

Architectural Acts:
architect-figures in Athenian drama and their prefigurations

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we shall search out... a real architect—even if he be a figure of speech

Louis Sullivan,
Kindergarden Chats
(1918), p.33

In the fifth century BCE, two Greek dramatists brought “architects” into their plays—and into performance—at the Great Dionysia festival in Athens. For Euripides, “architect” named a protagonist (Odysseus) scheming to overcome the Cyclops; for Aristophanes, “architect” qualified a comic hero (Trygaeus) daring to restore Peace. Although remarkable for being among the earliest extant “architects” to appear in Greek literature, these architect-protagonists are also surprising because architecture (as it tends to be objectified) is not their target of attention. Rather, transformative and restorative schemes are their foremost concern. While such peculiarities already commend these figures for study there are further grounds for considering their deeds: by their exemplary performances in particular situations these “architects” offer mimetic demonstrations of primary architectural acts; acts that, being subtle and ephemeral, are otherwise difficult to perceive.

This dissertation interprets the actions of the “architects” in Euripides’ satyr play *Cyclops* and Aristophanes’ comedy *Peace*, specifically by asking: What motivated the dramatic poets to qualify their protagonists as architects? What is implied about architects and architectural acts by the manners in which they did? And, what do the dramatic plots and their mythic models suggest about the peculiar situations that architects figure into and struggle to transform? Beyond probing the plays through such questions, this dissertation also has two theoretical aims: to uncover the earliest examples of a *topos*, one that posits dramatic protagonists (and dramatic poets) *as* architects; and, correspondingly, to draw-out the performative aspects of *architecting* that this *topos* suggests. As this study unfolds, I intend to show that what at first might seem like a casual metaphor opens more profoundly onto an intricate web of mythic, ritual and metaphoric associations that are as telling as they are troubling about the representative deeds and ethical dilemmas that architects perennially enact. Furthermore, in treating Greek sources from the fifth century BCE—from a time when architects were only just beginning to gain that title and so appear as figures of cultural significance—this dissertation argues for a reconsideration of how *architektons* can be most fundamentally understood; that is, less hierarchically as *master*-builders, and more poetically and dramatically as agents of *archai*—as individuals who knowingly initiate, make and make apparent *for others* auspicious beginnings, originating conditions and exemplary restorative schemes.

Au cinquième siècle avant notre ère, deux dramaturges firent apparaître des “architectes” dans leurs pièces et leur représentation, aux fêtes Dionysiaques d’Athènes. Dans le cas d’Euripide, “architecte” désigne un personnage (Odyssée) complotant pour neutraliser le Cyclope. Pour Aristophane, “l’architecte” est un comédien audacieux (Trygaeus) cherchant à rétablir la paix. Ces architectes-protagonistes étonnent parce qu’ils sont parmi les tous premiers architectes à paraître en littérature grecque, mais aussi, de part le fait que l’architecture (telle qu’on tend à l’objectiver aujourd’hui) n’est pas au coeur de leurs préoccupations. Ils s’affairent plutôt à des enjeux transformatoires et reconstituants. Alors que ces particularités seules sont dignes d’intérêt, il y a encore d’autres raisons pour se pencher sur les actions de ces “architectes”.

Cette thèse interprète les figures de l’architecte dans *Cyclope*, pièce satirique d’Euripide, et *Paix*, une comédie d’Aristophane, en demandant: qu’est ce qui a motivé ces auteurs à qualifier leurs protagonistes d’architectes? Et que suggère ce choix sur les architectes et les actions architecturales? Enfin, que disent ces intrigues et les modèles mythiques qui leurs correspondent, sur les situations curieuses dans lesquelles se retrouvent les architectes et que ces derniers s’acharnent à transformer? Au delà de servir d’outils exploratoires pour ces pièces, ces questions guideront une étude théorique à deux buts: découvrir les premiers exemples d’un *topos* qui pose en principe le protagoniste dramatique (et poète dramatique) en “architecte”; et dessiner les aspects performatifs de *l’architecturant* suggérés par ce *topos*. Au fil de ce questionnement, j’entends démontrer que ce qui paraît au premier regard être de simples métaphores ouvrent plus profondément sur un entrelacs d’associations tout aussi révélatrices que troublantes sur les actions représentatives de l’architecte et les dilemmes éthiques que ceux-ci mettent en jeu et en scène. Plus encore, en traitant des textes grecques du cinquième siècle avant notre ère, une époque à laquelle les architectes commençaient à peine à être ainsi nommés et connus dans la sphère publique, cette thèse est aussi un appel à reconsidérer le sens de *l’architekton*: non plus dans la hiérarchie de maître d’oeuvre mais dans le sens poétique et dramatique d’agents de *l’archai* – figures initiatiques, des faiseurs qui dans leurs constructions rendent apparents les départs de bonne augure, les conditions d’origine et les actions exemplaires.

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In the late fifth century BCE, two Greek dramatists brought “architects” into their plays—and into performance—at the Great Dionysia festival in Athens. For Euripides, “architect” named a protagonist (Odysseus) scheming to overcome the Cyclops; for Aristophanes, “architect” qualified a comic hero (Trygaeus) daring to restore Peace. Later (circa 200 BCE), the Latin dramatist Plautus also featured “architects” in his comic plays. For Plautus, *architectus* entitled a variety of cunning slaves who, devising and directing elaborate ruses, succeed in outwitting diverse adversaries for the common good. Although remarkable for being among the earliest extant “architects” to appear in Greek and Latin literature,¹ these architect-protagonists are also surprising, in part, because architecture (as it tends to be objectified) is not their target of attention. Rather, transformative and restorative schemes are their foremost concern. While such peculiarities already commend these figures for study there are further grounds for considering their deeds: by their exemplary performances in particular situations these “architects” offer mimetic demonstrations of primary architectural acts—situated, mediated, decisive and influential acts that, being subtle and ephemeral, are otherwise difficult to perceive. In other words, these plays and protagonists provide vivid (if oblique) dramatizations of *architecting*, and invite basic questions concerning what architects *do*.

This dissertation interprets the actions of the “architects” in Euripides’ satyr play *Cyclops* and Aristophanes’ comedy *Peace*. The later performances of “architects” in the Latin plays of Plautus serve only as occasional points of reference; and a few other “architects” found in the fragments of Athenian drama and in other ancient Greek literature will be summarily treated. Although the primary plays (*Cyclops* and *Peace*) and their protagonists (Odysseus and Trygaeus) have been studied from a variety of perspectives within the discipline of Classics, the figurative “architects” in these plays have rarely been commented upon and, where they have, the implications they raise for architects have not been considered.² Neither have these figures played any part in

¹ The “architects” in Aristophanes’ *Peace* (line 305) and Euripides’ *Cyclops* (line 477) are roughly synchronic with the “architects” anecdotally mentioned in Herodotus’ *Histories*. See below, p. 36, n. 71. The *architectus*-figures in Plautus (in *Miles Gloriosus* 903-03, 915-21; *Poenulus* 1110; *Mostellaria* 760; *Truculentus* 3; and *Amphitruo* 45) provide the earliest appearances of the term in extant Latin literature—nearly two centuries before Vitruvius.

² A few classical scholars note the suggestive oddity of the “architect” trope in *Cyclops* and *Peace*, as in Seaford (1984), 193-94; Graves (1911), 83-4; Slater (2002), 121; and Arnott (1996), 450-51. Others note, in passing, the metaphor’s relation to normative building trades, as in Olson (1998), 133; Olcott (1973); Sharples (1905), 86; and Merry (1900), 24. The Latin *architectus* trope in Plautus, although considered “obscure” in one instance by Christenson

architectural discourse.³ Thus, a basic intent of this study is to introduce these dramatic architect-figures to architects and to their interpreters. Yet, the intent is also, more probingly, to ascertain what these poetic agents have to offer our understanding of architects. And so, although this dissertation makes extensive use of classical scholarship, the line of inquiry is mainly architectural. The primary questions guiding this study are these: What motivated the dramatic poets to qualify their protagonists as architects? What is implied about architects and architectural acts by the manner in which they did? And, what do the dramatic plots and their mythic models suggest about the peculiar situations that architects figure into and struggle to transform?

Beyond probing the particular plays through such questions, this dissertation also has two more theoretical aims: to uncover the earliest examples of a *topos*, one that posits dramatic protagonists (and dramatic poets) *as* architects;⁴ and, more importantly, to draw-out the performative aspects of *architecting* that this *topos* suggests. As this study unfolds, I intend to show that what at first might seem like a casual metaphor cast onto clever heroes, opens more profoundly onto an intricate web of mythic, ritual and metaphoric associations that are as telling as they are troubling about the representative deeds and ethical dilemmas that architects perennially enact. The corpus of Athenian drama and Homeric epic, as well as select historical writings and inscriptions from the

(2000), 146, has been considered by other scholars as a significant metaphor not only for the cunning slave (*servus callidus*) leading the ruse within the play, but also for the knowing dramatist leading and adapting the play's plot, as in Sharrock (2009), esp. 17; Slater (1985), 172; Duckworth (1994), 160-67; and Frangoulidis (1994), esp. 80. The relevant observations of these and other scholars will be introduced at appropriate instances throughout this study.

- ³ I have not found these Greek architect-figures to be mentioned, even anecdotally, in architectural discourse, although other details from Athenian drama (such as the use of vocabulary for temple parts; references to craftsmen and tools; and descriptive imagery of gods, temple settings and religious rites) are cited and discussed, as in Rykwert (1976), 87, and (1996) esp. 128-29, 186; Hersey (1988), 30, 62, 74-4, 111; Coulton (1976), 1, 11, 44; Burford (1972), 53, 99, 135; Bundgaard (1957), 136; Onians (1988), 8; and Scully (1969). Certain architectural historians have also noted the fact that the Latin word "*architectus*" appears for the first time in Plautus, as in Pevsner (1942), 549; and Clarke (1963), 17.
- ⁴ The *topos* of the poet *as tekton* (fitting-together verses like a craftsman) is as old as poetry itself and widely discussed in classical scholarship and related disciplines (see below, p. 51, n. 104). However, the "architects" under study here have *not*, to my knowledge, been a part of this discussion, even though they arguably participate as a variation on this *topos*. As such, the figures in *Peace* and *Cyclops* provide the earliest examples of this "architect" variation, which then persists not only in the Latin plays of Plautus, but in later drama, notably in the English Renaissance (see below, p. 204, n. 466). The related *topos* of God *as* architect, which becomes influential in Judeo-Christian imagery, is beyond the scope of this study. On the significance of this figure in architectural discourse (which was influenced, in part, by a key proverb in the Old Testament, 8.27-30, by the *demiourgos*-figure in Plato's *Timeaus*, and by the writings of Philo of Alexandria), see Pérez-Gómez (1999), and Smith (2000).

fifth century BCE, comprise the primary limits for investigating this web of architecturally telling associations. My premise in focusing on dramatic sources and in drawing out the actions and agencies of architects is that drama may be understood as a mode of representation that—like drawing, modeling and writing—is proper to architects. Although other interpreters have recently discussed such a mode of representation (through other examples) in terms of “ephemeral”, “gestural”, “demonstrative”, “mimetic”, “prophetic”, “verbal”, “rhetorical” and “ethical” acts,⁵ the dramas under study here provide especially appropriate material to speak theoretically about such performances and to inquire, with precision, into the *modus operandi* of architects.

Finally, in treating Greek literary sources from the fifth century BCE—from a time when architects were only just beginning to gain that title and so appear as figures of cultural significance—this dissertation argues for a reconsideration of how *architektons* can be most fundamentally understood; that is, less hierarchically as *master*-builders, and more poetically and dramatically as agents of *archai*—as individuals who knowingly initiate, make and make apparent *for others* auspicious beginnings, originating conditions and exemplary restorative schemes. Put differently, this study aims to uncover and recover certain metaphoric, ritual and mythic meanings that underlie architectural acts and, although largely obscured today by literal, popular, and narrowly practical definitions, nevertheless remain latent both in the “architect” title, and in certain acts performed with earnest architectural intent.

It is also appropriate to say a few words about the overall layout of this dissertation. Following a prologue, through which I establish the primary topics to be elaborated, the study moves to interpret, in detail, the architect-figures in each play, first in *Peace* and then in *Cyclops*. Although certain architectural acts found in *Cyclops* are anticipated through my initial discussion of *Peace*, and a number of arguments concerning the figure in *Peace* are recalled in the subsequent analysis of the “architects” in *Cyclops*, the relative complexity of each drama has made it best to keep my interpretation of the two plays and their protagonists apart. Thus, chapters one through

⁵ For example, Frascari (1991), esp. 95; Leatherbarrow (2001), esp. 90; Bruzina (1990), esp. 205; Pérez-Gómez (2006), and with Pellitier (1997), esp. 7-9; Rykwert (1982), esp. 68, 71; Harries (1997); and Veseley (2004), esp. 44, 70-5. I mention here those disciplinary studies that regard the architect’s performative role historically, philosophically, poetically and/or mythically. Other studies, more marginally relevant to the general question of this dissertation, include: those that study the performance of architects in the context of professional practice, such as Kostof (1977), Schön (1983) and Cuff (1992); those that study the “image” of the architect in culture, art and literature, such as Saint (1983), Wittkower (1969) and Kris and Otto (1979); and those that study “incorporated knowledge” and cultural performances, in general, in related theatrical and anthropological disciplines, such as Barba (1991); Hastrup (1995) and (2004); de Certeau (1984); Bruner (1990); Geertz (1973); and Bourdieu (1977).

six focus on *Peace*, and chapters seven through thirteen on *Cyclops*. Given the difference of genre—Comedy and Satyr play (an afterpiece to Tragedy)—as well as the different status of the two protagonists—an otherwise unknown farmer (Trygaeus) and a well-known Homeric hero (Odysseus)—the interpretive strategy varies for each play accordingly. Whereas Trygaeus’ architectural acts are interpreted mainly in relation to the contemporaneous situation in Athens and to comparable protagonists in Aristophanes’ other plays, Odysseus’ acts are interpreted mainly in relation to Homeric poetry and to certain Euripidean tragedies.

The treatment of each architect-figure begins by paraphrasing the dramatic plot in which they are implicated and subsequently lead (chapters one and seven); then proceeds to lay out the relevant grounds for interpretation (chapters two to three and eight to nine); then moves on to selectively interpret the language, imagery, situation and actions (motives, manners and effects) that are presented in each play and that are closely associated with the protagonist’s role as “architect”. Whereas Trygaeus’ role primarily involves directing the collaborative recovery of Peace, in part by dramatically representing Peace’s absence and re-emergent presence (chapters four and five); Odysseus’ acts as “architect” primarily involve commanding, persuasive and figurative modes of speech (chapters ten to twelve), which, being at times supplemented with influential props (chapter thirteen), together make known and bring about a transformative scheme of liberation, restoration and retribution. This focused interpretation of the “architects” and their actions within each play is intertwined with an analysis of the larger cultural and poetic contexts in which these figures bore meaning. In other words, the interpretive strategy involves, on the one hand, delving into the figure of the architect as dramatized; and, on the other hand, reaching through and beyond that figure to their pre-figurations (their poetic and dramatic models), in an attempt to grasp the mythic, ritual and rhetorical milieu that these “architects” performed in the midst of.

Although architectural acts are the focus of this study, the interpretive work does not proceed by overlaying a predetermined understanding of what architects do onto these protagonists. Rather, this inquiry pursues an understanding of architectural acts as an open question, aiming as much as possible to let the dramas, the protagonists and their complex situations speak for, and show, themselves. I do, however, proceed with certain architectural topics and questions in mind. These I will now sketch in the prologue, with some help from Vitruvius and Alberti.

Architectural Acts between the lines of Vitruvius and Alberti

Before embarking on this investigation of architectural acts in the eccentric context of Athenian drama, it is helpful to first draw-out the significance of such acts within the context of architectural discourse. The treatises of Vitruvius and Alberti provide relevant material for this preliminary rehearsal. Conferring with these disciplinary treatises will also assist in articulating the primary architectural topics that will then be taken up through an interpretation of dramatic poetry.

ENDURING PROPERTIES: VITRUVIUS' TALE OF ARISTIPPUS

As he did for many of his ten books, Vitruvius began his sixth book on architecture with a story:

It is related of the Socratic philosopher Aristippus, that, being shipwrecked and cast ashore on the coast of the Rhodians, he observed geometrical figures drawn thereon, and cried out to his companions: 'Let us be of good cheer, for I see *vestiges of man*.'⁶

(*de architectura* 6.pref.1)

This much of the story has been valuably interpreted in recent architectural discourse.⁷ Vitruvius, however, did not end his story with an impression of auspicious figures on the shore. Rather, he goes on to tell us that Aristippus' discovery on the coast of the Rhodians prompted him to *actively* seek out the city, find its citizens and engage them in philosophical disputations. Those disputations, indeed, must have been engaging since Aristippus, we are told, chose to remain in Rhodes while his companions prepared to sail

⁶ My emphasis. Morgan, Trans. "*Vestiges*" retains the Latin term, which is otherwise translated as "traces" (Morgan), or "footprints" (Granger).

⁷ These "geometrical figures" (*geometrica schemata*) have been interpreted as orienting and civilizing marks, in Leatherbarrow (2000), 228-9, 239; as prompting "transcendental revelation" in Pérez-Gómez (1983), 43; as establishing the geometrical foundation of architectural drawing, in Oechslin (1981); and, as evidence and "emblem" of men's learning, in McEwen (2003), 135-154.

back to their own country. When these companions asked Aristippus what message he wished them to relay home, Vitruvius tells us that he bade them relay this: “‘that children ought to be provided with property and resources of a kind that could swim with them even out of a shipwreck.’ These”—Vitruvius adds for emphasis—“are indeed the true supports of life, and neither Fortune’s adverse gale, nor political revolution, nor ravages of war can do them any harm” (6.pref.1-2).

As the geometrical figures did for Aristippus, and as the story of Aristippus did for Vitruvius, so this Vitruvian anecdote prefigures topics of relevance for this study. These topics concern the vital “properties and resources” of architects and the persistent support they offer. Prior to engaging these topics in the context of ancient drama, it is helpful to recall more fully Vitruvius’ presentation of them.

In telling this story of Aristippus in the way that he does Vitruvius makes at least two provocative suggestions: that the “properties and resources” (*possessiones et viatica*) of a shipwrecked philosopher are analogous to those of an architect; and that such possessions are the “true supports (*praesidia*) of life.” With these suggestions, Vitruvius also shifts his discourse, as he intermittently does throughout his treatise, from architecture to architects (a shift of emphasis this dissertation sustains); and this turn of attention is aimed *not* biographically at an individual architect, but rather comparatively and discerningly at the actions of an exemplary figure (Aristippus). By accepting Vitruvius’ suggestions and shift we are thus obliged to ask: in what ways are Aristippus’ “properties and resources” *like* those of an architect; and in a hypothetical shipwreck which of these remain animate while others go down with the ship? Moreover, of those possessions that will not sink, how is it that they not only endure but truly support life?

For Vitruvius, possessions of an intellectual sort remain afloat, while material riches and the benefits of chance sink. In his subsequent commentary to the Aristippus story, Vitruvius insists that trust is best placed not in material treasures or luck, but rather in “learning” (*doctos*) and in the “[directed] thinking power of the mind” (6.pref.3).⁸ His valuation here, in the preface of book six, recasts what he had earlier set forth in book one, where a capability for “reasoning” (*rationatione*) and an encyclopaedic range of “knowledge” (*scientia*)—drawing, geometry, history, philosophy, music, medicine, jurisprudence, astronomy and astrology—were upheld as proper intellectual possessions

⁸ *animi mentisque cogitationibus gubernari*. *Gubernari* suggests that this animate thinking power is “directed” or “steered”, as by a ship’s “pilot” or *gubernātor* (Lewis and Short).

of architects.⁹ Yet, does Vitruvius' encyclopædia sufficiently encompass and convey the peculiar "properties and resources" with which Aristippus swam to shore? If, as Vitruvius suggests, this philosopher swam away with buoyant "learning" and animate "thinking power", we should be able to recognize these through the acts he performs upon landing ashore. What are Aristippus' acts in the story? They are manifold: *interpretive* of the schemata in the sand; *social* in seeking out the citizens; *discursive* by engaging others in disputations; *decisive* in opting to remain with the Rhodians; and *pedagogical*, as well as *anagogical*, through the advice he bids his companions to relay. These diverse acts of Aristippus not only dramatize his "thinking power" and modes of "learning" but also demonstrate his avid, even meddling, curiosity. Moreover, these acts show his resilient capability to modulate and adapt his own plans and performance in unfamiliar and conflicted circumstances. Vigorous adaptability, then, would seem to be a kind of knowledge that Aristippus swam away with and that Vitruvius, by choosing to tell the tale, likewise upholds.¹⁰

Vitruvius was not alone in deeming Aristippus' performance of adaptability remarkable, for a number of other ancient authors also made note of it. Some considered Aristippus' adaptability as a cause for suspicion—an indication of unprincipled indulgence and loose morals.¹¹ Others, in apparent admiration of his malleable manner, speculated on how he had learned it. In *The Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, for instance,

⁹ "Let [the architect] be educated, skillful with the pencil, instructed in geometry, know much history, have followed the philosophers with attention, understand music, have some knowledge of medicine, know the opinions of the jurists, and be acquainted with astronomy and the theory of the heavens." (1.1.3). Vitruvius elaborates on these kinds of knowledge in book one (1.1.1-17).

¹⁰ This active/adaptable kind of knowledge demonstrated by Aristippus and promoted by Vitruvius could be put in terms of *phronēsis* "practical intelligence". Aristotle posits *phronēsis* as a kind of ethical knowledge complementary to *technē* and *epistemē*—technical and philosophical understanding (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1141b). For a discussion of these kinds of knowledge in relation to contemporary architectural pedagogy, see Leatherbarrow (2001), esp. 85-7. As much as this dissertation concerns dramatic demonstrations of *phronēsis*, I am resisting the appropriation of this epistemological/philosophical category, which was not commonplace at the time of the dramas under study. Where the concept does appear in Athenian drama, it is usually as a verb, *phroneō*, 'to have understanding' (*LSJ*). On the single occasion where it arises as an abstract noun in a Euripidean drama it is mimetic of divine wisdom and ambiguously problematized, for Theseus (the legendary King of Athens) surmises, "*phronēsis* [human understanding] tries to be mightier than the gods. With our vainglorious minds we think we are wiser (*sophōteroi*) than the powers divine" (*Suppliant Women* 216-18).

¹¹ Aristippus was portrayed as a hedonist as early as the fifth century BCE, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.1.8-9). On this topic, see: Gosling and Taylor (1982), 40-43.

Diogenes Laertius surmises that Aristippus' adaptive capability was learned from actors, because like them "he was capable of adapting himself to place, time and person, and of playing his part appropriately under whatever circumstances" (2.66).¹² In his architectural treatise, Vitruvius also valued adaptability, although he elaborated on its significance differently. For Vitruvius, a broad range of architectural adaptations, or adjustments, were imperative for accomplishing harmonious relations (*eurhythmia*). Such adjustments not only aimed to harmonize various members of an architectural work and the work with its site, but also aimed to establish meaningful participation with broadly diverse conditions: physical and topographical, historical and social, celestial and perceptual, to name but a few. For example, in book six (the book that the Aristippus story prefigures), Vitruvius remarks on several adjustments for architects to consider: adjusting parts of a house with respect to its region and climate (6.1-2); distributing rooms with regard to the regions of the heavens (6.4); and situating domestic amenities in relation to local decorum (6.6-7).¹³ With such adjustments in mind, one begins to recognize another vital suggestion tacit in Vitruvius' story of Aristippus: just as the avid philosopher willingly and knowingly adapted his own actions in the Rhodian situation, so architects ought to adjust their acts (and designs) to the situations they perform in. Such adaptability, Vitruvius suggests, would engender harmonious relations with diverse conditions. Those architects capable of discerning and directing such relations, Vitruvius characterized as possessing an agile ingenuity or "versatile mind" (*ingenio mobili*).¹⁴

¹² The verb for "playing a part" (*hupokrinasthai*) is cognate with the Greek noun for a stage actor: *hupokritēs*, an "interpreter" or "one who answers", *LSJ*. The Greek for "adapting himself... appropriately" (*harmosasthai... harmodiōs*), suggests more literally that Aristippus was "harmonizing (his performance)... harmoniously (to his situation)". Maximus of Tyre (another author of the 2nd c. CE) adds to this interpretation of the philosopher's performance in his *First Oration*: "Exactly like the actors, who successively assume the roles of Agamemnon or Achilles or Telephus... the philosopher is bound to play his political drama..." Quoted in Kokolakis (1960), 15 and 48-9.

¹³ Such situational adjustments are considered throughout Vitruvius' treatise. Other examples include: adjusting individual architectural members to the arrangement of the whole (1.2.2); laying out cities with regard to climate (1.4.1); situating temples in accordance with ritual practices (1.7.2); making proportionate adjustments to account for human perception (3.3-5); adjusting altars to the God they honor (4.9.1); suiting a forum to the spectacles it may sponsor (5.1.2); modifying a theater to its site (5.6.7); etc. This topic is elaborated in a chapter entitled "Proportional Enclosure" in Leatherbarrow (1993); and is also taken up under the name of appropriateness (*to prepon*) in Brown (1963).

¹⁴ 5.6.7. This capability is variously reasserted as "vigorous intelligence and ingenuity" (*rationes vigore animi sollertiqua*, 6.7.6), and "vigorous cunning" (*sollerti vigore*, 10.pref.3).

Versatile and discerning, adaptable and resilient would seem then to qualify not only the “properties and resources” that Aristippus swam away with, but also the capabilities that an architect would still possess even after a shipwreck. Yet, these vital possessions survive more than a shipwreck, since Vitruvius goes on to claim “neither Fortune’s adverse gale, nor political revolution, nor ravages of war can do them any harm” (6.pref.2). With this expression, Vitruvius echoes a commonplace—a poetic *topos* as old as poetry itself regarding its endurance. In doing so, he incidentally connects his lesson in resilient ingenuity to poetic persistence. Pindar, for instance, sang the *topos* in this way:

a treasure house of hymns has been built in Apollo’s valley rich in gold,
one which neither winter rain, coming from abroad,
as a relentless army from a loudly rumbling cloud, nor wind shall buffet
and with their deluge of silt carry into the depths of the sea.

(*Pythian Ode* 6.8-14)

Horace, a contemporary of Vitruvius, closes his *Odes* similarly:

I have completed a monument more lasting than bronze
and higher than the decaying Pyramids of kings,
which cannot be destroyed by gnawing rain
nor wild north wind, or by the unnumbered
procession of the years and flight of time.

(*Odes* 3.30.1-6)

And, again, Ovid culminates his *Metamorphoses* with these insistent words:

And now my work is done, which neither the wrath of Jove, nor fire, nor
sword, nor the gnawing tooth of time shall ever be able to undo.

(*Metamorphoses* 15.871-2)

Agents famously destructive to architecture—weather, gravity, time, and war—are here resisted by the work of these poets, which remains forever “alive on men’s lips” as another archaic poet (Simonides) had similarly said.¹⁵ Treasuries of song, stories and

¹⁵ Harriott (1969), 95, paraphrasing Frag. 581. In these fragmentary verses, Simonides ridicules another poet for inscribing his words in stone, which “ever flowing rivers... the flame of the sun... the eddies of the sea... [and] even mortal hands [may break].” Campbell (1991), 465.

poetic wisdom, these poets suggest, are more permanent than monuments of stone because they live in, and are perpetually revived through, the willing engagement and knowing adaptations of others.

Permanence was a quality that Vitruvius also valued in his architectural treatise, although he more famously termed it *firmitas* (1.3.2; 6.8.1). His allusion to the *topos* of poetic persistence in the preface of book six, however, invites a reinterpretation of this architectural quality. For the “true *supports* of life” that Vitruvius promotes by telling the tale of Aristippus are not only to be fixed in the body of architecture but also invested in those vital agents who bear and perpetuate adaptable knowledge, passing on stories of architects’ and architecture’s resilience.

ANIMATE ORNAMENTS: ALBERTI’S RHETORICAL ASIDE

A millennium and a half after Vitruvius retold the tale of Aristippus, Alberti reiterated the importance of versatile knowledge for architects in his treatise *On the Art of Building* (*De re aedificatoria*, 1452); and he, too, told stories of shipwrecks as allegorical measures of life’s most enduring and profitable resources.¹⁶ Like Vitruvius, Alberti also involved a *topos* in his architectural treatise that bears particularly on the performance of architects (and architecture). This *topos* expands on the topics raised by Vitruvius by involving not only individual architects and their animate properties, but also diverse agencies and animating phenomena that architects, in the course of design, are obliged to rehearse. Alberti’s own presentation of this *topos* will help make this matter more clear.

¹⁶ In the second book of Alberti’s dialogue *On the Family* (*Della famiglia*), the interlocutor Battista argues that “good judgment” and “what men call arts” are the most profitable qualities, since these “remain with us and do not go down in shipwrecks but swim away with our naked selves. They keep us company all our lives and feed and maintain our name and fame.” Trans. from Watkins (1969), 145. Alberti elaborates on this theme in one of his *Dinner Pieces* (*Intercenales*) entitled “Shipwreck”, see Marsh (1987). Sea-tossed individuals and wind-filled sails (as reminders of life’s fragility and Fortune’s gales) recur as images in Alberti’s writing (as in his *Dinner Pieces*, “Fate and Fortune” and “Rings”), and as architectural motifs (sail emblems) adorning the facades of Santa Maria Novella and the Rucellai Palace in Florence. See Grafton (2002), 184-5. In his *Art of Building*, Alberti also involves the trope of a ‘ship of state’ to depict the vulnerability of the city (4.3, 7.1). Some see in Alberti’s recurring ship imagery an allusion to the ‘church’, since the Catholic Church at the time was frequently figured as a ‘barque’, with St. Peter at the helm. See Smith (2004), 168. The image of a shipwreck was a commonplace in moral allegories. St. Basil (writing in the fourth century), for instance, warns: “You must give heed unto virtue, O men, which swims forth even with a man who has suffered shipwreck.” He goes on in this passage to reveal the plight of Odysseus as his point of reference. See Eden, (1997), 51. On the persistence of this figure of thought, see Blumenberg (1997).

In the middle of the thirteenth chapter of the seventh book on the *Art of Building*, Alberti makes a provocative assertion regarding ornament. Alberti sets up this assertion by having previously described the many ornaments belonging to a column (7.6-9); by having established the column as the principal ornament to a temple (6.13); and by having designated the temple as the greatest ornament to a city (7.3). One can already discern the nested and contingent nature of this topic. Having discussed these and other *fixed* ornaments relating to a city's temple, Alberti then shifts his discourse to the ritual practices performed in a temple, asserting:

There are other sorts of ornaments also, *not fixed*, which serve to adorn and grace the sacrifice; and others of the same nature that embellish the temple itself, the direction of which belongs likewise to the architect.

(*De re aedificatoria*, 7.13)¹⁷

What sort of *unfixed* ornaments did Alberti have in mind? A few lines later he tells us. The majestic charm of aromatic light emanating from well-disposed candelabras would honor and thus ornament the rite of sacrifice and the temple.¹⁸ In this image one recognizes the subtle activity of both wax and flame, as well as the ephemeral embellishments these phenomena would offer life at the temple. Yet, between his assertion of “other sorts of ornaments” that are “not fixed” (*non stabilia*), and his splendid example of illumination, Alberti interrupts himself with a puzzling aside: “It has been a question—”, he asks us again to consider:

—which is the most beautiful sight: a large square full of youth employed about their several sports; or a sea full of ships; or a field with a victorious army drawn out on it; or a senate-house full of

¹⁷ Leoni Trans. The Latin reads: *Sunt et quaedam alia ornamentorum genera non stabilia, quibus sacrificium ornetur; sunt et quibus alioquin templa honestentur, quorum spectet ratio ad architectum*. Orlandi et al (1966).

¹⁸ Alberti's words run as follows: “But I would wish there to be a certain majesty to the lighting of a temple, a majesty that is singularly lacking in the tiny, blinking candles in use today. They have, I do not deny, a certain charm, when arranged in some form of pattern, such as along the lines of the cornices; but I much prefer the ancient practice of using candelabra with quite large lamps, which burn with a scented flame.” (7.13). Rykwert et al, Trans.

venerable magistrates; or a temple illuminated with a great number of cheerful lights?

(*De re aedificatoria*, 7.13)¹⁹

This complementary series of images further amplifies the illuminating ornament that Alberti, in the end, recommends for the temple. His rhetorical detour, however, offers more than amplification; for, with this aside, Alberti gathers a series of analogous ornaments that are in some ways comparable to the many charming lights: sporting youths, sailing ships, parading armies, and venerable magistrates. Are we to infer that these vital agents, or agencies (sporting, sailing, parading and counseling), are ornaments of the same unfixed sort as illumination by candlelight? Are we, further, to suppose that the anticipation and consideration of such ornaments “belongs likewise to the architect”? If so, we should be happy to know where this exemplary series of animate ornaments might be coming from.

Just as Vitruvius echoed the poets with his *topos* of persistence, so Alberti, with his aside on non-fixed ornaments, recalls a poetic figure and commonplace. For, among the *Homeric Epigrams* we find a strikingly similar series of lively adornments that inform and amplify the lustrous figure with which it culminates:

Children are a man’s crown, towers of a city; horses are the glory of a plain, and so are ships of the sea; wealth will make a house great, and reverend princes seated in assembly are a [glory] for the folk to see. But a blazing fire makes a house look more comely upon a winter’s day, when the Son of Kronos sends down snow.

(*Homeric Epigram* 13)²⁰

¹⁹ Leoni Trans. The Latin reads: *Quaeritur, quid omnium pulcherrimum sit: triviumne laetum ludibunda iuventute, marene refertum classe, campusne refertus milite et signis victricibus, forumne refertum patri||bus togatis, et eiusmodi, an templum alacrilampade*. Orlandi (1966).

²⁰ Evelyn-White (Loeb 1977). This *topos* is similarly expressed in the opening lines of Gorgias’ *Encomium of Helen*: “The grace (*kosmos*) of a city is excellence of its men, of a body beauty, of a mind wisdom, of an action virtue, of a speech truth; the opposite of these are a disgrace (*akosmia*).” Trans. in MacDowell (1982). Sappho puts the *topos* in terms of beauty: “Some say a host of cavalry, others of infantry, and others of ships, is the most beautiful (*kalliston*) thing on the black earth, but I say it is whatsoever a person loves.” Frag. 16, in Campbell (1982), 67.

While Alberti substitutes a luminous temple for a comely house, the other places gathered by his rhetorical aside—city, sea, field and senate house—are remarkably consistent with the places assembled in the Homeric epigram. Where these two series diverge, however, is in the key words that yoke them. While the Homeric epigram repeats each image as possessing “glory”, or “order” (*kosmos*), Alberti represents each as “beautiful”, or prosperous (*pulcherrimum*), because it is replete or “full” (*refertum*). Whereas the Homeric epigram highlights the crowning “order” that towers offer the city, horses the plain, ships the sea, and princes the assembly; Alberti rehearses each place as “full”, or bountiful: the square becomes “full” with youths, the sea with ships, the field with victors, and the senate house with magistrates. Put another way, playing, sailing, parading and counseling *fill* each respective place, making it momentarily replete. These two modes of composition—ordering and filling—are complementary to be sure, yet one can take Alberti’s verbal adjustment to emphasize each area’s open capacity and availability for variable ordering potential. The large square, the harbor, the field and the senate-house, Alberti suggests, are not only capable of being filled like the temple with animating charm, but also remain capable of being refilled—ornamented and re-ornamented—with a variety of other animating ensembles. The potentiality for such replenishment implies that civic places, seas, fields, senate houses and architectural settings more generally, are not in themselves complete, or full, but rather come to be fulfilled at those times when fitting yet variable, exemplary yet unknown ornaments animate their receptive settings.²¹

As interpreters of the *Art of Building* frequently remark, ornament, as Alberti described it over the course of four of his ten books, is as challenging to fully appreciate as it is to limit.²² With his digression onto this series of non-fixed ornaments in book

²¹ To more fully appreciate what Alberti intends by *refertum*, one ought to consider his use of the term in his treatise *On Painting*. In his discussion of *historia* (narrative compositions), he writes: “The first thing that gives pleasure in a *historia* is a plentiful variety.” This, he elaborates as involving copious (*copia*) and varied (*varietas*) things, and especially attitudes and gestures of well-disposed figures in a scene. “But”—he continues—“I would have this abundance not only furnished with variety, but restrained [moderate (*moderata*) and grave (*gravis*)] and full of dignity (*dignitas*) and modesty (*vereecundia*)” (2.40). For a discussion of narrative composition in Alberti’s writing *On Painting*, see Baxandall (1971), 121-39. On the quality of *varietas* in Alberti’s architectural designs and writing, see Smith (1992), 98-129.

²² On ornament in Alberti’s treatise, see Rykwert (1979), esp. 6, where he suggestively remarks that “our re-interpreting, digesting of that word *ornament* may... force us to reconsider the way in which the architect *makes* the building...” On Alberti’s moral language of “appropriateness” with respect to ornament, and its relation to Cicero’s language of *decorum*

seven Alberti keeps the topic of ornament an open question for his readers. But is his riddling detour at all incongruous with his articulation of architectural ornament elsewhere in the treatise? While difficult to paraphrase, it can generally be said that ornament for Alberti was not a gratuitous embellishment to a building but rather its imperative complement. Ornament was that “auxiliary light” which makes corporeal beauty vividly apparent (6.2).²³ This suggests that the phenomenal effects, human events and civic acts that Alberti includes in his rhetorical aside perform, likewise, as auxiliary yet imperative complements to built settings, since these animating ensembles would dramatically vivify architecture’s ordering potential, momentarily making order manifest. And so, just as architects properly concern themselves with fixed ornaments (columns, capitals, beams, wall facings, and so forth), so the direction of “unfixed ornaments” belongs likewise to architects; or, as Alberti more literally asserts, the “reasoning” (*ratio*) of such animate ornaments are for architects to “see” (*spectet*).²⁴

Attentive to the peculiarities of this animating sort of ornament one begins to recognize others like them in the *Art of Building*. For example, in the same book in which he offers his illuminating aside on temples, Alberti sets up another interrelated series of ornaments concerning roads. Having first established that well-disposed roads are ornaments to a city (7.1), Alberti begins his subsequent book with a reversal: outside the city it is the countryside, especially if cultivated or adorned with sepulchers, that acts as ornament to the road passing through it (8.1). Yet, a witty companion, he digresses, is an imperative ornament to one’s journey along such a road, since the animate discourse arising would further draw out the beauty of the amblers’ situation.²⁵ Alberti supports

in *De officiis*, see Onians (1971). On Alberti’s aesthetics, and the sense of ornament as affective “stage-settings” that impress beholders, see Bialostocki (1963).

²³ Alberti offers a relatively concise statement on ornament in book six, chp. 2: “ornament may be defined as a form of auxiliary light and complement to beauty. From this it follows that beauty is some inherent property, to be found suffused all through the body of that which may be called beautiful; whereas ornament, rather than being inherent, has the character of something attached or additional.” (Rykwert Trans.) In Book 9, chp.5. Alberti also speaks of ornament as an added yet unifying and variegated entity that seeks to “bond several elements into a single bundle or body, according to a true and consistent agreement and sympathy”.

²⁴ *quorum spectet ratio ad architectum*, 7.13. Orlandi et al (1966).

²⁵ “Another great embellishment to a highway is its furnishing travelers with frequent occasion of discourse, especially upon notable subjects.” (8.1). Leoni Trans. Yet another example of unfixed ornament is found in Alberti’s discourse on theaters in book 8. While porticos, seats, ceilings and so forth are ornaments to a theater, and a theatre is ornament to the city, *so* the events that unfold at the theater are ornaments to society. *These*, Alberti asserts, ornament the

this suggestion with the saying of a traveling mime: “As Laberius put it, ‘[With] a witty companion at your side, to walk’s as easy as to ride’.”²⁶ Alberti’s inclusion of this memorable saying happily ornaments his own ambling discourse on the art of building.

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Like a prologuist who speaks at the beginning of a play, then steps aside so that others may play out and probe what was set forth, so Vitruvius and Alberti will now recede from this dissertation leaving us with their valuable topics. Vitruvius, through his story of Aristippus, leaves us with a concern for an architect’s performative role; that is, for acting with adaptive knowledge and discerning versatility in varied and vexed situations. Vitruvius also leaves us with a question about *firmitas*, since the message Aristippus relays invites us to consider this quality as involving poetic and pedagogical persistence as much as material stability. With his allegorical tale of a shipwreck, Vitruvius further leaves us with a paradigmatic setting and scenario: arriving with little but one’s wits to an unfamiliar shore—a situation that Odysseus (the architect-figure in Euripides’ *Cyclops*) also arrives to. Alberti, with his rhetorical aside, similarly leaves us with a topic and a riddle: a topic, concerning animate ornaments; and a riddle, concerning the permanent value of such ephemeral performances. Beyond clarifying and grounding these topics, Vitruvius and Alberti, by their manner of posing these topics, also leave us with some confidence that storytelling, rhetorical asides and poetic commonplaces (even

citizens with either, the “vigour and fire of the mind” (as gained by attending plays), or with “strength and intrepidity of the heart” (as gained by performing athletic exercises). The citizens are thus adorned by dramatic events, with either wit or health, and as such become themselves embellishments to society (8.7).

²⁶ 8.1. Rykwert, Trans. Laberius (c.106-43 BC) is known to have composed scripts from the performances of Southern Italian mimes, of which only fragments remain. Anecdotes from other dramatists—including, Euripides, Ennius, Terence and Juvenal—are dispersed throughout Alberti’s *Art of Building*. These anecdotes, like the numerous other literary sources, adages and personal observations, vivify and contextualize Alberti’s architectural discourse (Euripides: 5.1, 5.4; Ennius: 3.14; Terence: 5.1, 5.5, 9.2, 9.5; Juvenal: 7.8, 9.5, 10.16). Similarly, Vitruvius not only echoes Pindar with his *topos* on persistence, but also makes explicit mention of epic and dramatic poets including: Homer, Aeschylus, Euripides, Aristophanes, Alexis, Eucrates, Chionides and “the Greek comic poets” whose compositions he claims to have so admired. He mentions these figures, as he did with Aristippus, in his prefaces: (5.pref.4; 6.pref.3; 7.pref.5-11; 8.pref.1).

where prefatory, parenthetical and auxiliary) are integral to architectural discourse and vital to the speculative practice of architects.²⁷

We now turn to engage these topics more dramatically with another cast of exemplary architects, specifically with those protagonists figured-forth as architects in Euripides' *Cyclops* and Aristophanes' *Peace*. Before turning to the more familiar story of *Cyclops* and its more storied protagonist (Odysseus), we will first consider the acts of a more unlikely hero who dares to restore Peace.

²⁷ Alberti explicitly defends his own manner of interrupting himself with rhetorical asides in his *Art of Building*, when he writes that although he includes such “anecdotes” for “amusement” he also involves them because they “bear a particular relevance to the present discussion” (7.16).

*Repairing Prosperity: daring to architect in Aristophanes' Peace*²⁸

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After three full days of tragedy, the fourth and final day of drama at the *City Dionysia* festival in Athens played host to comedy. Three consecutive comedies, each composed by a different comic poet, were performed in competition on this day. In 421 BCE, one of these comedies was Aristophanes' *Peace* (*Eirēnē*). In this play, "peace" is a civic and worldly condition that the protagonist aims to restore; yet "Peace", in this play, is also personified as a particular goddess—one who has been dishonored by mortals, abandoned by gods, and imprisoned in an underground pit by War. It is this manifold, vital, contentious and deeply concealed Peace that Trygaeus, the protagonist of the drama, seeks and (in spite of complications) begins to recover both for himself and for the sake of all the Greeks.

Despite such a broadly appealing plot and (as will be shown) striking theatrics, Aristophanes' *Peace* placed second that year at the dramatic competition, after *The Flatterers* of Eupolis, which evidently won the judges' favor.²⁹ However, the extant status of Aristophanes' script and the flimsy remains of Eupolis' could be taken as some measure of the more persistent value of what was, at that time, perhaps the less popular drama. Be that as it may, we should also be very happy to possess the full text of Aristophanes' *Peace* because in it we find the protagonist acting as architect. For, as the chorus members rush into the orchestra to help Trygaeus they insist that he "be (or *act*) the architect" and, in this way, direct them in a plan to rescue Peace so that together they might restore the life of prosperity and revelry they have been deprived of in her absence. The situation in which the protagonist is called upon *to architect* this ambitious reparation is as follows.

²⁸ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of *Peace* cited in this dissertation are those of Jeffrey Henderson (Loeb 1998). Translations are occasionally cited from Alan H. Sommerstein (Oxford 2005). My reading of this play has greatly benefited from the detailed commentary and critical edition of the Greek text prepared by S. Douglas Olson (Oxford 1998).

²⁹ The results of this dramatic competition are recorded in the ancient prose *hypothesis III*. Such anonymous hypotheses came to be appended to the ancient scripts by Alexandrian and Aristotelian scholars in the fourth and third centuries BCE. See Slater (1988).

Exasperated by incessant war, which by its disruptions has undermined common revelry and agricultural prosperity, Trygaeus, a farmer, chooses at the start of this play to mount a giant flying dung-beetle—a modified stage machine. Upon this dramatic device, the unlikely hero soars up to the heavens, thus taking his concern for society’s well-being *directly* to the highest authority: Zeus. His intent upon reaching Zeus is to boldly question him, demanding: “What on earth do you plan to do?” (58). After his spectacular ascent, however, Trygaeus is surprised to learn that Zeus and all the Olympian divinities have vacated their ethereal premises. Only Hermes remains behind as “doorman” to Zeus’ threshold (179). This messenger then explains that all the gods have moved away to where they can neither “see” nor “hear” mortal affairs, for they had become disgusted with mortals and their political misconduct (204ff). Although mortals often prayed for peace their actions demonstrated that they wanted nothing but war. Therefore, War—monstrously personified—has, with divine consent, taken over Zeus’ supreme place and power (206). With uncontested authority, War (*Polemos*) has proceeded to imprison the goddess Peace, casting her into a pit (223); and, further, has resolved to utterly destroy all of the Greek cities and citizens (231). At this point in the play, a brief but poignant appearance of War makes this imminent threat to civilization vivid. While Hermes exits and Trygaeus hides, War struts into the orchestra and brags that he will begin crushing and grinding all the Greek cities in a giant mortar, as soon as he finds a sufficiently formidable pestle (236-88). When his assistant (Riot) fails to find such an implement, War recedes back into the halls of Zeus determined to fashion his own pestle, and then to commence grinding.

Witnessing this, and recognizing the dire urgency of the situation, Trygaeus feels himself obliged to lead a plan to rescue Peace on behalf of all the Greeks. And so, as War withdraws to prepare his destructive pestle, Trygaeus steps forward to initiate his restorative plan: to rescue Peace from the deep heavenly pit where War has hidden her. Standing alone in the midst of the orchestra, this protagonist begins to rescue Peace with a summons. He calls upon “all the people” —specifically farmers, merchants, carpenters, workers, immigrants, foreigners and islanders—to come forth and lend a hand (292-300).³⁰ The chorus members respond to this summons; and, for the first time in the play,

³⁰ Trygaeus’ call extends to: “farmers” (*geōrgoi*); “merchants” (*emporoi*); “carpenters” (*tektōnes*); “workers for the people”, or craftsmen (*dēmiourgoi*); “immigrants” (*metoikoi*); “foreigners”, strangers or guests (*xenoi*); and allied “islanders” (*nēsitōai*) (296-98). I will return to address the special nature of “all the people” (*ō pantes leōi*) below, p. 66-9.

these twenty-four masked and costumed players flood into the orchestra in exuberant choreography, accompanied by their props (shovels, levers and ropes) and by the lively music of their pipe player.³¹ As this heterogeneous population—all longing for Peace—fill the open area of the theater, their own chorus leader rouses them with further incitements: to come “eagerly, straight for salvation”; and to seize this moment—“now if ever before”—to “free themselves of military formations and the fine red uniforms [of war]” (301-03).³² This representative leader of the chorus then turns to Trygaeus and delivers the pivotal demand:

So, if it is necessary for us to do anything [in view
of salvation and freedom], direct us and architect.³³

πρὸς τὰδ' ἡμῖν, εἴ τι χρὴ δρᾶν, φράζε κἀρχιτεκτόνει

(Peace 305)

To clarify: the chorus leader demands that Trygaeus *actively* “architect”, for *architektonei* is given as an imperative verb. Following this performative demand from the chorus

³¹ On the composition of the chorus, see Olson’s note to line 301, and Pickard-Cambridge (1997), 236.

³² The chorus’ leader’s incitements, more fully, are as follows: “Everyone come this way in high spirits [or eagerly] (*prothumōs*), straight for salvation (*euthu tēs sōtērias*). All you Greeks, let’s lend a hand [or, help, *boēthēsōmen*], now if ever before (*eiper pōpote*) and rid [or, free] ourselves (*apallagentes*) of musters [or, military formations] (*taxeōn*) and fine red uniforms: for this is the shining dawn of a Lamachus-loathing day!” (301-04) (Lamachus was a despised general whose leadership as a *taxi-arch* is here opposed to Trygaeus’ *architecting*).

³³ My translation, as adapted from Henderson (1998), who provides: “So tell us what needs doing here, and be our foreman.” My version aims to emphasize two things: first, the close relation of the chorus’ command to the “salvation” and freedom noted in the previous line (as is indicated in Greek by *pros tad'*, meaning “toward these things (just mentioned)”; and, second, the back-to-back imperative verbs—*phraze*, “direct (us)” (tell, or show us); and, *architektonei* “architect (us)”. Of the numerous modern language translations consulted during this research, I have not found any to translate “architect” literally. Rather, the figure in English is given variously (usually as a noun): “act as foreman”—Olson (1998), Olcott (1973) and Sharpley (1905); “be our director”—Roche (2005) and Sommerstein (2005); “be our supervisor”—Merry (1900); and “be thou our guide and leader, managing, presiding o’er us”—Rogers (1913). Other English translations retain the active sense of the double verbs, but render them more generically: “tell me what is the problem, and it shall be undertaken”—Beake (1998); and “give your orders direct us”—O’Neill (1938). The apparent avoidance of “architect” (and the difficulty of rendering this term as a verb) persists in other languages. The French Budé Edition, for instance, translates the line as: “dis-le nous et dirige nos travaux”—Coulon (1948). The only retention of the “architect” trope that I have found is in a nineteenth century Latin edition: “dic nobis et impera, quasi architectus aliquis”—(Firmin 1838).

leader, Trygaeus begins officially and more collaboratively what he has indeed already begun: directing and architecting the recovery of Peace. How, then, does he commence this part of the plan? By tempering the people's zeal. For, these chorus members who have rushed into the orchestra in response to his summons are *so* eager to be free of war and *so* assured that they will gain "salvation" (*sōtēria*) that their excessive enthusiasm and premature jubilation jeopardizes the very opportunity to rescue the goddess. Their antics not only risk alerting War to their activity, but also make it impossible for themselves to collectively concentrate on the serious task at hand. Thus, this "architect" begins directing the rescue of Peace by redirecting the chorus' energies: from celebration to preparation, from the beat of chaotic dancing to the rhythm of collaborative work (309-45). In redirecting the chorus toward these aims, Trygaeus is also reminding them of why they have gathered in the orchestra in the first place. Upon resolving this complication (at least for the moment), Trygaeus then turns his own thought to concentrate on the basic question of how to reach Peace (361). As he does so, another complication arises, for Hermes reappears from Zeus' doorway with renewed resistance. Having been previously shocked by Trygaeus' intrusive knock at heaven's door (180ff), Hermes is now outraged by the audacity of this mortal, not only to attempt the rescue of a goddess, but to initiate a course of action unsanctioned by Zeus. And so, this divine messenger threatens to turn Trygaeus over to Zeus for punishment (362ff). However, with compelling arguments and enticing gifts (food and a golden bowl), Trygaeus eventually persuades Hermes not to report him (377-424). Together with additional appeals and promises from the chorus (385-99), Trygaeus further persuades him to actively join the plan. To this, too, Hermes consents (425). Then, with a line that closely echoes the earlier call to Trygaeus, the chorus leader turns to Hermes, urging him, "the wisest of gods" (*ō theōn sophōtate*), to "take charge" (*ephestōs*) and—

in craftsmanly fashion (*dēmiourgikōs*) direct us [in] what needs doing.

(*Peace* 429)

To clarify: the chorus leader demands that Hermes direct them in the manner of a "craftsman" or "worker for the people", since *dēmiourgikōs* is given here as an adverb.³⁴

³⁴ As a noun, *dēmiourgos* designates a "worker for the people", a skilled wanderer for hire. In the *Odyssey*, a "seer" (*batis*), "healer" (*iatēr*), "carpenter" (*tekton*), "bard" (*aoidē*) and "herald" (*kērukōn*) were each included in this class of workers (17.384-5, 19.135).

Thus, with the sanction and exemplary guidance of Hermes, the full team for procuring Peace is assembled: with Trygaeus as mortal director and architect; with Hermes as divine director and fellow-worker; and with the diversely skilled chorus as representative of “all the people”. After Trygaeus and Hermes together lead this group in a propitious libation and prayer—during which the agencies of the divine Graces, the Horai, Aphrodite and Desire are also brought into the plan (431-56)—these unified collaborators then set to work in their common task of drawing-forth Peace; specifically, hoisting her from the pit with “ropes” (458).

Although comic complications persist during this hoisting work—as the heterogeneous chorus members at first bicker and laugh while pulling the ropes inefficiently in divergent directions (464-507)—the goddess, after much ado, finally appears. And she appears most spectacularly *not* as an actor in disguise but as an appealing statue (516ff). What is all the more surprising is that this figure of Peace emerges from the pit accompanied by a lively and lovely pair of attendants (523), namely Theōria, a personification of “Beholding” as happens in the theater;³⁵ and “Harvest” (*Opōra*),³⁶ a voluptuous figure of agricultural abundance that Trygaeus (whose very name implies “Harvester”)³⁷ ultimately takes as his wife (702-08). Following the emergence of these three feminine figures from the heavenly ground, Trygaeus, with the guidance of Hermes (725-27), then leads the dramatic action back down to the mortal plane to direct corresponding earthy interventions. These include: first, returning Theōria directly to the spectators, for Trygaeus escorts this personification of “Beholding” to a prominent seat in the theater; then, “setting up” the retrieved statue of Peace in the midst of the orchestra for all the spectators to “behold”; and, finally, showing the renewed order and prosperous

³⁵ “Theōria” is etymologically related to the English nouns “theory” and “theater”—*theōria* being derived from the Greek verb *theomai*, an especially active and interpretive kind of “seeing”: “beholding” or “looking” with wonder from a god-like point of view, as the spectators did at a dramatic festival. “Beholding (in the theater)” is the translation offered by Newiger (1980). This personification of “Theōria” is otherwise translated as “Holiday” (Henderson), “Festival-going” (Olson) and “Showtime” (Sommerstein). Theōria is discussed further below, p. 74.

³⁶ “Harvest” is Olson’s translation for this figure. *Opōra* is otherwise rendered as “Cornicopia” (Henderson) and “Fullfruit” (Sommerstein). *Opōra*, more literally, names the season (late summer) in which the harvesting of the vintage took place. See Olson’s note to line 523.

³⁷ “Trygaeus” is a neologism derived, in part, from the verb *trugaō*, “I harvest”, or “gather (the vintage)”. Trygaeus’ special name bears further relevant associations, which are presented more fully below, p. 88.

way of life that such reparations promise. For, in the end, Trygaeus takes “Harvest” as bride and prepares a great wedding feast, which all the “spectators” are invited to join (1115). This drama *Peace* then culminates most joyously in a marriage procession, with *all* the rejuvenated people—including the protagonist as bridegroom, Harvest as bride, and the chorus as representative revelers—together leaving the orchestra for the countryside in eager anticipation not only of feasting, drinking and dancing but also of plowing fields and “harvesting” the full fruits of Peace (1316ff).³⁸

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There remains a great deal more of this play to elaborate in detail, yet this much of its dramatic action sufficiently sets-out the situation, as well as the motivations, complications and accomplishments of the protagonist. And this protagonist—in light of the chorus’ demand that he actively “architect” (305)—I am calling an architect-figure. Setting aside, for now, the peculiar verb form of *architecting*, it is helpful first to articulate some of the more general problems and questions that this protagonist raises for architects and to draw out the primary ways in which this figure performs.

³⁸ The chorus’ exit song specifically anticipates the activity of “gathering fruit” *trugēsomen* (1339-40)—a verb form of Trygaeus’ own name.

In Aristophanes' *Peace*, the chorus' urgent call to the protagonist to actively "architect" (305) could be (and has been) taken to refer, most immediately and restrictively, to Trygaeus' impending activity of coordinating the diversely-skilled chorus members in their practical task of hoisting a colossal statue up and out of a quarry-like pit and into a proper upright position.³⁹ The elaborate dramatization of this physical "work" (*to pragma*, 510) and Trygaeus' leading role in directing it do, indeed, make "architect" a fitting title for the protagonist, particularly in view of the analogous "work" that was underway at the time of *Peace*'s performance just up the hill from the orchestra on the Athenian Acropolis. There, architects had been directing hoisting operations and other building activities for decades. Substantial reconstruction of the Parthenon and Propylaea had recently been completed (in 437 and 432 BCE, respectively),⁴⁰ and other new work was underway; notably, the Erechtheion, arguably Athens' most unusual sanctuary, construction of which began in 421 BCE—the very same year that *Peace* was performed.⁴¹ The architects directing this work upon the Acropolis included Mnesikles,

³⁹ Olcott (1973), Sharpley (1905), and Merry (1900) are among the classical scholars assuming this limited interpretation of the figure in their commentaries to the line.

⁴⁰ The Parthenon, involving the architects Iktinos, Kallikrates and Pheidias, was substantially completed in 438/7 BCE (having begun 447/6). See, Hurwit (1999). The Propylaea (the monumental "gateways" to the Acropolis), involving the architect Mnesikles, were completed in 432 BCE (having begun in 437, immediately after the substantial completion of the Parthenon). See Bundgaard (1957).

⁴¹ Construction of the Erechtheion, involving the architect Philokles, went on from 421-406/5 BCE. This sanctuary was unusual for its heterogeneity of design and purpose (providing for diverse practices and honoring multiple antagonistic figures, including the legendary Erechtheus and the god Poseidon). Other work on the Acropolis attested for the year 421 includes: alterations to the temple of Athena Nike (on the Western precipice of the Acropolis), and construction of the House of the Arrhephorai (near the Erechtheion on the North side of the Acropolis). A few other works underway around the Acropolis at the time of *Peace*'s performance are relevant to mention. On the Southern slope of the Acropolis within the Sanctuary of Dionysus Eleuthereus (which included the theater), construction of a new stoa was underway (425-400 BCE). This shaded porch was located immediately behind (just South/downhill) of the orchestra. Construction of the New Temple of Dionysus, augmenting the Old Temple in the same sanctuary area, may also have begun in 421 BCE. It is relevant to point out here that the theater of Dionysus was *not* a stone theater in 421 BCE. Although it may have had a stone foundation for its wooden skēnē, the skēnē itself would have been rebuilt each year. As well, there may have been a low stone curb marking the limit of the orchestra (and acting as a platform for the first row of seats, the *prohedria*); but the stone orchestra floor, and the stone seats that exist today, were not built until the rule of Lycurgus

Kallikrates, Iktinos, Philokles, and especially Pheidias—who is evoked by name in Aristophanes’ play (a point I shall return to). Of course, none of the architects mentioned here, nor any other, were working on the Acropolis on the very day of *Peace*’s performance, since all building activities would have been suspended for the duration of the Dionysian festival.⁴² Moreover, all the architects (who were living) would have themselves been sitting amidst the thousands of spectators gathered on the southern slope of the Acropolis to witness the dramatic performances, including Aristophanes’ *Peace*.⁴³ Nevertheless, when architects were working on the Acropolis, their work, not unlike the work of Trygaeus in the orchestra, would have involved directing diverse agents in hoisting operations, so that together they might move divine statues (and other figurative matter) into the most honorable and revealing positions.⁴⁴ Yet, in spite of the proximity of these analogous hoisting operations, it is a basic premise of this study that the primary actions of architects (be they normative, figurative, or both) are not sufficiently understood by regarding their most obvious instrumental deeds as definitive of their role. Even if we try to impose such a narrowly instrumental interpretation of architecting onto Trygaeus in the hoisting scene of *Peace*, we discover that the fit is rather peculiar. Three peculiarities stand out as most revealing. These are elaborated below.

(in 338-322 BCE). See Csapo (2007), 99, 112; and Pickard-Cambridge (1946). Also on the Southern slope of the Acropolis, and immediately to the West of the theater’s spectator area, preparations were underway for the Sanctuary of Asclepius; construction of which began in 420/19 BCE and continued until 412/11. The tragedian Sophocles was partially responsible for bringing the cult of this healing god to Athens from Epidauros. It is tempting, then, to believe that the dramatist may have been influential in proposing the site next to the theater. See Hurwit (1999), 219-21, and Aleshire (1991). In the Athenian agora (just North-West of the Acropolis) architectural activity is also reported for the year 421 BCE. Most notably, the Temple of Hephaestus and Athena (which today still overlooks the agora on its high West hill) was completed in same year as *Peace*’s performance, having begun around 450 BCE; construction of the large Stoa Basileios (Portico of Zeus at the North-West entry to the agora) likely commenced in 420 BCE; and the Fountain-House in the South-West corner of the agora was under construction between 425-420 BCE. This review is based primarily on Boersma (1970), and Hurwit (1999).

⁴² All normal business was suspended on this day, and all temples and sanctuaries (except for the sanctuary of Dionysus) were closed. See, Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 59.

⁴³ All male Athenian citizens and a large number of Pan-Hellenic citizens were present in the theater during this dramatic festival. Even prisoners were released from captivity for the occasion. Thus, there is every reason to assume that the architects listed above would have been present. Phidias, however, had died in exile a few years prior.

⁴⁴ On the organizational work of ancient architects on building sites, see Bundgaard (1957), esp. 184-85, and Roebuck (1969), 2-34.

As mentioned above, the first act of Trygaeus, as architect, consists of tempering the chorus' zeal—their gleeful “shouts” and “rejoicing”. He then redirects their initially erratic movements—their energetic “spins”, vigorous “kicks”, enthusiastic “dancing” (*orchēsis, choreia*), and exuberant displays of “(dance) figures” (*ta schēmata*, 317-336). As one attempting to re-orchestrate such an animated troupe as this, Trygaeus would have appeared to act as a director of dramatic performers as much as a supervisor of construction laborers. Aristophanes must have had the *performative* resemblance of these two leading figures in mind when choosing his figure of speech, for both architects and leaders of choruses sought synchronized actions amid energetic groups and boisterous situations. Euripides, too, may have had this performative resemblance of architecting and chorus-directing in mind, since his protagonist (Odysseus) is entitled “architect” also in direct relation to an exuberant chorus that he likewise attempts both to temper and to lead.⁴⁵ Granting this performative resemblance among architects and chorus leaders, a question, however, remains: if architecting was *like* leading a dramatic chorus, what then was leading a dramatic chorus like? Given that Aristophanes—himself a dramatist—regarded the activities of these leaders as analogous, the likeness must have extended beyond their obvious physical actions to include their underlying motives and aims, as well as the ultimate consequences of their acts. Furthermore, Aristophanes' own work, as a dramatist, would have involved devising the play's choreography, leading the choral movements, and teaching the full ensemble of actors.⁴⁶ In other words, aspects of this dramatic poet's own directing activity correspond to Trygaeus' architecting activity in *Peace*.

⁴⁵ This relation of architect-figures to choral groups persists in the comedies of Plautus, where *architectus* often qualifies the leading slave as he directs a group of fellow conspirators in a plan to outwit adversaries. Cf. *Miles Gloriosus* (901ff) and *Poenulus* (1110ff). Slater (2002), 121, comments (in passing) on the relation of this trope in Plautus to that found in Aristophanes' *Peace*: “Trygaeus [as] master planner... will assume the role of director of the play's actions, just as the *architectus doli* of later Roman comedy does”. Cf. Graves (1911), who also takes the metaphor to imply that Trygaeus has “engineered the whole scheme”.

⁴⁶ Dramatic poets were commonly referred to as a “teacher” (*didaskalos*). Aristophanes is himself referred to as the “*didaskalos* of comic choruses” in the parabasis of his own play *Acharnians* (628). In the early stages of Athenian drama, dramatic poets had even performed the role of the protagonist. Aristophanes and the tragedian Aeschylus are both believed to have performed in this capacity. On the role of the poet in the production of the play, see Bremer (1993); Wilson (2000); and Slater (1996), esp. 110, and (1989), esp. 79.

The second suggestive peculiarity in Trygaeus' performance is that the select chorus members he ultimately leads in the work of hoisting up Peace are all, like him, farmers. Of the heterogeneous group of people from diverse trades and regions that had initially gathered in response to his opening summons, only "the farmers" (*oi geōrgoi*) among them ultimately rise to the occasion to pull earnestly and concordantly along the redemptive ropes (508), while all the others—including the "carpenters" (*tektones*)—are dismissed (497-507), for they turn out to be unprepared to commit to the recovery of peace, being unwilling to set aside their shenanigans and their pride.⁴⁷ Although the identity of the chorus throughout the drama is quite mercurial, being radically heterogeneous, inclusive and shifting, during the crucial work of hoisting and in the celebratory moments following Peace's emergence, the group is repeatedly referred to as "farmers" by Trygaeus, by Hermes and by the chorus themselves (508, 511, 551, 556ff 603). Given that Peace—the goddess, the statue and the worldly condition—is to be drawn out gradually from the ground, farmers indeed stand as most qualified to retrieve her. By his ultimate choice of collaborators, then, this architect-protagonist would seem to be as concerned with leading the cultivation of an earthy and fertile Peace as he is preoccupied with managing the immediate difficulties of hoisting her statue. Ought we to infer that architects, like farmers, might somehow be responsible not only for "harvesting" the benefits of peace but, more fundamentally, for cultivating, nurturing and even planting the seeds for Peace; preparing the grounds for Peace, the basic conditions for Peace? Furthermore, how is it that an earthy figure, drawn up from such liminal grounds, might help to repair civic well-being and the socio-political crisis of war? Might Trygaeus, as an architecting-farmer, be an appropriate agent to mediate between these agrarian, liminal and civic domains?

Thirdly, if Aristophanes had the limited work of physically hoisting a colossal statue foremost in mind when he projected his protagonist's activity as architecting (305), then it is peculiar that during the laborious hoisting operation (459-519) there are no ostensible building metaphors or construction site images. Instead, as the physical work of drawing out Peace begins, its movement is figured more nautically. The chorus of farmers draw-forth Peace as though drawing a ship ashore: "bring her to land", Hermes shouts (458); upon which Trygaeus and the chorus cry "heave", "heave ho!" and "heave

⁴⁷ Trygaeus accuses some of the chorus members of being proud, or "puffed up" (465); others are accused of pulling in the wrong direction (492), of accomplishing nothing (481), and of "accomplishing nothing but litigation" (505).

again” (459ff), and ultimately “heave now” and “heave all” as they pull in rhythmic unison along the peace-saving “ropes”—specifically, “tow ropes” and “reefing lines” (517-19).⁴⁸ In this most revelatory scene, then, the choral group—with Trygaeus leading among them—work as a crew of chanting mariners as much as a group of laboring farmers. Although practically incongruous, such nautical imagery would have appeared quite appropriate in performance, for it was probably a wooden ship-like cart—the theater’s *ekkuklēma*, or “rolling-out (device)”⁴⁹—that was pulled forward by the chorus and their ropes, thus conveying the divine statue (and her lively benefits) out into the open area of the orchestra. In this way, these rhythmic haulers would have appeared—as on a beach—to pull, or drag, a ship full of Peace *up* and *out* from where this had been hidden: up and out from the representative depths of the orchestra’s back wall, or *skēnē*, which by its obscuring and delimiting capacity had somehow conjured and combined the elusive limits of heaven, earth and sea. It must be further emphasized that in this dramatic ship imagery there are also profound Dionysian associations, for this god of drama, wine, vegetation and fertility was himself conveyed in ship-like carts during festivals held in his honor and, like Peace, he too was represented as arriving (together with his bountiful vintage) via the sea.⁵⁰ Nautical imagery had also figured into Trygaeus’ earlier ascent on the dung-beetle, for when he takes flight on this hoisting device—the theater’s crane, or stage machine (*mēchanē*)—he is said to be “rowing the air” (*meteōrokois*, 92),⁵¹ and as he makes his way toward the heavens he clutches the “steering oar” (*pēdalion*) of his “beetle-boat” (143).⁵² Thus, in both of these hoisting

⁴⁸ Both kinds of rope—“tow ropes” (*schoinion*, 36, 299, 437) and “reefing lines” (*kalois*, 458)—have nautical associations, as Olson emphasizes in his notes to these lines. Rope imagery is also drawn into the play in the opening scene, when the slave mimes the beetle’s dung-eating manner, while describing it as “moving its grinder back and forth, and all the while going like *this*, swiveling its head and hands, like the men who plait thick ropes for barges” (35-7).

⁴⁹ The *ekkuklēma* was used in Aristophanes’ other plays to roll an interior tableau out into the orchestra, as in *Acharnians* (408-9), and *Women at the Thesmophoria* (96, 285). On this theatrical device, see Olson (1998), xlv-xlvi; Taplin (1977), 442-3; and Taplin (1978), 11-12.

⁵⁰ Vase paintings bear testimony to such Dionysian movements. The two I have in mind are among the most famous: an archaic skuphos (Bologna) and a black-figure kylix (Exekias, ca. 540 BCE). See, for instance, Simon (1983), fig. 12; and Lissarrague (1990a), fig. 94.

⁵¹ On the man-powered mechanics of this theatrical crane, see Mastronarde (1990).

⁵² This line bears a complex pun on the “Naxian-built (*Naxiourgēs*) beetle-ship (*kantharos*)”, for Naxos was a place famous for both boat-builders and dung-beetles. Trygaeus is clutching a large wine cup as he delivers the line, thus adding another vessel to the series.

operations—pivotal scenes of levitation, revelation and transformation, which each make overt use of theatrical devices (the *ekkuklēma* and *mēchanē*)⁵³—the arts of seafaring join the arts of drama and farming to further complement, complicate and broaden the agencies of the architecting-protagonist who aims to restore a basic yet worldly Peace—a harmonious condition that is at once earthy, civic and divine.

Together with these dense peculiarities surrounding the hoisting actions within the play, there are also suggestive parallels to these actions beyond it, which likewise expand Trygaeus’ architectural acts far beyond construction site supervision. For, both hoisting movements—drawing out Peace and raising up oneself—are modeled on exemplary upward movements. Bringing the goddess up and out from the ground, for instance, recalls certain mythic and ritual actions; notably, the “coming up”, “bringing up” or “return” of a divinity whose temporary absence had rendered the mortal world infertile. The mythic return of Persephone to her mother Demeter (after having been abducted by Hades and kept in the underworld) and the consequent return of fertility to the earth (after a period of barrenness), particularly underlie the primary action and broad significance of Peace’s return together with her related benefits (stimulating Theōria and bountiful Harvest).⁵⁴ Trygaeus’ bold ascent on the high-flying dung-beetle is also closely modeled after the exemplary upward movement of other protagonists; notably, Bellerophon who, according to myth, took flight on Pegasus to slay various beasts on behalf of society, but who, according to Euripides, suffered a tragic fall when he flew with higher self-serving ambitions.⁵⁵ Trygaeus’ ascent also recalls the flight of a more

⁵³ On the revelatory and transformative role of these theatrical devices, see Padel (1993), esp. 363, where she writes: “Together, the two machines epitomize ways dramatic situations change.”

⁵⁴ The myth of Persephone is best known from the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*. This myth is also relevant as a model for *Peace*, since Hades’ mistreatment of Persephone (keeping her temporarily in the underworld) resembles War’s mistreatment of Peace (hiding her in a heavenly pit). The participation of Hermes in both the myth and the drama provides another link. In the *Hymn to Demeter*, Hermes meets Hades at the threshold of the underworld and persuades him—“with gentle words” (336)—to release Persephone. In *Peace*, Trygaeus’ own meeting with Hermes at the threshold of the upper-world and his persuasion of Hermes—with compelling arguments and gifts—to assist in releasing Peace, can be seen to mirror the myth. For this and other ritual schemas of “return” (*anodos*, *anagoge*, *anabasis*) that underlie the return of Peace in Aristophanes’ play (such as the return of Semele), see Bowie (1993), 142-50; and Olson (1998), xxxv—xxxviii.

⁵⁵ The story of Bellerophon is known best from the *Iliad* (6.172-97), and from the later *Library* of Apollodorus (2.3.2). Euripides composed two, now fragmentary, tragedies based on this same myth: *Bellerophon* and *Sthenoboea*. The fragments of these plays are gathered and

unlikely protagonist, one who takes action in a certain fable of Aesop. In this extant fable, a little dung-beetle flies *directly* to Zeus, boldly seeking justice against an eagle on behalf of a wronged rabbit.⁵⁶ In *Peace*, Trygaeus makes explicit reference to both the tragedy involving “Pegasus” and the fable of “Aesop”, just as he commences his own daring and justice-seeking ascent (76ff, 129-34).⁵⁷ One could go on gathering models for these hoisting operations,⁵⁸ and further go on to speculate about how other stories

translated by Collard and Cropp (2008). On Aristophanes’ use of these particular tragic models in this play, see Dobrov (2001), 89-104. The mythic stories of the tragic figures Phaethon and Salmoneus can also be seen to inform Trygaeus’ comic ascent to the heavens.

⁵⁶ Defending his choice of vehicle, Trygaeus claims that “in Aesop’s fables (*logois*) it [a dung beetle] is the only winged thing I could find that ever reached the gods.” (129-30). His daughter finds his “story” (*muthon*) unbelievable (131). Nevertheless, he further explains that this dung-beetle flew to heaven because he was “trying to take vengeance for himself (*anti-timōroumenos*)” against an eagle (134).

The extant fable fully dramatizes both the motive and the mode of this dung-beetle’s vengeance. The story, collected (with others) in Daly (1961), 94-95, may be paraphrased as follows: One day a rabbit was being pursued by a hungry eagle. With no one else to turn to for help, the rabbit appealed to a lowly dung-beetle who was close-by. Heeding this appeal, the beetle encouraged the rabbit and commanded the eagle to abandon his attack. But the eagle did not. Instead, the eagle devoured the rabbit before his very eyes. Witnessing this, the dung-beetle subsequently kept watch on the eagle, and whenever she laid her eggs the beetle flew up to her nest and rolled the eggs out, smashing them to the ground. Seeking a safer place for her eggs, the eagle flew up to Zeus, and asked if she might keep them on his lap. Zeus consented (for eagles were his favorite bird). The dung-beetle, witnessing this, himself flew up to heaven with a special ball of dung. He dropped this ball in Zeus’ lap and when Zeus sprang up to brush away the dung, the eagles’ eggs (once again) fell and were smashed.

There would seem to be a doubly relevant moral in this fable for Aristophanes’ *Peace*: aggressors have no refuge even when they have sympathizers in high places; and daring deeds of retribution may be performed by the most unlikely heroes. Aesop’s tale of the dung-beetle is also referred to in Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* (695); and Aesop (who is believed to have lived in the sixth century BCE) is mentioned again in *Birds* (471, 651) and *Wasps* (566). On this and other folktale motifs in relation to Aristophanes’ *Peace* (such as Jack-and-the beanstalk tales), see Olson (1998), xxxviii.

⁵⁷ Such explicitly inter-textual references to other poetry are relatively common in Aristophanes’ comedies, but are especially abundant in *Peace*. One scholar (J. M. Bremer) has counted over twenty-five explicit references to known ancient sources, including works by Homer, Hesiod, Euripides, Sophocles, Aeschylus, Sappho, and Archilochus. See Bremer (1993), especially p. 150. Edith Hall (2006), 321ff, has also remarked on the unusually dense repertoire of images in this play. The protagonist himself, she argues, embodies “a fascinating range not only of theatrical roles (including Bellerophon and Silenus), but of poetic genres, forms, meters, quotation, and styles of vocal delivery.” Every key poetic genre (including epic, tragedy, satyr play, dithyramb and comedy), Hall claims, is assimilated into this play through Trygaeus’ role.

⁵⁸ For instance, within the play, hoisting is compared to wine drinking—to *raising* a toast. For, when urging the chorus to help with the work, Trygaeus appeals to them by saying, “now is our chance to *hoist* one for the Good Spirit” (300)—the “good spirit” being a common name

involving flying architects, namely Daidalos, may have influenced (or been influenced by) the dramatic flight of Trygaeus.⁵⁹ Yet, for the moment, I must stop here.

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To reiterate what has been said above about the peculiarities of Trygaeus' hoisting activities in *Peace*: First, he acts as a leader of dramatic choruses as much as a supervisor of construction laborers. Second, his most crucial collaborators are shown to be farmers—those who earnestly tend to generative grounds. Third, his primary actions are manifold: in their metaphoric allusions; in their meta-theatrical associations; and in the poetic models they actively appropriate, adjust and recall. And, these poetic models further raise mythic, tragic and allegorical topics: about provisionally restoring worldly harmony by recovering absent figures; and about protagonists acting with civilizing and just ambitions, but with ambiguous consequences. Given that all of these profoundly suggestive peculiarities and exemplary topics are implicit within the hoisting scenes of *Peace*, it is evident that even if one were to limit Trygaeus' architecting to that of

for a wine libation poured out at the end of a common meal and the start of a drinking party. The collective activity of hoisting in *Peace* is also a model of collective political deliberation. For, when the chorus members pull in divergent directions they are suggestively portrayed as argumentative jurors. The hoisting scene further resonates with scenes in certain satyr plays in which the chorus of satyrs are called upon to hoist, push or pull together in a common task. Euripides' *Cyclops* (and its architect-figure) involves such imagery for similar reasons (469-73). So, too, does Sophocles' *Searches* (*Ichēutai*, 39-49) and Aeschylus' *Net-haulers* (*Diktyulci*, 18-20)—in which a chest containing Danaë is hoisted from the sea; and Aeschylus' *The Sacred Delegation*, or *At the Isthmian Games* (*Theōroi ē Isthmiastai*, 72-4). See, Seaford's note to *Cyclops* line 477 for further references. As Francisco R. Adrados (1972) has argued, such rope-pulling scenes (including that found in *Peace*) may further be interpreted as unifying ritual endeavors, and as mimetic of binding acts such as marriage.

⁵⁹ Images of a winged Daidalos predate Aristophanes' play; yet, the story of Daidalos fashioning wings for himself and his son Icarus (so as to escape the labyrinth and the wrath of King Minos) is best known from later Roman sources, including Virgil's *Aeneid*. On the early winged imagery of Daidalos (found on vase paintings and medallions), see Simon (1995). Although Daidalos is rightly regarded as the first mythic architect, he does not seem to have been called an "architect" (in extant Greek literature) until the second century BCE—in the *Library* of Apollodorus (circa 180 BCE). In this mythological compendium, Daidalos is referred to as the "best architect" (*architektōn aristos*) and "first inventor (*prōtos heuretēs*) of statues (*agalmatōn*)" (3.15.8). Aristophanes, however, wrote a now fragmentary comedy entitled *Daidalos*, in which a verb form of "architect" (like that found in *Peace*) appears. See below, p. 123-24. On Daidalos' emergence as "architect" in the late classical period, see Morris (1992), esp. 14. Daidalos' mythic architectural works, beginning with the dance floor in Knossos, attributed to him in the *Iliad* (18.592), are also treated in Frontisi-Ducroux (1975). On the significance of Daidalos and *daidala* for architectural discourse, see Pérez-Gómez (1985) and McEwen (1993).

directing hoisting operations, these operations, as dramatized, broaden and deepen the significance of this act by revealing its manifold models, motives, manners and effects. Adding to the suggestive complexity of architectural acts in this play is the explicit mention of the famous architect/sculptor Pheidias—a point, noted above, which I must now return to.

PHEIDIAS' TROUBLE AND TRYGAEUS' REPARATION: A MIMETIC INTERPRETATION OF HERMES' ASIDE

2.3

Soon after Peace, Theōria and Harvest are drawn out of the pit (520ff), Hermes—standing right beside Peace's recovered statue—turns to the chorus of “wise farmers” (603)⁶⁰ to explain how “she” had come to disappear in the first place. Whereas theological and allegorical explanations (the exodus of Zeus and War's interment of Peace) had initially made the event of her disappearance understandable (197ff), Hermes now offers a more historically grounded account. He explains that Peace began to perish when Pheidias and Pericles got into “trouble” (604-16). Who, then, were Pheidias and Pericles? What was their “trouble”? And, how does Hermes' interpretation of these events bear upon our interpretation of Trygaeus' architecting?

As is well known from later historical sources, Pheidias was a key advisor to the Athenian statesman Pericles on matters pertaining to his ambitious and controversial building campaign, which was carried out in Athens in the 440's and 30's.⁶¹ It is also well known that Pheidias had directed and presumably designed all of the sculptural work related to the Parthenon, including the forty-foot tall gold and ivory clad statue of Athena that stood within it—an unprecedented sculpture both in its size and its expense.⁶² What

⁶⁰ *hō sophōtatoi geōrgoi*, 603. See Olson's note to this line regarding the textual difficulty with “wise” (*sophōtatoi*). Not all editors accept this adjective.

⁶¹ The relevant ancient testimony for Pheidias (as Olson notes) includes: Plutarch's “Life of Pericles” (31.2-5); Diodorus Siculus 12.39.12; and a historic fragment of Philochorus, *FGrH* 328. F 121. Sommerstein's note to these lines gives a good summary of Pheidias' relevant work. Pericles' building campaign was controversial, in part, because it was funded by the monetary tributes of allies who thought they were providing funds to ensure common readiness for defense—not to adorn the Athenian Acropolis. Plutarch, for instance, notes that Pericles was accused of lavishness, for adorning the city “as if it were some vain woman, hung round with precious stones...” (*Life of Pericles*, 12.1-2). Thucydides had implied a similar criticism in his *Peloponnesian War* (1.10.2). See Andrews (1978), and Powell (1995).

⁶² On Pheidias and the Parthenon, see Hurwit (1999), 168-88; and Harrison (1996).

must be made known here, however, is that the official “installation” of this colossal statue of Athena, which marked the substantial completion of the Parthenon, would have been a vivid living memory for Aristophanes and much of his audience, since this ceremony was likely performed during the Great Panathenaea festival of 438/7 BCE, just sixteen years prior to *Peace*’s performance.⁶³ Thus, by referring to Pheidias and Pericles, just after the statue of Peace appears in the orchestra, Hermes would bring the theatrical statue of Peace and the colossal statue of Athena into comparison. This comparison is reinforced and furthered when the chorus takes Hermes’ surprising comment about Pheidias’ relation to Peace to account for her “fine facial features” (*euprosōpos*), as if the statue of Peace had been authored by Pheidias, modeled after his design, or perhaps left as an unfinished work of the recently deceased artisan (615-18).⁶⁴ Beyond the aesthetic comparison of these statues and the suggestion of their common authorship, Hermes’ mention of the famous architect/sculptor would have also invited a performative comparison: between Pheidias’ memorable installation of “Athena” in the Parthenon during the Panathenaea of 438/7 BCE and Trygaeus’ dramatic installation of “Peace” in the orchestra during the *City Dionysia* presently underway. This performative comparison is elaborated later in the play when Trygaeus enacts the “installation” of Peace’s statue as a veritable rite, a *hidrusis*. Upon returning to the mortal plane with the newly recovered statue of Peace, Trygaeus proclaims that he shall now “install her” (*hidruteon*, 923). He then does so with due procedures and an appropriate offering, a

⁶³ In addition to Pheidias’ colossal statue of Athena within the Parthenon, his bronze statue of Athena *Promachus* stood outside, facing visitors to the Acropolis as they walked through the monumental gateways. This statue had been installed sometime between 460 and 450 BCE. See Hurwit (1999), 23-5

⁶⁴ This reference to Peace’s “lovely face” (*euprosōpos*) could also be understood as a “fine-mask” (*eu-prosōpon*), such as the actors themselves wore. This is the only direct comment on Peace’s physical appearance. For, Peace is *not* called a “statue” in this play. In fact, she is not referred to in any terms that bring attention to her status as a work of art. For instance, she is not called: a *kolossos* (statue); a *xoana* (statue, or “smoothed thing”); an *agalmata* (statue, or votive offering); an *anathēmata* (gift, or “thing set-up”); a *daidalon* (an appealing thing); an *eikones* (a likeness); or an *eidōla* (idol, or image). Rather, she is called “Peace” (*Eirēnē*, 221, 294, 975, 1019, 1056, 1063, 1108); and the “goddess” (*theon*, 315, 501, 581, 726). She is also alluded to simply as “she” or “her” (222-26, 337, 372, 416, 604, 616, 660ff, 923). And, she is addressed with a number of epithets qualifying her beneficent influences: “friend of us all” (*pasin philēn*, 294); “greatest of all goddesses” and “most friendly to vines” (308); “Lady, Bestower of Grapes” (520); “most beloved” (*hō philatē*, 583); “most desired” (*hō pothoumenē*, 588); “Lady” (657); “most shield-averse of females” (662); and “Most august sovereign goddess, Lady Peace, mistress of dancing grounds (*chorōn*), mistress of weddings” (974-76). All this would seem to affirm that the architecting-figure should not be taken as narrowly concerned with this statue’s aesthetic or formal qualities.

lamb (923-1115).⁶⁵ This veritable rite of installing a statue with special procedures including a sacrifice typically consecrated a sacred site, establishing a divinity's enduring influence in a particular sanctuary by permanently situating a representation of the divinity.⁶⁶ As Niall Slater has observed, Trygaeus' performance of an installation rite during the play, together with Hermes' reference to Pheidias, would have significantly influenced the spectators' reception of "Peace", effectively "transforming Peace into a cult statue—and the Theater of Dionysus into her shrine."⁶⁷ Thus, the statues (of Athena and Peace), the rites (of *hidrusis*), and the sites of installation (the Parthenon and the orchestra) are all suggestively compared by the dramatic actions and situational allusions.

Finally, Hermes' mention of Pheidias' "trouble" (*praxas kakōs*) adds another comparative dimension. For, when Hermes claims that Peace began to perish when

⁶⁵ This rite asserts Peace's status as a statue (although she is not referred to as such in the play). Trygaeus further reinforces the significance of his deed by claiming to enact it after an epic model. For, in the course of performing the rite, he quotes a (made-up) verse of Homer: "Thus casting away the detestable vapor of warfare, they opted for Peace and with a victim installed her (*hidrusanth'*, 1090-91).

⁶⁶ *Peace* is the only extant play in which an installation rite is performed in the course of the drama (although the rite is named and anticipated at the end of Aristophanes' *Wealth* (1197-8), and other of his fragmentary plays (Frag. 256, and 581.84-6). On this rite of *hidrusis*, see Burkert (1985), 88-92. This rite is also known to have prefigured other installations at sanctuary sites; notably, the *setting* of foundations upon which walls of temples would later rise. In Callimachus' *Hymn to Artemis*, for instance, the poet sings of the installation (*hidrusanto*, 3.238) of Artemis' cult statue (*bretas*), then of the rites and dances that circled the image in celebration—"and afterwards around that image (*bretas*) was raised a shrine (*dōmēthē*) of broad foundations (*euru themeilon*)" (3.248-9). Here, both the "installation" and the "dance" auspiciously prefigure the raising of walls. As Malkin (1991), 86, argues, "it is the *hidrusis* of the cultic image that makes possible the creation of the sanctuary." An *ap-hidruma*, as Malkin shows, was any sacred object to be transferred to a new site, the setting-up of which initiates worship in that place, thus beginning a cult. The English word 'cathedral' retains in it the root word *hedra*, or sitting-place of a god, to which this rite refers. The term *hidrusis* is also used to describe an act of founding an altar, temple, settlement or city (Cf. Plato, *Laws* 909e, *Republic* 427b). The rite was usually accompanied with first-fruit offerings (*aparchē*) buried beneath the foundations in "pots" (*tas chutras*), such as Trygaeus proposes in *Peace* (923), before installing her with a "lamb" instead.

⁶⁷ Slater (2002), 125. Peace was known as a goddess as early as the poetry of Hesiod (*Theogony* 902); and was occasionally evoked as a personified figure in other poetic works, including Aristophanes' *Farmers* (Frag. 111) and Euripides' *Bacchae* (419-20), *Orestes* (1682f), *Phoenician Women* (784ff), *Suppliant Women* (487ff), and Frag 453. She also occasionally appears on vase paintings (from the late fifth century BCE) in Dionysian contexts, where she appears to safeguard the festive way of life Dionysus represents. The goddess did not have a cult or shrine at this time in the fifth century BCE. However, in 375/6 a statue of Peace holding the child Wealth in her arms was made by Kephisodots and set-up on the Areopagus along with an altar "to commemorate a peace treaty with Sparta". On the Athenian cult of Peace, see Shapiro (1993), 45-50; Stafford (2000), 173-97; and Parker (1996), 229-30.

Pheidias got into “trouble” and when Pericles then feared that he would “share in Pheideas’ fate” (605-06), he connects the loss of Peace in the play to an actual political controversy in Athens involving Pheidias’ alleged embezzlement. From other sources we know that this controversy started when the people accused Pheidias of stealing gold and ivory intended for the colossal statue of Athena and presumed that Pericles was complicit with the theft. This controversy may well have been further fueled by Pheidias’ decision to depict himself upon the shield of Athena (an attribute of the goddess, held at the statue’s side). Specifically, Pheidias is said to have portrayed himself (and Pericles) amid those mythic Greeks battling the Amazons, which was an indecorous act of personal vanity in the eyes of Athenians.⁶⁸ All this “trouble” not only led to Pheidias’ imprisonment, subsequent escape, flight and ultimate death, but also triggered significant political complications for Pericles, and further negative repercussions for the people.

The complications in and around these historic events, and whether or not they actually sparked the loss of Peace and the start of the Peloponnesian war, as Hermes claims in the play, are not central concerns here. There are, however, two points of relevance to take away from Hermes’ mention of Pheidias. First, Aristophanes clearly invited his audience to see his theatrical property (the statue of Peace) as being associated with significant religious, sculptural and architectural work. Second, Trygaeus’ dramatic “installation” of Peace in the orchestra can be seen, more particularly, to re-enact Pheidias’ installation of Athena in the Parthenon—and yet, to do so in a way that would also repair the colossal “trouble” that Pheidias’ installation purportedly began. In other words, if we take Trygaeus’ architectural act to mime that of Pheidias, the mimetic performance should be seen not simply as an imitation of the prior act, but—more critically and creatively—as a corrective and poetic response to it. Indeed, by installing the statue of Peace, Trygaeus aims to recuperate and propitiate the very condition of peace that the famous architect/sculptor and patron/statesmen had promised yet failed to secure through their own (overly) ambitious building program.⁶⁹ Put differently,

⁶⁸ For a discussion of this trouble in relation to *Peace*, see MacDowell (1995), 186-89. Plutarch attests to Pheidias’ self-portrayal upon the shield: “lifting up a rock in both hands... [alongside] a beautiful image of Pericles fighting an Amazon” (*Life of Pericles* 31.3-5). Cf. Hurwit (1999), 187, 350; and Harrison (1966).

⁶⁹ In attempting to gain early support for his building program, Pericles apparently argued that the work would help forge more peaceful relations between the Athenians and Spartans. It has been suggested that Pericles, in the end, considered this to be a “political misjudgment”. See Powell (1995), esp. 246 and 257.

Trygaeus reenacts the original “installation” as it *ought* to have occurred. Given that Trygaeus installs Peace in the open orchestra—at the base of the Acropolis—one may further see his theoretical architectural act to speculatively re-situate the preeminent site of Athenian influence: away from the top of the monumental Acropolis and down to its peripheral but nevertheless integral sacred site, the Dionysian theater.

ARCHITECTURAL ACTS UPON THE ACROPOLIS AND WITHIN THE ORCHESTRA

2.4

Having reflected on the suggestive peculiarities in the hoisting scene of *Peace*, as well as on the critical reference to Pheidias and Pericles, a general argument can be made: Trygaeus’ architecting was devised and performed in view of architects and their activities—both visually and speculatively. For, Trygaeus’ actions were not only performed for architects to see (contemporary architects being among the play’s spectators), but were also performed in a special speculative arena—a theatrical and theoretical arena, which played an imperative role in Athenian culture by re-interpreting and re-presenting civic and mythic practices with the aim of comprehending their interdependence.

It is perhaps necessary to clarify that I do not believe Aristophanes intended to compose a drama primarily about architects. Rather, I recognize that the drama *Peace*, concerning a protagonist’s attempt to repair worldly harmony, implicates architectural activity as crucial to its plot, and I have been taking it as my task here to try to understand how. I am further aiming to show that Aristophanes’ dramatic involvement of architectural activity remains relevant today for architects to see and to consider. Such persistent relevance is arguable, in part, because affinities and tensions between architectural activity and *architecting* as figured in drama recur across time (as the much later relationship between Inigo Jones and Ben Jonson attests),⁷⁰ and, in part, because the particular conflict that the protagonist faces in *Peace* is perennial. Yet, Trygaeus’ performance is also particularly relevant for architects because it was staged in the fifth century BCE—at a time when architects were only just beginning to gain that title and so appear as figures of cultural significance. In other words, the architect-figure in *Peace*,

⁷⁰ On the vexed relationship in the English Renaissance between the dramatic poet, Ben Jonson, and the court architect, Inigo Jones (whom Jonson satirized in a number of masques), see Gordon (1949).

as in *Cyclops*, performs synchronically with those other architects (Mnesikles, Kallikrates, Iktinos, Philokles and Pheidias) who have become identified with the beginnings of a recognized architectural discipline.⁷¹ While the endeavors of these historical architects (Mnesikles and the others) as well as mythic architects (such as Daedalos) have been studied in ways that have informed architectural discourse, the figures in *Peace* and *Cyclops* (Trygaeus and Odysseus) have received no attention. Thus, by interpreting the actions of these dramatic “architects” this study aims, on the one hand, to reveal instances of architectural theory (or theatrics) that were emerging alongside architectural practice;⁷² and, on the other hand, to add to the repertoire of stories about architects whose peculiar dilemmas, deeds and desires help us to understand our own.

⁷¹ Besides Aristophanes’ *Peace* (421 BCE) and Euripides’ *Cyclops* (408 or 424 BCE), the earliest “architect” recorded in Greek literature is otherwise found in the *Histories* of Herodotus—a work known to Athenians by 425 BCE, and likely composed during the preceding decade. In Herodotus’ inquiries, we find individual architects named anecdotally for their involvement in certain remarkable works: a temple in Egypt (2.175.5); a temple, tunnel and harbor mole in Samos (4.87-88), and two Persian bridges crossing the Bosphorus and Hellespont (3.60.3-4; 7.36.1). Ancient Greek inscriptions suggest that the “architect” title came into official use in the two decades prior to the performance of *Peace*—decades coinciding with the Periclean building program in the 440’s and 30’s. Whereas a few “architect” titles are found on inscriptions in the mid and late fifth century BCE, the title is found more abundantly on inscriptions in the early fourth century BCE (that is, in the decades following the performance of Aristophanes’ *Peace* and Euripides’ *Cyclops*).

The earliest inscription involving an “architect” (that I know of) is *IG* i³ 32, dated by scholars to either 447/6 or 432/1 BCE. This inscription names Koroibos as the “architect” involved in the ongoing alterations of the initiation hall in Eleusis. Another inscription (*IG* i² 76, dated to 422 BCE) mentions a priest and an “architect” as being involved in choosing the site for the building (*oikodomēsai*) of “silos” (*siros*) at Eleusis. Such “silos”, or granaries, received the “first fruit offerings” (*aparchai*) left by worshippers. A third inscription (*IG* i³ 79.16, dated to 421/20 BCE) states that the “architect” Demomeles shall supply *suggraphsēi* (graphic descriptions of some sort) for a bridge along the Sacred Way to Eleusis. An earlier inscription (*IG* i² 24, of circa 448 BCE) names an individual in relation to building design activity but does not entitle him an architect. On this inscription we learn that the “altar” and “temple” (of Athena Nikē on the Athenian Acropolis) are to be “built” (*oikodomēsai*) and its “doors” are to be “set in position” (*kathistasthai*)—all “according to the *suggraphsēi* of Kallikrates”. The ancient primary sources invoking “architects” (literary and epigraphic) are gathered by Hendrik Svenson-Evers (1996). (No figurative “architects” are included in his otherwise comprehensive study). On these early inscriptions, see also Meiggs and Lewis (1988), 107-111 (on the Eleusinian silos), and 217-23 (on Kallikrates). More generally, see Scranton (1960).

Earlier than all of these inscriptions, however, is a line from Aeschylus’ fragmentary *Dikē* play (possibly of 476 BCE), in which the office of Justice (daughter of Zeus and sister to *Peace*) is, arguably, put in terms of *architecting*. See below, p. 115-21.

⁷² On instances of architectural theory emerging in the context of craftsmanship and pre-Socratic philosophy (notably of Anaximander), see McEwen (1993).

Comparable Agents and Agencies of Old Comedy

3.1

In the previous chapter, I introduced aspects of the architectural situation in Athens at the time of *Peace*'s performance and suggested ways in which Trygaeus' performance participated in that situation while at the same time participated in metaphoric, mythic and ritual situations beyond it. In the present chapter I will establish different comparative grounds for interpreting Trygaeus' actions: the poetic grounds of Old Comedy—a genre of Athenian drama that Aristophanes' plays exemplify.⁷³ My intention ultimately is to elaborate on the specific questions concerning Trygaeus' peculiar modes of architecting (as sketched above): his manner of directing and interacting with the chorus; his attention to generative grounds; his appropriation and adjustment of poetic models; and his basic yet complex aim to recover civic and sacred figures of Peace. Yet, in order to begin this interpretive work it is first necessary to take a comedic detour so as to emphasize the civic and sacred nature of Old Comedy in general, and to regard certain other comic protagonists of Aristophanes whose acts and accomplishments are comparable to those of Trygaeus.

In spite of the light and ludic connotations suggested by the title “comedy”, the genre of Old Comedy was intensely political, both in content and in its venue of performance. Comic poets frequently took contemporary politics and living politicians as material for satire,⁷⁴ and many comedies (including *Peace*) were composed specifically for the *City Dionysia*—an annual festival held in honor of the god Dionysus. It was during this civic and religious festival that the city of Athens dramatically represented itself to itself, as well as to the pan-Hellenic citizens of its various allied states, many of whom had traveled great distances in eager anticipation of the comedies, as well as the tragedies, satyr plays, dithyrambs, processions and related civic displays that would be elaborately staged during the four (or five)-day event.⁷⁵ This dramatic festival, then, was

⁷³ The comedies of Aristophanes are the only fully intact surviving examples of Old Comedy (from the fifth century BCE), which is distinguished from Middle and New Comedy (of the fourth and third centuries BCE), as exemplified by the fragmentary plays of Alexis and Menander, respectively. What is known of Aristophanes' contemporaries (and rivals, such as Eupolis) has recently been discussed in a collection of essays; see Harvey and Wilkins (2000).

⁷⁴ Politics should be understood here as activities involving citizen-based institutions concerned with the care of the *polis*. J. M. Bremer has concisely stated, “the city and its citizens are the constant theme and focus of his [Aristophanes'] plays” (1993), 127.

⁷⁵ On the importance of civic display to the festival, see Goldhill (1987) and Bowie (1993), 10ff.

a central forum for the city's self-representation, as well as a crucial means of re-enacting, re-interpreting and re-affirming civic identity and intercity solidarity. The fact that the *City Dionysia* was celebrated in early spring (when the seas were navigable again after a stormy winter season) must have only added to the people's eager anticipation of the festival and to their perception of its role in renewing hospitable relations, both civic and worldly. There is much one could say about the general importance of civic and religious issues to the dramatic festival and its dramas.⁷⁶ However, I must focus my discussion on the overtly political and specifically peace-making agendas of other comic protagonists. For, although Trygaeus is the only protagonist in all of Aristophanes' plays *to architect* a restoration of "Peace", he is not the only comic protagonist to expressly desire "peace" and to intentionally contrive a way to establish peaceful conditions.

Of the eleven extant comedies of Aristophanes, four feature a protagonist whose peace-seeking ambitions are readily comparable to those of Trygaeus in *Peace*: *Acharnians*, *Lysistrata*, *The Assembly Women*, and *Birds*. Like the integrity of politics and religion to the *City Dionysia*, a great deal could be said about these four comic plays: about their affinities with *Peace*, and about their differences—these being based, in part, on the changing political circumstances in Athens at the time of each play's performance.⁷⁷ I will, however, limit my review of these plays to two manifold concerns: to the primary *actions* of each protagonist, particularly with respect to their motivating desire for peace and their manner of procuring it; and to the primary *tokens* by which "peace" manifests in each play, particularly with respect to how these tokens tangibly relate to "the city" and to "the people" (the chorus). After narrating the plot of each play with respect to these primary concerns, I will then turn back to *Peace* to regard more particularly how its primary token of peace (a statue), and how the motives and manners of its protagonist are unique with respect to these others. It is my premise that understanding this uniqueness will help to clarify the ways in which "architecting" is

⁷⁶ My understanding of this topic has been most informed by Goldhill and Osborne (1999); Henderson (1989); and Sourvinou-Inwood (1990), and (2003).

⁷⁷ These plays were staged within a span of thirty-two years: *Acharnians* (425); *Birds* (414); *Lysistrata* (411); *Ecclesiazusae* (393). I am introducing the plays *out of* chronological order (treating *Birds* last), to better draw out its analogous actions with respect to *Peace* (421). The Sicilian Disaster (in 413), which sparked the temporary collapse of Athenian democracy, also had implications for the institution of drama (funds to train and costume choruses, for instance, were withheld). Aside from historical issues, these plays also differ since *Acharnians* and *Lysistrata* were performed at the *rural* festival called the Lenaea, which gathered only local spectators. These plays were, however, likely still performed at the Dionysian theater in Athens; see, Slater (1986).

most appropriately attributed to Trygaeus. Here, then, are the four comedies for comparison.

COMPARABLE PEACE-SEEKERS

DIKAEOPOLIS IN *ACHARNIANS*

3.2a

In the opening scene of *Acharnians* (425 BCE), the protagonist Dikaeopolis—whose compound name suggests that he has “Just (advice) for the city”⁷⁸—enters the orchestra. He then sits amidst the theatrical spectators as though sitting in the “Assembly” (*Ekklēsia*, 19), a key institution of Athenian democracy.⁷⁹ From this position amid the spectators turned Assemblymen, the protagonist expresses both his longing for “peace” and his frustration at his fellow citizens for being unwilling to discuss the topic of “peace” directly (17-39). When the venerable presidents and ambassadors (the other actors) finally arrive and, again, skirt the serious question of “peace” (40ff), the protagonist takes it upon himself to procure his very own peace agreement. With his own funds, he dispatches an especially adept delegate to go to the Spartans and “make a truce” (*spondas poiēsai*, 130).⁸⁰ With comic speed, this delegate returns from Sparta only a few lines later with a “truce” in the form of an aromatic flask of wine (187ff).⁸¹ Dikaeopolis himself ratifies this “truce” with a libation and a sip, and at once becomes “free of war and hardships” (199-200). He then sets off—“truce” in hand—to his country home, where he intends to further indulge in the benefits of “peace” by celebrating the Rural Dionysia festival (202).⁸² The *agon* that this drama then develops (for the remaining

⁷⁸ Jeffrey Henderson suggests this translation in his note to the first line of the play (Loeb 2000). For a more detailed discussion of the protagonist’s name, see Foley (1998), esp. 46.

⁷⁹ Except for festival days, the Assembly met daily at dawn in the Pnyx—an open area just West of the Acropolis, overlooked the *agora* to the North. In this area about 6,000 citizens listened to speeches, responded to them, and voted upon matters of the day. On the role of this institution, see Hansen (1987).

⁸⁰ This delegate is especially adept, in part, because he is named Amphiltheus—he who has “a god on both sides”. See the note to line 46 in Olson (2002).

⁸¹ Part of the joke here is that the word for “truce” (*spondē*) is itself the same word for a wine “libation” (*spondē*)—since the “truce”, treaty, or peace agreement was named after the sacred “libation” that was performed in ratification of the accord. In other words, this comic protagonist takes the substance offered in a peace agreement *as* the actual source of peace. On the rite of pouring libations, as for a truce, see: Burkert (1985), 70-3.

⁸² This rural festival, counterpart to the *City Dionysia*, was celebrated in the winter (December)

1100 lines of the play) revolves around tensions between the individual protagonist and “the people”. For, the chorus members are initially suspicious of Dikaeopolis and angered by what they perceive to be an illicit peace-deal (287ff), while Dikaeopolis—hoarding “peace” for himself—refuses to share even a “spoonful” of its benefits with anyone but his own family (1053ff). Although Dikaeopolis eventually persuades the chorus to accept his “peace”, having with “just” arguments “changed the people’s mind about the truce” (497-627), a number of other individuals in the play remain deprived of “peace”, which the protagonist continues to hoard. This play ends with a special Dionysian event: a drinking contest, which Dikaeopolis participates in (off-stage) and predictably wins.⁸³ Intoxicated, Dikaeopolis reappears to announce his victory and to claim his prize: another flask of wine (1198-1225). In celebration, he then leads the chorus out of the orchestra in a drunken procession. With his closing words, this “Just (advisor) for the city” commands the chorus to follow him (1231); and they—“the people” of Acharnae—respond: “Yes, we’ll follow [you]... you and your flask” (1233-35).

As many have observed, wine is closely associated with peace throughout this comedy *Acharnians*.⁸⁴ Being a primary binding substance of political accords, common revelry and individual intoxication, wine (and its flask) contribute tangibly to dramatizing the much sought-after and highly contentious condition of peace.⁸⁵ In the next play, particularly at its end, we discover another appealing (and potentially intoxicating) token of peace and another pseudo-diplomatic means of procuring it.

not spring (March). In being celebrated by each of the various *demes* of Attica, it attracted local spectators, not Pan-Hellenic citizens. Nevertheless, like the City festival, this rural festival also involved musical and dramatic competitions. It further involved a special fertility procession, during which large phalluses were borne. This procession is the specific event of the festival that Dikaeopolis in the play goes on to enact with his family (241-79). See the note to these lines and to 201-02 in Olson (2002).

⁸³ This drinking contest, an event called *Choes* (named for the “Jugs” that competitors drank from), was enacted each year on the second day of the *Anthesteria*. This Dionysian festival (held at the *end* of winter, a month before the *City Dionysia*) celebrated the occasion of first opening the casks of wine that had been fermenting since autumn. On the mix of Dionysian festivals dramatized in this play (and further references), see Habash (1995).

⁸⁴ Habash (1995), 559.

⁸⁵ Wine also figures prominently in this play in representing conditions *opposed* to peace; for, in a song of the chorus, War is personified as a violent drunkard who arrives uninvited to dinner parties, then spills the wine, upsets the tables, starts fights, and destroys the vintage by his rampage (977-85).

At the start of *Lysistrata* (411 BCE), the female protagonist Lysistrata—whose compound name means “Loosener”, or “Dissolver of armies”—eagerly awaits a select group of women to join her just outside the monumental gateway of the Acropolis (the Propylaea). It is early morning, and Lysistrata has secretly called these women together to help her in an ambitious plan “to save Greece”, for she is convinced that “the ‘salvation (*sōtēria*) of all Greece lies in women’s hands!’” (30, 41, 46, 525). Together with these women, Lysistrata hopes to “find a device to end the war” (111), and to urge their war-obsessed husbands to go to “peace” (121)—a “just and honest peace” (169). Once the women have assembled, Lysistrata then persuades them to commit to two key aspects of her plan: they must individually resist the advances of their husbands, denying them of sexual favors (124); and they must band together to commandeer the Acropolis, barring the treasuries that fund the war (176, 488). By this doubly-restraining device Lysistrata hopes that their husbands will be doubly-compelled to surrender to them and to accept their “good advice” for more peaceful ways.⁸⁶ After these women ratify their commitment in an elaborate oath ceremony (188ff), the rest of the play dramatizes the enactment, complications, and eventual success of Lysistrata’s plan. Complications play out, in part, among the play’s double chorus, which consists of incendiary men and water-bearing women (254ff, 319ff, 614ff, 781ff); and success begins to come about when the men, submitting, finally do urge the Athenian “Council”, the Boulē,⁸⁷ to elect ambassadors for peace-talks with the Spartans (1009-12). The two opposing sets of delegates subsequently come together in the orchestra for negotiations (1071ff), and—with Lysistrata acting as mediator—reconciliation suddenly appears not only possible but

⁸⁶ Lysistrata’s “good advice” (*chresta legousōn*, 527) includes a metaphoric proposition: to treat the city’s problems *as* knotted wool, by carefully unraveling them and then re-weaving a finer web (567-86). As others have observed, Lysistrata’s “advice” prefigures the metaphor of weaving *as* governing, which is pervasive in Plato’s later dialogue *Laws*. On myths and metaphors associated with weaving in Greek literature, see Scheil and Svenbro (2001), especially chapter 1. Aristophanes returns to this image of weaving for governing in *The Assembly Women*, for when one man learns that the city has been turned over to women, he asks “For what? For sewing (*huphainein*)?” The response is: “No, for governing (*archein*)” (556). In *Lysistrata*, weaving also performs as a metaphor both for the heroine’s scheming and for the dramatic plot (630).

⁸⁷ The Boulē was an advisory board to the Ecclēsia, consisting of five-hundred members (fifty from each attic region, or *deme*). On the crucial role of this elite institution in Athenian democracy, see Rhodes (1972).

desirable. Indeed, “Reconciliation” herself (*Diallagē*)—in the form of an appealing (and naked) young woman—suddenly steps forward from behind the skēnē (1114). All the more eager for “Reconciliation” now, these charmed ambassadors endure Lysistrata’s scolding, accept her conditions, and promptly reach a settlement. Lysistrata then leads the ambassadors, together with “Reconciliation”, out of the orchestra so that they may exchange their “oaths of mutual trust” (1185). This play ends with the reconciled ambassadors rejoining the reconciled chorus to sing songs of thanks both for this “gentle-minded Peace”⁸⁸ and for Aphrodite’s special contribution in helping them to make it (1289-90). Although, “Reconciliation” appears but mutely and fleetingly in this play (1114-87), her desirable figure—moving amidst the ambassadors in the orchestra—would have made vivid and palpable to all those assembled certain sensual and social benefits of peace.

Whereas a lively figure of Reconciliation and an appealing flask of wine help to make “peace” manifest and interpretable in *Lysistrata* and *Acharnians*, respectively, in *The Assembly Women* it is the arts of transformation, metaphor and “disguise” (*metaskeuazō*, 499) that figure-forth peace most palpably. Being one of Aristophanes’ last plays, the integral role of the chorus is significantly diminished, and the peace pursued is localized, being concerned with more inner-city and domestic affairs. Nevertheless, the protagonist’s plan for civic transformation has particular relevance both for Trygaeus’ plan in *Peace* and for a dramatic interpretation of *architecting*.

COMPARABLE PEACE-SEEKERS

PRAXAGORA IN *ASSEMBLY WOMEN*

3.2c

At the beginning of *Assembly Women* (*Ekklesiastousai* of 393 BCE), the female protagonist Praxagora—whose compound name means “Effective (in the) *agora*”—waits outside her Athenian home for a group of women to join her. It is not yet dawn, and Praxagora (not unlike Lysistrata) has secretly called these women together to help her initiate a “daring deed” to boldly “take over the government and *do* something good for the city” (106-08), for she fears that the city is adrift—as a ship being “driven by neither

⁸⁸ This “peace” (*hēsuchia*) suggests a sense of “tranquility”, as in having ‘peace of mind’. *Ēirene* (the Peace of Aristophanes’ play) stood more for civic tranquility, or “peace between states”. The two terms are, nevertheless, related. See the note to line 1289 of *Lysistrata* in Henderson (1987).

sail nor oar” (109).⁸⁹ Thus, for the sake of the city’s “salvation” (*sōtēria*, 202, 401, 412-14), Praxagora intends to take control. Her plan specifically requires that she and her female friends, first, transform themselves by dressing-up as men and, then, proceed to the Athenian “Assembly” (*Ekklēsia*). There, these women (disguised as men) intend to address the Assembled citizens, persuading them to vote (by “show of hands”) for their plan “to turn over the governance of the city to the women” (210-12, 264ff). After donning guises, practicing manners and rehearsing arguments (116ff), these women turned men exit the orchestra for the meeting to be held on the Athenian Pnyx (284). The overwhelming success of Praxagora’s speech before the “Assembly” is soon reported (400ff); and the details of how she intends to transform civic affairs are eventually disclosed. In the interest of common prosperity, Praxagora proposes to pool together the assets of all the citizens into a single fund, thus eliminating the difference between rich and poor (569ff). She further proposes a broad transformative scheme for civic habitation. Not unlike her plan for ethical transformation (turning the women to men), Praxagora suggests turning the city’s courthouses and porticos into shaded lounges for communal banqueting (675); and turning the courts’ elevated platforms for defendants and plaintiffs into distinguished places for children to recite poetry (677-9). Moreover, and more generally, she proposes to turn “the city into a household”, not only by rethinking its economic administration but also by making it more welcoming—“by breaking down all partitions to make one dwelling, so that everyone can walk into everyone else’s space” (673-4).⁹⁰ Having herself pronounced these transformations, Praxagora then exits the orchestra for the *agora* to oversee their implementation. As in the other comedies, these changes are “effective” immediately (715ff). This play then ends with a series of exchanges between a variety of individual citizens who respond selfishly, cynically and joyfully to the city, so dramatically transformed.

⁸⁹ Ussher Trans. (1973), in his note to line 109. This metaphoric image of a ‘ship of state’ recurs in *Peace*. See below, p. 92.

⁹⁰ This trope—of rethinking the city (*astu / polis*) as a household (*oikos*), and of considering women as proper to govern civic institutions due to their exemplary management of domestic affairs according to “ancient custom” (*archaion nomon*, 216)—is pervasive throughout the play (210-12, 214ff, 555ff). As has been pointed out, aspects of Plato’s *Republic* are discernible in Praxagora’s proposals for the city. This reversible metaphor, of the city as a large house and the house as a small city, becomes a central metaphor also for Alberti, in his *de re aedificatoria* (1.9.23).

Although less tangible than a flask of wine and a feminine figure (of Reconciliation), Praxagora's dramatic metaphors (showing a ship *as* city, the city *as* household, and domestically savvy women *as* politically adept men) offer concentrated images that vividly convey her broad scheme of peaceful transformation. In the next example, *Birds*, we back up about twenty years to a time closer to that of *Peace*, when (unlike the *Assembly Women*) the chorus was still crucial to the dramatic action. In this last example we again encounter a protagonist whose scheme for peace, like that of Praxagora's just described, involves situational transformations that seem overtly architectural.

COMPARABLE PEACE-SEEKERS

PEISETAIROS IN *BIRDS*

3.2d

In the opening scene of *Birds* (414 BCE), the protagonist Peisetairos—whose compound name means “Persuader of Companions”—leaves the city together with his companion Euelpides, he of “Good Hope” (or, perhaps ‘Mr. Gullible’). Fed up with Athenian politics, with its fines, fraudulence, petty lawsuits, obsessive jurors and constraining obligations, Peisetairos and his companion head out “in search of a peaceable place”—a “troubleless place” (*topon apragmona*), which they hope to find somewhere far away from Athens (44-8). After taking counsel with certain feathered friends, including an auspicious crow and jackdaw, as well as the mythic Tereus (who used to be a man but is now a bird), Peisetairos deduces that he is unlikely to find a “peaceable place” anywhere on earth, and so he persuades himself and Tereus that he must found such a place among the birds in the sky (162ff). Tereus is thrilled by the “thought” (*noēma*, 195) of a city in the sky—a place from which he and the birds might rival the heavenly gods for mortal admiration (as Peisetairos persuasively suggests). Thus, Tereus consents to introducing his mortal visitors to all the birds (the chorus) so that they, too, may learn of this novel “plan” (*bouleuma*, 162). The remainder of the play dramatizes the complications that arise as Peisetairos strives “to settle” (*oikizein*)—effectively colonize—the previously “troubleless” region and the previously tranquil birds.⁹¹ Preliminary violence (308ff) gives way to “more peaceable” negotiations (386ff), which ultimately lead to willing collaboration (634ff, 836ff), for Peisetairos successfully persuades the chorus of birds to help him found an ethereal city by fortifying the sky.

⁹¹ The plot of this comedy can be interpreted as a schema of colonization, being structured after certain myths of city-foundation. For this argument, see Bowie (1993), 151-177.

Specifically, he proposes to “encircle the whole atmosphere... with a wall of big baked bricks, like Babylon” (551-52). Just as Tereus had been thrilled at the “thought” of a city in the sky (195), these initially skeptical birds are won over by Peisetairos’ dramatic representation of a “terrible [awe-inspiring] citadel” (553). The birds further deem such a citadel proper to their status; a superlatively divine status that Peisetairos has persuaded them they have always possessed (468ff). Flattered, these birds accept Peisetairos and his companion into their fold, and further permit them to sprout “wings”. Wings subsequently become the primary token in the play for the much sought after conditions of freedom, levity and peace (654-55ff).

However, complications persist in this new city, which Peisetairos has appropriately named “Cloudeuckooland” (819). While the birds and Peisetairos’ “hopeful” companion are (off-stage) building the city wall, mortal intruders begin to appear. Wishing to perform a traditional founding deed for the new city, these intruders enter one after the other pestering Peisetairos with regulations and proposals. Each of these intruders are then chided and one by one dismissed, including Meton, a famed geometrician who arrives with a special pair of “compasses” (flexible “air-rulers”) to measure, divide, and re-design the layout of the sky (859-1055).⁹² Other mortals who have caught wind of the airy city also appear on the scene. These mortals, having gone “bird crazy”, desperately want their very own pair of “wings” (1284-1469). Meanwhile, “war” breaks out between the emboldened birds and the threatened gods (1189ff); and, among the birds, internal conflict erupts, with dissenters being caught and punished on the barbecue (1583-84). Along with this, various agitated gods begin to arrive, including the messenger Iris with a warning about Zeus’ anger (1171-1261). Then Prometheus arrives with a report on Zeus’ vulnerability, as well as with some advice on how the enterprising mortal (Peisetairos) might, if he wishes, usurp Zeus by marrying “Sovereignty” (*Basileia*)—the Princess who tends to his thunderbolt (1493-1551). Finally, a divine embassy arrives (including Poseidon, Heracles and a Thracian god) with “instructions to discuss a settlement... to end the war”—and, so, procure peace (1576-88). Persuasive, even among these formidable figures, Peisetairos urges them to a reconciling “truce”—on *his* conditions (1599). This play then ends with a comic yet disturbing scene in which the protagonist flaunts his complete victory: the winged

⁹² This intruder, Meton, who bears flexible “air-rulers” (*kanones aeros*, 999), as a pair of “compasses” (*diabētēn*, 1003), was a known historical figure. See the note to these lines 992-1020 in Dunbar (2002). The other intruders include a priest, a poet, an oracle collector/proclaimer, an inspector, and a decree seller.

Peisetairos—“having conquered in all ways” (1752)—leads his subjects (the birds), out of the orchestra together with, on the one hand, his newly awarded Princess bride and, on the other hand, the terrible thunderbolt taken from Zeus—a menacing token, descriptively qualified as a “winged missile” (575, 1714, 1748ff).

This brings to an end the survey of accomplishments, manners and motives of four comparable peace-seekers in Aristophanes’ *Acharnians*, *Lysistrata*, *Assembly Women*, and *Birds*. I am now in a better position to recognize and articulate how Trygaeus’ actions and accomplishments in *Peace* are unique in relation to the other protagonists. As mentioned above, it is my premise that understanding the uniqueness of Trygaeus’ performance (in the corpus of Aristophanes’ drama) will help to clarify the ways in which *architecting* qualified his performance appropriately. Before returning to interpret Trygaeus’ actions, however, it is helpful to make a few general observations on the comedies just described.

ARCHITECTURAL CONDITIONS AND SITUATIONAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE COMIC ORCHESTRA

3.3

Besides providing comparative grounds to help clarify Trygaeus’ architectural acts in *Peace*, this review of related comedies has also made apparent particular ways in which architectural conditions are implicated in them. For example, architectural conditions are found in the particular settings conjured by the dramas, notably in those civic and religious settings wherein negotiations for peace are publically staged: the open area of the Pnyx (where the “Assembly” gathered); and the open area before the Propylaea, the “Gateways” of the Acropolis (through which worshippers, pilgrims, and visiting ambassadors periodically passed). Respectively, these settings (the Pnyx and the Propylaea) are most active in the opening scene of *Acharnians* and in the climactic reconciliation scene of *Lysistrata*. In the course of each of these dramas the open area of the theatrical orchestra momentarily becomes these other sites of Athenian topography. Architectural conditions are implicated in another way in the *Assembly Women*, when Praxagora, standing before her common house, proposes transformations for the city that would alter particular settings by changing the activities that these settings typically host. Her proposal to turn the raised platforms in the courts into revered places for the delivery of poetry (instead of accusations and defenses) exemplifies such a transformation. Additionally, Praxagora’s metaphoric proposition to rethink the city as a household

implicates architectural conditions by imagining different environments (city and house) as performing analogously.

Yet, there is a more fundamental way in which architectural conditions are implicated in each of these dramas: by the representative capacity of the theatrical orchestra itself, which plays host to situational transformation. At different times throughout the same play, the open orchestra momentarily becomes a variety of places, each sponsoring particular dramatic exchanges. *Acharnians*, provides a case in point. At the start of this drama, the orchestral site becomes the Athenian Assembly-place (the Pnyx, wherein peace is initially skirted). Once the Assembly adjourns, this same site becomes, in turn: the open orchestra itself, which hosts the transformative effects of the peace “treaty” (173ff); then, the rural area before the protagonist’s home, which hosts the Dionysian celebration (202ff); and, then, the area just outside the house of Euripides, who provides Dikaeopolis with tragic props for his “just” arguments (394ff). The orchestra subsequently becomes again the very theater of Dionysus, which hosts Dikaeopolis’ para-tragic speech to the chorus (496-508); then, a common market-place, which hosts commercial exchanges (719ff); then, again, the rural area before the protagonist’s home (969ff); and, in the end, a Dionysian site, hosting a drinking contest.⁹³ These transformations are brought about not simply by a willing suspension of disbelief but by particular dramatic actions, including figurative allusions in speech and gesture; a proliferation of tangible and implied properties; as well as timely engagements of the orchestral limits, notably the skēnē’s central door and the front row of seats delimiting the area of the chorus. Whereas the orchestral situation during *Acharnians* is remarkable for its many iterative shifts, the orchestral area during Aristophanes’ *Peace* is remarkable for hosting simultaneous extremes. For, in *Peace* the orchestra becomes the area just outside the heavenly halls of Zeus, only to become again—or rather remain—the very theater of Dionysus. In other words, the orchestra conjures the most distant heavens while at the same time maintaining (via Trygaeus’ meta-theatrical asides delivered directly to the spectators) awareness of the present earthly and shared civic situation.

