEVERN	Destroyed
Oct.1-March 25	Ship ANNA MARIA (Spain)	SEVERN	Bermuda
Oct.1-March 25	Ship BUONOPARTE (Spain)	SEVERN	Bermuda
Oct.1-March 25	Ship ANNA (U.S.)	SEVERN	Bermuda
Oct.1-March 25	Ship BETSEY (U.S.)	SEVERN	Destroyed
Oct.1-March 25	Schooner VIRGINIA (U.S.)	SEVERN	Destroyed
Oct.1-March 25	Schooner NONSUCH (U.S.)	SEVERN	Destroyed
Oct.1-March 25	Schooner BRANT (U.S.)	SEVERN	Destroyed
Oct.1-March 25	Priv. Ship NECESSITY (U.S.)	SEVERN	Bermuda
Oct.1-March 25	Schooner AMELIA (U.S.)	SEVERN	Bermuda
Oct.1-March 25	Schooner RESOLUTION (U.S.)	SEVERN	Ransom
Oct.1-March 25	Priv. Brig INK (U.S.)	SEVERN	Destroyed
Oct.1-March 25	Ship ADVENTURE (Brit./Recap)	SEVERN	Bermuda

Sources: Bermuda Prize Book, 1795-1813; Essex Institute, *American Vessels Captured by the British During the Revolution and War of 1812* (Salem, Mass., 1911); Faye Kert, *Research in Maritime Studies #11- Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812* (St. John's, Nfld., 1997); Library of Congress, Cochrane Papers, 1813-1815; *The London Times*, 1811-1815; *The Naval Chronicle*, 1807-1815; Public Archives of Canada, MG12, Adm.1/497-509; Public Archives of Canada, RG 8, IV, Vol. 64-160; University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library, Hotham Papers, 1812-1815

## APPENDIX B: SHIPS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN SQUADRON 1807-1814

<u>DATE</u>	<u>H.M. SHIPS(* Flagship)</u>	<u>CLASS(GUNS)</u>	<u>COMMANDERS (Admiral/Captain)</u>
Jan.1, 1807	LEOPARD*	4th Rate (50)	G. Berkeley/S.P. Humphreys
Jan.1, 1807	CAMBRIAN	Frigate (44)	W. Bradly
Jan.1, 1807	MILAN	Frigate (38)	R. Laurie
Jan.1, 1807	DECADE	Frigate (36)	John Stuart
Jan.1, 1807	CLEOPATRA	Frigate (32)	R. Simpson
Jan.1, 1807	SQUIRREL	6th Rate (24)	J. Shortland
Jan.1, 1807	AVON	Sloop (18)	M. Stark
Jan.1, 1807	HALIFAX	Sloop (18)	Lord J. Townsend
Jan.1, 1807	BERMUDA	Sloop (18)	W.H. Byam
Jan.1, 1807	DRIVER	Sloop (18)	C. Claridge
Jan.1, 1807	BUSY	Sloop (18)	R. Keily
July 1, 1807	TRIUMPH	3rd Rate (74)	T.M. Hardy
July 1, 1807	BELLONA	3rd Rate (74)	J.E. Douglas
July 1, 1807	LEOPARD*	4th Rate (50)	G. Berkeley/S.P. Humphreys
July 1, 1807	MILAN	Frigate (38)	R. Laurie
July 1, 1807	CLEOPATRA	Frigate (32)	R. Simpson
July 1, 1807	SQUIRREL	6th Rate (24)	J. Shortland
July 1, 1807	CROCODILE	6th Rate (24)	G.E. Betteworth
July 1, 1807	HALIFAX	Sloop (18)	Lord J. Townsend
July 1, 1807	BERMUDA	Sloop (18)	W.H. Byam
July 1, 1807	MARTIN	Sloop (18)	John Evans
July 1, 1807	OBSERVATEUR	Sloop (18)	W. Love
July 1, 1807	ATALANTE	Sloop (18)	Fred Hickey
July 1, 1807	DRIVER	Sloop (18)	C. Claridge
July 1, 1807	BUSY	Sloop (18)	R. Keily
July 1, 1807	COLUMBINE	Sloop (18)	J. Bradshaw
July 1, 1807	AVENGER	Sloop (14)	T. White
July 1, 1807	BREAM	Schooner (4)	A.B. Dowry
July 1, 1807	TANG	Schooner (4)	H.F. Senhouse
July 1, 1807	CUTTLE	Schooner (4)	T. Bury
July 1, 1807	PORGEY	Schooner (4)	E. Steel
July 1, 1807	CHUB	Schooner (4)	W.P. Croke
July 1, 1807	MULLET	Schooner (4)	G.M. Guise
Jan.1, 1808	SWIFTSURE*	3rd Rate (74)	J.B. Warren/J. Conn
Jan.1, 1808	TRIUMPH	3rd Rate (74)	T.M. Hardy
Jan.1, 1808	BELLONA	3rd Rate (74)	J.E. Douglas
Jan.1, 1808	LEOPARD	4th Rate (50)	S.P. Humphreys
Jan.1, 1808	HORATIO	Frigate (38)	G. Scott
Jan.1, 1808	MILAN	Frigate (38)	R. Laurie
Jan.1, 1808	MELAMPUS	Frigate (36)	E. Hawker
Jan.1, 1808	AEOLUS	Frigate (32)	Lord W. Fitzroy
Jan.1, 1808	CLEOPATRA	Frigate (32)	R. Simpson
Jan.1, 1808	SQUIRREL	6th Rate (24)	J. Shortland

