

INTEREST GROUPS AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
THE CASE OF BANGLADESH

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the response of Canadian interest groups to the 1971 Pakistan civil war, to explore the pattern of reaction of different types of groups, and to evaluate explanations of their activity. The thesis documents abdication rather than confrontation as the principal characteristic of the interest groups' response to Canadian policy during the conflict. Concentrating on their individual organizational interests, almost all groups were content to leave responsibility for public examination of the issues to the newspaper editorialists.

When tested against the evidence of this case, the five explanations extrapolated from the literature on Canadian foreign policy did not provide a convincing explanation of the groups' overwhelming passivity. The only valid explanation of interest group activity was its institutionalization. This thesis specifies the components of a multivariable explanation needed to examine the response of Canadian interest groups to Canadian foreign policy.

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RESUME

Le but de cette thèse était d'examiner la réaction des groupes de pression canadiens vis-à-vis de la guerre civile du Pakistan en 1971, d'étudier le schème de réaction des différents types de groupes et d'évaluer les explications de leurs activités. La thèse montre que les groupes ont réagi mollement au conflit. Presque tous les groupes se sont davantage concentrés sur leurs intérêts particuliers et ont laissé le soin aux éditorialistes des journaux d'examiner les questions d'intérêt public.

Les cinq explications fournies par les études sur la politique étrangère du Canada n'ont pas réussi l'épreuve des faits pour expliquer la passivité des groupes. Seule l'hypothèse basée sur l'institutionnalisation a été trouvée suffisamment valable. Cette thèse a donc montré la nécessité d'employer plusieurs facteurs pour analyser la réponse des groupes de pression canadiens à la politique étrangère du Canada.

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To my family

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PREFACE

This thesis makes three principal contributions to knowledge.

First, a potentially useful typology of a country's foreign policy actions in the face of a civil war in another nation is established. The development of operational indices for types of policy responses should facilitate comparison in international relations. Equally important, it enables researchers to concentrate attention on a careful assessment of explanatory factors in cases of dissimilar responses.

Secondly, the thesis tested several hypotheses derived from the literature on Canadian foreign policy about the response of Canadian interest groups to foreign policy events. The thesis documents an unexpected record of passivity by the principal interest groups and finds no satisfactory explanation of this passivity in the current literature. While a data base of a single case precludes any generalization, the thesis does suggest that some important explanatory variables may be discarded, others refined, and new variables analyzed in other case studies. Lastly, the thesis makes an original contribution to the examination of Canada's relationship with the third world, an area where little prior research has been undertaken.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Foreword

Much of the literature on Canadian foreign policy has suggested that groups within Canada have been more quiescent on international issues than on issues of domestic policy. Researchers have noted that pressure groups rarely oppose government policy and consequently decision-makers operate in an unconstrained environment. This study will attempt to assess that argument. It will examine the Canadian pressure groups support of, and opposition to, government policy on a salient foreign policy issue. The Pakistan civil war was chosen deliberately because it followed the civil war in Nigeria, a war which produced extraordinary activities by humanitarian groups in Canada, mobilized by the spectre of mass starvation and slaughter. Canada's senior officials expected that similar upheavals were likely in the coming decade:

Unlike the situations related to the period of rapid decolonization... the types of strife which seem likely to occur with increasing frequency are related to internal conflict: e.g., civil war, racial or other forms of dissention within an independent state, indirect aggression and guerrilla warfare fomented by liberation movements....¹

Both from an international and a domestic perspective, the response of Canadian interest groups towards the Pakistan civil war is of considerable relevance.

The introduction to this study begins by an examination of the research on Canadian interest groups and foreign policy. Secondly, the hypotheses which organize the case study are examined and the methodology is explained. Lastly, the background of Canadian-Pakistan relations prior to the civil war is reviewed.

A. Research

Given the concentration of decisionmaking power in the shifting nexus of influence between the civil service bureaucracy and the political leadership, it might well be asked how the variegated pressures of the domestic community are brought to bear on the policy process. The answers to such questions are untidy, for the channels are many and their relative significance—difficult in the best of circumstances to calculate with precision—varies from one case to the next.

The politicization of the Canadian foreign policy process has been a relatively recent phenomena. Until the end of the nineteen fifties, public opinion in general and interest groups in particular remained indifferent to the external policies of Canada. The foreign policy process was dominated by a professional elite which was watched only by a small attentive public. Foreign policy was, as a consequence, insulated from the domestic political process and except under extraordinary circumstances, was of little interest to all

but a select few.³ As a result, researchers devoted greater attention to the response of Canadian interest groups to domestic rather than to external policies.

However, since the nineteen-sixties there has been an increase in the scale and intensity of pressure group demands on foreign policy decision-makers, and in the breadth of issues to which they have responded.⁴ Interest groups have taken stands not only on issues that had a direct impact on domestic concerns, such as wheat surpluses or fish stocks, but on purely external issues such as nuclear testing and the Vietnam war. Involvement, informed comment, and lobbying by a whole variety of interest groups have become more commonplace and have elicited increased academic interest from both normative and empirical perspectives.

Scholars debated the question of whether the Canadian public "should have the right to participate in the formulation and conduct of Canadian foreign policy."⁵ Proponents of the continued exclusion of the public from the decision-making process stressed that democratization would bring about a deterioration in the quality of Canadian foreign policy. They cited such failures of open diplomacy as the arms race and raised the spectre of jingoistic nationalism inspired by yellow journalism.⁶ Their opponents countered that such an elitist position was not only a denial of a fundamental tenet of democracy, but also a hindrance to an improvement in the quality of Canada's external policies. Active participation by interest groups in the

foreign policy process, in their view, would provide the government with increased intellectual resources both to formulate and to implement the foreign policy of Canada.⁷ To support their prescriptions, however, the proponents provided no empirical evidence drawn from case studies of the impact of pressure groups on the decision-making process.

Despite the resonance of the normative debate there were few rigorous empirical studies on the role of interest groups in the Canadian foreign policy process. Most researchers confined themselves to descriptions of pressure groups within the context of a more general examination of the role of the domestic⁸ or internal⁹ environment in Canadian external affairs. In their examination of such domestic sources¹⁰ or internal factors¹¹ as Parliament, political parties, the mass media and public opinion, few researchers differentiated among types of interest groups or the specific issue areas in which the groups converged with and diverged from the policies of government. Moreover, even in the few available case studies, explanations of the groups' influence were based upon either correlative description-inference from the juxtaposition of an interest group with a foreign policy outcome similar to its objectives¹²—or "arbitrary eclectism... a highly selective and incomplete sample of the analytical possibilities."¹³ Thus most empirical research was characterized by "implicit analysis... highly descriptive and theoretically unadorned narratives that contained very little

systematic analytic evidence."¹⁴

A large part of the research problem can be traced to the operationalization of the concept of influence. Though influence is an important theoretical concept, it is almost impossible to measure not only because of the lack of agreement on its definition,¹⁵ but also because of the difficulty of evaluating the impact of interest groups on a foreign policy action¹⁶ and the reliability of the sources of empirical data upon which any such judgement must be based. The main problem is the weighing of the influence of pressure groups relative to that of external factors in a foreign policy decision. Even if explanatory alternatives are limited to domestic factors, the basis of a ranking of importance of the various interest groups as well as the political parties and the mass media is far from obvious. In addition, one of the main sources of empirical data, decision-makers' accounts of the influence of the various factors, is often of questionable validity. The explanations of the foreign policy elite are usually ex post facto rationalizations designed in many instances to ensure their rightful place in history. Therefore, in the absence of valid means to measure the concept of influence, researchers can only speculate as to the impact of interest groups on the making of foreign policy decisions.

Because it is impossible to validly infer group influence on a governmental policy or decision, a more immediate research goal is to assess the type of interest group response and in particular

their support or opposition in relation to the actions of the government. As a consequence, the principal focus of this study will be the scope and range of activity of Canadian interest groups on the Pakistan civil war. This is a fundamental prerequisite to further analysis of the role interest groups play in the foreign policy process.

Canadian researchers have suggested two sets of variables to explain the pattern of response of Canadian interest groups to external events: the structural characteristics of the groups and the contextual factor of public attitudes. The former includes the type of group, and its internal and external links. The latter focusses on the degree of public support for government policies.

The main set of explanations originate from the structural characteristics of the interest groups. Analysts expect that groups with broad societal functions will adopt a cautious, non-political role because of the importance of benefits from a continued good relationship with the Canadian government or conversely because of the fear of government reprisals for any attempt to exert influence on official policy. For example, in the Nigerian civil war, the vast majority of institutional groups, with the exception of the Presbyterian church, concentrated its activities on non-political fund raising activities. In contrast, ad hoc and issue-oriented groups that were formed on a short-term basis, for the exclusive purpose of altering a specific policy or decision of the government, are

considered as more likely to take an active political role to pressure the government; the nature of their organization deprives the government of countervailing leverage. In the Nigerian case, ad hoc groups of concerned Canadians and immigrant Nigerians sought to modify the Canadian policy in favour of Biafra.¹⁷

A subset of structural explanations traces the response of a group to its links or ties to other societal groups. One researcher postulated that if a group participates in a coalition of interest groups there is a trade-off point at which members are able to cooperate in pursuit of objectives which do not entirely satisfy any member organization, but which each can accept as being meaningful and worthwhile.¹⁸ During the Nigerian civil war, the minimum condition of cooperation by the participating voluntary agencies of the Nigerian/Biafra Relief Fund was the acceptance of a non-political role for the coalition because of the members' concern that their impartiality and their future operations would be jeopardized if the coalition made any concerted attempt to influence the government.¹⁹ Of particular importance, the degree of financial dependency upon the government is also considered likely to limit any group predisposition for engaging in "political activities."²⁰

The second set of potential explanations is the contextual factor of public opinion. Researchers suggest that generalized public support of government policies results in the low volume of explicitly articulated interest group demands that diverge from the

policies of the Canadian government.²¹ Such policies as Canadian aid to the developing nations,²² continued support of the United Nations,²³ and participation in the UN intervention in the Korean war²⁴ received widespread public support. When public opinion was fragmented on the basis of language in the conscription crisis during the two world wars, interest group activity was considerable.²⁵ Generally, however, the public consensus on Canadian foreign policy initiatives has meant that interest groups have rarely opposed the politics of the government.

Thus any analysis of the patterned response of Canadian interest groups to foreign policy can examine both structural and contextual determinants. The structural set focusses attention on the degree of institutionalization of groups, and the type of external linkages. The contextual set underlines the degree of public support for the policies of the Canadian government.

B. Hypotheses

Drawing upon the principal explanations of the pattern of response of Canadian interest groups, the following hypotheses will be examined:

- 1) In response to a civil war in another country ad hoc groups are more likely than established groups to oppose the policies of the Canadian government.²⁶

Ad hoc groups—those formed after the commencement of the civil war in direct response to the event—are more likely than

established groups—those in existence prior to the commencement of the conflict—to criticize the policies of the Canadian government since they are less dependent on an ongoing and constructive relationship with either the government or a large public constituency.

Equally important, the short-term nature of their organization removes any fear of future government reprisal if they are critical of government action. Established groups are thus likely to support the policies of the government because of concern over their future relationships with the governmental and private sectors, and their public image.

- 2) In response to a civil war in another country established groups that have no ongoing links with that country are more likely to oppose the policies of the Canadian government than established groups that have such links. 27

Established groups that engage in programs such as development assistance in foreign countries are often dependent upon the permission and the good will of their host governments in order to carry out their operations in the field. They are unlikely, therefore to oppose policies of the Canadian government that support a central government in a civil war. Similarly, established groups that have commercial interests either with private or governmental groups in the country undergoing civil strife would be unwilling to jeopardize them by denouncing the policies of the Canadian government that support the central government. Established groups that are not constrained by such links would be more likely to contest the policies of the Canadian government.

- 3) In response to a civil war in another country, interest groups that have no financial links to the Canadian government are more likely than interest groups that have such links to oppose the policies of the Canadian government.²⁸

Interest groups that finance relief assistance largely through contributions from the government will not jeopardize their financial and relief capacity by statements and/or actions that are critical of the government. This would be especially unlikely in an international emergency situation where it is highly improbable that the groups have sufficient funds or supplies on hand to meet the crisis. There is also the added consideration of future applications for governmental grants.

- 4) In response to a civil war in another country interest groups that have no organizational links with a coalition of groups are more likely than interest groups that have such links to oppose the policies of the Canadian government.²⁹

The decision to form a coalition of groups would moderate any inclination to criticize the policies of the government. Because cohesiveness in an alliance of groups with diverse interests is essential, the costs and consequences of criticism of the government are substantial. This is especially the case when one of the primary functions of the coalition is fund raising.

- 5) In response to a civil war in another country, when public attitudes are largely supportive of the government interest groups will articulate few explicit demands that oppose the policies of the Canadian government.³⁰

Given the fact that the majority of active interest groups are established ones that are dependent to a large extent upon public sup-

port, it is unlikely that they will actively oppose the policies of the government when public opinion is supportive of the government's policies. They would be especially reluctant to alienate public opinion on an issue that is not a primary goal of the group. Moreover, since the government frequently uses measures of public support to counter criticisms of its policies, few groups would risk the loss of scarce resources to criticize government policies, if the government has the overwhelming support of public opinion.

The author acknowledges that the hypotheses based upon the structural and contextual variables are potentially contradictory. When the two variables operate in different directions, structural variables will likely be more important than contextual factors. Firstly, public opinion is dependent upon the attentive public for its information and evaluation of foreign policy events. Secondly, the mobilization of public opinion to support or condemn the policies of the government is the result of the conscious efforts of interest groups. After the examination of the empirical data, the importance of structural and contextual factors in the response of pressure groups can be assessed with greater confidence.

C. Methodology

To examine these hypotheses, the central concepts must be made operational, the criteria for inclusion of groups in the project must be made explicit, and the sources of evidence to operationalize

the structural and contextual variables must be established. Moreover, to assess whether the principal interest groups supported or opposed Ottawa's policy during the civil war in Pakistan, it is necessary to establish the policy position of the Canadian government. Once government policy has been established, it serves as a yardstick against which support or opposition can subsequently be measured.

Five concepts are central to this research: the foreign policy response by government to a civil war abroad; interest groups; support and opposition; structural linkage; and the contextual factor of public support. The first, the foreign policy response of a government to a civil war,³¹ can be broken down into three components. The diplomatic component comprises those actions by members of the government which indicate endorsement or criticism of either side. At one extreme of a continuum of support are public statements of approval for the actions of the central government in the war-torn country and/or criticism of the secessionists. Further along the continuum is a refusal to comment on the internal affairs of another government and a refusal to place the issue on the agenda of a regional or international organization. Although it is frequently difficult to establish inaction, government spokesmen in their explanation of policy occasionally do refer explicitly to a principle of non-intervention. An indicator of negative support would be public criticism of the actions of the central government in the civil war

and in particular a request that a regional or international organization discuss the civil war. A still stronger indicator is a public statement of approval for the secessionist side, a form of de facto recognition. Lastly, at the other extreme in policy is the official or de jure recognition of the secessionist government. During the Nigerian civil war, for example, the Canadian government refused to place the fighting in Biafra on the agenda at the United Nations, arguing that such an action would constitute unjustified intervention in the internal affairs of another state.³²

The next area of government response, economic support, includes all economic aid, other than military assistance that a government could extend to either side in the civil war. This includes trading and commercial relations as well as humanitarian relief, both monetary and material loans, grants and personnel. At one extreme is a policy of support for the central government. Normal trade and commerce is maintained between the two countries. Existing development assistance continues and/or new agreements are negotiated. Any humanitarian relief is sent either directly to the central government and/or through channels that have its approval. At the other extreme is a policy of support for the secessionist regime. Existing assistance programs are discontinued as a matter of policy rather than necessity because of the conflict, and/or new agreements are precluded. Humanitarian relief is sent either under strict international supervision or directly to secession-

ist forces through channels that have not received the approval of the central government. Lastly, trade or commercial transactions between the two countries may be embargoed. During the Nigerian civil war the Canadian government, complying with the wishes of the Nigerian government, was unwilling to supply humanitarian aid either directly or indirectly to Biafra. While the Canadian government supported the work of agencies such as the International Red Cross, it refused to aid the work of a Canadian aid consortium, Canairelief, that was supplying assistance to Biafra, since the latter's activities had not been sanctioned by Nigerian authorities.³³ Canadian development aid also continued to the Nigerian government and there was no disruption of normal commerce between the two countries.

Lastly, military support includes direct involvement, assistance through a less direct strategy of compellence or deterrence, or military aid. When military support is direct, the government sends a contingent of its armed forces to participate in the fighting in the theatre of conflict. A government may abjure such direct involvement but may issue warnings of potential military action or engage in military manoeuvres to deter or compel either side or their allies. Lastly, military aid includes the transfer of equipment and support services, through sale or loans which finance the purchases, to either of the parties in the conflict. Governments may also embargo shipments of strategic supplies in the pipeline to one of the

parties and, in so doing, indicate strong support of the other. During the Nigerian civil war, for example, Ottawa expressed its support of the federal regime by continuing to sell and ship Canadian military equipment to Lagos³⁴ and by permitting Nigerian military officers to receive training in Canada.³⁵ Ottawa refused, moreover, to agree to the request of a coalition of groups organizing relief aid to permit daytime flights into a Biafran airstrip because the landing strip was being used for arms shipments.

A second principal concept is that of interest groups. An interest group is an aggregation of people organized to pursue shared objectives. Any group that articulates objectives and responds with political or economic action to the civil war is considered part of the relevant domestic environment. The group need not attempt to gain access to and influence those who are constitutionally empowered to define, make or administer Canadian foreign policy. An ad hoc group is defined as any group that was formed after the civil war began in direct response to the event. An established group is defined as any group that was in existence prior to the commencement of the conflict.

To analyze the activities of pressure groups, a third concept—that of support and opposition in regard to the policy of the government—must be measured. Support includes all statements that approve of the diplomatic, economic, or military responses of the Canadian government and actions that parallel them.

The highest level of support would include both statements of support for the actions of the government and attempts to mobilize their membership and other groups to reinforce the policies of the government. At an intermediate level of support, group leaders publicly declare their approval of the policies of the government.

At the lowest level, group action would parallel that of government and would not, directly or indirectly, constrain or contradict the government.

The opposite type of response, opposition to the government, consists of all activity contrary to government diplomatic, economic or military policies. The strongest dissenting actions are those that are consciously designed to either constrain or modify government policy. This includes statements and actions undertaken to mobilize either their membership or other groups to pressure the government to change its policy. More moderate are public statements that are critical of governmental policy. The lowest level of opposition is activity that either directly or indirectly, constrains government policy. To measure support and opposition, the publications of relevant interest groups can be monitored to assess their treatment of the conflict abroad and Canada's response to it. Examination of the amount and kind of coverage, as well as editorial comment, should index, albeit indirectly, their attempt to mobilize their membership on behalf of, or in opposition to, government policy.

Interest groups also vary in the scope and number of the structural linkages they have developed. Some may have permanent links with their own government or with the participants in the civil war through ongoing relationships. These relationships may be political, economic, or sociocultural, they may be direct or indirect. They may, for example, directly administer programs or indirectly supply material or personnel for the programs of related groups. Many groups are linked financially to their own government, since they rely on governmental grants, loans, or services to support their programs in the field. When an interest group receives more than half of all its relief funds from government sources, it is considered to be structurally linked. The scope of structural linkage would be more validly measured if data on the financial structure of the group prior to the outbreak of conflict in the field were available. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. Most groups use different calendar and financial years and some are reluctant to supply a detailed breakdown of their financial sources. Lastly, organizational linkage to a coalition of interest groups is defined as participation in any alliance of groups organized to respond to the conflict abroad. Participation can include either constituent or associate membership while the response can be political and/or economic.

The final concept to be operationalized is the contextual factor of public consensus. Public opinion data would be the most valid and reliable measure of the degree of public consensus on the poli-

cies of the Canadian government. However, public opinion regarding Pakistan, Bangladesh and Canada's policy was not polled. In the absence of survey data, editorial comment of newspapers in various regions of the country was used as an indirect measure of public opinion. The degree of consensus among editorialists is measured both directly and indirectly. Direct measurement includes a comparison of the degree of editorial approval of the Canadian response to the civil war as well as the proportion of editorials that either focussed on, or referred to government policy. Approval is defined as any editorial support of an action, decision, or policy of the Canadian government. The degree of consensus is measured indirectly by comparing anglophone and francophone editorial references to parallels between Pakistan's situation and that of Canadian federalism. The comparison includes the relative number of both of references and prescriptions for Canadian foreign policy that flowed from the parallels editorialists drew.

Generally groups are selected for analysis if they were active in Pakistan prior to the civil war or became active once the war began. Groups which meet the first criterion are: the Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship; the Canadian Red Cross Society; the Canadian UNICEF Committee; CARE of Canada; Centre d'Etude et de Co-opération Internationale; the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada); Oxfam of Canada; Operation Eyesight Universal; the Roman Catholic development agency, the Canadian Catholic Organization for

Development and Peace, and two orders—Les Frères et Les Pères de St. Croix; The Salvation Army of Canada.³⁶ Church groups selected within the second criterion are: the Canadian Council of Churches; The Anglican Church of Canada; the Baptist Federation of Canada; the Lutheran Church; The Presbyterian Church in Canada; the Religious Society of Friends; The United Church of Canada; and the Student Christian Movement in Canada. Voluntary agencies which meet this second criterion are: the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Canadian Save the Children Fund, Canadian University Services Overseas, Canadian UNICEF Committee, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, World University Service of Canada and World Vision of Canada.

Four groups were organized ad hoc to respond to the civil war. The Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief was a coalition of church and voluntary organizations, including the Canadian Red Cross Society, the Canadian Council of Churches, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, the Canadian Save the Children Fund, the Canadian UNICEF Committee, CARE of Canada, Oxfam of Canada, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and World Vision of Canada. The South Asia Crisis Committee, a small university-based group concentrated on educating students about the needs of the people of East Pakistan and the necessity of relief fund raising. The Bangladesh Association of Canada, composed of citizens and students from East Pakistan, and the Canadian Com-

mittee for the Independence of Bangladesh, a small Toronto-based group, were also formed after the outbreak of the civil war to promote the cause of an independent Bangladesh.

Evidence on the scope, direction and intensity of pressure group activity was drawn from four sources: the annual reports of a group, its official publications, interviews with group members, and coverage in newspapers and magazines. The official position of a group is usually articulated either in the minutes of its annual or executive meetings and/or in statements and explanations that appear in its official publications. Activities of a group are also frequently covered in its journals and newspapers. In all cases, interviews and correspondence with members of the organizations were used where possible to supplement publicly available sources.

At least one major newspaper from each of the provinces with the exception of Prince Edward Island was selected for analysis.

They included The Evening Telegram of Newfoundland, The Chronicle Herald of Nova Scotia, The Telegraph Journal of New Brunswick, La Presse of Quebec, The Toronto Star of Ontario, The Winnipeg Free Press of Manitoba, The Star-Phoenix of Saskatchewan; The Edmonton Journal of Alberta and The Vancouver Sun of British Columbia. Also included were the principal publications of the two major urban centres; for Toronto—The Globe and Mail, and for Montreal—Le Devoir, The Gazette and The Montreal Star, and The Ottawa Citizen from the nation's capital. Lastly, in order to insure

an adequate francophone component, Montréal Matin, Le Soleil and Le Droit were chosen.

Before the content and direction of interest group advocacy is examined, a brief review of Canadian policy towards Pakistan before the critical period of civil strife is in order. Prior Canadian policy provides the framework for the interpretation both of Ottawa's response to the civil war and the broader domestic activity once the war began in 1971.

D. A Perspective: Canadian Policy Before 1971

Prior to 1971, Canadian relations with Pakistan ranged across a series of issues in a variety of formats. South Asia was a traditional focus of Canadian interest through its involvement in the Commonwealth. Although Canadian activity in India generally received greater attention, Canada's relations with Pakistan were both formal and informal across a range of policy issues. Ottawa had established a series of economic, diplomatic and military relationships before the crisis of 1971. Voluntary agencies within Canada, private businesses, and the Pakistani immigrant community were prominent in trans-national activity, but government-to-government interaction especially on economic issues, was more important.

Canada has provided considerable development assistance to Pakistan over the years. With the exception of India, Pakistan was

the largest individual recipient of Canadian assistance funds in the post-war period.³⁷ Assistance was concentrated in three sectors: electric power, food aid and industrial commodities.³⁸ Canada was Pakistan's main partner in the development of its power system through such projects as the Warsak hydro dam and the Karachi nuclear power plant.³⁹ Indeed, the majority of Canada's exports to Pakistan consisted of goods and services tied to loans and grants within the aid program. The flow was determined by the amount of financial assistance that the Canadian International Development Agency and the Export Development Corporation could provide.⁴⁰ Canadian development assistance to Pakistan was principally coordinated through the Aid to Pakistan Consortium of the World Bank but also by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and the United Nations Development Program.⁴¹ Canada ranked fourth among official donors of aid to Pakistan and was less restrictive as to proof of the results of its programs than some of the more prominent donors.⁴²

Before the civil war, Canada concentrated its economic assistance principally in East Pakistan, the poorer half of the country.⁴³ The Canadian International Development Agency financed hydroelectric projects in the eastern wing and enlisted Canadian business firms and teachers to train Pakistan personnel to operate these plants.⁴⁴ The Agency also provided grants to two Roman Catholic voluntary agencies to carry out educational and social service projects in

small villages.⁴⁵ Lastly, the government was in the process of providing two and a half million dollars of emergency assistance because of the cyclone and tidal wave disasters that had struck East

Pakistan in November 1970.⁴⁶

Canada's diplomatic ties with Pakistan developed within the larger context of Canadian-Indian relations and the antagonism between these two South Asian rivals.⁴⁷ The bitter conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir shaped early Canadian policy in the region. Immediately after partition of the subcontinent, Canada was a participant in the United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan on the Kashmir border. Subsequently, Ottawa joined the India-Pakistan Observer Mission for a short period after the war between the two states in 1965.⁴⁸ When the Canadian Prime Minister visited Pakistan in January 1971, he could not avoid issues arising out of regional tension. The President of Pakistan urged Prime Minister Trudeau that Canada require India to submit to the same standards of nuclear safeguards that Pakistan had agreed to in accepting Canadian nuclear assistance. Pakistan had accepted the International Safeguard System of the International Atomic Energy Agency while India had made no such commitment to Canada.⁴⁹ Traditionally, India has been more central to Canada's foreign policy concerns in the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the third world.⁵⁰ Canadian policy toward Pakistan developed in the shadow of Ottawa's relationship with India and the evolution of regional con-

shift into bilateral relations.

Canadian Pakistan military relations were not extensive. They centered primarily on the sale of "non lethal" military equipment, the only permissible kind of export.⁵¹ Sales of gas turbine engines, replacement parts for aircraft electrical components, military vehicles, general equipment and field stores⁵² amounted to nine million dollars between 1963 and 1971⁵³ and in some cases short- to medium-term financing was provided by the Canadian government.⁵⁴ Indirectly ninety Canadian F-86 Sabre jets were sold to Pakistan in 1966.⁵⁵ The aircraft, which had originally been sold to West Germany in 1957, were in turn resold to Pakistan through an Iranian intermediary without the required Canadian permission for the resale of these military aircraft that had been built under an American design license.⁵⁶ Lastly, some officers of the Pakistan armed forces attended the Canadian Forces Staff College in 1963, 1965, 1967, 1968 and 1969 under a plan sponsored by the Canadian Forces for foreign officers.⁵⁷

Prior to the outbreak of the civil war, church and voluntary aid organizations were prominent in trans-national interaction.⁵⁸ In the majority of cases, Canadian agencies sent funds, material and personnel to their respective parent or affiliated organizations that were administering development assistance programs in Pakistan. Six organizations (the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, the Canadian Red Cross Society, the Canadian

UNICEF Committee, CARE of Canada, Oxfam of Canada, and Operation Eyesight Universal)—supplied only funds.⁵⁹ Four organizations (the Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship, Centre d'Etude et de Co-opération Internationale, the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada), and the Salvation Army of Canada) sent funds and personnel.⁶⁰ Only two Roman Catholic Orders, les Frères de St. Croix and les Pères de St. Croix, actually carried out aid programs though these were nominally under the supervision of their parent body, the Congregation of the Holy Cross.⁶¹ These two Catholic orders were active mainly in the areas of education, social services and co-operatives and were the only agencies to have their programs funded by the Canadian International Development Agency.⁶²

Businessmen and Pakistan immigrants in Canada were two other non-governmental groupings that had ties with Pakistan. Some Canadian firms supplied material or services for Canadian assistance programs. When the civil war began in East Pakistan, three Canadian engineering firms were working on projects that were financed by CIDA. These were Acres International of Niagara Falls who was consultant to East Pakistan's Water and Development Authority, and W.P. London of Niagara Falls and Pelletier Engineering of Montreal who were working on the construction of hydro lines.⁶³ The activities of the Pakistan immigrant community in Canada were restricted to immigration inquiries and to participation in such symbolic events as the celebration of Pakistan Independence Day. Participation in

these festivities were usually coordinated with the High Commissioner of Pakistan to Canada.⁶⁴ The community was also in the process of organizing a relief fund in response to the natural disaster of November 1970 in East Pakistan.⁶⁵

In summary, before the civil war, the provision of development assistance by the Canadian government was the most important arena of interaction. Diplomatic relations were less salient and were largely the product of the international repercussions of regional tensions. Strategic links were exclusively commercial and limited to the modest sale of Canadian military equipment to Pakistan's armed forces. Lastly, even the trans-national activities of business and voluntary groups were variants of the focal point of the government-to-government relationship: Canadian economic assistance to Pakistan.

In 1971, however, the dramatic events in Pakistan made the continuation of Canada's low profile increasingly unlikely. The escalation of the domestic conflict to a war between the two wings of Pakistan and its spillover into India, made tacit neutrality virtually impossible. Government leaders, particularly those in the Commonwealth and in the United States, expressed their concern about the growing numbers of refugees, the escalating violence, and the intervention of foreign powers. Government officials, church groups, voluntary agencies, and newspaper editorialists throughout Canada were no exception. They too expressed their opinion about the

issues in dispute.

Chapter II describes the diplomatic, economic, and military response of the Canadian government to the civil war in Pakistan.

Chapter III documents the response of the churches, while Chapter

IV examines the activities of voluntary agencies. Chapter V studies the response of groups organized in response to the civil war.

Chapter VI considers the contextual factor of public support by reviewing editorial responses across the country. Chapter VII concludes with an examination of the evidence for the explanation of the response of Canadian interest groups in crises abroad.

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CHAPTER II

THE RESPONSE OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

This chapter examines the economic, diplomatic, and military policy of Canada in response to the Pakistan civil war to provide a yardstick for assessing the support and opposition of interest groups. These three aspects have been isolated and arranged thematically to provide a measure by which their relationship to the Canadian government response to the 1971 internal conflict in Pakistan may be assessed.

A. Diplomatic Response

... the best solution would be a duly elected democratic government in Pakistan. This may seem a remote possibility ... but ... it would be irresponsible to recommend the division of Pakistan, a country already in dire economic straits, into two separate and weaker states. It may be that this will turn out to be the only solution; whether it would be the best solution is another matter.¹

(The Minister for External Affairs, July 10, 1971.)

Canadian diplomatic policy during the civil war evolved from support of the Pakistan government through a refusal to take a public position, to qualified calls for a political solution, and finally to the grant of diplomatic recognition to the new country of Bangladesh.

Canada undertook few diplomatic initiatives in response to a domestic dispute in a country with which it had had cordial diplomatic relations. The rare exceptions to this pragmatic policy were primarily

motivated by concern over regional stability. Thus, with the exception of a few carefully qualified actions, Canada's policy supported the central government of Pakistan until the creation of Bangladesh through the following four phases.

The first phase of Canada's diplomatic response to the civil war consisted of a refusal to comment upon the situation in Pakistan. This position was evident in the earliest official reference to the situation on March 29, 1971, when the Minister for External Affairs was asked in the House of Commons if the Canadian government had made any representations to the government of Pakistan, "particularly with a view to preserving democratic government in that fellow member of the Commonwealth." Specifically, Mr. Sharp replied that inquiries were being made and as soon as they could ascertain the facts, they would consider whether any "useful purpose" would be served by making representations.² He reminded members that "bitter experience should have taught us the dangers of attempting to intervene in civil conflicts of this kind."³ He later revealed that the High Commissioner of Pakistan to Canada had urged the Canadian government to prevail upon other countries not to intervene in the situation.⁴ Mr. Sharp reported that they had made it clear, that until "all the facts" were available, intervention would not "serve much purpose."⁵ Since both sides had engaged in acts of violence, the Minister did not think that "pious declarations" against violence were useful.⁶ This policy stance was tantamount to support

of the central regime of Pakistan.

Canada also refused to raise the issue of the civil war and its possible regional ramifications with either the Pakistan government or the United Nations. Mr. Sharp stated:

... the problem is that we do not yet have the facts. I believe it is important before we take any action for us to know what is going on and not to have to depend ... upon newspaper reports which may or may not have substance.

He explained to journalists that since Canada had no representation in the eastern wing it had no direct information on how much bloodshed was occurring there and until it had all the facts it was not about "to stick its nose in."⁸ Discussing the possibility of a Canadian initiative at the United Nations, he noted that the Secretary General had not undertaken any action: "I can understand his hesitation because I am sure he wants to do something very constructive in the situation and under the circumstances it is very difficult to know how to proceed."⁹ Therefore the only Canadian response to the situation was to consult with the International Red Cross to discover whether there were any "practical ways" to help.¹⁰ Thus, in the initial stages of the civil war, the Canadian government refused to intervene in the internal affairs of Pakistan.

In the second phase, the government's reluctance to diplomatically comment upon the civil war disappeared when, in response to a threat to the regional equilibrium posed by the massive entry of refugees into India, the government publicly recommended a

"political settlement" of this question and not one that involved "too much bloodshed."¹¹ Acutely aware of the problems for the "stability" of South Asia created by the influx of refugees from East Pakistan and recognizing that the origins of the problem lay not in India itself but in Pakistan, with the breakdown of discussions between the central government and the Awami League, the Canadian government decided to urge the Pakistan government to resume the search for "a political solution" which would permit refugees to return to East Pakistan.¹² The government's definition of its preferred political solution then progressed from "the restoration of democratic government"¹³ to the establishment of "democratic civilian rule"¹⁴ and finally to "one in which those individuals who were elected pursuant to the recent election in Pakistan should be given the responsibility of governing Pakistan, particularly East Pakistan."¹⁵ Thus the Canadian government obliquely criticized the Pakistan government in its public prescription of a solution for the civil war in East Pakistan.

Nonetheless, the government was careful to state that any such statements should in no way be construed as a conscious policy of indirect support for the secessionist forces. The Minister for External Affairs stated that while the restoration of democratic civilian government in East Pakistan was "the best solution," he felt that it was only a "remote possibility."¹⁶ Moreover, though the Minister acknowledged that separation might turn out to be "the only solution," to have the Canadian government openly recommend bifurcation of

Pakistan was "irresponsible."¹⁷ The Canadian government therefore made it clear that it recognized and supported only the central government in both parts of Pakistan.¹⁸

The government also sought to avoid having its call for a political settlement linked to support of separation. This was not unrelated to Canada's own internal problem. In a meeting with reporters to clarify the exact position that the government wished to convey, the Minister for External Affairs claimed that the mass media of Quebec had misconstrued his statements in inferring any encouragement of a separate Bangladesh. The Awami League, he pointed out, had called for more autonomy in East Pakistan—not separation. It was suggested to Mr. Sharp that support for those elected meant support for the League, which implied separation. He replied that it didn't, and that the government was "not supporting in any way, any separatist movement anywhere in the world."¹⁹ Thus Ottawa was conscious of the domestic ramifications in its reaffirmation of diplomatic support of Pakistan.

The government also made it quite explicit that Canada would not attempt to initiate international discussion of the question of genocide. When asked whether the government had had any official contact with the Pakistan High Commissioner to Canada with respect to charges of genocide, made by a Pakistan journalist who had fled the country, the Minister for External Affairs replied that he had not and

he added that both the Commissioner and the Pakistan government had "of course denied the charges."²⁰ In response to a proposal that an observation team be sent to investigate charges, Mr. Sharp noted that the Secretary General of the United Nations had not considered it necessary to have inquiries made upon receipt of the complaint of genocide: "I should think it would be incumbent upon the Secretary General, if he felt there was justification, to have such an inquiry."²¹ The Minister even ruled out an initiative by the world organization to deal with regional implications of the civil war because

... there is little that outside governments, no matter how well disposed, can do in a situation of this kind where the contending parties would be understandably sensitive to any attempt to prescribe, much less impose a solution. . . . The ultimate responsibility for reaching that political settlement necessarily rests with the contending parties.²²

Thus the Canadian government supported the Pakistan government by its refusal to undertake diplomatic initiatives in an international forum.

The Canadian authorities, moreover, participated in a conscious attempt by an international organization to refrain from public criticism of the government of Pakistan. On June 21, 1971 Canada attended an informal meeting of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium that had been called to hear a report of a World Bank and International Monetary Fund mission, sent to investigate economic, social, and political conditions in Pakistan.²³ The World Bank decided to delete

key parts of the report in a public copy that was released for the use of the press.

A comparison of the original and the public copy showed four main changes. Firstly, with reference to the army of West Pakistan, the edited version said that normality could be restored to East Pakistan "only when the general atmosphere improved." Then it added that any interim program would have to include as essential elements, "arrangements that would reduce the visibility of the army so as to reduce the major sources of fear among people." However, the unedited version said that it was "most unlikely that any significant movement in the direction of normality" would occur until there was a "drastic reduction in the visibility and physically even the presence of the army." Secondly, the edited version spoke merely of the desirability of appointing a "civilian administration for the province." But the unedited version urged a "re-establishment of normal civilian administration in East Pakistan." Thirdly, on the army's campaign of punitive action against East Pakistan's rebels the edited report implied that the main targets were "known or suspected Awami Leaguers, students or Hindus." It added that "punitive measures [were] fostering fear among the population at large." The unedited version made it clear that punitive actions by the martial-law administration were widespread, whether "directed at the populace or at particular elements," and that these actions had "the effect of fostering fear among the population at large." Fourthly, the edited

version omitted specific eyewitness material relating to conditions in East Pakistan as observed by individual members of the mission. But the unedited version included an account written by economist Hendrik van der Herjden who said the town of Kushtra reminded him of a wartime German town that had suffered strategic bombing. This, he said, was the result of twelve days of punitive action by General Yahya's troops. Qualified informants said that the World Bank had edited its comments because of their fear of offending the government of President Khan.²⁴

Nonetheless, the day after the meeting, Mr. Sharp informed the House of Commons that the report had stated that humanitarian aid was of the highest priority and that the members of the Consortium generally were prepared to provide such aid to Pakistan, though they reserved their position with regard to the provision of development aid. He made no mention of the deletions or of their substance.²⁵ The Canadian government supported the government of Pakistan by its complicity in the suppression of negative public comment by a global organization.

The third phase of the diplomatic response of the Canadian government consisted of a series of diplomatic initiatives to ease or contain "the tension in the subcontinent"²⁶ while continuing to support the Pakistan government. This phase lasted from the first week of August until the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan on December 3, 1971. Canada, along with a dozen other govern-

ments who had special ties to India and Pakistan, decided to take independent initiatives to press the two nations to reach a peaceful solution to the East Pakistan crisis.²⁷ However the government still maintained that Canada believed "in finding domestic solutions to domestic problems" and that this was the outcome to be hoped for in Pakistan.²⁸

As tensions mounted on the subcontinent, the Canadian government tried to impress upon the Pakistan authorities the necessity of a change in their policies toward East Pakistan. On August 11, the Prime Minister sent a note to the President of Pakistan in which he drew the President's attention to the Canadian view that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the imprisoned head of the Awami League of Pakistan, was regarded in many places as the elected spokesman for a large part of the Bengali population. He did not comment on the merits of the central government's charge of treason against the Sheikh, but asked President Khan to consider the positive significance that a unanimous decision might have for Pakistan.²⁹ Two days later the Canadian Prime Minister wrote to President Khan expressing his deep concern over the trend of events in the subcontinent. Mr. Trudeau stated that it was quite clear the flow of refugees from East Pakistan had to be stopped and reversed if the threatening trend of events were to be arrested. He stated that such steps had to be taken internationally and by Pakistan itself to facilitate the return of the millions of displaced persons from India. Although

the Prime Minister was unwilling to suggest the nature of any political settlement, he did express his conviction that successful efforts must be accompanied by measures in East Pakistan that would create a climate of confidence for all Bengalis.³⁰

The government joined with the Soviet Union to recommend the necessity of an internal political settlement. On October 26 in a joint communiqué, issued on the occasion of a visit to Canada by the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, Canada and the U.S.S.R.

... agreed that to maintain peace and to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in that region, it was necessary to achieve an urgent political settlement in East Pakistan that would take into account the legitimate rights and interests of its population and would facilitate a speedy and secure return of the refugees. This would be facilitated if interested parties exercised restraint.³¹

The Canadian government thus began to retreat somewhat from its policy of diplomatic support of the Pakistan government as a regional war became more likely.

Canada also asked India to reconsider their rejection of the proposal made by the Secretary General of the United Nations to station UN representatives on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border to facilitate and encourage the return of the refugees. Pakistan had accepted the proposal. In his message of August 13, 1971 to the Indian Prime Minister explaining the Canadian attitude toward East Pakistan as well as the steps Canada had taken to try to reduce the tension, Prime Minister Trudeau expressed support for Secretary General U Thant's proposals.³² On October 5, the Minister for External Affairs

stated that the Canadian government still supported the views of U Thant and hoped that "some suggestions might still be found acceptable."³³ The President of CIDA repeated the same view in his appearance before the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations when he stated that the Canadian government looked forward to the day when the government of India would be prepared to agree to the proposal of the Secretary General "to facilitate the process of voluntary repatriation of the refugees."³⁴ Mr. Gérin-Lajoie was blunter in his statement on December 2 before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence saying that the Indian government might show "a more open mind" to the suggestion of the Secretary General than the Indian government had shown up to that time and that it should respond "more favourably" to the offer of the Secretary General and welcome specific observers appointed for that purpose.³⁵ The Canadian government thus supported the government of Pakistan in its efforts to prevent a regional conflict with India.

Nonetheless, Ottawa refused to either mediate between India and Pakistan, or to initiate a discussion of their dispute within the United Nations, preferring instead to concentrate on the humanitarian aspects of the situation and to avoid political involvement. The authorities rejected a mediatory role because neither side had welcomed such an effort by nations "in a more strategic position than Canada."³⁶ They also did not feel that a debate in the United Nations

would serve any useful purpose because, despite the warnings of the Secretary General, neither of the two parties nor the members of the Security Council had requested such a discussion.³⁷ Their estimate was that a debate would degenerate into general acrimony.³⁸ The only feasible response to the possibility of war was the "more quiet sort of diplomacy" in either direct discussions between the two conflicting governments or talks between the great powers.³⁹ Canada's best course of action was to place first importance on humanitarian relief to both the refugees in India and to the people of Pakistan. This would avoid "getting mixed up in the internal problems of Pakistan."⁴⁰

The public stance of Canada on October 5, 1971 supported some of the internal policies of the Pakistan government in East Pakistan. In his presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Mr. Sharp stated that there were grounds for optimism in a series of steps that had been taken by the government of Pakistan which had included:

1. The replacement of military government by a civilian council.
2. The announcement of by-elections to fill the seats vacated by the forcible ejection of the Awami League members accused of illegal secessionist activities.
3. The amnesty granted to all political prisoners except for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and certain East Pakistan political figures.
4. The acceptance of representatives of the United Nations to

supervise the return of refugees and to co-ordinate relief and rehabilitation operations.⁴¹

Nor was the Minister critical of President Khan's failure to reply to the Prime Minister's plea for the life of Sheik Mujibur Rahman. The letter was not, in his opinion, of such a nature as to require a reply.⁴² In contrast, the Minister did criticize the secessionist forces in East Pakistan. Their attacks on the transportation system had added to the suffering of the people and had discouraged aid from the international community.⁴³

The government was careful to avoid the appearance of indirect recognition of Bangladesh. When three East Pakistan sailors jumped ship in Montreal and applied for political asylum, the Department of Manpower and Immigration announced that they would be allowed to stay for at least one year at which time their applications would be reconsidered.⁴⁴ Thus the government continued its policy of general diplomatic support for the Pakistan regime, in this particular case by its avoidance of decision.

During the period of open hostilities between India and Pakistan, the Canadian government adopted a policy of non-involvement. Because of the failure of previous Canadian and Commonwealth initiatives the Minister for External Affairs ruled out any new Canadian overtures to either of the disputants. He noted that neither India nor Pakistan had responded to Canada's pleas to settle their dispute peacefully.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, he refused to pass judgement on

either side in the war ⁴⁶ This position neither supported nor criticized the Pakistan government.

The Canadian authorities did make one exception to this policy of non-involvement by a vote on a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1971. This resolution:

1. called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and a withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan border;
2. urged that efforts be intensified in order to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of East Pakistan refugees to their homes;
3. called for the full cooperation of all states with the Secretary General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;
4. requested the Secretary General to keep the General Assembly and the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;
5. decided to follow the question closely and to meet again should the situation so demand;

6. called upon the Security Council to take appropriate action in light of the present resolution.⁴⁷

Canada joined Pakistan and the United States in support of the resolution which India and the Soviet Union opposed and from which the United Kingdom and France abstained.

Mr. Hearn of the Canadian delegation said Canada had voted for the resolution, passed by 104 votes to 11 with 10 abstentions, for two basic reasons: Firstly, because the draft resolution called "unequivocally for a ceasefire in the hostilities between India and Pakistan" which had added "immeasurably to the suffering of the people in the subcontinent" and secondly, because of "the humanitarian appeal" which the draft resolution made on behalf of the refugees. Nevertheless, Mr. Hearn felt that the resolution was deficient in that it included neither specific United Nations arrangements to supervise the ceasefire nor a recommendation that pressed the Security Council to play the role assigned to it by its charter to restore peace.⁴⁸ The Minister for External Affairs had expressed similar views prior to the vote stating that the best response to the outbreak of war was a discussion of the situation in the Security Council since action by the General Assembly was not equivalent to a resolution adopted in the Security Council. He extrapolated from previous occasions, that a general discussion in the United Nations would be "more likely to exacerbate than resolve difficulties."⁴⁹ The Minister reiterated that the objective of his government was to find

a procedure to bring about a settlement and not simply a resolution which condemned participants. Thus, the Canadian government in its response to the war and specifically in its vote at the United Nations, adopted a position that did not diverge significantly from that of Pakistan.

The government also refused to extend diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh. The Minister for External Affairs stated that Canada had not been formally requested to give recognition to Bangladesh nor was it Canada's intention to grant recognition.⁵⁰ Though he acknowledged that there would be pressure from India to recognize Bangladesh, he emphasized it was not Canadian policy at that time⁵¹ since the government did not want to use the question of recognition "as a tool to decide in advance a political situation as India had done."⁵² Even with respect to the right of the people of East Pakistan to choose independence, he noted that the conflict between the right of self-determination and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states was "an unsettled one."⁵³ Therefore, during the Indo-Pakistan war the Canadian government continued its implicit support of the central government.

The fourth phase followed the war's end. The Canadian government still avoided interference in Pakistan's internal affairs despite the collapse of Pakistan's army in East Pakistan, and India's recognition of Bangladesh. The Minister for External Affairs stated that it was neither appropriate nor useful to make

representations to the government of Pakistan for the return of the imprisoned leader of the Awami League to East Pakistan.⁵⁴ Mr.

Sharp also indicated that the government preferred to offer Canadian assistance through the intermediary of international agencies rather than direct communications with civil authorities in East Pakistan.⁵⁵ Thus the Canadian policy of non-interference, with its avoidance of the appearance of even de facto recognition of a new state, supported the central government of Pakistan.

Moreover, the Minister for External Affairs stated that Canada was reluctant to formally recognize the new state of Bangladesh in the absence of an independent government in effective control of the territory, and the continuing presence of the Indian military for the administration of law and order. Questioned on December 20 as to whether Canada had protested the cruelty and savagery that was taking place in Bangladesh and whether assurances had been received from the Indian government that atrocities would be kept under control, the Minister for External Affairs stated that he did not know to which authority Canada could make representations.⁵⁶ When asked to state Canada's policy (as India had requested) with regard to recognition of that country, Mr. Sharp replied that Canada did not intend to recognize Bangladesh since they were not "satisfied that there was a government in that area responsible for administration," saying that "the principal control" rested with the Indian army.⁵⁷ Mr. Sharp later reiterated that until there was evidence of a government

in control in that area, it would be unwise to proceed with recognition or exchange of diplomats with the new state, a policy that supported the central government of Pakistan.⁵⁸

In January Mr. Sharp enunciated the criteria of recognition even more clearly:

Bangladesh would not be recognized as an independent state until Canada was assured its newly formed government was in firm control. Canada's philosophy was that recognition was a means of protecting Canadian interest. I think we ought to adhere to our traditional policy which is to recognize a government when it, itself, is effectively in control and isn't a puppet of someone else. Now we're not yet sure about this because the Indian army is the mainstay of law and order in Bangladesh today.⁵⁹

The Minister emphasized the fact that a local government had not assumed full responsibility for internal sovereignty:

... the presence of foreign troops is a sort of reflection upon the independence of a state. It's one thing if you have troops in because you are trying to protect yourself from outside aggression. . . . If you have troops in, however, for the purpose of enforcing law and order, then I think questions can be raised.⁶⁰

Thus Ottawa continued to extend diplomatic support to the central government of Pakistan by its refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh.

