RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY INTELLIGENTSIA: THE STATELESS IDEAL IN THE IDEOLOGY OF THE POPULIST MOVEMENT

Joseph Schull
Department of Political Science
McGill University , Montreal
September , 1985

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master's of Arts.

Abstract

The relationship between Russia's traditional political culture and the outlook of the revolutionary intelligentsia is the subject of this thesis. Employing the concept of political culture to denote the context of political action, which helps to constitute the manner in which political choices are conceived, we attempt to show how Russian political culture set the framework within which the intelligentsia's political aspirations were formulated. Our analysis focuses on the ideology of the Russian Populist movement, in particular its conception of the state and its aspiration to a stateless society ; we argue that the meaning of 'the state' for the Populists was partly constituted by the nature of Russia's political traditions, and that the Populists' aspiration to a stateless future reflected the heritage of a popular tradition of ideological opposition to the absolutist secular state erected by Peter the Great. In addition, we will follow the partial eclipse of Populist thought by Marxism within the intelligentsia at the end of the nineteenth-century, and discuss both the circumstances attending this transition and its significance for the fate of the stateless ideal.

Résumé

Le lien qui existe entre la culture politique traditionnelle russe et la perspective de l'intelligentsia révolutionnaire constitue le sujet de cette thèse. En nous servant du concept de la culture politique afin de désigner le contexte de l'action politique, qui aide à constituer la manière par laquelle sont conçus les choix politiques, nous tentons de démontrer que la culture politique russe fut établi comme cadre à l'intérieur duquel les aspirations politiques de l'intelligentsia furent formulées. Notre analyse se centrera sur l'idéologie du mouvement populiste russe, et en particulier sur sa conception de l'état et son aspiration vers une société sans état; nous soutenons que la signification de 'l'état' pour les populistes fut constituée partiellement par la nature des traditions politiques russes, et que l'aspiration des populistes vers un avenir sans état fut le reflet de l'héritage d'une tradition populaire d'opposition à l'état absolutiste séculaire érigé par Pierre le Grand. De plus, nous retracerons l'évincement partiel de la pensée populiste par le Marxisme au sein de l'intelligentsia à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle, et nous discuterons aussi bien des circonstances au moment de cette transition que de sa signification pour le sort de l'idéal anti-étatiste.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Charles Taylor, who stimulated my interest in some of the questions addressed here and provided valuable comments on my thesis proposal. I would also like to thank Professor Valentin Boss of the History Department for his generous advice and criticism of an earlier draft of Chapter Two. In particular, I want to thank my advisor, Professor Joan DeBardeleben, for the helpful advice and criticism she offered throughout the research and writing of this work.

During my years as a graduate student, I have received a number of research fellowships from McGill University, as well as an F.C.A.C. bourse d'etudes from the Quebec government. I am very grateful to both of these institutions for the generous support they provided during the period of my studies and research.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 : 'Political Culture' and the Analysis of Traditions

Introduction

The relationship between Russia's political traditions and the revolutionary intelligentsia is the theme of this study. The intelligentsia's sense of alienation from Russian 'reality', its commitment to revolution, and its dependence on Western ideas for self-identification, might seem to provide a *prima facie* case for its estrangement from Russia's own political traditions. We will argue that this class was in fact solidly grounded in Russia's political culture, and that its outlook must be understood against the background of the nation's past. Our analysis will center on the Populist movement, and elucidate the relationship of its vision of the future society to a traditional, popular 'image' of political authority. At the same time, we shall discuss the eventual eclipse of Populist thought and the conversion of many members of the intelligentsia to Marxism at the end of the nineteenth century. Our aim will be to clarify the circumstances attenting the decline of Populism, as well as the significance of the growing influence of Marxism on the intelligentsia for this class' vision of the future society.

Within the field of political science, the most widely-used analytical framework for studying the significance of traditions in shaping political action has been the political culture approach. In this chapter, we will review the history of the concept of political culture, discuss some of the problems its proponents have faced in clarifying the nature of their object, and outline the manner in which we intend to use it in our analysis.

The political culture approach broadly conceives of political culture as a variable which causally interacts with other variables - mode of production, political institutions, and so on - which can themselves be identified and described in culture-invariant terms. Some studies of political culture (1) characterize the culture-invariant phenomena in functional terms ; all societies must fulfill broadly similar functions (socialization, interest aggregation and articulation, and so on). These functions can be identified and described in culture-invariant terms, and the impact of specific cultural patterns on them (and vice versa) evaluated subsequently. The analyst of political culture thus implicitly relies on a general understanding of the forces at work in any society, and then factors in the cultural variable to assess its relationship with these phenomena in a given social context.

In what follows, we will propose a conception of

culture not as one variable among others, which might be neatly separated from them in social inquiry, but as a context of meaning which imbues social phenomena with significance. Culture envelops and pervades these phenomena, which can only be identified as distinct variables within a given cultural setting, and which conversely cannot be adequately described in abstraction from it. Culture cannot be factored into an analysis after determining certain 'real', underlying processes or functions. Rather, any analysis of the latter presupposes an understanding of the cultural context in which they are located.

Man is unique in being an animal for whom things have meaning, and it is culture which imbues the world with a determinate significance for him. Culture does not 'cause' political 'behaviour'. It constitutes the field of meanings available to political actors ; it sets the terms in which political choices are made. If human action is meaningful, then social inquiry must entail the search for the meaning of action. The analysis of political culture would serve this end by explicating the range of choices for political action provided by a society's traditions. Its aim would be to enable a better understanding of contemporary patterns of political action by drawing out the range of meanings embedded in the traditional political conceptions and practices of a society. Cultural analysis would not attempt to provide causal

explanations of political action ; but in fleshing out the terrain in which action takes place, it would be a precondition for such studies.

The Political Culture Approach

The concept of political culture seems to have emerged in political science largely in response to problems associated with the study of industrializing nations. As Archie Brown has noted, the use of the concept was stimulated in large part

> by political events in the 'Third World' when constitutions and institutions with which newly-independent states had been endowed fairly rapidly began to function in ways which surprised, and sometimes dismayed, their former political mentors (2).

Faced with the diversity of patterns of 'development' among Third World nations, scholars began to ask whether cultural peculiarities might account for this phenomenon. From the outset, this question tended to be posed with a distinct normative bias. Lucian Pye, one of the first scholars to link the notions of political culture and political development, epitomized this bias ; in his view, one of the central questions which studies of political culture should seek to answer is : "to what extent is it possible to accelerate and direct political change, and how can traditional societies be best transformed into democratic polities?" (3) Pye and others traced a

trajectory of political development which placed the Western industrialized democracies at its summit ; the aim of the political culture approach was not only to clarify the relationship between a society's political culture and its political system, but also to get industrializing nations 'on the right track' by encouraging their assimilation of values and beliefs which were deemed compatible with a stable, democratic society.

In recent years, this aim has come under attack for its ethnocentricity, and many have proposed to replace the concept of political 'development' with the less ideologically charged concept of political 'change' (4). The basic approach, however, remains the same ; the analyst seeks to clarify the effect of cultural phenomena on the pattern of change of a society's political system or structure, and conversely the effect of political change on cultural patterns.

Given the lesser influence of the West upon Russia and Eastern Europe, the prescriptive orientation of the political culture approach was always less relevant to studies of these areas. Yet similar analytical dilemmas seem to have underlain the adoption of the concept in this domain. In the wake of the Second World War, the number of Communist states grew substantially. These societies often evolved in markedly different ways. As a result, scholars began to recognise the need to account for the unique

features of these societies, and it is largely with this end in view that the concept of political culture has come to be employed (5).

The first task for this approach was to demarcate a specific region of culture as the domain of the political scientist. Writing in 1956, Gabriel Almond argued that a society's political system is embedded in a "political culture", comprising that society's "pattern of orientations to political action", which is "a differentiated part of the culture and has a certain autonomy" (6). Following Almond, most scholars have defined political culture as a complex of attitudes, beliefs, and values which together establish a general orientation to political action. Sydney Verba has defined political culture as

> the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics (7).

More recently, however, Stephen White has argued for a broader definition of political culture as "the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political system is located" (8). The issue at stake here is whether political culture should denote only "orientations" to political action, or also the behaviour which is presumed to result from them. While it would seem arbitrary to exclude behaviour since it is so integrally linked to attitudes and beliefs, it is feared that an analytical framework which encompasses

both would shortcircuit its powers of explanation by subsuming under the cultural variable that which it is supposed to explain. To argue that a pattern of political action is explained by the "behavioural matrix" within which it is located would be, after all, an exercise in circular reasoning.

This dispute should not obscure the basic assumptions which are common to these definitions.First, all treat the non-behavioural component of political culture as the subjective orientation of individuals to politics, that is, the psychological traits from which behaviour ostensibly results. This assumption is founded on an atomistic/utilitarian conception of social life : society is the sum of its parts, and culture is the sum of individually- and independently-held "orientations". The heavy reliance of the political culture approach on questionnaires and surveys also reflects this assumption ; from these, a collection of individual responses is derived, which are concatenated into a general portrait of a society's political culture. Moreover, these analysts tend to conceive of political action in behaviouristic terms. The individual is conceived as a receptor of psychological stimuli which provoke a causal response ; the problem is to ascertain exactly where culture fits into this chain of forces. And this is the bone of contention between White and the others mentioned above. For according to the

behaviourist scheme, White has conflated stimulus and response, and in this way clouds the causal relationship which is assumed to exist between them.

These assumptions and the analytical techniques associated with them have drawn criticism from a number of quarters. Charles Taylor has argued for a conception of culture which highlights the significance of "intersubjective meanings" over that of purely subjective orientations. In Taylor's view, both our beliefs and our actions emerge out of a background of social practices which are prior to and constitutive of the outlook of the individual members of society. Individuals become competent members of society by internalizing its practices; but these are internalized in the first instance not as <u>their</u> beliefs, but as <u>the</u> modes of social relation which are part of a common reference world. We do not share in these practices independently of each other ; rather, the sharing is a collective act (9).

Perhaps the model for this conception of culture is the phenomenon of language. It would be a conceptual confusion to say that a language belongs to its speakers independently of each other, and that members of a linguistic community understand each other through some kind of 'consensus'. Language belongs to society before it is internalized by the individual. Analogously, on Taylor's account it would be more appropriate to say that individuals collectively grow

into culture, rather than that culture is parcelled out separately into individual minds.

Moreover, Taylor would argue that the search for causal relationships between culture and politics is misguided. The background of social practices which make up culture do not cause behaviour but constitute the meaning of action. Man is conceived not as a passive receptor of stimuli which determine his behaviour, but as an animal whose action embodies an implicit vision of himself and of his relationship with others, a self- understanding which constitutes the meaning of action. Cultural analysis would in this view seek to clarify the meaning of action by explicating the cultural context which imbues it with determinate significance. Moving within the hermeneutical circle, the analyst would interpret a belief or act by reference to its intersubjective context and, conversely, elucidate this context by reference to its individual manifestations.

Lowell Dittmer has recently attempted to incorporate the phenomenon of intersubjectivity into the concept of political culture. Criticizing the "psychological reductionism" (10) of the political culture approach, he has suggested that this concept "may most fruitfully be understood as a semiological system, consisting of political symbols" (11). This definition would get us out of the heads of individuals and into "the context of meaning of political action"

(12). The analyst would focus on the 'symbol systems" or "codes" to which individuals become acculturated, and which exist independently of subjective orientations (13).

But Dittmer still tends to conceive of political culture in behaviouristic terms, and is consequently concerned to clarify its causal relationships with other phenomena. While Taylor wants to undermine the value of behaviouristic, causal accounts of culture, Dittmer wants to enable better accounts of this form. In his view, political culture still must not denote action, for this would only cloud the causal relationship between culture and action(14). To treat culture as symbols would merely ensure the "degree of autonomy" Almond once claimed for it, and permit more fruitful empirical analyses (15).

Despite the political culture approach's insistence on treating culture as a causal variable, its advocates have been unable to agree on the specific role of the cultural variable. For some, it is a 'mediating' variable through which are filtered other forces to produce a given political outcome. Gabriel Almond has characterized it as an "interactive" variable :

> The relationship between political structure and culture is interactive... one cannot explain cultural propensities without reference to historical experience and contemporary structural constraints, and in turn, a prior set of attitudinal patterns will tend to persist in some form and degree

and for a significant period of time, despite efforts to transform it (16).

In a slightly different formulation, Stephen White highlights the "dialectical" relationship between a political culture and its social base ; while culture is in the final analysis part of the social superstructure, and is thus determined by material forces, it has a "relative autonomy" from the social base and is capable of modifying it in a "complex pattern of interaction over time" (17). Lowell Dittmer argues for a still more flexible scheme, which would allow for political culture to play the role of independent, intervening, or dependent variable depending upon the circumstances. As the set of symbolic resources available to political actors, it promotes a similar "response" to a given "stimulus", encouraging some types of action and inhibiting others ; in this sense, it is an independent variable. But this symbol system may be deployed by political actors to accomplish certain objectives ; in such cases it becomes an intervening variable. And, insofar as it may be shaped by other factors, it is also a dependent variable (18).

Now the difficulty in sorting out this dispute is that all of its participants seem in some measure to be right. As a causal variable, political culture can indeed play all of the roles outlined depending upon the context. Yet, surely this must indicate that

somewhere, something has gone wrong. We must remember that the purpose of causal explanations is to enable generalizations, leading ultimately to the prediction (and, for Pye, the control) of future events. None of the advocates of the political culture approach would be so bold as to claim that this goal is within reach. But theory-building, the establishment of generally-valid causal accounts of the relationship between culture and politics, remains the telos of the political culture approach and is the implicit rationale for its analytical framework. But the diversity of causal roles played by culture makes this goal a fantasy. One could only ever know a posteriori which role it has played in a given instance. Moreover, even then it would be tremendously difficult to select from the myriad possibilities which one is relevant to the case at hand.

Perhaps these are the growing pains of a relatively new approach. But we may be permitted the suspicion that the problem is a deeper one, and results from the very attempt to treat culture as a causal variable. Perhaps we are trying to fit it into a conceptual grid for which it is ill-designed. Perhaps the way to a better, and more faithful understanding of political culture is to remove it from the explanatory model of social science, and situate it within an interpretive scheme which would treat culture not as a variable but as a context.

Culture as Context

In an article published in 1974, Robert Tucker worked through some of the problems of the political culture approach, and pointed toward a new definition of the concept; granting that the explanatory enterprise would suffer for the subsumption of 'behaviour' under 'political culture', he asked :

> Does the scholarly value of the concept of political culture turn on its explanatory potency? Might not the central importance of a concept like that of political culture be that it assists us to take our bearings in the study of the political life of a society, to focus on what is happening or not happening, to describe and analyze and order many significant data, and to raise many fruitful questions for thought and research - without explaining anything? (19)

Tucker continues :

> Conceivably, we could relinquish the concept of political culture in favor of what might be called simply a cultural approach to politics : an orientation toward the study of political institutions, ideologies, values, practices, etc., as phenomena embedded in the larger cultures of political societies. Alternatively, or at the same time, we could retain the notion of a political culture - meaning by it the predominantly political aspects of a culture - but beware of treating it as something clearly differentiated from the larger cultural pattern and forming an autonomous sphere (20).

One need not relinquish the concept of political culture along with the approach to which it has been associated, although, as Tucker suggests, we would have to be more wary of claims such as Almond's that it represents a clearly differentiated and autonomous region of culture. It is difficult to imagine how one

could theoretically partition a set of phenomena and label them the political culture of any society, nor how the claim to its autonomy would be made good. It seems equally clear that in any given case one would want to identify a certain range of phenomena as more or less relevant to a political analysis, for otherwise one would be faced with an analytically overwhelming mass of undifferentiated material. The important point is that the concept would become context-bound, fleshed out on the basis of the study of particular societies ; a study of the political culture of the United States, for instance, might pay little attention to its religious practices, while a study of the political culture of Poland would be sadly deficient if it did not incorporate this element of its larger cultural setting. This is, after all, only proper ; if we want to use the concept to draw out the uniqueness of each society, it must be allowed to incorporate this uniqueness within itself. The attempt of scholars such as Pye and Verba to pre-determine the content of political culture, by identifying a constellation of four sets of values (trust/distrust, hierarchy/equality, liberty/coercion, and loyalty/commitment (21)) which are to provide the focus for any study of political culture, contradicts the purpose of cultural analysis. One does not want to decide in advance the range of phenomena which will and will not be relevant ; this must emerge out of the

analysis itself. The consequent elasticity of the concept of political culture will surely not serve the enterprise of theory-building, but that is because culture is the area par excellence in which such aims are inappropriate.

Tucker's other suggestion, that we treat political institutions, practices, and so on as phenomena embedded in the cultures of particular societies, seems very promising. We could then employ the concept of political culture to explicate the context within which political phenomena are set, not as part of an attempt to identify specific causal links between culture and political institutions or structures, but merely to better describe and understand these phenomena.

For guidance in such a usage of the concept, moreover, we would do well to consider Clifford Geertz's work in the domain of anthropology. Geertz describes his own approach as "semiotic" :

> Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning (22).

We must be careful to distinguish this definition from that of Dittmer, for although both lay emphasis on the importance of symbols in constituting culture, Geertz emphasizes that his aim is not one of "explanation" but of "thick description" :

> Culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviours, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed ; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly - that is, thickly - described(23).

To treat culture as a context does not necessarily entail the claim that it is powerless or without causal efficacy. Studies which try to show the effect of a society's political culture on its institutions (or vice versa) are not exactly wrong ; but they are misconceived. Culture is not primarily a variable which interacts with other variables in relations of mutual (or some other kind of) determination. It is the context within which these other phenomena are embedded and by virtue of which they acquire a determinate significance. Indeed, the search for causal relationships in the political life of a society requires a prior foothold in its culture, that is, it depends upon a prior "thick description", acknowledged or not, of the cultural context within which these phenomena are embedded. Cultural analysis, then, should be considered as a precondition for but not itself a part of causal analysis.

Such a conception of political culture would also dissolve the knottier problems of the political culture approach. We could abandon the attempt to determine the precise function of the cultural 'variable', which has up to now provided a multiplicity of options which all seem equally valid, and are thus of little value at

all. Moreover, we could forego as needless the distinction between the "subjective" (or, in Dittmer's formulation, the "symbolic") component of political culture and "political action". The purported threat to the explanatory potency of the concept would become irrelevant.

This would also allow a more faithful account of the phenomenon itself, for the distinction between 'beliefs' and 'behaviour' seems in any case to be a hopelessly scholastic one. In the terms of Almond, Verba, and Brown, political culture is presented as an essentially private realm of disembodied consciousness, existing independently of action and only subsequently impacting upon it. But our average, every-day understanding of culture is quite different, and much more sensible. We do not normally make any distinction between 'private' and 'public' spheres of culture, but collapse them into a single whole. We would not hesitate, for instance, to include voting or the singing of a national anthem or a myriad of other political rituals as elements of our political culture. And if they are not, just what are they?

We might overcome any sense of unease about letting go of this distinction by considering Taylor's account of social practices. In his formulation, they comprise both the 'external' features of action and the 'internal' self-definition which is embodied in them. Political action is itself unintelligible in

abstraction from the self- definition which it reflects, and conversely, the self-definition is not abstract and contemplative, but engaged and practical ; it realizes itself within political action, and sustains itself only insofar as it is so realized. Thus, in studying social practices as phenomena of a society's political culture, we would be concerned with both political actions and the self-definition which is implicit in them.

Cultural analyses of this form would be particularly interested in a society's traditions. For social practices are more than anything else a vehicle for traditions, and the self-definition they embody comes into being against the background of a nation's past. However, we would want to employ this concept rather differently than it has been in most political culture analyses up to now. The central aim of the political culture approach thus far has been to elucidate causal relationships between cultural traditions and political structures or systems, in particular to explain the stability or resilience of traditions in contemporary political societies. Yet, this assumes that the stability of a tradition demands some special explanation. To reverse the question, why should a tradition <u>not</u> be stable? Would a certain pattern of actions or practices <u>be</u> a tradition if it were not stable? This approach implicitly assumes an incompatibility between traditions and contemporary

political settings which simply may not exist. And in doing so, it occludes the extent to which political structures and institutions are already embedded in a society's traditions.

Conversely, the attempt to posit a tradition as a causal variable with its own effect on a political system seems equally misguided. A tradition is never a seamless whole which might impose a specific pattern on a society's political development. It is more often a web of conflicting currents which is compatible with a whole range of political 'outcomes'. Traditions merely provide the terms in which political choices are made ; the determinants of any specific choice are exterior to the tradition itself.

Our approach would be to analyse traditions merely to set out in meaningful order the path leading from a society's past to its present, to elucidate the historical background out of which contemporary orientations have emerged. The point would not be to present traditions as the cause of a contemporary pattern of action. For this approach tends to rely on a behaviouristic model of action, depicting man as an essentially passive receptor of 'stimuli' which provoke a causal 'response'. Our view emphasizes that political action is the result of <u>choices</u> made on the basis of certain assumptions about the nature and ends of politics. The aim of social inquiry in this view would be to provide a better understanding of the

choices made by social actors by making explicit the assumptions inherent in them. The analysis of political culture would serve this endeavour by showing how these assumptions are themselves embedded in a larger context constituted by the ideas and practices of a society. Cultural traditions set the framework within which political choices are made ; the aim of cultural analysis would be to explicate this framework, and to show how traditional conceptions of politics are manifested in contemporary patterns of action.

This is, broadly speaking, the orientation of our analysis in what follows. The question we shall explore is : to what extent can the political aspirations of the Russian intelligentsia be understood as a manifestation and continuation of some of the traditional aspirations of Russian society? Or, stated differently: can the intelligentsia be seen as a succeeding chapter in a much older and essentially continuous tradition of ideological opposition to the Russian state?

In Chapter Two, we will follow the development of Russia's political traditions, both from the perspective of the central authorities and that of popular Russia, from the medieval era until the emergence of the intelligentsia in the nineteenth century. We will highlight the conflict which developed during this period between two 'images' of Russia, and the forms in which these 'images' were

manifested in the actions of popular and official elements of Russian society.

In Chapter Three, we will set the emergence of the intelligentsia against this background ; following this, we will focus on the Russian Populist movement, which reflected the aspirations of the intelligentsia through much of the nineteenth century. We will draw out the Populists' vision of the future society, and particularly its image of the state and its role in this society, as it was presented in the thought of Alexander Herzen, Peter Lavrov, and George Plekhanov. The aim will be to uncover the affinities of the Populists' aspirations with the traditional, popular 'image' of Russia, and in this way to suggest that the intelligentsia can best be understood not only as a phenomenon sui generis, but also as the more articulate advocate of a vision of Russia which had deep roots in the nation's past. Our analysis of Plekhanov's conversion to Marxism will also enable us to clarify the reasons for the decline of Populist thought, as well as the significance of the conversion of much of the intelligentsia to Marxism for the aspirations of this class.

Notes - Chapter One

1. See Frederick Barghoorn, Politics in the U.S.S.R. (Boston : Little,Brown & Co., 1966).

2. Archie Brown and Jack Gray, ed., Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (New York : Holmes & Meier, 1977), p.3.

3. Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba, ed., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1965), p.4.

4. See Brown and Gray, ed., Political Culture and Political Change, p.3.

5. Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London : McMillan Press, 1979), p.5.

6. Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics 18 (No.3 Aug.1956),p.396.

7. Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, p.513.

8. White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p.1.

9. Charles Taylor,"Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in Understanding and Social Inquiry, ed. Fred Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy (Notre Dame : University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p.121.

10. Lowell Dittmer, "Political Culture and Political Symbolism," World Politics 29 (No.4 July 1977), p.554.

11. Lowell Dittmer, "Comparative Communist Political Culture," Studies in Comparative Communism 16 (Nos.1-2 Spring/Summer1983), p.11.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid, p.12.

14. Ibid, p.11.

15. Idem,"Political Culture and Political Symbolism," p.557.

16. Gabriel Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory," Comparative Politics 15 (No.2 Jan.1983), p.127.

17. White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p.20.

18. Dittmer, "Comparative Communist Political Culture," p.11.

19. Robert Tucker, "Communism, Political Culture, and Communist Society," Political Science Quarterly 88 (No.2 June1973), p.179.

20. Ibid, p.181.

21. Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, pp.22-3.

22. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York : Basic Books, 1973), p.5.

23. Ibid, p.14.

Chapter 2 : Traditional Russian Political Culture : Two Images of the State

Introduction

In this chapter, we shall attempt to elucidate the political traditions which established the context for the emergence of the Russian intelligentsia and helped to set the framework within which its political choices were made. We shall follow the evolution of Russia's political culture between the mid-fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the fifteenth century, the Russian people achieved independence from the Mongols, who had ruled them for over two hundred years. This cleared the way for Russia's emergence as an independent nation- state under the leadership of the Muscovite prince, the direct predecessor of the Russian tsar. It was the Muscovite era which saw the consolidation of a coherent political culture with direct links to Russia's subsequent development. As such, it is with this era that our analysis will begin.

Muscovite Russia was marked by a basic ideological compatibility between ruling and popular elements based on a common religious self-understanding. In the eyes of all, Russia was defined by its adherence to the Orthodox Christian faith, while its prince stood as God's representative on earth, a spiritual father to

his people. Political authority was grounded in religious purposes. The prince's primary function was to safeguard the faith and thereby ensure the salvation of his people. Yet, the activities which this function entailed were quite limited ; the prince was to quell internal disputes, protect the people from attack, extract from them enough to provide for his support, and do little else besides. This accorded with the medieval conception of the immutability of the temporal (as well as the spiritual) realm ; this world, the temporal realm, was to be left much as it had always existed, as God had initially ordained it. Above all, the notion of the ruler and state as forces for spurring social progress was quite foreign to Muscovite Russia.

This religious ethos, and the political arrangements it supported , formed the cornerstone of Russia's political culture throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The unity of Russian political culture was shattered, however, with the advent of Peter the Great at the turn of the seventeenth century. Drawing heavily upon Western models, Peter broke with the Muscovite tradition to introduce a secular conception of the state and its role in society. The foundations of the state's legitimacy were effectively transferred to the temporal realm, and its role re-defined and greatly expanded to center on the task of directing the progress of society.

These ideological innovations split Russia into radically opposed camps. Popular elements remained stubbornly faithful to the traditional religious 'image' of Russia, and bristled under the weight of a state which, in keeping with its new secular functions, increasingly deprived the local communities of their traditional freedoms. On the other hand, ruling elements largely followed Peter in embracing the new 'image' of Russia and of the absolutist secular state (1).

Although the Russian state would subsequently lose much of the dynamism with which Peter had imbued it, the ideological path he had charted, and the institutional arrangements it entailed, were in the main adopted by later rulers. Russia's political culture thus came to be characterized by a schism between ruling and popular elements, based upon diametrically opposed conceptions of the nature and role of the state. Popular Russia clung to an image of essentially passive or negative political authority, while the ruling image accorded to the secular state an absolute right to direct the life of society. The resulting social and spiritual dislocation would endure throughout the Tsarist era. It was out of this context that the radical intelligentsia would emerge in the nineteenth century as a class dedicated to bridging this gap once and for all.

The intelligentsia owed its origins to the Petrine

reforms, emerging out of the Westernized social elite which Peter had created. In opening Russia to the West, the Petrine reforms allowed for the gradual assimilation of the values of secularism, science, and progress, which the nineteenth-century intelligentsia would fervently embrace. Indeed, some of the radicals would see their role as that of completing the 'civilizing' mission which Peter had begun.

Yet, the intelligentsia's aspirations were by no means a simple reflection of the Petrine image of political authority; they were a hybrid of the Petrine and popular images of Russia. The intelligentsia linked up with a popular tradition of opposition to the Tsarist state, and many of its members came to accept an image of political authority which bore remarkable similarities with the popular image of Russia. A comprehensive analysis of the intelligentsia's relationship with Russia's traditional political culture would be beyond the scope of this study ; we will focus on one aspect of this relationship, the intelligentsia's relationship with the popular image of Russia. The central claim we shall support is that the intelligentsia, in its origins and for much of its history, represented a continuing chapter of a popular tradition of opposition to the centralized, bureaucratic state, and articulated an aspiration to radically decentralized, effectively stateless political authority which reflected the legacy of the

popular image of Russia.

The intelligentsia was constituted by its irreconcilable opposition to the Tsarist state, which in its view had become a dead weight on Russian society. In this stance, it came to link hands with popular Russia and its conception of political authority. This was in part a reflection of the stark dichotomy in the evolution of Russia's political traditions. Russia's political culture had since Peter the Great evolved as an opposition of two extreme images of the state. The first, introduced by Peter as the ruling image of political authority, arrogated to the state an absolute right to direct the life of society. The second, dominant during the Muscovite era and preserved thereafter by popular elements, allowed the state little in the way of a positive function of rulership, and emphasized the right of local communities to govern their affairs. In its opposition to the Tsarist state, and given the absence of any mediating element between the two images of Russia, the intelligentsia was naturally drawn to a conception of political authority which paralleled the popular image of Russia..