Jan.1, 1808	INDIAN	Sloop (18)	C. Austen
Jan.1, 1808	BERMUDA	Sloop (18)	W.H. Byam
Jan.1, 1808	DRIVER	Sloop (18)	C. Claridge
Jan.1, 1808	COLUMBINE	Sloop (18)	J. Bradshaw
Jan.1, 1808	EMULOUS	Sloop (18)	G. Stupart
Jan.1, 1808	OBSERVATEUR	Sloop (18)	W.R.Smith
Jan.1, 1808	VESTA	Cutter (4)	C. Crowdy
Jan.1, 1808	BREAM	Schooner (4)	A.B. Dowry
Jan.1, 1808	CUTTLE	Schooner (4)	T. Bury
Jan.1, 1808	PORGEY	Schooner (4)	E. Steel
Jan.1, 1808	MULLET	Schooner (4)	G.M. Guise
Jan.1, 1809	SWIFTSURE*	3rd Rate (74)	J.B. Warren/John Conn
Jan.1, 1809	BELLONA	3rd Rate (74)	J.E. Douglas
Jan.1, 1809	HORATIO	Frigate (38)	G. Scott
Jan.1, 1809	MILAN	Frigate (38)	R. Laurie
Jan.1, 1809	HUSSAR	Frigate (38)	R. Lloyd
Jan.1, 1809	PENELOPE	Frigate (36)	John Dick
Jan.1, 1809	MELAMPUS	Frigate (36)	E. Hawker
Jan.1, 1809	AEOLUS	Frigate (32)	Lord W. Fitzroy
Jan.1, 1809	CLEOPATRA	Frigate (32)	R. Simpson
Jan.1, 1809	SQUIRREL	6th Rate (24)	J.Shortland
Jan.1, 1809	EURYDICE	6th Rate (24)	J. Bradshaw
Jan.1, 1809	BANTERER	6th Rate (22)	A. Shepperd
Jan.1, 1809	INDIAN	Sloop (18)	C. Austen
Jan.1, 1809	COLUMBINE	Sloop (18)	G. Hills
Jan.1, 1809	EMULOUS	Sloop (18)	G. Stupart
Jan.1, 1809	DRIVER	Sloop (18)	C. Claridge
Jan.1, 1809	CARNATION	Sloop (18)	C.M. Gregory
Jan.1, 1809	HALIFAX	Sloop (18)	Lord J. Townsend
Jan.1, 1809	FERRET	Sloop (18)	R. Wales
Jan.1, 1809	ATALANTE	Sloop (18)	Fred Hickey
Jan.1, 1809	OBSERVATEUR	Sloop (18)	J. Lawrence
Jan.1, 1809	PLUMPER	Brig (10)	W. Frissel
Jan.1, 1809	BARBARA	Schooner (10)	Dickens
Jan.1, 1809	SHAMROCK	Schooner (8)	A.B. Bowen
Jan.1, 1809	THISTLE	Schooner (8)	P. Proctor
Jan.1, 1809	HOLLY	Schooner (8)	L. Teacher
Jan.1, 1809	VESTA	Cutter (4)	W.B. Monds
Jan.1, 1809	BREAM	Schooner (4)	G.Miall
Jan.1, 1809	CUTTLE	Schooner (4)	T. Bury
Jan.1, 1809	PORGEY	Schooner (4)	M. Coote
Jan.1, 1809	MULLET	Schooner (4)	R. Standly
Jan.1, 1809	CHUB	Schooner (4)	W.P. Croke
Jan.1, 1809	TOURTERRELE	Receiving Ship	J. Young
Jan.1, 1810	SWIFTSURE*	3rd Rate (74)	J.B. Warren/John Conn
Jan.1, 1810	MILAN	Frigate (38)	R. Laurie
Jan.1, 1810	HUSSAR	Frigate (38)	R. Lloyd
Jan.1, 1810	JUNON	Frigate (38)	J. Shortland
Jan.1, 1810	PENELOPE	Frigate (36)	John Dick



Jan.1, 1810	MELAMPUS	Frigate (36)	E. Hawker
Jan.1, 1810	AEOLUS	Frigate (32)	Lord W. Fitzroy
Jan.1, 1810	CLEOPATRA	Frigate (32)	S.J. Pechell
Jan.1, 1810	EURYDICE	6th Rate (24)	J. Bradshaw
Jan.1, 1810	INDIAN	Sloop (18)	C. Austen
Jan.1, 1810	COLUMBINE	Sloop (18)	G. Hills
Jan.1, 1810	EMULOUS	Sloop (18)	G. Stupart
Jan.1, 1810	DRIVER	Sloop (18)	J. Lawrence
Jan.1, 1810	HALIFAX	Sloop (18)	Lord J. Townsend
Jan.1, 1810	FERRET	Sloop (18)	R. Wales
Jan.1, 1810	ATALANTE	Sloop (18)	Fred Hickey
Jan.1, 1810	MARTIN	Sloop (18)	John Evans
Jan.1, 1810	GOREE	Sloop (18)	H.Byng
Jan.1, 1810	LITTLE BELT	Sloop (18)	John Crispo
Jan.1, 1810	OBSERVATEUR	Sloop (18)	D. Weatherhall
Jan.1, 1810	COLIBRI	Brig (16)	J. Thompson
Jan.1, 1810	PLUMPER	Brig (10)	W. Frissel
Jan.1, 1810	BARBARA	Schooner (10)	Dickens
Jan.1, 1810	SHAMROCK	Schooner (8)	A.B. Bowen
Jan.1, 1810	THISTLE	Schooner (8)	P. Proctor
Jan.1, 1810	HOLLY	Schooner (8)	L. Treacher
Jan.1, 1810	CAROLINE	Schooner (8)	
Jan.1, 1810	JUNIPER	Schooner (8)	Vassal
Jan.1, 1810	VESTA	Cutter (4)	G.Miall
Jan.1, 1810	BREAM	Schooner (4)	Pollard
Jan.1, 1810	CUTTLE	Schooner (4)	T. Bevey
Jan.1, 1810	MULLET	Schooner (4)	R. Standly
Jan.1, 1810	CHUB	Schooner (4)	Innis
Jan.1, 1810	INFLEXIBLE	Receiving Ship	P. Brown
Jan.1, 1810	TOURTERELLE	Receiving Ship	Young
Jan.1, 1810	CENTURION	Receiving Ship	Dyer
Jan.1, 1811	SWIFTSURE*	3rd Rate (74)	J.B. Warren/R.Lloyd
Jan.1, 1811	GUERRIERE	Frigate (38)	S.J. Pechell
Jan.1, 1811	BELVEDIRA	Frigate (36)	R. Byron
Jan.1, 1811	MELAMPUS	Frigate (36)	E. Hawker
Jan.1, 1811	AEOLUS	Frigate (32)	Lord Townsend
Jan.1, 1811	CLEOPATRA	Frigate (32)	C.J. Austen
Jan.1, 1811	EURYDICE	6th Rate (24)	J. Bradshaw
Jan.1, 1811	INDIAN	Sloop (18)	H. Jane
Jan.1, 1811	EMULOUS	Sloop (18)	G. Stupart
Jan.1, 1811	HALIFAX	Sloop (18)	A. Fraser
Jan.1, 1811	ATALANTE	Sloop (18)	Fred Hickey
Jan.1, 1811	RATTLER	Sloop (18)	A. Gordon
Jan.1, 1811	LITTLE BELT	Sloop (18)	A.B. Bingham
Jan.1, 1811	FANTOME	Sloop (18)	Lawrence
Jan.1, 1811	COLIBRI	Brig (16)	J. Thompson
Jan.1, 1811	PLUMPER	Brig (10)	W. Frissel
Jan.1, 1811	BARBARA	Schooner (10)	Dickens
Jan.1, 1811	JUNIPER	Schooner (10)	Vassal
Jan.1, 1811	HOLLY	Schooner (8)	L. Treacher