Unlike tragic settings, which tend to be stable for the duration of a single drama, comic settings tend to shift. Indeed, the comic orchestra seems to have been a special

⁹³ On the spatial ambiguity and temporal fluidity in *Acharnians*, the plot of which suggestively moves through each season and each corresponding Dionysian festival, see Slater (1993), esp. 401, where he emphasizes the special Dionysian dimension of these changes. For instance, the “tasting” of the (wine) “treaty”, not only prompts the move from war to peace and the altered mood of the protagonist but also initiates a change of setting.

place for dramatizing situational shifts—for testing the potentiality of civic settings to become otherwise.⁹⁴ As such (and as suggested above) the theatrical orchestra provided a theoretical, critical and operative forum for representing the city and its surroundings areas in ways that have architectural implications. Such implications are most perceptible in Aristophanes’ *Birds*, for it is in this play that architectural conditions are not only conjured in the course of the drama but also implicated directly in the central problem (or *agon*) of the play. Thus, Aristophanes’ *Birds* requires greater elaboration.

A DETOUR IN CLOUDCUCKOOLAND

AN *ARCHŌN* WHO IS NOT ARCHITECTING AND A *TECHNĒ* THAT IS AS DRAMATIC AS IT IS TECTONIC

3.4

Although Aristophanes’ *Birds* is set in a marginally nebulous place, architectural conditions are implicated most ostensibly in it, since Peisetaerus proposes a “plan” (*bouleuma*) that involves founding a city and building its walls (162). Peisetaerus further persuades others to accept his “plan” with compelling arguments and representations (162ff); he provides detailed instructions to those who will build it (550ff, 836–44); and he names the place he has proposed (819). However, even though Peisetaerus appears to involve architectural conditions more directly than any of the other comic protagonists, and even seems to be acting like an architect, he is not, like Trygaeus, said to be architecting. Perhaps this is because Peisetaerus is acting more as a city “founder” (*oikistēs*, 1277),⁹⁵ and as the “ruler” (*archōn*, 1123) and “King” (*turannos*, 1708) of the city he founds. A discussion of the ancient institution of city founding (and the architectural acts implicit in it) is beyond the scope of this study.⁹⁶ It is pertinent, however, to elaborate briefly on Peisetaerus’ entitlement as *archōn*, for the dramatic

⁹⁴ As Alberto Pérez-Gómez has compellingly shown, the dramatic orchestra provides a “paradigmatic site for the revelation of architectural order”. Pérez-Gómez and Pelletier (1997), 51, cf. Pérez-Gómez (1994).

⁹⁵ Toward the end of the play an eager herald greets Peisetaeros as: “O founder (*oikistēs*) of the most glorious aetherial city...” (1277). Earlier in the play, Peisetaeros’ actions are also put into terms of “founding”, as when he first proposes to “found (*oikisate*) a single city” (173). The related verbs “to found” (*oikizein*), “to settle” (*katoikein*), and “to settle-down (or establish)” (*kathidruen*) are invoked throughout the play (cf. 45, 152, 183, 194, 964).

⁹⁶ On the institution of city founding and the cult of its “founder”, or “settler” (*oikistēs*), also called the “first leader” (*archēgetēs*), see Malkin (1987); Dougherty (1993); Jeffery (1961); Bowie (1993), 151–177; and Detienne (1998)—who casts Apollo as “architect” when discussing this god’s oracular role at Delphi in prompting such city founders.

situation in which this title is assigned to him suggestively links him to *tektones*, and to the direction of their work.

In Aristophanes' *Birds*, the only time that Peisetaerus is called *archōn* is at the moment he receives a detailed report from a messenger about the progress of construction on the "wall" that he had earlier commanded the birds to build. Upon rushing into the orchestra and invoking Peisetaerus as "*archōn*" (1123), this messenger reports that the wall is "completely built" (*exōikodomētai*, 1124), and that its appearance is magnificent, its width extraordinary, its height towering, and its "carpenters" (*tektones*)—being woodpeckers—"exceptionally skilled" (*sophotatoi*, 1154-55). Peisetaerus, then, is here called an *archōn* in specific relation both to sophisticated *tektones* and to a magnificent "wall" (*teichos*). Although we may consider this *archōn*, these *tektones*, and this "wall" as exemplifying architectural conditions, we must acknowledge that the description of the work is given hyperbolically and in jest. For, according to the messenger, this "wall" is *so* wide as to allow two chariots hitched to two Trojan Horses to pass on top (1126-29); *so* high ("one hundred fathoms") as to be twice as tall as Babylon (1130-31); and *so* well-built not only by sophisticated woodpeckers, "who pecked out the gates with their beaks", but also by "ten thousands storks", who bore bricks in their bills, and "thirty thousand cranes", who hoisted the masonry (1133-41). Hence, this ridiculously inflated report should be heard as an elaborate parody both of architectural magnificence and of the magisterial ambitions of the *archōn* whose "plan" (*bouleuma*)—intent, wish, or will—it was to build such a bigger-than-Babylon wall.⁹⁷

One could take this comic portrayal of an ambitious *archōn* as a general parody of over-reaching colonizers and tyrants;⁹⁸ or, as a more targeted critique aimed at local Athenian *archōns*—those "magistrates" who were appointed each year by lot to administer, on behalf of the people, the city's religious festivals (including the *Dionysia*), and not to over-build the civic infrastructure and sacred sanctuaries (as some may have

⁹⁷ Nan Dunbar (2002) has suggested that this exchange parodies the detailed description of Babylon in Herodotus' *Histories* (1.178-79)—a description Aristophanes would have known. See her note to lines 1125-31 in *Birds*.

⁹⁸ The failed Athenian mission to Sicily the previous year (415 BCE) may be parodied in Aristophanes' *Birds*. Konstan (1997) summarizes the views on this hypothesis in the course of developing his own. A comparable parody of colonizing ambitions seems implied in a verse of Euripides' fragmentary tragedy *Erechtheus*, in which newly founded cities are described as game boards, with their settlers as game pegs that do not quite fit (Frag. 360.7-13 Loeb).

been tempted to do).⁹⁹ Yet, here, it is most helpful to see the architectural ambitions of the *archōn* in *Birds* in distinct relation to the ambitious architecting demonstrated in *Peace*, since this distinction suggests further reasons why Aristophanes withheld the activity from Peisetaerus, but granted it to Trygaeus, whose ambitions and accomplishments were quite different. Indeed, by comparison, one even can take Trygaeus' "architecting" in *Peace* as performing in opposition to Peisetaerus' "walling" (*teichizein*), "walling-off" (*apoteichizein*), "walling-round" (*periteichizein*), "fencing" (*phrassein*), and "building" (*oikodomein*) in *Birds*.¹⁰⁰ For, whereas Trygaeus' "architecting" ultimately aims to regenerate the city, to liberate Peace, to rejuvenate the people, and to set-up a divine statue conspicuously for all to behold; Peisetaerus' "building" activities aim to abandon the city, to colonize the sky, to subjugate the birds, and to cut-off mortal communication with the gods by blockading the ethereal realm through which the smoke and fragrance of burnt offerings would rise.¹⁰¹ In Aristophanes' *Peace*, Trygaeus commands just one comparably obstructive, or "blockading", activity: as he takes flight on the beetle he urges all mankind to "wall-off... the privies and alleyways" so that his heaven-bound dung-beetle will not become distracted by the scent of mortal dung (99-100).¹⁰² Trygaeus' "walling-off", then, does not, like Peisetaerus', aim to interrupt mortal communication with the gods, but rather to

⁹⁹ In Athenian democracy, the primary duties of these *archōns* involved maintaining civic and religious traditions on behalf of the people. For instance, the office of the *archōn basileus* (King *archōn*) involved administering the city's most ancient festivals (the Eleusinian Mysteries, the Arrephoria, the Panathenaia, the Anthesteria, and the Lenaia). The office of the *archōn epōnymos* (whose name entitled the year) involved administering the more recently established festivals (including the *City Dionysia*). And the office of the *War archōn* (*Polemarch*) involved administering the rites pertaining to war—including, propitiatory sacrifices (to Artemis and Ares), public funerals, and commemorative funeral games held in honor of those who had fallen in battle. The duty, or "office" (*archē*), of each of these Athenian *archōns* was thus primarily defined by the "ancient" (*archai*) traditions, and newer comparable customs, they were obliged to uphold (and not on an abstract idea of authority). Given that such traditions (festivals and sacred practices) took place at particular sanctuary sites, administering the upkeep of those sites would have also been an integral aspect of their office. It is easy to imagine then that some *archōns* would also have become overly-involved in ambitious building projects. Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution* is a primary source for the duties of *archōns*; see Simon (1983), and Garland (1984), esp. 111-13.

¹⁰⁰ Line numbers respectively: 838; 552; 1576; 182; 1125 and 1133.

¹⁰¹ Interrupting the aromas of sacrificial offerings is central to Peisetaerus' argument in *Birds*, for he persuades the birds that they can tax the gods for the pleasure of receiving the fragrant smoke—which must pass through their domain first (190-93).

¹⁰² The verb for walling-off here is, more literally, to "build-up" (*an-oikodomein*).

restrain those malodorous emanations that might hinder his own heavenly ascent and intended communication with Zeus. Furthermore, in Aristophanes' *Peace*, there is just one comparable "building" activity that is hyperbolically described; and this comes not in a moment of parody but in the *parabasis*—a special song of the chorus, performed soon after the climactic recovery of Peace. In this song, the chorus members turn directly to the spectators (and to the dramatic judges) to extol the virtues of their own performance. As they do so, they claim that their "comic poet [Aristophanes]... [is] worthy of high praise... [for] by getting rid of... lowbrow buffoonery, he's made our art (*technē*) great and *built it up* (*oikodomēsas*) to towering size with impressive verses, conceptions, and uncommon jokes" (734-50). The great edifice under construction in *Peace*, then, is the drama itself; a work composed by Aristophanes with poetic elements: "verses" (*epos*), "conceptions" (*dianoias*) and "uncommon jokes" (*skōmmasin ouk agoraiois*). Compared to the "building" activities parodied in *Birds*, the "building" activities celebrated by the chorus in *Peace* are aimed more at opening-up the potential for anagogic speculation than at walling-off such lofty communicative exchange. Perhaps, then, we ought to take "architecting" in *Peace* to include directing the "building-up" of divine pursuits through such dramatic poetry as the chorus members demonstrate and describe.

Of course, one must grant that the building activities commanded by Peisetaerus are also constructs of the dramatic poet, and that Peisetaerus' "walls", be they parody or not, are "erected on a scaffolding of metaphor".¹⁰³ Indeed, just as in *Peace*, the only mention of *technē* in *Birds* comes in direct relation to dramatic poetry; specifically, when a composer of dithyrambs arrives "bird-crazy" to Cloudcuckooland in search of wings so that he may "fly on high and snatch from the clouds fresh preludes", for, as he explains, his "whole art (*technē*) depends on them!" (1383-87). Not unlike this "bird-crazy" poet, when Aristophanes refers to *technē* in his plays, the "art" of dramatic poetry, together with its composition, adjustment, bases and high aims, are primarily at stake.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ I quote here, the words of Gregory W. Dobrov (1997), 96, who shows how Peisetaerus' mastery is linked to his own mastery of metaphoric language.

¹⁰⁴ Craft-metaphors frequently qualify poetic arts in Aristophanes' dramas. For instance, in *Frogs*, which stages a poetic debate between Euripides and Aeschylus, the poets are qualified as "thought-builders" (*phronotektonos*, 820) and "melody-makers" (*melopoion*, 1250) who raise "heaven-high towers of rhyme" (*purgosas rhymata sumna*, 1004). Their wit is "brightly-polished" (877) and "neatly-chiseled" (957); and their verses are judged by weighing them on scales, measuring them line-by-line with rulers (*kanons*) and wedging them into brick-moulds to test their dramatic form (798-803, 1366). In *Women at the Thesmophoria*, the dramatic poet Agathon is shown in the act of composition. Before he appears, however,

This review of comparable comedies begins to reveal that, although architectural acts are explicitly implicated in Aristophanes' *Peace*, they are also generally active in his other dramas: active in the settings conjured within the orchestra; active in the transformative schemes proposed and pursued by protagonists; and active in the dramatic art of the poet, whose analogous *technē* involves not only devising well-crafted plots and verses but also representing civic transformation persuasively, and in its fullest frame of reference. The comparison of Peisetaerus' and Trygaeus' distinct intentions and accomplishments further suggests that, for Aristophanes, architecting did not simply involve planning to found cities, to build walls and to transform situations, but to do so in ways that might liberate and rejuvenate the people while also bringing them into conspicuous and phenomenal contact with positive, worldly and divine influences.

Now I must return this discussion to the particularities of *Peace*, so as to consider in more detail the dramatic accomplishments, manners and motives of its protagonist.

(pulled out from behind the skēnē on the ekkylēma), a servant describes his imminent activity: "[he] is going to construct the [beginnings] (*archas*) of a drama (*dramatos*). He is rounding fresh poetical forms, he is polishing them in the lathe and is welding them; he is hammering out sentences and metaphors; he is working up his subject like soft wax. First he models it and then he casts it in bronze" (52-7)—Eugene O'Neill, Jr., Trans. And, in *Knights*, a slave recalls an homage to Cratinus, entitled "Artificers of dexterous songs" (*Tektones eupalamōn humnōn*, 530). Such imagery is found in the earliest examples of Indo-European poetry, see below, p. 195, n 449. On the trope in *Aristophanes*, see the section entitled "*Le poète-architecte*" in Taillardat (1965), 438-39. The trope persists in ways that are relevant to Plautus' *architectus*-figures, notably in *Mosterllaria* (90-156) where, edification of oneself and one's children is compared to building and caring for a house (cf. 760-65). And in *Miles Gloriosus* (915-21), the *architectus* is said to have prepared his scheme as a ship-builder, having "laid down the keel true to line (*bene lineatam*)".

Whereas these tectonic tropes conjure a kind of word-smithing, *technē* more generally extends to a range of arts involving *performative* capacities in Athenian drama: discerning arts of seamanship and archery; interpretive and mantic *arts* of divination (like that of the seer Teiresias and the prophetic god Apollo); communicative arts of heraldry (like that of Hermes); strategic arts of scheming (as tends to be demonstrated by certain female protagonists); deceitful arts of trickery (as exemplified by Odysseus); persuasive and animating arts (like that of the magical sculptor Daidalos); musical and enchanting arts (as of Orpheus, Amphion and the Muses); and dramatically ambiguous arts of Dionysus. Sources for these are as follows: discerning arts (of seamanship and archery)—Sophocles' *Ajax* (357, 1121); interpretive and mantic *art*—Euripides' *Phoenician Women* (771, 954); *Hypsipyle* (Frag. 757.857, 890), and Frag. 87; Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* (357, 707, 562, 642, 707); *Antigone* (998); and Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (249, 1133, 1209); *Eumenides* (17); and *Seven Against Thebes* (25); Heraldry—Euripides' *Suppliant Women* (382); Sophocles' *Women of Trachis* (620) and *Philoctetes* (137); scheming—Euripides' *Medea* (322, 365, 402), *Iphigenia at Aulis* (744); and Frag. 87; deceit and trickery—Aeschylus, Frag. (322); Sophocles' *Philoctetes* (89, 769, 137), Euripides' *Rhesus* (953); *Iphigenia among the Taurians* (24); "the arts of Daedalus" (invoked for their persuasive force)—Euripides' *Hecuba* (838); musical and enchanting arts—*Bacchae* (674, 806). Cf. the long list of "arts" Prometheus claims to have given to human society in *Prometheus Bound* (477ff).

In the comedies presented above “peace” manifests most palpably as a flask of potent wine (in *Acharnians*), as a lively feminine figure (in *Lysistrata*), as a dramatic series of metaphors (in *Assembly Women*), and as an ambiguous pair of wings (in *Birds*). In *Peace*, however, Peace manifests most divinely (as a goddess), most enduringly (as a statue “installed” within the orchestral grounds), and most diversely (since “Peace” is conjured not only with images of wine, animate femininity, dramatic potentiality and soaring levity, but also with civic, social and worldly consequences that extend beyond those peaceful benefits figured forth in the other plays). Furthermore, Trygaeus’ way of procuring peace involves not only “just”, “loosening”, “effective” and “persuasive” modes of action, as the other protagonists exemplify and by their names personify, but also other agencies pertinent to “architecting”, including “directing” (*phrazein*), and acting meta-theatrically. By acting meta-theatrically I mean acting in ways that, on the one hand, reflexively draw attention to the artifice of dramatic poetry, and, on the other hand, interpretively mediate between the conjured world of the drama and the situated world of the spectators. Niall Slater has called Aristophanes’ *Peace* the “most metatheatrical” of his extant plays,¹⁰⁵ and Edith Hall has emphasized that, “*Peace* is tied more closely than any other Aristophanic work to its immediate historical situation.”¹⁰⁶ Although meta-theatricality as an interpretive construct is not central to my arguments,¹⁰⁷ such agencies do pervade Trygaeus’ performance in *Peace*, just as they also inform the actions of the “architects” in Euripides’ *Cyclops*, and the role of Odysseus (as a storyteller within the story) in the *Odyssey*, as will later be shown.¹⁰⁸ Thus, as I proceed to interpret the architectural acts of Trygaeus, his meta-theatrical acts will also be revealed.

¹⁰⁵ Slater (2002), 115.

¹⁰⁶ Hall (2006), 327.

¹⁰⁷ On the meta-theatrical aspects of Aristophanes’ comedy and the status of scholarship on the topic, see Slater (2002).

¹⁰⁸ See below, for instance, p. 202, 227-28 (n. 546), 233, and 240. Meta-theatrical agencies are also demonstrated by the *architectus*-figures of Plautus. See, for instance, Slater (1985) and Moore (1998)—although these studies do not place any special emphasis on the *architectus* title in relation to the protagonist’s meta-theatrical acts.

If a divine, enduring and manifold “Peace” is what Trygaeus restores in this drama, and if “architecting” can be understood to gather his diverse modes of action, what then are his motives, or motivating desires? Posed differently, what constitutes the problematic situation that prompts this protagonist to act in the first place? Simply put, Trygaeus desires peace because he is exasperated by perpetual war. His experience of war on the mortal plane, followed by his discovery of War’s concealment of Peace in the heavens, together motivate him to lead a two-fold plan: to retrieve Peace on behalf of all the people; and to (re)install Peace enduringly upon the earth—within the very milieu threatened by War. Thus, the absence of Peace and the ongoing threat of War, together constitute the basic problem of this play and together qualify the problematic situation motivating the protagonist to act in the ways that he does.

Such a basic plot—peace is lacked, then Peace is regained—has led some interpreters of Aristophanes’ *Peace* to judge it as his most simple play. And yet, while pointing out its simplicity (sometimes dismissively), these same interpreters also emphasize that the play is unique in its manner of dramatization.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, although the central problem (or *agon*) of the drama can be stated simply, it is not so simply represented in the play. Rather, the profound lack of peace is made dramatically apparent in a number of ways, the most significant of which involve political, allegorical and metaphoric representation. Politically, the negation of peace is shown most strongly with verbal scorn aimed directly at all the citizens gathered in the actual theater who, by their political misconduct, prevent peace from emerging. Allegorically, the loss of Peace is represented with a dramatic interlude staged in the heavens among a cast of personified agencies and suggestive props (including, Peace, War and Riot, as well as an instructive

¹⁰⁹ Jeffrey Henderson (1975), for instance, notes that the story of *Peace* is “simpler” than his other plays that treat the same theme (such as *Acharnians*), and that its “method of dramatizing” is “more symbolic” (p. 62). Cedric H. Whitman (1964) judges *Peace* to lack both a complex plot and significant character development—“yet... its verbal and imagistic wealth is abundant” (p. 104). Hans-Joachim Newiger (1980) also finds *Peace* to be unique alongside Aristophanes’ other peace-plays; suggesting that, compared to *Acharnians* and *Lysistrata*, *Peace* presents its themes most directly and symbolically, and takes its metaphors literally (p. 226). K. J. Dover (1972) also regards *Peace* as thematically comparable to *Acharnians*, but different in its “composition and in the characters of their heroes” (137). In spite of innumerable illuminating comments by these scholars on *Peace*, I have not found a thorough analysis of *Peace*’s peculiar mode of dramatization. It is also worth noting that due to its apparent simplicity, some scholars have been outright dismissive of the play, thus not studying it in detail. Niall W. Slater sums up such (unwarranted) scholarly opinion by saying: “few would list it among his best plays”. See Slater (2002), 115, with further references.

mortar and allusive pestle). Metaphorically, the dearth of peace is variously represented throughout the play; most forcefully, it is shown in the opening scene with an odiferous immersion in dung—the profane stuff that fuels the dung-beetle, thus propelling the protagonist’s heavenly ascent and initiating his restorative scheme.

It is helpful to regard in detail each of these manners of dramatic representation (political, allegorical and metaphoric) for two primary reasons: first, in order to recognize how these displays of Peace’s absence prefigure and then yield to enduring and (arguably) architectural representations of Peace’s presence; and, second, in order to see how Trygaeus’ actions are crucial in revealing and bringing about these transformations. And so, throughout the extensive discussion that follows, I am arguing that architectural representation both underlies and entails these other modes of dramatic representation. In other words, although the following chapters focus on the political, allegorical and metaphoric representations of Peace’s absence turned presence, it is architectural representation and transformation—as dramatic modes—that remain my primary theoretical concerns.

POLITICAL MISCONDUCT, CONTEMPORANEOUS TROUBLE AND PRODUCTIVE SEASONS OF DISCONTENT

4.1a

Politically, the lack of peace is represented throughout the play with verbal scorn for those—among the “people” (*dēmos*), among the “Greeks” (*Hellēnas*), and among the very “spectators” (*theatai*)—who, by their own political misconduct, prevent Peace from emerging. Trygaeus, the chorus, Hermes and even Peace herself voice complaints against such individuals whose obstructive behavior they oppose. Trygaeus specifically holds self-interested “sycophants” and “lovers of litigation” in contempt—emphasizing that these troublemakers exemplify what he is not (190-91).¹¹⁰ Later, the chorus members, who are themselves eager for peace, wish to be distinguished from “bitter jurymen”—from all those who, reluctant to compromise, are ever ready to condemn (349).¹¹¹ The chorus members also target “regimental commanders” (*taxiarchon*) for critique, not only because these commanders have pompously led their troops into battles that they themselves were then the first to flee,¹¹² but also because these same commanders have committed social “injustices” (*adikēsan*) by treating city folk with lenience and farmers with undue abuse (1172ff). Hermes augments these mortal protests with divine interpretation. In the course of explaining why the gods have abandoned “the Greeks” in disgust, Hermes characterizes the typically distrustful, conspiratorial and aggressive ways of these Greeks, who stubbornly persist in their misconduct even when they should be negotiating for peace on behalf of the people (211-20). Later, in the course of explaining how Peace came to perish, Hermes delivers more particularized scorn. As mentioned above, he specifically implicates Pheidias (the architect/sculptor) and Pericles (the patron/statesman) in the colossal “trouble” that initiated Peace’s

¹¹⁰ Standing at heaven’s door, Trygaeus introduces himself (to Hermes) for the first time in the play, as “Trygaeus of Athmonum, an accomplished vintager, *no* sycophant and *no* lover of litigation (*erastēn pragmatōn*)” (190-91).

¹¹¹ Hermes reiterates the chorus’ distaste for “bitter jurymen” (*dikastēn drimun*) later in the play when, during the hoisting scene, he accuses certain uncooperative members of the chorus of “accomplishing nothing but litigation (*dikazete*)” (506).

¹¹² 919, 992, 1130, 1172ff. In addition to this particularized scorn for “regimental commanders”, the chorus also gives voice, throughout the play, to the various unpleasantnesses of war: to its constraining formations and uniforms (303, 561); to its emblems of terror (561); and to its limited rations of onions (312); etc.

disappearance (603-14). Hermes then blames the irascible manners of the Greeks, and the greedy tendencies of their allies, for having exacerbated that “trouble” (607-27). The messenger god further condemns urbane “speakers”, not only for having misled the naïve farmers who had sought refuge from war within the city (and among the citizens), but also for having agitated the people generally by stirring-up their suspicions and fears (632-48). Most strikingly, Peace herself issues a formal charge, or “complaint” in this play.¹¹³ Upon being rescued, this speaking statue (via her interpreter Hermes) accuses the very “spectators” gathered in the theater of inconsiderately voting-down her peace-treaties when seated in “Assembly” (*Ekklēsia*, 658-67). She goes on to accuse “the people” (*dēmos*) of having thoughtlessly elected malicious “guardians” for themselves (684). And, by her questions, Peace further suggests that these “people” have turned their backs on what she holds to be most dear: “archaic things” (*ta archaia*), such as the poetry of Sophocles and Cratinus, which began to perish, she claims, at the same time she did (694ff).

All of these accusations, most forcibly those of Peace, are delivered directly to the assembled audience. In this emphatic meta-theatrical way, Trygaeus, the chorus, Hermes, and Peace herself invite us not simply to hear their political complaints but also to see the direct political relevance of their theatrical show. For, by their manner of performance we see these actors as political speakers, the on-looking “spectators” as chastened deliberators, and the entire dramatic event as an active session of “Assembly” and/or “Council”. These comparisons exemplify a frequent situational trope in the comedies of Aristophanes, wherein the theatrical orchestra suggestively becomes the open area of the Pnyx (where the Assemblymen typically gathered).¹¹⁴ Such meta-theatrical comparisons further reinforce the political agency of drama, and assert the civic importance of the theatrical institution.

As a satirical treatment of disingenuous citizens and dysfunctional politics, the variety of verbal scorn delivered throughout *Peace* is consistent with Aristophanes’ other political plays and suits well the comic genre that Aristophanes exemplifies. Yet, the unusually serious and direct satire found in *Peace* also stands as an especially fitting

¹¹³ This “complaint” (*epikaleis*) of Peace may have had some influence on Erasmus (a translator of Aristophanes’ plays), for much later in the Renaissance he composed his own “Complaint of Peace”—a monologue in which Peace scorns her contemporaries for their worship of War.

¹¹⁴ On the Pnyx, see above, p. 39 n. 79. This situational trope is exemplified also in the opening scene of *Acharnians* (as discussed above); throughout Aristophanes’ *Assembly Women* (*Ecclesiazousai*); and in the trial scenes of *Wasps*, *Clouds*, and *Frogs*.

response to the contemporaneous situation in Athens. For, at the time of the play's performance, the citizens were indeed embittered, irritable and in a general state of discontent, since they were themselves suffering from strained politics and perpetual war; namely, the Peloponnesian War, which in that spring of 421 BCE was already in its tenth year. Although this war between the Athenians and Spartans (and their respective allies) would ultimately last for thirty years, a particular incident during the summer prior to *Peace*'s performance had opened the possibility for a positive turn of events. For, during that summer (of 422 BCE), Kleon and Brasidas (the pugnacious leaders of the Athenians and Spartans, respectively), had both been killed in battle.¹¹⁵ With these aggressive leaders eliminated, reconciliation among the Athenians and Spartans finally seemed possible. Indeed, soon after the death of these aggressors, both sides "turned their attention to peace", as the ancient historian Thucydides, who lived through this very war, attests (5.14.1). According to Thucydides, these peace negotiations began optimistically soon after the deadly summer battle, but then dragged on throughout the ensuing fall and winter—seasons that must have yielded increasing anxiety for the people (5.17.2). Although nearing accord, the two sides were still negotiating peace in the very early spring of 421 BCE. We know this detail since Thucydides notes that their truce was finally ratified "at the end of winter, just at the beginning of spring, immediately after the *City Dionysia*" (5.20.1).¹¹⁶ In other words, peace was found just after the dramatic festival during which *Peace* was performed.

Although we do not know what persuasive effect Aristophanes' drama had on the actual peace negotiators (who were likely sitting among his spectators), we do know that the political atmosphere during that Pan-Hellenic festival of 421 BCE would have been optimistic and tense. We may also be fairly certain that like the play's chorus members who eagerly rush into the orchestra near the beginning of the play in response to Trygaeus' summons (292ff), all the people who had gathered on the Southern slope of the Acropolis to witness Aristophanes' drama were themselves longing for war to end and peace to return, *if only* the right leader would seize this opportunity to propose a proper plan for peace. Furthermore, we may safely presume that during those anxious seasons

¹¹⁵ Thucydides narrates the events surrounding this Battle of Amphipolis in book five of his *Peloponnesian War*. On the relevance of these events for Aristophanes' *Peace*, see Olson (1998), xxv-xxxi; and Sommerstein (2005), xvff. Cf. Ste. Croix (1972), 231-44.

¹¹⁶ This truce is known as the "Peace of Nikias", named after the Athenian statesman who led the negotiations. Edith Hall (2006), 326ff, has described Trygaeus as "Nicias' shadow", as a dramatic stand-in for this historic peace-making politician.

just prior to the *City Dionysia*—that hopeful fall and uncertain winter of negotiations—Aristophanes was himself composing and rehearsing his scheme for *Peace*. Perhaps he was doing so in a positive state of melancholy, not unlike the madly optimistic mood that Trygaeus is said to have been in at the start of play.¹¹⁷ Thus, with all these historically reflective motivations and meta-theatrical associations, Aristophanes' *Peace* offers (together with comedy) serious mimetic testimony to a contemporaneous situation—a problematic yet hopeful situation that motivated the dramatic protagonist to attempt restorative action, and stirred the concerned dramatist to represent that hypothetical action in terms of architecting.

A-POLITICAL INCLINATIONS: PURSUING HARE-BRAINED SCHEMES

4.1b

Although the situation motivating Trygaeus to take action for the sake of Peace was clearly reflective of specific political problems involving diplomatic strife, democratic discord, social discontent, and the incessant threat of war, the particular mode of action that Trygaeus preliminarily engages in the play does not attempt to repair these problems via normal political procedures. This apparent avoidance of politics and its most obvious institutions stands out all the more when compared to the overtly political actions taken by certain peace-seeking protagonists in Aristophanes' other plays. Indeed, alongside these other agents, Trygaeus' preliminary action seems *a*-political. For, the serious lack of peace does *not* motivate Trygaeus to go directly to the "Assembly" (to persuade his fellow-citizens to discuss the topic more earnestly);¹¹⁸ nor to press for a reconciling "truce" (neither by hiring a special delegate to procure one, nor by coercing "Council" to host their adversaries for negotiations).¹¹⁹ Neither does Trygaeus trick the entire democratic body into voting him into power with a "show of hands" (so that he

¹¹⁷ Near the beginning of *Peace*, Trygaeus' own slave deems his master "crazy" (*matēn*, 95), "deranged" (*parapaieis*, 90), and "mad" (*mania*, 54, 64-5). He further suspects that this madness has been brought on by a bout of melancholy, or "(black) bile" (*cholē*, 66). Trygaeus' "mad" plan "to fly straight to Zeus" was modeled after the plan of Bellerophon, who Euripides had dramatized with similar qualities in his now fragmentary tragedy, *Bellerophontes*. See Riedweg (1990), esp. 49-50. The ancient Greek doctrine of humours, implicit in Athenian drama and pre-Socratic teachings, is more fully developed in later works, such as Aristotle's *Problemata* (XXX, i). See Klibansky et al (1964), and below p. 72, n. 154.

¹¹⁸ As Dikaepolis does in *Acharnians*.

¹¹⁹ As Dikaepolis does in *Acharnians*, and as the charming heroine does in *Lysistrata*.

might rule the city as he pleases).¹²⁰ Rather, Trygaeus acts preliminarily in a way that circumvents all such political institutions and procedures. Opting to engage the theater's stage machine, this architect-figure initially bypasses local and human authorities. Instead, he flies "beetle-back"—"straight to the gods"—in a dramatic move that is at once mythic, paratragic, allegorical, even hare-brained.¹²¹ Nevertheless, Trygaeus can claim this highly unconventional move as his most political and just act, since he dared to perform it publically and on behalf of others. Where this comic hero does appear willing to engage in more conventional political procedures, it is to boldly indict Zeus; for, as Trygaeus takes flight on the dung-beetle he warns that if Zeus refuses to reveal a plan for restoring worldly harmony he will "write him up" (*graphomai*, 107)—an official mode of public prosecution, and one that Justice herself (the daughter of Zeus), claims as a serious part of her office elsewhere in a relevant drama of Aeschylus.¹²²

Trygaeus' preliminary act on the dung-beetle, then, although seemingly a-political is, in many ways, also hyper-political. For, although Trygaeus engages theatrical devices in lieu of political institutions, he makes political use of those devices, hyperbolically: by taking his concern for worldly harmony directly to Zeus—the preeminent figure of "counsel" (*boulē*) and "justice" (*dikē*);¹²³ and by acting on behalf of

¹²⁰ As Praxagora does in the *Assembly Women*.

¹²¹ This move may be called "hare-brained", in part, because in the Aesopic fable that Trygaeus takes as his model it is the hare's *idea* to seek help from a dung-beetle. "Hares" also figure into *Peace*, for barbequed rabbit meat is one of the delicacies offered at Trygaeus' wedding feast (1150, 1196, 1313). Yet, the scheme may also be considered 'harebrained' because the phrase "Aetna beetle" (73) seems to have had such idiomatic connotations: expressing astonishment for phenomena that were marvelous yet monstrous, ingenious yet ludicrous. "Aetna beetle" expressions are also found in the fragmentary lines of Epicharmus' *Heracles* (Frag. 76); Plato Comicus' *Feasts* (Frag. 37); Aeschylus' satyr play *Sisyphus* (Frag. 127); and Sophocles' satyr plays *Trackers* (Frag. 314.307) and *Daidalos* (Frag. 162). On dung-beetles, in general, see Davis and Kathirithamby (1986), 83-89. In ancient Egyptian religion and mythology, dung-beetles, or scarabs, also figure prominently and profoundly, especially in the iconography and hieroglyphic representation of the god Khepera, "he who comes into being". Khepera was a manifestation of the rising Sun-god Rā, and associated with acts of creation, resurrection, protection and judgment. See Budge (1904), 354-58. In some instances, scarab-shaped medallions bear inscriptions commemorating the installation of obelisks and royal marriages, see Wilkinson (2008), 40-1.

¹²² On Aeschylus' so-called *Dikē Play* (which arguably has another *architecting*-figure in it), see below, p. 115-21.

¹²³ Trygaeus repeatedly emphasizes that he is going "straight (*euthu* / *orthos*) to Zeus" (68, 161, 77, 819 cf. 301). This bold intention performs metaphorically, since "straight" (*euthu*) and "upright" (*orthos*) are common tropes qualifying just acts. See, Havelock (1978), 252-54. Later in the play, Trygaeus again posits his deed as "just"; for as he prepares to take

so many others—all “the cities”, all “the Greeks”, and “all the people”. Furthermore, these hyper-political ambitions should be seen not merely as over-arching and broadly-reaching but also as profoundly archaic, or *pre*-political. This is partly because the Peace that is ultimately recovered in the play is a most basic, earthy and archaic figure; and partly because the special class of “people” that Trygaeus claims most emphatically to act on behalf of are best understood as “the founding people” (*laoi*)—representatives of a “pre-political social world”, as Johannes Haubold has argued.¹²⁴ These extreme dimensions of Trygaeus’ actions—to reach hyperbolically for such exemplary counsel (and justice), and to act so representatively, for and with “all the people”—must now be elaborated. First, the hyperbolic reach for “counsel”.

HYPER-POLITICAL AMBITIONS: SEEKING EXEMPLARY COUNSEL (*boulē*)

4.1c

As mentioned above, Trygaeus begins to recover peace neither by joining his fellow citizens in “Assembly” (*Ekklēsia*), nor by seeking advice from the members of “Council” (*Boulē*). Rather, Trygaeus begins to recover Peace, more boldly, by seeking counsel of another sort and at a higher level: he seeks the divine counsel, or counseled plan, of Zeus. This we learn, first, from a slave who pronounces, incredulously, his “mad” master’s intent to go directly to Zeus and inquire: “what on earth do you *plan to do* (*bouleuei poiein*)” (58). A moment later we hear Trygaeus himself—as a voice from behind the skēnē—rehearsing this same question in protest: “Zeus! What on earth are you trying to do to our people?” (62). Then, again, from above—while in full view upon his heaven-bound dung-beetle—Trygaeus reasserts his “intent” (*noos*): to go *straight* to Zeus to ask, “what he’s *planning to do* (*poiein bouleuetai*) [about the Greeks]” (104-06).¹²⁵

This hyperbolic ambition to obtain the “plan”, or “will”, of Zeus resonates with tragic tales of mortal hubris, and with epic portrayals of Zeus’ omniscience. For, in

“Harvest” as his prized wife, he rhetorically asks whether he is not being *rightly* or “justly” (*dikaiōs*) rewarded: “And *rightly*, no? For I alone rode on beetle-back and saved the Greeks, who now can all live safely in the countryside...” (865-7).

¹²⁴ This special group (the *laoi*) was invoked on occasions when political and sacred institutions were either being founded for the very first time, or being re-founded ceremonially, as will be discussed further below. See Haubold (2000), 163-73.

¹²⁵ The Greek verb for “planning” (*bouleuein*) is cognate with *Boulē*, the Council of five-hundred advisors who, by performing this activity, preliminarily put forth a “plan” (*boulē*).

Greek myth there is more than one tale of divine punishment delivered to those who had presumed they could gain such counsel;¹²⁶ and, in epic and dramatic poetry, there are specific reminders that the “intent”, or “mind (*noos*), of Zeus is ever stronger than that of man” (*Iliad* 16.688), and that the “plan”, or “will” (*boulē*), of Zeus is inscrutable.¹²⁷ Of course, in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, the comic conceit to find out the plan of Zeus is not brought to fruition. For, once Trygaeus makes it to the heavens he does not learn what Zeus is “planning” (*bouleuein*), instead—in Zeus’ absence—he learns what War is “planning”. And, according to Hermes, War is planning to do “exactly as he pleases” (*atechnōs ho ti bouletai*, 206). This colloquial expression with which Hermes first presents War’s destructive plan suggests, more literally, that War will do thoughtlessly, or “artlessly” (*atechnōs*), whatever he “wishes” (*ho ti bouletai*).¹²⁸ Having no crafted intent, War’s careless plan is (in effect) no plan at all.¹²⁹ Soon after making this double discovery—of the unavailability of Zeus’ plan and the threat of War’s planless plan—Trygaeus himself begins to plan. Having hyperbolically sought divine counsel, Trygaeus is, thus, obliged to take counsel—with himself, with his situation, with others (Hermes and the chorus), and with exemplary models (such as Aesop)—and, so, devise a plan to rescue Peace.

Trygaeus’ subsequent proposition—to “draw-out Peace” (292)—is not, however, explicitly called a “plan” (*bouleuma*), such as the comparable “plans” of other scheming protagonists in Athenian drama are.¹³⁰ Neither is his own activity expressly qualified as

¹²⁶ The stories of Bellerophon, Phaethon and Salmoneus attest to the virtue of knowing one’s mortal limits. So, too, does an adage from the archaic poet Alcman: “Let no man fly to heaven or attempt to marry Aphrodite” Frag 1.16-17, in Campbell (1982), Vol. 2, 363.

¹²⁷ “The [plans] (*bouleuei*) of heaven are indeed frightening (*deina*) and inscrutable (*dusgnōsta*)” (Euripides Frag. 13a Loeb). This sentiment is also found toward the end of Aristophanes’ *Peace*, when a skeptical priest warns: “men... know not the mind (*noos*) of the gods” (1064). On “the plan (*boulē*) of Zeus, a marked topic in the *Iliad* from line 5 of the first book, see Lyn-George (1988), 37-41.

¹²⁸ According to Hermes, the Olympian gods also thoughtlessly, or “simply” (*atechnōs*), abandoned the heavens (199). This use of the colloquial adverb is relatively common in Aristophanes’ plays. Cf. *Clouds* 439. See Olson’s note to the line 199.

¹²⁹ The absence of Zeus’ “plan” and the threat posed by War’s “careless” (*atechnōs*) plan resembles the conditions that the architect-figure (Odysseus) faces in *Cyclops*. For, just before enacting his own plan, he fears that “chance” (*tuchēn*) might be the only god (606-07).

¹³⁰ In *Acharnians*, the chorus praises the peaceful “plan” (*bouleumatos*) and “good counsel” (*euboulías*) of Dikaeopolis (838, 1008). In the opening scene of *Assembly Women*, Praxagora begins to share her “plans” (*bouleumata*) secretly under lamplight (17). And in *Birds*,

“planning” (*bouleuei*). Nevertheless, Trygaeus’ dramatic actions show that he himself begins *to do* (*poiein*) what he thought Zeus ought to be doing: bearing witness to War’s mistreatment of Peace and the people (236-88); recognizing the “great danger” (and injustice) of this situation (264); and intending to do something about it (292). Trygaeus, then, goes on to demonstrate the development of his plan with a series of decisive actions: seizing the opportunity to act; summoning “the people” to help him; and proposing that, together, they “draw-out Peace, the friend of us all” (292ff). It is at this point in the play that these summoned “people”, the assembled chorus, qualify Trygaeus’ activity as “architecting” (305). And this activity (interrelated with “planning”), then continues, for Trygaeus goes on: tempering the chorus’ enthusiasm (309ff); reminding them of their common goal (315); re-orchestrating them for collaborative work (309-45); and, then, pausing to take thought on how precisely to reach the concealed figure of Peace. This active pause is marked in the script by Trygaeus turning his gaze down toward the ground wherein Peace is hidden and saying, “Let me see” (*katidō*, 361)—an act that resonates with an exemplary (epic) mode of preliminary contemplation.¹³¹ Following this productive pause Trygaeus’ architecting (or planning) continues by: persuading Hermes to join in the work (362-424); summoning the Graces, the Horai, Aphrodite and Desire to sway the work (431-56); and, then, encouraging, evaluating and adjusting the chorus’ performance as they, all together, draw-forth Peace with their ropes (464-510).

Even though Trygaeus’ proposition to “draw-out Peace” is not explicitly called a plan, this procession of performative acts—perceptive observations, expressed intentions, situated exchanges, and timely judgments—should be taken as demonstrative of his planning. The chorus members suggestively affirm this when, toward the end of the play, they cast such a processual series not only as comparable to the planning Trygaeus had

Peisetaerus puts forth his “plan” for a city in the sky, most boldly: “Oh what a grand *bouleuma* I see in the race of birds...” (*Birds* 162-63). Later in *Birds*, the proposition of Meton is also called a plan, for Peisetaerus asks him: “What form (*idea*) does your plan (*bouleumatos*) take?” (993). In *Lysistrata*, the heroine summons her collaborators to join her for “planning” (*bouleusomenaisin*, 14), then describes the “device” (*mēchanē*) she has in mind to counteract the bellicose ways of men (111, cf. 300). Many of the “plans” devised by scheming heroines in Euripidean tragedy are also called a *bouleumatos* (*Medea* 769, 772; *Helen* 1044, 1079; *Electra* 948; *Iphigenia Among the Taurians* 1290, 1431). Odysseus, however, devises a *dolon*, a deceptive “scheme” or “trick” (*Cyclops* 476).

¹³¹ In the *Iliad*, Odysseus is remembered as one who—before speaking—would first, “look down with eyes fixed on the ground (*kata chthonos*)” (3.218). Trygaeus’ own downward glance is marked in the script by his reference to “these stones” covering Peace (361).

initially sought from Zeus but also as part of the architecting they had demanded of him. Praising Trygaeus, they sing: “Surely all that God wills and fortune favors goes forward according to your intent (*kata noos*), with one success leading to another at just the right moment (*kata kairon*)” (939-41).¹³² Peace is coming to be restored, this chorus suggests, by Trygaeus’ own motivating desire for Peace, “according to [his] intent” (*kata noos*); and by his thoughtful responses to the contingencies of his peculiar situation, “according to the right moment”, or “opportunity” (*kata kairon*). And all this is not only “going forward” in agreement with divine will and fortune’s favor but is, more literally, being “set upright” (*kat-orthoi*), just like the divine statue of Peace herself, which Trygaeus (just a few lines earlier) had promised to “install” (923). Thus, the “plan” of this architecting-figure proceeds both in opposition to Polemos and in imitation of divine planning, which, though absent, was sought.

Two further points should be noted before moving on. First, the chorus’ praise for the intentional and processual planning of the protagonist echoes the way they had earlier qualified the intentional and processual work of the dramatic poet; for, in their parabasis (the self-reflexive song about the play), they had promised to tell the spectators about their “intent”, or what they have in “mind” (*noos*), and about their “path of words” (*odon logōn*, 733).¹³³ Secondly, the importance of acting as a guiding agent, or guiding “mind” (*noos*), in situations that are full of contingencies, would become persistently associated with “architects” in early Greek thought.¹³⁴

¹³² The chorus praise Trygaeus in various ways in the closing scene of the drama, extolling his “good spirit” (864), “wise mind” (*sophe phreni*) and “resourceful daring” (1029-30). They further deem him to be “good for all the citizenry” (909-10); “a savior for all mankind” (914); a paradigmatic citizen, the “envy (*zēlōtes*) of everyone” (1035); and simply the best, or “first” (*prōton*)—“next to the gods” (917).

¹³³ The way, road, or “path of words” (*odon logōn*) is a poetic commonplace apparent already in the *Odyssey*, specifically when Odysseus praises the Phaeacian minstrel’s Muse-inspired “paths of song” (*oimas aoidōn*, 8.481 cf. 8.74). See Olson’s note to this line in *Peace*.

¹³⁴ Where Plato and Aristotle do mention “architects”, it is usually their knowing guidance that they value: providing not “manual labor” (*cheirourgian*), but leadership toward aims (*eustochia*), *logos* and “knowledge” (*gnosini*). See, Plato *Statesman* 259e; Cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 981a30, 1013a10; *Nichomachean Ethics* 1141b20, 1152b1; and *Politics* 1260a15, 1282a1, 1325b20; and Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.2.10.

The statesman Demades (c. 380-319 BCE) asserts this valuation more dramatically by personifying “Intent”, or Mind (*Noos*), as “architect”. In the midst of a lengthy speech (a self-defense of his own skills as a counselor), Demades introduces this persuasive aside: “Force does not enable a man to master even the smallest things. It was inventiveness (*epinoia*) and system (*methodō*) that made him yoke the ox to the plough for the tilling of the land, bridle the horse, set a rider on the elephant, and cross the boundless sea in boats of

Aside from Peisetaerus, who abandons the city, the other comparable peace-seekers in Aristophanes’ comedies (as presented above), claim to act on behalf of the “city” and the “Greeks”.¹³⁵ Trygaeus, however, claims to act not only for the “city” and the “Greeks” but for a much greater and more profound collection of others. Throughout *Peace* Trygaeus claims to be acting on behalf of various comprehensive groups: all “the cities”; “all the Greeks”; “all the Pan-Hellenic Greeks”; all the “common folk”; all the “peasant folk”; all the “mortals”; “all the sorry little humans”; all of “humankind”; all “the spectators”; and, most immediately, “all of you”.¹³⁶ Yet, at certain pivotal moments of the drama, Trygaeus acts, most basically, for and with those who have been called “the founding people”. As Johannes Haubold has shown, these “people” (*laoi*), tend to be evoked with poetic and ritual force when political and sacred institutions are just being founded, or re-founded.¹³⁷

It is helpful to gather the few instances in *Peace* in which Trygaeus invokes this special pre-political group, starting with his very first words of the play. These opening words of Trygaeus—called out while he still remains hidden behind the skēnē—signal a protest against Zeus’ apparent negligence to watch over “the people”: “Zeus! What on earth do you plan to do to *the people*?” (62). A moment later, we see Trygaeus soaring up to confront Zeus on the *people’s* behalf (82). Upon reaching the heavens and

wood. The *architektōn* and craftsman (*dēmiourgos*) of all these things is Mind (*Nous*), and we must [consult] it as our guide (*kathēgemoni*), not always seeking to follow the subtleties of our own [private interests] (*idias*) but rather the natural changes of events (*metaptōseis*)...” (*On the Twelve Years*, 42). J. O. Burt, Trans.

¹³⁵ Dikaepolis claims to act for “the city” (*Acharnians* 27, 75, 499); Praxagora acts for the “city” (*Assembly Women* 108, 175 etc.); and Lysistrata acts to save “all of Greece” (*Lysistrata* 29, 41, 46 etc.).

¹³⁶ Trygaeus acts on behalf of: all “the cities” (*poleis*, 63, 1035); “all the Greeks” (*pantōn Hellēnōn*, 93, 105, 293, 436, 1321); “all the Pan-Hellenic Greeks” (*ōi Panellēnes*, 302); all the “common folk” or, “fellow demesmen” (*ton dēmotēn*, 920); all the “peasant folk”, or “farmer people” (*geōrgikon leōn*, 921); all the “mortals” (*brotoi* 286); “all the sorry little humans” and “humankind” (*anthrōpia* 263, 914); all “the spectators” (*theatai*, 1115); and “all of you” (*humeis*, 150, 759). As Hall (2006), 326, observes, “[Trygaeus] is exceptional amongst Aristophanic heroes in that he represents the whole of the assembled city, inviting identification with virtually all Athenians present. He is humane, altruistic, and self-sacrificial (364-75); he is only self-interested insofar as his self-interest coincides with that of his fellow Athenians and Greeks.”

¹³⁷ Haubold (2000).

discovering the danger Peace is in, Trygaeus again invokes “all the *people*”, this time calling upon them to actually come forward and help rescue Peace. He summons this group (who subsequently appear as a heterogeneous chorus), first, by invoking their basic trades, outlying regions and humble social ranks (296-98);¹³⁸ and, then, by issuing a ritual call, “Come hither, all ye *people*” (*deur’ it ō pantes leōi*, 298). This call matches verbatim the legendary call of Theseus, the founding King of Athens. According to Aristotle, Theseus had, with these very same words, once called “all the *people*” together to re-settle the city of Athens as a democracy—“on equal conditions” (*epi tois isois*).¹³⁹ The profoundly ritualized dimension of these “people” perhaps explains how it is that they (the chorus) are able to suddenly appear in the heavens in response to Trygaeus’ call. For, unlike common mortals, these ritually and poetically-charged “people” are akin to the sacred setting from which they dramatically emerge in the play.¹⁴⁰ Soon after the chorus members (who, in part, perform as representatives of these “founding people”) help the protagonist to recover Peace, Trygaeus calls upon this special group again. When he is ready to announce—to all those assembled—the benefits they have together regained, Trygaeus cries out in the manner of a herald, “Hear, ye *people* (*akouete leōi*, 551).¹⁴¹ The good news following this formulaic cry is that the “whole world” has been

¹³⁸ Trygaeus specifically calls upon: the farmers, merchants, carpenters, craftsmen; the islanders; and the immigrants and foreigners (as noted above, p. 18).

¹³⁹ Aristotle’s historical note (Frag. 384) is preserved in Plutarch’s “Life of Theseus” (*Lives* 25.1), which reads: “Desiring still further to enlarge [augment, or amend] the city, he invited all men thither on equal terms (*epi tois isois*), and the phrase ‘Come hither all ye people’ (*to deur’ ite pantes leōi*), they say was a proclamation of Theseus when he established a people, as it were, of all sorts and conditions.” (Bernadotte Perrin, Trans.). For a discussion of this passage, see Haubold (2000), 170-71. As Haubold emphasizes, this ritual formulae of Theseus, although preserved in later sources (of Plutarch/Aristotle), is “faithfully recalled in drama”—specifically, in Aristophanes’ *Peace* (p. 180). Such a call is also prefigured in Homeric epic, in those calls of heralds, which assemble all the people for critical events: for counsel, for games, for funerals, and for receiving others into their group. The consequences of such events affect the broad community, cutting across all social ranks (*Iliad* 2.50ff, 9.10, 19.42; and *Odyssey* 8.7, etc). See Haubold’s “Appendix B”, *ibid*.

¹⁴⁰ Commentators on Aristophanes’ *Peace* sometimes take the sudden appearance of the mortal chorus in the heavens as a structural problem in the play, as does Dover (1972), 132-33. Cf. Hubbard (1991), who reviews the problems in his Appendix 3 “The Identity of the Chorus in the *Peace*”. Understanding the chorus as representative of the *laos* may help with the interpretation of this and other apparent contradictions in the chorus. On the “deeply un-prosaic notion” and “poetic-ritual force” of the *laos*, see Haubold (2000), 14.

¹⁴¹ Haubold (2000), 202, gathers the few other instances in Athenian drama where this ritual call is made.

replenished with peace; and that the farmers, liberated from the city, can now return to replant their fields (551-55). Later, having himself returned home to earth, Trygaeus invokes the “people” again. Just before announcing his intent to “install” Peace’s statue enduringly in the orchestra (923), he boldly claims that he deserves a reward for performing such restorative deeds, including freeing “the peasant *people*” (921, cf. 632). Finally, in the jubilant exit scene, as Trygaeus prepares to leave the orchestra with his new bride, he invites “all the *people*” to join in common rejoicing (1317).

To summarize, then, the drama *Peace* both begins and ends with the protagonist invoking the “founding people”, who are at first endangered (62) and in the end rejoicing (1317). The relative well-being of these “people” is thus a measure of the protagonist’s overall success.¹⁴² Trygaeus further involves these “people” rhetorically, ritually and poetically throughout the drama, each time he commences a re-founding act: as he prepares to recover Peace in the heavens (296); as he pronounces and, thus, re-inaugurates her benefits for all in the theater (551); as he begins to re-establish her statue in the city (921); and as he sets-forth to re-settle his own domestic life (together with Harvest) in the country (1317). Such (re)founding acts, as led by this architect-figure—in the heavens, in the theater, in the city, and in the country—resonate with other founding acts involving these “people” (*laoi*) as presented elsewhere in Athenian drama. Two such exemplary acts are relevant to note here. Near the end of Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* (458 BCE), the goddess Athena calls upon “the [founding] people” just as she establishes Athens’ first homicide court, together with this institution’s civic site, the Areopagus (681-84). And, in Euripides’ *Orestes* (408 BCE), a messenger recalls the time when King Danaus “first assembled the [founding] people” for public arbitration, thus inaugurating what would become known as the “Assembly” (*Ekklēsia*), together with this institution’s civic site, the Pnyx (872-73).¹⁴³ With such foundational acts in mind, it is easier to see in Aristophanes’ *Peace* how these pre-political “people” (*laoi*)—those who had previously been without such foundational institutions—would call upon a protagonist *to architect* on their behalf and, so, prepare enduring places for them to begin to perform politically.

¹⁴² Haubould (2000) makes this argument with respect to Homeric heroes and the “people” they lead in epic. Such people are, in a sense, touchstones of a leader’s success; although, as Haubould, shows Homeric leaders are rarely successful in saving their “people” (as Trygaeus, comically, *is* in *Peace*).

¹⁴³ Haubould (2000), 167, notes further examples (in Pindar and in reference to the Delphic oracle) where the *laos* were evoked in relation to the laying of foundations and the founding of cities.

A few observations about the semantic and metaphoric relevance of these “people” (*laoi*) are warranted before moving on. Whereas the “citizens” (*politai* or *dēmos*) are defined by the particular “city” (*polis*) or “region” (*dēme*) to which they belong, and the “commoners” (*hoi polloi*) are named for their anonymous “plurality” (*pollotēs*); the *laoi*—those called the “founding people”—are etymologically and conceptually bound to “stones” (*lithous*).¹⁴⁴ This basic association between “founding people” and “stones” recalls, on the one hand, the autochthonic myth of the Athenians—the tale that they, being indigenous, sprang spontaneously from the lithic soil of Attica in the manner of stones emerging from the earth.¹⁴⁵ Yet, on the other hand, associating living people with “stones” also reminds the present population of their own paradoxical strengths and vulnerabilities. As for their strength, the image of stone-like people conceptually asserts a sense of firm solidarity both individually, as stones, and in aggregate, as durable social constructs. Like individual stones in an architectural work, these “people” each contribute to the strength and integrity of a greater work, one much larger and more epic than themselves.¹⁴⁶ Metaphorically, then, one could compare (and allegorically assert) the socio-political composition of a society with the composition (or *concinnitas*) of a city’s stonework.¹⁴⁷ As for the group’s vulnerability, invoking the *laoi* during ceremonial occasions before the “citizens”, reminds these civilized people of their own stone-like condition—not simply that basic condition from which they once sprang, but also a base condition to which they might catastrophically return *if* (whether by some internal lack of communal bonds or by some external threat) they would allow their society to break apart and their citizens to scatter and fall. The risk of reverting to rugged individual stones thus remains a possibility integral to “the people”. Or, as Haubould puts it, these “people” (*laoi*) are “[c]arrying in themselves a memory of their non-

¹⁴⁴ Haubould (2000), 43.

¹⁴⁵ Rosivach (1987), and Loraux (1993).

¹⁴⁶ As Haubould (2000), 43, argues, this group, the *laos* “tend to subsume individual purpose under the overarching project of communal survival”.

¹⁴⁷ Alberti composed such an allegory in one of his *Dinner Pieces*, called “The Temple”. In this tale, the discontented foundation stones scorned their lowly placement in the great edifice and, in revolt, raised themselves up to what they deemed a more distinguished place—high upon the parapet. This self-interested move of the huge stones caused the entire temple (of which they had once been an integral part) to crumble and fall. Alberti’s allegory called “Stones” is also relevant. See Marsh (1987), 175-76 and 61.

existence [as a human society]”.¹⁴⁸ Interestingly, one of the rare instances in Homer’s *Odyssey*, in which Odysseus refers to his own crewmen as “people” (*laoi*) instead of “companions” (*hetairoi*) arises when they are together caught within the cave of the Cyclops—a stoney situation, in which not only are the individual lives and social bonds of the group threatened, but so too is their basic humanity (*Odyssey* 9.263).¹⁴⁹ Like the threatening situation within the cave of the Cyclops, the intolerable situation at the start of *Peace* provides another circumstance in which an Athenian dramatist (in the fifth century BCE) deemed it appropriate to involve “architects” for the sake of people.¹⁵⁰

The extent to which such architectural metaphors (involving autochthonic myths, foundational “stones”, and enduring socio-political cohesion) may have supported Aristophanes in his choice to have Trygaeus actively architect for and with stone-like “people” must remain an open question. Nevertheless, it is suggestive that “stones” are involved in the dramatic recovery of Peace. For, when Hermes first indicates where Peace is hidden—in a “deep cave... down there”—he also emphasizes that she lay there beneath a pile of stones: “And do you see how many stones (*lithōn*) he [War] has piled on top, so that you’ll never ever get your hands on her?” (223-26). It has been suggested that as Hermes utters these vivid lines he also opens the central door of the skēnē, so, revealing this heap of “many stones” lying immediately beyond.¹⁵¹ These conspicuous “stones” are reasserted a short while later by Trygaeus. For, when he turns his own attention to the problem of reaching Peace, he wonders aloud how he will manage “to clear away these stones (*lithous*)” (361). Besides adding tangibly to the problem of reaching Peace, this pile of “stones” performs metaphorically in at least two ways: as representing a heap of obstructive individuals (such as those enumerated above) who, by their political misconduct, prevent Peace from emerging; and, secondly, as relating closely to those stone-like “people” (the *laoi*). It is, after all, these “people” (the representative chorus) who, at Trygaeus’ command, ultimately do “clear away those stones (*lithous*)”, making Peace’s emergence from the ground possible (427). This uncovered figure of Peace, then, by being drawn out from beneath “stones” and with the

¹⁴⁸ Haubould (2000), 43.

¹⁴⁹ Haubould (2000), 105-06.

¹⁵⁰ On the comparable groups of representative people that Odysseys, as architect, acts on behalf of in Euripides’ *Cyclops*, see below, p. 219-22.

¹⁵¹ Olson surmises this stage action in his note to lines 224-25.

help of stone-like “people”, would herself seem to share in the foundational qualities of both these “stones” and these “people” (*laoi*). For, this nascent Peace is brought into the drama, like them, as a potentially strong yet ever-vulnerable figure.

But what of the “stones” themselves? Aside from their metaphoric associations with obstructive and foundational people, how else might one see the material stones? It may well be the case that when Hermes opened the door of the skēnē to reveal the “many stones” lying immediately beyond, that these theatrical “stones” were seen against great heaps of building stones lying in the distance, just behind the theater’s skēnē (within the open sanctuary of Dionysus). For in that year (421 BCE) preparations were underway to build a new portico and temple to this god of drama, the stones for which must have been piled about the sanctuary grounds.¹⁵² Thus, when Hermes opens the door of the skēnē to indicate the problematic site wherein Peace lay hidden, he very plausibly revealed both theatrical “stones” and building “stones”. Such a superimposition would invite one to see the full ensemble of “stones” as being both obstructive and potentially re-constitutive of Peace; and, further, to consider the dramatic emergence of Peace and the nascent architectural conditions as performing in tension and in parallel.

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In the preceding discussion I have touched on the a-political, hyper-political and pre-political manners of representing and pursuing an absent Peace. What remains to be seen, however, is how these circuitous, exemplary and preliminary modes of action come to address the central political problems of the play: those involving the lack of peace, the dysfunctional institutions, and the disingenuous citizens. Trygaeus’ meta-theatrical manner of repairing these political problems by repairing the social and sacred bonds underlying them is sketched below.

META-THEATRICAL RESTITUTION: RESTORING PRE-REQUISITES FOR PEACE (*philia* AND *Theōria*)

4.1e

When Trygaeus (as mortal architect), Hermes (as divine overseer) and the chorus of farmers (as founding “people”) together draw Peace out from the pit and into the light, a manifold sense of harmony is drawn out with her. For, upon rescuing Peace, specific social improprieties are, at once, rebalanced: the soldiers are released from military

¹⁵² Boersma (1970), 217; Pickard-Cambridge (1946), 1-49.

service to return to healthier pursuits (526ff); the farmers are restored to their productive livelihood (551-59); the makers of agricultural implements (mattocks and sickles) are at liberty to revive their trades (545-56); the citizens of formerly conflicted cities are “reconciled” (*diallageisai*, 540); and “all” is rejuvenated, for the “whole world” (*hōs apanta*)—like a replenished cask of wine—suddenly “brims with late-vintage peace” (554).¹⁵³ Besides these broadly social and worldly reparations, which Trygaeus and Hermes proclaim in the heavens upon Peace’s appearance, a more subtle harmonious adjustment is attempted later in the play by Trygaeus himself. For, during the earthy “installation” scene, this architect-figure renews good humor with a poetic image offered in prayerful petition. Standing in the midst of the orchestra and speaking directly to all the spectators assembled on the slopes around him, Trygaeus—as if speaking from the bottom of an enormous bowl full of people—implores Peace, to “release us from battles... [to] rid us of suspicions... and [to] blend us afresh with the juice of friendship (*philiās*)...” (996-97). Like tempering strong wine with the right amount of water, Trygaeus proposes here to “blend” or “mix” (*meixon / keration*) all of the ill-humored Greeks assembled around him—all of those irascible, disingenuous, embittered, pompous, cowardly, abusive, aggressive, stubborn, skeptical, irritable, greedy, self-interested and inconsiderate individuals sitting right there in the theater—into milder, better-humored citizens.¹⁵⁴ And, this figurative blending, Trygaeus claims, will not only mix them “afresh”, but (more literally), re-mix them as “in the beginning” (*ex archēs*, 996).

Such reparations, as pronounced in the heavens and enacted in the orchestra, thus involve extremely comprehensive adjustments aimed at reconciling relations at all

¹⁵³ Only the makers of war-gear (Crest-makers, Sword-smiths and Spear-sharpeners) remain unrejuvenated in this scene (543-49).

¹⁵⁴ On the resonance of these lines with the Greek doctrine of the humours, see the notes to lines 996-99 in Platnauer (1964), where he writes: “Aristophanes here seems to use *cholos* [“juice”] as equal to the Hippocratic *chomos* = ‘humour’... The Greeks believed that both psychical and physiological phenomena were conditioned by humours. Trygaeus here prays that all men may be, as it were, recompounded; this time with a larger admixture of the juices of friendliness and mercy, qualities in which they are deficient.” On the ancient doctrine of humors (black bile, yellow (or red) bile, blood, and phlegm; and their corresponding moods, melancholy, choleric, sanguine, and phlegmatic), see Klibansky et al (1964), esp. 3-41 (although with no reference to this drama). See also below, p. 60, n. 117 and p. 313.

The larger image of re-mixing the Greeks as in a giant bowl may also have magically rejuvenating connotations. Medea, for instance, accomplished (and deceptively promised) such a magical feat (Apollodorus 1.9.27). And, in Aristophanes’ *Knights*, Dēmos (a personification of the “People”) is magically “boiled” (off-stage) so as to restore him to his former vigor and glory (1321). On this motif in Aristophanes, see Reckford (1979), esp. 194.

levels—from the most intimate and immediate, to the most extensive and worldly. And just as wine figures as an active ingredient in both the rejuvenated individuals (being tempered with “friendship”) and in the replenished “world” (now “brimming” with Peace), so Trygaeus as architect (and vintager) acts as a primary agent, re-balancing and adjusting various conditions in ways that aim not only to restore personal happiness but also to refresh social, civic and cosmic bonds, so that the familial, political and religious relations crucial to worldly peace might be fully sustained.

Besides refreshing filial relations, drawing-out Peace also recuperates another vital prerequisite for peaceful politics: Theōria. This lively (yet silent) personification of “Beholding”, having reappeared in the heavens together with Peace, returns to earth with Trygaeus and is ultimately delivered by him directly to the spectators. Appropriately, this return of Theōria plays-out meta-theatrically. Just after returning to the mortal plane (and just before installing Peace), Trygaeus—again reaching beyond the limit of the orchestra—leads this desirable figure to a prominent seat among the members of “Council” (*Boulē*), who were themselves seated in the front row of the theater.¹⁵⁵ Finding no one among these men sufficiently “just” (*dikaios*) to act as her escort (877), Trygaeus himself leads her to and sets her in the Councilors’ midst (881-2). In this way, Trygaeus reasserts the intimate bond between dramatic and political representation, while at the same time making fully apparent—for all those assembled—the proper activity of these Councilors: attending less to the business of war, and more to the care of “Beholding”.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, by “setting-down” (*katithēmi*) Theōria as a lively actor in the midst of the theater (882), Trygaeus prefigures his own “installation” (*hidrusis*) of Peace as a vital statue in the midst of the orchestra (923ff), while at the same time preparing the counselors to “behold” that subsequent act all the more keenly.

Yet, this restitution also performs more broadly. For, by returning Theōria to “spectators” (*theatai*) in the “theater” (*theatron*), Trygaeus begins to fulfill one of his

¹⁵⁵ These distinguished elders had special front row seats (*prohedria*), such as the stone thrones surviving today in the Dionysian theater (although in the fifth century BCE these seats were likely made of wood). The “Boulē”, and its implied members, are repeatedly mentioned in this scene (714, 715, 846, 872, 878, 887, 893).

¹⁵⁶ The handing over of Theōria to these men of the Council is as sexually charged, as it is politically motivated (886-908). Such sexual imagery, although appropriate to Aristophanes’ comic genre, is also specifically suggestive here of the strong desire the counselors ought to have for Theōria and for Peace.

earlier promises to the people: to restore their right to “spectating” (*theōrein*, 342).¹⁵⁷ This activity of “spectating at public festivals” (which Theōria properly personifies),¹⁵⁸ involves more than “beholding” drama. As others have emphasized, this special mode of keenly “seeing” in the theater was only one manifestation (albeit an important one)¹⁵⁹ of festival experience, which also included such benefits as: the pleasure of travel from one’s hometown to a host venue; the enlightening delights of sight-seeing along the way; the advantages of hospitality among locals; and the stimulating risk of mingling with strangers.¹⁶⁰ Such benefits of “spectating” (*theōrein*) would also include: participating in the related events staged before and after the plays (such as political meetings, patriotic displays, parades, songs, feasts and revels); partaking in the greater drama of common holiday, religious release and Dionysian worship; and sharing in a liturgical calendar that united citizens across the expansive Pan-Hellenic region.¹⁶¹ Diplomatic relations were also fostered and maintained by “spectating”, particularly by official inter-city delegations of spectators led by representatives known as *architheoroi*.¹⁶² In other words, although it may be tempting to translate Theōria with its related English word “Theory”, and to isolate Theōria’s primary benefit to the apprehension of dramatic poetry (or, even more restrictively, to its conceptual content), it must be emphasized that Theōria, at the time of Aristophanes’ *Peace*, was intertwined with social, civic and religious festivities. Theōria was also intertwined in special ways with the theater (*theatron*)—the sloped area accommodating the activity of “spectating”; and the open level ground supporting dramatic performances for the duration of the festival. This orchestral ground, or dance floor (*choros*), also (in all likelihood) supported the rehearsal of drama, the training of

¹⁵⁷ According to Thucydides, the right to “attend festivals (*theōrein*) in safety” was the very first provision of the actual peace-agreement between the Athenians and Spartans (5.18.1).

¹⁵⁸ Hall (2006), 327ff.

¹⁵⁹ On the special significance of actively and judiciously *seeing* to the institutions of both the Theater and the Assembly, see Goldhill (2000); and Goldhill and Osborne (1999), esp. 5-7.

¹⁶⁰ On the interrelation of traveling to *see* the world and the wisdom one gains from thinking about, or speculating upon, that experience, see Dougherty (2001), esp. 3-4. As Dougherty shows, Odysseus and (historically) Solon exemplify such speculative, or theoretical wisdom.

¹⁶¹ Trygaeus himself speaks to such benefits in his promise to the chorus (341-45). Cf. Reckford (1987), 14-35; and Hall (2006), 337, who asserts that Aristophanes’ *Peace* and its protagonist are “obsessively interested in festivals”. On the “festive character of theater”, described from another (philosophical, aesthetic and hermeneutic) perspective, see Gadamer (1986), esp. 57-65.

¹⁶² Wilson (2000), 44-6.

choruses, and other such socially constructive, divinely inspired, mimetic and anticipatory events throughout the year.¹⁶³ It is this full institution of Theōria that Aristophanes (as dramatist) and his spectators (as audience and prior chorus members themselves) were enmeshed in; and it is this full scope of “spectating (at festivals)” that Trygaeus (as protagonist) aims to repair and perpetuate when he assertively returns the appealing figure of Theōria to “Council”. Perhaps then we should see Trygaeus (as architect) as likewise being concerned, proactively, with this greater scope of Theōria, of which the physical setting (the theater) was a definitive part—a stable forum, representative of the whole diffuse institution.

The scope of an architect’s concern and their dramatically assertive manner of appealing to “Council”, bring us to a final observation on political representation in *Peace*.

ARCHE-TECTURAL ACTION: APPEALING DIRECTLY AND PROFOUNDLY TO COUNCIL

4.1f

As mentioned above, the architect-protagonist in *Peace* initially bypasses political institutions such as the “Assembly” and “Council”. Yet, in the end, he does go *directly* to the Councilors sitting in the front row. He goes to these members of the Boulē, however, not to gain their counsel but to offer them what they need to perform counsel well, and to fully remind them of what is good for the people: Theōria. While such a bold move as this makes for compelling comic drama, it may also have reflected contemporaneous procedure. As ancient inscriptions attest, architects indeed presented their propositions directly to this advisory board of elders, since these Councilors, and their institution known as the Boulē, were responsible for preliminarily reviewing the *suggraphai* (graphic markings) and *paradeigmata* (models) of those architects who were being considered for public hire.¹⁶⁴ Thus, members of the Boulē—such as those sitting in the front row of the theater for Aristophanes’ *Peace*—would have routinely acted as spectators, beholding the persuasive propositions that architects figured-forth, together

¹⁶³ See Wilson (2000), 72-3. Other places called the *choregeion* and *didaskaleion* (place of dancing and teaching), which were likely a part of the *Choregos*’ home, are attested.

¹⁶⁴ Rhodes (1972), 122-27. One fifth century BCE inscription, notes that Kallicrates shall submit (or “show forth”, *epideichsai*) to the Boule *suggraphai* for the door and altar of the Temple of Athena Nike on the Acropolis. Members of the *Boule* were also routinely involved in the general supervision of public building projects, together with architects and priests of those sanctuary sites being rebuilt.

with the representative offerings they brought forth. As with Trygaeus' "installation" of Peace's statue in the orchestra (which can be seen to mime Pheidias' "installation" of Athena's statue in the Parthenon) his mimetic performance before the Boulē should be taken not simply to mirror normative architectural acts but, more proactively and profoundly, to offer dramatic corrections and poetic expansions of them, as well as to perform as an exemplary model for them; since, Trygaeus not only provides the Boulē with markings and models for the peace that was initially sought, but also aims to fully reveal the motives and benefits of a divine Peace that had been hidden, or absent. Thus, this architect-figure seeks to repair and reveal both peace and the basic yet obscure conditions underlying Peace. And these conditions, as the discussion above has shown, include: philial and sacred relations, good humor, and the right to "spectating" (*theōrien*).

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We do not know how ancient architects, such as Pheidias and Kallikrates, actually acted before the Boulē, or to what extent their manners of figuring forth propositions and showing forth supporting models may have resembled the dramatic performance of Trygaeus. Yet, we do know that Philon, a Greek architect of the fourth century BCE, performed in a way that left an enduring impression on his critical audience; for, as one author recollects, "Philon, gave so eloquent account of his dispositions (*rationem*) in the theatre, that the people, lettered as they were, praised his oratorical no less than his artistic skill."¹⁶⁵

The suggestive image of an architect-figure performing persuasively with words and props, will be helpful to bear in mind as we move to consider another mode of dramatic architectural representation in *Peace*: allegory. As with political representation, the allegorical lack of Peace prefigures and then yields to her enduring presence.

¹⁶⁵ Valerius Maximus (8.12.2), Trans. in Shackleton (2000). A similar anecdote about Philon, concerning his complementary arts of architecting and performatively speaking, is found in Cicero's treatise on the art of the orator (of 55 BCE): "If it is true that Philon, the architect who designed the arsenal for the Athenians, expressed himself quite fluently when he gave an account of his plans (*rationem*) before the people, we must not attribute this fluency to the craft (*artificio*) of the architect rather than to that of the orator." (*de Oratore*, 1.62). Translation in May and Wisse (2001). Besides the arsenal in Piraeus, Philon also designed the porch on the initiation hall in Eleusis (as noted by Vitruvius 7.pref.17).

BEARING WITNESS TO DRAMATIC INTERLUDES STAGED IN THE HEAVENS

4.2a

Allegorically, the loss of Peace is represented near the beginning of the play with a dramatic interlude, staged in the heavens, among a cast of personified agents and suggestive props. These agencies include the menacing persona “War”, his accomplice “Riot”, a “martial mortar” (full of endangered farmers and farm products), and a much sought-after “pestle” (236-88). The abused figure “Peace” is also present (though invisibly) throughout this scene, since just before War comes out to demonstrate his proposed mistreatment of mortals, Hermes points out the “deep cavern” (and lithic grounds) wherein the mistreated goddess lies hidden (223-24). The confinement of this feminine figure in an underground chamber brings to mind a number of mythic models, such as Persephone’s confinement in Hades (as mentioned earlier).¹⁶⁶ The interest here, however, is on the allegorical interlude, which is played-out in full view of both Trygaeus and the spectators and which is dramatized through a particular ensemble of personified agents and suggestive props.

This allegorical interlude—during which War demonstrates how he intends to “grind” all the people—is crucial to the plot since upon witnessing it Trygaeus feels himself not only motivated but obliged to counteract War’s plan on behalf of all the endangered people. Yet, besides offering persuasive testimony to War’s general threat, this allegorical interlude also offers particular ways to understand that threat. In this interpretive regard, the tangible properties of War—his much sought-after “pestle” and his “martial mortar”—play significant roles. The “pestle”, for instance, like Peace, War and Riot, is itself personified. For, when War discovers that he is missing his “pestle”, and dispatches Riot—first to Athens (261) and then to Sparta (274)—to find this grinding agent (to no avail), he is at the same time searching for a mortal replacement for those pugnacious leaders of the Athenians and Spartans (Kleon and Brasidas) who had, indeed, recently been lost in battle.¹⁶⁷ As powerful and seemingly unstoppable as War appears to be, this allegory shows that he is nevertheless dependent on a mortal “grinder” if he is to

¹⁶⁶ See above (p. 28, n. 54). On the motif of imprisoned women in Athenian tragedy, which metaphorically associates burial and bridal chambers, see Seaford (1990).

¹⁶⁷ Trygaeus himself makes this interpretation relatively clear in the play (271f). Kleon is likened to a “pestle” also in Aristophanes’ *Knights* (924). Cf. Slater (2002), 20.

crush all that he has gathered in his bowl. Without a “pestle”, War is momentarily at a standstill. Yet, as War himself warns, another grinding agent will surely materialize. Comprehending all this, and encouraging the spectators (with his own meta-theatrical asides) to understand the situation as well, Trygaeus seizes the fleeting opportunity to rescue Peace and, so, preempt the advance of War.

Aside from this personified “pestle”, War’s “martial mortar” also contributes to an understanding of war’s threat, as well as to Trygaeus’ plan for peaceful restitution. This property performs, however, not as a personified figure, but rather as a figured site of conflict. This architecturally suggestive “mortar”—as a delimited place of both conflict and potential restitution—requires greater elaboration.

When War first makes his monstrous appearance in the play—by marching out from behind the theater’s skēnē as though stepping out from the halls of Zeus—he brings with him a huge stone bowl, which is “over-grown in size”, according to Hermes (229), and of astonishing “breadth” in the eyes of Trygaeus (238).¹⁶⁸ Setting this gargantuan bowl down in the midst of the orchestra and standing menacingly over it, War then verbalizes his threat to the “much-enduring mortals” (236). As he does so, he tosses an agricultural product emblematic of each region he intends to grind into his bowl: Prasian *prasa* (leeks), Megarian garlic, Sicilian cheese, and Attic honey (242-52). The punning wordplay makes clear that it is both the fruits of farming and the farmers that War intends to grind (mash into mincemeat) in his bowl.¹⁶⁹ And this huge stone surround—in which the farmers have been gathered by War—can be seen not only as a culinary vessel (in which War, as a cannibal, prepares his ghastly meal),¹⁷⁰ but also as the encircling stone walls of a city; for during the Peloponnesian War farmers had indeed been forced to retreat inside of city walls, since attacking farmland was a primary tactic of ancient warfare.¹⁷¹ By planning to grind up all that he has gathered within this stone bowl, then,

¹⁶⁸ Upon first seeing the mortar, Trygaeus is aghast: “Lord Apollo, the [breadth] (*platous*) of that mortar!” (238). A moment earlier, Hermes had warned Trygaeus of its being “over-grown in size” (*hyperphua to megethos*, 229)—Olson’s translation.

¹⁶⁹ See Olson’s note to the line for the quasi-authenticity of War’s recipe for *muttōtos*.

¹⁷⁰ The image of human devastation as crushed food is prefigured by Trygaeus’ concern that if Zeus (if he does not pay attention) will have “pitted and pulped the cities” (63)—*as if* preparing to eat them. Belligerent rulers make a mash of cities also in *Wasps* (924-25).

¹⁷¹ In *Peace*, Hermes refers to farmers having sought refuge in the city (632-33). On the vulnerability of farmland during wartime, see Hanson (1998); and Olson’s note to lines 632-33. (Note: Athens is known to have been a walled city since the mid-sixth century BCE).

War is threatening not only to continue ravaging the outlying farmland and fruits of farming, but also to grind up all those who thought they were safe when they took refuge within the city walls. In other words, the encircling stone walls of the city—thought to be a defense—are ironically shown by this allegory to perform also as a trap.

Such an interpretation of War's "mortar"—as a walled-city caught up by war—seems to be supported in the play by the architect-figure himself. For, before Trygaeus even sees the astonishing "breadth" of War's bowl (238), he first hears war's "martial" sounds (235). More literally, he claims to hear "war-charging" sounds (*polemistērias*)—sounds that Aristophanes associates elsewhere with the terrible noises of a walled-city under siege, with door-ramming, ladder-clamoring, and other such "wall-storming" operations (*teichomachas*).¹⁷² Thus, according to Trygaeus, War's "mortar" sounds like a city at war even before it comes to look and perform like one. Along a similar line of interpretation, one may take War's "martial mortar" as a garrisoned-fort; for, like ravaging farmlands and besieging cities, building and manning fortified surrounds within enemy territory was a veritable tactic of ancient warfare—one by which the crucial supply roads leading to a besieged city might be blocked by building a strategically located fort, or else the besieged city itself might be completely encircled by another enemy wall (as by circumvallation). Either way, the unpleasant goal of such fortifying tactics was to force all those people trapped within the walled city to surrender, or die of eventual starvation.¹⁷³ According to the ancient historian Thucydides, such tactics were increasingly relied upon during the Peloponnesian War, which (as mentioned above) was already in its tenth year at the time Aristophanes staged *Peace*. Moreover, according to Thucydides, the Spartans had specifically been threatening to use such proven tactics more aggressively against the Athenians—if they did not concede to a truce in that Spring of 421 BCE (5.17.2). These tactics of war—whereby "walls" were designed and built as coercive weapons, deadly traps and interruptive blockades—were known as techniques of "counter-walling" (*apo-teichismos*), as well as "walling-against" and "walling-upon" (*epi-teichismos*).¹⁷⁴ Such tactics recall the various "walling", "walling-off" and "walling-

¹⁷² *Acharnians* 570-72. Cf. Herodotus 5.113. For aural imagery of wall-storming operations and siege warfare, see Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* 465-71; and Euripides' *Phoenician Women*, 1172-86.

¹⁷³ On these walling tactics, see Kern (1999), 89-134; and Hanson (1991), 180-88. Ironically, the situation for the besiegers within the walled forts was often as contemptible as those besieged.

¹⁷⁴ Several passages of Thucydides attest to such tactics (6.99.1). See also the previous note.

round” activities that the tyrannical protagonist Peisetaerus commanded when colonizing the sky, ensnaring the birds and cutting-off communication with the gods in Aristophanes’ *Birds*.¹⁷⁵ With these menacing tactics of “walling” in mind, it is easy to see, in *Peace*, how it is that a huge stone surround, or “martial mortar”, would have been an appropriate property in the hands of War. By this allegory, one may further recognize what a mistake it would be to leave such property in martial hands, for although this bowl is full of strife it nevertheless remains representative of civic space.

This allegorical interlude helps to make both the specific threat of War and the general war-time situation within and around walled cities not only more apparent but more understandable. How, then, does this allegory inform the architect-figure’s peculiar response to that full situation? At one level, as already stated, War’s demonstration obliges Trygaeus to take immediate action. Although Hermes had already told Trygaeus what War had done to Peace and what he planned to do to the people and their cities (223-31), it is only upon witnessing this allegorical representation that Trygaeus comes to understand the broader circumstances and, so, discern what he must do to transform these. Thus, by offering general insights into basic human conditions, the dramatic allegory performs as most allegories do: persuasively, didactically, indirectly and comprehensively.¹⁷⁶

At another level, the allegorical display suggests how Trygaeus’ preliminary action on the high-flying dung-beetle can be understood, retrospectively. For, at the start of the play, Trygaeus (being a farmer caught in wartime) would have himself been trapped, together with the citizens, within such city walls as the “martial mortar” represents. Trygaeus’ preliminary upward flight, then, can be seen as being performed in opposition to those stone walls that surround him. For, wishing to find a way out of the war-threatened city he was caught in—and having reportedly made a failed attempt with “scaling ladders” (69)¹⁷⁷—Trygaeus seizes upon the beetle. Appropriating the stage-

¹⁷⁵ See above, p. 50-51.

¹⁷⁶ On ancient allegory, see Shapiro (1986). As Shapiro notes, the Greek term *allēgoria* is not found until the fourth century BCE (in Demetrios of Phaleron’s work *On Style* 151; 285). The concept, however, is discernible in early poetic works, including Aristophanes’ *Peace*, as others have shown. Cf. Hinks (1939), and Rothwell (1995), 233, who also emphasizes the role of fables (*ainos*) in Aristophanes’ plays, which are “designed to teach... by indirect means”.

¹⁷⁷ Trygaeus’ slave mentions his attempt to reach Zeus on “scaling ladders” (*lepta klimakia*). Such ladders, as Olson notes, were typically used offensively to attack city walls during a siege (although never very successfully). Thucydides, however, tells of an historical incident (in 428 BCE) in which the besieged men of Plataea used such ladders successfully to break-

machine, Trygaeus catapults himself up and over the wall of the theater's skēnē, as though up and over the wall of the city—as though up and out of War's deadly bowl.¹⁷⁸ In this parabolic way, Trygaeus liberates himself from his immediate and limited circumstances, not simply by escaping this situation but by opening up another point of view onto its conflicts, with the hope of finding both comprehension and positive means of transformation.¹⁷⁹ Walls and “walling”, as devices and tactics intended to entrap, would seem, then, to be representative of what this architect-figure seeks to over-come and counter-act. As such, these walls, like War, perform as antagonizing agents. And yet, their agency is more ambiguous; for walls—as of the skēnē, the city, and the allegorical bowl—remain throughout the play primary sites of dramatic attention, surprising revelation, and potentially peaceful transformation.¹⁸⁰

TURNING A “MARTIAL MORTAR” INTO A SACRED “BOWL OF FRIENDSHIP”

4.2b

Although a “mortar” and encircling walls are shown in the dramatic allegory to be properties belonging to and in the service of War, it should be emphasized that there is nothing inherently war-like in either of these stone surrounds. In fact, the “mortar” (*thueian*) that is named in the play (228, 230, 235, 238), is etymologically and performatively linked to the ritual activity of “offering”, as by burning (*thuein*)—the honorable rite that such a “mortar” more typically served.¹⁸¹ In this common vessel called a *thueian*, fragrant herbs, frankincense, pieces of cedar, and other such aromatic substances were ground together, mixed with perfumed oils, and then burned as incense

out of their city when they had become entrapped by the Spartans' circumvallation (3.20-24). On the use of scaling ladders in siege warfare, see Hanson (1991), 181.

¹⁷⁸ Although Trygaeus' liberating and peace-seeking deed on the stage-machine seems to mime the action of a catapult, this war-machine was (reportedly) not invented until 399 BCE (in Syracuse). See, Hanson (1991), 187; and Marsden (1971).

¹⁷⁹ It is tempting to compare this upward escape of Trygaeus, to Daedalus' escape from the encircling stone walls of the labyrinth. According to later poets, upon being imprisoned in this work that he himself had built, Daedalus looked up and said to his son: “surely the sky is open, And that's the way we'll go” (Ovid, *Metamorphosis* 8.189-90).

¹⁸⁰ Athenian tragedy and episodes of epic poetry frequently involve walls as metaphorically, politically and symbolically-charged constructs. On walls, as exemplary sites on which, over which and before which *agons* are powerfully staged, see Goldhill (2007).

¹⁸¹ As opposed to the *igdis*, a “mortar” named for the act of “pounding” (*igdizein*). See Olson's note to line 228-29, and Mortiz (1958), 22.

in honor of the gods.¹⁸² Aside from preparing and offering such fragrant gifts, a “mortar” by the name of *thueian* was also used as a common domestic bowl for mixing and sharing gratifying meals.¹⁸³ Given these common uses of a “mortar”—as a site for rendering sustenance to both gods and mortals—one can imagine that as Trygaeus disdainfully watched War’s menacing show, he was beginning to feel himself obliged, not only to rescue Peace and save the people, but also to re-appropriate that stone bowl for its proper peaceful roles. Indeed, the re-appropriation of the bowl—and the city it represents—seems to be initiated in the play in at least two ways.

One way in which this sacred property is effectively taken out of the hands of War and into the service of Peace is by the involvement of a number of other peaceful vessels that dramatically take over after War’s menacing show. In the second half of the play, following the recovery of Peace, a variety of beneficent bowls enter into the performance. For instance, a libation bowl (1093ff), a lustral basin (956), and a sacred basket of barley (947), each perform as tangible props in the hands of Trygaeus and his assistant as they carry-out purifying and propitiatory rites around the orchestral altar during the “installation” of Peace. Other vessels—those exemplifying peacetime activities—are conjured verbally in the play. These include: wine cups, wine jugs, and wine strainers (535, 537, 916); as well as porridge pots (594), and kettles full of cooked beans and figs (1144). A platter of delicacies (1193), a tray of grilled meat (1031, 1115), and a pan for kneading honey cakes (869) also show up in the orchestra in preparation for the play’s culminating wedding feast. Other holding places, wherein mixing and mingling are figured positively, include those suggestively alluded to off-stage: the warm bathtub for Trygaeus’ bride (843, 868, 1339), and the ready marriage bed for the happy couple (844). More suggestive still are the receptive hollows of those feminine figures, whom Trygaeus rescues along with Peace (892), as well as the fertile recesses within the maternal earth, which the chorus of farmers, in the end, eagerly rush home to plant (1140).

Besides overcoming the image of War’s destructive bowl with a diverse series of more peaceful (plentiful, productive and receptive) bowl-like hollows, there is another way by which the sacred property misused by War is dramatically re-appropriated for Peace. In the second half of the play, War’s stone “mortar” (*thueian*) is effectively

¹⁸² Lilya (1972); and Detienne (1994), 38ff.

¹⁸³ Cf. *Frogs* 123-24, *Wealth* 718-20.

replaced with the stone “altar” (*thumelē*)—the sacred theatrical property that permanently stood at the center of the Dionysian orchestra.¹⁸⁴ This substitution of the “mortar” (*thueian*) with the “altar” (*thumelē*), as a site to receptively sponsor the honorable activity that War’s “mortar” would not (that is, “offering”, or *thuein*), is intimated in part by the punning language. Yet, the substitution manifests most vividly in performance by the paralleling of two distinct yet comparable episodes in which first the “mortar” and then the “altar” perform conspicuously: as focal points for the dramatic action; as sites of transformation; and as suggestive models of civic and sacred space. The first episode—oriented around the “mortar”—consists of War’s allegorical demonstration, which is staged as an interlude in the heavens near the beginning of the play (236-88). The second episode—oriented around the “altar”—consists of Trygaeus’ “installation” of Peace, which is acted-out as a sacred rite in the orchestra near the drama’s end (923-1038). In the first episode, War presides over the “mortar” *as if* he were a hungry cannibal, ominously forecasting destruction for all the cities and people. In the second episode, Trygaeus presides over the “altar” *as if* he were a religious official, prayerfully wishing for the rejuvenation of all the cities and people. The relative position of Peace during these two scenes is also helpful to picture: whereas Peace is visibly absent throughout the first scene (hidden in a pit beneath a pile of stones); Peace is visible to all in the second scene, for her statue stands by Trygaeus in the orchestra “fully revealed” (*apophēnon*, 997). She may also have been positioned in such a way that would allow her to behold the “offering” (*thusian*) being prepared openly in her honor (977). Even the “war-charging” sounds of War’s mortar are replaced in the later episode by the music of “flutes”; for the play’s pipe player takes up his position alongside the altar while Trygaeus enacts the propitious rites (952ff). Finally, one must compare the figured contents gathered by the comparable vessels. Whereas War’s stone surround—as a walled-city—comes to be filled, by War’s threat, with frightened people, misplaced farmers and endangered farm products (taken from troubled territories); Trygaeus’

¹⁸⁴ Trygaeus makes this altar conspicuous when, in need of an altar to sacrifice to Peace, he discovers one (with feigned surprise) right there in the orchestra: “Look, here’s the altar right in front of the door!” (942). Trygaeus leads a purifying rite around the altar (956-72); pronounces a propitious prayer over it (973-1015); arranges fire-wood upon it (1024-26); and then, after lighting it (1031), the fragrant “aroma” is evident (1050). This permanent orchestral altar is well attested and, arguably, used as a stage property in some plays. Such a raised platform performed as an orienting feature of choral dances and, according to legend, provided the elevated spot upon which Thespis first leaped so as to address the chorus in a spoken voice, thus giving birth to the art of the actor. See: Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 86-86; Burkert (1966), 101; Arnott (1962), 42-56; Dearden (1976), 46-49; Rehm (1988).

altar—as a level civic platform—comes to be filled, by Trygaeus’ wishful prayer, with local citizens, as well as with all that exemplifies bountiful harvests and fair trade with distant territories: Megarian garlic, cucumbers, apples and pomegranates; Boetian ducks and other tasty birds; as well as exotic Copaic eels (1000-05). By his elaborate prayer, Trygaeus continues to figuratively fill the level area of the altar *as though* filling an open marketplace with positive civic conflicts, such as the busy jostling of competitive shopping (1007ff). At last, he fills this altar-turned-*agora* with all “the Greeks” (including himself). And then, speaking over this representative area full of citizens (while at the same time speaking from within the great bowl of the theater), Trygaeus implores Peace (as quoted above) to “blend us Greeks [as in the beginning] with the juice of friendship...” (996-98). Given that “bowls of friendship”, “bowls of freedom”, and “cups of welcome” were common tropes in Greek poetry for filial and sacred relations, the social and spatial connotations of Trygaeus’ rejuvenating demonstration—being performed over the vessel-like altar and within the bowl-like theater—would likely have been perceived and experienced by the assembled spectators.¹⁸⁵

And so, by this propitious *in situ* performance with representative words and props, this architect-figure transforms the image of the city from an area encircled by entrapping walls to an area defined by the open orchestra, and from a “martial mortar” to an honorable “altar”. When, just a few lines later, the chorus members thank Trygaeus for having saved their “sacred city” (1035-36), it is tempting to picture them as synchronically gesturing to and dancing round the re-sanctified and representative altar.¹⁸⁶ Although this orchestral altar was arguably involved in a number of dramas as a stage property (as an altar, as a place of supplication, as a tomb, as a speaker’s platform, as a musicians’ perch, and as an offering table),¹⁸⁷ it seems rather appropriate that an

¹⁸⁵ In the *Iliad*, for instance, Themis receives Hera back into the halls of Olympus with “cups of welcome” (*deikanoōnto depassin*, 15.86); and Hera, later, reciprocates the gesture and the trope (24.101). Hector, in his Trojan city, prays for “a bowl of freedom” (*krētēra eleutheron*, 6.528)—a cup he is denied. In Athenian drama, there are many expressions involving the image of a “bowl of friendship” to qualify social bonds among those who drink wine and pour libations from a common bowl. Cf. Euripides’ *Medea* 138.

¹⁸⁶ Safeguarding altars was a trope for protecting cities, as the architect-figure in Euripides’ *Cyclops* also suggests (286-98). See below, p. 237-38, n. 577.

¹⁸⁷ On the involvement of this orchestral altar in Athenian tragedy, see Rehm (1988). Given that the term *thumēle* refers to the flat stone slab, or “top surface” of the altar on which fire was kindled, *thumēle* at times suggestively names other such stone surfaces; including, steps, foundations, platforms, a stage, and even the orchestra itself. See Gow (1912), esp. 234-35.

architect-protagonist would see in this theatrical and religious platform a complex image of the *polis* and a dramatic scheme for its propitious transformation.

PERFORMING (AND PERSONIFYING) TRANSFORMATION

4.2c

In a short comic episode toward the end of the play (1210-64), Trygaeus performs a series of transformations that, like his dramatic substitution of the “mortar” with the “altar”, convert destructive devices of war into properties supportive of peace. Like the previous substitution, this series of transformations also perform representatively, since the changed artifacts reveal aspects of the broader (civic and worldly) transformations that the protagonist also aims to bring about. Aside from offering additional examples of such transformations, this particular series further suggests that Trygaeus’ actions may be taken to exemplify a *technē* of transformation; specifically, an art of initiating transformations with broadly peaceful intent.

Near the end of the play, following the elaborate “installation” of Peace in the orchestra, Trygaeus begins preparing a banquet to celebrate his impending marriage to Harvest. As he does so, a Sicklemaker and Potter arrive bearing wedding gifts, including products of their respective trades (1198-1206). These grateful craftsmen have come to reward Trygaeus for the “great blessings”, as well as for the good “sales and profits”, that he has brought them by “making peace” (*eirēnēn poiēsas*, 1199). A moment later, however, an Arms-dealer, Helmet-maker and Spear-maker pay Trygaeus a visit. These unhappy craftsmen have come to complain that the return of Peace has put them out of business. Specifically, they accuse Trygaeus of having “uprooted” them by destroying both their “*technē* and livelihood (*bios*)” (1210-12). In the comic exchange that follows, Trygaeus, aiming at ridicule as much as at reparation, proposes a series of peaceful transformations for their now obsolete wares. Having just previously used a captain’s crest-feather for dusting crumbs off a banquet table (1192-3), Trygaeus now demonstrates for these weapons-makers (much to their dismay) how their devalued war-gear may be converted for peaceful use: by utilizing an item of armor, specifically a cuirass, as a toilet (1224-39); by turning a troop-marshal’s bugle into either a device for playing drinking games, or a scale for weighing figs (1240-9); by inverting a warrior’s helmet for use as a wine vessel (1258-9); and by taking a set of deadly spears as supportive vineyard stakes, after sawing them in two (1262-3). Insulted by these proposals, the arms-makers leave (1264).

This episode, staged late in the play, recalls an earlier (and even briefer) exchange in which, just after the recovery of Peace, Hermes and Trygaeus turn directly to the “spectators” to ridicule those among them whose *technē* depends upon war (544). Crest-makers, Sword-smiths and Spear-sharpeners bear the brunt of their abuse; while those spectators who fashion agricultural tools (mattocks and sickles) are said to join in mocking these craftsmen of war (545-49).

These brief episodes—in which crafted instruments of War are turned into implements of Peace, and craftsmen of war-gear are ridiculed by artisans of agricultural tools—suggest many things. At a practical level, the episodes attest to the importance of crafted tools in making and maintaining either War or Peace. The episodes also show that Trygaeus’ manner of “making peace” includes making critical preliminary changes that allow for others to “make peace”, in part, by simply offering them the proper tools to do so. In other words, the making of Peace is, for this architect-figure, shared with other makers (including certain craftsmen) and concerned with the appropriateness of mediating tools. At a dramaturgical level, the emphasis on tools demonstrates the importance of such tangible properties in making the benefits of Peace vigorously apparent in the drama. Even as invisible props, tools are integral to the imagery of Peace’s restoration. For instance, soon after Peace emerges from the pit, Trygaeus tells the farmers that they are free to lay down their “spear, sword and javelin”, to take up their “farm tools” (552-53), and to return to their farms where their “shining mallets” (for breaking-up the earth) await them, and where their “winnowing shovels glitter in the sunlight” (566-67). There is a further element of parody at work in this radiant imagery, since on the Homeric battlefield it is the armor and weaponry of warriors that gleam in this celebratory and divinely sanctioned way.¹⁸⁸ At a more iconographic level, there are further observations to draw from the particular tools, props, or attributes that these craftsmen bear. At this level, the agricultural figures—with their mattocks, mallets, sickles, winnowing shovels and pottery—can be seen to representatively dramatize the seasonal cycle of (re)productive labor: breaking-open the earth and releasing her fertility (mattock/mallet); reaping earth’s benefits (sickle/winnowing shovel); then gathering, preparing and sharing those bounties, conveying them to markets, and preserving them for winter (pottery). On the other hand, the opposing figures—with their spears, swords,

¹⁸⁸ As the armed Achilles moves in to deliver Hector the fateful blow, a “gleam” from his sharp spear appears as a star in the heavens (*Iliad*, 22.317-19).

helmets and regimental crest feathers—can be seen as representative of perennial battles (which heed no season), and of the more troubling honor sought by those men who lead them. Thus, beyond re-enforcing the abstract opposition between Peace and War, these episodes—by showing the lively antagonism of particular craftsmen and crafted products—compare and contrast human practices: the *technē* of agriculture (involving worldly rhythms and the strife of labor), and the *technē* of warfare (involving civic (dis)harmony and the strife of battle). How then, does Trygaeus’ own *technē* relate to these others?

Unlike the craftsmen named in these episodes (makers of mattocks, sickles, pottery, helmets, spears, crests and swords), Trygaeus does not himself make any such crafted products. Rather, Trygaeus is making, or performing, peace.¹⁸⁹ Thus, amid these craftsmen, Trygaeus proposes and enacts transformations that aim to adjust their products so that these artifacts might support positive activities. Although Trygaeus may be said to turn one product into another (the cuirass into a toilet, the bugle into a target and scale, the helmet into a cup, and the spears into a set of vineyard stakes) he, more performatively, can be seen to reinterpret each device, adjusting others’ perception of them and demonstrating how they might serve a diversity of positive human practices, such as relieving oneself, festive gaming, careful measuring, communal banqueting, and nurturing vines. One could go on to compare how these proposed adjustments would further transform the social relations among the people performing such activities, as well as the general mood of the situations in which the changed devices would perform. For instance, turning the war-gear into domestic, sympotic and agrarian props would also turn combatant tensions toward relief, revelry, agreement and gratification. By considering such interrelated transformations, Trygaeus’ preliminary adjustments can be understood to initiate representative changes that potentially turn not simply one artifact into another but social and situational relations from strictly antagonistic to loosely sympathetic. And this understanding of the protagonist’s transformative capability, or *technē*, leads to another.

Given the particular diversity of transformations that Trygaeus initiates in *Peace*—combined with an understanding of his special name—one may begin to see this protagonist as exemplifying, even personifying, a transformative agency; one that not

¹⁸⁹ As mentioned above, Trygaeus is said to “make peace” (*eirēnēn poiēsas*, 1199); and he is shown, by comparison, to make, or “perform planning” (*poiēsas bouleuein*)—such as he hoped Zeus might *do* (58ff, 106). The verb *poieō* here retains its double sense, meaning both “to do” and “to make”, see Gould (1955), 20, n. 1.

only turns conditions of war to conditions of peace but also turns devices of Tragedy toward the aims of Comedy. This poetic transformation of genre (Tragedy to Comedy) is heard both in the laughter, which is among the profound benefits of his dramatic actions, and in the name “Trygaeus”, which suggestively identifies this protagonist as Tragedy-turned-Comedy. For, in the name “Trugaios” one not only hears “trugaō” (“I harvest”), together with “trugē” (the wine “vintage”), and “trux” (the “dregs”, or unfermented wine), but also discerns “Trugōdia”—Aristophanes’ invented word for his own comic genre, which is itself a pun on “Tragōidia” (Tragedy).¹⁹⁰ Thus, the name “Trygaeus” embodies Tragōidia (Tragedy) *turned* Trugōdia (Comedy). This etymology and punning word play, when taken together, presents Trygaeus as both an agent of “Harvesting”—he who “Gathers the vintage”—and an agent of Aristophanic “Comedy” (Trugōdia)—he who takes up tragic themes but turns these to comic ends.¹⁹¹ Trygaeus’ special *technē* of transformation, then, gathers not only the *technē* of farmers and architects but also the *technē* of both tragic and comic poets.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ “Trugōdia” is the “ode” (*ōdia*) sung for the “dregs” (*trux*); whereas Tragōidia is the “ode” (*ōdia*) sung for the sacrificed “goat” (*tragos*), which tragic poets in archaic times had sung for. The “dregs” (*trux*) refers to unfermented wine; the unstrained residual portion of wine that remained in the bottom of a cask after the new wine was poured off. It was the lowest but most potent substance in the cask, thus fittingly qualifying the stuff of comic drama (according to Aristophanes). On Trygaeus’ potent name, and the correspondence of “Tragedy and Tragedy”, see Olson (2002), note to line 497-500; Taplin (1983); Edwards (1991); and Hall (2006), 328-35. As Hall notes in these pages, the special ending of Trygaeus’ name (*aios*) makes him “in some sense the *offspring* of ‘Tragedian’”. Hall also notes here that in some contexts, the god Dionysus was evoked with the epithet *Protrugaios*, he who “presides over the vintage”, *leading* or looking forward to such harvesting activities.

¹⁹¹ As Hall (2006), 178, claims: “Trygaeus”, being closely identified with *trugōdia*, exemplifies a form of Comedy having “the same social utility and didactic force as Tragedy.” In this discussion, Hall further suggests that Trygaeus is “virtually a personification of socially useful Comedy” and can be seen as the masculine counterpart to the *feminine* figures of “Poetry” (as personified in Aristophanes’ fragmentary *Poiēsis*, Frag. 466-67 Loeb), and “Kōmōdia” (as personified in Cratinus’ fragmentary *Putinē*, the “Wine Flask”, 423 BCE). The serious sense of *trugōdia* is made explicit in Aristophanes’ *Acharnians*, when Dikaepolis asserts: “even comedy (*trugōdia*) knows about what’s right (*dikaion*)” (500).

Performing in a mixed genre persists as a predicament and opportunity for architect-figures beyond Trygaeus. For, in Euripides’ satyr-play, “architects” perform in a burlesque, yet tragically interdependent genre; and in Plautus’ *Amphitryon*, Zeus—the “architect of all” (*architectus omnibus*, 45)—devises, with the help of Mercury, a tragic plot in a comic guise, a mix called (for the first time), “*tragicomoedia*” (59). See, Christenson (2000), 149.

¹⁹² Given that the chorus in *Peace* praises the “great *technē*” of their comic poet (749), one may take the *technē* of dramatic poetry, the *technē* of agriculture (and the arts that support it), and the *technē* of warfare (and the arts that support it), as forming a triad of “arts” in this play (544, 1212). The *atechnos* manner of War (and the gods) adds a fourth artless (careless and thoughtless) sort of art (206, 199).

With this complex understanding of Trygaeus' name, one may also count him among the ensemble of other personified figures performing allegorically in the play. Together with War, Riot, Peace, Theōria, and Harvest,¹⁹³ Trygaeus acts as Harvester and Tragedian—a tragicomic cultivator of potentially positive transformation. In this way, Trygaeus would also join those other comic protagonists—Dikaeopolis; Lysistrata; Praxagora; and Peisetairos—whose own names, likewise, evoke their special capability: Justly advising Cities; Loosening Armies; Acting effectively in the Agora; and Persuading Comrades.

PARADIGMATIC SHOWS: WAR AND PEACE IN THE ORCHESTRA AND ON EXEMPLARY ARTIFACTS

4.2d

Before moving on to consider another manner of representation in *Peace*, I must briefly return to the allegorical interlude so as to draw out a further allusion in its show. A clue to this allusion is borne by “Riot”. As assistant to War, Riot contributes comically to the allegorical scenario—rushing from place to place in search of a “pestle” at War’s command, and absorbing the abuse of his ruthless master. Yet, beyond physical comedy, Riot (*Kudoimos*)—whose name is variously translated as “Havoc”, “Uproar”, “Tumult” and “Confusion”¹⁹⁴—also resonates profoundly with the epic din of battle. For in the *Iliad*, Riot is found both on the troubled battlefield (5.593)¹⁹⁵ and on the artfully wrought shield of Achilles, where the divine craftsman Hephaestus chooses to inset Riot, together with Strife (*Eris*) and destructive Fate (*Kēer*), as ornaments, animating the shield’s image of a city at war (18.535). Riot is also found on the shield of Heracles; since, in Hesiod’s

¹⁹³ There are more personifications in *Peace* than in any other of Aristophanes’ comedies. Other personified abstractions appearing in Aristophanes plays include: “Reconciliation” (Diallagē) in *Lysistrata*; “Sovereignty” (Basileia) in *Birds*; the “People” (Dēmos), and the “Treaty (Agreements)” (*Spondai*) in *Knights*; the “Just” and “Unjust” arguments (Dikaioi and Adikoi Logos) in *Clouds*; “Poverty” (Penia) and “Wealth” (Ploutos) in *Wealth*; and the “Muse of Euripides” (*Frogs* 1306ff). These figures are gathered and briefly discussed in relation to other personified agents in Greek myth in Lever, (1953). Cf. Olson (1992), especially pp. 313-14. In Athenian tragedy, one finds the “Well-Minded Ones” (*Eumenides*), “Might” (Kratos) and “Force” (Bia) in Aeschylus’ *Prometheus Bound*; in Euripides one finds “Madness” (Lyssa) in *Heracles*, Death (Thanatos) in *Alcestis*.

¹⁹⁴ “Riot” the name offered by Bowie (1993), 134ff; “Uproar”, Olson (1998); “Tumult”, Newiger (1980); “Hubbub”, Henderson (1991); “confusion” is the often sense of the noun in epic.

¹⁹⁵ “Riot” together with Ares and Enyo (god and spirit of war) follow Hector onto the battlefield in book five (5.593). Cognate forms of *kudoimos*, also qualify the phenomena of “havoc” and the activity of “wreaking of havoc” on the battlefield (11.163, 324, 15.136).

poem *The Shield*, Hephaestus has again inset Riot as an animate ornament, together with Strife and destructive Fate (155-56).¹⁹⁶ By having War call his accomplice by the name “Riot” (255), then, Aristophanes associates this comic extra with the riotous persona set into epic poetry. Beyond appropriating epic clout for Riot, such an allusion more significantly links Aristophanes’ allegorical representation of War (and his drama *Peace* in general) to the shields of Achilles and Heracles—those exemplary defensive works of representational art that, like his own drama, actively display elaborate images of war and peace together with an impressive milieu of worldly conditions. By alluding to these shields, one may also infer that Aristophanes was linking his own work as a dramatic poet to the activity of the exemplary craftsman Hephaestus; for this smith’s manner of orchestrating lively representations upon the bounded area of a shield provides an appropriate model for the dramatic poet, who similarly fashions vivid scenarios in (and around) the bounded area of the orchestra.

There is a further, more narrative, way in which Aristophanes’ dramatic allegory resembles the Homeric description of the shield of Achilles. Like the allegorical representation in *Peace*, which is staged in the heavens as an interlude set within the play, the making of the shield of Achilles is presented as an elaborate digression (a descriptive ekphrasis) set within the larger epic (18.476-616). During this episode of the *Iliad*, the action on the Trojan battlefield is momentarily suspended (together with the tensions among all those in conflict) as poetic attention moves up to “high Olympus”, ascending—together with Thetis—to the divine workshop of Hephaestus where Achilles’ shield and its representative scenes of war and peace are vividly prepared (18.142ff). As in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, then, it is in the heavens above where the audience of the epic, as of the drama, is given such a comprehensive and illuminating show. As Mark W. Edwards has observed, such representational digressions in Homeric poetry perform like extended similes, “Like an enormous simile, the scenes on the shield [of Achilles] hold the narrative still for a while as we gaze at them.”¹⁹⁷ In Aristophanes’ *Peace*, the spectator’s gaze upon the allegorical interlude is marked and modeled within the drama by Trygaeus himself. For, while War and Riot perform their menacing show, Trygaeus watches on discerningly from his hiding place at some limit of the orchestra (234). From this

¹⁹⁶ As Heracles dons his shield for a duel with Kyknos (son of Ares), the images upon his shield are elaborately described in a way that closely resembles the model scene in the *Iliad*.

¹⁹⁷ Edwards (1987), 278. Cf. Becker (1995), 49, who also compared the ekphrasis on Achilles’ shield to Homeric similes.

marginal and intermediate position, Trygaeus offers the spectators numerous interpretive (and comic) asides: responding to the scenario as it develops; urging the spectators to look on as well and to “see (*horate*) the serious danger (*megas kindunon*)” (264); and reassuring them to endure this “great test” (*megas agōn*)” (276-86). In this way, Aristophanes’ digression brings interpretive attention to the dramatic poetry, to its own artifice and to its bearing. And this it does (like the Homeric display of Achilles’ shield) by moving to an eccentric place and to an alternative mode of representation; as well as by offering a comparative, layered and expanded view back onto the main themes of the narrative. Thus, by their interpretive role, combined with their conspicuous manner of influencing events both within the story and beyond it (to the story’s audience), such digressions (allegorical interludes, descriptive ekphrasis, and extended similes) act as illuminating and auxiliary complements to the poetic work of which they are also an integral part.¹⁹⁸

I must refrain from delving too deeply into this nested topic of poetic and representational devices. I will simply emphasize that the architect-figure in Euripides’ *Cyclops* (Odysseus) also involves such a device; specifically, an extended simile, or mixed analogy, which, like the interlude in *Peace*, is inclusive of allegorically and architecturally suggestive imagery and is modeled after epic poetry. And, the architect-figure in *Cyclops* delivers this poetic image, as a kind of architectural representation, to both the chorus and the spectators so as to persuasively show and dramatically illuminate the broader significance of his transformative scheme. (This will be discussed below, p. 267ff).

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If the allegorical interlude staged in the heavens offers extraordinary and divine insight onto War and Peace, the metaphoric display staged on the mortal plane would seem to offer a visceral immersion in the human experience of war and the lack of peace. It is to this metaphoric mode of representing Peace’s absence and potential presence that we now turn.

¹⁹⁸ On the general significance of digressions in Homeric poetry, see Austin (1966). The poetic role that such devices play within epic and dramatic poetry resembles the architectural role that ornament plays for buildings, as described by Alberti (and as discussed above in the prologue). For a relevant discussion of this notion—that poetic and architectural ornaments gain and sustain value in relation to the works and situations they adorn—see the chapter entitled “Aesthetic and Hermeneutic Consequences” in Gadamer (1993), esp. 159.

PRELIMINARY DESCENT INTO DUNG (THE OPENING ACT OF *PEACE*)

4.3a

Metaphorically, the lack, or negation of Peace, is represented most forcibly at the very start of the play with an odiferous immersion in “dung”.¹⁹⁹ In this ridiculously chaotic opening scene, one slave is stationed in the midst of the orchestra at a mixing tub full of dung. There, he begrudgingly shapes the dung into neat little balls, all the while complaining directly to the spectators about his unpleasant experience in doing so. A second slave, meanwhile, frantically rushes, back and forth, from this tub of dung in the midst of the orchestra to the central door of the skēnē. There, he delivers the carefully prepared dung-balls to a “filthy, smelly and voracious [thing]”—hidden immediately beyond (38). When the slave that has been busy shaping the dung finally becomes fed-up with his foul task, he abandons the offensive tub, and goes himself to take a peak behind the door of the skēnē (29). Astonished, this slave turns back to the spectators to mime what he has just seen (35ff), and then to disclose the play’s “plot” (*logon*, 50). From this dung-shaping slave we thus learn that the repulsive yet fastidious thing concealed behind the skēnē is “a giant Aetna dung-beetle” (73). We further learn that this beastly beetle—a device imported by his “mad” master—has been feeding on dung as unlikely fuel for an urgent ascent to the heavens.

As A. M. Bowie has concisely observed, the preliminary presentation of dung in Aristophanes’ *Peace* shows that “all is not well in the world”.²⁰⁰ Indeed, here, as elsewhere in epic poetry, the excessive presence of dung is emblematic of a situation run amuck.²⁰¹ Yet, beyond plunging us into muck, into general chaos, and into aberrant conditions as abhorring as war, this metaphoric scenario—involving dung, dung-shaping, dung-eating and dung-fueling—also introduces a series of more precisely suggestive associations. To begin with, one may compare the “tub” of dung to the “mortar” of War; both as a conspicuous site of transformation, and as a primary stage property

¹⁹⁹ This “dung” is first called out as “donkey dung” (*onidōn*, 4), but mortal dung (*kopos*, 9) and a slang substance (*chezo*, 24, 151, 164) are also included in this mix.

²⁰⁰ Bowie (1998), 135.

²⁰¹ Odysseus encounters “great heaps of dung (*kopos*)” within the cave of the Cyclops (*Odyssey* 9.329), and again at the doors of his own household in Ithaca (17.297, 306). These are the only two mentions of “dung” that I am aware of in Homeric poetry.

representative of the city. In performance, War may well have used the very same stage property (for his menacing show) that the slave had just previously used (for his repulsive chore). Such a re-appropriation of the same prop for different purposes would make explicit its metaphoric capacity. The slave initiates this representative capacity of the “tub” with the particular name he gives to it. For, as he abandons this “tub” in disgust, he calls it (literally) a “bilge” or “hull”, as of a ship (*antlias*, 17).²⁰² As such, this “tub” of dung not only prefigures the allegorical image of the “martial mortar” as a walled city caught up in war, but also introduces the metaphor of a ‘ship of state’—burdened with sewage.²⁰³ The dung within this “tub”, or troubled ship, further foreshadows the mash of leeks, garlic, cheese and honey at the bottom of War’s “mortar”; as well as the intolerable condition of all the people War’s mash represents. At another level of interpretation, the ominous stench rising out of the collective dung strongly suggests that the relationship between mortals and gods has also run amuck; for, as Bowie explains, “bad smells... stand in opposition to spices and perfumes that are a means of communication with the gods, and altars are naturally polluted by such [smells] as excrement.”²⁰⁴ Thus, this first dung-ridden scene of *Peace*, suggests what the subsequent episode in the heavens proves: that both the human and the divine situations have become profoundly problematic.

Beyond revealing the magnitude of the play’s central problems (in the midst of which the architect-figure is obliged to act), the presence of dung in the first scene of the play also sheds light—a contrasting light—on a range of primary transformations brought about in the course of the drama. For instance, the repulsive stench of dung and the reluctant “shaping” of dung balls for consumption by a strange beetle at the start of the play (4ff), gradually give way to more attractive imagery: to the appealing fragrance of wine, flowers, perfume and divine offerings (525f, 862, 1050); to the “shaping-together”

²⁰² Rejecting the demand for more dung-balls, this slave says: “No, by Apollo, I won’t! I can’t stand over this ship (*antlias*) any longer!” (17). The *antlias* refers specifically to the lowest part of a vessel, which tended to fill with stagnant “bilge water”. See Olson’s note to the line, whose translation of the verb “stand over” (*huperechein*) I have borrowed.

²⁰³ Such a trope—of the city, or state *as* ship—is found in a number of Aristophanes’ other comedies: in *Wasps*, a slave claims that the plot of the play concerns “the whole ship” (*tou skaphous holou*, 29). Cf. *Frogs* 361; and *Assembly Women* 108. The image reappears in *Cyclops*, (see below p. 273), and persists in the philosophical writing of Plato (*Republic* 488a-89b). It was popular among poets already by the sixth century BCE, as in the poetry of Alcaeus and Theognis (667-682). See Page (1955), 179-97.

²⁰⁴ Bowie (1998), 135. “Fragrant” is an epithet of “altars” in Homeric poetry. On the importance of good smells to Greek gods, see also Lilja (1972), 19-30, and Detienne (1994).

of wedding cakes made of sesame seeds, oil and honey (869),²⁰⁵ and to the consumption of these auspicious cakes by the bride, the bridegroom, and all their grateful guests at the play's end (1305ff). Whereas the slave in the first scene makes it very clear that he would never think of tasting the dung-balls that he is obliged to shape (13-14); the chorus members, in the culminating banquet scene, eagerly devour the honey-cakes (as well as the roasted meat, sweet rolls and cookies) that they are generously offered (1191-96, 1305ff). And, it is tempting to see them being offered these delicious treats from the very same metaphoric bowl. Thus, the preliminary image of dung (together with its "tub") performs as a base phenomenal measure against which the fuller spectrum of peaceful transformation (its more diversely sensual, social and satisfying scope) may be more thoroughly appreciated and clearly desired. Modern scholarship has offered a number of ways to concisely express these primary transformative movements in the play: from "dung cakes... to wedding cakes"; from excreting to eating; from sterility to fertility; from decay to rejuvenation; and from the foul smell of animal dung to the fragrant exhalations of gods.²⁰⁶ To this series one may add the change from "shaping" (*plassein*, 4) to "shaping-together" (*sumplassein*, 869), which implies not only a movement toward more subtly inclusive manners of making, but also a development from forming an overwhelmingly singular condition to synthesizing a variegated condition of abundance. Although the gist of these positive movements may be clear enough, there is still more to be seen, sensed and made of the dung.

Dung, as has been shown above, gives representation to the dearth of Peace, to the burdensome reach of War, and—by measure of contrast—to the positive scope of the play's peaceful transformations. But dung is not reducible to a negative element simply opposed to a positive and plentiful peace, for the involvement of dung as fuel for the heaven-bound beetle introduces one of the profound ironies of the drama: the unlikely role of low substances for high pursuits.²⁰⁷ There is, in other words, a potentially positive

²⁰⁵ The "sesame rolls" (*sēsamē*) being "shaped-together" (*xumplattetai*, 869) in the play were standard treats at weddings. By their "prolific" seeds, sesame rolls were believed to bestow fertility onto the marriage couple, see Oakley and Sinos (1993), 23.

²⁰⁶ These primary transformations (or reversals) are emphasized by the following scholars: from "dung cakes... to wedding cakes"—Whitman (1964), 63; from excreting to eating—Reckford (1979), 192; from sterility to fertility—Henderson (1991), 63; from decay to rejuvenation and from foul smells (of mortals and animals) to fragrant communion (between mortals and gods)—Bowie (1993), 135-36.

²⁰⁷ Dung also plays a productive role for Odysseus in the Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*; for, he hides the sharpened stake in a heap of dung just before using it to blind the cannibal (9.329).

and generative agency within the dung. Indeed, Trygaeus, as a farmer, would be keenly aware of the dung's potential as a productive fertilizer—as a substance especially appropriate to bring about not only a bountiful “Harvest” but an earthy Peace. Accepting the substance in this ironically positive way invites an additional comparison: seeing the lowly “dung” as analogous to residual “dregs” (*trux*)—the potent substance that collects at the bottom of a new cask of wine, which Trygaeus (as “Trugedian” and Vintager) would likewise aim to re-cultivate.²⁰⁸ One may further see in these dark, mucky, low yet potent substances a reflection of the maddeningly melancholic “bile” (*cholē*), which according to the dung-shaping slave had so positively overwhelmed Trygaeus at the start of the play (66); just as it may well have infected Aristophanes himself as he began to shape the drama. Given these potentially positive interpretations of the dung (as earth's fertilizer, as wine's potent “dregs”, and as a poet's bitter verve) one may find in *Peace*'s preliminary episode of dung-shaping a dramatic metaphor for poetic composition; one that enacts the shaping of verses into refined drama *as* the kneading of dung into neat digestible balls—which, in turn, propel speculative devices and restorative schemes. This performative association is made apparent in the play by the dung-shaping slave himself, for it is this same actor who (just after shaping the dung) goes on to bring aspects of the drama into visibility and intelligibility: first, by vividly miming the concealed dung-eating beetle (35); then, by lucidly sharing the play's “plot”, or reasoning (*logos*, 50ff). And this the slave does both by pronouncing the protagonist's initial complaint, the motivating argument behind the dramatic action (58), and by revealing the “novel way” (*tropon*) the protagonist intends to act (63-77).²⁰⁹ Dung-shaping, then, models the shaping of drama and, more specifically, prefigures and fuels the protagonist's scheme.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ On the poetic merits of “dregs” to Aristophanes see Edwards (1991), 167.