The scope of our study will not permit an analysis of the entire intelligentsia. Rather, we will focus on the ideology of the Populist movement, which dominated the intelligentsia for the early part of its history, and thus offers an accurate reflection of the original

aspirations of this class. We will suggest that the Populists' vision of the ideal political structure of the future society, as espoused by some of the movement's leading thinkers, was a re-expression of a traditional popular aspiration to a decentralized and passive form of political authority. In both the popular image of Russia and the ideology of the Populists, the ideal political structure was conceived in diametrical opposition to the Petrine scheme : Russia was to be a radically decentralized association of local agrarian communities, freed of the oppressive presence of a strong central authority.

At the same time, the revolution of 1917 ended with the erection of yet another omnicompetent and centralized state. The intelligentsia's central role in the revolution makes it incumbent on us to account for the radical divergence between the original aspirations of this class and the final outcome of its efforts. The breakdown and eclipse of the vision of a stateless utopia must be explained. The latter part of our analysis will address this question by following the decline of Populist thought at the end of the nineteenth century. We will argue that it was essentially the process of industrialization which fatally undermined the Populists' aspirations. This was so because the Populist ideology was grounded in the conditions of an agrarian society. The local communities which, in the formulation of the Populists,

were to be self-governing were agricultural communities. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, industrialization had begun to change the structure of Russian society, and was sweeping away the social foundations of the stateless ideal. The Populists had imagined Russia as a slowly-developing agrarian nation. Now, their goals began to seem more utopian and anachronistic. Industrialization had become the central trend in Russian life. The intelligentsia, as the self-appointed vanguard of the future, would find it necessary to accomodate this trend within its aspirations.

This was the great strength of Marxism, to which many members of the intelligentsia became converted at the end of the nineteenth century. Marxism explained industrialization so as to make it not only compatible with but an essential prerequisite for the revolutionary aspirations of the intelligentsia. Socialism and the stateless utopia remained the goal, but now they were presented as the end-point of a long process of economic development.

However, with the conversion of much of the intelligentsia to Marxism and its acceptance of industrialization as a central goal, the nature of the political choices facing this class had to change. Industrialization had during the nineteenth century taken place under the aegis of the state, and there was little reason to believe that it could continue without

the directing hand of a strong central authority in the future. Moreover, the shape of Russia's political culture tended to limit the range of options available to the intelligentsia. Between the extremes of the Petrine and popular images of the state, nothing else had taken root. Once it accepted the challenge of industrialization, the intelligentsia had to acquire an implicit bias toward the erection of a political system which once again arrogated absolute power to the state.

Our analysis will also be concerned to elucidate the fate of the stateless ideal after it had been eclipsed as a realistic solution to Russia's problems. For, if it had been exposed by industrialization as a myth, qua myth it had so deeply embedded itself in the discourse of the intelligentsia that it could be repudiated only at great political cost. The intelligentsia's traditional antipathy to statist schemes made it averse to the prospect of a new Leviathan appearing on the morrow of the revolution. Thus, the discourse of this class in the period leading up to the revolution came to be characterized by a dissonance between its aspiration to liberty, which entailed the elimination of the state, and its aspiration to economic progress, which called for a strong central authority, i.e. a state.

We will highlight this dissonance as it is manifested in Lenin's The State and Revolution. We will argue that although Leninism clearly entailed the

erection of a powerful and centralized state following the revolution, it did allow the theoretical space necessary for an appeal to the stateless ideal as a means of rallying the forces of revolution behind the Bolsheviks. The voluntaristic and utopian features of Leninism allowed Lenin, in The State and Revolution, to assert simultaneously that the state would begin immediately to 'wither away' following the revolution and that a strong central authority would be necessary to build socialism in Russia. What we hope to suggest here is that although by 1917 the stateless ideal had been eclipsed as a practical project, it remained a powerful symbol for the forces of revolution, and could be manipulated to attract their support. Originally formulated as one of the central goals of the Populist movement, the stateless ideal was first exposed as a myth by industrialization and finally manipulated by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in 1917 as a stepping-stone to power.

In this chapter, we will attempt to set the context for our interpretation of the intelligentsia by explicating Russia's traditional political culture. First, we will outline the central features of the Muscovite political tradition, from the perspective of both ruling and popular elements. Then, we will focus on the Petrine transformation, and clarify the nature of the split in Russian society which it precipitated. Finally, we will outline the fate of Peter's

ideological innovations in the Imperial age. We cannot cover in a comprehensive fashion the various stages of evolution of Russian state doctrine after Peter; rather, we will focus on certain key moments in this process, when the nature of the transformation in the state's self-image becomes particularly clear. At the same time, we will examine the tate of the now-oppositional popular image of political authority, and note its modes of expression up to the mid-nineteenth century, when it became linked with the aspirations of the intelligentsia.

Muscovite Russia

The religious roots of Russia's traditional political culture were laid well before the Muscovite era. Russia had officially been a Christian society since the conversion of prince Vladimir in 988, and a common religious consciousness seems to have been a central unifying force in Kievan Rus' (2). This era ended, however, with the dispersion of the population of Rus' into scattered principalities in the North-east ; and, with the subjugation of the Russian people to the 'godless' Mongols, their religious consciousness seems to have lapsed into a state of dormancy, lacking as it did any point d'appui. The reconsolidation of a

Russian political culture occurred only during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with the gradual ascent of the principality of Muscovy to the status of national state of all Russians.

In the early fourteenth century, the appanage of Muscovy began to expand and acquire control over the formerly independent principalities of North-eastern Rus'. By the mid-fifteenth century this process was completed, and, after the final expulsion of the Mongols, Russia was able to declare its national independence in 1480. The Muscovite era lasted for over a century, ending in 1598 with the onset of a long period of political instability known as the Time of Troubles.

The principality of Muscovy was founded upon the same appanage principles which had governed Russia since the early thirteenth century, when there began a gradual process of emigration from the basin of the Dnieper in south-western Rus' to the region of the upper Volga. This region became a scattered, mutually-independent, and often-feuding assortment of petty principalities (3). In these principalities, the main organising and directing agency of the life of the country was the hereditary prince, who ruled the province as his personal property. Each province was seen as the prince's personal possession, to be passed on from father to son either by testamentary disposition or according to accepted custom (4).

Thus, the northern provinces of Rus' came to be known first as votchini (patrimonies), and later as udeli (appanages), signifying the personalization of the governing power as well as its extension to include such rights as would attach to private ownership (5). This essentially economic conception of political authority was maintained by the Muscovite appanage as it acquired control over the other principalities of Rus' ; in doing so, according to Richard Pipes, the princely dynasty of Muscovy transformed Russia into a "giant royal estate" (6). The patrimonial principle, as Pipes (following Max Weber) has called it, would soon become anachronistic, as it inhibited the development of a genuine political community in Russia. But it would remain a source of inspiration to the Muscovite tsars, who could never quite rid themselves of the notion that the realm was their own private property, to be disposed of as they saw fit (7).

A second source of inspiration to the Muscovite rulers was the Mongol heritage. During the period of Mongol overlordship, the Muscovite princes became the Mongols' chief administrative assistants in North-eastern Rus', and were eventually granted the exclusive right of collecting taxes on the Horde's behalf as well as the supreme judiciary authority over all Russian princes (8). The princes of Muscovy thus were able to learn much from their former masters concerning the practical tasks of administration and

defense.

Beyond this, the Mongols' influence is more difficult to evaluate. James Billington has downplayed its importance, arguing that the Mongols' main role was to provide the Orthodox Russians "with a common enemy against whom they could unite and rediscover a sense of common purpose"(9). Tibor Szamuely has made a much stronger claim, arguing that Rus' was conquered not only by the Mongol army, but also by the "Mongol state idea" (10). The Mongols, in this view, passed on to the Russian princes a genuine ideology, which called for

> the unqualified submission of all to the absolute, unlimited power of the khan. Every member of society was allotted from above his specific position, to which he was bound for life, and which he could never desert on pain of death. The khan... was also sole owner of all the land within his domains, and all other persons could only hold land on conditions of temporary tenure (11).

Thus, in Szamuely's view, the notion of the total submission of society to the state, the practice of universal and compulsory service, and the Russian state's attitude to property, were all a product of the Mongol experience.

The disagreement over the Mongols' role in shaping Russia's subsequent development is largely a result of the fact that the Mongol heritage was in many respects congruent with Russia's indigenous tradition of rulership. The Russian princes did not need to learn from the Mongols that they were the absolute owners of

the property over which they ruled. Similarly, the practice of universal and compulsory service which the Tsarist state instituted was in some respects an extension of the traditional appanage relationship of prince and household servant to the realm at large. It would seem, then, to be an exaggeration to say that Russia was conquered by the "Mongol state idea".

Yet, the significance of the Mongol experience in extending and accentuating relationships and ideas already embedded in Russian society must not be underestimated. This influence is apparent in the Russian adoption of the practice of universal and compulsory service. Slavery had always existed in Russia, but the extension of this relationship to include all of Russian society involved a qualitative change. The only persons who had been territorially bound to the appanage were the prince's personal slaves (kholopy) - relatively small in number - while the rest of the population had no permanent connection to the land or its prince. These essentially free persons could settle in an appanage, contract themselves into service to the prince as sluzhilye (boyars), or agricultural enterprise as tchernye (tenants), there, and depart again upon the fulfillment of their obligations. Vassily Kliuchevsky describes these people as less a political unit than an "economic accident" (12). Thus, the system of universal and compulsory service marked an important departure from

the appanage system, and would seem to have been an emulation of Mongol practices.

The third main source of inspiration to the Muscovite rulers was the Orthodox Christian faith and the Byzantine court tradition. The influence of Byzantium was theoretically legitimized with the birth of Christianity in Russia at the turn of the tenth century. Thereafter, the Russian state became part of the universal Christian empire, and recognised at least the spiritual or eschatological sovereignty of the basileus (13). As we have mentioned, with the end of the Kievan era Russia's religious consciousness lapsed into dormancy ; and, during the period of Mongol overlordship, the basileus as a supreme image of rulership was suppressed by the invaders, who imposed the (albeit usually unenforceable) obligation to pray for no-one but the khan. But with the rise of Muscovy in the fifteenth century, its princes would turn again to the Byzantine court tradition in order to legitimise their newly-acquired authority. Given the pervasiveness and fervor of the Russian religious faith, Byzantine principles and rituals rapidly became a central element of the Muscovite political tradition. Marc Raeff describes this influence well :

> Sur le modèle Byzantin, le tsar est en fait un personnage ecclésiastique, au même titre que le patriarche. Il a une fonction hiératique dans certains rites célébrés dans l'Eglise. En outre, le tsar tire sa légitimité à la fois de son role hiératique et du fait que, depuis la prise de

> Constantinople par les Ottomans, il est le seul prince orthodoxe indépendant... dans la tradition populaire et la mythologie officielle, c'est la légitimité fondée sur la transmission au tsar de l'héritage romano-byzantin (Moscou le Troisième Rome) et sur la conception hiératique de son pouvoir qui a été l'élément primordial et dynamique dans l'élaboration d'une idéologie et d'une pratique politique moscovites...(14)

As Raeff mentions briefly, the Byzantine tradition also provided the basis for a dramatic expansion in the status of the Russian state. While for medieval Russia the supreme image of religious authority was the Byzantine emperor, the basileus, the Muscovite period saw the transfer of the headship of the Orthodox Church to Moscow (in the Muscovite view, at least). This process was symbolized by the doctrine of "Moscow, the Third Rome", which proclaimed that Byzantium's turn to the Western Church at the Council of Florence in 1439, and the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, meant the transferral of the headship of the Orthodox Church to Moscow. The Byzantine tradition, then, both served to define the nascent Russian state and its functions, and to justify its nationalist aspirations.

The confluence of these three sources of inspiration to the Muscovite rulers, and the contradictions which were thereby evoked, are well illustrated by the reign of Ivan IV (1533-84). Superficially, at least, Ivan placed himself squarely within the tradition of the Byzantine emperors. James Billington has written that

> In some ways Ivan can be seen as a kind of fundamentalist survival of Byzantium. Following his Josephite teachers, he used Byzantine texts to justify his absolutism and Byzantine rituals in having himself crowned in 1547 with the Russian form of the old imperial title. His sense of imperial pretense, formalistic traditionalism, and elaborate court intrigue all seem reminiscent of the vanished world of Constantinople (15).

The adoption of Byzantine customs and rituals by the Muscovite princes had begun before Ivan IV. But, writes Vassily Kliuchevsky, "Ivan was the first Muscovite ruler to perceive, and clearly to apprehend in his own person, the Tsar as taken in the literal Biblical sense of the 'Lord's anointed'"(16). Yet, these were merely the halting steps of a ruler who barely understood the implications of his imperial pretensions. For, Kliuchevsky continues,

> these workings of Ivan's intellect and imagination never succeeded in suggesting to him anything beyond the bare outlines of the idea of Imperial authority. That is to say, they never led him to any of those deductions which should have flowed from such an idea - to a new state order, for instance, or to a new political programme. (17)

The Byzantine tradition, then, does not fully account for the pattern of rulership under Ivan IV. For an understanding of Ivan's own conception of his relationship to his subjects, we have an excellent source in his correspondence with the exiled Prince Kurbsky, which extended over fifteen years (1564-79). Responding in one instance to the Prince's criticism of the harsh and arbitrary manner of his rulership, Ivan wrote the following :

> Doth it, forsooth, show a leprous soul that a man should preserve his power in his own hands instead of delivering it over unto slaves? Is it against reason that a man should will not to be ruled by slaves? Is it right orthodoxy that he should lie under the authority of slaves? (18)

Vassily Kliuchevsky argues that Ivan's conception of his subjects as slaves reflects the influence of the appanage tradition, and demonstrates that in him the hereditary proprietor triumphed over the sovereign (19). Yet, this explanation is still not quite satisfactory, since the power to which Ivan laid claim far exceeded that which had been inherent to the appanage system. Specifically, the conception of the prince as owner of the people as well as the land within his realm was not a part of the appanage tradition. The real origin of this conception lay in the experience of Mongol domination. This experience did not negate the appanage system, and indeed was historically co-temporal with it, but it did provide the conditions for an enlargement of the appanage principles to include persons as well as land. In this way, the Russian tsar was made truly the absolute sovereign and proprietor of the realm.

The pattern of rulership and conception of political authority represented by Ivan IV was thus a hybrid of the three sources of inspiration to the Muscovite rulers. But this hybrid embodied certain contradictions which were never resolved by the Muscovite rulers, and which eventually provoked the

collapse of the Muscovite state. Ivan and his predecessors had laid claim to political authority in the name of the Imperial principle, but they really sought to rule over Russia gua otchina - as their own private property (20). Absolute proprietor and autocratic sovereign competed for centre stage, with neither quite displacing the other. For much of the time, this merely resulted in a certain discursive incoherence on the part of the Muscovite rulers. At some moments, however, it made rulership itself quite impossible. When questions of more than ordinary importance, such as the succession to, or the proper form and scope of, the supreme power arose, the political life of Rus' was plunged into a state of confusion which eventually brought the dynasty of Muscovite princes to the ground (21). Tsar Theodore, the last of the Rurik dynasty, died in 1598 ; the inability of the ruling circles to provide for a successor threw Russia into a state of political instability and internecine warfare (the Time of Troubles) which lasted until 1613. Thus ended the Muscovite era of Russian history. The state which was reconsolidated during the seventeenth century under the Romanov dynasty would eventually come to ground itself in quite different principles of rulership, heralding the onset of the modern age in Russia.

The popular conception of political authority during the Muscovite era was basically congruent with

that of the ruling elements. It was, however, more thoroughly religious in inspiration. In the popular view, Russia constituted less an administrative, juridical, or political entity than a religious community, organically united by a common faith and spiritual/historical destiny. James Billington offers a good description of the pervasively religious nature of Muscovite social life during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, and may be quoted at length :

> Ivan's legislative council of 1549-50 - which provided some precedent for later parliamentary 'councils of the land' (zemskie sobory) - was conceived as a religious gathering. The Church code enacted in 1551 known as the hundred chapters was designed only to "confirm former tradition", and prescribed rules for everything from icon painting to shaving and drinking. Every day of the calendar was covered and almost every saint depicted in the 27,000 large pages of the encyclopaedia of holy readings, Cheti Minei. Every aspect of domestic activity was ritualized with semi-monastic rules of conduct in the "Household Book" (Domostroy). Even the oprichnina was bound together with the vows, rules, and dress of a monastic order... The consequence of this radical monasticization of society was the virtual elimination of secular culture in the course of the sixteenth century. By the time of Ivan the Terrible Muscovy had set itself off even from other Orthodox Slavs by the totality of its historical pretensions and the religious character of its entire culture (22).

In the popular view, the political institutions and practices of Muscovite Russia were legitimized by their service to the Orthodox community and faith. This, according to Michael Cherniavsky, reflected the absence of any "theory of the state" in Russian society

prior to the introduction of Christianity :

> Whatever form the state took in pre-Christian Russia, the theory of the State, the very concept of State was introduced into Russia as part of the Christian ethos. In other words, there was no concept of a secular state in Russia, no concept outside Christianity and its purposes ; Kievan Russia received and assimilated Christianity, but not the antique concept of secular society and state which antedated the new religion. (23)

Moreover, the concept of the state as it was introduced in Russia was in the popular view entirely encompassed in the person of the ruler. God's representative on earth, he was the exclusive focus of popular loyalties. The popular relationship to the tsar was conceived in organic, familial terms : he was a father to his people, the "batiushka-tsar". This view allowed no room for a conception of the state as a de-personalized juridical entity ; the notion that 'l'état, c'est moi' was always more true in the Russian context than in the West.

Thus, when in the mid-fifteenth century the Council of Florence and the fall of Constantinople led to the rejection of Byzantium as an external source of Christian authority, the newfound power which fell to the Russian state as head of the Orthodox Church was entirely encompassed in the person of the Muscovite prince. He became a 'tsar', or basileus. Thus, if the doctrine of "Moscow, the Third Rome" expressed the idea of a state, it was defined by an ecclesiastic hierarchy and political boundaries which were established by the

Russian ruler. Neither Church nor State were independent abstractions in Russia, but rather received their legitimacy from the image of the Russian tsar. (24)

But what exactly did popular Russia expect from its 'batiushka-tsar'? Popular expectations were naturally coloured by the actual experience of rulership in Russia. The appanage system, with its scattered, independent communities internally organized on only the most tenuous bases, had accustomed Russian society to an essentially passive form of governance, with local communities largely directing their own affairs. The experience of Mongol domination also had a significant effect upon popular conceptions of political authority. Michael Cherniavsky has argued that the Mongol khan came to inherit some of the attributes of the basileus. The khan could not displace the basileus, for he was, after all, a 'godless one' (25). But the relative unsophistication of popular conceptions allowed a certain overlapping of these two images of authority. The image of the khan could borrow some of the attributes of the universal and unique emperor, and become identified with it in the popular mind (26).

Thus, when following the fall of Constantinople the Russian ruler began to acquire the dignities and functions associated with the basileus, this latter image had already been coloured by the Mongol

experience, so that the Russian ruler really inherited the mantle of the basileus-khan. We have seen that the ruling image of political authority had undergone this gradual mutation ; Ivan IV had clearly attempted in some ways to emulate the Mongol khan. But the Mongol experience seems to have had a similar effect on the popular consciousness. Cherniavsky argues that in the sixteenth century, for popular Russia the title of "tsar" was in fact more firmly connected with the image of the khan than with that of the basileus (27).

These images of authority co-existed in the popular mind, each suggesting a different aspect of the ruler's function :

> If the image of the basileus stood for the orthodox and pious ruler, leading his Christian people toward salvation, then the image of the khan, perhaps, was preserved in the idea of the Russian ruler as the conqueror of Russia and of its people, responsible to no-one. (28)

Both aspects, one emphasizing the pious benevolence of the tsar, the other his harshness and arbitrariness, were encompassed within the popular image of the tsar as father. He might be harsh or benevolent as the situation demanded, but he always retained a paternal responsibility for the spiritual well-being of his flock.

All of these images, drawn from the appanage system, the Mongol experience, and the Byzantine tradition, emphasized the <u>negative</u> aspect of the ruler's function. He was the guardian of tradition, the

preserver of Christian orthodoxy, but never was he expected to take a positive role in shaping the life of society. Indeed, the popular image of Russia was static, emphasizing the immutability of the social order. The actual strategies of rulership associated with these images also tended to support popular expectations (because they shared the same assumptions). The basileus was always a remote figure, who played virtually no role in governing the nation. The appanage prince had an essentially economic relation to the community, and a tenuous one at that ; his properly political function of rulership was negligible. The Mongols, too, had been rulers from a distance, little interested in the internal affairs of the community. They were concerned mainly with the control of internal disputes and especially with the exaction of tribute. None of these ruling figures had taken an active role in shaping the life of the community ; they made exactions from it for their own benefit, and for the rest left it pretty much to its own devices.

Thus, as a genuine state and bureaucracy did emerge in Muscovite and Imperial Russia (especially in the latter), they would be seen as a cancerous growth which merely obstructed the natural bonds between tsar and people. And, when Peter the Great introduced an image of rulership which arrogated to the state the function of genuinely taking in hand the life of

society and promoting its development, a permanent schism would be established in Russia's political culture. Popular Russia held to a vision of uninstitutionalized, decentralized, and essentially negative political authority against the pretensions of the Petrine state. The history of the popular image of Russia would thenceforth be one of resistance to the Russian state and bureaucracy, which had betrayed the age-old foundations of Russian life.

Before this would occur, however, and contributing to the intensity of the eventual rejection of the Russian state, there developed a widespread sense of fanatical devotion to the state and its ruler, in the form of what has been called the 'Russian Idea' (29). The initial conditions for a cult of the state lay in the experience of political disintegration and subjugation to the Mongols which followed the Kievan era. When at last a focal point for the Russian people's aspirations emerged in the form of the Muscovite prince, the long period of frustration made for a particularly intense outpouring of support for this new force. Vassily Kliuchevsky has argued that when the population of Northern Rus' realized that Moscow was a political centre around which it could group its forces for the struggle with external foes, they hastened to ally themselves with the Muscovite prince, and raised him to the height of "national sovereign of Great Rus'" (30).

The success of the Muscovite princes in unifying and pacifying the perenially feuding appanages of North-eastern Rus', and in finally freeing the land from the domination of the Mongols, consolidated their hold upon the sympathies of the Russian people, and promoted a sense of "ecstatic rapture with the state" (31). According to Tibor Szamuely, the 'Russian Idea' entailed the conviction that "Russia had been entrusted with the divine mission of resuscitating the world by sharing with it the revelation that had been granted to her alone"(32). The parallel between the 'Russian Idea' and the doctrine of "Moscow, the Third Rome" is quite evident. We might say that "Moscow, the Third Rome" was the official formulation of a generally-prevailing sentiment, which it helped to consolidate. This also underlines the fact that, during this period of Russia's history, the ruling and popular images of political authority were basically compatible with each other.

The Petrine Transformation

As we have noted, the Muscovite tradition of rulership embodied certain contradictions which ultimately provoked the collapse of the state. Following the death of Tsar Theodore in 1598, there

ensued a lengthy period of political instability, marked by court intrigue, political assassinations, and the appearance of a series of 'false tsars' vying for the throne. The Time of Troubles finally ended in 1613, with the accession of a member of the Romanov family to the throne. Gradually, political conditions were stabilized and the state reconsolidated.

But the state established by the Romanov dynasty would eventually come to embody principles which stood in radical contrast to the Muscovite political tradition. The general context for this transformation was Russia's turn to the West in the seventeenth century. Vassily Kliuchevsky has argued that although Russia had previously engaged in diplomatic and commercial relations with the West, Western influence on Russia was a phenomenon of the seventeenth century. The source of this influence was

> Russia's dissatisfaction with life and her own position... The difficulty lay in the impossibility of making the material requirements of the Government square with the stock of domestic resources offered by the Government's system of subsistence. That is to say, the difficulty lay in the recognised necessity of re-organising the Government's system of subsistence in order to provide the means which the state so sorely lacked...(33)

Though initially the Russian state turned to the West in search of the means to satisfy its material requirements, and thus was mainly interested in the technological and military secrets it could discover there, this process gradually (and perhaps inevitably)

broadened to include the assimilation of the political forms and principles of some of the states of Northern and Western Europe. This process reached a climax under Peter the Great, and the Petrine reforms will be the main focus of our attention. Yet, an essential prelude to Peter's reforms were the initial steps taken in this direction by his immediate predecessors. Alexis I (1645-76) seems to have been a particularly important figure in this connection. Writes James Billington :

> Already under Alexis the semi-sanctified title of tsar was giving way to the Western title of emperor. Although the title was not formally adopted until the time of Peter, Alexis' new Polish-designed and Persian-built throne of the 1660s carried the Latin inscription Potentissimo et Invictissimo. Moscovitarium Imperatori Alexio. Subtly, the distinctively modern idea was being implanted of unlimited sovereignty responsible only to the national ruler. The "great crown" that arrived in June,1655, from Constantinople contained a picture of the Tsar and Tsarina where symbols of God's higher sovereignty used to be ; and pictures of Alexis began to replace those of St. George on the seal of the two-headed eagle. To the large group of dependent foreigners in Muscovy, Alexis was no longer the leader of a unique religious civilization but a model European monarch...(34)

Still, it was the reign of Peter I which marked a radical break in Russia's history, in decisively transforming the ruling image of political authority. One of the most important features of this new image, foreshadowed by Alexis yet spelled out more clearly under Peter, was its secular foundation. The function of the sovereign, which had traditionally been

conceived in hieratic and eschatological terms, now came to be founded on pragmatic and material grounds. According to Marc Raeff, the sovereign's primary function was now to see to it that society's material needs were satisfied (35). This does not mean that the state's traditional, religious bases of legitimacy were repudiated ; but to these bases were added secular ones, and the balance subtly shifted in the direction of the latter. One of Peter's main propagandists, Feofan Prokopovich, epitomized this shift. In his 'Sermon on Royal Authority', Prokopovich expressed his argument for absolutism in theological terms, insisting that " the highest power is established and armed with the sword of God and... to oppose it is a sin against God Himself..."(36). Yet he bolstered his position with rational arguments based on the doctrine of natural law and the writings of contemporary Western political theorists (37); "...besides Scripture there is in Nature herself a law laid down by God... supreme authority receives its beginning and cause from Nature itself"(38). Thus, not only did the ruler receive his absolute power from God, but also from the natural, material needs of mankind ; his function would have to change accordingly. The state would become responsible not only for the spiritual salvation but also for the material prosperity of mankind. Religion tended now to become subservient to the state, only one of its various functions, rather than its raison-d'être.

Michael Cherniavsky lists a number of administrative and symbolic reforms which the new image of rulership entailed :

> Abolition of the patriarchate, the establishment of the Governing Synod of the Church under a lay bureaucrat, the law permitting members of the reigning dynasty to marry foreign princesses who are not converted to the Orthodox faith. All this was symbolized by the new title - Imperator - which the Senate, established by Peter himself, offered to the tsar upon the conclusion of the victorious war with Sweden. It was perhaps equally well symbolized by the consequent elimination of the epithet "tishaishi", the "most-gentle", from the liturgy.(39)

Peter's reforms also marked the adoption of a positive, activist model of rulership by the Russian state. No longer a mere guardian of tradition, the state became the main force for promoting social change. According to this conception of rulership, the state was called upon to take in hand the life of society, to re-organise and develop it according to a rational plan. Marc Raeff calls this the Polizeistaat model, and argues that Peter adopted it from the empires of Northern Europe (in particular Sweden) (40). This conception of rulership was anchored in the changing conception of the universe which had been developing in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. A growing sense of the infinity of the universe and of its limitless resources was married with the conviction that these resources must be controlled by mankind and marshalled in the interests of progress. The

Polizeistaat model was a reflection of this general outlook. It also happened to fit well with Peter's own convictions. For he seems to have believed that Russia was in fact superior to the West in untouched natural resources, and that only the state could properly develop those resources (41).

The secularization of the foundations of political authority, and the adoption of a rationalist and activist model of rulership, constituted a radical break with the Muscovite tradition. Indeed, the subsequent schism in Russia's political culture, the opposition of ruling and popular images of political authority, may be placed under the rubric of conflicts between tradition and modernity, between Enlightenment and medieval conceptions of political authority. In Muscovite Russia, society was seen to be immutable, and the tsar as a guardian of tradition, who would ensure the salvation of his flock merely by preserving what had always been. Peter's aspirations could not have been more opposed to these notions ; he sought to free Russia from the weight of tradition, and lead it into a glorious future.