Government spokesmen attributed the delay in establishing diplomatic relations with Bangladesh to Canadian sensitivity to possible Pakistani reaction. Though the Minister for External Affairs initially denied that diplomatic recognition was being withheld to avoid antagonizing Pakistan,⁶¹ a spokesman for his department acknowledged that

one of the factors contributing to Canadian hesitation was uncertainty about the attitudes of the Pakistan government. This spokesman specifically mentioned the possibility that the Pakistan government might sever relations with countries which recognized East Pakistan as a separate nation. He also noted that in addition to being a member of the Commonwealth, Pakistan had a number of Canadian aid projects, particularly in the Western half of the country.⁶² The Minister similarly acknowledged this factor when he stated it would be important to consult with the government of Pakistan on whether it would be possible to maintain normal relations with Pakistan if Canada recognized Bangladesh.⁶³ On January 26, 1972, despite a statement that Canada would not permit Pakistan to veto a Canadian move to recognize Bangladesh, the Minister said that he would like Canada's decision to be acceptable to Pakistan and its people.⁶⁴ Again on January 31, the Minister stated that Canada would not try to ascertain whether Pakistan intended to sever diplomatic ties should Canada grant recognition to Bangladesh, because "that would be, in effect, [asking] Pakistan's permission." The government preferred to decide this question in accordance with the principles that they followed in recognition.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, he did admit that Ottawa wished to give Mr. Bhutto an opportunity to reconcile the people of his country to the fact of separation. He agreed that "painful and difficult adjustments are bound to be required as a new state comes into being" and that they appreciated the very great problems

that the government of Pakistan was having.⁶⁶ Thus the government supported the Pakistan government as long as possible by its delay in extending recognition to the new state.

The Canadian government justified its hesitation in granting diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh by the fact that few other countries had done so.⁶⁶ On December 16 the Minister for External Affairs reminded newsmen that the Soviet Union had not yet recognized Bangladesh despite its full support of India during the war.⁶⁸ On January 5, a spokesman for the Department of External Affairs noted that only India and the tiny Himalayan state of Bhutan had extended recognition.⁶⁸ He stated that the Soviet Union, India's staunchest ally in the war, had still not granted recognition. Finally, on January 31, the Minister for External Affairs stated that it was notable that only a few countries had recognized Bangladesh and none of them were African or Islamic.⁷⁰ The Canadian government thus referred to the delay of other countries in granting recognition to Bangladesh, i. e., the lack of effective external sovereignty, to rationalize Canada's hesitancy in recognizing the former East Pakistan.

On February 14, approximately two months after the Minister for External Affairs had stated that the Canadian position would have to take cognizance of the new situation created by the collapse of the East Pakistan army and the Indian recognition of what had been the eastern half of Pakistan, and after similar actions by thirty-four other countries, Canada did finally grant diplomatic

recognition to the independent state of Bangladesh and to the government of Sheik Mujibur Rahman. In a cable to the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, the Canadian Prime Minister stated:

I am happy to inform you that Canada has today accorded full recognition to Bangladesh as an independent state. On behalf of the Government and People of Canada, I wish to extend greetings and best wishes to you and your government. It is our sincere desire that harmonious and mutually beneficial relations may develop between our two countries and that these relations will be enhanced through an association within the Commonwealth.⁷¹

In making the parallel announcement, the Minister for External Affairs stated that the delay in formal recognition had only been a matter of timing. Mr. Sharp observed that it had been evident to all for some time that a new state was emerging in what was East Pakistan. Once the generally accepted legal criterion of an independent government in effective control of a defined territory had been met, and after many states had recognized Bangladesh, only the timing of Canada's recognition remained to be decided. The Minister for External Affairs announced that the government had "taken careful account" of the very great problems facing the government of Pakistan in the formation of the new state.⁷²

After the formal announcement, the Minister attempted to clarify the government's principal reasons for the previous delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bangladesh. He pointed out that the presence of Indian troops and bilateral considerations with Pakistan had been resolved sufficiently to allow Canada to make the

decision. Mr. Sharp admitted that at the end of 1971, he had pointed to the presence of the Indian army in Bangladesh as sufficient reason for a delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations. But given the announcement of the expected withdrawal of the Indian army, he felt that the sovereignty of the Sheikh's government was not compromised, even though units of the Indian forces still remained in East Pakistan. Mr. Sharp also stated that President Bhutto had had time to accustom the Pakistan people to the separation of Bangladesh.⁷³

In summary the Canadian government, in its diplomatic posture either expressed approval of the actions of the Pakistan central government or refrained from comment upon its internal affairs. Minor exceptions to this policy were undertaken only in an attempt to avert a regional conflict and to reaffirm Canada's humanitarian concerns. Thus Canada did not grant de facto recognition to the secessionist forces, and, even after the Indo-Pakistan war, delayed de jure recognition of the new state of Bangladesh in a diplomatic response that seemed at best open to multiple interpretations.

The primary motivation for Canada's diplomatic response was apprehension over regional instability tempered by pragmatic external and domestic concerns. The fear of civil war escalating into a regional and, even possibly, an international conflict motivated

both the appeals for a political settlement and the diplomatic memos to the Pakistan and Indian leaders. However, realpolitik reinforced by diplomatic protocol and Canadian commitment to federal structures biased Canadian policy toward support of the Pakistan government, and, in particular, towards delaying the recognition of Bangladesh.

Canadian diplomatic initiatives had as a principal objective the preservation of regional peace. Since the influx of refugees threatened the always delicate equilibrium of South Asia,⁷⁴ the Canadian government issued a series of statements that stressed the necessity of a political solution in Pakistan to allow the return of the displaced population. The Prime Minister sought to encourage the necessary conditions for such a return through notes to the Pakistan and Indian heads of government.⁷⁵ His plea on behalf of Sheik Mujibur Rahman was made because of the possible negative external repercussions of the proceedings.⁷⁶ And Canada joined with the Soviet Union to urge a political settlement⁷⁷ in order to defuse what the Minister for External Affairs had earlier described as "the tension building up in the subcontinent."⁷⁸ Thus concern that the civil war might escalate to a regional war with international ramifications was an important motivating factor in the diplomatic response of Canada.

Nonetheless pragmatism formalized in diplomatic protocol circumscribed the limits of Canadian diplomatic initiatives. Though the

government recognized that its preferred solution, i.e., the restoration of a duly elected government in Pakistan, was only "a remote possibility," it felt it would be irresponsible to recommend what was likely to be "the only solution," i.e., the separation of East Pakistan.⁷⁹ Therefore, Canada refused an open and public statement of support for the "primary objective" of the secessionist forces, the independence of Bangladesh.

The government was especially careful to isolate Canadian diplomatic actions from any hint of support of separatism with its implicit link to the problems of Canadian federalism. Despite the insistence by the Minister for External Affairs that the Canadian government did not have "an obsession with our own separatists here,"⁸⁰ the day after his statement supporting the restoration of democratic government under civilian rule, he went to great lengths to make quite clear that Canada neither supported nor had any intention of supporting any separatist movement either in East Pakistan or elsewhere.⁸¹ He later reminded the members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence that Canadian Parliamentarians had to think in terms of whether they would like other countries "to interfere in our affairs and on what conditions."⁸² Ottawa thus consciously avoided creating a precedent through its diplomatic response to the civil war that could be applied to Canada's own domestic dispute.

The government also refused to undertake diplomatic action at the United Nations because it did not perceive that organization

as a viable means of responding to the situation. It rejected any Canadian initiative to raise the issue of civil war at the world organization because it did not feel that such a move would be "the most effective means."⁸³ Ottawa continued to adhere to this position even as tensions rose between India and Pakistan. Thus the Canadian decision not to undertake action on multilateral levels was utilitarian and practical; it was based upon considerations of effectiveness.

While Canada was not in favour of the use of the United Nations, its representatives used international quiescence as an excuse for inaction. The government declined to undertake an initiative at the UN even with reference to the question of genocide, citing, in particular, the Secretary General's reluctance to formally place the question of the civil war on the agenda of the world body.⁸⁴ Thus Canada drew upon the inactivity of the United Nations to justify its own policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan.

The government was especially pragmatic in its decision to delay the extension of diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh. Given the possibility of reprisals by Pakistan, Canadian authorities sought to minimize negative diplomatic repercussions by delaying the establishment of diplomatic relations until the basis for retaliatory action had diminished. The Pakistan government's release of the East Pakistan leader Sheik Mujibur Rahman meant not only that a political leader was available to assume political control of a new government,⁸⁵ but more important, that Pakistan's President had accepted the inevitability of the division of his country.⁸⁶ Next, the decision by Paki-

stan to maintain diplomatic relations with Commonwealth countries that recognized Bangladesh, despite Pakistan's withdrawal from that organization, further reduced the prospect of reprisal.⁸⁷ In addition, the growing number of countries which had accorded diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh enabled Canada to do the same without appearing to initiate the international legitimization of the new government.⁸⁸ Thus the Canadian government sought to minimize the negative consequences when it reduced its support of the central government of Pakistan.

When the Minister for External Affairs modified the government's insistence on the withdrawal of Indian forces as a condition for recognition, he indicated the secondary importance of internal sovereignty of an indigenous government as a factor in the Canadian decision to delay the recognition of Bangladesh. In so doing he underlined the pragmatism of Canadian policy. On January 31, the Minister for External Affairs stated that

... though the presence of Indian troops was a cause of concern because of the possibility that the new government was being kept in office by them, the Indian troops were performing other functions: Indian troops were there for the purpose of protecting certain groups against molestation, or even against slaughter by groups within Bangladesh, and this seemed to us to be quite a legitimate purpose. If the present government didn't have people available to protect their groups it isn't really any compromise of their position if they asked the Indian troops 'will you temporarily protect these groups?'... That doesn't mean the authority of the government in governing that area is being compromised by that presence. It is more serious however if their troops are there to see the Mujibur government isn't overthrown.⁸⁹

Yet until that point, the Minister had stressed that the only valid excuse for the presence of foreign troops was an external threat, not the maintenance of internal order:

... the presence of foreign troops is a sort of reflection upon the independence of a state. It's one thing if you have troops in because you are trying to protect yourself from outside aggression... to have foreign troops on your soil under these conditions may not be a reflection on your own independence. If you have troops in, however, for the purpose of enforcing law and order, then I think questions can be raised.⁹⁰

Therefore, once assured of continuing bilateral ties with Pakistan, the Canadian government proceeded to recognize the new state even though Indian armed forces still remained to maintain law and order.

In summary, the Canadian diplomatic response to the Pakistan civil war is best explained as an attempt to preserve regional stability without serious deterioration in Canadian-Pakistan bilateral relations. Canadian diplomatic initiatives were directed towards the improvement of political conditions in East Pakistan so that the refugees would not spark a regional conflagration. However, given the inability of both the United Nations and the Commonwealth to undertake effective diplomatic initiatives, Canadian decision-makers pragmatically discarded futile diplomatic moves that could also undermine Canadian-Pakistan relations and set a dangerous international precedent for Canada's own domestic problem in Quebec. Faced with the incompatible principles of the right of self-determination and

non-interference in the internal affairs of another country, Canadian decision-makers chose non-interference as the most practical option in a situation that risked negative consequences both internally and externally.

B. Economic Response

In our decisions about the aid program in general, we shall be guided by our understanding of the needs of the people of Pakistan, not by any desire to maintain the status quo in that country.⁹¹

(The Minister for External Affairs, July 10, 1971.)

As Pakistan has shown, a decision to continue assistance once a commitment is made and not use the lever which the relationship undoubtedly does provide, is nevertheless a decision inspired by political considerations—in this case, a decision to support (with reservations) the status quo.⁹²

(The President of the Canadian International Development Agency, September 8, 1971.)

The Canadian government provided humanitarian relief and development assistance for Pakistan through bilateral and multilateral channels throughout the civil war. Canada also sent material and financial aid to the Indian government to alleviate the financial burden imposed by the refugees from East Pakistan. In addition to humanitarian considerations, the government also attempted to prevent the outbreak of war between the two historical protagonists. Given its desire to preserve regional stability, the Canadian government felt that it had no other alternative but to prevent further deterioration

of the economic situations in Pakistan and India. A weakened economy might have further increased the exodus of East Pakistan residents into India. In India, the financial costs of maintaining the refugees had already provided sufficient incentive for decision-makers to contemplate the use of force to decrease a growing economic burden. Thus, in its economic response, the thrust of Canadian policy was to sustain Pakistan.

Responding to the civil war, the Canadian government allocated both disaster relief and food aid. The government announced appropriations of over \$22,050,000; fifty thousand on May 4, 1971 from CIDA's budget appropriation for general disaster relief,⁹³ and three supplemental allocations of two million on May 29, 1971,⁹⁴ plus two million on July 22, 1971,⁹⁵ and eighteen million on November 17, 1971.⁹⁶ On July 22, 1971, the government further authorized the release of \$7,000,000 worth of wheat for East Pakistan, originally budgeted as CIDA's total Pakistan 1971/72 food aid allocation.

As a matter of policy, Ottawa separated the situation in Pakistan from that of India and, furthermore, divided the question of humanitarian relief from that of development assistance. The first enunciation of this position was on May 25, 1971, when the Minister for External Affairs stated that Canada was doing its best to meet two problems; that of the refugees in India, and that of Pakistan's condition as well as "the conflicts" that then separated the two parts.⁹⁸ On November 18, the President of CIDA reiterated that

"the refugee problem in India and the misfortunes of the people within East Pakistan were "quite different and distinct problems."⁹⁹ Reporting on his mission to India and Pakistan from October 24 to November 4, he explained that while the basic problem in East Pakistan was the reduced capacity to transfer relief supplies to a dispersed and displaced population because of the destruction of the transportation and communications structures, in India the problem involved actual shortages of food, shelter and clothing due to a massive influx and concentration of refugees.¹⁰⁰ In his appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, the President of CIDA stated, therefore, that the situation and problems in both countries were of a different nature, and indeed they had to be considered "quite separately and distinctly."¹⁰¹ In addition he drew "a thin but definite line" between humanitarian relief and long-term economic assistance in each of the two countries.¹⁰²

Canadian authorities also tried to separate their economic and diplomatic actions. In a speech to the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 18, the President of CIDA, Mr. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, stated that Canada's activities in South Asia would be limited strictly to the humanitarian aspects.¹⁰³ When he appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on December 2, Mr. Gérin-Lajoie emphasized again that the purpose of his mission to the area

was "neither to study the political question nor to examine the military situation on either side of the border between the two countries" but that "the humanitarian question was of course the objective" of his visit.¹⁰⁴

The economic response of the Canadian government to Pakistan during the civil war involved both questions of humanitarian relief and development assistance. Canadian decision-makers considered obtaining permission from the central government of Pakistan to dispatch relief supplies to the eastern half of the country. They emphasized also the desirability of involving the United Nations and its agencies in the distribution and supervision of aid. They examined the continuation of existing Canadian development assistance schemes and the initiation of new programs for Pakistan as well. The government never considered the possibility of discontinuing export assistance programs between the two countries. Priorities in the development of economic policy were relief supplies for secessionist areas and Canadian development assistance for the central government.

Once civil war began, Ottawa faced the primary problem of humanitarian relief for the eastern half of Pakistan. Canada initially refused to dispatch relief because of both the uncertainty of the situation and the absence of an official Pakistan request. On March 29, 1971, the Minister for External Affairs noted that Canada

was still negotiating assistance to Pakistan because of the natural disaster of 1970. Since the situation was still unclear, Ottawa first had to ascertain the facts to decide whether Canada's intervention would be useful.¹⁰⁵ On April 30, 1971, the Prime Minister reported that the Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan had been asked to report on the possibility of the dispatching of large supplies of foodstuffs and other relief items to East Pakistan "if and when they were requested by the government of that country."¹⁰⁶ On May 4 the Minister for External Affairs repeated that Canada had not received from the Pakistan government any request for humanitarian relief. In the meantime, he noted that government officials were seeking through bilateral contacts and multilateral consultations to obtain a balanced assessment of the situation to determine how to make Canada's aid effective.¹⁰⁷ On May 17 Mr. Sharp stated that the government of Pakistan had not yet indicated the extent of need in Pakistan, but had insisted that if relief were to be distributed, it would be through the Pakistan government.¹⁰⁸ By waiting for the request of the Pakistan authorities, the Canadian government gave economic and moral support to the central government of Pakistan.

When the government of Pakistan did request humanitarian relief, the Canadian government refused to send relief supplies until supervisory arrangements for their distribution had been completed. On May 28, 1971, the Minister for External Affairs reported that the Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan was urging the central

government to admit relief supplies under "proper international supervision and control."¹⁰⁹ Subsequently, the Canadian government received assurances from the Pakistan government that relief supplies would be used exclusively for rehabilitation and relief, and that, in their view, there appeared to be adequate facilities to ensure proper distribution for the purposes intended.¹¹⁰ Mr. Sharp then pointedly announced that he was prepared to recommend that Canada send relief to Pakistan only when the Secretary General of the United Nations had indicated that Pakistan would permit the UN to supervise the distribution of such humanitarian relief. This acceptance was announced on June 11, 1971.¹¹¹ Only after the willingness of the Pakistan government to permit adequate surveillance had been confirmed¹¹² and reinforced by a decision of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium of the World Bank to recommend the dispatch of humanitarian relief only "under the surveillance of the United Nations,"¹¹³ did the Canadian government make an official announcement on July 26 of a seven million dollar grant for food to the people of East Pakistan through the World Program of the United Nations.¹¹⁴ The Minister for External Affairs stated that Canada had waited for "the necessary guarantees" so that the food would be properly distributed. He defined these guarantees as "those under the auspices of the United Nations."¹¹⁵ In its conditions for relief the Canadian government appeared to withhold support from the government of Pakistan by its insistence that humanitarian relief be sent to Pakistan only if

the United Nations assumed the responsibility for supervision of that relief.

The Canadian government disbursed a total of \$7,206,630 in humanitarian relief for East Pakistan consisting of surplus wheat, a cash grant and material supplies (see Table 2:1).

TABLE 2:1
Canadian Government Relief Disbursements
for Pakistan

	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Wheat Cost	\$5,199,300	72.2%
Transport of Wheat	1,437,330	19.9
Grant to U. N. E. P. R. O.	500,000	6.9
Relief Supplies Cost	35,000	.5
Transport of Relief Supplies	35,000	.5
Total	<u>\$7,206,630</u>	<u>100%</u>

Canada's main contribution was \$5,199,300 worth of wheat and the \$1,437,330 cost for its transportation via four shipments between September 22 and October 14 to East Pakistan.¹¹⁶ The wheat had been part of the normal Canadian allocation of food aid for all of Pakistan.¹¹⁷ The Minister for External Affairs noted that had they needed to supplement the funds in order to provide the seven million dollars of relief they would have done so; but as it happened "we had the money for the purpose."¹¹⁸ It was stated that the government of Pakistan had agreed that this relief be channelled to

East Pakistan and that it be distributed by the World Food Program.¹¹⁹

The Canadian government also gave a cost grant of \$500,000 to the United Nations on September 16, 1971 to help finance technical and relief personnel that the world organization was sending to East

Pakistan to determine relief priorities and enhance the efficiency of relief distribution.¹²⁰ On November 1, 1971, the government donated

\$35,000. worth of material supplies consisting of 6,000 blankets, 2.2 million capsules of tetracycline, and 7.5 metric tons of canned fish to the League of Red Cross Societies.¹²¹ Canada also absorbed the

costs of approximately \$35,000 to transport these supplies in Canadian Forces aircraft to Pakistan.¹²² The government thus provided tangible economic support for the central government of Pakistan.

However, because of distribution problems, very little, if any of Canada's surplus wheat contribution to Pakistan actually reached the population for which it was intended. On February 23, nine days after Canada had extended diplomatic recognition to the new state of Bangladesh, the Minister for External Affairs revealed that only a little over half of the wheat had been delivered to Pakistan.¹²³ Of the approximately 70,000 tons of relief wheat, only 30,000 tons had been unloaded at Chittagong prior to the commencement of the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971. The remainder had been diverted to Singapore because supply lines and ports in East Pakistan were clogged.¹²⁴ In addition, 7,000 tons worth \$597,330.35¹²⁵ of the undelivered 40,000 tons disappeared in transit because of a dispute

over freight charges and, when recovered, had to be sold immediately because the tropical climate had heavily damaged the wheat.¹²⁶ Moreover, it was uncertain what percentage actually left the ports to be distributed to the population. The President of CIDA stated that by the first week of November (because of the lack of organization in the main port of Chittagong and the disruption of the rail and highway system by the civil conflict) none of the Canadian wheat supplied unloaded in East Pakistan had left the ports of entry to be distributed.¹²⁷ On February 15, the United Nations Secretary General reported that the Canadian wheat supplies in East Pakistan had just been moved from silos in the ports to central supply depots.¹²⁸ Thus very little relief support actually reached the displaced population in East Pakistan.

Though the Canadian government had given the impression that the World Food Program of the United Nations was to distribute the wheat, which was the principal component of Canadian humanitarian relief for East Pakistan, the government of Pakistan in fact disbursed that relief: The World Food Program "merely acted as consignee" for the shipments of Canadian wheat and as such "was not intended to assume any other responsibility."¹²⁹ The World Food Program maintained that while CIDA might have intended, and the government of Pakistan agreed to, the shipment being distributed by the W.F.P., it actually was a bilateral donation from Canada to Pakistan and after the wheat had been offloaded in Chittagong, East

Pakistan, the World Food Program was "not in any way involved in arrangements for either transportation or distribution."¹³⁰ The Canadian government acknowledged in July the fact that the World Food Program was to act only as consignee for the shipments prior to the dispatch of Canadian relief supplies to East Pakistan.¹³¹ On December 2 the President of CIDA stated that, while the United Nations personnel did not distribute the supplies themselves, they could see or try to see that the distribution was done effectively.¹³² Thus the Canadian government, in effect, supported the central government of Pakistan in agreeing to the central government as the distributor of Canadian relief supplies.

In addition, the capacity of the United Nations to perform a supervisory role in the distribution of Canadian relief supplies was extremely doubtful from the beginning because of its limited operations in East Pakistan and its friction with the Pakistan authorities in East Pakistan. Four days after the announcement of the Canadian allocations of wheat relief supplies for East Pakistan, the United Nations and the Pakistan government signed (on July 31) an initial agreement whereby 156 civilian relief and rehabilitation experts under United Nations sponsorship would be stationed in East Pakistan.¹³³ Two weeks after the first shipment of wheat had left Canada, only forty-five United Nations personnel had arrived in Pakistan¹³⁴ and by October 13, the day before the last of the four Canadian shipments of wheat was to leave for East Pakistan, their number had risen only

to seventy-five.¹³⁵ During the first week of November the President of CIDA noted that UNEPRO, which numbered 107, "was only in the process of deploying its staff to nine stations in different districts to monitor the arrival and distribution of food supplies."¹³⁶

The United Nations operation in East Pakistan was hampered also by the Pakistan authorities' imposition of restrictions upon the movement of UN personnel, and their reluctance to regard the United Nations as an independent body rather than as part of their own relief operations.¹³⁷ As a result, on September 20 the Secretary General of the United Nations wrote to the President of Pakistan to put on record his understanding of the principles on which the United Nations efforts were based. He did so, he wrote, to establish good working relationships between United Nations personnel and all those with whom they would have to deal, and to avoid misunderstandings between the government of Pakistan and the United Nations concerning the way in which this operation was to be managed. He reminded the president that in June 1971 "you had welcomed and gave your full support to the United Nations operations being set up in such a way as to give contributors and donors the requisite assurances that the relief provided by and through the United Nations was reaching those for whom it was destined, the people of East Pakistan."¹³⁸ On November 17, one week before the UN operation ceased to function because of the evacuation of most of its personnel due to the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan,¹³⁹ an agree-

ment was finalized under which UNEPRO personnel would enjoy freedom of access and movement in East Pakistan (subject to temporary restrictions for necessary reasons), unrestricted right of communication, and the assurance that all UNEPRO property, equipment as well as relief supplies, would not be diverted for any purposes incompatible with the strictly humanitarian functions of UNEPRO.¹⁴⁰ Since Ottawa dispatched humanitarian relief to East Pakistan without effective assurances as to supervision of distribution of relief supplies, it implicitly supported the central government of Pakistan. Its policy could be explained by the awareness of the urgent need for relief assistance. Nonetheless it acceded to the conditions imposed by Pakistan.

Canadian authorities admitted that they were unable to verify the effectiveness of the supervisory arrangements for the distribution of relief supplies that they had insisted upon as a precondition to their dispatch of humanitarian relief. In his appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Mr. Sharp was questioned about rumours that Canadian food relief was not being distributed exclusively in East Pakistan and some of it had indeed appeared on the black market in West Pakistan. The Minister for External Affairs replied that he was hopeful that the presence of United Nations' observers in Pakistan would help to give "international reassurance." When pressed further as to whether Canada had any direct involvement in the distribution of aid, Mr. Sharp replied that they had "confidence in the United Nations."¹⁴¹ The President of CIDA, in reply to a reporter's query as to how his organization insured that wheat reached the East

Pakistan population in need of relief, stated:

On this we have no direct control. We can only make sure it goes to Chittagong. We do have some information through the U.N. system as to how the food is distributed, at least when it starts from Chittagong. Whether it does in actual practice reach displaced persons and people who are really in need of food aid in East Pakistan we are not able to check.¹⁴²

Thus the Canadian government acknowledged indirectly its support of the central Pakistan government.

A second broad area of economic policy was that of development assistance for Pakistan. During the last week of April 1971, after a series of meetings and consultations at senior levels, the Canadian government decided to continue existing development aid agreements with Pakistan, but not to enter into any new ones.¹⁴³ The government made the decision just prior to Canada's participation in a World Bank meeting of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium that was held on April 30—without Pakistan present—to determine appropriate responses by Consortium members to the changed economic and political situation in Pakistan. The Canadian decision was confirmed on May 31 with Pakistan's declaration of a unilateral moratorium on debt due to Consortium members.¹⁴⁴ The Minister for External Affairs made the first public announcement of the policy on May 26, when, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, he stated that they were "not entering into any new commitments [but rather] carrying on with those that had been made."¹⁴⁵ Canada announced

this formal position at the June 21 meeting of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium in Paris.¹⁴⁶ The Consortium adopted the same position.¹⁴⁷ The Canadian government thus appeared to limit its support of the central government of Pakistan to the short-term.

The Canadian government justified its decision to maintain ongoing aid programs for Pakistan on humanitarian and diplomatic grounds. On May 25 the Minister for External Affairs stated that Canada did not wish to raise additional hardships for the people of East Pakistan by the denial of aid projects that could be of immediate assistance and noted that none of the main donor countries—Britain and the United States—had suspended their relief aid and development aid to Pakistan.¹⁴⁸ The next day the Minister reiterated that Canadian policy on the matter was the same as that of all other donor countries.¹⁴⁹ In reply to the request by India's Foreign Minister on June 15 that Canada refuse all aid likely to reinforce the Pakistan government, Mr. Sharp responded that it would not be to anyone's advantage to increase unemployment or starvation in Pakistan by stopping Canadian aid projects.¹⁵⁰ In early July, the Minister termed an editorial of The Globe and Mail, which urged the suspension of aid to Pakistan, "the kind of simplistic proposal" that took no account of the facts of life in a country whose economy was "balanced on a knife edge." He said there was little in the history of nations to suggest "that throwing a country into chaos serves the common people."¹⁵¹ In his October appearance before the House of

Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, he downgraded the effectiveness of aid as an instrument to force the Pakistan government to change its policy on an internal problem. He stated that "such action would only create difficulties for international relief operations" and hurt those they meant to help. He also observed how "notable" it was that all the various international agencies concerned with development shared this view.¹⁵² The Canadian government thus rationalized a policy that, in effect, supported the central government of Pakistan.

The government defended its policy of no new aid agreements with Pakistan on practical grounds. In his appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on October 5, the Minister for External Affairs stated that after the outbreak of hostilities in East Pakistan, Canada had decided, on the basis of developmental policy considerations, not to enter into any new development commitments with the government of Pakistan. He maintained that the drastically altered economic situation had invalidated existing plans and it would be "wasteful to go on as if nothing" had happened.¹⁵³ The President of the Canadian International Development Agency noted that the political situation in East Pakistan had become "so unstable as to make the provision of new aid rather unfeasible."¹⁵⁴ He informed Pakistan officials in early November that the members of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium had agreed that "the renewal of economic assistance to Pakistan

depended upon the creation of conditions favourable to the effective utilization of aid.¹⁵⁵ In refusing further aid, Ottawa appeared to limit its economic support of the Pakistan government.

Nonetheless the Canadian policy, on aid assistance to Pakistan, still proved to be economically beneficial to the regime of President Khan. The continuation of existing Canadian programs of development assistance meant that Canadian aid projects would continue until the 1974-75 fiscal year.¹⁵⁶ Under existing aid programs, commodities and equipment worth \$19,261,564 were shipped to Pakistan in 1971. The commodity shipments included aluminum, aluminum cables, copper, copperpy lead, zinc, rubber, wood pulp and rapeseed. Included under equipment were nuclear fuel bundles, diesel locomotives' spares, railway track material, telecommunications equipment and transmission line equipment.¹⁵⁷ As a result, Canadian aid to Pakistan reached its highest level in that fiscal year.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, Ottawa's policy did not preclude a Canadian-Pakistani agreement on April 1, 1971 whereby Canada agreed to provide, under the Special Development Loan program, a loan of one million dollars to Pakistan for locomotive supplies. The loan was interest free with a maturity term of fifty years and a grace period of ten years.¹⁵⁹ Finally, Canadian aid projects only effectively continued in West Pakistan throughout 1971, while those in the East were stopped because of the civil conflict.¹⁶⁰ Generally, in its aid programs, Ottawa continued to support the central government of Pakistan during the conflict.

Moreover, even though the publicly stated intention of Ottawa's prohibition of new assistance agreements was to force a change in Pakistan's internal policy, Canadian authorities recognized that the practical effect of its decision to continue ongoing aid projects to Pakistan was support for the central government. Authoritative World Bank officials stated that the June 30 decision of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium, including Canada, recommending that no new development assistance be given to Pakistan, in effect recommended that economic aid be withheld pending a "political accommodation" between President Khan and the insurgents.¹⁶¹ The President of CIDA stated that before Pakistan received any new development assistance, the government of President Khan would not only have to review its aid priorities but also have to restore "civil order to the east wing."¹⁶² But the President of CIDA noted

... some difficult questions were coming in the developmental assistance relationships. The one closest to the headlines during the last few months is the question of whether or not donor nations should continue to let their assistance, which is already committed to flow to Pakistan and even enter into new commitments, or whether they should use this aid relationship as leverage in an attempt to hasten a political settlement in the eastern part of that stricken country.... The question is a very real one: should assistance ever be used as leverage in any circumstances? As Pakistan has shown, a decision to continue assistance once a commitment is made and not use the lever which the relationship undoubtedly does provide, is nevertheless a decision inspired by political considerations—in this case, a decision to support (with reservations), the status quo.¹⁶³

The Canadian government acknowledged that its policy on development assistance effectively constituted support of the central Pakistan government.

Canada's economic response to the problem of the East Pakistan refugees in India was primarily that of humanitarian relief and secondarily that of economic assistance. The Canadian government focussed mainly on the provision of monetary and material relief to aid and supplement the efforts of the Indian government to supply food, shelter and medical care for the millions of East Pakistan refugees who had fled the civil war into the border states of India. Canadian authorities also sought, less successfully, to alleviate the strain that had been placed on the Indian economy in general and to concentrate particularly on development plans through some form of debt relief. In both areas the Canadian government praised the attempts of the Indian government to cope with the massive influx of refugees from the civil war in Pakistan.

Canada disbursed \$7,983,334 in humanitarian relief, principally cash grants and surplus grain for the East Pakistan refugees in India (see Table 2:2). The major part of the relief was \$5,299,400 in cash grants that went partly to constituent organizations of the United Nations,¹⁶⁴ and partly to Canadian non-governmental organizations.¹⁶⁵ The government chose to send funds because many of the needed supplies such as medicine and blankets could be purchased in

India for less than the cost of goods shipped to the area.¹⁶⁶ Since cash grants afforded greater effectiveness of aid the purchase of supplies was left to the recipients.¹⁶⁷ A second form of relief was \$2, 046, 352 worth of rapeseed donated to the government of India and \$355, 182 to cover the cost of transportation.¹⁶⁸ Ottawa decided to provide this type of grain because rapeseed had been confirmed as a high priority requirement in India's refugee support program.¹⁶⁹ The Department of National Defence also absorbed the cost of twelve flights to India valued at \$285, 400. This covered the transportation of refugee relief supplies for the United Nations and for the Canadian Red Cross.¹⁷⁰

TABLE 2:2
Canadian Government Relief Disbursements
for India

	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Rapeseed Cost	\$2, 046, 352	25.6%
Transport of Rapeseed	355, 182	4.4
Grants to UN Agencies	2, 770, 000	34.7
Grants to Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations	2, 529, 400	31.7
Transport of Supplies	285, 400	3.6
Total	\$7, 986, 334	100%

The Canadian government responded to the appeals of the United Nations Secretary General and the High Commissioner for Refugees

with a donation of \$2,770,000 cash to the constituent agencies of the world organization for use in their relief programs for the East Pakistan refugees in India. This included \$2,300,000¹⁷¹ for the UNHCR, \$420,000 for the United Nations Children's Fund¹⁷² and \$50,000¹⁷³ for the World Health Organization. The Canadian Armed Forces also assumed \$232,000 in freight costs for the transport of nearly 325 tons of shelter material destined for UN programs for the East Pakistan refugees in India.¹⁷⁴

Canada channelled part of its humanitarian relief to India through Canadian non-governmental voluntary agencies, in part because of the policy of the Indian government towards foreign personnel and in part to extend support to domestic groups. Ottawa disbursed \$2,529,000 in cash grants to fourteen church and voluntary organizations (see Table 2:3).¹⁷⁵ Ottawa channelled these contributions through Canadian organizations because the Indian government insisted upon using Indian personnel for all relief operations; therefore the government considered that it was easier for small numbers of voluntary organization representatives to operate than for Canadian government officials.¹⁷⁶ In addition, the Minister for External Affairs stated that by making part of Canada's contributions available through local Canadian organizations, they would encourage these organizations in their "voluntary efforts" to raise funds and at the same time "provide tangible evidence" of their support.¹⁷⁷

TABLE 2:3

Canadian Government Relief Disbursements to Canadian
Non-Governmental Organizations

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Anglican Church of Canada	\$125, 000	4. 9
Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace	290, 000	11. 5
Canadian Council of Churches	190, 000	7. 5
Canadian Lutheran World Relief	140, 000	5. 5
Canadian Red Cross Society	750, 000	29. 7
Canadian Save the Children Fund	14, 400	. 6
Care of Canada	290, 000	11. 5
Combined Appeal for Pakistan Relief	100, 000	4. 0
Mennonite Central Committee (Canada)	150, 000	5. 9
Oxfam of Canada	200, 000	7. 9
Salvation Army	50, 000	2. 0
Unitarian Service Committee of Canada	140, 000	5. 5
World University Service of Canada	50, 000	1. 9
World Vision of Canada	40, 000	1. 6
Total	\$2, 529, 400	100%

The Canadian government explained that the material support for the East Pakistan refugees in India would offset, in part, the negative economic impact that these refugees would have on the Indian development plans. Because of the potentially serious consequences for the economy of India, Canada and the other members of the Aid to India Consortium of the World Bank recognized the need for special assistance to prevent cutbacks of development expenditures in India.¹⁷⁸ The President of CIDA stated that the cost of the maintenance of the refugee camps had to be diverted from India's development programs. He considered that the refugees had placed a serious burden on India's limited resources and their continued support threatened to undermine plans for its own social and economic development.¹⁷⁹

The Canadian government demonstrated its concern for the domestic, economic and political considerations of the Indian authorities in their contribution of rapeseed to the Indian government for the East Pakistan refugees. Canadian decision-makers made the costs of the grain (\$2,042,352) and the freight charges of two shipments (\$355,182) separate and distinct from the normal Canadian development assistance budgeted for India.¹⁸⁰ The Aid to India Consortium of the World Bank had recommended such additional help because of the serious consequences of the refugee influx for the Indian economy.¹⁸¹ Ottawa also entered into an agreement with India whereby the population surrounding the refugee camps, particularly infants, would get

the same treatment as the refugees in order to lessen the contrast between the relief support of the refugees and the impoverished inhabitants in the adjacent areas.¹⁸² Canadian relief was not used exclusively for the East Pakistan refugees. Thus in contrast to its policy toward Pakistan, Canadian relief for India to care for the East Pakistan refugees was in addition to normal Canadian development allotments.

Despite public statements by Canadian officials that an effective form of assistance for India would be debt relief, the Canadian government did not implement that recommendation. Both the Minister for External Affairs and the President of CIDA on November 18, stated that India needed some kind of relief to offset the heavy burden placed on her development program by the diversion of development resources to refugee needs.¹⁸³ Since, in their view, the effectiveness of such assistance required the concentrated efforts and cooperation of donors, both stated that Canada was prepared to meet with major donors to discuss this possibility. The report of the CIDA Mission, made public on November 25, mentioned that some donor countries were considering debt relief arrangements that could provide a quick new source of funds for India to meet local costs of the refugee program.¹⁸⁴ However, Canada did not grant India debt relief for Canadian loans as an additional form of assistance to offset the economic burden of the East Pakistan refugees.

In summary, the Canadian government announced total allocations of \$29,050,000 for relief in response to the civil war. Of that amount, \$15,192,964 or 52.5 percent was spent prior to the Canadian recognition of Bangladesh. The disbursements were in two areas: \$7,983,334 for the refugees in India and \$7,206,630 for the displaced population of East Pakistan (see Table 2:4). In India, Canadian relief was supplementary to normal development assistance, while in Pakistan, the aid was diverted from the normal food aid for all of Pakistan. Canadian officials continuously stressed the necessity of differentiating the relief problems of the two countries and the need to isolate the economic from the political aspects of the problem. Pakistan received aid at the same rate as before the civil war but actually received a higher per capita rate because of the refugee flight into India.

TABLE 2:4
Comparison of Canadian Government Relief Disbursements
for Pakistan and India

	Pakistan		India	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Grain Cost	\$5,199,300	72.2	\$2,046,352	25.6
Transport of Grain	1,437,330	19.9	355,182	4.4
Supply Cost	35,000	.5	-	-
Transport of Supplies	35,000	.5	285,400	3.6
Grants to UN Agencies	500,000	6.9	2,770,000	34.7
Grants to Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations	-	-	2,529,400	31.7
	\$7,206,630	100%	\$7,986,334	100%

In its economic policy during the Pakistan civil war, the Canadian government made decisions in the two areas of humanitarian relief and economic assistance. Canadian authorities not only waited for a request from Pakistan to allocate their relief, but also dispatched the food aid with the full knowledge that the wheat would be distributed by Pakistan without effective supervisory procedures, in contradiction to their public statements that the World Food program of the United Nations would serve as distributor. While the decision to postpone any future economic assistance definitely implied that the central Pakistan regime should implement political reforms in East Pakistan, the practical effect of continuing existing Canadian projects provided both symbolic and tangible economic support for the central government of Pakistan.

C. Military Response

... so far as I am aware there will be no arms shipments from Canada on that ship.¹⁸⁵

(The Minister for External Affairs, June 28, 1971.)

The shipment consists of spare parts for the F86 Sabre jet ... which they could use for fighting with, that's for sure. They're military type parts.¹⁸⁶

(The President of Maritime Aircraft and Overhaul Limited, June 30, 1971.)

Three incidents involving strategic and military material arose between Canada, India, and Pakistan during the course of the conflict.

The first involved the shipment of spare parts to the Pakistan air

force—the second concerned the use of Canadian-built Sabre Jets by the Pakistan air force; and the third was the provision of new safeguards for Canadian nuclear assistance to India. The shipment of spare parts was a direct infringement of the March 31 embargo, placed on all strategic military material to Pakistan,¹⁸⁷ and thus constituted indirect military support of the central government of Pakistan. Canadian Sabre jets had been shipped prior to the civil war and their continued use depended upon a supply of spare parts. Finally, in an attempt to strengthen nuclear safeguards Canada seemed to have reacted to the protests of the Pakistan government and thus indirectly lent its support of that government. In its management of strategic issues the Canadian government also supported the central government of Pakistan. This tacit support lasted until Ottawa imposed a total embargo when the activities of a private arms dealer came to light.

The first issue involved the sale of spare parts for Canadian F96 Sabre jets in Pakistan's Air Force by the Maritime Aircraft Overhaul and Repair Limited of Moncton, New Brunswick. The company, which had begun to deal in F86 aircraft in 1963, had purchased all the surplus planes of that design from the Canadian Armed Forces over a period of years prior in order to sell spare parts to countries who bought F86 jets from Canada.¹⁸⁸ Pakistan was among those purchasers and the President of Maritime Aircraft Overhaul and Repair Limited noted that the Pakistanis had been sold the fighters by

Canada "a few years ago."¹⁸⁹ This company had supplied spare parts to Pakistan for this, its major military aircraft,¹⁹⁰ under contracts that dated from 1966¹⁹¹ because Canada was "about the only place" Pakistan could get the parts.¹⁹² In September 1970, the company bought and dismantled sixty-four Sabre jets from the Crown Assets Disposal Corporation under an agreement that precluded the sale of any armaments and with the understanding that they would be sold to Pakistan.¹⁹³ On December 3, 1970, Maritime applied to the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce for export permits covering Sabre parts to Pakistan. The permits were issued on February 9, 1971, and were valid until August 9, 1971.¹⁹⁴ The company then began shipping parts to Pakistan under four contracts that had been obtained over the previous years and continued to do so even after the outbreak of the civil war in March of 1971. In May, the company received a new contract for parts from the Pakistan government.¹⁹⁵

In June, Maritime Aircraft prepared a shipment of forty-six crates of spare aircraft parts for the Pakistan Air Force to be sent via the port of Montreal aboard a vessel of the Pakistani National Shipping Corporation.¹⁹⁶ The company advised government officials of the consignment as early as June 18.¹⁹⁷ And on June 24 the crates arrived in Montreal by tractor trailer and were stored in the warehouse of pier 8 on the Montreal waterfront to await loading aboard the S.S. Padma that was arriving four days later.¹⁹⁸

The transaction first came to public attention through a foreign newspaper report on June 22. An American report stated that a Pakistan freighter, the S.S. Padma, had sailed from New York with a cargo of United States military equipment for the government of Pakistan.¹⁹⁹ The next day, a spokesman for the owners of the ship stated that the ship was due in the port of Montreal on June 28 but that she was not carrying explosives or ammunition and noted that there would be no request for a special permit for hazardous cargo to the harbour master's office in Montreal.²⁰⁰ However, on June 27, the Bangladesh Association of Canada sent a telegram to the Minister for External Affairs in which they stated that they suspected that the S.S. Padma was coming to Montreal to take on arms bought in Canada. Arguing that the dispatch of military supplies would provide support for the Pakistan government's repression in East Pakistan, they therefore asked Ottawa to publicly declare whether or not Canadian arms had been sold to Pakistan and to seize the S.S. Padma if an examination of the cargo revealed such armaments.²⁰¹

The next few days highlighted the anomalies of the military policy of the Canadian government. On the morning of June 28, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Sharp, was questioned in the House of Commons as to whether he had received a telegram from the Bangladesh Association alleging that Canadian arms were going to be shipped to Pakistan and whether he could assure the House of

Commons that no Canadian arms would be sent to Pakistan.²⁰² Mr.

Sharp replied that he had received the telegram and his inquiries had revealed that no export permits for "arms" had been issued for some time now because of the situation in that part of the world.

Furthermore, as far as he was aware, there could be no "arms shipments" on that ship.²⁰³ This appeared to be corroborated in a

newspaper interview that day by Mr. Jim Harris, secretary treasurer of Keel Shipping, agents for the S. S. Padma, who stated that the manifest for the cargo which the S. S. Padma was to load in Montreal made no mention of Canadian arms. The S. S. Padma had come to Montreal to pick up a shipment for Pakistan from CIDA and, in his view, "the whole affair" including the allegations about American arms had been raised by "agitators."²⁰⁴ Thus the statements of both the responsible government official and a representative of the shipping agents appeared to indicate that there would be no violation of the military embargo on Pakistan.

However, that same day, the Canadian government undertook a series of actions to stop the shipment of Canadian military supplies to Pakistan. After the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce became aware of the cargo in Montreal, the export permit of Maritime Aircraft Overhaul and Repair Limited was suspended.²⁰⁵ The next morning, June 29, only hours after the arrival of the S. S. Padma in the port of Montreal, the Department informed the company by telephone of the indefinite suspension of their past

export licenses for the shipment of spare aircraft parts to Pakistan.²⁰⁶

At the same time, the government told the Montreal agents for the Padma by telephone that military supplies could not be dispatched.²⁰⁷

The Montreal interim receiver of customs impounded the merchandise by virtue of the regulations which they were forced to apply in the name of the Canadian Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce until an export permit was issued. He categorically stated that the action resulted from "a verification of the exports" because the Customs Act doesn't include the term "embargo."²⁰⁸ The Minister for External Affairs informed the House of Commons that instructions had been issued that same day to the effect that no militarily sensitive items from Canada were to be loaded aboard the S.S. Padma since that was "the purpose of government."²⁰⁹

Both the arms dealers and the Canadian authorities confirmed the fact that the government had indeed decided only at the last moment to prevent the sale of military equipment to Pakistan under licenses issued. On the afternoon of June 29, the President of the Maritime Aircraft Overhaul and Repair Company, chagrined over the possible loss of large contracts with Pakistan, including one obtained in May, stated that the Canadian government seemed "to change its policy overnight." He noted that when Canada was "having its trouble with Quebec," foreign states didn't suspend their shipments to Canada.²¹⁰ The Minister for External Affairs corroborated the hastiness of the government's action when he informed the House of Com-

mons that the authorities had not advised the company of the decision prior to the arrival of the S.S. Padma in Montreal on June 24, because he had not been aware of the outstanding permits until he had ordered a review of all licenses. He stated:

The procedure in granting export permits is that sometimes permits are given in advance of the time an application is made for shipment at a later date, but always subject to suspension or cancellation of the permits if, in the meantime, government policy has had to be changed as it had to be with respect to the particular case involving Pakistan. In this instance the export permit has been suspended.²¹¹

The Minister indicated further that the Government had had to apply this policy change to other companies who had also been involved in the sales of military supplies to Pakistan. Mr. Sharp stated that after a review was made, he had been advised that all companies, which had outstanding export permits involving shipment of militarily sensitive items to Pakistan, had their export permits suspended. Though he was unsure about how many export permits were involved, he stated that the orders had been for "relatively small amounts." He did note that some of the goods had been on their way to shipment points while others were still in the factory.²¹² The Canadian authorities had therefore permitted military support to be sent to the Pakistan government until late June.

The government was careful not to allow the enforcement of its strategic policy to affect the actions of other nations, particularly those of the United States. The day the Minister for External

Affairs announced the government's interdiction of the dispatch of military items on the S. S. Padma, a spokesman for his department stated that the ship itself was of no official concern to the Canadian government.²¹³ Ottawa would not interfere in the shipment of equipment to Pakistan by another government. Although a refusal to intervene to impound the American military equipment on the ship was to be expected, despite the Indian request to the United States to halt deliveries,²¹⁴ Ottawa nevertheless served the interests of Pakistan.

The second incident of a military nature occurred when newspapers reported that Pakistan's airforce was using Canadian-supplied aircraft in the theatre of combat. In late September, a journalist of The Toronto Star first reported that F-86 Sabre jets built by Canadair in Montreal were being used "to strafe villages" in East Pakistan.²¹⁵ In early November, the Associated Press reported that "flights leaving camouflaged Dacca airport were delayed up to half an hour because of what authorities called military activity. Pakistan jet fighters supplied by Canada and the United States took off regularly beginning at sunrise."²¹⁶ However, it was not until after the commencement of the Indo-Pakistan war that Canadian "government sources" admitted that a number of Canadian-made Sabre jets were operating in the war.²¹⁷ When questioned, the Department of External Affairs did not know how many planes were in operation. An official said that it had not been possible to distinguish between Canadian- and U.S.-built Sabres flown by the Pakistanis.²¹⁸ The Department

spokesman added that Canada had "stopped selling war plane parts to Pakistan" several months before,²¹⁹ apparently seeking to minimize the government's linkage to a potentially embarrassing incident from a previous administration that highlighted its military support of the Pakistan government.