²⁰⁹ Trygaeus' “novel way [or turn]” (*kainon tropon*, 54-5) on the beetle is later cast by him as “new” (*neon*, 94). Yet, it should be emphasized that Trygaeus *found* this device in the fables of Aesop and in the tragedy of Bellerophon (as he himself points out, 129ff). The novelty he demonstrates, then, is in the way he *turned* the beetle and tragic devices to his present situation.

²¹⁰ In later Roman literature, “shaping” becomes a common trope for the forming of poetry. The *architectus*-protagonist in Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus*, for instance, says with delight that his “scheme” is *shaping-up* well “under his hands” (*sub manus*, 873, cf. 1143). This same protagonist is greeted as “*architectus*” a moment later (901). This trope may already be suggested in the *Iliad*, by the potter-simile that specifically qualifies a image of making circle-dances upon Achilles' shield (18.600-03). In Greek literature, “shaping” becomes a common trope for *fashioning* thoughts (as in the imagination) and *molding* young minds (as in education). Cf. Plato's *Phaedrus* 246c, *Republic* 377c.

Together with these productive metaphors of dung and dung-shaping, the activity of “shaping” itself should be heard as productive; for the word “shaping” names a basic form-giving act. The two productive examples that frame this drama—the initial “shaping” (*plassein*) of potent dung-balls (4), and the ultimate “shaping-together” (*sumplassein*) of auspicious offerings (869)—have already been mentioned. A few examples of “shaping” as found beyond this drama will help to reveal further relevance in this basic mode of making. In the other plays of Aristophanes, for instance, one finds verses referring to the “shaping” of clay vessels, as by a potter (*Wasps* 926); and to the “shaping” of clay houses, as by a child (*Clouds* 879).²¹¹ In tragic drama, more ambiguously, one finds the “shaping” of speech (notably, Odysseus’ fabrication of lies),²¹² and the “shaping” of life-like bodies (notably, the gods’ fashioning of a phantom-figure, or *eidōlon*, of Helen).²¹³ In the poetry of Hesiod one finds verses that not only provide a rare example of the same “shaping-together” activity as found in the drama *Peace*,²¹⁴ but also suggest a primary, if troubling, model for the figure of Peace herself. For, when Hesiod describes how Hephaestus formed Pandora (the first woman), he does so as follows: “the renowned smith took [moistened] earth and shaped it together (*sumplasse*), through Zeus’ counsels (*dia boulas*), into the likeness of a modest maiden” (*Theogony* 571-72). The full description of this event in the poetry of Hesiod reveals that

²¹¹ Whereas the vessel-shaping remark in *Wasps* is made in passing, the house-shaping remark in *Clouds* is given as part of a more significant passage. Here, a father, seeking to gain admittance for his son into Socrates’ “think-shop”, gives the following evidence for his son’s ability to learn: “He’s a born philosopher at heart. Why, when he was still a tyke this high, he could make clay houses at home, and carve boats, and fashion figwood carts, and he’d make frogs out of pomegranates as pretty as you please—” Yet, it is the discerning capacity for reasoning that his son lacks: “—Just see that he learns that pair of Arguments (*logō*), the Better (*kreitton*)... and the Worse (*adikon*)”. (*Clouds* 877-85). A fragmentary line of a lost drama (likely by Euripides) offers another sense of such house-shaping. Here, the poet asks: “What house shaped (*plastheis*) by carpenters (*tektones*) could enclose the divine form within its enfolding walls” (Frag. 912a Loeb). Both an affinity and a contest between the enfolding potential of a *tekton*’s well-shaped walls and a poet’s well-shaped words seems implied by these lines.

²¹² In Sophocles’ *Ajax*, the chorus suspects that Odysseus “shapes” slanderous lies (148). And, in Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, Hermes warns Prometheus that Zeus’ threat to him is *no* lie—“no shaped boast” (1030).

²¹³ Menelaus presumes the gods fashioned an *eidolon* of Helen in Euripides’ *Helen* (585). The notion that humans are “shaped” from clay is found also in Aeschylus’ *Seven Against Thebes* (890) and Aristophanes’ *Birds*, where the feathered chorus mocks mortals as mere “artifacts of clay (*plasmata*)” (686).

²¹⁴ Besides Aristophanes’ *Peace* and Hesiod’s *Theogony*, the compound verb “shaping-together” (*sumplassein*) is rarely found in ancient literature, appearing only in a few later sources. *LSJ*.

like the auspicious offerings (made of sesame seeds, oil and honey), Pandora was “shaped-together” with a diversity of ingredients including: earth and water, voice and vigor (as harmonized by Hephaestus); the skills of weaving (as implanted by Athena); the qualities of charm, passion and “stinging desire (*pothos*)” (as mixed in by Aphrodite); and a deceitful mind (as worked in by Hermes).²¹⁵ The ironic intent in crafting Pandora in the first place would seem to be the special contribution of Zeus himself, for it is by his “counsels” (*dia boulas*) that all these gifts are “shaped-together” and then presented to mortals as a “tempting snare (*dolon*)” (*Theogony* 589).²¹⁶ Perhaps all of these specific examples of “shaping” when brought together provide a series of clues as to the implied “shaping-together” of Peace in Aristophanes’ play. For, these examples of forming clay vessels, model accommodations, ambiguous speech and alluring maidens provide clues to the earthy materiality of Peace’s statue (perhaps made of clay, not stone); to her uncertain yet shapely and capacious form (perhaps resembling a large amphora);²¹⁷ to her ambiguously alluring influence (prompting both proper desire and, potentially, more troubling lust); as well as to her own shaper, for whoever it was that formed this representation of Peace may well have done so after the manner of Hephaestus.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ Besides Hesiod’s *Theogony* (566-616), the making of Pandora is also described in *Works and Days* (58-106). There, Hephaestus’ formative act is narrated in similar terms: “without delay the renowned lame god shaped (*plasse*) from earth (*ek gaiēs*), through Zeus’ will (*dia boulas*), the likeness of a shy maiden” (71-2). The earlier command of Zeus had specified that Hephaestus should first “dampen earth with water” (*gaian hudei phurein*, 61).

²¹⁶ Zeus gives Pandora to Epimetheus (and all men) in retribution for Prometheus’ theft of fire.

²¹⁷ There are no direct clues in the play as to Peace’s physical appearance (aside from the chorus’ comment about her “fine face [or mask]”, *euprosōpos* 617). Yet, the goddess does appear amphora-like to Trygaeus, for when the goddess first emerges from the earth, Trygaeus searches for a fitting expression to greet her with, one that, like her, has “the capacity of ten-thousand amphorai” (*muriamphoron*, 521). Pandora was closely associated with a large vessel, a *pithos* (erroneously called a box). Ancient clay vessels were metaphorically and formally charged with feminine aspects (shapeliness, receptive hollows, and bearing capacity), see Dubois (1988), esp. 47-9. On the Greek conception of women “as containers” (as having wombs, and as residing in the inner rooms of a house), see Reeder (1995), 49-56, 91-101 and 195-99. On p. 51 of this collection is a suggestive vase painting image of “Hope” poking her head out of Pandora’s vessel—thus appearing as a large vessel with a face atop it. On the Greek perception of divine statues as vessels in general—as receptacles to be filled with divine influences and to preserve and properly release these influences—see Steiner (2001), esp. 121-25.

²¹⁸ Pheidias arguably shaped the colossal statue of Athena *after* the manner of Hephaestus *shaping* Pandora. For, upon the base of his colossal statue of Athena was a sculptural relief depicting the “birth of Pandora” (said to show Athena bestowing her with a crown and woven gifts with a group of witnessing gods). Why the making of this first troubling woman is shown beneath the statue of Athens’ first patroness has been a question. One could consider

Yet, what do these “shaping” and “shaping-together” activities tell us about Trygaeus, and his architecting activities? As protagonist of the scheme to recover Peace, Trygaeus does not himself shape her figure as Hephaestus had shaped Pandora, since Peace emerges from the earth fully formed.²¹⁹ Rather, more like Zeus (in Hesiod’s story), Trygaeus’ actions lead to Peace being brought (back) into appearances in the heavens; and then to her being (re)presented to mortals in the orchestra. Yet, here, Trygaeus’ intentions diverge from those of Zeus, for Trygaeus returns Peace to mortals so that she might perform not, like Pandora, as a “tempting snare” but rather as a compelling reminder of peaceful benefits. Granted, somewhat like Pandora, this representation of Peace prompts “desire” (*pothos*)—the chorus members admit that they are “overcome with desire (*pothoi*)” for Peace (584);²²⁰ just as Peace is said (by Hermes) to have “desire (*pothoi*) for this land (*chōras*)” (638). Yet, this kind of “desire” (*pothos*) is not primarily a sexual desire (such as Pandora’s figure might be expected to compel), rather it is a longing for some thing, some one, or some condition that is absent—a “desire for something not at hand.”²²¹ Thus, by installing Peace in the open area of the orchestra, as well as by enacting social activities that her figure orients (such as dancing, wedding feasts and sacrifices), this architect-figure seems to be prompting mortals not to lust for Peace’s shapely form but to urgently desire the social and worldly conditions that are

the sculptor’s own emergent self-awareness of his act of fashioning an exemplary female figure, which might be as troubling as it is appealing. See Hurwit (1999), 235-45.

²¹⁹ There is another version of Pandora’s genesis (on a vase painting) showing her rising—fully formed—*up* and *out* of the earth in a kind of epiphany. Such a “coming up” is comparable to Peace’s coming out from behind the obscuring skēnē. On the well-known vase (a volute krater of circa 450 BCE kept at the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford)—see Reeder (1995), 284-86. The tool held by Epimetheus in this painting is especially important: a large “mallet” (*sphura*). While this “mallet” is closely associated with certain craftsmen, potters and smiths (*Odyssey* 3.434, Aeschylus *Frag.* 307)—for, with it clods of earth might be struck and, so, softened in preparation for shaping clay formworks—the implement was also linked to farmers—for with it one broke up the earth, releasing its fertile potential (*Peace* 566). A satyr play by Sophocles (of 470 or 460 BCE), suggestively entitled *Pandora*, or *The Hammers* (*Sphurokopoi*) supports the interpretation that the tool was used to strike the ground and, so, releasing or summoning Pandora. On the relation of this vase image, its tool, and dramatic ‘coming-ups’, see Simon (1982), esp. 134-36, and 145-47; and Olson (1998), xxxvi-vii.

²²⁰ The chorus members further address Peace as the “desired one” (*hō pothoumenē*, 588).

²²¹ Weiss (1998), 33. As Weiss shows in this article, *pothos* is the kind of desire that Demeter has for her abducted daughter Persephone, and that Odysseus’ family in Ithaca has for him. In Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, *pothos* is also the kind of desire that Dionysus has for a “skilled poet” and that Heracles has for minestrone (53, 66, 71). As Weiss, following Plato (*Cratylus* 420) further shows, *pothos* is distinguished from other kinds of desire, namely *eros* and *himeros*.

lacking and that her form and forum (the open orchestra) represent.²²² If *all* this—all that has taken shape in the orchestra—may be taken as “shaping-together”, then the transformation from the play’s initial dung “shaping” is indeed profound. For, this development has not only gathered more variegated and auspicious conditions of abundance, but has also sought to harmonize these tangible, spatial, social and dramatic ingredients through diverse modes of animate participation. This architecting-protagonist, then, succeeds in shaping-together, or “making peace” (*eirēnēn poiēsas*, 1199), by making peaceful benefits dramatically apparent, appealing and available to others.

Finally, along with all that has been said above about “dung”—its metaphoric potential and its suggestive malleability (being transformable even into the desirable drama of Peace)—Aristophanes’ choice to establish the conditions of War in relation to “dung” also turns an abstract conflict (the battle for peace) into a palpable struggle with the profane stuff of one’s own mortal self. For, in the first scene, this familiar substance (and the actors’ slavery to it) dramatically exposes the primary strife of this drama as being bound to basic human conflicts: to the mortal conditions of hunger, toil, decay and death—incessant burdens that are nevertheless overcome in the play by poetic pursuits.²²³ By its reminder of such basic mortal topics, then, “dung” ultimately returns us to earth, not only as that inevitable repository of death but as the fertile grounds out of which Peace emerges, and as the supportive grounds for divine statues to be installed and human activities to be enacted. It is to the metaphoric and productive potential of this earthy substance—the fertile, supportive and orchestral grounds—that we now turn.

FERTILE GROUNDS: DRAWING UP PEACE (TOGETHER WITH HER EARTHY BENEFITS)

4.3b

Although Trygaeus’ initial movement on the high-flying beetle is unmistakably upward—“away from the ground”; up “into the air”; skyward “to the heavens”; and

²²² The kind of desire Peace prompts is expressed well by Kenneth J. Reckford (1987), 8, who puts it more in terms of the poet: “Peace cannot be regained until it is strongly enough desired; cannot be desired until it is remembered; cannot be remembered until it is rightly imagined—under the guidance of the comic poet employing the magic of poetry and stage.”

²²³ Such basic mortal conditions recur as urgent concerns for Odysseus in Euripides’ *Cyclops*. The problem of hunger is also a concern unique to Odysseus, among all Homeric heroes. (cf. *Iliad* 19.154-83, 198-237). Concern for his own (and his men’s) “accursed belly” has prompted W. B. Stanford (1963), 69, to qualify Odysseus as an “untypical hero”.

“straight [up] to Zeus”²²⁴—Peace, ultimately, is not recovered from above but is rather pulled up to the orchestra from below. As numerous descriptive utterances in the play make clear, Peace is “drawn”, “drawn-out”, and “drawn-up to the light”. She is also dug-up and unearthed from “down there”, from beneath heaps of “stones”, and from the “deep cave” she was “thrown in” by War.²²⁵ In other words, in spite of pursuing Peace in the upper-world, the architecting-figure, together with Hermes and the chorus, draw Peace out, in a sense, from the under-world. Peace—the goddess, the statue, and the worldly condition—emerges not from the clouds but from the earth.

Although, in performance, the actors most likely pulled Peace out more laterally—by pulling the ship-like rolling device (the *ekkyklēma*) out from behind the obscuring *skēnē* into the open orchestra—this revelatory event is comparable to a miraculous chthonic emergence. The language in the script supports such an image. The chorus members, for instance, are repeatedly called “farmers” during and immediately after the work of reaping Peace (508, 511, 551, 556ff 603). And, the chthonic nature of the event is then sustained and extended with imagery of other earthy phenomena: with the bountiful produce, pleasing aromas, sweet tastes, and seasonal sensations that (together with Peace) emerge from the fertile ground. Trygaeus, Hermes and the farmers draw-out these earthy phenomena both physically—with their rope—and verbally with catalogues of peaceful benefits. These benefits show forth first as images of wine; for Peace is anticipated as a “Vine-lover” (308); greeted as “Grape-giver”; regarded as capaciously yielding “10,000-amphora” (520-21); and inhaled as a fragrant vintage (523-30).²²⁶ Such earthy benefits of Peace also show forth palpably in song as plentiful produce: as fresh figs, myrtle berries, blooming grape vines, flourishing violets and healthy olive trees (572-81); as well as nourishing cucumbers, pomegranates, apples and

²²⁴ The line numbers for all this upwardness are as follows: “away from the ground” (*apos gēs*, 159), up “into the air” (*meteōros airetai*, 80), skyward “to the heavens” (*ouranon*, 104) and “straight [up] to Zeus” (*euthu tou Dios*, 68). Cf. lines 58, 62, 70, 68, 77, 80, 161.

²²⁵ Peace is “drawn” (*elkusai*, 300), “drawn-out” (*exelkusai*, 294, 315), and “drawn-up to the light” (*anelkusai to phōs*, 307, cf. 417 etc.)—from “down there” (*touti to katō*, 224), from beneath heaps of “stones” (*lithōn*, 225), and from the “deep cave” (*antron bathu*) she was “thrown-in” (*enbal’*) by War (223). Hermes also emphasizes the *underground* status of Peace when he indicates the place War has “thrown (her) in” (*enebal’*, 223), and when he warns that Zeus intends to punish anyone caught “digging her up” (*anoruttōn*, 372).

²²⁶ This epithet “grape-giver” (*botruōdore*) further associates Peace with earthy conditions, since it recalls similar epithets for Earth, such as “giver of grain (*zeidōros*) in the *Odyssey* (3.3).

acorns (1000-02). Other earthy benefits of Peace show as proper mortal toil, for Trygaeus and the farmers eagerly anticipate their joyful work of inspecting vines (1160f) and “gathering (the vintage)” (*trugēsomen*, 912, 1139f); as well as their satisfying toil of harvesting produce, re-plowing fields, re-planting crops, preparing feasts, and marrying brides (570ff, 775ff, etc.). The earthy benefits drawn out together with Peace also include “Harvest” (Opōra), who brings to Trygaeus an intimate and familial promise of begetting a “brood of grapes” (708), and who brings to all the broader benefits of Harvest-season, including the aroma of ripe fruit, the music of harvest festivals, and the related social and somatic pleasures of the feast (523-30, 1159-71). Peace herself, as one of the divine Hōrai (that is, a daughter of Zeus and sister to Justice and Good Order),²²⁷ also brings with her the seasonal benefits of worldly regularity, which the chorus members celebrate with images of winter pastimes, played inside by the fire while it rains (1131-58); and with images of high summer pleasures, including the return of the cicada’s song (1159-71). Whereas a variety of more social and political benefits (such as the restitution of *philia* and *Theōria*) are also drawn forth upon drawing-out Peace, these earthy images—of abundant wine and produce, and of the synchronization of mortal toil and worldly rhythms—attest to the broad scope of harmony that Peace’s re-emergence restores.

But there is still more that the architecting-Harvester (Trygaeus), the founding-farmers (the chorus), and the divine guide (Hermes) draw forth from the orchestral grounds when they draw out Peace, for they also bring to light certain poetic images bearing architectural relevance.

POETIC GROUNDS: DRAWING UP PEACE (TOGETHER WITH HER ORIGINATING IMAGERY)

4.3c

All the bountiful and vigorous imagery celebrated in *Peace* (and gathered above) not only projects a prodigious future but also resonates with a mythic past, by bringing to mind comparable scenes of prosperity portrayed elsewhere in epic poetry. For instance,

²²⁷ According to Hesiod’s *Theogony*, “Peace” (*Eirēnē*) was sister to “Justice” (*Dikē*) and “Good Order”, or “Lawfulness” (*Eunomia*); collectively called the Hōrai (Seasons). These three figures of regularity were born to Zeus and his second wife Themis, “Divine Custom” (*Theogony* 901-04). The Hōrai are twice evoked in Aristophanes’ drama: just before drawing Peace out of the pit, in the libation prayer that also invokes Aphrodite, the Graces and Desire (455); and, following her emergence, in a euphoric song, celebrating the joys of summer, the chorus exalt “dear Seasons” (*Hōrai philai*, 1168). It is tempting to regard the two female companions to Peace (*Theōria* and *Opōra*) as surrogates for Justice and Good Order. On the significance of the Horai in choral performance, see Mullen (1982), 209-24, esp. 218.

the strifeless abundance of the Golden Age, as represented in Hesiod's *Works and Days* (110-27), resonates with the worldly harmony and earthy prosperity figured forth in *Peace*. One may even take this strifeless Golden Age as a model for the conditions sought in *Peace*.²²⁸ And yet, given that a defining feature of this lost Golden Age was the earth's capability to bring forth fruits "of its own accord" (*automatē*, 118), this particular poetic image is limited as a model for the kind of Peace pursued by Trygaeus and the farmers, who themselves long for the toil of agricultural labor. The only "automatic", or "self-moving", agency in *Peace* is a desirous agency intrinsic to Peace herself. For, Hermes insists that Peace had many times in the past "appeared" in Athens "of her own accord" (*automatē* / *autēn*)—out of her "longing for this land"—but her "longing" (*pothōi*) was not reciprocated by the people, so she turned-away.²²⁹ Thus, the work of sustaining desire for Peace is more at stake in this play than the desire to be free of work. Although Athenian poets, especially comic poets, did dramatize (and satirize) the nostalgic draw of the idyllic Golden Age,²³⁰ Aristophanes seems to have modeled the desirable conditions in *Peace* after different poetic images.

Given that Trygaeus is himself an exemplary "Harvester"—he who "gathers the vintage" (*trugaō*)—one may begin by considering the only three scenes of "harvesting" in epic poetry. These images, which Aristophanes (and Trygaeus) must have had in mind when composing (and pursuing) Peace, include: the scenes of earnest toil—ploughing, reaping and "harvesting" (*trugoōsin*, 293)—as depicted on the shield of Heracles in Hesiod's poem *The Shield* (285-99); the scenes of joyful work—ploughing, reaping and "harvesting" (*trugoōsin*, 18.566)—as animated upon the shield of Achilles in Homer's *Iliad* (18.541-72); and the scenes of an ever-blooming orchard and active vineyard—

²²⁸ Most interpreters of *Peace* take it for granted that the 'Golden Age' was its primary model for the prosperity desired. See, for instance, Olson (1998), xxxi.

²²⁹ As Hermes puts it: "The orators... took to driving this goddess away... though many times she appeared (*phaneisan*) of her own accord (*auten*) out of longing (*pothōi*) for this land" (635-38). And, again, a few lines later: "she came here of her own accord (*automatē*), offering the city a basketful of treaties, and was voted down three times in the Assembly" (665-67).

²³⁰ The fragments of Athenian comedy attest to a number of plays dealing with this theme. See Ruffell (2000). On the ambiguities of the Golden Age, also known as the "Age of Kronos", see Vidal-Naquet (1978). As Vidal-Naquet and others emphasize, the savageness of the Cyclops and the idyllic nature of his land exemplify the kind of ambiguity associated with such an age. In the *Odyssey*, this is also drawn out by the so-called Goat Island, a land of unfailing prosperity, which Odysseus describes in detail as being right next door to the Cyclops' island (9.131-42).

together with its rhythms of “harvesting” (*trugoōsin*, 7.124)—as portrayed in the land of the Phaeacians in Homer’s *Odyssey* (7.112-32). As in Aristophanes’ drama, each of these epic scenes of “harvesting” also show a variety of festive activities (wine-drinking, feasting, music-making, sporting and dancing), which both accompany and follow the agricultural work. What must be further emphasized is that integral to each of these scenes of worldly peace and earthly prosperity is also an exemplary model of civic peace and social justice. Close to the ploughed fields and grapevines upon the shield of Heracles is set a “city of men”, animated with wedding processions (*Shield* 270ff). Situated within the ring of cultivated land on the shield of Achilles, is a circle of elders, who are each in turn deliberating the justice of a case (*Iliad* 18.497-508). And, bounded by the generous orchard and vineyard of the Phaeacians is the hospitable palace hall where a stranger (Odysseus) is kindly received, judged on the merits of his speech (especially his stories), and duly awarded honors (*Odyssey* 11.333-76; 13.1ff).

If the worldly and civic Peace that Aristophanes (and his protagonist) sought were modeled after such exemplary scenes as these, then we ought to regard as well how these scenes entail architecting, or architectural conditions. Within the shield of Heracles, architectural conditions are implied by the configuration of encircling city walls with their “seven golden gates” and “fitted lintels” (270ff), as well as by the configuration of charioteers competing nearby in an open “arena” (*agonōs*), in the middle of which stands a “much-adorned” (*poludaidalon*) tripod—the work of Hephaestus (*Shield* 301-13). Upon the defensive shield of Achilles, architectural conditions are found in the configuration of deliberating elders, who are seated together in a “sacred circle” (*hierōi kuklōi*) upon a ring of “polished stones” (*xestōisi lithois*). Architectural conditions are also found nearby in the configuration of youths “running round with cunning feet” upon the “dance floor” (*choros*), which is fashioned after the one once made by Daidalos. And these active configurations themselves take shape just as they are being set into animate armor by Hephaestus (*Iliad* 18.503-4, 590-606). In the *Odyssey*, the Phaeacian “overseers” actively initiate architectural conditions when, in anticipation of a bard’s performance, they prepare a “dance floor” (*choros*) by leveling the ground and marking its threshold (8.258-60). Architectural conditions are further woven into the hospitable Phaeacian hall: with its golden doors, silver doorposts, bronze threshold, and elaborate walls with fixed seats that extend “from the threshold to the innermost chamber”. And this ornamented surround—within which Odysseus’ storied speech is shared and judged—has at its threshold vigilant dogs, also fashioned by

Hephaestus (7.81-102). One could go on regarding the full range of exemplary conditions that these nested milieux offer (including the parallel situations of war and strife, the delimiting realm of Oceanus, and the over-arching constellations), but this much of their settings is sufficient for my argument.

Each of these settings just described (the city, the competitive arena, the sacred circle, the dance floors, and the ornamented hall) should be taken as architectural not only because they are elaborately crafted and appropriately arranged for dwellers and their activities, but also because they exemplify originating settings for primary mortal actions: marrying, competing, deliberating, dancing, hosting strangers and telling stories. Taken together with the orchards, the vineyards, and their accompanying activities, these originating scenes may be considered as the bases for Aristophanes' and Trygaeus' scheme for Peace—the exemplary “beginnings” from which *Peace* (the play) and Peace (the worldly and civic condition) gain orientation, mythic depth and enduring relevance. Such originating conditions or exemplary “beginnings”, the poets called *archai*.²³¹ Given that Aristophanes' architect-protagonist was seeking such conditions, it is not surprising that the Peace he recovers is repeatedly associated with *archai* in the play. Indeed, Peace is said to re-inaugurate, or begin (*arxai*), “many good things” (436); to revive festivals

²³¹ On this poetic sense of *archē* (which is not reducible to a logical, philosophical or material “cause”), see Mullen (1982), 116-17. As Eric Voeglin (1957), 133ff, has also emphasized, philosophical notions of a generative principle (*archē*) and phenomenal cause (*aition*) were “prefigured in the medium of myth”. In the *Odyssey*, for instance, an orienting olive tree served as the “beginning” (*archomenos*) for Odysseus' marriage bed (*Odyssey*, 23.199). And, the primary question for an oral poet (one who knew a vast repertoire of interrelated stories) was “where to begin”. Odysseus asks himself this question just before he begins to tell his incredible tales to the Phaeacians: “What shall I tell you first (*ti prōton*...9.14). On the significance of this question in the *Odyssey*, see Pucci (1998), 138; and Burkert (1987), 48. Similarly, in Aristophanes' *Women at the Thesmophoria*, the dramatic poet Agathon sets down the “beginnings” (*archas*) of his drama (52). See also, Vernant (1965), esp. 79, where (with reference to Hesiod) he emphasizes that when the Muses sing they start “at the beginning—*ex archēs*”. And this prioritizing of “beginnings”, Vernant continues, is *not* meant “to situate events within a temporal framework, but to reach the very foundation of being, to discover what is original... which makes it possible to understand the whole process of becoming.” Cicero would later name “Archē” as one of the Muses (*De Natura Deorum* 3.54), see Detienne (1996), 41. In the related context of ritual, Walter Burkert (1983), 5, emphasizes, “The Greeks seem to have given most care to the ‘beginning’ stages (*archesthai*)”. Finally, Aristotle would later posit an appreciation for “beginnings” as interrelated with an understanding of the “good” (*Nichomachean Ethics* 1095b6, 1098b2)—an understanding that led Gadamer (1986), 162, to surmise, that, for Aristotle, “the true archē (starting point)” consisted of our common practices—our living awareness and experience of what is agreed upon as good. On the profound significance of common dwelling practices, or typical situations, for architects, see Vesely (2004), esp. 387; and Leatherbarrow (1993), esp. 215-25—sources to which my argument about originating settings (above) is indebted.

with “original” (*archēs*) themes (780); to reinvigorate “ancient” (*archaion*) customs;²³² to recall “archaic” (*archaios*) ways of life (572, 694); as well as to recover “all good things” and remix amiable affiliations—just as these were “in the beginning” (*ex archēs*, 996, 1327). Conditions of *archē*, then, are also drawn-forth when the architect-protagonist draws-up Peace—not only Peace and her benefits, but her pre-conditions. And Trygaeus makes these *archē*-conditions apparent for others not by pointing forlornly to some peace lodged inaccessibly in the past,²³³ but by revealing Peace as a vital potentiality, the “beginnings” of which are available, right there, in the present.²³⁴ For, in spite of the dramatic conceit that Peace was hidden in a remote heavenly pit, Trygaeus, together with his collaborators, draws her out—most inventively—from the very grounds of the theater. He then gives this act more persistent presence by re-founding archaic Peace anew, installing her enduring statue as a dramatic figure in the midst of the orchestra to stand as “patroness of marriages” and “dancing grounds” (*chorōn*, 974-76). Directing such re-inaugural, re-generative and re-presentational acts, with archaic depth, novel appeal and enduring relevance, would seem, then, to exemplify “architecting” in Aristophanes’ *Peace*.

DRAWING COUNSEL FROM THE DREGS: ARCHITECTING AND THE REACH FOR *ARCHAI*

4.3d

Compared to those other protagonists (Dikaeopolis, Lysistrata, Praxagora, and Peisetairos) who also sought peace in Aristophanes’ plays, the actions of Trygaeus, again, stand out as unique. For, although certain of these other protagonists uphold “ancient customs” (*archaion nomon*) in the course of their reparations,²³⁵ Trygaeus actively seeks-

²³² Numerous verses of the chorus’ songs describe what Aristophanes calls elsewhere “ancient customs” (*archaion nomon*)—traditional practices or ancestral ways.

²³³ Although peaceful conditions are displayed in the *Iliad* (on the shield of Achilles and in certain extended similes), where “peace” is actually mentioned in the epic, it is evoked as a condition of *former* times (*to prin ep’*), to be recalled and longed for but not experienced (2.797, 9.403, 22.156).

²³⁴ The only mention of “peace” in the *Odyssey* casts it as a potentially re-inaugurated condition, for Zeus, in the closing book of the epic, declares: “let wealth and peace abound” (24.486).

²³⁵ Praxagora argues that women ought to rule the city because they uphold “ancient custom” (*archaion nomon*), while men are indifferent to them (*Assembly Women*, 216, 588). At the close of *Acharnians*, Dikaeopolis’ drinking competition is an “ancestral custom” (*ta patria*, 1000). In *Birds*, on the other hand, the birds fear that their “ancient ordinances” (*thesmous archaious*) will be broken if they allow Peisetaerus to build a city in their sky (331).

out, brings-back and sets-up an archaic figure that was thought to have been irretrievably lost. Regarded in this way—as bringing back an archaic figure thought lost—the primary action of Trygaeus closely relates to (and even anticipates) that of a different comic protagonist: Dionysus, who himself performs in Aristophanes’ *Frogs* (405 BCE). Although in this comedy Dionysus travels down to Hades, not up to heaven, and brings back an exemplary poet, not an exemplary Peace, the primary actions of the two protagonists are remarkably similar. For, both Dionysus and Trygaeus initially yearn for what is lacked (a “skilled poet” / an enduring peace),²³⁶ both risk crossing daunting thresholds in pursuit of this desire (via elaborate theatrical means),²³⁷ and both return *not* with what they had initially sought (Euripides / Zeus’ plan for peace) but with a comparable figure (Aeschylus / Peace), which is both more archaic and more basic than what they had initially yearned for.²³⁸ Furthermore, both Dionysus and Trygaeus bring these representative figures back to the mortal plane so that their “good counsels” (*gnōmais agathais*)²³⁹ and “many good things” (*pollōn agathōn*)²⁴⁰ will positively influence the citizens and “save the city”.²⁴¹

More could be said about the comparable plots of these two dramas (*Frogs* and *Peace*), and about their kindred protagonists (the god of drama and an exemplary Tragedian). Yet, it is enough here to point out that Dionysus’ primary movement—his descent to Hades—is analogous to Trygaeus’ own ambiguous ascent to heaven. Indeed, given the numerous ambiguities in Trygaeus’ movement and in Peace’s emergence, as well as the many references to the topography of Hades in *Peace*,²⁴² one wonders if the

²³⁶ Dionysus “yearns” (*pothos*) for a skilled, or “dexterous poet” (*poiētou dexiou*, 71, cf. 53, 59), since he judges all living poets to be “wreckers of their art (*technes*)” (93).

²³⁷ Dionysus’ descent involves an elaborate costume change and a ride in Charon’s ferry.

²³⁸ In *Frogs*, Aeschylus is said to have been alive “in the old days” (*tois archousin*, 1073).

²³⁹ *Frogs* 1502. As Dionysus prepares to lead Aeschylus back to the upper-world, Pluto bids farewell to the dramatic poet in this way: “Save (*sōze*) our city with your fine counsels (*gnomais agathais*)”.

²⁴⁰ *Peace* 436. The “good things” Peace brings with her are repeatedly invoked: 538, 887, 946, 999, 1198, 1134, 1326 etc.

²⁴¹ *Frogs* 1501. Peace’s capacity to save is marked by the chorus’ first words, as they enter the orchestra: “*straight* for salvation” (301).

²⁴² There are numerous allusions to “descents” and underworld conditions in *Peace*: when the slave abandons the tub of dung, he says “take it to the ravens” (19)—a euphemism for ‘take it

maneuver on the dung-beetle is not a “descent”, or *katabasis*, in disguise.²⁴³ Such an ironic inversion (ascent *as* descent) would not simply aim at humor, but rather aim to associate the basic conditions that Trygaeus ultimately seeks less with Zeus and more with a mortal and ancestral realm hidden beneath the earth, being latent in the experience and counsel of those who had lived before.

The motif of drawing up figures from the underworld seems to have been a relatively common motif in Old Comedy. In Eupolis’ *Demes* (412/17 BCE), for instance, when the political situation in Athens reaches an insoluble state of crisis, certain exemplary statesmen—those who led the city “before” (*prosthen*, 43)—are brought back to earth from Hades. These exemplary leaders (including Solon and Pericles) are summoned to the mortal plane, drawn up into the orchestra (perhaps with the *ekkuclēma*), and then consulted on topics of civic affairs.²⁴⁴ Inversely, in Aristophanes’ *Gērytades* (408/7 BCE), a group of poets, troubled by the degenerate state of their “art”, descend to the underworld to confer with their deceased predecessors about their common concerns. Representatives from each dramatic genre (Dithyramb, Tragedy and Tragedy) join this delegation for the sake of their *technē*.²⁴⁵ These dramas (*Frogs*,

to Hades’; the beetle is thought to be a portent (*teras*) of “Zeus the Descender” (*kataibaou*, 42); and Hermes (who is himself sometimes found in Hades as *Psychopompos*, guide of souls) addresses Trygaeus at heaven’s door by exclaiming “Lord Heracles!” (180)—thus implying a comparison between Trygaeus and a hero known for his labor in the underworld. As well, each time “Dionysus” is evoked in *Peace*, it is in association with death (267, 109, 442, 1278 cf. 188-89). Furthermore, although apparently in heaven, Trygaeus warns the chorus to be quiet so as not to awaken Cerberus, the watchdog of Hades (313). Hermes’ claims that Peace “perished” (604)—as if she had died and gone to Hades. And Trygaeus’ return to earth recalls a *katabasis*, for he asks: “How will I get back” (*katabēsomai*, 725).

²⁴³ The metaphoric dung, figured forth in the orchestra at the start of *Peace*, can be seen to play a role in conjuring imagery and topographical conditions that are conducive to such a harrowing passage. For, in *Frogs*, Dionysus’ descent is dramatized with a ferry-ride across the orchestral grounds, which (by verbal allusions and choral songs) becomes a dark, wet, muddy, marshy, bubbly, gurgling and fragrant “lake”, or “swamp” (*limnē*, 137, 181ff, 209-20, 228-35, 241-49, 272, 352). This “swamp” most likely refers to Dionysus’ own archaic place of worship in Athens, his sanctuary “in the marshes” (*en Limnais*), which may have been located just South of the theater, near the river of Illissos, and may indeed have performed as an underworld passage. For this argument, see Hooker (1960). Aeschylus’ fragmentary *Psychagogoi* also involved a “swamp” in its dramatization of necromancy (Frag. 273). On Dionysus’ association with underworld topography, see Cole (2003).

²⁴⁴ Storey (2007), 175-77, where he notes that, “Rectifying a degenerate present was a good comic *topos*.” The translated fragments of Eupolis’ *Demes* are in Page (1942), 203ff.

²⁴⁵ *Gērytades*, Frag. 156-204 (Loeb). On the significance of this delegation of poets, or “fellow artisans” (*sumtechnoi*, Frag. 190), and on the relation of these fragments to Aristophanes’ *Poiēsis*, see Hall (2006), esp. 414. The fragments of *Gērytades* are further relevant here

Demes and *Gērytades*) help to reveal yet another earthy benefit that Trygaeus (as architect-Harvester-Tragedian), the chorus (as founding-farmers), and Hermes (as a deity of thresholds) bring out of the orchestral grounds when they draw-up Peace: not only bountiful produce, divine statues, lively figures, and poetic images with architectural relevance, but also archaic counsel—basic yet profound counsel that is hidden just beyond, or beneath, mortals’ present situation and thus available to them by means of dramatic arts.

With the strong desire for *archē* conditions underlying the motives of Trygaeus in *Peace*, it is thinkable that Aristophanes conceived this architect-protagonist less as a leader of *tektons* and more as a *tekton* of *archai*—as one who reaches for profound counsel, brings basic yet novel figures into appearances, and makes originating conditions persuasively apparent and available for others.

since, like *Peace*, they preserve a call to the stage-machine operator (Frag. 160), see below p. 118. *Poiēsis* is of further interest since its fragments suggest that its plot (like *Peace*) also involved the recovery of a personified figure (*Poiēsis*), who had suffered some “injustice” (*adikoumenē*), and was then found (possibly in the underworld) as a statue and brought back, or “led up” to the *agora*, where she was set-up in an installation rite. A fragmentary line preserves the intention to “install [the goddess] (*hidrusōmai*) with an ox” (Frag. 591.84-6).

— CHAPTER FIVE —
Giving, Taking and Discerning Directions

(phrazein) **ACTIVITIES INTEGRAL TO ARCHITECTING**

5.1

When the heterogeneous chorus members rush into the orchestra in response to Trygaeus' call, they first display their overwhelming eagerness for peace. Then, they turn to Trygaeus and insist, "if it is necessary for us to do anything [in view of peace], *direct us* and architect" (305). While numerous aspects of "directing" (*phrazein*) have been worked into the discussion above, the following section offers a more focused account of this activity, which, as Aristophanes suggests, is both analogous and integral to *architecting*.

At a basic level, *phrazein* is an act of making disclosures. In this sense, the term is sometimes translated as "telling" or "explaining". A number of examples from Aristophanes' *Peace* demonstrate this semantic range. In the opening scene of the play (just following the confusing immersion in dung), the dung-shaping slave turns to the spectators and offers to "explain" (*phrasō*) the play's "plot" (*logou*, 50). He then discloses Trygaeus' protest as well as his intent to boldly question Zeus (54-61). Once Trygaeus makes his soaring entry upon the beetle, this same slave—seeking clarity—demands that Trygaeus "tell (him)" (*phrasēs*) exactly where he intends to fly (102). "Heaven" is the reply (103). Once Trygaeus reaches heaven's door, Hermes appears, insisting that this stranger "tell (him)" (*phraze*) who he is and where he's from (186). Trygaeus answers by fully disclosing (for the first time in the play) his potent name and homeland;²⁴⁶ his special skill, "a dexterous vintager"; and what he is *not*—"no sycophant and no lover of litigation" (190-91). Later, in the course of persuading Hermes to join his plan, Trygaeus introduces a compelling argument by saying: "I'm going to tell you (*phrasō*) something terribly important..." (403). A made-up tale then follows about the Sun and Moon plotting to oust the Olympian gods (406ff). Finally, toward the end of the play a skeptical priest arrives, interrupting Trygaeus' installation ceremony with this demand: "tell me (*phraseth*) who you're sacrificing to... please say (*phrasēs*)" (1054-61). "Peace" is Trygaeus' eventual response (1062).

Each of these verbal disclosures, having been either promised or demanded, reveal important narrative (and divine) details, thus making known to others that which is

²⁴⁶ "Athmonon" was a region known for its grape vines and its shrine to Aphrodite, see Hall (2006), 325; and Bowie (1993), 138, n. 23.

not yet apparent about the drama: its plot; the protagonist's underlying concerns and forward-thinking intent; destinations and settings; identifications and backgrounds; important arguments; and the name of an as yet unrecognized (or, not fully acknowledged) god. Thus, at this basic level, one could say that *phrazein* is an act of *phrasing*—of figuring forth *logos* through common speech so as to make sense apparent.

At another level, *phrazein* should be understood as an activity involving disclosures that are, at once, more performative and more interpretive. As such, the verb is best translated as “directing”, “elucidating”, “revealing” and “pointing out”. Hermes demonstrates these more subtly active and situational dimensions of *phrazein* within the play, just as he exemplifies such divine agencies elsewhere.²⁴⁷ Within Aristophanes' *Peace*, the “directing” activities of Hermes may be taken to include, first, his protective role as “doorman” to Zeus' threshold (179). It is in this position that he effectively directs unwelcome intruders away. After Hermes has been persuaded to welcome Trygaeus and the chorus across this threshold (426ff), he then turns his protective and directive attention toward other transitional sites, including the orchestral limits and the underground. For, together with Trygaeus, Hermes watches over Peace's emergence from behind the *skēnē*, while directing the chorus in hoisting the goddess out of the pit and “into the light” (516). Following these acts performed *in situ* and in relation to particular thresholds, Hermes' “directing” continues in a related manner. Prompted by the chorus' demand to “teach them” (*didazon*, 602), Hermes elucidates the obscure events behind Peace's disappearance. Whereas earlier (in conversation with Trygaeus at heaven's door) he had disclosed the theological and allegorical reasoning behind her loss (204-26), Hermes now narrates the detailed political history that led to her withdrawal (603ff). In this interpretive, or hermeneutic, capacity, Hermes also translates—and conveys to all—Peace's otherwise mute concerns (661ff). Then, as Trygaeus prepares to return to the mortal plane, Hermes provides him with further directives: to deliver Theōria back to Council (713-14); to take Harvest as his bride, to “set up house” together with her, and to propagate (706). Finally, Hermes points out the way for this mortal to return to earth, leading the dramatic action across yet another threshold with a gesture, and the words “[right] this way, right past the goddess” (725). Given this variety of

²⁴⁷ On the special capacities of this god in relation to *phrazein* (and *aphrastōs*)—on making hidden sense perceptible for others and (when he chooses) imperceptible—see Steiner (1994), 40-49. The *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* forms the basis of Steiner's observations. On the divine aspects of Hermes, which make him an appropriate accomplice to Trygaeus in *Peace*, see Bowie (1993), 138-42.

precise directives, it is remarkable that Hermes does *not* direct Trygaeus to “install” the statue of Peace in the orchestra. This directive would seem to be a mortal initiative; one that the architect-protagonist may, nevertheless, have conceived during his meeting with Hermes—perhaps while contemplating the obstructive pile of stones and reflecting on the more common manifestation of Hermes in the city as a herm.²⁴⁸

Although these directions performed by Hermes are not each qualified as acts of *phrazein*, it would seem right to consider them as such, since, like Trygaeus, Hermes is called upon by the chorus to generally direct the rescue of Peace: “you, wisest of gods, take charge, and in craftsmanly fashion *direct us (phraze)* in what needs doing” (428-29). When compared to the narratively clarifying verbal disclosures, these more performative, interpretive and situated acts demonstrated by Hermes invite a broader understanding of *phrazein*: as directing malevolent agencies away; as directing attention toward critical thresholds and through uncertain topographies; as directing others in collaborative and transformative work; as directing initiatives for civic, domestic and regional prosperity; and as directing others toward a deeper understanding of events, with historical, allegorical and theological interpretations.

This last point opens onto a further manifold sense of directing; one that involves both self-direction, and the direction of others in matters that are not only knowable and inferable but desirable. These more reflective, ethical and philosophical acts of *phrazein* can be understood in terms of “perceiving”, “discerning”, “advising” and “guiding”. As others have shown, this sense of the verb closely relates it to the complementary acts of recognition and comprehension.²⁴⁹ In these senses, *phrazein* also bears epic and mythic depth. For, according to Homer, Odysseus (like Nestor) often pauses to “take thought”,

²⁴⁸ *Herma* is, literally, “heap of stones”. Such a heap—a “monument set up as an elemental form of demarcation”—prefigured the more statuesque form of a herm. See Burkert (1985), 156. In *Peace*, the chorus members *do* see Peace in relation to a herm, for they suggest that she deserves a more honorable installation sacrifice than the “pots (of food)” that a herm typically received (924). If Peace performed like a herm, then she would perform apotropaically: averting evil, or turning War away. Trygaeus does greet Hermes as “the Averter of Evil” (*alexikakōi*, 422)—a rare epithet that is also put upon Aristophanes in the parabasis of *Wasps* (1043). In the *Iliad*, Odysseus similarly becomes involved in a relevant mission to “ward off evil” (*alexikakos*, 10.96). See below, p. 196ff. Cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 123.

²⁴⁹ Steiner (1994), 16-29. In her discussion of “recognition” (*anagnōskein*) of various Homeric *sēmata* (such as Odysseus’ scar and bed), Steiner emphasizes that both verbal and non-verbal disclosures are put in terms of *phrazein* in epic poetry. She further shows that *phrazein* tends to involve interpretation of non-verbal and inferential disclosures, and “silent or oblique messages” such as portents (thunder crashes, bird phenomena). Etymologically, *phrazein* is tied to *phronēsis*, practical intelligence or prudence, and *phrenes*, the seat of “deep thought”.

or “direct himself” (*phraszomtha*) both in advance of action and in the midst of difficult situations (*Odyssey* 10.192, *Iliad* 14.61),²⁵⁰ and according to Hesiod, Zeus swallowed Mētis so that she might “advise him” or “direct him (*phrassaito*) in matters good and bad” (*Theogony* 900).²⁵¹ In *Peace*, Trygaeus’ own reflective actions recall these epic and mythic modes of *phrazein*. For, by perceiving the trouble within his own situation at the start of the play, and by being himself stirred with concern throughout the play, Trygaeus repeatedly discerns the best way to act: first, steering the high-flying beetle directly to Zeus; then, summoning appropriate collaborators to help rescue Peace; and, finally, installing Peace in the midst of the orchestra such that *her* benefits might be fully revealed and thus provide telling direction (*phrazein*) to others. Each of these pivotal deeds of Trygaeus—at the onset, in the midst and at the end of the drama—ought to be understood as acts of *phrazein* since the chorus members call upon Trygaeus to “direct” them in the overall recovery of Peace. And they do this not once but twice: as they arrive in the orchestra eager for peace (305); and, again, as they prepare for the collaborative work of hoisting (359).²⁵² Moreover, at the very end of the play, the chorus members thank Trygaeus for having “directed them” to the peaceful benefits they desire (1311).²⁵³ In order for these benefits to have been recognized as desirable, however, they had first to be not only drawn-out and figured-forth but fully-disclosed via acts of *phrazein*—verbal and non-verbal disclosures, which are comparable to poetic modes of *ekphrasis*, akin to dramatic modes of representation, and integral to architecting.

²⁵⁰ See Mourelatos (1970), 20-21, where he emphasizes the navigational dimension of *phrazein*, “The action of the divine navigator is often expressed by the verb *phrazō*: the guide ‘shows’ the way or ‘singles out’ the goal.” He gives examples from the *Odyssey*: Athena guiding Telemachus on his journey; Proteus instructing Menelaus on his homecoming; and Calypso giving instructions to Odysseus. By taking these directions and his own self-direction, Odysseus (like Trygaeus) would seem to be miming these divine navigators and their acts of *phrazein*. *Phrazein* is occasionally found as a participle, as in Aeschylus’ *Suppliant* when Danaus requests attendants and local “guides” (*phrastoras*) to lead the way to the city’s temples (492). Cf. Sophocles’ *Electra*, where *dolos* is personified as the “director” (198).

²⁵¹ Similarly, Gaia and Ouranos “[together] contrive (*sum-phrassasthai*) *mētis*” on behalf of Rhea, so that she may prevent Kronos from swallowing her new child, Zeus (*Theogony*, 471). It has been pointed out that in certain instances the verb *phrazomai* “functions as a verb [form] of *mētis*”, see Nagy (1999), 48. He cites passages from the *Iliad* (involving Odysseus) in support of this claim: 9.423, 426, 347, 423-26.

²⁵² Turning to express their serious commitment to Trygaeus, the chorus says: “But whatever we can do to please you, come tell us (*phraze*); for a stroke of good luck has chosen you as our commander (*autokrator*)” (357-60).

²⁵³ This gratitude is expressed just after Trygaeus offers the chorus delicious food (as the culminating peaceful benefit) and insists that they indulge.

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“Directing” (*phrazein*) and “architecting” (*architektonein*) are closely associated in Aristophanes’ drama *Peace*, both by the chorus’ combined attribution of the acts to Trygaeus (at line 305), and by Trygaeus’ joint demonstration of them throughout the play. Although this comedy would seem to be the earliest, it is not the only ancient evidence asserting such an affinity. For, in the fourth century BCE, public inscriptions pertaining to architectural work typically included a line that made *phrazein* an obligation of architects, specifically by stating that *all* work shall be carried out “as the architect directs” (*an phrasēi ho architektōn*).²⁵⁴ The most intact and best known of such inscriptions dates to 330 BCE. This inscribed stone (or stela) pertains to the architect Philon and to the construction in Piraeus of a naval Arsenal (an edifice to house sails and other shipping gear). This lengthy inscription first pronounces the names of those implicated in the work, then gives a series of precise specifications for the building features, including: details about the arsenal’s siting; its overall dimensions; its stone (where this should be quarried and its finish); the thickness of its foundations; the girth of its columns; the spacing of these columns; the orientation of its door; the placement and proportion of its windows; the spacing of openings for air-movement; the spacing of its roof timbers; the spanning direction of its crossbeams; the dimension of its overhangs; and the provision for wooden storage chests (to keep the sails in). This inscription, then, culminates with a revealing statement concerning the role of the architect:

and all this (*tauta apanta*) shall be thoroughly worked (*exergasontai*)
by those hired, in accordance with the markings (*suggraphai*),
measures (*metra*) and models (*paradeigma*), as the architect directs
(*an phrasēi ho architektōn*).

(Arsenal Inscription, 95-6)²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ See, for example, the inscription pertaining to work at the Athenian Asklepieion (IG II² 1685.105, 108, of circa 400 BCE), in Aleshire (1991), 26.

²⁵⁵ My translation, adapted from the translation available in Bundgaard (1957), 117-21. Expressions similar to “as the architect directs”—such as “according to the architect”, or “as the architect *commands*” (*ho architektōn keleuēi*)—are also found in this and other inscriptions, particularly where the work requires some in situ judgment about measures and rhythms. Note that “commanding” *keleuein* is directly associated with “the architects” in Euripides’ *Cyclops*, see below p. 223ff.

Although, by the time this Arsenal inscription was prepared, *phrazein* may not have conjured all the profoundly synthetic modes of direction that Hermes and Trygaeus (as well as Odysseus, Nestor and Mētis) had once performed, this inscription does maintain that “directing” was crucial to the full task of *architecting*, and that such activity would involve more than whatever may have been shown through the architect’s models, measures and markings. While the on-site direction of diverse tradesmen has long been considered crucial to architectural work,²⁵⁶ Aristophanes’ dramatization of “directing”, as integral to architecting conditions for Peace, reminds us of its fuller scope and originating basis; that is, as involving performative acts, qualitative conveyances, situated judgments, interpretive discoveries and dramatic disclosures that direct and compel others (and oneself) toward deeper understandings, desirable conditions and propitious beginnings. Although such subtle and ephemeral acts are difficult to recognize and interpret, let alone preserve and archive, Aristophanes’ dramatization of *phrazein*, together with this Arsenal inscription and the later anecdotes concerning Philon’s eloquent “dispositions” (quoted above, p. 76), attest to the persistent value of such vital architectural performances.

²⁵⁶ On the practice of architecture in general in the ancient Greek world, see Bundgaard (1957) and Coulton (1977). Ancient Greek (and Roman) architects seem to have made little use of drawings, engaging rather verbal and numerical demonstrations, see Wilson Jones (2000) 50, n. 10. On ancient Greek practices of *in situ* devising (drawing full scale templates and sketches directly on temple walls), see Haselberger (1997).

Architecting beyond Peace: instances of the verb in other ancient literature

While a verb form of “architect” is rare in modern English, it was not uncommon in ancient Greek. Besides its use in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, there are at least ten other certain instances of the verb in extant Greek literature and two conjectured appearances of the verb in the fragments of Athenian drama. A verb form is also found in ancient Latin. In the pages that follow, I have gathered these few instances of *architecting*, along with a brief description of how the term arises in the script. Together, these examples lend grammatical support to the seemingly anomalous verb in *Peace* and, further, inform the activity of the protagonists in both *Peace* and *Cyclops*. These examples, spanning from the fifth to the first centuries BCE, also give some indication (however oblique) of the changing perception of architectural activity during the time prior to Vitruvius’ *de architectura* (circa 25 BCE). Here, then, are the other instances of *architecting*, given in chronological order. The two earliest examples happen also to be the two conjectured appearances of the verb.

DISTRIBUTING JUSTICE: AESCHYLUS’ FRAGMENTARY DIKĒ PLAY²⁵⁷

6.1

Among the fragments of Athenian drama one finds a few lines of tattered script belonging to a play by Aeschylus in which the role of Dikē—the personified figure of Justice—is arguably cast in terms of *architecting*. Although the textual remains of this script are slight, one can nevertheless discern from them that a pivotal scene is in the midst of unfolding: Dikē, having just arrived as a stranger to an unnamed land, is speaking to a group (presumably the chorus), who stand as representative inhabitants of the land. She presents herself as the revered daughter of Zeus, who himself exemplifies justice. Ever since Zeus “justly” (*dikēi*) overcame his father Kronos, she claims to have held a place of honor at the side of Zeus’ throne (5-10). Now, at his bidding, she has descended from her divine seat to this mortal land with a beneficent intent (11-13).

²⁵⁷ This untitled fragment of Aeschylus, consisting of just over forty lines, is occasionally referred to as the *Dikē Play*. The most recent Loeb Classical Library edition identifies it as “Frag. 281a”. Unless otherwise noted, all line numbers used here refer to this source and make use of its translation by Alan H. Sommerstein (2008), 276-287. The prior Loeb translation was also useful, Lloyd-Jones (1963), 579ff.

Prompted by questions from the chorus, Dikē pronounces her name: “Justice, [she] who has the greatest primacy in heaven” (15). She then elaborates on her special role, or office: for “the just” (*dikaiois*) she extends their “life in justice” (*endikon bion*); for the brash, she chastens them (17-19).²⁵⁸ How does she do this, the chorus ask, “by the charms of persuasion, or by the method of force?” (20). “By writing” (*graphousa*), Dikē responds, “by writing down their transgressions on the tablet of Zeus” (21), and then disclosing these inscriptions at the ordained time (22-24). In the last intelligible fragments of this play, Dikē testifies to her benefits by recalling how she once reformed even the most savage of gods. She presumably refers to Ares, god of war, and to how she once compelled this agent of strife to be more discrete in his ways (30-41).²⁵⁹ Finally, from the chorus, we gain a sense of how the newcomer is likely to be received. For, they predict that “the people” of the land will indeed welcome this divine figure who brings procedures for just treatment and proof of her benefits; and who calls herself “Dikē”.

Being the only known Athenian drama in which “Justice” performs as a personified agent, this play of Aeschylus, partial though it is, nevertheless contributes to our understanding of the institution and representation of justice in the fifth century BCE.²⁶⁰ This rare dramatization of Justice, however, may also add to our understanding of architectural performance, since one of the play’s tattered lines arguably casts the role

²⁵⁸ I am following Lloyd-Jones (1963) in his reconstruction of this fragmentary line: “In the reckless I implant (*phuō*) a chastened mind (*sōphronas phrenas*)”. *Sōphronas* here suggests that the “mind” (*phrēn*) would somehow be “softened” by some imposed moderation. Sommerstein (2008) conjectures in his translation that Dikē somehow causes the wicked “to change their ways” (19).

²⁵⁹ There is some scholarly debate over which “unruly child” of Zeus and Hera Dikē refers to here. As Sommerstein suggests, Ares best fits Dikē’s image of a reckless child who had been shooting “wayfarers with arrows” and who she claims to have “nursed” or “reared” (*ethrepha*, 31). According to myth, *dikē* (as a judicial process) also played a formative role in suffusing the strife of Ares. As a mature divinity Ares was the first murderer made to stand trial before the counsel of the gods—a trial that founded the first homicide court of Athens. The site of this trial is still called Areopagus, “Hill of Ares”. See Robertson (1953).

²⁶⁰ Although Dikē does *not* actively perform as a character elsewhere in extant Athenian drama, Aeschylus and other dramatists do invoke her as a personified figure. Her earliest appearance in Greek literature (together with her sisters Peace and Good Order) is in Hesiod’s *Theogony* (901-2), and *Works and Days* (213-285). In Homeric poetry, her personification is only hinted at. In an extended simile in the *Iliad*, men who give “crooked judgments (*skolias themistas*) in the place of assembly (*ein agorē*)” are said to “drive justice out”. This chasing away of “justice” (*dikēn*) from the “agora” prompts Zeus (in this simile) to send in a tempest as menacingly destructive as the din of war (16.386-92). On Dikē’s procedures and persona in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and beyond, see Havelock (1978), esp. 193-217; and Lloyd-Jones (1971) and (1956).

of Dikē in terms of *architecting*. Upon learning the name of Dikē, the chorus asks her a leading question:

What sort of honor *do you architect (architektoneis)*? (16).²⁶¹

Dikē responds, as mentioned above, by indicating that she honors “the just” by extending their “life in justice”, and chastens the brash by inscribing their offences and making these known. If a long “life in justice” is the sort of “honor” (*timē*) that Dikē brings to mortals, then her manner of “extending” (*teinein*)²⁶²—distributing, withholding and adjusting—such “honor”, as well as her manner of making dishonor apparent, must

²⁶¹ My translation, based on those indicated below. This fragmentary line has significant textual difficulties due to a lacuna of several letters in the critical verb. The editor of the authoritative edition of these fragments, cautions against any reconstruction of the fragment, which he prints as follows:

ποίας δὲ τ[ιμ]ῆς ἀρχ.....εἷς . [

S. L. Radt, *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta. Vol. 3, Aeschylus*. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 381. In spite of Radt’s caution, the Greek verb *architektoneis* is the only conjectured verb that has been posited for the line in scholarly commentary. D. L. Page reconstructs the lacunae as follows:

ποίας δὲ τ[ιμ]ῆς ἀρχ[ιτεκτον]εἷς . [λέγε.

See: D. L. Page, “P.Oxy. 2331 and Others” in *The Classical Review. New Series*. Vol. 7, No. 3/4 (Dec. 1957), 192. Although arguing for the plausibility of this verb, Page himself does not translate it with its literal English equivalent. Instead, he offers (in the same article) two descriptive alternatives:

“Of what privilege are you the originator?”; and,
“Of what office are you the chief executive?”

Lloyd-Jones (Loeb 1963), accepts Page’s reconstruction of the Greek verb, but in English provides an appropriately gendered substitution:

“And of what privilege are you the mistress?”

Sommerstein (Loeb 2008), renders the line as follows [his brackets]:

“And over what h[onou]rable function do you pre[side (?)], t[ell us (?)?”

Although these scholars do not render the finite verb *architektoneis* as “architect” they do offer a series of related actions and figures that they consider to have bearing on the role: originating, executing, influencing as a mistress, and presiding.

²⁶² The verb *teinein* (stretching, extending or drawing-out) is related both to the verb *enteinein* (stretching *in* tension) and to the abstract noun *entasis*, which would come to name the kind of adjustments (relational, perceptual and proportional refinements) that architects *do* perform. See Vitruvius *On Architecture* 3.3.13.

together qualify her role, or office. It is this complex office that the chorus figuratively projects as *architecting*.

Given the fragmentary status of this play, including a gap of several letters in the critical verb, it is risky to say more about its architectural implications. However, in spite of this risk, the suggestion—that justice, as an act may be understood in terms of architecting—warrants further consideration. This suggestive association is all the more pertinent given that Aeschylus makes it in the mid-fifth century BCE, which would make it the earliest extant “architect” term recorded (in either literature or inscriptions).²⁶³ Thus, before moving on to the other instances of the verb, it is productive to ask what might have prompted Aeschylus to figure Dikē’s distribution of “honor” as analogous to architectural activity?

One could approach this question by considering the contemporaneous ground of the play’s performance;²⁶⁴ it is appropriate, however, to first seek out the mythic grounds for Aeschylus’ trope. In this respect, Dikē herself provides a clue to the poetic model that Aeschylus may have had in mind when choosing his figure of speech. This clue points directly to Zeus and to his triumph over Kronos. According to Hesiod’s *Theogony*, after overcoming Kronos and subduing the Titans, Zeus commenced his first order of business: distributing “honor” to each and every god (73-4, 885). Hades, for instance, was allotted the honor of influencing the dead, while Poseidon earned dominion over the sea.²⁶⁵ Aphrodite gained sway over the alluring ways of women (203-06), and so on for each of the immortals. Like the “honor” that Dikē purportedly *architects* in Aeschylus’ play, the “honor” that Zeus allocates in the *Theogony* is also called *timē*.²⁶⁶ For Hesiod, however,

²⁶³ Aeschylus’ fragmentary Dikē play is undated, but it is likely to have been composed and performed between 476 and 458 BCE (the known date range of his extant plays). On the early appearances of “architect”, see above, p. 36, n. 71.

²⁶⁴ Such an interpretive approach would involve considering Aeschylus’ acquaintance with Pericles, the influential statesman (and friend of Pheidias) who led the extensive rebuilding program in Athens from 440-430 BCE. Interestingly, well before this rebuilding campaign, Pericles acted as *chorērgos* (producer) for Aeschylus’ earliest extant tragedy *The Persians* (472 BCE). On the interrelations of politics and art (dramatic poetry and architecture) at that time, see Castriota (1992), and Shapiro (1989).

²⁶⁵ This allotment, which is discernible in the *Theogony*, is made more explicit in the *Iliad*, where Zeus, Poseidon and Hades are said to have shaken out lots for these honors, and, thus, “in three ways have all things been divided, and to each has been apportioned his own domain (*timēs*)” (15.185-89).

²⁶⁶ M. L. West describes *timē* as: “the ‘provinces’ or ‘spheres of influence’ of the gods, allotted at the beginning of Zeus’ régime”. See his note to lines 73-4 in West (1966). Homeric poetry

Zeus did not *architect* this *timē*, instead, he “declared”, “arranged”, “apportioned”, “divided” and even “subdivided” it.²⁶⁷ Such manners of distributing “honor” suggest that Zeus was not only entitling each god to influential powers or privileges, but that he was also arranging appropriate accommodations for them. Indeed, just as one (in the position to do so) might divvy-out spoils among comrades after a lucrative battle raid,²⁶⁸ or partition land among citizens when founding a city,²⁶⁹ Zeus allots to each god both an appropriate mode of influence and a correspondingly influential placement. Zeus himself, for instance, as the new sovereign, fittingly ascends to a new place of honor: high atop Mount Olympus (37). Other Olympians rise as well to dwell there with him (101). Hades and Poseidon come to be situated elsewhere: below the earth and within the sea, respectively (456, 767, 930ff). Yet, it is not only these new ruling gods who earn honors and placements from Zeus; for the poet of the *Theogony* goes on to sing of the revised honors and reordered arrangements of other more contentious and marginal agents. The troublesome Titans, for instance, who had brashly attempted to overthrow Zeus’ rule, are stripped of honor, banished and imprisoned deep below the earth, in Tartaros (730-43, 808, 882). The gigantic Hundred-Handers, who had helped Zeus resist the Titans, are deployed to an appropriately supportive place: beneath the sea “at Ocean’s foundations” (816). The monstrous Gorgons, and other agents dangerous to mortals, are placed at another limit: beyond Oceanus, “at earth’s end” (274-75). This survey of

reveals *timē* to be more broadly inclusive: an ability to exercise political influence; a claim to status and prestige in relation to one’s peers; a political right shared communally; and, a particular property (land or prize) that is earned, gained or otherwise owned. See Adkins (1960), esp. 29.

²⁶⁷ *Theogony* 73-4, 112, 390-4, 425-6, 885. The various verbs used to describe Zeus’ distribution of “honor” (*timē*), as well as “ordinances” (*nomous*) and “wealth” (*aphenos*), include: *diatassō* (arrange); *phrazō* (tell/direct/declare); *dateomai* (divide); *diadateomai* (subdivide); and, *diaireō* (apportion).

²⁶⁸ In the *Odyssey*, for instance, after raiding the city of the Cicones, Odysseus then “divided” (*dassametha*) their treasure proportionately in a way that “no man might go defrauded of an equal (*isēs*) share” (9.41-42). On the divvying-out of battle prizes as being related to the relative balancing of honor and rebalancing of equity, see chapter 7 of Havelock (1978).

²⁶⁹ An exemplary partitioning of land is also mentioned in the *Odyssey*. When Nausithous first settled the people in the Phaeacian land he is said to have performed the following set of preliminary activities: “he had drawn a wall, he had built houses and made temples for the gods, and divided (*edassat*) the plowlands” (*Odyssey* 6.9-10). Another kind of distribution, no less central to Greek myth, religion and society, was the cutting, dividing and distributing of sacrificial meat. This act dramatically delineated the portions and privileges proper to gods and men. On this topic, see Vernant (1989).

divinities receiving “honors” could be expanded, yet the selection above is sufficient to show how Zeus’ distributive activity is both resonate with the office of Dikē (as presented by Aeschylus) and analogous to architecting. For Zeus, in having “declared” due honor for each god, concurrently elaborated a broadly differentiated topography of upper, lower and liminal regions. And, within these differentiated regions, diverse agents, both complementary and conflictual, were appropriately accommodated: in poetic correspondence to their unique mode of influence; in telling relation to one another; and in anticipation of mortals, who came to dwell, diversely and in conflict, in the terrestrial region bounded in their midst.

Although Zeus is not said *to architect* in the *Theogony*, he does acquire a certain capability to which Hesiod gives a tectonic title. Upon rising to his new office, Zeus takes for himself (indeed swallows) his first wife named Mētis, who personifies “cunning intelligence” and who Hesiod qualifies elsewhere as a *tektōn* of *dikaioi*—an artisan of just judgments, or “fabricator of what is just” (*tektaina dikaiōn*).²⁷⁰ It is only after assimilating this discerning feminine agent—who might “direct him in matters good and bad” (900)—that Zeus’ governance begins to prosper.²⁷¹ Thus, in addition to Zeus, Aeschylus may have also had Mētis in mind—as an exemplary “*tektōn* of what is just”—when he figured, or prefigured, the office of Dikē in terms of architecting. And so, if we can fathom Aristophanes’ architecting-figure as an exemplary *tektōn* of *archai*, a maker (or revealer) of preliminary conditions potentially leading to peace, then it is thinkable that Aeschylus’ figure was modeled after a primary *tektōn* of *dikaioi*, a maker of judgments in view of justice.

Before moving on, I must also touch on the contemporaneous ground of this play’s performance. Although the date of the fragmentary play is not certain, scholars have persuasively suggested that these fragments personifying Dikē belong to Aeschylus’ most unique drama; one that was neither a tragedy nor a satyr play, as he typically

²⁷⁰ Hesiod Frag. 294.14, in Most (2001). This particular fragment may have belonged to a now lost portion of Hesiod’s *Theogony*, since the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (282-206 BCE) claims that Hesiod evoked Mētis as *tektaina dikaiōn* in his account of Zeus taking Mētis as his first wife. Although modern scholars doubt these lines belonged to Hesiod’s *Theogony*, their attribution to Hesiod by Chrysippus (via Galen) seems secure. It should be emphasized that a singular abstract sense of justice is *not* implied here by the plural genitive adjective “(of) justices”, or “(of) just (things)”. Rather, the term suggests “judgments (that are just)” because they have been pronounced appropriately in a particular situation. See Havelock (1978), 192ff.

²⁷¹ On the decisive and advisory role of Mētis to Zeus’ governance, see Detienne and Vernant (1978), esp. chapter 3, “The Combats of Zeus”.

prepared for the Dionysian festival in Athens, but rather an aetiological composition (a dramatization of origins) commissioned by Hiero, the new ruling tyrant of Sicily, to celebrate his founding of the city of Aetna in 476 BCE.²⁷² Ancient testimony claims that Aeschylus put forth this drama optimistically as “an omen of good life for the settlers of the city”.²⁷³ If, indeed, the founding of Aetna was the situation for this play’s performance, then it would only have added to the aptness of Aeschylus’ architecting trope, for the arrival of Dikē to *this* land would initiate—most auspiciously—both the beginning of justice for the new settlers, and a just beginning for the city they would build.²⁷⁴

LEADING AMID AMBIGUITIES AND IRONIES: EURIPIDES’ FRAGMENTARY TRAGEDY *TELEPHUS*²⁷⁵

6.2

Euripides’ tragedy *Telephus* (438 BCE) dramatizes a pivotal event from a time just prior to the start of the Trojan War, and its action revolves around the conflicted Greek hero Telephus. In the opening prologue of the play, Telephus introduces himself as one whose troubled fate caused him long ago to leave his Greek homeland behind and to settle the distant land of Mysia, whose people were Trojan allies and, thus, enemies to the Greeks. Although he became the King of Mysia, Telephus appears in this play as a beggar. He is disguised in this way because he is presently in Greek territory and, so, fears for his life. Leaving much aside about this Greek hero’s complex story,²⁷⁶ it is

²⁷² The fragments of this play, entitled *Aetnaeae*, “Women of Aetna”, are assembled in Henderson (2008), 6-9. On the relation of this play to Aeschylus’ *Dikē* fragments, first postulated by Eduard Fraenkel, in *Eranos* 52 (1954), see Bremer (1991). Cf. Poli-Palladini (2001). Pindar, Bacchylides and Simonides also performed “foundation poetry”, which seems to have been a genre of its own. See Dougherty (1994) and (1993), esp. chapter 5, “Hieron and Aetna” (which discusses this play of Aeschylus).

²⁷³ *The Life of Aeschylus (vita Aeschyli)*—an anonymous ancient commentary. The line claims that Aeschylus exhibited (*epedeixato*) his *Aitnaeae* “as an omen [or augury] (*oiōnizomenos*) of good life (*bion agathon*) for the settlers (*tois sunoikizousi*) of the city (*tēn polin*)”. This translation is from Lloyd-Jones (1971), 100. For the Greek see Herington (1967), 82.

²⁷⁴ Aetna, as a setting for an architecting-figure bringing justice, would also provide a precedent for Euripides’ introduction of “architects” in *Cyclops*, which (unlike the Homeric version of the tale) is set in Aetna. See below, p. 132, n. 302.

²⁷⁵ The fragments of this tragedy are gathered in Henderson (2000); and Collard & Cropp (2004).

²⁷⁶ Telephus’ claim to have “settled (*exidrusamēn*) far from home” (696.13) and “made [his] home” (*katoikō*) in Mysia (696.10), resonate with actions of colonists. The myth of Telephus, however, reveals that he did not travel to Mysia as a colonizer, but rather inherited the

enough here to point out that at the close of his prologue, Telephus sums up what turns out to be his primary dilemma in the play: his displaced position and his ironic role:

Although a Greek I *architected* (*ērchitektonōn*) barbarians.

(Euripides' *Telephus*, Frag. 696.14)

One of the many ironic turns in this tragedy is that by the end of the play this same conflicted hero comes to be regarded, conversely, as a barbarian leading the Greeks (or, perhaps architecting them). This reversal is brought about because the Greeks ultimately come to depend on Telephus—whom they take to be a stranger—to lead them to Troy.²⁷⁷ Telephus' experience among strangers and in foreign lands makes him most appropriate for this navigational role—a role that he is also compelled to fulfill by an oracle's declaration. Much could be said about the ethical complications that this fated role presents for Telephus (since he must guide the Greeks on their way to start a war with the Trojans, who are neighbors and allies of his own people, the Mysians). However, I must limit my comments here to how Telephus' "architecting" relates most ostensibly to the activity as presented in the other dramas. As in Aristophanes' *Peace* and Euripides' *Cyclops*, the protagonist who is qualified as having "architected" in this play did so in relation to a group to which he, paradoxically, both belongs to and is estranged from. This paradox is true both for the so-called "barbarians" that Telephus, as a Greek, had initially "architected"; and for the "Greeks" whom he, *as* a stranger, must ultimately lead. Furthermore, each group to which these architect-figures are strangely bound—an overly-exuberant chorus, threatened farmers and "(founding) people" (as in *Peace*); an unruly throng of satyrs (as in *Cyclops*); a population of "barbarians" and a bellicose band of Greeks (as in *Telephus*)—is portrayed as precariously volatile and tending toward waywardness and disorder. Thus, each group stands, hypothetically, to benefit from the actions of an alien leader. The unnamed inhabitants in Aeschylus' *Dikē Play* (who are initially without judicial institutions) similarly stand to benefit from the architecting-

Kingdom after his displaced mother married the King. Upon this King's death, Telephus presumably *re-settled* the land. On the Greeks' perception (and "invention") of "barbarians", see Hall (1989).

²⁷⁷ Frag. 696.14 (Loeb). For a translation and discussion of the fragments of this play, see Collard, Cropp, and Lee (2004), 17-52. As these scholars note, the conjectured "architected" line was proposed by H. J. Mette. They consider Mette's reconstruction "clever but unconvincing" (p. 43). They, however, offer no other viable verb for the line.

stranger. Although, it must be emphasized that in the tragedy of *Telephus* the perceived benefit the hero offers also leads to further difficulties, strained relations and catastrophic war.

Although *Telephus*' story may not be well-known to modern readers, it was influential to ancient poets; notably to Aristophanes, who adapts certain motifs from it in a number of his comedies, including *Peace* (528).²⁷⁸

"TO ARCHITECT" IN ARISTOPHANES' FRAGMENTARY COMEDY DAIDALOS

6.3

In addition to *Peace*, the infinitive verb "to architect" (*architektonein*) was also uttered in one of Aristophanes' now lost comedies suggestively entitled *Daidalos* (undated, Frag. 201 Loeb).²⁷⁹ Unfortunately, the fragments of this comic play are too slight to deduce how either the verb or Daidalos precisely performed. Yet, given the few surviving lines of script, it is likely that Daidalos assisted someone (perhaps Zeus, or someone else posing as him) in "changing" (*metaballonta*, Frag. 198). Daidalos performed this assistive work in order to help the unknown agent deceive a mortal woman and, so, accomplish an amorous union with her.²⁸⁰ Such a feat recalls the assistive work that Daidalos once performed for Pasiphaë, when he fashioned for her an alluring apparatus by which she disguised herself and successfully seduced a handsome bull. Although this transformative work of Daidalos and the famous offspring of the

²⁷⁸ Here, Trygaeus (mis)quotes a line from *Telephus* (Frag. 727) in his descriptive dismissal of war. Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (429-577) and *Frogs* (19-42) also borrow from this tragedy.

²⁷⁹ The grammarian Pollux makes this isolated note in his third century CE study of words called *Onomasticon* (7.117). The fragments of Aristophanes' *Daidalos* (Frag. 191-204) are gathered and translated by Jeffrey Henderson (Loeb 2007), 198-205. Interestingly, Pollux makes his note about Aristophanes' verb form of "architect" alongside another grammatical oddity: a reversal of the same compound term, "*tekonarchos*", which was uttered in the now lost satyr play of Sophocles also suggestively entitled *Daidalos* (Frag. 159 Loeb). Pollux's full entry from Sophocles' play—*tekonarchos mousa*—suggests that a muse was qualified as a leading *tekon*. The other surviving fragments of Sophocles' *Daidalos* suggest that the agon of the play involved magically (or musically) overcoming the menacing bronze giant of Crete (Talos). See: Lloyd-Jones (2003); and Pearson (1917), 110-14; and, Radt *TrGF*, Vol. 4, p. 171. On other dramatizations entitled, or involving, "Daidalos", see Morris (1992), 36-59.

²⁸⁰ This mortal woman is perhaps Leda, which would make Zeus' new form (or costume) a swan. Leda is a plausible conjecture for this mortal woman since a surviving line of the play makes reference to a woman who has given birth to an egg (Frag. 193). The fragments of the play suggest, however, that the complex plot involved a certain contemporary politician who was posing as Zeus (in disguise).

union (the Minotaur) are better known from later sources, a version of this deed may have been dramatized in this and other fragmentary plays.²⁸¹

In addition to the amorously-inspired disguise, we also know that during the drama *Daidalos* the theatrical stage machine was activated, for one of its fragments preserves a direct appeal to the “stage machine operator” (*ho mēchanopois*, Frag. 192). This appeal in *Daidalos* echoes Trygaeus’ meta-theatrical cry as he heads to the heavens near the beginning of *Peace*: “Stage mechanic (*ho mēchanopoie*) pay attention...if you aren’t careful I’ll be foddering the beetle” (174-75). These lines also resonate with another fragment from Aristophanes’ comedy *Gerytades* (408/7 BCE) in which someone complains that “the operator (*mēchopoion*) ought to have deployed the crane as quickly as possible” (Frag. 160). Whereas *Peace* (and perhaps *Daidalos*) involved the stage-machine to dramatize movements between mortal and divine planes, this comedy *Gerytades* may have involved the device to cross the threshold to Hades, where an episode of the drama is set.²⁸² One wonders, then, if this fragmentary play might have also involved an “architect”, since, for Aristophanes, theatrical devices seem to have been *profoundly* related to this figure, being engaged not simply as a clever hoisting mechanism, but as a truly theatrical and theoretical apparatus by which seemingly unbridgeable thresholds might be hypothetically traversed; by which worldly and other-worldly agencies might meet, converse and suggestively intermingle; and by which seemingly insoluble human situations might be reconciled, or at least more profoundly represented and, so, potentially understood.

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In the examples given above (all from the mid to late fifth century BCE), “architecting” is found to suggestively qualify the acts of distributing justice (in Aeschylus’ *Dikē Play*) and leading others amidst ironic volatility (in Euripides’ *Telephus*). The activity is also found to be related, by Aristophanes, to *Daidalos*, as well as to feats of amorous metamorphosis involving theatrical devices. Although these deeds

²⁸¹ Euripides’ *Cretans* (Frag. 471-72, Loeb) may have provided an earlier dramatization of this deed, for one of this play’s verses records King Minos expressing outrage (perhaps directed at *Daidalos*): “You are a carpenter (*tekton*) but you were not practicing carpentry [or, wood-work] (*xulourgika*)”. See also Collard & Cropp (1997), 52-78.

²⁸² On *Gerytades*, see above, p. 107.

are full of ambiguities, they are (like the acts of Trygaeus) presented in relation to noble themes: justice, leadership, love and peace. In other words, in these examples we do not find overtly negative overtones, which later come to shade certain architect-figures. The orator Demosthenes, for instance, involves “architects” derogatorily to qualify the prime mover of a dubious scheme—the “architect of the whole plan (*epiboulēs*)”, where that “plan” involves breaching a contract for the sake of personal gain.²⁸³ But I digress, for Demosthenes involves “architects” as a noun, whereas the focus of this survey is the verb.

In the following examples from the fourth and third centuries BCE, architecting is presented not derogatorily per se but nevertheless differently from the ways in which Aeschylus, Euripides and Aristophanes had involved the activity, which could suggest that a century after the peak of Athenian drama (and Athenian architecture), architectural activity had become more suspect. The first example comes from a late fourth century BCE work of Theophrastus, a student of Aristotle.

ARCHITECTING IN THE SERVICE OF FLATTERERS

6.4

In his ethical and comical study *Characters* (319 BCE), Theophrastus describes The Flatterer as one who (among other things): follows a wealthy man around town showering him with compliments; prepares a seat for the man at the theater with comfortable pillows; brings apples to his children; and ingratiatingly tells him that his land is “well-cultivated” (*eu pephuteusthai*), and his house “well-architected” (*eu*

²⁸³ The two passages of Demosthenes (c. 384-322 BCE) are found in his *Speeches*: “Against Boeotus II” (40.42) and “Against Dionysodorus in the matter of a Loan” (56.11). Similar architect-tropes are found in later writings. For instance, Diodorus Sicilius (a contemporary of Vitruvius) qualifies those who led crimes of “monstrous impiety” and those who “schemed for the seizure of the shrine (in Delphi)” as “architects” (29.25.25; 16.61.2). And in Libanius’ *Julianic Orations* (of the fourth century CE) we find an “architect of the assassination” (24.23). An ancient gnomic expression also involves “architects” negatively. A verse in the anonymous (and undated) *Menandri Sententiae*, for instance, involves the figure in this way: “All (men) suffer misfortune, for all women are architects of evil” (*Polloi gunaikōn dustuchousin einēka, pasai gar eisin architektones kakōn*). *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, 633-34. My translation, with the assistance of Mark Golden. This ambiguous sense of the figure persists most strongly in the much later examples from the English Renaissance (see below, p. 204, n. 466); and it is evident in Alberti’s use of the figure in his 1443-50 fictional piece *Momus*. Soon after the protagonist, Momus, initiates his scheme of retribution he rhetorically asks, “have I not shown myself to be an elegant architect of all kinds of mischief?”—translation in Knight (2003), 63.

ērchitektonēsthai).²⁸⁴ Irrespective of what this passage reveals about “Flatterers” and about individual land and home-owners in Hellenistic times, it also makes at least two suggestions relevant to this study: that cultivating the earth and architecting are closely related (as Trygaeus’ performance has already shown); and that architecting remains positively discernible in physical settings *after* the activity has been performed. Lastly, the use of the verb in this way not only re-affirms its valuation as an act, but also supports the supposition that there remained no noun for “architecture” in Greek at this time.²⁸⁵

ARCHITECTING: AMONG THE ARTS OF SOPHISTICATED COOKS

6.5

The verb “to architect” is also found in a comic play of Sosipater called the *False Accuser* (from the third century BCE).²⁸⁶ In this comedy a cook considers the capability “to architect” (*architektonein*) and the capability “to interpret the stars” (*astrologein*) as imperative to his own “art” (*technē*) of cooking. These complementary arts, he professes, help him not only in perfecting what is in the pot, but in concocting the whole situation for the fullest appreciation of a meal. According to his lengthy speech, these other arts guide him in a number of ways: in arranging the lay-out of his kitchen, with respect to beneficent light and breeze (37-43); in discerning what ingredients are most seasonable and auspicious (25-36); and in orchestrating a feast for his guests in a timely and orderly manner (45-55).

²⁸⁴ Theophrastus, *Characters*, “The Flatterer” (*Kolakeias*) 2.34. My translation. Most editions convert the verb (the perfect infinitive) into a noun; for example, calling the wealthy man’s house a “masterly example of architecture”, as in Diggle (2004), 71. Praising a handsome house, may have been a typical tactic of flatters; for, as Diggle points out in his commentary to the line, Lucian’s portrayal of a flatterer similarly involved telling a wealthy man that his house resembles that of Zeus (Lucian, *Pro Imaginibus* 20). Theophrastus also mentions architects (more normatively) in his *Enquiry into Plants*, where “architects” are said to either specify, or not specify, certain species of wood based on their special qualities (5.5.4-5).

²⁸⁵ “Architecture” as a noun appears to have been first used by Cicero (*De Officiis* 1.151, circa 45 BCE); only a short time before Vitruvius composed *de architectura* (circa 25 BCE). In this passage, Cicero compares the art of “architecture” to “medicine” and “teaching”—arts that, likewise, benefit society and demand prudence of their practitioners.

²⁸⁶ Sosipater, “The False Accuser” (*Katapseudomenos*) Frag. 1.16. See Edmonds (1957-61), 281-5. This fragment of Sosipater is preserved in Athenaeus’ *The Learned Banqueters* (*Deipnosophistae* 9.377ff).

Another comic play of the same period by Alexis similarly depicts a sophisticated cook (a pastry chef) likening his own art to the *technē* of “architects”.²⁸⁷ Contrary to expectation, the point of resemblance is not primarily based on comparing buildings to pastries with fanciful forms but rather on the partial and contingent role of the “master”. Like an “architect”, this maker of pastries (*opsopoion*) claims that he does not produce pleasures all by himself. Rather, any pleasure experienced from his work depends as much on those who arrive in a timely manner to properly savor and judge what has been prepared.

This trope of comic cooks likening their *technē* to architecting (and related arts), seems to have been a commonplace in the third century BCE, for more such examples can be found. The comic dramatist Nicomachi, for instance, depicted a cook who lays claim to a wide range of knowledge, including the arts of military strategy, physics, astrology, medicine and geometry, as well as a “sense of proportion” (*symmetros*).²⁸⁸ All these arts, the cook claims, help him to choose the most seasonable fish and to interpret the temperament of his diners so as to prepare dishes that best nourish them, yet do not leave them with indigestion. All of these speeches of comic cooks are striking since they seem to prefigure not only the encyclopedic range of knowledge that Vitruvius later itemizes as being appropriate to architects (1.1.3), but also the kinds of adjustments that Vitruvius values: namely, crafting situational relationships with respect to particularities of place, season, climate, human practices and temperament. Finally, in this dramatic affinity of cooking and architecting it is also possible to see related ceremonial activities, since founding temples and installing statues were rites often accompanied by the preparation of sacrificial meals—as demonstrated by the architect-figure in Aristophanes’ *Peace*.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Alexis, “The Milesians”, Frag. 149K. See, Edmonds (1957-61), Vol. 2, 446-7. This quote is also recorded by Atheneaus (*Deipnosophistae*, 9.479a-c). In his commentary to the passage, W. G. Arnott suggests that *architectōn* grants the cook a sense of an “organizer... with designed pomposity” (1996), 449-57.

²⁸⁸ Nicomachi, *Eileithuia*, Frag. 1 (*Eileithuia* was the goddess of childbirth). See, Edmonds (1957-61), Vol. 2., 267-69; Atheneaus (*Deipnosophistae*, 7.291a-d). On sophisticated cooks in “Middle Comedy”, see W. G. Arnott (1972), esp. 77-8; and John Wilkins (2000). On master-chefs in the Latin plays of Plautus, see Lowe (1985).

²⁸⁹ When Trygeaus prepares the sacrifice in honor of the newly installed statue of Peace, he directs an assistant to sacrifice a lamb in a “master-chef-ily” manner (*mageirikōs*, 1017). Cf. *Acharnians*, 1015. Athenian butchers (*mageiros*) were professionals hired to perform ritual sacrifices for religious festivals, to oversee the fair distribution of meat to the citizens, and to direct the general preparations for the ceremonial meal. See the discussion of “Dicaeopolis as μάγειρος” in Compton-Engle (1999).

Verb forms of “architect” also appear in a technical handbook by Biton entitled *Construction of War Machines and Artillery* (circa 240 BCE). In this treatise, dedicated to King Attalus of Pergamum, Biton describes in detail how to make various non-torsion catapults. Yet, he also makes a point of recording the names of those individuals who first invented the devices he describes: a certain “stone-thrower was *architected* (*ērchitektoneumenon*) in Rhodes by Charon of Magnesia” (46); a giant siege-tower was “*architected* (*ērchitektoneuse*) [by Posidonius the Macedonian] for Alexander son of Philip” (52); and a catapult called “the belly-bow [was] architected (*ērchitektoneuse*) at Miletus [by Zopyrus of Tarentum]” (62).²⁹⁰

In later historical prose, one also finds the verb to qualify the work of certain architects. In the first century BCE, the ancient historian Diodorus Siculus reports that the entry to the temple of Hephaestus in Memphis (Egypt) was “architected by Daidalos” (*architektonēsai Daidalon*).²⁹¹ And, in the first century CE, the geographer Strabo writes that Chersiphron was “first to architect” (*prōtos... ērchitektonēsen*) the temple of Artemis in Ephesus. Like Biton, whose anecdotes emphasize originating acts, Strabo names Chersiphron not simply for having authored a work but for having inaugurated it, since others furthered the work that Chersiphron began.²⁹² In another anecdote of the early second century CE, the biographer Plutarch uses the verb in a related way that emphasizes the temporal, or durational, quality of architectural work. In his “Life of Pericles” Plutarch notes that the entrances of the Athenian Acropolis (the Propylaea) were brought to completion in just five years “with Mnesicles *architecting*” (*Mnēsikleous ērchitektonēsen*).²⁹³ Besides qualifying the activity of individuals who inaugurated, completed and sustained the work of building civic and sacred sites, a verb form of “architect” also arises as a manner of forethought with broad societal concern. While

²⁹⁰ Marsden (1971). The title “architect” is also found throughout Biton’s handbook and others, such as *The Artillery Manual* of Philon of Byzantium (*Belopoeica*, circa 270 BCE), in which Philon claims to have learned his subject from Alexandrian “architects” (51.12, cf. 59.24).

²⁹¹ Diodorus Siculus, *Library* 1.97.6.

²⁹² Strabo, *Geography* 14.1.22: “Chersiphron was [first to architect] the temple of [Artemis]; another afterwards enlarged it, but when Herostratus set fire to it, the citizens constructed one more magnificent.”

²⁹³ Plutarch, *Lives* (Pericles) 13.7.

describing the ancient city of Philadelphia—a place especially vulnerable to earthquakes—Strabo notes that its concerned inhabitants were “continually [attending] to the disturbances in the earth and *architecting* (*architektonountes*) with a view to their occurrence.”²⁹⁴

**ARCHITECTING: INTRINSIC TO THE CAPABILITIES OF WISDOM AND THE ART OF MEMORY AS WELL AS TO
THE POWER OF NATURE AND THE ART OF ADJUSTING**

6.7

In ancient Latin, a verb form of “architect” is found in a few remarkable instances: in Cicero’s inquiry on Ethics; in an anonymous work on Rhetoric; and in Vitruvius *de architectura*. In his ethical dialogue, *The Ends of Goods and Evils*, Cicero maintains that the personified figure of Wisdom (*Sapientiam*) awakens such passion in her followers because of her “supreme ability and cunning to architect pleasures” (*architectari voluptates*).²⁹⁵ Elsewhere, in an anonymous work on ancient Rhetoric (the *Ad Herennium*, sometimes attributed to Cicero), the art of architecting complements the art of memory. For, if one desires a particular setting in which to memorably place emblems but an appropriate setting can not be found, one need only “to architect” (*architectari*) such a setting in one’s imagination.²⁹⁶ The very few instances of the verb in Vitruvius’ treatise suggestively reveal its special senses in architectural discourse. In the preface of book seven, Vitruvius notes that the temple of the Olympion in Athens was nobly “architected” (*architectatus*) by Cossutius, a Roman of great “knowing” (*scientiaque*) and “cunning” (*sollertia*). No doubt it was significant for Vitruvius that the

²⁹⁴ Strabo, *Geography* 12.8.18.

²⁹⁵ *de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, “About the Ends of Goods and Evils” 2.16.52: “The sense of sight, says Plato, is the keenest sense we possess, yet our eyes cannot behold Wisdom (*sapientiam*); could we see her, what passionate love would she awaken! And why is this so? Is it because of her supreme ability and cunning (*callida*) in [*architecting*] pleasures (*architectari voluptates*)?” In an earlier passage of this same dialogical inquiry, an interlocutor offers to tell Cicero about his teacher, the pleasure-seeking philosopher Epicurus, who is introduced as an “architect” of the beautiful life: “I will give you [*sc.* Cicero] a complete account of the system, and expound the actual teachings of the great explorer of truth, the [architect] of human happiness (*architecto beatae vitae*).” (*de Finibus*, 1.10.32, Rachham, Trans.)

²⁹⁶ *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 3.19.32. Note: I am not enumerating here the many extant appearances of *architectus* as a Latin noun. The earliest of such nouns is found in the comedies of Plautus, as noted above, p. 1, n. 1.

architectural work of this Roman citizen primarily consisted of knowingly and cunningly re-proportioning a Greek temple “according to symmetry” (7.pref.15; cf. 7.pref.17). The second example in Vitruvius shifts the sense of the activity from mortal acts of adjustment to divine acts of alignment, for when Vitruvius describes the rotation of the earth and the axis it pivots around, he suspects that it was the power of Nature herself that “architected” (*architectata*) the design, having “contrived and placed the pivots... about which the firmament for ever rolls” (9.1.2).

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Leaving this series of architecting-figures aside, we must now return to the Dionysian festival and to the Athenian situation in the fifth century BCE, so as to consider the activities of “the architects” in Euripides’ *Cyclops* and their pre-figurations in epic and myth.

*Telling Figures: the architects in Euripides' Cyclops*²⁹⁷

7.0

Within a few years of Aristophanes' comedy *Peace*,²⁹⁸ Euripides, the Greek tragedian, dramatized the Homeric tale of the Cyclops in a satyr play. Like tragedy and comedy, satyr plays are a genre of Greek drama. This genre is less well known to us than tragedy and comedy, in part, because Euripides' *Cyclops* is the only intact surviving example of its kind.²⁹⁹ Satyr plays were not, however, unknown to the Greeks. On the contrary, they too were annually rehearsed, composed and performed in the theater of Dionysus, where large audiences, assembled for the dramatic festival, eagerly awaited their staging. Why might audiences have been especially eager for these satyr plays? Because satyr plays were not only short and burlesque, but were performed at the end of a trio of tragedies; thus culminating each day of tragic immersion with a kind of comic relief.³⁰⁰ In poetic structure and content, however, satyr plays were more akin to tragedy than to comedy. Being composed by the same dramatist who staged the preceding tragedies, satyr plays shared much of their formal vocabulary and poetic meter with the

²⁹⁷ Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Euripides' *Cyclops* cited here are those of David Kovacs (Loeb 2001). Translations of William Arrowsmith (Chicago 1969) are occasionally cited. This study has greatly benefited from the detailed commentary on Euripides' *Cyclops* prepared by R. A. S. Seaford (2003).

²⁹⁸ Euripides' *Cyclops* is undated. Scholars are divided over the likely year of its performance: either 424 or 408 BCE. If 424, then *Cyclops* was staged after the tragic trilogy that included Euripides' extant *Hecuba*—which is comparable to *Cyclops* both topically (dealing with blindness as a punishment for breeching customs of hospitality), and dramaturgically (for Hecuba's deceitful scheme resembles that of Odysseus). The year 408 BCE, on the other hand, is the year before Euripides died while living in Macedon under the patronage of the Macedonian King. Euripides' extant tragedies *Bacchae* and *Iphigenia at Aulis* are attributed to these last years of his life. These last plays were performed in Athens in the years just after his death. Either way (424 or 408), Euripides' *Cyclops* is roughly synchronic with the Aristophanes' *Peace* (421 BCE), and with the earliest known literary references to "architects" in the *Histories* of Herodotus (circa 425). On the problems of the *Cyclops*' date, see Seaford (1982). On the early appearances of "architect", see above, p. 36, n. 71.

²⁹⁹ Substantial fragments of Sophocles' satyr play *Trackers* are extant, and fragments and titles of other satyr plays are known. See Sutton (1980). *Cyclops* survives in a fourteenth-century manuscript, kept in the Laurentian Library in Florence. This alphabetically arranged manuscript collection of Euripides' plays is thought to have been copied from an Alexandrian edition. On the manuscript tradition of *Cyclops*, see Seaford (2003), 59-60. On the transmission of ancient plays in general, see Kovacs (2005), 387.

³⁰⁰ Comic relief is the simplest way to understand this genre, the relevant complexities of which will be discussed where appropriate in this study.

tragic genre.³⁰¹ Like tragedy, satyr plays also dramatized familiar episodes of myth, not topics of contemporary political concern, as Aristophanes' *Peace* and other Old Comedy primarily did. In the case of *Cyclops*, the myth taken up by Euripides follows (more or less) the plot found in book nine of Homer's *Odyssey*. Euripides' dramatization departs from this model, however, in a number of ways: by setting its action in Aetna (instead of a more hypothetical terrain);³⁰² by eliminating the obstructive stone at the mouth of the Cyclops' cave (replacing it with the traversable opening of the skēnē); by involving a requisite chorus of satyrs and their father Silenus (devotees of Dionysus);³⁰³ and by invoking "architects", since Odysseus confers this plural title upon himself in the midst of the dramatic action. For Euripides, then, the situation begins as follows.

"ARCHITECTS" IN THE LAND OF THE CYCLOPS

7.1

In Euripides' satyr play, much as in book nine of Homer's *Odyssey*, Odysseus becomes trapped. He becomes trapped with his crew in a cave on the island of the man-eating Cyclops. Following a harrowing experience within this cave, Odysseus (together with his surviving crew) escapes by devising a scheme to blind and flee the beast. Yet, before dramatizing the entrapment and escape of the hero, Euripides first shows that the chorus of satyrs and their father Silenus are already trapped against their will in the land

³⁰¹ Seaford (2003), 47-8, emphasizes that in spite of a few colloquialisms, Euripides' satyr play "behaves like tragedy... Odysseus' lines, and to a large extent Polyphemus' lines in the agon [the central verbal argument] are virtually indistinguishable in these respects [of language and metrical technique] from tragedy." Elsewhere, Seaford (1976), 211, notes that Euripides' satyr play follows tragic structure, "with a prologue, parodos, four episodes (one involving an *agon*) each followed by a choral song, and exodus."

³⁰² The setting, in the apparently uninhabited Sicilian land of Aetna, is repeatedly emphasized in the play (lines 20, 62, 95, 366, 395, 599). This choice of setting may allude to an ancient legend that the Cyclopes had once lived on this volcanic island. Yet, the choice also recalls Aeschylus' play, "The Women of Aetna", which (as mentioned above) may have involved Dikē and her office of *architecting*. One wonders if Euripides had this earlier play of Aeschylus in mind when he, too, brought "architects" to Aetna *not* to optimistically found a just city, but to flee an unjust and inhospitable land. The topic of colonialism, its enticements and failures (already central to the Homeric tale) is, thus, implicit in Euripides' choice of setting, as has been argued by Dougherty (1999) and Rinon (2007). The historic "Sicilian disaster" of 415 BCE, may have also informed the choice of site, either as a recent Athenian catastrophe (if *Cyclops* was composed in 408) or an impending one (if 424).

³⁰³ This satyr-chorus was most likely comprised of twelve to fifteen costumed actors, see Seidensticker (2003), 104. On the satyrs as representing a Dionysian "*thiasos*" (a group of religious follows), see Seaford's introduction to the play (2003), 26-33.

of the Cyclops. Having become shipwrecked—while searching for Dionysus—these revel-loving creatures now suffer in servitude to the reclusive beast. It is the misery of Silenus, the suffering of the satyrs, and the ambiguous absence of Dionysus that fill the opening scene of this play, just as these concerns and these satyrs will continue to sway the full scope of dramatic action.

As the satyrs sing of their longing for Dionysus and Dionysian ways, Silenus spots an approaching ship (85). Odysseus and his crew subsequently appear, pronouncing their own basic “desire” (*pothos*): to quench their thirst and acquire food (96-98). Following a friendly exchange of questions and clarifications as to the nature of this strange place, Odysseus and Silenus initiate a trade. To Silenus’ delight, Odysseus has Dionysian wine to offer, and for just one cup of this divine substance Silenus is prepared to give away all the Cyclops’ food (his flocks, cheese and milk). But this exchange is interrupted when the Cyclops, returning from a hunt, struts into the orchestra (203ff). Now terrified at being caught giving away the Cyclops’ food, Silenus misrepresents Odysseus and his crew as hostile bandits (232-40). Neither Odysseus’ verbal self-defense (253-60), nor the satyr’s words of support for “the strangers” (270-72), nor even Odysseus’ elaborate attempt at dissuasion (286-312) are able to move the giant who, in response to their pleas, delivers a detailed counter-argument upholding his Cyclopean ways (316-44), then demands that Silenus ready the fire and sharpen his knives, for he shall roast (not host) these strangers (345-46). Thus, as the giant forces the sailors into his cave, Odysseus utters a prayer soliciting the help of Athena and the vigilance of Zeus (350-55). Then, he too disappears behind the skēnē, leaving the chorus of satyrs to musically conjure the hidden horrors of the cannibal’s meal (356-74).

But soon, at what must have been a decisive moment in the midst of the trauma, Odysseus somehow eludes the beast. Sneaking out of the cave and into the orchestra, he delivers vivid testimony of the terrible events transpiring in the dark recesses behind him. From his story we learn that the Cyclops has already consumed two of his shipmates and those who remain (himself included) will soon be killed, cooked and eaten if he fails to act. And so, Odysseus has risked crossing back over the cave’s threshold to make a plea to the chorus of satyrs to collaborate in his scheme to subdue the giant by wine, then to blind and flee the beast. If successful, his scheme will release his remaining shipmates from the cave, free the captive chorus from their servitude, and allow Odysseus himself to resume course on his fated return home from Troy. But that is not all; for Odysseus also emphasizes that his scheme will punish the Cyclops for having transgressed sacred

customs; notably, the obligation to offer hospitality to strangers. Thus, having fully disclosed the improper conditions within the cave (375-426), the justifications for his “retribution” (426-72), and his plan’s many details, Odysseus then urges his potential collaborators with these pivotal words:

Be silent now—for you know my scheme completely—
and when I command, be persuaded (to follow) the architects.³⁰⁴

σιγᾶτέ νυν · δόλον γὰρ ἐξεπίστασαι ·
χῶταν κελεύω, τοῖσιν ἀρχιτέκτοσιν | πείθεσθ' .

(*Cyclops* 476-8)

³⁰⁴ My translation, as adapted from Arrowsmith (1956) and Kovacs (1994), who respectively provide: “Be quiet now. You know my stratagem. When I give the word, obey your leaders”; and “Then hold your tongue—you now know my plan—and when I give the word, do what the master builder tells you.” My translation aims to emphasize two key terms: first, “the architects”, which is given as a plural dative noun, *architektosin*, meaning “for, to, or toward architects”, along with the definite article, *toisin*, “the”; and, second, the imperative verb *peithesthai*, which is given in second-person middle-voice, implying that the satyrs ought to “persuade themselves (to follow)” or “obey the architects”. Although this verb form is commonly translated as “obey”, this term conceals the root Greek verb (persuade, *peithō*). Further, the hierarchical sense of obedience is not particularly helpful in understanding the *shared* involvement in this persuasive exchange—a feature this study aims to draw out.

Neither “architects” nor persuasive activity typically figure into modern translations of this passage. Among the numerous translations consulted during this research, I have found only two to use “architect”. In Latin editions, one finds: “*tacete nunc. Doum enim scis, Et quando jubebo, architectis parete*” (Musgravii 1797). More recently, and in English, “architect” is given (erroneously in the singular) as: “Quiet, now. You know the plan. When I give the signal, do as the architect says”, Waterfield (2003). Unfortunately, the editor’s clarifying note to this line—“Odysseus is the inventive modern man pitted against the antediluvian Cyclops”—does little to draw out the nuances of either the trope or the conflict. Other translations for this part of the line include: “You know the plan and when I give the order obey the master-builder”, Davie (2002); “Once I give the word, do everything your master carpenter commands”, McHugh (2001); “And now that you know my entire plan, when I call on you be ready to obey the master planner”, Bovie (1998); “Ye know the close device—and when I call, Look ye obey the masters of the craft”, Way (1956); “You know the trick right well; So, when I call on you, do you obey the master-mind—that’s me”, Way (1916); and “Hush! for now thou knowest my plot in full, and when I bid you, obey the author of it”, Coleridge (1896). Ussher (1978), in his commentary to this line, also emphasizes authorship—suggesting that we take the architects as “the author—of the dolos”. Ussher further notes that the “noun is very rare in verse”. Olson (1999), in his commentary to the passage, suggests that we take the “architects” as “supervisors” and understand the plural as referring “to Odysseus and his men”. The curious aversion to providing “architects” in translations persists in French and Italian, for the critical French edition of the play suggests that the satyrs: “obéissez au chef de la manoeuvre”, Méridier (1965); and in Italian we find “vui faciti com’io dico” (Pirandello, c.1936). The most valuable commentary to the passage is provided by Seaford (1984). He provides no translation, but notes that the trope is “surprising” and “odd”. Given its resemblance to the equally odd figure in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, he suggests that the trope “may be symptomatic of a *topos*.”

With these words Odysseus marks a crucial turning point in the drama: the difficulties of the situation have been made apparent and the course of action to alter that situation (together with its motives and benefits) has been fully revealed, thus the “scheme” (*dolon*)³⁰⁵ has been made known completely, thoroughly, or through and through (*ex-epistamai*).³⁰⁶ Anticipation, heightened by the call for “silence”,³⁰⁷ now turns to how this “scheme” will play-out, and to the implications it will bring. With these same pivotal words, Euripides also marks Odysseus with a peculiar figure: “architects”. By choosing this oddly plural figure, Euripides not only casts Odysseus as an “architect”, ostensibly as the deviser and director of the scheme proposed, but also implicates “architects”, in general, into a strange Dionysian situation and into a notorious Cyclopean myth.

Unlike the actions of Trygaeus in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, which relate closely to contemporary circumstances in Athens and loosely to other comic protagonists (as well as to an array of mythic agents, ritual acts and poetic images), the actions of Odysseus in Euripides’ *Cyclops* directly follow and adjust his own deeds as these are portrayed in the *Odyssey*. The *Odyssey*, then, provides proper grounds to begin interpreting Odysseus’ actions as “architect” in this play. Thus, before delving further into the satyr drama and its uniquely Dionysian situation, it is helpful, first, to review the Homeric situation wherein the Cyclops story is told, and then to consider both the mythic species of Cyclopes and (in more detail) the Homeric persona of Odysseus.

³⁰⁵ Other translations for *dolon* include “trick”, deceptive “plan” or “stratagem”. “Scheme”, however, is best for my purposes. The term will be discussed further below, p. 153, 170, 320.

³⁰⁶ The prefix “ex” on the root verb *epistamai*, suggests “thoroughness”—drawing out a course of action to its full completion, from beginning to end. While Odysseus, as architect, is here ensuring that the chorus members “know” the scheme *completely*, elsewhere such thoroughness is associated with *completing* architectural works. For instance, Herodotus notes that the Egyptian King Amasis “*thoroughly made*” (*exepoiēse*) the temple’s gateway at Saïs (2.175.1), and “*thoroughly built*” (*exoikodomēsas*) the temple of Isis at Memphis” (2.176.2). Later in his *Histories*, Herodotus praises the Samians, including the “architects” Eupalinus and Rhoikos, for “*thoroughly working*” (*exergasmena*) the “greatest works in all Greece” (a tunnel, a harbor mole and the temple of Hera at Samos) (3.60.1-3). Cf. 5.62.2. On this sense of the prefix “ex”, see Lloyd (1988), commentary to Herodotus 2.176. We may also recall that the inscription pertaining to the construction of Philon’s Arsenal culminates with the statement that “all this shall be *thoroughly worked* (*exergasontai*)”. See above, p. 113. And, in Aristophanes’ *Birds*, Peisetaerus receives a report that the wall he requested has been “*thoroughly built*” (*exōikodomētai*, 1124). See above, p. 49. In Euripides’ drama, the architects’ concern for *thorough* understanding may be taken to complement (poetically expand, correct and/or critique) the common concern for *thorough* construction.

³⁰⁷ A call for holy silence (*sigatē nun*), or “good sounds” (*euphēmeite*), typically marked the beginning of ritual actions, since inauspicious sounds would interfere or nullify the sacred acts and divine communications underway. See Burkert (1983), 220.

Having been tossed for ten years by the winds of fate on his troubled voyage home from Troy, Odysseus finally arrives at what will turn out to be the most hospitable of shores. He is not yet home, but his gracious host, the Phaeacian King, will soon deliver him there: to his loyal family and threatened household in Ithaca. But first, as is customary, Odysseus as a newly arrived stranger and guest is to be properly entertained with sport, song and dance, feasted on abundant wine and meat, and honored with gifts bestowed by the King in the much-adorned palace of the well-ordered land of the Phaeacians. In this exceptional setting and in the midst of a captivated audience, the weary hero is invited to recollect his own agonizing tales of the less-than-hospitable treatment he endured at sea. Prominent among the tales he tells, and one of the first he shares with his host in book nine of the *Odyssey*, is the story of his monstrous encounter with a Cyclops whose name is Polyphemus: the much-famed, one-eyed, man-eating, son of Poseidon.

As an isolated episode in the *Odyssey*, the tale of the Cyclops is entertaining and suspenseful. The entrapment of the hero and his shipmates in the Cyclops' cave, followed by the cannibal's consumption of half the crew, prompts Odysseus to devise a scheme to blind the beast, escape his cave, and flee the land. The enactment of this scheme provides the most condensed and explicit display of Odysseus' cunning in the entire epic: a resounding victory of wit (*mētis*) over might (*bia*). The significance of this victory, however, extends well beyond book nine. Indeed, Odysseus' accomplishment in the land of the Cyclops is crucial to the larger narrative of the *Odyssey*. Being the first extraordinary ordeal that he had suffered after leaving Troy, Odysseus' overcoming of Polyphemus turns out to be a defining and pivotal deed, one that marks the hero and his subsequent turns of fate in profound and conflicting ways. In one sense, overcoming the Cyclops prefigures Odysseus' success in overcoming other trials; most notably, his eventual restoration of order to his own household in Ithaca, where treachery and uncivil conditions (comparable to the conditions he survived in the cave) await him. Yet, in another sense, Odysseus' very success over the Cyclops, which marks him as a potent civilizer, also leads him into deeper troubles. For, by blinding Polyphemus and by proudly revealing his own name as he gloats over his accomplishment, Odysseus provokes Polyphemus to curse him with the wrath of Poseidon, thus sparking epic challenges for himself at sea, which not only threaten his life but also delay his homecoming, destroy his ship, consume his shipmates, and thoroughly test the limits of

his humanity by thrusting him into a variety of agonizing situations. At different moments of crisis throughout this turbulent journey, Odysseus would reflect on his confrontation with Polyphemus. In this reflective way, the conflict Odysseus once suffered in the land of the Cyclops becomes for him an instructive example—a model and a measure by which he not only checks himself but also judges difficult situations, those that lay at hand and those ahead.³⁰⁸

Although the Cyclops story in the *Odyssey* resembles and is even modeled after a simple folkloric tale of a clever adventurer outwitting an uncivilized ogre,³⁰⁹ it is, like all folk tales, profoundly instructive. Indeed, for Odysseus it is a basic story, central both to the epic story of his return and to his own development as a reflective and forward-thinking hero. In spite of the fact that Euripides dramatized the Cyclops episode in the context of a burlesque genre,³¹⁰ and in isolation from its full epic narrative, we must not

³⁰⁸ Odysseus reflects on his Cyclopean experience upon arriving to another strange land (of Circe, 10.189ff, 431ff); while preparing to confront other threatening forces (Scylla, 12.208ff); and when restoring order to Ithaca (20.20ff). Less explicit reflections on the Cyclops episode are discernable in his actions throughout the epic. On the defeat of the Cyclops as prefiguring Odysseus' defeat of the suitors, see Cook (1995), 97ff. On the frame story of the *Odyssey*, which has Odysseus tell his inhospitable tales in the context of an exceptionally hospitable setting, see Segal (1994), 12-64.

³⁰⁹ Homeric poets were neither alone in telling nor the first to tell this tale. Scholars of comparative mythology have identified over two hundred variations of it, some of which are independent from and possibly antecedent to the memorable Homeric rendition. See, Frazer (1963), 404-455; and Merry and Riddell (1871), 546-550. Wilhelm Grimm collected the various Cyclopean tales in *Die sage von Polyphem* (Berlin 1857). For comparative treatments of these folktales with the Homeric story, see Page (1966), 1-20; and Glenn (1971); (1978).

³¹⁰ Besides Euripides' *Cyclops*, Polyphemus' Homeric story was dramatized in at least one other satyr play of the fifth century BCE (by Aritias). The giant was also impersonated in a handful of fifth century comedies (by Epicharmus, Kratinus, and Callias) and dithyrambic performances (by Timotheus, Philoxenus, Stesichorus, and possibly Oeniades). Polyphemus also appeared in later Middle Comedy (of Antiphanes, Nicochares and Alexis). These fragments are gathered and studied by Hordern (1999), (2002) and (2004); Tanner (1915); and Arnott (1996), 139-51. Later, non-dramatic poets also took up and passed on the problem of Polyphemus, including Theocritus (*Idylls* 6 and 11) and Callimachus (*Galatea* fr. 378-9). Curiously, many of these comic and pastoral treatments of Polyphemus shift the central conflict of the tale—away from the Homeric hero's problem of escaping and punishing an inhospitable giant, and toward the personal predicaments of the giant himself. In comedy and dithyramb, for instance, Polyphemus appears as a clumsy buffoon displaying outrageous gluttony; whereas, in later pastoral poetry, he stands as a pathetic love-stricken figure—a gigantic misfit who, lonely, homely and blind, suffers not only from having been rejected from society but from his own unrequited love for the nymph Galateia. Although humorous and amorous characterizations of the Cyclops were known in Euripides' day (indeed his own portrayal participates in these themes), such problems in themselves do not exemplify the full extent of this tragedian's concern. Rather, for Euripides the more central conflict remains the greater problems that Cyclopean figures pose to social customs and sacred institutions.

forget that for Euripides and his audience, Odysseus' encounter with Polyphemus was inextricably enmeshed in folkloric and Homeric significance.

KYKLŌPES: MYTHIC FIGURES OF SIGNIFICANCE BEYOND HOMER

7.3

Grappling with a Cyclopean antagonist bore even broader significance in the context of Greek culture, since, in Greek myth, there were three apparently autonomous families of Cyclopes. In addition to the Homeric Polyphemus and his man-eating brethren, Hesiod presents a trio of Cyclopes as integral to the generations of gods. According to his *Theogony*, these Cyclopes were the gigantic sons of Gaia and Ouranos (Earth and Sky) and were named Brontes, Steropes and Arges (Thunderer, Brightner and Lightner). By personifying the volatile forces of the sky (which one hears, sees, or may be struck by),³¹¹ these Cyclopes embodied agencies that Zeus would appropriate in the next generation of the gods, for Zeus himself comes to act through the same dangerous weather phenomena and uncanny portents. According to Hesiod, these same three Cyclopes served Zeus as craftsmen. In gratitude for having been released from prior bondage, they harnessed their fiery resources to forge Zeus' thunderbolt—the decisive weapon by which he overcame the Titans and secured the Olympians' reign.³¹² Later mythographers portrayed these Cyclopean craftsmen as having also forged Poseidon's trident and Hades' helmet of invisibility.³¹³ A certain Orphic fragment even entitles these Cyclopes as “the first hand-craftsmen (*prōtoi tektonocheires*) [who] taught Hephaestus and Athena all cunning works (*daidala*) that the heaven contains.”³¹⁴ A third group of Cyclopes was known as a clan of legendary masons capable of heaving huge stones. These powerful giants were thought to have built the so-called “Cyclopean walls” of the

³¹¹ See West (1966), note to line 139.

³¹² *Theogony* 503-5. Hesiod portrays these *Kyklopēs* as possessing “inventive skill (*mēchanai*) and strength and power in their deeds” (139 ff). On these *Kyklopēs* and their “instruments of domination”, see Detienne and Vernant (1978), 61ff.

³¹³ Apollodorus' *Library* 1.2.1; and Callimachus' *Hymn to Artemis* 3.46-79—where *Kyklopēs* assist Hephaestus in his Sicilian forge. Similar portrayals of Cyclopean blacksmiths figure into Apollonios Rhodios' *Argonautika* (1.509-11, 730-34) and Lucian's *Timon* (1.19).

³¹⁴ Guthrie (1935), 140, with the Greek from Otto Kern's *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin 1963). This Orphic fragment (#179) was noted in the margins of Plato's *Timeaus* (291a) by Proclus (a neoplatonic philosopher of the fifth century CE).

Mycenaean era, such as the fortifying walls of the Athenian Acropolis that rise up behind the theater of Dionysus.³¹⁵

It would seem significant that the giant cannibal Odysseus confronts is related to these other groups of Cyclopes whose specific capabilities for craft were so profound (forging fiery weapons and building archaic walls of stone). Since Euripides knew all three varieties of these giants,³¹⁶ it is possible that they are each, in some way, active in Polyphemus. If so, then, Odysseus, as “architekton”, could be seen as confronting one of his own mythological predecessors: a “first *tekton*” with gigantic “hands” (*cheires*)—features of Polyphemus that are menacingly portrayed in the satyr play.³¹⁷ What is also relevant to recognize here is that the antagonist Odysseus faces in Euripides’ *Cyclops* is reducible neither to a brute beast nor to Odysseus’ diametrical opposite. What is also clear is that there was a great deal said about the species of Cyclopes in and prior to the fifth century BCE. Having so much said about them, one can understand how it was that, already for Homer (in the eighth century BCE), the Cyclops was named Poly-phemus. When Euripides dramatized this Homeric tale again, the fame of Odysseus was even more polyvalent than that of Polyphemus. It is to this protagonist and the problem of his variegated fame that we now turn.

³¹⁵ Cyclopean masonry is mentioned in the poetry of Bacchylides (11.77ff); Pindar (Frag. 169); Sophocles (Frag. 227); and in six different tragedies of Euripides: *Electra* 1159; *Heracles* 15, 944, 998; *Iphigenia at Aulis*, 152, 265, 534, 1501; *Iphigenia at Tauris* 845; *Orestes* 965; and *Trojan Women* 1088). In Strabo’s later *Geography*, *Kyklopēs* are mentioned as if they were normative masons brought to Greece for their special skill (8.6.11). For a comparative review of these wall-builders in relation to the other *Kyklopēs*, see Rautenbach (1984).

³¹⁶ In addition to the six tragedies listed in the previous note, Euripides also mentions the mythic sons of Gaia, as the “*tektons* of Zeus’ fire”, in *Alcestis* (6); the mountaineering and man-eating Cyclops of Homer are also evoked by Cassandra in the *Trojan Women*, 437. For an attempt to reconcile the stories of these three families of Cyclopes, see Mondì (1983).

³¹⁷ Polyphemus snatched up and “weighed in his hands” the two fattest shipmates (379-80); and, as the men try to escape the cave after he is blinded, he “fits [his] hands” to the cave opening (668) with the hope of catching the fleeing men in either “hand” (681). Cf. 418.

Pre-figurations: the figure of Odysseus and some problems of his fame

8.0

Unlike Trygaeus, the otherwise unknown individual called upon “to architect” in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, Odysseus, who entitles himself “architect” in Euripides’ *Cyclops*, is a well-known figure of epic poetry. While Trygaeus is comparable to certain mythic, tragic and comic protagonists (in light of his dramatic actions),³¹⁸ and relates to epic themes (by his suggestive name),³¹⁹ Odysseus, being the central figure of the *Odyssey* and crucial mediating agent of the *Iliad*, is arguably the most famous and manifold of all Greek heroes. Such prominence and multivalence make Odysseus’ actions as “architect” in Euripides’ *Cyclops* difficult to perceive and to critically interpret, for his particular performance there is both prefigured by and tangled up in his broader Homeric fame. Although the heroic deeds and epic status of Odysseus are not, in themselves, primary concerns of this study, his conspicuous fame must be schematically assessed in order to establish the relevant poetic grounds for his later qualification as “architect”.

One way in which Odysseus’ broad fame was concisely articulated prior to his dramatic performance in *Cyclops* was through the many descriptive epithets (short adjectival expressions) that Homeric poets had attached to his name. While his fame is not reducible to these epithets,³²⁰ recollecting a representative range of them will provide a fitting survey of his renown. Beyond providing this familiarization with Odysseus, an excurses into these qualifying expressions will also provide a framework for the primary question guiding this chapter: in what ways might Odysseus’ epithets have prefigured his later appellation “architect”? The premise underlying this question is that one can begin to understand the dramatists’ choice to involve “architects” in the later plays in relation to this poetic device;³²¹ and that this poetic device is a meaningful thematic clue, being not

³¹⁸ See above, p. 28-9, 38ff, and 105f.

³¹⁹ See above, p. 87-9 and 102ff.

³²⁰ On the Greek concept of *kleos* (fame) and its “ironic” complexities for Odysseus, see Segal (1994), 85-109; and Goldhill (1991), 69-166.

³²¹ In the discussion above, for instance, *architecting* and “architect” perform somewhat like epithets by qualifying the personified figures of Justice, Mind, Wisdom and Nature, as well as a farmer (Trygaeus), a number of cooks (as in the fragments of New Comedy), and schemers in general (as in the later plays of Plautus). At another level of association, the names of Aristophanes’ protagonists show how compound titles served to succinctly qualify special

only relevant to the particular narrative situation in which the epithet performs but also resonant with broader poetic themes.³²² After preliminarily gathering Odysseus' epithets from Homeric poetry, the associations these raise and the manner in which they perform in the narrative context will then be considered. This (rather extensive) discussion of Odysseus' epic appellations and associations will prepare the way to consider the dramatic names and qualifications (including "architects") that he receives in *Cyclops*.

REASSESSING ODYSSEUS' CRAFTY CLOUT

8.1

The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* both speak to Odysseus' fame by endowing him with a plethora of epithets. When named in these oral poems, his name "Odysseus" is often formally coupled with a laudatory and usually compound adjective, such as: "much-enduring", "great-hearted", "of great passion", "of many tales", "god-like", "dear to Zeus", "born of Zeus", "flawless", "glorious" and "noble".³²³ Long before witnessing Odysseus in action in Euripides' satyr play, these laudatory epithets and variations of them, would have been familiar to Greek audiences—perhaps exceedingly so. Itinerant

agencies of individuals (see above p. 39ff, 89). The names of Greek heroes perform similarly: Herakles, for instance, means "he who has the *kleos* of Hera"; and Achilles, "he who suffers [and inflicts] grief (*achos*)". See Nagy (1999), 69, 303. The proper names of historical architects also perform, in some ways, like epithets: Trophonius, the "Nurturer"; Eupalinos, he who is "Good (with his) hands"; Kallias, the "Beautiful (one)"; Kallicrates, he of "Beautiful strength"; Mnēsikles, he who "Remembers fame (*kleos*)"; and Xenodorus, a "Stranger (bearing) gifts"; Philon "Friend / Stranger". In his study of Indo-European languages, M. L. West (2007), 79-81, has asserted that compound words are fundamentally poetic words, acting as "poetic coinages that never were a part of ordinary speech... [but] which serve to enrich [speech] with a condensation of associated ideas."

³²² This premise is supported by those scholars who argue that Homeric epithets, though formulaic, are not mere metrical fillers. For instance, Gregory Nagy (1999), 4, claims that an epithet's thematic appropriateness is integral to their metrical fit; and, elsewhere (1990), 23, he argues that a distinctive epithet is "like a small theme song that conjures up a thought-association..." Norman Austin (1975), 24, shows that Homeric poets selected epithets based on "various contextual forces" in the narrative as well as on meter. Likewise, Calvert Watkins (1995), 68, describes epithets (in Indo-European poetry) as a "vehicle of themes" in which a society's "doctrine, ideology and culture" lay latent. And, Johannes Haubold (2000), 72, holds that, rather than empty rote expressions, the frequent repetition of epithets should be heard as "resound[ing] through the echo-chambers of a whole poetic culture".