The view that Peter the Great was a radical innovator is by no means held unanimously, and the significance of his reign may be clarified by a brief consideration of an alternate interpretation of the Petrine era. Vassily Kliuchevsky has argued that Peter accepted Russia as he had found it, and merely combined

the elements of its socio-political system in new combinations without introducing any new relationships :

> Without laying a finger on the ancient bases of the existing order, and without introducing any new ones, he either completed processes begun by other hands, or modulated ready-made combinations of conditions by either segregating the constituent elements... or fusing those elements together until these methods had succeeded in creating for the State a position permitting of augmentation, for the State's exclusive benefit, both of the State's administrative institutions and of the people's working forces...(42)

This argument emphasizes the preservation and accentuation of practices, such as obligatory state service and the Statute of Bondage, into the Petrine era. The state was no less arbitrary and despotic than before, but merely tightened its grip on society. We do not mean to minimize the significance of these factors. However, if certain practices were preserved by Peter, the spirit which animated them did change. The state was provided with a radically new telos for its actions. It had always imposed heavy obligations on Russian society, for the simple reason that the nation's survival lay in the balance. The task of defense had always impelled the state to adopt a dirigiste approach to rulership. In this sense, the argument that the Muscovite rulers played only a negative role may seem to distort matters somewhat. But an important distinction between the Muscovite and Petrine images of rulership must nevertheless be made ;

there had not existed in Muscovite Russia a sense that the state must control society for the purposes of development or progress. The state had quelled internal disputes, mobilized society for the purpose of defense, and extracted from it enough to provide for its own functioning. These functions remained central during Peter's time and after ; but to them was added the notion of the state as a catalyst of social and economic progress, and this, moreover, along purely secular or material lines.

Yet, it cannot be denied that even at the level of ideology the results of the Petrine era were ambiguous. In particular, Peter's attempt to de-personalize political authority by investing sovereignty in the state rather than its ruler was a resounding failure. Peter himself contributed to this failure, for he was such a central figure in all of his reforms that they could not but be identified with his person. He might proclaim that sovereignty lay in the state, but the general perception was that it was <u>his</u> state. Even Peter eventually fell victim to this tendency, and with one act - the Ustav, or Charter of February 5, 1722 - he revealed how much he remained imprisoned in the perspective of his predecessors. In it, he proclaimed that

> We have decided to enact that, from this time forth, it may lie wholly within the will of the ruling Sovereign to grant the succession unto whomsoever he desireth, and likewise to revoke the same should he perceive his

> successor-designate to have aught of unworthiness in him. (43)

According to the Imperial principle, the throne should have been passed on according to the system of primogeniture. Yet, Peter could not bear the prospect of passing his throne on to a son who seemed unsympathetic to his reforms, fearing that in no time after his death all of his greatest works would be undone. The circumstances and personal motivations attending this decision are less important, however, than its implications. For with this one act, Peter had reverted to the practice of the appanage princes, who, as proprietors of the realm, could bequeath it to whomever they chose. Thus, the weight of the past impinged on even the one ruler who sought to escape from it.

Still, other innovations did outlive Peter's reign, and remained central to the ruling image of political authority throughout the Imperial age. The state had been secularized, and its function both transformed and expanded. Given the wholly religious nature of Muscovite Russia, and its tradition of negative rulership, this in itself was enough to cause an estrangement of the Russian state and society. The widespread sense of popular devotion to the state, and specifically to its ruler, had been based upon the common religious self-understanding of tsar and people. Suddenly and irrevocably these foundations had been

swept away. The ever-growing exertions to which society was put were no longer aimed merely at ensuring the integrity of national boundaries, and thereby protecting the traditional Russian way of life, but were directed toward the creation of an entirely new way of life.

The Russian state after Peter I did lose much of the dynamism with which Peter had infused it. But the main instrument of the Petrine reforms, the bureaucracy, continued to expand throughout the Imperial era and became the concrete symbol of Russia's betrayal of its organic/religious roots. It was based upon purely secular foundations. It was the instrument for applying the will of the centre, stamping out local autonomy and initiative. And it interposed itself between the tsar and the people, negating the organic bonds which had once united the nation. In every respect, it contradicted the popular understanding of the foundations of Russian society, and it became a focus of popular discontent throughout the Imperial age.

The bureaucratization of Russia was an inevitable corollary of the Petrine reforms. The state's pretension to direct the life of society by definition meant a huge administrative effort. The success of Peter's project depended upon the creation of effective intermediate bodies ; political power remained highly centralized, but the impetus which came from the centre

would have to be taken up by enthusiastic intermediate bodies. The administrative system of Muscovite Russia was simply unfit for these tasks. Writes Marc Raeff :

> La Moscovie était relativement dénuée de tels corps intermédiaires... les groupements institutionnalisés traditionnels de la Moscovie étaient trop passifs et rétrogrades pour se prêter à la nouvelle culture politique. (44)

Thus, Peter was forced to refashion Russia's administrative system. Traditionally based on local and family ties, and governed by the system of mestnichestvo, the system of universal service was completely reformed. Service became more regular, continuous, and exacting. Every member of the gentry was required to devote his entire adult life - beginning at the age of sixteen - to state service (45). Moreover, Peter insisted that, in both civil and military offices, all must start at the bottom and advance solely on the basis of merit. The promulgation of the Table of Ranks in 1722 listed in hierarchical order the fourteen ranks to be obtained in the military, civil, and court bodies, and established a meritocratic system of advancement. This table served as the foundation of the Imperial Russian bureaucracy and lasted, with modifications, until 1917 (46).

In instituting these reforms, Peter ensured the total (if temporary) subordination of the aristocracy to the state, refashioning it as a social elite qua administrative class. That is to say, the

aristocracy's social status now depended directly on its service to the state. It is this which has prompted many scholars to argue that Peter merely strengthened the existent relations in Russia, and it is true that at the end of his reign bureaucratized Russia resembled nothing more than the servant state to which Ivan IV had always aspired. Both of the chief social classes in Russia - the aristocracy and the peasantry- were practically defined by their status of bondage to the state, the landowners directly through their service functions, the landworkers indirectly through the institution of serfdom.

We cannot here give the institution of serfdom the attention it deserves, but it does seem to be related to the general trend in state activity which we have pointed out. The practices which eventually culminated in serfdom developed long before the Petrine era, and initially took place outside the sphere of the state. However, it was the Ulozhenie of 1649 which finally gave legal form and permanence to these practices. The state's involvement in this matter seems to have been in large part a function of its growing service needs. Muscovite Russia was not yet equipped with a modern bureaucracy, but the military challenges it faced made it heavily dependent upon the military service class. Richard Hellie has argued that the government's legitimation of serfdom in the Ulozhenie of 1649 was the result of pressure put on it by the middle service

class - the members of the Muscovite cavalry who were dependent for financial support on the peasants who lived on their landholdings (47). The flight of peasants from their landlords had become very common, and stood as a constant threat to the livelihood of the middle service class which held lands in return for service to the state. The Ulozhenie attempted to remove this threat, and demonstrated the already-growing tendency of social practices in Russia to reflect and serve the interests of the state. Serfdom thereafter remained in place until the government began to see it as a liability.

Post-Petrine Russia : Images of Rulership in Conflict

In the period following Peter's death, the general trend of state ideology was in the direction suggested by the Petrine reforms. A symbolic turning-point in the secularization of the state came in 1742 ; beginning with the coronation of Elizabeth, the Russian rulers crowned themselves in the ceremony performed in the Cathedral of the Dormition in the Kremlin (48). This, writes Michael Cherniavsky, "was the final symbolic step in the evolution of the autocratic ruler, truly secular and truly absolute" (49). Thereafter, the imperial mantle remained central to state doctrine.

The image of the emperor did not entirely displace that of the Orthodox Father in state ideology - this latter image continued to exist, partly contained in and partly living alongside that of the emperor(50). Just as during the Muscovite era there had existed a tension between the different images of political authority, so such a tension existed during the Imperial era. But the balance had shifted, and decisively, in favor of the image of the emperor and of a state based upon secular foundations.

This shift was illustrated even during the reign of Nicholas I (1822-55), who has often been characterized as a throwback to an earlier model of rulership. Nicholas' reign saw the introduction of a novel ideological formula which was designed to rally the nation behind its ruler. The ruling image of Russia was now expressed in three ideas : Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality. Recognising the persistent appeal of the traditional conception of the tsar as an Orthodox Father amongst popular elements, S.S. Uvarov, Nicholas' chief ideologist, attempted to effect a resolution of the traditional and modern images of rulership :

> His formula was a synthesis of the Russian myths, in which orthodoxy could serve as a third term, as a bridge from the Sovereign Emperor to the people by way of the pious, Orthodox Tsar. But in the synthesis, the keystone was autocracy. The paradox was that while Autocracy was no better defined than the other terms of the new Trinity, it defined itself through each government action

> and therefore was the only standard available, the measure of all things... (51)

Uvarov's ideological formula was at one level a manipulation of popular symbols ; yet it seems also to have been an accurate expression of Nicholas's self-image. Nicholas seems really to have understood his role as that of the 'Blessed Tsar', the Orthodox Father (52). This image was embodied, moreover, in Nicholas' most famous institutional innovation, the Corps of Gendarmes. Created in 1836 under the direct control of the 'Third Section of the Personal Chancery of his Imperial Majesty', the Corps was controlled by Nicholas himself because he saw the fulfillment of his role in personal government. Michael Cherniavsky describes the role of the Corps as follows :

> The gendarmes intruded into every aspect of Russian life, personal and institutional, exactly because Nicholas I saw them as an extension of his personal will ; and his will as tsar, as person, intruding into private lives, contradicting his own laws; could only be beneficial.... The imperial system, the state with the emperor at the head, went on functioning (though rather badly). Superimposed above it, however, was the Blessed Tsar, whose personal qualities and judgment were the real guarantees of justice and happiness. Though the great codification of Russian law was done under Nicholas I, on his orders, the emperor found it impossible to admit that his human impulses, exactly because they were his, and therefore just, could be limited by his own laws (53).

Yet, even this tsar who attempted to play the role of Orthodox Father found himself trapped within the framework established by Peter the Great. Indeed, it was perhaps this which made Nicholas' reign seem so

horrible. Alexander Herzen said of Nicholas that he had stopped being a European without becoming a Russian (54). He instead combined the worst of both worlds, for he

> tried to be a Tsar Alexis by means of his fligel and general-adiutanty... The myth of the pious tsar was executed through the secular state which was contained... in a military mold (55).

The secularized Petrine bureaucracy was by now solidly entrenched in Russian society, and even Nicholas was confined to enacting his personal will through this medium.

Though initially inspired by the West, the imperial bureaucracy remained in an important sense quintessentially Russian. For the bureaucratization of Russia was never accompanied by its logical counterpart, a system of law which would define and regulate the state's relationship with society. Russia's modern bureaucracy remained until the end grounded in traditional arbitrariness. A legal system was foreign to the Muscovite tradition ; the saint-prince stood above the Law, and the assurance of justice was provided by his personal sanctity(56).In practice, the prince's sanctity and piety were measured by his adherence to customs, rituals, and traditions. But the evolution of the state under Peter the Great, in abolishing old customs and rituals, also abolished the standard by which the person of the ruler could be judged. In Michael Cherniavsky's terms, Peter's reforms

> abolished the distinction between the emperor's personal will and law or Law. To put it another way, Law in Russia did not serve as a middle term between the tsar and the people, but, identified with the person of the Tsar, served to emphasize the identity of the ruler and the state (57).

Cut loose from its religious foundations, the need for a legal system to ground the state should have become clear. Yet, it is a telling testimony to the continuing hold of the Muscovite image of rulership on much of Russian society (including some of its elites) that, in its efforts to limit the arbitrariness of the state, society remained largely indifferent to legal formulas. Russia continued to seek justice through the tsar, who, it was hoped, would personally intervene to protect the interests of his dependents.

This is illustrated by the political crisis which occurred in 1730, when a proposal was submitted by D.M. Golitsyn, in the name of the Privy Council, to formally limit the prerogatives of the monarch. The service class rose in massive opposition to this proposal, throwing its lot in with the tsar and full autocracy. It still saw its interests as wholly dependent upon the will of the monarch. And this conviction had the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy, for,

> in the final analysis, by restoring full autocracy, the crisis of 1730 reinforced the concept of the nobility as a body of equal servicemen whose individual and group status depended exclusively on the will, favor, and interests of the Autocrat (58).

The indifference of Russian society to a legal framework for political authority is even better displayed in the findings of the legislative commission of 1767. The political establishment had by then begun to recognise the dilatory effects of the arbitrary exactions imposed on Russian society as a result of the Petrine reforms. The legislative commission was an attempt to address this dilemma by taking the pulse of Russian society. What it discovered was that the different social classes wanted a more precise definition of their juridical and functional status, some sort of guarantee of their property rights, and a certain protection against arbitrary imprisonments, seizures, and confiscations. These claims were directed not against the acts of the sovereign, but against the administrative agents of the state. And yet, writes Marc Raeff :

> on ne revendiquait ni un codé de lois, ni même une sorte de charte... l'élite dirigeante semblait préférer des rapports fondés sur une autorité suprême personnalisée à un cadre de lois et à l'échafaudage de règlements impersonnels...(59)

This would seem to indicate that not only the masses but also some members of the social elite identified themselves with the Muscovite ideal. The representatives of the different social groups seem to have envisioned Russia as a cleavage of classes and 'orders' corresponding to their socio-economic functions. The nobility opposed the interference of the

merchants in the agricultural economy, while the merchants wished to deny the nobility any involvement in commerce and manufacture. According to Marc Raeff, this indicates that much of Russia still had a 'medieval' conception of society as based on a hereditary separation of functions and with an 'organic' structure :

> La Commission de 1767 a révélée que la société Russe... prenait, par le truchement de ses représentants, le contre-pied de l'Etat policé, des normes et des objectifs que s'assignait ce dernier, du moins selon le schème pétrovien. La société prenait ses distances vis-à-vis de l'Etat bureaucratisé qui se proposait de la restructurer et de l'organiser en vue d'une productivité à long terme (60).

In the end, it would be the state which, as at so many other times in Russian history, would take up the reforming initiative and make some steps toward the establishment of a legal foundation for Russia. The reign of Catherine the Great, in particular, inspired great hopes in this regard. Following the palace revolt to remove Peter III and install Catherine on June 28, 1762, Catherine announced her intentions in the Manifesto of July 6. In it, according to Vassily Kliuchevsky, she promised the nation something totally unprecedented : a state based upon legislative enactment alone (61). Catherine's "Instructions" to the Legislative Commission of 1767 repeated this promise. Though she re-iterated the claim of the sovereign to absolute power, she also affirmed that :

> every Individual Citizen in particular must wish to see himself protected by Laws, which should not distress him in his Circumstances, but, on the Contrary, should defend him from all Attempts of others, that are repugnant to this fundamental Rule. (62)

Catherine's "Instructions" were based in large part on the writings of Western legal authorities such as Montesquieu, Beccaria, and Blackstone. The depth of her commitment to these principles is less clear. One source claims that

> there are no grounds for doubting that before 1767 she earnestly hoped that it would be possible to translate the principles of the Enlightenment into reality in Russia by inspired legislation (63).

On the other hand, a British diplomat at Catherine's court was more skeptical, remarking that her actions, "like false pearls, have more éclat but less value than the genuine one"(64).

At any rate, Catherine's promises went unfulfilled. The Pugachev rebellion inspired tremendous fear in the gentry and turned most of its members against the idea of reform. For Catherine, the French Revolution was a key turning point, as it killed her enthusiasm (along, again, with that of the gentry) for the reformist ideas of the West. After the French Revolution, a period of political reaction set in, extinguishing hopes for reform along legal lines.

The reign of Alexander I (1801-25) was also marked by periods of reformist ambition, during the years 1801-05 and 1807-12, respectively (65). There is even,

it seems, some reason to believe that in the first of these periods Alexander intended to abolish the autocracy and serfdom (66). But the continuing opposition of the gentry quashed hopes for the dismantling of the latter institution, and Alexander himself was reluctant in practice to part with his autocratic powers. When war with France broke out in 1805, these plans for reform were definitely abandoned (67).

The second 'liberal' period of Alexander's reign was dominated by his advisor Michael Speransky. Speransky seems to have wished to establish a strong monarchy firmly based on law and legal procedure, modeled on the German Rechtstaat (68). At the emperor's request, Speransky drew up in 1809 a plan for a constitution. But his suggestions were never implemented, and once again war with France, this time in 1812, announced a period of conservatism which lasted until the end of Alexander's reign.

Thus, Russia's political culture remained throughout the Imperial era dominated by a dichotomy between two radically opposed images of rulership, one drawn from the Muscovite era and emphasizing the negative aspect of political rulership, the other introduced by Peter the Great and arrogating to the state an absolute right to direct the life of society. Between these images of authority, nothing else had been able to lay solid roots. As a consequence,

political choices tended to be made in starkly opposed terms. One either opted for an absolutist state, as was the case with most of official Russia, or for a negligible state role, as was the case with most of popular Russia.

A liberal tradition did gradually evolve during the latter part of the Imperial era as a potential mediating element between the two traditional images of rulership. This tradition was supported by some members of the service class, and also by the local elites who came together through the zemstvo assemblies created during the reign of Alexander II. The liberal tradition might have become a logical eventual successor to the Petrine image of rulership, insofar as it evoked the possibility of embarking on a resolutely Western path of development. Yet, perhaps because it was so Western, the liberal tradition was slow to implant itself. Moreover, the most common base of support for such a model of rulership, an independent bourgeoisie, never really existed in Russia. The merchant class tended to depend heavily on the state, and never developed the sense of independence which in the West had been a precondition for a liberal outlook. During the late nineteenth-century, when the supporters of a liberal pattern of rulership began to organise as a genuine political movement, they often found themselves on the defensive in the nation's political debates ; even the term 'liberal' acquired for many a

negative connotation as the century progressed. Moreover, by this time the radical intelligentsia had emerged and rapidly eclipsed the liberals as a movement of opposition. This class drew inspiration from quite different sources, and was destined to play a much larger role in the nation's history.

Thus, we may summarize the post-Petrine evolution of the ruling image of Russia as follows : although the state lost much of the initiative Peter had attempted to instill in it, its ideological development basically followed the path Peter had charted. Peter's attempt to transfer sovereignty from the person of the ruler to the institution of the state failed, and until the end of the Imperial era the tsar remained the locus of legitimacy in the Russian state. However, his image qua ruler had been transformed, with the image of the emperor eclipsing that of the Orthodox Father.

Moreover, the prime instrument of the secular state, the bureaucracy, continued to grow in size and power throughout the Imperial age, both symbolizing and concretizing the transformation of the ruling image of political authority. Indeed, the bureaucracy became more and more an autonomous force in society. Though legitimacy remained the preserve of the ruler, power came more and more to repose in the bureaucracy. Initially, this was encouraged by the instability at state level which followed Peter's death ; the weakness of his immediate successors allowed the administrative

class, which had been created as an instrument of the ruler, to act more and more as a ruling class.

The nobility now used its position in the state to buttress its status in civil society. An important step in this direction was made with the Ukaz of March 31, 1731. It proclaimed that pomiestie landholdings, which had formerly been dependent upon the fulfillment of service obligations and technically remained the property of the state, now passed into wholly private possession, purchase-free and in perpetuity. The pomiestchik was thus converted into the permanent proprietor and master of his holdings (69).

The period between 1730 and 1760 saw the nobility acquire several other important privileges. These included : a class monopoly of serf-right, an extension of the pomiestchik's judicial-police authority to include the power of awarding the criminal code's heavier penalties, a right to sell serfs apart from lands, a regularisation of the recovery of peasant absconders, and facilities for obtaining cheap State credit secured upon the borrower's immoveable property (70).

Conversely, the service obligations upon which the civil status of the nobility had always depended became ever-lighter. The nobles were first granted the right to enter service directly as an officer if first the required educational standard had been attained. Subsequently, a fixed term of service was set. Finally,

the crowning privilege came in 1762, with the nobility's exemption from any state service save that which was of a voluntary nature.(71)

The social position of the nobility continued to improve during the reign of Catherine. But it is easy to see that this development created an unnatural imbalance in Russian society. The basis of the old order had been the compulsory, semi-bonded labour of all classes for the benefit of the state. Now, one class had been freed of its obligations while increasing its privileges. And, all this came at the expense of the peasantry, whose burdens in this period became even heavier. Attention could not but be drawn to this inequitous situation. The sympathies of a small part of the emancipated nobility would soon be directed toward 'the people', the toiling masses who suffered at the hands of the landowners and the state. Initially, the 'conscience-stricken gentry' would appeal to the state to abolish the institution of serfdom, which seemed to be Russia's greatest ill. But the state's conservatism would soon make it a target of attack, and the aspiration to a new political order came to occupy the minds of some elements of Russian society. It was out of this socio-psychological context that the intelligentsia was born.

Russia's political culture tended to narrow the range of choices available to the intelligentsia. The terms in which the state had traditionally been

conceived were starkly-opposed ; it would be all-powerful or practically non-existent. The intelligentsia's inherent opposition to the Tsarist state and to political absolutism thus tended to translate into a rejection of the institution of the state as such. In its desire to link forces with popular Russia, and to seek justice for the traditionally disinherited, the intelligentsia (for the first part of its history, at least) came to accept some of the terms in which popular Russia conceived of the role of the state.

But what, in the meantime, had occurred at this level of society? What was the popular response to the transformation in the ruling image of political authority, and how did the popular image evolve during this period? In general, the popular reaction to the Petrine innovations was one of opposition, though not always in an active form. Peter's reforms never penetrated to the heart of society, and his appeal to the masses to renounce their prejudices and traditional customs was clearly a failure.

Yet, exactly because many remained unmoved by Peter's ideological innovations, and in all likelihood did not fully understand their implications, the masses continued to conceive of their relationship to the ruler in traditional terms. For the mass of the Russian peasantry, the ruler remained the "batiushka-tsar", the Orthodox Father (72). Though the

rulers generally de-emphasized their hieratic functions, much of popular Russia continued to see them in this light, imbuing the image of the emperor with the attributes of the Orthodox Father. In this way, the Russian state avoided the wholesale alienation of the people, without ever winning them over to the new image of political authority.

Other elements of Russian society reacted in a more hostile, and perhaps a more rigidly logical, fashion, adopting a stance of outright opposition to the state and its ruler. Though we must concentrate on the movements of popular opposition to the state during the Imperial age, we do find an important precursor of them in the religious schism (raskol) which shook Russia in the latter half of the seventeenth century. This is not surprising, moreover, since the turn to the West which would culminate in the Petrine reforms had already begun in the seventeenth century. The religious schism was in part a reflection of the unsettling effects of this turn. Hitherto, the Russian community had been essentially homogeneous in its religious and moral composition. Writes Vassily Kliuchevsky of the Russian people :

> they did not all understand things in the same way, or study their catechism of life with equal strictness ; but at least they all affirmed the same catechism, sinned with equal indifference, and, with an identical fear of the Almighty in their hearts, went to confession and Communion. This varied tortuosity of an automatic conscience helped the old Russians to understand one another,

> and to form a homogeneous moral body... This moral wholeness of the Russian community was shattered by Western influence. (73)

Foreign influence during the seventeenth century had begun to disturb the 'moral wholeness' of the Russian community by introducing new conceptions and customs into its life. What was occurring was a gradual breakdown in common understanding, in which the masses no longer saw their values reflected in the practices developing around the state. A first explosion of opposition to this estrangement occurred, naturally enough, within the Church, which had been the moral centre of Muscovite social life.

We must not commit the error of drawing too close an analogy between the religious schism and the subsequent clash between the traditional and modern images of political authority (though later they did come to overlap). For both of the principal factions in the religious dispute accepted the traditional, Muscovite image of Russia. Each side - the 'theocratic' and the 'fundamentalist', as James Billington has called them (74)- answered in a different manner the same question : how was religion to be kept at the centre of Russian life in the changing conditions of the seventeenth century?(75) That is to say, both accepted the image of Russia as an organic religious community.

The theocratic solution, proposed by Patriarch Nikon, entailed a strengthening of central authority

within the Church hierarchy, and an improvement in the discipline and educational level of the clergy by editing and printing systematic catechistic manuals. This latter task called for the 'purification' of Muscovite religious texts and rituals of the errors and aberrations which had found their way into them over time. All of this spelled innovation and foreignness to the fundamentalists, led by the Archpriest Avvakum and supported mainly by the parish priests of the provinces. The fundamentalist position, writes James Billington, was

> a simple equation of trouble with innovation, innovation with foreigners, and foreigners with the devil. The past that the fundamentalists sought to maintain was the organic religious civilization that had prevailed in Russia prior to the coming of "guile from beyond the seas".(76)

Whether or not the Nikonian reforms represented the introduction of 'foreign' innovations into the Orthodox Church, the important point is that, given the context of unsettling changes already taking place in Russian society, they were <u>interpreted</u> by the schismatics as "guile from beyond the seas". The immediate catalyst of the schism was Patriarch Nikon's attempt to introduce corrections into the texts and rituals of the Church. When a Church Council in 1667 approved these reforms, the <u>raskol</u> began in earnest. The 'Old Believers' rejected the Greek three-fingered sign of the cross, the corrected spelling of the name of Jesus, the tripling instead of the doubling of the

'Hallelujah', as well as other reforms, and hence rejected the Church (77). Many of them interpreted the reforms as a sign that the end of the world was imminent, and painted Nikon as the AntiChrist.

We needn't enter too closely into the details of the schism, but its outcome is particularly significant for us. The Church Council of 1667 may seem to have been a victory for Nikon; but the Council actually devoted most of its attention to the final deposition and exile of the Patriarch. The theocratic solution to the problem of keeping religion at the centre of Russian life was also defeated. The main result of the Council "was to establish the clear subordination of church to state by flooding the church bureaucracy with new priests who were, in effect, state-appointed"(78). Both of the main parties to the religious dispute, both of the religious responses to the changing circumstances of seventeenth-century Russia, were defeated. In James Billington's view, this indicates that

> the basic schism in Christian Russia was not the formal one between those who accepted and those who rejected the Nikonian reforms. The real schism was, rather, the basic split between the Muscovite ideal of an organic religious civilization and the post-1667 reality - equally offensive to both of them - of the church as a subordinate institution of a centralized state. (79)

This would suggest that the religious schism was a prelude to the Petrine reforms, in establishing an initial break with the Muscovite tradition of

rulership. The schism was much more than an internal religious dispute, rapidly taking on political overtones. Michael Cherniavsky links the schism with the origins of the secular state in Russia. The Old Believers were faced with a tremendous doctrinal dilemma once the tsar stepped in to support the Nikonian reforms ; not only were they opposing an arrogant Patriarch, but also the 'Most Blessed' Tsar, God's representative on earth. That they did oppose him, Cherniavsky argues, is explained by the fact that

> the theocratic tsar began to ring a little false in the ears of the raskol'niki, that something different and new was beginning to show through the theocracy. What that something was can be illustrated by the first law of the Ulozhenie of 1649, which established a new category of crimes, political crimes... we have here a symbolic indication of the early secular state, for which the sacramental phrase was crime d'etat, as for the full-blown secular state it was, and is, raison d'etat. (80)

Moreover, if the Old Believers consistently held out the hope that the tsar would personally intervene to erase the heresies of Nikon, the state acted in such a way as to galvanize the Old Believers into hardened political opponents. The Council of 1667 decreed that opponents of the reforms were in rebellion both against the authority of the church and against that of the state. The Council's declarations characterized the Old Believers as "heretics and recalcitrants", and affirmed that heretics were liable to civil as well as ecclesiastical punishment (81). A law of 1684 made

adherence to the schism a secular, state crime, with the punishment of death for the unrepentant schismatic (82). The state's actions proved to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, for after 1667 the Old Belief became an indistinguishable blend of opposition to liturgical and political reforms. The Old Belief came to symbolize the traditional image of Russia, and served as a touchstone for all those who were disenchanted with the turn away from the Muscovite tradition of rulership. Beginning with the insurrection of 1682, every popular uprising in Russia - the continued strel'tsy troubles, the Cossack rebellions under Peter I, and the Pugachev revolt - was fought under the banner of the Old Belief (83).

A key focus for the opposition of the Old Believers was Peter the Great. Baron von Haxthausen, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, reported a conversation with a raskol'niki, who said :"it was not Nikon who separated us so completely from our other Russian brethren, but Peter I effected this, by the Western tendencies he introduced, of which the order to cut off the beard was only an outward sign"(84). The reason that Peter was singled out for criticism, it seems, was that he defined the world of 'AntiChrist' more bluntly and violently than had his predecessors (85).

A whole list of Peter's reforms symbolized the new state and society which were being erected. In addition

to the laws specifying new dress codes, these reforms included : a law of 1715 imposing fines for not confessing and attending communion at least once a year ; a law of 1722 transferring to lay courts cases of nonperformance of "Christian duties", including confession and Communion ; another law of 1722, requiring priests to report to the authorities secrets heard at confession, if they involved either crimes planned for the future or crimes for which the confessant did not repent. All of these laws, writes Michael Cherniavsky,

> reveal the essence of the absolutist secular state... the state as a perfectly self-sufficient, self-contained entity, and the state as the measure of all things. Everything necessary for man's existence was to be found within the state, and, at the same time, reasons of state, the interests of state, were the ultimate standards for judging all actions and motives" (86).

Peter's reign signalled the reversal of the balance between religion and the state in Russia. No longer the raison d'être of the state, religion became itself subordinate to the state, which was now grounded in secular purposes. The old religion of the state and the old theocratic imagery were not exactly abandoned ; the new conception of the state's role was often expressed in traditional terms. What occurred can, according to Michael Cherniavsky, be described in theological terms as the shift from the ruler as the image of Christ to the image of God (87). God and His Word no longer served as an external criterion for

judging the ruler ; rather, the tsar had made himself God. This was exactly the accusation leveled against Peter by the Old Believers (88). It was also what Peter's new priests, his officers and servants, called him : zemnoi bog, the god on earth(89).