In a matter not directly related to the conflict, Canada agreed to the transfer of safeguards on nuclear reactors from a bilateral level to an international agency. The arrangements dealt with procedures for inspection of the reactors to ascertain that they were used only for peaceful purposes. The September 30, 1971 treaty signed by Canada, India and the International Atomic Energy Agency was tabled in the House of Commons on December 16, 1971 by the Minister for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp.²²⁰

The changes may have resulted in part from Pakistan's requests. During the visit of Prime Minister Trudeau to Pakistan the previous January, President Khan had urged that the provision of Canadian nuclear assistance to India be placed under international rather than bilateral control, as Canada's nuclear aid to Pakistan had been.²²¹ Pakistan's objections that India had received preferential treatment from Canada were met by the new agreement. The announcement of symmetrical arrangements during the conflict, implicitly supported the central Pakistan government.

In conclusion, the Canadian government tacitly permitted private agencies to supply strategic material to the central government of Pakistan until it imposed a complete military embargo on Pakistan

in late June, well after the commencement of the civil war. Their review of export permits for military supplies apparently provoked by newspaper reports, revealed that there was no general arms embargo on Pakistan either for military equipment from Canadian arms merchants or on future shipments for military equipment to the government of Pakistan. The Canadian government embargo applied only to future sales at first, but the subsequent abrupt cancellation of export permits was triggered by the public revelation of the shipment of military material. Two other incidents of a military nature occurred during this same time period. The previous Liberal government had allowed earlier sales of Canadian F86 jets to the Pakistan Air Force and, not unexpectedly, they were used in the Indo-Pakistan war. If the Trudeau administration was unaware of earlier sales, the S.S. Padma shipments demonstrated that those aircraft were still in service with the Pakistan Air Force. It was also clear that the Canadian government showed some support for the central Pakistan regime with the revision of the safeguards on Canadian nuclear assistance to India. This was however only of symbolic importance since India's nuclear capabilities at that time were of no military significance and could not be developed sufficiently in the short-term to alter the military balance of power of the region. Thus the Canadian government militarily supported the central government of Pakistan until late June.

D. Conclusion

This examination of Canadian policy suggests that Ottawa continued, first overtly and then tacitly, to extend support to the central government of Pakistan. Although their interests were multiple and their concerns considerable, decision-makers in Ottawa pragmatically assessed the effectiveness of available options and chose those that promised the least risk. Canadian policy-makers did emphasize the considerable danger of a regional conflagration that could escalate to involve the big powers and, indeed, this concern motivated many of their diplomatic initiatives and economic policies. In its public and private diplomacy, and in its dispatch of humanitarian relief for refugees in India, Canada attempted to reduce the probability of a regional war. Generally, however, Canada gave greatest weight to its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. The application of this policy inevitably led Canada to support the central government of Pakistan. Such a policy was consistent, moreover, with the interest by Canadian decision-makers in avoiding any appearance of granting de facto legitimacy to separatist movements. Ottawa chose therefore, to continue its support of the central government of Pakistan even though they were pessimistic about the feasibility of either diplomatic or economic actions to effect their preferred solution, a political accommodation in East Pakistan.

An important motivation for Canada's diplomatic, economic, and military response was the desire "to ease or contain the tension

building up in the subcontinent due to the influx of refugees into India from the Pakistan civil war."²²² Concerned that a further deterioration of relations in the region would threaten the stability of South Asia, the government issued a series of statements that called for a political settlement in East Pakistan, a plea for the life of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and notes to the Indian and Pakistan heads of government.²²³ It provided humanitarian relief to India to lessen the financial incentive to seek a military solution that would relieve the economic burden of the refugees. At the same time Canada supplied short-term food relief to Pakistan to prevent an even greater exodus of East Pakistan residents that would further aggravate the already tense situation.²²⁴ Lastly, the ineffective arms embargo was abruptly adjusted to conform with an established policy of prohibiting shipments of arms to areas of tension or potential conflict.²²⁵ Thus all aspects of the Canadian response to the civil war in Pakistan were animated by concern that any further deterioration of the situation in the region could result in war with wider implications for the world community.²²⁶

Nonetheless, the Canadian response was tempered by pragmatic considerations both of the improbability of a political solution in East Pakistan and the likely ineffectiveness of Canadian and international initiatives to achieve such a solution. Although Ottawa preferred a duly elected democratic government in Pakistan, they considered this only "a remote possibility."²²⁷ Despite the severe financial pressures

on the Pakistan government,²²⁸ the Canadian government viewed any proposal to use existing aid as a lever to achieve a political solution in East Pakistan as simplistic and unlikely to succeed.²²⁹ Canada supported the proposal of the UN Secretary General to station UNHCR representatives on both sides of the border; however, Canada refused to initiate further action by the UN that they considered would exacerbate rather than reduce tensions.²³⁰ Nor were they prepared to take independent action in the diplomatic arena. The known intransigence of the two regional rivals and the reluctance of the superpowers to become involved made the success of any such action highly unlikely.

Due to their pessimistic evaluation of the possibility of external initiatives to achieve a political settlement in East Pakistan, the Canadian government attempted to separate the problems of the civil war in Pakistan from that of the refugees in India.²³¹ As a corollary, they also tried to separate the diplomatic from the economic issues. Both the Minister for External Affairs and the President of CIDA stressed that the problems in both countries were of a different nature so they had to be considered quite separately and quite distinctly.²³² They also felt that it was important not to "mix political matters with humanitarianism."²³³

Nonetheless, the Canadian government acknowledged that the influx of refugees in India was closely related to the growing civil war in East Pakistan; their economic response could not be isolated from their diplomatic objectives.²³⁴ They declared:

The whole question of the refugees in India from East Pakistan results from a situation which is mainly political. . . . It has a political origin and will only be solved when questions of a political nature have been given a satisfactory solution, satisfactory, that is, for the people concerned and in particular for the refugees.²³⁵

Underlying Canadian humanitarian relief was an attempt to create conditions in which a political settlement was possible.²³⁶ However, Ottawa did not use its most effective lever in this pursuit, the cessation of existing development programs. Broader policy concerns were at issue.²³⁷

In its diplomatic, economic, and military policies, the Canadian government supported the central government of Pakistan until the creation of the new state of Bangladesh. While Canadian authorities had been willing to advocate the necessity of a political settlement in the Pakistan civil war, they did not undertake any effective diplomatic, economic or military actions to achieve this desired solution. With the exception of the plea for the release of the East Pakistan political leader, the Canadian government refused to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan during the civil war and even delayed its recognition of the secessionist movement as long as possible. The decision to continue previous development assistance agreements as well as the dispatch of food relief without effective supervision was material evidence of Canadian support for the Pakistan government. The inability and/or unwillingness to implement an operative arms embargo allowed the dispatch of strategic military supplies to the Islamabad regime for three months. By design and in effect, Canadian policy supported the status quo in Pakistan.²³⁸

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¹The Globe and Mail, July 19, 1971.

²Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1971, p. 4685.

³Ibid., April 2, 1971, p. 4852.

⁴Ibid., April 5, 1971, p. 4899.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., April 7, 1971, p. 4993.

⁷Ibid., April 2, 1971, pp. 4852-3.

⁸The Montreal Gazette, April 3, 1971.

⁹Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 7, 1971, p. 4993.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., April 29, 1971, p. 5345. The next day Mr. Trudeau revealed that he had been in communication with the President of Pakistan, but no specific details were given. (Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 30, 1971, p. 5388.)

¹²Ibid., June 7, 1971, pp. 6458-9.

¹³The Globe and Mail, June 15, 1971; The Montreal Star, June 15, 1971; La Presse, June 15, 1971.

¹⁴Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 15, 1971, p. 6714.

¹⁵Ibid., June 16, 1971, pp. 6775-6.

¹⁶The Globe and Mail, July 10, 1971.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1971, p. 6561.

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¹⁹The Globe and Mail, June 18, 1971; The Montreal Star, June 18, 1971; The Gazette, June 18, 1971; Le Devoir, June 18, 1971; The Canadian Press, June 18, 1971.

An examination of the newspaper articles that appeared on June 17, 1971 in the major newspapers of Quebec revealed that no mention of separation was made in their coverage of his statements in the House of Commons on June 16, 1971. (Le Devoir, La Presse, Le Soleil, June 17, 1971.) An aide to Mr. Sharp said that the key-words of the Awami League position were greater autonomy.

²⁰Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 15, 1971, p. 6714.

²¹Ibid., June 17, 1971, p. 6813.

²²Ibid., June 7, 1971, pp. 6458-9.

²³International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Press Release, June 21, 1971, Subject: Meeting on Pakistan.

The meeting was attended by representatives of the governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and United States as well as representatives of the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

²⁴The Globe and Mail, July 12, 1971; July 16, 1971.

²⁵Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 22, 1971, p. 7215.

²⁶Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 7.

²⁷The New York Times, August 8, 1971. The source of the story was authoritative diplomats in Washington. "This is probably the first time when all of us—the Americans, the British, the Canadians, the Europeans, the Russians and even the Chinese have been working in the same direction in a major international crisis," a ranking United States official stated.

²⁸Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), pp. 7-8.

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²⁹Canada, Department of External Affairs, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs, "The Indo-Pakistan conflict and the emergence of Bangla Desh," International Perspectives (March/April, 1972), p. 9.

A spokesman for the Department of External Affairs noted that the Canadian message had been sent before the Indian Prime Minister had cabled twenty-four heads of government, including Canada, to seek their aid to save the Sheik from execution. Mrs. Gandhi had supposedly sent her message on August 10. (The Toronto Star, August 13, 1971.)

³⁰Canada, Department of External Affairs, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs, "The Indo-Pakistan conflict and the emergence of Bangla Desh," International Perspectives (March/April, 1972), p. 9.

³¹Canada, Department of External Affairs, "Visit to Canada of Premier Alexei N. Kosygin," External Affairs, XXIII, No. 11 (November, 1971), p. 418. No specific details of the discussions were given.

³²Canada, Department of External Affairs, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs. "The Indo-Pakistan conflict and emergence of Bangla Desh," International Perspectives (March/April 1972), p. 9.

The Prime Minister explained the Canadian attitude toward East Pakistan as well as the steps Canada had taken to try to reduce tension.

³³Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 7.

³⁴Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, "Canadian Assistance to Pakistan Refugees," Statement by Paul Gérin-Lajoie to the Third Committee, United Nations General Assembly, New York (November 18, 1971), p. 3. Hereinafter referred to as CIDA.

³⁵Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 34 (December 2, 1971), p. 25.

³⁶Ibid., No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 16.

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³⁷Ibid., pp. 7 and 22.

³⁸Ibid., p. 19.

³⁹Ibid., p. 22.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 14 and 22.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁴²Ibid., p. 22.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 6-7.

⁴⁴La Presse, August 19, 1971; The Gazette, August 19 & 20, 1971; The Montreal Star, September 30, 1971.

The Minister of Manpower and Immigration had earlier granted East Pakistani students who were supposed to return home permission to remain in Montreal.

⁴⁵Canada, House of Commons Debates, December 6, 1971, pp. 10155-10157. It also appeared in the Department of External Affairs Statements: "India and Pakistan," Statement on Motions, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, House of Commons, December 6, 1971. The statement itself consisted of five paragraphs, the two largest of which concerned the evacuation of Canadian citizens. The remaining three paragraphs reviewed the diplomatic and military aspects of the situation, one of past Canadian efforts, and one of the reaction of the United Nations.

⁴⁶The Toronto Star, December 7, 1971; The Ottawa Citizen, December 7, 1971.

During the Prime Minister's discussions with President Nixon in Washington that day, a great deal of time was spent on broader international matters including the situation in the Indian subcontinent and "the steps which are now being pursued in the United Nations to arrest the hostilities and create a measure of confidence that the grievances in the area can be redressed" (Canada, House of Commons Debates, December 7, 1971, p. 10206).

When asked whether he agreed with President Nixon that the main responsibility for the fighting rested with India, Prime Minister Trudeau said he would not put that blunt an interpretation on the

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President's position. He said the Canadian government was evaluating the situation between India and Pakistan in light of independent reports they were receiving. "Our sources of information are not as immediate nor as direct as those of the United States, but we are in the process of evaluating them at the moment. . . . I would have to rely on second-hand information to give you now my impression of what has happened." As a result he stated that the Canadian government had not been able to assess the fighting, but would make known its views when the matter went before the General Assembly of the United Nations (The Ottawa Citizen; The Toronto Star; Le Droit, December 7, 1971).

⁴⁷United Nations General Assembly, Annexes, Twenty-sixth Session, Agenda Item 102, pp. 1-2.

It was reported that Canada had been consulted in the drawing up of the resolution and had insisted on the inclusion of the paragraph that called on the Security Council to take up the question of the Indo-Pakistan War again (The Ottawa Citizen, December 8, 1971).

⁴⁸United Nations General Assembly, Annexes, Twenty-sixth Session, 2003 Plenary Meeting (December 7, 1971), p. 27.

⁴⁹Canada, House of Commons Debates, December 6, 1971, pp. 10162-10163.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 10163.

⁵¹Ibid., December 15, 1971, p. 10486.

⁵²The Ottawa Citizen, December 16, 1971.

⁵³Canada, House of Commons Debates, December 15, 1971, p. 10486.

⁵⁴Ibid., December 16, 1971, p. 10256.

⁵⁵Ibid., December 22, 1971, p. 10705. Despite his statement that Canada had been neutral during the dispute and the subsequent war so as to preserve its acceptability as an intermediary "as a peacekeeper in an ultimate settlement," the Minister also expressed reservations about Canadian participation in a UN peacekeeping force. "We do not intend to take on responsibility for peacekeeping without the terms being better understood by both sides and without

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a very clear mandate. Our experience in the Middle East didn't encourage us. It caused a great deal of disappointment and a great deal of disapproval, so this time we like to know what it is we're expected to do" (Canadian Press, January 3, 1971).

⁵⁶Canada, House of Commons Debates, December 20, 1971, p. 10614.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., December 22, 1971, p. 10705.

⁵⁹The Canadian Press, January 3, 1972.

⁶⁰Canada, Department of External Affairs, Transcript, "A T.V. interview with Mr. Sharp by Peter Stursberg, Don Newman and John Drury on January 11, 1972." The three-page summary was in the library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

⁶¹The Canadian Press, January 3, 1972.

⁶²The Montreal Star, January 5, 1972.

⁶³Canada, Department of External Affairs, Transcript, "A T.V. interview with Mr. Sharp by Peter Stursberg, Don Newman and John Drury on January 11, 1972." The three-page summary was in the library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

⁶⁴The Globe and Mail, January 27, 1972; The Montreal Star, January 27, 1972; Le Devoir, January 27, 1972.

⁶⁵The Canadian Press, January 31, 1972.

⁶⁶Canada, Department of External Affairs, Transcript, "Comments regarding Pakistan and Bangladesh made to reporters by Mr. Sharp on January 31, 1972." The seven-page summary was in the library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

⁶⁷The Ottawa Citizen, December 18, 1971. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Transcript, "A T.V. interview with Mr. Sharp by Peter Stursberg, Don Newman and John Drury on January 11,

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1972." The three-page summary was in the library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs: Le Devoir, January 12, 1972; Canadian India Times, January 20, 1972; The Globe and Mail, January 27, 1972; Le Devoir, January 27, 1972; The Montreal Star, January 27, 1972.

Canada, Department of External Affairs, Transcript, "Comments regarding Pakistan and Bangladesh made to reporters by Mr. Sharp on January 31, 1972." The seven-page summary was in the library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

The Canadian government consulted with a number of countries on the question of recognition. Included were the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan.

⁶⁸The Ottawa Citizen, December 16, 1971.

⁶⁹The Montreal Star, January 5, 1971.

⁷⁰Canada, Department of External Affairs, Transcript, "Comments regarding Pakistan and Bangladesh made to reporters by Mr. Sharp on January 31, 1972." The seven-page summary was in the library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

⁷¹Canada, Department of External Affairs, Communiqué, "Recognition of Bangladesh," No. 6 (February 14, 1972).

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³The Montreal Star, February 14, 1972; The Toronto Star, February 14, 1972.

⁷⁴Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 7, 1971, pp. 6458-9.

⁷⁵Canada, Department of External Affairs, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs, "The Indo-Pakistan conflict and the emergence of Bangladesh," International Perspectives (March/April 1972), p. 9.

⁷⁶The Toronto Star, August 13, 1971.

⁷⁷Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, "Visit to Canada of Premier Alexei N. Kosygin," XXIII, No. 11 (November, 1971), p. 419.

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⁷⁸Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 7.

⁷⁹The Globe and Mail, July 10, 1971.

⁸⁰Ibid. The minister was replying to an editorial in the newspaper on July 8 that stated: "The Government should forget its obsession with our own separatists. It should call for the duly elected to govern East Pakistan; it should punctuate the call by cutting off aid to Pakistan, it should increase aid to the refugees." An earlier editorial, "Interpretation Please" on June 18, asked for a clarification of his remarks in the House of Commons on June 16, 1971 because it was "... essential for Canadians to see how far the Government is prepared to interest itself into the affairs of Pakistan." And with respect to the minister's attempts to clarify his remarks on June 17 the latter editorial noted: "Precisely what he did mean he didn't say."

⁸¹Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 17, 1971, p. 6813; The Globe and Mail, June 18, 1971; The Montreal Star, June 18, 1971; The Gazette, June 18, 1971; Le Devoir, June 18, 1971; The Canadian Press, June 18, 1971.

⁸²Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 19.

⁸³Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 21, 1971, p. 6032.

⁸⁴Ibid., April 7, 1971, p. 4993 and June 17, 1971, p. 6813.

⁸⁵Canada, Department of External Affairs, Transcript, "A T.V. Interview with Mr. Sharp by Peter Stursberg, Don Newman, and John Drury on January 11, 1971." The three-page summary was in the library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

⁸⁶The Montreal Star, January 5, 1972.

⁸⁷Ibid.; Le Devoir, January 12, 1972.

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⁸⁸The Globe and Mail, January 27, 1972; The Montreal Star, January 27, 1972; Le Devoir, January 27, 1972.

⁸⁹Canada, Department of External Affairs, Transcript, "Comments regarding Pakistan and Bangla Desh made by Mr. Sharp to reporters on January 31, 1972." The seven-page summary was in the library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

⁹⁰Canada, Department of External Affairs, Transcript, "A T.V. interview with Mr. Sharp by Peter Stursberg, Don Newman and John Drury on January 11, 1972." The three-page summary was in the library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

⁹¹The Globe and Mail, July 10, 1971.

⁹²Canada, CIDA, "Development Administration, CIDA in a changing government organization," paper delivered by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA, to the Institute of Public Administration Conference, Regina, September 8, 1971. Thoughts on International Development, No. 4 (1972), (Ottawa: Information Division of CIDA, 1972), pp. 13-14.

⁹³Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 4, 1971, p. 5474; Canada, CIDA, Annual Report 1971/72 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972), pp. 47-48.

⁹⁴Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 28, 1971, p. 6154. This was also published in the Department of External Affairs publications: Statements, "Relief for East Pakistani Refugees." Statement on Motions By the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp in the House of Commons, Friday, May 28, 1971.

⁹⁵The Globe and Mail, July 24, 1971; Canada, CIDA, News Release, 71-29, July 26, 1971.

⁹⁶Canada, House of Commons Debates, November 17, 1971, pp. 9635-6. It also appeared in two Department of External Affairs publications: Statements, "Relief of Pakistani Refugees in India," Statement on Motions, House of Commons, November 17, 1971, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, and Statements and Speeches No. 71/27, "Relief for Pakistani Refugees in India," a statement in the House of Commons on Novem-

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ber 17, 1971 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp.

⁹⁷The Globe and Mail, July 24, 1971; Canada, CIDA, News Release, 71-29, July 26, 1971; Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), pp. 17-18; Canada, CIDA, Annual Review 1971-72 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972), p. 48.

⁹⁸Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 25, 1971, p. 6075.

⁹⁹Canada, CIDA, "Canadian Assistance to Pakistan Refugees," Statement by Mr. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA to the Third Committee United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 18, 1971, p. 2.

¹⁰⁰Canada, CIDA, Report, "Report on Mission to India and Pakistan," October 24 - November 4, 1971, by Mr. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA (Ottawa: n.p., November 25, 1971), p. 6.

¹⁰¹Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 34 (December 2, 1971), p. 6.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Canada, CIDA, "Canadian Assistance to Pakistani Refugees," Statement by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA, to the Third Committee United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 18, 1971, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 34 (December 2, 1971), p. 5.

¹⁰⁵Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1971, p. 4685.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., April 30, 1971, p. 5388.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., May 4, 1971, p. 5474.

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¹⁰⁸Ibid., May 17, 1971, pp. 5873-4.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., May 28, 1971, p. 6154.

¹¹⁰Ibid., May 31, 1971, pp. 6240-1.

¹¹¹The Globe and Mail, June 12, 1971.

¹¹²Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 22, 1971; The Globe and Mail, July 10, 1971.

¹¹³International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Press Release, June 21, 1971. Subject: Meeting on Pakistan.

¹¹⁴Canada, CIDA, New Release, 71-29, July 26, 1971.

¹¹⁵The Montreal Star, July 27, 1971; The Canadian Press, July 27, 1971.

¹¹⁶Canada, CIDA, letters to author from Mr. Jack Redden, Information Division, May 27, 1976; August 26, 1976; October 26, 1976.

The four shipments included:

<u>Date of Departure</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Freight Charges</u>
September 22, 1971	Nautica	\$1,192,700	\$310,545.26
September 28, 1971	Marou-Dio	2,078,300	630,998.12
October 3, 1971	Theokeetor	1,190,900	310,090.26
October 14, 1971	President Roxas	737,400	185,797.49
		<u>\$5,199,300</u>	<u>\$1,437,330.13</u>

All shipments were from Port Cartier and freight charges were all based on full berth terms: inclusive of loading, offloading and lighterage charges. A breakdown of the freight charges into the aforementioned three components was not available.

¹¹⁷Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 33.

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¹¹⁸Ibid., pp. 17-18.

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 33; ibid., No. 34 (October 19, 1971), p. 51; Canada, CIDA, "Canadian Assistance to Pakistani Refugees," Statement by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA, to the Third Committee United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 18, 1971, p. 1.

¹²⁰Canada, House of Commons Debates, September 15, 1971, pp. 7868-9.

¹²¹Canada, CIDA, letter to author from Mr. Jack Redden, Information Division, May 27, 1976; August 26, 1976; Canada, CIDA, Report, "Report on Mission to India and Pakistan," October 24 - November 4, 1971, by Mr. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA (Ottawa: n.p., November 25, 1971), p. 136.

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Canada, House of Commons Debates, February 23, 1972, p. 178.

¹²⁴The Globe and Mail, December 7, 1971.

¹²⁵Canada, CIDA, letter to author from Mr. Jack Redden, Information Division, October 26, 1976.

¹²⁶The Toronto Star, January 4, 1972; The Canadian Press, March 2, 1972.

¹²⁷Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 34 (December 2, 1971), pp. 7, 10.

¹²⁸United Nations, Document A 8662-S/10539, "Report of the Secretary General Concerning the Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 2790 (XXVI) and Security Council Resolution 307 (1971) (February 15, 1972), p. 4.

¹²⁹United Nations, World Food Program, letter to author from R. Muller, Project Management Officer, Asia and Far East Branch, Project Management Division, February 17, 1977.

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¹³⁰United Nations, World Food Program, letter to author from H. Sethna, Acting for Chief, Asia and Far East Branch, Project Management Division, June 2, 1977.

¹³¹Canada, Department of External Affairs, letter from Mr. H. E. Ryan, Alternative Representative of Canada to FAO, to Mr. T. C. M. Robinson, Deputy Executive Director, World Food Program, July 29, 1971.

The fact that the World Food Program did not act as the channel of Canadian aid was also confirmed in reply to a question in the House of Commons that included a query as to the names of countries that had received food aid under the World Food Program. Pakistan was not listed as a recipient country in 1971/72 (Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Paper 284-2/303, unpublished, April 24, 1972, p. 8).

¹³²Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 34 (December 2, 1971), p. 14.

¹³³The New York Times, August 1, 1971.

¹³⁴The Globe and Mail, October 5, 1971.

¹³⁵The New York Times, October 14, 1971.

¹³⁶Canada, CIDA, "Report on Mission to India and Pakistan," October 24 - November 4, 1971, by Mr. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA (Ottawa: n.p., November 25, 1971), p. 8.

¹³⁷Oxfam of Canada, [United Kingdom] "Bengal Campaign," Bulletin, No. 52 (October 26, 1971), n.p. The Oxfam worker who had made the observation also recommended that the number of UN personnel be expanded so that they would be much more in control of distribution "all the way down the line."

¹³⁸United Nations, Office of Public Information, Press Release SG 1763, IHA/93, November 17, 1971. "Agreement Between Secretary-General and Government of Pakistan on Conditions of Discharge of Functions of United Nations Relief Operations in East Pakistan."

¹³⁹The Globe and Mail, November 24, 1971.

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¹⁴⁰United Nations, Office of Public Information, Press Release, SG 1763, IHA/93, November 17, 1971, "Agreement Between Secretary-General and Government of Pakistan on Conditions of Discharge of Functions at United Nations Relief Operations in East Pakistan."

¹⁴¹Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 13.

¹⁴²Canadian India Times, November 18, 1971.

¹⁴³Canada, CIDA, letters to author from Mr. W. Bryan Wannop, Regional Director, Asia Southwest, March 22, 1976 and July 8, 1976.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 26, 1971, p. 6075.

¹⁴⁶Canada, CIDA, letters to author from Mr. W. Bryan Wannop, Regional Director, Asia Southwest, March 22, 1976 and July 8, 1976.

¹⁴⁷International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Press Release, June 21, 1971. Subject: Meeting on Pakistan.

The meeting was attended by Consortium representatives of the governments of Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank also attended.

¹⁴⁸Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 25, 1971, p. 6070.

¹⁴⁹Ibid., May 26, 1971, p. 6127.

¹⁵⁰The Globe and Mail, June 15, 1971; The Montreal Star, June 15, 1971; La Presse, June 15, 1971.

¹⁵¹The Globe and Mail, July 10, 1971.

¹⁵²Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 34 (October 5, 1971), pp. 6 and 23.

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¹⁵³Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁵⁴The Ottawa Citizen, November 15, 1971.

¹⁵⁵Canada, CIDA, Report, "Report on Mission to India and Pakistan," October 24 - November 4, 1971, by Mr. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA (Ottawa: n.p., November 25, 1971), p. 17.

¹⁵⁶The Globe and Mail, July 21, 1971.

¹⁵⁷Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Paper No. 284-2/70, unpublished, March 1, 1972.

¹⁵⁸The Globe and Mail, July 21, 1971.

¹⁵⁹Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Paper No. 283-2/1310, June 14, 1971, p. 3; The Globe and Mail, April 1, 1972.

¹⁶⁰Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 12.

¹⁶¹The New York Times, July 12, 1971; The Globe and Mail, July 12, 1971.

¹⁶²The Ottawa Citizen, November 15, 1971.

¹⁶³Canada, CIDA, "Development Administration, CIDA in a changing government organization," paper delivered by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA, to the Institute of Public Administration Conference, Regina, September 8, 1971, Thoughts on International Development, No. 4 (1972), (Ottawa: Information Division of CIDA, 1972), pp. 13-14.

¹⁶⁴Canada, CIDA, Document, "Canadian External Assistance Programs, International Emergency Relief 1971-72 to January 15, 1972," January 27, 1972.

¹⁶⁵Canada, CIDA, Document NGO 54, NGO Supported 72/73 Bangladesh Program, NGO-54 March 30, 1973.

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¹⁶⁶Canada, CIDA, News Release, 71-20, June 8, 1971.

¹⁶⁷Canada, CIDA, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, Memorandum, "East Pakistani Refugees in India," for acting Prime Minister, June 8, 1971.

¹⁶⁸Canada, CIDA, Document, "Canadian External Assistance Programs, International Emergency Relief 1971-72 to January 15, 1972," January 27, 1972. This was composed to two shipments of 8,200 MTN of rapeseed worth \$2,046,352 from the port of Vancouver, on the ship President Roxas on July 9, 1971, and Brigette Skou on October 15, 1971. Ocean freight and related costs amounted to \$355,182.

¹⁶⁹Canada, CIDA, News Release, 71-21, June 16, 1971.

¹⁷⁰Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 32.

There were ten flights that transported material and two that carried Red Cross supplies. The latter two were Hercules (SF6230 & 6231) both of which left June 17 with two ambulances donated by the Ontario government, fifty-three crates of clothing and twenty-four crates of blankets. The cost of each Hercules flight was approximately \$26,700. The ten UN flights are examined in footnote 174 (Department of National Defence File Sheet, n.d.), [Relief Flights to India 1971].

¹⁷¹Canada, CIDA, Document, "Canadian External Assistance Programs, International Emergency Relief, 1971-72 to January 15, 1972," January 27, 1972; Canada, CIDA, News Release 71-20, June 8, 1971.

¹⁷²Canada, CIDA, News Release 71-29, July 19, 1971; 71-30, August 3, 1971; Canada, CIDA, Document, "Canadian External Assistance Programs, International Emergency Relief, 1971-72 to January 15, 1972," January 27, 1972.

The initial \$70,000 disbursed on August 10, 1971 was given for the purchase of plastic sheeting worth \$103,000 that was to be used for shelter of the refugees in India. The government of Ontario had agreed to pay the difference.

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¹⁷³Canada, CIDA, Document, "Canadian External Assistance Programs, International Emergency Relief 1971-72 to January 15, 1972," January 27, 1972; Canada, CIDA, News Release 71-30, August 3, 1971.

¹⁷⁴Canada, Department of National Defence, File Sheet, n.d.

<u>Flight No.</u>	<u>Date of Flight</u>	<u>Load</u>
UN 7024	June 23-26	63,000 lbs. of shelter material
UN 7030	July 6 - 9	62,000 lbs. of shelter material
UN 7031	July 16-19	65,000 lbs. of shelter material
UN 7032	July 24-27	65,000 lbs. of shelter material
UN 7033	Aug. 2 - 5	65,000 lbs. of shelter material
UN 7034	Aug. 6 - 9	65,000 lbs. of shelter material
UN 7035	Aug. 10-13	65,000 lbs. of shelter material
UN 7040	Aug. 14-17	65,000 lbs. of shelter material
UN 7042	Aug. 18-21	65,000 lbs. of shelter material
UN 7043	Aug. 24-27	65,000 lbs. of shelter material

All flights were Boeing 707's at a cost of approximately \$24,200 per flight.

¹⁷⁵Canada, CIDA, Document, "NGO Supported 72/73 Bangladesh Program, NGO-54, March 30, 1973; Canada, CIDA, Document, "Canadian External Assistance, International Emergency Relief 1971-72 to January 15, 1972," January 27, 1972.

¹⁷⁶Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 34 (December 2, 1971), p. 12.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 14.

¹⁷⁸International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Press Release, June 18, 1971, Subject: India Consortium.

¹⁷⁹Le Devoir, December 6, 1971.

¹⁸⁰Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 26, 1971, p. 6127.

¹⁸¹International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Press Release, June 18, 1971, Subject: India Consortium.

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¹⁸²Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 34 (December 2, 1971), p. 27.

¹⁸³Canada, House of Commons Debates, November 17, 1971, pp. 9635-9636. The Minister for External Affairs noted that the Aid to India Consortium meeting of October 20th had discussed this form of aid. Canada, CIDA, "Canadian Assistance-to Pakistani Refugees," Statement by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA, to the Third Committee United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 18, 1971, p. 3.

¹⁸⁴Canada, CIDA, Report, "Report on Mission to India and Pakistan," October 24 - November 4, 1971, by Mr. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA (Ottawa: n.p., November 25, 1971), p. 13.

¹⁸⁵Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 28, 1971, p. 7373.

¹⁸⁶The Globe and Mail, June 30, 1971.

¹⁸⁷Ibid.

¹⁸⁸Ibid.

¹⁸⁹La Presse, June 30, 1971.

¹⁹⁰The Montreal Star, June 30, 1971.

¹⁹¹The Globe and Mail, June 30, 1971.

¹⁹²The Montreal Star, June 30, 1971.

¹⁹³The Globe and Mail, June 30, 1971.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵Ibid.

¹⁹⁶The Gazette, June 30, 1971.

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¹⁹⁷The Montreal Star, June 30, 1971.

¹⁹⁸The Globe and Mail, June 30, 1971.

¹⁹⁹The New York Times, June 22, 1971. This was in apparent violation of the embargo on military equipment to Pakistan that the United States government had proclaimed. The American State Department claimed that this was apparently due to confusion within the administration on how the three-month ban on military shipments should be applied. It was later explained that the ban on military shipments was made effective after March 25 and did not affect earlier transactions. The State Department said that this technicality was not mentioned when the State Department made its April 15 announcement.

²⁰⁰The Montreal Star, June 23, 1971: If the vessel was carrying what port authorities and customs officials considered hazardous cargo, a special permit had to be obtained before the ship was allowed to dock in any harbour. A request for this special permit had to be made forty-eight hours in advance so that port authorities could consider the cargo carried. Such requests were considered routine.

²⁰¹Le Devoir, June 28, 1971. Their conviction was reinforced by the fact that a Pakistan Military Mission had visited Canada in April and had been in Montreal on April 9. It was possible that the ship Sunderban, which was in Montreal at the same time as the mission, had also transported arms from Canada.

The author of the article, Sadat Kazi, was an active member of the Bangladesh Association of Canada, though no mention of this was made in the article. In The Montreal Star article of June 28, 1971, the Bangladesh Association was listed as the source of the suspicions rather than "observers."

²⁰²Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 28, 1971, p. 7373.

²⁰³Ibid.

²⁰⁴La Presse, June 28, 1971; Le Devoir, June 29, 1971. According to a CIDA spokesman, the agency shipment aboard the Padma was composed of 150 tons of rubber, 150 tons of copper and 100 tons of zinc.

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²⁰⁵The Globe and Mail, June 30, 1971; The Montreal Star, June 30, 1971.

²⁰⁶La Presse, June 30, 1971; The Globe and Mail, June 30, 1971; The Gazette, June 30, 1971.

²⁰⁷La Presse, June 29, 1971.

²⁰⁸Le Devoir, June 30, 1971.

²⁰⁹Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 29, 1971, p. 7437.

²¹⁰La Presse, June 30, 1971; The Globe and Mail, June 30, 1971.

²¹¹Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 30, 1971, p. 7518.

²¹²The Montreal Star, June 30, 1971. The Minister for External Affairs later revealed that the Pakistan government had protested the decision. "They were naturally quite concerned when we stopped the shipment of arms that had been ordered." (Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32, [October 5, 1971], p. 21.)

Mr. Heath Macquarrie, the Progressive Conservative member of a Canadian Parliamentary delegation that visited the area, reported that the Pakistan President had given what amounted to a "tick off" for Canada's refusal to allow the shipment of plane parts to leave Montreal. President Khan told the delegation that the Sabre jet episode was not something he looked kindly upon. (The Chronicle Herald, July 20, 1971.)

²¹³The Montreal Star, June 29, 1971.

²¹⁴The Times, June 26, 1971; The Globe and Mail, July 16, 1971. An American Congressman, Senator Frank Church had also asked (President Nixon, in vain) to request Canada to intercept the Padma (La Presse, June 29, 1971.)

²¹⁵The Toronto Star, September 22, 1971. The reporter also noted that the Pakistan army was using Twin Otter and Beaver aircraft from the Toronto production line of de Havilland for logistic support.

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²¹⁶The Globe and Mail, November 4, 1971. The lines in an Associated Press article had a Dacca dateline.

²¹⁷The Toronto Star, December 9, 1971; The Globe and Mail, December 9, 1971; Le Devoir, December 9, 1971.

The planes had originally been sold as a lot of 225 to West Germany by Canada. West Germany, in turn, had sold ninety of them, with Canada's approval, to Iran. After India had publicly raised the issue in 1966, it was discovered that the planes had been transferred from Iran to Pakistan. West Germany at that time said it would ensure and verify their return to Iran from Pakistan. However, when the Canadian Department of External Affairs was asked on December 8, 1971 to confirm that in fact the Sabres had been returned to Iran, they replied that "a certain number" apparently were still in Pakistan. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute listed the ninety aircraft as still being part of the Pakistani armed forces in 1971. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Trade with the Third World, [New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1971].) A more detailed description of the transaction is contained in the book by George Thayer, The War Business (New York: Avon Books, 1970), pp. 200-202.

²¹⁸Ibid. On October 7, 1970 Jean Luc Pépin, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, in a written reply to a question, stated that in the sale of military aircraft to foreign governments, the government had imposed the requirement that Canadian permission be obtained before the purchasing country could resell the aircraft in those cases which involved the exports from Canada of all aircraft built under license to a United States design. The reply listed only one instance between 1963 and 1969, where this requirement had come into force; the resale of F86 Sabres by the Federal Republic of Germany to Iran and Canadian permission, it noted, was sought in this case. No mention whatsoever was made in the reply of the Pakistan aspect of the transaction. (Canada, House of Commons Sessional Paper No. 2/1521, unpublished, October 7, 1970.)

²¹⁹Ibid.

²²⁰Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Paper, No. 283-6/97B, unpublished December 17, 1970.

²²¹The Globe and Mail, December 18, 1971. Canada and Pakistan in October 1961 had agreed that safeguards involved in the provision of Canadian nuclear materials to Pakistan should be put under

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the international agency. Pakistan had held that provision of Canadian nuclear materials to India should also be put under international control—not simply India-Canada safeguards—and made this point to Prime Minister Trudeau during his visit to Pakistan the previous January. The new safeguards for Canadian nuclear assistance to India mainly involved inspection of the reactors to ensure that they were used only for peaceful purposes. This reportedly satisfied the Pakistan government's complaints that India was receiving preferred nuclear treatment from Canada.

²²²Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 7.

²²³Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 7, 1971, pp. 6458-9.

²²⁴Canada, CIDA, "Canadian Assistance to Pakistani Refugees," Statement by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA, to the Third Committee United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 18, 1971, pp. 1-2.

²²⁵Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 6.

²²⁶Ibid., pp. 7 and 20.

²²⁷The Globe and Mail, July 10, 1971.

²²⁸Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 25, 1971, p. 6070.

²²⁹The Globe and Mail, July 10, 1971.

²³⁰Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 32 (October 5, 1971), pp. 19 and 22.

²³¹Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 25, 1971, p. 6075.

²³²Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 34 (December 2, 1971), p. 5.

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²³³Ibid.

²³⁴Ibid., p. 56.

²³⁵Ibid., p. 5.

²³⁶Ibid., No. 32 (October 5, 1971), p. 22.

²³⁷Canada, CIDA, "Development Administration, CIDA in a changing government organization," paper delivered by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, President, CIDA, to the Institute of Public Administration Conference, Regina, September 8, 1971, Thoughts on International Development, No. 4 (1972), (Ottawa: Information Division of CIDA, 1972), pp. 13-14.

²³⁸Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE RESPONSE OF CANADIAN CHURCH GROUPS

... there has been no taking part on behalf of either side by outside governments. We don't wish to take sides in the conflict so as not to hamper our efforts in favor of the refugees.¹

(A delegation of leading Canadian Churchmen, July 30, 1971.)

Church groups were especially active in fund raising during the Pakistan civil war. They were visible and directly concerned, but not in the political arena. All the church groups were in existence prior to the outbreak of civil war. Four church groups examined here had undertaken missionary and/or relief activities in Pakistan prior to the civil war: the Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship; The Mennonites through the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada); the Roman Catholic Church in Canada through their aid organization, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace and two orders, Les Frères et Les Pères de St. Croix; and the Salvation Army. Seven church groups responded to the outbreak of the civil war: the Canadian Council of Churches, The Anglican Church of Canada, the Lutheran Church, The Presbyterian Church in Canada, the Religious Society of Friends, The United Church of Canada and the Student Christian Movement of Canada. Throughout the conflict, the emphasis on humanitarian relief was very much a part of the sense of clerical concerns.

Members of religious groups emphasized the collection of relief for the refugees in India. They were much less concerned with government policy than with refugee relief. Their primary objective was fund raising and this directed their activities both alone and in coordination with other groups. The church groups rarely mentioned the Canadian response to the Pakistan civil war in their statements and publications. Only four of the church groups,

The Anglican Church of Canada, The United Church of Canada, the Religious Society of Friends and the Student Christian Movement of Canada, opposed the government policies and of these, only the Student Christian Movement of Canada attempted to mobilize public opinion. Therefore, most of the church groups either passively concurred with or actively supported the response of the Canadian government to the Pakistan civil war. Evidence of their approval of government policy is drawn from their statements, publications and activities.

A. Statements

Church groups made almost no reference to Canadian government policy. In the few statements that they did make, spokesmen concentrated mainly upon the refugees in India and, in particular, upon their relief activities. When they did mention either the civil war in East Pakistan or the role of the Canadian government, most of the churches supported the Canadian response. Two major church

groups, the Baptist Federation of Canada and the Salvation Army, and one minor one, the Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship, made no public statements, while the Lutheran Church, in its single declaration, did not refer to any aspect of Canadian foreign policy. The public policy statements of The Mennonites, through their relief organization, the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada), supported the foreign policy position of Canada as did the statements of The Canadian Council of Churches, The Presbyterian Church in Canada, and the Roman Catholic Church in Canada. The Roman Catholic Church expressed some reservations, however, about the level of material support and The Anglican Church of Canada disagreed indirectly with the diplomatic policy of the Canadian government. Lastly, the Religious Society of Friends, the Student Christian Movement of Canada and The United Church of Canada disagreed with both the diplomatic and economic policy of Canada. Only these three latter groups criticized the policy of the Canadian government publicly. The others offered only mild and indirect critical comment, but, more frequently, made no comment.

In their drive to raise funds for relief, church statements usually stressed the plight of the refugees in India. At its 1971 convention, the Lutheran Church passed four resolutions which: commended Canadian Lutheran World Relief for its continued concern for those around the world who were in need of material assistance and especially for its contribution of \$10,250 for the relief of the refu-

gees in India; requested its member synods to encourage their congregations and members to respond to the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, with contributions to be forwarded to Canadian Lutheran World Relief for the continuation of its programs; requested that its National Committee forward all contributions or resources it may have had for Pakistani relief to the Canadian Lutheran World Relief; and requested its executive committee to seek a conference of persons representing the Lutheran Church bodies in Canada and the organizations engaged in relief operations to discuss the problems of administering relief programs including the promotion of such programs, the reception of contributions, and the administration of resources.² These resolutions obviously did not criticize or constrain the Canadian government.

Senior church officials emphasized the need for increased public donations for the refugees in India in their public statements. The Primate of The Anglican Church of Canada, in an announcement in October of the church's allocation that year for Pakistan relief, emphasized that East Bengalis faced one of the most hideous situations in modern history. The Secretary of the Anglican Primate's World Relief and Development Fund, said that, though he was excited by the recent response to appeals from The Anglican Church of Canada, he expected the refugee problem to continue or worsen over the next several months.³ In December, the former moderator of The United Church of Canada, Dr. Robert McClure, announced that the church

had asked its members to contribute one quarter of what they intended to spend on Christmas presents to Pakistan refugee relief. Citing a lack of compassion on the part of the Canadian public he noted that Canada, prior to October, had sent only three cents per capita to help the refugees in India. He stated that it was not enough, and that Canadians spent "more on dog food."⁴ Finally, when the director of the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace made the announcement of a new relief grant, he declared that the war between India and Pakistan had allowed many to forget "the terrible sufferings of a people of nine million persons." One fact remained, however, that when the war ceased, the refugees must live. With the war finished, the great task of readapting this vast population would become the challenge for the entire international community.⁵ Thus, the church emphasis on relief paralleled the statements of Canadian authorities.

Church spokesmen made few references to the political situation in Pakistan. In a newspaper interview, a member of the Congregation of the Holy Cross, who was the director of an educational institute in East Pakistan, traced the Bengali revolt to economic causes. The revenues from East Pakistan's only export, jute, were always reinvested in West Pakistan, the financially dominant part of the country. That is why the leaders of East Pakistan had consistently called for the "autonomy of the two regions, above all on the economic level." He hoped that the war

would end and the institute would not be obliged to shut its doors.⁶

In a letter to the editor that described the conditions of the refugees in India and the relief efforts of members of a Canadian Jesuits' Mission in India, a member of that mission stated that he had

... no deeper insight into the complex political situation of East and West Pakistan, but heaven knows there has been enough of hate, killing, suffering and death. [Nonetheless, he concluded, that since the problem would not be] solved immediately we must do all in our power to help alleviate some at least of the human suffering of a large number of our brothers ...

in the refugee camps in India,⁷ which was the same evaluation as that of the Canadian government authorities.

A church official who did make reference to the political aspects of the civil war in East Pakistan, argued explicitly that the main focus of the Canadian response should be the refugees in India.

A member of the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada) stated that,

... it was not only useless to continue to debate whether the war between the two wings of Pakistan was an internal matter, but it was also fruitless to debate whether it was possible to move relief supplies into what was, until two months ago, East Pakistan. Both of these issues are so complicated by political self interest, political protocol and the presence of the West Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, that waiting to settle them will only lead to an indefinite delay in providing relief to those who need it now.⁸

Moreover, in his estimation, it was impossible to assist the needy in East Pakistan because the West Pakistani army could not be expected to allow supplies to be brought to those who were their

enemies. Those who were allies of the West Pakistani Army, he pointed out, had no need of relief assistance as they were being allowed to help themselves to the possessions of those who had fled.⁹ But those who had fled to India could be helped without "the political complications" which would have arisen if an attempt was made to help those in East Pakistan.¹⁰ This position was consistent with the view of the Canadian government.

When the church statements referred to Canadian policy they contained little criticism and in most cases prescribed courses of action that paralleled those of the Canadian government. After the semi-annual meeting of the Canadian Catholic Conference of Bishops in April, the national hierarchy of the church sent a telegram to the Minister for External Affairs:

On Sunday April 25, Catholics in Canada are observing a Right to Life Day. In reflecting on the numerous ways in which this God-given and most basic human right is forcibly denied or threatened throughout the world, thoughtful Catholics will have in mind the deplorable loss of innocent lives and reported atrocities now taking place in the Pakistani conflict. . . .

While we recognize that there are limitations and obstacles which now make difficult positive mediation of this lamentable conflict, we urge the Government of Canada to persist by every available means in offering good offices and humanitarian assistance, through the United Nations or otherwise, in the hope that continued human suffering and loss of innocent lives may soon come to an end in East Pakistan.¹¹

On July 30, after a meeting with the Minister for External Affairs covering both the proposed American nuclear tests in the Aleutian

Islands and the civil war in Pakistan, four Canadian church leaders: Reverend A. B. Moore, President of the Canadian Council of Churches and Moderator of The United Church of Canada; Reverend E. W. Scott, Anglican Primate of Canada; Reverend J. A. Plourde, President of the Canadian Catholic Conference and Reverend E. E. Long, General Secretary of The United Church of Canada, declared to journalists that their intervention had only a humanitarian objective and they had asked Mr. Sharp to increase aid to the victims of the Pakistani civil war.¹² Though they recognized that the basis of the civil war was political, they noted that

... there has been no taking part on behalf of either side by outside governments. We don't wish to take sides in the conflict so as to not to hamper our efforts in favour of the refugees.¹³

Dr. Moore said that he was reassured by Mr. Sharp's description of Canadian policy, but was depressed over "inside information" on the extent of the problem, stating that they could not "wait passively until a political solution [was] achieved while people [were] dying for a lack of food, shelter and medicine."¹⁴ Church leaders thus emphasized the same priorities as the Canadian government.

Five leading church leaders supported the diplomatic, economic and military response of the Canadian government to the Pakistan civil war as reflected by the South Asia Conference. This conference organized by Oxfam of Canada, endorsed with only one exception, Ottawa's stance. The Associate Secretary of the Canadian Council

of Churches, E. Mackay, the Anglican Primate of Canada, Archbishop E.W. Scott, the President of the Canadian Catholic Conference, Archbishop J.A. Plourde and the former moderator of The Presbyterian Church of Canada, Reverend Ernest Long, participated with other representatives from Canadian voluntary agencies, political parties, educational institutions and public life, in discussions on the situation in East Pakistan. They signed the Declaration of the meeting that urged all governments:

- 1) To terminate immediately all military deliveries to Pakistan;
- 2) To suspend all economic aid to Pakistan;
- 3) To channel all possible resources into a massive emergency program for famine relief in East Pakistan, directed and administered by the United Nations;
- 4) To make firm, continuing commitments to share fairly the economic burden of supporting the refugees in India;
- 5) To intervene to save the life of Sheik Mujibur Rahman.¹⁵

This position was consistent with that of Ottawa; Canada had undertaken all the recommended policy actions except the suspension of development assistance to Pakistan. Even in this respect, the government had decided not to introduce new aid agreements.

The only church group which appeared as a witness before the hearings of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, the Mennonites, also recommended a diplomatic and economic policy response to the civil war that was in accord with the position of the Canadian government. A representative of the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada) told a hear-

ing of the committee that, because they believed that a solution must be political, their group urged the Canadian government to use its influence to restore peace in East Pakistan by encouraging the government of Pakistan to end the violence in East Bengal. If the situation became international in scope, they suggested that the Canadian government ask the United Nations to place an international peacekeeping force in East Pakistan to provide the stability through which peace could be restored. Lastly, they felt that the Canadian government should use its economic and technological resources to relieve the suffering in East Pakistan and in particular, should undertake (in cooperation with the United Nations relief administration in East Pakistan) a massive food lift.¹⁶ Thus the proposals coincided with the response of the Canadian government.