³²³ *polytlas* (*Iliad* 9.676, 10.248; *Odyssey* 5.486, etc.); *megalētopi* (*Il.* 5.674, *Od.* 9.500, etc.); *megathūmous* (*Il.* 2.631, *Od.* 15.2); *polyainos* (*Il.* 9.673, 10.544, 11.430; *Od.* 12.184); *antitheos / theios* (*Il.* 11.140, *Od.* 21.254, etc.); *diiphilon* (*Il.* 11.419, etc.); *diogenēs* (*Il.* 23.723, *Od.* 5.198, etc.); *amumonōs* (*Od.* 2.225 etc.); *phaidimos* (*Od.* 10.251 etc.); *dios* (*Il.* 3.314, *Od.* 9.1 etc.).

singers had been proliferating Odysseus' fame with such expressions for centuries. Domestic storytellers, choral trainers, banquet entertainers and leaders of ritual further saturated the daily lives of the Greeks with tales of Odysseus and other heroes. Professional rhapsodes had then helped to make the heroes' fame all the more indelible, by rehearsing and competitively reciting set arrangements of the Homeric epics at each Panathenaia festival.³²⁴ Thus, for Euripides and his audience, Odysseus' fame was not only ubiquitous but proverbial. Indeed, the extent to which Odysseus' reputation *preceded* his acts, seems itself to have been one of his central dilemmas as a hero. Yet, it is not my task here to risk a general portrait of this complicated figure, but rather to seek in Odysseus' Homeric fame that which might prefigure or suggestively support the specific title Euripides later gave him.

Beyond accumulating laudatory epithets (such as those cited above) that lay claim to his eminence and endurance, Odysseus also earned a variety of epithets that speak to what one could call his craftiness—a faculty difficult to synthesize, but which Homeric poets valued as much for its abundance as for its versatility. The capabilities these epithets suggest bear particularly on Odysseus' manner of thought and action in Euripides' later play. In the *Odyssey*, when Odysseus is named, he is sometimes called “crafty-minded” (*poikilomētēs*). Other times he is evoked as a figure of “many devices” (*polymēchanos*), “diverse counsels” (*polymētis*), “many turns” (*polytropos*), “much invention” (*polyphrōn*), and one who excels in “all sorts of wiles” (*pantoioisi doloisi*).³²⁵ In the *Iliad*, Odysseus also performs in a crafty manner and is invoked with many of the same manifold expressions. He is there also called “crafty-minded” (*poikilomētēs*), and named as a figure of “many devices” (*polymēchanos*) and “diverse counsels” (*polymētis*). He is, again, renown for “all manners of tricks” (*pantoious te dólous*), and is “insatiable of guile” (*dolōn atē*).³²⁶

³²⁴ Beginning in the late sixth century BCE, Homeric performances were institutionalized, likely by the tyrant Peisistratus. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* began to take the narrative shape we know today from the “transcripts” arranged for these performances. On the transition of the oral (script-less) epics into “transcripts” and then into “scripts”, see Nagy (2003), 2ff. On the institutionalization of Homeric performances, see Nagy (1996), 69-71. On the other various occasions for Homeric performance in the daily life of the Greeks, see Buxton (1994).

³²⁵ *poikilomētēs* (13.293, etc.); *polymēchanos* (5.203, etc.); *polumētis* (9.1 etc.); *polutropos*, (1.1, 10.330); *polyphrōn* (20.239, etc.); *pantoioisi doloisi* (3.119, 122; 9.19; 13.292).

³²⁶ *poikilomētēs* (11.482); *polymēchanos* (2.173, 10.146 etc.); *polumētis* (1.311, 2.216 etc.); *pantoious te dólous*, (3.202); *dolōn atē* (11.430).

These epithets not only speak to Odysseus' abundant and versatile craftiness, but also sing him into a divine company of exceptionally crafty figures whose fame resounds with some of the same expressions. Most explicitly, in the *Iliad*, Odysseus is described as the “equal of Zeus in counsel (*mētis*)”.³²⁷ More associatively, he is compared to other crafty divinities by virtue of the epithets he shares exclusively with them. He is associated in Homeric poetry with four divinities in this way. In the epics, two of Odysseus' epithets extend to the blacksmith-god Hephaestus: both Odysseus and Hephaestus exercise “much invention” and “diverse counsels” (*polyphrōn*, *polymētis*).³²⁸ The later *Homeric Hymns* further project certain epithets of Odysseus onto Zeus, Athena and Hermes. In these *Hymns*, Zeus, like Odysseus, is said to demonstrate a “crafty-mind” (*poikilomētēn*);³²⁹ Athena shares with Odysseus “diverse counsels” (*polymētis*);³³⁰ and the messenger god Hermes demonstrates, like Odysseus, a “crafty-mind” and “diverse counsels,” as well as “many turns” (*poikilomētēn*, *polymētis*, *polytropon*).³³¹ This divine company, to which Odysseus is associated through these epithets, is revealing in its range. On the one hand, Odysseus shares faculties with Zeus and Athena, the preeminent Olympian divinity and his daughter, the foundress of Athens. On the other hand, Odysseus shares capabilities with two more dubious divinities: with Hephaestus, a craftsman-god, who in spite of his revered skill as a smith was also mocked as a lame cuckold;³³² and with Hermes, a messenger-god, who in spite of his value as an emissary

³²⁷ *Diū mētīn atálan ton* (2.169, 407, 636; 10.137). (*Diū*, here indicates Zeus).

³²⁸ *polyphrōn* (*Iliad* 21.367; *Odyssey* 8.297, 327); *polymētis* (*Iliad* 21.355).

³²⁹ *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 322.

³³⁰ *Homeric Hymn to Athena* 2.

³³¹ *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 155, 514; 319; 13, 439. Odysseus' association with divinities vis-à-vis epithets could further be extended to Prometheus who, according to Hesiod's *Theogony*, speaks (like Odysseus) with “guileful intent” (*dolophroneōn*, 550)—a manner demonstrated elsewhere by “tricky-minded women” (Archilochus, Frag. 184). Yet, I am attempting to restrict my discussion here to those divine associations found in Homeric literature, in which Prometheus does *not* figure.

³³² Hephaestus famously had a lame foot—a birth defect (by some accounts) for which his mother Hera rejected him from the heavens. By other accounts his lame foot was an injury incurred when Zeus tossed him to earth for having helped Hera without his approval. Hephaestus was later restored to divine status, where his skill was a benefit and his lameness an amusement to the Olympian gods. The story of Hephaestus' status as a cuckold is sung in the *Odyssey* (8.266-369).

and guide was also a celebrated thief.³³³ It must further be emphasized that Zeus and Athena were themselves not free of ambiguity. Indeed, the “crafty-mind” of Zeus was valued with suspicion, for this epithet, *poikilomētēn*, is delivered to Zeus in anger by Hera, who, exasperated by his covert tricks, calls out to him: “O stubborn and crafty-minded one! What else will you now devise?”³³⁴ Athena, too, it should be recalled, was as crafty in the arts of war as she was cunning in the arts of counsel. This ambiguous range of associations serves to remind us that craftiness was, for the Greeks, as troubling as it was divine. While Homer indeed sings Odysseus into divine company with these crafty epithets, one must not be tempted to hear in them simple unambiguous praise.

This particular cast of divinities (Zeus, Athena, Hephaestus and Hermes), with whom Odysseus is associated by virtue of sharing crafty epithets with them, is made all the more relevant by the supportive roles these gods play for the architect-figures in each of the dramas under study. In Aristophanes’ *Peace*, Trygaeus not only appeals to but directly collaborates with Hermes. And, in Euripides’ *Cyclops*, Odysseus appeals specifically to Zeus, Athena and Hephaestus for help in his scheme. These dramatic invocations and collaborations, however, are not specifically marked by the crafty epithets quoted above; neither do they involve manners or agencies that are ostensibly crafty. In *Cyclops*, Odysseus appeals to Zeus *not* for his “crafty-mind” but for his divine protection, evoking him together with his epithet *xenia*, “Zeus, (protector) of strangers” (354). Odysseus further appeals to Zeus for his vigilance as a witness, imploring him to “look upon” (*hora tade*) the situation he faces—presumably to *see* the injustice of it (354).³³⁵ In the same prayer, Odysseus invokes Athena as “Pallas” (350-1), thus appealing to her *not* directly for her cunning counsel, but for her protective aid in this extreme moment of crisis. Finally, Odysseus appeals to Hephaestus *not* as an inventive craftsman but as “Lord of Aetna”, so, summoning the raw force of his explosive (and liberating) fire (599-600). Similarly, in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, Trygaeus does not appeal

³³³ Hermes’ status as a thief is demonstrated in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, especially lines 175ff, 282ff, 290. On this capacity of the god, see Brown (1947).

³³⁴ *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 322. The covert trick that prompts Hera’s exasperation is Zeus’ self-conception of Athena—giving birth to her from his head, without the help of Hera.

³³⁵ Zeus is commonly portrayed in epic and dramatic poetry as one who “oversees” (*ephorai*) all things. He is also specifically invoked as “witness (*histo*) of oaths” (*Iliad* 19.258). “Witness” here is cognate with *oida*, as a knower, or seer. Cf. Solon, Frag. 13.17. In Aristophanes’ *Peace*, Trygaeus calls upon Zeus in a similar capacity. Indeed, his first words of the play are a protest that Zeus has *not* been fulfilling this role as witness (62).

to Hermes for his celebrated craftiness. Rather, having already initiated his own scheme to rescue Peace, Trygaeus and the chorus persuade Hermes to become involved in it by appealing to his philanthropy (393), to his benevolence (602), and to his usual willingness to help mortals avert trouble (417-22).³³⁶ Furthermore, of the “many turns” (*polytropos*) Hermes was famous for, the “turns” that he demonstrates in the drama include: turning away trouble; turning what is confounding to sense; and watching over the return of Peace. Thus, in spite of the fact that crafty epithets link Zeus, Athena, Hephaestus and Hermes to Odysseus (and Trygaeus), these architect-figures do not call upon these gods for purposes that are ostensibly crafty; neither in the sense of material craft, nor in the sense of covert trickiness. Are we then to take the concerns of these “architects” as being unrelated to such craftiness? Or, should we rather extend (or modify) the scope of craftiness to include the topics that these architect-figures *do* raise: hospitality, protection (of strangers), justice, liberty, philanthropy, hermeneutics, apotropaic agencies, and chthonic emergence? My hunch is we should. Nevertheless, it is clear from this preliminary discussion that while epithets are important clues to particular manners of action, modes of influence and associative relations, they (like any qualifying title) are not adequately understood when taken in isolation from the performative situations in which they arise. Additionally, it is evident that the capabilities implied by Odysseus’ crafty epithets do not fit neatly under the umbrella category of “craft”. Indeed, “craft” and “crafty” are themselves part of the confusion here.

The synthesizing adjective “crafty”, which (in English) so conveniently gathers Odysseus’ manifold fame, is not applied to Odysseus in Homeric poetry by its literal Greek equivalent. Although much of the constituent vocabulary of his epithets—notably, *mētis*, *mēchanē* and *poikilos*—was, or would become, intertwined with capabilities of craftsmen and with qualities of their artifacts, not one Homeric epithet formally identifies Odysseus with the Greek words for “craft” or “craftsman” (*technē* or *tekton*). While there are specific circumstances in the *Odyssey* where Odysseus does *perform* “craftily”, and *act* in ways analogous to *tektōnes*, these particular manners and mimetic modes do not arise as qualifying titles or epithets (names or adjectives) put upon Odysseus directly. Rather, Odysseus demonstrates these capabilities through his manner of performing

³³⁶ Trygaeus, addresses Hermes as “the Averter of Evil” (*alexikakōi*, 422)—an epithet that is put upon Aristophanes by his chorus in the parabasis of *Wasps* (1043). While the chorus call on him as the “most philanthropic of divinities” (*ō philanthrōpotate*, 393), and later extol him as the “most benevolent of gods” (*ō theōn eunoustate*, 602).

specific actions: he *weaves* a sail for his raft and *steers* his course to the Phaeacian shore “craftily” (*technēentōs*, 5.259, 5.270); he *lays-out* the broad preliminary base of his raft like one “well-versed in tectonic arts” (*eu eidōs tektosunaōn* 5.250); and he *adorns* his marriage bed in the manner of other exemplary craftsmen, namely Hephaestus, who is the only other Homeric craftsman to “adorn” (*daidallōn*) in this special manner (23.185ff),³³⁷ and Daidalos, whose name is cognate with the exemplary mode of “adorning” he performs.³³⁸ Moreover, these particular acts—weaving, steering (a straight course), laying-out (preliminarily), and adorning—are involved in the epic narrative metaphorically. For, these acts have as much to do with the crafting of poetry, the edification of society, and the guidance of oneself and others as they do with the ostensibly tectonic and navigational work depicted in the story.

In spite of Odysseus’ limited performance in the mode of “craft”, translators and commentators frequently and sweepingly deem Odysseus “crafty”. Generally, this adjective is taken to convey his all-around cleverness.³³⁹ More specifically, “crafty” is taken as an apt synonym for his *mētis*, his “cunning intelligence”,³⁴⁰ or capacity for “counsel” (which is the translation of *mētis* that I am favoring here).³⁴¹ The term “crafty” also serves to distinguish Odysseus’ peculiar mode of heroic action, which, when compared to other Homeric heroes, tends to be more subtle than forceful, more shifty than valiant.³⁴² For the particular purposes of this study, however, the basis of the hero’s

³³⁷ This rare verb form of adorning (the present participle) is found only here (*Odyssey* 23.200), and in the *Iliad*, where it qualifies Hephaestus’ act of “*adorning* [Achilles’ shield] in every part” (*pantose daidallōn*, 18.479). See Morris (1992), 11.

³³⁸ Daidalos performs as a model even for the divine blacksmith, for Hephaestus, when adorning Achilles’ shield, inlays a dancing floor (*choron*) “like the one which in wide Knosus Daedalus fashioned of old for fair-tressed Ariadne” (*Iliad* 18.590-92).

³³⁹ Among those positing “craftiness” as Odysseus’ “most famed quality” is Finley (1982), 66.

³⁴⁰ Detienne and Vernant (1978) call Odysseus “the very embodiment of cunning” (p. 22); “a crafty character” (p. 2); and “the *polymētis* one” (p. 39). Here, too, there is an implied connection between *mētis* and the French word for craft (*métier*). While Detienne and Vernant maintain that *technē* is within the semantic field of *mētis*, they admit that their study does not adequately explore *mētis* in this domain of craft (p. 1).

³⁴¹ On the association of *mētis* with counsel, and as “an essential ingredient of *euboulia* [good counsel, or sound judgment]” as exemplified by Homeric agents like Odysseus and Nestor, see Schofield (1986), 8.

³⁴² On Odysseus’ heroic craftiness, or “artifice” (*mētis*) in relation to others’ heroic “might” (*bia*), see Nagy (1999), 47ff.

association with “craft” must be reassessed. If Odysseus’ Homeric epithets do not name him with *technē* or *tekton*, how then are we to take his crafty reputation? In what ways, and in what contexts *does* Odysseus become associated with *technē*? And, how might these craft performances prefigure his later acts as “architect”?

One way to approach these questions is to continue with the strategy already commenced. Odysseus readily appears crafty, in part, because his epithets link him to Athena and Hephaestus—the two principal divinities of craft in ancient Greece. Thus, I will begin to seek-out Odysseus’ “craftiness” by examining the Homeric contexts wherein he meets these craft divinities either directly (in collaborative pursuits), or indirectly (by virtue of their shared epithets). The concern in this examination is twofold: to uncover the peculiar agencies that Athena and Hephaestus share with Odysseus (in so far as these involve craft or otherwise implicate architectural acts); and to interpret the narrative contexts in which the figures meet—the situations that ground or give rise to their associated work. It is convenient to first treat Odysseus’ indirect associations with Hephaestus, and then turn to his more direct and extensive associations with Athena.

Hephaestus was broadly associated with *technē* in Homeric poetry through his didactic role in having taught mortals (with Athena) “all kinds of craft” (*technēn pantoīēn*).³⁴³ Yet, he was also uniquely defined by his skill in handling fire.³⁴⁴ In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, Hephaestus was especially renown for having forged many elaborate and influential works. Among these works are dwelling accommodations for the Olympian gods, including the house of Zeus with its “bronze threshold” and “polished colonnades”; the chamber of Hera with its “strong doors” and “secret lock”; and his own “preeminent” house of bronze, which (like everything he made) was “imperishable” (*aphthiton*).³⁴⁵ However much these divine dwellings may commend Hephaestus as a model architect, his peculiar mode of making is more diversely shown and better understood through his other exemplary works. These works and some of the ways they perform are collected below. This overview of what Hephaestus is said to have made in Homeric poetry prepares the way for a discussion of two particular accomplishments that bear most ostensibly on his relation to Odysseus, and to Odysseus’ acts as architect in *Cyclops*.

HEPHAESTUS’ PERFORMATIVE ARTS IN HOMERIC POETRY

8.2a

Besides accommodating gods with imperishable houses, Hephaestus also fashioned intricate allurements, collectively called *daidala*: spiral armbands, necklaces, brooches and other such bodily adornments, as were worn by Hera in her seduction of Zeus (*Iliad* 14.178ff).³⁴⁶ The divine smith was also famed for making diversely

³⁴³ *Odyssey* 6.229ff, 23.159ff.

³⁴⁴ Creative kindling, forging and destroying with fire belonged to Hephaestus’ area of influence. Fire’s spark, however, was the invention of Hermes; and transferring fire to mortals was the defiant act of Prometheus. See, the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 109ff; and Hesiod’s *Theogony* 566ff. On the interrelation of these fire divinities, see “Prometheus and the Technological Function” in Vernant (1983), 237-47; and, Detienne and Vernant (1978), 282.

³⁴⁵ These accommodations are attributed in the *Iliad* collectively (1.607-8; 11.76-7); and individually: Zeus (1.426; 20.10-12); Hera (14.166-8); and Hephaestus (18.369-71).

³⁴⁶ Cf. 18.400-02. Achilles’ armor is collectively called *daidala* (19.13-19). In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus’ brooch is a *daidalon* (19.227), but this is not noted as being made by Hephaestus.

appealing gifts. Among these gifts are a mixing bowl of silver, given by Menelaus to Telemachus as an enduring token of friendship (*Odyssey* 4.617, 15.117); a golden throne and foot stool, promised by Hera in a persuasive exchange (*Iliad* 14.241ff); and a funerary urn also of gold, passed on from Thetis (via Dionysus) to her son Achilles, who would ultimately be reunited in it with his beloved friend Patroclus.³⁴⁷ Besides these intricate allurements and appealing gifts, Hephaestus also wrought defensive devices. These include various armaments of heroes, each inlaid with elaborate designs,³⁴⁸ and the shield of Achilles, itself inlaid with images of peace and strife (*Iliad* 18.468ff). As defenses, Hephaestus also fashioned the *aegis* of Zeus, a fear-inspiring garment inlaid with terrifying images of rout (*Iliad* 15.310), as well as the dogs of gold and silver, which stood guard at the palace threshold of the Phaeacian King, and which were themselves imbued with ageless immortality (*Odyssey* 7.92f). Whereas the intricate allurements (*daidala*) and appealing gifts (silver bowl, golden throne and urn) would seem to invite agreement, these defensive devices (armaments, shield, *aegis* and dogs) serve more to maintain differences. Much like the flame of Hephaestus itself, each defensive artifact, being imbued with influential qualities or apotropaic images, was made to turn away—as by fire—all that would threaten the prevailing order, while at the same time reassert and preserve that order by the elaborate designs they also bore.³⁴⁹ Other devices forged by Hephaestus were famous *not* for turning others away but for turning themselves, as they were bidden. These obeisant works included: self-moving tripods on golden wheels that would “of themselves” (*oi automatoi*) enter the assembly of the gods (*Iliad* 18.373ff); animate bellows that would turn themselves toward the fire upon Hephaestus’ command (18.469); and life-like assistants who helped the lame smith in his forge—golden handmaids, endowed with “strength”, “speech” and “understanding in their minds” (18.417-20). Like the alluring, appealing and apotropaic works, these automatons were endowed with performative capabilities—not simply automatic movement but a kind of specialized cooperation, or willing obeisance. As such, the cooperation offered by these

³⁴⁷ *Odyssey* 24.73-5; cf. *Iliad* 23.91-2.

³⁴⁸ Hephaestus made the “elaborate (*daidaleon*) breastplate” of Diomedes (*Iliad* 8.194-5). Elsewhere, the armor of Herakles—including the breastplate “of diverse designs” (*poludaidalon*)—are noted for being the gifts of Hephaestus (Hesiod’s *Shield* 123ff).

³⁴⁹ On the apotropaic function of Hephaestus’ creations, and other examples of his magically animated works, see Faraone (1992), 18-35; and Delcourt (1957).

animate assistants (tripods, bellows and attendants) was timely, knowing and precisely complementary to the events they also generally honored.

In addition to the works described above, Hephaestus also made symbolic attributes; notably, the scepter of Agamemnon, an attribute of lordly rule and prudent counsel. Like the dwellings of the gods, this scepter, is “imperishable” (*Iliad* 2.46, 186). Such a quality must have been magically imbued by the fire god’s special process of making. Yet, when the poets of the *Iliad* invoke this scepter, they do so along with its full history. This would seem to suggest that the imperishability of the scepter was not only initially kindled and forged by Hephaestus but further maintained, burnished and perpetually re-instilled by its successive holders. Homer parades the legacy of the scepter in this active manner:

Then among them lord Agamemnon stood up, holding in his hands the scepter which Hephaestus had toiled over making. Hephaestus gave it to lord Zeus, son of Cronos, and Zeus gave it to the messenger Argeiphontes (Hermes); and Hermes, the lord, gave it to Pelops, driver of horses, and Pelops in turn gave it to Atreus, shepherd of men; and Atreus at his death left it to Agamemnon to carry, to be lord of many isles and of all Argos. Leaning on this he addressed the Argives.

(*Iliad* 2.100-09)

As Agamemnon leans on this scepter, each of its former guardians—together with their stories of conflict—would seem to be supportively present as exemplary and cautionary advisors, tacitly participating in the session of counsel.³⁵⁰

In recognizing that so many works of Hephaestus are endowed with influential qualities, one can begin to discern performative capabilities in all his artifacts. The silver mixing-bowl, for instance, which was given as an appealing gift to Odysseus’ son Telemachus, carried with it an active appeal of its own. For, this vessel not only

³⁵⁰ As many interpreters of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* have emphasized, Homer rarely describes artifacts by portraying static pictures of them. Rather, artifacts of poetic significance (such as this scepter, Achilles’ shield and Odysseus’ raft and marriage bed) are revealed processually through narrations of their influential history; of their active making; and of their dynamic affects. On the role of significant artifacts in Homeric poetry, see Edwards (1987), 82-7; Griffin (1980), 1-49; and Lessing’s 1766 essay in *Laocoön* (chp. 18).

conveyed the potential for mixing wine with friends, but bore as well a memorable story of its prior friendly exchange since Menelaus (the giver of the vessel) had himself received this bowl as a gift from the King of Sidon and passed it on—together with its story—to his young guest (4.614-19). In being received in this way, the bowl would continue to perform with persuasive appeal: serving friends, while obliging reciprocal friendship and the remembrance of it.

There are other animate works of Hephaestus known from poetry beyond Homer,³⁵¹ yet those presented above offer a sufficiently representative range of his crafted works and their performative capabilities. There are, however, two further accomplishments of Hephaestus to consider, which draw-out the more troubling dimensions of his *technē*. For, unlike the artifacts introduced above, these dramatic accomplishments involve influences that are more coercive than filial, more punishing than glorifying, more corrective than assistive, more arresting than animating, and more disabling than empowering. Moreover, the following works of the divine blacksmith bring us back to his peculiar associations with Odysseus and to the agencies that the “architects” demonstrate in Euripides’ satyr play.

MAKING IN THE DIVERSELY MOTIVATED AND DRAMATICALLY EFFECTIVE MODE OF *POLYPHRŌN*

8.2b

Beyond those works already introduced (divine accommodations, bodily allurements, appealing gifts, apotropaic defenses, obeisant automatons and symbolic attributes) Hephaestus, in the *Odyssey*, also forged a “scheme” (*dolon*, 8.276), involving unseeable bonds.³⁵² Hephaestus devised this scheme to catch his wife (Aphrodite) and her lover (Ares) in their act of infidelity by ensnaring them in a bed of “crafty bonds” (*desmoi technēentes*, 8.296-97). While all the artifacts forged by this divine smith inform our understanding of his exemplary manner of making, it is only this last kind mentioned—a punishing scheme of hidden bonds—that is explicitly and repeatedly called

³⁵¹ Other works of Hephaestus include Pandora, the first woman, and Talos, a giant automaton that circled the island of Crete three times, keeping guard. Sophocles wrote a satyr play called *Daidalos*, in which the mythic craftsman and this bronze giant Talos may have met. On Pandora see Hesiod’s *Works and Days* 58-106, *Theogony* 566-616; and above p. 96-8.

³⁵² These bonds are “imperceivable” (*oude idoito*)—or, *not* seeable (8.280).

a work of *technē* by the Homeric poet.³⁵³ Moreover, it is this scheme of “crafty bonds” that joins Hephaetus and Odysseus in several respects: by involving a specially crafted marriage-bed and the topic of fidelity (which are also integral to the story of Odysseus’ return to Ithaca),³⁵⁴ and by involving a “scheme” named *dolon*, which is the name also given to the “scheme” Odysseus devises against the Cyclops (in both the Homeric and Euripidean versions of the tale).³⁵⁵ Yet, the link here between Hephaestus and Odysseus is also drawn by *polyphrōn*, the Homeric epithet that qualifies Hephaestus as he makes this “scheme”, and that elsewhere in the *Odyssey* also qualifies Odysseus.³⁵⁶ In the story of crafting these unseeable bonds, Hephaestus is twice qualified as *polyphrōn*, “much-inventive” (8.297, 327). Yet, it is not merely the surprising bonds—having been forged with both delicacy and strength so as to be at once unseen and unbreakable—that make Hephaestus’ manner of work *polyphrōn*. Rather, it is as much the mixed motives prompting the smith to make the bonds and the dramatic consequences they bring about that warrant the qualification. This special capacity of *polyphrōn* calls for a probing detour.

The root of this epithet, *phrēn*, is not itself tied to any craft-specific terminology, but rather names a general human capacity for intellectual and emotional expression. This capacious *phrēn* also had a particular place: deep within the body, in the ever-fluctuating and ventilating region of the midriff, commonly associated with the diaphragm. According to the poets, the *phrēn* of artisans was especially active: the *phrēn* of a minstrel was where gods implanted a reservoir of songs;³⁵⁷ the *phrēn* of a seer was

³⁵³ *Odyssey* 8.297, 327, 332. In this episode, Hephaestus also receives the epithet *klutotechnēs*, “famed for his *technē*” (8.286)—which is also attributed to him in the *Iliad* as he is called upon to make the shield of Achilles (18.143, 391), and as he pours the reconciling nectar for the gods (1.571). The epithet is also attributed to him in the poetry of Solon (Frag. 13.49).

³⁵⁴ On the comparable marriage beds of the smith and the hero, see Newton (1987); and Segal (1994), 206. As Segal notes, Athenaeus in the second century CE had already noted the parallelism (5.192 d-e). Hephaestus’ bed, rigged with retributive bonds, however, contrasts with Odysseus’ bed, since he had devised a more preemptive scheme to ensure the honor of his marriage bonds (building his bed around the rooted olive tree).

³⁵⁵ *Odyssey* 9.422 and Euripides’ *Cyclops* 476. Cf. *Odyssey* 9.19, 406, and 408, where Odysseus’ scheming ways, or “guile” (*doloi*) is noted; and *Cyclops* 449, where Odysseus presents his “guileful” (*dolios*) intent. Latin terms related to the Greek *dolon*, are also repeatedly linked to the *architectus* in the plays of Plautus: to his “scheme” (*dolos*) and his “wily”, or “subtle” (*subdolos*) ways. See, for example, *Miles Gloriosus* 147, 191-98, 249, 355, 943 etc.

³⁵⁶ 1.83, 14.424, 20.239, 21.204, etc. See also below, p. 156, n. 365.

³⁵⁷ *Odyssey* 22.347-8.

the place that became enthused with prophetic capability;³⁵⁸ and when Athena gives women the capability to be “crafty at the loom” she, at the same time, puts “good sense” (*esthlas*) in their *phrēn*.³⁵⁹ For Hesiod, on the other hand, “fanciful men build wagons [not in their fields but] only in their *phrēn*” (*Works and Days*, 455). Yet, one’s *phrēn* was not exclusively a seat for divine inspiration, sensible creativity, or fanciful thoughts, as these examples may suggest and as the convenient translation of “much-invention” might lead one to believe. Rather, the *phrēn* was also the ponderous seat of passion, a place where profoundly-felt impressions gathered (often in conflict), and from where deeply motivated actions sprang. As such, one’s *phrēn* was volatile and in flux. It could fill, drain, swell and be swayed. It was the seat not only of deep thinking but also of deep brooding, filling at times with productive passion, courage or concern, and at other times with rage, anger or angst. To lose control over one’s volatile *phrēn* was to lose one’s wits (*aphrēn*), whereas to hold one’s passions in check was to be sober-minded, or to have a *safe-phrēn* (*sophrēn*).³⁶⁰ To grasp the full significance of Hephaestus’ *phrēn* in the story of the “crafty bonds”, one must further notice the particular moment at which it is first evoked; for, the *phrēn* of the smith is mentioned just as he learns of his wife’s infidelity. As the Homeric poet puts it: “when Hephaestus heard the heart-stinging tale [from the all-seeing Sun], he went his way to his forge, pondering evil in the deep of his *phrēn*” (8.272-73).³⁶¹ Hephaestus’ *phrēn*, then, being involved in this troubling moment of realization and being put in parallel to his “forge” (*chalkeōna*), locates his generative space of invention while at the same time qualifies his volatile temperament. It is, so to speak, both his destination for making and his point of departure.

³⁵⁸ *Iliad* 1.107. Cf. Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* 17, and *Seven Against Thebes* 23.

³⁵⁹ *Odyssey* 7.109-11. The *phrēn* of Penelope is also active as she weaves (2.93).

³⁶⁰ The *phrēn* is a site of internal debate, as when Odysseus deliberates on which course of action to take in his “mind and spirit” (*kata phrena kai kata thumon*, *Iliad* 5.671; 11.411; cf. *Odyssey* 20.10). The *phrēn* might also be seized with indecision, as when King Pelasgus, in Aeschylus’ *Suppliant Maidens*, admits: “I am at a loss, and fear has hold of my *phrēn*, of action as well as inaction and taking a chance” (379-80). On the *phrēn* and other aspects of Greek temperament, see Padel (1992), 20-3, 113; and Onians (1973), 14-43. As these scholars point out, *phrēn* is cognate with *phronēsis*, ethical, or “practical intelligence”; *phroneō*, “to have understanding”, or sense; and *phrazein*, the capability “to direct”, such as Trygaeus demonstrates in Aristophanes’ *Peace*.

³⁶¹ This kind of deep pondering, or “building in the deep” (*bussodomeuon*) of one’s *phrēn* is also performed by the suitors, as they plot against Telemachus (4.676, 20.66); by Telemachus, as he schemes against the suitors (17.491); and by Odysseus, as he schemes against the suitors (17.465, 20.5-10, 184) and the Cyclops (9.316).

With this fuller understanding of *phrēn*, one can better appreciate the appropriateness of *polyphrōn* in gathering the “diverse” (*poly*) passions at work in the smith, in the smithy, on the anvil and around the bed rigged with artfully wrought bonds. In making these punishing fetters for his unfaithful wife and her valiant lover, the lame smith was motivated not solely by a passion for forging cunning things, but more by a passionate mix of anger, jealousy, sorrow, pride and a vengeful yearning for justice.³⁶² Moreover, unlike Hephaestus’ other works for heroes and gods this scheme involving the punishing bonds was not commissioned. Rather, having been himself provoked, Hephaestus’ passionate work of *technē* was commanded by his own troubled volition.³⁶³ And yet, as has already been suggested, these deeply felt motives only partially explain the manifold implications of *polyphrōn*. The culminating effects of the scheme, as much as the motives and manners of its making, also merit the epithet. We must bear in mind that this exemplary work of *technē* culminated in a dramatic act of retribution; one that did not merely punish the transgressors, but also made an example of them before the other Olympian gods. For, when the “crafty bonds of *polyphronos* Hephaestus” successfully ensnared Aphrodite and Ares in bed (8.296-97), he then called upon the other gods to come forward as witnesses. With this display of shamed adulterers trapped in invisible bonds, the scorned craftsman reasserted and defended his own honor, while at the same time he exposed the dishonored bonds of marriage—making *these* invisible bonds visible for others.³⁶⁴

But then again, and on another note, this dramatic scheme of retribution also wrought levity. As the Olympians gathered round the love trap an “unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods as they saw the craft (*technas*) of *polyphronos* Hephaestus” (8.327). The lame smith had overcome Ares, the mighty god of strife, “by craft” (*technēsi*, 8.332). This spectacle amused the gods profoundly and such delight

³⁶² Hephaestus’ temperament is repeatedly qualified in this tale: he fashions his snare “in wrath” (*kecholōmenos* 8.272-6); upon learning of the infidelity, he becomes “troubled at heart” (*tetiēmenos ētor*), and seized by “fierce anger” (*cholos de min agrios hētor*, 8.303-4). He is also “filled with grief at the sight (of them)” (8.314).

³⁶³ This point resonates with Trygaeus, who is himself stirred to act in *Peace*.

³⁶⁴ Hephaestus also forges unseeable bonds for his mother Hera, who had once tossed her lame son out of the heavens. As the story goes, in retribution, Hephaestus sent her a golden throne (adorned with invisible bonds). Flattered, she sat in it and her son’s bonds took hold. This scheme similarly enforces invisible bonds—familial bonds between mother and child. Hephaestus is later restored to heavens to release her—an event known from vase paintings, see “The Return of Hephaistos” in Carpenter (1986).

extended beyond them, to Odysseus. For, one must recall that in the *Odyssey* it was a bard that sang this lively tale about Hephaestus. He did so just outside the Phaeacian palace in the midst of a leveled performance place (*choros*, 8.260). Odysseus himself was principal among the appreciative on-lookers gathered round to witness and to judge the spectacle. Like the smiling gods, who mused upon the “craft” of Hephaestus, so Odysseus pondered keenly the song of a dishonored marriage bed and wondered also at the learned dancers who mimed the smithy’s agonizing drama. In this contemplative way, the *phrēn* of Odysseus was likewise affected; for, having become deeply stirred, Odysseus’ *phrēn* filled with delight (*terpet’ eni phresin*, 8.367).³⁶⁵

And so, if Odysseus shares a “crafty” *polyphrōn* capability with Hephaestus, this capability would seem to involve not only crafting subtle things but also forging dramatic schemes of retribution for the sake of honoring dishonored bonds, renewing order, and stirring others to delight.

FLAGRANT STRIFE AND TACIT COUNSELS: PERFORMING WITH *POLYMĒTIS*

8.2c

Whereas *polymētis* tends to qualify Odysseus in instances of thoughtful discourse (as will be shown in the next section), this same epithet qualifies Hephaestus in quite different circumstances—peculiar and volatile circumstances that are comparable to the situation that the “architects” figure into in Euripides’ *Cyclops*. In the *Iliad*, the fire-god is named together with *polymētis* (and *polyphrōn*) during his perilous contest with the raging river Skamandros (21.324-82). This agonizing clash of elemental forces, fire and water, is not easily understood as exemplifying either *polymētis* or *technē*, since

³⁶⁵ In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus’ own *phrēn* demonstrates a variable and volatile range. For instance, when taking an active gutsy stand during the battle for order in his household, his *phrēn* is “fiery” and his *mind* is “crafty”, since these two epithets—*daīphrōni* and *poikilomētes*—are paired to qualify him as he enacts retribution against the suitors (22.115, 205, 281; cf. 3.163; 7.168; 1.48, 8.18, 21.379. Cf. *Iliad* 11.482). Alternatively, while hiding within the Trojan Horse and while enduring his entrapment by Calypso, Odysseus’ *phrēn* is “patient” (*talasiphrōnos*, 4.270, 1.87). And, when he is trapped in the cave of Polyphemus, his *phrēn* is “ready” or “forward (thinking)” (*prophrōn*, 9.355); for being aided by a flask of potent wine, he succeeds in getting “round the wits” (round the *phrēn*) of the giant (9.362). Odysseus receives the epithet *polyphrōn* at times when, like Hephaestus, his manifold suffering, passionate capabilities and retributive agencies are foregrounded. Athena, for instance, evokes him with this epithet in the course of persuading Zeus that his suffering is out of proportion and that his return to his threatened household ought to be fulfilled (1.83). Odysseus’ loyal old swineherd names “Odysseus *polyphrona*” as he prays that the gods grant his return, so that he might punish those who have threatened his household and dishonored his marriage bonds (14.424, 20.239, 21.204).

Hephaestus' performance appears neither wisely counseled nor the least bit crafty. Rather, his fiery blast is suddenly called upon to subdue the surge of the divine river Skamandros, which has swelled up in anger against Achilles. The situation of this conflict is as follows: Achilles, by his relentless slaughter of Trojans, has clogged the divinely flowing waters of Skamandros with lifeless bodies. Aggravated by this and by the warrior's belligerence, the Trojan river god threatens to drown Achilles—the central hero of the *Iliad*—before his fated time. A startled Hera intervenes, sending in her son Hephaestus as a more fitting match against the watery antagonist. She urges the fire god to release his mighty flame, abate the river in defense of Achilles and, so, restore the hero to his fated course. Hephaestus complies, and his blast is devastatingly effective. While somehow allowing Achilles to escape unscathed, his divine fire utterly consumes the lifeless Trojans, burns up all the fishes, ignites the trees and other plants along the river bank, parches the plain, and brings the divine river to a boil. Thus, Skamandros, together with all the life around him, was “sorely tormented by the blast of *polymētis* Hephaestus” (21.355); and, in spite of Skamandros' pleas for the fire god to desist, “the might (*bīē*) of *polyphronos* Hephaestus” persisted (21.367). Only at Hera's bidding does the divine smith then extinguish his all-consuming flame. In the end, Skamandros, defeated but flowing again, gives up his assault on Achilles and concedes to the course of fate—as counseled by Zeus, and as enforced (at Hera's bidding) by Hephaestus.

As an example of *polymētis* this performance of the divine blacksmith is striking, particularly when compared with other demonstrations of *mētis* in Homeric literature. When gods and heroes engage *mētis* in the epics their conduct tends to exemplify reasoned planning for action, not exhibitions of might (*bía*).³⁶⁶ This work of Hephaestus is also odd when considered alongside his other artfully forged works. Even his vengeful bed was rigged with a high degree of forethought, and some measure of humor and finesse. In contrast to this fabrication, his fiery blast against the river is sudden and utterly destructive. Furthermore, without Hera to stop him, one senses that Hephaestus would not have checked himself. If such an unrestrained conflict between Fire and Water were taken to extreme, the result would, of course, be catastrophic. Hera does not seem to consider such an end. Yet, all the same, she does finally urge Hephaestus to stop in response to the formal concession cried out by Skamandros (21.377-80).

³⁶⁶ *Mētis* and *bía* (cunning and might) are contrasted throughout the Homeric epics; explicitly, in Nestor's advice to his son for the chariot race (23.313ff). On this contrast, see Nagy (1999).

Where, then, are ‘all the counsels’ in this performance of *polymētis* Hephaestus? One way to take *polymētis* in this episode of the *Iliad* is to see its “diverse counsels” as being less attributable to the divine smith and more divided and agitated among the other gods. Skamandros, for instance, had earlier counseled Achilles to move his fighting elsewhere, but the warrior did not heed his advice, thus provoking the river’s surge (21.214ff). Once Skamandros attacks the hero, it is Hera, not Hephaestus, who takes notice of the threat, and it is she that urges and calls off his fiery backlash. As fitting as it may be to send imperishable fire to fight against an immortal river, Hera’s spontaneous decision to do so seems to arise as an afterthought to rectify a situation run amuck. This, together with Skamandros’ unheeded pleas to both Achilles and Hephaestus, suggest a lack or failure of *mētis* more than a demonstration of it. Hephaestus himself, moreover, acts as a raw personification of fire, not a deliberating blacksmith.³⁶⁷ He does not speak a word during this episode, for instance, and his *phrēn* is evoked in the midst of his display of “might”, not in a moment of planning. Nevertheless, Hephaestus is no mere abstraction. Both Hera and Skamandros personally address him during the episode. Skamandros even attempts to reason with him: first flattering him, then pleading that he cease his attack (21.356-59). The fire god, however, makes no verbal reply. Without speech we can learn little of Hephaestus’ thought, let alone forethought; we only witness his absolute obedience to Hera’s command and the devastating efficacy of his flame. As such, the divine smith appears as a mute and complicit force—an effective deliverer of pyrotechnics. Hera uses this complicit smith as a destructive and punishing weapon—a tool of war craft.

Hephaestus, Hera, Skamandros and Achilles are not alone in acting with an apparent lack of *mētis* and in conditions of strained counsel during this episode of the *Iliad*. Indeed, the furious fighting of Achilles, the aggressive surge of the river, and the liberating counterattack by the divine smith, arise as nested crises in the midst of an extended scenario of discord, which, spreading over three books of the epic, cuts across the whole counsel of the gods. The context of this broader crisis is telling. At the beginning of book twenty, in anticipation of Achilles’ imminent return to battle, Zeus calls for a divine assembly. All the gods then convene for counsel, orderly, amid Zeus’ “polished colonnades” (20.11). Yet, provoked by Zeus to meddle in the war, these gods soon depart from his halls “divided in counsel” (20.32). Descending to the Trojan

³⁶⁷ Hephaestus is occasionally evoked as equivalent to fire in both the epics and later drama: in the *Iliad* 2.426, 9.468, 23.333; and, for example, in Euripides’ *Iphigenia in Aulis*, 1602.

battlefield and taking sides, these gods, including Hephaestus, prepare to intervene in the mortal strife by amplifying the din of war with terrible cries and incitements (20.47-66). Later, all these agitated Olympians confront one another directly in a series of duels (21.385ff); all, that is, except for Zeus, who continues to look upon the strife in contemplative amusement (20.23, 21.385). The tumultuous contest of Hephaestus and Skamandros falls in between these two divine conflicts: shortly after the agitating assembly of the gods (amid the “polished colonnades”), and just before their all-out duels (upon the battlefield). These divine conflicts, in turn, anticipate the climactic confrontation of the epic: the fated clash of opposing heroes, Achilles and Hector (22.131-366).

Considered in this volatile narrative context, Hephaestus’ boiling of Skamandros and burning of all the life around him, can be seen as a vivid intensification of the other escalating conflicts; for, these various conflicts—playing-out at multiple levels in the story—each find dramatic representation in the fiery display. At one level, Hephaestus’ menacing blaze offers an amplified show of mortal rage in combat, marking an extreme limit of violence. As Achilles’ own violence grows in intensity he approximates this Hephaestean limit by battling *like* fire: his eyes flash “like flame” (19.16); his hands appear “like fire and his fury like blazing iron” (20.371-2); his rage spreads over the battlefield like wildfire (20.490); and the Trojans flee from him like locusts escaping an onrushing blaze (21.12-15). This incendiary warrior inflames the battlefield, ignites the anger of Skamandros, and sets the stage for Hephaestus’ own fiery performance (21.324ff).³⁶⁸ In addition to amplifying mortal rage with divine intensity, Hephaestus’ fire also foreshadows fated events yet to come, for his defeat of the Trojan river prefigures the imminent defeat of the Trojan hero Hector, and provides an awful prelude to the ultimate annihilation of Troy. Here, the civic scale of conflict finds representation in the scope of destruction wrought by Hephaestus’ *technē*. His all-consuming flame does not simply overcome his combatant (the river), but also torments the life it hosted (a variety of fishes), burns the peripheral growth (a mix of trees, shrubs, lilies and herbs), and dries up the surrounding tillable fields (21.345-52). In other words, Hephaestus’ obliteration approaches an erasure of all the life the river sustains. Although the fall of Troy is not played-out in the *Iliad*, this comprehensive portrayal of destruction rehearses its fate.

Beyond mortal conflict and regional or civic situations of strife, the clash of Hephaestus and Skamandros also participates in representing an elemental and divine

³⁶⁸ Images of blazing fire frequently vivify the appearance of armored warriors in the *Iliad* 2.455-58; 5.4-8; 13.39, 53, 341, 673; 15.623; 18.206; 22.135, etc.

level of discord. For, while Hephaestus and Skamandros stir-up Fire and Water, the ensemble of other agitated Olympians disturb the Earth and Air by raising a cacophony of thundering sounds, whirling tempests and rumbling vibrations that shake the earth to its very foundations (20.51-66). At this elemental and divine level of discord, Hephaestus' fire also recalls the fire that Zeus wields to dire effect in Hesiod's *Theogony*. Here, Zeus alone unleashes "flashes of lightning" and "a stream of sacred flames", engulfing the Titans and blinding their eyes (690-99). As in the *Iliad*, Hephaestus and his *technē* figure into this display of might in the *Theogony*. For, as Zeus' last stricken victim (Typhoeus) falls, with his hundred-heads ablaze, the ground he falls upon ignites and the earth begins to melt "like tin that has been heated by craftsmen... [which] the scorching fire tames and the craft (*technē*) of Hephaestus melts (*tēketai*)..." (*Theogony* 863-7). With this simile, Zeus' victory for the Olympians is complete and his re-crafting of the divine situation commences (884ff). This fiery display in the *Theogony*, thus, reminds us that together with the mortal, regional, elemental and divine levels of conflict, fiery discord extends to cosmic and metaphysical limits. Hephaestus' *technē* unites the representation of these various levels, limits and situations of strife, and further suggests a forceful mode of re-figuration that resolves (tames or melts) nested conflicts, so as to inaugurate more harmonious or fateful situations.

With all the fiery force displayed and implied in and around Hephaestus' *polymētis* performance in the *Iliad*, we must ask again: where are we to find the many counsels, the forethought and intelligence that are implied by the epithet? That *mētis* is found but found to be so problematized suggests that *mētis*—and its limits—are the marked topics of concern in this part of the epic. There is, however, one figure of influence throughout these episodes who is presented as being not only reasonably in control, but fairly content: Zeus. It was Zeus who inaugurated the assembly of the gods, delivered the agitating counsel, and then watched over the ensuing conflicts with both concern and pleasure. However troubling Zeus' provocations were, they were nevertheless necessary within the story, for his agitating counsel postponed Achilles' confrontation with Hector so that the fated end of the *Iliad* would arrive at its proper time and with its proper suspense and intensity.³⁶⁹ Thus, Zeus' provocations knowingly prevented Achilles from killing Hector and sacking Troy prematurely, while at the same time aimed to withhold that ultimate fall of the city for another tale. In this way, Zeus

³⁶⁹ See Mark W. Edwards' introduction and notes to book twenty-one in Kirk (1985).

demonstrates his own *mētis*, a capability marked in the epics by his epithet *mētieta*, “the counselor”.³⁷⁰ As others have observed, Zeus can be seen in these episodes of the *Iliad* as a representative of the Homeric poet, as one crafting the plot and resolution of the story, and taking pleasure in seeing these fulfilled—according to plan.³⁷¹ Besides appearing as a model poet, Zeus can also be seen in these episodes as a model spectator, as one who bears witness to mortal and worldly strife with invested concern.³⁷² Indeed, as Zeus looks on, anticipating the approaching climax of the epic, his *phrēn* (like that of Odysseus while musing on the smithy’s drama) stirs to delight—as is his wont (20.23).

The question remains, however, if Zeus is the implied model of *mētis* in these troubled episodes of the *Iliad*, why then is the epithet *polymētis* put upon Hephaestus? One could take this to emphasize Hephaestus’ role as a representative of Zeus, for Hephaestus intervenes to restore the epic’s fated course and to punish the river god who had challenged that course. In this way, Hephaestus (via Hera) serves as a vehicle, or proxy of the *mētis*, or will, of Zeus, who is mindful of Achilles’ fate. Hephaestus can also be taken as a representative of Zeus in that he wields fire—Zeus’ preferred weapon of intervention (as demonstrated in the *Theogony*). Alternatively, one could see Hephaestus as augmenting Zeus’ pleasure by offering him a thrilling spectacle—a memorable schema of the closing conflicts of the story. Beyond this, however, it is also helpful to consider Hephaestus’ own representative influence and willful acts in the other interrelated arenas of conflict, since the smith’s fiery blast against Skamandros is neither his only, nor his most subtle work in this part of the *Iliad*. Rather, Hephaestus’ *technē* is active also in those other levels and situations of conflict: in the assembly of the gods, and in the culminating confrontation of mortal heroes.

Where, then, is Hephaestus’ own diversely-counseled *technē* in these episodes? It is latent in the settings and defenses. As all the divinities assemble for Zeus’ agitating counsel, the “polished colonnades”—having been prepared with Hephaestus’ “knowing

³⁷⁰ Zeus “the counselor” is evoked in the *Iliad* when mortals pray to him for help or reassurance (1.175, 16.249, etc.), and when he communicates with mortals via portents (2.324, 6.197, 7.478, 8.170, 9.377, 12.279, 15.376). Zeus’ *mētis* (like the works of Hephaestus) is qualified in the last book of the *Iliad* as “imperishable” (24.88). Cf. *Odyssey*, 14.243, 16.298, 20.102.

³⁷¹ Bremer (1987). One wonders if it was in *this* capacity—knowingly tempering a tale so as to be both delightful and suspenseful—that the Homeric poet qualified Odysseus as “equal to Zeus in *mētis*” (2.169, 407, 636; 10.137).

³⁷² On Zeus (and the gods in general) as an exemplary “audience”, see Griffin (1978).

mind”—accommodate them (20.10-12).³⁷³ And, as Achilles raises his sword against Hector for the fated strike, his “fair and elaborately worked” armor—having been forged by Hephaestus—defends and emboldens him (22.306-16). In light of the earlier discussion concerning the performativity of Hephaestus’ artifacts, one can discern in these accommodating colonnades and honorific armor embedded capabilities. These performative capabilities—in the colonnades and in the armor—not only situate and facilitate the particular conflicts of the narrative but also tacitly suggest alternative modes for resolving them. For, in open contrast to the agitating counsel in the halls of Zeus, Hephaestus had knowingly set there—in the smoothed finish of its “polished colonnades”—a suffusing quality of lustrous evenness. And, in spite of the armor’s role in facilitating a violent retaliation, Hephaestus had nevertheless knowingly set into Achilles’ shield an appealing image of discursive resolution, for among the elaborate designs inlaid on this defensive work was a circle of “polished stones”—a place of counsel, actively hosting a verbal debate (18.490-508). Together with these suffusing qualities and images, there is a further way in which Hephaestus’ fiery work in this conflicted part of the epic performs as an antidote to strife. While his blast against Skamandros brings no levity (except to Zeus), it does offer some earthly relief. For, Hephaestus’ fire sets the river flowing again. Purged of its battle gore, this divine stream flows free and clear once more—purified by fire and, so, released to resume its proper course (21.382). Such a restoration of a divine and vital flow offers a glimmer of hope, and some reassurance of a sustaining worldly order in this otherwise troubling and violently mortal situation.

These diverse works of Hephaestus, dispersed and nested as they are in and around his fiery act of *polymētis* in the *Iliad*, invite a broadly inclusive yet particularly complex understanding of how “diverse counsels” perform. Although Hephaestus’ *technē* is shown to destructively magnify mortal strife, embolden an already enraged hero and accommodate discord, his crafts are also shown to dispel or diffuse violence by representing situations of vital tension otherwise, and by restoring fated (counseled and worldly) courses of action. It would seem, then, that these subtle interventions and broadly restorative intentions ought to be considered, together with Hephaestus’ fiery blast, as a comprehensive ensemble of mediating acts involving *poly-mētis* and its nested limits.

³⁷³ “And having come to the house of Zeus... they sat down inside the polished colonnades which... Hephaestus had made (*poiēsen*) with his understanding mind (*iduiēisi prapideassin*)”.

Although Hephaestus crafted many artifacts in Homeric poetry that, in some ways, qualify him as a model architect (having made houses, defenses, gifts, automatons, bodily allurements and symbolic attributes), the two dramatic accomplishments presented above—involving corrective schemes, invisible bonds, fiery forces, representative displays and suffusing interventions—most closely ally him with Odysseus’ performance as “architect” in Euripides’ satyr play. For, in *Cyclops*, Odysseus devises a scheme involving similarly complex agencies and aims in a comparably volatile situation. As a satyr play, *Cyclops* hosted strange volatility by definition of its genre. Yet, more particularly, the threatening antagonist Odysseus confronts there is, like Skamandros, a watery divinity (the son of Poseidon) and, like the adulterous lovers, a transgressor of invisible bonds (those obliging hospitality). And so, Odysseus’ scheme to punish Polyphemus, to restore honor to dishonored bonds (and mistreated groups), and to resume a fated course by releasing himself, his crew and the satyrs from a Cyclopean situation, resembles the schemas of action that *polyphrōn* and *polymētis* Hephaestus enacts in the episodes of Homer described above. At another level, the explosive force of Hephaestus’ fire against Skamandros also models the kind of fire that Odysseus solicits in the satyr play, since it is *not* Hephaestus’ metallurgic assistance that Odysseus prays for (just before blinding the Cyclops with a fiery stake), but rather his liberating Aetna-like blast (599-600). This kind of agency further models the force of the divine wine that Odysseus involves in his scheme—fiery wine, in which Dionysus is active. Although Dionysus was a god of potent influence, he apparently possessed no *mētis*.³⁷⁴ If this god’s influence is a kind of cunning, it resembles less the cunning of smiths crafting artifacts in their forge, and more the agencies that Hephaestus demonstrates in the Trojan valley against Skamandros³⁷⁵—ironic agencies that are at once punishing yet liberating, destructive yet rejuvenating, vengeful yet delightful.

³⁷⁴ Vernant and Detienne (1978), 279, note Dionysus’ lack of *mētis*: “Neither Demeter nor Poseidon nor Artemis nor Apollo appear to have any share of it. Nor does Dionysus whose spells and tricks never spring from pure *mētis*”.

³⁷⁵ As Charles Segal (1982), 149, emphasizes, the fire associated with Dionysus “is not the Promethean fire of technology nor the sheltered fire of house and hearth but the elemental fire of lightning that flashes suddenly and destructively from the sky.” Dionysus was himself associated with prodigious flames by the flamboyant circumstances of his conception and birth, since his mother, Semele, was tricked (by Hera) into asking Zeus to amorously appear to her in *all* his divinity. Thus, he came to her as a thunderbolt—a union that resulted in Dionysus’ conception, but which Semele did not survive. Zeus, however, took the unborn child from the ashes and sewed him into his own thigh, giving a second birth to him in due time. See Euripides’ *Bacchae* 1-8, 286-97, 519-29; and Burkert (1985), 165-66.

Among the many roles Athena played in Greek myth, religion and culture,³⁷⁶ the most relevant to sketch here, include her role as patroness to craftsmen, as inventor of civilizing tools, as influential guide in civilizing arts, and as arch-defender of cities. In reviewing these, the following discussion moves from Athena's general influence in the realm of hand-crafts toward her more particular relation to Odysseus in the realm of crafting restorative schemes and compelling stories. It is in this realm of crafting schemes and stories that Athena most closely shares *mētis* and *polymētis* with Odysseus. It is also these scheming and storied modes of action that meaningfully prefigure Odysseus' acts as "architect" in Euripides' later play. But, I must come to these special modes of action through a review of Athena's more tangible craft influences.

MANIFOLD MODES OF CRAFT INFLUENCE

8.3a

As patroness to craftsmen, Athena offered guidance, inspiration and honor to several kinds of artisans in their work, notably potters, blacksmiths, weavers, and woodworkers. Such artisans prayed to Athena in their workshops, and formally worshipped her on the Acropolis as Athena *Ergane*, "the Worker".³⁷⁷ Although, Athena is not summoned with this epithet "Ergane" in Homeric poetry, her influence in the domain of

³⁷⁶ Athena's many roles can be gleaned, like Odysseus', from a representative range of her epithets. In Homeric epic, for instance, she is *polyboulos* (rich in counsel, *Iliad* 5.260; *Odyssey* 16.282); *glaukōpis* (flashing-eyed); and *Pallas* (possibly, the Brandisher). In later poetry and cult, she is *Poliouchos* (city holder, or protector); *Parthenos* (the Virgin, or Maiden); *Nike* (of Victory); *Polias* (of the City); *Chalkioikos* (of the Bronze House); *Hygeia* (of Health); *Hippia* (of the Horse); *Chalinitis* (of the Bit); etc. See Burkert (1985), 139-43.

³⁷⁷ On "Athena Erganē", see Burkert (1985), 139-43; and Hurwit (1999), 15-18. Vase-paintings, showing Athena amidst artisans in their workshops, are gathered in Burnford (1972), 71 (fig. I), 169 (fig. IV). A certain potters' prayer gives a sense of Athena's influence in this domain. Here, she is evoked to *protect* the volatile process within the kiln, *turning away* the daemons (Smash, Crash and Char) that ravage the potter's work. This prayer, found among the *Homeric Epigrams* (no. 14), begins: "Come, then, Athena, with hand upraised over the kiln. Let the pots and all the dishes turn out well and be well fired." Such protection recalls her capability on the battlefield to *rout* enemies with her emblematic Gorgon, and her own "terrible" eyes (*gorgōpin*). On this prayer, see Noble (1965), Appendix III. A dramatic fragment naming "Athena *Ergane*" also makes reference to the protective agency of her eyes. Sophocles' *Frag.* 844 begins: "Be on your way, all people (*leōs*) who work with your hands, you who entreat Zeus' daughter, *Ergane* of the terrible eyes (*gorgōpin*), with baskets placed before her, and by the anvil with heavy hammer." See, Pearson's note to *Frag.* 844. On Athena's terrifying gaze, see Vernant and Detienne (1978), 175-86.

craft is emphasized at certain times throughout the epics. In the *Odyssey*, Athena is specifically credited with giving women the capability to be “crafty (*technēssai*) at the loom” as well as giving them “knowledge (*epistasthai*) of beautiful handiwork and good sense” (2.117 etc.).³⁷⁸ In the *Iliad*, Athena’s influence in the realm of carpentry, more than weaving, is emphasized. There, in the *Iliad*, the goddess is said to encourage *tektons* to work “to a line” (*stathmē*) so as to knowingly “make straight” (*exithuneī*) the timbers for their ships (15.410-13). By her affection for *tektons*, Athena is also said to make their hands “wise” (*epistato*), “knowing”, or “well-skilled in fashioning all manner of elaborate works (*daidala panta*)”—including “shapely ships” (5.59-64). Beyond these particular influences—over the weaving of webs, the truing of timbers, and the wizening of hands—Athena also, more generally (and along with Hephaestus), is said to have taught mortals “all kinds of craft” (*téchnēn pantoīēn*).³⁷⁹ In short, all material artifacts of clay, metal, fabric and wood were fashioned in Greek poetry (as in Greek society) with Athena’s assistance.

Before moving to another area of Athena’s influence, it must be emphasized that the craft influences of Athena that are mentioned in Homeric epic have particular relevance to the artifice of the narrative. In the *Odyssey*, for instance, Odysseus’ wife Penelope exemplifies the weaving capabilities that the goddess is said to have given women. For, while Odysseus is experiencing trouble at sea, Penelope is busy in Ithaca weaving a subtle ruse into her beautiful handiwork—one by which she knowingly resists the advances of her suitors until the time of Odysseus’ return.³⁸⁰ Along with playing a crucial role in the epic plot, Penelope’s weaving is further representative of the intricate work of epic plot-making.³⁸¹ In the *Iliad*, Athena’s tectonic influence also bears

³⁷⁸ In the *Odyssey*, Penelope (2.117), the Phaeacian women (7.109-11), and the daughters of Pandareüs (20.72) are the notable recipients of these gifts. In the *Iliad*, Athena’s own handiwork is found in the “many embroideries” (*daidala polla*) of the robe that she herself wove and that Hera wore during her seduction of Zeus (14.173-5).

³⁷⁹ *Odyssey* 6.229ff, 23.159ff. Cf. *Homeric Hymn to Hephaestus*, and to *Aphrodite*, 8-15; Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, 65; Pindar’s *Olympian Ode* 7.50ff; etc.

³⁸⁰ Penelope unwove each night what she wove each day, promising to marry one of her suitors when her weaving was complete. (2.93-128; 15.512-17; 19.137-40; 24.128-50, 139-46).

³⁸¹ In the *Iliad*, the central conflicts of the epic plot are also woven into exemplary tapestries. While the fighting between the Trojans and Achaeans rages outside on the battlefield, Helen, within the palace, weaves the conflict into her web (3.125-28). Cf. Andromache’s weaving at the end of the *Iliad* (22.440). On this metaphor, linking weaving with epic plot-making and storytelling, see Scheid and Svenbro (2001), 68-9.

reflexively upon the epic story, for her arts are not only integrated in its specific narrative events but are also representative of its peculiar strife. For example, Athena's encouragement to carpenters—to work “to a line”—arises in the context of an extended simile describing a particular battle, which is as equally strained as the taut line of a carpenter when truing ship timbers:

[Just] as the carpenter's line makes straight a ship's timber in the hands of a skilled (*sophiēs*) workman (*tektonos*) who knows well (*eu eidēi*) all manner of craft through the promptings of Athena, so evenly was strained their war and battle.”

(*Iliad* 15.410-13).

The broader narrative context reveals the complex irony of this strained yet constructive image. For, the particular battle so described is being fought along the crumbling Achaean wall—a line of defense that the Achaeans had only recently established with the hope of protecting their vulnerable ships from the advancing Trojans.³⁸² Well in advance of this event, a corresponding sense of irony is also active in the “hands” of a particular *tekton*, which Athena had made “knowing”, or “wise” (*epistato*, 5.60). For, this *tekton*, whose hands are qualified in this seemingly positive way, is said to have fabricated the ships that had enabled Paris to steal away Helen. To be clear, this “wise” *tekton* built the very vessels that started the Trojan War—ships that are, in the same passage called the “initiators of evil” (*archekakous*, 5.63).³⁸³ But there is more, for the son of this Trojan *tekton* is himself being slain by an Achaean at the very moment that the qualifying statement is being made about his “wise” father. Here, the irony to which the image contributes concerns the double consequences of the *tekton*'s accomplishment: both the war his ships began, and his own son's misfortune in that war, are intertwined with his tectonic skill.

³⁸² Elsewhere in the *Iliad*, the even strain of battle is qualified with a comparable simile portraying women weighing wool upon a balance (12.432-38).

³⁸³ “And Meriones slew Phereclus, son of *Tekton*, Harmon's son, whose *hands were skilled* (*chersin epistato*) in fashioning (*teuchein*) all manner of elaborate works (*daidala panta*); for Pallas Athene loved him especially. He it was who had also *built* (*tektēnato*) for Alexander the shapely ships, initiators of evil, which became the bane of all the Trojans and of himself.” (5.59-64). Ships are also called *archekakous* in Herodotus' *Histories*. These Athenian ships initiated the historic Ionian Revolt (5.97.3). Thucydides involves the same epithet to qualify the ill-omened day that *began* the Peloponnesian War (ii.12).

In summary, what is important to emphasize here is that Homeric poetry does not make straightforward statements about craft or about Athena's crafty influence, but rather involves craft imagery in narratively specific ways that illuminate both the broader stories of the narrative and the artifice of poetry, while keeping the wisdom of *tektons* and the effects of their work in question.

PRIMARY INVENTIONS AND MEDIATING DEVICES

8.3b

Beyond her general role as patroness to artisans and her specific influence over weaving and woodworking, Athena was also operative in the domain of *technē* by having revealed to mortals certain exemplary devices. These include: the first bridle, the first plough, the first chariot, and the first ship.³⁸⁴ As primary inventions, these devices inaugurated diverse strategies of civilized way-making: taming beasts, cultivating soil, crossing lands and navigating seas. As mediating devices, the bridle, plough, chariot and ship each assisted mortals in crafting and maintaining viable relations with diverse agents: temperamental elements; living matter; mettlesome beasts; fellow mortals; and strangers. The chariot and ship further promised the potential for civil exchange with distant and unknown societies, while at the same time they enabled the (often problematic) expansion of Athenian influence by land and sea. As symbols of civilized governance, cosmic journey and epic struggle, these devices bear far too much to summarize here. Some points of connection with Odysseus, however, are helpful to clarify.

Although Athena's divine influence over wooden ships and directed way-making would seem to make her an imperative companion to Odysseus during his struggles at sea, the goddess is conspicuously absent from the nautical episodes of the *Odyssey* (books nine to twelve). Instead, Poseidon (in his wrath over the blinding of Polyphemus) together with an array of other meddling immortals sway the hero in this largely uncivilized realm. It is only as Odysseus approaches the shore of the Phaeaceans and when he finally returns to his homeland of Ithaca that Athena manifests for him again.³⁸⁵

³⁸⁴ By some accounts (Pindar, *Pythian* 12) Athena also invented the *aulos*, or double-flute, an instrument central to civic celebrations. For a summary of Athena's "civilizing" inventions, as known from dispersed myths and anecdotes (beyond Homer), see Burkert (1985), 139-143, 404 n.24 (with references). See also, Detienne and Vernant (1978), Section IV.

³⁸⁵ Upon returning to Ithaca, Odysseus himself says to Athena: "never since then [ie. sacking Troy] have I seen you" (13.318-19). Erwin F. Cook (1995), 180, explains Athena's absence

Athena's influences, however, if not the goddess herself, are felt to offer Odysseus palpable assistance during specific trials of his sea journey. Most notably, her involvement is implied when he makes the raft that initiates his return to civil shores; and, when he prepares the tool that blinds the Cyclops. In these episodes, Athena's influence is partial and indirect, being felt through certain mediating devices: through an axe with a handle of olivewood, which Odysseus uses to transform towering trees into a sea-worthy vessel; and through a stake of olivewood, which Odysseus finds in the Cyclops' cave, then modifies before blinding the giant with it. Endowed as they are with olivewood—the emblematic species of Athena—these symbolic devices put Odysseus in contact with the goddess and, so, enable him to assert her civilizing mode of *technē* in situations where it is otherwise lacking. Somewhat like the bridle, plow, chariot and ship, this olivewood axe handle and stake convey Athena's transformative and civilizing influence indirectly. In this mediated, subtle yet substantial way, Athena's influence contributes to the restoration of Odysseus to Ithaca, where the tenacious roots of an olive tree correspondingly ground and protect his household.³⁸⁶ What is also significant to emphasize with these wooden devices (axe handle and stake) is their relative passivity, for as the narrative context reveals these devices depend on the agencies of knowing handlers. Finally, this indirect mode of influence is important for interpreting the “architects” in *Cyclops* since Odysseus involves several assistive devices in his scheme: not only the olivewood stake, but also a sword, cup and wine flask, through which the conspicuously absent god Dionysus is active.

EMBEDDED DIRECTIONS (IN AND AROUND THE TROJAN HORSE)

8.3c

There is another exemplary wooden device that bears Athena's influence and that Odysseus figures into in a crucial way: the Trojan Horse. Although the episode involving this giant horse does not play out in the extant Homeric epics, the event is mentioned anecdotally in the *Odyssey*. In different circumstances Menelaus, the Phaeacian bard,

in this way: “Athene fails to assist her protégé during his years of wandering because he finds himself in a world over which she has no jurisdiction, a world in apposition to the Greek cultural sphere”. Athena does, however, intervene on Odysseus' behalf from her position in Olympus, for in the opening book of the epic she persuades Zeus to end his trials (1.44ff).

³⁸⁶ On the imagery of the olive tree in the bedchamber of Odysseus and the cults of Athena, see Cook (1995), esp. 129-34.

and Odysseus each share brief recollections of the decisive event.³⁸⁷ From these partial accounts we can discern the peculiar involvement of Odysseus and Athena. What, then, were their respective roles?

Odysseus himself claims to have been charged with leading the scheme involving the Trojan Horse through to completion, for as he recalls, “the command of all (*panta*) was laid upon me” (11.524). From the bard we learn that having first filled the horse with warriors, Odysseus then “led” (*ēgage*) the deceptive trap up to the citadel of Troy (8.494-5). And he led this trap while he himself lay hidden amidst his fellow warriors within the hollow belly of the horse (8.503, 4.281). Once the Trojans received this pregnant work through their city wall and into their *agora*—having convinced themselves it was a gift “to charm” (*thelkērion*) the gods (8.509)—Odysseus continued to direct the action while concealed within: holding back those among his anxious comrades who were eager to leap out for the attack; enduring the weeping of others who were afraid (11.530-32); and forcibly silencing (with his hands) those warriors who longed to cry out to Helen, who had teasingly begun to encircle the trap while seductively calling each warrior’s name (4.284ff). Athena lent assistance here by leading the mischievous Helen away (4.289). Besides urging restraint while enclosed within the horse, Odysseus was also entrusted with closing and then opening “the door of the stout-built ambush” (11.525).³⁸⁸ And he must have opened this door at just the right moment for the warriors to “pour forth from the horse” and deliver the fatal surprise (8.514-5). Thus, while his men wasted the city, Odysseus proceeded to the palace, where he overcame the reigning prince (8.517). Having acted in these capacities—leading the scheme, restraining his collaborators, initiating the timely pivotal moves, and taking the plan of action to its dire and symbolic end—Odysseus was credited with a decisive “victory” (8.520), and praised for having “saved” all the Achaeans (4.288).

³⁸⁷ *Odyssey* 4.270-89 (Menelaus); 8.492-520 (Phaeacian bard); 11.523-32 (Odysseus). The scheme involving the Trojan Horse is perhaps alluded to in the *Iliad*. Zeus seems to foresee this scheme and Athena’s influence of it when he tells Hera that he will not stop his wrath against the Achaeans until the Trojan hero Hector falls; only then will he permit the Achaeans to take Troy “through the counsels (*dia boulas*) of Athena” (15.69-71). On this utterance (and other allusions to the Trojan Horse) in the *Iliad*, see Haft (1990), 37-56.

³⁸⁸ In the *Iliad*, the divine Hōrai are similarly entrusted with opening and closing the nebulous gates of heaven (8.395). The verse qualifying the task of the Horai (*ēmen anaklinai pukinon nephos ēd' epitheinai*) and Odysseus (*ēmen anaklinai pukinon lochon ēd' epitheinai*) are virtually identical. See Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989), note to *Odyssey* 11.525.

These Homeric anecdotes do not at all suggest that Odysseus built the wooden horse; rather, a certain Epeius did, “together with Athena” (8.493).³⁸⁹ Odysseus’ actions were instead concerned with the overall performance of the stratagem. Nevertheless, just as Epeius is said to have constructed the wooden artifact with Athena’s assistance, so Odysseus carried the well-crafted scheme through to completion by her influence; for, as the bard sings, “there it was [in the Trojan palace] that Odysseus dared the most terrible fight and in the end prevailed by the aid of great-hearted Athena” (8.519-20). This “double” or plural involvement of Athena (as exemplified by her collaborations with both Epeius and Odysseus), and her nested influences (at the onset, in the midst, and at the end of the scheme), will remain significant as our discussion of crafty capacities continues.³⁹⁰

Before continuing to another facet of Athena’s influence, it is helpful to point out two ways in which this scheme involving the Trojan Horse bears particularly upon Odysseus’ actions in *Cyclops*; that is, as a model and as a measure. First, the “scheme” involving the Trojan Horse acts as a model for the “scheme” Odysseus leads in the *Cyclops* since both are called a *dolon*. It is a deceptive *dolon* that Odysseus “led” into the walled city of Troy (*Odyssey*, 8.494); just as it is a *dolon* that Odysseus leads in the land of the Cyclops (476); just as it was a *dolon* that Hephaestus crafted for his unfaithful wife in the *Odyssey* (8.276).³⁹¹ Besides acting as a model, the scheme involving the Trojan Horse is also relevant to Odysseus as a measure of the conflict he confronts, for although

³⁸⁹ Epeios is said to have *made* (*epoiēsen*) and *constructed* (*kamnō*) the Horse (8.493, 11.523)—Odysseus himself names Epeios as its builder and he its leader (11.524). Little else is known about Epeios besides this and his skill in wrestling (*Iliad* 13.838). Later, in Apollodorus’ *Library* (second century BCE), Epeios is called the “architect” of this horse for having constructed it, while Odysseus is said to have conceived it (*epinoei*, 5.14). On the poetic reciprocity between Epeios and Odysseus with respect to this Horse, see Loudon, (1996), 282.

³⁹⁰ Vernant and Detienne (1978) emphasize Athena’s “double” (technological and intellectual) role with respect to works of *technē*, including her influence over the building and devising of the Trojan Horse (p. 238); the building and driving of chariots (p. 234); the building and steering of ships (p. 237); the weaving of both cloth and subtle thoughts (p. 239); and her invention of horse bridles and influence over horse riders (p. 187ff). I prefer, however, to speak not of her binary plural and nested influences. Indeed, in the full story of the Trojan Horse there was a third key collaborator that was also influenced by Athena. Besides Epeios and Odysseus, Sinon performed a critical role for the Greeks by deceptively appealing to the Trojans at their city gate and, so, persuading them to accept the well-constructed trap into their citadel. On Sinon, see the fragments of Stesichorus (Frag. 200, 205.S89); and book two of Virgil’s *Aeneid*. Sophocles wrote a now lost play entitled *Sinon* (Frag. 542-4); Cf. Euripides: *Trojan Women* 511ff and *Hecuba* 905ff.

³⁹¹ The scheme involving the Trojan Horse also acts as a model also for the *architectus* in Plautus’ *Miles Gloriosus* (1025), whose own cunning scheme involves breaking through a wall.

the culminating episode of the Trojan War is remembered in the *Odyssey* as Odysseus' "most terrible fight" (8.519), in Euripides' satyr play, Odysseus judges the conflict awaiting him in the cave to be all the more terrible. As he is forcibly marshaled across the Cyclops' threshold, he utters this plea to Athena:

O Pallas Athena, Zeus's divine daughter, now, now, is the time
to help me! For I have come into trouble greater than at Troy
and to the very [foundations] (*bathra*) of danger (*kindunou*).

(*Cyclops* 350-52)

With these lines Odysseus not only judges his Cyclopean conflict as "greater", or "mightier" (*kreissonas*) than that of Troy, but he also suggests (by the architectural metaphor) that its danger is more foundational, being a basic crisis underlying, and so threatening, the stability of other situations and institutions.³⁹² Odysseus' emphasis on the primacy of his conflict in *Cyclops* recalls Trygaeus' emphatic appeal in *Peace*. For, as Trygaeus watches the menacing show of War, he urges the spectators to "see the great danger" (*megas kindunon*, 264) and to recognize that "Now, is our great test" (*agōn megas*, 276). It is in the midst of emphasizing the severity and urgency of this basic crisis for "the city" that the architect-figure in *Peace*, likewise, calls upon "Athena" (271-72).

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³⁹² This foundational place of danger (*bathra*), elsewhere names the "base" of a sacrificial altar; the immovable "plinth" or "pedestal" of a divine statue; the revered "platforms" of oracles (such as Zeus' at Dodona); and "places" of sanctity and sanctuary (such as Chiron's sacred land of Pelion and Hestia's safe and holy hearth)—see, respectively, Euripides' *Trojan Women* (16); *Iphigenia at Taurus* (1158, 1201); *Phoenician Women* (982); *Iphigenia at Aulis* (705); and *Heracles* (715). More broadly, the term names the "foundations" of cities, citadels and palaces, namely of Troy and Mycenae; as in Euripides' *Helen* (1652); *Trojan Women* (47); *Iphigenia at Aulis* (1263); *Phoenician Women* (1132); *Heracles* (943, 1306); and *Suppliant Women* (1198). At another scale, such "foundations" provided support to individual speakers upon the Areopagus (the open-air homicidal court of Athens), for it was upon a *bathra* that the accuser and the accused stood during a trial. Orestes stood upon a *bathra* during his trial for having murdered his mother (*Iphigenia at Taurus* 962; cf. Pausanias 1.28.5). For Euripides, such a position would seem to be as metaphysical as physical, for when Orestes (in another version of his ordeal) was denied a trial, he appears unstable or "debased" (*ek bathrōn*, *Electra* 608). Thus, the "foundations of danger" (*kindunou bathra*) to which Odysseus arrives are as much a place and limit of vulnerability as they are positions from which to plead a case on its most fundamental and persuasive grounds. Seaford, in his note to line 352, likens the *bathra* to a place of supplication, an altar's "foundations", where a vulnerable suppliant would seek refuge.

Beyond influencing “all kinds of craft”, including “schemes” concerning cities and the individuals who knowingly devise and direct them, Athena also played a leading role in the building and rebuilding of civic and religious works. There appears to be only one Homeric verse that explicitly attests to this overtly architectural role. In the *Iliad*, Athena is said to have “made” (*poieon*), together with the Trojans, the high city walls of Troy (*Iliad* 20.145-7)—walls that are ironically fated for destruction in the epic.³⁹³ Beyond Homeric poetry, Athena’s influence in this domain of building and rebuilding is represented more dramatically: in at least one vase painting she actively leads a mason in restoring the Athenian Acropolis; and in at least one song she (together with Hephaestus) is said to have revealed the design, or “arrangement” (*rhythmos*), for the third temple of Apollo at Delphi. These examples not only extend Athena’s craft influence materially from clay, metal, fabric, and wood onto masonry and stone; but also extend the scope of her influence from crafted artifacts to situated sanctuaries and to the influences these enduring institutions bear and perpetuate.

GUIDING FIGURES (AROUND AND ABOUT PAINTED VESSELS)

8.3d

On a certain painted drinking cup (fig. I), Athena is portrayed wearing her distinguishing helmet and civic dress. She walks assuredly with her right arm extending forward. A mason, bending beneath a heavy load of stone borne upon his shoulder, follows just behind her. Given the conjectured date of this cup (circa 440/30 BCE), Athena’s leading role here can be understood as directing the restoration work for her own sanctuary atop the Acropolis—weighty work, necessitated by the devastating fires set by Persian invaders in 480/79.³⁹⁴ Yet, Athena’s leading gesture and forward gaze direct attention to something more, for her right arm extends toward a second scene painted on the other side of the vessel. Represented there is the sacred emblem of the goddess and civilizing symbol of Athens: her olive tree. This tree, planted by Athena on

³⁹³ As the *Iliad* attests, Athena helped make these walls as a refuge for Heracles who was fleeing a monstrous serpent. In another passage, however, it is Poseidon and Apollo who had built these walls (or perhaps their antecedents) at the command of Zeus (*Iliad* 7.452-3, 21.441-57).

³⁹⁴ Robert D. Cromeey (1991) argues that the imagery on this vessel commemorates the decision to commence this restoration, following the Persian attacks. This restoration work was weighty, in part, because of ancient controversy surrounding the question of whether to reconstruct this temple, or else to leave it as a monument to the Athenians ultimate defeat of their invaders. See Hurwit (1999).




FIG. I. Red-figure skyphos by Penelope Painter (Louvre G 372), side A, circa 440 BCE.
From Neils (2001), 13, Fig. 10.



FIG. II. Red-figure skyphos by Penelope Painter (Louvre G 372), side B, circa 440 BCE.
From, Neils (2001), 13, Fig. 11.

the Acropolis in a founding myth of Athens, is testament to her patronage of the city.³⁹⁵ Leafless though it is, this tree miraculously survived the ravages of war, and legend tells us it will flourish again.³⁹⁶ Two men, with measuring rods and leveling lines in hand, center their attention on this vestigial stump. It has been argued that these two men are architects who are awaiting both the mason's load and Athena's guidance so as to begin their work of restoration.³⁹⁷ The particular sanctuary to be restored, the Pandroseion, was oriented around this sacred tree,³⁹⁸ to which these architects, like Athena, also gesture. But there is more. For, the olive tree itself extends a gesture, which one could follow up and over the vessel, back again to a corresponding centerline on the opposite side. This curious vertical line, standing between Athena and the mason, mirrors the enduring upright tree. It has been argued that this vertical element is a measuring rod, marker, or surveying staff (*kanon*), like those presently held askew by the architects on the other side.³⁹⁹

The configuration of gestures around this painted cup suggests that Athena's role involves not only leading the mason's work of restoration, but also restoring attention to the orienting olive tree. For, in this tree one finds the founding story of Athens. In this tree one also finds a compelling symbol of Athenian imperishability, if the obligation to honor it and its sanctuary is upheld. And in this damaged tree—aligned as it is on this cup across from the upright *kanon*—one can further find both a measure and a marker: a vital measure of Athenian society's persistence and ongoing work of renewal; and a fixed, or rooted, marker from which cultural orientation may be drawn. The architects convened at this tree, moreover, do not seem to be passively awaiting brute masonry and divine instruction. Rather, engaged as they are—gesturing to each other about this tree—

³⁹⁵ On this myth of Athena's contest with Poseidon for the patronage of the Acropolis and their competing gifts (her olive tree and his salt-water spring), see Parker (1988). The myth was represented in sculptural relief on the West Pediment of the Parthenon.

³⁹⁶ Herodotus 8.55; 5.77.3. Sophocles includes an ode to this enduring olive tree in *Oedipus at Colonus*: "And there is a thing such as I have not heard of on Asian ground... a plant unconquered, self-renewing, causing terror to destroying enemies... Youth cannot harm it by the ravages of his hand, nor can any who lives with old age..." (696-701—Jebb Trans.).

³⁹⁷ Cromey (1991), 167, 173.

³⁹⁸ This open-air precinct (just to the West of the Erechtheion) accommodated Athena's tree and the altar of Zeus Herkeios, "(protector) of the court". The Pandroseion was named for Pandrosos, she of "All dew" who tended to Athena's tree. See Hurwit (1999), 145, 200-04.

³⁹⁹ Cromey (1991), 168.

they appear to have already initiated their work: interpreting and perhaps debating their city's founding stories; taking measure of their obligation to cultivate this tree, along with what that entails and represents; and considering how the damaged institutions ought to be refigured and restored. To take up and share a drink from a cup bearing such animate figures as these must have been to rehearse and uphold similar gestures of commitment. In this last most mediated way Athena's influence would seem to extend again, beyond the cup and the material work depicted upon it, to the social and discursive situations in which this cup would perform.

PERSUASIVE ARRANGEMENTS (OF INFLUENTIAL TEMPLES)

8.3e

But what of the other civic and religious work of Athena, the design or "arrangement" (*rhythmos*) for the third temple of Apollo at Delphi? Pindar, in a now fragmentary song, posed the problem of this temple's composition also in the form of a question:

O Muses. But of the other [temple], what arrangement (*rhythmos*) was shown (*ephaineto*) by the all-fashioning skills (*pantéchnois palamais*) of Hephaestus and Athena? The walls were of bronze and bronze columns stood in support, and above the pediment sang six golden Charmers—

(Pindar, *Paeon* 8.65-71)

This third temple for the oracular site of Apollo is said to have followed after a first made of laurel, and a second made of feathers and bees wax. Of these earlier temples, we know little beyond the vital symbolism and ephemerality of their materials.⁴⁰⁰ Of the third temple, however, we also have an idea of its *rhythmos* and musical effects, for its bronze walls, columns and pediment were "arranged" so as to support "Golden Charmers" that sing. Yet, the song these bird-like "Charmers" (*Kêlēdónes*) sang was dangerously charming, since those who succumbed to its enchantments forgot all mortal cares and, loosing themselves completely in the excessively sweet sounds, withered away. Pindar

⁴⁰⁰ On the successive temples at Delphi, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1979). As she shows in this essay, the materials of these early temples are suggestive of the site's cultic functions: the laurel played a role in Apollo's mode of prophecy; and the bees and birds relate to the arts of divination, as well as demonstrate their own ingenuity in crafting habitats.

went on to sing of the fate of this third temple of Apollo, which was destroyed not by war and foreign invaders but by disapproving gods:

—the children of Kronos split open the earth with a thunderbolt and buried that most holy of all works, in astonishment at the sweet voice because strangers were perishing away from their children and wives as they suspended their hearts on the honey-minded song...

(Pindar, *Paean* 8.72-86)⁴⁰¹

Although this bronze temple perished, its *rhythmos* and charm continue to persuade us to be wary of the “all-fashioning skills” of Athena (and Hephaestus). Yet, this temple’s mode of influence also persuades us to compare Athena’s sanctuary for Apollo, as represented by Pindar, to Athena’s sanctuary atop the Acropolis, as represented upon the painted vessel, since both sanctuaries revolve around influential figures: a compelling olive tree, and a compelling voice of “Charmers” (themselves arranged around the influential voice of Apollo). The stories of both sanctuaries also incorporate and contrast architectural ephemerality with poetic persistence, for in spite of devastating losses, compelling schemes of restoration are offered: Athena’s sanctuary atop the Acropolis was indeed rebuilt in such a way that its story persists,⁴⁰² and poets beyond Pindar went on to sing about a fourth temple of Apollo at Delphi. According to the *Homeric Hymn of Apollo*, Apollo himself set the foundations of this temple, upon which Trophonius and Agamedes (legendary architects) then placed a threshold of stone; whereupon, generations of mortals raised up polished walls—“to be a theme of song forever” (294-99).⁴⁰³ In such works of perpetual restoration, we witness a sustained commitment to sites of enduring significance by those divinities with invested interest (Athena, Hephaestus and Apollo), and by diverse figures of *technē* (poets, potters, painters and architects), who make the stories of these places manifestly and persistently known.

⁴⁰¹ Later poets compared the song of these charmers to “the persuasive notes of Sirens” such as Odysseus resists in the *Odyssey* 12.39ff (Philostratus, 1st c. CE, *Vita Apollonii* 6.11). See Nelson (1940), 448. Later, Athenaeus remarks that these Charmers “made anyone who listened to them forget about eating and drinking, and *wither away (aphauainesthai)*” (7.291e).

⁴⁰² The extant Erechtheion attests to this scheme of refurbishment.

⁴⁰³ On the story of this fourth temple, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1979).

Another work exemplifying Athena's sway in relation to *technē* is relevant to mention before returning to the question of how these modes of craft bear more directly on Odysseus. Somewhat like the sanctuaries mentioned above, the mythic ship Argo was not only initially fashioned with Athena's guidance but also continued to convey her guidance after it was launched. This is because she fitted a "speaking timber" into its prow (or, by other accounts, its keel). This member, itself taken from the prophetic oak tree of Zeus at Dodona, endowed the ship with an influential and imperishable voice. From its new position within the wooden vessel, this timber uttered timely encouragement, prophecy and warning to Jason and his Argonauts during their turbulent quest for the Golden Fleece.⁴⁰⁴

As with Athena's influence over the Trojan Horse, her direction of this wooden vessel was not only about guiding well-fitted timbers into place, but also about providing fitting guidance, as well as support to those who offer guidance. The integral role played by the guiding timber set within the ship, for instance, resembles the guiding role performed by Odysseus within the Trojan Horse. Like the knowing timber, Odysseus offered crucial restraint and timely influence from a position hidden within a wooden device. These two embedded figures (Odysseus and the speaking timber), together with the olive tree and the Golden Charmers, begin to suggest a pattern whereby each mythic fabrication incorporates a nested figure of sway: the scheme involving the Trojan Horse had *in it* Odysseus as a guiding figure; the sacred sanctuary of Athena atop the Acropolis had *in it* the obliging tree with its persistent demonstration of renewal; the third temple of Apollo at Delphi had nested *in it* the devastating Charmers; and Argo had *in it* the guiding timber, itself a vestige of Zeus. Each of these persuasive figures (Odysseus, the olive tree, the Charmers and the timber), embedded as they are by the craft of Athena, represent and extend her influence through and beyond those tangible fabrications (horse, sanctuary-cup, temple and ship) that memorably bore them.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰⁴ This story of Argo is known best through Apollonius' *Argonautica* (1.18-21, 111-14, 226, 524-7, 551, 723-4; 2.612-14, 1187-89, 4.580-91). A dramatic fragment of Aeschylus also notes "Argo's sacred speaking beam (*xulon*)" (Frag. 20). On Zeus' speaking oak tree and its sanctuary in Dodona, see Parke (1967).

⁴⁰⁵ This manner of setting figures into fabrications can be compared to Hephaestus' mode of inlaying qualities and designs into material artifacts, such as the shield of Achilles. This poetic act is marked by a verse beginning "in it (is set)—" (*en dē—*). For example, as Hephaestus makes the shield, he sets *in it* Strife, *in it* Tumult, and *in it* deadly Fate (*Iliad* 18.535). On this manner of in-working in Greek and Indo-European poetry, see Watkins (2000).

We return now to a Homeric context to engage a pair of examples where Athena extends her craft influences directly onto Odysseus. Twice in the *Odyssey*, an elaborate craft simile is introduced to descriptively qualify Athena's act of endowing Odysseus with much-needed charm:

And just as when a man overlays silver with gold, a cunning workman whom Hephaestus and Pallas Athena have taught all kinds of craft (*technēn pantoīēn*), and full of grace is the work he produces, even so the goddess shed grace upon his head and shoulders.

(*Odyssey* 6.232-35 and 23.159-61)

In this twice-repeated passage it is Odysseus himself who Athena, as a “cunning” or “knowing” (*idris*) smith, works on. And this vital figure she “produces”, fulfills or completes (*teleiei*), by overlaying him with “grace” or “charm” (*charis*). While such an overlay immediately transforms Odysseus in appearance—making him a “wonder” (*thauma*) to look upon (6.237, 7.145, 8.17)⁴⁰⁶—the treatment also adjusts him in other less visible and more narratively significant ways; for, this adjustment prepares Odysseus to act and speak appropriately (and charmingly) in decisive situations, while at the same time it participates in marking decisive narrative turns in the *Odyssey*. The first treatment turns Odysseus from a weather-beaten castaway—“all befouled with brine” (6.137)—to a radiant self-assured stranger who must go on to present himself before the Phaeacians in a way that will earn their reverence, so gaining for himself an honorable reception and the favor of an escort home.⁴⁰⁷ The second transformation, later in Ithaca, turns Odysseus from his brutal task of overcoming the suitors to his gentle reunion with his wife. Having just played the warrior in restoring order to his household, Odysseus—“all befouled with blood and filth, like a lion that comes from feeding on an ox” (22.401-3)—must now,

⁴⁰⁶ One may compare a gilded Odysseus to the only other gilded work in the *Odyssey*: a heifer, whose horns are overlaid with gold in preparation for its being offered to the gods (3.418ff). Such preparatory work makes the offering a “wonder” for gods to look upon. For a related interpretation of this twice-repeated simile, including its role of ritually purifying Odysseus, see Friedrich (1981). Athena similarly “pours”, or “sheds” (*katecheue*), “charm” upon Odysseus (8.19) and Telemachus (2.12, 17.63), and “beauty” upon Penelope (18.191ff).

⁴⁰⁷ These charms also, most obviously and immediately woo the Phaeacian Princess (6.237ff).

himself, be restored to civil and lordly station. Athena's charming overlay (preceded by a bath), helps to finish the well-crafted restoration of Ithaca by purifying and ennobling its leader, readying Odysseus to be regarded again as leader and to be fully recognized by his wife. In each episode (among the Phaeacians and with Penelope), Athena's craft-like adjustment initiates conditions that promote Odysseus' favorable reception, which, in turn, advances the story. Yet, her divine preparations alone do not clinch the favor (of an escort home) and the recognition (from Penelope) that Odysseus desires. Odysseus himself ultimately accomplishes these aims by his own compelling speech and stories. In these performances we see, hear, even feel, the extended influence of the "charm" initially prepared by the craft of Athena.

With Penelope, Odysseus compels her recognition of him, neither by his rejuvenated appearance nor by his distinguishing scar, but rather by properly recollecting the arrangement of their marriage bed, which he wrought long ago with secrets only they share (23.181ff). By telling Penelope this one familiar story, with its deeply embedded secrets, Odysseus earns her recognition and "charms (*thelgoito*) her very heart" (17.514).⁴⁰⁸ Among the Phaeacian strangers, Odysseus recollects not a single familiar story but many unfamiliar tales. And these he shares not intimately but openly for all, and in a way that earns not recognition but astonishment, gratitude and a fateful commitment to his cause. Midway through telling his tales to the assembled Phaeacians, Odysseus pauses, whereupon we learn that his listeners were charmed, "hushed in silence, and held spellbound (*kēlēthmōi*) throughout the shadowy halls" (11.333-5). During this captivating pause, the Phaeacian king compliments Odysseus for his "well-shaped words", for his "good sense", and for telling his tales "knowingly (*epistamenōs*) like a bard (*aoidos*)" (11.363-68).⁴⁰⁹ This king also re-pledges his commitment to convey Odysseus home and urges him not to stop but to continue his storytelling (11.347-53, 370-76). When Odysseus finishes, the charming effect of his stories on the Phaeacians is described again in the very same words: "they were all hushed in silence, and were held spellbound throughout the shadowy halls" (13.1-2). What is important to emphasize here

⁴⁰⁸ This charming effect on Penelope, predicted in book 17, is witnessed in book 23 as her knees loosen and heart melts (23.205-6). The song of Phemius also brings about this kind of "charm" (*thelgoito*) (1.337). This is also the disarming effect of the Trojan Horse on the Trojans (8.509). And, in the *Iliad*, Hera's allurements (borrowed from Aphrodite) are inlaid with the same "charms" (14.215).

⁴⁰⁹ On the correspondence of truthfulness and well-ordered song in Homer, see Walsh (1984), 7.

is that before “charming” or seducing (*thelgein*) Penelope, and before “charming” or leaving the Phaeacians “spellbound” (*kēlēthmōi*), Odysseus is himself prepared, as by a craftsman, with “grace” or “charm” (*charis*).⁴¹⁰ Athena’s preliminary overlay, then, may further be seen to initiate a telling relation between the performativity of stories, and the performativity of the figure conveying them.⁴¹¹

There is a further clarification to make about the “spellbound” Phaeaceans, since their condition after listening to Odysseus’ stories recalls the devastating effect of the song of the Golden “Charmers” (*Kēlēdónes*), which Athena had arranged atop the third temple of Apollo at Delphi. Although the Phaeacians do not appear to fatally wither upon hearing the charming speech of Odysseus, they do, a short while later, become fatefully petrified. Once Odysseus completes his tales, the Phaeacians, true to their pledge, convey him to Ithaca, then commence their own journey back home. Poseidon, however, in his perpetual wrath against Odysseus (and anyone granting him favors) intervenes to punish them. Although he had initially intended to obliterate the Phaeacian ship, he instead—at Zeus’ suggestion—turns the vessel and all its sailors into stone, making a permanent marvel for others to “wonder upon” (*thaumazōsin*, 13.146-64). The extent to which this dramatic punishment—and architectural metamorphosis—comes as a direct consequence of Odysseus’ spellbinding performance remains a question. What is significant to note, however, is that *like* the work of a smith and the performance of a bard this stone monument compels “wonder” (*thauima*) by the revealing stories its figure captures, conveys and prompts.

A closing comment must be added on the narrative role of the two extended craft similes in the *Odyssey*. These similes, repeated word for word in book six and twenty-three, not only adjust Odysseus and the particular events in these parts of the epic but also adjust the epic poem as a whole by acting as memorable turning points in the larger plot, and by forging interpretable links between distinct episodes and their related topics. In this way, these craft contributions of Athena participate in a commonplace of epic poetry;

⁴¹⁰ On this interrelated variety of charms—seductive, spellbinding and graceful—see Walsh (1984), and Segal (1994), 85ff.

⁴¹¹ The opposite correlation is revealed in the *Iliad* by Thersites, who talks with “measureless speech” (*ametroepēs*), and “in no due order” (*ou kata kosmon*), whose *phrēn* is full of “disorderly words” (*epea... akosma*), and whose body was misshapen (2.212-15). Given Odysseus’ own unsightly appearance in the *Odyssey*, however, Athena’s adjustment may also be understood as compensation; as Odysseus himself says (seemingly of himself): “For one man is inferior in looks, but the god sets a crown of beauty upon his words...” (8.169ff).

one that memorably ornaments significant narrative thresholds by introducing a revealing digression involving a vivid ekphrasis of a crafted artifact or architectural setting.⁴¹²

POLYMĒTIS AND ITS DISCURSIVE SITUATIONS

8.3h

Thus far in our survey of Odysseus' relation to *technē*, vis-à-vis Athena and the crafty influences she exerts, we have not yet come upon *polymētis*, the epithet (implying "diverse counsels" or "cunning intelligence") that Odysseus shares with her. We have not found *polymētis*, in part, because Athena does not receive this epithet in the Homeric epics, where it belongs solely to Odysseus—save for a single attribution to Hephaestus near the climax of the *Iliad* (21.255), as discussed above. *Polymētis* does, however, qualify the goddess in the *Homeric Hymn to Athena*—a short devotional song (just eighteen lines long), which may have been performed as a prelude to such oral epics as the *Odyssey*.⁴¹³ In this hymn "*polymētis*" is one of the many superlative appellations put upon the goddess in what amounts to a concise inventory of her agencies, particularly those related to her defense of cities and readiness for battle. Aside from embedding Athena's *polymētis* in a field of strife, this hymn also reveals where her *mētis* is coming from, for the hymn recollects the myth of the goddess' birth: fully armed, from the head of Zeus, "the counselor" (*mētieta*, 6, 16).⁴¹⁴ As the story goes, Zeus brought forth Athena in this way after having swallowed his pregnant wife Mētis—herself a personification of counsel and foresight.⁴¹⁵ Although recalling this potent genealogy of Athena's *mētis* and the condition of strife in which her *polymētis* is enmeshed, this *Homeric Hymn* does not present either her *mētis* or *polymētis* in action. To regard the dramatization of *mētis* and to understand the narrative circumstances in which Odysseus becomes qualified with *polymētis* we must turn back to the Homeric epics.

In what circumstances, then, is Odysseus qualified with this famous epithet? Surprisingly, the attribution is rather limited. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus is said to act with

⁴¹² In Vergil's *Aeneid*, for example, a lingering description of ornamented doors (designed by Daedalos) marks a significant narrative threshold at the start of book six. See Sharrock (1994). On "Ekphrasis as a Rhetorical *Topos*", see Dubois (1982), 4-11.

⁴¹³ Athanassakis (1976), x-xi.

⁴¹⁴ *Mētieta* is a frequent epithet of Zeus in Homeric poetry. See above, p. 161, n. 370.

⁴¹⁵ On the significance of this assimilation of Mētis for Zeus, see above, p. 120.

“diverse counsels” (*polymētis*) as he begins to speak in response to others and, in one instance, where he prudently chooses to be silent. The most frequently repeated Homeric expression involving this epithet presumes an act of speech:

“Then *polymētis* Odysseus answered him and said—”

Odysseus’ fitting words and telling tales, such as those uttered amid the Phaeacians and the suitors, then follow.⁴¹⁶ Given that this expression qualifies Odysseus in situations of urgent discourse, the Homeric scholar Norman Austin has suggested, “it might be better to translate the formula in that context as ‘thinking hard, Odysseus spoke,’ or ‘while his mind ranged far, Odysseus spoke.’ Such translations would remind us that when Odysseus speaks he is usually pleading a case, marshalling his most persuasive arguments.”⁴¹⁷ Indeed, when Odysseus’ speech is introduced in this way he has particular intentions in mind—both for his immediate situation and, more broadly, for Ithaca. And these manifold and nested intentions he strives to advance in situations that are full of strangers, unfamiliar conditions, ambiguous tensions, as well as (at times) flagrant resistance. The special significance of diversely counseled speech may be further understood by contrast with another Homeric expression that introduces the speech of Odysseus (and others) in more congenial circumstances. When Odysseus speaks directly and openly to his son and loyal servants he sometimes does so “with winged words” (*epea pteroenta*, 22.410, 436 etc.). As Richard P. Martin, has argued, “winged words” tend to fly between interlocutors “sharing a social bond”.⁴¹⁸ The open air through which these words figuratively move is thus comparable to the shared social medium of language and customs that interlocutors would hold in common. Such

⁴¹⁶ Odysseus repeatedly receives the epithet *polymētis* when speaking before the Phaeacians (7.202, 207, 240, 302; 8.152, 165, 412, 463, 474; 9.1; 11.354, 377; 13.311, etc.), and while advancing his scheme in Ithaca (17.16, 192, 19.106; 22.390, etc.). Amid the suitors “*polymētis* Odysseus” also chooses once *not* to speak at all (20.183, cf. 300). At other times, amid the suitors, the speech of “*polymētis* Odysseus” is supplemented with “tricky intents” (*dolophroneōn*, 18.51, 21.274), and with non-verbal gestures—as when “*polymētis* Odysseus” answers the suitors judgmentally “with an angry glance” (18.14; 22.34, 60, 320), and reassures his son “with a smile” (22.371). In the *Iliad* the epithet adorns Odysseus in instances of speaking (4.349, 358; 9.308; 10.144, etc.), and rising silently to take decisive action that furthers the epic plot (1.311, 440; 3.268, 8.94, 9.624, 23.709).

⁴¹⁷ Austin (1975), 39.

⁴¹⁸ Martin (1989), 33. Although Martin’s argument is based on the poetics of the *Iliad*, his observations largely hold true for the *Odyssey*, as he states in his introduction (p. 14).

“winged” exchanges, however, are not necessarily problem-free, as the feathery image suggests. Indeed, as Martin shows, “winged” directives and interrogatives might also be forcefully delivered and highly charged—“like arrows going to their mark”.⁴¹⁹ Thus, it is not agreement that “winged words” assume but, more basically, the direct reception and comprehension of another’s speech. By comparison with such “winged” discourse (passing directly through open air), speech qualified as *polymētis* would seem to be moving more cautiously and across more uneven grounds, negotiating circumstances that are interrupted by various intervening contingencies. It is this riskier kind of discursive topography, one persistently challenged by unique difficulties and by the potential for partial and *mis*-understandings, in which “*polymētis* Odysseus” frequently finds himself as he strives to make his way to Ithaca.

Given that Odysseus speaks with *polymētis* in such conflicted situations, one might expect his speech to be qualified in this way when he is trapped in the land of the Cyclops. But this is not the case. Here, as in all the eccentric situations of the *Odyssey*, *polymētis* does not qualify Odysseus’ speech directly. Although the Homeric poet does evoke “*polymētis* Odysseus” as he begins to tell his incredible stories to the Phaeacians (9.1) and, again, when (after being interrupted) he resumes his storytelling (11.355, 377), the epithet is not found within the stories themselves. In other words, *polymētis* is put upon Odysseus as he tells his tales (in books nine through twelve), but not upon his speech or actions within these tales. In these episodes, then, *polymētis* qualifies Odysseus’ speech and performance as a storyteller.⁴²⁰ The special relation of this epithet to Odysseus’ narrative role is reinforced quite differently later in the *Odyssey*. As he commences the climactic deeds of the epic—raising up his bow in a formidable display of archery (21.404ff) and, moments later, springing up upon the threshold of his courtyard, bow in hand, to take restorative action against the suitors (22.1ff)—he is twice qualified with the epithet.⁴²¹ In the first instance, he is further compared to a knowing

⁴¹⁹ Martin (1989), 35.

⁴²⁰ Since Odysseus himself narrates these tales, one could take the absence of *polymētis* as his reluctance to name himself with this epithet. There is only one situation in the *Odyssey* in which Odysseus qualifies himself with *polymētis*: as the epic approaches its climax, he reassures his wife (while in disguise) that “*polymētis* Odysseus” will soon return to outperform the suitors and, so, restore order to his household (19.585).

⁴²¹ These are the only two instances in the *Odyssey* in which Odysseus’ speech is not a part of the same verse in which *polymētis* also appears. Nevertheless, Odysseus’ fitting speech does follow just a few lines later in each of these instances (21.424ff, 22.5ff).

bard, for as “*polymētis* Odysseus” silently raises, regards, strings, draws and plucks his bow (in a representative display that both suggestively prefigures and actively inaugurates his defeat of the suitors) he does so in the manner of “a man well-skilled (*epistamenōs*) in the lyre and in song” (21.406-10).⁴²² This dramatic simile—presenting Odysseus as a knowing bard (*aoidos*) and, thus, as a vigorous proxy for the Homeric poet—is anticipated by the Phaeacians’ praise of Odysseus in book eleven (11.363-68), and thoroughly entertained by modern interpreters of Homeric poetry.⁴²³ What is helpful to emphasize for this study, is that these dramatic bard-like actions are analogous to his “diversely counseled” speech and storytelling, since all of these *polymētis* performances dramatically advance the overall plot of the epic amid revealing situations of conflict.⁴²⁴ And so, if Odysseus’ acts as an “architect” in the later satyr play relate to his *polymētis* performances in the *Odyssey*, this relation must be grounded in his speech acts, as well as in his nonverbal acts that are analogous to the narrative and dramatic arts of the epic poet.

In light of these *polymētis* performances in the *Odyssey*, the absence of this epithet in the Cyclops episode remains striking, since it is in the cave of the Cyclops that Odysseus’ “diverse counsels” would seem to be most urgently needed and most variously engaged. Given that *polymētis* so often qualifies Odysseus’ speech, we are perhaps best to seek the demonstration of his “diverse counsels” in the Cyclops episode by attending to the subtleties of his discursive acts. This is the strategy attempted in the following section.

⁴²² “—but *polymētis* Odysseus, as soon as he had lifted the great bow and scanned it on every side—just as when a man well-skilled (*epistamenōs*) in the lyre and in song easily stretches the string about a new peg, making fast at either end the twisted sheep-gut—so without effort did Odysseus string the great bow...” (21.404-09). This dramatic simile compares and contrasts the well-tuned instruments (bow and lyre), the knowing performers (hero and bard) and the resounding affects of their impending deeds, which strike fear in the hearts of the suitors while striking a resonate chord with Zeus, who, in anticipation of the epic’s climax, thunders his complicity (21.413). With this image in mind (of Odysseus handling his bow like a “knowing bard”), one is tempted to picture him *leaping* upon his threshold a moment later as a vigorous thespian well-poised to bring the action of the epic to a dramatic close. The *representative* nature of these “*polymētis*” displays resonate with the representative fiery display of *polymētis* Hephaestus toward the climax of the *Iliad* (21.355), as discussed above.

⁴²³ For example, Moulton (1977), 145-53; Dougherty (2001), 196 n. 43; Goldhill (1991), 57; Walsh (1984), 19-21; Loudon (1996); Walsh (1984), 3-21.

⁴²⁴ Odysseus also demonstrates *epistamenōs*-manners when he “*knowingly* straightens [timbers] to a line” while making his raft (5.245); and while making his marriage bed, when he “well and *knowingly*” smoothed the olive-tree, so, preparing the rooted center of his household (23.197). On this knowing capability, see Walsh (1984), 11; and Gould (1955), 3-30.

When first caught by Polyphemus in the cave and questioned as to who he is and why he is there, Odysseus is terrified. But, nevertheless, he answers the giant plainly, admitting that “all the winds” delivered him and his crew to the island on their way home from Troy, as “Zeus was pleased to devise” (*mētisasthai*, 9.262ff). To this apology, Odysseus adds direct appeals for hospitality and fair treatment (9.264-71). Polyphemus, however, rejects all such appeals, “with a pitiless heart” (9.272-78). With this failure of plain and direct speech, Odysseus responds to Polyphemus’ next question differently. With “deceitful words” (*doliois epeessi*) he lies about his ship, claiming that it was wrecked and his crew nearly destroyed (9.282-87). To this appeal (perhaps for sympathy, as well as to protect his intact ship), Polyphemus makes no verbal response. Instead, springing into action, he seizes two of Odysseus’ crew, kills them, eats them, and guzzles down some milk (9.288-97). Thus, the limits of verbal communication are made dramatically apparent. The action in the cave has moved abruptly from curt speech to mute violence and, so, Odysseus moves on to silent scheming.

Although at this point of despair, Odysseus admits to himself his own “helplessness” (*amēchanin*, 9.295),⁴²⁵ he nevertheless takes counsel with himself, “planning (*bouleusa*) in his great heart” (9.299). He first considers a plan to kill the giant, but then rejects it. For, to kill the Cyclops would be to trap himself, since only the giant can move the huge stone blocking the cave’s opening (9.299-303). And, so, Odysseus endures—through the night and on through the cannibal’s next morning meal—all the while silently “devising evil in the depths of [his] heart”,⁴²⁶ and wondering “if in any way [he] might take vengeance on [Polyphemus], and [so, have] Athena grant [him] glory” (9.316-17). Even in this moment of crisis, it is remarkable that it is not an immediate escape that Odysseus foregrounds as his intention, but rather “vengeance” (*tisaimēn*) and “glory” (*euchos*): just retribution (in the name of Zeus),⁴²⁷ and a feat

⁴²⁵ This condition of “helplessness” (*amēchanin*) marks moments of significant dilemma in later Athenian tragedy. Cf. Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* (480).

⁴²⁶ This mode of devising, or “building in the deep of [one’s] *phrēn*”, matches Hephaestus’ manner of preparing the unseeable bonds (8.272-73), as described above, p. 154, n. 360.

⁴²⁷ Odysseus had earlier appealed to the Cyclops in the name of “Zeus, the avenger (*epitimētōr*) of suppliants and strangers” (9.270-71). And, as the giant slaughtered the two shipmates, Odysseus and his remaining crew “with wailing held up [their] hands to Zeus” (9.294).

(endorsed by Athena) for him to boast of and poets to sing. It is with these ambitious intentions in mind that Odysseus decides upon a “plan” (*boulē*), one that—in these circumstances—“appeared to [his] mind the best” (9.318).⁴²⁸ Thus, while Polyphemus is out shepherding his flocks, Odysseus leads his crew in sharpening the found olive branch (cut from Polyphemus’ own cudgel), tempering its point in fire, and hiding it away in a pile of dung, to be drawn out later—at just the right moment (9.325-30). When Polyphemus returns to the cave, Odysseus waits through the cannibal’s third ghastly meal and then addresses the giant again, but now with words that are both “deceitful” and supplemented. For, just when Polyphemus would normally reach for his cup of milk, Odysseus reaches out to Polyphemus with ingratiating words and a “bowl of dark wine” (9.346ff). To the persuasive pull of speech Odysseus joins the compelling force of wine, which proceeds to soften the giant on his behalf (9.360-61). The next time Odysseus speaks to the Cyclops, he solicits the potency of language alone. Responding to the giant’s question about his identity, Odysseus tells him that his name is “No one” (*Outis*, 9.363-66). Being uninterested in language and, so, oblivious to the pun, Polyphemus accepts the name, promising in turn to give this “Outis” a personal gift: out of all the remaining crew, he will eat “No one” last (9.369). A moment later, under the spell of the wine, Polyphemus falls asleep. Whereupon, Odysseus, with “cheering words” (9.376ff),⁴²⁹ leads his crew, first, in reheating the sharpened stake in the fire’s ashes, then, in thrusting it into the giant’s eye. And Odysseus himself narrates this feat with memorably vivid figures of speech; specifically, with dramatic similes that qualify his own climactic action as analogous to a ship-builder boring timbers (9.384-88), and to a smith quenching fired works (9.391-94).⁴³⁰

Thus, in this Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus modulates his discourse: from plain speech, to deceptive speech, to silent exchanges (interpretively conversing

⁴²⁸ This expression—“Now to my mind (*kata thumon*) this appeared (*phaineto*) the best plan (*aristē boulē*)”—qualifies Odysseus again in the *Odyssey* (11.230); and, in the *Iliad*, it notably qualifies the discerning acts of Zeus (2.5), and Nestor (7.325, 9.94).

⁴²⁹ Odysseus’ verbal and non-verbal discourse with his crew is repeatedly noted. Aside from encouraging words, he also discourages their weeping “with an upward nod” (9.468); gives instructions on preparing the stake (9.326ff); advises them “to cast lots” to see who will help wield the stake (9.330ff); and, in their escape, prompts them to “fall to their oars” by “nodding [his] head” (9.489).

⁴³⁰ These similes will be discussed below, p. 267ff.

with himself, his problematic situation, and his crew);⁴³¹ and then to speech that is supplemented (with wine), and presented figuratively (with concealing pseudonyms and revealing similes). By shifting in this way through diverse modes of discourse Odysseus would seem to demonstrate the “*diverse* counsels” (*polymētis*) that he earns as an epithet elsewhere in the *Odyssey* when he speaks. For, it is from such variegated discursive modes that Odysseus chooses best how to speak and act according to both the immediate situation and to larger narrative concerns. The concealing pseudonym “*Outis*”—the most famous example of wordplay (specifically paranomasia) in all of Homeric literature—is especially telling.⁴³² By cautiously withholding his proper name, Odysseus avoids being recognized by Polyphemus who, as we come to learn, knew from a prophecy that a stranger named “*Odysseus*” would one-day blind him. By this deceit, Odysseus also sets up a defense with further consequences for the story. For, once Polyphemus is blinded, he cries out in pain from inside the cave, prompting his Cyclopean brothers (who live nearby) to come and ask if anyone, or “not one” (*mē tis*), is harming him either “by guile (*dolōi*) or by strength (*biēphin*)?” (9.406, 410). To this question, Polyphemus cries back from within his cave: “No one (*Outis*) is harming me by guile (*dolōi*) not by strength (*biēphin*)” (9.408). The other Cyclopes, taking this literally, go away assuming their brother is alone but mad (being afflicted by Zeus); while Polyphemus remains inside the cave unassisted (9.410-12). Pleased with this success, Odysseus “laughed within [himself]”, knowing that his “name and flawless *mētis* had so thoroughly beguiled (*exapatēsen*)” (9.414).⁴³³ Odysseus’ beguiling pun not only shields him from a curse but furthers his scheme by turning away the other Cyclopes.⁴³⁴ Appropriate discourse, then, is shown to act *as* effectively as wine acts in this scheme; yet, even more defensively and diversely.

But Odysseus’ scheming through diverse modes of discourse continues; since, unlike Euripides’ abbreviated version of the Cyclops tale, at this point in the *Odyssey*

⁴³¹ Taking counsel with oneself and one’s situation is a defining capability also of Trygaeus in *Peace* (see above, 62-5, 111-12) and of the *architectus*-figures in the later comedies of Plautus. In *Miles Gloriosus*, for instance, the leading slave, Palaestrio, first calls for silence, then “calls his wits to counsel” (*dum ego mihi consilia in animum convoco*, 196-97ff).

⁴³² On this mode of naming alongside, see Podleck (1961), esp. 130.

⁴³³ The prefix “*ex-*” on the root verb *apataō* implies “thoroughness”. See above, p. 135, n. 306.

⁴³⁴ On the role of this pun as a defense, see Goldhill (1991), 31; and Austin (1972)—who further discusses the pseudonym in terms of name-taboos and protection against magic spells.

Odysseus and his surviving crew remain trapped within the cave. Meanwhile, the giant, painfully blinded, is livid. He rolls back the enormous stone from the door and sits within the threshold, aiming to catch anyone trying to escape (9.415-18). But again Odysseus “takes thought” (*bouleuon*, 9.420) and, so, he “wove (*huphainon*) all sorts of wiles (*dolous*) and schemes (*mētēn*) as a man will in a matter of life and death” (9.422). Again, he chooses the “plan” (*boulē*) that, in these circumstances, “appeared best to his mind” (9.424). Thus, “silently”, he proceeds to tie each man with “twisted withes” to the underside of a trio of dark sheep, while he himself clings to the fleecy underbelly of a ram (9.427ff).⁴³⁵ Then, at dawn (9.437), as the Cyclops allows his flock out of the cave to pasture, Odysseus and his remaining crew (having concealed themselves beneath the bellies of these sheep) escape the deadly clutches of the Cyclops “unperceived” (9.442). Following this ruse, as Odysseus and his crew make their getaway by ship (9.468-72), Odysseus then speaks out to the giant again and for the first time since giving his false name. With “mocking words” he shouts from afar: for “eating your guests... Zeus has taken vengeance (*tisata*) on you” (9.474-79). With this claim to justice, Odysseus nearly brings about his own shipwreck, for Polyphemus, blind as he is, hurls a huge stone at the aural target—just missing their fleeing ship (9.480ff). Then, “with an angry heart”—and against the advice of his crew (9.500)—Odysseus delivers a more fateful boast, calling out to the Cyclops: “if any one of mortal men shall ask you about the blinding of your eye, say that Odysseus, sacker of cities blinded it, the son of Laertes, whose home is in Ithaca” (9.501-05). With this boast, Odysseus foolishly gives Polyphemus the proper name—and epithets—he needs to pronounce the catastrophic curse, which ultimately contributes to Odysseus’ own trouble at sea, his crew’s demise, and his difficulties in Ithaca (9.495ff).

Thus, to Odysseus’ “*diversely* counseled” exchanges in this episode of the *Odyssey* (his plain, deceptive, silent, supplemented and figurative speech), we must add his “mocking words” and “angry” boast—modes of speaking that, as Odysseus relates this tale to the Phaeacians, he claims to regret (9.228).⁴³⁶ Later in the epic (among the suitors) when “*polymētis* Odysseus” chooses to be silent (20.183 cf. 21.300-02) and

⁴³⁵ Even this space beneath the sheep’s bellies is prefigured in the narrative when Odysseus watches Polyphemus place the young lambs beneath each sheep for feeding (9.245-46).

⁴³⁶ As he begins to tell this tale, Odysseus recalls that his crew had urged him to leave the Cyclops’ cave (before the giant returns), “But I did not listen” (9.228).

cautions his servant *not* to boast (22.411ff), this particular incident of having misspoken to the Cyclops must have been on his mind. Along with this, what is important to emphasize here is that the potentialities and problems of language—its performative effects, narrative consequences, discursive limits and ironies, as well as its related modes of nonverbal exchange—are central to Odysseus’ *mētis* in general and to his conflict with the Cyclops in particular. Similar potentialities and problems, then, should be seen to underlie his performance, as “architect”, in Euripides’ *Cyclops*.

IN THE CITY AS IN THE CAVE: KINDRED CONFLICTS AND COMPARABLE MODES OF CRAFTING *MĒTIS*

8.3j

What is also clear from this Cyclops episode in the *Odyssey* is that “*mētis*” not only qualifies Odysseus’ “cunning” capability (9.414) and performs as a suggestive substitute for his own proper name (*mē tis*, 9.406, 410), but also identifies something he lacks and must, therefore, make. For, Odysseus claims in this episode to have “woven *mētis*” (9.422)—to have actively crafted the scheme that liberates him and his surviving crew from the cave. The only other situation in the *Odyssey* in which Odysseus’ scheming is qualified in this same crafty manner is when he conspires together with Athena to restore order to his household in Ithaca. As these collaborators commence their scheming on the shores of Ithaca, Athena says to Odysseus: “I have come here to weave *mētis* with you” (13.303); and, a few lines later, Odysseus reciprocates both her intent and her trope: “come [Athena] weave some *mētis* by which I may requite them” (13.386).⁴³⁷ In these passages, as in the comparable passage of the Cyclops episode (9.422), *mētis* is less a capability that Odysseus and Athena independently possess, and more the course of action that they together initiate, elaborate and gradually bring about.⁴³⁸ As in the cave of the Cyclops, their scheming encompasses a variety of

⁴³⁷ This exchange also includes Athena’s famous speech in which she claims *mētis* for herself, “I among all the gods am famed for *mētis*...” (13.299), and praises Odysseus as “far the best of all men in counsel (*boulē*) and in speech (*muthosin*)” (13.291ff).

⁴³⁸ This sense of *mētis*, as being more actively sought than possessed, recurs in the *Odyssey*. For instance, Penelope (anxious about Odysseus’ whereabouts) *longs* to find some *mētis* to resolve the situation in Ithaca (19.158). Odysseus *longs* for *mētis* soon after escaping the land of the Cyclops: upon arriving to another unknown situation he prompts his crew to seek *mētis*: “Let us at once take thought *if* any *mētis* is still left for us. As for me, I do not think there is” (10.192-3). The *active* sense of weaving *mētis* is also prefigured in the Cyclops episode by Zeus’ own act of “devising” (*mētisasthai*), which, according to Odysseus’ story, had led him into the land of the Cyclops in the first place (9.262).

coordinated acts including: the concealment of Odysseus' identity (with pseudonyms and a ragged disguise); probing research (cautiously assessing the servants and the suitors while in disguise); deceptive tales (knowingly told to advance the scheme); the direction of trusting collaborators (including Odysseus' son and loyal servants); representative displays (notably of archery, which is likened by a simile to the performance not of a carpenter and smith, but of a knowing bard); and culminating violence for the sake of renewing order (slaughtering the suitors). The promptings of Athena and the approvals of "Zeus, the counselor"—who twice thunders his complicity (20.103, 21.413)—also influence the course of these events.

As in the cave of the Cyclops, this diversely counseled work of scheming in and around Ithaca is figured in terms of "weaving". As presented above (p. 165), weaving (*huphainein*), or being "crafty (*technēssai*) at the loom", is a principal domain of Athena's craft influence in the *Odyssey*. Thus, Odysseus is here found to collaborate directly with Athena in a work of *technē*, not by making a crafted artifact but by craftily "weaving" *mētis*—subtly preparing a manifold scheme of retribution and restoration, which is prefigured by and mimetic of the scheme that was earlier woven in the cave of the Cyclops. Indeed, Odysseus' encounter with the Cyclops performs as both a rehearsal for and provocation of the later scheming in Ithaca.⁴³⁹ Given the thematic correspondence between these distinct episodes, Odysseus' conflict in the remote cave can be taken as a basic model for the conflicted situation in the city; for, the Cyclops' radical breach of hospitality (although more extreme) is kindred to the suitor's transgression.⁴⁴⁰ Thus, the Cyclopean situation presents a foundational crisis that is underlying and interrelated with the civic problem; it is, as Euripides would later have Odysseus claim in *Cyclops*, a "base (*bathra*) of danger" (352).⁴⁴¹

Beyond the thematic interplay between these two Homeric conflicts, Odysseus' crafty manner of scheming in each situation is comparable since Odysseus "weaves

⁴³⁹ Polyphemus' curse had prophesied that Odysseus shall "find trouble in his house" (9.535).

⁴⁴⁰ Whereas the Cyclops refuses to offer hospitality, the suitors over-indulge in the hospitality offered to them. In both situations, these adversaries are deemed "overbearing" (*hyperphialoi*) and "lawless" (*athemistoi*) threaten social institutions: Polyphemus is labeled this way once (9.106); and the suitors repeatedly (1.134, 227; 17.363, 481; 21.289; etc.). On the thematic correspondence between these transgressions, see Cook (1995); and Segal (1994), 202-15. On the importance of the opposition between *hybris* and *sophrosyne* in the fifth century BCE art (architecture and drama), see Castriota (1992), esp. 73.