It was from this perspective that the Old Believers were viewed by the state, this which made them the victims of such intense persecution. They attempted to remain outside the sphere of the secular state. They refused to belong, and symbolized this by their refusal to pray for the ruler.

Yet, the Old Believers survived. One source estimates that from the start perhaps twenty percent of all Russians embraced the Old Belief (90). Without any institutional support or independent theology, the Old Believers continued to attract the sympathies of millions of Russians throughout the Imperial age. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Robert Crummey has estimated that they accounted for 12-15% of the population of the Russian empire (91).

As a source of genuine resistance to the Tsarist state, however, the Old Believers were relatively ineffectual, usually limiting themselves to non-violent forms of protest. They were also inclined to self-destruction ; it has been estimated that between 1672 and 1691 over twenty thousand burned themselves alive in communal conflagrations (92). This was perfectly consistent with their religious convictions,

for the appearance of the AntiChrist signalled the imminent end of the world, and the Old Believers' self-sacrifice symbolized the purgative flames which were to precede the Second Coming. But as a concrete form of protest, such actions could have little effect. The Old Believers were in the end most important in merely keeping alive a traditional image of Russia ; the attack upon the bureaucratic secular state was largely the work of others.

A greater threat to the state came from the peasant insurrectionaries of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Opposition from this source had begun already in the early seventeenth century (e.g. the Bolotnikov rebellion of 1606-07), but it was the Petrine reforms which consolidated it as a distinct tradition with a broad social base and a deep ideology (93). Both the Old Believers and the peasant rebels were protesting against the obligations and restrictions imposed upon them by the expanding bureaucracy. Each group had its own axe to grind, and was often motivated by fairly specific grievances. But they shared an implicit vision of society which was derived from the Muscovite era. In this way, they overlapped and reinforced one another, and helped to shape the character of all oppositional movements in Tsarist Russia, including that which brought down the Romanov dynasty in 1917.

Paul Avrich has analysed the four major peasant

uprisings which took place between 1600 and 1800 - these occurred in 1606-07, 1670-71, 1707-08,and 1773-74, and were led respectively by Bolotnikov, Razin, Bulavin, and Pugachev (94). Avrich argues that these revolts shared certain common features :

> In each case the rising was directed not against the tsar but against the nobility and bureaucrats and the innovating state which they administered... In each,moreover, religious and social myths played a key part in inciting the rebellion. The lower classes were hungry for a Messiah, and the groundswell of popular support that arose about the rebel leaders owed much to the belief that the promised savior had arrived to punish the wicked and purge the land of sin and suffering.(95)

Though the first of these rebellions occurred during the Time of Troubles, well before the state's turn to the West, the continuity in the forms of protest from this to the later rebellions indicates that the popular image of political authority had remained unchanged throughout the period. Indeed, it seems to have petrified in the face of state-induced change. While the privileged elements of Russian society had generally followed the state's lead, popular Russia had turned in upon itself, and was left outside the dynamic and creative forces of the nation.

Thus, the peasant rebels' actions were essentially negative in form. That is to say, they rose up against a present which was intolerable, but offered little in the way of a positive solution to their grievances ; they only vaguely remembered a past which had been

kinder. A focal point for discontent was the bureaucracy, and the boyar class which they believed still dominated it :

> The state, in the eyes of the people, became an alien and evil tyranny, extorting taxes, exacting military service, and trampling on native customs and traditions. It neither ministered to their welfare, nor defended their concept of justice ; nor did it perform any other function which seemed vital, or even relevant, to their way of life. Rather, it was an agent of oppressive innovation, a giant octopus, as they saw it, which stifled their independence and squeezed out their life's breath (96).

What the peasant rebels sought was to eliminate the wall of nobles and bureaucrats which stood between them and their Orthodox Father. The rebels always distinguished between the ruler and the bureaucratic state. The tsar remained for them a benevolent father, while the bureaucracy was a wicked usurper which distorted his will. The myth of the pious, benevolent ruler thus became the central rallying point for disaffected popular elements throughout the Imperial age. The aim of popular revolts was to restore a mythical age of passive and decentralized political authority , a political structure based upon self-administering local communities united and led to salvation by a pious ruler.

Popular Russia had, however, proven incapable of realizing this aspiration. Seething with discontent, and clinging to a petrified vision of the Muscovite past, popular Russia awaited a savior. This savior did

appear, finally, though in a rather unexpected form : the intelligentsia. This class inserted itself into a context of political conflict between popular Russia and the centralized, bureaucratic state, i.e between a traditional and modern image of rulership. In linking its forces with popular Russia, the intelligentsia itself came to adopt a conception of the state's role in society which reflected the heritage of the popular image of Russia.

Notes - Chapter Two

1. The term 'image' should suggest a set of conceptions which provide a structure for thought and are embodied in action. The images of rulership which we shall elucidate in what follows have some ideological features, yet they are less systematic and explicitly articulated than an ideology. We have relied on secondary sources for our account of the conflicting images of rulership in Russian political culture. The ruling image of Russia, in both the Muscovite and Imperial ages, was manifested in both the symbolic and administrative actions of the state, which always embody an implicit vision of the role of the state and the grounds of its legitimacy. The ruling image is not the same thing as official policy or doctrine ; it is implicit in them, serving as the background of often unacknowledged assumptions which underlie official policy. The general inarticulateness of popular Russia makes its conceptions of political authority somewhat more difficult to discern. Here, our sources rely heavily on orally-transmitted popular myths, legends, and folk-tales. In addition, the popular elements did tend to articulate a conception of legitimate political authority at times of rebellion, as a means to justify their actions. The movements of popular opposition to the State thus also serve as an important source for our account of the popular image of rulership.

2. James Billington, The Icon and the Axe : An Interpretive History of Russian Culture (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp.12-13.

3. Vassily Kliuchevsky. A History of Russia, 5 Vols., trans. C.J. Hogarth (New York : Russell & Russell, 1960), Vol.1,p.182.

4. Ibid,p.241.

5. Ibid,p.250.

6. Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (London : Penguin Books, 1974), p.21.

7. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, Vol.3,pp.12-13.

8. Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition (London : Secker & Warburg, 1974),p.18.

9. Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p.14.

10. Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, p.18.

11. Ibid,p.15.

12. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, Vol.1,p.260.

13. Michael Cherniavsky, ed., The Structure of Russian History : Interpretive Essays (New York : Random House, 1970), p.65.

14. Marc Raeff, Comprendre l'Ancien Régime Russe (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1982), p.18.

15. Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p.67.

16. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, Vol. 2, p.100.

17. Ibid, p.101.

18. Cited in ibid, p.69.

19. Ibid, pp.70-71.

20. Ibid, p.25.

21. Ibid, p.26.

22. Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 69.

23. Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People (New York : Random House, 1970), pp.32-33.

24. Ibid, p.38.

25. Cherniavsky, ed., The Structure of Russian History, pp.68-69.

26. Ibid, p.69.

27. Ibid, p.72.

28. Ibid, p.74.

29. Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, p.61.

30. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, Vol.1, p.314.

31. Szamuely, The Russian Tradition, p.60.

32. Ibid, p.69.

33. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, Vol. 3, p.266.

34. Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p.148.

35. Raeff, Comprendre l'Ancien Régime Russe, p.62.

36. Feofan Prokopovich, "Sermon on Royal Authority and Honor," Russian Intellectual History : An Anthology, ed. Marc Raeff (New York : Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p.16.

37. Ibid, p.14.

38. Ibid, pp.19-20.

39. Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, p.72.

40. Raeff, Comprendre l'Ancien Régime Russe, p.12.

41. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, Vol.4, p.109.

42. Ibid, p.220.

43. Ibid, p.218.

44. Raeff, Comprendre l'Ancien Régime Russe, p.51.

45. Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 3rd ed. (New York : Oxford University Press, 1977), p.260.

46. Ibid, p.260.

47. Richard Hellie, Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1971), p.16.

48. Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, p. 90.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid, p.93.

51. Ibid, p.151.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid, pp.152-53.

54. Cited in ibid, p.155.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid, p.87.

57. Ibid.

58. Marc Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), pp.82-83.

59. Raeff, Comprendre l'Ancien Régime Russe, p.102.

60. Ibid, pp.103-04.

61. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, Vol.4, p.372.

62. "Catherine the Great's 'Instructions' : Excerpts," Readings in Russian Civilization, 3 Vols., ed. Thomas Riha (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1964), Vol.2, p.258.

63. I. Young, "Russia," in The American and French Revolutions 1763-93, ed. A Goodwin, vol.8 of New Cambridge Modern History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p.331.

64. Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia - From the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1961), p.537.

65. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, p.336.

66. Ibid, pp.336-37.

67. Ibid, p.337.

68. Ibid, p.338.

69. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, Vol.4, p.332.

70. Ibid, pp.337-38.

71. Ibid.

72. Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, p.95.

73. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, Vol.3, p.373.

74. Billington, The Icon and the Axe, pp.126-27.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid, p.136.

77. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, p.220.

78. Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p.144.

79. Ibid, p.158.

80. Michael Cherniavsky, "The Old Believers and the New Religion," Slavic Review 25 (March 1966), p.12.

81. Robert O. Crummey, The Old Believers and the World of AntiChrist (U.S. : University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p.15.

82. Cherniavsky,"The Old Believers and the New Religion," p. 20.

83. Ibid.

84. Baron von Haxthausen, The Russian Empire, 2 Vols. (London : Chapman & Hall, 1856), Vol.1, p.259.

85. Cherniavsky,"The Old Believers and the New Religion", p.27.

86. Ibid, p.35.

87. Ibid, p.38.

88. Ibid, p.33.

89. Ibid, p.39.

90. Ibid, p.4.

91. Crummey, The Old Believers and the World of AntiChrist, p.xii.

92. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, p.221.

93. Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 192.

94. Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels : 1600-1800 (New York : Schocken Books, 1972).

95. Ibid, p.1.

96. Ibid, p.256.

CHAPTER 3 : RUSSIAN POPULISM AND THE STATELESS IDEAL

Introduction

We have seen that throughout the post-Petrine era a popular tradition of resistance to the Tsarist state and its image of Russia survived and encouraged a number of uprisings, all of which were informed by an image of stateless social autonomy. All of these uprisings were defeated. Popular Russia, it seems, was unable to overcome the Tsarist state on its own. But by the mid-nineteenth century there had been consolidated a new social force which was destined to lead a victorious revolutionary effort : the intelligentsia.

The possibility of a revolutionary alliance of educated dissidents and popular elements had been foreseen by some observers well before 1917. In a remarkably prophetic moment, Joseph de Maistre had predicted a social upheaval led by " some university Pugachev " . Some years later, and surely with greater satisfaction, the Populist historian Schapov anticipated a time when " Pugachev, mover of the popular masses, will extend his hand to Muraviev, Pestel, or Petrashevsky, when the mournful sounds and thoughts of popular ballad will mingle with the thoughts of Ryleev " (1).

The strategic alliance of the intelligentsia and the popular, largely peasant, masses in the Revolution

of 1917 is now a matter of historical record. Less clear is whether this alliance was ever anything more than strategic, whether these allies shared anything other than a sense of discontent with Tsarist Russia. Was there perhaps a deeper link between the " sounds and thoughts of popular ballad " and the thoughts of the intelligentsia?

What is the Intelligentsia?

We should initially attempt to clarify the origins and characteristic features of the object of our analysis in this chapter. Although we cannot give this issue the full treatment it deserves, at least a few words are in order.

At a most general level, the origins of the intelligentsia can be located in the Muscovite state's turn to the West in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In some respects this process predated Peter the Great, but there is no doubt that it was he who gave it the greatest impetus. Peter's reforms opened the way to the development among Russia's upper classes of a modern, secular culture which was almost entirely derivative of the West. As a by-product of the Petrine reforms there gradually evolved a social group which was distinguished from the mass of the population by its education, its manners and customs,

and in general by its affinity with Western thought and culture (2). But if the inculcation of Western ideas was in the first instance a matter of state initiative, this phenomenon became uncoupled from the state as time went on. The state had triggered a process which it could never fully control, and, as it lost the progressive spirit with which Peter had imbued it, this spirit would be taken up by a part of the educated classes. There resulted a certain disaffection with the increasingly conservative state, and it was from these disaffected elements that the intelligentsia would emerge.

Marc Raeff lays special emphasis on one of Peter's reforms : the creation of a stratum of professional state servants. This was both the instrument for the application of Peter's and his successors' policies and the prime means of Westernization and cultural transformation of the nobility itself (from whose ranks the service class was in large part drawn). Moreover, Raeff argues, this class came to embody certain values which would later help to shape the character of the intelligentsia. Principal among these was the sense of duty to a higher ideal. Professional officialdom meant that the noble's identity was in large part dependent upon service to monarch and state. Peter had drawn the nobility away from their purely private interests, and imparted to them a sense of responsibility for shaping the life of the nation (3).

Over the course of the eighteenth century, the nobility would be absolved of service obligations ; but if the nobles had fought hard for these concessions, the result cut both ways. For, according to Raeff, its real significance was that the state had declared its independence from the nobility (4). It no longer needed them to fulfill its purposes. Yet the sense of duty to a higher ideal, and the will to creative action, by now ran deep among some elements of the nobility, and began to seek a new outlet. Gradually, the nobility's attention would turn to " the people " ,the masses who had been left behind by the advances of the past centuries, and whose barbaric condition stood in stark contrast to the newly acquired freedoms and dignities of the nobility. Some members of the nobility began to project their service ethos onto the people, and sought to redress the wrongs for which they, as landlords and masters, were in large part responsible (5).

Whether or not we concur with Raeff in attributing particular importance to the service experience as a formative influence on the intelligentsia,there is no doubt that the phenomenon of the ' 'conscience-stricken gentry' helps to explain the origins of this class. When after 1762 the nobility was completely freed of service obligations, the disparity between their own position and that of the peasantry became painfully clear. Attention was focused in particular on the

institution of serfdom, which had long ago disappeared in the West, and maintained the Russian peasantry in a state of near-slavery. To be sure, most of the nobility simply returned to their estates and congratulated themselves on their good fate. For some, however, the situation was intolerable (6).

This was particularly so given the widespread enthusiasm in the second half of the eighteenth century for Western Enlightenment thought, with its notions of human dignity and the rights of man. These endowments of modern humanism were embraced by much of the nobility during the Catherinian era, and provided the foundations for a critique of the conditions of the peasantry, and an attack upon the institutions and practices responsible for them (7).

This eventually and inevitably brought them into conflict with the state. The nobility knew all too well that their own privileges had been a gift of the state, and might be snatched away at any moment depending upon the caprices of the ruler (as the reign of Paul illustrated)(8). Moreover, the state had become an essentially reactionary force in Russian society. Catherine had dabbled in the ideas of the Enlightenment, but her enthusiasm was extinguished with the French Revolution. After 1789 there followed a period of political conservatism which lasted until the end of the century. The state would have no more truck with the 'subversive' reformist ideas of the West.

Some attempts in the direction of reform were made under Alexander I, but war with the West and the opposition of much of the gentry soon put an end to them.

That section of the gentry (always very small) which had committed itself to reform was now pitted in opposition to the state. The Decembrist revolt of 1825 saw some of its members attempt a coup d'etat as a means of instigating change. This revolt failed, but its very failure, and the thirty years of political reaction which followed under Nicholas I, only hardened the hostility of the 'conscience-stricken gentry' to the state, and drove it to ever more extreme positions.

It was during the reign of Nicholas I (1825-55) that a hard core of radical opponents to the Tsarist state was formed. The generation of radicals which succeeded the Decembrists, including Alexander Herzen, began to form small circles and study groups, to discuss the latest fruits of Western philosophy and to elaborate projects (usually very vague) for Russia's future. These men, by now totally alienated from Russian 'reality' and thus dependent for self-identification on their 'ideas', formed during the 1830s and 1840s the first generation of the intelligentsia.

In the meantime, changes in Russia's educational system had created the conditions for the entry of new elements into the ranks of the intelligentsia. After

1803, the state set up a network of educational establishments : five universities, high schools in nearly every provincial capital, and an improved elementary educational system (9). The state needed educated non-military personnel to staff its growing bureaucracy, but a by-product of these reforms was the creation of a new breed of radicals : the raznochintsy. These 'people of diverse rank' were able to climb the rungs of the educational ladder and acquire the skills to become effective critics of the regime. The raznochintsy came together with the disaffected gentry through the universities, and formed during the 1850s and 60s the second generation of the intelligentsia.

It was during the 1860s that a novelist named Boborykin introduced the term 'intelligentsia' into the Russian language, and it seems to have become current almost immediately (10). It indicates the primacy of 'ideas' to the self-understanding of this group, which thought of itself as something like the embodied intelligence or consciousness of the nation (11). This is the key feature of the intelligentsia, for although it did constitute a distinct class in Russian society, it did so according to ideological rather than socio-economic criteria.

Although the initial origins of the intelligentsia were in the gentry, it soon came to encompass much more diverse elements, drawn from the petty bourgeoisie, the priesthood, and in some isolated cases the peasantry.

The very term 'raznochintsy' is not a socio-economic category but an indication of the fact that the intelligentsia came from a diversity of social backgrounds. The criterion of education gets us no further, since many of the educated did not join the ranks of the intelligentsia. The possession of an education was a necessary but insufficient condition of membership. In the end we must come back to the intelligentsia's sense of complete alienation from Russian society and especially from 'official' Russia, as well as its commitment to some kind of radical reform. This was its constitutive feature, and it is in this ideological sense that the intelligentsia became a distinct class in Russian society.

The era of Nicholas I seems an appropriate date of demarcation for the birth of the intelligentsia (although all such demarcations are somewhat arbitrary). It was at this time that the disaffected elements of the gentry became totally alienated from the state, and as a consequence became entirely dependent upon their 'ideas' for self-identification. Many of the Decembrists were army officers, who continued to serve the state and sought to effect change from within. The gentry idealists of the forties, however much they paid tribute to the legacy of the Decembrists, distinguished themselves by their total opposition to the Tsarist state and their commitment to its destruction (12). It was this

characteristic which, more than anything else, would be passed on to future generations of the intelligentsia.

Between East and West

The intelligentsia's sense of alienation from Russian society led it to look to the West for sources of self-identification. Indeed, many have argued that its ideas were wholly derivative. Isaiah Berlin has written that, in general, Russia has not " contributed a single new social or political idea : nothing that was not traceable, not merely to some ultimate western root, but to some doctrine discoverable in the west eight or ten or twelve years earlier than its first appearance in Russia " (13). The intelligentsia were in this view " somewhat exaggerated Westerners of the nineteenth century " (14). Speaking of the Populist movement, Richard Pipes makes a similar claim: " As is generally known, the philosophical foundations of Populism were constructed almost entirely of materials taken directly from the West, especially from the literature of French socialism and positivism, and German materialism " (15).

Though it is not explicitly stated, the impression such comments generally leave is that the intelligentsia was wholly estranged from Russia's

indigenous ideological traditions, with no vital link to the spirit of the nation. The possibility of such a link is not so much excluded as it is occluded by the emphasis laid on the importance of Western thought in the intellectual formation of the intelligentsia. On the other hand, many scholars have argued that this class was in fact solidly grounded in Russian culture, espousing political views and evincing character traits which can only be understood against the background of Russian traditions. Some have emphasized the element of authoritarianism in the outlook of the revolutionaries, and relate it with a political tradition of autocracy and despotism (16). Others have sought to locate the roots of the intelligentsia's apocalyptic vision of revolution in the Russian religious tradition (17). Still others find an affinity between the so-called 'maximalism' or 'extremism' of this class and the sectarian Christian tradition in Russia (18).

We will attempt to establish a slightly different link between the intelligentsia and the traditional political culture of Russia. We will try to show that the vision of the future society articulated by the Populist Movement (which dominated the intelligentsia for much of its history and reflected the original aspirations of this class) was remarkably similar to the popular image of Russia. Both the Populists and popular Russia looked forward to a 'golden age' of

Russian society as a radically decentralized, stateless association of self-governing local units. These elements of the intelligentsia, then, shared with popular Russia a conception of the ideal political structure. In this sense, the Populist movement would have to be seen as part of a continuous tradition of opposition to the Tsarist state, rejecting along with the popular elements the state's image of Russian society. The intelligentsia did not simply capitalize upon a tradition of popular revolt and channel it to its own purposes, but also merged with it to become its next chapter.

This is not to deny that there were significant differences between the intelligentsia and the popular masses. Many of its members enjoyed quite privileged social backgrounds, and their possession of an education lent them an anomalous position in Russian society. More importantly, some of the central values of this class were quite foreign to popular Russia. The peasantry remained throughout the nineteenth century profoundly religious, while most of the revolutionary intelligentsia had eschewed religion and adopted instead the cult of 'science'. Although the intelligentsia's commitment to science has been described by some as a sort of inverted religious faith, there is no doubt that the structure of thought in which these notions were set was fundamentally different from the popular self-understanding. While

popular Russia's ideas had their roots in the pre-Petrine era of Russia's history, the intelligentsia's 'scientism' simply could not have come into being if not for the advent of Peter the Great. Linked with their religious self-understanding was the masses' continued devotion to the tsar, who remained for them a spiritual father and quasi-divine figure. Despite some occasional wavering, the radical intelligentsia rejected the tsar along with the state, seeing little difference between the two. While popular Russia's aspiration was to free itself from the clutches of the nobility, eliminate 'the state', and install a 'good tsar' on the throne, the revolutionary intelligentsia sought to eliminate both tsar and state and to establish a fully autonomous society. Moreover, the popular image of Russia was derived from the medieval era, and as such was informed by a conception of the immutability of both spiritual and social orders. There was no real notion of progress to be found here ; revolt meant the restoration of an antecedent state of affairs. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, was thoroughly committed to progress (as it was variously interpreted), and revolution for it was to be a leap into the golden future.

The significant differences between the outlook of the intelligentsia and that of popular Russia are undeniable, and help to explain the revolutionaries' many setbacks in their attempts to enlist the support

of the masses. But too little emphasis has been placed on what these two forces shared. If the intelligentsia was alienated from Russian 'reality', so was popular Russia. The general direction of Russian history since Peter the Great had been contrary to their deepest aspirations. For both popular Russia and the Populist movement, moreover, this alienation was directed against 'the state', i.e. the tentacular bureaucracy which had spread its web across Russian society, underwriting serfdom, stifling personal freedoms, and stamping out local initiative. Although the sources of this alienation may have differed in each case, the solution it led to in both was the same : the state (though not always the tsar) was rejected in toto, in favor of a vision of radical decentralization and local autonomy.

It is true that, in formulating its vision of the future society, the intelligentsia relied almost entirely on Western thinkers. But we must not see any necessary opposition of Russian and Western sources of influence. As we have seen, the Petrine state's break with its medieval religious roots and initiation of a new ideological tradition constituted the conditions for the possibility of the very existence of the intelligentsia,and thus for its receptivity to radical Western thought. Moreover, just as important as the intelligentsia's adoption of Western theories was the manner of this adoption. As Isaiah Berlin has himself

pointed out, the intelligentsia did not take over western ideas uncritically. Of the Populists, he writes that :

> they accepted, in broad outline, the educational and moral lessons, but not the state worship, of Rousseau... They accepted the anti-political ideas, but not the technocratic centralism , of Saint-Simon. They shared the belief in conspiracy and violent action preached by Babeuf and his disciple Buonarotti, but not their Jacobin authoritarianism... " (19).

Similarly, the Populists were greatly influenced by Marx's description of the atrocities of capitalism and the hypocrisy of 'bourgeois democracy', but rejected his notion of the highly centralized 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. In all of this we find a general antagonism to centralized authority and statist schemes. This illustrates that, although the Populists emerged out of the Petrine tradition, they tended to reject the Petrine image of the state as the main engine of social progress, and were instead brought within the sphere of a popular image of stateless social autonomy.The Populists' receptivity to certain specific anarcho-socialist theories developed by Western thinkers, then, should be understood against the background of this popular tradition and their own relationship to it.

If our argument does not contradict those which emphasize Western influences upon the intelligentsia, a more significant opposition may be established with arguments which emphasize the intelligentsia's

authoritarian propensities (20). Such analyses, in our view, tend to distort the nature of Russia's political traditions and that of the mainstream intelligentsia. Focusing exclusively upon the authoritarian tradition of the Russian state, these arguments tend to ignore the existence of a tradition of decentralism, bordering on anarchism, which was sustained by popular and sectarian elements throughout the post- Petrine era. The intelligentsia's relationship to this tradition deserves scholarly attention.

But this requires a re-assessment of the intelligentsia itself. Scholars such as Szamuely seem to retrospectively read characteristics into this class which only ever applied to a minority of its members. Starting from the fact of Soviet authoritarianism, Szamuely locates this phenomenon in the outlook of the class which led the revolution. Lines of filiation are drawn linking Populists such as Nechaev and Tkachev with Lenin, while the Bolsheviks' organizational strategies are linked with the conspiratorial tradition of certain Populist factions. The impression left is that the intelligentsia was from its very origins an authoritarian class.

Such tendencies no doubt existed, but an exclusive emphasis on them leads to a distorted picture of the intelligentsia as a whole. It should be remembered that Nechaev and Tkachev were relatively isolated figures on the outer fringe of the Populist movement,

and that the strategies they espoused were vociferously condemned by most of their contemporaries. The by far more common position within the intelligentsia at this time and through much of its history was almost anarchistic in its opposition to centralized authority and to the state as an agent of social change. Though the authoritarian factions of the intelligentsia did ultimately win out in the struggle for power, the primordial spirit of libertarianism remained an important source of self-identification for many of its members. This spirit must be drawn out in order to provide a faithful account of the outlook of the intelligentsia.

The Rise and Decline of Russian Populism : The Stateless Ideal in the Thought of Alexander Herzen, Peter Lavrov, and George Plekhanov

The preceding remarks on the nature of the intelligentsia will serve to orient our analysis in what follows. However, the scope of our study is more self-contained. We shall focus on the vision of the future society elaborated in the thought of Alexander Herzen, Peter Lavrov, and George Plekhanov, and draw out its similarities with the popular image of Russia. These three were leading members of the Populist movement, which dominated the radical scene from the

1840s until the 1880s, and thus reflected the aspirations of the intelligentsia during its crucial formative years. Moreover, the Russian Populists established a revolutionary heritage which helped to shape the Russian Marxist movement, which later eclipsed them as an oppositional force, as well as the Social- Revolutionary Party, the twentieth-century representative of Populism. As such, our analysis is by no means irrelevant to an understanding of the intelligentsia in its later manifestations.

Herzen, Lavrov, and Plekhanov were each influential at a different stage in the movement's history. In their views we will be able to follow the development of Populist ideology, and to show the basic continuity in its vision of the future society. Moreover, all three were considered resolute 'Westerners' within the spectrum of nineteenth-century Russian radical thought. As such, they offer compelling ground for an analysis which seeks to show that even as the intelligentsia was turning to the West in search of guidance for Russia's future, it was at the same time perpetuating an indigenous political tradition. Anarchists such as Bakunin have previously been linked with the popular tradition of opposition to the state (21) ; here we will try to cast the net a little wider.Plekhanov is a particularly interesting figure for our analysis, since he eventually rejected Populism to become the 'father of Russian Marxism'. In studying his development, we

will be able to elucidate some of the weaknesses of Populist ideology and suggest some explanations for its eclipse. Moreover, we will try to clarify the significance of the transition to Marxism for the Populist heritage.

In focusing upon the Populist ideology, we will be constrained in some measure to abstract from the actual history of the movement. If this approach can be at all justified, it is because the intelligentsia's identity was wholly bound up with its ideas ; and these ideas, once embedded in the revolutionaries' outlook, retained a certain independence from the play of historical forces. The Populists' vision of the future society was eschatological; it was at once beyond history and to be realized within history. And even as it began to appear that this vision was historically unrealizable, it remained a source of self-identification for much of the intelligentsia, right up to the revolution in 1917.

Alexander Herzen : The Birth of Russian Populism

The ideas of the Russian Populist movement were never encapsulized in a coherent body of doctrine. Most of its members declared themselves 'socialists', yet the term admitted of many meanings. But there did exist some common assumptions about the form of the socialist society of the future. For our purposes, two of these seem of particular importance : the basic institution

of Russian socialism would be the peasant obshschina, and society as a whole would rid itself of the state. The obshschina, organized in the form of a collective unit called the mir, " constituted the cornerstone on which, so the Populists maintained, a federation of socialized, self-governing units...could be erected " (22). These federated units would be held together less by formal arrangements, such as a constitution, than by a natural, 'organic' unity based upon a common value system. Above all, they would be free of compulsion from above ; the Populists

> held the institution of the state in particular hatred, since to them it was at once the symbol, the result, and the main source of injustice and inequality... All Russian Populists were agreed that the state was the embodiment of a system of coercion and inequality, and therefore intrinsically evil ; neither justice nor happiness were possible until it was eliminated (23).

Some Populists admitted the necessity of a certain amount of central authority during a transitional period following the revolution, but of the ultimate objective there was never any doubt : the state would be eliminated once and for all.