In its statement on diplomatic recognition for the former eastern half of Pakistan, the Canadian Council of Churches was substantially in accord with the policy declarations of the Minister for External Affairs. On January 18, 1972 the Executive Committee adopted a resolution urging the government of Canada to recognize the state of Bangladesh "as soon as possible" and encouraging the government to provide as much assistance as possible in loans, grants, and material aid with technically trained personnel for the task of rehabilitation.¹⁷ Thus the group supported an important aspect of Canadian diplomatic policy in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan war.

Church representatives were critical of Canadian reluctance to support United Nations' initiative and economic sanctions. On April 13, Mr. Edwin Abbot, representing the Canadian Friends Service Committee of the Religious Society of Friends stated:

No doubt it will be argued that the right of national sovereignty dictates that we do not interfere with the internal workings of any country. However, a country's government stands to defend the rights and lives of its people, and when it fails to do this, it has abrogated its right to govern. Measures should be found to enable the people to manage their own affairs in a peaceful way. We call on our Government to exert every moral pressure, both directly and through the United Nations, to end this intolerable denial of human and democratic rights.¹⁸

On July 30, after a meeting with the Minister for External Affairs, the Primate of The Anglican Church of Canada, Edward W. Scott, stated that:

United Nations pressure should be used to prevent killings. To achieve humanitarian ends in the conflict we'd be concerned about supporting international action ... by the United Nations.¹⁹

On October 8-11, 1971, the Student Christian Movement of Canada's Board of Directors requested that:

... the Government immediately stop sending any kind of aid or giving any kind of support to the Government of Pakistan because this could assist it to continue prosecuting the war in East Pakistan.²⁰

On November 29, the International Affairs Committee and the Board of World Missions of The United Church of Canada stated in a telegram to Prime Minister Trudeau that Canada could no longer avoid her responsibility to raise the situation in East Pakistan in the

United Nations. They insisted that Ottawa should use every possible means to place the matter on the agenda of the General Assembly. They recommended that Canada ask the Security Council to enlarge the UN presence on the borders of East Pakistan in order to combat tensions between East and West Pakistan. They also asked that Ottawa immediately suspend all Canadian aid and support to the government of Pakistan and provide more aid and relief to the people of East Pakistan, but only under the direction and control of such international agencies as the Red Cross or the United Nations. They requested that Canada press for the immediate and unconditional release of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and urge the restoration of the democratic process in East Pakistan.²¹ Thus, on four separate occasions prior to the Indo-Pakistan war, four church groups expressed some public disagreement with the policy response of the Canadian government. They focussed on Canada's failure to take any diplomatic initiatives at the UN while continuing to supply economic assistance to Pakistan.

In the aftermath of the regional Indo-Pakistan war, one group did request that the Canadian government grant immediate recognition to Bangladesh. A committee of the Religious Society of Friends wrote the Prime Minister on January 13, 1972 stating:

... as pacifists we regret that in the end, military action by India seemed to be the only way to ensure that the expressed wishes of the majority of the people of East Pakistan could be realised. We believe.

however, that the most helpful political action that the Canadian government could take at this time was to grant immediate recognition to the newly founded state of Bangladesh, so that Bangladesh may be admitted into the Family of Nations and thus be assisted at all levels to develop a stable government and to provide, with all available international aid, for the urgent needs of its 80,000,000 people.²²

The Quakers were the sole Church group to criticize the Canadian government's delay in recognizing Bangladesh.

In fact, the harshest criticism of the position of the Canadian government did not come from church representatives of the major denominations, but rather from the Student Christian Movement of Canada which issued a series of pamphlets. In the first, entitled, "Bangladesh Is For Real," and dated September 20, 1971, its author stated that, by dispensing aid in "an unbiased and open way," Canadians were guilty of aiding and abetting a colossal man-made disaster which was much more destructive than any natural catastrophe. The rationalization that the civil war was an internal matter was false because Canada was already involved through the provision of economic aid.²³ Therefore, action which went beyond innocuous letters and diplomacy was necessary and urgent. The pamphlet urged the provision of more material and monetary relief to the Indian government for relief work; the provision of relief to Bangladesh under the strict control of the Red Cross and the United Nations, but not the government of Pakistan; the immediate suspension of all aid to and support of Pakistan; and pressure for the immediate uncon-

ditional release of Sheik Mujibur Rahman. Unlike other church bodies, the Student Christian Movement of Canada called for the recognition of Bangladesh, but made no demand for a Canadian initiative at the United Nations. The international organization was, in their opinion, "the biggest false god that modern man created." The placement of UN observers on the border would not ensure the return of the refugees; they would not be permitted to return "unless there is a political solution."²⁴ A second pamphlet, entitled "Pakistan Crisis Deepens," dated December 21, 1971, criticized the Canadian delay in the recognition of Bangladesh.

Nine months data is sufficient to act on, for the position becomes increasingly hypocritical, especially since Canada continued for nine months to support a government while it carried out systematic genocide. Now it has fallen and just what good was all the quiet diplomacy?²⁵

Thus the Student Christian Movement of Canada was more critical than other church organizations and pressed for immediate recognition of Bangladesh. It clearly differed from the main diplomatic and economic policies of the Canadian government to the civil war.

Some church officials did criticize the scope of the Canadian response to the plight of refugees in India. Their criticism focussed principally on the amount of the Canadian relief contribution. In a September interview, Dr. Bob McClure, former moderator of The United Church of Canada, stated that in a century that was noted for such occurrences, this was the largest flood of refugees. While

the Indian government was, in his view, doing a superb job of coping with what would be an impossible problem for any country, he felt that since India was not responsible for the situation she should not have to pay for it. Instead, he stated, Canada and other nations should carry their share, by pressing the government to do more by increasing "their individual contributions."²⁶ On November 19 the Anglican Archbishop stressed the need for vastly increased support from world governments in general and Canada in particular to care for the refugees in India who required two to three million dollars a day. He said the government of Canada could be more generous, and strongly supported the suggestion that Canada provide funds to feed the refugees one day each month for a six-month period at a cost of approximately eighteen million dollars. By lending "financial support," he said, Canada and other countries could help prevent a war which no one could guarantee would only be local.²⁷ Their perspectives did not therefore significantly diverge from that of Canadian authorities.

Thus the vast majority of the church groups agreed with the foreign policy response of the Canadian government in their statements. The Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship, the Baptist Federation of Canada and The Salvation Army made no statements regarding Canadian policy, nor did the Lutheran Church, except with regard to their fund raising activities. The Mennonites through their relief organization, the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada),

actively supported the policies of the Canadian government by their public prescriptions of diplomatic and economic actions that paralleled those of Canada. The Canadian Council of Churches, The Presbyterian Church in Canada and the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, with the exception of one recommendation for the suspension of all economic aid to Pakistan similarly supported government policy. The Anglican Church of Canada also duplicated the policy stance of the latter three church bodies, but differed in its recommendation of a United Nations initiative in response to the civil war. Only three church bodies, the Religious Society of Friends, the Student Christian Movement of Canada, and The United Church of Canada publicly disagreed with government economic and diplomatic policies. Church groups generally, therefore, supported the foreign policy response of the Canadian government to the Pakistan civil war.

B. Publications

Church publications paid very little attention to Canadian policy towards Pakistan and India during the civil war. The majority of church publications had no editorial comment on the situation and the few editorials that were written did not diverge from the policies of the Canadian government (see Table 3:1). They focussed more heavily on the refugees in India than on the politics of Pakistan but, in either case, made little reference to the content of Canadian policy. The majority of church publications neither criticized the

government policies nor provided their readers with factual descriptions of the government's response.

The Canadian Council of Churches, the Baptist Federation of Canada, The Presbyterian Church in Canada and the Religious Society of Friends publications had no editorial page.²⁸ The Lutheran Church and The United Church of Canada publications did not print editorials on the situation.²⁹ Of the remaining four church publications, the Canadian government was mentioned in two editorials of both, The Anglican Church of Canada and the Mennonites publications, and in only one editorial each of the Roman Catholic Church in Canada and Salvation Army publications. Thus the ten church publications provided little editorial evaluation of the Canadian government's response.

The first editorial in the Anglican publication, Canadian Churchman, criticized the lack of a Canadian response to the situation, while the second made policy recommendations that the Canadian government had already adopted. The first editorial in June questioned:

For how long in this 20th century must the rights of people living under outdated colonial established boundaries and under outmoded colonially established regimes be abrogated in the name of preserving one nation, even though that nation—in the case of Pakistan—is divided by 1,000 miles of another country.

How long will democracies such as Canada acquiesce to suppression of human rights by refusing to get involved for fear of upsetting the status quo? And as Christians, how long do we, by our indifference allow

oppression to exist when we profess the sanctity of human life over all else?³⁰

The second September editorial urged church members to write to their members of Parliament:

... to get our Government to support an immediate return to civilian government in Bangla Desh, ask him to keep pressure on Mitchell Sharp—I think he'll welcome it—to send more government aid to India who's spending a million dollars a day feeding people Yahya Khan can't be bothered with.

Tell that M. P. the Indian subcontinent needs a political solution to this crisis now before we find ourselves embroiled in a bloody war costing even more lives.³¹

Thus The Anglican Church of Canada supported more strenuous diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, but the broad lines of policy were consistent with the public statements of the Minister for External Affairs.³²

The first editorial in the Canadian Mennonite Reporter praised the Canadian military response and criticized the lack of a global diplomatic initiative while the second drew lessons for future Church-Government relations. The September 15, 1971 editorial noted:

... the present refugee crisis brings into focus more than ever before the inadequacy of handouts, the early need for removing the causes and the urgency for finding long-term solutions soon ... a good beginning would be to commend the Canadian government for its immediate embargo, to urge the United States government to follow suit, and to seek the intervention not of the big powers but of the United Nations, while at the same time pleading and praying that the Pakistani leaders reverse their policies and that the Indian leaders do not lose patience.³³

The second editorial on January 10, 1972 focussed upon the political aspects of relief that emerged from the Pakistan civil war:

We won't say as some have said that relief is politics. That is language too handicapped to be useful, but there can be no doubt that relief or the lack of relief has to do with the policies of governments and would-be governments . . . the new name for relief is not only Kinshasa, Saigon, Amman and Jerusalem but also Washington and Ottawa. M. C. C. (Canada) had reservations about instituting an office last year, but how can there be any doubts this year. ³⁴

In its editorials, the Mennonites supported the military embargo, but pressed for greater diplomatic activism.

The Roman Catholic publication suggested economic and diplomatic policy initiatives that the Canadian government had already taken. The Canadian Register argued:

The most important point that needs stressing concerns the ascertaining of whether material aid to Pakistan is actually distributed where it is most needed . . . apathy on the part of the free world can only delay still further what is now of prime urgency: namely concentrated action by the Pakistan government with its base in the West towards reconciliation in the Eastern territories. ³⁵

On the other hand, the publication of The Salvation Army, The War Cry, offered only general criticism. It demanded a long-term economic strategy by the Western world for the development of the impoverished third world.

Yet Canada like all the other wealthier countries has shown scant concern for the problems of the poor nations. . . . Our concern to keep our economic balance when crisis looms ahead should be tempered by the thought that in this respect there are many nations which have yet to find their feet. ³⁶

TABLE 3:1

Church Publications: Editorial Content Analysis

Organization	Editorial Page	Pertinent Editorials	Canadian Foreign Policy			
			Focus	Mention	Pro	Con ^e
Anglican Church	yes	2	2	0	1	1
Baptist Federation	no	-	-	-	-	-
Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship	*	*	*	*	*	*
Canadian Council of Churches	no	-	-	-	-	-
Lutheran Church	yes	0	0	0	0	0
Mennonites	yes	4	0	2	1	1
Presbyterian Church	no	-	-	-	-	-
Religious Society of Friends	no	-	-	-	-	-
Roman Catholic Church	yes	1	0	1	1	0
Salvation Army	yes	1	0	1	1	0
Student Christian Move- ment	*	-	-	-	-	-
United Church	yes	0	0	0	0	0
		8	2	4	4	2

* Publication unavailable for analysis.

The demands of the Roman Catholic publication for effective supervision of relief and a political settlement paralleled the policy of the Canadian government while the criticism of The Salvation Army publication did not concern the Canadian response to the civil war.

Therefore only two church publications differed editorially with the policy response of the Canadian government to the Pakistan civil war and both concentrated on Canadian passivity in the diplomatic arena. Two editorials, by The Anglican Church of Canada and The Mennonites respectively, criticized the lack of general diplomatic response and in particular the failure to take the initiative at the United Nations. The majority of church editorial opinion supported the policies of the Canadian government either passively through the absence of comment or through the suggestions of policy responses that the Canadian government had already taken.

While the articles in church publications did not outline the policy preferences of the religious bodies, they did serve as a useful indicator of their concerns, especially for their membership. The main focus of the majority of articles in church publications was the plight of the refugees in India, their needs, and the importance of fund raising either by the church itself or through the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief (see Table 3:2). There was little mention of the civil war in Pakistan and of the response of the Canadian government. Three of the church publications, those of the Baptist Federation of Canada, the Lutheran Church and The Salvation Army

dealt only with the refugees in India.³⁷ Of the remaining seven that were surveyed, five (those of The Anglican Church of Canada, The Canadian Council of Churches, The Presbyterian Church in Canada, the Religious Society of Friends and the Roman Catholic Church in Canada) concentrated on the situation in India,³⁸ while that of The Mennonites divided its attention between India and Pakistan.³⁹ Only the publication of The United Church of Canada paid more attention to the situation in Pakistan and to the Canadian foreign policy response than to the refugees in India.⁴⁰

Those articles that dealt with the refugees in India concentrated on the fund raising and relief activities of church organizations. Four publications (those of The Anglican Church of Canada, the Baptist Federation of Canada, The Canadian Council of Churches and the Lutheran Church) had articles only on the fund raising and relief activities of their Church or associated bodies.⁴¹ Three (The Mennonites, the Roman Catholic Church in Canada and the Salvation Army) devoted the majority of their articles to fund raising activities.⁴² The Presbyterian Church in Canada and The United Church of Canada divided their attention evenly between fund raising and relief.⁴³ Only the Religious Society of Friends published more articles on the condition of the refugees than on the fund raising activities of their own church.⁴⁴ Even within the limited perspective of the refugee problem, church publications provided little information to help their readers develop an informed evaluation of Canada's

relief contributions to the East Pakistani refugees in India.

Church publications devoted scant attention to the policy response of Canada to the civil war in Pakistan. Four of the publications (those of the Baptist Federation of Canada, the Lutheran Church, the Religious Society of Friends, and The Salvation Army) neither published articles nor made reference to the foreign policy response of the Canadian government. Another three publications (those of The Canadian Council of Churches, The Anglican Church of Canada and the Roman Catholic Church in Canada) included one article each on the response of the Canadian government,⁴⁵ while those of The Mennonites and The United Church of Canada had two articles each.⁴⁶ In addition, three publications contained articles that mentioned Canadian foreign policy but only within the context of the general situation. Three articles appeared in the publication of The United Church of Canada, two in that of The Anglican Church of Canada and one in that of The Presbyterian Church in Canada.⁴⁷ Thus church publications did not perform an educational function, much less provide the basis for informed criticism. They provided little information or guidance for their readers about policies of the Canadian government.

Of the eight articles in church publications that did focus on Canadian foreign policy, few were critical of the response of the government. Three were simply factual reports of Canada's economic activities: the government's July 20 announcement of additional

relief for India and Pakistan in the United Church Observer, its announcement of the October trip by a CIDA team to South Asia in the Council Communicator; and its November announcement of additional relief in the Canadian Mennonite Reporter.⁴⁸ Three articles reported the statements by their churches which had been forwarded to the government: the April resolution of the Roman Catholic Bishops that had been sent to the Minister for External Affairs; the submission of the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada) to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence; and the resolution of the committees of The United Church of Canada that had been sent to the Prime Minister.⁴⁹ One article published the statement by the Anglican Primate on the civil war,⁵⁰ while the eighth was a reprint of the September editorial of the Anglican paper, the Canadian Churchman, which appeared in the United Church Observer.⁵¹ Only the article reporting the resolution of the United Church contained negative references to Canadian policy; these included the recommendations for Canadian initiatives to have a UN discussion, to press for the release of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and to suspend economic aid to Pakistan.

The majority of the five articles in church publications that mentioned Canadian foreign policy contained no negative references to the responses of the Canadian government. Three were summaries of the Toronto Declaration of Concern that did not specifically criticize the Canadian government and deviated from Canadian policies

only in recommending the suspension of all economic aid to Pakistan.⁵² The United Church Observer interviewed its former moderator who recommended that Canadians should press Ottawa to do more by increasing its contributions.⁵³ The fifth article in the Anglican paper, the Canadian Churchman, was an on-the-spot story by the editor who felt that there were: "... no longer illusions about Canada's ability to make unpleasant governments around the world behave properly [but there comes] a point ... when self respect and Christian ideals require us to stop supporting those kinds of governments at any level, including diplomatic."⁵⁴ Thus only the publication of the Anglican Church of Canada directly criticized the Canadian government. Even then it did not specify policy demands beyond broad general diplomatic sanctions against Pakistan.

This survey of church publications suggests that they provided little information for their readership on the foreign policy response of the Canadian government. Only five of the ten publications alluded to Canadian foreign policy at all: the Roman Catholic Church in Canada; The Canadian Council of Churches; The Mennonites; The Anglican Church of Canada; and The United Church of Canada. Only the last three published more than one article and only the last two were critical of Canadian policies. Church publications were disappointingly ineffective, therefore, in educating their readership. They provided little or no information to those among their subscribers who wished to learn about Canadian policy. The failure to

TABLE 3:2

Church Publications: Article Content Analysis

Organization	Publication	Pertinent Articles	Pakistan-Civil War	Refugees in India	Canadian Foreign Policy
Anglican Church	Yes	9	3	5	1 (2)*
Baptist Federation	Yes	2	0	2	0
Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship	No	-	-	-	-
Canadian Council of Churches	Yes	4	0	3	1
Lutheran Church	Yes	2	0	2	0
Mennonites	Yes	12	4	6	2
Presbyterian Church	Yes	5	2	3	0 (1)*
Religious Society of Friends	Yes	1	0	1	0
Roman Catholic Church	Yes	15	3	11	1
Salvation Army	Yes	4	0	4	0
Student Christian Movement	No	-	-	-	-
United Church	Yes	7	2	2	3 (2)*
Total		61	14	39	8 (5)*

* Figures in parentheses are the number of articles which mentioned but did not feature Canadian foreign policy.

inform led inevitably to a failure of evaluation. With an inadequate information base, church members were neither expected nor asked to comment critically on Canadian government policy. If their publications can be used as a point of reference, Canada's churches contributed little to the creation of attentive and informed opinion even on those foreign policy issues that were of clerical concern.

C. Activities

The principal activity of Canadian churches was fund raising: The Canadian Council of Churches, The Anglican Church of Canada, the Baptist Federation of Canada, the Lutheran Church, The Mennonites, The Presbyterian Church in Canada, the Religious Society of Friends, the Roman Catholic Church in Canada and its related missionary groups, The Salvation Army and The United Church of Canada all concentrated their efforts on collection of money and, in some cases, material relief for the victims of the civil war. The Canadian Council of Churches, and the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace were also members of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, an ad hoc fund raising body that was composed of church and voluntary agencies. Only the Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship and the Student Christian Movement of Canada did not participate in fund raising activity. The majority of Canadian church groups spent most of their time engaged in non-political

activity that in no way affected the policies of the Canadian government.

Most of the ten church organizations collected more than fifty percent of their relief funds themselves (see Table 3:3). The Baptists, Presbyterians, Quakers, and the United Church raised one hundred percent of their funds⁵⁵ while the Mennonite Central Committee and The Salvation Army raised more than 50 percent of their own funds.⁵⁶ The remainder--The Canadian Council of Churches, The Anglican Church of Canada, the Lutheran Church, and the Roman Catholic Church in Canada received more than fifty percent of their funds from the Canadian government.⁵⁷ Thus, while six church organizations (the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Council of Churches, The Anglican Church of Canada, the Lutheran Church, The Mennonites in Canada and The Salvation Army) received direct cash grants from the Canadian government, only the first four were dependent on government disbursements as their principal source of relief funds.

None of the ten church organizations distributed their own relief funds (see Table 3:4). Six (The Canadian Council of Churches, the Lutheran Church, the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Religious Society of Friends and The Salvation Army) disbursed the entire amount allocated for relief through their respective parent bodies.⁵⁸ The Anglican Church of Canada and The Presbyterian Church in Canada disbursed the funds

TABLE 3:3

Church Relief Funds: Sources

Organization (Body)	Public Donations	Canadian Government	C. A. P. R.	Provinces	Total
Anglican Church	\$126, 720 (28.1%)	\$325, 000 (71.9%)	0	0	\$451, 720
Baptist Federation	29, 025 (100%)	0	0	0	29, 025
Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship	*	*	*	*	*
Canadian Council of Churches	14, 370 (2.8%)	440, 000 (86.8%)	\$52, 746 (11.4%)	0	507, 116
Lutheran Church	86, 850 (38.3%)	140, 000 (61.7%)	0	0	226, 850
Mennonites	414, 034 (73.4%)	150, 000 (26.6%)	0	0	564, 034
Presbyterian Church	89, 338 (100%)	0	0	0	89, 338
Religious Society of Friends	6, 100 (100%)	0	0	0	6, 100
Roman Catholic Church	601, 220 (46.5%)	640, 000 (49.5%)	52, 746 (4%)	0	1, 293, 966
Salvation Army	58, 027 (52.7%)	50, 000 (47.3%)	0	0	108, 027
Student Christian Movement	*	*	*	*	*
United Church	333, 740 (100%)	0	0	0	333, 740
	\$1, 759, 424 (48.7%)	\$1, 745, 000 (48.3%)	\$105, 492 (3%)	0	\$3, 609, 916

*Did not undertake fund raising.

TABLE 3:4
Church Relief Funds: Disbursals

	Own Organization	Parent Body	Voluntary Agency	Church Body	Indian Govt.	Pakistan Govt.	United Nations	Total
Anglican Church	0	\$390,005 (86.3%)	0	\$61,716 (13.7%)	0	0	0	\$ 451,721
Baptist Federation	0	23,281 (88.6%)	\$3,000 (11.4%)	0	0	0	0	26,281
Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Canadian Council of Churches	0	507,116 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	507,116
Lutheran Church	0	226,850 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	226,850
Mennonites	0	564,634 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	564,634
Presbyterian Church	0	40,100 (40.4%)	0	54,135 (59.6%)	0	0	0	94,235
Religious Society of Friends	0	6,100 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	6,100
Roman Catholic Church	0	1,002,190 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	1,002,190
Salvation Army	0	108,027 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	108,027
Student Christian Movement	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
United Church	0	0	0	323,125 (97.3%)	0	0	9,015 (0.7%)	332,140
	0	\$2,868,303 (86.4%)	\$3,000 (0.1%)	\$438,976 (13.2%)	0	0	\$9,015 (0.3%)	\$3,319,294

* Did not undertake fund raising.

allocated for relief partly to their parent bodies and partly to other church organizations for redistribution.⁵⁹ The Baptist Federation of Canada gave its relief funds to the parent body and a Canadian voluntary agency. The United Church of Canada sent the funds that it had allocated for relief to another church organization and a multilateral agency.⁶⁰ Thus, the majority of the churches simply transferred their relief funds to their parent organizations for use on behalf of the East Pakistan refugees. Those that did not, sent their funds to other clerical organizations.

Two church groups also participated in a coalition of church and voluntary aid agencies formed to raise relief funds. The Canadian Council of Churches and the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace were both constituent members of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief and, as a result, each received \$52,746 as their share of the funds raised. However, representatives of The Canadian Council of Churches had hesitated to join. Secular agencies had asked the council to represent their member churches on C.A.P.R. because they wanted only one church representative in the organization. Church members preferred equal representation since they expected that the right to vote would increase the amount of revenues received. The representative of The Canadian Council of Churches was finally able to persuade his members to accept joint representation. Despite these frictions, the principal link to other groups was only through fund raising; these joint activities did not

touch upon policies of the Canadian government.

Only three groups attempted to change the direction of government policy and only two tried to involve the public in their efforts. The Religious Society of Friends, the Student Christian Movement of Canada and The United Church of Canada forwarded statements of their respective positions to the government and the latter two sent copies to members of Parliament.⁶¹ The board of the World Mission of The United Church printed a set of pamphlets written by one of its members who was then working as Atlantic regional secretary for the Student Christian Movement of Canada.⁶² The first pamphlet distributed by The United Church and the Student Christian Movement emphasized the obligation of individuals, governments, agencies, and churches to take political action. In the total context of the disaster, Canadian humanitarian aid was no longer adequate. Even though further action might be considered "one-sided," Bangladesh was "bleeding profusely" and continued to be "raped, looted, and laid to waste."⁶³ The second pamphlet recommended that Canadians urge their government to recognize Bangladesh without delay by writing to the Prime Minister, the Minister for External Affairs and their members of Parliament.⁶³ To animate the expression of opinion, the author of the two pieces gave speeches and distributed the pamphlets to students.⁶⁵ This was the only instance, however, where church groups attempted to activate, politicize and mobilize Canadian public opinion and this activity was concentrated largely among the student

population.

Only on three specific occasions did church members participate in public activities not exclusively devoted to fund raising and only one meeting was organized under church auspices. On July 30, 1971, representatives of The Canadian Council of Churches, The Anglican Church in Canada, the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, and The United Church of Canada met with the External Affairs Minister to discuss both the proposed American nuclear test in the Aleutian Islands and the Pakistan situation. They explained to journalists that the purpose of the meeting was humanitarian; they had asked Mr. Sharp to continue increasing aid to the victims of the Pakistan civil war.⁶⁶ In mid-August, representatives of The Canadian Council of Churches, The Anglican Church of Canada, The Presbyterian Church in Canada, the Roman Catholic Church in Canada and The United Church of Canada attended The South Asia Conference, organized by Oxfam of Canada, to discuss the Pakistan crisis.⁶⁷ Lastly, the associate executive director of the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada) was a witness at the October 19, 1971 hearing of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.⁶⁸ In none of the three instances did church representatives criticize the policies of the Canadian government.

On the contrary, church representatives explicitly refused to undertake actions that could directly or indirectly pressure the Canadian government. Representatives of relief agencies met in

May to discuss the possibility of coordinated action that would urge the Canadian government to press for a ceasefire in East Pakistan on humanitarian grounds, thereby allowing the distribution of relief supplies. The representative of The Canadian Council of Churches argued that the principle focus should be the refugees in India and the mobilization of public support for relief activities. In the absence of adequate information about the situation in East Pakistan, he continued, any action would not be effective and he doubted that West Pakistan would permit direct observation of conditions in the field. In the interim, he suggested that they establish a clearing house to share information of agency representatives in the region and that they also ask the Canadian government to rectify the omission in the Charter of the United Nations concerning humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts. In his view, only those refugees who had crossed the border into India could be helped at that time and this coincided with the position of the Canadian government.⁶⁹

The Mennonites and The United Church of Canada also refrained from overt political activity. Although the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada) had encouraged its members to emphasize the need of a political settlement in Pakistan to persons and places that had "power to influence policy," it stressed that this should be done in a quiet and positive way so as to avoid "unnecessary embarrassment" to the responsible authorities in order that the plight of the affected people would not be further jeopardized. The executive of The United

Church of Canada referred a proposal from the South Asia Crisis Committee for the establishment of a Pakistan tribunal to the appropriate church body for further consideration.⁷¹ Both groups, therefore, refused to take an action that could embarrass the Canadian government.

This examination of church activities suggests that few groups organized or participated in overt political activities designed to affect Canadian policy. The pamphlets of the Student Christian Movement of Canada were the only attempt to mobilize Canadian public opinion. The South Asia Conference attended by The Canadian Council of Churches, The Presbyterian Church in Canada, the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, and The United Church of Canada was organized by a voluntary agency—Oxfam of Canada. The principal, almost exclusive focus of church activity was fund raising; getting cash grants from the Canadian government, obtaining funds from the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief and the transmittal of relief funds to parent organizations for disbursement to the refugees. These activities by church groups did not in any way restrict the actions of the Canadian government.

D. Summary

Church policy on Canada's proper and possible role in the conflict in South Asia was permissive and passive. Although none of the church groups directly supported the policies of the Canadian

government, most gave support by silence or de facto concurrence with the response of the government. The Canadian Council of Churches, The Mennonites, The Presbyterian Church in Canada and the Roman Catholic Church in Canada prescribed policy actions that paralleled those of Canada, while four additional groups, the Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship, the Baptist Federation of Canada, the Lutheran Church and The Salvation Army did not contradict those policies. The Anglican Church of Canada vacillated somewhat in its policies and The United Church of Canada, while it initially recommended policies similar to those of the government, later criticized Ottawa's policies. Only the Religious Society of Friends and the Student Christian Movement of Canada consistently disagreed with government policies and only the student organization attempted actively to mobilize public opinion. Thus most church groups supported government policy by default in their concentration upon fund raising for relief of Pakistan refugees in India.

Three church organizations expressed no interest in the policies of the Canadian government. The Baptist Federation of Canada, the Lutheran Church and The Salvation Army in Canada made no statements referring to Canadian policy. Their publications made no mention, either in editorials or in articles, of any aspect of the foreign policy response of Canada and these three groups participated solely in fund raising activities.

In their statements, three churches concurred with the policies of the Canadian government and, with the exception of a minor part of a declaration, recommended policy action that the Canadian government had undertaken.⁶ Their publications contained no negative evaluations of government policy, either in their editorials or in their articles, and in their activities, they concentrated upon fund raising. The Canadian Council of Churches, The Presbyterian Church in Canada, and the Roman Catholic Church in Canada issued statements that supported the diplomatic and military policies of the Canadian government. Only the recommendation of immediate suspension of economic aid to Pakistan contained in the Declaration of the South Asia Conference, differed with the Canadian decision to suspend future aid and development assistance, but to continue existing programs. The Canadian Council of Churches and The Presbyterian Church published no editorial page. The Roman Catholic Church had only one editorial and it recommended policy parallel to that of the Canadian government. All three, in their publications, carried one article which referred to the response of the Canadian government without criticism. Lastly, the main activity of each of the groups was fund raising; political activity was restricted to participation in the South Asia Conference.

The Mennonites generally supported policies that paralleled those of the government and urged their members to convey the group's position to members of Parliament. Both the articles

in their publication that referred to Canadian foreign policy did not contain negative evaluations and the one editorial which urged a diplomatic initiative at the United Nations also praised Canada for its military embargo on Pakistan. Thus the public position of The Mennonites supported the thrust of Canadian government policy.

The Anglican Church of Canada demonstrated an inconsistent pattern towards the policies of the Canadian government. Though the primate of the church was one of four churchmen who declared that the churches did not wish to take sides in the conflict, he nonetheless stated that he favoured United Nations' action and pressure to prevent killings. He signed the South Asia Conference Declaration that recommended policy actions that the Canadian government had already undertaken, and urged the suspension of aid as well. In November, he recommended increased Canadian governmental contributions for refugee relief in India. Though the June editorial of the Canadian Churchman criticized the lack of Canadian initiative in urging a political solution to the civil war, a September editorial supported policies that the Canadian government had already recommended. Two articles dealing with the response of the Canadian government made no negative comment while a third requested the government to reduce its support of the Pakistan regime. Thus The Anglican Church of Canada neither completely opposed nor sup-

ported the policies of the Canadian government. It did demand less support of Pakistan and greater diplomatic imagination.

The United Church of Canada, in its publications and activities, began by agreeing with the policies of the Canadian government. However, just prior to the Indo-Pakistan war, it began to criticize Ottawa's diplomatic and economic response. Although the church was one of four who affirmed that they did not wish to take sides in the civil war, they too signed the South Asia Conference Declaration. In so doing, they too supported the termination of economic assistance to Pakistan. The United Church paper published no editorials on the situation, and had no articles critical of Canadian policies until the January issue. In late November, two church committees recommended that the Canadian government undertake new diplomatic and economic initiatives and the January edition of their publication reported these recommendations. This was the only one of six church articles on the conflict which criticized Canadian policies. The United Church also published and helped distribute two pamphlets in December that criticized Canada's failure to recognize Bangladesh. Thus, though The United Church of Canada initially supported the policies of the Canadian government they later criticized Ottawa's actions and attempted to change them.

Two groups undertook actions that were consciously designed to modify government policy, though only one of them attempted to

mobilize other groups to join in pressing the government. Both the Religious Society of Friends and the Student Christian Movement of Canada were unequivocally critical of Canadian policy in the Pakistan civil war. However, only the student organization tried to mobilize the public through the distribution of pamphlets. Despite its criticism, the Quakers did not publish any articles that referred to the foreign policy response of Canada and the Student Christian Movement of Canada did not have a regular publication. Therefore only one church group offered sustained criticism of Canadian policy.

The church groups established few links amongst themselves or with non-church groups, other than for relief purposes. Intra-church ties were restricted to cooperation between the Board of World Mission of The United Church of Canada and the Student Christian Movement of Canada for the printing and distribution of a set of pamphlets. The main non-church link was through the membership of The Canadian Council of Churches and the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (the development assistance organization of the Roman Catholic church in Canada) in the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief. The strong reservations of church members of The Canadian Council of Churches, moreover, have been noted. There was considerable reluctance to participate in the umbrella organization which distributed relief funds collected by the churches. Their contacts with government officials were restricted almost exclusively to financial issues. In their visit,

to the Minister for External Affairs, the four church leaders of The Canadian Council of Churches, The Anglican Church of Canada, the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, and The United Church of Canada, concentrated on their humanitarian objective and expressed no criticism of the policies of the Canadian government.

Thus seven of the eleven church groups agreed with the policies of the Canadian government. These included the Bible and Medical missionary Fellowship, the Baptist Federation of Canada, The Lutheran Church, The Mennonites, The Presbyterian Church in Canada, the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, and The Salvation Army. Four groups, The Anglican Church of Canada, the Religious Society of Friends, the Student Christian Movement of Canada, and The United Church of Canada, disagreed in varying degrees with the policies of the Canadian government during the civil war. Even so, the scope of their political activity was extraordinarily limited. In a self-limiting role, they placed overwhelming emphasis on fund raising.

Explanation of the passivity on policy is not obvious. The second hypothesis argues that established pressure groups with ties in the field are more likely to diverge from the policies of the government in Ottawa than those groups with links to agencies operating in Pakistan or India. This hypothesis is only partially confirmed. None of the four church groups that did have ties in Pakistan (the Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship, The Men-

nonites, the Roman Catholic Church and their associated organizations, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Les Frères and Les Pères de St. Croix, and The Salvation Army of Canada) opposed Canadian government policy. Three well-established groups that had no such ties (the Religious Society of Friends in Canada, the Student Christian Movement of Canada, and The United Church of Canada), did criticize Canadian policy. However, the Baptist Federation of Canada, the Lutheran Church and the Presbyterian Church in Canada which had no links to agencies in the field, supported Ottawa's policies. The explanation does not fully account for the evidence.

The third hypothesis is not much more satisfactory. The argument that interest groups that are not linked financially to the Canadian government are more likely to oppose its policies is only partially supported. The Religious Society of Friends in Canada, the Student Christian Movement of Canada and The United Church of Canada received no government funds. They did criticize government policy as inadequate. The Canadian Council of Churches and the Lutheran Church which received more than half their relief funds from the government, did concur with Ottawa's policies. The Anglican Church, however, which also received over fifty percent of its relief funds from the government criticized Canada indirectly for its failure to take any initiative at the United Nations to promote a political solution. While dependence on government funding appears to be closely associated with passivity and tacit support of government policy, dependence is not necessarily determining.

The fourth hypothesis suggests that those interest groups with no organizational ties to other groups or coalitions are more likely to diverge from official policy. Again, the evidence is promising but not conclusive. The Canadian Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Church through its lay organization, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, both belonged to the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief and both accepted government policies. The Religious Society of Friends in Canada and the Student Christian Movement of Canada had no such organizational or governmental connections and they both criticized elements of Canadian policy. However, The Anglican Church, the Baptist Federation, the Lutheran Church, The Presbyterian Church, and The Salvation Army which belonged to no coalition, also concurred with Canadian policy. Concurrence and tacit support was not explained simply by financial dependence or institutional links in this instance.

When all these factors work together, when groups have built up relationships in the field, when they depend on government for funds to transmit to their agencies in the field, and when they work in broad coalitions to increase the effectiveness of their fund raising, it is clear that their interest and capacity for criticism is not likely to be strong. The majority of organized church groups studiously avoided political comment and involvement. They were content to simply concentrate on fund raising.

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¹The Chronicle Herald, July 31, 1971; The Gazette, July 31, 1971; Le Devoir, July 31, 1971; The Globe and Mail, July 31, 1971.

²The Lutheran Church in America, Canada, Minutes of Fifth Biannual Convention, June 21-23, 1971, p. 27. The convention was also informed of the formation of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief so as to have a concerted impact in the collection of funds for the catastrophe (p. 45). The author used the documents of this part of the Lutheran Church because of their availability.

³The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 9 (October, 1971), p. 2.

⁴The Calgary Herald, December 4, 1971. Dr. McClure made the statements in a television film called Cry World that was shown in United Churches and on television throughout Alberta in December.

The secretary of the General Council of The United Church, Dr. E.E. Long, in a speech on the role of the church noted that Canadians had not risen to the challenge of the worst refugee crisis that the world had seen: that of East Pakistan (The Ottawa Citizen, December 11, 1971).

⁵Roman Catholic Church in Canada, L'Eglise Canadienne, V, No. 2, (February 1972), p. 43; La Presse, October 9, 1971.

⁶La Presse, September 15, 1971.

⁷The Globe and Mail, July 9, 1971.

⁸The Toronto Star, June 16, 1971. Mr. Pankratz was a doctoral student who had been working on his thesis in India. Being a Mennonite he had been in close touch with the Mennonite Central Council during the crisis and had represented the M.C.C. at the meetings of international relief agencies in India during May when the director was absent. John Weiler, Associate Executive Secretary of the M.C.C. (Canada) stated "the statement was not authorized by M.C.C. (Canada) although it was well received here." (The Mennonites, Mennonite Central Committee [Canada], letter to author from John Weiler, Associate Executive Secretary, October 27, 1976.)

⁹The Toronto Star, June 16, 1971. "Whether the East Bengalis are secessionists or freedom fighters is a matter which may be

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debated comfortably from 11,000 miles away. But that debate is of no use to the homeless and hungry refugees."

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Register, May 12, 1971.

¹²Le Devoir, July 31, 1971; The Gazette, July 31, 1971; The Globe and Mail, July 31, 1971; The Chronicle Herald, July 31, 1971.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid. Mr. Sharp told them that the Canadian government did not want "to politicize the problem."

¹⁵Oxfam of Canada, Document, "The Toronto Declaration of Concern," August 21, 1971. See pp. 206-207 for details of the meeting.

¹⁶Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 33 (October 19, 1971), pp. 19, 28, 52-59.

¹⁷The Canadian Council of Churches, Minutes of Second Tri-annual Meeting (November 27-30, 1972), p. 77.

¹⁸The Globe and Mail, April 15, 1971. This was based partly upon a cable from Rose Mae Harkness, a Canadian serving with the Society of Friends in Central India. She stated "what until recently was a non-violent movement for self-government by the people of East Pakistan is being ruthlessly crushed by the West Pakistan army." Mr. Abbot also based their appeal upon the fact that "this authoritarian and irresponsible use of armed might... to resist the changes that the majority of East Pakistani people had decided upon by the ballot box, puts the government action beyond all countenancing."

¹⁹The Chronicle Herald, July 31, 1971; Le Devoir, July 31, 1971; The Montreal Gazette, July 31, 1971; The Globe and Mail, July 31, 1971. Given the statements of the church leaders that they

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did not want to politicize the situation, some doubt exists as to whether his recommendation for a UN initiative was intended as a direct criticism of the Canadian government.

²⁰Student Christian Movement of Canada, Document, "Resolution," October 18, 1971. They also requested that the government of Canada substantially increase aid immediately to the government of India so as "to assist it in its relief work with refugees from East Bengal." Copies of this resolution were sent to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and to all members of Parliament.

²¹The Calgary Herald, November 20, 1971.

²²Religious Society of Friends, Canadian Friend Service Committee, letter to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, from Edward S. Bell, Chairman, January 13, 1976.

²³Student Christian Movement of Canada, Jack Lakavich, pamphlet, "Bangladesh Is For Real," (September 20, 1971), pp. 12-16.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Student Christian Movement of Canada, Jack Lakavich, pamphlet, "Pakistan Crisis Deepens," (December 21, 1971), n.p.

²⁶The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 3 (September, 1971), p. 8.

²⁷The Chronicle Herald, November 19, 1971.

²⁸Baptist Federation of Canada, The Canadian Baptist, No. 1-10 (1971); The Canadian Council of Churches, The Council Communicator, II, No. 1-4 (1971); The Presbyterian Church in Canada, The Presbyterian Record, 95, No. 1-12 (1971), 96, No. 1-2 (1972); Religious Society of Friends, The Canadian Friend, 67, No. 1-6 (1971), 68, No. 1-6 (1972).

²⁹Lutheran Church, Canadian Lutheran, IX, No. 1-9 (1971), X, No. 1-2 (1972); The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 1-9 (1971-1972).

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³⁰The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 6 (June, 1971), p. 4.

³¹Ibid., No. 8 (September, 1971), p. 4.

³²Both editorials in their publication, Canadian Churchman, drew parallels with the Nigerian civil war. The first remarked:

"It seems but yesterday that Canadians were growing weary of looking at pictures of the atrocities in Biafra. It seems only a few weeks since we heard Mitchell Sharp refuse to involve the Canadian government in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. . . . Now we are hearing it all over again in East Pakistan."

The second editorial noted, ". . . the old familiar scene from Biafra."

³³The Mennonites, Canadian Mennonite Reporter, I, No. 2 (September 15, 1971), p. 6.

³⁴Ibid., No. 10 (January 10, 1972), p. 6.

³⁵Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Register, June 18, 1971. Their French language counterpart, L'Eglise Canadienne, had no editorials on the situation.

³⁶The Salvation Army, The War Cry, No. 4529 (September 11, 1971), p. 2.

³⁷Baptist Federation of Canada, The Canadian Baptist, No. 8 (August-September, 1971), pp. 10, 21; Lutheran Church, Canadian Lutheran, IX, No. 7 (September-October, 1971), p. 17, X, No. 1 (January, 1972), pp. 3, 8, 9; Salvation Army, The War Cry, No. 4519 (July 3, 1971), p. 2, No. 4523 (July 31, 1971), p. 2, No. 4527 (August 28, 1971), p. 6, No. 4529 (September 11, 1971), p. 9.

³⁸The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 7 (July-August, 1971), p. 3 - re: refugees in India; No. 8 (September, 1971), p. 5 - re: Pakistan civil war; pp. 9-10 - re: refugees in India; pp. 11-13 - re: refugees in India; p. 11 - re: refugees in India; p. 13 - re: Pakistan civil war; p. 14 - re: Pakistan civil war; p. 14 - re: Canadian foreign policy; No. 9 (October, 1971), p. 2 - re: refugees in India.

The Canadian Council of Churches, The Council Communi-

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cator, I, No. 2 (July, 1971), pp. 1-2 - re: refugees in India; No. 3 (November, 1971), p. 11 - 54: Canadian foreign policy; p. 11 - re: refugees in India; No. 4 (December, 1971), p. 7 - re: refugees in India.

The Presbyterian Church in Canada, The Presbyterian Record, 95, No. 7-8 (July-August, 1971), pp. 21-22 - re: refugees in India and Pakistan civil war; No. 9 (September, 1971), p. 25 - re: refugees in India; No. 10 (October, 1971), p. 20 - re: Pakistan civil war; p. 20 - re: refugees in India; p. 22 - re: refugees in India.

Religious Society of Friends, The Canadian Friend, 67, No. 6 (December, 1971-January, 1972), p. 16 - re: refugees in India.

Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Register, May 8, 1971 - re: Canadian foreign policy; June 12, 1971 - re: refugees in India; June 19, 1971 - re: refugees in India; June 26, 1971 - re: refugees in India; July 17, 1971 - re: refugees in India; August 14, 1971 - re: refugees in India; August 14, 1971 - re: refugees in India; August 28, 1971 - re: Pakistan civil war; September 11, 1971 - re: refugees in India; October 23, 1971 - re: refugees in India; November 6, 1971 - re: Pakistan civil war; November 27, 1971 - re: refugees in India; December 18, 1971 - re: refugees in India; January 1, 1972 - re: refugees in India; January 5, 1972 - re: Pakistan civil war.

³⁹The Mennonites, Canadian Mennonite Reporter, I, No. 1 (August 3, 1971), p. 1 - re: refugees in India; p. 2 - re: refugees in India; No. 2 (September 15, 1971), p. 1 - re: Pakistan civil war; No. 4 (October 8, 1971), pp. 1-2 - re: refugees in India; No. 6 (November 15, 1971), p. 1 - re: refugees in India; p. 12 - re: refugees in India; No. 7 (November 29, 1971), p. 1 - re: Canadian foreign policy, p. 1 - re: Canadian foreign policy, p. 1 - re: refugees in India; No. 9 (December 27, 1971), pp. 1-2 - re: Pakistan civil war, p. 2 - re: Pakistan civil war; No. 10 (January 6, 1972), p. 10 - re: refugees in India.

⁴⁰The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 3 (September, 1971), p. 8 - re: refugees in India, p. 46 - re: refugees in India; No. 4 (October, 1971), p. 10 - re: Canadian foreign policy, p. 17 - re: Pakistan civil war, p. 30 - re: Canadian foreign policy; No. 5 (November, 1971), p. 45 - re: Pakistan civil war; No. 7 (January, 1972), p. 45 - re: Canadian foreign policy.

⁴¹The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 7 (July-August, 1971), p. 3; No. 8 (September, 1971), pp. 9-10, pp. 11-13, p. 11; No. 9 (October, 1971), p. 2.

Baptist Federation of Canada, The Canadian Baptist, No. 8

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(August-September, 1971), p. 10, p. 21.

The Canadian Council of Churches, The Council Communicator, II, No. 2 (July, 1971), pp. 1-2; No. 3 (November, 1971), p. 11; No. 4 (December, 1971), p. 7.

Lutheran Church, Canadian Lutheran, IX, No. 7 (September-October, 1971), p. 17; X, No. 1 (January, 1972), p. 8, p. 9.

⁴²The Mennonites, Canadian Mennonite Reporter, I, No. 1 (August 3, 1971), p. 1 - re: refugees, p. 2 - re: fund raising; No. 6 (November 15, 1971), p. 1 - re: refugees, p. 12 - re: fund raising; No. 7 (November 29, 1971), p. 1 - re: fund raising; No. 10 (January 6, 1972), p. 10 - re: fund raising.

The Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Register, June 12, 1971 - re: fund raising; June 19, 1971 - re: refugees; June 26, 1971 - re: fund raising; July 17, 1971 - re: fund raising; August 14, 1971 - re: fund raising, - re: refugees; September 11, 1971 - re: relief; October 23, 1971 - re: fund raising; November 27, 1971 - re: fund raising; December 18, 1971 - re: relief; January 1, 1972 - re: relief.

Salvation Army, The War Cry, No. 4519 (July 3, 1971), p. 2 - re: fund raising and relief; No. 4523 (July 31, 1971), p. 2 - re: fund raising and relief; No. 4527 (August 28, 1971), p. 6 - re: relief; No. 4529 (September 11, 1971), p. 9 - re: refugees.

⁴³The Presbyterian Church in Canada, The Presbyterian Record, 95, No. 7-8 (July-August, 1971), pp. 21-22 - re: refugees; No. 9 (September, 1971), p. 25 - re: fund raising; No. 10 (October, 1971), p. 20 - re: fund raising, p. 22 - re: refugees.

The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 3 (September, 1971), p. 8 - re: refugees, p. 46 - re: fund raising.

⁴⁴Religious Society of Friends, The Canadian Friend, 67, No. 6 (December, 1971 - January, 1972), p. 16 - re: refugees.

⁴⁵The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 8 (September, 1971), p. 14.

The Canadian Council of Churches, The Council Communicator, I, No. 3 (November, 1971), p. 11.

The Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Register, May 8, 1971.

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⁴⁶The Mennonites, Canadian Mennonite Reporter, I, No. 7 (November 29, 1971), p. 1, p. 1.

The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 4 (October, 1971), pp. 10, 30.

⁴⁷The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 3 (September, 1971), p. 8; No. 4 (October, 1971), p. 17; No. 5 (November, 1971), p. 45.

The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 8 (September, 1971), pp. 9-10, p. 14.

The Presbyterian Church in Canada, The Presbyterian Record, 95, No. 9 (September, 1971), p. 25.

⁴⁸The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 4 (October, 1971), p. 30.

The Canadian Council of Churches, The Council Communicator, II, No. 3 (November, 1971), p. 11.

The Mennonites, Canadian Mennonite Reporter, I, No. 7 (November 29, 1971), p. 1.

⁴⁹Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Register, May 8, 1971.

The Mennonites, The Canadian Mennonite Reporter, I, No. 7 (November 29, 1971), p. 1.

The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 7 (January, 1972), p. 45.

⁵⁰The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 8 (September, 1971), p. 14.