⁴⁴¹ See above, p. 171. The Cyclopean situation is closely related to civic problems also by its portrayal of the extreme risks of colonization. See above, p. 132, n. 302.

mētis” both to resist Cyclopean dangers and to restore order to Ithaca. One could go far in seeking other examples and pre-figurations of this persistent trope of weaving.⁴⁴² Here, however, it is appropriate to go only so far as the *Iliad*, where *mētis* is not only woven (*huphainein*) but also fabricated (*tektainomai*), and, again, involves Odysseus. Thus, it is necessary to review these few episodes of crafting *mētis* in the *Iliad*, drawing-out what they add to our understanding of Odysseus’ scheming and to an interpretation of Odysseus’ acts as “architect” in the later play.

WEAVING *MĒTIS*—ADVANCING RECONCILIATORY SCHEMES (IN THE *ILIAD*)

8.3k

In the *Iliad*, Odysseus is once remembered for his capacity to “weave *mētis*” (3.212ff), yet it is the elder counselor Nestor who explicitly performs the action in the narrative. On two occasions, Nestor begins “to weave a web of counsel (*mētis*)” for the Achaean leaders who all, in turn, consent to his speech (7.324ff, 9.93ff). The “counsel” Nestor begins to weave in each episode involves: first, a proposal to build a wall along

⁴⁴² In the *Odyssey*, the suitors “weave *mētis*” against Telemachus (4.678), and Penelope hopes that Odysseus’ father will “weave some *mētis* in his heart” to help the situation in Ithaca (4.739). Elsewhere, Bacchylides sings of King Minos “weaving *mētis*” to bolster his kingdom (17.51-2), and of “some god” whose weaving of *mētis* caught Deianeira in a perplexing web (16.25). In Hesiod’s *Shield*, Zeus is “weaving another *mētis* in the loom of his mind” as he contrives to seduce Alkmene (28). This same ruse is dramatized in Plautus’ later comedy *Amphitryon*, where Zeus is qualified as “architect of all” (*architectust omnibus*, 45).

This trope of weaving to qualify poetic activity would seem to be as old as poetry itself, since in one of the earliest examples of Indo-European literature, the Rig-Veda, one finds verses in which the poets claim to be *stretching* out their songs (*as* on a loom) and singing their tale “without a knot”. See “Poesy as weaving” in West (2007), 36-38.

As for the persistence of the trope—in the Homeric epics (as in later lyric poetry and Athenian drama), one frequently finds that fate is *spun* (*epeklōsen*); tricks are *woven* (*huphainēs*in); and plans, like odes, are *stitched* (*rhaptein*). While a number of such tropes have pejorative senses (such as stitching evil and sewing death plots), there are also a number of more positive, if ambiguous, examples. For Sappho, Aphrodite is a “weaver of wiles” (*doloploke*, Frag. 1.2), and Eros a “weaver of tales” (*muthoplokon*, Frag. 188). Sewing is also integral to the activity (and etymology) of epic singing, for a “rhapsode” is, literally, “he who sews together (*rhaptō*) the song(s) (*aoidē*)”, see Nagy (1996), 62-74. Pindar’s *Nemean* 2.1-3 and Hesiod’s Frag. 357 (297) are important sources for this etymology. The trope of weaving as song making is found in Bacchylides, who portrays his own hymns as being “woven” (*huphanas humnon*, 5.9-10; cf. 19.8-9). Similarly, Pindar promises to “sew (*plekōn*)... [a] varied hymn (*poikilon humnon*)” (*Olympian* 6.86-7), and to “weave out” (*exhuphaine*) a song “in Lydian harmony” (*Nemean* 4.44; cf. *Nemean* 4.94, Frag. 179). Pindar also sings of “embellishing” (*daidalōsemen*) his patron in “folds of song” (*Olympian Ode* 1.105). For a discussion of the imagery of weaving and other kinds of “craftsmanship” in Pindar see Steiner (1986), 52-65. Weaving becomes an important metaphor for joining partners in marriage and for the web of state (as exemplified by passages in Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* and Plato’s *Statesmen* 279b, 311b). On these tropes, see Scheid and Sverbro (1996); and Snyder (1981).

the beach to defend the vulnerable Achaean ships (7.324-43); and, later, a proposal to reconcile themselves to Achilles, who had abandoned the battle in anger, leaving the Achaean mission vulnerable (9.93-113). While Odysseus does not at all figure into the episodes where the “wall” is proposed and subsequently built (9.433-41), he does end up leading the embassy to persuade Achilles to rejoin the fated mission (9.192ff). In spite of the fact that Odysseus fails to persuade Achilles,⁴⁴³ it is nevertheless suggestive that of the two woven schemes of *mētis* it is *not* the one involving wall construction, but the one involving persuasive discourse with reconciliatory intent that Odysseus prominently figures into and strives to advance. During this embassy to Achilles, it is Odysseus who takes the “lead” (*archō*), both when initially setting out and when returning (9.192, 657). He is also the first (of three leaders) to speak persuasively to Achilles (9.225), and the only one at the end of the mission to report back to Agamemnon (9.676ff).⁴⁴⁴ Thus, by his guiding role and persuasive speech, Odysseus actively leads others in advancing the reconciliatory scheme that Nestor had initiated. In other words, the *mētis* that Nestor “began to weave” (*huphainein ērcheto*, 9.93), Odysseus furthered.⁴⁴⁵

Odysseus’ leading role in this embassy to Achilles becomes suggestive of a pattern peculiar to him when considered together with an analogous embassy; one that had also involved persuasive speech with reconciliatory intent, and concerned a conflict similarly crucial to the course of epic events. The remembrance of this analogous embassy arises near the beginning of the *Iliad*. As the Trojan elders gather on their city wall to regard the warriors upon the battlefield, Helen is called upon to identify each Achaean leader. She points out “*polymētis* Odysseus” from afar, identifying him as one who “knows all manners of tricks (*pantoious dolous*) and close devices (*mēdea pukno*)” (3.200-02). Prompted by this identification, one of the Trojan elders recalls the occasion

⁴⁴³ Achilles refuses to be persuaded, instructing Odysseus to go back to the Achaean leaders and “declare my message... that they may devise (*phrazōntai*) some other *mētis* in their minds better than this” (9.421-23).

⁴⁴⁴ In this mission, Odysseus performs not only as a faithful messenger, conveying the appeals and promises as bidden (by Agamemnon and Nestor), but also as a discerning counselor: *urging* Achilles to check his anger and take thought of consequences to come (9.250ff); *reminding* him of wisdom of the past (the words of his father) which Odysseus dramatically quotes (9.259ff); and *commanding* him to stop his “bitter wrath” (9.259), to raise himself up (9.247), to listen (9.262) and to pity the Achaeans (9.301). For an interpretation of this exchange as representative of the conflict between *mētis* and *bia*, see Nagy (1999).

⁴⁴⁵ The verbs for Nestor having “began” (*ērcheto*) and for Odysseus having “led” (*ērchē*) both derive from the same verb *archō*, “to begin”, “to go first” or “to take the lead”. *LSJ*.

when Odysseus and Menelaus had come in embassy to Troy, attempting to win Helen back by diplomacy and, so, avert the war. Although Odysseus' persuasive attempt on this embassy failed (as did his later attempt to persuade Achilles), his performance was nevertheless remarkable. For, the Trojan elder vividly recalls "*polymētis* Odysseus" and his unrivaled capability "to weave a web of speeches (*muthous*) and plans (*mēdea*) in the presence of all" (3.212-16).⁴⁴⁶

Although it may be tempting to take the weaving of *mētis* as a general trope for any act of scheming, these two examples in the *Iliad* (together with the two examples from the *Odyssey*) suggest that, for Odysseus, weaving *mētis* involved particular topics, tactics and intentions. As for topics, these are basic: love and strife (here, the competition for Helen and the wrath of Achilles), together with fidelity (the bonds of marriage and the loyalty of groups). As for tactics, these involve persuasive discourse and representative exchanges: influential "speeches" and "plans" performed on behalf of others and "in the presence of all" (although the *Odyssey* highlights his secret planning). And, as for intentions, these are reconciliatory and restorative: aiming to repair propitious relations and conditions, as well as the course of epic events. A third embassy in the *Iliad* involving "*polymētis* Odysseus" also fits this pattern, but without the trope of weaving. This embassy, motivated by the utterance of a prophet as much as the advice of a counselor, ends more successfully than the others. In the first book of the *Iliad*, "*polymētis* Odysseus" is called upon to go as "leader" (*archos*) of an embassy that aims to resolve the epic's opening conflict: the wrath of the god Apollo (1.310-11). Taking command of a ship and its rowers, Odysseus leads Chryses, the captured daughter of the priest of Apollo, back to her proper place. He escorts her over the sea and directly into the arms of her father—an act accompanied, again, by fitting speech (1.440ff).⁴⁴⁷ In this embassy, at least three sets of relations are restored: familial, political and divine. For, the daughter is repaired to her father (the priest of Apollo); this foreign priest is

⁴⁴⁶ Poets beyond Homer also recalled Odysseus' performance on this embassy. Bacchylides, for instance, names Odysseus and Menelaus as leaders of this envoy and asks the Muses: "who first began the righteous pleas" (*tis prōtos logōn archen dikaiōn*, 15.47). Fragments of Menelaus' "spell-binding words" and appeal to "Justice" (*Dikan*) follow; but nothing of Odysseus' speech remains. The same reconciliatory embassy is possibly the topic of a sculptural metope (#24) on the North side of the Parthenon. (All the metopes on this North side featured events of the Trojan War). This weathered metope depicts two figures striding forward: the leading figure (possibly Odysseus) bears a shield; the figure that follows (possibly Menelaus) is clad in a flowing cloak. See Schwab (2005), 182.

⁴⁴⁷ For an interpretation of Odysseus' brief speech in this scene, see Martin (1989), 120.

reconciled to the Achaeans; and Apollo is appeased, thus relieving the Achaeans from the plague (which, according to the prophet, had been sent by the angered god). And so, this embassy, although closely related to the others (to Troy and to Achilles), also extends the topics and intentions of envoys led by “*polymētis* Odysseus” to broader aims and to divine levels—to reconciling not only individuals and groups, but also sacred relations among representative figures.⁴⁴⁸

FABRICATING *MĒTIS*—PURSUING REPRESENTATIVE DISPLAYS (IN THE *ILIAD*)

8.31

Besides weaving, one also finds *mētis* in Homeric poetry to be actively “fabricated” (*tektainomai*)—a verb cognate with *tekton*. Although this verb, and other craft terms like it, would later become relatively common as tropes for the making of schemes, songs and speeches,⁴⁴⁹ in Homeric epic the verb appears in this sense only once,⁴⁵⁰ and in a way that prominently involves Athena and “*polymētis* Odysseus”.

⁴⁴⁸ This recalls Trygaeus’ reparation of divine relations in *Peace*. In the *Iliad*, however, one must bear in mind that Odysseus’ reconciliatory act has disturbing consequences, for Agamemnon, angered at having to return his prized Chryses, takes Achilles’ mistress instead; thus prompting Achilles’ wrath and another reconciliatory attempt by Odysseus.

⁴⁴⁹ As with “weaving”, the trope of “fabricating” poetry is found in the earliest examples of Indo-European literature, for the poets of the Rig-Veda claim to compose their verses *like* artisans fitting together a chariot: “The sons of Àyu, wishing for good things, have fitted together [root *taks-* from *tek(s)-*] this utterance, just as the skilled artisan (fits together) a chariot” (*Rig-Veda*, 1.130.6ab). Quoted from Nagy (1999), 297-300. Here, Nagy notes that the name “Homer” embodies this agency, since the name is etymologically related to the verb *arariskō* (to fit-together), making “Homer” one “who fits (the song) together”. Cf. the sections “Poesy as construction” and “Poesy as carpentry” in West (2007), 35-40.

In a dramatic fragment of Sophocles, the reconciliatory and synthesizing agency of fabricating is, similarly, suggested: “discussion, even when men disagree, [fabricates] (*tektainetai*) the arguments (*logos*) of both sides compactly together [in a mean] (*es meson*)” (Frag. 867 Loeb). Here, “fabricating” brings competing materials and intentions into close agreement, just as mitigating discourse conciliates, or harmonizes, opposing arguments. Other Athenian drama, however, suggests that the verb qualified the fabrication of lies (as in Aristophanes’ *Knights* 461 and *Acharnians* 599; and in Euripides’ Frag. 918 Loeb). In later oratory the sense of deceptive fabrication persists. Demosthenes, for instance, urges his audience to believe the testimony of eye-witnesses, *not* the statements subsequently “fabricated” (*tektainomenois*) by others (*Against Phormio* 36.48). And, in his *Hymn to Zeus* Callimachus casts Cretans as proverbial “liars” (*etektēnanto*, 9). The activity was associated, more positively, with the fabricating of song in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, where Hermes was “the first to *make* (*tektēnat*) a singer (*aidon*) of a tortoise.” (25).

⁴⁵⁰ The verb is also used just once in Homeric poetry in its presumably more literal sense: for earlier in the *Iliad* it is noted that the ships that had started the war—those “initiators of evil”—had been “fabricated” (*tektēnato*) by “Tekton”, son of Harmon (*Iliad*, 5.59-63).

Although neither of these agents initiates this scheme of *mētis*, it is nevertheless influenced by Athena and elaborated by Odysseus in significant ways. The situation in which *mētis* is being fabricated in the *Iliad* begins in this manner: Agamemnon, in distress after the failed embassy to Achilles, decides to seek out Nestor in hope that “together” (*sun*) they might “fabricate (*tektēnaito*) some incomparable *mētis* that would serve to ward off evil (*alexikakos*)” (10.19). The *mētis* that Agamemnon initially fabricates with Nestor is simply to keep watch: “let us look on” (10.96). Nestor, in turn, proposes to summon *all* the leaders together so that they may “share in counsel” (*sum-mētiaastha*, 10.197). Once these leaders are assembled, Nestor then urges a plan of action: to sneak into Trojan territory and find out what *they* are “counseling” (*mētioōsi*, 10.208). To be clear, in each case, Nestor’s “counsel” is to learn the counsel of others. Diomedes bravely offers to take on the dangerous mission into Trojan territory, but he desires a comrade—for alone, he admits, one’s *mētis* is “but slender” (10.226). In order to compensate for this lack of *mētis* he chooses Odysseus who, as Diomedes emphasizes, is always prepared for “all manner of toils” and “wise above all in discernment” (*perioide noēsai*, 10.245). While their mission comes to involve a number of violent acts (the merciless slaughter of a lone Trojan scout suggestively named Dolon, who is sent out from the opposing camp with similar instructions; the violent killing of a Trojan allied King and his sleeping guards; as well as the brazen theft of this King’s horses), the subtler actions that Odysseus contributes seem to provide the “counsel” that Diomedes, alone, would have lacked. It is by these subtle performances, then, that “*polymētis* Odysseus” extends, or elaborates, the collective work of *mētis*—lending symmetry to this “shared” fabrication, by balancing Diomedes’ valor with precautionary mindfulness.⁴⁵¹ It is helpful to follow these two comrades on their mission, in order to articulate more precisely Odysseus’ peculiar contributions to the ongoing fabrication of *mētis*, which Agamemnon and Nestor had initiated.

Upon being selected by Diomedes to accompany him on the daring mission, Odysseus’ first act is to temper Diomedes’ praise of him (10.249-50).⁴⁵² Then, straightaway, he looks to the stars, thus taking measure of the waning night and of the

⁴⁵¹ This is suggested by the many references in this episode to “counsel” as being *shared* and fabricated *together* (*sun/sym*) with others.

⁴⁵² This initial act recalls Trygaeus’ first act as “architect” in *Peace* (see above, p. 25), as well as Odysseus’ tempering and silencing of the chorus in *Cyclops* (476ff).

little time remaining to complete their covert mission while under its cover (10.251-53).⁴⁵³ As the armed comrades set out into enemy territory, Odysseus is then first to hear the call of a heron and to interpret this call as a good omen sent by Athena (10.275-77). In thanks, he makes prayer to the goddess and asks for her protection. He further shares with her (and Diomedes) his own intention: to bring “renown” (*eukleias*) to the Achaeans and “sorrow” to the Trojans by performing a “great deed” (*mega ergon*, 10.282). In these ways, even before commencing the central actions of their mission, Odysseus has already elaborated the scheming; this he has done not only by noticing and interpreting the auspicious signs of the night, but also by articulating intentions (the scheme’s desired and influential effects) that extend beyond the counsel he was initially given. As the two comrades proceed in darkness across the field of battle, Odysseus is then first to notice (from a distance) the lone Trojan scout (10.340); to point out this approaching scout to Diomedes (10.341); and to indicate the right moment and manner for seizing him (10.344ff). The comrades, lying low (concealed amid the dead), wait silently for him to pass, then chase him down. By the throw of his spear, Diomedes arrests and frightens this adversary (10.372); then “*polymētis* Odysseus” confronts Dolon verbally—reassuring him (disingenuously), and persuading him to surrender details about the Trojans’ intentions and about the distribution and readiness of their forces (10.382ff). With precise and pressing questions, Odysseus learns of the newly arrived Thracian King, his sleeping guards, his most prized horses, his decorated chariot, and where each of these are situated (10.433ff). With this, Odysseus seems to have heard enough and Diomedes abruptly slays the informant (10.456). Uttering a prayer of thanks to Athena, Odysseus then sets up a conspicuous “marker” (*sēma*) with the victims’ spoils (10.466).

In the subsequent development of the scheme—as Odysseus and Diomedes act upon what was learned from the verbal exchange—this balanced pattern of collaboration between them continues. As they proceed in darkness, Odysseus is again first to see and to point out the King’s horses from a distance, and to suggest the subsequent course of action (10.476-81). Then, as Diomedes slaughters the King and his sleeping guards,

⁴⁵³ Odysseus’ actions are often correlated with cosmic and seasonal phenomena. His return to Ithaca, for instance, has been shown to correspond to the return of Spring’s “new moon”. See Austin (1975), 144-53. His encounter with the Cyclops *begins* by sailing into the harbor of the neighboring island on a *moonless* night (9.144-45); and he escapes the Cyclops’ cave at “dawn” (9.437). The Trojan Horse attack was also timed to the “setting of the Pleiades”, according to Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon*, 826. And Odysseus’ timely opening and closing of the gates of the Trojan Horse are comparable to the Horai’s (the Season’s) opening and closing of the gates of heaven. See above, p. 169, n. 388.

“*polymētis* Odysseus” drags the victims aside—preparing a way for both themselves and the horses to pass unimpeded (10.488-93). Odysseus then loosens, rebinds, and drives these horses onward (striking them with his bow), while beckoning Diomedes with a whistle (10.498-502). Stopping only to reap the “marker” (*sēma*) previously arranged, the two heroes then make their return, bearing full testament to their accomplishments. Back in the Achaean camp, “*polymētis* Odysseus” recollects the story of their “great deed” to Nestor (10.554ff); then, again, sets up the spoils of Dolon, now conspicuously on his ship; and, finally, pours, together with Diomedes, a libation of thanks to Athena.

While Agamemnon and Nestor initiated this scheme of *mētis*, it is clear that Odysseus and Diomedes further its fabrication by responding to unplanned circumstances that are gradually discovered in the course of narration. In other words, the developing scheme (the fabrication of *mētis*) unfolds concurrently with the telling of the story. Within this unfolding scheme, Diomedes’ contributions are presented primarily as abrupt acts of slaughter, while those of Odysseus involve a broader, subtler and more prospective range, which not only respond to events as they arise but also prepare for events to come. At every phase of the scheme—before setting out, before engaging the Trojan, before taking the horses—Odysseus takes note of each situation’s limits and potentialities, and responds to these diversely. Although Odysseus’ verbal correspondence is central to this mission (his persuasive exchange with the Trojan scout marks the scheme’s turning-point), his non-verbal negotiations are also influential, for Odysseus anticipates, perceives, interprets and responds to non-verbal conditions: the signs of the night; the call of a bird; the will of Athena; the topography of the battlefield; the vulnerabilities and strengths of others; the value of possessions, gained and lost; the habits of horses; and the reaction of a friend, even to a whistle. All of these phenomena factor into the decisions Odysseus makes as he elaborates the scheme in which he also performs. Odysseus’ involvement with representative tokens (*sēma*) in the course of this scheming is also striking. Throughout the mission, and most enduringly at its end, Odysseus prepares representative displays, including: the spoils, set-up as a conspicuous marker first on the battlefield and then upon his ship for all to see; the story, told directly to Nestor but for all to hear; and the libation, offered especially to Athena yet for all the gods to witness.

Besides dramatizing Odysseus’ *polymētis*—his diverse (*poly*) range of counseled actions (perceptive, interpretive, discursive and demonstrative)—the enactment of this scheme in the *Iliad* also reveals a developing variety of intentions. For, as Agamemnon

first phrased it, the intention was to fabricate some *mētis* to “ward off evil” (10.19-20), which, he suggests, might come simply from watching (10.96). Nestor rephrased this intention as actively seeking “counsel”—both from their fellow leaders and from their adversaries (10.108, 197). As Odysseus elaborates the scheme, however, the intention shifts to acquisition, to seeking and setting-up representative displays, and to considering how these accomplishments will affect others as well as the epic course of strife. In this episode of the *Iliad*, then, Odysseus may be seen as one who elaborates, combines and adjusts the guiding intentions of a scheme that others initiated. Or, put differently, Odysseus leads (*archō*) the fabricating (*tektainomai*) of *mētis* with accumulative intentions in mind. Such a leading role illuminates his later role as *archi-tekton*; since, in *Cyclops*, Odysseus similarly leads a collaborative scheme composed of a comparably diverse range of actions and intentions (although this dramatic scheme begins more by his own initiative).

This concern for guiding intentions also brings attention to qualifying prefixes, such as *archē*, *poly* and *sum/sym*, and to the leading, varying, balancing and synthesizing actions these imply. With this awareness of prefixes in mind, we turn to two final examples involving *tektainomai* in Homeric epic.

PARA-FABRICATING STORIES: MAKING ALONGSIDE AND IN THE MIDST OF EXEMPLARY MAKERS

8.3m

There is another mode of fabricating that *polymētis* Odysseus figures into in Homeric poetry and that also prefigures his acts as “architect” in the later play: *para-tektainomai*. This fabricating act is unique because of the relative alterity implied by “para”, and because the compound verb arises just once in each epic. In the *Iliad*, the activity involves Zeus and irrevocable events, whereas in the *Odyssey*, the activity involves Odysseus and the malleability of events. I will first treat the irrevocable.

Halfway through the *Iliad*, just after the Trojans have breached the defensive wall of the Achaeans, the building of which Nestor had counseled (7.324-43), Nestor himself bears witness to the unfortunate event. Going to a “place of outlook” to see the situation, Nestor confirms that the wall in which they had put their trust has broken down, and many Achaeans are dead (14.13ff). Distraught, Nestor goes to the other leaders (some of whom are injured), and listens to Agamemnon recast the damage even more despairingly. Acknowledging the irreversibility of these events, Nestor admits that even “Zeus himself, who thunders on high could not [*fabricate*] them *otherwise*” (*para-*

tektēnaito, 14.54). Nestor, thus, suggests that what is done cannot be undone; the broken wall (and related damage) cannot be rebuilt, repaired or replaced, even by the crafty ways of Zeus. At this point Nestor proposes to Agamemnon that they again “take thought” (*phrazōmeth*) on what to do; but to this he adds a skeptical remark: “if planning (*noos*) will accomplish anything” (14.61-2).⁴⁵⁴ The failed wall would seem to have shaken this counselor’s trust, not only in material defenses but in the value of any “planning” or intentions conceived by the mind (*noos*). And Nestor’s doubt—being put in parallel to his denial of Zeus’ capacity to (re)fabricate events—brings divine devising also into question. The fragility of divine “planning” is confirmed a little later when the “mind” (*noos*) of Zeus becomes unsettled by the beguiling seductions of Hera (14.160ff, 217ff). Thus, the distracted “mind” of Zeus, the shaken “*noos*” of Nestor, and the shattered “wall” of the Achaeans, each find representation in the other.⁴⁵⁵ It would seem that fabricated schemes, like fabricated walls, are as vulnerable to catastrophic failure as the mind is to disarming charms. Recognizing this, the counselors of the *Iliad* have approached their wits end. Soon, however, Achilles rejoins the Achaeans, to advance their mission by “might” (*bia*).

In the *Odyssey*, it is Odysseus who is associated, more positively, with para-fabricating (*paratektainomai*). The circumstance in which the association arises is rather involved (and so more difficult to paraphrase). However, it ultimately raises a relatively simple point (one that has already been suggested), that Odysseus’ manner of para-fabricating is mimetic of Homeric poets.

Whereas Nestor, in the *Iliad*, had denied even to Zeus the ability to fabricate past events otherwise and, by extension, had doubted the value of any prospective “planning”; Eumaeus, in the *Odyssey*, suspects that Odysseus will re-fabricate words, or verses (*epos*), and thus possibly alter both present circumstances and events to come. The situation in which this “para-fabricating” arises runs as follows: Soon after Odysseus returns to Ithaca, he goes, disguised as a ragged stranger, to visit Eumaeus (his loyal old swineherd). He does so in order to learn of the troubles awaiting him at home. Among the details Eumaeus reveals while hosting this stranger is that over the years many strangers just like him have come to Ithaca claiming to have news of Odysseus. These

⁴⁵⁴ This skepticism is similarly expressed by Odysseus in the *Odyssey* when, just following his narrow escape from the Cyclops, he urges his men “to take thought if any *mētis* is still left for us. As for me, I do not think there is” (10.192-93).

⁴⁵⁵ This complex image is taken a step further by Apollo, in book fifteen, who knocks down all that is left of the Achaean wall—as a child destroys sand structures by the sea (15.362-66).

strangers, having “no desire to speak the truth”, go to Penelope to try and win both her favor and her gifts by telling “random lies” (14.124-27). Although none of these strangers have so far persuaded Penelope with their speech, Eumaeus suspects that this ragged individual before him (Odysseus) will himself soon try: “readily would you too, old man, para-fabricate a story (*epos paratektēnaio*) if one would give you a cloak and a tunic to wear” (14.131-2).

This scene and these words are full of irony. For, on the one hand, Odysseus ultimately will tell a true story (about his marriage bed) that shall indeed win over Penelope and win back his own kingly wardrobe. On the other hand, in his current disguise, Odysseus readily speaks deceptively (though not randomly) both for the sake of advancing the restorative scheme that he and Athena are weaving,⁴⁵⁶ and for the sake of gaining a woven cloak. As a ragged stranger actually in need of a cloak, Odysseus proceeds to tell Eumaeus a tale involving a cloak. Specifically, he tells a tale about an occasion during the Trojan War when he was on a nighttime mission with “Odysseus”. Laying in ambush at the base of the city’s wall, he had found himself cold and cloakless. So, he awoke “Odysseus”, who proceeded to gain a cloak for his shivering comrade by telling a useful lie to the other Achaeans (14.462-505). Delighted by this tale about his master’s clever generosity, Eumaeus compliments the stranger by telling him that his “tale” (*ainos*) is “flawless” (*amumōn*), and that no “verse” (*epos*) is “amiss”, or out of measure (*para moiran*, 14.508-09).⁴⁵⁷ Eumaeus, then, rewards this stranger by giving him a cloak for the night, which Odysseus had hoped to obtain but did not wish to ask for directly (14.510ff). Thus, by the end of his conversation with Eumaeus, Odysseus’ capacity to knowingly and profitably “para-fabricate” a story is fully shown.

Odysseus’ demonstration of para-fabricating in this episode of the *Odyssey* marks his performance as analogous to Homeric bards. Like these performers, Odysseus recomposes epic verses (*epos*), selecting and adjusting these so that, together, his “tale” is appropriate to his particular situation, memorable by its compelling imagery, and delightful for those listening to it.⁴⁵⁸ Furthermore, his “tale”, “parable”, or “fable” (*ainos*,

⁴⁵⁶ Odysseus initially deceives everyone he encounters in Ithaca: On Odysseus’ special “art of lying”, see Walcott (1977); and Haft (1984), esp. 299.

⁴⁵⁷ On the theme of proportionality in Homeric poetry, singing each part “according to order” (*kata moiran*) see Walsh (1984), 3-21.

⁴⁵⁸ On the importance of adjusting the parts of a poem so that its performance fits the occasion and the purpose of the poet, see Walsh (1984), 7-8; and Goldhill (1991), 58. An *epos* is neither simply a word nor a full story but more of a saying, or “epic utterance”, such as the

14.508), advances both a particular purpose and a general moral, and this it does indirectly through a mimetic representation modeled after a story that *might* have occurred.⁴⁵⁹

As interpreters of Homeric poetics show, Odysseus performs in the *Odyssey* as an exemplary storyteller nested within the epic story: as an “internal narrator”, “embedded voice”, or “poet in the poem”.⁴⁶⁰ Such a nested position of a persuasive figure within a larger work recalls the other constructs influenced by the craft (*technē*) of Athena (as presented above): the wooden horse, the enduring sanctuary (and painted vessel), the charming temple, and the wooden ship. Like these mythic constructs, the epic poem has *in it* an influential and paradigmatic figure, one that performs within the poem and alongside (*para*) the poet (Homer), influencing the immediate narrative situation, while at the same time appealing to situations and audiences beyond the narrative. In this meta-poetic (or para-poetic) way, Odysseus’ epic performance also pre-figures the meta-theatrical performances of the architect-figure in *Peace*, whose leading actions similarly sway the dramatic events while, at the same time, affecting the spectators’ reception and interpretation of the drama.⁴⁶¹

Whereas Homer had put Odysseus’ storytelling in terms of *paratektainomai*, and, like later poets, had cast the epic art in terms of *tektainomai* and tectonics (*tektonsunē*),⁴⁶²

epic verses and thematic phrases that Homeric bards appropriated, adjusted and composed their variations of the oral poem with. On this aspect of oral poetics, see Nagy (1990), esp. 26-7; and, on the role of the Homeric bard, or rhapsode, in general, see Nagy (1996). It is tempting to discern a pre-figuration of the Vitruvian triad—commodity, firmness and delight—in the implied criteria of oral poetics (appropriate, memorable and delightful).

⁴⁵⁹ An *ainos* is a tale with a purpose, one that “instructs” or “advises” (*paraineō*). See Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, 202, with Nagy (1999), 239. Odysseus is closely related to a plurality of such tales by his epithet *polyainos*, he “of many tales” (*Odyssey* 12.184; *Iliad* 9.673; 10.544; and 11.430). Odysseus’ made-up “tale” about the cloak can also be seen as a composite of plausible acts as borrowed from Homeric verses. In the *Iliad*, for instance, Odysseus himself “tosses off his cloak” before running a mission (2.182).

⁴⁶⁰ See Louden (1986), 287; Pucci (1998), 145; Rose (1992), 112; and Goldhill (1991), 57. In my modest review of the scholarship on this topic (of Odysseus as poet within the poem), I have found only Dougherty (2001) to consider the passage involving *paratektainomai*. Yet, she takes *para* to imply that Odysseus’ tale is told “out of order or contrary to reality” (p.68f).

⁴⁶¹ Trygaeus’ direct appeals to the audience during the dramatic interlude are one example of such metatheatrical acts. See above, p. 91.

⁴⁶² The philosopher Democritus (a contemporary of Euripides) claims: “Homer, by getting a share in the divine nature, fabricated the ordering (*etektēnato kosmos*) of all kinds of verses (*epeōn pantoion*)” (Frag. 21 Diels-Krans.) Frag. D.13, in Taylor (1999), 8-9. Cf. West (2007),

Aristophanes and Euripides seem to have been among the first to extend (or shift) this trope to “architecting” and “architects”. One could consider this adjustment in relation to the changing notions of poetic composition and authorship in the fifth century BCE—changes involving an emergent distinction between composers and performers, and an increasing interdependence of textual means and dramatic modes.⁴⁶³ Yet, it is best here to conclude this section with some observations on how para-fabricating stories most ostensibly illuminates the activity of architects.

That para-fabricating stories would have been a common concern for ancient architects is suggested, in part, by the fact that mythic stories were selectively adapted and tellingly arranged as stone sculptural reliefs in and around temples; and, in part, by the fact that the dramatic events, customary practices and sacred rites, which periodically filled those temple settings, were themselves mimetic of mythic events. In other words, architects designed temples and planned their settings in relation to mythic plots.⁴⁶⁴ That storytelling is a central concern for the architect-figures in the dramas under study here is also made explicit. In *Peace*, Trygaeus’ own daughter judges his intention to fly to heaven as “unbelievable” (*apiston*) and like a “story” (*muthos*, 129-31); and Trygaeus himself suggests that he modeled his installation of Peace on the verses of “Homer” (1089ff). Within Euripides’ *Cyclops* Odysseus’ storytelling capability is even more closely tied to his role as “architect”, for he entitles himself in this way just after

39. A later epigram (first century BCE) qualifies Homer’s art as tectonic. This sepulchral epigram (attributed to Nicarchus), reads: “Orpheus won the highest prize among mortals by his harp, Nestor by the skill (*sophiē*) of his sweet-phrased tongue, Divine Homer, the learned in lore (*polyistōr*), by the [tectonic] art of verse (*tektosunē d’ epeōn*): but Telephanes, whose tomb this is by the flute” (*Greek Anthology*, Vol. 7, Epigram # 159). When Odysseus, in the *Odyssey*, preliminarily lays out the broad base of his raft like one “well versed in tectonic arts” (*eu eidōs tektosunaōn*, 5.20), the art storytelling (which he then proceeds to demonstrate among the Phaeacians) is also strongly suggested.

⁴⁶³ On the re-invention of “Homer” in Classical times, see Graziosi (2002). See also Nagy (1996), who shows the importance of “composition *in* performance” for Homeric rhapsodes; and Havelock (1982), who argues that Athenian drama participates in the transition from oral to literary modes of poetic composition, and that this transition may be understood as a shift from acoustic to “architectural principles” of composition (p. 9). Classical scholars frequently describe “architectural” qualities of Homeric poetry, cf. Martin (1989), 3. However, the poem as a well-made thing (like an architectural work) has not been the analogical basis of this study, which is more focused on the analogous *acts* of the poetic agents (architect and poet).

⁴⁶⁴ The customary practices and liturgical dramas that animated sacred sites were often linked to the practices and deeds narrated in myths. Put differently, the architectural program developed as a reinterpretation of certain mythic plots. The configuration of the Erechtheion in relation to the cults of the Arrhephoria (among others) is a case in point. See, Burkert (1990), 37-63.

narrating the events that had transpired in the cave—“unbelievable” (*kou pista*) events that, as he prepares to tell them, he likens to “stories” (*muthois*, 376).⁴⁶⁵ Odysseus follows his narration of these events by describing his own “scheme” (*dolon*) to alter those events—a scheme that is, of course, adapted from the verses of Homer. And, this story-telling, story-changing and scheme-disclosing performance culminates with Odysseus urging his listeners to believe *all* that he has told them, to persuade themselves to follow, obey, or trust, “the architects” (477).

One could go far in tracking the persistence of such architect-figures in later literature, including those “architects” performing as dramatic storytellers, as plot-makers, and as persuasive (re)composers of verses intended to alter situations and reinterpret human events.⁴⁶⁶ Yet, I must steer this inquiry back to the particulars of Euripides’ *Cyclops*. And this I will do by recalling the general question that has guided this chapter: in what ways might Odysseus’ Homeric epithets have prefigured his dramatic qualification “architect”? The subsequent discussion takes up this question in more broadly narrative ways.

⁴⁶⁵ When Odysseus first emerges from the cave, after having witnessed the events hidden within, he begins his narration to the chorus in this way: “O Zeus, what am I to say (*ti lexō*) when I have seen in the cave terrible things, [unbelievable] things such as one meets only in stories (*muthois*), not in the deeds of mortals (*ergois brotōn*).” (375-76). Several aspects of this short introduction mark Odysseus’ speech as one of storytelling: his evocation of Zeus (who is always interested in the narration of dreadful events); his rhetorical question (which resonates with the question he poses before telling his stories to the Phaeaceans in the *Odyssey*, “What, then, shall I tell you first, what last? (*ti prōton... katalexō*)” 9.14); his emphasis on having seen “dreadful (*dein*)” and “unbelievable” (*kou pista*) things; and his distinguishing of these events from the prosaic “deeds of mortals”. As Seaford writes in his note to the line, with these words “he [Odysseus] places himself to some extent outside of the story, rather like Cratinus’ Odysseus, who give the impression of having read it: (fr. 141).”

⁴⁶⁶ In the second century CE, the Greek satirist Lucian calls Homer an “architect” (*Charon, or the Inspectors* 4). Yet, as Hermes demonstrates in this dialogue, it is not only the coherence of the poetic composition that makes Homer comparable to an architect but the broad outlook on the human situation that his verses afford. Cf. Lucian’s “To one who said ‘You’re a Prometheus in words’, wherein Prometheus is likened to an “architect” (3).

I know of no other instances in ancient literature in which Odysseus is called an architect. However, much later in the English Renaissance, Ben Jonson may have had Odysseus in mind when he called a character named Brainworm “architect”. “Brainworm” is qualified in this way because he is an exceptional “weaver of language”: one who, molding his speech and actions to fit whatever circumstance, seems to have “studied begging all his life” (*Every Man in His Humor*, Folio Edition (1616), Act 3, scene 2, ln. 230). In the English Renaissance, a number of comparable architect-figures are found in dramatic literature: in Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus*, Act 5, Scene 3, line 121; in Christopher Marlowe’s *Tamburlaine the Great, Part I*, Act 2, Scene 7, line 22, and *Edward II, Part I*, Act 4, Scene 5, Line 31; in George Peele’s *Descensus Astraeae*, line 58, *Anglorum Ferae* line 143, and *The Love of Davide and Faire Bethsabe, with the Tragedie of Absolon* line 1739; and in an anonymous work (possibly by Robert Greene), *The Tragedy of Selinus, Emperour of the Turkes* line 1439.

Limited Qualifications: Naming Contingently and in Situ

8.4

As I hope to have demonstrated above, Odysseus' epithets (such as *polymētis* and *polyphrōn*) and crafty capabilities (such as weaving and fabricating *mētis*, and para-fabricating verses) are best understood in relation to the narrative situations in which they arise. Before considering the dramatic situation in which “architects” arise for Odysseus, it is helpful to summarize the various ways qualifying epithets perform in epic poetry.

The frequently reiterated epithets that accompany the names of heroes in Homeric poetry perform in part as verbal mnemonics, augmenting an individual with vividly memorable attributes. For Homeric poets, who composed and performed their verses orally, such descriptive cues were especially important. Besides vivifying individuals, epithets also play an important role in portraying a large cast of unique individuals. In the *Iliad*, in particular, Odysseus (together with his diverse epithets) performs in tandem and in tension with his fellow Achaeans, who are each qualified with epithets distinguishing their own status, accomplishments and capabilities.⁴⁶⁷ Taken all together, the Achaean heroes and their epithets reveal the relative interdependence of the group, highlighting agencies that are mutually complementary and, at times, antagonistic.

Odysseus, who himself acts and suffers diversely, has multiple epithets—the most by far of any hero. Such multiplicity points to a further role that epithets play in Homeric poetry: revealing differences internal to an individual. By having a large repertoire of epithets for Odysseus, the poet could choose the most appropriate, adjusting him to his situation by foregrounding the most telling aptitude. In the *Odyssey*, for instance, when Odysseus lies asleep in exhaustion, having just washed up on the shore of the Phaeacians, he is cast then and there as the “much-enduring, noble Odysseus” (6.1).⁴⁶⁸ He is entitled “sacker of cities” at other instances: when he compels his enemies to flee; when he prompts strangers and comrades to fall into respectful obeisance; and when he foolishly boasts after blinding the Cyclops (9.504).⁴⁶⁹ Odysseus is named with “diverse

⁴⁶⁷ Odysseus performs with Agamemnon, “Lord of men” (9.163 etc.) and “Shepherd of the people”; with Diomedes “of the Great war-cry” (10.219 etc.); with Menelaus, who is “Famed for his spear” (5.577, 10.230 etc.); with Achilles, who is “Swift-footed” (9.307 etc.); and with Nestor, the “Driver of horses” (10.543 etc.), “Shepherd of the people” (10.73 etc.), and “Guardian of the Achaeans” (15.370 etc.).

⁴⁶⁸ Cf. 5.354, 486; 7.1, etc.

⁴⁶⁹ *Iliad* (10.363, 2.278); and *Odyssey* (8.3ff, 9.504, 22.283 etc.).

counsels” (*polymētis*) in situations of vexed discourse and when inaugurating climactic narrative actions. He becomes “equal to Zeus in *mētis*” just when he is called upon to lead others in maintaining the course of fate (the epic plot).⁴⁷⁰ No single epithet suffices to characterize Odysseus. Each one of them defines him only partially and provisionally. An epithet’s meaning, being situational, is always limited, being bound both by the context of the story and by the conditions of the story’s (public) performance. The poet’s choice of epithet, then, prepares the individual for particular deeds and dilemmas within the narrative while at the same time it prepares the audience (or reader) to consider the narrative’s variety of motives, tacit agencies and subtle ironies.⁴⁷¹

Beyond qualifying an individual and their relation to nested situations, epithets also draw attention to diverse social tensions among individuals. In most of the examples discussed above, it is the voice of the epic poet (the storyteller or narrator) who attributes epithets to Odysseus. It is usually ‘Homer’ who calls Odysseus “much-enduring”, “noble”, and a figure of “much invention” and “diverse counsels”. Yet the poet is not alone in delivering epithets, for they also arise in dialogue when characters address one another. These attributions speak not only to the individual addressed but to relations between them, to their relative dependencies and expectations with respect to one another. For example, “Odysseus of many devices” (*polymēchanos*) is the personal address of the goddess Athena, the nymph Calypso, the enchantress Circe, and the spirit of the blind prophet Teiresias. These extraordinary agents call upon Odysseus with this epithet when they have productive counsel to offer him for his journey. This summoning epithet prefaces their counsel, whether its guidance entails motivating encouragement, imperative instructions, or riddling directions.⁴⁷² Like the gods who speak out from the

⁴⁷⁰ Odysseus is “equal to Zeus in counsel” when (at Athena’s prompting) he restrains the Achaeans from fleeing Troy before the fated time (2.169, 407); and when Nestor calls upon him to join a decisive counsel that leads to his infiltrating mission (10.137).

⁴⁷¹ On features of Homeric poetry that reflect on its own performance and performative situation, see Bakker (2005).

⁴⁷² Athena speaks to (and of) “Odysseus *polymēchanos*” when offering him help to make his way home, and when advising him on the restoration of Ithaca (1.205, 13.285, 16.137). Calypso addresses him in this way when offering help with his raft so that he can begin his return home (5.203). Circe calls on Odysseus with the epithet when she offers directions for his trip to the underworld (10.401, 10.488). Teiresias greets him with this epithet in Hades, when offering directions for his journey that extends beyond the *Odyssey* (11.92). Other spirits in Hades also preface their advice by addressing Odysseus with this epithet: Elphenor (11.60); Agamemnon (11.405); Achilles (11.473); and Herakles (11.617). Later, Odysseus recalls a moment of self-direction in which he addressed himself with the formula (14.486).

stage-machine (*ex mēchina*) in later Athenian tragedy, these supernatural agents in Homeric epic intervene to reorient (and to some extent resolve) the course of mortal action. Thus, when the goddess, nymph, enchantress or spirit invoke “Odysseus *polymēchanos*” they are not simply ornamenting the hero with praise, nor emphasizing some diversity of “devices” that he already possesses. Rather, they are prompting him—more proactively—to proceed advisedly, to take and interpret their guidance and, so, devise his “way” (*mechanē*).⁴⁷³ This epithet, then, speaks, in part, to Odysseus’ capability to accept counsel and, so, act with assistance. Another good example of how epithets speak to the relative aptitudes and motives between characters is when Odysseus’ fellow contenders for fame address him in the *Iliad*. For instance, on different occasions, Agamemnon and Nestor each greet him as “Odysseus, greatly to be praised, great glory of the Achaeans” (9.673, 10.544). In isolation, these superlatives might be taken literally as uncritical praise. In narrative context, however, they suggest more of a subtle test that teasingly puts him in probation. For, each time they use this address they go on to ask Odysseus whether and how well he managed to accomplish an assigned mission (to Achilles and into Trojan territory). His reputation, then, would here seem to be more questioned than asserted by these qualifications, since at the time of their address Agamemnon and Nestor are wondering whether Odysseus has indeed earned his great glorious reputation.⁴⁷⁴ In these two examples of personal address (by extraordinary agents in the *Odyssey* and by contending heroes in the *Iliad*), Odysseus’ fame is announced with some ambiguity. This ambiguity points to the contingency and relative weakness of individual capabilities by drawing attention to other agencies and conditions that influence, limit, and challenge individual actions. In these examples we also find a mode of naming that most resembles the manners of address in Athenian drama, where individuals are usually speaking to one another in dialogue.

Two further Homeric modes of naming are relevant to note, since these also help to understand Odysseus’ claim to the title “architects” in Euripides’ play. In the *Odyssey*, the hero is sometimes named with epithets elliptically, *in lieu* of his proper name. In these instances, the qualifications perform obliquely as suggestive pseudonyms. Being

⁴⁷³ This term *mechanē*, does not assume the involvement of a machine, but rather any thoughtful contrivance. In some cases, a “way” (as in finding a “way” out) is the best translation of the term. As “*polymēchan*” Odysseus demonstrates at a dire moment on the Trojan battlefield, one of the “ways” available is to run away *Iliad* (8.93).

⁴⁷⁴ In the *Odyssey*, the Sirens also tease the hero with the same address (12.184).

frequently uttered by his family and loyal servants, these names tend to be euphemistic and pitying. In this manner, the hero is named as “that man”, “a good man”, a “kindly master” and the “honorable one”, as well as the “most woeful” and “unhappy one”.⁴⁷⁵ Compared to many of his other titles, this short list of names uttered in place of “Odysseus” presents a figure that is at once more modest, more common, and more sorrowful. Finally, Odysseus names himself. This mode of naming bears directly on Euripides’ play, since it is Odysseus who calls himself “architects”. In this self-reflexive manner in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus makes diverse and contradictory claims: to anonymity, to blamelessness, to symbolic status, to unluckiness, and to unrivalled renown. We have already reviewed his most memorable claim to anonymity when, in what has been called an “abandonment of heroic identity”, he defensively calls himself “No one” (*Outis*) while trapped inside the cave of the Cyclops (9.366).⁴⁷⁶ In other situations, notably when he is obliged to lie so as to conceal his identity for the sake of his restorative scheme, Odysseus calls himself “blameless” (*amumonos*).⁴⁷⁷ While in disguise, he also presents himself in ways that are symbolically charged: claiming to be a man in exile from Crete,⁴⁷⁸ and naming himself Aethon, “Blazes”, before his wife.⁴⁷⁹ At other moments, when lamenting his misfortune, Odysseus qualifies himself as a man “of many sorrows” (*polystonos*), and “bad luck” (*dusmorō*).⁴⁸⁰ However, when Odysseus prepares to tell his incredible tales to the Phaeacian King—beginning with his story of overcoming the Cyclops—he boldly announces his proper identity, harnesses all his tricks, and casts his fame far and wide: “I am Odysseus son of Laertes, a concern to men by all my wiles (*pasi doloisin*) and my fame reaches the heaven” (9.19-20).⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁵ See, for example, 14.122; 4.724ff, 814; 14.63; 14.147; 5.105, 3.95, 4.325; 4.182. On this mode of oblique naming, see Austin (1972).

⁴⁷⁶ Segal (1994), 97.

⁴⁷⁷ *amumonos*, 14.159, 16.100, 19.304, etc.

⁴⁷⁸ *Odyssey* 13.256ff, 14.199ff, 16.62, 17.523, 19.172, 338. As a man on the run from Crete, Odysseus resembles Daedalus, who also took flight from Crete.

⁴⁷⁹ *Odyssey* 19.183. On the significance of this name, see Bradley (1976), and below p. 298.

⁴⁸⁰ *Odyssey* 19.118 and 7.270.

⁴⁸¹ For the significance and complexities of this self-introduction, see Segal (1994), 86ff.

Dramatic Adjustments: re-qualifying Odysseus in Athenian drama

9.0

Although many of the qualifying epithets discussed above belong exclusively to Odysseus in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, not one is attributed to him in Euripides' *Cyclops*. Such a divestiture of Homeric fame is, however, neither peculiar to Odysseus nor to Euripides' satyr play. Homeric epithets are rarely found anywhere in Athenian drama. Such expressions, although integral to epic composition, were not essential to dramatic poetry. Nevertheless, although the poetic style of fifth century BCE drama had changed, the poetic act of suggestively naming protagonists remained significant. Moreover, the purposefulness of the dramatic poet in qualifying their protagonists had arguably increased; for, unlike oral poets, dramatists were not bound to a tradition of drawing from a stock repertoire of epithets.

The only instances where Odysseus' epic epithets do appear in Athenian drama are in scenes that overtly exploit their Homeric reference, treating Odysseus' epic fame with suspicion. In Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, the central hero of the tragedy (Philoctetes) accuses Odysseus of harboring “many devices” (*polymēchanos*), which are further qualified as “shameless deceptions” (1135-36). Elsewhere, in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, “*polymētis* Odysseus” is evoked for comic effect. When a man obsessed with jury duty is detained in a cell because of his affliction, the chorus members (wondering how next he will try to escape) guess that he will attempt to “tunnel through” the wall like “*polymētis* Odysseus” (350-51). From just these two excerpts of Athenian drama it is evident that in the fifth century BCE, Odysseus' epic fame was regarded ambiguously: to a tragic hero his “many devices” shamelessly deceive; and to a comic chorus his “diverse counsels” (though exemplary) were laughable. How, then, do the agents in Euripides' satyr play qualify Odysseus? This is the question to which we now turn.

QUALIFYING ODYSSEUS IN EURIPIDES' *CYCLOPS*

9.1

Silenus, the elder father of the satyrs, is the first to see and, so, address Odysseus. Silenus catches sight of him, together with his team of rowers, approaching the island of the Cyclops from a distance and regards him as some sort of “commander” (*stratēlatē tini*, 87)—a military man together with his militant crew, “lords of the oar” (*kōpēs anaktas*, 86). As Odysseus and his crew come closer, however, Silenus regards them as “unlucky strangers” (*ō talaipōroi xenoι*, 89), since he foresees their terrible fate. Once

Odysseus properly introduces himself, Silenus assesses him otherwise: “[I’ve heard of you], the wheedling chatterer, Sisyphus’ son” (104). With this response, Silenus makes clear that certain aspects of Odysseus’ reputation have preceded him even to the land of the Cyclops; for, in this line, Silenus not only compares the hero to a noisy instrument (a “wheedling chatterer”, or “bitter castanet”),⁴⁸² but also foregrounds the rumor of his bastard status as the son not of Laertes but of the infamous cheater of death, Sisyphus.⁴⁸³ After Odysseus offers Silenus a tantalizing taste of wine, however, Silenus’ judgment of him quickly softens; for, Silenus now greets him as “dearest of friends” (*ō philtate*, 140), and with his proper name and title, “my lord Odysseus” (*anax Odusseu*, 189). Yet, any graciousness implied here is shown to be self-serving and short-lived, since Silenus soon reverts to insults, misrepresenting Odysseus to the Cyclops as a bandit (232-40), and chiding Odysseus’ artful manner of speech as “grandiloquent and glib” (*kompsos kai lalistatos*, 315).

Polyphemus also labels Odysseus with an array of mostly derogatory titles. As the Cyclops first struts into the action of the play, he too catches sight of Odysseus and his crew at a distance, and regards them as some sort of “mob” (*ochlon*)—“pirates” or “robbers” (*lēistai... klōpes*) that have come to plunder his cave (222-3). Odysseus’ subsequent identification of himself as one of the sackers of Troy does little to improve the giant’s judgment of him, since Polyphemus condemns that famous expedition as “shameful” (*aischron*, 280-4). The giant extends this contemptuous assessment of the hero with a further taunt, addressing him as “Little man...” (*anthrōpiske*, 316). Once Odysseus offers the Cyclops a pleasing cup of wine, however, the giant’s ill humor is tempered and his perception of the stranger adjusted. For, after just one sip, Polyphemus welcomes Odysseus as his “dearest friend” (*philtate xenōn*), “guest” (*ō xene*), and personal “wine-pourer” (*oinochoos*, 418, 510, 548, 566). This condition of polite rapport,

⁴⁸² Olson’s translation for *krotalon drimu*.

⁴⁸³ This version of Odysseus’ parentage was “popular with his enemies in tragedy”—see Seaford (2003), note to line 104. The same sentiment is found in Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Aulis* 1363, and in Sophocles’ *Ajax* 189ff, and *Philoctetes* 416f, 624-5.

According to myth, Zeus punished Sisyphus to death for disclosing one of his love affairs. Just before dying, however, Sisyphus instructed his own wife to refuse his body proper burial. Once in Hades, Sisyphus then persuaded Death (or, by other accounts, Persephone) to allow him to return to earth temporarily so as to receive his due burial rites. Yet, once back among the living, Sisyphus did not keep his promise and lived to a ripe old age. When he returned to Hades (having died of natural causes) he received his famous punishment—perpetual futile toil (rolling a stone uphill), intended to keep the clever escape artist in check. On Sisyphus’ crime and punishment, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1986).

however, is fleeting, since Polyphemus' assessment of Odysseus at the end of the play culminates in a flurry of abuses: "worthless wretches", or *non-beings* (*ouden ontes*, 667); "abominable guest" (*ō xenos*, *ō miaros*, 676-7); and "all-evil one" (*pankakos*, 689).

Only the chorus of satyrs addresses Odysseus with consistent respect over the course of the play. Such goodwill conferred by a chorus is significant, as choruses tend to give representative voice to the common views of the people.⁴⁸⁴ The extent to which this held true for a chorus of satyrs is somewhat of a question;⁴⁸⁵ nevertheless, the satyrs' courtesy to Odysseus stands out against the many belittling remarks from Silenus and Polyphemus. To begin with, the satyrs call the hero simply by his proper name "Odysseus" (175, 377, 708). Then, in appropriate instances, they speak out in defense of his status as a representative "guest" and "stranger"—imploing Polyphemus to "do no injustice (*adikei*) to the strangers (*tois xenois*)" (272, cf. 551). The satyrs also greet Odysseus pitifully, "poor man..." (*ō talaipōre*, 381); endearingly, "dearest of friends..." (*ō philtate*, 437); and with an apparent compliment on his shrewd intellect, "We have long heard about your being clever (*sophon*)" (450).

Despite these few words of regard from the satyrs, the names and descriptive addresses that Odysseus receives in the land of the Cyclops resound with little of his Homeric fame. Only "Lord" (*anax*) matches one of his epic titles, and only "clever" (*sophon*) hints at his famed cunning. In the context of the fifth century BCE, however, being "clever" was ambiguous. Although *sophos* was in some cases a commendable qualification of *tektons*, poets, musicians, seers and certain divinities;⁴⁸⁶ it was in other

⁴⁸⁴ Donald J. Mastronarde (1999), among others, emphasizes the "middling values" of choruses, which (in tragedy) mediate between the common views of the spectators and the extraordinary virtues, ambitions and failures of the heroes. On the role of the tragic chorus as representative of the "collective citizen body", see Longo (1990). On the tragic chorus' embodiment of "traditional [or gnomic] wisdom", see Foley (2003). On the ritual agencies of the chorus, see also below, p. 232-33, n. 561, and p. 243-44.

⁴⁸⁵ Some scholars take satyrs as a counter-model to society; others see their strangeness as performing a special representative function. Mark Griffith (2005), esp. 171-76, for instance, suspects that Athenian audiences perceived satyr choruses as "friends", playing out their "most childish and simple desires"—basic, or naïve, desires for food, drink, revelry, sex and existential release from arduous human conditions and mortal limitations. Similarly, Bernd Seidensticker (2003), esp. 107, suggests that satyrs, being always extrinsic to the mythic stories they become involved in, are special outsider interpreters of them, thus modeling the audiences' eccentricity to the same tale.

⁴⁸⁶ *Sophos* qualifies Daedalus in Euripides *Eurytheus* (Frag. 372), and *tektons* in general in Euripides' *Alcetes* 348, and Bacchylides' *Ode* 26.6. The noun *sophia* (wisdom or art) is associated with *tektons* already in the *Iliad* 15.412; yet the adjective found here (*sophos*) is not Homeric. *Sophos* qualifies dramatic poets and protagonists (in Aristophanes' *Peace* 700,

circumstances associated more dubiously with treacherous artifice;⁴⁸⁷ and further trivialized by contemporaneous peddlers of sophistry. The particular context of the attribution of *sophos* to Odysseus in the satyr play offers a clue on how we ought to take it; that is, as being closely associated with Dionysus. For, not only do the satyrs (Dionysian followers) initially qualify Odysseus as being “clever”; but, later in the play—as Odysseus pours the climactic cup of Dionysian wine that brings about Polyphemus’ drunken epiphany (and catastrophic decision to go sleep in his cave)—the wine-supplying “grapevine” is deemed “clever” by Polyphemus (572). In other words, first Odysseus (who bears the wine), and then the wine Odysseus pours, is qualified as *sophos*. In a related play of Euripides (*Bacchae*), *sophos* is also repeatedly associated with Dionysus, specifically with the “wisdom” of participating in Dionysian rites (such as wine drinking and masquerading), and with the “wisdom” of following other such sacred customs.⁴⁸⁸ Thus, a special kind of Dionysian “wisdom” seems to be active in Odysseus’ *sophos*. Although this Dionysian quality does not lessen the ambiguity of what such “wisdom” entails (as both the tragedy of *Bacchae* and the punishing effects of the wine on Polyphemus show) it does connect Odysseus’ “clever” capabilities less to sophistry and more to those dramatic arts and religious rites that Dionysus exemplifies.

Less ambiguous than the satyrs’ attribution of *sophos* to Odysseus, are the many negative personal addresses of Silenus and Polyphemus. From the beginning, these antagonists establish an air of suspicion around the hero, holding him and his heroic deeds in ill repute, and prejudging him as an aimless troublemaker and thief. One way to

798, 1029-30 and *Lysistrata* 368, 577); musicians (Euripides’ *Iphigenia Among the Taurians* 1238); seers, notably Cassandra (Euripides’ *Frag.* 62g); and a number of Divinities, including Hermes (Aristophanes’ *Peace* 428), Dionysus (Euripides’ *Bacchae* 655-6, 815), Prometheus (Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 62, 944); Apollo (Aeschylus *Eumenides* 279; Euripides’ *Electra* 1246; Aristophanes’ *Wealth* 11); and Athena (Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* 431).

⁴⁸⁷ In Euripides’ *Medea*, for instance, Medea (while scheming to murder her children) claims to be the “the most skillful (*sophōtatai*) *tekton* of every sort of harm (*kakōn*)” (407).

⁴⁸⁸ See Leinieks (1996), 257-75. As Leinieks shows, when *sophos* is associated with Dionysus in *Bacchae* it implies the “wisdom” of participating in Dionysian rites; yet, when the term is attributed to the young impious King it implies a trivial and practical sort of “cleverness” (*sophon*). This “clever” King falls to Dionysian “wisdom” in *Bacchae*, not unlike the self-assured Polyphemus falls to Odysseus’ (and the wine’s) *sophos* in *Cyclops*. In *Cyclops*, Dionysian “wisdom” also stands in opposition to Polyphemus’ earlier statements: that “wealth” is “god to the wise” (*tois sophois theos*, 316); and that to think only of oneself is “god in the eyes of those of wisdom” (*toisi sōphrosin*, 337). For another view of Euripides’ use of *sophos* (as being connected to the “wisdom” of the dramatic poet), see Winnington-Ingram (1969). For a related view on Aristophanes’ use of *sophos* (as an “active, creative skill or artistry, for which knowledge, practice, and native wit are all required”) see K. J. Dover’s note to line 94 of Aristophanes’ *Clouds* (1968).

explain these mostly derogatory epithets would be to consider them as simply playing into the burlesque atmosphere of satyr plays. Yet, the satyrs' own judgment of Odysseus is rather neutral, even sympathetic. The assumption that Odysseus' ambiguous fame in *Cyclops* is explainable by the satyr situation is dismissible also for another reason: a survey of Odysseus' fame in other Athenian drama quickly shows that his ill reputation was not genre-specific. Euripides, in particular, adorned the Homeric hero with mostly derogatory epithets and Sophocles, similarly, presented him with suspicion.⁴⁸⁹ A review of the hero's fame in tragic drama will demonstrate this point, and further suggest the grounds for such suspicion.

TRAGIC INFAMY: ODYSSEUS' *POLY*-CAPABILITIES TURN TO *PAN*

9.2

As mentioned above, Odysseus' Homeric epithets, specifically, his "many devices" (*polymēchanos*) and "diverse counsels" (*polymētis*) are portrayed in Athenian drama as shameless and laughable. His "*poly*-devices" and "*poly*-counsels", however, are not the only manifold aspects of his fame to be cast into suspicion; for, in Athenian tragedy, his *polyvalence* is itself targeted for abuse. Instead of being praised as a "*much* enduring" figure of *diverse* turns, tales, tricks and inventions (*polytlas*, *polytropos*, *polyainos*, *pasi doloisin*, *polyphrōn*), Odysseus is accused of being "*all*-evil" (*pankakos*),⁴⁹⁰ "*all*-destructive" (*panōlei*),⁴⁹¹ "*all*-cunning" (*pansophon*),⁴⁹² "*all*-working" (*panourgos*),⁴⁹³ and prepared to "do [*any* or] *everything*" (*panta prassōn*).⁴⁹⁴ It seems that Odysseus' *poly* has turned to *pan*. His positively diverse and copious capabilities, from which he typically (in Homeric epic) aimed to select the most appropriate mode of action for particular occasions, are re-cast in tragic drama as an indiscriminate willy-nilly

⁴⁸⁹ Aeschylus makes one ambiguous mention of Odysseus in *Agamemnon*. Upon returning from Troy, Agamemnon recalls that Odysseus, "who sailed against his will" became ("once yoked") a close ally—"my willing right-hand man" (841-42). Some, however, have interpreted this to exemplify Agamemnon's misjudgment. See Stanford (1963), 261, n. 1.

⁴⁹⁰ Euripides' *Cyclops* 689 (as accused by Polyphemus).

⁴⁹¹ Sophocles' *Philoctetes* 1357 (as accused by Philoctetes).

⁴⁹² Sophocles, Frag. 913. Here Odysseus is called an "all-cunning piece of mischief" (*krotēma*)—a "thing worked by the hammer" (*LSJ*), suggesting a marred or hardened individual.

⁴⁹³ Sophocles' *Philoctetes* 408, 448, 927; and *Ajax* 445 (Ajax specifically claims that Odysseus' *phrēn* is "all-working"). Cf. Euripides' *Philoctetes*, 789d.9.

⁴⁹⁴ Sophocles, Frag. 567.

fancy for “all”.⁴⁹⁵ Along with this lack of discretion, Odysseus is qualified in tragedy as an incessantly shifty and deceitful individual: “a shifty-minded wrangler”;⁴⁹⁶ a “well-practiced fox”;⁴⁹⁷ a “silently crafty... snake”;⁴⁹⁸ and one who is as “wicked” (*kakou*) as he is “wise” (*sophou*).⁴⁹⁹ In addition to these complaints about his scrupulousness, Odysseus was further judged to be an instrument of the mob: a “hypocrite with a honeyed-tongue”; and, a pandering demagogue “who cringe[s] for favors from a screaming crowd”.⁵⁰⁰ Further, Odysseus’ craftiness, which the tragic poets do put literally in terms of *technē*, qualified his special skill for fashioning *not* restorative schemes and charming stories, but “treachery” (*kakon*).⁵⁰¹ As one tragic rival suspects, Odysseus is “the tool of every treachery”.⁵⁰² Finally, in Athenian tragedy, the only direct remark about Odysseus’ *mētis* is that it is “bad” (*kakomētis*).⁵⁰³

⁴⁹⁵ Odysseus’ poly-manners later become the topic for Plato’s dialogue *Lesser Hippias*. There, Socrates questions his interlocutor’s assumption that a figure of “many turns” (*polytropos*), like Odysseus, is necessarily “false” (*pseudēs*). He argues that the power to deceive (*exapatan*), if directed by “shrewdness and a sort of intelligence” (*panourgias kai phronēseōs tinos*, 365e), or if led “by design” (*ex epiboulēs*, 370e) is more virtuous than falseness arising unintentionally. This brings Socrates and his interlocutor to the unsettling conclusion that he who deceives intentionally is better than a man who acts deceptively by mistake (372d). Aristotle similarly valued shiftiness as a necessary mode to discover what is most appropriate (*Rhetoric* 1408a). Yet, as Stanford (1963), 91, points out in his study of the changing perceptions of Odysseus, “the border between adaptability and hypocrisy is easily crossed”. On the poetic ambiguities of a “master of truth” as also being a “master of deception”, see Detienne (1996), esp. 86ff.

⁴⁹⁶ *poikilophrōn kopis*. Euripides’ *Hecuba* 131, Collard Trans. On Odysseus as the “embodiment of changeable opinion”, see Worman (1999).

⁴⁹⁷ *toupitripton kinados*. Sophocles’ *Ajax* 103 (as evoked by Ajax).

⁴⁹⁸ *siga dolios... drakōn*, Euripides’ *Orestes* 1404-6 (as evoked by Helen’s Trojan slave).

⁴⁹⁹ Euripides’ *Trojan Women* 1224-5 (as portrayed by Hecuba).

⁵⁰⁰ Euripides’ *Hecuba* (131-2, 256). This judgment by the Trojan chorus is echoed in *Iphigenia at Aulis* by Agamemnon: “He is always [crafty] (*poikilos*) and sides with the rabble” (526).

⁵⁰¹ In Sophocles’ *Philoctetes* Odysseus is accused of “crafting treachery” (*technasthai kaka*, 80). In Euripides’ *Iphigenia Among the Taurians*, Iphigenia claims to have been lured away from her mother (to be sacrificed) “by the craft (*technais*) of Odysseus” (24). In Euripides’ *Rhesus*, Hector deduces that his comrade was murdered “by the arts (*technaisi*) of Odysseus” (953).

⁵⁰² *apantōn t’aei kakōn organon*. Sophocles’ *Ajax* 381-2 (as evoked by Ajax).

⁵⁰³ Euripides’ *Orestes* 1403. A Trojan slave deems Odysseus as the model for another “evil-minded (*kakomētis*) man”. In other rare instances where *mētis* is mentioned in Athenian drama, it is also dubiously valued. For instance, the chorus of defeated elders in Aeschylus’ *Persians* ask: “what mortal can escape the guileful-*mētis* (*doliomētis*) of the gods?” (93). And, in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* the chorus portray Clytemnestra (who has just murdered her husband) as possessing an over abundance of *mētis*: *megalomētis* (1426).

Euripides offers an especially vehement assessment of the hero through a speech of Hecuba, which gives a fuller sense of such negative evaluations. One must bear in mind, however, that at the time of Hecuba's outburst in the *Trojan Women*, her misery is already profound. Once a majestic Trojan Queen, this heroine is now a defeated captive, being held by the Greeks: her city is destroyed, her husband gone, her fifty sons dead, one daughter has been sacrificed, and another is raving mad. On top of these misfortunes, a herald arrives and announces another: she is to be handed over, as a slave, to Odysseus. Hecuba is livid:

Oh no, no!... Is it my lot to be a slave to a vile and treacherous man, an enemy of justice, a lawless creature! He twists everything from there to here and back from here to there by his deceitful tongue, making enmity where before there was friendship! Alas.

(*Trojan Women*, 278-87)⁵⁰⁴

The reasons behind Odysseus' apparent degradation from epic fame to dramatic infamy do not wholly concern us here.⁵⁰⁵ There are, however, a few relevant issues that should be emphasized. Unlike other heroic lords of epic poetry, Odysseus repeatedly found himself in scenarios where typically heroic modes of action were not feasible. His predicament in the land of the Cyclops (in the *Odyssey*) exemplifies such a situation. Polyphemus was too powerful to fight directly, and too witless to reason with openly. This dilemma called for more complex and (for some) less honorable modes of intervention. Odysseus was also caught in awkward situations during the Trojan War. For instance, on a certain mission, Odysseus was required to sneak into Troy disguised as a down-trodden beggar. His exit strategy was even more wretched, as he was forced to

⁵⁰⁴ Other extended critical assessments of Odysseus in Euripidean tragedy are delivered by the Trojan warrior, Hector, in Euripides' *Rhesus* (498-509), and by a Trojan in *Orestes* (1403-07).

⁵⁰⁵ On this problem, see the chapters "Growing Hostility" and "The Stage Villain" in Stanford (1963). Stanford offers a number of reasons why Odysseus' "variegated personalities" came under scrutiny in the fifth century BCE: because a "stricter attitude to truth and morality" was emerging; because the dire political situation in Athens prioritized (for some) military might and aristocratic power over subtlety; and because deceptive politicians, sophists and sycophants had trivialized the kind of rhetorical savvy Odysseus exemplifies (pp. 100-1). Aside from a dismissive footnote (p 263, n. 19), Stanford does not mention Odysseus' performance in *Cyclops* in his otherwise comprehensive study. Odysseus' poly-manners may have also been problematically related to *polypragmosunē*, a kind of "meddlesomeness", associated with political busy-bodies in Aristophanes' *Clouds* 471, *Wealth* 914, *Acharnians* 833, *Frogs* 228, 749, *Birds* 44, and *Peace* 652, 1058. See Osborne (1990).

escape the city through its sewer.⁵⁰⁶ Such unflattering performances as these meant that Odysseus attracted ambivalent remarks already in Homeric poetry.⁵⁰⁷ The seemingly unheroic tactics of Odysseus also drew dismissive judgments from later aristocratic poets.⁵⁰⁸ His misadventures further supplied early comic poets with excellent dramatic material for satire;⁵⁰⁹ and provided tragedians (other than Euripides) with plots for their satyr plays.⁵¹⁰ With all this multifarious fame, Euripides' audience would have been as familiar with a much-reviled, most-deceitful and buffoonish Odysseus, as they would have been with a "much-praised", "great-hearted" and "god-like" figure of myth. Yet, this review of Odysseus' variegated fame in Athenian drama is significant not primarily because it tells us what audiences thought about Odysseus, but more because it shows that dramatic poets, especially Euripides, deemed Odysseus an appropriate figure to bear such contradictions and, so, give full representation to them. Further, this review reveals that it was in the context of Odysseus' ill-repute, as an ambiguous and unappreciated (or, perhaps, under-appreciated) figure that Euripides choose to qualify him with a new name, one that he had not earned before, a compound name beginning neither with *poly* nor *pan*, but with *archē*.

While acknowledging Odysseus' dubious reputation it is also necessary to make a concession. The most negative assessments of Odysseus in Athenian tragedy are voiced by his adversaries: by his Trojan enemies (Hector, Hecuba and other captive women); and by those disgruntled comrades (Ajax and Philoctetes) who, believing themselves to be more valorous, felt they had been dishonored by the subtle hero. As suggested above, Odysseus is not reducible to what his antagonists might say about him in moments of tragedy. This is not only because such remarks disregard broader situational tensions, but

⁵⁰⁶ His sneaking into Troy in the likeness of a beggar is mentioned at *Odyssey* 4.246ff. His escape is known through the fragments of the "Little Iliad" of Lesches and a play, now lost, by Sophocles' *The Laconian Women* (Frag. 367-8).

⁵⁰⁷ Achilles implies suspicion when he says to Odysseus "hateful in my eyes... is that man who hides one thing in his thoughts and says another" (*Iliad* 9.312). See Nagy (1999), 52. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' own crewman voices suspicion about his rashness (10.428-37); and a Phaeacean youth taunts him, calling him a poor athlete and mere "leader of sailors (*archos nautaōn*) who are merchantmen, one who is mindful of his freight and keeps close watch on his cargo and the gains of his greed (*kerdeōn*)" (8.162-4).

⁵⁰⁸ Pindar's *Nemean Odes* 7 and 8 exemplify such dismissals. See Stanford (1963), 92-4.

⁵⁰⁹ Epicharmus and Cratinus, among others, comically dramatized Odysseus. See Phillips (1959).

⁵¹⁰ For example, Aeschylus' fragmentary *Circe*.

also because they fail to consider how he represented himself. Indeed, as in the epics, Odysseus speaks for and of himself in *Cyclops*. Thus, we must return to Euripides' satyr play, as we have yet to ask: what does Odysseus call himself besides "architect"?

SELF-REPRESENTATION: ODYSSEUS QUALIFIES HIMSELF

9.3

Just as the other characters in Euripides' *Cyclops* have many names for Odysseus, so Odysseus has names for himself. Yet, unlike those given to him by others, the names he puts upon himself would seem to represent aspects of himself that he intends to portray for others. Here, we are presented with a diverse range, for Odysseus qualifies himself diversely both as an individual and as one belonging to various groups. First, as an individual.

Upon coming ashore the island of the Cyclops, Odysseus introduces himself to Silenus by giving his proper name and status: "Odysseus of Ithaca, Lord of Cephallene", the island region around his homeland (103). A little later, however, Odysseus presents himself to the satyrs as a humbled servant (*diakonos*), having gravely attended to Polyphemus at his meal inside the cave (406). Among the satyrs, Odysseus further accentuates his agile manner and beguiling intent. For, just before describing his scheme to overcome the Cyclops, Odysseus qualifies the mode of action he prefers: "My desire (*prothumia*) is for something cunning" (*dolios*, 449). The hero marks his intention in this way specifically to reject the satyrs' assumption that his plan would involve more overtly violent or cowardly manners of attack (slaughtering the Cyclops, or else pushing the drunken giant off a cliff)—tactics to which Odysseus is presently opposed (447-8).

Besides qualifying his individual status (as flexing from lord to servant) and his own predisposition (for cunning), Odysseus also admits his anonymity. As in the Homeric episode, he withholds his proper name from Polyphemus, shielding himself from the curse by calling himself "No one" (*Outis*, 549).⁵¹¹ Yet, this detail does not receive extended attention in Euripides' drama. The second part of the trick, for instance (in which, *mē tis* "not one" arises as a suggestive substitute for his name) does not manifest. A different kind of ellipsis, however, does; for, just before and immediately after blinding the Cyclops, Odysseus estranges himself from himself by referring to "Odysseus" in the third person. Just prior to entering the cave, he prays to Hephaestus,

⁵¹¹ See above p. 187-88.

Sleep and Night, to not allow “Odysseus, himself (*auton... Odussea*)... to die at the hands of a man who heeds not gods or men” (603-5).⁵¹² Then, after the punishing deed is done, Odysseus responds to Polyphemus’ frustrated cry (“where are you?”) by saying: “At some distance, where I can keep this person of Odysseus (*sōm’ Odusseōs tode*) safe from harm” (690). He then boastfully reveals to Polyphemus the “name” of his avenger: “*Odussea*” (692). And this he does in an emphatic way that brings attention less to his name, than to the agency his name implies.⁵¹³ For, “Odysseus” is derived from *oduomai*, a double-acting verb form of “odium”, thus making “*Odussea*” a personification of “he who inflicts [and suffers] pain”.⁵¹⁴ This forceful presentation of his painful name together with his self-estrangement at the dire moment of vengeance not only implies that Odysseus is calling himself the “Pain-inflictor”, but also suggests that another punishing agent is acting through “this person of Odysseus”. At the very end of the play the liberated satyrs maintain ambiguity about Odysseus’ identity by eagerly following “*this Odysseus*” (*toud’ Odusseōs*) out of the orchestra and toward “Bacchus” (708). Thus, “*this Odysseus*” seems to perform as a disguise and pseudonym for the god Dionysus who, acting through both Odysseus and the wine, inflicts pain on the adversary who had mistreated his followers (the satyrs) and shunned his sacred and social ways. There is, then, a theoxeny and theodicy motif in this climactic scene of Euripides’ *Cyclops*.⁵¹⁵ Granting this, it is also likely that Dionysus, though ostensibly absent, is among the plural

⁵¹² Other protagonists in Euripidean tragedy address themselves similarly in moments of extreme resolve. Medea, for instance, summons her courage to avenge Jason, by intoning, “Come, luckless hand, take the sword...” (*Medea* 1244, cf. 1028, 1056). And, Dionysus resolutely tells himself, “Dionysus, it’s now up to you... let us punish him!” (*Bacchae* 848). Alternatively, self-addresses arise in moments of extreme doubt, as when Hecuba asks herself, “Hecuba... What am I to do” (*Hecuba* 736-37). On such modes of self-address, see Walsh (1999). Poetic addresses to the “self” (*autos*) demonstrate a capacity for self-reflection, self-direction and internal dialogue—capacities that Odysseus indeed demonstrates throughout Homeric poetry (*Iliad* 11.400, Cf. 5.671, *Odyssey* 16.100, 20.9-30), see Pucci (1998), 149.

⁵¹³ The name is emphatic by repetition and position in the line, as Olson and Seaford note.

⁵¹⁴ See Austin (1972), where he reiterates Dimock’s suggestion that the double-acting name may be best translated as “Trouble”. Cf. Sophocles’ Frag. 965 in which Odysseus himself says: “Rightly I am called Odysseus, a name pregnant with harm (*kakōn*): for many enemies (*epōnumos*) have found me odious (*ōdusonto*)”. Cf. Clay (1983), 54-68. The story of how Odysseus received his name is told in the *Odyssey* 19.402ff.

⁵¹⁵ The motif of *theoxeny* (a god appearing in the guise of a stranger) is already associated with Odysseus’ return to Ithaca in the *Odyssey* (17.485-7). See Kearns (1982). On Odysseus’ relation to *theodicy* motifs (a god delivering justice), see Clay (1983), 213-39. One may also interpret this oblique intervention of Dionysus in relation to the *deus ex machina*—a mode of plot resolution favored by Euripides in his tragedies, see Dunn (1996), esp. 26-44.

“architects” actively leading the scheme in this play. Yet, we must also uncover Odysseus’ more mortal presentations of his plural representative “self”.

A PLURAL AND REPRESENTATIVE FIGURE

9.3b

Besides qualifying himself diversely as an individual, Odysseus further expands and complicates his identity in Euripides’ satyr play by naming various mortal groups to which he belongs, or in which he is bound to act. Being given in the plural, “architects” can be considered in relation to these other groups he names: sailors, strangers, suppliants and merchants. The situations in which Odysseus identifies himself with these particular groups are as follows.

Just prior to introducing himself to Silenus as “Lord” (103), Odysseus announces himself, while coming ashore, as one among “needy sailors” (*nautilois kechrēmenoīs* 98). In performance, a crew of sailors most certainly followed Odysseus into the orchestra, for their presence is often remarked upon in the script (indeed two of them are eaten in the cave). Theatrical convention, however, prevented these extras (effectively a second chorus) from speaking for themselves. Odysseus, then, can be regarded not simply as the “commander” (87) of these “sailors” (as Silenus had first identified him), but as their representative—as one who speaks and acts on their behalf. As Euripides’ other dramas attest, “sailors” could become “unruly” and “riotous”.⁵¹⁶ Yet, they might also be in genuine need of help—a wayward group seeking proper refuge from their disorienting troubles at sea. Being weathered, meek and disadvantaged by their displacement, “sailors” also perform in Euripidian drama figuratively: both metaphorically, as suppliants;⁵¹⁷ and allegorically, as figures who, being more metaphysically wayward, are seeking orienting markers upon the land and within the heavens, so as to direct their mortal journey.⁵¹⁸ Several times throughout the play, Odysseus re-asserts his bond and obligations to this “needy” group, since it is largely for the sake of these “sailors”,

⁵¹⁶ Euripides’ *Hecuba* (607) and *Iphigenia in Aulis* (914).

⁵¹⁷ The exiled descendents of Heracles, who are denied sanctuary as suppliants, figure themselves as displaced sailors—“who have escaped the wild blast of the storm and are a hand’s breadth from dry land, but then are driven by winds into the deep again!” (*Heracleidai*, 427-9). *Hecuba*, similarly, compares herself to a sailor who must surrender to chance and succumb to the waves (*Hecuba* 688ff). Cf. *Andromache* 891f.

⁵¹⁸ *Herakles* 668; *Helen* 1504; *Ion* 276, *Orestes* 1637, 1690; and *Hecuba* 1273.

“shipmates”, “comrades”, “friends”, “(fellow) survivors”, and “wasted (men) of the sea” that Odysseus vouches to overcome the Cyclops.⁵¹⁹ Indeed, immediately after Odysseus presents himself to the satyr chorus as “architect” (477), he makes a pledge concerning the mortal group he also leads: “I shall not leave behind my friends in the cave and save myself alone” (477-78).⁵²⁰

When the son of Poseidon first questions Odysseus about his identity, Odysseus foregrounds a bond beyond sailors. Instead, he names himself and his crew as “descendents of Ithaca” (277). Such a civic and ancestral affiliation, however, gains Odysseus no respect in the eye of the Cyclops, who sees all men as meat. Odysseus is thus obliged to count himself and his crew among another group: the class of wayward “strangers” (*xénoi*, 253). It is as a member of this vulnerable group that Odysseus begins his appeal to Polyphemus for fair treatment and customary hospitality. When this appeal of “strangers” goes unheeded, Odysseus implores Polyphemus more earnestly, if rhetorically, in the mode of “suppliants” (*hiketas* 287, 300).⁵²¹ In speaking as a member of these groups—strangers and suppliants—Odysseus places himself under the auspices of Zeus, whose epithets (*Xenios* and *Hikesios*) formally identified him as the divine protector of these groups and an avenger against anyone violating the sacred customs pertaining to their proper treatment.⁵²² As one among “strangers” and “suppliants”, Odysseus also acts within two of the most ardently upheld institutions of Athenian society. Although commonly respected, these religious and civic institutions were also increasingly at risk. For, in Euripides’ day, atrocious stories were circulating about the mistreatment of strangers and suppliants in places uncomfortably closer to Athens than the seemingly remote land of the Cyclops.⁵²³ The extreme mistreatment of the strangers

⁵¹⁹ The references are as follows: “shipmates” (*te nautas*, 604); “comrades” (*hetairōn*, 695); “friends” (*philous*, 466, 478); “wasted (men) of the sea” (*pontious ephthapménous*, 300); “us survivors” (*toūs leleimménous*, 307); “my own [kin] friends” (*toisi oikeiois philois*, 650).

⁵²⁰ Euripides presents Odysseus’ scheme as a social obligation, since, unlike the Homeric version, he could have fled (having already snuck out of the cave) and saved only himself.

⁵²¹ On figurative, or verbal supplication (without prostration), see Gould (1973), 84.

⁵²² On these common roles of Zeus, see, for example, Lloyd-Jones (1983), esp. 5.

⁵²³ Gould (1973), 82-3. The play’s setting in Aetna is telling in this regard, since the ancient historian Thucydides tells of the deplorable treatment that Greek prisoners actually received in that Sicilian land during the Peloponnesian War.

by Polyphemus in this satyr play (although presumably humorous) would have provided audiences with an appalling reminder of such violations of customary hospitality.

At another level, Odysseus' arrival as a stranger to an inhospitable and hostile situation bears special significance in the context of the Dionysia festival. This is, in part, because the theater of Dionysus was itself full of strangers (Pan-Hellenic visitors who had traveled to Athens with the expectation of receiving hospitality during the dramatic festival). Yet, beyond this immediate performative context, the situation in the satyr play also alludes to mythic contexts. For, by arriving to an inhospitable land as a stranger, Odysseus arrives to the land of the Cyclops as the god Dionysus had *first* arrived to various places in Attica: as a stranger, bringing with him compelling yet dangerous gifts, notably wine. According to myth, this god and his gifts were, at first, misunderstood and mistreated. Thus, the "stranger" (Dionysus) was greeted by violent resistance, which he—not unlike Odysseus—famously repaid.⁵²⁴ At another level of interpretation, Odysseus' appearance as a representative stranger also recalls his most sustained role in the *Odyssey*, since in nearly every book of this epic the hero appears to someone as a stranger. Thus, by identifying himself as one among "strangers" and "suppliants", Odysseus not only projects himself into these mortal groups and their political risks, but also suggestively implicates his own situation with topics of religious, mythic and epic significance that extend well beyond the ostensible plot of escaping the land of the Cyclops.

There is one further group that Odysseus explicitly associates himself with in Euripides' *Cyclops*. In a moment of self-defense—not wanting to be mistaken for belonging to a mob of pirates—Odysseus suggests that he and his crew have come ashore as merchants, engaged in fair and willing trade (254-8). A "cup of wine" is what

⁵²⁴ The myths of Dionysus' *first* arrivals are discussed in Detienne (1989). Dionysus' arrival to Athens is especially relevant to the *Dionysia*. As the story goes, when a priest from Eleutheraï first arrived to Athens with a statue of Dionysus "the Athenians did not receive the god with honor." Enraged by the cool reception, Dionysus inflicted all the Athenian men with a malady. The citizens consulted an oracle, and a cure was pronounced: "introduce the god with all due honor". Dionysus' statue was, then, brought back in a great procession, culminating with his proper reception—a seat of honor and hospitality including feasting, wine-drinking and dramatic storytelling. (Large phalluses were also fashioned by the Athenian men and carried in the procession, in memory of the malady they had suffered). The citizens were cured. The annual Dionysian festival can thus be understood as a recurring enactment of recompense, or atonement, providing Dionysus each year with the proper reception, seat and hospitality that he was initially denied. In other words, the festival was intended to mime the first installation of the god, as it *ought* to have occurred. On this "god-welcoming schema", its ritual of "integration" and the details of the myth of arrival, see: Sourvinou-Inwood (2003), 106-20; Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 57; Garland (1992), 159; and Connor (1989), 17.

Odysseus has to offer (139, 256), and a “cure for thirst” and sustenance (“bread”) is what he and his crew crave (98, 133).⁵²⁵ Although this exchange is interrupted, Odysseus’ offer of wine is very well received. Moreover, his skill in promoting Dionysian commodities only becomes more evident as the drama unfolds and more critical to his scheme as his trouble in the land of the Cyclops mounts.

Odysseus’ self-identification with “architects” later in the play does not obviously fit alongside these other named groups: needy sailors, strangers, suppliants and merchants. If there is commonality among these groups, it is in their wayward mode and intermediary status. Ought we extend these qualities also to “the architects”? If so, then the “architects” would appear likewise to be vulnerable, medial and interdependent. Then again, “the architects”—which Euripides added to the dramatization of this epic tale—could be taken to amend this set of groups, complementing them by offering what they lack: orientation, hospitality, protection, and hope for fair and just exchange. Regardless of how precisely the “architects” fit amidst these other groups, what is clear from this review is that Odysseus’ diverse and plural representation of himself extends the relevance of his story far beyond himself, for he projects himself as a member of such groups that any mortal might, at times, find themselves a member of.⁵²⁶

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At this point I must introduce another interpretive approach. Whereas the strategy attempted so far has focused on Odysseus’ names and epithets as primary clues illuminating the title and qualification “architects”, the subsequent discussion interprets the *acts* Odysseus performs as architect. We may recall that in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, “architecting” and “directing” (being explicitly associated with the protagonist) were taken as primary actions that gathered Trygaeus’ diverse modes of bringing about and revealing transformation. Here, in *Cyclops*, Odysseus’ role as “architect” is most explicitly related to acts of “commanding” and “persuading”.

⁵²⁵ Although Odysseus does not explicitly call himself a “merchant” (*emporos*), merchandise (*empolēn*) and mercantile actions (“buying” and “selling”) frequently qualify his initial exchanges in the play. On this “language of commerce”, see Konstan (1990), esp. 213.

⁵²⁶ The representative capacity of Odysseus is asserted in the very first line of the *Odyssey*, since the poet calls upon the Muse to help him sing of “that man” (*andra*, 1.1). See Goldhill (1991), 28ff; and Haubold (2000), esp. 26, and 134. Cf. Peradotto (1990), who notes that “Odysseus is never more himself, *autos*, than when he is [No one] *Outis*”; for such anonymity represents his open “potentiality” (p. 161 and 170).

— CHAPTER TEN | Part One —
Commanding Acts and Appeals to Order

After sneaking out of the cave and into the orchestra, Odysseus tells the satyrs about the dreadful story-like events taking place invisibly behind him. He then reveals the elaborate details of his scheme to positively alter those events, including the specific role the satyrs ought to play in it. Odysseus then culminates his exchange with the satyrs in this way:

Be silent now—for you know my scheme completely—
and when I command, be persuaded (to follow) the architects.

σιγατέ νυν · δόλον γὰρ ἐξεπίστασαι ·
χῶταν κελεύω, τοῖσιν ἀρχιτέκτοσιν | πείθεσθ' .

(*Cyclops* 476-8)

In this pivotal passage, which is at the root of this study, the activities of commanding (*keleuein*) and persuading (*peithesthai*) frame the evocation of “the architects”. The following two chapters take these actions as primary clues to interpreting Odysseus’ performance as “architect”. Before focusing on the commanding acts within the play, it is helpful to briefly consider some relevant models for such acts beyond it.

PROFITIOUS AND CONCILIATORY: PARADIGMATIC BIDDINGS OF GODS

10.1a

Commanding (*keleuein*) is a common but significant action in Greek drama, one that always intends to bring about further dramatic acts. When a protagonist commands, the command they give is usually authoritative in delivery and binding to those it directs. In Athenian drama, as in Athenian society, commanding tends to be a privilege of those already in a position of command, such as leaders of troops, rulers of lands, heads of households and masters of attendants—individuals whose claim to authority is acknowledged and generally accepted by the group subject to their authority. To fail to heed a command of one of these leading figures is to threaten the structure of authority.⁵²⁷ Yet, it is not an abstract sense of authority that we seek to understand by concerning ourselves with this act, but rather a particular understanding of how the action involves “architects”, or otherwise relates to architectural acts.

⁵²⁷ On “authority figures” in Athenian drama in general (especially tragedy), see Griffith (2005a).

My review of epic and dramatic poetry has shown that we are best to seek the architectural relevance of “commanding” *not* in the orders of mortals, but in the biddings of gods (and other such exceptional figures). For, whenever a significant work is to be made in Greek poetry, it is first bidden by an exemplary agent. For example, Zeus *bids* Hephaestus to shape-together Pandora (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 61); Thetis *implores* Hephaestus to make the armor for Achilles (*Iliad* 18.457ff); Calypso *bids* Odysseus to prepare the sacred place (*chōros*) to reach the underworld (10.517); Elpenor *bids* Odysseus to remember him by fashioning a burial marker (11.71), Teiresias *prophesizes* Odysseus’ act of setting up a permanent tribute to Poseidon (11.121ff); and Circe (herself bidden by Zeus via Hermes), *prompts* Odysseus to build his raft (*Odyssey*, 5.98ff, 5.162). In the *Homeric Hymns* one further finds gods commanding their own sanctuary to be founded and their own temple to be built. In the *Hymn to Apollo*, for instance, it is the very “words” of Apollo that establish the “foundations” of his oracular sanctuary at Delphi. It is upon these foundations that Trophonios and Agamedes (the architects) then “place a threshold of stone”, which, in turn, prepares conditions for innumerable mortals to build up temple walls all around.⁵²⁸ One could go far in gathering other architecturally suggestive commands in early Greek poetry—such as Pasiphaë bidding Daidalos to fashion for her a wooden cow (Bacchylides, *Dithyramb* 26.9)⁵²⁹—but this series is sufficient to demonstrate a pattern: significant works, including architectural works, are not simply made but preliminarily made known by a resolute declaration. It is this act of disclosure that, by pronouncing the intention of the work for others to hear, performs as a binding promise; one that is, in turn, reciprocated and perpetuated by the bidden work.

⁵²⁸ In the *Hymn to Apollo*, Apollo first “resolves to make” (*tekmērato poiēsasthai*) a lovely temple” at Delphi; then declares, “Here I *intend* to fashion (*phroneō teuxai*) a beautiful temple”; the poet subsequently sings, “So saying (*eipōn*) Phoibos Apollo [arranged] (*diethēke*) the foundations (*themethla*), broad and very long from beginning to end; and on them the sons of Ergionos, [the architects] Trophonios and Agamedes... placed a threshold (*oudon*) of stone. And the numberless races of men built the temple all around with hewn stones, to be a theme of song forever.” (294-99). Notably, each of Apollo’s *thoughtful* acts—of resolve, intention and speech (*tekmaïromai, phroneō, eipon*)—are accompanied by productive acts—of making, fashioning, and arranging (*poieō, teuchō, diatithēmi*). Cf. the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, where Demeter prompts “all the people” of Eleusis to fashion her temple (270ff); and a few lines later the mortal ruler of Eleusis echoes her call (296ff). On the motif of gods commanding their own temple to be built, see Burkert (1996), 27.

⁵²⁹ Other examples may be gathered from the poetry of Pindar (such as Nemean 4.80), where the poet presumes he has been *bidden* “to erect... a stele whiter than Parian marble”. There is an implied comparison here between the marble stele and Pindar’s own commissioned song. Cf. the negative connotations of an “unbidden” (*akeleustos*) song, as suggested by the chorus in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* (979).

This performative act of declaring and, so, inaugurating significant works is frequently put in terms of “commanding” (*keleuien*). And, it is this act that Odysseus, as “architect”, most explicitly promises to perform.

The importance of such preliminary declarations in the inauguration of architectural works in ancient society is also demonstrated by the recorded utterances of the oracle of Apollo at Delphi—an oracle that was central to the institution of city founding.⁵³⁰ The many fascinating details of this oracular institution do not concern us here, what is relevant to note is simply that several of the recorded proclamations of Apollo’s priestess either began with, or included, the binding verse: “I command—” (*keleuō*). The well-documented oracle commanding Telesikles to settle the Parians, for instance, began in this way: “Announce to the Parians, Telesikles, that I bid you found (*keleuō ktizein*) a conspicuous city in the island of Eeria”.⁵³¹ Other such oracular utterances include similar injunctions, thus marking the founding command as a binding proclamation—a kind of efficacious speech that requires no further support for its claim to veracity.⁵³²

Aside from these biddings of exceptional agents in Homeric and archaic poetry and of Apollo via his priestess from within Delphi’s oracular chamber, architecturally relevant commands are also delivered by gods in Athenian tragedy; particularly, by those divinities speaking-out from comparably eccentric positions at a drama’s end. Although tragic drama is full of agonizingly insoluble human conflicts, most tragedies do end with some sort of divinely influenced resolution, however paradoxical. For Euripides, many of these resolutions involved a god appearing miraculously overhead (either upon a stage machine or from an upper platform of the *skēnē*) and—from this elevated position—delivering a command for all the mortal agents assembled below to hear. A number of these commands implicate architecture, since the resolutions tend to involve the inauguration of sanctuaries and the perpetuation of sacred customs to be enacted there. For instance, at the close of Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Tauris*, Athena appears on high to bring about the drama’s proper end. She first commands King Thoas to stop his impending act of violence (1437). Then she bids Orestes to go to a certain “place”

⁵³⁰ Sourvinou-Inwood (1990), esp. 303ff; Malkin (1987); and above, p. 48, n. 96.

⁵³¹ Malkin (1987), 57, cf. 80.

⁵³² On the “magicoreligious” nature of such utterances, like that of Apollo who “realizes through his speech”, see Detienne (1996), esp. 70-1.

(*chōros*, 1450). At this sacred “place” Orestes is to “arrange a temple”,⁵³³ to “set up” (*hidrusai*) a statue of Artemis, and to establish the social practices, or “custom” (*nomos*), to be regularly performed there (1450-61). Orestes, and all who hear Athena’s pronouncement, shall further make known and carry on the special name of this place: “Halae” (1452).⁵³⁴ Following the the goddess’ commands, receptive mortal responses ensue: King Thoas promises that he shall do “as [Athena has] commanded” (1483); and, a few lines later, the chorus give voice to the people’s agreement, with similar words (*hōs su keleueis*, 1494). Thus, establishing a temple is an integral part of Athena’s full reconciliatory disclosure, which also includes commands concerning a sacred site, its significant token (here a statue), its customary practices, and its name.

There are a number of other examples of commands delivered at the close of tragic drama, which aim to bring about renewed order and which also entail architecture. The range of concerns of such commands include: the founding of cities (such as Thebes);⁵³⁵ the founding of civic institutions (such as the Areopagus);⁵³⁶ the founding of hero cults (as for Heracles);⁵³⁷ the installation of new Kings on ancient thrones;⁵³⁸ the establishment of burial sites together with their enduring markers;⁵³⁹ the resettlement of

⁵³³ The verb here is disputed, being either *taxas* (arrange / distribute) or *teuchō* (build / fashion). See the note to line 1543 in Cropp (2000).

⁵³⁴ On the archaeological remains of this temple at Halae, see Hollinshead (1985), 436-9.

⁵³⁵ At the close of Euripides’ fragmentary tragedy *Antiope* (Frag. 223.90-95), Hermes commands the founding of Thebes. He first bids Zethus to build the city walls, together with its seven gated openings, then bids Amphion (Zethus’ brother) to take up his lyre and sing the god’s praise. In this way, the solid rocks, “bewitched by the music” will follow him and, so, “make light work for the builder’s hands”. Cf. Euripides’ fragmentary *Archelaus*, which ends with the founding of Aegeae.

⁵³⁶ Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* dramatizes the founding of Athens’ first homicidal court, the Areopagus. The goddess Athena plays a crucial role in inaugurating this place.

⁵³⁷ At the close of Euripides’ *Heracles*, the King of Athens (Theseus) promises the fallen hero that “massive temples of stone” will be built in the city in his honor (1332).

⁵³⁸ At the end of Euripides’ *Ion*, Athena appears and commands Creusa to take her son and “set him up (*hidruson*) upon the royal throne”, so, establishing him as the Ionian King and “founder of the cities of Asia” (1553-1605).

⁵³⁹ A number of tragedies end with instructions on memorializing the dead. The god Castor delivers such commands at the end of Euripides’ *Electra* (1238-91), as does the god Thetis at the close of his *Andromache* (1231-72). Cf. Sophocles’ *Ajax*, where Odysseus commands a proper burial for Ajax, even though Ajax had earlier wronged him (1332ff).

wayward groups in proper dwelling accommodations;⁵⁴⁰ and the enactment of reconciling oaths together with the conspicuous dedication of a significant artifact, which would go on to bear enduring testament to the oath performed.⁵⁴¹ Each of these examples merits consideration, for each affirms that commanding (*keleuein*) is intertwined with inaugurating significant architectural works, and further affirms that such architectural conditions are, in some ways, involved with the resolution of (tragic) conflicts. Yet, it is sufficient here to close this section on exemplary commands by briefly elaborating on a particular command of Athena, which is delivered at the close of Euripides' fragmentary tragedy *Erechtheus*. This command is significant, in part, because the built work Athena inaugurates, the Erechtheion, remains today substantially intact; and, in part, because the actor posing as Athena uttered this inaugural command in the theatrical orchestra while construction of the Erechtheion upon the Acropolis was either underway, or about to commence. Indeed, it is possible that the dramatic declaration was made in the early spring of the very year that its construction began; that is, in 421 BCE (which would mean that this tragedy of Euripides was performed in the same Dionysian festival as Aristophanes' comedy *Peace*).⁵⁴²

Leaving much aside concerning the overall action and underlying myth of this fragmentary drama *Erechtheus*, it is enough to regard its tumultuous close and Athena's suffusing intervention in it. In this climactic scene, Athena appears on high to bring about a manifold and nested reconciliation: one that aims to preserve the stability of the Acropolis (which is presently being shaken by an angered Poseidon);⁵⁴³ to honor those

⁵⁴⁰ Aeschylus' *Suppliants* culminates with a King's promise to re-settle a group of displaced maidens in proper housing within the "well-fortified city [and its] well-crafted walls" (952ff).

⁵⁴¹ At the close of Euripides' *Suppliant Women*, Athena commands an elaborate scheme of reconciliation, involving: the enactment of an oath; the performance of a sacrifice over a particular tripod upon which the oath shall be inscribed; and the dedication of this tripod at a certain sanctuary site (1183-1226). On the institution of oaths and the role of sanctuaries to "guarantee permanence" of oaths, see Burkert (1985), 250-54.

⁵⁴² Euripides' *Erechtheus* is undated. Some scholars have argued that it was performed in 421 or 422 BCE; while others claim it was staged in 411—when the Erechtheum was nearing completion. On this range of dates and the supporting arguments, see Calder (1969).

⁵⁴³ The fragments of the chorus' song give a vivid image of this shaking: "The city's ground dances with the quaking! Poseidon is hurling (an earthquake) on the city... [...] the roof is falling in... we are lost.. all... and dancing in frenzy" (370.45-52). This translation is from Collard, et al (Loeb 2008). A translation and commentary to this fragmentary play is available in Cropp, et al (1997).

who had died in the course of defending Athens (including King Erechtheus and his daughters); and to appease those adversaries who had threatened the city (including Poseidon and his mortal son Eumolpus). In her lengthy speech, Athena first commands a stop to Poseidon's destructive shaking (370.55); then, turning to address the widowed Queen and chorus, she commands attention: "Hear" (*akou'*, 370.64). She then declares that a "sanctuary" (*temenos*) shall be set apart in memory of her daughters, and that annual sacrifices, wine-offerings, and dances shall be performed there in their honor (Frag. 370.65-89). Concerning Erechtheus, Athena continues: "for your husband, I command (*keleuō*) a precinct (*sēkos*) be constructed in the middle of the city with enclosing walls of stone" (Frag. 320.89-90).⁵⁴⁴ Her subsequent pronouncement concerns the practices to be performed there (offering oxen), and the name by which the secure place shall be henceforth known (Erechtheus-Poseidon).

While one could discuss the manifold and reconciling intentions motivating this sanctuary (the Erechtheion) in relation to its unusually accommodating and multi-faceted design,⁵⁴⁵ here it is enough to emphasize that architecture is, again, implicated in a reconciling declaration delivered by a divinity at the close of tragic drama and in a way that bears reflexively on contemporaneous events. Although the explicit involvement of architectural intentions within climactic scenes of Athenian drama may be surprising, it is not so unusual when we consider that a number of ancient plays dramatized aetiological myths related to the often tumultuous origins of religious practices, sacred sites, and temples.⁵⁴⁶ In other words, architectural beginnings are often integral to the ends of dramatic conflicts. Furthermore, a number of ancient performances (plays, dances and songs) were staged in contexts that celebrated the founding of cities and civic institutions; indeed, some performances were specifically commissioned for such occasions.⁵⁴⁷ What is also significant to note here is that these exemplary declarations—intended to bring about a broadly enduring sense of order—are announced with marked statements, such as

⁵⁴⁴ This translation is from Calder (1969), 156.

⁵⁴⁵ On the integration of cults and representation of numerous gods and myths within this single sanctuary, see for instance Hurwit (1999), 200-09.

⁵⁴⁶ As Dunn (1996), 26-44, shows, aetiological disclosures by gods via *deus ex machina* was a primary theatrical means by which Euripides forged connections between the mythic past (dramatized in the play) and the lived present, since the disclosure of the god often pertained to a temple or sacred site that the spectators would have been familiar with.

⁵⁴⁷ Aeschylus' *Women of Aetnae*, for example. See above, p. 120-21.

“I command” (*keleuō*); and subsequently received with such mortal expressions as “We shall do as you command” (*hōs su keleueis*),⁵⁴⁸ “I shall obey your commands”, or I will “be persuaded (to follow) your words” (*peisomai logoisi sois*).⁵⁴⁹

Turning back to Euripides’ satyr play we recognize that somewhat like the other commanding agents introduced above, Odysseus ultimately does bring about a renewed sense of order. For, with the help of various influential agencies, the Cyclops is, in the end, blinded and left alone on his inhospitable island, while the full ensemble of satyrs and mortals—liberated—together flee. Yet, when we inquire how the “command” of the architect-figure and commanding acts in general play-out in the land of the Cyclops what we encounter is something quite unlike the utterances of Apollo and the enunciations of Athena. Where these tend to be efficacious and conciliatory, those delivered in Euripides’ satyr play are either ineffective or disturbing. The ineffective command is that delivered by Odysseus to the satyrs, whereas the biddings of Silenus and Polyphemus are effective yet disturbing in both implication and intent. The special “urgings” (*keleusmatōn*) of the chorus provide a positive alternative and complementary amendment to the faltering “commands” in the play, since their commanding song—performed out in the orchestra—ultimately moves the liberating scheme along within the cave. Thus, the commands of each of these agents draw-out manifold aspects, problems and potentialities of the dramatic act that Odysseus, as architect, performs. It is helpful, then, to treat each in turn, beginning with the seemingly ineffective command of Odysseus.

LIMITED AUTHORITY: ODYSSEUS COMMANDS THE UNRULY SATYRS

10.1b

Upon revealing the details of his scheme to overcome the Cyclops, Odysseus promises the satyrs that he will command them into action when the time is right for them to join the collaborative part of the plan (477-8). The time is right only after Polyphemus, overcome by wine, lies asleep in his cave, and the branch of olivewood, completely sharpened and heated, lies ready for the strike (595). With an invocation of Hephaestus (god of fire), and of Sleep and Night (deities of darkness), Odysseus re-enters

⁵⁴⁸ Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Tauris*, 1494.

⁵⁴⁹ Euripides’ *Suppliant Women*, 1227.

the cave for a final check on the readiness of the burning branch and the vulnerability of the sleeping giant. Both weapon and victim are in place. Odysseus reemerges from the cave and delivers his command:

Come then, you must go inside [the cave] and put your hands to
the firebrand (*dalón*).

(*Cyclops* 630-1)

In spite of their earlier enthusiasm for the architect's scheme, the satyrs now fail to act according to his command. Evading direct participation they fake disabling injuries and offer cowardly excuses: they have dust in their eyes; they have suddenly become lame; and the weapon, being deep within the cave, is far beyond their reach (635-41). As actual assistants, these would-be collaborators seem "worthless" to Odysseus (642), who instructs them, instead, to lend their "encouragements" (*keleusmatōn*, 653, 655). Left to these and other devices (including the direct assistance of his own shipmates), Odysseus, thus, turns back to cross again the threshold of the cave.

In keeping with the burlesque atmosphere of a satyr play, both the faltering command of the hero and the squeamish response of his collaborators would have been amusing for an Athenian audience. The spectators may have even anticipated the satyr's evasive response, as they would have been familiar with the satyrs' tendency to cower when called upon to act. Satyrs often acted cowardly and were frequently judged to be worthless; or, so it seems, based on the limited sources available. Hesiod, for instance, had called them "the race of lazy good-for nothing Satyrs".⁵⁵⁰ And, in a fragmentary satyr play by Sophocles, Silenus chastises them as follows: "Useless assistants—spineless, slovenly, unenterprising! Just bodies and tongues and phalluses! In every crisis you profess loyalty, but fly from action."⁵⁵¹ While comically living-up to their reputation for flightiness in Euripides' *Cyclops*, the satyrs' response to Odysseus' command raises more than a laugh, for it also raises awareness of the problems and limitations of commands. On the one hand, the satyrs' failure to act according to the command exposes a weakness of this particular hero's direct orders.⁵⁵² On the other

⁵⁵⁰ *Catalogue of Women*, Frag. 10.18 (Loeb). This translation is from Lissarrague (1993), 208.

⁵⁵¹ Sophocles' *Ichneutai*, "The Searchers" (147-52).

⁵⁵² In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' own crew rarely obeys him: he orders them *not* to eat the cattle of the Sun, but they do (12.303ff); he orders them *not* to open the bag of winds, but they do (10.27ff); he orders them to flee the land of the Cicones, but they do not (9.444); etc.

hand, the satyrs' apparent worthlessness in action exposes a flaw in Odysseus' expectation—and this flaw is double. For, Odysseus misjudges the capacity of his potential collaborators in two respects: as satyrs and as actors.

First, as satyrs. Formal commandments over these ludic creatures simply have no efficacy. This is not only due to their manner (be it squeamish, spineless or slovenly), but derives as much from their position—being eccentric to humans and human society. As is well attested by vase paintings, satyrs were part animal, exhibiting horse-like ears, tails and exaggerated phalluses. Their bodily appetites were, likewise, shown to be out of proportion: overly aroused, indulgent, insatiable and licentious in most aspects of their behavior.⁵⁵³ Indeed, even Odysseus, who himself expects the satyrs “to act like men” (595),⁵⁵⁴ calls them “savages” (*thēres*) just as he is about to command them into action (625), and just as he had previously called the Cyclops (442).⁵⁵⁵ As the scholar Richard Seaford has emphasized, the satyrs are creatures that are “at home in the wild, outside the confines of the civilized community”. They are also, Seaford suggests, “antithetical to the *polis*” in that they are “representative of more ancient social relations”.⁵⁵⁶ Seaford, here, consciously echoes the judgment of Plato, who, in his *Laws*, had declared satyrs and their manner of dance to be “unfit for citizens” (*ou politikon*).⁵⁵⁷ Modern scholars have similarly suggested that, in their licentiousness, satyrs were for the Athenians “a counter-model to humanity”.⁵⁵⁸ However, in spite of their obvious outsider-status—contrary to and in conflict with human culture—satyrs, being hybrid, were not completely inhuman. The contradictions they represented were, after all, essentially human ones, recognizable even in disguise. Indeed, the satyrs enacted basic human desires and weaknesses; but they did so *excessively*. Thus, by their animality and unruliness, the satyrs dramatized transgressions of civility, making civil and civic limitations apparent by breeching them. It is, in part, because of this special capability to make limits apparent that the satyrs' uncivilized antics remained integral to one of the most important civic festivals in

⁵⁵³ See Lissarrague (1990) and (1993), 210; as well as Hedreen (1992).

⁵⁵⁴ Arrowsmith, Translation (*all' hopos anēr esē*).

⁵⁵⁵ The satyrs are also called “savages” in Sophocles' *Ichneutai* 221.

⁵⁵⁶ Seaford (2003), 30ff.

⁵⁵⁷ *Laws* 815c-d. In the *Republic*, Plato dismisses dramatic influences with a hint of regret, confessing that “we ourselves are very conscious of her charms (*kēloumenois*)” (605-607c).

⁵⁵⁸ Lissarrague (1990b), 66.

Athens—the *City Dionysia*.⁵⁵⁹ Yet, satyrs were released from civic and mortal authority not only because of their hybrid animality, but also by the special license of their partial divinity. As representatives of Dionysus (comprising a *thiasos*),⁵⁶⁰ satyrs incorporated many of the ambiguities of the god to whom they were devoted. These ambiguities are most palpably represented in the volatile gifts Dionysus offered to mortals. Through such “gifts” as wine, enthusiastic dancing and masquerading, Dionysus offered transcendent experience: revelry, erotic pleasure and illusion. Yet, in the absence of moderation, those same gifts led to madness, lustful violence and deceit. And so, by incorporating and performing these ambiguities—savage, mortal and divine—satyrs represented manifold contradictions within human civilization, exposing the limits of its rational modes of command. In short, satyrs were neither polite nor political creatures, and as such they could not be strictly bound by human jurisdiction, even by the formal biddings of so civilizing a hero as Odysseus. Thus, Odysseus’ direct command to the satyrs was bound to fail.

That Odysseus is mistaken in his attempt to command the satyrs is redoubled in performance by his misjudgment of their capacity as actors. Not only were the ludic and mythic creatures incompatible to his command, but so too were the men who personified the creatures in the play. These men of the chorus, who were themselves well-rehearsed Athenian citizens costumed as satyrs, were not sanctioned to act upon the protagonist’s command. The conventions of the Dionysia festival precluded the direct involvement of any chorus in the principal action of any drama. Although integral to the drama, choruses acted indirectly. They might encourage or, conversely, discourage certain actions: prompt, condone, exhort, resist, charm or otherwise influence actions with their gestures, prayers and songs. As well, they might interpretively qualify actions: describe, contextualize, emphasize or otherwise represent actions, as well as their models and effects.⁵⁶¹ However, to have directly acted in the plan to blind the Cyclops—to have left

⁵⁵⁹ This paradox—performing Dionysian unruliness within the ordered city by first dissolving then reconstituting its limits—is expressed well by Sourvinou-Inwood (1999): “only by surrendering control and embracing disorder in the service of Dionysos can men ultimately maintain order and avoid the catastrophic loss of control” (p.289). Cf. Segal (1982), esp. 246; and Collinge (1989).

⁵⁶⁰ Seaford (2003), 30-31. For a more structuralist account of this “double opposition” to human civilization, as performing between “beast and god”, see Segal (1974).

⁵⁶¹ On the ritual and hermeneutic role of the chorus, see Calame (1994/95) and (1999); Cf. Bacon (1995); and Dale (1969). Tragic choruses, not satyr choruses, however, are the focus of these

the orchestra, entered the cave, and put their hands to the firebrand—would have overstepped their dramatic and ritual role as a chorus. Unlike Odysseus, who himself repeatedly crosses the threshold of the orchestra (moving in and out of the cave three times in the play), the chorus members are bound to the open representative space of the orchestra.

That a protagonist commanded a chorus of satyrs to take direct action against the Cyclops within the cave (behind the skēnē) was perhaps laughable. Still, given that the tragic poet crafted Odysseus' command to falter as it did, the situation must have more to offer than humor.⁵⁶² Indeed, when Odysseus bid the chorus to participate in the plan to resist the Cyclops—in spite of their obvious disqualifications to do so—his command teased the limits of their performative role, while at the same time extended the question of commitment far beyond them. For, in the broader performative context, Odysseus' command would also have been delivered to the assembled spectators, both indirectly by way of the chorus (which always, in some manner, represented the heterogeneous public body), and by way of direct dramatic delivery, since with a broad sweep of his arm and upward glance, Odysseus (the actor) would have easily extended the range of his plea, metatheatrically, to the greater audience. Thus, commanding the satyrs into agreement (in spite of their obvious limitations) is an effective way of calling on the spectators to consider the limits of their own involvement in, and/or complicity with, the dramatized dilemma. In other words, Odysseus' apparently ineffectual command within the story performs most effectively by being aimed at those active witnesses just beyond it.⁵⁶³

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studies. That a chorus was *bound* to perform their role *at a distance* from the primary action, is made explicit in Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*, where the chorus, cognizant of a murder about to be performed within the palace, sings: "Stand we aside until the work is done, for so we shall not seem to be accountable in this foul business" (872-4); cf. *Agamemnon* (1346ff). Aristotle would later address the integral yet indirect role of a tragic chorus, as taking "a share in the action (*sunagonizesthai*)" (*Poetics* 1456a25). Cf. Aristotle's *Problemata* 1948.

⁵⁶² Euripides frequently problematized mortal commands. The tragic efficacy of a King's command in the closing scene from *Helen* (1415ff) provides a case in point.

⁵⁶³ Metatheatricity was not a central feature of Athenian Tragedy, as it was for Comedy. The mode of performance is apparent, however, at certain points in this satyr play. Odysseus himself may be acknowledging his immediate situation, for instance, when, upon first entering the orchestra and seeing the satyrs, he exclaims: "What is this? We *seem* to have marched into the *city* of Dionysus!" (99); thus, perhaps alluding to the *City Dionysia* festival presently underway.

As mentioned above, Odysseus is not the only agent to deliver commands in Euripides' satyr play. Silenus, the Cyclops and the chorus each perform commanding acts that are comparable to (and cognate with) the bidding (*keleuein*) that Odysseus, as architect, enacts. Thus, we turn now to consider these comparable commands and the architects' relation to them.

EFFICACIOUS AND DISTURBING: SILENUS DAMNS THE OPPRESSIVE CYCLOPS

10.1c

Silenus delivers his own command near the beginning of the play, shortly after Odysseus arrives ashore and moments before Polyphemeus returns to his cave. In this scene, Silenus and Odysseus have initiated their trade. Silenus is prepared to barter away Polyphemus's flocks to Odysseus and his hungry crew, and Odysseus in exchange offers Silenus wine—a Dionysian indulgence Silenus has been deprived of ever since his enslavement to the Cyclops. With just one sip of this divine drink, Silenus is instantly won over. He becomes so emboldened at the prospect of being emancipated from his oppression by loosing himself completely in the drink, that he eagerly agrees to give away all the giant's provisions, and then bids Polyphemus be damned: "Shall I not kiss such a drink and tell the bonehead Cyclops—and the eye in the middle of his head—to go wail?" (173-4). "Go to hell," is a more colloquial way to translate Silenus' command, but literally he is "bidding [Polyphemus] to wail" (*klaiein keleuōn*)—to howl in suffering as though he were in Hades.⁵⁶⁴

The unusual relevance and force of Silenus' idiomatic expression (a common insult in Athenian comedy)⁵⁶⁵ is underlined by the repetition of the command later in the drama. Indeed, every character in this drama (including Polyphemus himself) commands Polyphemus to wail. The satyrs bid him to wail soon after he has eaten his horrible meal, when (having been loosened-up under the influence of wine) he begins to bellow out a horrid song. Affronted by his "tuneless" (*apōdos*) and "graceless" (*acharin*) singing, the satyrs predict that he is "bound to wail" (490).⁵⁶⁶ Whereas Silenus' insult was prompted

⁵⁶⁴ Both Seaford (2003) and Ussher (1978) note the "absurdly literal" tone of this command.

⁵⁶⁵ Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (200, 1131) and *Knights* (433-4).

⁵⁶⁶ *klausomenos*. This grammatical form of the verb "to wail" (*klaiein*) has the prophetic force of fate, performing as "a curse as much as a threat"—as Olson emphasizes in his note to the line. Cf. Ussher, who translates the line as he is "destined to weep".

by a sip of wine and its taste of freedom, the satyrs' command is motivated more by a distaste for Polyphemus' musical performance. A few lines later, as the intoxicated giant (being moved by the wine) emerges from the cave, it is Polyphemus who ironically predicts his own sad fate. Although ignorant of the potential danger he himself is in, he warns his drinking partner (Silenus) to beware of the reversibility of the wine's pleasure: "Watch out! [literally: "You'll wail!" (*klausēi*)] You love the wine; it doesn't love you" (554).⁵⁶⁷ Although this command is colloquial, it is (like Silenus' idiomatic command) also ironically effective, since at the end of the play these figurative commandments literally manifest when Polyphemus—with the fiery pole in his eye—indeed roars in pain.

This roar from inside the cave—marked in the script by the cry, "*Ōmoi!*" (663)—represents and amplifies the climax of the play. For, with this roar, Polyphemus' defeat is confirmed. But in this roar one also hears many other things: the triumphant roar of the wine god (who has vanquished the impious beast); an affirmative response to Silenus' apostrophizing call for *Bromius*, "the Roarer" (called out in the very first line of the play);⁵⁶⁸ and an affirmation of fate, which Polyphemus in his blindness is now forced to see as he emerges from his cave, "Oh, oh, an ancient prophecy is now being fulfilled! It said that I would be blinded at your hands when you had set out from Troy. But it also prophesized that you [Odysseus] would pay the penalty for this by drifting about on the sea..." (696-99). Yet, even at this point, after Polyphemus' defeat and recollection of the prophesy, Odysseus repeats, yet again, the same command, "Go wail" (*klaiein s' anōga*), to which he adds, resolutely, "and I have done what I say" (701).⁵⁶⁹ Why does Odysseus add insult to injury by repeating this command to wail? In one sense Odysseus is replaying the bravado he exhibited at the end of the Homeric version of the tale—bravado that famously brought on Polyphemus' curse. Because of this curse, Odysseus, in the *Odyssey*, does not have the final say; yet, here in the satyr play he suggests that he does. Besides boldly suggesting that he has usurped prophecy, one could also take Odysseus'

⁵⁶⁷ Arrowsmith, Trans.

⁵⁶⁸ "Bromius" is a pseudonym for Dionysus. In other contexts it is an aural adjective, qualifying thunder, earthquakes, and wild beasts. See Seaford's note to the line. Another pseudonym of Dionysus, *Iacchus*, was also onomatopoeic (of the Eleusian initiates' cry).

⁵⁶⁹ As Richard Seaford suggests, Odysseus' boast may be paraphrased as follows: "I do not need to rely on mere prophecy, I have actually made you κλαίειν [wail]". See his note to line 701.

figurative command to literally send Polyphemus to Hades “to wail”—a send-off Odysseus had wished he might fulfill in the *Odyssey*.⁵⁷⁰ Yet, it is appropriate to close here not with further speculations on Polyphemus’ “wailing” but with a few observations on what this series of commands suggest about the dramatic act that “architects” also perform.

Whereas Odysseus’ command to the satyrs had raised a number of issues concerning limits—of mortal authority, of dramatic institutions, and of spectators’ involvement in representative events—this series of commands “to wail” teases such limits in other ways. For, these colloquial yet powerful illocutionary acts raise such topics as: curses (as heard in Silenus’ damnation);⁵⁷¹ onomatopoeia (as heard in the roars and wails); prophecy (its interpretation and fulfillment); the power of common speech (even where used flippantly); and the potency of figurative language (to perform literally). In each of these examples, we also recognize that Euripides (like Homer) connects the potency of language with the potency of wine.⁵⁷² Silenus, for instance, delivers his provocation to Polyphemeus upon his first sip of the Dionysian drink. Indeed, it would seem to be as much the wine talking as Silenus, since his vehemence for the Cyclops is inversely proportionate to his enthusiasm for the wine. Polyphemus is also moved by the wine to predict the reversibility of wine’s effects and his own painful fate. And the satyrs, who uphold Dionysian ways, damn the Cyclops for his musical travesty. This leaves Odysseus, the architect-figure, who—as primary holder and distributor of the potent wine, and as one in command of his own potent speech (and other dramatic arts)—arguably acts as a proxy for Dionysus.

ANARCHIC DISMISSALS: THE CYCLOPS BIDS FAREWELL TO SACRED SITES AND HUMAN CUSTOMS

(WHILE THE “ARCHITECTS” COMMAND VIGILANCE) 10.1d

Polyphemus also issues commands in this play. Like Silenus, he launches these against authorities he wishes to be emancipated from. Yet, unlike Silenus who utters his

⁵⁷⁰ “Would that I were able to rob you of soul (*psyche*) and survival, and to send you to the house of Hades (*domon Haidos*).” (9.523-4):

⁵⁷¹ “I bid you—” is a formulaic utterance found inscribed on ancient Greek curse tablets. One such tablet, aiming to turn away wild animals and demons from residences in Crete, reads: “I *bid you* to flee from these houses of ours...” See Jordan (1992). The formula “I bid you—”, resembles other maledictions that begin “I bind you—”, see Faraone (1991).

⁵⁷² On this connection in the Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*, see above, p. 187.

command flippantly in a moment of Dionysian enthusiasm, Polyphemus delivers his commands intentionally and in opposition not only to Dionysian ways but to all such sacred and civic customs. These negative and nullifying commands delivered by the play's antagonist arise in the course of a persuasive exchange with the protagonist.