For both of these assumptions, the Populists were greatly indebted to Alexander Herzen, who has been called " the true founder of Russian Populism " (24). It was Herzen who first attempted to work out a theory of 'Russian socialism ' which would blend the best of Russia's popular traditions with the theories of Western socialists. He exerted a considerable influence

on the development of Populist thought, particularly during the late 1840s and 1850s in his writings from abroad. His views help to provide a sense of the Populists' ambitions during the formative years of the movement.

Herzen's theory of 'Russian socialism' was formulated partly as a response to his disenchantment with Western Europe following the failed revolutions of 1848. Given Europe's seeming inability to make a decisive break with its own past, Herzen began to rest his hopes for a socialist future on Russia and the Slav peoples. " The more I lost all hope of a Latin-German Europe, the more my belief in Russia revived again, " he later wrote (25). Herzen searched for the " socialist element " (26) in Russian society which would offer promise for its future. He found it in the obshschina, with its land-equalizing practices, internal democracy, and limited autonomy from the state. It was this institution, Herzen decided, which provided the seed from which a socialist Russia could grow.

Most of the Russian peasantry had by the nineteenth century become members of an institution called the mir (27). The commune's functions and practices often varied from region to region , but some broad generalizations can be made about it. The mir governed the life of the peasant - specifying the amount of land available to him, deciding which crops

he should plant and when he should harvest, assessing his obligations, and guarding his rights (28). This institution had three distinctive characteristics : property in land was vested in it and not in the individual peasant ; each household in the obshschina had the right to an allotment of land on an equal basis with all other member households ; and the community as a whole usually had the right to repartition the land periodically to equalize the holdings of each household (29).

This organ of village self-government also performed broader social functions. According to John Maynard, these included :

> distributing among its members the customary peasant-duties of repair of roads and bridges, escorting of holy ikons and the like, forming by collection from all a reserve of corn for insurance against need, allotting his subsistence farm to the priest, managing the communal field when there was one, organising fire- fighting and protection against thieves, enforcing the patriarchal authority upon contumacious sons, and settling minor disputes among its members (30).

The mir carried out these functions through village meetings, which, it seems, were informal gatherings at which any villager could speak, though the right to vote was limited to the male heads of households (31). The entire community was allowed to participate in arriving at most decisions, though certain matters were left to the discretion of elected officials (32). The mir seems to have had a chief executive of sorts in the Elder (starosta), who played the role of permanent

administrator of its affairs (33).

This picture of plebeian democracy in action may be somewhat idealized, for there were reports that commune meetings often degenerated into drinking bouts, and that the richer members tended to dominate its proceedings (34). Jerome Blum notes that the commune was " not free of ills that, regrettably, have plagued popular democratic institutions at other times and in other lands " (35). Yet for all its limitations, the mir did provide the people with a voice in the administration of their affairs, and for that alone it was unique in nineteenth- century Russian society.

The obshschina was largely ignored by the intelligentsia, however, until the appearance in 1847 of Baron Haxthausen's account of his travels through Russia in 1843-44 (36). A staunch opponent of the bourgeois industrial values of Western Europe, Haxthausen felt that he had found in the obshschina the bulwark that would save Russia from the fate of the West. He assumed that it was an ancient institution borne out of the religious spirit of the Russian people. God had given the land to the Nation, divided into communes which together formed a family, united under the authority of its spiritual father, the tsar (37). The egalitarianism of the commune reflected the peasants' conviction that God had given them the land as a common heritage, in which each member had the right to an equal share (38). The commune was the

national family in microcosm, with the starosta exercising the patriarchal authority of the tsar (39). Haxthausen believed that the land-equalizing practices of the commune prevented the emergence of proletarians, the scourge of Europe and cause of its social unrest (40) :

> In all the other countries of Europe the originators of social revolution rise up in rebellion against wealth and property. Destruction of the right of inheritance, and an equal division of the land, are their shibboleth. In Russia such a revolution is impossible, as this Utopia of the European revolutionists already exists here, fully incorporated with the national life (41).

Haxthausen's analysis of the obshschina formed part of a defense of traditional, patriarchal society. For the Populists, however, it would serve as a living model of socialism, an institution realizing in practice the principle of 'to each according to his need', and attesting to the socialist- revolutionary instincts of the people.

Herzen himself was not immediately convinced of the potential of the obshschina, though he did express interest in Haxthausen's study as early as 1843, after meeting with him in Moscow (42). It was only after his departure from Russia in 1847 that Herzen began to see the socialist potential of this institution. Franco Venturi suggests that it was only from a distance that Herzen could begin to " idealize " this phenomenon of " feudal " life (43). But it would seem to be less Herzen's distance from Russia than his disillusionment

with Europe after 1848 which precipitated his change of heart. While his faith in Europe lasted, it was perhaps less likely that he should have been inclined to rest his hopes for socialism on a unique and traditional Russian institution. When after 1848 he cast his attention back upon his own country, the stage was set for his conversion.

Haxthausen's study had in the meantime triggered a series of debates in Russia concerning the real nature and origins of the obshschina. While the Slavophiles (and many Populists) followed Haxthausen in locating its roots deep in Russia's past, others saw it as an administrative creation of relatively recent date. Supporters of this latter view maintained that the land-equalizing practices of the obshschina did not evolve naturally out of the customs of the peasantry, but were imposed upon them by the state in order to ensure the peasants' capacity to pay their taxes. But, in Herzen's view, the important point was not the origin of the obshschina but the simple fact of its existence (44). Writing to a colleague in Russia, he said :

> I have read your discussions about the commune ; they are very interesting, but less to the point than appears on the surface. Whether the village commune is racial in origin or the work of the government, whether the land belonged in the past to the commune,to the landowners, or to the princes, whether the institution of serfdom strengthened the commune or not, all that ought to be investigated ; but what is most important for us is the present position of

> affairs. The fact, whether distorted or not, whether right or wrong, forces itself upon us. The Government and the institution of serfdom have, in their own fashion, maintained our native commune ; the stable, permanent principle left in it from patriarchal days is not lost. The common ownership of land, the mir, and the village elections form a groundwork upon which a new social order may easily grow up, a groundwork which, like our black earth, scarcely exists in Europe (45).

What was it, in Herzen's estimation, that made of the obshschina the 'groundwork' for Russian socialism? There was, firstly, its egalitarianism : " Son principe économique est l'antithèse parfaite de la célèbre maxime de Malthus : elle laisse chacun sans exception prendre place à sa table " (46). Herzen was also attracted by its democratic features. Here he parted ways with Haxthausen, for whom the commune's starosta represented the patriarchal authority of the tsar, and thus commanded the implicit obedience of all. Herzen claimed that, on the contrary :

> L'ancien (le staroste) a une grande autorité sur chaque membre, mais non sur la commune ; pour peu que celle-ci soit unie, elle peut très bien contrebalancer le pouvoir de l'ancien, l'obliger même à renoncer sa place s'il ne veut pas se plier au voeu général. Le cercle de son activité est d'ailleurs purement administratif ; toutes les questions qui ne sont pas de simple police sont résolues, ou d'après les coutumes en vigueur ou par le Conseil des pères de famille - des chefs de maison - ou enfin par la réunion générale. M. Haxthausen a commis une grande erreur en disant que le staroste administre despotiquemnent la commune. Il ne peut agir despotiquement que si toute la commune est pour lui (47).

Most important for Herzen was the fact that the commune formed a self-enclosed moral unit which had maintained the peasantry outside the sphere of certain notions which tended to encourage submission to authority, particularly to that of the state. The commune did not recognise the moral legitimacy of three " Roman ideas " which largely accounted for the apathetic state of European society : the idea of the state as something that transcends the sum of the individuals that compose it, the idea of law as something that exists over and above the freely expressed will of the community, and the idea of a right to private property as something that transcends the humane purposes for which material wealth ought to exist (48). These ideas had in their own time served the cause of social progress in the West, but they now tended to hinder it ; their absence from Russia's popular life was a token of its revolutionary potential :

> Le manque même des notions juridiques bien arrêtées, le caractère vague et flottant des droits acquis, ne permettaient pas aux idées de propriété de se consolider, de prendre corps. Le peuple russe n'a vécu que la vie communale, il ne comprend ses droits et ses devoirs que par rapport à la commune. Hors d'elle, il ne reconnait pas de devoirs et ne voit que la violence. En se soumettant à l'Etat, il ne se soumet qu'à la force ; l'injustice flagrante d'une partie de la législation l'a amené au mépris de l'autre. L'inégalité complète devant le tribunal a tué partout le germe du respect pour la légalité. Le Russe, à quelque classe qu'il appartient, enfreint la loi chaque fois qu'il peut le faire impunément ; le gouvernment agit de

même. C'est pénible et triste pour le moment, mais il y a là un avantage immense pour l'avenir (49).

This was the nub of Herzen's argument. Russia's very backwardness vis-à-vis European society left it free of " all those hard-and-fast prejudices which, like a paralysis, deprive the Western European of the use of half his limbs " (50), and its peasantry enjoyed an " unconscious fitness for the social ideal which European thought has consciously reached " (51).

As this last comment suggests, however, Herzen was only making a conditional argument for the potential of the obshschina. He always resisted deterministic formulations, and argued that in order for the potential of the commune to be realized it would have to be invigorated by the thought of the West. Against the Slavophiles, who had attempted to establish a strict opposition of Russia and Europe, Herzen argued for a 'fusion of horizons' :

> The primitive foundations of our life are insufficient... Only the mighty thought of the West to which all its long history has led up to is able to fertilise the seeds slumbering in the patriarchal mode of life of the Slavs. The workmen's guild and the village commune, the sharing of profits and the division of fields, the mir meeting and the union of villages into self-governing volosts, are all the cornerstones on which the temple of our future, freely communal existence will be built... But these cornerstones are only stones... and without the thought of the West, our future cathedral will not rise above its foundations (52).

Of all the ideas of the West, Herzen cherished the most fervently and consistently throughout his life those which were concerned with the liberty of the individual. For him, socialism was never posed in antithesis to individualism ; it meant rather the realization of the right of all men, individually and collectively, to a free and autonomous existence (53).

> The liberty of the individual is the greatest thing of all, it is on this and on this alone that the true will of the people can develop. Man must respect liberty in himself, and he must esteem it in himself no less than in his neighbour, than in the entire nation (54).

It is this concept which serves as the guiding thread throughout the various stages in Herzen's development. As a young man, he was attracted to the notion of 'human personality' (lichnost') in Schiller's thought (55). At this time, freedom had more aesthetic than political significance for Herzen ; it meant the flowering of the personality, the expansion of the individual (56). However, as his interest became directed toward explicitly political problems, the notion of freedom remained central to his thought while acquiring broader meaning. The task of socialism was to ground social relations in the 'principle of personality' without isolating man from his neighbour (57).

Here we seem to have come to the rock-bottom of Herzen's philosophy. The individual is paramount, and socialism entails the eradication of all constraints

upon him. The commune, too, would have to embrace the 'principle of personality' in order to become an adequate vehicle for Herzen's aspirations.

> La commune, comme produit d'une tradition millénaire, assoupit l'homme et absorbe son indépendance ; elle ne peut ni s'abriter du despotisme ni émanciper ses membres ; pour se conserver, pour progresser, elle doit faire ou subir une révolution individualiste. (58)

This was the real basis of Herzen's initial doubts about the obshschina; could this collectivist institution adjust itself to the individualist values which would be central to socialist society? Herzen was finally convinced by what he saw as the commune's antagonism to the state. The obshschina, in his view, had never recognized the legitimacy of the state, which was at the same time the greatest threat to individual liberty. It was in the shadow of this institution that the obshschina and the 'personality principle' became allies, and that Russian and Western traditions coalesced in Herzen's thought.

The obshschina was in Herzen's view a moral and social unit which preserved a certain distance between the peasant and the state, and prevented the development of a sense of loyalty to this institution:

> La commune rurale...représente chez nous l'unité sociale, parce que la vie sociale du paysan russe ne s'élève pas jusqu'à l'Etat, et ne descend pas non plus jusqu'à l'individu. Le mir est la personnalité morale complète, imposable, corvéable, punissable, mais au-delà de laquelle l'Etat lui-meme n'atteint point. Elle est responsable pour tous et pour chacun, et par suite elle est autonome en tout ce qui concerne ses affaires

intérieures (59).

The obshschina itself was perhaps weak and unable to resist the interventions of the state, but its existence did mean that the peasantry saw in these actions only force and violence. The idea of the state as an institution necessary for the governance of the community had remained alien to the peasantry. It was this which boded well for the peasantry's revolutionary potential and its ability to adjust to the stateless society of the future.

It was in this fashion that the influence of Western thinkers upon Herzen merged with the popular image of Russia. The primacy of the individual was certainly not an important element - quite the contrary - of Russia's ideological traditions, and in the elaboration of his views on this subject Herzen clearly relied heavily on Western thinkers (60). But these views led him in the last analysis to a rejection not just of the Tsarist state but of the very institution of the state. In this stance, Herzen linked hands with the popular tradition of ideological opposition to " the state " , and articulated an ideal which he shared with popular Russia.

The suppression of the individual, which was perhaps the greatest sin of the Tsarist regime, was not a peculiar Russian problem ; it was an inherent feature of any state. Whether monarchical or 'bourgeois-democratic', the state always embodied a "

dualism " of government and people, and a relationship of domination :

> L'idée du gouvernement séparé du peuple, se tenant au-dessus de lui, ayant pour vocation de le guider, c'est l'idée de l'esprit organisant la matière grossière, c'est Jehova, c'est le roi, le symbole de la providence sur terre (61).

Thus, the only difference between European democracy and Tsarism was a semantic one ; of the French case, he wrote to Jules Michelet :

> It is quite clear that any difference there may be between your laws and our Ukases lies almost entirely in the wording of their preambles; Ukases start with a painful truth - 'The Tsar commands...' - whereas your laws start with an insulting lie, the triple Republican motto, the ironical invocation in the name of the French people...(62)

For Russia, this meant that there was no meaningful middle term between the Tsarist regime and 'Russian socialism' : " Despotism or socialism - there is no other alternative " (63). This view also reflected the traditional dichotomy in Russian political culture. The notion of a limited state had never been able to embed itself in Russia's political debates ; the very concept of the state had come to mean a centralized and omnipotent force. Herzen's own tendency to fuse the 'bourgeois-democratic' state with the Tsarist regime merely reflects the lack of any other potential meaning for " the state " in Russia's political culture.

Herzen does not seem to have advocated the immediate destruction of the state following the defeat

of Tsarism. In a letter to Bakunin, he supported the temporary use of the state to consolidate the revolution. Echoing Lassalle, he asked : " Why destroy the mill...when its millstones are capable of grounding our flour as well? " (64) But on the ultimate goal he was in complete agreement with Bakunin : " For both of us the final solution is the same " (65). The future society which Herzen envisioned was a federated republic of Slav peoples, with a maximum of local autonomy and a minimum of state interference. The central government, insofar as there would be one, would be an emanation out of the communes and not their master. " It would be the moral center of a loose federation and not the sovereign law-making and executive summit of a state " , writes Martin Malia (66).

While European society seemed unable to rid itself of the conception of the state as necessary to the life of a community, the Slav people were particularly suited to Herzen's vision, he claimed:

> Centralization is contrary to the Slav genius ; federation on the other hand is its natural form of expression. Once the Slav world has become unified, and knit together into an association of free autonomous communes, it will at last be able to enter on its true historical existence. Its past can only be seen as a period of preparation, of growth, of purification. The historic forms of the state have never answered to the national ideal of the Slavs, an ideal which is vague, instinctive if you like, yet by the same token gives promise for the future of a truly remarkable vitality (67).

In a series of articles, Herzen attempted to posit the continued existence and vitality of this 'national ideal' despite its historic suppression by the despotic state. He argued that " les forces essentielles du peuple russe n'ont jamais été effectivement absorbées par son développement politique, comme l'ont été celles des peuples latins et germains, actuellement constitués en nations " (68). The Russian state, on the other hand, was not really Russian at all : " le gouvernement russe n'est pas russe mais antinational, despotique, et rétrograde. Il est plus allemand que russe, comme le disent les slavophiles " (69).

Though Herzen was never inclined to idealize Russia's past, he did find in its early history a positive principle for the future. From the ninth to the fourteenth centuries, he argued, Russia was divided into, on the one hand, the primitive democratic and egalitarian local communities and, on the other,the hierarchical clan of princes, descendants of Rurik. In Herzen's view, only the most tenuous of links existed between these two levels of society. This allowed 'the people' a measure of freedom which did not exist in the more integrated societies of Western Europe : " le peuple russe d'alors est plus libre que les peuples de l'Occident féodale " (70).

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries these two forces came into conflict. Epitomized by the battle between Moscow and Novgorod, the forces of

centralisation and hierarchy clashed with those of democracy and local initiative. Herzen describes this clash as follows :

> La Russie pouvait être sauvée soit par le développement fédéraliste des institutions communales, soit par l'absolutisme d'un souverain. Les éléments se prononcèrent en faveur de l'absolutisme ; la Russie fut sauvée ; elle est devenue forte et grande ; mais, à quel prix? C'est le pays le plus malheureux du globe, le plus asservi ; Moscou a sauvé la Russie, mais en étouffant tout ce qu'il y avait de libre dans la vie russe (71).

Herzen's attitude to Peter the Great was rather more equivocal. On the one hand, he credited Peter with being the first 'emancipated individual' in Russia, its 'crowned revolutionary ' (72). Herzen admired Peter's ability to turn Russia away from its medieval roots and lead it into the modern world, and he saw him as an important sign of Russia's ability to make another such leap into the future. Yet by his very accomplishments Peter had created a vast chasm separating the civilized and popular elements. And he could not be forgiven for the 'German element' he had brought to Russian life, " a pedantry of bureaucracy, etiquette, and discipline altogether contrary to our customs " (73).

These practices Herzen contrasted with a 'genuinely Russian' way of handling matters, informally and without recourse to laws or contracts (74). The Russian people resolved disputes amongst themselves, without recourse to higher authorities, whom they

mistrusted in any case (75). The same natural, 'organic' harmony would prevail in Herzen's republic :

> la République ressemble à la nature...Dans la nature tout est indépendant, détaché, et forme un tout ; la nature ne cherche pas du tout à obéir aux lois ; au contraire, partout où elle peut, elle les saute ; on peut dire de la nature ce que Proudhon disait de l'histoire - c'est la révolution en permanence. Dans la nature comme dans la République, le gouvernement est caché, on ne le voit pas, le gouvernement est l'ensemble, il n'existe pas à part, continuellement il s'agglomère et se disperse (76).

Herzen's account of the boundless harmony prevailing amongst the Russian people is undoubtedly idealized. He also seems to have underestimated the peasantry's continued devotion to the tsar, and its need to justify its actions by recourse to at least this higher authority. Herzen collapses 'tsar' and 'state', because for him there is at bottom no difference between the two. But, as we have seen, these notions were kept quite distinct in the popular outlook. Yet Herzen was correct in describing the peasantry's antagonism to 'formal', 'bureaucratic' methods, and to the state which was the main vehicle for them. Moreover, in justifying his own aspirations by emphasizing the alienness, the un-Russian nature of the Tsarist state and bureaucracy, Herzen was adopting some of the same terms in which popular Russia expressed its rejection of this institution.

Thus, 'the state' in Russia did not stand as an ideal which would have to be superseded in order to

create the libertarian paradise Herzen aspired to :

> En Russie - dèrriere l'Etat visible - il n'y a pas d'Etat invisible qui soit l'apothéose, la transfiguration de l'ordre des choses existant ; il n'y a pas ce mirage d'idéal impossible et sacré, qui ne coincide jamais avec la réalité, tout en la promettant toujours. Il n'y a rien dèrriere les paliśsades où une force supérieure nous tient en état de siège. La possibilité d'une révolution en Russie se réduit à une question de force matérielle. C'est ce qui fait de ce pays... le sol le mieux préparé pour une régénération sociale (77).

Herzen not only saw the similarities between his own aspirations and those of popular Russia, he also emphasized that the revolution was possible only on the basis of an alliance with these elements : " Je ne crois en Russie en aucune autre révolution qu'à une guerre des paysans, " he wrote to Mazzini (78). Moreover, Herzen saw particularly valuable allies in the Old Believer sects, who as we have seen were perhaps the most radical exponents of the popular image of Russia :

> Il serait possible que de l'une des skites (communautés schismatiques) sortit un mouvement populaire qui embrassat des provinces entières, dont le caractère serait certainement national et communiste et qui marcherait à la rencontre d'un autre mouvement prenant ses sources dans les idées révolutionnaires de l'Europe (79).

Herzen did make some concrete steps in the direction of an alliance with the Old Believers ; on the 15th of June, 1862, the first number of a newspaper addressed to those merchants, artisans, and businessmen united by their adherence to the old faith appeared in

London. Called the Obshscheye Veche (The Common Assembly), its title recalled the assemblies of citizens in medieval communes, and appealed to a tradition of self-administration which was different from yet parallel to that of the mir (80). Herzen had been encouraged to take this step after meeting with an Old Believer named Martynov in London (81), and he supported the efforts of other emigre radicals, such as V.I. Kelsiev, to make direct contact with the Old Believer sects in Russia (82).

Not very much seems to have come of these attempts, yet Herzen did help to establish a pattern which was pursued in the 1870s by the Populists. The failure of these attempts is largely explained by the mutual distrust between these parties; despite their common antipathy to the state, the fanatically religious Old Believers and the largely atheistic Populists would have been strange bedmates. Their common aspirations were expressed in a different language, and were overshadowed by other, very real differences between these two groups. The Old Believers did not conceive of their own aspirations as revolutionary.; their actions were directed toward the restoration of an antecedent state of affairs. Socialism, science, and progress were all quite foreign to both the Old Believers and popular Russia, and this stood as a tremendous obstacle to any real alliance between these forces. In Herzen's time, these

obstacles might be depreciated ; if only contact with 'the people' could be made, their traditional superstitions would be dissolved by the powerful light of rationalism. In subsequent years, however, the radicals would come to the painful awareness of how great these obstacles really were.

Peter Lavrov and the Apotheosis of Russian Populism (83)

Peter Lavrov was a second key figure in shaping the development of Populist thought. In his commitment to individualism and rationalism, he was both an intellectual heir of Alexander Herzen and, according to Isaiah Berlin, representative of " the deepest strain of all, the very centre of the Populist outlook " (84). Born in 1823, Lavrov's intellectual career spanned more than half a century, from the Westerner-Slavophile debates of the 1840s to the emergence of the Social-Democratic Party at the turn of the century. The years of his greatest influence, however, occupied less than a decade, from the end of the 1860s to the second half of the 1870s (85).

Separating this period from that of Alexander Herzen's greatest prominence was the 1860s, a decade during which a 'new breed' of men, drawn mainly from the raznochintsy, appeared on the radical scene. One of the most striking features of this new generation

was its wholesale rejection of tradition, including the tradition of intellectual opposition forged by Herzen and his contemporaries during the 1840s (86). The solution to Russia's ills, they fervently believed, lay in mastering the truths of science (especially natural science), and in emacipating oneself completely from the weight of the past.

Mastery of the 'truths' of science, usually involving programs of 'self-improvement', led ultimately to a decline in the social activity of the young radicals. For Lavrov, this was a cardinal sin. He did not share the (rather vulgar) scientism of the men of the sixties, and in one of the first Historical Letters he defended the value of historical study against that of the natural sciences (87). Moreover, the Historical Letters were a direct attempt to rekindle among the student youth the sense of a social mission which Lavrov felt had declined during the sixties.

Although the Historical Letters were thus a reaction against the ethos of the sixties, Lavrov's own outlook seems in some measure to have been shaped by this period. In particular, there is not in his writings the same admiration for tradition that we often find with Herzen. Lavrov was less equivocal in his criticism of Russia's historical legacy :

> In our past, we have no cause to be carried away by our national theories or by the recollection of political and social habits

> ingrained in the flesh and blood of our successive generations. We have not had thinkers of world renown, nor sacred, national systems which could be revered by descendants. Neither have we had social traditions which might nurture the possibility of broad development (88).

Conversely, Lavrov rejected the 'decline of the West' argument advanced by Herzen, forecasting on the contrary its continued development and progress. Lavrov also aligned himself more directly with the Western socialist tradition, and has been called one of the most " absolute westernisers " in the Populist movement (89). Of course, this does not necessarily indicate the uncoupling of Populist thought from Russia's popular traditions. Rather, the influence of the latter seems to have been submerged in Lavrov's thought, as is suggested by his preservation of a quasi-anarchistic vision of the future society. In adopting this vision as his own, Lavrov was implicitly linking up with the popular image of Russia.

Lavrov's attempt to distance himself from Russian traditions and to link more closely the fates of Russia and the West is best illustrated by his attitude to the peasant commune. The socialist potential of this institution had by the 1860s become an article of faith among the Populists, and Lavrov shared this faith no less than another. Yet his view of it was quite different than that of Herzen, for whom it justified a relative idealization of Russia's past and a conviction of its unique socialist destiny. Lavrov does not seem

to have used this phenomenon to prove Russia's unique fitness for socialism ; he more often treated it as not' peculiarly Russian at all. He seems to have preferred the use of this term in its generic, 'universal' sense (90). The socialist goal was " the ideal of a European federation of free obshschiny " , and " the future of the Slavs as of all mankind consists in this device : science and the obshschina, truth and labor, war against idols and monopoly " (91). In these cases, Lavrov uses the term as the Russian equivalent of the French 'commune' or the German 'gemeinde', rather than to distinguish Russia from Europe. These terms were frequently used in Western socialist literature to describe the future federated units of society, whether in Europe or Russia. Lavrov, it seems, used the term to unite the destinies of Europe and Russia, seeing it as the basic unit not of 'Russian socialism' but of socialism tout court (92).

A more direct continuity with Herzen's thought is found in Lavrov's views on the state and its role in the future society. Neither Herzen nor Lavrov saw any meaningful distinction between different state forms; for both, socialism amounted to a gradualistic anarchism, in which the role of the state would be progressively diminished until its complete elimination.

Lavrov's views on the state were sketched in broad outline in the Historical Letters, published in Russia

as a collective edition in 1870. This work had a tremendous impact on the educated youth of the time, and has been described as the " handbook and bible of the revolutionary youth of the seventies " (93). The Historical Letters were instrumental in inciting the sudden exodus of nearly 3,000 students in the summer of 1874 to the countryside to teach a new religion of brotherhood and socialism to the peasant masses (94). The " To the People " campaign was perhaps the apogee of Populist activity, and Lavrov's role in instigating it entitles him to a central place in the movement's history.

The dominant theme of the Historical Letters is the concept of progress and its unavoidable costs. Lavrov defines progress as " the physical, intellectual, and moral development of the individual ; the incorporation of truth and justice in social institutions " (95). Hitherto, the benefits of such progress had fallen only to a privileged minority, whose ascent to civilization had been made at the cost of the toil and suffering of the majority. Lavrov's central message is that progress thus entails a corresponding 'debt' to the people, which must be repayed by extending to them the benefits of civilization (96). Lavrov did not expect all of the privileged elements to respond to this moral imperative. He directed his remarks to the minority of 'critically-thinking individuals', and urged them to

link their efforts with those of the masses and work toward the material transformation of the social order. This was an implicit call to revolution.

Lavrov's call also entailed a certain conception of the society which would follow the revolution. Central to this was Lavrov's letter on " The State " . In it, Lavrov, depicted the institution of the state as intrinsically an instrument of compulsion and inequality, and linked the progress of mankind to the necessary reduction of its role in social life.

He begins with the observation that the principle of state has been subjected to a " false idealization " which must be corrected by " penetrating to the natural basis of the state in its simplest form " (97). This basis Lavrov locates in the principles of 'compulsion' and 'contract' (98). The state primordially is an instrument for the enforcement of the will of a minority, i.e. it is a means of compulsion. To this principle is added, early in the history of the state, the principle of contract (99). For Lavrov, this means that " a group of people voluntarily <u>upholds</u> the obligatory character of certain decisions issuing from a person, an institution, or an elected council - an obligatory character which extends to others who have <u>not</u> joined this union voluntarily " (100). But the state contract still embodies an injustice, since the contract itself is concluded by a small number of people, while the compulsion extends to all (101).

This injustice contradicts Lavrov's definition of progress, and thus the state from its very inception is anti-progressive. " Hence the inescapable conclusion that political progress has had to consist in the reduction of the role of the state principle in social life " (102).

The ideal state in Lavrov's scheme would be one in which all of society would be party to the " contract " which is binding upon them. Lavrov evokes this possibility only to underline its impossibility :

> The reader will see at once that the ideal thus derived from the very essence of the state principle works to negate this same principle. The state is distinguished from other social institutions by the fact that its contract is adopted by a <u>smaller</u> number of persons and is maintained by them as binding upon a <u>greater</u> number. The two sources of state cohesion - the natural principle of compulsion and the deliberative principle of contract - come into conflict because the latter, in the name of justice, strives to diminish the former (103).

That is, the principle of compulsion can be mitigated only by broadening the state contract to include all those subject to its authority. Yet this cannot be done, the notion of a just contract is illusory, and as such the idea of a just state is a contradiction in terms.