⁵¹The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 4, p. 10. The editorial appeared in the September issue of Canadian Churchman.

⁵²The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 8 (September, 1971), p. 14.

The Presbyterian Church in Canada, The Presbyterian Record, 95, No. 9 (October, 1971), p. 25.

The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 7 (November, 1971), p. 45.

⁵³The United Church of Canada, The United Church Observer, 35, No. 3 (September, 1971), p. 8.

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⁵⁴The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 8 (September, 1971), p. 14.

⁵⁵Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Report of Contributions, February 2, 1972 to February 15, 1972.

The Presbyterian Church of Canada, Acts and Proceedings of the Ninety-Eighth General Assembly (June 4-9, 1972), p. 372; Acts and Proceedings of the Ninety-Ninth General Assembly (June 4-9, 1973), p. 376.

The Religious Society of Friends in Canada, Document, "Organization of Quaker Service Bangladesh," (May 31, 1972).

The Religious Society of Friends in Canada, Newsletter of Canadian Friends Service Committee, I, No. 10 (April, 1972), p. 16.

The United Church of Canada, Year Book 1972, II, p. 135.

⁵⁶The Mennonite Central Committee, M.C.C. (Canada) News Brief, No. 5 (May 14, 1972), n.p.

The Salvation Army financial figures are based upon the final C.A.P.R. Report of Contributions, May 24, 1972 to June 28, 1972. Attempts to receive financial data and/or confirmation of the figures from the Salvation Army headquarters in Canada and England proved futile. It is doubtful that the total based upon C.A.P.R. reports is accurate. C.A.P.R. Report of Contributions were not supposed to contain government grants unless otherwise indicated. However, the C.A.P.R. Report of Contributions for the period of January 19, 1972 to February 1, 1972 showed additional contributions of \$50,580 for the Salvation Army, the largest single increment for that group for any two-week period, either before or after, while it must be noted that on January 6, 1972 the Canadian government gave the Salvation Army a grant of \$50,000 for refugee relief. (Canada, CIDA Document, "Canadian External Assistance Programs 1971-1972 to January 15, 1972," January 27, 1972.)

⁵⁷The Canadian Council of Churches, interview with Dr. Floyd Honey, November 6, 1975.

The Anglican Church of Canada, Document, "East Pakistan Refugees/Bangladesh Rehabilitation," (October 11, 1972).

Lutheran Church, letters to author from J. G. Keil, Executive Secretary, Canadian Lutheran World Relief, September 8, 1975 and September 29, 1975.

The Mennonites, letter to author from John Weiler, Associate Executive Secretary, Mennonite Central Committee (Canada), October 27, 1975.

Religious Society of Friends, Document, "Organization of Quakers Service Bangladesh," (May 31, 1972).

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Religious Society of Friends in Canada, Newsletter of Canadian Friends Service Committee, I, No. 10 (April, 1972), pp. 1-2.

The Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Document, "Emergency Aid for the East Pakistani Refugees," (May 31, 1972). Precise figures on the amounts raised by the Canadian Jesuit Mission and the Congregation of the Holy Cross were not available. However, the former received grants from the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace of \$10,000 and from Oxfam of Canada for \$20,000. Oxfam of Canada also shipped eight boxes of medical supplies to India on their behalf.

58. The Canadian Council of Churches, interview with Dr. Floyd Honey, November 6, 1975.

Lutheran Church, letters to author from J.G. Keil, Executive Secretary, Canadian Lutheran World Relief, September 8, 1975 and September 29, 1975.

The Mennonites, letter to author from John Weiler, Associate Executive Secretary, Mennonite Central Committee (Canada), October 27, 1975.

Religious Society of Friends, Document, "Organization of Quakers Service Bangladesh," (May 31, 1972), n.p.

Religious Society of Friends, Newsletter of Canadian Friends Service Committee, I, No. 10 (April, 1972), pp. 1-2.

Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Document, "Emergency Aid for the Pakistani Refugees," (May 31, 1972). No information was available on the disbursement of funds by either the Canadian Jesuit Missions or Congregation of the Holy Cross, though both probably made direct disbursements to their members in the region.

Salvation Army of Canada, letter from Colonel Ernest Denham, Under Secretary, International Headquarters, to Commissioner C. Wiseman, Canada, May 4, 1973.

59. The Anglican Church of Canada, Document, "East Pakistan/Bangladesh Rehabilitation," (October 11, 1972).

Mrs. Shepherd of the Primate's World Relief and Development Fund remarked that the money was given to church agencies because they felt that the agencies could be trusted. She then mentioned the graft and corruption in India at that time. (Comments on December 5, 1975 to the author when she was supplying the aforementioned information.)

The Presbyterian Church in Canada, Acts and Proceedings of the Ninety-Eighth General Assembly (1972), p. 372; Acts and Proceedings of the Ninety-Ninth General Assembly (1973), p. 376.

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⁶⁰Baptist Federation of Canada, letter to author from Carl W. Tiller, Associate Secretary, Baptist World Alliance, June 28, 1976.

⁶¹The United Church of Canada, letter to author from Miss Glenna Graham, Development Secretary, December 29, 1975.

Religious Society of Friends, letter from Edward S. Bell, Chairman, Canadian Friends Service Committee to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister, January 13, 1971.

~~Student Christian Movement of Canada, Document, "Resolution,"~~ (October 18, 1971).

The Calgary Herald, November 20, 1971.

Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 33 (October 19, 1971), pp. 27-28.

⁶²Student Christian Movement of Canada, letter to author from Ms. Liz Brown, Administrative Secretary, September 5, 1975.

⁶³Student Christian Movement of Canada, Jack Lakavich, pamphlet, "Bangladesh Is For Real," September 20, 1971, pp. 12-16.

⁶⁴Student Christian Movement of Canada, Jack Lakavich, pamphlet, "Pakistan Crisis Deepens," December 21, 1971.

⁶⁵Student Christian Movement of Canada, letters to author from Ms. Liz Brown, Administrative Secretary, September 5, 1975 and October 1, 1975.

⁶⁶The Chronicle Herald, July 31, 1971; Le Devoir, July 31, 1971; The Gazette, July 31, 1971; The Globe and Mail, July 31, 1971.

⁶⁷Oxfam of Canada, Document, "The Toronto Declaration of Concern," August 21, 1971.

⁶⁸Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 33 (October 19, 1971), pp. 19, 28, 52-59.

⁶⁹Oxfam of Canada, Minutes of Meeting, May 6, 1971, pp. 1-3.

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⁷⁰Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 33 (October 19, 1971), p. 53.

⁷¹The United Church of Canada, Year Book 1972, II, p. 14.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESPONSE OF CANADIAN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

We want to be recognized as humanitarian perhaps in the same way as the Red Cross is. We would like to help where the need for our kind of help is greatest and it would be a pity to be excluded or hindered from working in areas because we have made political statements.

(Unitarian Service Committee of Canada Official.)

The voluntary agencies actively responded to "the unimaginable tragedy" of the Pakistan civil war as they had done in the past to other natural and man-made disasters. They focussed their efforts on the provision of humanitarian relief to the mass of refugees that had flooded into India. All the agencies predated the civil war and six had already undertaken assistance programs in Pakistan prior to its commencement: the Canadian Red Cross Society, the Canadian UNICEF Committee, CARE of Canada, Centre d'Etude et de Coopération Internationale, Operation Eyesight Universal and Oxfam of Canada. Six other groups responded to the outbreak of the civil war in Pakistan and its consequences: the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Canadian Save the Children Fund, Canadian University Service Overseas, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, World University Service of Canada and World Vision of Canada.

Most of the voluntary agencies concentrated on the collection of relief for the refugees in India. The primary objective of the

agencies, both alone and in conjunction with other public and private groups, was fund raising. They rarely mentioned the foreign policy position of the Canadian government in either their statements or in their publications. Only one agency, Oxfam of Canada, differed with the policies of the Canadian government and tried to mobilize other groups and the Canadian public to pressure the Canadian authorities. Thus, most of the voluntary agencies accepted the response of the Canadian government to the Pakistan civil war.

A. Statements

The voluntary agencies made few public statements and those (with the exception of Oxfam of Canada) concentrated on relief for the refugees in India. Six voluntary agencies (the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, the Centre d'Etude et de Co-opération Internationale, Operation Eyesight Universal, Canadian Save the Children Fund, CARE of Canada and World Vision of Canada) made no public statements. The statements of the representatives of Canadian University Service Overseas, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, and the World University Service of Canada, focussed upon the fund raising activities of their respective organizations on behalf of the refugees in India. In addition, the statements of the Canadian Red Cross Society and the Canadian UNICEF Committee also referred to the response of the Canadian government in a positive light. Only Oxfam of Canada made public statements that recommended

actions that differed from the policies of the Canadian government. Thus, the vast majority of voluntary agencies agreed passively with the policies of the Canadian government.

Agency spokesmen stressed the plight of refugees in India.

During a \$300,000 fund raising campaign, Oxfam's field director Raymond Cournoyer described the condition of Pakistan refugees:

Most refugees arrive with practically nothing; they have no clothing other than what they wear; they have no pots to cook in even if they can find food. [He estimated that there were] at least four and a half million refugees, of which two and a half million are without either shelter or even straw matting to be on the ground. These people have no protection against hunger, epidemic, and cold.²

The Executive Director of the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada pleaded that additional funds were desperately needed to cover the unexpected demand on their already overtaxed budget for food, supplies and vehicles.³ In a review of CARE of Canada's contribution to the refugees in India, the western branch director noted that funds for the programs were not being diverted from the organization's regular programs, being an added burden which required "extra support and generosity by Canadians."⁴ During a tour of Western Canada in October to promote Hallowe'en contributions and the sale of UNICEF Christmas cards, the Executive Director of the Canadian UNICEF Committee stated that:

This isn't just another refugee problem; it's the largest migration of people in history. Most people remember the six million Jews who died in the Second World War, but right now an even larger

group of people are in the camps in India. It's going to get there soon with temperatures down to 40 degrees or even freezing in the northern part of West Bengal. The children in the camps have no clothing, they will get carried off by pneumonia. There is also a strong possibility that malaria will break out and that's a disease that can kill and maim children. And all the time there's the problem of water-borne diseases like dysentery and gastroenteritis.⁵

Thus the emphasis in the statements by voluntary agencies on the immediate and urgent needs of the East Pakistan refugees in India coincided with that of the Canadian government.

Voluntary agencies also stressed India's burden in their organizational drives for relief funds. Oxfam's field director, Raymond Cournoyer, noted that the heavy financial weight of the influx of refugees, some two hundred and seventy million dollars in six months, was unsupportable for India. Many of India's citizens themselves were living in desperate conditions.⁶ On June 15, 1971, the President of the Canadian UNICEF Committee emphasized that five million Pakistan refugees or a quarter of the population of Canada had suddenly moved into a country which was totally unprepared and lacked the basic resources to feed them. He asked that additional funds, both government and private, be sent "direct to the Canadian UNICEF headquarters."⁷ Miss Nancy Gérin of the Canadian University Service Overseas, a recently returned volunteer, described India's "crushing burden" during a country-wide tour for funds to supply basic needs for almost six million displaced Pakistanis:

You get used to walking past beggars in the street . . . you have to. But this was worse, much worse. There's terrible overcrowding and inhuman conditions and hungry, pathetic people. The adults are staying alive on a ration of rice, water, vegetables, and boiled jute leaves. But the children are not getting by at all. There's not enough protein for them. Everybody is sick, just everybody. The next problem will be winter. It's cold in northern India, and where do you find seven million blankets?⁸

The World University Service of Canada also reminded its contributors that the refugee problem facing India was without precedent in the hope that they would "make a contribution" to assist the Pakistan refugee children and teachers.⁹ In tone and content, the statements of the spokesmen for the voluntary agencies paralleled those of the Canadian government.

The Canadian Red Cross Society in particular hesitated to make even indirect public criticism of the Pakistan regime. In a May 30 statement that reviewed the Canadian Red Cross relief contribution for the November 1970 natural disaster in East Pakistan, the national commissioner, Major General Arthur E. Wrinch, noted that although little money had been sent to East Pakistan after the civil war had begun, Pakistan officials had stated the need for aid was diminishing. When asked if he felt that the Pakistan government was a reliable authority on the situation, he replied that they had to "rely on whatever sources" they could find.¹⁰ Their representatives' written brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs on October 19, 1971,¹¹ virtually duplicated their earlier confidential report on the East Pakistan Refugee Operation in India, with one ex-

ception.¹² In the only exception he detailed the following background to the situation:

Between December 7th, 1970, and January 17th, 1971, free elections were held in East Pakistan resulting in the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman having 167 members elected for a great majority of the Pakistani Assembly. The leader determined that East Pakistan should become an independent state to be known as Bangladesh. This was a decision not favourably received by the President of Pakistan and action was taken to prevent its implementation. On March 25th the Pakistani army attacked without warning. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of people were killed or wounded and untold numbers were rendered homeless. Thousands fled in terror, crossing the border into India. The President of the Pakistan Red Cross was relieved of his position and a new President was appointed in his stead. The Secretary of the East Pakistan Red Cross Branch left his homeland to become a refugee, one of the millions who were destined to leave all they possessed to seek safety elsewhere.¹³

The Canadian Red Cross decided not to contradict the Pakistan authorities or to publicly reveal information embarrassing to them. In this procedure, their practice was consistent with that of the Canadian government.

When the agency representatives did refer to the situation in East Pakistan, they spoke very generally of the importance of a political solution without reference to a specific Canadian role. Reviewing the problems of the refugees in India, the response of the Indian government, and the difficulties of international voluntary agencies before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Mr. Albert Batten, former executive director of the Canadian

Red Cross, emphasized the urgency of a political settlement to resolve the problems of the refugees. His personal interviews had indicated that the majority of the refugees would return to their homes only when they could return "in assured safety by a Government of their own choice [Bangladesh]." However he refused to make any specific recommendations concerning an appropriate political settlement:

I am a Red Cross person, I keep out of the political aspects of the situation. . . . I am not qualified to make recommendations as to what the political settlement should be; all I know is that it must be done.¹⁴

The executive director of the Canadian UNICEF Committee, in his appearance before the same committee, stated that:

We have a tremendous responsibility as Canadians and particularly the government of Canada to use all possible influence in obtaining a peaceful settlement of this crisis. When I said that, I do not mean there is any simplistic answer. This problem has been plaguing the world from time immemorial. . . . I think that the Canadian government has a particular role to play, interpreting to the government of India and the government of Pakistan, from a respective point of view, the feelings of Canadians and other governments in the developed world, and above all providing assistance through all channels; bilateral channels, multilateral and voluntary or non-governmental channels.¹⁵

He refused to comment on a suggested Canadian initiative at the United Nations because UNICEF was providing assistance to both India and Pakistan. Thus the representatives of both agencies refused to comment on the substance of politics either at home or in the field.

Oxfam alone of the voluntary agencies chose to criticize the response of the Canadian government. Their representatives rejected

the premise that the government had to be circumspect because the civil war was an internal matter. The chairman of the board charged that other countries had hidden:

... behind the excuse that it is an internal matter. This sort of 'head in the sand' philosophy may have sufficed during the days of 'gunboat diplomacy' but Vietnam, Biafra and Czechoslovakia have shown that it is no longer applicable in the Global Village of the 1970's. Governments must react swiftly to situations such as East Pakistan or bear a collective responsibility for the tragedy which has resulted from a status quo philosophy.¹⁶

The ultimate solution to the tragedy was "a political one."¹⁷ Oxfam thus disagreed with the overall Canadian policy stance of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country.

Oxfam representatives specifically criticized the lack of Canadian diplomatic response to the civil war. On April 20, 1971, the vice-chairman of Oxfam stated that a disaster of major proportions had occurred in East Pakistan and, since the situation was deteriorating every day, Oxfam asked the government to:

- 1) Appeal to the Government of Pakistan to end military operations immediately and admit neutral observers;
- 2) Urge conciliation by members of the Commonwealth;
- 3) To request an emergency session of the Security Council of the United Nations. Since this struggle involves the conflicting interest of the world's major powers, it constitutes an obvious threat to international peace and thus under article 39 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council clearly has jurisdiction. Inactivity cannot be justified on the grounds that this is an internal matter.¹⁸

Oxfam therefore diverged from the diplomatic thrust of the Canadian response to the Pakistan civil war.

In October, at a meeting with government officials, an Oxfam delegation recommended that the Canadian government press immediately for the inclusion of the civil war in Pakistan on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.¹⁹ It urged Canada to request a much expanded UN program to include UN negotiations with the Pakistan authorities and Bangladesh representatives for the safe conduct of food and relief supplies within East Pakistan and the appointment of senior UN personnel to operate the program. Finally, it asked Canada to urge an immediate ceasefire as an interim measure to allow the introduction of massive relief supplies into East Pakistan.²⁰ Oxfam, unlike most other agencies, did significantly deviate from the Canadian diplomatic response to the civil war.

Oxfam felt that Canada was in a unique position to undertake an initiative at the United Nations. Dr. Robert McClure, in his presentation on behalf of Oxfam to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, stated that:

- a) A special position is reserved for Canada, Australia and New Zealand because we are i) sister members of the Commonwealth, ii) we never have had and are not suspected of having any colonial nor territorial ambitions, iii) we are not in any way directly involved and, iv) we are neutral.
- b) Canada is the largest, most wealthy and most powerful member of this group.
- c) Canada is a food-producing and food-exporting nation as well as having a wide variety of manufactured products. In the present East Pakistan Crisis both food and development machinery are going to be required.
- d) Canada is an expert at peace-designing and peace-keeping. . . . Because of these features we appeal for more vigorous and more extended Canadian participation in the East Pakistan crisis bilaterally and multilaterally through the United Nations.²¹

When asked to define what practical moves Canada could undertake to facilitate a political settlement, Dr. McClure reiterated that Canada should introduce the issue at the United Nations level:

Canadians could certainly suggest the machinery necessary for a ceasefire just to stop military action within East Pakistan and on the border. . . . We should offer the services of our forces for peacekeeping. . . .²²

He also felt that the Canadian government should propose Canada as a neutral site for a meeting between representatives of East and West Pakistan and India.

Oxfam also recommended that Canada assume a more active role to avert a regional war. East Pakistan in their view could develop into a world trouble spot as had the Middle East and Vietnam. Dr. Robert McClure urged Canada to

. . . show more guts as a go-between. As a Commonwealth country we have an advantage over there. They'd sooner have a Commonwealth corps of observers than Americans and Russians.²³

In November an Oxfam brief to the Minister for External Affairs recommended that Canada should take the lead at the United Nations and, if necessary, intercede directly with India and Pakistan to prevent a war between the two countries. To promote a settlement, Ottawa should offer diplomatic and financial assistance to both parties.²⁴ Oxfam thus criticized the lack of a more active Canadian diplomatic effort to forestall a war between India and Pakistan.

Even Oxfam, however, would not go as far as recommending the independence of Bangladesh. While Dr. McClure felt that East Paki-

stan could be "written off" as a part of Pakistan, he preferred political neutrality rather than support for a separate state of East Pakistan. Political neutrality would not jeopardize a potential Canadian role as mediator. Dr. McClure stated:

I think we would jettison our own meeting. We have to go in with an open mind, surely and offer them a completely unbiased thing. One of our difficulties is that in reading our papers today, it is very difficult for us to provide the amount of compassion and sympathy we should be providing to the people in West Pakistan. 25

Oxfam's vacillation thereby gave some support to the Canadian government's refusal to grant diplomatic recognition to the secessionist forces.

Thus all the voluntary agencies, with the exception of Oxfam of Canada, studiously and deliberately avoided disagreements with the Canadian government. The Canadian Council for International Cooperation, Canadian Save the Children Fund, CARE of Canada, Centre d'Etude et de Coopération Internationale, Operation Eyesight Universal, and World Vision of Canada tacitly supported Ottawa by issuing no public statements on policy or politics. The Canadian University Service Overseas, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada and the World University Service of Canada statements focussed only on the question of relief for the refugees in India. The Canadian Red Cross Society and Canadian UNICEF Committee agreed with the Canadian government because their statements prescribed policy responses that paralleled those of the Canadian authorities. Oxfam of Canada

was the sole agency to criticize Canada's passive diplomatic performance. Yet Oxfam did not recommend economic sanctions against the central regime and explicitly refused to endorse the independence of Bangladesh. Therefore, with one exception, no voluntary agency attempted to shape or shift the foreign policy response of the Canadian government.

B. Publications

If agency spokesmen studiously avoided comment on Canadian policy, agency publications did little to fill the gap. They offered little editorial comment and even less criticism of Canadian policy and focussed on the refugees in India rather than the Pakistan civil war. Three of the agencies, Canadian Save the Children Fund, CARE of Canada, and the Unitarian Service Committee had neither a regular newspaper nor a magazine. The publications of the Canadian Red Cross, the Canadian UNICEF Committee and the World Vision of Canada contained neither an editorial page nor articles that referred to the policies of the Canadian government.²⁵ Only the publications of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation and the Canadian University Service Overseas included articles that referred to Canadian government. In addition, the former was the sole publication with an editorial page that offered a commentary on the Canadian policy. Two publications, those of Oxfam of Canada and World University Service of Canada, were not available for examination. There-

fore, in their publications, voluntary agencies provided very little material in general on the problems of South Asia and, in particular, on the policies of the Canadian government.

The Canadian Council for International Co-operation January publication, Informadev, had the only editorial that appeared in an agency publication. It criticized Canada's \$2.3 million contribution to the voluntary agencies as too small:

Is our Government concerned with the real plight of the people of Bangladesh, are they interested in taking some initiatives in the great task of reconstruction and rehabilitation? Or is window dressing the extent of our effort? Are we content to get maximum public relations for each dollar given? Unfortunately, the answer to these questions appears all too clear.²⁶

The editorial therefore suggested that:

... Canada must undo the purse strings now. We have the material, we have the men, we have the money and we have the food—but do we have the will and the initiative?

Diplomatic recognition is not the issue today, political negotiations do not feed and house and educate and rebuild. We should do all we can to facilitate these exchanges, but at the same time we must get on with this challenge to our sensitivity, to our people and to humanity.²⁷

Thus while the editorial criticized the amount of Canadian relief, it indirectly accepted the diplomatic response of the Canadian government to the Pakistan civil war and specifically supported the refusal to recognize Bangladesh.

The main focus of the majority of articles in agency publications dealt with their relief efforts (see Table 4:1). The Canadian Council

TABLE 4:1

Voluntary Agency Publications: Article Content Analysis

	Publication	Pertinent Articles	Pakistan Civil War	Refugees in India	Pakistan & India	Canadian Foreign Policy
Canadian Council for International Co-operation	yes	8	0	0	6	2 (4)**
Canadian Red Cross Society	yes	0	0	0	0	0
Canadian Save the Children Fund	no	-	-	-	-	-
Canadian UNICEF Committee	yes	2	1	1	0	0
Canadian University Service Overseas	yes	2	0	1	1	0 (1)**
CARE	no	-	-	-	-	-
Centre d'Etude et Co- opération Internationale	no	-	-	-	-	-
Operation Eyesight Universal	no	-	-	-	-	-
Oxfam	yes	*	*	*	*	*
Unitarian Service Committee	no	-	-	-	-	-
World University Service	yes	*	*	*	*	*
World Vision	yes	3	0	0	3	0
Total		15	1	2	10	2 (5)**

* Publication unavailable for analysis

** Figures in parentheses are the number of articles which mentioned but did not feature Canadian Foreign Policy.

for International Co-operation's Informadev, contained four articles that dealt with refugee relief activities of Canadian non-governmental organizations²⁸ and one article that listed governmental disbursements to the agencies and the churches for their work.²⁹ One of two articles in the Canadian UNICEF Committee's publication, Action, described the relief activities of UNICEF for the refugees.³⁰ Similarly, the second of the two articles in the Canadian University Services Overseas publication, Bulletin, reported that a luncheon to raise funds for the refugees had taken place at the Organization's annual convention after an off-the-floor discussion of the plight of the refugees.³¹ All three articles in the publication of World Vision of Canada, Heartline, described the relief efforts of their agency.³² Thus, even with respect to the situation in India, these publications provided little information which their readers could use to evaluate Canada's contributions to the East Pakistan refugees in India.

The three agency publications that covered South Asia made few references to either the Pakistan civil war or its background. Though the first article of Informadev was a compendium of Canadian newspaper coverage of the international and Canadian response to the policies of the central Pakistan regime,³³ its other six articles were confined to the relief efforts among the East Pakistan refugees in India.³⁴ The Canadian UNICEF Committee publication Action had a single brief response to the civil war in two articles. The April 1971 article entitled "The Needs of Pakistan," noted that:

Although politically Pakistan is in an unhealthy position at the moment, the aid it is receiving from such organizations as UNICEF and WHO is helping to relieve many of its internal difficulties.³⁵

C. U. S. O.'s Bulletin was the sole publication to feature an article that detailed the background to the civil war including the cultural, linguistic and economic differences between the two wings in Pakistan.³⁶ These publications provided no factual basis for informed consideration and evaluation of the Canadian response to the Pakistan civil war.

Canadian foreign policy received almost no attention. Only Informadev included any articles on Canadian policy.³⁷ The Bulletin mentioned the Canadian government once³⁸ in its articles as compared to the four mentions in Informadev. Agency publications provided little opportunity, if any, for their readers to learn about the foreign policy of the Canadian government.

In its magazine, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation made no negative references to Canadian policy in either of the two articles it published which focussed on Ottawa's response. The first, in the August-September issue, was simply a factual report of the government's July 26th announcement of cash grants for Canadian non-governmental organizations to care for East Pakistani refugees in India, and a listing of Canadian food relief for East Pakistan.³⁹ The second article, in the December issue, reported statements by Canadian authorities on the government's relief efforts.⁴⁰ Thus the two articles only reported certain aspects of Canada's economic re-

sponse to the situation in Pakistan.

The majority of the five articles in the two agency publications that mentioned Canadian foreign policy did not contain negative references to that policy. The first of the four, in Informadev of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, reprinted a Toronto Star editorial that called for the immediate diversion of all Canadian aid to Pakistan as well as the statement of the Indian foreign minister that the continuation of Canadian aid to Pakistan constituted moral and political support for the military junta.⁴¹ The same article also noted that Canada had called for the restoration of democratic civilian government and had instituted a military embargo.⁴² The other three references in Informadev simply reported the scope of Ottawa's relief contributions to the Pakistan refugees.⁴³ The article in the Bulletin of C.U.S.O., in addition to recommending that the Canadian public "push" the Canadian government through letters to their M.P.'s to increase aid contributions, included a suggestion that the Canadian people and government should press strongly for a political solution acceptable to all the peoples of Pakistan, though "we cannot say what this solution should be. . . ."⁴⁴ Thus only the Canadian Council for International Co-operation published any material recommending economic policy initiatives were different from the policy response of the Canadian government. At the outer limits, one article of the C.U.S.O. Bulletin in recommending a general increase in Canadian relief contributions, offered implicit criticism of Ottawa's policies. The pub-

lications of the voluntary agencies therefore neither offered nor established the basis for informed discussion of Canadian policy.

Only four publications—those of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Canadian University Service Overseas, the Canadian UNICEF Committee, and World Vision of Canada—had articles on the situation and of those only the first two publications referred to Canadian foreign policy. Moreover, critical comment in two of the publications was confined to requests to increase Canadian relief contributions in the Bulletin of the Canadian University Service Overseas and to limit Canadian economic ties with Pakistan in Informadev of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation. The very limited editorial comment also supported Ottawa's refusal to recognize Bangladesh even though it did recommend an increase in Canadian relief contributions. Thus, with only two exceptions, the majority of the voluntary agency publications provided little information for their readers to learn about the political and economic policies of the Canadian government let alone stimulate discussion of their merits.

C. Activities

The majority of the voluntary agencies confined their activities to the area of fund raising and its related aspects. Eight groups, the Canadian Red Cross Society, Canadian Save the Children Fund, CARE of Canada, the Canadian UNICEF Committee, Canadian University

Service Overseas, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, World University Service of Canada and World Vision of Canada, concentrated their organizational efforts on fund raising. Six of these groups, the Canadian Red Cross Society, Canadian Save the Children Fund, Canadian UNICEF Committee, CARE of Canada, and World Vision of Canada as well as Oxfam of Canada were members of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, an alliance of church and voluntary groups whose purpose was to raise relief funds. Only Oxfam of Canada undertook political activities both in relation to other organizations and to the public, in addition to its fund raising efforts. Four groups, CARE of Canada, the Canadian UNICEF Committee, Canadian University Service Overseas and the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada explicitly ruled out any political activities. Lastly, two groups, the Centre d'Etude et de Co-opération Internationale and Operation Eyesight Universal, engaged in no activities while the activity of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation was limited to the attendance at and the use of its office for a group meeting. With the exception of Oxfam, all the voluntary agencies concentrated their efforts in non-political activities that in no way attempted to limit the policies of the Canadian government.

The majority of the nine voluntary agencies that engaged in the collection of relief raised more than fifty percent of the total funds collected either by themselves or through their participation in the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief (see Table 4:2). Three, CARE

TABLE 4:2
Voluntary Agency Relief Funds: Sources

	Public Donations	Canadian Govt.	C. A. P. R.	Provinces	Total
Canadian Council for International Co-operation	*	*	*	*	*
Canadian Red Cross Society	\$132,800 (13%)	\$776,700 (76.4%)	\$52,746 (5.2%)	\$55,000 (5.4%)	\$1,017,246
Canadian Save the Children Fund	113,193 (16.4%)	14,400 (17.8%)	52,746 (65.7%)	0	180,339
Canadian UNICEF Committee	35,411 (36.1%)	0	52,746 (53.7%)	10,000 (10.2%)	98,157
Canadian University Service Overseas	†	†	†	†	†
CARE	393,000 (53.4%)	290,000 (39.4%)	52,746 (7.2%)	0	735,746
Centre d'Etude et Coopération Internationale	*	*	*	*	*
Operation Eyesight Universal	*	*	*	*	*
Oxfam	1,171,135 (75.2%)	200,000 (13.3%)	52,746 (3.5%)	84,975 (8%)	1,508,856
Unitarian Service Committee	358,658 (66.7%)	140,000 (25.9%)	0	40,000 (7.4%)	538,658
World University Service	†	50,000	†	†	†
World Vision	105,287 (42.1%)	90,000 (36%)	52,746 (21.1%)	2,000 (0.8%)	250,033
Total	\$2,309,484 (52.2%)	\$1,561,100 (36.9%)	\$316,476 (7.5%)	\$191,975 (4.4%)	\$4,329,035 ^B

*Did not undertake fund raising.

†Precise figures unavailable.

^BDoes not include World University Service.

of Canada, Oxfam of Canada and the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, raised more than fifty percent of their funds themselves.⁴⁵ The Canadian Save the Children Fund and Canadian UNICEF Committee received more than fifty percent of their funds as their share of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief.⁴⁶ The largest portion of the funds of World Vision of Canada were drawn from direct donations but it also received contributions from the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief and the Canadian government.⁴⁷ The Canadian Red Cross was the sole agency to receive more than fifty percent of their funds from government sources.⁴⁸ Figures were not available for either the Canadian University Service Overseas or the World University Service of Canada.⁴⁹ Thus, while the Canadian UNICEF Committee and the Canadian University Services Overseas were the sole voluntary agencies of the nine surveyed not to have received direct cash grants from the Canadian government, the Canadian Red Cross Society was the only agency with structural links to the Canadian government. It received a majority—76.4 percent—of its relief funds from Ottawa.

Only one of the nine agencies, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, actually disbursed the money itself,⁵⁰ (see Table 4:3). Five—the Canadian Red Cross Society, CARE, Oxfam, UNICEF and World University Service—each transferred the entire amount allocated for relief to their parent organization.⁵¹ Two, CANSAVE and World Vision, each gave the amount allocated for relief principally to

TABLE 4:3

Voluntary Agency Relief Funds: Disbursals

	Self Disbursed	Parent Body	Voluntary Agency	Church Body	Indian Govt.	Pakistan Govt.	United Nations	Total
Canadian Council for Inter- national Co-operation	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Canadian Red Cross Society	0	\$1, 102, 000 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	\$1, 102, 000
Canadian Save the Children Fund	0	54, 241 (85. 8%)	\$9, 000 (4. 2%)	0	0	0	0	63, 241
Canadian UNICEF Committee	0	92, 911 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	92, 911
Canadian University Service Overseas	0	0	+	+	0	0	0	+
CARE	0	735, 745 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	735, 745
Centre d'Etude et Co-opération Internationale	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Operation Eyesight Universal	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Oxfam	0	1, 464, 047 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	1, 464, 047
Unitarian Service Committee	\$538, 653 (100%)	0	0	0	0	0	0	538, 653
World University Service	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	+
World Vision	0	188, 447 (70. 9%)	0	\$56, 840 (39. 1%)	0	0	0	245, 287
Total	\$538, 653 (12. 7%)	\$3, 637, 391 (85. 8%)	\$9, 000 (0. 2%)	\$56, 840 (1. 3%)	0	0	0	\$4, 241, 884

*Did not undertake fund raising.

+Precise figures unavailable.

their parent organization and secondly to other voluntary agencies or church organizations.⁵² One, C.U.S.O., gave the entire amount to unrelated church and voluntary agencies to distribute.⁵³ Thus the majority of agencies simply transferred their relief funds to their parent organizations for distribution to the East Pakistan refugees.

Leaders of some voluntary agencies were reluctant initially to have their organizations participate in a combined effort to raise relief funds. At a May 6 meeting that had been called by Oxfam of Canada to discuss the possibility of a joint non-governmental organizational response to the situation, CARE of Canada's National Director, Mr. Tom Kines, told the assembled representatives that they should bear in mind that a special campaign had to be very carefully prepared because repeated appeals over the previous years had tapped the same people. He warned that a hurried and improperly planned effort might not bring the optimum results and noted that if something were done too soon it would be more difficult to get a larger operation running subsequently.⁵⁴ The representative of the Unitarian Service Committee told the assembled participants that the U.S.C. budget was fairly rigid with little contingency funds set aside for immediate disasters since most of their programs were long-term. In addition, she noted that U.S.C. projects were very personalized and Dr. Hitschmanova, their director, normally investigated all programs before committing the U.S.C. to give aid.⁵⁵ The representatives of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Canadian

Save the Children and Canadian University Service Overseas did not indicate support for a combined appeal.⁵⁶ Five agencies initially refused to join an alliance to raise funds for the East Pakistan refugees in India.

After its proposal for a combined effort was rejected, Oxfam of Canada became the most active of all the agencies in the public solicitation for relief funds though, as late as May 26, 1971, Oxfam announced that they had decided not to launch a mass appeal for donations from the general public.⁵⁷ Local committees were instructed to initiate appeals in their areas,⁵⁸ a series of letters was sent to various professional groups by members of Oxfam;⁵⁹ a subcommittee of Oxfam was created to prepare a list of material needs—especially pharmaceuticals—and to solicit them from leading manufacturers;⁶⁰ and a telegram was sent to all provincial premiers and heads of provincial parties:

Oxfam of Canada has launched a massive fund raising campaign for relief of Pakistani refugees. We urge strongly that you support our campaign with dollars and also ask citizens, communities in your province to donate generously for humanitarian reasons. We also would be deeply grateful if you would proclaim Friday, June 18th, 'Pakistan Refugee Day,' in your province. Your support would help immeasurably with our campaign on behalf of the Pakistan refugees who are victims of . . . the greatest tragedy of the century.⁶¹

Responding to a growing public interest in relief contributions for the refugees due to the momentum of the Oxfam fund raising campaign, five agencies decided to participate in the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief. These included the Canadian Red Cross Society,

Canadian Save the Children Fund, Canadian UNICEF Committee, CARE of Canada, and Oxfam of Canada who were the founding members. World Vision of Canada became the sixth voluntary agency to join just prior to the official formation of C.A.P.R. The Canadian Red Cross Society, in particular, concentrated its efforts in this organization mainly because its head, Major General Arthur E. Wrinch, and Mrs. Terry Watson assumed equivalent responsibilities within the combined drive. Despite an earlier rejection of its proposal for a similar venture, and a projection of inferior financial results for their organization, Oxfam of Canada joined because the overall effects both for the refugees and the Canadian public would more than compensate for the concessions that Oxfam of Canada made "to adjust to the situation."⁶² A majority of the voluntary agencies concentrated their relief activities within this coalition of Canadian non-governmental organizations.

With the exception of Oxfam, these agencies did not undertake political activities, while some explicitly refused to participate in a combined effort to pressure the Canadian government to become more active. At the May 6, 1971 meeting of church and voluntary agencies, the Oxfam representatives asked if the groups would be willing to work together to press the Canadian government to take diplomatic and economic initiatives in response to the civil war. The representative of CARE of Canada, Mr. Kines, stated that he did not believe that the agencies had the influence to mobilize public opinion to pres-

sure the government to act. Moreover, he noted that CARE could not legitimately speak on behalf of a constituency since it had no committees or branches and was supported solely by donors. CARE could not join a venture which purported to represent the view of non-existent constituents. More effective than mobilizing opinion for political action, he suggested, would be involvement of the government in relief measures.⁶³ The representative of the Unitarian Service Committee also made it quite clear that it was difficult for the U.S.C. to make any commitment to bring pressure to bear on the Canadian government since the U.S.C. was both non-denominational and non-political.⁶⁴ Representatives of the other voluntary agencies at that meeting, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, CANSAVE and C.U.S.O. indicated no support for Oxfam's proposal.⁶⁵ Thus the five groups expressly refused to attempt to pressure the Canadian government to change its policies.

Two voluntary agencies were especially careful not to associate their organizations with actions that could even indirectly be construed as political. The Canadian University Service headquarters in Ottawa were leery of their volunteers working in refugee camps because of "possible political involvements." They noted the Indian government's interdiction of even certain types of relief activities.⁶⁶ The Canadian UNICEF Committee refused to give their organization's assessment of the situation to Oxfam of Canada for use in a special manifesto on Pakistan due to a "worry of the political implications."⁶⁷ These two

groups expressly avoided activities that could impair their links with government.

Oxfam of Canada was the sole agency to attempt, both publicly and privately, to press the government to undertake some form of political initiative. On April 20, Oxfam wrote to the Minister for External Affairs to communicate its position.⁶⁸ On October 6, a delegation of five Oxfam members met with the President of CIDA and the Minister for External Affairs to discuss the situation in South Asia.⁶⁹ Lastly, on November 13, Oxfam presented a brief that included policy recommendations to the Minister for External Affairs.⁷⁰ Thus Oxfam of Canada actively attempted to press the government to change its policy response.

Oxfam of Canada also attempted to mobilize public opinion to pressure the Canadian government. On June 10, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Derek Hayes, stated:

Oxfam will continue its efforts on behalf of the Pakistan refugees as long as it is needed. We cannot, however, forsake the ultimate solution to this tragedy which must be a political one.

We are presently attempting to create a ground swell of public concern across the country and indeed around the world. We are asking political and religious leaders of Canada to join in proclaiming the weekend of June 18-20 as Pakistan Refugee Day.⁷¹

On November 12, in a letter sent to the editors of different newspapers, he warned that the India-Pakistan crisis had reached such proportions that only massive government intervention could bring about a tenable solution.

This is not an internal matter. It is a matter which must actively involve the entire world community. If we turn our backs it will be to our everlasting shame. It is Oxfam's hope that concerned members of the public will endorse our stand and write individual letters to their members of Parliament in Ottawa urging the government to respond to the current crisis in a strong and definitive manner.⁷²

Oxfam tried not only to politicize public opinion, but also to organize various church and voluntary groups to pressure the Canadian government. On May 6 they arranged a meeting of Canadian non-governmental organizations that included the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Canadian Save the Children Fund, Canadian University Service Overseas, CARE of Canada, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Canadian Council of Churches and the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada) to discuss the possibility of concentrated action to meet the Pakistan crisis.⁷³ Mr. John T. Shea, Executive Director, told the assembled representatives that the conflict in Pakistan had received little coverage in the media despite evidence of an imminent famine in Pakistan. He noted that the only official reference in the House of Commons had been a request for information about Canada's efforts. The Minister for External Affairs had replied that a report was expected shortly. In contrast, he noted that the British Parliament, in a precedent-creating vote by members of all parties from right to left, had passed a motion urging a ceasefire. Mr. Shea therefore suggested that it might be possible for the agencies to work together to bring pressure to bear on the

government to take action.⁷⁴

Mr. Shea was asked whether Oxfam was specifically suggesting that the voluntary agencies should form a lobby to pressure the government either to take political action, to press for a ceasefire, or to increase supplies in a humanitarian effort.⁷⁵ In reply, Mr. Shea insisted that the time to stand on the sidelines was past; it was necessary for individuals or coalitions of associations of people who were not bound by rigid protocol to find other ways of meeting emergencies. He further suggested that it was possible to arouse public opinion so that the government, which depended upon public support, would be galvanized to act. In this regard, he announced that Oxfam was interested in sending an observation team to East Pakistan to bring back photographic information on the scope of the disaster—the needs and the apparent facts—as well as arranging a meeting with a government representative in order to acquire direct information about possible action by interested voluntary groups.⁷⁶ Thus Oxfam of Canada attempted to organize Canadian non-governmental groups to press the government to undertake diplomatic and economic initiatives and end its policy of non-interference.

Oxfam was unable, however, to convince the Canadian non-governmental organizations to take any action. Representatives did not act on the suggestion of sending an observation team to East Pakistan. Similarly, they took no position on the proposal to contact an official of the government to obtain further information. They

only agreed to circulate their agency reports from East Pakistan to other interested organizations and to reconvene as soon as further information was available.⁷⁷ Oxfam failed in its efforts to organize Canadian non-governmental groups to lobby the government to change its policy.

Oxfam also organized and financed the South Asia Conference, held in Toronto from August 19 to 26, 1971. Its principal objective was to bring together people knowledgeable about India and Pakistan who could bring pressure to bear on their own governments. This included Canadian political, religious, educational, social and humanitarian leaders as well as American, British and Indian representatives.

The meeting made five specific recommendations to all governments:

- 1) To terminate immediately all military deliveries to Pakistan;
- 2) To suspend all economic aid to Pakistan;
- 3) To channel all possible resources into a massive emergency program for famine relief in East Pakistan, directed and administered by the United Nations;
- 4) To make firm continuing commitments to share fairly the economic burden of supporting the refugees in India;
- 5) To intervene to save the life of Sheik Mujibur Rahman.⁷⁸

The premises of their recommendations were fourfold. Firstly, there was a "threat to peace both in the subcontinent of South Asia and throughout the world, with the danger of great power involvement in a familiar pattern of escalation." Secondly, there could be no solution that did not "allow the refugees to return and to live in security in their villages and homes." A "political settlement" had to be based upon "the democratic consent of the people of East Pakistan."

Thirdly, the execution of Sheik Mujibur Rahman would end any hope of a peaceful settlement of the crisis. Lastly, there were "grave problems" in India because of the 7.5 million refugees and "the certainty of famine in East Pakistan by October."⁷⁹ These premises offered little challenge to Canadian policy; with the exception of the termination of existing aid agreements, all parts of the resolution agreed with the stated policies of the Canadian government.

Representatives of Canadian churches, political parties and educational circles signed this document. The church representatives included the associate secretary of the Canadian Council of Churches, the Primate of the Anglican Church, the former moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, and the secretary of the General Council of the United Church of Canada. The N.D.P.'s foreign affairs spokesman in Parliament and its Ontario provincial leader also signed. Representatives of educational institutions who signed, included the Associate Director of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, the Vice-President of Trent University and the Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.⁸⁰ Oxfam did succeed in mobilizing some support from different sectors of the informed public for a modest statement of political demands.

Even then, however, Oxfam of Canada was careful to differentiate their organization from the recommendations of the South Asia Conference. The Oxfam executive committee that approved the

decision to organize the conference insisted from the outset that the conference committee be broadly based and include non-Oxfam members. No Oxfam officials signed the declaration and conference officials emphasized to the press that it was not an Oxfam meeting.

The members of the conference wish to express their gratitude to Oxfam of Canada for making this meeting possible. They are particularly appreciative of the fact that Oxfam of Canada placed no restrictions on the proceedings of the conference and made no effort to influence its conclusions. It is of course understood that Oxfam Canada has no responsibility for views expressed by members of the conference or for the decisions subsequently published.⁸¹

Thus Oxfam of Canada refused to associate its organization with an overtly political event that it had organized, even though all the resolutions coming from the conference, with the exception of the request to terminate all economic aid, were consistent with Canadian policy.

Nor were the officials of Oxfam of Canada unanimous in support of certain of the proposed political actions. At the May 2 board meeting it was proposed that Oxfam attempt to initiate actions at a local level to pressure Members of Parliament to raise the matter in the House of Commons. One Oxfam member cautioned that "a relief operation and government pressure were two separate issues and ought to be treated as such." He felt that a Canair relief style operation would not be successful at that time due to "emotional overkill and the current economic conditions in North America." Instead he suggested that Oxfam approach someone of

the stature of Lester Pearson to undertake a mission to East Pakistan in an attempt to collect information and stimulate public opinion on the matter.⁸² Thus Oxfam of Canada itself was divided on the appropriateness of political activities.

Equally important, Oxfam of Canada's attempts to politicize the situation created friction between the younger and more political Canadian organization and its British parent body, and its field director from Canada. In spite of the fact that the actual disbursement of relief funds was being handled by the parent organization in England, Oxfam of Canada, at one point, considered the transportation of food directly to a "liberated" zone in Bangladesh. Mr. Alan Leather, assistant field director of the parent organization reported that he had spent "half an hour or more hammering out whether or not Oxfam should become involved in sending food into East Pakistan over the border."⁸³ The field director, Mr. Raymond Cournoyer, a Canadian, felt that a lot of energy would be wasted since the zone was inaccessible and its inhabitants were more Indian than Bengali. Oxfam of Canada did agree eventually not to try to implement this plan.⁸⁴ But dissention remained; group leaders could not agree on the importance of political action to pressure the governments if that action threatened to impair in any way the primary function of collecting and distributing relief funds.

In summary, none of the international voluntary agencies with the exception of Oxfam of Canada, organized or participated in overt

political activities designed to pressure the Canadian government to change its policies. Eight of the nine agencies limited their activities exclusively to fund raising, even though only one, the Canadian Red Cross Society, received more than half of its funds from the Canadian government. Six agencies, the Canadian Red Cross Society, Canadian Save the Children Fund, Canadian UNICEF Committee, CARE of Canada, Oxfam of Canada and World Vision of Canada joined a coalition of church and agency groups to participate in the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief. They also had important external links to their respective parent organizations to whom they transferred relief funds for distribution. Six other agencies, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, the Canadian Save the Children Fund, the Canadian UNICEF Committee, the Canadian University Service Overseas, CARE of Canada and the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada refused to participate in political activities. Only Oxfam of Canada attempted to mobilize other groups and public opinion to pressure the Canadian government. Yet even in its most successful activity, the South Asia Conference, Oxfam was careful to try to insulate itself from association with overt political activity. In their fund raising activities, the principal voluntary agencies offered no challenge, therefore, to the policies of the Canadian government.

D. Summary

The majority of voluntary agencies active during the civil war remained practically apolitical in their statements, activities and publications. Oxfam of Canada was the only exception and their differences with the Canadian policy response was confined to a narrow area of diplomatic policy: they urged a Canadian initiative to raise the issue in the United Nations. The only other negative comments were a report of suggestions for economic sanctions against Pakistan in an article in the publication of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation and a recommendation of public pressure for increased Canadian relief aid in the publication of the Canadian University Service Overseas. The majority of voluntary agencies confined their statements and activities to fund raising and thereby left the field to decision-makers in Ottawa.

Five voluntary agencies abstained from actions that either directly or indirectly limited or contradicted Canadian policies. The Centre d'Etude et de Coopération Internationale and Operation Eyesight Universal made no response whatsoever to the situation. Canadian Save the Children Fund, CARE of Canada and World Vision of Canada issued no statements and published no articles that contained references to the policies of the Canadian government and confined their activities to fund raising. Through their passivity, these five agencies supported the Canadian government.

Two other groups avoided any possible conflict with the Canadian government. They focussed their comments exclusively on relief funds for the refugees, restricted their activities to fund raising and issued no official publications. The Unitarian Service Committee of Canada and the World University Service of Canada limited their comments to their own fund raising efforts, the only activity they undertook. Neither of these groups had an official magazine or newspaper. By refraining from any participation in the political arena, they supported the policies of the Canadian government.

Two groups agreed with Canadian government policy in their statements which paralleled Ottawa's response. Their activities were confined to fund raising and their publications contained no references to Canadian policy. The Canadian Red Cross spokesmen, for example, indicated full confidence in the Pakistan authorities and deleted material that might have proved embarrassing to the Pakistan authorities from their presentation to Parliament. The spokesman for the Canadian UNICEF Committee recommended that Canada seek a peaceful settlement of the crisis as well as an increase in its economic relief. Both groups restricted their activity to fund raising and the Canadian UNICEF Committee was particularly careful to avoid any association with political activity. Lastly, neither of their publications contained any reference to the policies of the Canadian government.