Just before Polyphemus succeeds in forcing all the strangers across his cave's threshold, Odysseus attempts to reason with the beast. In a lengthy speech, he first argues that Polyphemus ought to give up his impious ways and pay heed to the temples of the gods, particularly those of his father Poseidon (286-98). With surprising specificity, Odysseus identifies places of refuge in the deep harbors of Taenarum and Malea, and upon the rocky promontories of Sounion and Geraestus—sites that were indeed sacred to Poseidon, and were well known for welcoming strangers and providing orientation to travelers at sea.⁵⁷³ In the course of his argument, Odysseus claims to have protected all of these “temple seats (*naōn hedras*) in every corner of Greece”, so, safeguarding Poseidon (290). It is these sacred places that Odysseus urges Polyphemus to likewise uphold, heed, or “share in” (*koinoi*, 297).⁵⁷⁴ Polyphemus, however, in an elaborate counter-argument, retorts: “I don't give a damn for my father's shrines” (318-19). More literally, he says: “I bid them [the establishments of my father] farewell” (*chairein keleuō*). The Cyclops' dismissal of Poseidon's temples, or “establishments” (*kathidrutai*, 318), resounds with a fatal sense of finality. For, elsewhere in Euripidean tragedy, “I bid you farewell” is the expression of a goddess to a dying man.⁵⁷⁵ More ironically, Poseidon himself utters these same departing words when—looking down upon the burnt temples and fallen walls of Troy—he remorsefully bids “farewell” to the city he had once helped build.⁵⁷⁶ To permit sacred places, together with the practices they support, to fall into

⁵⁷³ On the importance of these sacred sites of Poseidon as places of refuge to both suppliants and travelers, see Schumacher (1993); Sinn (1993); and Semple (1927). The fifth century BCE temple to Poseidon atop the conspicuous promontory of Sounion is substantially extant. The sacred site is mentioned already in the *Odyssey* (3.278).

⁵⁷⁴ Olson Trans.

⁵⁷⁵ These are the words of Artemis to the dying son of Theseus in *Hippolytus* (1437-9). These words are also uttered by Ajax the instant before he falls upon his own sword, in Sophocles' *Ajax* (863-5).

⁵⁷⁶ “So, towers of dressed stone, city once prosperous, farewell! If Zeus' daughter Pallas [Athena] had not destroyed you, you would still be standing firm on your foundations (*en bathrois*)” (*Trojan Women*, 45-6). This tragedy was staged in 415 BCE.

ruin by war or neglect was disconcerting to Poseidon (in Euripides' *Trojan Women*),⁵⁷⁷ just as it must have been disconcerting to Odysseus (as an architect-figure in Euripides' *Cyclops*), and to many Greeks besides. Thus, Polyphemus' irreverent "farewell" to his own father's "establishments" in the satyr play, although humorous in some respects, would have also struck a serious chord, particularly for all those among the spectators who may well have benefited from the safety of these very harbors (Taenarum and Malea) and the orientation of these very sacred promontories (Sounion and Geraestus) as they sailed toward Athens for the Dionysian festival.

Polyphemus' anarchic commands do not end with a rejection of sacred sites, for he goes on to bid adieu to human "customs" (*nomoi*)—which Odysseus had specifically appealed to in the second argument of his speech (299-309). Most blatantly, Polyphemus disavows practices of hospitality and invalidates the gods, professing to "know no reason" (*oude oida*) to either respect Zeus or fear his thunderbolt (320-21). The only "god" Polyphemus acknowledges is his own "belly"—"the greatest of divinities"—which he singularly honors and ceremoniously sacrifices to (318-35).⁵⁷⁸ Having judged the authority of Zeus (god of strangers and suppliants) as irrelevant, the Cyclops then goes on to reject all mortal "customs" as trivial ornaments to life, bidding those who uphold them to "go wail" (338-40).⁵⁷⁹ The giant's detailed rebuttal to Odysseus' argument, together with the demonstration of his solipsistic ways, further testify to the dearth of sacred and social "customs" in his land. Over the course of the play we learn that on the island of the Cyclops not only is there no respect for Zeus and no "custom" of hospitality, but there

⁵⁷⁷ Poseidon's speech suggests it is mortals' neglect, or "abandonment", of temples as much as their destruction by war that concerns him, see Kovacs (1983). Cf. the chorus' song 1071-80. Protecting a city by safeguarding its altars was a commonplace, cf. Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* 14, *Suppliants* 189-90; *Agamemnon* 527; Euripides' *Erechtheus* Frag.360.15

⁵⁷⁸ "I sacrifice to no one but myself—never to the gods—and to my belly, the greatest of divinities" (334-35). From Odysseus' speech, we learn that Polyphemus kills and cooks the men *as if* preparing a sacrifice, using a sacrificial knife, bowl and procedures. On the "perversion" of sacrificial rites in this play, see Seaford's commentary to lines 395, 469-71.

⁵⁷⁹ "As for those who embroider (*poikillontes*) human life with their little laws [or, customs]—damn the lot of them! [or, "go wail" (*klaiein anago*)]" (339-40)—Arrowsmith, Trans. This "embroidering" of life is derived from the verb *poikillō*—a manner of ornamentation that is exemplified in Homeric poetry by the "designs" (*poikilmasin*) worked into women's weaving (*Odyssey* 15.107, *Iliad* 6.294), and by the "dancing ground" (*choros*) that is "cunningly inlaid", or "embroidered" (*poikille*) into the shield of Achilles by Hephaestus (18.590-92). Given this choice of verb, one could take human "customs" as comparable to such exemplary "ornaments". And so, the Cyclops' dismissal would encompassing both human practices and such crafted artifacts as would give them enduring representation to them.

is no musical expression, no jubilant song, no dancing and no wine (21, 63, 124-25). There is also no appreciation for language or discerning discourse, for the Cyclops censures Odysseus' "well-shaped words" (*logōn eumorphia*, 317) and dismisses the satyrs' moralizing speech (273), while embracing Silenus' flattery as "just" (266-9).⁵⁸⁰ Further, the Cyclops' island supports no activities that are performed in harmony with the seasons or in sensitivity with the land, for there is no agricultural practice, no cultivation of grain, and no nurturing of vines (121-24). Correspondingly, there is no concern for the weather (331), no interpretation of portents (such as thunder), and no thought for the future (323). There are also no institutions of governance, no cities, no households, no laws, and no rules—aside from the unquestioned rule of the self (115-19). These Cyclopes are "solitaires" (*monades*), Silenus warns at the start of the play, for "no one is subject to anyone" (120).⁵⁸¹ With all of these impious, asocial, apathetic and anarchic demonstrations, one recognizes that in the land of the Cyclops not only are there no sacred practices, no Dionysian arts, no social customs, and no civic institutions, but there are no conditions for architecture. It is no wonder that an "architect" would lead a scheme to flee such a land and attempt to restore those improperly confined there to more appropriate dwelling conditions. Indeed, Odysseus specifically promises to return his mortal crew to their homeward bound ship (467, 703), and to restore the devout satyrs to the "halls of Dionysus" (430).

In spite of Odysseus' successful initiation of renewed order by the play's end, he fails here to persuade Polyphemus to respect sacred sites and human customs, for Polyphemus, after giving his rebuttal, forcibly commands Odysseus and his crew into his cave (345-46). And so, as Odysseus crosses this threshold, he prays for the help of

⁵⁸⁰ Specifically, Polyphemus accepts Silenus' flattering lies as being "more just" (*dikaioteron*) than the judgments of Rhadamanthys—the honest judge of the Underworld (273-4).

⁵⁸¹ In the Homeric version, Polyphemus had, similarly, professed that he does only what "[his] own heart bids" (*thumos me keleuoi*, 9.278). The Homeric land of the Cyclops lacks similar institutions: the Cyclopes also have no "assemblies for council" (*agorai boulēphoroi*), no "appointed laws" (*themistes*), and "no regard for one another" (9.112-115). They are "savage" (*agrion*, 9.215), "over-bearing" (*hyperphialōn*, 9.106), "lawless" (*athemistōn*, 9.106, 189, 215), and know nothing of "rights" (*dikas*, 9.215). Cyclopean lifestyle would become a trope for anti-social and anti-civic behavior in Greek literature. Aristotle, for instance, in arguing for the importance of social laws and nurturing pedagogy, notes, regretfully, that "in most states such matters have been neglected, and each man lives as he pleases, Cyclops fashion—". He clarifies what he means here by quoting from the Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*—"to his own wife and children dealing law'." (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1180a26-29). In his *Politics*, Aristotle makes similar statements, "He who is unable to live in society or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god" (1253a25).

Athena (350-52) and the vigilance of Zeus, specifically insisting that “Zeus, Protector of Guests... *look* upon these things (*hora tad*)”—for, if he fails *to see* this situation, mortal worship of him is “worthless” (354-55);⁵⁸² and, further, if this absence of care goes unacknowledged, “Chance itself will seem to be the greatest god” (606-07).⁵⁸³ Like his earlier command to the satyrs, which extended meta-theatrically to the spectators, Odysseus’ command for vigilant vision—“to look” (*hora*) and “to see” (*blepies*) the present crisis—urges not only Zeus but all the spectators to turn their attention not simply to his own dire circumstances but to all that has been rejected by the Cyclops. And so, by his assertive command for vigilance, the architect-protagonist aims to counteract the anarchic commands of the antagonist while, at the same time, he begins to restore concern (and desire) for such basic yet threatened conditions as sacred sites and human customs.

There remains a further mode of commanding to consider here: the special “urgings” of the satyrs.

MUSICAL AND MAGICAL MODES OF URGING: THE SATYRS MOVE THE SCHEME ALONG

10.1e

As noted above, Odysseus had impressed upon the satyrs that they ought to “obey the architects” when he “commands” (*keleuō*, 477-78). But, then, when he does command the satyrs to go inside the cave and put their hands to the firebrand they do not obey (630-31). Deeming them “worthless” in this regard, Odysseus adjusts his initial command, asking the satyrs to instead “urge on” (*epeg-keleue*) his crew of rowers within the cave by means of “urgings” (*keleusmois*, 652-53). To this the satyrs do comply, agreeing to sing “encouragements” (*keleusmatōn*, 655). Thus, while Odysseus joins his crew inside the cave to presumably guide, or steer, the wooden device that his oarsmen physically advance, the satyrs—from their eccentric position out in the orchestra—perform their urging song, complete with the beat of a rower’s chant and dramatic rotating imagery.⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸² The full line reads: “if you do not behold (*blepeis*) [these things], men mistakenly honor you as a god when you are in fact Zeus the worthless (*meden*)”. Odysseus’ protest, not unlike Trygaeus’ in *Peace* (see above, p. 66), targets the apparent negligence of Zeus. See also Seaford’s note to line 355, where he paraphrases Odysseus’ concern: “(if Zeus ignores what is happening) the honour [or, customary ‘respect’, *nomizēi*] paid to him as a god is paid in vain”.

⁵⁸³ Trans. McHugh (2001). Odysseus utters this second prayer also just before entering the cave.

⁵⁸⁴ This song includes such verses as: “turn it, *oh*; burn it; *oh*...” (656-662).

This string of cognate terms related to “commanding” (*keleuiēn*), together with Odysseus’ adjustment to his own command and the satyr’s subsequent manner of urging, bring attention to a still wider range of agencies that “commanding” bore, including the more musical agencies associated with nautical urging. For, the “encouragements” (*keleusmatōn*) that the satyrs dramatically offer were indeed sung by an individual known as a *keleustēs*, a boatswain, whose role during sea-voyages was to move the expedition along by urging the rowers with rhythmic songs and calls. It is helpful to briefly elaborate on this urging work and its striking effects before drawing out another more ritual aspect of the satyr’s special mode of command.

Unlike a singular authoritative command, the “urgings” (*keleusmatōn*) of a boatswain (*keleustēs*) were ongoing and modulated, being performed not only as a preliminary prompt but as a sustaining and regulating pulse—giving measure (time, order and crucial adjustments) to the movements of an ensemble.⁵⁸⁵ Such urging was motivated not merely by a need for efficient labor. In large tri-leveled ships of tightly-packed rowers (such as those in operation in Euripides’ day) coordinated efforts would have been prerequisite for any intended movement—a minimum condition for collective agency, not a goal to be urged toward. Rather, coordinating actions at sea (as in the orchestra) was as much about compelling minds as propelling wooden vessels. In ancient nautical operations, the ordered appearance of Greek ships was most impressive to others and most terrifying to enemies. A Persian messenger in a tragedy by Aeschylus delivers vivid testimony to this effect when describing the ominous approach of the Greeks by sea. As this messenger reports, before the Greek ships even came into view he first heard—“on the command” (*ek keleumatōs*)—the concordant roar of their oars, then the whole awesome armada appeared, “well-marshaled” (*eutaktōs*) and “in orderly advance” (*hēgeito kosmō*, 390-401). Stunned by the terrible spectacle and then overcome, the Persians either perished or, in marked contrast to the Greek fleet, fled—all in “disorder” (*akosmōs*, 422, 470, 481).⁵⁸⁶ Such an influential representation of order, as prompted by

⁵⁸⁵ On the figure of a *keleustēs*, see Morrison and William (1968), esp. 196.

⁵⁸⁶ It was not only in Athenian drama that the *display* of order was expected to impress, or terrify, an audience. The ancient biographer Plutarch reports that Nicias, the peace-seeking politician of the fifth century BCE, once proposed that *direct* confrontation with the enemy might be averted by a similar display. Realizing that the Greek machine of war was already churning toward Sicily but eager to forestall a bloody battle, Nicias urged an alternative course of action. Instead of culminating in attack, he proposed to “circumnavigate the island, *make a display* (*aparchamenous*) of their troops and triremes and then sail back to Athens” (Plutarch, *Nicias* 14.3). Having led-out their menacing fleet in such a well-ordered display, this peace-

a boatswain's "command", is made dramatically apparent in another way in a choral song of Euripides' tragedy *Electra*. In this song, the soundings of the keleustēs suggestively sway not only the movements of men and their vessels but also the moods of the sea, the dances of dolphins, and the forces of fate.⁵⁸⁷ The rhythmic dancing of the chorus as they performed this song would have given further representation to these movements by conveying, mimetically, the ordering of these larger relations. In light of these "urgings" and their influential displays in the theater as on the sea, the satyrs' musical mode of "command" in Euripides' *Cyclops* should be heard not only as an appropriate way for a chorus to participate in deeds enacted beyond the limits of the orchestra, but also regarded as an appropriate mode of representing such deeds both in the proper theatrical arena and in their full frame of reference.

Yet, the satyrs' "urgings" are powerful not only by their representational scope but also by their being modeled after an "incantation of Orpheus" (646). The satyrs themselves offer to sing such an "incantation", one that will compel the firebrand within the cave to move *as if* by its own accord—"as an automaton" (*hōst' automaton*, 647).⁵⁸⁸ By choosing Orpheus as a model for their "encouragements" (*keleusmatōn*), the satyrs, on the one hand, intensify the musical and nautical force of their performance, for Orpheus was renown not only for compelling beasts (as well as birds, fishes and trees) to move according to his song,⁵⁸⁹ but also for having once charmed all the Argonaut rowers into a powerfully synchronized pace by his rhythmic "commands" (*keleusmata*).⁵⁹⁰ Yet,

making politician (and fleet commander) was confident that a favorable victory would follow. This preliminary "display" (*aparchamenous*) is, by name, related to the act of "leading away" (*aparchōn*) the dance" (*tōn orchēstōn*), as well as to the "first [fruit] offerings" (*aparchai*) made to gods, thus suggesting that such a display was *profoundly* representative. *LSJ*.

⁵⁸⁷ *Electra* 432ff. Cf. *Trojan Women* 126ff. Cf. *Helen* 1576ff. There was even a dance called "keleustes", named after "the one who sets the tempo for the oarsmen". See Lawler (1964), 120, quoting Athenaeus 14.629F.

⁵⁸⁸ When Odysseus expresses his disappointment in the satyrs' "worthlessness", they respond by saying "But, I know an incantation of Orpheus so wonderful that the firebrand all on its own will march up to his skull and set the one-eyed son of earth on fire." (646-48).

⁵⁸⁹ In Euripides' *Bacchae*, Dionysus shall lead the Bacchantes *as* Orpheus once led the "beasts of the wild" (561-4). Cf. Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* 1630; Simonides, Frag. 567 (Loeb). The musical power of Orpheus is comparable to that of Amphion, whose song moved the stones that comprised the walls of Thebes (Euripides' *Amphion* Frag. 223.90-95).

⁵⁹⁰ According to a fragmentary play of Euripides, this mythic musician—from his middling position in the ship (next to its mast)—both moved and modulated the "long-sweeping strokes" of these epic rowers during their pursuit of the Golden Fleece (*Hypsipyle* 752g). As

on the other hand, by casting their song as an “incantation” (*epōdē*), and by emphasizing its self-moving capability, the satyrs also foreground the ritual and magical agency of their “encouragements”. For, in other choral songs of Athenian drama, “incantations” perform as binding curses (like those enacted by the chorus of Furies),⁵⁹¹ as rapturous love charms (like those influenced by Dionysus and Aphrodite),⁵⁹² as healing enchantments (like those once taught by the wise centaur Chiron),⁵⁹³ and as alleviating odes, providing audiences of tragic drama with musical distractions from pain and sorrow (like those Euripides typically composed).⁵⁹⁴ By performing “encouragements” after these exemplars (Orpheus, the Furies, Dionysus, Aphrodite, Chiron and Euripides) one wonders if the satyrs were not indeed following *their* “architects”—leading figures most appropriate to them. If so, then their divinely, mythically and dramatically inspired “encouragements” would recall some of the poetically efficacious utterances described at the start of this chapter (those of Athena, Apollo and the various extraordinary agents in epic and archaic poetry). Within the satyr play, there is no doubt that the satyrs’ song is efficacious, for it is during their performance of “encouragements” that justice is brought about within the cave, and order is reinitiated. Further, by performing “commands” in the archaic manner of “incantations” this choral group begins to re-inaugurate certain

the heroine of this tragedy wistfully recalls: “and by the mast amidships the Thracian lyre cried out a mournful Asian plaint singing commands to the rowers for their long-sweeping strokes, now to speed forward, now to take rest from the pinewood oar” (752g 8-12). See: Collard et al (2004), 192-3 (translation), and 233-4 (commentary).

- ⁵⁹¹ The chorus of Furies in Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* attempt this “binding song” (*humnon desmion*), hoping to leave their opponent (Orestes) tongue-tied in trial (306ff). See Prins (1991).
- ⁵⁹² *Bacchae* 233-36. On the amorous (and healing) agency of such songs see Segal (1974). One may further compare the spell-binding songs of the Sirens; the spell-binding stories of Odysseus himself (as performed in the *Odyssey*); and the withering affects of the golden charmers atop the temple arranged by Athena and Hephaestus in Pindar’s song (*Paeon* 8).
- ⁵⁹³ On the healing agency of choral songs and magical odes as associated with Aesclepius (who was taught by the wine centaur Chiron), see Pindar *Pythian Ode* 3.52-3; Cf. *Odyssey* 19.457-8; and Euripides’ *Hippolytus*, 478. Dionysus was also associated with healing agencies. In Euripides’ *Bacchae*, Dionysian wine is called a “treatment for misery” (*pharmakon ponōn*, 283), and as that which “puts an end to pain” (773). Similarly, the chorus of Sophocles’ *Antigone* calls on Dionysus to come with his “healing foot” (*kartharsiōi podi*, 1144). On Dionysus’ relation to *pharmakon*, see Deteinne (1989), 23ff.
- ⁵⁹⁴ On the therapeutic role of choral songs, to sooth and ameliorate grief and ward off death, see Euripides; *Andromache* 526; with Segal (1989), esp. 346. On the “ritual and cultic function” of such songs and choral actions see Calame (1994/5), esp. 147.

musical modes and Dionysian “customs” (*nomoi*) that had previously been bidden away by the Cyclops.⁵⁹⁵

What is also made apparent by the satyrs’ contribution of “encouragements” during the climactic deed of the play is that both the authoritative “command” of the individual “architect” and the physical labor of his crew are partial, since these become fully effective and meaningful only by being complemented by the chorus and the archaic agencies they represent. Such a performance recalls Trygaeus’ collaboration with the heterogeneous chorus in *Peace*. For, just as Odysseus overcomes the Cyclops only with the special help of the divine satyrs, so Trygaeus rescues Peace only with the special assistance of the chorus who act, in part, as representatives of the ritually and poetically charged “(founding) people” (*laoi*).⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁹⁵ The satyrs, by their song, may even be bringing Polyphemus’ wailing into tune, for as they sing and he wails they receive his painful sounds gladly as though the wails are striking a chord with their own victory *paian*: “A lovely song: please sing it for me again, Cyclops!” (664). The ironic resonance between joy and pain is common in tragic songs, as Seaford notes in his commentary to this line. In *Cyclops*, the satyrs (and Silenus) repeatedly bring attention to the Cyclops’ *lack* of musical capability throughout the play: to his a-musical, danceless, tuneless, charmless, unlearned, uncultured, unjust and impious ways (*a-mousa*, 426; *a-choron*, 124; *a-pōdos*, 491; *a-charin*, 489; *a-mathian*, 173; *a-paideuton*, 493; *a-dikei*, 272; and *a-nosiou*, 26, etc.). This emphasis on the giant’s lack of musical arts is a significant shift from the Homeric version of the tale, where his lack of tectonic arts is emphasized. See below, 307.

⁵⁹⁶ See above 66-71.

Persuasive Acts and Appeals to Agreement

Together with commanding (*keleuein*), Euripides also involves “architects” most directly in the activity of persuasion (*peithesthai*). Before turning to focus on persuasive acts, it is helpful first to comparatively consider the interaction and mutual dependencies of these two activities. Here, again, it is helpful to quote the line wherein Odysseus’ plea to the satyrs culminates:

Be silent now—for you know my scheme completely—
and when I command, be persuaded (to follow) the architects.

σιγαῖτέ νυν · δόλον γὰρ ἐξέπιστασαι ·
χῶταν κελεύω, τοῖσιν ἀρχιτέκτοσιν | πειθῆσθ’ .

(*Cyclops* 476-8)

RECIPROCAL ACTIVITIES: COMMANDING AND PERSUADING

10.2a

Odysseus’ insistence that the satyrs be persuaded might at first seem not only redundant to the force of command but trumped by it. Such redundancy, if there is any, should however be understood as reciprocal and complementary. To command is to give direction while to be persuaded, in a restricted sense, is to take direction. This reciprocal giving and taking of direction was demonstrated in earlier examples of *keleuein*. Most explicitly, it was heard at the end of certain tragedies, where Athena delivered commands that were then accepted, acknowledged and affirmed, by a mortal’s words: “I am persuaded”.⁵⁹⁷ Without such words avowing a move to agreement, the commands would be without consequence for the drama, and worse, bear doubtful significance beyond it. As Odysseus’ failed command to the unruly satyrs demonstrates, such directives must not only be addressed to but also actively received by a directable agency. That such directability, or receptivity, is not passive is also attested by another individual who spoke out in Greek tragedy: Cassandra. In Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon*, Cassandra poignantly reveals the reciprocal activity of persuasion even where it is denied. For, although this

⁵⁹⁷ Euripides’ *Ion* 1607. Variations of such responses are found in Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Tauris* 1483 and 1494; and *Suppliant Women*, 1227 (as quoted above). Similarly, at the end of *Orestes*, upon hearing Apollo’s commandments, Orestes consents by saying: “I will do as you say [or, be persuaded to your words]” (*peisomai de sois logois*, 1670); a few lines later, Menelaus concurs, “We must obey” (*peithesthai chreōn*, 1679). Cf. Dunn (1996), 35-6.

Trojan Princess famously received the gift of prophetic speech, she was denied the persuadability of a receptive audience. As Cassandra herself despairingly acknowledged: “I could persuade no one of anything” (*epeithon ouden' ouden*).⁵⁹⁸ To be unpersuadable was, on the other hand, a tragic flaw, for it implied an unwillingness to turn one’s mind, to adapt one’s ways, or to alter one’s course of action in consideration of another’s counsel. Athenian tragedy frequently reveals the merits of persuadability by dramatizing the negative effects of being the opposite: incorrigible, inflexible, immoveable, unyielding, or otherwise harboring a “mind impervious to persuasion”.⁵⁹⁹ Yet, Cassandra’s despair reveals the importance not only of active self-persuasion but of interpretation. For, the utterances of Cassandra, although truthful, were poetic—synthetic, figurative and seemingly paradoxical—thus demanding a further effort from her listeners to discern implied meanings in relation to lived circumstances. Beyond this interactive receptivity, persuading can also be understood as complementary to commanding by its differing grounds of appeal. Whereas commands appeal to duty, persuasion appeals to reason and desire. The first urges through social bonds and common institutions, while the second moves others as ambivalent individuals—sensible but sensitive, skeptical but curious.

Another way to draw-out the complementarity of these two acts, is to regard how they respond differently to perceived resistance. In Athenian drama, for instance, one finds that in response to resistance commands tend to escalate or intensify, whereas persuasion modulates and diversifies. A relevant example of an escalating command is found in Aeschylus’ *Prometheus Bound*. In the opening scene of this tragedy we learn that Hephaestus has been commanded by Zeus to bind Prometheus to a rock as punishment for his transgressions against the new reigning god. Hephaestus groans with reluctance, but duty compels him to submit to Zeus’ plan: “I am forced to do this—”, he complains to Might (*Kratos*) and Force (*Bia*), the personified agents that stand over him

⁵⁹⁸ Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1212 (Smyth, Trans.).

⁵⁹⁹ Aeschylus, *Suppliants* 108. This translation in Buxton (1982), 69. Similarly, in Aeschylus’ *Prometheus Bound*, the *phrēn* of the new sovereign (Zeus) is “obdurate” (34), his mind (*noos*) “inflexible” (164), and his heart “inexorable” (185), thus Zeus himself is “not persuadable” (*ou gar eupithēs*, 333). Prometheus’ unpersuadability and defiant self-will is also presented in this tragedy (1000-14, 1034-9). See Buxton (1982), 90-104; and Voegelin (1964), 258, who describes persuadability as a kind of wisdom—“wise in the sense of being capable of taking wise counsel”. In the *Iliad*, unpersuadability is a problem for Hector (13.725-6, cf. 3.61), and Achilles (9.496ff); whereas Nestor says, “to be persuaded is better” (1.273). Even the gods were persuadable (by prayer, sacrifices and libations). Only Death was unpersuadable (*Iliad* 9.159; Euripides *Alcestis* 48ff; Aristophanes *Frogs* 1392).

as watchdogs, “—do not keep commanding me”. But Might thunders back at him: “Yes, I will command you, and hound you on as well” (71-2).⁶⁰⁰ Here, the command of Zeus, enforced by Might, turns from commanding (*keleuein*) to hounding (*epithōussein*)—a mode of exhortation sometimes suited to the goading of animals.⁶⁰¹ A subsequent escalation would conceivably turn to a threat, and from there extend to some form of punishment, as the commanded binding of Prometheus already exemplifies. Besides escalating in duress commands may, alternatively, intensify in urgency, becoming more pressing or potent in their urgings. Such an intensification of command is demonstrated by the chorus in Euripides’ *Iphigenia among the Taurians*. Anticipating Iphigenia’s imminent escape from a foreign land, the chorus rehearses the movement of her fleeing ship and predict that its rhythms of rowing will be *so* robust since these will be intensified by the “reed pipe of Pan”. In place of a mortal boatswain (*keleustēs*) and his commanding chant (*keleumatos*), the divine soundings (*epithōuzei*) of Pan shall urge the pressing beat of these oars, while the song of Apollo shall mark the striking pull (1123-31). Through these examples of escalating commands run intensifying chains of directional influence. Whereas Might moved from authoritative commandments to menacing threats, the chorus of Iphigenia moves through mortal urging to divine influence (an escalation akin to the movement from Odysseus’ “command” to the satyrs’ “urgings” in *Cyclops*). By comparison, persuasive acts tend to develop through less directional and hierarchical means, by involving more diversified and modulating webs of influence.

This brief analysis of commanding and persuading shows that these acts, although different, are significantly interdependent in Greek drama and thought. What is important to recognize for this study is that both modes of action are announced, engaged and anticipated by Odysseus, and it is in the midst of these influential and interdependent acts that Euripides casts the “architects”.

MANIFOLD AND MIDLING MODES OF PERSUASION

10.2b

Throughout Euripides’ satyr-play Odysseus demonstrates his persuasive capability. Most discursively, he attempts, through detailed arguments, to persuade the

⁶⁰⁰ Greene, Trans. (I have substituted “commanding” and “command” for “urging” and “urge”).

⁶⁰¹ Cf. *Bacchae* 871 and *Hippolytus* 219.

Cyclops not to mistreat him and his crew (286-312). Failing this, Odysseus attempts, via prayer, to persuade Athena and Zeus to help him (350-55). Following this, he attempts, by means of a compelling proposition and figurative speech, to persuade the chorus to join his scheme and, so, actively alter the course of events. Yet, in the critical verse culminating this speech, Odysseus is telling the satyrs to do the persuading: to “persuade themselves (to follow)”, or “obey (*peithesthe*) the architects” (*toisin architektoisin*, 477-78). Before discussing Odysseus’ active appeals, it is helpful to elaborate on this middle mode of self-persuasion, since the verb is given here in its middle-voice (*peithesthai*). In this regard, it is helpful to confer with those scholars who have attended to the representation of this activity in other dramatic poetry of the fifth century BCE.

One scholar of the ways of persuasion describes the activity of *peithesthai* primarily in terms of “belief”, “trust” and “fidelity”. To say that one persuades themselves to follow another is, according to Alexander Mourelatos, to say that they choose to “place trust” or “faith” in a persuasive figure, whereas to actively persuade (*peithein*) is to “propose”, “promise”, or “pledge” in a manner that presumes, invites and offers such “trust” as is reciprocally desired.⁶⁰² In such a relationship, Mourelatos shows, a congenial bond between the persuader and the persuaded is gradually forged. Although this bond may exert a “mighty hold” its binding force is quite unlike that of compulsion, since it is not forged by threats or force (*bia*), but rather by mutual favors, promises and commitments. Further, the success of such persuasive exchange comes, in part, from a pre-conditional desire to agree. Thus, Mourelatos insists the salient feature of open persuasion (as opposed to deceitful persuasion) is “consent”.⁶⁰³ Mourelatos’ study, it should be noted, is grounded in his close philological reading of Parmenides’ philosophical poem, “The Way of Truth” (circa 450 BCE)—although this title, Mourelatos claims, is a misnomer. “The course of Persuasion,” he suggests, more accurately describes the poem, since the personified figure of “Truth” in it does not make truth-assertions, but rather compels belief in those who already wish to be persuaded by her. And so, the *way* to Truth (as dramatized by Parmenides) is undertaken persuasively,

⁶⁰² Mourelatos (1970), 137-9. Mourelatos, here, also emphasizes the various Greek terms that are cognate with “persuasion”: the noun *pistis*, “trust”, “good faith” or “agreeable commitment”; and the adjective *pistos*, “trusty”, “faithful” or that quality of one bound by a covenant. He also emphasizes the Latin equivalents: *fido*, *fidus*, *fides*, *foedus* and their English derivatives: *fidelity*, *faith*, *affiance*, etc.

⁶⁰³ Mourelatos (1970), 136.

in a manner of reciprocal longing.⁶⁰⁴ While such exemplary modes of consensual persuasion may have rarely been demonstrated in either Athenian society or Athenian tragedy (there is little drama without disagreement), such a model of mutual persuasion was available to the dramatic poets and discernible in the composition of their persuasive dialogues.

Another scholar of persuasive activity in dramatic poetry describes *peithesthai* primarily in terms of gradual acquiescence. In his study of *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy*, R. G. A. Buxton shows how a persuaded group gradually comes to “acquiesce in the will or opinions of another”, while the one who actively persuades encourages them “to acquiesce in (some belief or action).”⁶⁰⁵ To successfully move others to acquiesce is properly understood as a culminating “achievement”, “result” or “stage reached”.⁶⁰⁶ Achieving this stage, however, is neither a solo effort nor an instantaneous occurrence. Rather, it is accomplished in tandem with others, and through the variegated and reciprocal work of persuasion that is likely to have been drawn out over several prior exchanges. Buxton elaborates this ongoing work of persuasion with an analysis of how the activity plays out in the closing scene of Aeschylus’ *Eumenides*. In this much-discussed scene, the goddess Athena patiently, yet persistently, varies her strategies in her attempt to move the vengeful Furies to acquiesce to her will. Specifically, she aims to persuade the Furies to turn away from their desire for violent revenge and to reconcile themselves to the more civil and discursive modes of justice she presents. The Olympian goddess opens her speech to the chorus of Furies with a prompt: “be persuaded by me” (*emoi pithesthe*, 794).⁶⁰⁷ She then appeals to the Furies, alternatively, with soothing

⁶⁰⁴ Mourelatos (1970), 155-60 and 63-7, where he discusses *alethia*. Persuasion becomes an important figure of thought for Plato. In *Timeaus*, for instance, the created universe is said to have come into being by “yielding to intelligent persuasion” (48a). Similarly, in *Philebus*, “the art of persuading (*peithein*) is superior to all arts (*technōn*): for she overmasters all things not through force (*dià bias*) but with their consent (*di’ ekóntōn*)” (58a). See Mourelatos (1970), 138. On the centrality of persuasion for Plato, see Morrow (1950) and (1953).

⁶⁰⁵ Buxton (1982), 49.

⁶⁰⁶ Buxton (1982), 49; cf. Mourelatos (1970), 137.

⁶⁰⁷ Smyth, Trans. Athena’s prompt has epic resonance, for in the *Iliad* she urges Achilles to refrain from drawing his sword against Agamemnon in a similar way: “I have come from heaven to put a stop to your anger, if you will listen (*ai ke pitheai*)... Restrain yourself, and obey us (*peitheo d’ hēmin*, 1.207-14). Similarly, in the *Theogony*, when Gaia encourages her children (including Kronos) to help her overcome Ouranos, she prefaces the details of her scheme by saying “obey me (*peithesthai*) if you will” (1.164-65, cf. 4.93). Cf. Euripides’ *Antiope*, Frag. 188; *Children of Heracles* 174; and *Hippolytus* 892.

words (801), with promises of honor (804-5), with compelling precedents (826), as well as with a hypothetical threat (828). This threat, however, is swiftly superseded by more pleasing words and offers (829), including a promise of an eminent place of worship at her side (854ff). Athena also appeals with words of respect to the elder chthonic goddesses whom she seeks to sway (847-8), and with a deferential evocation of the goddess Persuasion herself (Peithō, 885). Finally, Athena brings her speech to a close with an appeal to justice, by indicating what is proper, honorable, or broadly beneficent for the citizens and city she represents (888). Her various appeals are interrupted by the Furies' skeptical song, in which they consider the goddess' propositions (808-22; 837-447; 870-80). When the Furies finally acquiesce (916), having persuaded themselves to accept Athena's will and, so, act as she directs, the benefits of the culminating achievement are mutual, just as the work of persuasion was shared. Athena, the implied citizens she represents, the Furies, and the figure of Peithō herself, are among the agents in this dramatization of beneficent sway.

By interpreting other dramas of Euripides (namely *Medea* and *Hecuba*), Buxton goes on to show that this tragic poet tended to put persuasion to more “morally dubious ends” than Aeschylus had in his treatment of the *Eumenides*.⁶⁰⁸ Nevertheless, in Euripidean drama the activity of persuasion again proceeds reciprocally and gradually, with iterative and broadly diverse acts of appeal. These points of emphasis complement Mourelatos' valuation of mutual consent, reciprocal trust and filial bonds as primary features of persuasive exchanges in dramatic poetry.

Besides drawing-out some of the reciprocities and subtleties of persuasive exchanges, the discussion above also makes clear that, at the time Euripides composed *Cyclops*, persuasion was neither equivalent to rhetoric, nor reducible to an instrumental or gratuitous facet of speech. This is not only because the “art of rhetoric” (*hē rhētorikē technē*), as Plato and Aristotle would so thoroughly define (and question) it several decades later, was still in gestation in the fifth century BCE;⁶⁰⁹ but also because persuasive influence was integral to poetic, ethical, interpretive and ponderous pursuits. Furthermore, persuasion was felt through means other than words. Indeed, the

⁶⁰⁸ Buxton (1982), 170. Euripides' *Cyclops*, however, is not interpreted in Buxton's study.

⁶⁰⁹ Plato defined rhetoric in his dialogue *Gorgias* as the “art of persuasion” (453a), and Aristotle composed a three-book treatise on the topic, *Rhetorica*. The emergent status of rhetoric at the time of Euripides is shown, in part, by the fact that the term, *rhetorica*, does not appear in dramatic poetry (or prior), although *rhētōr* (speaker) and *rhēsis* (speech) does. See, Gagarin (2007): 27-36, with further references. On the origins of rhetoric in Sicily, see Hinks (1940).

compelling force of persuasion was felt to act not only discursively and politically, but religiously, amorously and magically through dispersed influences.⁶¹⁰ Persuasive influence also performed animistically through artistic, sculptural and (arguably) architectural works. A speech in Euripides' *Hecuba* suggests this most strikingly. When Hecuba seeks to augment her own appeals to a reluctant interlocutor she prayerfully wishes that every limb of her body might—"either through the arts of Daidalos, or some god"—gain a poetic "voice", so, making her fully persuasive.⁶¹¹ This wish of Hecuba—which contains the only evocation of "Daidalos" in the extant plays of Euripides⁶¹²—suggests that the divine-like "arts" (*technai*) of Daidalos exemplify persuasive influences as corporeally conveyed.

As the examples introduced above show, Athenian dramatists were acutely aware of the powerful ambiguities of persuasion and of the overlapping arenas, modes and mediums of its influence. Such persuasive influence was at play not only in every actor's dramatic performance before the assembled spectators, but also as a conspicuous topic of concern in the dramas. A number of characters in both tragedy and comedy engage in and debate this mode of action, which influences in ways other than by force (*bia*). The dramatists also exposed more ambiguous modes of persuasion, which they even named

⁶¹⁰ The goddess Peithō was worshiped at various sanctuaries in and around Athens in the fifth century BCE. As a "figure of agreeable compulsion" she was a "patron of civilized life and democratic institutions". Her subtle influences, involving mutually agreeable bonds, also implicated her in relations that were more erotic than civic. Indeed, Peithō's places of worship were often shared with Aphrodite, where together they represented the seductive power of speech. See Buxton (1982), 31-48; Detienne (1996), 77-8; Oliver (1960): 108-16; Mourelatos (1970), esp. 139; and Stafford (2000), 111-146. In magical operations persuasion was implicit in beneficent charms, malevolent curses, incantational odes and talismanic devices. See, Faraone and Obbink (1991), chps. 1 and 7.

⁶¹¹ Toward the end of her lengthy plea to Agamemnon, Hecuba (doubting that she will succeed in persuading him to help her), says: "One thing is still lacking from my speech (*muthos*). If only I had a voice (*phthoggos*) in my arms and hands and hair, and the motion of my feet, either through the arts (*technaisin*) of Daidalos or of some god, so that together they all might hold you knees [in supplication], in tears, pressing all kinds of arguments (*pantoious logous*) upon you" (*Hecuba* 835-40). Collard Trans. Hecuba is likely alluding to the magical automatons and life-like statues of the mythic maker. As an actor—elaborately costumed and masked—Hecuba may well have borne a resemblance to such creations of Daidalos. Life-like statues also recall the speaking statue of Peace, which the architect-figure in *Peace* recovers and installs. For comments on Hecuba's dramatic allusion to Daidalos, see Morris (1992), chp. 2, and Buxton (1982), 179. Hecuba's invocation of Daidalos may be all the more relevant to the "architects" in *Cyclops*, since *Hecuba* may have immediately preceded the performance of the satyr-play in the tragic trilogy at the Dionysian festival. See above p. 131, n. 298.

⁶¹² Daidalos may have performed in Euripides' *Cretans*, Frag. 471-72 (Loeb), the plot of which involved Daidalos' trouble with King Minos after Pasiphaë's affair with the bull.

peitho dolia.⁶¹³ This concern for deceitful, or “tricky persuasion” prompts a clarification about Odysseus. Although Odysseus was characterized in Athenian drama as an exceptionally deceptive agent, and was even suspected of being “exceedingly persuasive” (*sphodra peithei*),⁶¹⁴ when he appeals to the satyrs in Euripides’ *Cyclops* he does not intend to deceive them. Although his scheme involves deceit (to overcome the Cyclops), his persuasive exchange with the chorus is open, and he has their best interests in mind. In many ways, it is not necessary to persuade the satyrs to punish Polyphemus at all, for the satyrs themselves have been voicing their distaste for him since the beginning of the play. Thus, Odysseus’ persuasive speech to the satyrs would seem to be less about gaining their consent to the scheme’s immediate course of action, and more about fully revealing the problematic situation within the cave and the broader motivations of the transformative scheme proposed. In other words, Odysseus, as “architect”, is urging the chorus—and the audience they represent—toward a thorough understanding of their shared situation and to a deeper consent, or commitment, to what underlies the scheme.

With all this in mind we now turn to consider more closely Odysseus’ persuasive appeals. We begin by recalling his culminating plea:

Be silent now—for you know my scheme completely—and
when I command, be persuaded (to follow) the architects.
(*Cyclops* 476-8)

THE ARCHITECTS’ DIVERSE APPEALS

Having disclosed the details of his scheme to overcome the Cyclops and having defined the role the satyrs ought to play in it, Odysseus urges his potential collaborators, “be persuaded” (478). His emphatic injunction performs in double directions. Looking forward to the timely and cooperative enactment of the plan, Odysseus’ injunction solicits (and assumes) the satyrs’ commitment to perform their part when called upon to act. And, glancing back, his injunction casts his prior exchange with the satyrs as persuasive and, so, bids them to move themselves into full agreement with the motives and details of the scheme as described. In other words, by urging the satyrs to “be persuaded” Odysseus aims to move them toward double, yet complementary, ends: not

⁶¹³ Aeschylus’ *Libation Bearers* 726. See Buxton (1982), 63-6.

⁶¹⁴ Sophocles’ *Ajax* 148-50.

simply to comply, but to redirect their will and, so, knowingly transform their situation. Willing and knowing collaborators are what this architect-figure seeks, and what he seeks to affirm when he says, “be persuaded”.

As we already know, the satyrs ultimately will not persuade themselves to participate in the scheme strictly as directed. Yet, in spite of their performative deviation, they do agree with the scheme in general and in detail, for they fully share in the scheme’s motives (of retribution, liberation and restoration) and they are thrilled by the scheme’s specific tactics (of blinding the Cyclops with wine, fire and refigured stakes). These tactics—vividly described by Odysseus with an elaborate simile—will be treated in the subsequent section of this dissertation. Here, however, it is the scheme’s motives and intentions that concern us. To recognize Odysseus’ role in persuasively representing these it is necessary to back-up in the play to his prior exchanges with the satyrs in order to uncover the grounds for their agreement.

THE ARCHITECTS’ APPEALS

TO COMMON GROUNDS, SHARED SUFFERING, AND FRIENDLY DISPOSITIONS

10.2c

At one level, the grounds of agreement between Odysseus and the satyrs lie in their common suffering. Both Odysseus and the satyrs are threatened by the Cyclops, and both suffer their displacement in a shared situation. The suffering of the satyrs is well attested in the opening prologue and songs of the play. Since becoming trapped on the island of the Cyclops, the satyrs have been denied friendship with their god and deprived of their proper modes and means of worship. Rather than share wine with Dionysus, they must mix milk for Polyphemus (216-18). Rather than join in with singing nymphs, they are forced to tend to bleating sheep (63-72). Instead of escorting revelers in ecstatic dance, they must drive hungry herds to pasture (25-6). Further, they have been stripped of their joyous implements, castanets and drums (64-65, 205), and are instead clad in “wretched goatskins”—tragic garb, according to the satyrs.⁶¹⁵ These denials and impositions, as lamented in their songs, establish the severity of the satyrs’ discontent. They also warrant the satyrs’ moral assessment of Polyphemus as “impious”,⁶¹⁶ for their ritual practices have been both negated and insulted by the Cyclops (221).

⁶¹⁵ On the ambiguities of the satyr’s dress, see Seaford’s note to line 80.

⁶¹⁶ The satyrs, Silenus, and Odysseus accuse Polyphemus of impiety (26, 30-1, 310-11, 348, 365, 378 396, 438 and 602).

Later in the play, when Odysseus sneaks out of the cave, having experienced the dreaded events within, the satyrs recognize at once his suffering and, commiserating, greet him with sympathy: “Poor man...” (381). At their prompting, Odysseus proceeds to tell of the terrible deeds perpetrated against his crew inside the cave, where, contrary to hospitality, his shipmates were treated to a godless sacrifice by a “murderous cook” (397). Odysseus’ detailed portrayal of this ghastly scene cinches the common discontent (379-425). It is at this point in his speech that he begins his pitch to save the satyrs and himself:

I have crept out [of the cave] with the intention of saving you and me,
if you agree—

(*Cyclops* 426-7)

By the time Odysseus delivers this liberating proposition, the improper conditions in the cave and on the island of the Cyclops have been vividly presented, and a sympathetic bond between Odysseus and the satyrs has been forged. Indeed, this filial bond has been building up since their first direct exchange, when Odysseus had called the satyrs “friends”, and himself a “friend” to them (*philoï... pros philon*, 176). Now, they recognize each other all the more as friends in suffering. Thus, amiable to both Odysseus and his proposition, the satyrs encouragingly reciprocate his liberating intent: “Dearest of friends, *if only* we might see that day and [flee] from the impious Cyclops!” (437-8).

Although differing in detail, the analogous suffering of the satyrs and Odysseus at the hands of the Cyclops lays a common ground for their agreement and potential collaboration. Before the architect-figure lays-out his scheme to reform this situation, the shared circumstances, as commonly experienced and dramatically represented, have already been very persuasive. But there is more to this course of persuasion than common discontents and friendly dispositions.

THE ARCHITECTS’ APPEALS

TO PARTICULAR DESIRES, CUSTOMARY PRACTICES AND BACCHIC HALLS

10.2d

As Odysseus advances his proposition to the satyrs he adjusts and focuses his appeal. From the oppressive situation they share he moves to address what the satyrs in particular desire: the modes and means of Dionysian worship they have been denied. As conveyed through their songs, the satyrs desire musical instruments: tambourines and

castanets, the cheerful barbitos and the Asian lyre.⁶¹⁷ They also desire liberating expressions of Dionysian delight: euphoric dancing, thyrsus-whirling, ecstatic shouts, ritual cries and enthusiastic yelps.⁶¹⁸ And they further desire musical companions: lovely nymphs, bare-footed Bacchants and Aphrodite.⁶¹⁹ Demonstrating an awareness of such desires, Odysseus alludes suggestively to them. Appealing to their want of exultant song, Odysseus directs the satyrs' aural attention to the "tuneless" singing of Polyphemus, the hapless "wailing" of his crew, and the rocky cavern that "re-echoes" their cacophony (425-6). Having accentuated this "unmusical" din (*amoussa*, 426), Odysseus then asks the satyrs:

So tell me, whether or not you want to be quit of this savage and [dwell]
in the halls of Bacchus together with the Naïads [river Nymphs].

(*Cyclops* 429-30)

Beyond reviving musical potential, Odysseus promises, here, to reunite the satyrs with their preferred partners in song, and further to return them to a proper place of worship. That Odysseus expressly proposes to return the satyrs to Bacchic "halls" (*melathra*, 430)—away from Cyclopean "caves" (*antron*, 426)—shows that his appeal is aimed not only at restoring them to their activities and consorts, but also at reconstituting proper accommodations. These accommodating "halls" require elaboration.

If we take Odysseus' promise literally, re-housing the satyrs in "halls" suggests a setting that is not only better fitted to their modes of worship but also better crafted. Throughout Euripidean drama, "halls" (*melathra*) designate both the esteemed residences of kings and the temples of gods.⁶²⁰ Similarly, for Homer, *melathra* named the roofed rooms of heroes,⁶²¹ as well as the well-wrought timbers that spanned such rooms. In the *Odyssey*, for instance, *melathra* named one of the projecting "roof-beams" over the great hall of Odysseus' palace in Ithaca. We know of this lofty detail because perched upon that "roof-beam" Athena, disguised as a swallow, kept watch over the hero and his

⁶¹⁷ Lines: 65, 205, 40, 443-4.

⁶¹⁸ Lines: 63, 64, 25, 65, 70.

⁶¹⁹ Lines: 68-9, 70-2.

⁶²⁰ For example, *Heracles* 523; *Orestes* 759; *Ion*, 738, 1372, etc.

⁶²¹ *Iliad* 2.412, 9.204, 640; *Odyssey* 18.150, 22.239, etc.

dangerous scheme of restoring order to his household (22.239-40).⁶²² In figurative leaps, the term for this spanning roof timber came to name the broad ceiling of timber, the impressive room that those timbers covered and, then, the palace or temple that housed such rooms.⁶²³ This brief overview makes clear that when Odysseus offers to return the satyrs to the “halls” of Bacchus, a more refined setting than the cave of Polyphemus is promised.

Yet, are we right to imagine these Bacchic “halls” as materially refined, as the term seems to suggest, and as their being offered by an architect-figure could further imply? Materially refined accommodations would seem not only ill-suited to rustic satyrs but also unrepresentative of their god, who was the most itinerant, “least sedentary”,⁶²⁴ of Greek divinities, and whose places of worship were relatively immaterial compared to the monumental temples of other gods.⁶²⁵ Dionysus’ most enduring sanctuary in Athens, for instance, was a place of worship “in the marshes” (*en Limnais*)—a sensual setting, more saturated in atmosphere than encapsulated by roof-beams. Such a precinct was not only without a fixed ceiling but further denied a solid ground. Nevertheless, although this site “in the marshes” provided no refuge, as an ephemeral passage it was ideally suited to the temporal and transportive rites enacted there.⁶²⁶ A more firmly grounded yet equally liminal place for Dionysian worship was a remote clearing, or untrodden grove, on a wooded mountainside. There, liberated from the city and its urbanely-roofed citizens, frenzied followers of the god performed their

⁶²² Athena’s performance here mimes that of Odysseus in Penelope’s dream, for, in the guise of an eagle perched upon a roof-beam (*melathrō*), Odysseus (in the dream) reassures Penelope of his imminent return (19.544-53).

⁶²³ Whether or not those well-crafted wood-beams (*melathra*) took their name, in a similar turn, from the fragrant and durable *ash*-wood (*melia*)—a favored material for royal woodwork and sacred barges in Egypt—is a possibility that would only further extend the resonance of *melathra*. On Egyptian *ash*-wood, its qualities and uses, see Meiggs (1982), 407-8.

⁶²⁴ Detienne (1989), 1.

⁶²⁵ Large temples of Zeus, Athena, Apollo, Poseidon, Artemis and Hera took shape in the late sixth and early fifth centuries BCE. See, for example, Lawrence (1996).

⁶²⁶ On this sanctuary “in the marshes”, which may have performed as harrowing point of entry to the underworld, see Hooker (1960). The sanctuary “in the marshes” has left no archaeological record, but literary sources attest to its being open just one day a year for the early Spring wine-tasting festival, the *Anthesteria*. See, Burkert (1985), 237-42; H. W. Parke (1977), 107-24; Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 1-25; Shapiro (1989), 84. A sanctuary “in the marshes” is qualitatively similar to other damp sites (caves and grottoes) associated with Dionysian worship, see Otto (1965), 160-71.

ecstatic rites.⁶²⁷ Where Dionysus, or his inspired activities, are found beneath roof-beams, the effects of this enclosure are dramatized as devastating. In Euripides' *Bacchae*, for example, when the impious King of Thebes (Pentheus) tries to imprison the god within his "halls" (*melathra*), his stately palace trembles and falls—a catastrophic foreshadowing of this King's own demise.⁶²⁸ In another legend about the impious treatment of Dionysus, both the King of Thrace (Lycurgus) and his palace are punished for their inhospitality. A dramatic fragment of Aeschylus attests to this unhinging: "the house [of Lycurgus] is frenzied with the god, the roof revels". Here, the "house" (*dōma*) literally becomes enthused (*enthusia*)—possessed by Bacchus—and the "roof" (*stegē*), shaking wildly, "plays the Bacchant".⁶²⁹ A much later story also linked Dionysus agonistically to "roof-beams". The geographer Strabo reports that on a remote island in Gaul a certain group of female devotees to Dionysus would ritually dismember the roof of their sanctuary and then reassemble its parts. Interestingly, this annual rite of architectural unmaking and re-making is mimetic of one of the rites performed by the god's frenzied followers on a mountainside, whereby a sacrificial victim was, likewise, dismembered, then reconstituted.⁶³⁰

Closer to the polite confines of the city, and in spite of the momentum of the Athenian building campaigns in the fifth century BCE, Dionysus' primary places of worship remained unroofed open areas: "broad streets" (*euruchorous*) for the enactment

⁶²⁷ In Euripides' *Bacchae*, Dionysus himself refers to his "roofless rock" (*anorophois petrais*) on the mountaintop outside of Thebes (38, cf. 105f, 1036f, and 556-9, with Dodd's commentary). In his *Phaenician Women*, Dionysus is said to have there an "untrodden grove" (*sēkōs abatos*, 1751-2). Other nymph-populated hilltops and remote sites are referred to in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* (1105) and *Antigone* (1118ff). Cf. Pausanias' description of Mount Parnassas (10.4.3); and Herodotus' note about the oracle of Dionysus in Thrace being "upon their highest mountain range" (7.111.2).

⁶²⁸ The chorus gives vivid testimony to this destruction: "Soon the *melathra*... will be shaken and fall! Dionysus is in the *house*! (*melathra*)... See, here on the columns the stone lintels are falling! Bromios is raising a shout... Zeus' son is attacking this *melathra*" (586-603).

⁶²⁹ Aeschylus' *Hēdōnoi*, Frag. 28 (58). Trans. in Detienne (1989), 52. When Bacchic-like madness strikes individuals their "halls", "roofs" and "houses" also tend to shake. See Euripides' *Herakles*, 888-907, 1122, with Seaford (1993).

⁶³⁰ Detienne (1989), 42-6. The tale told in Strabo (4.4.6) adds a further detail: if any woman faltered during their duties, they met dire consequences, for their bodies were treated in a manner similar to the roof. Commenting on this, and other stories, Detienne offers a provocative dismissal: "All these tales suggest that this is a good reason not to place too much confidence in Dionysos' talents as an architect" (p. 52). However, such dismembering and reconstituting may be seen as a symbolic loosening and restitution of order, which, as a means of analysis, would seem to be within the scope of an "architect's" interest (as *Peace* and *Cyclops* further suggest). On ritual dismembering (*diamoirasai*), see Burkert (1983), 232.

of public processions;⁶³¹ and circumscribed places for the performance of song, dance and drama. Such a circumscribed place, a “dancing ground” (*choros*), was marked-out each year for dramatic festivals in the Athenian agora (in the late sixth century BCE). Aeschylus performed his earliest tragedies in this open and annually re-constituted place.⁶³² Later, around the beginning of the fifth century BCE, another broad place for Dionysian drama was retained on the South slope of the Acropolis (which would become the theater of Dionysus)—a site already well-trodden by ritual dance. A roofed temple (of relatively modest size) was indeed part of this Dionysian precinct.⁶³³ Like all Greek temples its “halls” accommodated a cult image, or statue, of the god. Yet, on the days of the dramatic festival those “halls” were empty, for the god (his statue) was, like the citizens themselves, seated in the open theater watching-over the drama performed in his honor.⁶³⁴

From this overview of the places of Dionysian worship it becomes clear that the “halls” Odysseus offered to the satyrs would not be reducible to well-roofed or materially refined accommodations. Although each sanctuary for Dionysian worship mentioned above (in the marshes, upon the hilltops and in open areas of the city) was well suited to the ritual acts they hosted, they were (like Dionysus himself) materially unstable, intermittent and broadly dispersed. Dionysian activity tended to draw worshippers out from under their enclosing roof-beams and into open, sometimes volatile, situations. The persistent locus of Dionysus was, thus, found in performance—when and where festival processions, religious drama, ecstatic rites, ritual song, communal dance and revelry became manifest. Dionysus, then, would seem to have preferred the sky’s vault as his roof.

Again, if Dionysus was so at home in the open, and if satyrs would seem to be content in the wild, why does Odysseus promise the satyrs “halls”? If it is not material refinement, or even practical enclosure that he promises, what, then, does this architect’s

⁶³¹ Such “broad places” are described by Demosthenes in his speech *Against Meidias*, 52. For an interpretation of this passage in relation to Dionysian worship, see Seaford (1993), 134-35.

⁶³² Hammond (1972). As Hammond notes, Plato gives evidence for the persistence of setting-up temporary performance places in the agora (Plato *Laws* 817c).

⁶³³ Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 60, quoting Pausanias 1.29.2.

⁶³⁴ The presence of Dionysus’ statue in the front row is clearly identified in Aristophanes’ *Knights* 536. On the significance of the statue’s mobility during the *Dionysia* and the cult of Dionysus Eleuthereus, see Pickard-Cambridge (1968); and Sourvinou-Inwood (1994).

offer represent? Clearly we should consider these “halls” as metaphoric accommodations, which loosely encompass the diverse places of Dionysian worship. Yet, we should also recall a certain detail of Odysseus’ promising question, for he had specifically asked the satyrs if they wish “to dwell in the halls of Bacchus” (430). This promise of active dwelling (*naiein*) suggests further conditions extending through and beyond the material enclosure of “halls”. For, such dwelling would aim to install the satyrs not only in apt relation to Dionysus, but also to other divine accommodations likewise called *melathra* by Euripides: “the halls of Zeus” (*Orestes* 1684) and “the lofty halls of heaven” (*Hecuba* 1100). While such lofty dwelling might elevate the satyrs, rhetorically, the offer also promises to restore them to a properly liminal placement where they—the satyrs, their companions and their Dionysian modes of worship—could be recollected as actively integral to a divine milieu. This topic of “dwelling”, raised as it is in the context of an “architect’s” offer of metaphoric halls, merits a further digression.

THE ARCHITECTS’ APPEALS

TO DWELLING IN *RELATIVE HARMONY*

10.2e

To “dwell” (*naiein*) is best understood here in relation to *oikein*, an activity typically translated in terms of inhabitation. Although the two modes of living are sometimes given synonymously, “to inhabit” (*oikein*) more often describes human, terrestrial and civic habitation. As such, *oikein* is a condition of being settled in one’s “household” (*oikos*) or “city” (*polis*). The activity is also semantically intertwined with the act and institution of “colonizing” (*oikizein*); with the role of the “colonizer”, or city founder (*oikist*); and with the civilized terrain that the Greeks knew as “the inhabited world” (*oikoumenē*), having Oceanus for its limit.⁶³⁵ To “dwell” (*naiein*), on the other hand, is to be situated amidst a broader topography; to be open to a more cosmic realm; and to be actively related to a wider cast of agents. These other agents include mortals, but also extend to innumerable other animating forces that share in and magnify human life and imagination. To assemble the diverse agents that “dwell” in early Greek literature is to gather a great pantheon of forces.

⁶³⁵ According to Agathemerus (1.1-2), Anaximander represented “the inhabited world” (*tēn oikoumenē*) on a tablet. See Kirk and Raven (1964), 103; McEwen (1993), 26; and cf. Voegelin (1964), 203.

In the *Theogony*, Hesiod describes a great variety of agents—divine, monstrous and mortal—who (upon Zeus’ distribution of honor) dwell in appropriate places.⁶³⁶ In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus portrays a comparably diverse cast of agents, each dwelling eccentrically. Among these are the nymph Calypso, dwelling in her captivating cave (5.58); the sea monster Scylla, dwelling in her treacherous cave (12.85); as well as Circe who dwells enchanting in her halls (10.135). Odysseus also tells of Aeolus, the keeper of the winds, dwelling on a floating island of bronze (10.1-3); the Spirits of the dead, all dwelling in Hades (11.475-6); and, of course, the Cyclopes who themselves “dwell on the peaks of mountains in hollow caves.” (9.113-14). Each of these eccentric dwelling situations in the *Odyssey* represent unique topographical challenges to Odysseus as he himself strives to restore his own situation in Ithaca, but Odysseus’ stories also extend the topic of dwelling to marginal and inhospitable extremes. Hesiod, by comparison, conciliates extremes through the topic of dwelling. In his *Theogony*, dwelling places are distributed in relative harmony to Zeus, and in fitting relation to diversely conflictual agents. Here, dwelling performs as a unifying device, connecting cosmic order to divine justice. The topography of Homer’s *Odyssey*, on the other hand, is explored not primarily for its harmonizing unity with respect to Zeus, but rather for its comparatively wild diversity, as experienced by a mortal protagonist who must make his way in spite of inhospitable challenges. With such inhospitable diversity, one might expect to find “dwelling” in this Homeric landscape to be used as a register of proper mortal habitation. However, it is not. (Even the Cyclops “dwells”). Rather, as with Hesiod’s *Theogony*, it is the *relative* diversity and appropriateness of various dwelling situations more than any singular manner of dwelling that seems to intrigue Odysseus as he (while telling his stories to the Phaeacians) lingers over the description of each place and mode of dwelling he encounters.⁶³⁷ That such disparate places are found to sponsor “dwelling”, suggests an understanding of the activity as being inclusive of heterogeneity and strife.⁶³⁸

⁶³⁶ On Zeus’ distribution of “honor” (and dwelling situations) in the *Theogony*, see above, p. 118-19. Zeus was worshipped as “the god who *dwells*”, for in Dodona he dwelt in the sacred oak. See Cook (1903). The Greek term for “temple” *neōs* is related both to “dwell” (*naiein*), and to “flow” (*naō*), such as a *flowing* spring in a meadow (*Odyssey* 6.292). See, Burkert (1988), 29.

⁶³⁷ As Norman Austin (1975) shows, the *Odyssey* may be read as an anthropological study of various social orders. Whether the narrative takes us into a swineherd’s hut, a beast’s cave, or a heroes’ palace, everywhere there is “high decorum” and a “vivid mimesis of that decorum”.

⁶³⁸ The interest in the *diversity* of dwelling situations is captured by the Phaeacian King, prompting Odysseus with these words: “tell me of the people and of their well-peopled (*eu naietoōsas*) cities, both of those who are cruel and wild and unjust, and of those who are kind

When we turn from the mythic topographies of Hesiod and Homer to the world of Athenian drama, we find the topic of dwelling (*naiein*) to be both more focused and more problematic. While in the dramas one finds a cosmic order resonate with the situation in the *Theogony* (for Zeus dwells in the heavens,⁶³⁹ Poseidon in the sea,⁶⁴⁰ deities in their proper sanctuaries,⁶⁴¹ monsters at the ends of the earth,⁶⁴² and citizens in cities⁶⁴³), one more often finds mortals dwelling improperly: apart from their ancestral home; outside their social station; in exile; in foreign lands; and in excruciating conditions of turmoil and discontent. As Jean-Pierre Vernant has aptly concluded, in Athenian drama (in contradistinction to myth) the “status of man becomes the problem.”⁶⁴⁴ As this brief survey suggests, this problematic status involved “dwelling” (*naiein*). Whereas in Euripidean tragedy, the problem of dwelling primarily concerns the displacement of individual women (Queens and daughters of fallen Kings),⁶⁴⁵ in the tragedies of Sophocles, the topic arises most directly as a problem for Kings and

to strangers and fear the gods in their thoughts” (8.574-6). This epithet “well-peopled”, or ‘of good dwelling’ (*eu naietoōas*) also qualifies the halls of Odysseus (in the *Odyssey*, 2.400, 4.96, 17.28, -85, -178, -275, 19.30, 21.242, 21.387, 22.399, 24.362), and of Hector (in the *Iliad*, 6.497). In the *Odyssey*, the epithet also adorns the city of Sidon (13.285), and in the *Iliad*: Crete (2.648), Thebes (4.45), Phrygia (3.400) and Troy (2.133, 9.402, 13.380).

⁶³⁹ Euripides’ *Orestes* 1684ff; *Electra* 991-92.

⁶⁴⁰ Euripides’ *Helen* 1584.

⁶⁴¹ Zeus *dwells* in Dodona (Sophocles Frag. 455); Apollo in Delphi (Euripides’ *Orestes* 591); and Dionysus in his sanctuary in the marshes (Aristophanes’ *Frogs* 324), as well as in Thebes (Sophocles *Antigone* 1124); and on hill-tops (Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1105). “Dwelling” in the dramas also qualifies ethical and temperamental situations: Hecate (and her magic) *dwells* in Medea’s inner chamber (Euripides’ *Medea* 397); an angry temper *dwells* in Oedipus (Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus* 338); Good Order (*Eunomia*), Justice (*Dikē*) and Peace (*Eirēna*) *dwell* in the prosperous city of Corinth (Pindar, *Olympian Ode* 13.4-8); Persuasion (*Peithō*) and Grace (*Chāris*) *dwell* in a praise-worthy man (Pindar, Frag. 123.10); and, “Justice *dwells* close to mortal wrong-doing” (Euripides’ Frag. 151).

⁶⁴² Aeschylus’ *Prometheus Bound* 794.

⁶⁴³ *Hippolytus* 1159.

⁶⁴⁴ Vernant (1983), 196.

⁶⁴⁵ The heroines dwelling out-of-place include those whose names entitle their tragedies: *Medea* 436, 937; *Iphigenia at Tauris*, 219-20, 629, 1085; *Electra* 208, 240, 251, 307, 1005, 1163; and *Hecuba* 617ff, also in *Trojan Women* 139). Even the spirits of dead heroes *dwell* in unrest, for Achilles *dwells* as a ghost on an island “in the Sea Inhospitable” (*Andromache* 1261).

heroes.⁶⁴⁶ Yet, in the more archaic tragedies of Aeschylus, dwelling arises as a problem for groups. In his *Suppliants* (circa 470-59 BCE), it is a wayward chorus of women (led by the fugitive King Danus) who seek to restore their dwelling situation in their ancestral land of Argos.⁶⁴⁷ And, the culminating scene of Aeschylus' *Eumenides* (as sketched above), involves Athena's persuasive offer and the chorus' eventual acceptance of a revised dwelling situation. Specifically, the goddess offers the chorus of Furies a revered place of worship in proximity to the Aeropagus, the judicial institution she founds in the drama. Thus, these two dramas of Aeschylus provide precedents for the persuasive offer of revised dwelling to a chorus. In Euripides' *Cyclops*, then, Odysseus can be seen to follow the example of these models: King Danus (in part); and, to a greater degree, Athena—for, like Athena, Odysseus (as “architect”) seeks to reestablish proper dwelling conditions not only for a mortal group (his crew) but also for mythic and divine agents (the satyrs).⁶⁴⁸

THE ARCHITECTS' APPEALS

TO BASIC CONDITIONS, ANCIENT TRADITIONS AND “FIRST” FRIENDS

10.2f

So far, in his persuasive exchange with the satyrs, Odysseus has established common grounds for their potential agreement. This he has done by being predisposed to offer and invite friendship, and by representing for them the problematic situation, aspects of which they relate to and share. Odysseus has also attempted to move the satyrs into deeper agreement with his scheme by appealing, more pointedly, to their particular cravings for liberation, for musical practices, for Bacchic halls, and for the potential of dwelling in appropriate harmony. However, Odysseus does not end his appeals here, for he also appeals to the satyrs' most profound desire, by promising to restore them *directly* to their god:

Be saved with me and get back your *first* friend (*archaion philon*) Dionysus.⁶⁴⁹

(*Cyclops* 435-6)

⁶⁴⁶ Dwelling in exile is the preliminary complication for Philoctetes (*Philoctetes* 153ff), and the culminating crisis for King Oedipus (*Oedipus Tyrannus* 1451-2).

⁶⁴⁷ The problematic dwelling status of these maidens and the appropriate accommodations offered to them are central concerns of this drama, especially lines 954-71.

⁶⁴⁸ The architect-figure in Aristophanes' *Peace* similarly restores the chorus of farmers (previously trapped in the city) to the peaceful countryside, and the poetically and ritually charged “people” (*laoi*), previously disregarded, to common concern.

⁶⁴⁹ My variation of Kovacs' translation, which reads, “escape with me and get back your old friend Dionysus” (*sōthēti met' emou kai ton archaion philon Dionyson analab'*).

Odysseus' promise (given in the imperative) performs like a prediction: you shall "be saved", and you shall "get back your first friend." His pledge is made all the more engaging because Odysseus' offer, to "get back" Dionysus, can be understood in its most haptic sense: to take back into your hands the friend you crave.⁶⁵⁰ The availability of such a palpable reunion is further demonstrated by the presence of the wine flask Odysseus bears and, perhaps, holds in his hand while extending his promise. In this wine flask, Odysseus carries a manifestation of the divinity that is sought, since the potent drink and powerful god were effectively the same.⁶⁵¹ With the god so palpably represented, the persuasive reach of Odysseus' offer of friendship becomes demonstrably clear. And, so, when the satyrs enthusiastically reciprocate his promise of reunion by exclaiming "Dearest of friends (*ō philtate*)..." (437), these plural "friends" seem to address not only Odysseus but also Dionysus, as well as the flask that brings him so tantalizingly near.

Odysseus' offer is *so* eagerly embraced by the satyrs also because it promises exactly what they have been longing for from the beginning of the play. Starting with Silenus' very first apostrophizing word, "Oh Bromius..." (1), every character in the play has expressed their craving for Dionysus by emphasizing his absence. As the satyrs enter the orchestra, they sing, "No Bromius is here..." (63). They further qualify this lack as mutually unfortunate, "Ah me, lord Dionysus, where are you going without your companions... [while] I, your attendant, serve this one-eyed Cyclops... deprived of your friendship" (74-81). As Odysseus enters the orchestra, he, too, reminds us of the absence of Dionysus. For, upon seeing the satyrs he erroneously believes that he has arrived to "the city of Bromius" (99). Silenus, soon corrects this mistake, however, and further recalls the incident of the god's abduction by pirates (112, 17). Lastly, Polyphemus struts into the orchestra with yet another negative assertion, denying both the god and his worship: "Why this Bacchic holiday? Here is *no* Dionysus..." (203-5). Given the presence of Dionysus' statue in the front row of the Dionysian theater, these repeated negations perform paradoxically and humorously. Yet, these negations also assert, more seriously, the fundamental conflict of the drama: beyond the crisis confronting Odysseus in the cave and the mistreatment of the satyrs by Polyphemus, there is (initially) no Dionysus in the land of the Cyclops—the god is missing and has been mistreated. Such

⁶⁵⁰ The verb *analabe* (a form of *lambanō*) implies grasping or seizing by the hands. The act is integral to expressions concerning the enactment of solemn bonds, pledges and oaths: as in the *give* and *take* of trust (*pista didonai kai lambanein*), see Mourelatos (1970), 139, 141.

⁶⁵¹ On this confluence, see below, p. 342, n. 871.

an *agon* resonates with the situation facing Trygaeus at the start of Aristophanes' comedy, in which Zeus is absent and Peace mistreated. In *Peace*, as in *Cyclops*, this profound absence prompts the proactive involvement of an architect-figure.

Yet, it is also significant to recognize that these repeated negations of Dionysus prepare the grounds for Odysseus' persuasive offer: to reunite the chorus with their god, or "first friend".⁶⁵² And here, the "first" (*archaion*) serves to emphasize not only the primacy of the divinity, but also the "beginnings" of Dionysian worship in Athens, for this "first" recollects the "most archaic *Dionysia*" (*ta archaiotera Dionusia*), the Anthesteria festival, during which the community came together to collectively open casks of the new vintage and taste the first wine.⁶⁵³ In spite of these appealingly primary and palpable promises, the satyrs still receive Odysseus' offer with some ambiguity, for their response—"if only we might see that day"—treats the promise of reunion with their god as a wish.⁶⁵⁴ Although the satyrs' desire for Dionysus is great, they cannot themselves imagine how to handle Polyphemus (440)—a problem Odysseus will assist them with.

THE ARCHITECTS' CULMINATING APPEAL

10.2g

Odysseus' persuasive appeals to the chorus are not yet exhausted. Beyond appealing to aspects of their common situation, to their particular desires (for Dionysian ways, Bacchic halls and proper dwelling), and to their most profound lack (Dionysus), Odysseus makes a further and final appeal. In doing so, he exceeds the satyrs' particular cravings, adjusts their common grounds for agreement, and rearticulates the basic impetus to act. Having stirred the satyrs' enthusiasm for liberation and reunion, Odysseus then offers justice:

Then listen now to the punishment I have (in mind) for the
knavish beast and how you may flee from slavery.⁶⁵⁵
(*Cyclops* 441-1)

⁶⁵² The satyr's desire for their "friend" is repeatedly asserted: 74, 496, and 498.

⁶⁵³ On the Anthesteria festival, see Burkert (1983), 213-47; and Simon (1983), 92-99. This festival was celebrated in Athens a month prior to the dramatic festival.

⁶⁵⁴ The chorus of Aristophanes' *Peace* respond with the same wishful words, just after Trygaeus promises to restore to them the diverse benefits of Peace (345).

⁶⁵⁵ This translation is my variation of Kovacs': "Then listen to the punishment I have contrived for the knavish beast and how you may escape from slavery" (*Cyclops* 441-2).

The details of Odysseus' scheme to subdue and blind Polyphemus soon follow (451-63). As aggressive as this blinding "punishment" is, the word Odysseus uses to name it suggests that it is not a private act of retaliation or revenge that he proposes, but a more broadly sanctioned act of "retribution" meant to restore "honor". For, this "punishment" or "retribution" (*timōria*, 441, 695) is literally a "watching over of honor"—*timōria* being a compound term joining together both *timē*, "honor" (such as Zeus and Dikē distribute), and *oromai*, the act of keeping watch or "looking on" with vigilance.⁶⁵⁶ In Aristophanes' *Peace*, Trygaeus performs the same kind of act, for as he takes flight on the dung-beetle intending to restore peace to the wronged people, he explains that an Aesopic dung-beetle had once flown to heaven aiming "to take retribution against" (*anti-timōroumenos*) an eagle on behalf of a wronged rabbit (133-34). Architect-figures, then, are in each drama linked to this kind of honorable, if aggressive, restoration. As one scholar of this topic in ancient Greek society has emphasized, "in certain circumstances taking vengeance was positively considered a duty by the Greeks... [The act] goes hand in hand with public justice, as long as it remains within approved limits."⁶⁵⁷ Probing the limits and ambiguities of so-called "just" retribution was for the tragedians, and for Euripides in particular, a significant preoccupation.⁶⁵⁸

This emphasis on delivering "punishment" to Polyphemus is also particularly significant for Odysseus, since this act sets his deed apart from comparable deeds of other heroes. Whereas Theseus *kills* the Minotaur; Bellerophon the Chimera; Perseus the Gorgon; Oedipus the Sphinx; Jason the Serpent; and Herakles the many-headed Hydra (among other beasts); Odysseus *blinds* the Cyclops, he does not kill him. Although the relationship of agents in this series is the same (hero versus monster), and the ultimate accomplishment is similar (liberation from a threat and cultivation of some more fortunate, or civilizing potentiality), the critical act is remarkably different. Indeed, Odysseus' treatment of Polyphemus resembles less the heroic deeds of these other protagonists and more the retributive work of Zeus, who himself delivers blindness as a

⁶⁵⁶ Aristotle would later sharply distinguish this sanctioned or reasoned mode of "retribution" (*timōrian*) from impulsive, vindictive, and private acts of "revenge" (*kolasis*) (*Rhetoric* 1369b13). Although this distinction is not so sharp in Athenian drama, "honor" (its protection and distribution) is central to punishment and justice in Greek society and poetry. On *timōrian* and its broad significance, see McHardy (2008), 3; and Allen (2000), 61.

⁶⁵⁷ Mossman (1995), 169-71.

⁶⁵⁸ *Hecuba* and *Medea* are particularly relevant to *Cyclops* for their comparable dramatizations of ambiguous punishments, see Mossman (1995), Meridor (1978); and Pucci (1980).

punishment according to certain myths.⁶⁵⁹ Thus, in blinding the Cyclops, Odysseus is acting, in part, as a representative of Zeus' *dikē*.⁶⁶⁰

There is much that could be said about blindness as a punishment (especially for transgressions against social and sacred bonds, and against the Muses);⁶⁶¹ and as a trope related to the alternative vision of poets and seers (as exemplified by Homer and Teiresias).⁶⁶² What is important here, however, is that an architect-figure promises justice: as a proportionate rebalancing of honor (*timē*); as a culminating argument in his persuasive appeal; as a primary motive for his proposed scheme of transformation; and as a critical intention complementary to his earlier promises of liberation and restoration. Given the way Odysseus introduces this intention—"listen now to the retribution I have in mind" (441)—this "retribution" (*timōria*) can further be taken as a synonym for the "scheme" (*dolon*) he has in mind. For, just after disclosing the punishing details of this "retribution" (445-72), Odysseus tells the satyrs that they now "know his scheme completely" and should follow the "architects" of it (476-77)—and these "architects" may now be understood as being further inclusive of both Zeus and Dikē.

* * *

The discussion above has presented the architectural acts that Odysseus names and performs in the satyr play: "commanding", or appealing to order with a variety of urging modes; and "persuading", or appealing to agreement and common understanding with diverse arguments and offerings. The following chapter presents a related act that Odysseus performs: speaking figuratively, a poetic mode of representation by which he fully discloses not only the details and desired effects of his transformative scheme but also its profound analogical reach.

⁶⁵⁹ See, for instance, Buxton (1980); and W. Slater (1997).

⁶⁶⁰ In the Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus warns Polyphemus not to mistreat him and his crew, for "Zeus is the *avenger* (*epitimētōr*) of suppliants and strangers" (9.270)—literally, one who "puts *timē* back upon" those who have been wronged. It is Odysseus, however, who goes on to play this role in the *Odyssey*, just as he does in the satyr play. Yet one must bear in mind that in the *Odyssey* Zeus seems not to condone Odysseus' actions, for he is said to refuse the sacrificed ram that Odysseus later offers to him (9.554).

⁶⁶¹ In Euripides' *Hecuba*, the heroine blinds Polymestor for breaking both customs of hospitality and his oath to protect her son. Such transgressions, as well as boasting, lying and challenging the gods, were hubristic acts that were punished with blindness both in myth and in ancient society, see Collard (1991), note to *Hecuba* lines 1035-55, and Bernidaki-Aldous (1990), 57-93. In the *Iliad*, Thamyris is said to have been punished with blindness for having boasted that he could out-sing the Muses (2.594-600).

⁶⁶² Buxton (1980).

*Analogous Acts and Figurative Speech:
a manifold scheme and its various schemas*

11.0

After revealing the dreadful situation within the cave (375-426), together with the motives and benefits for altering that situation (426-42), Odysseus continues his persuasive exchange with the chorus of satyrs by describing the details of his transformative scheme. As in the *Odyssey*, these details involve intoxicating the giant with potent wine, then blinding him in his sleep with a specially prepared stake of olive wood that he had found inside the cave (451-459).⁶⁶³ Immediately following this direct disclosure, however, Odysseus presents an elaborate analogy as a further qualification of his intent:

And just as a ship joiner
whirls his auger with a pair of straps,
so I shall drill the brand into the Cyclops' orb of vision
and burn out his eyeball.

(*Cyclops* 460-3)

Being replete with figures of *technē*, this analogy both prefigures and supports the “architect” title that Odysseus claims just a few lines later (477). Yet, this analogy—given in anticipation of his performance inside the cave—also recalls the extended simile that qualified the same deed in the *Odyssey*. There, Odysseus narrated the event of blinding the Cyclops—after the fact—as follows: “They [my crewmen] took the stake of olivewood, sharp at the point, and thrust it into his eye, while I, throwing my weight upon it from above, whirled it round.” He then delivers the model simile:

[And just] as a man bores a ship's timber with an
[auger], while those below keep it spinning with the strap,
which they lay hold of by either end, and the drill runs unceasingly.
Even so we took the fiery-pointed stake and whirled it
around in his eye, and the blood flowed round it, all hot as it was.

(*Odyssey* 9.382-88)

⁶⁶³ “But when he falls asleep, overcome by Dionysus, there is an olive stake in his hall, whose tip, when I have sharpened it with this sword of mine, I shall put into the fire. Then when I see it burnt I shall lift it hot and poke it into the Cyclops' face and melt-out his eye with the fire” (454-59). These preparations are discussed further below in relation to the sword, p. 327.

Although neither Homer nor Euripides employ the terms *tekton* or *technē* in these passages,⁶⁶⁴ both poets draw unmistakably on images of craftsmen at work to make vivid and palpable the incredible task of overcoming the giant. Yet, unlike the Homeric simile, which revolves cohesively around the action of boring and the productive teamwork involved in joining timbers for a ship, Euripides brings together a denser series of more incongruous images. These incongruities become more apparent as we break down Euripides' passage and uncover the intended complications, which the translation cited above smooths over. By this exercise, what at first seems to simply follow and abridge the Homeric model will be found to adjust and expand it in significant ways.

In Euripides' *Cyclops*, Odysseus begins this mixed analogy by projecting himself as a "ship-joiner". To be clear, the figure here is not a ship-builder (*neon téktōn*),⁶⁶⁵ but rather a "ship-joining-man" (*nau-pēgian... anēr*)—one who "fastens" (*pēgnumi*), ties, tightens or binds heterogeneous parts, so that together these members will perform as a whole. Within the same line, Odysseus further qualifies this work of "fastening" as "fitting" (*harmozōn*). This activity may be taken simply as fitting-together material members (such as timbers or stones).⁶⁶⁶ Yet, *harmozōn* is as much an act of social binding: fitting-together propitious relations (as in unions of marriage);⁶⁶⁷ fitting social customs (such as hospitality and song) to particular occasions;⁶⁶⁸ and articulating fitting promises before witnesses that are thus made mutually binding.⁶⁶⁹ In the second line of his analogy, Odysseus suggests that he will perform this fastening-fitting work as with an "auger". This "auger" (*trupanon*) is the same large shipwright's drill named in the

⁶⁶⁴ Euripides, however, does end the line immediately preceding this analogy with an expression—*t'ektēxō puri*, "melt-out by fire" (459)—which, when pronounced aloud, "*tek-tekh-o*" may have phonetically performed as a *tektonic* pun.

⁶⁶⁵ In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus notes that the land of the Cyclops lacks *tektones* of ships, 9.126.

⁶⁶⁶ Euripides' *Herakles* 943; *Phoenician Women* 116; *Helen* 233; and *Trojan Women* 11.

⁶⁶⁷ On the rite of betrothal as formally "fitting-together", see Carson (1982), esp. 122. Cf. Euripides' *Electra* 24; Sophocles' *Antigone* 570; and Pindar's *Pythian* 9.12, 117.

⁶⁶⁸ Jason provides "fitting hospitality" (*xeini harmozonta*) in Pindar's *Pythian Ode* 4.129; and, with the Muses' help, Pindar fits his song to Dorian measure (*Olympian Ode* 3.5). Cf. Bacchylides, *Ode* 14.12; Sophocles' *Antigone* (1318), *Electra* (1293), *Oedipus at Colonus* (902), and *Frag.* 244; and Aristophanes' *Clouds* 968; *Frag.* 930; *Knights* 989; and *Women at the Thesmophoria* 162, with Olson's note. One may also recall that Aristippus was famed for "harmonizing (his own actions) harmoniously" to various situations. See above, p. 8, n. 11.

⁶⁶⁹ In the *Iliad*, Hector proposes (to no avail) that he and Achilles ought to call off their duel and instead "call the gods to witness... our covenants (*harmoniaōn*)."⁶⁶⁹ (22.253-5).

Odyssey (9.385). Although in name this drill may be common, the action Odysseus intends to perform with it in *Cyclops* is not. Whereas the Homeric “auger” (*trupanon*) predictably “bores” (*trupōi*) and “spins” (*dineomen*), the Euripidean “auger”, surprisingly, is to be “rowed” (*kōpēlatei*)—turned, presumably, but in the manner of pulling and plunging an oar (*kōpē*). This oar-like movement of the “auger” is further complicated because it is to be manipulated by unlikely “straps”. These “straps” are unlikely because, whereas the “strap” (*himas*) in the *Odyssey* appropriately (and suggestively)⁶⁷⁰ named a belt of leather operated by a crew, the device in *Cyclops* is, literally, a “pair of bridles” (*diploin chalinoi*). Bridles are, of course, better fitted to horses than to augers, and better maneuvered by individuals than by a crew. Furthermore, neither *tektons* nor ship-joiners have need of such devices for their work; rather, horse-tamers, riders and charioteers are the more adept handlers of bridles. With this substitution (“double bridle” for a “strap”), Euripides shifts the ostensible purpose of Odysseus’ equipment: away from a device that perpetuates movement and toward a device essential for guidance and restraint. Whereas the Homeric “strap” kept the auger spinning (9.385), Euripides’ “double bridle” conceivably directs the tool to its target, and by like restraint redirects the beast toward an alternative course. What, then, does this combination of images so far yield?

Within these first two lines of the mixed analogy, Odysseus presents himself *as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man who rows an auger, with a double bridle*. As a description of his imminent activity within the cave, this series of analogous acts suggests that Odysseus will deal with the beast by tying him up, rowing him over and reining him in. Such an improvisation is more likely to be found at a rodeo or circus than at a workshop or shipyard. Athenian audiences might well have found these incongruities amusing. Odysseus, in delivering the line, may have heightened the comic effect by playing the braggart, as jack-of-all-trades. Yet, in spite of the comic effect of the incongruity, the actual vocabulary chosen by Euripides presents a deliberate cluster of *technē* activities that Odysseus intends to perform: not only boring, but also fastening, fitting and rowing. And, these activities he shall perform *as* with an auger and double bridle. This cluster of activities and devices becomes all the more bewildering in the second half of the analogy, where Odysseus claims *not* that he will drill the wooden stake

⁶⁷⁰ This leather “strap” (*himas*), can be suggestively linked to other devices of the same name in Odysseus’ story: the oxhide “strap” that he had stretched over his marriage bed (23.201); and the taught “string” that kept Penelope’s chamber door securely locked in his absence (4.802). The string of Odysseus’ bow (as of a minstrel’s lyre) also resonates with this device.

into the giant's eye, but that he will "circle" (*kuklōsō*) a "firebrand" (*dalōn*) and "(together) wither" (*sunauanō*) the Cyclops' "pupils" (*koras*). The entire passage, then, can be reread (more literally) as follows:

just as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man
 rows an auger with a double bridle
 so I shall circle a firebrand into the light-bearing
 vision of the Cyclops and together-wither his pupils.⁶⁷¹

naupēgian d' hōsei tis harmozōn anēr
diploin chalinoi trupanon kōpēlatei,
houtō kuklōsō dalon en phaesphorōi
Kuklōpos opsei kai sunauanō koras. (Cyclops 460-63)

Granting this elaborate schema more significance than hyperbolic buffoonery, it is productive to consider its convoluted mix as concentrated clues that deliberately open onto a complex image of the grander actions involved in the protagonist's scheme. For the seemingly incongruous activities (fastening, fitting, rowing, circling and withering), together with their apparently mismatched tools (an auger, double-bridle and a firebrand) are deliberately offered by Odysseus to adjust, expand and problematize the manifold deed he intends to perform within the cave. In other words, this mixed analogy can be taken to represent—in condensed form—the fuller complexities of Odysseus' scheme. This odd cluster of activities and attributes further invites a corresponding interpretation of the comparably anomalous and plural "architects", which Euripides works into the script only a few lines later (line 477). Like the *technē* figures gathered in this densely mixed analogy, the figurative "architects" likewise unsettle, enrich and reach beyond the obvious scope of *tektons* and tectonic arts; thus, the "architects" may be taken as an extension and tropological culmination of the mixed analogy that precedes it. And so, an interpretation of Euripides' analogy must not stop at recognizing its resemblance to the Homeric simile,⁶⁷² but rather begin by taking seriously the dramatic poet's subtle adjustments to it and expansive deviations from it.

⁶⁷¹ (my translation).

⁶⁷² Commentators often point out the resemblance, but not the differences. See Seaford (notes to 455-9 and 460-1), Olson (note to 454-63), and Ussher (note to 460-3).

Of course, one must grant that the model Homeric simile also moves expansively through and beyond shipbuilding to other levels of meaning. Indeed, this Homeric image bears upon key themes of the epic by linking and, so, comparing specific deeds in dispersed episodes of the narrative. Most notably, the image of Odysseus blinding the Cyclops *as though* boring ship timbers (in book nine), recalls the portrayal of him making the raft to leave Calypso's island (in book five), and prefigures the story of him having made his marriage bed in Ithaca (in book twenty-three). Both of these episodes show Odysseus acting as an able craftsman. Indeed, while making his raft Odysseus is said to have cut, trimmed, smoothed, straightened and "bored all the [timbers]" with "augers", and then to have "fitted them to one another" with pegs and morticings (5.247-48). Similarly, while remembering for Penelope how he had fashioned their marriage bed, Odysseus describes how he had cut, trimmed, smoothed and straightened his bedpost, and then "bored it all with the auger" before stretching a radiant hide across it (23.194-201). Given that Odysseus' raft and bed are obviously tectonic constructs, it is especially significant that they are linked and likened to his accomplishment in the land of the Cyclops by the tectonic simile. The essential linkage between these three separate scenes is reinforced by the distribution of other similes that qualify Odysseus' actions throughout the epic. Over the course of his diverse experiences in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus is likened to many agents: acting at times like a lion (6.130-4, 23.48), like a vulture (22.302), like an eagle (24.538), like a cuttlefish (5.432-5), like a woman (8.530), like a child (5.394-8), like a beggar (13.ff), and like a bard (11.368, 21.406-9). But, Odysseus only acts like a *tekton* when he fabricates his raft, fashions his marriage bed, and resists the Cyclops. One can take this trio of tectonic actions to exemplify certain culturally constructive practices that were valued (and threatened) at the time of the epic poem's composition.⁶⁷³ These culturally valued practices involve: shipbuilding and seafaring, as profitable if risky ventures (for mercantile, colonial and diplomatic exchange); establishing well-founded and loyal households as integral to enduring civic realms (as Odysseus' marriage bed in Ithaca symbolizes); and unifying diverse agencies to resist (Cyclopean) threats to the civic and sacred societies that such ships and households bear. Taken together, then, these representative deeds—fabricating well-fitted ships, founding well-grounded households, and resisting Cyclopean threats—suggest an interrelated set of civilizing values and related kinds of *technē* that Odysseus in the *Odyssey* exemplifies.

⁶⁷³ The insights of Dougherty (2001) have helped frame this argument.

Returning to Euripides' *Cyclops*, it is evident that the adjustments this dramatic poet makes to the mixed analogy posit somewhat different links, comparisons and emphases. Given that the analogy arises in a satyr play, these associations perform not only in relation to Homeric poetry (and myth) but also in relation to the nested contexts of Euripidean drama, Dionysian agencies, and Athenian society in the fifth century BCE. We must, therefore, begin again to review Euripides' mixed analogy—word by word, and in more expansive detail—in order to draw from its diverse clues and its broader milieu a fuller understanding of the protagonist's scheme and of the “architects” involvement in it.

FASTENING, FETTERING and FIXING ‘SHIPS’ (*nau-pēgnumi*)

11.1

as a ship-*fastening*... sort of man...
—(*Cyclops* 460)

The first manner of action that Odysseus projects as being *like* the action he shall perform in the cave is “fastening”. As many sources show, fastening (*pēgnumi*) was a legitimate way to tie together timbers, as for a raft, ship, chariot, wagon or plough.⁶⁷⁴ “Fastening” was also an appropriate way to assemble temporary wooden structures, including the bleachers, scaffolds, stage and skēnē, which were reused each year for the dramatic festival in Athens.⁶⁷⁵ However, Euripides does not involve “fastening” in the context of carpentry anywhere in his plays. Rather, this tragic poet consistently engages the verb to describe hapless victims being fastened to stakes; and, in one instance, a maddened hero bound fast to a column.⁶⁷⁶ In the *Cyclops*, two of Odysseus' shipmates are fastened to roasting spits precisely in this manner—with their “limbs transfixed” (302).⁶⁷⁷ Given this arresting context, Odysseus—as a fastener—should be taken to emphasize the punitive restraint he will impose on the dangerous giant: Odysseus shall do

⁶⁷⁴ Unlike mortise and tenon joints, “fastening” (*pēgnumi*) involved tying planks together with rope, as for a raft (*Odyssey* 5.163); a ship (*Iliad* 2.664; Hesiod's *Works and Days* 809; Aristophanes' *Wealth* 513, *Knights* 1310); a chariot (*Iliad* 4.485), a wagon (*Works and Days*, 455); and a plough (*Works and Days*, 430). The chorus in Aeschylus' *Suppliants* describes such a ship as being sewn, or “linen-bound” (*linorraphēs*, 134). On this archaic mode of making ships, see Casson (1971), 9-10, 201ff; and Morrison and William (1968), 50, 199.

⁶⁷⁵ The *scholia* to line 395 of Aristophanes' *Women at the Thesmophoria*, notes that the “bleachers” (*ikiria*) were “fastened-together” (*sunpēgnumi*). See Csapo (2007), 105-6.

⁶⁷⁶ Euripides' *Iphigenia at Tauris* 1430; *Electra* 898; *Bacchae* 1141; and *Heracles* 1395.

⁶⁷⁷ *pēchthentas melē* (*pēchthentas* being the passive participle of *pēgnumi*). See Ussher's note.

to Polyphemus figuratively what the beast had done literally to his shipmates. Yet, Odysseus does not compare himself simply to a fastener, but to a *ship*-fastener—a detail that puts Polyphemus into the position of the ship. Such a superimposition, of beast and boat, is made quite explicit later in the play when the satyrs picture Polyphemus as filling the “hull of his ship” with the freight of a godless meal (362). Later, after his meal, this image is presented again by Polyphemus himself. When the giant surges forth from his cave, he describes his own over-stuffed belly as a loaded down cargo ship on the move.⁶⁷⁸ As a gargantuan construct in dire need of restraint, Polyphemus may be seen not only as a perilously burdened vessel venturing out to sea, but also as a personification of an aggressively eager and volatile institution. As for the institution, one might cast Polyphemus as any of those reckless industries of gain involving ships: excessive commercial trade; the overly-ambitious expansion of colonies; or, even shipbuilding itself. More allegorically, one could cast Polyphemus as the imperiled “ship of state”—a popular image among poets already by the sixth century BCE.⁶⁷⁹ As a “ship of state”, the intoxicated giant would manifest a drunken society—one in danger of becoming shipwrecked. At the same time, the gluttonous giant may have presented the image of an overstuffed city—one that having gorged itself on tributes of foreigners and allies has become “swollen” and “festering”, which is how an interlocutor in Plato’s *Gorgias* would later describe Athens herself (518e). With the Cyclops as a figurative “ship” and with Odysseus as one who restrains “ships”, it is clear that beyond recalling Odysseus’ raft-building skills (as demonstrated in book five of the *Odyssey*), his well-practiced ways in mooring and navigating large vessels on rough seas, as well as his willingness to impose restraint with ship cables, are intertwined in Euripides’ portrayal of him as a “ship-

⁶⁷⁸ “My hull (*skaphos*) [like a cargo ship (*holkas hōs*)] is full right up to the top deck of my belly. This cheerful cargo (*gemistheis*) brings me out to revel...” (503-09). The particular “ship” that Polyphemus likens himself to here is a *holakas* (505)—a barge, or large trading vessel, typically towed by another ship. Unlike a tri-leveled war ship (*trireme*), these trading vessels were loaded down with merchandise for sale, or with building materials for transport (*LSJ*). Cf. Herodotus, *Histories* 3.135.3, 7.25.2. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus models his own raft (*schedia*) on the pattern of such a “freight ship” (*phortidos*, 5.250); and, when trapped in the Cyclops’ cave, he compares the found olive wood stake to the mast of such a vessel (9.323).

⁶⁷⁹ The “ship of state” is alluded to in *Peace* and other comedies of Aristophanes (see above, p. 93, n. 203), and is pervasive in tragic drama. In Euripides’ *Suppliant Women*, citizens are said to be unable (on their own) to “steer straight a city” (*orthōs... euthunein polin*, 418), and are further disadvantaged by having a “bad steersman” (*kubernētēn kakon*, 880). In the tragedies of Aeschylus a mortal ruler is sometimes portrayed as steering the city (*Eumenides* 16; *Suppliant Maidens* 177; *Seven Against Thebes* 1-3, 62-4, 652), or else Zeus himself is at the “helm” (*Prometheus Bound* 149, 185).

fastener”.⁶⁸⁰ In other words, civic and social restraint, as much as well-crafted joinery, are active in this “fastening” figure.

In its restraining, immobilizing and punishing capacities, the verb *pēgnumi*, “to fasten” also becomes synonymous with *desmeuō*, “to chain”, “fetter” or “bind”. In the *Odyssey*, Hephaestus demonstrated this manner of binding when he dramatically ensnared his unfaithful wife in unseeable “bonds” (*desmoi*).⁶⁸¹ The added dimension of invisibility in this exemplary work of restraint is illuminating for Odysseus’ own binding scheme in the *Cyclops* in at least two ways: because the punishment Odysseus devises for Polyphemus is also largely unseen (since he is blinded inside the cave—off stage and out of sight); and because other potent agencies also bind the giant invisibly (including wine, sleep, persuasion and song).⁶⁸² Such potent yet unseen agencies as these temporarily bind the wits, will and capabilities of the Cyclops, just as blindness will soon more fatefully constrain him. These binding modes of constraint further speak to the limited range of tactics available to Odysseus to overcome his adversary; for, it must be recalled that Polyphemus was himself an immortal (the divine son of Poseidon). However troublesome he may be, he may not be done away with completely. As a number of Greek myths attest, such transgressive divinities may be chained, restrained, put away, cast-out, covered, buried, or otherwise subdued and hidden from sight, but they—and the forces they personify—cannot be completely eliminated. As others have concluded: “A divine being cannot die; it can only be bound.”⁶⁸³

⁶⁸⁰ In the *Iliad*, Odysseus is involved in anchoring ships—“they threw out the mooring stones and fastened (*pegnumini*) the stern cables” (1.437). On such moorings, “the hold-fasts of swift ships”, see Morrison and Williams (1968), 56-7. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus resists the appealing song of the Sirens by binding himself to the ship’s mast (12.50, 160ff); and the disloyal maids in his household are punished (hung) with ship cables (*peisma*, 22.465ff).

⁶⁸¹ *Odyssey* 8.272ff. See above p. 152-56.

⁶⁸² Hesiod sings of the binding power of wine: “Dionysus gave [wine] to men as a delight and as burden. Whoever drinks his fill, the wine becomes maddening for him, it binds together his feet and his hands and his tongue and his mind with invisible bonds (*desmois aphrastoisei*), and soft sleep loves him.” Frag. 179, in Most (2007). Hera demonstrates the binding power of Sleep (and seduction) in the *Iliad* by overcoming Zeus (14.165ff). The binding power of song is attested in dramatic poetry, as when the chorus of Aeschylus’ *Libation Bearers* claim that their song has the power to bind with “chains not of bronze” (981-2). See Segal (1989). The architect-figures in the later plays of Plautus also bind others invisibly. The *architectus* of *Poenulus* is a subtle prestidigitator (1106-26); and the primary accomplice of the *architectus* in *Miles Gloriosus* is Periplektomenos, or “He who ties around”.

⁶⁸³ Detienne and Vernant (1978), 115.

As an act performed by Odysseus and in relation to the son of Poseidon, “fastening” is also especially portentous, for this particular act figures profoundly in the central Homeric prophecy concerning Odysseus’ fate. As revealed to him by the prophet Teiresias in book eleven of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus is obliged, after returning to Ithaca, to make a further journey. After enduring many trials at sea and then restoring order to his household, Odysseus must travel inland carrying his own oar with him. When he has traveled so far from the sea that someone mistakes this oar for a winnowing fan, then and there he is to “fasten”, or “fix (*pēxas*) in the earth [his] shapely oar and make handsome offerings to the lord Poseidon” (*Odyssey*, 11.129-30, 23.276). As Teiresias presents it, this deed will reconcile Odysseus to the sea god whom he had angered by blinding Polyphemus. Yet, Odysseus’ fated act—of fixing his relinquished oar into the earth—can be seen to perform in a variety of other ways. For, in performing this deed, Odysseus would also be marking a limit and threshold of the sea’s influence; retiring a seafaring way of life while reasserting an agrarian one; commemorating an encounter between strangers; memorializing the completion of an arduous journey; as well as anticipating his own final journey and ultimate fixity in death.⁶⁸⁴ In addition to these reconciling and constitutive actions, by fulfilling this prophesy Odysseus might inaugurate an *inland* sanctuary to Poseidon, for such acts as Odysseus is obliged to perform—fixing a marker in a particular place and establishing its site with offerings—are features of a *hidrusis*, and thus integral to aetiological myths concerning the founding of shrines.⁶⁸⁵

⁶⁸⁴ This final journey and its marker are prefigured in the *Odyssey* by the death of Odysseus’ own rower Elpenor and the memorial Odysseus prepares for him. Having been bidden by Elpenor’s spirit in Hades (11.71-8), Odysseus returns to Circe’s island to prepare a memorial: “we heaped up a mound and dragged onto it a pillar (*stēlēn*) and on the very top of the tomb we fixed (*pēxamen*) his shapely oar” (12.14-15). This monument to the young rower acts as a complementary counterpart to Odysseus’ marker to Poseidon in another more topographical way: whereas this tribute to Elpenor is located on a promontory, “where the headland runs furthest out to the sea” (12.11); Odysseus’ tribute to Poseidon is sited inland, at the inner most reach of the sea’s influence. Dedicating one’s tools to a god upon death was a common motif: *tektons* resigned their plumb-line, rule, hammer and axe (to Athena); rowers, their oars, rain hat and flint (to Poseidon); writers, their rulers and pens (to Hermes); song-writers, their lead markers and sharpeners (to the Muses); and, weavers, their spindles and thread (to Athena). See “Dedicatory Epigrams” (#90, 103, 90, 65, 62, 39), in Paton (1993), book 6.

⁶⁸⁵ See Hansen (1977) and (1990); Peradotto (1990), chp. 3; and Segal (1994), 44-5, 187-94. On *hidrusis*, see above, p. 33. The architectural significance of *pēgnumi* is reinforced by other examples. For instance, “boundary stones” (*horoi*) were “fixed” in the ground (Solon, Frag. 36.6), just as tent-posts were “fixed” in the earth (Herodotus 6.12.4); and Apollo “fixed” (*pēxe*) the altar of his sanctuary in Delos” (Callimachus’ *Hymn to Apollo* 2.62). Similarly, Zeus “fixed”, or “set fast” (*stērizo*), the portentous stone that fell in Delphi (after Kronos disgorged it), thus inaugurating Apollo’s oracle (Hesiod, *Theogony* 498). Such acts also metaphorically establish poetic monuments (Euripides’ *Bacchae* 972, 1073; *Hippolytus* 1207).

Although these various deeds of fixing may stretch the fastening-figure beyond the associations intended by Euripides in the mixed analogy,⁶⁸⁶ they do suggestively open onto a number of representative acts that are relevant to architects: fixing representative markers, delineating limits, and resolutely initiating constructs that are operative on the scale of human fate. Bearing these acts in mind, along with the other associations presented above, one gains a more complex understanding of the “fastening” figure: as a metaphor for restraint; as a trope for hidden yet powerful bonds; and as a physical and symbolic act resonate with architectural intentions. With such considerations we move through the direct analogy of boring holes in ship timbers (and the physical technicalities of the deed to be performed within the cave), toward the greater restorative agendas embedded in the mixed analogy and in the scheme of these “architects”.

‘FITTING’ ACTIONS: HARMONIZING IN THE MIDST OF DISCORD (*harmazōn*)

11.2

as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man...

—(*Cyclops* 460)

In the mixed analogy, Odysseus further qualifies his ship-fastening work as “fitting”, or “harmonizing” (*harmazōn*). As mentioned above, this activity qualifies the propitious coming-together of not only physical members but social relations. Given that Euripides’ mixed analogy extends so far beyond the joinery of wooden ships, it is best to embrace this term in its socially constructive sense. Granting this, the precise work to be performed in the cave should be taken as re-fitting, or repairing proper relations between mortals, beasts and gods. For Odysseus, this involves, first, releasing the mortal crew and divine satyrs from the grasp of the Cyclops, and ultimately rejoining these misplaced groups to their proper situations. Thus, by repairing the sailors to civil society and the chorus to Dionysian ways, Odysseus aims to restore a joint accord. Both social and metaphysical harmony, then, are initiated by this ambitious joiner’s scheme.

⁶⁸⁶ This broad range of action may, however, be alluded to in the satyr play. For, by having Odysseus promise to “fasten” an oar-like implement in the face of the son of Poseidon, Euripides may be superimposing this deed with Odysseus’ fated act of fixing his “shapely oar”. If so, then, the remote deed prophesized by Teiresias (12.14ff), and anticipated by Odysseus in epic poetry (*Odyssey*, 23.248ff), can be seen to manifest in the climactic episode of *Cyclops*. Such a superimposition would suggest that, for Euripides, Odysseus avenges his mistreated shipmates and settles his differences with Poseidon simultaneously.

Underlying this doubly aspiring restitution is another two-fold sense of “fitting”: “fitting-together” a complex scheme composed of diverse aims, agencies, attributes and desired effects; and “fitting” that scheme to a particular situation. Although these “fitting” activities are not further elaborated in terms of *harmazōn* in the script, they are nevertheless demonstrated throughout the play by Odysseus. For, in composing his scheme Odysseus indeed brings together a striking mix of tactics: combining a variety of relatively subtle and appealing influences (such as speech and wine), with more violently punishing agencies (namely fire, the sharpened instrument of blinding, and the delayed consequences of potent language and wine). In the course of leading this mixed scheme, Odysseus also modulates it in accordance with conditions he faces (anticipating, for example, the peculiar vulnerabilities of his adversary, and combining elements that are imported, such as wine, with those found within the situation, such as fire and the wooden stake). Certain verses in the poetry of Solon (an Athenian lawgiver of the sixth century BCE) may well have served as a model for this *harmazōn* figure. For, in these verses Solon himself claims to have harmonized heterogeneous modes of resolution—specifically “force” (*bia*) and “justice” (*dikē*)—and then to have fit that mixed scheme to a particular situation of conflict, thus accomplishing liberty for some (a group of Athenians previously bound by slavery), and particularized restraint for others (those who had mistreated them).⁶⁸⁷

Yet, what might this harmonizing figure reveal about architectural work? I admit that I was hoping to find Euripides making more direct use of *harmazōn* in his other plays to either positively illuminate architectural composition, or else to qualify his own compositional work as a dramatist (as is sometimes found in other poetry).⁶⁸⁸ However, I did not quite find this to be the case. In Euripidean drama *harmazōn* rarely qualifies built

⁶⁸⁷ Solon, Frag. 36.16-19 (Loeb). This poem consists of a detailed defense of Solon’s own political accomplishments and of the tactics by which he brought them about. He claims that his success was brought about by “fitting-together (*sun-armosas*) force (*bia*) with justice (*dikē*)”—two modes of action held conceptually apart as antithetical alternatives, by others. He, then, qualifies his manner of administering this mixture as not simply enforcing laws, but rather “fitting (*armosas*) justice straight to each man”. On these verses and their mix of agencies, see Almeida (2003), 226; and Havelock (1978), 253ff, who emphasizes that Solon’s “fitting justice *straight*” recalls “the idiom of oral management”, for straightening justice involved verbal deliberation, whereby judgments were adjusted, or rectified, becoming “straight” (*entheian*), or right, for particular individuals and situations.

⁶⁸⁸ In the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, the Delian maidens are said to be exemplary in their mimetic manner (representing any voice) and in their skill at “fitting-together songs” (*sunarēren aoidē*, 164). And Pindar sings of “echoing verses” being “fit-together (*harmosan*) by wise craftsmen (*tektōnes sophoi*)” (*Pythian Ode* 3.114). Cf. Sophocles’ “harmony of the lyre” (Frag. 244).

works, and where it does, the dramatic image tends to involve a sense of falling apart as much as fitting together. In his tragedy *Heracles*, for instance, the stone wall of a Mycenaean citadel is described as being “fitted snug (*hērmomena*) with red plumbline and mason’s hammer” (945). Yet, if there is any architectural harmony suggested in this image, it is most precarious, for this wall is targeted for destruction in the play. Specifically, the maddened hero Heracles conjures this image of a plumb and well-fitted wall just as he declares his intention to pry up its foundations with “crowbars and pickaxes” (*Heracles* 943-46).⁶⁸⁹

Conjuring a well-fitted construct (such as a stone wall) only to reveal its vulnerability, recalls a poetic *topos* found also in Homeric epic; notably, in the presentation of the wooden raft that Odysseus so meticulously composes in book five of the *Odyssey*. This raft is initially “fitted-together” by Odysseus not only with divine guidance, but also with “fitting” tools, choice timbers, special “fittings”, and with the skills of one “well versed in tectonic arts” (5.162-248).⁶⁹⁰ However, once this raft encounters turbulence at sea, Odysseus fears that its timbers—so “firm in their fittings (*harmoniēsin*)”—will not hold (5.361). Indeed, by the end of the very same book in which Odysseus had fit it so well together, his raft is shattered to pieces by the enraged sea god (5.370). So, being left to other devices, Odysseus himself swims to the Phaeacian shore. In spite of the total destruction of his wooden raft, Odysseus (with the help of Athena)⁶⁹¹ nevertheless arrives to the shore of the Phaeacians with his *technē* for “fitting” well intact. For, following this shipwreck, Odysseus goes on to display this skill

⁶⁸⁹ Other material constructs “fitted-together” in Euripidean tragedy only to be involved in scenarios that are falling apart include: the stone walls of Thebes in *Phoenician Women* (116); and the Trojan ships and Trojan Horse (*Helen* 233, *Trojan Women* 11). For Euripides the term qualifies other kinds of snug-fits and steadfast relations: bridles in the mouths of horses (*Rhesus* 27); feet in their stirrups (*Hippolytus* 1188), or planted upon the ground (*Electra* 233); and eyelids shut tight (*Iphigenia among the Taurians*. 1167, *Phoenician Women*, 1451). And, at the end of *Cyclops*, the blinded Polyphemus takes his stand in the opening of the cave, promising to “fasten [his] hands” (*enarmosō cheras*) to the sides like gates, hoping the catch the escaping men (668).

⁶⁹⁰ *Harmazōn*, and its cognates, repeatedly enter the portrayal of this raft’s fabrication. Circe first bids Odysseus to “fit together (*harmozō*) a broad raft” (5.162-63); she then provides him with detailed guidance and special tools that are “well fitted (*harmenon*) to his hands” (5.234). Then (having been led to the trees) Odysseus cuts, shapes, smoothes, straightens and bores the timbers. He then “fitted them (*hērmosen*) to one another” (5.247), and strengthened their joints with “pegs and fittings (*harmoniēsin*)” (5.248). And all this Odysseus performs in the manner of one “well-versed in *tekton arts*” (*eu eidōs tektosunaōn*, 5.250).

⁶⁹¹ During this shipwreck, Athena gives Odysseus “presence of mind” (*epiphrosunēn*, 5.437).

by fitting-together his various tales. And, these tales he assembles in a way that—unlike the raft—both hold together and endure. Moreover, these well-composed stories secure for him what the raft did not: a safe and fulfilling passage to Ithaca. As others have argued, Odysseus’ work of “fitting-together” his raft (in book five) prefigures his fitting-together of tales among the Phaeacians (in books nine to twelve).⁶⁹² Put differently, by composing his raft Odysseus rehearses the composition of his tales. His harmonic work in wood models in a preliminary and provisional yet exemplary way the well-made tales he goes on to tell. In light of this, it is possible to see the “well-fitted” raft in the *Odyssey* and the “well-fitted” wall in Euripides’ *Heracles* as being constructive yet ephemeral foils against which the oral and dramatic poets compare and contrast their own more persistent but similarly well-made works.⁶⁹³

But what of harmony (*harmonia*, as a noun)? Like the “well-fitted” quality of the Euripidean wall, where “harmony” does enter the drama of this tragedian, disharmony is active in it. For instance, in the fragmentary *Phaethon*, the chorus of young women foreshadow the play’s strife when they cry: “the nightingale sings her subtle harmony... awake at dawn with her lament of many tears...” (67-8).⁶⁹⁴ Although the nightingale’s song (like that of the chorus) may itself be finely tuned, its content and effect consists of sorrow and discord.⁶⁹⁵ Elsewhere, in Euripides’ *Hippolytus*, *harmonia* qualifies another volatile composition: the temperament of women. Near the beginning of this tragedy, the chorus warns: “Women’s nature is an uneasy harmony” (161-2).⁶⁹⁶ A more forceful

⁶⁹² Dougherty (2001). On the interrelation of ship-building and plot-making, compare the architectus-figure in Plautus’ *Miles Gloriosus* 915-21.

⁶⁹³ A *topos* of poetic persistence (like that exemplified by Aristippus persevering in spite of his own shipwreck) is implied in these harmonic yet vulnerable constructs of Homer and Euripides. The wall that the Achaeans fabricate as a defense in the *Iliad* provides another example of a construct set up by the poet only to be destroyed. (*Iliad* 7.326-345, 433-466; 12.3-35). It is notable, however, that in Euripides’ tragedy it is *not* an antagonized sea, or sea god, but a destructively maddened hero (Herakles) who is the agent of destruction.

⁶⁹⁴ Euripides’ *Phaethon*, Frag. 773.67-68 (Loeb). See Collard, et al (1997). *Harmonia*, as “harmony”, or the “art of musical composition” is surprisingly rare in early Greek literature. Cf. Aristophanes’ *Women at the Thesmophoria* (162)—with Olson’s note to the line 162, where he emphasizes that *harmonizōn* more often refers to the act of adjusting poetic compositions for performative occasions than to composing new harmonic works.

⁶⁹⁵ On this ironically discordant harmony of choral songs—using joyful mediums of music and dance to represent joylessness and thus affect a kind of healing—see Segal (1989), esp. 346.

⁶⁹⁶ The emergent discourse on humors—the notion that one’s disposition consists of a fluctuating mix of disparate fluids—underlies this passage. See Barrett (1964), note to the line.

example of this unsettling harmony comes in the closing scene of Euripides' *Bacchae*, where the god Dionysus addresses "Harmonia" herself, but only after Dionysian discord has been tragically enacted.⁶⁹⁷ Occasionally, Euripides does involve *harmonia* more positively; specifically, in the context of figuring-forth worldly rhythms and divine relations—as when his choruses refer to the "four-fold harmony" of the seasons (Frag. 1111a), and suggest that "Harmonia" is born from all nine Muses (*Medea* 830-34). Yet, this tragic poet more often involves "harmony" to help reveal the dissonance and volatility in mortal situations.⁶⁹⁸ Thus, one may take the "harmonizing" activity that Odysseus intends to perform in Cyclops' cave as emphasizing the difficult reconciliatory adjustments to be attempted in a situation of profound disharmony—a situation troubled by social, temperamental and metaphysical discord.

ROWING DOUBLE-OARED SHIPS, WINGED VESSELS and ANIMATE ENSEMBLES

11.3

as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man
rows an auger...

—(*Cyclops* 460-61)

How, then, does "rowing" (*kōpēlatei*) extend this fastening-fitting figure, and further illuminate the activity of "architects"? Although such reciprocating movement seems mismatched to an auger in Odysseus' mixed analogy, as a means of rhythmic propulsion rowing fits well within the grasp of his crew—"lords of the oar", as Silenus

⁶⁹⁷ Just prior to Dionysus' culminating address, the daughter of Harmonia (Agave) has, in a state of Dionysian frenzy, unwittingly killed her own son (Pentheus) with her bare hands. Having mistaken him for a wild animal in the woods, she tore him apart limb-by-limb. Upon returning to the city, this daughter of Harmonia, first, gloats over her work (a portion of which she bears in hand); then, gradually returns to her senses; then, recognizes in horror what she has done; and, finally, claims to understand—having reached a tragic "knowing" (1296). A moment later, Dionysus appears in epiphany, to make known the full resolution of the tragic conflict. Relieving Harmonia and Cadmus (Queen and King of Thebes) of the misery they have witnessed (the demise of their kin and kingdom), Dionysus declares that they shall be transformed into serpents and resettled in the land of the Blest (1339). Thus, if there is any "harmony" associated with "Harmonia" in this play, it arises only out of dramatic conflict, and only as a culminating figure introduced by Dionysus at tragedy's end. On the sense of tragic "knowing" (*anagnorisis*), see Segal (1999-2000). On Harmonia's role in Euripides' *Bacchae* (as the wife of King Cadmus and daughter of Aphrodite), see Segal (1982), 11. On Harmonia as a mythic agent of marriage, "she who joins together", see Shapiro (1993). In Euripides' *Bacchae*, Harmonia is said to be the daughter of Aphrodite and Ares (1338)—thus, implying that she was born from the adulterous union Hephaestus punished in the *Odyssey*.

⁶⁹⁸ On Euripidean drama as a drama of "turbulence"—figuring forth the "disorder of experience" (in an orderly way) for interpretation—see Arrowsmith (1968).

had called them (86). It is this crew of rowers, after all, that Odysseus urges the satyrs to help, and it is the rowers that Odysseus ultimately relies on for direct assistance when the satyrs shy away from physical labor (650-51). Nevertheless, the satyrs are capable of some form of rowing. From Silenus' prologue we learn that just prior to being shipwrecked on the island of the Cyclops, the satyrs had indeed taken action as rowers. In their attempt to find and rescue Dionysus (who had been kidnapped by pirates), Silenus claims to have "steered (*ēuthunon*) their double-oared ship", while the satyrs, "sitting at the oars, made the gray sea whiten with [splashings] as they searched for [their god]" (15-17).⁶⁹⁹ Later in the drama, the satyrs also demonstrate their eagerness to row in pursuit of Dionysus. When they are instantly excited by the prospect of participating in the liberating deed Odysseus has proposed, the satyrs rehearse their collective hold on the blinding implement by hypothetically gripping its "oar-handle" (*kōpēn*). And this they do while singing: "Who shall be stationed first, who next to first, to hold fast the [oar-handle] of the firebrand" (484-5). The satyrs, then, seem willing to move this "firebrand" (*dalón*), for the sake of liberty from the Cyclops, just as they had once moved their "double-oared ship" (*dorú*), for the sake of rejoining Dionysus.⁷⁰⁰ Later, during the climactic episode of blinding, rowing figures again into the satyrs' involvement with the "firebrand". Although the satyrs do not themselves physically turn this wooden device, they do (as discussed above) urge it along with "encouragements" sung to the rhythm of a rower's chant and modeled after an "incantation" of Orpheus.⁷⁰¹ Finally, at the end of the *Cyclops*, the satyrs are again put in relation to rowers; for, after the work in the cave is complete and their Orphic song is sung, the satyrs join the ranks of Odysseus' crew as self-declared "shipmates" (*sunnaútai*, 708). With this pronouncement (the last utterance of the play), the satyrs affirm what Odysseus had earlier promised: that they shall all be propelled away from the land of the Cyclops "by means of double-oars" (*diplaisi kōpais*, 468).⁷⁰² In their final resolve to join together as "shipmates with Odysseus" (708), the satyrs recall and reassert the nautical roles of each of the scheme's participants: their own

⁶⁹⁹ I use Olson's literal "splashings" here for *rhothioisi*, in lieu of Kovac's "rowing".

⁷⁰⁰ This association is reinforced by the metonymic similarity of the wooden *dalón* (firebrand) and wooden *dorú* (plank/beam, here metonymic of a ship).

⁷⁰¹ See above p 242-43.

⁷⁰² Olson, trans.

double role as figurative oar-handlers and incanting boatswains; the crew's role as representative rowers; and the role of Odysseus, who—having taken over Silenus' position in “steering” the satyrs' vessel⁷⁰³—then guides the play's full ensemble out of the orchestra, and Bacchus bound (709).⁷⁰⁴

Thus, although technically incongruous with much of the other imagery in the mixed analogy, “rowing” seems consistently right for those Odysseus seeks to enlist in his scheme: right for the oarsmen, who are well-practiced in its labor; right for the satyrs, who are well-rehearsed in its propelling rhythms; and right for himself, as a model helmsman—for, in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus had once guided his own raft straight and “craftily” (*technēntōs*), with his hand on the “steering oar” and his eyes on the stars (5.270-77).⁷⁰⁵ Thus, like “hoisting” in *Peace*, “rowing” in *Cyclops* performs as a model of collaborative action that the architect-figure participates in, leads and adjusts.

Beyond the various agents within the satyr play, “rowing” may also have been persuasive for the many spectators gathered at the dramatic festival who were themselves eager to partake in the Bacchic rhythms of the post-performance celebration. For, the play's repeated imagery of rowing “double-oared” vessels in collaborative pursuit of liberty may have prefigured the analogous rhythms of drinking from double-handled cups in common pursuit of revelry. As is known from other sources, wine drinking and a roving “revel” (*komos*) were features integral to this dramatic festival;⁷⁰⁶ and those who drank eagerly in the course of such ambulating revels were regarded as “rowers of cups” (*kulikōn eretai*).⁷⁰⁷ If an allusion to “rowing” double-handled wine cups was also offered

⁷⁰³ On Odysseus' gradual take-over of Silenus' role in leading the chorus, see Hamilton (1979). Leading a chorus as a steersman is a trope that Aristophanes involves elsewhere to qualify his own role in directing dramatic choruses, as in the parabasis of *Knights* (542-44).

⁷⁰⁴ In the very last line of the play the satyrs suggest that they are on their way to Dionysus, hoping to “ever after serve in Bacchus' train” (*Bakchiō douleusomen* 709).

⁷⁰⁵ Odysseus' other nautical performances are also relevant. For instance, in the *Odyssey*, he repeatedly figures himself as leading in the midst of rowers at urgent moments—commanding them to “embark”, so, setting the ensemble into motion and toward a common goal (9.100-1, 177-8, 472-3, 561-2; 10.127, 11.636-7, 12.178). In the only seafaring episode of the *Iliad*, *polymētis* Odysseus goes “in the lead” to guide twenty rowers on the reconciliatory mission to the priest of Apollo (1.311, cf. 2.631-37).

⁷⁰⁶ Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 63.

⁷⁰⁷ Athenaeus, 10.443d. In Euripides' *Alcestis*, Heracles also eagerly pulls (*pitulos*) on his wine cup like a rower pulls an oar (798). On these and other images linking drinking and rowing, see Lissarrague (1990), 108ff. On the *komos*, see Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 102-03. Plato says the Dionysian *komos* involved revelers moving about “on the wagons” (*Laws* 637a).

in Odysseus' mixed analogy, it would make the prospect of overcoming the Cyclops still more appealing, for this allusion would not only lighten the daunting task by recalling its liberating incentives, but also put into every man's reach both the collective means and social obligation to resist Cyclopean figures by joining together in Dionysian festivities.