Jan.1, 1811	VESTA	Cutter (4)	G.Miall
Jan.1, 1811	BREAM	Schooner (4)	Simpson
Jan.1, 1811	CUTTLE	Schooner (4)	Molloy
Jan.1, 1811	CHUB	Schooner (4)	Nesbitt
Jan.1, 1811	TOURTERELLE	Receiving Ship	Scott
Jan.1, 1811	CENTURION	Receiving Ship	Kinsman
July 1, 1812	AFRICA*	3rd Rate (64)	H. Sawyer/J. Bastard
July 1, 1812	GUERRIERE	Frigate (38)	J.R. Dacres
July 1, 1812	SPARTAN	Frigate (38)	E.P. Brenton
July 1, 1812	SHANNON	Frigate (38)	B.P.V. Broke
July 1, 1812	BELVEDIRA	Frigate (36)	R. Byron
July 1, 1812	AEOLUS	Frigate (32)	Lord Townsend
July 1, 1812	TARTARUS	6th Rate (20)	J.Pasco
July 1, 1812	EMULOUS	Sloop (18)	W.H. Mulcaster
July 1, 1812	RATTLER	Sloop (18)	A. Gordon
July 1, 1812	INDIAN	Sloop (18)	H. Jane
July 1, 1812	ATALANTE	Sloop (18)	Fred Hickey
July 1, 1812	GOREE	Sloop (18)	H.D.Byng
July 1, 1812	MORGIANA	Sloop (18)	D. Scott
July 1, 1812	SYLPH	Sloop (18)	W.Evans
July 1, 1812	RECRUIT	Sloop (18)	H.F. Senhouse
July 1, 1812	MARTIN	Sloop (18)	John Evans
July 1, 1812	COLIBRI	Brig (16)	J. Thompson
July 1, 1812	PLUMPER	Brig (10)	Bray
July 1, 1812	PAZ	Schooner (10)	Dumaresq
July 1, 1812	JUNIPER	Schooner (8)	Vassal
July 1, 1812	BREAM	Schooner (4)	Simpson
July 1, 1812	CUTTLE	Schooner (4)	Saunders
July 1, 1812	CHUB	Schooner (4)	Nesbitt
July 1, 1812	CENTURION	Receiving Ship	Kinsman
July 1, 1812	RUBY	Receiving Ship	Commodore Evans/Trounce
July 1, 1813	SAN DOMINGO*	3rd Rate (74)	J.B. Warren/S.J. Pechell
July 1, 1813	DRAGON	3rd Rate (74)	R. Barrie
July 1, 1813	RAMILLIES	3rd Rate (74)	T.M. Hardy
July 1, 1813	POICTIERS	3rd Rate (74)	J.P. Beresford
July 1, 1813	MARLBOROUGH*	3rd Rate (74)	G. Cockburn/R. Honyman
July 1, 1813	VALIANT	3rd Rate (74)	R.D. Oliver
July 1, 1813	LA HOGUE	3rd Rate (74)	Commodore Hotham/T.B.Capel
July 1, 1813	VICTORIOUS	3rd Rate (74)	J. Talbot
July 1, 1813	PLANTAGENET	3rd Rate (74)	R. Lloyd
July 1, 1813	SCEPTRE	3rd Rate (74)	C.B.H. Ross
July 1, 1813	MAJESTIC	4th Rate (54)	J. Hayes
July 1, 1813	ACASTA	Frigate (44)	A.R.Kerr
July 1, 1813	LOIRE	Frigate (40)	T. Brown
July 1, 1813	NYMPHE	Frigate (38)	F.P. Epworth
July 1, 1813	JUNON	Frigate (38)	J. Sanders
July 1, 1813	TENEDOS	Frigate (38)	H. Parker
July 1, 1813	SPARTAN	Frigate (38)	E.P. Brenton
July 1, 1813	SHANNON	Frigate (38)	B.P.V. Broke

July 1, 1813	LACEDEMONIAN	Frigate (38)	S. Jackson
July 1, 1813	MAIDSTONE	Frigate (36)	G. Burdette
July 1, 1813	BELVEDIRA	Frigate (36)	R. Byron
July 1, 1813	BARROSSA	Frigate (36)	W.H. Shirreff
July 1, 1813	NARCISSUS	Frigate (32)	J.R. Lumley
July 1, 1813	AEOLUS	Frigate (32)	Lord J. Townshend
July 1, 1813	CLEOPATRA	Frigate (32)	C. Gill
July 1, 1813	MINERVA	Frigate (32)	R. Hawkins
July 1, 1813	LAURENSTINUS	6th Rate (24)	T. Graham
July 1, 1813	WANDERER	6th Rate (24)	F. Newcombe
July 1, 1813	SOPHIE	Sloop (18)	N. Lockyer
July 1, 1813	CURLEW	Sloop (18)	M. Head
July 1, 1813	RATTLER	Sloop (18)	H.D. Byng
July 1, 1813	NIMROD	Sloop (18)	N. Mitchell
July 1, 1813	ATALANTE	Sloop (18)	Fred Hickey
July 1, 1813	FANTOME	Sloop (18)	J. Lawrence
July 1, 1813	COLUMBIA	Sloop (18)	J. Kinsman
July 1, 1813	MORGIANA	Sloop (18)	D. Scott
July 1, 1813	LOUP CERVIER	Sloop (18)	W.B. Mends
July 1, 1813	SYLPH	Sloop (18)	W. Evans
July 1, 1813	RECRUIT	Sloop (18)	G.R. Pechell
July 1, 1813	RALEIGH	Sloop (18)	G.W. Hooper
July 1, 1813	WASP	Sloop (18)	T. Everhard
July 1, 1813	RINGDOVE	Sloop (18)	W. Dowers
July 1, 1813	MARTIN	Sloop (18)	H.F. Senhouse
July 1, 1813	EMULOUS	Sloop (18)	W. Godfrey
July 1, 1813	COLIBRI	Brig (16)	J. Thompson
July 1, 1813	MANLY	Brig (14)	E. Collier
July 1, 1813	CONFLICT	Brig (14)	H.L. Baker
July 1, 1813	CONTEST	Brig (14)	J. Rattray
July 1, 1813	MOHAWK	Brig (12)	W. Litchfield
July 1, 1813	BORER	Brig (12)	R. Coote
July 1, 1813	BOLD	Brig (12)	J. Skekel
July 1, 1813	BOXER	Brig (12)	S. Blyth
July 1, 1813	THISTLE	Brig (12)	J.K. White
July 1, 1813	PAZ	Schooner (10)	Dumaresq
July 1, 1813	BREAM	Schooner (4)	Hare
July 1, 1813	CUTTLE	Schooner (4)	Saunders
July 1, 1813	CENTURION	Receiving Ship	Brand
July 1, 1813	RUBY	Receiving Ship	Evans/Ward
July 1, 1813	ARDENT	Prison Ship	J. Cochet
April 1, 1814	ASIA*	3rd Rate (74)	A. Cochrane/W. Wainwright
April 1, 1814	DRAGON	3rd Rate (74)	R. Barrie
April 1, 1814	RAMILLIES	3rd Rate (74)	T.M. Hardy
April 1, 1814	VALIANT	3rd Rate (74)	R.D. Oliver
April 1, 1814	LA HOGUE	3rd Rate (74)	T.B. Capel
April 1, 1814	VICTORIOUS	3rd Rate (74)	J. Talbot
April 1, 1814	PLANTAGENET	3rd Rate (74)	R. Lloyd
April 1, 1814	SCEPTRE*	3rd Rate (74)	G. Cockburn/C.B.H. Ross
April 1, 1814	SAN DOMINGO	3rd Rate (74)	J.C. Pechell