Two groups only are somewhat more difficult to classify. Their statements and activities neither directly nor indirectly criticized or constrained the Canadian government though their publications contained a minimal number of negative references to the Canadian response. The Canadian Council for International Co-operation issued no statements and undertook no activities with the exception of its participation at a meeting where its representative did not approve a proposal to pressure the Canadian government. The statements of the Canadian University Service Overseas focussed upon the question of relief for East Pakistani refugees. While C.U.S.O. did organize fund raising activities, it also rejected the political proposal at the aforementioned meeting. Only one article out of eight published by the Canadian Council for International Co-operation contained negative references to Canadian foreign policy; these were restricted to reports of press suggestions of cessation of economic aid to Pakistan and of criticism by the Indian Minister for External Affairs. Also, an editorial, which recommended increased Canadian relief, approved the decision to delay recognition of Bangladesh. C.U.S.O. had an article that urged their readers to pressure the Canadian government for increased relief aid for the refugees. With the exception of a single article in each of their publications, however, both groups passively concurred with Canadian policy.

One group did diverge from the policies of the Canadian government. It consciously attempted to modify the government's stand

and attempted to mobilize other groups and the public to press the government to do so. Oxfam of Canada recommended that the Canadian government undertake a more forceful diplomatic policy. It urged Ottawa to press for a United Nations initiative, for the dispatch of a military observer team, for an attempt at mediation and for increased economic relief. However, they did not go so far as to recommend the independence of Bangladesh. Despite their attempts to sensitize public opinion they were careful not to directly associate themselves with their largest effort, the South Asia Conference whose policy recommendations were essentially those of the government. Even Oxfam of Canada's opposition to Canadian government policy was confined principally to Canadian diplomatic passivity at the United Nations.

In conclusion, while none of the voluntary agencies actively supported the policies of the Canadian government, all the groups, with the exception of Oxfam of Canada, studiously avoided opposing these policies. Seven groups, Canadian Save the Children Fund, CARE of Canada, Centre d'Etude et de Coopération Internationale, Operation Eyesight Universal, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, World University Service of Canada and World Vision of Canada did not even indirectly limit or contradict the policies of the Canadian government. Two groups, the Canadian Red Cross Society and the Canadian UNICEF Committee issued statements that paralleled those of government spokesmen. Two groups, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation and

the Canadian University Service Overseas, also supported government policy with the exception of a single article in each of their publications. Only Oxfam of Canada actively opposed the policy response of the Canadian government and undertook to mobilize groups and public opinion. The voluntary agencies distinguished themselves through passivity, abstinence, and studious avoidance of any political activity. In their effort to be apolitical, they allowed the government to monopolize the definition and management of a problem that went to the core of their concerns.

It is difficult to explain this extraordinary passivity and reluctance to engage in substantive comment on the issues. This is particularly so for groups animated by humanitarian concerns with considerable experience and expertise. Most of these groups were not newly formed to meet the emergency but well-established organizations with considerable expertise and well-trained professional staffs.

One plausible hypothesis suggested that groups with ongoing and established links in the field are unlikely to run the risk of criticism of governmental policy if such criticism could jeopardize these relationships. There is little support for such an argument, however, in the record of Canadian voluntary agency activity in this case. On the contrary, Oxfam, the only group to engage in sustained political activity, did have considerable ties with Pakistan before the civil

war. Many other groups that remained passive had few such links. Representation in the field acted as neither a deterrent nor an inducement to political activity.

A second explanation is no more convincing. It was suggested that those agencies with no financial links to the authorities are more likely to criticize official policy. Oxfam of Canada, the principal critic among the agencies, did not receive a majority of its relief funds from the Canadian government. Six other groups, however, also received less than fifty percent of their funds from the government but offered no comment or criticism of official policy. Financial independence, relative or absolute, appears to be an insufficient condition of activity and political involvement.

A related argument suggests that interest groups with no organizational links with other voluntary associations are more likely to engage in independent comment and activity than those groups deeply enmeshed in a broad structure. The evidence offers very little support of such an explanation. On the contrary, Oxfam of Canada which belonged to the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, opposed Ottawa's policies, while the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada and the World University Service of Canada had no such connections but made no comment on Canadian policy. Again, independence does not encourage political engagement and critical evaluation.

Structural factors do not provide a convincing explanation of the extraordinary passivity and narrowness of conception of the principal voluntary agencies. They so defined their roles that they abjured philosophical, political, or social comment and concentrated on the "neutral" activity of fund raising. Their narrow concept of their proper activity allowed the widest possible scope of action for Canada's policy makers. Ottawa was not required to defend, explain, account, or elaborate since it faced no such requests. Only Oxfam's search for a voice outside itself was an attempt to come to grips with the national and international factors that shaped and defined the conflict in South Asia.

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¹Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, letter to author from Raymond van der Buhs, Director of Administration, January 22, 1976.

²The Globe and Mail, June 8, 1971; The Montreal Star, June 8, 1971; Le Devoir, June 9, 1971; Montréal Matin, June 10, 1971; La Presse, June 11, 1971.

³The Chronicle Herald, June 28, 1971.

⁴The Ottawa Citizen, August 4, 1971; The Vancouver Sun, September 18, 1971.

⁵Ibid.

⁶The Globe and Mail, June 8, 1971; The Montreal Star, June 8, 1971; Le Devoir, June 9, 1971; Montréal Matin, June 10, 1971; La Presse, June 11, 1971.

⁷The Toronto Telegram, June 15, 1971.

⁸The Ottawa Citizen, August 4, 1971; The Vancouver Sun, September 18, 1971.

⁹World University Service of Canada, Memo, dated December 9, 1970.

¹⁰The Montreal Star, June 11, 1971.

¹¹Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 33 (October 19, 1971), pp. 48-50.

¹²Canadian Red Cross Society, Report by Albert Batten, former Executive Director, "Report by Albert Batten on His Tour of Duty on the East Pakistani Refugee Operations in India as a Delegate of the League of Red Cross Societies from May 28 to August 25, 1971," n. d., pp. 1-2.

¹³Ibid.

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¹⁴Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 33 (October 19, 1971), p. 26.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁶The Chronicle Herald, June 15, 1971.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Oxfam of Canada, letter from Derek Wynne, Vice Chairman, to Mitchell Sharp, Minister for External Affairs, April 20, 1971.

¹⁹The Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Register, November 13, 1971.

Oxfam of Canada, Report by Alan Leather, "Diary of Events and Comments on My Recent Trip to the United States and Canada," October 20, 1971.

The delegation included Mr. Alan Leather—Oxfam Assistant Field Director for Calcutta, and Jack Grant, Ann Temlinson, Yves Gagnon, Jean O'Keefe and Jean Perrault of Oxfam of Canada. They were informed by a Canadian government representative that Canada was not prepared to do anything other than stay completely neutral in the situation, as they felt that a strong position on behalf of either side would make it impossible for them to influence any decisions. Although Mr. Leather did not specify which of the government representatives made the statement, it most probably was Mitchell Sharp.

²⁰Oxfam of Canada, Report by Alan Leather, "Diary of Events and Comments on My Recent Trip to the United States and Canada," October 20, 1971.

²¹Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 33 (October 19, 1971), pp. 50-52.

²²Ibid., pp. 14, 27.

²³Ibid., p. 27.

²⁴The Ottawa Journal, November 15, 1971; Canadian India Times, November 15, 1971.

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²⁵Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 33 (October 19, 1971), p. 30.

Canadian Red Cross Society, Despatch, 33, No. 1-4 (Spring-Winter, 1971).

Canadian UNICEF Committee, Action, II, No. 1-4 (February-November, 1971); III, No. 1-2 (February-April, 1972).

World Vision of Canada, Heartline, VIII, No. 2-6 (March/April-November/December, 1971).

²⁶Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Informadev, I, No. 5 (January, 1972), p. 1.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., I, No. 2 (August-September, 1971), pp. 7, 8, 10; I, No. 5 (January, 1972), p. 3.

²⁹Ibid., I, No. 2 (August-September, 1971), p. 9.

³⁰Canadian UNICEF Committee, Action, II, No. 3 (September, 1971), p. 5.

³¹Canadian University Service Overseas, Bulletin, No. 4 (1971), p. 2.

³²World Vision of Canada, Heartline, VIII, No. 4 (July-August, 1971), pp. 2-3; VIII, No. 5 (September-October, 1971), pp. 3-5; VIII, No. 6 (November, 1971), pp. 2-3.

³³The Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Informadev, I, No. 2 (August-September, 1971), p. 6.

³⁴Ibid., I, No. 2 (August-September, 1971), pp. 7, 9, 10; I, No. 4 (December, 1971), pp. 3, 4; I, No. 5 (January, 1972), p. 3.

³⁵The Canadian UNICEF Committee, Action, II, No. 2 (April, 1971), p. 5.

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³⁶Canadian University Service Overseas, Bulletin, No. 3, 1971, pp. 4-5, 14.

Their French section, S. U. C. O., in cooperation with Oxfam of Canada's Quebec branch published a twenty-page article in their magazine Deux Tiers entitled "La plus grand tragédie du siècle." Their purpose was to have "la population canadienne exercera les pressions appropriées quand elle aura vu la dimension réelle du drame: nos députés, nos ministres et nos financiers seront alors forcés de faire tout en leur pouvoir pour contribuer d'une façon efficace et rapide à la solution politique du conflit." The article was in four parts: A general description of Pakistan, Consequences of the 1947 partition, The repression and desperate plight of the Bengalis, Situation in the camps, and Oxfam facing the tragedy. The last part announced that Oxfam of Canada had launched a campaign for funds which would be used. It quoted extensively from a La Presse editorial by Jean Paul Desbiens that had compared the genocide of the Jews in World War II with that of the Bengalis and stating that even greater numbers were being killed in a shorter time period. The section noted the indifference and the apathy of the general public: "C'est peu à peu l'immunisation contre l'horreur. Pourtant les photos publiées dans ces articles illustrent jusqu'à quel point l'horreur n'en finit plus de finir." The article did not mention the response of the Canadian government (Deux Tiers, II, No. 8 [December, 1971], pp. 9-29).

³⁷The Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Informadev, I, No. 2 (August-September, 1971), pp. 8, 9, 10; I, No. 4 (December, 1971), pp. 3, 4.

³⁸The Canadian University Service Overseas, Bulletin, No. 3 (1971), pp. 4-5, 14.

³⁹The Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Informadev, I, No. 2 (August-September, 1971), p. 9.

⁴⁰Ibid., I, No. 4 (December, 1971), p. 4.

⁴¹Ibid., I, No. 2 (August-September, 1971), p. 6.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., I, No. 2 (August-September, 1971), pp. 8, 9, 10; I, No. 4 (December, 1971), p. 3; I, No. 5 (January, 1972), p. 3.

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⁴⁴Canadian University Service Overseas, Bulletin, No. 3 (1971), pp. 4, 5, 14.

⁴⁵CARE of Canada, letter to author from Mrs. F. C. L. Wyght, Administrative Secretary, September 30, 1975.

Let it be noted that the last Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Report of Contributions, 24 May 1972 to 28 June 1972 listed CARE of Canada as having received direct donations of only \$92,239.

Oxfam of Canada, Financial Report, "Financial Position as at February 29, 1972." This included \$493,564 in cash contributions, \$263,588 in receipted goods and \$392,100 in unreceipted goods.

Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, Annual Report, 1972, p. 3.

Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, Financial Report, "Cash Transfers to the Ramakrishna Mission for Refugee Relief and Bangladesh," December 11, 1972. The direct contributions consisted of \$185,669 in cash, \$59,175 worth of drugs and \$93,815 worth of clothing.

⁴⁶Canadian Save the Children Fund, personal interview with Mrs. Hinsley, Public Relations, November 27, 1975; Canadian Save the Children Fund, telegram to author from Mrs. Hinsley, Public Relations, November 11, 1975.

Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Report of Contributions, 24 May, 1972 to 28 June, 1972.

Statement of Receipts and Disbursements, June 17, 1971 to March 31, 1972.

Statement of Receipts and Disbursements, April 1, 1972 to March 2, 1973.

Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, Document, "NGO Supported 72/73 Bangladesh Program, NGO54, March 30, 1973, p. 6. Hereinafter referred to as CIDA.

The Save the Children Fund of British Columbia was a separate organization and is therefore not included in these figures. It raised a total of \$176,975; \$119,975 from the British Columbia government—including \$9,975 of dried egg powder and \$57,000 from an appeal fund by the Vancouver Sun. All the funds were donated to the parent body, Save the Children Fund of England. No public statements were made and its activities were confined to fund raising. (Canadian Save the Children Fund, letter to author from Mrs. J. F. Dewhurst, Executive Secretary, Save the Children Fund of British Columbia, January 5, 1976.)

The figures for Canadian UNICEF Committee were based upon the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Report of Contributions, 24 May to 28 June 1972 and its Statement of Receipts and Disbursements, June 17, 1971 to March 31, 1972.

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⁴⁷World Vision of Canada, Report, "Dispersal of C. A. P. R. Fund," December 16, 1975.

World Vision of Canada, personal interview with Mr. Bernard Barron, Director Relief and Development, November 27, 1975.

⁴⁸Canadian Red Cross Society, Annual Report, 1971, pp. 72-78; Annual Report, 1972, pp. 70-79.

⁴⁹Repeated attempts by letter, telephone calls and visits to obtain exact financial data from C.U.S.O. proved futile. Initially the information was said to be "stored away in unlabelled storage boxes." When the author offered to help go through these boxes, he was then informed that C.U.S.O. did not have time to provide the information "when it's a personal thesis" (repeated twice). (Canadian University Service Overseas, personal interview by telephone with author, Shah de Vanni, December 4, 1975.)

The author did learn that funds were raised from four sources. Firstly, donations were received from the Canadian public. Secondly, C.U.S.O. volunteers in India agreed to each contribute the equivalent of one hundred dollars. Thirdly, C.U.S.O. volunteers in other programs made donations. Lastly, the central organization contributed a minimum of \$25,000 which one member of C.U.S.O. thought came from CIDA. She was certain the latter amount had not come from C.U.S.O.'s project funds. (Canadian University Service Overseas, letter to author from Patsy Ann Phillips, February 1, 1976). Though the money was supposedly used to purchase blankets, Canadian government documents do not list any such allocation for C.U.S.O. (Canada, CIDA, Document, "NGO Supported 72/73 Bangladesh Program," NGO-54, March 30, 1973, p. 6.

World University Service of Canada did receive \$50,000 from the government for relief. (Canada, CIDA, Document, "NGO Supported 72/73 Bangladesh Program," NGO-54, March 30, 1973, p. 9.)

⁵⁰The Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, Financial Report, "Accounting of Funds for East Pakistani Refugees (Bangladesh)," April 17, 1972.

⁵¹Canadian Red Cross Society, Annual Report, 1971, pp. 72-78; Annual Report, 1972, pp. 70-74.

Canadian UNICEF Committee, personal interview with Mr. Colin Ramsbury, Field Director, November 4, 1975.

CARE of Canada, letter to author from Mrs. F.C.L. Wyght, Administrative Secretary, September 30, 1975.

Oxfam of Canada, Financial Report, "Financial position as

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at February 29, 1972."

It is important to note that some of the relief sent included potato flakes. Mr. Cournoyer felt that they were of such little nutritional value, that he sent a cable to Oxfam of Canada to send personnel to distribute them since he was not going to waste his time on such useless things. (Oxfam of Canada, personal interview with Mr. Raymond Cournoyer, January 14, 1976.)

World University Service of Canada, personal interview with Mr. Bill McNeil, Vice-Chairman, November 13, 1975.

⁵²Canadian Save the Children Fund, personal interview with Mrs. Hinsley, Public Relations, November 27, 1975.

Canadian Save the Children Fund, telegram to author from Mrs. Hinsley, Public Relations, November 11, 1975.

World Vision of Canada, Report, "Disbursal of C.A. P.R. Funds," December 16, 1975.

⁵³Canadian University Service Overseas, letter to author from Patsy Ann Phillips, February 1, 1976; letter to author from Nancy Gérin, February 2, 1976.

⁵⁴Oxfam of Canada, Minutes of Meeting, May 6, 1971: Meeting of Voluntary Agency Representatives, pp. 1-3.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Oxfam of Canada, Memo to Officers and Staff from John T. Shea, Executive Director, May 26, 1971 - re: "Pakistan Refugee Situation."

⁵⁸Oxfam of Canada, Memo to Officers and Staff, unsigned, July 20, 1971 - re: "Pakistan Disaster."

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Oxfam of Canada, telegram to all provincial premiers and heads of provincial parties, n.a., n.d.

Oxfam did issue a press release that was more political in the French version than in the English version. Though both lan-

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guage releases of June 10 contained telexes of support for Oxfam by the Premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, and the leaders of Quebec's political parties (Jean Jacques Bertrand, Union Nationale; Camille Samson, Cr ditiste Rally of Quebec; Ren  L vesque, Parti Qu b cois) part of the English version was not an exact translation of the French version. The former read "The Parti Qu b cois has already voiced its concern for the inhumane repression of all the peoples of East Pakistan, and Mr. L vesque reiterated his conviction that 'unless the freedom of East Pakistan is accomplished morally, it will not become a political reality.'" The French version stated, "Le Parti Qu b cois avait d j  condamn  par r solution de son Conseil National en date du 10 mai 'la r pression inhumaine dont le R gime F d ral se rend coupable' et dont la tragique  pid mie de chol ra est en quelque sorte la cons quence. Toutefois tant que la libert  du peuple du Bangla Desh, d j  moralement acquise, ne deviendra pas une r alit  politique, la population du Qu bec devra continuer   encourager par tous les moyens le travail incessant d'Oxfam Qu bec."

⁶²Oxfam of Canada, Memo to Officers and Staff from John T. Shea, Executive Director, June 25, 1971.

⁶³Oxfam of Canada, Minutes of Meeting, May 6, 1971; Meeting of Voluntary Agency Representatives, pp. 1-3.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Canadian University Service Overseas, letter to author from Patsy Ann Phillips, February 1, 1976; letter to author from Nancy G rin, February 23, 1976.

⁶⁷Oxfam of Canada, Telex to Philip Jackson, London, England - re: "Special Oxfam Manifesto," n.d.

⁶⁸Oxfam of Canada, Memos to Officers and Staff from John T. Shea, Executive Director, May 26, 1971 - re: "Pakistan Refugee Situation."

On May 20, a delegation composed of Jack Shea, Executive Director, and Mr. Jack Grant and Father Gabriel D carie, board members, met with Mr. Paul G rin-Lajoie, President of CIDA. Their purpose was to request assistance from the Canadian govern-

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ment for Oxfam's relief activities. They presented to Mr. Gérin-Lajoie the following alternative proposals:

a) That CIDA provide an airplane, or equivalent funds for the chartering of an aircraft to India to fly medical supplies that Oxfam was collecting;

b) That CIDA provide Oxfam of Canada with a matching grant of \$150,000, that would be disbursed by the Field Director in India, and hopefully when opportune, in East Pakistan;

c) That CIDA provide a one million dollar fund for relief purposes that would be administered by Oxfam in the relief area.

It seemed to the members of the delegation that CIDA would "actively entertain the second option."

⁶⁹Oxfam of Canada, Report by Alan Leather, "Diary of Events and Comments on My Recent Trip to the United States and Canada," October 20, 1971.

Roman Catholic Church in Canada, The Canadian Register, November 13, 1971.

⁷⁰Oxfam of Canada, Minutes of Meeting, December 7, 1971: Administrative Committee Meeting, p. 2.

⁷¹The Toronto Telegram, June 10, 1971.

⁷²The Evening Times Globe, November 12, 1971.

⁷³Oxfam of Canada, Minutes of Meeting, May 6, 1971: Meeting of Voluntary Agency Representatives, pp. 1-3.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Oxfam of Canada, Document, "Toronto Declaration of Concern," August 21, 1971.

⁷⁹Ibid.

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⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Oxfam of Canada, Memo to Officers and Staff, from John T. Shea, Executive Director, August 24, 1971 - re: "South Asia Conference."

⁸²Oxfam of Canada, Minutes of Meeting, May 2, 1971: "Board Meeting."

⁸³Oxfam of Canada, Report by Alan Leather, "Diary of Events and Comments on My Recent Trip to the United States and Canada," October 20, 1971, p. 1.

⁸⁴Oxfam of Canada, personal interview with Raymond Cournoyer, January 14, 1976.

CHAPTER V

THE RESPONSE OF AN AD HOC COALITION OF CANADIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

... we have to face the question whether or not we want to submerge the agency identification or do we want to preserve that very important loyalty to an agency that our supporters attach themselves to ... in Canada there are many subcultures and in areas of international development or disaster relief, people do have loyalties.¹

(The Executive Director of Oxfam.)

... everyone realizes that Oxfam is raising funds independently. But so are the churches through their Sunday bulletins, from the pulpit and by other appeals to their parishioners to give generously 'during the special collection for Pakistani refugees' or send your cheque to your Church.²

(The National Director of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief.)

A number of groups were organized ad hoc to respond to the civil war. Some of them were minor. One was the South Asia Crisis Committee, a small student-based group at Glendon College, whose principal objective was "to motivate and educate students at all levels to the conditions and needs of the people of East Pakistan during the current crisis."³ In existence only from September to December, this group organized presentations on the main university campuses of Ontario.⁴ Another such ad hoc group was the Canadian Committee for an Independent Bangladesh, consisting of only Torontonians whose sole objective was to try to obtain government support for the independence of East Pakistan.⁵ Their activities consisted mainly of

letters in which arguments for a change in Canadian policy were made to editors of Toronto newspapers.⁶ The Bangladesh Association, composed principally of Pakistan citizens attending Canadian universities as well as some students who were naturalized, arose in the large urban centres to promote the cause of independence for their homeland.⁷ Most of their activities (they had no publications and engaged in limited fund raising) were conducted on "a semi-independent basis" with very little coordination among provincial branches.⁸ Students concentrated principally on the policies of the Pakistan and American governments and paid relatively little attention to those of Canada. The most important group, however, which arose in response to the emergency in South Asia was the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief and this chapter concentrates on an examination of its activities.

The Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief was a coalition of Canadian churches and voluntary agencies formed to improve the collection of funds to relieve the human suffering caused by the Pakistan civil war. The organization took form at a June 11, 1971 meeting of voluntary agency representatives that was held at Canadian Red Cross headquarters in Toronto. The Chairman stated that Oxfam had informed him that they had proposed to launch a low key appeal for funds for Pakistan relief but it appeared that the campaign had built momentum very quickly. He suggested "because of the interest of the public in contributing to Pakistan relief it might be desirable to

broaden the base of the appeal in order that it would be more effective and avoid, again, the multiplicity of appeals springing up around the country."¹⁰ After a general discussion it was agreed that the agencies and organizations in attendance were strongly in favour of and would support a combined appeal to the Canadian public. The constituent members included: the Canadian Red Cross Society; the Canadian Council of Churches; the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace; the Canadian Save the Children Fund; the Canadian UNICEF Committee; CARE of Canada; Oxfam of Canada; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The members agreed to urge and encourage their representatives at the provincial and local levels to combine their fund raising efforts with those of other organizations in their respective communities.¹¹ Thus the main organizational stimulus for the formation of C.A.P.R. and centralization of fund raising was apolitical. There was no reference to the policies of the Canadian government.

The formation of this coalition followed two earlier unsuccessful attempts to bring Canadian non-governmental organizations together in alliance. Oxfam of Canada called a meeting on May 6, 1971 to discuss the possibility of concerted action by voluntary organizations to pressure the government to take action. The groups present (The Canadian Council of Churches, the Mennonite Central Committee [Canada], the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Canadian Save the Children Fund, Canadian University Service Overseas,

CARE of Canada, Oxfam of Canada, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada and the Y.M.C.A.) agreed only to circulate the reports of their representatives from East Pakistan to other interested organizations and to reconvene as soon as "further information" became available. They took no decision on Oxfam's proposals to dispatch their own observation team in East Pakistan and to contact a Canadian government official directly to obtain further information.¹²

Again at a meeting convened on June 3 to examine the possibility of cooperative fund raising in times of overseas disasters, church and voluntary agency representatives (the Canadian Council of Churches, the Canadian Red Cross Society, Canadian Save the Children Fund, the Canadian UNICEF Committee, CARE of Canada and Oxfam of Canada) agreed on several points for a cooperative appeal. However, they only undertook to explore the matter further with their masters when they had reached an appropriate stage in their conclusions.¹³

Thus the agencies were initially unwilling to undertake cooperative action either to pressure the government or even to raise funds cooperatively.

The question of membership in the new body was unsettled. The suggestion that the Canadian Council of Churches represent all churches on the appeal provoked considerable reaction by church representatives who wanted equal representation and voting privileges, especially since they felt they would raise much of the money. In what was termed "a very delicate situation," the Canadian Council of Churches'

representative was eventually able to convince member churches to accept combined participation despite their anger over the reduction in their voting power.¹⁴ World Vision of Canada became the ninth member in late June despite an emphasis on limited membership to maximize a rapid response.¹⁵ The Mennonite Central Committee (Canada) was not admitted because a limit of nine members had supposedly been established. The executive director of M.C.C. felt that the coalition's "excuse" was "rather weak" and did not do much to help their "image."¹⁶ In attempting to organize and promote humanitarian relief, the nascent coalition faced problems emanating from its constituent units and from the scope of the organizational task it faced. The policy of the coalition was evident in their public statements and publications.

A. Statements

Representatives of the appeal made little mention of the Canadian government's response to the Pakistan civil war. They did refer in passing to the dispatch of relief to the refugees in India, but their statements concentrated upon the needs of the displaced population and the urgency of increased financial donations by individual Canadians. C.A.P.R. shared the government's view of its role: to sensitize the public of the need to send aid.

Representatives of the appeal stressed the plight of the refugees in order to raise the level of contributions. At a press con-

ference in Toronto on June 16 to announce the commencement of the appeal, Major General A.E. Wrinch, chairman of the drive, stated one hardly needed to underline the "gravity of the situation." This was undoubtedly likely to be "one of the worst, if not the worst, refugee situations in our time." He reported that recent figures had indicated the presence of five to six million refugees in India with 3,500,000 in camps and 2,000,000 "in other circumstances in the fields and on the road." While such relief needs as food, fuel, shelter and anti-cholera vaccines, were in his estimation immeasurable, he stated that the appeal hoped to obtain \$2.5 million in the near future.¹⁷ The emphasis of C.A.P.R. paralleled that of government spokesmen in their analysis of the troubled subcontinent.

The same theme was reiterated by Dr. Robert McClure, former moderator of The United Church of Canada. On a speaking tour of Western Canada on behalf of the appeal, he reported on his visit to the refugee camps in India arguing that India had supplied ninety-seven percent of the aid in food and medicine, and urged the Canadian government to transfer any surplus wheat to India. He observed, however, that:

... the Canadian government is far ahead of the Canadian people. In fact they are so far ahead of the people that they are afraid now of losing them.

... I have seen educated men in this country study pictures of the death and misery of these camps and say they are faked. This apathy, the very antithesis of love, is one of the blights of affluence.¹⁸

Given the context of his remarks, the doctor's statements were more of a prescription than a censure of the limited Canadian relief for the refugees. The constraint was not the government but the public.

Spokesmen praised the Canadian effort even though they pleaded for an increase in relief contributions. At an August 2 press conference, Mr. Paul Ignatief, executive director of the Canadian UNICEF Committee, who, in his capacity as vice-chairman of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief had just returned from a three-week visit to India to examine the conditions in the camps and assess the extent and success of Canadian relief efforts, commended the Canadian government for its decision to send surplus rapeseed to camps in India to be converted into edible oil—a major dietary need. Nonetheless, he said, the refugee problem would not be solved unless countries like Canada responded with much more substantial aid, as they had responded to Biafra after the civil war broke out in July 1967. The East Pakistan crisis, in his view, had already surpassed the Biafra disaster in its magnitude, yet Canada had sent East Pakistan less than a quarter of what it had contributed to Biafra.¹⁹ Given the governmental emphasis on the need for increased aid to India, the vice-chairman's statements were consistent with the policy response of Ottawa.

As the campaign neared its end, the chairman of the appeal emphasized the appeal's principal theme. In a series of letters in newspapers, he expressed his disappointment²⁰ that, with five days

to go before the end of its fund raising campaign, the coalition had received only \$800,000 in public contributions. He reiterated that the refugees were in desperate straits with practically nothing to wear with the coming of winter. He pointed out the sum collected amounted to an average of only four cents per Canadian: "Surely we cannot allow the price of about a quarter of a cup of coffee to be the measure of our concern. Let's at least fill the cup and meet our objective." Disclaiming any political motivations, he noted that funds provided to that date had been used exclusively to send immediate relief supplies.²¹ The chairman of C. A. P. R. thus made clear the apolitical nature of the fund raising objective.

C. A. P. R. representatives mentioned the response of the Canadian government only within the context of relief for the refugees in India. Their only demand was for an increase in the amount of aid and spokesmen alluded to public rather than official indifference. Coalition statements clearly concentrated on the question of fund raising and the necessity of increased contributions by individual Canadians. C. A. P. R. representatives therefore fully agreed with the broad policy outlines of the Canadian response to the Pakistan civil war.

B. Publications

The appeal's publications also reflected the organization's exclusive concentration on fund raising. Its press releases focussed on

the need for cash donations to relieve the plight of refugees, and never mentioned the civil war or the response of the Canadian government. The June 16 release announced the formation of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief "to alert the Canadian public to the situation's severity and to launch a combined appeal for its relief."²² Two days later, a release featured a report by a medical consultant to the League of Red Cross Societies that stressed the need for shipment of medicines. This report stated that Indian productive capacity could no longer meet the demands created by the outbreak of infectious diseases such as typhoid fever and cholera in the camps, illnesses which were due to deplorable sanitary conditions.²³ A July 9 release reported the evaluation of a recently returned pharmaceutical expert who depicted the miserable conditions of the camps.

Some refugees are sleeping in six to twelve inches of water . . . a man can stand just so long, then he must lie down. If he has no shelter and thousands of refugees do not, he lies down in water, mud, and filth because he simply cannot stand on his feet any longer. . . . The people are drinking filth, washing in filth, literally eating filth, for there is no other water.²⁴

He advised that since many items could be purchased locally, money was "a top priority."²⁵ The July 16 release noted that the funds of one of the relief coordinators in India had run out because of the arrival of another 40,000 refugees. It expressed the hope that Canadians would awaken "to the desperate need here."²⁶ In another

release that same day, the chairman of the campaign summed up the overall emphasis of their publications:

Many concerned Canadians have already responded generously to our appeal for funds, but the growing number of Pakistanis living in overcrowded camps and on the roadsides desperately need our help, and need it now. Money is urgently needed to provide the minimum amounts of food, medicines, clothing and shelter the refugees need to survive. We can afford to share what we have with those who are suffering. They can't afford to wait.²⁷

Thus the publications of C.A.P.R. provided information of deteriorating conditions in the refugee camps and created a growing sense of urgency. They provided no material, whatsoever, however, on the relief effort mounted by Canada and, consequently, did little to inform their public. On the contrary, they made no mention of the broader outlines of Canadian policy in a situation of escalating tension in South Asia.

C. Activities

The exclusive activity of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief was fund raising. The sole purpose of their activities was to "achieve a concerted fund raising effort on a nation-wide basis to provide the maximum possible assistance to the Pakistani people who have suffered so much from the recent tidal wave and civil unrest and have now fled into the border areas of India." To this end the organization sought "to alert the Canadian public to the situation's severity" so as to obtain their contributions for a non-political humanitarian objective, i.e., relief for the victims of the Pakistan civil

war.²⁸

The alliance received the major portion of its funds from direct individual contributions. The money collected was divided evenly amongst its members. The appeal raised a total of \$441,916 from three sources: direct contributions of \$336,068 (53.4%), \$105,848 (24%) through the constituent members (almost totally from Oxfam of Canada), and a cash grant of \$100,000 (22.6%) from the Canadian government.²⁹ The appeal disbursed cash grants of \$52,746 to each of its eight constituent members; the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, the Canadian Council of Churches, the Canadian Red Cross Society, the Canadian Save the Children Fund, the Canadian UNICEF Committee, CARE of Canada, Oxfam of Canada and World Vision of Canada. They also gave a cash grant of \$5,000 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Their expenses amounted to \$15,952.³⁰ The appeal thus served as a central fund raising agency which simply transferred the funds to the member organizations.

The appeal was aided in the organization of its activities by Canadian government personnel. Major General D.C. Spry of the Canadian International Development Agency, who was listed in the initial publicity releases as a representative of one of the organizations in the appeal,³¹ attended meetings "to bring information from Ottawa and keep Ottawa informed of the workings of the group."³² Equally important, the national coordinator of the appeal was a civil servant on loan from the government. Mr. George Pirie from the

Department of National Health and Welfare, coordinated the first half of the appeal.³³ Lieutenant Colonel Walter Dabros, from the Department of National Defence replaced him for the remainder of the drive on half-salary from Ottawa.³⁴ At the termination of the appeal's activities, the chairman wrote to the Minister for External Affairs to express his appreciation for: "the support of the Government of Canada and, particularly, the way friendly and productive co-operation . . . had been accorded us by C.I.D.A., the Department of National Defence, Department of National Health and Welfare and the Department of National Revenue."³⁵ Thus the appeal had close and intimate organizational as well as financial links with the Canadian government.

The appeal confined its efforts to fund raising and avoided 'political' comment. The section of the Appeal's Procedural Guidelines that dealt with "Why Are There Refugees?" explained that "a period of intense civil unrest" had led "to a mass exodus of refugees into the Indian border areas."³⁶ A reporter questioned the fact that the name Bangladesh was never mentioned officially at a Montreal press conference that was held to launch the appeal. A representative acknowledged that there was "a delicate side to the situation," given the "problems which one saw only a little while ago in Biafra/Nigeria." He stated that the appeal preferred to concentrate on the humanitarian aspects leaving the politicians to deal with the political causes.³⁷ At the July 14 meeting of the organization, the public

relations coordinator reported that his agency would attempt to "personalize" a Reuter article to be used for publicity. As it stood, the article was "too political." Thus the appeal self-consciously confined its efforts to fund raising and so avoided any possibility of conflict with the policies of the Canadian government.

Coalition members limited the time period of the appeal from its commencement in mid-June to the end of August because they did not wish to interfere with their normal year-round operations. When the prolongation of the appeal was discussed at a mid-August meeting, Oxfam's representative argued that his organization had planned on the basis of an emergency operation of ten weeks to three months. As a result, he noted that appeal arrangements with the banks were to end on August 31 and Oxfam's normal fall campaign would start in September.³⁹ Thus he emphasized that Oxfam had established its priorities and, as a consequence, was locked into a three-month time phase for the appeal. Mr. Marshall of CANSAVE stated that the closing date of August 31 had been established because all or most of the agencies would become involved in their normal fall activities in September. He was inclined to agree with Oxfam that they could not prolong the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief indefinitely, though he did ask if there might be a compromise in order to take advantage of the last week before Labour Day, as this was the normal time when people came home from vacations. He suggested that a blitz campaign might continue from August 24 to September 7.⁴⁰ All other

agency representatives agreed that the campaign should officially end on August 31, but that an extra effort should be made to try to reach their goal and that any projects which were underway should be carried to conclusion.⁴¹ Thus the participating agencies refused to sacrifice a significant part of their regular institutional activities to the emergency campaign.

Moreover, cooperation on the provincial and local levels was limited despite an agreement to urge and encourage representatives to coordinate or combine their activities. An improvement in coordination to avoid duplication had been one of the principal motivating factors for a combined appeal.⁴² At the July 7 meeting a group representative put forward a suggestion to speed up the process of local coordination by having the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief name a specific agency at each local level to act as a "convenor" to bring the agencies together to form local committees and to appoint coordinators. After discussion, the representatives decided that such a procedure was impractical due to the organizational differences among various agencies. It was agreed that all agencies would again urgently request their local representatives to invite other agencies to form local appeal committees.⁴³ At that date, the appeal did not have a coordinating committee in Toronto to ensure greater cooperation. The groups were therefore unable to achieve effective working arrangements below the national level.

The national coordinator listed examples of deliberate non-cooperation, stating that Hamilton and London were "cases in point."⁴⁴

He noted that even where local Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief committees were established, such as Halifax and Winnipeg, some individual agency publicity for Pakistani refugees continued. The coordinator stated:

I cannot be convinced that it takes less effort to solicit one hundred sponsors for a newspaper ad in London than to telephone six representatives of participating agencies to form a local committee. But such an initiative will not be undertaken unless co-operation exists at and is directed from the national level.⁴⁵

Thus the agencies were unable to cooperate in the joint ventures of fund raising. Coordination was more apparent than real.

In fact, the apparent concurrence on the appeal's objectives concealed ongoing friction at the national level between constituent members. Still smarting over the question of combined memberships, church representatives were critical of the operational style of the voluntary agencies, both centrally and in the field. Church representatives felt that some of the voluntary agencies were obsessively concerned with individual publicity because of their need to have "success stories," in contrast with church groups which emphasized "the total group."⁴⁶ As a consequence "little tensions" arose when they caught voluntary agency signs in a group photo. They noted that church representatives did not stay at "hotels at 20 dollars a day."⁴⁷ Thus underlying tensions existed between church and voluntary agen-

cies' representatives within the appeal.

The main strains throughout the appeal, however, focussed on the relationship between Oxfam and the other members. An incident just prior to the commencement of the campaign was indicative of that tense relationship. A Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief representative in Montreal telephoned Oxfam headquarters in Montreal to discuss the fact that Oxfam had obtained a permit from the City of Montreal to collect money for their campaign and as a result the City refused to issue another permit to the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief. An Oxfam representative replied that General Winch and the Red Cross knew nothing of what was going on and what was needed, that "only one group was doing something and that was Oxfam." The Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief representative in turn responded that Oxfam had joined a combined appeal and suggested that contact be made with Oxfam's Toronto branch to find out what was going on.⁴⁸ The tone of the interaction was characteristic of inter-agency cooperation throughout the short life of coalition.

Participating members raised questions about Oxfam's degree of commitment to the appeal. Arguments surfaced over Oxfam newspaper advertisements that either made no reference to the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief or placed the main emphasis on Oxfam. The chairman, who was the head of the Canadian Red Cross Society, and the heads of the Canadian UNICEF Committee and CANSAVE stated that the ads were in conflict with the spirit of the appeal.⁴⁹

In reply, Oxfam's representative explained that it was difficult to redirect the enthusiasm of their local groups from Oxfam to the combined undertaking since they had organized fund raising prior to the creation of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief. When the validity of this premise was challenged by the representative of CANSAVE, Mr. Tubman of Oxfam of Canada stated that if such co-operative endeavours were to impede their fund raising at any point their paths would "split."⁵⁰ This suggestion of "a saw-off point" evoked a rebuttal by both the representative of CANSAVE and the chairman that all agencies were expected to cooperate fully at all levels.⁵¹ Member organizations clashed over the minimal level of cooperation needed for the organization's fund-raising efforts.

A related but distinct conflict between Oxfam and the other members developed over the policy the appeal should adopt with reference to the political aspects of the situation. While Oxfam preferred more active comment, most members shared the UNICEF's emphasis on "a quieter approach."⁵² Division was evident when members considered a report by Mr. Shea of Oxfam, Mr. Marshall of CANSAVE and Dr. Mackay of the Canadian Council of Churches on a briefing session given them in Ottawa by Mr. James George, Canadian High Commissioner to India. At the general meeting of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief on July 29, 1971 the minutes reported that:

... all three expressed disappointment about the somewhat negative attitude which Mr. George had toward the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief and its ability to produce assistance. Mr. George stressed to them that

the Indian government was the main operating and co-ordinating body in the provision of assistance to the refugees and he had indicated moreover that, the emphasis for providing assistance would be from the Canadian Government to the Indian government. It was apparent to them that Mr. George was very careful in his remarks and did not give the frank appraisal of the situation that those attending the briefing had hoped for.⁵³

The chairman of the Combined Appeal, Major General Wrinch of the Red Cross, stated that he understood the attitude of the Canadian government on the issue of bilateral relations between governments. The entire relief operation was under the direct control of the government of India and the state governments involved. He stated that these governments were supplying the bulk of the assistance to the refugees and "the political implications were gigantic."⁵⁴

However, at the next meeting the report on the meeting was considerably amended to read as follows: Mr. Shea of Oxfam reported that he was disappointed in the negative attitude which Mr. George had toward the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief and its ability to produce assistance. He said that Mr. George had stressed that the Indian government was the main operating and coordinating body in the provision of assistance to the refugees and he indicated that assistance would flow principally from the Canadian government to that of India.⁵⁵ Mr. Marshall (CANSERVE) stated that while he agreed with most of Mr. Shea's report, he did not share the same negative estimate of Mr. George's remarks about the role of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief.⁵⁶ He had not detected any

feeling that the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief was not a useful effort.⁵⁷ Thus two of the three members attempted to reduce potential disagreement with the Canadian government.

Oxfam became increasingly disturbed by the attitudes of its fellow members and even considered a unilateral departure from the organization. In July, Oxfam sent a memo to its officers that listed four possible alternatives with reference to the "elephant":

- 1) They buy us out for \$100,000.
- 2) We buy out the others and run the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief.
- 3) We run our own campaign in certain undefined fields not being tapped by the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief.
- 4) We withdraw from the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief.⁵⁸

Dissatisfied and frustrated by inter-organizational conflict, the founding agency considered withdrawal even though the departure would have severely crippled if not destroyed the coalition.

As a result the appeal's national director, Walter G. Dabros, felt that the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief was never a "truly" combined co-ordinated and co-operative effort [based upon] results achieved for efforts expended."⁵⁹ He noted that a review of the minutes of the committee meetings clearly revealed that:

... each preceding meeting was only marginally productive because each succeeding meeting necessitated a rehash of the same problems, the same emotional pleas for understanding, the same evasive replies with qualifications regarding cooperation and the same summation (no offence intended), 'the discussion was useful'... the discussion may have been useful but it did not achieve the essential results—final solution of the

procedural wrangles so that the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief can direct its energies to its 'raison d'être', fund raising.⁶⁰

Secondly, he pointed out that the appeal had received only \$16,500 of the total amount raised by mid-August because the organizations had deliberately encouraged contributions to a choice of several institutions with the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief "appearing almost as an afterthought."⁶¹ This approach to the appeal, in his estimation, had tended to dissipate the combined advantages to affect adversely the success of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief and to create "major problems" in the area of cooperation:

Based on information available, the decision to launch the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief was a good one. Unfortunately it is now apparent that the information available was inadequate and incomplete, so the launching of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief in its present form becomes a bad decision. I am not suggesting that anyone had dishonorable intentions, deliberately withheld information to deceive or that their integrity and sincerity are questionable.... The fact remains however, that the intensity of already launched individual campaigns was played down and misrepresented to the initial meeting with the result that the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief was born on a false premise. Just as a fib moves through a 'little white lie' to a Big Lie in order to maintain credibility of the first fib so also does the base of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief become more hollow and cooperation more distant with each anemic justification (more emotional and evasive than the last) of the sins of non-cooperation committed by field representatives probably in all innocence because they have not been told otherwise.⁶²

Thus the activities of the coalition were undermined and dissipated by dissension and misunderstanding. The financial consequences were

considerable and the results disappointing. Disagreement over organizational priorities and purposes weakened the capacity of a combined effort to coordinate the policies of its constituents. Already emasculated organizationally, the appeal avoided any political statements which could further jeopardize its fund raising enterprise.

D. Summary

The Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief chose to confine their response to fund raising and assiduously avoided any partisan political stance concerning the Pakistan civil war. Statements and publications focussed on the urgency of cash donations to relieve the appalling conditions of the refugees. Members did not discuss publicly any aspect of Canadian policy in the civil war other than the dispatch of aid to India. Given the monetary and organizational assistance of the Canadian government as well as the presence of government personnel it is not surprising that the appeal chose the safety of silence and passively supported official policy.

If political neutrality was the price of effective organization, the appeal nevertheless never became a truly combined, coordinated and cooperative effort. Member groups were able to function together at the national level only on a limited basis; at the provincial and local levels they deliberately chose not to work together if they had to submerge individual organizational identities. They could agree only on the time span of their commitment to the appeal in order to

avoid interfering with their normal year-round operations. Members of the appeal apparently were too preoccupied with the politics of relief to consider and comment on the policies of the Canadian government.

In retrospect, the main organizational objective of the appeal's activities appears to have been to project an image of unity to the Canadian public and to the government. Representatives of the nine major organizations were not willing to work together "to alleviate this desperate situation [while] eliminating duplication and competition to keep administrative costs to an absolute minimum."⁶³ They did not consider whether in a disaster situation the more effective way to collect and disburse relief aid was through a single highly organized and experienced agency rather than through a profusion of groups. They made no attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of their individual relief efforts or the appropriateness of the Canadian government's response. Nor did they examine the underlying causes of the outflow of East Pakistanis or the regional and global context of the escalating conflict. Their strategy was designed solely to promote individual donations by a public already inundated by similar charitable appeals.

Thus, even in the face of what they described as "the greatest tragedy of the century,"⁶⁴ members of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief were unable to transcend the vested interests of their individual organizations. The appeal was riven with internecine factionalism as each of the members jockeyed to protect or advance their

own institutional interests and to impede those of rivals. The scholarly literature has suggested that the lowest common denominator in a broad based coalition of non-governmental organizations would be the collection of funds in a non-political context. In fact, members demonstrated by their continuous and serious divisions that the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief operated on an even lower level of agreement. It served only as "... a good vehicle for acquiring public credibility for individual agencies." 65

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¹Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Minutes of Meeting, May 25, 1972: 18th.

²Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Document, W.J. Dabros, National Coordinator, "Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Problems and Recommendations," Ibid. Mr. Dabros was the National Coordinator for the second half of the appeal. Though undated, given the amount of contributions listed, it was probably written during the third week of August.

The Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief is hereinafter referred to as: C.A.P.R.

³South Asia Crisis Committee, Publication, newspaper, untitled, December 17, 1971.

Oxfam of Canada, Minutes of Meeting, December 7, 1971: Administrative Committee meeting. The core of the group numbered no more than six persons.

⁴Ibid. Though the group tried to establish a formal link with Oxfam of Canada, the administrative committee decided against any such relationship.

⁵Canadian Committee for an Independent Bangladesh, personal interview with C.K. Kalevar, November 5 and 28, 1971.

⁶Ibid. These included letters in The Globe and Mail, July 14, 1971; The Toronto Star, July 20, 1971; The Globe and Mail, August 7, 1971; The Globe and Mail, August 26, 1971; The Toronto Star, December 6, 1971.

Since the leader attributed Ottawa's support of the Pakistani government to Canadian decision-makers' obsession with separatism in Quebec, he felt that it was imperative to differentiate the situation in East Pakistan from that of Quebec:

1. Geographically, Bangla Desh is not an integral part of West Pakistan as Quebec is of Canada.
2. Democratically, Bangla Desh has the majority of population and thus cannot be accused of separatism.
3. Electorally, the Awami League obtained 167 seats out of 169 seats in Bangla Desh, a convincing mandate by any standards.
4. Historically, in spite of the fact that Bengalis form the majority, no head of state of Pakistan has been

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a Bengali, while frequently a French Canadian has ruled Canada.

5. Economically speaking, Quebec has gained from the Canadian federal government while Bangla Desh has been exploited by West Pakistan."

(The Toronto Star, July 30, 1971.)

The only other activity of the group was a combined project with the South Asia Crisis Committee in which a simulated refugee camp was erected in Nathan Phillips Square in Toronto. A number of tents were pitched in the South West corner and simulated refugees camped in them. Some sewer pipes and oil drains served as illustrations of typical shelters. Blowups depicting life in the camps in India were also displayed and a C.T.V. news documentary "The Seed of War," shot at Indian refugee camps, was shown. Speakers who had visited the camps were on hand to give their impressions to the public. The objective of the project was "to bring the problem dramatically before the Canadian people." (Canadian India Times, November 4, 1971.)

⁷Bangladesh Association of Canada, personal interview with Sadat Kazi, July 2, 1974.

⁸ibid.

⁹ibid. On March 27, 1971 fifty members paraded in Toronto in front of a building where one hundred persons from West Pakistan were holding a meeting to celebrate Pakistan Republic Day (The Globe and Mail, March 24, 1971). On July 19, one hundred members clashed with a much larger group of the Pakistani Solidarity Committee in Toronto. (The Canadian India Times, August 15, 1971.) On July 21 about fifteen members demonstrated outside the National Press Building in Ottawa where a press conference by two Pakistani journalists was being held. (The Globe and Mail, July 22, 1971.)

The Quebec chapter, the most active of the association's branches, did undertake a special campaign against the dispatch of Canadian military supplies on the ship, the Padma (see pp. 89-90) that included telegrams to the government and the four political parties as well as a demonstration in Montreal.

¹⁰C.A.P.R., Minutes of Meetings, June 11, 1971 - re: Representatives of National Agencies and Organizations Discussion of a Co-ordinated Appeal for Pakistani Relief, p. 1.

¹¹ibid., p. 2; C.A.P.R., Procedural Guidelines, n.a., n.d., pp. 1-2.

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¹²Oxfam of Canada, Minutes of Meeting, May 6, 1971: Meeting of Voluntary Agency Representatives.

¹³C.A.P.R., Minutes of Meeting, June 3, 1971 - re: Cooperative Fund Raising in Times of Disaster Overseas, pp. 1-5.