The truly radical implications of Lavrov's argument are illustrated by his consideration of the federated states of America, which for many in the nineteenth century stood as a model of decentralization and popular self-government. For Lavrov, even this

system is unjust and unprogressive, since the federated states are still too large to allow for real popular participation (104). True socialism would have to go much further ; Lavrov seems to have imagined that the population would be divided into modestly proportioned communes, which would co- operate in clusters of about one hundred members (105).

Lavrov sees no contradiction between this form of organization and the goal of development :

> Even if we were to imagine the world as a collection of separate, autonomous communes (obshschiny) we would have no reason to think that in all the respects mentioned we would encounter a reduction in progress, since broad economic, scientific, and similar undertakings could be carried out through intercommunal associations, expressly formed for specific purposes (106).

That he did not see any such contradiction here is explained by the fact that 'progress' for him is conceived in primarily moral terms. Lavrov mentions the necessity for economic and scientific undertakings, but the key aspect of socialism is the 'introduction of truth and justice in social institutions'. Lavrov did accept the need for a certain amount of non-capitalist industry in Russia, but his basic vision was one of a slowly-developing agrarian nation (107).

Lavrov admits that the 'external function' of the state, i.e. its role in the international community of states, may call for a degree of centralized authority. His solution to this dilemma seems somewhat Tocquevillian: the internal and external dimensions of

state activity must be more rigorously separated, and the former progressively transferred to the communes. Yet to this solution is added a characteristically anarchist/utopian twist, since Lavrov goes on to predict that as progressive notions spread throughout the international community, even the latter aspect of state activity will decline in importance. National boundaries will lose their significance, while temporary alliances will be forged for specific purposes. In this way, Lavrov allows himself to forecast a truly stateless world fully congruent with the 'natural' needs of mankind (108).

Certain qualifications are appended to this thesis, as Lavrov admits the need for a state during a transitional period following the erection of progressive social institutions. Like Herzen, Lavrov stopped short of the Bakuninist call for the immediate destruction of the state, since it might be needed to protect the gains of the revolution. But he insists that its role must be a " negative " one - " that is, only to overcome the obstacles to the free development of society posed by existing cultural forms " (109).

This formulation is exceedingly vague, and attests to Lavrov's own hesitations on the matter. He seems to have sensed that his own aspirations would demand a certain amount of central direction, yet his almost instinctive antipathy for the state prevented his acceptance of an important role for it in the future

society. It appears that he wanted to emphasize that the state must not be used as a leading agent of social change, i.e he rejected the Petrine image of Russia. Progress would occur through the natural filtering-down from the intelligentsia to the popular elements of the values of socialism, until the freely-associated communes became capable of taking full charge of their common destiny.

Lavrov's intentions in this regard are perhaps clarified by his views on the 'bourgeois' republics of Western Europe. Like Herzen, his assessment of them was an unfavorable one. In Vpered (110), he wrote :

> We oppose all present-day centralized political problems. All political parties, with their more or less liberal constitutional ideals, all attempts to replace the centralized and bourgeois empire with a centralized and bourgeois republic, to replace the existing division of (Russia's) territory with another having other centers and other laws - all this we consider inimical in its basic structure and indifferent in its manifestations (111).

Lavrov expresses a similar view in an article written in 1881 and included in the 1890 edition of the Historical Letters:

> Yes... human progress does consist in introducing freedom and equality into the social order, in introducing law in the form of justice into social life. But it is not for the state to do this. The state, by its very nature, is domination, inequality, constraint of freedom. And with strengthening and consolidation of the ascendancy of one class over others, not only is it impossible to count on a more humane existence for the subject classes - their material, intellectual, and moral degeneration must ever increase. A constitutional state is an

unrealizable dream (112).

All of this is in perfect accord with the views of Herzen, who refused to the state a positive role in shaping the life of society, and rejected the option of bourgeois democracy as an illusion based upon a false idealization of the state. Like Herzen, Lavrov tended to fuse European democracy with Tsarist despotism, seeing both as representing the domination of society by the state. Whatever form the state took, it was inimical with individual freedom and socialism.

However, Lavrov's critique of the state includes an economic aspect, which attests to the growing influence of Marx upon the Populists at this time. Marx's works had been known to advanced Russian intellectuals as early as the 1840s, but his direct influence developed only later. In 1869, Bakunin made the first translation of the Communist Manifesto, and in 1872 a translation of Capital appeared in Russia (113). Lavrov himself expressed a great admiration for Marx's works. The influence of Marx is apparent in Lavrov's letter of 1881, where he writes that states have

> given juridical form to the economic domination that really existed beforehand...Is it not true that constitutions, codes, and charters have everywhere been written by the social groups in whose hands economic dominion was actually located? (114)

Herzen had based his critique of the state upon moral considerations, primarily its suppression of individual freedoms. Lavrov concurred, but to this critique he added the Marxist critique of the state as an agent of economic domination. Marx's analysis did not yet change the Populists' attitude to the state, but rather buttressed an antipathy for it which at the deepest level was based on moral considerations.

Lavrov did not, however, accept Marx's views on political organisation, remaining on the Bakuninist side of Marx on this question. Writes James P. Scanlan :

> Although he carefully avoided the extremes of Bakuninist anarchism and recognised the need to utilise the coercive machinery of the state in the transitional period to the good society, he was by no means as far from anarchism as Marx. He was much more wary of the state, even as a temporary weapon... Like Bakunin, Lavrov had a horror of centralized authority, no matter in whose hands it was vested (115).

Lavrov was only able to sketch in outline his views on the state in the Historical Letters; however, it would seem that later on his views did not change, but were merely elaborated in greater precision and detail. His major work on this subject was an article published in June, 1876, and called " The State Element in the Society of the Future " . Of this article, Philip Pomper writes that

> its thesis amounted to a gradualistic anarchism, based upon the gradual growth of social solidarity, the " state element " forever diminishing toward zero as the

> socialist order, with its new morality and new social forms, rendered the old instruments of coercion obsolete (116).

For both Herzen and Lavrov, the meaning of 'the state' had been constituted by Russia's political traditions, which, devoid of any real conception of a limited or regulated role for the state, had imbued this concept with the attributes of Tsarist despotism ; 'the state', whether monarchical or 'bourgeois-democratic', was in the end a repressive force which would have to be eradicated from the socialist society of the future. What would replace the state in socialist society would be a bedrock of values, a commitment to 'science' and rationalism, and an acceptance of the supremacy of the individual. The agricultural commune, and small artisanal and industrial collectives such as the artel, would become the vehicle for these conceptions. The intelligentsia would serve as a middle term between Western ideas and Russia's traditional popular institutions, but Herzen and Lavrov both hoped (romantically, perhaps) that it could play this role without resort to compulsion. Underlying this hope was an immense faith in the powers of revolution ; the destruction of the Tsarist state would be an act of spiritual purification, cleansing the peasantry of its conservative tendencies and opening it to the new values of socialism. The religious features of this faith are self-evident. Even Lavrov, who was one of the most positivist and

rationalist of the Populist thinkers, would write on the eve of the Paris Commune :

> The True Messiah is born
> The all-powerful God-man
> He is incorporated in our thought
> He is truth, brotherhood, peace,
> eternally ! (117)

The same faith in revolution was to be found in Marx's thought. Marx also offered new and 'scientific' foundations for the Populists' critique of the state and bourgeois society. He, too, offered an eschatological vision of a stateless future. But in Marx's thought the bedrock of this future would be a highly-developed, industrial society. Marx had already in Lavrov's time enjoyed an influence on the Russian intelligentsia, but this aspect of his thought had been largely ignored or rejected. Soon, many members of the intelligentsia would begin to incorporate this element of Marx's thought into their own. Simultaneously, an ominous note would be sounded for the Populist vision of the future.

George Plekhanov and the Eclipse of Russian Populism (118)

The intellectual development of George Plekhanov highlights what was perhaps the most significant trend in Russian radical thought of the late nineteenth century : the gradual eclipse of Populism by Marxism as

the cherished doctrine of the radical intelligentsia. After joining the revolutionary movement in the mid-1870s, at a time when the Populists remained the leading oppositional force in Russian society, Plekhanov soon became one of the principal exponents of this movement's ideology. But Plekhanov eventually rejected Populism, and during the 1880s and 1890s he became a key figure in promoting the infiltration of Marxism into the thought of the radical intelligentsia. Plekhanov personified the conversion of much of the intelligentsia to Marxism ; as such, his development elucidates some of the causes as well as the significance of this conversion.

Populist thought had by the mid-1870s given rise to a motley assortment of often-bickering revolutionary groupings, whose efforts had in the last analysis accomplished little of significance. The peasantry seemed indifferent to the intelligentsia's call to revolution, and more often than not greeted these missionaries of socialism with skepticism and distrust. Popular Russia still expected that its deliverance from bondage would be the work of a 'true' tsar, an Orthodox Father, not that of a group of atheistic socialists. The movement " To the People " in the summer of 1874 marked a dramatic setback for the Populists. Not only did the peasants not respond to the socialist propaganda, but in many cases they turned its purveyors in to the local authorities. The Populists were

abruptly awakened to the fact that although 'the people' might be discontented, and shared some of their aspirations, there remained much that separated them. The battle against autocracy, it now became clear, would be rather more difficult than anticipated.

In the wake of these disappointments, some of the Populists began to see the need to consolidate their forces, and to tailor their demands more closely to those of the people. A first attempt to unite the various currents of Populism was made by the re-incarnated Zemlya i Volya (119) (Land and Liberty). A programme for this organization was drawn up in 1876, emphasizing the need to restrict the Populists' objectives to those which were immediately attainable and most consonant with the demands of the peasantry (120). Broadly speaking, these objectives were threefold : the transfer of all the land to those who tilled it, the dissolution of the Russian empire " according to local desires " , and the self-administration of the obshschina (121). According to Franco Venturi, this programme contained " all the elements of Zemlya i Volya in embryonic form " (122). It also indicates that, despite their setbacks, the Populists had in no way abandoned their ultimate goals.

Plekhanov became a member of Zemlya i Volya in 1876, and wholly endorsed its strategy. The revolutionaries would have to base their demands on those of the people, while working to raise their

awareness of the need for a radical solution to their grievances. This was so because the revolution itself depended on a mass following ; it would be victorious as a 'social' revolution, or not at all.

Some members of Zemlya i Volya, however, soon came to embrace a different approach. Their faith in the people had been somewhat shaken by the failure of their efforts thus far. Moreover, these efforts, they felt, were stymied at every turn by the absence of political liberties in Russian society. The main obstacle to an alliance with the peasantry was the autocracy itself. An assault on this target, then, was a precondition for social revolution. As a consequence, the late 1870s were marked by a wave of political terrorism, the primary aim of which seems to have been to destabilize the government and force it to grant the country a constitution. This would free the intelligentsia for broader social activity, and at the same time awaken the masses from their slumber.

Plekhanov was an outspoken opponent of this 'political' strategy on several grounds. He suspected the terrorists of harboring Jacobin intentions, and argued that their actions could only lead to the replacement of one dictatorship by another. This fear was based on Plekhanov's conviction that the revolution depended on society's readiness for it, and could only realize its aims if backed by a mass following. This was precisely what the terrorists undermined, for they

diverted the intelligentsia from its work among the people. Besides, he argued, such actions would only incite retaliation by the state, and in any case stood no chance of success : " You cannot establish a house of parliament at the point of a pistol, " he wrote (123). Plekhanov even rejected the terrorists' aims, finding the aspiration for constitutional government incompatible with the anarchist premises of Populism (124). The proper objective was not to establish a new state, but to eliminate the state as such.

The dispute between 'social' and 'political' strategies may appear to be a characteristic exercise in doctrinal hair-splitting common among marginal social groups. It is on the face of it difficult to understand why a revolutionary movement would stand opposed in principle to 'political' activity. Their efforts ultimately could not fail to become political, and it seems clear that basic political freedoms would be an invaluable adjunct to 'social' activity. But it was taken very seriously by the participants, and must be understood in relation to the ideological heritage of the movement. A central element of this heritage was an aversion to the state, and not simply the autocratic state. 'Political' actions directed toward the establishment of a new state, constitutional or not, temporary or not, would quite naturally be seen by orthodox Populists as half-measures or, even worse, outright heresy.

The fissure in Zemlya i Volya 's ranks persisted, however, and ultimately led to a split of the organization into two rival groupings, Chernyi Peredel (Black Repartition) and Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), in 1879. Plekhanov's intransigence vis-a-vis the terrorists helped to precipitate this split, and he became a leader of Chernyi Peredel, the spokesman for 'orthodox' Populism and 'social' agitation.

Chernyi Peredel called for a return to the ideological roots of Populism, and in particular to its Bakuninist sources (125). Memories of Stenka Razin and Pugachev, and of the long tradition of peasant antagonism to the state, must be rekindled, in order to drive home the point that it was there that the socialists' greatest strengths and opportunities lay. In the first number of " Chernyi Peredel " (the organization's publication), Plekhanov took this pedagogical task upon himself:

> According to us, the inner history of Russia consists only of the long tragedy-filled tales of the struggle to the death between two forms of collective life which are diametrically opposed : the obshschina which springs from the people and the form which is at the same time statist and individualist. This struggle becomes bloody and violent like a storm when the masses are in movement during the revolts of Razin and Pugachev. And it has never stopped for one moment, though taking on varying forms (126).

This passage brings to mind Herzen's account of Russian history : it had pitted the egalitarian and collectivist obshschina against the oppressive state,

and would culminate in the victory of the small, self-governing communities and the eradication of the state. But Plekhanov even here distinguishes himself as a Populist with a difference. He does not display the same concern for individual liberties that is at the very core of the writings of Herzen and Lavrov. Like Plekhanov, Herzen had identified at least the Petrine state as an agent of individualism, but for him this was a cause for mitigated praise. The same is not true with Plekhanov ; he evokes this notion only to contrast the obshschina with the state, and presumably feels that it must remain foreign to the commune.

This difference is bound up with another, much more fundamental, one. As we have seen, the basic argument for socialism was presented by both Herzen and Lavrov in moral terms ; socialism must be established not because history dictates so, but only because it is right and just. Socialism itself is conceived in primarily moral terms ; it is the freedom of all men, individually and collectively, to realize their potential.

With Plekhanov the moral argument recedes into the background, and socialism becomes the inevitable result of an historical (and primarily economic) process. In an article written in 1879, and entitled " The Law of the Economic Development of Society and the Problems of Socialism in Russia" , Plekhanov sought to " fix upon an unshakable foundation the program that the populists

generally upheld " (127), by demonstrating the historical inevitability of their vision. The foundation he looked to was the theory of historical materialism of Karl Marx. " Let us see, " he wrote, " what the teaching of Karl Marx obligates us...in view of the necessity of establishing the points of departure of our program " (128).

Plekhanov concurred with Marx in identifying the " economic history of society " (129) as the determining factor in its development. But did this not commit him to an acceptance of the thesis that socialism could emerge only as a natural product of capitalism? Not at all, he argued. Marx's theory in fact supported the hope of a different destiny for Russia, since its material conditions differed markedly from those of the West. The basic material fact of Russian social life was the myriad peasant communes, a phenomenon which had disappeared in the West. The survival of the commune meant the preservation of a collectivist bias among the people, while the tradition of opposition to the state that it engendered illustrated the people's aspiration for freedom from central authority. Thus, the Populist hope for a " free federation of free (self- governing) communes " (130) was rendered secure. At this stage, Plekhanov's outlook was " Marxian-materialist in form, Bakuninist- populist in content " (131). He still anticipated the attainment of socialism by a mass peasant revolution and without the necessity of passing

through a capitalist stage of development (132).

Plekhanov also set himself apart from earlier Populist writers by the emphasis he placed on the role of the industrial working class in the revolution. Already in February of 1879, he could write that :

> Our large industrial centers group together tens and sometimes even hundreds of thousands of workers. In the great majority of cases these men are the same peasants as those in the villages... The agricultural problem, the question of the self- administration of the obshschina, land and liberty : all these are just as close to the heart of the workers as of the peasants. In a word, it is not a question of masses cut off from the countryside but part of the countryside. Their cause is the same ; their struggle can and must be the same. And besides, the towns collect the very flower of the village population, younger, more enterprising... there they are kept far removed from the influence of the more conservative and timid elements of the peasant family... Thanks to this they will constitute a precious ally for the peasants when the social revolution breaks out (133).

This passage illustrates Plekhanov's ambivalent feelings about the peasantry even during his Populist period. On the one hand, he re-affirms the classic Populist aims, and emphasizes only that the workers share these aims because they are still really peasants, having left the villages only recently. Then, he goes on to argue that the workers are in fact the " flower " of the peasantry, because they are free of the " conservative " influences of peasant life - that is, because they are not quite peasants. The resulting argument is a strange one : the workers are allies of the peasantry because they are still really

peasants, and they are all the more valuable as allies because they are not really peasants. One way or another, this tension would have to be resolved.

The attention Plekhanov devotes to the working class also signals the most important development in Russian society in the second half of the nineteenth century : industrialization. In this period Russia underwent a process of industrialization on a very large scale and mainly under the tutelage of the state. Concentrating large numbers of workers in a few urban areas, often in appalling conditions which might easily stimulate unrest, this development could not go unnoticed by the revolutionaries. Given their relative lack of success in mobilizing the peasantry, the intelligentsia would naturally be drawn to the working class as a potential base of support.

The twenty years following the Emancipation Act of 1861 were basically a period of preparation for the real industrialization drive which would begin in the mid-1880s (134). The Russian state at first remained fearful of industrialization, seeing the disruptive effects it had had on Western European social life. Nor did the Emancipation of itself initiate a period of economic growth. The Emancipation settlements imposed heavy redemption payments on the peasantry, and made the mir the interim proprietor of the peasants' share of land until their dues were paid off (135). The government feared the prospect of social unrest, and

still saw the obshschina as a bulwark of conservatism. In tying the peasantry to the commune, the Emancipation Act retarded the formation of an urban labor force, and perpetuated inefficient methods of farming which limited economic growth (136).

At the same time, the autocracy realized that economic strength was essential to bolstering its external position, and already in the 1860s the government initiated a program of railroad building to facilitate the access of agricultural produce to foreign markets (137). The emerging network of railroads would provide the foundation for Russia's subsequent industrialization drive. Moreover, the Emancipation does seem at least to have created the framework for industrialization, and has been termed by one scholar an " essential prerequisite " for it (138). In obligating the peasants to redeem their land by cash payments, it encouraged their integration into the expanding money economy. The peasantry would have to produce goods for sale on the market in order to acquire the money necessary to meet their redemption dues. Slowly, the peasantry was being drawn away from the natural economy that had been a feature of traditional agrarian life, and into the money economy which would be an essential adjunct to Russian industrialization. In addition to the production of market crops, more and more peasants took up artisanal production on a small scale (139). Others worked in the

towns on a seasonal basis, returning to the villages to sow and harvest their crops (140). Moreover, the Emancipation did lead to the appearance of small pockets of poor, landless peasants, many of whom would make the transition to industrial employment (141). Overall, the number of factory workers rose somewhat during this period ; in the fifty provinces of European Russia, their numbers increased from 797,649 in 1861-70 to 945,597 in 1871-80 (142).

In other ways also the Emancipation act helped to create the preconditions for industrialization. The redemption system redirected the flow of rent obligations from the landlords to the government, where they could be more productively used. Most of Russia's landlords had been heavily in debt to the government prior to 1861, so that the peasants' redemption payments were often rechannelled to the government and ended up in state coffers (143). This would provide one source of capital for the state-led industrialization drive. Also, the emancipation left the landlords with the largest share of land allotments ; on these large estates, more grain could be produced for export, and thus to support economic growth (144).

Industrialization was still at an inchoate stage in 1879. The big break would come during the 1880s, after the state had finally overcome its hesitations and began to construct railroads on an unprecedented scale as the main lever of a rapid industrialization

policy (145). Yet already the new trends had made themselves felt, and Plekhanov's attention was drawn to them. What he saw in 1879 as a potential opportunity for the Populists, however, actually sounded an ominous note for their vision of the future. The Populists based their hopes on the agricultural class in Russia, and their aspirations were shaped accordingly. They did emphasize the need to modernize the countryside, and all affirmed a commitment to 'progress'. But for most, progress had been conceived in moral terms. Neither Herzen nor Lavrov seems to have anticipated an industrial revolution in Russia ; they pictured rather a slowly- developing agrarian nation. Already, Russia was moving in a different direction, and soon it would do so at a very rapid pace. As a result, the Populist vision was bound to seem more and more a thing of the past. It was primarily as a result of this development that the Populist ideal, and Plekhanov's own faith in it, would be undermined.

Within Zemlya i Volya, the tide had shifted in favor of Narodnaya Volya and the terrorist campaign. Disappointed at the paucity of results of the Populists' work " among the people " , the intelligentsia would naturally look for different strategies, and the dramatic acts of the terrorists, whatever their ultimate results, were sure to attract attention. Chernyi Peredel, on the other hand, was a still-born organisation, limited to repeating the

time-worn slogans of Populism, and with no real successes to its credit.

The failure of Chernyi Peredel 's efforts was surely disheartening for Plekhanov. Yet he would not countenance the terrorist alternative. It seemed to him to be based upon theoretical confusion ; within the system he had erected on the basis of Marx's theory of historical materialism, it was a hopeless attempt to force the laws of history. Plekhanov's very scientism now left him with no place to turn. Could it be that history itself was militating against the Populists? Plekhanov was not ready to accept this verdict. Yet his own analysis of current trends was not encouraging. In the age-old tradition of peasant oppposition to the state, it was the peasants who had been worsted :

> Until now the victory of the State has been complete. It has enclosed the people within the iron circle of its organization. By making use of its prerogatives, it has been able to stifle not only all risings of the people, both large and small, but every manifestation of its life and thought. It has put its heavy hands on the Cossacks ; it has maimed the obshschina. It has made the people pay for what has always been its own, i.e. the land, and has demanded a fee which is even greater than the price of the fields. Labour as a whole is dominated by the state. The land hunger that it has created by seizing the people's property has given rise to that crowd of manual workers artificially snatched from their houses and fields, which constitutes the labor in our factories and workshops. It imposes heavy taxes and thus compels the peasant to submit to economic exploitation. It supports the kulaks and the capitalism of the extortioners in the villages, thus undermining the forms of the people's life in those very places which are dangerous to it (146)..

Plekhanov now clung to a belief system which his own analysis undermined. Conservative elements intrinsic to the village sapped the peasants' revolutionary fervor, agricultural techniques as they existed discouraged collective exploitation of the fields (147), and the state was now undermining the obshschina 's very existence. Refusing to relinquish the commitment to a " social " revolution to which his analysis had led him, Plekhanov would be forced to reject Populism in toto. His own Populist orthodoxy would lead him to Marxism.

Plekhanov's faith was dealt another blow with the appearance in 1880 of a major study of the obshschina, Orlov's " Communal Property in the Moscow District " . Based upon extensive empirical research uncommon at that time, Orlov's study not only did not attest to the vitality of the obshschina but claimed that it was undergoing a steady process of disintegration owing to causes internal to it, in particular to clashes between richer and poorer peasants (148). Plekhanov and the Populists had always maintained that any weaknesses of the commune were caused by external factors, especially the interference of the state. Now, Plekhanov was presented with 'scientific' evidence which radically contradicted his interpretation of Russia's social conditions.

Shortly thereafter, Plekhanov left for the West, hoping to find there the materials to pull together the

fragments of his system. Instead, he would be led over the next two years to reject almost every tenet of Populism. One by one, they fell under the onslaught of Marxist theory. Later, he would write : " the more we became acquainted with the theories of scientific socialism, the more doubtful became our populism to us from the side of both theory and practice " (149). By 1883, Plekhanov would re-emerge in a new guise, that of the 'prophet of Russian Marxism'.

In his articles for " Chernyi Peredel " , published in the West following its' leaders' emigration there, Plekhanov gradually distanced himself from the 'truths' of Populism. In September, 1880, he evoked the possibility of a constitutional order and capitalist development as the first stage of the revolution (150). He still attempted to accomodate this scenario to Chernyi Peredel 's program, though ; let the bourgeoisie fight for political freedom, he said, while the socialists should concentrate on " economic agitation " (151), on propagating the idea of " the transfer into the hands of the laborers of the means and products of labor " (152). Plekhanov had not yet relinquished his hope for an immediate transition to socialism. He accepted the prospect of a bourgeois regime, but seemed to envision the presentation of the socialist program to the bourgeoisie at the very moment of its accession to power (153).

This uneasy compromise would eventually be

resolved in favor of a scenario identical with that charted by Marx for Western Europe. In Plekhanov's article for the third issue of "Chernyi Peredel" in January, 1881, he stated unequivocally that Russia's next socio-economic formation would be capitalist and its political regime bourgeois-constitutional. But he now relinquished his earlier distinction between 'social' and 'political' tasks, arguing instead for a fusion of the two in revolutionary activity (154). Plekhanov's study of Marxism had led him to the conclusion that only by way of political action could the revolutionaries' social aims be achieved (155).

Plekhanov directed the socialists to organize the working class as an independent force in society, fighting alongside the bourgeoisie insofar as it served the battle against autocracy, and subsequently pressuring the bourgeois regime to provide the rights and liberties necessary to consolidate the forces of socialism. This strategy, incidentally, parallelled not only that suggested by Marx for West European socialists, but also that of the Narodovoltsy within Russia. Indeed, Plekhanov supported attempts to re-unite the forces of Populism in the early 1880s. But he remained opposed to the exclusive emphasis on terrorism, and ultimately the attempt to reconcile the two factions failed. This mattered little, though, for Plekhanov was already moving in a different direction.

In 1883, Plekhanov wrote his first lengthy Marxist

article, entitled " Socialism and Political Struggle " ; " Our Differences " followed a little over a year later. In these articles, he set out in full clarity the synthesis of social and political struggle which he had sketched in outline in his writings for " Chernyi Peredel " . At the same time, he launched an attack on Populism which would continue for over twenty years ; only if socialism were transferred from its 'utopian' basis in Populist thought to the 'scientific' foundation offered by Marx could the battle for freedom be successful.

Plekhanov directed his fire on the cornerstone of the Populist credo : the obshschina. After suffering through his own doubts about the vitality of this institution, Plekhanov could at last abandon any lingering devotion to it. All of his doubts had been justified ; the obshschina was disintegrating, while capitalism " can become, and... is becoming, the exclusive master in Russia " (156).

The Emancipation had in his view been the turning point in this process. The natural economy of pre-reform Russia had been undermined by it, and the many speculations, the establishment of banks, and the construction of railroads which followed paved the way for a tremendous expansion of exchange (157). The conditions were being created for a money economy, which, as Marx had shown, was the cornerstone of capitalism. The redemption payments, Plekhanov argued,

and the peasants' resulting need for cash, forced them to concentrate on the production of one or a few goods which could be sold for money, and conversely to purchase goods which they had formerly bought for themselves. Thus, " the emancipation sealed the doom of self-sufficient, natural economy, which retreated before the advance of commodity-producing, money-based economy " (158).

The assimilation of the peasantry to a money economy inaugurated an inevitable process of decay of the obshschina. Capitalism would insinuate itself into village life, and transform the collectivist peasant world into a competitive jungle, with the same class divisions and exploitative relationships that obtained in the industrial sector. " At a certain stage in its development, commodity production will lead to the exploitation of the producer, will give birth to the capitalist employer and the proletarian worker " (159). Production for the market meant a gradual differentiation in the status of the peasantry ; some would prove unable to meet the challenge of the market, while others would rise to the status of capitalist-entrepreneurs. The first would be unable to maintain their land, and would sink to the status of proletarians, working as the employees of more succesful peasants or leaving the village entirely for the cities. In this way, the obshschina would break up in favor of independent, capitalist production. Hoping

for its continued vitality, Plekhanov wrote in " Our Differences " (1885), was like hoping " for a long life and further development for a fish that has been landed on the bank " (160).

Thus, the Populist vision of a free association of communes became a form of economic romanticism which could only hamper the socialist cause. The revolutionaries would have to resign themselves to an extensive period of capitalist development and bourgeois rulership. There would be no shortcuts to socialism. The intelligentsia must overcome its horror of capitalism, and accept it as an essential prelude to socialism. Rural Russia was quickly moving along this path, while with respect to industry capitalism had already implanted itself as the dominant mode of production (161). The revolutionaries must accept this verdict of history, and learn to organize their efforts on the basis of capitalism : " we suffer not only from the development of capitalism but from the scarcity of that development " (162).

A natural concomitant of this new scenario was the championing of the industrial proletariat as the agent of socialist revolution. Plekhanov still admitted the possibility of some role for the peasantry in the distant future (163), But the hope for a mass peasant uprising was a utopian fantasy, for this class was at bottom a reactionary force. Some years later, he wrote : " The proletarian and the muzhik are real political

antipodes... The historical role of the proletariat is as revolutionary as that of the muzhik is conservative... " (164)

Plekhanov's about-face was complete. In his attack upon the Populist heritage, not a stone was left unturned. Not socialism but capitalism was the next stage of Russia's history. Not the peasantry but the proletariat would be the seed-bed of revolution. Not 'social' but a synthesis of 'social' and 'political' struggle was the proper revolutionary strategy. Not a stateless utopia, but a 'bourgeois' regime lay in the immediate future. Overall, Russia's destiny, far from unique, would be identical with that of the West.