But there is still more to consider with respect to the persuasiveness of Odysseus' figured action. Just as "rowing" may have looked forward to the roving revel and other post-performance festivities involving wine vessels, it is also possible that the figured action reached backward to the rhythmic movement of pre-performance vessels. Specifically, "rowing" for the sake of Dionysus may have conjured the collective activity of parading the god himself on a ship-like cart just prior to the start of the festival. While the details of the procession preceding the dramatic festival leave unknown its peculiar modes of movement,⁷⁰⁸ it is certain that the most archaic *Dionysia* (the *Antheateria*, celebrated in the prior month), did involve the processional movement of a wooden vessel. This ship-like cart bore Dionysus (his animate statue or vital representative), together with his entourage (satyrs and perhaps a cargo of wine), through the city to the accompaniment of music.⁷⁰⁹ What is relevant to emphasize here about such Dionysian processions is that the ensemble movement over land takes as its model the cooperative motion of vessels crossing the sea. The wooden parade cart, its conveyers, its accompanying musicians and its procession leader, all find correlates in a wooden ship bearing orderly rowers, urging boatswains and a guiding helmsman.

How, then, are we to see "architects" performing in relation to such an elaborate portage? Interestingly, a nautical mode of ensemble action for architectural aims does have precedents. Herodotus, for instance, gives a vivid portrayal of an exasperated "architect" who had led two thousand "boatmen" (*kubernētai*) in a three-year mission, conveying a single massive granite stone from a quarry in Elephantine to a site up the Nile and overland to Saïs.⁷¹⁰ Later, Aristotle named "rowers"—literally "under-rowers"

⁷⁰⁸ On this more solemn pre-performance procession, see Sourvinou-Inwood (2003), 70-71.

⁷⁰⁹ A certain vase painting clearly shows the cart used during this festival, see Simon (1983), 94 and Pickard-Cambridge (1968), fig. 11-14. Other Dionysian vessels, parading either the god or dramatic performers in Dionysian contexts, are relevant here, see Hammond and Moon (1978), esp. fig.5; and Boardman (1958), esp. fig. 2. In drama, see Aristophanes' *Frogs* (180-208); and Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* (135, 269-84, 468).

⁷¹⁰ *Histories* 2.175. Herodotus mentions this unnamed "architect" because his "groan" ended the arduous journey. For, the Egyptian King (Amasis) interpreted the architect's groan as an auspicious sign, terminating their portage and, so, establishing the temple's site.

(*hupēretēs*)—as performing under the guidance of “architects” (*Politics* 1253b35).⁷¹¹ Later still, Plutarch recalled the nautical movements that were involved in propelling Pericles’ building program, including the “forwarders (*pompoi*) and furnishers (*komistēres*) of the materials”,⁷¹² consisting of “sailors and pilots by sea” (*Life of Pericles*, 12.6). And so, like guiding helmsmen and procession leaders, architects seem to have had a role to play in orchestrating ensemble movements at civic and regional scales.

Finally, and more metaphysically, in the activity of rowing one finds the metaphor of flight, for “shapely oars” extending out and up from a ship were already seen by Homer as a “vessel’s wings”.⁷¹³ In Euripidean drama ships are similarly propelled by “beating wings” and “flashing wings”.⁷¹⁴ And in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, Trygaeus’ beetle-boat is said to be both winged and oared (119).⁷¹⁵ This trope is pervasive in later Roman poetry. Vergil, for instance, depicts Daidalos fleeing the labyrinth (and the clutches of King Minos) on his swift-moving “oarage of wings” (*remigium alarum* 6.19). While these metaphors conjure comparable vessels and modes of movement, they also give

⁷¹¹ The context of Aristotle’s comment is illuminating. Although it arises in a section dealing with the unequivocal relationship between slaves and masters, the specific reference to architects and “under-rowers” qualifies a kind of relation that is quasi-magical. After likening a slave to a tool, he clarifies that these are animate and inanimate variants (of tools) that must be knowingly directed by another, “For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daidalos, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, ‘of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods’; if in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, [architects] would not want [under-rowers], nor masters slaves” (*Politics* 1253b35). Aristotle, then, seems to suggest that *like* a weaver, musician and householder, an architect guides those with whom she works and that these collaborators (*not* being automatons) also have a share in anticipating and comprehending her will; and, further, this shared work can be understood in relation to magical self-moving automatons (although he prefers willing and knowing assistants to artificially animate tools).

⁷¹² In Euripides’ *Hecuba*, Odysseus claims that the Achaeans have appointed him as “*pompous kai komistēras*” of the embassy to retrieve Hecuba’s daughter for sacrifice (222).

⁷¹³ *Odyssey*, 11.125, 23.272. The movement of ships is also likened to the flight of birds (3.321f); and, with sails, ships move as swiftly “as wing or thought” (*pteron ēe noēma*, 7.36+1.300). The trope (sails as wings) is also found in *Odyssey* and in Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, 628. See West’s note to the line for further references. Cf. Hesiod *Frag.* 205.

⁷¹⁴ *Iphigenia in Tauris* 289, cf. 1346; *Trojan Women*, 1086; *Ion* 161; *Helen* 147. Cf. Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* 52; and Apollonios Rhodios’ later *Argonautika* 2.1255.

⁷¹⁵ Trygaeus’ beetle is winged (*pteron*, 76); it flies by “rowing the air” (*meteōrokoḗs*, 92); and it is guided as with a ship’s “steering oar” (*pēdalion*, 142).

representation to poetry's liberating, magical and anagogic potential not only to defy gravity and other mortal limitations, but also—by a joint mimesis of rowers, birds and gods—to rise up in an uncanny displacement that brings a fuller view back onto life, while at the same time reaching out (by like mobility) to audiences far and wide.⁷¹⁶ Thus, when Odysseus claims that his scheme will involve “rowing”, and that by this action all will escape the clutches of the Cyclops, we are perhaps best to take the trope as harnessing its full potential: to mobilize ensemble actions and Dionysian festivities; to attempt the work of gaining poetic and mystic perspective; and to risk levity.

DOUBLE-BRIDLING (AND RELATED MODES OF RESTRAINING DANGEROUS THRESHOLDS)

11.4

as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man
rows an auger with a *double-bridle*
—(*Cyclops* 460-61)

As for the “double-bridle”—which somehow facilitates both the liberating activity of rowing and the punishing advance of the auger—where does it lead and what does it curb? Aside from the bridle's manifold significance as a wondrous invention of Athena, a fire-forged work of *technē*, and an emblem of civilized relations and restraint,⁷¹⁷ the “double bridle” (*diploin chalinoi*) also widens the aim of Odysseus' proposed intervention to include a second target. In addition to blinding the Cyclops, Odysseus suggests that with a “double-bridle” he might also muzzle him—a fitting restraint for a blasphemous cannibal. Perhaps this pair of offences associated with the giant's mouth—gluttony and blasphemy—further warrants the detail of bridle's doubleness. That Euripides involves a bridle metaphor elsewhere, in *Bacchae*, a tragedy that also deals with punishing impious speech in a Dionysian context, would seem to lend support to this

⁷¹⁶ On the imagery of flight in later Roman poetry, see Wise (1977), esp. 56. On images of flight in early Greek poetry and art, especially related to Daidalos (who is winged and on the run with tools in hand in early representations), see Simon (1995); and Morris (1992), esp. 191-96 and 202, where she interprets Daidalos' flight as a “paradigm of flight from one royal patron to another” (202). In *Iliad*, Achilles is lifted upward “as if on wings” (19.386) after adorning himself in daidalic armor (19.13ff). Pindar likens his own song to a “winged chariot” (traveling far and wide), distinguishing it from Homer's all-purpose “wagon” traveling a beaten road (Frag. 52h). Graziosi (2002), 58-59. One may also bear in mind that whereas Homeric “winged words” were well-received, an unwinged song was unheard. Cf. Plato's image of the a winged soul ascending to truth (*Phaedrus* 246b-e).

⁷¹⁷ On bridle imagery in Greek myth and thought, in general, see Detienne and Vernant (1978), 187-213, and 292; and Cook (1995), 193-94.

interpretation of the device as an appropriate restraint for oral transgressions.⁷¹⁸ Also supporting this interpretation is the fact that Odysseus himself attends critically to mouths in Homeric poetry. In both epics, Odysseus restrains and censures the mouths of comrades and strangers alike not with a bridle but with a reproach—publicly scolding their inappropriate speech.⁷¹⁹ In the *Iliad*, Odysseus extends such corrective interventions even to his superiors, twice urging Agamemnon to speak more guardedly. Each reproach begins with an exclamation, targeting the site of offence: “What a word has escaped the barrier of your teeth!” (4.350, 14.83).⁷²⁰ In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus restrains immoderate mouths even more directly. In one instance, he is remembered for having pressed shut, with his own “strong hands”, the mouth of a comrade whose eagerness to call out (while inside the Trojan Horse) would have spoiled the well-crafted plan (4.287). And, in the restorative fight for his household, Odysseus aims his first deadly arrow at the exposed throat of the most out-spoken suitor, just as this suitor tips-up a cup of wine to indulge in yet another greedy sip (22.8ff).⁷²¹ Taken together, these Homeric and dramatic instances of imposing oral restraint and, so, curbing both indecorous speech and indecorous dining,⁷²² can be seen to prefigure Odysseus’ (or Euripides’) choice to involve a double-bridle in the mixed analogy of *Cyclops*.

Within the context of Euripides’ satyr play, there is no doubt that the mouth of Polyphemus is intended as a site of punishment and critique, for there are many graphic references to its gross physiognomy and offenses.⁷²³ Such reproaches do not simply find

⁷¹⁸ In *Bacchae*, the chorus warns: “Mouths that know no bridle (*achalinōn*) and folly that knows no law end in misery” (386-8). Licentious mouths are often targeted for punishment in Euripidean tragedy, as when the “unbridled tongue” of the Tantalus is recalled in *Orestes* (8-10); and when Polymestor’s bold mouth must be “stopped” in *Hecuba* (1282-4). In Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, Euripides derides Aeschylus’ “unbrideled” and “ungated mouth” (838).

⁷¹⁹ He targets Thersites, in the *Iliad* (2.243ff), and a Phaeacian youth, in the *Odyssey* (8.166ff).

⁷²⁰ This “barrier” is, by name, the same “barrier” (*herkos*) that protects and delimits households, courtyards, sanctuaries and cities (*LSJ*); thus likening mouths to the profane openings of sacred walls—both being vulnerably open to a multifarious range of comings and goings.

⁷²¹ Antinous’ outspokenness begins in book one, when he tells Telemachus, threateningly, that he will never become King of Ithaca (1.383-87).

⁷²² These transgressions are frequently intertwined in Greek myth and poetry, see Steiner (2002).

⁷²³ Silenus brings attention to the giant’s drooling “lip” (562) and, more forebodingly, to his “man-eating jaws” (92). The satyrs accentuate the Cyclops’ “loathsome teeth” (373), “ready throat” (215), and “wide larynx” (356). Odysseus derides Polyphemus’ “jaws” and “throat”, which he deems “shameless” (592) not only for taking in “gluttonous” and “godless” meals but for spewing out “impiety” (289, 303, 310, 410).

fault in the gruesome details of the cannibal's mouth, but in the fatal consequences and moral offenses his mouth exemplifies. As for the morally offensive practices, these extend to "gluttony" (a common metaphor for overly-indulgent and self-satisfying habits of tyrants),⁷²⁴ and to "impiety" (thus, emphasizing the Cyclops' violation of sacred customs as much as his murderous transgression). As for the fatal and foreboding consequences exemplified by the giant's mouth, these are reinforced in performance by timely commentary. Silenus, for instance, ominously conjures his "man-eating jaws" just as Odysseus and the sailors step foot upon Cyclopean land (92), thus extending the qualification to the broader topography—to the "inhospitable ground" (91), deadly "cave" (87) and rocky "crag" (95), which these sailors vulnerably approach. With similarly suggestive timing, the satyrs—just as Odysseus and the sailors are forcibly marshaled into the deep cave—sing: "Open the gate, O Cyclops, of your wide larynx..." (356). Thus, the mouth of the cave would appear as deadly as the mouth of the beast, and the central doorway of the skēnē would perform as a "hell-mouth"—a terminal passage, through which these sailors pass to meet their imminent death.⁷²⁵ And so, like the opening to this cave and the threshold to Hades, the mouth of the Cyclops ought to be regarded by all with caution; or, as Odysseus suggests, somehow negotiated with a "double-bridle".

Another way to interpret the significance of bridling in this play is to take it up as a metaphor synonymous with "yoking" (*zeugnumi*). This, the Greeks themselves tended to do, for both metaphors broadly suggest the taming and harnessing of wild and worldly forces for mortal benefit through works of human ingenuity. In this figurative sense, yoking was directly associated with architects in ancient Greece. Plutarch, for instance, used "yoking" to convey an architect's work with respect to architraves. After naming Coroebus as the first architect of the initiation hall in Eleusis, Plutarch then provides the following detail: when Coroebus led his team in building the sacred hall, they first set

⁷²⁴ In Aristophanes' *Knights*, certain politicians are portrayed as gorging themselves on foreign islands (1033-4); and in *Wasps* a politician indulges in exotic delicacies representative of foreign regions (908-11, 924-25). Such imagery recalls War's cannibal-like preparation of cities (within his mortar) in *Peace* (231ff). These tropes are prefigured by Hesiod, who portrays deceitful Kings as "bribe-devouring" (*Works and Days* 264), and by Homer, who has Achilles portray Agamemnon as a "people-devouring king" (*Iliad* 1.231). For a discussion of the imagery of "imperial greed" in *Cyclops*, see Dougherty (1999), esp. 325.

⁷²⁵ The "mouth of Hades" (*Aida stoma*) was a relatively common trope among ancient poets. Cf. Pindar *Pythian* 4.44 (cf. Frag. 169). In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus also faces, yet resists, the Hades-like mouth of Charybdis (12.104ff, 12.430ff).

each stone column in place, then “yoked” their tops together with beams (*Life of Pericles* 13.4).⁷²⁶ Such imagery, conferring restrained vitality, bounded strength and dangerous potential onto towering stone columns, perpetuates an architectural trope found also in the fifth century BCE. For, at this time, “yoking” commonly qualified the bridging of seas. In his *Histories*, Herodotus notes that the “architect” Mandrocles won honor in his day for having “yoked” the Bosphorus—a critical strait that the Persian King Darius wished to cross (4.83-88). Later, Herodotus notes that “other architects”, at the bidding of King Xerxes, “yoked” the Hellespont (7.36)—the Western straight of the same contested sea. Not long after this Persian accomplishment, Aeschylus dramatized the tragic consequences of it, which he figured similarly as “yoking the neck of the sea” (*Persians* 71).⁷²⁷ This “yoking” is all the more appropriate as a metaphor for bridging since a “strait” was called the “neck” (*auchēn*) or “mouth” (*stomatos*) of the personified sea. The image is further reinforced by the fact that the “yokes” crossing these “necks” and “mouths” consisted of separate wooden rafts tied together, and extending from one bank to the other, like links of a great chain.⁷²⁸ The architects charged with “yoking” such a vast and volatile “neck”, must have surely found themselves in a powerful yet precarious position. Indeed, the ironies of the yoking metaphor (if it is one) and the precarious risks for architects are brought out by the fuller story of King Xerxes’ crossing of the Hellespont. According to Herodotus, when a storm caused the first “yoke” spanning this “neck” of the sea to fail, Xerxes became “full of wrath” and proceeded to treat the body of water as though she were a disobedient beast, or slave. As Herodotus’ detailed account attests, Xerxes gave orders for the Hellespont herself to be flogged with “three hundred lashes”; to be bound by having “a pair of fetters” cast into her; to be scourged with branding irons; to be cursed with wicked words; and then, to be re-yoked by “other architects” (*alloi architektones*). As for the first architects, Xerxes gave orders for them to lose their heads (7.35-36).⁷²⁹ Here, the most extreme sense of yoking is ironically enforced.

⁷²⁶ See Mylonas (1961), 113-17.

⁷²⁷ The ghost of Darius tragically describes his son’s hubris later in this play (743-50).

⁷²⁸ Herodotus describes the construction method in detail in 7.34-36.

⁷²⁹ The story of Xerxes’ bridge (and its architects) may be contrasted to Herodotus’ story of Darius’ bridge (and its architect). In the earlier book of the *Histories*, Herodotus notes that King Darius was *so* pleased with his bridge across the Bosphorus that he rewarded the

Although this last image may be an exceptional extreme, these anecdotes from Plutarch, Herodotus and Aeschylus do show that architecting and yoking were related acts. Besides the obvious physical resemblance of spanning critical distances with heavy members, these metaphors give a sense of the more punishing burdens and risky benefits that architecting and yoking share. For, those who perform and direct these activities grapple with conditions, elements, agencies and consequences that are largely beyond mortal control: with sacred thresholds, precarious pillars, ponderous stones, and ruthlessly indiscriminate gravity; and with temperamental seas, violent storms, and the stubborn banks of opposing lands. As an incorrigible giant (and son of Poseidon), the Cyclops would seem to fit this series of wildly reluctant forces, which, although they may be tamed or curbed via works of human ingenuity, they are not overcome without serious risks. Given these associations, one wonders if Euripides had such analogous feats and ironic risks in mind when he introduced “architects” to lead a scheme of restraint against the Cyclops.⁷³⁰

Yet, Euripides may have had another motive in mind when he worked a double-bridle into Odysseus’ mixed scheme. For, we must recall that the architect-figure in Aristophanes’ *Peace* also took up a bridle as he commenced a daring deed. Trygaeus, however, involves this device *not* to punish a gluttonous beast but to harness the volition of one. Seizing the chains of a “golden bridle” (*chruso-chalinon*, 155), this architect-figure directs the dung-eating beetle straight up to Zeus, miraculously traversing a vertical threshold even more sublime than the mouth of a divine sea. This comic bridle, then, redoubles the poetic potential of Odysseus’ double-bridle. Along with imposing just restraint and guidance, Aristophanes’ architect-protagonist demonstrates the bridle’s role in dramatically pursuing divine counsel and a reluctant Peace.

“architect” Mandrocles with many gifts. With these gifts, the architect commissioned a “picture” (*graphsamenos*) of “the whole yoking (*zeuxin*), with King Darius sitting in a seat of honor, and his army engaged in the passage” (4.88). The architect, then, dedicated this image, as a “first fruits [offering]” (*aparchēn*) at the Temple of Hera in Samos, with an enduring inscription, that all was accomplished “by the intent (*kata noos*)” of the King.

⁷³⁰ While overcoming a giant Cyclops may not seem like an architectural act, we must recall that overcoming such agents as centaurs, amazons and giants were ubiquitous themes of sculptural pediments, friezes and metopes adorning the temples and treasuries all over Greece. Further, the architect/sculptor Pheidias *did* (so the story goes) identify himself with those who overcame the Amazons, depicting himself among these mythic agents on the shield of Athena. See above, p. 34. On the importance of these themes in Athenian culture and their integrity to Athenian architecture, see Castriota (1992); duBois (1991); Shapiro (1989); and Hall (1998), 102.

as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man
 rows an *auger* with a double-bridle
 —(*Cyclops* 460-61)

What, then, does the “auger” contribute to this architect’s scheme? As mentioned above, this *trupanōi* is the same large shipwright’s drill named in the Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*. In the play, as in the epic, the tool conjures a device analogous to the sharpened instrument of blinding. Given the mixing of activities into the figurative analogy in *Cyclops*, however, one may set the tool itself aside and look more to its modes of action for clues to its meaning for Odysseus.

As an act of passing-through solid materials and seemingly impassible barriers, “boring” is well suited to Odysseus, for on more than one occasion he passed right through the walls of Troy. This he did while leading the scheme from within the Trojan Horse; and, on a prior occasion, when he passed directly through the gates while disguised as a beggar (on a spying mission). When his disguise was detected, he escaped the city in another manner comparable to “boring”: burrowing through the sewer.⁷³¹ This capability of “*polymētis* Odysseus” to “tunnel through” was parodied by Aristophanes in his comedy *Wasps* (350-51). Such an act was also suspect for Herodotus, who tells stories of prisoners escaping confinement by “tunneling through” (*diaruxai*, 9.37.3). Similar acts were commonly associated with burglars. In Aristophanes’ *Wealth*, tunneling-in, or digging through a wall, is the trademark of a thief, or “house-breaker” (165). In the *Iliad*, Odysseus’ own grandfather, Autolycus, is said to have “bore right through (*antitorēsas*) the well-built house of Amyntor” to steal a cap—a cap that Odysseus comes to own and wear during his mission (with Diomedes) to sneak across enemy lines and steal the prized horses (10.266-67).⁷³² This motif recalls, as well, the god of thieves, Hermes, who, in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, brags that he shall “bore right through (*antitorēsōn*) the great house of Apollo” (in Delphi) to steal his tripods and cauldrons (178-79 cf. 282-85). This act (of Hermes, Odysseus, Odysseus’ grandfather, prisoners and thieves) also resembles the actions of certain architects. The legendary architect Trophonius, for instance, is said to have stolen from the treasury he built at

⁷³¹ See above, p. 216, n. 506.

⁷³² The elaborate description of this cap and its history are narrated just as Odysseus puts the cap on in preparation for the mission. Tunneling-through would become key to the *architectus* in Plautus’ *Miles Gloriosus*, for his liberating ruse involves making a hole between adjacent houses—a scheme that takes the Trojan Horse as its model (1025).

Delphi by leaving one of its stones a little loose, such that he could easily remove this stone and pass through the wall at night—unperceived (Pausanias 9.37.5). Such deceptions also recall the allegations against the architect/sculptor Pheidias, which Hermes alludes to in Aristophanes’ *Peace* (604ff). For, Pheidias was accused of embezzling gold and silver (meant for the colossal statue of Athena) from the Athenian treasury.⁷³³ Yet, for an architect to lead a scheme of “boring” or “tunneling through” did not in all cases imply illicit activity, since Herodotus tells us that one of the many “wonders” of Samos was a tunnel designed by the “architect” Eupalinos, which—by passing right through an obstructive hill—brought fresh water to the citizens (*Histories*, 3.60.2-3).

Within Euripides’ *Cyclops*, however, “tunneling-through” would seem to dramatically describe Odysseus’ own risky movements in and out of a different barrier. For, unlike the Homeric account (in which Odysseus makes his one-time escape from the cave concealed beneath the belly of a ram), in the satyr play, Odysseus repeatedly crosses the harrowing threshold: sneaking out of the cave, so as to reveal for the satyrs and the spectators the otherwise obscure events transpiring within; and boldly crossing back inside, so as to advance the punishing and liberating scheme. If there is any thievery at work in this “boring” action of Odysseus it may be found in his final crossing: when he steals away his remaining shipmates from Polyphemus’ deadly grasp. Thus, like an auger, Odysseus himself bores right through the Cyclops’ cave—and the theatrical skēnē—so, bringing both the endangered crew and the cryptic story to light.

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We have now reached the hinge-point of the mixed analogy qualifying Odysseus’ scheme, which he proposes to enact *as a ship-fastening joining-together sort of man rows an auger with a double bridle*. The second half of the analogy presents his intentions rather differently. For, in the above manner, he *shall circle the firebrand into the light-bearing vision of the Cyclops, and together-wither his pupils* (*Cyclops* 462-63). It is to the activity of *circling* that we now turn.

⁷³³ The motif of architects stealing from treasuries is a persistent one. Much later, for instance, the Renaissance architect Filarete was accused of stealing relics, see Giordano (1998), 51.

just as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man
rows an auger with a double-bridle,
so I shall *circle*...

—(*Cyclops* 460-62)

Odysseus' intended activity of *circling* (*kuklōsō*, 463) is not reducible to its punning wordplay on *Kuklōpos* (464). Neither is it sufficiently understood if taken as a mechanical rotation along the lines of boring holes. Rather, in the context of drama "circling" suggests a much broader choreography of interrelated movements, including the active configuration of performers in the orchestra,⁷³⁴ the ordered movement of celestial bodies across the sky, and the rhythmic cycling of the seasons.⁷³⁵ Between these corporeal and worldly gestures, circling also performs at the scale of the city, for in dramatic poetry circling (*kukloō*) describes the defensive acts of encompassing a city with patrolling guards,⁷³⁶ and of enclosing it with a more stable surround of fortifying walls.⁷³⁷ Either way, each of these encircling precautions represents both the ready solidarity of citizens and the impenetrability of their domain. This doubly defensive schema is similarly effective at yet another scale of representation: that of shields. In Homeric poetry, as in drama, shields are portrayed as gaining both resistive strength and apotropaic effect from their formidable edges and menacing figures of rout, which (like patrolling guards) actively encircle them.⁷³⁸ Acting against such defensive devices is

⁷³⁴ Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*, 430; *Iphigenia at Aulis*, 1055; Aristophanes' *Women at the Thesmophoria* 967 and *Birds*, where the dithyrambic poet, Cinesias calls himself a "cyclic (chorus) teacher" (*kukliodidaskalon*, 1403). On circle dances (*enkuklioi*)—including the liberating dance that Theseus led out of the Cretan labyrinth—see Calame (2001), 34-8.

⁷³⁵ Euripides' *Phoenician Women* 477, 544; *Ion* 1148, 1155, 1486-7; *Orestes* 1645; *Helen* 112, and Aristophanes *Peace* 414.

⁷³⁶ Such guards were called *peripolos*, "one who circles round [the city]". On the significance of their patrol, see Vidal-Naquet (1986), 107. Cf. Aristophanes' *Birds* 1177.

⁷³⁷ Cities are "encircled (with stone)": Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis*, 775. Such circularity was as magical as defensive. The Trojan walls, for instance, could only be violated by the magical "leap" of the Horse. See Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, 825ff and *Aeneid* 6.515-16, with Knight (1967), 112-13. In the *Iliad*, Achilles' chasing of Hector three times round his city walls may also be seen to magically loosen the bonds of the fortified city, inaugurating its fall.

⁷³⁸ Euripides' *Phaenician Women* 1126, *Electra* 455; Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes* 121, 489-95, 591. In the *Iliad*, "well-rounded" or "well-circled" (*eukuklos*) is an epithet of shields (5.453). And, a critical part of Hephaestus' work on Achilles' shield consisted of setting a bright rim "round about it (*peri kuklon*)."
(*Iliad* 18.479, cf. 12.297).

another circling schema: that of circling-in—of strategically surrounding and closing-in on an adversary. Such entrapment by surprise requires not only inviolable configurations and threatening displays but also subtlety and forethought. It is perhaps for these reasons that captivating schemes are frequently figured together with encircling forms of action. For instance, according to the Phaeacian bard in the *Odyssey*, when Hephaestus set the snare for his unfaithful wife, he took care to place these unseeable bonds in a circle (*kuklō*)—spreading them with anticipation all around the bedposts (*Odyssey* 8.278).⁷³⁹ In ritual contexts, circling also performed auspiciously. The preliminary ambulating circuit around an altar, which a religious official performed while bearing sacred implements immediately prior to a sacrifice, was perhaps the most commonly witnessed act of representative circling in ancient society. Such a movement traced the limits of a sanctified area, defining and inaugurating a place for grave actions to follow by first performing its threshold.⁷⁴⁰ The rite of walking around the Dionysian orchestra with a sacrificial piglet just prior to the dramatic festival—a purifying rite led by officials known as *peristiarchoi*—is another such example of ritually-charged encirclings that may well have informed Odysseus’ circling action toward the Cyclops.⁷⁴¹

Finally, circling also qualifies significant gestural and representative arcs, such as those performed by the emphatic swing of one’s arm; by the deliberate movement of a tool, weapon, or sacred attribute;⁷⁴² or even by the miraculous bending of a tall fir tree. In Euripides’ *Bacchae*, Dionysus himself performs this miraculous circling gesture in a way that bears particularly on Odysseus’ intent in the *Cyclops*. For, Dionysus’ gesture, like that promised by Odysseus, anticipates and inaugurates a punishing scheme; moreover, Dionysus performs this circling act in the manner of one who traces an arc

⁷³⁹ Captivating circles also figure into schemes of entrapment in Athenian drama: in Euripides’ *Iphigenia among the Taurians* 331 and *Orestes* 444; Sophocles’ *Ajax* 19; Aeschylus’ *Seven against Thebes* 247, *Agamemnon* 1382; Aristophanes’ *Birds* 346. On the imagery of encircling traps, see the chapter: “The Circle and the Bond” in Detienne and Vernant (1978).

⁷⁴⁰ This “circuit” is performed in Aristophanes *Peace* 956-7 and *Birds* 959; and in Euripides’ *Heracles* 926 and *Iphigenia at Aulis* 1568. On this rite, as establishing a *temenos* and “marking off the sacred realm from the profane”, see Burkert (1983), 4ff.

⁷⁴¹ This rite was also performed on the Athenian Pnyx just prior to a meeting of the Assembly. Temples and public meeting places were, likewise, purified in this way. See Parker (1983), 21. Cf. Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* 43-5, *Lysistrata* 128, and *Assembly Women*, 128-30.

⁷⁴² Pindar *Olympian Ode* 10.72. Burkert (1983), 278, emphasizes that holding a ritual attribute (such as a *bakchos* branch) “greatly enhances the strength of one’s bare hands, and even more so the impression made by a threatening gesture.”

with a turning device, or compass (*tornōi graphomenos*, 1067). This anticipatory circling gesture of Dionysus requires a circuitous diversion of its own.

With intentions and manners that are comparable to those of Odysseus in *Cyclops*, Dionysus, in Euripides' *Bacchae*, devises an elaborate scheme of punishment for a proud and impious adversary: a young King named Pentheus. Pentheus has rejected Dionysian ways, refusing to participate in the god's rites and threatening to imprison anyone in his kingdom that does. Dionysus, who himself performs in this drama disguised as a stranger, somehow convinces Pentheus to indulge in an illicit "viewing" (*theorias*) of the very rites he has dismissed—rites involving a group of enthused women dancing and hunting in the forest. With his curiosity piqued, this young King permits Dionysus first to disguise him as a woman (806-46), and then to lead him out to a wooded grove for a special "viewing" atop a fir tree (1043ff). What the King does not know is that these women will find him out and, in their fury, attack him as though he were a hunted animal. Like the deed of blinding Polyphemus in *Cyclops*, this climactic attack in the tragedy takes place off-stage and out of sight. Yet, whereas in the satyr play Odysseus gives vivid testimony to the details of his own scheme in advance of enacting it, in the tragedy a messenger, claiming to have witnessed Dionysus preparing the King's fall, reports on the scheme after it is accomplished. In this speech we learn that "the wonder" (*to thauma*) that most impressed this witness was the preliminary act performed by "the stranger" (Dionysus), when, reaching up, he took hold of the "tip" (*akron*) of a "heavenly-high (*ouranion*) fir tree", and then gradually led this tip down to the ground—thus drawing the tall tree into a circle (and momentarily drawing the "heavenly" to earth). According to the messenger, as the stranger pulled down the tip of the tree "it began to circle (*kuklouto*)—

just as a bow or a rounded wheel when its shape is being traced by
the compass (*tornōi graphomenos*) when it drags (*elkei*) its rotational
course (*periphoran dromon*). So the stranger, with his own hands
bent it (*ekampten*) to the ground, a deed no mortal could do.

(*Bacchae* 1066-7).⁷⁴³

⁷⁴³ My translation, adapted from Kovacs and Dodds. Kovacs' translation of the fuller passage runs as follows: "At this point I saw the stranger perform a miraculous deed (*to thauma*). He took hold of the tip (*akron*) of a fir tree that rose toward heaven and down he pulled, pulled, pulled it to the black earth. It began to curve (*kuklouto*) like a bow or a rounded wheel when its shape is being traced by the peg and line with its spiraling rotation. So the stranger, drawing down with his hands the mountain tree, bent it to the ground, a deed no mortal could

Following this wondrous preparatory movement, Dionysus “installs” (*hidrusas*) the excited King upon the lowered perch, and then carefully returns the tree to its upright stance, so, placing the King into a precarious position, since this tree and the King conspicuously atop it are soon themselves encircled by the frenzied women he had aimed to spy on (1106f). Encouraged by Bacchus, these women uproot the tree, causing the proud spectator to fall. And so, the downward course of the tree, as first enacted by Dionysus, prefigures not only the down-fall of the King but also the loosening and overturning of the tree, as well as the uprooting of the Kingdom he had perched on. Thus, Dionysus’ initial “circling” inaugurates a corresponding course of transformative action.

Given all these meticulous, menacing and marvelous modes of preliminary circling, it is possible to see in Odysseus’ promise *to circle* his torch into the Cyclops’ vision an auspicious geometrical gesture, one intended to mime the gist of these other encirclings and, so, dramatically draw their efficacy into his plan.

A BRANCH TRANSFORMED: INCENDIARY, REJUVENATING AND INAUGURATING AGENCIES

11.7

as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man
rows an auger with a double-bridle,
so I shall circle a *firebrand*...
—(*Cyclops* 460-62)

The manifold significance of Odysseus’ *circling* gesture is further drawn-out by the special item he proposes to hold while performing it: a *dalón*, “firebrand” or “torch”. This *dalón* is significant in at least two ways: first, as something Odysseus finds in the cave of the Cyclops in a rudimentary state and intentionally transforms for his scheme; and, second, as a symbolic attribute, which (together with other torches) played conspicuous roles in mythic and civic practices. It is best to initially treat Odysseus’ transformation of this torch within the Cyclops story, then turn to consider its role in those relevant myths and rituals that extend beyond it.

do” (*Bacchae* 1063-69). On this passage, see Dodds (1960), 210 (note to lines 1066-7). Comparable preparatory circling actions are performed near the beginning of the *Iliad*, when Odysseus, together with Hector, “first measured out (*diemetreon*) a space (*chōron*)” in preparation for the leaders to perform their oath (3.315); and at the end of the *Iliad*, as the Achaeans prepare for Patroclus’ funeral by “trac[ing] the compass (*tornōsanto*) of the mound (*sēma*) and set[ting] out foundations (*themeilia*) round the pyre” (23.255). In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus lays-out, or “turns-out” (*tornōsetai*), the broad preliminarily base for the raft like “a man well-versed in tectonic arts” (*eu eidos tektosunaōn*, 5.249-50). And in the *Iliad* Lycaon stretches back his bow “into a circle” before releasing the truce-breaking arrow (4.124).

When Odysseus first mentions this critical item in the satyr play he introduces it simply as he found it: as a “branch of olivewood” (*akremōn elaias*, 455). This find clearly makes reference to the sacred species and civilizing agency of Athena, as well as to the same auspicious discovery of olivewood in the Homeric version of the tale. However, unlike the Homeric timber, which was remarkable to Odysseus for being as big as a ship’s mast (9.322), this Euripidean “branch” (*akremōn*) is, by name, little more than a “twig”—less a sturdy trunk than the tapering vine-like end of a branch, like the “tip” (*akron*) by which Dionysus drew down the “heavenly-high” fir tree.⁷⁴⁴ All the same (and possibly with comic effect), Odysseus intends to transform this delicate olive-shoot for his ambitious scheme. He will first “sharpen its tip completely” (*exapoxunas akron*, 456), then lower it into a fire, presumably (as in the *Odyssey*) to harden its tip, although in *Cyclops* he intends for the branch to be lit, or “kindled” (*kekaumenon*, 457). Upon sharing these intentions with the satyrs, Odysseus likens the device to an “auger” (*trupanon*, 461)—which, in the first half of his mixed analogy, is to be rowed with a double-bridle. Finally, when Odysseus names again (in the very next line) the device he shall circle into Polyphemus’ vision, he invokes it as a *dalón*, a “firebrand” or “torch” (462). Hereafter, Odysseus and the satyrs repeatedly refer to the transformed device as a *dalón*.⁷⁴⁵ In the *Odyssey*, however, Odysseus did not once call it by this name.

This Euripidean transformation—from a slender “branch”, to an “auger”, to a “torch”—resembles, in part, the transformation of olivewood in the *Cyclops* episode of the *Odyssey*. A comparison with the Homeric treatment of this timber is telling. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus first presents this found timber as “green olivewood” (*chlōron elaineon*, 9.320). Besides greenness, this olivewood is distinguished from its Euripidean counterpart since Polyphemus is said to have used it as a “great cudgel” (*mega ropalon*, 9.319). When Odysseus, trapped inside the Cyclops’ cave, begins searching for a way out of his predicament, he takes notice of this menacing olivewood cudgel. As he does so, he compares it to the towering upright “mast of a ship”—a huge merchant ship—“broad of beam which crosses over the great gulf [of the sea]” (9.322-3). Clearly Odysseus sees in this cudgel a way out of the present trouble. And so, he proceeds to cut-off a piece of this olivewood and transform it: bidding his men to trim and smooth it, while he then “sharpened it at the [tip]” (*ethoōsa akron*) and “hardened it” in the flames

⁷⁴⁴ *Bacchae* 1064. Such thin branches were woven into laurel crowns (cf. Euripides’ *Ion* 423).

⁷⁴⁵ *Cyclops*, lines 471, 472, 484, 593, 614, 630, 647.

(*epurakteon*, 9.325-28). Once this piece of olivewood (cut from the cudgel) is reshaped, Odysseus calls it a *mochlon*, a “stake” (9.332)—a leveraging tool of laborers.⁷⁴⁶ It is, then, as a “stake” and “olivewood stake” that he repeatedly refers to this transformed implement.⁷⁴⁷ As Odysseus and his crew perform the daring deed, however, the “stake” they wield earns, in back-to-back similes, three new titles: an “auger” (*turpanon*); a “great axe” (*pelekun megan*); and an iron “adze” (*skeparnon*, 9.391).

Whereas the Euripidean implement is transformed, by name, from a slender “branch of olivewood”, to an oddly manipulated “auger”, to a newly-kindled “torch”, the Homeric implement is changed from a massive piece of raw “olivewood”—presently misused as a cudgel—into a sharpened “stake”, which is then compared to a series of forged tools: an “auger”, “axe” and “adze”.⁷⁴⁸ While these Homeric transformations gather an impressive range of inventions—all squarely within the civilizing domain of *technē*, as influenced by Athena—Euripides’ transformation of the olive “twig” seems to parody tectonic interventions (with incongruous analogies), while moving through and beyond such devices to a mode of ritual artifice. For, in *Cyclops*, the “torch” that Odysseus ultimately proposes—both to make and to make use of in the course of his scheme—is not a tool of laborers, *tektons* or smiths. Rather, the “torch” he introduces is, on the one hand, an attribute of worshipers and revelers,⁷⁴⁹ and, on the other hand, an incendiary device bearing agencies that are representative of certain fiery protagonists (including Odysseus himself).⁷⁵⁰ The fire of such a *dalón*, then, does not properly belong

⁷⁴⁶ Odysseus also lowers and launches his raft with such leveraging “stakes” (*mochloisin*, 5.261).

⁷⁴⁷ *Odyssey*, lines 9.375, 378, 382, 387, 394, 396.

⁷⁴⁸ Walter Burkert (1982), 34, takes this weapon as a mythic motif: “at the center of the Cyclops tale [in the *Odyssey*] we find the invention of the first weapon described, along with the use of fire”. Others emphasize the “technological sophistication” of converting a cudgel to a tool—Cook (1995), 106-7. Yet, Euripides shifts the inventive emphasis to ritual artifice.

⁷⁴⁹ Odysseus’ twig-like branch could also be compared to other ornamental branches and decorated olive-shoots, such as those borne by suppliants; by worshippers in festival processions (the *Eiresione*, *thallos*, and *bakchos*); and by Dionysus himself, who bears a sinewy grape vine (*ōschos*) on certain vase paintings. See Simon (1983), 76, 32; Hoorn (1951), 15-16; Harrison (1962), 317-21, 437-38; and Burkert (1979), 134-35 and (1983), 278.

⁷⁵⁰ At a prosaic level, a *dalón* was a small wooden torch commonly used to light other fires. Its own fire was kept alive and ever-ready by having its tip buried beneath the heap of smoldering ashes on a hearth. Headlam (1922), 33-34. Although a *dalón* would have been a common implement in every household hearth and sacred sanctuary, it was in epic and dramatic poetry a potent symbolic device. In Euripides’ *Trojan Women*, Paris (who would ultimately bring about Troy’s fiery demise by stealing away Helen), is said to have

within a workshop, forge, or kiln, but performs more openly, ritually and symbolically: during festive processions, solemn ceremonies, carousing revels, and Bacchic rites; and, within epic stories of rejuvenation (including the *Odyssey*) and annihilation (as of Troy). Although Athena's divine influence and civilizing force is implicit in both the Homeric and Euripidean devices, the *dalón* Odysseus takes up in Euripides' *Cyclops* gathers agencies and occasions that tease the limits Athena's realm of influence.

The *dalón* by which Odysseus punishes Polyphemus and restores liberty to others recalls his own fiery *dalón*-like performance in the climactic episode of the *Odyssey*, during which he similarly sparks the restitution of justice and order in Ithaca.⁷⁵¹ Yet, here it is more illuminating to elaborate on certain ritual and dramatic practices in the fifth century BCE in which torches played crucial roles, for such practices not only elucidate Odysseus' restorative scheme but also reveal their relevance for "architects".

A BRANCH TRANSFORMED

TORCHES AND CONJUGAL EVENTS

11.7b

In bearing and conveying fire—with its protective, purifying and dangerously mysterious flame—torches of various names (*dalón*, *dalion*, *daidas*, *lampadas*) played significant roles in diverse civic and religious practices in ancient Greece. Wedding processions were one of the most conspicuous of such events. As interpreters of these practices emphasize, "The cry 'Get up! Make way! Carry the torch!' began the

forebodingly appeared to his pregnant mother in a dream as a "fatal *mimēsis* of a torch" (*dalou mimēma*, 922, 1256). And, in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus himself mimes a *dalón* when he washes up, barely alive, onto the Phaeacian shore and burrows himself beneath leaves: "[just] as a man hides a *dalón* beneath the dark embers... and so saves a seed of fire, that he may not have to kindle it from some other source, so Odysseus covered himself with leaves" (5.488). In this way Odysseus preserves his nearly extinguished vitality and begins to rekindle his own fiery self. The next morning (with the additional help of Athena), Odysseus' fiery quality becomes glaringly apparent: appearing gilded and "gleaming" in his meeting with the Phaeacian princess (6.232ff); and sitting (as a suppliant) in the ashes upon the Phaeacian hearth (7.153ff). As one interpreter has suggested, by miming a *dalón*, Odysseus is "symbolically reborn", Bradley (1976), 138-9.

⁷⁵¹ In the scenes leading up to his climactic battle, Odysseus' fiery potentiality (prefigured by the *dalón* simile, 5.488) is displayed with greater force: he appears to others to have the "glare of torches (*daidon*) in him" (18.354); he names himself before his wife as "Blazes" (*Aethon*, 19.183); and he is likened to the sun (22.388). Images of both punishing justice and purifying rejuvenation are at work in this fiery culmination. There is also a renewed sense of worldly order, for as Austin (1975), shows, the full story of Odysseus' return can be read as an almanac, culminating with him returning to Ithaca like the sun bringing the new light of Spring.

procession that brought the bride to her new home.”⁷⁵² In Aristophanes’ *Peace*, for instance, which ends with the beginning of a wedding, we hear Trygaeus (the architect-figure) emphatically call for “torches” (*daidas*, 1317).⁷⁵³ We then witness his elaborate exit from the orchestra with his new bride (Harvest), and with the chorus of laborer-farmers turned torch-bearers in their reveling train.⁷⁵⁴ Such a wedding procession, having commenced in this way with a torch-lit departure from the bride’s home, would then proceed to convey the veiled bride through the city streets by the protection of torches. This procession culminated with the bride crossing the threshold of her new household—a pivotal passage marked also by torch-light. Here, the bridegroom (had he not accompanied the bride during the procession) would be awaiting her arrival in the nuptial chamber.⁷⁵⁵ While the mothers of the bride and groom each held up torches auspiciously at their respective domestic thresholds, designated torch-bearers bore them protectively en route. Other appointed figures also played conducive roles in this elaborate torch-lit event, including a personal escort, or “leader of the bride” (*numphagogos*), and a leader of the overall procession, a *proēgētes*—“one who goes before to show the way”.⁷⁵⁶ Besides performing as an auspicious and protective precaution, conveying the bride with torch-fire was profoundly symbolic of the bride’s role, for it was the duty of young women in Athenian society to tend to the family hearth—the rooted center of domestic life.⁷⁵⁷ Thus, besides the sexual and procreative activity that her conveyance also sparked, this bride moves through the city expectantly as an enticing ember to rekindle another’s hearth.

⁷⁵² Oakley & Sinos (1993), 26—citing Aristophanes’ *Wasps* (*aneche pareche... daidi*, 1326ff).

⁷⁵³ This “torch” (*daidas*) is derived, like *dalos*, from the verb *daiō*, “to light” or “make burn”, *LSJ*.

⁷⁵⁴ On the torch-lit procession as a common motif culminating comic drama (as in a wedding or carousing revel), see the discussion of “The *Exodos*” in Cornford (1993), 56-77.

⁷⁵⁵ Oakley & Sinos work (1993), 26-34.

⁷⁵⁶ Hermes often plays this leading role in portrayals of divine marriages and in representations of mortal marriages after mythic models. See, Oakley & Sinos (1993), 27ff.

⁷⁵⁷ This schema of transfer and integration also performs at the scale of cities, as when flames from the common hearth (*koine hestia*) of the mother city were taken to light the hearth of a colonized city. On this transfer of sacred fire, see Gernet (1968), and Malkin (1987). On the symbolism of the domestic hearth (as an interrelation of Hestia’s fixity and Hermes’ movement), see Vernant (1983).

In Euripides' *Cyclops*, an analogous conveyance may be underway. This is suggested not only by Odysseus' preparedness with a "torch", but also by the satyr's portrayal of Polyphemus as a ready bridegroom in one of their songs.⁷⁵⁸ His readiness as a bridegroom is reinforced by his state of arousal toward the end of the play, as he drunkenly retreats to his cave—just before he is blinded (581-88). The wedding motif is established much earlier, however, with Polyphemus' own emphatic call for torches, for when he first enters the orchestra he calls out: "Hold up (the torches)! Hold them alongside!" (203).⁷⁵⁹ Although this demand can be taken simply as Polyphemus' pompous announcement of his own arrival and as a threatening call to order in the satyrs' disarray, it should also be heard as a deliberate quotation of the wedding procession cry.⁷⁶⁰ As such, Polyphemus' very first words ironically spark his own unwitting wedding. Instead of receiving a submissive bride into his cave's chamber, however, he will be delivered a potent divinity in the guise of a delectable drink (the full effect of which is felt only with the assault of the torch). Odysseus, here, is the leader of this procession, having conveyed Dionysus (veiled in a flask) across the sea and over the Cyclops' threshold. As such, Odysseus can be seen to perform both as *numphagogos* and *proēgētes*, the personal escort and the experienced guide.⁷⁶¹ In this interpretation, Odysseus is merely late in taking hold of a proper "torch"—promising to raise it just for this culminating passage.

This complex image—involving the wooden "torch" (*dalon*) as the enticing guise of a bride—may be linked to certain mythic schemas of sacred weddings (*hieros gamos*). The wedding enacted each year during the "most archaic" *Anthesteria* festival is of obvious Dionysian significance.⁷⁶² Yet, the ritual marriage festival called *Daidala* celebrated in Boeotia (just outside of Athens) since at least the sixth century BCE may be

⁷⁵⁸ The satyrs cast him as a handsome groom on his wedding day: "With a lovely glance he steps forth in beauty from the halls (*melathrōn*)..." (511-518).

⁷⁵⁹ Torches are the implied object of the verbs (*aneche pareche*). See Seaford's note to the line.

⁷⁶⁰ Euripides involves this wedding cry elsewhere with tragic and ironic effect. In *Trojan Women*, Cassandra, foreseeing her own death, raises her torches and cries, "Hold (them) up, hold (them) alongside, bring a light" (308ff)—thus inaugurating her wedding with Hades. On the tragic motif of weddings turning to burials, see Seaford (1987); Rehm (1994) and Alexiou (2002), 118-22. Seaford's commentary to this line of *Cyclops*, notes the wedding motif, but not its relevance to the play.

⁷⁶¹ In Euripides' *Bacchae*, Dionysus is said to play the role of *proēgētēra* when he deceptively leads Pentheus to his special "viewing" (1159).

⁷⁶² Simon (1983), 92-99; and Burkert (1983), 230-338. This rite involved the ceremonial marriage of Dionysus (or his representative) to the wife of the *archon basileus*.

of more particular relevance, for a false bride, fashioned from wood selected from a sacred grove, was a central feature of this archaic festival.⁷⁶³ This wooden figure was first prepared, adorned and veiled, then paraded before the people while being led to a site where it would be ceremoniously burned in a great pyre. Such spectacular preliminaries seem to have made way for the proper bride (or new season) to come forward and a proper union (or propitious new year) to be consummated. This ritual practice was closely related to a particular myth about Zeus and Hera, for Zeus himself is said to have once fashioned a wooden bride in an elaborate attempt to reconcile himself to Hera who had deserted him in anger due to his promiscuity. As the story goes, when Hera saw Zeus escorting what she believed to be a veritable bride in a wedding procession, she rushed down to interrupt the ceremony. Upon unveiling the false bride and discovering Zeus' trick, Hera's rage turned to laughter and, in this way, she became reconciled to Zeus. According to ancient sources, the wooden bride that Zeus once fashioned, and that was correspondingly refashioned each year for the festival, was called either a *xoanan* (a sculpted or "smoothed thing"), or a *daidalon* (an alluring thing). This *daidalon* lends its name to the fiery marriage festival and recalls the legendary maker, Daidalos.

In light of this mythic and ritual schema, together with the active wedding motif in the satyr play, it is tempting to consider Odysseus' re-fashioned branch as relatable to this enticing bride-like figure, or *daidalon*. For, Odysseus' fiery *dalon* performs similarly in a mock-erotic event that ultimately aims to reconcile mortal and divine relations, and to re-kindle revelry (after a day of tragedy) for all in the theater.⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁶³ Avagianou (1991), 59-68; and Morris (1992), 56-7. The key primary source for this event is Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 9.3.1-3. Other rites and myths concerning "sacred marriages" may be relevant here, including the relatively obscure festival involving Ariadne and Dionysus. For this and other such cyclical and seasonal festivals of renewal—akin to "bringing in the tree [or Maypole], and with it prosperity"—see Burkert (1979), 134-5; and (1988).

⁷⁶⁴ It is further tempting to see in the name "Daidalos" a "fiery-dalon" (*dai-dalon*). Such an image, however, does not figure into the etymological studies of Daidalos' name. Morris (1992), 3ff, traces the etymology of "Daidalos" by breaking it down into Indo-European syllables, although, she says, "its root remains unknown." This fiery and erotic imagery may also be considered in relation to other architect-figures, since (for later Latin poets) "*incensus amore*" implied an illicit or "uncontrolled passion", such as that Pasiphaë had for a bull (and which Daidalos helps her fulfill). One wonders if the "*incensus architectus*" in a fragmentary Latin play of Titinus (Frag. 16) may have sparked, put out, or otherwise kindled such a desire.

Besides wedding processions, torches also accompanied other inaugural rites of passage in ancient Greece, notably the ceremonial transfer and installation of deities (or their representations) in their places of worship. We are able to witness these rites, in part, because certain Athenian dramas end by commencing such a ceremony. Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, for instance, closes with a chorus of chthonic deities being escorted out of the orchestra and toward their new chambers within the Areopagus. Athena herself "goes first" (*proteran*) to lead this solemn parade (1003-5), which, as she declares, shall be accompanied "by the light of radiant torches" (*phenges lampadōn*, 1022). At her command, venerable escorts arrive to bear these torches, whose "splendor", "sacred light", and "fiercely blazing (flames)" fill the resplendent exit scene of this drama (1021ff). Like a wedding procession, which enacts the bonds of a mutual commitment for all to see, this spectacular movement of deities—across the orchestra and out to the city—enacts their binding promise: to follow Athena and the Athenian ways to which she has persuaded them. Athena, in turn, by leading this procession, begins already to fulfill her reciprocal promise: to guide these deities toward "good speech", upright ways, and a "sitting-place" (*hedran*) of honor (804, 854, 989-94). In performance, such movements not only confirm the binding agreements verbalized in the play, but also make these invisible bonds of agreement manifest for others.⁷⁶⁵ The torch fire participates in dramatizing these binding resolutions by amplifying the majesty and symbolism of their procession,⁷⁶⁶ and by visibly extending their promise—via rising flames and fragrance—to witnesses distant and divine. The sanctuary chambers, where this "torch-lit" drama is set to culminate, can be seen to extend these promises still further and in other ways. By their material testimony to the promises enacted, these chambers would tangibly confirm their commitments, perpetually recollect them, and persist in acting as enduring sites to host other such promises yet to be declared. The inauguration of these expectant chambers, then, would seem to warrant Athena's call for auspicious torch fire as much as the inauguration of deities who will take up residence there.

⁷⁶⁵ Oliver Taplin (1977), 215, characterizes the significance of this culminating procession as putting "into visible and concrete terms the reconciliation between Athens and the Erinyes."

⁷⁶⁶ Gantz (1977) sees these flames as the culminating transformation of fire imagery developing throughout the tragic trilogy. Beginning with the ominous smoke in *Agamemnon*.

In another dramatic context we find a torch-lit procession that is comical, but nevertheless comparable to the closing scene of Aeschylus' *Eumenides* (458 BCE). At the end of Aristophanes' comedy *Wealth* (388 BCE), the god of Wealth (*Ploutos*) is to be led up the Acropolis to join Athena in her temple as the new resident guardian of her treasury, or "back chamber" (1193).⁷⁶⁷ As this procession takes shape in the orchestra, the protagonist (Chremylus)—who has cleared the way for Wealth's ascendancy—calls for "lighted torches" (*daidas*); he also calls for a priest "to lead" (*proēgēi*) the procession (1194-5).⁷⁶⁸ A chorus of peasants, and others eager for the prosperity that Wealth represents,⁷⁶⁹ join this propitious movement—the final exodus of the play. Although earlier events in the comedy (and contemporaneous events in Athens) suggest that we take this culminating procession as a parody (a move to enshrine trouble in a perfunctory public display),⁷⁷⁰ the protagonist's call for "torches" and the formation of a procession train that will culminate with a god's "installation" (*hidrusis*, 1191), make explicit the ritual schema that is underlying the scene.

Whereas the torch-lit processions at the end of Aeschylus' *Eumenides* and Aristophanes' *Wealth* anticipate a rite of installation that is imagined to take place beyond the drama, the same rite (a *hidrusis*) is performed within the drama of Aristophanes' *Peace*. As described above, Trygaeus (the architect-figure) leads this ceremony "to install" (923) the statue of Peace in the midst of the Athenian orchestra. Although Trygaeus does not call for "torches" to accompany the exodus of Peace from the heavens, he does involve a torch (in its diminutive form) for a purification rite performed during the "installation" in the orchestra. For this rite, the tip of a small torch (a *dalion*) was first heated in the smoldering ashes of a fire. An officiate then took this fiery torch out of the hot embers, thrust its burning tip into a bowl of lustral water, then raised it up, using it as an aspergillum to besprinkle: an animal, altar and area. In *Peace*, Trygaeus says, "I will take this *dalion* and dip it (*embapsō*)" (959); he then besprinkles a

⁷⁶⁷ This "back-chamber" (*opisthodomos*) likely refers to the treasury in Athena's 'old temple' on the Acropolis, which was damaged during the Persian invasions of 480 BCE. On this temple and its relation to the Erechtheion (completed 406), which effectively replaced it, see Sommerstein (2001), note to line 1193; Harris (1995), 40-1; and, Hurwit (2001), 143-44.

⁷⁶⁸ Sommerstein, Trans.

⁷⁶⁹ "Wealth" here stands for agricultural bounty (as much as monetary plentitude); see the introduction to the play in Sommerstein (2001). Cf. Hesiod's *Theogony* (969-73).

⁷⁷⁰ For an interpretation of the play's ending as gratuitous (in part, because the protagonist had already conducted a private installation in his house), see Bowie (1996), 290-91.

lamb and (presumably) the altar and area around her.⁷⁷¹ This action with the *dalion*, then, purifies select subjects (such as lambs),⁷⁷² and consecrates particular sites (such as altars and orchestras) in preparation for a sacrifice. Although this little *dalion* does not, like the other torches mentioned above, spectacularly convey flames throughout the city and sky, it nevertheless performs in a similarly striking and palpable way. This modest but potent device brings together the purifying elements of fire and water, dramatically plunging one into the other, and then vigorously distributes these combined powers so as to cleanse and definitively mark subjects and places for significant acts to follow. In Euripides' satyr play, it is likely that Odysseus also models his actions and aims on this rite, for although he does not intend to dip a *dalion* into a lustral basin, he does propose to plunge his torch into the watery eye of the sea god's son, so, gaining potency for his device (his *dalos*), while at the same time purifying the land of Cyclopean influences—thus, promoting auspicious conditions for performances (in the orchestra) yet to come.

Although Odysseus' proposed deed with the fiery torch in *Cyclops* does not (as in *Peace*, *Wealth* and *Eumenides*), involve a typical "installation" rite or torch-lit procession, it is clear that by the end of the play, this architect-figure has initiated an analogous transfer and installation of Dionysus, as embodied in the wine and implicit in the torch. In light of these affinities, it would seem that Odysseus' proposed act—*circling* a torch—is aimed not only at blinding the eye of the Cyclops but also at ushering-in Dionysus with all the auspicious and conspicuous drama that torches provide. One could go on gathering inaugural occasions when this god of drama was himself conveyed "with torches"—especially during the *Dionysia*, which began with the god's own statue being paraded via torch-light out of the city (to the Academy), then back again (through the *dipylon* gate, across the *agora* and around the Acropolis) to be "installed" in the front row of the theater for the duration of the dramatic festival.⁷⁷³ Yet, this survey is

⁷⁷¹ Elsewhere, the implement is used to purify an altar: in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* (1129-30) and *Birds* (959); and in Euripides' *Herakles* (928-9). See Olson's note to these lines in *Peace*.

⁷⁷² On this rite, see Burkert (1985), 77-79. On "purifying fire", see Euripides' *Helen* 869, *Heracles* 937, and *Iphigenia at Aulis* 1112, 1471, with Parker (1983), 227-8. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' halls are purified by fire (22.481-2).

⁷⁷³ Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 60. Each year, at the start of the *Great Dionysia* festival, the cult statue of Dionysus was moved out of its small Athenian temple (just behind the theater's orchestra), to a site beyond the limits of the city (the Academy, North-West of the Agora). After a night of due rites and festivities in this eccentric area, the god's statue was then returned to Athens in an elaborate procession "with torches" (*meta phōtos*). The details and itinerary of this procession are scanty and debatable. It is certain, however, that upon

comprehensive enough to make a few observations regarding the significance of the fiery device for architects.

Aside from a general understanding of the occasions for and agencies of torches in Athenian society, the examples introduced above also establish particular patterns bearing architectural relevance. One such pattern links drama—specifically its culminating resolutions—with torch bearing processions that, in turn, lead to the establishment, or re-establishment, of enduring institutions, such as marriages, religious cults, civic offices and theatrical festivals. The torches involved in these events bear special witness to newly constituted relationships between individuals, families and citizens; between mortals and immortals; between divinities and their sites of influence; and between particular places and the activities they potentially host. As well, torches lead to, and cross, a number of corresponding thresholds: the doorways of conjugal households; the inner chambers and treasuries of sacred sanctuaries; and, in the case the Dionysian procession (just described), the thresholds of the city itself—its gates, avenues, open assembly places and theatrical orchestra. By following these processual routes and their torch-bearing rites, many constitutive features of the *polis* are dramatically linked, thus revealing the full domestic, political and sacred topography of the city as a complex interactive narrative. Perhaps, then, we may see the torch-bearers, procession leaders, religious representatives, divine figures, dramatic protagonists as well as “architects” as appropriate agents to navigate, and bring attention to, such extensive and dramatically interrelated domains.

returning to Athens the statue came to be temporarily installed in the front row of the Theater of Dionysus. There, Dionysus sat amidst the other spectators for the duration of the dramatic festival held in his honor. At the end of the festival (and perhaps each night after the last performance), the statue was restored to its permanent sitting place in the nearby temple, where it rested until the next cycle of activity. In this annual routine we find a procession with all of the conspicuous splendor of torch-fire that the other dramatized processions (discussed above) involved. We also find a procession with similar intentions: to auspiciously reposition a divinity by virtue of their representation; and to properly inaugurate their place of influence. However, whereas the other torch-lit rites sought to enact permanent bonds (such as marriage) and to inaugurate fixed situations (of divinities in their sanctuary) this movement of Dionysus culminates in the re-establishment of a temporary, but perpetually recurring relation. By this cyclical and seasonal schema of action, Dionysian benefits are made to persist *not* by virtue of a one-time inauguration, but by their being re-inaugurated each year. This procession into the city is also held to be a “re-enactment of the original advent of Dionysus” into Athens. See, Csapo (2007) 103ff; Sourvinou-Inwood (1993); and above p. 221, n. 524.

That “architects” were involved in such “installations” in the theater is suggested by later inscriptions; those announcing that it was the duty of “the architect elected to look after sacred works” to prepare, or allocate *prohedria*—“front (row) seats” for honorable guests visiting the theater, thus making for them an appropriate “viewing (place)”, or *thea*. Eric Csapo (2007), 110, notes eleven such Athenian inscriptions, dating from 331/24-185/4 BCE.

as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man
 rows an auger with a double-bridle,
 so I shall circle a firebrand into the light-bearing
 vision of the Cyclops, and *together-wither* his pupils

—(*Cyclops* 460-63)

In circling the *dalón* into the Cyclops' "light-bearing vision" (*phaesphorōi... opsei*), Odysseus will "together-wither his pupils" (*sunauanō koras*). Setting aside for the moment the peculiar targets of this assault (luminous "vision" and "pupils") as well as the prefix "*sun-*", it is enough to first uncover the basic act of *withering* (*-auanō*). To even begin here, however, one must take a step back, for withering is an unexpected shift from the imagery of burning, which otherwise qualifies the event of blinding in Euripides' play. It is "by fire" and with a "firebrand" that Odysseus repeatedly promises to "ignite", "burn-out", "melt-out", "char", "smoke" and "smoke-out" the vision of the Cyclops—turning his bright eye "to cinders".⁷⁷⁴ Such fiery imagery is just as heated in the Homeric presentation of the deed. There, in the *Odyssey*, the hero's "fiery" stake causes Polyphemus' eyeball to "burn", the roots of his eye to "crackle in the flames", and the area surrounding his eye to be "singed" (9.387-90).⁷⁷⁵ A second Homeric simile, given just after the image of boring, dramatically follows through with this fiery transformation:

as when a smith dips a great axe or an adze
 in cold water to temper it and it makes a great hissing
 —for from this comes the strength of iron—
 so did his eye hiss round the stake of olivewood.

(*Odyssey* 9.391-94).

⁷⁷⁴ These fiery images are found as follows: "by fire" (*puri*, 610, 635); with a "red-hot" and "charred" "firebrand" (*dalón*, 462, 470, 484, 593, 630-33); to "ignite" or burn (*puroun*, 594, 600); "melt-out" (*ektēxō*, 459), "burn-out" (*ekkaiete*, 633, 657, 659), "smoke" (*tuphō*, 655, 658); "smoke-out" (*ekthupsomen*, 475) and turn "to cinders" (*katēnthrakōmetha*, 664).

⁷⁷⁵ "... we took the fiery-pointed stake (*puriēkea mochlon elontes*) and whirled it around in his eye, and the blood flowed round it, all hot (*thermon*) as it was. His eyelids above and below and his brows were all singed (*heusen*) by the flame from the burning (*kaiomenēs*) eyeball and its roots crackled (*spharageunto*) in the fire (*puri*).” (9.387-90).

Like the Homeric simile of a man boring ship timbers with an auger (9.384-88), this kindred image (following just after it) reinforces the productive craft-like manner of Odysseus' brazen deed. Given the repeated references to the Cyclops' lack of craft (*technē*) in this episode of the *Odyssey*,⁷⁷⁶ the presentation of Odysseus overcoming him in craftsmanly manners sharpens this difference between the hero and the beast. In other words, Odysseus' manner of overcoming the giant is qualified precisely with the sort of skills that the Cyclops lacks.⁷⁷⁷ The Homeric simile of a smith tempering fired creations, however, does more than cast Odysseus as an artful civilizer opposed to a rudimentary giant. By its position in culminating the narration of the deed, the simile also suggestively expands the poetic significance of the accomplishment. In this way, the simile in the *Odyssey* functions much like the blacksmith simile in Hesiod's *Theogony*, which likewise both punctuates and elaborates a fiery confrontation, in this case between Zeus and Typhoeus. Here, too, a fated victory over a rebellious giant culminates with imagery of an exemplary smith and fiery creation. As the giant Typhoeus, engulfed in Zeus' flames, falls defeated upon the ground, his burning body begins to melt the earth—

*just as tin that has been heated by craftsmen
over a well-pierced crucible, or like that strongest metal,
iron, which in mountain woodlands the scorching fire tames
and the craft of Hephaestus melts (tēketai) inside the divine earth.
So melted (tēketo) the earth from the flash of the burning fire.”*

(Hesiod, *Theogony* 861-67).

Although, this simile of Hesiod narratively functions like the simile of Homer, the particular work of the smith in each image differs significantly in detail. Whereas the divine smith in Hesiod's image is in the process of melting-down raw material such that it may yield to reformation, the mortal smith in Homer's image is performing a finishing touch: “tempering”, curing or quenching (*pharmassōn*). By suddenly immersing fired works in the opposing volatility of cold water, the mortal smith in the *Odyssey*

⁷⁷⁶ The Cyclops' lack of *technē* is made explicit: they have neither “ships” (*nēōn*) nor *tektones* to build them (9.125-6). Without these *tektones* they have no “well-arranged settlements”, and without ships they lack social and mercantile exchange with others (9.126-30). This lack is heightened by the fact that the neighboring island is full of potential.

⁷⁷⁷ Interpreters of this episode frequently emphasize the opposition between Odysseus and Polyphemus as a confrontation of the civilized and the uncivilized. See, Pucci (1998), 113-30; Dougherty (2001), 123; Cook (1995); Segal (1994), 32-3.

simultaneously arrests and releases fire's potency. And, so, this treatment, along with its "great hissing" (*megala iachonta*), prepares the formed matter (axe and adze) to both resist destruction and productively endure.

In this moment of material transformation much happens that begs to be described.⁷⁷⁸ What is most relevant here, however, is an allegorical comparison of the two culminating images. Whereas the figurative "melting" in the *Theogony* makes the cosmic situation malleable for Zeus' divine re-fashioning of it, the "tempering" in the *Odyssey* reinforces mortal constructs that have already been forged, engendering these with a perpetuating strength for unknown works to come. In the human world of the *Odyssey*, unlike the divine setting of the *Theogony*, civilizing tools (axe and adze), as well as civilizing institutions, are already in formation. Odysseus' figurative tempering, then, can be taken as a complex act of maintenance—a critical and qualitative adjustment *not* to make worldly relations anew (like Zeus), but to make mortal constructs that have already been made hold together more firmly in the face of strife. Thus, it is not simply forged tools (axe and adze) that are being tempered, but the social constructs these tools represent. Obligations to hospitality and taboos of consumption are among the social constructs that Odysseus—as a quenching smith—*treats* in this Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*.⁷⁷⁹

However distinct (in detail and in extenuating implication) these smith similes are in the *Odyssey* and the *Theogony*, they are both ostensibly productive. Both Homer and Hesiod involve images of fire and *technē* to cast the destructive accomplishments of their protagonists in a productive light,⁷⁸⁰ and to demonstrate the vigor and fortitude of those agents (Odysseus and Zeus) who exemplify civilizing (and punishing) intent.

Unlike Homer and Hesiod, Euripides does not involve a culminating blacksmith simile to qualify the fiery accomplishment of his protagonist. Although, at a later critical

⁷⁷⁸ Seaford sees Odysseus' *dalon* in *Cyclops* as a ritual substitution for this quenching simile in the *Odyssey*. See his note to these lines 469-71; and Seaford (1981), 274.

⁷⁷⁹ Detienne and Vernant (1978) have made a similar distinction with respect to Zeus' battle with the Titans versus his subsequent defeat of the Giants (as told in Hesiod's *Theogony*). Whereas Zeus overcame the Titans so as to obtain sovereignty (establishing anew the divine order of relations), he and the Olympians subdued the Giants to maintain that sovereignty. *Mētis* contributes decisively to this second kind victory, as Detienne and Vernant show.

⁷⁸⁰ Similar reversals (of violent narrative events and productive similes) are found throughout Homeric poetry. In the *Iliad*, for instance, as a stricken warrior topples to his death, his fall is compared to a falling tree that *tektōnes* chop-down intentionally to build ships (13.289ff), and chariots (4.482ff). On this poetic device of 'reverse similes', see Edwards (1987), 102-110.

point, Odysseus does pray to Hephaestus to help him “burn out the bright eye” of the Cyclops, he does not solicit technical assistance from him. Rather, it is their mutual liberation from the beast that Odysseus invokes as a proper motive for the divine smith’s involvement. In other words, Hephaestus stands to benefit from Odysseus’ deed as much as Odysseus will benefit from the apotropaic effect of the god’s fire (599-600).⁷⁸¹ Again, unlike the similes of Homer and Hesiod, Euripides does not culminate his simile with imagery of forging or quenching. Instead, Odysseus’ mixed analogy peaks with an intention to “wither” (-*auanō*) the Cyclops’ “pupils” (463); and this intent *to wither* is reiterated by Odysseus when he later warns Polyphemus that Dionysus “will *dry* you up” (*xēranei*, 575).⁷⁸² By substituting withering and drying, for quenching and forging, Odysseus (with the help of both Hephaestus and Dionysus) clearly intends to treat the matter differently. Indeed, with such parching effects as these, the dramatic poet seems to move the fiery metaphor out of the forge and onto an arid and thirsty plane. Such a move as this, however, is not a full departure from either epic imagery or the divine smith’s capabilities; for, in the *Iliad*, dried and withered were the very conditions of the Trojan land surrounding the river Scamandros after “*polymētis* Hephaestus” blasted its surging waters and banks with his abating flames. This episode from the *Iliad* was discussed above, primarily with respect to Hephaestus’ role in releasing Achilles from the threatening river, thus restoring both the central hero and the epic narrative to its fated (or counseled) course. What is of further interest here is the condition of the Trojan land during and after this fiery confrontation. Along with the graphic description of the boiled river, burned fishes, consumed warriors and inflamed plant life, the transformed Trojan land all around Scamandros is further qualified by an extended simile. Once Hephaestus has released his “wondrous blazing fire”, the surge of Scamandros is arrested and the plain is “thoroughly dried” (*exēranthē*)—

just as in harvest time the North Wind quickly *dries* (*anxēranēi*) a freshly watered orchard, and glad is he who tills it, so was the whole plain thoroughly dried (*exēranthē*), and the dead he utterly consumed.
(*Iliad* 21.342-49).

⁷⁸¹ “Hephaestus, lord of Aetna, burn out the bright eye (*lampon omma*) of this pest (*kakou*), your neighbor, and [be set free of him] for good (*apallachtheth’ hapax*)” (599-600). Popular belief placed Hephaestus’ forge beneath the volcano in Sicily, where the *Cyclops* play is set.

⁷⁸² Olson, Trans.

If this fiery work of the smith is productive, its manner of production is of a kind other than those transformations in the forge. For, here, the divine smith is not melting-down iron for cosmic reformation (as in the *Theogony*), nor quenching fired works to perpetuate civilizing strength (as in the *Odyssey*). Rather, while Hephaestus burns and purges the Trojan valley the ensuing simile readies the surrounding plain for re-cultivation, anticipating its renewed fertility and a change of season. If (as suggested above) Hephaestus' fiery devastation of the Trojan river and its surrounding land ominously foreshadows the burning fall of Troy,⁷⁸³ this image of re-cultivation also looks forward to a workable peace that might follow this strife. For, amidst the raging battle of Troy the poet plants a "freshly-watered orchard", promising joy at "harvest time" to those who till it. There is, then, a kind of worldly justice at work with this restorative imagery, which is akin, on the one hand, to the justice of Zeus (often figured with weather phenomena),⁷⁸⁴ and, on the other hand, to the worldly harmony restored by the architecting-Harvester in Aristophanes' *Peace*.⁷⁸⁵

This complex act of Hephaestus in the *Iliad*, which both burns and purifies, dries and rejuvenates, helps us to recognize withering as a related alternative to the other fiery modes of smiths: forging and tempering. This simile in the *Iliad*, together with the smith similes in the *Theogony* and *Odyssey*, also helps to reveal how such imagery shifts the central conflict of the epic to elemental substances by recasting the mortal and divine strife as a proportional competition involving fire, water, earth and air. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' fiery clash with the sea god's son is clinched by the image of fired iron gaining strength when plunged into cold water. In the *Theogony*, Zeus' fiery victory over the last Earth-born giant is crowned by the image of earth melting like molten tin in an underground forge.⁷⁸⁶ And, in the *Iliad*, the flooding river's submission to Hephaestus' fiery blast gives way to an image of freshly-watered earth flourishing in harvest time

⁷⁸³ See above, p. 159.

⁷⁸⁴ Zeus's justice is sometimes figured as rising up suddenly, like a tempest, against mortals and mortal works; then subsiding, leaving pleasing and prosperous conditions (*Iliad* 16.385-93, cf. 5.87-94). In Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women*, Zeus' invention of War (which puts an end to the race of heroes) is similarly accompanied by images of climatic change; see Frag. 155 (204).95-140. Cf. *Works and Days* 106-201. Similar images, of the sudden destruction of man's "fair works" followed by shining sun, appear in the poetry of Solon (Frag. 13.17-25).

⁷⁸⁵ See above, p. 100-01. In the *Iliad*'s simile, "harvest time" (*opōrinos*) is cognate with *Opōra*, whom Trygaeus recovers together with Peace and, in the end, takes as his bride.

⁷⁸⁶ In the same simile, Zeus' hot "vapour" (*atmos*, 861) overwhelms Typhoeus, himself the progenitor of "moist" (*hugron*) sea winds (869).

because of (or in spite of) hot drying winds. These elemental clashes and interminglings complement the oppositions between mortal and divine agents, but they also complicate them by asserting some ambiguity into their conflict. Whereas the victors at the mortal and divine level are clear (Odysseus, Zeus and Hephaestus ostensibly defeat Polyphemus, Typhoeus and Skamandros), at the elemental level there is no victor. Instead, there are proportional adjustments, changes of state and qualitative transformations. Although these elemental clashes (like those of the primary agents) involve violence and violation,⁷⁸⁷ they are also shown to be potentially beneficent for human society, particularly when mediated by regulating processes such as forging, quenching (tempering), and tilling.

There is in all this a two-fold suggestion to be made about *withering* and *drying* in Euripides' *Cyclops*: first, Odysseus' intention to wither Polyphemus must also lead to a vital moistening; and, second, such a treatment must be aiming to adjust an underlying elemental imbalance. In other words, Odysseus' action of withering can be taken as a proportional adjustment of wet and dry conditions intended to affect corresponding mortal benefits. That elemental relations are underlying concerns for the architect-figure in this play is implied, in part, by the recurring imagery of initial dryness. At the start of the play, the Cyclopean land is said to have *no* flowing nourishment: no "gushing springs of water" and no "fresh drops of wine" (66-7).⁷⁸⁸ This infertile "ground" is itself, correspondingly, "inhospitable" (*axenon te gēn*, 92), and the rocky "earth" is itself "danceless" (*achoron chthona*, 124). Likewise, the inhabitants are spiritless: Silenus has been "drained dry" (*exantlō*, 10, 110) by his servile labor, and the satyrs' "siphons" (presumably their phalluses) have been drained of vitality (439). Such dispiriting imagery resonates with tragic despair, for numerous individuals in Athenian tragedy fear that by their solitary suffering they may "wither-away".⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸⁷ The personified elements, themselves, give voice to their agony: the water lets out a "great hissing" in protest when the smith plunges his fired works into it (*Odyssey* 9.392); the Earth "groans" when Typhoeus' flaming body falls upon her (*Theogony* 858); and Skamandros bellows "like a bull" as his aggravation escalates (*Iliad*, 21.237).

⁷⁸⁸ The profound lack of moisture in the land is reinforced by the prominent imagery of barren rockiness. The Cyclops resides on a lonely bluff (116), in a "desolate cave" (22, 623) full of "rocky recesses" (195-7, 407). His abode is entered through a "rock-vaulted" opening (82); and, his "rocky roof" (382) is flanked by ridges of "overshadowing rocks" (680), and surmounted by the "rock of Aetna" (20, 298). Although inhospitable for the others, this lithic ground suits Polyphemus, who claims to be content living beneath his impermeable canvas of stone—his "waterproof tentings" of rock (*stegn(a) skēnōmata* 324)—Olson's trans.

⁷⁸⁹ Having been abandoned by his fellow heroes on an island and deprived of his special weapon, Philoctetes fears that alone and dishonored he shall "wither away" (Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, 954). With her father murdered by her mother's hand, with her sister complicit with her

In the satyr play, the restorative element for this dry and stagnant situation is the potent wine Odysseus brings. In the course of the drama this doubly-active substance parches Polyphemus while revitalizing those who thirst for Dionysus, acting as a kind of molten fire, flooding the Cyclops, while appealing to the others as an ever-flowing pleasure—a “lovely spring”, a “fine bouquet”, “streams of grape-clusters”, and the “beloved juice of the vine”.⁷⁹⁰ In Euripides’ *Bacchae*, Dionysian wine is figured just as exuberantly by flowing not only through its vines but also through the land, and even erupting from rocky cliffs.⁷⁹¹ Elsewhere, in the *Homeric Hymn to Dionysus*, the god causes a “gurgling stream” of wine to pour forth from a wooden ship, and grapevines to cluster about its mast (36-42). Other literature describes similar Dionysian miracles: water turning to wine; milk flowing from stones; and honey oozing from wooden looms.⁷⁹² As Plutarch later wrote: “the Greeks regard Dionysus as the lord and master (*archēgon*) not only of wine, but of the nature of every sort of moisture” (*Moralia*, 365).

This complex potentiality of wine (to wither, parch and dry, but also to saturate, invigorate and gladden) together with the variety of elemental conditions to be adjusted in the land of the Cyclops (including the sterile condition of the land, of social relations and of individual temperaments) helps to explain the appropriateness of not only the reciprocal withering-moistening treatment but also its prefix “*sun-*”. This qualifying *sun*, otherwise transliterated as *syn* (as in *synthetic* and *synoptic*), or *sym* (as in *sympathy* and

mother’s new consort, and with her brother thought dead, Electra, cries out: “without a friend, I shall wither away my days” (Sophocles’ *Electra* 819, Jebb, Trans.). In being worn by grief and drained by weeping, Electra is similarly *dried-out* (*xēron*), according to Euripides (*Electra* 239). Cf. *Orestes*, 329 (where Orestes’ eyes are “parched”). Withered conditions also extend, more generally, to disgraced households and places without prosperity. In Aeschylus’ *Libation Bearers*, Orestes fears that the whole royal stock of the house of Atreus will “wither utterly away” (*auainō*, 261, Smyth, Trans); Cf. Euripides’ *Andromache* 784; *Electra* 734; and Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1452.

⁷⁹⁰ To Silenus, this wine is a “lovely spring” (148), a “fine bouquet” (153) and a gushing “pleasure” (147-8). To the satyrs, it is the “well-beloved juice of the vine” (496)—or, “streams of grape-clusters” (Olson Trans.). And, to Odysseus, the wine’s vine gives forth “streams” (123). Odysseus’ first words of the play prefigure, periphrastically, this Dionysian substance: announcing his desire (*pothos*) to Silenus, he says, “Stranger... where might we find a rivery flowing (as) a cure for thirst” (97)—Olson’s translation.

⁷⁹¹ *Bacchae* 142-3, 704-11 and 274-85, with commentary by Dodds, who points out “what underlies this passage [concerning Demeter and Dionysus] is the traditional opposition of the Dry and the Wet (*to xēron* and *to hugron*) as elements of the world’s body and of man’s body”.

⁷⁹² On watery automatons and temple chambers designed to support Dionysian wine miracles, see Dodds on *Bacchae*, lines 704-11; and Bonner (1910) and (1929).

symmetry), brings attention to the diversity of proportionate adjustments that are integral to the withering act Odysseus intends to perform. Such “withering-together” (*sunauanō*) also recalls the “shaping-together” (*sumplassein*) of diversely animate conditions in the orchestra, as led by the architecting-figure in Aristophanes’ *Peace*.⁷⁹³ Yet, this special compound word, *sunauanō*, which Euripides works into a scheme attributed to “architects”, and which implies proportionate and reciprocal adjustments, is itself rare. No other fifth century author seems to have used it.⁷⁹⁴ Plato, however, would later use the verb in his *Phaedrus* to qualify the effect of unrequited longing on the soul. In this discourse on love, Socrates surmises that when the soul (*psychē*) receives “effluences of beauty” from its beloved, it is “nourished”, “warmed” and “filled with joy”. But, when the soul is deprived of these effluences it becomes “withered”, or correspondingly parched (*sunauainomena* 251d).⁷⁹⁵ By *sym*-withering, then, Odysseus arguably intends not only to wither (or perhaps shrivel) the giant,⁷⁹⁶ but also to drain him of the self-love that was his Cyclopean vision, vigor and pride, while correspondingly (or symmetrically) reinvigorating all those who had been drained-dry by the Cyclops and long to be re-nourished by Dionysus.

And, so, this complex act of “withering-together”, which the dramatic poet mixed into the mixed analogy, brings attention to the corresponding elemental, or humoral, adjustments—the worldly, social and ethical adjustments—that the “architects” (Odysseus, together with Dionysus and Hephaestus) aim to treat in the land of the Cyclops. As in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, the “architects” in *Cyclops* attempt restorative adjustments at multiple scales and levels, from the most intimate to the most expansive.⁷⁹⁷ And, as in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus can again be seen to overcome the Cyclops precisely with the sort of skills the giant lacks. For, Odysseus delivers a proportionate mix of punishing (and replenishing) agencies to his adversary, who (just

⁷⁹³ See above, p. 94-9.

⁷⁹⁴ *LSJ*.

⁷⁹⁵ Trans. of Rowe (1986), 71, 184-5.

⁷⁹⁶ In Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, Zeus is said to “shrivel (*karphei*) the insolent” (7). And in the *Odyssey*, Athena “shriveled (*karphen*) the handsome flesh on [Odysseus’] supple limbs...”, thus turning him into a beggar by the touch of her “wand” (*rabdō*) (13.429-32).

⁷⁹⁷ See above, p. 72-3. The ancient doctrine of the humors, although elaborated elsewhere (in Hippocratic texts and later philosophy) is active in both plays.

before giving his mixed analogy) he had called an “unmixed man” (*ameikton andra*, 429).⁷⁹⁸ Proportionate “mixing”, then (as of wine, of poetic images, of restorative schemes, of temperaments, and of interrelated worldly conditions) must be added to the series of other transformative and regulating processes (forging, quenching/tempering and tilling) that had figuratively and allegorically qualified civilizing and fire-wielding agents in epic poetry.

SYMMETRICAL CORRECTIONS: DIMMING CYCLOPEAN VISION

11.9

as a ship-fastening fitting-together sort of man
rows an auger with a double-bridle,
so I shall circle a firebrand into the *light-bearing*
vision of the Cyclops, and together-wither his *pupils*
—(*Cyclops* 460-63)

While blinding the “eye” (*ophthalmon* / *omma*) of the Cyclops was obviously central to the Homeric plot,⁷⁹⁹ in the satyr play Odysseus promises, more specifically, to *sym*-wither his “light-bearing vision” (*phaesphorōi... opsei*) and his “pupils” (*koras*, 462-3). The satyrs reiterate these luminous and plural features of the Cyclops when they predict that the “light-bearing / light-bringing” (*phōsphorous*) capability of his “pupils” (*koras*) will be extinguished (611); and when they yearn to put out his “light” (*to phōs*, 633) and “bright vision” (*lampran opsin*, 486, cf. 600). And, at the end of the play, after Polyphemus has been blinded, it is “the brightness” (*selas*) of his own eye (*ophthalmou*) that he apostrophizes (663). To recognize the significance of these particular targets it is necessary to recall the Greek conception of vision.

In Euripides day, visual perception was not a one-way affair. Rather, more like amorous experience, the activity of seeing was interactive and reciprocal. As the philosopher Empedocles (Euripides’ contemporary) tells us, eyes—like a lantern—had within them a flame that resisted the watery surround of the eye, while emitting diffuse

⁷⁹⁸ “Unmixed”, here, most obviously implies immoderate behavior, which Polyphemus demonstrates, in part, by drinking “unmixed” wine (557, 602 cf. 149). An early use of “symmetry” in ancient Greek also implies proportionality of behavior. The chorus of Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* warns: “‘Be moderate’ (*xummetron*) is my advice: truly Impiety’s offspring is Hybris, while from Health-of-mind is born Prosperity...” (532-6)—Trans. Podlecki (1989).

⁷⁹⁹ In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus targets the Cyclops’ “eye” (*ophthalmon*, 9.383, 387, 394, 397); and “eyeball” (*glēnēs*, 9.390) between his “eyelids” (*blephara*, 9.389).

beams of light into the world through the eye's delicate membranes.⁸⁰⁰ Beams of light flowed out through these membranes “in a stream smooth and dense”, where they mingled with the kindred outer light of day. In this way, the world's phenomena came to be revealed, and proper vision was kindled when the proportion of outer light and inner flame was balanced. According to Empedocles, this inner flame was concealed in a particular place within the eye: its “round pupil” (*kuklopa kourēn*).⁸⁰¹ Plato later expanded on Empedocles' notion of visual perception in his *Timeaus*, where he likewise emphasized both the “light-bearing/bringing” (*phōsphora*) capability of “eyes” (*ommata*), and the reciprocal coalescence of inner and outer light. For instance, accounting for why one cannot see at night, Plato writes: “When the light of day surrounds the stream of vision, then like falls upon like, and they coalesce... But when night comes on and the external and kindred fire departs then the stream of vision is cut off... and the eye no longer sees.” (45c-d). Extinguishing the external daylight, thus, puts out the kindred inner flame—and vice-versa.

These clarifications (from Empedocles and Plato) help to show the appropriate precision of Odysseus' intention to dim the Cyclops' “light-bearing/bringing” vision and “pupils”. Yet, these clarifications also reveal, more generally, the agency of vision. For, to have fire in one's eye was not only a sign of vision and of life, but also an imperative way to actively participate in and affect a shared world. Here, vision is understood not only to be luminous (by its inner flame), and interactive (in its receptive and reciprocal modes of perception), but also operative by its capacity to project influential effluences into the world of others. As many stories from Greek myth and drama attests, the gaze (be it of beasts, gods or mortals), had a precariously sensitive and potent agency. Gorgons, for instance, inspired terror in anyone who saw them, and turned mortals to stone simply by their gaze. Typhoeus, the nemesis of Zeus, could “cast glances of burning fire” from his innumerable eyes and send out “bolts of savage flame”.⁸⁰² Among the gods, Athena, in particular, acted through the potency of her “gleaming”, “fierce” and

⁸⁰⁰ Empedocles, Frag. 88(84). Paraphrased from the translation in Wright (1981), 240-43.

⁸⁰¹ Frag. 88(84). Wright (1981), 240-43. On Empedocles' theory of visual perception, see Long (1966). The detail about the pupils as the seat of the eyes' inner flame is also found in Aristophanes' *Wealth* (635), and Sophocles' fragmentary *Phineus* (Frag. 710).

⁸⁰² Hesiod's *Theogony* 827-8; cf. Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* 356-7. It should be recalled that Zeus blinds the eyes of Typhoeus when he overcomes this Titan with fire in the *Theogony* (690-99), and above p. 160. On beastly eyes in general, see Vernant (1991), 111-38.

“gorgon-like” eyes, causing enemies to flee on the battlefield and daemons to turn away from a potter’s kiln.⁸⁰³ Similarly, the flashing eyes of mortals could project fury and madness;⁸⁰⁴ spread anger and envy;⁸⁰⁵ and release dangerously charming rays of love—as “a kind of lightning of the eyes”, thus warming the onlooker and inflaming the one desired.⁸⁰⁶ The eyes of Helen, for instance, were so charming as to be lethal: “avoid looking at her”, Hecuba warns, “lest she capture you with desire. For she captures the eyes of men, destroys their cities, and burns their houses. So powerful is the spell she creates.”⁸⁰⁷ To come under such a fiery gaze (for good or ill) was, thus, to become precariously vulnerable to vision’s potency.

With such potency in mind, Odysseus’ intention to snuff out the Cyclops’ “light-bearing / light-bringing vision” may be seen even more comprehensively, for by “sym-withering” the inner flame of his eye, Odysseus would be not only blinding him, but liberating others from his gaze—preventing others from receiving the Cyclops’ effluences, lest anyone should become fascinated by them. And, so, by turning away Cyclopean vision and by turning attention toward the honored “customs” (*nomoi*) that such vision threatens (as he does throughout the play), Odysseus begins both to rekindle a proper vision attuned to Dionysian ways and to restore more auspicious conditions for the persistent practice of such basic yet threatened customs. Leading such reciprocal and

⁸⁰³ Athena’s “gleaming” (*glaukōpis*), “sharp-sighted” (*oxuderkēs*), and “fierce” or gorgon-like (*gorgōpis*) eyes are active in the *Iliad* 18.227 etc. On her turning away of kiln daemons, see above, p. 164, n. 377. Besides Athena, Zeus’ watchful eyes were said to be “gleaming”, or “shining” (*phaeinō*, *Iliad* 13.7). Dionysus had “the charm of Aphrodite in his eyes” (*Bacchae* 236) and in Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, under the pseudonym of Iacchus, Dionysus was a “light-bringing star” (*phōsphoros aster*, 343). The sun and moon were also conceived as the sky’s radiating eyes (Euripides’ *Ion* 1157, Sophocles’ *Frag.* 441a).

⁸⁰⁴ The eyes of warriors “blaze with fire” (*Iliad* 12.466, 20.172); and Odysseus, at times, looks like a lion with fire in his eyes (*osse daietai*, *Odysseus* 6.130-2, 23.48).

⁸⁰⁵ Angry “looks” were thought to be capable of spreading pollution (and plague), see Allen (2000), 80. According to Euripides’ fragmentary *Ino*, “envy”—a “great evil” and the “greatest of all mankind’s afflictions”—also resided “close by the eyes” (*Frag.* 403, Loeb).

⁸⁰⁶ Sophocles, *Frag.* 474 (Loeb). The full verse goes on to implicate the discerning modes of “tektons” into this reciprocal vision: “Such is the magic charm of love, a kind of lightning of the eyes, that Pelops has; by this he himself is warmed and I am inflamed; he scans with responsive vision (*ison metrōn*) as closely as the craftsman’s (*tektonos*) straight-driven plumbline clings to its level”.

⁸⁰⁷ Euripides’ *Trojan Women* 890-4.

corrective adjustments of “vision” would seem, then, to be another act proper to “architects” in Euripides’ play.⁸⁰⁸

But what about the detail of the plural “pupils”? How is it, or why is it, that a one-eyed giant possesses more than one pupil?⁸⁰⁹ While such a feature may be attributable to Greek grammar (as an allusive plural), multiple pupils were indeed seen in the eyes of certain individuals in ancient society, especially those who possessed disturbing influences. Pliny the Elder twice notes the physiognomic oddity in his *Natural History*. Citing Greek authors from the fifth century BCE, Pliny reports that certain individuals from Thrace had “two pupils” (*pupillas binas*) in each eye, and that with these they could “bewitch (*effascinent*) with a glance”, or kill with the gaze of their “evil eye”. Continuing, Plutarch claims that certain women of Scythia possessed the same talent for bewitching, and an even greater oddity in their eyes: “a double pupil” in one, and a “likeness of a horse” in the other.⁸¹⁰ Elsewhere, in Ovid’s eighth poem on love, a certain old woman is remarkable for her bewitching love spells and for her “double pupils (*pupula duplex*).”⁸¹¹ And so, the Cyclops’ single eye might have been an “evil eye”, which, reciprocally suggests that Odysseus’ scheme may have involved comparably magical agencies to avert such an effluence.⁸¹²

⁸⁰⁸ Plato similarly considered such optical work as a primary tectonic act. For, just prior to describing the reciprocal coalescence between the lights of the inner eye and outer world in his *Timeaus* (as quoted above), he posited how such a structure of subtle interdependence was fashioned. In the course of describing how mortals were made, he claims that “light-bearing eyes” were the first organs that the creator “(together) fabricated” (*sun-(e)tektēnanto*) and bound in place (45b). The tragedian Sophocles also involved *tektons* in his image of reciprocal vision (see above, note 806). Perhaps, then, we may see Odysseus’ archi-tektonic act of blinding the Cyclops as a kind of preliminary and radical optical correction (*entasis*).

⁸⁰⁹ Their plurality is twice mentioned in the play (463, 611). His “eye” (*ophthalmon*, 405), however, is otherwise singular and centered in his head (*ophthalmon meson* 174, 235); and he is himself “one-eyed” (*monōpes*, 21, 645; *monoderkta* 79). However, when, having tasted the wine, he comes out of his halls with a lovely look, his “eyes” (*ommata*) are plural (470, 511).

⁸¹⁰ Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*, 7.2.16-17. In addition to contributing to their magic, this horse daemon somehow made them incapable of drowning. For another ancient discussion of evil eyes (though without any mention of ‘double pupils’), see Plutarch’s *Moralia* 680.

⁸¹¹ *Amores* 8.15. In Barsby (1973), 92-3.

⁸¹² Dionysian phalluses, for instance, may have performed as charms against the evil eye. Some such phalluses are depicted (on vase paintings) with eyes at their end. See Csapo (1997). This suggestion gives rise to yet another interpretation of the fiery *dalon* that Odysseus intends to circle into the Cyclops’ eye (as a phallus-like evil-eye averter). At least one scholar has considered the blinding of Polyphemus (in the *Odyssey*) to be related to a folk rite intended to ward-off the evil eye. See Rautenbach (1984), 43, with reference to S. Eitrem’s

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So, ends this elaborate unpacking of the densely mixed analogy offered by the architect-figure as a persuasive culmination of his transformative scheme. What, then, was the satyrs' response?

entry in the *Real-Encyclopädie*. The “*sym-withering*” may also have a magical agency in it, for in Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* the archaic Furies sing a song by which they intend to “wither mortals” (*auona brotois*) and “bind their minds” (*desmios phrenōn* 345-46). “Withering” an adversary also figures into ancient curse formulas. And, much later in the Shakespeare’s *Macbeth*, one of the witches warns the King that she shall “drain him dry as hay” (I.iii.18).

Enthusing Inventions and Poetic Adjustments (what “architects” make)

12.0

Upon taking in the dense offering of poetic figures in Odysseus’ mixed analogy, the chorus of satyrs respond first with onomatopoetic glee—“*Iou, iou!*”—then, with a further qualification as to how they have been affected by his proposals:

We are made crazy by your inventions (*tois heurēmasin*).

(*Cyclops* 464-5)

The satyrs’ enthusiastic shout (*iou, iou*) combined with their “crazy” or “maddened” condition (*mainomestha*) together mark their mood as generally euphoric and particularly Bacchic, for the satyrs’ condition after listening to Odysseus’ figurative speech is like that of Silenus and Polyphemus after experiencing Dionysian wine. Silenus, upon his first contact with this divine substance, is seized by onomatopoetic outbursts (*ba bai... ho Bakchios a a a...*), as well as by tantalizing sensations, ecstatic leaps, erotic impulses, and an urge to proclaim, “whoever does not enjoy drinking is mad (*mainetai*, 168).⁸¹³ Similarly, Polyphemus, upon tasting the potent wine, begins to shriek (*papapai... ho Bakchios*), to sing, to dance, to seek out friends, to drink more wine and, eventually, to draw the satyrs’ condemnation; for, as he retreats to his cave in a drunken stupor (soon to be blinded in the manner described), the satyrs urge-on the “crazing (*mainomenou*) wine” (618).⁸¹⁴ Hence, just as wine enthuses Silenus and maddens Polyphemus, so Odysseus’ speech enthuses and maddens the satyrs. To be more precise, Odysseus’ dense poetic image, which dramatically represents the scheme’s desirably-mixed appeal, performs like Dionysian wine, which (as this play shows) might delightfully transform, maddeningly excite, and either rejuvenate or else ironically parch and punish.⁸¹⁵

⁸¹³ Silenus’ fuller response to this substance runs from lines 156-74.

⁸¹⁴ Polyphemus’ response begins in the cave (423), and develops in the orchestra (503ff). On Dionysian “madness”, which might also induce prophetic capability (*Bacchae* 301), inexplicable violence (*Heracles*), or general mania, panic and fear, see Carpenter and Faraone (1993). One may also recall that a special kind of optimistic “madness” (*mania*) stirred the architect-protagonist of *Peace* to attempt restorative action on a heaven-bound dung-beetle (see above, p. 60, n. 117). On the productive value of such poetic madness, see also Plato’s *Phaedrus* (244a-b), with Pérez-Gómez (2006), 79.

⁸¹⁵ The analogous transformative agency of figurative language and potent wine has already been suggested above, p. 187 and 236.

Yet, the satyrs' immediate response is also of interest here since it casts Odysseus' appealing speech as "inventions" (465). Given that Odysseus has just presented the details of his transformative scheme, together with the mixed analogy which modifies the original Homeric similes, these "inventions" would seem to include not only Odysseus' "scheme" (of liberation, restoration and retribution), but also Euripides' surprising changes, or dramatic adjustments, to the poetic images that had qualified the same scheme in the *Odyssey*. Given that there is more than Homeric poetics at play in the mixed analogy, these "inventions", "findings", or "discoveries" (*heurēmata*), would further seem to account for Euripides' selection and adjustment of other relevant models that Odysseus' "scheme" (or *dolon*)⁸¹⁶ performs in relation to. And these models include: not only Homeric similes, but also (as presented above) other exemplary figures,⁸¹⁷ potent metaphors,⁸¹⁸ epic motifs,⁸¹⁹ as well as mythic and ritual

⁸¹⁶ The term "*dolon*" itself brings a series of model schemes to mind. In the *Odyssey*, these include the infiltrating scheme involving the Trojan Horse, as led by Odysseus (8.494); the retributive scheme involving unseeable bonds, as enacted by Hephaestus (8.296); the resistive scheme of Penelope, involving the weaving and unweaving of her web (2.93-106); the surprising scheme of ambush and attack by Menelaus upon Proteus involving disguise and opportune timing (4.437, 455); and the transformative scheme of Circe against Odysseus' men, which (like Odysseus' scheme in *Cyclops*) involves appealing drinks and false hospitality (10.231). In the *Iliad*, *dolon* qualifies the scheme of Hera to seduce Zeus (14.165-216, 15.14), and a scene of ambush inset by Hephaestus upon the shield of Achilles (18.526). "*Dolon*" also names the Trojan scout, whose valuable counsel (about the Thracian King's horses and decorated chariot) Odysseus appropriates so as to advance his own subtle mission (10.314ff). For Hesiod, Pandora is a *dolon* conceived by Zeus (*Theogony* 589, *Works and Days* 84). In the context of Athenian tragedy, deceptive schemes of murderous retribution tend to be called a *dolon*, as in Sophocles' *Electra* 198, 1395; and Euripides' *Electra* 154.

⁸¹⁷ Such as Dionysus, and his retributive circling in Euripides' *Bacchae*; Athena, and her restorative actions in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*; and certain influential Athenians, such as Solon and his harmonizing intentions, and various procession leaders, torch-bearers and helmsmen, with their navigational expertise. In *Peace* Trygaeus explicitly models his actions after the actions of Bellerophon, an Aesopic dung-beetle and the architect/sculptor Pheidias; and, more suggestively, he mimes agencies of Hermes and the absent planning of Zeus.

⁸¹⁸ These include complex metaphors, such as conceiving the Cyclops as a precarious ship, and this giant ship as an over-indulgent institution, or city, in need of redirection and restraint; as well as associating rowing with collective revelry, participatory liberation, and poetic flight; and mixing the full inventory of extended craft similes (from Homer and Hesiod) with other technical skills, such as ritual artifice and Dionysian arts. Such dramatic metaphors also recall those engaged in *Peace*, such as showing a "martial mortar" as a troubled ship and distressed city, and then re-presenting that city as an altar and orchestra; as well as figuring dung not only as dregs, potent fertilizer and metaphoric fuel, but also as the lack of peace and the malleable substance potentially re-constitutive of both Peace (the divine statue) and *Peace* (the drama). The transformative schemes in Aristophanes' other plays also involve comparable metaphors: figuring wine as peace (in *Acharnians*); the city as house (as in *Praxagora*); and the work of weaving as the intricate work governing (as in *Lysistrata*).

schemas of action.⁸²⁰ In other words, the comprehensive “scheme” Odysseus proposes in the land of the Cyclops is inclusive of poetic “inventions”⁸²¹—those poetic figures and models, which, having been found and adjusted, lend the scheme not only immediate potency, but also profound meaning and enduring relevance. It is this full disclosure (the scheme’s particularly appealing details together with its broad fields of meaning) that the satyrs enthusiastically respond to and that Odysseus, just a few lines later, claims to have thoroughly made known, and promises to lead as one of its “architects” (476-77).⁸²²

⁸¹⁹ Such as Odysseus’ fiery rejuvenation of Ithaca and scheme involving the Trojan Horse; and Hephaestus’ fiery rejuvenation of the Trojan valley and scheme involving the invisible punitive bonds. Similarly, in *Peace*, the epic imagery of “harvesting” (*trugoōsin*), and its corresponding settings and activities, prefigures the image of prosperity offered by Trygaeus.

⁸²⁰ Such as “installation” rites (*hidrusis*) and purification rituals (as performed with *dalion*), as well as sacred marriages (*hieros gamos*) and other rites of initiation. One may also recall that in Aristophanes’ *Peace*, Trygaeus’ scheme may be seen as being inversely modeled on a *katabasis* (descent to the underworld); and an *anodos*, a “leading up”. At another level of influence, both the chorus of satyrs (in *Cyclops*) and of founding-farmers (in *Peace*), contribute to the protagonists’ schemes, by their archaic songs, their mimetic movements, and their ritual and magical modes of influence.

⁸²¹ In dramatic poetry, “inventions” (*heurēmata*) qualify certain remarkable artifacts, such as musical instruments (including a drum) and weapons (specifically an archer’s bow), as in Euripides’ *Bacchae* 59, 126 and *Heracles* 188. Yet, “inventions” also qualify other kinds of “findings”, including: rejuvenating substances, specifically the life-giving wine, which Dionysus is said to have “invented” as wet counterpart to Demeter’s dry grain (in *Bacchae* 278); interpretive devices, namely “weights, numbers and measures” for studying the stars, which were the “invention” of Palamedes (in Sophocles, Frag. 432); and appropriate words, or persuasive “arguments” (*logōn*), such as Odysseus claims to have “searched for” or “found” in Euripides’ *Hecuba* 250, cf. *Hippolytus* 716, 688. And, in one instance (not unlike this line *Cyclops*), “inventions” qualifies dramatic poetry, for in the parabasis of Aristophanes’ *Clouds* the chorus leader, speaking on behalf of the “poet” (*poiētēs*, 545), turns directly to the “wise spectators” (*theatais sophois*, 535), and says, “If you take pleasure in me and my inventions (*heurēmasin*), you will be respected in ages to come for your good sense (*eu phronein*)” (*Clouds* 561-2). A related sense of “inventions” as qualifying dramatic poetry is also found in Euripides’ *Bacchae*, where Dionysus prophesizes that the impious Pentheus will “invent” (*heurēseis*), or “find” for himself, “a glory (*kleos*) towering to heaven” (972). The irony, here, is that Dionysus (and Euripides) is devising *not* a tower but this King’s memorable dramatic downfall from the “heavenly-high fir tree”. At the very end of this tragedy, the chorus reasserts this Dionysian (Euripidean) sense of “inventing” with a gnomic expression: “What men look for is not brought to pass, but a god *invents* a way to achieve the unexpected” (1390-91). On “inventions” as “findings”, notably as “finding what the gods give”, see Walsh (1984), 60 n. 87.

⁸²² Both “the architects” (*toisin architektoisin*, 477) and “the inventions” (*tois heurēmasin*, 465) perform persuasively for the chorus—a performative resemblance that is reinforced in the script by their kindred case (dative plural) and by their like position in the verse (at the end).

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We now turn to poetic inventions of another sort: to the dramatic properties Odysseus bears in the land of the Cyclops and the comparably metaphoric and representational role they play in his scheme.

Dramatic Properties: influential attributes of architects

The following section (the final chapter of this dissertation) interprets the personal properties of the architect-figure in Euripides' satyr play. These properties include three mediating devices: a flask of potent wine (145), an appealing cup (150), and a double-edged sword (456). Unlike the "torch" (*dalon*), which Odysseus finds as a branch within the Cyclops' cave, these properties (flask, cup and sword) are on his person when he arrives ashore. With these mediating devices, Odysseus knowingly advances his transformative scheme of liberation, restoration and retribution. Before elaborating on each of these devices, it is helpful to first outline the general relevance of such props, and to comment on their peculiarity for architects. First, their peculiarity.

One might expect an architect-figure to hold, as their primary property, a measuring rod or surveying staff (*kanon*), such as those held by the architects configured round the enduring olive tree on the painted vessel discussed above (p. 172-76). Alternatively, one might presume architect-figures to have a pair of "compasses" (*diabētēn*): such as Meton performs with, while proposing to partition the air in Aristophanes' *Birds* (999ff); as Socrates involves, while enacting a lesson upon an ash-covered tabletop (as though drawing figures in sand) in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (178f); and as Dionysus is figured with, when inaugurating his scheme of retribution against an impious adversary in Euripides' *Bacchae* (1066-7).⁸¹⁹ Then again, one might expect architects to be associated with carpenter's tools, such as Odysseus uses while making his raft and bed in the *Odyssey* (5.234-61; 23.183-204). In Euripides' satyr play, however, Odysseus' props do not outwardly resemble these canonical, metrical and tectonic implements. Neither do they resemble the heroic properties associated with Odysseus in Homeric epic: his "decorated shield" (*poikilon sakos*, *Iliad* 10.149), his storied "cap" (*Iliad* 10.261ff), and his suggestive "bow" (*Odyssey* 22.405ff). Rather, in *Cyclops*, Odysseus arrives equipped with dramatic properties suggesting different modes of interaction and intervention. Before considering these peculiar properties, however, Odysseus' association with carpentry tools merits further introduction.

In two critical episodes of the *Odyssey* (making the raft and bed), Odysseus makes use of tools that are precisely named and plausibly suited to the work he performs. Before he fells, cuts, smoothes, straightens and fits-together the timbers for his raft,

⁸¹⁹ See above p. 45 (Meton), and p. 293-95 (Dionysus).

Odysseus first takes hold of proper tools: an “axe”, “adze” and “augers”. He also makes use of a carpenter’s “line” as he straightens his timbers, and an implied “turning” tool as he lays-out, or turns-out (*tornoomai*), the broad preliminary base of his raft. All of these tools enable Odysseus to obtain, prepare, join and adjust the materials for his vessel, so setting into motion his departure from Calypso and his return to Ithaca. Yet, beyond enabling the work, these tools also enable the representation of the work leading to this pivotal passage. If the tools were not named in the narrative we might (with hindsight) infer their involvement, but thanks to their inclusion the nuances of Odysseus’ activity are more vividly conjured: ostensibly, the diverse modes of his fabrication; the peculiar resistances and gradual transformations of the materials; his own efforts and judgments; as well as the particular conditions and contingencies he anticipates. In other words, these tools not only shape what is made, they also sharpen our comprehension of making, which is here also representative of making poetic narrative.⁸²⁰ The later episode—his own story of how he had once made his marriage bed round the rooted olive tree with an “adze”, “auger” and carpenter’s “line”—complements and culminates this epic narrative, while at the same time revealing anew its beginnings.⁸²¹

By specifying such tools the Homeric poet was clearly not indulging in arbitrary diversions, but rather attending closely to the tangible properties that both influence and poetically elaborate narrative actions. The broad poetic significance of Odysseus’ “augers”, which link distinct episodes in the epic, has already been mentioned.⁸²² Yet, tools also perform narratively by preparing agents for imminent actions and transformations in the story. In the *Iliad*, for example, before Hephaestus begins to make Achilles’ shield, he first mobilizes his assistive implements: setting “a great anvil” in place; commanding his “bellows” to turn to the fire; then taking in one hand a “massive hammer” and a pair of “tongs” in the other (18.476-7). Even individuals whose acts of craft seem less central to the story (than those of Odysseus or Hephaestus) are properly and preliminarily equipped. When Nestor calls for a goldsmith to gild a heifer’s horns in

⁸²⁰ See above p. 279.

⁸²¹ In his story, Odysseus himself claims, “beginning (*archomenos*) with this [the trimmed and trued olive tree], I made smooth the timbers of my bed, until I had it done” (23.199). In telling the story of this bed’s constitution, Odysseus marks the new “beginning” of order for Ithaca.

⁸²² See above p. 271.

preparation for a sacrifice, the anonymous smith arrives, “bearing in his hands his tools of bronze, the implements of his craft, anvil and hammer and well-made tongs” (*Odyssey* 3.433-4).⁸²³ When a healer is called upon to tend the wounds of a warrior, he similarly enters the story together with his “soothing herbs” (*Iliad* 4.191; 11.514, 830; 16.27). And, when a minstrel arrives to a banquet, he arrives bearing his vital instrument: a “clear-toned lyre” (*Odyssey* 8.67). In the *Iliad*, the Achaean heroes are also associated with significant attributes at anticipatory moments: when they prepare themselves for particular arenas of action (assembly or battlefield) and modes of engagement (discourse or combat) by first arming themselves with symbolically-charged weapons and defensive attire.⁸²⁴

One could go on regarding the suggestive attributes of gods (such as Athena’s golden spear, Hermes’ heraldic staff and Poseidon’s trident),⁸²⁵ yet this summary is sufficient to establish the general poetic significance of such props, and to further recognize that in Homeric poetry tangible properties perform in ways that are similar to verbal epithets. Like qualifying epithets, these properties help to make vivid and distinct a diverse cast of agents, while giving particularized representation to their peculiar

⁸²³ The “implements of his craft” (*peirata technēs*) are here, more literally, the “means of accomplishing his art”, for *peirata* implies “ends” or “limits”. See Heubeck & Hoekstra (1989), note to 3.432-3. Cf. *Iliad* 23.350. This smith, then, arrives with the “tools” (*hopl'*) by which he will accomplish not only the specific task (of gilding), but also the ultimate goals of his *technē*, which here includes honoring the gods.

⁸²⁴ A revealing series (involving Odysseus) occurs in book ten, when a number of heroes arm themselves differently for the same event. As each Achaean leader is roused to attend a meeting that will decide the subsequent course of action in the battle, they attire themselves as they see fit. Agamemnon puts on sandals, a tunic and a lion skin—then takes up his “spear” (10.21-24). Menelaus dons a leopard skin and a helmet—then takes up his “spear” (10.29-31). Nestor slips into sandals, a tunic and a purple cloak—then takes up his “spear” (10.131-35). Diomedes wraps himself in a fiery lion skin—then, likewise, takes up his “spear” (10.177-79). Odysseus, however, prepares himself differently, by taking up a single attribute: a “decorated shield” (*poikilon sakos*, 10.149). Each leader’s choice of weapon seems to prefigure the mode of action they prefer and the argument they might be prepared to bring forth in counsel. This counsel session ends with the decision that Diomedes and Odysseus will infiltrate the Trojan camp, at which point they adorn themselves with more telling equipment: Diomedes takes a “double-edged sword” (*phasganon amphēkes*, 10.256); and Odysseus dons his stolen cap (10.260-271). This mission ends with Diomedes having slaughtered a King and his men, and with Odysseus leading back stolen horses and spoils—tokens of reassurance (defensive ornaments) for the Achaeans. (See above, p. 195-99).

⁸²⁵ In Greek art (poetry, drama, sculpture and painting) figures of cultural significance were frequently represented with and identified by the attributes they held. On the importance of iconography in Greek culture, in general, see Bérard (1989).

manners of action and interaction. They further assist in making ambiguous modes of influence more apparent and graspable. Poseidon's trident, for instant, identifies him as god of the sea, but it also makes imaginatively plausible his peculiar way of disturbing the sea.⁸²⁶ In Athenian drama, we may grant that the poetic practice of adorning protagonists and antagonists with telling attributes becomes all the more significant, for such properties perform most conspicuously (and subtly) amid diverse actors in the orchestra, dramaturgically mediating their ensemble interactions.⁸²⁷ It is my premise that by attending to the performative role of Odysseus' primary props (wine flask, cup and sword) we will be better able to recognize his subtle agencies in the play and interpret the significance of these for architects. We begin with a property that, at first, does not seem so subtle: the double-edged sword.

⁸²⁶ As Poseidon catches sight of Odysseus approaching the Phaeacian shore on the raft, "he gathered the clouds, and seizing his trident in his hands troubled the sea" (*Odyssey*, 5.291f, cf. 4.506).

⁸²⁷ On the role of "objects and tokens" in Athenian tragedy, in general, see Taplin (1978), 77-100. For a reading of Euripides' sparse yet striking use of props—notably an urn, in the tragedy of *Electra*—see Raeburn (2000).

An adaptive and decisive double-edged sword

13.1

As a primary property, a double-edged sword is surely more appropriate to warriors and pirates than to architect-figures. Nevertheless, in Euripides' *Cyclops*, a sword is integral to the very scheme in which “architects” are implicated. Perhaps this fit is not as contradictory as it may seem, for Odysseus does not intend to use his sword directly as a violent weapon; rather, he engages it indirectly, both as a preliminary tool and as a representational device. With his sword, Odysseus proposes to smooth and sharpen the found branch of olivewood, thus preparing it for its more direct role in overcoming the Cyclops. Also with his sword, Odysseus shows—by mimetic suggestion—aspects of his scheme that otherwise go unseen. In the course of narrating the details of his scheme to the chorus, Odysseus indicates his sword and demonstrates its involvement as follows:

when he (Polyphemus) falls asleep, overcome by Bacchus,
there is an olive branch in his halls, whose tip,
when I have sharpened it completely with *this sword* of mine,
I shall lower into the fire. Then when I see it kindled,
I shall lift it hot and thrust it into the middle
of the Cyclops' face, melting-out his eye with the fire.

(*Cyclops* 455-59)⁸²⁸

Like Odysseus' other properties, “*this sword*” (*phasganōi tōide*), as its verbal presentation suggests, would have been conspicuously displayed in performance.⁸²⁹ Yet, unlike the wine flask and cup, which continue to figure prominently in the drama once they have been introduced, Odysseus' sword is neither verbally recalled nor (presumably) displayed again for the audience. Nevertheless, Odysseus' conspicuous display of the weapon here highlights its role as integral to his scheme. As for the sword's display, it is tempting to picture Odysseus revealing it in this way: unveiling the previously hidden

⁸²⁸ I have made minor substitutions here to Kovac's translation (cited above p. 306, n. 775). The Greek is as follows: *hotan d' hupnōssēi Bakchiou nikōmenos, | akremōn elaias estin en domoisi tis, | hon phasganōi tōid' exapoxunas akron | es pur kathēsō: kaith' hotan kekaumenon | idō nin, aras thermon es mesēn balō | Kuklōpos opsin omma t' ektēxō puri.*

⁸²⁹ The deictic pronoun “this” (*tōide*), testifies to the sword's immediate presence. The flask and cup are presented similarly, as will be shown below.

weapon by drawing back his cloak; gesturing to its tip as he conjures the analogous “tip” of the sharpened branch; miming the lowering, lifting and thrusting actions of his future attack as he narrates them; then concealing the weapon again beneath the folds of his cloak. In spite of the brevity of the sword’s appearance, such a menacing show would have a lingering effect, keeping the sword in memory as a veiled but genuine threat—a ready recourse to violence should his proposed scheme fail. By its timely and vivid display, the sword would also prefigure the implement that Odysseus proposes first to prepare and then to wield against the Cyclops. In so far as the script suggests, this proposed implement (the *dalon*) is otherwise unseen by the audience, for it remains hidden within the cave for the duration of the play. Odysseus’ sword, then, by the manner of its presentation not only stands in for the device that it will prepare but also makes certain aspects of this unseen device stand out dramatically for the audience.

While Odysseus’ sword could be taken simply as a standard property of Homeric heroes and dramatic protagonists, the discussion below shows that such assumptions are not appropriate for this hero and this dramatic genre. Indeed, this particular sword—a *phasganon*—appears incongruous as a weapon both in the hands of Odysseus and in the performative context of satyr plays. This apparent incongruity of the sword, combined with its emphatic display, only makes one wonder all the more about its peculiar manner of engagement. For, Odysseus proposes to use his sword *not* as a deadly weapon, disfiguring and final, but as a creative tool, transformative and preliminary. All this suggests that Odysseus’ sword ought to be regarded with suspicion. I will do this by reviewing Odysseus’ involvement with swords elsewhere in Homeric poetry; by considering the role swords play in the different dramatic genres; and by drawing-out the symbolic and metaphoric connotations of this double-edged device. What all this suggests for “architects” and their preliminary, transformative and representative actions is the underlying concern of the inquiry.

EPIC SWORDPLAY: ODYSSEUS’ PECULIAR ENGAGEMENT OF SWORDS

13.1a

While Odysseus engages a variety of arms during his trials in the *Odyssey*, including a sword, spear and bow,⁸³⁰ a sword by the name of *phasganon* is not involved in his encounter with the Cyclops (as Euripides would later have it). Odysseus does bear

⁸³⁰ Odysseus uses all three weapons during his battle in Ithaca (book twenty-one); and bears them for self-protection during his adventures at sea (books nine to twelve), esp. 10.261-2.

a sword in the Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*, but it is called there by another name. While trapped inside Polyphemus' cave, Odysseus briefly considers drawing his "sharp sword" (*xiphos oxu*) against the giant (9.300). He does so impulsively upon witnessing the cannibal's appalling treatment of his shipmates. Yet, significantly, "a second thought" checks him (9.302). Odysseus himself explains: "for there in the cave we too would have perished in utter ruin. For we would not have been able to thrust back with our hands from the high door the mighty stone which he (Polyphemus) had set there" (9.303-6). Odysseus' forethought and self-restraint in this decisive moment of crisis are remarkable, so too is the poet's discrimination in naming the particular "sword" that Odysseus chooses *not* to draw: a *xiphos*. Although, at times in Homeric poetry *xiphos* appears interchangeably with *phasganon*, a *xiphos* more often designates those swords that are not wielded violently but worn symbolically and, at times, even exchanged peacefully as tokens of reconciliation and friendship.⁸³¹ A *phasganon*, on the other hand, is consistently engaged in close and grisly combat.⁸³² Etymology seems to confirm this difference of function. Compared to *xiphos*, which is relatively obscure as to its root purpose (being associated with similarly shaped things, such as "swordfish"); a *phasganon* is clearly caught up with acts of "slaughter" (*sphazein* / *sphagiazomai*).⁸³³ In the *Iliad*, for instance, while a hero may sling a "silver-studded sword" (*xiphos arguronlon*) over his shoulder before heading into battle, or in advance of more discursive contention, the instant he draws the sword to violently attack an adversary it is renamed *phasganon*. In other words, whereas *xiphos* tends to name a sword as an emblematic artifact possessing a potentiality for injury, *phasganon* divulges the sword as a directly harmful weapon that physically injures and probably kills. Such renaming speaks to meaningful changes *not* in the tangible property itself but in the situation, manner and motives of its engagement. This distinction in the naming of swords becomes all the more pronounced in relation to Odysseus, for even in the battle-filled scenes of the *Iliad*, Odysseus does not in any way use or bear a *phasganon*. Although Odysseus wears a "silver-studded *xiphos*" and carries a "bow and quiver", he does not

⁸³¹ In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus receives a *xiphos* as a gift from a Phaeacian youth who had earlier mocked him (8.403-6). In the *Iliad*, in a pact of friendship between enemies on the battle-field, Hector exchanges his *xiphos* for Ajax's belt (7.299-305)—an exchange that would later turn out badly for Ajax (see below, p. 338, n. 859). Swords named *xiphos* also play a symbolic role in oath rites, as in Xenophon's *Anabasis* 2.2.9. See Faraone (1996), 149-198.

⁸³² *Iliad* 5.80, 10.456, 15.712ff, 16.339, 20.469, 20.481, 21.19, etc.

⁸³³ *LSJ*.

engage either of these arms directly in battle. Where he does fight in the *Iliad* it is with a “sharp spear” and a “bronze lance”⁸³⁴—weapons aimed and thrown (like words) from a distance.

Unlike the *Iliad*, in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus repeatedly uses a sword, which is evoked by various names (including *phasganon*). The manner by which he engages these swords, however, is often peculiar, and these peculiarities of engagement reveal intentions that counter-act the weapon’s most obvious use. For example, as stated above, in the Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus chooses not to kill Polyphemus with his “sword” (*xiphos*). Although he draws his sword in the cave, he turns it to another purpose: engaging it as a creative tool, he carves out from the giant’s own olivewood cudgel a device more appropriate to his scheme (9.327-8). Beyond the land of the Cyclops, Odysseus similarly misuses his sword in ways opposed to its directly violent use. Soon after escaping the cave, Odysseus sails into the harbor of the Laestrygonians, who also turn out to be man-eating giants. Upon the first sign of trouble, Odysseus draws his “sword” (*xiphos*) and swiftly cuts loose the cables of his moored ship, thus taking flight from the dangerous situation (10.126). That Odysseus engages his weapon here to flee rather than to fight stands out in sharp contrast to the activity of the Laestrygonian giants who, meanwhile, are “spearing [Odysseus’] men like fishes” (10.124). Later, Odysseus again uses his sword to *avert* danger. Having been forewarned by Circe about the bewitching song of the Sirens (12.39ff), Odysseus prepares waxen earplugs in advance of sailing through their domain of influence. With his “sharp bronze” (*oxēi chalkō*), Odysseus cuts off small portions of wax; reshapes these with his hands; then fits the newly formed plugs to each of his crewmen’s ears (12.173-77). In this way, Odysseus prevents his crew from hearing and thus succumbing to the dangerously sweet song. (Odysseus, on the other hand, and at Circe’s urging, restrains himself by having his shipmates bind him—open-eared—to the ship’s mast). In each of these circumstances—amid the Cyclops, the Laestrygonians and the Sirens—Odysseus draws his sword to turn away danger by turning its sharp edge to alternative modes of cutting: smoothing olivewood, severing ship cables and dividing portions of wax. In this series of averting acts, a development in the timeliness of the sword’s engagement is also discernable. In the first instance (in the cave of the Cyclops), Odysseus uses his sword *retroactively*, to

⁸³⁴ Odysseus wears a “sword” (*xiphos*, 10.261), carries a quiver and “bow” (*bion/toxa*, 10.260), and is “famed for his spear” (*douriklutos*, 11.396, 401, 661; 16.26); he also fights with a “sharp spear” (*oxei douri*, 11.421, 424, 447), and “bronze lance” (*enchei chalkeiōi*, 6.31).

prepare an offensive device after being caught in the thick of trouble; he then uses it *promptly*, to flee a situation at the first sign of strife; and then *preemptively*, to prepare defensive devices for others. Thus, beyond its importance as a creative and averting tool Odysseus' sword contributes to these episodes as a telling measure of his own variable and adaptive ingenuity (in turning a deadly weapon to appropriately productive and protective use); and of his growing forethought (in gradually deploying his sword more preemptively than retroactively).⁸³⁵ Just as important, is Odysseus' capability to take action with his sword in light of counsel—not only from himself, in keen awareness of problematic circumstances (as in the cave of the Cyclops and harbor of the Laestrygonians), but also from guiding figures bearing insight greater than his own (such as Circe).⁸³⁶

In a subsequent episode of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus uses his sword most incisively and proactively: as a special inaugural and ritual implement. Acting again on the guidance of Circe, Odysseus sails to the far edge of Oceanus; there, at a particular “place” (*chōros*) foretold by the goddess, he draws his “sharp sword” (*aor oxu*) to measure and form in the ground a shallow sacrificial pit (11.24ff). In this delineated area Odysseus pours libations of milk, honey and wine; then adds water, barley and the blood of sheep, which have been sacrificed (presumably) with the same “sharp sword”. Awakened by this mix of liquids seeping into the earth, the ghosts of the underworld emerge, including Teiresias who, as Circe foretold, gives Odysseus further counsel for his journey. In this episode, Odysseus engages his sword for three kinds of ritualized cutting: cutting the throats of sacrificial animals;⁸³⁷ cutting-off a separate area for the performance of this sacred act;⁸³⁸ and cutting-into the ground, thus inaugurating a threshold to a realm of counsel otherwise beyond his mortal reach.⁸³⁹

⁸³⁵ After fleeing the Laestrygonians, Odysseus again involves his sword in a precautionary measure: taking his *phasganon* with him as he goes to a place of wide look-out (10.145).