¹⁴The Canadian Council of Churches, personal interview with Dr. Floyd Honey, November 6, 1975.

¹⁵C.A.P.R., Minutes of Meeting, June 23, 1971, pp. 3-4.

¹⁶C.A.P.R., letter from W.J. Dabros, National Coordinator, to Daniel Zehr, Mennonite Central Committee (Canada), July 15, 1971.

The Mennonites, letter from Daniel Zehr, Executive Secretary, Mennonite Central Committee (Canada), to W.J. Dabros, National Coordinator, C.A.P.R., August 19, 1971.

¹⁷The Globe and Mail, June 17, 1971; The Toronto Star, June 17, 1971.

¹⁸The Edmonton Journal, August 9, 1971; The Province, August 6, 1971.

¹⁹The Montreal Star, August 3, 1971; Montréal Matin, August 3, 1971.

²⁰The Montreal Star, August 26, 1971.
The Anglican Church of Canada, Canadian Churchman, 98, No. 8 (September, 1971), p. 11.

²¹Ibid.

²²C.A.P.R., Press Release, June 16, 1971 (1).

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., July 9, 1971 (1).

²⁵Ibid.

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²⁶Ibid., July 16, 1971 (1).

²⁷Ibid., (2).

²⁸C. A. P. R., Procedural Guidelines, n. a., n. d., p. 1.

²⁹C. A. P. R., Statement of Receipts and Disbursements from Commencement of the Fund on June 17, 1971 to March 31, 1972; C. A. P. R., Statement of Receipts and Disbursements, April 1, 1972 to March 2, 1973; C. A. P. R., Report of Contributions for the Period May 24, 1972 to June 28, 1972.

This was composed of \$103,398.55 from Oxfam - 97.7%; \$195.00 from CARE - .2%; \$815.00 from C. C. O. D. P. - .8%; \$1,389.86 from World Vision - 1.3%; \$50.00 from UNICEF - less than .01%.

³⁰Ibid. In mid 1972, after the Canadian recognition of Bangladesh, \$5,245.77 was disbursed to each of the constituent members.

³¹C. A. P. R., Document, unsigned, "Organization Representatives," undated.

³²C. A. P. R., Minutes of Meeting, June 3, 1971 - re: Cooperative Fund Raising in Time of Disaster Overseas, p. 4.

³³Canada, Department of National Health and Welfare, letter from John Munro, Minister for National Health and Welfare to Major General Arthur E. Wrinch, Chairman of C. A. P. R., September 1, 1971.

³⁴Canada, Department of National Defence, letter from Donald S. Macdonald, Minister for National Defence to Major General Arthur E. Wrinch, Chairman of C. A. P. R., July 14, 1971.

³⁵C. A. P. R., letter from Major General Arthur E. Wrinch, Chairman, to Mitchell Sharp, Minister for External Affairs, September 28, 1971.

³⁶C. A. P. R., Procedural Guidelines, n. a., n. d., p. 6.

³⁷Le Devoir, June 17, 1971.

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³⁸C.A.P.R., Minutes of Meeting, July 14, 1971: 6th, p. 5.

³⁹C.A.P.R., Minutes of Meeting, August 12, 1971: 8th, p. 7.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²C.A.P.R., Procedural Guidelines, n.a., n.d., pp. 1-4.

⁴³C.A.P.R., Minutes of Meeting, July 7, 1971: 5th, pp. 5, 7.

⁴⁴C.A.P.R., Document, W. J. Dabros, National Coordinator, "Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Problems and Recommendations," n.d., p. 3.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Canadian Council of Churches, personal interview with Dr. Eion Mackay, November 28, 1975.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸C.A.P.R., Document, unsigned, "Notes on a Telephone Call from Mrs. Marguerite Wilson, June 14, 1971, 12:30 P.M.," n.a.

⁴⁹C.A.P.R., Minutes of Meeting, June 29, 1971: 4th, p. 13; Minutes of Meeting, July 14, 1971: 6th, p. 5.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²The Canadian Council of Churches, personal interview with Dr. Floyd Honey, November 6, 1975.

⁵³C.A.P.R., Minutes of Meeting, July 29, 1971: 7th, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁴Ibid.

(Footnotes - Chap. V)

⁵⁵C. A. P. R., Minutes of Meeting, August 12, 1971: 8th, pp. 1-2;

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Oxfam of Canada, Memo to the Officers and Staff, unsigned, July 20, 1971 - re: Pakistan disaster.

⁵⁹C. A. P. R., Document, W. J. Dabros, National Coordinator, "Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Problems and Recommendations," n.d., p. 1.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., p. 2.

⁶³C. A. P. R., Document, "Procedural Guidelines, n.a., n.d., pp. 1, 6.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵C. A. P. R., Document, W. J. Dabros, National Coordinator, "Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, Problems and Recommendations," n.d., p. 3.

CHAPTER VI

THE RESPONSE OF CANADIAN NEWSPAPERS

Canada's policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of other nations is strained—whatever Ottawa does—when civil war or rebellion breaks out in a friendly country. To continue normal relations, including trade and aid, is in effect to support the regime that stands for the status quo. To recognize or even to feed a rebellious or breakaway province will be interpreted as backing its claims.

(The Toronto Star, April 14, 1971.)

There is very little that a country like Canada, a very modest power in the community of international politics can do to ameliorate the calamity in Pakistan. We are neither rich enough nor strong enough to bring any effective pressure to bear on events in that troubled country.

(The Globe and Mail, July 16, 1971.)

The Canadian public received very little information from the agencies and groups active in fund raising. Neither church groups nor voluntary agencies provided a flow of information which the interested public could use to evaluate government policy. A major source of information and education, however, was newspapers across the country.¹ They were an obvious resource if an informed and critical public were to consider any aspect of government policy. Newspaper comment could not only inform but also establish a broad political context for the operations and activities of voluntary associations and for the conduct and content of Canadian foreign policy. Government leaders and voluntary associations turned to the public for support of

their definition of the issues. Newspapers (given the absence of alternative sources of information and evaluation), in their reports and editorials, were the sole sources available to the public. The quality of their coverage and comment would be critical in the creation of an educated public.²

Canadian newspapers showed considerable editorial interest in Canada's foreign policy response to the Pakistan civil war. One of the seventeen newspapers surveyed, Le Devoir, focussed more than 50% of its editorials on the actions of the Canadian government. Six newspapers (La Presse,³ Montréal Matin, The Gazette, The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star and The Vancouver Sun) devoted between 27% and 37% of their editorial coverage to Canadian policy. Four newspapers (The Telegraph Journal, Le Soleil, The Montreal Star and The Ottawa Citizen) had almost 11%. Six newspapers (The Evening Telegram, The Chronicle Herald, Le Droit, The Winnipeg Free Press, The Star Phoenix and The Edmonton Journal) had none. When the definition of relevant editorials is expanded to include simply a reference to the Canadian response, five newspapers (The Chronicle Herald, The Telegraph Journal, Le Soleil, Montréal Matin and The Montreal Star) had between 30% and 40%. Thus newspaper editorials provided the Canadian public the necessary comment to form an educated opinion about the response of the Canadian government to the Pakistan civil war (see Table 6:1).

TABLE 6:1

Pakistan Civil War Editorials

	No. on Pakistan Civil War	Focus on Canadian Foreign Policy	Mention of Canadian Foreign Policy	References to Canadian Foreign Policy
Evening Telegram	14	0 (0%)	1 (7.1%)	1 (7.1%)
Chronicle Herald	7	0 (0%)	3 (42.8%)	3 (42.8%)
Telegraph Journal	11	1 (9%)	3 (27.3%)	4 (36.3%)
Le Soleil	19	2 (10.5%)	5 (26.3%)	7 (36.8%)
Le Devoir	12	7 (58.3%)	3 (25%)	10 (83.3%)
La Presse	16	5 (31.3%)	6 (37.5%)	11 (68.8%)
Montréal Matin	3	1 (33.3%)	9 (0%)	1 (33.3%)
Le Droit	7	0 (0%)	4 (57.1%)	4 (57.1%)
Gazette	15	5 (33.3%)	5 (33.3%)	10 (66.6%)
Montreal Star	22	2 (9.1%)	7 (31.8%)	9 (40.9%)
Ottawa Citizen	26	2 (19.7%)	11 (42.3%)	13 (50%)
Globe and Mail	19	7 (36.8%)	10 (52.6%)	17 (84.2%)
Toronto Star	15	4 (26.7%)	7 (46.7%)	11 (73.3%)
Winnipeg Free Press	8	0 (0%)	1 (12.5%)	1 (12.5%)
Star Phoenix	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)	2 (100%)
Edmonton Journal	3	0 (0%)	2 (66.7%)	2 (66.6%)
Vancouver Sun	14	4 (28.5%)	9 (64.3%)	13 (92.9%)
Total	213	40 (18.8%)	79 (37.1%)	119 (55.9%)

Generally, newspapers gave active or passive editorial sanction to the direction of Canadian foreign policy. Ten of the seventeen newspapers surveyed (The Chronicle Herald, The Telegraph Journal, Le Soleil, Montréal Matin, Le Droit, The Gazette, The Globe and Mail, The Winnipeg Free Press, the Saskatoon Star Phoenix and The Vancouver Sun) had mostly positive editorial evaluations of Canadian actions and of those, seven made no negative comments. The Gazette, The Globe and Mail and The Vancouver Sun were the only exceptions. Two newspapers, The Montreal Star and The Edmonton Journal, published an equal number of positive and critical comments while one newspaper, The Evening Telegram, made no editorial evaluations. Only four of the seventeen newspapers—Le Devoir, La Presse, The Ottawa Citizen and The Toronto Star—had more negative than positive editorial references to Canadian foreign policy. Thus the newspapers supplied the Canadian public with editorial guidance that was positive in its evaluation of the appropriateness of the Canadian response (see Table 6:2).

A. Areas of Support

An examination of the content of the favourable editorial comment revealed some diversity in detail, but rather little in substance. The areas of support for Canadian foreign policy included almost complete agreement on aid to the refugees in India with majority approval of the call for the restoration of democratic civil-

TABLE 6:2

Editorial Evaluations of Canadian Foreign Policy

	References to Canadian Foreign Policy	Positive Evaluations	Negative Evaluations
Evening Telegram	1	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Chronicle Herald	3	2 (66.6%)	0 (0%)
Telegraph Journal	4	3 (75%)	0 (0%)
Le Soleil	7	4 (55.5%)	0 (0%)
Le Devoir	10	2 (20%)	8 (80%)
La Presse	11	3 (27.3%)	5 (45.5%)
Montréal Matin	1	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
Le Droit	4	3 (75%)	0 (0%)
Gazette	10	8 (80%)	2 (20%)
Montreal Star	9	4 (44.4%)	4 (44.4%)
Ottawa Citizen	13	4 (30.6%)	6 (46.1%)
Globe and Mail	17	10 (58.8%)	5 (29.4%)
Toronto Star	11	3 (27.2%)	7 (63.6%)
Winnipeg Free Press	1	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
Star Phoenix	2	1 (50%)	0 (0%)
Edmonton Journal	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
Vancouver Sun	13	5 (38.5%)	4 (30.6%)
Total	119	55 (46.2%)	42 (35.3%)

ian rule in Pakistan and the implementation of a military embargo. Some newspapers also endorsed the decision to delay immediate recognition of the new state of Bangladesh. Editorialists gave only scattered praise to other aspects of the Canadian response to the Pakistan civil war.

Some editorialists began by endorsing the initial Canadian decision not to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The Vancouver Sun (March 30) stated that:

Pakistan is a sovereign country and must settle its affairs its own way. This is the position Canada must take. We can only hope that peace will come as soon as possible, one way or other.

Both The Edmonton Journal (April 6) and The Montreal Gazette (April 16) felt that there was very little that any outside country or agency could or should do about the situation in East Pakistan, saying it was not possible "even to insist upon an end to bloodshed and humane treatment of the surviving losers." The Toronto Star (April 14) stated that:

Canada would indeed be foolish to start a diplomatic offensive against the Pakistanis, to express our disapproval by some action—like breaking off relations—which might be hard to undo later when calm is restored.

Le Droit castigated the proposals of opposition parties and interest groups that Canada take a stand. The June 14 editorial noted that:

Un député de l'opposition M. Heath Macquarrie qui paraissait d'avantage animé de soucis électoraux que de compassion pour les pauvres... a rudement apostrophé le premier ministre pour n'avoir pas la solu-

tion à présenter en vue du règlement du conflit pakistanaï. Cette attitude irréfléchie... implique une intervention du Canada dans les affaires d'autrui. Elle serait déraisonnable que si l'Inde ou le Pakistan se mêlât de donner au Canada des conseils pour le règlement des problèmes qui peuvent exister entre le fédéral et les provinces canadiennes.

while the July 21 editorial stated:

Des groupes de pression sont toujours prêts à pousser le Canada dans des aventures qui ne sont pas les siennes. Qu'on se rappelle les débats acrimonieux qui se sont livrés aux Communes sur le Biafra. Les agitateurs de service sont toujours à l'oeuvre, et le ministre des affaires extérieures a toutes les raisons de se montrer prudent dans ses propos comme dans ses actes. Il eût été préférable que les délégués canadiens au cours de leur voyage aient observé la même discrétion que le ministre. Quelques-uns se sont fourboyés en abordant l'aspect politique d'un problème d'une extrême complexité alors que seul l'aspect humanitaire doit nous préoccuper.

Canada's policy of non-interference received substantial editorial support during the first stages of the Pakistan civil war.

Nonetheless many newspaper editorialists approved the call by the Minister for External Affairs for a political settlement in East Pakistan and in particular his speech on that subject in the House of Commons on June 16. Both the editorials in The Ottawa Citizen and Le Soleil (June 9) stated that the international community needed "non seulement de porter des secours immédiats aux réfugiés bengalis en Inde, mais de favoriser le rétablissement d'une situation normale au Pakistan oriental, de même que l'intégration rapide des millions de réfugiés en Inde provenant du Pakistan oriental." The Telegraph Journal (June 18) thought that the Minister's view was "widely shared

among governments and supporters of democracy throughout the world." The editorials of The Ottawa Citizen (June 18), The Winnipeg Free Press (June 18) and The Vancouver Sun (June 19) expressed the view that there should be general satisfaction because Mr. Sharp had voiced "the feelings of Canadians on the subject"—in a speech that "hit the nail on the head." Le Soleil (July 14) reflected the view of most of the nation's press that the minister's proposal was a middle of the road solution that would not satisfy the two sides in the civil war, but was the only possible compromise plan. Thus many editorialists agreed with the government's decision to modify its policy of diplomatic support for the Pakistan government.

The newspapers justified approval for Canadian diplomatic interference in Pakistan's internal affairs because of the possible escalation of the civil war to international conflict and the strong possibility of genocide. The Ottawa Citizen (June 15) noted that the Pakistan government was not only seeking outside economic aid which could be used to strengthen its oppression in the eastern wing but, by its policies, it was responsible for six million refugees in India. The exodus might well cause a regional "explosion." The Montreal Star (June 18) remarked that the Minister's statement had indeed ended

... the old evasive policy loosely labelled as non-interference in the internal conflicts of another country. The fact is that so-called internal conflicts often refuse to confine themselves to fixed frontiers ... the whole subcontinent is in danger of violent con-

frontation.

This is the practical approach which alone can justify the decision . . . but beyond it is a factor of at least equal importance drawing on moral and humanitarian considerations. The Pakistani regime is practising genocide.

Thus the newspapers rationalized the government's violation of its previous commitment to non-interference, a cornerstone of its past diplomatic policy.

Editorialists applauded the Prime Minister's plea for the life of Sheik Mujibur Rahman because, as The Toronto Star (August 12) argued, if the Sheik were executed "one of the last hopes for avoiding a war between India and Pakistan will have been lost." The Vancouver Sun (August 14) stated that "decent opinion is at one with Prime Minister Trudeau in his appeal" while the Globe and Mail (August 14) noted that:

If ever there was time for restraint by Pakistan President Yahya Khan it is now. . . .

For this reason Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's request that the West Pakistanis show mercy toward Sheik Mujibur should be emulated by every country in the world, and especially by those like Canada which are providing aid of any kind to the unreasoning government of President Yahya.

La Presse (August 18) felt that the Canadian intervention had played an important role:

On ne peut certes pas assurer que c'est l'intervention du premier ministre Trudeau qui a convaincu les autorités pakistanaises d'ajourner le procès du leader bengali mais il n'est pas défendu de penser qu'elle y a contribué.

The newspapers therefore sanctioned a second diplomatic intervention by Ottawa in the civil war.

Editorialists praised the dispatch of relief to East Pakistan refugees in the border states of India both because of the plight of the displaced and because of the growing danger of regional war.

The Vancouver Sun (December 7) stated that despite "Canada's poor showing in international aid statistics, this country's crash program to help the East Pakistan refugee problem has been generous, applauded by all parties . . . and undoubtedly by all Canadians." The Toronto Star (December 7) commented that "Canada had not been . . . niggardly in its response." The Chronicle Herald (June 9) and Le Droit (June 14) felt there could be no political objections to the dispatch of relief since, as the latter stated (July 21), the only form of intervention required of Canadians was the provision of medical and food aid. In addition to the humanitarian aspect, The Montreal Star (October 7) felt the relief could "cut down on the chance Pakistan and India will be pushed into war." The Globe and Mail (May 24) also pointed to the danger of an Indo-Pakistan conflict provoked by a violent uprising in West Bengal that would profit "neither Canada nor the world." As a result the Toronto Star (May 31) stated that any diplomacy to prevent such an occurrence was "likely to be most persuasive if accompanied by an international program for the refugees." The newspapers thus lauded the general Canadian economic response to the civil war.

Newspaper editorialists agreed with the insistence of Canadian authorities upon international supervision of relief for Pakistan.

Though The Globe and Mail (May 24) suggested that Canada give more food as relief assistance to a fellow member of the Commonwealth, it as well as La Presse (June 6) recognized the necessity of United Nations involvement in the relief process "to make sure that most of the aid reaches its proper destination," and "not be used as a tool of suppression." The Edmonton Journal (June 26) was even more precise:

Donor nations must also insist that distribution of aid is the responsibility of neutral international agencies such as the Red Cross, its equivalent or an organization of the United Nations. The West Pakistani army can, for obvious reasons, not be entrusted with this task.

The newspapers therefore favoured the government's insistence on proper supervision of the flow of relief to Pakistan.

One newspaper did give editorial approval to a related decision by Canada to allow the continuation of development assistance to Pakistan. The Gazette (July 16) was the sole newspaper to unequivocally support the dispatch of development assistance:

Surely Heath Macquarrie, the Conservative Member . . . spoke for a majority of concerned Canadians when he expressed the view that aid to Pakistan should not be discontinued because of the events in East Pakistan. . . .

It seems to be a poor principle that says aid must go only to countries whose governments and armies meet certain standards of behavior.

It is when conditions are at their worst that outside help, moral and material, is of its greatest value. The willingness to help need not imply the slightest degree of approval.

The newspaper therefore supported the government's decision not to impose immediate economic sanctions on the Pakistan government.

Newspaper editorialists acclaimed the government's decision to impose a military embargo on Pakistan. The Globe and Mail (July 2) noted:

There was a time when scribblings on a contract were much akin to Holy Writ. . . .

Thank goodness that is no longer the case. At least not as far as Canada is concerned. In placing a hold order on those forty-six crates of jet fighter parts bound for Pakistan, the authorities in Ottawa have recognized a duty above commercial self-interest . . . this country will not be a party to any transactions that could further exacerbate Pakistan's difficulties.

Le Devoir (June 30 and July 9) and Montréal Matin (July 1) gave their approval. Montréal Matin argued:

Mais pour nous, simples citoyens qui sommes plus du côté de l'Oxfam que du côté des états-majors, il semble tout simple que nous ne nous fassions pas les complices des oeuvres de mort. . . . Notre bonne conscience doit aller plus loin que le chèque à la Croix-Rouge. Nous voulons bien payer les médicaments, mais au moins que l'on n'exporte pas aussi les armes qui créent des malheurs que nous essayons de soulager.

The Montreal Star (July 2) traced the embargo to public pressure:

Why the ban on Pakistan. . . ? Last year we were busy shipping military weapons and aircraft engines and parts to the Sudan where there has been a particularly brutal civil war going on for several years.

The answer is . . . that there was no public outcry over the men, women and children who were being butchered in the Sudan while there was a great deal of protest over those who are dying in East Pakistan. . . . noise surely should not be the determining factor in such matters. Unfortunately, it seems to be, with our men in Ottawa.

In contrast, The Ottawa Citizen (July 9) attributed the decision of the Canadian authorities to their interest in a peaceful solution to the

civil conflict:

Canada has acted from considerations of humanitarianism by blocking arms shipments to Pakistan for as long as that country is in a state of turmoil.

Canada does not want to be a party to military repression in Pakistan which it would be if it sold arms to the military government that would be used to suppress the majority of the country's population.

This does not mean that we are siding with India against Pakistan or that we are interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and a friendly one. It does mean that we do not wish to assist, even indirectly, military repression. It remains this country's belief that the use of force cannot solve Pakistan's problems. Only a political solution can.

There was general agreement with the evaluation of Le Droit (July 21):

"Personne ne peut jeter la pierre au Canada pour avoir interdit l'expédition d'armes au Pakistan." Newspapers across the country were in complete agreement with the Canadian military response to the civil war.

In November, some newspapers echoed the reservations of the Minister for External Affairs about the feasibility of any Canadian initiative to prevent the outbreak of a regional war. Le Soleil (November 11) stated that only Pakistan and India could solve their problems. The Telegraph Journal (November 25) observed that there was no practical role for an outsider given the growing strain between the two main antagonists. The Montreal Gazette (November 26) echoed Mr. Sharp by noting that:

It is obviously too late for mediation by smaller powers to have any chance of success, if indeed such a chance ever existed.

Only the joint efforts of the major powers can persuade India and Pakistan to end the fighting and to

bring at least the immediate causes of this conflict before the UN Security Council.

If there is any hope at all of averting prolonged bloodshed on a truly enormous scale, it is the ability of the major powers to see their common interest in trying to restore peace to the sub-continent and prevent it from becoming a Cold War theatre.

Editorial scepticism of the capacity of interested third parties to prevent escalation of the conflict to regional war coincided with that of policy makers in Ottawa. There was no disagreement among public and private opinion makers.

After the commencement of the Indo-Pakistan war, editorials supported the argument of the Minister for External Affairs that the best diplomatic alternative was a discussion of the situation in the Security Council of the United Nations. A Security Council debate should focus on discussion of the substance of a political settlement rather than on a fruitless apportionment of responsibility for hostilities. Le Devoir (December 6) reiterated the words of the Minister in its call for a quick and effective intervention by the United Nations through an immediate examination by the Security Council of the causes of the conflict. The Globe and Mail (December 8) noted that if the United Nations were to be effective, it would have to look beyond simple arrangements for a ceasefire and troop withdrawals to former lines and examine the underlying issues that had caused three wars. The Canadian delegate at the UN had proffered the same advice the previous day. The Telegraph Journal's (December 8) editorial also felt that "the logical place for U.N. action" was the Security

Council. The country's leading newspapers thus agreed with the government's evaluation that the best diplomatic response to the outbreak of war was consideration by the responsible United Nations' body.

In the aftermath of the war, editorial commentators voiced many of the conditions for Canadian participation in a UN peacekeeping force that the Minister for External Affairs had mentioned. Le Soleil (January 5, 1972) noted that a UN operation was only possible if the belligerents wished to cooperate. The Gazette (January 5, 1972) stated that a firm UN mandate to ensure "consistent backup support" was needed before Canada should agree to participate. The Vancouver Sun (January 5, 1972) recommended that:

Before Canada undertakes the job of peacekeeper it should insist not only on a clear definition of peacekeeping but also on the undertaking from other nations—especially Russia and China—that they will leave a clear field to the UN and its agents and also honor any financial assessments made upon them.

Above all, there must be a willingness on the part of the "host" countries to accept peacekeeping forces.

... who is to say that the humiliation of our troops in 1967 wouldn't be repeated?

The newspapers supported the government's reluctance to participate in peacekeeping under the auspices of the world organization.

Editorialists also agreed with the government's position that recognition of Bangladesh should be delayed because of uncertainty over the degree of internal control exercised by the new regime.

The Montreal Star (January 10, 1972) felt that the guidelines established by the British Prime Minister for recognition—the withdrawal of Indian forces and clear control by Bengalis of their own territory—

were as good as any. The Ottawa Citizen (December 17, 1971) contended that Bangladesh should win recognition only when the new authorities protected the non-Bengalis against mob vengeance for their support of the Pakistan central government. The Gazette (January 17, 1972) recommended that the government resist pressure for quick recognition to offset the new state's dependence upon Russian aid because "aid does not wait on recognition. It waits upon the restoration of the facilities, including an established government through which it can be distributed." Editorialists generally approved the government's measured diplomatic response to the emergence of a new state.

The Globe and Mail in particular voiced many of the same concerns about the role of the Indian army expressed by Canadian decision-makers. An editorial on December 22 stated that the world had a responsibility to determine that Bangladesh represented "the true will" of the Bengali people and then, if so, to ensure that its independence was "genuine." The January 12, 1972 editorial emphasized that

Canada need not and should not decide the question of recognition at least until the Indian forces have been withdrawn from Bangladesh, and perhaps until the government of Pakistan has acquiesced in the loss of its territory.

We have no major interests that can be served better than by strict impartiality in the tragic quarrel between India and Pakistan. Recognition now would amount to a salute for India's victory, and to some an endorsement of its future policy toward Pakistan which is still far from clear.

... Humanitarian relief need not depend on determination of the future of Bangladesh, which is a political issue still to be resolved.

The January 29 editorial entitled "Are the Indians Out?" reiterated the central Canadian objection that

... one obstacle to recognition remains. Bangladesh is still a country under occupation by a foreign army. Until the Indians have withdrawn, Bangladesh cannot be considered an independent sovereign state. It is at best an Indian protectorate.

Leading newspapers wholeheartedly supported Canadian diplomatic conditions for recognition of the independence of the former eastern half of Pakistan.

In summary, the editorialists directed their approbation primarily towards the diplomatic military and relief components of the government's response. Ottawa received sustained editorial support for the dispatch of relief to the refugees in India. A majority of the country's influential newspapers approved Canada's military policy and the diplomatic decision to delay recognition of Bangladesh. Over 50% of the leading editorialists supported Ottawa's diplomatic intervention and call for the restoration of democratic civilian rule in Pakistan. All other facets of Canadian policy were given only limited editorial assent (see Table 6:3).

The principal areas of editorial support were the dispatch of Canadian relief supplies for the refugees in India and the government's decision to impose a military embargo on Pakistan. All newspapers with the exception of The Telegraph Journal praised the Cana-

TABLE 6:3

Positive Editorial Evaluation

	Civil War							Refugees in India	Indo- Pakistan War				
	Diplomatic				Economic		Military		Humanitarian Relief	Mediation Role before War	UN Initiative before War	UN Initiative after War	Peacekeeping Participation
	No Internal Interference	Restoration of Democratic Rule	Plea for Sheik Rahman	Support for Pakistan Government	Recognition of Bangladesh	Continuation of Development Aid	Supervision of Relief	Embargo on Military Sales					
Newspapers													
Evening Telegram									+				
Chronicle Herald									+				
Telegraph Journal		+						+		+	+		
Le Soleil		+			+				+	+		+	
Le Devoir								+	+		+		
La Presse		+	+				+	+	+				
Montréal Matin								+	+				
Le Droit	+				+			+	+				
Gazette	+				+	+			+	+		+	
Montreal Star		+			+			+	+				
Ottawa Citizen		+			+			+	+				
Globe and Mail		+	+		+		+	+	+		+		
Toronto Star		+	+	+	+				+				
Winnipeg Free Press		+							+				
Star Phoenix								+	+				
Edmonton Journal	+						+		+				
Vancouver Sun	+	+	+					+	+			+	
	4	9	4	1	7	1	3	10	16	3	0	3	3

dian relief for the displaced East Pakistanis in the India border states. Ten newspapers (The Evening Telegram, Le Devoir, La Presse, Montréal Matin, Le Droit, The Montreal Star, The Ottawa Citizen, The Globe and Mail, The Star Phoenix and The Vancouver Sun) lauded the government's moves to stop the sale of military supplies to Pakistan. Thus there was widespread editorial approval for the government's decision not to be a contributing factor to the strife and violence.

In the area of diplomatic policy, a majority agreed with the government's call for the restoration of democratic civilian rule in East Pakistan with a significant number favouring the delay in recognizing the new state of Bangladesh. Four newspapers (Le Droit, The Gazette, The Edmonton Journal and The Vancouver Sun) did agree with Canada's initial adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. However, The Vancouver Sun, as well as eight others* (The Telegraph Journal, Le Soleil, La Presse, The Montreal Star, The Ottawa Citizen, The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star and The Winnipeg Free Press) approved the statement by the Minister for External Affairs on June 16, 1971 urging the re-establishment of democratic processes in East Pakistan. Four newspapers (La Presse, The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star and The Vancouver Sun) commended the Prime Minister's plea on behalf of Sheik Mujibur Rahman. The Toronto Star recommended the retention of Canadian diplomatic ties with Pakistan and seven (Le Soleil, Le

Droit, The Gazette, The Montreal Star, The Ottawa Citizen, The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star) supported delay in diplomatic recognition to the former eastern half of Pakistan. Thus there was broad-based newspaper support for the government's more active diplomatic stance and an appreciable amount of approval for its hesitancy in extending diplomatic legitimacy to Bangladesh.

A small number of editorialists agreed with the government's economic response to the civil war. One newspaper, The Gazette, sanctioned the continuation of Canadian development assistance to Pakistan. Three (La Presse, The Globe and Mail and The Edmonton Journal) expressed the need for UN supervisory involvement in the relief assistance program in East Pakistan. Therefore a limited number of newspapers agreed with Ottawa's economic actions during the conflict.

A few newspapers also gave editorial approval to the general thrust of Canadian policy on the Indo-Pakistan war. Three newspapers (The Telegraph Journal, Le Soleil and The Gazette) approved the Canadian refusal to act as mediator prior to the war. Three (The Telegraph Journal, Le Devoir and The Globe and Mail) emphasized, as the Canadian UN representative had, the importance of an examination by the United Nations of the underlying causes of the war. Three (Le Soleil, The Gazette and The Vancouver Sun) reiterated the conditions for Canadian participation in any UN peace-keeping operation stated by the Minister for External Affairs. Thus

there was some scattered support for Canadian actions during the Indo-Pakistan War.

Newspapers gave editorial sanction to a limited number of policy areas and decisions. The dispatch of humanitarian supplies to the displaced East Pakistanis in India was overwhelmingly supported. Most editorialists approved Canada's attempts to promote an internal political settlement and its refusal to sell military equipment to the Pakistan army. The delay in recognition of the new state also received favourable comment. The remaining areas of Canada's foreign policy response received little attention in the nation's editorial columns.

B. Areas of Opposition

Even though editorial support was measured, it was considerably more frequent and sustained than critical opinion. Government policy was criticized infrequently by newspapers across the country and disapproval was confined to Canada's refusal to comment upon the internal affairs of Pakistan and its decision to continue development assistance to the central government.

Some editorialists criticized Canada's failure to condemn the central government of Pakistan. La Presse expressed this point of view clearly in an April 6 editorial entitled "Il faut parler, M. Sharp":

M. Sharp ne veut pas d'une intervention canadienne dans les affaires intérieures d'un autre Etat. Ce scrupule l'honore grandement. Mais n'est-il pas en son

pouvoir de suivre l'Inde, autre partenaire au sein du Commonwealth, quand celle-ci, par la voix de Mme. Gandhi, estime que le silence n'est plus de mise devant le 'génocide' et les excès du 'colonialisme'?...

Quand la liberté est menacée en un point quelconque du globe elle est menacée partout. M. Sharp doit parler s'il souhaite que le Canada conserve quelque poids dans les conseils des nations.

The Toronto Star (June 15) mirrored this view:

Perhaps there is little the Canadian government can do by itself to stop this. One thing it can do, however, is raise its voice. . . . It would not be wrong for Prime Minister Trudeau to tell Pakistan President Yahya Khan quite frankly that Canadians who have helped Pakistan in times past and more recently and are now doing so again, are perfectly appalled by what is going on in East Pakistan.

The Ottawa Citizen editorialized on April 20: "The world should encourage the unity and integrity of Pakistan to be preserved in a manner that guarantees the rights of all of its people. . . . Unity imposed by the sword is neither morally defensible nor workable in the long run." The Edmonton Journal (June 26) stated that the Pakistan army should also be condemned because it sought to frustrate the democratic will of the East Pakistan people. The Montreal Star (April 25) noted that "individual governments, can demand of the West Pakistan authorities an end to the carnage and an easing of restriction on international, medical and relief agencies." In their early editorials, some of the major newspapers in Montreal, Ottawa, and Toronto criticized the caution and reticence of Canada's initial diplomatic position.

Le Devoir in particular denounced the Canadian government's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. On April 1 an editorial entitled "Pakistan: Le Canada doit prendre position" noted:

On trouve d'ailleurs dans le programme de politique étrangère publié l'an dernier par le gouvernement canadien l'affirmation que le Canada doit collaborer à l'effort international pour développer les droits, les normes et les codes de bonne conduite internationaux.

Le Canada irait à l'encontre de tels objectifs s'il se bouchait les yeux devant la crise pakistanaise sous prétexte que c'est une affaire intérieure que l'armée peut régler par la violence et par la force au mépris de la volonté populaire exprimée par les élections. Le silence dans un tel cas serait une approbation tacite d'autant plus flagrante qu'il s'agit d'un pays du Commonwealth.

On April 6 an editorial entitled "Une position digne d'Ottawa"

again focussed on the refusal of the Canadian government to intervene:

En temps de guerre civile il ne faudrait pas intervenir dans les affaires intérieures de ses voisins. Mais en temps de paix, on pourrait leur vendre des armes, du blé, et même leur fournir de l'aide pour "le développement". On aurait le droit d'intervenir dans la vie d'un peuple en toutes sortes de commerce avec les pouvoirs en place, mais à l'heure de massacres, il faudrait s'abstenir de toute intervention.

The editorial also noted that:

C'est derrière 'l'efficacité' que se retranche le gouvernement fédéral pour ne pas intervenir dans les drames de cette envergure. On ne dénoncera jamais assez ce sophisme. Le Canada n'a pas attendu d'avoir la preuve qu'il serait efficace pour entrer en guerre contre l'Allemagne nazie. . . .

Le Canada a bien dégénéré depuis pour n'avoir à donner aux Bengalis que la morne dérobade du gouvernement Trudeau.

The April 15 editorial expressed the central theme of newspaper criticism to Canada's diplomatic response:

Nul ne leur a jamais demandé d'empêcher la sécession ou de la favoriser. Leur seul pouvoir et pourtant leur responsabilité étaient peut-être en condamnant le recours aux armes contre la population,

de réduire les massacres et de sauver la possibilité d'un règlement politique.

Le Devoir was particularly vehement in its condemnation of decision-makers' adherence to a non-interventionist diplomatic posture in the civil war.

Several editorialists denounced Canada's failure to take the initiative at the United Nations to avert bloodshed and, in the view of some, genocide. The Ottawa Citizen (April 5) argued that the United Nations "prompted by Canada and other disinterested powers" had to intervene "if more innocent men, women and children are not to perish, killed by germs and hunger." The Montreal Star on April 24, 1971 editorialized that "the world community through the United Nations" should demand that the West Pakistan authorities put "an end to the carnage" and on May 26, that "the international community as represented by the United Nations" had to apply pressures on Rawalpindi "to speed solutions to a humanitarian problem." The Toronto Star (July 9) supported international action in even stronger terms:

The great powers and most of the members of the United Nations . . . can combine to bring pressure on the Pakistani government to call off its blood thirsty generals, end the butchery and restore conditions of minimum security in East Pakistan that will permit the refugees to return to their homes.

The Canadian government should take the lead in calling for such international action and should be prepared to support it.

Le Devoir also supported a strong international initiative (July 9):

"Le silence et l'inaction complices des gouvernements membres des Nations Unies ont permis une nouveau génocide." Important editorial-

ists criticized a central element of the government's diplomatic policy.

Two newspapers recommended that the government arrange for observers to be sent to the region. The Toronto Star (June 9) felt that Canada had to press for the speedy dispatch of a UN team so observers from the world organization could be there "to tell the whole world the truth." The Ottawa Citizen (June 15) proposed that the government send a Parliamentary delegation to the region to ascertain the facts of the situation, a course of action that the government did not adopt. The newspapers were critical, therefore, of the government's refusal to undertake a more active diplomatic response to a deteriorating situation.

Even when Ottawa publicly recommended the restoration of democratic civilian rule in East Pakistan, the most prestigious Canadian newspaper expressed scepticism about the degree of change in Ottawa's diplomatic policy. In an editorial entitled "Interpretation Please" (June 18), The Globe and Mail focussed on attempts by the Minister for External Affairs to clarify the meaning of his June 16 statement in the House of Commons.

A clarification . . . is essential so that Canadians can see how far the Government is prepared to interject itself into the affairs of Pakistan.

Yesterday Mr. Sharp made a confusing attempt at clarification. He did not mean that the Awami League should take over the Government of Pakistan, he said, nor that East Pakistan should be allowed to secede. Precisely what he did mean, he didn't say.

. . . now that the Prime Minister has returned to Ottawa . . . perhaps he can give his version of what Mr. Sharp, and presumably the Government, is trying to say.

Dubious of Ottawa's willingness to effect real change in its diplomatic policy, this newspaper continued to indirectly criticize the government.

Nonetheless only one newspaper, Le Devoir, recommended a complete break in Canadian relations with Pakistan and supported the independence of East Pakistan. A Le Devoir editorial on May 29 entitled "Quel Pakistan Ottawa doit-il aider?" stated: "le régime militaire devrait être mis au ban de la communauté politique et économique." On July 21 an editorial entitled "L'avenir du Bangladesh" concluded that the only solution for East Pakistan was independence:

Il peut être facile de se soulager la conscience en augmentant les subsides accordés aux millions de réfugiés. Il serait plus utile pour la paix et l'avenir politique des Bengalis que la communauté internationale s'attaque à résoudre la question de fond: celle que M. Sharp voudrait cacher et qui s'appelle l'indépendance du Bangladesh.

Le Devoir therefore opposed a central element in Canadian diplomatic policy.

Newspapers were also critical of Canadian economic support for the Pakistan government. Editorialists demanded that the Canadian government cut off all development assistance to Pakistan in protest against its actions. Le Devoir (May 28) explicitly stated this position:

Le moins qu'on doive exiger du gouvernement fédéral et de ses agences c'est qu'il ne contribue rien à ce régime sanguinaire. Ou s'il veut le faire, qu'il prévienne les Canadiens que les enfants du génocide leur feront payer tôt ou tard par bombes, enlèvement ou autres méthodes, au pays ou à l'étranger, ce qui ne saurait être qu'une participation à l'écrasement du peuple bengali.

as did The Toronto Star (July 9):

Canada has given Pakistan economic aid over the years since 1947, to the tune of some \$337 million. It should be made clear to President Yahya Khan that no further aid can be expected until civilized standards of governments are restored.

Again, editorialists criticized a principal component of Canada's economic response to the civil war.

Some newspapers felt that the cessation of Canadian development assistance to Pakistan would serve as a symbolic protest against the policies of the central Pakistan government. The Toronto Star editorial of April 14 noted that:

On April 2 Canada signed a long-term loan agreement amounting to \$1,000,000 so the West Pakistanis could buy spare parts for their railroad. No doubt this agreement has been in the works long before the latest violence; and our government cannot be accused of complicity in the civil war, or of taking the side of Goliath.

Nevertheless, it would have been more fitting to have postponed the ceremony . . . such a postponement would have had symbolic value, indicating Canada does not always stick up for the strong.

The same newspaper on June 19 stated:

Canada should not, of course, send troops to interfere, but to actively help an obviously ruthless power—however 'civilian' the aid may be—is heartless.

Mr. Sharp still fails to appreciate the symbolic significance of stopping the aid. Would it not be a more accurate reflection of Canada's better self to divert these moneys immediately to relief of the refugees?

The Globe and Mail (July 16) argued that it was through "manipulation of this assistance" that Canada could at least demonstrate and perhaps influence others to demonstrate that the Canadian government

was dismayed by the brutal policies that President Yahya Khan had been pursuing in East Pakistan. Editorial writers therefore rejected the government's contention that any such economic moves would be counterproductive.

Other editorialists recommended that the Canadian government use the lever of development assistance to achieve a political settlement. They emphasized particularly the importance of the withdrawal of the Pakistan army and negotiations for the restoration of democratic civilian government. La Presse (May 31) stated:

Ottawa devrait exiger de son allié qu'il accepte de négocier avec le Bengale. Cette condition devrait être considérée comme un préalable à toute discussion relative à une assistance économique dont le gouvernement du Président Yahya Khan, une fois de plus se tient prêt à savourer seul les bienfaits.

The Montreal Star (June 18) felt that Canada could apply pressure because of its past aid to Pakistan. They recommended that Mr. Sharp reinforce his call for the restoration of democratic civilian rule in East Pakistan by "refusing any further assistance to a malevolent regime" unless there were distinct signs that East Pakistan would be spared further abuse and allowed to pursue democratic processes. The Vancouver Sun of June 19 was even more explicit:

The Western countries should make any aid to Pakistan itself conditional on that country's willingness to follow Mr. Sharp's counsel and allow the elected representatives of the people take over. It is probably only on such terms that the majority of the refugees would go home.

The showdown with the West should come next month when a World Bank consortium . . . meets to

consider a Pakistani request for development aid. It is one time when strings are necessary and justified.

The Edmonton Journal (June 26) was equally direct saying that pressure had to be brought to bear on the government of Pakistan to order the army back to the barracks and to seek a political solution with imprisoned East Pakistani leader, Sheik Mujibur Rahman. The nations of the world could exert much pressure "by withholding all foreign aid, present and future." The Toronto Star (August 14) bluntly stated that it was in Canada's "own best interests" to make clear that all aid would cease if Yahya Khan executed Sheik Mujibur Rahman. If other countries followed Canada's example, it might "just persuade Yahya Khan to step back from the brink." Lastly, The Ottawa Citizen (July 24) reasoned that since the Pakistan government had sent private envoys to Canadian cities to improve the image of their country,

... Canada's good opinion and more important, aid to Pakistan are important. Otherwise why the attempt to regain and preserve both?

The Canadian government does have a lever and it should be used to help restore some measure of peace and democracy to that benighted land.

These editorials did not accept the argument made by the Minister for External Affairs that economic pressures would be inappropriate and counterproductive.

The newspapers justified economic intervention in the internal politics of Pakistan on humanitarian grounds. Though The Toronto Star (June 15, 1971) felt that though in normal circum-

stances, it ill became a country that had aided another to use that as an excuse to intervene in the aided country's internal affairs it was "never out of place to speak up in the name of common humanity." Similarly the Montreal Star (June 18) considered that Pakistan's case was an exception to the general principle that aid should not be linked to political demands. The enormity of the human problem inside and outside the borders of Pakistan made the problem urgent. The Edmonton Journal (June 20) stated that the civil war could not be dismissed as an internal matter since the actions of the Pakistani army were "as reprehensible as any international aggression." Furthermore, "no government had the right to make war on its own people." Some editorialists thus directly attacked the morality of the government's economic response to the Pakistan civil war.

Two newspapers recommended the cessation of Canadian development assistance to Pakistan because they suspected that aid was unlikely to be used for the intended humanitarian purposes. In a July 24 editorial entitled "Aid to Pakistan that only does harm," The Globe and Mail rejected the contention of the Minister for External Affairs that any moves to halt existing Canadian aid projects would cause unemployment and further hunger in East Pakistan:

Mr. Sharp may believe what he is saying, but high officials for the World Bank aren't so naive. They fear that funds earmarked for East Pakistan are almost certain to be diverted to bolster the economy of West Pakistan which has been seriously undermined by the civil war. Even if development aid were to reach its goal, it would be used to help the central

Government devote more of its domestic resources to military action. Unfortunately, Mr. Sharp does not seem to be able to get the point.

The Toronto Star in an earlier editorial (June 19) bluntly ruled out relief assistance for the victims of the civil war because it was impossible to visualize the Pakistan authorities generously handing over food, medicine and money to the people they were in the "process of exterminating or driving out." Criticism of the government's economic response to the conflict was levelled on both moral and pragmatic grounds.

A few editorialists also directed some criticism at the quantity of Canadian relief for the refugees in India. The Montreal Gazette (June 9) noted that:

Canada prides itself on being one of the world's humanitarian nations willing to help the underprivileged to the extent of its resources. If we want to earn this reputation around the globe we should be seen to be making efforts at relief which surpass those of the other advanced countries. . . .

A La Presse (June 9) editorial counselled the Canadian public:

"amener le gouvernement à faire davantage et plus vite ses secours."

The Toronto Star (June 9) condemned the limited scope and slow pace of the Canadian effort:

If one cause of our tardy response to disaster is our sloth, the passive repletion of an audience with violence, the missing spark of leadership is another.

Yet there are, surely, things Canadians can do. The Connaught labs know how to make cholera vaccine. . . . Any massively stepped-up program would take money, new staff and perhaps six months to bring to maturity. But the need will still be there in six

months, and Ottawa could pay the shot.

What about the stock of unsold wheat?... Shall we leave the western grain unmoved?

Again, on August 3 it chided:

... when the situation is as terrible and as huge as the one in the refugee camps of India... only massive help by governments around the world can really alleviate the suffering involved....

Canada is particularly well suited to make such an effort.

Canada has hundreds of millions of tons of wheat that the government pays to keep in storage. Canada has hundreds of thousands of men whom the government pays to do nothing because there is no work for them.

The connections are obvious.

The government should pay some of the unemployed men to put the surplus wheat onto trains and ships bound for the refugee camps of India. And if necessary, Ottawa should send Canadian servicemen to help with the unloading and distribution of the wheat.

These newspapers criticized the limited extent and the lack of imagination in Ottawa's efforts to assist the victims of the Pakistan civil war.

As the border skirmishes between India and Pakistan increased in intensity, several editorialists asserted that the United Nations had a responsibility to try to prevent a regional war. The Vancouver Sun (October 5) stated that if "ever a situation demanded emergency debate and emergency action by supposedly concerned nations of the world it was... the Pakistan question." The Montreal Star (October 28) suggested that the United Nations arrange a mutual withdrawal from the border with United Nations' observers to ensure compliance. The Montreal Gazette (November 9) declared that:

The time for mediation . . . is now and the Canadian government should be putting all possible efforts into the search for ways to bring India and Pakistan into peaceful contact at the highest levels.

There is naturally no reason to be optimistic about the chances of Canada playing an effective role. . . .

Somebody has to try to prepare the ground for third-party mediation, under the auspices either of the United Nations or of a group of smaller powers with no axes to grind. Canada might conceivably play a role because it is one of the few countries to enjoy cordial relations with both India and Pakistan. It can at least make a credible appearance in both capitals as a disinterested friend.

As the armed clashes between the two historic protagonists intensified, a Globe and Mail editorial (November 24) argued that since "sooner or later" the United Nations would have to become fully involved it was "better now than later." Editors of these newspapers refused to accept the diplomatic inaction of the Canadian government in the face of an impending regional war.

After the surrender of the Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan on December 16, 1971, two negative editorial references to Canadian foreign policy appeared. The first downgraded Canada's potential as a mediator while the second attacked governmental hesitancy in granting immediate recognition to the new state of Bangladesh. In response to the suggestion of the Minister for External Affairs that Canada could play a useful role as peacekeeper in the ultimate settlement, The Globe and Mail (January 4) stated that:

In this situation it's rather ridiculous for Canadian External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp to be musing about the possibility of Canada adopting a peacekeeping role between India and Pakistan. India

is in total and undisputed control. It's not a question of keeping belligerents apart. And as far as mediating is concerned, India has no need of it other than perhaps to play off a mediator as a tool for political advantage.

Mr. Sharp should heed well his own white paper on foreign policy where Canada's peacekeeping capacity was played down and emphasis was placed on seeking ways for the United Nations to play a useful role. So far he has failed to demonstrate the value in Canada's role as mediator.

Le Devoir (January 13) criticized the government's reluctance to recognize the new state: "Pendant combien de temps encore l'ombre du séparatisme bengali va-t-il empêcher Ottawa de reconnaître le Bangladesh." Both these papers were dissatisfied with the Canadian diplomatic response to the new regional political configuration.

In summary, newspaper editorialists concentrated their criticism on Canada's refusal to condemn the actions of the Pakistan central government in the civil war, or to undertake a United Nations or Commonwealth initiative to deal with an obviously deteriorating situation, or to discontinue economic development assistance to Pakistan. Six newspapers (Le Devoir, La Presse, The Montreal Star, The Ottawa Citizen, The Toronto Star and The Vancouver Sun) contained editorials that urged the government to raise the civil war before the UN forum, while The Montreal Gazette had earlier supported a Commonwealth initiative. Le Devoir stood out in its criticism of the government's unwillingness to deal with the fundamental issue of the independence of Bangladesh and its early support of Canadian recognition of the new country. Eight newspapers (Le Devoir, La Presse,

The Montreal Star, The Ottawa Citizen, The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, The Edmonton Journal, and The Vancouver Sun) demanded that the government stop all Canadian development assistance to Pakistan. Lastly, The Gazette, The Montreal Star, The Globe and Mail, and The Vancouver Sun reproached the government for its rejection of the possibility of a United Nations role to prevent the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan.