April 1, 1814 ALBION	3rd Rate (74)	J.F. Devonshire
April 1, 1814 GOLIATH	4th Rate (54)	F.L. Maitland
April 1, 1814 MAJESTIC	4th Rate (54)	J. Hayes
April 1, 1814 DIADEM	4th Rate (54)	G. Byng
April 1, 1814 SATURN	4th Rate (54)	J. Nash
April 1, 1814 ACASTA	Frigate (44)	A.R. Keir
April 1, 1814 ENDYMION	Frigate (40)	H. Hope
April 1, 1814 LOIRE	Frigate (40)	T. Brown
April 1, 1814 SEVERN	Frigate (40)	J. Nourse
April 1, 1814 STATIRA	Frigate (38)	H. Stackpole
April 1, 1814 JUNON	Frigate (38)	C. Upton
April 1, 1814 NYMPHE	Frigate (38)	F.P. Epworth
April 1, 1814 TENEDOS	Frigate (38)	H. Parker
April 1, 1814 NIEMEN	Frigate (38)	S. Pym
April 1, 1814 CHESAPEAKE	Frigate (38)	A. Gordon
April 1, 1814 ARMIDE	Frigate (38)	T. Troubridge
April 1, 1814 BARROSSA	Frigate (36)	W.H. Shirreff
April 1, 1814 MAIDSTONE	Frigate (36)	G. Burdette
April 1, 1814 BELVEDIRA	Frigate (36)	R. Byron
April 1, 1814 NARCISSUS	Frigate (32)	J. Lumley
April 1, 1814 ORPHEUS	Frigate (32)	H. Pigot
April 1, 1814 MINERVA	Frigate (32)	R. Hawkins
April 1, 1814 ROSAMOND	Sloop (20)	D. Campbell
April 1, 1814 HERALD	Sloop (20)	C. Milward
April 1, 1814 AMARANTHE	Sloop (18)	G. Pringle
April 1, 1814 ACTEON	Sloop (18)	B.C. Cator
April 1, 1814 CHILDERS	Sloop (18)	J. Bedford
April 1, 1814 CASTILIAN	Sloop (18)	D. Braimer
April 1, 1814 CURLEW	Sloop (18)	M. Head
April 1, 1814 EPERVIER	Sloop (18)	R. Wales
April 1, 1814 EMULOUS	Sloop (18)	W.H. Godfrey
April 1, 1814 FANTOME	Sloop (18)	J. Lawrence
April 1, 1814 INDIAN	Sloop (18)	T. Sykes
April 1, 1814 MARTIN	Sloop (18)	H.F. Senhouse
April 1, 1814 MORGIANA	Sloop (18)	D. Scott
April 1, 1814 MOSELLE	Sloop (18)	J. Maberley
April 1, 1814 PARTRIDGE	Sloop (18)	J. Adye
April 1, 1814 PEACOCK	Sloop (18)	B. W. Mends
April 1, 1814 RALEIGH	Sloop (18)	G. W. Hooper
April 1, 1814 RECRUIT	Sloop (18)	G. Dickens
April 1, 1814 SYLPH	Sloop (18)	W. Kinsman
April 1, 1814 WASP	Sloop (18)	T. Everhard
April 1, 1814 CONFLICT	Brig (14)	H. L. Baker
April 1, 1814 CONTEST	Brig (14)	J. Rattray
April 1, 1814 MANLY	Brig (14)	E. Collier
April 1, 1814 THISTLE	Brig (12)	J. K. White
April 1, 1814 HELICON	Schooner (10)	H. Hopkins

Sources: Public Records Office, Adm.8/93-100; *Steel's Original and Correct List of the Royal Navy, 1814*

### **APPENDIX C: SHIPS LOST BY THE N.A. SQUADRON 1807-1815**

<b><u>DATE</u></b>	<b><u>H.M. SHIPS</u></b>	<b><u>CLASS (GUNS)</u></b>	<b><u>CAUSE OF LOSS</u></b>
Feb. 1807	BUSY	Sloop (18)	Wrecked
Oct.3, 1808	CARNATION	Sloop (18)	Mutiny; Destroyed by French at Martinique
Oct.29, 1808	BANTERER	6th Rate (22)	Wrecked in the St.Lawrence
Dec.13, 1809	JUNON	Frigate (40)	Sunk after battle with four French Frigates
Nov. 1810	PLUMPER	Brig (10)	Wrecked in the St.Lawrence
March 6, 1811	THISTLE	Schooner (10)	Wrecked off Sandy Hook near New York
Aug.14, 1812	CHUBB	Schooner (4)	Wrecked near Halifax
Aug.19, 1812	GUERRIERE	Frigate (38)	Sunk by Frigate USS CONSTITUTION
Sept.8, 1812	LAURA	Schooner (12)	Captured by French privateer DILIGENT
Sept. 1812	MAGNET	Brig (16)	Presumed lost on journey to Halifax
Dec. 5, 1812	PLUMPER	Brig (12)	Wrecked in the Bay of Fundy
Aug.22, 1813	COLIBRI	Brig (16)	Wrecked off South Carolina
Sept.3, 1813	BOXER	Brig (16)	Captured by Brig USS ENTERPRISE
Sept.27, 1813	BOLD	Brig (14)	Wrecked off Prince Edward Island
Oct.22, 1813	LAURENSTINUS	6th Rate (22)	Wrecked in the Bahamas
Nov. 10, 1813	ATALANTE	Sloop (18)	Wrecked near Halifax
Feb.14, 1814	PICTOU	Sloop (14)	Captured by Frigate USS CONSTITUTION
April 29, 1814	EPERVIER	Sloop (18)	Captured by Sloop USS PEACOCK
June 28, 1814	LEOPARD	4th Rate (Troopship)	Wrecked on Anticosti Island
Aug.4, 1814	PEACOCK	Sloop (18)	Presumed lost foundered off South Carolina
Sept.15, 1814	HERMES	Sloop (20)	Destroyed off Fort Bowyer
Nov.24, 1814	FANTOME	Sloop (18)	Wrecked near Halifax during a gale
Nov.24, 1814	CUTTLE	Schooner (4)	Wrecked near Halifax during a gale
Nov.24, 1814	HERRING	Schooner (4)	Wrecked near Halifax during a gale
Jan.17, 1815	SYLPH	Sloop (18)	Wrecked off Long Island
Feb. 26, 1815	ST. LAWRENCE	Schooner (16)	Captured by American privateer CHASSEUR
Feb. 26, 1815	STATIRA	Frigate (38)	Wrecked in the West Indies

Sources: William Laird Clowes, *A History of the Royal Navy From the Earliest Times to the Present Times*, 7 vols. (London, 1897-1903); W.P. Gosset, *The Lost Ships of the Royal Navy 1793-1900* (London and New York, 1986)

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

This work relied on several key primary and secondary sources relating to British naval history. The most important of these are the In-Letters and Out-Letters of the Secretary's Department of the Admiralty, referred to as Admiralty 1 and Admiralty 2. These cover not only the correspondence and letters between the commanders-in-chief of the North American Squadron and the Board of Admiralty, but also include those of the commander-in-chiefs and the captains who served under them on the station. These were extremely useful in giving firsthand accounts of lesser-known battles involving the squadron's ships, particularly against enemy privateers and merchant shipping. They were also quite valuable in giving insight into some of the conflicts and personality clashes between the officers in the Royal Navy, and reveal that although this era was the navy's golden age, it was not always one big 'band of brothers.'