⁸³⁶ In another instance, Odysseus' crew persuades him *not* to raise his “sword” (*aor*) against his own crewman who had accused him of recklessness. Instead of killing this critic, Odysseus decides to leave him behind (from the mission) to guard the ship (10.438ff).

⁸³⁷ This act was typically performed with a special knife (*machairan*), yet Odysseus' “sharp sword” (11.24) is inferred as he is “cutting the throats” of the sheep (11.35). Where Odysseus appears with a sword on vase paintings it is also in relation to animal sacrifice; specifically, in relation to the ram he sacrifices to Zeus after escaping the Cyclops' cave concealed beneath its fleecy belly (*Odyssey* 9.551-55). See LIMC, “Odysseus” 105-19.

⁸³⁸ The “pit” (*bothros*) that Odysseus measures out “a cubit's length this way and that (*entha kai entha*)” resembles other ritual areas: the Greek *temenos* and *chōros*; and the Latin *mundus* (counterpart to the city's outer limit, or *terminus*), see Rykwert (1999), 121-26. A *bothros* is

During this harrowing encounter with the spirits of the dead, Odysseus engages his sword in yet another manner, adding further apotropaic and rhetorical agencies to its range of performance. Once the spirits begin to emerge in the saturated place he had prepared, Odysseus (again acting on the advice of Circe) holds out his “sword” in ready self-defense.⁸⁴⁰ He brandishes his weapon *as if* to harm the approaching spirits who, ironically, are already dead. In this menacing way, Odysseus limits the dangerous situation. Having first opened a way for the ghosts to approach, he then turns them back, holding them off—at a safe distance. Odysseus’ earlier confrontation with Circe prefigured this apotropaic action with his sword. For, when Odysseus had initially encountered Circe he was himself at great risk (since she had intended to turn him into a pig). When Circe commenced her sorcery, however, Odysseus (acting upon the precautionary advice of Hermes, 10.293ff) drew his “sharp sword” (*aor oxu*) and rushed toward her *as if* to harm the immortal goddess who, like the spirits in Hades, was not susceptible to actual injury (10.321).⁸⁴¹ Nevertheless, Circe—surprised and awed—yielded to the assertive mortal, whom she then recognized as “Odysseus of many turns” (*polytropos*, 10.330ff).⁸⁴² As with his gesture toward the spirits, Odysseus raises his sword against the goddess not to inflict injury but to momentarily assert both his control of the situation and his capability to change it—to knowingly turn it otherwise. And, it is by means of this assertive and averting demonstration that he makes his identity and transformative capability known to Circe. That Odysseus’ sword is in this dramatic instance called an *aor*, after the verb *aeirō*, “to raise”,⁸⁴³ further emphasizes this performative gesture and its profoundly rhetorical contribution.

distinct from a raised “altar” (*bomos*) for burnt offerings to Olympian gods (as opposed to chthonic deities). See Burkert (1985), 88 and 99-100.

⁸³⁹ On this blood ritual and its role in communicating with the dead (necromancy), descending to the underworld (*katabasis*), and other rites associated with chthonic deities and hero cults, see Heubeck *et al* (1989), intro. to book 11; and Burkert (1985), 60.

⁸⁴⁰ Odysseus’ sword is invoked three times in this apotropaic capacity: as a “long sword” (*tanuēkes aor*, 11.231); as a “sharp sword” (*xiphos oxu*, 11.48); and as a *phasganon* (11.82). When the spirit of Teiresias approaches, however, he advises Odysseus to put this *phasganon* away (11.95). There is no further mention of a *phasganon* until much later in the epic, when it is the suitors who brandish theirs against Odysseus, and Odysseus who—with his lyre-like bow—disarms them (22.74-90).

⁸⁴¹ Burkert (1983), 24ff, shows that “pretended aggression [...] plays a special role in ritual communication.”

⁸⁴² This epithet is only put upon Odysseus here and in the very first line of the *Odyssey* (1.1).

⁸⁴³ *LSJ*.

In all of these instances so far introduced, where Odysseus draws his sword he turns it *not* against humans, but against other agencies and materials: against divinities, ghosts, animals and earth; and against various material substances (olivewood, ropes, and bees-wax). As for these malleable materials, the sword enables Odysseus to transform them and his situation. As for the other agencies (divinities, ghosts, animals and earth) the sword ritually mediates Odysseus' exchanges with them, allowing him to initiate communicative exchanges that are essential to the situational transformation he seeks, while at the same time limiting the dangerous influence that these extraordinary counselors exert on his own vulnerable mortal condition.

In one instance in the *Odyssey*, however, Odysseus turns his sword against a man. Although, as stated above, Odysseus does not rely on a sword during the final battle for his household (where his reclaimed lyre-like bow is his preferred weapon), he does—at the battle's culmination—take up a “sword” (*xiphos*) from a recently slain suitor in order to strike-off the head of a priest, the suitors' own “soothsayer”.⁸⁴⁴ And this Odysseus does irrespective of the soothsayer's supplicating claim to innocence (22.310-19) and, most remarkably, as the man is still speaking (22.329). To grasp the fuller significance of this violent act, it should be considered together with Odysseus' subsequent acts; namely, his decision to spare the lives of the suitors' bard and herald. After dealing harshly with the soothsayer, Odysseus—presumably with the double-edged sword still in hand—listens to the bard's supplication; considers his own son's testimony in support of the bard and herald; then deems both of these agents innocent. Odysseus further finds them useful in spreading the word of his return, for he instructs the bard to wait at the door until he is finished (22.377), and he dispatches the herald to begin spreading a message: “how better is the doing of good deeds than of evil” (22.374). Although Odysseus' initial action with this sword is violent and deadly, the fuller context of the scene shows that the double-edged device contributes dramatically to each of his three decisions. As for the false soothsayer, Odysseus, with his sword, judges him guilty both for his complicity with the suitors (who had violated sacred customs of hospitality), and for what has been called his “abuse of divine authority”—for telling these suitors only the auspices they wanted to hear.⁸⁴⁵ As for the bard and herald, Odysseus, with

⁸⁴⁴ A *thuoskoos* is one who “inspects (*skopeō*) burnt offerings (*thusia*)”—one who performs sacrifices on behalf of others and interprets the divine auspices from the smoke and fire. This Greek official is akin to the priestly *hāruspex* of the Etruscans and Romans. *LSJ*.

⁸⁴⁵ Yamagata (1994), 167. See also Haubold (2000), 124, who compares Odysseus' killing of this soothsayer named Leiodes, meaning “he who pleases the people”, to his killing of

sword in hand, judges them relatively innocent, but he also obliges them to act as witnesses, for their vital testimony to the events in his household may benefit others. The sword, then, figures into Odysseus' condemnation and acquittal. That Odysseus articulates the reasoning for his decisions, and considers both the suppliant's speech and his own son's counsel before demonstrating his decision, further brings attention to the basic yet serious act that Odysseus is performing here with his sword in hand: an act of judgment.

While all the agencies discussed above (transformative, apotropaic, ritual, rhetorical and judicial) are tacitly active in Odysseus' sword in *Cyclops*, it is this last activity of judgment that Odysseus most emphatically demonstrates in the play. For, Odysseus shows his sword most decisively and persuasively in the moment of making his decision to punish Polyphemus known to others and in anticipation of a subsequent decisive act. In this way, the sword gives dramatic presence to the largely invisible act of judgment, which is underway when Odysseus, as "architect", makes his restorative scheme thoroughly known to the chorus.

CRAFTING JUSTICE: ARCHITECT-FIGURES AND OBLIGATIONS TO STRIFE

13.1b

That a sword—as an attribute of judgment and justice—may be appropriately associated with architect-figures is supported by comparable dramatic images. For instance, in Euripides' *Bacchae*, while Dionysus is (off-stage) exacting retribution against an impious adversary, as with a compass (1066-67),⁸⁴⁶ the chorus (out in the orchestra) performs a fitting song, featuring this twice-repeated refrain: "Let justice proceed for all to see, let it proceed with sword in hand (*xiphēphoros*)" (992-3, 1011-12). The compass and the sword are thus made analogous by metaphorically qualifying the same Dionysian deed. One may also recall that for Aeschylus *architecting* had suggestively qualified the office of Justice,⁸⁴⁷ who (according to several vase paintings from the fifth century BCE) indeed bore a double-edged sword as her primary attribute.⁸⁴⁸ Elsewhere in epic and

Eupeithes, "he who persuades well", or falsely (24.523-25). Like Leiodes, Eupeithes speaks *against* the likelihood of Odysseus' homecoming, thus denying the validity of the story.

⁸⁴⁶ An extended craft simile, delivered by a messenger, qualifies this act. See above, p. 294.

⁸⁴⁷ Aeschylus, *Dikē Play*, Frag. 281a in Sommerstein (Loeb 2008). See above, p. 115-21.

⁸⁴⁸ See Shapiro (1993), 39-44; and *LIMC* under "Dikē". These representations, in which Dikē holds a sword down at her side or on her lap, are related to the judgment of souls at the gates of the underworld. In her earliest graphic portrayal, however (circa 520 BCE), Dikē more aggressively wields not a sword but a brutal hammer; and in Euripides' *Hippolytus* (428 BC), she is figured with a crushing "cudgel" (*roptron*), as of an animal trap.

dramatic poetry, *tektones* and tectonic actions (such as working discerningly with rulers and carpenters' lines) frequently represent the enactment of justice.⁸⁴⁹ Similarly, Hesiod had figured Mētis as a “*tekton* of what is just” (*tektaina dikaiōn*).⁸⁵⁰ More ambiguously, the heroine of Euripides' *Medea* calls herself a “wise *tekton*” (*tektones sophōtatai*, 404) just as she devises a violent scheme of retribution.⁸⁵¹ Clytemnestra's portrayal of herself as a “righteous craftsman” (*dikaias tektonos*, 1406) at the end of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* is another case in point—a tragic case (like Medea's), which requires further elaboration in order to draw-out its specific relevance for architects.

This self-qualification by the murderess at the end of *Agamemnon* is the first in a series of metaphors in the tragic trilogy that cast acts of justice in terms of craft. Yet, whereas in the first tragedy, Clytemnestra deems herself a “righteous craftsman” as she discloses her sword-stricken victims (whose limbs she has cut and rearranged),⁸⁵² in the second tragedy, *Libation Bearers*, the craft imagery shifts. At a crucial moment in the action—as Orestes and his accomplice prepare (off-stage) to exact retribution against Clytemnestra—the chorus sings of a personified Destiny (Aisa) forging both a “sword” and more defensive “arms” upon an “anvil of Justice” (646-47).⁸⁵³ This more complex figure of Justice is not, like the “righteous craftsman”, wielding a sword, but is rather performing as a firm and level place of making—a supportive base, or “anvil” (*puthmēn*),

⁸⁴⁹ The Homeric imagery of *tru*ing ship timbers “to a line” (*stathmēn*) imply just procedures, so too does the contrast of “straight (*ithus/orthos*) judgments” and “crooked counsels” (*ankulo-mētēs*), as in Hesiod's *Works and Days*, 9, 35, 48, 219. The archaic poet Theognis, similarly, sings: “I must render this judgment (*dikassai*) by rule (*stathmēn*) and square (*gnomona*)... and give an equal share to both sides, with the aid of seers, auguries, and burning sacrifices, so that I not incur the shameful reproach of having erred.” Frag. 543-46, in Gerber (Loeb 1999), 251. On this and other examples of the trope in Theognis, see Nagy (1985), esp. 37. The imagery of measuring judgments with rules and squares is comparable to the image of measuring fates with a pair of “scales” (*talanta*), such as Zeus is figured with in the *Iliad* (8.69, 19.223ff, 22.209). See Detienne (1996), 55-6. One may also recall that the only work of Hephaestus to be repeatedly qualified as a work of *technē* in the *Odyssey* is a scheme of justice—his retributive bed of “crafty bonds” (8.296-97). See above, p. 152-56.

⁸⁵⁰ Hesiod Frag. 294.14, in Most (Loeb 2001). See above, p. 120.

⁸⁵¹ Figures of *technē* fill this speech of Medea (364-409) in which she summons her courage and magical “arts” to slaughter her children and thus punish their unfaithful father (Jason).

⁸⁵² Clytemnestra (likely still holding high her *phasganon*) stands over and within this tragic tableau, which is pulled out from behind the skēnē on the ekkylēma. On the staging of this scene, see Taplin (1977), 325-37, 442-43. On the mutilated bodies, see *Libation Bearers* 439 with Garvie's (1986), note to the line.

⁸⁵³ The chorus, more fully, sing: “the anvil of Justice is planted firm. Destiny fashions her [defensive] arms and forges her sword (*phasganourgos*)” (*Libation Bearers* 646-47).

upon which the just work of Destiny may take place. In the last tragedy, *Eumenides*, this figured place of justice—as an anvil-like site foundational to justice’s crafting—becomes more fully grounded on a civic level. For, in this culminating tragedy, Athena intervenes to break the cycle of violence by establishing a judicial institution upon the great anvil-like rock of a hill known as the Areopagus. She founds this “institution” (*thesmos*) to host the murder trial of Orestes, then to endure as the stable “ground (*pagos*) where justices deliberate” (685)—thus accommodating mortals’ desire for justice in a more discursive manner. Within this institution, Athena also accommodates the vengeful Furies (who had been threatening further violence against Orestes), by offering them shining “thrones” in deep “chambers” within the Areopagus’ rock. And so, in this last tragedy, the figures of justice again shift. The imagery of swords and their crafting are ostensibly dropped,⁸⁵⁴ being replaced with a series of interrelated places, both real and metaphoric: the “thrones”, “chambers”, “ground”, “house” and “altar of Justice” (516, 539, 804-05). If there are weapons wielded in this “house of Justice” they are the words and arguments (accusative and defensive) of persuasive speech—involving the tongue, not the sword. Nevertheless, swords remain mutely in the background of this last tragedy, as figures (like the Furies) of a persistent mode of justice, which Athena’s institution strives to accommodate, regulate and diffuse. Indeed, when Athena leads the Furies as chastened agents of violence into their deep chambers, it is tempting to picture them as swords being sheathed. Along with this nested image, what is relevant to emphasize is that over the course of Aeschylus’ tragic trilogy the craft metaphors of justice both change and move: from a “righteous craftsman” wielding a vengeful sword; to a firmly planted apparatus supportive of justice’s crafting; to an assemblage of places, as durable architectural settings for the deliberation of justice through crafted speech and telling stories.

Aside from an attribute of justice, with special relevance to both architect-figures and architectural beginnings, Odysseus’ sword in Euripides’ play may also be interpreted in relation to the satyr genre. To draw this interpretation out, however, it is helpful first to sketch the role swords play in tragic and comic drama.

⁸⁵⁴ While the sword (*xiphos*) is, at the start of this play, still held by Orestes in his right hand, in his left hand he bears a supplicating olive-branch (43). From this point forward, no clear mention of swords is made again. Where weapons are alluded to it is metaphorical and in the negative: as when Orestes himself is said to be “blunted” (237); and when Athena restores order *without* the compulsion of arms, or “work of her spear” (289).

Where Odysseus does perform as a character in the extant tragedies, he is not said to bear a sword by any name.⁸⁵⁵ When swords are engaged by other tragic actors, however, the violence they enable is as close and grisly as that portrayed in the *Iliad*. Yet, violence conjured in the dramatic orchestra is, in some ways, both more disturbing and more significant than in epic poetry. This is, in part, because tragic violence tends to be valorized as ritualized aggression (murder is described with sacrificial metaphors and enacted as though following a ritual procedure);⁸⁵⁶ and, in part, because the tragic motives of sword-wielding agents are more complex. Although the work of a *phasganon* on the Homeric battlefield may be alarming in its consequences, in tragic drama it is the intentions and conduct of those who engage the weapon that are most disconcerting. In Athenian tragedy, a sword is wielded for menacing threats, murder by ambush, human sacrifice and suicide. The victims of such tragic swordplay are rarely straightforward enemies (as the Achaeans are to the Trojans). Rather, victims of the sword in tragedy include former friends, fellow comrades, members of a single family, and shamed individuals. Thus, the limits of violence and of self-restraint are central questions to tragic conflicts involving swords.⁸⁵⁷ Being seldom drawn in open combat, swords in Athenian tragedy also tend to be carried covertly and drawn in schemes of preconceived treachery (somewhat like the ploy of Odysseus in *Cyclops*).⁸⁵⁸ Yet, even where covert,

⁸⁵⁵ Of the thirty-two extant tragedies, Odysseus appears as a character in four: in Euripides' *Rhesus* and *Hecuba*; and in Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Philoctetes*. The only mention of a sword in direct relation to Odysseus in these tragedies is in *Rhesus*, where the chorus of Trojans recall the time when Odysseus snuck into Troy disguised as a beggar with "a sword (*xiphērēs*) hid beneath his garments" (713-14). In the same play, Athena urges Odysseus and Diomedes (off-stage) to "put their whetted swords to sleep" (670); yet, the earlier lines indicate that only Diomedes had performed a violent deed (624-6).

⁸⁵⁶ On the "sacrilization of violence" and "perverted sacrifices", see Henrichs (2000); Burkert (1966); and Seaford (1994). Such representations do not legitimate violence, but rather put its problems in profounder terms. As Henrichs (*ibid*), 174, explains: "by reconceptualizing and verbalizing murder as a rite of sacrifice, tragedy turns mundane acts of self-motivated aggression into quasi-religious events, thereby magnifying them and elevating them to a rank compatible with its ritual frame, moral authority, and interest in the divine."

⁸⁵⁷ In the *Iliad*, swords also contribute to dramatizing such conflicts, as when a *phasganon* is used to strike the neck of a man who is still speaking (10.456); to strike a man's liver (20.469); to decapitate (20.481); and to slay a priest from behind as he is running away (5.80). Athena's opening intervention—urging restraint when Achilles considers drawing his sword against Agamemnon—is another case in point (1.190ff).

⁸⁵⁸ The concealment of Odysseus' sword in *Cyclops* links his scheme to tragic Euripidean counterparts, including the chorus' reference to Odysseus' Trojan scheme in *Rhesus* (713f);

swords are active. Indeed, at times, a sword is granted a troubling agency of its own: invoked as the “progeny of fire” (*purigenei*) in Euripides *Orestes* (820); and greeted as a personified “Slaughterer” (*sphageus*) in Sophocles’ *Ajax* (815).⁸⁵⁹ Furthermore, swords in tragedy tend to be indicative of a failure, or limit, of communication. Ajax, for instance, chooses to fall upon his own sword when his shame prevents him from attempting reconciliatory discourse.⁸⁶⁰ And Orestes (not unlike Odysseus in *Cyclops*) chooses to take up his sword vengefully after an attempt at discursive resolution has failed.⁸⁶¹

In sharp contrast to tragedy, the swords of comedy are engaged less often and more passively. On the few occasions where a sword is named in the comedies of Aristophanes it is mentioned only to be dismissed, or else involved in a joke. In three different comedies, individuals are said to be too weak, too mad, or too aroused to even hold a sword (*xiphos*).⁸⁶² Where the protagonist of *Acharnians* does manage to draw a sword (*xiphos*), he draws it against a basket of coal (331ff)—in an explicit parody of a tragic hostage-taking scene (from Euripides’ *Telephus*). In Aristophanes’ *Peace*, a sword (*xiphos*) is among the weapons that Trygaeus specifically relieves the people from having to bear (553); and, later, when a “hoe-maker” becomes overjoyed by the renewal of Peace

and the heroine’s scheme in *Hecuba*, in which “all of a sudden from somewhere in their clothing [the women] produced swords (*phasgana*) and stabbed the children (of Polymester)” (1161). Similarly, Orestes and Pylades plan to make a surprise attack on Helen by hiding and then producing swords “from beneath the concealment of purple-bordered robes.” (*Orestes* 1125, 1457ff, 1125). Cf. *Andromache* (1118ff, 1150), and *Electra*. Concealing a sacrificial knife in a basket of grain before drawing it to kill an animal was a common ritual motif.

⁸⁵⁹ This sword of Ajax was a gift from his enemy Hector (*Iliad* 7.299-304), thus adding irony to its troubling agency. Personified weapons also figure into Euripides’ *Heracles*, where the hero imagines that his bow comes alive, turns back at him and rebukes him for the shameful murders he just committed (1380-81). The troubling agency of weapons is also integral to a certain Greek legend about a knife that was itself blamed, tried and found guilty of murder. This story and its rite (the Buphonia) accounts for the origin of animal sacrifice. See Detienne (1986), 50. An ancient proverb also spoke of a sword’s magnetic agency, “For of itself does the iron draw a man to it” (*Odyssey* 16.294, 19.13). On the magical/religious agency of swords in general see Cary and Nock (1927).

⁸⁶⁰ Ajax’s sword and his own “senseless”, “weaponed” and “frenzied hand” eagerly swinging “bright iron”, are problematized from the start of this play by Odysseus, Athena and the chorus (40, 97, 230, 147 etc.).

⁸⁶¹ Swords are rarely mentioned in the first half of this drama, so long as hope for a counseled resolution remains. When words fail, however, swords (of Orestes and others) are evoked more than thirty times (between lines 953-1656), beginning with a messenger’s announcement: “So get the sword ready...” (953).

⁸⁶² The references are, respectively: *Wasps*, 714; *Frogs* 563; and, *Lysistrata* 156, cf. 53, 631. Another inconsequential sword is referred to in *Women at the Thesmophoria* (140).

he dismissively “farts at a sword-smith” (546-7). These swords, then, do not contribute so much to the dramatic action as they do provide a tangible sign, measure and limit of that which comedy opposes. In other words, swords represent what comic drama is *not*. If this weapon performs at all combatively for Aristophanes, it is in dramatizing Comedy’s competition with and potential overcoming of Tragedy, for Aristophanes incorporates the arsenal of tragic devices only to refuse, reverse, or replace them by alternative implements and tactics.⁸⁶³ In this way, he asserts Comedy’s interest in Tragedy’s themes, while at the same time showing his genre’s freedom from tragic consequences.⁸⁶⁴ His appropriation of the stage machine in *Peace* is a good example of a comic reversal with serious intent. Whereas this device typically brought a god down to earth to resolve mortal situations at tragedy’s end, Aristophanes has a mortal ride it up to heaven at his comedy’s start, so as to repair a situation that the gods themselves had abandoned.

How, then, do these comic and tragic treatments of swords (and other tragic equipment) help to interpret the role of this property in the satyr play? Although, as in comedy, Odysseus asserts the sword only to reject its violent use, he does not completely reject its injurious agency. Odysseus does not, like Trygaeus, subvert the sword (with ridicule) or convert it into a peaceful implement (via re-interpretation). Rather, Odysseus knowingly prepares an injurious instrument with it. Further, in spite of verbally rejecting the satyr’s guess that his scheme might (as in tragedy) involve “slaughter” (*sphaxai*, 448), Odysseus willfully exhibits his slaughtering-*phasganon* a moment later (457), thus revealing his capability for the very act he verbally denied. Showing forth a sword in a satyr play—the after-piece to tragedy—can be seen, then, to carry forward certain tragic problems associated with swords: their violence, violations, moral ambiguities, conflicting consequences and judicial agencies; as well as their antagonistic relation to language and discourse. Far beyond a handy device to sharpen olivewood as the plot demands, Odysseus seems to flash his sword in the satyr play as a question—asserting a lingering tragic *agon* into this supposedly burlesque play.

⁸⁶³ Trygaeus’ reinterpretation of the war-gear in *Peace* (1208-64), turning weapons into devices supportive of peaceful activities, is one example of such reversals. See above, p. 85-7.

⁸⁶⁴ As A. M. Bowie (1993), 27, writes, “comedy turns to tragedy to makes its ‘serious’ points”. Similarly, Helene P. Foley (1988), 43, states “Aristophanes uses the contrast between genres to define his own comedy; indeed, comedy’s deliberate violation of tragic limits becomes the basis of its self-defense, of its claim to free speech, truth, and justice.”

Yet, there is a further point to consider. While tragic themes are valid in satyr drama, a sword and its violent capability still seem out of place amidst a chorus of frolicking satyrs. Although satyr choruses are depicted on vase paintings as (mis)handling a variety of equipment,⁸⁶⁵ swords do not figure into the extant representations of these mythic agents. Neither do other protagonists in satyr plays depend on this weapon. In so far as the extant fragments suggest, where violent conflicts do arise in satyr plots they are neither instigated by nor resolved with sophisticated weaponry. Rather, more rudimentary means are engaged. For instance, in Sophocles' *Amycus*, Polydeuces overcomes a barbarian King with a bare-fisted punch to the head.⁸⁶⁶ In Aeschylus' *Kerkuōn*, Theseus defeats a ruthless leader with a deadly wrestling maneuver. And, in Euripides' *Sciron*, Theseus subdues another cruel tyrant by shoving him off a cliff. In spite of such crude means, there is a precise sense of poetic justice at work in each of these schemes, since each oppressor is overthrown by means they themselves had been using to overcome others. In other words, these adversaries are beaten at their own game. Such symmetrical tactics of retribution may account for the satyrs' confusion in Euripides' *Cyclops* that they might be expected to "eat the Cyclops back",⁸⁶⁷ or else that Odysseus will overcome the giant by comparably brutal tactics. Indeed, the satyrs had assumed not only that Odysseus might "slaughter" the Cyclops, but that he might alternatively catch him alone and "push him off a cliff" (448). Yet, Odysseus explicitly rejects such obvious responses in favor of tactics more "cunning" (*dolios*, 449)—more subtly crafted.

Considered in this context of dramatic genres, the involvement of Odysseus' sword in the satyr-play stands out as most problematic. For, although he turns the deadly weapon to a productive task, the ostensible product of this turn (the *dalos*) inflicts injury for the sake of retribution and liberation. Some scholars have termed such violence "formative" and "culturally generative", pointing out that Odysseus exemplifies this paradoxical kind of restorative action (as when he slaughters the suitors for the sake of

⁸⁶⁵ Satyrs are pictured as frolicking with athletic gear; as wielding hammers and mallets (against the earth); as performing the hoplite's war-dance with ready shield, spear and phallus; as stealing the bow and club of Heracles (while he sleeps); and as parading their more usual Dionysian appurtenances (wine vessels, grape vines and musical instruments). On the representation of satyrs on vase paintings, some of which are considered to be depictions of lost satyr plays, see Seidensticker (2003); Simon (1982); and Hedreen (1992), esp. 105-124.

⁸⁶⁶ The fragments of this satyr play are meager, but a description of the episode is narrated in the later work of Apollonius Rhodios (*Argonautica* 2.92-97). See also Sutton (1980), 38.

⁸⁶⁷ Arrowsmith's translation of: *ouk echomen kataphagei* (440).

restoring order to Ithaca).⁸⁶⁸ Such “culturally generative” or re-generative violence also recalls the exemplary modes of duplicitous action mixed into Odysseus’ scheme (as discussed above), including Solon’s political (and poetic) manner of fitting-together “violence” and “justice”; Hephaestus’ manner of both burning and rejuvenating by fire; and Dionysus’ manner of both parching and revitalizing through wine. Yet, one must also include in this mix of ambiguously regenerative and just agencies Odysseus’ influential mode of speech—his special interest in the subtle, performative and ironic potential of language. Accordingly, we may take “*this sword*” of Odysseus in two further interrelated ways: as figuring-forth his own sharp, potent and duplicitous “tongue”;⁸⁶⁹ and as making dramatically apparent the pain-inflicting agency of the wine. Indeed, each time Odysseus ingratiatingly offers his antagonist a “taste” of Dionysian wine,⁸⁷⁰ a punishing dose of poetic justice is precisely served, for the Cyclops had not only previously shunned Dionysus and Dionysian ways but had also explicitly rejected Odysseus’ own persuasive speech and “well-shaped words” (317).

Having tasted the sword, we now turn to consider another influential property of the architect-figure: the flask of potent wine.

⁸⁶⁸ Cook (1995), 14 and 140-57, where he argues that Odysseus’ schema of revenge and restoration models the rite of an Athenian festival called *Skira*, the central event of which reenacted the formative violence that gave way to peace between Athens and Eleusis. Burnett (1998), among others, argues that “culturally generative” violence was central to satyr plays, which, by punishing a notorious villain, provided “positive revenge tales”. Unlike the victims of tragedy (who were within one’s own social group), adversaries in satyr plays (as in folk tales) are eccentric monstrous transgressors whose acts seem to obviously deserve punishment. Thus, duly punishing these antagonists in satyr plays alleviated some of the tensions that tragic drama had built up.

⁸⁶⁹ Silenus establishes the potency of Odysseus’ “tongue” when he suggests that Polyphemus will become “clever and glib” if he chews it (314-15). In Aristophanes’ *Frogs* Euripides is presented as worshipping “Tongue” as a god (826-29, 892). In *Cyclops*, it is tempting to compare the role of Odysseus’ sword in *thoroughly*-sharpening (*ex-apoxunas*) the branch (457) to the role of Odysseus’ tongue in making his scheme *thoroughly* known (*ex-epistamai*, 476). A comparison between the tongue and sword is also made by Pindar, who advises the Sicilian tyrant Hieron to “guide your people with a rudder of justice; [and] on an anvil of truth forge your tongue” (*Pythian Ode* 1.86-8).

⁸⁷⁰ To offer a “taste” of one’s sword was an epic trope for offering retribution. For instance, in the *Iliad*, when Achilles returns to the battlefield, he invites the Trojans to “have a taste” (*geusetai*) of his spear (21.60, cf. 20.258). And, nearing the climactic battle in the *Odyssey*, the Homeric poet predicts that the most outspoken of suitors (Antinous) will be the “first to taste an arrow from the hands of flawless Odysseus” (21.98). In Euripidean tragedy, Polyxena similarly prepares to have a “taste of disaster” (*Hecuba* 375); and Herakles recalls having “tasted countless troubles” (*Herakles* 1353). Cf. *Hippolytus* 663 and *Alcestis* 1069.

In Euripides' satyr play, as in the Homeric episode, wine is indispensable to Odysseus' scheme to overcome the Cyclops. With the wine Odysseus plies and softens the beast, loosens his wits, breaks down his colossal strength and effectively lowers the giant, so, gaining advantage over him and altering the *agon* of the situation. Not unlike a tool, the wine extends Odysseus' capability, allowing him to manipulate conditions that resist his will and that he could not otherwise alter. Yet, Odysseus not only alters, he also injures Polyphemos with the wine, making him susceptible to the decisive strike that finally blinds him. Thus, as much as a tool, Odysseus bears the wine as a subtle weapon, the serious danger of which is masked by its initial appeal and gradual effects.

The particular wine that Odysseus bears in this play, however, is not reducible to a fluid tool or weapon. Rather, as Odysseus first presents it, this wine is "Dionysus' drink" (*pōma Dionusou*, 139)—a sacred substance given to him by "the god's own son [Maron]" (141). As Odysseus further involves this wine, he calls it: "a divine drink" (*theion pōma*, 415); "the gleam of Dionysus" (*Dionusou ganos*, 415); the "drink of Bacchus" (*Bakchiou potōi*, 446); and, most overtly, "Bacchus" (454, 519, 575). With these appellations, Odysseus emphasizes not only the wine's status as a divine gift, but also its special agency as a liquid incarnation of Dionysus himself—a potent confluence sustained throughout the drama.⁸⁷¹ Indeed, Dionysian wine is such an influential collaborator in the scheme that it is credited (together with Odysseus) with overpowering Polyphemos. Near the end of the play, the vanquished giant cries out: "Know well, it was my guest... the abominable guest, who [inundated] me (*kateklusen*) with the drink" (677).⁸⁷² Odysseus also asserts the wine's Dionysian influence when he predicts that Polyphemos shall be "dried up" and "overcome by Bacchus" (575; 454). The satyrs, as well, stress the divine potency of the substance with their eager chant: "Let the [crazing] wine come, let it act, let it extract the eye of the Cyclops"—to which they righteously

⁸⁷¹ Also at lines, 156, 412, 524 and 616-18. The confluence is also attested in Euripides' *Bacchae* when Teiresias says, "Himself a god, he [Dionysos] is poured out in libations to the gods" (284, cf. 45-6). Cf. Lissarrague (1990a). In the *Odyssey*, Dionysus is not at all mentioned in the Cyclops episode, where the dark, sweet and unmixed wine is a "divine drink" and gift from Maron, the priest of Apollo (9.196ff).

⁸⁷² In the *Odyssey*, the defeated giant similarly cries out "a small, worthless weakling has blinded me of my eye when he had overpowered me (*edamassato*) with wine" (9.515-16). Cf. 9.454.

add—“so that his drinking may turn out badly for him” (616-19).⁸⁷³ Over and above the sharp fiery torch, Polyphemus blames the wine for bringing on the cataclysmic flood of blindness; Odysseus emphasizes the wine’s drying and vanquishing effect; and the satyrs underline its moral authority. Yet, in spite of its aggressively punitive agency, the wine preliminarily performs in less forceful and antagonizing ways: as a pleasing and mediating element of social exchange. In this more positive manner, the wine lends assistance to Odysseus’ scheme by acting as a social softener; as a binding agent; and as a much sought-after source of “pleasure” (*terpsin*, 521, 528). In other words, while casting the divine drink as a transformative tool, a vanquishing weapon and a punishing vehicle of Dionysus helps to identify its diverse agencies it is also necessary to consider its more socially nuanced performances in the play. Considering the wine’s involvement in these more subtle ways will also help to reveal the architect-figure’s precise participation with it, particularly with the administering and tempering of its transformative influence.

TEMPERAMENTAL AND SITUATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS

13.2a

The transformative influence of the wine is revealed most dramatically by the changes Polyphemus undergoes as he drinks it. The giant’s transformation begins immediately upon his first gulp. Whereas, just prior to this drink, Polyphemus had been mercilessly butchering (and eating) his guests, upon tasting the wine he raises not brutal weapons, but an open hand. And this he raises in a gesture of admiration both for the wine and for the friendly stranger who offered it, exclaiming: “Dearest friend (*Philtate xenōn*), you give me fine drink on top of a fine meal” (418-19). With this first cup of wine, Polyphemus moves from ruthlessness to gratefulness. Given a second cup, he is moved to sing (423). The next time we hear from Polyphemus, he is emerging gregariously from the cave, gaily singing of his indulgence in the wine and demonstrating (possibly by dancing) his nearly complete submission to it:

Ooh la la! I’m loaded up with wine, my heart skips with the cheer
of the feast. My hull is [like a cargo-ship]⁸⁷⁴ full right up to the top
deck of my belly. This cheerful cargo brings me out to revel, in the
springtime, to the houses of my brother Cyclopes.

(*Cyclops* 503-9)

⁸⁷³ Olson’s translation of the short clause *hōs piēi kakōs*.

⁸⁷⁴ *holkas hōs*, 505. (Seaford, Trans.).

While moments earlier, the bold giant had forced the helpless crew into his cave (345-6); the wine now compels a changed Polyphemos to come out of this cave and into the orchestra (507). Whereas the Cyclops had previously boasted of his selfishness (324-37), he now openly seeks companions to share in good cheer (*euphrōn*, 507). Formerly vicious and seemingly invincible, the giant now appears foolishly venturesome and vulnerably clumsy: like an over-stuffed merchant ship burdened by its load, the giant is on the verge of sinking. As Polyphemos continues to consume the divine drink out in the orchestra, the divine drink quickly takes possession of Polyphemos from within: the wine nearly drowns him (577); it disorients him with a dizzying epiphany (577-8); and it distracts him with erotic impulses (581ff). As Polyphemos wobbles back into the cave, seizing Silenus on the way to satisfy his new appetite for love, his transformation—in appearance, comportment and inclination—is profound. His subjugation to the wine, as well as to Odysseus, is also blatant. With the Cyclops thus loosened, the situation is now ripe for further reformation.

Although the wine is portrayed throughout these scenes as the primary agent of transformation, it is Odysseus' savvy administration of the substance that makes it so influential and well received. Like the wine's potency, Odysseus' prescience is evident from the start, for Odysseus offers the first thirst-quenching drink to Polyphemos at the most opportune moment: the instant he finishes his ghastly meal (409ff).⁸⁷⁵ Odysseus promptly offers a second cup upon perceiving the giant's pleasure in the first (420). Thereupon, as Polyphemos sings, Odysseus plies him with cup after cup, knowing full well that this "wine would be his undoing" (421-2). When Polyphemos emerges euphorically from the cave, however, it is he who then takes up the plying: pressing Odysseus for more and more of the delightful drink (510, 566). At this point, Odysseus shifts his tactic from urging to restraining. Tempering the giant's eagerness to wander off in pursuit of revelry, Odysseus cites a number of adages about decorous drinking at home.⁸⁷⁶ He also appeals, to Polyphemos' greedy ego: "Keep it for yourself and you will

⁸⁷⁵ Odysseus claims that it was Polyphemos' own burp (after eating the shipmates) that gave him the idea: "when sated with the meal... he fell on his back and belched a foul stench from his maw, [and] I was struck with a heaven-sent thought" (409-412). This burp, which Odysseus interprets as a heavenly thought, or "godly thing" (*ti theion*), may make reference to oracular utterances and divine inspiration. Yet, the foul belch also conjures the smell of death and the voice of the shipmates—calling up from the belly of the beast.

⁸⁷⁶ "Reveling often ends in fists and quarrelling" (534); "Good friend, it's best when drunk to stay at home" (536); "But he who's drunk and stays at home is wise (*sophos*)" (538). On the gnomic nature of these expressions, see Ussher's and Seaford's notes to the lines.

be more honored (*timiōteros*)” (532). Silenus adds to these appeals by demonstrating and promoting self-indulgence: “Stay, what need [have we] of other banqueters (*sumpotōn*)?” (540). Odysseus further reassures Polyphemus (disingenuously) that the wine will delight, not harm him (522-30), and if he drinks it all up it will lull him to a most satisfying sleep (573-4).

By such timely, persistent and measured offerings, Odysseus shows his savvy ways with the wine, demonstrating that he knows the wine completely (its sources, manners and effects)—knowledge that he also attests to by admitting he is well-practiced in things Bacchic (520) and well-acquainted with the vine (567).⁸⁷⁷ Yet, Odysseus knowingly handles not only the wine but the beast, whom he not only intoxicates but also begins to socialize. Whereas Polyphemus had initially regarded the strangers merely as meat, after tasting the wine he begins to recognize Odysseus as a “friend” (418), and receive him as a “guest” (548). Although the giant had earlier claimed to have no want of company, he begins to desire companionship, seeking the social pleasures of the “feast” (*dais*, 504) and the carousing “revel” (*komos*, 508). Polyphemus also willingly accepts the present occasion for communal drinking, which is played-out in the orchestra as a symposium.⁸⁷⁸ Like its aristocratic model, this Cyclopean drinking party is accompanied by appropriate accoutrements: cups and a mixing bowl; wine and wine-pourers; reclining couches (made of soft flowery leaves); crowns of garland; fellow-drinkers (Silenus); and an implied master of ceremony (*symposiarch*), Odysseus—the sober regulator leading the event.⁸⁷⁹ The topics of conversation at this pseudo-symposium also fittingly include the merits—and the risks—of wine, beauty and love (553-5, 581-88). Polyphemus himself gives further orientation to this occasion by insisting that the “mixing bowl” (*krater*), which had previously been within the cave and full of milk (216, 388), be placed out “in the middle” (*es meson*), thus promoting fair access to it (547). During this extended scene, Silenus and Odysseus draw the giant into the etiquette of the philial institution,

⁸⁷⁷ “At least my hand has some acquaintance (*gignōsketai*) with the vine” (567); “I am practiced (*tribōn*) with this Bacchus” (519-20). Here, *tribōn* implies that he is “well-worn” or “rubbed”, as a much-traveled path. See Seaford’s note to the line.

⁸⁷⁸ On imagery of the symposium in *Cyclops*, see Hamilton (1979). On the institution of the symposium, in general, see Murray (1990).

⁸⁷⁹ The “symposium leader” (*symposiarch*) was responsible for mixing the wine, determining the proportion of wine to water, and regulating the share of wine distributed to each guest. A *symposiarch* did not themselves drink, just as Odysseus does not drink in this play. See Levine (1985), 176 n.1; Lissarrague (1990a), 8-9; and Plutarch’s *Table Talk*, 1.4.620a-622b.

showing him where to sit (541), how to recline (563), how to sip neatly (561), and how to mix and pour (547, 567-8). This socialization of the giant opens as well onto some form of communion with the gods. Whereas Polyphemus had previously claimed to have no interest in any divinity beyond his own belly (323-28), during the symposium he becomes curious about Bacchus (521), and his divine awareness peaks—in a dizzying epiphany—with a majestic vision of Zeus’ throne (579).⁸⁸⁰

Beyond these physical, ethical and metaphysical transformations of the Cyclops, the broader situation is also reformed by this occasion of communal drinking. From a place of selfish hostility, the land of the Cyclops begins to appear as a place of hospitality. With the help of the wine and its socializing agencies, Odysseus has turned ungodly man-eating circumstances, oriented within and around the cave, to a strangely familiar symposium, centered round a “mixing bowl”—placed openly “in the middle” of the orchestra.⁸⁸¹ The situation further opens upward, however briefly (via Polyphemus’ epiphany), to the society of the gods. This broader transformation, then, can also be seen as an expansion of the drama’s central conflict: out of the cave, into the orchestra, and up to a divine realm.

Granting that the transformational potency of wine permeates this drama, it is instructive to further consider how far Odysseus himself changes through his handling of it. In the first half of the play, Odysseus is vulnerably subordinate to the giant. Once he and his crew are corralled into the cannibal’s cave, this hierarchy of relations becomes absolute. Yet, as Odysseus’ scheming with the wine advances, these relationships are gradually rebalanced and ultimately reversed. The orchestral drinking scene shows this hierarchical loosening and turning most dramatically. Whereas (while held within the cave), Odysseus had served at the Cyclops’ guest-eating meal (406), out in the orchestra,

⁸⁸⁰ Polyphemus exclaims: “*iou iou*... This is pleasure [unmixed] (*akratos*). I think I see the heaven and the earth swimming around together, I see Zeus’ throne and the whole revered company of the gods...” (576-80). Polyphemus might be confusing “Zeus’ throne” with the revered seat of Dionysus (stationed in the front row of the theater), and the “revered company of the gods” with the satyrs (dancing wildly round him in the orchestra). Seaford interprets this epiphany scene as a Dionysian initiation ritual (akin to initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries). See his notes to lines 578-80, 495-502, and 514-15. He elaborates this argument in Seaford (1981), esp. 272-4.

⁸⁸¹ This restoration of the mixing bowl—from being filled with milk within the cannibal’s cave to its being filled with wine out in the open orchestra—may be compared to the transformation of the representative property in *Peace*, the “martial mortar”, which the architect-figure dramatically restores to its proper and propitious role as an offering bowl. See above, p. 81-5.

Odysseus comes to preside over the Cyclops, holding him in friendly symposium. As the Cyclops is inculcated in these sympotic ways, he becomes gradually incapacitated and increasingly vulnerable. In other words, while Polyphemus (previously the oppressor) becomes the prey, Odysseus (formerly the victim) becomes the victimizer. With this reversal, Odysseus appears not only to have been emancipated with the help of the wine, but boldly empowered by it—so much so that, by his deliberately harmful actions against a vulnerable opponent, this hero by the play’s end can be seen as behaving monstrously to the monster.⁸⁸² Indeed, just after the blinding, Polyphemus calls Odysseus a malicious name: *pankakos*, “all-evil one” (689)—a variation of the name that Odysseus had earlier called Polyphemus, “evil one” (*to kakon*, 628, 599). This echo would seem to confirm the potential reversibility of their roles.

In all these transformations—of individuals, their interrelations and the situation they share—Dionysian wine is shown to be a primary agent of influence. Not unlike the dramatic medium, this wine loosens and dissolves fixed roles; reveals, reforms and reverses myriad relations; and meaningfully initiates situational transformation at all levels. It is this complex medium of transformational influence that Odysseus brings to the land of the Cyclops, and, as an “architect”, administers—proportionately—with a revealing variety of intentions, tactics and consequences.

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Also contributing to the wine’s influence in this play are the various vessels by which it is distributed. It is appropriate to first give attention to its remarkable flask. In the context of the dramatic festival, this portable property may have recalled other special flasks associated with Dionysian occasions: the full wineflask awarded annually to the winner of a drinking contest at the Anthesteria festival;⁸⁸³ and the goat-skin flask that had been awarded to the winning tragic poet in the earliest stages of the dramatic festival (in

⁸⁸² William Arrowsmith provides valuable insights on this reversal in *Cyclops*: “As usual in Euripides the sympathy invoked for one character is suddenly alienated and shifted to another; the victim and the oppressor change places. Polyphemus, from being first a Homeric cannibal... is suddenly turned into a decadent, rather likable buffoon... Odysseus’ action is contemptible, but not quite criminal; Polyphemus gets what he deserves, but we pity him.” See, his introduction to the translation of this play in Grene and Lattimore (1992). On the relevance of sympathy for Polyphemus in the *Odyssey*, see Newton (1983).

⁸⁸³ On the drinking contest called *Choes*, see Simon (1983), 95. Dikaeopolis wins this contest (and prized flask) at the end of Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* (1002ff), see above, p. 40.

the sixth century BCE).⁸⁸⁴ The recollection of such prized flasks in *Cyclops* would confer a special status both to its protagonist and its contending tragedian. Yet, the flask brought into this drama is itself very special, since it is portrayed as bottomless. Near the beginning of the play, when Odysseus first announces that he bears “Dionysus’ drink” (139), Silenus eagerly asks whether it is on his ship, or on his person (144). Odysseus responds by producing—from beneath his cloak—a dramatic revelation:

*This is the wineskin (hod’ askos) that holds it, as you can see, old sir.*⁸⁸⁵

(*Cyclops* 145).


Silenus greets this disclosure with both delight and dismay: delight, because this flask confirms the presence of the very drink he craves; and dismay, because the flask is so disappointingly small. In spite of its modest size, however, Odysseus promises that it will release wine in excess of its apparent capacity (147). Indeed, beyond providing for the over-indulgence of both Silenus and the giant, this flask performs as a magic portal through which ever-flowing streams might disproportionately gurgle forth (148-53).⁸⁸⁶ Given the confluence of wine and Dionysus in this play, it must not only be the bountiful drink that this flask holds, but the potent god himself. Thus, the flask Odysseus bears is, in a sense, Dionysus’ abode—a suggestion made explicit by Polyphemus when he asks how it is that a god can make a flask a “home” (*oikous*, 525). As its bearer, then, Odysseus may be seen as the knowing purveyor of the divine drink, a personal acquaintance of the fluid god, and a protective guardian of his peculiar sanctuary.

If Odysseus’ humble flask is thinkable as a portable “house” of Dionysus, then his cup appears as the god’s convivial porch. It is to this threshold of Dionysus—and crucial property of the architect-figure—that we now turn.

⁸⁸⁴ See Burkert (1966), 114. Odysseus’ prop may have also recalled more boisterous roles that large inflated wineskins played in drinking games; such as being used as juggling balls; as pillows; as floatation devices; as mock missiles; and as slippery vessels upon which a drunken rider would try to stay upright, see Lissarrague (1990a), 68-76.

⁸⁸⁵ The pronoun “this” (*hode*) marks the flask as conspicuously present. Ussher (1978) is among the scholars suspecting that it is revealed from beneath Odysseus’ cloak.

⁸⁸⁶ Odysseus promises “twice as much” wine will “gush (*rhuēi*) out of the flask” (148). There may be an allusion here to poetic verbosity, for Euripides’ contemporary Cratinus composed a comic drama entitled *Wineflask* (*Pytinē*) in which there was an unstoppable “flow” (*rheumatōs*), not of wine but of “words” (*epōn*): “The streams are gurgling; his mouth has a dozen springs and there’s an Ilisus in his throat... Unless someone plugs his mouth, he’s going to flood everything here with his poetry”. Frag. B.13, in Olson (2007), 424.



Dinocrates.

Francesco di Giorgio, *Tratatti di architettura*, c. 1490.

According to Vitruvius, the architect Dinocrates once made an unusual appeal to Alexander the Great. Wishing to persuade this ruler to consider his architectural proposal, the handsome Dinocrates disrobed. He then adorned his head with a garland, his shoulder with a lion skin and his right hand with a club. In this way, he boldly proceeded to Alexander's place of judgment and pronounced his memorable scheme: to reshape Mount Athos into the figure of a man who holds in his left hand a city and in his right a libation bowl. Such a bowl, as Vitruvius clarifies, would have first received all the water running down the mountain streams, so, benefiting the city before pouring forth to the sea (*de architectura* 2.pref.1-2). Later, the Renaissance architect Francesco di Giorgio gave graphic representation to this story of Dinocrates. Yet, in doing so, Francesco adjusts Vitruvius' image of this architect. For, Francesco's drawing seems to present *both* the architect's proposal *and* the architect in the act of proposing. Here, the libation bowl is not only an integral aspect of the architectural proposition but also a critical attribute of the architect, which (unlike the club it replaces) both models and accompanies his propitious offering.

As potent and plentiful as the wine within its flask may be, the Dionysian substance would not be shareable, graspable, or *as* influential without a cup. In Euripides' satyr play, Odysseus brings forth the wine's cup shortly after revealing the wine flask. Thereafter, this cup and others play crucial roles in sponsoring specific developments of the scheme. It is with a cup that Odysseus initiates and advances a variety of persuasive exchanges in the play. With a cup, Odysseus excites Silenus and solicits his cooperation. With a cup, Odysseus diverts and intrigues Polyphemus, earns his trust, and gradually delivers the liquid agency that transforms him—and the situation—from within. It is also with a cup that the satyrs embrace Odysseus' scheme and pledge their commitment to it. This the satyrs do figuratively when they express their willingness to put their hands to the "dalon" *as if* to pour a libation to the gods (469-71).

Besides participating in these persuasive exchanges, the cup, as a dramatic property, also contributes tangibly to the representation of wine throughout the play. The cup figures prominently, for instance, in the initial showing of the wine. Whereas Odysseus' revelation of the flask attests to the wine's proximity, his subsequent display of the cup anticipates the wine's first sip by prefiguring its ready availability. The cup provides a dramatic place (and way) to receive the wine's preliminary pour—with all its gurgling surplus and teasingly accessible appeal. In being extended to others, the cup manifests the reach of Odysseus' offer. In being taken and held by others, the cup attests to their preliminary reception of the wine and espousal of its offer. While the wine itself may have been imperceptible to many spectators at the theater (assuming wine was even used in performance), Odysseus' cup would have made the wine present as a tangible potentiality. Whoever held the cup, held the wine. Whoever drank from the cup became possessed of (and by) the wine. This ambiguous possession raises another, less expected, way in which the cup performs. With its broad circular shape, the cup—when tipped up for a sip—would have dramatized the face-to-face encounter of drink and drinker. In this meeting, the face of the one who sips would partially disappear into the countenance of the cup, as though donning a mask! In performance, this cup would appear as a second mask, since the actor already wore a figured face of clay. Such a superimposition—of masked face and mask-like cup—would be all the more revelatory if the underside of the cup were adorned with large Gorgon eyes (such as those found on several examples of

pottery).⁸⁸⁷ As a kind of mask, the vessel can be seen to perform at such moments not only as a dramatic prop but as an intervening persona, with motives, agencies and dilemmas of its own. This transitory phenomenon, as others have observed, would appear as an epiphany of Dionysus—revealing outwardly to the spectators an aspect of the divine agent that the drinker was, at that moment, taking in.⁸⁸⁸ The potentiality of wine cups to perform as masks may well have been a celebrated feature of symposia and other wine-drinking occasions. If so, the occurrence of such a moment in the satyr play would demonstrate a fundamental correspondence between the masquerade of drama and the analogous transformation that animates wine drinking. Both masked drama and common wine drinking promote temporary transformations of character (*ethos*) and custom (*nomos*), and further open onto unexpected delights, insights, exhilarations and disturbances—all modes of alterity associated with Dionysus. It is as an especially influential locus of Dionysus, then, that Odysseus' cup performs in the play, helping to make Dionysus' presence and the distribution of Dionysian influence manifest and interpretable both for the agents within the drama and for the spectators before it.

Dionysus, however, is not the sole agent of influence that this study seeks to grasp by means of the cup. Rather, the primary concern here is to draw-out the peculiar contributions the cup makes to a transformative scheme that Odysseus attributes to “architects”. It is necessary, then, to consider in more detail Odysseus' involvement with the cup, including the persuasive exchanges—with Silenus, Polyphemos and the satyrs—that he initiates and advances with it. It is my theoretical premise that each time the architect-figure offers a cup, the act is comparable to an architectural proposition.

A SINGLE VESSEL WITH DIVERSE APPEALS (*potēra*, *skuphos* AND *kulix*)

13.3a

As Odysseus makes his various offers of wine within the play, the cup he extends is diversely named. The discussion below takes this variety of names as a clue to the variety of ways in which the cup performs.

When Odysseus first extends a taste of wine to Silenus, he calls the vessel conveying the divine drink a *potēra* (151). Odysseus brings forth this *potēra* (from

⁸⁸⁷ Lissarrague (1990), esp. 140-3; and Frontisi-Ducroux (1989).

⁸⁸⁸ On the “epiphanic nature” of Dionysus, which the cup and mask contribute to, see Lissarrague and Frontisi-Ducroux (in previous note), and also Detienne (1989), 10.

beneath his cloak) just after displaying the wine's flask. Here, the cup is made conspicuous:

See, I've brought the flask's cup with me.

(*Cyclops* 151)

Delighted with this device and with Odysseus' preparedness, Silenus urges him: "Splash some [wine] in so that I can remember what it's like to drink" (152). Odysseus pours a pungent sample and passes it to him for approval (153). Silenus, already taken by the wine's appealing aroma and resounding "splash", then puts his eager hands and lips to the *potēra*—tipping it up for a sip. In this way, Silenus' long desired reunion with Dionysus most palpably begins. His jubilant response upon tasting the wine suggests that he experiences this reunion as a further series of appeals: to call-out in glee (156); to dance (157); to kiss (172); to leap madly from a cliff (167); to embrace a lover (170); to recall his virility (169-71); to forget his troubles (172); to release all the Cyclops' flocks in exchange for just one cup (165); and, finally, to curse the dim-witted giant, whom he boldly bids "go wail" (177-4). By offering this initial sip from his *potēra*, Odysseus has not only renewed Silenus' Dionysian enthusiasm and sense of liberty, but has also gained for himself (at least for the moment) the full cooperation of Silenus.

A little later (and under less friendly circumstances), Odysseus refers to his cup differently. When defending himself before Polyphemus, who suspects him of stealing his flocks, Odysseus claims that he gained these sheep fairly, having offered to Silenus in exchange for them a "cup of wine" (256). Yet, this "cup" he now calls not a *potēra* but a *skuphos*. Perhaps it is with the aim of dispelling Polyphemus' suspicion of him, that Odysseus gives his cup this more familiar name, for a *skuphos* was a basic drinking bowl of peasants, rustics and herdsmen.⁸⁸⁹ Indeed, Polyphemus' own milk-cup is called a *skuphos* later in the play (390), and when Polyphemus himself eventually asks for wine it is a full *skuphos* he calls for (556). Although Odysseus does not immediately escape suspicion by calling his own cup a *skuphos*, he does refer to his cup by this same name in a situation where he again seeks Polyphemus' acceptance, trust and admiration. When Odysseus first offers the "divine drink" to Polyphemus inside the cave, it is a *skuphos*

⁸⁸⁹ Elsewhere in Euripidean drama, a *skuphos* names the wine-cup of peasants (*Electra* 499), and a milk-cup of herdsmen (*Andromeda*, Frag. 146). In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus' loyal old swineherd offers wine to Odysseus in a *skuphos* (14.112). In the Cyclops episode of the *Odyssey*, it is a hollowed-out bowl "of ivy-wood" (*kissubion*) that Odysseus brings to the Cyclops' land (9.346). On the *skuphos* in general, see Richter and Milne (1973), 26-28. Cf. Athenaeus' discussion of rustic cups in *The Learned Banqueters* (11.477a-e).

that he extends invitingly to him (411-15). Thus, by changing his cup's name from *potēra* to *skuphos*, Odysseus recasts it as a common vessel—a cup held in common. In this way, Odysseus ingratiates himself (and Dionysus) to his antagonist by virtue of the cup's familiarity, shielding himself from suspicion while at the same time masking the wine's special potency. Whereas Odysseus had initially offered the Dionysian drink to the god's devotee openly in a *potēra*, it is with a more familiar *skuphos* that he introduces the unfamiliar drink to Polyphemos, and initiates his own potent scheme—shrewdly advancing “the gleam of Dionysus” (415) into the darkest of circumstances.

But there must be more to Odysseus' cup, since it receives another name in the play. As Odysseus advances the second “cup” to Polyphemos, one that will make him sing, he calls it a *kulix* (421). And earlier, when Silenus expresses his desire to drink-down completely the “cup” that so enthralled him, it is a *kulix* that he craves (164). This shift in name reveals a desire for further transformations: of the cup, of the drinkers, and of their shared situation. For, unlike a basic *skuphos*, a *kulix* (a broad shallow two-handled cup with a stem) was a proper Athenian vessel for drinking with friends and lovers at symposia, and other such spirited occasions.⁸⁹⁰ The joyous fellowship that a *kulix* might sponsor is poignantly attested elsewhere in Athenian drama. In Sophocles' *Ajax*, for instance, the chorus of homesick sailors sing longingly for the “deep cups” (*batheian kulikōn*), and for the companionship, music and other benefits their sharing brings (1200-1). Similarly, in Euripides' *Rhesus*, a chorus of weary soldiers wonder if they will ever again partake in the “wine-wandering cups” (*kulikōn oinoplanētois*), and in the revels, songs and love-pledges that they move one to make (360-69). Given that cups by the name of *kulix* appear integral to joyful affairs, “*kulix*” would seem to aptly name those vessels in Euripides' satyr play that move both Polyphemos and Silenus to musical expression, and toward social and amorous experience. It is, after all, a *kulix* that prompts Polyphemos first to sing (421-3), then to gregariously come out from the cave longing for revelry (503ff); just as it is a *kulix* that Silenus wants to “kiss” (172), and becomes “mad with desire to drink” (164).⁸⁹¹ Where Odysseus evokes a *kulix* once again, however, he reveals the potential danger in its unlimited appeal. When Silenus' devotion grows excessive, he becomes stuck to this “cup” (*kulix*)—“like a bird caught in bird-lime, flapping his wings in vain” (432-3). This image not only dramatizes Silenus' mistake

⁸⁹⁰ A *kulix* is also in circulation in Plato's *Symposium* (214b). Cf. Richter and Milne (1973), 24-5.

⁸⁹¹ Seaford's Trans. See his note to the line for its textual difficulty.

and prefigures Polyphemus' own impending plight, but also models the scheme of appealing entrapment (the *dolon*) that Odysseus is in the midst of devising and will, following this image, go on to describe in captivating detail (441ff).

By naming his cup differently in particular situations, Odysseus brings attention to the myriad roles and manifold capacities of the single vessel he bears, while, at the same time, he presents the wine's potency in various guises. Thus, by introducing the cup under each of its names—*potēra*, *skuphos* and *kulix*—Odysseus knowingly moves others to become either immediately enthused by, or gradually more amenable to, potential transformation by first binding them to the particular vessel's peculiar appeal.

PROFITIOUS VESSELS: CONSENSUAL SCHEMES AND THE *SCHEMA* OF *spondē*

13.3b

Whereas a tangible cup (under three explicit names, *potēra*, *skuphos* and *kulix*), mediates Odysseus' relation to Silenus and Polyphemus, another more implicit cup figures in Odysseus' exchange with the satyrs. The satyrs introduce this cup with a consensual figure of speech—a palpable image by which they forge alliance with Odysseus and vouch agreement with a scheme that delights them. After Odysseus reveals all the details of his “scheme” (*dolon*), the satyrs willingly embrace it:

Is there any way that we too could put our hand, *as* men do with a
libation to the gods, to the torch (*dalón*) that will blind the Cyclops
[for we wish to have a common share (*koinōnein*) in this deed].

(*Cyclops* 469-71).⁸⁹²

This “libation to the gods” (*spondas theou*), figuratively put forth by the satyrs, adds an implicit libation cup (*phialē*) to the variety of vessels active in this drama.⁸⁹³ Yet, along with this sacred cup, the satyrs' “libation” also introduces a complex metaphor, one that relates both the *dalón* and *dolon* (the fiery “torch” and the transformative “scheme”), to

⁸⁹² I have modified Kovac's translation for the last verse, which reads: “I want to have a part in this bloodletting (*phonou*).” *Phonou* is usually translated as murder, but the more general sense of a grim deed is apt for my purposes. Also, ‘having a part in’ does not quite capture the communal sense of *koinōnein*. “We” in place of “I” is provided for the same reason.

⁸⁹³ A *phialē* was a shallow bowl without handles or stem, but with a slightly raised boss at its center for ease of grasping. A *phialē* was more often formed from metal (silver) than turned in clay, see Richter and Milne (1973), 29-30.

the ritual schema known as *spondē*, a common rite of pouring out a libation of wine to the ground in honor of gods and ancestors, and in ratification of mortal accords.⁸⁹⁴ Although the satyrs (with their figurative speech) compare a “libation” most directly to the *dalón* (torch), this *dalón* ought to be taken as conjoined with Odysseus’ *dolon* (scheme). This *dalón* and *dolon* are coupled by their punning similarities; by their frequent repetition in a dense span of verses;⁸⁹⁵ and by their figurative synecdoche, for the *dalón* is both constitutive and representative of the fuller scheme. In other words, *as* a libation cup (*phialē*) is to the performance of a libation rite (*spondē*), so the *dalón* is to Odysseus’ *dolon*. For, this *dalón* (torch) performs as the most salient and graspable detail of Odysseus’ comprehensive *dolon* (scheme). Furthermore, like a libation rite (*spondē*), Odysseus’ “scheme” aims to bind a group into common agreement; to propitiate transformed conditions; and to honor the gods (especially Dionysus). Thus, when the representative chorus of satyrs figure their combined consent by wishing to take hold of the *dalón* *like* a libation (471), and when Odysseus promptly affirms that indeed they must seize this “mighty *dalón*” together (472),⁸⁹⁶ we must recognize that it is the full schema of action (*dolon* as *spondē*) that is being offered and collectively grasped, just as it is this full scheme of action that Odysseus (a moment later) claims to have thoroughly made known, and proposes to lead as one of its “architects” (476).

That the proposed scheme of an architect-figure is comparable to a propitious libation is affirmed by Trygaeus in Aristophanes’ *Peace*. It is illuminating to briefly confer with his kindred offering. When Trygaeus first summons the chorus to come

⁸⁹⁴ On libations, and their role in making agreements “absolutely binding”, see Burkert (1985), 70-73, 250-54. A divinely witnessed libation not only accompanied and ratified mortal accords but also named them. For example, the “truce” Dikaeopolis makes with the Spartans in Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* is simply called a *spondē* (130ff). As Burkert (*ibid.*), 71, points out, “Normally there is no other word for armistice or peace treaty than simply the *spondai*. ‘We, the polis, have made libation’ means: we have resolved and committed ourselves.”

⁸⁹⁵ Odysseus introduces the *dalón* at line 462. The satyrs respond to this first with general enthusiasm (464-65), then by figuring their consent more particularly by wishing to take hold of the *dalón* as a shared libation (471). Odysseus promptly confirms that they must indeed seize this “mighty *dalón*” together (472); whereupon, the satyrs rehearse analogous operations (474-5). Finally, Odysseus silences the chorus, concluding that they now “know the *dolon* completely” and that they should follow the “architects (of it)” (476-77).

⁸⁹⁶ There is a further play-on-words here, since “mighty *dalón*” (*megas dalos*) recalls the common expression “mighty oath” (*megas horkos*), which Homeric heroes (and other lordly figures) collectively swore—not by putting their hands to a *dalón*, but to a scepter. As Detienne (1997), 70, writes, the speech of such oaths “is indissociable from the power of the scepter, which assimilates the oath to oracular pronouncements.”

forward and lend a hand to draw up Peace, he culminates his call with an appealing trope: “now is our chance to hoist one for the good spirit” (300). This act of “hoisting” (*harpasai*), refers not only to the collaborative work of raising up the mistreated goddess from the pit, but also to the social activity of raising up a sacred toast to the “good spirit” (*agathou daimonos*)—a beneficent daemon to whom libations were typically poured at the end of a shared meal and the start of communal drinking.⁸⁹⁷ In *Peace*, the chorus responds to Trygaeus’ appeal in a way that confirms and perpetuates the libation metaphor: arriving (with tools in hand) these laborers pledge not to leave the orchestra until they have “hoisted” the divinity “most friendly to the vines” (307-8). Like the satyrs in *Cyclops*, the chorus in *Peace* commit to the protagonist’s scheme as if to a libation. And, these schemes (of Odysseus and Trygaeus) are each analogous to libations both in their preliminary actions (collective grasping and coordinated raising), and by their transformative aims (to propitiate more favorable conditions). As well, in each play (*Peace* and *Cyclops*), the figured libation is itself representative of social practices that the chorus members wish to restore. The people in *Peace* ultimately *do* wish to collectively raise-up cups of wine and, so, celebrate their renewed vintage and common prosperity, and demonstrate their freedom to indulge in boisterous revelry. And, in *Cyclops*, the satyrs ultimately *do* wish to renew contact with Dionysus, who—being himself present in the libation and active in its pour—will indeed be seized *if* they consent to the “scheme” proposed. Both libations, then (the *agathou daimonos* in *Peace* and *spondas theos* in *Cyclops*), are dramatically representative of the protagonists’ proposed plans in that they are mimetic not only of the social and divine interactions these plans entail but also of the social and divine customs these complicit actions aim to restore.

Besides these figurative and mimetic associations, libations also bear directly upon transformative schemes by auspiciously initiating them. Whereas Odysseus and the satyrs inaugurate their scheme to overcome Polyphemus by *conjuring* a libation, Trygaeus and his collaborators initiate their rescue of Peace by *performing* a libation. For, Trygaeus and Hermes together lead the chorus in a preliminary wine offering that marks the beginning of their collective and consensual work (431ff).⁸⁹⁸ That the

⁸⁹⁷ On this libation and its social occasion, see Olson’s note to the line, and Tolles (1943).

⁸⁹⁸ Trygaeus leads a second libation during his inaugural “setting up” (*hidrusai*) of Peace’s statue in the midst of the orchestra (1102ff).

ceremonial enactment of a libation rite could be as spatially defining as it was socially binding,⁸⁹⁹ offers another reason why a libation and its orienting vessels may be taken as appropriate concerns for “architects”.

To review: by their manner of involving cups (both tangibly and figuratively), all the agents in Euripides’ *Cyclops* attest to the importance of this dramatic property in giving representation to their desires. For, each cup performs as a symbolic collector, graspable reminder and practical participant in the experiences they crave. Although the name of each cup (*potēra*, *skuphos*, *kulix* and *phialē*) should not be taken to strictly codify its performance, the specific names do bring attention to a particular variety of social practices and settings in which such vessels perform. It is further suggestive that whereas Odysseus involves cups selectively from the full variety of names (depending on his motive and the situation), the devout satyrs only evoke a sacred libation cup (*spondas* / *phialē*), the pleasure-seeking Silenus only craves a *kulix*, and the Cyclops only asks for a basic *skuphos*. This review returns us, then, to the *potēra* (151)—the first name that Odysseus’ cup receives in the play, and a name that only he pronounces.

PERFORMATIVE VESSELS, MAGICAL SIPS AND SACRED PROPERTIES

13.3c

While the discussion above has emphasized the more subtle and mediating roles of cups (in mediating social relations, supplementing persuasive speech, distributing influential wine and modeling transformative schemes), the following remarks aim to account for this property’s capacity to perform immediately, in potent and seemingly magical ways. A clue to this potency is found in the peculiar name Odysseus first gives the cup: “*potēra*” (151). This word is rarely found in early Greek literature. It does not appear at all in Homeric epic, while in Athenian drama only Heracles and a slave drink from such a vessel, and they do so indecorously.⁹⁰⁰ “*Potēra*” does, however, appear

⁸⁹⁹ In Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* (181ff), the heroine and her collaborators enact an oath rite round an unusually large wine vessel. This vessel not only configures the immediate conspirators but also the chorus of housewives, who (likely) dance a second circle around them.

⁹⁰⁰ Heracles over-indulges in unmixed wine, which he drinks from a *potēra*, in Euripides’ *Alcestis* (756ff). In Aristophanes’ *Knights*, a slave steals a *potērion*, then over-indulges in undiluted wine—a sign of immoderate behavior and barbarism to the Greeks (120ff). Ambiguous and exotic cups by the name of *potērion* are also found Herodotus’ *Histories*: a *potērion* made of precious metals (fastidiously polished every day) was used by Egyptian priests in ceremonies that Herodotus considered lavish, or “beyond measure” (*perissos* 2.37.1); the Scythians fashioned drinking vessels (named *potērion*) from the skulls of their most detested enemies, which they then covered with leather and inlaid with gold (4.65.1);

directly on early Greek cups, where (in its cognate form *potērion*)⁹⁰¹ it is incised into the clay as part of an inscription. A particular owner of a cup is likely to have marked their vessel in this ad-hoc way.⁹⁰² That possession is of paramount importance in these inscriptions is also obvious by the emphatic message they convey, for these inscriptions speak for the cup itself: “I am the cup (*eimi poterion*) of Tharios”, says one seventh-century BCE vessel.⁹⁰³ This performative inscription, granting both personified agency and authoritative voice to the clay vessel, resonates with the inscriptions borne by boundary stones around the Athenian agora, which similarly declare: “I am the boundary stone of the agora” (*horos eimi tes agoras*).⁹⁰⁴ Such proprietary utterances simultaneously assert and warn: declaring and delimiting a personal property or sacred precinct, while at same time insinuating that any violation of the property will not only be witnessed, but also punished. Thus, by their assertions, the cup (of Tharios) and the boundary stones (of the agora) act as vigilant advocates for and protectors of the individual, the property and the institution they manifestly represent.

The performative potential of cups called “*potērion*” is further demonstrated by the magical verses this word was occasionally a part of. The earliest of such verses, inscribed on a cup from the eighth century BCE, claims: “I am the cup (*eimi poterion*) of Nestor, good for drinking | Whoever drinks from *this* cup (*tode potērio*), desire for beautifully | Crowned Aphrodite will seize him instantly.”⁹⁰⁵ As Christopher A. Faraone has argued, this inscription was intended to perform as a magical incantation, for its

and a gold and silver vessel, called *potērion*, accompanied the elaborate meal and entertainment of the Persian King during his invasion of Greece (7.119.2).

⁹⁰¹ A *potērion* is thought to be a normal drinking cup, whereas a *potēra* seems to be Euripides’ neologism for an especially large *potērion*, see Dale (1952). Both terms derive from the verb “to drink” (*posis*), as Athenaeus claims in his *Deipnosophistae* claims 11.460b.

⁹⁰² On ancient graffiti, see Lang (1974).

⁹⁰³ This inscribed cup (found in a grave in the Athenian agora) is recently published in Papadopoulos (2007), 129, with further references. Another such cup declares not ownership but quality: “I am a beautiful drinking cup” (*kalon eimi poterion*). See Lissarrague (1990), 65.

⁹⁰⁴ See, Thompson and Wycherly (1972), 117. Such boundary stones marked the limits of a sacred precinct (*temenos*). One could cross into this sacred area (from the profane) only after properly purifying themselves. See: Burkert (1985), 86-87.

⁹⁰⁵ Quoted in Faraone (1996), esp. 105. Here, Faraone quotes two other “cup spells” involving both *potērion* and erotic seizure (*Papyri Graeca Magicae* VII 385-89, 642). Incidentally, this inscription on ‘Nestor’s cup’ is among the earliest extant examples of the Greek alphabet. See, Jeffery (1961b), 235-36, plate 47.1; and Lang (1991), 70.

verses follow the poetic meter and conditional formula of other binding charms (and curses). As well, the emphatic “this” of “*this* cup” is typical of the performative language used in sacred rites and magical acts, whereby uttering “this” confers onto the implicated artifact an immediate presence and special representative agency.⁹⁰⁶ The amorous effect claimed by the cup of Nestor is also relevant here, for the inscribed utterance makes the cup itself perform as an aphrodisiac, conferring directly onto the drinking vessel an amorous potency kindred to that concentrated in the drink it potentially held.⁹⁰⁷ While these associations in the satyr play may have served to recall Odysseus’ ties to magical practices,⁹⁰⁸ and to endow the cup with appealing and apotropaic functions,⁹⁰⁹ they also serve to emphasize the interdependence of performative language, influential actions and representative properties in persuasively revealing and bringing about transformation.

We do not know if the cup Odysseus bore in Euripides’ *Cyclops* had a possessive or magical utterance inscribed upon it, but we do know that Odysseus puts the name *potēra* upon the cup when he first presents it in the play (151). We also know that whoever drinks from *this* cup in the course of the play indeed becomes both instantly (and gradually) seized not only with erotic impulses, but also with desire for music,

⁹⁰⁶ “With *this* ring, I thee wed”, is a modern example of such an expression. On “Performative Utterances”, in general, see Austin (1961), chp. 10. Cf. Faraone (1996), 79, 96. On the significance of sympathetic magic in ancient culture, see Lloyd (1987), 2-3, who offers an important reminder: “The criteria that are relevant to judging magical behaviour are not whether it achieves practical results but whether it has been carried out appropriately.”

⁹⁰⁷ Dionysus and Aphrodite are closely associated. As the messenger in Euripides’ *Bacchae* puts it: “If there is no wine, there is no Aphrodite or any other pleasure for mortals” (773-74).

⁹⁰⁸ Some have detected a magical formula in Odysseus’ speech in the *Odyssey* (18.148-51); see Faraone (1996), 86. In much later versions of the Cyclops tale (405 CE), Odysseus is explicitly associated with magic. In this version of the tale he escapes Polyphemus’ cave not by his usual trick of intoxicating and blinding the giant but by selling the Cyclops “enchantments (*epōidē*), magic ties (*katadesmos*) and love spells (*iunx*)” so that he might seduce the nymph Galatea (who has not been reciprocating his love). In this version Odysseus is called a “wizard” (*goēs*). This tale is recorded in the writing of Neoplatonic philosopher, Synesius of Cyrene’s (*Epistle* 121). See Gager (1992), 260-61.

⁹⁰⁹ Apotropaic ornaments commonly protected a house from unwanted attacks (from wild animals, bad weather and other malevolent agents). Hesiod, in his *Works and Days*, for instance, recommends that when building a house one should “carve a luck-bringing sign so that no crows will perch on it and caw” (746-47)—crows, being a sign of both bad weather and bad luck. See West (1978), note to these lines. Cf. Faraone (1996), 92. Magic Bowls, bearing apotropaic inscriptions, also performed as amulets protecting houses. Such bowls (found beneath house foundations, or within walls) are thought to have performed as traps—enclosing daemons in the closed sphere formed by two bowls, see Naveh and Shaked (1985).

dancing, friendship, social experience, revelry and more wine. In other words, whoever drinks from *this* cup becomes seized by desire not only for Aphrodite but ultimately for Dionysus (and for all he represents). Furthermore, whoever mistreats this cup (and all it represents) is punished with blindness.⁹¹⁰ Thus, the “cup” Odysseus bears in this satyr play, seems to perform as an assertive and vigilant advocate for Dionysus. That it is Dionysus’ *potera* Odysseus brings into the play is a detail Odysseus himself suggests when he first presents the cup to Silenus as not exactly belonging to him but belonging more to the flask—“the cup of the flask” (*potēr’ askou*, 151).⁹¹¹ Thus, Odysseus’ special property may be seen as a sacred property that is representative of Dionysus and his itinerant institution and which Odysseus is privileged (and burdened) to bear, together with its diverse appeals, obligations and dangerously binding effects.

Although *this* “cup” in *Cyclops* may be seen now to belong more to Dionysus than to Odysseus, there is another wine vessel crucial to the play’s plot and central to its symposium, which, in Homeric poetry, *did* come to belong to Odysseus: a mixing-bowl (*krater*). In the *Iliad*, Odysseus earns this vessel as a prize in a footrace (one of the funeral games held in honor of the fallen hero Patroclus). This vessel is relevant to regard in some detail for at least three reasons. First, taking possession of this mixing-bowl is the last act Odysseus performs in the *Iliad*, thus leaving open the possibility that he carries it forward beyond the narrative.⁹¹² Second, the elaborate description of this bowl brings attention to a kind of ornament that is concerned not only with the bowl’s status as a prized treasure but also with its value as a persistent treasury of (and for) stories. And, finally, by its mediating and orienting role, a mixing bowl performs as a social and spatial paradigm especially pertinent for “architects”.

⁹¹⁰ Blindness is a punishment often incorporated into ancient curses. One such verse inscribed on a vessel declares: “I am the jug of Tataie. Whoever steals me will go blind (*thuphlos*)”, see Faraone (1996), 81. Dionysus is also associated with magical agencies. In Euripides’ *Bacchae*, Pentheus suspects that Dionysus is a “wizard” (*goēs*), and “enchanter (*epōdos*)... with a face wine-colored and the charm of Aphrodite in his eyes” (234).

⁹¹¹ This cup may have been attached (by a string) to the flask, since Odysseus claims not simply to have “brought” it, but to “have it in tow”—as a large cargo ship (with a full hull of wine) might “tow” a small maneuverable vessel. See Seaford’s note to the line. Aristotle, later in his *Poetics*, also presents the cup as being especially tied to Dionysus. While giving examples of metaphors and their reciprocity, he writes: “a cup (*phialē*) is to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares. The cup accordingly will be metaphorically described as the ‘shield of Dionysus’, and the shield as the ‘cup of Ares’.” (1457b 21-3).

⁹¹² In this way, the vessel can be seen to perform like the oar Odysseus is to carry forward beyond the *Odyssey*.

In the second to last book of the *Iliad*, Achilles sets out the prizes for the footrace that Odysseus will ultimately win. For the third prize he sets out a “half-talent of gold” (23.751). For the second prize he sets out an ox, “great and rich with fat” (23.750). Before these, however, he sets out the first prize. As he does so, it is displayed as follows:

a mixing bowl of silver, well wrought, six measures it held, and
in beauty it was far the best in all the earth, since Sidonians,
diversely skilled in handiwork had fashioned it cunningly, and
men of the Phoenicians brought it over the murky deep and
landed it in harbor, and gave it as a gift to Thoas; and, as a
ransom for Lycaon, son of Priam, Jason’s son Euneos gave it to
the warrior Patroclus. This bowl did Achilles set out as prize.

(*Iliad* 23.740-49)⁹¹³

Although the Homeric poet does not narrate this bowl’s active fabrication (as is done for Odysseus’ raft and bed) it is remarkable in several comparable respects. This vessel is prized for its valuable material; its generous capacity; its superlative beauty; and its excellent craftsmanship, having been “well-wrought” (*tetugmenon*) and “cunningly fashioned” (*eu ēskēsan*) by the “diversely-skilled” (*polydaidaloi*) Sidonians. The exceptional artistry of this mixing bowl invites comparison between it and other Homeric artifacts.⁹¹⁴ And the peculiar manners of its makers invite further comparisons between the Sidonians and Odysseus; for, in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus had “wrought” (*tetukatai*), “fashioned” (*askēsas*) and “adorned” (*daidallōn*) his marriage bed in ways comparable to how the Sidonians had prepared this bowl.⁹¹⁵ Furthermore, just as Sidonian artifacts

⁹¹³ The following discussion has benefited from the detailed commentary on this passage by Nicholas Richardson in Kirk, et al (1993), 249ff.

⁹¹⁴ In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus’ raft and bed share qualities with this bowl (5.234ff, 23.199ff). Within the *Iliad*, Odysseus’ bowl shares qualities with the cup of Achilles (16.225); the bow of Pandarus (4.105-113); the chariot of King Rhesus (10.438); and the shield of Achilles (18.483ff, 18.590-92).

⁹¹⁵ *Odyssey* 23.183-204. Although many crafted artifacts (shields, breastplates, thrones, couches, chariots and gold chains) receive the epithet *poludaidalos*, the Sidonians are the only

perform as tokens of devotion in Homeric epic (being exchanged between mortals and offered by mortals to gods),⁹¹⁶ so Odysseus' bed performs as a token of devotion (being an emblem of both his marriage covenant with Penelope and his special bond with Athena). Such similarities suggest that these diversely-skilled makers share a common concern for giving enduring representation to social, sacred and amorous bonds. Such commensurate capabilities further make Odysseus an especially appropriate figure to receive, appreciate and carry forward both the "well-wrought" Sidonian bowl and the well-practiced ways of its *polydaidaloi* makers.

Beyond the artistry of the bowl and capabilities of its artisans, the mixing bowl Odysseus wins at the end of the *Iliad* is just as remarkable for its storied provenance—for the rich and diverse history it has accumulated and combined. Before Odysseus takes possession of this vessel, it possesses already an elaborate heritage. Having first been made by Sidonian craftsmen, it was then picked up by Phoenician traders and shipped overseas. It was later offered up by these traders to a King (Thoas of Lemnos), and subsequently passed on from this King to his kin (Euneos, son of Jason). This royal heir later gave the vessel away to a Greek hero (Patroclus), in exchange for a royal slave (Lycaon, son of Priam—King of Troy). With the death of Patroclus, Achilles then took the vessel and set it out as a prize, which Odysseus (with the help of Athena) ultimately claims. With each of these transfers—from craftsmen, to merchants, to a King, to his heir, to Patroclus, Achilles and Odysseus—this vessel accumulates, retains and intermingles the stories of its various handlers, becoming an enduring testament to their transience. Yet, in spite of its relative endurance, with each change of hands this vessel is also in some ways changed. Having begun as an artifact of exceptional artistry, this mixing bowl becomes, by turns: a piece of valuable merchandise; a token of diplomatic exchange; a family heirloom; a ransom for a royal slave; a gift bequeathed in friendship; then a trophy for the winner of a race. By such turns, this single vessel reveals an ambiguous versatility, since it is just as operative in gaining admiration, instilling trust and conveying honor, as it is in mediating, recalling and even perpetuating strife. Indeed, strife is present not only in the circumstances of the contest that Odysseus wins (and Ajax does not), but also in the agonizing occasion that this competition honored: Patroclus'

craftsmen to be qualified in such a way, while Odysseus and Hephaestus are the only individuals to actively *daidallōn*. See, Richardson's note to the line in *The Iliad* 23.743.

⁹¹⁶ Menelaus gives a "well-wrought" Sidonian mixing bowl as a guest-gift to Telemachus in the *Odyssey* (4.618-19); and Hecuba offers Sidonian tapestries, with "many embroiderings", to Athena in the *Iliad* (6.286-311).

(avoidable) death in battle. Besides these immediate circumstances, strife is also present in this vessel by the old grudge brought to mind with the mention of Lycaon, for this Trojan Prince had once been enslaved by the Greeks, then sold to their allies in exchange for this bowl, only to be ruthlessly killed by Achilles in a scene just prior to the bowl's (re)awarding (21.34ff). Thus, just as throughout the epic, honor and strife are mixed; here, they are mixed into this diversely exchanged and ambiguously prized mixing bowl.

The variety of stories that are mixed into this vessel are also particularly appropriate to Odysseus, for in its travels this bowl has passed through the hands of a number of figures representative of his own peculiar capabilities and problems. These include: adept figures of craft (the Sidonians); well-traveled merchants (the Phoenicians);⁹¹⁷ a resilient King (Thoas) who, like Odysseus, survives a domestic upheaval;⁹¹⁸ a royal figure (Euneos) who, like Odysseus, plays mediating roles in major conflicts;⁹¹⁹ as well as the personal friends and heroic rivals of Odysseus (Patrocles and Achilles).⁹²⁰ All these figures, their capabilities, stories and conflicts would seem to be mixed into the bowl that Odysseus is awarded near the end of the *Iliad*.⁹²¹

The only other artifact in Homeric poetry with a formative history as elaborate as Odysseus' mixing bowl is Agamemnon's scepter (2.101-09). Yet, Odysseus' capacious bowl may be seen as an even more appropriate artifact than a scepter to gather, hold, mix and convey such an accumulative variety of stories, as well as to perform in situations

⁹¹⁷ On the significance of Phoenicians merchants to Odysseus, who similarly travels far and wide trading a valuable cargo of stories, see Dougherty (2001).

⁹¹⁸ King Thoas of Lemnos (son of Dionysus by some accounts) was the sole male survivor of a local uprising of Lemnian women. By the ruse of his daughter (Hypsipyle), Thoas escaped the island (disguised as Dionysus) while all the other men were killed by the enraged women. Lemnos is further significant to Odysseus since it was the mythic homeland of the divine blacksmith Hephaestus; as well as the site of a cult of blacksmiths; and the host of a special festival involving the kindling of new fire. Lemnos is also connected to the story of the ship Argo, for this ship once docked there during the quest for the fleece. See: Euripides' *Hypsipyle* Frag. 752a; *Iliad* 15.18ff; Burkert (1970), (1983), 190-96, and (1985), 167-68.

⁹¹⁹ Euneos supplied the Achaeans with wine during the Trojan War (*Iliad* 7.467-82). He is later portrayed as having been educated by Orpheus in the arts of music (Euripides' *Hypsipyle* Frag. 759a 1621).

⁹²⁰ Achilles exemplifies *bia* (strength) and Odysseus *mētis* (wit and counsel). Cf. Nagy (1999).

⁹²¹ Like the tapestries with the stories of epic conflict woven into them (*Iliad* 3.125) this bowl is embroidered with stories. Perhaps this relation to woven (and storied) artifacts explains the simile that qualifies Odysseus' manner of running in the race to the work of weaving.

where its stories might be recalled and other stories told, thus adding to its treasury. Considered in this performative way—as a vessel set at the center of hospitality and storytelling—Odysseus again appears as a fitting recipient and curator of this Sidonian bowl, not only because he is himself an exceptional storyteller, but also because he is (in the *Odyssey*) an exemplary stranger—one who is often seeking the hospitality and orientation that such bowls oblige. Finally, Odysseus appears to be fundamentally allied to mixing bowls in Homeric poetry because no one else (aside from his own son) receives a mixing bowl,⁹²² and because wherever mixing bowls are present, so, too, is Odysseus. In the *Odyssey*, where the institution of hospitality (and its transgression) is central to the plot, mixing bowls are correspondingly integral to nearly every setting in the narrative.⁹²³ In the *Iliad*, on the other hand, where strife (and its resolution) is the more central topic, mixing bowls appear less often and, so, stand out by contrast where they do. It is striking, then, that even in the *Iliad*, Odysseus is active in every situation involving a mixing bowl. By gathering these situations we find a telling series of exchanges and settings: social exchanges, wherein the resolution of strife is achieved (or attempted) by non-combative means; and architecturally suggestive settings for primary human practices.

In the *Iliad*, a mixing bowl is central to the epic's initial “equal feast” (*dais eĩsē*)—a shared meal that celebrates the resolution of the epic's opening conflict.⁹²⁴ Odysseus is not merely present at this feast as it culminates with libations and singing around “mixing bowls” (1.470ff), but is present as the Achaeans' primary representative,

⁹²² Although many gifts and prizes are distributed to key figures in both epics, only Odysseus receives a mixing bowl. In the *Iliad*, the award is made at the funeral games (23.740ff). In the *Odyssey*, he receives a mixing bowl as a gift from Maron (9.201ff); and, in a lie to his father, he himself claims to have given “Odysseus” a mixing bowl (24.275). Telemachus receives a mixing bowl from Menelaus, along with stories of Odysseus (4.617). Other artifacts received by heroes as gifts include: items associated with excellence in warfare, such as swords, helmets, belts and breastplates; items associated with the bounty of one's household, such as beasts of burden, oxen and mules, iron bars that blacksmiths might transform, and women “skilled in noble handiwork”; and various tokens of Kingly wealth and prestige, such as gold talents and tripods, horses and chariots, much adorned vestments, cloaks and tunics, and vessels of precious metals, goblets (*depas*), libation bowls, (*phialē*), cauldrons (*lebēta*) and urns (*amphiphorēa*). On gift exchanges in Homeric poetry, see Donlan (1981); and Finley (1954).

⁹²³ Odysseus declares his affinity for mixing bowls (and all they represent) to the Phaeacians as he prepares to tell his stories (9.5-11).

⁹²⁴ On the significance of the “equal feast” as a model of civic equity, see Ruden (1996). For the archaic poet Theognis, the symposium and the revel similarly performed as a model of the city. See Levine (1985), 176 n.1. Cf. Plato *Laws* 773d.

having himself led the reconciling embassy that this feast celebrates. Later, a mixing bowl is moved into the midst of the battlefield so that the opposing contenders for Helen (Menelaus and Alexandros) might declare an oath and engender a truce. Odysseus is present on this occasion not only as a witness to their oath (and its faltering), but also as a co-delineator of their contested space; for Odysseus, together with Hector, had “measured out a space” (*deimetreon... chōron*) for the anticipated action in the open area between (*es meson*) the Trojans and Achaeans (3.247ff, 3.315). In addition to these scenes of reconciliation and potential agreement among opposing parties, mixing bowls are also central to situations of deliberation and entreaty among members of the same group: in the midst of Agamemnon’s hut, as he hosts his fellow leaders (including Odysseus) in concerted counsel (9.175); and in the midst of Achilles’ tent, as he hosts Odysseus (and his fellow ambassadors) during their persuasive entreaty of him (9.202). On both of these occasions, Odysseus and the other leaders aim to reintegrate (or remix) Achilles back into their company and common mission. Elsewhere, a mixing bowl is central to situations of bounded unity: to a situation of shared victory, as Odysseus and Diomedes pour a libation of thanks to Athena after their successful mission (10.578); and to a situation of shared grief, when all the Achaeans (including Odysseus) gather for Patroclus’ funeral (23.219). It is toward the close of this last event that Odysseus wins the footrace and takes the mixing bowl (23.778). Neither Odysseus nor a mixing bowl appear again in the *Iliad*.

In all of these situations, which either terminate or in some way aim to dispel strife and re-inaugurate propitious relations, a mixing bowl is central to the social occasion and Odysseus is active as mediator. Such a position—in the middle (*es to meson*)—is key to early Greek concepts of equity, and to the formation of democratic space.⁹²⁵ In the *Iliad*, for instance, Odysseus’ own ship is beached “in the middle” of all the Achaean vessels arrayed along the shore (11.6). It was in this middle area—before Odysseus’ vessel—that the Achaeans had established their “place of assembly” (*agorē*), their “place of judgment” (*themis*), and their “altars to the gods” (*bōmoi*, 11.806-08). Occupying a middle position was also crucial to Odysseus’ verbal stance as an epic

⁹²⁵ On the importance of the “middle” for early Greek concepts of political and social equity, leading to the invention of the *agora*, see Vernant (1982), esp. 47-8. On the importance of this space for the fair display of goods, before a judicial redistribution (as demonstrated in the *Iliad* 19.173ff), see Detienne (1996), esp. 90-95, where he writes, “to put things *es meson* is to set them ‘in common’.” In another context, Walter Burkert (1996), 25, has shown how early temples originate from a ‘center’: from an altar, or image; and, at another scale, from occupying a ‘middle ground’ outside of a palace or city, “in the midst of occupied territory... untouched by individual rivalries [and, so] ‘left free’ for the god.” This view, of cults and cities originating from eccentric middling grounds, is elaborated by de Polignac (1994).

hero.⁹²⁶ Thus, by his association with mediating dispositions, with mixing bowls, and with middling grounds, Odysseus is closely associated with the reconciliatory agency of discourse, with the institution of hospitality, and with the beginnings of civic space. At the close of the *Iliad*, then, Odysseus would indeed seem to carry forward (to the end of his ordeal in the *Odyssey*) if not the mixing bowl itself (for this property must have gone down with his ship) then at least its vast treasury of stories, together with the vital knowledge of the various occasions and capabilities that such a bowl potentially orients and represents.

Whereas the wine, its flask and its vessels are closely tied to Dionysus and Dionysian modes of influence in Euripides' satyr play, the common mixing bowl set at the center of the symposium and in the midst of the orchestra is also tied closely to Odysseus. This close association, thus, suggests that Odysseus performs—together with the “architects” (Dionysus, Hephaestus and others)⁹²⁷—as a vigilant advocate for the social customs and sacred institutions that this vessel manifestly presents. And, as the *Iliad* demonstrates, these customs and institutions would be inclusive not only of those obviously hospitable and festive occasions (such as the symposia and the *Dionysia*), but also such situations as equal feasts, diplomatic exchanges, concerted counsels, prayerful libations and public funerals—basic situations that, like the originating (*archē*) practices recovered by the architecting-protagonist in *Peace*, are constitutive of architectural beginnings.⁹²⁸

With this in mind it is possible, then, to end this chapter by recalling an argument and a trope from this dissertation's prologue: like an altar orienting a sacred rite, or a hearth, centering domestic life, or a speaker configuring an assembly, so a mixing bowl anticipates exemplary social events which, like Alberti's animate ornaments, are for architects to see, consider and sustain.

⁹²⁶ Richard P. Martin (1989), 120ff, has interpreted the centered, balanced and democratic position of Odysseus' ship to be representative of his verbal stance, for, as Martin writes, “the key to Odyssean rhetoric is positioning, the stance the hero takes toward his audience and his aptitude at varying this alignment.”

⁹²⁷ Interestingly, Hephaestus, whom Odysseus invokes in *Cyclops* (599), provides a divine model for reconciliatory performances around mixing bowls. For, in a moment of strife among the gods in the *Iliad* (1.571ff), Hephaestus offers both soothing words and cups of nectar. His manner of doing so prompts the previously angered gods to smile and laugh.

⁹²⁸ In this sense, the mixing bowl performs somewhat like the fire in Vitruvius' story of architectural beginnings (2.1.1-2). On the significance of this originating event for architecture, see, for instance, Gottfried Semper's “The Basic Elements of Architecture” in Herrmann (1984), 196-203; with Leatherbarrow (1993), 127-32; and Rykwert (1972).

Metaphoric Potential and Dramatic Understandings

The difference between trivial metaphor and poetic metaphor is not that one can be paraphrased and the other not, but that the paraphrase of the latter is without end. It is endless precisely because it can always spring back to life. If metaphor engenders thought throughout a long discourse, is this not because it is itself a brief discourse?

Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor* (1977), p. 188.

Throughout this dissertation I have attempted to describe certain definitive actions of the architect-figures in *Peace* and *Cyclops* in ways that aim to illuminate those actions, as dramatized, while at the same time aim to reveal how they (and their prefigurations) resonate with what may be understood as architectural acts. My premise has been that the transformative schemes led by Trygaeus and Odysseus, and (correspondingly) the dramatic plots devised by Aristophanes and Euripides, are *like* schemes of transformation that any architect might devise, rehearse and propose. The basis of this likeness has been grounded on a trio of closely related analogies.

The first of these analogies is that architects, dramatists and these protagonists share certain dramatic modes of representation, or mimetic modes of making. These dramatic modes of making and making apparent, which are mimetic in that they are modeled after exemplary (mythic) acts while at the same time figure-forth corresponding potential acts,⁹²⁷ have been shown to explicitly include “directing” (*phrazein*), “commanding” (*keleuein*), and “persuading”—both oneself (*peithesthai*) and others (*peithein*). Yet, these dramatic modes of representation have also been shown to entail a range of other activities—inaugural, interpretive, inventive, discursive, mediated and situated activities—that are demonstrated, if not named, in each play.⁹²⁸

⁹²⁷ The supportive literature for this profound sense of *mimēsis* includes: Aristotle’s *Poetics*, esp. 1450a16; Gadamer (1986), esp. 97-104, 116-22; Nagy (1996); Harrison (1927); and Adrados (1975), esp. 451, where he qualifies drama, in its origin, as “a description of the past and an anticipatory imitation of a desired future”. On the mimetic nature of architecture—being imitative of exemplary (mythic) “forms of conduct” and dwelling situations—see Leatherbarrow (1993), esp. 90-106 and 215-25; and Vesely (2004), esp. 366-72.

⁹²⁸ It would be tedious to list all the dramatic actions that are demonstrated in the plays and that have been presented throughout this dissertation. The following selection of pages, however, are notably representative: pp. 62-5, concerning Trygaeus’ “planning” (*boulein*), both in discerning awareness of situational contingencies and in approximation of divine planning, which though absent was sought; pp. 81-7, concerning Trygaeus’ *in situ* performance of transformational displays and representative adjustments; pp. 183-90 and 196-98, concerning

The second basic analogy linking architects, dramatists and these protagonists concerns what these comparable poetic agents make; namely, schemes of transformation. And these schemes, plots, or plans of action further make possible a more comprehensive schema of renewed order—a broadly desirable and animate condition encompassing more ambitious transformations, including *restoration* (of worldly rhythms and archaic practices, as well as divine, filial and theoretical relations); *liberation* (from Polemical and Cyclopean threats); and *retribution* (in the sense of a proportionate rebalancing of honor). Although in the course of developing these schemes the architect-figures selectively involve and adjust a variety of crafted things (including mediating devices, representative properties, theatrical settings and delimiting thresholds) it is the comprehensive and nested schemes of transformation that they most significantly make—make apparent, make appealing and make available for others.

Together with dramatic modes of representation and comprehensive schemes of transformation, a third analogy, or analogous condition, has grounded this study: situations; more specifically, the problematic situations that motivate the protagonists to act in the ways they do and that (twenty-five hundred years later) we still closely relate to. Although situations involving giant one-eyed cannibals are unlikely to present any immediate danger to present-day architects, comparable anarchic, asocial, apathetic and gluttonous forces *do* persist as real antagonizing threats to both meaningful architecture and well-meaning architects.⁹²⁹ The problematic situation facing the architect-figure in *Peace* is further telling, not only because the general problem of war is perennial, but also because War's peculiar eagerness to make mincemeat of cities with a crushing pestle may be seen to allegorically dramatize a variety of twentieth-century cravings: for aggressively singular technologies, and for imposing minimum-standard engineering. War's menacing display over the mortar may also be seen to expose certain risks built in

Odysseus' epic demonstrations of *polymetis*; pp. 320-21, concerning Odysseus' poetic adjustments and figurative inventions in *Cyclops*; pp. 87, 104-05, and 293-95, concerning the "leading" or "beginning" (*archein*) actions of each protagonist, which initiate corresponding transformations; and pp. 53, 59-60, 105, 233 and 240, concerning meta-theatrical acts—instances where the "architect" performs as one who is inextricably embedded within the situation that they are nevertheless attempting to synthetically represent, understand and transform on behalf of others.

⁹²⁹ For a discussion of Polyphemus' anarchic dismissals, and the architect-figure's opposition to them, see above, pp. 236-40. Another relevant trans-historical problem implicit in *Cyclops* involves colonial expansion. See above, p. 132, n. 302.

to gated communities.⁹³⁰ Yet, perhaps the more profound situational condition that is common to the two ancient plays and that remains problematic in the present era concerns the ambiguous status of gods. At the start of both *Cyclops* and *Peace* a divinity is conspicuously absent and seriously mistreated.⁹³¹ And in each of these troubled situations it is an architect-figure who proactively restores the palpable presence of the divine figure felt to be lacking. As George Steiner has asserted in *Real Presences*, the potentiality of a divine presence (even where apparently absent) remains imperative to the production and experience of aesthetic meaning in literature, music and art.⁹³² Euripides and Aristophanes (Odysseus and Trygaeus) would seem to concur and, furthermore, to suggest that architects and architectural acts have been, from the beginning, inextricably intertwined in palpably sustaining such a meaningful paradox.

However this may be, these three analogies—concerning motivating situations, schemes of transformation and modes of representation—have grounded and guided this study of dramatic architect-figures and the drama of architecting.

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That architects, dramatists and certain protagonists perform analogously is claimed directly, if sarcastically, by another agent: the prologuist of Plautus' Latin comedy *Truculentus* (circa 186 BCE). Here, this actor—speaking *directly* to the spectators assembled round him in an open forum of Rome⁹³³—begins the play with these inaugural words:

⁹³⁰ For my interpretation of War's performance in *Peace*, see above, pp. 77-85.

⁹³¹ Euripides' *Hecuba* also stands out among Athena dramas for its conspicuous absence of gods. On the absence of divinities in this tragedy, and its corresponding abundance of mortal confusion, see Mossman (1995), 53 n. 19. Some scholars suspect that *Cyclops* immediately followed the tragic trilogy involving *Hecuba* at the Dionysian festival of 424 BCE. See above (p. 131, n. 298).

⁹³² Steiner (1989), esp. 3 and 299, where he elaborates his concerns for the consequences of "real absence" (or "negative theism") on the future history of art.

⁹³³ Plautus' plays were performed in markets (with the spectators possibly standing); in the area before a temple (using the temple steps as bleachers); and in other open areas, which were likely prepared with wooden players' platforms for the duration of a religious festival, or for another more ad-hoc occasion. Permanent stone theaters were not established in the Roman world until 55 BCE. See Hanson (1959); Duckworth (1994), 76ff; and Beare (1964), 241ff.

It's Plautus' plea that you provide a plot (*locus*),
within your pretty city please, a spot,
where he can rear his Athens proud and high
—all by himself, no architects need apply.

(Plautus, *Truculentus* lines 1-4).⁹³⁴

Although “architects” are involved at the very beginning of this play only to be dismissed, the actor’s manner of involving them suggests that they and the dramatist are qualified to perform the same task: to transform present circumstances; to initiate theoretical narratives; and to persuasively represent exemplary settings and situations (places and plots).⁹³⁵ Although this actor claims to need “no architects” (*sine architectis*) for such a performance, he clearly relies on architects figuratively to assist in conjuring aspects of his own dramatic work that are otherwise difficult to articulate and perceive. This dissertation has, in a sense, been considering the inverse of this actor’s claim: that certain agencies of dramatic actors correspond to an architect’s work, and that seriously entertaining these correspondences helps to reveal those performative dimensions of an architect’s role that are otherwise difficult to see, to speak of, and to fully comprehend.

Given this valuation of dramatic and metaphoric architects—oblique figures that might nevertheless poetically illuminate and mythically orient what actual architects do—it is plausible that just such an architect may qualify as the “real” architect that Louis Sullivan (who himself had a great capacity for both dramatic dialogue and metaphor) had once theoretically sought.⁹³⁶

⁹³⁴ Translation by James Tatum (1983), 153.

⁹³⁵ Much later in the English Renaissance, Ben Jonson reasserts this affinity between architects and dramatic poets more analytically. In his collection of commonplaces called *Timber*, or *Discoveries*, he describes the “constitution of a poem” as analogous to the constitution of a building, positing plot-making and place-making as dramatic and spatial correlates; for, he writes, both a poetic action and an architectural place have their “largeness, compass, and proportion” (2686ff). See, Jonson (1925-52), 645ff. Such an analogy, grounded on the likeness of a building and a poem as much as on the architect and poet, has informed modern interpretations of Jonson’s drama, as in Johnson (1994), and of other Renaissance and later literature, as in Eriksen (2001), and Frank (1979). The related yet contested activities of plot-making and place-making are presented by Jonson in a more dramatic manner in his court “masques”, which satirize the architect and set-designer, Inigo Jones; see Gordon (1949).

⁹³⁶ Sullivan (1976), 33. As cited at the beginning of this dissertation: “We shall search out... a real architect—even if he be a figure of speech.” Sullivan carries out this search throughout his *Kindergarten Chats*, most directly in a part entitled, “What is an Architect?”, 135-42.

With the contemporary proliferation in popular media of what Paul Ricoeur might call “trivial metaphors”,⁹³⁷ and with the persistent tendency to associate architects too simplistically, casually, or dismissively with tricksters, heroes or gods,⁹³⁸ there may be good reason for architects to be wary of any figurative approach to architects. Yet, the “architects” under study here have (I hope) revealed the profoundly poetic and precisely mythic basis of their dramatic and metaphoric potential. Although the “architects” in *Peace* and *Cyclops* are by no means free of troubling ambiguities (indeed Odysseus’ transformative agency hinges, at times, on selective deceptions and painful ironies), both figures do destabilize any overly-simplified or singular interpretation of architect-figures. For instance, even though the “architects” in these plays may be likened, in part, to tricksters, their acts on the whole are not reducible to covert tricks, for even their most cunning deeds are expressly performed on behalf of others and in the genuine interest of civic, worldly and poetic justice. Similarly, although the deeds of these “architects” may be deemed heroic, one must acknowledge that Trygaeus is a comic and hybrid hero (a lowly Tragedian, a basic farmer, and one who associates himself with vigilant dung-beetles as much as high-flying protagonists); and Odysseus is an ambiguous and atypical hero (according to both his fellow contenders for fame in Homeric poetry and a number of modern scholars). Indeed, it has been suggested that one of Odysseus’ peculiar traits as a hero is that he suffered from the expectation of heroism.⁹³⁹ Finally, although the architect-figures in *Peace* and *Cyclops* act in some ways like gods, one must bear in mind that ancient Greek religion was profoundly polytheistic and diversely anthropomorphic. Odysseus’ entitlement of himself in the plural—as “architects”—may be taken as a clear reminder of the many cooperative agents and rivaling agencies that he represents. The

⁹³⁷ Ricoeur (1977), 188 (as quoted at the opening of this conclusion). An exception to such trivial metaphors might include US President Barack Obama’s recent reminder of the importance in “constructing an architecture to keep the peace”, where “architecture” implies “institutions”, such as the United Nations, and diplomatic relations. Quoted from a transcript of his speech at the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo, Dec. 9, 2009, published as “Obama’s Nobel Remarks”, *New York Times*, Dec. 11, 2009 <<http://www.nytimes.com/>>.

⁹³⁸ See, for instance, Saint (1983), who treats the perception and portrayal of architects from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century. The first chapter, entitled “The Architect as Hero and Genius”, is devoted to Ayn Rand’s depiction of Howard Roark in *Fountainhead* (of 1943).

⁹³⁹ Stanford (1963), 117. Here, Stanford is discussing Plato’s portrayal of Odysseus at the end of his *Republic* (620c-d), in which the spirits of the Homeric heroes are preparing to be reincarnated by choosing which body to take for their next life. Odysseus chooses the form of an “ordinary citizen”; for, as Stanford paraphrases, “He now knows the futility of all ambition.” Although, one could also see Odysseus’ choice as a familiar disguise.

plurality of these “architects” may also reflect the Athenian suspicion of singular authority and absolute autonomy. It is, after all, the Cyclops’ *self*-worship and solipsistic ways that are targeted for punishment by “the architects” in Euripides’ satyr play. Furthermore, when Odysseus and Trygaeus do act like Zeus, the most authoritative of Greek gods, they are not acting as an omnipotent creator, but rather as an exemplary witness: looking upon improprieties that threaten human situations; seeing and understanding these volatile situations; and imploring others (the chorus and spectators) to do the same.

Thus, the full situation in which these figures perform, as well as the unique variety of their actions and intentions, contribute to our understanding of the “architects”. And these polysemic “architects”, in turn, help to reveal the fullness and depth of the nested situations they perform in. It is, perhaps, this reciprocally revealing capacity that makes the figure so valuable and makes the poets’ choice of figure so appropriate. After all, Aristophanes and Euripides, as composers of speech and drama, must have selected their “architect” figures *not* inadvertently but animadvertently, so as to turn attention to particular topics of mythic, ritual and cultural relevance both within and beyond the play. This reciprocally revealing capability, together with their plurality and malleability, must also contribute to the resilience of “architects” as a particularly telling metaphor for dramatic poets.⁹⁴⁰

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But, what of the resilience of dramatic figures in architectural discourse? By way of closing this dissertation, I offer a brief review of the vital persistence of drama as a mode of representation for architects.

Although the particular “architects” studied in this dissertation are (and will likely remain) marginal to architectural discourse,⁹⁴¹ the dramatic medium and theatrical

⁹⁴⁰ Eugene Ionesco and Václav Havel are two twentieth-century dramatists to profoundly involve architect-figures, respectively, in *Killer* (of 1958), and *Redevelopment, or Slum Clearance* (of 1987).

⁹⁴¹ Aside from John Dee’s staging of *Peace* at Trinity College, Cambridge (in 1547), there seems to be no evidence of architects or architectural interpreters concerning themselves directly with the plays and their architect-figures. On the negative consequences that this performance of *Peace* had for Dee (for, his wondrous manner of manifesting Trygaeus’ heavenly ascent led to further allegations against him that he was a “Conjuror” practicing magic), see his own account of the matter in his “Compendious Rehearsall” (1592), in *Autobiographical Tracts of Dr. John Dee*, J. Crossley, Editor. (Chetham Society, 1851), with Yates (1969), 31ff.

institution they exemplify has been (and will likely persist in being) of central importance to architects. Vitruvius, for instance, whose tale of Aristippus' adaptability began this dissertation, devoted part of his tenth book *On Architecture* to those theatrical devices essential for festivals. He, further, considered the theater to be an architectural work most mimetic of the cosmos, for he advised architects to configure theaters after the manner of astrologers laying out the regions and rhythms of the sky (5.4.1). Alberti, whose aside on animate ornaments likewise began this study, also valued the ancient theater in his architectural treatise and even expressed regret that "so splendid and useful an institution" had fallen into disuse in his day (8.7). Alberti, in his own way, kept this institution very much alive, however, for he was himself an avid composer of dialogues, and his earliest composition (of 1424) was a play.⁹⁴² Thus, by the time Alberti completed his *Art of Building* (in 1452), his manner of treating topics dramatically, and in dialogue, was well established. Although his architectural treatise is obviously not written as a play to be staged, it nevertheless may be read as an animated discourse among various agents speaking out from across time; or, as David Leatherbarrow has put it, "The book is a city composed of many voices 'exercising themselves in rivalry'".⁹⁴³ Alberti's ten books can be read in this dramatically discursive way because, throughout them, he demonstrates his habit of taking counsel with diverse and divergent advisors on each architectural topic he treats. At certain times throughout the *Art of Building*, Alberti speaks explicitly to this manner of inquiry, for he finds that taking animated counsel—with others, with particular and exemplary situations, and with oneself—is an activity integral not only to his present task as a searching author striving to do justice to complex

⁹⁴² In this allegorical comedy entitled *Philodoxus*, a young man named Philodoxus, "Lover of Glory", seeks an amorous relation with Doxia, "Glory". Although intervening agents complicate this protagonist's pursuit—including Doxia's sister, "Fame" (or Popularity) and "Fortuna"—he is, in the end, triumphant with the help of his friends, "Phronesis" (Prudence) and "Time". See Grund (2005). Besides *Philodoxus*, Alberti also composed a number of treatises as dialogues, including: *Momus*, a political allegory in which the ambitions of Jupiter resonate, in part, with the contemporaneous building ambitions of Pope Nicholas V; *Profugiorum ab aerumna*, or "On the tranquility of the Soul", which involves a significant architectural allegory; on which see Smith (1992), 19-39; and *della famiglia*, or "On the Family", in which a forward-thinking "architect" figuratively exemplifies the way a "father" ought to edify his son; see Watkins (1969), 60. Additionally, many of Alberti's *Dinner Pieces* are written as dialogues. Of particular interest are those in which the melancholic "Lepidus" speaks out resolutely: as in "The Writer"; "Religion"; "The Dream"; "Garlands", and "Fame". (Lepidus, meaning "Witty", was the name Alberti used as a pseudonym when he first published *Philodoxus*).

⁹⁴³ Leatherbarrow (1990), 51.

topics and questions, but also to the projective task of discerning architects striving in the course of design to fully consider the range of competing complexities and potentialities.⁹⁴⁴

Vitruvius and Alberti are not alone in demonstrating the architectural value of the theatrical institution and dramatic manners of thought, for Alberti's contemporary Antonio de Piero Averlino (who called himself, "Filarete") demonstrates this as well with his own architectural treatise, which he composed as an extensive dialogue. As the primary speaker within this dialogue, Filarete ("Lover of Virtue") rehearses for a curious patron all the "modes and measures of building", and further elaborates—over the course of a long meandering conversation—the design for a hypothetical city.⁹⁴⁵ A century after Alberti and Filarete, Bernard Palissy composed a study of horticultural, magical and architectural topics also as a probing dialogue between a questioning interlocutor and an answering author, who at one point rehearses for his questioner yet another animate debate. This debate (nested within the dialogue) is played out among a set of personified geometrical tools, each vying for honor.⁹⁴⁶ Later, in the seventeenth century, Gian Lorenzo Bernini also composed dramatically. For, Bernini was not only designing architectural, sculptural and theatrical settings, but was also himself producing dramas, writing comic plays, and acting in them. Of the approximately twenty plays he wrote, only one is extant: *The Impresario*—a *commedie dell'arte* in which the desire for spectacle and the making of drama are explicitly (if satirically) dramatized.⁹⁴⁷ It is especially suggestive that Bernini was himself performing as "Impresario" at the same time he was preparing to stage, architecturally, a dramatic (and divine) intervention: the

⁹⁴⁴ For example, Alberti urges architects to seek, compare and "examine repeatedly" all that might relate to a work, including that which is "hidden" and "obscure" (1.5). He also describes the process of deliberation and reflection as holding, in the mind, "a secret argument and discourse" (9.5, Leoni, Trans.). Cf. 1.1; 2.4; 9.8-10.

⁹⁴⁵ *Trattato de architettura* (1469). See, Spencer (1965).

⁹⁴⁶ Bernard Palissy, *Recepte Véritable* (La Rochelle 1563). See, Palissy (1988), 174-177. In this debate each tool (compass, rule, set square, plumb bob, level, adjustable square and astrolabe) voices its claim to preeminence. The "author", however, in the end, weighs in on the tools' debate. Taking the role of judge, he emphasizes that it is not their relative honor that is most at stake in the discussion, but the honor of the one who knowingly forms and involves them.

⁹⁴⁷ Bernini (1994). This play was likely intended for performance during the 1644 Carnival season in Rome. See, Lavin (1980), 146-157.

“Ecstasy of Saint Theresa”.⁹⁴⁸ In the same century, Guarino Guarini also composed a play intended for the stage. This play by Guarini involved over thirty speaking parts, but its plot revolved around a single man who first loses and then regains his sight.⁹⁴⁹ And Guarini composed this play just a few years prior to composing his own complex theory of vision, not long before he began to architecturally negotiate the appearance of light and its opposing substance (darkness) in the course of designing the Chapel of the Holy Shroud in Turin.⁹⁵⁰ In the eighteenth century, Piranesi continued this dramatic tradition with his *Opinions on Architecture*—a debate played out in both words and plates, in which Didascalo, the “Straight Talker”, defends architectural ornament and innovation against a detractor of Piranesi’s designs.⁹⁵¹ And, one could go on assembling architects who composed in such dramatically discursive ways.⁹⁵²

Each of the architects mentioned above, who wrote either dramas or dialogues between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, were, on the one hand, participating in modes of composition fashionable at the time. Indeed, writing in dialogue form was a common literary genre. Charles Perrault, brother to the architect Claude, even used the form of a dialogue (set in the gardens of Versailles) to advance his rather one-sided views

⁹⁴⁸ This sculptural work, for the Cornaro Chapel of Santa Maria della Vittoria in Rome, was likely commissioned in 1644 (completed in 1652). See, Borsi (1984), 160-71, 313-14.

⁹⁴⁹ *La Pietà Trionfante* (Messina 1660). For a synopsis of this “*tragicommedia morale*” (a manuscript of which is, to my understanding, in the Vatican Library), see Meek (1988), 19 and 25-6, where he notes that the play was intended for performance by members of a boys choir.

⁹⁵⁰ Guarini’s theory of vision is found in his dialogue “De Luce” and in a chapter of his *Placita Philosophia*, “De Vita” (1665), which he began to compose in Paris in 1662. Guarini was commissioned to take over the design of the Turin chapel in 1667. For an eloquent discussion of Guarini’s negotiation of light and material (as well as spirit and matter, appearance and surface, *logos* and flesh), see Debanné (1999).

⁹⁵¹ *Parere su l’architettura* (1765), in Piranesi (2002).

⁹⁵² Including: Francesco Colonna’s *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili* (Venice 1499), the plot of which has many resonances with *Peace*; and the dramatic trick Brunelleschi played on his carpenter, which was later turned into a play by one of his Renaissance acquaintances (now published as *The Fat Woodworker*). On the problematic significance of Brunelleschi’s mastery of representation and “malicious ruse” for architects, see the preface of Tafuri (2006). It is perhaps significant that Brunelleschi’s ruse (convincing his woodworker that he was someone else) has its antecedent in a trick that Mercury plays in Plautus’ *Amphitryon*—in which, as mentioned above, Zeus (Mercury’s accomplice) is evoked as the “architect of all” (45). One could further consider the plays of Palladio’s patron Trissino; and those written by Sir John Vanbrugh and Nicholas Le Camus de Mézières.

favoring the moderns over the ancients in his influential version of the longstanding “quarrel”.⁹⁵³ Yet, such modes of composition did not traditionally perform as stylistic scaffolds for shoring up predetermined arguments, but rather as genuine interpretive devices for probing the complexities and potentialities of difficult topics. These modes of dramatic exploration—of playing-out hypothetical exchanges among diverse agents in particularized settings for the sake of vividness and topical suggestiveness, and of speaking alternatively from “different points of view” (*in utramque partem*) for the sake of finding new insights, discovering valid criticisms, and procuring comprehensive understanding—*these* dramatically discursive modes were exemplified by Athenian dramatists; prefigured by Homeric performers; demonstrated by Greek philosophers; promoted by Latin orators; practiced by poets, preachers and others throughout the Middle Ages; pursued by humanists (like Alberti) in the Renaissance; and taught with rigor and wit throughout the same periods in grammar schools.⁹⁵⁴ As one scholar of this resilient topic has argued, such modes of speculative composition peaked again in the English Renaissance with Elizabethan drama, after which a culture of ambivalence, cynicism and disbelief in the value of such inquiry gradually took hold—a culture for whom, as Joel B. Altman puts it, “the faith in finding out was dying”.⁹⁵⁵ But, of course, such dramatic manners of inquiry persist. Moreover, the fact that speculative dialogues of various manifestations can be found in the writings of Sverre Fehn, Louis Kahn, Alvar Aalto and Louis Sullivan, strongly suggest that such dramatic modes of inquiry persist as being especially relevant to architects.⁹⁵⁶ Indeed, the enduring relevance of these modes for architects has already been suggested, not only by Trygæus’ dramatic reenactment of

⁹⁵³ Charles Perrault’s *Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes* (1688-97). On the significance of the dialogue form (involving three distinct speakers) and its setting (Versailles) for Perrault’s argument, see Howells (1983). On the influence this version of the “quarrel” had on the architectural discipline, see the introduction of Perrault (1993).

⁹⁵⁴ For a survey of this tradition and an argument on its importance to philosophy, see Kristeller (1979), and Grassi (1980), respectively.

⁹⁵⁵ Altman (1978), 395, and chapter 2 on “The Moral Cultivation of Ambivalence”.

⁹⁵⁶ I am thinking especially of Sverre Fehn’s conversational and graphic exchange with Palladio, in Norberg-Schulz (1997), 108; Louis Kahn’s habit of quoting imaginary conversations during his lectures, as in Twombly (2003), 76; Alvar Aalto’s imaginary interviews and hypothetical dialogues between an architect and professor, in Schildt (1997), 263-265; and Louis Sullivan’s *Kindergarten Chats* (Chicago 1918).

Pheidias' "installation",⁹⁵⁷ and by the precise performative language at work both in architectural inscriptions and in the plays *Peace* and *Cyclops*,⁹⁵⁸ but also by the particular topics acted out in the dramas and dialogues of Alberti, Filarete, Palissy, Bernini, Guarini and Piranesi. Although the dramas and dialogues of these architects may have served, in some ways, as delightful diversions from their architectural work, they also most certainly acted as influential preludes and reflective complements to it. For example, the dramatic conflicts involving desire and light as rehearsed by Bernini and Guarini in their plays were also played-out in their architectural works among analogous agents: material and phenomenal, mortal and divine.

Given all this, it would seem, then, that by composing dramatically and in dialogue these architects were not only participating in modes of composition commonplace at the time, but were also engaging a dramatic mode of rhetorical and theoretical inquiry appropriate to their architectural work—or, as Alberti would have it, integral to it.

⁹⁵⁷ As discussed above, p. 32-5.

⁹⁵⁸ In *Peace*, the architecting-protagonist is closely associated with the act of directing (*phrazein*), which resonates with the performative formula found on many architectural inscriptions: "all this shall be worked to completion... as the architect directs". See above, p. 113. And, in *Cyclops*, the architect-figure's claim to have made his scheme "thoroughly known" (*ex-epistamai*, 476), resonates with (and poetically expands) the act of "thoroughly building" (*ex-oikodomēsas* / *ex-ergasonta*), which typically qualified the obligation of laborers in inscriptions pertaining to architectural work. See above, p. 113, and 135, n. 306.

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