The printed media showed little consensus in their criticism of the conduct and substance of Canadian foreign policy. Some newspapers objected to the government's adherence to the principal of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and to Canada's refusal to sever development assistance to Pakistan during the civil war. Otherwise the newspapers directed minimal criticism at the Canadian foreign policy response in most policy areas (see Table 6:4).

C. Comparison of French and English Editorial Response

It would not be surprising to find that Canada's francophone and anglophone press would differ substantially in their analysis of the conflict in South Asia and in their prescriptions for Canadian policy. Specifically, one would expect the francophone press in Quebec to make more frequent references to the parallel problems of Canadian federalism and to the role of "indépendantiste" movements. Indeed, francophone newspapers had a greater number of editorial references to Canadian federalism than their English counterparts. The five

TABLE 6.4

Negative Editorial Evaluation

	Civil War							Refugees in India	Indo-Pakistan War				
	Diplomatic				Economic		Military						
	No Internal Interference	Restoration of Democratic Rule	Plea for Sheik Rahman	Support for Pakistan Government	Recognition of Bangladesh	Continuation of Development Aid	Supervision of Relief	Embargo on Military Sales	Humanitarian Relief	Mediation Role before War	UN Initiative before War	UN Initiative after War	Peacekeeping Participation
Newspapers													
Evening Telegram													
Chronicle Herald													
Telegraph Journal													
Le Soleil													
Le Devoir	-			-	-	-					-		
La Presse	-					-			-				
Montréal Matin													
Le Droit													
Gazette	-								-				
Montreal Star	-					-					-		
Ottawa Citizen	-					-					-		
Globe and Mail	-	-				-					-		
Toronto Star	-					-			-				
Winnipeg Free Press													
Star Phoenix													
Edmonton Journal	-					-							
Vancouver Sun	-					-							
Total	8	1	0	1	1	8	0	0	3	0	4	0	1

francophone publications had a total of nine references (La Presse and Le Devoir three each, Le Soleil two, Le Droit one and Montréal Matin none) for an average of 1.8 per paper. The twelve Anglophone publications had a total of five references (The Evening Telegram, The Gazette, The Globe and Mail, The Ottawa Citizen and The Vancouver Sun had one each, while The Telegraph Journal, The Chronicle Herald, The Montreal Star, The Toronto Star, The Winnipeg Free Press, The Star Phoenix and The Edmonton Journal had none) or an average of .4 per paper. French- and English-language newspapers did not differ significantly in the number of parallels they drew between tensions within the Canadian and Pakistan systems.

Newspapers in both languages shared a common analysis of the political parallels. Both saw analogies in the Pakistan socio-political situation to Canada. The Vancouver Sun (March 30, 1971) commented that "to see a Commonwealth nation rent in this fashion is not comforting to Canadians already troubled by the divisions of Northern Ireland and their own country." A Le Devoir editorial of the same date stated that:

Le conflit qui a éclaté au Pakistan suivant de près celui qui mettait à feu l'an dernier le Nigeria, comporte cependant des éléments qui intéressent au plus haut point l'opinion canadienne et mondiale. Les deux conflits ont éclaté dans des pays qui étaient naguère soumis à la domination Britannique. Ils ont également surgi dans des pays à structure fédérale. . . .

Les événements du Pakistan intéressent au plus haut point les pays à structure fédérale qui ont faire face à des problèmes religieux ou culturels non résolus.

La Presse (April 6, 1971) argued: "ce qui se passe au Pakistan est comparable à ce qui se serait passé ici si, après des élections ayant porté René Lévesque au pouvoir par une écrasante majorité, l'armée fédérale intervenait pour emprisonner le leader du parti québécois et tenter d'exterminer tous les sympathisants." The Evening Telegram (July 14) noted that:

Where politics is based on religion, and national identities which have been torn from their roots, solutions do not come easily. Canadians know only too well, for while they watch the tragedies of Northern Ireland and Pakistan with sympathy or amusement depending on personal taste, they have yet to find a solution to their own problem of what to do about French-Canada. Therein lies the seed which might wreck this fumbling nation.

And La Presse (August 7, 1971) explicitly cautioned:

Irons-nous nous prononcer, de Montreal, de façon imperturbable sur ... le réalisme de ceux qui ont constitué un Etat dont les deux parties sont séparées par 1,400 milles de territoire l'étranger? 1,400 milles, c'est la distance de Québec à Winnipeg. Ici aussi, il ne manque pas de gens pour prétendre qu'un territoire étranger sépare, disons, les deux villes.

Thus French and English newspapers were equally likely to suggest that Pakistan's internal problems were comparable to those of Canada.

French editorialists addressed themselves specifically to the importance of constitutional provision for multi-ethnicity, the legitimacy of separation, and the use of force to prevent fragmentation. Le Soleil (July 19) stated the Pakistan situation had shown that: "le consensus de toutes les parties d'un pays est nécessaire pour procéder à une évolution constitutionnelle. Il y a des exemples récents

ailleurs qu'il n'est pas besoin de rappeler . . . et pas très loin." Le Devoir (March 30) noted:

Dans un pays fédérale formé d'éléments humains homogènes, la présomption en faveur du droit du gouvernement est très forte. Dans un pays formé de communautés nettement distinctes, comme c'est le cas du Pakistan, comment ne pas privilégier, en dernière analyse, le droit d'une communauté nationale à disposer librement de son propre destin, par-delà la droit que peut revendiquer l'Etat fédéral d'assurer l'unité d'une société déjà divisée de l'intérieur? On peut, en pareil cas, insister sur les conditions devant favoriser une séparation équitable et pacifique. On ne saurait, sans violer le droit des gens, sans subordonner la vie à une abstraction, faire passer le droit supposé d'un gouvernement central avant celui d'une nation dont l'opinion commune reconnaît sans conteste le caractère distinctif et les aspirations légitimes.

A La Presse editorial (July 26), focussing on a statement by a Progressive Conservative candidate in Toronto who advised that force be used if necessary to keep Quebec in Canada, remarked:

Sait-on que le président Yahya Khan du Pakistan, à qui on impute la mort de 30,000 à 50,000 civils et l'exil forcé de 6,000,000 de Bengalis, a un disciple au Canada dans la personne de Murray R. Maynard? . . . le génocide dont vous rêvez, vous l'avez déjà raté une fois au 18^e siècle. Vous l'aviez presque réussi avec les Acadiens. Ne comptez pas réussir avec les Québécois d'aujourd'hui. Il vous en cuirait.

French newspapers, much more so than their English counterparts, used the Pakistan civil war to probe at Canada's political fragility.

La Presse editors (August 7) extended their analysis of the conflict to draw parallels between East Pakistanis and groups within the province of Quebec and their political tactics:

Dans le cas des réfugiés bengalis on est en face de la bêtise. . . . Le mort bête est la seule chose que l'on ait vraiment démocratisée. Toujours pour des raisons, infiniment drapeutières Pierre Laporte est mort de vieillesse comme chacun sait. Qu'est ce que Pierre Laporte vient faire là-dedans? Rien. A quoi pensez-vous?

They pointed out:

On pourrait conclure que les solutions de forces ne règlent rien nulle part. Ce serait faux. Le preuve c'est que les mêmes personnes qui nous suivraient, dans ce raisonnement, aussi longtemps que cela ferait leur affaire, nous lâcheraient si nous disions que les solutions de force sont mauvaises aussi quand il s'agit d'Amos et de Gaspé, de Chicoutimi et de Montréal en matières scolaires ou en matières hospitalières. Il n'y a pas de bout à unir de force quand l'idée est à la force et il n'y a pas bout à séparer, quand l'idée est à séparer.

This francophone newspaper did not confine its analysis of relevant parallels strictly to the national level.

The press of both linguistic groups saw a strong connection between Canada's policy response to the conflict in Pakistan and Canadian federalism. Editorialists reminded their readers of France's intervention in Canada's internal affairs. The Ottawa Citizen (June 18) referring to the call by the Minister for External Affairs in the House of Commons for the restoration of democratic civilian control in East Pakistan, noted that:

It is rarely that a Canadian external affairs minister makes a statement about the internal situation in another country. In fact, Ottawa reacted with indignation when General de Gaulle raised his Vive Québec Libre in Montreal!

Le Soleil (June 19) stated: "Il y en a qui eurent peur, car de fait le contraire eut été une ingérence d'Ottawa dans les affaires du Pakistan comme le fut celle du général de Gaulle dans les affaires du Canada, il y a quelques années." In their comments, editorialists highlighted Canada's diplomatic intervention in the Pakistan civil war.

Some editorialists also alluded explicitly to the creation of a precedent that could subsequently apply to Canada's internal problems. Leery of such a precedent, they supported Canada's response to the civil war in Pakistan. Le Droit (June 14) observed:

Un député de l'opposition M. Heath Macquarrie, qui paraissait d'avantage animé de soucis électoraux que de compassion pour les pauvres... a rudement apostrophé le premier ministre pour n'avoir pas de solution à présenter en vue du règlement du conflit pakistanais. Cette attitude irréfléchie... implique une intervention du Canada dans les affaires d'autrui. Elle serait aussi déraisonnable que si l'Inde ou le Pakistan se mêlait de donner au Canada des conseils pour le règlement des problèmes qui peuvent exister entre le fédéral et les provinces canadiennes.

In considering diplomatic recognition, The Gazette (December 7) drew a similar parallel:

The violation of Pakistan's territorial integrity raises ticklish questions for countries, Canada for instance, that talk a lot about their territorial integrity. Canada ought to think twice before recognizing Bangladesh and then announce that it will make up its mind in due course.

Le Soleil (February 2, 1972) traced the reluctance to extend recognition directly to the fears of creating an undesirable precedent:

Qu'est-ce qu'il en serait par exemple, si pour une raison ou pour une autre, les Etats-Unis envahissaient

un jour le Québec pour en chasser l'armée canadienne et installer un gouvernement séparatiste? C'est à peu de différence ce qui s'est produit au Pakistan.

Thus editorialists from both linguistic groups justified their support of Canada's cautious response to the civil war by warning of possible future international intervention in Canada's own domestic politics.

Other English and French papers suggested that Canada should ignore the question of local separatists and revise its policy stance.

The Globe and Mail (July 7, 1971) recommended that "the Government should forget its obsession with our own separatists. It should call for the duly elected to govern East Pakistan; it should punctuate the call by cutting off aid to Pakistan; it should increase aid to the refugees." Le Devoir (January 13) felt:

La normalisation du statut international du Bangla Desh est d'autant plus importante et pressante que le nouvel Etat aura besoin de la collaboration de nombreux pays et des agences internationales pour faire face aux problèmes sanitaires et alimentaire qui avec le retour des réfugiés vont doublement se poser.... Pendant combien de temps encore l'ombre du séparatisme bengale va-t-il empêcher Ottawa de reconnaître le Bangladesh?

In fact Le Devoir (April 1, 1971) had warned earlier that a policy of continued support for Pakistan's central government could complicate Canada's internal problems:

L'indifférence du gouvernement canadien devant cette crise risque d'être interprétée comme l'affirmation implicite du droit de tout gouvernement central d'un Etat fédéral d'imposer ses vues par la force militaire aux Etats membres ou provinces qui relèvent partiellement de son autorité. Le gouvernement canadien doit manifester plus d'intérêt et moins

de désinvolture devant le conflit pakistanais; l'attitude adoptée par M. Sharp lundi au Communes est au sur-plus intempestive et contre-indiquée à cause du débat constitutionnel canadien.

Both those who supported and those who criticized Canadian policy towards the secessionist forces drew analogies with Quebec in Canada. They interpreted the relevance of that analogy quite differently, however, to develop different recommendations.

Despite differences in the number and kind of parallels they drew between the cleavages in Pakistan and in Canada,⁴ newspaper editorialists did not polarize along linguistic lines in their evaluations of Canada's foreign policy. French newspapers were more prone to refer to the problems of Canadian federalism in their commentaries and to use the parallel to highlight the friction within Canada. Nonetheless, both English and French newspapers advised both boldness and caution. In fact the two most respected newspapers from each of the respective linguistic communities—The Globe and Mail and Le Devoir—both decried the government's use of Canada's separatist movement as a justification for support of the status quo in Pakistan. Thus interpretation and prescriptions cut across linguistic lines.

The absence of systematic differences in anglophone and francophone editorial commentary on Canada's response to the Pakistan civil war and in particular the limited editorial focus on parallel strains in the two political systems—only 10 out of 213 editorials—is especially surprising given the proximity of a recent crisis within

Quebec. Editorialists drew surprisingly few linkages between Canada's domestic and foreign policy. They saw little impact of external conflicts on Canadian political life.

D. Summary

In comparison with other groups, newspaper editorialists provided a much more detailed examination of Canada's response to the Pakistan civil war. They did review and comment on Ottawa's adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, its continuation of development assistance to Pakistan, the imposition of a military embargo on Pakistan and the dispatch of relief to the refugees in India. They discussed the validity of the government's hesitancy to undertake initiatives at the United Nations and its reluctance to grant immediate recognition to the new state. They did provide the public with the information and argumentation necessary to understand the Canadian response to the conflict.

The majority of newspapers were either actively or passively in editorial agreement with the most important components of Canada's response to the Pakistan civil war (see Table 6:5). A sizeable group of editorialists castigated the Canadian government for its initial refusal to condemn the actions of the Pakistan war or to place the problem on the agenda of the United Nations. However, few newspapers continued their criticism of Canada's diplomatic response after the Minister for External Affairs recommended the restoration of

TABLE 6:5

Positive and Negative Editorial Evaluation

	Civil War							Refugees in India	Indo- Pakistan War					
	Diplomatic					Economic			Military	Humanitarian Relief	Mediation Role before War	UN Initiative before War	UN Initiative after War	Peacekeeping Participation
	No Internal Interference	Restoration of Democratic Rule	Plea for Sheik Rahman	Support for Pakistan Government	Recognition of Bangladesh	Continuation of Development Aid	Supervision of Relief	Embargo on Military Sales						
Newspapers														
Evening Telegram									+					
Chronicle Herald									+					
Telegraph Journal		+						+		+		+		
Le Soleil		+			+				+	+			+	
Le Deyoir	-			-	-	-		+	+		-	+		
La Presse	-	+	+			-	+	+	/	+				
Montréal Matin								+	+					
Le Droit	+				+			+	+					
Gazette	/				+	+			/	+	-		+	
Montreal Star	-	+			+	-		+	+		-			
Ottawa Citizen	-	+			+	-		+	+					
Globe and Mail		/	+		+	-	+	+	+		-	+	-	
Toronto Star	-	+	+	+	+	-			/					
Winnipeg Free Press		+							+					
Star Phoenix								+	+					
Edmonton Journal	/					-	+		+					
Vancouver Sun	/	+	+	+		-		+	+				+	
+	=	1	8	4	2	7	1	3	10	13	4	0	3	3
-	=	5	0	0	1	1	8	0	0	0	0	4	0	1
/	=	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0

/ Positive and Negative Editorial Evaluations Expressed.

democratic civilian rule in East Pakistan. Eight newspapers (Le Devoir, La Presse, The Gazette, The Montreal Star, The Ottawa Citizen, The Toronto Star, The Edmonton Journal and The Vancouver Sun) printed editorials that criticized Ottawa's decision to refrain from comment upon the civil war in Pakistan. Following the minister's statement on June 16, six of the newspapers (La Presse, The Montreal Star, The Ottawa Citizen, The Toronto Star, The Edmonton Journal and The Vancouver Sun) gave editorial approval to the action. The Telegraph Journal, Le Soleil, The Globe and Mail and The Winnipeg Free Press also supported the Minister's statement. Only three of the newspapers who had been critical (Le Devoir, The Toronto Star and The Vancouver Sun) continued to print editorials which expressed dissatisfaction with the government's diplomatic position. Le Devoir denounced the general thrust of Canadian policy and the refusal to consider the question of independence for Bangladesh. The Toronto Star and The Vancouver Sun recommended Canadian initiatives at the United Nations. Thus the majority of the Canadian press supported the Canadian diplomatic response to the civil war after the government took what appeared to be a more active and interventionist role in pressing for a political solution.

In contrast, few editorialists were satisfied with the government's decision to continue existing development assistance to Pakistan even though it would not enter into new agreements. All eight newspapers (Le Devoir, La Presse, The Montreal Star, The

Ottawa Citizen, The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, The Edmonton Journal and The Vancouver Sun) that recommended the termination of economic assistance to Pakistan as a technique to press for the return to democratic government, did so after the Minister for External Affairs' announcement of the government's position on May 26, 1971. The Gazette was the only newspaper to endorse the Canadian policy of continuing development assistance. Despite their satisfaction that Canada had finally acted, most newspapers still felt that the Canadian authorities were lax in refusing to employ economic assistance as an effective lever to achieve their diplomatic objectives.

Though Canadian editorial commentators felt that Ottawa could have exerted greater economic pressure on the Pakistan government to restore democracy, none suggested that the Canadian government rupture relations with the central government or recognize the rebel forces, at least not prior to the Indo-Pakistan war. The Toronto Star was the sole newspaper to refer specifically to diplomatic relations with the regime of President Khan but they recommended the retention of formal links. Even Le Devoir, the most critical of the newspapers, stopped short of demanding a break in diplomatic relations as it decried the government's blindness to the problem of the independence of Bangladesh. On an important policy issue, newspaper editorialists offered no critical comment; editorial opinion did not attempt to constrain Ottawa's policy.

The editorialists were more divided on the advisability of an initiative at the United Nations to deal with the possibility of an Indo-Pakistan war. While four newspapers (The Gazette, The Montreal Star, The Globe and Mail and The Vancouver Sun) recommended intervention by the United Nations to prevent a regional war, three papers (The Telegraph Journal, Le Soleil, and The Gazette) advised that the situation had so deteriorated that any United Nations action would be ineffective. In discussing the proper and possible role for the United Nations, only The Gazette referred specifically to possible action by Canada. Thus, there was no editorial consensus on the desired Canadian response to a potential regional war.

In contrast the press displayed near editorial unanimity in their approval of the Canadian actions subsequent to the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war. Three newspapers (The Telegraph Journal, Le Devoir and The Globe and Mail) published editorials that echoed the reservations of the Minister for External Affairs on the role of the United Nations in any post-war settlement. Another three (Le Soleil, The Gazette and The Vancouver Sun) repeated the Minister's conditions for Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations. The Globe and Mail's editorial criticism of the Minister's comments about a potential mediatory role between India and Pakistan was the exception to the general editorial approval of the Canadian diplomatic response to the altered regional power configuration.

The majority of newspaper editorialists that discussed the question of diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh supported the Canadian decision to delay recognition. Seven newspapers (Le Soleil, Le Droit, The Gazette, The Montreal Star, The Ottawa Citizen, The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star) vigorously endorsed Ottawa's stress on the required conditions for recognition, this in marked contrast to the earlier censure of the Canadian diplomatic and economic support of the Pakistan regime by the last four papers. Le Devoir's criticism of the government's refusal to grant immediate recognition was the only deviation from the general editorial approval of the last important element in Canada's diplomatic response to the Pakistan civil war.

The newspaper editorials displayed virtual unanimity in their coverage and evaluation of Canada's response to the Pakistan civil war. The majority of newspapers gave consistent editorial support to the Canadian government; there was a very limited amount of critical comment. Few newspapers maintained a negative view of the government's policy throughout the civil war. This support was reflected in an overall consensus on the main areas of Canadian policy. Editorial criticism was limited primarily to the government's refusal to use Canadian economic aid to achieve a diplomatic objective with which newspapers were in accord. The English and French newspapers did not divide on linguistic lines in the parallels they drew to Canadian federalism. Therefore, the press provided little basis for public

opposition to Canada's foreign policy response to the Pakistan civil war.

Footnotes - Chapter VI

¹One major newspaper from each of the provinces with the exception of Prince Edward Island was selected for analysis. They included The Evening Telegram of Newfoundland, The Chronicle Herald of Nova Scotia, The Telegraph Journal of New Brunswick, La Presse of Quebec, The Toronto Star of Ontario, The Winnipeg Free Press of Manitoba, The Star Phoenix of Saskatchewan, The Edmonton Journal of Alberta and The Vancouver Sun of British Columbia. Also included were the principal publications of the two major urban centres: for Toronto—The Globe and Mail and for Montreal Le Devoir, The Gazette and The Montreal Star and, the Ottawa Citizen from the nation's capital. Lastly, in order to insure an adequate francophone component, Montréal-Matin, Le Soleil and Le Droit were chosen.

The newspapers were examined for their editorial coverage of the Canadian foreign policy response between March 25, 1971, the date of the commencement of the civil war and February 14, 1972, the date of Canadian recognition of Bangladesh.

²Definition of Terms:

- a) Focus is defined as the main subject or theme of the editorial.
- b) Mention is defined as any reference to Canadian foreign policy in the context of an editorial whose focus is not Canadian foreign policy. This includes indirect reference where the subject is donor nations, members of the Commonwealth or the international community.
- c) Evaluation is defined as any course of action, decision or policy suggested by the editorial, i.e., an 'ought' or 'should' statement.
- d) A positive evaluation is defined as any editorial approval given to an action, decision or policy of the Canadian government.
- e) A negative evaluation is defined as action, decision or policy that an editorial recommends that the government of Canada had not taken, stated it would not take, or had taken or opposed.
- f) Federalism is defined as any editorial reference to Canada's system of federalism and/or to the province of Quebec.

³La Presse did not publish from October 28, 1971 to February 9, 1972 because of a strike. The editorials for this newspaper were examined from March 25, 1971 to October 27, 1971 and from February 10, 1972 to February 13, 1972.

(Footnotes - Chap. VI)

⁴The then President of the Parti Québécois, René Lévesque also examined the question of a parallel between Pakistan and Canada in his April 22, 1971 column for Le Journal de Montréal. He noted: "se met encore à évoquer une guerre civile pour le jour où le Québec opterait démocratiquement pour l'indépendance. . . . La froide lâcheté d'Ottawa devant les génocides qui ont suivi l'effondrement de fédéralisme carton-pâte au Biafra puis au Bengale n'est-ce pas là qu'elle trouve une bonne partie de son explication. Il y a certes la solidarité bebête des Establishments du Commonwealth, la tradition commode (quand ça fait sombre après Mike Pearson, surtout depuis l'avènement de notre mini-Kennedy de vaudeville et de son commis aux écritures, Mitchell Sharp. Mais très évidemment cette inertie scandaleuse est aussi un calcul de politique intérieure. Vous voyez, dit-on silencieusement aux indigènes québécois ce que ça peut coûter ailleurs, alors prenez garde. . . ."

Nonetheless he still felt: "Le Québec n'est ni le Biafra ni le Bengale, pas plus que le Canada n'est le Nigeria ou le Pakistan. Là-bas tribales et faméliques, ce sont des populations qui n'ont souvent rien à perdre que leur vie, et peuvent même s'en trouver délivrées, hélas. L'Empire qui les a jetées dans l'indépendance n'avait, honteusement, rien fait pour les y préparer. Ici ce sont des majorités de producteurs, vendeurs et consommateurs nord-américains, sachant bien au fond qu'ils auraient—de part et d'autre—tout à perdre au jeu de massacre.

Nous sommes fort loin, Dieu soit loué, de la mentalité militariste des Gowon, Yahya Khan et autres pachas en uniformes dont sont affligés tant d'états nouveaux. Même en essayant très fort P.E. Trudeau ne 'ferait' pas sérieux en Fuehrer de la National Unity. Un homme comme David Lewis, pour qui tout empêchement forcé de l'indépendance québécoise serait criminel et insensé, reflète le plus probable consensus, douloureux bien sûr, mais inscrit dans la nature des choses et des gens en question. D'ailleurs la faible 'consistance' nationale du Canada exclut clairement tout aventure militaire."

CHAPTER VII

THE CONCLUSION

Qui tacet consentit.
[Silence means consent.]¹

... I believe one of the tasks of Christians and Churches ... is to help people in deciding moral priorities. Which is why I am sorry to see Churches ... seeming to forget about East Pakistan.²
(An Anglican Minister, September 27, 1971)

The most effective way ... of developing income is through tested and proven means [that is by] the emotional approach of showing a starving diseased child. ... On the other hand mass sensitization ... has been a dismal failure despite millions of man hours invested and tons of papers consumed.

If no one has come up with a way to accomplish mass sensitization to the truly horrendous implications of the current world situations, it is hardly surprising that no one has yet found a way to combine the functions of sensitization and fund raising with any degree of success.³

("The PR Dilemma at Oxfam," April, 1972)

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the response of Canadian interest groups to the 1971 Pakistan civil war, to explore the pattern of reaction of different types of groups and to evaluate explanations of their choice of rules. The thesis began with a survey of the existing research on pressure groups and the Canadian foreign policy process. A description of the response of the Canadian government to the civil war was also given to provide a yardstick to measure the position of the groups against official policy. Church, voluntary and special ad hoc groups as well as press comment were then examined to assess their support of or opposition to government

policy.

In this concluding chapter the main components of the groups' response will be reviewed and the hypotheses will be reexamined in light of the evidence. Lastly, further research alternatives will be suggested.

A. Response of Canadian Groups Reviewed

One would have expected a high level of interest group activity in response to the Pakistan civil war. Reports of millions of refugees, slaughter and destruction, a war of national liberation pitting small bands of guerrilla fighters against a well-equipped modern army, thousands of children ill with cholera in overcrowded and squalid refugee camps, and the ever-present possibility of superpower involvement in an escalating regional conflict duplicated the conditions in Biafra which had recently evoked Canadian empathy and involvement. Canadian interest groups and public opinion had been active and aroused; they could have been expected to oppose any government reinforcement of a military regime intent on crushing the supporters of a democratically elected movement.

Surprisingly, the vast majority of established interest groups took a passive, non-political stance, preferring to abstain from public declarations on the civil war. Three church groups as well as seven voluntary agencies made no public pronouncements at all.⁴ The statements of another church group as well as three voluntary agencies

focussed only on their organization's relief activities; they made no reference to the response of the Canadian government.⁵ Concentrating upon the plight of the refugees in India, most of the groups in their public declarations appealed to the humanitarian instincts of their constituencies without an explanation of the underlying causes of the conflict or suggestion of alternate policy choices. Thus a significant number of groups did not feel that Ottawa's response to the civil war was sufficiently important or unacceptable to warrant public comment.

Even the more active church groups only offered qualified criticism of the position of the government. They recommended economic sanctions and the traditional Canadian palliative to an international crisis—a discussion at the United Nations. However, reservations about the Canadian response to the civil war expressed by the church groups were both muted in content and focus, and counter-balanced by the earlier and more explicit statement of their neutrality. Thus, prescriptions for change in government policy were few and general rather than specific condemnations of Canadian policy actions.

Only four established groups made explicit demands for a change in Canadian policy and the modifications they sought primarily centered on Ottawa's decisions to respect Pakistan's internal sovereignty and to continue existing Canadian development assistance to that country. Oxfam of Canada recommended a Canadian initiative to have the matter discussed at the United Nations as well as the dispatch of an observer team to the area. The Religious Society of Friends advised

the government to exert "moral pressure" bilaterally and, through the world organization, to end the denial of human rights, and followed this in January with an urgent plea for recognition of the new state. The United Church of Canada asked Canadian authorities to suspend all aid to Pakistan and to initiate a UN discussion, despite their earlier public affirmation of a non-political stance. No established church group went as far as the Student Christian Movement, which requested a total cessation of Canadian support for Pakistan and recognition of Bangladesh. Even Oxfam of Canada, the most vociferous and active of the government critics, did not advise open Canadian diplomatic support of the secessionists. Thus the Canadian government had to contend with only a small number of critical interest groups whose dissatisfaction with official policy was limited, for the most part, to its reluctance to undertake symbolic diplomatic or economic condemnation of the central Pakistan regime.

Some sectors of the public concerned over tacit Canadian diplomatic and economic support of the Pakistan regime did form spontaneous groups to publicly denounce the government's position and to advocate Canadian support for the independence of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Association of Canada and the Canadian Committee for the Independence of Bangladesh urged Canadian authorities to recognize the right of self-determination and to formally endorse that position by extending diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh. This public pressure from marginal groups for a major change in the Canadian posi-

tion on the civil war as well as analogous pressure from the Student Christian Movement of Canada were in marked contrast to the near silence of established interest groups towards Ottawa's actions and policies.

This indifference was reflected in their house publications—the principal forum of information and membership education. Few editors apparently felt a need to counteract the apathy of their readers. Their journals provided subscribers with very little description of the civil war, let alone of Canadian policy. Fourteen of the twenty-four established groups printed nothing that even referred to Ottawa's position.⁶ Editorial comment appeared in a total of four group publications⁷ and differed from official government policy only in the emphasis on the need for a diplomatic initiative. Thus, church and voluntary agency publications provided few opportunities for their readership to develop critical attitudes toward Canadian policy.

In their concentration on the international relief efforts to relieve the plight of the refugees, interest group publications were indifferent to reports of the incapacity of developing nations to govern themselves and to utilize development assistance. They made no serious attempts to correct public impressions that new nations were inclined to resolve political disputes through violence and to squander foreign aid domestically as well as externally. They did not draw on their expertise to put the conflict within a wider development context. This in turn helped to reinforce the predisposition of the public, re-

pulsed by widespread violence, to assent to the government's diplomatic passivity and to approve any future cutbacks in Canadian development assistance.

Interest groups confined their activities to fund raising, responding in the traditional manner as humanitarian agencies. Four church groups⁸ and all the voluntary agencies, save Oxfam, concentrated all their efforts on the collection of funds, with no disruption being created for the normal organizational priorities and routines. The only public political activity undertaken by four other church groups⁹ was a press conference at which they emphasized their non-partisan position. They also attended the South Asia Conference which produced a five-part resolution that largely reiterated Canadian government policy with only one exception. Moreover, six groups explicitly rejected an Oxfam proposal to form a coalition to press the Canadian government to respond differently to the civil war.¹⁰ The Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief scrupulously avoided even a hint of politics in its relief drive. Thus, most church and voluntary agencies, determined to maintain passive neutrality in a potentially controversial situation, explicitly ruled out the need to mount a public campaign to bring pressure to bear on the Canadian government to change its policy on the civil war.

Despite the general agreement on the importance of a non-partisan response and a focus on fund raising, the most prestigious church and voluntary groups were unable to transcend their own vested

institutional interests to cooperate in a combined humanitarian effort. They were hesitant to sacrifice institutional autonomy to form a relief coalition until Oxfam of Canada forced the issue by acting in an effective manner. Even with agreement on the objectives and procedures of the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief, that organization was weakened by constant squabbling and bickering as each group sought to ensure that their own interests were not subordinated to the common effort. The only point of unanimous agreement was the August termination date of the appeal which allowed each member to resume their "normal" fall activities. Thus, the majority of established groups made no more than a formal gesture of cooperation. They were too preoccupied with safeguarding their respective group interests to have acted together effectively. This precluded their cooperating to pressure the Canadian government to increase its contribution in an area of joint concern.

Only four established groups ventured beyond the issue of humanitarian relief and undertook activities that would pressure Canadian authorities to modify their policy. Oxfam of Canada, the Religious Society of Friends, the Student Christian Movement of Canada, and The United Church of Canada sent statements of their respective positions to the government and, in the case of the latter two, to its members of Parliament as well. The United Church indirectly censured the government by printing and distributing a highly critical pamphlet that had been written by a member of the Student Christian

Movement. Oxfam of Canada, the most active of all the groups, sought to mobilize interest groups and public opinion through a variety of activities to press for changes in Canadian policy. But even they were careful to differentiate their organization from their most successful public effort, the South Asia Conference. Thus, of the four groups, two made concrete efforts to mobilize public opinion to pressure the government and only the Student Christian Movement of Canada clearly condemned Canadian policy.

Despite much more strongly held positions on the civil war, activities of the small number of ad hoc groups were marginal and uncoordinated. The Canadian Committee for an Independent Bangladesh wrote letters to the editors of Toronto newspapers. The educational programs of the South Asia Crisis Committee, whose lifespan was approximately four months, were confined to Ontario university campuses. Only the Bangladesh Association organized activities across Canada. Though the Montreal chapter was successful in effecting a change in Canada's military policy, most of the Association's programs were semi-autonomous with little national coordination being directed primarily at the Pakistan and American governments. The activities of these groups were sparse and diffuse and had little impact on the Canadian government.

In contrast with the churches and voluntary agencies, newspaper editorialists were more willing to comment upon and to criticize the government response. They went beyond the simple examination of the

relief needs of the refugees and they analyzed the advisability of Canadian interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign state. They commented upon the implications of the use of development assistance as a lever to achieve political objectives and the viability of Canadian mediation efforts before and after the Indo-Pakistan war. Interestingly enough, English and French newspapers were equally predisposed to explore the internal repercussions and ramifications of the Canadian foreign policy stance for Canadian federalism.

While some editorialists objected to the government's refusal to condemn the military regime or to apply economic pressure by an immediate cessation of development assistance, most supported government policy, particularly after it called for the restoration of democratic civilian rule. The majority of editorialists demonstrated widespread support for the military embargo on Pakistan and for the decision to delay the recognition of the new state of Bangladesh. Regional variations in editorial coverage were limited to the amount of editorial space devoted to the Canadian foreign policy response; most newspapers supported the government's position. Newspaper editorials thus did not challenge Canadian decision-makers to defend their actions nor did they arouse public opinion.

In summary, the majority of Canadian interest groups were quite prepared to permit considerable flexibility to policy makers in Ottawa as long as Canadian policy did not interfere directly or indirectly with

their ongoing humanitarian efforts. In their concentration on fund raising they neither led nor followed public opinion concerning a proper Canadian response to the civil war. Instead, the central tactical issue for most established groups was the promotion of their own individual brand of humanitarianism rather than pressure on the Canadian government to substantially change its policy.

Church and voluntary organizations therefore contributed little to the policy debate on the civil war in Pakistan. They deliberately chose not to use their potential influence either to change public opinion or to force a serious discussion of the issues. Concentrating on their individual organizational interests, interest groups were quite content, for the most part, to leave the responsibility for public examination of the political or moral issues involved in the Pakistan civil war to newspaper editorialists. Abdication rather than confrontation was the principal characteristic of the response of Canadian interest groups to Canadian policy during the Pakistan civil war.

B. Review of Hypotheses

Within the general pattern of accommodation or abdication, there were instances of criticism and confrontation by interest groups (see Table 7:1). To what extent does group type explain these differences

TABLE 7:1

Group Structural Characteristics and Response to Canadian Foreign Policy

	Type	Links			Response	
	Established Ad Hoc	With Country	With Government	Through Coalition	Support	Opposition
Anglican Church	x		x		x	
Baptist Federation	x				x	
Bible Medical Missionary Fellowship	x	x			x	
Canadian Council of Churches	x		x	x	x	
Lutheran Church	x				x	
Mennonites	x	x			x	
Presbyterian Church	x				x	
Religious Society of Friends	x					x
Roman Catholic Church	x	x	x	x	x	
Salvation Army	x	x			x	
Student Christian Movement	x					x
United Church	x					x
Sub Total	12	4	3	2	9	3
Canadian Council for International Cooperation	x				x	
Canadian Red Cross Society	x	x	x	x	x	
Canadian Save the Children Fund	x			x	x	
Canadian UNICEF Committee	x	x		x	x	
Canadian University Service Overseas	x				x	
CARE	x	x		x	x	
Centre d'Etude et de Co-operation Internationale	x	x			x	
Operation Eyesight Universal	x	x			x	
Oxfam	x	x		x		x
Unitarian-Service Committee	x				x	
World University Service Overseas	x				x	
World Vision	x			x	x	
Sub Total	12	6	1	6	11	1
Bangladesh Association		x				x
Canadian Committee for Independent Bangladesh		x				x
Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief		x			x	
South Asia Crisis Committee		x				x
Sub Total	4	0	0	0	1	3
TOTAL	24	4	10	4	8	21

in the response of interest groups? As the first hypothesis suggested, established groups did adopt a more cautious and non-political role in contrast with the ad hoc groups which sprang up in response to the civil war. With the exception of Oxfam of Canada, the Religious Society of Friends in Canada, the Student Christian Movement of Canada, and The United Church of Canada, established groups supported Canadian policy. Issue-specific groups—the Bangladesh Association, and the Canadian Committee for an Independent Bangladesh—opposed Canadian policy. While the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief technically qualifies as an ad hoc group, its membership was composed of well-established church and voluntary agencies whose common objectives reflected their individual non-political concerns. In fact, C.A. P.R. was not really an integrated cohesive group, but rather a loose joint-advertising agency designed to produce publicity to enhance individual fund raising activities by its constituent members.

While differences in group types appear to explain the variation in response, the overwhelming passivity by the majority of established interest groups is more difficult to understand. The widespread tacit support of Canadian policy was not expected. A second hypothesis suggested that established interest groups with no history or organizational linkages in the theatre of conflict would feel freer to criticize Canadian policy. Of the four groups that did criticize Canada's foreign policy posture, three—the Religious Society of Friends, the Student

Christian Movement of Canada, and The United Church of Canada—had no previous links with Pakistan. However, Oxfam of Canada, the most vocal critic of Canadian policy, did have a history of prior involvement. In addition, while nine groups¹¹ which were active in relief work in Pakistan before the civil war supported government policy, so did eleven other groups which had no such ties.¹² External structural links do not discriminate between those groups who supported and those who opposed government policy. They do not provide a sufficient explanation of the pattern of interest group activity.

A third explanation suggests that those interest groups that were financially independent of government funding would be more likely to criticize the substance of policy. The evidence permits only partial confirmation of this hypothesis. None of the four groups¹³ that opposed Canadian policy were dependent on government funding while four groups¹⁴ that supported the policy, obtained fifty percent of their funds from Ottawa. But sixteen groups which were not dependent on government funding in whole, or in part, nevertheless supported Canadian policy.¹⁵ Thus, while reliance on disbursements from government funds was correlated with support for government policy, independence did not necessarily lead to opposition to government policy. While dependence discriminated, independence did not.

Nor does the evidence offer much support for the fourth hypothesis that interest groups with no organizational links to other groups are more likely to take a critical position on a controversial issue than groups that participate in a tight network of interrelated memberships. Three groups—the Religious Society of Friends, the Student Christian Movement of Canada and The United Church of Canada—that were not members of the coalition did criticize the response of the Canadian government. Conversely, thirteen other groups who similarly did not participate in the combined relief effort supported Canadian policy.¹⁶ Contrary to the expected relationship, however, Oxfam of Canada, a constituent member of the appeal, actively sought to change Canadian policy. Membership within an institutional network does not provide a convincing explanation of the variation in interest group behaviour.

A final hypothesis suggested that the context of broadly-based public opinion would set the parameters of interest group activity. If public opinion and the media were broadly supportive of government policy, interest groups were much less likely to challenge government action. Such a correlation does appear to exist. Public opinion, as indexed by newspaper editorial opinion, displayed general approval of Canadian policy. Editorial criticism was limited to a demand that Canada use economic assistance as a lever to promote a political settlement. All the established interest groups, with the exception of four, supported Canadian policy. The criticism offered by three of the four dissenters paralleled that levelled by newspaper editorialists.

Although the two seem to be related, the explanation is not entirely convincing. Interest groups are not only constrained by public and editorial opinion; they are also capable of shaping it. The relationship is interactive as each can affect the other. Even though public comment was generally supportive, this support is not a sufficient explanation for the failure to try to mobilize, educate, or change its direction. A convincing explanation of the extraordinary passivity of church and voluntary agencies is unavailable in the scholarly literature.

The canvas of explanations by analysts of Canadian foreign policy produced a set of five related interpretations of interest group activity in the arena of foreign policy. Tested against the evidence of one case, they do not provide a convincing interpretation. Contrary to general expectation, the broad pattern of institutional interest group activity was passive and apolitical. The analyst of Canadian foreign policy is challenged not to trace the linkages between pressure group activity and a politicized foreign policy, but rather to explain the extraordinary reticence of Canadian interest groups in an age of mass involvement. To do so, available explanations must be refined and recast.

C. Alternative Explanations

Observers of interest group activity on issues of Canadian foreign policy first must examine additional cases to determine whether the pattern of passivity documented in this thesis is typical. The validity of these findings is modified by the earlier record of activism on Biafra. Given past practice and organizational experience, interest groups should have been prepared, efficient and effective in their response. Their inactivity is therefore all the more surprising. If this record of passivity is the norm rather than the exception, the analyst of Canadian foreign policy must explain the activism of the few and the passivity of the many.

The hypotheses examined in this thesis were rooted in the literature on Canadian foreign policy. But they do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the activism of the four established groups. Inclusion of additional structural variables might provide a more compelling explanation.

These factors would include the belief system of the group, the demographic composition of its membership, and the tenure of its leadership. While the two most critical institutional groups—the Religious Society of Friends and the Student Christian Movement of Canada—were classified as established groups, they are nonetheless different in certain important respects from the other church groups. The Quakers have a tradition of dissidence on issues of war; this tradition is a central component in their philosophical system. In

addition, they are smaller, more cohesive and more dedicated than most of the other established groups. Their strong commitment to a common ideology and a common set of practices has built considerable group solidarity. Their membership, imbued with the ideals of the movement, is responsive to a position that supports and reinforces an integral part of commonly-held beliefs. The Student Christian Movement of Canada does not have the same commitment to long-standing ideological positions. They are led, however, by an especially young group of officers. Both their age and their occupation—college students—differentiates their membership and their leadership from that of other established groups. Their leadership is also not as permanent: it is limited to the life-span of a student in college. The leadership, therefore, is less concerned with longer-range implications of the policy positions it takes. It also reflects the generally more activist and critical perspective of its student membership. Student organizations generally tend to be more critical of established policies than most of their parent institutions. Age, mobility, occupation and a critical milieu may explain the greater activism of certain interest groups. The younger and the smaller its membership, the shorter the tenure of its executive, the stronger its philosophical commitments the more likely that an interest group would oppose the government on a controversial foreign policy issue.

A second and major area of concern which arises from the evidence gathered in this thesis is an explanation for the passivity of the

vast majority of institutional groups. The thesis did attempt to examine one possible reason for this pervasive apathy—the role of the mass media in changing, unifying or marshalling public opinion.

However, while the thesis reviewed editorial attention to, and evaluation of, Canadian foreign policy vis à vis the civil war, it did not attempt a comparable examination of daily coverage either of the civil war or of Canadian policy. An absence of sustained and integrated news coverage is likely to make the task of editorialists and groups seeking to mobilize the public difficult, if not impossible.

Thus if the news media does not devote sufficient coverage to an issue, then the public would not consider the issue important enough to support attempts to modify government policy. This is likely to be the case even if editorialists do recommend such a course. The quality of Canadian news coverage may be an important component of the climate in which Canadian foreign policy is made.

Secondly, the concept of structural linkage to the government may need refinement if its power to explain is to improve. While the thesis did examine the dependence of the various groups on the Canadian government for relief funds during the civil war, the reliance of these groups on government subsidies for their general operations was not analyzed. This information was frequently unavailable. A more valid indicator of the willingness to support government policy might be the percentage of government subsidies financing their year-round programs. An examination of the tax exemptions on property and in-

come as well as the right to issue tax receipts for donations also should be evaluated, since each depends upon government good will. Voluntary agencies that were strongly critical might anticipate a withdrawal of government funding and their tax-exempt status. Thus the more a group is financially dependent upon the government, both directly and indirectly, the greater the likelihood that the group would support Canadian foreign policy. Financial vulnerability is not likely to permit critical comment and active opposition.

Thirdly, the examination of a group's structural linkages in the field may need refinement. While the thesis did examine the question of group ties to Pakistan, their broader ties and operations in the third world were not reviewed. Although activities in the theatre of conflict reflect one aspect of linkage, a more accurate indicator of vulnerability would be the extensiveness of their overseas operations and, in particular, the number of underdeveloped countries in which they operated programs at the time of the conflict. Groups actively engaged in development projects in a large number of countries would be less likely to risk jeopardizing these operations by directly supporting the secessionists in a civil war or by pressuring the Canadian government to do so. Such action is not welcomed by many governments of developing nations with fragile political orders and contested political boundaries. Open support of secessionist forces risks the enmity of governments throughout the third world. An examination of the importance of the group's activities in the third world,

in comparison with both their general activities and their stated purposes, should also be evaluated. Thus, the more extensive a group's ties to developing nations, the greater the likelihood it will refrain from criticism of government policy in a civil war in the third world.

A multivariable explanation of the passivity and activism of Canadian interest groups is needed. Groups financially linked to government, extensively engaged in overseas operations and led by older men with long tenure in office are likely to limit their activities and passively support official policy. Conversely, a group with a younger and more transitory leadership, financially independent, with strong ideological commitments, would be more likely to confront Canadian decision-makers on foreign policy issues. Thus, when the majority of groups are established, with an older membership, a long term executive and government financial ties, and when newspaper coverage of the international issue is minimal, then the sets of factors interact to permit enormous flexibility and decisional latitude for decision-makers in the conduct and management of Canadian foreign policy.

In conclusion, this thesis demonstrated that no single variable is sufficient to explain confrontation or passivity on a Canadian foreign policy question by major interest groups. In each case a mixture of variables contributes to the posture a groups adopts. To improve the quality of explanation, subtle distinctions among groups must be noted

and refined. A more sophisticated examination of structural linkages between interest groups and the government, as well as their ties to other countries in the region, is necessary. Finally, greater breadth as well as depth is important. More case studies of the response of similar types of groups over longer time periods are also essential. Moreover, in each case, it is especially important to establish precisely the response of the government so that the position of interest groups can be compared and assessed. Thus through extensive and intensive research, a better understanding may be developed of the underlying causes of the pattern of response of Canadian interest groups to Canadian foreign policy and, in particular, their tendency to renounce any active role in the foreign policy process.

Footnotes — Chapter VII

¹Latin epigram.

²The Vancouver Sun, September 26, 1971; The Province, October 2, 1971.

³Oxfam of Canada, Report, "The PR Dilemma at Oxfam," April, 1972, n.a.

⁴Baptist Federation of Canada; Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship; Canadian Council for International Co-operation; Canadian Save the Children Fund; Canadian University Service Overseas; CARE of Canada; Centre d'Etude et de Coopération Internationale; Operation Eyesight Universal; The Salvation Army; World Vision of Canada.

⁵Canadian University Service Overseas; Lutheran Church; Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; World University Service of Canada.

⁶Baptist Federation of Canada; Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship; Canadian Red Cross Society; Canadian Save the Children Fund; Canadian UNICEF Committee; CARE of Canada; Centre d'Etude et de Coopération Internationale; Lutheran Church; Operation Eyesight Universal; Oxfam of Canada; Religious Society of Friends; The Salvation Army; Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; World Vision of Canada.

⁷The Anglican Church of Canada; Canadian Council for International Co-operation; The Mennonites; Roman Catholic Church in Canada.

⁸Baptist Federation of Canada; Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship; Lutheran Church; The Salvation Army.

⁹The Anglican Church of Canada; The Canadian Council of Churches; The Presbyterian Church in Canada; Roman Catholic Church in Canada.

¹⁰The Canadian Council of Churches; Canadian Council for International Co-operation; Canadian Save the Children Fund; Canadian University Service Overseas; CARE of Canada; Unitarian Service Committee of Canada.

(Footnotes - Chap. VII)

¹¹Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship; Canadian Red Cross Society; Canadian UNICEF Committee; CARE of Canada; Centre d'Etude et de Coopération Internationale; The Mennonites; Operation Eyesight Universal; Roman Catholic Church in Canada; The Salvation Army.

¹²The Anglican Church of Canada; Baptist Federation of Canada; Canadian Council for International Co-operation; The Canadian Council of Churches; Canadian Save the Children Fund; Canadian University Service Overseas; Lutheran Church; The Presbyterian Church in Canada; Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; World University Service Overseas; World Vision of Canada.

¹³Oxfam of Canada; Religious Society of Friends; Student Christian Movement of Canada; The United Church of Canada.

¹⁴The Anglican Church of Canada; The Canadian Council of Churches; Canadian Red Cross Society; Roman Catholic Church in Canada.

¹⁵Baptist Federation of Canada; Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship; Canadian Council for International Co-operation; Canadian Save the Children Fund; Canadian UNICEF Committee; Canadian University Service Overseas; CARE of Canada; Centre d'Etude et de Coopération; Lutheran Church; The Mennonites; Operation Eyesight Universal; The Presbyterian Church in Canada; The Salvation Army; Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; World University; World Vision of Canada.

¹⁶The Anglican Church of Canada; Baptist Federation of Canada; Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship; Canadian Council for International Co-operation; Canadian University Service Overseas; Centre d'Etude et de Coopération Internationale; Lutheran Church; The Mennonites; Operation Eyesight Universal; The Presbyterian Church in Canada; The Salvation Army; Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; World University Service Overseas.

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* The Canadian India Times is a bimonthly ethnic newspaper whose subscribers were mainly Canadian citizens of Indian origin. The paper is published in Ottawa.

** The Pakistan Forum is a bimonthly ethnic magazine for "Pakistanis in the United States and Canada" (masthead). The magazine is published in Canada.