Another important source of primary material are the journals, papers and diaries of some of the key individuals who served on the station. They help present a more personal aspect of the men who served in the squadron and in the Royal Navy. These include the papers of Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn, and Captain Sir Robert Barrie, both of whom commanded the British naval forces operating in Chesapeake Bay in 1813 and 1814; the papers of Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Hotham, who served as Warren's fleet captain; the papers of John Wilson Croker, who served as Secretary of the Admiralty throughout this period; the papers of Robert Dundas Saunders, 2<sup>nd</sup> Viscount Melville, the First Lord of the Admiralty during the War of

1812; the journal of Lieutenant Henry Napier, who served on the northern sector during the later part of the war; and the papers of four of the squadron commanders, Admirals Sir Peter Warren, Sir John Borlase Warren, Sir Herbert Sawyer the Younger and Sir Alexander Cochrane.

As this work primarily concerns the naval operations of the North American Squadron, it was important to obtain full and complete listings detailing the composition of the squadron between 1807 and 1815. The most reliable source for this is the Ships-in-Sea-Pay list from the Admiralty 8 series. These show the full order of warships attached to every squadron in the Royal Navy. For the period after 1813, it was necessary to consult *Steel's Original and Correct List of the Royal Navy* and *The Naval Chronicle* to obtain an accurate count of the ships attached to the North American Squadron.

By far the most difficult job of this thesis was in compiling the lists of ships captured or destroyed by the ships of the squadron. Apart from the lists included in the Cockburn, Cochrane and Hotham papers and the Admiralty 1 series, this work also used the records of the Vice-Admiralty Courts of Bermuda and Halifax. The Bermuda Prize Book, 1795-1813 and the Essex Institute's *American Vessels Captured by the British During the Revolution and the War of 1812* were also frequently consulted. The *Naval Chronicle* and the *London Gazette* reprinted many of the lists that appeared in the Admiralty 1 Series, though not without occasional errors. The main problem in compiling the list was that several cases of the sources contradicting each other as to date of capture of some ships. The most reliable sources are the letters from the captains describing in full detail the ships they captured, but this was not always done.

The discrepancies in the dates were sometimes weeks or even months apart, and resulted in the ships being recorded as having twice been captured. The most frequent cause of the errors was from the Vice-Admiralty Courts, which sometimes listed the date the captured ships were brought to port, not when they were captured. As it was not uncommon for several ships to have the same name, the ships would be listed twice. This work strove to weed out the mistakes made from these records.

As France was the primary opponent of Great Britain in the Western Hemisphere until the War of 1812, it was necessary to consult French archival documents concerning their part in the naval war in this sector. Marine Série BB5 gives very good details of the warships and privateers lost by France during the war, while Marine Série FF2 was invaluable in listing not only the names of the French privateers operating in this theatre between 1807 and 1810, but also in showing that several of their raiders openly operated from American ports. This was crucial in establishing a more tangible reason for the Royal Navy's presence off American ports, a key factor in the deterioration of relations between the United States and Great Britain.

The squadron's role period prior to the War of 1812 was extensively covered in this work, for which several sources were used. W.A.B. Douglas' thesis "Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766" was immensely useful to give background on the creation of the North American Squadron and its role in the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War. The works of Herbert Richmond and Julian Corbett, *The Navy in the War of 1739-48* (3 vols.) and *England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined Strategy* (2 vols.) respectively, were also frequently cited. These works gave an excellent account on the Royal Navy's operations in these



conflicts, and also showed the political and economic impact of these operations. David Syrett's works on naval operations during the American Revolution, *The Royal Navy in American Waters 1775-1783* and *The Royal Navy in European Waters During the American Revolutionary War* have also become standard works on the subject, expertly showing the conduct of the Royal Navy's officers and operations during that conflict. Another very useful work for this period is Robert Gardiner's *Navies and the American Revolution*, which gives a thorough account of the naval war in every ocean it was fought.

The relationship of the colonies and the Royal Navy was the subject of several works by George Rawlyk, including *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations*, *Yankees at Louisbourg*, and *Revolution Rejected 1775-1776*. There was also no shortage of general works on the conflicts of this early period, including Fred Anderson's *The Crucible of War*, Francis Parkman's *The Battle for North America*, Robert Leckie's *A Few Acres of Snow: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars*, Guy Fregault's *Canada: The War of the Conquest*, and Piers Mackesy's *The War for America 1775-1783*.

There has been no shortage of secondary sources describing the war at sea during the 1793-1815 period. One of the first to be published was William James' *A Full and Correct Account of the Chief Naval Occurrences of the Late War Between Great Britain and the United States of America*, published in 1817. Most of the material in this history was incorporated into his more famous work, *The Naval History of Great Britain From the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV*. This work was originally five volumes, but a sixth volume was added to include the

events that led up to the Battle of Navarino.<sup>1</sup> James' purpose was to write a narrative of the major naval battles involving the Royal Navy during this period, from fleet battles to single-ship actions, and confines his history strictly to the sea. While this is a most useful guide in compiling the numerous actions that were fought during this period, it would be a mistake to say it is flawless. He did place importance on first-hand sources in collecting his data, such as log books and letters in writing his history, but one would think after reading James' history that the war at sea consisted solely of battles fought by the navies at war. In fact, he pays little attention to the Royal Navy's actions against enemy privateers and shipping, as if they were not worth mentioning. Also, one must fault James for his extreme bias against England's enemies, particularly on his section dealing with the War of 1812, which can be labeled as extremely xenophobic. This had largely to do with the fact that James had been detained in the United States during the war, and wrote his work to counter American claims that they had come out of the conflict victorious. The Admiralty thoroughly approved his work, and it soon became for the British the standard naval history of that era.