We will not follow the subsequent course of Plekhanov's development. The principles he enunciated between 1880 and 1885, first hesitantly and then forthrightly, remained basically unchanged throughout the rest of his life. They were, rather, clarified over the course of battles Plekhanov waged, first with the Populists, then with the 'revisionists' and 'economists', and, eventually, with the Bolsheviks. Already by 1885 Plekhanov had laid the foundation for the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). In the internecine struggle which followed the split of the RSDLP in 1903, Plekhanov's system was adopted as the policy of the Mensheviks, who upheld its validity through the Revolution of 1917.

Plekhanov's significance in the history of Russian

Marxism is thus clear. But we are concerned specifically with the significance of the transition to Marxism for the Populist ideal of the future society. As we shall see, the consequences of this shift were not unambiguous ; Marxism and the changed conditions of Russian society had in the eyes of much of the intelligentsia exposed Populism as based upon a myth, and yet as a myth the Populist vision remained a touchstone of self-identification for the intelligentsia throughout the pre-revolutionary period.

The intelligentsia's conversion to Marxism was by no means complete. Populism as a social movement had effectively collapsed with the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 and the intense government repression which followed it, but it was again revived with the formation of the Social-Revolutionary Party at the turn of the century. This party embraced many of the traditional objectives of Populism, and played a key role in the Revolution of 1917. Moreover, the Populist ideology was defended against the attacks of Marxists during the 1880s and 1890s, as many refused to accept Plekhanov's prediction of a capitalist and bourgeois future for Russia. Plekhanov himself, moreover, remained isolated within the intellligentsia for at least a decade after his conversion.

But within the intelligentsia the tide would gradually shift in favor of the Marxist vision of the future, and we must ask why this occurred. What were

the general conditions which militated in favor of the abandonment of Populism and its replacement by Marxism?

First among these is the fact that the Populist movement of the 1870s had been essentially a failure. Notwithstanding the intelligentsia's faith in the peasantry, the call to revolution was generally met with indifference if not outright hostility. This is not to say that the peasantry was quiescent at this time. But the inability of the intelligentsia to harness the peasants' discontent to its own objectives must have been doubly disappointing. The peasants were indeed unhappy, but they did not seem to share the Populists' commitment to revolution. They wanted land, freedom from noble and state interference, and a 'good tsar'. But this they did not equate with revolution.

These frustrating results must have provoked some Populists to question their ideals. If the peasants had been unresponsive to their propaganda, could it be that their faith in them had been misguided? This question became all the more pertinent as another force, the industrial working class, made its appearance on the Russian stage. Clustered in large numbers in a few urban centers, every bit as discontented as the peasantry, and in close proximity to the largely urban-based intelligentsia, the workers offered tremendously fertile terrain for socialist activity.

The appearance of the working class, moreover,

reflected the changes that were taking place in Russian society. Industrialization had by the mid-1880s begun to take place on a massive scale, and promised to radically transform the nature of the country. The overall extent of industrialization during the Tsarist period should not be exaggerated. One source has described it as " on the whole a picture in slow motion... a development in which elements of continuity were very strong and all- pervading " (165). Although by 1913 Russia would become the fourth- largest industrial nation in Europe, " the structure of society, of the labour force, and of the GNP remained characteristic of a pre-industrial or at best a semi-industrial economy " (166). The majority of the population remained " in the vast intermediate zone of economic activity, with a very low degree of economic specialisation, devoting varying parts of time and resources to subsistence activities and to cash earning activities " (167). Much of Russia's economic growth during this period had been non- industrial ; this form of employment actually grew faster than industrial forms, and within the latter category artisan forms grew faster than factory employment (168).

What this suggests is that Russia's economy was in a transitional state ; but of its ultimate direction there could be little doubt. The trend of Russia's economy was toward industry. The total number of industrial workers rose from 1,660,000 in 1860 to

6,100,000 in 1913 (by a factor of 3.67). In the fifty provinces of European Russia, the number of factory workers rose from 945,597 in 1871-80 to 1,160,771 in 1881-90, and again to 1,637,595 in 1891-1900 (169). In metal-working and machine construction, between 1866 and 1897 the number of firms increased by a factor of six, the value of output by a factor of twenty, and the labour force by a factor of ten (170). The number of workers in mining and metallurgy doubled between 1865 and 1887 alone, from 200,000 to 400,000 (171). Overall, the average annual rate of industrial growth during the 1890s was around 8%, and between 1905 and 1913 it was approximately 6% (172).

Although by 1913 the agricultural sector would still account for the great majority of the working population and national income, the greatest opportunities for economic strength lay in the industrial sector. In 1913, the factory labor force accounted for only 5% of the active population (compared with 66% in agriculture), but it provided 20-25% of the national income (compared with 45-55% for agriculture) (173). Thus, the productivity gains from the transition to industry had proved to be considerable, and indicated where Russia's strength in the future would lie.

Most of this, moreover, was taking place under the tutelage of the state. The strategic factor in initiating the great industrial upswing of the 1880s

was the changed attitude of the state to industrialization. It now became an accepted, in fact the central, goal (174). The scarcity of capital in Russia was such that no banking system could have attracted the funds necessary to fuel industrial development, while the low standards of business honesty and the general skepticism of the public meant that the banks could not even attract the small capital funds that were available (175). Only the state could lead the process of industrialization. The supply of capital required the compulsive machinery of government, which, through its policies of taxation, managed to direct incomes from consumption to investment (176), while working to attract the foreign capital necessary to make up for Russia's shortcomings. The state also helped to determine the pattern of industrial development. It was interested mainly in heavy industry, and on a massive scale ; it supported primarily large-scale enterprises as well as amalgamations or co-ordinated policies among industrial firms (177). Although, as mentioned, small industrial production of the artisan form accounted for an important part of Russia's economic growth in this period, the foundations of its industrial economy were being established quite differently.

It is clear that, at least at the time of the writings we have considered, Plekhanov had exaggerated the effects of the Emancipation on the rural economy.

The Act in some ways strengthened the obshschina, and initiated no flood of peasants to the cities nor a class war within the village. But the economic changes after 1861, and especially after the 1880s, did not leave the countryside untouched. The number of rural wage-earners increased dramatically between 1860 and 1913, rising from 3,960,000 (index=100) in 1860 to 9,156,620 (index=231) in 1897,to 10,375,080 (index=262) in 1900, and to 17,815,000 (index=450) in 1913 (178). The peasants were indeed being drawn into the money economy. Moreover, a gradual transition of rural elements to city life was occurring. In St. Petersburg, in 1869, 31% of the population was classed as peasants ; by 1890 this number had risen to 68% (179). The integration of these elements to urban life was by no means complete ; one source notes that probably not more than one-third of the factory labour force had by 1913 become fully committed to industrial employment, in the sense of a full severance from farming and a corresponding social self-identification (180). But the ultimate fate of these elements was secure.

The government's attitude to the obshschina would change only during the twentieth century, by which time it had lost faith in the peasant commune as a bastion of social stability ; the Stolypin reforms of 1905 sought to create a new base for the regime by encouraging the development of a sturdy class of independent farmers, the kulaks. The obshschina was

perhaps inefficient, but it seems to have remained a major source of identification for the peasantry, especially its poorer elements, throughout the nineteenth century (181). Alexander Gerschenkron has argued that, contrary to the arguments of the Marxists, the obshschina was not in a state of general disintegration, and that "even a blow as strong as the one imparted by Stolypin failed to prove completely annihilating" to it (182). But the obshschina was proving to be a drag on its more enterprising members, as its land-equalising practices stifled their self-aggrandising ambitions. (183). Moreover, the overall importance of the commune, both within the agricultural sector and with respect to industry, was declining. It had to begin to seem more and more a thing of the past.

The intelligentsia, which had always seen itself as the vanguard of social change, would have to find some way of accomodating their worldview to these new trends. The Populist ideology was ill-equipped to do so. Its adherents did envision the introduction of technological innovations into the commune, as well as a moderate industrial sector based on the collectivist artels. But industrialization on the scale at which it was beginning to take place simply did not fit into the picture. Although the Populists concentrated their attack on capitalism and bourgeois society, underneath this was a very real contempt for industrial society as

such. When they voiced their commitment to progress, they meant moral progress. As for economics, Herzen, Lavrov, and most of the Populists foresaw a slowly developing agrarian-socialist society.

Thus, the Populist ideal of a free federation of self-governing communes became increasingly disconnected from the material processes taking place in post-reform Russia. It had to appear more anachronistic and utopian. It is true that the intelligentsia had always been defined by its alienation from Russian 'reality', but its raison-d'etre was also to realize its ideas in practice. For the Populists, the new trends meant that their very identity rested on a mistake, a distorted conception of reality.

Several responses to this crisis were possible. One could reject the veracity of the new trends, depreciate their significance and re-affirm the attainability of the Populist ideal ; Russian conditions were sufficiently transitional to make this a reasonable option. Or, one might reject 'reality' itself, and console oneself with romantic or religious fantasies ; the religious features of Populism made this a relatively logical transition, and indeed at the end of the nineteenth century many made it (184). A third response, that of Plekhanov, was to look for another system of thought which would explain the new reality and still provide a foundation for one's

revolutionary aspirations.

Marxism was an ideal choice as this new system of thought. For, on the one hand, it was 'scientific', a purely rational foundation which would be highly attractive given the intelligentsia's widespread commitment to 'science'.This feature was of great importance in accounting for Plekhanov's conversion ; other Russian radicals would be attracted by it as well :

> I found it exactly what I needed at the time, a philosophy of method that gave continuity and logic to the processes of history and that endowed my own ethical aspirations, as well as the revolutionary movement, with the force and dignity of a historical imperative. In Marx's materialist conception of history, I found a light which illuminated every corner of my intellectual life (185).

Marxism gave an account of history which made industrialization not only compatible with but necessary for the attainment of the socialist paradise. What had been the death-knell of the Populist ideal now became for new generations of radicals a tremendous opportunity, if only they could adjust their perspective to it. The stateless utopia was still in the offing ; only the path leading to it had changed.

In Plekhanov's formulation of Marxism, however, this path would be a long and painful one. Socialism would emerge naturally out of a process of capitalist industrialization, which would divide both city and countryside into opposing factions of proletarians and property-owners, until finally the conditions were

created for a class war which would result in socialism. The intelligentsia was assigned a key role in this process. It must organize the working class as an independent force in society, fighting alongside the bourgeoisie in the battle against autocracy, and subsequently pressuring the bourgeois regime for the rights and liberties necessary to protect its interests. The intelligentsia must raise the workers' consciousness of the irreconcilability of their interests with those of the bourgeoisie, and convince them of the need for a radical, socialist solution to their grievances.

Plekhanov never relinquished this two-stage theory of revolution. One could not, after all, skip an entire historical era. He did, however, waver somewhat on the chronology of the revolution(s). His theory implied a lengthy period of capitalist development and bourgeois rulership. But Plekhanov at times expressed the hope that this period might be shortened, so that " our capitalism will fade away before it has had time to blossom completely " (186). This hope was based on two factors. First, if a proletarian revolution broke out in the West, the pace of social change in Russia might be hastened, and the period of bourgeois domination shortened (though not eliminated). Second, the relative weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie meant that the balance of forces might tilt more rapidly in favor of the working class (187). But this, of course,

depended on the intelligentsia's success in raising the class consciousness of the workers.

Still, on the whole the future projected by Plekhanov was a prosaic one. The libertarian paradise of the Populists receded into the past, while that of Marx was pushed far into the future. In the meantime, the revolutionaries would have to rest their hopes on a bourgeois-constitutional regime, the scorn of generations of Russian radicals. Plekhanov and his associates, after experiencing the setbacks of the 1870s, might be heartened by the knowledge that their cause would be triumphant in the end, and that in the meantime there was much important work to be done. And for other, younger radicals as well, the security provided by the Marxist scenario could be comforting. But it did mean a revision of their expectations for the immediate future. And this would be difficult to accept, especially at times of unrest, when the revolution seemed imminent, and the revolutionaries' impatience for the earthly utopia asserted itself.

Curious though it may seem, Plekhanov's new attitude to the state brought him, within the spectrum of Russian political thought, to occupy a position which was functionally similar to that of supporters of the liberal proto-tradition. Of course, Plekhanov and his supporters would have categorically rejected any such comparison. Yet his advocacy of a limited role for a 'bourgeois' state in the period following the

defeat of Tsarism pitted Plekhanov, along with the liberals, somewhere between the two traditional images of the state. Plekhanov's deviation from Russia's political traditions was related to the failure of the Populist movement and the process of industrialization in Russia. The Populists' failure meant also the breakdown of a tradition of quasi-anarchistic opposition to 'the state', and created the conditions for the formulation of a modified stance toward this institution. Moreover, industrialization posed a challenge which encouraged among some of the radicals an acceptance of at least a limited or temporary role for the state in the future society. Plekhanov himself was influenced by both of these factors. And yet, as we shall see, it was precisely his deviation from Russia's political traditions that came to constitute a central weakness in Plekhanov's scheme.

Lenin and the Stateless Ideal

If Plekhanov had helped to undermine the Populists' ideal, this did not mean that elements of their ideological heritage did not remain of importance to the intelligentsia. Generations of radicals had been raised on tales of the horrors of capitalism and the hypocrisy of bourgeois-constitutional government.

They might now relinquish their faith in the future of the obshschina, but the alternative future painted by Plekhanov would be more difficult to countenance. The intelligentsia's traditional faith that the stateless utopia could be erected on the morrow of the revolution would only with great difficulty be replaced by the project of joining the battle against autocracy and then leaving power to the bourgeoisie, to return to the status of loyal opponents for the duration of the capitalist era. But Plekhanov's system, and his own disposition, would allow no truck with these sentiments. The radicals would have to be weaned from their utopian fantasies, and set on the secure path of science.

In this, Plekhanov was certainly being faithful to at least one element of Marx's thought. Marxism claimed to be the general science of social life, and Marx himself was scornful of early generations of Western 'utopian' socialists. Yet his system also embodied a utopian element, and its origins lay in certain moral considerations of freedom and the fulfillment of man's genuine nature. This element of Marx's thought is evident in his depiction of the horrors of Western capitalism ; it might be a necessary stage of social development, but Marx never hid his disdain for it nor for its main agent, the bourgeoisie. The utopian element of Marx's thought is equally apparent in his eschatological vision of a bountiful,

stateless paradise which would follow the proletarian dictatorship, when the 'administration of men' will give way to the 'administration of things'.

This element fit uneasily into Plekhanov's version of Marxism. Capitalism was necessary, and socialists would have to welcome it : " we suffer not only from the development of capitalism, but from the scarcity of that development " (188). The emphasis here is shifted from what is ultimately desirable to what is immediately necessary ; or rather, the desirable must flow out of the necessary. Similarly, Marx's eschatological vision disappears almost entirely from view ; it is only the last step of an exceedingly long climb. Not only a state, but a bourgeois state must be accepted for the immediate future. Plekhanov's need to set his hopes upon a secure, 'scientific' foundation, already apparent in his Populist writings, must have become all the more intense after the destruction of his earlier beliefs ; never again could such a painful error be allowed to happen. But this meant necessarily that the utopian element in Marx's thought had to be overshadowed.

The utopian element of Marx's thought, on the other hand, was much more consonant with the Populist heritage. Indeed, much of the Marxist critique of capitalism had already been integrated into the Populist writings of the 1860s and 70s, and deployed to emphasize both the possibility and the necessity for

Russia to avoid the fate of the West. Moreover, although Marx himself, in his actions within the Western socialist movement, generally de-emphasized the stateless utopia in favor of the highly centralized 'dictatorship of the proletariat', the Populists had been less willing to follow him, opposing centralized methods and favoring an immediate accession to liberty.

And it is no mere coincidence that it was the utopian element of Marx's thought which triumphed in 1917 and helped to carry the Bolsheviks to power. Lenin eventually rejected Plekhanov's projection of an extensive period of bourgeois rule, and by 1917 was advocating instead an immediate seizure of power by the forces of socialism. In his strategy and tactics also, Lenin adapted many elements of the Populist heritage. Thus, if Plekhanov had served as a middle term between Populism and Marxism, Lenin served as a middle term in the reverse direction, between Marxism and Populism. He was able, in a way in which Plekhanov and the Mensheviks were not, to deploy the Populist heritage to the Bolsheviks' advantage, by manipulating a myth which, though itself unrealizable, had retained a considerable command on the sympathies of both the masses and the intelligentsia.

Lenin served as a middle term between Marxism and Populism in several respects. It has often been observed that his views on Party organisation owed much to the conspiratorial tradition of certain Populist

factions, and that he linked up with an authoritarian strain in Populist thought represented by such figures as Nechaev and Tkachev. In assigning an important role to the peasantry in the revolution, Lenin also adopted an important element of the Populist program. Moreover, his agrarian program seems to have been derived from that of the Social-Revolutionaries, the latter- day representatives of Populism.

What has perhaps received less attention is that, in the months immediately prior to the October Revolution, Lenin also appealed to the anti-statist, libertarian tradition which had been so central to Populist thought. It is true that Lenin always emphasized that the revolution would be followed by a 'revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry'. Yet this notion was to remain ill-defined and at the same time awe-inspiring. Lenin never clearly articulated what it would entail ; indeed, Marcel Liebman, an admirer of Lenin, has faulted him for dealing " so lightly " with it (189). But what was perhaps a theoretical lacuna would become a tremendous strategic advantage. For the imprecision of the concept allowed for a certain theoretical 'slack' which the all-too-familiar notion of bourgeois government did not. It even allowed room for an appeal to the myth of the stateless utopia; and, at the moment of revolution, Lenin marshalled this myth in the Bolsheviks' favor, and in doing so helped to ensure

their victory.

Of particular interest in this connection is Lenin's The State and Revolution (190). Lenin began writing this work in early 1917 while in exile in Switzerland, and finished it during the summer of that year after his return to Russia. In it, he set out to " restore the true doctrine of Marx on the state " (191), as well as to elaborate his own vision of the society which would emerge out of the ashes of revolution.

Lenin first directed his fire against the Mensheviks and other 'bourgeois ideologists' who advocated the erection of a bourgeois-constitutional state. Such could not be the goal of the revolutionaries, he argued, for the democracy provided by a bourgeois regime is an illusion :

> To decide once every few years which member of the ruling class is to misrepresent the people in parliament is the real essence of bourgeois parliamentarism, not only in parliamentary-constitutional monarchies but also in the most democratic republics (192).

The problem, Lenin argued, was not one of " perfecting the state machine but one of smashing and destroying it " (193). The revolution must not be followed by the erection of a new state, but to its elimination :

> The proletariat needs only a state which is withering away, i.e a state so constituted that it begins to wither away immediately, and cannot but wither away (194).

In his attack upon bourgeois democracy, his call to 'smash and destroy' the state, and his forecast of its immediate withering away under socialist rule, Lenin was merely restating some of the classic arguments of Populism (not to mention anarchism). Although he carefully distinguished himself from the outlook of his revolutionary rivals, he clearly deployed some of their symbols. But he did so on the basis of appropriate citations of Marx and Engels, and thus carefully avoided the label of revisionism. He was, Lenin insisted, merely rescuing the 'true doctrine' of Marx from the distortions of others. This was a formidable argument, which embodied elements of other ideologies without straying into self-contradiction.

Its importance should be understood against the background of events in Russia following the February revolution in 1917. This period seems to have been marked by a tremendous politicization of the masses, who were, in the words of one scholar, in a state of " permanent mobilization " (195). A contemporary observer of these events described them as follows :

> All Russia... was constantly demonstrating in those days. The provinces had all become accustomed to street demonstrations. And in Petersburg, too, in those same days, the " over-forties " and the women were demonstrating - in general, everyone was demonstrating who wasn't too lazy ! (196)

This popular tumult was diffuse, disorganized, anarchical. The question of a new government was, it seems, being set aside in favor of demands for direct

democracy. One source has described the mood of popular Russia :

> The question was not one of being better governed, or of choosing another form of being governed, but of being self-governing. Any delegation of power was excoriated, any authority unbearable. (197)

The popular aspiration for autonomy, so long suppressed, was now being vented in the most extreme form. Even the revolutionaries seem to have been somewhat carried away by it. Marcel Liebman argues that at this time a rapprochement was taking place between Bolsheviks and anarchists : " members of Lenin's Party regularly attended the anarchist meetings that were organized in Petrograd, responding to invitations they received from the libertarian groups " (198).At the upper echelons of the Bolshevik Party, too, some such interaction seems to have been taking place : " from June 1917 onwards the Party united with the Anarchists every time they quarrelled with the coalition, and concluded agreements with them... about the administration of local affairs " (199).

The Menshevik and Social-Revolutionary parties had been compromised by their support for or participation in the provisional government ; they could only look on this unrest with consternation. But the Bolshevik leadership also evinced some of this sentiment. It felt threatened by a phenomenon which it could not control ; having for so long seen themselves as the vanguard of the revolution, the Bolsheviks were

uncomfortable with the prospect of taking a back seat to the masses. One of the party's members remarked that " we have to play the part of the fire-hose " (200).

It was into this context that the ideas expressed in The State and Revolution inserted themselves. Lenin wanted to shake the Party out of its slumber, and convince its members that what they saw as a threat was actually a great opportunity. The popular aspirations for direct democracy could be incorporated into the Bolshevik program ; Lenin insisted that they must be the aspiration of any genuine Marxist. The Bolsheviks could appeal to these anarchic forces, and ride a wave of unrest to power. Indeed, this would seem to be what happened in October.

One need not see any inevitability in the outcome of the revolution ; conditions were such that it could have been concluded in any number of ways. But this should not obscure the fact that several factors were militating in the Bolsheviks' favor. The tight and disciplined organisation of the Party was one. Another was the Bolsheviks' willingness to adopt the most extreme positions at the behest of the masses. One of these positions was the demand for the destruction of the state, and its replacement by some form of libertarian democracy. Lenin deployed the myth of the stateless utopia to rally the masses behind his Party and catapult it to power.

This raises the question of Lenin's convictions at

the time. Many scholars have found a glaring contradiction between The State and Revolution and Lenin's other works, which were marked by a more authoritarian tone. Leonard Schapiro asserts that " it is unlikely that the more utopian parts of (State and Revolution) represented Lenin's convictions " (201). Marcel Liebman argues on the contrary that Lenin's views were actually modified during this period, as he became carried away at the display of popular 'revolutionary consciousness'. The model for direct democracy depicted in The State and Revolution was in this view both sincerely held and a reflection of the spectacle already taking place in revolutionary Russia (202).

A close reading of The State and Revolution, however, reveals that there exist fewer contradictions between it and Lenin's other works than might appear on the surface. For Lenin is careful to follow any 'libertarian' remarks with reminders of their conditional nature. He distinguishes himself from the anarchist " dreams " of dispensing immediately with all " subordination " , and affirms that " we want the revolution with human nature as it is now, with human nature that cannot dispense with subordination, control, and 'managers' " (203). Moreover, Lenin rejects the Populist and anarchist ideal of a decentralized federation of communes. " Marx was a centralist " , he writes, and " Engels opposed

federalism, and defended the 'one and indivisible republic' " (204).

The contradiction between these last remarks and Lenin's promise of the withering away of the state is only apparent, for we find that Lenin's eradication of the state was merely definitional. He seems to treat it as purely those 'special bodies of armed men' used to suppress the majority; this state will disappear, but that is not to say that it won't be replaced by something else :

> During the transition from capitalism to communism suppression is still necessary ; but it is the suppression of the exploiting minority by the exploited majority. A special apparatus, a special machine for suppression, is still necessary, but this is now a transitory state ; it is no longer a state in the proper sense (205).

Indeed ; the state under socialism is still necessary, but it is no longer really a state at all. The difference, it seems, is that the majority will now be doing the suppressing, and that they will play an active role in the fulfillment of its functions. All members of society will become bureaucrats, and this will mean that there will be no 'real' bureaucrats (206). The state will be run like a post office, its tasks so simplified that all may carry them out for a time, continually exchanging positions on a rotational basis (207).

But the central point is that Lenin makes this scenario dependent upon a high level of economic

development :

> Capitalist culture has created large-scale production, factories, railways, the postal service, telephones, etc., and on this basis the great majority of functions of the old " state power " have become so simplified and can be reduced to such simple operations of registration, filing, and checking that they can be easily performed by every literate person, and it will be possible to perform them for " workmen's wages " ...(208)

Lenin knew well that Russia had nothing like this level of " capitalist culture " in 1917. Despite the advances of the last century, it remained a largely agrarian nation. Modernization, which had been made the central objective by the Bolsheviks, would require the direction of the " transitory state " on a long-term basis. Until the majority of the population was fit to fill its positions, others would have to do it for them. The libertarian veneer of this 'transitory' state would be stripped away, leaving only its dictatorial and permanent core.

The fate of the stateless ideal was a sorry one. Formulated initially as a central goal of the Populist movement, it would eventually be undermined by the changing conditions of Russian society, to become a myth, with no prospect of realization. The myth would live on, but as a practical project it died with the original Populist movement in the 1880s. It continued to command the sympathies of much of the intelligentsia, however, and in 1917 it would be manipulated by other forces with quite different

objectives as a means to acquire power. After the revolution, the myth of the stateless utopia would have to be suppressed, so that the more prosaic tasks of administratiuon could be carried out. It was possible to ride a wave of anarchic unrest to power, but impossible to govern on the basis of it. The myth had served its purpose, and would now be eliminated once and for all.

Concluding Remarks

In the argument presented here, we have employed the concept of political culture to denote the context of political action, a context which constitutes the meaning of political action. Concentrating on the ideology of the Populist movement, we have tried to show how Russia's political traditions set the conceptual framework within which the intelligentsia's aspirations were conceived. Specifically, the Populists' conception of the state as intrinsically an agent of domination which would have to be eradicated from the socialist society of the future, was in our view a reflection of the exceedingly narrow range of meanings which the concept of 'the state' had taken on in Russia's traditional political culture.

In Muscovite Russia, 'the state' effectively denoted the Orthodox ruler. This ruler was seen as a spiritual father to his people, whose function was to guard the religious traditions of the people and thereby ensure their salvation. Most importantly, the ruler was never expected to play a positive role in directing the life of society. He was expected only to preserve what had always been. Moreover, the idea of 'the state' as an impersonal, bureaucratic institution for administering society was never accepted, indeed was inconceivable.

Peter the Great upset these traditional notions by introducing a conception of the state as an institution

based upon secular foundations, with an absolute right and duty to take in hand and refashion the life of society for the purposes of progress and development. Peter's project required a huge administrative effort, and led to the erection of a massive bureaucracy which spread its tentacles across Russian society, stamping out local freedoms and imposing new exactions on the people. This institution, which continued to grow in size and power throughout the Imperial age, was seen by most of popular Russia as a foreign intrusion, fundamentally illegitimate, which represented the betrayal of Russia's organic/religious roots. Russia was divided into radically opposed camps, and its subsequent history reflected the continuing attempts of the popular image of political authority to assert itself over against the hegemonic state.

Though some tentative moves toward reform were made during the Imperial age, the meaning of 'the state' effectively remained within the boundaries established by Peter. His conception of the state as a highly centralized and omnicompetent force for directing society became the dominant image of political authority, and served as the axis around which Russia's political debates revolved. 'The state' came to signify the Petrine state, which thus served as the touchstone with respect to which one's attitude to 'the state' was formulated.

The intelligentsia emerged out of the context of

social and spiritual dislocation which resulted from the Petrine reforms, and was shaped by its complex relationship with the two images of Russia. In its origins, this class was unarguably a phenomenon of Westernization. It could not have existed if not for Peter's break with Russia's religious roots and his assimilation of Western customs and ideas. In this sense, the intelligentsia was an emanation out of the Petrine tradition.

But the intelligentsia was also defined by its alienation from the Russian state. The impetus to progress with which Peter had imbued the state was lost by the nineteenth century, leaving only a reactionary shell. All that was left was the massive bureaucracy which Peter had erected, and the principle of compulsion on which it was founded. The intelligentsia, like popular Russia, bristled under the deadening weight of this institution, and, like popular Russia, came to reject its very legitimacy.

The Populist movement rejected not only the Tsarist state and the Petrine image of political authority but also the very notion of the state as necessary to the life of the community. The Populists envisioned instead an ideal political structure which was akin to the popular image of political authority. 'The state' would be eradicated once and for all, leaving the small, local communities to govern themselves without the interference of an oppressive

central authority. The point of our analysis has been to show that the Populists' project, in its total rejection of 'the state', reflected the traditional dichotomy in Russia's political culture. The very concept of the state had come to be defined by the boundaries and priorities set by Peter the Great. Thus, the Populists tended to collapse all of the potential state formations into a single oppressive whole, seeing no difference between the 'bourgeois- democracies' of Western Europe and the Tsarist regime in Russia. As a result, the Populists rejected not only the Petrine state but 'the state' as such. Their opposition to the Petrine state tended to translate into a wholesale opposition to 'the state' because of the absence of any other concept of 'the state' in Russia's political discourse. The notion of the state as something other than a centralized and omnipotent institution had been occluded by the pattern of Russia's political evolution, and as such it was seen by the Populists as, at bottom, a contradiction in terms.