The first major American naval history was James Fenimore Cooper's *History of the Navy of the United States*, which was published in 1839. Though not a historian by profession by profession, Cooper also relied on primary sources and even oral accounts from survivors of the naval conflicts.<sup>2</sup> He wrote his work partly in response to James' history, but was considerably less biased than James and other contemporaries in his writings. Like James, though, his work must also be relegated as a narrative, more

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<sup>1</sup> Andrew Lambert, *The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession* (London, 1998), 58-59

interested in recounting the naval battles of the period. Four decades after Cooper's history was published, Theodore Roosevelt produced another important work on the subject, simply titled *The Naval War of 1812*. At first glance it is a most impressive work, especially when one considers that Roosevelt was not a writer by profession, let alone a historian. Through sheer determination, Roosevelt forced himself to become an expert on this subject, and compiled an impressive amount of data and information from numerous sources. On the whole it is still a very good work, but like his predecessors, Roosevelt also had his motives to write this work. His main purpose was, like Cooper, to give a counterbalance to James' work, which he described as a piece of special pleading by a bitter and not over-scrupulous partisan.<sup>3</sup> He was also less than flattering towards Cooper's work, which he claimed was less accurate and even less of an authority than James' work.<sup>4</sup> Roosevelt even went so far as to claim that prior to his work, most of the documents at the Navy Department had never been examined. In this he was clearly wrong, as Cooper made extensive use of the dispatches and battle reports from the official records. It appears that Roosevelt went so far to show the faults and biases of his predecessors that he could be accused of letting his own biases taint his work.

Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, naval history as a whole underwent a remarkable transformation. This was due largely to the efforts of men such as John and Philip Colomb, John Knox Laughton, Alfred Thayer Mahan, as well as Richmond and

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<sup>2</sup> William S. Dudley, 'Naval Historians and the War of 1812', *Naval History* (Spring 1990), 53

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 54

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

Corbett. Laughton in particular gained attention in 1874 when he delivered a paper entitled “The Scientific Study of Naval History”, in which he described how the study of naval history was more than just describing naval battles. He claimed that it contained lessons that could be applied in future naval conflicts.<sup>5</sup> Laughton was able to take naval history out of the hands of mere specialists or analysts, and this owed much to the application of critical methods to primary source material.<sup>6</sup> He helped to establish the Navy Records Society in 1894, and along with Mahan can be credited with the naval intellectual revival of the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century. He did this by helping with the development of strategic thought and naval doctrine, and the interconnection of politics, commerce, finance and naval strategy.<sup>7</sup> Many of the historians who followed him, such as Corbett and Richmond, were very much inspired by his methods. Their works were far removed from the simpler narratives of James and his contemporaries, whose works could be considered as propaganda, interested primarily in describing great battles and the men who fought them, while paying little attention to the world outside of these engagements.

While Laughton is remembered mainly as a teacher of naval history, Alfred Thayer Mahan can arguably lay claim as one of history’s most famous historians. In fact, his fame has made him the naval equivalent of Clausewitz. As an officer in the United States Navy, Mahan came across Laughton’s 1874 paper, which would have an

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<sup>5</sup> Gerald S. Graham, *The Politics of Naval Supremacy: Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy* (Cambridge, 1965), 4-6; D.M. Schurman, *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914* (Chicago, 1965), 12-15, 85-86

<sup>6</sup> Schurman, *Education of a Navy*, 108-109

<sup>7</sup> Graham, *The Politics of Naval Supremacy*, 6; Lambert, *The Foundations of Naval History*, 228

important influence on his later works.<sup>8</sup> Mahan's most famous work remains *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*, was published in 1890, followed two years later with *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812*, both of which were immediately acclaimed as masterpieces. He claimed that his intent was to show the impact of naval affairs on the shifts of European power politics for a hundred-year period, and to expound the principles that emerged from the study of the main naval operations and battles during that time.<sup>9</sup> Of special importance was his use of the works of French histories in his works, to help balance the traditional British views of events and reasons for the French Navy's failures.<sup>10</sup> Yet the real importance of his works was that, as Dr. Schurman describes, "He helped reawaken in England that upon the nurture and proper use of their naval power great military and political results had depended in the past, and to suggest convincingly that these past lessons might be instructive to confused military and political people in the present."<sup>11</sup> Put simply, he was able to link England's Imperial power with her naval supremacy.

Strangely enough, Mahan showed no immediate interest in writing a naval history of the War of 1812. This was the logical conclusion to his two earlier works, but he waited thirteen years after the second work to publish *Sea Power In Its Relations to the War of 1812*. His description of the main naval battles of this war are less detailed than in the works of his predecessors like James, Cooper and Roosevelt. However, he could

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<sup>8</sup> Graham, *The Politics of Naval Supremacy*, 4

<sup>9</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783* (London, 1892) 1-2; Schurman, *The Education of a Navy*, 71

<sup>10</sup> Schurman, *Education of a Navy*, 70

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 80

not be accused of a pro-American bias, or that he was trying to counterbalance another historians work. He was highly critical of Jefferson and Madison for their diplomatic ineptitude and for leading their nation to war without being properly prepared for it, as well as how the United States Navy was used in the war. Roosevelt was highly critical of this work, stating that "I was diappointed as you with Mahan's War of 1812... he cannot write in effective shape of the navy or of the fighting of his own country."<sup>12</sup> If there was a weakness in Mahan's work is that it paid little attention to the British coastal campaign. Still, it remains an important source, and further helped in inspiring generations of naval historians.

The 19<sup>th</sup> Century closed with one more major contribution to naval history, William Laird Clowes' seven-volume *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present*, published between 1897 to 1903. Clowes was a naval correspondent of the Times, and set about to produce a complete history of the Royal Navy. This was a monumental task, and he would recruit several high profile authors to help him. Mahan contributed to the section on the American Revolution, while Roosevelt rehashed his own work for the War of 1812. In many ways, Clowes' work feels like a throwback to the earlier histories of James and Cooper, with considerable detail to the countless actions fought at sea (unlike James, though, he is more charitable about including battles with enemy privateers). However, he also includes the technical and administrative aspects of the navy, which was especially useful in this work. It is a far better work than James, but also not without its fair share of inaccuracies. Overall,

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<sup>12</sup> as quoted in Dudley, 'Naval Historians and the War of 1812', 56

the Laughton and Mahan approach to naval history had a major impact in the writings of 20<sup>th</sup> Century naval historians, such as Corbett and Richmond, and offer more than a narrative on the naval battles of the two wars. They give the readers a broader view of the conflicts from the political and economic point of view, and describe events that occurred far from the sea that had a direct impact on the course of the naval war. The bulk of the naval histories written in the last century have attempted to emulate Mahan, focusing more on the strategic aspects of the wars than in describing every individual battle, large or small, that was fought.

There are no shortages of works devoted to the Royal Navy during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Apart from the works already mentioned, some of the more prominent works covering this period include Michael Lewis' *A Social History of the Navy 1793-1815* and N.A.M. Rodger's *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy*, which give a vivid description of the workings of the Royal Navy, from the Lords of the Admiralty to the lower ranks. Brian Lavery's *Nelson's Navy* is also a useful guide to this, and he incorporates much of Rodger and Lewis' work into his own. There are countless other major works that focus on the inner workings of the Royal Navy during the sailing ship era, including N.A.M. Rodger's *The Admiralty*, J.L. Stokesbury's *Navy and Empire*, Nicholas Blake and Richard Lawrence's *The Illustrated Companion to Nelson's Navy*, Christopher Lloyd's *The Nation and the Navy*, Leslie Gardiner's *The British Admiralty*, Graham J. Marcus' *The Age of Nelson*, Keith S. Dent's "The British Navy and the Anglo-American War of 1812 to 1815", Barry Judson Lohnes' "The War of 1812 at Sea: The British Navy, New England, and the Maritime Provinces of Canada", Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, and

Steve Pope's *Hornblower's Navy*. These works all provided considerable information about the men who served in on board the ships of King George III.