The Populists' rejection of the state was made possible by its other aspirations. All of the Populists affirmed a commitment to progress, and in particular wished to promote the assimilation by Russian society of the values of individualism and rationalism. The Populists hoped, perhaps romantically, that these values could be taught to the masses without the strong hand of a central authority

and without resort to compulsion. The basic structure of Russian society would be unchanged. The agricultural commune provided an adequate foundation for the society of the future, which would be a slowly-developing agrarian nation.

However, the foundations of Russian society were being transformed in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Once the process of industrialization got underway, the Populists' aspirations began to appear anachronistic. The nation was moving in a different direction. The intelligentsia's self-understanding, moreover, helped to make this dilemma all the more acute. For this class had always seen itself as the vanguard of the future. Now, the future which was taking shape before its eyes contradicted its most basic assumptions. If it were to remain at the cutting edge of Russian society, it would have to accomodate this new trend within its own aspirations, and take up the challenge of industrialization.

Marxism provided the ideal solution to this dilemma. On the one hand, it affirmed the intelligentsia's commitment to socialism and the stateless utopia, making them the inexorable culmination of history. It provided a 'scientific' foundation for these aspirations. At the same time, it offered an account of industrialization which transformed it from a threat into an assurance of the advent of this utopia. The forces which were beyond

the intelligentsia's control, and had appeared to undermine its hopes, now secured them.

But Marxism also entailed a subtle change in the intelligentsia's conception of progress. The moral element of progress, so central to Populist thought, was now embodied in and made a function of economic progress. It was economic development which would make the intelligentsia's moral aspirations possible. But this also posed certain problems for the intelligentsia. Russia's circumstances were still far removed from the classic Marxist scenario for a socialist revolution. Industrialization had become the dominant trend, but society itself remained in a transitional state. Somehow, the gap would have to be made up.

Great challenges such as this one had in Russia always entailed a central role for the state. It was the state which had led the industrialization drive so far, and there was little reason to believe that it could be otherwise in the future. The contradiction between the intelligentsia's dual aspiration to liberty and progress, which had remained relative in Populist thought, now became absolute. The stateless utopia would be unattainable without the impetus which only a strong central authority could provide.

This contradiction was magnified by the shape of Russia's political traditions. Between the two extreme images of political authority, nothing else had been

able to lay solid roots. The nascent liberal tradition had not had time to implant itself, and the absence or weakness of an independent bourgeoisie left this tradition without its most common social base. Once the intelligentsia accepted the prospect of a genuine role for the state in the future society, a bias was thus established in the direction of a state which once again arrogated to itself an absolute right to direct the life of society. Originally adopting a conception of political authority which owed much to the popular image of Russia, the intelligentsia would be led in the end to erect a state which radically repudiated this image, a state whose foundations lay in the other, Petrine image of political authority.

The latter part of our analysis has been concerned to illustrate the manner in which this transition was made in the thought of the intelligentsia. Given the traditions of this class, the implications of its new aspirations were hard to face prior to the revolution. Its own as well as the people's antipathy to the state was too deep for them to accept the prospect of a new Leviathan following the revolution. At the same time, the intelligentsia's abounding faith in the healing powers of revolution, and the Bolsheviks' conviction that the Russian revolution would be the spark which would ignite a worldwide conflagration, establishing socialist regimes in more advanced nations which could then come to Russia's aid and make up for its

deficiencies, made it possible for this question to be occluded for a time. This same contradiction runs right through Lenin's The State and Revolution, which re-affirms a commitment to the stateless utopia while at the same time emphasizing the need to erect something in place of the state to lead Russia into modernity.

When the dust had settled, however, the contradiction would have to be addressed. The stateless ideal, which had its roots in the popular tradition of opposition to the Petrine state and which had been so central to the original aspirations of the intelligentsia, was finally discarded. In its stead there emerged a model of political authority which bore a remarkable resemblance to the Petrine image of rulership, the only other image of rulership provided by Russia's political traditions. Economic progress on a massive scale and at a breakneck pace would become the central objective, once again under the direction of a state whose authority was without limit.

NOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Cited in Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels : 1600-1800 (New York : Schocken Books, 1972), p. 263.

2. Richard Pipes, " The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia, " in The Russian Intelligentsia, ed. Richard Pipes (New York : Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 47-48.

3. This is a very summary account of a much more complex argument. See Marc Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia (New York : Harcourt,Brace,and World, 1966).

4. Ibid, p. 108.

5. Ibid, p. 159.

6. Martin Malia, " What is the Intelligentsia?, " in Pipes, The Russian Intelligentsia, pp. 8-9.

7. Ibid, p. 8.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid, p. 13.

10. Ibid, p.1.

11. Ibid, p.3.

12. Ibid, pp.11-12.

13. Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (Great Britain : Hogarth Press Ltd.,1978), p.24.

14. Ibid,p.125.

15. Richard Pipes, " Russian Marxism and its Populist Background, " Russian Review 19 (No.4 1960) : 319.

16. See Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition (London : Secker and Warburg, 1974).

17. Feodor Dostoevsky, in a number of works, gave the classic expression to this argument. It is also a theme of Landmarks (a translation of Vekhi), a collection of essays on the intelligentsia written by Russian intellectuals in the wake of the 1905 revolution. See, in particular, Sergei Bulgakov, " Heroism and Asceticism : Reflections on the Religious Nature of the Russian Intelligentsia, " in Landmarks : A Collection of Essays on the Russian Intelligentsia : 1909 ,ed.

Boris Shragin and Albert Todd (New York : Karz Howard, 1977). On the religious roots of Russian Populism, see James Billington, Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1958).

18. See Nikolai Berdiaev, The Origin of Russian Communism (London : The Centenary Press, 1937).

19. Berlin, Russian Thinkers, p. 214.

20. See Szamuely, The Russian Tradition.

21. See Paul Avrich, The Russian Anarchists (Princeton : Princeton University Press,1967).

22. Isaiah Berlin, Introduction to Roots of Revolution, by Franco Venturi (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. viii.

23. Ibid, pp. ix,xiii.

24. Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p.1.

25. Alexander Herzen, My Past and Thoughts, 6 Vols., trans. Constance Garnett (London : Chatto & Windus, 1927) 3 : 186.

26. Idem, La Russie et l'Occident (Lausanne : Editions Rencontre Lausanne, 1968), p.299.

27. Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia - From the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1961),p.508.

28. Francis M. Watters, " The Peasant and the Village Commune, " in The Peasant in Nineteenth Century Russia, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich(Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1968), p.134.

29. Ibid.

30. John Maynard, Russia in Flux - Before October (London : Victor Gollancz Ltd.,1946), p.31.

31. Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia, p.524.

32. Ibid.

33. Maynard, Russia in Flux, p.30.

34. Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia, p.523.

35. Ibid, p.524.

36. Ibid, p.508.

37. Franz August Maria von Haxthausen, The Russian Empire, 2 Vols., trans. Robert Farie(London: Chapman & Hall, 1856 ; reprint ed., New York : Arno Press and the New York Times, 1970), author's preface, p. xvi.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid, p.xvii.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Of this meeting, Herzen wrote that : " I was amazed by his clear picture of the life of our peasants and the power of our landlords, rural police, and the administration in general. He looks upon the peasant communities as an important element which has survived from the most distant antiquity, and which must be developed in the light of present-day requirements... " Cited in Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p.22.

43. Ibid, p. 76.

44. Jerome Blum has argued that by the twentieth century there was general agreement that the land-equalising practice of the obshschina was not of ancient origin. On the other hand, he writes, the antiquity of the communal form of organisation among the peasantry is undeniable. See Blum, Lord and Peasant, p. 510. Whatever the origins of the land-equalising obshschina, it seems that the important fact is that it did become an accepted and central feature of peasant life. This is Herzen's point. A similar one is made by Geroid Tanquary Robinson : " whatever may have been the primitive and present sources of the commune's strength, it is beyond dispute that it still played a part of the greatest importance in the life of the peasantry. Whatever the cause, whatever the result, the commune was ; for history, that is the outstanding fact. " Geroid Tanquary Robinson, Rural Russia under the Old Regime (New York : MacMillan & Co., 1949), p.125.

45. Herzen, My Past and Thoughts, vi : 94.

46. Idem, La Russie et l'Occident, p. 329.

47. Ibid, p.331.

48. Martin Malia, " Herzen on the Peasant Commune, " in Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, ed. Ernest Simmons (Cambridge : Harvard University

Press, 1955), p.210.

49. Herzen, " Du Developpement des Idees Revolutionnaires en Russie " , in La Russie et l'Occident, p.432.

50. Idem, My Past and Thoughts, vi : 92.

51. Ibid, vi : 98.

52. Ibid, vi : 275.

53. Malia, " Herzen on the Peasant Commune " , in Simmons, Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, p.198.

54. Herzen, From the Other Shore, trans. Moura Budberg (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956), p.12.

55. Martin Malia, Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1961), p.12.

56. Ibid.

57. " Comprendre toute l'étendue et la réalité, comprendre toute la sainteté des droits de l'individualité, et ne pas détruire, ne pas morceler en atomes la société, c'est le problème social le plus difficile. Probablement, l'histoire elle-même le résoudra pour l'avenir ; dans le passé, il n'a jamais été résolu. " Herzen, Lettres de France et d'Italie (1847-52) (Genève : Editions des Enfants de l'Auteur, 1871), p.76.

58. Idem, La Russie et l'Occident, pp. 319-20.

59. Ibid, p.329.

60. Martin Malia has suggested that Herzen may be seen as a Russian counterpart of John Stuart Mill, and Herzen himself expressed his admiration for Mill. Malia, in Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, ed. E. Simmons, p.214.

61. Herzen, Lettres de France et d'Italie, p. 247.

62. Idem, The Russian People and Socialism, trans. R. Wollheim (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1956), p.200.

63. Idem, My Past and Thoughts, Vol. 2, p.277.

64. Herzen, " Letter to an Old Comrade " , in his Selected Philosophical Works (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), p.591.

65. Ibid, p.576.

66. Malia, Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, p.373.

67. Idem, The Russian People and Socialism (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956), p.175.

68. Idem, La Russie et l'Occident, p. 301.

69. Ibid, p.438.

70. Ibid, p.304.

71. Ibid, p.310.

72. Ibid, p.322.

73. Ibid, p.339.

74. Herzen, From the Other Shore, p. 183.

75. Idem, La Russie et l'Occident, p.341.

76. Idem, Lettres de France et d'Italie, p.247.

77. Idem, La Russie et l'Occident, p.433.

78. Cited in Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p. 34. It is true that Herzen at times extended the hope that the tsar might serve as an instrument of social change, specifically toward the abolition of serfdom. To Alexander II, Nicholas' successor, he wrote: " Your reign begins under an auspicious star. You bear no blot of blood upon you. The Russian autocracy can be revolutionary. It is all- powerful for good or evil. Peasant democracy remains conservative. " (Cited in Richard Hare, Pioneers of Russian Social Thought (London : Oxford University Press, 1951), p.258.) This comment reflected Herzen's anxiousness to see some kind of reform within his lifetime, and contradicts his more consistently-held view that change would come through a peasant revolution. Yet, insofar as he did waver on this question, he revealed his susceptibility to another important popular myth, that of the 'good tsar'. Moreover, none of this changed his views on the ultimate shape of the future society : it would be stateless.

79. Herzen, La Russie et l'Occident, p.351.

80. Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p.113.

81. Ibid.

82. Herzen, My Past and Thoughts, v : 105-14.

83. Of Lavrov's extensive body of writings, only the Historical Letters are to our knowledge available in English or French translation. Thus, our analysis will be limited to this work as well as secondary materials. However, the Historical Letters were perhaps Lavrov's most important contribution to Populist thought, and there is good reason to believe that his views on the state did not change significantly after the publication of this work in 1870.

84. Berlin, Russian Thinkers, p.224.

85. Michael Karpovich, " P.L. Lavrov and Russian Socialism, " in California Slavic Studies II : 23.

86. James Billington, Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1958), p.12.

87. Peter Lavrov, Historical Letters. trans. and intro. James P. Scanlan (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1967), Letter No. 1.

88. Cited in Alan Kimball, " The Russian Past and the Socialist Future in the Thought of Peter Lavrov, " in Slavic Review 30 (March 1971) : 35.

89. T.G. Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia, 3 Vols. (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1961) II : 135.

90. Kimball, " The Russian Past and the Socialist Future... " , p.41.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Peter Lavrov, Historical Letters, Intro. p.2.

94. James Billington, " The Bolshevik Debt to Russian Populism, " Occidente (July-August 1956), p.322.

95. Lavrov, Historical Letters, p.111.

96. There is no clearer statement of the outlook of the 'conscience- stricken gentry'.

97. Lavrov, Historical Letters, p.237.

98. Ibid, p.238.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid, p. 238-39.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid, p.240.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid, p.245.

105. Philip Pomper, Peter Lavrov and the Russian Revolutionary Movement (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1972), p.191.

106. Lavrov, Historical Letters, p. 249.

107. A. Walicki, The Controversy over Capitalism : Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists (Great Britain : Oxford University Press, 1969), p.95.

108. Lavrov, Historical Letters, p. 268.

109. Ibid, p.255.

110. A journal Lavrov edited in Switzerland between 1873 and 1876.

111. Cited in Richard Pipes, " Russian Marxism and its Populist Background, " Russian Review 19 (No.4 1960), p.327.

112. Lavrov, Historical Letters, p.295.

113. Samuel Baron, Plekhanov - The Father of Russian Marxism (Stanford : Stanford University Press), 1963), p.48.

114. Lavrov, Historical Letters, p.313.

115. James P. Scanlan, introduction to Historical Letters, Peter Lavrov, pp.60-61.

116. Pomper, Peter Lavrov and the Russian Revolutionary Movement, p.188.

117. Cited in James Billington, " The Bolshevik Debt to Russian Populism " , p.322.

118. We have been unable to locate any translations of works written by Plekhanov during his Populist period. We will rely on secondary sources for this period of his career.

119. Zemlya i Volya had been first founded in 1860, with the participation of Alexander Herzen and Nicholas Ogarev.

120. Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p.573.

121. Ibid. Zemlya i Volya admitted the possibility that some of the communes would not be immediately prepared to fully administer themselves. Some part of their social functions might have to be given up to the government. But, the programme emphasized, " our duty consists exclusively in reducing this part as much as possible " . See Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p.573.

122. Samuel Baron, Plekhanov - Father of Russian Marxism (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1963), p.34.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p.658.

126. Ibid, p.659.

127. Cited in Baron, Plekhanov, p.50.

128. Cited in Samuel Baron, " Plekhanov and the Origins of Russian Marxism, " Russian Review 13 (No.1 1954), p.42.

129. Ibid.

130. Baron, Plekhanov, p.51.

131. Ibid, p.54.

132. Ibid, p.51.

133. Cited in Venturi, Roots of Revolution, pp.625-26.

134. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1962), p.125.

135. Maynard, Russia in Flux, p.32.

136. William Blackwell, The Industrialization of Russia : An Historical Perspective (New York : Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970), p.25.

137. Ibid, p.26.

138. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, p.19.

139. Cf. page 72.

140. Olga Crisp, " Labour and Industrialization in Russia, " in The Industrial Economies - Capital, Labour, and

Enterprise: The United States, Japan, and Russia, ed. P. Mathias and M.M. Postan, vol.7, pt.2 of Cambridge Economic History of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp.414-15.

141. Ibid, p.322.

142. Ibid, p.347.

143. Blackwell, The Industrialization of Russia, p.26.

144. Ibid, p.26.

145. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, p.19.

146. Cited in Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p.660.

147. On this, Plekhanov wrote in 1879 : " The present situation of our agriculture, with its predominance of extensive farming, does not favour collective exploitation of the fields. The instrument most in use is the plough, which, as is well known, can be employed only by a single labourer. Self-division of work is impossible given the use of such tools ; nor would co-operative work increase produce... Socialization of agricultural work can be a natural consequence of property based on the obshschina only when a certain level of agricultural technique has been reached. " Cited in Venturi, Roots of Revolution, p.660.

148. Baron, Plekhanov, p.56.

149. Cited in Ibid, p.58.

150. Ibid, p.70.

151. Ibid, p.71.

152. Ibid, p.72.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid, p.73.

155. Ibid, p.75.

156. George Plekhanov, " Our Differences " , in Selected Philosophical Works, 5 Vols. (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961) : Vol.1, p.267.

157. Samuel Baron, " Plekhanov on Russian Capitalism and the Peasant Commune - 1883-85, " The American Slavic and East European Review 12 (1953), p.465.

158. Cited in Ibid, p.468.

159. Plekhanov, " Our Differences " , in Selected Philosophical Works, Vol.1,p.308.

160. Ibid, p.298.

161. Ibid, p. 266.

162. Cited in Solomon M. Schwarz, " Populism and Early Russian Marxism on Ways of Economic Development of Russia (the 1880s and 1890s), " Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, ed. Ernest J. Simmons (Cambridge : Harvard University Press,1955): p.55.

163. John Keep, The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia (London : Oxford University Press, 1963), p.21.

164. Ibid.

165. Olga Crisp, " Labour and Industrialization in Russia, " p.413.

166. Ibid, p.308.

167. Ibid, p.415.

168. Ibid.

169. Ibid, p.332, 347.

170. Ibid, p.353.

171. Ibid.

172. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, pp.129, 133.

173. Olga Crisp, " Labour and Industrialization in Russia, " p.415.

174. Gerschenkron, p.125.

175. Ibid, p.19.

176. Ibid.

177. Ibid, p.20.

178. Olga Crisp, " Labour and Industrialization in Russia, " p.330.

179. Ibid, p.364.

180. Ibid, p.414.

181. Maynard, Russia in Flux, p.33.

182. A. Gerschenkron, " Agrarian Policies and Industrialization: Russia 1861-1917, " in The Industrial Revolutions and After : Incomes, Population, and Technological Change, ed. H.J. Habakkuk and M.M. Postan,vol.6,pt.2 of Cambridge Economic History of Europe (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,1965),p.795.

183. Maynard, pp.32-33.

184. See, on this point, Richard Wortman, The Crisis of Russian Populism (London : Cambridge University Press, 1967).

185. Cited in Baron, Plekhanov, p.146.

186. Plekhanov, " Our Differences, " Selected Philosophical Works, Vol.1,p.379.

187. Ibid.

188. Schwarz, p.55.

189. Marcel Liebman, Leninism under Lenin, trans. Brian Pearce (London : Jonathan Cape, 1975), p.193.

190. In Lenin's Collected Works, this work is noted as having been published only in 1918, after the Bolshevik seizure of power. However, as A.J. Polan argues, " this does not mean that the ideas contained in it were not made public until after the October revolution. It appears that the actual writing of The State and Revolution was in itself little more than a formality; the central themes had already been articulated in various public writings throughout the year. " Polan goes on to list a number of occasions (including, notably, the " April Theses ") on which Lenin was able to propound the central ideas of The State and Revolution prior to October 1917. Moreover, notes Polan, these ideas had already received a similar formulation in works by Bukharin written before 1917, and had already been given currency in the revolutionary movement by its anarchist and Populist curents. What Lenin did was to " take the ideas out of the realm of romantic politics and emotive speculation and fuse them with a practical and seemingly successful politics. " See A.J. Polan, Lenin and the End of Politics (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1984), pp.12-13.

191. Henry M. Christman,ed., Essential Works of Lenin (New York : Bantam Books, 1966), p.272.

192. Ibid, p.304.

193. Ibid, p.292.

194. Ibid, p.286.

195. Liebman, Leninism under Lenin, p. 201.

196. Sukhanov,in Liebman, p.201.

197. Ibid, p.203.

198. Ibid, p.197.

199. Ibid.

200. Ibid, p.200.

201. Schapiro, in Polan, Lenin and the End of Politics, p. 23.

202. Liebman, Leninism under Lenin, p.202.

203. Christman,ed., Essential Works of Lenin, p. 307.

204. Ibid, p.310,325.

205. Ibid, p.339.

206. Ibid, p.355.

207. Ibid, p.308.

208. Ibid, p.302.

Selected Bibliography

Primary Materials

Chernyshevsky, Nikolai. What is to be Done? Trans. Benjamin R. Tucker. New York : Vintage Books, 1961.

Herzen, Alexander. La Conspiration Russe de 1825, suivie d'une lettre sur l'Emancipation des Paysans en Russie. Londres : S. Tchorzewski, 1858.

---------. Lettres de France et d'Italie (1847-52). Genève : Editions des Enfants de l'Auteur, 1871.

---------. My Past and Thoughts, 6 Vols. Translated by Constance Garnett. London : Chatto & Windus, 1927.

---------. From the Other Shore, trans. Moura Budberg, and The Russian People and Socialism, trans. Richard Wollheim. London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956.

---------. Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956.

---------. La Russie et l'Occident. Lausanne : Editions Rencontre Lausanne, 1968.

Lavrov, Peter. Historical Letters. Translated with an introduction by James P. Scanlan. Berkeley : University of California Press, 1967.

Lenin, Vladimir. Essential Works of Lenin. Ed. Henry M. Christman. New York : Bantam Books, 1966.

Plekhanov, George. Selected Philosophical Works, 5 Vols.. Vol.1. Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.

Secondary Materials

Acton, Edward. Alexander Herzen and the Role of the Intellectual Revolutionary. New York : Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Almond, Gabriel. " Comparative Political Systems, " Journal of Politics 18 (No.3 Aug.1956) : 391-409.

---------. " Communism and Political Culture Theory, " Comparative Politics 15 (No.2 Jan.1983) : 127-38.

Avrich, Paul. Russian Rebels : 1600-1800. New York : Schocken Books, 1972.

Barghoorn, Frederick. Politics in the U.S.S.R.. Boston : Little,Brown & Co.,1966.

Baron, Samuel. " Plekhanov on Russian Capitalism and the Peasant Commune, 1883-85. " The American Slavic and East European Review 12 (1953) : 463-74.

--------. " Plekhanov and the Origins of Russian Marxism. " The Russian Review 13 (No.1 1954) : 38-51.

--------. " The First Decade of Russian Marxism. " The American Slavonic and East European Review 14 (1955) : 20-30.

--------.
" Plekhanov's Russia:The Impact of the West upon an 'Oriental' Society. Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (June 1958) : 388-404.

--------. Plekhanov : Father of Russian Marxism. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1963.

Berdiaev, Nikolai. The Origin of Russian Communism. London : The Centenary Press, 1937.

Berlin, Isaiah. Russian Thinkers. Great Britain : Hogarth Press, 1978.

Billington, James. " The Bolshevik Debt to Russian Populism. " Occidente (July-August 1956) : 319-28.

--------. Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1958.

--------. The Icon and the Axe : An Interpretive History of Russian Culture. New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.

Blackwell, William. The Industrialization of Russia : An Historical Perspective. New York : Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970.

Blum, Jerome. Lord and Peasan in Russia : From the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century. New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1961.

Brown, Archie, and Gray, Jack, ed. Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States. New York : Holmes & Meier Pub., 1977.

Cambridge Economic History of Europe. Vol.6, Part 2, The Industrial Revolutions and After: Incomes,

Population, and Technological Change (II). Ed. H.J. Habakkuk and M.M. Postan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1965.

Cambridge Economic History of Europe. Vol.7,Part 2, The Industrial Economies- Capital,Labour,and Enterprise: The United States,Japan,and Russia. Ed. P. Mathias and M.M. Postan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Carr, E.H. " 'Russia and Europe' as a Theme of Russian History. " In Essays presented to Sir Lewis Namier, pp. 357-93. Ed. Richard Pares and A.J.P. Taylor. U.S.A. : St. Martin's Press, 1956.

Cherniavsky, Michael. " 'Holy Russia' : A Study in the History of an Idea. " American Historical Review 63 (April 1958) : 617-37.

--------.
" The Old Believers and the New Religion. " Slavic Review 25 (March 1966) " 1-39.

--------. Tsar and People. New York : Random House, 1970.

--------,ed. The Structure of Russian History : Interpretive Essays. New York : Random House, 1970.

Crummey, Robert O. The Old Believers and the World of AntiChrist. U.S. : University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.

Dittmer, Lowell. " Political Culture and Political Symbolism : Toward a Theoretical Synthesis. " World Politics 29 (No.4 July 1977) : 552-83.

--------. " Comparative Communist Political Culture. " Studies in Comparative Communism 16(Nos.1-2 Spring/Summer 1983) : 9-24.

Eisenstadt, S.N. " Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition. " Daedalus 102 (No.1 Winter 1973) : 1-27.

Fedotov, G.P. " The Religious Sources of Russian Populism. " Russian Review 1 (No.2 April 1942) : 27-39.

Fischer, George. Russian Liberalism : From Gentry to Intelligentsia. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1958.

Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York : Basic Books, 1973.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1962.

Granjard, Henri. " Du Romantisme Politique:Slavophiles et Populistes. " Revue des Etudes Slaves 34 (1957) : 73-80.

--------. " Alexandre Herzen à la Croisée des Chemins (1842-46). " Revue des Etudes Slaves 35 (1958) :57-76.

Haimson, Leopold. The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1955.

Harding, Neil, and Taylor, Richard, ed. Marxism in Russia : Key Documents 1879-1906. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Hare, Richard. Pioneers of Russian Social Thought. London : Oxford University Press, 1951.

Haxthausen, Baron Franz A.M. von. The Russian Empire, 2 Vols. London : Chapman & Hall, 1856.

Hellie, Richard. Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1971.

Karpovich, Michael. " P.L. Lavrov and Russian Socialism. " California Slavic Studies 2 (1963) : 21-38.

Keep, J.H.L. The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia. London : Oxford University Press, 1963.

Kimball, Alan. " The Russian Past and the Socialist Future in the Thought of Peter Lavrov. " Slavic Review 30 (March 1971) : 28-44.

Kliuchevsky, Vassily. A History of Russia, 5 Vols. Translated by C.J. Hogarth. New York : Russell & Russell, 1960.

Koyré, Alexandre. Etudes sur l'Histoire de la Pensée Philosophique en Russie. Paris : Librairie J. Vrin, 1950.

Liebman, Marcel. Leninism under Lenin. Translated by Brian Pearce. London : Jonathan Cape, 1975.

Malia, Martin. Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1961.

Masaryk, T.G. The Spirit of Russia, 3 Vols., 3rd ed.

London : George Allen & Unwin, 1961.

Maynard, John. Russia in Flux : Before October. London : Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1941 ; reprint ed. 1946.

New Cambridge Modern History. Vol. 8, The American and French Revolutions: 1763-93. Ed. A. Goodwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.

Pipes, Richard. " Russian Marxism and its Populist Background. " Russian Review 19 (No.4 1960) : 317-37.

--------,ed. The Russian Intelligentsia. New York : Columbia University Press, 1961.

--------. Russia under the Old Regime. London : Penguin Books, 1974.

Pomper, Philip. Peter Lavrov and the Russian Revolutionary Movement. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1972.

Pye, Lucian,and Verba, Sydney, ed. Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1965.

Raeff, Marc. Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia. New York : Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966.

--------, ed. Russian Intellectual History - An Anthology. New York : Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966.

--------. Comprendre l'Ancien Régime Russe. Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1982.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas. A History of Russia. 3rd ed. New York : Oxford University Press, 1977.

Riha, Thomas, ed. Readings in Russian Civilization, 3 Vols. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Robinson, Geroid T. Rural Russia under the Old Regime. New York : MacMillan & Co., 1949.

Scanlan, James P. " Populism as a Philosophical Movement in Nineteenth-Century Russia : The Thought of P.L. Lavrov and N.K. Mikhajlovskij. " Studies in Soviet Thought 27 (1984) : 209-23.

Shragin, Boris, and Todd, Albert, ed. Landmarks - A Collection of Essays on the Russian Intelligentsia - 1909. Translation of Vekhi. New York : Karz Howard, 1977.

Simmons, Ernest J.,ed. Continuity and Change in

Russian and Soviet Thought. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1955.

Szamuely, Tibor. The Russian Tradition. London : Secker & Warburg, 1974.

Taylor, Charles. " Interpretation and the Sciences of Man. " In Understanding and Social Inquiry, pp. 101-32. Edited by Fred Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy. Indiana : Notre Dame Press, 1977.

Timberlake, Charles, ed. Essays on Russian Liberalism. Columbia : University of Missouri Press, 1972.

Tucker, Robert.
" Communism, Political Culture, and Communist Society. " Political Science Quarterly 88 (No.2 June 1973) : 173-90.

Utechin, S.V. Russian Political Thought : A Concise History. London : J.M. Dent & Sons, 1963.

Venturi, Franco. Roots of Revolution. New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1960.

Vucinich, Wayne, ed. The Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Russia. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1968.

Walicki, A. The Controversy over Capitalism : Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists. London : Oxford University Press, 1969.

--------. A History of Russian Thought : From the Enlightenment to Marxism. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1979.

Walker, F.A. " The Morality of Revolution in Pyotr Lavrovich Lavrov. " The Slavonic and East European Review 41 (Dec. 1962) : 196-207.

White, Stephen. Political Culture and Soviet Politics. London : MacMillan Press, 1979.

Wortman, Richard. The Crisis of Russian Populism. London : Cambridge University Press, 1967.

--------. The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1976.