The sailing ships of this era were as important as the men who served on them. Several books have been written in recent years on the design and development of the sailing warship. One of the most prominent naval historians on this subject is Robert Gardiner, who wrote *Frigates of the Napoleonic War* and *Warships of the Napoleonic Era*. These two volumes offer an excellent account of the construction and maintenance of the warships of all the major navies from this period. Yet with regards to the Royal Navy's warships, even these books are dwarfed by David Lyon's *The Sailing Navy's List: All the Ships of the Royal Navy Built, Purchased and Captured, 1688-1860*, which gives a full description of the various warship classes and their subsequent fates. Another important work on the subject of the construction and maintenance of the ships of the Royal Navy is Robert Albion's *Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy 1652-1862*. Albion shows how access to timber and naval stores played an important role in British foreign policy. On the American side, Howard Chapelle's *A History of the American Sailing Navy, Their Ships and Their Development* is an invaluable source on American warship design, especially on their mighty 44-gun frigates. The French do not have a work comparable to Lyon's or Chapelle in dealing with warship development in the French Navy, but Jean Boudriot's *History of the French Frigate* did prove useful for this class of warship, and how they measured up to their British and American counterparts.

As France and the United States were the two main enemies England confronted during the 1807-1815 period, it was necessary to give considerable attention to these



nations. Apart from the works of Chapelle, Cooper, Roosevelt work, one of the major works on the American side of the naval war is Edgar Stanton Maclay's *History of the United States Navy from 1775 to 1898*. Maclay in particular falls in the same category as James both for thoroughness and bias in favor of his country's navy. A more recent study on the early years of the United States Navy is Craig L. Symonds' *Navalists and antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States 1785-1827*. This is an invaluable work in describing the American government's changing policies towards their navy, and shows why the United States was not better prepared for war in 1812. Other important source is William S. Dudley's *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*, which have reprinted hundreds of letters between key officials in the American government and senior officers of the American Navy, as well as many between the officers of the Royal Navy and their own government. Other important works cited in this work include Christopher McKee's *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815*, and Harold and Margaret Sprout's *The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918*.

Compared to British and American works on the subject, there are far fewer sources dealing with the activities of the French Navy in this era. This is understandable, as both the British and Americans were able to sell their histories to a public that wanted to read about glorious victories. For the most part, the history of the French Navy is a litany of defeats, which made it far more difficult for French readers to become enthused over. Nevertheless, one of the better general histories written in the last few decades is E.H. Jenkins' *A History of the French Navy*. Jenkins' work is especially useful in describing the political and administrative side of the French Navy,

and how mismanagement at the top and political intrigue did more harm to the French Navy than its rival navies. Jenkins does include the important naval campaigns, but pays little heed to the smaller actions.

Privateering was also an important aspect of the war at sea in this era, especially as it became the main naval weapon of both France and the United States. One of the main sources on the French *guerre-de-course* is C.B. Norman's *The Corsairs of France*, and was especially valuable in providing statistics on the success and failures of the French raiders. Other important sources are Colonel H. de Poyen's *La Guerre des Antilles de 1793 à 1815* and Ulane Bonnells *La France, Les États-Unis et la Guerre-de-Course 1797-1815*. The former was very useful in describing privateer operations in the West Indies and their impact against British trade, while the latter work is one of the most thorough accounts of Franco-American relations during the period, and also gives considerable detail to the exploits of French privateers against American shipping. Bonnells work shows that the United States had almost as much reason to go to war with France as it did with England, as the French were almost as ruthless against American merchant ships as the British.

The subject of privateering has been dominated by American historians, and for obvious reasons. Their successes in the American Revolution and the War of 1812 have been easy to sell to the American public. One of the first serious works on the subject was George Coggeshall's *History of American Privateers During Our War With England in the Years 1812, 1813, and 1814*. This is a very useful guide that attempts to list all of the vessels captured by American raiders during the war, though only a small number of engagements are fully described. Edgar Stanton Maclay also wrote an

important work on American privateer operations, *The History of American Privateers*, but unlike Coggeshall, he gives much fuller accounts of privateer actions, but does not come close to giving a full account of the privateer war. Jerome Garitee's *The Republic's Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore During the war of 1812*, and John Philip Cranwell and William Bowers Crane's *Men of Marque: A History of Private Armed Vessels Out of Baltimore During the War of 1812* offer a close examination of the privateers that operated from this port, the largest privateer center in the United States.

Privateering was also a popular subject in Canada. Two of the standard works on the subject are C.H.J. Snider's *Under the Red Flag: Privateers of the Maritime Provinces of Canada in the War of 1812*, and Archibald MacMechan's *Nova Scotia Privateers*. Snider's work is closer in spirit to Maclay, as he uses examples from some of the better known privateer actions in his work rather than just list all of the actions involving Canadian privateers. Far more useful to the subject is Faye Kert's recent work, *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of*, which gives considerable detail to the workings of the Vice-Admiralty Court, how letters-of-marque were obtained and how prizes were adjudicated. And Although British privateering during the war with France is not a central theme to this work, several works were consulted on the subject. Foremost among these are Sister Jean de Chantal Kennedy's *Bermuda's Sailors of Fortune* and *Frith of Bermuda: Gentleman Privateer*. These works help show how privateers helped the British war effort in attacking enemy trade, but were often at odds with the ships of the Royal Navy, who saw them as rivals for prize money. Kert's work was particularly useful in detailing

privateer activity in Nova Scotia, as well as the workings of the Vice-Admiralty Court in Halifax.

The history of the North American Squadron's bases at Halifax and Bermuda were also an integral part of this study. Apart from the works of Rawlyk and Douglas, other important works about the history of Halifax are Thomas Raddall's *Halifax, Warden of the North* and T.B. Akins' *History of Halifax City*. Though they both offer only a brief overview of the history of the city, they do provide a number of useful anecdotes about the role of the Royal Navy in the city's development. Other works consulted include David Allison's *History of Nova Scotia*, W.S. MacNutt's *The Atlantic Provinces: Emergence of a Colonial Society 1712-1857*, Thomas Haliburton's *Historical Account of Nova Scotia*, Walter Copp's "Nova Scotia and the War of 1812", and Beamish Murdoch's *History of Nova Scotia or Acadie* (3 vols.) Murdoch's stands out as the most useful in showing the relationship between the navy and the city. Yet arguably the most prominent historian to write on the subject of the Royal Navy and its role in the North Atlantic is Gerald S. Graham. Graham's *Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America and Sea Power and British North America 1783-1820* are among the most cited works on the subject of the Royal Navy and North America, a true testimony to their reliability.

The history of Bermuda and the development of the naval base on the island was also a crucial part of this work. Among the major works cited are Henry Wilkinson's *Bermuda From Sail to Steam: The History of the Island From 1784 to 1901* (2 vols.), Lieutenant-Commander Ian Stranack's *The Andrew and the Onions: The Story of Bermuda 1795-1975*, Terry Tucker's *Bermuda Yesterday and Today*, Jack Arnell's

“Bermuda’s Early Naval: The Decision to Establish a Permanent Base”, and Captain H.J. Carr’s *The Naval History of Bermuda From the Earliest Times*. Wilkinson’s work is the most thorough account of the history of the island during this era, but he makes several factual errors and other claims regarding the squadron’s operations that are impossible to corroborate. Arnell and Stranack are more reliable works, and give a most thorough account of the development of the naval base, down to the construction of individual buildings.

There are many sources that deal directly with the War of 1812. One of the earliest general works is Benson J. Lossing’s *Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*. Lossing visited most of the battlefields of the war in order to make his sketches as accurate as possible, but like most 19<sup>th</sup> Century historians, his work shows a considerable bias towards his side. A few decades after Lossing’s history was published, Henry Adams came out with his nine-volume epic *The History of the United States During the Administration of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison*. This is a most comprehensive examination of the war and the events that led to it, and is still regarded as one of the standard works on the subject. The only real flaw in his work was his desire to criticize everyone except his ancestors, John Adams and John Quincy Adams. During the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the War of 1812 gained renewed interest, particularly in the latter half of the century. Several general histories were introduced, and among the ones most frequently used are the works entitled *The War of 1812* by Francis Beirne, Reginald Horsman, and Donald Hickey. J. Mackay Hitsman’s *The Incredible War of 1812* is arguably the best account of the war from the Canadian side, but most acknowledge that Horsman’s work is the most accurate description of the war as a whole. Several works were also

introduced that focused on the political side of the conflict, including J.C.A. Stagg's *Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy and Warfare in the Early American Republic*, Frank Updyke's *The Diplomacy of the War of 1812*, Julius W. Pratt's *Expansionists of 1812*, Roger Brown's *The Republic in Peril: 1812*, Reginald Horsman's *The Causes of the War of 1812*, John Bartlet Brener's *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain*, A.L Burt's *The United States, Great Britain and British North America From the Establishment of Peace After the War of 1812*, and Bradford Perkins' *Prologue to War: England and the United States 1805-1812*. Most of these works have made extensive use of American, British and French primary sources. Stagg's work gives the most thorough examination of the role played by the Madison government prior to and during the war, while Horsman and Perkins expertly trace the road that led to the start of the war.

Several memoirs and biographies were used to provide additional material about the key individuals who served on the North American Station. Most of the British and Canadian biographies came from *The Dictionary of National Biography* and *The Dictionary of Canadian*, while the biographies of several key American figures were obtained from *American National Biography*. James Ralfe's four-volume *Naval Biography of Great Britain: Consisting of Historical Memoirs of Those Officers of the British Navy Who Distinguished Themselves During the Reign of His Majesty George III* also provided much information regarding the lives of several of the officers who served on the North American station. Other works that were consulted include Captain Walter Anson's *Life of Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren*, which was somewhat disappointing had made numerous errors and omissions, not the least of which was

ignoring Warren's first tenure as commander of the North American Squadron. Julian Gwyn's *The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1756-1752* and *The Enterprising Admiral: The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren* give a complete account of the man who was most responsible for the creation of the North American Squadron. Lady Bouchier's *Memoirs of the Life of Sir Edward Codrington* and Walter Whitehill's *New England Blockaded: The Journal of Henry Edward Napier, Lieutenant in HMS Nymphe* provide an excellent glimpse into what life was like on board one of the squadron's blockading ships during the War of 1812 from two different perspectives. Alexander Cochrane's *The Fighting Cochrane*s offered some information about Sir Alexander Cochrane, but most of the book is focused on the more infamous Sir Thomas Cochrane. J.G. Brighton's *Admiral Sir P.B.V. Broke, Bart, K.C.B. etc... a Memoir* and *Admiral of the fleet Sir Provo W.P. Wallis, G.C.B., etc...a Memoir* provided much insight on two of the key British officers involved in the *Shannon-Chesapeake* battle. Roger Morriss' *Cockburn and the Royal Navy in Transition: Admiral Sir George Cockburn 1772-1853* and James Pack's *The Man Who Burned the white House: Admiral Sir George Cockburn 1772-1853* are among the better biographies consulted, with Pack being more useful in describing the Chesapeake campaign, while Morriss focused more on Cockburn's life as a whole.

Just as there are no shortages of volumes devoted to the Royal Navy during the era, so too there is no shortage of works devoted to the specific campaigns and battles of the War of 1812. Among the several works consulted, standouts include Robert Gardiner's *The Naval War of 1812*, a recent addition to the subject, and one that will undoubtedly be consulted by many future historians. Wilburt S. Brown's *The*

*Amphibious Campaign for West Florida: A Critical Review of Strategy and Tactics at New Orleans 1814-1815* is perhaps the most complete examination of the operations in the Gulf region. Wade Dudley's "Without Some Risk: A Reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States 1812-1815" was quite useful in showing the specifics of how the British blockade worked. The campaign in the Chesapeake has been the subject of countless histories, and among the better ones included in this work are Christopher T. George's *Terror on the Chesapeake: The War of 1812 on the Bay*, Donald G. Shomette's *Flotilla: Battle for the Patuxent*, Anthony S. Pitch's *The Burning of Washington: The British Invasion of 1814*, and Joseph Whitehorn's *The Battle for Baltimore 1814*. The *Shannon-Chesapeake* fight has been extensively covered in works such as C.H.J Snider's *The Glorious Shannon's Old Blue Duster and Other Faded Flags of Fadeless Fame*, yet possibly the most thorough retelling is H.F. Pullen's *The Shannon and the Chesapeake*. Pullen not only gives considerable detail to the ships and the circumstances that led to the battle, but also includes its perspective from both the American and British point of views. In addition, he also gives an excellent retelling of the *Chesapeake-Leopard* and *President-Little Belt* incidents. The *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair is only expertly covered in Spencer T. Tucker and Frank T. Reuter, *Injured Honor: The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, June 22, 1807*, and also in Anthony Steel's "More Light on the Chesapeake", which offers new insight into the circumstances that led to the incident between the two ships.

Finally, this work relied on many contemporary journals and newspapers of this era. The most useful of are the *Naval Chronicle* and *Niles' Register*. Both proved extremely valuable in describing naval and military operations during the wars, and are



especially important in gauging opinions of the populace regarding the conflicts. Though both are very much one-sided and heavily biased, they still remain useful as a window to this era. The *London Gazette*, *London Times*, *Bermuda Royal Gazette* and *Halifax Royal Gazette* were also examined as contemporary sources for the events during the war.

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